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INONG ACEH:
An Analysis on the Changing Position of Women in Aceh

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the degree of
Masters of Philosophy
in the
Department of Anthropology and Archaeology
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The Australian National University
Chapter 4:

THE WORKING WOMEN OF ACEH
Chapter Four:

THE WORKING WOMEN OF ACEH

Recent resistance by women to female-specific sections of the newly introduced *syariah* law seems to indicate that Acehnese women are uncomfortable with their position as the focal point of moral contestation by male religious authorities. This discomfort has been channelled through women's activism, which bloomed in the late 1980s, mainly spearheaded by university students. The DOM status provided a focus for the movement as it provided a practical function in social life allowing women to care for victims of violence, refugees, and to lobby for peace. The genesis of the movement was related to the socio-economic changes in the role and status of women in Aceh. There is a widespread belief among women activists in Aceh that feminism would not have found acceptance among women if women's conditions and their social and political awareness had not improved in the first place.

This chapter will provide evidence that the economic condition of women has improved significantly in Aceh during the post-Indonesian independence era and that women are more economically independent than before. They have a higher level of literacy and have benefited from the increased flow of information in the form of the printed and electronic media. However, women still have little public acknowledgment of their accomplishments (see chapter five). They are demanding more control in decision making about their lives. Already this is reflected in the changing attitude toward marriage and divorce in Aceh. A married couple used to be
socially obliged to settle marital problems before divorce was even considered. Now they do not always bother with efforts to reconcile (see chapter three). The traditional perception regarding the low status of women who are not in a marriage – unmarried, whether widowed or divorced – in Acehnese society is no longer as important as before the effects of development in Indonesia started. Women's control over their personal lives is increasing.

4.1. Male Obstacles

While the socio-economic condition of women is improving, their role in the family (at least formally) remains subordinate to men. Their workload and responsibilities in the household has remained the same. Men seem unwilling to change the status quo. The women activists whom I interviewed were optimistic in that they placed faith in educating men about gender relations in order to change this condition. As chapter six will show, some Acehnese men resist "efforts by women to dominate" citing "negative Western influence" and even the "Madonna factor" (referring to the perceived influence among women towards sexual promiscuity and "immorality" symbolised by the Western pop icon, Madonna).

The most powerful response to attempts to nullify female demands for change, however, is to label them "un-Islamic." In Aceh, it seems, the use of Islamic symbolism in public discourse has always ended with the further disenfranchising of women. Since the Ulama have acquired political power, political use of Islamic symbolism has become part of mainstream

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politics in Aceh. The profession of Ulama is still a predominantly male occupation, and they dictate the acceptable values for public and private lives in Aceh. With a more patriarchal political Islam in Aceh, not only has women’s access to formal political leadership been further restricted compared to more moderate Islamic leadership. Women must also give up a significant degree of control over domestic life. Unless a woman has the credentials of being a good mother, a good Muslim (displaying the requisite dress and demeanour) and has access to economic resources, a woman’s access to politics is far more restricted than in the pre-independence era. Membership by marriage into powerful lineages no longer guarantees legitimacy for leadership. In a growing capitalist world – of which Aceh is increasingly becoming a part – legitimacy for leadership is becoming strongly tied to economic resources.

4.2. Women and Education

Barbara Rogers (1980) argued that in developing societies, women are being domesticated – meaning they become increasingly barred from public life – including through restricted access to economic resources. Since the modern economy relies heavily on an educated and skilled workforce, the domestication of women also involves a restriction on

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33 Under New Order rule, the use of Islamic symbolism in politics was discouraged – even repressed – due to the government’s rigid pursuit of national unity. For further discussion of this issue, see Amir, 2001.

34 Single women are deemed immature as well as politically insignificant while childless married women are deemed inexperienced. Indeed, the peumeungkleh (separation ceremony) declaring a couple’s separation and independence from their parents is conducted after the birth of the first child.
women wanting to access education facilities especially those in vocational education (i.e. education deemed to be strongly relevant to the job market).

In Aceh – as in all of Indonesia – women, in theory, have equal access to education. Recent studies in Aceh (Qurnati, 1994; Yeoh, 1994; Boender, 1997) indicate an increased participation by women in both state and religious education. Social norms, however, dictate the preferred choice of type of education. Interest among women to study in religious schools is especially growing since it is deemed valuable for future childcare. There are other reasons for this preference; however, most of them are economic. Religious schools are less expensive than state schools. On the other hand, Rama (1986) and Boender (1997) also indicated that there is a strong perception among Acehnese parents that state school graduates are more prepared for the job market than those from religious schools.

A survey conducted in 1994 revealed the major reasons for parents sending their girls to study in religious schools:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reasons given by girls who choose to study at religious schools:</th>
<th>Reasons given by parents who send their girls to study at religious schools:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>* to study religion</td>
<td>* socio-economic factors (location, cheap cost, maintaining household labour)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* feel that parents’ economic resources are limited</td>
<td>* feel that religious education is necessary to girls to improve their morality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* no other educational alternative (due to isolation, lack of resources, etc)</td>
<td>* feel that religious school environment is better than other schools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* health limitations prohibit them from attending other schools</td>
<td>* feel that girls do not need high education since they will end up becoming housewives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* bad performance in previous schools</td>
<td>* influenced by religious leaders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* influenced by friends</td>
<td>Source: Qurnati (1994:64-65)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Parents are more willing to provide financial support for boys’ education than girls’.
In the pre-New Order past, especially at the height of Ulama leadership of the 1950s, religious schools were prestigious institutions. Everyone aspired to become their graduates. Today, this view is ambivalent. While religious school graduates still have high status in society, the need to obtain a job with a good salary – something which often requires state school credentials during the discriminative selection process\(^{35}\) – is something that both parents and students are anxious about (Rama, 1986). Some Acehnese even go to extremes in order to address the problem. An academic and Ulama that I interviewed, FW, recalled his education:

I went to both state school and madrasah (religious school). In the morning I went to the state school then after school, I went to study at the madrasah afternoon classes. ... I used to get teased a lot by fellow students at the state school for being an alim (pious) student. I know it is partly a compliment, but it can also make you feel apart from the others.

Interestingly, it is this combination of education that gave him tenure at the IAIN Ar Raniry (Banda Aceh’s Islamic university). Religious schools have been challenged by the state education system for decades. Nevertheless, his choice of a combination of state and religious education is indicative of the high degree of interest in obtaining religious education.

This interest is not accommodated by the Indonesian government. The Indonesian government even set up a powerful competition in the form

\(^{35}\) My research indicates that this job discrimination is still widely practiced among employers despite the regional government law in the mid-80s which allow religious school graduates to be employed as public servants as well as teachers in state schools.
of IAIN (the Institute of Islamic Studies) tertiary education schools. The traditional religious schools no longer have a monopoly on producing Ulama since any high-school graduate (state or religious) can obtain an advanced religious education through the IAIN. Most religious schools are not as extensively subsidised as state schools or the IAIN (Hudori, 1986). The following charts demonstrate that despite the high interest in religious education (similar student-school ratio) compared to state schools, the number of religious schools remained at the same level in the last three decades while the number of state schools has grown.

Graph 4.1.
Schools in Aceh from Primary to High School

Source: Compiled from BPS data.
Graph 4.2.
Religious Schools in Aceh

Source: Compiled from BPS data.

This numerical disadvantage of the religious school is compounded with the quality of schooling in relation to student demands. The following charts describe the student-teacher, student-school and teacher-school ratios of the two types of school.

Graph 4.3.
Details of Schools in Aceh: Student-Teacher Ratio

Source: Compiled from BPS data.
Graph 4.4.
Details of Schools in Aceh: Students-School Ratio

Source: Compiled from BPS data.

Graph 4.5.
Details of Schools in Aceh: Teacher-School Ratio

Note: ○ Circled point (steep slopes and peaks indicate that the number is in doubt (see Introduction).
Source: Compiled from BPS data.

State schools are improving the student-teacher ratio by increasing the number of teachers and achieved a higher student-teacher ratio. State schools attract teachers who graduated from either state and religious schools, due to the relatively easier teaching qualifications (no formal religious educational background required). At the same time, few
religious school graduates want to find employment in the religious schools. In the past decade, there has been a surge of interest for women to study in religious schools (Qurnati, 1994). Their numbers are close to two-thirds of religious school students mainly because most men prefer (and are encouraged) to go to state schools. Should the trend continue, education in Aceh will become a gendered domain with women concentrated into the underprivileged religious schools while men dominate the better-funded state schools.

Fortunately for women, due to the *wajib belajar* program\(^{36}\) launched by the Indonesian government throughout the state, women have equal opportunity to study in primary, junior and high school levels. Parents are obliged to send their children – male or female – to school. Hence, women’s participation rate in these levels is high, close to 50%\(^{37}\). Gaining an education is not difficult for a young Acehnese woman also because the family will see it as a major reason to postpone marriage. Since going to school while being married is frowned upon (for a wife going to school is seen as neglecting family duties) only single women go to school. Men can go to school freely whether they are married or single. The higher the education obtained, the less likely women marry young. Indeed, there is a strong relationship between marital age and economic conditions. If parents cannot afford higher education for their daughter, usually they try to find her a job or marry her off (source: interviews).

