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AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE POLICY

A STUDY OF EMPIRE AND NATION (1897–1910)

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PART FOUR

IMPERIALIST DEFENCE POLICY: THE TACIT ALLIANCE
(1909 and After)

(In) Australia ... there is not merely a compatibility, but even a causal connection between nationalism and imperialism ... 

RICHARD JEBB, 1905.

From the theoretical naval and military stand-point, it is argued that any system of divided control is unsound. On the other hand, to give up control is to surrender the principle of local autonomy .... Wise statesmen will, however, recognize that national sentiment, after all, is a more potent cement than written agreements drawn up by naval and military strategists.

SENATOR PEARCE, May 1914.

Australians will stand beside the mother country to help and defend her to our last man and our last shilling.

ANDREW FISHER, July 1914.
More than a decade of discussion had failed to produce an acceptable imperial dimension in Australian policy. The federalist solution had been rejected by the innovators. Yet they in turn had not met the complex requirements of security and sentiment. The nationalist era ended with incomplete projects and unfulfilled aspirations. Then in 1909 it suddenly seemed possible to resolve all major difficulties.

The first half of the year saw the stimulation and the consolidation of imperial sentiment. The second half witnessed the reshaping of previous schemes and their integration into a new concept of imperial defence. Further appeal to Whitehall produced promises and plans which assumed that the demand for nation impregnability and the desire for imperial autarky were not merely co-existent but reciprocal. The results pleased Deakin, satisfied Bridges, and delighted Creswell. They won the approval of Cook and Reid, their followers and supporters. They were at first reluctantly accepted by Fisher, Pearce, and Hughes; and within a year were being championed as if they were the sole product of the Labour Party. Though some time was to pass before decisions were translated into detailed projects, the deliberations of 1909 resulted in policies which most Australians acknowledged met the demands of nation and Empire.

With the acquisition of the fleet unit suggested by Sir John Fisher and the creation of the National Citizen Force along the lines approved by Lord Kitchener, the Commonwealth possessed the trappings of a nation-state within Greater Britain. Henceforward, it could assume responsibilities for regional — not merely local — defence. Because the fleet unit included a battle-cruiser of use only when operating with the Royal Navy on the high seas and because the new army was to provide the men and material for an expeditionary force that would become "as an instrument of policy", the relation between Australia and Great Britain became that of an alliance. Henceforward, its naval posture would be one of active cooperation and its military potential would be sufficient to follow suit. Because Australians continued to demand control over their
forces in peacetime and because they still feared catastrophe in the Pacific as well as danger from the European enemies of the Crown, few formal arrangements were made. Henceforward, the policy of the Commonwealth on the outbreak of war would be one of active belligerency but the degree of military commitment, it was said, would depend on the circumstances. Lord Esher acknowledged the new stance in 1911. "The Empire", he said, "is not a federation, but an alliance between greater and lesser States based upon understandings not so clearly defined as those which exist between some States in Europe."²

Yet the very forces which compelled prudent restraint in peace could lead to fervent commitment in war. Germans did not aid Austrians nor Frenchmen respond to Russians as Australians joined the British in 1914. By then Australian aspirations and Imperial sentiment had become so fused that the British cause became for many a national crusade. By then the Commonwealth had ships and men in excess of its needs for security in the Pacific. They were willingly used in the European maelstrom. If 1899 was the exception to colonial policy, 1914 saw the fulfilment of the decisions of 1909 and all the impulses which preceded them.
... (it) is difficult to conceive any circumstances under which an overseas Dominion would not feel called upon to throw in its lot entirely with the Mother Country. It might possibly be that a war would be unpopular in a given Dominion for a short period, but let the Empire, or any portion of the Empire, be seriously threatened, and I am sure the revulsion of feeling would be very great indeed.

Colonel Foxton, 1909.

... (We) accept the position that the burden of defence must in the future be borne, not by part, but by whole Empire. We accept the position that a fuller Imperial partnership, particularly in regard to defence, is indispensable to the future security of the Imperial fabric. (We) will provide an expeditionary force for immediate despatch overseas or elsewhere whenever the Government of the day feel themselves under an obligation.

Joseph Cook, 1909.

... (We) are in the unique position of being a nation within a nation. A country with a separate navy. (But) while the Navy that we are establishing shall be, in some respects, separate from the British Navy, it shall at the same time be auxiliary to that Navy. All ships shall be kept ready for any emergency. Whatever wars the Empire may become involved in, we shall be involved also. If those wars be of a naval character, we shall be directly concerned in them, even though we may have done nothing to bring them about...

Senator Pearce, 1910.
The coalition of remnant Liberal and the Free-trader groups resulted not only in the Fusion government of May 1909 and the fall of the second Labour ministry. It produced two strong parties in the House and martialed the numbers to pass legislation with ease until April 1910. It also assembled Imperialists of the most diverse kinds behind Alfred Deakin. Those who had criticized nationalist defence were now aligned with its key exponent.

The elimination of the "little Australians" from power had been effected amid a burst of Imperial fervour not unlike that of 1899. For more than two decades Australians had been assured that the Royal Navy would always maintain sufficient battle strength to engage any two of its most powerful adversaries. In Opposition, Deakin's present allies had often pointed to the two-power standard not realizing what a shibboleth it had become. Naval rivalry had not merely increased; it had been transformed. The appearance of Fisher's Dreadnought battleship in 1906 had rendered obsolescent all previously built capital ships. All naval powers had only to build the same class of vessel, ship for ship with the British, to rival the fighting capacity of the Royal Navy. After a pause of eighteen months to absorb the implications of the new design, Germany did so. By 1909 mistaken assessments in the Admiralty indicated that within the immediate future Great Britain could claim less than a ratio of five to four against one naval rival. Other figures, produced in the House of Commons by the British Conservatives, suggested British sea power would be eclipsed before 1913. A campaign that began with an attack on the restricted naval programme of Asquith's Liberal government ended in furore when the two-power standard was officially abandoned. Though British opinion was divided, the effect was equal to that felt by the world when Russia exploded her first atomic device. The grim fact, clear for all Australians to see, was that Britain no longer possessed a monopoly of naval might.3

On the 19th of March 1909 the Age sounded the alarm. It
reduced the issues to three. The Empire and Australia were in deadly peril. Future navalist projects would include not only measures for local defence but a force capable of positive "assistance to the Empire in time of emergency ...". In the meantime, since Great Britain needed Dreadnoughts to meet the German challenge, Australians must provide them. Within a week the rest of the daily press expounded the arguments of the British Conservatives with increasing excitement and hurled cries of "Imperial Defiance in Imperial Defence" at the world. Civic meetings in all capitals passed resolutions favouring the gift of battleships to the Motherland. Each donation was reported in the press which urged Australians to greater sacrifice. The Dreadnought scare was under way.

Deakin and Cook applauded these spontaneous outbursts of loyalty. By the 22nd of March Deakin supported the movement; on the same day Cook promised a Dreadnought for Great Britain if ever he was returned to office. This emphasized the political content of the campaign which had from the outset been manipulated partly to expose Labour's wanton neglect of Imperial responsibilities. Fisher was called upon by the press to contribute a battleship in the name of the Commonwealth as New Zealand had done. He accepted instead Creswell's scheme and arranged for Australian representation at the Imperial Defence Conference the British government felt compelled to convene. At this, the premiers of New South Wales and Victoria - in addition to other brave resolutions - promised to provide a battleship should the federal government fail its manifest Imperial duty. The agitation continued without relief until Asquith's government withstood a vote of no-confidence on its naval programme with an overwhelming majority. Then, as one contemporary observed, "... something of a chill fell upon the movement ..." and many began to ask whether they had been encouraged to take part in "a political coup de theatre". Of the millions promised for one, two, and often it seemed three Dreadnoughts, only a little more than £100,000 was collected. The Dreadnought scare was over.

It had been more than mere melodrama. On reflection C.E.W. Bean felt that the quiet and inscrutable Australian had responded like a wild
BULL: "HERE ARE THE GIFTS OF OUR OVER-SEA COLONIES. A DREADNOUGHT ACHE FROM AUSTRALIA, CANADA, NEW ZEALAND, SOUTH AFRICA, AND INDIA."

ANNIA: "GOD BLESS MY SONS!"
bull "nostrils wide, at the first scent of danger". Beneath the "superficial political squabble" he believed that silent body of men and women who constituted the heart of the nation had fulfilled the prophecy made by George Reid at the Jubilee Celebrations. Others noted the same quickening of nationalist sentiment amid Imperial fervour that had marked Commonwealth participation in the South African War. Senator Pearce felt that the principal consequence of the crisis had been not so much the rallying of support for a greater Royal Navy under British control but the "solidifying opinion in favour of an Australian-owned and controlled Navy ...". The spirit of 1909 was not, however, that of 1897 or 1902.

For both Bean and Pearce had sensed that the crisis had undermined the assumptions of the "little Australians". Nationalists of all kinds continued to believe that Australia should be made impregnable. Indeed the Dreadnought scare had greatly intensified fears of the Yellow Peril in both the press and the top levels of government. While German rivalry continued it was difficult to see how the Royal Navy could concentrate any battle strength in the Pacific. At the same time substantial doubts had been raised about the sanity of an Imperial policy which stopped at self-defence. Such had been the misgivings within the Fisher ministry about Labour's policy, that he had hastened to inform the Governor-General - and the public - that while his programmes would continue to provide for Australian defence, "still, in the event of a crisis, all the resources of the Commonwealth would be cheerfully placed at the disposal of the Mother Country ...". This was more than an admission drawn from Fisher in the midst of clamour. It was part of a gradual change in attitudes whose processes Richard Jebb had been quick to perceive, if not to examine: as each Australian demand was accommodated within new concepts of Empire, national and Imperial sentiment became not merely the more compatible but reciprocal.

The Anglo-Japanese Alliance had never been popular among Australian nationalists, and after 1909 Imperialists looked upon it with reservations. Nor was it ever viewed favourably within the Admiralty. Sir John Fisher considered the treaty "the very worst thing that England
ever did for herself. And he had continued to hold this view partly because he wished to see Anglo-American naval cooperation and partly because he wanted to create a self-sufficient Imperial navy capable of dealing with all possible foes. Many an influential British Imperialist, interested equally in defence and preferential trade, also envisaged an autarkic Empire in a state of permanent siege. As one of the many heirs to Chamberlain's later campaigns, L.S. Amery explained one fundamental assumption in 1910:

We exist as an Empire today ... by the grace of the Americans and the Japanese. No empire can live for long by foreign favour or foreign alliances. If its strength is not within itself it must in the end come to grief.

The words could have been Hughes'. On such shared assumptions it was possible to extend the drive for national self-sufficiency to plans for Imperial autarky. As Senator Pearce put it in 1914:

Australia believes that in the interests of the Empire itself we cannot leave British interests in the Pacific either to the arbitrament of European nations or the friendly keeping of an Asiatic ally.

Once Australians were shown how nationalist plans could be integrated in Imperial defence, they were ready - if not eager - to maintain British interests in the Far East to suit their own ends.

The assimilation of many basic tenets of policy in a manner which the Bulletin of the eighties would have found inconceivable was aided by the attitudes of those parliamentarians who claimed special privileges and duties as first class citizens of the white Empire. More and more from 1904 Australian chauvinism resulted in demands upon Greater Britain rather than postures of defiance at the rest of the world. In that year Deakin announced:

... our own interests and those of the Empire are bound up with the application of our present forms of government to the new circumstances of a new world, as a preparation for the new Empire that is to be ...

Having drawn from English liberal ideals to justify Australian opposition to the Boer War, H.B. Higgins also had no hesitation in reversing the
process and asserting that Australian standards were best for Imperial policy. Labour parliamentarians agreed. It was not only that the Commonwealth was held to be the social laboratory for Greater Britain. The aspirations and values which nationalists wished to embody in domestic legislation were projected upon the British world. Thus the development of self-government in Australia was urged upon the British government as the solution to the problems of Home Rule; the principle of White Australia was to be applied so that no British ship trading with the Commonwealth would carry coloured crews; the navigation laws were to be altered so that English seamen would serve under Australian awards; British leadership and supremacy was to be preserved in South Africa because of its manifest virtues in the Antipodes; nationalist protectionist policies were fused with Chamberlain's campaign for tariff preference. The issue which provoked the most forthright stand was the introduction of Chinese labour on the Rand. Watson and Deakin felt their opposition was justified on two grounds: Commonwealth participation in the South African War gave it the status of an Imperial partner; Australians had unique experience in immigration problems and self-government which the British administration must heed. Nationalists were convinced that they had the right to correct aberrations in Imperial policy not merely because some values were held in common but because Australian standards were best for all Britons.

These gestures were more important than accomplishment. They became part of Australian Imperialism. When in 1911 Fisher declared that each Dominion possessed the fundamental right to strike the British flag during an unjust war, Hughes could answer Labour's critics:

... any departure from recognition of the common standards, the common destiny, and the common responsibility of the various members of the Empire ... would be not merely destructive of an idea, but fatal ... to the independence of some of them .... (N)eutrality .... is (therefore) incompatible with any form of alliance .... I know Mr. Fisher's views very well ... he was merely emphasizing the other side of an idea which I have put forward ...

The gestures also indicated how an excess of national enthusiasm or of Imperial loyalty could result in the same fervent support for Britain
and Empire. Defence policy was never based on an examination of explicit and definite Australian interests, despite the acceptance of Imperial duties in the Pacific during an emergency. The war aims implied in policy were therefore vague, but potent: the defence of Australian soil, the preservation of national values, and the maintenance of British integrity. In the absence of a clear and present danger to the Commonwealth, the values of liberty, justice, democracy, self-government - and even White Australia - no less than the fate of the Empire could be determined in the Pacific islands or the North Sea, Gallipoli or Flanders Fields.

It was an impulse such as this that Bean thought he had detected during the Dreadnought scare. Yet "the superficial political squabble" was more important than he acknowledged. One price of coalition had been the reshaping of Deakin's schemes to satisfy Cook and his followers. Indeed Cook was made Minister for Defence. Yet much of the foundation of opposition to naval and military reform had crumbled. Heid now admitted that the Empire was by no means as secure as he thought; nor was Australia as safe as he had suggested. In this spirit he congratulated Hughes on his prescience late in 1909. The danger was sufficient to justify new programmes. With Liberals still favouring a National Guard and conservatives demanding new militia forces, the plans for universal training were therefore thrown back into the melting-pot. With nationalists still favouring a localized naval force and Imperialists demanding an addition to British naval strength, order had to be imposed on the confused suggestions for submarines, destroyers, cruisers, increased naval contributions, and donations for battleships that the scare had left in its wake. The Fusion had but one general commitment - the possible gift of a Dreadnought from the Commonwealth.

On assuming office the Prime Minister immediately attempted to clarify matters by yet another appeal to Whitehall. On the 4th of June 1909 Deakin, the Imperialist, informed the British government that apart from proposals for coastal defence, his ministry "now begs to offer to the Empire an Australian Dreadnought ...". Deakin, the nationalist, added "or such addition to its naval strength as may be determined after
consultation with the Naval and Military Conference in London, at which it will be represented".  

* * *

At the Imperial Conference of 1907 the British government had acknowledged the differential growth of national sentiment in Greater Britain. The result had been the encouragement of the separate and disparate local policies Tweedmouth had been prepared to condone rather than the degree of coordination Haldane had suggested. The naval crisis revealed the opportunity to redress the balance. Could the Dominions be encouraged to provide for their own security in such a manner that their forces would be capable of contributing "immediately and materially to the requirements of Imperial defence"? To answer this question Asquith convened the Imperial Defence Conference in July 1909.  

The plans and briefs prepared by the Admiralty and the War Office were comprehensive and thorough. Yet no enemy was postulated for the Dominion delegations. Naval rivalry with the Triple Alliance was mentioned though the friendly relations between Great Britain and all European powers were stressed. The military defence of all parts of the Empire was also mentioned though neither the source nor the degree of danger was specified. Doubtless to strengthen its case and possibly because it hoped for strength in the Pacific when the Japanese Alliance had run its course, the Admiralty hinted darkly that by 1915 the strength of German and Japanese fleets would be "very formidable, and the position of Australia in the event of war might be one of some danger". Without explaining the nature of treaty commitments or suggesting probable spheres of operation, the War Office dwelled upon the need for Imperial military forces "available for expeditionary action ... to protect our land frontiers, to cooperate with an allied Power, to carry a war into an enemy's country, and to bring it to a decisive issue". British recommendations rested on the prevalence and intensity of vague fears. For it was assumed that "some day" a
conflict of huge dimensions might sweep the world and involve all Greater Britons. The aim was clearly to create an Empire impregnable in peace and formidable in war. 19

In substance Haldane's recommendations rested on the proposals of 1907: common organization, training, and weapons for all the Crown's citizen forces to enhance their capabilities for mutual support and coordination. Greater stress was, however, placed on amending colonial legislation so that whole units could volunteer for overseas service. The new Imperial General Staff could then draw up strategic plans which would incorporate the total military might of the Empire. These would overcome the disorganization which marked the South African campaigns, yet would not interfere with the control of Dominions over their forces or the spontaneity of offers in times of crisis. By 1909 Hutton's vision had at last become part of the official basis for military autarky. Explaining the role of the Imperial Staff, Haldane had earlier declared:

Canada might easily add five or six territorial divisions for her own defence, and for the assistance of Great Britain in times of emergency .... Australia might produce five divisions, New Zealand one, South Africa four or five. The Colonies will (so add to our regular and citizen forces that we will eventually possess) an army of the Empire of ... twenty-three army corps. The German army has just twenty-three .... 20

A similar spirit pervaded the Admiralty. Tweedmouth had been replaced by Reginald McKenna whose cool judgement now tempered Sir John Fisher's ruthless enthusiasm. Once a protege of Sir Charles Dilke, McKenna not only felt that he understood the aspirations stirring Greater Britain but had become so familiar with naval hopes in the Commonwealth that he supposed the rest of the Dominions might eventually follow whatever path he could prepare for the Australians. At the time Fisher was under a cloud. He had been chastized for taking insufficient interest in the Committee of Imperial Defence. He had been charged by his most influential critic, Lord Beresford, with gross neglect of measures to protect the sea-borne commerce of the Empire. He was also acutely aware that the
Admiralty had failed to organize the Eastern Fleet of cruiser squadrons contemplated from before 1904. Now, then, was the appropriate time to plan in such large terms that critics would be confounded and lines of future Dominion naval policy would be set for all time. The basic premise used by the two Lords of the Admiralty, Fisher later explained, was simple: "... our greater Colonies are practically independent nations and are not going to subscribe to other people's Navies." 21

Indeed McKenna and Fisher had seen the issues raised by the Australian response to the naval crisis more clearly than Deakin. It was certain that Australians would wish to proceed with their own naval plans. The outburst of imperial loyalty in no way denied the solid trunk of nationalism upon which any lasting scheme must rest. It was obvious that Creswell's destroyers were as defective as Tweedmouth's submarines. Both involved ill-founded strategic judgement, inadequate protection against raiders or invasion, services doomed to inaction and inefficiency, vessels of no value to the Royal Navy, and poor imperial politics. It was probable that at the policy level the problem of control could be easily overcome. The discussions provoked by Deakin and the later attitude of Labour indicated that administrative decisions about the role of the Senior Naval Officer and the limits of the Australian Station would ensure Commonwealth control in peace and Admiralty direction in war. It was clear that limited finance was no longer the barrier Deakin thought. Local naval defence and the gift of a Dreadnought which the Fusion ministry had promised would cost far more than £500,000 annually for the next twenty years, irrespective of all shore establishments. How, then, could nationalist aspirations and imperial sentiment be welded in a scheme within the terms of reference in Deakin's telegram?

Fisher had the answer. In the recently launched battle-cruiser, the Indomitable, he saw an exciting equivalent to the Dreadnought, almost as formidable in fire-power and greater in speed. There was the weapon. It would deter or destroy commerce raiders of any kind; it could form squadrons more powerful than any enemy in distant seas; it could also play an important role in the concentration of battle fleets. With
characteristic gusto, Fisher later described the potential of colonial navies thus:

The Observer has hit the nail on the head in its leading article recommending the Indomitable type for colonial imitation, and not the small Beresfordian cruisers, which like ants will all be eaten up by one 'indomitable' armadillo, which puts out its tongue and licks them all up! 22

In the creation of a fleet unit with attendant vessels of complementary abilities he saw that local security and the protection of sea-borne commerce would be found in operations on the high seas. There lay the germs of an Australian naval policy anticipated eight years before by Beaumont. Accordingly, the Admiralty exhorted the Dominions to dismiss all idea of local naval forces and create navies. As in 1865 and 1867 Australia could blaze the trail. The Commonwealth could organize its own self-contained fleet capable of both offence and defence: one battle-cruiser; three second-class cruisers; six modified River Class destroyers; and three submarines. To establish the model the British were prepared to assist. If Australians raised £E500,000 annually, Whitehall was willing to grant £E250,000 annually for maintenance. Apart from shore establishments, the Commonwealth fleet unit would be financed by Imperial cooperation.

This, however, was only part of the grand design. Once equipped with fleet units the Dominions could cooperate to maintain naval supremacy in the Pacific, the very area which caused Australians most alarm and the sphere where British naval strength was weakest. In combination the fleet units could sweep the Eastern seas and, should a grave crisis arise, deter the enemy until battle strength at present concentrated in European waters was redistributed. Fisher explained the future to Esher:

I am surprised how utterly both the Cabinet and the Press have so failed to see the "inwardness" of the new "Pacific Fleet" .... It means eventually Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the Cape (that is, South Africa) and India running a complete Navy! We manage the job in Europe. They'll manage it against the Yankees, Japs, and Chinese as the occasion demands out there. 23

Here, again, the British would assist. Pending decision by the other Dominions, the Royal Navy would establish units equivalent to the Austra-
lian on the China and East Indies Stations if the Australians would take
the first step. Slowly the British-Australasian Fleet would be replaced
by the Imperial Pacific Fleet.

The Australian delegation was awed, but not overwhelmmed, by the
scale of the British proposals. To represent the Commonwealth Deakin had
chosen Colonel Foxton, a minister without portfolio in the Fusion govern-
ment. A cautious and tactful politician from Queensland, Foxton was a
militia officer in the Field Force of decidedly conservative views. He
had championed Hutton's schemes, favoured increased contributions under
the Naval Agreement, and discussed the formation of an Imperial Reserve
with Deakin in 1907. Yet there was little reason for the suspicion and
indignation caused in Labour ranks by this replacement for Senator Pearce.
Foxton understood fully the Prime Minister's purpose which was fundamentally
the same as that outlined earlier for Sir George Clarke. Moreover, he was
accompanied by Creswell and Bridges, the one eager to wrest from the
Admiralty approval for coastal defence where Deakin had failed and the
other adamant that no Imperial commitment should be countenanced before
domestic military policy was settled. In addition, Foxton had been
instructed that while the Commonwealth would agree to "a warlike machinery
so organized as to be instantly ready for war" he would not "be able to
promise the enlistment of Australians in military forces for other than
home defence or to weaken the Federal Parliament's control over the whole
of the local naval and military forces in times of peace". 24 It was clear
from the outset, then, that within these limits the Australian delegation
could support the British request for preparations "for the general defence
of the Empire". 25

Quick to grasp the precedents for Haldane's proposals and the
absence of any infringement of local autonomy, Foxton displayed none of
the suspicion that fired Smuts and Herriman from South Africa or Borden
from Canada. He quietly stated that all were acceptable — in principle;
that all would be implemented — as far as possible; and that Colonel
Bridges would agree to technicalities — as far as he saw fit. He was
quite prepared to support the British case on these terms, and with some
justice informed Deakin that the military proposals were "mostly in accord with Australian ideals and practice ....". The basis of this agreement was revealed during the discussion. In refusing to pledge the Cape, Merriman summarized the case for the dissentients. To raise expeditionary forces, he said, always poses the question:

What is the war about - what has led you to go into war? Supposing you had a war in the Balkans ... the colonists would be very reluctant indeed to send a force to engage in that .... (Do) you suppose that any colonist would for a single moment send an expeditionary force to help an Eastern Power? Never! 27

Complexities arising out of Dominion interests in the Imperial maze did not bedevil Foxton any more than ideas of neutrality or passive belligerency mentioned by other delegates. His answer was simple: no Imperial war would be unpopular for long; a conflict of any dimension would lead to fervent commitment. Gone was the reservation Reid had voiced in 1897. 28

McKenna's proposals took a little longer for the Australians to evaluate. Yet even while he continued to expound Deakin's brief before the conference, Foxton requested ministerial direction convinced that the Admiralty schemes "more nearly approach our views than those of the other Dominions ....". 29 Here at last was the resolution to the multiple issues raised by the navalist campaign, the substance of a policy Australian in origin and Imperial in end and value, and the promise of a navy in which each faction could find something of value. Would the Fusion government accept it? At first Creswell, suspicious that this was another piece of chicanery, felt that it should not. Then as he grasped the potential of the new force, he became increasingly enthusiastic. To direct a fleet unit instead of destroyers surpassed his wildest dreams. With the promise of a battle-cruiser, nationalist advocate became new Imperialist. Deeply impressed by the "great trust and responsibility" the British bestowed upon the Commonwealth, Creswell exhorted the Fusion ministry to spare no effort "to make the vessels of the Australian Unit such an efficient addition to the Royal Navy, as to do us honour even in that distinguished company". 30
JOSEPH COOK

... an Australian policy for full Imperial partnership ...

COLONEL FOXTON

... no Imperial war can be unpopular for long ...
a precedent established in the first parliament: a loan of £3,500,000 was to be raised to finance the project. Two days later Joseph Cook announced the new naval programme to the House. It was designed, he said, to ensure Australian security in the Pacific and to meet the responsibilities of Imperial partnership. Shortly afterwards the Naval Loan Act 1909 was passed.

At the instigation of McKenna and Fisher, a distinctive Australian naval policy had been decided. Deakin had failed to reorganize the Empire. His complex procedures had borne fruit. Creswell had suffered considerable frustration in the pursuit of futile policies. Now he, too, was triumphant.

*   *   *

The military policy of the Fusion ministry involved greater difficulties. As yet it had no Imperial _imprimatur_. Even so, on the 21st of September, Cook introduced the Defence Bill of 1909 which aimed, by a series of compromises, to overcome all the principal objections within Australia and to produce an army equivalent to the proposed fleet unit.

The conservatives had made it a condition of coalition that the Field Force would be reformed, not abolished. Fundamentally, then, the bill was designed to meet the objections of those militia officers who had opposed the institution of the National Guard and to satisfy Hutton's followers who had urged the use of universal training to infuse new life into his schemes.* The most satisfactory features of the legislation introduced by Deakin and Pearce were to be implemented so that youths would be compulsorily trained — but only to the age of twenty. They could then voluntarily enlist in the Field Force. The ultimate goal was to create a militia army at the war strength Hutton had recommended, complete in all arms and services, with a huge trained reserve for further expansion.

* The scope of piecemeal and essential reform contemplated by the ministry can be gauged from the criticisms examined in Chapters Nine and Ten above.
In all the Commonwealth would command 200,000 troops. Gone was the appeal to improvised forces, campaigns of resistance, and guerrilla warfare. The stress was clearly upon the creation of citizen forces more efficient and better-equipped than the British Territorials.

The Fusion ministry was also prepared to implement some of the proposals discussed at the 1909 Conference. The Imperial General Staff (Commonwealth Section) was established. The path towards Imperial cooperation was cleared of minor barriers. Three aspects of South African experience were not to be repeated. Bridges urged the formation of Australian troops into divisions not only for home defence, but so that they would not again be scattered amid British forces. He also stressed that, should an expeditionary force ever be organized, Australians should not be tied to the protection of lines of communications unless they directly served their compatriots. Nor was the ghost of Breaker Morant to bedevil Anglo-British relations. After prolonged correspondence with the War Office, it was agreed that on active service Australians would operate under the Army Act. But Australian officers would pass judgement on their own men and all serious offenders would be shipped back to the Commonwealth for punishment. Deakin and Cook were apparently prepared to go further than Bridges. Once the new scheme was launched, it was implied, the Defence Acts would be amended to allow the immediate despatch of an expeditionary force anywhere within the Australian sphere of interest—or beyond.34

Despite the strength of the Fusion in the House, the military policy of Imperial partnership provoked considerable opposition. All Labour and some Liberal parliamentarians thought it a retrograde step. Lieutenant-Colonel Legge agreed. The Daily Telegraph and Argus, still opposed to compulsion, suspected that Cook had fallen victim to Deakin's wiles. As important, the Teutonic and Yellow Perils were being discussed in ministerial circles, yet neither the government nor the first Chief of the General Staff, Brigadier-General Hoad, could decide the strategic foundation which would justify their military programme.* Help was at hand.

* These difficulties have been more fully described in Chapter Eight above.
The Defence Act 1909 was given Royal Assent on the 13th of December. Twelve days later Hoad and Legge arrived in Port Darwin to meet Lord Kitchener. If Rome could not satisfy the ministry's detailed requirements, the Caesar on vacation would.\(^{35}\)

Conscious of the need for military advice equivalent to the naval proposals of the 1909 Conference, Deakin had invited Kitchener to visit Australia earlier in July. Apparently he was given liberty to recommend the most sweeping reform to complete the Fusion's policies. In reality he was expected to pronounce judgement on the "possible invasion of this country", to provide strategic foundations for existing projects, and to amend them in the light of previous schemes for universal training.\(^{36}\) He was also to bear in mind "not only the public interests of the Commonwealth" but "Imperial reasons (such) as ... the General Staff so as to associate military forces of all Dominions with those of the Mother Country".\(^{37}\) It is almost certain that Kitchener acted on no advice from the Committee of Imperial Defence though he may have been given general directions by the War Office. It is certain that he exercised his private judgement within the existing Australian context which both Hoad and Legge clarified for him. With their assistance, he was able to submit his recommendations on the 12th of February 1910. The broad principles of national and Imperial defence were then privately explained to Deakin and Cook during the following weeks and it was agreed that one of Kitchener's aides, Major-General Kirkpatrick, would be appointed Inspector-General to direct the implementation of the scheme and to unfold its responsibilities as the new National Citizen Force came into being.\(^{38}\)

Despite many contradictory features, the Kitchener scheme settled the basis of universal service. The Field Force would be gradually absorbed in the National Citizen Force. From the age of twelve until twenty-five males would be compulsorily trained. Though emphasis was placed upon recruit training, men were expected to supplement a mere six days of annual compulsory service with voluntary drills. The nation was divided into battalion areas to be controlled by permanent officers educated at a central military college. Thus would the 1909 Act be amended.
EASTWARD HO!

Britannia (to India). "We can ill spare him; but you see we give you of our best!"

PUNCH, July 16, 1902

... the Caesar to whom Deakin appealed ...
Thus would the virtues the innovators wished to inculcate in Australians be impressed from schooldays to domesticity. Thus would the Commonwealth possess a competent military machine. By 1920, 40,000 troops could be detailed for garrison duties, yet remain part of a mobile army of seven Light Horse Brigades and seven Infantry Divisions.

Although the new army was created to meet all possible enemies, Kitchener's published strategic assessment did not openly admit the probability of invasion. Exercising his famed intuition, he informed Legge that a great conflict in which Australia would be directly involved was possible before 1920. In this context the temporary loss of Royal Naval supremacy in the Pacific, it was said, was "quite conceivable". Should the British government fail to maintain the proper combination of might and diplomacy, it was implied, Australians could expect not merely raids and landing parties but operations of greater size - if not full-scale invasion. Even so, it was suggested, "the best defence is generally by taking the offensive and there should therefore be no difference in the enrolment, organization, and equipment of any unit (of the National Citizen Force)". 39

In a guarded fashion Kitchener had rested his assessment on the principles of national impregnability, Imperial autarky, and the combination of the military might of the Empire. These principles Kirkpatrick expounded during the ensuing three years in a fashion to satisfy alarmists. Despite the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Japan was chosen as the likely enemy of Australia. From European enemies or Asian adversaries, the forces could expect attack by three or four unarmoured cruisers accompanied by transports capable of landing 2,000 troops. Should, however, British and Australian naval forces be defeated, the enemies could despatch expeditionary forces. They would, of course, court defeat at the hands of the Australians and would risk being cut off from the source of supply once British superiority was re-established. Such actions were, nevertheless, possible. Only if Great Britain were defeated could Australian territory "be successfully conquered and permanently occupied by an organized invader from overseas". 40 While such a defeat was inadmissable,
preparations for disaster on a scale just one degree less grave than this would be wise. Plans had therefore to be prepared for the mobilization of the Australian army to meet an invader landing at Brisbane, Newcastle, Sydney, or Melbourne. Coastal transports and naval cover had to be arranged for movement of special expeditionary forces so that an invader could be expelled from Tasmania, South Australia, Western Australia, and the Northern Territory.  

What was the mobile army of over 100,000 troops to do if the scale of attack remained limited to raids? Was it only to maintain public confidence? Kirkpatrick replied that preparation for offensive operations was the "most effectual means of employing an army as an instrument of policy".  

There were specific Australian interests in the Pacific demanding protection. The creation of a Royal Australian Navy not merely imbued Australian policy with a spirit of offensive but clarified the proper sphere of external military operations. The navy would want enemy ports occupied and it was essential to deny hostile powers access to all probable bases. It was essential therefore to prepare for campaigns in New Caledonia, the New Hebrides, German New Guinea, and adjoining islands. The sphere would necessarily be extended by cooperation with New Zealand forces. And plans must be laid for combined operations with the British in the Phillipines and India. Events would reveal the extent of more purely Imperial responsibilities.

This advice implied that insofar as British might and British diplomacy protected the Commonwealth in the Pacific, Australian troops would be available for general Imperial service. Did Kitchener have this in mind? It is possible. Before his visit to Australia he informed the British ambassador in Tokyo that "the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was a sheet-anchor" in British Far Eastern policy and that "in all her legitimate aspirations we should stand by Japan through thick and thin" — including her claims on Manchuria. Kitchener clearly thought the Alliance would be renewed. So it proved. And before his visit to Japan, he was asked to accept the Mediterranean command. On the 14th of July 1909, Esher explained the great potential of that post:
The underlying idea is that the Mediterranean Garrison should form a nucleus of a great Imperial Concentration in time of war—a concentration of Imperial forces, naval and military, drawn from every quarter of the Empire.

I need not elaborate the idea, which you will seize at once; from that central position you, with your experience and authority, will be able to do more to influence Colonial opinion than you would be able to do, or than anyone would be able to do, from here. 45

Though Kitchener later refused the position, he doubtless had these duties in his mind when he visited Australia. The plan was to create a great Imperial Strategic Reserve in Egypt. So it eventually proved. 46

On the 14th of February 1910 Deakin announced that, having appealed to Caesar, the Fusion would "defer to Caesar's judgement". 47 The Defence Act of 1909 would be amended accordingly. Indeed Caesar had settled many issues. His stature could be invoked to remove opposition to reform. His memorandum encompassed all Australian fears. His scheme promised the realization of all Australian hopes. There were, however, many unresolved problems. Would not the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance remove most of the dangers countenanced? What was Japanese intent? How could Australian statesmen proceed to move detailed assessments without knowledge of foreign policy? Did not the creation of the Royal Australian Navy limit the scale of attack for which such a massive army had been created? Would not the proposed Imperial Pacific Fleet offer security enough? And were it not to be organized, how could the army relieve any distant area in Australia when the enemy was assumed to have control of the seas? Was not the scale of preparations for home defence, both naval and military, excessive? Would other governments accept Kirkpatrick's recommendations for expeditionary forces which restored the balance between naval and military programmes? None of these questions were posed. The prime task was to end prevarication and implement military reform. On the 24th of March 1910 Cook informed the Military Board that future policy would be governed by the spirit and the letter of the Kitchener memorandum.

