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Junior Ministers and Parliamentary Secretaries in the Australian Commonwealth Government

by

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A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy of
The Australian National University

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Statement

I certify that this thesis is my own original work. It contains no material which has been accepted for a degree or diploma by the University or any other institution. To the best of my knowledge it contains no material previously published or written by another person except where due acknowledgment has been made in the text of the thesis.

I certify that this thesis is less than 100,000 words in length.

Ian Beckett
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Abstract

The first aim of this thesis is to examine the work of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries in the Australian Commonwealth government between July 1987 and March 1996. This thesis sets out a new approach to conceptualising the jobs of political executives. It also sets out a new framework for examining the division of responsibility between senior ministers, junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries for different components of the workload of each portfolio. It applies this new framework to examine the work of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. It focuses on the division of responsibility for portfolio management and cabinet representation. It briefly examines the division of responsibility for parliamentary work and party interaction. It examines different approaches to the division of responsibility from the perspectives of senior ministers as well as those of both junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. It finally explores the roles of senior officials and ministerial advisers in managing the division of responsibility between teams of political executives within portfolios.

The second aim of this thesis is to examine the wider implications of the enlargement and restructuring of the Commonwealth political executive and the introduction of teams of political executives at the head of portfolios. It argues that the introduction of teams of political executives increased the complexity of political-bureaucratic relations at the portfolio level. It sets out a new framework for conceptualising interaction between political and bureaucratic executives. It examines the impact of the introduction of teams of political executives on different groups of senior officials. It focuses on two key issues. The first is their contribution to increased political control over portfolios. The second is their impact on coordination and priority-setting within portfolios. This thesis finally explores the implications of the enlargement and restructuring of the Commonwealth political executive for patronage and careers. It focuses on the impact of the changes on relationships between the prime minister, the parliamentary party and the political executive.
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Chapter 1

Introduction and Background

Introduction

This chapter is divided into three parts. The first part describes the composition of the Commonwealth executive branch. It first examines its constitutional foundations. It then discusses the conventions of responsible government which establish relationships between the formal components of the executive branch. It argues that the Commonwealth executive branch can be divided into political and bureaucratic components. Finally it examines three important extra-constitutional components of the political executive: the office of the prime minister and the cabinet system, “irregular” political executives and ministerial offices.

The second part of the chapter describes the introduction of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries as part of the 1987 machinery-of-government changes. It argues that these changes had important implications for the Commonwealth political executive. The number of ministers increased from 27 to 30. The ministry was divided into two tiers. Teams of ministers were appointed to head portfolios. Finally “irregular” political executives were reintroduced in the form of parliamentary secretaries.

The changes also had important implications for the bureaucratic executive and the cabinet system. The bureaucratic executive was restructured through departmental amalgamations and the introduction of a new portfolio structure consisting of 16 cabinet portfolios and two “sub-cabinet level” portfolios. The cabinet system was restructured through changes to cabinet committees and central agencies.

The third part of the chapter describes the objectives of the 1987 machinery-of-government changes. It argues that the restructuring of the bureaucratic executive was expected to produce savings as well as improve the coherence of policy development and program delivery. Departmental amalgamations were also expected to alter the relationship between
portfolios and the cabinet system. They aimed to reduce the need to cabinet to resolve overlaps between portfolios and to facilitate the introduction of devolutionary budget reforms. The enlargement and restructuring of the political executive was expected to increase political control over the new larger portfolios. It also aimed to enhance the flexibility of the prime minister to shape the functions of individual political executives without the need for disruptive changes to the departmental machinery-of-government. A final “unofficial” objective was to enhance the patronage available to the parliamentary party and the prime minister.

The Commonwealth Executive Branch

The first part of this chapter describes the composition of the Commonwealth executive branch. It sets out the constitutional foundations of the executive branch. It also briefly examines the conventions of responsible government. It finally describes the evolution of the cabinet system, Commonwealth experiments with “irregular” political executives and the enlargement and politicisation of ministerial offices.

Constitutional Foundations

The constitutional foundations of the Commonwealth executive branch are contained in Chapter II of the Australian Constitution. This establishes the Governor-General as the formal head of state. The ‘executive power of the Commonwealth’ is formally vested in the Governor-General as the ‘Queen’s representative’ (Section 61). It also establishes the Federal Executive Council to advise the Governor-General in the exercise of most gubernatorial powers (Sections 62 and 63). The Governor-General serves as President of the Federal Executive Council.

The Constitution empowers the Governor-General (on the advice of the Federal Executive Council) to create ‘departments of State of the Commonwealth’ (Section 64). The formal instrument used to create and abolish departments of state is the Order-in-Council. The Administrative Arrangements Order (AAO) sets out the major functions of each department and allocates responsibility for legislation between departments. The Constitution places no restrictions on the number of departments or the functions they perform (Van Munster 1975, Castleman 1992, 1993). The Commonwealth machinery-of-government initially
consisted of seven departments. The number of departments briefly totalled 37 under the Whitlam government but had decreased to 28 at the time of the 1987 machinery-of-government changes. There have also been substantial changes in the distribution of functions between departments since Federation (Castleman 1992, 1993).

Chapter II of the Constitution establishes the office of the ‘Queen’s Minister of State for the Commonwealth’. Section 64 empowers the Governor-General to appoint ministers ‘to administer such departments as the Governor-General in Council may establish’. It also states that ministers ‘shall be members of the Federal Executive Council’ and that they hold office ‘during the pleasure of the Governor-General’. Finally it requires ministers to occupy a seat in parliament or to gain a seat in parliament within three months of their initial appointment. Ministers are members of parliament appointed by the Governor-General to administer departments of state and advise the Governor-General as members of the Federal Executive Council.

The Constitution initially limited the number of ministers to seven (Section 65). However it allowed parliament to legislate to increase the maximum size of the ministry. Section 66 of the Constitution provided for ministers to be paid from a combined salary fund of up to ‘twelve thousand pounds a year’. Parliament was also permitted to legislate to increase the size of the ministerial salary fund. Since 1952 the total size of the ministry and ministerial salaries have been regulated by the Ministers of State Act. The number of ministers has grown steadily since Federation. The largest single expansion occurred in 1941 when the Menzies government increased the size of the ministry from 12 to 19. By 1987 the size of the ministry had reached 27. Finally the Constitution states that members of parliament who hold an ‘office of profit under the Crown’ are ‘incapable of being chosen or sitting as a senator or a member of the House of Representatives’ (Section 44). Parliamentarians who breach this provision forfeit their seats and become liable to financial penalties (Sections 45 and 46). However ministers of state are specifically excluded from these provisions (Section 44).

The interpretation of Section 64 of the Constitution has long been a topic of considerable controversy. It has always been assumed that a single minister of state can be appointed to administer two or more departments. However there has been doubt over whether two or more ministers could be appointed to jointly administer a single department or whether each department could only be administered by a single minister. This issue was most
famously examined in 1958 (at the time of the Morshead Committee’s inquiry into the organisation of the Defence-related departments) when the Menzies government sought expert legal opinions from the Solicitor-General, Sir Kenneth Bailey, as well as from Menzies QC and Barwick QC, on whether two ministers could simultaneously administer a single department (Griffith 1987, Weller 1987). Bailey and Menzies both maintained that Section 64 did not preclude the appointment of two or more ministers to head a single department. They argued that it did not require a minister to be the sole administrator of a department. Menzies QC argued that ‘to administer a department includes to take part in the administration of a department’ (Griffith 1987, p. 24). Multiple ministers could be appointed to head a single department provided the total size and salary of the ministry did not exceed the limits imposed by the Ministers of State Act (Griffith 1987, p. 24).

Sawer (1956) had earlier reached a similar conclusion. He argued that Section 64 did not require departments to be administered by a single minister. Just as it was possible for a single minister to administer two or more departments so too was it possible for a single department to be jointly administered by two or more ministers. Sawer suggested that the most important barriers to the joint administration of departments were practical rather than constitutional (Sawer 1956, p. 124).

Barwick QC was alone in advancing a contrary interpretation of Section 64. His opinion held that it was not possible for more than one minister to administer a department of state. Barwick argued that ‘in the nature of things . . . the office of administering a department is a single office’ and was ‘insusceptible of sub-division whether by joint occupancy or by way of the appointment of Assistant Ministers’. Barwick argued that the appointment of two or more ministers to administer a single department could render them liable to disqualification from parliament, forfeiture of their seats and financial penalties under the relevant sections of the Constitution (Griffith 1987, pp. 24-25).

The balance of legal opinion clearly upheld the validity of appointing two or more ministers to jointly administer a single department. However Barwick’s opinion was seized upon by prime minister Menzies who stated that it would be ‘unsafe, to say the least of it, to appoint a salaried assistant minister’ (CPD, HoR, 19 March 1958, p. 434). Barwick’s dissenting opinion appears to have had a profound influence over official interpretations of the meaning of Section 64. In 1974 Professor Enid Campbell concurred with Sawer that the Constitution did not require departments to be administered
exclusively by a single minister (Campbell 1976). However successive attorneys-general during the McMahon and Fraser governments provided only equivocal opinions on the constitutional validity of joint ministerial appointments. Hughes, Bowen and Durack were each unable to affirm the validity of the practice (or unwilling given Barwick's position as Chief Justice of the High Court) (Griffith 1987, p. 24). It was not until 1987 that a Commonwealth Solicitor-General was willing to offer and a Commonwealth government willing to accept an unequivocal opinion that Section 64 permitted the joint administration of departments by two or more ministers (Griffith 1987, pp. 25-27).

The interpretation of Section 64 of the Constitution as requiring ministers to each administer their own departments had two important implications. Firstly it established a nexus between the number of ministers and departments. The number of departments had to equal or exceed the total number of ministers. Secondly it meant that adjustments to the responsibilities of individual ministers necessitated disruptive changes to the allocation of functions between departments (Castleman 1992, pp. 24-25).

In the light of this controversy it is relevant to note that the Senate Standing Committee on Constitutional and Legal Affairs recommended in 1981 that the Constitution be amended to remove doubt about the constitutional validity of appointing ministers to jointly administer departments (SSCCLA 1981, pp. 71-73). Similar recommendations emerged from the report of the Constitutional Commission (Constitutional Commission 1988, pp. 327-329). There have been no changes to the formal provisions of Section 64. It now appears to be accepted that the wording of Section 64 permits the appointment of two or more ministers to administer a single department. The validity of this current interpretation has not been challenged.

**Conventions of Responsible Government**

The relationship between the formal components of the Commonwealth executive branch derives from the conventions of responsible government. The most important of these are the principles of individual and collective ministerial responsibility. In its simplest form the principle of individual ministerial responsibility holds that ministers must account to parliament for both their own conduct and the operations of their respective departments. By virtue of their accountability to parliament individual ministers have final executive authority over their respective departments. Departmental officials are accountable to the
relevant minister. This simple proposition inevitably masks considerable disagreement over the extent of ministerial responsibility for departmental operations and the extent of their accountability, particularly the circumstances under which they should resign their positions (eg Butler 1973, pp. 49-69, Parker 1980).

It is commonplace to distinguish between the political and bureaucratic components of the Commonwealth executive branch (eg Campbell and Halligan 1992a, Halligan and Power 1992). The political executive comprises ministers of state, “irregular” political executives and advisers in private ministerial offices. The bureaucratic executive consists of officials in the departments and agencies which together comprise ministerial portfolios.

The principle of collective ministerial responsibility holds that ministers must collectively account to parliament for the policies of the government to which they belong. This principle has important implications for the relationship between ministers. It requires that important matters relating to their individual departments must be submitted for collective approval. Collective ministerial deliberations are conducted on a confidential basis. Collective decisions are binding on individual ministers. Ministers are expected to present a united public front and support collective decisions (Codd 1990, pp. 1-4).

Finally the conventions of responsible government have significant implications for the relationship between the Governor-General and the ministry. Ministries are appointed on the basis of their capacity to command majority support in the House of Representatives. Ministries remain in office while they maintain the support of a majority in the House of Representatives. The executive powers of the Governor-General are exercised only on the collective advice of ministers. The Federal Executive Council is therefore simply a formal mechanism which gives effect to collective ministerial decisions.

**Extra-Constitutional Components of the Executive Branch**

The Constitution makes no mention of three important components of the Commonwealth executive branch: the prime minister and the cabinet, “irregular” political executives and ministerial offices. These three components are examined below.

**(a) The Prime Minister and the Cabinet.** Prime minister is an unofficial title given to the elected leader of a party which either alone or in coalition with other parties is able to
command majority support in the House of Representatives and is therefore commissioned by the Governor-General to form a ministry. The prime minister is therefore the head of government (as opposed to the head of state) and chair of cabinet. Prime ministers retain their position subject to the continued support of their respective parties and their capacity to maintain the support of the House of Representatives (Davis 1992).

Prime ministers have substantial influence over the structure of the Commonwealth executive branch. It has traditionally been one of the prerogatives of the prime minister to determine both the total number of departments and the allocation of functions between them. Prime ministers determine the functions of the departments and the composition of the portfolios to which ministers are each appointed (Castleman 1992, pp. 40-53). Non-Labor prime ministers have invariably selected and dismissed their own ministers. By contrast the ministers in Labor governments have usually been elected by the parliamentary party. Both Labor and non-Labor prime ministers determine the allocation of ministers to particular portfolios (Weller 1990a, pp. 40-41).

As chairs of cabinet prime ministers have considerable discretion over the design of the cabinet system. Prime ministers may divide their ministries into cabinet and outer ministers and decide the membership of cabinet committees (especially powerful “inner” committees and committees responsible for coordinating the annual budget process). Prime ministers can determine cabinet’s agenda and steer issues through the cabinet system. Finally prime ministers exert a powerful influence over the conduct of cabinet meetings. Briefings prepared by their own departments can constitute an additional important prime ministerial resource (Weller 1985a, pp. 135-165, 1992, pp. 14-17).

The cabinet is simply a committee of ministers which deliberates to determine a collective ministerial position on issues brought before it. Cabinet performs two sets of functions: authorisation and coordination (Page 1989, pp. 87-88). The authorisation function includes endorsing routine business and monitoring the work of individual ministers and departmental officials (Weller 1990a, p. 33). It includes ensuring that individual ministers and portfolios ‘are not making unilateral decisions without government consideration’ (Davis 1994a, p. 48). The coordination function can range from acting as a ministerial ‘information exchange’ to resolving disagreements between ministers and portfolios (Weller 1990a, p. 33). One of the most important aspects of this function involves the
development of budget strategies and the establishment of expenditure priorities between portfolios in the context of the budget process (Page 1989, p. 87, Davis 1994a, p. 48).

The Commonwealth cabinet has developed substantially from its origins as an informal committee of ministers. It is now more commonplace to refer to the cabinet system. Four sets of developments have been particularly significant. The first has been the division of the ministry into cabinet and non-cabinet (or outer) ministers. Prior to 1956 all ministers were appointed as members of cabinet. In 1956 the Menzies ministry was divided into cabinet and non-cabinet ministers (Weller 1992, p. 16). Non-cabinet ministers were co-opted to cabinet only for the business of their portfolios. They were otherwise excluded from its deliberations. The practice of distinguishing between cabinet and non-cabinet ministers was abandoned under the Whitlam government. The ministry was once again synonymous with the cabinet (Lloyd and Reid 1974, pp. 32-55). However the distinction was reinstated by the subsequent Fraser government and in a significant departure from past Labor practice retained by the Hawke government (Weller 1983, pp. 309-312). The distinction between the ministry and cabinet meant that non-cabinet ministers remained collectively responsible for cabinet decisions when they had not participated in relevant deliberations. The period of the Hawke government was noteworthy for its redefinition of the principle of collective ministerial responsibility to take account of the distinction between cabinet and outer ministers. Both cabinet and outer ministers were expected to give public support to collective cabinet decisions. However outer ministers were not prevented from opposing cabinet decisions in parliamentary party meetings provided they had not attended the relevant cabinet meeting (Weller 1985b).

A second development has been the emergence of elaborate cabinet committee systems. Cabinet has become only one of several committees which together comprise the cabinet system. The establishment of cabinet committees at the Commonwealth level has been traced to the period before the First World War (Crisp 1983, p. 375). However their systematic use is more recent in origin. The widespread use of cabinet committees has been particularly important since the advent of the Whitlam government (Hawker, Smith and Weller 1979, pp. 50-103, Weller 1985c, 1992, pp. 11-14).

Cabinet committees can be divided into four categories. The first consists of policy development committees. These are usually established in response to particular policy problems and often have a relatively short-lived existence. The second category comprises
functional policy committees. Networks of these committees have often been established to filter issues relating to particular policy areas in order to reduce the burden on the full cabinet. The third category consists of coordinating committees. These have commonly dealt with two types of business: parliamentary business and the budget process. Weller (1992, p. 12) described the Expenditure Review Committee (ERC) established by the Whitlam government to scrutinise budget submissions prior to the 1975 budget as ‘the most lasting legacy of the Whitlam government to cabinet procedures’. Weller stated that ‘in one form or other it has been re-established consistently since’ (1992, p. 12). The fourth category consists of committees established to deal with particular types of business regardless of its functional origins. Powerful “inner” committees have been created to deal with politically sensitive issues. Committees have also been created to deal with the more mundane aspects of cabinet’s authorisation function such as the approval of proposed statutory appointments (Codd 1990, p. 6).

A third development has been the development of detailed procedures which regulate both the content of cabinet business and its progress through the committee system (see PM&C 1984). These are set down in the Cabinet Handbook. Successive editions of the Cabinet Handbook have described increasingly detailed rules governing the preparation and format of cabinet submissions, prior consultation processes, the listing of cabinet business and the circulation of cabinet documents and decisions. Specific provisions govern the work of the Expenditure Review Committee and the annual budget process. This development has been described as ‘the bureaucratisation of cabinet procedures’ (Weller 1992, p. 8).

A fourth development has been the evolution of departments with specific responsibility for managing the operation of the cabinet system. These are known as central agencies. The most important of these is the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. This department is responsible for the implementation of the detailed procedures which regulate the content of cabinet business as well as its progress through the cabinet system. It has also developed a policy capacity which covers most areas of Commonwealth government activity (e.g. Crisp 1967, Mediansky and Nockels 1975, 1981, Yeend 1979, Walter 1992). The Department of Finance is the other key central agency. It was split from the Treasury in 1976 (Weller 1977). The Department of Finance plays a central role alongside the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet in the management of the budget process (Keating 1990, Campbell and Halligan 1992a, pp. 48-49, 136-144). The cabinet system therefore comprises both political and bureaucratic components.
(b) "Irregular" Political Executives. Commonwealth governments have not consisted exclusively of ministers of state. They have often included "irregular" political executives. These were appointed by every Commonwealth government during the period between 1901 and 1941. They were appointed under a wide range of different titles. The most common titles were "honorary minister", "minister without portfolio" or "assistant minister". The first Commonwealth government consisted of two "irregulars" and seven ministers. By 1941, when the appointment of "irregulars" temporarily ceased following an increase in the size of the ministry to 19, the Commonwealth government consisted of four "irregulars" and 12 ministers (Hasluck 1952, p. 368).

The constitutional status of "irregulars" was ambiguous. They were not ministers of state and were not formally appointed to administer departments. However they were usually appointed as members of the Federal Executive Council. While the Constitution limited the maximum size of the ministry it placed no limitations on the appointment of executive councillors. In 1918 amendments to the Acts Interpretation Act extended the definition of the term "minister" for the purposes of Commonwealth legislation to include executive councillors (rather than just ministers of state). This more expansive definition enabled "irregulars" to exercise most of the statutory powers of their ministerial counterparts.

"Irregulars" could not be directly paid for their services because they were not appointed as ministers of state. Direct receipt of a ministerial salary would have rendered them liable to disqualification from parliament (as well as the loss of their seats and possible financial penalties) for occupying an 'office of profit under the Crown' (Section 44). However successive Commonwealth governments adopted various techniques to circumvent this constitutional prohibition on the direct payment of "irregulars". These measures were first introduced by the Barton government in response to the financial hardship suffered by Senator O'Connor, who served in an "irregular" capacity as Leader of the Government in the Senate. A system of voluntary deductions was instituted in which the seven ministers of state funded the payment of an additional salary to O'Connor as well as an allowance for the government whips (La Nauze 1965, pp. 254-255). Similar arrangements were apparently adopted by later commonwealth governments. Encel cited correspondence between the Prime Minister Bruce and the South Australian Premier in response to an inquiry concerning the remuneration paid to honorary ministers (1962: 267). The prime minister replied:
Honorary ministers do not draw any emolument under the Ministers of State Act, but an amount is paid to them - varying with the circumstances of each particular case - out of the salaries paid to ministers with portfolio. This latter amount is represented by a lump sum specially provided by the Act, and which is allocated in accordance with the wishes of each Administration.

The indirect payment of “irregulars” gradually became standardised. Payment had initially made on an ad hoc basis depending on the workload and financial circumstances of the individuals concerned. By 1941 “irregulars” were each paid a standard annual salary from funds allocated for the payment of ministers. Accordingly when Menzies increased the size of the ministry from 12 to 19 he stated that not all ministers of state would receive the same annual salary. 12 ministers were to receive full ministerial salaries. Menzies stated that the remaining seven would ‘be remunerated on the basis on which assistant ministers are now remunerated’ (CPD, Vol 167, 24 June 1941, p. 323).

There have been no systematic studies of the work of the “irregular” political executives appointed by Commonwealth governments between 1901 and 1941. As a consequence it is only possible to gain a general picture of their activities by piecing together information from a range of sources. These sources stress similarities between the work performed by “irregulars” and that of their ministerial colleagues. Most importantly “irregulars” were each appointed to cabinet alongside ministers. They were included in the membership of both of the inner wartime cabinet committees created by the Menzies government (Hasluck 1952, pp. 425, 428).

“Irregulars” often acquired extensive parliamentary responsibilities. This was partly a consequence of the small size of early Commonwealth ministries and the location of most ministers in the House of Representatives. This placed a particularly onerous burden on the small number of Senate ministers who were required to oversee the passage of the government’s entire legislative program through the upper chamber as well as represent the portfolios of their lower house colleagues. It was partly to overcome this problem that governing party senators were often appointed as “irregulars”. Their appointment also allowed prime ministers to accommodate persistent Senate demands for greater ministerial representation. “Irregulars” were regarded as backbenchers for the purposes of determining parliamentary salaries and received salary increases which were withheld from ministers of state. In other respects they were accorded the same parliamentary status as ministers. They were permitted to introduce legislation on behalf of the ministry as well as to answer parliamentary questions.
It was common for early Commonwealth governments to appoint their leader in the Senate to the “irregular” position of Vice-President of the Executive Council. Governments were able to confer quasi-ministerial status on Senate leaders without burdening them with the administration of departments. These Vice-Presidents of the Executive Council often had overall responsibility for the management of government business in the Senate. Early Commonwealth governments were often represented in the Senate by one minister and two “irregulars”. Together they shared the burden of steering government bills through the Senate and responding to questions relating to the portfolio responsibilities of their House of Representatives colleagues. The parliamentary duties of “irregulars” in the House of Representatives appear to have been far less onerous than their counterparts in the Senate. This was because most ministers were based in the House of Representatives. However they represented the portfolios of Senate ministers and sometimes assisted lower house ministers with their parliamentary work.

“Irregulars” were not confined to cabinet and parliamentary work. They were also involved in the administration of portfolios. They acted on behalf of their ministerial colleagues in the event of prolonged illness or absence overseas. They were also often delegated responsibility for specific projects or particular functions within the portfolios of their ministerial colleagues.

“Irregulars” were often appointed to assist prime ministers. This was a consequence of the size of prime ministerial workloads as well as their extensive portfolio responsibilities. Several “irregulars” were appointed to assist prime minister Bruce. One “irregular”, Sir William Howse, served as cabinet secretary and supervised the establishment of a cabinet office within the Prime Minister’s Department in 1927 (Cumpston 1989, p. 55). Howse also assisted prime minister Bruce in his capacity as Minister for External Affairs. Bruce gave instructions that Howse would do his work if he was unable to complete it himself (Cumpston 1989, p. 76). A second “irregular” of this period described his work in the following terms: ‘I became a sort of off-sider to the Prime Minister, taking the work of any minister who was either ill or absent’ (McLachlan 1948, p. 130). Two “irregulars” later assisted prime minister Lyons in his capacities and prime minister and treasurer. One of these was R. G. Casey. His biographer has argued that Casey had almost complete discretion over the day-to-day administration of the Treasury (Hudson 1986, p. 89).
As previously noted, “irregulars” were first appointed to generic titles such as “honorary minister”, “minister without portfolio” or “assistant minister”. However during the period of the Lyons government the titles bestowed upon irregulars began to reflect their specific functional responsibilities. “Irregulars” were given titles such as Assistant Treasurer or Minister without portfolio assisting the Minister for Commerce.

There continued to be sporadic experiments with the use of “irregulars” during the period between 1941 and 1987. The Menzies government appointed three parliamentary under-secretaries in 1950. A fourth was added in 1952. Similar positions had previously been established under both the Hughes and Lyons governments. Between 1921 and 1923 the Hughes government included a Parliamentary Under-Secretary for External Affairs. The Lyons government appointed a Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Employment in 1934. In 1938 two more parliamentary under-secretaries were briefly appointed, one for Defence and one for the Treasury (Crisp 1973, p. 386). Parliamentary under-secretaries were re-titled parliamentary secretaries in 1956. The positions were abolished in 1961. In April 1971 the McMahon government announced the appointment of six assistant ministers to assist senior cabinet ministers. However these positions were immediately abolished by the incoming Whitlam government in 1972. Finally in 1980 the Fraser government announced its intention to appoint two parliamentary secretaries. Three were eventually appointed to assist the prime minister, deputy prime minister and treasurer. Following the pattern established by Whitlam’s abolition of the McMahon government’s assistant minister position, the Fraser government’s parliamentary secretory positions were not retained by the incoming Hawke government.

There were several important differences between the “irregulars” appointed between 1941 and 1987 and their pre-1941 counterparts. They were not usually appointed to the Federal Executive Council. (The assistant ministers appointed by the McMahon government were the only exceptions.) The indirect payment of “irregulars” from the ministerial salary pool was also abandoned after 1941. Instead they were compensated only for out of pocket expenses incurred in the course of their official duties. It is relevant to note that Sawer argued that “irregulars” could probably be paid an official salary if they were appointed by individual ministers and confined themselves to parliamentary duties. Sawer argued that these positions could then be seen as parliamentary offices rather than offices under the Crown (1956, p. 127, see also Campbell 1976).
There were also important differences in the work of the “irregulars” appointed between 1941 and 1987. They were not appointed as members of cabinet or cabinet committees. Similar restrictions had applied to the parliamentary under-secretaries appointed under the Hughes and Lyons governments, although Lyons’ Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Employment could apparently attend cabinet ‘when unemployment was being discussed’ (Crisp 1973, p. 386). They also had a much more limited parliamentary role. Menzies had hoped that parliamentary secretaries could assist their ministerial colleagues as bills passed through their committee stage (CPD, Vol 218, 27 August 1952, pp. 618-621). However this proved impossible following the refusal of speaker Cameron to recognise the position. McMahon similarly expected that assistant ministers would be able to relieve ministers of certain aspects of their parliamentary work. In particular it was proposed that assistant ministers be able to take the chair as bills passed through their committee stage thereby relieving senior ministers of the need to remain in the parliamentary chamber for long periods of time (CAPD, HoR, Vol 72, 29 April 1971, p. 2244).

The main role of the “irregulars” appointed between 1941 and 1987 was to assist ministers with the administration of their portfolios. Menzies listed the duties of parliamentary under-secretaries as: ‘under the direction of his Minister, to make inquiries, to conduct correspondence when authorised to do so and from time to time, to receive deputations on behalf of his Minister’ (CPD, Vol 218, 27 August 1952, p. 618). McMahon listed the duties of assistant ministers as ‘conducting correspondence and making inquiries’ as well as ‘receiving deputations on behalf of the Minister’ (CAPD, HoR, Vol 72, 29 April 1971, p. 2244). Finally the Fraser government’s parliamentary secretaries were to undertake:

A range of duties including assistance with correspondence and other papers, liaison with other members of parliament, and meetings with delegations and clients of the department and authorities, and other representational activities (CAPD, HoR, Vol 120, 26 November 1980, p. 81).

Finally it is important to emphasise that ministers in postwar Commonwealth governments have not just received assistance from “irregulars”. It was also increasingly common for ministers to receive assistance from other ministers. This was done through the informal appointment of “ministers assisting”. This practice was an extension of the longstanding arrangement under which ministers could introduce bills and answer parliamentary questions on behalf of absent colleagues or ministers in the other chamber. Ministers were designated to assist senior cabinet colleagues with the administration of their portfolios. The appointment of “ministers assisting” began under the Menzies government following
the abolition of parliamentary secretaries in 1961. This practice has become increasingly common since the period of the Whitlam government (see Weller 1980, pp. 601).

(c) Ministerial Offices. Ministerial offices constitute the non-elective component of the Commonwealth political executive. This can be distinguished from the elective component which consists of ministers and “irregular” political executives. Ministerial offices have a long pedigree. However for much of their history they tended to be small. In the 1960s most consisted of a ‘private secretary’, as well as ‘a press secretary and a few clerical assistants and typists/secretaries’ (Woodward 1993, p. 112). They were staffed by relatively junior officials. They provided ministers with basic administrative support and performed departmental liaison functions (Walter 1986, pp. 51-52). While formally a part of the political executive these offices can be more accurately conceptualised as simply extensions of the bureaucratic executive.

During the period of the Whitlam government ministerial offices underwent a substantial transformation. The size of ministerial offices increased substantially. This expansion occurred at senior levels within offices. It was most clearly evident in prime ministerial offices (Walter 1992, pp. 43-60). Under the Whitlam government the number of ministerial staff increased from 155 to 219 (Woodward 1993, pp. 113). The composition of ministerial offices also changed. The senior ranks of offices were no longer dominated by departmental officials. Although ministerial offices still included departmental liaison officers they were increasingly dominated by partisan appointees recruited on the basis of personal loyalty to the minister. By 1975 officials accounted for ‘just over 40 per cent’ of all ministerial staff (Woodward 1993, p. 113). The period of the Whitlam government was therefore characterised by the enlargement and politicisation of ministerial offices.

The enlargement and politicisation of ministerial offices was a substantial departure from past Commonwealth practice. However the changes were continued by the subsequent Fraser and Hawke governments. The Hawke government also created a new category of adviser: the ministerial consultant. These were to work in departments rather than being confined to ministerial offices. They were expected to enable ‘larger numbers of politically committed people’ to play a more extensive role in ‘the development and implementation of policy’ (RAPS 1983, pp. 23-25, see also Dawkins 1984, pp. 6-7). However Halligan has argued that consultants were not particularly numerous or important in comparison with staffers based in ministerial offices (1988, pp. 45-48). By 1992 the
total number of ministerial advisers had increased to 356. Most offices contained ‘a staff of around 10-13’ (Woodward 1993, p. 114).

A substantial literature has emerged on the work of ministerial offices since the period of the Whitlam government (Anthony 1975, Briot and Lloyd 1975, Forward 1975, 1977, Hawker 1975, Smith 1976a, 1977, Walter 1986, 1989, 1992, White 1988, Woodward 1993, Ryan 1994, Dunn 1995, Waterford 1997). This literature argues that ministerial offices performed three important roles. The first consisted of the provision of personal support to ministers and general office administration. The second consisted of managing interaction between ministers and officials in their portfolios. Dunn (1995, pp. 509-512) has divided this role into three components: ‘evaluation of departmental work’, ‘directing the department’ and ‘facilitating department-minister interaction’. The third role of ministerial offices consists of managing relationships between ministers and other actors in the wider environment within which they operate. Dunn has described one aspect of this third role as ‘brokering policy positions’ between ministers (1995, p. 514). It has been argued that networks between ministerial offices have emerged as a significant adjunct to the cabinet system (see Davis 1995, pp. 48-54). A second aspect of this wider role consists of interaction with party colleagues and outside interest groups. This has been described as ‘managing networks of political interaction’ (Halligan and Power 1992, p. 83).

The expansion and politicisation of ministerial offices has significantly altered the terrain of the Commonwealth executive branch. Ministerial offices have become important actors in their own right. The transformation of ministerial offices has ‘promoted the emergence of the “group enterprise” (rather than the minister alone) as the basic unit on the “political” side of the decision-making equation’ (Walter 1986, p. 58).

**The 1987 Machinery-of-Government Changes**

The first part of this chapter has described the main components of the Commonwealth executive branch. This second part outlines the 1987 machinery-of-government changes. It describes their impact on the political executive as well as the bureaucratic executive and the cabinet system.
Restructuring the Political Executive

The 1987 machinery-of-government changes had several important implications for the Commonwealth political executive. The size of the ministry grew from 27 to 30. This change occurred on 18 September 1987 following the passage of necessary amendments to the Minister of State Act. The ministry was reshaped into a ‘two-level ministerial structure’ consisting of portfolio and non-portfolio ministers (CAPD, HoR, 15 September 1987, p. 43). Following its enlargement the ministry consisted of 16 portfolio ministers and 14 non-portfolio ministers. Teams of ministers were appointed to administer a single department. Some departments were still administered exclusively by a single minister. Many were headed by teams of two or occasionally three ministers. Each department was headed by a different portfolio minister. Non-portfolio ministers worked in departments alongside their senior colleagues.

Portfolio and non-portfolio ministers had identical constitutional status. They were both formally appointed to administer an entire department and its complement of legislation. Portfolio and non-portfolio ministers were each allocated specific responsibilities within their portfolios. The prime minister’s initial statement announcing the changes appeared to leave open the possibility that non-portfolio ministers might simply assist their senior colleagues on an open-ended basis throughout their portfolios. The role of non-portfolio ministers was described as being ‘responsible for specific parts of a cabinet minister’s portfolio, or assisting across a range of functions’ (Hawke 1987a). It was subsequently stated that non-portfolio ministers would each have ‘specific responsibilities allocated to them’. They were also able to bring forward cabinet submissions ‘related to their specific areas of responsibility’ within each portfolio. Finally non-portfolio ministers were to have ‘a clear accountability to parliament for their responsibilities, including answering questions and developing and steering through legislation’ (Hawke 1987b, 1987c).

Portfolio ministers had additional distinctive roles under the new arrangements. Most importantly they were also expected to assume ‘overall responsibility’ for the operations of their portfolios (Hawke 1987a). In particular each portfolio minister was expected to ‘focus on the strategic direction’ of their respective portfolios and their ‘contribution to government priorities’ (Hawke 1987b). They were also empowered to resolve internal disputes within their respective portfolios (Hawke 1987a). This was reflected in formal powers retained by portfolio ministers. Portfolio ministers had formal responsibility for
coordination and priority-setting across their respective portfolios. Most importantly they retained formal control over the portfolio budget process. This enabled senior ministers to determine expenditure priorities throughout their portfolios (including the responsibilities of their junior colleagues).

Non-portfolio ministers also had distinctive roles under the new arrangements. In addition to working in their own functional areas, they were to assist their senior colleagues by ‘releasing them from some detailed administrative work’ in their portfolios (Hawke 1987c, pp. 43-44). The prime minister emphasised that non-portfolio ministers had ‘a special role to play’ in relieving their colleagues of ‘significant elements of their parliamentary duty and of their general duties in the areas of correspondence, client and intergovernmental discussions and representational duties’ (Codd 1988, p. 27).

The distinctive roles of portfolio and non-portfolio ministers were reflected in the official titles to which they were appointed. The titles of the 16 portfolio ministers corresponded to the titles of their respective portfolios. By contrast, non-portfolio ministers were given specialist titles which reflected their limited functional responsibilities.

The final change was the reintroduction of “irregular” political executives in the form of parliamentary secretaries. The Hawke government initially appointed three parliamentary secretaries pending the passage of legislative amendments necessary to expand the size of the ministry. These positions were abolished following the passage of these amendments. However they were reintroduced yet again after the 1990 Commonwealth elections.

During the rest of the period under review there were two further important changes to the structure of the Commonwealth political executive. The first related to the structure of the ministry. Under the Hawke government each minister was appointed to a single cabinet portfolio. Hawke also maintained a clear distinction between portfolio and non-portfolio ministers. Under the Keating government ministers were simultaneously appointed to administer two or even three different portfolios. Keating also blurred the distinction between portfolio and non-portfolio ministers with the appointment of “hybrid” ministers. These “hybrids” administered one portfolio as a portfolio minister and participated in the administration of a second portfolio as a non-portfolio minister. Keating also began the practice of appointing two cabinet ministers as the joint heads of a single cabinet portfolio. Under the Hawke government each cabinet portfolio had been headed by a single portfolio
minister. Two cabinet portfolios were headed by dual cabinet ministers under the Keating government (Foreign Affairs and Trade and Health, Housing, Local Government and Community Services).

In 1993 the Keating government dispensed with the distinction between portfolio and non-portfolio ministers. The ministry was simply divided into cabinet and non-cabinet ministers. The number of cabinet ministers varied between 19 and 17 while the number of non-cabinet ministers fluctuated between 11 and 13. The abolition of the distinction between portfolio and non-portfolio ministers had no effect on the basic division of responsibilities within ministerial teams at the head of portfolios. Cabinet and non-cabinet ministers continued to be allocated specific functional responsibilities. Cabinet ministers retained formal responsibility for coordination and priority-setting across their portfolios. This responsibility was shared by co-equal cabinet ministers.

This thesis simply refers to senior and junior ministers. The term senior minister refers to both portfolio ministers between 1987 and 1993 and cabinet ministers between 1993 and 1996. The term junior minister refers to both non-portfolio ministers between 1987 and 1993 (including the handful appointed to cabinet) and non-cabinet ministers between 1993 and 1996. The terms senior and junior ministers are used throughout the remainder of this thesis.

There were also regular changes in the size and composition of ministerial teams at the head of portfolios during the period under review. Ministerial positions were shifted from one portfolio to another. There were also often changes in the functional responsibilities of junior ministers within portfolios. These changes were sometimes reflected in titles to which junior ministers were appointed. Table 1.1 lists cabinet portfolios which were formally headed by more than one minister during the period under review. It shows changes in the total number of ministers at the head of these cabinet portfolios (including junior ministers heading "sub-cabinet level" portfolios). It also lists the different titles under which junior ministers served in each of these cabinet portfolios during the period under review.

The second important development to take place during the remainder of the period under review was the second reintroduction of parliamentary secretaries. As previously noted, the Hawke government had briefly appointed three parliamentary secretaries for two
months in 1987. In April 1990 it established four new parliamentary secretary positions. In December 1991 the Keating government doubled the number of parliamentary secretaries from four to eight. Two further positions were added in 1993. This increased the total number of parliamentary secretaries to 10. It also increased to 40 the size of the elective component of the Commonwealth political executive.

Table 1.1


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cabinet Portfolio</th>
<th>Official Titles of Junior Minister(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Services</td>
<td>Minister for Home Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1-2 Ministers)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attorney-General's</td>
<td>Minister for Consumer Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2-3 Ministers)</td>
<td>Minister for Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minister for Justice and Consumer Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arts, Sport, the Environment, Tourism and Territories*</td>
<td>Minister for Sport and Territories</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1-2 Ministers)</td>
<td>Minister for the Arts and Territories</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minister for the Arts, Tourism and Territories</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minister for the Environment and the Arts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Services and Health*</td>
<td>Minister for Aboriginal Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3-4 Ministers)</td>
<td>Minister for Aged Family and Health Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minister for Family Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minister for Housing and Aged Care</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minister for Veterans' Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Defence</td>
<td>Minister for Defence Science and Personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2-3 Ministers)</td>
<td>Minister for Veterans’ Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment, Education and Training</td>
<td>Minister for Aboriginal Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2-3 Ministers)</td>
<td>Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minister for Employment and Education Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minister for Higher Education and Employment Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minister for Employment Services and Youth Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minister for Schools, Vocational Education and Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance</td>
<td>Minister for Administrative Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1-2 Ministers)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Affairs and Trade</td>
<td>Minister for Development Co-operation and Pacific Island Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2-3 Ministers)</td>
<td>Minister for Trade and Overseas Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minister for Trade Negotiations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs*</td>
<td>Minister for Local Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1-2 Ministers)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Ministry/Portfolio</td>
<td>Minister/Role</td>
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<td>-------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry, Technology and Commerce* (2-3 Ministers)</td>
<td>Minister for Science and Small Business</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Minister for Science, Customs and Small Business</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minister for Science and Technology</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Minister for Small Business and Customs</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minister for Small Business, Construction and Customs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minister for Small Business, Customs and Construction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial Relations (1-2 Ministers)</td>
<td>Assistant Minister for Industrial Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Industries and Energy (2 Ministers)</td>
<td>Minister for Resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prime Minister and Cabinet (1-3 Ministers)</td>
<td>Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Special Minister of State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Security (1-2 Ministers)</td>
<td>Minister for Family Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport and Communications* (2-3 Ministers)</td>
<td>Minister for Communications</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minister for Land Transport</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Minister for Land Transport and Infrastructure Support</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Support</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Minister for Land Transport and Shipping Support</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Minister for Shipping</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minister for Shipping and Aviation</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minister for Shipping and Aviation Support</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minister for Telecommunications and Aviation Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minister for Transport and Communications Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treasury (1-3 Ministers)</td>
<td>Assistant Treasurer</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Special Minister of State</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cabinet portfolios are listed using the titles in place when junior ministers were first appointed to the portfolio. Cabinet portfolios marked with an asterisk have undergone at least one name change.

The titles of junior ministers are listed in alphabetical order.

Parliamentary secretaries are chosen by the prime minister. The prime minister also appoints them to particular portfolios. A few have been allocated to two portfolios. Table 1.2 illustrates the spread of parliamentary secretaries across different cabinet portfolios between 1990 and 1996. (It excludes the three parliamentary secretaries briefly appointed in 1987.) Parliamentary secretaries were appointed as members of the Federal Executive Council (in common with most pre-1941 “irregulars” and the assistant ministers appointed by the McMahon government). They were not paid additional ministerial salaries and were compensated only for expenses incurred in the course of their duties. Parliamentary secretaries were also allocated functional responsibilities in their respective portfolios.
These were explicitly delegated from the relevant senior minister. They were usually set down in a letter to the parliamentary secretary from the senior minister.

Table 1.2

The Distribution of Parliamentary Secretaries (1990-1996)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arts and Administrative Services*</td>
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<td></td>
<td>0-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attorney-General's</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defence</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment, Education and Training</td>
<td>0-1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment, Sport and Territories</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Affairs and Trade</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health, Housing and Community Services*</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing and Regional Development</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry, Technology and Regional Development*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Industries and Energy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prime Minister and Cabinet</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Security</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport and Communications*</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0-1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treasury</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cabinet portfolios are listed using the titles in place when parliamentary secretaries were first appointed to the portfolio. Cabinet portfolios marked with an asterisk have undergone at least one name change.

Restructuring the Bureaucratic Executive and Cabinet System

The restructuring of the bureaucratic executive consisted of two components. The first consisted of a reduction in the total number of departments from 28 to 18. This was achieved through extensive departmental amalgamations. 16 departments were abolished. Six new departments were created. Three other departments were renamed. Nine departments continued under their existing titles although only four of these escaped the changes completely unscathed (Castleman 1995, pp. 31-34).
The second component of the restructuring of the bureaucratic executive was the introduction of a new portfolio structure consisting of 16 cabinet portfolios and two “sub-cabinet level” portfolios (Aboriginal Affairs and Veterans’ Affairs). These two “sub-cabinet level” portfolios were attached as “outriders” to various cabinet portfolios (initially Community Services and Health). Cabinet portfolios were each represented in cabinet by the relevant senior minister. “Sub-cabinet level” portfolios were represented in cabinet by the senior minister from the cabinet portfolio to which they were attached. This meant that for the first time since 1956 (with the exception of the period of the Whitlam government) all portfolios had their own permanent cabinet representative.

The structure of the bureaucratic executive underwent further during the period under review. The total number of departments increased from 18 to 20. One department was abolished (although Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs retained the status of a “sub-cabinet level” portfolio). Three new departments were created (Communications, Tourism and Housing and Regional Development). The total number of cabinet portfolios increased from 16 to 18. The three new departments were each established as cabinet portfolios. Administrative Services was relegated to the status of a “sub-cabinet level” portfolio in April 1994 (Castleman 1995, pp. 11-12, 35-36).

There were also changes in the allocation of functions between different cabinet portfolios. Three were renamed after changes in their functions. Three others were renamed twice. One cabinet portfolio underwent three separate name changes. Finally “sub-cabinet level” portfolios were also shifted between different cabinet portfolios. Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs moved from Community Services and Health to Employment, Education and Training and thence to Prime Minister and Cabinet. Veterans’ Affairs moved from Human Services and Health (as Community Services and Health was then known) to Defence (Castleman 1995, pp. 12-13, 36-37).

The restructuring of the cabinet system involved changes to the structure of cabinet committees. The comprehensive system of functional committees was largely abolished (although the separate Security committee was retained). In its place were established three ‘policy development committees’: Structural Adjustment, Social and Family Policy and Public Service Reform (Codd 1988, p. 26). A new General Administrative committee was established to deal with routine housekeeping business related to cabinet’s
authorisation role. The three coordinating committees (Expenditure Review, Legislation and Parliamentary Business) were unchanged (Codd 1988, p. 26, Weller 1990b, p. 22).

There were also further changes to the structure of the cabinet system during the period between 1987 and 1996. A fourth coordination committee was added through the establishment of the Revenue committee. The General Administrative committee was abolished. A new General Policy committee was later established (albeit with a much narrower membership). The three new ‘policy development committees’ also underwent significant change. The Public Service Reform committee was abolished. The Structural Adjustment committee was renamed Structural Adjustment and Trade. Social and Family Policy was renamed Social Justice and subsequently Social Policy.

Objectives of the 1987 Machinery-of-Government Changes

The second part of this chapter described the 1987 machinery-of-government changes. It distinguished between the restructuring of the political executive and the restructuring of the bureaucratic executive and cabinet system. The third part of this chapter examines the objectives of the 1987 machinery-of-government changes. It distinguishes between the goals of the restructuring of the bureaucratic executive and the cabinet system and the aims of the restructuring of the political executive.

Objectives of the Restructuring of the Bureaucratic Executive and the Cabinet System

The restructuring of the bureaucratic executive involved the creation of a smaller number of larger departments and the introduction of a new portfolio structure. Departmental amalgamations joined previously separate functions within a single portfolio. This was expected to generate cost savings through ‘the removal of duplication and overlap of functions’ (Hawke 1987a). More importantly the amalgamated departments were expected to provide ‘broader perspectives and greater coherence in policy advice and program development’ (Codd 1988, p. 26). They were also expected to give additional emphasis to the Hawke government’s policy priorities (Keating 1993, pp. 2-3).
Departmental amalgamations were expected to transform the relationship between portfolios and the cabinet system. They were expected to reduce the need for cabinet to resolve disputes between portfolios. They were also expected to facilitate the introduction of devolutionary budgetary reforms by providing increased scope for trade-offs between priorities at the portfolio level (Keating 1990, pp. 9-12). Finally, the new cabinet committee system was expected to direct political and bureaucratic attention towards the government’s main policy priorities (Codd 1988, 1990, Hamilton 1990, Keating 1990, 1993).

It had long been argued that the Commonwealth cabinet system was over-burdened by the need to coordinate between portfolios. This placed a substantial burden on senior cabinet ministers. The burden of cabinet on senior ministers became a particular issue during the Fraser government. It was argued that ministers were overloaded by the demands of the cabinet system and were unable to devote sufficient attention to other components of their work (Weller 1989, pp. 122, 124-125). This was often attributed to the fragmented nature of the Commonwealth bureaucratic executive. This meant that more issues spilled across portfolio boundaries and needed cabinet coordination. Problems were exacerbated by the extent of conflict between officials and ministers in rival portfolios (Emy 1976, p. 36, Smith 1976b, pp. 198, Hawker, Smith and Weller 1979, pp. 43-44, Painter and Carey 1979, pp. 12-14).

In response to these problems proposals emerged to reduce the burden on the cabinet system through the creation of larger and more inclusive departments. These can be traced to the Morshead committee which in 1958 recommended the integration of the five defence related departments into a single department of defence. More recently the 1976 report of the Royal Commission on Australian Government Administration concluded that there was considerable merit in reducing the number of departments (RCAGA 1976).

The main obstacle to the creation of fewer but larger departments was the assumption that Section 64 of the Constitution required each department to be administered by a single minister. This meant that a reduction in the number of departments would necessitate a reduction in the total size of the ministry and hence the patronage available to prime ministers and parliamentary parties. Larger departments also had the potential to reduce political control because of the size of their ministerial workloads. The reinterpretation of Section 64 allowed the Hawke government to reduce the number of departments while
increasing the total size of the ministry. It also meant that the new larger departments could be directly administered by teams of ministers rather than by a single minister with the assistance of colleagues from other portfolios.

Objectives of the Restructuring of the Political Executive

The introduction of teams of political executives was expected to enhance political control over portfolios. This was expected to result from a new division of responsibility for the administration of portfolio. This was described in the second part of the chapter. Junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries were expected to relieve senior ministers of some of their departmental and parliamentary work. This was expected to allow senior ministers to focus on the ‘strategic direction’ of their portfolios as well as both the formulation and implementation of policy and ‘departmental management’ (Codd 1988, p. 27).

Increased political control over portfolios has been an important objective of recent Commonwealth governments. Prior to 1987 there had been numerous attempts to bolster the capacity of ministers to control their portfolios. These were described in the first part of this chapter. There have been attempts to enlist the support of parliamentary and ministerial colleagues through experiments with the appointment of “irregular” political executives as well as “ministers assisting”. There have also been attempts to bolster the capacity of ministers through the enlargement and politicisation of ministerial offices through the recruitment of increased numbers of partisan advisers. These were expected to increase the capacity of ministers to cope with their workloads and to reduce ministerial reliance on their departments by providing an alternative source of advice.

The introduction of teams of political executives also broke the nexus between the size of the ministry and the number of departments. It was expected to enable prime ministers to adjust the responsibilities of individual ministers without the need for disruptive changes to the departmental machinery-of-government (Codd 1988, p. 26, Hamilton 1990, p. 66, Keating 1993, pp. 8-9). Finally an important “unofficial” objective of the enlargement of the Commonwealth political executive was to increase the patronage available to the Labor Party caucus and the prime minister. It increased the number of ministerial positions from 27 to 30. The reintroduction of parliamentary secretaries eventually led to the addition of a further 10 positions to which backbenchers could aspire (Weller 1987, p. 22, Healy 1993, p. 48).
These patronage issues had often been an important consideration behind past increases in the size of the ministry as well as the previous Commonwealth experiments with “irregulars” described in the first part of this chapter. “Irregulars” played an important role in allowing successive Commonwealth governments to circumvent legislative restrictions on the size of the ministry by creating additional front bench positions.

In many respects the two main components of the changes were complementary. The introduction of teams of political executives was necessary in order to achieve a reduction in the number of departments and an increase in the overall size of the ministry. Teams of political executives were also necessary to cope with the larger workloads generated by the new portfolios. However there was also the potential for tension between the two sets of changes. The creation of larger and more complex portfolios had the potential to reduce political control. The restructuring of the political executive also had important implications for the coordination objectives of departmental amalgamations. Most importantly the division of direct responsibility for portfolios between teams of political executives had the potential to exacerbate the difficulties of coordination and priority-setting at the bureaucratic level.

**Conclusion**

The first part of this chapter described the Commonwealth executive branch. It argued that its formal structure consisted of the Governor-General and the Federal Executive Council, ministers of state (who serve as members of the Federal Executive Council) and departments of state (which are established by the Governor-General and administered by ministers of state). It focused on the interpretation of Section 64 of the Constitution and the assumption of a nexus between the number of ministers and the number of departments. It argued that the Commonwealth executive branch can be divided into political and bureaucratic components.

It also examined the evolution of the Commonwealth executive branch. It described the evolution of the cabinet system. It also described previous Commonwealth experiments with “irregular” political executives and the enlargement and politicisation of ministerial offices since the 1970s.
The second part of the chapter explored the introduction of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries as part of the 1987 machinery-of-government changes. It argued that the changes had four important implications for the Commonwealth political executive. The number of ministers increased from 27 to 30. The ministry was divided into senior and junior ministers. Teams of ministers were formally appointed to head a single department. Finally "irregular" political executives were reintroduced in the form of parliamentary secretaries. There were also important changes to the bureaucratic executive and the cabinet system. The number of departments was reduced from 28 to 18 through extensive amalgamation and restructuring. A new portfolio structure was introduced which (initially) consisted of 16 cabinet portfolios and two "sub-cabinet level" portfolios. There were also changes to the cabinet committee system and the functions of central agencies.

The third part of the chapter examined the goals of the 1987 machinery-of-government changes. It argued that the main objective of the restructuring of the bureaucratic executive was to enhance the coherence of policy development and program delivery. The changes were also expected to reduce the amount of material entering the cabinet system. The most important objective of the restructuring of the political executive was to increase political control over portfolios. Other objectives related to patronage and flexibility in the deployment of political executives.

It argued that these two sets of objectives were complementary. The introduction of teams of political executives was necessary for the Hawke government to increase the size of the ministry whilst simultaneously reducing the number of departments. Many of the new larger portfolios were also beyond the capacity of a single political executive. However the two sets of changes were also potentially contradictory. The new larger portfolios were potentially more resistant to political control even by teams of political executives. Furthermore the introduction of teams of political executives had the potential to detract from the objective of improved coordination and priority-setting at the portfolio level.

The next chapter reviews the literature on the 1987 machinery-of-government changes. It argues that the literature has focused on the restructuring of the bureaucratic executive and changes to the cabinet system. By contrast little attention has been devoted to the work of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries or the implications of the restructuring of the political executive.
Chapter 2

Literature Review

Introduction

The previous chapter described the impact of the 1987 machinery-of-government changes on the political and bureaucratic components of the Commonwealth executive branch. The first part of this chapter examines the literature on the 1987 machinery-of-government changes. It argues that most studies have focused on departmental amalgamations as well as changes to the cabinet system. Little attention has been devoted to either the work of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries or the wider implications of the enlargement and restructuring of the Commonwealth political executive.

The second part provides an overview of the literature on political executives. It identifies three categories of political executives. It also identifies three approaches to the study of political executives. It examines the literature on the work of sub-cabinet level political executives. It also briefly notes key studies of the work of cabinet ministers.

The third part focuses in detail on previous approaches to the study of the work of sub-cabinet level political executives. It aims to gather insights which can be applied to the study of the work of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. It argues that studies of the work of both cabinet ministers and sub-cabinet level political executives divide their jobs into six components. Studies of sub-cabinet level political executives focus on the division of responsibility between cabinet ministers and their junior colleagues for these different components of their work. They emphasise the extent of variation in the division of responsibility between cabinet ministers and sub-cabinet level political executives. They also examine the implications of different approaches to the division of responsibility from the perspectives of both cabinet ministers and sub-cabinet level political executives. Finally they examine the management of the division of responsibility.
The fourth part of the chapter reviews previous approaches to the study of the implications of sub-cabinet level political executives. It argues that the literature focuses on two sets of implications. The first set of implications relate to political-bureaucratic relations at the portfolio level. Two issues are typically examined under this heading: their contribution to greater political control over portfolios and their impact on processes of coordination and priority-setting within portfolios. The second set of implications relate to patronage and ministerial careers.

Literature on the 1987 Machinery-of-Government Changes

There is an extensive literature on the 1987 machinery-of-government changes. Most of the studies which comprise this literature can be divided into two categories: academic contributions and practitioner contributions. The main exceptions are two parliamentary committee reports which have examined the division of responsibility between different categories of political executives for parliamentary work in the House of Representatives (HoRSCP 1993, 1995).

Academic contributions can also be divided into two categories. The first consists of studies published soon after the introduction of the changes (Halligan 1987, Weller 1987, Wettenhall 1989). These studies aimed to locate the changes in the context of wider reform agendas and enumerate their main objectives. There were also attempts to predict the possible consequences of the changes. The second category consists of more recently published studies (Weller 1991, 1993, Campbell and Halligan 1992a, 1992b, Halligan, Beckett and Earnshaw 1992, Aucoin and Bakvis 1993, Craswell and Davis 1993, 1994, Davis 1994b, Gruen and Grattan 1993, Castleman 1995). These more recent studies have been more concerned with evaluating the changes.

The practitioner literature is overwhelmingly comprised of contributions from senior officials. There have been very few ministerial contributions. The only exceptions are a series of prime ministerial statements announcing the changes and the prime minister’s 1988 Garran Oration (Hawke 1987a, 1987b, 1987c, 1989). There has also been one contribution from an opposition MP (and former minister) (Sinclair 1996, pp. 33-47). The contributions of senior officials can be divided into two categories. The first consists
of contributions by senior officials from the Department of Finance and the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (Codd 1988, 1990, 1991, Hamilton 1990, Keating 1990, 1993, Williams 1993). These central agency officials were among the principal architects of the changes. The second consists of contributions from senior officials involved in the implementation of the changes within their departments. These contributions have come from five departments. Most contributions have come from three departments: Foreign Affairs and Trade (Harris 1988, Woolcott 1988, 1989, Forrester 1993), Primary Industries and Energy (Evans 1988, Hearn 1989, Hunt 1989) and Transport and Communications (Wilenski 1988a, 1988b, Evans 1992, Mildern 1993). There have also been contributions from officials in two other departments: Employment, Education and Training (Johnston 1989) and Health, Housing and Community Services (Hamilton 1993). The practitioner literature contains description and evaluation of the changes from the perspectives of central agency and line department officials.

The previous chapter argued that the 1987 machinery-of-government changes consisted of two components. The first was the enlargement and restructuring of the Commonwealth political executive. The second consisted of the restructuring of the bureaucratic executive and changes to the cabinet system. This part of the chapter reviews the literature on each of these two components of the 1987 machinery-of-government changes. It begins with the literature on the restructuring of the bureaucratic executive.

The Restructuring of the Bureaucratic Executive

The literature on the 1987 machinery-of-government changes devotes considerable attention to the restructuring of the bureaucratic executive. This literature can be divided into three categories. The first category consists of studies which focused on describing the changes and their objectives as well as locating them in the context of reform agendas. This approach is particularly evident in contributions from the central agency architects of the changes (eg Codd 1988, 1990, 1991, Hamilton 1990, Keating 1990, 1993). It is also evident in academic studies which explored differences in the extent of change between departments (Halligan 1987, pp. 42-43, Wettenhall 1989, Castleman 1995).

The second category consists of studies which focused on the process of amalgamating departments. Two academic studies examined the process of amalgamation (Campbell and Halligan 1992a, pp. 177-183, Halligan, Beckett and Earnshaw 1992, pp. 13-15, 19-20).
Several official contributions have also described the process of amalgamation and the development of new organisational and program structures. These almost invariably emphasise the practical difficulties involved in the amalgamation process (Evans 1988, pp. 65-66, Harris 1988, Hearn 1989, p. 4, Hunt 1989, Wilenski 1988a, pp. 11-15).

A study by Weller (1991) attempted to measure progress towards amalgamation in three merged departments: Health, Housing and Community Services (formerly Community Services and Health), Primary Industries and Energy and Transport and Communications. Weller tried to compare the extent of change in the internal structures of these departments and locate them along a continuum between 'complete integration' and 'confederation' (1991, p. 44). He identified three indicators of the extent of amalgamation. The first was the extent to which previously separate functions had been joined within a single division (rather than lying separately alongside one another). The second was the extent to which senior staff had moved away from their former functions into new areas of responsibility. The third was the 'management style' of the department (1991, p. 44). His conclusions focused on the first two indicators. He found varying amounts of structural integration within each department. Integration was most evident in relation to common service and corporate support functions. He also found that there had been 'conscious efforts' in two of the three departments to 'introduce mobility to reduce different cultures' (Weller 1991, p. 44).

The third category of studies were not simply concerned with the process or extent of form amalgamation. These studies explored the operation of amalgamated departments. They examined the extent to which departmental amalgamations had achieved their stated goals of improving coordination and priority-setting at the portfolio level and reducing the volume of business entering the cabinet system.

(a) Impact on Departments. Research undertaken by Craswell and Davis (1993, 1994, see also Davis 1994b) examined the operation of four amalgamated departments: Employment, Education and Training, Foreign Affairs and Trade, Health, Housing and Community Services, and Transport and Communications. The aim of this research was to determine whether departmental amalgamations had enhanced the coherence of policy advice and program delivery within departments.
Craswell and Davis described the evolution of new formal structures within each of the four departments. In common with Weller (1991) they emphasised the extent of variation both between and within departments in ‘the actual extent of change to program structures’ (1993, p. 188). Most importantly they also emphasised the continuing need to coordinate policy development and program delivery overlaps which transcended formal boundaries within the new departments. Craswell and Davis argued that departments had been forced to develop new ‘policy coordination mechanisms’ to cope with these policy development and program delivery overlaps (1993, pp. 188-189). They described the emergence of both formal and informal processes of coordination within departments.