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36 This is the government program that oblige all underage children to go to school. Originally children were obliged to go to school for six years but since late 1980s it was extended to nine years.

37 During the six-years *wajib belajar* (ended in the early 1990s) female participation in high school education dropped because the young women were of marital age and some dropped off to get married. The nine-years *wajib belajar* reduced this trend.
The gender difference in education, however, is more obvious in higher education. In New Order Indonesia, universities – especially state universities – were training grounds for leadership positions in society. On paper, women’s involvement in higher education is quite promising. Enrolment in universities by women has increased in the past 25 years.

### Table 4.2.
**Number of Students in Two of Banda Aceh Universities**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>University of Syiah Kuala</th>
<th>Islamic Institute Ar-Raniry (IAIN)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>2087</td>
<td>462</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>2033</td>
<td>496</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>2679</td>
<td>677</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>3057</td>
<td>886</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>3863</td>
<td>1200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>4453</td>
<td>1578</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>4713</td>
<td>1750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>4973</td>
<td>1922</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>5528</td>
<td>2168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>10617</td>
<td>4576</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>6443</td>
<td>2971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>7164</td>
<td>3454</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>9327</td>
<td>5750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>9415</td>
<td>5677</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>8978</td>
<td>6325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>8856</td>
<td>7516</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>8836</td>
<td>6681</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>8249</td>
<td>6549</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>7662</td>
<td>6416</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>7248</td>
<td>6494</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>6928</td>
<td>6402</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>6306</td>
<td>6903</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>6496</td>
<td>6625</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>6800</td>
<td>7119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>7104</td>
<td>7613</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>8594</td>
<td>7887</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Blanks are unavailable data
Source: Compiled from BPS data.*

However, the following sections will demonstrate that the choice of faculties among men and women is directly linked to the demand of a gendered labour market, and consequently reflect the values placed by Acehnese society on women.

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4.3. Women’s Labour

Another aspect of the limitation of access for women – even those who gained education – to economic resources is directly visible in the market and labour force. In most parts of Aceh, for example, the marketplace is the domain of men (Das Gupta 1962; Siegel, 1969). They shop and barter while the women stay at home to manage the household and raise the children. It has not always been like this. Women used to dominate the marketplace in pre-colonial Aceh (Reid, 1988). When asked about this, my male respondents replied that today’s arrangement is in accordance with Islam. This is justified in terms of control over women’s sexual promiscuity rather than control over domestic economy. Women complained that the limitations on activities outside is about control of money. SRY said that:

Men love to go outdoors not only to avoid domestic chores, but also to control the purse. Women must obey – or at least pretend to – in order to gain men’s money.

Her own experience seemed to exemplify the way in which urban women fare better in regard to mobility and economic access than rural women in Aceh. The city provides more economic opportunities than rural areas, and urban residents are less constrained by social obligations (for historical comparisons see Inkiriwang, 1975 and BPS, 1999). According to a study of migrant women workers conducted in 1993, two thirds of women workers in Banda Aceh claimed that working in the city is better than working in rural areas (Ismail, et.al., 1993:18-21). Few of these women appeared to have migrated to achieve individual aspirations (20.69% respondents) compared to those who migrated following their spouse (44.83%) or family (34.48%). Another survey compared working hours and
income of women in Banda Aceh and its surrounding area (the rural district of Greater Aceh).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Work</th>
<th>Working Hours (Hours/month)</th>
<th>Income (Rp/month)</th>
<th>Hourly Income* (Rp/Hours)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Banda Aceh</td>
<td>Civil Servant</td>
<td>154.60</td>
<td>466,884.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Private Sector</td>
<td>154.90</td>
<td>307,333.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Labourer</td>
<td>60.30</td>
<td>37,500.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Average</strong></td>
<td><strong>123.27</strong></td>
<td><strong>270,572.33</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater Aceh</td>
<td>Civil Servant</td>
<td>129.40</td>
<td>332,143.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Farmer</td>
<td>97.10</td>
<td>125,059.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Private Sector</td>
<td>129.10</td>
<td>72,857.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Labourer</td>
<td>35.00</td>
<td>26,835.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Average</strong></td>
<td><strong>97.65</strong></td>
<td><strong>139,223.50</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * Productivity is roughly calculated as income per working hours. Source: Survey Primary Data (Kasimin, Makmur & Fuaidah: 1998)

Not only are women’s wages higher in Banda Aceh, but also their working hours. Average productivity in the city is 44.64% higher than the rural areas. The most significant increase is that of the working hours and income of women public servants and those in the private sector. The productivity of female civil servants in the city is 17.65% higher than their rural counterparts. The income per hour of women in the private sector in the city is an enormous 251.56% greater than those in the rural areas. This provides a major incentive for entrepreneurial female villagers to move to the city. Interestingly, although the wages of female labourers in the city is higher than in the rural areas, the returns of labour for female labourers in the city is actually 18.88% lower than in the rural areas because their wage increase (39.74% increase) is not proportionate to the increase in their working hours (72.28% increase). Women labourers in the city are being underpaid, it seems. Despite this, one might say that overall the urban environment offered an economic “upgrade” of the same occupation in rural areas. Rural women who want to improve their lot, especially if they

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want to work in better paying jobs, must move into the city. This is generally indicated in another 1998 survey of urbanisation to Banda Aceh that showed occupations of migrants moving in from the rural areas to the provincial capital of Banda Aceh.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Job</th>
<th>In Rural Place of Origin</th>
<th>In Banda Aceh (city)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Farmer</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trader</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private sector employee</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil servant &amp; military</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry &amp; crafts</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Survey Primary Data (Aliasuddin, Zulham & Ben Hasan: 1998)

Rural Acehnese women are predominantly farmers (see Siegel, 1969; Jayawardena, 1977b; Nurfadhilah, et.al., 1995; Yahya and Kurnaeni, 1997; and Purnomowati, et.al., 1998). Since there are no farmers in the city, those women who want to earn income must take up other occupations. Non-farmer men, however, usually never change occupations. Civil servants and military employees are usually promoted to city assignments. Traders – men and women – merely change their base of operation from rural to city. Only new entrants to the urban job market usually go into the private sector, industry and services as they provide relatively higher occupational status than becoming a farmer (returning to rural areas) or being unemployed. Education has a strong influence on the type of occupation these migrants have in the city. The same survey indicated that a majority of these migrants have a high level of education. Those with little or no formal education stayed in the rural areas.
Table 4.5.
Education of Rural-Urban Migrants in Aceh
(Male and female)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary School (SD)</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junior High School (SMP)</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School (SMA) Dropout</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School (SMA) Graduate</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University/Academy</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Survey Primary Data (Aliasuddin, Zulham & Ben Hasan: 1998)

How do women fare in the increasingly urbanised Aceh? If one uses the general pattern of the survey above, in order to have better access to economic resources, women must have access to higher education and if they live in rural areas they must also move to the urban areas. There are other surveys of women working (not just migrants) in Banda Aceh that seem to confirm this pattern.

Table 4.6.
Education of Women Workers in Banda Aceh

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary School (SD)</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>21.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junior High School (SMP)</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
<td>42.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School (SMA) Graduate</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>34.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University/Academy</td>
<td>37.9%</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Survey Primary Data (Nurfadhilah, et.al.: 1995; Purnomowati, Abdullah & Shodiq: 1998)

In the bureaucratic-minded New Order Indonesia, the more lucrative formal sector demanded higher qualifications, which explained the drastic low-level of primary and junior high graduate workers in the formal sector. A 1998 survey on the women in the city of Banda Aceh and the region of Greater Aceh indicated that women do not perceive their domestic responsibilities as an obstacle to a career, rather it is a lack of education and vocational skills that hold them back.

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Table 4.7. Women’s Perception of Major Obstacles in Obtaining Work in Aceh*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Housework</th>
<th>Lack of Skills</th>
<th>Both</th>
<th>Don’t Know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Banda Aceh (city)</td>
<td>8.75%</td>
<td>18.75%</td>
<td>6.25%</td>
<td>16.25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater Aceh (rural)</td>
<td>6.25%</td>
<td>30.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>13.75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15.00%</td>
<td>48.75%</td>
<td>6.25%</td>
<td>30.00%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Answers to the question “What is the main obstacle to finding work?”
Source: Survey Primary Data (Kasimin, Makmur & Fuaidah: 1998)

In order to be a part of the formal economic sector, women need to work harder to gain post-primary education. Women I interviewed did not perceive systemic discrimination against them. They expressed belief in equal opportunity in the workplace. RHN, a middle-aged female academic, described women’s leadership prospects as such:

Women are just as capable as men in any line of work. ... The reason there are few women leaders is that very few women would step forward to compete for the position.

This self-blame is considered by feminist theorists as part and parcel of the discriminative system itself as a means to keep women away from political positions.