One month later the Fusion was overwhelmingly defeated in the
federal elections. Labour was returned with added strength and greater exuberance. Deakin's manoeuvres had seen the creation of a defence policy founded on a concept of Imperial partnership and forces capable of fulfilling the obligations of an active Imperial alliance. Labour was obliged to work within that context. Its role was not to negate Deakin's accomplishment. It carried most of the proposals to their final stages. It did, however, convert the active alliance into a tacit agreement.

* * *

Once in office Labour accepted the Admiralty proposals of 1909, but refused financial assistance from the British and repealed the Naval Loan Act in the belief that national defence projects should be paid from revenue. Hailed in some quarters as the essence of self-reliance, this step allowed Andrew Fisher to demand the construction of three lighter vessels in Australia. It also strengthened the claim for Commonwealth control in peace and increased the potential of its discretionary powers on the outbreak of war. Perhaps for this reason the limits of the Australian Station were so severely restricted. With that, hopes for regional defence diminished. Labour spent its three years of power unravelling the minor but complex problem of administration, recruitment, and shore establishments which arose once the Naval Defence Act came into operation on the 1st of January 1911.

The extent of Labour's commitment to the new Imperialism was often obscured by both its supporters and its detractors. Some members of the Opposition, now led by Joseph Cook, raised such a disturbance over Australian control that elements of the press charged the government with proto-republicanism. Many Labour members apparently did not see that the fleet unit could realize its potential only on the high seas. In many speeches the Prime Minister indicated that the fleet unit would be used primarily for local defence. In turn this provoked the question whether the initials of the much-vaunted Australian navy - R.A.N. - would be an apt description of Labour naval policy. Yet below the verbiage, the
ANDREW FISHER

... self-defence comes first ...

SENIOR PEARCE

... there can be no passive belligerency ...
direction of policy was clear. The acquisition of a fleet unit, said
Pearce in 1910, meant that a posture of benevolent neutrality or passive
belligerency in an Imperial war was no longer tenable. From its nature
and its method of control, the Royal Australian Navy would join the Royal
Navy in any emergency calling for naval operations. Whatever wars the
Empire was engaged upon, therefore, Australia would be involved.

In fact the spirit of Imperial cooperation envisaged by McKenna
ebbled more quickly in London than Melbourne. With the renewal of the
Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the intensification of German naval rivalry
after 1912, the Admiralty, under Winston Churchill, decided that it was
neither necessary nor desirable to fulfil the promises of 1909. The
British could not spare the vessels for the Imperial Pacific Fleet. The
project lapsed. Because the Commonwealth had done all that had been asked,
the Labour ministry was indignant at this breach of agreement. Suspicion
of British intentions was further inflamed when Churchill later suggested
that the Australian fleet unit be assembled at Gibraltar, there to form
the basis of a Dominion Squadron. At the time he faced more pressing
problems of matching the naval strength of the Triple Alliance in the
Mediterranean. And doubtless he considered it realistic to recommend that
Australians rest content with the protection afforded by British diplomacy
and the goodwill of Japan. In Australia it caused a furore.

By a quirk of parliamentary fortune Cook and the conservatives
were back in power when the storm broke. Significantly, his stand was
the same as that which would have been taken by Deakin or by Pearce. No
British government was to reassert the principle of Imperial survival by
the sacrifice of Australian security! This was a gross perversion of
Imperial policy! It was an insult to national self-respect! Though the
storm soon passed it left a reservoir of doubt and stiffened the resolve
of those who believed that the correct posture in peace - and perhaps in
war - was to examine carefully the British case before extensive involve-
ment. The two Australian parties had been reminded that there was both
a national and an Imperial content to their policy. If the British could
neglect the first and misinterpret the second, there was definite need
to maintain Commonwealth control over its armed forces in peacetime. In short, the alliance persisted but it was now tacit rather than active. This had become part of Australian policy, no longer a source of intense party controversy.

When on the 4th of October 1913 the principal elements of the Royal Australian Navy steamed line-ahead into Port Jackson, the welcome was tumultuous. Sir John Fisher's vision and Deakin's faith were embodied in the leading battle-cruiser, the Australia, with the Southern Cross at the jackstaff and the White Ensign fluttering from the stern. Beaumont's judgement and Forrest's deliberations were represented in the Melbourne and the Sydney. Creswell's persistence and Labour's resolute action were symbolized by the escorting destroyers Warrego, Parramatta, and Yarra. It was the occasion for grand speeches. But in the light of all that had preceded this moment, Cook's words held special meaning for his contemporaries:

Since Captain Cook's arrival, no more memorable event has happened than the advent of the Australian Fleet. As the former marked the birth of Australia, so the latter announces its coming of age, its recognition of the growing responsibilities of nationhood, and its resolve to accept and discharge them as a duty both to itself and to the Empire .... It is the expression of Australia's resolve to pursue, in freedom, its national ideals, and to hand down unimpaired and unsullied the heritage it has received, and which it holds and cherishes as an inviolable trust. 48

* * *

The third Labour ministry insisted upon modifications to the Kitchener scheme before it was incorporated in legislation. On the one hand, the long campaign conducted by Hughes had not resulted in an adequate measure of universal service. On the other, the stand taken by H.B. Higgins in the first parliament had seemed to be undermined by the Fusion government.
Lieutenant-Colonel Legge met the first objection. In substance, he stressed that the element of voluntary training recommended by Kitchener spelt disaster. Labour therefore accepted his advice and decided to make eight days drill per year as compulsory as eight days of camp. The compulsory training of all other arms was increased correspondingly. In effect, this did not only satisfy Hughes but other ministers who realized that the greater the measure of compulsory service the greater the restraint upon requesting whole units to volunteer for overseas service.

While this issue was being settled, Pearce and Hughes examined the possibility of dismissing Kirkpatrick and replacing him with an Australian more sympathetic to Labour's views. This they found they could not do without breaking faith with the War Office. Pearce decided, therefore, to ignore Kirkpatrick's strategic advice for the time being, and to use him merely as Inspector-General. This role Kirkpatrick played most effectively, exposing each weakness in the military system with a force and clarity absent in his predecessors. For he had two firm criteria: the standards set by Kitchener; and the assumption that the army must be ready for conflict within one month of the warning that an emergency was imminent.

With a clear policy and funds undreamt of in earlier days, Pearce then turned to administrative decisions in a manner military officers had long awaited. He gave new life to the Council of Defence and the administrative boards. There the problems of fixed defences were thoroughly examined - if not all solved. Pay was increased; a military college was established; armament and clothing factories began production. A huge programme to re-equip the forces with everything from field guns to aeroplanes was undertaken. In short, all that Hutton had hoped for - and far more - resulted from the implementation of the Kitchener scheme.

Yet in launching universal training Pearce proceeded with caution. The preliminary tasks of registering and medically examining all the youths the scheme involved were formidable in themselves. Although regulations were promulgated in June 1911, the full force of the law was not invoked until January 1913. Of the estimated 260,000 youths below the age of eighteen in Australia only 90,000 were being trained in 1914. The number
declared unfit was lower than Hughes would have estimated — less than six percent. The number brought before courts for neglect of duty was much higher — over twelve percent. Some declared that the period of training would have to be longer. Others were disturbed at the intrusion upon civil liberties. Many pointed to a total defence estimate of nearly £6,000,000 for experiments barely under way and wondered where it would all end. A few asked whether the danger facing Australia warranted the disruption. No one could with precision answer the question: What was the effect of compelling men and youths to give twenty-four Saturdays a year to the state without pay? In an apprehensive moment Pearce was moved to offer a tentative answer: "deep discontent". 49

Yet a moment of gloom did not rob Pearce and others of pride in their achievement. For by 1914 the experiment was pronounced a success. Already the Citizen Force boasted 45,000 young men and there was ample promise to be confident of the future. Nor did criticism obscure the zeal and enthusiasm that swept through the citizen officers drawn from the old militia as they saw their new army taking shape. Not only had their status been enhanced but articles in unit journals testified to their urgent desire for expertise. Such men were bound to wonder whether they would fight overseas. Pearce could not ignore the question forever or the assumptions in the Kitchener report which Kirkpatrick continued to expound. Officially decision was deferred. Unofficially plans were drawn up for an Australian expeditionary force. Between 1912 and 1914 at least two schemes were apparently drafted and put aside for use in times of emergency.

Yet although Deakin's efforts to infuse an Imperial dimension into military policy had been successful, these confidential arrangements bore the tenets of the tacit alliance. In 1912 Pearce asked Major C.B.B. White, the Director of Military Operations, and Major-General Gordon, the Chief of the General Staff, to produce a skeleton organization which would combine Australian and New Zealand forces roughly in proportion to their military contributions during the South African War. He did so on the express understanding that, as Kirkpatrick put it, preparations did
"not commit either government to their execution" but were "wise precautions, not definite obligations". He apparently agreed in principle that the sphere of combined operations might conceivably be those Kirkpatrick had outlined or that the units organized in one division could join "the Imperial forces during an Imperial war, should the respective people so decide to do". 50 But it was not the task of the Commonwealth to conceive what those operations might be. Moreover, Pearce laid down three conditions. No part of the Australian forces was to be assigned to overseas duty. All draft plans had to depend on individual and voluntary recruitment when the emergency arose in accord with the principle enunciated by Higgins a decade earlier and embodied in Section 49 of the Defence Act. The British government was not to be informed of his secret decision or led to believe that the Commonwealth would be prepared to commit its forces. Gordon felt that these conditions must lead to dislocation and confusion on the outbreak of war and a long period of training before embarkation. He desired the selection of special units or a list of individual trainees who in advance would "signify their willingness to serve overseas should the need arise". 51 Pearce was adamant. Major White therefore drafted a scheme for an expeditionary force of 12,000 volunteers drawn from the youthful members of the Citizen Force and men who had military experience in the militia.

Once the conservatives led by Cook came to power in June 1913, Gordon again objected to Pearce's arrangement. It is likely that another plan was then drafted, on the same basis as White's, for a complete Australian division "for service anywhere within the Empire or out of it ...". 52 This the Cook ministry apparently accepted and the Imperial government was informed of its decision. In a most tentative fashion, then, the basis had been laid for the Australian Imperial Forces. 53

In all other respects, the conservatives did not depart from the stand taken by Pearce. Such restraint, they thought, was in part justified by the fear that Australia was insecure - for all its defence preparations. Despite the explicit assurance Grey had given Andrew Fisher in 1911 that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance would have to be maintained to
protect all Imperial interests in the Pacific — or ignorant of the fact — the Chief of the General Staff assumed that the Alliance could be terminated at any time. And he apparently had no trouble convincing his civilian superiors that the nation was vulnerable to attack anywhere from Rockhampton to Geraldton on the Western coast. Further discussion revealed the enormity of the questions Kitchener had left unanswered. The Japanese, it was argued, could occupy any relatively unpopulated section of the continent "with the object of securing territorial accession upon the conclusion of the war" with positive gains to strengthen their hands at any peace conference. 54 There was no coordination between naval and military policies or between Commonwealth programmes and British naval dispositions to prevent this. The only solution, the Cook ministry decided, was to request another Imperial Conference. Sober investigation revealed, on the one hand, that Australian impregnability was impossible without reliance upon British might and diplomacy. On the other, it was extremely difficult to proceed with plans for use of the forces the Commonwealth had created without knowledge of British foreign policy and British war plans. And again, refusal to integrate national schemes into imperial defence deprived the Australians of the knowledge they thought they needed. For all the talk of partnership and alliance, the riddle of Empire at the policy level involved as many unanswered questions as in the eighties.

The time was not, however, ripe for misgivings within Australia. By and large, governments were content with partial resolution of their problems. The Commonwealth would soon have the forces of a nation-state. If it could not act like one, it did not yet wish to do so. External interest remained unexamined and no definite plans prepared for operations beyond the shores of the Commonwealth — not even in its own sphere of influence. Inordinate fears of Asian incursion marked definite limits to the degree of commitment to Empire — in peace. The impulse towards imperial partnership should be tempered by the persistence of the garrison mentality. Security, no less than self-respect and autonomy, demanded that there be no formal Imperial strategic war plan. As in the case with disagreements with Churchill over naval policy, the tacit alliance had become part of national — not party — policy.
On the 4th of May 1914 Senator Pearce summarized the Australian stance for the Governor-General. Traversing all the arguments provoked by the failure of the promise of 1909, he explained that the Royal Australian Navy was ready for "immediate and complete" cooperation in times of emergency. Until then it would remain firmly under Commonwealth control. Arguing once more that no alliance was more inherently unstable than the Anglo-Japanese but also acknowledging that Germany would be the Empire's enemy in both Europe and the Pacific, he admitted that plans existed for the mobilization of an expeditionary force within six weeks of the approach of a crisis. Nevertheless, the extent of military aid, he warned, would rest with the Commonwealth just as service abroad "must always be left to voluntary action". The absence of Imperial strategic plans, he said, need cause the British no concern. For "national sentiment, after all, is a more potent cement than written agreements ...".\(^5\)

Pearce was amply vindicated within two months, and the special connotations of the term "national" - so different now in usage from the days of the Imperial federationists - were to be further explored during the first two years of the Great War.

*    *    *

The Royal Australian Navy prepared for active service on the 30th of July 1914. Eleven days later control was formally transferred from the Commonwealth to the Admiralty. The ensuing six months saw the test of many pre-war arguments. The potential of cruiser warfare was manifest in Von Spee’s German China Squadron. The predictions of Rear-Admiral Sir William Rooke Creswell were partially realized in the operations of the *Emden*. But the raiding activities of that one enterprising enemy officer could never have been prevented, restricted, or deterred by a destroyer service in Australian waters. Sir John Fisher’s promise that a battle-cruiser would fulfil every requirement of Commonwealth policy was redeemed. The presence of the *Australia* not only worried Von Spee but became a dominant influence on all his decisions. The assurances
Vice-Admiral Sir William R. Creswell.
THE ADMIRALTY SOLUTION ...

Australia ... Battle Cruiser
... THE FLEET UNIT

Sydney ... Protected Cruiser

Parramatta ... Destroyer
implicit in British policy and explicit in advice from Whitehall were no less effective. With the declaration of war by Japan, the China Squadron proceeded to Germany so that its armoured cruisers could supplement the High Seas Fleet. If Coronel seemed to support the arguments of those Australians who had feared the grave weaknesses in the Royal Naval shield, Falkland justified the many Australians who had faith in British might. The new nationalists and the new Imperialists could both find honour and vindication in the engagement between the *Emden* and the *Sydney*. The raider which featured in so many hypothetical discussions was destroyed by an Australian man of war.

To engage the enemy the *Sydney* had left a convoy bearing an Australian expeditionary force destined soon to do battle near — if not in — the Balkans. The decision to meet unwritten military commitments had been taken one day before the formal declaration of war; and two of Hutton's protégés, Major-General Bridges and Major White, had been selected to lead the Commonwealth contingent of 20,000 men. It was they who made certain that the force to represent Australia would not be scattered amid British units to lose its identity as in 1899. It was they who strove to create a distinctive army from the trainees whom the advocates of universal service had produced, from the veterans of the South African War and the experienced militiamen on whom the federalists had depended, and from untrained citizens in whom everyone had placed trust. Haste, improvisation, and confusion there had certainly been. But the organization of units — and their eventual expansion — was eased by the matériel, the officers, and the plans which military reforms had produced. The force was ready to sail by the 21st of September. With all effort directed to that end, there was little to be spared for military expeditions to the North. Thus it was that the incomplete citizen army designed initially for defence against an enemy which seemed to threaten national existence and national values in the Pacific formed the genesis of an army for a distant war which was later held to involve the same dangers. Appropriately it was called the Australian Imperial Force.

But the advent of war revealed the inadequacy not only of schemes
but of policies justified as preparations for defence and for peace. By 1913 the extent of naval commitments in an Imperial war, it seemed, would be determined by the number of ships. Military commitment, it was believed, would be limited by national considerations. And, it was further assumed, Australians would be restrained by a cool and sober judgement of the nature of the British cause and the scale of the conflict. In true Whig fashion, Reid had declared in 1901: "Let us never forget that with all the glitter and glory of deeds of heroism on the field all these are black, dark chapters in the progress of humanity .... War is a horror." He was stressing but one aspect of an ambivalent attitude. The other Forrest emphasized when, two days before the outbreak of the Great War, he cried: "If Great Britain goes to her Armageddon, we will go with her!" Mingled with national and Imperial sentiment was an indifference to military affairs in peace matched by a will to war in times of crisis. Prolonged discussion of defence policy in a troubled world had emphasized the second by attempting to overcome the first.

The advocates of universal training had held that preparation for defence was a sacred duty. And defence, it was often said, was preparation for peace. Through military service men would be so introduced to the horrors of war that jingoism would be a thing of the past. Had not the Swiss proven this, they asked. The Swiss model was, in fact, seriously deficient. Peoples in arms conducted war with indisputable elan – and great savagery and aggression. All the states cited in the continuous debate had so acted – even the Swiss. Yet not only had the innovators studiously neglected the Imperial dimension of Australian experience. They had believed it both realistic and proper to march in line with the "modern European nations"; to recall the spirit of revolutionary France; and to scorn professional armies for their decorous encounters when war was "a brutal bloody game" in which success went to the "big battalions" and in which "a nation in arms had the last word amid the strife of peoples and the shock of interests". Despite themselves, they were preparing their compatriots for total war. This was a process obscured by the refusal to admit that the martial ethos they sought to create in the civilian population could operate lustily under the cloak of democracy and Empire.
From 1905 Deakin and Hughes had indicated the instability of this ambivalent attitude to war. In many respects they were Nietzsche's priest and warrior in federal parliament. Deakin claimed to be an expert only in the departments of peace and looked upon war as "the dread exception". Hughes carried the preparation for the inevitable conflict almost to the point of exultation. Yet neither Deakin nor Hughes had been untouched by the mood which led men to howl for blood in 1914. The corollary of the assertion that universal training would ensure no bloodshed and rape on Australian soil was that war would be conducted overseas - and that it would be conducted with vigour. Neither had examined the question that had given Cavan Duffy such concern forty years earlier: What was a war of defence? In the context of the times conflicts of any dimension greater than skirmishes with natives could be wars of defence - and on this crude criterion could warrant fervent commitment. It was H.B. Higgins, even while resisting Commonwealth participation in the Boer War, who had declared that were Great Britain ever in need "every man and every shilling" would be spent "in defending the Empire". The justifiable yet blind insistence of Australians upon home defence and their understandable refusal to examine their own specific interests in the Imperial maze - symbolized by their treatment of Hutton and their neglect of Kirkpatrick - had become increasingly unreal after 1908. In the place of careful deliberations, such as might have been produced by meetings of the Council of Defence, came vague assurances of spontaneous, undirected, and unlimited military assistance for the British cause. Mass armies might well be used, Hughes once declared to a British audience, against "even the most determined of those who seek to spoil us of our prestige, our trade, or our very national existence ...". If military preparations involved for him racial regeneration, war could be the crucible in which moral fibre was tested. Deakin's terms of reference were equally imprecise - and potent. Once Britons passed from passivity to fervent commitment, he had said, not only would nations quake but war would become the testing ground of Australian and British "self-sustaining power" and "moral courage". To both might become right once the Empire was challenged. For Australians war was not the continuation of state policy by other means, but a crusade.
It was Hughes' fortune to pursue the path Forrest had declared open. As military reformer, the policy he had helped fashion had no war aims. As warrior-statesman, the crusade which he led he had helped to prepare. Though a shrewd bargainer over the conference table and in political corridors, Hughes was essentially an emotive rhetorician. He had at first resisted the public clamour for assistance to the British cause in South Africa, and then had capitulated readily to the fervent throngs. And if the South African War had led him to express flamboyant sentiments, his advocacy of universal training so that Australia no longer need creep timorously upon the world stage had kept them alive. In his speeches there had been much ambiguity. Society, country, nation, race, state, civilization, Australia, England, and Empire were terms that flowed from his lips, often used interchangeably: defence for one was defence for all. The tone of his war speeches was not therefore unfamiliar to those who had supported his stand. Having declared the British cause to be no struggle for aggrandizement or territories in 1916, he exulted that Germany had chosen to translate its commercial rivalry into war. Thus could its power and influence be extirpated. But the struggle which had caused him to mourn the death of so many Australians promised more:

This war has done great things for the Empire ... It has saved us from moral - aye, and physical - degeneration and decay .... I believe that the trade and greatness of Empire were slipping from us. We were becoming flabby .... This war has purified us, and is purging us .... This war, like the glorious beams of the sun, has quite dried up the mists of suspicion with which class regarded class .... Before this war "Empire" was a name which merely fell from the lips of men .... But today it is real, and not a shibboleth. This war is the beacon light that is lighting us on; it is the sign and shibboleth of our race, and ... the means of our salvation. 66

Fervent commitment was justified because the Great War was a struggle of defence against an enemy which knew only the law of force:

Civilization is at stake. Free government is at stake. Liberty is at stake. Our national independence is at stake. Our economic welfare is at stake. Everything is at stake - spiritual, moral, and material - for which we as a people stand .... We will never lay down our arms until we have crushed German military despotism. 67
Hughes the war leader, Hughes the fiery and unforgiving statesman at Versailles - and Hughes the leader of the conscriptionists - was the same man who urged the creation of a nation in arms.

The national sentiment upon which Pearce had put such store intensified, rather than limited, commitment. The assumptions of 1909 became the basis of Australian attitudes to the Great War. It was in the nature of crusades that leaders knew few restraints. None was seriously challenged until the conscription referenda of 1916.

Until then, Hutton's men fulfilled their destiny in the charges of the Light Horse upon the sands of Palestine and Syria. The innovators were vindicated in the mud of Flanders Fields. Both saw the realization of their hopes at Gallipoli. For the men of the first Australian Imperial Force were thrice blessed by the extended discussions of defence before 1914. First, they were citizens displaying virtues and hardiness to belie the prophets of racial degeneration. Secondly, they were soldiers whose bravery and initiative established a national military tradition and whose cohesion epitomized the national unity Deakin had sought. Thirdly, they were the volunteers who fought not only for country but for King. They also fulfilled the predictions - current in 1885 and again in 1899 - that the nation would be fused and its identity clarified through personal sacrifice and blood. And debate about military reform had prepared other ground for ANZAC. For if Australians had been expected to find harmony and civic virtue in self-control and reverence, if they were to discover honour and security in the reformation of their society, they were also told that glory and grace was to be found in death. In 1906 the Bishop of North Queensland had written:

There is a nobility of character in a man, who is thus willing to part with his life for his country which atones for many failings .... Such readiness is more in accord with the Supreme Example of Christian self-sacrifice than the position of those who deprecate any preparation for national defence .... 68
In the *Official History*, C.E.W. Bean noted many of these qualities. He also answered by inference the questions raised before 1914. What was of worth in Australian society? How did it cohere? How did men prosper apart from the state? How would men withstand the shock of war without the inculcation of virtue? Bean replied that Australians were in no need of indoctrination. With a natural grace they had displayed outstanding decency, fortitude, and dignity. There was, moreover, a quality which some called comradeship but which Australians termed mateship.
FOOTNOTES

Note: Except for quotations, the material cited for any particular paragraph has been consolidated under one footnote, the number of which appears at the end of the final sentence.

The format of footnotes has been designed to indicate clearly the source of particulars and to overcome the difficulties of all sources appearing at the end of the work.
ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>A.W.M.</td>
<td>Australian War Memorial</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAO</td>
<td>Commonwealth Archives Office</td>
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<td>CDC</td>
<td>Colonial Defence Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>C.H.B.E.</td>
<td>Cambridge History of the British Empire</td>
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<td>CID</td>
<td>Committee of Imperial Defence</td>
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<tr>
<td>C.N.L.</td>
<td>Commonwealth National Library</td>
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<td>CPD</td>
<td>Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates</td>
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<td>CPP</td>
<td>Commonwealth Parliamentary Papers</td>
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<td>D.D.</td>
<td>Defence Department</td>
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<td>N.S.W.P.D.</td>
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<td>ODC</td>
<td>Overseas Defence Committee</td>
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<td>RANA</td>
<td>Royal Australian Navy : Archives</td>
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<tr>
<td>RUSIJ</td>
<td>Royal United Services Institute Journal</td>
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<tr>
<td>USM</td>
<td>United Services Magazine</td>
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*Other abbreviations are used but these usually involve short titles for the many official papers and are clearly marked in the footnotes.*
NOTES FOR CHAPTER ONE

1 On Deakin and British troops in Australia: 
The Times, 17 May 1907.

On sources for Chapter One:
Originally this Chapter - like most of the early parts of this work - was five times the present length. Because it now serves as an introductory essay, resting for the most part on familiar sources, no further footnotes will be used. The works consulted appear in the bibliography.

The following list either supplements the material cited there or indicates the more important sources:

(1) Precis of important colonial decisions, both military and naval, 1860-1900. 
Confidential Papers ... Imperial Defence Conference 1909 ..., pp.1-6, 33-36. (CAO : CP103, S12, B8)

(2) G.L. Macandie, The Genesis of the Royal Australian Navy : A 
Compilation (Sydney 1949 : Government Printer).


(6) Files from the Department of Defence, Victoria, 1883–1900 (CAO : MP106).
(Notes Chapter Two: continuing 1)

  Deakin: pp. 73, 76, 82.
  Dibbs: pp. 184 ff.

  Comments: pp. 87-88, 317-318, 775, 1069.

  On Deakin and control of defence: pp. 2249 ff.
  On Barton and control: pp. 2252 ff.

(5) Report, Together with Appendices of the Federal Military Conference ... to consider a General Scheme of Military Defence ... Sydney, October 1894 (Bound Papers, Defence Department, Canberra, No. 45.30, 12302).

(6) Report of the Intercolonial Military Conference on the 14th December 1896 ... (Bound Papers, cited above).

(7) Report and Summary of Proceedings, together with Schedules and Minutes of the Intercolonial Military Committee ... Sydney, January 1896; Also including "General Scheme of Defence", February 1896 and the draft "Federal Defence Agreement", February 1896 (Printed Papers 1890-1900: Defence Department, Canberra).

(8) Departmental files on military defence:
  On service of Victorian troops outside the colony October 1887: Downs to Crown Solicitor (CAO: MP106, 87/2686).
  On lack of colonial military coordination: Brownrigg to Premier of Victoria, November 1888 (CAO: MP106, 88/3168a).

  Reid to other Premiers on military defence, c. March 1894
  (CAO: MP106, 94/930).

  Correspondence N.S.W. and other colonies on military legislation, 1896-1899 (CAO: MP106, 97/1435).

(9) Memoranda by Robert Collins on federal defence, 1896-1899, for the guidance of the Victorian government (Bound Papers, Defence Department, Canberra, No. 45.30/12302).
Quotation from:

Quotation from:
Reid to All Australian Premiers, 16 April 1895 (Reproduced in part in Colonial Defence Committee Memorandum No. 119F of 1896; See special collection of CDF memoranda held by Commonwealth Archives Office, Canberra).

Quotation from:
Clause 18 of the draft "Federal Defence Agreement" of February 1896 in Papers of the Military Conference, January–February 1896, cited above.

On armament for the colonial infantry:
Considerable time was spent during these and subsequent discussions on the rifle to be adopted by the Australian colonies. The issues were: whether Australians should have automatic weapons; whether the colonies should have uniform arms and ammunition; whether those arms should be of imperial pattern to allow coordination of the forces; when Australian governments could afford to replace – or convert – the weapons they possessed. These problems were vitiated by changing patterns of armament.

Briefly, the changes in the rifle were these. In the eighties the standard weapon of the British infantryman was the Martini-Henry rifle. Possessing a calibre of .45" and a powerful recoil, this rifle was single-loading with a simple falling block breech mechanism. The Australian forces purchased many of these as well as a few Mannlicher rifles of .256" calibre with a similar action. In the early nineties, the British Army experimented with a magazine rifle using cordite-propelled bullets, the Lee-Metford. This weapon had a .303" calibre, a bolt action, and a metal cut-off in the magazine to prevent troops from squandering ammunition. The Metford barrel was found to be far less successful than the Lee breech mechanism, mainly because of the increased muzzle velocity given by cordite charges. During the Boer War the Lee-Enfield rifle (the M.L.E.) was introduced. The Lee mechanism was then matched by an Enfield barrel to produce an efficient and durable magazine rifle. The difficulty for the infantryman, however, lay partly in its length. Duly, the War Office experimented with modified versions and soon after 1903 the Short, Magazine, Lee-Enfield rifle (the S.M.L.E.) was produced. This was the weapon to be used by British and Australian forces in 1914.
The Commonwealth did not decide to re-arm fully with the S.M.L.E. until 1907 or after. And although the creation of a small arms factory was often discussed from 1894, the contracts were not arranged until in 1908, and rifles were produced after 1912. The Australian rifle was the S.M.L.E. manufactured under licence in New South Wales.
1 From the point of view of the premiers this distinction is appropriate. From the point of view of many in liberal and radical circles in Britain Imperialism (i.e. concern for the unity of the Empire, particularly of Greater Britain or the self-governing colonies) was identified with Imperialism (i.e. a passion for aggression and conquest).

See:

Information on the Colonial Conference and the Jubilee celebrations has been gleaned from:


Reid, op. cit., pp.149-150.
Minutes : Colonial Conference 1897, pp.149-150.


This impression of Chamberlain, the sympathetic listener and the bargainer, is vindicated in the Minutes of the Conference.
(Notes Chapter Three : beginning 5)

For examples of the accommodation of colonial interests see:
Minutes: Colonial Conference 1897; for Commercial Treaty
with Japan, pp. 91-92; and for Alien Immigration, pp. 130 et seq.

5 Garvin, op. cit., p. 181.

6 Ibid., pp. 178-179, 181.

7 Ibid., pp. 185-186.

Miss Melhuish of the Sydney University is in the final stages writing
her Ph.D. on Australian views and the development of the Imperial
Conference, 1887-1902. This should illuminate the Conference from
the Australian viewpoint in all its aspects.


Murdock, op. cit., pp. 145-147, 150.
Reid, op. cit.

From the evidence I have considered it is clear Reid is a much
underrated man. For a persuasive article attempting to reinstate
him see:
W. G. McMinn, "George Reid and Federation: the Origin of the
'Yes-No Policy'," in Historical Studies: Australia and New

9 Australian Encyclopaedia, Vol. 8, p. 60.
This summary is also founded on other evidence to be used later in
this work.

For an excellent comment on Turner as Federal Treasurer see:
G. Sawyer, Australian Federal Politics and Law (Melbourne 1956 :
H.U.P.) pp. 16-17.

10 Australian Encyclopaedia, Vol. 4, p. 162.
Other evidence for this sketch of Forrest will be presented later
from Chapter IV of this work.
Minutes: Colonial Conference 1897:
Chamberlain’s exposition, pp. 6-7, 24, 30-31.
Turner’s exposition, pp. 21-22.
Quote from p. 31.

Minutes: Colonial Conference 1897:
Forrest’s response, pp. 29-32.
Kingston’s response, p. 27.
Reid’s response, pp. 32, 37, 38, 39.
Turner’s response, pp. 77, 86-89.

Ibid., p. 2.

Ibid., pp. 2-4, 100.

Ibid., pp. 107-108.

Ibid., p. 107.

Ibid.
For the premiers on political relations and the efficacy of regular conference:
Seddon of New Zealand, pp. 103-105, 106-108.
Braddon, p. 107.
Turner, pp. 100, 115-116.
Forrest, pp. 100, 106.

Ibid.:
Chamberlain’s exposition, pp. 4-5.

Ibid.:
Beaumont, pp. 54-57, 141.
First Lord of the Admiralty (Goschen), pp. 140-149.
Laurier’s observations, pp. 58, 61-62.

Ibid., p. 57.
21 Minutes: Colonial Conference 1897:
Beaumont's case and the Australian response:
Beaumont, pp. 54-64.
Braddon, p. 85.
Forrest, pp. 56-57.
Kingston, p. 63.
Turner, pp. 56-57.
Reid, p. 57.

22 Ibid.: Chamberlain, pp. 56, 60.
Turner, pp. 55-57.

23 Ibid., p. 55.

24 Ibid.: Reid's case and support from the other Australians, pp. 55-56, 61-62.
Quote, p. 62.

25 Ibid.: Goschen, pp. 140-149.

26 Ibid., pp. 142, 143, 148.

27 Ibid., pp. 210 ff.

28 Ibid., p. 216.

29 Ibid.: Chamberlain quoted, p. 6.
A memorandum was drawn up by the C.D.C. on 12 June 1897 for the guidance of the Conference, pp. 190-194.
Discussion on each clause of the document, pp. 64-77.

Nelson, pp. 64-65.
Reid, pp. 64-65.
Laurier, pp. 64-65.
Turner, p. 65.
31 Minutes: Colonial Conference 1897:
The British case, pp.66-70.
The Australian response, pp.67-70:
Reid, pp.67, 68, 70.
Kingston, pp.67, 71.

32 Ibid.:
The British case and discussion, p.71.

33 Ibid.:
The British case and discussion, pp.71-72.

34 Ibid.:
The British case and discussion, pp.73-74.

35 Ibid.:
The British case and discussion, p.74.

36 On the Colonial Contingents and the South African War:
Condensed in a few pages are the results of three month's research on the Australian response to the South African War from which the present work developed. The sources consulted are copious. But as the intention here is to sketch the colonial response which the first Commonwealth government had to consider - examined in Chapter Five below - there is no need to do more than indicate the material from which the generalizations are made.

For short accounts:
Grimshaw, Some Attitudes to the Imperial Connection, pp.12 ff.

On a brief summary of sources:

(1) Parliamentary debates:
Parliamentary discussion in each of the colonial legislatures, from September 1899 until June 1900, has been examined, in particular the controversy in Queensland, New South Wales, and Victoria.
(Notes Chapter Three : beginning 37)

(2) Contemporary works:
A selection of books and pamphlets written by war correspondents and others appears in the bibliography at the end of this work.

(3) Newspapers:
Apart from selective examination of the newspapers cited in Chapters below, the following have been perused:
The *Advertiser*, 1899-1902.
The *Sydney Morning Herald*, 1899-1902.
The *Bulletin*, 1898-1904.

(4) Departmental files:
Two groups of files relating to participation in the Boer War were passed to the Defence Department. Those at the Australian War Memorial and in the Commonwealth Archives Office (Accession: MP84, S2) have been exhaustively examined. Others were left when it became clear that the problems of writing a thorough politico-military study of the Australian role in South Africa were insurmountable.

(5) Battle reports, diaries, etc.:
Collections held by the Commonwealth Archives Office, the Australian War Memorial, the Victorian Public Library, the South Australian Archives, and the Mitchell Library have been perused. On these—plus the printed and official histories—the generalizations on Australian military performance are based.

