J.C. Altman

Aborigines, Tourism, and Development: the Northern Territory Experience

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Darwin 1988

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J.C. Altman

**Australian National University
North Australia Research Unit
Monograph
1988**

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Cover: Tourists at 'Sunset Strip', Uluru National Park, May 1986.
Photo: Jon Altman.

Contents

Maps	vi
Tables	vii
Preface	ix
Abbreviations	xv
Introduction	1
Central concerns	2
Limits of the study	4
Definitions	5
The conceptual framework	10
Methodology	12
Outline	17
Part A	Wider issues
<i>Chapter 1</i>	Australian tourism and Aborigines 21
	Defining the tourism industry 22
	Recent tourism growth 23
	The economic impact of tourism 26
	Federal and state concerns 30
	Aborigines and the tourism industry 32
	Federal:state politics and tourism 40
	Conclusion 42
<i>Chapter 2</i>	Northern Territory tourism: economics 45
	The Northern Territory economy 45
	The tourism sector in the economy 50
	Aborigines and tourism 58
	Conclusion 68
<i>Chapter 3</i>	Northern Territory tourism: politics 61
	The Northern Territory polity 71
	Formal politics 74
	Paragovernmental politics 78
	Bureaucratic politics 81
	Pressure groups 89
	Conflict and cooperation 92
	Conclusion 94

Part B	Case studies	
<i>Chapter 4</i>	Uluru National Park	99
	A brief history of tourism	100
	The Mutitjulu community economy	104
	Mutitjulu and the tourism industry	113
	The economic impact of Yulara	130
	Conclusion	135
<i>Chapter 5</i>	The Ayers Rock region	143
	The regional impact of Mutitjulu enterprises	144
	The regional impact of Yulara	149
	Other Aboriginal tourism enterprises	156
	Future developments and regional issues	167
	Conclusion	172
<i>Chapter 6</i>	Kakadu National Park	175
	Tourism in the region	178
	The economies of Aboriginal communities	184
	The economic impact of tourism	198
	Recent developments	208
	Conclusion	212
<i>Chapter 7</i>	Gurig National Park	217
	The establishment of Gurig National Park	218
	Tourism in the region	223
	Aboriginal communities and economic issues	228
	Tourism enterprises	237
	Distribution of Park moneys	240
	Aboriginal aspirations and expectations	243
	Conclusion	247
<i>Chapter 8</i>	Melville and Bathurst Islands	251
	The Tiwi region	252
	The history of tourism development	261
	Tourism enterprises in 1986	266
	Recent developments	273
	The economic impact of tourism	279
	Conclusion	281

Part C Conclusion

<i>Chapter 9</i>	Policy issues	287
	The economic impact of tourism	288
	The nature of Aboriginal tourism involvement	290
	Land rights and economic leverage	293
	Aboriginal cultural tourism	299
	Some economic issues	309
	Assessing benefits and costs	319
	Conclusion	325

Bibliography	329
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Maps

1	Case study communities in the Northern Territory	xvi
2	Aboriginal involvement in Northern Territory tourism	44
3	Uluru National Park	98
4	Uluru National Park and surrounding region	142
5	Kakadu National Park, Stages 1 and 2	174
6	Gurig National Park	216
7	Melville and Bathurst Islands	250

Tables

2.1	The Northern Territory population, by race	49
2.2	Key tourism indicators, 1981/82 to 1986/87	52
2.3	Tourism takings from accommodation, 1981/82 to 1986/87	53
4.1	Uluru National Park visitors, 1960/61 to 1985/86	101
4.2	The Mutitjulu population, 1985 and 1986	106
4.3	Employment at the Mutitjulu community, 1985 and 1986	107
4.4	Aggregate cash income at Mutitjulu, by source, 1985 and 1986	109
4.5	Aggregate cash income at Mutitjulu, by source, 1986	110
4.6	Cash income per fortnight at Mutitjulu, 1985 and 1986	110
4.7	Employment income by source, 1985 and 1986	112
4.8	Nature of artefacts produced for Maruku, April 1985 to May 1986	115
4.9	Artefact retail sales at Uluru National Park, 1986	117
4.10	Gross turnover of Malpa Trading Co. 1980 to 1986	120
5.1	Regional production of artefacts bought by Maruku Arts and Crafts, April 1985 to May 1986	146
5.2	Actual and projected visitation to Uluru National Park and Yulara	150
5.3	Employment at Yulara, May 1986	154
5.4	Expected visitor numbers at national parks on a possible regional circuit, 1985 to 1990	168
6.1	Visitors to Kakadu National Park, 1982 to 1987	180
6.2	The Aboriginal population of Kakadu National Park, 1981 to 1987	186
6.3	Aboriginal residents of Kakadu National Park, by community	187
6.4	Aboriginal employment in the Kakadu region, 1986	190
6.5	Sources of cash income for Aboriginal people, December 1986	193
6.6	Tourism enterprises owned by the Gagudju and Djabulukgu Associations, 1986	203
7.1	Visitors to Gurig National Park, 1978 to 1986	224
7.2	Mode of visitor access to Gurig, 1978 to 1986	226

7.3	Resident population of Gurig National Park, June 1986	230
7.4	Cash incomes of Aboriginal residents of Gurig National Park, June 1986	233
7.5	Lease and licence payments at Gurig National Park, 1986	240
8.1	The Aboriginal population of Melville and Bathurst Islands, 1981 and 1986	254
8.2	Funds available for distribution by the Tiwi Land Council	259
8.3	Tiwi Tours visitors, 1981 to 1987	268
8.4	Expenditure by Tiwi Tours visitors at Nguuu, Bathurst Island	269
9.1	The nature of Aboriginal tourism involvement	290
9.2	Factors influencing the value of lease and licence payments	295
9.3	Factors influencing the economic leverage provided by the Land Rights Act	296
9.4	Preferred tourist activities involving Anangu, 1985 and 1986	301

Preface

This monograph has been written with two main objectives in mind. The first is to present empirical data about the economic impact of tourism on Aboriginal communities in the Northern Territory. There is some concern in the wider community that Aboriginal ownership of important tourist destinations constrains tourism growth, but this has never been rigorously examined. The evidence presented here suggests that this concern may be misplaced. Secondly, I have canvassed a range of tourism policy issues that need to be addressed, especially by Aboriginal people contemplating involvement in this industry. This policy discussion has been animated by my longer term research focus on the impact of land rights on the economic status of Aboriginal people. Will ownership of important tourism destinations, like Kakadu and Uluru National Parks, provide Aboriginal people with economic and political leverage? If not, is the granting of land rights truly 'a first step on a long road towards self-sufficiency and eventual social and economic equality for Aborigines'? (Woodward 1974:138).

The study has its genesis in a grant that I received from the Australian Institute of Aboriginal Studies to examine the impact of land rights on the structural position of Aboriginal people in the Northern Territory political economy. My interest in tourism was kindled in 1985 when I became involved in a multi-disciplinary study on the social impact of tourism on the Mutitjulu Aboriginal community located within Uluru (Ayers Rock-Mount Olga) National Park. This study was undertaken jointly by the Central Land Council, the Pitjantjatjara Council, and the Mutitjulu community itself. My role in this study was to investigate the economic impact of tourism on the Mutitjulu community and on other Aboriginal communities in central Australia which are affected by rapid regional tourism growth after the opening of Yulara township.

My work at Uluru convinced me that a wider ranging study of Aborigines and tourism was needed. It quickly became apparent that while tourism in Australia generally, and in the NT particularly, was growing rapidly, there was almost no research on its impact on Aboriginal communities. There have been some exceptions in volumes edited by Gillespie (1983), Sullivan (1984) and Palmer (1985); and in two social impact assessment studies focussed on Uluru (CLC et al. 1987) and the East Kimberley region (East Kimberley Impact Assessment Project, or EKIAP, in press) that are not yet widely available. This study varies from these others because it emphasises the economic, rather than the environmental or social, aspects of the impact of tourism. Furthermore, it is a comparative study that looks at a number of different locations during one period of time.

A problem that this study has faced has been the identification of its intended audience. This monograph aims to capture a wide readership, including members of Aboriginal communities, staff of their political and resource organisations, bureaucrats in both the NT and federal administrations, policy makers and politicians, recreational planners, private sector tourism industry interests, and academics. Consequently, I have aimed to keep the text and analysis relatively straightforward and jargon free (despite my natural tendency to prolixity). It attempts to begin to fill a research void that has been identified in official inquiries (e.g. Miller 1985; Kennedy 1987), in consultants' reports (e.g. Barrington Partners 1986), and in a survey of the Australian literature (CLC et al. 1987:Appendix 5). I emphasise though that this research is only an exploratory beginning in what will surely become a rapidly expanding field of inquiry in Australia.

Many individuals provided information, assistance, and both personal and institutional viewpoints at the various locations visited. I would like to thank the following:

Alice Springs: Staff of the Central Land Council, the Pitjantjatjara Council, the Conservation Commission, the Tourist Commission, the Department of Aboriginal Affairs, the Aboriginal Development Commission, and the Yulara Development Corporation; managers of the tour companies Ansett Trailways, AAT Kings, and Dreamtime Tours; local members of the NT Legislative Assembly.

Uluru National Park: Staff of the Mutitjulu Community Inc., Malpa Trading Company, Maruku Arts and Crafts, and the Australian National Parks and Wildlife Service; members of the Uluru Kata Tjuta Board of Management; and members of the Mutitjulu community.

Yulara: The Board of the Yulara Corporation; staff of the Yulara Corporation and the Conservation Commission; and managers of the Sheraton Hotel, Four Seasons Hotel, Ayers Rock Campground, Ayers Rock Lodge, Yulara Supermarket, Mobil Yulara, the Ernest Giles Tavern and takeaway, the Yulara newsagency/post office/gift shop, Ansett NT and Ayers Rock Touring. All interviews with Yulara operators were kindly organised by the Yulara Corporation.

Ayers Rock region: Staff and members of the Imanpa community; the management of Wallara Ranch; and staff of the Conservation Commission and Maruku Arts and Crafts.

Darwin: Staff of the Tourist Commission, the Northern Land Council, the Australian National Parks and Wildlife Service, the Conservation Commission, the Department of Aboriginal Affairs, the Australian Bureau of Statistics, the Gagudju Association, the Djabulukgu Association, Financial Advisory Consulting & Training Services Pty Ltd (also managers of the Tiwi Land Council), the Aboriginals Benefit Trust Account, and the NT Development Corporation; the management of Tiwi Tours, Australian Kakadu Tours, and the Kakadu Holiday Village; members of the NT Legislative Assembly; and the North Australia Research Unit which provided me with an office and logistical support.

Kakadu National Park: The Chairman and members of the Gagudju Association Executive Committee and members of the Gagudju Association; staff of the Gagudju Association, the Australian National Parks and Wildlife Service, the Northern Land Council, Energy Resources of Australia, the Jabiru School and the Jabiru Town Council; managers of the Cooida Hotel, the Border Store, Kakadu Air Service Pty Ltd, Bridge Autos Jabiru, Jabiru Newsagency, and Jabiru Supermarket; and the coordinators of the Women's Resource Centre. The Department of Aboriginal Affairs provided accommodation at Jabiru.

Gurig National Park: The Chairman and members of the Cobourg Board; staff of the Conservation Commission, Thunder Rock School and Gurig Store; residents of Black Point, Araru Point and Gumuragi communities; and the joint owners of Wimray Safaris Pty Ltd.

Melville and Bathurst Islands: The Chairman and members of the Tiwi Land Council, and the chairmen and members of the Milikapiti, Pularumpi and Nguiu Councils; staff of the Milikapiti, Pularumpi and Nguiu Councils, the Milikapiti and Pularumpi general stores, Tiwi Tours, Tiwi Designs, Bima Wear, Tiwi Pima Art, Tiwi Pottery, and the Roman Catholic Church.

Katherine: Staff of the Conservation Commission, Northern Land Council, Mimi Arts and Crafts, and Financial Advisory Consulting & Training Services Pty Ltd (managers of the Yolngu Association); and the managers of Springvale Homestead and Andutjmi Pty Ltd.

Canberra: Staff of the Department of Aboriginal Affairs, the Australian National Parks and Wildlife Service, the Aboriginal Development Commission, the Australian Bureau of Statistics, the Bureau of Tourism Research, the Department of the Arts, Sport, the Environment, Tourism and Territories, and the Australian Institute of Aboriginal Studies.

Needless to say, there was marked variability in the degree of support for this project; some bodies provided exceptionally open access to file material, while others provided almost no information beyond that of a public nature. While it would be invidious to differentiate between institutions, all file material that has been used in this monograph is fully referenced.

I would like to thank the Australian Institute of Aboriginal Studies for funding support, particularly of my fieldwork, and the Research School of Pacific Studies of the Australian National University, where I am employed, especially for a well equipped vehicle.

In preparing my research for publication, I would like to acknowledge the tremendous assistance provided by Linda Allen in commenting on all chapters, sub-editing, proof reading, secondary data collection, and bibliographic matters; Diane Smith who worked with me during December 1987 and January 1988; Claire Smith who

typed up parts of the manuscript; and staff of the Cartography Unit of the Research School of Pacific Studies for drawing the maps. I thank the Central Land Council for permission to publish versions of Chapters 4 and 5 of the report *Sharing the Park: Anangu Initiatives in Ayers Rock Tourism* (CLC et al. 1987:169-286) that I had initially written for them.

Helpful comments on individual draft chapters were provided by Francesca Baas Becking (Chapters 1, 2, 3 and 9), Dan Gillespie (Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7), Tim Rowse (Chapters 4 and 5), Peter Wellings, Diane Smith and Paul Taçon (Chapters 6 and 7), Mike Butler (Chapter 7), Stephen Marshall (Chapter 8), Mike Parsons (Chapter 5), and Kim Anson, Lynne Alexander and Sarah Dunlop (Chapter 4). I would like to thank Mike Dillon for being a critical sounding-board in numerous discussions about economic policy issues and for his permission to use a great deal of material in Chapter 3 from a co-authored article (Altman and Dillon 1988).

On a more personal note, I would like to single out a few individuals for special thanks. Luana Johnston and Peter Wellings were of crucial importance for my work at Uluru and Kakadu respectively, particularly in their collaboration in the collection of primary data. Chris Burchett, the Aboriginal liaison manager at the NT Tourist Commission, was a constant source of information and advice during the three years that this project has been in gestation. Peter and Jan Cooke were exceptionally hospitable when we arrived, dog and all, on their Darwin doorstep. Finally, I would like to thank Francesca Baas Becking and Tessa Altman for accompanying me on a lengthy fieldtrip that was, at times, a little more arduous than anticipated.

And now to two provisos. Firstly, almost all the fieldwork on which this monograph is based was completed by December 1986. When this manuscript was submitted for publication, one referee suggested that I may choose to add a postscript commenting on the substantial growth in NT tourism in the past two years. Instead of doing this, I have incorporated updates in the monograph based on brief return visits to the Northern Territory in November 1987 and August 1988. However, it should be noted that most of the changes that have occurred in the past two years have affected the non-Aboriginal, rather than the Aboriginal, component of the tourism industry.

Secondly, a personal admission. This project was probably a little too big and complex for one researcher to undertake. This is a reflection, in part, of the complexity (that is outlined in Part A) of the tourism development debate in the Northern Territory. The writing up of this monograph has consequently taken longer than envisaged, although I have also diverted my attention to other commitments over the past two years. My apologies to any collaborators who feel that this publication is a little tardy.

I end with the usual disclaimer that all opinions expressed in this monograph (unless otherwise stated), and any shortcomings, are my own.

Jon Altman
October 1988
Canberra

Abbreviations

AAB	Aboriginal Arts Board (of the Australia Council)
ABS	Australian Bureau of Statistics
ABTA	Aboriginals Benefit Trust Account
ABTF	Aborigines Benefits Trust Fund
ADC	Aboriginal Development Commission
AEDP	Aboriginal Employment Development Policy
AIAS	Australian Institute of Aboriginal Studies
AKT	Australian Kakadu Tours
ALS	Average length of stay
ANCAAA	Association of Northern and Central Australian Aboriginal Artists
ANPWS	Australian National Parks and Wildlife Service
ASCOT	Australian Standing Committee on Tourism
ATC	Australian Tourism Commission
BIE	Bureau of Industry Economics
CCNT	Conservation Commission of the Northern Territory
CDEP	Community Development Employment Program
CLC	Central Land Council
CPSLT	Cobourg Peninsula Sanctuary Land Trust
DAA	Department of Aboriginal Affairs
DEET	Department of Employment, Education and Training
DEIR	Department of Employment and Industrial Relations
FACTS	Financial Advisory Consulting & Training Pty Ltd
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HKF	Harris, Kerr, Forster and Company Ltd
MLA	Member of the (NT) Legislative Assembly
NEAT	National Employment and Training Scheme
NLC	Northern Land Council
NT	Northern Territory
NIDC	Northern Territory Development Corporation
NTTC	Northern Territory Tourist Commission
POA	Project Officers Account
POM	Plan of Management
RUM	Ranger Uranium Mines
TLC	Tiwi Land Council
TPA	Tourist Promotion Association
YC	Yulara Corporation
YDC	Yulara Development Corporation

Map 1 The case study communities in the Northern Territory

Introduction

This study examines the relationship between Aborigines, tourism, and development in the north of Australia. The geographic focus is on the Northern Territory for the following reasons:

1. Aboriginal people own a number of important tourist destinations in this region.
2. The NT government, and more specifically the NT Tourism Commission, have aggressively marketed the Northern Territory as the primary location in Australia where 'Aboriginal cultural tourism' can be experienced.
3. The Aboriginal population constitutes a significant proportion of the NT population (22 per cent) and owns a significant part of the NT (currently about 34 per cent) under inalienable freehold title.
4. The NT was administered until 1978 by the federal government. Historically, the NT has been an area where the potential for Aboriginal involvement in tourism has been recognised at least since the mid 1960s.
5. The Northern Territory is a region of north Australia for which statistical information is readily available. The availability of quantitative data is important for comparative purposes.
6. Many Aboriginal people in the NT have been able to maintain a distinct Aboriginal identity and way of life.

Over the years, direct Aboriginal participation in tourism has been limited. Even today most Aboriginal people appear extremely reluctant to participate in the industry- there are probably fewer than one hundred Aboriginal people in the NT directly involved in tourism enterprises, as owners, managers or employees.

This lack of involvement has been noted by two recent and influential reports. The *Report of the Review of Aboriginal*

Employment and Training Programs (Miller 1985) included a section on Aboriginal participation (or lack of participation) in tourism. Similarly the recently completed *Australian Government Inquiry into Tourism* (Kennedy 1987) included a brief section that dealt specifically with Aboriginal involvement in tourism.

Central concerns

The broad concerns addressed in this monograph have been articulated by Aboriginal people themselves, frequently through their advisers and political organisations.

Aboriginal people readily acknowledge that they lack an adequate understanding of the nature of the tourism industry. This ranges from broad sociological issues like why tourists (especially from overseas) actually visit, to more specific economic matters like what constitutes a commercially viable tourism enterprise. Aboriginal people also lack comprehensive information on the financial returns received by groups that are involved in the industry. Views expressed range across a wide spectrum: some groups are convinced that tourism represents a panacea for all their economic problems, that it is a veritable gold mine that merely needs to be tapped; others take the exact opposite and pessimistic view that there is nothing that Aboriginal people can get out of the industry and that even if enterprises are profitable it will be non-Aboriginal people who will accrue the financial benefits. Groups that are optimistic about the potential of the tourism industry ponder how one begins to get involved. People emphasised these points at all the locations visited during the fieldwork phase of this project.

Propositions

These concerns can be expressed as three propositions which can be empirically tested. These are:

1. Tourism is a rapidly expanding sector of the economy, yet there is limited direct Aboriginal involvement. Why is this the case? Is it a structural issue linked to the nature of the industry or the location of Aboriginal communities; a cultural issue linked to the

nature of contemporary Aboriginal society; or an economic issue linked to a general absence of Aboriginal involvement in business enterprises?

2. Has the *Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act, 1976* provided Aboriginal people with leverage to take part in commercial developments in the tourism sector? There is no doubt that in the final report of the Aboriginal Land Rights Commission, Woodward (1974) intended that Aboriginal people should use their statutory rights to land to improve their marginal economic status. Is there a correlation between people's rights in land and the extent of their involvement in the tourism industry?
3. Assuming that tourism develops into a leading sector of northern development, there will be growing political pressure on Aboriginal interests to allow full exploitation of this resource. Can Aboriginal people effectively control tourism development by participation in commercial developments or in the management of the national parks that they own?

Assumptions

The research in this study is predicated on a number of assumptions:

1. The economic status of the Aboriginal population is characterised by a high dependence on the welfare state. As a consequence of this, formal economic status is marginal, with Aboriginal people experiencing far higher levels of formal unemployment than non-Aboriginal people and a far lower income status.
2. On the other hand, there is an increasing tendency for Aboriginal involvement in the informal economy, particularly in hunting, fishing and gathering activities, to be recognised (Blanchard 1987). Participation in these activities means that real economic status is sometimes significantly higher than formal economic status measured by social indicators (Altman and Taylor 1988).
3. The marginal economic status of Aboriginal communities is of concern to some Aboriginal people. These people want

employment and other commercial opportunities to improve their standard of living, to reduce inactivity (and associated social problems) and to reduce welfare dependency (Altman and Dillon 1986).