Craswell and Davis found substantial agreement among senior officials that departmental amalgamations had achieved their goal of greater policy coherence and improved program delivery at the portfolio level. The merged departments promoted ‘links between policy areas’. Senior officials described programs as ‘more integrated’. However policy making within departments was not dominated by a single perspective. Finally it was argued that ministers were presented with at least as many if not more policy options than prior to the changes (1994, p. 70). These perceptions were contrasted with those of ministers who were more likely to emphasise the size of their workloads. Ministers also feared a ‘loss of options’ (1994, p. 71). Craswell and Davis (1994, p. 71) concluded that ‘bureaucrats and ministers look for different attributes in the structure of government’.

Practitioner contributions also examined the operation of the amalgamated departments as well as the extent to which the amalgamations achieved their stated objectives. Despite emphasising the practical difficulties associated with the changes, senior officials argued that the amalgamations achieved the objective of more coherent policy advice and program delivery at the portfolio level (Evans 1988, pp. 67-68, Woolcott 1988, pp. 2-3, Forrester 1993, pp. 67-68, Hamilton 1993, pp. 85-86, Mildern 1993, pp. 94-96). Keating (1993, pp. 2-6) reproduced statements from several secretaries of amalgamated departments who each emphasised the benefits of the changes. These findings are similar to those reported by Craswell and Davis (1993, 1994).

Practitioner contributions have similarly emphasised the importance of coordination and priority-setting across divisions and programs within departments. Mildern (1993, p. 91) described ‘a common process of policy reform’ throughout the Department of Transport and Communications involving ‘a consistent set of policy principles’. Hamilton described
a process of ‘breaking down program barriers’ within the restructured Department of Health, Housing and Community Services (1993, p. 85). He stated:

These sorts of inter-connections of course always existed when they were in separate departments, but nothing very much happened. Now the department cannot avoid doing something (Hamilton 1993, p. 82).

Hamilton also emphasised the difficulties of ‘breaking down program barriers’ within the amalgamated departments. He described the emergence of ‘centrifugal forces’ deriving from the creation of ‘strong program units’ (Hamilton 1993, pp. 79-83). He stressed the need for ‘corporate initiatives’ to counteract ‘centrifugal forces’ and ensure ‘the coherent operation of the department’ (Hamilton 1993, pp. 79-83).

Many other practitioner contributions have also argued that the creation of larger and more complex departments placed greater demands on departmental executives and necessitated the development of new processes to promote coordination within departments (eg Evans 1988, pp. 66-67, Wilenski 1988a, p. 11, Forrester 1993, pp. 64-66, Keating 1993, pp. 6-7, Mildern 1993, pp. 89-91). Forrester (1993, p. 61, 70) stressed that the demands of coordination were not confined to the departmental level. There was also the need for coordination between departments and portfolio agencies at the portfolio level.

The practitioner literature emphasises the importance of coordination within departments. It also argues that these processes became more difficult as a consequence of departmental amalgamations and that this placed greater demands on departmental executives. The practitioner literature also argues that the coordinating role of departmental executives was not confined to policy development and program delivery overlaps between divisions. They also had a central role in the allocation of resources between divisions in the budget process. This was important regardless of the extent of policy development and program delivery overlap. The establishment of larger departments was expected to provide greater flexibility to reallocate administrative resources within departments and to determine policy priorities at the portfolio level rather than within the cabinet system (see Hamilton 1990, p. 68, Keating 1990, pp. 9-12, Williams 1993, pp. 39-40). Practitioner contributions have highlighted the central role of departmental executives in the budget process (Evans 1988, p. 66, Forrester 1993, p. 66, Hamilton 1993, p. 83, Mildern 1993, pp. 93-94).
(b) **Impact on the Cabinet System.** The literature has also examined the impact of departmental amalgamations (as well as devolutionary budget reforms) on the operation of the cabinet system. The contributions of senior central agency officials have been most significant. Codd (1990) argued that more decisions were being taken outside cabinet as a result of the changes. He argued that there had been a substantial decline in cabinet’s non-budget workload. He also reported a decline ‘in the number of budget or budget-related decisions’. Codd claimed this constituted ‘a major shift in the balance between ministerial government and cabinet government’ (1990, p. 13, see also Weller 1991, p. 45). Keating similarly argued:

There has been a significant qualitative change in the matters going to cabinet. Gone is the dross which once overloaded the cabinet agenda because ministers and interdepartmental committees could not settle their differences. The clearest indicator of this welcome development was the decline of the cabinet’s General Administrative Committee - which dealt with the tailings thrown up by the old system - to the point that no further meetings were held after 1988-89. Moreover both the Expenditure Review Committee and the cabinet proper are now free to concentrate on major strategic issues (1993, p. 10).

Keating (1993, p. 7) argued that the introduction of devolutionary budget reforms also allowed departments ‘much greater scope to consider expenditure and policy trade-offs’. He further argued that this development had ‘radically changed the relationship with the centre, and particularly with the Department of Finance’ (1993, p. 7, see also 1990, p. 11).

Two academic contributions also examined the impact of departmental amalgamations on the cabinet system (Aucoin and Bakvis 1993, Craswell and Davis 1993, 1994, see also Campbell and Halligan 1992b). The study by Craswell and Davis found ‘contradictory’ evidence concerning the relative influence of line departments and central agencies (1993, pp. 196-197). Aucoin and Bakvis focused on the budget process. They found that the new larger departments had provided increased potential for trade-offs between priorities in the context of the budget process. However they further concluded that there had only been a ‘partial shift in responsibility’ because the Expenditure Review Committee retained an important role in setting portfolio targets and approving the reallocation of resources within portfolios (1993, pp. 407-408).
The Restructuring of the Political Executive

The literature on the 1987 machinery-of-government changes devoted less attention to the enlargement and restructuring of the Commonwealth political executive. Several studies have noted the introduction of junior ministers (Weller 1987, Halligan 1987, Evans 1988, Halligan, Beckett and Earnshaw 1992, Aucoin and Bakvis 1993, Gruen and Grattan 1993, HoRSCP 1993, 1995, Keating 1993, Sinclair 1996). However these studies each devoted only one or two pages to the new ministerial arrangements. Many of them were primarily concerned with the restructuring of the bureaucratic executive. Furthermore they were not based on evidence gained from interviews with political executives. The study by Aucoin and Bakvis was based on data from interviews with an unspecified number of ‘government officials’. Most of the other academic studies were based on a combination of newspaper reports and “insider gossip”. Studies by Evans (1988) and Keating (1993) were based on their experiences as secretaries of Commonwealth government departments (the latter as secretary of Prime Minister and Cabinet).

The literature devotes even less attention to parliamentary secretaries. Furthermore it has focused almost entirely on their parliamentary work (Healy 1993, HoRSCP 1993, 1995, Sinclair 1996). There have been no studies of any other aspects of their work.

Most of the literature on junior ministers has focused on the division of responsibility for departmental and cabinet work within portfolios. Sinclair (1996, p. 35) stated that junior ministers were ‘limited to specified areas’ and were ‘subject to the ultimate authority of the senior minister’. He further argued that junior ministers had different levels of autonomy: ‘some junior ministers enjoyed almost complete autonomy within their designated fields of responsibility but others were under much tighter control’ (Sinclair 1996, p. 35). Other studies simply noted the capacity of senior ministers to marginalise their junior colleagues and deny them ‘a real job to do’ (Weller 1987, p. 22, see also Halligan, Beckett and Earnshaw 1992, p. 16, Gruen and Grattan 1993, p. 45, Keating 1993, p. 8).

The literature devoted less attention to the division of responsibility between senior and junior ministers for cabinet work. Halligan, Beckett and Earnshaw (1992, p. 16) simply noted complaints by some junior ministers that they had been denied access to the cabinet system by the relevant senior minister. Weller predicted that while junior ministers could
attend cabinet to present their own submissions they would remain at least partially reliant on senior ministers to represent their interests in cabinet (1987, p. 22).

Finally there was some attention to the division of responsibility between senior and junior ministers for parliamentary work in the House of Representatives. A report by the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Procedure concluded that senior ministers ‘had delegated many of their House tasks to junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries’ (HoRSCP 1993, p. 26). This report also examined the division of responsibility for House of Representatives question time between senior and junior ministers. It found that question time was dominated by a few senior ministers to the exclusion of the remainder of the front bench, particularly junior ministers (HoRSCP 1993, p. 25). However a later report by the same committee revealed an increase in the question time visibility of junior ministers. It found that in 1992 junior ministers received a total of 43 questions without notice (7 per cent). In 1993 they received 73 questions without notice (17 per cent). In 1994 they received 176 questions without notice (nearly 20 per cent) (HoRSCP 1995, pp. 22-23).

The literature devoted some attention to the division of responsibility for parliamentary work between ministers and parliamentary secretaries. Healy described amendments to parliamentary standing orders which allowed parliamentary secretaries to play a larger role in government business in both the Senate and the House of Representatives (1993, pp. 46, 56-57, see also Beazley 1990, 1991, SPC 1991). Sinclair argued that during the period of the second Keating government parliamentary secretaries handled ‘all legislation and most parliamentary rostered duty’ (1996, p. 36).

The House of Representatives Standing Committee on Procedure painted a more modest picture of the work of parliamentary secretaries in the House of Representatives. It found that during 1994 nearly 43 per cent of government bills were introduced by parliamentary secretaries. Parliamentary secretaries were more likely to make second reading speeches than ministers (52 per cent of government bills). Finally parliamentary secretaries had a larger role than ministers in concluding second reading debates. 76 were concluded by parliamentary secretaries compared with 51 by ministers (HoRSCP 1995, p. 11).

The literature stressed the dominance of senior ministers and their capacity to marginalise their junior colleagues by denying them a substantial departmental role and excluding them
from the cabinet system (Weller 1987, p. 22). Aucoin and Bakvis (1993, p. 401) stated that in each portfolio ‘the senior minister has explicit authority over the junior minister’. They identified three key sources of senior ministerial power. The first consisted of the requirement that they approve ‘any significant actions taken in the name of the portfolio’. The second consisted of their ultimate authority over all portfolio cabinet submissions. The third consisted of their control over all officials within their portfolios. Aucoin and Bakvis argued that junior ministers did ‘not have direct control over permanent officials’ (1993, p. 401). The literature reveals few attempts to explain variation in the approaches of senior ministers to the division of responsibility. Keating’s study was the only partial exception. Keating (1993, p. 8) attributed variation in the approaches of senior ministers to the division of responsibility for departmental work to differences in ‘rapport between the ministers within a portfolio’.

The literature also emphasised the concomitant weakness of junior ministers (Aucoin and Bakvis 1993, p. 401). However there have been few attempts to examine the division of responsibility from the perspective of either junior ministers or parliamentary secretaries. Most studies just noted junior ministerial dissatisfaction with senior ministers who denied them substantial departmental and cabinet roles (Halligan, Beckett and Earnshaw 1992, p. 16, Gruen and Grattan 1993, p. 45).

Keating highlighted the importance of relationships between senior and junior ministers (1993, p. 8). Other studies described the potential for tension and conflict between senior and junior ministers (Halligan 1987, p. 43, Weller 1987, p. 22). Weller argued that this was more likely in Australia than in the United Kingdom because of the proximity of Australian junior ministers to the prime minister as well as the absence of ‘a rigid sense of “hierarchical position” in the Labor government’ (1987, p. 22). Two studies described celebrated examples of ministerial disagreement (Halligan, Beckett and Earnshaw 1992, p. 16, Gruen and Grattan 1993, pp. 45-46). However studies also argued that ‘relationships started to sort themselves out’ (Gruen and Grattan 1993, p. 46, see also Aucoin and Bakvis 1993, p. 401). This was attributed to the departure of junior ministers who had previously headed their own departments and the acceptance by junior ministers of their subordinate status in relation to the senior minister (Aucoin and Bakvis 1993, p. 401).

Finally the literature on the new ministerial arrangements examined the management of the division of responsibility between senior and junior ministers. The principal focus of the
literature was on the circulation of information within portfolios between senior and junior ministers. Evans (1988) stressed the importance of paper flows between senior and junior ministers. He emphasised the new requirement for departments to manage ‘paper flows between the two offices’ and to determine which issues could be handled by the relevant functional minister and which issues necessitated the involvement of both ministers (Evans 1988, p. 67). Evans also described the need for departments to cope with the demands of two ministers for ‘briefing and correspondence’ services (1988, p. 66).

Three academic studies also focused on the flow of information between senior and junior ministers. These studies each emphasised the potential for the emergence of “information asymmetries” between senior ministers and their junior colleagues. Halligan, Beckett and Earnshaw (1992, p. 16) argued that some junior ministers were dissatisfied with their lack of access to ‘politically sensitive information’ within their respective portfolios. However senior officials kept senior ministers informed about the departmental work of their junior colleagues (Aucoin and Bakvis 1993, p. 401, Gruen and Grattan 1993, p. 46). Gruen and Grattan argued that ‘public servants would sometimes have to “rat” on junior ministers to keep the “senior” informed’ (1993, p. 46). Finally one study stressed the importance of the circulation of information between senior and junior ministers who represented one another in question time in different parliamentary chambers (Gruen and Grattan 1993, p. 46).

**Implications of the Restructuring of the Political Executive**

The literature on the 1987 machinery-of-government changes devoted some attention to the implications of the enlargement and restructuring of the Commonwealth political executive and the introduction of teams of political executives at the head of portfolios. Two sets of implications emerge from the literature. The first relate to political-bureaucratic relations within portfolios. The second relate to patronage and ministerial careers.

**(a) Implications for Political-Bureaucratic Relations.** Evans (1988, p. 67) noted that the changes impacted upon ministers, ministerial offices and senior officials. However this point was not developed any further in the literature. A few studies examined the contribution of junior ministers to increased political control over portfolios. Their most important conclusion was that many senior ministers remained overburdened. Halligan, Beckett and Earnshaw argued that the introduction of teams of political
executives ‘failed to ease substantially the workload of senior ministers’. They argued that senior ministers ‘were either unable or unwilling to delegate, or both’ (Halligan, Beckett and Earnshaw 1992, p. 16). Three other studies also emphasised the large workloads of senior ministers under the new arrangements (Evans 1988, p. 68, Keating 1993, p. 12, Craswell and Davis 1994, pp. 65, 71). Keating argued that the requirement for senior ministers to ‘take responsibility for the strategic direction of a major area of government policy’ had the potential to reduce ‘the time available for developing the government’s political agenda’ as opposed to ‘developing the policies of the government’ (1993, p. 12). Keating further argued that the goal of increased political control over portfolios depended on the capacity of senior ministers to delegate to their junior colleagues. This depended upon ‘rapport between the ministers within a portfolio’ (Keating 1993, p. 8).

The literature also examined the impact of the introduction of teams of political executives on coordination and priority-setting within portfolios. Aucoin and Bakvis (1993, p. 401) argued that the architects of the changes gave explicit recognition to the potential for junior ministers to hinder coordination at the portfolio level (and most importantly to perpetuate distinctions between formerly separate areas within amalgamated departments). It was for this reason that senior ministers retained formal responsibility for coordination within their respective portfolios (Aucoin and Bakvis 1993, p. 401). Keating similarly argued that the coordination objectives of the departmental amalgamations depended on the capacity of senior ministers to maintain control over ‘strategic direction’ within their portfolios (1993, pp. 8, 12).

Concern about the potential for junior ministers to perpetuate divisions within departments was also evident in the allocation of functional responsibilities to junior ministers. Aucoin and Bakvis (1993, p. 401) described deliberate attempts in some portfolios to ensure that the responsibilities of junior ministers ‘cut across’ different functions within departments. Evans (1988, p. 67) described a division of responsibilities between ministers in another portfolio which gave ‘both a mix of specific responsibilities for agricultural, minerals and energy matters’. This was intended to ensure the involvement of both ministers ‘in issues across all sectors’ (Evans 1988, p. 67).

Finally there was some evidence of the potential impact of processes of coordination and priority-setting on the work of junior ministers. Craswell and Davis (1994, p. 65) found some evidence that junior ministers found themselves marginalised within amalgamated
departments and ‘experienced problems defining their role and their relationship to the new policy process’. Halligan, Beckett and Earnshaw (1992, p. 17) suggested that junior ministers had created the least problems in departments which were conglomerations of unrelated functional areas (such as Arts, Sport, the Environment, Tourism and Territories and Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs).

(b) Implications for Patronage and Careers. The literature devoted some attention to the implications of the enlargement and restructuring of the Commonwealth political executive for patronage and careers. Weller (1987, p. 22) emphasised the significance of patronage considerations behind the increase in the size of the ministry: ‘More jobs keep more members of the party happy, and hold out the prospects of promotion for those who are still on the backbenches’. Healy (1993, p. 47) also noted the potential importance of patronage considerations behind the reintroduction of parliamentary secretary positions. Increased patronage emerged as an important “unofficial” objective of the enlargement of the political executive.

(c) Summary. The first part of this chapter has examined the literature surrounding the 1987 machinery-of-government changes. It has argued that this literature focused on the restructuring of the bureaucratic executive and changes to the cabinet system. The most important studies examined processes of coordination and priority-setting within amalgamated departments. These studies concluded that departmental amalgamations had improved the coherence of policy development and program delivery and reduced the volume of business entering the cabinet system (Craswell and Davis 1993, 1994, Keating 1993).

It concluded that much less attention has been devoted to the restructuring of the political executive. Studies have only devoted one or two pages to the work of junior ministers and even less attention to the work of parliamentary secretaries. The literature emphasised the power of senior ministers and their capacity to marginalise their junior colleagues. There was some evidence of variation in the approaches of senior ministers to the division of responsibility for departmental and cabinet work within their portfolios. Keating attributed different approaches to variation in the ‘rapport’ between ministers (1993, p. 8). Most studies simply emphasised the potential for tension and conflict between ministers. Finally the literature highlighted the role of senior officials in the circulation of information within portfolios and the potential for “information asymmetries” between senior ministers.

The literature devoted some more attention to the implications of the introduction of teams of ministers for political-bureaucratic relations at the portfolio level. Evans (1988, p. 67) highlighted the potential for the emergence of complex relationships between political and bureaucratic executives. Several studies emphasised the size of the workloads of senior ministers (Evans 1988, p. 68, Halligan, Beckett and Earnshaw 1992, p. 16, Craswell and Davis 1994, pp. 65, 71, Keating 1993, pp. 8, 12). The literature emphasised the potential for junior ministers to hinder processes of coordination within portfolios. It highlighted the importance of the formal coordinating powers retained by senior ministers as well as the significance of the characteristics of the functions allocated to junior ministers (Aucoin and Baskis 1993, p. 401, Keating 1993, pp. 8, 12). Finally there was limited evidence of the impact of coordination and priority-setting within portfolios on the departmental work of junior ministers. Craswell and Davis (1994, p. 65) suggested that junior ministers 'experienced problems defining their role and their relationship to the new policy process' within merged departments. Halligan, Beckett and Earnshaw (1992, p. 17) suggested that ministerial relationships appeared to have generated fewest problems in departments which were conglomerations of unrelated functional areas.

The literature finally noted the patronage implications of the enlargement and restructuring of the political executive. This was evident in relation to both junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries (Weller 1987, p. 22, Healy 1993, p. 47). The remainder of this chapter examines previous studies of the work of sub-cabinet level political executives and their wider implications for political-bureaucratic relations at the portfolio level as well as patronage and careers.

**Literature on Political Executives**

The second part of this chapter identifies three categories of political executives as well as three approaches to the study of political executives. It surveys the literature on sub-cabinet level political executives. It finally describes some important studies of the work of cabinet ministers.
Three Categories of Political Executives

King (1975, p. 183) identified three categories of political executives. The first category consisted of chief executives (prime ministers, premiers and chief ministers). The second category consisted of cabinet ministers. The third category consisted of sub-cabinet level political executives.

The most important distinction for this thesis is between cabinet ministers and sub-cabinet level political executives. Cabinet ministers have formal constitutional responsibility for departments. They are also full members of cabinet. Sub-cabinet level political executives have no formal constitutional responsibility for departments. Their work is delegated from the relevant cabinet minister. They are not full members of cabinet (although they may be appointed as members of cabinet committees and participate in full cabinet meetings).

The first chapter of this thesis described the evolution of the elective component of the Commonwealth political executive prior to 1987. It argued that the distinction between cabinet and non-cabinet ministers emerged only in 1956. Indeed prior to 1941 cabinet had included “irregular” political executives who lacked formal constitutional responsibility for departments. Only the four parliamentary under-secretaries appointed by the Hughes and Lyons governments were not appointed to cabinet during this period. Between 1941 and 1956 Commonwealth governments consisted of cabinet ministers and “irregulars” who were not members of cabinet. Between 1956 and 1987 (with the exception of the period of the Whitlam government) the ministry was divided into cabinet and non-cabinet or outer ministers. However these outer ministers had full constitutional responsibility for their departments. They therefore occupied an ambiguous position in King’s typology. During this period only “irregulars” appointed by the Menzies, McMahon and Fraser governments could clearly be described as sub-cabinet level political executives.

The 1987 restructuring of the Commonwealth political executive heralded the introduction of a clearer distinction between different types of ministers. Senior ministers had formal constitutional and political responsibility for entire departments. The only exception was when two senior ministers were appointed to head a single department on a co-equal basis. Senior ministers were also invariably appointed to cabinet. Senior ministers can be clearly located within King’s second category of political executives.
Junior ministers also had formal constitutional responsibility for departments. However they only had political responsibility for a limited range of functions within portfolios. Furthermore they were subject to the overall direction of the relevant senior minister (or ministers). Only five junior ministers were appointed to cabinet (although they were more often appointed as members of cabinet committees and could still bring forward cabinet business from within their functional responsibilities). Junior ministers can therefore be described as sub-cabinet level political executives.

Parliamentary secretaries lacked formal constitutional responsibility for departments. Their responsibilities were explicitly delegated by the relevant senior minister. They were not appointed to cabinet and could not bring forward cabinet business (although they were occasionally appointed to cabinet committees and could attend cabinet meetings for issues relating to their direct responsibilities). Parliamentary secretaries are clearly sub-cabinet level political executives.

Three Approaches to the Study of Political Executives

Following King (1975) it is possible to identify three different approaches to the study of political executives. The first can be termed the formal/legal approach. This is the oldest and most common of the three approaches. Studies which adopt this approach usually focus on a limited range of issues. They typically examine the constitutional foundations and evolution of different categories of political executives as well as the principles of individual and collective ministerial responsibility. This first approach is also frequently characterised by a pronounced normative flavour. Studies are often concerned as much with how the system should work as with its actual operation. This is most clearly evident in relation to the principles of individual and collective ministerial responsibility. There are numerous examples of this first approach to the study of political executives in Australia (eg Quick and Garran 1976 [1901], Parker 1976, Reid 1980, Aitkin, Jinks and Warhurst 1989, Page 1990).

The second approach to the study of political executives can be termed the sociological approach. This approach is not concerned with the formal offices occupied by political executives. Instead it focuses on the characteristics of the individuals who occupy these positions, particularly their social backgrounds. An important objective of this approach is to examine social stratification and the possible existence of a "ruling class". In Australia
the study of political executives using the sociological approach was pioneered by Encel (1961, 1962, 1970). These studies had two main objectives. The first was to examine the selection process by which individuals enter the parliament and are recruited to the political executive. The second was to examine the family, educational, occupational and religious backgrounds of Australian government ministers. Rydon (1980, pp. 66-77) has similarly examined the backgrounds and careers of Australian government ministers. There have also been several international comparative studies of ministerial backgrounds and career paths (e.g. Blondel 1985, Blondel and Thiebault 1991).

The third approach to the study of political executives is concerned with their work rather than either the formal characteristics of their offices or their social backgrounds. Studies which adopt this approach focus on issues such as relative power and influence within the executive branch. They examine relationships between political executives and officials as well as relationships between political executives themselves (particularly in the context of the cabinet system). These studies usually aim to achieve two sets of objectives. The first is to describe the work of different categories of political executives. This often involves the provision of detailed descriptions of the routines of ministerial life based on interviews with political executives themselves. The second is to identify and explain patterns of variation in the work of political executives. This third approach to the study of political executives is most clearly relevant to the aims of this thesis. This thesis aims to examine the work of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries as well as the wider implications of the enlargement and restructuring of the Commonwealth political executive.

**The Literature on Sub-cabinet Level Political Executives**

King excluded sub-cabinet level political executives from his mid-1970s survey of the literature on political executives. He argued that ‘almost nothing has been written about them’ (1975, p. 183). In fact at the time of his survey there existed a significant literature on this category of political executives. Most of this literature focused on British sub-cabinet level political executives (Milne 1950, Willson 1959, Heasman 1961/62, 1963, 1964, 1970, Chester 1964, Alderman and Cross 1966, 1967, Rose 1971). There had also been two studies of Canadian sub-cabinet level political executives (Banks 1965, Stairs 1970). Finally some attention had been devoted to Australian experiments with “irregular” political executives (Sawer 1956, Encel 1962, Crisp 1973). Additional studies have subsequently appeared which have examined sub-cabinet level political executives in the

Early studies of sub-cabinet level political executives overwhelmingly adopted formal/legal or sociological approaches. These studies typically feature descriptions of the evolution of ministerial hierarchies and the constitutional conventions which apply to sub-cabinet level political executives as well as analyses of career paths within ministerial hierarchies. This last topic is most clearly evident in the literature on sub-cabinet level political executives in the United Kingdom. These positions were often viewed as little more than constitutional curiosities. Their significance derived primarily from their impact on the socialisation and training of future cabinet ministers and chief executives.

Only a few studies have undertaken a detailed exploration of the work of sub-cabinet level political executives. The most important of these has been Theakston’s *Junior Ministers in British Government* (1987, see also 1986). This study undoubtedly constitutes the most extensive investigation into the work of sub-cabinet level political executives. It can be divided into two parts. The first part had much in common with most earlier studies of sub-cabinet level political executives in the United Kingdom. It described the evolution of the junior ministry. It examined the constitutional status of junior ministers. It analysed the career paths of British junior ministers. The second part was explicitly concerned with the work of British junior ministers: ‘the jobs they do, how they do them, how they work with other office-holders in government’ (1987, p. vi). Most importantly the study also aimed to examine the relative influence of political and bureaucratic executives. It aimed to determine whether junior ministers were ‘of much use in ensuring that decisions reflect political rather than bureaucratic aims and values’. Its also aimed to achieve a better understanding ‘of the problems involved in ensuring continuing political control of the Whitehall machine’ (Theakston 1987, p. vi).

Three article-length studies have explored the work of Canadian parliamentary secretaries (Majeau 1983, Randle 1983, Vanderhoff-Silburt 1983/84). Two other studies are worthy of note. The first is Chenier’s article-length study of the work of Canadian ministers of state to assist (1985). Chenier described ministers of state to assist as a ‘made in Canada
version of [British] junior ministers’ (1985, p. 400). Ministers of state to assist were each appointed to cabinet. However they had no constitutional responsibility for departments. Their departmental work was delegated from the relevant cabinet minister. In this respect they were similar to British junior ministers. This study can therefore be considered part of the literature on sub-cabinet level political executives. Chenier’s study aimed to assess the costs and benefits of ministers of state to assist. In particular it aimed to determine whether these positions ‘improved political control’ and provided ‘sound training grounds for inexperienced politicians’ (1985, p. 400).

The second is Weller’s article-length study of the cabinet participation of Australian outer or non-cabinet ministers (1980, see also Weller and Grattan 1981, pp. 112-116). Outer ministers had full constitutional responsibility for departments. However they were not members of cabinet (although they could bring forward cabinet business and were usually appointed to relevant cabinet committees). This study can therefore be examined as part of the literature on sub-cabinet level political executives. The study argued that ‘considerable attention had been given to the workings of cabinet itself, but little to the activities of those ministers, whatever their status, who are in the government but not in cabinet’. It focused on the ‘problems’ of ‘ministers who are not in cabinet’ (Weller 1980, p. 599). Finally it also devoted some attention to the work of British junior ministers (1980, pp. 603-605, 610-613).

The Literature on the Work of Cabinet Ministers

Relatively few studies have examined the work of sub-cabinet level political executives. Most studies have focused on either their formal constitutional status of their contributions to the subsequent socialisation of cabinet ministers. There have been more studies of the work of cabinet ministers. Three book-length studies stand out as particularly important. The first is Headey’s pioneering study of the work of British cabinet ministers (1974a, see also 1974b, 1975a, 1975b). This study aimed to ‘present a minister’s-eye view of his job’. It examined the ‘task priorities’ of ministers and the ‘problems they faced in achieving their objectives in office’ (Headey 1974a, p. 9). Headey’s study focused on the departmental work of ministers. It identified five different ways in which ministers could approach their departmental work. These were termed ‘role conceptions’. It contrasted the ‘role conceptions’ of different cabinet ministers. It also identified three sets of variables which influenced the capacity of cabinet ministers to perform in accordance with
their ‘role conceptions’. These consisted of ministerial ‘skills and attributes’, the ‘advice and expectations of civil servants’ and ‘the favourableness of the situation and the department’ (1974a, pp. 24-25). The study examined the impact of these variables on the capacity of cabinet ministers to achieve their different objectives. Headey’s study focused on cabinet ministers. However it also devoted some attention to the work of British junior ministers (1974a, pp. 101-107).

A second important study of the work of British cabinet ministers is Rose’s Ministers and Ministries: A Functional Analysis (1987). The main contribution of this study was to highlight the impact of political ambition on the work of British political executives (both cabinet ministers and junior ministers). Rose argued that political executives were almost invariably ambitious and aimed to advance their careers through promotion within the ministerial hierarchy (1987, pp. 73-74, 87). Rose further argued that political executives advanced their careers primarily through their work in cabinet and parliament (1987, pp. 22, 80-84). This had important implications for their departmental work. Rose argued that political executives had little incentive to undertake departmental work which did not impact on their cabinet and parliamentary duties (1987, p. 84). Rose further argued that ambitious political executives sought departments which were characterised by high levels of parliamentary and media attention, which were ‘stepping-stones to promotion’ or which brought ‘authority in cabinet’ (1987, p. 85).

A third important study is Weller and Grattan’s Can Ministers Cope? Australian Federal Ministers at Work (1981). This study had similar objectives to Headey’s earlier study. It aimed to analyse the work of Australian government ministers from the perspective of both ministers and senior officials. In contrast to Headey’s study it examined all aspects of the work of ministers. The study also aimed to address four important debates about the role of ministers. The most important of these involved the relationship between ministers and their departments (the debate about the ‘control of public policy by the bureaucracy’) and the relationship between ministers and the prime minister (the debate about ‘the growth of prime ministerial government’) (Weller and Grattan 1981, pp. 3-4). This study devoted some attention to the cabinet participation of non-cabinet ministers. Along with another collaborator Weller subsequently undertook a similar but smaller scale study of the work of ministers in Australia’s Northern Territory (Weller and Sanders 1982).
Four other studies have examined particular elements of the work of cabinet ministers. Bakvis (1991) studied the work of ‘regional ministers’ in the Canadian government. This study focused on the capacity of ministers to represent particular constituencies or regions. It explored the consequences of this representational function for the different aspects of the work of Canadian cabinet ministers. Three other important studies have focused on the work of cabinet ministers in the budget process. The first is Heclo and Wildavsky’s study of the budget process in the United Kingdom (1974). Similar studies have since been undertaken in both Australia and Canada (Weller and Cutt 1976, Savoie 1990).

This second part of the chapter has identified three different categories of political executives as well as three different approaches to the study of political executives. It has argued that junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries can be described as sub-cabinet level political executives. It has described previous studies of sub-cabinet level political executives. It has also noted several important studies of the work of cabinet ministers. The next part of the chapter focuses in detail on the literature on the work of sub-cabinet level political executives.

Work of Sub-cabinet Level Political Executives

The Jobs of Political Executives

Studies of the work of both cabinet ministers and sub-cabinet level political executives emphasise the diversity and complexity of their jobs. They divide their jobs into different components which can be examined in turn. Six components are commonly identified: departmental work, cabinet work, parliamentary work, party work, interest group work and public relations work (Headey 1974a, p. 39, Weller and Grattan 1981, p. 18, Rose 1987, pp. 80-81, Theakston 1987). These six components were often divided into several different sub-components (and these sub-components were sometimes further divided into distinct elements).

separate elements. He divided policy into 'policy initiation', 'policy selection' and 'policy legitimisation'. Management was divided into 'organising', 'motivating' and 'controlling' (1974a, pp. 44-46).

(b) Cabinet Work. Some studies simply referred to participation in collective decision-making (Weller 1980, Weller and Grattan 1981, Theakston 1987). Healey identified two sub-components of cabinet work. He distinguished between the work of cabinet ministers representing their departments ('departmental battle-axe') and their contributions to wider strategic discussions ('cabinet all-rounder') (Healey 1974a, p. 49).

(c) Parliamentary Work. There have been several different approaches to dividing up the parliamentary work of political executives. Weller and Grattan (1981, pp. 137-143) divided the parliamentary work of Australian ministers into four sub-components: general duty, legislation, other debates, and question time. Theakston (1987, pp. 126-136) divided the parliamentary work of British junior ministers into four slightly different sub-components: bills, other debates relating to departments, question time and backbench interaction. Two studies of Canadian parliamentary secretaries divided their parliamentary work into three sub-components: 'parliamentary work', committee work' and 'extra-parliamentary work' (Majeau 1983, p. 6, Vanderhoff-Silburt 1983/84, pp. 7-8). These different sub-components were often further divided into separate elements.

(d) Party Work. There have been few attempts to divide the party work of political executives into separate sub-components. Indeed this component is often examined as an extension of their parliamentary work. This is most clearly evident in studies of the work of sub-cabinet level political executives (Majeau 1983, p. 6, Vanderhoff-Silburt 1983/84, pp. 7-8, Theakston 1987, pp. 129-134). Weller and Grattan distinguished backbench interaction from interaction with party machines. Backbench interaction was divided into interaction with party committees and interaction with individual backbenchers (1981, pp. 143-150).

(e) Interest Group Work. There have been few attempts to divide the interest group work of political executives into separate sub-components. Theakston’s study is the main exception to this pattern. He distinguished between local and national interest groups (1987, p. 140). A similar approach was adopted by Vanderhoff-Silburt in her study of the work of Canadian parliamentary secretaries (1983/84, p. 8). Theakston also distinguished
between representation at ‘formal social functions’ and ‘substantive’ policy negotiations (1987, pp. 138-140).

(f) Public Relations Work. There have also few attempts to distinguish between different sub-components of public relations work. Most studies simply differentiated between interest group interaction and public relations (eg Headey 1974a, pp. 52-54). The main exception was Weller and Grattan’s study. This study distinguished between different branches of the media: ‘television, radio and newspaper’ (1981, p. 154). It also distinguished the Canberra press gallery from state and locally based media representatives (1981, pp. 155-156). It finally identified two modes of interaction between ministers and journalists: ‘on the record’ statements and off the record ‘background’ or ‘leaks’ (1981, pp. 159-165).

Studies of the work of political executives have grouped these six components in different ways. The departmental and cabinet components of their work were invariably examined separately (Headey 1974a, Weller and Grattan 1981, Theakston 1987). The other four components were grouped together in various ways. Theakston grouped them all under a single heading: ‘junior ministers in parliament and as departmental ambassadors’ (1987, pp. 125-147). Headey (1974a) and Weller and Grattan (1981) examined them under two headings. Headey grouped together parliamentary and party work and interest group and public relations work (1974a, pp. 52-54). Weller and Grattan combined parliamentary, party and interest group work under a single heading and examined public relations work separately (1981, p. 18).

Variation in the Division of Responsibility between Cabinet Ministers and Sub-cabinet Level Political Executives

Studies of the work of sub-cabinet level political executives typically focus on the division of responsibility between cabinet ministers and their junior colleagues for the workload generated by each portfolio. Three basic approaches are evident. The first approach is simply to list the different components and sub-components of work which sub-cabinet level political executives can perform. This approach focuses on differences between the jobs of cabinet ministers and sub-cabinet level political executives. The second approach has been to examine variation in the overall size of the workloads of sub-cabinet level political executives. The third approach has been to examine variation in the different
components of the work of sub-cabinet level political executives. This third approach has focused on two aspects of variation. The first has been the size of each component of their work. The second has been the involvement of the relevant cabinet minister.

(a) Departmental Work. Previous studies have emphasised the extent of variation in the division of responsibility for departmental work between cabinet ministers and sub-cabinet level political executives. The literature highlights variation in the extent to which sub-cabinet level political executives were allocated specific functional responsibilities. This was common in relation to British junior ministers and Canadian ministers of state to assist (Chenier 1985, pp. 399-400, Theakston 1987, p. 87). Theakston (1987, pp. 87-93) argued that British junior ministers have increasingly been allocated ‘specific areas of departmental work to oversee’ and are no longer confined to ‘miscellaneous duties’. It was less common for Canadian parliamentary secretaries to be allocated specific functional responsibilities (Randle 1983, p. 13, Vanderhoff-Silburt 1983/84, p. 8).

There have been few attempts to examine variation in the characteristics of the functional responsibilities allocated to sub-cabinet level political executives. The focus has been on variation in the workloads generated by entire departments (Vanderhoff-Silburt 1983/84, p. 9, Theakston 1987, pp. 94-96). Theakston noted the existence of different ‘subjects and divisions’ within departments (1987, pp. 87-93). He also argued that the functions of British junior ministers varied in their importance and frequently changed. However his study simply listed examples of functions allocated to different junior ministers in two departments (Theakston 1987, pp. 87-91).

The most important exception to this pattern was Chenier’s study of Canadian ministers of state to assist (1985). Chenier focused on the characteristics of the different bureaucratic units corresponding to the responsibilities of ministers of state to assist. He identified differences in the strength of overlaps between these bureaucratic units and their parent departments. He argued that different units were characterised by different ‘degrees of independence or autonomy’ (Chenier 1985, p. 411). Chenier also argued that there were differences in the characteristics of the client groups of ministers of state to assist. Some client groups were narrow and clearly defined. Others were larger and more diffuse (Chenier 1985, pp. 405-406).
The literature also examined the involvement of senior ministers in the specific functional responsibilities of their junior colleagues. The focus was on the policy autonomy of sub-cabinet level political executives. Theakston argued that the key issue was whether there was any 'real delegation of responsibility for policy' (1987, p. 93). He distinguished junior ministers who were confined to 'administrative trivia' from those who were given 'real authority over policy' (1986, p. 22). Vanderhoff-Silburt similarly divided Canadian parliamentary secretaries into two basic categories: those who were treated as an 'errand boy' and those who were 'treated like a partner in the department' (1983/84, p. 8). These studies emphasised variation in the involvement of senior ministers. They both argued that the involvement of cabinet ministers in the functions of their junior colleagues could be located along a continuum between two extremes (eg Theakston 1987, pp. 92-94).

(b) Cabinet Work. Several studies have examined the cabinet work of Australian outer ministers (Weller 1980, Weller and Grattan 1981) and British junior ministers (Weller 1980, Theakston 1987). These studies focused on similarities and differences between the work of cabinet ministers and sub-cabinet level political executives. They focused on the capacity of sub-cabinet level political executives to access information about the operation of the cabinet system as well as their participation in the cabinet system.

Weller emphasised similarities between Australian cabinet and non-cabinet ministers in their access to cabinet information. He argued that the circulation of information reduced 'the distinctions between cabinet and non-cabinet ministers' (1980, p. 609). Theakston emphasised differences between British cabinet and junior ministers. Junior ministers had no automatic right to cabinet information. There was substantial variation between junior ministers in their access to cabinet information beyond their own departments (Theakston 1987, pp. 113-114, see also Weller 1980, p. 611).

Weller (1980) also highlighted similarities between the capacity of Australian cabinet and non-cabinet ministers to participate in the cabinet system. Both cabinet and non-cabinet ministers were solely responsible for the cabinet business of their respective departments. The key difference between them related to their role in wider strategic discussions. It was argued that outer ministers had considerably less involvement in these discussions than their cabinet colleagues (Weller 1980, pp. 606-610). Theakston also examined differences in the cabinet participation of British cabinet and junior ministers. He found that junior ministers often had a very small role in cabinet. They could not bring forward their own
submissions and only attended cabinet in place of the cabinet minister (Theakston 1987, pp. 116-117, see also Weller 1980, p. 611). The cabinet participation of most junior ministers was confined to cabinet committees (Theakston 1987, p. 118-122). Theakston argued that cabinet ministers spent much more time in cabinet committees than their junior colleagues (1987, p. 120). He also identified substantial variation between different junior ministers in the size of their cabinet committee workloads (Theakston 1987, p. 120).

(e) **Parliamentary and Party Work.** Studies of the work of sub-cabinet level political executives have usually examined their party work as a sub-component of their parliamentary work (Majeau 1983, p. 6, Vanderhoff-Silburt 1983/84, pp. 7-8, Theakston 1987, pp. 131-135). Two studies of the work of Canadian parliamentary secretaries simply listed the different sub-components and elements of parliamentary and party work which they typically performed. These studies simply noted the potential for variation in the volume and type of parliamentary work performed by different parliamentary secretaries (Majeau 1983, p. 6, Vanderhoff-Silburt 1983/84, pp. 7-8).

Theakston used appointment diaries and interviews to examine the parliamentary work of British junior ministers. He compared the parliamentary workloads of British junior ministers with those of cabinet ministers (1987, p. 125). He also emphasised variation in the size of the parliamentary workloads of different junior ministers. He argued that junior ministers ‘devoted between one-tenth and half of their working time to parliamentary duties’ (Theakston 1987, p. 125).

Theakston was particularly concerned with the division of responsibility for parliamentary work between British cabinet ministers and their junior colleagues. He examined the division of responsibility for major debates, oral questions, bills and backbench interaction (Theakston 1987, pp. 126-136). Theakston argued that cabinet ministers usually opened major debates and introduced major bills (Theakston 1987, p. 126). Junior ministers were primarily responsible for ending major debates and for the committee stages of debate on government bills (Theakston 1987, pp. 127-131). They also had primary responsibility for routine backbench interaction: answering MPs letters, participating in adjournment debates and responding to written questions (Theakston 1987, pp. 131-135). Finally they answered between 60 and 65 per cent of oral parliamentary questions (Theakston 1987, p. 136).
Theakston also contrasted the size and composition of the parliamentary workloads of junior ministers in the House of Commons with those of their counterparts in the House of Lords. Junior ministers in the House of Lords had responsibility for all the different types of parliamentary business generated by their respective departments. They also handled large amounts of parliamentary business generated by other departments (Theakston 1987, pp. 136-138).

(d) Interest Group and Public Relations Work. The division of responsibility for these two components of the work of political executives was examined at greatest length in Theakston's study of British junior ministers. Theakston argued that interest group work had increasingly been delegated to junior ministers (1987, p. 146). He argued that the most important difference between cabinet and junior ministers related to the categories of delegations they received. Cabinet ministers were more likely to meet 'national bodies'. Junior ministers were more likely to meet 'local bodies' (Theakston 1987, p. 140). There has been little attention to the division of responsibility between cabinet ministers and sub-cabinet level political executives for public relations work. Majeau (1983, p. 5) simply noted variation in the extent to which Canadian parliamentary secretaries were allowed a public relations role.

Explaining Variation in the Work of Sub-cabinet Level Political Executives

Studies of the work of sub-cabinet level political executives have not simply described variation in the division of responsibility between cabinet ministers and their junior colleagues. They have also attempted to explain this variation. Two factors have been advanced to account for variation in the division of responsibility: differences in the size and composition of the workloads generated by departments and differences in the attitude of the relevant cabinet minister.

(a) Differences in Departmental Workloads. Studies of the work of both cabinet ministers and sub-cabinet level political executives have noted differences in the size and structure of departments. Rose noted differences in the 'resource claims' of departments. Three types of resources were identified: 'laws', 'public expenditure' and 'civil servants'. Rose divided departments into three categories on the basis of their resource claims: 'high', 'medium' and 'low' (1987, pp. 55-61). Theakston distinguished between 'older

Studies have had limited success distinguishing between departments on the basis of their size and structure. They have had much less success in measuring the size of departmental workloads or comparing the subject matter of departments. These differences have proved particularly resistant to measurement. For example Theakston argued that differences in the number of senior officials at or above the rank of under secretary was ‘conventionally taken as a good indicator of the volume of important work in departments and the burden on ministers’ (1987, p. 110). There have been no attempts to measure differences in the subject matter of departments. Headey had to content himself with naming a department as typical of a particular extreme (1974a, p. 170).

Studies have identified differences in the cabinet work generated by different departments. Two sets of differences have been identified. The first consists of the overall volume of cabinet business. Several studies have distinguished between self-contained departments which generate small amounts of cabinet business and departments which generate large volumes of business because of extensive links with the rest of government (eg Theakston 1987, p. 120). The second consists of the cabinet status of departments. Headey (1974a, p. 170) distinguished between ‘high status’ and ‘low status’ departments. Rose also distinguished between departments on the basis of their cabinet authority (pp. 84-92). Weller and Grattan (1981) distinguished between departments on the basis of cabinet weight and special departmental responsibility for coordination. Theakston (1987, p. 121) also identified differences in the cabinet status of departments. Again there have been few attempts to operationalise or measure these differences. Rose (1987, pp. 84-92) argued that the cabinet authority of departments could be measured by the opportunities they provided to chair cabinet committees on behalf of the prime minister.
Several studies have identified differences in the overall size of the parliamentary workload generated by different departments (e.g., Majeau 1983, p. 6, Vanderhoff-Silburt 1983/84, p. 7, Theakston 1987, p. 125). Studies have described differences in both the volume and salience of the bills generated by different departments. Rose measured differences in the amount of legislation and the number of partisan divisions during debate on these bills (1987, pp. 85-86). Headey noted differences in the parliamentary sensitivity of different departments. He distinguished ‘politically safe’ departments from ‘politically sensitive’ departments (1974a, p. 170). These differences were based on the amount of debate, the amount of legislation and the amount of questions they generated (1974a, pp. 166-171). There have been no attempts to identify differences in the volume of party work generated by different departments.

Studies have identified differences in the characteristics of the interest groups associated with particular departments. Headey distinguished between the size of the interest groups surrounding each department as well as the nature of the policy community (open or closed) (1974a, p. 163). Weller and Grattan (1981, p. 150) argued that departments differed in the visibility and importance of interest groups. Theakston argued that departments differed in the size of their clientele and the amount of correspondence they generated (1987, pp. 131-133). Finally, studies have identified differences in the public visibility of departments (Headey 1974a, p. 170, Rose 1987, pp. 86-87, Theakston 1987, p. 170).

Studies of the work of sub-cabinet level political executives have argued that the size of the workloads of different departments influenced the amount of work which cabinet ministers delegated to their junior colleagues (Majeau 1983, p. 5, Vanderhoff-Silburt 1983/84, p. 9, Theakston 1987, pp. 94-96). It was argued that large departments placed an increased burden on cabinet ministers and lessened competition within teams of political executives for politically attractive work (Theakston 1987, p. 95). By contrast, small departments placed fewer pressures on senior ministers to delegate and increased the potential for competition within teams of political executives (Majeau 1983, p. 5).

(b) Differences in the Attitudes of Senior Ministers. The second factor used to explain differences in the division of responsibility consists of the attitude of the relevant cabinet minister. The attitudes of cabinet ministers were particularly important because of their formal constitutional responsibility for the work of their departments (Weller 1980,
pp. 611-613, Majeau 1983, pp. 3, 5, Randle 1983, pp. 12-13, Vanderhoff-Silburt 1983/84, pp. 8-9, Theakston 1987, pp. 92-96, 113-115, 127). It was argued that there are limits on the capacity of cabinet ministers to delegate to their junior colleagues. These derive from the need for cabinet ministers to remain directly involved in key policy issues across their departments (Headey 1974a, pp. 105-106, Theakston 1987, p. 79).

It was also argued that cabinet ministers still had substantial discretion over the division of responsibility for the workloads of their departments. Cabinet ministers had incentives to delegate to their junior colleagues. These derived from the overall size of departmental workloads (Theakston 1987, pp. 95-97). A central theme of the literature on the work of cabinet ministers is that they are overloaded by the demands of the different components of their work (eg Weller and Grattan 1981, p. 198). One of the reasons for the introduction and expansion of sub-cabinet level political executives has been to enhance the capacity of cabinet ministers to cope with their workloads (see Weller and Grattan 1981, pp. 207-209, RCA 1983, pp. 25-26).

Studies of the work of sub-cabinet level political executives have also identified pressures against delegation by cabinet ministers to their junior colleagues. These derive from two sources. The first consists of career rivalry. It has been argued that cabinet ministers and their junior colleagues are potential rivals for cabinet positions. This rivalry could limit the willingness of cabinet ministers to delegate extensively to their junior colleagues (Majeau 1983, p. 5, Randle 1983, p. 13, Chenier 1985, p. 407, Theakston 1987, pp. 93-94). Rose argued that it was necessary for a British junior minister ‘to attract positive comment about his work without competing with the Secretary of State over him’ (1987, p. 22). Studies have also highlighted the potential for rivalry between sub-cabinet level political executives themselves (Theakston 1987, pp. 96-97).

The second source of problems consists of poor relationships between cabinet ministers and their junior colleagues. Studies of the work of sub-cabinet level political executives have stressed the importance of ‘personal chemistry’ within teams of political executives (Weller 1980, p. 612, Majeau 1983, p. 3, Randle 1983, p. 13, Vanderhoff-Silburt 1983/84, pp. 8-9, Theakston 1987, pp. 92-94). The paramount importance of personal relationships is reflected in the following quote from a Canadian parliamentary secretary: ‘it all depends on the minister’s personality and his willingness to give you some latitude and some responsibility’ (cited by Majeau 1983, p. 5). Randle (1983, p. 14) argued that
the extent of delegation depended on the 'attitude' of the cabinet minister and the 'aptitude' of the sub-cabinet level political executive.

The Division of Responsibility from the Perspective of Sub-cabinet Level Political Executives

Studies of the work of Canadian parliamentary secretaries emphasised the importance they attached to acquiring additional parliamentary and departmental work. In particular they sought to acquire direct responsibility for functions within departments and participate in the formulation of policy (Majeau 1983, p. 5). Majeau cited a Canadian parliamentary secretary who stated: 'when a parliamentary secretary can become involved in policy and participate in meetings between the minister and officials, this is what makes the job satisfying and rewarding' (1983, p. 5). Their most important source of dissatisfaction consisted of having no work to do (Majeau 1983, p. 5). These studies of the work of Canadian parliamentary secretaries emphasised the importance of 'getting along' with the cabinet minister (Majeau 1983, p. 5). This was important because cabinet ministers could decide whether to allow their junior colleagues access to departmental work (Randle 1983, pp. 12-13). Similar arguments were evident in Theakston's study. Theakston also quoted one junior minister who stressed the potential importance of links between junior ministers and the prime minister (1987, p. 92). However this point was not examined further.

The literature on the work of sub-cabinet level political executives focuses on the problems they experience in overseeing departments. These problems derive from their lack of formal constitutional responsibility for their respective departments. Studies have stressed the 'tenuous' nature of the relationship between sub-cabinet level political executives and departments (Chenier 1985, p. 404, see also Randle 1983, pp. 12, 15, Theakston 1987, pp. 68-70, 106-108). This was most clearly evident in the event of disagreement between sub-cabinet level political executives and senior officials. Theakston (1987, pp. 106-108) argued that British junior ministers had no formal capacity to direct departments. This was because their responsibilities were delegated from the relevant cabinet minister. Junior ministers could not overrule departmental recommendations. However departments could appeal junior ministerial decisions to the cabinet minister. This meant that junior ministers were dependent on the support of the cabinet minister in the event of disagreements with their departments (Theakston 1987, pp. 79, 106-108). This applied equally to Canadian parliamentary secretaries (Majeau 1983, p. 6, Randle 1983, pp. 13-14). Theakston noted
that interest groups and the media could also ‘bypass the delegated responsibilities’ of sub-
cabinet level political executives and go directly to the relevant cabinet minister (1987, p. 
147).

Chenier argued that the capacity of Canadian ministers of state to assist to direct relevant 
officials depended in part on the characteristics of their functional responsibilities. Chenier 
found that different functions were characterised by different ‘degrees of independence or 
autonomy’ (Chenier 1985, pp. 405, 411). He argued that it was easier for ministers of 
state to assist to control autonomous functions within departments. It was more difficult 
for them to control functions which were closely related to the rest of departments. These 
difficulties were most acute when the objectives of the minister of state to assist clashed 
with those of the rest of the department and the cabinet minister (Chenier 1985, pp. 405, 
409).

**The Management of the Division of Responsibility**

Studies of the work of sub-cabinet level political executives have devoted some attention to 
the management of the division of responsibility between cabinet ministers and their junior 
colleagues. The literature emphasised variation in the extent of interaction between cabinet 
ministers and their junior colleagues. Theakston noted variation between British cabinet 
ministers in their use of formal meetings with their junior colleagues (Theakston 1987, pp. 
100-102). Randle similarly noted variation in the extent to which Canadian parliamentary 
secretaries were allowed to participate in meetings between cabinet ministers and senior 

The literature has also described variation in the circulation of information within teams of 
political executives. This variation was evident in relation to both departmental and cabinet 
information. Access to information by sub-cabinet level political executives was often 
dependent on the attitude of the relevant cabinet minister (Weller 1980, p. 611, Majeau 
1983, p. 6, Randle 1983, pp. 13-14, Vanderhoff-Silburt 1983/84, pp. 8-9, Theakston 

The literature has finally described the impact of sub-cabinet level political executives on 
the work of departmental officials. Studies have identified two sets of difficulties. The 
first consists of ‘priority confusion’. This derives from the need to service the demands of
multiple political executives. It was noted by Vanderhoff-Silburt in her study of Canadian parliamentary secretaries (1983/84, p. 9). The second set of problems derives from the need for departmental officials to balance responsiveness to a sub-cabinet level political executive with their ultimate accountability to the cabinet minister. These problems were most acute in the event of disagreement between political executives. The main problem for the perspective of departmental officials was the need to ensure that sub-cabinet level political executives maintained the confidence of the cabinet minister. This was important because of the latter’s formal responsibility for the entire department (Randle 1983, p. 15, Theakston 1987, pp. 106-108).

The third part of this chapter has examined previous studies of the work of sub-cabinet level political executives. There is evidence of considerable similarities in their approaches and findings. They each divided the work of political executives into six components. These six components were themselves usually divided into different sub-components and elements. They each focused on the division of responsibility between cabinet ministers and sub-cabinet level political executives. They usually explored different approaches to the division of responsibility from the perspectives of both cabinet ministers and sub-cabinet level political executives. They finally examined the management of the division of responsibility between cabinet ministers and their junior colleagues.

The literature stresses variation in the workloads of sub-cabinet level political executives as well as the extent of their autonomy from relevant cabinet ministers. It also emphasises the importance of relationships between cabinet ministers and their junior colleagues. It is commonly argued that the capacity of sub-cabinet level political executives to acquire work is dependent on their relationship with the relevant cabinet minister. Studies have also described variation in the extent of personal contact within teams of political executives as well as “asymmetries” in the flow of information between cabinet ministers and their junior colleagues. Studies have finally highlighted the difficulties confronted by officials in coping with teams of political executives.
Wider Implications of Sub-Cabinet Level Political Executives

The fourth part of this chapter examines the literature on the wider implications of sub-cabinet level political executives. It first examines their impact on political-bureaucratic relations. It then examines their impact on patronage and ministerial careers.

Implications for Political-Bureaucratic Relations Within Departments

The literature on the work of sub-cabinet level political executives has emphasised the complexity of political-bureaucratic relations at the departmental level. This complexity was less evident in studies of the work of cabinet ministers. Rose (1987, pp. 232-239) argued that departments could be conceptualised as collections of functional divisions. Weller and Grattan (1981, pp. 48-49) described patterns of interaction between ministers and a wide range of officials in different functional areas. However studies of the work of cabinet ministers have focused on the balance of influence between two monolithic entities: the political executive and the bureaucratic executive.

Studies of the work of sub-cabinet level political executives have stressed the complexity of political-bureaucratic relations within departments. They have not simply focused on the relationship between a single cabinet minister and their department. Instead they have emphasised the potential for the emergence of triangular relationships between cabinet ministers, sub-cabinet level political executives and departments. These relationships were most important in the event of disagreement between sub-cabinet level political executives and departments. Departments could appeal the decisions of sub-cabinet level political executives to the relevant cabinet minister. Alternatively departments could bypass sub-cabinet level political executives and deal directly with the cabinet minister. Sub-cabinet level political executives therefore needed the backing of the cabinet minister in the event of disagreement with departments (Randle 1983, p. 14). Cabinet ministers could also bypass their junior colleagues and interact directly with departments in relation to issues within the formal responsibilities of their junior colleagues. Finally there was evidence
that departments could use sub-cabinet level political executives in their dealings with the cabinet minister (Randle 1983, p. 14).

The literature on the work of sub-cabinet level political executives has also disaggregated departments into different functional areas under the direct control of different political executives (see Chenier 1985, Theakston 1987). Theakston noted the potential for the emergence of conflict between rival groups of political and bureaucratic executives. He argued that that disagreement within departments 'more often than not' involved different combinations of political and bureaucratic executives (1987, p. 106). It was less common for disagreements to pit political executives against bureaucratic executives. However this point was not developed in Theakston’s study. Theakston simply gave an example of this type of conflict within the British Ministry of Defence. He argued that 'single-service ministers ... symbolised and helped to reinforce already well-developed inter-service rivalries which had a deleterious effect on policy for the whole ministry' (1987, pp. 141-142).

(a) The Issue of Political Control. This has been a central theme of studies of the work of cabinet ministers (eg Headey 1974a, Weller and Grattan 1981, Rose 1987). The study by Weller and Grattan explicitly focused on the capacity of ministers to control their departments (1981, pp. 3-4).

The literature on the work of cabinet ministers emphasises obstacles to political control. Two obstacles have been identified. The first consists of a lack of ministerial attention to their departmental work. This has been attributed to two different factors. The first was a lack of ministerial interest in their departmental work (or more specifically departmental policy-making). This factor was most clearly evident in Rose’s study of British cabinet ministers (1987). Rose argued that political executives usually spent only a short amount of time in each department and advanced their careers on the basis of their cabinet and parliamentary work. They were interested in their departments only to the extent that they impacted on their cabinet and parliamentary work (Rose 1987, p. 84). This first factor is familiar in the wider Australian literature. Australian ministers have long been criticised for devoting too much attention to their external work and insufficient attention to their departmental work (Butler 1973, pp. 27-35, Hawker 1975, p. 18, Hughes 1976, p. 211, RCAGA 1976, pp. 60, 66-67, Wilenski 1979, pp. 34-36, RCA 1983, pp. 17-29).
Other studies have argued that ministers adopted different approaches to their departmental work. Headey (1974a, pp. 65-74) identified five different role conceptions: ‘minimalist’, ‘departmental ambassador’, ‘policy selector’, ‘policy initiator’ and ‘executive manager’. Savoie (1990, p. 189) argued that Canadian ministers could be divided into four different categories: ‘status participants’, ‘mission participants’, ‘policy participants’, and ‘process participants’. Status participants attach greatest importance to public relations work. The other categories of ministers attach far more importance to policy change. However they approach this task from different perspectives. Mission participants pursue causes or ideological agendas. Policy participants pursue rational policy outcomes. Process participants focus on representing particular client groups or regions. These ministers are most concerned with the distributional consequences of policy changes (Savoie 1990, pp. 189-195).

The second factor consists of the competing demands of other components of the work of cabinet ministers. Headey (1974a, p. 9) and Weller and Grattan (1981, pp. 40-42) both argued that most ministers attached considerable importance to their departmental work. Weller and Grattan argued that the demands of other components of their jobs distracted cabinet ministers from their departmental work (1981, pp. 204-211). Several different reforms have been proposed in an effort to increase the capacity of cabinet ministers to devote more time to their departmental work. There have been proposals to reduce the burdens of the cabinet and parliamentary work (Hughes 1976, p. 211, Wilenski 1979, pp. 35-36). There have also been efforts to bolster the resources of cabinet ministers. This assistance has come from two sources. The first has been the appointment of ministers assisting and sub-cabinet level political executives. The second has been the enlargement and politicisation of ministerial offices. These developments were described in the first chapter of this thesis. They were expected to enhance the capacity of cabinet ministers to cope with their workloads.

The second important obstacle to political control identified by the literature on the work of cabinet ministers relates to the training of cabinet ministers. This was a central theme of Headey’s study (1974a). He argued that the capacity of cabinet ministers to control their departments depended on their ‘role skills’ (1974a, p. 28). Headey concluded that the backgrounds of British cabinet ministers commonly equipped them with the ‘role skills’ to function as ‘minimalists’, ‘departmental ambassadors’ or ‘policy selectors’ rather than as ‘policy initiators’ or ‘executive managers’. This problem was exacerbated by the attitudes
of senior officials and the ‘unfavourableness’ of the situations in which cabinet ministers often found themselves (Headey 1974a, pp. 270-190). The previous chapter argued that the enlargement and politicisation of ministerial offices was expected to overcome these problems by providing ministers with access to new sources of expertise.