37 Quotation from:
The *Age*, 16 May 1899.

38 Quotation from:
The *Age*, 11 September 1899.

39 Quotation from:
Grimshaw, *op.cit.*, p.15.

40 Quotation from:
The *Bulletin*, 6 January 1900.
See also:

41 Quotations from:
Lieutenant-Colonel Henry to Deakin, February 1908 (CAO: MP84, S1, 1856/5/51).
See also:

Grimshaw, *op.cit.*, pp. 15 ff.

W.T. Reay, *Australians in War: With the Australian Regiment from Melbourne to Bloemfontein* (Melbourne 1900 : Massina).

42 Quotation from:

The *Age*, 17 November 1902.

See also:

*Fragmentary Records of Service Background of Volunteers* (D.D., 02/615 : A.W.M.).

Nominal Rolls of the Victorian Contingents (*Public Library of Victoria*).


Note: The estimates of social background are only hypothetical, based on the above sources.
NOTES FOR CHAPTER FOUR

(Starting from Introduction to Part Two)

Preface - Quotation from:

1 Quick and Garran, Annotated Constitution of the Australian Commonwealth, p.335.

2 Ibid., p.341.

3 Deakin to Northcote, 22 December 1906, para.6.
(CAO: CP103, S12, F/M 06/5561)

4 Undated pencil drafts for a speech in 1907-1908 (Deakin Papers).
See also:
Below Chapter Eight.
Below Chapter Nine.

5 Deakin to Northcote, 31 October 1906, para.13.
(CAO: CP103, S12, F/M 06/5561)

6 On the power of the Commonwealth:
Joseph Chamberlain and his unofficial representative in Australia during 1901, Sir John Anderson, were sympathetic to the Commonwealth's need for supremacy vis-a-vis the states. In the Vondel case, Chamberlain assumed the supremacy of the Commonwealth in external affairs while Alfred Deakin, the Attorney-General, proved more cautious. In matters of precedent given the members of the Commonwealth parliament—an issue which absorbed a great deal of time and correspondence—the Colonial Office again displayed the wish to see the central government supreme. Generally, the Colonial Office realized the necessity of the Commonwealth to overcome provincialism.
Sir John Anderson to Edmund Barton, 1 January 1901, 2 August 1901 (Barton Papers: C.N.L.).
On Barton-Deakin Programme in 1901:
Deakin to Barton, 7 November 1900 (Barton Papers : C.N.L.).
Governor-General's Address (CPD 1 : 28-9, 10 May 1901).

Quotation from:
Deakin to Barton, 3 June 1902 (Barton Papers : C.N.L.).

On Party strengths:
Protectionists : 32
Free-traders : 27
Labour : 16
Yet as Sawyer writes (Australian Federal Politics, p.82) this is
to be wise after the event. The party alignments were far more
uncertain initially than these figures indicate.

The Labour Party was divided on the tariff issue. The potential
total Protectionist vote was 37 to 33; but 5 uncommitted Labour
members could turn the issue. Furthermore, in the Senate matters
were even more troublesome for Barton and Deakin. The
Protectionist, Free-trade, Labour strengths were 17:11:8. But
alignments were so uncertain that the possible defection of one
potential Protectionist - Senator Dobson - was to give Deakin
considerable worry.

On State representation in the House:
Protectionists : 16 seats from Victoria out of a total 32.
Free-traders : 15 seats from N.S.W. out of a total 27.

On the strength of the "radical nationalists":
The strength of this group will emerge as the narrative proceeds.
Taking the debates and divisions over the Immigration Restriction
Bill, the Naval Agreement Bill, the Defence Bill of 1901, and the
resolution to support the British in South Africa, the radical
group clearly included:

From the Protectionists -
  J.N. Hume-Cook (Vic.)
  H.B. Higgins (Vic.)
  V.L. Solomon (S.A.)
  Mauger (Vic.)
  R.A. Crouch (Vic.)
  J. Wilkinson (Qu.)

From the Opposition -
  A.H. Conroy (N.S.W.)
  A. Poynton (S.A.)
  G.B. Edwards (N.S.W.)
  P. Glynn (S.A.)
  J.W. McCoy (Vic.)

From Labour -
Nearly all of the Labour parliamentarians could be expected to
resist measures likely to involve subservience to Great Britain,
especially after 1902 when party policy on the formation of a
national navy was clarified and after the Boer War had ended.
However, of the sixteen, the following could be considered the
hard-core radicals:
(Notes Chapter Four: beginning 9)

Bamford (Qu.) Batchelor (S.A.)
Mahon (W.A.) McDonald (Qu.)
Ronald (Vic.) Thomas (N.S.W.)

The following were moderate – or more discreet –
Hughes (N.S.W.) Watson (N.S.W.)
Fisher (Qu.) Page (Qu.)
Spence (Qu.)

In short, the 16 Labour members could be joined by 6 ministerialists and 5 Free-traders on some issues. Of these at least 22 could unite on some issues. That no debate ended in such a revolt does not remove the power given to the leaders of this group – Higgins, McCay, and Watson. Nor does the fact that many of the Labour politicians took little interest during this period in defence.

It is significant, for instance, that during the debates on immigration the government depended on some opposition voters and the party whips were hard at work. During the debates on the South African War and the Naval Agreement the government relied upon support from Reid and his followers.

9 Deakin to Barton, 7 November 1900 (Barton Papers: C.N.L.).

10 On Barton's promise:
   CPD 8 : 11006.
   CPD 12 : 11650.

On the confidential minute:
   Minute with erasure of 18 May 1902.
   (CAO : CP717, S1, Vol.32, E/A 02/85)

On giving life to the constitution:
   Barton explained this at length before the Colonial Conference of 1902:
   Colonial Office, Miscellaneous No.144, Confidential – Conference between the Secretary of State for the Colonies and the Premiers of the Self-Governing Colonies: Minutes of Proceedings and Papers ..., pp.9-10, 29-30, 46, 121.
   HEREAFTER: Minutes: Colonial Conference 1902.

On Watson's support:
   CPD 3 : 3192-2, 30 July 1902.

11 On the Braddon Clause:

On Barton at the Colonial Conference:
   Minutes: Colonial Conference 1902, pp.29-30, 121.
12 On State expenditure:
The figures are approximate, taken from:
*Naval & Military Forces of the Commonwealth (Numbers and Cost), CPP: 1903, Vol.II* (Ordered to be Printed, 24 July 1903).

13 On motion by Braddon (Free-trade):
CPD 9: 12093, 30 April 1902.

On Watson's attack:
CPD 9: 12096 ff., 30 April 1902.

On Watson's motion:
CPD 9: 12211, 30 April 1902.

14 On Forrest's promise:
CPD 9: 12090 ff., 30 April 1902.

On Turner's response:
CPD 9: 12102 ff., 30 April 1902.

On Forrest's departmental instructions:
CAO: WP84, S2, B56, 1902/2811.

On Forrest's reductions:

15 Table of Defence Expenditure from:
Commonwealth Year Book, No.12, p.1017.

16 On O'Malley:
*Advertiser, 1 September 1902.*
CPD 3: 3532 ff., 31 July 1901.

17 On Hughes:
CPD 3: 3291-9, 31 July 1902.
A full treatment of Hughes' views will be found in Chapter Nine.

On Higgins:
See below in this Chapter.

On Watson:
CPD 3: 3192, 30 July 1901.

18 Age, 12 December 1901.
On the Age and the British in South Africa:

*Age*, 11 September 1899,
19 December 1899,
26 December 1899,
7 March 1901,
7 August 1901,
16 January 1902.

On the *Age* and the nation in arms:

*Age* (Editorial), 7 March 1901,
7 August 1901,
16 January 1902.

The *Age* drew heavily from the writings of I.S. Bloch.
I.S. Bloch, *Is War Now Impossible?* : Being an Abridgement of
"The War of the Future in its Technical, Economic, and Political
Relations" with foreword by W.T. Stead (London 1899 : Grant
Richards).

 Australians came to learn of Bloch's work from a debate in the
Royal United Services Journal in 1900 and articles in other
periodicals. See:
"Wars of the Future" in *Contemporary Review*, September 1901,
Vol. 80, pp. 301 ff.
"Militarism in Politics ..." in *Contemporary Review*, December 1901
Vol. 80, pp. 761 ff.

On amateurs among the politicians:

There were enough amateurs among the politicians to give voice
eventually to the idea of a nation-in-arms. Of the government
members Deakin, Kingston, Crouch, Wilkinson, and Salmon had had
some experience in the volunteers or rifle clubs. Of the Labour
Party politicians Watson, Hughes, Spence, had been citizen-soldiers;
Page had served in the British regular forces. Among the
Free-traders were Conroy and McCoy. Others in the lower House
like Barton, Reid, Braden, and Ewing could claim long experience
with the problems of defence. In the upper House there was a
group of senators with the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel in the
A.J. Gould (N.S.W.); Lt.Col. J. Cosh Neild (N.S.W.); Lt.Col.Hon.
Sir F.T. Sargood (Vic.); and Senator Ryrie. As later events
demonstrated, direct and informal connections existed between
many New South Wales Free-traders and eminent members of the
militia units. Future military policy was to be moulded by such
men.

For samples:

Hume-Cook, CPD 4 : 4639-42, 6 September 1901.
Glynn, CPD 4 : 4642-4646, 6 September 1901.
(Notes Chapter Four : beginning 21)

21 In this truncated exposition of Australian immigration policy the intention is to establish the concern of politicians with the future of the white British race - particularly in southern seas. Generalizations are based upon the debate in Commonwealth parliament on the Immigration Act.

See also:
Gollan, Radical and Working Class Politics, p.195.

22 On the Asian hordes:
Solomon - CPD 1 : 507, 30 May 1901.
Ewing - CPD 14 : 2052, 7 July 1903.
Groom - CPD 14 : 2129.
Crouch - CPD 3 : 2959, July-August 1901.
McLean - CPD 3 : 3203, July-August 1901.
Edwards - CPD 3 : 3596, July-August 1901.
Kirwan - CPD 3 : 3524, July-August 1901.
Senator Pearce - CPD 1 : 260, 23 May 1901.

On opposition to invasion scares:
See D.C.S. Sissons, Attitudes to Japan and Defence 1890-1923

On Barton and Hughes:
Barton - CPD 14 : 1777, 7 July 1903.
Hughes - CPD 15 : 3073-8, 5 August 1903.

On lack of concern for security:
Sissons, op.cit., Vol.II, p.8 lists the following who see little danger to Australia:
Ronald (Labour),
Sawyers (Free-trade),
McDonald (Labour),
J. Cook (Free-trade),
O'Malley (Labour),
Conroy (Free-trade),
Forrest (Protectionist),
Wilks (Free-trade),
Higgins (Protectionist),
McCay (Free-trade),
J.H. Cook (Protectionist),
Brown (Labour),
V.L. Solomon (Protectionist).

23 Sydney Morning Herald, 15 February 1901.

24 On the New Hebrides issue generally:
Departmental summary of attitudes 1900-1903.
(CAO : WP178, S1, 1902/2005)
On Henry Labouchere:
Labouchere to Barton, 16 May 1900 (Barton Papers: C.N.L.).

On Sources:
See below Chapter Eight and relevant notes.

25 On those favouring renewal of the Agreement in 1901:

Labour: Watson (CPD 3: 3195-6),
Hughes (CPD 3: 3329-30),
Fowler (CPD 3: 3430),
Watkin (CPD 3: 3438).

Protectionist:
Quick (CPD 3: 2967),
Higgins (CPD 3: 2991),
Braddon (CPD 3: 3201),
McLean (CPD 3: 3203),
A.G. Groom (CPD 3: 3594),
R. Edwards (CPD 3: 3598),
Barton (CPD 3: 3598),

Free-trade:
G.B. Edwards (CPD 3: 2981),
Reid (CPD 3: 3107),
S.W. Cook (CPD 3: 3189),
McCay (CPD 3: 3205),
Mcmillan (CPD 3: 3303),
Knox (CPD 3: 3306),
Manifold (CPD 3: 3308),
Cruckshank (CPD 3: 3430),
Sawyers (CPD 3: 3519),
J. Cook (CPD 3: 3520),
Wilks (CPD 14: 1992),

On those against:
Against without reservation:
Crouch - Protectionist (CPD 3: 2964-5).
McDonald - Labour (CPD 3: 3250 ff.).

On those radicals who were silent:
Hume-Cook, Mauger, Thomas and Page.

On the response of Barton and Forrest:
Barton (CPD 3: 3598 ff., July 1901).

On the change in Labour Party attitudes:
H.S. Broadhead, The Australian Federal Labour Party 1900-1905

26 On Australians having no love of war:
Barton (Age, 15 February 1901).
Reid (CPD 3: 3107, 20 July 1901).
On the dominance of the citizen soldiery and paramount interest in defence:

Forrest (Age, 26 February 1901).
Crouch (Age, 26 March 1901).
McCay (Age, 30 March 1901).
McEacham (Age, 27 February 1901).
Barton (Age, 7 January 1901; 17 January 1901; 12 February 1901; 15 February 1901).
Quick (Age, 25 March 1901).
Turner (Age, 12 March 1901).
Mauger (Age, 12 March 1901).
Reid (Sydney Morning Herald, 13 February 1901).

On Labour views:
Age, 8 March 1901.
Sydney Morning Herald, 19 February 1901.
Bulletin, 16 February 1901.
Broadhead, op. cit., pp. 7-9.

On Cabinet's views of use of Australian troops overseas:
Age, 15 February 1901.
Minutes: Colonial Conference 1902, pp. 31-32.
See discussion on the Defence Bill in this Chapter and Chapter Five on South Africa.

On the iniquities of Imperial Defence:
Glynn (CPD 1: 193, 22 May 1901).

On the demand for self-reliance:
Watson (CPD 3: 3192-4, 30 July 1902).

On limited aims in organization of the military forces:
Reid (CPD 3: 3107, 26 July 1901).
Deakin (Age, 7 March 1901).
Quick (Age, 25 March 1901).
Barton (Age, 17 January 1901).
See also Barton's summary Minutes: Colonial Conference 1902, pp. 87 ff.

27 On Sir John Forrest:
These, and the following generalizations about Forrest as a Minister are based upon departmental minutes by him too numerous to quote, evidence that will be revealed later in the narrative, and Forrest's testimonials to the House while Minister for Defence.

CPD 2: 2159 ff., 9 July 1901.
CPD 9: 12090 ff., 30 April 1902.
CPD 14: 2264 ff., 16 July 1903.
28 On the responsibility borne by Forrest:
   Barton in the Age, 12 February 1901.
   CAO : CP146, S2, 01/84/–.
   CAO : MP160, S1, E5, 1901/60.
   Papers of the Attorney-General's Department on the drafts of the
   1901 Defence Bill (Attorney-General's Department, Canberra).

29 On the assimilation of Colonial Acts:
   Age, 26 February 1901.
   Further Report of the Federal Military Committee, Assembled at
   Melbourne, Victoria, 12 June 1901.
   HEREAFTER : Military Committee 1901.
   CPP : 1902, Vol.2 (Ordered to be Printed 21 August 1901).
   Various drafts of the Bill and some correspondence relating to
   them are to be found in a bundle of papers on the Defence Bill
   of 1901 at the Attorney-General's Department, Canberra.
   Some seventy clauses of the first draft depended in part on the
   Queensland Defence Acts, 1884-1896. Only some eight had no
   colonial precedent.

   On advice sought from the Victorians:
   Sir Frederick Sargood to Forrest, 10 June 1901.
   J.W. McCoy (?) to Forrest, Undated.
   (CAO : MP160, S1, 1901/640)

   On protests at some of Forrest's drafts:
   Military Committee 1901, p.6.

   On the final draft of the Defence Bill of 1901:
   A Bill to Provide for the Defences of the Commonwealth (C.15 -
   250/9.7.1901 n.a. – F 5492) in file held by Attorney-General's
   Department, Canberra.
   HEREAFTER : Defence Bill 1901.

30 On the supremacy of civil authority:
   Defence Bill 1901, Clauses 4, 6-10.

   On command of the forces:
   Ibid., Clauses 7-8.

   On naval powers:
   Ibid., Clause 37.
   Sargood to Forrest, 10 June 1901 (CAO : MP160, S1, 1901/640).

   On division of the military forces:
   Defence Bill 1901, Clauses 27-30, 81.

   On authority of commandants:
   Ibid., Clause 9.

   On promotion from ranks:
   Ibid., Clauses 10-15.
   Military Committee 1901, p.11.
(Notes Chapter Four: beginning 31)

On the Army Act:
  Defence Bill 1901, Clauses 58, 59.

On the death sentence:
  Ibid., Clause 86.

31 On the levy en masse:
  Ibid., Clauses 31-36.

On penalties:
  Ibid., Clauses 96-97.

32 On Overseas service:
  Military Committee 1901, p. 11.
  Barton's private address to a deputation of the "Peace, Humanity,
  and Arbitration Society", 22 January 1901.
  (CAO: CP146, S2, 01/84/-)

On the permanent forces and overseas service:
  Defence Bill 1901, Clause 49.

On the citizen forces and overseas service:
  Ibid., Clause 48 (this clause is quoted in part).
  Ibid., Clause 52.

On raising special units for overseas service:
  Ibid., Clause 111 (this clause is quoted in part).
  Ibid., Clause 50.

33 CPD 2: 2159 ff., 9 July 1901.

34 On Forrest's performance:
  Forrest did point to the militia units as the model of a future
  army, to the importance of executive control, to the power over
  finance given to the civil department, and to the possibility of
  despatching troops to Fiji. But his description of a provision
  which allowed promotion of officers only after written examina-
  tion as one of the most important features of the Bill indicated
  his inability to present - or to grasp? - essentials.
  Parliamentarians view that Forrest's performance on this occasion
  was inept is indicated by the unsympathetic report in the Age,
  10 July 1901. Catarrh and grief may well have contributed to
  his discomfort.

On the Debate on the Bill:
  CPD 3: 2958, 3102, 3186, 3292, 3416, 3515, 3591, 3607 and ff.

On the response of parliament:
  Age, 8 August 1901.
On Barton's performance:
Barton (CPD 3 : 3599 ff., 9 August 1901).

On the Amendments:
Proposed Amendments in the Defence Bill, 12 September 1901
(Artorney-General's Department, Canberra).
HERBAFTER: Amendments September 1901.

On the role of rifle clubs:
Watson (CPD 3 : 3191 ff., 30 July 1901).
On an amendment of Piesse, Forrest proposed to alter Clause 119
of the Bill.

On preference for rankers only to commission:
Crouch (CPD 3 : 2959 ff., 24 July 1901).
Proposed amendment to Clause 11; Forrest refused to allow this
change.

On the Council of Defence:
Proposed by Sir John Quick as a new clause and allowed by Forrest.

On fears for civil authority:
This argument was expounded by Sargood to Forrest in June 1901.
CAO : MP160, S1, B5, 1901/640.

On restriction of service to particular States:
Proposed by McCay as an amendment to Clause 50 and allowed by
Forrest. Citizen-soldiers could, however, be taken over state
boundaries for camps of continuous training.

On objections to the Army Act:
Amendments proposed by McCay and changes made by Forrest to
Clauses 58, 59, 83, 84 and 104 of the Bill.

On limitations to discretionary power of the officers:
Amendments by Forrest to Clause 104 restricting punishment of
citizen soldiers to a maximum fine of £5. Members of Permanent
Forces could have pay stopped for fourteen days or be confined
to barracks for twenty-one days, only seven of which might
involve imprisonment.

CPD 3 : 2991, 24 July 1901.

Quotation from:
J.W. McCay (CPD 9 : 12111, 30 April 1902).

On Higgins' criticisms:
CPD 3 : 2990 ff., 24 July 1901.

On Labour support for Higgins:
For Watson's immediate response (CPD 3 : 2992). For the
declaration of support (CPD 4 : 4392).
39 First quotation from:
Clause 4 of Defence Bill 1901.

On retention of the levy en masse:
Higgins proposed to have Clauses 33–34 struck out. The attitude of J.W. McKay (CPD 3: 3205 ff., 30 July 1901) is characteristic of those with reservations who did not support Higgins; newcomers to parliament, K. O'Malley and Senator Pearce, opposed the levy en masse fearing militarism. The measure generally accepted as an indispensable reserve power (e.g. Sydney Morning Herald, 2 August 1901).

On restricting the discretionary powers of commandants:
The deletion was moved by W.M. Hughes. For report of Labour support for Higgins on this and other measures see: Sydney Morning Herald, 27 July 1901.

On the limitation of the Executive's power to declare an emergency:
Higgins intended to move a stronger amendment of Clause 48 requiring resolutions from both Houses of parliament; Forrest's alteration was less specific.

On the limitation of volunteers for overseas service:
Higgins successfully moved the deletion of Clause 49 (the overseas service of permanent forces) and amendments of Clauses 48, 50. For these and other amendments allowed by Forrest see Amendments August 1901 and Amendments September 1901 cited in Note 34 above.
Quote from amendment to Clause 50 in Amendments September 1901.

40 On Hughes and the Bill:
CPD 3: 3297, 31 July 1901.
With less vituperation and indignation the Sydney Morning Herald on 2 August 1901, agreed.

41 First quotation from:
Age 12 July 1901.

On Barton's justification of the Bill:
CPD 3: 3599 ff., 9 August 1901.

42 On Forrest's inclusion in Barton's ministry:
Sawyer, op.cit., p.15.
Forrest to Barton, 8 March 1900 (Barton Papers : C.N.L.) wherein Forrest expressed the hope that Chamberlain would amend the Constitution Bill to ensure the continuation of existing tariffs in Western Australia for five years.
On Forrest's attitude to England:
"I have seen many countries in the Old and New World", he wrote of England in 1900, "but our island Home is the best."
Forrest to Barton, 8 March 1900 (Barton Papers: C.N.L.).

While Turner could look upon the Naval Agreement as a business agreement from which the Commonwealth prospered, Forrest saw it also as the means of upholding British naval strength. See below Chapter Seven.

See below Chapters Six and Seven.

The general treatment to follow is based on the following sources:


Statement by Asquith on 25 July 1912, concerning the structure and function of the Committee of Imperial Defence, reported and discussed in the Royal United Services Institute Journal, August 1912, pp. 1189 ff.


Various memoranda prepared by the Colonial Defence Committee, the Overseas Defence Committee and the Committee of Imperial Defence for Australian use. In particular:

Proposed Organization of the Military Forces of the Australasian Colonies ... Remarks by the Colonial Defence Committee, No. 40R of the 16th of May 1890.

Colonial Defence - Memorandum by the Colonial Defence Committee, No. 90M of the 31st of December 1896.

New South Wales - Defence Scheme revised to September, 1896 - Remarks by the Colonial Defence Committee, Secret No. 159R of the 29th of April 1897.

New South Wales - Defence Scheme revised to September, 1898 - Remarks by the Colonial Defence Committee, Secret No. 204R of the 14th of January 1899.

Australia - Defence Forces and Defences - Memorandum by the Colonial Defence Committee, Confidential No. 254M of the 30th of March 1901.

Report of the Committee of Imperial Defence upon a General Scheme of Defence for Australia, in Commonwealth Parliamentary Papers (Ordered to be Printed, 15 August 1906).


On scale of attack prior to 1902:
CDC No. 254M (of March 1901), p.8.
CDC No. 195R (of April 1897), p.8.
CDC No. 204R (of January 1899), p.2.

On scale of attack 1901-1906:
CDC No. 254M (of March 1901), p.8.
CID of 1906, pp.6-8.

On scale of attack after 1906:
See below Chapter Eight.

On guerre de course:
The French were more consistent in their interest in commerce destruction.
e.g. Marder, British Naval Policy, Chapters 6, 13.
Insofar as this affected Australian naval thought it will be treated below in Chapter Seven.

On changes in naval policy:
In the first draft of this thesis considerable space was given to changes in naval architecture and policy to explain the departure by the Admiralty from localized coastal defence, its application by the French in the form of defense mobile, and the affect that this had on Australian thought. More technical considerations, both naval and military, have been omitted from the final draft to conform to the word limit. It is hoped that this truncated account will serve as sufficient background to understand – and correctly assess – navalist thought in Australia.

On the enunciation of the doctrine of fleet concentration:
Minutes: Colonial Conference 1902, pp.18-26, but particularly Memorandum on Sea Power and the Principles Involved in it, June 1902, pp.213 ff.

This simplified account rests on:
Marder, British Naval Policy, Chapters 24, 26, 27.
Marder, From Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, Chapters 3, 6.

On value of fleet concentration to Australia:
CID of 1906, p.7.
It is clear from Marder and articles in Brassey's Naval Annual that lessons of importance were drawn from the Russo-Japanese War.
On the efficacy of blockade:
   CID of 1906, p.7. The efficacy of blockade was not expounded in that memo; at the time the Admiralty was experimenting with distant rather than close blockade.
   Hankey, op.cit., I, p.77.

50 On the alleged bogey of bombardment:
   This represented a change in assessment of the efficacy of bombardment from the eighties and the early nineties. The Governor of Victoria, later Secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defence, and a correspondent of Deakin's, Sir George Sydenham Clarke, clearly made this point, inter alia, in a lecture, The Navy and the Nation, in Melbourne, 11 June 1903.
   The difficulties of bombardment were suggested in CID No.40R (of May 1890) p.2; they were repeated in CID No. 254M (of March 1901) p.4; the most confident assertion appeared in CID of 1906, p.6.

51 On the duties of the Commander on the China Station concerning commerce protection:
   Maruter, British Naval Policy, pp.251 ff., 302 ff., 427 ff., 450 ff., 491 ff.
   See also Chapter Eight below.

52 On the Dual Alliance:
   Maruter, Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, p.40. (See also British Naval Policy, pp.97, 162, 233, 104)
   On Germany as naval antagonist:
   Ibid., pp.40, 119, 122. (See also British Naval Policy, Chapter 24, pp.496 ff.)
   On Japan:
   Ibid., pp.40, 233, 237 ff. (See also Note 51 above)
   On the U.S.A.:
   Ibid., pp.124, 184. (See also British Naval Policy, pp.312, 442-450)

53 See below Chapter Nine.

54 On Australians as part of an Imperial reserve:
   Minutes: Colonial Conference 1902, pp.81-85. Europe was excluded as an area of operation for colonial troops.
NOTES FOR CHAPTER FIVE

1 Age, 15 February 1901.

2 Barton's speech before a deputation led by Rentoul, 22 January 1901 (CAO : CP146, S2, 01/84/-).

3 On comments from the Age:
   7 January 1901.
   12 February 1901.

On pledge for future commitment:
   Sydney Morning Herald, 10 January 1902.

On comment by other Ministers:
   Age, 15 February 1901.
   Age, 7 March 1901.

4 CPD 3 : 3107, 26 July 1901.

5 See above Chapter III.

6 On potential opposition of Labour members:
   From evidence presented in Chapter IV above:
   Thomas,
   Watkins,
   Bamford,
   McDonald,
   Ronald,
   could easily have maintained their opposition.

On potential radical opposition:
   CPD 3 : 3191-2, 30 July 1901.

7 On Elands River:
   See above Chapter III.

On Lawson and Elands River:
   "That Pretty Girl in the Army", p.635.
On Request for service clasps:
Hopetown to Chamberlain, No. 49 of 1 August 1901.
Chamberlain to Hopetown, No. 89 of 1 November 1901.
CAO: CP78, S21, B45a.
Also CAO: CP146, System 2, 01/36/—.

8 Officially Beatson was to admit to anger but not public statement. Although only hearsay evidence, the probability is that Beatson used words very like those quoted.

Quotations from:
Report by Major McKnight prepared for the Prime Minister, c. 23 October 1901 (CAO : MP84, S2, 1901/3859).

9 The account of the affair has been shortened in the text.

On Sources:

McKnight report cited in Note 8 above.

On questions concerning the affair:
Age report of incident quoted in the lower house - CPD 5 : 6642.
Chapman - CPD 6 : 7836.
Fowler - CPD 4 : 5459.
Watson - CPD 5 : 6811.

On Ministerial concern:
Memos by Forrest and Barton, 26 October 1901, 29 October 1901, on the McKnight Report cited in Note 8 above.

10 Chamberlain to Hopetown (telegram) received 7 November 1901 (CAO : CP78, S21, B45a).
On Barton's response:
CPD 5: 6643-4, 30 October 1901.
Hopetoun to Chamberlain, 29 November 1901 (Confidential Telegram)
Hopetoun to Barton, 27 November 1901 (Barton Papers).

On Beatson's denial:
CPD 5: 6642, 30 October 1901. In fact, Beatson was promoted to the rank of Major-General and placed in command of operations against the Boer leader, Scheepers, in the Cape Colony.
(Official History, 4: 242)
Chamberlain to Hopetoun (telegram) received 4 January 1902 -
CAO: CP78, S21, B45a.

On Omissions:
The Handcock and Morant affair has been shortened in the text.

On the Morant Affair:
F. Renar (Frank Fox of the Bulletin), Bushman and Buccaneer (Sydney 1902: Dunn & Co.) for the first coherent attempt to link the story with the legend. The pamphlet includes many letters written by Morant and verbal evidence provided by Lenehan.


G.R. Witton, Scapegoats of the Empire (Melbourne 1907: Patterson & Co.) for a contemporary report of the only surviving Australian involved in the affair. This embittered and rambling work undoubtedly includes some of the proceedings of the court-martial; internal evidence, careless dating of incidents, and conflict with the few published sources make this work far more unreliable than later journalists and publicists have admitted. Witton did, however, have access to the papers of Major Thomas, the defending counsel.

F.M. Cutlack, Breaker Morant (Sydney 1962: Ure Smith) for the latest treatment of the case. Cutlack depends heavily upon Witton and Fox without questioning their evidence. Significantly he was one of the historians of the official history of the Australian role in the Great War and like its editor, Dr. C.E.W. Bean, was imbued with the Australian legend.

On the official documentation:
The few official documents - Kitchener's telegram and the findings of the court-martial - are to be found in CAO: CP78, S21, B45b (Misc. No.78 of 1/4/02). The substance of these were later printed in a parliamentary paper - CPP: 1902, Vol.II, pp.134 et seq. (Ordered to be Printed, 15 April 1902).
The *Times History* and the official history of the South African War are silent on the affair. As we shall see, they are also silent on whether Kitchener proclaimed a general order that Boer prisoners caught wearing British uniforms were to be shot without a court-martial. The case presented here rests on the balance of probabilities, not on general statements made by writers like Edgar Holt, *The Boer War* (London 1958: Putnam) on whom Cutlack depends, especially statements in Chapter 22.

13 Other officers were involved — Lieutenant Picton, for instance — but here we are concerned primarily with the Australians.

14 CPP, Vol. II, 1902, pp. 137 ff. (Ordered to be Printed, 16 April 1902) for the official record of the charges.

15 Quotation from: Cutlack, *op. cit.*, p. 31 (Letter Morant to Patterson, 3 August 1895).

16 This sketch of Morant's life rests upon information from Cutlack, Chapters II and III, which in turn rests heavily on Fox's account.

17 Cutlack, *op. cit.*, p. 81.
   Fox also evokes considerable emotion from the mateship theme.


19 This interpretation is of considerable importance. The official precis of the findings makes no mention of recommendation for mercy in the case of the eight Boers. But in Witton's published statement of what he argues to be the true findings of the court, Morant is recommended to mercy. (Witton, *op. cit.*, pp. 158-161)

Witton's evidence is suspect on three counts:
(1) The summing-up of the Judge-Advocate (pp. 133-134) would seem to leave little room for mercy; for he suggested that if provocation (i.e. Hunt's death) be considered an extenuating circumstance the finding should be manslaughter. Furthermore, he urged the court to consider the method of the criminal act, the probability of premeditation, and the time that lapsed between the provocation and the crime.

(2) If Witton's statement be a "true" document, then it is hard to account for two mistakes in the dating of the confirmation of the sentences.
(3) Again, if Witton's document be authentic, it is difficult to account for the changes in format. In the first place, it differs from the format of the official and printed findings. In the second, it is inconsistent: those who number the reasons for the recommendation of mercy in one case are very likely to do so in a second (cf. the findings of the Visser Case with that of the Eight Boers Case). In the third, from the court-martial proceedings on other cases which I have perused, the format seems to be fixed by regulation. Witton's document is not in accord with this established practice. There is, therefore, a reasonable suspicion that the recommendation for mercy in Witton's account was interpolated.

20 Cutlack, _op.cit._, p.175.

21 On Barton's Statement:
    CPD 9 : 11250-1, 2 March 1902.

On Press Response:
    Cutlack, _op.cit._, Chapter Eight.

On Correspondence with Kitchener:
    Hopetoun to Kitchener, 27 March 1902.
    Kitchener to Hopetoun, 1 April 1902.
    Kitchener to Hopetoun, 6 April 1902.
    (CAO : CP78, S21, B45b, Misc.78)
    (CAO : CP78, S1, 1/382)

On the Printed Report:

22 On Requests for Clemency:
    Tennyson to Chamberlain, 6 December 1902.
    (CAO : CP78, S8, Vol.II, p.73)
    Chamberlain to Tennyson (Confidential), 12 December 1902.
    Correspondence May to July 1903.
    Barton to Tennyson, 1 September 1903.
    (CAO : CP78, S1, 316)

On Deakin's Actions:
    Witton, _op.cit._, p.240.
    Deakin to Tennyson, 18 February 1904.
    Tennyson to Lyttleton, 7 April 1904.
    Lyttleton to Tennyson, c. 22 June 1904.
    (CAO : CP78, S1, 316)
    See also Lenehan to Deakin, 5 February 1905.
    (CAO : CP78, S1, 1/382)
On the Refusal of the War Office:
Lyttleton to Tennyson, 12 August 1904.
Lyttleton to Tennyson, 17 October 1903 - Enclosure from the War Office.
(CAO : CP78, S1, 316)

Material on the Lenehan case is copious. Here are but a few references:
N.S.W. P.P., 10 September 1902.
For discussion on the Commonwealth Defence Department 1902-1904:
D.D. 02/673 (A.W.M. 8/19).
For claims against the War Office 1902-1905:
CAO : CP78, S1, 1/382.
For 1907:
For 1911:
CAO : MP84, S1, 142/3/5.
See also:
Thomas to Forrest, 16 October 1903.
(D.D. 02/673 - A.W.M. 1/19)
Hutton to Chapman, 5 October 1903.
(D.D. 02/673 - A.W.M. 8/19)

Quotation from:
Chamberlain to Hopetoun (telegram), 7 August 1901.
(CAO : CP146, System 2, 01/30/-)

On Requests for Aid:
Kitchener requested reinforcements of mounted troops in December 1900, and in March of the following year. (CAO : CP78, S21, B456, Miscellaneous S.A.) From most states no contingents or drafts were sent to South Africa after April 1901. Significantly, the exception was Queensland.

On Barton's Response:
CPD 2 : 1488, 25 June 1901.
CPD 3 : 3880, 16 August 1901.

On Supremacy of the Commonwealth:
Question by Crouch (CPD 3 : 2939, 24 July 1901). This affair stemmed from a report in the Age on the 18 July 1901.
(CAO : CP146, System 2, 01/30/-)
(D.D. 1901/1485)

On Other Issues:
Excluded from the text is the account of the attempt by the British government to transport Boer prisoners to Tasmania and the ministerial resistance to this. Also excluded is Barton's brief for the Colonial Conference concerning Australian supplies for British armed forces East of Suez.
25 On Forrest's problems:
CAO : E/A, 02/25, 69, 100, 103, 141, 142.
CAO : 146, System 2, 01/75/-. 