4. The current federal government commitment to longer term employment equity (incorporated in the Aboriginal Employment Development Policy) will be sustained in the immediate future.
5. In the longer run Aboriginal communities will come under increasing pressure from both federal and NT governments to become more financially self-sufficient. This pressure will be linked to a broad policy shift to decrease the subvention of north Australia by the Commonwealth.

Limits of the study

This study examines the actual and potential economic impact of tourism, and the role that this industry could play in changing Aboriginal people's dependence on the state and marginal economic status. But at another level it is recognised that 'economic development' means different things in different cultures, and that it can also mean different things to different people within a heterogeneous Aboriginal society. Some Aboriginal people want limited contact with non-Aboriginal society, irrespective of potential financial rewards, while others are looking for means to achieve economic equality.

Environmental impacts

The impact of mass tourism on the natural environment or on heritage sites is not a primary concern of this study, partly because research has already been undertaken on this aspect of the impact of tourism (see for example, Gillespie [1983]; Sullivan [1984]; Gale and Jacobs [1987]; and CLC et al. [1987]). Nevertheless, it must be emphasised that a key concern of many Aboriginal people is that tourism will have a negative impact on their 'culture'. This concern is not only limited to sacred sites (the religious environment) but also to sites of cultural, historical and economic significance.

Social impacts

Similarly, the study is not primarily about social impact assessment. I do not believe that social impacts from tourism can be differentiated from the social impacts of other white intrusions (invited or uninvited) into Aboriginal society. This statement is made despite the fact that I have participated in two interdisciplinary studies (the East Kimberley Impact Assessment Project [EKIAP in press] and the Ayers Rock Region Tourism Impact Study [CLC et al. 1987]) that have attempted to assess social, and other, impacts.

The fact that this is not a social impact assessment does not mean that social dimensions will be ignored. Both the theoretical perspectives and the methodology used here (see below), emphasise that economic, political, social, and cultural dimensions of tourism developments are inter-dependent. But there are limits to the focus of any one study, and the emphasis here is on economic issues.

Definitions

Definitions of the three broad parameters that are included in the title of this monograph are provided here to avoid any confusion. These definitions are introductory and therefore simplified; each is discussed in more detail in subsequent chapters.

Aborigines

The term 'Aboriginal' is used throughout in its 'official' sense - an Aboriginal person is someone who self-identifies as an Aboriginal and is accepted as such by her/his immediate social milieu. This is a social rather than racial or genetic definition of Aboriginality.

Aboriginal people live in a number of different locations that include Aboriginal townships (so described because the majority of the population is Aboriginal and the town's location is on Aboriginal land), in predominantly white townships (with either integrated or segregated living arrangements), on pastoral stations (Aboriginal or white owned) and at outstations and homelands, usually on Aboriginal land.

Aboriginal people also live within national parks; indeed the majority of the cases examined in Part B deal with Aboriginal communities at such localities. Almost all the cases deal with Aboriginal people who either own the land on which they reside or have special residential rights. This feature is of some consequence because under the *Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act*, 1976 people must establish traditional Aboriginal ownership of land when claiming it under the Act. Traditional Aboriginal ownership is based on religious (common spiritual affiliation to sites) and economic (entitlement to forage by Aboriginal tradition) considerations. The residents of the communities studied are frequently traditional owners of Aboriginal land.

The case studies deal with Aboriginal people who are predominantly tradition-oriented. In other words, their world view remains informed by distinctly Aboriginal social and cultural systems, which feature a socio-centric kinship system and complex social networks, a ritual system, a complex land ownership system and varying degrees of involvement in the subsistence economy. It is important to note that these people frequently live in remote parts of the Australian continent that have only recently been developed as tourist destinations, primarily for 'environmental tourism' (Smith 1978a:2). There is a direct correlation between people who continue to pursue lifestyles that are primarily informed by 'traditional' or 'pre-contact' beliefs and values and the remoteness and tourism appeal of the land in which they live.

The Aboriginal population should be recognised as being heterogeneous. All too often Aborigines are treated as a uniform pressure group or constituency, but there are differences in people's attitudes and aspirations that range from tradition-orientation to modernity-orientation. Such factors have a bearing on attitudes to commercial developments on Aboriginal land.

Tourism

Tourism is a concept that is difficult to define; indeed its definition is highly dependent on a researcher's aims. In the anthropology of tourism, a tourist is defined as 'a temporarily leisured person who voluntarily visits a place away from home for the purpose of experiencing a change' (Smith 1978a:2). In the economics of

tourism, visitors are not differentiated according to the nature of their activities. Hence business travellers, travellers visiting kin and even day-trippers are regarded as tourists because they utilise similar goods and services. The tourism industry is not a discrete industry but the sum of all goods and services utilised by travellers (see Chapter 1 for further discussion).

The anthropology of tourism does differentiate various forms of tourism, depending on the type of leisure activity the visitor pursues. These include ethnic, cultural, historical, environmental and recreational tourism (Smith 1978a:2-3). In the Australian context, the term 'cultural tourism' is used in a manner that is analogous to the term 'ethnic tourism' as used in the tourism literature. According to Smith (ibid:2) ethnic tourism is marketed to the public in terms of the quaint customs of indigenous and often exotic people. Destination activities include visits to native homes and villages, observation of dances and ceremonies and shopping for primitive wares and curios. In Australia, ethnic (= cultural) tourism is invariably inter-linked with historical, environmental, and recreational tourism.

The economics of tourism establishes that involvement in this industry is rarely different from other forms of involvement in the services sector. In this sense, whether the customer is local or non-local makes little difference, differing tastes and possible communication problems aside. In the north Australian context, the tourism industry provides accommodation, meals, tours, transport and entertainment to visitors. (Inter-industry linkages between tourism and other sectors of a regional economy are discussed in more detail in Chapter 1.) Some important features of tourism are that:

1. It is an extremely demanding service industry, with seasonal peaks and troughs. As in all services, the customer is always right; in the tourism industry services must be available seven days a week, 24 hours a day. This means that the industry can be extremely labour intensive, demanding and relentless.
2. The lead times in the industry are long and it is generally assumed that it will take three years (at a minimum) for a new tourism enterprise to become established and financially viable.

As an investment option, tourism can be risky, and returns can be relatively low when contrasted with other opportunities.

3. The quality of services provided is constantly being assessed by the visitor, particularly if on holiday. Comparisons are frequently made with other destinations, both in terms of quality of the experience and value for money. Reputations in this industry (positive or negative) are established quickly and circulated widely.

Development

The term 'development' is included in this monograph's title because the issue of tourism and Aborigines cannot be separated from 'the development debate'. However the term is extremely problematic and it is used in different contexts to mean very different things.

Development in the Australian context invariably refers to a process whereby the material well-being of a population (national, state, regional, community) is improved. The concept of development implies change and has connotations of progression. Implicit assumptions that are made (particularly by policy makers) are that 'quality of life' variables are given due consideration in the development processes and that changes for the better will inevitably occur, even in cross-cultural settings.

In the Northern Territory, which Heatley (1986:226) refers to as 'underdeveloped', the term development is generally used as a synonym for economic growth. The NT is often depicted as a part of Australia with enormous potential for economic development, with the mining and tourism sectors being regarded as leading sectors. However, it is also highly dependent on the rest of Australia for budget subventions, and development is seen as a means to decrease the currently high degree of financial dependence on Canberra.

The pursuit of unbridled economic growth termed 'developmentalism' is being increasingly challenged in the 1980s (Head 1986:55). At the vanguard of this challenge to mainstream values are pressure groups like environmentalists and supporters of

Aboriginal land rights. However, in the NT there is bipartisan political support for development because this part of Australia is still perceived to be 'the frontier'; many non-Aboriginal Territorians move there primarily in a quest for material betterment.

As will be shown in Chapter 3, while the main political parties in the NT are extremely 'pro-development', Aboriginal interests (often represented by land councils) are generally regarded as 'anti-development'. It has been argued elsewhere that Aboriginal interests are not anti-development, but are required by legislation to be balanced in assessing development options (Altman and Dillon 1988). Land rights legislation allows Aboriginal people to 'veto' development on their land if they so choose. This statutory right means that Aboriginal people are frequently cautious in their assessment of the potential economic benefits from development; furthermore, potential social and environmental costs are given due consideration.

Within the Aboriginal population there are advocates for and against development. Indeed the evidence presented in Part B of this study shows that there are Aboriginal groups who are clearly pro-development and who are inviting tourist operators onto their land despite their right of veto. The section of the Aboriginal population who reside at outstations and homelands are often seen as being anti-development. They represent about a third of the NT Aboriginal population and about 10 per cent of the total NT population; the majority live on Aboriginal land. It would be inaccurate, however, to depict these people as 'anti-development' per se; rather they should be seen as making conscious (and frequently well informed) decisions about alternative land use. Many outstation people are involved in a land extensive subsistence economy that is incompatible with tourism (or other) development; they are using their property rights to choose a lifestyle that they believe to be economically and otherwise superior to the other options available.

This study assesses economic development options available to Aboriginal people in the tourism industry in a balanced way. It will be emphasised throughout that economic development has social and cultural as well as commercial components; it is not just about economic growth, increased cash income and increased formal

employment, but also about levels of living, political power and future options.

The conceptual framework

The conceptual framework for this study is informed by the theoretical perspectives of economic anthropology and political economy. This framework allows an investigation of both mainstream and Aboriginal economic institutions and micro-economic and macro-economic issues. The core of the monograph are the case studies in Part B; this part is heavily dependent on the research methods of economic anthropology. The introductory and concluding parts raise a host of wider policy concerns that are investigated by the use of a political economy approach.

Economic anthropology

Economic anthropology involves the comparative analysis of the principles and practices governing production, consumption, distribution, and exchange in different societies. In this sub-discipline it is assumed that economic activity is an integral part of any society's political, social, religious, and cultural institutions. While the separation of the economy from other spheres of human activity is a problematic heuristic abstraction, it can be justified as a means to narrow the scope of investigation. The hallmarks of economic anthropology are an emphasis on primary data collection by participant observation methods. Historically, this has been associated with an emphasis on micro-economics, and the study of small scale societies where non-capitalist relations of production dominate.

In recent years, it has been recognised by economic anthropologists that the broad concepts (like 'tribal', 'peasant' and 'capitalist') used to distinguish different economic systems are becoming increasingly ambiguous. For example, the attention here is on the contemporary Aboriginal economy in the Northern Territory. Traditionally, this economy based on hunting and gathering would have been defined as 'tribal'. But today, some Aboriginal people could be called capitalist (in that they employ wage labourers); many are highly dependent on the welfare state

for employment or social security support. Nevertheless, 'tribal' relations of production (evident, for example, in the ownership of land by local descent groups) continue to be of great importance.

It is clear that to adequately analyse contemporary economies requires an understanding of diverse economic forms. While the pre-contact Aboriginal hunter-gatherer economy has been irreversibly transformed with white colonisation of the north, the extent of this transformation has been ameliorated by the role of the state. Involvement in tourism means an incorporation of the Aboriginal economy into the regional mainstream economy, as a part of the world economy; this will result in further economic and social transformations.

It was noted above that the separation of the economy from other spheres of human activity is problematic. The extent that such separation can be undertaken for analytical purposes varies between societies. It will become clear in Part B of this study that economic decisions among Aboriginal people are frequently informed by non-economic considerations that are of primary significance from the emic (Aboriginal) perspective. For example, an Aboriginal community may decide to reject a lucrative tourism development project because of a perceived threat to an important sacred site. This is potentially an environmental or social impact issue, but it has ramifications for economic decision-making.

Political economy

Political economy refers to a 'school of thought' that has re-emerged within the discipline of political science in the 1970s and 1980s. This school of thought is divided into radical and non-radical branches. Radical political economy, in the Australian context, is generally associated with dependency theory and neo-marxist articulation theory. Non-radical political economy, refers more to a research methodology than to a strict theoretical position. The non-radical perspective has developed from a dissatisfaction with mainstream economics, which frequently ignores the political dimension. This perspective attempts to integrate the political and economic aspects of decision-making in empirical studies. This is achieved by the careful linking of economic processes with the political and vice versa.

Parts A and C of this study are heavily influenced by this 'non-radical' political economy approach. For example, it is shown that economic policy making in the tourism arena cannot be divorced from political processes. The primary emphasis in political economy in Australia is often on formal party politics at federal and state government levels, but it is increasingly recognised that informal politics (influenced primarily by pressure groups) can be of great significance.

Certainly the research topic 'Aborigines, tourism, and development' is enmeshed with a number of contentious issues such as Aboriginal land rights, federally-run national parks, the uranium debate, and environmental protection. At a formal political level various policy positions are taken by federal and NT political parties and by 'paragovernmental' bodies like Aboriginal land councils. At an informal level, there are a range of pressure groups representing Aboriginal, business, and environmental interests. These political aspects of decision-making will be addressed in Chapter 3, where 'the politics of tourism development' is discussed.

While a 'rational choice' approach is not central to this study, it is assumed that individual Aborigines hold certain points of view about tourism development. Individual views are informed by a range of economic and non-economic factors, although it is highly likely that people have incomplete knowledge when forming such views. Individuals' views are subsequently moulded into a group position through local political processes that may include Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal mechanisms. Group decisions are articulated in the wider polity by political parties, or more commonly, by a variety of Aboriginal organisations.

Methodology

This study's key methodological feature is its reliance on participant observation to collect primary data. A range of other methods were used to collect secondary material. These include searches of contemporary and historical file material within a number of government departments and statutory authorities, analysis of official statistical material, and interviews with people in bureaucracies, governments, Aboriginal organisations, and industry.

Fieldwork and participant observation

What does participant observation mean in a study of Aborigines, tourism and development? During my fieldwork I often found myself asking this question. The fieldwork locations varied enormously and included periods of residence within Aboriginal communities (as at Mutitjulu in Uluru National Park) or within mining towns (like Jabiru) where I felt a part of the host community; residing in regional centres like Alice Springs and Darwin where one's links were primarily with the black and white bureaucracies; or participant observing as a tourist - climbing Ayers Rock, observing sunset over Uluru on a dune called 'sunset strip', boating on Yellow Waters at Kakadu or watching a performance by the Andutjmi dancing troupe at Springvale Homestead near Katherine. Fellow travellers, particularly the 'overlanders', were certainly the easiest to approach for opinions about the tourism industry. People working in the industry were always forthcoming at interviews, although they showed concern that a researcher who was interested in the economic impact of tourism on Aboriginal communities, would not understand the hard realities of the industry or give the industry a sympathetic hearing.

And then there were Aboriginal people. They fell into numerous categories - people who felt that they could not influence tourism growth; people who just did not understand the industry; people who had totally unrealistic financial expectations; and people who were determined that tourism development would occur in a manner that was compatible with their priorities. This diversity required me to approach interviews and group discussions wearing many different hats and to adjust my supposedly impartial position extremely quickly at times. Generally in discussion, if people had totally unrealistic expectations, I tried to inform them about the commercial realities of tourism; if people were resigned to tourism growth, I reminded them of their rights; if they did not understand the industry, I frequently found that I was the one being interviewed for information. At times people felt that I was an advocate for the tourism industry and I tried to explain my research interests.

The multiple roles that I had to play to collect information made life complex sometimes. I remember turning up to interview

the manager of the Sheraton Hotel at Yulara the night after a concert had been disrupted by a handful of Aborigines, and being made to feel somehow responsible for this disruption; or scrubbing myself up at the public ablution facilities at the Mutitjulu community prior to heading off to interview the general manager of the Yulara Corporation. Among my most enjoyable interactions with both Aboriginal people and tourists were the few days that I spent assisting at the Maruku Craft Camp within Uluru National Park, engaging tourists and Maruku staff in informal conversations about cultural tourism in Australia and about the development of the north. On more than one occasion tourists asked why I was assisting with the sale of items when I was not an Aborigine; on one occasion a Maruku craft adviser was accused of 'ripping off the natives'. There were numerous colourful episodes during fieldwork.

Measuring economic impact

Most of the primary data collected during this study used a methodology that I adopted working at Uluru National Park in August 1985 (Altman 1987a). This methodology is based on a combination of the multiplier approach and cost-benefit analysis. At each community visited, an attempt was made to measure the direct and indirect impacts of tourism in both benefit and cost terms. At most locations though, I was unable to collect the amount of quantitative data which I had collected for Uluru because I only spent a short time at each place. At the very least, I tried to gather information on employment patterns and household incomes so as to be able to differentiate the direct and indirect impacts of tourism from other impacts. These quantitative data were gathered by conducting household censuses, employment and income surveys, and analyses of local business records, whenever possible. Information was collected with the assistance of key co-researchers within each community.

Other information was less amenable to rigorous collection. For example, some of the positive impacts of tourism development included people's improved access to goods and services and resultant community economic well-being. With such variables, one can only comment on the differences in comparison to other Aboriginal (and non-Aboriginal) communities. Similarly, information on people's economic aspirations, both within and

outside the tourism industry, could only be gleaned from formal interviews and informal conversations. However, the tendency (as is often the case with short-term field research) was to speak with community leaders and advisers - the overall coverage is far from comprehensive and makes no pretence to represent the views of either the 'average' Aboriginal person or all Aboriginal people.

The itinerary

Three periods of fieldwork were undertaken. The first and last were short periods spent in Alice Springs and in the Ayers Rock region in August 1985 and November 1986. The main field research was undertaken over a five month period that began in April and ended in September 1986. In November 1987 a brief period was spent in Darwin to update information collected on the extent of Aboriginal involvement in tourism. The following is a synopsis of the fieldwork itinerary:

August 1985	Fieldwork at Uluru National Park, Alice Springs
April 1986	Fieldwork at Uluru National Park, Alice Springs
May 1986	Fieldwork at Uluru National Park, Yulara, Kings Canyon
June 1986	Residence in Darwin and Jabiru; fieldwork at Gurig and Kakadu National Parks.
July 1986	Residence at Jabiru and Darwin, fieldwork in Kakadu National Park, Maningrida region, Melville and Bathurst Islands
August 1986	Fieldwork in Katherine, Springvale, Kununurra, Warmun, Halls Creek, Broome, Derby, and Perth
September 1986	Perth
November 1986	Fieldwork at Uluru National Park; visit to Imanpa
November 1987	Visit to Darwin to update data
August 1988	Visit to Darwin to update data.

It should be noted that the primary research undertaken from the time I crossed the NT border into Western Australia is recorded elsewhere (Altman 1987b). However, the experience gained and data collected in the Kimberleys, and in Perth, have influenced the discussions in Parts A and C of this study.

Limitations

Academics are usually reluctant to identify the methodological limitations of their research. This monograph has its limitations. The total period of fieldwork is inadequate; one needs much more than six months in north Australia to do justice to such a broad ranging topic. The researcher always faces a dilemma: should the study emphasise one location or aim for a broad sweep? The number of cases and the fieldwork itinerary for this investigation are based on my tradeoff between longer term research at a particular location and short periods at various places, with overall financial and time constraints in mind. I never left a case study location without feeling that the research visit was too short to collect the information needed.

Similarly, one frequently faces a dilemma about whether to gather quantitative data (essential for economic considerations) or qualitative data (essential for policy considerations). To get hold of the former frequently requires careful negotiation; to collect qualitative information is never easy with short-term fieldwork as there is insufficient time to build up trusting relationships with locals. I also felt particularly inhibited working at high visitor destinations like Uluru and Kakadu; it seemed that local people had enough intrusions into their lives without facing a researcher's inquiries. It is particularly important to note that I was unable to collect quantitative data on subsistence activities owing to the short-term nature of each visit.

In such a research project there are also numerous and variable interest groups with whom to negotiate. Without being too specific, it should be mentioned that the welcome I received as an independent researcher at different locations was variable. This was partly linked to how I was perceived by 'host' communities and organisations and partly to quite arbitrary factors like the primacy my research was given vis-à-vis a host of other pressing priorities. The variability in the case study material presented in Part B is based on the extent of tourism development at each location; on the time I spent at each place; and on the extent of local co-operation.

Outline

This study is divided into three inter-related parts. It is envisaged that different audiences will find different parts of primary interest depending on their objectives, their disciplinary backgrounds, their occupations, and so on.

Part A: Wider issues

Part A sets the issue of 'Aborigines, tourism and development' in a broader context. In Chapter 1, a national perspective on tourism in the Australian economy, and the policy prescriptions for Aboriginal involvement in the industry, are reviewed. Chapter 2 concentrates on the Northern Territory and discusses the role of both tourism and Aborigines in the regional economy. Chapter 3 investigates the politics of tourism development, or the 'tourism development debate' in the Northern Territory context.

Part B: Case studies

Part B forms the substantive part of this monograph. It is based on research at Aboriginal communities. The emphasis in each of the five chapters is on the current economic impact of tourism on each region visited, and the future potential for Aboriginal involvement in the tourism industry. Chapter 4 deals with the Mutitjulu community located within Uluru National Park, while Chapter 5 investigates the wider impacts of tourism at Uluru (and Yulara) on other Aboriginal communities in central Australia. Chapter 6 outlines the situation in Kakadu National Park, while Chapter 7 looks at nearby Gurig National Park. In Chapter 8, the somewhat different situation at Melville and Bathurst Islands is examined.