The horizontal and vertical segregation of both men and women in the workforce affects women’s access to political power. Horizontally, women are concentrated in fewer occupations than men and in jobs where women are the majority of workers; most are not occupations from which political candidates are traditionally recruited. ... Vertically, women are concentrated in part-time, temporary, non-organised, lower-status, lower-paying, and less powerful positions. (Peterson & Runyan, 1999:90-91).
Women's structural disadvantage in the labour market translates into their having fewer resources, less status, and less experience in "wielding" power when competing with men for political office.\footnote{\textsuperscript{38}}

Higher education grew in importance in increasing the number of women looking for a job, and improving women's chances of gaining employment, as well as the ability to migrate in order to work. Women who have university degree are more likely to seek a job (graph 4.6.a.) and more likely to be placed in a job (graph 4.6.b.) than those who do not have a degree.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{graph4_6a.png}
\caption{Sex Ratio of Job Seekers in Aceh (>1.00 More Women, <1.00 More Men)}
\end{figure}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textbullet\ Non-University Graduate Job Seeker
\item \textbullet\ University Graduate Job Seeker
\end{itemize}

Note: \textcircled{\textbullet} Circled point (steep slopes and peaks indicate that the number is in doubt (see Introduction).

Source: Compiled from BPS data.

\footnote{\textsuperscript{38} In Indonesia nothing reflected this more than the ascent of President Megawati Sukarnoputri. Her main asset in becoming the leader of the largest Indonesian political party, the PDIP, is her family tie to a man, her father Sukarno, who was the founding father of Indonesia. Her first candidacy failed because of opposition among the Indonesian political elite, presented in the media as due to her gender. Her critics also cite reasons like lack of political experience, intellectual inferiority, and religious credential. Only after a political crisis during the rule of her predecessor, President Abdurrahman Wahid, did she become president through unconventional means.}

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Graph 4.6.b.
Sex Ratio of Job Seekers Who Are Placed in Jobs in Aceh (>1.00 More Women, <1.00 More Men)

Source: Compiled from BPS data.

Graph 4.6.c.
Sex Ratio of Job Seekers Who Are Placed in Jobs But Have to Move to A Different Region in Aceh (>1.00 More Women, <1.00 More Men)

Source: Compiled from BPS data.
In recent years – as shown in graphs 4.6.a., 4.6.b. and 4.6.c. – the number of women seeking jobs even surpassed that of men (sex ratio greater than 1.00). However, these numbers do not reveal the traditional gender arrangements that remain a powerful constraint for women in entering the paid workforce. First, access to jobs outside the home does not immediately mean women will have reduced responsibility for housework. There is also an indication that men would not give up existing public-domestic division of labour. A survey of women’s daily activities in Banda Aceh and its surrounding area revealed that women continue to contribute the largest amount of unpaid housework despite their dual role as co-breadwinners (Kasimin, Makmur & Fuaidah: 1998). Men spend almost all of their time outside the home while women’s activities are spent predominantly at home:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Work</th>
<th>Domestic Work (Hours)</th>
<th>Paid Work (Hours)</th>
<th>Social Activities (Hours)</th>
<th>Other Activities* (Hours)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Banda Aceh</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Servant</td>
<td>4.60</td>
<td>7.40</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>11.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Sector</td>
<td>3.90</td>
<td>7.20</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>12.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labourer</td>
<td>4.60</td>
<td>6.20</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>12.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average</strong></td>
<td>4.37</td>
<td>6.93</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>12.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Greater Aceh</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmer</td>
<td>4.60</td>
<td>8.00</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>10.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Servant</td>
<td>6.10</td>
<td>7.30</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>9.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Sector</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>8.70</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>9.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labourer</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>6.30</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>12.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average</strong></td>
<td>5.43</td>
<td>7.58</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>10.35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Include sleeping, praying, bathing, resting, etc.
Source: Survey Primary Data (Kasimin, Makmur & Fuaidah: 1998)

Note that the survey above shows that there is no significant difference between the average hours spent working (domestic or paid) by women in the city and the villages of the Greater Aceh district. Significant differences (almost two hours on average) exist in how they spent their free
time (other activities). What the survey does not reveal is the breakdown of how the women of the city spend this extra time. The wage differences shown earlier in table 4.3. indicate that rural women earn less (lower productivity average) than urban women. In addition, some urban women spend their extra time to earn additional income through informal, non-wage activities or entrepreneurship such as door-to-door sales, arisan (rotating credit) and money-lending. I have not been able to find similar studies conducted on men, therefore I cannot make a comparative analysis about the relative situation of men and women. However, my encounters with male respondents indicated they feel threatened by women's economic independence. In a limited job market like Aceh, adding extra competition is threatening. The arguments they used are moralising (e.g. the sexual promiscuity issue) as well as religious (e.g. men and women are destined to be biologically different hence suited to different jobs).

4.4. Higher Education and the Gendered Labour Market

The second constraint on women in entering the paid workforce is that the official numbers hide the fact that the job market remains sex-segmented. As a general rule, unemployment rates are especially high for women (Karl, 1995:47-48). Women in their primary role of family manager confront a variety of pressures both inside and outside of the domestic sphere. Maintaining a household remains their primary identity and profession (Seager, 1997:70).
Although the specific jobs assigned to women and men vary cross-culturally, "women's work" worldwide is associated not only with lower status and pay but also with less power than "men's work."

Traditional stereotypes work against gender equality in the workplace because they help to promote the idea that women and men are suited for different kinds of work – and that the jobs for which women are best suited are the least powerful, lowest-paying ones. (Lips, 1991:159)

Aceh is no exception as some jobs are considered as male jobs and others female. For example, professions like construction work, public transportation, and other physically demanding jobs are considered male jobs, while jobs like shop keeping, book keeping, and secretarial work are considered female.

Despite claims – especially from women activists – that men and women are equally capable in any kind of work, the tendency remains for Acehnese women to prepare themselves for "nurturing roles" hence their
preference for the teaching and medical faculties as shown in the graph 4.8. It is also interesting that the relatively new faculty of science also attracts a significant number of women, in contrast with the more vocational male-dominated engineering faculty. This may have to do with the demands of a gendered labour market that puts engineering graduates into perceived "male jobs" like machinery or construction work, while research in science is considered as "soft works", hence socially acceptable work for women.

Graph 4.8.
Female Students in the University of Syiah Kuala

Note: Circled point (steep slopes and peaks indicate that the number is in doubt (see Introduction)).
Source: Compiled from BPS data.
During the New Order development era, there was a great emphasis on higher education that focused on technological skills specifically targeted at the heavy industry job market. In the early days of the New Order, this demand marginalised people of certain types of educational background — specifically religious education — in the job market. For example, only in the mid-80s did the regional government declare that religious school graduates were were qualified to take teaching positions in government schools.

The government university of Syiah Kuala (Unsyiah) gained more female students in recent years — some faculties more than others — while the Islamic university maintained its numbers. The main reason is that many young men abandoned religious education in favour of state education. There are several things that needed to be explained regarding the relationship between university education and the job market in Aceh. Unsyiah graduates — male or female — are favoured in the job market especially in the formal sector while IAIN graduates' job prospects are limited to teaching (or preaching) positions as well as entrepreneurship. Only in recent years has the local government declared equal employment opportunity for both types of university graduates. In addition, most female IAIN graduates seemed to enter the university not with the goal of a career in mind but rather to raise better children (for details see Boender, 1997) hence their interest in the perceived “nurture” oriented faculties.
The most popular faculties among women are the *tarbiyah* (education) and *adab* (culture) faculties. The *dakwah* (preaching), *syariah* (law) and *usuluddin* (epistemology) faculties have traditionally been viewed as the domain of men with the female participation rate usually below 50%. When the diploma programs in *tarbiyah* (education) and *adab* (culture) were opened in the 1990s, over 70% of the students were women mainly because these programs will supposedly aid students in raising children (see Boender, 1997). Furthermore, as the following graphs show, the importance of having a university education in finding a job was at its peak...
in the early 1980s during the oil boom in Aceh. Today, however, there is apparently only a small advantage for university graduates when finding employment in Aceh.

Graph 4.10.
Job Seekers That Receive Jobs (Total Male and Female)

Year


Percentage of Total Job Seekers

△ Regular Job Seeker ● University Graduate Job Seeker

Source: Compiled from BPS data.

Graph 4.11.
Job Seekers Who Obtain Jobs (Female)

Year


Percentage of Job Seekers That Receive Jobs

△ Regular Female Job Seeker ■ Female University Graduate Job Seeker

Source: Compiled from BPS data.

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In many countries, women are gaining formal-sector employment due to their low wage as well as their reliable (often unprotected by workers' union) and vulnerable positions (United Nations, 1995:xxii). The graphs above show that although throughout the years the proportion of job seekers who obtain work is in decline, the proportion of female job seekers who obtain work is increasing. It is difficult to assess whether or not this is a gain for women or not because the data above reflect job seekers only in the formal sector. The trend also shows little difference between those with or without university education. More women are contributing to the economy, especially married women. The dual income family has become quite common in the city. During my stay in Aceh, I did not find a married woman in Banda Aceh who was not earning an income, either by employment or entrepreneurship. The ideology of women's place is at home remained strong both among men and women (e.g. see Leigh, 1992: 339). Activities that earn income would strongly accommodate this ideology. Although there are no detailed statistics on female employment and the unemployment rate in Aceh, available figures tell part of the story as long as household-related work is not counted. Indeed, most economic activities among housewives in Banda Aceh revolve around informal communal activities (e.g. arisan,\footnote{Rotating lottery usually conducted within housing communities, office and department groups, etc.} house-to-house sales, catering).