On Barton's restraint:
Though Barton deceived the House later on the dates on which the
decision to send a Commonwealth contingent was reached there is
no reason to doubt his explanation of motives for earlier
inaction. It is fully consistent with other evidence.
(CPD 7 : 8739 ff., 14 January 1902)
See also the public address of Hopetoun reported (CPD 7 : 9477-8,
30 January 1902).

On Barton's demand that the British government request troops:
Barton held this view consistently. See his memos:
18 July 1901 (CAO : CP146, System 2, 01/30/-).
3 August 1901 (CAO : CP146, System 2, 01/75/-).
21 November 1901 (CAO : CP146, System 2, 01/75/-).
CPD 7 : 8739-40, 14 January 1901.

26 Barton on financial and alleged constitutional difficulties:
CAO : CP146, System 2, 01/75/- (E/A, 75/1, 01).

27 Quotation from:
Sydney Morning Herald, 10 January 1902.
Barton was skilfully evasive on the date of commitment and
constantly returned to the same set of facts giving them a
different emphasis each time.
(CPD 7 : 8739-8744)

On the Henniker Heaton affair:
Heaton to Chamberlain, 9 December 1901.
Enclosure to despatch, Chamberlain to Hopetoun, 4 April 1901.
(CAO : CP178, S21, B45a, S/S Cable 7 February 1902)
Chamberlain denied any connection with Heaton and asserted that
his despatch of 9 December 1901 to Barton was quite unrelated
to Heaton's communication.
Heaton's explanation - Advertiser, 4 March 1902.

28 On Chamberlain's enquiry:
Chamberlain to Hopetoun (Secret telegram), 9 December 1901.
(CAO : CP78, S1, B45a, S/S Cable 31 December 1901)

On Barton's commitment:
Hopetoun to Barton, 10 December 1901.
Barton's Confidential Minute, 10 December 1901.
Hopetoun to Chamberlain, 11 December 1901.
(CAO : CP146, System 2, 01/75/-, E/A, 75/01)
(Notes Chapter Five : beginning 29)

Hopetoun to Chamberlain, 15 December 1901.
Hopetoun to Chamberlain, 17 December 1901.
(CAO : CP78, S9, Vol.I, pp.102-3)
Hopetoun to Barton, 18 December 1901.
(Barton Papers : C.N.L.)

29 Hopetoun to Chamberlain, 11 December 1901.

30 On the request for justification:
   Chamberlain to Hopetoun, 14 December 1901.
   Chamberlain to Hopetoun, 21 December 1901.
   (CAO : CP78, S21, B45a, S/S Cable, 31 December 1901)

On formal and official approval:
   Hopetoun to Chamberlain, 22 December 1901.

31 Report of the Conference of Military Commandants ... on 28th September, 1899 ... in bound volumes of printed documents in library of the Defence Department (45, 30/12302).

32 Quotation from:
   Advertiser, 4 January 1902.

33 On pressure from the States:
   CAO : CP146, System 2, 01/75/- (E/A, 75/5, 01).

On Deakin's intervention:
   Barton to Deakin, 26 December 1901.
   (CAO : CP146, System 2, 01/75/-)
Only Barton's response is on record.

On Newspaper comment:
   Advertiser, 9 January 1902.
   Sydney Morning Herald, 1 January 1902.

34 On Barton's justification:
   Sydney Morning Herald, 10 January 1902.

On rumours of Reid's actions:
   Sydney Morning Herald, 16 January 1902.
   Age, 14 January 1902.
35 Barton to Reid, 13 January 1902.
(Barton Papers : C.N.L.)

36 *Loc. cit.*
On Reid's response:
Reid to Barton, 13 and 14 January 1902.
(Barton Papers : C.N.L.)

37 On Barton's attitude in 1899:
*N.S.W.P.D. 100 : 1495-1504, 19 October 1899.*

On Barton's resolution in 1902:
CPD 7 : 8738 ff., 14 January 1902.

*Note:* Unless otherwise indicated all speeches were made on 14 January 1902. Barton's resolutions were introduced on the first day of parliament after the Christmas recess.

On the divisions in the House:
CPD 7 : 8800.

On the debate in the Senate:
CPD 7 : 9007-30, 22 January 1902.

38 From this account the case for participation has been omitted because, given the limitations of space, it is deemed clear from attitudes presented in Chapters II and III above. Hereunder are samples of views expressed about the following propositions:

On the war being just:
W.A. Fowler (Labour) - CPD 7 : 8762-8769.
Bruce Smith (Free-trade) - CPD 7 : 8787-8792.
Barton - CPD 7 : 8795-9.

On Pro-Boers encouraging resistance to the British cause:
Barton - CPD 7 : 8795-6.
Salmon (Protectionist) - CPD 7 : 8769-71.
Quick (Protectionist) - CPD 7 : 8782-5.

On Australia's interests lying in the preservation of the Cape Route:
Barton - CPD 7 : 8741-2.

On the inviolability of Empire:
Barton - CPD 7 : 8740, 8744, 9383.
Quick (Protectionist) - CPD 7 : 8782-5.

On Australian security depending upon British power and prestige in the world and the Empire being a spear-head of civilization and good government:
Barton - CPD 7 : 8798.
Reid - CPD 7 : 8747-9.
(Notes Chapter Five • beginning 39)

Salmon (Protectionist) - CPD 7 : 8769-71.
Smith (Free-trade) - CPD 7 : 8792.

On general support for racial patriotism:
McGregor (Labour) - CPD 7 : 9013.
Pearce (Labour) - CPD 7 : 9026-7.

39 CPD 7 : 8954, 21 January 1902.

40 On Higgins:
Grimshaw, *Some Aspects of Australian Attitudes to the Imperial Connection 1900-1919*, pp.22-23.
CPD 7 : 8752-8762, 14 January 1902.
Age, 28 March 1901, p.8.

41 CPD 7 : 8752-8762, 14 January 1902. His points have been given a coherence they did not have in the long and rambling speech.

42 CPD 7 : 8757.

43 CPD 7 : 8753.

44 For sample views:
McDonald (Labour) - CPD 7 : 8771-8775, 14 January 1902.
Ronald (Labour) - CPD 7 : 9389-90, 29 January 1902.

45 CPD 7 : 9393, 29 January 1902.

46 For Labour's response in 1899 see Chapter III above.

47 CPD 7 : 9012, 21 January 1902.

48 Watson (Labour) - CPD 7 : 8749-52, 14 January 1902.
Pearce (Labour) - CPD 7 : 9026-29, 21 January 1902.

49 For discussion of the two notions:
CPD 7 : 9375 et seq., 29 January 1902.
CPD 7 : 9476 et seq., 30 January 1902.
50 Watson (Labour) — CPD 7 : 8749–52, 9374–78, 9394–6, 9497 ff.

51 Loc. cit.

52 e.g. Barton — CPD 7 : 8798–9, 14 January 1902.
Reid.— CPD 7 : 8750, 14 January 1902.

53 On the Contingents:
P.L. Murray, Official Record of the Australian Military Contingents in the South African War (Melbourne 1910 ; Government Printer ?).
Chamberlain to Hopetoun, 17 January 1902.
Chamberlain to Hopetoun, 18 March 1902.
(CAO : CP78, S21, B45a, S/S Cable, 31 December 1901)
CPD 7 : 8944–5, 21 March 1902.
CPD 8 : 11099, 20 March 1902.

On the lack of officers:
Bilton to Forrest, 16 April 1902.
D.D. 02/879 (A.W.M. 2/19).

54 Quotation from:
CPD 10 : 12938, 28 May 1901.

See also:
CPD 10 : 13146–7, 3 June 1901.

55 On Deakin and South Africa:
CPD 18 : 718–19, 17 March 1904.
Jebb to Deakin, 18 June 1906.
(CAO : CP103, S10, 06/3694)

56 On Newspaper Response:
Advertiser, 14 January 1902, accuses Barton for not anticipating Chamberlain's wishes.
Advertiser, 16 January 1902, chides Barton for unduly stressing German provocations.
Age, 14 January 1902, calling for a contingent and parliamentary support for Barton's policy.
Age, 16 January 1902, praises the speeches of the more flamboyant of the Imperial loyalists, Fowler and McLean.
Sydney Morning Herald, 16 January 1902, blames Barton for hesitation and lack of appreciation of Imperial responsibilities.
On resolutions of support for Chamberlain:
   These were passed on to Chamberlain by Hopetoun. **Samples:**

On pro-British fervour:
   **Advertiser**, 30 January 1902, p.5.

On opposition to participation:
   **Bulletin**, 20 December 1901 (editorial), and 28 December 1901 (editorial).
   Grimshaw, *op.cit.*, Chapter II.

   CAO : CP146, System 2, 02/137, January 1902.
   CAO : CP78, S1, 1/317, 1902 to 1907.
   CAO : CP78, S21, B45a (S/S Cable 31 December 1901), 1901 to 1907.

58 On the Heaton affair:
   Hopetoun to Chamberlain, No.15 of 7 February 1902.
   (CAO : CP78, S8, Vol. I of 1902, p.355)
   Chamberlain to Hopetoun, No.116 of 27 December 1901.
   Chamberlain to Hopetoun (Confidential), 4 April 1902.
   (CAO : CP78, S21, B45a, S/S Despatch of 7 February 1902)
   Much speculation occurred in parliament on the roles of Heaton and Chamberlain, *e.g.* CPD 7 : 9031 ff., 21 January 1902.

59 On Chamberlain's position in the winter of 1901:
   Kruger, *op.cit.*, **pp.454-7**.

60 Quotation from Amery:
   Amery, *Union and Strength*, p.15.

Quotation from Hodern:

On Captain Mahan:

On Lord Brassey:

61 Jebb, *Colonial Nationalism*, p.84.

NOTES FOR CHAPTER SIX

1 Colonial Defence Committee No.226M (of 30 July 1901) "... Organization of the Defence Department and the Constitution of Head-Quarters Staff", p.15.

2 Chamberlain to Hopetoun, 13 November 1901.
See also Despatch of 1 December 1901 (CAO : CP78, S1, 1/55, Cable 1 June 1901).

3 Ibid., Chamberlain to Hopetoun, 29 May 1902 (Enclosure War Office to Colonial Office, No.108 of 1902).

4 The material on the selection of a General Officer is copious. As the account is reduced in the text, citation will also be restricted.

On Correspondence with the Colonial Office:
CAO : CP78, S9, VI, pp.51, 55.
CAO : CP78, S8, VI, PP.67, 75-78, 89, 90, 91.
CAO : CP78, S1, 1/55, Cable of 1 June 1901 (Despatches plus enclosures).
Hopetoun to Barton, 2 August 1901, 1 December 1901 (Barton Papers : C.N.L.).
CDC No.226M.

On the Australian response:
CAO : MP84, S2, 01/2488.
The Argus, 23 September 1901.
CPD 4 : 5219, 26 September 1901.
Sydney Morning Herald, 5 February 1902.
CPD 6 : 8064-5, 2 December 1901.
Sydney Morning Herald, 10 January 1902.

5 Apart from the official material used and yet to be quoted – and far too profuse to be cited here – this sketch of Hutton draws heavily upon the following sources.

The works of Major Warren Perry:
Warren Perry, Military Reforms of General Sir Edward Hutton ..., cited above.

While Perry has carefully collected a great deal of material for a short biography of Hutton — and other military officers — which I have used freely, and has kindly spoken and corresponded with me on Australian military subjects, the interpretation of Hutton offered here is my own.

The unofficial writings of Hutton:
E.T.H. Hutton, *The Tactical and Strategical Power of Mounted Troops in War...* (read at the United Service Institute of N.S.W., 28 August 1894).

The last two addresses were given to audiences which included Sir Charles Dilke, the Duke of Connaught, Sir John Colomb, H.O. Arnold Forster. All three were presented to Barton with sections on Imperial cooperation heavily scored as a form of Brief for the Colonial Conference 1902 (CAO : CP103, S12, B4).


Other sources:

See also Hutton's views on the British Territorials in addresses and discussion reported in the *Royal United Services Institute Journal*. HEREAFTER: RUSIJ.

Before the National Defence Association, May 1908: RUSIJ
November 1908, pp.1585 ff.
Discussion after lecture by Baden-Powell on the Territorials, RUSIJ, November 1908, pp.1487 ff.

6 [RUSIJ, November 1908, quotation from p.1586; see also pp.1585 ff.]

7 In general terms this was Hutton’s teaching as it finally evolved based upon his official and unofficial writing. See also *Instruction Book of Training of Imperial Yeomanry* (War Office: 1900?), A.W.M. 11/19.
8 Quotation from:
Hutton to Chapman, 15 March 1904.
CAO : MP84, S2, 1904/1539.

See also:
RUSIJ, November 1908, p.1585.

9 On the elaboration of the function of the mounted rifles:
Hutton's remarks on the manoeuvres of the 3rd and 4th Australian
Light Horse - issued with General Order No.104 of 4 May 1904.
CAO : MP84, S2, 1904/2709.

On the lessons of South Africa:
See his reply to criticism in the Age, 7 November 1903.
CAO : MP84, S2, 1903/6166.

10 Deakin to Barton, 17 June 1902 (Barton Papers : C.N.L.).
Sir George Turner suspected that Hutton had been juggling the estimates
to prevent the reduction of £132,000 promised by Forrest.

11 Hutton to Chapman, 14 March 1904.
CAO : MP84, S2, 1904/1539.


13 See Note 5 above.

14 Lord Brassey, Papers & Addresses ... Imperial Federation and Colonization
from 1880 to 1894 (London 1895 : Longmans, Green) particularly pp.
144-146, 211, 264-266.

15 Quotation from Daily Mail, 30 June 1897: cutting of paper in Fragmentary
History of Records of Second Australian Light Horse Regiment (Mounted

16 Colonial Defence Committee Secret No.126M (of February 1899) -
"Australia; Mounted Rifles for Imperial Service in War".
CDC Memo No.254M, p.10.
Quotation from:
Parliamentary Papers 1904, XL (Cd.1789) p.89.
For statements by British Ministers of State 1900-1901:
CDC Memo No.254b, pp.10-11.

Other Sources:
P.A. Silburn, A Plea for an Imperial Army in the United Services Magazine, August 1903, pp.470 ff.

Annual Report upon the Military Forces of the Commonwealth by Major-General Sir Edward Hutton ... 1st May, 1903.
CPP 1903, Vol.II, pp.57 et seq. (Ordered to be Printed 6 August 1903) - p.23 of the report.
HEREAFTER: Commonwealth Military Report 1903.

e.g. Commonwealth Military Report 1903, p.5.

Subservience to the Commonwealth was subject to a proviso which, on present evidence, can only remain a doubt. There is no way of discovering in Australia the nature of Hutton's instructions from the War Office - supposing any existed. It is likely that British authorities wanted the way left open for some kind of Imperial reserve. Moreover, like other General Officers Commanding Hutton possessed a secret cypher with which he could make confidential reports to the War Office. See below in this Chapter.

See below Chapter VIII.

In this attempt to present a fundamental difference between Hutton and Australian Cabinets, I have distilled from his remarks and recommendations the manner in which he appears to have conceived policy should be made. In fact, he was often not as articulate as this summary suggests. The advantage of the summary is that it lends a cogent pattern to his complaints and his difficulties.

Moreover, it was standard practice, indeed part of the King's Regulations, that military planning be compiled resting on answers to all these questions - or approval by Cabinet to answers given by military staff. The resulting document, in Australia at least, was known as a Defence Scheme: it was supposed to begin with considerations in strategy and policy and end with detailed plans for mobilization.
Bridges was more persistent and clearer in his argument partly because Hutton had already laid the foundations of military policy and partly because one minister for Defence, T.T. Ewing, was more acute than his predecessors.

21 On the request of Forrest and Barton: 
Commonwealth Military Report 1903, p.5.

On Hutton's Strategic Assessment and Military Policy:
The method of exposition here will be to take the Defence Minute April 1902 as a basis and include the later recommendations, most of which found their way into printed parliamentary papers in some form or another. They were summarized for the first time in Chapter I of the first proof of the Defence Scheme for the Commonwealth of Australia of July 1904 which was prepared for approval by the Colonial Defence Committee. Hutton himself explained that this blue-print was merely an amplification of the basic minute of April 1902.
CAO : MP84, S2, 1904/1185: Meeting of the Commonwealth Defence Committee, p.4.

The most important sources will be: 
Correspondence on the Formation of Head-Quarters Staff, Feb.-April 1902 and April 1904.
D.D. - 02/124, 02/393, 02/147 (A.W.M.).
CAO : MP84, S2, B56, 1904/1616.
HEREAFTER : Correspondence on H.Q. Staff.

Minute Upon the Defence of Australia by Major-General Sir Edward Hutton ... 7th April 1902 in CPP, Vol.II of 1902.
HEREAFTER : Defence Minute April 1902.

Recommendations on Fixed Defences 1902-1905.
CAO : MP84, S2, 1972/2/261.
CAO : CP290, S15, B1, Secretary of State Cable, 23 June 1904.
HEREAFTER : Hutton on Fixed Defences.

Correspondence on the Defence Act 1903, May-Oct. 1903.
D.D. - 03/341 (A.W.M.).
HEREAFTER : Hutton on Defence Act 1903.

Hutton to Forrest, 14 May 1903, on Transcontinental Railway.
CAO : MP84, S1, 1957/2/43, Printed in part in Parliamentary Paper (Ordered to be Printed 23 July 1903).

Hutton to Dawson, 23 June 1904.
CAO : MP84, S2, 1904/184 and 1904/1496.
Commonwealth Military Report 1903.
Pacific and the corresponding rise of Japan. Secondly, he made the following reference to the Defence Act in an amendment of a sentence already quoted: "It may be assumed, therefore, that although Australia under the conditions of the new Defence Act, confines her military forces to action upon Australian soil, she will in the near future determine ... also to defend those vast interests beyond her soil ..."
Commonwealth Defence Scheme July 1904, p.2.

The are of possible conflict involving Australia included, in Hutton's estimation: China, the Northern Pacific, the South-West Pacific, India, and the Indian Ocean.

27 On the primacy of the field force:
CAO : MP84, S2, 03/7403.

On the cadre principle:
A Cadre - a term often to be used in this Chapter - is the permanent establishment of a military unit forming a nucleus for expansion in war. For instance, the establishment for an infantry unit proposed in 1902 was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regiment of Infantry.</th>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>Warrant Officers</th>
<th>Sergeants</th>
<th>Rank &amp; File</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peace</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>445</td>
<td>509</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>929</td>
<td>1010</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On Organization:
For the most vehement expression of this, see his statement of colonial experience as he related it to the British Territorials. RUSIJ, op.cit., Nov.1908, pp.1487 ff., 1585 ff.

On the Estimates:
Defence Minute April 1902, p.7.
Commonwealth Military Report 1903, pp. 5 and 16.
Statement by the Minister of State for Defence on the Estimates of the Defence Department for the Financial Year 1903-4, 30 July 1903. - CPP, Vol.II of 1903 (Ordered to be Printed 30 July 1903).

28 Quotation from:
Hutton to Dawson, 26 April 1904.
CAO : MP84, S2, 1904/1616.

See also:
Commonwealth Military Report 1903, pp.5-7.
Correspondence on H.Q. Staff, Feb.–April 1902.
Hutton assumed the duties of Chief of Staff with the help of a military secretary though his burden was partly lightened as the Deputy Adjutant-General, Colonel J.C. Road, was also made Chief Staff Officer.

Much of the technical and administrative detail has been omitted from the final draft of the text, on the grounds that the military aspects of the thesis should not clutter the story of policy. (For a table showing lines of responsibility see Chapter VIII below) The following brief comments may, however, help:

(1) The fountainhead of all power inside the military scheme lay with Hutton. The officers on his staff held essentially executive positions; even then he was reluctant to delegate authority.

(2) The District Staffs would be responsible to the central body charged with the formulation and direction of military policy. Staff Officers appointed to District Staff while under the command of the District Commandant, were also responsible to Head-Quarters. Even the training of the field force would come under centralized rather than district control.

(3) In addition Hutton wished to have direct influence over Warrant Officers, Staff Sergeants, and Staff Officers who might for a time be allotted to militia regiments. Thus in addition to their responsibility to militia officers and to the District Staffs, they would be responsible to Head-Quarters. This involved a degree of centralization many found stifling.

A Staff Officer was to (a) assist and supervise administration of militia regiments as the Officer in Command desired, (b) instruct the Acting Adjutants of the regiment, (c) instruct officers and non-commissioned officers especially by lectures, yet (d) be available for general staff duties as Head-Quarters desired.

(4) The two key positions on the staff were those of the Deputy Adjutant-General and the Deputy Quarter-Master-General. Hutton had to do without the services of both before his reforms were complete. The position of Assistant Quarter-Master-General, held by Lieutenant-Colonel Bridges, was also important.

(5) As far as I can ascertain the Staff Officers on duty in October 1904 numbered only five: Lieutenant-Colonel Bridges (Chief Staff Officer and Assistant Quarter-Master-General); Lieutenant-Colonel Le Mesurier (Assistant Adjutant-General for Artillery); Captain Buckley (Assistant Adjutant-General for Engineers); Major Sandford (Assistant Director for Artillery); Colonel Williams (Director of Medical Staff).
(Note Chapter Six: beginning 31)

(6) On Sources:

Appendix to Memo Hutton to Forrest, 18 April 1902, Correspondence on H.Q. Staff (CDH Memo No. 266 of July 1901).


D.D., 02/1889, 22 July 1902 (A.W.M.).

D.D., 04/1342, 02/2103, 03/556 (A.W.M.).

CAO: MP84, S2, 1904/1185.


T.T. Ewing (?) to Deakin, c. August 1906. "Notwithstanding to adverse opinion obtained from Major-General Hutton (on the Board System), all the officers appointed to the Military Board were ex-members of his staff and Major-General Finn was appointed Inspector-General."

CAO: MP178, S1, 1905/111305.

List of officers holding the positions mentioned is in the above file—see also D.D., 02/173, February 1902—October 1903 (A.W.M.).

On Bridges' staff in 1914 was Major C.E.B. White who had assisted him earlier when he was Chief of Intelligence. White became Hutton's aide-de-camp in 1904 and was to be deeply impressed by the man, his work, and his aims. Yet he was too junior an officer to influence affairs immediately after Hutton's departure. Others, including Major H. Le Mesurier, Lieutenant-Colonel H.G. Chauvel, Major R. Wallace, and Major V.C.M. Sellheim, were more senior. Brigadier-General H. Finn, the Commandant in New South Wales, also understood and approved Hutton's reforms. Permanent officers were the main, but not the sole, beneficiaries. Those militia officers of established regiments, especially from the Light Horse, who had served well in South Africa were appointed as aides-de-camp to the State Governors and the Governor-General. To different degrees these men were influenced by the General Officer Commanding. To different degrees they were willing to carry on his work after 1904. Finn, Bridges and Le Mesurier were more prepared than most.

32 Quotation from:


See also the Introduction of Bean, Two Men I Knew, for comments which could have been directed at J.C. Hoad or J.M. Gordon.

33 This impression of Hoad's lack of professional ability is based upon careful analysis of his memoranda. This is not to deny that Hoad possessed certain administrative skill; his later work on the formation of the Commonwealth Section of the Imperial General Staff demonstrated that ability.
Warren Perry and Professor J. La Nauze, in conversation, added to my knowledge of him, but the responsibility for the judgements given is clearly my own.

The selection of Hoad as Inspector General and Chief of General Staff was, as we shall see, a matter of principle. During the nineties successive ministries were under pressure from the A.N.A. to ensure that all future staff positions would be filled by Australians. Hoad was among those selected for overseas training as part of the grooming for higher promotion. It is therefore not so surprising that Hoad should prosper under Deakin ministries.


For a brief resume of his career see:


For the selection of an observer to the Russo-Japanese War see:

CAO : MP84, S2, 32/04, 1904/6970, 1904/6165.

For Deakin's espousal of Hoad's desire to be both a professional soldier and president of the Prahan Branch of the A.N.A. see:


For parliamentary discussion of Hoad's appointment and his soliciting of support see:

CPD 3 : 838 ff., 840-1, 844-5, 856-7, 857-9, 890-1.

Also the answers to questions in the House assembled in


34 On Bridges' position under Hutton;

Initially Bridges was under Colonel Taunton, the Deputy Assistant Quarter-Master-General, whose duties were more broad but close to those of the Assistant Quarter-Master-General drafted by the Colonial Defence Committee in 1901. However, intelligence, organization, and mobilization schemes were always in Bridges' hands. After Taunton's retirement Bridges assumed his duties but still with nominal position of Assistant Quarter-Master-General.

On Bridges in 1914;

It might well have been that Bridges' recommendation was merely a gesture since he would have suspected that Cabinet would not accept Hutton as leader of the A.I.F. Nevertheless, this gesture speaks of a respect for Hutton on which all remaining documentary evidence is silent.

On Sources:

Bean, Two Men I Knew, Part I.

My reading of Bridges' memoranda convinces me that C.E.W. Bean's assessment of his astute caution and professional zeal is correct.
(Notes Chapter Six : beginning 35)

35 Hutton to Forrest, 1 April 1902 (Correspondence on H.Q. Staff).

36 Ibid., Hutton to Forrest, 18 April 1902.

37 On Salary Range:
The Military Committee which drafted the first Defence Bill recommended that the salary range for a colonelcy be £700-900, in itself a substantial increase on that paid in many colonies. Hutton recommended a starting salary of £1,000 for a colonel who held the position of Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General. Cabinet reduced this to £800.

On Parliament:
The parliamentary attack upon salaries was general, deeply affecting most government departments. Two points here. First, neither Cabinet nor parliament was predisposed to understand Hutton's case before rejection. Secondly, Cabinet did allow substantial increases to some officers.

On Sources:
Forrest to Hutton, 17 April 1902 (Correspondence on H.Q. Staff). See also statement by Sir William Lyne in parliament (CPD 12: 16431, 3 October 1902.

38 On Strength in 1901:
The total of all forces, permanent and citizen, stood at 29,751. Defence Minute April 1902, p.3.

On Previous Function:
For details of the functions of the various arms to meet the various methods of attack available to enemy raiders:
Queensland - Scheme of Defence (Revised to 1 December 1900).
Defence Scheme for the State of New South Wales (Revised to 30 September 1901).
CAO : MP153, S16.

39 On Garrison Forces:
Hutton used the term "sedentary" for garrison troops since they would not be expected to operate out of their immediate locale. As well as operating against large landing parties anywhere on the coast, the field forces were to meet the various threats previously countered by the mobile sections of the colonial forces.

On Fixed Defences:
CAO: MP84, S2, 03/7403.
HEREAFTER : Hutton On Fixed Defences 1904.
On Omissions:
The tactical principles and the armament of the garrison forces is omitted from this account. Sufficient here to suggest that these forces if equipped as Hutton suggested could deter any raider.

40 On Protected Ports:
Hutton to AAG/Artillery, 8 April 1902.
Le Mesurier (Chief of Ordnance) to Playford, October 1905.
CAO: MP84, S2, 03/1963.

On Albany:
Later doubts were to be raised about the need to defend Townsville and Albany. Hutton believed that the defences of Townsville, Brisbane, and Newcastle had been given too much importance because the sea approaches were difficult enough to help deter raiders. He did not, however, make any changes.
Hutton on Fixed Defences 1904.
Hutton on Fixed Defences 1902-3.
CAO: MP84, S2, 1972/2/261.
Defence of Torres Straits 1903-5.
CAO: CP290, S15, B1, S/S Cable, 23 June 1904.

41 On Conditions in Great Britain:
There was a similar profusion of obsolete and obsolescent weapons used in coastal defence in Great Britain. In 1899 a conference on Coast Defence decided to sweep away much of the existing armament and depend on a lesser number of modern, powerful, high-velocity, quick-firing guns. The 6" B.L. Mark VII quick-firing gun was in part result of this change.

On Conditions in Australia:
A few samples of conditions in Australia must suffice. Most of the weapons overlooking Hobart had been purchased between 1882 and 1885. During the Russian scare in 1885 the South Australian government purchased two 9.2" B.L. Guns of no recognizable War Office pattern without control gear or hydro-pneumatic mountings which were never utilized; the existing 10" B.L. guns were aging and of extremely low velocity, and by 1902 were useless. In Sydney there were some 9.2" B.L. Mark VI guns with control gear but no mountings purchased in haste in the eighties but not used; when examined in 1903 Australian military authorities were uncertain whether the weapons fell under Mark I, Mark II, or Mark III of the War Office Ordnance List. In Melbourne, little had been done about the fixed defences since 1887.

On Strength of Fixed Defences:
In the opinion of the Colonial Defence Committee: "The B.L. armament of Sydney is greater than that of any port in England, with the exception of the fortresses of Portsmouth, Plymouth,
and the Thames, and as great as that of any defended port abroad, except Gibraltar, Malta, Aden, and Bombay."

CDC (Revision of Defence Scheme for N.S.W.) No. 159R of April 29, 1897.

On Naval Cooperation:
It may be added here that in late 1904 Hutton allowed a meeting of members of his staff and officers of the local naval forces to draw up recommendations for cooperative measures to control harbour shipping in wartime; to examine harbour facilities and foreign shipping at anchor; and to ensure harbour defence generally. The conference was not very fruitful.
See Appendix to Meeting of the Commonwealth Defence Committee, 31 October 1904.
CAO : MP84, S2, 1904/1185.

On Sources:
Hutton on Fixed Defences 1904.
Hutton on Fixed Defences 1902-3.
Queensland — Scheme of Defence (1900); Defences of Tasmania — Report by the Defence Committee (1890); Defence Scheme for the State of New South Wales (1901).
CAO : MP153, S16.

On Omissions:
A full list of armament and an assessment of the capability of the fixed defences has been omitted from this account.

On Queensland Alarms:
Andrew Fisher, the future Labour Prime Minister, was approached by the Chamber of Commerce at Brisbane, Townsville, Cairns, and Maryborough between July and October 1904.
CAO : MP84, S2, 1972/2/261.
For the naval aspect of this agitation see the next Chapter, VII.

On Passages through Torres Straits:
Though there were other channels — and some unchartered near the coast of New Guinea — through which alarmists argued cruisers could pass, the most commonly used were Prince of Wales Channel and Endeavour Straits. Thursday Island was surrounded by larger islands which masked these passages from the batteries and even from observation posts.

On Use and Fortification of Thursday Island:
CAO : CP290, S15, B1, S/S Cable 23 June 1904 contains many of the various recommendations.
See also CAO : MP84, S2, 1972/2/261.
Before the Colonial Conference of 1887 a scheme was mooted to fortify the group of islands of which Thursday Island was one.
At the conference it was decided to restrict work to Thursday Island. Coal was then needed for the light cruisers of Australian Auxiliary Squadron for sustained operations in northern waters; the scrapping of light cruisers by Lord Fisher and the increase in range of heavier cruisers made a coal depot at Thursday Island redundant.

The Admiralty eventually decided that a moveable hulk bearing coal - much like the one Burns, Philp & Co. kept at Goode Island - should be taken to Thursday Island in time of war. Admiral Fanshawe to Northcote, 12th December 1904.

Lieutenant-Colonel Owen (AAG/Engineers) and Lieutenant-Colonel Bridges (AQMG) recommended the installation of 2 - 6" Mark VII Q.F. guns on Goode Island.

Hutton, after a tour of the area July to August 1903 suggested that the permanent garrison be increased. In October 1905 there were still only 28 non-commissioned officers and men in the garrison. He also recommended that the existing armament be augmented. Yet in 1908 the armament was the same as that in 1904.

On Omissions:
Consideration of the technical, strategic, political and imperial aspects of the complex problems arising out of Thursday Island fortifications has been omitted from the text.

43 On Reductions:
The numbers in the R.A.A. were drastically reduced in 1902-1904. Commonwealth Military Report 1903, p.8 - numbers of permanent soldiery allowed for in Estimates:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>Other Ranks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January 1902</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>1,170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduced in 1902</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>922</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1902-3 Estimates</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1903-4 Estimates</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>714</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

See also Hutton to Lyne, 27 October 1902 (Uncategorized D.D. File in A.W.M.).

On Corps d'Elite:
This is not to suggest the R.A.A. achieved this standard, as we shall see. Hutton took many opportunities to enthrone officers and men and to elevate their status.

Defence Minute April 1902, p.6.


On Permanent Garrison Forces:
Permanent Garrisons at some strength were maintained at the points of importance to the Royal Navy: Sydney; Thursday Island; Albany. At the harbours of refuge smaller garrisons were to be augmented by the citizen artillerymen and engineers of the garrison forces: Townsville; Brisbane; Newcastle; Melbourne; Hobart; Adelaide; and Fremantle.

For the instruction and coordination of garrison troops see Hutton's Minute of 22 September 1904 - D.D. 04/1626 (A.W.M.).

44 On Garrison Forces (Citizen-Soldiery) as Projected:
Originally Hutton intended numbers in the Garrison Force in excess of:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mounted Troops</th>
<th>Artillery</th>
<th>Infantry</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Field Guns</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N.S.W.</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>845</td>
<td>3,048</td>
<td>794</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4,912</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vic.</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>1,313</td>
<td>1,456</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3,193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Queens.</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>476</td>
<td>1,678</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2,679</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S.A.</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>341</td>
<td>937</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1,509</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W.A.</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>840</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1,205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tas.</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>259</td>
<td>1,426</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1,972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>1,108</td>
<td>3,445</td>
<td>9,385</td>
<td>1,532</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>15,470</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Defence Minute April 1902*, p.4.

On Garrison Forces as Planned:
By 1904 he had to accept 11,752 men and 26 guns.
*Commonwealth Military Report 1904*, pp.7-9, Appendix A.

On Mobilization of Garrison Forces:
Garrison Troops were to be augmented by District Reserves. They were thus detailed to the following points in times of danger - Townsville; Rockhampton; Brisbane; Newcastle (+ Lismore + Richmond); Sydney; Wollongong; Melbourne; Hobart; Launceston; Adelaide; Perth; Fremantle.
*Ibid.*, Appendix A.

45 Quotation from:
*Defence Minute April 1902*, p.3.

On Strength of the Field Force:
Despite retrenchment over the period and small changes in proposed organization the strength of the planned field force remained substantially unchanged, with this exception. Initially Hutton hoped to see a peace establishment of 14,100 troops. Retrenchment and difficulties of converting units to the field force resulted in a peace establishment of 11,831. In short, wherever possible Hutton attempted to shift the difficulties of reorganiza-
tion onto the volunteer units of the garrison forces rather than endanger his field forces.