Part C: Conclusions

Chapter 9, the last chapter, addresses a range of tourism policy issues. It is important to emphasise that this range of topics is based on my own ranking of pertinent issues; it reveals my own agenda setting, and not that of any other individual or institution. The emphasis is on the political and economic leverage that the federal Land Rights Act has bestowed on Aboriginal interests and the Aboriginal role in the provision of cultural tourism.

The conclusion is aimed at policy makers in general, but more specifically at those who formulate tourism policies at national, Territory, regional, and local levels, that directly impinge on Aboriginal people. This emphasis on Aboriginal affairs is taken intentionally because there is a significant research void in this area. However, the perspective taken throughout is independent and divorced from restrictions that may be imposed by any interest group, be it federal or NT, black or white, or the tourism industry itself. Throughout the monograph every effort is made to canvass a wide range of views in a dispassionate manner.

Part A

Wider issues

Chapter 1

Australian tourism and Aborigines

The Australian Tourist Commission (ATC) has forecasted that over two million inbound tourists will visit Australia in 1988. In the past decade there has been a rapid growth in the economic significance of tourism. This is a reflection of the stagnation of other sectors of the Australian economy, but is also due to the recent discovery of Australia as a tourist destination by north Americans and north Asians. Only recently has the federal government come to recognise that tourism is an important component of the nation's economy, generating employment and export earnings. Tourism has been accepted as an important sector of the economy because it appears to be relatively impervious to the domestic and international recessions of the last few years; its growth has been counter-cyclical.

While tourism is a growing industry, tourism research in this country is in its infancy; it was only after the *Report of the Australian Government Inquiry into Tourism* (Kennedy 1987) that a Bureau of Tourism Research was established within the Department of the Arts, Sport, the Environment, Tourism and Territories.

As already stated, the emphasis in this monograph is on the relationship between Aborigines and the tourism industry, and the role that tourism may play in the economic advancement of Australia's indigenous minority. The study's completion in 1988, when different sections of the Australian population either celebrate or protest the arrival of the First Fleet some two hundred years ago, is somewhat paradoxical. At one level, tourism development represents a new invasion. It is important that Australia's indigenous minority are informed about the tourism invasion if they are to avoid further economic and political marginalisation. At another level though, many Aboriginal groups have statutory rights, not available to them in 1788, that will allow them greater controls over this 'invasion'. Alternatively, Aboriginal communities, groups or individuals may choose to convert these rights to commercial gain.

This chapter investigates the development of tourism at the national level. In the next chapter, the focus is shifted more directly onto the Northern Territory. The aim is not only to establish the economic significance of tourism to the nation, but also to ascertain federal government policies influencing the role of Aboriginal people in this industry.

Defining the tourism industry

The *Report of the Australian Government Inquiry into Tourism* (or the Kennedy Report) notes that the term 'tourist industry' is a misnomer. It shows that tourism is never one discrete industry, but a collection of 'inter-industry goods and services which constitute the travel experience' (Kennedy 1987:11). A definition of 'the tourist industry' should include all the industries that either wholly, primarily, partially, incidentally or accidentally provide a range of goods and services to tourists.

Defining a tourist

As Kennedy (1987:11) notes, the definition of tourism varies considerably. In economic studies, all travellers are generally defined as tourists because they use a similar range of goods and services irrespective if they are on business, on holiday, in transit or visiting kin or friends. In Australia, there has been a shift to standardise the definition of tourism in economic studies to be consistent with the definition used by the Bureau of Industry Economics (BIE) in *Tourist Expenditure in Australia* (1984).

The BIE (1984:1) defines tourist trips to include all overnight and certain day trips undertaken by Australian residents and all visits to Australia off less than 12 months duration by overseas residents. Specifically a tourist is defined as:

a person who undertakes travel, for any reason, involving a stay away from his or her usual place of residence for at least one night; or a person who undertakes a pleasure trip involving a stay away from home for at least four hours during daylight, and involving a round trip distance of at least 50 kilometres; however for trips to national parks, state and forest reserves, museums, historical parks, animal parks and other man-made attractions, the distance limitation does not apply (BIE 1984:1).

The breadth of this definition means that numerous components of the national economy contribute to 'the tourism industry'. Or alternatively, the tourist industry is highly fragmented. Hence while accommodation suppliers and many transport operators are by definition wholly a part of the tourism industry (in so far as they ensure that people either stay away overnight or travel more than fifty kilometres away from their usual place of residence), other businesses like retailers and restaurants are only partially in the industry as they frequently cater for non-tourists. Rather obviously this raises an important locational (or spatial) consideration; any business that is located at or near a tourist resort will be a part of the industry and conversely any business that is located at a major centre where there are permanent residents will only be partially or incidentally involved. Indeed it is difficult to envisage a business that is wholly involved in tourism because all provide some goods or services to local residents even at remote resorts like Yulara. It is also a fact that the Australian tourism industry extends beyond the nation's border, because goods and services used by tourists in Australia often originate, at least in part, overseas.

Recent tourism growth

Tourism statistics are generally divided into inbound or international visitors and domestic travellers. The former are enumerated in number of visitors, the latter in terms of trips. This distinction occurs primarily because it is possible to keep a record of international arrivals and departures, while it is impossible to collect comprehensive information on domestic tourism. Estimates of domestic tourism are invariably based on sample surveys.

Available national statistics

There is a general dearth of accurate and strictly comparable information on tourism in Australia. While the breadth incorporated in the above BIE definition of tourism is useful for economic impact studies, it is not used in regularly updated data bases on domestic and international tourist numbers.

Data on domestic tourism are presented annually in the *Domestic Tourism Monitor*, which is an on-going Australia-wide

household survey that is designed to monitor inter-state and intra-state travel patterns. Currently the survey is conducted by McNair Anderson. In this survey, the emphasis is on enumerating 'trips', defined as a stay of one or more nights, but less than three months away from home. A trip involves a journey of a least forty kilometres away from home for any reason (usually holidays, business and to visit friends and relatives) except when related to such things as semi-permanent employment. In its publication *Domestic Travel and Tourism Survey, 1983* (Cat. No. 9216.0) the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) use a somewhat different definition; they define a 'person trip' as a journey in Australia which involves a person aged 15 or over staying away for at least one night from a usual place of residence (ABS 1985).

Information on international visitors are collected by the ABS and published in the quarterly publication *Overseas Arrivals and Departures, Australia* (Cat. No. 3402.0). These statistics are collected from information on Incoming and Outgoing Passenger Cards. The statistics relate to the number of movements of travellers rather than the number of travellers. However they do exclude crews of planes and ships and transit passengers. Figures that are published on movement by air are largely based on sampling and are subject to error. Nevertheless the category 'Arrivals, short-term movement, overseas visitors' is used by the ATC as the estimate of international visitor numbers.

International tourism

Time series information on short-term overseas arrivals indicates that this sector of the tourism industry has grown rapidly in the past 15 years. In 1972, about 400,000 overseas visitors came to Australia. In calendar year 1984, this figure exceeded one million visitors, and by 1986 totalled 1,429,400. The latest ATC estimates for 1987 indicate that overseas visitors will total about 1.7 million visitors.

Domestic tourism

In the period since 1972, domestic tourism has grown more slowly than international tourism from 26 million trips to an estimated 45.2 million trips in 1985/86 (ASCOT n.d.). The ABS, using their

definition of a trip, estimated that in 1983 52.1 million person trips, or 39 million household trips (defined as a journey taken by one or more members of a household) were made in Australia (ABS 1985:4).

Future projections

The future growth of tourism in Australia is dependent on numerous demand and supply side factors both in Australia and overseas. The demand for Australia as a tourist destination for overseas visitors appears to be increasing, particularly in north-east Asia (Japan) and in north America. There is no doubt that with continued economic growth in the newly industrialised countries, people will be looking to Australia as a holiday destination. For people in north-east Asia, the attractions of Australia are its sheer size and relative underpopulation. Other factors, like Australia's currency depreciation in the early 1980s and its isolation from international terrorism, have also made it an increasingly popular destination. International visitor numbers are estimated by the ATC to exceed two million in 1988, the target established in their *Three Year Strategic Overview 1985-88* (ATC 1985). Kennedy (1987:14) calculated that the annual average growth rate of overseas visitor arrivals was 9.9 per cent for the 1965 to 1984 period and projected that if growth continued at this rate, Australia could expect 4,708,400 visitors by the year 2000. The 1986/87 annual report of the Australian Tourism Industry Association estimates more optimistically that there will be five million overseas visitors to Australia by the year 2000 (*The Canberra Times*, 30 September 1987). It appears that Australia is increasingly being integrated into the international tourism circuit.

There are few estimates of future growth in domestic tourism, although recent trends indicate that growth is slow. This can be linked to recent declines in real income levels in Australia.

While there may be reason to be optimistic about Australia's tourism prospects, it is also important to note that 'the tourism industry' is susceptible to massive fluctuations. This has been noted the BIE (1984) and Kennedy (1987). International tourism demand in particular is both highly income elastic and liable to unpredictable change in consumer demand. Even in the regional

context Australia faces keen competition as a tourist destination for international visitors from New Zealand, the Pacific Islands, and Indonesia.

The economic impact of tourism

It is often more straightforward to analyse the economic impact of tourism than to enumerate actual tourist numbers, because comparable measures, like dollar expenditure by tourists and jobs created by tourism, are used in economic impact analysis. However, there has been little systematic research in Australia on the economic impact of tourism on the national economy. The most comprehensive studies have been two reports by the Bureau of Industry Economics on the impact of tourism on the Australian economy (BIE 1979; 1984). The latter report, which was based on a survey of expenditure on domestic travel in 1981/82, provides the most up-to-date information available.

Impact on the national economy

The BIE (1984) estimates that in the 12 months to September 1982, domestic tourists in Australia spent \$8200 million on overnight trips and \$1800 million on day trips. A further \$1100 million was spent by domestic travellers on travel-related expenses (equipment, holiday homes, vehicle costs). Gross receipts from foreign tourists added another \$1600 million to give a gross tourism expenditure of \$12,700 million. Net expenditure, after deducting transfers and imports was \$9500 (BIE 1984:3).

The BIE (1984:3-4) notes that further deductions must be made from net tourist expenditure to calculate tourism's proportion of Gross Domestic Product at factor cost. In particular, the value of (indirect) imports that went into the Australian production of goods and services consumed by tourists must be deducted as must indirect taxes levied on goods consumed by tourists. Expenditure net of indirect taxes and all imports totalled an estimated \$7000 million in 1981/82 or 4.8 per cent of gross domestic product at factor cost. Tourism expenditure generated employment for 338,000 persons or 5.2 per cent of the Australian workforce.

More recently, Kennedy (1987:13) estimates that tourism expenditure generated 370,000 full and part-time jobs in 1985/86. Overall employment generated, including employment in the construction of new tourism and related infrastructure, totalled about 400,000 jobs. In attempting to establish the overall economic significance of tourism, the Kennedy Report (1987:12) notes that this industry's value was equivalent to the combined contribution of textile, footwear, clothing, and motor vehicle manufacturing industries to the Australian economy.

The economic significance of international tourism is greater than its estimated share (of about 13 per cent) of total tourism expenditure. The reasons for this are that overseas tourist expenditure has a positive impact on the balance of payments, and that expenditure by overseas tourists has a more significant impact, as overseas dollars constitute an injection to the national economy which does not have a transfer expenditure component. In other words, a component of domestic tourism expenditure would have occurred elsewhere in the national economy, whereas the transfer component of overseas tourism would have accrued to other countries. Of course, Australia also loses revenue when Australians travel overseas. Since late 1986, short-term overseas arrivals to Australia have exceeded departures by residents reversing a trend established over several decades. It is important to note that domestic tourism is of critical importance to the tourism industry because it provides revenue for businesses (particularly in the accommodation sector) during off-peak periods. Without domestic tourism many tourism enterprises would not be commercially viable.

Multipliers: national versus regional impacts

As already noted, the term 'tourism industry' is a generic expression rather than a definition of a homogeneous entity (BIE 1979). As Cooper and Pigram (1984:12) note, the economic significance of tourism varies sectorally with the type of activity and with the characteristics of the participants. It was illustrated above that while some industries provide goods and services primarily for tourists, others only participate incidentally. Similarly, there are differences in the spending characteristics of tourists; in general, overseas visitors spend more per day than

domestic travellers and are consequently more desirable consumers for tourism businesses. The components that constitute the tourism industry are widespread in themselves. But as in all other industries, tourism expenditures also have multiplier effects.

The BIE (1984:64) indicates that tourism multipliers (like all multipliers) have direct, indirect, and induced effects on the national economy. Suppliers of goods and services to tourists experience the direct effects, while those who provide inputs into the goods and services purchased by tourists experience the indirect effects. These effects are expressed in terms of income or employment multipliers- or how much income and how many jobs are generated by tourism expenditure. Direct and indirect effects can be augmented by induced effects that result from the expenditures of the beneficiaries (owners of enterprises and their employees) from tourism on consumption goods and services (BIE 1984:70). The BIE (1984:70) has argued that induced effects are largely illusory in the context of the total economy.

Multipliers measure the flow on benefits to the total economy from tourism expenditure. The BIE (1984:72-73) estimates that the income multiplier from tourism in 1981/82 was 0.556; that is \$1,000,000 of tourism expenditure generated \$556,000 of income; the remainder is either spent on transfer items (expenditure that would have occurred anyway) or else leaks into indirect taxes and imports. The direct effects of tourism expenditure account for about 65 per cent of the multiplier; these effects are felt primarily in the service sector, but also in manufacturing. Indirect effects occur in service, manufacturing, mining and rural sectors. As suggested above, the income multiplier for foreign tourism expenditure exceeds that for domestic tourism expenditure. A similar pattern emerges with employment multipliers. Overall, 26.6 jobs are generated by every million dollars of tourism expenditure, with direct employment accounting for 72 per cent of jobs generated. The majority of jobs accrue to the services sector, although some accrue to manufacturing, mining, and rural sectors. Foreign tourism expenditure again generates more jobs per dollar than domestic tourism. It is generally accepted that the tourism industry is labour intensive because it involves the services sector and because its contribution to national employment exceeds its contribution to national income. However the BIE (1984:90) shows

that employment multipliers in the tourism industry are only slightly higher than the national average for all industries.

Of particular interest are the BIE (1984:74) estimates of income and employment multipliers by state. These vary depending on the number of overseas and interstate visitors as a proportion of total visitor numbers. Tourists from within a state have a high transfer expenditure component for their home state. Three states (Queensland, WA and Tasmania) have income multipliers above the national multiplier, while only two (Queensland and WA) have employment multipliers above the national figure.

The BIE (1984:90) warns that there are variations in multipliers by state and that it is dangerous to use national or state multipliers to estimate the economic effects of tourism on smaller regions. In particular, the indirect effects of tourism are often lower the smaller the region and/or the less developed the economy. If regional self-sufficiency is high then indirect effects may be relatively high; but if regional self-sufficiency is low and/or the services and manufacturing sectors are undeveloped, leakages will be high. This is an issue that will be taken up in more detail in the next chapter when the impact of tourism on the NT economy is examined.

Multipliers measure the spin-off benefits from tourism expenditure and there is no doubt that these are invariably positive. However, a far more pertinent question, and one that is frequently ignored in policy discussions, is the opportunity costs that result from investment in tourism, particularly if higher multipliers exist in other sectors of the economy. In appraising the desirability of tourism development, limited attention is focussed on the costs of tourism. These can include environmental, social and economic costs. In particular, it does seem that the private and public sector economic costs of tourism, that can be quantified, are frequently overlooked. Private sector costs may include the cost of operating tourist plant and equipment including amortisation of investment and investment in, and maintenance of, capital plant and equipment. Public sector costs relate to the marginal costs of expanding, operating and maintaining infrastructure such as roads, water, sewerage and electricity used by tourists (Barrington

Partners 1986:29-30). It is generally assumed that so long as private sector businesses operate in the tourism sector net economic benefits exceed net costs. However such calculations frequently overlook public sector costs.

Federal and state concerns

Under Australia's federal system of government, it is not unusual for Commonwealth and state concerns to differ. What is perhaps most interesting in the tourism arena, is the increasing co-operation that is occurring between all levels of government.

The Kennedy Report (Kennedy 1987:13-14) outlines in some detail the role that the federal government perceives for the tourism sector in the structural adjustments that are occurring in the Australian economy. Over the past thirty years, Australia's performance has slipped from 8th to 23rd in world export rankings; Australia's share of world export trade has dropped from 2.6 per cent to 1.2 per cent (Kennedy 1987:20). While Australia's share of world international tourism receipts is an identical 1.2 per cent, this area has been identified by the government as a potential growth sector. Tourism is perceived to be making an important contribution to national income and employment, to have a high labour intensity with a potential to employ disadvantaged groups, to provide scope for regional development in the absence of other viable alternatives, and to require limited government intervention and subvention (Kennedy 1987:14).

The growth of international tourism has been recognised as an important component of the government's strategy to close Australia's chronic balance of payments deficit. This deficit can be reduced in a number of ways that are linked to tourism. Encouraging international visitors to come to Australia is one strategy, but discouraging Australians from travelling overseas has similar positive balance of payments effects. Another strategy is to encourage vertical industry integration so that more of the imported inputs into the tourism industry are produced in Australia. This would also have the effect of increasing the economic spin-offs from tourism for Australia. Given the federal government's interest in promoting international tourism, it is not

surprising that the ATC's role has been to promote Australia overseas.

While from the national perspective growth in overseas visitation is preferable to domestic tourism growth, from the perspectives of state and territory governments, regions, local governments, and tourism business interests there is little difference between these two components. The aims of the states and territories have been to attract both overseas and Australian visitors. In short, these lower level governments have aimed to maximise their share of the national tourism cake. For states and territories, domestic tourists are nearly as attractive as overseas tourists, except that income and employment multipliers from domestic tourism expenditures tend to be lower. However, domestic tourists must come from outside the host state or territory if their expenditures are to have a significant economic impact. This is because intra-state visitors have a marginal impact on the regional economy because of transfer expenditures. However, from the perspective of small businesses all expenditure is welcome; indeed, many operations may not be financially viable without income from intra-state trade, including day trippers.

The strategies of states and territories have rarely been integrated. The aims of policy makers and tourism bureaux staff have invariably been to maximize tourism numbers and expenditures, and to assist private developers by ensuring that public sector infrastructure development has complemented private sector investment. Kennedy (1987:176-77) summarises the state and territory investment incentives that have been provided to tourism developers. These have included grants, loans, guarantees, flexible interest rates, incentive payments, marketing subsidies and the provision of infrastructure for resorts. Increasingly, state governments are aiming to not only increase visitor numbers but also visitor length of stay, visitor expenditure and visitor return. It is also being recognised at the government level that if the economic spin-offs from tourism are to be retained within state boundaries then vertical and horizontal industry integration is essential.

It must be recognised that for regional economies the significance of the tourism sector is highly dependent on other

economic opportunities. There is enormous variation in the stake that each state or territory has in the national tourism cake. For example, ASCOT (n.d.) estimates that NSW attracted 35 per cent of domestic tourism in contrast to the NT that only attracted about one per cent. However, the NT Treasury (1987:21) estimates that in 1986/87 tourism represented 4.6 per cent of Territory product, a proportion that is higher than for any other state or territory in Australia.

Kennedy (1987:23) shows there has been an increased tendency for the activities of the ATC and state and territory tourism bodies to overlap despite agreements on division of responsibilities. In theory, the states and territories have responsibility for the development of infrastructure and facilities, the tourism product, and domestic marketing, while the ATC's domain is international tourism marketing. In practice, the states and territories have moved to aggressively market their particular regions overseas and the ATC has entered the domestic arena.

Finally, it is not surprising that the emphasis on the development of tourism as an export sector (by the federal government) and as a generator of economic growth and employment (by federal, state, and territory governments) has occurred during a period of rapid growth in Australian tourism. Overseas experience indicates that tourism can be a highly volatile industry and it is important that this is recognised in both national and regional planning. The need to diversify export industries has been increasingly recognised and the development of tourism as an export earner is an example of export diversification. However, there is a danger that at regional levels there may be too much concentration on the tourism sector, and this could result in rapid economic decline if current tourism growth stagnated.

Aborigines and the tourism industry

History

The first comprehensive study of the Australian tourism industry was undertaken over twenty years ago by the consultants Harris, Kerr, Forster & Company and Stanton Robbins & Co. Inc. (or the HKF

Report). It is pertinent that these consultants identified an important niche for Aboriginal people in the future of the tourism industry. This report was completed in 1965, when Aboriginal affairs policies were based on the principle that assimilation, or total absorption of the indigenous minority into the mainstream, was both desirable and unavoidable. (The terminology used in the HKF Report indicates how rapidly community attitudes in Aboriginal affairs have changed since 1965).