The issue of political control has also been an important theme in studies of the work of sub-cabinet level political executives. Two studies emerge as particularly important. The first is Chenier’s study of Canadian ministers of state to assist. This study aimed to assess whether ministers of state to assist resulted in ‘improved political control’ (1985, p. 400). The second is Theakston’s study of British junior ministers. Theakston’s study aimed to determine whether junior ministers were ‘of much use in ensuring that decisions reflect political rather than bureaucratic aims and values’. It also had a wider aim of providing a better understanding of ‘the problems involved in ensuring political control of the Whitehall machine’ (Theakston 1987, p. vii). These two studies specifically addressed the problem of maintaining political control over amalgamated departments (Chenier 1985, p. 399, Theakston 1987, p. 109). The three studies of Canadian parliamentary secretaries also devoted some attention to political-bureaucratic relations within departments and the issue of political control.

The literature reveals that sub-cabinet level political executives can contribute to increased political control in two different ways. The first can be termed their “direct” contribution. This refers to the capacity of sub-cabinet level political executives to assert close political control over a narrow range of departmental functions. It applied to sub-cabinet level political executives who had specific functional responsibilities within departments. Chenier described one of the roles of Canadian ministers of state to assist as ‘singling out issues buried in the bowels of large departments for special political attention’ (1985, p. 399). The second can be termed their “indirect” contribution. This refers to their capacity to assist cabinet ministers by relieving them of certain aspects of the workload generated by their departments (Vanderhoff-Silburt 1983/84, p. 6, Chenier 1985, p. 411, Theakston 1987, pp. 110-111, 176). It applies to all sub-cabinet level political executives (including those who lacked their own specific departmental responsibilities).

Previous studies have reached mixed conclusions about the contributions of sub-cabinet level political executives to increased political control. This was evident in relation to the issue of their “direct” contributions. Chenier argued that the appointment of ministers of
state to assist did ‘not automatically ensure or lead to greater political control over policies, programs or unelected officials’ (1985, p. 411). Chenier emphasised the difficulties confronted by ministers of state to assist in directing departmental officials. These derived from their lack of formal constitutional responsibility for departments. These difficulties were particularly acute when their functions were closely related to the rest of the relevant department. Chenier concluded that the introduction of ministers of state to assist had the potential to ‘increase . . . the power of officials over ministers, especially junior ones’ (1985, p. 411).

Theakston found ‘impressionistic evidence’ that junior ministers spent ‘relatively little of their time on problems of administration and policy-making’ (Theakston 1987, p. 177). He also highlighted the problematic relationship between junior ministers and departments. He nevertheless argued that junior ministers: ‘have surely made a difference for the better in bringing more areas of departmental activity under political supervision at an earlier stage in the policy-making process’ (Theakston 1987, p. 111). Theakston also argued that ‘Whitehall departments’ are ‘now potentially subject to more pervasive ministerial control and influence’ (1987, p. 111). This was attributed to junior ministers being ‘given real responsibility for overseeing areas of departmental work’ (1987, p. 176).

These mixed conclusions were also evident in relation to the “indirect” contribution of sub-cabinet level political executives to increased political control. Chenier suggested that ‘the use of ministers of state to assist may increase the small amount of time ministers have to oversee their departments (although only marginally in most cases)’ (1985, p. 411). Theakston was more positive in his assessment of the “indirect” contribution of British junior ministers. He argued that: ‘the workload on cabinet ministers is already too heavy; without the support of junior ministers it would be simply impossible . . . junior ministers free cabinet ministers to concentrate on their primary roles of policy formulation, decision-taking, cabinet discussions and major political and parliamentary controversies’ (1987, p. 176). Studies of the work of Canadian parliamentary secretaries emphasised the difficulties of generalising about their “indirect” contribution to political control. They stressed the extent of variation in both the workloads of different cabinet ministers and the workloads of parliamentary secretaries. Vanderhoff-Silburt (1983/84, p. 9) argued that parliamentary secretaries could assist cabinet ministers if they were used ‘beneficially’.
(b) The Issue of Coordination. Studies of the work of sub-cabinet level political executives have examined their implications for coordination and priority-setting within departments. Theakston highlighted the potential for the emergence of horizontal conflict between rival groups of political and bureaucratic executives within departments (1987, pp. 106, 141-142). Studies have also emphasised the impact of coordination and priority-setting on the work of sub-cabinet level political executives. Chenier and Theakston both emphasised that the capacity of sub-cabinet level political executives to pursue their own policy directions was constrained by demands for coordination and priority-setting within departments (Chenier 1985, pp. 403-404, 409, 411-412, Theakston 1987, pp. 104-108). Chenier explicitly argued that there was a trade-off between the importance of coordination at the bureaucratic level and the capacity of sub-cabinet level political executives to direct their functional responsibilities (1985, p. 409). Chenier argued that was much easier for sub-cabinet level political executives to direct units which enjoyed a substantial degree of independence within departments (1985, pp. 411-142).

Implications for Patronage

Studies of the work of sub-cabinet level political executives in Canada and the United Kingdom have devoted considerable attention to the significance of these positions for the relationship between chief executives and their parliamentary parties. They highlight the contribution of these positions to the function of party management (Majeau 1983, pp. 3-5, Vanderhoff-Silburt 1983/84, pp. 6-7, Chenier 1985, pp. 399-400, Theakston 1987, pp. 44, 49). This issue was examined at greatest length in Theakston’s study of British junior ministers. Theakston argued that the size of the junior ministry had grown to match increases in the size of parliamentary parties. He noted the existence of constraints on the flexibility of British prime ministers in recruiting junior ministers. Theakston nevertheless argued that the size of the junior ministry enhanced prime ministerial capacity to respond to various demands for representation within the government (1987, pp. 44-46).

This fourth part of the chapter has examined the literature on the wider implications of sub-cabinet level political executives. It found that studies have focused on their implications for political-bureaucratic relations within departments as well as for patronage and careers. Studies have emphasised the potential complexity of political-bureaucratic relations. They have also argued that sub-cabinet level political executives could contribute directly as well as indirectly to increased political control. Finally studies have emphasised the importance
of the relationship between the work of sub-cabinet level political executives and processes of coordination within departments. There was evidence that sub-cabinet level political executives had the potential to obstruct coordination within departments. However there was also evidence that departmental coordination processes could limit the capacity of sub-cabinet level political executives direct their functional responsibilities.

Conclusion

This chapter has examined two groups of literature. The first consists of studies of the work of sub-cabinet level political executives in Canada and the United Kingdom. The second consists of the literature on the 1987 machinery-of-government changes.

Studies of the work of sub-cabinet level political executives have focused on similar issues. They examined the division of responsibility between cabinet ministers and their junior colleagues for the workload of each department. They contrasted the perspectives of cabinet ministers and sub-cabinet level political executives. Finally they examined the management of the division of responsibility. These studies also reached similar findings. They emphasised the capacity of cabinet ministers to shape the division of responsibility. They also stressed the extent of variation in the approaches of different cabinet ministers to the division of responsibility. These differences were attributed to variation in the size of the workloads of different departments and the quality of personal relationships between cabinet ministers and their junior colleagues.

Studies of the work of sub-cabinet level political executives have also examined their wider implications. They focused on their implications for political-bureaucratic relations within departments as well as for patronage and careers. These studies have emphasised the potential complexity of relationships between political and bureaucratic executives. They distinguished between the “direct” and “indirect” contributions of sub-cabinet level political executives to increased political control. They also highlighted links between the work of sub-cabinet level political executives and coordination within departments. They argued that sub-cabinet level political executives had the potential to obstruct coordination within departments. However coordination within departments could also operate as a constraint on the autonomy of sub-cabinet level political executives. Finally these studies emphasised the contribution of sub-cabinet level political executives to the capacity of prime ministers to manage their respective parliamentary parties.
This chapter also reviewed the literature on the 1987 machinery-of-government changes. It has argued that most studies focused on the restructuring of the bureaucratic executive and changes to the cabinet system. There have been no substantial studies of the work of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries or the wider implications of the enlargement and restructuring of the Commonwealth political executives.

A handful of studies have briefly examined the work of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. These studies have reached similar conclusions to those contained in the wider literature on the work of sub-cabinet level political executives. They emphasised variation in the approaches of senior ministers to the division of responsibility. They emphasised the power of senior ministers and their capacity to marginalise their junior colleagues. They also emphasised the importance of relationships within teams of political executives. They described the management of the division of responsibility. They focused on the role of officials in circulating information within teams of political executives.

The literature has also devoted some attention to the wider implications of the enlargement and restructuring of the Commonwealth political executive. In common with other studies of the work of sub-cabinet level political executives it has focused on their implications for political-bureaucratic relations within departments. There was evidence of the emergence of complex links between political and bureaucratic executives at the departmental level. Studies examined the “indirect” contribution of junior ministers to greater political control over departments. They also emphasised the importance of the relationship between the work of junior ministers and coordination within departments. It was argued that junior ministers had the potential to obstruct coordination within departments. There was also evidence of the impact of coordination within departments on the work of junior ministers. The literature finally emphasised the importance of patronage considerations behind the enlargement and restructuring of the Commonwealth political executive.

The thesis uses the approaches adopted by previous studies to examine the work of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. It focuses on the division of responsibility between cabinet ministers and sub-cabinet level political executives. It identifies different approaches to the division of responsibilities and examines some of the causes and consequences of these different approaches. It also explores the roles of ministerial
offices and senior officials in managing different approaches to the division of responsibility.

The thesis also examines the wider implications of the enlargement and restructuring of the Commonwealth political executive. In common with previous studies it focuses on two key issues. It focuses on the impact of sub-cabinet level political executives on political-bureaucratic relations within portfolios. It devotes particular attention to the contribution of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries to the objective of enhanced political control. It also explores the impact of sub-cabinet level political executives on relationships between the prime minister, the parliamentary party and the political executive.
Chapter 3

Methodology

Introduction

The previous chapter reviewed the literature on the 1987 machinery-of-government changes. It argued that most studies had focused on the restructuring of the bureaucratic executive and changes to the cabinet system. By contrast little attention has been devoted to the restructuring of the political executive. There have been no systematic studies of the work of Australian junior ministers or parliamentary secretaries. There have also been no sustained attempts to examine the wider implications of the enlargement and restructuring of the Commonwealth political executive. This thesis aims to remedy these two important deficiencies in the literature.

This chapter sets out the methodology used in this thesis. It is divided into five parts. The first part describes the research strategy used in this study. It argues that this thesis adopts a similar approach to previous studies of the work of sub-cabinet level political executives. These similarities are evident in both the topics it examines and the source of the data upon which it relies.

The second part describes the characteristics of the sample of respondents interviewed for this research. A total of 75 interviews were conducted for this study. Interviews were conducted with 30 political executives, 33 senior officials, six ministerial advisers, five Labor Party backbenchers and one parliamentary official. This sample is similar to those of previous studies of the work of political executives. It compares favourably with previous studies of the work of sub-cabinet level political executives.

The third part outlines the approach to qualitative interviewing used for this research. The fourth part describes the interview schedules used in the study. These are reproduced as appendices to this thesis. The fifth part of the chapter focuses on the management of the interview process. It also explains the referencing of quotations in this thesis.
Research Strategy

The first aim of this thesis is to examine the work of Australian junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. The previous chapter argued that there had been no systematic studies of their work of either junior ministers or parliamentary secretaries. It focuses on three key issues. Firstly it examines similarities and differences in the division of responsibility between senior ministers, junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries for different components of the workload of each portfolio. Secondly it examines different approaches to the division of the responsibility from the perspective of different categories of political executives. It contrasts the perspectives of senior ministers from those of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. Thirdly it examines the management of the division of responsibility within teams of political executives. These issues are similar to those examined by studies of the work of sub-cabinet level political executives described in the previous chapter (Majeau 1983, Randle 1983, Vanderhoff-Silburt 1983/84, Chenier 1985, Theakston 1987).

The second aim of this thesis is to examine the implications of the enlargement and restructuring of the Commonwealth political executive and the introduction of teams of political executives at the head of portfolios. The previous chapter argued that Australian studies had focused on the implications of the restructuring of the bureaucratic executive. Less attention has been devoted to the implications of the restructuring of the political executive. This thesis again focuses on similar issues to those examined by previous studies of the work of sub-cabinet level political executives (Majeau 1983, Randle 1983, Vanderhoff-Silburt 1983/84, Chenier 1985, Theakston 1987).

It examines the impact of the introduction of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries on political-bureaucratic relations at the portfolio level. It focuses on their contribution to increased political control. It also examines the relationship between the work of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries and processes of coordination and priority-setting within portfolios. These two issues were both canvassed in previous studies of the work of sub-cabinet level political executives. They also received some attention in the literature on the 1987 machinery-of-government changes (see Evans 1988, pp. 66-68, Halligan, Beckett and Earnshaw 1992, pp. 16-17, Aucoin and Bakvis 1993, p. 401, Keating 1993, pp. 8, 11-12, Craswell and Davis 1994, pp. 65, 71). This thesis also examines the implications of the enlargement and restructuring of the Commonwealth political executive
for patronage and ministerial careers. This issue was canvassed in previous studies of the work of sub-cabinet level political executives as well as in the small Australian literature on junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries (Weller 1987, p. 22, Healy 1993, p. 47).

The two aims of this thesis are most appropriately addressed using qualitative research. Qualitative research can be described as an umbrella term (Denzin and Lincoln 1994, pp. 2-3). It is a diverse field characterised by multiple paradigms and multiple approaches within each paradigm. This diversity has been described as one of the strengths of the qualitative approach (Denzin and Lincoln 1994, pp. 3-4). Within qualitative research it is possible to select from a wide variety of research strategies (Janesick 1994, p. 212). The most appropriate research strategies for this thesis consist of ethnography and grounded theory. These strategies are derived from anthropology and sociology respectively (Morse 1994, p. 224). They focus on the perceptions and practices of particular groups of actors. They rely on ‘empirical materials’ derived from in-depth qualitative interviews with key participants (Denzin and Lincoln 1994, pp. 4-6).

This research strategy closely resembles those adopted by previous studies of the work of sub-cabinet level political executives. Similarities are most clearly evident in their reliance on ‘empirical materials’ derived from in-depth qualitative interviews. Theakston (1986, p. 22) conducted ‘56 interviews with serving and former office-holders at all levels over 1981 and 1982: MPs, junior ministers, cabinet ministers and senior civil servants’ for his study of British junior ministers. He emphasised the role of interviews in providing data on the ‘first hand experience of office-holders’. Interviews furnished data which was not available from other sources: most notably ‘on personal and political relations’ (Theakston 1987, pp. vii). Two studies of the work of Canadian parliamentary secretaries were also based on interview data (Majeau 1983, Randle 1983). These studies were based on interviews with parliamentary secretaries as well as both cabinet ministers and senior officials. These three groups were questioned about the work of parliamentary secretaries. Finally Weller (1980, p. 599) examined the cabinet work of non-cabinet ministers using data from interviews with Australian ‘ministers, advisers and public servants’. Only the two studies by Vanderhoff-Silbur (1983/84) and Chenier (1985) contain no indication of the use of data obtained from qualitative interviews.

This approach was also evident in studies of the work of cabinet ministers. These studies were based on interviews with political executives as well as other groups of actors with
whom they interacted in the course of their work. The actors most commonly interviewed were senior officials. Headey interviewed 50 ministers and 25 officials. His study aimed to provide ‘a minister’s eye view of his job’ (1974a, p. 7). Headey examined ministerial perceptions of priorities and problems. He relied on interviews because of the difficulty of acquiring ‘data on actual behaviour’ (1974a, p. 9). Weller and Grattan also interviewed 50 ministers and 25 officials. They similarly aimed to describe and analyse the ministerial role from the viewpoint of ministers themselves (1981, pp. 3-4). They aimed to discover ‘what ministers think’ (1981, p. 17). Studies of various parts of the work of ministers (most notably participation in the budget process) have also relied on qualitative interviews (eg Heclo and Wildavsky 1974, Weller and Cutt 1976, Savoie 1990). The study by Bakvis of Canadian regional ministers was based on ‘a total of 128 interviews’ (1991, p. 357).

Australian studies of the work of ministerial offices have also relied extensively on data derived from qualitative interviews. Walter (1986, p. 115) interviewed 23 ministerial advisers from the early period of the Hawke government. Dunn (1995, pp. 1-2) interviewed nine ministerial staffers as well as seven current or former ministers and nine departmental secretaries. Ryan (1994, p. 145) interviewed seven ministerial staffers as well as a minister and ‘three senior public servants’.

Finally many Australian studies of the work of senior officials have also used data from qualitative interviews. Most importantly the research by Craswell and Davis (1993) which was described in the previous chapter was based on data gained from interviews with 26 senior Commonwealth officials. They subsequently interviewed three former ministers as a follow-up to their initial study (Craswell and Davis 1994, p. 61, Davis 1994b, p. 34). Other studies of the work of senior officials and their interaction with political executives have also used qualitative interview data (eg Campbell and Halligan 1992a, Davis 1995, Halligan, Mackintosh and Watson 1996).

**Interview Sample**

A total of 75 interviews were conducted for this study. 30 political executives were interviewed (senior ministers, junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries). 33 senior officials were interviewed. Interviews were also conducted with six ministerial advisers, five Labor Party backbenchers and one parliamentary official.
The size of the sample compares favourably with previous studies of the work of sub-cabinet level political executives. Theakston’s study of British junior ministers was based on data from ‘56 interviews with ... MPs, junior ministers, Cabinet ministers and senior civil servants’ (1986, p. 22). The other studies of the work of sub-cabinet level political executives cited in the previous chapter provided no indication of the number of interviews upon which they were based (see Weller 1980, Majeau 1983, Randle 1983, Vanderhoff-Silburt 1983/83). The study by Majeau contains quotes from 10 named Canadian MPs. The study by Randle (1983) contains quotes from two Canadian parliamentary secretaries and two senior Canadian officials.

Two of the other studies cited in the previous section of this chapter were based on much larger number of respondents. Campbell and Halligan (1992a, 238-241) interviewed 128 senior officials. Bakvis also conducted 128 interviews (1991, p. 357). The studies of the work of cabinet ministers by Headey (1974a, pp. 297-299) and Weller and Grattan (1981, p. 17) were also based on data from 75 interviews (although their samples included a larger proportion of political executives). Many of the other interview-based studies cited in the previous section of this chapter were based on far fewer interviews. Craswell and Davis (1993, p. 185, 1994, p. 61) interviewed 26 officials and three ministers. Halligan, Mackintosh and Watson (1996, p. x) interviewed 24 senior officials. Dunn (1995, pp. 1-2) and Walter (1986, p. 115) conducted 25 and 23 interviews respectively. Ryan (1994, 145) conducted only 11 interviews. The remainder of the second part of this chapter describes the characteristics of the interview sample in greater detail.

Junior Ministers and Parliamentary Secretaries

There were a total of 40 junior ministers during the period between 1987 and 1996. Table 3.1 lists their names as well as the titles of the positions in which they served. There were a total of 21 parliamentary secretaries during the period under review (including the three briefly appointed in 1987). Table 3.2 lists their names and the cabinet portfolios in which they served. Eight individuals served at different times as both junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Junior Minister</th>
<th>Official Titles(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Baldwin, Hon. P.  | Minister for Employment and Education Services  
                      Minister for Higher Education and Employment Services  
                      *Minister Assisting the Treasurer* |
| Beddall, Hon. D.  | Minister for Communications  
                      Minister for Resources  
                      Minister for Small Business and Customs  
                      Minister for Small Business, Construction and Customs |
| Bilney, Hon. G.   | Minister for Defence Science and Personnel  
                      Minister for Development Co-operation and Pacific Island Affairs |
| Blewett, Hon. N.  | Minister for Trade and Overseas Development  
                      Minister for Trade Negotiations  
                      *Minister Assisting the Minister for Industry, Technology and Commerce*  
                      *Minister Assisting the Minister for Primary Industries and Energy* |
| Bolkus, Senator N.| Minister for Consumer Affairs  
                      *Minister Assisting the Treasurer for Prices* |
| Brown, Hon. B.    | Minister for Land Transport  
                      Minister for Land Transport and Shipping Support |
| Collins, Senator B.| Minister for Shipping  
                      Minister for Shipping and Aviation  
                      Minister for Shipping and Aviation Support  
                      *Minister Assisting the Prime Minister for Northern Australia* |
| Cook, Senator P.  | Minister for Resources  
                      Minister for Shipping and Aviation Support |
| Crean, Hon. S.    | Minister for Science and Technology  
                      *Minister Assisting the Prime Minister for Science*  
                      *Minister Assisting the Treasurer* |
| Crowley, Senator R.| Minister for Family Services  
                      *Minister Assisting the Prime Minister for the Status of Women* |
| Duffy, Hon. M.,   | Minister for Trade Negotiations  
                      *Minister Assisting the Minister for Industry, Technology and Commerce*  
                      *Minister Assisting the Minister for Primary Industries and Energy* |
| Duncan, Hon. P.   | Minister for Employment and Education Services  
                      Minister for Land Transport and Infrastructure Support |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Ministry</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fatin, Hon. W.</td>
<td>Minister for Local Government Minister for the Arts and Territories</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Minister Assisting the Prime Minister for the Status of Women</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faulkner, Senator J.</td>
<td>Minister for Defence Science and Personnel Minister for Sport and Territories Minister for Veterans' Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Minister Assisting the Prime Minister</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Minister Assisting the Prime Minister on Science</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Minister Assisting the Treasurer</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free, Hon. R.</td>
<td>Minister for Schools, Vocational Education and Training Minister for Science and Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Minister Assisting the Prime Minister</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Minister Assisting the Prime Minister on Science</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Minister Assisting the Treasurer</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gear, Hon. G.</td>
<td>Assistant Treasurer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Griffiths, Hon. A.</td>
<td>Minister for Resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hand, Hon. G.</td>
<td>Minister for Aboriginal Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holding, Hon C.</td>
<td>Minister for Employment Services and Youth Affairs Minister for the Arts and Territories Minister for the Arts, Tourism and Territories Minister for Transport and Communications Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Minister Assisting the Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Minister Assisting the Prime Minister</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Minister Assisting the Treasurer</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humphreys, Hon. B.</td>
<td>Minister for Veterans' Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Minister Assisting the Prime Minister for Northern Australia</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johns, Hon. G.</td>
<td>Assisting Minister for Industrial Relations Special Minister of State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Minister Assisting the Prime Minister for Public Service Matters</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Vice President of the Executive Council</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jones, Hon. B.</td>
<td>Minister for Science and Small Business Minister for Science, Customs and Small Business</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Minister Assisting the Prime Minister for Science and Technology</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kelly, Hon. R.</td>
<td>Minister for Defence Science and Personnel Minister for Telecommunications and Aviation Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kerin, Hon. J.</td>
<td>Minister for Trade and Overseas Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kerr, Hon. J.</td>
<td>Minister for Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lee, Hon. M.</td>
<td>Minister for Resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McHugh, Hon. J.</td>
<td>Minister for Consumer Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morris, Hon. P.</td>
<td>Minister for Housing and Aged Care Minister for Resources Minister for Transport and Communications Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Minister Assisting the Prime Minister</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Minister Assisting the Treasurer</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister</td>
<td>Position</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Punch, Hon. G. | Minister for Defence Science and Personnel  
Minister for Telecommunications and Aviation Support  
Minister for the Arts and Territories |
| Ray, Senator R. | Minister for Home Affairs  
*Minister Assisting the Minister for Transport and Communications* |
| Reynolds, Senator, M. | Minister for Local Government  
*Minister Assisting the Prime Minister for the Status of Women* |
| Richardson, Senator G. | Minister for the Environment and Territories |
| Ryan, Senator S. | Special Minister of State  
Minister Assisting the Minister for Community Services and Health  
Minister Assisting the Prime Minister for the Bicentenary  
Minister Assisting the Prime Minister for the Status of Women |
| Schacht, Senator C. | Minister for Science and Small Business  
Minister for Small Business, Construction and Customs  
*Minister Assisting the Prime Minister for Science* |
| Sciacca, Hon C. | Minister for Veterans' Affairs |
| Simmons, Hon. D. | Minister for Defence Science and Personnel  
Minister for Family Support  
Minister for Local Government  
Minister for the Arts, Tourism and Territories |
| Staples, Hon P. | Minister for Consumer Affairs  
Minister for Housing and Aged Care  
Minister for the Aged, Family and Health Services  
*Minister Assisting the Treasurer for Prices* |
| Tate, Senator M. | Minister for Justice  
Minister for Justice and Consumer Affairs  
*Minister Assisting the Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs* |
| Tickner, Hon R. | Minister for Aboriginal Affairs  
Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs  
*Minister Assisting the Prime Minister for Aboriginal Reconciliation* |
| Walker, Hon. F. | Minister for Administrative Services  
Special Minister of State  
*Vice-President of the Executive Council* |

The official title(s) of junior ministers are listed in alphabetical order rather than the order in which the positions were held.

The italicised titles refer to "minister assisting" appointments.

Compiled from lists of ministers and titles published by the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet.
Table 3.2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parliamentary Secretary</th>
<th>Cabinet Portfolio(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bevis, Hon. A.</td>
<td>Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brereton, Hon. L.</td>
<td>Prime Minister and Cabinet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crawford, Hon. M.</td>
<td>Housing and Regional Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crosio, Hon. J.</td>
<td>Arts and Administrative Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Environment, Sport and Territories</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duncan Hon. P.</td>
<td>Attorney-General's</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elliot, Hon. P.</td>
<td>Communications and the Arts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Treasury</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free, Hon. R.</td>
<td>Prime Minister and Cabinet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johns Hon. G.</td>
<td>Health, Housing and Community Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Treasury</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kelly, Hon. R.</td>
<td>Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lindsay, Hon. E.</td>
<td>Industry, Technology and Regional Development*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McMullan, Senator B.</td>
<td>Treasury</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martin, Hon. S.</td>
<td>Foreign Affairs and Trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O'Keefe, Hon. N.</td>
<td>Transport and Communications*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Price, Hon. R.</td>
<td>Prime Minister and Cabinet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punch, Hon. G.</td>
<td>Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reynolds, Senator M.</td>
<td>Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sciaccia, Hon. C.</td>
<td>Arts and Administrative Services*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sherry, Senator N.</td>
<td>Primary Industries and Energy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Snowdon, Hon. W.</td>
<td>Employment, Education and Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Environment, Sport and Territories</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Transport and Communications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tate, Senator M.</td>
<td>Attorney-General's</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theophanous, Hon. A.</td>
<td>Health, Housing, Local Government and Community Services*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Prime Minister and Cabinet</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cabinet portfolios in which each parliamentary secretary was located are listed in alphabetical order.

Titles of cabinet portfolios operational at the time each parliamentary secretary was initially appointed. Asterisk indicates subsequent change in their title during the period of service of the relevant parliamentary secretary.

Compiled from lists of ministers and portfolios published by the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet.

21 of the 29 political executives interviewed for this study had served as junior ministers during the period under review (53 per cent of all junior ministers). 11 of the 29 political
executives interviewed for this study has served as parliamentary secretaries (52 per cent of all parliamentary secretaries).

It was not possible to interview all junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries from the period under review. It was therefore important to ensure that the sample of interviewees was characterised by the maximum possible variation. Patton (1990, p. 172) has argued that 'any common patterns that emerge from great variation are of particular interest and value'. It was necessary to identify important potential sources of variation in the work of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries and ensure that these are reflected in the sample. Two important sources of variation were the cabinet portfolios in which junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries were based and the senior minister (or ministers) under whom they worked.

There were a total of 19 different cabinet portfolios in existence at different times during the period between 1987 and 1996. The number at any one time varied between 16 and 18. Junior ministers were appointed at various times to 16 of these 19 cabinet portfolios. They were appointed under 44 different official titles. Parliamentary secretaries were also appointed at various times to 16 of these 19 cabinet portfolios (although not necessarily to the same portfolios). The junior ministers interviewed for this study had experience in 15 of the 16 cabinet portfolios in which junior ministers served (93 per cent). They also had 29 different titles (66 percent). The sample of parliamentary secretaries interviewed for this study had experience in 14 of the 16 cabinet portfolios in which parliamentary secretaries served (88 per cent).

There were a total of 35 senior ministers during the period between 1987 and 1996. Table 3.3 lists their names as well as the cabinet portfolios in which they served. Only six of these senior ministers had no direct experience with junior ministers. The remaining 29 all had junior ministers at one stage of their careers. Only nine senior ministers did not work alongside a parliamentary secretary. The remaining 26 had parliamentary secretaries. The sample of junior ministers interviewed for this study had worked alongside 25 of the 29 senior ministers who had junior ministers at one stage in their careers (86 per cent). The sample of parliamentary secretaries interviewed for this study had worked alongside 18 of the 26 senior minister who had parliamentary secretaries (69 per cent).
Table 3.3
Senior Ministers (1987-1996)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Senior Minister</th>
<th>Cabinet Portfolio(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baldwin, Hon. P.</td>
<td>Social Security</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Beazley, Hon. K.   | Defence  
                       Employment, Education and Training  
                       Finance  
                       Transport and Communications  |
| Blewett, Hon. N.   | Community Services and Health  
                       Social Security  |
| Bolkus, Senator N. | Administrative Services  
                       Immigration and Ethnic Affairs  |
| Bowen, Hon. L.     | Attorney-General's                                                            |
| Brereton, Hon. L.  | Industrial Relations  
                       Transport  |
| Brown, Hon. J.     | Arts, Sport, the Environment, Tourism and Territories  |
| Button, Senator J. | Industry, Technology and Commerce                                              |
| Collins, Senator B.| Primary Industries and Energy  
                       Transport and Communications  |
| Cook, Senator P.   | Foreign Affairs and Trade  
                       Industrial Relations  
                       Industry, Technology and Regional Development*  |
| Crean, Hon. S.     | Employment, Education and Training  
                       Primary Industries and Energy  |
| Dawkins, Hon. J.   | Employment, Education and Training  
                       Treasury  |
| Duffy, Hon. M.     | Attorney-General's                                                            |
| Evans, Senator G.  | Foreign Affairs and Trade  
                       Transport and Communications  |
| Faulkner, Senator J. | Environment, Sport and Territories  |
| Griffiths, Hon. A. | Industry, Technology and Regional Development  
                       Tourism  |
| Hand, Hon G.       | Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs  |
| Hawke, Hon. R.     | Prime Minister and Cabinet                                                       |
| Hayden, Hon. B.    | Foreign Affairs and Trade                                                         |
| Holding, Hon. C.   | Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs  |
| Howe, Hon. B.      | Community Services and Health*  
                       Housing and Regional Development  
                       Social Security  |
| Keating, Hon. P.   | Prime Minister and Cabinet                                                        
                       Treasury  |
| Kelly, Hon. R.     | Arts, Sport, the Environment, Tourism and Territories*  |
| Kerin, Hon. J.     | Primary Industries and Energy  
                       Transport and Communications  
                       Treasury  |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Portfolio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lavarch, Hon. M.</td>
<td>Attorney-General's</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lawrence, Hon. C.</td>
<td>Human Services and Health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lee, Hon. M.</td>
<td>Communications*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tourism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McMullan, Senator B.</td>
<td>Arts and Administrative Services*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Foreign Affairs and Trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morris, Hon. P.</td>
<td>Industrial Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ray, Senator R.</td>
<td>Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richardson, Senator G.</td>
<td>Arts, Sport, the Environment, Tourism and Territories</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Environment, Sport and Territories</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Health, Housing, Local Government and Community Services*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Transport and Communications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walsh, Senator P.</td>
<td>Finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West, Hon. S.</td>
<td>Administrative Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willis, Hon. R.</td>
<td>Finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Industrial Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Transport and Communications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Treasury</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young, Hon. M.</td>
<td>Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cabinet portfolios are listed in alphabetical order.

Titles of cabinet portfolios operational at time of initial appointment of each cabinet minister. Asterisk indicates subsequent change in their title under the same senior minister.

Does not include temporary appointment of Hon. R. Hawke as Treasurer between 3 June and 4 June 1991 following resignation of Hon. P. Keating.

Does not include temporary appointment of Hon D. Kerr as Attorney-General between 24 March 1993 and 27 April 1993 pending the election of Hon. M. Lavarch.

Compiled from lists of ministers and portfolios published by the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet.

A third dimension of variation consists of the period in which interviewees held office as junior ministers. The sample of junior ministers interviewed for this study held office as junior ministers at different times throughout the period under review. Interviews were conducted with 11 of the 19 junior ministers from the term of office immediately following the introduction of the changes (July 1987 to April 1990) (58 per cent). Seven of the 18 junior ministers who served between April 1990 and March 1993 were interviewed (39 per cent). Finally eight of the 15 junior ministers who held office between March 1993 and March 1996 were interviewed (54 per cent).
Other Relevant Actors

Interviews were not just conducted with junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. They were also conducted with a number of other relevant actors. These can be divided into five categories: senior ministers, ministerial advisers, Labor Party backbenchers, senior officials and parliamentary officials.

As previously noted there were a total of 35 senior ministers during the period under review. Eight of these were interviewed. These senior ministers had experience in 10 different cabinet portfolios. They had worked alongside 12 different junior ministers and 10 different parliamentary secretaries. Interviews were conducted with four current and two former ministerial advisers. Five of these were advisers to senior ministers. One had also been an adviser to a junior minister. The other was an adviser to a parliamentary secretary. Six of the senior officials interviewed for this study also reported extensive experience in the office of a minister (four in the office of a senior minister, two in a junior ministerial office). Five backbenchers were interviewed.

The fourth category of other relevant actors consisted of senior officials. A total of 33 senior officials were interviewed for this study. Ten were current or former members of departmental executives (secretaries or deputy secretaries) or held equivalent positions in portfolio agencies. The remainder were senior line officials (first assistant secretaries or assistant secretaries). These officials were chosen from divisions and agencies within the direct functional responsibilities of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. The senior officials interviewed for this study were drawn from 12 different cabinet portfolios. This represents 80 per cent of the cabinet portfolios which contained junior ministers during the period under review. Interviews were also conducted with two senior officials from the “sub-cabinet level” Veterans’ Affairs portfolio. One interview was conducted with a senior parliamentary official. Table 3.4 summarises the sample of respondents interviewed for this study.

Approaches to Qualitative Interviewing

Patton (1990, p. 280) has identified three basic approaches to qualitative interviewing: the ‘informal conversational interview’ approach, the ‘general interview guide’ approach and
the ‘standardised open-ended interview’ approach. The difference between these three approaches lies in the extent to which the order and wording of questions is determined in advance.

Table 3.4

Summary of Interview Sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Senior Ministers</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junior Ministers</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliamentary Secretaries</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Total</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministerial Advisers</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALP Backbenchers</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior Officials</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliamentary Officials</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The sample of political executives interviewed for this study included individuals who served as both parliamentary secretaries and junior ministers as well as individuals who served as both junior ministers and senior ministers. For this reason the sub-total of 30 is smaller than the sum of the numbers corresponding to the three categories of political executives.

This study has used Patton’s ‘general interview guide’ approach (1990, p. 280). Within this approach questions can be framed in greater or lesser detail. At one extreme it is possible simply to list a set of topics to be canvassed in an interview. At the other extreme researchers can maintain a much more rigid adherence to a particular order and wording of potential questions (Patton 1990, p. 287).

This study has adopted the latter of these two approaches during earlier interviews. This was due to a relative lack of experience with qualitative interviewing techniques. During later interviews questions were asked in different orders and in different ways. This more flexible approach offered several important advantages. Firstly it allowed interviewees to discuss topics in any order rather than in order in which they were listed in the interview schedules. This allowed the interviews to flow and made better use of scarce time. It also
enabled interviewees to pursue at greater length topics which they regarded as particularly important.

The use of the ‘general interview guide’ approach also has some disadvantages which must be borne in mind. It still does not allow as much flexibility as the ‘informal conversational interview’ approach. Furthermore, in comparison with the 'standardised open-ended interview' approach, there is the danger that important issues might be neglected since questions can remain unasked. The failure to pose identical questions in identical order can also reduce the comparability of the data obtained (see Patton 1990, pp. 288-289). However these disadvantages did not outweigh the benefits of the 'general interview guide' approach.

**Interview Schedules**

Two interview schedules were used to guide the interviews upon which this thesis is based. The first was the interview schedule for political executives. This was developed primarily for use in interviewing junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries as well as their respective advisers. It was used in a modified form for interviewing senior ministers and their advisers. The second was the interview schedule for bureaucratic executives. This was developed primarily for use in interviewing senior line officials who reported directly to junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. It was used in a modified form to interview more senior officials who were members of departmental executives.

Different interview schedules were also used for interviews with the five Labor party backbenchers and the single parliamentary official interviewed for this study. The political and bureaucratic interview schedules are reproduced in full in as appendices to the thesis. The fourth part of this chapter describes the main features of the political and bureaucratic interview schedules.

**Interview Schedule for Political Executives**

This interview schedule contained 37 questions and was divided into eight sections. The first section explored variation in the overall jobs of senior ministers, junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries as well as the priorities of individual political executives.
The next three sections each explored the departmental work of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. The second section examined their functional responsibilities. It focused on the process by which responsibility for each cabinet portfolio was formally divided between senior ministers, junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. It also surveyed the objectives of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries in relation to the formal division of responsibility and examined their capacity to realise these objectives.

The third section examined the operation of the division of responsibility between senior ministers and their junior colleagues. It was the largest section of the interview schedule. It contained 10 questions. It was concerned with five key topics. The first was the extent to which senior ministers were involved in the functions of their junior colleagues. The second was the involvement of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries in functions beyond their direct responsibilities. The third was the participation of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries in coordination and priority-setting within their respective cabinet portfolios. The fourth topic consisted of patterns of interaction within teams of ministers and parliamentary secretaries. Finally political executives were questioned about how the division of responsibility could be improved.

The fourth section examined interaction between junior ministers, parliamentary secretaries and senior officials. It focused on relationships with senior line officials within their direct functional responsibilities. It focused on two sets of issues. The first was whether different categories of political executives interacted with different types of officials. The second was whether junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries were treated differently by officials and had less influence over officials than senior ministers. Questions focused on the capacity of officials to appeal the decisions of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries to their senior colleagues.

The fifth section focused on the cabinet participation of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. It examined their roles in both the general cabinet process and the budget/ERC process. It focused on variation in the division of responsibility between senior ministers, junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries for different types of cabinet work generated by their respective cabinet portfolios.

The sixth and seventh sections examined the remaining components of the work of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. The sixth section focused on their parliamentary
and party work. The seventh examined their interest group and public relations work. The study explored the division of responsibility for this work between senior ministers, junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries.

The eighth section contained two questions. The first was whether junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries were full utilised under the new arrangements. The second was whether the new arrangements could be improved.

**Interview Schedule for Bureaucratic Executives**

This interview schedule consisted of 31 questions. It too was divided into eight sections. The first section contained a single question. Officials were questioned about the division of functional responsibilities within teams of political executives. They were asked why particular functional areas were allocated to junior ministers or parliamentary secretaries rather than the senior minister.

The second section examined the relationship between senior officials and the relevant junior minister or parliamentary secretary. It focused on two sets of issues. The first was the expectations of officials concerning political executives. The second was whether there were systematic differences in the capacity of senior ministers, junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries to perform in accordance with these expectations.

The third section focused on the relationship between senior line officials who reported directly to junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries and the relevant senior minister. It was also concerned with two sets of issues. The first was the relationship between these senior line officials and the senior minister. It was particularly concerned about whether these links were initiated by officials or by senior ministers. The second was the role of senior officials in coping with disagreements within teams of political executives.

The fourth section examined ministerial offices. Senior officials were questioned about how their work had been affected by the expansion and politicisation of ministerial offices. They were also asked about the most important roles of ministerial offices.

The fifth section focused on relationships at the bureaucratic level between officials within cabinet portfolios. Officials were questioned about the extent of policy development and
program delivery linkages between their functions and other functional areas within their portfolios. They were questioned about how these overlapping issues were coordinated at the bureaucratic level. Finally they were questioned about the impact of the introduction of teams of political executives of the coordination of these types of overlaps. They were also questioned about the budget process.

The sixth and seventh sections of the interview schedule were designed to explore official perceptions of the work of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries in dealing with cabinet, interest groups and public relations. The two sections contained a total of seven questions. Officials were asked about the division of responsibility between senior minister, junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries for these three aspects of their work. They were also questioned about the capacity of junior ministers to represent their functions in the cabinet process as well as the capacity of interest groups to “shop around” within teams of political executives.

The eighth section consisted of four questions. Senior officials were asked to evaluate the costs and benefits of the introduction of teams of political. They were asked about how the system could be improved. They were also asked about whether these changes had increased political control and about their impact on processes of coordination and priority-setting within portfolios.

Management of the Interview Process

Management of the interview process involves decisions about three sets of issues. The first relates to access to interviewees and the order in which interviews are carried out. Potential respondents were identified through official directories and approached using formal letters, supplemented where necessary with follow-up telephone calls. Interviews were conducted in three stages. 33 interviews were conducted during May and June 1995. These were almost solely with political executives (mostly junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries) and backbenchers. A further 30 interviews were conducted during March and April 1996, all with senior officials. These interviews were conducted following the defeat of the Keating government and after the close of the period under review. Finally 12 interviews with former political executives and senior officials were conducted between November 1996 and February 1997.
The issue of access also covers ethical questions. The most important interviewer obligations are those that relate to confidentiality. Researchers have an obligation to protect the anonymity of respondents (Weiss 1994, pp. 131-134). However this can conflict with the demands of academic transparency and the free dissemination of research findings. Respondents participated in interviews on confidential basis. Following the practice adopted by Bakvis (1991, p. 357) each interviewee has been assigned a number. References and quotations which appear in this thesis each include an interviewee number and a page number. The page number refers to the relevant notes or transcript.

A second set of issues relates to the management of individual interviews themselves. All but two of the interviews were conducted at the interviewee’s office. Interviews ranged from 30 minutes to one and a half hours in duration. Most lasted for between 45 minutes and 1 hour.

The third set of issues relate to data collection. According to Hammer and Wildavsky (1989, pp. 70-71) these issues revolve around a central question: ‘to tape or not to tape’. Different researchers have answered this question in different ways. For example, Weiss (1994, p. 54) generally favours the use of tape recorders, while Hammer and Wildavsky (1989, p. 71) ‘prefer to take notes’ during interviews. This divergence extends to studies of the work of ministers. Weller and Grattan (1981, p. 18) adopted a ‘general procedure’ of taping all interviews with ministers. They reported no substantial difficulties with this approach. By contrast, Headey eschewed the assistance of a tape recorder. Headey (1974, p. 23) argued that the use of a tape recorder ‘might well have precluded frankness, even if it had not led to an outright refusal to be interviewed’. Headey noted ‘potentially quotable responses’ during the course of his interviews, writing-up full notes ‘as soon as possible’ after their completion (see also Bakvis 1991, p. 357).

Each approach has its advantages and disadvantages. The use of a tape recorder brings with it some important advantages. Most importantly, it permits the researcher to produce a verbatim transcript of the interview. It also allows the interviewer to devote full attention to the task of developing and maintaining rapport with the respondent. By contrast note taking can only produce an incomplete record of the interview and also has the potential to distract both the interviewer and interviewee (Hammer and Wildavsky 1989, Weiss 1994, pp. 53-54). However, tape recorders also have important disadvantages. Firstly they can be unreliable. Secondly they generate vast amounts of empirical material which must be
transcribed into written form. The process of transcription can be extremely expensive and time-consuming. It too is prone to error. Thirdly and most importantly, the use of a tape recorder has the potential to affect the behaviour of respondents (eg Williams 1980, p. 304). It has the potential to reduce the candour of interviewees.

The data upon which this thesis is based was collected using both of these approaches. Extensive notes were taken during the first stage of interviews conducted during May and June 1995. Interviews undertaken during the second and third stages were taped. Many of the quotes that appear in the remainder of this thesis come from taped interviews.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has described the research strategy used in this study. In common with previous studies of the work of sub-cabinet level political executives it has focused on four sets of issues. It examines similarities and differences in the division of responsibility between senior ministers and their junior colleagues for different components of the workloads of each portfolio. It examines these different approaches from the perspective of senior ministers. It also examines them from the perspectives of both junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. It finally examines the management of the division of responsibility within portfolios.

This thesis also adopts a similar approach to previous studies in exploring the implications of the enlargement restructuring of the Commonwealth political executive. It focuses on the implications of the changes for political-bureaucratic relations within portfolios as well as for ministerial careers and patronage.

In common with previous studies of the work of sub-cabinet level political executives this study is based on data obtained from in-depth qualitative interviews from sub-cabinet level political executives and those with whom they work. It is based on 75 interviews with junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries as well as those with whom they worked (most importantly senior ministers and senior officials). The size of this sample compares favourably with previous studies of the work of sub-cabinet level political executives. Interviews were conducted with 53 per cent of all junior ministers and 52 per cent of all parliamentary secretaries. However the sample of junior ministers had experience in 93 per cent of cabinet portfolios which contained junior ministers and with 86 per cent of
senior ministers who worked alongside junior ministers. The sample of parliamentary secretaries had experience in 88 per cent of the portfolios which contained parliamentary secretaries and with 69 per cent of senior ministers who had worked alongside parliamentary secretaries. Finally the sample of senior officials had experience in 80 per cent of the cabinet portfolios which contained junior ministers during the period under review.
Chapter 4

The Work of Junior Ministers and Parliamentary Secretaries

Introduction

This chapter examines the work of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. It is divided into three parts. The first part sets out a new framework for conceptualising the work of political executives. It divides their jobs into six components. These are grouped under four headings. These four headings are examined in turn.

The second part argues that the introduction of teams of political executives necessitated the introduction of a new division of responsibility for portfolio management and cabinet representation between senior ministers, junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. It further argues that this new division of responsibility can be conceptualised in terms of overlapping horizontal and vertical dimensions.

The third part examines the operation of the division of responsibility for portfolio management and cabinet representation within teams of political executives. It argues that the division of responsibility for portfolio management and cabinet representation could operate in a variety of different ways. It described different approaches to the division of responsibility for portfolio management and cabinet representation. It also examines the division of responsibility for parliamentary and party work between senior ministers and their junior colleagues.

The Work of Commonwealth Political Executives

The first part of this chapter sets out a new framework for conceptualising the work of political executives. This new framework is necessary to accommodate the complexity of
the division of responsibility between senior ministers and their junior colleagues for the workloads of portfolios.

Chapter two identified four key studies of the work of political executives (Headey 1974a, Weller and Grattan 1981, Rose 1987, Theakston 1987). These studies each divided the work of political executives into six basic components: departmental work, cabinet work, parliamentary work, party work, interest group work and public relations work (Headey 1974a, p. 39, Weller and Grattan 1981, p. 18, Rose 1987, pp. 80-81, Theakston 1987). These six components were often further divided into separate sub-components. They were also grouped together under different headings. Departmental and cabinet work was invariably examined separately. The remaining four components were grouped together in different combinations. Theakston examined them all under a single heading: ‘junior ministers in parliament and as departmental ambassadors’ (1987, pp. 125-147). Headey (1974a, pp. 52-54) grouped together parliamentary and party work and interest group and public relations work. Weller and Grattan (1981) adopted a slightly different approach. They combined parliamentary, party and interest group work under one heading. Public relations work was examined under a separate heading.

In common with previous studies this thesis divides the work of political executives into six components. These components are grouped together under four headings: portfolio management, cabinet participation, parliamentary work and backbench interaction.

**Portfolio Management**

Portfolio management is an umbrella term which includes three components of the work of political executives: interaction with senior officials, interaction with interest groups and clients and broader public relations. Previous studies examined these components under separate headings. However interviews conducted for this thesis emphasised the need to examine them under a single heading.

**(a) Interaction with Senior Officials.** Political executives headed portfolios. These comprised both departments and agencies. Agencies often formed an important part of the responsibilities of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. Departments can also be conceptualised as collections of functional divisions headed by a common secretary and departmental executive (Rose 1987, pp. 232-239).
Interaction between political executives and senior officials involved two types of issues. The first type of issues could be contained within the boundaries of a single division or agency. They were characterised by an absence of bureaucratic level overlap. Following Theakston (1987, pp. 77-92) these issues can be divided into routine administration and functional policy change (eg Interviewee 28, pp. 12-13).

The second types of issues involved coordination and priority-setting across different divisions (and agencies). This could involve the coordination of policy development and program delivery overlaps. The budget process was a second source of bureaucratic level overlap. It involved trade-offs between divisions at the departmental level and between departments and agencies at the portfolio level. This was important even in the absence of policy development and program delivery overlaps. The following statement by a senior official describes these two different sources of bureaucratic level overlap.

The problem of demarcation comes up in two ways. One is that the budget makes the demarcation different. Because Finance cuts across the portfolio even if the functions don’t. So there’s a tension there. The other one is that if you’re looking at things like Aged Care and Disabilities for example as programs, they obviously interlink with Health (Interviewee 58, p. 1).

(b) Interaction with Interest Groups and Clients. Chapter two argued that there had been few attempts to distinguish between different aspects of the interest group work of political executives. The main exception was Theakston’s (1987) study of the work of British junior ministers. Theakston distinguished between national and local interest groups (1987, p. 140, see also Vanderhoff-Silburt 1983/84, p. 8). He also distinguished between routine representation and policy negotiations (1987, pp. 138-140). Interviewees emphasised the importance of the distinction between routine representation and policy negotiations (eg Interviewee 46, pp. 7-8). This thesis therefore divides the interest group and client interaction work of political executives into two sub-components. The first consists of routine representation. The second consists of policy negotiations.

(c) Public Relations. Chapter two also argued that there had also been few attempts to distinguish between different aspects of the public relations work of political executives. The main exception was Weller and Grattan’s (1981) study of the work of Australian government ministers. This study distinguished between different branches of the media, different levels of media and different modes of interaction (Weller and Grattan 1981, pp. 154-165). Interviewees emphasised the importance of the distinction between different levels of media (Interviewee 02, p. 4). The thesis therefore adopts a modified version of
the second dimension of variation identified by Weller and Grattan (1981). It divides the public relations work of political executives into two sub-components: interaction with regional, local and specialist media representatives and interaction with the Canberra press gallery and national media representatives.

Cabinet Participation

Chapter two argued that most previous studies of the work of political executives simply referred to cabinet participation. They did not explicitly divide the cabinet work of political executives into separate components. The main exception was Headey’s (1974a) study of British cabinet ministers. Headey identified two potential cabinet roles: ‘departmental battle-axe’ and ‘cabinet all-rounder’ (Headey 1974a, p. 49). This thesis divides cabinet participation into two sub-components: cabinet representation and cabinet coordination and priority-setting. Cabinet representation is similar to the role of ‘departmental battle-axe’ (which was described by Headey 1974a, p. 49). Cabinet coordination and priority-setting consists of participation by political executives in broader cabinet discussions not directly related to their individual portfolio responsibilities. This is analogous to Headey’s role of ‘cabinet all-rounder’ (1974a, p. 49).

Most previous studies of the cabinet work of political executives simply refer to the cabinet process. Interviewees emphasised the complexity of the Commonwealth cabinet system. They revealed that the cabinet system could be divided into two components. The first consisted of the general cabinet system. The second consisted of the budget/ERC process. The budget/ERC process was described as the most important part of the cabinet system (eg Interviewee 33, p. 8). It emerged as a focal point of coordination and priority-setting at the cabinet level (Interviewee 51, p. 9, see also Interviewee 05, pp. 10-11). During the period in which the interviews for this study took place the budget/ERC process consisted of three stages. The first consisted of preliminary negotiations between the Treasurer, the Minister for Finance and representatives of each portfolio. These were termed “trilaterals” (Interviewee 04, p. 2). The second consisted of scrutiny of portfolio budget submissions by the ERC. The budget submissions of each portfolio were subject to ERC approval (Interviewee 43, p. 6). The third consisted of budget cabinet. Cabinet representation could therefore be carried out within both the general cabinet process and the budget/ERC process.
Parliamentary Work

Previous studies of the work of political executives have divided their parliamentary work into many different sub-components. Weller and Grattan (1981, pp. 137-143) divided the parliamentary work of Australian ministers into four sub-components: general duty, government bills, other debates and question time. Theakston (1987, pp. 126-136) divided the parliamentary work of British junior ministers into four slightly different sub-components: bills, other debates, question time and interaction with backbenchers (1987, pp. 126-136). Two studies of the work of Canadian parliamentary secretaries divided this aspect of their jobs into three sub-components: ‘parliamentary work’, ‘committee work’ and ‘extra-parliamentary work’. This third part consisted of interaction with backbenchers (Majeau 1983, p. 6, Vanderhoff-Silburt 1983/84, pp. 7-8).

This thesis follows the approach adopted by Weller and Grattan (1981). It divides the parliamentary work of political executives into four sub-components. Interviewees revealed that the two most important aspects of the parliamentary work of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries were overseeing government legislation and participation in question time. This work could be performed within either the House of Representatives or the Senate.

Party Interaction

Chapter two argued that this component was accorded little attention by most previous studies of the work of political executives. It was often examined as an extension of their parliamentary work (Headey 1974a, pp. 50-52, Majeau 1983, p. 6, Vanderhoff-Silburt 1983/84. pp. 7-8, Theakston 1987, pp. 143-150). An important exception was Weller and Grattan’s study of the work of Australian ministers (1981). This study distinguished between interaction with the party machine and interaction with the parliamentary party. It divided interaction with the parliamentary party into two parts: interaction with individual backbenchers and interaction with committees (1981, pp. 143-150).

Interviewees emphasised the importance of interaction between political executives and the parliamentary party (eg Interviewee 64, p. 4). Interaction with the parliamentary party was divided into two sub-components. The first sub-component derived from the routine party business generated by each portfolio. It included interaction with individual
backbenchers, caucus committees and full caucus meetings. This first sub-component can be termed routine portfolio representation. It can be distinguished from participation in wider caucus politics and the cultivation of individual party status. This second sub-component includes interaction with party factions. The parliamentary party was divided into three factions during the period under review (the Right, the Centre-Left and the Left). It also included a number of non-aligned backbenchers (Lloyd and Swan 1987). Political executives were almost invariably members of a faction. This was because the factions were the principal avenues of recruitment to the political executive. Almost all ministerial and parliamentary secretary positions were divided between the three factions. The factions also played an important role in wider caucus politics. Policy issues considered by caucus often involved inter-factional negotiations (Lloyd and Swan 1987).

The Division of Responsibility between Senior Ministers, Junior Ministers and Parliamentary Secretaries

The first part of this chapter argued that the work of political executives can be grouped under four headings: portfolio management, cabinet participation, parliamentary work and party interaction. The second part of this chapter focuses on two aspects of the work of political executives: portfolio management and cabinet representation. It argues that the introduction of teams of political executives necessitated the introduction of a new division of responsibility for portfolio management and cabinet representation. It also sets out a new framework for conceptualising this division of responsibility. It argues that this can be conceptualised in terms of overlapping horizontal and vertical dimensions. It finally argues that this division of responsibility could operate in widely differing ways.

Portfolio Management

The division of responsibility for portfolio management between senior ministers and their junior colleagues can be conceptualised in terms of overlapping horizontal and vertical dimensions. The horizontal dimension derived from the allocation of direct functional responsibilities to both junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. The responsibilities of junior ministers were set down in prime ministerial charter letters. The responsibilities
of parliamentary secretaries were usually set down in a formal letter from the relevant senior minister. Their responsibilities usually comprised a mixture of departmental policy areas and portfolio agencies. These agencies accounted for a substantial proportion of the responsibilities of some junior ministers.

The vertical dimension derived from the formal powers retained by senior ministers. Senior ministers retained formal responsibility for coordination and priority-setting within their respective portfolios. Most importantly they retained control over the determination of expenditure priorities in the portfolio budget process. Senior ministers determined the contents of each portfolio’s budget submission. The only exception consisted of separate “sub-cabinet level” portfolios. These presented their own submissions to ERC.

Senior ministers also retained a number of other formal powers which could impact on the direct functional responsibilities of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. These commonly related to appointments and Commonwealth-state relations. Senior ministers could also assert explicit control over policy change within the responsibilities of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. In these circumstances the portfolio management roles of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries were explicitly confined to routine administration. Functional policy change was the responsibility of the senior minister.

(a) Potential for Variation in the Horizontal Dimension. The horizontal dimension derived from the functional responsibilities allocated to junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. The functional responsibilities of all political executives can be conceptualised in terms of two dimensions. The first consists of the characteristics of the relevant bureaucratic units. The second consists of the characteristics of the workloads generated by these bureaucratic units.

These two dimensions were both evident in the literature on the work of cabinet ministers. Rose noted differences in the ‘size and shape’ of departments (1987, pp. 55-61). Headey identified differences in the size and complexity of departments (1974a, p. 170). Headey also identified differences in the workloads generated by different departments (1974a, pp. 163, 170, see also Rose 1987, pp. 86-87).

Studies of the work of cabinet ministers focused on variation in the overall characteristics of departments. This approach was also evident in the literature on the work of sub-
cabinet level political executives (Vanderhoff-Silburt 1983/84, p. 9, Theakston 1987, pp. 94-96). There were fewer attempts to identify differences in the characteristics of the functions of sub-cabinet level political executives. For most studies the key issue was simply the extent to which sub-cabinet level political executives had their own functional responsibilities. Theakston just stated that British junior ministers had increasingly been granted their own functional responsibilities. He listed the functions of junior ministers at particular times in two selected departments (1987, pp. 88-91).

The main exception consisted of Chenier’s (1985) study of Canadian ministers of state to assist. This study argued that the bureaucratic units corresponding to the responsibilities of ministers of state to assist were characterised by different ‘degrees of independence or autonomy’. It also identified differences in the characteristics of interest groups associated with the functions of ministers of state to assist. Some were narrow and well-defined while others were larger and more diffuse (Chenier 1985, pp. 405-406, 411).

Research conducted for this thesis revealed three potential dimensions of variation in the characteristics of the bureaucratic units corresponding to the functional responsibilities of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. The first consists of the “clarity” of the division of responsibility. This refers to the extent to which the responsibilities of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries corresponded with the boundaries of departmental divisions and agencies. Junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries could be allocated direct responsibility for entire divisions and agencies. Alternatively their responsibilities could be scattered across different divisions or agencies throughout portfolios. This can be described as a “fuzzy” division of responsibility.

The second consists of the size of the bureaucratic units corresponding to the functions of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. This has usually been measured by the size of their staff and budgets (eg Rose 1987, pp. 55-61, 232-239).

The third consists of the strength of bureaucratic level overlaps between the functions of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries and the remainder of the relevant portfolio. Chenier simply noted variation in the ‘independence or autonomy’ of bureaucratic units (1985, pp. 405, 411). This thesis distinguishes between variation in the strength of two types of overlap. The first consists of the budget process. The second consists of policy
development and program delivery overlap. The budget process was often a significant source of overlap in the absence of policy development and program delivery overlaps.

Research conducted for this thesis also revealed three potential dimensions of variation in the characteristics of the workloads of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. The first consists of the overall size of their workloads. This includes all aspects of portfolio management: interaction with senior officials, interaction with interest groups and clients and broader public relations.

The second consists of the composition of their portfolio management workloads. This refers to the balance between different types of work. Junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries distinguished functions which were characterised by substantial policy change and opportunities for national public relations work with functions which involved large amounts of routine administration and representational work and interaction with regional, local and specialist media representatives.

The third consists of the impact of coordination and priority-setting. This is a product of bureaucratic level overlaps. Some functions were characterised by weak policy development and program delivery linkages with the rest of the portfolio. The impact of coordination and priority-setting was confined to the portfolio budget process. Other functions were characterised by strong policy development and program delivery overlaps with the rest of the portfolio. Processes of coordination and priority-setting within portfolios impacted much more substantially on this second group of functions.

(b) Potential for Variation in the Vertical Dimension. The literature on the work of sub-cabinet level political executives emphasised the extent of variation in the approaches of cabinet ministers to the functions of their junior colleagues. Vanderhoff-Silburt distinguished between Canadian cabinet ministers who treated their parliamentary secretaries like an ‘errand boy’ and cabinet ministers who treated them ‘like a partner in the department’ (1983/84, p. 8). Theakston similarly distinguished British cabinet ministers who confined junior ministers to ‘administrative trivia’ from those who allowed them ‘real authority over policy’ (1986, p. 22). The most important issue for these two studies was the extent of the autonomy enjoyed by different sub-cabinet level political executives.
A similar focus was evident in the literature on the work of Australian junior ministers. Sinclair argued that junior ministers ‘were all, at least in theory, subject to the ultimate authority of the senior minister in the portfolio’ (1996, p. 35). However some ‘enjoyed almost complete autonomy’ while others ‘were under much tighter control’ by the senior minister (1996, p. 35).