On the Allotment of Field Forces:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Brigades</th>
<th>Brigades</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Light Horse</td>
<td>Infantry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New South Wales</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victoria</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tasmania</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Queensland</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Australia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Australia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On Combined Strength of the Commonwealth Forces:

Combining the proposals for the field force and the garrison force the Commonwealth would command, therefore, 27,500 troops and 86 guns in peace and 38,654 troops and 117 guns in war as well as about a thousand permanent troops (excluding fixed defences). All the troops (garrison, field and permanent) would be allotted as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Artillery</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mounted</td>
<td>Field</td>
<td>Garri-</td>
<td>Mobile</td>
<td>Engin-</td>
<td>Infan-</td>
<td>Ancillary</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rifles</td>
<td>Artil-</td>
<td>son Guns</td>
<td>eers</td>
<td>try</td>
<td>Services</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>lery</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace</td>
<td>6,108</td>
<td>1,548</td>
<td>2,151</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>938</td>
<td>13,421</td>
<td>1,534</td>
<td>25,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War</td>
<td>11,352</td>
<td>2,999</td>
<td>2,151</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>1,295</td>
<td>19,484</td>
<td>2,341</td>
<td>39,622</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


On Hutton and the Field Force:

Hutton took every opportunity to expound the principles of the field forces. The following are the more complete from published sources:

- Defence Minute April 1902, pp.3-5 and Appendix B.
- Sydney Morning Herald, 6 December 1902.
- Commonwealth Military Report 1903, pp.16-22, 29-31, and Appendices.
- Commonwealth Military Report 1904, pp.7-9, 31-32, and Appendices.

46 On the Reserve Problem:

For an appreciation in 1896 which shows how difficult it was to entice men into a reserve and how men drifted in and out of the Victorian forces and from colony to colony:

Commandant (Victoria) to Premier, 29 May 1896.

CAO : MP153, 96/2638.
(Notes Chapter Six: beginning 47)

Hutton on rifle clubs and the "leavening" of men of South African experience:
Defense Minute April 1902, p.6.
Sydney Morning Herald, 6 February 1902, p.8.

Hutton's hopes that men of military experience would join rifle clubs though marginal to his scheme was still ill-founded. In 1909 of 57,855 members of rifle clubs only 3,624 had served for 2 years or more in the militia.
CAO : MsF84, S1, 1974/1/75.

On the levy en masse:
See above Chapter IV.
Part IV of the Defence Act (No. 20 of 1903).

47 CID Memo of 1906, p.10.

48 On Rifle Clubs:
CDC No. 40R of June 1890, p.4.
CDC No. 119R of November 1895, p.3.
CDC No. 90M of December 1896, p.5.
CDC No. 254M of April 1901, p.6.
CID Memo of 1906, pp.10-11.

On Reserves:
A number of CID Memos between 1901 and 1905 which levelled these criticisms were destroyed. However, from comments in departmental files, it seems that the principles were forcefully expressed in:
CDC No. 301R of 22 October 1902.
CDC No. 330M of February 1905.


The 5th, 6th, 7th and 8th Australian Commonwealth Horse were, as closely as possible, organized so that a battalion was drawn from one state (i.e. military district), a squadron from a district locality, and a troop from one district area.

51 Perry, Military Reforms of General Sir Edward Hutton, op.cit., p.9.
52 Quotation from:
Hutton to McCay, 6 September 1904.
D.D. 04/1531 (A.W.M.).

See also:
The instructional cadre system was to be variously applied to
the Corps of Australian Engineers; Australian Army Medical
Corps; and the Australian Army Service Corps.

53 Hutton to Lyne, 27 October 1902.
D.D. (unnumbered) - (A.W.M.).

54 Quotation from:
Hutton to Forrest, 6 July 1903.
Hutton on the Defence Act.
D.D. 03/341 (A.W.M.).

On Social Background of Regiments:
In some established Light Horse regiments officers had long been
drawn from those with commercial or pastoral interests. The 1st
Light Horse Regiment, for instance, had squadrons in Sydney,
Parramatta, Richmond, and Windsor; while the 2nd Light Horse
Regiment was drawn from Goulburn, Bungendore, Cooma, Gundagai
and Bega. Both were to be part of the 1st Light Horse Brigade.

Selection and promotion of officers in South Australia and
Western Australia indicated most came from country districts,
were known as men of "means" or "independent means" and were
drawn, in the case of urban areas, from the professions. A
successful businessman or secretary of a building society was
thought to be, for that fact, good officer material.
D.D. 03/247, February 1903 (A.W.M.).
D.D. 03/506, September 1902 - March 1903 (A.W.M.).

Application forms for promotion in the Light Horse regiments of
Eastern States almost invariably showed occupation as "gentleman"
or "public servant".

55 Quotation from:
The inference that Perry appears to draw - that the scheme was
to be wholly a Militia one - is not correct.

On Qualifications to Command:
Bridges and others agreed and resisted attempts by various
ministers to open the avenues of promotion to rankers and citizen-
officers so long as professional competence was endangered. The
struggle continued until after 1908.
CAO: MP84, S1, 1811/1/7 (1903-1909).
Defence Minute April 1902, p.5.

56 Quotation from:
Hutton to Forrest, 6 July 1903.
Correspondence on the Defence Act.
D.D. 03/341 (A.W.M.).
See also: Commonwealth Military Report 1903, p.30.

On Disparate Pay:
The units in Tasmania and South Australia were, for instance, nominally volunteer or unpaid units. In fact they received capitation grants and special duty pay. Even so, they were poorly paid and were clearly awaiting the Commonwealth to improve their lot.

The militia in Victoria and N.S.W. were better treated. A militia private in N.S.W. received 8/- per day for 16 days training and an efficiency allowance, a sum totalling £7/8/-; in Victoria the equivalent pay for 18³⁄₄ days training was £7/10/-.

On Hutton's recommendations for Uniform Pay:
Artillery and Engineers:
Equivalent of 20 full days a year at 8/- per day, with deductions for non-attendance: total £8/-/- per annum.

New Recruits and Young Soldiers (Under 2 years service):
Equivalent of 24 days a year of drill and instruction, with deductions for non-efficiency at a rate of 6/- per day: total £7/4/- per annum.

All others:
From 16 to 20 days service a year at 6/- a day for a sum not exceeding total £6/8/-.

On Cabinet's Decision:
Cabinet decided that 8/- a day (that is a sum uniform with the amount paid in N.S.W.) was a just wage, to be paid half-yearly. Thus Hutton saw neither a pay suitable for cooperation with the Imperial Army nor the payment on a retainer system.

Approved Rates of Uniform Pay (by 1904):
£6/8/- a year, for 16 days service at 8/- a day plus an initial £2 allowance for clothing and incidental expenses.

On Sources:
Hutton to Lyne, July 1902 - D.D. 02/1243 (A.W.M.).
Hutton to Forrest, 18 June 1902 - D.D. 02/2954, 02/1967 (A.W.M.).
On Size of the Field Force:
See above Chapter II.

Field Force on War Footing:
Bevan Edwards (1889) — 30,000 to 40,000.
Federal Military Conference (1896) — 12,200.
Hutton (1902-4) — 27,553.

On Parliamentarian Views:
See above Chapter IV.

On Spirit of Hutton's Reform:
The terms were used in a letter Hutton to Deakin, 24 January 1906 (Deakin Papers) for which reference and others in the Deakin Papers I am indebted to Professor La Nauze of Melbourne.

58 See table of ministries in the federalist era, above in Chapter IV.

59 Salmon (Protectionist and A.N.A. radical) — CPD 12: 16930, 2 October 1902.

60 J.W. McCay (Free-trade) — CPD 9: 12116, 30 April 1902.

61 Page (Labour) — CPD 12: 16127, 25 September 1902.

For samples of attack upon Head-Quarters Staff:
Page (Labour) — CPD 12: 16126, 25 September 1902.
Daily Herald of Melbourne, 18 March 1903.


63 There is little point in taking the reader through the various debates and parliamentary questions when most of the influential views have been summarized in Chapters IV and V above. The substance of parliamentary attitudes and the influence of the radicals can be fairly quickly gathered from the following sources:

On Discussion of Supplementary Estimates 1902-3 in Committee of Supply:
CPD 9: 12090-12144, 12199-12213, 30 April to 1 May 1903.

On Discussion of the Budget 1902-3 in Committee of Supply:
CPD 12: 15939-41, 15952-54, 16121-16128, 16352-16430, September-October 1902.
Minutes: Colonial Conference 1902, pp. 87-90.
On Discussion of the Defence Bill of 1903:

On Forrest and the Estimates:
  Statement by the Minister of Defence on Estimates 1903–4.

64 H.B. Higgins - CPD 12 : 16376, 2 October 1902.

65 On McCay and the Radicals:
  CPD 9 : 12110 et seq., 30 April 1902.
  CPD 12 : 16364 et seq., 2 October 1902.
  CPD 14 : 2538 et seq., 23 July 1903.

On McCay's Views:
  CPD 15 : 3036, 5 August 1903. See also pp. 3086 et seq., in
  which McCay is less guarded in expressing his suspicions of the
  instructional cadres. Clause 28 of the Bill was amended to
  restrict the permanent forces in the fashion he desired.

This resume of McCay's views is based not only on parliamentary
debates. It is also founded upon his work as Minister for Defence
in particular on his address and discussion in the (Commonwealth)
Council of Defence in the first quarter of 1905.
See below Chapter VII.

66 Clause 49 - Defence Act (No.20 of 1903).

67 On Forrest and the Bill:
  The drafting process can be seen from Defence Act of 1903 (File
  in Attorney-General's Department, Canberra).

On Hutton and the Bill:
  In substance, the struggle between Forrest and parliament was
  duplicated on this occasion between Forrest and Hutton.

From Hutton's minutes of the 25 May, 6 July, 13 October and the
Defence Act (No.20 of 1903), it is clear that against his advice,
the following measures, amongst others, were passed:

Preference to men who had served in the ranks for 3 years on first
applying for a commission (Clause 11).

The institution of a joint naval and military college (Clause 29).

The use of permanent troops in the event of civil disturbance
only by consultation between State and Federal Governments
(Clause 51) and not by local magistrates acting on their own
initiative.
The organized units of both permanent and militia forces restricted to service within Australian territory (Clauses 49 and 50).

Modifications to Army Act for both peacetime and wartime service (Clause 55).

A Board of Advice to be appointed to "advise on all matters relating to the Defence Force submitted to it by the Minister" (Clauses 28, also 124a).

On Sources:

Hutton on the Defence Act (cited in Note 21 above).

The substance of the material on which the foregoing analysis of Hutton's beliefs is to be found in the brief for Colonial Conference. Barton's habit of lightly underlining in lead pencil as he read indicates that only the Minute was perused.

CAO : CP103, S12 (Unnumbered).

On the Colonial Conference:


Seddon's views, pp. 90-95.

St. John Brodrick's views (the Secretary of State for War), pp. 80-85.

War Office Memorandum.

The Organization of Colonial Troops for Imperial Service (November 1901), pp. 206-211.

New Zealand was to contribute 4,500 troops. Canada was to contribute 3,000 troops.

Barton's views, pp. 87-90.

Ibid., p. 89.

Lyne to Hutton, 6 August 1902 - CAO : MP84, S2, 02/5015 (emphasis added).

On Request for full approval:


On Hutton's Response:

Lyne to Hutton, 6 August 1902 - CAO : MP84, S2, 02/5015.

See also CPD 12 : 16020, 24 September 1902.
73 Quotation from:  
Forrest to Hutton, c. 3 July 1903.  
CAO : MP84, S2, 02/2688.

On the views of Colonial Defence Committee:  
Though the relevant reports of the Colonial Defence Committee  
were apparently destroyed, the argument was built up from  
fragments of:  
CDC Memo No. 301 R (October 1902 ?).  
CDC Memo No. 281 W (November 1901).

On other comment:  
Hutton to Forrest, c. 4 June 1903.  
Correspondence dealing with Estimates 1903–1904.  
D.D. 03/677 (A.W.M.).

74 Hutton to Minister, 14 May - On the Transcontinental Railway.  
CAO : MP84, S1, 1957/2/43.  
See also CPP, Vol. II of 1903 (Ordered to be Printed, 23 July 1903).

75 Commonwealth Military Report 1903, p. 31.  
See also Hutton on the Defence Act.  
Hutton to Minister, 6 July 1903, where he is also offering the argument  
that an offensive-defensive militia force was necessary.

76 See below Chapter VIII.

77 The six key documents from which I have drawn are:  
On the Estimates (Supplementary) 1902 - CAO : MP84, S2, B56,  
1902/2811.  
On the Estimates 1903–4 - D.D. 03/677 (A.W.M.).  
On the Estimates of Equipment 1903–4 - D.D. 03/624 and 03/677  
(A.W.M.).  

78 On Reduction in Numbers of Men:  
Commonwealth Military Report 1903.  
On Correspondence on the Friction caused by implementing the Scheme:  
Addenda to D.D. 03/677 (A.W.M.).  
D.D. 03/715, August 1903 (A.W.M.).  
D.D. 03/1348, September 1903 (A.W.M.).  
D.D. 1583, October 1903 (A.W.M.).  
D.D. 1680, October 1903 (A.W.M.).  
CAO : MP84, S2, 1903/4489, August 1903.
79 This is a complex subject to which we shall return in Chapter VII below.

On Sources:
- Hutton on the Defence Act 1903.

On the Council of Defence:
At Deakin's suggestion, Forrest elicited the advice of Sir George Clarke and was duly told on 26 June 1904 that centralization of authority was too great for Australia. Nevertheless, the proposed reform suggested by Clarke was not as decentralized nor was civilian interference as possible as that in the scheme suggested by a Senate Select Committee led by Senator Dawson.

In any event, J.W. McCay was the painstaking author of the reform of January 1905 which called for a Council of Defence (including representatives of the army and navy, presided over by the Minister for Defence and the Treasurer) to formulate policy and a Military Board and a Naval Board for general administration and execution of policy laid down by the Council. These bodies were to advise the Minister instead of a G.O.C. He submitted the proposal to Cabinet and gained its approval 15 September 1904.

Hutton proposed a Council of permanent soldiers (and local naval officers) with no civilian representatives under the presidency of the General Officer Commanding who would report to the Minister. One attempt was made to use such a scheme. It failed. Hutton dominated proceedings and stifled criticism and suggestions. Moreover, he rambled on justifying himself and his proposals until it was clear that he tolerated the body under sufferance only insofar as it was an instrument for perpetuating his scheme. Commonwealth Defence Committee October 1904.

One other consideration: until the board system was inaugurated the local naval officers had little say in the direction of policy. After January 1905 Captain Creswell had much to say. The introduction of this reform seems to have been influenced by:
- a. Friction with Hutton.
- b. Dawson's Committee.
- c. Changes in the control of defence in Britain after 1903.
- d. Appeal to republican traditions of U.S.A. and Switzerland.

The aims of McCay were:
- a. To remove the G.O.C. and ensure civilian control.
- b. To acquaint statesmen with the demands of defence policy.
- c. To diminish the influence of permanent soldiers.
- d. To introduce citizen-soldiers into the councils of state.
- e. To ensure that only Australian officers would hold top positions in the forces.
80 Quotation from:

81 On the Secret Cypher Case:
   Watson, after a long interview with Hutton, made a statement to
   the House in which the precise causus belli was not revealed,
   only the general conditions.
   CPD 19: 1673-1676, 31 May 1904.

   Hutton claimed he could not reveal the contents because the
   cypher would then be broken. It is probable therefore that the
   contents of the telegram (and others if there were any) will not
   be known until government files in London are examined. There
   were, however, two issues between Dawson and Hutton which could
   have been the subject of the latter's appeal to the Army Council:
   a. The intention of Dawson to abolish the position of G.O.C.
   b. The refusal of Dawson to approve the arming of the Light Horse
      with .45 calibre pistol on the grounds that it was not of
      standard Imperial pattern.

   Of course, it is conceivable that the telegram included the attempt
   to alter the reports of Colonial Defence Committee in his favour.

   Relations between Hutton and Dawson were acrimonious and accord-
   ing to one acute historian of the Labour Party "deteriorating
   relations between the two men might well have led to a crisis
   in the defence administration". At one stage Dawson cancelled
   a regulation ordering personnel in uniform to exchange salutes
   and another requiring citizen-soldiers to consider themselves on
   duty whether in or out of uniform.

   H.S. Broadhead, The Australian Federal Labour Party 1900-1905

On Sources:
   CAO: MF84, S1, 1904/5207.
   D.D. 02/2594 (A.W.M.).

   This was but one of many affairs not presented here.

83 Forrest to Hutton, 19 June 1903 - D.D. 03/624 (A.W.M.).

84 See Note 77 above for sources of information on the various estimates.
   See also Commonwealth Military Report 1903 and Commonwealth Military
   Report 1904.
On State of the Forces in December 1904:
This summary is, in the main, drawn from the text and footnotes above.

On Recruiting:
Possibly the only explanation required concerns recruiting and establishments. Recruiting ceased in May 1902 when Forrest first promised to reduce the estimates. It was allowed again for a brief period in 1903, stopped in June 1903, allowed again in October 1903. Among other things, this meant that it was difficult for unit commanders to recruit men returning from South Africa or to take advantage of the martial enthusiasm 1901-1903. Recruiting started only when the hangover of giddy Imperialism was being felt. Moreover, though recruiting was periodically allowed, most militia units had to maintain their establishment as at May 1902 or at June 1903. Thus commanders could not bring their units up to strength.

On Morale and Status in the public eye:
Ironically it was Lieutenant-Colonel J.C. Neild - Hutton's sworn enemy - in his capacity as Senator who made this assessment in March 1904.
CAO : MP84, S2, 1902/2688.

It was not, however, an isolated judgement as an enquiry by officers in Queensland indicated.
CAO : MP84, S2, 1906/1604.

Commonwealth Military Report 1904 for the state of the scheme of reorganization generally. See Appendices for Establishments - figures taken from Appendix K of the document, p.69.

Commonwealth Defence Committee October 1904, p.4. Hutton's rambling monologue at this meeting indicated not only his fear of criticism and his limitations as a public speaker, but what seems to be profound exhaustion.

Hutton to Deakin, 24 January 1906 (Deakin Papers).

Hutton to Senator Pearce, 26 January 1911 (Pearce Papers : A.W.M.).
NOTES FOR CHAPTER SEVEN

1 On "lines of defence":
Reid in 1897 - Minutes: Colonial Conference 1897, pp.60-62;
see above Chapter Three.
Hughes in 1903 - CPD 14: 2313, 21 July 1903.
MacCay in 1905 - Minutes: Council of Defence, 12 May 1905
(Defence Department, Canberra); see below Chapter Eight.
Deakin's Defence Policy of December 1907 - CPD 42: 7509 ff,
13 December 1907.

2 Note on Official Sources:
Some of the files used are lodged with the Commonwealth Archives
Offices in Canberra and Melbourne and are cited with the usual
prefix CAO.

Others have been opened to me with the permission and generous
assistance of officers of the Archives Branch, Navy Office,
Victoria Barracks in Melbourne. They are cited with the
prefix RANA (i.e. Royal Australian Navy: Archives).

3 On previous examination of the Imperial Squadron:
See above Chapters One, Three and Four.

On cooperation with the China Squadron to increase British strength
in the Far East from 1898:
Marder, British Naval Policy, p.304.

On the limited value of the Squadron on the Australian Station:
"No other European Flag is permanently shown in those distant
waters ... For political reasons it is desirable to keep up
an effective squadron for Australasia. It is a link with the
mother country and a reserve for the China Squadron."
Naval Annual 1903, p. xix.

On details of strength and capabilities of the Squadron:
Naval Annual 1903, p.65.

4 On previous examination of the Australian Auxiliary Squadron:
See above Chapters One and Two.

On Katoomba Class cruisers:
Brassey and Beaumont independently recommended second-class
protected cruisers of about 5,000 tons for Australian service,
as well as first-class cruisers to replace the old third-class
cruisers.
On the expiration of the 1887 Agreement:
The date on which the Agreement was deemed to expire is obscure. If taken from the date of ratification it would have been 1899; if from the arrival of the Australian Auxiliary Squadron it would have been 1901. The point is of little consequence. After discussion at the Colonial Conference of 1897 it was clear the Agreement would continue until 1901 and thereafter as long as the three parties (Australia, New Zealand, and Great Britain) were agreeable.

5 On previous examination:
See above Chapter One.

On establishment in 1901:
CAO : MP178, S1, 1901/4627.

Marine Establishment of the Commonwealth on 30 June 1901:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Paid</td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Militia</td>
<td>1,644</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteers</td>
<td>424</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,305</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On the vessels:
Apart from the Cerberus, Protector, Gayundah, and Paluma there were nine vessels of lesser capability than the torpedo boat Countess of Hopetoun.
See above Chapter One and below in this Chapter.

6 Age, 20 December 1901.

7 Quotation from:
Age, 17 November 1902.
See also:
Sydney Morning Herald, 26 February 1903, 20 April 1903.

8 Age, 17 November 1902.

9 Quotation from:
Captain W.R. Creswell to Sir John Forrest, 11 May 1901.
(CAO : MP160, S1, 1901/640)

Other editorials in the Age:
Age, 17 November 1902.
Age, 27 February 1903.
Age, 23 April 1903.
(Notes Chapter Seven : beginning 10)

See also:

Register, 4 December 1899.
Brisbane Courier, 16 July 1902.
Register, 19 February 1903.
Bulletin, 6 June 1903.

On general summary of press and parliamentary opinion in this Chapter:

A perusal of parliamentary debates, newspaper files - the Age in particular - and British service journals, 1899-1904.

Clippings from Australian and London newspapers 1898-1904 in the Naval Archives (RANA : 1851 - Part a).

Grimshaw, Some Aspects of Australian Attitudes to the Imperial Connection.

Hall, Australia and England.


10 Argus, 18 December 1901, 22 May 1902, 7 November 1902, 3 March 1903. Sydney Morning Herald, 7 August 1899, 22 August 1899, 5 September 1899, 20 December 1901, 1 July 1902, 12 November 1902, 12 January 1903.

11 On Cabinet's attitude to the navalist press and issues:

Deakin to Barton, 29 August 1900 (Barton Papers : C.N.L.).

As the story progresses it will be clear that Barton, while prepared to keep the issue alive, argued that a navy worthy of the name would prove exorbitantly expensive; Kingston - the one minister to have openly challenged the Agreement in 1897 - was absorbed with the problems of arbitration and conciliation; Turner dismissed navalist aspirations because of cost; Lyne's public attitudes were ambiguous but he was ready to support renewal of the 1887 Agreement.

On the attitude of Alfred Deakin:

See above Chapter One, and below Chapters Nine and Ten.

Deakin to Barton (undated but probably July 1902) - CAO : CP103, S12, B5.


Grimshaw, op.cit., pp.143 ff.

Deakin to Clarke, 8 January 1906 (Deakin Papers).

From an article in the Morning Post (presumed to be written anonymously by Deakin early in 1902) quoted in "Australian Loyalty and the British Navy" by Norman Young in USM, February 1903, p.452.
On warships as symbols:
This is in the main deduction and inference. However see Deakin's policy speech of December 1907 examined in Chapter Ten below.


13 On Hughes:
CPD 14 : 2313 ff., 21 July 1903.

14 On qualifications of officers:
The nine officers, given here the highest rank they attained in the period 1898–1904, were:

Captain W. Drake (Lieutenant R.N. – retired) of the Queensland Naval Forces.

Captain R.N. Collins (Lieutenant R.N. – retired) of the Victorian Defence Department.

Captain W.R. Creswell (Lieutenant R.N. – retired) of the South Australian Naval Forces, from 1900 of the Queensland Naval Forces, then from 1905 Director of Naval Forces.

Captain C.J. Clare (ex – Merchant Service) of the South Australian Naval Forces.

Captain F. Tickell (ex – Merchant Service) of the Victorian Naval Forces.


Captain F. Hixson (Master, R.N. – retired; ex – Merchant Service) of the New South Wales Naval Forces.

Commander F.H.C. Brownlow (ex – Merchant Service; Second Mates Ticket) later of the New South Wales Naval Forces.

There were, of course, others. But from the sources available it seems that none of these affected policy.
On their enforced silence:
Forrest's ruling was similar to that applied to military officers, citizen and regular. Captain Clare of the South Australian Forces and Lieutenant Biddlecomb of the Victorian Forces were forced to obey this ruling. No censure of Creswell exists in the official files.

15 On Creswell's roles in the Commonwealth 1901-1904:
During 1904 Creswell's roles were fourfold; he was Naval Commandant in Queensland; recruiting officer for men enlisting for service in the Royal Navy under the Naval Agreement; Naval Officer Commanding the Commonwealth Naval Forces - i.e. an executive commander of the naval forces; and Director of the Commonwealth Naval Forces.

From 1905 his roles were clearer and twofold; Naval Commandant in Victoria (1904-1907) and Director of the Naval Board of Administration (1905-1911).

In this narrative Director of the Commonwealth Naval Forces will be used for brevity and clarity.
(CAO : MP178, S1, 1904/5180)

On contemporary assessments of Creswell as navalist:
Plaudits from the Register - cutting in (RANA : 3T).

See also:
Brisbane Courier, 16 July 1902.

On the biographical sketch of Creswell:
For this portrait of Creswell, I must take full responsibility. It is essentially an interpretation based on inference from, among other things, the following biographical sources:

Feakes, op.cit., pp.103-113. Feakes' testimony in other places is valuable for he knew Creswell and his struggles well.


Biographical Sketch and collected obituaries in (RANA : 3T).
The Creswell Papers are held by a relation of his in Healesville, Victoria; other papers were sent on to his surviving daughter in South Africa to make the basis of a book. From correspondence, and other sources, it appears that these papers in Australia are primarily concerned with Creswell's attempt at an autobiography.
Significantly, he did not get much further than his days in the Royal Navy and makes much play of the excitement of small expeditionary activities.

Conversation and assistance from Mr. G.L. Macandie, C.B.E., has proved invaluable. He worked under Creswell in Queensland (1900-1904) and came with him to Melbourne. He was therefore with Creswell from 1900-1919 and remembers aspects of the struggles during the years 1900-1910 well. His compilation of documents, *The Genesis of the Royal Australian Navy*, is in a sense Creswell's memorial.

16 On the Creswellian argument for local naval forces:

This summary of the Creswellian brief omits all changes, confusions, and side arguments. Essentially it is more clearly the stand taken in 1906 than 1899. It is drawn from the following:

(1) Draft of two letters to *The Times*, October and November 1899. (RANA : 1851 - Part a).

(2) Memoranda - Creswell to Forrest, 28 September 1901: Report ... The Defence of Commerce and Forts. (RANA : 1851 - Part a).

Almost complete it was printed as a parliamentary paper - CPP : 1902, Vol. 2 (Ordered to be Printed 7 February 1902).

(3) Article in the *Brisbane Courier* in 1901, quoted in Macandie, *op.cit.*, pp.87-98.

(4) Memoranda - Creswell to Dawson, 5 May 1904 (CAO : MP178, S1, 1904/3436).

(5) Memoranda, Brief, and Exposition before the (Commonwealth) Council of Defence, 12 May 1905 -
   a. Minutes of Meeting in the "Council of Defence Minute Book" held by the Department of Defence, Canberra.


(7) And also on the strategical arguments of other reports and recommendations 1905-1909 to be cited later in this work.

17 Like the summary of Creswell's strategic arguments, the sketch of his indignant claims is drawn from many sources quoted in this and other Chapters.
18 On the proposal for a Naval Reserve in 1897:
See above Chapter Three.
Minutes: Colonial Conference 1897, pp.122-124, 146-147, 148.
Robert Collins' (of Victorian Defence Department) minute of
11 October 1898 (RANA: 1851 - Part a).

19 Macandie, op.cit., pp.65-68.
Naval Annual 1898, pp.110-115.
1899, pp.3-15.
1900, p.23.
1901, p.31.
1902, Brassev's introduction, pp.68-70, 77 ff.
1903, pp. xxxi ff.
Labour men like W.M. Hughes and Senator Pearce became sharply aware of
the problem of alien seamen when struggling for (a) mail contracts
only for those shipping lines with all white crews and (b) navigation
laws which would allow the application of Australian arbitration acts
and the immigration acts to coast-wise shipping.

20 Quotation from:
Macandie, op.cit., p.64.

21 On Collins' views:
Collins' views are to be found in various submissions between
1890 and 1899 in Macandie, op.cit., pp.53, 61-64, and in a
collection of documents in the file (RANA: 1851 - Part a).

On the Colonial Naval Defence Act:
See above Chapter One.

22 On the Conference of 1899:
A full report is to be found in (RANA: 1851 - Part a).

23 On the Australian response to the 1899 Conference:
Age, 6 September 1898, 19 September 1898, 23 August 1899.
Sydney Morning Herald, 7 August 1899, 22 August 1899, 5 September
1899.
Register, 23 August 1899.
Brisbane Courier, 26 August 1899.
Daily Telegraph, 23 August 1899.
25 The Times, 6 October 1899.

26 Quotation from:
   Macandie, op.cit., p.64.

   See also:
   Collins' letter to The Times, 20 November 1899.

27 On the impact of the South African War:
   The Times, 13 January 1900.

   On letters to The Times:
   Robert Collins, 20 November 1899.
   William Creswell, 22 November 1899.
   H. D'Egville, Secretary for the Imperial Federation (Defence)
   League, 12 January 1900.
   Lord Brassey, 7 February 1900.

   On the commentary in Australia:
   Register, 4 December 1899.
   Age, 6 December 1899.
   Brisbane Courier, 6 December 1899.

   On replies from London:
   The Times, 6 October 1899, 13 January 1900.
   The Army and Navy Gazette, 20 January 1900.
   British Empire Review, February 1900.
   Naval Annual 1902, pp.78 ff.
   1903, p. xxxii.

28 Quotation from:
   Creswell to Forrest, 11 May 1901 (CAO : MP160, S1, 1901/640).

   See also:
   Captain Clare to Forrest, May 1901 (CAO : MP160, S1, 1901/440).

29 Macandie, op.cit., p.93.

30 See sources cited above in Note 16, Parts (2) and (3).
31 On the press response to Creswell's 1901 scheme:

- Argus, 18 December 1901, 22 May 1902.
- Age, 20 December 1901, 2 August 1902.
- Sydney Morning Herald, 20 December 1901, 1 July 1902.
- Brisbane Courier, 10 July 1902.

32 On Forrest's contribution to policy:

It can be established from the papers cited in the subsequent note that Forrest was personally responsible for seeking a revision of the 1887 Agreement after a thorough investigation of the issues. Not even the Secretary of the Department of Defence, Robert Collins, appears to have taken a hand in drawing up the submissions Forrest presented.

On Forrest's policy:

There is little point in describing in detail the manner in which Forrest arrived at his policy. The following shortened account rests upon the following:

1. Debate upon the first Defence Bill (see above Chapter Four).
Macandie, op.cit., pp.77-81.
4. Barton to Hopetoun, 1 August 1901.
Hopetoun to Barton, 2 August 1901.
(Barton Papers : C.N.L.)
This was published as a Parliamentary Paper on 7 February 1902. But it is suggested in unnumbered official files that Forrest received a sketch of the "general idea" between July and September and the report after September 1901. The report was released to the press in December.
7. Forrest's draft submission presented to Barton, 5 October 1901 (CAO : MP160, S1, B5, Unnumbered).
(8) Beaumont's comments on the draft submission - Beaumont to Forrest, October 1902 (RANA : 185i - Part a).

(9) Results of a conference between Barton, Forrest, and Beaumont at Victoria Barracks (Melbourne), 7 November 1901. Macandie, op.cit., pp.79-81.

(10) Forrest's second draft submission on naval defence presented to Barton, 2 December 1901 (RANA : 185i - Part a).


It is clear from papers in the Attorney-General's Department (Canberra) on the Defence Bills and Acts (1901-1904) that this submission was distributed to all ministers.

33 CPD 3 : 3598 ff., August 1901.

34 Beaumont's views are compressed in the text and - like those of Forrest - are not presented exactly as they evolved in chronological order.

35 Beaumont to Forrest, October (?) 1901 (RANA : 185i - Part a).

36 Beaumont to Hopetoun, 22 July 1901 (RANA : 185i - Part a).
The italics have been added.

37 Forrest to Barton, 2 December 1901 (RANA : 185i - Part a).

38 Forrest to Barton, 5 October 1901 (CAO : MFP160, S1, B5, unnumbered).

39 Loc. cit.

40 This last point was important, and in a difficult situation Beaumont kept the notion of a sea-going squadron alive.

41 Forrest to Barton, 5 October 1901 (CAO : MFP160, S1, B5, Unnumbered).

42 Quotation from: Brisbane Courier, 7 November 1902.

For approval of Forrest:

Argus, 7 November 1902.
Quotations from:
Minute by Sir John Forrest written on 15 March 1902 cited in Note 32, part (11) above.

On Naval Defence at the Conference:
Minutes: Colonial Conference 1902:
Barton's views, pp.29-32, particularly 30-31.
Chamberlain's views, pp.1-9; quotation from p.3; naval affairs, pp.4-5.
New Zealand's Motion, p.a2; see also pp.21-27.

On Barton and the Conference:
For a resume of Barton's possible attitude to the Conference see article in The British Empire Review, December 1902, pp.164 ff.

Barton's attitude is also drawn from the manner of his speeches and the interchange of correspondence with Deakin during this period.
Barton Papers: C.N.L.)
(CAO: CP103, S12, many unnumbered files)

Quotation from:
Minutes: Colonial Conference 1902, p.214.

See also:
Selborne, pp.18-21, 173-174; quotation from p.19.
"Memorandum on Sea-Power and the Principles involved in it", Admiralty, June 1902, pp.213-222; quotation from p.214.

Appendix IV, "Detailed Proposals Relative to Australia and New Zealand", June 1902, Minutes: Colonial Conference 1902, pp.223-229.

Quotations from:
Deakin to Barton, undated but probably before 22 July 1902 (CAO: CP103, S12, B5).

See also:
Deakin to Barton, 4 July 1902 (CAO: CP103, S12, B5).
Barton to Deakin, 22 July 1902 (CAO: CP103, S12, B5).

Quotation from:
Minutes: Colonial Conference 1902, Draft Agreement, pp.268-271, Clause II.

See also:
Until official files are examined in London, this clearly tentative but credible case for the Admiralty rests upon the printed sources available in Australia:

On the Anglo-Japanese Alliance:
Marder, British Naval Policy, pp.427-434, 449-455; quotation from p.430 (Marder's italics).
British Documents (Gooch & Temperley) Vol.II, pp.103-105, 110.

On Fisher and the Australian Station:

Only one Australian radical in the House seems to have guessed the connection between the Agreement and the Anglo-Japanese Treaty. He was soon to become an ardent propagandist on Japanese threats to Australia.
R.A. Crouch (CPD 14 : 1814, 7 July 1903).

The following are samples of responses to the Agreement on which the ensuing commentary is founded:

On Australian parliamentary attitudes:
Debate on the Naval Agreement Bill, 7 to 22 July 1903, in the House. In particular:
Barton (CPD 14 : 1772 ff., 2437 ff.).
Crouch (CPD 14 : 1802 ff.).
Quick (CPD 14 : 1905 ff.).
Reid (CPD 14 : 1969 ff.).
Forrest (CPD 14 : 1992 ff.).
Higgins (CPD 14 : 1996 ff.).
Watson (CPD 14 : 2045 ff.).
McCay (CPD 14 : 2131 ff.).
Hughes (CPD 14 : 2313 ff.).
See also Grimshaw, op.cit., pp.133 ff., for an excellent summary of attitudes.