In a separate section 'Aborigines: Their Place in Australia's Tourist Programme', the HKF Report (1965:281) notes that 'The Aborigines of Australia constitute a unique, primitive civilisation of great interest to the world'. The report goes on to suggest that they [Aborigines] are one of Australia's very important tourist assets and that tourism offers them one of the best ways to preserve their 'tribal life and customs' while making a living. This suggestion is extremely contentious at two levels. Firstly, the weight of the evidence gathered by anthropologists in overseas contexts suggests that tourism is as likely to destroy, as to preserve indigenous cultures (Smith 1978b; de Kadt 1979). Secondly, while the HKF Report lists five broad areas where Aboriginal people could become involved in tourism, there is no evidence provided that this commercial involvement would provide communities or individuals with a living. The HKF Report did emphasise that state and territory Aboriginal affairs and tourism departments should not only take a greater interest in tourist activities that affect Aborigines, but that they should also exert greater control over such developments. This implies that the consultants were aware of the potentially negative impacts of tourism on Aboriginal society.

Specifically, the HKF Report identified the following broad areas in which Aborigines could contribute to the tourism industry:

1. The presentation of Aboriginal life and history in museums. While this may have positive impacts for the tourism industry, it is difficult to see what commercial or other spin-offs would have accrued to Aboriginal people.
2. Presentations at Aboriginal communities of the traditional way of life, including demonstrations of firemaking, tool-making, use of traditional weapons, tracking, painting and other traditional

occupations. In making this recommendation, the HKF Report (1965:282) was fully aware that tourists visiting Aboriginal communities would require careful guidance and restrictions on movements.

3. Performances of dances and ceremonies. The HKF Report (1965:281) emphasised that such performances would require genuineness, proper staging, authenticity of costuming and enthusiastic participation by the Aborigines.
4. The establishment of an Aboriginal art and artefacts industry. The HKF Report suggested that only items that are 'natural' (pre-contact) had value; it also assumed that this industry was in decline. The report recommended government intervention to establish a marketing authority to ensure quality control and authenticity for all items sold.
5. It was suggested that tourist facilities be established at destinations that have natural (scenic) tourist attractions, adjacent to Aboriginal communities to give Aboriginal people opportunities for formal employment in the hospitality industry. It is also suggested that such facilities would provide outlets for the sale of artefacts and the performance of dances for tourists.

The language of the HKF Report has been modified somewhat here to comply with contemporary terminology. It is interesting though that similar recommendations still form the cornerstone of plans to involve Aborigines in facets of the tourist industry. Two features of the HKF Report recommendations were an emphasis on 'traditional' Aboriginal culture and a perceived role for Aborigines in the industry, but as employees rather than as employers or owners of facilities. The report was criticised from the outset for lack of consultation with Aboriginal people. As Pittock (1967:95) noted, 'it would be a poor start to involving Aborigines in the tourist industry to make decisions affecting Aboriginal communities in which Aborigines from those communities did not play a major role'.

The federal government's response to the HKF Report was to establish the Australian Tourist Commission in 1967. In 1968, the ATC began to consider the report's recommendations in conjunction with the Australian Institute of Aboriginal Studies (AIAS) and the

new Office for Aboriginal Affairs. In particular, there was a call for a national committee to consider the role of Aborigines in the tourist industry. An ad hoc inter-departmental committee met at the Office of Aboriginal Affairs in October 1968, but a political storm about Aboriginal involvement in tourism that erupted in 1969 appears to have limited this committee's activities.

In 1968 it appears that the Welfare Branch of the NT Administration had proceeded to develop some tourism activities on Aboriginal reserves. In late 1968, the Minister-in-Charge of Aboriginal Affairs, the Hon. W.C. Wentworth heard of these developments and urged caution in encouraging tourists to go onto reserves (correspondence dated 25 November 1968, DAA file 68/2506, Darwin). After a considerable amount of interdepartmental politicking between the Minister-in-Charge of Aboriginal Affairs, the Minister for the Interior, the Minister Assisting the Minister for Trade and Industry in Tourism Activities and the NT Administration, the push to establish tourism enterprises in Aboriginal communities appears to have abated. A major statement 'Tourism and Areas of Significance to Aborigines' presented in the Senate in September 1969 by the Minister Assisting the Minister for Trade and Industry in Tourist Activities, the Hon. R.C. Wright amounted to a victory for the Hon. W.C. Wentworth. The statement noted that:

In all its considerations of the role of Aborigines in the developing tourist industry the Government has considered the interests of the Australian Aborigines first, and will respect their right to privacy ahead of the interests of the tourist industry or of tourists themselves....

I conclude by again stressing that the Government is concerned to protect Aboriginal antiquities from deliberate and accidental damage; and to preserve the interests and respect the wishes of Aboriginal communities and individuals in the development of their participation in the tourist industry. It is concerned to ensure that Aborigines should secure the maximum material benefit from their participation in the industry in ways which enhance their status as Australian citizens with uniquely interesting cultural traditions (DAA file 68/2506, Darwin).

Subsequently, there was a great deal of research commissioned by the Office of Aboriginal Affairs and the state governments of NSW, WA and SA to examine the issue of Aboriginal economic

development. Five reports in a series conducted by the consultants W.D. Scott and Company in the period 1969 to 1973 investigated the potential role for Aborigines in tourism in the Kimberleys, the Nullabor Plains region of WA, the south coast of NSW, and the Central Reserves Region (now mainly Pitjantjatjara lands) of South Australia and Western Australia (Leggoe 1975). Reports were also commissioned by the Australian Tourist Commission (*Tourism Plan for Central Australia*, Harris, Kerr, Forster and Company 1969a) and the NT Reserves Board (*Ayers Rock-Mount Olga National Park Development Plan*, Harris, Kerr, Forster and Company 1969b). In 1971, a major conference on the preservation of Australia's Aboriginal heritage was held at the AIAS in Canberra (Edwards 1975). While the conference dealt primarily with 'the preservation and development of Aboriginal monuments, antiquities and sites' (Edwards 1975:112), a number of contributors examined the issue of cultural tourism. The conference made a number of recommendations for greater Aboriginal involvement in the careful exposure of sites to tourism. It was noted that 'Exploitation of these cultural assets could create an industry worth many millions of dollars annually and employ large numbers of Aborigines...' (Edwards 1975:120). It was emphasised repeatedly that Aboriginal participation and consultation with Aborigines was important.

Despite academic interpretations that Aboriginal culture was an integral part of the Australian tourist industry (Washington 1975; Ride 1975), there were few policies or programs developed that specifically included Aboriginal people in the industry. This was partly because government objectives were diverse, and often incompatible. For example, it was accepted as desirable that Aboriginal people and culture were incorporated into the tourism industry for the benefit of Australia, the industry, and Aborigines. However, at the same time there was a belief that Aboriginal 'traditional' culture was only alive and well on Aboriginal reserves in the remote parts of the continent. Champions of Aboriginal interests argued that this culture remained vibrant on reserves precisely because Aboriginal people were insulated from non-Aboriginals (white Australian or overseas tourists).

The apparent contradiction was the desire to expose Aboriginal culture (including sites) to the tourist industry to ensure that impacts could be controlled; it was argued that exposure was a

means of protection. This apparent dilemma can only be understood within the context of the general government policies of assimilation and integration that were dominant at that time. Tourism provided a possible means to incorporate Aboriginal people into the mainstream Australian economy and society. However this strategy was never successful because Aboriginal people were reluctant to participate in the industry. Furthermore, Aboriginal reserves were only opened up to tourism on a very limited scale.

The early development of tourism in the Northern Territory will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter. It is interesting to note that the only recommendation in the HFK Report that was acted on was the establishment of an artefacts marketing company, Aboriginal Arts and Crafts Pty Ltd, by the federal government's Office of Aboriginal Affairs in 1971 (Peterson 1983).

Recent policy

With the recent growth of tourism, there has been renewed interest in Aboriginal involvement in the industry. Perhaps the most clearly articulated national perspective is contained in the *Report of the Committee of Review of Aboriginal Employment and Training Programs* or the Miller Report (Miller 1985). This report was published some twenty years after the HKF Report.

Miller (1985:329-30) notes that despite the increased emphasis being placed on promoting tourism development by both state and federal governments, there has been little research about its existing and potential impact on Aboriginal people. The dearth of research on the impact of tourism on the Aboriginal social environment is contrasted with the detailed consideration given to the impact of tourism on the natural environment. Miller (1985:330) also states that no detailed consideration has been given to the questions of how Aboriginal people can both benefit from, and be involved in, the industry.

The Miller Report makes four broad recommendations that aim to ensure economic benefits to Aboriginal people from tourism:

1. That the Commonwealth government should initiate discussions with state governments and, where relevant, Aboriginal land

councils, with a view to ensuring greater Aboriginal participation in the management and operation of national parks (Miller 1985:333).

2. That the Commonwealth government, in conjunction with the states, territories and Aboriginal land councils should develop policies to create opportunities for Aboriginal involvement in tourism. The National Tourism Policy should ensure that Aboriginal control over tourism development is maximised in areas where there are significant Aboriginal populations or where areas are historically important to Aboriginal people. There should be provisions to ensure that Aboriginal people can gain significant financial equity and access to employment opportunities at such locations (Miller 1985:333).
3. The Aboriginal Development Commission (ADC) should support requests from Aboriginal people who wish to participate in the tourism industry. Similarly the Commonwealth Development Bank should make available financial assistance to Aboriginal individuals who can meet their funding criteria. The aspirations of these groups and individuals should be taken into account in the development of regional, state and national plans for tourist development (Miller 1985:334).
4. That the ATC and other state and territory tourist authorities should be encouraged to develop appropriate marketing material in relation to those tourist destinations where there are significant Aboriginal populations or locations of special Aboriginal significance. This should involve meaningful consultation with relevant Aboriginal land councils and the Aboriginal communities involved (Miller 1985:334).

The changes in Aboriginal affairs policies between 1965 and 1985 are very evident in the recommendations of the Miller Report. With a broad government policy shift to self-determination and self-management since 1972, the Miller Report emphasises that Aboriginal people should not only get jobs and financial returns from tourism development, but that they should also have effective controls over how their culture is presented to tourists. A major thrust in the Miller Report is that Aboriginal interests in national parks should be protected by legislation and that Aboriginal

interests in commercial developments should be guaranteed by equity participation. The unstated, or very much understated, parameter in the Report is the role that effective Aboriginal land rights can have in ensuring that Aboriginal people exert controls on the nature of tourism development. As the case studies in Part B of this study will demonstrate, statutory rights to land, even over national parks that have been leased back to park authorities, can provide Aboriginal groups with some leverage to gain a stake in tourism developments.

The Kennedy Report will set the agenda for tourism development in the next decade. Unfortunately, there is limited attention to Aboriginal participation in tourism development. This is partly because the report's terms of reference did not specifically refer to Aboriginal people; consequently none of the 96 submissions to the Inquiry came from an Aboriginal land council, organisation, community or individual. The Committee's deliberations on Aboriginal issues were based primarily on a submission from the DAA and only extended over one page (Kennedy 1987:62-63). It was noted that the long term viability of 'cultural tourism' as a resource for both Aboriginal communities and the Australian tourism industry will be undermined if it is forced to conform to the requirements of package tours. The integrity of Aboriginal culture must be maintained or its value to the industry will be lost.

Kennedy (1987:63) also recommends that 'a co-ordinated policy must be formulated after consultation with all interested parties to sensitively integrate the special needs of the Aboriginal communities with the sometimes disruptive influence of badly planned tourism'. It is recommended in the report that the National Tourism Policy should place a high priority on devising a means for ensuring financial returns to Aboriginal people from participation in the tourism industry that does not result in the demise of the Aboriginal cultural resource.

A comment that must be inserted here is that the issue of Aborigines, tourism, and development is highly complex and variable. Like so many issues in Aboriginal affairs, it is questionable whether a national strategy will have the flexibility needed to cope with regional differences. This variability is evident in Part B, where marked differences are empirically documented.

Federal:state politics and tourism

The politics of development in Australia in general is complex because of the constitution and federal system of government (Head 1986; Galligan 1986). It has already been emphasised that tourism is not a discrete industry, but is made up of a number of component activities. Consequently, at one level there is a great deal of interdependence between states and territories in the provision of goods and services to tourists. At another level though, each state and territory, and at a lower institutional level, each local government, are potential competitors for a share of revenue from tourism.

Tourism is linked to some controversial issues in federal/state relations. It was recognised above that on the one hand there has been a great deal of co-operation between the ATC and state and territory tourism authorities because these bodies are inter-dependent; their common aim has been to increase the economic significance of tourism in Australia. However, a rational division of functions has become increasingly blurred in recent times, as each state and territory has aggressively aimed to increase its overall share of the total tourism market.

On the other hand, tourism development is frequently linked with environmental and Aboriginal affairs issues. Indeed there is frequently a correlation between these two issues because it is precisely in those areas where the environment remains relatively pristine that 'traditionally-oriented' Aboriginal communities are located.

The particular focus of this study superimposes Aboriginal rights on an already complicated mosaic. However, it would be erroneous to oversimplify and to assume that it is the federal government that is representing Aboriginal interests while state and territory governments represent business interests. Within the federal bureaucracy there are sections that represent tourism interests, just as, at the state level, there are departments and authorities that represent environmental and Aboriginal interests. In tourism development, as in other development issues, there are also a host of 'informal' political bodies and alliances that cut across the hazy federal and state jurisdictions and formal party lines.

There are pro-tourism pressure groups like the Australian Tourism Industry Association; pro-environment lobby groups like the Australian Conservation Foundation, and para-governmental bodies, like land councils in the Northern Territory, that have Aboriginal people as their constituents.

As will be demonstrated in Chapter 3, the politics of tourism development is particularly complex in the NT because of a range of historical, demographic, and legislative factors. Briefly, the Territory was administered by the Commonwealth from 1911 to 1978; Aboriginal people represent a significant 22 per cent of the NT population, in contrast to 1.4 per cent of the national population; and 34 per cent of the NT is currently owned by Aboriginal people under federal legislation. Furthermore, some of north Australia's most renowned tourist destinations, like Kakadu and Uluru National Parks, are not only owned by Aboriginal people, but are administered by the federal Australian National Parks and Wildlife Service.

Historically, it has been recognised at least since 1968 (correspondence from the Minister Assisting the Minister for Trade and Industries in Tourist Activities to the Minister for the Interior dated 29 July 1968, DAA file 68/2605, Darwin) that the Commonwealth would have difficulties in involving the states in any tourism development strategy involving Aboriginal people. This problem was also identified at the Inter-departmental meeting held at the Office of Aboriginal Affairs in October 1968 where it was noted that:

While the role of the ATC was confined [at that time] to overseas aspects [of tourism] and conservation was generally a State matter ... the Commonwealth enjoyed constitutional powers [after the 1967 Referendum] in respect of the Aboriginal aspects of tourism. In realistic terms, however, the issue became in large part one of how to persuade the States to take the necessary action in respect of Aborigines, tourism and conservation in a co-ordinated manner (DAA file 68/2605, Darwin).

The problem of the states was never directly addressed primarily because the Commonwealth itself was not able to establish a significant Aboriginal component of the tourism industry in the Northern Territory where it could act unilaterally until 1978. And it was clear in the HKF Report that it was precisely regions like the

NT, where Aboriginal culture was perceived to be alive and well and suitable for 'consumption' by international tourists, that was of interest to the industry's development. In the next chapter, some of the concrete attempts to incorporate Aboriginal people in the NT tourism industry in the 1960s will be discussed. However, as already noted, even in the NT the issue became extremely politicised when it was discovered that the NT Administration proposed to open up Aboriginal reserves to tourism development.

As in so many issues in Aboriginal affairs, Aborigines involvement in tourism was left as the policy domain of individual states. Subsequently, non-Aboriginal business interests have come to dominate the industry in both the densely populated and remote parts of the continent. While these business interests have formed national, state-wide, and regional industry associations and lobby groups these do not appear to be particularly powerful or vocal, partly because tourism development has been relatively free of public sector regulation. It is also a reflection of the fragmented nature of the industry and the relative significance of independent small business interests, especially in remote north Australia.

This situation is changing; Australia is increasingly becoming a part of the world tourism industry. As Australian tourism is incorporated into this 'standardised and sanitised' international industry and as transnational operators (particularly of hotel and motel chains) move into the industry, there is a simultaneous need to differentiate the Australian product from others. It is primarily for this reason that there has been increasing interest in a greater Aboriginal involvement in the tourism industry.

Conclusion

Australia has somewhat belatedly discovered the role that tourism may play in generating national income and employment in the late 1980s and beyond. Tourism could develop into an extremely important component of the national economy, particularly at a time of rapid restructuring and a concomitant decline in traditional industries. Currently, Australian tourism appears to be competitive in the international tourism market.

Concurrently, there is growing recognition at the national level that tourists, particularly international visitors, are interested in an interaction with Australia's indigenous minority. This observation was originally made over twenty years ago in the HKF Report. Such interaction is generally referred to as 'ethnic' or 'cultural' tourism. To date, this component of the Australian tourism industry is extremely undeveloped, in part because the late development of the tourism industry has been linked with a tardiness to identify what tourists actually want. In general, identification of the requirements of different segments of the tourism market has been undertaken at state and territory, or local government, levels. There has been limited research on the willingness of Aboriginal communities and individuals to become involved in the industry and little direct consultation.

Map 2 Aboriginal involvement in Northern Territory tourism

Chapter 2

Northern Territory tourism: economics

In this chapter, the role of tourism in the Northern Territory economy is contextualised. Initially, a brief overview is provided of the structure of the contemporary economy. Then the historical, current, and future significance of the tourism sector is assessed. The key emphasis in the analysis is on the place of Aboriginal people, both in the Territory economy and in the tourism industry.

The Northern Territory economy

Brief overview

The Northern Territory has many features that make it atypical of Australia generally; it has a massive land area that totals 1.3 million square kilometres, but a tiny population that totalled only 155,000 in the 1986 Census. The NT covers about 18 per cent of the Australian continent, but is populated by less than one per cent of the total Australian population; its population density is the lowest for any Australian state or territory. The key feature of the NT economy is its extremely narrow base (see Gerritsen and Jaensch 1986; O'Faircheallaigh 1987); it is dependent almost entirely on the public sector, mining, and primary industries. Despite this, the average standard of living in the NT is commensurate with that in other states; this is primarily due to generous Commonwealth funding negotiated in the 1978 Memorandum of Understanding (in respect of financial arrangements between the Commonwealth and a self-governing Northern Territory). A statistical overview can substantiate this brief description.

The Northern Territory's gross domestic product at factor cost in 1983/84 totalled \$1.86 billion, approximately 1.1 per cent of Australia's GDP. It is only with the publication of the Australian National Accounts by State and Territory in 1987 (ABS Cat. No. 5222.0) that comprehensive comparative data on the NT economy

have become available. A recent publication by the NT Treasury, *The Northern Territory Economy 1987*, is based almost exclusively on these ABS data. The NT Treasury (1987:4) estimated that GDP at factor cost for the NT was in the region of \$2.3 billion. This estimate appears to be based on ABS data for 1985/85 on wages, salaries and supplements rather than on gross domestic product (ABS 1987:14). Total household income in the NT in 1985/86 was estimated at \$1899 million or nearly one per cent of Australia's household income. The labour force in June 1987 totalled 75,900, with 71,400 employed. The particularly high employment participation rate of 70 per cent is in large part due to youthfulness of the population and to the fact that the NT economy was in an expansionary phase up to that time.

The structure of the NT economy is markedly different from the rest of Australia. In particular, public sector, mining, construction and tourism are relatively significant while manufacturing, finance, and business services are underdeveloped. Public administration, defence and community services account for 24 per cent of Territory product; mining for 18 per cent; construction for 10 per cent and tourism for nearly 5 per cent). On the other hand, the manufacturing sector accounts for only 6 per cent of GDP; finance and business services for 4 per cent; and wholesale and retail trade for 11 per cent. It is estimated that the public sector accounts for a massive 40 per cent of total employment (NT Treasury 1987:39).

The Northern Territory economy has grown rapidly in the decade since self-government and per capita income and employment levels have been consistently high by Australian standards. For example, the NT Treasury (ibid:4) estimates that GDP has grown at annual average rate of 16.1 per cent between 1979/80 and 1985/86, compared to 11.7 per cent for Australia generally. According to the ABS (1987:5) household income per mean head of population has been higher in the NT than in all other states and territories, except the Australian Capital Territory, from 1974/75 to 1983/84. Recently though, this high ranking has slipped; in 1985/86, the NT was fourth after the ACT, NSW, and Victoria in this measure of well-being. Average weekly earnings in the NT in 1986 were the highest in Australia (ABS Cat. No. 6302.0), although more recently they have fallen below the ACT.

The reasons for the NT's impressive growth and more recent relative decline can be attributed to three factors. Firstly, as Gerritsen and Jaensch (1986:155) note, the initial impetus resulted from massive inflow of federal funds to the NT to assist in the reconstruction of Darwin in the aftermath of Cyclone Tracey. Secondly, in the late 1970s and early 1980s some large resource development projects (particularly uranium in the Top End and oil and gas in central Australia) provided a boost to the economy. Finally, and most crucially, has been the role played by the financial deal struck between the Commonwealth and the NT in the Memorandum of Understanding associated with the *Northern Territory (Self Government) Act*, 1978.