These studies each adopted a one dimensional approach to the roles of senior ministers. This thesis argues that it is necessary to conceptualise the role of senior ministers in terms of two dimensions. The first consists of the involvement of senior ministers in portfolio management within the functional responsibilities of their junior colleagues. The potential approaches of senior ministers can be located along a continuum between two extremes. At one extreme senior ministers can adopt “limited” approaches and eschew involvement in portfolio management within the responsibilities of their junior colleagues. At the other extreme senior ministers can adopt “expansive” approaches and maintain extensive direct involvement in the functions of their junior colleagues.

It is also possible to distinguish between different types of senior ministerial involvement in the responsibilities of their junior colleagues. Senior ministerial involvement can be either “supportive” or “antagonistic”. “Supportive” involvement is characterised by senior ministers backing functional policy positions adopted by junior ministers or parliamentary secretaries. “Antagonistic” involvement is characterised by senior ministers overruling or bypassing junior ministers or parliamentary secretaries. This distinction was not evident in previous studies of the work of sub-cabinet level political executives.

The second dimension consists of the extent to which senior ministers allowed their junior colleagues to participate in coordination and priority-setting within portfolios. This second dimension received little attention in the literature on the work of sub-cabinet level political executives. Theakston simply noted variation in the attitudes of British cabinet ministers to the purpose of formal meetings with their junior colleagues (1987, pp. 100-102). The potential approaches of senior ministers can again be located along a continuum between two extremes. At one extreme senior ministers can adopt “exclusive” approaches to their coordinating roles. These senior ministers dominate coordination and priority-setting to the exclusion of their junior colleagues. At the other extreme senior ministers can adopt an “inclusive” approach and allow junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries to participate extensively in coordination and priority-setting.
Cabinet Representation

The first part of this chapter argued that cabinet participation could be divided into cabinet representation and cabinet coordination and priority-setting. It also argued that this work could be performed within the general cabinet process and the budget/ERC process.

The pre-existing division of responsibility for cabinet coordination and priority-setting remained in place following the introduction of teams of political executives. Coordination and priority-setting in the general cabinet process was confined to full cabinet ministers. Senior ministers were invariably appointed to cabinet. They served as permanent cabinet representatives of their respective cabinet portfolios (as well as related "sub-cabinet level" portfolios). Only five junior ministers were appointed to cabinet during the period under review (although both non-cabinet junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries were occasionally appointed members of cabinet committees) (Interviewee 38, p. 2, Interviewee 54, pp. 1-2, Interviewee 70, p. 2).

Most junior ministers had little involvement in cabinet coordination and priority-setting within the general cabinet process. They only attended full cabinet meetings when acting in the position of the substantive senior minister (Interviewee 04, p. 2, Interviewee 22, p. 4, Interviewee 35, p. 3, Interviewee 39, p. 3, Interviewee 66, p. 4). This was particularly important in the Foreign Affairs and Trade portfolio because of the extent to which its ministers were required to represent colleagues who were absent overseas. It was partly for this reason that the Foreign Affairs and Trade portfolio was represented in cabinet by two ministers during most of the period under review (Interviewee 18, p. 1, Interviewee 43, p. 1, 5). This lack of involvement in coordination and priority-setting emerged from interviews as the most important distinction between the cabinet work of senior and junior ministers. The significance of this distinction is reflected in the following statements. The first is from a junior minister. The second is from a senior minister.

The portfolio minister is a regular "attender" at cabinet and so has a broader input into the overall framework of government decision-making (Interviewee 44, p. 1).

They come in on any cabinet submission that's in their area. They get co-opted to cabinet. In some cases they go to cabinet when the senior minister's not available, because they're overseas or on holiday or something else. But it is just a little frustrating for them at times that decisions are being made across government . . . that they don't have a say in (Interviewee 57, p. 6).
Participation in coordination and priority-setting in the budget/ERC process was confined to a select "inner" group of senior ministers. Most senior ministers had little involvement in coordination and priority-setting in the budget/ERC process. Their roles were limited to cabinet representation (eg Interviewee 51, pp. 8-9).

The introduction of teams of political executives necessitated the extension of the existing division of responsibility for cabinet coordination and priority-setting to encompass cabinet representation. This was an important departure from past practice. Prior to 1987 both cabinet and non-cabinet ministers had exclusive responsibility for representing their portfolios within both the general cabinet and budget/ERC processes. The division of responsibility for cabinet representation between senior and junior ministers can also be conceptualised in terms of overlapping horizontal and vertical dimensions.

The horizontal dimension derived from the capacity of junior ministers to bring forward general cabinet business from their direct functional responsibilities. Junior ministers who were not full members of cabinet continued to be co-opted for business from within their functional responsibilities. Junior ministers were not co-opted for submissions from other parts of their respective portfolios. There was also evidence that they were not always co-opted for relevant submissions from other portfolios. In these circumstances they were forced to rely on the relevant senior minister to represent their functional responsibilities. Parliamentary secretaries could not bring forward general cabinet business. This was an important difference between junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. However parliamentary secretaries were able to attend cabinet for the duration of discussions relating to their direct functional responsibilities. It was also possible for parliamentary secretaries to participate in cabinet committee discussions which impacted on their direct functional responsibilities.

The vertical dimension derived from the formal powers retained by senior ministers. Senior ministers usually retained explicit authority over the contents of general cabinet submissions from their portfolios. This was described by a senior official: ‘Certainly in this portfolio its not just implied, its express. Every cabinet submission must be cleared by Crean’s office. And in areas of Free’s interest by Free’s office as well’ (Interviewee 07, p. 8). Most importantly senior ministers also retained exclusive formal responsibility for carriage of portfolio budget submissions in the budget/ERC process.
(a) Potential for Variation in the Horizontal Dimension. The literature on the work of cabinet ministers focused on differences in the characteristics of the cabinet work generated by different departments. Two aspects of variation were identified. The first consisted of differences in the overall volume of cabinet business generated by different departments. The second consisted of cabinet status or authority. This derived from the responsibility of particular departments for cabinet coordination and priority-setting (e.g., Headey 1974a, pp. 164-166, Weller and Grattan 1981, p. 112, Rose 1987, pp. 84-92).

The literature on the work of sub-cabinet level political executives has also focused on differences in the characteristics of the cabinet work generated by different departments (e.g., Theakston 1987, p. 120). Studies have not examined variation in the characteristics of cabinet work generated by the functional responsibilities of sub-cabinet level political executives. This is partly because Australian outer ministers had responsibility for representing entire departments in the cabinet system while the cabinet work generated by British departments remained the exclusive responsibility of the relevant cabinet minister. British junior ministers could not bring forward their own cabinet business (Weller 1980, Theakston 1987, pp. 116-117).

Australian junior ministers occupied a position between these two extremes. They were able to bring forward their own general cabinet business. However senior ministers had formal control over the contents of each cabinet submission from their portfolio. Senior ministers also had formal responsibility for representing their portfolios in the budget/ERC process.

Research revealed the potential for variation in the characteristics of the cabinet workloads generated by the functions of junior ministers. Two aspects of variation were particularly important. The first consisted of their general cabinet visibility. The second consisted of their budget/ERC visibility. There was also potential for variation in the cabinet authority of different junior ministerial positions.

(b) Potential for Variation in the Vertical Dimension. The vertical dimension derived from the formal powers retained by senior ministers. Senior ministers retained similar formal powers. However these powers could be used in different ways. Studies of the cabinet work of British junior ministers emphasised the potential for variation in the approaches of cabinet ministers. Theakston (1987, pp. 118-122) argued that cabinet
ministers differed in the extent to which they allowed their junior colleagues to represent their departments in cabinet committees. There was also evidence of variation in the extent to which they allowed their junior colleagues access to cabinet information (Weller 1980, p: 611, Theakston 1987, pp. 113-114).

This thesis argues that the roles of senior ministers can be conceptualised in terms of two dimensions. The first dimension relates to their involvement in the presentation of general cabinet submissions from within the functional responsibilities of junior ministers. The approaches of senior ministers can be located along a continuum between two extremes. At one extreme senior ministers can adopt a “limited” approach and eschew involvement in the presentation of general cabinet submissions by their junior colleagues. At the other extreme senior ministers can adopt “expansive” approaches and dominate the presentation of general cabinet submission from throughout their portfolios.

The second dimension consists of the extent to which senior ministers allowed their junior colleagues to participate in the budget/ERC process. The approaches of senior ministers can also be located along a continuum between two extremes. At one extreme senior ministers can adopt “exclusive” approaches and dominate the budget/ERC process. At the other extreme senior ministers can adopt “inclusive” approaches and allow their junior colleagues an extensive role in the budget/ERC process.

The second part of this chapter has set out a new framework for conceptualising the division of responsibility between senior ministers and their junior colleagues for portfolio management and cabinet representation. It has also emphasised the potential for variation in the operation of this division of responsibility. The third part of this chapter uses this framework to examine the portfolio management and cabinet representation work of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries.

The Work of Junior Ministers and Parliamentary Secretaries

The third part of this chapter examines the work of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. It focuses on their portfolio management and cabinet representation work. It
also briefly examines the division of responsibility between senior ministers and their junior colleagues for parliamentary work and party interaction.

**Portfolio Management**

(a) The Functions of Junior Ministers and Parliamentary Secretaries. The functional responsibilities of junior ministers were set down in prime ministerial charter letters. Under the Hawke government these were reproduced in Hansard. This practice was discontinued under the Keating government. A few departments listed the functions of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries in their annual reports. In other cases lists were obtained by writing to the relevant departments. The functions of parliamentary secretaries were set down in formal letters from the relevant senior minister. These were also obtained by writing to relevant departments.

It is important to make two initial points about the functional responsibilities of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. The first is that junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries were rarely allocated a single functional responsibility. They were commonly allocated a range of different functional responsibilities. The number of different functions allocated to individual junior ministers can be roughly illustrated by examining the number of paragraphs necessary to list their responsibilities. In May 1990 the responsibilities of 14 junior ministers totalled 52 paragraphs (an average of 3.7 paragraphs for each junior minister). The functions of one junior minister (Justice and Consumer Affairs) required 10 paragraphs. It is also important to note that a single paragraph could include up to three different policy areas or six different agencies (CAPD, HoR, 8th may 1990, pp. 15-17). The functions of parliamentary secretaries were often similarly numerous and diverse. This diversity makes it difficult to generalise about the functional responsibilities of an individual junior minister or parliamentary secretary. It is even more difficult to compare the responsibilities of different junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries.

The second initial point concerns the extent of change and continuity in the responsibilities of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. In some portfolios responsibilities were regularly shifted backwards and forwards between senior ministers and their junior colleagues. These changes were often reflected in changes to the official portfolio titles of junior ministers (see Table 1.1). These changes could result from three sources. The first was change in the importance of different functional areas. Interviews revealed that senior
ministers would target certain functions for reform before transferring them back to junior ministers or parliamentary secretaries (Interviewee 15, p. 1, Interviewee 28, p. 2). The second was the need to accommodate change in the size and structure of teams of political executives (especially the expansion in the ranks of parliamentary secretaries). The third source of change was the transfer of functions between departments.

Interviews examined differences in the characteristics of bureaucratic units corresponding to the functions of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. There was evidence of substantial variation in the “clarity” of the functions of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. The functions of a few junior ministers corresponded to entire “sub-cabinet level portfolios” and were therefore clearly defined. There were three “sub-cabinet level” portfolios during the period under review (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs, Administrative Services and Veterans’ Affairs).

The responsibilities of other junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries were often less clearly defined. Some of the functions allocated to junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries corresponded to an entire division or agency. However many of their functions corresponded to only part of a division or agency. It was common for junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries to share responsibility for a single division or agency with other political executives (particularly the senior minister). The division of responsibility was much “fuzzier”.

Responsibility for a single division or agency could be shared by political executives in two different ways. The first was for junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries to be given responsibility for a distinct function performed by a division (or a branch within a division). The second was for the responsibilities of junior ministers or parliamentary secretaries to be explicitly confined to routine administration and representation. This type of arrangement was particularly common in relation to large agencies. For example in the list of the division of responsibilities between senior and junior ministers reproduced in Hansard in May 1990, the Minister for Small Business and Customs was allocated responsibility only for ‘issues involving the management of, and day-to-day decision-making in relation to, the Customs Service’. Similarly the Minister for Higher Education and Employment Services had responsibility only for ‘administrative/delivery aspects’ of the Commonwealth Employment Service. In both these examples policy change remained the explicit responsibility of the relevant senior minister. This approach to the division of
responsibility can be contrasted with other portfolios in which junior ministers were given responsibility for both ‘policy and administrative issues’ relating to particular portfolio agencies (see CAPD, HoR, 8th May 1990, pp. 15-17).

The “fuzzy” nature of the division of responsibilities in some portfolios meant that junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries often lacked responsibility for distinct bureaucratic units. Divisions and agencies fell within the direct responsibilities of multiple political executives. This meant that it was often difficult to compare the size of bureaucratic units corresponding to the responsibilities of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. In the absence of precise measurements it is necessary to rely on interviews to illustrate the extent of variation in the size of the functions of different junior ministers. One junior minister stated that his budget had increased from ‘about half a million dollars to three or four billion dollars’ following his transfer to a position in a different portfolio (Interviewee 68, p. 2). The “fuzziness” of the responsibilities of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries also had important implications for their relationships with senior ministers and relevant senior officials. These are examined in the following two chapters.

There was also evidence of substantial variation in the strength of bureaucratic level overlaps between the functions of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries and those of other political executives. Senior officials were questioned about the strength of policy development and program delivery overlaps between their functions and the remainder of the relevant portfolio. Interviews revealed evidence of substantial variation in the strength of policy development and program delivery overlaps. Some functions were characterised by strong linkages while others could operate separately from the remainder of the relevant portfolio. Senior officials often emphasised the extent to which the functions of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries could operate separately from the functions of other political executives. There was evidence of deliberate efforts to co-locate related functions within the responsibilities of a single policy executive. However there were also examples of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries with functions characterised by strong policy development and program delivery overlaps (Interviewee 71, pp. 3-4).

Senior officials were also questioned about the impact of the budget process. Interviews revealed less evidence of variation in the importance of the budget process. The budget process was important even in the absence of policy development and program delivery overlaps. The budget process was also important for addressing policy development and
program delivery overlaps. It emerged as the focal point of coordination and priority-setting within portfolios (Interviewee 14, p. 2, Interviewee 33, p. 2, Interviewee 46, p. 1, Interviewee 57, p. 4, Interviewee 66, p. 3, Interviewee 68, p. 3). There was also limited evidence of in the significance of budget overlaps. Most importantly junior ministers who headed their own “sub-cabinet level” portfolios had direct access to the budget/ERC process. Their budgets were not subsumed within the parent cabinet portfolio. This pattern is described in the following quotation from a senior official.

The Minister for Veterans’ Affairs has in practice been treated as a portfolio minister, and so consequently has the department. So we haven’t had to work like a junior minister would through the structure of a major portfolio department. We’ve submitted our own budget, and our minister has dealt with the ERC and the cabinet on that (Interviewee 48, p. 1).

Interviews therefore revealed that the responsibilities of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries could be divided into three basic categories. The first consisted of functions which were characterised by strong policy development and program delivery linkages and formed part of a larger portfolio budget. Small business was a good example of this type of function. It was characterised by strong linkages with many other areas of the relevant portfolio (Interviewee 71, p. 3). The second consisted of functions which were discrete but still formed part of a larger portfolio budget. Local government was a good example of this type of function. It could operate separately from the rest of the relevant portfolio (Interviewee 29, p. 8). The third consisted of “sub-cabinet level” portfolios which had direct access to the budget/ERC process. Veterans’ Affairs was a good example of this type of function. Variation in the strength of bureaucratic level overlaps determined the impact of coordination and priority-setting on the responsibilities of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. This in turn had implications for their relationships with both senior ministers and relevant senior officials. These implications are examined in the next two chapters.

There was also evidence of substantial variation in the size of the workloads of both junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. It was argued that some junior ministers had larger jobs than their colleagues. There was some evidence of a hierarchy of junior ministerial positions. The location of different positions in this hierarchy was determined by the scope and the content of corresponding portfolio management workloads. Junior ministers distinguished ‘selling jobs’ from ‘substantial policy jobs’ (Interviewee 38, p. 1, see also Interviewee 04, p. 7, Interviewee 66, p. 6, Interviewee 68, pp. 1-2). There was less evidence of a hierarchy of parliamentary secretary positions (Interviewee 54, p. 6,
Interviewee 65, p. 8). There were more similarities in the size and composition of the workloads associated with these positions. Most importantly they were each associated with a large proportion of routine administration and representation work.

Interviews compared the scope and importance of the functional responsibilities of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. There was evidence of a distinct “pecking order” between different categories of political executives within a single portfolio. This meant that junior ministers had larger and more important responsibilities than parliamentary secretaries (Interviewee 44, p. 7). However interviews also revealed evidence of overlap between the two categories of political executives. Parliamentary secretaries in some portfolios had larger workloads than junior ministers in other portfolios (Interviewee 54, pp. 3, 6). This overlap is described in the following statement by a senior minister.

There were two or three junior ministers who were basically a waste of space because they were given very little to do. Jobs at parliament and so on. My parliamentary secretary for Defence, Roger Price, being the first contact point for defence industry, had a far bigger workload, a far bigger budget than some junior ministers. But that’s not the junior minister’s fault. Is just the way we divided things up (Interviewee 57, p. 3).

(b) The Functional Autonomy of Junior Ministers and Parliamentary Secretaries. Interviews examined the extent of senior ministerial involvement in the functions of their junior colleagues. There was evidence of considerable variation in the approaches of different senior ministers. Junior ministers often contrasted the approaches of different senior ministers with whom they had worked. One junior minister argued that some senior ministers ‘kept a much tighter rein’ on their junior ministers than others. He described the approach of one of the senior ministers with whom he had worked as ‘more hierarchical’ than the other two (Interviewee 68, p. 3). Two other junior ministers with extensive experience in different portfolios also contrasted between the approaches of different senior ministers. They both argued that some had allowed them almost complete autonomy while others remained extensively involved in their responsibilities (Interviewee 35, pp. 1-2, Interviewee 66, pp. 2-3). These findings support Sinclair’s assertion that some junior ministers had ‘almost complete autonomy’ while others ‘were under much tighter control’ (1996, p. 35).

Interviews revealed that the approaches of different senior ministers could be clustered around three points along the continuum between “limited” and “expansive” approaches described in the second part of this chapter. One group of senior ministers adopted pure
“limited” approaches to the functions of junior ministers. They focused entirely on their own functional responsibilities. They had no involvement in portfolio management within other functional areas. Their wider involvement across their portfolios was confined to coordination and priority-setting. This meant that junior ministers had complete autonomy over all aspects of portfolio management within their direct functional responsibilities.

This approach was most clearly evident in the case of junior ministers with separate “sub-cabinet level” portfolios. These were formally attached to a particular cabinet portfolio. However, interviewees emphasised the lack of involvement by relevant senior ministers (Interviewee 48, p. 1). However, this approach was not confined to “sub-cabinet level” portfolios. It was also evident in relation to a few junior ministers who worked alongside senior ministers in a single cabinet portfolio. This first approach is described by a senior official and a junior minister.

In this portfolio, with the two individuals that are in there at the moment, it doesn’t really operate as portfolio minister/junior minister. The way it operates is that the issues have been broadly split. And while Collins is the portfolio minister, he basically looks after a set of issues and Beddall looks after another set of issues (Interviewee 31, p. 1).

The way in which [the senior minister] and I divided our responsibilities was such as to essentially mean we each took the independent management of sections of the overall portfolio (Interviewee 44, p. 1).

A second group of senior ministers adopted approaches which could be located at the “expansive” end of the continuum. These senior ministers remained both extensively and “antagonistically” involved in portfolio management within the functional responsibilities of their junior colleagues. This direct involvement was most clearly evident in relation to functional policy change and national public relations work. The autonomous sphere of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries was limited to routine administration and representation along with less important public relations work. This “expansive” approach is described below by two senior officials.

You’ve got a junior minister who is subject to more intensive probing and scrutiny by the senior minister to the extent that he or she might not be sure whether they have the authority to do things (Interviewee 74, p. 6).

Crean perceived that he ran things and ran any aspect of things that he chose to run. And that Free was to be given simply no latitude on any area where Crean wanted to have any influence. Down to individual project level. If Crean wanted something funded, then Crean would get it funded. And there was simply no consultation with Free on it (Interviewee 07, p. 1).
Interviews with junior ministers revealed evidence of "expansive" approaches. One junior minister stated that he had been confined to routine administration and representation. He described his portfolio management workload as comprising ‘whatever the senior minister wanted to off-load’ (Interviewee 35, pp. 1, 2). A second junior minister similarly argued that the senior minister had dominated policy change and public relations throughout the portfolio. This junior minister had been unable to make public announcements in relation to his direct functional responsibilities without the senior minister’s approval (Interviewee 19, p. 2). A third junior minister stated some senior ministers adopted the attitude that the views of the junior minister were ‘only a secondary consideration’ and that they had the right not only to be consulted about issues beyond their functional responsibilities but also to continually ‘second guess’ the junior minister (Interviewee 66, p. 2). There were also examples of junior ministers who were explicitly confined to routine administration and representation within their portfolios. This approach to the division of responsibility was described by a senior official.

Dawkins had a huge agenda in terms of international development, education exports and higher education reform, with some concern also about schools and vocational education reform. That meant that in the portfolio he took charge of the policy side, but the delivery side was pretty much left to Peter Duncan who had the sort of Austudy, CES, labour market programs thing (Interviewee 28, p. 1).

Interviews also revealed examples of parliamentary secretaries who found themselves in a similar position. Interviewees argued that several parliamentary secretaries were confined to routine administration and representation across their portfolios. This second approach was described by two senior ministers.

I know it has happened with regard to some parliamentary secretaries. Effectively they’ve had no substantive work to do at all. Simply process things. Letters. They sign letters etcetera, which is worthwhile and it eases the burden on the portfolio minister. Its not a worthless thing to do, but its not as satisfying as more substantive areas of administrative responsibility (Interviewee 51, p. 1).

Two or three [parliamentary secretaries] were told to just sign-off all the letters and do all the shit work (Interviewee 57, p. 9).

The third and largest group of senior ministers adopted approaches between these two extremes. These senior ministers did adopt pure “limited” approaches. They monitored the functions of their junior colleagues and expected to be consulted on important issues. However direct involvement in the functional responsibilities of their junior colleagues
was usually confined to a handful of issues. This approach is described in the following quotations from senior officials.

You have a junior minister who’s got an area of activity basically carved out pretty much by himself . . . In large part the junior minister is able to do what he thinks is appropriate as long as he talks to the senior minister on more important matters. And the senior minister is not continually delving into the work of the junior minister (Interviewee 74, p. 6).

Cook’s preferred style is to delegate fairly heavily and allow Schacht to get on with the job in all of the areas that he has responsibility for as a junior minister. Mind you, if there are issues of sensitivity, if some issues become politically hot, that interest level will rise and he’ll start taking . . . a much closer interest in what’s going on (Interviewee 71, p. 2).

Interviews with junior ministers emphasised the extent to which senior ministers adopted this approach. They emphasised the extent of their autonomy over portfolio management within their direct functional responsibilities (eg Interviewee 08, p. 1, Interviewee 14, pp. 1, 2, Interviewee 59, p. 2, Interviewee 68, p. 3). However they also described limits to their functional autonomy. Their functions were monitored and they were also expected to brief the senior minister on key issues within their responsibilities (eg Interviewee 35, pp. 1, 2, Interviewee 59, p. 2, Interviewee 68, p. 3). One junior minister explicitly stated that he had been expected to clear all policy changes within his functional responsibilities with the relevant senior minister (Interviewee 30, p. 1).

Interviews revealed that many senior ministers adopted similar approaches to the functions of parliamentary secretaries. Several parliamentary secretaries also argued that they had enjoyed considerable functional autonomy although they had been monitored by the senior minister and had been required to obtain senior ministerial approval for functional policy changes (Interviewee 20, p. 1, Interviewee 51, pp. 5-6, Interviewee 53, p. 1).

Senior officials who reported directly to parliamentary secretaries emphasised similarities between the approaches of senior ministers to these two categories of political executives (Interviewee 08, p. 2, Interviewee 49, pp. 1-2). One of these two officials argued that the only difference between the two categories political executives had been that parliamentary secretaries were unable to exercise some ministerial powers because of their “irregular” status. This had necessitated more frequent contact with the senior minister than had been necessary under a junior minister (Interviewee 49, p. 2).
Finally it is important to stress that the involvement of the senior minister could take one of two forms: “supportive” or “antagonistic”. Direct involvement did not necessarily mean that senior ministers overruled their junior colleagues. This distinction was emphasised by a ministerial adviser who argued that senior ministers could become more closely involved in issues within the responsibilities of junior ministers or parliamentary secretaries without overruling them.

The senior minister will ensure that he or she keeps in pretty close contact. And they tend of course on [controversial] issues to express a view more readily than on more minor issues or things that are just not flaring up. But I can only remember a couple of occasions when we were basically given what amounted to orders. The rest of the time, even on those issues where we differed, we would sit down and argue things through. And sometimes Gareth would say: “All right, do it your way”. And other times we would say: “All right Gareth, you’re probably right, lets do it your way” (Interviewee 52, pp. 1-2).

Interviews did not just examine the extent of direct senior ministerial involvement in the functions of their junior colleagues. They also examined the routine involvement of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries in portfolio management within the responsibilities of their senior colleagues.

Most junior ministers argued that their direct involvement in portfolio management within the functional responsibilities of the senior minister was confined to short periods in which they had acted in the senior minister’s position (Interviewee 04, p. 2, Interviewee 22, p. 2, Interviewee 35, p. 3, Interviewee 38, p. 2, Interviewee 59, p. 4). This was particularly important in the Foreign Affairs and Trade portfolio because of the senior minister’s frequent absences overseas (Interviewee 04, p. 2, Interviewee 43, p. 2, Interviewee 51, p. 4). In the words of a senior official from this portfolio: ‘since the Foreign minister will be travelling a lot and the Trade minister will be travelling a lot, half the time you’re acting in the other bloke’s position anyway’ (Interviewee 34, p. 1).

At other times the direct involvement of junior ministers in portfolio management within the responsibilities of their senior colleagues was confined to small amounts of routine administrative and representational work (Interviewee 59, p. 2). One junior minister stated that he had sometimes been consulted by the senior minister on important issues within the wider portfolio (Interviewee 04, p. 2). However most junior ministers argued that they did not seek to become involved in functions beyond their direct responsibilities (Interviewee 08, p. 1). One junior minister stated that he had been ‘too busy’ and ‘didn’t bother sticking his nose in’ (Interviewee 68, p. 3). Another argued that he had not sought
to become involved in the wider portfolio in return for the senior minister not intervening in his own more limited functional responsibilities (Interviewee 04, p. 3).

This was a significant difference between junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. Interviews with parliamentary secretaries revealed that they usually had a greater share of routine administration and representation work from throughout their respective portfolios. This was particularly evident in relation to ministerial correspondence (Interviewee 12, p. 1, Interviewee 13, p. 1, Interviewee 20, p. 1).

(c) Involvement of Junior Ministers and Parliamentary Secretaries in Coordination and Priority-Setting. Interviews finally examined the extent to which senior ministers allowed their junior colleagues to participate in coordination and priority-setting at the portfolio level. Interviews focused on the role of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries in the budget process. The budget process was described as a focal point of coordination and priority-setting at the portfolio level. Its impact on the functions of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries was evident even in the absence of strong policy development and program delivery overlaps. The only exception consisted of junior ministers with their own "sub-cabinet level" portfolios. These junior ministers were able to determine budget priorities without senior ministerial involvement. They also had direct access to the budget/ERC process (Interviewee 36, p. 2, Interviewee 48, p. 1, Interviewee 70, p. 3, Interviewee 74, pp. 5-7).

Senior ministers had formal authority over each portfolio budget submission. Their most important role consisted of the determination of overall portfolio priorities. Interviewees argued that this was a key role of all senior ministers regardless of different approaches to portfolio management within the functions of their junior colleagues. This is reflected in the following quotations from two senior officials.

The common thread among all senior ministers was that they took a critical interest in the department's total new policy proposals and the allocation of resources across functions, where the savings would be, where the new policies would rest (Interviewee 02, p. 2).

Even with the attitude that Collins takes to being the portfolio minister, he certainly directs all those processes. The Minister for Resources presents his own new policies [to the ERC]. But they're only ones that the Minister for Primary Industries and Energy has agreed. So the portfolio minister acts as the complete portfolio minister in that case (Interviewee 31, p. 4).
Senior ministers differed in the extent to which they involved their junior colleagues in the budget process. The approaches of senior ministers could be located at three different points along the continuum between “exclusive” and “inclusive” approaches. One group of senior ministers adopted “exclusive” approaches. These senior ministers did not just determine portfolio-wide priorities. They also determined priorities within each functional area of their portfolio. Junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries were excluded from direct participation in the portfolio budget process.

Interviewees argued that it was common for parliamentary secretaries to be excluded from the portfolio budget process (Interviewee 12, p. 1, Interviewee 13, p. 2, Interviewee 54, p. 2, Interviewee 65, p. 2). One parliamentary secretary described his role in the budget process as ‘very minimal . . . non-existent really’ (Interviewee 54, p. 2). Interviews also revealed evidence that junior ministers were also excluded from the budget process (even in relation to their functional responsibilities). This “exclusive” approach is described by a senior official.

It’s been Crean and Crean’s office, not simply running the budget, but running it in a way in which Free’s office regularly had no input whatsoever (Interviewee 07, p. 2).

A second group of senior ministers adopted an approach closer to the “inclusive” end of the continuum. These senior ministers allowed their junior colleagues to determine budget priorities within their functional responsibilities. They also allowed them to represent their responsibilities in negotiations concerning overall budget priorities. Interviews revealed that most senior ministers adopted this second approach. Many junior ministers stressed the extent to which they had been able to determine budget priorities within their separate functional responsibilities (eg Interviewee 04, p. 1, Interviewee 22, p. 3, Interviewee 35, p. 2, Interviewee 38, p. 5, Interviewee 64, p. 3, Interviewee 66, p. 3). Junior ministers also stressed the importance of representing their functions in negotiations with the senior minister. This is termed “functional advocacy” at the portfolio level. It is examined at greater length in the next chapter.

Finally there was some evidence of a third more “inclusive” senior ministerial approach. The involvement of junior ministers extended beyond simply determining priorities within their own responsibilities and representing their functions in negotiations with the senior minister. Junior ministers were jointly involved in the determination of budget priorities.
across the entire portfolio. Interviews revealed only one example of this arrangement. It is described in the following statement by a junior minister.

The whole process of the ERC both [the senior minister] and I did jointly. We'd always meet with the department jointly. Basically we were sort of a two-headed team (Interviewee 44, p. 2).

This section has made five points about the portfolio management work of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. Firstly junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries were often allocated a large number of different functional responsibilities. Secondly there was substantial variation in the characteristics of both their bureaucratic units and their overall workloads. Variation was most evident in the case of junior ministers. Thirdly there was substantial variation in the approaches of senior ministers. Some senior ministers adopted "limited" and "inclusive" approaches. A few others adopted "expansive" and "exclusive" approaches. Fourthly the approaches of most senior ministers could be located between these two extremes. They monitored the functions of their junior colleagues but usually allowed them considerable functional autonomy. They also played a leading role in the portfolio budget process but usually allowed their junior colleagues to determine their own functional priorities and negotiate over their share of portfolio resources. Fifthly there was evidence of overlap between junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. Parliamentary secretaries in some portfolios had larger workloads as well as more functional autonomy and a larger role in the budget process than junior ministers in other portfolios.

**Cabinet Representation**

(a) **Cabinet Workload of Junior Ministers.** Interviews examined variation in the general cabinet visibility of the responsibilities of junior ministers. Junior ministers were questioned about the frequency with which they attended cabinet. Interviews revealed some evidence of variation in the general cabinet visibility of junior ministerial functions. Most junior ministers argued that they attended weekly meetings of cabinet at a rate of between once per month and once every two months. There was also evidence of much lower levels of attendance. One junior minister stated that he had only attended cabinet three or four times during his entire three year term of office (Interviewee 19, p. 3). The Status of Women portfolio was described as having a particularly high cabinet visibility. This was because of the extent of its concern with the business of other portfolios rather than the volume of its own submissions (see Interviewee 14, p. 1, Interviewee 22, pp. 1-
Interviewees emphasised the impact of the budget/ERC process on the functions of most junior ministers. This was evident even in the case of junior ministers whose functions accounted for only a small portion of their respective portfolio budgets (eg Interviewee 05, pp. 2-3). However there was evidence of variation between junior ministers in the relative importance of the general cabinet and budget/ERC processes. Junior ministers with large budgets emphasised the primary importance of the budget/ERC process. They argued that the most important cabinet decisions about their functions were taken in the context of the budget/ERC process. This emerged as the focal point of their involvement in the cabinet system. These junior ministers had much less involvement in the general cabinet system between budget cycles (Interviewee 14, p. 3, Interviewee 68, p. 4).

Finally there was no evidence of variation in the cabinet status or authority of different junior ministerial positions. Junior ministers have been appointed to cabinet and cabinet committees from a range of different portfolios. No junior ministerial or parliamentary secretary positions had important cabinet coordination and priority-setting roles (although junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries in the Prime Minister and Cabinet portfolio were often charged with overseeing the passage of business between caucus, cabinet and the Federal Executive Council and were also able to approve minor legislative amendments (Interviewee 38, p. 2, Interviewee 54, p. 1). This has changed to some extent under the Howard coalition government with the appointment of the Assistant Treasurer to the ERC (Interviewee 55, p. 2).

(b) General Cabinet Autonomy of Junior Ministers. Interviews revealed little evidence of systematic attempts to exclude junior ministers from the general budget process. However one junior minister stated that he had attended cabinet ‘by leave and not right’ and could have been excluded by the relevant senior minister (Interviewee 08, p. 2). A senior official also provided evidence of the exclusion of junior ministers: ‘I believe there’s been a number of times when Free hasn’t been invited into the cabinet room while they’ve been discussing his submission’ (Interviewee 15, p. 7). However senior officials commonly argued that junior ministers were routinely co-opted to attend cabinet for their own general business.
If you have an initiative coming from an area that is the responsibility of the junior minister it would be almost unheard of for the junior minister not to be co-opted and not to be expected to actually carry that. Whether it be Jeannette McHugh or Frank Walker you’d always expect them to be there presenting, or Senator Schacht, presenting their case (Interviewee 02, p. 6).

It's theoretically possible that the junior minister might not attend cabinet when some of his issues were being discussed, but it is unusual ... The junior minister would be co-opted more as a matter of course (Interviewee 69, pp. 4-5).

There was more evidence of variation in the attendance of junior ministers in relation to relevant submissions from other portfolios. It was argued that junior ministers would not always be co-opted to cabinet for these submissions. This meant that they were forced to rely on the relevant senior minister to represent their functional responsibilities.

Interviews examined senior ministerial involvement in the general cabinet business of their junior colleagues. They revealed that the approaches of senior ministers could be clustered around three different points along the continuum between “limited” and “expansive” approaches described in the second part of this chapter.

One group of senior ministers adopted “limited” approaches. They eschewed involvement in the general cabinet business of their junior colleagues. Senior and junior ministers assumed exclusive responsibility for the presentation of their general cabinet business. Senior ministerial involvement in the general cabinet business of their junior colleagues was confined to relevant submissions from other portfolios when the junior minister was not in attendance. Interviews revealed that this first approach was most clearly evident in relation to junior ministers who headed their own “sub-cabinet level” portfolios. This is described in the following quotation. However it was also evident in relation to junior ministers who shared a cabinet portfolio with a senior minister.

You've got the Veterans' Affairs circumstance, where you've got a junior minister in name but not in practice. Little contact [with the senior minister] and matters were taken into the cabinet room by the Minister for Veterans' Affairs with very little knowledge on the part of the senior minister (Interviewee 74, p. 7).

A second group of senior ministers adopted approaches which could be grouped further towards the “expansive” end of the continuum. These senior ministers did not completely eschew direct involvement in the submissions of their junior colleagues. They expected to be consulted in the development of junior ministerial submissions. They were also more likely to become involved in their presentation. These senior ministers usually confined
themselves to a supporting role. However they could also assume a leading role in the presentation of junior ministerial submissions. They also retained the capacity to oppose submissions lodged by their junior colleagues with which they disagreed. It is therefore also necessary to distinguish between “supportive” and “antagonistic” senior ministerial involvement in the general cabinet business of their junior colleagues. The approach of this second group of senior ministers is described in the following quotation from a senior minister.

Any decent junior minister would come to you and say: "We need a submission on this particular thing". We’d sit down and discuss the basis of the submission. It’d then go through the departmental approval process . . . . The junior minister would approve it then come back and say: "Are you happy with the form?" Because we’d already have a copy of it. And we’d say: "Yes, terrific". And I’d usually say: "Look, you present it but tell me what arguments you want to run, what interference you want me to run in support of you" (Interviewee 57, pp. 6-7).

A third group of senior ministers adopted “expansive” approaches to the general cabinet business of their junior colleagues. They maintained extensive direct involvement in the development and presentation of general cabinet business from throughout their portfolios. The relevant junior minister would usually be co-opted for their submissions. However presentation was dominated by the senior minister. Junior ministers were relegated to a subordinate role. This “expansive” approach is described in the two following comments from senior officials.

With Simon Crean that’s how it would operate . . . I can’t remember any situations where it was different. He would have put forward all cabinet submissions. And he would have co-opted the Minister for Resources to sit in on the cabinet discussion. But he would have presented the submission, where ever it came from, which ever part of the department (Interviewee 31, pp. 5-6).

We worked extraordinarily intensively for six weeks pulling it together with probably 20 different bits of contact with people in Crean’s office every day. There was never any contact . . . with Free or Free’s office on it until the day of the cabinet meeting to give it all the tick (Interviewee 07, p. 3).

(c) The Role of Junior Ministers in the Budget/ERC Process. Interviews also explored the extent of variation in senior ministerial approaches to the involvement of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries in the budget/ERC process. Once again the approaches of senior ministers could be clustered around three points along the continuum between “exclusive” and “inclusive” approaches.
The first group of senior ministers adopted "exclusive" approaches to the division of responsibility for the budget/ERC process. They represented their entire portfolio in the budget/ERC process. Interviews revealed that this approach was most clearly evident in relation to parliamentary secretaries. It was uncommon for parliamentary secretaries to participate in the budget/ERC process. Only two of the 11 parliamentary secretaries interviewed for this study reported involvement in the budget/ERC process (Interviewee 51, p. 10, Interviewee 53, pp. 1-2). There was also evidence of the exclusion of junior ministers. Several junior ministers stated that they rarely participated in the budget/ERC process. The relevant senior minister usually represented the entire portfolio (Interviewee 08, p. 2, Interviewee 19, p. 3, Interviewee 30, p. 3, Interviewee 39, p. 5). This approach is described by a senior official.

Dawkins was ruthless in those first days as I recall. Tickner never got in. I don’t think Duncan went into the actual Expenditure Review Committee of cabinet. Dawkins ran that. He had his charts and in he’d go and have a little bit of theatre and then do his trade-offs (Interviewee 28, p. 2).

Other senior ministers adopted more "inclusive" approaches to the involvement of their junior colleagues in the budget/ERC process. Junior ministers were allowed to participate in discussions relating to their functional responsibilities. A handful of senior ministers also invited parliamentary secretaries to discussions relating to their direct responsibilities (Interviewee 51, p. 10, Interviewee 53, pp. 1-2). Many senior ministers adopted this second approach. The prevalence of this approach is reflected in the following comment from a senior official.

Mostly portfolios in my experience would have the junior ministers in there . . . They generally made an effort to ensure that they were there for discussion on matters affecting them (Interviewee 61, pp. 3-4).

However it is important to stress that both junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries were confined to a subordinate role. Senior ministers played a leading role in representing their entire portfolios (Interviewee 33, p. 4, Interviewee 43, p. 5). The subordinate roles of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries are described in the following recollection from a senior minister.

They were there to support me. I'd lead off, but at that point where they'd finally argued you down over a number of areas and you're starting to get a bit exhausted and tired, the junior minister would come in and create a diversion and argue the case, and I'd get all the material ready to once again wear them down on it. So we worked as a team (Interviewee 57, p. 7).
A third group of senior ministers adopted more “inclusive” approaches. Most importantly they allowed junior ministers a much more substantial role in representing their direct responsibilities. This approach to the division of responsibility was described by several junior ministers (Interviewee 14, p. 3, Interviewee 22, pp. 2-3, Interviewee 59, p. 3). One junior minister stated that his functions had been acknowledged as his responsibility by the relevant senior minister and that he was best placed to function as their advocate in the budget/ERC process (Interviewee 68, p. 4). This third approach is described in the following statement by a senior official.

Beddall will actually present for his new policies and argue that out. And if he loses, then the portfolio loses. They lose that bit out of the portfolio bid . . . That’s the way that Collins operates. And he says that quite publicly. He says: “I don’t operate like the traditional portfolio ministers. We’ve split the resources and that’s his problem” (Interviewee 31, pp. 5-6).

This section has made four key points about the cabinet representation work of junior ministers. Firstly there was considerable variation in the overall cabinet visibility of the functions of junior ministers. There was also variation in the relative importance of the general cabinet and budget/ERC processes. However there was no evidence of variation in the cabinet authority or status of different junior ministerial positions. Secondly there was considerable evidence of variation in the approaches of senior ministers. Some senior ministers adopted “limited” and “inclusive” approaches. Others adopted “expansive” and “exclusive” approaches. Thirdly most senior ministers adopted approaches in between these two extremes. The most important distinction was between the general cabinet and budget/ERC processes. Most junior ministers were allowed to represent their functions in the general cabinet process. Senior ministers were more likely to represent their entire portfolios in the budget/ERC process. Junior ministers were more likely to be confined to subordinate roles. Fourthly there was evidence of overlap between junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. This was less evident than in the case of portfolio management. However some junior ministers had responsibilities characterised by very low general cabinet visibility and were excluded from the budget/ERC process. Two parliamentary secretaries reported participation in the budget/ERC process.

**Parliamentary Work**

Interviews examined the division of responsibility between senior ministers and their junior colleagues for parliamentary work. They focused on the division of responsibility
for the oversight of government bills and question time. Previous studies of the work of sub-cabinet level political executives have devoted considerable attention to this component of their work (eg Majeau 1983, p. 6, Vanderhoff-Silburt 1983/84, pp. 7-8, Theakston 1987, pp. 125-138). Theakston examined the division of responsibility for parliamentary work between cabinet and junior ministers. He found that cabinet ministers had a leading role in major debates as well as the introduction of government bills. Junior ministers had primary responsibility for minor debates and the committee stages of government bills as well as routine backbench interaction. Junior ministers also answered more oral questions than cabinet ministers (1987, pp. 126-136). Finally Theakston contrasted the size and composition of the parliamentary workloads of junior ministers in the House of Commons from that of their counterparts in the House of Lords. He concluded that Lords junior ministers had larger and more diverse workloads than their House of Commons colleagues (1987, pp. 136-138).

Two Commonwealth parliamentary committee reports have also examined the division of responsibility for parliamentary work between different categories of political executives in the House of Representatives (HoRSCP 1993, 1995). They examined the division of responsibility for the oversight of government bills. The first report concluded that senior ministers ‘had delegated many of their House tasks to junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries’ (HoRSCP 1993, p. 26). The second report highlighted the growing role of parliamentary secretaries. It found that during 1994 nearly 43 per cent of government bills were introduced by parliamentary secretaries. Parliamentary secretaries were more likely than ministers to make second reading speeches (52 per cent of government bills). Finally parliamentary secretaries were more likely to conclude second reading debates. A total of 76 were concluded by parliamentary secretaries compared with 51 by ministers (HoRSCP 1995, p. 11). Two other studies also noted the growing role of parliamentary secretaries in the government’s parliamentary business (Healy 1993, pp. 46, 56-57, Sinclair 1996, p. 35).

These two reports also examined the division of responsibility for question time between senior and junior ministers. This was an important difference between the work of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. Parliamentary secretaries were not permitted to participate in question time. They were permitted neither to ask questions of government ministers nor to answer questions relating to their portfolios. The first report argued that question time in the House of Representatives was dominated by a few senior ministers
(HoRSCP 1993, p. 25). The second report also examined the involvement of ministers in question time. It presented data on the number of questions without notice directed to each minister in the House of Representatives between 1992 and 1994. This data emphasised the dominance of senior ministers. However it also revealed an increase in the question time visibility of junior ministers. In 1992 junior ministers received a total of 43 questions without notice (7 per cent). In 1993 they received 73 questions without notice (17 per cent). In 1994 they received 176 questions without notice (nearly 20 per cent) (HoRSCP 1995, pp. 22-23).

Interviews examined the division of responsibility for government bills between different categories of political executives in both the House of Representatives and the Senate. Interviews revealed important differences between the two chambers. They revealed that oversight of government bills in the House of Representatives was dominated by junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. The involvement of senior ministers was usually confined to the introduction and second reading of a few particularly important pieces of legislation (Interviewee 20, p. 3, Interviewee 30, p. 3, Interviewee 33, p. 8, Interviewee 44, p. 7, Interviewee 55, p. 1).

Interviewees argued that parliamentary secretaries had acquired a particularly large role in the oversight of government bills. Parliamentary secretaries had initially been allowed to act as “duty minister” and oversee the passage of government bills through the committee stage of debate (Beazley 1990). Their roles were soon extended to the introduction of bills on behalf of ministers (Beazley 1991, SPC 1991). In the words of one junior minister: ‘inevitably parliamentary secretaries do a lot of the less glorious work, the slogging work in the parliament’ (Interviewee 44, p. 7). This was most clearly evident in the work of the Main Committee of the House of Representatives. This was established in February 1994 to facilitate the consideration in more detail of less controversial legislation (Interviewee 13, p.3, Interviewee 20, p. 3, Interviewee 33, p. 8, Interviewee 44, pp. 7-8, Interviewee 53, p. 2). The Senate was characterised by a different division of responsibility from that evident in the House of Representatives. Most importantly senior ministers had a much larger role in the oversight of government bills.

Interviews examined how senior and junior ministers shared the task of representing their portfolios in question time. This was a significant issue because both senior and junior ministers could be questioned about their entire portfolios. Interviewees argued that the
division of responsibility for question time depended on the distribution of senior and junior ministers between the House of Representatives and the Senate. There were two basic patterns. The first consisted of senior and junior ministers who were both based in the same chamber (usually the House of Representatives but occasionally the Senate). The second consisted of senior and junior ministers who were based in different chambers. This second pattern can be further divided into two variants. The first consisted of junior ministers who represented their entire portfolios in the House of Representatives. The second consisted of junior ministers who represented their entire portfolios in the Senate.

Interviews revealed that teams of ministers who sat alongside one another in the same chamber were almost invariably questioned about their direct functional responsibilities. Most importantly junior ministers were not questioned about the functional responsibilities of their senior colleagues (Interviewee 44, p. 8, Interviewee 55, p. 5). There was some evidence of "one-way overlap". Senior ministers were sometimes questioned about the functional responsibilities of their junior colleagues (Interviewee 44, p. 8, Interviewee 55, p. 5).

Interviewees argued that ministers sitting together in the same chamber had considerable discretion in dealing with questions on their portfolios. One junior minister argued that he could respond to questions relating to issues beyond his direct functional responsibilities. Alternatively he could refer the question to the senior minister. Finally the senior minister could take over and answer the question (Interviewee 44, p. 8). A second junior minister described how his senior minister would decide on an ad hoc basis whether to respond to questions directed to the junior minister or whether he would leave the question for the junior minister to answer. This junior minister argued that he usually answered questions relating to the routine administration of the agency for which he had direct responsibility. The senior minister would take questions related to wider government policy (Interviewee 68, pp. 1-2).

House of Representatives junior ministers uniformly emphasised their low question time visibility (Interviewee 04, p. 5, Interviewee 08, p. 3, Interviewee 22, p. 6, Interviewee 30, p. 3, Interviewee 35, p. 4, Interviewee 36, p. 5, Interviewee 38, p. 6, Interviewee 66, p. 6, Interviewee 68, p. 5). Interviews revealed little evidence of the impact of the introduction in February 1994 of a roster system for House of Representatives question time. One junior minister argued that the roster system had further reduced the visibility of
ministers rostered alongside the prime minister (Interviewee 70, p. 1). However a ministerial adviser stated that the roster system had created greater opportunities for junior ministers rostered on other days because they no longer operated in the shadow of the prime minister or as many other senior ministers (Interviewee 33, p. 1). The second of the two reports cited above reached a similar conclusion (HoRSCP 1995, pp. 22-23).

Interviewees argued that question time placed greater demands on junior ministers who sat in a different chamber to their senior colleagues. They could no longer confine themselves to their direct functional responsibilities. They were also likely to be questioned about the functional responsibilities of their portfolio colleagues. This meant that junior ministers had to be briefed about their entire portfolios (Interviewee 46, p. 8, Interviewee 57, p. 3). This arrangement is described by a senior minister.

If they’re in two different chambers there’s a higher responsibility on the junior minister because they will represent the senior minister to be right across the portfolio and be the public face there. So when Gary Punch was a junior minister in Defence he’d be right across all the other issues so if he got a question he could answer in my area, and vice versa (Interviewee 57, p. 3).

This additional responsibility was not usually a problem for junior ministers in the House of Representatives because of their low parliamentary profiles. Questions on other areas of their portfolios were directed to the senior minister in the Senate (Interviewee 04, p. 5). However it imposed far greater demands on junior ministers in the Senate because of their higher parliamentary visibility. Interviewees also argued that Senate junior ministers did not just represent their own portfolios. They were also required to represent the portfolios of colleagues in the House of Representatives (Interviewee 14, pp. 2, 4, Interviewee 59, pp. 1, 6, Interviewee 64, p. 4).

Interviewees therefore emphasised differences between the parliamentary work of different categories of political executives in the House of Representatives and the Senate. In the House of Representatives there were substantial differences between the parliamentary work of senior ministers and their junior colleagues. Oversight of government bills was dominated by junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. They often had responsibility for bills from other parts of their respective portfolios as well as from the portfolios of other senior ministers. By contrast question time was dominated by senior ministers. Junior ministers had little involvement in question time even when they represented entire portfolios in the House of Representatives.
This division of responsibility between senior ministers and their junior colleagues was much less evident in the Senate. Senior ministers were more extensively involved in the oversight of government bills. Junior ministers had much higher question time profiles than their House of Representatives colleagues. This was most clearly evident when they represented their entire portfolios as well as the portfolios of their colleagues in the House of Representatives.

**Party Interaction**

Interviews focused on the division of responsibility between senior ministers and their junior colleagues for routine portfolio representation. This consisted of interaction with individual backbenchers, caucus committees and full caucus meetings.

Interviews revealed limited evidence about the division of responsibility between senior ministers and their junior colleagues for routine party business. Interviewees argued that all three categories of political executives were involved in party interaction in relation to their direct functional responsibilities. There was also evidence that junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries gradually acquired responsibility for representing the functions of their senior colleagues. This was an important aspect of the work of several parliamentary secretaries (eg Interviewee 12, p. 3, Interviewee 13, p. 3, Interviewee 20, pp. 2-3, Interviewee 33, p. 9, Interviewee 37, p. 5). A key distinction to emerge from interviews was between interaction with individual backbenchers and relevant caucus committees and interaction with full caucus. The first two aspects of this work were commonly delegated to parliamentary secretaries (Interviewee 20, p. 3, Interviewee 54, p. 2). However senior ministers usually retained direct responsibility for the business of their functions in full caucus meetings (Interviewee 13, p. 3, Interviewee 20, pp. 2-3).

**Conclusion**

This chapter has examined the work of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. The first part of the chapter set out a new framework for conceptualising the work of political executives. It has argued that their work could be divided into six components. These six components were grouped together under four headings: portfolio management, cabinet participation, parliamentary work and party interaction.
The second part of this chapter focused on two aspects of the work of political executives: portfolio management and cabinet representation. It argued that the introduction of teams of political executives necessitated the introduction of a new division of responsibility for portfolio management and cabinet representation. It also set out a new framework for examining this division of responsibility. It argued that the division of responsibility for both portfolio management and cabinet representation could be conceptualised in terms of overlapping horizontal and vertical dimensions. It also argued that the vertical dimension could itself be divided into two dimensions. It finally argued that there was substantial potential for variation in the division of responsibility for portfolio management and cabinet representation between senior ministers and their junior colleagues.

The third part of this chapter applied this framework to examine the portfolio management and cabinet representation work of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. It found that the responsibilities of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries often consisted of a large number of different functions. There was substantial variation in the characteristics of the bureaucratic units allocated to junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. There was also substantial variation in the size and characteristics of their portfolio management and cabinet workloads. Finally there was evidence of overlap between the workloads of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries.

This chapter has argued that there was substantial variation in the approaches adopted by some senior ministers. This was evident in relation to portfolio management and cabinet representation. Some senior ministers adopted "limited" and "inclusive" approaches. Other senior ministers adopted "expansive" and "exclusive" approaches. However it has also argued that most senior ministers adopted approaches between these two extremes. There was also evidence of overlap between junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. This was most clearly evident in relation to portfolio management. Most junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries had considerable autonomy over portfolio management within their functional responsibilities. However they were monitored by the relevant senior ministers and experienced occasional direct intervention. Most junior ministers also had a leading role in presenting their own general cabinet business. By contrast senior ministers usually played a leading role in coordination and priority-setting within their portfolios. This was particularly evident in the portfolio budget process. Many junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries were either excluded from this process or confined to a subordinate role. Senior ministers were also much more likely to play a leading role
representing their portfolios in the budget/ERC process. Again many junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries were either excluded from the budget/ERC process or confined to a subordinate role.

The next chapter examines these different approaches to the division of responsibility for portfolio management and cabinet representation from the perspective of senior ministers as well as junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. It also examines the management of the division of responsibility within teams of political executives.
Chapter 5

Relationships Between Senior Ministers, Junior Ministers and Parliamentary Secretaries

Introduction

The previous chapter set out a new framework for conceptualising the work of political executives. It also set out a new framework for approaching the division of responsibility for portfolio management and cabinet representation between senior ministers and their junior colleagues. It applied this framework to examine the portfolio management and cabinet representation work of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. It described similarities and differences in the operation of the division of responsibility for portfolio management and cabinet representation in different portfolios. It identified variation in the characteristics of the responsibilities of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries as well as the approaches of senior ministers.

This chapter examines this variation in greater detail. It explores different approaches to the division of responsibility for portfolio management and cabinet representation from the perspectives of senior ministers as well as junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. It also examines the management of the division of responsibility.

This chapter is divided into three parts. The first part examines different approaches to the division of responsibility from the senior ministerial perspective. It begins with the senior ministerial perspective because of the capacity of senior ministers to shape the division of responsibility within their cabinet portfolios. It focuses on the division of responsibility for portfolio management. It examines the costs and benefits of different approaches to the division of responsibility for portfolio management. The second part of the chapter examines different approaches to the division of responsibility for portfolio management and cabinet representation from the perspectives of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. It focuses on the implications of different senior ministerial approaches. The
third part examines the management of the division of responsibility. It examines the roles of senior officials, political executives and ministerial offices.

**Perspectives of Senior Ministers**

The first part of this chapter examines different approaches to the division of responsibility for both portfolio management and cabinet representation from the perspective of senior ministers. It focuses on the division of responsibility for portfolio management. It first emphasises the capacity of senior ministers to shape the division of responsibility and marginalise their junior colleagues. It describes two different approaches to the division of responsibility for portfolio management. It examines the costs and benefits of these two approaches. It then examines obstacles to delegation. It emphasises the importance of relationships between senior ministers and their junior colleagues. It examines the impact of wider “environmental factors” on the capacity of senior ministers to shape the division of responsibility for portfolio management within their portfolios. It also briefly explores the division of responsibility for cabinet representation from the perspective of senior ministers.

**Senior Ministerial Dominance and Capacity to Marginalise Junior Colleagues**

The literature on the work of sub-cabinet level political executives in Canada and the United Kingdom emphasised the capacity of cabinet ministers to shape the work of their junior colleagues. This capacity derived from their formal constitutional responsibility for the entire workloads of their respective departments. Cabinet ministers had considerable discretion over how much of this work was delegated to their junior colleagues (Weller 1980, pp. 611-613, Majeau 1983, pp. 3, 5, Randle 1983, pp. 12-13, Vanderhoff-Silburt 1983/84, pp. 8-9, Theakston 1987, pp. 92-96, 113-115, 127). The small literature on the restructuring of the Commonwealth political executive also emphasised the dominance of senior ministers and their capacity to marginalise their junior colleagues (Weller 1987, p. 22, Halligan, Beckett and Earnshaw 1992, pp. 16-17, Aucoin and Bakvis 1993, p. 401, Gruen and Grattan 1993, pp. 45-46).
Interviews conducted for this study similarly emphasised the capacity of senior ministers to shape the division of responsibility for the work of their portfolios. This was clearly evident in relation to both portfolio management and cabinet representation.

**a) Portfolio Management.** Interviews revealed three key dimensions of the capacity of senior ministers to shape the division of responsibility for portfolio management. The first consisted of their influence over the division of functional responsibilities within their portfolios.

The allocation of direct functional responsibilities to junior ministers was formally the responsibility of the prime minister. However interviews revealed that prime ministers were often not extensively involved in this process. They determined the official titles and hence often the core responsibilities of junior ministers. They sometimes also directed that certain functions either be retained by the senior minister or given to a junior minister (Interviewee 73, p. 1). However detailed decisions about the responsibilities of junior ministers were usually left in the hands of the relevant senior minister. The involvement of the prime minister was usually confined to the ratification of arrangements determined by senior ministers within their respective portfolios. This pattern is described by a senior official.

> The actual nomenclature is determined by the prime minister and then there's a division of responsibilities letter which will go from the portfolio minister back to the prime minister. At least that's how we do it. And that letter sets down the parameters, you know. I will be looking after Commonwealth-state relations, appointments, budget policy, international relations, memorandums of understanding ... and Mary's going to be doing Youth and Bill's going to be doing as little as I can give him because I think he's an incompetent dud. It doesn't say that. It says Bill's looking forward to developing employment programs for the prickly pear growers association and other good works (Interviewee 62, p. 4).

The absence of prime ministerial involvement was even more clearly evident in relation to the functions of parliamentary secretaries. These decisions were usually left entirely to the discretion of the relevant senior minister (Interviewee 40, p. 1).

The junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries interviewed for this study described the central role of senior ministers in the allocation of functional responsibilities within their portfolios (eg Interviewee 12, p. 1, Interviewee 22, p. 1, Interviewee 43, p. 2). One junior minister stated that senior ministers had been free to divide their portfolios as they pleased. They could usually chose which functions they wanted to retain themselves and
which they were prepared to allocate to their junior colleagues (Interviewee 68, p. 1). Interviewees repeatedly emphasised the discretion of senior ministers over the allocation of functional responsibilities within their respective portfolios. They also highlighted the existence within each portfolio of a distinct “pecking” order between senior ministers, junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. These two points are reflected in the following statements by a senior official and a ministerial adviser.

Fundamentally the senior minister gets first choice and then there’s a bit of negotiation at the margin and the junior minister would have a say, but not I think a great deal of say, about what they’re actually going to do (Interviewee 15, p. 1).

The role of the parliamentary secretary in all of that was that basically he got the dregs of what was left. If no one wanted something then the parliamentary secretary might be given a range of things to go ahead and look after (Interviewee 40, p. 1).

Interviewees therefore emphasised the dominance of senior ministers over the allocation of functional responsibilities within their portfolios. They also emphasised their capacity to marginalise junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries by confining them to a narrow range of functional responsibilities.

The second dimension consisted of the capacity of senior ministers to “antagonistically” intervene in portfolio management within the responsibilities of both junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. One senior minister interviewed for this study differentiated between junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. This senior minister argued that it was always possible to intervene within the functions of parliamentary secretaries because of their lack of formal ministerial status. Their functions were explicitly delegated from the relevant senior minister and could be taken back at any time. However junior ministers had the same formal status as senior ministers. This meant that their decisions could not be overruled in the same way by the senior minister. This distinction is reflected in the following statement.

To the extent that there was intervention, it was basically a cooperative intervention to try and improve the outcome, not that we had some statutory right to intervene. In fact ultimately the sign-off was with the so-called junior minister. I didn’t have the right to sign-off the minutes (Interviewee 46, p. 5).

This distinction between junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries was not reflected in any other interviews. These emphasised the capacity of senior ministers to intervene in portfolio management within the functional responsibilities of both junior ministers and
parliamentary secretaries. This was evident regardless of differences in their formal constitutional status. One junior minister described the position in the following terms: 'As a junior minister . . . you're a second class citizen. You're there at the discretion of . . . your portfolio minister and their staff' (Interviewee 05, p. 1). A second junior minister put the position more succinctly: 'junior ministers basically have no rights' (Interviewee 19, p. 2). The following statements by a ministerial adviser and a senior official highlight the capacity of senior ministers to "antagonistically" intervene in portfolio management within the functional responsibilities of their junior colleagues.

