Inscribed Landscapes
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PREFACE

This book is an archaeological and social anthropological exploration of the role of place marking in place making. The approaches taken by the various authors are varied, although all are united in the view that landscapes are not simply "out there," but constructed in social engagement. People physically inscribe spaces, such as in rock-art, monuments, and the like, in the process of dwelling. More intimately, people's spatial experiences are inscribed through the senses. Both people and place are codefined in a process of engagement that involves inscription. It is various dimensions of this codefinition that are explored in this book.

The initial seeds for this volume were laid in 1998 when we considered assembling a group of researchers to discuss how the marking of place affects human interaction and perception. As first we were particularly interested in how places marked or decorated with rock-art gained significance as socially marked territorial (already-owned) spaces. The psychological and social implications of such a process of place marking are considerable, but have remained largely unexplored by archaeologists.

However, we were not entirely satisfied with the initially bounded archaeological direction for this book. It was clear that it was not inscriptions that were at stake, but people's relationships with places in the production of a sense of place and belonging. We thus decided to redirect the book somewhat, to focus less on fixed landmarks and more on the humanization of landscapes, on the process of social and sensual anchorage in place. The book's new direction echoed more closely our intellectual interests and curiosities.

We have followed a number of conventions in the following pages. For one, we write of the nonwritten past as "pre-History" rather than "prehistory." We do this as an attempt to avoid the evolutionary loadedness of the notion of prehistory (while at the same time being well aware of the history of the terms prehistory/prehistory, as influentially used in particular by John Lubbock and Daniel Wilson during the mid- to late nineteenth century).

Following Paul Taçon and Christopher Chippindale's lead (1998, An archaeology of rock-art through informed methods and formal methods, 1–10 In The Archaeology of Rock-Art, edited by C. Chippindale and P. S. C. Taçon, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), we hyphenate "rock-art" to distinguish such practices from the Western artistic program, which is closely tied to a market economy. We also sometimes refer to radiocarbon dates and sometimes to calibrated ages. Wherever radiocarbon dates are presented, they are listed as "years B.P."; calibrated ages are presented as "years ago." We use the
The notion of a "culture of terror," developed by ethnographers of Latin America and given wider currency through the writing of Michael Taussig, resonates powerfully with conditions around the world's richest mining operation, Freeport's Grasberg mine in the Indonesian province of Papua or Irian Jaya. Taussig (1987) described how a climate or culture of terror, the perpetual imminence of the threat of death, can create a "space of death," an imaginary zone in which fear blocks the senses as violence and representations of violence achieve a near-perfect circle of mirrors reflecting terror back upon both perpetrators and victims. Neither cultures of terror nor spaces of death, however, have been explored in any depth in terms of their topographic arrangement, the nature of their inscription in a specific landscape. How does death—or, more accurately, the terror of an unfamiliar, unexpected, or violent death—come to inhabit a landscape? How is the land itself marked, manipulated, and deployed in the orchestration of terror? And if landscapes, by definition, invoke perspective and the scope for different readings, how are these markings received by different audiences?

I address these questions by considering the history of violence around the Freeport mine, in an attempt to understand the operation of a technology of terror through the deployment of a particular iconography. The manipulation of a layered series of images and other prompts for the memory allows the very meaning of the landscape for a community, and thus the literal base of its identity, to be reconfigured. These images both record and recall violent events, conferring upon those who have the power to inscribe the landscape in this way a degree of control over the summoning of memories of the past and the heightening of terror and uncertainty about the future. In a companion paper (Ballard 2000), I considered the performative aspects of violence at Freeport and elaborated upon the relationship between violence and terror. Here I focus on the manner in which death and the terror of dying are implanted in the landscape and rendered perpetually present for its inhabitants, as an echo of violence that persists through the intervals between episodes of murder, torture, and disappearance. The manner in which bodies become absent and are then re-presented is mediated by an iconography of violence, which introduces signs that stand for these absences (Graziano 1992:73).
Recent studies of political iconography in violent contexts have tended to focus on the symbolism of community resistance and sectarian distinction. The graphic and political sophistication apparent in the graffiti and murals of Northern Ireland and Palestine has required that close attention be paid to the identity of the intended audiences for these images and slogans. Although Catholic murals in Belfast, often restricted to clearly defined working-class neighborhoods, are at one level emblems of resistance to Protestant domination and British rule (Sluka 1992), they are also, and perhaps just as powerfully, a means of policing community will, "part of an inwardly focused propaganda which largely ignores debate" (Jarman 1993:118). Murals have multiple audiences, but consideration of their location, their content, and their immediate historical context yields a much richer sense of their reception and their efficacy as interventions in relations of power, both between and within communities.