O'Faircheallaigh and Hadden (1987:26) provide a summary table of Commonwealth grants to the NT between 1979/80 and 1986/87. In current terms this grew from \$441 million to \$978.9 million over the eight year period. In 1986/87, this subvention amounted to \$6300 per capita; this figure was 4.3 times the average per capita Commonwealth grant to the states and accounted for over 43 per cent of Territory GDP at factor cost. It is of particular interest that when O'Faircheallaigh and Hadden (ibid:26) deflate these Commonwealth payments using the Darwin consumer price index, they show that funding levels increased rapidly in real terms between 1979/80 and 1984/85, but have subsequently declined by 9.1 per cent between 1984/85 and 1986/87. Trends in Commonwealth funding have enormous implications for the overall performance of the NT economy. There seems little doubt that as the effects of the fiscal squeeze of the late 1980s have their full impact on the NT economy there will be a significant slowing of economic growth. Indeed there is already some evidence of an economic downturn in 1988 as the Territory population declined for the first time since the second world war (Taylor 1988). Most commentators are pessimistic about the economic prospects for the NT in the immediate future (see O'Faircheallaigh 1987; O'Faircheallaigh and Hadden 1987; Stanley 1988).

Aborigines in the economy

A general discussion of the NT economy tends to ignore marked differences in economic well-being between Aboriginal and non-

Aboriginal Territorians. Unfortunately, there are some real difficulties in making such a comparison. Firstly, national accounts data are not divided on the basis of race; the only data that can be used for such comparisons are collected in the five yearly census, but these data have shortcomings, especially as they are based on self-reporting. Secondly, any broad based distinction between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal components of the population includes an implicit assumption that there is some heterogeneity within each group; this assumption may be false, as some Aborigines may live as non-Aborigines and vice versa. Thirdly, the social indicator data collected in the census ignores some significant features of economic life for many Aboriginal people in the NT. These include access to subsistence foods (income-in-kind); different cultural values and economic priorities; different expenditure patterns; different needs (especially for those Aborigines living in remote locations) that all undermine the comparative value of social indicators (Altman 1987c).

These provisos will be given greater attention in the detailed case studies of Part B. An attempt will be made here to gauge the position of Aboriginal people in the NT economy in fairly general terms. Overall, in both the 1981 and 1986 Census, Aboriginal people accounted for about 22 per cent of the total NT population (Table 2.1). The two critical features of this population are that Aboriginal people are the permanent component of the NT population and that they reside primarily in rural areas. About 70 per cent of Aboriginal people live outside urban areas in contrast to 17 per cent of the non-Aboriginal population. The first feature is particularly significant. Taylor (1988) notes that a striking feature of the NT population is its high rate of turnover; in the NT as a whole as much as 70 per cent of the population left or entered a statistical local area (SLA) during the 1981-86 intercensus period. The highest turnover was in urban areas, while the lowest was in some predominantly Aboriginal areas. Population turnover is particularly high in white mining towns like Jabiru and Alyangula and also at tourist towns like Yulara. Overall, Taylor (1988) notes that the main cause of population turnover has been inter-state migration, accounting for two-thirds of all migration. Aboriginal people frequently reside at locations that are remote; employment and economic opportunities at these locations are severely circumscribed.

Table 2.1
The Northern Territory population, by race

	1981	1986
Total Territory	123,324	154,848
urban - number	86,633	109,815
- per cent	70.2	70.9
rural - number	36,691	45,033
- per cent	29.8	29.1
Total Aboriginal	29,088	34,739
urban - number	8,159	10,661
- per cent	28.1	30.7
rural - number	20,929	24,078
- per cent	71.9	69.3

Source: ABS 1986 Census of Population and Housing, small area data, format CSD.

Household income per head of mean population was \$12,962 in the NT in 1985/86; this was above the Australian average of \$12,420. However, this figure masks a marked discrepancy between the household incomes of Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal individuals. Unfortunately, national accounts data are not available by race; the only comparative data available on household income are collected in the census.

1986 census data on income of persons aged 15 and over is provided by broad categories only and includes a large 'not stated' component of 11 per cent; nevertheless, it provides the only means to compare Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal income status and suggests that the income of the average Aboriginal household amounts to about 40 per cent of the non-Aboriginal average. If the 1986 household income data from the ABS are converted into Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal components using this proportion, then in 1985/86, 89 per cent of total household income would have accrued to the 77 per cent of the population that is non-Aboriginal and only 11 per cent to the 23 per cent of the population that was Aboriginal. Non-Aboriginal household income per capita would

have been over \$15,000 per capita, or on a par with the highest Australian figure for the ACT. It is likely though that the discrepancy between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal cash incomes was even greater because the proportion estimated in the Census refers to persons aged over 15 years and does not take into account the age structure of the Aboriginal population which in 1986 had twice as many persons aged under 15 (39.6 per cent) than the non-Aboriginal population (19.6 per cent).

This economic duality between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal components of the population is substantiated by Census data on employment status. Of the Aboriginal population aged over 15 years, 25 per cent was employed, 13 per cent was unemployed, and 52 per cent was not in the labour force; in marked contrast, 65 per cent of the non-Aboriginal population was employed; 5.5 per cent unemployed and 24 per cent outside the labour force. There are indications (Stanley 1988; Taylor 1988) that the employment situation in the NT has deteriorated markedly since the census date of 30 June 1986.

The tourism sector in the economy

History

Longer term data on tourist visitation to the Northern Territory are both rare and of questionable accuracy. It was not until the *Northern Territory Travel Survey 1981/82* was undertaken by the Roy Morgan Research Centre (1983) for the NT Tourist Commission that reliable data on tourism became available. Prior to that time, data were only available from the publication *Domestic Tourism in Australia* regularly published by the Australian Standing Committee on Tourism (ASCOT).

Data summarised by the Gerritsen (1985:272-73) provide some information on tourist visitation and expenditure in the late 1970s, although the source of these data are unclear. In 1977/78 he suggests that 226,000 visitors came to the NT; he provides a tourist expenditure figure of \$85 million for 1978/79. Gerritsen (ibid:273) suggests that between 1979/80 and 1981/82 the tourism industry in the NT stagnated.

Pearse (1983:142) provides some early ASCOT data that indicate that between 1979/80 and 1983/84, interstate travel by Australians to the NT increased from 132,000 visits to 345,000. However, as Pearse (ibid:143-44) notes these estimates must be regarded with caution for a number of reasons. Firstly, the size of the sample base used by ASCOT means that sampling error for locations like the NT are high. For example, in 1978/79 it was estimated that total trips to the NT accounted for 0.53 per cent of total trips in Australia. The estimated sample error of 24 per cent for this proportion meant that actual trips to the NT were within the range 83,720 to 238,280 at the 95 per cent confidence level. The mean estimated figure was 161,000 trips +/- 77,280. The change in the ASCOT figures between 1978/79 and 1979/80 (from 161,000 to 357,000) reflect this unreliability. Another important shortcoming in the ASCOT surveys is that they excluded trips with a duration of more than three months from their definition of a trip; this may have biased findings against remoter locations like the NT (Pearse 1983:144).

Pearse (ibid:139) does provide some historical data on international tourist visitation to the Northern Territory for the years 1971/72, 1973/74 and 1979/80. In the first year, there were an estimated 20,200 international visitors to the NT, in the second 21,000 and in the last 23,100 international visitors. International visitor numbers were estimated to have increased to 39,300 by 1981/82 (ibid:140).

Tourism in the 1980s

Key tourism indicators for the years 1981/82 to 1986/87 are summarised in Table 2.2. It is important to note that a survey was not undertaken in 1982/83 and that these studies were undertaken by a number of different market research consultants. The 1983/84 and 1984/85 studies were conducted by Territory Research Associates, the 1985/86 study by McNair Anderson Associates and the 1986/87 study by Cameron McNamara. The NTTTC (1987) warns that because of the variable methodologies used by different consultants, care must be exercised when any comparisons are made between different years.

Table 2.2
Key tourism indicators, 1981/82 to 1986/87

Year	Trips (,000)	Nights (,000)	Expenditure (\$ millions)
1981/82	411	3,797	109
1983/84	514	4,962	172
1984/85	595	6,854	281
1985/86	651	6,455	289
1986/87	709	5,903	285

Source: NT Tourist Commission (1986, 1987).

The other main source of information on tourist visitation is the ABS quarterly survey on tourist accommodation in the NT (ABS Cat. No. 8635.7). However, it was until 1986 that this series published data on arrivals, and even now these data are collected only for hotels and motels with facilities. Furthermore, arrivals differ from visitors, as in the accommodation survey 'arrival' refers to each establishment, and not to the NT generally. Of more significance are the ABS data presented in Table 2.3 on takings from accommodation.

Data in Table 2.3 show that official takings from tourist accommodation trebled in the five year period 1981/82 to 1986/87. The overall economic impact of tourism on the NT is difficult to assess because data are usually presented in current rather than real terms. However, even when tourism takings are deflated to account for inflation, it is evident that there has been rapid growth in this sector. For example, even when the consumer price index is used as a deflator (ABS Cat. No. 6401.0), accommodation takings doubled between 1981/82 and 1986/87 from \$14.6 million (in 1980/81 terms) to \$30.3 million. Overall tourist expenditure in the corresponding period (Table 2.2) increased by 81 per cent from \$97 million to \$175 million (in 1980/81 dollar terms). It is interesting to note that the ABS estimate of takings from commercial accommodation of \$49 million in 1986/87 exceeded the estimate (of \$21 million) in the 1986/87 travel monitor (NTTC 1987).

Table 2.3
Tourism: takings from accommodation, 1981/82 to 1986/87

Year	Takings from accommodation		
	hotels, motels, etc. (\$ million)	caravan parks (\$ million)	total (\$ million)
1981/82	15.342	0.765	16.107
1982/83	16.367	1.173	17.540
1983/84	20.996	1.700	22.696
1984/85	25.897	2.236	28.133
1985/86	34.300	3.066	37.366
1986/87	42.186	7.032	49.218

Source: Tourist accommodation, Northern Territory, quarterly series (ABS Cat. No. 8635.7).

Despite the paucity of reliable comparative data, it is undeniable that there has been a rapid growth in tourism. This growth is particularly evident when disaggregated data on visitor numbers at specific destinations like Uluru or Kakadu National Parks are examined (see Chapters 4 and 6).

Share of Australian tourism

According to the *Domestic Tourism Monitor 1983/84* (ASCOT 1985) 2.4 per cent of all inter-state visits, 2.0 per cent of all inter-state trips, and 4.25 per cent of all inter-state nights occurred in the NT. Intrastate travel is of less significance in the NT in Australian terms because of the Territory's small population; it accounted for only 0.9 per cent of visits, trips, and nights. However, international visitors are relatively significant. According to the Australian Tourism Commission in 1984, 6 per cent of overseas visitors spent the majority of their time in the NT.

The ABS *Domestic Travel and Tourism Survey, 1983* (Cat. No. 9216) estimated 279,000 person trips to the NT by persons aged over 15, from within Australia; this accounted for 5.4 per cent of domestic person trips. This survey is not particularly reliable for minor destinations like the NT due to potential sampling error. For example, the survey indicated that there was nil travel between NSW and the NT in 1983.

Gross expenditure by tourists in Australia (domestic and international) was estimated to be \$19 billion in 1985/86 (Kennedy 1987:12). In the same year, the NTTC (1987) estimated that total tourist expenditure in the NT was \$289 million. This amounted to approximately 1.5 per cent of Australian total.

Future prospects

It has been suggested elsewhere (Gerritsen and Jaensch 1986; Altman 1988) that the rapid growth of the tourism sector over the past decade coupled with decreased federal funding of the NT in both real and absolute terms presents the NT government with little choice: if the post-cyclone and post-self government growth of the NT is to be sustained at a time of declining federal funding, then the tourism sector will need to grow rapidly. Indeed forecasts prepared for the NT Tourist Commission by Cameron and McNamara (1987) suggest that this rapid growth will be maintained at least to the early 1990s: medium projections estimate an increase in traveller nights from 6.408 million in 1986/87 to 9.258 million in 1990/91. The NT Treasury (1987:23) is optimistic about the future of the industry in the NT; it notes that tourist projects to the value of almost \$260 million are under construction or firmly committed at 1 June 1987.

Commentators appear divided about their assessments of the tourism sector's future as a potential leading sector of NT economic growth. For example, Gerritsen and Jaensch are pessimistic:

The tourist industry is the latest candidate for the Territory's economic salvation. The total number of tourists are increasing, but the hopes that the Territory will become part of the international 'high rollers' circuit appear misplaced (1986:150).

On the other hand, O'Faircheallaigh (1987) is more optimistic, but guarded. While he notes that tourism will probably continue to expand for some time, he warns that tourist preferences, like mineral, beef and fish prices tend to be volatile; consequently, he predicts that the NT economy will remain largely dependent on public sector spending (ibid:41).

It seems to me that there are three major issues that will influence the future growth and economic impact of tourism.

Firstly, there is the question of the linkages between the tourism sector and the rest of the NT economy. In Chapter 1 it was noted that these linkages are generally measured by tourism multipliers. Unfortunately, the only comprehensive study of the economic impact of tourism expenditure (BIE 1984) did not include the NT. However, there are a number of factors that suggest that the income multiplier for tourism in the NT would be lower than the lowest state estimate of 0.467 for Victoria (ibid:74). As already noted, the manufacturing sector in the NT is particularly small; this implies that many of the goods needed to supply tourists have to be imported. Multipliers are notoriously low in small open economies like the NT. Pearse (1983) notes the exceptionally strong economic linkages between South Australia and central Australia. While the sealing of the Stuart Highway between Port Augusta and the NT border may have increased tourist visitation, it may also have increased the role of Adelaide suppliers in NT tourism.

Furthermore, there are indications that people employed in the accommodation sector, particularly at the larger hotels, are interstate visitors who work in the NT for relatively short periods and repatriate a high proportion of their incomes (see Chapter 5 for a discussion of employment at Yulara). While no precise quantitative evidence is available, it is generally believed that there is a high proportion of tourist resorts (like Yulara) and hotels (Sheraton and Four Seasons groups) in the NT have inter-state and overseas ownership. The newest hotel at Jabiru, for example, is a joint venture between the Gagudju Association and the Melbourne-based Industrial Equity Ltd. This implies that tourist sector profits would be repatriated out of the NT.

While in Victoria the low income multiplier is linked to the high rate of intrastate tourism (Victorians are estimated to account for 75 per cent of expenditure), this is not a feature of NT tourism. The latest estimates for 1986/87 (NTTC 1987) indicate that NT residents accounted for less than 10 per cent of tourist expenditure. This implies that leakages out of the NT are exceptionally high. For example, in 1986/87, total tourist expenditure was estimated at \$285 million. In that same year, the NT Treasury (1987:21) estimated that tourism accounted for 4.6 per cent of Territory product. If this estimate (which is based on the GDP industry component recreation, personal and other services) is accepted,

then it seems likely that the NT income multiplier is less 0.4. This means that for each \$1 million of tourist expenditure, less than \$400,000 of income is generated in the NT economy. The obvious corollary of this finding is that a concerted effort must be made to increase foodstuff production and manufacturing in the NT that is specifically targetted to the tourist demand.

Secondly, there is the issue of seasonality and remoteness. One of the features of the NT, especially the tropical Top End, is its distinct seasonality. In the Top End the division is between the humid monsoonal Wet, that extends from November to April, and the cooler Dry from May to October. In central Australia, the distinction is between the hot summer months and the cooler winter months. Tourism in the past has tended to be seasonal, with the period April to October frequently referred to as the tourist season; some operators only run tours during this period.

The seasonality in visitation is reflected in the tourist accommodation statistics collected by the ABS (Cat. No. 8635.7). This quarterly series provides important monthly statistics on room and bed occupancy rates, number of arrivals, and takings from accommodation. Since the series began in 1979 there has been evidence of a marked trough in tourist visitation during the December and March quarters, and a peak in the June and September quarters. The March quarter invariably has the fewest visitors, and in the early 1980s takings from accommodation in this quarter were frequently only 55 per cent of takings in the peak September quarter. Since the mid 1980s, the NTTC has undertaken a concerted campaign to attract visitors, especially from overseas, during the off-season. For example, there was a shift from referring to the Wet season; it is now the Green season, at least in tourist bureaux parlance. Aggressive marketing of the off-season has been partially successful, although in 1985/86 and 1986/87 takings from accommodation in the March quarter were still only about 60 per cent of takings in the September quarter.

Seasonality is a particularly important issue because the trough in visitation tends to set the limit on physical infrastructure development in the accommodation sector; investors cannot afford to finance hotels and motels that have room occupancy rates of only about 40 per cent during the March quarter. Subsequently, there

tends to be an acute shortage of accommodation during seasonal peaks especially at popular destinations like Yulara and Kakadu National Park. The future of tourism growth in the NT will obviously depend on continued amelioration of the effects of extreme seasonality in visitation.

The remoteness factor is part of what makes the NT an appealing destination, but the cost of getting to the NT is high both for Australians from interstate and for overseas visitors whose port of entry is not Darwin. Gerritsen and Jaensch (1986:150) suggest that the NT tourism industry cannot compete with north Queensland because of the greater travel costs. It is not at all clear whether this argument is valid; it assumes, perhaps wrongly, that there is direct competition between the two regions and that they appeal to identical market segments. There seems no doubt though that the relatively high domestic airfares may hamper the growth of NT tourism; for example, Darwin residents can travel overseas to islands in the Indonesian archipelago for less than the cost of domestic travel to Gove. It is far from clear how the NT can influence the domestic fare structure to boost NT tourism.

Finally, there is the issue of the Aboriginal component of the industry. The NT only enjoys two distinct comparative advantages in the tourism arena: the environment and Aboriginal culture. These two areas correspond to what is termed 'ethnic' and 'environmental' tourism in the anthropology of tourism literature. Smith (1978a:3) suggests that environmental tourism attracts a tourist elite to remote areas to experience a truly alien scene; it is primarily geographic. In Australia, interstate visitors are not necessarily an elite, but they are certainly attracted by the geographic isolation of 'the outback'. Ethnic tourism, on the other hand, is marketed to the public in terms of the quaint customs of indigenous and often exotic people (ibid:2). It was noted in the introduction that in Australia ethnic tourism is usually termed Aboriginal cultural tourism. Interestingly, Smith suggests that environmental tourism is often ancillary to ethnic tourism; in the Northern Territory it is ethnic tourism that is generally ancillary to environmental tourism.

In marketing the NT as a tourist destination there has been a growing emphasis on the unique Aboriginal component of the

Territory. Since the Morgan (1983) survey of 1981/82 and in subsequent studies (like the NTDC/NTTC [1984] initiatives for tourism facilities survey) a need for greater Aboriginal participation in the industry has been recognised. The extent of current Aboriginal involvement in the industry is outlined below; it is not substantial. If the growing trend to market the NT on the basis of its Aboriginal heritage and the vitality of contemporary Aboriginal culture is to continue, then it is important for the tourist industry that there is a concomitant increase in Aboriginal participation in the industry. Otherwise, there is a real risk that this marketing strategy will backfire as dissatisfied tourists report to others that access to Aboriginal cultural tourism is limited. Similarly, because Aboriginal people own a significant part of the NT it is likely that continued growth of the tourist industry will become increasingly predicated on access to Aboriginal owned or Aboriginal controlled destinations. This in turn implies that there will be a need for a high degree of cooperation between the tourism industry and Aboriginal interests if the future growth of the industry is to be assured. This issue will be addressed more fully in the next chapter.

Aborigines and tourism

Historical perspective

It was shown in Chapter 1 that soon after the Harris, Kerr, Forster Report of 1965, there were moves afoot in federal circles to include Aboriginal people in the expanding tourism industry. A search through files of the Welfare Branch of the NT Administration (now held by the DAA) revealed some interesting cases of early Aboriginal involvement in tourism in the Northern Territory. A major institution that was involved in promoting and financing tourism projects at Aboriginal communities was the Aborigines Benefits Trust Fund (ABTF) chaired by H.C. Giese, the Assistant Administrator (Welfare) of the Northern Territory Administration. The main incursions into tourism in rough chronological order included the following enterprises and proposals:

1. Standley Chasm: The Iwupataka Progress Association constructed a kiosk and toilet block at Standley Chasm as the

first independent Aboriginal tourism venture in the NT in 1969. This venture was funded with loans from the ABTF (1971:33).

2. Papunya: Motel type accommodation was constructed at Papunya in 1969 and 1970. However there was extremely limited community support for this project and the enterprise was never established (DAA file 73/5152 Papunya - Tourist activities; ABTF 1971:33).
3. Alice Springs region: In 1970 and 1971 short courses were held for Aboriginal people from Amoonguna, Iwupataka and Hermannsburg to train as tourist guides. The courses were a Welfare Branch response to perceived demand for Aboriginal guides by tourists. The courses were of limited success (in terms of retention rates) and were discontinued in 1971 (DAA file 74/483 Training of Aborigines in tourist activities).
4. Alice Springs region: A company Tiwa Tours was established in 1971 to provide transport between Alice Springs and Aboriginal communities. This enterprise was always in part a passenger transport and freight service as well as a means for transporting tourists to Aboriginal communities (ABTF 1972:15; 1973:15-16). The enterprise was funded by the ABTF. Tiwa Tours was not a viable tourism enterprise and ceased operations in 1974 (DAA file 74/447 and 74/448 Tiwa Tours and coachline).
5. Hermannsburg: The ABTF provided loans in 1970 and 1971 for individuals at Hermannsburg to convert Albert Namatjirra's house into a museum, to build a toilet block for the convenience of tourists and to procure a bus to transport tourists from Hermannsburg to Palm Valley (ABTF 1971:33).
6. South and east Arnhem region: A brief field survey was undertaken by a team from the Welfare Branch and some NT businessmen in 1971 to gauge the possibility of a tourism enterprise in the Arnhem Land reserve. The focus of this visit was Roper River settlement (Ngukurr) and an area known as Ruined City in south east Arnhem Land. Despite some Welfare Branch support for the proposal 'to promote and foster a

tourism industry in Arnhem Land' no development resulted (DAA file 70/3628 Welfare aspects of Aborigines engaged in tourist activities).