The independence of a family in urban areas from its non-immediate kin is mainly due to the increasing economic independence of married couples. A survey of working women in Banda Aceh (Purnomowati,
Abdullah & Shodiq, 1998) attributed that trend to the dual income family grew out of the rising costs of raising children. There is no doubt that there are some women who have self-aspirations to work, however, the dominant motivator remain the social drive for women to marry and build a family. Education and work are still geared to support this goal. Formal education is seen by most parents as a way to postpone marriage, especially for daughters. Once married, women are no longer expected to continue formal education. This is further emphasised by family and society once women have children. Married women with dependent children have no choice but to work to support the children. With new expenses like schooling and mortgages, married couples can no longer depend on the generosity of the wali hukum. Married women whose children have grown up (are no longer dependent) can relax a bit and they are polarised either into spending less working hours (retiring), or use more time to work. The survey showed that most wives (see graphs below) contributed between 25%-50% of total family income. This shows a significant difference from the workload of women in the rural areas, which – as the next section will show – involves predominantly agricultural activities bringing in the lion’s share of family income. The same survey (Purnomowati, Abdullah & Shodiq, 1998) also showed choices of spouse were still tied to the economic conditions of the husband, and the income of husbands and wives were corresponding to each other. Seldom is there the case of a wealthy husband married to a wife of low income or vice versa.
Graph 4.12.
Wife’s Contribution to Household Income in Relation to Working Hours

- ■ Wife Working <4 hours per day
- □ Wife Working 4-8 hours per day
- ▼ Wife Working >8 hours per day

Source: Survey Primary Data (Purnomowati, Abdullah & Shodiq: 1998)
Graph 4.13.
Wife's Contribution to Household Income in Relation to Husband's Income

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wife's Income (Rp/Month)</th>
<th>Percentage of Wife's Contribution to Household Income</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&lt;100,000.00</td>
<td>5.08%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100,000.00 - 250,000.00</td>
<td>13.56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250,000.00 - 500,000.00</td>
<td>11.86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;500,000.00</td>
<td>10.17%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- □ Husband's Income > Rp 500,000.00/month
- □ Husband's Income Rp 250,000.00 - 500,000.00/month
- □ Husband's Income Rp 125,000.00 - 250,000.00/month
- □ Husband's Income < Rp 125,000.00/month

Source: Survey Primary Data (Purnomowati, Abdullah & Shodiq: 1998)

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This survey as well as other data presented in this chapter are but profile snapshots of the economic condition of women in Aceh, especially in the cities. It shows that women in Aceh are relative latecomers to the modern wage economy due to their ties to the land and its agricultural tradition. Nevertheless, for the past decade their role in the urban scene has increased and as such it demands more representation in the political sphere. The next chapter will expand on these snapshots by profiling women’s representation in political leadership and decision making positions in Aceh.
Chapter 5:

LEADING ACEHNESSE WOMEN
Chapter Five:
LEADING ACEHNESSE WOMEN

The political system of the New Order era systematically marginalised women's roles in politics, including Acehnese women. This system has been critically examined by various authors (e.g. Indijah, 1983; Nurhadi, 1983; Blackwood, 1995; Feillard, 1997; Siapno, 1997, etc) all of whom concluded that women’s roles were under-represented and unacknowledged in the political arena due to the militaristic and patriarchal political system. Indonesian women in general seemed to suffer the systematic “domestication of women”, while these studies documented the various “resistance movements” to such institutionalised marginalisation. The following section will show how such a system operated in Aceh.

5.1. The Islamic and Nationalist Obstacles

Masculinities and femininities vary along the dimensions of race/ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, ability, and age. The resulting variations of the expectations of gendered political participation matter significantly in terms of who actually enters/succeeds in politics. We are better able to explain gendered political participation if we look at the interaction of stereotypes and gender-differentiated living situations. This section will explore the stereotypes, concerning leadership positions in Aceh as well as examining the related gendered political participation that goes with it.

Although the post-New Order witnessed a boom in high-profile women's activism, women's roles in Indonesia have still changed little.
During my fieldwork in Aceh, I found that while there were plenty of women NGO figures talking bravely about the need for equal access to formal decision making, but resistance to the concept was still strongly held among both men and women.

In my observation of three high-profile public meetings which involved women’s organisations, the issue of gender equality was discussed with reluctance and great care. On one hand there was a certain degree of suspicion and uncertainty in embracing activism perceived to carry a “Western agenda.” On the other hand, the women’s organisations tried hard to appear non-oppositional – but rather reformist – in regard to hardline religious leadership, because to appear as “anti-Islam” in any degree is the worst “public relations” blunder for any organisation in Aceh. There is a general apologetic attitude (at least in public) among women regarding conservative and hard line patriarchal-Islamic behaviour. Not a single women activist would ponder facing this attitude head-on. One may argue that they are being strategic, however, most of the statements I heard indicated genuine reluctance to question mainstream attitudes toward gender relations. This perception is partially confirmed by a recent survey on Acehnese women’s entrepreneurship, where despite the track record of most Acehnese clerics’ reluctance to support working women, nearly 85% of its respondents still claimed that religion and culture actually encouraged women’s entrepreneurship while only 15% respondents declined to comment (Halimatussakdiah, Yurnalis & Hasan, 2000:25).

A major reason for the relatively patriarchal condition of Aceh is tied to the New Order rule of Indonesia as well as increasingly dominant

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patriarchal Islam. One of the specific local causes of such a condition is that
decades of Ulama-dominated politics left Aceh with a male-dominated
political system. Traditional religious belief systems and institutions play an
important role in perpetuating images of women that deny them leadership
positions. All too frequently women are portrayed as either the source of
evil (e.g. biduen pacah or the uncontrollable sexual whore) or the model of
saintliness (e.g. dara meukureubeuen or the self-sacrificing virgin). Neither
is there an appropriate identity for political leadership. It is these images
that the women activists in Aceh strive to overturn. They succumb to overt
display of “Muslim-ness” (e.g. wearing the jilbab). Their use of Islamic
symbolism is an attempt to gain political legitimation without confronting
outright the existing male-dominated Islamic establishment. For example,
most Muslim women activists in Aceh whom I encountered have employed
“textual re-interpretation” tactics pioneered by Muslim feminists such as
Fatima Mernissi (1987) and Riffat Hassan (1987). They questioned
traditional interpretations of the Islamic holy texts which they considered
heavily male-biased, and offered more female-friendly interpretations
(often introduced as a more historically contextual interpretation) of the holy
texts. Interestingly, the demands of these women were focused solely on
the domestic sphere, such as an end to violence against women, an end to
poverty, increased education, etc. Save for a minority of the activists, in
general there were no demands for increased political representation.
There were widespread dismissal of the idea of affirmative action plans.
There seemed to be a consensual confidence in equal opportunity to
leadership positions.
The "textual re-interpretation" tactic has shown limited success. First, as long as the holy texts contain literal meanings that favour men over women, contextual reinterpretations will always be vulnerable to challenges on authority (e.g. human reasoning vs the actual word of God). At best such efforts will be relegated into an "hypothetical" status or as another supplementary religious reinvigoration project. At its worst, the reinterpretation might offend or cause discomfort among the majority of the community, thus alienating its proponents. It also provides an opening for another reverse-Othering process\(^{40}\) which would discourage future moderate reformist voices for fear of being accused as a "bad Muslim."\(^{41}\)

Second, without significant support by the male religious authorities, any effort at religious reform will always be stunted and never become an actual movement. The authorities' support is therefore vital especially at the early stages of any reform effort when fair gender representation in leadership is the primary aim. Without cultural prestige female power is not fully legitimate and can only be exercised in hidden/distorted/manipulative ways (Ortner, 1996:142). At this time, legitimate power – which is based on the monopoly over textual interpretation – is dominated by male Acehnese Ulama. Re-interpretation of holy texts may be seen as a challenge to their authority and would antagonise them rather than recruit them to the cause.

In chapter six, I will describe how women activists recognised this. They

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\(^{40}\) This was discussed in earlier chapters regarding the construction of the Acehnese Islamic image, as well as in a separate article of mine (see Amir, 2002).

\(^{41}\) Indeed, during my participation in a seminar on gender (see chapter 6), a conservative Ulama panelist blatantly accused other Ulama panelists who endorse feminism of "not knowing what they were talking about because of lack of understanding of the texts." All of these Ulama panelists were men.

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recruited feminist Ulama to help spread their cause, but created new problems.

Third, social scientists ranging from Spencer, Marx, and Durkheim have always acknowledged that religion both influences and is influenced by the socio-economic conditions of a community. Re-interpretation efforts often forget that religion is also an indicator of the socio-economic conditions of society. Militancy and radicalism in religion – two religious tendencies that are often hostile to textual re-interpretation efforts – always occur in times of rapid social change. Over-reliance on symbolic resistance can actually have the opposite effect as in the case of GAM and the government using imagery of women as a propagandist battleground (see chapter two).