The senior minister's got the capacity to work on whatever it is he or she wishes. Politics doesn't work on the basis of patches. It works on the basis of competition for influence and power, constantly, and there's no difference in the minister to minister relationship (Interviewee 07, p. 9).

If minister Brereton had a strong view on something, then its unlikely that Gary Johns would pursue a different line. He might have been pursuing a different line. But he would change course. He was a very junior minister. It was his first appointment (Interviewee 25, p. 2).

The third dimension consisted of the formal authority of senior ministers over coordination and priority-setting within their respective portfolios. Most importantly senior ministers retained formal control over the portfolio budget process. They could determine overall budget priorities within their portfolios (subject to the approval of ERC). They could also determine budget priorities within different functional areas of their portfolios. Control over the budget process was described as the most important formal power retained by senior ministers (Interviewee 33, p. 4, Interviewee 44, p. 2). The following statements by senior officials stress the significance of the capacity of senior ministers to determine budget priorities throughout their portfolios.

It gave the portfolio minister even more authority to live within a portfolio budget. If there were to be offsets made in terms of finding savings to fund expenditure or you had to prioritise which expenditure would go up, then the portfolio minister ultimately was the arbiter (Interviewee 28, pp. 1-2).

If you're taking about ordinary budget rounds, at the end of the day the senior minister's got to sit down and say: "Do I want another station for Triple J, or do I want X or Y on land transport, or do I want to spend a bit more on the local airport?" At the end of the day only the senior minister can make that decision about what he's going to bid for (Interviewee 02, p. 7).

Interviewees therefore emphasised the dominance of senior ministers over the division of responsibility for portfolio management and their capacity to marginalise their junior colleagues. Senior ministers could limit their junior colleagues to a narrow range of
functional responsibilities. They could also adopt “expansive” approaches and remain both extensively and “antagonistically” involved in portfolio management within the direct responsibilities of their junior colleagues. Finally senior ministers could adopt “exclusive” approaches to coordination and priority-setting within their portfolios.

(b) Cabinet Representation. Interviews also revealed three dimensions to the capacity of senior ministers to shape the operation of the division of responsibility for cabinet representation. The first consisted of their influence over the cabinet visibility of the functions of junior ministers. This derived from their role in the allocation of functional responsibilities within their portfolios. Senior ministers could retain direct responsibility for functions characterised by high cabinet visibility and allocate less visible functions to their junior colleagues.

The second dimension derived from the formal powers of senior ministers. Senior ministers retained formal authority over the contents of general cabinet submissions from throughout their portfolios. This is described by a senior official: ‘Nothing can ever go forward under our arrangements without it going in the name of the senior minister (Interviewee 15, p. 7, see also Interviewee 07, p. 8). Senior ministers also retained formal responsibility for carriage of their portfolio budget submission in the budget/ERC process.

The third dimension derived from the informal powers of senior ministers. Interviewees argued that senior ministers almost invariably had the capacity to ensure the defeat of junior ministerial cabinet submissions to which they were opposed (Interviewee 30, p. 2, Interviewee 52, p. 4, Interviewee 69, p. 6). Interviews revealed this situation could arise when senior ministers had not been adequately consulted prior to the lodging of a general cabinet submission by the junior minister. In the words of a senior official: ‘its unlikely to get very far if the senior minister doesn’t support it’ (Interviewee 02, p. 5). It was also argued that junior ministers were often also dependent on the active support of the relevant senior minister. This was evident in both the general cabinet and budget/ERC processes. It was particularly evident in the budget/ERC process. The importance of active senior ministerial support in the budget/ERC process is emphasised in the following comment by a senior official.

Unless the junior minister is a particularly strong junior minister or particularly capable of compelling argument, its the portfolio minister at the end of the day that will mostly sway the
ERC. They tend to listen to him more than the junior. So the junior actually needed to portfolio minister on side. And if you had the support of the portfolio minister, and the portfolio minister was able to speak for you, that often was crucial in getting an outcome you wanted (Interviewee 61, p. 4).

Interviews therefore emphasised the dominance of senior ministers over the division of responsibility for cabinet representation. Interviewees argued that senior ministers could exploit their formal and informal powers to dominate the development and presentation of general cabinet submissions from across their portfolios and exclude both junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries from the budget/ERC process.

Two Approaches to the Division of Responsibility for Portfolio Management

Interviews examined the division of responsibility for portfolio management from the senior ministerial perspective. Interviews revealed evidence of two sets of constraints on the capacity of senior ministers to delegate work to their junior colleagues. The first was the requirement for senior ministers to retain a leading role in coordination and priority-setting within their portfolios. This was a key point to emerge from the previous chapter. Senior ministers argued that it was not possible for them to delegate responsibility for coordination and priority-setting to their junior colleagues. Most importantly they had to retain a leading role determining priorities in the portfolio budget process (Interviewee 46, p. 1, Interviewee 57, pp. 1, 4). This constraint is described by a senior minister.

The critical ones had to do with budget decisions, which were entirely those of the [senior] minister in consultation with the cabinet . . . . You had to finally have somebody who was responsible for the whole portfolio. You couldn’t delegate that (Interviewee 46, p. 1).

The previous chapter argued that senior ministers remained involved in coordination and priority-setting across their respective portfolios. It described variation in the extent to which they allowed their junior colleagues to participate in these processes. There were only two exceptions to the dominance of senior ministers. The first consisted of policy development and program delivery overlaps between the functions of a junior minister or parliamentary secretary (eg Interviewee 52, p. 3). The second consisted of the budgets of separate “sub-cabinet level” portfolios.
The second constraint on senior ministers derived from their ultimate accountability for their respective portfolios. This meant that they had to remain involved in key functional issues throughout their portfolios (including within the direct functional responsibilities of their junior colleagues (Interviewee 18, pp. 1-2, Interviewee 46, p. 1, Interviewee 57, p. 1). This was a second important constraint on the capacity of senior ministers to delegate to their junior colleagues. The previous chapter argued that only a few senior ministers were willing to completely eschew involvement in the functions of their junior colleagues. Furthermore this approach was most common in relation to separate “sub-cabinet level” portfolios. This second set of limitations was described by two previous studies of the work of sub-cabinet level political executives (Headey 1974a, pp. 105-106, Theakston 1987, p. 79).

Within these constraints senior ministers could adopt two different approaches to the division of responsibility for portfolio management. The first consisted of the “expansive” approach. Senior ministers who adopted the “expansive” approach remained extensively involved in functional policy change and public relations throughout their portfolios. Junior ministers were sometimes granted large and important functional responsibilities. However in common with parliamentary secretaries their workloads consisted of routine administration and representation as well as less important aspects of public relations. The previous chapter described several examples of this “expansive” approach. One junior minister described his portfolio management workload as comprising ‘whatever the senior minister wanted to off-load’ (Interviewee 35, p. 1, see also Interviewee 28, pp. 1, 13).

The second senior ministerial approach was the “limited” approach. Senior ministers who adopted the “limited” approach focused on their own functional responsibilities. Junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries had extensive functional autonomy. The previous chapter argued that a handful of senior ministers eschewed direct involvement in portfolio management within the functions of their junior colleagues. However most continued to monitor their junior colleagues and would occasionally become more extensively involved in key issues within their wider portfolios. However it is important to emphasise that this involvement could take two possible forms: “supportive” or “antagonistic”. Senior ministers would not always overrule their junior colleagues or take over responsibility for public relations work (Interviewee 52, p. 1-2).
The previous chapter argued that most senior ministers adopted the “limited” approach. It also emphasised the extent of variation in both the scope and composition of the portfolio management workloads of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. This variation was most evident in the case of junior ministers. It was less evident in the workloads of parliamentary secretaries. Their workloads almost invariably included large amounts of routine administrative and representational work. However parliamentary secretaries in some portfolios had larger and more important workloads than junior ministers in other portfolios.

Costs and Benefits of Different Approaches to the Division of Responsibility for Portfolio Management

Interviews examined the costs and benefits of these different approaches to the division of responsibility for portfolio management from the senior ministerial perspective. The most important point to emerge from interviews was that senior ministers could derive two important benefits by adopting “limited” approaches and by allocating a large range of functional responsibilities to their junior colleagues.

The first of these benefits related to the capacity of senior ministers to cope with portfolio management workloads. Interviewees argued that the workloads of most portfolios were far beyond the capacity of a single senior minister (Interviewee 43, p. 2, Interviewee 57, p. 10). This was particularly evident when senior ministers also had important cabinet committee and parliamentary leadership responsibilities (Interviewee 60, p. 1). This made it necessary for senior ministers to delegate responsibility for portfolio management to their junior colleagues. These arguments were evident in previous studies of the work of sub-cabinet level political executives (Majeau 1983, p. 5, Vanderhoff-Silburt 1983/84, p. 9, Theakston 1987, pp. 94-96). The importance of this workload imperative is reflected in the following statements by two senior officials.

Most of the mega-departments are beyond the capacity of one minister to give detailed attention to all the matters in the department (Interviewee 61, p. 9).

Given the sophistication and complexity of policy and administration, it seems to me that it’s unreasonable for a modern senior minister to do it all himself. So you’re left with the pragmatics of how you do it (Interviewee 58, p. 5).
The advantage of the “limited” approach was that it enabled senior ministers to use their junior colleagues as “filters”. Senior ministers could focus on important functional areas within their portfolios and leave the remainder to their junior colleagues. These other areas were often characterised by large amounts of routine administrative and representational work (Interviewee 18, p. 1, Interviewee 43, p. 2). In the words of one junior minister: ‘there is just a huge amount of mundane routine in the administration of the Attorney-General’s portfolio. The amount of paperwork and process is enormous’ (Interviewee 44, p. 2). Senior ministers could limit their direct involvement in these parts of their portfolios to a handful of key issues. All other portfolio management work could be handled by the junior minister or parliamentary secretary. Interviews emphasised the benefits for senior ministers who delegated extensively to their junior colleagues. These are described by senior officials.

It would be interesting to know what their perspective was, whether or not having a junior minister who was both an ally and a curse in some senses was a positive or a negative. I would have thought it might have been largely positive in terms of not just control of departments, but control of caucus and politicking and having another pair of arms and legs to do the politicking around the place (Interviewee 58, p. 6).

I think in a way its been a relief to the senior minister to have people who are perceived to be quite active in their portfolio at the junior minister level (Interviewee 71, p. 3).

Interviews revealed considerable evidence of the potential workload benefits for senior ministers who were able to delegate responsibility for large functional areas to their junior colleagues. One senior minister expressed regret that he had not delegated more functions to his parliamentary secretary (Interviewee 18, pp. 1-2). One junior minister argued that senior ministers increasingly came to appreciate the extent to which they could delegate functions to their junior colleagues. This enabled many junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries to increase the scope and importance of their functional responsibilities as well as their functional autonomy.

I suspect at the start not just the ministers but their staff, the senior staff of the cabinet ministers, didn't quite understand how it was to work. And they liked to exercise a bit of extra authority. But as people got on with each other on a day-to-day basis, I think the senior ministers realised that junior ministers could be used for a lot more than they anticipated (Interviewee 05, p. 1).

Interviewees also emphasised the size of the portfolio management workloads of senior ministers who attempted to maintain direct involvement in functions across their portfolios (Interviewee 01, pp. 9-10, Interviewee 07, p. 10). The following quotation from a senior
minister stresses the difficulties confronted by senior ministers who adopted “expansive” approaches to the division of responsibility for portfolio management.

They’d be mad to exercise it in too much detail because it’s just unmanageable. Its defeats the purpose of the system . . . They shouldn’t try to micro-manage how it is done, but they should be looking at the question of broader portfolio strategy and direction (Interviewee 51, p. 3).

These problems were also evident in the case of senior ministers who adopted “limited” approaches but only gave junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries a narrow range of functional responsibilities within their portfolios.

The second benefit derived from the need for senior ministers to maintain the cooperation of their junior colleagues. This was important for two reasons. Senior ministers argued that they needed the cooperation of their junior colleagues to cope with the workloads of their portfolios (Interviewee 57, p. 2). There was evidence of junior ministers who had withdrawn from all portfolio management work as a result of senior ministers adopting “expansive” approaches to the division of responsibility for portfolio management. This is described by a senior official.

So essentially he hasn’t had a job for a couple of years. I’ve gone in the job for periods of up to three months with absolutely no contact with either him or his office. Running one of the two divisions that he was supposedly responsible for (Interviewee 07, p. 3).

Interviews also revealed evidence that junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries had the potential to generate problems for the senior colleagues. One junior minister argued that senior ministers had strong incentives to maintain a good relationship with their junior colleagues because of the capacity of junior ministers to ‘turn feral’ (Interviewee 19, p. 1). Interviewees argued that junior ministers could exploit their access to information from throughout the portfolio to organise opposition among relevant interest groups and clients to senior ministerial policy agendas as well as to leak material damaging to senior ministers (Interviewee 19, pp. 1-2, see also Interviewee 05, pp. 6-7, Interviewee 40, p. 5, Interviewee 57, p. 2). This is described in the following quote from a senior official: ‘the junior minister’s entire time was spent trying to knock the senior minister off his perch. And when I say entire time I mean minute by minute’ (Interviewee 72, p. 7). Arguments about the need for cabinet ministers to maintain the cooperation of their junior colleagues were not evident in previous studies of the work of sub-cabinet level political executives.
The need for senior ministers to maintain the cooperation of their junior colleagues had important implications for their approaches to the division of responsibility for portfolio management. One senior minister emphasised the importance of giving junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries a large range of functional responsibilities. This maximised the extent to which senior ministers could use their junior colleagues as “filters”. It also minimised the potential for tension and conflict within teams of political executives. This senior minister emphasised the importance of removing potential sources of friction between senior ministers and their junior colleagues.

The most important thing is at the very start of their career they sit down with the portfolio minister and they’re given a decent load. The worst thing you can do is say: “I’m going to give you a light load and increase it”. Because all that really means is that you whet their appetite. Then they get dissatisfied because you’ve held on to things. So you make the division originally as fair as possible (Interviewee 57, p. 3).

The need for senior ministers to maintain the cooperation of their junior colleagues also had important implications for their involvement in portfolio management within the direct functional responsibilities of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. One senior minister stated that he expected to be involved in key issues within the responsibilities of his junior colleagues. However it was important for him not to continually intervene in their functions. Two senior ministers emphasised the benefits of adopting “limited” rather than “expansive” approaches and minimising their direct involvement in the functions of their junior colleagues.

They should be given a section of the department, a specific area to run. They shouldn’t be made super-secretaries to sign-off stuff or to be fobbed-off to meet the weaker delegations. They should be given an area that they run. You know, they create the policy, they’re in charge of the administration, they’re in charge of the publicity. They should be given that sort of autonomy to do it (Interviewee 57, p. 3).

It wouldn’t be capricious. You’d try to give a fair degree of autonomy or its not a very satisfying job (Interviewee 46, p. 5).

The first of these two senior ministers contrasted these benefits with the problems which resulted from the “expansive” approach to the division of responsibilities adopted by one of his senior colleagues.

Always tried to keep complete control of everything and treated his junior minister like shit. Not the only one. But that was an example of someone who couldn’t let it go. Wanted almost total control over everything. Therefore the partnership didn’t work very well with any of his junior ministers (Interviewee 57, p. 1).
Interviewees revealed two additional points concerning the direct involvement of senior ministers in portfolio management within the of their junior colleagues. The first was that senior ministers should not simply bypass their junior colleagues through direct links with relevant senior officials (Interviewee 57, p. 4). Instead disagreements should be resolved as far as possible within the political executive. This argument is reflected in the following quotation from a senior minister.

You have to respect the integrity of the decision and make sure the parliamentary secretary is treated with a bit of respect and dignity. That doesn’t mean you always have to support them. But they shouldn’t be overridden in a cavalier fashion (Interviewee 51, p. 5).

It was also argued that it was important for the offices of senior ministers to manage any “antagonistic” intervention in order to minimise damage to relationships between political executives and their offices. This management role is described by a ministerial adviser. The third part of this chapter examines in detail the role of ministerial offices in managing the division of responsibility between senior ministers and their junior colleagues.

On occasions we would trample on it. But the trampling would be very specific. And my usual approach would be that I would trample, then I would immediately ring the senior adviser and say: “We’ve trampled on you”. So at least the egos were partly dealt with in that there was an acknowledgment by [the senior minister’s] office at a senior level that this is your turf . . . We’d never apologise for it. But, you know, acknowledging that we’d done it (Interviewee 07, p. 5).

Finally there was evidence that the need for senior ministers to maintain the cooperation of their junior colleagues impacted on their approach to the involvement of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries in coordination and priority-setting. Senior ministers had to maintain direct involvement in coordination and priority-setting. It could not be delegated to their junior colleagues. It therefore remained an important potential source of friction within teams of political executives. Two important points emerged from interviews. The first was that senior ministers often tried to minimise the potential for friction by giving junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries responsibility for discrete functions characterised by weak policy development and program delivery overlaps with the remainder of the portfolio.

The second important point was that the budget process often remained a potential source of friction between senior ministers and their junior colleagues. The potential for friction derived from the need to establish a single set of priorities across the functions of different
political executives. A senior official highlighted the significance of the budget process as a key source of tension within teams of political executives.

The real tension comes back to the budget process. Because the senior minister will have his own ideas about priorities, in terms of money, and those may well run counter to the junior minister’s interest in his own particular responsibilities. So I think to a large extent a senior minister will let a junior minister run until the point where it starts to bear seriously on priorities (Interviewee 58, p. 2).

Interviewees emphasised that senior ministers could adopt “exclusive” approaches to the budget process and ignore the priorities of their junior colleagues. However a senior minister argued that it was ‘very important to be proportionate’ in determining priorities between different functional areas because friction could easily develop between ministers if this process was not handled with care (Interviewee 18, p. 3). He argued that he had been ‘very careful not to give the impression to Justice and Consumer Affairs that cuts were being unduly directed to them’. He also argued that he had not targeted cuts in these parts of his portfolio (Interviewee 18, pp. 2-3). A junior minister also argued that senior ministers had to accommodate junior ministerial priorities to maintain their cooperation (Interviewee 19, p. 1, see also Interviewee 55, p. 1, Interviewee 66, p. 3). Senior ministers often allowed their junior colleagues to determine their own functional priorities within overall portfolio parameters (Interviewee 05, p. 3). The need to maintain the cooperation of their junior colleagues emerged as a significant constraint on the capacity of senior ministers to pursue their own budget priorities at the portfolio level (eg Interviewee 07, p. 7, Interviewee 18, pp. 2-3, Interviewee 58, p. 7).

Interviewees therefore emphasised the benefits to senior ministers of delegating as many functions as possible to their junior colleagues and adopting a “limited” approach to the division of responsibility for portfolio management. This allowed senior ministers to use their junior colleagues as “filters” and enabled them to focus on key functional areas within their portfolios. This approach also meant that the potential for friction within teams of political executives was largely confined to the budget process.

**Obstacles to Delegation: The Importance of Relationships**

Interviewees also revealed the existence of three sets of obstacles to delegation. The first consisted of the career ambitions of senior ministers. Previous studies of the work of sub-cabinet level political executives highlighted the impact of career ambitions on the division
of responsibility between cabinet ministers and their junior colleagues. Several studies argued that cabinet ministers were often reluctant to allow their junior colleagues to emerge as rivals by giving them access to important work (Majeau 1983, p. 5, Randle 1983, p. 13, Rose 1987, p. 22, Theakston 1987, p. 93).

Interviews conducted for this study also emphasised the potential impact of career rivalry on the extent to which senior ministers were prepared to delegate to their junior colleagues (Interviewee 07, p. 9, Interviewee 69, p. 1). The following statements from a senior official and a senior minister highlight the significance of career rivalry between political executives.

The most important factor at work was what the senior minister was prepared to trust his junior minister with. In two ways. One was the political credit he wanted to get for himself and his own interests on the own hand, balanced against the ambitions of a junior minister which were often greater than the senior minister wanted to allow . . . There's a very real tension between what a senior minister is prepared to let go of and the ambitions of a junior minister (Interviewee 58, p. 1).

People who have the opportunity to delegate tend only to do so if they've got a lot of confidence in themselves. Insecure people won't delegate. They keep everything to themselves because they think if they delegate others might outshine them or they might lose control (Interviewee 51, p. 1).

Senior ministers could marginalise their junior colleagues because they regarded them as potential rivals for ministerial or cabinet positions. A second and much more important obstacle to delegation consisted of poor relationships between senior ministers and their junior colleagues. Previous studies of the work of sub-cabinet level political executives emphasised the overwhelming importance of relationships within teams of political executives in determining the extent of delegation between cabinet ministers and their junior colleagues (Weller 1980, p. 612, Majeau 1983, p. 3, Randle 1983, p. 13, Vanderhoff-Silburt 1983/84, pp. 8-9, Theakston 1987, pp. 92-94). The small literature on the restructuring of the Commonwealth political executive also stresses the significance of personal 'rapport' in determining the extent of delegation between senior ministers and their junior colleagues (Keating 1993, p. 8).

Similar findings emerged from the interviews conducted for this study. Interviewees emphasised the impact of personal relationships between senior ministers and their junior colleagues on the operation of the division of responsibility for portfolio management.
(Interviewee 57, p. 2). Senior officials stressed the importance of personal relationships within teams of political executives.

I think a lot comes back through to personalities . . . I think that the personal dynamics are much more important than the theory of demarcation (Interviewee 58, p. 1).

A lot depends on personal relationships between the ministers and how their offices get along. You can’t under-estimate the influence of the personalities involved (Interviewee 60, pp. 6-7).

Previous studies of the work of sub-cabinet level political executives have adopted a one dimensional approach to relationships between cabinet ministers and sub-cabinet level political executives (eg Theakston 1987, pp. 92-94). The interviews conducted for this study revealed that relationships between senior ministers and their junior colleagues can be conceptualised in terms of two related but distinct dimensions. The first dimension can be termed the personal relationship. The personal relationship refers to senior ministerial perceptions of the trustworthiness and competence of their junior colleagues (Interviewee 28, p. 2). These perceptions were important because of the extent to which most senior ministers regarded themselves as ultimately responsible for portfolio management across their entire portfolios (Interviewee 18, p. 1, Interview 46, pp. 1-2, Interviewee 57, p. 1). Senior ministerial perceptions of the trustworthiness and competence of their junior colleagues were important in determining whether they adopted “expansive” or “limited” approaches to the division of responsibility for portfolio management (Interviewee 28, pp. 2-3, Interviewee 33, p. 3). This applied equally to both junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. Its importance is highlighted in the following statements by a senior official and a ministerial adviser. These statements refer specifically to parliamentary secretaries although identical considerations applied to junior ministers.

[The parliamentary secretary] was regarded as a bit of a light weight as well. So he was just on the “administrivia” of the thing. Nothing to do with the major political program development. All driven from [the senior minister] (Interviewee 28, p. 3).

It was also dependent I suppose on the individual who was parliamentary secretary. Because some of them were much more capable than others. And you’d be prepared to trust them and give them a policy implementation role. Others you would basically only use as a substitute for representing the minister at particular functions and doing set pieces that the minister couldn’t do. Where the bulk of the work had already been done by the advisers or the departmental staff (Interviewee 40, p. 1).

Senior ministerial perceptions of the trustworthiness and competence of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries also determined the scope and importance of their functional
responsibilities. Interviews revealed some junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries had substantial autonomy over only a narrow range of functions. Others were granted substantial autonomy over a larger and more important range of functional responsibilities (Interviewee 08, p. 1, Interviewee 52, p. 1).

Interviewees argued that personal relationships between senior ministers and their junior colleagues could evolve in opposite directions. There were senior ministers who extended the functional responsibilities of their junior colleagues and allowed them more autonomy as their personal relationship developed. Junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries were also monitored far less closely by the office of the senior minister. Senior ministers also allowed their junior colleagues a greater role in the portfolio budget process. This direction of evolution was described by a senior minister.

You don’t have to start off by trusting them. You’ve got to work up a working relationship where trust evolves. By you being loyal to them, the loyalty’s usually returned (Interviewee 57, p. 9).

There were also senior ministers who adopted the opposite approach. They became increasingly involved in portfolio management within the functions of their junior colleagues and excluded them from coordination and priority-setting. These senior ministers adopted “expansive” approaches because of poor personal relationships with their junior colleagues (eg Interviewee 07, p. 1, Interviewee 28, pp. 2-3).

The second dimension consists of the policy relationship. This emphasises the importance of policy agreement between senior ministers and their junior colleagues. This was significant because most senior ministers continued to monitor the functions of their junior colleagues and expected to be involved in key policy issues within their wider portfolios. It was also important because of the leading role of senior ministers in the portfolio budget process. Policy relationships are explored in greater detail in the next part of this chapter which examines the division of responsibility from the perspective of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries.

A third obstacle to delegation consisted of the failure of senior ministers to allocate clearly defined functions to their junior colleagues. This was most clearly evident when junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries were only given responsibility for particular types of work. It was also evident when junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries were
allocated functions characterised by strong bureaucratic level overlaps with the functions of the senior minister (eg Interviewee 09, p. 2).

The Impact of Environmental Factors

Interviewees emphasised the influence of relationships between senior ministers and their junior colleagues over the division of responsibility for portfolio management. They attached particular importance to senior ministerial perceptions of the trustworthiness and competence of their junior colleagues. However interviewees also argued that these relationships did not operate in isolation. There was some evidence of the impact of wider “environmental” factors on the approaches of senior ministers.

These wider “environmental” factors have received little attention in previous studies of the work of sub-cabinet level political executives. Theakston quoted one junior minister who emphasised the potential importance of the relationship between junior ministers and the prime minister (1987, p. 92). However this point was not examined further. The small literature on the restructuring of the Commonwealth political executive also contains a reference to the potential impact of wider “environmental” factors on relationships between senior ministers and their junior colleagues. Weller (1987, p. 22) argued that relationships between Australian senior and junior ministers were more likely to be influenced by their respective links to the prime minister and party colleagues than relationships between British cabinet and junior ministers. This was attributed to the proximity of Australian political executives to the prime minister and the importance of caucus and factional politics (Weller 1987, p. 22).

Interviews revealed some evidence to support Weller’s suggestion. It was argued that the capacity of senior ministers to shape the division of responsibility could be influenced by the party status of the relevant junior minister as well as their relationship with the prime minister. Party status emerged as particularly important when senior and junior ministers were members of the same party faction. There was some evidence that senior ministers could be constrained in their capacity to “antagonistically” intervene in the responsibilities of junior ministers.

There was also evidence of the impact of “environmental” factors on the involvement of junior ministers in coordination and priority-setting. Most importantly there was evidence
that the party status of junior ministers could limit the capacity of senior ministers to ignore their priorities in the portfolio budget process. It was argued that some junior ministers could exploit party and prime ministerial support to resist senior ministerial intervention in their responsibilities and pursue their own priorities in the portfolio budget process. This did not apply to parliamentary secretaries. The three following quotations are particularly important because they describe the potential influence of party status and to a lesser extent links with the prime minister on the operation of the division of responsibility for portfolio management. The first is from a ministerial adviser.

In the Labor government it depended very much on an individual’s political position with the prime minister and with the caucus. So making the comparison, my experience with the Howe-Staples relationship against this one for example, there were a whole range of issues on which Howe would never have dared interfere with Staples in the way that Crean has interfered with Free. Because he knew that Staples would have done him in in the caucus committee. Howe knew that Staples would have done him in. Whereas I think Crean has felt wholly free to trample over Free however he wished. Because essentially I think Free has sort of relied on his closeness to the Prime Minister. But the Prime Minister wasn’t too interested in any of that sort of stuff. And never put the effort in with caucus. Indeed, had a very poor reputation with the Caucus. You see Crean’s office worked very hard with the Caucus on Working Nation and ensuring that they could use Working Nation in local electorates. Free’s office essentially dropped the ball on all but school openings. So Free had no real support in the Caucus which left Crean, you know able to do what he liked (Interviewee 07, pp. 1-2).

The second is from a junior minister. It argues that some junior ministers had the capacity to cultivate party support and limit the capacity of the senior minister to “antagonistically” intervene in portfolio management within their direct functional responsibilities or ignore their budget priorities.

Staples had built up an enormous support base in caucus for policies and managed to get those policies through the process. Howe could not have fought Staples, both for those broader caucus reasons and also for the Left caucus ... factional reasons. There’s nothing strange about that. That’s the way this place operates. The factional considerations are always there (Interviewee 05, p. 5).

Finally a senior official emphasised the potential importance of party status on the role of junior ministers in the budget process and their capacity to represent their functional responsibilities in negotiations with the senior minister over budget priorities. This official highlighted the importance of personal relationships and the need for senior ministers to maintain the cooperation of their junior colleagues. However he also argued that some junior ministers could exploit party support to pursue their own priorities in the portfolio budget process.
There's some very interesting power plays there. It goes to the faction and the relative strength within the faction that the junior minister and the senior minister have. And that influences the outcomes significantly (Interviewee 61, p. 3).

Interviewees therefore argued that relationships between senior ministers and their junior colleagues did not operate in isolation. Senior ministerial approaches were influenced by the prime ministerial and party status of their junior ministers. However it is important not to overemphasise the significance of these "environmental" factors. A former ministerial adviser argued that there were usually few constraints on the ability of senior ministers to "antagonistically" intervene in the functions of their junior colleagues. He argued that senior ministers could be constrained in relation to a certain issue or if the prime minister had specifically allocated a function to a junior minister. However this was only a 'minor constraint'. Senior ministers were even less constrained if they themselves had given the function to the junior minister (Interviewee 55, p. 3). The following statement from a senior minister likewise emphasises the paramount importance of personal relationships within teams of political executives in comparison with "environmental" factors.

I'm not sure about that. That's an interesting view. Maybe true. I'd also suspect that there's so many hidden power structures in government that often a junior minister wouldn't even know that he'd been duded by a senior minister. There's just so many power relationships and structures that a junior minister would find it hard to bring to bear on decision-making their other strengths, you know party strength, factional strength, prime minister strength. I don't think very often a junior minister would have gone to the prime minister and said: "Look, I'm getting duded by the senior minister, will you intervene" (Interviewee 57, p. 5).

**Different Approaches to the Division of Responsibility for Cabinet Representation**

Interviews focused on the division of responsibility for portfolio management. However they also revealed some evidence concerning the division of responsibility for cabinet representation (especially in the general cabinet process). The previous chapter argued that most junior ministers presented their own general cabinet business. It also found evidence of variation in the involvement of senior ministers. Some eschewed involvement in the general cabinet business of their junior colleagues while others remained more extensively involved. It was also argued that this involvement could take two forms: "supportive" or "antagonistic".
Interviewees revealed differences in the propensity of senior ministers to become involved in the presentation of junior ministerial submissions. These differences are highlighted in the following statements by a ministerial adviser and a senior official.

It depends a bit on the senior minister’s personality too. Ralph tended to say very little in cabinet. He wasn’t a very vocal participant in cabinet discussions. Other people can’t keep their mouths shut. So in a situation where you had a senior minister who was a particularly loquacious individual, they probably wouldn’t be able to resist participating in the discussion. Whereas Ralph would tend not to become involved unless he was either asked to be or he felt it was going very badly (Interviewee 55, p. 6).

Graham Richardson was reasonably protective of his junior ministers. I think Ros [Kelly] saw herself as batting for her particular issues. I think she had a more demarcated view of the process (Interviewee 63, p. 3).

Interviews also revealed other factors which influenced the role of senior ministers. The first consisted of the capacity of the junior minister. Interviewees argued that some junior ministers had considerable cabinet status and highly developed presentation skills. These junior ministers were capable of prevailing in cabinet with little or no support from their senior colleagues: ‘the junior minister . . . will come in and give a presentation that’s every bit as polished as the better senior ministers’ (Interviewee 55, p. 6, see also Interviewee 17, p. 3, Interviewee 75, p. 3). Other junior ministers were less competent performers who were much more dependent on the active support of the senior minister (Interviewee 55, p.6, Interviewee 73, pp. 5, 11-12). A second and closely related factor consisted of the difficulty of the relevant cabinet submission, particularly the extent of opposition from other cabinet ministers. Interviews revealed that junior ministers expected the support of their senior colleagues on difficult submissions characterised by extensive ministerial opposition (Interviewee 57, pp. 6-7).

Interviewees also stressed the importance of the attitudes of other senior ministers. There was the potential for senior ministers to be drawn into the discussion of junior ministerial submissions at the behest of their cabinet colleagues (Interviewee 75, p. 3, Interviewee 55, p. 3, Interviewee 63, p. 6). This was particularly likely in relation to controversial submissions being presented by junior ministers with poor presentation skills and low cabinet status. This is described by a senior official.

I suppose its a case of the cabinet saying: “Are you fair dinkum as the senior minister backing this thing?” Because if its at all contentious I think they do look to the senior minister for their weight of opinion . . . So you get this situation where the senior minister gets incorporated
back into the process. So that the next cabinet submission or subsequent material involves that senior minister more explicitly and directly (Interviewee 75, p. 3).

Senior ministers responded to these factors in different ways. Interviews revealed that some senior ministers would automatically support their junior colleagues. The extent to which senior ministers actively supported the submissions of their junior colleagues also depended on the quality of their personal relationship (Interviewee 69, p. 6). Senior ministers argued that it was important for them to support their junior colleagues in order to maintain their cooperation. The failure of senior ministers to support junior ministerial submissions was described as an important source of tension and conflict within teams of political executives. This is described by a senior minister.

If you were a portfolio minister and your junior minister gets rolled, that reflects on you too. So you make sure it doesn’t happen. If the junior minister suddenly gets into dreadful trouble, the portfolio minister may intervene and say: “There are a couple of aspects of this submission that I think we could re-polish, you know, re-target it. So why don’t we come back next week?”. So there’s no humiliation or anything... But also, why wasn’t the submission right? It came from my department. So there’s also pride of ownership in the submission comes into it (Interviewee 57, p. 8).

There was also evidence that senior ministers were able to maintain an independent stance on junior ministerial submissions (Interviewee 69, pp. 5-6). This capacity is described by a senior official.

Different senior ministers deal with it differently, they might say you’re responsible for A to Z, whatever you say goes, I’ll back you to the hilt. Now I think with Brereton that wasn’t the case. He would buy in on issues where he believed his reputation was at stake... In the eyes of his peers he wants to be seen as someone who’s got ears and doesn’t just back something no matter what (Interviewee 75, p. 3).

In these cases junior ministers were forced to negotiate with their senior colleague at the portfolio level. They were sometimes forced to change submissions to accommodate the concerns of the senior minister (Interviewee 07, p. 8, Interviewee 40, p. 5). This was important because senior ministerial opposition would almost inevitably ensure the defeat of a junior ministerial submission (Interviewee 05, p. 3).

Senior ministerial support was particularly important in the budget/ERC process. It was argued that senior ministers would sometimes allow junior ministers to include proposals in the budget submission in order to avoid friction at the portfolio level. However they would fail to actively support them in the budget/ERC process. This would usually ensure
their defeat (Interviewee 07, p. 7, Interviewee 28, p. 2, Interviewee 73, pp. 6-7). This process is described in the following statements by senior officials. It was also argued that senior ministers would sometimes trade-off junior ministerial priorities for their own in the budget/ERC process (Interviewee 62, p. 4).

Occasionally if the portfolio minister didn't want to have too big a kind of brawl before the cabinet, the portfolio minister just wouldn't argue strongly for it in cabinet and so it wouldn't get up anyway (Interviewee 28, p. 2).

And invariably the process, having sat in on some of those meetings, Crowley would present, Lawrence would then argue and support the submission, but when the hard Finance portfolios or the Treasury portfolios came in heavy on Crowley, then ... Crowley was on her own. I mean that's probably the easiest way I could describe it (Interviewee 73, p. 6).

Finally interviews again revealed limited evidence that the approach of senior ministers to the division of responsibility for cabinet representation was influenced by "environmental" factors. It was argued that the approaches of senior ministers could be influenced by the party and prime ministerial support of the relevant junior minister. The impact of these wider factors on the division of responsibility for cabinet representation between senior and junior ministers is reflected in the following comment from a ministerial adviser.

It depends very much on positions in Caucus. The fact that a senior minister does that to a junior minister. What they do to a junior minister in cabinet would immediately become known in caucus. So the fact that Howe and Richardson had vigorous goes at one another in cabinet would be, so what? But if Howe were to have walked away from Staples in cabinet, then that would have been a matter of concern within the Left. If Crean were to walk away from Free in cabinet it wouldn't cause him too much factional difficulty, but it would have caused him a difficulty with the Prime Minister, who was closer to Free than to Crean and would have opened up gaps where Keating might have dealt with Free on issues that he would have otherwise not quite perceived the divisions and he'd have dealt with Crean. So I think it depends very much on factors outside cabinet (Interviewee 07, p. 8).

The first part of this chapter has examined different approaches to the division of responsibility for portfolio management and cabinet representation from the perspective of senior ministers. It focused on the division of responsibility for portfolio management. It highlighted the capacity of senior ministers to shape to division of responsibility for portfolio management. It found that senior ministers were constrained by the need to retain direct control over coordination and priority-setting and involvement in key issues throughout their portfolios. Within these constraints senior ministers could adopt different approaches to the division of responsibility for portfolio management. The size of their workloads and the need to maintain the cooperation of their junior colleagues gave them
incentives to adopt "limited" approaches and to allocate an extensive range of functional responsibilities to junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. However there was also evidence of obstacles to delegation. The first obstacle was career rivalry within teams of political executives. The second obstacle consisted of poor relationships within teams of political executives. It was argued that these relationships can be conceptualised in terms of two dimensions: the personal relationship and the policy relationship. The approaches of senior ministers to the division of responsibility for portfolio management depended on their perceptions of the trustworthiness and competence of their junior colleagues. They also depended on the extent of policy consensus within the portfolio. Career rivalry and poor relationships were used to explain the marginalisation of junior ministers by their senior colleagues. The importance of relationships within teams of political executives is also emphasised in the second part of this chapter. Finally there was some evidence of the impact of "environmental" factors on the capacity of senior ministers to shape the division of responsibility for portfolio management.

Perspectives of Junior Ministers and Parliamentary Secretaries

The second part of this chapter examines the division of responsibility for portfolio management and cabinet representation from the perspectives of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. It first examines their objectives in relation to the division of responsibility for portfolio management and cabinet representation. It then examines their capacity to achieve these objectives. It argues that the capacity of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries to achieve their objectives depended on their personal and policy relationships with the relevant senior minister.

The Objectives of Junior Ministers and Parliamentary Secretaries

The literature on the work of sub-cabinet level political executives devoted only a little attention to their objectives. Most studies simply emphasised the importance they attached to acquiring additional work. The most significant source of dissatisfaction among sub-
cabinet level political executives consisted of having insufficient work to do (Majeau 1983, p. 5, Theakston 1987, pp. 79-84).

(a) Portfolio Management. Interviews examined different approaches to the division of responsibility for portfolio management from the perspectives of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. There was evidence of variation in the ambitions of different junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. This variation is described by a ministerial adviser.

There are different kinds of people who can be in those roles. You've got people who are very talented in public presentation. You've got people who are on their way up. Then you've got a group of ministers who are more limited in their ability and their political aspirations (Interviewee 55, p. 2).

Ambitious junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries shared three common objectives in relation to the division of responsibility for portfolio management. Their first objective was to maximise the scope and importance of their direct functional responsibilities (eg Interviewee 04, p. 2, Interviewee 38, pp. 2-3, Interviewee 43, p. 2, Interviewee 51, p. 2). This was a key theme to emerge from interviews. One junior minister boasted that he had been granted a larger range of responsibilities than any of his predecessors in the same portfolio (Interviewee 44, p. 2). By contrast a second junior minister bemoaned the narrow scope of his initial responsibilities (Interviewee 05, p. 2). A third junior minister stressed the importance of 'grabbing' additional responsibilities (Interviewee 38, p. 3). This importance of this first objective is emphasised in the following statement by a junior minister.

I wanted to get control over the superannuation industry from Keating. He wouldn't even consider it . . . I think a lot of junior ministers didn't push. You had to push. And you had to keep on pushing. And some I think just got the job and thought: "This is pretty comfy, I'll just sign the documents from the department". But that wasn't the way to do it (Interviewee 05, p. 2).

Ambitious junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries aimed to maximise the overall scope of their portfolio management workloads. However they were most concerned with the composition of their workloads. In particular they sought functions which provided opportunities for policy change and public relations work rather than those characterised by large amounts of routine administration and detailed interaction with interest groups and clients. They differentiated 'serious policy jobs' from 'selling jobs' (Interviewee 04, p. 6, see also Interviewee 38, p. 1).
The second objective of ambitious junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries was to function as the sole source of political direction over portfolio management within their functional responsibilities. Junior ministers argued that they should be left alone by senior ministers to ‘run their own race’ (Interviewee 35, p. 1). This was another recurring theme of interviews with both junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. They argued that the division of responsibility for portfolio management worked best when senior ministers adopted “limited” approaches and gave them considerable autonomy over clearly defined functional responsibilities. One junior minister stated that: ‘the system worked best when there was a clear division of responsibilities and the senior minister said “I want to know about something if it has the potential to cause me trouble, otherwise don’t worry me”’ (Interviewee 35, p. 2). This objective was also described by several senior officials.

A junior minister given a certain area would like to protect that turf . . . would like to make a name for himself in that area (Interviewee 25, p. 2).

Peter Staples was very much the community services minister and he jealously guarded that (Interviewee 58, p. 1).

The third objective of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries related to coordination and priority-setting within their portfolios. These processes had the potential to impact significantly on the functions of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. However the extent of this impact depended on the strength of bureaucratic level overlaps between the functional responsibilities of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries and those of other political executives. Senior ministers almost invariably maintained a leading role in coordination and priority-setting within their portfolios. The only exceptions consisted of policy development and program delivery overlaps which could be contained within the responsibilities of a junior minister or parliamentary secretary and the budgets of “sub-cabinet level” portfolios. Most importantly senior ministers played a central role in the determination of budget priorities within cabinet portfolios.

The role of senior ministers in coordination and priority-setting at the portfolio level had important implications for junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. Their influence over coordination and priority-setting within their portfolios depended on their capacity to negotiate with the senior minister. This role can be described as “functional advocacy” at the portfolio level. Junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries stressed the importance of “functional advocacy”. This was most clearly evident in the budget process. Junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries had two key objectives in the budget process. The
first was to determine priorities within their own functional responsibilities (Interviewee 14, p. 2, Interviewee 36, p. 2, Interviewee 59, p. 5, Interviewee 64, p. 3, Interviewee 66, p. 3). This objective is described by a senior official.

They ought to get to a point where you don’t need to go to the senior minister. I’d even go so far as to say that . . . a really good junior minister would be smart enough and strong enough to effectively take control of the budget issues in his or her patch. You need a bit of ambition and skill and all the rest of it to do that (Interviewee 15, p. 6).

Their second aim was to represent their functions in negotiations with the senior minister over overall budget priorities and to maximise their share of portfolio resources. Many junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries explicitly described their role as representing their functional responsibilities within portfolios (Interviewee 04, p. 3, Interviewee 05, p. 3, Interviewee 39, p. 3, Interviewee 68, p. 3). One junior minister argued that both junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries operated as ‘political lobbyists, lobbying senior ministers on behalf of elements of departments’. This junior minister argued that it was ‘harder for senior ministers to say “no” to their political colleagues than to say “no” to departmental officials’ (Interviewee 19, p. 1).

The importance of “functional advocacy” in the portfolio budget process emerged as a key distinction between most junior ministers and non-cabinet ministers prior to 1987. The only exception consisted of junior ministers who headed their own separate “sub-cabinet level” portfolios and retained direct access to the budget/ERC process. This distinction was highlighted in an interview with a former non-cabinet minister who had previously headed his own portfolio but whose functions had been amalgamated into a larger cabinet portfolio under the ultimate control of a senior minister. This junior minister argued that his most important role was no longer participating in the budget/ERC process. Rather it was representing his functions in negotiations with the senior minister and departmental executive (Interviewee 39, pp. 3, 5). The following statement from a senior official also emphasises the significance of the “functional advocacy” role of junior ministers in the portfolio budget process.

Bob Brown, when he was Minister for Land Transport, once he’d got his money allocation, by and large Gareth [Evans] or Ralph [Willis] or Kim [Beazley] really didn’t want to hear about it, at all if possible. Bob could run that program. Bob could mount his new policy proposals. But first of all he would have to convince the senior minister that this made sense (Interviewee 02, p. 4).
Interviewees therefore argued that ambitious junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries shared three key objectives in relation to the division of responsibility for portfolio management. The first was to maximise the scope and importance of their direct functional responsibilities. The second was to function as the sole source of political direction over portfolio management within their direct functional responsibilities. The third was to perform as an effective "functional advocate" in relation to coordination and priority-setting at the portfolio level. This third objective was most clearly evident in the portfolio budget process.

(b) Cabinet Representation. Interviews also examined the division of responsibility for cabinet representation from the perspective of junior ministers. Once again there was evidence of variation in the ambition of individual junior ministers. However there was also evidence that ambitious junior ministers shared three common objectives.

Their first objective was to maximise the extent of their participation in both the general cabinet and budget/ERC processes. Interviewees argued that junior ministers attached considerable importance to their participation in the cabinet system (Interviewee 33, p. 7). This had important implications for the division of functional responsibilities within portfolios. Junior ministers sought functional responsibilities which were characterised by high cabinet visibility. A junior minister stressed the importance of cabinet participation.

Unless you’re there you’ll waste away as a junior minister. You don’t have a long life expectancy. I think there’s a fair chance that if we won the last election that sort of 10 of the junior ministers would have lost their portfolios. Because they weren’t performing. They weren’t performing ... in the ERC process [or] the cabinet process. So its important. Its important in two senses. Its important for your own personal survival. But its also important for the survival of the government (Interviewee 05, p. 8).

Their second objective was to play a leading role in representing their functional responsibilities within the cabinet system. This was particularly important in relation to the general cabinet process. This objective derived from the capacity of senior ministers to dominate the presentation of general cabinet submissions from throughout their portfolios and confine their junior colleagues to a subordinate role. A senior official emphasised the importance of this second objective.

He’d like to feel that he was able to run his own show and demonstrate to his cabinet colleagues that he was ministerial material in his own right. So you’ve got egos and the pressure to demonstrate your capacity (Interviewee 28, pp. 6-7).
Interviews also revealed evidence of a third objective. Interviewees argued that although junior ministers aimed to play a leading role representing their functional responsibilities in the cabinet process they also expected the active support of the relevant senior minister (eg Interviewee 30, p. 2, Interviewee 44, p. 4). This was most important in the budget/ERC process. The potential for senior ministerial support was described by junior ministers as an important benefit of the introduction of teams of political executives (eg Interviewee 35, p. 2). This third objective is described by a senior minister.

They'd prefer to start the argument and carry the thing. But they'd expect their senior minister to intervene if there's strong opposition. To come into bat for them (Interviewee 57, p. 7).

Interviews therefore revealed that ambitious junior ministers shared three objectives in relation to the division of responsibility for cabinet representation. They aimed to maximise their participation in the cabinet system. They also aimed to play a leading role in representing their functional responsibilities. This was most clearly evident in relation to submissions from within their own functional areas. Finally junior ministers expected the support of the relevant senior minister in both the general cabinet and budget/ERC processes.

**The Capacity of Junior Ministers and Parliamentary Secretaries**

(a) Portfolio Management. Interviews explored the capacity of ambitious junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries to shape the division of responsibility for portfolio management in line with their three objectives. They first examined the influence of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries over the allocation of functional responsibilities within their respective portfolios.

A few junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries stated that their functions had been determined following negotiations with the relevant senior minister. However interviews revealed that their influence was usually confined to the margins. Junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries were sometimes able to acquire responsibility for functions in which the senior minister had little interest. However they lacked the capacity to demand either particular functions or additional functions (Interviewee 20, p. 1, Interviewee 38, p. 3, Interviewee 64, p. 2). Most junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries were simply allocated their functions by the senior minister. There was no process of negotiation. One junior minister stated: ‘you take what you’re given’ (Interviewee 22, p. 2, see also
Interviewee 30, p. 1). Another junior minister summarised the process in the following terms: 'some sort of agreement is either reached or imposed' (Interviewee 19, p. 1).

The role of prime ministers in ratifying the division of functional responsibilities between senior and junior ministers (although not parliamentary secretaries) created the potential for junior ministers who were dissatisfied with their functional responsibilities to appeal to the prime minister over the head of the relevant senior minister. One junior minister stated that this avenue had never been used successfully (Interviewee 19, p. 1). Other interviews revealed only one successful appeal to the prime minister over the allocation of functional responsibilities. This related to proposals to strip a junior minister of his direct functional responsibilities and reduce him to shadowing the senior minister across the portfolio on an open-ended basis (Interviewee 33, pp. 2-3). Interviewees therefore emphasised the extent to which junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries were dependent on the generosity of the relevant senior minister. This dependency is reflected in the following statement by a junior minister.

I don't think there's anything you can do if you're not happy (Interviewee 44, p. 2).

The previous chapter emphasised the extent of variation in the scope and importance of the portfolio management workloads of junior ministers. Some junior ministers had large and important functional responsibilities. Others had been left with responsibility for 'things that the senior minister couldn't be bothered doing' and 'wanted to off-load' (Interviewee 35, p. 1, see also Interviewee 68, p. 3). This variation was also evident within a single portfolio (Interviewee 44, pp. 3-4). There was less evidence of variation in the workloads of parliamentary secretaries (Interviewee 12, p. 4, Interviewee 20, p. 4, Interviewee 65, p. 4). However it was argued that a few parliamentary secretaries had larger and more important workloads than junior ministers in other portfolios (Interviewee 57, p. 3).

The different approaches of senior ministers to the allocation of functional responsibilities within their portfolios had important implications for junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. Several junior ministers expressed satisfaction with the scope and importance of their functional responsibilities (Interviewee 04, p. 1, Interviewee 33, p. 3, Interviewee 44, p. 2, Interviewee 68, p. 2). However interviews also revealed examples of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries who were unhappy with the size and composition of their workloads (eg Interviewee 33, p. 2, Interviewee 46, p. 8).
Interviews explored the capacity of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries to extend their functional responsibilities. Junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries argued that the only way that this could be done was by lobbying the relevant senior minister. This is described in the statement below.

When I was a parliamentary secretary I found that after a year or two the area of responsibility I'd been given wasn't enough to keep me intellectually challenged or fully occupied. So I went and sought some more . . . I didn't have any capacity to do other than ask the Treasurer to refer some other areas to me but eventually he did (Interviewee 51, p. 2).

Interviews with junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries highlighted the importance of personal relationships with senior ministers. They stressed the need to cultivate the trust of the relevant senior minister. One junior minister explained that he had exploited his access to paperwork from throughout the portfolio to demonstrate that he could be trusted with a larger and more important range of functional responsibilities than he had initially be allocated. This is described in the quotation below. Interviewees distinguished junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries who sought to extend their responsibilities by lobbying the senior minister from those who informally expanded into functional areas within the direct responsibilities of the senior minister. One interviewee stated 'I didn't try and just push myself into other areas' (Interviewee 51, p. 2). Interviewees argued that the second of these two approaches was likely to damage their personal relationship with the senior minister.

I'd be getting just about everything. And it gave me the opportunity for instance to pick up on issues and lobby the [senior] minister's office and the [senior] minister. And that worked quite constructively. It also meant that I started picking up more parts of the portfolio. [The senior minister] felt more comfortable giving me areas like bankruptcy law, privacy law, the Law Reform Commission (Interviewee 05, p. 7).

There were several other examples of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries who succeeded in extending the scope of their functional responsibilities (eg Interviewee 04, p. 2, Interviewee 38, p. 2). However interviews also revealed examples of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries who had been unable to acquire additional functions from the senior minister (Interviewee 33, p. 2, Interviewee 46, p. 7). One junior minister stated that 'in lots of cases you were forced to take what you were given. And no matter how reasonable you were you couldn't extract anything further' (Interviewee 05, p. 2).
Junior ministerial and parliamentary secretary frustration over the scope and importance of their direct functional responsibilities emerged from interviews as an important source of tension between senior ministers and their junior colleagues. The potential for tension within teams of political executives over the allocation of functional responsibilities is described by a senior official.

Junior ministers tend to regard themselves as ministerial letter writing machines, receivers of the most unpleasant delegations and the work which is politically unattractive... There's a very real tension between what a senior minister is prepared to let go of and the ambitions of a junior minister (Interviewee 58, p. 1).

The allocation of functional responsibilities did not only have the potential to generate tension between senior ministers and their junior colleagues. Interviews revealed evidence of tension between co-equal senior ministers over the allocation of functions (Interviewee 04, p. 1). There was also evidence of tension between junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries themselves (Interviewee 09, pp. 2-3, Interviewee 30, p. 1, Interviewee 33, p. 5). This was most likely to emerge in portfolios with three or more ministers (see Table 1.1). It could also emerge when senior ministers retained direct responsibility for most of their portfolios leaving junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries to compete over a narrow range of remaining functions. This situation is described by a senior official.

With Richardson taking the Health Care side, that inevitably pushed Howe into keeping his hands on the Community Services side. So in the sense it was a bit of a squeeze for Rosemary [Crowley]. She was left with the leavings, I suppose. And of course we had Andrew Theophanous at that time as parliamentary secretary, who also had to be accommodated and given some work to do... he always acted as a bit of a barrier to any possible expansion of Crowley's empire because he was always on the look out for more work too (Interviewee 61, pp. 1-2).

The potential for competition for functions between junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries was highlighted in an interview with a junior minister who argued that there were too many parliamentary secretaries. He argued that the total number of parliamentary secretaries should be reduced so that their functions could be reallocated to junior ministers (Interviewee 38, p. 8).

Interviews also examined the capacity of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries to function as the sole source of political direction over portfolio management within their direct responsibilities. Two key points emerged from interviews with junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. The first was the importance of personal relationships with the relevant senior minister. Junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries emphasised the
importance of developing a good personal relationship with the relevant senior minister. This is reflected in the following statement by a junior minister.

I think the reality was that if you couldn't work with your senior minister then you really had to rethink your position (Interviewee 05, p. 4).

The development of personal trust was described as particularly important during the initial stages of the relationship. Several junior ministers argued that the relevant senior minister had initially maintained close oversight of their functional responsibilities. One stated that the senior minister 'would have been foolish' not to have kept 'close tabs' on him during this period (Interviewee 04, p. 2). However, many junior ministers argued that they had been allowed far greater functional autonomy once they had convinced the senior minister of their competence and trustworthiness (Interviewee 04, p. 2; Interviewee 68, p. 3). The relevant senior ministers focused on their own functional responsibilities. A similar pattern also emerged from interviews with parliamentary secretaries. One parliamentary secretary recalled: 'although I didn't realise it at the time, Ray had set up a number of confidence hurdles. After I cleared these I received excellent support' (Interviewee 54, p. 2).

The second key point to emerge from interviews was that it was not only important for junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries to develop a good personal relationship with the senior minister. The policy relationship was equally important. The previous chapter argued that a few senior ministers completely eschewed involvement in the functions of their junior colleagues. However, most senior ministers regarded themselves as ultimately responsible for their entire portfolios (including the functions of their junior colleagues). They expected junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries to involve them in key issues within their functional responsibilities (Interviewee 46, p. 1; Interviewee 57, p. 1). This was most clearly evident in the case of parliamentary secretaries because their functional responsibilities were explicitly delegated from the senior minister (Interviewee 46, p. 7). Most senior ministers also monitored the functions of their junior colleagues. However, the extent of this monitoring varied according to their perceptions of the competence of their junior colleague as well as the size of the workload generated by their own functional responsibilities. This is described by a senior official.

He and Bilney get along very well . . . Evans's office would only take an interest insofar as they could see that Evans was taking an interest and they're so busy servicing Evans that they don't go looking for anything that they don't need to do (Interviewee 72, p. 1).
It is important to emphasise that even senior ministers who adopted “limited” approaches retained the capacity to intervene “antagonistically” in the functional responsibilities of their junior colleagues. Senior ministers could overrule their junior colleagues or bypass them and interact directly with relevant interest groups and clients. Finally senior officials could attempt to appeal the decisions of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries to their senior colleagues.

This potential for “antagonistic” senior ministerial intervention in portfolio management throughout their portfolios meant that it was vital for junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries to maintain the policy support of the senior minister in relation to key issues within their responsibilities. The potential for appeals to the senior minister meant that it was particularly important for junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries to obtain senior ministerial policy support in the event of disagreement with officials and interest groups. This was necessary to maintain a united front within the political executive and prevent successful appeals to the senior minister. The importance of maintaining a united front within the political executive was described by a junior minister: ‘we just didn’t allow ourselves to get played-off like that’ (Interviewee 44, p. 6).

Interviewees also argued that junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries could benefit from the “supportive” involvement of senior ministers in relation to portfolio management within their functional responsibilities. This is reflected in the following recollection from a ministerial adviser.

At the staff level people got on reasonably well and were prepared to talk to one another and discuss issues through. So quite often they’d come in and ask for advice from us, basically what’s the way to handle a prickly issue? (Interviewee 40, p. 3).

This emphasises the importance of distinguishing between “antagonistic” and “supportive” senior ministerial involvement in portfolio management within the responsibilities of their junior colleagues. One junior minister interviewed for this study explicitly emphasised the importance of both policy and personal relationships with the relevant senior minister: ‘the personal interaction was important and the policy agenda was important’ (Interviewee 05, p. 5). The capacity of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries to function as the sole source of political direction over portfolio management within their direct responsibilities was therefore dependent on both the personal trust and policy support of the relevant senior minister. Interviewees emphasised the need for junior ministers and parliamentary
secretaries to maintain the support of the relevant senior minister on key policy issues within their respective functional responsibilities (Interviewee 30, p. 1, Interviewee 51, p. 6, Interviewee 59, p. 2). This process is described in the following recollections from a junior minister and a ministerial adviser.

I think the continual perception in the junior minister’s mind was that you really had to ensure that your portfolio minister was on side (Interviewee 05, p. 4).

We were very careful to make sure that the Treasurer knew if there was anything significant going on or likely to be going on. So we always gave the Treasurer the opportunity to get involved. And the Treasurer’s office the opportunity to get involved if they wanted to. And sometimes they did. Sometimes they didn’t (Interviewee 55, p. 2).

“Antagonistic” intervention by senior ministers in portfolio management within the direct functional responsibilities of their junior colleagues emerged from interviews as the main source of friction within teams of political executives (Interviewee 19, p. 2, Interviewee 22, p. 2, Interviewee 35, pp. 1-2). This is highlighted in the following statement by a ministerial adviser.

There’s lot of ego in ministers and minister’s offices. And the damage is always done when someone believes that it is their turf and they find it being trodden on (Interviewee 07, p. 5).

Interviews examined the capacity of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries to resist “antagonistic” senior ministerial intervention in their responsibilities and pursue separate functional policy agendas in the face of senior ministerial opposition. Interviewees argued that a few junior ministers had limited capacity to exploit “environmental” factors such as party support to pursue separate functional policy agendas. One ministerial adviser stated: ‘it’s possible. It would depend on their political skills. If you had someone with highly developed political skills then I think it could be achieved’ (Interviewee 40, p. 4). A second ministerial adviser similarly argued: ‘there are circumstances in which junior ministers have the time, the capacity and the opportunity to organise support for particular policy positions’ (Interviewee 55, p. 4). However interviewees emphasised limitations on the capacity of junior ministers to resist their senior colleagues (Interviewee 40, p. 4). It was also argued that junior ministerial attempts to pursue functional policy agendas in the face of senior ministerial opposition were likely to damage their personal relationship with the senior minister: ‘if it happened it would be likely to have serious repercussions for their relationship . . . they’re not likely to push their senior minister’s patience too much’
(Interviewee 55, p. 4). A junior minister concluded that it was 'very difficult to buck the senior minister' (Interviewee 38, p. 1).

Interviewees therefore argued that both junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries were dependent on gaps in the interests of the relevant senior minister. In the absence of these gaps they were dependent on the senior ministerial policy support. This is emphasised in the following quotations from a senior official and a ministerial adviser.

You’ve got two choices as a junior minister. You either turf fight and get in the way of getting re-elected . . . or you can live with it and rail against the edges. It depends pretty much on aspirations, operating styles and the like. I think there’s probably been some junior ministers who’ve railed against it (Interviewee 62, p. 2).

I think some of the successful junior ministers essentially had the capacity to not take a structural view. I think . . . if you approach these things from a structural view rather than a relationships view then you get into trouble. But if you look at it in terms of relationships and say well there’s a group of people working in this area, and the senior minister’s got the capacity to work on whatever it is he or she wishes, and so the junior minister then makes the judgments of where there’s room to be filled and then puts in the effort to fill them . . . And ensures that they don’t let their ego be offended. Where it comes unstuck is when people take a structural view (Interviewee 07, p. 9).