Of particular relevance to the Freeport case is Peter's (1996:140) observation that an analysis of the way in which graffiti are read forces enquiry to extend beyond the simple binary of domination and resistance. Palestinian graffiti have provided the community with a voice, a means of access to communal memory, and a public affirmation of allegiance to different Palestinian factions; but the fact that most graffiti are rendered in Arabic means that Israeli soldiers, although keenly aware of the role of graffiti as a challenge to authority, remain largely ignorant of their content (Peter 1996:150). Local historical context, relations of power, and the positions of image makers and image readers are thus vital to an adequate analysis of what, following Poole (1997), we might think of as a "visual economy" of political violence. The notion of visual economy introduces the sense of a systematic production, exchange, and reproduction of images and interpretations in whose organization the relations of power feature prominently.

Around the Freeport mine, the more obvious iconography of murals and graffiti has been overwhelmingly that of the state and its armed forces, and the multiple interpretations of these images and the intentions of their makers demand attention. An analysis of the apparent presence of the state's images is potentially revealing of the structured nature of its attempts to dominate the community and thus capable of identifying the means of subverting their intended effects. Yet this is not to portray the communities of the mine area as passive consumers of some discourse of the dominant. Much as armed forces and communities alike participate in novel "vocabularies of terror" (Suarez-Orozco 1992:233) to manage and communicate conditions of radical violence, an iconography of terror requires the participation of both the army, as producers of the images, and the community, as active readers and interpreters. The capacity and the will to read and interpret, however, the message might be transformed in the act of communication, necessarily implicates the audience as culturally fluent agents, fully capable of response. At Freeport, where the community's response has not thus far taken the more obvious forms of murals or graffiti, other, more subtle means of resisting the intended import of these images and insisting on the integrity of the community can be identified.

CONTEXTS FOR VIOLENCE AT FREEPORT

Irian Jaya has had a deeply troubled history of incorporation within the Republic of Indonesia since the colonial territory of Dutch New Guinea was transferred to Indonesia via the interim authority of the United Nations in 1962 (Budardjo and Liang 1988; Defert 1996; Osborne 1985; Saltford 2000). The Indonesian military campaign to seize the western half of the island of New Guinea from the Dutch played a role in creating the international pressure that led to the transfer, and the army thereafter displayed a tendency to regard the possession of Irian Jaya and its resources as a right of conquest. Popular uprisings during the 1960s were brutally suppressed. After the crushing in 1977 of a province-wide insurrection led by the poorly equipped Free Papua Movement (Organisasi Papua Merdeka, or OPM), Irian Jaya became one of three provinces, along with East Timor and Aceh, in which the military exercised almost complete control (Aditjondro 1994; Robinson 1998).