These criticisms merely serve to demonstrate the complex relationship between religious symbolism and political structure (see King, 1995). With minimal political representation, any gender reform movement of religion through symbolic contestation will have a limited if not minimal result (see articles in Bodman and Tohidi, 1998; as well as Jeffery and Basu, 1998). Indeed, the vast majority of religious institutions exclude women from top leadership roles. No matter how this exclusionary practice is legitimised, it sends a clear message that reinforces the gender stereotype that women are not equal to men and that they either cannot be trusted with, or lack the qualifications for positions of authority and power. Gender discourse that remains within such a framework run the risk of reinforcing the misogynist aspect of the religion it sought to criticise (Roald, 1998). Only an outright demand for more women in political leadership would have a

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chance to change such a system. While women activists still refuse to do this, gender equality in Aceh will remain a contentious – if not threatening – issue.

Religious beliefs also interact with and may reinforce other cultural sources of gender stereotyping. The structural separation of the public and private has gendered consequences. Religious, educational and judicial institutions tend to reproduce the ideological and gendered division of public and private. The role of religion and education in this process has been shown earlier. The role of judicial institutions in maintaining this division is quite simply, a matter of numerical representation. Throughout Aceh history, the closest Aceh leadership came to meaningful female judicial representation was during the rule of Sultanah Safiatuddin Syah (died 1675) who tried to include women in the legislative branch of her government. Of the 73 members of *Balai Majelis Mahkamah Rakyat* (House of the People’s Court) there were 17 women (23.28%). This arrangement ended swiftly even before the fall of the last queen of Aceh, Kamalat Zainatuddin Syah (1699). The following section will show how this trend – that the gains in women’s political power that were secured at great cost in one period of history are often abandoned, renounced, or traded away in other periods (Peterson & Runyan, 1999:79) – is still happening today in Aceh.

### 5.2. Women’s Involvement in State Governance

We have seen earlier how the universities have “prepared” women for the workforce. Just as the university preferences are gendered, women are consequently underrepresented in certain professions that historically have

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been associated with achieving or maintaining political power (law, military, career civil service, big business). Globally, women are notoriously absent at the top levels of these professions (also a recruiting ground for political leadership). In international organisations, women's roles have increased (though not significantly). In 1994 only 24% of the UN delegates were women, a gradual improvement from 4% in 1949.\(^{42}\) Comparatively, women's leadership in Indonesia is no exception to this improvement. Women elected to national legislatures shape relations through policy issues and their participation on legislative committees (Peterson & Runyan, 1999:76).

Not only are there very few women "at the top" but even those who succeed in achieving positions of power remain largely gender-invisible in conventional accounts of how power works in the world (Peterson & Runyan, 1999:78). This invisibility is partly because so few women appear in the most powerful decision-making positions. But it is also because women's underrepresentation in political office and leadership positions is linked to globally pervasive gender-differentiated patterns where gender socialisation, situational constraints and structural obstacles work together to favor men (Randall, 1987:83-94). These patterns discriminate against women as candidates for and effective holders of political office. In short,

\(^{42}\) The highest percentage of women delegates is from the Caribbean (29%) and Latin America (24%). The lowest is from Eastern Europe (5%) and Southern and Western Asia as well as Oceania (9%). Although such low numbers in the diplomatic circle has influenced the dynamics of international politics, it is less problematic than the fact that no women had been appointed head of any of the 89 autonomous or specialised UN agencies as of 1995. Bodies like the World Bank, the IMF, the WTO or the ICJ continue to be male dominated (Peterson & Runyan, 1999).
the politics in most parts of the world are systemically discriminatory. Indonesia – and by current extension Aceh – is no exception.

The Indonesian political system uses a party representation system in the legislative bodies. As a result women's representation in the legislature depends heavily on party nominations, which are already male-dominated. The parties usually have some sort of tokenistic “women's division” to cater for the women voters, a pool for women candidates of the urutan sepatu position (the bottom of the party candidate's preferential list). In Aceh, past elections of members for the people's representative assembly (DPR) have resulted in insignificant levels of women's representation. In the latest election of 1999, of the 14 parties that gained a seat in the regional people's representative assembly (DPRD) of Aceh there were only four parties which include women representatives. These were two major Islamic parties (PPP and PAN) and two major secular parties (PDIP and GOLKAR). Each elected only one female member. Proportionally, these parties' female representation is well below the goal established in the 1992 study by the UN Division for the Advancement of Women (UNDAW). The study determined that a critical mass of about 30-35% women in political representation is necessary for women to advocate with certainty their needs and priorities (Karl, 1995:64). With women's representation in the parties of PPP (6.66%) PDIP (14.29%) PAN (10%) and GOLKAR (11.11%) there is relatively little opportunity for women. In Aceh it is obvious that the critical mass is still unreachable.

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43 These numerical improvements are mainly due to the quota resulting from the lobbying by the Koalisi Perempuan (Women’s Coalition) before the post-Suharto era 1999 election. It is Iwan Dzulvan Amir
The graphs below show that during the past three elections women’s representation actually decreased, which also reflected a global political trend. Around the world the percentage of women in legislative bodies steadily increased from 1975 into the early 1990s but has been declining in recent years. Women’s representation dropped from 29% in the mid 1980s to 7% in 1994 (Sivard, 1995:37-38). There seems to be a narrowing of the window of opportunity for female politicians. The graphs below also show that while in Aceh the percentage of female representatives is in decline, their quality in terms of level of education is actually improving in the last three elections. The men’s education level remained relatively the same.

Graph 5.1.
Female Representation in the People's Representative Assembly in Aceh

Source: DPRD Aceh

also worth noting that the first female presidential candidate Megawati Sukarnoputri — whose party PDIP won the majority — was outmaneuvered and blocked from the position at the time by the predominantly male politicians. The male Muslim party leaders at the time expressed concerns over her gender. She gained the vice presidency but in July 2001 was finally appointed president when the “acceptable” male alternative — President Abdurrahman Wahid — was impeached by the parliament.
Graph 5.2.
Male Representation in the People's Representative Assembly in Aceh

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year of Election</th>
<th>Percent of Seat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>44.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>44.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>40.74</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Educational Background

- High School Graduate
- Undergraduate
- Postgraduate
- PhD

Source: DPRD Aceh

It is important to note at this point that all the representations in these elections were appointed by the political parties, which means that they did not necessarily "representative" of the electorates. Voters voted for parties. The parties chose their representations and in most cases, women are placed at the bottom of the candidate list (nicknamed urutan sepatu or number in preference list that resemble shoe size) thus least likely to be appointed if the seat allocation received by her party was few.

Women do not lack interest in or motivation for political action. Numerous feminist studies have concluded that:

women are as likely (if not more likely) to work for political causes or candidates as are men. (Lips, 1991:191)
The daily socialisation into appropriate feminine behaviour that makes women less likely than men to pursue traditionally defined political activities. Socialisation into appropriate masculine behaviour makes men more likely than women to identify with political activities. Acehnese studies as early as Siegel (1969) have determined that Acehnese men belong to the public sphere embodied in religious institutions (e.g. the meunasah and mosques) while women are domestic creatures. The influence of the more male-oriented values of Islam – which came into dominance since the 1950s – reinforced this division (Bakti, 1993; Yeoh, 1994). The New Order government encouraged this division, mainly because it fit well with the militaristic concept of family structure (Suryakusuma, 1996; Robinson, 2000). Most importantly, history hides this sort of systemic imbalance by glorifying the individual. Heroines such as described in earlier sections have been counterproductive for the gender equality movement. These arguments are well known among the women activists whom I met in Aceh, such as SRY, who complained that:

People – especially women – do not seem to realise that the heroism of characters like Cut Nya Dhien or Cut Meutia grew out of necessity and only after their dominant males such as husband or father failed to continue the struggle. They fail to see that Aceh has been a sexist society even back then, let alone today.

These heroic images are repeated by the government (especially through the history schoolbooks) as well as advocated by other Acehnese elite. By elevating female icons, Acehnese women are expected to adopt a dismissive attitude to trivialise the women's movement by naturalising existing gender relationship. These individual achievements hide the fact

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that in formal political decision making institutions, women remain grossly underrepresented.

The pattern of male dominance by numerical preponderance in political institutions is ever-present in small local organisations all the way to powerful international economic institutions.\textsuperscript{44} Whereas women are fairly equally represented in entry-level grades – where competitive examinations determine hiring – their low representation at higher levels is due in part to recruitment practices that favour men (Peterson & Runyan, 1999:81).

Such practices also exist in Aceh. The following graphs show the demography of civil servants employed in the city of Banda Aceh (Source: Nurfadhilah, et.al., 1995) in which male civil servants outnumber female civil servants by more than three to one. Few women make it to the higher ranking and better paid positions (ranks III and IV) and most of them are stuck in the middle rank (II). This situation may be compared with that of male civil servants who are reasonably dispersed between upper-middle and middle ranks (II and III). Further breakdown of the figures reveals that more lucrative departments\textsuperscript{45} – such as regional income and regional planning departments – are heavily dominated by men. The previously discussed labour market segmentation is also evident. Women civil servants are concentrated in “nurturing” positions (e.g. health and

\textsuperscript{44} For example, in the UN, women have always constituted the majority of clerical (general services) workers but the minority of professional staff (Timothy, 1995).

\textsuperscript{45} Also known as departemen basah (wet department), these are departments where chances for employees of obtaining extra income is substantially higher than others. Lobbyists are far more willing to provide “soft money” for its officials to obtain government projects.