On Australian press opinion:
Register, 13 March 1902.
Brisbane Courier, 16 July 1902, 7 November 1902, 10 January 1902
Age, 2 August 1902, 17 November 1902, 17 February 1902, 27
February 1902, 3 April 1903, 23 April 1903.
Argus, 22 May 1902, 7 November 1902, 10 January 1903, 3 March
1903, 6 April 1903.
Sydney Morning Herald, 1 July 1902, 18 July 1902, 7 November
1902, 17 November 1902, 12 January 1903, 26 February 1903, 20
March 1903, 31 March 1903, 1 April 1903.
On The Times:
The Times, 2 July 1902 (on Mahan),
10 January 1903 (A summary of previous arguments
and the Conference),
2 February 1903 (In reply to the Age and Register),
12 June 1903 (Reply continued).

On British commentary in favour of the navalists:
Spectator, 5 July 1902.
Admiral C.C. Penrose-Fitzgerald (Tryon's biographer), "Colonial
Responsibilities", USM, November 1902, from p.111.

51 This criticism is based on the testimonies of Quick and Matheson,
Reid and Watson, and Higgins, Hughes and Crouch, cited above.

52 On Ewing and the Agreement:
Argus, 28 February 1902, 8 April 1903.
The Times, 12 June 1903.

53 On other Australian views in favour of the Agreement:
Sydney Morning Herald, 12 November 1902, 26 February 1903,
20 March 1903, 31 March 1903.
Advertiser (Adelaide), 19 February 1903.
Argus, 3 March 1903, 6 April 1903.

54 Quotations from:
Chapman to Creswell, 22 March 1904.
Creswell to Chapman, 22 March 1904.
(CAO : MP178, S1, 04/1435)

55 Forrest to Barton, March 1903 (CAO : MP178, S1, 1902/245).

56 This resume of the condition of the Commonwealth Naval Forces is
drawn from:

On Organization:
Forrest to all Naval Commandants, 1 March 1901 (CAO : MP160,
S5, 1901/1688).
Creswell to Forrest, (undated) 1903 (CAO : MP178, S2, 445/03).
Creswell to Dawson, 5 May 1904 (CAO : MP178, S1, 1904/3436).

On Finance:
Forrest to Collins, 2 May 1902 (CAO : MP84, S2, 1902/2811).
Commonwealth Year Book, No.12, p.1017.
On the Vessels, Materiel and Personnel:
Reports from Naval Commandants for 1903 (CAO : M178, S1, 445/03).
Creswell to Dawson, 5 May 1904 (CAO : M178, S1, 1904/3436).
Reports by the Director of the Naval Forces ... 1905 and 1906
— before publication (CAO : CP103, S12, B6) — published almost
Creswell to Playford, 22 September 1905, in Macandie, *op.cit.*
pp.136-137.

On the views of Colonial Defence Committee:
CDC Memo 254/1, 3 April 1901, p.9.
CDC Memo 321/1, 23 June 1903.

On Concerted Action:
evidence and that of the quickly perused reports on the later
bi-annual exercises suggests:
(a) If all the vessels could be kept together, the speed of the
force was that of the slowest vessels (9-11 knots).
(b) As a force it was subject to the vagaries of wind and
weather, particularly in Bass Strait.
(c) Of all the vessels only the two torpedo boats in Port Philip
the Countess of Hopetoun and the Childers, could be classed
as deterrents. They could conceivably operate from the range
of coastal batteries against (unarmoured) merchant auxiliaries
at night. The efficacy diminished quickly in inverse
proportion to size of the raider. Against second-class
cruisers they would stand far less chance unless a surprise
and coordinated attack were carried out, at night. But they
were only two in number. And as the bi-annual exercises
demonstrated they could not pursue their quarry in all
seasons.
(d) The much-vaunted Protector was not only insufficiently
armoured but too slow. She could only be used effectively
against the (unarmoured) merchant auxiliaries attached to
the Russian Navy some of which had speeds ranging from 12
to 14 knots. Creswell always emphasized the one unique
feature of the Protector, the weight of the salvo her guns
could deliver, to the exclusion of all else.

57 *Sydney Morning Herald*, 31 March 1903.

58 On the Naval Militia, 30 June 1901 (CAO : M178, S1, 1901/4627):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Naval Militia</th>
<th>Volunteers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New South Wales</td>
<td>599</td>
<td></td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victoria</td>
<td>150</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Queensland</td>
<td>719</td>
<td></td>
<td>357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Australia</td>
<td>176</td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>1,644</td>
<td></td>
<td>424</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
On Sir John Forrest on the Naval Militia:
e.g. Forrest to Barton, 21 December 1901 (RANA : 1851 - Part a).
See also all other memoranda by Forrest cited in Note 32 above.

Quotation from:

Quotation from:
Fanshawe to Forrest (via Governor-General), 29 April 1903
(RANA : 1851 - Part a).

See also:
All memoranda by Forrest cited in Note 32 above.
Forrest to Barton, March 1903 (CAO : M178, S1, 1902/245).

On Barton and radial port defence:
CPD 14 : 1773 ff., 7 July 1903.
CPD 14 : 2437 ff., 22 July 1903.

(unnecessary note placed in text)

Creswell to Chapman, 4 September 1903 (CAO : M84, S2, 1903/5016).
CDC Memo 321M, 23 June 1903.
Creswell to Chapman, March 1904.
Hutton to Dawson, 26 August 1904.
(CAO : M84, S1, 1972/2/261)

See also Creswell's clashes with Hutton over the responsibility for port defence.
"Meeting of the Commonwealth Defence Committee 31 October 1904",
(CAO : M84, S2, 1904/1185)

Chapman to Creswell, 3 March 1904 (CAO : M178, S1, 1904/5180).
Creswell to McCay, December 1904 (CAO : M84, S2, 1904/1198).
In all Creswell received £1,050 a year, more than any soldier on Head-Quarter's Staff except Hutton.

All relevant papers are to be found in (CAO : M178, S1, Unnumbered); the quotations are taken from memoranda in that file, i.e. Creswell to Chapman, March 1904.

See note above.
On petitions from Queensland:
   CAO : MP84, S2, 1972/2/261.

Quotations from:
   Creswell to Dawson, 5 May 1904 (CAO : MP84, S1, 1904/3436).

Quotation from:
   Dawson to Watson, 8 August 1904 (CAO : MP84, S1, 1904/3436).
   See also:
      Northcote to C.O., c. 20 June 1904.
      C.O., to Northcote, 19 May 1904.
      (CAO : MP84, S1, 1904/3436)
NOTES FOR CHAPTER EIGHT

1 On the changes in and the operation of the new administration:
   CAO : MP84, S2, 1901/6516; 1903/3006; 1904/184; 1904/1496.
   CAO : MP84, S2, 1904/1185.
   DD 03/341 (A.W.M.)

Memoranda by Forrest, Chapman, Dawson, McCay, and Clarke,
   1903-1905 - DD 04/62; 05/14-51 (A.W.M.).

Memoranda by McCay, January 1905 - DD 04/184 (A.W.M.).

Administration of Military and Naval Forces (Memorandum by
   Senate Committee convened by Senator Dawson)
   CPP : 1905, Vol.II (Ordered to be Printed, 16 August 1904).

Administration and Control of the Military Forces by a Board
   (Memorandum by the Inspector-General)
   CPP : 1906, Vol.II, pp.161 ff. (Ordered to be Printed, 12
   October 1906).

On the Tables:
   The Tables (A to D) were constructed from information in the
   above sources, plus the direction of correspondence taken from
   official files to be listed here.

On the role of the Minister in the new system:
   For a sample of McCay's use of the new administration to develop
   policy and free the commandants and citizen-soldiers from the
   control of Head-Quarters:
   Minute Book : Council of Defence (Defence Department, Canberra).
   CAO : MP84, S2, 1905/1678.

2 On the General Staff:
   We shall return later, in another context, to the formation of
   the Imperial General Staff, Commonwealth Section.

3 Quotation from:
   Bridges to Ewing, 7 November 1907 (CAO : MP84, S1, 1849/2/13).

4 Quotation from:
   Loc. cit.
On the Australian Intelligence Corps:
CAO : MP84, S1, 1902/7/47a; 1902/7/137; 1902/7/153.

On reports from New Guinea:
CAO : MP84, S1, 2022/1/53; 2022/1/66; 2022/1/63.

On businessmen's report:
CAO : MP84, S1, 1877/4/1.

On proposed counterespionage:
CAO : MP84, S1, 1877/5/5.

On interchange of Intelligence Diaries:
CAO : MP84, S1, 1929/2/1237-11.

On British Handbooks:
CAO : MP84, S1, 1912/1/27; 1912/1/31; 1912/1/37; 1954/1/6.

On Admiralty lists:
CAO : MP84, S1, 2215/6/64; 2310/1/69.

On combined Intelligence:
CAO : MP160, S1, 1/14/3681.

On military intelligence 1911-1913:
Kirkpatrick to Pearce, 17 March 1911+ (CAO : MP84, S1, 1902/7/137)
White to Pearce, 7 December 1912 (CAO : MP84, S1, 2021/1/14).
The potential for collecting and collating useful intelligence
in areas of probable external operations can be seen from a
competent report on the Cocos–Keeling (July 1909 - CAO : MP84,
S1, 2021/1/10).

On the Japanese in Australia in 1908:
CAO : MP84, S1, 1887/5/1; 1887/5/4.

On Japanese in Sydney in 1911:
Police Report for 1911 (CAO : MP84, S2, 1877/1/2).

On Japanese in Western Australia:
Intelligence Corps report 1913 (CAO : MP84, S2, 1877/5/23B).

On Japanese–European activity in the South–Western Pacific 1913:
CAO : MP84, S1, 2021/1/14.
CAO : MP84, S1, 1856/1/99.

On the working of the Council of Defence:
Minute Book : Council of Defence.

On disorganization at staff level and the working of the Military
Board:
CAO : MP84, S1, 1828/2/46; 1828/2/50; 1828/2/52; 1828/2/104.
CAO : MP84, S1, 1856/4/4.

On Bridges' criticisms of the system:
From June 1907 - CAO : MP84, S1, 1856/4/5; 1856/4/75.
From June 1909 - CAO : MP84, S1, 1804/2/81.
8 Quotation from:
CAG : MP84, S1, 1856/5/69.
Ewing's uneasy explanation in the House, 11 March 1908.

9 These and other generalizations about political behaviour and attitudes are based upon examination of the defence debates of the period to be quoted in subsequent chapters and the works of general historians quoted elsewhere in this work.

10 Quotation from:
Pearce to Hughes, 14 January 1911 (RANA : Part 1851, Section b).

11 On the New Hebrides issue and Alfred Deakin:


Minutes: Imperial Conference 1907 (C.O. Miscellaneous No. 203 - Confidential) pp. 117 ff., 201 ff., 205 ff.

On W.M. Hughes:
Deputation of Members of the Presbyterian Church to Minister for External Affairs (Sydney Morning Herald, 9 August 1904).
Minutes: Navigation Conference 1907.

12 Quotation from:
An address, 3 September 1908 (USM, October 1908, p. 99).

See also:
Article to the Morning Post, 14 April 1908.

13 On Reid:

On Cook:
CPD 35 : 5695 ff., 28 September 1906.

On McCay:
CPD 3 : 3205 ff., 30 July 1903.
Minutes: Council of Defence, 12 May 1905.
Meeting of Imperial Federation League, 18 May 1908 (USM, November 1908, pp. 214-215).
(Notes Chapter Eight : beginning 14)

On Ewing:

Argus, 28 February 1902.
The Times, 8 April 1903.
CPD 35 : 5691, 28 September 1906.
Meeting of the Imperial Federation League, 18 May 1908.

14 On Hughes' Imperialism:


See also:

Hughes to Richard Jebb, 23 September 1907 (Jebb Papers : C.N.L.).

15 Quotation from:

Review of Reviews, July 1911.

16 Fisher on peace and arbitration:

Before a delegation from the Society of Friends objecting to universal service, 18 August 1910 (CAO : MP84, S1, 1802/2/221).

Fisher on self-reliance:

Newspaper interview (The Times, 16 May 1911).

Before Kier Hardie (The Times, 19 May 1911).

Before Lloyd George (The Times, 29 May 1911).

Fisher on Empire:

The Times, 25 July 1911, 27 July 1911, 29 July 1911, 9 August 1911.

Grimshaw, Some Aspects of Australian Attitudes to the Imperial, pp. 28-30.

On Hughes' repudiation of Fisher's reported views:

Sydney Morning Herald, 31 July 1911.

On another view of Fisher's stand:

The Worker, 28 July 1911.

17 Quotation from:

Deakin to Jebb, 4 June 1908 (Jebb Papers : C.N.L.).

For sample of attack upon Labour's naval policy:

Advance Australia (organ of the Australian Natives Association), September 1905.
18 On Hughes and Deakin and national aspirations:
Quoted in part in Grimshaw, op. cit., pp. 31–32.
The lecturer's points have here been elaborated in some respects
to make a complex point briefly.

19 On Deakin and role of the Commonwealth:
Deakin to Northcote, 31 October 1906 (CAO : CP103, S12, Brief
for 1907 Conference).
Sir George Clarke to Deakin, 1 June 1906 (Deakin Papers).

On Ewing's forthright agreement:
Memorandum on Defence, 12 November 1908 (CPP : 1907–8,
Miscellaneous, p. 237).

On Hughes and the paramount powers of the central government:
Hughes to State Premiers, 23 April 1909 (CAO : MP84, S1, MP
1856/4/135).

Each was concerned with establishing the authority and the interests
of the Commonwealth over the varying policies of the States.

After 1909, once the Liberal-Labour alliance had fulfilled its
usefulness and collapsed, Labour wished to give the Commonwealth
greater powers than Deakin, as a federalist, thought proper. This
is evident not only in the referenda of the later period but in Hughes' struggles in the High Court.

20 On national aspirations and White Australia:
There was a tendency for many radicals and Labour men to equate
White Australia with other reform. R. Gollan sums up the
view thus:
"The defence policy of the Labour Party was closely
related to its policy on White Australia; involved
in it was the concept of the white democratic,
Australian nation."
(Radical and Working Class Politics, p. 196).

On a conscious equation of immigration with radical policy - all to be
protected from the Yellow Peril - in the minds of contemporaries, see
the following of which the first and last are the most succinct and
passionate:

R.A. Crouch (Radical-Liberal), "An Australian View of the War"
in the Contemporary Review, August 1904, pp. 178 ff.

Dr. Maloney (Labour), Flashlights on Japan and the Far East
(Melbourne 1905).

W.M. Hughes (Labour), CPD 32 : 2582, 9 August 1906.
Senator Pearce (Labour), CPD 41: 5679, November 1907.
Reply to Deputation from the N.S.W. Political Labor League, c. August 1912 (CAO: MP84, S1, 1939/3/245).

See also:
D.C.S. Sissons, Attitudes to Japan and Defence 1890-1923, in three volumes (M.A. Thesis, Melbourne: unpublished). Much of the information on Australian attitudes to Japan has been gleaned from this work.

21 For the view of the Admiralty on this transformation see Harder, British Naval Policy, pp. 435-455.
One Admiralty minute read: "Tsushima is the equivalent to Trafalgar".

22 Quotation from:
Sydney Morning Herald, 2 October 1905.
Quoted in Grimshaw, op.cit., p.139.

23 Quotation from:
The Worker, 15 March 1905.
Quoted in Grimshaw, op.cit., p.141.

24 Quotation from:
The Call, November 1906, p.4.
On the Australian National Defence League:
A survey of the Call from August 1905 until March 1910 reveals that Japan was discussed as a possible, often the probable, enemy in every issue but two. References were made to European complications between 1906 and 1907. Germany was alluded to throughout 1908 but not specified as a great threat until May 1908, though by design or accident it could assist Japanese ambitions in the Far East. By March 1910, Germany, Japan, and China were considered the probable foes.

On the Call and threats to Australia:
President's inaugural address, August 1906.
Unsigned Article, November 1906.
"The United States and Japan", November 1907.
"The Japanese in Northern Australia", February 1908.
Experts on Asian invasion, August 1908. Views of the following were quoted and often misused: Captain Mahan; Admiral Dewey; L.S. Amery; Colonel Repington; Lieutenant Dewar.
"An Asiatic Bridge in Peace and War", November 1908.
"The Tragedy of Korea", February 1908.

25 Quotation from:
Hall, Australia and England, p.258. See also his Chapter X.

See also:
Sissons, op.cit., pp.21-76.

26 On Labour and defence innovation:
See below Chapters Nine and Ten.

27 Quotation from:
Morning Post, 6 October 1906.

28 Quotation from:
Deakin to Jebb, 4 June 1908 (Jebb Papers : C.N.L.).

On Deakin's Opinions:
Newspaper interview of June 1905 reprinted in ... Statement ... by Alfred Deakin ..., CPP : 1905, Vol.II (Ordered to be Printed, 31 August 1905).
CPD 35 : 5564 ff., 26 September 1906.
Policy Speech, December 1907 (see below Chapter Ten).

On Ewing's Opinions:
Sissons, op.cit., p.8, concerning Asian fears in the nineties.
CPD 14 : 2056-7, 14 July 1903.
CPD 35 : 5691, 28 September 1906.
CPD 38 : 2239 ff., 22 August 1907.
CPD 47 : 437 ff., 29 September 1908.

During this period Ewing was closer to Deakin than any other minister and discussed many issues including defence informally at the Prime Minister's home. Deakin was to attribute most of the responsibility for introducing universal service to Ewing.

29 For a thorough survey:
Sissons, op.cit., pp.35 ff., particularly pp.60-68.
On the Alliance:
Rumours reported in the National Review 1906, Vol. 47, pp. 1-3, 2.
The Call, February 1907, p. 2.

On the loss of the Two Power Standard and naval strength in the Far East:
Deakin in 1907-8 - Undated Drafts of a Public Address (Deakin Papers).
The Call, November 1906, pp. 13-14.
Creswell to Deakin, 6 March 1907 (CAO: CP103, S12).
The Call, May 1908, pp. 16-17.
The Courier, 24 August 1908.
The Advertiser, 2 September 1908.
The Call, May 1909, pp. 4-6.

On racial disturbances and survival of the white races:
Hughes, CPD 32: 2530 ff., August 1907.

On Korea:
J.C. Fearnley, "The Tragedy of Korea - A Warning to Australia" in the Call, February 1909, pp. 9-10.

On the U.S. Fleet:
The Call, May 1908, pp. 16-17.
The Register, 5 September 1908.

On novels, plays, etc., concerning invasion:
A.H. Adams, The Day the Big Shells Came (Sydney: 1909).
F.R.C. Hopkins, Reaping the Whirlwind (Sydney: 1909).

On articles concerning defence, invasion, and the Asian threat:
J.C. Watson, "The Defence of Australia", August 1907.
L. Essen, A series on Japan, August-December 1908.
'Veronica', "Guarding Our Northern Gate", August 1909.
E. Cable, "First Blood", May 1911.
A. White, "The Defence of Australia", November 1911.
(All the above articles from the Lone Hand)
See also:

The *Sun* (Sydney), 12 January 1911, 31 March 1913.

Though the *Bulletin* sustained fears of alien attack by comment and imaginative articles from 1905, its monthly magazine, the *Lone Hand*, was far more concerned with invasion after 1909. On this and defence, articles were to increase in number 1909-1914.

*

The *Call* draws attention to evidence which demonstrates how tentative conclusions must be. In 1907 and 1908 it insisted that interest in security and defence was insufficient and latent. In early 1909 one alarmist noted in exasperation:

"(To) the average citizen of Sydney, in common with the rest of Australia, the idea of his country being invaded ... is too preposterous to be taken seriously."

*The Call*, May 1909, p.16.

30 On lack of assessments about Japanese intent:

Sissons, *op.cit.*, pp.60-84.

31 On the Commonwealth and the Treaty of 1896:

The attitude of Australians and their governments to the Alliance and the complicating aspects of the Queensland Protocol — a subject overlooked by most historians — deserves a monograph. The desire for trade preference without reciprocal immigration rights; a tussle for authority by the Commonwealth over the States; disagreement with Imperial authorities about Australian status by virtue of federation — these and many other issues are involved.

On the complexities of the 1896 Treaty:

CAO : CP103, S12, B5.

CAO : CP78, S8, Vol.I.

CAO : CP78, S9, Vol.II.

CAO : CP78, S1, 1/65.

CAO : CP717, S1, No.23.


On hostility to the Alliance prior to 1911:

*The Times*, 13 July 1911, 15 July 1911, 18 July 1911.

Particularly — W.M. Hughes (*Argus*, 18 July 1911).

The Alliance as a shield after 1911:

Deakin (*The Times*, 17 July 1911).

*Sydney Morning Herald*, 15 July 1911.

*The Call*, 6 September 1911, p.2.
32 Quotation from:  
\textit{Hansard}, 21 September 1909.

33 Quotation from:  
\textit{W.M. Hughes, CPD 38: 1282}, 1 August 1907.

34 The factual material for these distinctions lies in the sources already cited.

35 Australian commercial interests and the Pacific:  
Burns Philip & Co. to Joseph Cook, June 1909 (CAO : MP84, S1, 1877/4/1).

On the Entente:  
\textit{Daily Telegraph}, 11 April 1904.  

On experience in London:  
Undated Notes 1907–1908 (Deakin Papers).  
See below Chapter Ten.

36 On fear of French bases in the New Hebrides:  
Lyttleton to Northcote, 18 August 1905 (CAO : CP78, S21, B34a, Unnumbered).

On fear of German secret bases in the New Hebrides:  
Creswell to Deakin, 6 March 1904 (CAO : CP103, S12, Unnumbered).  
Captain Reason to High Commissioner for the Western Pacific, 25 August 1906 (CAO : CP717, S1, V4).  
Vice-Admiral Fawkes to Northcote, 26 August 1906 (Ibid.).  
Northcote to Elgin, 18 September 1906 (Ibid.).  
Wilson to Deakin, 20 October 1906 (Ibid.).

37 Quotation from:  
Clarke to Deakin, 14 February 1906 (Deakin Papers).

38 See below Chapter Nine on the report of the Committee of Imperial Defence.

39 Quotation from:  
On renewal of the Alliance and Hong Kong:

Quotation from:
ODC Memo No.429 Secret (24 February 1911).

On requests for advice from Australia:
- Deakin to Dudley, 15 September 1909.
- Crewe to Dudley, 2 October 1909.
- Crewe to Dudley, 7 July 1911.
(CAO : OP290, S15, Unnamed)

After Labour accession in 1910, Pearce became impatient with the lack of response and requested Fisher to enquire about the scale of attack at the Imperial Conference of 1911. This was not done. (CAO : MP84, S1, 1888/1/20)

On the Overseas Defence Committee:
The most exhaustive search has not uncovered the relevant memoranda from the Overseas Defence Committee. From evidence in departmental files too scattered and numerous to list here, the likely contents of each are:

ODC Memo No.414 M (of December 1909):
That 9.2-inch B.L. Mark X guns are used for the defence of British and Imperial ports against armoured cruiser attack. No recommendation was apparently made for Australian fixed defences.

ODC Memo No.417 (of July 1910):
Contents unknown. It may well have been a commentary on Kitchener's recommendations, particularly on fixed defences (submitted to the Fusion government, 12 February 1910). There is very flimsy evidence to suggest that it dealt with fixed defences during a national emergency in the Pacific when the Japanese Alliance had been terminated and the British sea inferiority in the Pacific might be protracted. (CAO : MP84, S1, 2002/1/310)

ODC Memo No.429 Secret (of 24 February 1911):
On the scale of attack to which Australasia might be subject. The general argument seems to have been extended in later documents. In this document appears the warning quoted in the text to the effect that once the Alliance ended the strategic position of Australia would be gravely changed. Then a reassessment of the scale of attack would be essential.

ODC Memo No.438 Secret (of 26 May 1911):
On the scale of attack to which ports might be subject - particularly Sydney and Thursday Island. Phrases in this document indicated what might be done if the Alliance was not renewed. Probably it also alluded to German cruiser activity for it referred to the defences necessary should the Alliance be
renewed on terms which the British fleet would not be able to count on Japanese support.

**ODC Memo No. 442 Secret (of 3 May 1911):**
Contents unknown. This appears to have been a crucial document dealing with "Strategic Situation in the Event of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance being terminated". Other evidence suggests that the Committee argued that, while British sea superiority was inferior, "an Eastern Power" might conduct large numbers of raiding operations which the Commonwealth could deter by raising armed strength for garrison duties and for a "mobile expeditionary force. Invasion appears not to have been countenanced.

43 On Hood's Committee of 1906:

... Report of Committee of Officers .... Organization etc.,
September 1906 (CAO: CP290, S15, Item 9).

44 Quotation from:
"Summary of Proposals for Future Defence", c. September 1906
(CAO: MP84, S2, 02/2688).
From the handwriting it would appear that Playford drafted the proposals for military defence; marginal comments and material on the naval forces were possibly made by Ewing.

45 On the Deakin ministry and universal training:
See below Chapter Nine.

46 On Bridges' strategic assumptions 1906-1909:
Bridges to Ewing, 29 January 1907 (CAO: MP84, S1, 1843/1/52).
Bridges to Ewing, 5 July 1907 (Defence Department: Uncategorised).
Papers for Schools of Instruction 1908 (CAO: MP84, S1, 1856/4/105)
Japan and America were excluded from most assessments. This left Germany as the most probable enemy.

47 On the U.S. Fleet and the test of coastal communications:
CAO: MP178, S2, 2173/4; 2173/16; 2173/17; 2173/110; 2173/263.
CAO: MP84, S1, 1997/8/---.

48 Quotations from:
Bridges to Ewing, 9 October 1908 (CAO: MP84, S1, 1856/1/2).
Ewing to Bridges, 13 April 1907 (CAO: MP84, S1, 1856/4/4).
(Notes Chapter Eight : beginning 49)

49 On Bridges' differences with Ewing:
   Bridges to Ewing, 20 October 1908 (CAO : MP84, S1, 1856/1/4).
   Bridges to Ewing, 3 August 1908 (CAO : MP84, S1, 1856/4/75).

50 On Creswell and Invasion 1905–1907:

51 Quotations from:
   Creswell to Deakin, 6 March 1907 (CAO : CP103, S12, Unnumbered).

52 On the limitations of Creswell's torpedo craft:
   Colonel Foster who held the Chair of Military Science at the
   University of Sydney attacked Creswell's views vigorously
   (*Argus*, 24 October 1908).
   See also other critics mentioned below in Chapter Ten.

53 Note number appears in the text by error.

54 Quotation from:
   Head to Cook, 26 July 1909 (CAO : MP84, S1, 1804/2/81).
   This memo was referred to the Military Board and was the subject
   of the first request from Whitehall for a strategic assessment.

55 Head to Cook, 14 October 1909 (CAO : MP84, S1, 1997/2/36).

56 Ibid.

57 On Committee to investigate wireless telegraphy:

58 Minute by Creswell on Naval Board Memo 27 August 1912 (CAO : MP472, 28/8/1912).

59 Ibid.
   Minute of 26 August 1912 by the Inspector-General (CAO : MP84, S1, 1999/2/2).

60 Note number appears in the text by error.
(Notes Chapter Eight: beginning 61)

61 On Road and Kitchener's visit:
   Road to Cook, 3 September 1909 (CAO: MP84, S1, 1856/4/163).
   On Deakin's correspondence with Kitchener before his arrival:
   CAO: MP84, S1, 1901/13/16.

62 Minute Book: Council of Defence (Defence Department: Canberra) pp.1-28
   Macandie, op.cit., pp.117-123.

63 Quotation from:

   On Mahan and Australian naval defense:
   A.T. Mahan, "Considerations Governing the Dispositions of Navies"
   in the National Review, July 1902, pp.701 ff.
   The Times, 2 July 1902.

   It must be noted that Mahan's words were ambiguous. The
   Spectator (5 July 1902) construed them as Creswell did, while
   The Times took them to be an exhortation for naval contributions.
   For an uneasy compromise between these two views by an
   Imperialist see:
   L.H. Hodern, "Colonial Responsibilities" in USM, October 1902,
   pp.1-10.

64 Quotation from:

65 Quotation from:
   Ibid., p.8.
   The report of the meeting is written sometimes in the direct
   and sometimes in indirect speech. Here the words are presented
   in the direct speech with appropriate punctuation added.

66 Loc. cit.

67 Ibid., pp.10-11.


69 Ibid., p.28.
   Macandie, op.cit., p.123.
(Notes Chapter Eight : beginning 70)

70 Minute Book: Council of Defence, p.21.


72 Ibid., p.15.

73 Ibid., pp.16-21.
On federalist (military) legislation:
Drafts of the Defence Bills of 1901 and 1903 were distributed individually to Cabinet members. Though others made comment, Deakin does not appear to have done so.
(Papers on the Defence Bill No. 31 of 1903: Attorney-General's Department, Canberra)

On Hutton's military scheme:
Deakin to Clarke, 3 October 1905.
Deakin to Clarke, 8 January 1906.
Clarke to Deakin, 4 February 1906.
Clarke to Deakin, (?) April 1906.
(Deakin Papers)

On a consistent national scheme:
Deakin anticipated this before the fall of the Reid ministry in a newspaper interview, 12 June 1905.
Defence of Australia: Statement by ... Alfred Deakin ...
CPP: 1905, Vol. II (Ordered to be Printed, 31 August 1905)

7 Deakin to Northcote, 28 August 1905.
The Naval Agreement with Australia and New Zealand ...
CPP: 1906, Vol. II (Ordered to be Printed, 10 October 1906) Clause 5.
HEREAFTER: On Revision of the Agreement 1905.

8 Deakin to Clarke, 3 October 1905 (Deakin Papers).

9 Deakin to Northcote, 28 August 1905.
On Revision of the Agreement 1905, Clause 3.

10 On Deakin's suggestion:
Deakin to Clarke, 8 January 1906.
The reference to the 1865 Act is implied. Compare, Murdoch, op.cit., p.273.

On Robert Collins and the 1865 Act:
See above Chapter Seven.
See above Chapter One.

On revision, not abrogation, of the Agreement:
Deakin to Jebb, 4 June 1908 (Jebb Papers: C.N.L.).

On the general distinction made between naval cooperation and local naval defence:
In his correspondence with Clarke and Jebb, Deakin keeps these issues separate. The distinction, moreover, is the only means on interpreting the three aspects of his policy speech, CPD 42: 7509 ff., 13 December 1907, and his lack of concern over the kind of craft for a local naval force.
Quotation from:
Deakin's speech before the Imperial Federation League in 1905, cited by Grimshaw, op.cit., p.150.

CPD 42 : 7513, 13 December 1907.

Comment on this presentation of Deakin's Imperial policy:
In this section of the Chapter I have interpreted the speeches and actions of Deakin primarily from the point of view of defence policy. Statements are made with greater confidence because of independent study of the Commonwealth's response to the New Hebrides affair. Though no claim is made here either for a well-balanced interpretation or general and authoritative comment, it is hoped that Deakin's attitude as seen through defence will help clarify much else about him.

On Imperial reorganization:
The difference between Ewing, who wanted Australian defences completed before integration in larger schemes of Imperial defence, and Deakin, who desired that Imperial issues be settled first, is starkly brought out at a meeting of the Imperial Federation League, 18 May 1908 (reported in USM, November 1908, p.214).

It is also very probable that Deakin had not decided what executive functions the Imperial Council and its Permanent Secretariat should possess. This may well have been another occasion when Deakin was hoping that the general idea and the grand scheme would provoke others to clarify the issues, for his speech on reorganization before the Imperial Conference of 1907 was remarkably inept. In part he was presenting the substance of the Lyttleton Despatch written two years earlier with the approval of a Conservative government. He was encouraged in this by men like L.S. Amery. At the Conference, however, he was addressing his remarks to a Liberal government with quite different notions of Empire.

On Sources:
Minutes of Proceedings of Colonial Conference, 1907 ... (Command 3524 and 3523 in House of Commons, Accounts and Papers, Volume 55) pp.7-10, 26-29, 41-44, 611-621.
HERBERT : Colonial Conference 1907.

Correspondence Jebb to Deakin (CAO : CP103, S12, Unnumbered).
Correspondence on the Lyttleton Despatch (CAO : CP103, S12, Unnumbered).
14 Deakin to Jebb, 4 June 1908 (Jebb Papers : C.N.L.).

15 On request of Whitehall for encouragement for navalist plans:
Deakin to Northcote, 29 December 1906 (CAO : CP290, S15, B6, Unnumbered).

On Deakin and local naval defence:
Defence of Australia : Statement by ... Alfred Deakin ..., cited in Note 6 above.
Deakin to Clarke, 3 October 1905 (Deakin Papers).
Deakin to Clarke, 8 January 1906 (Deakin Papers).
CPD 35 : 5563 ff., 26 September 1906.

On Deakin and Labour policy:
Deakin to Jebb, 4 June 1908 (Jebb Papers : C.N.L.).

On eventual formation of a sea-going navy (implied reference only):
Ibid.
Deakin to Clarke, 8 January 1906. Extract from speech to U.S. Fleet, 1 September 1908 (Deakin Papers).

16 Deakin to Clarke, 3 October 1905 (Deakin Papers).

See also:
Clarke to Deakin, (?) April 1906 (Deakin Papers), wherein Clarke refers to previous conversations with Deakin concerning universal training as an instrument of building national spirit.

17 There is in Deakin despatches - and speeches - a repeated appeal to the emotions expressed during colonial participation in the Boer War. This may have been in part the result of observation during that war. It is also the result of Richard Jebb's work, Colonial Nationalism - widely read and praised by Deakin - wherein Jebb argued that response to war demonstrated the co-existence and mutual dependence of nationalist aspirations and Imperial sentiment. See above Chapter Three.

18 Quotation from:
A speech before National Service League in London.
The Times, 17 May 1907.

19 Quotation from:
CPD 42 : 7509, 13 December 1907.
Quotation from:
Deakin to Clarke, 11 November 1905 (CAO : CP290, S15, Unnumbered).

See also:
Deakin to Northcote, 29 December 1905 (CAO : CP290, S15, Unnumbered).
Playford to Bridges, 21 December 1905 (CAO : MP84, S1, 1856/2/13).

Quotation from:
Deakin to Playford, 6 February 1906.

Quotation from:
Deakin to Clarke, 8 January 1906.

See also:
Bridges to Playford, 11 December 1905.
Playford to Bridges, 21 December 1905.
(CAO : MP84, S1, 1856/2/13).

Quotation from:
Playford to Bridges, 21 December 1905 (CAO : MP84, S1, 1856/2/13).

On Deakin's view of Creswell and Bridges:
Deakin to Playford, 6 February 1906 (Deakin Papers).

See also:
Playford to Deakin, 7 February 1906 (Deakin Papers).
Correspondence Deakin - Clarke, January-February 1906 (CAO : MP178, S2, 2286/3/6; 2286/3/13).

On Creswell in England:
Report on the Director of Naval Forces on his Visit to England,
CPP : 1906, Vol.II (Ordered to be Printed, 21 September 1906).
Creswell to Playford, 21 September 1906 (RANA : 1851, Part a, Items 6 & 7).