7. Western Arnhem Land: The Land Rover Owners' Club of the Northern Territory undertook a trip into western Arnhem Land in 1971. A condition of entry was that the club comment on the feasibility of using Aboriginal people in the tourism industry in Arnhem Land. Despite a positive, but extremely brief, report from the club, no development resulted (DAA file 70/3259 Training of Aborigines in tourist activities).
8. Ayers Rock: The Docker River Social Club (Walpanya Trading Company) received funds from the ABTF (1973:17) to establish a service station, store and aircraft refuelling agency at Ayers Rock in 1972. The Ininti Store and BP Ayers Rock are still operating (see Chapter 4).
9. Garden Point (Pularumpi): A proposal was floated by Ansett Airlines, Connair, and the NT Tourist Bureau to establish a tourism venture at Garden Point, Melville Island in 1972. Attractions included the remains of Fort Dundas, fishing in the Apsley Strait and purchase of Aboriginal artefacts. The proposal was discussed for some two years but did not receive community support (DAA file 72/7921 Garden Point Progress Association tourist activities; see Chapter 8).
10. Alice Springs: A proposal to establish an Aboriginal-owned Travelodge in Alice Springs staffed by Aboriginal people was discussed by DAA and the Travelodge Group in 1973. This proposal involved the training of Aboriginal staff in Alice Springs and Sydney. The proposal did not go ahead (DAA file 74/483 Training of Aborigines in tourism activities).

It is not possible to embark on a sophisticated analysis of the early history of Aboriginal involvement in tourism here; as a general statement it could be said that the Welfare Branch attempts to use tourism as means to improve Aboriginal economic status failed. The reasons for this are complex. On one hand, these attempts to incorporate Aboriginal people in the mainstream economy suffered because they were unrealistic, and this was a common fault of

many assimilationist programs. It was recognised that Aboriginal people had something unique to offer the industry. This was accepted wisdom after the Harris, Kerr, Forster and Company (1969a) report for central Australia. However, rather than emphasise this uniqueness most enterprises attempted to offer European style services; the hurdles that Aboriginal people faced in tourism employment were similar to those in other sectors, but more so. There was evidence of lack of real consultation with Aboriginal people and there was a limited management role envisaged for Aboriginal people. Perhaps the main problem was that enterprises were funded without comprehensive financial feasibility assessments, a practice that was not uncommon during the assimilation era. On the positive side, some of the early ABTF-funded enterprises, at places like Standley Chasm and Ayers Rock, did provide Aboriginal people with a commercial stake which augmented their local leverage when these locations became Aboriginal land.

Self determination and land rights

The growth of Aboriginal involvement, or experimentation, in the tourism industry, slowed considerably in the early 1970s. There appear to be two key reasons for this change. The first, was the radical change in government policy after the election of the Whitlam Labor Government in December 1972 from assimilation to self determination. The second was the Aboriginal Land Rights Commission convened in 1973 and headed by Mr Justice Woodward. These events allowed an Aboriginal viewpoint to be articulated. Up until 1973, it was the Welfare Branch of the NT Administration that determined who had access to Aboriginal reserves. This authority was amply demonstrated in 'open days' for tourists held at government settlements like Papunya and Maningrida during the late 1960s and early 1970s. From 1973, there was greater consultation with Aboriginal people about tourist access onto Aboriginal reserves.

It is clear from the brief discussion of tourism in the final report of the Aboriginal Land Rights Commission (Woodward 1974:92-3) that Aboriginal attitudes to tourism were highly variable. Some communities opposed tourism, or were disinterested, while others encouraged tourism to facilitate the sale

of artefacts. The (then) Department of Tourism and Recreation decided that there was a widespread interest in the unique traditional culture of Aborigines and suggested (in a manner reminiscent of the HKF Report of 1965) that this could be used to the advantage of both the Aborigines and the Australian tourist industry. The Department emphasised the role that tourism may play in preserving Aboriginal skills and providing employment opportunities. Woodward (1974:93) recommended that Aboriginal communities and traditional owners must be allowed to decide for themselves if they want tourists in their areas; that tourists should be generally subject to a permits system (on Aboriginal land); and that if Aboriginal people wish it, non-Aboriginal tourist enterprises should be established on Aboriginal land, preferably in the form of a partnership or joint venture with the local community.

While there is no specific mention of tourism in the *Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act*, 1976, Aboriginal interests were provided with a statutory means to control any commercial development on Aboriginal land (with the exception of commercial interests that predated the Act) and to restrict tourist access. Land rights legislation appeared to provide Aboriginal people with enormous economic leverage in the tourism arena, especially when they were vested with ownership of destinations like Kakadu National Park (in 1979) and Uluru (in 1985). However, despite this apparent leverage Aboriginal interests have not made significant economic returns from the tourism industry. This proposition will be demonstrated in fairly general terms below and in more detail in Part B.

The Aboriginal artefacts industry

After the assimilationist policies that extended to 1972, and right up until the early 1980s, Aboriginal involvement in tourism appeared to lessen. This indicates that many Aboriginal communities were in opposition to tourism. The major exception appears to have been the rapid growth in the Aboriginal artefacts industry.

As noted in Chapter 1, the only recommendation that was acted upon (with respect to Aboriginal issues) in the HKF Report (1966) was the establishment of a marketing authority, Aboriginal

Arts and Crafts Pty Ltd. This Sydney-based company was formed by the Office of Aboriginal Affairs in 1971 to wholesale and retail Aboriginal artefacts. In 1973, the Aboriginal Arts Board (AAB) of the Australia Council was established. The AAB has subsequently funded an increasing number of community craft centres especially in the Northern Territory. From 1976-84, the AAB also subsidised the operations of Aboriginal Arts and Crafts Pty Ltd. This arrangement altered in 1984, when another company Inada Holdings, funded by the Aboriginal Development Commission, took over the role of Aboriginal Arts and Crafts Pty Ltd. Inada Holdings is now called Aboriginal Arts Australia.

Government subvention of Aboriginal artefacts marketing has been extremely important; but marketing only provides a channel between producers and final buyers. It was particularly significant that in the 1970s Aboriginal people became increasingly involved in the production of artefacts for sale. This efflorescence is today widely recognised as being linked to the outstations movement, the movement of people back out of centralised missions and settlements to small satellite communities (AAB 1986; Blanchard 1987; Altman and Taylor 1988). Formal employment and cash earning opportunities at outstations were, and are, extremely limited and artefacts manufacture provided an important means to earn cash income. However, outstations communities were also remote and it was for this reason that community craft centres, and craft advisers, became essential components of the industry. On the demand side, the crucial development was the growth of overseas tourism to Australia; Pascoe (1981:13) estimated that in 1979/80, 70 to 80 per cent of artefacts sales were to overseas tourists. The rapid growth in tourism during the 1980s suggests that the art and craft industry will continue to grow.

A submission by the Aboriginal Arts Board (1986:695) to the House of Representatives Standing Committee of Aboriginal Affairs Inquiry into the Aboriginal homelands movement provides quantitative data to support this expected growth. Pascoe (1981) estimated that artists' returns in the NT totalled \$554,800 in 1979/80 and that craft centre sales totalled \$683,000. An AAB survey of 12 outlets revealed that by 1984/85 returns to producers had increased to \$1,279,984 and craft centre sales increased to \$1,825,725. Even after deflating the 1984/85 figure by the implicit

price deflator, the AAB estimated an annual growth rate of 10 per cent in total returns to artists. It is also suggested by the AAB that the multiplier effects resulting from these sales are especially high for a number of reasons: the industry is labour intensive and dependent on few imports; the producers themselves are all Territorians and have a high propensity to spend their income in the NT as they are relatively poor; a high proportion (73 per cent) of sales occur within the NT and thus generate additional income for those retailers who are also NT-based.

The direct correlation between the growth of the outstations movement and the growth of the Aboriginal artefacts industry is interesting. After the passage of the Land Rights Act, many Aboriginal people re-occupied rural areas that were regarded as prime locations for an Aboriginal tourist industry in the late 1960s and early 1970s. For a variety of reasons, including the protection of sacred sites, Aboriginal people chose to reoccupy and use their land and to restrict access to competing tourist interests. It appears that when Aboriginal people were provided with an effective choice, they preferred to avoid intense contact with tourists and instead to establish indirect links with the tourism market via the sale of artefacts.

Aboriginal involvement in tourism, 1986

The extent of Aboriginal involvement in tourism when I was undertaking field research in 1986 is depicted graphically in the map that prefaces this chapter. The greatest part of this involvement occurred on Aboriginal land, with the locations studied in more detail in Part B of this monograph being of primary significance. Kakadu and Uluru National Parks with their current 200,000 plus visitors per annum are the two most important tourist destinations in north Australia on Aboriginal land. The full range of Aboriginal involvement in tourism in 1986 is listed below. An attempt is subsequently made to estimate the extent of Aboriginal involvement in the industry in monetary terms. This list should be read in conjunction with Map 2.

1. Uluru National Park: At Uluru, Aboriginal people own two retail outlets, work as tour guides for the ANPWS, and produce artefacts for sale to tourists (see Chapter 4)

2. The Ayers Rock region: Aboriginal interests in the Ayers Rock region own a roadhouse (Mt. Ebenezer), own a store and camp ground at Docker River that is open to tourists, produce artefacts for sale, and have a number of commercial concessions for enterprises planned for Kings Canyon National Park (see Chapter 5). Aboriginal people have no business interests at Yulara.
3. Kakadu National Park: Aboriginal interests own a hotel and have a third share in another, own retail and craft outlets, produce souvenirs for sale, and work as guides for the ANPWS (see Chapter 6).
4. Gurig National Park: Aboriginal interests own cabins and a store and allow safari companies to hunt feral species (see Chapter 7).
5. Melville and Bathurst Islands: Aboriginal people own and operate a number of craft outlets, produce artefacts for sale, and have an interest in a fishing lodge (see Chapter 8).
6. Standley Chasm: Aboriginal people own the chasm and in 1986 allowed a white entrepreneur to operate the kiosk there. The Iwupataka Aboriginal Land Trust received income from the rent of the kiosk and from gate takings (CLC 1987:60).
7. Dreamtime Tours: This is a white owned and operated tour company that employs a small group of Alice Springs based Aboriginal people on a casual basis to demonstrate bush skills to tourists.
8. Yuendumu Sports Festival: This is an annual event which allows tourists access to the community. It does not attract a large number of tourists.
9. Barunga Festival: This is an annual cultural event that features Aboriginal dancing troupes from many different communities. It attracts a substantial number of tourists.
10. Springvale Dancers: In 1986, the Andutjmi dancing troupe incorporated as a company. The troupe performs at Springvale

Homestead on a regular basis three nights a week during the tourist season (April to October).

11. Gummulkbun: In 1986, Terra Tours, a white owned tour company based in Darwin, began taking groups to Gummulkbun outstation in western Arnhem Land. This enterprise was only at an early establishment phase.
12. Belyuen: A dancing troupe from Belyuen entertains tourists who travel across by boat from Darwin to Mandora.
13. Craft outlets: A number of craft outlets were operating in 1986 at the case study communities (see Chapters 4 to 8) and at other locations like Maningrida, Yirrkala, Darwin, Alice Springs, Katherine, and Ramingining. Outlets on Aboriginal land are not generally accessible to tourists.
14. Wagait and Daly River regions: A few white entrepreneurs were operating fishing and buffalo safaris into the Daly River Land Trust region and the Wagait land claim area. These operations involved the payment of royalties to Aboriginal people, but had limited Aboriginal involvement. They did not continue in 1987.

There has been a rapid escalation in tourism activity in the NT in the 1980s and an increase in Aboriginal participation. The only means available to estimate the extent of Aboriginal involvement in the industry, in economic terms, is to gauge the proportion of total tourist expenditure that has accrued to Aboriginal people and Aboriginal-owned enterprises. An estimate of the turnover generated from the tourism enterprises listed above and the Aboriginal artefacts industry totalled between \$4 and \$5 million in 1986. This represents between 1 and 2 per cent of gross tourism expenditure estimated at \$289 million for 1985/86 (NTTC 1986).

In Chapter 5 a more detailed and disaggregated estimate is made of the proportion of total tourist expenditure that accrues to Aboriginal interests. This estimate is based on research undertaken at Yulara and Uluru National Park. It shows that Aboriginal interests are only capturing 1.3 per cent of regional tourist expenditure and suggests that the above estimate is realistic.

Update 1988

There have been some new developments since completion of the fieldwork on which this study is based . During the 1987 tourist season the following new ventures began operating:

1. Ipolera, central Australia: An Aboriginal family residing at an outstation near Gosse's Bluff has been involved in a joint venture with Ansett Trailways since April 1987. This enterprise involves local Aboriginal people interacting with tourists with a special emphasis on showing some landscape features to visitors and relating their significance in Aboriginal religion and mythology. This enterprise combines environmental and cultural tourism.
2. Kakadu National Park: In July 1987, a small Aboriginal-run tour company called Wild Goose Tours was established in Kakadu National Park. The tour is run by a senior traditional owner of the area. The emphasis is on wildlife and its significance for the traditional and contemporary Aboriginal economy and culture (see Chapter 6).
3. Putjamirra, Melville Island: Australia Kakadu Tours established a wilderness camp on Melville Island in April 1987. This small scale enterprise is owned and operated by a white entrepreneur, but has an important Aboriginal component that involves local Tiwi people taking visitors on hunting and fishing trips (see Chapter 8).
4. Gove (Wigram Island): A small enterprise run by an Aboriginal man and his non-Aboriginal wife began operations in 1987. The emphasis in this tour is on recreational tourism on Wigram Island and on fishing.
5. Jabiru: The Gagudju Association is participating in a joint venture with the Four Seasons Group to build a 110 room hotel in Jabiru. The hotel was completed and opened in September 1988 as this monograph was being completed (see Chapter 6).

However, a number of small safari and fishing tour companies (working in the Daly and Wagait areas) are no longer operating.

Furthermore, the construction of the Kings Canyon (Watarka) Wilderness Lodge planned to be completed by early 1988 has stalled.

Conclusion

While the tourism sector remains small in the NT, it is growing rapidly. As we shall see in the next chapter, tourism is regarded as a particularly important component of the economy because it is assisting the diversification of the NT economic base. While a number of problems were outlined which hamper the potential for tourism to be a leading sector of NT economic development, there is no doubt that tourism will grow rapidly in the immediate future.

Aboriginal people are in a paradoxical situation in the NT: they are a clearly identifiable, highly visible component of the population and they are the NT's long term and permanent residents; yet they are also extremely poor by wider Australian standards and highly dependent on government program and welfare funding. This observation has to be qualified in the NT context, because Territorians in general are highly dependent on the rest of Australia for a high proportion of their household income; indeed Commonwealth grants to the NT account for about 40 per cent of Territory GDP, and that is not including welfare transfers and funding of many Commonwealth public servants (especially defence personnel) in the NT.

Quantification of Aboriginal involvement in tourism suggests that currently between 1 and 2 per cent of tourist expenditure accrues to Aboriginal interests. This is despite Aboriginal ownership of key tourist destinations like Uluru and Kakadu National Parks. The only area in which Aboriginal people appear to have a monopoly in the tourism sector is in the manufacture of Aboriginal material culture for sale to tourists.

The implications of this situation are diverse. Firstly, it seems likely that a continued growth in the NT tourism sector will require increased cooperation between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal interests. Aboriginal people own a considerable proportion of the NT, and the NTTC marketing of the NT emphasises its unique

Aboriginal heritage and the vitality of contemporary Aboriginal culture. The issue of increased cooperation will be discussed in greater length in the next chapter on the politics of NT tourism. Secondly, a number of important issues are raised for Aboriginal people themselves: Are there opportunities for Aboriginal people in tourism? Are Aboriginal people being actively excluded from the interests by more powerful economic interests? Can land rights be used to provide commercial leverage in the tourism industry? Are the costs of involvement in tourism so great that they outweigh any potential benefits? It is precisely these sorts of questions that will animate the discussion in Part B when a more in depth analysis is provided of the economic impact of tourism at a number of case study locations.

Chapter 3

Northern Territory tourism: politics

Conflict is inherent in the political process, as legitimately conflicting interests will always exist (Gibbins 1988:45); it is the processes through which political conflicts are resolved that are of interest. This monograph is not about a political analysis of the Northern Territory, but it would be negligent not to include a brief discussion about the politics of tourism development. It was noted earlier that economics and politics cannot be readily separated; this is especially so because political conflict is frequently about the global allocation of public and private resources. Such allocative issues are particularly pertinent for tourism because it is a rapidly expanding sector of the NT economy. It should be recognised that the separation of economics and politics in Chapters 2 and 3 is largely artificial; it is only made to facilitate analytical clarity.

The aim of this chapter is to outline the main tourism interest groups in the NT, and to analyse some of the political complications, conflicts, cooperations, and cross cutting cleavages evident in the tourism arena. This discussion provides a background to Part B where the focus will shift to specific localities, and regional, rather than Territory-wide, politics.

The Northern Territory polity

The politics of tourism development is more complicated in the NT than anywhere else in Australia. In Chapter 1 it was suggested these complications arise from a combination of historical, demographic, and legislative factors. These three issues are examined in greater detail here.

Historical factors

The outstanding historical feature of the NT is the role that the Commonwealth has played in its political and economic development. This is reflected in part by the fact that the NT has

still not achieved statehood; it is also evident in the significance of federal funding as a revenue source for the Territory government. O'Faircheallaigh and Hadden (1987:25) demonstrate the narrowness of the NT's revenue base in a comparison with the two other major primary producing states, Western Australia and Queensland. In 1985/86, Commonwealth payments accounted for 81 per cent of Territory government receipts, in contrast to only 46 per cent in the other two states.

In the previous chapter, it was suggested that the NT is at a critical cross-roads; for the first time since self-government there is evidence of economic decline brought about primarily by a reduction in Commonwealth funding levels. Under these circumstances, the NT government has emphasised the need to broaden the NT's economic base with tourism earmarked as a critical component of the NT's economic future. It is somewhat paradoxical that in its quest for increased financial independence from Canberra, the NT government faces a problem that is not dissimilar to one faced by many Aboriginal communities (Altman 1987c): this problem could be termed 'the dependency trap'. It is likely that as the tourism sector increases in value, the levels of Commonwealth funding to the NT will decline; the net impact of tourism development may be that Territory GDP will not increase and the economy will stagnate, despite a major structural shift from public to private sector activity. It is also likely that a rapid increase in private sector activity will increase state revenue and this in turn may hasten the decline in Commonwealth funding.

Demographic factors

Demographics play a major role in the NT polity. The two outstanding features are the relative significance of the Aboriginal population and the high mobility of the NT population in both intra and inter-state terms (Taylor 1988). It is also important that the Aboriginal component of the NT population is the most stable in residential terms.

In the NT political system, the significance of the Aboriginal vote is not reflected in parliamentary representation, although there are currently two Aboriginal members of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs) representing 8 per cent of all seats. While Aboriginal people have a greater say in formal politics in the NT

than anywhere else in Australia, they are not empowered to an extent that reflects their demographic representation. This under-representation of Aboriginal people in mainstream politics is a complex issue that is dealt with in some detail by Loveday (1987). Two factors are of paramount significance. Firstly, as shown in Table 2.1, Aboriginal people live in predominantly rural electorates; this means that Aboriginal votes have a marked impact in rural seats (of which there are seven) but little electoral impact in urban seats (of which there are 18). Secondly, Aboriginal votes have tended to favour the Territory ALP; indeed a third of the sitting ALP members are Aboriginal. However, the ALP has only been in opposition in the NT, and never in power.

Legislative factors

The continued role of the Commonwealth is clearly evident in both the Aboriginal affairs and national parks arenas. Two acts of the federal parliament that preceded self-government, the *National Parks and Wildlife Conservation Act*, 1975 and the *Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act*, 1976, continue to play key roles in the tourism arena. These acts result in the federal government maintaining control over a large part of the NT. The two national parks, Kakadu and Uluru, cover some 18,877 square kilometres, and account for about 60 per cent of all park and reserve land in the NT. These parks are administered by the ANPWS and come under the jurisdiction of the federal Minister for the Arts, Sport, the Environment, Tourism and Territories. Aboriginal land currently totals nearly half a million square kilometres, over a third of the NT. This land comes under the jurisdiction of the federal Minister for Aboriginal Affairs; it is especially pertinent that any major commercial developments on Aboriginal land require the final approval of the Minister.

These legislative factors have important ramifications for the NT polity. The Land Rights Act created Aboriginal land councils that have a range of statutory functions with respect to Aboriginal land. The councils are funded from sources that are quite independent of the normal NT and federal governments' budget processes. It has been argued elsewhere (Altman and Dillon 1988) that land councils represent an intermediate form of Aboriginal regional government. These paragovernmental institutions also have affiliated bureaucracies whose clients are both Aboriginal traditional owners

and residents of the Northern Territory. Second, federal controls over national parks and Aboriginal land have frequently resulted in a direct interface between federal and Aboriginal interests, and the frequent exclusion of the NT government.