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Leading Acehnese Women

agriculture departments) as well as auxiliary positions (e.g. secretaries in the mayor’s office).

Graph 5.3.a.
Civil Servants in Banda Aceh by Sex and Rank

![Bar graph showing the number of civil servants by sex and echelon in Banda Aceh.]

Source: DPRD Aceh

Graph 5.3.b.
Civil Servants in Indonesia by Sex and Rank

![Bar graph showing the number of civil servants by sex and echelon in Indonesia.]

Source: Compiled from BPS data
Reaffirming earlier conclusions, the following graphs show the importance of formal education in obtaining a civil service job. University graduates dominate the higher ranking positions. This is a practice that exists throughout Indonesia. Women have to strive harder to obtain these high positions because there are still too few of them in the workforce. Earlier sections demonstrate how female university graduates in Aceh have increased – even surpassed male graduates in some faculties – in the past decades. However, this does not translate into an equal rate of acceptance in the civil servant corps. The number of female university graduates compared with female civil servants in general is proportionally less than the male counterpart. They comprise one-fifth of the total female civil servants while male university graduates comprise a quarter of the total male civil servants. Such a discrepancy indicates some sort of discrimination in the recruitment of civil servants in Banda Aceh.
Leading Acehnese Women

Considering these are people who run the government of Aceh, women's representation is kept to a relative minimum.

Graph 5.5.a.
Civil Servants in Banda Aceh by Sex and Education

Source: Compiled from BPS data.

Graph 5.5.b.
Civil Servants in Indonesia by Sex and Education

Source: Compiled from BPS data.
Unlike graphs 5.3.a and 5.3.b, which show significant difference between local and national patterns of organisational ranks, graphs 5.5.a and 5.5.b. show little difference in the distribution of educational background of the civil servants in Aceh and at the national level. However, they do show that Acehnese female civil servants lag behind the national standard in terms of education.

Graph 5.6.a.
Civil Servants in Banda Aceh by Rank and Education: Male

Source: Compiled from BPS data.

Graph 5.6.b.
Civil Servants in Banda Aceh by Rank and Education: Female

Source: Compiled from BPS data.

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Graphs 5.6.a. and 5.6.b. also indicate a potential discriminative recruitment practice. On a level playing field (i.e. no working experience, low educational background) – where inequality is supposedly at its lowest – the primary school educated male entrants still outnumber the female entrants by about 10 to 1.

5.3. Women’s Leadership in the Private Sector

But what of the private sector? The industrial boom\(^{46}\) initiated in the 1980s should have had a positive impact on the women of the region. Unfortunately this was not the case. The following graphs provide the characteristics of the people employed in five key large-scale industrial companies that operate in Aceh.

![Graph 5.7.](image)

Private Sector Employees in Five Aceh Key Industries by Sex

Source: Compiled from BPS data.

\(^{46}\) The discovery of oil and natural gas in Aceh in the 1980s started a major industrialization of Aceh. Today Aceh has five major industrial complexes (oil, natural gas, timber, paper, cement, and minerals) and numerous smaller supporting industries.
Each company has proportionally fewer female employees – who may not necessarily be Acehnese women – than civil servants of any branch of the civil service in Banda Aceh. Heavy industry is a male dominated venture.

Graph 5.8.
Private Sector Employees in Five Aceh Key Industries by Rank

Female
Total % of data: 7.897%
Standard Deviation = 0.86
N=435
Pearson Chi-Sq = 108.233

Male
Total % of data: 92.103%
Standard Deviation = 1.01
N = 5073
Pearson Chi-Sq = 1520.161

Positions (left=lowest, right=highest)

Note: Positions are sorted by rank. Leadership positions are Direktur Utama (CEO), Direktur (Director), Ko. Kamp (Co-ordinator), Kadep/Karo (Head of Department), and Kabag/Kabid. (Head of Section). Secretarial and Support staff are Kasie (Chief of Secretaries), Karu (Chief of Chambers), Lakma (Executive Manager), Laktu (Executive of Chambers), Lakda (Daily Executor), and Pemila (Junior Executor).

Source: Compiled from BPS data.

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The breakdown of the ranks (graph 5.8.) indicates that in addition to vast numerical inequality in employment (7.897% female and 92.103% male), the distribution of these industries’ employees are quite different. The male employees distribution leans further toward the lower end of the ranks (SD=1.01) than the female employees distribution which are concentrated on the middle and lower ranks (SD=0.86). This means that while men have a relatively "normal" promotion process, women are stuck in the middle ranks. Women are far less likely to reach the high-paying and more powerful positions. One might say that women in these industrial companies are blocked by an Acehnese version of the "glass ceiling."

5.4. The Practice of Discouragement

Systemic discrimination is not limited to the companies themselves but also to the traditionalist values that exist in Aceh. The division of male and female work at home and in the workforce is detrimental to women’s ability to choose economically lucrative jobs. Social sanctions such as shaming women who work in male dominated jobs also discourages women from pursuing a career, or even education. Aside from sanctions, practices of rationalisation also exist, which was illustrated quite bluntly by RHN who mimicked someone from her village:

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47 Bear in mind that they are far more numerous than female civil servants one to eleven with a sex ratio of 0.085748.

48 The most widely used practice is accusations of sexual promiscuity (e.g. loose woman imagery) or irresponsibility (e.g. neglecting the family).
[Addressing a young female student] Why bother to study so high? In the end you’ll just end up in the kitchen anyway. Best you learn how to manage a household.

These attitudes are part of the feminine identity formation. It is inextricable from cultural expectations that motherhood is the primary role of women. Women’s domestic role is seen as antithetical to public sphere activities. Traits associated with political efficacy – ambition, aggression, competitiveness, authority – are distinctively masculine (and/or unfeminine). Thus, feminine traits – passive, dependent, domestic, engaged in meeting private and familial needs – are by definition inappropriate for any political actors who are expected to be active, autonomous, public oriented, and engaged in meeting collective needs. The only licence that Acehnese women have to engage in politics in such an environment is if their activities are an extension of household and/or other “nurturing” endeavours. Hence, their dominance in their roles as guardians of Acehnese identity and culture (teaching professions), “healing” roles (activism in humanitarian “non-profit” organisations), and mediatory roles (activism in lobby groups).
Chapter 6: INTERACTIONS: THREE SAMPLES
Chapter Six:

INTERACTIONS: THREE SAMPLES

This chapter will specifically provide an analysis of three public meetings in which I participated during my fieldwork. The previous five chapters provide the context for the interactions described in these three meetings.

6.1. Setting Common Grounds

The first meeting I wish to analyse is a one-day workshop in which I participated on 16 December 2000. Its theme was "Demokrasi dan Keadilan Gender Dalam Syariat Islam" (Democracy and Gender Justice in Islamic Law). The workshop was funded by KOMNAS-Perempuan (National Commission on Women), a national women’s rights organisation, in collaboration with PUSHAM Unsyiah (Pusat Studi Hak Azasi Manusia Universitas Syiahkuala or the Centre of Human Rights Study at the University of Syiahkuala). It was set up in response to the upcoming implementation of Syariah law (Islamic law) in Aceh by the local government. I was fortunate enough to be a part of the organising committee and as such was able to capture the members’ expectations before the event as well as their assessment of the event afterwards.

KOMNAS-Perempuan collaborated with PUSHAM to set up this seminar was because they wanted academic credentials to counter the negative images of "LSMs" (Lembaga Swadaya Masyarakat, Indonesian for
NGOs) currently established in Aceh while PUSHAM needed an activity concerned with the improvement of society to add to its list of accomplishments (no activity, no funding).

Photo 6.1.
Photos of the workshop speakers.

Top left: representatives of the workshop organiser.
Top right: Acehnese Ulama panellists.
Bottom right: non-Acehnese Ulama panellists.
Source: field photos

The committee consisted of at least a dozen volunteers. Most were graduates of the faculty of law, and women aged between 25 and 40 years old. They all had previous experience in gender-related activism. All were Muslim. There were four presenters invited to speak (see photos). They were all distinguished male Ulama. Two were local Acehnese, the other two from South Sulawesi. One was a traditionalist and the others were moderate.

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49 To the detriment of the honest, genuinely hard-working NGOs there is a boom of humanitarian organisations in Aceh (since 1998). At the time of fieldwork, the estimates range between 150 to 300 NGOs. Most of these organisations, according to PUSHAM (and other social commentators I met) as bogus NGOs, which took aid money from foreign donors but do not carry out projects for humanitarian causes in Aceh.
"feminist Ulama." I asked the chief organiser the reason why they invited a panel of only male speakers to address women's issues and she replied.

This is part of our strategy. Our aim here is to educate people about gender equality within Islam. If we have a woman speaker, most of the audience would have tuned out simply because she would be seen as biased. If we have a male authority on the subject, they would think the issue must be important and therefore they would listen.

I doubted the effectiveness of this strategy for several reasons, but mainly because presenting men to voice women's concerns may be seen as a symbolic gesture that women truly do not belong in the political sphere. The strategy may actually backfire by perpetuating the image of male dominance rather than promoting gender equality.