Most junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries stated that they had accepted the need to obtain the personal trust and policy support of the senior minister. They also accepted occasional “antagonistic” senior ministerial intervention in their functional responsibilities as an inevitable consequence of their junior status (eg Interviewee 33, p. 3). One junior minister argued that he had adopted a ‘realistic rather than a legalistic definition of accountability’. He argued that some of his colleagues had resented any senior ministerial involvement in their responsibilities but he has regarded it as inevitable (Interviewee 66, p. 3, see also Interviewee 34, p. 2). Interviews also revealed evidence of political executives who did not demand a substantial policy role. One such political executive is described by a ministerial adviser.

Ted [Lindsay] took on the role of trying to basically sell the government’s policies to the regional community. And he was comfortable with that role. He really didn’t have any formal policy-type functions or areas which he was needing to look after (Interviewee 40, p. 1).

There were also examples junior ministers who reacted to “antagonistic” senior ministerial intervention by withdrawing from any involvement in their functional responsibilities (Interviewee 07, p. 3). Finally there was evidence that a few junior ministers retaliated against “antagonistic” senior ministerial intervention by organising interest groups against
senior ministerial policy positions and by exploiting access to information from throughout their portfolio to leak information damaging to the senior minister (Interviewee 05, pp. 6-7, Interviewee 19, pp. 1-2, Interviewee 57, p. 2).

Interviews finally examined the capacity of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries to operate as effective "functional advocates" in relation to coordination and priority-setting within their portfolios. Interviewees argued that the capacity of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries to operate as effective "functional advocates" within the portfolio budget process also depended on their relationship with the relevant senior minister.

Junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries were dependent on the senior minister for access to the portfolio budget process (Interviewee 05, p. 3). There was evidence that their capacity to gain access to the budget process depended to a significant extent on their personal relationship with the senior minister. In the words of one senior official: 'a lot of it goes to the judgement that the senior minister makes about the junior minister' (Interviewee 28, p. 2). Interviewees also highlighted the need for junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries to cultivate the policy support of the relevant senior minister. The importance of senior ministerial support is reflected in the following statements by senior officials. The second of these statements reiterates a point made in the first part of this chapter about the need for senior ministers to maintain the cooperation of their junior colleagues by accommodating their budget priorities (Interviewee 19, p.1, Interviewee 55, p. 7, Interviewee 66, p. 3).

They tend to have a portfolio limit for the budget. So its a sort of zero-sum game if you like within that arrangement. Now, some junior ministers do better than others within the portfolio. Usually its because they've got a good political or logical story (Interviewee 02, p. 7).

In all cases the portfolio minister ended up taking the key decisions. How much he felt he needed to cater to the proposals of the junior minister depended on a whole raft of things and it wasn't just a simple case. Sometimes some of the junior minister's proposals would have a very strong electoral appeal and you'd be silly to ignore that if you were a portfolio minister. Other times it would be a case of giving the junior minister something so that he felt he hadn't been completely dudged in the process (Interviewee 61, p. 3).

Interviews revealed evidence that teams of political executives could share common budget priorities (Interviewee 44, p. 1). This is described in the following statements by a senior minister and a senior official.
But a lot of their priorities are your priorities. If you want to look after personnel in the Defence forces, then you'll actually be on his or on her side rather than necessarily saying "No, I want to move money into equipment or something else that I control" (Interviewee 57, p. 6).

The senior minister can be just as supportive and sometimes more supportive of initiatives that come from the junior minister's bailiwick that his own. It depends on the issue and the merits of the issue (Interviewee 71, p. 6).

However the budget process was also described as an important source of friction between political executives. Interviewees revealed evidence of tension between co-equal senior ministers (Interviewee 56, p. 4). It was also evident between senior ministers and their junior colleagues. Interviewees argued that tension could derive from the exclusion of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries from the budget process (eg Interviewee 28, p. 9). There was also evidence of tension when senior ministers adopted "inclusive" approaches and junior ministers were involved in determining overall portfolio priorities. This emerged as an inevitable consequence of the need to establish a single set of priorities between the functions of different political executives. This is reflected in the following statement by a senior official.

It's inevitable. Senior ministers and junior ministers have different perspectives, different things that each would be pushing. Sometimes there's personalities involved. But that just doesn't relate to this portfolio. It relates to every portfolio I've had any association with (Interviewee 74, p. 2).

Finally interviews revealed further evidence of the impact of "environmental" factors. It was argued that some junior ministers had successfully exploited party support to pursue their own budget priorities within portfolios in the face of senior minister opposition. This is described by a ministerial adviser.

In each budget there were some issues its true that Peter, on the advice of the Aged Care Division in particular, push particular issues and where we would then have discussions with Peter out of session where we would say pull out, and he would dig in, and where the caucus positions were such that Howe was not in a position to say that it was pulled (Interviewee 07, p. 7).

Interviews therefore emphasised the importance of relationships between junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries and the relevant senior minister. They also emphasised the importance of both the personal and policy dimensions of these relationships. There was evidence of disagreement within teams of political executives over both functional policy issues and overall portfolio priorities. The latter were particularly common in the budget process. There was also evidence of friction deriving from senior ministerial approaches
to the division of responsibility for portfolio management. This friction could derive from the division of functional responsibilities. It could also derive from “antagonistic” senior ministerial intervention in the responsibilities of their junior colleagues. Finally it could derive from either the exclusion of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries from the portfolio budget process or the capacity of senior ministers to ignore their priorities. This friction manifested itself in different ways. There was evidence that some junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries withdrew from their functional responsibilities. There was also evidence of junior ministers who attempted to retaliate against the relevant senior minister.

(b) Cabinet Representation. Interviews also examined the implications for junior ministers of different senior ministerial approaches to the division of responsibility for cabinet representation. They first examined the general cabinet process. A few senior ministers adopted “expansive” approaches to the division of responsibility and dominated the presentation of cabinet business from throughout their portfolios. However most senior ministers allowed junior ministers to play a leading role in the presentation of their own general cabinet business. A few senior ministers had no direct involvement in junior ministerial cabinet business (Interviewee 31, p. 5, Interviewee 69, p. 6).

Interviewees argued that it was vital for junior ministers to neutralise any senior ministerial opposition to general cabinet submissions. This was due to their formal authority over the contents of general cabinet submissions from throughout their portfolios as well as their capacity to ensure the defeat of submissions to which they were opposed. Most junior ministers argued that it was pointless to proceed with submissions in the face of senior ministerial opposition (Interviewee 04, p. 5, Interviewee 18, p. 4, Interviewee 30, p. 2, Interviewee 59, p. 5). One junior minister stated that he had lodged two general cabinet submissions in the face of senior ministerial opposition. Both these submissions had been defeated (Interviewee 38, p. 5). Another junior minister stressed need to neutralise senior ministerial opposition.

They could maintain an independent point of view. And you knew they always had the capacity to do that. And I think that as a junior minister you knew that if you lost them it was hardly worthwhile proceeding. But on occasions people did proceed and they had a conflict with their senior minister (Interviewee 05, p. 3).
Interviews also revealed that it was often not sufficient for junior ministers to neutralise senior ministerial opposition. It was also necessary to obtain their active support. The importance of senior ministerial support derived from two sources.

The first was the non-cabinet status of most junior ministers. Most junior ministers were only co-opted to participate in cabinet meetings for the duration of their own submissions. A senior minister argued that this provided some advantages to junior ministers. Most importantly they could focus on a single item of business for a limited period of time rather than the full business list for the duration of a meeting (Interviewee 51, p. 10). However most interviewees described disadvantages which derived from the non-cabinet status of most junior ministers. The most important of these was their lack of knowledge about the prior course of meetings. The following quotations describe the problems confronted by non-cabinet junior ministers and the importance of senior ministerial support.

It’s a hell of a job walking into the cabinet room. I remember going in when I was [a junior minister]. You’d walk in. They would have been meeting for some time. You can’t tell the mood of the meeting. You don’t know who’s got the shits with who. You don’t know what the dynamics are. And you don’t realise that all of them have been there for a long time and they don’t want to stay there for a long time. You’re about to present your case and it’s hard to sort of get the right pitch, the right length, the right sense of argument . . . On a number of occasions I would go out to [junior ministers] if they were friends and say: “Look make it short, so and so’s off his face” or whatever and just tune them in. Because otherwise you just don’t know whether you’re registering and how you’re registering (Interviewee 05, p. 9).

There’s no doubt an individual, not just in cabinet but in any circumstance, who comes in from outside a meeting, is in it for half an hour and then leaves, is in the main at a disadvantage compared to people who’ve got the pace of the meeting, who’ve been there for the debates that have gone before (Interviewee 51, p. 10).

The second factor was the less well developed presentation skills and lower cabinet status of many junior ministers. Interviewees argued that junior ministers tended to have lower cabinet status than their senior colleagues. However there was also evidence of substantial variation in the presentation skills and cabinet influence of junior ministers. In the words of a ministerial adviser: ‘it depends almost entirely on the individual’ (Interviewee 55, p. 6, see also Interviewee 69, p. 5). It was argued that some junior ministers were highly dependent on the active support of the relevant senior minister. This was partly because other senior ministers were far more likely to seek the endorsement of the relevant senior minister for their junior colleague’s submission. It was particularly important for these junior ministers to maintain the support of the senior minister (Interviewee 46, p. 4). Senior officials stressed the importance of senior ministerial support.
On issues that are relatively controversial within cabinet or require a lot of funding, you’d want to have Cook well and truly on side. I think it makes it certainly a lot harder for Schacht to carry the day in cabinet without the senior minister’s support (Interviewee 71, p. 6).

Junior ministers tend to be what their name suggests, they’re relatively young to the ministry. They don’t necessarily have strong backing amongst their peers, in a big bunch of egos (Interviewee 75, pp. 2-3).

However interviewees also argued that some junior ministers were much less reliant on the active support of the senior minister. They only needed active senior ministerial support for a narrow range of submissions. This variation is reflected in the following statement by a senior official.

Baldwin would occasionally call on Dawkins if he thought that he needed Dawkins support to get to the PM or Keating to head off something that he thought was a problem . . . You can use your senior minister to actually break some ground for you or to cover you or to reinforce a particular position (Interviewee 28, p. 6).

Most junior ministers did not just require the active support of the relevant senior minister in relation to their own general cabinet submissions. They also needed the senior minister to represent them in relation to business from other portfolios which impacted on their functional responsibilities. This requirement derived from the non-cabinet status of most junior ministers. Junior ministers were almost invariably co-opted for their own general cabinet business. However they were not always present for relevant business from other portfolios (Interviewee 70, p. 1). This is described by a senior official.

We’d try to get him in cabinet when there are other things affecting him. The disadvantage of a junior minister is you sometimes frankly don’t know. Or the senior minister, or the senior minister’s office, or the senior minister’s bureaucrats might not want you in there. So we’ve had quite a few occasions when we haven’t been in there and we’ve had to hold our hand up and say: “Hey you guys have forgotten something” (Interviewee 48, p. 5).

The inability of junior ministers to participate in cabinet discussion of submissions from other portfolios with implications for their direct functional responsibilities emerged as particularly significant in relation to the Status of Women portfolio. This derived from its concern with the cabinet business of other portfolios. One junior minister who had direct responsibility for this function argued that it had been difficult for her to gain access to cabinet in relation to submissions from other portfolios and that it had not always been possible to ‘push in’ (Interviewee 59, p. 5, see also Interviewee 22, pp. 1, 5). It was partly for these reasons that the Status of Women portfolio was later transferred to a senior minister (Interviewee 22, p. 1). This also emerged as a particular problem in the case of
junior ministers who headed their own separate "sub-cabinet level" portfolios because of their lack of contact with the relevant senior minister and the lack of senior ministerial involvement in their direct functional responsibilities (Interviewee 48, p. 5). Interviewees argued that it was difficult for these senior ministers to represent the perspectives of "sub-cabinet level" portfolios (eg Interviewee 74, p. 7).

Interviews also canvassed the involvement of junior ministers in the budget/ERC process. Interviewees emphasised variation in the approaches of different senior ministers. Many senior ministers adopted "exclusive" approaches to the budget/ERC process. Junior ministers (along with parliamentary secretaries) were either excluded from participation or confined to a subordinate role. Their most important budget roles consisted of "functional advocacy" within their portfolios. There was evidence that some senior ministers adopted more "inclusive" approaches to the division of responsibility for the budget/ERC process. These senior ministers still determined budget priorities across their respective portfolios. However they focused on their own responsibilities in the budget/ERC process. Junior ministers had primary responsibility for their functional responsibilities. The budget roles of these junior ministers consisted of two dimensions. The first dimension consisted of "functional advocacy" at the portfolio level. They needed senior ministerial approval for the inclusion of their priorities in the portfolio budget submission. The second dimension consisted of representing their functions in the budget/ERC process. This dual budget role is described by a junior minister.

If I wanted extra new policy I could go to ERC. If ERC wanted to knock-off some of the arms of the areas that I had responsibility for then I would go in there as well. So it was a dual role. You had to fight it at both levels (Interviewee 05, p. 3).

The main exception consisted of junior ministers who headed their own "sub-cabinet level" portfolios. These junior ministers had direct access to the budget/ERC process and did not have to work through the relevant senior minister.

Interviews emphasised the importance of obtaining the active support of the relevant senior minister. Senior ministerial support was more important in the budget/ERC process than within the general cabinet system. The following statements from a senior official and a ministerial adviser both emphasise the importance of senior ministerial support.

The one thing you need to be aware of, I suppose, is that unless the junior minister is a particularly strong junior minister or particularly capable of compelling argument, its the
portfolio minister at the end of the day that will mostly sway the ERC. They tend to listen to him more than the junior. So the junior actually needed the portfolio minister on side. And if he had the support of the portfolio minister and the portfolio minister was able to speak for him, that often was crucial in getting an outcome you wanted (Interviewee 61, p. 4).

Peter would go in [to ERC] and argue and argue vigorously and Howe would sit mute. That’s all the signal they needed to knock it off (Interviewee 07, p. 7).

Interviews emphasised the extent to which junior ministers were dependent on the active support of the relevant senior minister. However there was also evidence that some junior ministers could successfully represent their functions in the budget/ERC process without the active support of the relevant senior minister. This depended on the capacity of the junior minister and the priorities of ERC itself (Interviewee 51, pp. 8-9). The following statements by senior officials describe the capacity of some junior ministers to successfully represent their functions responsibilities in the budget/ERC process without strong senior ministerial support.

He won enormous battles and enormous amounts of money for his particular areas in the portfolio that none of us thought he could ever bloody win. Now he won it politically, not because he was astute and intelligent and all the rest of it. It was just a political game I think (Interviewee 15, p. 6).

I mean that doesn’t leave the junior minister powerless. He still goes to ERC, he can still argue his corner, and I think from where I sat as an official concerned with community services, Peter Staples had a remarkably good track record in pursuing community services (Interviewee 58, p. 2).

Junior ministers argued that the potential for senior ministerial assistance with their cabinet business was an important potential advantage of the introduction of teams of political executives (eg Interviewee 35, p. 2). However interviews also revealed evidence of junior ministerial frustration over senior ministerial approaches to the division of responsibility for cabinet representation. This commonly derived from two sources. The first was the need to obtain the support of the relevant senior minister at the portfolio level. This was most clearly evident in the portfolio budget process. Senior ministers could ignore their junior colleague’s priorities or exclude them entirely from the portfolio budget process (Interviewee 28, pp. 1-2, 9). A second source of frustration was the failure of senior ministers to support the submissions of their junior colleagues. This was evident in both the general cabinet and the budget/ERC processes. Evidence emerged from interviews that senior ministers would sometimes allow junior ministers to bring forward submissions with which they disagreed but fail to support them in cabinet or the budget/ERC process.
and rely on their senior colleagues to ensure their defeat (Interviewee 28, p. 2, Interviewee 73, pp. 6-7).

Interviews again emphasised the importance of relationships between senior ministers and their junior colleagues. Personal relationships were particularly important in determining the involvement of the junior minister in the budget/ERC process (Interviewee 28, pp. 2-3). It was argued that junior ministers with good personal relationships with their senior colleagues could get them to support general cabinet submissions in which they ’weren’t all that interested’ (Interviewee 49, p. 7). One senior minister argued that senior ministers would usually support their junior colleagues ‘even though the senior minister may not have been that keen. Its the usual thing to do’ (Interviewee 57, p. 7, see also Interviewee 08, p. 2). This derived from the need for senior ministers to maintain the cooperation of their junior colleagues. The importance of the policy relationship was most clearly evident in the budget/ERC process. However interviews also revealed that senior ministers would support important junior ministerial submissions and budget proposals even in the absence of good personal relations with the relevant junior minister. This is described in the following statement by a senior official.

Dawkins could allow Duncan to be left out to dry. He’d pick-off the things he liked of Duncan's that were useful to him and reinforce them. Otherwise he'd have nothing to do with them. Or occasionally he'd spike them (Interviewee 28, p. 1).

Interviews revealed that from the junior ministerial perspective the cabinet process could be conceptualised in terms of two distinct stages. The first consisted of negotiations with the senior minister at the portfolio level. It was necessary for junior ministers to neutralise senior ministerial opposition. It was also often necessary for them to obtain active senior ministerial support. The second stage consisted of participation in the general cabinet or budget/ERC process. The portfolio level was particularly important in the budget process because of the central role of senior ministers in the determination of portfolio priorities. The relative importance of the portfolio level depended on two other factors. The first was the approach of the senior minister. The portfolio level was most important when senior ministers adopted “expansive” and “exclusive” approaches to the division of responsibility for cabinet representation. The second was the extent to which junior ministers depended on the active support of the senior minister. This in depended on the presentation skills and cabinet status of the particular junior minister as well as the extent of opposition to the relevant submission.
Managing the Division of Responsibility

The third part of this chapter examines the management of the division of responsibility. Interviewees argued this function was shared between senior officials, political executives and ministerial offices. The roles of these three groups of actors are examined in turn.

Roles of Senior Officials

Interviews revealed that senior officials performed two management roles. The first consisted of the routine circulation of paperwork within teams of political executives. This has been described by several studies of the restructuring of the Commonwealth political executive (Evans 1988, p. 67, Halligan, Beckett and Earnshaw 1992, p. 16, Aucoin and Bakvis 1993, p. 401, Gruen and Grattan 1993, p. 46). Two of these studies described the role of portfolio officials in keeping senior ministers informed about the functions of their junior colleagues (Aucoin and Bakvis 1993, p. 401, Gruen and Grattan 1993, p. 46).

Interviews revealed that paperwork from across portfolios was routinely circulated to each political executive. This included junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. In most portfolios all minutes and submissions were circulated between the offices of each political executive. One senior official stated: ‘we copied all the minutes to the other minister, there was nothing that was not copied to the second minister’. A second official described this process in the following terms.

The way the bureaucratic machine operated was to duplicate all briefings to any minister to the other minister. So anything we do on public service stuff would be directed to Johns, but Brereton would get a copy of it. Brereton’s office would make a decision about whether or not it was sufficiently important for him to concern himself about (Interviewee 47, p. 1).

Interviews revealed evidence of greater selectivity in the circulation of information within other portfolios. It was argued that only important items from within each functional area were circulated to other political executives. One senior official who reported directly to a junior minister stated: ‘there was a judgement made by me when I thought something was significant enough that both ministers needed to know’ (Interviewee 73, p. 5. see also Interviewee 61, p. 4).
Paperwork was typically circulated for action by a particular political executive and for the information of their colleagues. It was sometimes necessary to circulate paperwork for the action of multiple political executives. This was most common when political executives shared direct responsibility for a single functional area. It was less common when political executives had clearly defined functional responsibilities.

Interviews revealed some evidence of asymmetry in the circulation of paperwork within teams of political executives. These “information asymmetries” were a central theme of previous studies of the work of sub-cabinet level political executives. These emphasised variation in the extent to which cabinet ministers allowed their junior colleagues access to departmental as well as cabinet papers (Weller 1980, p. 611, Majeau 1983, p. 6, Randle 1983, pp. 13-14, Vanderhoff-Silburt 1983/84, pp. 8-9, Theakston 1987, pp. 92-94, 113-115). Interviews revealed that asymmetries in the circulation of paperwork between senior ministers and their junior colleagues were usually confined to the portfolio budget process. Some senior ministers excluded their junior colleagues from the portfolio budget process. Other senior ministers gave their junior colleagues information about the budgets of their direct functional responsibilities. However they were denied access to the remainder of the portfolio budget submission. Junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries could also be denied information relating to the passage of the portfolio submission through the budget/ERC process. This is described by a senior official.

It’ll depend on the relationships as to whether the junior minister gets the whole budget kit or only that bit of the budget that relates to their functional responsibilities . . . . The senior minister might say I’m keeping this bit for myself. So that’s the first lockout. So the only one whose got the information for the whole portfolio is the senior minister and the senior minister’s staffers (Interviewee 28, pp. 8-9).

There was also limited evidence of asymmetries in the circulation of cabinet paperwork between ministers and parliamentary secretaries. Most general cabinet paperwork was circulated to both senior and junior ministers. However some was reserved for cabinet ministers or the members of particular committees (most notably the ERC and the security committee) (Interviewee 28, p. 5, Interviewee 57, p. 3). Parliamentary secretaries only had access to general cabinet paperwork relating to their own portfolios. They depended on senior ministers for additional cabinet information (Interviewee 20, p. 3).

The routine circulation of paperwork was important for three reasons. Firstly it allowed senior ministers and their offices to monitor the responsibilities of their junior colleagues.
Secondly it enabled teams of political executives to carry out routine representation and public relations work in relation to each other’s functional responsibilities (Interviewee 27, pp. 1-2, Interviewee 69, p. 2). Thirdly it allowed ministers to represent each other’s functional responsibilities in parliament. This was particularly important when ministers represented an entire portfolio in a particular parliamentary chamber. The previous chapter argued that this arrangement placed far greater demands on ministers (particularly junior ministers) to remained abreast of developments throughout their portfolios rather than just within their functional responsibilities. The routine circulation of paperwork within teams of political executives was crucial in this regard. Its importance is emphasised in the following statement by a senior official.

There was always a little bit of debate about what stage the portfolio minister needed to know that something important was going on. That had a fair bit to do with what chambers people were in. You see when we had Richardson running health and Howe running largely the community services side, and better cities and the housing and regional development side, Howe of course was the senior minister in the lower house and Richardson was a senior minister in the upper house. So they really had to be briefed about what was going on in each other’s part of the world, because they represented each other in the [different] chambers. So it was as much for parliamentary purposes that you tended to brief the other ministers (Interviewee 61, p. 2).

Two previous studies of the restructuring of the Commonwealth political executive also emphasised the importance of the circulation of information for parliamentary purposes within teams of political executives (Aucoin and Bakvis 1993, p. 401, Gruen and Grattan 1993, p. 46).

The second management role of senior officials consisted of “political coordination”. This management role was confined to issues characterised by the direct involvement of sets of political executives and offices. It consisted of maintaining consistency between different sets of political executives and offices. This was described by one senior official in the following terms: ‘the job of the bureaucrats was to make sure that one didn’t go off in one direction without the other side knowing’ (Interviewee 34, p. 3). It included brokering compromises in the event of disagreement between political executives and offices over issues in which they were both directly involved. This management role is explored in greater detail in the next chapter of this thesis/ This chapter examines the impact of teams of political executives on political-bureaucratic relations at the portfolio level.
Roles of Political Executives

Interviews emphasised variation in the extent of personal contact within teams of political executives. Only a few portfolios featured regularly scheduled meetings between political executives (Interviewee 08, p. 2, Interviewee 46, pp. 6-7). One senior minister described them as ‘unnecessary’ (Interviewee 18, p. 2). Most junior ministers argued that they only had sporadic contact with the relevant senior minister (Interviewee 30, p. 1, Interviewee 64, p. 2, Interviewee 66, p. 3). One junior minister reported very low levels of contact. This junior minister went for weeks without any contact other than in the parliamentary chamber and party meetings (Interviewee 22, p. 2). Other junior ministers stated that they had initially participated in regularly scheduled meetings with the senior minister but that contact had diminished considerably over time. This was explained in terms of success in cultivating a good personal relationship with the relevant senior minister (Interviewee 04, p. 2, Interviewee 38, p. 3, Interviewee 68, p. 3). The budget process was described by junior ministers as the focal point of interaction between political executives (Interviewee 04, p. 2, Interviewee 14, p. 2, Interviewee 66, p. 3, Interviewee 68, p. 3). This pattern also applied to parliamentary secretaries. This is highlighted in the following recollection by a parliamentary secretary.

People find it hard to believe as parliamentary secretary how little day-to-day contact I had with the Treasurer. I wouldn’t see the Treasurer very often at all. I just got in my own area and went off and did it (Interviewee 51, p. 5).

Finally interviewees also emphasised the lack of personal contact between junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries in the same portfolio (eg Interviewee 08, p. 1).

Roles of Ministerial Offices

Interviewees highlighted the important role of ministerial offices in managing relationships within teams of political executives. This was described by a ministerial adviser as a key aspect of the work of ministerial offices (Interviewee 33, p. 3). Interviews contrasted the lack of interaction between political executives with the frequency of interaction between their offices. In the words of one junior minister: ‘there was really a constant interchange of information between our two offices’ (Interviewee 44, p. 6). The following quotations also highlight the importance of ministerial offices. The first is from a senior minister. The second is from a ministerial adviser.
The day-to-day running of it would be managed, the communications would be managed by staff. Staff to staff. Ministers wouldn't talk directly to one another. Its only when problems emerged, and I don't mean catastrophes, I mean just issues that hadn't been resolved that the ministers would be involved or the parliamentary secretary would be involved (Interviewee 46, p. 6).

Offices are responsible for minimising the amount of personal involvement ministers have to have in particular issues. So any potential conflicts or unresolved issues, the offices are responsible for taking those things as far as they possibly can before a minister gets personally involved. That's part of the culture (Interviewee 55, p. 5).

The management roles of ministerial offices can be divided into two categories. The first consists of roles that were common to the offices of both senior and junior ministers. Interviews revealed three roles which were common to both sets of offices. The first consisted of maintaining consistency within teams of political executives in representation and public relations work (Interviewee 55, p. 10). The second role related to parliament. Offices played an important role along with senior officials in the circulation of briefings for parliamentary purposes. Interviewees argued that this role was important even when ministers sat together in the same chamber. This is described by a ministerial adviser.

You can never be sure in the parliament which of the ministers is going to get questioned . . . So there's a very heavy responsibility on the offices of junior ministers to make sure that the senior ministers are briefed properly on all the issues which might arise in parliament . . . Any difference of view or inconsistency between a senior and junior minister on an issue publicly is a potential point of attack for the opposition. So that's a very important issue and that's another reason why the offices work very closely together to make sure they're briefed properly for presenting these things in public (Interviewee 55, p. 5).

This role was even more important when ministers represented each other's functional responsibilities in different parliamentary chambers. Interviews described close interaction between senior officials and offices to ensure that junior ministers were adequately briefed about issues within the responsibilities of the senior minister (Interviewee 46, p. 8).

The third role of ministerial offices consisted of "political coordination" in conjunction with senior officials. This role is described by a senior minister.

A substantial number of briefs that came over required us both to sign off on them and to look at each other's comments on them. Everything that came to each of us the other one saw. But usually it was for one to act upon and the other to note. But sometimes they were for us both to act upon. And that required a fair bit of coordination. And our offices were usually able to coordinate there (Interviewee 51, p. 4).
The “political coordination” role of ministerial offices was particularly important from the perspective of senior officials. Senior officials attached considerable importance to links between ministerial offices. Office level relationships were described as just as important as those between political executives themselves (eg Interviewee 01, p. 5, Interviewee 07, pp. 9-10, Interviewee 15, p. 4). This is reflected in the following statement by a senior official.

Although there was some difficulties between the two ministers in terms of their relationships the offices got on quite well together and that helped (Interviewee 25, p. 2).

The second category of roles were distinctive to the offices of different types of political executives. The most important role of senior ministerial offices consisted of monitoring the functions of their junior colleagues. This was sometimes the task of a single adviser (Interviewee 07, p. 5, Interviewee 49, p. 2). In other offices this function was shared between several different advisers (Interviewee 40, p. 2). A ministerial adviser described this monitoring role as consisting of two components. The first involved the identification of issues which necessitated the involvement of the senior minister. Most issues did not necessitate senior ministerial involvement. The second consisted of determining whether to support or overrule the junior minister or parliamentary secretary (Interviewee 33, p. 1, see also Interviewee 71, p. 2).

Interviews revealed that the offices of senior ministers monitored their junior colleagues in different ways. They usually relied heavily on paperwork circulated within the portfolio by senior officials (Interviewee 18, p. 2). There was also evidence of direct links with the offices of junior ministers. Finally there was evidence of direct links with senior officials and interest groups within the direct responsibilities of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. These are described in the following quotation from a ministerial adviser.

The people who ran Aged Care in Health knew that they'd talk to Staples office on all these issues. But when it got to be this big an issue they'd better come and talk to me (Interviewee 07, p. 5).

The key role of junior ministerial offices consisted of obtaining the policy support of the senior minister and their office on issues within their functional responsibilities. This was particularly important in relation to issues involving disagreement with senior officials and interest groups because of their capacity to appeal to the relevant senior minister. The importance of this role was emphasised by a ministerial adviser.
We were very lucky, we were side by side, and when I was working there I would go in very frequently, especially if there was something I thought was potentially hot. I would go in and see my relevant off-sider there and I’d say: “This is it, this is why we think its hot, these are the salient issues, some of which might not be covered in the submission, this is how we’re handling it”. And usually they said: “Thanks” (Interviewee 52, p. 2).

This role of junior ministerial offices was also important in relation to cabinet business. The offices of junior ministers were usually required to clear general cabinet submissions with the office of the relevant senior minister. It was sometimes also necessary for them to obtain the active support of the senior minister in the presentation of general cabinet submissions (Interviewee 55, p. 6). It was also necessary for junior ministerial offices to brief the office of the senior minister on submissions from other portfolios which impacted on the functional responsibilities of junior ministers. This is described in the following statement by a ministerial adviser.

While George wasn’t in cabinet, a lot of issues in our area, telecommunications reform, tax issues, were going to the cabinet for decisions. And offices that are doing their job properly spend time either lobbying for your position or trying to figure out what the level of support is and what the main points of contention might be so that your minister’s briefed properly when you’re going into cabinet. So on our issues that were going to cabinet, unless George was going there as a respondent to a submission, we would be briefing the Treasurer and the Treasurer’s office on particular positions that they might take in cabinet and arguments that might be used when things that we’re anticipating from other parts of government come up in cabinet. So that’s another reason why you’re maintaining a close relationship. The senior minister is the cabinet minister and that’s the main decision-making forum (Interviewee 55, pp. 5-6).

Interviewees therefore emphasised the roles of senior officials and ministerial advisers in managing the division of responsibility. They revealed that senior officials performed two sets of management roles. The first was the routine circulation of paperwork within teams of political executives. The second consisted of active “political coordination”. Interviews revealed that ministerial offices were also involved in the circulation of information within teams of political executives as well as active “political coordination”. They also identified distinctive roles which were unique to the offices of particular categories of political executives. The offices of senior ministers had an important role in monitoring their junior colleagues. The most important role of junior ministerial offices consisted of maintaining senior ministerial support on key issues and cabinet business within their direct functional responsibilities.
Conclusion

This chapter has examined different approaches to the division of responsibility for portfolio management and cabinet representation from the perspectives of senior ministers as well as junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. It has emphasised the importance of relationships between senior ministers and their junior colleagues. It has further argued that these relationships could be conceptualised in terms of two distinct dimensions: the personal relationship and the policy relationship.

The first part of this chapter examined different approaches to the division of responsibility for both portfolio management and cabinet representation from the perspective of senior ministers. It focused on the division of responsibility for portfolio management. It stressed the capacity of senior ministers to shape the division of responsibility for portfolio management (although there was limited evidence of constraints deriving from the impact of wider “environmental” factors). It found that senior ministers had incentives to allocate large functional workloads to their junior colleagues and adopt “limited” and “inclusive” approaches to the division of responsibility for portfolio management. These derived from the size of their workloads and the benefits of maintaining the cooperation of their junior colleagues. However it also identified two obstacles to the adoption of this approach. The first consisted of career rivalry between political executives. The second consisted of poor personal and policy relationships within teams of political executives. These obstacles caused senior ministers to confine their junior colleagues to narrow range of functions or else adopt “expansive” and “exclusive” approaches to the division of responsibility for portfolio management.

The second part of this chapter has examined different approaches to the division of responsibility for portfolio management and cabinet representation from the perspectives of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. It argued that ambitious junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries shared common objectives. They aimed to maximise the scope and importance of their functional responsibilities and minimise the impact of their subordinate status. It also argued that the capacity of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries to achieve these objectives depended on their personal and policy relationship with the relevant senior minister (although there was limited evidence that junior ministers could exploit wider “environmental” factors in order to constrain their senior colleagues). It further argued that junior ministerial and parliamentary secretary dissatisfaction typically
resulted from being confined to a narrow range of responsibilities as well as the adoption of “expansive” and “exclusive” approaches to the division of responsibility for portfolio management and cabinet representation by their senior colleagues.

The third and final part of this chapter has explored the management of the division of responsibility. It emphasised the central roles of senior officials and ministerial offices. It argued that senior officials and ministerial offices shared two important management roles. The first consisted of circulating information within teams of political executives. The second consisted of more active “political coordination”. It further argued that senior and junior ministerial offices performed distinctive management roles. Relationships between political executives, ministerial offices and senior officials are examined in greater detail in the next chapter of thesis. It examines the impact of the introduction of teams of political executives on political-bureaucratic relations at the portfolio level.
Chapter 6

Wider Implications of the Restructuring of the Commonwealth Political Executive

Introduction

The previous chapter examined different approaches to the division of responsibility for portfolio management and cabinet representation from the perspective of senior ministers as well as junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. It also explored the role of senior officials and ministerial offices in managing the division of responsibility within each portfolio.

This chapter examines the wider implications of the enlargement and restructuring of the Commonwealth political executive and the introduction of teams of political executives at the head of most portfolios. It is divided into two parts. The first part explores the implications of the introduction of teams of political executives for political-bureaucratic relations at the portfolio level. It sets out a new framework for conceptualising interaction between political and bureaucratic executives. It uses this framework to examine two key issues. The first is the contribution of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries to the objective of increased political control over portfolios. The second is the impact of the introduction of teams of political executives on processes of coordination and priority-setting within portfolios. The second part examines the implications of the enlargement and restructuring of the Commonwealth political executive for patronage and careers. It focuses on the impact of the changes on relationships between the prime minister, the parliamentary party and the political executive.
Political-Bureaucratic Relations at the Portfolio Level

The first part of this chapter examines the impact of the introduction of teams of political executives on political-bureaucratic relations at the portfolio level. It is divided into three sections. The first section argues that the introduction of teams of political executives increased the complexity of political-bureaucratic relations within portfolios. It sets out a new framework for conceptualising links between political and bureaucratic executives. It identifies four different patterns of political-bureaucratic relations.

The second section explores the first two patterns in greater detail. It examines the impact of the introduction of teams of political executives from the perspective of senior officials in divisions and agencies. It also attempts to evaluate the contribution of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries to increased political control over portfolios.

The third section explores the third and fourth patterns of political-bureaucratic relations in greater detail. It focuses on the fourth pattern of political-bureaucratic relations. It contrasts the perceptions of two groups of portfolio actors. The first group consists of departmental executives and senior ministers. The second group consists of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries as well as senior officials who reported directly to junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. The third section also examines the impact of the introduction of teams of political executives on processes of coordination and priority-setting within portfolios.

Four Patterns of Political-Bureaucratic Relations

Interviewees stressed the complexity of political-bureaucratic relations within portfolios. This complexity was attributed to two sources. The first was the introduction of teams of political executives. Portfolios had previously been headed by a single political executive and their office. Most were now headed by teams comprising two or three sets of political executives and offices (although the offices of parliamentary secretaries were much smaller than those of their ministerial colleagues) (Interviewee 33, p. 9).
The second source of this complexity was the existence of direct links between political executives and their offices and a wide range of different senior officials. Interaction with the bureaucratic executive was not confined to secretaries and departmental executives. Political executives interacted with a wide range of senior officials in different divisions and agencies. This pattern of interaction was described in Weller and Grattan’s study of the work of Australian government ministers (1981, pp. 48-49). It is also described by two senior officials.

The way we ran the mega-department was that the division head has direct access to the minister without going through the secretary (Interviewee 49, p. 3).

At about branch head and above, that’s about the split, you’re really up at Parliament House a lot. I’m up there all the time. Some days I might be up there three times in the one day. So if you take that over a week I might go 10 or 15 times a week maximum and a light week would be two or three times (Interviewee 31, p. 7).

Interviewees argued that different issues led to different patterns of interaction between different combinations of political and bureaucratic executives. This can be illustrated by developing a typology of issues involving interaction between political and bureaucratic executives. These issues can vary along two different dimensions. The first dimension consists of the presence or absence of overlap at the bureaucratic level. The fourth chapter of this thesis distinguished between issues which could be contained within the boundaries of a single division or agency and issues which transcended the boundaries of individual division or agencies. These overlapping issues could derive from policy development or program delivery linkages between different divisions or agencies. The budget process was another important source of overlap. It also necessitated coordination and priority-setting between divisions and agencies. It was important even in the absence of policy development and program delivery linkages.

The second dimension consists of the presence or absence of overlap at the political level. The final part of the previous chapter argued that some issues could be handled by a single political executive and their office. The involvement of other political executives and their offices was limited to the routine circulation of paperwork by senior officials. However other issues directly involved two or more sets of political executives and offices. These issues had the potential to demand “political coordination”. This consisted of maintaining consistency between different sets of political executives and offices.
These two dimensions of variation can be combined to create a fourfold typology of issues involving interaction between political and bureaucratic executives. The first category of issues are characterised by the absence of overlap at both the political and bureaucratic levels. The second category of issues are characterised by the absence of overlap at the bureaucratic level but the presence of overlap at the political level. The third category of issues are characterised by the presence of overlap at the bureaucratic level but the absence of overlap at the political level. The fourth category of issues are characterised by the presence of overlap at both the political and bureaucratic levels. Interviews revealed that these four categories of issues were each associated with a distinctive pattern of interaction between different combinations of political and bureaucratic executives.

The first two categories of issues were both characterised by the absence of overlap at the bureaucratic level. These issues were typically handled by senior officials within divisions or agencies. The involvement of the secretary or departmental executive was confined to a narrow range of key functional policy issues.

The first category of issues was also characterised by the absence of overlap at the political level. This meant that the relevant senior officials within each division or agency could interact directly with a single political executive and their office. There was no need for direct interaction with other political executives and offices. The involvement of other political executives and offices was confined to the routine circulation of paperwork within portfolios. This could involve all paperwork or simply important issues. This first pattern of political-bureaucratic relations was compared to a “chimney stack”. This simple vertical pattern of interaction is described by a senior official.

We’d send them to Beddall’s office cc to Collins’ office. But not expecting any handling or response. So Beddall would sign-off all the woodchip licences. Any change in approaches, they’d all be in his bailiwick (Interviewee 31, p. 1).

The second category of issues was characterised by the presence of overlap at the political level. These issues were still usually handled by the relevant senior officials within each division or agency. However these senior officials could no longer interact directly with a single political executive and office. Instead they were simultaneously involved in direct interactions with two sets of political executives and offices. The second category of issues was therefore characterised by triangular patterns of interaction between a single
senior official and two sets of political executives and offices. This triangular pattern of interaction is described by the same senior official.

In all of that debate we used to involve both offices. So anything that went up was for action by both offices (Interviewee 31, p. 2).

The third and fourth categories of issues were both characterised by the presence of overlap at the bureaucratic level. They involved coordination and priority-setting. This meant that they could no longer be handled solely by senior officials within individual divisions or agencies. These issues involved interaction between different senior officials. They also typically involved the secretary and departmental executive. This derived from the role of secretaries and departmental executives in coordination and priority-setting within portfolios. This role was most clearly evident in the portfolio budget process. The following comments from senior officials both stress the role of departmental executives in coordination and priority-setting within portfolios. The second comment highlights their role in the management of the portfolio budget process.

The executive level, the secretary and deputy secretaries ... that's the only level in the portfolio where you really get the melding of employment and training policies along with education policies ... and it's up to them to establish the linkages or force the linkages if you like (Interviewee 15, p. 3).

If it's a budget issue it tends to be corporately managed. So there's a budget team. Various line divisions are brought in for their bit (Interviewee 28, p. 6).

The third category of issues was characterised by the absence of overlap at the political level. This meant that departmental executives and relevant senior officials could interact directly with a single political executive and their office. This was usually the senior minister because of their formal responsibility for coordination and priority-setting at the portfolio level. However these officials could interact directly with a junior minister in relation to policy development or program delivery overlaps which could be contained within their direct responsibilities (see Interviewee 52, p. 3, Interviewee 55, p. 8).

Interaction with other political executives was once again limited to the routine circulation of paperwork within the portfolio. The presence of overlap at the bureaucratic level meant that interaction between political and bureaucratic executives was no longer characterised by simple vertical links within a single functional "chimney stack". However the absence of overlap at the political level meant that portfolios could still operate as collections of
distinct political “fiefdoms”. This third pattern of interaction was particularly common in relation to policy development and program delivery overlaps between particular divisions or agencies. It was less common in relation to the budget process because this typically involved all divisions and agencies.

The fourth category of issues was characterised by the presence of overlap at both the political and bureaucratic levels. This category of issues generated the most complex patterns of interaction between political and bureaucratic executives. The presence of overlap at the bureaucratic level necessitated interaction between senior officials in relevant divisions or agencies and the departmental executive. Furthermore the presence of overlap at the political level meant that these officials could no longer interact directly with a single political executive. Departmental executives were involved in direct interactions with two sets of political executives and offices. Different senior officials also interacted directly with different political executives and offices. Each political executive and their office was therefore involved in direct contact with relevant division or agency officials as well as the departmental executive. Several interviewees stressed the complexity of this fourth pattern of interaction between political and bureaucratic executives (eg Interviewee 25, pp. 3-4, Interviewee 28, p. 6, Interviewee 63, pp. 2-3).

Interviewees argued that these four patterns of political-bureaucratic relations could each be evident at the same time within a single portfolio. Different issues generated different patterns of interaction between different combinations of political and bureaucratic executives.

**Political-Bureaucratic Relations: Patterns 1 and 2**

The previous section emphasised the complexity of political-bureaucratic relations at the portfolio level. It identified four different patterns of interaction between political and bureaucratic executives. This section focuses on the first two patterns. It examines these patterns from the perspective of senior officials in divisions and agencies. It also attempts to evaluate the contributions of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries to increased political control over portfolios.

Interviewees emphasised the prevalence of the first two patterns of political bureaucratic relations. It was argued that most issues which involved interaction between political and
bureaucratic executives were unique to particular divisions of agencies. Junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries stressed the importance of the first two patterns of political-bureaucratic relations. They emphasised the extent of their interaction with senior officials within their respective divisions and agencies. Interviews revealed less direct interaction with secretaries or departmental executives (Interviewee 04, p. 3, Interviewee 14, p. 2, Interviewee 59, pp. 1-2. Interviewee 66, p. 3, Interviewee 68, p. 3). This pattern of interaction was particularly evident in larger portfolios. It was somewhat less evident in small portfolios. Junior ministers in smaller portfolios reported more frequent interaction with departmental secretaries and executives (Interviewee 22, pp. 4-5, Interviewee 30, p. 2, Interviewee 38, p. 2).

The main exception to this pattern consisted of junior ministers who headed “sub-cabinet level” portfolios. These junior ministers (with the exception of the Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs) had their own departments. Their functions were not part of a larger department headed by a senior minister. These junior ministers had more interaction with secretaries and departmental executives as well as senior officials from different functional areas (Interviewee 36, p. 1, Interviewee 70, p. 1).

(a) The Perspective of Senior Officials. Interviews focused on the second pattern of political-bureaucratic relations. The potential for the emergence of the second pattern of political-bureaucratic relations was a product of the introduction of teams of political executives. It could emerge from two different sources. The first was a “fuzzy” division of functional responsibilities within teams of political executives. This meant that senior officials had to interact directly with two different sets of political executives and offices. The fourth chapter of this thesis identified substantial variation in the “clarity” of the functional responsibilities of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. Some had clearly defined responsibilities consisting of entire “sub-cabinet level” portfolios or entire divisions and agencies within cabinet portfolios. However it was common for both junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries to share direct responsibility for a single division or agency with other political executives (most commonly the senior minister). An example of a “fuzzy” division of responsibilities is described by a senior official.

Within the security division, the Attorney-General looks after much of the legal stuff like telecommunications interception, ASIO, and so on. And the Minister for Justice looks after most of the rest of it: the counter-terrorism coordination, the protective security for ministers and information technology security and so on. Its just the way they wanted it (Interviewee 27, p. 1).
The second pattern of political-bureaucratic relations could also derive from "antagonistic" senior ministerial intervention in portfolio management within the direct responsibilities of their junior colleagues. This was particularly evident when senior ministers bypassed their junior colleagues and interacted directly with relevant senior officials. The fourth chapter of this thesis argued that only a few senior ministers adopted pure "limited" approaches and eschewed involvement in the responsibilities of their junior colleagues. Most senior ministers monitored their junior colleagues and occasionally intervened in their functional responsibilities. A few adopted "expansive" approaches remained extensively involved in portfolio management within the functions of their junior colleagues.

Interviewees argued that the emergence of the second pattern of political-bureaucratic relations had the potential to generate two sets of problems for senior officials. The first consisted of uncertainty and the potential need to cope with disagreement between political executives. Disagreement between political executives generated demands for "political coordination". This problem was most common in relation to functional policy change. It was described in two previous studies of the work of sub-cabinet level political executives (Randle 1983, p. 15, Theakston 1987, pp. 106-108). It is also described in the following comments by two senior officials.

It means that you sometimes have to double team things or copy things, consult more often, spend a lot of time covering two offices, three offices perhaps. There are costs in slippage and discontinuity, dislocation (Interviewee 62, p. 5).

The uncertainty in the policy sense. You never know where you stand. You never know when you've got a decision. You never know what's going to happen. Whereas with a single minister there is a lot more certainty about life and about the direction that you're going to go down (Interviewee 15, p. 8).

The second problem for senior officials consisted of additional resource demands placed on divisions and agencies by their inclusion within the direct responsibilities of two or more political executives. These demands derived from the representational and public relations components of the work of political executives. Interviews revealed evidence of problems for senior officials in responding to competing demands for bureaucratic support as well as difficulties in accommodating conflicting policy agendas. This second problem was also described in a previous study of the work of sub-cabinet level political executives (Vanderhoff-Silburt 1983/84, p. 9). It is also described by two senior officials.
I think the costs are that we spend an enormous amount of time servicing two or three ministers that we didn’t have to do before (Interviewee 15, p. 8).

I think an unintended side effect of that is that for every person who’s in parliamentary life, who can look to a department to provide them with some sort of service, you then for our department for instance have three times the number of people who are capable of making speeches, meeting with people, making decisions. And yet there wasn’t an increase of any type in the resources available in the department to respond to that. Given that a lot of the day-to-day work of the department is simply answering their correspondence, writing briefings for the meetings they go to and writing their speeches, there was no recognition within the system that that was going to cause tension (Interviewee 71, p. 11).

Most senior officials preferred to interact exclusively with a single political executive and their office. This reduced the need for “political coordination” as well as the potential for clashes over the provision of bureaucratic support. A senior official interviewed for this study explicitly stated: ‘certainly from the public service perspective its easier to deal with one minister and one minister’s office on an issue’ (Interviewee 31, p. 8).

This had important implications for the allocation of functional responsibilities within teams of political executives. Senior officials emphasised the importance of “clarity” in the allocation of functional responsibilities between political executives (Interviewee 02, p. 1). Most senior officials preferred a clear division of responsibilities in which a single political executive was directly responsible for the work of each division and agency. One senior official stated of his portfolio: ‘it basically functioned because particular divisions had a particular person to deal with’ (Interviewee 49, pp. 6-7). A ministerial adviser similarly described how responsibilities had been divided between a senior and junior minister so that each was the ‘principal customer’ for advice from different parts of the portfolio. The two ministers could each develop close links with their respective divisions (Interviewee 55, p. 1).

Interviews with senior officials revealed evidence that departments had been restructured to maximise the extent to which senior officials could interact exclusively with a single political executive and office. One senior official recounted that his department had been restructured partly to quarantine the responsibilities of a particular junior minister within a single division in order to reduce the junior minister’s involvement with the rest of the department (Interviewee 15, p. 1). This process was also described by other senior officials. This is reflected in the following statements by senior officials. The first refers to the restructuring of a department so that particular divisions could interact directly with a single political executive and office. The second describes the restructuring of a single
division so that each of its two branches could interact exclusively with a different political executive and their office.

What we tried to do was to align reporting arrangements of divisions . . . to fit ministerial responsibilities (Interviewee 28, p. 5).

We tend to organise ourselves in the division on functional lines . . . it was clear who was responsible for what program and so there wasn’t any difficulty there (Interviewee 09, p. 3).

Interviews revealed only one exception to this pattern. This consisted of the bilateral relations divisions of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Interviews with senior officials emphasised the costs of dividing these divisions into separate political and trade units which could interact exclusively with either the Minister for Foreign Affairs or the Minister for Trade. A senior official from this department argued that these divisions had to continue to interact directly with both the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Minister for Trade despite the potential difficulties involved. These divisions were contrasted with other divisions in the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade which continued to report almost exclusively to a single political executive (Interviewee 56, pp. 2-3). This argument is reflected in the following statement.

Cook almost broke the whole thing apart. He started to say: “I want people to work to me, they’re my people” . . . Fortunately, I think, the Department had to say to him, and it did say to him: “Look, you can’t do it, it doesn’t work that way. The whole point of the amalgamation was that individuals are doing partly political and partly trade work” (Interviewee 34, p. 1).

This statement emphasises the potential impact of the introduction of teams of political executives on process of coordination and priority-setting at the portfolio level. This issue is addressed in the next part of this chapter.

Senior officials could report directly to senior ministers, junior ministers or parliamentary secretaries. Interviews revealed that senior officials had similar expectations of all three categories of political executives. They expected them to develop subject matter expertise. They expected them to be accessible. They also valued consistency in political direction. This partly explains why most senior officials emphasised the benefits of the first pattern of political-bureaucratic relations. Finally senior officials valued political executives who could successfully represent their functional responsibilities in the cabinet system. These expectations are clearly evident in the following statements from senior officials.
From a bureaucratic point of view a lot of the things you want are very pragmatic and practical. You need to turn around on documents, people who are willing to give you a decision and don’t say: “On the one hand, on the other hand”. But both Evans and Bilney are very decisive. They give you an answer and they’ll tell you why too. Not all ministers do that (Interviewee 72, p. 4).

Their overall responsibility is to be well-versed in their area of responsibility. To consult extensively with their clients . . . And to be a dogged advocate for those clients within the cabinet process (Interviewee 71, p. 7).

These findings were similar to those reported by Headey (1974a, pp. 142-145) and Weller and Grattan (1981, pp. 70-72). Weller and Grattan found that senior officials shared three expectations of ministers: the capacity to ‘win in cabinet’, ‘firm political direction’ and ‘accessibility’ (1981, pp. 70-72). Interviews revealed that senior officials had only one unique expectation of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. This was to maintain the personal trust and policy support of the senior minister. This expectation is described in the following statement by a senior official.

I don’t know that there are particular qualities you need in a junior minister except to get on with the senior minister. It would be hell if you had two that were fighting each other. It would in fact be unworkable (Interviewee 72, p. 4).

Senior officials were questioned about the costs and benefits of reporting directly to junior rather than senior ministers. Interviews revealed two sets of benefits. These both derived from the narrower functional responsibilities and lighter overall workloads of most junior ministers in comparison with their senior colleagues.

The first benefit consisted of the potential for junior ministers to develop more extensive subject matter knowledge of their direct functional responsibilities. The second benefit consisted of the greater accessibility of junior ministers to senior officials. The potential benefits for senior officials of reporting directly to junior ministers are enumerated in the following statements by senior officials. The second statement is particularly important because it reiterates the importance which senior officials attached to relationships between junior ministers and their senior colleagues.

From an official’s point of view there were huge benefits in having so much of Peter Staples’ time. And a junior minister just doesn’t have the same political demands, the cabinet demands, the party demands, as a senior minister. And in many ways community services and child care were very spoilt with Peter Staples because we had an advocate who was totally immersed in all of that of a kind we wouldn’t have had with a busy portfolio minister. And the same was true of the time he would have to spend with aged care organisations and service providers. I think all those things are very valuable in the scheme of things (Interviewee 58, p. 8).
He’s more likely to get time with Laurie Brereton than we are. So that’s a real advantage. And the fact that he’s a minister means he’s going to get press time, sometimes good, sometimes bad, but he is going to get press time. We are going to be able to use his to promote what we’re trying to do. He does have some influence with his colleagues in the ministry. There are a lot of advantages in having a dedicated junior minister (Interviewee 47, p. 5).

These benefits were reported in an almost identical form in interviews with senior officials who reported directly to parliamentary secretaries. The following statement comes from a senior official whose functions were located within the responsibilities of a parliamentary secretary.

I think there were a number of very practical advantages for me in the sense that we had very easy access. Any time that I wanted to talk to him, anywhere he was, I could just pick up the phone. Our portfolio minister’s got a very busy schedule and I wouldn’t presume to do that. So access was much easier. And he was interested in being involved with activities. You could organise them and he could allocate the time to them, for radio talk back or whatever. So I had a big access benefit. He was very good at turning around correspondence ... He was just very good at looking at the paper. So I probably had an easier time than most in terms of administration and correspondence and getting decisions. So there’s all those advantages (Interviewee 49, p. 4).

Interviews with senior officials also revealed two disadvantages of reporting directly to junior ministers or parliamentary secretaries. The first consisted of the potential for the emergence of the second pattern of political-bureaucratic relations as a consequence of “antagonistic” senior ministerial intervention in the functions of their junior colleagues. This created the potential for uncertainty in functional policy making. It also meant that senior officials were potentially exposed to conflicting instructions from different sets of political executives and offices. This could occur when senior ministers bypassed their junior colleagues and interacted directly with relevant senior officials. The potential for these problems is described in the following comments by senior officials. These officials also emphasise the additional demands placed on senior officials who reported directly to junior ministers or parliamentary secretaries as a result of the potential for “antagonistic” senior ministerial intervention.

In terms of ministers, sometimes it can be a bit difficult. When you do on occasions need to deal with two ministerial offices rather than just the one (Interviewee 60, p. 6).

The extra effort that’s required to ensure that you have two ministers on side ... in terms of thinking of the political implications, where they both come from if you like, and what their relationships are, means that there’s extra demands being placed on people (Interviewee 25, p. 5).

This problem was not experienced by senior officials who reported directly to the senior minister. In the words of one senior official: ‘its better to be able to deal with one person
who's got the authority to make a decision . . . You know you're not going to be second guessed' (Interviewee 28, p. 5, see also Interviewee 71, p. 8).

The extent of this problem depended on the approach of the relevant senior minister to the division of responsibility for portfolio management. It was not a problem when senior ministers adopted “limited” approaches and eschewed involvement in the responsibilities of their junior colleagues. It was much more of a problem when senior ministers adopted “expansive” approaches and maintained extensive direct involvement in the functions of their junior colleagues. The implications of this “expansive” approach are described by a senior official.

You then get confusion in the minds of the organisation about who’s taking decisions. If you put something to that junior minister, can the junior minister take a decision? Do you have to wait for the senior minister to take a decision? (Interviewee 74, p. 6).

Most senior officials argued that they experienced fewest problems when senior ministers adopted “limited” approaches to the division of responsibility for portfolio management and granted considerable functional autonomy to their junior colleagues. This perspective is clearly evident in the following statements from senior officials.

[The junior minister] had considerable autonomy in terms of the executive functioning of those programs. And from an official’s viewpoint that was good. You knew where you stood. Peter was in charge and he was handling it (Interviewee 58, p. 3).

And from a bureaucrat’s point of view, what that also enables you to do is you can actually make the judgements of who you’ll need to talk to and not get into this constant second guessing (Interviewee 07, p. 5).

The second disadvantage of reporting to junior ministers or parliamentary secretaries was their potential lack of influence in comparison with their senior colleagues. This was evident within both the general cabinet and budget/ERC processes. Officials frequently argued that junior ministers had lower cabinet status and worse presentation skills than their senior colleagues. This had important implications for their capacity to operate as effective cabinet representatives of their direct functional responsibilities. Parliamentary secretaries could not bring forward their own general cabinet business and rarely participated in the budget/ERC process. Senior official (and interest group) perceptions of the low cabinet status of most junior ministers are reflected in the following quotation from a senior official.
The downsides are that sometimes the junior minister can be perceived as having less clout. Certainly the small business lobby has lobbied long and hard to have the responsibility for small business back in cabinet (Interviewee 71, p. 8).

The extent of this problem depended on the characteristics of individual junior ministers. The previous chapter argued that there was substantial variation between junior ministers and that some could be just as skilled as their senior colleagues (Interviewee 55, p. 6, Interviewee 69, p. 5).

The lack of influence of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries was also potentially evident within their own portfolios. This was particularly evident in the portfolio budget process. Several senior officials argued that departmental executives focused primarily on the priorities of the senior minister. Two senior officials highlighted the potential lack of junior ministerial and parliamentary secretary influence at the portfolio level.

Within the department, if you’re working to a junior minister then almost by definition that means that you’re not working on the hot policy issue of the day. You’re in the backroom. That is the impact. I would see the secretary once in a blue moon but if I was running the employment programs division I’d see him ten times a day. So it does have that sort of an impact (Interviewee 15, p. 6).

I think the main difference is that you’ve got to fight to be heard more . . . heard by the Attorney. And heard by the hierarchy within the department. If the Attorney wants something its got a bit of a priority over something the parliamentary secretary might want (Interviewee 09, p. 7).

Many senior officials stressed the lack of influence of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries in comparison with senior ministers at both the portfolio and cabinet levels.

However there was also evidence of a contrary argument. Some interviewees argued that senior officials from the functional areas allocated to junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries would have little influence within portfolios headed by a single senior minister (eg Interviewee 74, p. 3). Indeed it was argued that these senior officials could benefit from the presence of a junior minister or parliamentary secretary with the capacity to represent their functions at the portfolio level in negotiations with the senior minister and the departmental executive. The previous chapter of emphasised the extent to which junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries approached the budget process as representatives of their direct functional responsibilities. This role was termed “functional advocacy” at the portfolio level. The capacity for junior ministers to assist senior officials in influencing portfolio budget priorities is described by a senior official.
The senior minister might have a particular view: “No way, I’m not going to back a new policy proposal, just find the resources”. And he won’t hear you all that well because he’s got that very strong judgement. The junior minister will hear the argument through and be able to weigh its merits up, and explore options and alternatives, and if he thinks its a crunch issue worth pushing, then he’ll pursue it. And I think that’s been the case. And I think that he’s been able to support successfully some new policy proposals and win Brereton over when the Secretary of the Department might say: “I’m not even going to talk to Brereton about this because he’s Doctor No” (Interviewee 75, p. 5).

Senior officials emphasised the importance of relationships between junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries and the relevant senior minister. These were important for two reasons. Senior officials argued that good personal and policy relationships reduced the likelihood of “antagonistic” senior ministerial intervention and the emergence of competing sources of political direction. Senior ministerial support also compensated for the lack of influence of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries at both the portfolio and cabinet levels. Officials emphasised the importance of senior ministerial support for the general cabinet business of junior ministers. This was important in both the general cabinet and budget/ERC processes.

It’s a basic degree of recognition that some of these things have to be done jointly. At the end of the day you’ve got to have your senior minister on side (Interviewee 75, p. 2).

But of course where you have a senior and junior minister that get along with each other, the trick is to keep them both informed, as we do. So that your junior minister is supported by the senior minister in cabinet (Interviewee 01, p. 1).

The active cabinet support of the senior minister (in this case the prime minister) was particularly important to the Status of Women portfolio. This was because of its interest in the general cabinet and budget/ERC submissions of other portfolios. The junior status of successive incumbents of the position of Minister Assisting the Prime Minister for the Status of Women meant that officials were often forced to rely on the senior minister to represent them in the cabinet system. This problem is described by a senior official. This official also highlights the problems which could result from direct interaction between senior officials who reported directly to junior ministers and the senior minister.

It was more tricky when we had non-cabinet ministers for our junior minister. In fact it was very tricky because non-cabinet ministers didn’t have access to the cabinet material which I as a bureaucrat had access to. Didn’t have access to the budget material. So you’re in an obvious difficulty there because you have a budget proposal coming up which you think is something that you should be a part of, that’s good for your client group, but you can’t use the junior minister. You can’t even brief the junior minister on it because the junior minister is not a cabinet minister and doesn’t have access to cabinet material. So your only route is to go through the bureaucracy
and through the senior minister’s office, through the prime minister’s office. So there were tricky situations. And you got junior ministers who were unhappy with the situation, understandably (Interviewee 41, pp. 2-3).