On approval given to full report of the scheme of defence:
Elgin to Northcote, 1 June 1906 (CAO : CP290, S15, Unnumbered).
The report was considered and approved by the Committee of
Imperial Defence which included: Campbell-Bannerman; Asquith;
Grey; Tweedmouth; Haldane; Morley; Elgin; Esher; Fisher; the
Chief of the General Staff; and the Directors of Naval Intelli-
gence and Military Operations.
On Clarke's commentary on the drafting of the scheme:
Clarke to Deakin, 8 January 1906.
14 February 1906.
15 February 1906.
30 March 1906.
1 June 1906. (Deakin Papers)

On the report of the Committee of Imperial Defence:
Report of the Committee of Imperial Defence upon a General Scheme of Defence for Australia (Excluding Recommendations on Port Defences) - CPP : 1906, Vol.II (Ordered to be Printed, 15 August 1906).

27 On Clarke:
Clarke to Deakin, 1 June 1906 (Deakin Papers).

28 CID Report 1906, p.3.

29 Ibid., p.9.

30 On Imperial Reserve:
Clarke to Deakin, 4 February 1904.

31 On parliamentary comment:
Questions in the House, 11, 13, 17 July 1906, 15, 16 August 1906.

On formal Australian Committees:
Report of Committee ... Organization ...
(Road Committee) September 1906.
Report of Committee ... Coastal Defences ...
(Gordon Committee) September 1906.
Report of Committee ... Naval Defence ...
(Creswell Committee) September 1906.
(CAO : CP29, S15, Unnumbered)

On ministerial consideration of the reports:
Playford to Deakin, c. September 1906.
Ewing to Deakin, c. September 1906.
(CAO : MP84, S2, 02/2688)
Ewing's Minutes, 24 November 1907 (D/D : 1843/1/56).
Ewing's Minutes, 16 February 1907 (D/D : 1843/1/51).
Creswell to Playford, 30 July 1906 (D/D : 1843/1/2).
On ministerial decision about military defences:
Playford's minute, 18 September 1906 (D/D: 1843/1/45).

On Bridges' analysis and criticism of the Australian Reports:
Correspondence Bridges - Ewing, February-July 1907 (CAO: MP84, S1, 1856/4/4).

On Bridges' explanation of the CID Report:
Bridges to Playford, 5 July 1906 (Unnumbered File from Defence Department).

Note on Deakin's Procedure:
Deakin decided that Creswell should organize a committee to criticize the report and Bridges should not. Accordingly, Creswell returned post haste from London. Not even Bridges' memorandum, written while he remained overseas, were presented to the local committees.

32 On Creswell and destroyer defence:
See below Chapter Ten.

33 On reorganization of Imperial Squadron:
Lyttleton to Northcote, 14 January 1905.
Reid to Northcote, 23 January 1905.
Reid to Northcote, 3 February 1905.
(CAO: CP290, S15, S/S 6 February 1903)

On the cost:
(CAO: MP178, S2, 2115/3/172)

34 On absorption of local forces into Imperial Squadron:
Correspondence of 1904 (CAO: MP178, S1, 04/1435).
Creswell to Playford, 10 September 1905 (Deakin Papers).

See also:
Chapter Seven above.
Chapter Ten below.

On Admiralty cooperation for navalist plans:
Fawkes to Northcote, 18 February 1907 (CAO: MP178, S2, 2115/1/46).

35 Quotation from:
Fanshawe to Tennyson, 31 March 1903 (CAO: CP290, S15, S/S 6 February 1903).
36 On discipline on the Imperial Squadron:
Report cited above in Note 35.
Parliamentary questions collected in (CAO: MP178, S1, 10468).

37 On use of vessels provided under the Agreement:
Parliamentary questions 1905 in (CAO: MP178, S1, 05/4063).
Quarterly returns in (CAO: MP178, S2, 2115/3/172).
Admiralty apology of September 1906 in (CAO: CP290, S15, S/S 6 February 1903).

38 On Creswell and cadets:
Creswell to Ewing, 24 March 1908 (CAO: MP178, S2, 2254/3/3).

On Fanshawe and new recruiting schemes:
Correspondence 1906–1907 (CAO: CP103, S12, B6 – "Defence Matters").

39 On response to new recruiting provisions:
Figures were compiled from lengthy returns in (CAO: MP178, S2, 2115/3/172).

In particular:
I am indebted to Mr. Ware of the Archives Branch of the Department of the Navy for a comprehensive list of annual strengths; and for clarifying a number of issues for me.

40 Quotation from:
Creswell to Playford, 22 August 1905 (CAO: MP178, S1, 1905/11047).

41 On the Powerful issue:
Questions in the House.
Correspondence: Departmental; Imperial.
Creswell's Memoranda 1906 (all from July 1905).
Colquhoun's Memoranda 1906.
(CAO: MP178, S2, 2115/3/172)
Admiralty to Colonial Office (Enclosure).
Lyttleton to Northcote, 29 December 1905.
(CAO: CP290, S12, S/S 6 February 1903).
Age, 8 February 1906.
42 Quotation from:
Creswell to Playford, 7 February 1906 (CAO: MP178, S2, 2115/3/172).

43 On Deakin's attack on the Agreement 1906 and quotation from:
Deakin to Northcote, 26 April 1906 (CAO: CP290, S15, S/S 6 February 1903).

44 On Admiralty rebuttal:
Admiralty to Colonial Office No. 163 of 1906.
(Enclosure) in Elgin to Northcote, 14 September 1906.
(CAO: CP290, S15, S/S 6 February 1903)

45 On Lord Tweedmouth:
Speech of March 1906 (USM, March 1906, p.708).
Speech of February 1907 (USM, June 1907, pp.327-328).

46 Quotation from:
Minute by Ewing on projected reserve system, 30 September 1907
(CAO: MP84, S1, 1856/4/24).

On the state of the forces:
Detailed evidence has been culled from departmental files
1905-1912. Such an extensive investigation was necessary to
discover the fate of Hutton's military scheme and the truth
beneath charge and countercharge in the House. However, for
the purposes of this work, only those aspects which relate to
the introduction of universal training are examined here.

SELECT SOURCES (All departmental files from CAO: MP84, S1):

(1) On defence schemes and state of forces generally:
Correspondence Ewing-Bridges 1907-1908: 1856/1/4; 1856/4/55;
1856/4/4.

(2) On the problem of reserves:
Correspondence Ewing - Wallack 1907-1909: 1856/4/24. Also
1974/1/74.

(3) On general reports 1905-1910:
1901/13/29; 1002/1/2 et seq.

(4) On annual state reports from commandants and field commanders:
South Australia: 1002/2/11 et seq.
Queensland: 768/2/40 et seq.; 702/2/2 et seq.
Western Australia: 1302/2/1 et seq.
New South Wales: 168/2/37 et seq.
Tasmania: 1856/5/65.
(5) Reports to Parliament:

Report on the Department of Defence
CPP: 1906, Vol. II (Ordered to be Printed, 18 September 1906).

Military Board: Report ... 1905
CPP: 1906, Vol. II (Ordered to be Printed, 30 July 1906).

Annual Report for ... 1905 ... Inspector-General
CPP: 1906, Vol. II (Ordered to be Printed, 30 July 1906).

Report by the Inspector-General ... 1906
CPP: 1906, Vol. II (Ordered to be Printed, 14 September 1906).

Report by the Military Board ... 1906
CPP: 1907-1908, Vol. II (Ordered to be Printed, 10 July 1907).

Annual Report ... 1907 ... Inspector-General
CPP: 1907-1908, Vol. II (Ordered to be Printed, 2 April 1908).

(6) On plight of Volunteer Regiments:
1902/1/10; 1071/7/11.

(7) On the cadets:
1832/8/80.

(8) On resistance of volunteers to absorption into the militia:
1937/1/21.

(9) On calibre of officers:
1952/1/33; 2002/3/11; 1901/13/29; 430/2/1-40; 130/3/12;

(10) On standard of instruction:
1856/5/94; 1862/7/37.

(11) On administrative defects:
1828/2/46 et seq.

(12) On ordnance:
1990/4/7; 1968/3/4; 1879/1/4.

(13) On surveys and maps:
1856/1/43.

(14) On tactical mobility (horses and vehicles):
1894/5/103; 1902/7/67; 2004/1/23; 2004/1/3-26; 1893/1/36;
1893/1/-; 2004/1/23.

(15) On railways:
457/1/26-79; 1957/2/43.

47 On conflict between Bridges and Ewing:
Sources in Note 46 (1) above.
Also see Chapter Eight above.
48 On condition of the militia:
Sources in Note 46 (2-6) above.
In particular - conferences of commandants and commanders 1907-1909 (CAO: MP84, S1, 1937/1/21).

Quotation from:
Lyster to Military Board, June 1907 (CAO: MP84, S1, 1937/1/21).

49 See below Chapter Ten, part two.

50 On mobility:
Argument rests on sources in Note 46 (14 and 15) above.

51 On cadet movement:
Reports from all states on the cadet movement 1906-1910 (CAO: MP84, S1, 183/1/296).
NOTES FOR CHAPTER TEN

1 On Ewing:
   CPD 35 : 5691, 28 September 1906.

2 On Watson:
   The Call, 8 August 1906, p.6.
   CPD 35 : 5575 ff., 26 September 1906.

3 On Playford:
   "Summary of Proposals for Future Defence", c. September 1906
   (CAO : MP84, S2, 02/2688).

   On Lyne:
   United Services Magazine, August 1907, p.566.

   On Victorians and Voluntary Service:
   The Call, August 1906.
   Deputation to Deakin, 4-7 November 1906 (CAO : MP84, S2,
   1856/6/3).

4 On the Press:
   This general statement rests on a survey of the Sydney Morning
   Herald, the Daily Telegraph, and the Argus: October 1905;
   December 1907; September 1908; February-April 1909; September
   1909.

   On W.H. Kelly (Free-trade defence critic):
   Kelly on Hughes - CPD 32 : 2590 ff., 9 August 1906.

   On Reid:
   CPD 47 : 839 ff., 7 October 1908.

5 On Deakin's anticipation of new measures:
   CPD 35 : 5563 ff., 26 September 1906.

On Deakin's evasion concerning universal training:
   Attlee Hunt to Campbell, 14 November 1906 (CAO : MP84, S2,
   1856/6/3).

On Deakin and the vessels for the Australian Naval Force:
   Deakin to Jebb, 4 June 1908 (Jebb Papers : C.N.L.).

6 See above Chapters Two and Six.
On Clarke and Destroyers in 1905:
Clarke to Collins, Collins to McCay, May–June 1905 (Deakin Papers).
At the time McCay was examining Creswell's schemes which he submitted before and after the Council of Defence meeting in 1905. See above Chapter Eight.

On Churchill and Destroyers:
Assistant Director of Operations Division's remarks on Churchill's letter, March 1913 in Warder, Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, p. 376.

On changing naval technology:
Much of the source material for the sketch of developments in destroyer and submarine construction — and relevant theories of coastal defence — overlaps with sources for other technical change mentioned elsewhere in this work. All relevant sources are listed here.

I have drawn much from many items and articles, too numerous to cite in full, which appear in Brassey's Naval Annual (from 1897 to 1917), in the United Services Magazine (i.e. USM, from 1896 to 1922), in the Royal United Services Institute Journal (i.e. RUSIJ, from 1896 to 1914), and in the Transactions of the Institute of Naval Architects (i.e. TINA, from 1900 to 1927) and in Jane's Fighting Ships (1900–1930).

These surveys were necessary because there was some secrecy, a good deal of evasion, and much confusion about the types of vessels and their functions in ministerial, parliamentary and editorial discussion of naval projects after 1906.

On specific sources for naval architecture:
Admiral Sir Cyprian Bridge, "Fifty Years of Architectural Expression of Tactical Ideas", TINA, Vol. LIII, Part 11, 1911.


On the failure of destroyers prior to 1906:


Henceforth: Fisher Papers.

Naval Annual 1901, pp. 112 ff.
1902, pp. 94 ff.
1905, pp. 97 ff.
Also 1908, pp. 152 ff.

On Admiralty Sub-Committee on Designs:

Fisher to Selborne, May 1904 (Fisher Papers) pp. xxi, xxvii.
Specifications and Comment (Fisher Papers) pp. 2, 22 ff., 41 ff., 221 ff.
Fisher to Churchill, March 1912 (Marder, Fear God and Dreadnought, Vol. II, pp. 436 ff.).

On Australian Assessments and work of Professor Biles:

Biles to Collins, 16 March 1910 (CAO: MP472, 16/12/490).
Colquhoun to Ewing, 4 July 1907 (CAO: MP178, S2, 2286/3/35).
Colquhoun to Ewing, 4 November 1907 (CAO: MP178, S2, 2286/3/60).
Creswell to Ewing, 24 March 1908 (CAO: MP178, S2, 2254/3/3).
Correspondence in (CAO: CP178, S2, 2215/3/54).
Builders' Specifications for various destroyers (RANA: 1851, Part a, item 11).
Macandie, Genesis of the R.A.N., pp. 196-207.
See also below in this Chapter.

On soliciting by private builders in Australia:

Thornycroft to Collins, 9 February 1900.
Thornycroft & Co. to Forrest, 19 December 1901.
Collins to Thornycroft, 14 February 1902.
(CAO: MP178, S1, 1902/694)
See also files for 1883-1892 in (CAO: MP160, S1).

On naval architecture and coastal defence:


Marder, Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, pp. 328 ff.


(Notes Chapter Ten: beginning 9)

On theories of radial port defence:
R.H.S. Bacon, "Harbour Defence and the Blockade", Naval Annual
1900, pp.81 ff.

On the Changing capacities of British Submarines 1902-1908:

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<td>180</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>30</td>
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<tr>
<td>A5-A12 (1904-5)</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>30</td>
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<tr>
<td>B1-B (1905-6)</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>30-50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C1-C11 (1906-8)</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>1,350</td>
<td>50-70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A13 (1908)</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1,350</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9 Creswell to Playford, 10 October 1905 - CPP : 1905, Vol.II (Ordered to be Printed, 12 December 1905).

10 Creswell to Pearce, 4 February 1909 (RANA : 185i, Part a, Item 13).

See also:
Macandie, op.cit., p.226.

11 On Creswell's submissions in 1905:

Note also:
Most of these documents are to be found in official files but, in this instance, the deletions in Macandie's collection, are of no consequence.

12 Much of this paragraph is based upon inferences drawn from:
Clarke to Deakin, 14 February 1906.
Clarke to Deakin, 30 March 1906.
Clarke to Deakin, 1 June 1906.
Creswell to Playford, 1 June 1906.
(Deakin Papers)
Creswell to Playford, 6 August 1906 (RANA : 185i, Part a, Items 6 & 7).

13 On Creswell and Submarines:
Creswell to Ewing, 24 March 1908 (CAO : MP178, S2, 2254/3/3).

See also:
Correspondence Colquhoun to Ewing, cited in Note 8 above.
1909, pp. 11 ff.

"Admiralty or Admiralties?", *USM*, November 1906, pp. 936 ff.
"On the Australian Destroyer Scheme", *USM*, February 1907, pp. 461 ff.

Editor of *United Services Magazine*, "The Colonies and Imperial Defence", *USM*, January 1908, pp. 341 ff.


See also:
Editorials in Australian press mentioned in Note 4 above.

Note also:
Ministerial questions and all of Creswell's answers are to be found scattered through memoranda cited in Notes 14 and 15 above.

17 Creswell to Pearce, 22 February 1906 (*Macandie*, *op.cit.*, p. 226).


19 Quotation from:
CPD 35 : 5577, 26 September 1906.

On Deakin and Defence 1906:
CPD 35 : 5564 ff., 26 September 1906.

20 Quotation from:
CPD 35 : 5578, 26 September 1906.

21 Quotation from:
Creswell to Ewing, 28 November 1907 (CAO : MP178, S1, 2215/3/66).

22 Quotation from:
Bruce Smith, CPD 46 : 11408, 22 May 1908.
23 On the destroyer project 1907-1908:
Voluminous correspondence by Playford, Creswell, Ewing, 
Colquhoun, Clarkson, Clarke, Watts, and Biles is to be found 
in: CAO: MP178, S2, 2215/3/54; 2215/3/66; 2215/3/95; 2286/3/34; 
2286/3/39; 2286/3/52; 2286/3/54; 2286/3/60.
On parliamentary discussion:
CPD 35: 5563 ff., 26 September 1906.
CPD 39: 3288 ff., 13 September 1907.
CPD 39: 3598 ff., 20 September 1907.
CPD 39: 3615, 20 September 1907.
CPD 39: 3677 ff., 24 September 1907.
CPD 46: 11408 ff., 22 May 1908.
CPD 46: 12076 ff., 4 June 1908.
See also:
Material on Australian assessments of destroyers and the work 
of Professor Biles in Note 8 above.

24 Quotation from:
Deakin to Jebb, 4 June 1908 (Jebb Papers: C.N.L.).

25 On Deakin's doubts about the destroyer for coastal defence:
CPD 35: 5563 ff., 26 September 1906.
Minutes: Colonial Conference 1907, pp. 474-475.

26 On control of Australian naval forces:
Deakin to Ewing, ? 1907 (Deakin Papers).
Deakin to Foxton, 19 September 1909 (Deakin Papers).
Correspondence 1906-1911 in Briefing Papers on Defence for 
Imperial Conference 1907 (CAO: MP153, S11).
Pearce to Denman, 4 May 1914 (Denman Papers: C.N.L.).

27 On ships of limited capability and the Colonial Naval Defence Act:
Until Admiralty and Colonial Office files are examined, the 
argument in this paragraph must rest largely on inference and 
conjecture. It does, however, solve a number of puzzles raised 
by the 1865 Act and the 1907 Conference.
B.A. Knox in a thorough and careful account of the 1865 Act 
shows that officials of the Colonial Office were more concerned 
about the status and control of colonial ships on the high seas 
than the Admiralty; he sees the Act as a major, if premature, 
move towards Imperial cooperation. The view of the Admiralty 
is the more explicable and his theme slightly less surprising 
if account is taken of the fact that the Cerberus was designed 
for harbour defence, and within a few years used only for that
(Notes Chapter Ten: beginning 28)

purpose. It would then be possible to see the 1865 Act as part of the long and sustained British campaign to encourage the colonies to provide for their own local and port defences—a process in which Victoria was to the fore—and not as an anticipation of naval cooperation.

Likewise, the stand taken by the Admiralty in 1907 is capable of a quite different interpretation than the usual when it is remembered that the submarine of the day was a port defence vessel.

On 24 April 1907 this interpretation of the Act was probably made clear to Deakin at a meeting at the Admiralty where he discussed submarine defence with the Director of Naval Intelligence and apparently discussed navalist projects with Admiral Sir John Fisher.

Later Admiralty despatches seem to imply that ocean-going destroyers raised problems outside the Act.

Other sources:


Resume of discussion on 24 April 1907 in unattached Admiralty despatch of 10 February 1908 (CAO : MP153, S11 - Unnumbered - Naval Briefing Papers).

Colonial Office to Dudley, 18 August 1910 (RAN: 1851, Part b).

See below next Note for Deakin at the Admiralty 1907.

28 Naval Discussions at the Conference 1907.

On Campbell-Bannerman:

Minutes: Colonial Conference 1907, p.5.

On Lord Tweedmouth:

Ibid., pp.128-132, 147-151, 469-473.

On Deakin:

Ibid., pp.132-134, 473-476.

On Deakin's conversations with officials of the Admiralty:

Deakin to (Fisher?), Undated—probably late 1907 (Deakin Papers).


Re Submarine Force and discussion with Director of Naval Intelligence, Colonial Conference 1907, Confidential Papers ..., C.O. Misc. No.208 Confidential (CAO : CP103, S12, "Defence Matters"), pp.3-4, 10-12.
29 Quotation from:
Confidential Papers, cited above Note 28, p.3.

30 On Deakin's later explanations:
CPD 42: 7509 ff., 13 December 1907.

31 Quotation from:
CPD 42: 7528, 13 December 1907.
See also:
The Bulletin, 10 November 1904.

32 Quotation from:
Draft Report on the Progress of the Defence Forces - Senator
Pearce, 1 June 1913 (CAO: MFP472, S1, CS, 1/11/4933).

33 On the campaign for compulsory military training:

What follows is essentially a short, interpretative essay. Originally it was planned to present this aspect of nationalist policy at greater length, and material was collected to that end for a period ending 1915. For the purposes of this work, however, the scale has been reduced, various complexities ignored, and the role of various agents omitted for the sake of clarity.

The prime task has been to make the campaign and its various arguments credible. To this end, William Morris Hughes is used as a means of illuminating the varying motives of men who supported universal training. As on each other occasion when characters are introduced my concern has not been to give a balanced portrait but a sketch which will illuminate the approach of individuals to defence discussions.

Mr. Fitzhardinge of the Australian National University has much to say about Hughes and defence in his forthcoming biography. As my supervisor, he has directed me to valuable sources; and this kindness has been reciprocated. My interpretation of Hughes, however, differs substantially from Fitzhardinge's. It borrows much from Wanning Clarke's sketch in his Short History of Australia but is based essentially on my own analysis of defence debates throughout the period.

Because of the nature of this section, then, footnotes are reduced to a minimum and the general sources are listed below. Material from works already cited is not duplicated here. Nor is detailed reference made to various speeches in the House which demonstrate the assumptions of each group interested in universal training.
On general sources:

(1) Survey and analysis of the *Call* (Organ of Australian National Defence League) 1906-1910.

(2) Survey of the *Bulletin*, 1898-1904.

(3) Survey of editorial opinion in the *Age*, the *Argus*, the *Sydney Morning Herald*, and the *Daily Telegraph*: October 1905; September-December 1906; December 1907; September 1908; February-May 1909; September 1909.

(4) The parliamentary campaign of W.M. Hughes:
   The *Bulletin*, 16 February 1901.
   CPD 3 : 3292 ff., 31 July 1901.
   Proposed Amendments to the Defence Bill 1901 (Attorney-General's Department, Canberra).
   CPD 15 : 3093 ff., 5 August 1903.
   CPD 32 : 2580 ff., 9 August 1906.
   CPD 37 : 1282 ff., 1 August 1907.
   CPD 47 : 860 ff., 7 October 1908.
   CPD 52 : 4472 ff., 13 October 1909.

   See also:
   Speech before the National Service League reported in *The Times*, 26 April 1907.

   Note Also: Mr. Fitzhardinge was generous enough to allow me to read the first drafts of his forthcoming biography.

(5) The parliamentary campaign of Senator Dobson:
   CPD 16 : 4875 ff., 10 September 1903.
   CPD 24 : 6384 ff., 14 December 1904.
   CPD 32 : 2541 ff., 9 August 1906.
   CPD 36 : 11 ff., 20 February 1907.
   CPD 38 : 2873 ff., 5 September 1907.
   CPD 41 : 5673 ff., 7 November 1907.

(6) The views of Major J.G. Legge:

(7) The views of Deakin, his followers, and opponents:
Deakin — See above Chapter Nine.
Speech before the National Service League reported in The Times, 17 May 1907.
CPD 42 : 7509 ff., 13 December 1907.
Ewing — CPD 47 : 437 ff., 29 September 1908.
Crouch — CPD 47 : 1008 ff., 9 October 1908.
Reid — CPD 47 : 839 ff., 7 October 1908.
Foxton — CPD 47 : 1047 ff., 13 October 1908.
Forrest — CPD 47 : 1129 ff., 14 October 1908.


(10) Military background: (Select Titles Only)

34 Quotation from:
Whyte, op.cit., p. 58.

35 Quotation from:
Ibid., p. 164.

36 Quotation from:
The Bulletin, 16 February 1901.
37 Quotation from:
CPD 32 : 2581, 9 August 1906.

38 Quotation from:
CPD 3 : 3296, 31 July 1901.

39 Quotation from:
CPD 15 : 3094, 5 August 1903.

40 Quotation from:
National Review, July 1907, p.733.

41 Quotation from:
National Review, July 1907, p.736.

42 Quotation from:
The Times, 26 April 1907.

43 Quotation from:
CPD 3 : 3298, 31 July 1901.

44 Quotation from:
CPD 32 : 2586, 9 August 1906.

45 Quotation from:
CPD 37 : 1285, 1 August 1907.

46 I.S. Bloch, Is War Now Impossible? ... (London 1899).
"Wars of the Future", in the Contemporary Review, September 1901, pp.305 ff.
"Militarism in Politics ...", in the Contemporary Review, December 1901, pp.761 ff.

Editorial discussion in the Age, the Bulletin, and the Call, and passing comment in the House indicated that some men at least were pitting Bloch against writers like Colmar von der Goltz and his The Nation in Arms.
(Notes Chapter Ten: beginning 47)

47 Quotation from:
Journals and Proceedings of the United Services Institute of New South Wales, 28 August 1899.

48 On attitudes from the eighties, including Labour and Liberal:
Apart from sources and speeches already cited:
The Bulletin, 1898-1904.

49 Quotation from:
Deakin's reply to the Victorian Defence League, November 1906 (CAO: MP84, S2, 1856/6/3).

50 Quotation from:
Deakin to Campbell, 14 November 1906 (CAO: MP84, S2, 1856/6/3).

51 Quotation from:
Senator McGregor (CPD 1: 132, 22 May 1901).

52 On Watson's Proposals of 1905:
CAO: MP178, S1, 1905/10092.
On Labour's view at the Triennial Conference 1905:

53 Quotation from:
G.R. Campbell, Australia's Defence (Sydney 1925) p.4.

54 On Hughes' calculation of success:
Hughes to Jebb, 23 September 1907 (Jebb Papers: C.N.L.).

55 On Playford and Universal Training:
CAO: MP84, S2, 02/2688.

56 On Deakin and the Defence Leagues:
CAO: MP84, S1, 1856/6/3.
(Notes Chapter Ten: beginning 57)

57 On Bridges' report on the Swiss system:
Bridges to Playford, 11 December 1905 (CAO : MP84, S1, 1865/2/13).

58 On formal military discussions in London:
Minutes: Colonial Conference 1907, pp.94-99, 102-107, 114-121, 123-128.
See also attached papers:
The Strategic Conditions of the Empire ..., Chief of the General Staff, March 1907.
Possibility of Assimilating War Organization Throughout the Empire, Chief of the General Staff, March 1907.

59 Quotation from:
Minutes: Colonial Conference 1907, p.96.

60 On the Proposed Imperial Reserve:
CAO : MP84, S1, 1856/1/10.
CAO : CP103, S12, B6, "Defence Matters".
On the formation of the Imperial General Staff (Commonwealth Section):
CAO : MP84, S1, 1894/5/45.
1894/5/43.
1894/5/59.

61 Quotation from:
The Times, 17 May 1907.

62 On Deakin and the National Service League:
Ibid.

63 Quotation from:
This work, shot through with excerpts from popular Social-Darwinists, was often quoted in debates on electoral procedure.
See also:

64 Quotation from:
65 Quotation from:
Ashworth, op.cit., p.13.

66 Quotations from:
Brief and undated notes for a speech during 1908? (Deakin Papers).
See also:
Deakin - Clarke correspondence 1905-1906 (Deakin Papers).

67 Quotation from:
See also:
A similar commentary of the affect on national and Imperial
tsentiment resulting from Hutton's scheme (CPP : 1909,

68 Quotation from:
Anonymous article in the Call, August 1906, p.13.
This article from both the style and content is clearly written
by Hughes. The same metaphor - and argument - is used elsewhere
by him.

A distinction has to be drawn in signed and unsigned articles
of the Call. Unsigned articles were stop gaps often provided
in haste by Hughes, Campbell, and their colleagues on the
executive committee. Unlike signed articles, they were the
expressions of editorial opinion. Hughes was joint secretary
and joint editor.

For other commentaries on universal trainees as an informal
Imperial Reserve, see the Call, February 1907, p.3; November
1908, p.6; February 1909, pp.6-7.

69 Quotation from:
The Call, November 1908, pp.5-6.
The arguments of this article are partly those of Hughes. From
the style, however, it seems that it was written by another
member of the executive committee, A.W. Jose. He was usually
given the task of expounding Imperial issues.

70 Whyte, op.cit., p.130.
71 On treatment of Deakin's speech:
The presentation of Deakin's proposals will be brief. Enough has been explained in the preceding pages to capture the spirit and intent of the speech.

On lack of consultation:
Deakin had not presented his proposals for comment to the inspector-General, the Military Board, or the Naval Board. The Council of Defence went unused. Fawkes, the Admiral on the Australian Station, was implicated but had not been consulted. The Admiralty had been approached indirectly by correspondence with Sir John Fisher. But Fisher rejected Deakin's proposed revision of the Agreement and interchangeability. These issues had not been, as Deakin claimed, discussed in London.

On the prime sources:
CPD 42 : 7509 ff., 13 December 1907.
Memorandum on the Proposed Organization of a National Guard ...
CPP : 1908, Vol.II (Ordered to be printed, 31 January 1908).
CPD 47 : 437 ff., 29 September 1908.

72 Quotation from:
CPD 42 : 7511, 13 December 1907.

73 Quotation from:
CPD 42 : 7515, 13 December 1907.

74 On the revision of the Agreement, see also:
Deakin to Jebb, 4 June 1908 (Jebb Papers : C.N.L.).

Note also:
The request for cruisers from the Admiralty had been independently recommended by Fawkes and Creswell, the first in order to free vessels of the Imperial Squadron, and the second to get sea-going training ships with some potentiality for duties as flotilla leaders.
Fawkes to Deakin, 18 February 1907 (ibid., pp.168-175).
Deakin thought that Fisher might release the third-class cruisers from the Imperial Squadron for special Australian service, but also hoped more modern ones might be presented on the same terms as the Cerberus.

75 Quotation from:
CPD 42 : 7524, 13 December 1907.
76 Quotation from:
CPD 42 : 7518, 13 December 1907.

77 Quotation from:
Deakin to Fisher, c. October 1907 (Deakin Papers).

78 Quotation from:
Memorandum on ...(the) National Guard, Clause 18.

79 Quotation from:
CPD 42 : 7536, 13 December 1907.

80 Quotation from:
Ibid.

81 Quotation from:
Deakin to Jebb, 4 June 1908 (Jebb Papers : C.N.L.).

82 On the Admiralty's response:
Fisher to Tweedmouth, c. October 1907 (Marder, Fear God and
Dreadnought, p.139).
Command Paper - House of Commons - No.4325 of 1908.

83 On survey of newspapers:
See above Note 4.
Daily papers which took this view included the Sydney Morning
Herald, Daily Telegraph, Argus, Advertiser (Adelaide),
Mercury (Hobart).

84 On the navalist response:
The Age, 16 December 1907; 20 December 1907.
Creswell to Ewing (Confidential), 24 March 1908 (CAO : MF178,
S2, 2254/38).

85 Quotation from:
The Times, 24 March 1908.
Quotations from:
Bridges to Ewing, 8 September 1908 (CAO : MP84, S1, 1856/5/106).

See also:
Bridges to Ewing, 18 June 1908 (CAO : MP84, S1, 1856/5/94).
Bridges was apparently the only staff officer to criticize Deakin's policy. Had apparently complained he had not been consulted. The remaining officers bent with the winds of change.

On Hughes and the Deakin programme:
CPD 47 : 860 ff., 7 October 1908.

On the Defence League:
The Call, February 1908, pp. 3-4.

On Reid:
CPD 47 : 839 ff., 7 October 1908.

Quotation from:
CAO : MP84, S1, 1856/5/27b.

Quotation from:
CAO : MP84, S1, 1856/4/174.

On the revolt of the militia officers:
Evidence of the response of the military to Deakin's speech covers approximately three feet of archival space. Most strands can be discerned from correspondence in (CAO : MP84, S1, Bundies 26A and 27A).
There has been insufficient space to examine the response further. The attitude of the militia officers can, however, be discerned from the following files:
CAO : MP84, S1, 1856/5/27.
1856/1/30.
1856/5/40.
1856/5/51.
1856/5/54.
1856/5/64.
1856/5/79.
1856/4/174, Parts A and B.

See also:
Articles in the Daily Telegraph, 4 January to 13 January 1908; and the Call, November 1908, pp. 22-23.
91 Quotations from:
Legge to Deakin (or Ewing?), Undated - but probably June-July 1908 (Deakin Papers).

92 On financial calculations in 1908:
The Finance Member to the Naval and Military Board was not consulted before the schemes were launched. He had therefore to work within the estimated expenses announced by Deakin (CAO : MP84, S1, 166/1/11).

On British estimates of universal training:

On cost in 1913:
*Commonwealth Yearbook*, No.7.

93 On Deakin and the press:
Sissons, *op.cit.*, quotation from p.60.

94 On Deakin and the response to the National Guard:
By October 1908 the only groups who appear to have formally rejected universal training on principle and under any circumstances, were the Society of Friends, the Seventh Day Adventists, and the nucleus of the Peace Society which was later to flourish.

By then the *Courier*, the *Evening Observer*, the *Register*, the *Age*, the *Sydney Morning Herald*, the *Advertiser*, and the *West Australian* were prepared to accept some form of universal training in principle. More reserved were the *Daily Telegraph* and the *Argus*.

The Australian Natives Association and the Associated Chamber of Commerce of Australia, were among extra-parliamentary groups ready to support Deakin on this issue.

On sources:
CAO : MP84, S1, 1856/5/11.
1856/5/96.
1856/5/78.
1856/5/153.
Sissons, *op.cit.*, pp.60-63.

95 On the visit of the United States Fleet:
Official correspondence and newspaper coverage.
CAO : MP178, S2, 2173/4.
2173/16.
2173/17.
2173/110.
2173/263.

On the Australian response:
Sissons, op.cit., pp.61 ff.

On Deakin's motives:
Deakin to Jebb, 4 June 1908 (Jebb Papers : C.M.I.).
The Age, 1 September 1908.

96 On Labour and Universal Training:
Fourth Commonwealth Political Labor Conference, Brisbane,
The Call, February 1909, p.2.
Deputation from Australian Natives Association (of N.S.W.) to
Pearce, 7 May 1909 (CAO : MP84, S1, 1856/5/136).
Sissons, op.cit., pp.54-55.

97 On Labour's military policy:
The Call, May 1909, pp.6-9.
Pearce to Campbell, 5 May 1909 (CAO : MP84, S1, 1856/5/137).

98 On Labour's naval policy:
The Call, May 1909, pp.6-9.
Correspondence: Attlee Hunt; W.M. Hughes; Senator Pearce,
March-April 1909 (CAO : MP178, S2, 2152/1/9) and (CAO : MP178,
S2, 2310/9/317-412).
Pearce to Australian Natives Association (of N.S.W.), May
1909 (CAO : MP84, S1, 1856/5/136).
Creswell to Pearce, 4 February 1909; Creswell to Pearce, 13
February 1909 (RANA : 1851, Part a, Item 13).
Macandie, op.cit., pp.216-236.
Fisher to Collins, 5 February 1909 (Deakin Papers).
Fisher to Dudley, 26 March 1909 (CAO : CP290, S15, B1, S/S
Cable, 20 April 1909).
Conference .... Naval and Military Defence of the Empire 1909,
CPP : 1909, Vol.II (Ordered to be Printed, 17 November 1909)
pp.4-5.
NOTES FOR CHAPTER ELEVEN

1 Quotation from:
   Major-General Kirkpatrick to Senator Pearce, c. November 1911
   (CAO : CP290, S15, Unnumbered).
   Kirkpatrick was employed to see the Kitchener scheme was
   implemented and was privy to his intentions. As will be made
   clear, it is not suggested that the new citizen army was created
   for Imperial service. That was to be only one of its justifi-
   cations.