Throughout the presentations Islam was presented as non-sexist and very pro-women and it was argued that problems arise only because of misogynist interpretations of the texts. The participants responded cautiously to this argument during question time, focusing rather on the credentials of the speakers as well as questioning the urgency of any project of holy text reinterpretation. The traditionalist panellist invoked the usual alarmist line, preaching about the danger of morally corrupt Western influence on "our women." It was he who actually drew out the delegates – both male and female – in the audience who feared feminism as a "Westoxification" project.

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50 These Ulama were also feminist scholars. They were educated abroad in universities in Egypt and the USA. They wrote heavily about women in Islam and sought to give the holy texts more female-friendly interpretations.
The delegates were representatives of various NGOs from all over Aceh. Half of them were women. Not all of them were concerned with gender inequality in general, but were more concerned about issues such as child education and morality among youths. The moderator – a seasoned veteran of several gender seminars – had warned the organisers before the workshop began that discussion time could easily degenerate into another “jilbab and headscarf debate.” It certainly appears that she was right. Almost two thirds of discussion time that followed the presentation was devoted to the issue of women’s clothing (including the jilbab issue). At the time this was a main concern because the upcoming Syariah law actually contains passages that suggest Muslims – especially women – could be fined for violating appropriate Muslim dress codes. When the delegates finally discussed the issue of women’s representation in the public sphere, a male delegate summed up the opinion of most conservatives in the workshop:

Politics is a dirty business. Women should not sully themselves in such activities for it would be detrimental to their cause.

Some female delegates actually stood up to support this stand. Only one of the speakers voiced his opposition to this argument. The rest of the discussion diverged from the topic and changed into a networking session where delegates presented their organisations’ causes.

Afterwards, the organisers admitted that the debate could have been handled better. Although they believed that a majority of their objectives – an open discussion on justice in gender relations – had been achieved, the one important topic that was not covered during the discussion was
democracy, which was the first theme mentioned in the title of the seminar. Also, the delegates failed to agree that there was a problem of gender inequality in Aceh. Overall, the one common issue that the delegates agreed upon was that gender relations in Aceh is an issue best left alone.

6.2. Setting Priorities

The second meeting I attended was on 15 January 2001. It was a meeting of various NGOs under Koalisi NGO (NGO Coalition) titled "Dialog Masyarakat Sipil untuk Kondisi Aktual Aceh" (Civilian Dialogue on the Actual Condition of Aceh). Only one-sixth of the audience were women. I met some women activists whom I had interviewed days earlier. They sat together at the back. Not one woman sat in the front near the microphone. Despite its non-provocative title (at least for the government), the meeting actually was a forum to respond to the police chief’s declaration made a few days earlier, which allowed official house searches post-Jeda Kemanusiaan II (the second cease fire that expired on 15 January 2001). The meeting started out with the moderator declaring that:

all women’s issues must be put aside since this meeting is about more important matters.

It would appear that the moderator was determined that the inclusion of “women’s issues” would risk derailing the discussion, hence it was preemptively denied. The discussion was very much restrained. Speakers were concerned about sharing experiences in the field related to police brutality and the government bureaucratic hostility to NGOs. From the way the discussion went, it was clear to me that this was not a government-friendly meeting.
The priorities of the meeting were interesting. The moderator drew up a list of "important points" for the official response from the group to be presented to the chief of police as the person officially responsible for public safety in Aceh. The list included a call for unity under strong leadership among the various NGOs and a call to the international community to pressure the TNI to be more humane in its approach.

At my urging, my women activist friend raised the issue of women to the moderator. The word *perempuan* (the currently appropriate form of "women") finally made it to number 11 on the list (after two hours of being neglected). The response of one of the male delegates – who, I presume, merely wanted to be polite – was that the military was threatening to step up their campaign of rape within their region of operation. This left no doubt

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as to what was the priority when it came to "women's issues" in that meeting: female delegates were concerned about women's issues in general (including rape) while the male delegates were concerned specifically about the protection of "our women" from rape by the military with no mention of rape committed by Acehnese or GAM. There was no mention of other gender-related issues, such as women as refugee, the extortion of households by the military, domestic violence, or even the imposition of strict Muslim dress code (especially for women) by the government. This certainly mirror the tendency that violence against women were used either as an instrument used in political conflicts, or as a tool to sideline women's aspirations to change their general conditions. Although violence against women is an important issue in gender relations, the male-dominated meeting confined it specifically only within the context of state-sponsored violence. In the meeting the issue of violence against women became a "token issue" thrown in (almost as an afterthought) to satisfy the women activists that their cause was being addressed.

Overall, the meeting was an example of how Acehnese activists view women's problems in Aceh. It was very much gendered. NGOs with male leadership view gender relationship differently from those with female leadership. Nationalism, violence and human rights are the important issues currently tackled by NGOs. Women and gender relations are – much as in the New Order era organisational format – considered to be an add-on to other issues. These are considered specialised issues only handled by "specialists" (women's organisations or organisations led by women). The lack of women's participation is the one important factor contributing to the
lack of recognition of women's issues as an important issue. Women's problems are simply not given high priority.

6.3. Setting the Law

The third meeting I attended was on 29 January 2001. The seminar was titled "Sosialisasi dan Implementasi Syariah Islam di Aceh" (the Socialisation and Implementation of Islamic law in Aceh). The seminar was organised by the Governor thus making it a government event. Out of the dozen presenters and 60-70 delegates, there was only one woman speaker and a dozen women delegates. There were many male Ulama, but very few NGO representatives and only two student activists.

The presenters argued that Syariah Law is a good idea. The delegates, however, argued that Syariah Law was inapplicable because it is impractical and ambiguous. For example, the delegates questioned the enforcement of the Syariah Law. Should punishments be carried out under the qisas (punishment system according to Syariah Law) or the national penal code? The Ulama in the audience seemed to be suspicious of the government motives for wanting to implement this law: was the government trying to make an impression on the Ulama or attempting to take over the role of the Ulama?

Photo 6.3.
Photo of the seminar

Source: field photos
Iwan Dzulvan Amir
The interaction between the various mainstream factions in Aceh was rather ambiguous. Ideological differences which were expressed did not correspond with actual interpersonal interactions. For example, Ulama who criticised the feminist academic speaker were actually talking, chatting, and laughing with the lady during breaks. When I asked her about this, she said:

Oh, everybody knows everybody around here. We've done this sort of talk many times before so we already know what the other person is going to present anyway.

Although the official intent of the government in conducting this seminar is to gather support from community leaders for the implementation of Syariah law, the method was not intended to change other people's minds. In spite of the government setting up a forum to discuss the issue of Syariah law, it seemed that the people who participated already had a fixed idea on the issue and did not intend to change it. Women's issues only appeared once, in a presentation by the only female speaker. The response was one of token resistance voiced by a male Ulama. The whole thing was a performance. This seminar itself was nothing but a formality with a seemingly predetermined outcome. The purpose of the government to bother conducting the seminar seemed to be ritualistic. Indeed, there was something that resembled rituals of wealth redistribution. During the last hour of the seminar a list was distributed for the delegates to sign. It was a confirmation of where to send the delegates' "attendance fee". In the past, public approval was usually solicited using other rituals such as buffalo sacrifice, which is still practiced in the villages. In a "modern"
setting the cash-filled ampol ("envelope") is the substitute, which may simply be a practice left over from the New Order era. The fee is supposedly an incentive for support of the policy or new law; so to all intents and purposes, this was still a New Order event. Considering it to be a New Order style exercise, there is little wonder the participants, both speakers and audience, were predominantly male.

6.4. Comparisons

These three meetings provide an insight into how women's issues are viewed among the political elites in Aceh. The sentiments ranged from a cautious and suspicious stand on the motivation and agenda of academics and NGOs promoting gender equality and justice to outright dismissal by the government. Unless a perceived moral threat by the construct of "non-Acehnese" (e.g. the threat of sexual violation by outsiders rather than "one of us") is involved, a woman's position in Acehnese society in general is viewed as good enough just the way it is. It is a view seemed to be shared by both men and women alike. Although some women complained about gender inequality, they appeared to distrust the idea of gender equality. They talked about the need to improve women's condition in Aceh (e.g. better education, better health, equal opportunity in workplace, an end to violence against women), acknowledged the need for increased female representation in leadership positions, yet shun discussions of structural discrimination that limit women's access to these positions. Affirmative action were viewed with suspicion. There was general optimism among women activists that "gender justice" (they disapprove of the term "gender equality") is achievable through women's hard work.

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The three meetings were organised by the Acehnese political elite, including the NGOs organisers, who had above average middle to upper class incomes, with access to higher education. Most of the participants – with the possible exception of the governor’s seminar – did not belong to this group. All of the organisers had access to financial resources, mainly foreign aid. Some of the delegates had experienced first hand the suffering caused by the armed conflict; all of the organisers had heard of it second hand. Some of the delegates had heard of feminism as “a Western product” while most of the organisers (of the first and second seminars) – again, with the possible exception of the government organisers – were armed with the works of Fatima Mernissi. These differences explain why there were differences in establishing a common platform for discussion. Organisers and participants had different ideas on what was important and what was urgent. The organisers seemed to focus on long term plans, religion, ideology, and the provincial economy. Participants seemed to focus on immediate problems such as strategies to handle military violence, strategies to survive shortages, and strategies to attract aid.
Conclusion
CONCLUSION

A female colleague who read the first draft of this thesis has complained to me of my tendency to “shoot down” all the accomplishments of women in Aceh. I would have to say that this is neither my intention nor the case. What I do point out early on in this thesis (chapters one and two) is that although Acehnese women have been constructed in a flattering manner in so many ways – almost all due to the achievements of individuals – such depiction may be harmful for them should it hide the real condition of Acehnese women in general. Certainly not everything about Acehnese women is tied to depictions and representations.