Interviews with senior officials therefore revealed that many of the potential disadvantages of reporting directly to junior ministers or parliamentary secretaries could be avoided through good personal and policy relationships between junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries and the relevant senior minister.

Interviews examined interaction between senior officials who reported directly to junior ministers or parliamentary secretaries and the relevant senior minister. Senior officials were questioned about whether it was ever necessary for them to initiate direct contact with the senior minister. In particular they were asked whether it was ever necessary for them to appeal the decisions of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries to the senior minister. Aucoin and Bakvis (1993, p. 401) argued that junior ministers lacked direct control over senior officials. However senior officials interviewed for this study argued that they were directly accountable to both junior minister and parliamentary secretaries in relation to issues within their functional responsibilities. Officials argued that they would only interact directly with the relevant junior minister or their office. This was also evident in relation to parliamentary secretaries. This direct accountability relationship is described in the following comments by two senior officials and a ministerial adviser.

Well you’ve got to be very careful. In some sense the junior minister’s relationships with the senior minister are his own. There might be the odd occasion on which the head of the department would feel things were going on which he should let the senior minister know about (Interviewee 58, p. 4).

What you attempted to do was to honestly work for the junior minister. And you wouldn’t directly bring in the senior minister. I mean just occasionally . . . you might ask the secretary to raise an issue with the senior minister. But you’d try not to do that too often (Interviewee 63, pp. 4-5).

There were very clear examples where, well Staples’ office in particular would be very very territorial about some issues and where people in the department would know that and would be very careful about dealing only with him (Interviewee 07, p. 7).

Many senior officials stated that their involvement with the senior minister was confined to the routine circulation of paperwork within teams of political executives described in the final part of the previous chapter. This pattern of direct interaction with a junior minister or parliamentary secretary and indirect interaction with the relevant senior minister through the routine circulation of paperwork is described by two senior officials.
Not only would it be seen as a deceitful thing, it would be. As I say there’s no secret correspondence. All the correspondence is copied. So that gives the senior minister an opportunity if he so wishes to pick the issue up (Interviewee 01, p. 5).

The senior minister always receives copies of any paperwork that goes through to the junior minister. He will become involved if there are any issues arising (Interviewee 69, p. 2).

Senior officials argued that they were reliant on junior ministers and their offices as well as parliamentary secretaries to maintain the policy support of the relevant senior minister. Senior officials stated that they would advise junior ministers or parliamentary secretaries to clear important issues with the senior minister. This removed the need for them to interact directly with the senior minister. This process is described by two senior officials. They emphasise the importance of the role of the offices of junior ministers in maintaining the policy support of the senior minister. This also applied to parliamentary secretaries.

We would always take the line of telling the minister or his private office that really this matter was important and they should tell the senior minister themselves. I really think officials who whistle blow probably lose the trust of both ministers. So I think our approach was always to say: “You do it yourself. You really ought to go and have a chat with Brian about this” . . . And they normally did it. I mean there were tensions and difficulties. But when it came to the crunch I can’t remember occasions when that kind of approach didn’t work reasonably well. In the end he’d say: “Okay, I’ll talk to him” (Interviewee 58, p. 4).

I’d make sure that the parliamentary secretary was aware I thought it was an issue that he should discuss with the minister. But I left it at that. It didn’t occur very often. But it did occur. And on these occasions he did speak to the minister (Interviewee 49, p. 3).

Senior officials therefore emphasised the importance of “supportive” senior ministerial involvement in important issues within the functions of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. They also highlighted the important role of ministerial offices in managing relationships within teams of political executives. Senior officials argued that good office relationships were vital to the management of the division of responsibility between senior ministers and their junior colleagues. The importance of ministerial office relationships from the perspective of senior officials is highlighted in the first two statements below. The third quotation describes the role of senior officials in encouraging the development of good office relationships. It emphasises the role of senior officials in encouraging junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries to maintain the policy support of the relevant senior minister. It also highlights the potential dilemmas which could be encountered by senior officials in attempting to balance direct accountability to junior ministers or parliamentary secretary with their ultimate accountability to the relevant senior minister.
But to work effectively the ministers and the minister's staffs have got to work with each other. So the main costs have really been about a lack of effective communication for whatever reason between the two ministers and their personal staffs (Interviewee 01, pp. 8-9).

I can't recall any occasions where we had to go behind Johns' back at all. I mean we would say to Johns' office: "Look, you'd better go and talk to Brereton about this". Or more often than not they'd say: "Well we'd better go and talk to Brereton about this". The relationship, because of the people, is very very easy. It didn't cause any problems at all (Interviewee 47, p. 2).

I guess part of our role also is to try and ensure that the junior minister's office see themselves as empowered by getting that endorsement from the senior minister's office as well. So yeah look it can cause difficulty and it can be seen to be the bureaucrats going round the back door for a junior minister but by the same token, if we don't do that we can be seen by the senior minister's office as not keeping them informed about issues of importance to the portfolio as a whole. So that can put bureaucrats in a very cleft position (Interviewee 71, p. 4).

Senior officials who reported directly to junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries usually argued that they would not initiate direct contact with the relevant senior minister. However interviews revealed evidence of direct contact being initiated by senior ministers and their offices. This usually derived from "antagonistic" senior ministerial intervention in the functions of their junior colleagues. Senior ministers could bypass their junior colleagues and interact directly with senior officials within their functional responsibilities. Senior ministers and their offices could request additional briefings or issue contradictory policy directions to senior officials. The extent of this direct contact with senior ministers depended on their approach to the division of responsibility for portfolio management. Most senior ministers adopted "limited" approaches. It was uncommon for them to initiate direct contact with senior officials who reported exclusively to their junior colleagues. The following statement describes a senior minister who adopted an "expansive" approach to the division of responsibility for portfolio management.

In my first three days in the job I was called over by Crean's senior adviser to be told quite explicitly, Free's called the Minister for Vocational Education and Training, but you need to understand Simon's most important and passionate interest, and you're working for him (Interviewee 07, p. 4).

Senior officials who reported directly to junior ministers or parliamentary secretaries were questioned about how they coped with direct interaction with the senior minister. Senior officials argued that they would sometimes be asked for additional briefings by the senior minister or their office. These requests were described by officials as a potential problem because of their direct accountability to the junior minister or parliamentary secretary. The most common response of senior officials was to inform the relevant junior minister or parliamentary secretary. Interviews revealed that it was important for senior officials not
to be seen to be going behind the back of the junior minister or parliamentary secretary. This is reflected in the following statements by senior officials.

It depends a lot on the circumstances of a particular ministry situation. The way I suppose not to make the junior minister feel left out, or to go behind their back, is to keep them informed of what you're doing (Interviewee 41, p. 2).

It's probably seen as going behind their back but it did happen. But invariably when those briefings occurred I would always advise Crowley's office that I was going to it. And often they'd say: "We want a report afterwards and any feedback that you get from the meeting that would be useful to us" (Interviewee 73, p. 6).

There have been quite a number of occasions when I have been called in to talk to the senior minister without the junior minister present, or anyone from the junior minister's office, which I find a bit disconcerting. But it happens. They can be in the same building . . . You've got to be nimble. But I've tried to play it down the middle (Interviewee 15, p. 4).

Finally senior officials were questioned about how they coped with contradictory policy directions from different political executives. Interviews revealed that senior officials preferred policy disagreements to be contained at the political level. In the words of one official: 'any differences of view would more appropriately be resolved at a ministerial or a ministerial office level' (Interviewee 69, p. 2). However this was not always possible. Senior ministers could bypass their junior colleagues and issue contradictory instructions to senior officials. The emergence of the second pattern of political-bureaucratic relations meant that the management role of senior officials shifted from the routine circulation of paperwork within the portfolio to active "political coordination". Senior officials argued that they would usually attempt to broker a compromise position between the two sets of political executives through negotiation with their respective offices. The important role of ministerial offices along with senior officials in "political coordination" is described by two senior officials.

They're not issues you would refer upwards. They're issues you would deal with at my level [division head] . . . I'd get the senior personal advisers from each office and say look there's an issue you've got to talk about between the two of you, and either sort it out or get the ministers to talk (Interviewee 01, p. 6).

As far as our patch has been concerned we've been able to reconcile those differences. And it's a multi-faceted task. We'll do a briefing, which goes to both. We'd say to John's office: "You try to massage this through and get a consensus. And if you can't we'd be happy to participate in a round table with reps. from both offices and ministers as required to try and nut it through to some consensus position. Identify and resolve any reservations that are outstanding" (Interviewee 75, p. 2).
Senior officials emphasised the potential difficulty of their “political coordination” role. They argued that they walked a tightrope between their direct accountability to the junior minister or parliamentary secretary with direct responsibility for their functions and their ultimate accountability to the senior minister. They stressed the importance of maintaining their relationships with both sets of political executives and offices. The importance of these relationships is reflected in the following statements by senior officials.

You’ve got to end up with bona fides with both. Because if you’re the mate of the junior minister and the junior minister’s off-side with the senior minister, the senior minister’s going to override in your policy area. You’ve got to make sure you’re also the person in the bureaucracy that the senior minister’s going to want to listen to and talk to directly if they want to shift something otherwise you get cut out yourself (Interviewee 28, p. 6).

Should there arise a situation where both ministers have an interest, you would organise your argumentation and discussions to deal with it collectively. You would never make yourself the meat in the sandwich (Interviewee 01, p. 5).

For heaven’s sake don’t get into a conspiracy with the junior office against the senior office. And visa versa, don’t get into a conspiracy with the senior office if the junior office isn’t helpful. Its unprofessional (Interviewee 62, p. 2).

Senior officials argued that in the event of continuing disagreement they would inevitably side with the senior minister. This emphasises the capacity of senior ministers to intervene throughout their portfolios including within the functional responsibilities of their junior colleagues. This point is emphasised by two senior officials.

You have to side with the senior one . . . they’ll win (Interviewee 28, pp. 6-7).

Basically if you’ve got a policy and you’re getting different instructions or a view that your senior minister and your junior minister are taking a different line . . . then you’ve got a problem because you don’t know which way to jump. In the end, if you have to, you jump the way of the senior minister (Interviewee 41, p. 8).

(b) The Contribution of Junior Ministers and Parliamentary Secretaries to Enhanced Political Control. Interviews examined the contribution of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries to enhanced political control over portfolios. This was one of the main objectives of the introduction of teams of political executives. Previous studies of the work of sub-cabinet level political executives revealed that this issue can be conceptualised in terms of two dimensions. The first consists of the “direct” contribution of sub-cabinet level political executives. This refers to their capacity to exercise closer political oversight over senior officials within their functional responsibilities. The second consists of the “indirect” contribution of sub-cabinet level political executives. This refers
to their capacity to assist senior ministers to control their portfolios by relieving them of part of their workloads (Vanderhoff-Silburt 1983/84, p. 6, Chenier 1985, pp. 399, 401, Theakston 1987, pp. 109-111). These two dimensions are examined in turn.

The previous chapter argued that one of the main objectives of ambitious junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries was to operate as the sole source of political direction over portfolio management within their functional responsibilities. Interviewees argued that junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries had the capacity to exercise close political oversight over their direct functional responsibilities (Interviewee 04, p. 1, Interviewee 38, p. 3). One junior minister argued that an important benefit of the introduction of both junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries was their capacity to give detailed attention to functions which had previously been left to senior officials (Interviewee 68, p. 2). This was attributed to the narrower scope of their functional responsibilities and their lighter overall workloads in comparison with senior ministers. The capacity of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries to exercise close oversight over a narrow range of functional responsibilities is described by two senior officials.

I think one of the advantages of the junior ministry is that the junior minister can actually look at particular issues or areas of policy in far more detail and have the luxury of doing that. And from that point of view are often able to drive reform quite effectively even though they don’t have the clout of senior ministers, either back into the parliamentary system or indeed even sometimes within the bureaucracy (Interviewee 71, p. 7).

The way we’ve operated has been under much closer scrutiny from ministerial advisers than I’ve ever experienced before ... you can understand that if they’re looking for briefing information they’re not going to ring me or a branch head when they almost know just about everybody in the division on first name terms. And they know who holds the data. And if they want that bit of information they’ll just ring-up and ask it ... It’s a much closer level of attention with a small office and a small program (Interviewee 73, pp. 9-10).

The potential for close interaction between political and bureaucratic executives within a particular functional area emerged from interviews with senior officials as one of the main benefits of reporting directly to junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries rather than senior ministers. Interviews emphasised the extent of symbiosis between senior officials and both junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. Similar findings were reported in Randle’s study of the work of Canadian parliamentary secretaries (1983, p. 14). This is described in the following quotes from senior officials.

The division has been arguing for more ministerial interest and for stronger positions to be taken in terms of some of the organisations we fund ... The ideal is where the minister and the
department want to achieve the same thing. And we've certainly by and large been in that position (Interviewee 09, p. 10).

We are going to be able to use him to promote what we're trying to do. He does have some influence with his colleagues in the ministry. There are a lot of advantages in having a dedicated junior minister (Interviewee 47, p. 5).

The literature on the work of sub-cabinet level political executives focuses on the problems they experience in overseeing departments (see Randle 1983, pp. 12, 15, Chenier 1985, p. 404, Theakston 1987, pp. 68-70, 106-108). The previous chapter argued that senior ministers could overrule their junior colleagues. They could also bypass them and interact directly with relevant senior officials. These officials could also appeal their decisions to the relevant senior minister. Interviewees argued that the capacity of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries to exercise "direct" control over their responsibilities depended on three factors.

The first was the approach of the relevant senior minister to the division of responsibility for portfolio management. The previous chapter argued that senior ministers could adopt "expansive" approaches and deny their junior colleagues a functional policy role. Junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries were dependent on the adoption by senior ministers of "limited" approaches to the division of responsibility for portfolio management.

The second was the approach of the relevant senior minister to the allocation of functional responsibilities. A "fuzzy" division of responsibility made it more difficult for junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries to function as the sole source of political direction over relevant senior officials. This was because of the emergence of the second pattern of political-bureaucratic relations. One junior minister stated that the senior officials within his functional responsibilities had also reported directly to the senior minister. This meant that his directions were subject to senior ministerial veto. This junior minister stated: 'theoretically I could ask for anything. Whether I was going to get it was a different matter' (Interviewee 39, p. 2). A parliamentary secretary similarly distinguished between 'clearly defined areas of responsibility' and 'areas of overlap' which he shared with the senior minister. He argued that he had considerable autonomy over the former group of functions. However in relation to the latter he stated: 'you keep having to force yourself into the picture' (Interviewee 53, p. 2). A senior official also argued that junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries had more scope for autonomy over clearly defined functions. This was because there was less potential for senior ministerial involvement. There was
also less potential for officials to appeal the decisions of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries to the senior minister. This is described by a senior official.

But in Health the ministers had pretty clearly defined areas, so there was no point. So if you tried to go to Blewett over Staples head on an Aged Care matter, Blewett would just say: 'Why are you coming to me?' Unless you could somehow link it to something that was important to Blewett you really weren't going to go anywhere (Interviewee 61, p. 5).

Junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries argued that they should be given clearly defined functional responsibilities rather than sharing direct responsibility for agencies or divisions with the senior minister (eg Interviewee 35, p. 1). Junior ministers with their own “sub-cabinet level” portfolios had the most clearly defined responsibilities. These junior ministers were least vulnerable to “antagonistic” senior ministerial intervention in portfolio management within their responsibilities. It was also more difficult for senior officials to appeal their decisions to the relevant senior minister.

The third factor was the policy support of the relevant senior minister. This was important because most junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries remained vulnerable to appeals to the senior minister in the event of disagreement with their senior officials. The potential for senior officials to appeal to the senior minister is described in the following comments by two junior ministers and a parliamentary secretary.

It happened often enough. Treasury was outrageous for it. Treasury would basically say to you: “If you don’t approve this we’ll go to the minister” ... In A-G’s we had the same problem ... On a number of occasions people in the [senior] minister’s office rang up to find out: “What was really happening?” That’s the way they’d put it. And we knew they’d been briefed by the bureaucrats (Interviewee 05, p. 4).

There was very much an attempt to isolate the Attorney-General as the sole administrative and political head. In other words, he would be the primus inter pares as it were and there would be a sort of court of appeal from anything that I determined to his (Interviewee 44, p. 5).

If people don’t like the parliamentary secretary’s decision, they’re entitled to go to the minister. And there’s two sets of people seek reviews. One is the department itself. The other is outside lobbyists who come to you then go to higher authority. You can’t stop them. Ultimately the decision-making responsibility is the minister’s (Interviewee 51, p. 5).

Junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries argued that they were dependent on senior ministerial policy support. This was necessary to prevent successful appeals by officials to the senior minister. The importance of senior ministerial policy support is reflected in the following statements by junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries.
It was important for my office and [the senior minister’s] office to be close and working together. We knew that they would go to the portfolio minister and when they did we’d have anticipated them. But there were situations like that where you knew there was backchanneling going on (Interviewee 05, p. 4).

Each of us made it very plain that was not how the show worked. But it took quite a while before we worked that out. It occurred well into the time of our administration of the portfolio . . . From time to time things were re-submitted to the Attorney. But never to any effect. Other than people were roundly told that wasn’t the way the system worked (Interviewee 44, p. 5).

What you need is a pretty clear indication from the [senior] minister that they’re not going to review every decision . . . If a senior person in the department wants to raise a question they have to listen. But they have to respect the integrity of the decision and make sure the parliamentary secretary is treated with a bit of respect and dignity. That doesn’t mean you always have to support them. But they shouldn’t be overridden in a cavalier fashion (Interviewee 51, p. 5).

The previous chapter examined the capacity of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries to assist senior ministers with their portfolio management work. It identified two opposite approaches to the division of responsibility for portfolio management. The first was termed the “expansive” approach. Senior ministers retained direct involvement in functional policy change and public relations throughout their portfolios. They confined their junior colleagues to routine administration and representation work. The second was termed the “limited” approach. Senior ministers used junior ministers and parliamentary as “filters”. They focused on their own direct functional responsibilities. They limited their involvement in the rest of their portfolios to monitoring and occasional “antagonistic” intervention.

Interviewees argued that the “expansive” approach failed to reduce the workloads of senior ministers. It also increased the potential for friction within teams of political executives. These problems are described in the following statement by a senior official. This statement also emphasises the problems which “expansive” approaches created for senior officials. These problems derived from the emergence of the second pattern of political-bureaucratic relations combined with the likelihood of tension and conflict within teams of political executives.

Both ministers would have to be across everything. Doesn’t make sense . . . Because of that you can then devote less time to the really important issues. You’ve then got issues of the delineation of responsibilities. And you say: “Where do minister A’s responsibilities stop and minister B’s start?” So it wouldn’t work. As far as the department’s concerned, it can send the same piece of paper addressed to two people. It can agree to talk to both ministers. But then you do have the real prospect of one minister wanting to go one way and another the other way. So there’s tremendous inefficiencies in it (Interviewee 01, pp. 9-10).
Interviewees also emphasised the benefits of the "limited" approach. This allowed senior ministers to focus on important functional areas within their portfolios. It also reduced the potential for tension and conflict within teams of political executives. Finally it allowed senior officials to interact exclusively with a single political executive and office.

Interviewees argued that the "indirect" contribution of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries to increased political control depended on two factors. The first was the approach of senior ministers to the division of responsibility for portfolio management. The second was the scope of the functional responsibilities given to junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. Interviewees further argued that the capacity of senior ministers to use their junior colleagues effectively depended on both their own career ambitions as well as their relationship with the relevant junior minister or parliamentary secretary. The importance of relationships within teams of political executives is reflected in the following statement by a junior minister.

The system depends on the wisdom of the portfolio minister in utilising the resources available to him or her to the best advantage. And part of those resources are that they have a colleague who has ministerial rank and who can be employed effectively in the management of the portfolio. I suppose it depends on their regard for their colleague and their judgement about what areas are necessary to be maintained in their own hands, if any (Interviewee 44, p. 3).

This section has examined the first two patterns of political-bureaucratic relations from the perspective of senior officials. Interviews revealed that senior officials preferred to interact with a single political executive and their office. They emphasised the problems associated with the second pattern of political-bureaucratic relations.

Senior officials identified two sets of benefits of reporting directly to junior ministers or parliamentary secretaries. These consisted of their capacity to develop detailed subject matter knowledge and their greater accessibility to officials. Interviews also revealed two potential disadvantages. The first was the potential for "antagonistic" senior ministerial intervention in the responsibilities of their junior colleagues. The second was the potential lack of influence of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries at both the portfolio and cabinet levels. Senior officials argued that these two potential disadvantages could both be overcome through the "supportive" involvement of senior ministers in the responsibilities of their junior colleagues. The maintenance of senior ministerial policy support emerged as a key role of the offices of junior ministers as well as parliamentary secretaries.
This section has finally examined the contribution of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries to enhanced political control over portfolios. It has found that junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries could exercise close political oversight over a narrow range of functional responsibilities. It has also found that they could relieve senior ministers of part of their portfolio management workloads. However, the extent of their contributions to increased political control depended on the approach of the relevant senior minister to the division of responsibility for portfolio management.

**Political-Bureaucratic Relations: Patterns 3 and 4**

The second section explores the third and fourth patterns of political-bureaucratic relations. It contrasts the perspectives of departmental executives and senior ministers from those of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries as well as their respective senior officials. It also examines the impact of the introduction of teams of political executives on processes of coordination and priority-setting within portfolios.

The third and fourth patterns of political-bureaucratic relations were both characterised by the presence of overlap at the bureaucratic level. Senior officials emphasised variation in the strength of policy development and program delivery overlaps within portfolios. They argued that some functions were characterised by strong linkages while others were more discrete and could operate separately from other parts of the relevant portfolio (Interviewee 15, p. 3, Interviewee 61, p. 9, Interviewee 62, p. 1). Senior officials also emphasised the importance of the portfolio budget process. This was an important source of bureaucratic level overlap for discrete functional areas. It was also a focal point for the coordination of policy development and program delivery overlaps. The following statement by a senior official highlights the central importance of the portfolio budget process.

> I've emphasised the problem of the budget and I'm sure it's come up in your other discussions because it goes to the heart of priority setting. But it doesn't matter whether you have a junior minister there or not. That process is always a horrible one inside the public service. It was bad before junior ministers and it's bad and difficult afterwards (Interviewee 58, p. 8).

Interviews with senior officials did not simply emphasise the importance of the budget process. They also emphasised its complexity. This was evident in two ways. The first was the distinction between decisions about the allocation of administrative resources and new policy proposals. Senior officials argued that administrative resources were usually
allocated at the bureaucratic level. However the development of new policy proposals involved interaction between political and bureaucratic executives. This first distinction is described by two senior officials.

There's a clear split between existing policy and new policy. And frankly existing policy by and large is all sorted out down here . . . But new policy is different altogether, I think (Interviewee 31, p. 4).

The main sort of ongoing budget for staff and operating costs was done departmentally, a departmental debate. And that was put up as part of a departmental bid, but allocated to us. Where you got into particular debate was what they called new policy proposals . . . And that's where you had a particular interaction with the portfolio ministers (Interviewee 49, p. 4).

The second source of complexity was the multi-layered nature of the budget process. The budget process involved priority-setting at three different levels. The first consisted of the divisional level. Senior officials described the process of establishing priorities between branches within a division (eg Interviewee 09, p. 4, Interviewee 60, p. 5). The second consisted of the departmental level. It was necessary to choose between the priorities of different divisions to produce a single set of departmental priorities. These first two levels of coordination are described by a senior official.

That's always a difficult process. You've got to make trade-offs within your own division often. Then you've got to make trade-offs with other areas of the department (Interviewee 09, p. 4).

The third level consisted of the portfolio level. It was also necessary to establish priorities between departments and agencies. This process related to new policy proposals rather than the allocation of administrative resources. Priority-setting at the portfolio level is described in the following statement by a senior agency official.

Whilst our guy might be in there arguing something for Customs, inevitably there's someone arguing for additional resources for CSIRO or for the Export Finance Corporation. And we don't get a look at that so we don't know how the capping of expenditure might be imposed on the portfolio (Interviewee 17, p. 4).

Interviewees emphasised the central role of secretaries and departmental executives in coordination and priority-setting at the portfolio level. This was most clearly evident in the portfolio budget process. This is reflected in the following statement by a senior official.

The formulation of new policy proposals is a bureaucratic exercise in most circumstances, in the vast majority of circumstances . . . So it had to go up through our executive (Interviewee 47, p. 5).
(a) The Perspectives of Departmental Executives and Senior Ministers. Interviews focused on the fourth pattern of political-bureaucratic relations. This was a product of the introduction of teams of political executives with their own functional responsibilities. It had the potential to emerge when overlapping issues at the bureaucratic level spilled across the boundaries of the responsibilities of individual political executives. The emergence of this pattern of political-bureaucratic relations had important implications for departmental executives. It had the potential to generate two sets of problems for departmental executives.

The first of these problems derived from disagreement at the political level. It consisted of the need to accommodate the different priorities and perspectives of different political executives with different functional responsibilities. This first problem was most clearly evident in the budget process. This was partly because it inevitably involved trade-offs between the functions of different political executives. It was also partly because of the extent to which junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries approached the budget process as "functional advocates" for their direct responsibilities. These problems were similar to those confronted by senior officials as a consequence of the emergence of the second pattern of political-bureaucratic relations. The following statements from senior officials highlight the difficulties experienced by departmental executives in attempting to accommodate the different priorities of different political executives in relation to issues which transcended the boundaries of their individual functional responsibilities. They also highlight the importance of the budget process.

You get portfolio targets and its all got to be balanced. And the difficulty is balancing within a portfolio when your senior minister has got certain parts of the portfolio and therefore says: "My priorities are better than your priorities. I want to be seen to be doing things in my area". So those trade-offs are extremely difficult (Interviewee 73, p. 8).

Schacht will fight his own battles within the portfolio . . . He'll go to the executive. He's got no compunction at all to go to the secretary as any minister, senior or junior has got the right to do, and say to the secretary that things from his interests aren't being looked at as well as they might, or indeed to say that this is a new initiative that I want looked at and I'm leaving it up to you, the secretary, to manage getting that looked at. Now that I think actually has placed greater tensions and greater pressures on executives within departments and certainly I've seen that happen in ours, where it can be a very difficult situation for a secretary to manage a department to two masters. And by and large there are two masters. I mean ultimately you can say that the senior minister would arbitrate but ideally, if you're not wanting to be going to the senior minister with problems of that type (Interviewee 71, p. 5).
The second potential problem was related to the first. It derived from disagreement at both the political and bureaucratic levels. The fourth pattern of political-bureaucratic relations was not just characterised by direct interaction between the departmental executive and two sets of political executives and offices. It was also characterised by direct interaction between different sets of political executives and offices and relevant senior officials. This meant there was the potential for the emergence of conflict within portfolios between rival alliances of political and bureaucratic executives. This was described by Theakston in his study of the work of British junior ministers (1987, p. 106). Interviewees argued that the emergence of this type of conflict increased the difficulty of the coordination and priority-setting at the portfolio level. This is reflected in the following statements by a ministerial adviser and a senior official.

Part of what we were doing was taking all the savings out of [the junior minister's] areas. So [the junior minister] would work very vigorously with his divisions to try and protect that (Interviewee 07, p. 7).

Divisions were quite good at doing that. Even with a junior minister you could get away with doing that because you could encourage a junior minister certainly to bid for a larger chunk of administrative funds. Ministers tend not to get terribly involved in the division of running costs and that sort of thing. And if you wanted to increase the resources applied to your program you could, with a bit of cunning, you could get ministers to take unilateral decisions on increasing resource levels or committing to some program which then had to be funded internally (Interviewee 61, p. 2).

Senior officials emphasised the problems for departmental executives which could result from the emergence of the fourth pattern of political-bureaucratic relations. However there was also some evidence of potential benefits. This is described in the following quotation from a ministerial adviser.

If the Treasury for instance wasn’t keen on something that the Assistant Treasurer was keen on, the rational thing for them to do would be to stitch it up with the Treasurer before the Assistant Treasurer had an opportunity to get involved with it. On the other hand if the Assistant Treasurer was keen on something that the Treasury was also keen on, and the Treasury was a bit worried about what the Treasurer’s point of view might be ... they’d enlist all sources of support. So its very much a case by case thing (Interviewee 55, p. 7).

The emergence of the fourth pattern of political-bureaucratic relations depended on two sets of factors. The first was the division of functional responsibilities within teams of political executives. The emergence of the fourth pattern of political-bureaucratic relations depended on the strength of bureaucratic level overlaps between the functions of different political executives. The second was the approach of the relevant senior minister to the
division of responsibility for coordination and priority-setting. The fourth chapter of this thesis distinguished "exclusive" approaches from more "inclusive" approaches. It argued that senior ministers differed in the extent to which they involved their junior colleagues in coordination and priority-setting. This variation was most clearly evident in the portfolio budget process.

Senior officials argued that the emergence of the fourth pattern of political-bureaucratic relations could be minimised by co-locating related functions within the responsibilities of a single political executive (usually the senior minister). This was possible because of the extent of variation in the strength of policy development and program delivery overlaps between different functions within portfolios. Interviews revealed considerable evidence of deliberate attempts to co-locate related functions under a single political executive. One senior minister explicitly argued that junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries had both been allocated ‘slices of the portfolio’ which had been ‘deliberately chosen’ because they ‘could be managed without much reference across other portfolio areas’ (Interviewee 46, p. 7). This approach to the allocation of functional responsibilities is described in the statement below.

In both cases they had relatively discrete portions of the total portfolio that could operate most of the time without affecting the remainder (Interviewee 46, p. 7).

There was also evidence from interviews with senior officials of deliberate efforts to give junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries responsibility for discrete functional groups within portfolio. The outcome of this approach is described in the following statements by senior officials who reported directly to junior ministers.

The Pacific is a part which takes a lot of time, which is important to our interests, and which forms a fairly discrete whole. Now its linkages to the rest of the portfolio aren’t as all-permeating as maybe the linkages for Asia or APEC. So in a sense the Pacific area was a fairly discrete group of countries that you could put in with a minister who’s doing aid work (Interviewee 60, p. 1).

Local government for example is almost a self-contained unit. Its a sphere of government. Its almost an industry in itself. Its the kind of thing that you could almost shove over there and say: “Go away and do what it is that you need to do” (Interviewee 29, p. 8).

The advantage of this approach to the allocation of functional responsibilities was that it maximised the extent to which policy development and program delivery overlaps could be coordinated within the ambit of a single political executive. This in turn reduced the need
for departmental executives to balance the priorities of two sets of political executives and offices and removed the potential for the emergence of conflict between rival combinations of political and bureaucratic executives. However it is important to note that there was still the potential for this pattern of conflict to emerge on a smaller scale within the functional responsibilities of a single political executive. The following statement by a ministerial adviser describes the potential for conflict between different senior officials and different advisers in the office of a single political executive. It further emphasises the potential complexity of political-bureaucratic relations at the portfolio level.

> There are always alliances, even just between parts of the department and particular advisers in a minister's office. Advisers and particular parts of departments, if they are competing for resources, will be in competition against other advisers and their part of the department. So that sort of thing happens all the time (Interviewee 55, p. 8).

Interviews revealed limited evidence of a different approach to the allocation of functional responsibilities. This approach is described in studies by Evans (1988, p. 67) and Aucoin and Bakvis (1993, p. 401). It consisted of giving closely related functions to different political executives. The advantage of this approach for departmental executives was its potential to lessen the tendency for political executives (especially junior ministers) to approach coordination and priority-setting as “functional advocates” for particular areas of portfolios (Interviewee 61, p. 1). However this approach brought with it disadvantages for senior officials. Most importantly it reduced the extent to which senior officials could interact directly with a single political executive and their office. It increased the potential for the emergence of the second pattern of political-bureaucratic relations. This problem is described by a senior official.

> I think you've got to have a split so that people know what they're doing. But as soon as you do that you're creating conflict and you're making policy coordination more difficult. But I don't know what else you can do (Interviewee 58, p. 5).

Interviews revealed limitations on the extent to which overlaps could be contained within the responsibilities of a single political executive. The budget process inevitably involved trade-offs between the functional responsibilities of different political executives. This was important source of demands on departmental executives for “political coordination” between different sets of political executives and offices. These demands are described in the following statement by a senior official.
The executive spent a bit of time trying to lubricate the relationship between ministers I suppose. We certainly went to some lengths to sort through the sensitivities of information flows and priorities . . . And we used to put a lot of thought into how we might resolve areas in which we knew there were going to be differences. Mostly these came back to budgetary issues, election policy issues. Anywhere where you had to prioritise programs within the portfolio, where you knew you were only going to get so much of the slice of the cake and you really had to trade-off one minister's priorities for another's. Those were the areas where there would be a difference, and we used to spend a lot of time trying to develop forums in which that could be done with a minimum of aggravation (Interviewee 61, p. 5).

The capacity of departmental executives to cope with the emergence of the fourth pattern of political-bureaucratic relations depended on two factors. The first was the approach of the relevant senior minister to the division of responsibility for coordination and priority-setting. Senior officials argued that departmental executives could not just overrule junior ministers (Interviewee 61, p. 3). The capacity of departmental executives to coordinate issues which spilled over the boundaries of the responsibilities of individual political executives depended on the support of a senior minister who could impose a single set of priorities in the event of disagreement within teams of political executives. Indeed the new arrangements generated least problems for departmental executives when senior ministers adopted dominated coordination and priority-setting across their portfolios to the exclusion of their junior colleagues. This is reflected in the following statement by a senior official.

I think that it certainly would make life easier on the big issues particularly, I come back to the budgetary thing, but the whole thing shifts around the budget and what you lose and gain in the budget cycles. And to the extent that you have a portfolio minister who's thinking right across the portfolio, that approach is easier (Interviewee 61, p. 7).

Two previous studies of the restructuring of the Commonwealth political executive also emphasised the importance of the formal coordinating powers retained by senior ministers (Aucoin and Bakvis 1993, p. 401, Keating 1993, p. 8). Departmental executives reported most difficulties in portfolios headed by co-equal senior ministers with joint responsibility for coordination and priority-setting. Interviewees described the additional difficulties of establishing priorities between the functions of different political executives in the absence of a single senior minister. These are described by two senior officials.

Budget time was always the most awkward time. There was always debate about what areas had to produce savings and what areas would get new policy up, that sort of thing. And because no one minister had taken an integral view across the portfolio, it was always that bit harder to get an answer (Interviewee 61, p. 2).
Each minister treated his own area as his own department. And the common areas of the department, the executive and the corporate support areas, just had to have split personalities for the duration (Interviewee 61, p. 6).

Certainly with Peter Cook, and the establishment of the trade ministry for the first time, it was the first time the executive had to deal with co-equal ministers who were determined to make equal demands. Whereas previously these sorts of concerns about resources would be adjudicated at the end of the day by a single portfolio minister. Now when you had two co-equal portfolio ministers the executive had to learn how to manage that and to help minimise disputes (Interviewee 56, p. 4).

Chapter five reported evidence that some junior ministers could exploit “environmental” factors such as party support to pursue their own budget priorities at the portfolio level in the face of senior ministerial opposition. Interviews with senior officials revealed that this could also generate problems for departmental executives in the development of portfolio priorities because they could not rely on the relevant senior minister to overrule their junior colleague. This is described by two senior officials.

Staples was very good at making public announcements of what he was developing and what he was going to be exploring in the budget process. Actually making announcements about those things. And then making it difficult for the executive and others to knock them out. So it was basically a strategy of ensuring that these sorts of proposals at least went forward to ERC and cabinet (Interviewee 73, p. 8).

If Peter Staples had two or three hobby horses that nobody thought would really get up, they wouldn’t tend to be knocked-off at an early stage. They would still go to cabinet. We’d still do all the work on them . . . And that was the negative side in a sense of having a junior minister. Because he would want to pursue his things and he wouldn’t quite see them in terms of the total priorities of the portfolio (Interviewee 58, p. 5).

The second important factor was the presence of a strong secretary and a united executive. This reduced the potential for the emergence of conflict between rival groups of political and bureaucratic executives. The importance of these two factors is described by a senior official. This official emphasised the paramount importance of the relationship between the senior minister and the relevant departmental secretary.

I suppose the key to it is the strength and confidence of the portfolio minister . . . and the quality of the relationship between him and the departmental secretary . . . It probably puts more demands on that relationship than ever before. That’s the single most important relationship in the whole damn thing. If the portfolio minister at the ministerial level is able to command his team, and get the outcomes he wants. And if you’ve got a departmental secretary who knows what he’s expected to produce from his team and he knows that he will be backed by the portfolio minister, you have less opportunity for going around the side. If that’s a good relationship with two strong confident people, then it works (Interviewee 61, pp. 9-10).
The importance of internal cohesion had implications for the allocation of responsibilities between members of departmental executives. It was easier for senior officials to interact exclusively with a single political executive and their office. Departments and divisions were restructured in order to minimise the extent to which they had to work with two sets of political executives and offices. However departmental executives were structured along opposite lines. One senior official stated that responsibilities within the departmental executive had been allocated so that none of these officials reported to just a single junior minister.

We if possible avoided any circumstance in which a very senior official... was seen to work exclusively for a junior minister. I never worked exclusively for any one of the junior ministers. I often had more than one junior minister to whom I reported, as well as reporting to the portfolio minister. Now clearly there are some dangers if you have very senior public servants reporting exclusively to junior ministers within a broader departmental framework. You can get begin to get factions developing within the department (Interviewee 02, p. 1).

Coordination and priority-setting within portfolios had important implications for the work of senior ministers. It constituted an important component of their portfolio management workload. The importance of this component of their workloads depended on the strength of policy development and program delivery linkages within portfolios. Some portfolios were essentially conglomerations of unrelated functions. The coordination and priority-setting workload of the relevant senior minister was confined to the portfolio budget process. Other portfolios consisted of functions characterised by more extensive policy development and program delivery overlaps. These portfolios placed greater demands on the relevant senior minister. These were particularly evident when overlaps spilled across the boundaries of the responsibilities of individual political executives. Furthermore this work could not usually be delegated to junior ministers or parliamentary secretaries.

Coordination and priority-setting also had the potential to emerge as an important source of friction within teams of political executives. This was one of the reasons for the allocation of discrete functional responsibilities to junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. This approach reduced the need for senior ministerial involvement in the functions of their junior colleagues. Senior ministers had formal authority over coordination and priority-setting across their respective portfolios. However the previous chapter argued that they were often constrained by the need to maintain the cooperation of their junior colleagues. There was also evidence that some junior ministers could exploit "environmental" factors such as party support to pursue their own separate priorities at the portfolio level. The
introduction of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries with their own functional responsibilities therefore had the potential to increase the difficulty of the coordination and priority-setting roles of senior ministers (Interviewee 58, p. 6).

(b) The Perspectives of Junior Ministers, Parliamentary Secretaries and their Senior Officials. Interviews also examined the third and fourth patterns of political-bureaucratic relations from the perspective of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. Bureaucratic level overlaps emerged as an important constraint on the capacity of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries to operate as the sole source of political direction over their functional responsibilities. This was because these overlapping issues almost always involved the senior minister. The involvement of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries was confined to "functional advocacy" at the portfolio level.

The impact of these constraints depended on the strength of bureaucratic level overlaps between the functions of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries and those of other political executives. Some of the functions allocated to junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries were characterised by weak policy development and program delivery linkages. Constraints on these junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries were evident only in the portfolio budget process. Other functions were characterised by much more extensive policy development and program delivery overlaps with the rest of the relevant portfolio. It was much more difficult for junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries to operate as the sole source of political direction over this type of function. The following statement by a senior official describes constraints on junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries deriving from bureaucratic level overlaps.

Those [overlapping] issues are always going back to the portfolio minister. Which means your degree of freedom, I suppose for independent action as a junior minister is relatively constrained in that particular case. Less so when you're the junior minister for higher education which is a much more discretely defined activity (Interviewee 62, p. 1).

There was greater potential for junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries to operate as the sole source of political direction over clearly defined responsibilities characterised by weak policy development and program delivery linkages. This was much more difficult when their functional responsibilities were characterised by "fuzzy" boundaries and strong policy development and program delivery linkages with those of the senior minister.
Interviews also examined the fourth pattern of political-bureaucratic relations from the perspective of senior officials who reported directly to junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. These senior officials also emphasised the increased difficulty of coordinating overlaps which spilled across the boundaries of the responsibilities of different political executives. This is reflected in the following statements by two senior officials.

When you get ministerial boundaries and ministerial office boundaries and divisional tribal boundaries around these sorts of things then clearly you make the policy coherence job harder. And it becomes more formal and less a natural and informal part of the culture of the organisation. You have to deliberately set up meetings across boundaries of divisions and across boundaries of minister’s offices. Or you basically set up formal procedures like steering committees or whatever (Interviewee 28, p. 12).

Some of the tensions I think that you can find in that situation is for some other areas who see themselves as reporting only to the senior minister, one of the things which can be actually very difficult is asking them to readjust their priorities when they don’t perceive what you’re doing as being a great priority to them. [They think] they’re being driven out of the senior minister’s portfolio (Interviewee 71, p. 4).

In common with departmental executives, these senior officials argued that many of these problems could be avoided through the co-location of overlapping functions under a single political executive (eg Interviewee 52, p. 3). The main difference between the two groups of senior officials related to overlapping issues which spilled over the boundaries of the responsibilities of individual political executives.

Departmental executives emphasised the benefits of a strong senior minister who could impose a single set of priorities across portfolios. They experienced least difficulties when senior ministers excluded their junior colleagues from coordination and priority-setting. They stressed the problems which derived from the need to accommodate the competing priorities of different political executives. Senior officials who reported directly to junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries argued that departmental executives attached little importance to their functions in comparison with those of the senior minister. This was an important potential disadvantage of reporting directly to a junior minister or parliamentary secretary rather than the senior minister. This problem was particularly evident in the portfolio budget process. It is described in the following statement by a senior official.

When it comes to any of the corporate business of the organisation, the priority is invariably given to the area which is the hot issue, which is invariably under the control of the senior minister (Interviewee 15, p. 6).
These senior officials therefore emphasised the importance of the involvement of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries in coordination and priority-setting. This was most important in the budget process. In the words of one senior official: ‘Its better for them to do the arguing than senior bureaucrats in other parts of the portfolio who don’t care much about what you do’ (Interviewee 29, p. 5). A second senior official stated: ‘we could have had a corporate compromise. I don’t think I would have won as much without going direct to the junior minister’ (Interviewee 28, pp. 7-8). These officials argued that they had two avenues to pursue their functional priorities. The first was within the normal bureaucratic processes. The second was directly with the junior minister or parliamentary secretary. For this reason they valued junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries with the capacity to operate as effective “functional advocates” within their portfolios. This is emphasised in the following statements by senior officials.

Peter Staples was a man who’d go into cabinet like a German tank commander and he’d sit there and never give way. He wouldn’t give way to Brian Howe either. Now you could argue that’s terrible in terms of priority setting and policy making and being logical. But if you’re looking at it from the point of view of the aged care constituency or disabled people or child care you’d think it was bloody wonderful. So there’s no right answer to what you’re asking me. What was important for that area of policy was having somebody who was like the panzer corps. Once he got an idea he’d never let it go. That was bloody unhelpful to Brian Howe at times. But in terms of the constituency as Peter saw it, critical (Interviewee 58, p. 6).

Individual agencies within the portfolio who don’t have to go through our secretary can throw up ideas directly to minister Johns and try to get some sympathetic hearing. And that’s certainly happened. And Brereton’s been prepared, if its not mega-bucks, to say: “Okay” (Interviewee 47, p. 6).

Senior officials who reported directly to junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries therefore attached considerable importance to their involvement in the budget process as well as coordination and priority-setting in relation of policy development and program delivery overlaps which crossed the boundaries of functional responsibilities. In contrast to departmental executives they emphasised problems which derived from the exclusion of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries from the budget process or their inability to operate as effective “functional advocates”. These problems are described by a senior official.

The whole department worked to Crean’s agenda and a couple of poor bloody divisions that had to work to Free were put out to dry. Miserable for everybody. Miserable for Free, miserable for Free’s staff and for the people in the divisions that worked to him (Interviewee 28, p. 12).
This section has examined the third and fourth patterns of political-bureaucratic relations. It has focused on the fourth pattern. It has contrasted the perspectives of departmental executives and senior ministers with those of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries as well as their respective senior officials.

It has argued that the introduction of teams of political executives had the potential to increase the difficulty of the coordination and priority-setting roles of departmental executives. The emergence of these problems depended on the allocation of functional responsibilities. They could be minimised by the co-location of related functions within the responsibilities of a single political executive. The impact of these problems depended on the approach of the relevant senior minister. Departmental executives experienced fewest problems when senior ministers dominated coordination and priority-setting throughout their portfolios to the exclusion of their junior colleagues. However senior ministers were often themselves constrained by the presence of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries.

Junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries emphasised the extent to which they were constrained by bureaucratic level overlaps. These reduced their capacity to function as the sole source of political direction over their functional responsibilities. Senior officials who reported to junior ministers or parliamentary secretaries acknowledged the difficulties of coordinating overlaps which crossed the responsibilities of individual political executives. However these senior officials were most concerned with their potential lack of influence over coordination and priority-setting within portfolios. This was particularly important in the budget process. They therefore valued junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries who could operate as effective “functional advocates” at the portfolio level. This enabled senior officials to pursue their functional priorities at both the bureaucratic and political levels of the relevant portfolio.

**Patronage and Careers**

The second part of this chapter examines the impact of the enlargement and restructuring of the Commonwealth political executive on patronage and careers. This was an important focus of previous studies of the work of sub-cabinet level political executives. These studies emphasised the contribution of these positions to the function of party management (Majeau 1983, pp. 3-5, Vanderhoff-Silburt 1983/84, pp. 6-7, Chenier 1985, pp. 399-

Interviews explored the impact of the enlargement and restructuring of the Commonwealth political executive on relationships between the prime minister, the parliamentary party and the political executive. The first point to emerge from interviews was that the expansion in the overall size of the political executive from 27 to an eventual 40 (through the addition of three further ministers and 10 parliamentary secretary positions) enhanced the capacity of the parliamentary party to manage internal competition for positions within the political executive.

Interviews with political executives emphasised the central role of the three factions in the recruitment of ministers (eg Interviewee 08, p. 4, Interviewee 30, p. 4, Interviewee 59, p. 7, Interviewee 70, p. 4). Most ministerial positions were divided between the factions. One and later two ministerial positions were held by non-aligned ministers (Interviewee 18, p. 8, Interviewee 53, p. 4). These positions were allocated in part on the basis of each faction’s representation in the parliamentary party. However the distribution of positions also reflected the existing composition of the political executive. Therefore some factions were nominally under-represented while others were proportionately over-represented.

Within each faction ministers competed with one another as well as backbench rivals for a limited number of ministerial positions. Interviewees emphasised the impact of shifts in the balance of power within each faction on ministerial careers (eg Interviewee 19, p. 5, Interviewee 39, p. 6, Interviewee 66, p. 7, Interviewee 64, p. 5). This competition could be particularly acute within declining factions (most notably the Centre-Left) as ministers competed with backbenchers for a reduced number of positions (see Interviewee 39, p. 6, Interviewee 64, p. 5). Interviewees argued that senior ministers had an advantage over junior ministers in this competition. Junior ministers were most vulnerable to backbench rivals. This vulnerability derived from a widely held perception that junior ministers who failed to gain cabinet selection should make way for their factional colleagues (Interviewee 10, p. 3, Interviewee 24, p. 2, Interviewee 39, p. 6).

Political executives argued that the 1987 expansion in the size of the ministry was intended to moderate factional competition for ministerial positions. It also expanded the capacity
of the factions to reward their respective supporters. In the words of one senior minister: ‘everybody wanted their turn in the tart shop’ (Interviewee 43, p. 9, see also Interviewee 18, p. 8). Parliamentary secretary positions were likewise described as an inexpensive way of accommodating backbench career pressures. These positions were also allocated between the three factions. One parliamentary secretary position was also reserved for non-aligned backbenchers (Interviewee 53, p. 4). One junior minister stated that these positions were ‘largely positions of patronage’ (Interviewee 66, p. 7). This was a sentiment shared by many other respondents (eg Interviewee 37, p. 3, Interviewee 42, p. 1, Interviewee 45, p. 2, Interviewee 54, p. 6, Interviewee 67, p. 4).

The contribution of junior ministerial and parliamentary secretary positions to the capacity of the parliamentary party to accommodate backbench career pressures is emphasised in the following statement by a ministerial adviser.

It’s partly that there are so many MPs, you’ve got to find something useful for them to do, and useful for them to aspire to, and therefore maintain some discipline in their behaviour. Otherwise you’ve got no control over them . . . Junior ministries are like that. And parliamentary secretary jobs are like that I suppose. It’s a hold you’ve got over backbenchers . . . So it’s a way of imposing some discipline on their behaviour. And in many ways for a government, and I’m thinking about this in purely a political sense, I think that’s one of the most useful functions those jobs play. It’s not actually what they do, it’s the way they provide an incentive structure that affects behaviour amongst the backbench and the outer ministry (Interviewee 55, pp. 10-11).

The importance of this function was also reflected in the emergence of a rule that junior ministers could only serve for a maximum of two terms. Junior ministers returned to the backbench if they had not become senior ministers after two terms of office (Interviewee 04, p. 7, Interviewee 08, p. 4, Interviewee 10, p. 3, Interviewee 35, p. 5, Interviewee 38, p. 8, Interviewee 66, p. 7). This rule was intended to increase circulation between the backbench and the political executive. It is described by a ministerial adviser.

The tradition was that you would have two terms. And if some way through the second term it was clear that you weren’t going to become a cabinet minister, then you’d had your turn. It was somebody else’s turn. And everybody knew that (Interviewee 55, p. 4).

A second important point to emerge from interviews was the significance of the changes for the relationship between prime ministers and the parliamentary party. This was most clearly evident in relation to the composition of the political executive. This is a key issue because of the inability of Labor Party prime ministers to chose their ministerial colleagues (see Weller 1985a, p. 74). The only partial exception was in 1993 when the Right and
Centre-Left factions (although not the Left faction) allowed the prime minister to select candidates to fill their respective allocations of ministerial positions (Interviewee 10, p. 3, Interviewee 24, p. 1, Interviewee 37, p. 2, Interviewee 45, p. 4, Interviewee 65, p. 5, Interviewee 67, p. 3, Interviewee 70, p. 4). Prime ministers had previously been required to negotiate with the factions over the composition of the ministry. Interviews revealed evidence that prime ministers had sought to influence factional choices to alter the balance of ministry to reflect both geographic and gender considerations. There was also evidence of prime ministerial attempts to ensure the inclusion and exclusion of particular individuals (Interviewee 05, p. 6, Interviewee 08, p. 4, Interviewee 10, p. 3, Interviewee 12, p. 4, Interviewee 24, p. 1, Interviewee 39, p. 6). Interviews revealed that the enlargement of the ministry was partly intended to enhance the capacity of the factions to accommodate prime ministerial demands.

Interviewees distinguished between ministerial and parliamentary secretary positions. The latter were also divided between the three factions (as well as non-aligned backbenchers). However parliamentary secretaries were chosen directly by the prime minister. Some parliamentary secretaries were chosen with factional support. Others were chosen on the basis of personal loyalty to the prime minister and in the face of factional opposition. This was evident under both the Hawke and Keating governments (see Interviewee 24, p. 2, Interviewee 33, p. 9, Interviewee 37, p. 4, Interviewee 54, p. 6). Political executives emphasised the contribution of parliamentary secretary positions to the personal patronage of prime ministers. The expansion of these positions was commonly explained in terms of increasing the capacity of prime ministers to reward their supporters (eg Interviewee 38, p. 8, Interviewee 45, p. 2, Interviewee 54, p. 1, Interviewee 67, p. 4).

Political executives argued that these positions could serve as useful training grounds for prospective ministers. However the usefulness of these positions depended on their work they performed. Some parliamentary secretaries were confined to routine administrative and parliamentary duties. Junior ministerial positions were contrasted with parliamentary secretary positions. These were not regarded as training positions (Interviewee 18, p. 8, Interviewee 35, p. 5, Interviewee 38, p. 8, Interviewee 68, p. 7, Interviewee 65, p. 5). It was sometimes argued that parliamentary secretary positions could provide an advantage in future competition for ministerial positions (Interviewee 20, p. 4, Interviewee 12, pp. 3-4). One parliamentary secretary argued that this was significant because of increased competition for prominent positions on party and parliamentary committees (Interviewee
53, pp. 3-4). It was also argued that these positions gave the factions an opportunity to assess the capacity of prospective ministers (Interviewee 37, p. 4). However they could also be a disadvantage to incumbents. These disadvantages were most clearly evident in relation to parliamentary secretaries chosen by the prime minister in the face of factional opposition (Interviewee 24, p. 2, Interviewee 37, p. 4). A ministerial adviser argued that parliamentary secretaries could suffer from having to promote unpopular policies to their backbench colleagues without any gaining any of the benefits of ministerial rank such as 'money or power' (Interviewee 33, p. 9).

The third key point to emerge from interviews was the significance of the introduction of teams of political executives at the head of portfolios for relationships between prime ministers and the political executive. Prime ministers continued to divide their ministry into senior and junior ministers. This division did not necessarily reflect the party status of political executives. Thus interviewees argued that there were junior ministers with higher factional status than senior ministers. There were also parliamentary secretaries with higher factional status than their ministerial counterparts (Interviewee 37, p. 3, Interviewee 65, p. 4, Interviewee 57, pp. 4-5). Prime ministers also divided senior and junior ministers along with parliamentary secretaries into teams at the head of the portfolio. Interviewees argued that the introduction of teams of political executives allowed prime ministers to marginalise ministers whom they distrusted by appointing them as junior ministers alongside powerful senior colleagues (Interviewee 05, pp. 4, 6, Interviewee 28, pp. 1-2). This was particularly important during the period between 1987 and 1993 when prime ministers were constrained in their capacity to influence the ministerial choices of different factions. This is described by a junior minister.

When I finally got in he gave me the two most senior ministers to have as senior ministers . . . I couldn’t have been more distrusted and more unwelcome (Interviewee 05, p. 6).

Interviewees also argued that the changes increased the flexibility of the prime minister (and relevant senior ministers) in the allocation of the functions of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. The capacity of prime ministers and senior ministers to adjust the functions of individual junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries was particularly important because of the role of these positions in accommodating backbench career pressures. This is reflected in the following statements by senior officials.
We’ve been very lucky in this portfolio. But I know talking to my colleagues that they’ve had to support junior ministers who simply wouldn’t have lasted the distance if they had been much more exposed as a full minister (Interviewee 48, p. 6).

There are obviously some junior ministers who are highly capable and on the move and in the fullness of time would get into the cabinet if they stayed around long enough. There are others who are there because they’ve paid their dues or perhaps just to balance state, gender and factional interests in the ministry (Interviewee 52, p. 1).

Interviewees therefore argued that the enlargement and restructuring of the Commonwealth political executive had important implications for relationships between the prime minister, the parliamentary party and the political executive. The changes enhanced the capacity of the parliamentary party to accommodate backbench factional and individual competition for positions within the political executive. There was also evidence that they increased the capacity of prime ministers to influence the composition of the political executive. Finally the changes increased the flexibility of both prime ministers and senior ministers in the allocation of functional responsibilities to junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries.

Conclusion

This chapter has examined the wider implications of the enlargement and restructuring of the Commonwealth political executive. It argued that the introduction of teams of political executives increased the complexity of political-bureaucratic relations at the portfolio level. Different issues involved different patterns of interaction between different combinations of political and bureaucratic executives. It set out a new framework for conceptualising these different patterns of interaction. It identified four patterns of political-bureaucratic relations.

It explored the first two patterns of political-bureaucratic relations. It found that senior officials could benefit from closer interaction with junior ministers or parliamentary secretaries. There were two sets of costs. The first consisted of increased demands on senior officials for “political coordination”. These derived from the emergence of direct links between senior officials and two sets of political executives and offices. The second consisted of the potential lack of influence of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries at the portfolio and cabinet levels. It argued that the extent of these costs depended on three factors: the clarity of the division of functional responsibilities, the approach of the
relevant senior minister to the division of responsibility for portfolio management, and the quality of relationships between political executives and their offices.

It also examined the impact of the introduction of teams of political executives on political control over portfolios. It argued that junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries had the capacity to exercise closer political oversight over a narrower range of functional responsibilities. They could also assist senior ministers by relieving them of a substantial amount of their portfolio management work. It argued that their contribution to increased political control depended on three sets of factors: the clarity of the division of functional responsibilities, the scope of their portfolio management workloads, and the approach of the relevant senior minister to the division of responsibility for portfolio management.

It also examined the relationship between the introduction of teams of political executives and processes of coordination and priority-setting within portfolios. It found that it was potentially more difficult to coordinate bureaucratic level overlaps which spilled over the boundaries of the responsibilities of different political executives. It also found that these difficulties could be minimised by co-locating related functions within the responsibilities of individual political executives. It contrasted the perceptions of departmental executives with those of senior officials who reported to junior ministers or parliamentary secretaries. Departmental executives experienced fewest problems when senior ministers dominated coordination and priority-setting throughout their portfolios to the exclusion of their junior colleagues. Senior officials who reported to junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries were most concerned with their inability to influence departmental executives and senior ministers. These officials favoured the involvement of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries in coordination and priority-setting within portfolios because of their capacity to operate as "functional advocates" at the portfolio level.

Coordination and priority-setting also had important implications for different categories of political executives. It imposed additional workload demands on senior ministers. There was also evidence that the introduction of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries increased the difficulty of the coordinating and priority-setting roles of senior ministers. Senior ministers could be constrained by the need to retain the cooperation of their junior colleagues. Processes of coordination and priority-setting also had important implications for junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. They acted as an important constraint
on their functional autonomy. They were limited to “functional advocacy” at the portfolio level.

It finally argued that the enlargement and restructuring of the Commonwealth political executive had important implications for patronage and the careers of political executives. It increased the capacity of the parliamentary party to manage competition for positions in the political executive. It enhanced the capacity of prime ministers to influence the overall composition of the political executive and reward their supporters. Finally it gave prime ministers and senior ministers greater flexibility to adjust the functional responsibilities of individual junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries.
Chapter 7

Junior Ministers, Parliamentary Secretaries and the Commonwealth Executive Branch

Introduction

This thesis has two objectives. The first has been to examine the work of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. The second has been to explore the wider implications of the enlargement and restructuring of the Commonwealth political executive. This chapter sets out the conclusions of this thesis. It is divided into four parts.

The first part sets out a new framework for conceptualising the work of different categories of political executives. It also sets out a new framework for conceptualising the division of responsibility for portfolio management and cabinet representation between cabinet ministers and sub-cabinet level political executives.

The second part shows how these two frameworks have been used to examine the work of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. It focuses on the division of responsibility for portfolio management and cabinet representation between senior ministers and their junior colleagues. It also briefly examines the division of responsibility for parliamentary and party work.

The third part examines different approaches to the division of responsibility for portfolio management and cabinet representation work from the perspectives of senior ministers as well as junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. It also examines the management of the division of responsibility.

The fourth part sets out the conclusions of the thesis concerning the wider implications of the enlargement and restructuring of the Commonwealth political executive. It focuses on
the implications of the changes for political-bureaucratic relations at the portfolio level as well as their implications for patronage and careers.

The Work of Political Executives and the Division of Responsibility Between Cabinet Ministers and Sub-cabinet Level Political Executives

The Work of Political Executives

This thesis has set out a new framework for conceptualising the work of political executives. This new framework is depicted in Table 7.1. In common with previous studies the work of political executives has been divided into six components: interaction with officials, cabinet work, parliamentary work, party work, interaction with interest groups and clients, and public relations work (Headey 1974a, p. 39, Weller and Grattan 1981, p. 18, Rose 1987, pp. 80-81, Theakston 1987).

The grouping of these six components differs from previous studies. Most importantly interaction with officials, interaction with interest groups and clients and public relations work are grouped together under the new heading of portfolio management. These three components have previously been examined separately (Headey 1974a, p. 39, Weller and Grattan 1981, p. 18, Rose 1987, pp. 80-81, Theakston 1987).

There are also differences in the way in which the six components have been divided into sub-components and elements. This is most clearly evident in relation to interaction with officials. Portfolios are divided into departments and agencies. Departments are further disaggregated into their constituent divisions. This thesis has argued that issues involving interaction between political executives and senior officials can be divided into two categories. The first category consists of functional issues unique to individual divisions or agencies. The second category consists of overlapping issues which spill across the boundaries of individual divisions or agencies. These overlapping issues necessitate coordination and priority-setting. Table 7.1 shows that both of these categories of issues can be divided into two further categories. Functional issues can involve either routine administration or policy change. The need for coordination and priority-setting can result
from policy development or program delivery overlaps. Coordination and priority-setting is also necessary in the portfolio budget process. This is important even in the absence of policy development or program delivery overlaps.