The Freeport mine played an important role in the history of Irian Jaya under Suharto's New Order regime. The 1936 discovery of a substantial copper deposit at the Ertsberg ("Ore Mountain") in the Central Highlands of Dutch New Guinea had led to further exploration in 1960 by an American mining company, Freeport Sulphur (Wilson 1981). When Suharto came to power in 1965, Freeport was the first foreign company to sign a major investment contract with Indonesia, forming a local subsidiary, PT. Freeport Indonesia. Initially a medium-sized copper and gold venture centered on the Ertsberg, the Freeport mining complex rose dramatically to global prominence after the 1988 discovery of the Grasberg, the world's richest copper-gold deposit, with an estimated reserve value in 1998 of US$54 billion. The newfound strategic significance of the mine for Indonesia resulted in a substantial increase in troop numbers around the mine and the local townships of Timika and Tembagapura, exacerbating existing tensions between the army, the mining company, and the Indigenous communities of the wider region. In the absence of an effective, functioning local civilian administration, the security forces, including both army and police units, are in many respects the representatives of the state, and their actions are commonly viewed locally as reflections of the will of a distant and fundamentally malign state.

The traditional landowners of the highland mining area, the mining township of Tembagapura and its surrounds, are the Amungme, a language community of about 8,000 people, divided between urban residents of the lowland towns of Timika and Aikinasa, and the inhabitants of rural hamlets scattered across a dozen narrow highland valleys cut into the southern slopes of the Central Range. Although both the 1936 and 1960 reconnaissance expeditions were peacefully received, the Amungme reacted almost immediately to the start of mine construction in 1967 with a strong show of protest. They had been neither consulted about plans for the mine nor compensated for the loss of land, productive trees, or gardens.

Much as the miners themselves were in awe of the technical demands and the scale of construction at the Ertsberg (see Wilson 1981), so too the Amungme were initially overwhelmed by the accompanying environmental destruction of the headwater areas where the mine is located. As the presence of the mine failed to translate into shared benefits or wealth for the community, Amungme protests grew more forceful, culminating in the closure of exploration camps, which were marked off with cross-shaped sticks forbidding further trespass. A 1974 agreement between the company and the community, mediated by the government and the army, was widely considered by the Amungme to have been forced upon them. When a small group of OPM fighters with Amungme leaders walked from neighboring Papua...
At dawn on the morning of Christmas Day, December 1994, a large crowd of Amungme and other highlanders raised the Morning Star flag on a small hill in the Wa Valley, overlooking the mining town of Tembagapura, a peaceful but astonishing act of defiance. The first troops to approach the gathering opened fire, wounding two men, one of whom, Narranebelan Angakab, was then captured. Reports from Amungme eyewitnesses detailed how Narranebelan was dragged behind a car by a noose around his neck to the army checkpoint near the Amungme settlement of Banti, a short distance from Tembagapura. By the time he was delivered to the Banti checkpoint, he was dead, and his body was then suspended by the ankles from a post opposite the checkpoint. Banti villagers, forced to file past the corpse on their way to church services that morning, were taunted by the surrounding soldiers asking whose pig, whose dog, whose dead pig. That day, and for the next few weeks, terrible violence was unleashed on the community, and numerous Amungme were killed or assaulted in individual incidents during the 1980s. In the aftermath of the discovery of the Graaberg ore body in 1988, army interest in the new economic opportunities on offer in the Freeport area intensified, and a more coordinated campaign of arrest, torture, and disappearance was designed precisely to distance the infliction of pain from its conception. But the patterned form of military or paramilitary campaigns of terror, and the parallel reproduction of highly elaborate and specialized forms of torture imply a network for the communication of techniques and technologies of terror that match the traffic in more conventional forms of military knowledge and hardware (Nordstrom 1995).

Drawing on Elaine Scarry's *The Body in Pain* (1985), I propose that the deliberate enactment of terror upon a community follows closely her distinction of the three central features of the torture of individuals: the infliction of pain in "in-intensifying ways"; the objectification of pain, in which the effects of pain are rendered visible for other observers; and the denial of the objectified pain, an act that is itself construed as evidence of the power of the torturer. In much the same way, communities
that become the target of campaigns of terror are subjected to a series of increasingly graphic forms of violence, in which the effects of violence are objectified and displayed before the community. The power of the state is then doubly confirmed by its capacity to deny the violence and to call into question the very absence of the disappeared.