The last chapter has so far supported the view that insofar as political participation requires time, resources, and control over women, capitalist and masculinist conditions make their participation exceedingly difficult (Peterson & Runyan, 1999:87). Aceh is a historically patriarchal society. It is also a society undergoing rapid change and modernisation. Its socio-economic conditions are vastly different from two decades ago when the oil boom began.

Are all the changes that have happened in Aceh necessarily bad for its women? Not necessarily. Female literacy in Indonesia, including Aceh, is among the highest in developing countries. The state schooling system guarantees equal access to primary schools for both boys and girls. Recent school burnings aside, the state of schools in Aceh – state owned or religious – is generally improving. Data in chapter four showed that classrooms are not as overcrowded as they used to be. Better access to health and sanitation facilities also has improved women’s life expectancy in
Aceh. Maternal mortality have declined.\textsuperscript{51} Women literacy increased as they enjoy better education than two decades ago. Women also have more control over their reproductive functions as chapter three has shown.

These are all issues regarding domestic life. In the public life, surprisingly despite the dismal assessment we saw earlier, women's political representation in Aceh has fared relatively well in comparison with other countries. Women in the Acehnese parliament still outnumber (proportionally) those in Western Asia and South Asia as well as North Africa. This is a significant leap considering a mere decade ago female leadership in Aceh was still something people talked about in a historical (and heroic nationalist) context.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>1987</th>
<th>1994</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Western Europe &amp; Other Developed Countries</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\textbf{Indonesia*}</td>
<td>12.40%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Asia</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeastern Asia</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America &amp; The Caribbean</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Europe</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\textbf{Aceh**}</td>
<td>8.33%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Asia</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Asia</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Asia</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Africa</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceania</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>8.90%</td>
<td>7.72%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{*} Calculated from 1992-1997 DPRD membership
\textsuperscript{**} Calculated from 1992-1999 regional election results
Source: Statistics (United Nations, 1995:154)

Acehnese women actually fare quite well in participating in decision-making process of the government. Despite their small number, their

\textsuperscript{51} The MMR (Maternal Mortality Rate, measured by deaths per 100,000 successful births) in Aceh is estimated at 580 in 1986 and declined to around 480 in 1998. Although the figure is still higher than the Indonesia as a whole (MMR of 450 in 1984, it declined to 373 in 1998) the decline in Aceh MMR is still a huge improvement. (Compiled from Zahr and Royston, 1991:465-476; BPS, 1994:220; Depkes RI, 1998:155).

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proportion in parliament is higher than the world average, and well above African and some Asian countries (though well below the national average). However, this is quite deceptive considering their numbers have swelled significantly in departments that are "concerned with women issues" or they are confined to supportive or secretarial posts, as chapter five has shown in more detail.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Caribbean</td>
<td>15.76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Developed Regions</td>
<td>15.24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central America</td>
<td>10.60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Europe</td>
<td>10.38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Aceh</strong></td>
<td>7.14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceania</td>
<td>6.86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>6.22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South America</td>
<td>6.08%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indonesia</strong></td>
<td>6.06%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Africa</td>
<td>4.82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>4.52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Europe</td>
<td>4.16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Asia</td>
<td>2.58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast Asia</td>
<td>1.90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Asia</td>
<td>1.58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia</td>
<td>1.20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>6.56%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Calculated from civil servants in the capital Banda Aceh of rank IV.
** Calculated from cabinet members in 1999.
Source: Statistics (United Nations, 1995:154)

This is no guarantee that these women are able to make a significant difference in formal politics. There are, however, several types of cases when women actually ascend to a position of leadership:
1. Through family connections, usually after the death of a father or husband who is a leader. The cases of the female warriors described earlier are examples of this point.

2. When stereotypes of women can work to benefit the position, usually during crises or transitions that require a caring, compromising, conciliatory, and ameliorative figure. Indeed, during the conflict in Aceh, women activists have usually relied upon the image of the "caring mother" who take care of the needy. They take a dangerous role by becoming mediators in the middle of a male dominated armed conflict.

3. By playing down feminine qualities and playing up ultra-masculine qualities. This is the only point that seems to be unpopular among women leaders in Aceh. The only known women who played this image are the Inong Balee women, the armed female branch of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM). The gender patterns of military service also influence who reaches political office. Women who remain a small percentage of the military are largely excluded from combat, thus barring them from another path to political power. Most of the Inong Balee duties are usually non-combatant (espionage, logistics, etc). Only when they pose for the media do they project their "masculine" qualities (e.g. carrying arms, wearing combat fatigues, etc). They practice the only way women can demonstrate the required militancy, which is by adopting an excessively tough image and rendering invisible their "feminine" qualities.

As long as female political actors are perceived either as traditional women or women-who-act-like-men, then gender expectations are not
really disrupted. Women political leaders in such an arrangement actually reinforce and reproduce traditional gender stereotypes.

This last point is something that I frustratingly failed to point out to the women activists whom I met in the field. Ever optimistic that political participation for women is only a matter of willpower among Acehnese women, their constant belief in a fair system can easily blind them to the fact that women's political participation is always barred by direct and indirect legal barriers. How can any woman participate if she is always institutionally handicapped from the start? Randall identified three institutional barriers in her discussion of political recruitment and promotion (1987:92-94), all of which has been demonstrated in chapter five.

1. Discrimination in criteria for career advancement: certain positions require people with “certain qualities” and/or “certain resources”, both often lacking in women candidates. The most commonly used excuse for this form of discrimination in Aceh is that women are deemed second class Muslims. The most “liberal” argument commonly cited is that although women can do anything as well as men, they must be subordinate to male leadership. This view stems from a literal interpretation of the Qur’an, which has recently been contested by women activists.

2. Discrimination in aim and objectives of positions and institutions: the institution itself aims at addressing “men's issues”, thus “women's issues” are deemed peripheral in daily operation. Not only are there “men's jobs” and “women's work” in Aceh the political parties themselves have compartmentalised women's political participation into...
tokenistic "special female-only sections within the party." These political appendages serve their purpose in that political representation within the Acehnese parliament remains minimal.

3. Discrimination in workplace behaviour: institutional environment and atmosphere are created to be less favourable to women. Acehnese have various ways to "neutralise" and trivialise such behaviour. I find it amusing that despite my occasional mimicking of misogynist behaviour during my time in the field, the one thing that singled me out as an outsider was that when a woman served drinks to me and my male informant hosts, I bothered to say thank you. Apparently what I considered as polite behaviour can often be seen as "un-manly" behaviour. Men take female servitude for granted in Aceh.

All of these forms of discrimination serve to maintain what is essentially male domination over women in both the domestic and public life. The activists I met denied this by saying that women perceive political power differently from men. They said that men tend to see power as a tool of domination while women tend to see it as a tool of cooperation. Chowdhury (1994) correctly declared that political discrimination against women is both the means and the ends to male domination in every aspect of daily life.

[The] culture and processes of formal political institutions – especially parties, their affiliated labor or employer groups, their youth wings, and even their women's auxiliaries – are major barriers to women's equal participation in institutional politics. The barriers include the concrete expressions of patriarchal and fraternal privilege found in men's expressive and problem-solving
styles, their networks, their workday, their domestic and child-care obligations, and even their traditions of making sexual access to women one of the prerequisites of power. (Chowdhury et.al., 1994:16).

In this regard, women’s participation requires a transformation not only in gendered divisions of labor and power but also in gendered identities.

**Last Words on The Conflict in Aceh**

The women of Aceh have become more outspoken in their demands to improve their lives. For too long their voices have been drowned in outside praises of a glorious and distant past. The previous chapters have shown that the exaggerated rhetoric of “the independent Acehnese women” often serves to hide the fact that Acehnese women have been confined into the domestic sphere and outside of the public sphere. This misleading image has been so successful that few Acehnese women would question such a construct and consequently failed to question the male dominance in almost every aspect of decision-making social mechanisms. This gender imbalance has been very structural and thoroughly internalised by Acehnese men and women that the current contestation is focused in representation (who gets to say what) and not political (who gets to do what).

Until Acehnese men and women in general achieve a level of gender awareness which transcends the obsession over form, any effort to improve gender relations will only scratch the surface. Worse, it may even serve to reinforce and reproduce the existing dominance of one gender over the
other. The use of women imagery in the propaganda war between the Indonesian military and the separatist GAM – both in more than one occasion claimed to champion women’s rights – is an example of the subversion of gender representation. It is no coincidence that both sides are basically male-dominated organisations.

Not everything in Aceh is hopeless. Fortunately for women the current conflict in Aceh presents a window of opportunity to demand for a change in the composition of political leadership. With so many Acehnese men is reluctant to be openly involved in politics (due to the military oppression), the field is open for women to become more involved in public leadership. Whether Acehnese women is able to seize this opportunity only history can tell.

*Insya Allah* …

**52** Arabic for “God willing.”

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