Formal politics

Economic development issues play a major role in formal NT party politics. While this emphasis is common for state-level governments (Head 1986), the intensity of that concern is unusually high in the NT context (Gibbins 1988:27). Indeed if a single issue has dominated NT politics since 1978 it has been economic growth and development and the associated CLP support of business interests. It is equally unusual, and rarely given due emphasis, that many Aboriginal people do not share this concern. Aboriginal people have a perspective on economic issues that can vary markedly from the mainstream. This different perspective is frequently a result of the economic marginalisation of Aboriginal people who did not experience the boom times of the past decade; it is also linked to the the higher value that Aboriginal people place on the cultural and social costs frequently associated with rapid economic growth. As the NT's long term residents, most Aborigines do not subscribe to the dominant and mainstream 'frontier mythology' that permeates so much of the NT's popular and political cultures (ibid:26). This mythology is of great significance to those Territorians who feel remote from the more populated parts of the continent and who have moved to the NT for economic betterment.

It is worth noting that local and community government is excluded from this discussion. While throughout Australia local governments play a relatively minor political role, in the NT this is especially so as a consequence of the small size of most urban centres; only Darwin has a population that exceeds 50,000. It is also because local government was not given an institutional role during the federal administration of the NT between 1911 and 1978; only Darwin and Alice Springs had elected municipal government by the time of self-government. By 1985, Katherine, Tennant Creek, Palmerston and Litchfield Shire attained self-government status (Gibbins 1988:92). Only in 1985 with the passage of the NT *Local Government Act* was a legislative framework for local and community government established. These new bodies are

beginning to play a role in regional tourism development, especially in collaboration with regional tourism associations.

Party politics

Most political commentators seem to be in agreement that rapid economic growth or 'developmentalism' is a common priority across the formal political spectrum in the NT. Heatley (1986:228) observes that it is generally agreed by all parties that the expansion of the primary sector and tourism is essential for economic growth. The initial emphasis here will be on the policies of the CLP because this party has formed the NT government in the past decade. The minor differences between the CLP and the main opposition party the ALP will be discussed briefly below.

From the time of self government the CLP has seen the development of the tourism sector as a key plank in its economic policy platform. The reasons for this were discussed in Chapter 3. The following two statements made by NT Treasurers are typical examples of this position:

It is common knowledge that this government sees tourism as the Territory's biggest growth industry ... Tourism is the world's biggest growth industry, and the major growth within that industry is occurring in two main areas - adventure tourism and business conventions. The Territory must take advantage of both these aspects, and the government is determined to make sure this happens (*The Northern Territory of Australia, Budget Speech 1983-84* delivered on 30 August 1983).

Tourism is one of the Territory's lifelines for future development. It is an area in which the Territory has a comparative advantage over the rest of Australia and, despite the growth that has occurred, huge potential remains. The Government will continue to promote this growth (*The Northern Territory of Australia, Budget Speech 1987-88* delivered on 15 September 1987).

It is not widely recognised that the NT government saw Aboriginal people as an important future component of the tourism sector and of NT economic expansion generally. In a letter dated 24 July 1979, the then Chief Minister of the NT Paul Everingham wrote to all Aboriginal communities inviting them to consider tourism as a means to achieve economic self-sufficiency. In an ensuing debate in the Legislative Assembly, Everingham noted that:

The main points of the letter are that the development of tourism is a means by which many Australians have achieved a good measure of financial self-sufficiency ... Much Aboriginal land is suitable for the development of tourist activities. There are risks to Aboriginal communities in the development of tourism and these need to be taken into account and, therefore, development should be undertaken in a way that will reduce these risks. Tourism is a means of assisting other Australians to learn about and respect the culture, customs and indigenous skills of Aboriginal people ... The Northern Territory Government seeks the views of Aboriginal people on the development of tourism and offers extension services where Aboriginal people may wish to explore the possibilities at greater depth. The ultimate decision is one for Aboriginals to make (*NT Parliamentary Record*, 22-3 August 1979:1718).

Whether tourism has provided Territorians in general (let alone Aboriginal communities) with a measure of financial self-sufficiency is a policy issue that has not been rigorously addressed. Very few empirical data are available to answer this question and one of the aims of Part B of this study is to present some quantitative information about the economic benefits of tourism for Aboriginal communities. Significantly, there has been a great deal of direct government financial intervention in the tourism arena by a conservative government (Heatley 1982, 1986; O'Faircheallaigh and Hadden 1987). Chief Minister Everingham justified this intervention in the following terms:

Developing the tourist industry has reinforced the fact that government must make things happen if there is to be development. The combination of distance and unfamiliarity with the opportunities make investors and entrepreneurs reluctant to commit themselves without government support or encouragement (1982:140).

The extent of NT government financial involvement in tourism development, either directly with the provision of capital and/or guarantees, or indirectly through the provision of physical infrastructure and support services, will be discussed in greater detail below. There is an apparent contradiction in NT government tourism development policy. An Aboriginal component of tourism has been identified as important to the industry (NTDC/NTTC 1984), but this component has received notional, rather than financial, public sector support. The main example of fiscal neglect in this study is the Kings Canyon Wilderness Lodge development proposal discussed in Chapter 5. It does seem that the NT government

demonstrates a far greater commitment to its ideological position (that private capital should finance tourism development) in its dealings with Aboriginal people, than when dealing with private developers at locations like Yulara, Alice Springs, and Darwin. The cynical interpretation of this inequitable distribution of public sector finance would be that it merely reflects CLP patronage for business interests (and indirectly, its voters). However, the situation is more complex than this, as will be demonstrated in Part B, because it also reflects low Aboriginal demand for tourism growth on Aboriginal land.

There appears to be little difference in the tourism policies of the two main parties in the NT, primarily because both are very development oriented. The Australian Labor Party (ALP) is generally perceived as being more closely allied with Aboriginal interests and currently two of its six MLAs are Aboriginal. However, it is also recognised that this alliance may be an electoral liability that will keep the ALP in opposition. In a policy document entitled 'Australian Labor Party, Northern Territory, Tourism Initiatives' dated May 1986 that ALP emphasised that need for greater Aboriginal involvement in tourism, especially because Aboriginals and their culture are an integral part of the industry (see 'Call to give Aborigines bigger say in tourism', *Centralian Advocate* 7 May 1986). It is difficult to predict what this policy prescription would mean in practice. The only other discernible difference is that ALP tourism policy supports greater direct government involvement in tourism enterprises, and less public underwriting of private sector activity.

Perhaps the main feature of NT government policy that has ramifications for tourism is its vehement opposition to Aboriginal land rights and land councils. Given the CLP's 'developmentalist' ideology this opposition is understandable, because NT government powers on Aboriginal land are greatly circumscribed. However, the vehemence of this opposition has also served to create major rifts between mainstream and Aboriginal economic interests and has in turn acted as a brake on tourism development on Aboriginal land.

Federal politics

It was noted in Chapter 1 that the federal government is keen to encourage the expansion of the tourism sector throughout Australia.

In the 1980s, federal government policies with respect to NT tourism have been complicated by ongoing political conflict with the NT government over the environment and national parks, uranium mining, and Aboriginal affairs (see Chapters 4 and 6 especially). It could be argued that because of its unusual powers in the NT, the federal government has truly acted in the national interest. For example, the World Heritage listings of Kakadu and Uluru National Parks have enhanced Australian tourism generally and Australia's profile among environmentalists. The Commonwealth has also been generous in its funding of ANPWS managed national parks (see below). Similar action in the states, especially in Tasmania and north Queensland, has been more contentious and more closely linked to the 'states rights' debate than is possible in the NT context.

Given the relatively benign stance of the federal government towards Aboriginal issues and its powers on Aboriginal land and national parks, it is not surprising that Aboriginal people have tended to ally themselves with the federal, rather than NT, government. This alliance is reflected in part in Aboriginal support for the federal ALP; since 1983 the only NT seat in the House of Representatives has been held by the ALP in two of three terms. It seems that the Aboriginal vote may have greater significance in federal than NT elections. The main reason that Aboriginal interests ally themselves with the federal government is because the NT government almost invariably, though not universally, takes a position that is counter to Aboriginal interests (Gibbins 1988:30; Altman and Dillon 1988:132). However, formal linkages between the federal government and Aboriginal interests have also been strained at times. Political differences have been most clearly evident in various federal government proposals between 1982 and 1987 to amend the Land Rights Act.

Paragovernmental politics

Politics in the Northern Territory is complicated by an intermediate form of government that lies between formal and informal institutional forms. This is represented by the three (Northern, Central, and Tiwi) Aboriginal land councils. It has recently been argued that these institutions represent the most advanced and comprehensive expression of Aboriginal self-government anywhere in Australia and that land councils' activities are increasingly

paragovernmental in nature (Altman and Dillon 1988:126). Land council members are Aboriginal people living in the area of the land council; they are either elected or nominated to represent the interests of Aboriginal people in these areas. While Aboriginal land is owned by incorporated bodies known as land trusts, it is only land councils that are empowered under sub-s.5(2) of the Land Rights Act to administer these lands and to give directions to land trusts.

The paragovernmental role of land councils has arisen for a number of reasons, although two are primary. Firstly, there are indications that mainstream political institutions are unable to meet the specific needs of Aboriginal people. Certainly there is little scope for Aboriginal interests to be recognised and satisfied within the NT political system because this majoritarian system invariably leads to outcomes favoured by the non-Aboriginal majority. The antagonistic relations between the NT government and Aboriginal interests further limits this scope. Secondly, the federal Land Rights Act established land councils as body corporates with a range of statutory functions on Aboriginal land, or on land with the potential to be claimed and converted to Aboriginal title. This means that land councils have a range of statutory responsibilities for a third of the NT, and when the land claims process is completed their jurisdiction could expand to half of the NT. While a narrow interpretation of the statute limits the role of land councils to the administration of Aboriginal land, in practice these institutions have acted as political bodies that have played a major role in articulating the needs and aspirations of Aboriginal people throughout the NT, both on and off Aboriginal land. It is particularly significant that the Act established a funding mechanism which provides land councils with substantial financial independence and a consequent high degree of political autonomy (Altman 1983a:97-100).

Initially, land councils were preoccupied with the researching and presenting of land claim submissions to the Aboriginal Land Commissioner. The land councils have also been active in completion of resource development agreements for mining and exploration on Aboriginal land. More recently, land councils have moved to widen their roles and address issues related to the use and development of Aboriginal land and to broader Aboriginal political and economic aspirations (Altman and Dillon 1988:130-34).

Their new horizons are directly linked to the growth of the tourism sector in the NT as well as the statutory requirement (under sub-sub-s.23(1) of the Land Rights Act) that land councils function as intermediaries between developers and Aboriginal traditional owners with respect to any enterprises on Aboriginal land. It is important to recognise that land councils must discuss any development proposal with all traditional owners and persons with an interest in the land; this requirement is necessary even if the proposals are from traditional owners themselves. Land councils must ensure that there is consensus about proposals relating to the land because land is held under communal title; disputes between land councils and local groups have often been linked to development proposals and a perception by traditional owners that there is undue interference by a land council or its bureaucracy (ibid:137).

An example of the paragovernmental development role of land councils is the tourism policies recently formulated by the two main land councils. The different emphases of the CLC and NLC reflect different priorities in their respective regions. The CLC has adopted a policy position that concentrates on Aboriginal involvement in national parks; this position was precipitated by negotiations with the CCNT in relation to Kings Canyon National Park (CLC 1985; Chapter 5). The CLC's policy aims are: to negotiate on behalf of traditional owners of park lands to obtain the most secure form of land tenure possible; to ensure effective decision making powers for traditional owners in park planning and management; and to negotiate for effective control by traditional owners over commercial developments in parks. (The term 'traditional owners' is used here in a non-statutory sense.) The policy emphasis for the NLC has been somewhat different and has concentrated on lease and licence agreements for tourism activity on Aboriginal land (even though their policy also covers land held under NT freehold or leasehold title). The main planks of NLC policy are to consult with traditional owners of, and other Aboriginals with an interest in, Aboriginal land with respect to tourism proposals (as per para.23(1)(c) of the Land Rights Act); to assess the financial viability of any project; and to provide information to traditional owners (NLC file 85/82; NLC 1987b:11). The much smaller Tiwi Land Council has also adopted a development plan that includes tourism development on Melville and Bathurst Islands (TLC 1988; 'Tiwi Story', *Land Rights News*, November 1986).

Land councils cannot hold a fixed position on tourism development as a political party or the NT government can, because they are required by law to act as mediators between developers and Aborigines, and they have to present proposals to traditional owners in an objective manner. Furthermore, they cannot operate as a single issue lobby group because a great heterogeneity exists in their constituencies. For example, some people living at outstations on Aboriginal land are anti-tourism because they fear that development will impinge on their chosen 'tradition-oriented' lifestyles. Other Aborigines may be extremely pro-development, especially if they believe positive economic spinoffs will result. These complexities are problematic for land councils. On the one hand, they are under continual wider political pressure to demonstrate to the Australian public (and more specifically the NT public) that land rights do not hamper economic development. On the other hand, their mediating role frequently results in their constituents viewing them either as brokers for developers or else as meddlers stifling Aboriginal entrepreneurship. It is undeniable that without land councils and their resources, Aboriginal people would lack the political power and commercial expertise to make informed decisions about tourism development. Finally, it should be noted that while land councils have statutory functions on Aboriginal land, their ability to unilaterally approve commercial developments is limited; under sub-s.27(3) of the Act, any contract that involves the payment or receipt of an amount exceeding \$100,000 requires the approval of the federal Minister for Aboriginal Affairs.

Bureaucratic politics

Bureaucracies are the instrumentalities charged with administering government policy; these institutions are theoretically apolitical, although it is quite evident that political appointments are made at the upper echelons of the public service. In the NT there has only been one party in power since self-government, so that the upper echelons of the NT public service have tended to be dominated by conservative appointments. This was demonstrated in the tourism arena, for example, when the chairman of the NTTC resigned in 1986; contested the seat of Araluen for the CLP in 1987; won; and is now the Minister for Tourism. Furthermore, the CLP has opposed Aboriginal land rights vehemently since 1978; while the upper

echelons of bureaucracy may or may not also oppose land rights, at times the CLP has imposed its political will on the NT public service. This was very evident in 1985 when Chief Minister issued a directive forbidding public servants to attend the festivities associated with the transfer of Uluru National Park from Commonwealth to Aboriginal ownership.

An important factor that has undermined the complete politicisation of the bureaucracy is the high turnover of staff linked to high population mobility into and out of the Territory. The relative youth of the NT public service has also meant that there has been little time for a bureaucratic culture to evolve independently of political parties. Davis et al. (1988:53-4) suggest that this is a feature of the Australian public service generally, when compared to the state departments in countries like Britain that have long histories, recognised traditions, and a reputation for pursuing their own policies whatever the government in power (ibid:53-4).

Five bureaucratic bodies are primarily involved in tourism with an Aboriginal component. All of these bodies are statutory authorities rather than government departments; one is a Commonwealth statutory body accountable to Canberra rather than Darwin, and another is an Aboriginal bureaucracy.

Northern Territory Tourist Commission

The NTTC was established by the *Northern Territory Tourist Commission Act*, 1979. The NTTC came into operation on 1 January 1980; its principal functions are to encourage and foster the development of tourism; to establish and operate tourist bureaux inside and outside the Territory; and to advise the Minister in matters relating to the promotion of tourism. The Commission consists of an executive chairman and four commissioners, but is subject to the direction of the Minister for Tourism. The Commission and the Minister are also advised by a statutory Tourism Advisory Council (NTTC 1988). Currently there are no Aboriginal members of the Commission or the Tourism Advisory Council.

The NTTC has been exceptionally well funded by wider Australian standards. In the financial year 1985/86, the NTTC's

expenditure exceeded \$11 million and in 1986/87 it exceeded \$13 million. Kennedy (1987:23) provides data on the budget allocations of all state and territory tourism bodies; the NT allocation is almost as large as that for NSW; the NTTC staff of 130 exceeds that of the NSW Tourism Commission. This expenditure reflects the NT government's emphasis on facilitating tourism development.

To what extent has the NTTC facilitated the establishment of tourism enterprises by Aboriginal groups? The first senior adviser, Aboriginal liaison (now called the Aboriginal liaison manager) was only appointed in 1984. The terms of reference of this appointment required the adviser to advise the NTTC on Aboriginal initiatives in tourism and their viability; to document potential projects on behalf of Aboriginal people; to assist Aboriginal people to develop viable, culturally sensitive tourism concepts; and to negotiate with land councils when required (NT of Australia 1984:44). The NT government's funding commitment to this role has not been significant. For the three years 1984/85 to 1986/87 it has varied from about \$130,000 to \$160,000 per annum, accounting for between one and two per cent of the total NTTC budget. This limited funding commitment appears to have assisted the establishment of some enterprises, especially in 1986 and 1987, as shown in Chapter 2. It is difficult to assess whether a greater NTTC financial commitment would have resulted in more enterprises or less. After all, the role of the Aboriginal liaison manager is not only to support Aboriginal initiatives, but also to undertake realistic assessments of their financial viability.

It is clear that since 1984 the NTTC has recognised the need for greater Aboriginal involvement in the tourism industry. In the report *Initiatives for Tourism Facilities, June 1984*, the first recommendation emphasised the need to establish ways of introducing tourists to Aboriginal culture. Later it was stated:

The most outstanding finding of the study has been the acute need for the provision of some means or facility to expose tourists to aspects of Aboriginal culture, lifestyle, way of life or mythology. Most segments of the market, as reported by virtually all operators and carriers, have expressed the expectation of being brought into contact with Aboriginal lifestyle or culture. However, the industry generally perceives that this aspect of the tourist experience is not adequately provided for (NTDC/NTTC 1984:23).

The report recommended that the development of Aboriginal cultural centres and museums should receive priority and further assessment without delay (ibid:43). In the four years since its completion no such facilities have been established with NT government financial assistance.

Northern Territory Development Corporation

The NTDC was established by the *Territory Development Act*, 1978 and disbanded in 1986. The corporation was a statutory body with an executive chairman and a seven member board. The NTDC was responsible to the Minister of Industry, Small Business and Tourism; in 1986 when the NTDC was disbanded it was absorbed by the Department of Business, Technology and Communications, but in March 1987 responsibility for tourism development policy was transferred back to the Tourist Commission (NTTC 1988b).

The NTDC's main aim was to stimulate growth and it actively promoted development of industry in the Territory by providing money, resources and advice. It acted as the principal arm of the NT government for fostering growth and attracting investment (NTDC 1985:i).

O'Faircheallaigh and Hadden (1987:39) identify government involvement in the economy as a key election issue in the 1987 Territory election. They suggest that considerable controversy has surrounded the issue of just how much support or encouragement the NT government should provide. The main support given by the NTDC was to the Yulara development, and the Darwin and Alice Springs Sheraton hotels. In 1984 the NT government bought the Darwin and Alice Springs casinos. O'Faircheallaigh and Hadden (ibid:40-42) provide a comprehensive listing of the annual costs of the subventions offered by the NT government to various tourism developments. A table summary of government guarantees and contingency liabilities for the period 1981/82 to 1985/86 shows that in this period guarantees totalling \$386 million, with contingency liabilities of \$211 million, were provided to tourism developments at Yulara, Alice Springs, and Darwin. It is not surprising that these subventions became a key election issue.

The NTDC had a particularly poor record in relation to financial assistance to tourism ventures on Aboriginal land, or with

Aboriginal equity participation. This is despite the fact that it was the co-author of *Initiatives for Tourism Facilities*. The NTDC was involved in feasibility studies at a number of locations including Kings Canyon and Melville Island (see Chapters 5 and 8). However, its attempts to secure private sector capital for these proposals were unsuccessful. In the absence of private investment funds, public sector underwriting of Aboriginal tourism enterprises has not been as forthcoming as elsewhere in the NT.

Conservation Commission

The CCNT is a statutory authority that was established under the *Conservation Commission Act*, 1980 to implement the NT government's conservation objectives. Its broad charter is to ensure that the economic development of the Territory is compatible with the use and conservation of its natural resources. The Act provides for a Commission Board of eight members; the director and deputy director of the CCNT are Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the Board; no less than two members of the Board must be Aboriginal people domiciled in the NT (CCNT 1985:3).

The CCNT is responsible for the planning, development, and management of Territory parks and reserves for tourism, recreation, and conservation. It identified its principal goals with respect to tourism in a submission to the 'Initiatives for Tourism Facilities' study as follows: to ensure the provision of a range of attractions and facilities sufficient to meet the diverse needs of visitors and locals alike; to ensure that all visitors to Territory parks and reserves have a quality experience; and to meet the information needs of all park visitors by developing a quality park information service (CCNT 1984:2-3). It is important to recognise that the CCNT's statutory functions are wide and encompass seven acts; it is responsible for forestry, soil conservation, bushfire prevention, and environmental assessment, as well as parks, reserves, wildlife, and Gurig National Park (Chapter 7).