James Siegel (1998:111) argued convincingly that Suharto's New Order regime employed violence along precisely these lines during a campaign to eliminate urban gangs in the capital of Jakarta during the 1980s. Beyond the immediate objective of creating the appearance of order for an international audience, Suharto sought to communicate to his political rivals and to the nation at large the extent of his control, both of events and of their meaning. The corpses of young men, bearing the tattoos associated with gang membership, assumed the function of signs, "left in the streets to keep the moment of disappearance from life vivid, retaining the memory of violence during the early 1990s was matched by the Freeport's ebullient chief executive this perception in describing the Grasberg ore body as anorher facer of the army's assault upon the community. Freeport's assault on the landscape has thus been quite literally an assault upon the body of Amungme identity and the foundations of Amungme belief and the relations of violence as a spectacle in Guatemala, it is equally the case that the sight of torture is itself a torture," as Fabri (1995:150) observed of the creation of violence as a spectacle in Guatemala, it is equally the case that the sight of torture is itself a torture, compelling the army to correctly identify and name the features of the landscape, are indistinguishable from one another, indicating the presence of the owners or their kin, or the capacity to correctly identify and name the features of the landscape, are sufficient in themselves.

The land acquires significance through a dense microhistory of these acts of naming, acts that include the use of a location for activities such as gardening, hunting, settlement, or ritual performance. Violence and death are already present in the landscape by foot or in vehicles point out these locations, recounting and reliving the events. In late 1996, the elite Kopassus unit stationed at Tsinga village carefully engraved and painted a large rock in front of their mess with a skull bearing their distinctive red beret (Figure 2.1). A similar emblem on walls or on prominent boulders, an activity common enough to military units everywhere. In late 1996, the elite Kopassus unit stationed at Tsinga village carefully engraved and painted a large rock in front of their mess with a skull bearing their distinctive red beret (Figure 2.1). A similar image of a skull, this time weeping blood from the cracks around the face—a like a corpse trapped in an eternal torture, portending perhaps the capacity of
For Amungme, the images are doubly potent through their capacity to summon up the memory of violent events and thus the enduring threat of further violence. The images themselves are almost invariably violent, as illustrated by the use of skulls and the themes of the panels of the Independence Day gateway. However, the particular significance of army unit designations and the ideological import of Independence Day celebrations and their symbolism more generally are not clearly recognized by many Amungme. Instead, the violence that is summoned up for Amungme through these images is the specific violence of the past enacted upon kin and neighbors, and of the perpetual threat of its resurgence. Where the bodies of the murdered, the tortured, and the disappeared are not made available for mourning and for appropriate reception in the Amungme landscape and memory, the army's graffiti come to stand instead for the absent corpses: as signs of corpses that are themselves signs of the power of the state.

If these images are evidently directed in part toward the Amungme, they also serve to speak to other audiences in quite different ways. During 1998, a further addition to this landscape of novel images was a rash of graffiti painted by the elite Police Mobile Brigade (Brimob). In large, white lettering, the acronym BRIMOB appeared on cliff faces and boulders along the length of the road between Tembagapura and the Amungme settlement of Banti (Figure 2.4). Because much of the previous unit-specific imagery had been confined to the immediate vicinity of army and police posts, this was something of a departure in its attempt to mark out a new territory for inscription; the sole Brimob post in the valley was one positioned above the gate at the bottom end of Tembagapura, controlling access from the Banti road. Unadorned by any attempt at
representation beyond the simple reproduction of the acronym, the Brimob graffiti assumed a literate audience. However, literate Amungme read this graffiti not as a warning to them, but as an unmistakable elite police to the Kostrad army units, much enviedingly unlimited company largesse and expanded opportunities for graft and theft from the mine and the company's townships.