Table 7.1

The Work of Political Executives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. Portfolio Management</th>
<th>Interaction with Senior Officials</th>
<th>Functional Issues</th>
<th>Routine Administration</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>Overlapping Issues</td>
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<td>Policy Change</td>
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<td>Interaction with Interest Groups &amp; Clients</td>
<td>Routine Representation</td>
<td>Policy Negotiations</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Regional, Local &amp; Specialist Media</td>
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<td>National Media &amp; Canberra Press Gallery</td>
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<td>Public Relations</td>
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<td>General Cabinet Process</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Budget/ERC Process</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Cabinet Participation</td>
<td>Cabinet Representation</td>
<td>Cabinet Coordination &amp; Priority-Setting</td>
<td>General Cabinet Process</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Budget/ERC Process</td>
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<td>3. Parliamentary Work</td>
<td>General Duty</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Government Bills</td>
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<td>Debates</td>
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<td>Question Time</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Party Interaction</td>
<td>Routine Portfolio Representation</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Party Politics &amp; Individual Status</td>
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</table>

The distinctions between functional and overlapping issues and between different sources of overlap were implicit in studies of Australian departmental amalgamations (eg Craswell and Davis 1993, 1994, Hamilton 1993). Previous studies of the work of both cabinet ministers and sub-cabinet level political executives have noted that departments can be disaggregated into their constituent divisions (Rose 1987, pp. 232-239, Theakston 1987, p. 110). However these studies simply divided ‘departmental work’ into either policy-

The two remaining components of portfolio management have been divided into distinct sub-components using approaches adopted by previous studies of the work of political executives. Following the approach of Theakston (1987, pp. 138-140) interaction with interest groups and clients is divided into routine representation and policy negotiations. Based on the approach of Weller and Grattan (1981, pp. 155-156) public relations work is divided into interaction with regional, local and specialist media and interaction with the national media and the Canberra press gallery.

The second heading consists of cabinet participation. Following the approach adopted by Headey (1974a, p. 49) this is divided into two sub-components: cabinet representation and cabinet coordination and priority-setting. This thesis also distinguishes between two different aspects of the cabinet system. The first consists of the general cabinet process. The second consists of the budget/ERC process. This distinction is particularly important in relation to the work of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. Previous studies of the work of sub-cabinet level political executives have simply referred to participation in the cabinet system (either full cabinet or cabinet committees) (Theakston 1987, pp. 113-125).

The third heading consists of parliamentary work. This thesis has adopted the approach used by Weller and Grattan (1981, pp. 137-143) in their study of Australian government ministers. Parliamentary work has been divided into four sub-components: general duty, government bills, debates, and question time. This thesis has focused on two of these sub-components: oversight of government bills and question time.

The fourth heading consists of party interaction. This thesis has argued that this can be divided into two sub-components. The first consists of routine portfolio representation. This includes interaction with individual backbenchers and caucus committees as well as participation in full caucus meetings. The second consists of participation in wider party politics and the cultivation of individual party status. Previous studies of the work of sub-cabinet level political executives devoted little attention to this component of their work. It was usually examined as an extension of their parliamentary work (eg Majeau 1983, p. 6, Vanderhoff-Silburt 1983/84, pp. 7-8, Theakston 1987, pp. 131-135).
The Division of Responsibility Between Cabinet Ministers and Sub-cabinet Level Political Executives.

The thesis has set out new frameworks for conceptualising the division of responsibility between cabinet ministers and sub-cabinet level political executives for both portfolio management and cabinet representation.

(i) The Division of Responsibility for Portfolio Management. This thesis has argued that the introduction of teams of political executives necessitated a new division of responsibility for portfolio management. This is depicted in Table 7.2. It has argued that the division of responsibility for portfolio management can be conceptualised in terms of overlapping horizontal and vertical dimensions.

The horizontal dimension derives from the functional responsibilities allocated to junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. Table 7.2 shows that the responsibilities of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries can be conceptualised in terms of two dimensions. The first consists of the characteristics of corresponding bureaucratic units. The second consists of the characteristics of the workloads generated by these bureaucratic units.

This thesis has identified three aspects of variation in the bureaucratic units corresponding to the responsibilities of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. The first consists of the “clarity” or “fuzziness” of the division of responsibility. The second consists of the size of bureaucratic units. The third consists of the strength of bureaucratic level overlaps between their units and the rest of the relevant portfolio. Bureaucratic overlap can derive from policy development and program delivery linkages. It also derives from the portfolio budget process.

This thesis has also identified three aspects of variation in the characteristics of the workloads generated by bureaucratic units corresponding to the responsibilities of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. The first consists of the size of their workloads. The second consists of the composition of their workloads (especially the balance between routine administration and functional policy change). The third consists of the impact of coordination and priority-setting. This refers to the balance between functional issues and overlapping issues. The impact of coordination and priority-setting varies according to the strength of bureaucratic level overlaps with other parts of the relevant portfolio.
### Table 7.2

#### The Division of Responsibility for Portfolio Management

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. Horizontal Dimension</th>
<th>Functions of Junior Ministers &amp; Parliamentary Secretaries</th>
<th>Characteristics of Bureaucratic Units</th>
<th>Clarity of the Division of Responsibility</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>Size of Bureaucratic Units</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Extent of Bureaucratic Overlap</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Characteristics of Workload</td>
<td>Size of Workload</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Composition of Workload</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Impact of Coordination &amp; Priority-Setting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Vertical Dimension</td>
<td>Involvement of Senior Minister in Functions of Junior Ministers &amp; Parliamentary Secretaries</td>
<td>&quot;Limited&quot; Approach</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;Expansive&quot; Approach</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Involvement of Junior Ministers &amp; Parliamentary Secretaries in Coordination &amp; Priority-Setting at the Portfolio level</td>
<td>&quot;Exclusive&quot; Approach</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>&quot;Inclusive&quot; Approach</td>
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</table>

Previous studies of the work of sub-cabinet level political executives focused on variation in the extent to which they were given their own functional responsibilities (Randle 1983, p. 13, Vanderhoff-Silburt 1983/84, p. 8). Theakston (1987, p. 87) simply noted variation in the importance of the jobs of British junior ministers. Chenier (1985, p. 411) argued that bureaucratic units corresponding to the responsibilities of Canadian minister of state to assist were characterised by varying degrees ‘of independence or autonomy’. However this study did not distinguish between different sources of overlap.

The vertical dimension derives from the authority of senior ministers over coordination and priority-setting as well as their capacity to intervene in portfolio management within
the functional responsibilities of both junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. Table 7.2 indicates that the vertical dimension can be divided into two further dimensions. The first consists of the involvement of senior ministers in portfolio management within the responsibilities of their junior colleagues. The second consists of the involvement of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries in coordination and priority-setting at the portfolio level.

This thesis has stressed the potential for variation in the involvement of senior ministers in portfolio management within the responsibilities of their junior colleagues. It has argued that the approaches of senior ministers can be located along a continuum between two extremes. At one extreme they can adopt "limited" approaches and eschew involvement in the functions of their junior colleagues. At the other extreme they can adopt "expansive" approaches and remain extensively involved in portfolio management within the functions of their junior colleagues. This thesis has also argued that it is important to distinguish between "antagonistic" and "supportive" senior ministerial involvement. It was possible for senior ministers to become involved in the responsibilities of their junior colleagues without overruling them or taking over responsibility for public relations work.

This thesis has also stressed the potential for variation in the role of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries in coordination and priority-setting. This thesis has argued that senior ministerial approaches can be located along a continuum between two extremes. At one extreme they can adopt "exclusive" approaches and exclude their junior colleagues from coordination and priority-setting at the portfolio level. At the other extreme they can adopt "inclusive" approaches and allow both junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries extensive involvement in coordination and priority-setting.

Previous studies of the work of sub-cabinet level political executives invariably adopted a one dimensional approach to the division of responsibility for departmental work. They simply focused on variation in the in the autonomy of sub-cabinet level political executives from the relevant senior minister (eg Vanderhoff-Silburt 1983/84, p. 8, Theakston 1987, p. 93). This approach was also evident in the small literature on the work of Australian junior ministers (Weller 1987, p. 22, Halligan, Beckett and Earnshaw 1992, p. 16, Gruen and Grattan 1993, p. 45, Keating 1993, p. 8, Sinclair 1996, p. 35). These studies did not distinguish between different forms of involvement by cabinet ministers in the functions of
their junior colleagues. They did not examine variation in the involvement of sub-cabinet level political executives in coordination and priority-setting within portfolios.

(ii) The Division of Responsibility for Cabinet Representation. This thesis has also argued that the introduction of teams of political executives necessitated a new division of responsibility for cabinet representation. This is depicted in Table 7.3. This thesis has argued that the division of responsibility for cabinet representation can also be conceptualised in terms of overlapping horizontal and vertical dimensions.

Table 7.3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Division of Responsibility for Cabinet Representation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Horizontal Dimension</td>
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<td>2. Vertical Dimension</td>
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The horizontal dimension derives from the capacity of junior ministers to bring forward general cabinet business from within their direct responsibilities. Table 7.3 shows that the cabinet representation workloads of junior ministers can be conceptualised in terms of two dimensions. The first consists of the cabinet visibility of their responsibilities. It is also possible to distinguish between general cabinet and budget/ERC visibility. The second consists of the cabinet authority which derives from their functions.
Previous studies of sub-cabinet level political executives have devoted little attention to the division of responsibility for cabinet representation between cabinet ministers and sub-cabinet level political executives. They focused on variation in the cabinet workloads of entire departments (Theakston 1987, p. 120). They did not examine variation in the cabinet workloads of the functions of sub-cabinet level political executives. Studies of the work of sub-cabinet level political executives have identified two dimensions of variation in the cabinet workloads of entire departments. The first consists of the overall volume of cabinet business they generated. The second consists of their cabinet authority (Theakston 1987, pp. 120-121). However these studies did not distinguish between the general cabinet and budget processes.

The vertical dimension derives from the authority of senior ministers over the contents of cabinet business from their respective portfolios as well as the dependence of many junior ministers on the support of the relevant senior minister. Table 7.3 shows that the vertical dimension can itself be divided into two further dimensions. The first consists of the involvement of senior ministers in the general cabinet business of their junior colleagues. The second consists of the involvement of junior ministers in the budget/ERC process.

This thesis has stressed the potential for variation in the involvement of senior ministers in the general cabinet business of their junior colleagues. The approaches of senior ministers can be located along a continuum between two extremes. At one extreme they can adopt “limited” approaches and eschew involvement in general cabinet business from within the functions of junior ministers. At the other extreme they can adopt “expansive” approaches and dominate the presentation of general cabinet business from throughout their portfolios. This thesis has once again stressed the need to distinguish “agonistic” and “supportive” senior ministerial involvement in the general cabinet business of their junior colleagues. This distinction is important because of the extent to which junior ministers depended on the support of senior ministers in the cabinet system.

This thesis has also stressed the potential for variation in the role of junior ministers in the budget/ERC process. Senior ministerial approaches can be located along a continuum between two extremes. At one extreme senior ministers can adopt “exclusive” approaches and exclude their junior colleagues from involvement in the budget/ERC process. At the other extreme they can adopt “inclusive” approaches and allow their junior colleagues to represent their own functional responsibilities in the budget/ERC process.
Previous studies of the cabinet work of sub-cabinet level political executives focused on variation in their access to cabinet information. They also examined variation in the extent to which they were allowed to represent the cabinet minister on cabinet committees (Weller 1980, p. 611, Theakston 1987, p. 120).

The Work of Junior Ministers and Parliamentary Secretaries

This thesis has used the two frameworks described in the first part of this chapter to examine the work of Commonwealth junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. It has focused on their portfolio management and cabinet representation work. It has examined similarities and differences in the division of responsibility between senior ministers and their junior colleagues for these two components of the work of political executives.

Portfolio Management

(a) Functions of Junior Ministers and Parliamentary Secretaries. This thesis has found that many junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries were allocated direct responsibility for a large number of functions corresponding with a wide range of different bureaucratic units. It has argued that there was considerable variation in the “clarity” or “fuzziness” of the functions of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. A few junior ministers were allocated responsibility for entire “sub-cabinet level” portfolios. Some of the functions allocated to other junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries corresponded to entire divisions or agencies within cabinet portfolios. However many junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries shared responsibility for particular divisions or agencies with another political executive (usually the senior minister). They were only responsible for part of the workload of relevant bureaucratic units. This “fuzziness” meant that there was little point in comparing the size of bureaucratic units corresponding with the functions of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries.

The functions allocated to junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries were characterised by substantial variation in the strength of bureaucratic level overlaps with other parts of the relevant portfolio. The functions allocated to junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries could be divided into three categories. The first consisted of separate “sub-cabinet level”
portfolios with direct access to the budget/ERC process. The second consisted of discrete functions whose only link to the rest of the relevant portfolio was the budget process. The third consisted of functions which were also characterised by strong policy development and program delivery linkages.

There was variation in the impact of coordination and priority-setting on the functions of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. The impact of coordination and priority-setting on some functions was confined to the portfolio budget process. Other functions were also affected by demands for the coordination of policy development and program delivery overlaps. Coordination and priority-setting had the least impact on separate "sub-cabinet level" portfolios which had direct access to the budget/ERC process.

There was also variation in the overall size and composition of the functional workloads of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. This variation was most evident in relation to the workloads of junior ministers. There was a changing hierarchy of junior ministerial positions. This hierarchy was based on the overall size and composition of the workload of different positions. There was less evidence of a hierarchy of parliamentary secretaries positions. These positions were uniformly characterised by substantial amounts of routine administrative and representational work. The workloads of junior ministers were usually larger than those of parliamentary secretaries. They were also characterised by greater policy change and more opportunities for national public relations work. However there was overlap between the two categories of political executives. Junior ministers in some portfolios had smaller workloads than parliamentary secretaries in other portfolios and were similarly confined to routine administrative and representational work.

(b) The Functional Autonomy of Junior Ministers and Parliamentary Secretaries. Sinclair argued that Australian junior ministers experienced different levels of functional autonomy: 'some junior ministers enjoyed almost complete autonomy within their designated fields of responsibility but others were under much tighter control' (1996, p. 35). This thesis has emphasised the extent of variation in the functional autonomy of both junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. Some junior ministers had almost complete functional autonomy (particularly those with "sub-cabinet level" portfolios). The relevant senior ministers adopted "limited" approaches to the division of responsibility and eschewed direct involvement in portfolio management within the functions of their junior colleagues. Other junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries experienced extensive
senior ministerial involvement in policy change and national public relations within their direct functional responsibilities. This was the result of “expansive” senior ministerial approaches. Their portfolio management workloads consisted of routine administration and representation as well as some lesser public relations work. Senior ministers adopted widely varying approaches to the division of responsibility for portfolio management.

Most senior ministers adopted approaches between these two extremes. Junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries usually had extensive autonomy over all aspects of portfolio management within their direct responsibilities. However this functional autonomy was not absolute. They experienced monitoring by the relevant senior minister and were expected to involve the senior minister in important issues within their responsibilities. Senior ministers could either support or overrule their junior colleagues. This emphasises the need to distinguish “supportive” and “antagonistic” senior ministerial involvement in the responsibilities of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries.

Junior ministers usually had greater functional autonomy than parliamentary secretaries. Parliamentary secretaries were monitored more closely and were more likely to experience intervention in their responsibilities. Parliamentary secretaries also had more involvement in routine administration and representation throughout their respective portfolios than junior ministers. However again there was overlap between the two categories of political executives. Junior ministers in some portfolios had less functional autonomy than parliamentary secretaries in other portfolios.

(c) Role of Junior Ministers and Parliamentary Secretaries in Coordination and Priority-Setting at the Portfolio Level. This thesis has argued that there was substantial variation in the impact of coordination and priority-setting within portfolios on the functions of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. The impact of coordination and priority-setting was most clearly evident in the portfolio budget process. The only exception related to “sub-cabinet level” portfolios with direct access to the budget/ERC process.

Senior ministers dominated the determination of budget priorities across their portfolios. However there was substantial variation in the involvement of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. Some senior ministers adopted “expansive” approaches and dominated the budget process to the exclusion of their junior colleagues. However many
other senior ministers adopted more “inclusive” approaches. They allowed their junior colleagues to determine budget priorities within their functional responsibilities. They also involved them in negotiations over the allocation of portfolio resources. The role of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries in this process was termed “functional advocacy” at the portfolio level. This emerged as one of the most important elements of the work of both junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. There was limited evidence that a few senior ministers gave their junior colleagues an equal role in determining budget priorities throughout their portfolios.

Junior ministers usually had a more extensive role in the portfolio budget process than parliamentary secretaries. Parliamentary secretaries were often excluded from the portfolio budget process. Most junior ministers were able to determine budget priorities within their functional responsibilities and participate in negotiations over the allocation of portfolio resources. Again there was overlap between the two categories of political executives. Junior ministers in some portfolios were excluded from the portfolio budget process. A few parliamentary secretaries participated extensively in the budget process within their respective portfolios.

**Cabinet Representation**

Only five junior ministers were appointed to cabinet. Most junior ministers were non-cabinet ministers (although non-cabinet junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries were appointed to cabinet committees). They only attended entire cabinet meetings when they were acting in the position of the senior minister. Their main cabinet work was therefore confined to cabinet representation.

(a) **The Functions of Junior Ministers.** This thesis has found substantial variation in the cabinet visibility of the functions of junior ministers. There was also variation in the relative importance of the general cabinet and budget/ERC processes. The cabinet representation work of junior ministers with large budgets overwhelmingly occurred in the context of the budget/ERC process. They had less involvement in the general cabinet process. No junior ministerial positions were characterised by special cabinet authority during the period under review.
(b) General Cabinet Autonomy of Junior Ministers. The Australian literature devoted little attention to the extent of senior ministerial involvement in the general cabinet business of their junior colleagues. Halligan, Beckett and Earnshaw (1992, p. 16) simply noted that some junior ministers had ‘been excluded from the deliberations of cabinet’. This thesis argues that there was substantial variation in the approaches of senior ministers to the general cabinet business of their junior colleagues. Junior ministers were almost invariably co-opted to cabinet for their own general cabinet business. A few were confined to a subordinate role by senior ministers who adopted “expansive” approaches to the division of responsibility for general cabinet business. However most junior ministers played a leading role in presenting their own general cabinet business. The involvement of senior ministers varied substantially. Some eschewed involvement in the general cabinet submissions of their junior colleagues. Other senior ministers were more likely to become directly involved in their junior colleagues’ submissions. This involvement could take two different forms: “supportive” or “antagonistic”.

Interviewees distinguished between general cabinet business emanating from within the functional responsibilities of junior ministers and relevant submissions from other portfolios. Junior ministers were not always co-opted for these submissions and were therefore dependent on their senior colleagues to represent their functional responsibilities. This supports Weller’s argument that junior ministers would remain at least partially reliant on senior ministers to represent their interests in cabinet (1987, p. 22).

(c) Role of Junior Ministers in the Budget/ERC Process. The Australian literature devoted little attention to variation in the involvement of junior ministers in the budget/ERC process. This thesis argues that several junior ministers had no involvement in the budget/ERC process. Other junior ministers were co-opted to ERC for discussion of their responsibilities but confined to a subordinate role. Two parliamentary secretaries reported similar participation in the budget/ERC process. The key budget role of these junior ministers (and parliamentary secretaries) consisted of “functional advocacy” within their portfolios. Some junior ministers had a more substantial role representing their direct functional responsibilities. The relevant senior ministers focused on their own functional responsibilities. These junior ministers had dual budget roles. The first part consisted of “functional advocacy” within their portfolios. The second part consisted of representing their functions in budget/ERC process. This functional demarcation was most clearly
evident in relation to junior ministers with their own "sub-cabinet level" portfolios who had direct access to the budget/ERC process.

Parliamentary Work and Party Interaction

This thesis has examined the division of responsibility between senior ministers and their junior colleagues for the parliamentary work generated by their portfolios. It has focused on the division of responsibility for the oversight of government bills and question time. It has emphasised the importance of the distinction between the House of Representatives and the Senate. In common with previous studies (HoRSCP 1993, 1995) this thesis argues that the oversight of government bills in the House of Representatives was dominated by junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. By contrast question time was dominated by a few senior ministers. House of Representatives junior ministers had low question time profiles. This distinction was much less evident in the Senate. Senior ministers had a larger role in the oversight of government legislation. Junior ministers also had higher question time profiles. This was particularly evident in the case of junior ministers who represented their entire portfolios in the Senate (as well as those of their colleagues in the House of Representatives). Parliamentary secretaries did not participate in question time in either the House of Representatives or the Senate.

This thesis has briefly examined the division of responsibility between senior ministers and their junior colleagues for the routine party work generated by each portfolio. It has found some evidence that senior ministers delegated responsibility for routine interaction with individual backbenchers and caucus committees to junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. Senior ministers retained responsibility for representing their functions in full caucus meetings.

The Perspectives of Senior Ministers, Junior Ministers and Parliamentary Secretaries

This thesis has examined different approaches to the division of responsibility for portfolio management and cabinet representation from the perspectives of senior ministers as well as junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries.
Portfolio Management

The literature on the restructuring of the Commonwealth political executive emphasises the dominance of senior ministers and their capacity to marginalise their junior colleagues (eg Aucoin and Bakvis 1993, p. 401). Other studies of the work of sub-cabinet level political executives have also described the capacity of cabinet ministers to shape the division of responsibility for departmental work (Weller 1980, pp. 611-613, Majeau 1983, pp. 3, 5, Randle 1983, pp. 12-13, Vanderhoff-Silburt 1983/84, pp. 8-9, Theakston 1987, pp. 92-96, 113-115, 127). This thesis similarly emphasises the dominance of senior ministers and their capacity to shape the division of responsibility for portfolio management. It has identified three key sources of senior ministerial dominance. The first was their capacity to determine the responsibilities of their junior colleagues. The second was their capacity to “antagonistically” intervene in the responsibilities of their junior colleagues. The third was their formal control over coordination and priority-setting at the portfolio level. However there was also some evidence that senior ministers could be constrained by the capacity of junior ministers to exploit “environmental” factors such as prime ministerial or party support.

There were two other sets of constraints on the capacity of senior ministers to shape the division of responsibility for portfolio management. The first derived from the need to remain involved in key functional issues throughout their portfolios. This explains why only a few senior ministers adopted pure “limited” approaches and eschewed involvement in the direct responsibilities of their junior colleagues. This first constraint was identified in previous studies of the work of sub-cabinet level political executives (Heady 1974a, pp. 105-106, Theakston 1987, p. 79). The second constraint derived from their need to maintain direct involvement in processes of coordination and priority-setting across their portfolios. The second constraint was described by Keating (1993, pp. 8, 12). The importance of this constraint depended on the strength of policy development and program delivery overlaps within portfolios. There was substantial variation between portfolios in the extent of policy development and program delivery linkages. This was an important component of the workload of some senior ministers. Furthermore it could not usually be delegated to their junior colleagues. This could account for the observation by several studies that many senior ministers remained overburdened by their portfolio management workloads (eg Evans 1988, p. 68, Halligan, Beckett and Earnshaw 1992, p. 16, Keating 1993, p. 12, Craswell and Davis 1994, pp. 65, 71). However there was potential for
variation in the extent that they involved their junior colleagues in these processes. Senior ministers could adopt "exclusive" or "inclusive" approaches.

This thesis has identified two distinct senior ministerial approaches to the division of responsibility for portfolio management. The first was the "expansive" approach. Senior ministers retained direct control over functional policy change and public relations work across their portfolios. Junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries were often allocated a substantial range of functional responsibilities. However, their involvement in these areas was limited to routine administration and representation work. The second was the "limited" approach. Senior ministers focused on portfolio management within their direct responsibilities (as well as wider coordination and priority-setting). They used their junior colleagues as "filters". Junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries were provided substantial autonomy over portfolio management within their direct responsibilities. The involvement of the senior minister was limited to monitoring and occasional "antagonistic" intervention. Within this second approach there was substantial potential for variation in the workloads of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. Some had a large and important range of functions while others were confined to a narrower range of functional responsibilities.

Interviewees emphasised the benefits to senior ministers of the "limited" approach. They also emphasised the benefits within this approach of giving large workloads to their junior colleagues. These benefits derived from two sources. The first was the size of the overall workloads generated by their portfolios. It was argued that these were usually beyond the capacity of a single senior minister. This potential benefit was noted by Keating (1993, p. 8). Previous studies of the work of sub-cabinet level political executives also described their potential to assist cabinet ministers with aspects their departmental work. This has been termed their "indirect" contribution to increased political control. It was contrasted with their capacity to exercise "direct" control over a narrow range of functions within portfolios.

The second was the need for senior ministers to maintain the cooperation of their junior colleagues. This second point was not evident in previous studies of the work of sub-cabinet level political executives. It derived in part from their need for the assistance of their junior colleagues in coping with the workload of their portfolios. It also derived from the capacity of junior ministers to generate problems for their senior colleagues by
leaking damaging information and organising opposition from relevant interest groups and clients against senior ministerial policy positions. These two factors often influenced the approach of senior ministers to the allocation of functional responsibilities of their junior colleagues as well as the extent of their "antagonistic" involvement in these functional responsibilities. There was further evidence that the need of senior ministers to maintain the cooperation of their junior colleagues influenced the involvement of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries in coordination and priority-setting (especially the portfolio budget process).

This thesis has also emphasised the potential costs to senior ministers of the "expansive" approach. Senior ministers faced much larger portfolio management workloads. They had to maintain direct involvement throughout their portfolios. They could not use junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries as "filters". Similar problems were faced by senior ministers who adopted "limited" approaches but confined their junior colleagues to a narrow range of responsibilities. The "expansive" approach also increased the potential for tension and conflict between senior ministers and their junior colleagues. The potential for tension and conflict derived from "antagonistic" senior ministerial intervention in the functions of their junior colleagues.

This thesis has also found two sets of obstacles to the adoption by senior ministers of "limited" approaches and the allocation of large workloads to their junior colleagues. The first derived from the potential for career rivalry within teams of political executives. This obstacle was noted by several previous studies of the work of sub-cabinet level political executives (eg Majeau 1983, p. 5, Randle 1983, p. 13, Chenier 1985, p. 407, Rose 1987, p. 22, Theakston 1987, pp. 93-94). The second obstacle derived from the importance of relationships within teams of political executives. In common with previous studies of the work of sub-cabinet level political executives this thesis has emphasised the importance of relationships between senior ministers and their junior colleagues (Weller 1980, p. 612, Majeau 1983, p. 3, Randle 1983, p. 13, Vanderhoff-Silburt 1983/84, pp. 8-9, Theakston 1987, pp. 92-94). The importance of relationships has also been an important theme of the literature on the restructuring of the Commonwealth political executive (Halligan 1987, p. 43, Weller 1987, p. 22, Keating 1993, p. 8). These previous studies each adopted a one-dimensional approach to relationships between political executives. They referred to 'personal chemistry' or 'rapport' between political executives (Vanderhoff-Silburt 1983/84, p. 9, Keating 1993, p. 8). This thesis has argued that these relationships can be
conceptualised in terms of two dimensions. The first consists of the personal relationship. This refers to the perceptions of senior ministers of the trustworthiness and competence of their junior colleagues. The second consists of the policy relationship. This refers to the extent of policy consensus between political executives.

The extent to which senior ministers benefited from the introduction of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries depended on their capacity to adopt “limited” approaches and allocate them large portfolio management workloads. This depended on the willingness of senior ministers to relinquish direct control over functional areas within their portfolios and allow political credit to their junior colleagues. This in turn depended on an absence of career rivalry as well as personal trust and policy consensus between senior ministers and their junior colleagues.

Differences in the scope and composition of the portfolio management workloads of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries was attributed to variation in personal trust and policy consensus between senior ministers and their junior colleagues. The adoption by some senior ministers of “expansive” approaches was also attributed to an absence of personal trust and policy consensus within teams of political executives. Finally these factors were also used to explain the exclusion of some junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries from coordination and priority-setting within their portfolios. Keating (1993, p. 8) similarly attributed variation in the approaches of senior ministers to the division of responsibility for departmental work to differences in ‘rapport’ between senior and junior ministers.

This thesis has also examined the division of responsibility for portfolio management from the perspectives of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. It has argued that ambitious junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries shared three common objectives. The first was to maximise the scope and importance of their portfolio management workloads. The second was to operate as the sole source of political direction over portfolios management within their direct functional responsibilities. The third was to operate as effective “functional advocates” in relation to coordination and priority-setting within portfolios.

The literature on the restructuring of the Commonwealth political executive emphasised the weakness of junior ministers (eg Aucoin and Bakvis 1993, p. 401). This thesis similarly
emphasises the weakness of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. They could not demand additional functions. There was only limited evidence that junior ministers could exploit “environmental” factors such as prime ministerial or party support to resist “antagonistic” senior ministerial intervention in portfolio management within their direct functional responsibilities. Finally there was only limited evidence that they could exploit “environmental” factors to pursue their functional priorities in processes of coordination and priority-setting at the portfolio level.

Interviewees argued that junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries were dependent on gaps in the direct interests of the relevant senior minister. In the event of senior ministerial involvement they were dependent on their support. The capacity of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries to achieve their objectives depended on their relationship with the relevant senior minister. Similar conclusions emerged from previous studies of the work of sub-cabinet level political executives (see Majeau 1993, p. 5; Randle 1983, pp. 12-13). This thesis has emphasised the importance of both the personal and policy dimensions of relationships between junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries and the relevant senior minister. Junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries stressed the importance of good personal relationships. It was important for them to win the trust of the senior minister. This was seen as the key to gaining additional functions and greater functional autonomy. The quality of personal relationships also influenced the extent of their involvement in coordination and priority-setting (especially the budget process).

Junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries also emphasised the importance of the policy relationship. The importance of the policy relationship derived from the monitoring role of senior ministers and their capacity for “antagonistic” intervention throughout their portfolios. The only exception was when senior ministers adopted pure “limited” approaches and completely eschewed involvement in portfolio management within the functions of their junior colleagues. It was also important because of the dominant role of senior ministers in coordination and priority-setting at the portfolio level. This was most clearly evident in the portfolio budget process. The capacity of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries to operate as “functional advocates” in the budget process depended on their relationship with the relevant senior minister.

In common with previous studies (eg Halligan, Beckett and Earnshaw 1992, p. 16) this thesis has found evidence of junior ministerial and parliamentary secretary frustration with
the division of responsibility for portfolio management. This frustration could derive from several different sources. The first was being confined to a narrow range of functional responsibilities (especially those which generated large amounts of routine administrative and representational work). The second was the need to maintain the policy support of the relevant senior minister an “antagonistic” senior ministerial intervention in the functional responsibilities of their junior colleagues. The third was the need to operate as “functional advocates” in processes of coordination and priority-setting and the capacity of senior ministers to ignore their priorities. This last source of frustration was most clearly evident in the portfolio budget process.

The extent of junior ministerial and parliamentary secretary frustration depended on the approach of the relevant senior minister to the division of responsibility for portfolio management. There was much less evidence of frustration when senior ministers adopted “limited” and “inclusive” approaches. There was greater evidence of frustration when they adopted “expansive” and “exclusive” approaches. This thesis has also argued that some junior ministers responded to “expansive” and “exclusive” approaches by withdrawing from their work or leaking information damaging to the senior minister and organising opposition from relevant interest groups and clients against senior ministerial policy positions.

Cabinet Representation

The literature on the restructuring of the Commonwealth political executive emphasises the dominance of senior ministers and their capacity to marginalise junior ministers (eg Aucoin and Bakvis 1993, p. 401). Previous studies of the work of sub-cabinet level political executives also emphasised the influence of cabinet ministers over their junior colleagues’ access to cabinet information as well as their capacity to participate in cabinet committees (Weller 1980, pp. 610-613, Theakston 1987, pp. 113-125). This thesis has similarly emphasised the capacity of senior ministers to shape the division of responsibility for cabinet representation. This derived from their formal authority as cabinet representatives of their respective portfolios as well as their informal influence over the fate of their junior colleagues’ submissions.

This thesis has focused on the implications of different senior ministerial approaches for the cabinet representation work of junior ministers. It has found that ambitious junior
ministers shared three common objectives. The first was to participate in both the general cabinet and budget/ERC processes. The second was to play a leading role in representing their functional responsibilities. The third was to be supported by the senior minister.

Interviewees emphasised the cabinet weakness of junior ministers. This derived from two sources. The first consisted of the capacity of senior ministers to approve the contents of cabinet submissions from throughout their portfolios (and to ensure the cabinet defeat of junior ministerial submissions lodged without their approval). The second consisted of the lower presentation skills and cabinet status of most junior ministers in comparison with their senior colleagues.

The cabinet representation work of junior ministers can be conceptualised as consisting of two levels. The first consisted of the portfolio level. It was necessary for junior ministers to overcome senior ministerial opposition. It was also sometimes necessary for junior ministers to obtain the active cabinet support of the relevant senior minister. The second consisted of the general cabinet and budget/ERC processes.

This thesis has argued that there was variation in the relative importance of the portfolio and cabinet levels. This was evident in the general cabinet process. The importance of the portfolio level depended on the approach of the relevant senior minister to the division of responsibility. It depended on the extent of their involvement in the presentation of junior ministerial submissions. This was important because of the capacity of senior ministerial to oppose the submissions of their junior colleagues. The importance of the portfolio level also depended on the cabinet capacity of the relevant junior minister. Some junior ministers were heavily reliant on the active support of their senior colleagues. Others were much less dependent on senior ministerial support. Finally the portfolio level was also important in relation to relevant submissions from other portfolios because junior ministers were often reliant on the senior minister to represent their functional responsibilities.

The importance of the portfolio level was more clearly evident in the budget/ERC process. This was due to the leading role of senior ministers in the development of portfolio budget submissions. It was also due to the extent to which senior ministers adopted “exclusive” approaches to the division of responsibility for the budget/ERC process. Junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries were either excluded from this process or confined to a subordinate role. Their most important budget roles consisted of “functional advocacy” at
the portfolio level. Some were even excluded from the portfolio budget process. Some junior ministers had more extensive role in representing their functional responsibilities in the budget/ERC process. These junior ministers had a dual role. They needed to represent their functions at both the portfolio and cabinet levels. Interviewees emphasised the paramount importance of active senior ministerial support in the budget/ERC process. There was evidence that senior ministers would sometimes allow their junior colleagues to bring forward budget proposals to avoid conflict at the portfolio level but fail to support them at the budget/ERC level. The portfolio level was least important for junior ministers with their own "sub-cabinet level" portfolios. These junior ministers had direct access to the budget/ERC process.

The capacity of junior ministers to achieve their objectives depended on the personal trust and policy support of the relevant senior minister. There was only limited evidence that junior ministers could exploit "environmental" factors to resist "antagonistic" senior ministerial intervention or to force senior ministers to support their submissions. Junior ministers emphasised the benefits of the cabinet support of a senior minister. However there was also evidence of junior ministerial frustration. This could derive from a failure to neutralise senior ministerial opposition or the failure of senior ministers to support their submissions in either the general cabinet or budget/ERC processes. The extent of this frustration depended on the approach of the relevant senior minister to the division of responsibility for cabinet representation. This was most clearly evident when senior ministers adopted "expansive" and "exclusive" approaches. Two previous studies of the restructuring of the Commonwealth political executive also noted junior ministerial dissatisfaction with senior ministers who denied them substantial cabinet roles (Halligan, Beckett and Earnshaw 1992, p. 16, Gruen and Grattan 1993, p. 45).

Management of the Division of Responsibility

This thesis has examined the management of the division of responsibility. It has stressed the importance of the management roles of senior officials and ministerial offices. This was contrasted with the lack of direct interaction between political executives themselves. Previous studies of the work of sub-cabinet level political executives simply emphasised variation in interaction between political executives (Majeau 1983, p. 6, Randle 1983, p. 13, Theakston 1987, pp. 100-102).
It concludes that senior officials performed two management roles. The first consisted of the routine circulation of information within teams of political executives. This role was described by two previous studies (Evans 1988, p. 67, Gruen and Grattan 1993, p. 46). Paperwork was circulated to all political executives within portfolios. It found that the emergence of "information asymmetries" between senior ministers and their junior colleagues was largely confined to the budget process. Senior and junior ministers also received similar cabinet paperwork. The main differences related to the work of ERC and the security committee. Parliamentary secretaries only received cabinet paperwork relating to their portfolios.

These findings can be contrasted with those of previous studies of the restructuring of the Commonwealth political executive. The focus of these studies was on "information asymmetries". It was argued that junior ministers complained that they lacked access to sensitive information about their portfolios (Halligan, Beckett and Earnshaw 1992, p. 16). At the same time officials kept senior ministers informed about the activities of their junior colleagues (Aucoin and Bakvis 1993, p. 401, Gruen and Grattan 1993, p. 46). Previous studies of the work of sub-cabinet level political executives also emphasised variation in the extent to which sub-cabinet level political executives received departmental and cabinet information (Weller 1980, p. 611, Majeau 1983, p. 6, Randle 1983, pp. 13-14, Vanderhoff-Silburt 1983/84, pp. 8-9, Theakston 1987, pp. 92-94, 113-115).

The second management role of senior officials consisted of active "political coordination". It derived from the direct involvement of two sets of political executives and offices in a single issue. It can be described as maintaining consistency and resolving disputes between two sets of political executives and offices. Previous studies of the work of sub-cabinet level political executives described the roles of senior officials in coping with the potential for contradictory political directions from cabinet ministers and sub-cabinet level political executives. They described the role of officials as ensuring that sub-cabinet level political executives remained within parameters set down by the cabinet minister with ultimate responsibility for the department (Randle 1983, p. 15, Vanderhoff-Silburt 1983/84, p. 9, Theakston 1987, pp. 106-108). The Australian literature has devoted less attention to the impact of the introduction of teams of political executives on the work of senior officials (other than demands for the circulation of paperwork within teams of political executives).
Ministerial offices also played important roles along with senior officials in the circulation of information within teams of political executives as well as “political coordination”. The offices of senior and junior ministers also had distinctive management roles. The most important management role of senior ministerial offices was monitoring the functions of their junior colleagues. This was done by monitoring paperwork routinely circulated by senior officials as well as through direct links with senior officials and interest groups. The main task of the offices of senior ministers was to decide whether to become involved in issues within the responsibilities of their junior colleagues and whether to support or overrule the junior minister or parliamentary secretary. The most important role of the offices of junior ministers consisted of maintaining the policy support of senior ministers for key issues within their responsibilities. This was equally important for parliamentary secretaries. However their offices were much smaller than those of junior ministers.

Wider Implications of the Restructuring of the Commonwealth Political Executive

The fourth set of conclusions involve the wider implications of the enlargement and restructuring of the Commonwealth political executive. The literature on the work of sub-cabinet level political executives identified two sets of implications. The first concerned the impact of the introduction of teams of political executives on political-bureaucratic relations at the portfolio level. Under this broad heading two key issues have been identified. The first was the contribution of sub-cabinet level political executives to enhanced political control (Vanderhoff-Silburt 1983/84, p. 6, Chenier 1985, pp. 399-400, Theakston 1987, pp. 109-111, 176). The second was the impact of sub-cabinet level political executives on processes of coordination and priority-setting within portfolios (Chenier 1985, Theakston 1987). The second set of implications concerned the impact of sub-cabinet level political executives on patronage and careers (Majeau 1983, pp. 3-5, Vanderhoff-Silburt 1983/84, pp. 6-7, Chenier 1985, pp. 399-400, Theakston 1987, pp. 44, 49).

Political-Bureaucratic Relations at the Portfolio Level

This thesis has argued that the introduction of teams of political executives increased the complexity of political-bureaucratic relations at the portfolio level. This was a key theme
of previous studies of the work of sub-cabinet level political executives (eg Randle 1983, p. 14, Theakston 1987, p. 106). The literature on the restructuring of the Commonwealth political executive has also noted that these changes impacted on different groups of actors within portfolios: ministers, ministerial offices and senior officials (Evans 1988, p. 67).

This thesis has described complex patterns of interaction between different sets of political executives and offices and a wide range of senior officials. It has argued that different issues produced different patterns of interaction between different combinations of political and bureaucratic executives. It has also set out a new framework for conceptualising these patterns of interaction between political and bureaucratic executives. This framework is depicted in Table 7.4.

**Table 7.4**

**Four Patterns of Political-Bureaucratic Relations within Portfolios**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pattern</th>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>Bureaucratic Actors</th>
<th>Links with Political Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pattern 1</td>
<td>No Overlap</td>
<td>Senior Officials in Division/Agency</td>
<td>Direct Links with Single Political Executive/Office (Circulation of Paperwork to Colleagues)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pattern 2</td>
<td>Overlap at Political Level</td>
<td>Senior Officials in Division/Agency</td>
<td>Direct Links with Two Sets of Political Executives/Offices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pattern 3</td>
<td>Overlap at Bureaucratic Level</td>
<td>Departmental Executive &amp; Senior Officials in Relevant Divisions/Agencies</td>
<td>Direct Links with Single Political Executive/Office (Circulation of Paperwork to Colleagues)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pattern 4</td>
<td>Overlap at Political &amp; Bureaucratic Levels</td>
<td>Departmental Executive &amp; Senior Officials in Relevant Division/Agencies</td>
<td>Direct Links Between Departmental Executive and Two Sets of Political Executives/Offices Direct Links Between Different Senior Line Officials &amp; Relevant Political Executive/Office</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This framework consists of four different patterns of interaction between political and bureaucratic executives. These four different patterns of political-bureaucratic relations can each be evident in the same portfolio at the same time. This thesis has used this
framework to examine the impact of the introduction of teams of political executives on political-bureaucratic relations within portfolios.

(a) Patterns 1 and 2. The first set of conclusions relate to the first two patterns of political-bureaucratic relations. This thesis has examined the impact of the introduction of teams of political executives on senior officials in divisions and agencies within portfolios. These senior officials can be divided into three categories. The first consists of senior officials who reported directly to two sets of political executives and offices. This was a product of a "fuzzy" division of functional responsibilities. The second consists of senior officials who reported to a junior minister or parliamentary secretary. The third consists of senior officials who reported to senior ministers. The introduction of teams of political executives impacted differently on these three categories of senior officials.

The first category of senior officials experienced most problems. These problems derived from the second pattern of political-bureaucratic relations. These senior officials described additional resource demands created by the need to service two sets of political executives and offices. They also highlighted the potential for policy uncertainty due to disagreement between political executives and offices. This potential policy uncertainty generated large demands for "political coordination". Similar problems were described in previous studies of the work of sub-cabinet level political executives (see Randle 1983, p. 15, Vanderhoff-Silburt 1983/84, p. 9, Theakston 1987, pp. 106-108). Senior officials emphasised the benefits of the first pattern of political-bureaucratic relations. They argued it was easier to interact exclusively with a single political executive and office. There was evidence that departments were restructured to minimise the emergence of the second pattern of political-bureaucratic relations.

The second category of senior officials reported to junior ministers or parliamentary secretaries. These senior officials described both benefits and costs of reporting to junior ministers or parliamentary secretaries. The benefits derived from the capacity of these two categories of political executives to devote more attention to the needs of senior officials. This was a consequence of their smaller overall workloads and narrower responsibilities than senior ministers. Two sets of costs were identified. These both derived from the subordinate status of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. The first was their lack of influence in comparison to senior ministers. This was important in relation to coordination and priority-setting at the portfolio level. It was also important at the cabinet
level (although there was substantial variation in the cabinet capacity of individual junior ministers). The second was the potential for the emergence of the second pattern of political-bureaucratic relations as a result of “antagonistic” senior ministerial intervention in the responsibilities of their junior colleagues. These costs were not experienced by senior officials who reported directly to senior ministers. The introduction of teams of political executives had least impact on this third category of senior officials.

The second category of senior officials emphasised the importance of personal and policy relationships between junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries and the relevant senior minister (as well as the importance of relationships at the office level). Personal trust and policy consensus reduced the potential for “antagonistic” senior ministerial intervention in the functions of their junior colleagues. This lessened the potential for the emergence of the second pattern of political-bureaucratic relations. Senior officials benefited from policy certainty and experienced fewer demands for “political coordination”. Senior ministerial policy support was also important because of the lack of influence of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries at the portfolio and the cabinet levels.

The second category of senior officials emphasised the need for junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries to maintain the policy support of the senior minister for important issues within their responsibilities (especially general cabinet submissions). This was also important in relation to coordination and priority-setting within portfolios. These senior officials reported most problems when senior ministers remained extensively involved in the responsibilities of their junior colleagues. This “expansive” approach generated greater policy uncertainty and increased demands for “political coordination”.

Aucoin and Bakvis (1993, p. 401) argued that junior ministers lacked direct control over senior officials. This thesis has found that the second category of senior officials regarded themselves as directly accountable to junior ministers or parliamentary secretaries. This had important implications for their relationship with the relevant senior minister. These senior officials routinely circulated paperwork to the senior minister. However their direct accountability relationship with the junior minister or parliamentary secretary meant that they would not initiate direct contact with the senior minister or solicit “antagonistic” senior ministerial intervention in the responsibilities of their junior colleagues.
The second category of senior officials argued that they depended on junior ministers or parliamentary secretaries and their offices to manage relationships with the senior minister. They argued that the most important role of these political executives and their offices was the maintenance of senior ministerial support for important issues within their functional responsibilities. They argued that second pattern of political-bureaucratic relations derived from “agonistic” senior ministerial intervention in the responsibilities of their junior colleagues. Senior officials described their involvement along with ministerial offices in brokering compromise positions between relevant sets of political executives. However they also argued that in the event of continued disagreement they would inevitably side with the senior minister.

This thesis has also examined the first two patterns of political-bureaucratic relations from the perspectives of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. The second pattern of political-bureaucratic relations had important implications for junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. The existence of direct links between senior officials and senior ministers meant that junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries were unable to function as the sole source of political direction over portfolio management within their functional responsibilities. This had important implications for their “direct” contributions to political control over portfolios. The literature on the restructuring of the Commonwealth political executive has not examined the “direct” contribution to political control over portfolios of either junior ministers or parliamentary secretaries.

This thesis has argued that junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries could exercise close political oversight over a narrow range of functional responsibilities which have received little attention from a lone senior minister. Similar conclusions have emerged from prior studies of the work of sub-cabinet level political executives (eg Randle 1983, pp. 13-14, Theakston 1987, p. 111). In common with previous studies of the work of sub-cabinet level political executives this thesis has also stressed the difficulties confronted by junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries in attempting to operate as the sole source of political direction issues within their functional responsibilities.

Their capacity to function as the sole source of political direction over their functional responsibilities depended on exclusive links with relevant senior officials. This was not possible when they shared direct responsibility for functions with the senior minister. Junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries had greater capacity to function as the sole
source of political direction over functions for which they had clear direct responsibility. However there was still the potential for the emergence of the second pattern of political-bureaucratic relations. Junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries could be overruled or bypassed by the senior minister.

The second pattern of political-bureaucratic relations could also emerge as a consequence of attempts by relevant senior officials to appeal their decisions to the senior minister. The capacity of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries to operate as the sole source of political direction over issues within their functional responsibilities depended on the personal trust and policy support of the relevant senior minister. This was important to prevent “antagonistic” senior ministerial intervention in their functional responsibilities. It was also important in the event of disagreements with senior officials. Junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries argued that it was necessary to anticipate and foreclose official appeals to the senior minister. Previous studies of the work of sub-cabinet level political executives have also described the ‘tenuous’ nature of their relationships with departments and the importance of their relationship with relevant cabinet ministers (Chenier 1985, p. 404, see also Majeau 1983, p. 6, Randle 1983, pp. 12, 15, Theakston 1987, pp. 68-70, 106-108).

(b) Patterns 3 and 4. The second set of conclusions relate to the third and fourth patterns of political-bureaucratic relations. These patterns both derived from the presence of overlap between divisions and agencies within portfolios. There were two sources of overlap: policy development and program delivery linkages and the budget process. This thesis has emphasised the extent of variation in the strength of policy development and program delivery linkages. This was evident both between and within portfolios. There was less variation in the importance of the budget process. It remained important in the absence of strong policy development and program delivery linkages.

The emergence of policy development and program delivery overlaps was a key objective of the restructuring of the bureaucratic executive. These changes aimed to combine related functional areas under a single portfolio umbrella. Larger portfolio budgets were expected to provide greater scope for the introduction of devolutionary budget reforms (Codd 1988, Keating 1993).
There is a substantial literature on the restructuring of the bureaucratic executive. This literature described the development of new structures within portfolios (Weller 1991). It also stressed the importance of processes of coordination and priority-setting within the new portfolios. It concluded that the changes were difficult to implement and had placed a larger burden on departmental executives because of their central role in coordination and priority-setting. It further concluded that the restructuring had increased the coherence of policy development and improved program delivery (Craswell and Davis 1993, 1994, Keating 1993).

This thesis has examined the impact of the introduction of teams of political executives on processes of coordination and priority-setting within portfolios. This was not explored by previous studies of the 1987 machinery-of-government changes. It has examined their impact from the perspective of two different groups of officials. The first group consisted of departmental executives. These had primary responsibility for coordination and priority-setting at the portfolio level. The second group consisted of senior officials who reported directly to junior ministers or parliamentary secretaries.

It has argued that the introduction of teams of political executives increased the difficulty of coordination and priority-setting within portfolios. These difficulties were evident when overlaps at the bureaucratic level spilled across the responsibilities of different political executives. This could result in the emergence of the fourth pattern of political-bureaucratic relations. The fourth pattern of political-bureaucratic relations generated two sets of problems. The first derived from the potential for disagreement between political executives. These disagreement placed additional demands on departmental executives for “political coordination”. Departmental executives had to reconcile the perspectives and priorities of different political executives with different functional responsibilities. The second problem derived from the potential for disagreement between both political and bureaucratic executives. These disagreements could result in the emergence of conflict between rival combinations of political and bureaucratic executives representing different functional areas. This second problem was also described in a previous study of the work of sub-cabinet level political executives (Theakston 1987, p. 106, 141-142).

The extent of these problems depended on two factors. The first was the strength of overlaps within portfolios. The second was the extent to which these overlaps crossed the boundaries of the direct responsibilities of political executives. The emergence of the
fourth pattern of political-bureaucratic relations could be avoided through the co-location of different groups of closely related functions under a single political executive (usually the senior minister). In many portfolios junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries were deliberately given responsibility for bureaucratic units characterised by weak policy development and program delivery linkages. However it was not always possible to divide portfolios into collections of separate functional areas under the control of different political executives. The budget process also inevitably transcended the responsibilities of different political executives.

This thesis has contrasted the perspectives of departmental executives with those of senior officials who reported to junior ministers or parliamentary secretaries. Departmental executives argued that their capacity to coordinate and establish priorities across the direct responsibilities of different political executives depended on the relevant senior minister. They stressed the importance of the formal coordinating powers of senior ministers. They argued that coordination and priority-setting depended on a united departmental executive supported by the senior minister. Aucoin and Bakvis (1993, p. 401) and Keating (1993, p. 8) similarly emphasised the importance of the formal coordinating powers retained by senior ministers. Departmental executives experienced fewest problems when senior ministers adopted “exclusive” approaches and dominated coordination and priority-setting throughout their entire portfolios. This removed the need to reconcile the perspectives and priorities of different political executives with different functional responsibilities. It also removed the potential for conflict between rival combinations of political and bureaucratic executives. Departmental executives experienced most problems with co-equal senior ministers. Coordination and priority-setting was also more difficult when junior ministers were extensively involved in coordination and priority-setting.

These perspectives can be contrasted with those of senior officials who reported directly to junior ministers or parliamentary secretaries. These senior officials often emphasised their lack of influence within their respective portfolios. This was partly a consequence of the location of their functions under the responsibilities of a junior minister or parliamentary secretary. These senior officials argued that their capacity to influence portfolio priorities depended on the capacity of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries to operate as “functional advocates” and lobby the senior minister and departmental executive. They preferred senior ministers to adopt “limited” approaches despite the problems this created for departmental executives. They experienced most problems when their junior minister
or parliamentary secretary lacked influence within the portfolio or was excluded from the budget process by senior ministers who adopted "exclusive" approaches.

The thesis has also examined the third and fourth patterns of political-bureaucratic relations from the perspectives of senior ministers as well as junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. In common with Chenier (1985, p. 411) it has argued that bureaucratic overlaps constituted an important constraint on the capacity of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries to operate as the sole source of political direction over their functional responsibilities. Junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries were limited to "functional advocacy" at the portfolio level (often in conjunction with their own senior officials).

This thesis has also argued that there was substantial variation between junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries in the impact of these constraints. Fewest constraints were experienced by junior ministers who headed their own "sub-cabinet level" portfolios. The budget process was an important constraint for most other junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. Some of these were further constrained by extensive policy development and program delivery linkages with the functions of the senior minister. These findings could account for the comment by Craswell and Davis (1994, p. 65) that some junior ministers in departments characterised by strong policy development and program delivery linkages 'experienced problems defining their role in relation to the new policy process'. They could also account for the observation by Halligan, Beckett and Earnshaw that the introduction of teams of political executives appeared to have created fewest problems in departments characterised by weak policy development and program delivery linkages (1992, p. 17).

This thesis has argued that bureaucratic level overlaps were an important component of the workload of senior ministers. Furthermore this work could not usually be delegated to junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. The introduction of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries also had the potential to increase the difficulty of the coordination and priority-setting role of senior ministers. It could also be an important source of friction within teams of political executives when it involved the functions of their junior colleagues. There was also evidence that senior ministers were constrained by the need to maintain the cooperation of their junior colleagues and by the capacity of junior ministers to exploit "environmental" factors such as prime ministerial or party support to pursue
their own functional priorities. This thesis has found that the potential for these problems could be reduced by senior ministers retaining direct responsibility for related functional areas and allocating only discrete responsibilities to their junior colleagues. The main disadvantage of this approach was its potential to limit the "indirect" contribution of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries to enhanced political control. Senior ministers could be left with large portfolio management workloads. Furthermore the budget process inevitably remained an important source of tension at the portfolio level.

**Careers and Patronage**

The second set of implications of the enlargement and restructuring of the Commonwealth political executive related to careers and patronage. Previous studies of the work of sub-cabinet level political executives emphasised the contribution of these positions to the function of party management (Majeau 1983, pp. 3-5, Vanderhoff-Silburt 1983/84, pp. 6-7, Chenier 1985, pp. 399-400, Theakston 1987, pp. 44, 49). Similar findings have emerged from the Australian literature (Weller 1987, p. 22, Healy 1993, p. 47).

This thesis has argued that the enlargement of the political executive enhanced the capacity of the parliamentary party to cope with factional pressures for a greater share of political executive positions as well as individual backbench pressures for positions within the political executive. There was also evidence that the changes enhanced the capacity of the prime minister to influence the composition of the political executive within the constraints imposed by the division of most positions within the three factions. There was evidence that the introduction of teams of political executives increased the flexibility of prime ministers in the deployment of political executives. Finally there the changes allowed the responsibilities of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries to be tailored to reflect assessments of their individual capacities. This was particularly important because of the extent to which these positions were used to accommodate individual career pressures and representational imperatives.

**Conclusion**

This thesis has set out a new framework for conceptualising the work of political executives. It has also set out a new framework for conceptualising the division of
responsibility for portfolio management and cabinet representation within teams of political executives.

It has used these frameworks to examine variation in the portfolio management and cabinet representation work of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. It has examined different approaches to the division of responsibility for portfolio management and cabinet representation from the perspectives of senior ministers as well as both junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries. It has also examined the management of the division of responsibility within portfolios.

This thesis has finally explored the wider implications of the enlargement and restructuring of the Commonwealth political executive. It has examined the impact of the changes on political-bureaucratic relations within portfolios. It has also examined their implications for patronage and careers.
Appendix 1

Interview Schedule: Political Executives

1. Introduction
What are the most important differences between the jobs of senior ministers, junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries?
What are the most important components of the jobs of senior minister/junior ministers/parliamentary secretaries?

2. Division of Functional Responsibilities
How was the division of responsibility initially determined? Were there any subsequent adjustments?
To what extent do junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries aim to maximise the scope and importance of their functional responsibilities?
To what extent do junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries differ in their capacity to acquire larger and more important functional responsibilities?

3. Relations with Senior Ministers
To what extent do junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries aim to maximise their functional autonomy?
To what extent do senior ministers remain involved in the functional responsibilities of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries?
Can junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries prevent senior ministers from becoming involved in their direct functional responsibilities?
Can junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries pursue policy lines in the face of senior ministerial opposition?
To what extent are junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries involved in functions beyond their direct responsibilities?
To what extent are junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries involved in coordination and priority-setting within their portfolios?
To what extent are junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries involved in the portfolio budget process?
To what extent are senior ministers required to accommodate the priorities of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries?
Are there regular formal meetings between senior ministers, junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries?
How can the operation of the division of responsibility be improved?

4. Relations with Senior Officials
To what extent do junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries have direct responsibility for particular divisions and agencies?
Do senior ministers, junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries deal with different level officials?
Do senior officials treat junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries differently from senior ministers?
Do senior officials appeal the decisions of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries to senior ministers?
Do senior officials invariably side with the senior minister in the event of disputes between senior ministers and either junior ministers or parliamentary secretaries?
To what extent has the introduction of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries increased political control of portfolios?

5. Cabinet Work

How frequently do junior ministers attend cabinet and cabinet committee meetings?
Can junior ministers bring forward cabinet submissions in the face of senior ministerial opposition?
To what extent are senior ministers involved in the development and presentation of junior ministerial cabinet submissions?
To what extent are junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries involved in the Expenditure Review Committee process?
Can junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries act as independent advocates for their own functions or are they confined to supporting the senior minister?

6. Parliamentary and Party Work

How is responsibility for parliamentary work divided between senior ministers, junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries?
What are the most important aspects of your parliamentary work?
How is responsibility for backbench interaction divided between senior ministers, junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries?
What are the most important aspects of your backbench work?

7. Interest Group and Public Relations Work

How is responsibility for interest group interaction divided between senior ministers, junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries?
What are the most important aspects of your interest group work?
How is responsibility for public relations divided between senior ministers, junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries?
What are the most important aspects of your public relations work?

8. Conclusion

Are junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries fully utilised under the new arrangements?
How can the new arrangements be improved?
Appendix 2

Interview Schedule: Bureaucratic Executives

1. Introduction

Why was this functional area placed within the direct responsibilities of a junior minister or parliamentary secretary?

2. Relations with the Junior Minister/Parliamentary Secretary

What are the most important functions that a minister or parliamentary secretary has to perform?
Do junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries have distinctive roles within portfolios?
Are there differences between reporting directly to a junior minister or parliamentary secretary and reporting directly to a senior minister?
How has the appointment of a junior minister or parliamentary secretary affected the operation of your functional area?

3. Relations with the Senior Minister

How often does the senior minister become directly involved in your functional area?
What type of issues are most likely to prompt the direct involvement of the senior minister in your functional area?
How often is it necessary to actively solicit the direct involvement of the senior minister in your functional area?
To what extent do relationships between senior ministers, junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries impact on your work?
How often are you aware of disagreements between senior ministers, junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries?
How do officials cope with disagreements between senior ministers, junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries?

4. Ministerial Offices

How has the expansion of ministerial offices affected the work of senior officials?
What are the most important roles of ministerial offices?
What have been the costs and benefits of the expansion of ministerial offices?

5. Coordination at the Portfolio Level

What are the main policy/program delivery linkages between this functional area and the rest of the portfolio?
At what level are these linkages typically coordinated?
How often do disagreements between officials generate disagreements within teams of ministers and parliamentary secretaries?
Who are the most important actors in the portfolio budget process?
Do you interact solely with the relevant junior minister or parliamentary secretary or directly with the senior minister?
How has the introduction of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries affected the portfolio budget process?

6. Cabinet System

Does this functional area generate a substantial amount of cabinet and cabinet committee business?
What is the role of the senior minister in the development and presentation of cabinet business from this functional area?
Do junior ministers have less influence in cabinet or in negotiations with other portfolios?
What is the role of the junior minister or parliamentary secretary in the Expenditure Review Committee process?

7. Interest Groups and Public Relations

How is responsibility for interest group work divided between senior ministers, junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries?
To what extent do interest groups "shop around" between different ministers and parliamentary secretaries?
How is responsibility for public relations work divided between senior ministers, junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries?

8. Conclusion

What have been the costs and benefits of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries?
To what extent has the introduction of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries increased political control of portfolios?
How has the introduction of junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries affected coordination within portfolios?
How could the system be improved?
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