2 Quotation from:
   Colonel the Right Honourable Viscount Esher, "The Coordination
   of the Naval and Military Services" - a lecture printed in

3 On the Dreadnought scare:
   Marder, Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, pp.151-185.
   Turner, The First Decade of the Australian Commonwealth,
   pp.203-207.
   Survey of editorial opinion, February to May 1909: Age; Argus;
   Sydney Morning Herald; Daily Telegraph.

4 Quotations from:
   The Age, 24 March 1909.

5 Quotations from:
   Turner, op.cit., p.206.

6 Quotations from:
   Bean, The Story of Anzac, p.15.

7 Quotation from:
   Undated Memorandum, but probably Pearce to Denman, 1914
   (Macandie, Genesis of the R.A.N., p.272).

8 Quotation from:
Quotation from:
Dudley to Crewe, 4 June 1909.
Conference ... Naval and Military Defence of the Empire 1909,
CPP : 1909, Vol. II (Ordered to be Printed, 17 November 1909)
p.13.
HEREAFTER: Precis : Imperial Conference 1909.

On the Imperial Defence Conference of 1909:
Because the treatment of all aspects of policy in 1909 and after
must be of necessity brief, only direct quotations will be cited.
The narration of events and the summary of attitudes rests on
the sources listed below:

On the Conference:
(1) Precis : Imperial Conference 1909.
(2) Confidential Papers ... Imperial Defence Conference 1909
(Dominions No.16 Secret - Imperial Conference Secretariat,
September 1909).
HEREAFTER: Confidential Papers : Imperial Conference 1909.
(3) Defence of the Empire 1909 ... Minutes of Proceedings (Dominions
No.15 Secret - Imperial Conference Secretariat, October 1909).
HEREAFTER: Confidential Minutes : Imperial Conference 1909.
(4) Defence of the Empire, 1909 ... Notes on the Proceedings of
Conferences at the Admiralty (Dominions No.17 Secret - Imperial
Conference Secretariat, October 1909).
HEREAFTER: Confidential Meetings at the Admiralty : Imperial
Conference 1909.

All the above documents can be found in (CAO : CP103, S12, B8).

On Australian military response:
Bridges to Foxton, September 1909 (Enclosure Foxton to Deakin,
3 September 1909 : Deakin Papers).
Comments by Chief of the General Staff in Road to Pearce, 4 May
1910 (CAO : MP84, S1, 1902/2/4-15).

On Australian naval response:
Memoranda Creswell to Cook, November 1909 (RANA : 1851, Part a).
Creswell to Cook, 16 November 1909 (Macandie, op.cit., pp.250 ff.)

On Colonel Foxton's brief:
Fragmentary correspondence and papers of May-June 1909 (CAO :
CP103, S10, 9/2321).

On Deakin and the Conference:
Telegraphic communication Foxton to Deakin, Deakin to Foxton,
July-August 1909 (CAO : CP103, S10, 12/975).
Cables and Correspondence between Foxton and Deakin, August-
September 1909 (Deakin Papers).
Correspondence Premier Western Australia, Deakin, Foxton, August 1909 (CAO : CP103, S10, 18/3822).

On quotations in the paragraph:

17 Quotation from:
Sir John Fisher on naval defence (Confidential Meetings at the Admiralty : Imperial Conference 1909, p.6).

18 Quotation from:
Chief of the General Staff on military defence (Confidential Papers : Imperial Conference 1909, p.45).

19 Quotation from:
Secretary of State for the Colonies (Crewe) – (Confidential Minutes : Imperial Conference 1909, p.12).

20 Quotation from:
United Services Magazine, April 1909.

On Roberts and Australian troops:

21 Quotation from:
Fisher to Henderson, 10 February 1914 (Marder, Fear God and Dreadnought, p.327).

On the attitudes of McKenna and Fisher:
Many of the views explained in this paragraph are scattered throughout the naval discussions of 1909. The case can only be put with certainty after examination of government files in London.

On McKenna:
Marder, Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, pp.22–23.

On Fisher and Beresford:
Marder, Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, pp.186–207.

On anticipation of Commonwealth cruisers for an Eastern Fleet:
C.E.W. Bean, With the Flagship in the South (Sydney 1908).
(Notes Chapter Eleven: beginning 22)

On anticipation of Dominion cruisers in London:

- Naval Annual 1909, pp.11 ff.
- 1910, pp.11 ff.

On Fisher and previous notions of a new Eastern Fleet:
See above Chapters Seven and Ten.
See also - Fisher to Selborne, May 1904 and October 1904 and November 1904 (Fisher Papers, pp.10, 38, 99).

Note also:
The role of Lord Hankey, the Victorian who was selected as secretary to the Committee of Imperial Defence, the work of that committee, and the briefs prepared by the Imperial Secretariat - a body instituted partly as a result of Deakin's advocacy at the Conference of 1907 - should not be overlooked in preparing the way for new naval and military policies in Whitehall.
See - Fisher to Mrs. McKenna, 18 May 1911 (Marder, Fear God and Dreadnought, p.871).

22 Quotation from:
Fisher to Yexley, 1 August 1909 (Marder, Fear God and Dreadnought, p.285).

23 Quotation from:
Fisher to Esher, 13 September 1909 (Marder, Fear God and Dreadnought, p.266).

See also:
Fisher to Fiennes, 14 April 1910 (Marder, Fear God and Dreadnought, p.321).
Fisher to Mrs. McKenna, 18 May 1911 (Marder, Fear God and Dreadnought, p.371).

24 Quotation from:

25 Quotation from:
Confidential Minutes: Imperial Conference 1909, p.32.

See also:
Foxton's readiness to support the motion - and his isolation (Ibid., pp.86 ff.).

26 Quotation from:
Foxton to Deakin, 5 August 1909 (CAO: CP103, S10, 12/975).
27 Quotation from:
   Confidential Minutes: Imperial Conference 1902, p.24.

28 On Foxton and Imperial wars:
   Ibid., pp.21-22.

29 Quotation from:
   Foxton to Deakin, 5 August 1909 (CAO: CP103, S10, 12/975).

30 Quotation from:
   Creswell to Cook, 16 November 1909 (Macandie, op.cit., p.253).
   On Australian response to the Admiralty solution:
   The Daily Telegraph, 15 September 1909.
   The Age, 22 September 1909; 28 September 1909.

31 Quotation from:
   Jose, The Royal Australian Navy, p.xxix.

32 Quotation from:
   Deakin to Foxton, 19 September 1909 (Deakin Papers).

33 Quotation from:
   Foxton to Deakin, 3 September 1909 (Deakin Papers).

34 On the Fusion's military policy:
   Cook's speech in Hansard, 21 September 1909.
   Foxton to Deakin, 3 September 1909 (Deakin Papers).
   Correspondence on the application of the Army Act 1908–1909
   (CAO: CP290, S15, B1, Unnumbered)
   (CAO: MP84, S2, 1856/5/138).
   On Hutton and Fusion reforms:
   The Call, May 1908, pp.5-6.
   On 1909 Bill:
   The Defence Act (No. 15 of 1909).
   See also:
   Other aspects, such as the creation of the Imperial General Staff,
   have been mentioned in Chapters above and the sources cited there.

35 On the Kitchener visit:
   The treatment here will be brief – far shorter than originally
   contemplated – and is drawn from the following sources:
On Hoad and Kitchener:

Memorandum by C.G.S. ..., June 1910 (CAO : MP84, S1, 1894/5/43).

On invitation to Kitchener:
Deakin-Kitchener Correspondence, June-September 1909 (CAO : MP84, S1, 1901/13/16).

On brief for Kitchener:
Hoad to Cook, c. September 1909 (CAO : MP84, S1, 1856/4/163).

On Kitchener's appreciations:

On other relevant appreciations see also:
Kirkpatrick to Pearce, 30 May 1911 (CAO : MP84, S1, 1902/7/77).
Kirkpatrick to Pearce, ? November 1911 (CAO : CP290, S12, B6, Unnumbered).
Kirkpatrick to Pearce, 30 May 1912 (CAO : MP84, S1, 1902/2/15).
Kirkpatrick to Pearce, 30 May 1913 (CAO : MP84, S1, 1902/2/15).
Kirkpatrick to Gordon, January 1913 (CAO : MP84, S1, 1856/1/4).

On Legge and Hoad on the Kitchener Scheme for the benefit of Labour:
Hoad to Pearce, ? May 1910.
Hoad to Pearce, 4 May 1910.
Legge to Pearce, 13 May 1910.
Legge to Pearce, 14 May 1910.
(CAO : MP84, S1, 1902/2/-4/15).

On Fusion acceptance of Kitchener's Scheme and Kirkpatrick's supervision of its implementation:
Cook to Military Board, 24 March 1910 (CAO : MP84, S1, 1804/2/84).
Correspondence, February-March 1910 (CAO : MP84, S1, 1902/2/28).

36 Quotation from:
Deakin to Kitchener, ? September 1909 (CAO : MP84, S1, 1901/13/16).

37 Quotation from:
Deakin to Kitchener, 9 July 1909 (CAO : MP84, S1, 1901/13/16).

38 On Kitchener's role:

Much of this paragraph must remain conjectural. Sir Philip Magnus, Kitchener's biographer, informed D.C. Sissons that he could find no papers relevant to the Australian scheme. Kirkpatrick did often invoke Kitchener's advice to substantiate later recommendations. Legge and Hoad did claim to have drawn up sections of the famous Memorandum; Legge has a better claim than Hoad. Ward of New Zealand was, however, told that the strategic assessments for Australia were generally in line with War Office considerations.
In addition to above citations, see also:
Kitchener to Ward, 2 March 1910 (CAO: MP84, S1, 1929/2/1237-11).
Johnson, Defence by Committee, p.107.

39 Quotations from:
Memorandum on the Defence of Australia, p.5.

40 Quotations from:
Kirkpatrick to Pearce, November 1911 (CAO: CP290, S15, B6, Unnumbered).

41 On meeting the Asian invader:
Kirkpatrick anticipated these recommendations but did not press
them until the new military reforms were well under way.
Kirkpatrick to Gordon, January 1913 (CAO: MP84, S1, 1856/1/4).

Note also:
It is assumed in writing this section that Kirkpatrick, as he
often claimed to do, was not merely satisfying Australian
alarums but amplifying Kitchener's principles.

42 Quotation from:
Kirkpatrick to Pearce, November 1911 (CAO: CP290, S15, B6,
Unnumbered).

43 On expeditionary forces and Kirkpatrick:
See memoranda cited in Notes 35, 41 and 42 above.

See also:
Commonwealth Defence Schemes, July 1913 - July 1914 (CAO:
AP161, 1652/62, Item 9).

44 Quotation from:
MacDonald to Grey, 10 December 1909 (Gooch and Temperly, British

45 Quotation from:
M.V. Brett (Ed.), Journals and Letters of Reginald Viscount

See also:
Command 5019 of 1910, and other papers (CAO: MP84, S1, 1894/7/31).
On the creation of the Imperial Strategic Reserve of 1914–1916:

Quotation from:
Magnus, op. cit., p.244.

Quotation from:
Macandie, op. cit., p.288.

Quotation from:
Minute by Pearce, 3 December 1912 (CAO: MP84, S1, 1939/1/33).

Quotation from:
Kirkpatrick to Pearce, 30 May 1913 (CAO: MP84, S1, 1902/2/15).

Quotation from:
Memorandum by Gordon, 2 July 1913 (CAO: MP84, S1, 1856/1/25).

Quotation from:

On Pre-War plans for an expeditionary force:
Memoranda by Kirkpatrick, 1911–1913, cited in Note 35 above.
"Military Co-operation between New Zealand and Australia", 2 July 1913 (CAO: MP84, S1, 1856/1/5).
Notes on Overseas Service, 30 November 1911 (CAO: MP84, S1, 1802/2/152).
Papers for Special Meeting of the Council of Defence – Defence of the Northern Littoral, 16 June 1913 (CAO: MP84, S1, 1855/1/11).

Quotation from:
"Military Considerations", June 1913 (CAO: MP84, S1, 1855/1/11).

Quotations from:
Pearce to Denman, 4 May 1914 (Denman Papers: C.N.L.).
See also:

56 Quotation from:
CPD 3 : 3107, 26 July 1901.

57 Quotation from:
Bean, The Story of Anzac, p. 16.

58 Quotation from:
A.W. Jose in the Call, August 1906, p. 10.

59 Quotation from:
W.M. Hughes, CPD 37 : 1288, 1 August 1907.

60 Quotation from:
W.M. Hughes, CPD 32 : 2583, 9 August 1908.

61 Quotation from:
A.W. Jose in The Times, 24 March 1908.

62 Quotation from:
The Times, 17 May 1907.

63 Quotation from:
CPD 7 : 8753, 21 January 1902.

64 Quotation from:
The Times, 20 April 1907.

65 Quotation from:
The Times, 17 May 1907.

66 Quotation from:
(Notes Chapter Eleven: beginning 67)

67 Quotation from:
W.M. Hughes, *The Day – And the Day After*, pp. 78-79.

68 The *Call*, August 1906, p. 4.
<table>
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<th>Description</th>
<th>Tons Displacement</th>
<th>Speed</th>
<th>Age (years)</th>
<th>knots</th>
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Note: All vessels are made of steel. The cost and tonnage figures are as at 1901.
APPENDIX B

THE IMPERIAL MILITARY RESERVE

It was possible for military cooperation between the citizen forces of Australia and those of Great Britain to take many different forms.

Men could volunteer individually for contingents raised to fight in particular Imperial wars as they had done in the Soudan and the Boer War. They then served in the British Army and were paid by the British government. The Australian government had little or no control over them once they had embarked.

Or they could volunteer individually to form a complete national expeditionary force paid and ultimately controlled by the Commonwealth but under the military command of the British staff. This they did in 1914. In both cases cooperation was marked by the hasty organization of often untrained men who had given no prior undertaking to serve abroad. Both cases involved the sudden utilization of the military potential of the Commonwealth.

Alternatively, forces could be trained - or trained and organized - for service abroad. Insofar as military cooperation was premeditated when Australian forces were being organized, they could be conceived as part of an Imperial reserve.

Crucial differences could lie, however, in the degrees of Australian control and of the formal obligation to serve overseas. At one extreme, militia units could be raised and trained in Australia, paid by the British government in peacetime for Imperial service in war. Such forces would constitute a formal Imperial reserve. At the other, men could be trained in the citizen forces to form a reservoir of skilled manpower from which expeditionary forces could be drawn by individual voluntary recruitment. Though encouraged to enlist, the men would not be committed for overseas service.

There was a compromise. Citizen forces could be organized in peace for operations at home or abroad with the British Army. They could be paid by the Australian government and still be ultimately responsible to it. Though primarily for home defence, units could elect to serve overseas, individual soldiers having then the right to resign from their units if they had no wish to go with them. Hutton favoured this last course.
These distinctions were far from academic as Haldane demonstrated with his military reforms after 1906. It was hoped that the British Territorials, though not liable for overseas service, would provide a reservoir of trained manpower for the front line regular regiments. Those militia units which accepted overseas service were eventually made part of Special Reserve for the regular forces; initially, the Imperial Yeomanry were allotted in the order-of-battle as second line cavalry.

By 1909 the position of the Territorials was ambiguous. Then the men could volunteer individually or in complete units - presumably at the request of their commanding officer - as part of the expeditionary force. In this spirit the Chief of the Imperial General Staff at the Imperial (Defence) Conference of 1909 wanted the Dominions to make similar provision for their citizen forces. His proposal read: "Legislation is, therefore, necessary to enable complete units, and not individuals, to volunteer for this (overseas) service."
APPENDIX C

AUSTRALIAN NAVAL DEFENCE: THE POSSIBILITIES

The concept of "lines of defence" and current notions of Imperial responsibilities opened, a priori, three courses for the Commonwealth: cooperation with the Royal Navy; the creation of an Australian naval force; or reliance — without obligation — on the Admiralty.

Cooperation with the Royal Navy?

Like the Cape Colony, Natal, and Newfoundland, the Commonwealth could have contributed directly to the maintenance of the British navy by annual payments to the Admiralty without making any specific demands upon the British government. Or it could finance a battleship for general service with the Royal Navy. Either would have involved a radical break with past practice.

To urge the Admiralty to reinforce the Imperial Squadron and to undertake an agreement similar to that of 1887 whereby the Auxiliary Squadron would be replaced would have been to preserve continuity of policy. There were, however, Australian objections to payments to the British government and dependence upon the Royal Navy. The indignity deeply felt by the opponents of the Agreement in the eighties had been kept alive by the advocates of an Australian navy. Cabinet could in part meet these by offering to train Australians aboard British vessels provided by the Royal Navy under an agreement instead of paying only a cash contribution. While this might be construed as a step towards developing trained manpower for a national navy, Australians meanwhile would be members of the Royal Navy or the Royal Naval Reserve liable to serve on His Majesty's ships in distant waters as well as on those allotted for local defence.

The advantages derived from such schemes would be the purchase of cheap defence and sufficient participation in Imperial defence to open the labyrinth that might lead to a voice in Imperial affairs. The disadvantages arose from complete dependence upon the Admiralty which would naturally desire to dispose of naval strength as it saw fit in time of war, the absence of Commonwealth control over its own defence and its own citizens serving in the Royal Navy, and a negative attitude to the creation of a national navy.

The Creation of an Australian Naval Force?

Between 1898 and 1909 there was a bewildering array of suggestions from Australian naval enthusiasts. No ship of war was left unconsidered. Each involved different degrees of Admiralty cooperation; each involved different assumptions about Australia's role in Imperial defence. The submarine of 1907, for instance, was designed for local
defence and could have been commissioned under the Colonial Naval Defence Act of 1865. It could not easily cooperate with the Royal Navy in distant waters. The converse was true of a battle-cruiser. It was only realizing its potential on the high seas; special legal arrangements would have to be made for its use outside of Australian waters; cooperation with the Royal Navy in an Imperial war was highly probable, if not certain. Politics, strategy, and weaponry were ever combined factors in the preparation for war.

Australian naval aspirations could therefore have taken one of many forms: a contribution of Commonwealth ships to the battle strength of the Empire; the formation of cruiser squadrons for commerce protection; the creation of a coastal defence force; or the replacement of existing port defence vessels. Decisive engagements with the King's enemies, cruiser warfare, coastal defence, or radial port defence - these were the possibilities.

To have purchased for Australia battleships and armoured cruisers would have established beyond doubt national status within the Empire. It would also have converted the relation with Great Britain to that of an alliance. Direct assistance would be given to maintain British supremacy upon the high seas while national aspirations would be fulfilled. A direct voice in the management of Empire might well have ensued. The difficulties in 1901 were clear. The Royal Navy was responsible for sea supremacy; Australia had no wish to be a world power; such a force would be foolishly excessive for local defence; its use would mean automatic involvement in Imperial wars; even the first steps towards such a navy seemed far beyond the slender resources available to the Commonwealth.

Less expensive would have been a sea-going squadron of first and second-class cruisers, which would assume the responsibilities of the Imperial Squadron. This could adequately protect interstate and overseas trade as well as serving as an impressive guarantee against invasion. Raiders would be running grave hazards in attempting to evade such a sea-going force. Though of use in local waters, it would best be fulfilling its functions primarily by cooperating with the Royal Navy in spheres distant from Australian ports. It would therefore give the Commonwealth a right to be represented in the Councils of Empire. To the young Commonwealth the initial disadvantages would, however, be considerable. A cruiser squadron would be too expensive while the Braddon Clause was in operation and the government was reluctant to raise tariffs or overseas loans for defence. Like a small battle fleet, it might involve Australians directly in Imperial wars. It would require the cooperation of the Admiralty, the permission of the British government, and a change in the legal status of colonial ships on the high seas. Though ensuring local defence, it would not remain within sight of the main ports. It would give - but not be seen to give - security. It would be a break with all precedent.

Nevertheless, an Australian force to replace the Imperial Squadron was in 1901 a conceivable — and even desirable — project for
the future. After 1907 it was an almost ideal solution. By then had emerged the fleet unit, a tactical unit, organized about a battle-cruiser with attendant lighter cruisers and destroyers. For the Australians this offered a compromise between the two courses so far examined. Alone the battle-cruiser could add to the battle strength of the Royal Navy. Operating as part of the fleet unit, it was an effective instrument for commerce protection. If the Commonwealth wished to possess a navy in the accepted sense of the word, it needed an homogeneous, sea-going force capable of offensive and defensive roles.

The naval forces the Commonwealth could have established under the Colonial Naval Defence Act of 1865 were not capable of effectively playing both roles. The vessels for coastal or radial port defence were cheap, would be restricted to Australian waters, and would be seen to protect shipping and harbours. But they would, in sea warfare, be the weapons of a strategically passive posture. Neither force would be created primarily to fight in distant seas. Neither need have involved Australians in Imperial wars. Neither involved the right to a voice in the conduct of Imperial affairs.

It was quite feasible to contemplate a naval force to replace the Australian Auxiliary Squadron. The Commonwealth would thus maintain the third "line of defence", the protection of coastal shipping. For coastal defence there were available three comparatively cheap vessels: the third-class cruiser of 2,500 tons, or less; a light cruiser of special design; and the destroyer. Depending upon size and design, these cruisers could conceivably cooperate with the Royal Navy in distant waters should the Commonwealth so desire. Yet, having been built for local defence and operations in coastal waters, their presence overseas would be token of political support in an Imperial war rather than an addition to fighting strength. The greater disadvantage was that the third-class and special service cruisers were fast becoming obsolescent weapons in the Admiralty's armoury. On the other hand, the destroyer was in the process of experimental development. Every attempt was being made to produce a destroyer capable of acting with the battle fleets. It therefore had considerable potential for coastal patrols. Even so its original and primary role was to destroy torpedo boats, not to engage heavier vessels. From 1901, therefore, its strategical and tactical use, no less than its sea-going capabilities, had to be proven. The efficacy of coastal patrols without the support of cruiser squadrons was always in doubt.

There remained the defence of major ports and coastal cities. From the sixties floating gun platforms, like the Monitor, or turret ships, like the Cerberus, were used for this purpose. From the turn of the century the French found other means. Combining coastal with port defence, they organized a defense mobile using the submarine, the torpedo boat, and lighter classes of destroyers, vessels of limited radius of action and sea-going capabilities. These were to act radially from the range of coastal batteries. They were far more lethal than the privateers in the days of sail. They would prey on merchantmen, prevent close blockade, render bombardment impossible, and even deter invaders intent on using
port facilities. Even so, they had to be used en masse from many bases. The disadvantages for the Commonwealth arose from the expensive waste involved, a proliferation of naval energies upon a passive deterrent untried in war against well-screened raiders, and the demand for specialist but not sea-going training. Nevertheless, radial port defence was within the future means of the Commonwealth.

Such then were the possibilities. The limitations set by domestic considerations have been suggested. Those imposed by the attitude of the British government were no less important. Any course but the creation of naval forces for port defence required its approval, or at least its consideration.

Reliance Upon the Royal Navy?

As seen from Whitehall the separation of Australian security into five "lines of defence" involved strategical heresy and poor Imperial politics. Once the theory of fleet concentration became orthodox previous views - especially those that condoned coastal defence - were held to be no longer tenable. The traditional role of the Royal Navy was reasserted in all its purity. There were no "lines of defence". Either the British navy would be strong enough to be victorious over the King's enemies in decisive engagements on the high seas or it would not. If victorious, invasion of Australia was not to be feared; if not, each Australian "line of defence" would crumble. The supremacy of expensive and essential Imperial battle fleets must be assured. Modern commerce marauders with increased speed and armament would no longer be deterred by small and vigilant vessels distributed along the coast. Nor would they be met by naval forces bound to stations throughout the world. They must be actively sought, hunted, and destroyed by sea-going cruiser squadrons. All the naval effort of the Empire must henceforward be directed to the offensive under firm Admiralty control. Thus it was more prudent for the Commonwealth to contribute to the supremacy of the Royal Navy and so demonstrate the unity of the Empire than to seek arrangements for local security or to waste its energies on a proliferation of defences of dubious efficacy, of no benefit to the victory of the British in decisive engagements, and of little use against enemy raiders. No longer, it seemed in 1902, was there a weapon, a strategic doctrine, or a political justification for local defence. Neither an Australian Auxiliary Squadron nor an Australian equivalent would suffice.
APPENDIX D

MINUTE ON THE DEFENCE OF AUSTRALIA MAY 1905

(Drawn up by J.W. McCay for consideration by the Council of Defence, 12 May 1905)

In discussing the problem of developing the defences of the Commonwealth of Australia, it is necessary to consider the form which any attack upon our shores is likely to take, so far as can be judged by the present circumstances of the world, and then to consider the way in which, having regard to Australian circumstances, this probable danger may best be met.

Regard must be had to the following facts:

(1) That Australia forms an integral part of the British Empire.

(2) That Australia is geographically remote from most of the military and naval powers of the world.

(3) That the population of Australia is less than four millions, and is distributed over a great area and a long coast line of 8,000 miles.

(4) That the funds available for defence purposes are necessarily limited in amount.

(5) That the development of Australian defence has followed more or less defined lines in the past, which must not be ignored in making plans for the future.

While the fact of our forming a portion of the British Empire may on occasions involve us in quarrels with which we would otherwise have no direct concern, this disadvantage is far outweighed by the immense protection afforded to us from the power of the British Navy in all the seas; and it must always be borne in mind that Australia is comparatively safe while that navy retains its power.

This fact, combined with our remoteness from most of the great warlike Powers, renders it extremely unlikely that, under present conditions, any hostile occupation of Australia, or of any portion thereof will take place; and the most probable danger to be feared is an hostile raid either upon our coastal shipping only, or (which is more likely) upon our great commercial centres, nearly all of which are on or close to the coast, and can be reached without much difficulty by attacks from the sea or by land, or by a combination of these.

It is against such dangers as those referred to, therefore, that for the immediate future Australian defence should prepare. It would obviously be desirable to make ourselves safe against both dangers, but it is more than doubtful whether financial limitations would permit of this; and we have therefore to consider which safeguard must be left to the last.
On this matter there are two schools of thought, the one alleging that we should begin by the immediate development of Australia as a naval power in order to meet our enemy as far as possible from the centres of national life; the other school alleges that we should begin by making safe that which is most vital — our own homes and commercial centres.

The policy of Defence pursued in the various States for the last thirty or forty years has, consciously or unconsciously, accepted this latter view, has been content with making us secure against attacks directed at the land, and has for the time being left our coastal trade apparently unprotected.

In view of the fact that the Imperial Navy, under even the most unfavourable circumstances, is likely to give us more protection than we can provide for ourselves on the water for many years to come, and that we are not likely to get any assistance from beyond our own shores in protecting our homes and commercial centres; the policy hitherto pursued appears to be the correct one, and Naval development should await the completion of land protection.

In this view of the case, our duty is to complete in their order those forces which will protect (1) our homes, (2) our cities against land attack, (3) our cities against bombardment and sea attack, and (4) our coastal trade. The first and second are provided against by the raising and maintenance of a Field and a Garrison Force of soldiers; the third is provided against by fixed defences and floating harbour defences; and the fourth by the establishment of a sufficient number of ships of proper types, to guard our coastal trade.

The Field and Garrison Forces are approaching a satisfactory condition; the fixed defences of some cities are satisfactory, but in others they require to be renewed, the city of Melbourne coming within the latter class. The addition possibly of Torpedo Boat Destroyers or Submarines or Submersibles, or the increase of our Torpedo Boat service is necessary in order to complete our harbour protection; and until this is attended to we are not justified in creating a fleet for coastal protection.

Criticisms are sometimes directed against what is called the excessive size of our land forces in view of the little likelihood there is of a strong invasion, but it must be remembered that the forces must be sufficient to promptly meet in preponderating force a landing wherever made; and this requires that we should have as far as possible near each important seaport, a force sufficient for its local defence; and should also have mobile forces which can be quickly removed to support local troops. This is necessary in each District, and consequently requires the maintenance of a force much larger than would be necessary if the whole force could be concentrated promptly at threatened ports.
APPENDIX E

STRATEGICAL FOUNDATIONS FOR THE AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES, POST 1911

The following memorandum was drawn up by Major-General Kirkpatrick, for comment by Senator Pearce, late in 1911. It was based on Kitchener's advice, and memoranda from the Overseas Defence Committee, mentioned in Chapter Eight. Though explicit ministerial decision was deferred, this strategical assessment was incorporated in all formal Defence Schemes of the Australian Military Forces from 1912 until the outbreak of war. The document is taken from CAO: CP290, S15, B6, Item 16.

*

SCHEME OF DEFENCE

MOBILE FORCES FOR AUSTRALIA: STRATEGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

1. It is laid down as an axiom of the British Government that the Empire's existence depends primarily on the maintenance of adequate and efficient naval forces. As long as this condition is fulfilled, and as long as British superiority at sea is assured, then it is an accepted principle that no British dominion can be successfully and permanently conquered by an organized invader from overseas.

2. But in applying this principle to Australia considerations of time and space cannot be disregarded. The conduct of a great war depends upon the calculated and proper combination of naval, military, and diplomatic forces; and it is quite conceivable that in the future, as in the past, national considerations may require the concentration of British naval forces in one or other theatre of operations. It follows that, in seas remote from such concentration, the British naval forces may find themselves for the moment inferior in force to an actual or potential enemy. In such a situation although the Empire's ultimate superiority at sea might not be a matter of doubt, some time might elapse before such command of the sea was definitely assured in Australian waters.
3. In considering the scale and nature of overseas attack that the temporary possession of the local command of the Pacific would enable an Eastern Power to bring to bear on Australia, it is necessary to draw a clear distinction between large operations, the success of which will depend on the power of the Foreign fleet to keep open overseas communications with its bases for an indefinite period and hasty raids dependent for success rather on surprise and rapidity of execution than upon the number of troops employed.

For the success of raiding operations the maintenance of open overseas communication is not an essential condition. During the period that the local command of the Pacific rested with an Eastern Power the despatch of a raiding force across the sea against British possessions in that region would be a practical operation of war for that Power.

4. The probability of such raids being undertaken will vary inversely as the strength and efficiency of the local naval and military forces maintained in Australia. Upon an estimate of such strength and efficiency will an enemy determine whether the probable result of an attempt by a raiding force to effect serious damage before being destroyed or compelled to surrender would be commensurate with the risks incurred in the enterprise.

5. In estimating the strength of the land forces necessary to meet a raiding attack such as that above mentioned, three principal factors must be considered:

(i) the ocean distances which lie between Australia and the territory of any possible enemies,
(ii) the armed strength and power of transportation oversea of any conceivably hostile nation,
(iii) the vast extent of the Australian continent, its existing railway communications and its territory not connected by such communications.

Further, it must be borne in mind, as suggested in Overseas Defence Committee H 429 of 24th February 1911, that "should the Anglo-Japanese Alliance be determined changes in the strategic situation would ensue which might have far reaching effects upon the position of Australia and necessitate a reconsideration of the scale of probable attack".

6. Consideration of these factors induces the belief that the land forces required must not be less than 100,000 men. Of this number a proportion varying according to individual requirements is needed to secure the naval bases and auxiliary harbours from attack and to maintain public confidence and national credit. The remainder
must be left free to form a field army capable of acting as a mobile expeditionary force. In view of the fact that railway communication does not at present exist with Western Australia and the Northern Territory, such an expeditionary force must be organized and equipped so as to enable it to be despatched overseas with the least possible delay.

7. A defensive attitude of a purely passive nature is, however, as is well known, the most ineffectual method of employing an army as an instrument of policy. As far as the organization and administration of the Australian Forces are concerned this has been realized and the whole of the Australian military forces are in consequence being uniformly enrolled, organized, and equipped in order that any sub-division thereof may be able to assume the offensive.

8. But the time has now arrived when provision must be made for giving wider effect to the policy of active offence. Two new factors have arisen which affect the basis upon which plans of operation for the mobile forces of Australia must be prepared:–

(i) At the Imperial Conference of 1909 the representatives of the self-governing dominions signified their general concurrence in the proposition "That each part of the Empire is willing to make its preparations on such lines as will enable it, should it so desire, to take its share in the general defence of the Empire".

(ii) The establishment of the Royal Australian Navy under the Naval Agreement of June 1911 imbued with the same spirit of active offence as the Royal Navy, marks an increase in the responsibilities of Australia.

As regards (ii) the present limits of the Australian Naval Station do not include any foreign territory, yet they approach so closely the French possessions of New Caledonia and the German and Dutch possessions in the Bismarck Archipelago, New Guinea, the Java and Flores Seas, that war preparations must include plans for the occupation, if necessary, of probable hostile bases in these localities.

9. For the fulfilment of these obligations as well as to provide efficiently for the needs of home defence, it is incumbent therefore, that plans of operations should contemplate the employment, overseas, of such portion of the Australian forces, as may from time to time be deemed necessary and is voluntarily agreeable so to serve.
10. (i) The question of the scale of probable attack by warships on Australian ports has been decided by the Overseas Defence Committee in their memo 438 M, dated 26th May 1911, where it is laid down that as a naval base the value of Sydney as a strategic objective will be considerably enhanced and that in determining the standard of defences there the contingency of attack by armoured cruisers must now be taken into consideration.

(ii) The only form of naval attack that need be provided against at other Australian ports is, however, raiding attack by unarmoured cruisers.
SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

From the nature of the material cited or consulted, it would be difficult to do more than indicate the principal sources in a select bibliography. Essential details and other items, not listed below, are to be found in the footnotes.
3 Other Archival Sources.

(1) Minute Book of the Council of Defence, and other papers, provided by the Defence Department, Canberra.

(2) Collections of legislation, regulations, printed memoranda, and other papers, 1887-1914, from Defence Department Library, Canberra.

(3) Papers, bills, drafts, and comments relating to legislation, 1901-1911, Attorney-General's Department, Canberra.

(4) Files of the Defence Department, 1901-1904, not yet in the custody of the Commonwealth Archives Office and held by the Australian War Museum. These are usually cited thus: D/D Number (A.W.M.).

(5) Minutes of Colonial Conferences, 1897, 1902, 1907, and 1909 with confidential papers attached. (Full citation given in footnotes.)

II PRIMARY MATERIAL: OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS

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Commonwealth Parliamentary Papers, 1901-1917.
Commonwealth Year Book, Numbers 1 to 14.
New South Wales Parliamentary Debates, 1885, 1887, 1890-1901.

III PRIMARY MATERIAL: NEWSPAPERS

Selective examination of editorial opinion has been undertaken within the general time span, 1898-1910. As with other material, details appear in the footnotes.

Advertiser
Age
Argus
Brisbane Courier
Bulletin
Daily Herald
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Register
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V PRIMARY MATERIAL : PRIVATE PAPERS

The most rewarding of the private papers consulted were selections from the Deakin Papers. Some material relating to defence policy was made available by Professor J.A. La Nauze, who had custody of the papers at the time (February 1963). The papers are not at present available for general inspection, but they are to be deposited in the Australian National Library, probably in 1965.

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Special acknowledgement is due to the works of Grimshaw and Sissons whose presentation and examination of public and press attitudes have been used throughout this work.


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