One of the enduring features of the long history of violence at Freeport has been the question mark about the company's complicity in the army's atrocities, an accusation leveled at Freeport by both the Amungme community and international observers, but denied by the company. Although this is not the place to offer definitive pronouncements on such a complex topic, it is valid to seek to understand the role of Freeport staff as another potential audience for the army's graffiti. Here, perhaps, the issue of complicity between image and audience is brought most powerfully into focus, because staff whom I questioned about the emergence of the army and police insignia appeared genuinely ignorant of their presence. The army and police pose no threat to the targets of violence. Only a small proportion of staff are exposed to the graffiti. But those Freeport staff who are exposed to the graffiti are also largely unaffected by them, viewing them as an integral part of the social landscape. Though these graffiti function as land mines for the memories of passing Amungme, Freeport staff can apparently move freely among them without triggering their charges. However, surrounded as they are by a community subjected to more than two decades of state violence, the ability of Freeport staff to remain oblivious to the potential significance of army graffiti is itself a form of knowledge, a will to ignorance. 9

RESISTANCE (AVANT LA LETTRE)

What Tausig referred to as "the problem of writing effectively against terror" (1987:3) is the risk we run of representing terror as a rational economy of behavior, and thus of extending its reach. This is to contribute, in effect, to the torturer's goal of creating a totality of representation, in which the efficacy of terror or terror is made evident through the fashioning of the victim (or the writer) as another mouth for the truths of the state. A common response to this problem has been to perceive, in even the most mundane actions, the seeds of a coherent project of resistance (Ortner 1995). Inspired by a commendable wish to portray communities as agents in their own right and not simply as passive consumers of the truths of others, studies of resistance tend to focus on conscious and unambiguous acts of reaction to domination (see also McNiven and Russell, this volume).

Without diminishing the scale or dismissing the impact of the army's onslaught on the community and the mine's assault on the land, it must also be observed that the Amungme have succumbed neither to the violence nor to the terror. As a community, Amungme have continued to escape the circle of mirrors, the totality of representation that I identify as the goal of the state operating through its security forces, and their success in this evasion can perhaps be characterized as a form of resistance. But to describe the various ways in which this is effected as a single, coherent strategy of resistance is to obscure several complex operations of power and to confute conscious and unconscious acts and their unintended and unintended consequences. At one level there appears to be a curious silence on the part of the Amungme in response to the iconography of terror described here. Thus far there has been no countericritique—no Amungme graffiti and very little graphic art—to challenge the images deployed around the Freeport mine by the security forces. The one exception to this observation is the raising of the Morning Star flag, a singular act of defiance that has historically provoked violent repression from the army and police. But Amungme have conventionally disparaged identity and land through a politics of residence and of naming, rather than through an iconography of graphic symbols denoting status. Amungme resistance might be said to revolve around an insistence on the primordial link between Amungme and their landscape, and a confidence that Amungme people have a privileged access to the meaning of the land and the knowledge of its names. In linking the violence of the security forces to the presence of the mine, Amungme accord a central role in their analysis of terror to the mine's assault on their land. It is no accident, in this light, that one of the principal demands of Amungme leaders during recent negotiations with Freeport has been the restoration of Amungme names to those elements of the landscape whose significance has been obscured by Indonesian or American terms. Amungme resistance has also drawn strength from the failure of the state to incorporate the community successfully in a symbolic relationship characterized by domination through the imposition of a common graphic vocabulary or visual economy. The symbols and imagery of the state, which are deployed to such effect elsewhere in Indonesia (Siegel 1998), are often imperfectly recognized and received by Amungme and thus limited in their
NOTES

This chapter was prepared with the kind permission of the Traditional Amungme Council/Lembaga Musyawarah Ancestral Amungme (LMMASA). Access to the Freeport area was made possible through the work of the UNCECN-ANU Baseline Studies (UARS) Project between 1996 and 1998, which was funded and supported by the Universitas Cenderawasih, The Australian National University, and Fako Freeport Indonesia. A very large number of people, many of whom cannot be identified for various reasons, have contributed materials and ideas that inform this paper, but I am responsible for the arguments put forward here and any factual inaccuracies.

I especially thank Yunus Omabak and the Amungme communities of the Wls, Timba, and Anue Valleys, and my colleagues in the UARS Project. The chapter was prepared during periods spent as a visitor at the Amsterdam branch of the International Institute of Asian Studies and at the Centre de Recherche et de Documentation sur l'Océanie of the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique in Marseille.

1. Formerly known as Irian Jaya, a name widely associated with the New Order regime of former President Suharto, Indonesia's easternmost province was renamed "Papua" in January 2000 by the newly elected president, Abdurrahman Wahid (however, Indonesia's Parliament had not yet ratified this change by January 2001). Though Papuans now refer to their territory as West Papua, Irian Jaya is used in this chapter to retain the historical flavor of the New Order regime under which these events took place.

2. The lowland portion of the Freeport mining lease is owned largely by Kamoro-speaking communities (through this ownership is not recognized by the state) (Widjojo 1997). The apparent absence of overt conflict between Kamoro people and the army poses intriguing questions, which space does not permit me to explore here, about the nature of resistance under different historical and cultural conditions.

3. A preliminary but incomplete accounts of these events is given in a report published by the Australian Council for Overseas Aid (ACFOA 1995).

4. Details of the long list of massacres and other abuses of basic human rights during 1994–1998 are beyond the scope of this chapter, but have been described in a series of reports by church groups and other ngo organizations (see ACFOA 1995; Catholic Church of Jayapura 1995; ESCHAM 1997, 1999; Robert 1996; Widjojo 1997). The apparent absence of overt conflict between Kamoro people and the army poses intriguing questions, which space does not permit me to explore here, about the nature of resistance under different historical and cultural conditions.

5. In fact, Amungme appear to have been only marginally involved in these riots, which largely involved migrants from other parts of Irian Jaya.

6. See Robinson (1998) and Kammen (1999) for further discussions of the role of business interests in similar conflicts within the security forces in Aceh and East Timor.

7. Ellenberger's (1996:144) detailed account of the role of mountaints in the beliefs of northern Amungme, on Dead, accords closely with my own limited enquiries among Amungme.

8. The Amungme assumption of the transparency of the emblem of the em jinkong sticks placed around the mine during the construction phase, as claims by landowners prohibiting further trespass, was sorely mis-placed. Freeport workers read the sticks instead as "tax sticks" (see, for example, Wilson 1991:168), designed to bring misfortune down upon the mine—evidence, for the miners, both of the "primitive" mentality of the Amungme and of their fundamental opposition to the entire mining project.

9. Elsewhere (Ballard 2000:170) I address in more detail the question of Freeport's apparent "will to ignorance" and also describe how the army has sought to attract Freeport's attention more directly and to insinuate a sense of terror in the company.

10. "Symbolic violence is the coercion which is set up only through the consent that the dominated cannot fail to give to the dominator (and therefore the domination) when their understanding of the situation and relation can only use instruments of knowledge that they have in common with the dominator; which, being merely the incorporated form of the structure of the relation of domination, make this relation appear as natural" (Bourdieu 2000:170).

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It is time that Australian historians sought to understand the Aboriginal response to conquest and dispossession. To do so it is necessary to seriously explore the farside of the frontier and the underside of the caste barrier.

**Ritual Response**

**Place Marking and the Colonial Frontier in Australia**

**Ian J. McNiven and Lynette Russell**

**H**istorical scholarship over the past two decades has seen a growing awareness of colonial processes and in particular the dramatic and often violent events of the colonial frontier. For Indigenous people, dispossession and dispossession are all-too-familiar themes of colonialism. In Australia, rewriting these violent themes into colonial history has undermined European narratives of colonialism. To do so it is necessary to seriously explore the farside of the frontier and the underside of the caste barrier.

**Henry Reynolds, Aboriginal-European Contact History (emphasis added)**