Currently, the CCNT controls 66 parks and reserves under s.12 of the *Territory Parks and Wildlife Conservation Act*, 1978. The total area of these parks is some 12,249 square kilometres or 0.9 per cent of the NT. These parks include national parks, historical reserves, conservation reserves, nature parks, forestry and forestry project areas, flora reserves, hunting reserves, a zoo and a marine

park. It has been estimated that there were 2.3 million visits to CCNT controlled and managed areas in 1985, and it is conservatively projected that this figure will increase to 3.1 million visits by 1990 (Taylor 1986:7).

There are two issues that are particularly relevant to the CCNT's role in tourism. Firstly, for a park authority, the CCNT appears to be unusually sympathetic to development; this perspective probably reflects the political reality of operating in the NT. Hence while park bureaucracies often operate in concert with environmental lobby groups, the CCNT tries to reconcile government, industry, and environmental interests. This is evident in the following principle adopted by the Board of the Commission in January 1981 and endorsed by the Chief Minister in March 1981:

Conservation is not a principle existing for its own sake but should be applied as an aid to government and industry to ensure that development programmes are planned and executed in an orderly way paying due regard to both conservation and the need for development (*CCNT Principles and Policy Guidelines*).

Secondly, the CCNT holds the view that the land reserved for NT parks and reserves is insufficient. This view is clearly evident in the following statement made in a submission to the 'Initiatives for Tourism Facilities' study:

By international and national standards, the Northern Territory's Park Estate is grossly inadequate and will not meet the growth requirements of the industry dependent on it. Unless the Park Estate is expanded and developed to meet the requirements of the rapidly developing tourist industry, the Territory will not be able to deliver the tourist product which it is so actively promoting (CCNT 1984:1).

This perspective has tended to result in some bureaucratic friction between the CCNT, and the ANPWS and Aboriginal land councils whose jurisdictions are larger than that of the NT parks body. The CCNT is looking to expand the total area of parks and reserves, but there is almost no unalienated land available. The alienation of some pastoral lands by the Conservation Land Corporation has particularly vexed Aboriginal people with an interest in those lands (Chapter 5). The CCNT frequently states that only 0.9 per cent of the NT is reserved for conservation purposes, whereas this figure is really 2.4 per cent when ANPWS managed parks are included.

Australian National Parks and Wildlife Service

The ANPWS is a federal statutory authority that operates under the *National Parks and Wildlife Conservation Act, 1975*; it is directly responsible to the Minister for the Arts, Sport, the Environment, Tourism and Territories, with the Director of ANPWS being required to perform his functions and exercise his powers in accordance with any direction given by the Minister. The parks branch of ANPWS is primarily involved in NT tourism because of its management of Kakadu and Uluru. Its major activities are similar to the CCNT's; they include the preparation of plans of management, the carrying out of park operations and capital works, and the provision of information and interpretation material for park visitors and the general public (ANPWS 1987b).

Uluru and Kakadu cover a total area of 18,877 square kilometres, or about 1.5 per cent of the NT. In other words, the two parks managed by the ANPWS exceed the total area of parks and reserves managed by the CCNT. The ANPWS managed parks are also two of the most popular park destinations in the NT. The cost of running these two parks is met by the Commonwealth. Gillespie (1988:242) provides a table that summarises ANPWS expenditure at Kakadu between 1982/83 and 1986/87. All told, some \$24 million was spent on salaries, operational costs and capital works; current expenditure is in the region of \$8 million per annum. Up until June 1986, Uluru National Park was managed by the CCNT with moneys provided by the federal government; since June 1986, Uluru has also been managed by ANPWS with an annual budget of about \$2 million. These national parks, both of which now have World Heritage listing, are two of the best funded in Australia.

The ANPWS has cooperative relations with traditional owners and residents of Kakadu and Uluru, partly because leaseback agreements have stipulated the need to consult with Aboriginal people, set up ranger training schemes, and provide employment and commercial concessions for local people (see Miller 1985; Chapters 4 and 6). The very fact that Kakadu and Uluru are located on recognised Aboriginal land has helped create symbiotic, rather than antagonistic, relations between Aboriginal people and the ANPWS. Furthermore, as a federal bureaucracy funded from Canberra, the ANPWS is divorced from NT government strictures and has greater autonomy in its dealings with Aboriginal people.

Aboriginal land councils

The three land councils, as noted above, act as political bodies and have a paragonovernmental role especially evident in relation to Aboriginal land. Land councils have an administrative staff or bureaucracy. This was clearly recognised in the case of the Northern Land Council in the period 1982-87 when its bureaucracy was called the Bureau of the Northern Land Council, as distinct from the political body, the Northern Land Council, composed of 79 Aboriginal people chosen to represent the Aboriginal population of the NLC region. More recently, the three land councils have not differentiated their administrative from political wings; the upper echelons of land council bureaucracies are frequently as politicised as in the NT Public Service.

The direct role of land council bureaucracies in tourism is most evident in the case of the Northern Land Council. The NLC's latest annual report states that agreements valued at \$25 million have been concluded relating to resort developments on Aboriginal land, and that there are 18 agreements in the NLC area relating to safari and tour operators on Aboriginal land (NLC 1987b:34). Staff of the land management branch of the NLC have taken an active role in providing advice and assistance to Aboriginal people who have an interest in tourism development. Each of the three land councils have now established commercial arms in the form of investment corporations. The CLC's Centrecorp has an equity stake in the proposed Kings Canyon Wilderness Lodge (Chapter 5), while the Tiwi Land Council's Pirntubula Pty Ltd has an interest in the Port Hurd fishing lodge on Bathurst Island (Chapter 8). The NLC's Northern Aboriginal Investment Corporation has not played a role in tourism development to date.

In the past, Aboriginal land councils have tended to take a fairly passive role in the commercial arena, awaiting to assess proposals from white or black entrepreneurs for developments on Aboriginal land. There are indications that the land councils recent interest in economic development issues has resulted in their adopting a higher profile role in tourism. This position is articulated by the NLC in the following way:

The Council has resolved to conduct a survey of Aboriginal land in areas where traditional owners have shown an interest in

tourism. This survey is to identify potential 'products' which the industry would see as having high market acceptance. An overall tourism strategy will be developed in order to maximise returns to traditional owners and the industry. In line with this, the Northern Land Council has written to all recognised tourist operators in the Northern Territory seeking proposals for development on Aboriginal land (NLC 1987b:34-35).

There are similarities between this statement and the one made by Paul Everingham, and quoted above, in 1979. The difference is that in this case it is made by an Aboriginal paragonment that supports land rights, rather than the NT government that opposes them. Furthermore, as noted above, there are a number of checks and balances, both within and beyond land councils, that will ensure that these institutions do not adopt developmentalist policies and practices that do not reflect the aspirations of their clienteles.

Pressure groups

Gibbins (1988:86) notes that in western democratic political systems, interest or pressure groups provide important vehicles through which a wide array of interests can exercise some degree of leverage in the political process. Informal politics is possibly of greater significance in the NT than elsewhere in Australia because electorates are extremely small (ranging from 2447 to 3388 voters on electoral rolls in the 1987 Territory election) and individuals can directly lobby Territory politicians to a greater extent than elsewhere; even Canberra-based academics can interview NT politicians. Despite the array of potential interest groups (ranging from individual companies up) that can be identified, I only concentrate here on three institutional forms: tourist promotion associations; Aboriginal incorporated bodies; and the environment lobby.

Tourism promotion associations

Tourism promotion associations (TPAs) are regional tourism bodies that are regarded by the NTTC as integral to the successful development of tourism throughout the NT. The NTTC currently provides funding to six TPAs: Darwin, Alice Springs, Katherine, Tennant Creek, Yulara, and Gove. They can each receive up to \$20,000 per annum in funding from the NTTC. The requirement

that TPAs have independently elected and constituted executive committees separate from local government or any other organisation makes them nominally independent groups. TPAs are primarily regional tourist industry pressure groups, although their aims could result in close collaboration with local governments.

The typical aims of TPAs can be demonstrated with reference to those of the Darwin Tourist Promotion Association. These include the aim to bring more tourists into the Darwin region; to assist visitors when in the region by providing them with relevant information; to increase regional development through the provision of more tourism facilities; to find ways to improve existing facilities; and to educate the population of the region about the value and importance of tourism to the local economy (s.3 of the Constitution of the Darwin TPA). The prime objective of TPAs is the development and promotion of tourism within their respective regions in cooperation with the NTTC and the tourism industry at large.

An interesting trend in the NT is the growing involvement of big business interests in TPAs, especially at locations like Darwin, Alice Springs, and Yulara. These business interests are keen to set high industry standards, and to ensure that relations between tour operators and consumers and other service providers, are harmonious. This in turn may result in the introduction of a code of ethics for operators, a move that the NT government with its ideological commitment to *laissez-faire* has been reluctant to make. This has been an important issue for Aboriginal people who frequently feel that they, and their culture, are inaccurately and negatively portrayed by tour guides (CLC et al. 1987). It also seems likely that with the growth of local government in the NT, increased competition may develop between regions; TPAs would appear to be the logical groups that would articulate regional industry interests.

Aboriginal incorporated bodies

Aboriginal interest groups are numerous and are usually incorporated under any one of three acts: the federal *Aboriginal Councils and Associations Act*, 1976; the *NT Associations Incorporation Act*, 1978; and the *NT Local Government Act*, 1985. They include Aboriginal community councils, outstation resource

organisations, individual outstation groups, royalty associations (groups incorporated to receive mining royalty equivalents), regional associations, and community (local) governments. A recently incorporated body is the Association of Northern and Central Australian Aboriginal Artists (ANCAAA) established in 1987 to represent the interests of seventeen community craft centres (some of which are in Western Australia and South Australia). ANCAAA is an unusual example of an Aboriginal industry lobby group.

An important role of Aboriginal incorporated bodies is to provide a political voice for small groups that can be in opposition to land councils. Indeed a common cause of political division between land councils and regional interest groups is frequently linked to resource developments, although to date it is mining rather than tourism development that has been the main divisive issue.

Another reason for political division and informal politicking is caused by unclear jurisdictions over Aboriginal land. This often results in the availability of numerous political channels for small groups. For example, as will be shown in Part B, groups at Kakadu can utilise a number of organisations including the ANPWS, royalty associations, the DAA, or the NLC as political mouthpieces (see von Sturmer 1982). Similarly at Uluru National Park the local Mutitjulu community can utilise the CLC, the Uluru-Kata Tjuta Board, the Pitjantjatjara Council, the ANPWS, the CCNT, and the local community council. As Gibbins (1988:89) notes astutely (in relation to the NT statehood issue), the problem that NT Aborigines may face is not the lack of a political voice, but rather the existence of too many political voices.

In the tourism arena, this has an important implication: the plethora of formal and informal, regional and local political bodies, can result in a greater degree of debate between various Aboriginal interest groups than occurs in the wider polity. This can give the impression of deep-seated conflict within the Aboriginal political domain; however it is frequently no more than a public airing of differing views and a form of local politicking that is usually kept more private in non-Aboriginal formal and informal politics.

The environmental lobby

The environmental lobby does not play a major role in NT formal politics; in the parlance of Davis et al. (1988:92-3) the environmentalists are an outsider pressure group without a working relationship with the departments and agencies of the NT government. The key issue that environmentalists have been concerned with in the NT has been the possibility of mining in national parks, especially Kakadu (see, for example, 'Hawke, the greenies and Kakadu' *The Weekend Australian* November 22-23 1986). The fact that Kakadu National Park is administered by the federal ANPWS has meant that much of their lobbying has been directed at the federal government. A critical role in this lobbying has been played by the Australian Conservation Foundation (ACF) that has evolved into a 'quasi-insider pressure group' (ibid:93) at the federal level. The evolution of the ACF from an outsider to a quasi-insider pressure group can be directly linked to changing community attitudes to environmental issues (Head 1986:55), especially in the aftermath of the Franklin dam controversy and its impact on the 1983 federal election.

Two features of the environmental lobby are particularly pertinent in the NT context. Firstly, it is generally assumed that there is a natural alliance between environmentalists and Aboriginal interests. This observation may have some validity in the land rights area, but there has been tension in the NT between environmentalists who oppose uranium mining and Aboriginal interests (especially uranium royalty associations) that benefit financially from such activity on Aboriginal land. Secondly, the environmental lobby has tended to emphasise the positive economic impact of tourism in their arguments against mining in national parks (Allen and Harris 1987). The preference for tourism over mining (especially uranium mining) is understandable from an environmental perspective, but it overlooks the negative social and cultural impacts that tourism may have on Aboriginal residents of visitor destinations.

Conflict and cooperation

Gibbins (1988:30) states that conflicting economic interests are to be expected given the coexistence of two very different world

visions in the Territory, one shaped by traditional Aboriginal values, and the other by the values of a European frontier community. Consequently, one finds a continuous tension between the NT government and Aboriginal interests, a tension that Gibbins calls 'the conflict agenda' (ibid:30-42). Gibbins lists three main issues on this agenda, land rights, mining, and tourism and national parks, but in fact all three emanate from the land rights debate. As Altman and Dillon (1988:132) note, the NT government has opposed almost all land claims since 1977 and has joined sectional interests like the mining and pastoral lobbies in vitriolic attacks on the Land Rights Act and land councils. This has meant that Aboriginal interests have frequently been pitted against competing private interests supported by the NT government (Gibbins 1988:30). At times, the NT government itself has acted more as a pressure group than a government in its dealings with Aboriginal people.

At a structural and formal level Aboriginal interests, represented by land councils, have tended to ally themselves with the federal government against the NT government. As Heatley (1986:238-42) notes, all too often Aboriginal interests in the NT have become entangled in the acrimonious relations between Territory and federal governments. Conflict to date has concentrated on the granting of additional land to Aboriginal people through the claims process incorporated in the Land Rights Act and the issue of mining on Aboriginal land. However, as NT government policy increasingly stresses economic diversification, attention is swinging to tourism. It is not unusual for tertiary activities, like tourism, to follow primary sector activities, like mining; conflict between competing economic interests may follow a similar path. To date, tourism-related conflict has been restricted to two major areas, the federally controlled Kakadu and Uluru National Parks, and Katherine Gorge National Park that is currently under claim. As the boundaries of tourism set to expand, increased pressure to gain access onto Aboriginal land can be predicted.

This chapter has outlined a range of competing tourism interests groups. Indications are that conflict can be seen at a number of different levels, some of which encompass Aboriginal interests and some of which do not; the possibilities for conflict in the tourism arena are numerous and complex. For example, at the federal:NT level there has been continuing conflict over national parks. Recently, the NT Treasurer, the Hon. Barry Coulter MLA

stated 'We must ensure that the Commonwealth does not limit the number of visitors, or our ability to provide suitable facilities in our major national parks' (NT Budget Speech 1987/88, 15 September 1987). This is despite the extremely rapid growth at both Uluru and Kakadu documented in Chapters 4 and 6. At the Aboriginal:NT government level there is continuing friction over Uluru National Park, with the threat periodically voiced by the federal Opposition that Uluru National Park will be returned to the NT government, although they have never held the title to this national park. At the bureaucratic level there is competition between the CCNT and the ANPWS (NT:federal) and between statutory authorities within the NT bureaucracy.

It is of interest that the cooperative relations between these competing interests are frequently overlooked. For example, Aboriginal interests have cooperated with the NT government in the establishment of Gurig National Park (Chapter 7) and Kings Canyon National Park (Chapter 5). These cooperative relations are also evident in commercial proposals to establish wilderness lodges at Coral Bay and Watarka (Kings Canyon) with Aboriginal equity participation. Similarly, the federal government provides extremely generous funding to encourage tourism at Kakadu and Uluru, and the CCNT provides staff that are employed at Kakadu by the ANPWS. There are a number of cross-cutting cleavages of cooperation and conflict between various interest groups.

It is also important to recognise the growing cooperation between Aboriginal and mainstream business interests most evident in joint ventures on Aboriginal land. The growing list of examples here include Ipolera in central Australia, the Kings Canyon Wilderness Lodge proposal, the Jabiru Hotel and Kakadu Holiday Village in Kakadu National Park, the Barra Base fishing lodge on Bathurst Island, and the Putjamirra safari camp on Melville Island (see Chapter 2). Most of these proposals have been successful because participants have kept their commercial dealings relatively independent of formal politics and conflict.

Conclusion

The developmentalist policies and associated support for business interests that have ensured electoral success for CLP in the first

decade of self-government have been aimed at the mainly urban, mainly white, majority of the electorate (Gerritsen and Jaensch 1986; Jaensch and Loveday 1987; O'Faircheallaigh and Hadden 1987). This has proved a fail safe success formula for the CLP in the first decade of self government, but it has been predicated on extremely generous funding by the Commonwealth. In the future, as the fiscal squeeze continues, two factors will play increasingly important part in politics of tourism development. Firstly, there may be a demographic shift of urban white migrants back to other states and a corresponding increase in the political leverage of the more permanent Aboriginal component of the population. Secondly, there will be increasing pressures to further diversify the economy, with tourism being an important potential growth sector.

The future growth in NT tourism will require greater cooperation between NT government and Aboriginal interests. Environmental tourism is dependent on a sense of remoteness and associated adventure. But as the popularity of existing destinations increases, the 'wilderness' component of tourism will be eroded, and there will be a need to open up new areas. Environmental pressures on existing attractions could also undermine their appeal, and there will be a need to diversify destinations. For example, the only new developments listed in the 1987/88 NT Budget outside the urban centres of Darwin and Alice Springs, were at Gurig National Park; Kings Canyon National Park (Watarka), and at Jabiru. The first two are on Aboriginal land, the last is being financed primarily by the Gagudju Association, with mining royalty equivalents from the Commonwealth. Tourism expansion is becoming increasingly dependent on access to Aboriginal land, and even to Aboriginal capital.

Secondly, the Aboriginal cultural component of NT tourism can only be genuinely provided by Aboriginal people. This is a complex issue that will be discussed in Parts B and C, but obviously the demand for Aboriginal cultural tourism will have to be met in the future if it continues to feature in promotion of the NT.

From the Aboriginal perspective, there is evidence at the regional political level, of increasing interest in tourism as a means to improve economic status, while controlling its adverse social and cultural impacts. However, the non-Aboriginal experience in north Australia suggests that the establishment of financially viable

enterprises is largely dependent on access to capital (either directly or indirectly) from the public sector. It is unfortunate that public sources of such development finance are declining rapidly just as Aboriginal interests are contemplating greater involvement in tourism. Alternatively, it could be argued that the track record of the NT government would result in any available finance being channelled to non-Aboriginal, rather than Aboriginal, development proposals. This in turn suggests that Aboriginal people may need to increasingly use their own sources of capital, especially from mining royalty equivalents, to fund Aboriginal owned enterprises.

One can only speculate on the longer term tourism opportunity costs which have been precipitated by the decade of conflict between the NT government and Aboriginal interests; political expediency can have a high economic cost. The challenge now for the mainstream political parties is to persuade Aboriginal people that they can benefit from tourism development. This task will not be easy because Aboriginal people have a perspective on development which emphasises actual and potential social and cultural costs. They did not enjoy the boom times evident in many urban electorates in the past decade and they are skeptical about accruing financial benefits from tourism on their land (Altman 1988).

Ultimately, the Aboriginal response to tourism will not be dependent on policies formulated by white or black politicians and implemented by black or white bureaucracies, but on the experiences of different groups involved in this sector. In the following five chapters this micro perspective will be examined at a number of very different Aboriginal communities in the NT.

Part B

Case studies

Map 3 *Uluru National Park*

Chapter 4

Uluru National Park

This chapter investigates the economic impact of tourism on the Mutitjulu Aboriginal community located in Uluru National Park. Tourism to the Ayers Rock region has provided this community with unique commercial opportunities, particularly since October 1985 when ownership of Uluru National Park was vested in an Aboriginal land trust, and then leased back to ANPWS.

Data on the economic structure of the Mutitjulu community at three points in time (August 1985, May 1986 and November 1986) are examined and changes occurring since the August 1985 survey are analysed to provide insights into short-term changes in the contribution of tourism to the local economy. While the Mutitjulu community remains heavily reliant on the social security and public sectors, there is a gradual increase in Aboriginal involvement in tourism-related activities. Most of this involvement is indirect and exploits tourists' interests in Aboriginal culture.

Residents of the Mutitjulu community have invested in commercial enterprises within Uluru National Park on Aboriginal land, rather than at Yulara. In November 1986, no Aboriginal person was employed at Yulara, and since 1984, when Yulara was completed, there has been no Aboriginal community at the tourist village. The residents of the Mutitjulu community have focussed their commercial investments on developments within Uluru National Park, primarily for cultural reasons. This presents them with an ongoing dilemma. Aboriginal people do not wish to become mere pawns in the tourism industry, responding to increasing demands to supply 'cultural tourism' to a rapidly increasing number of tourists. However, they do not wish to see commercial operators at Yulara reaping all the economic benefits from an asset (the national park) that is owned by Anangu. This chapter documents how Aboriginal people at Mutitjulu have attempted to resolve this dilemma.

A number of features of this chapter should be noted. Firstly, my work at Uluru National Park was sponsored by the Central Land Council, Pitjantjatjara Council and Mutitjulu community. The research for this and the following chapter was completed late in 1986. Versions of these chapters appear in the report *Sharing the Park: Anangu Initiatives in Ayers Rock Tourism* (CLC et al. 1987). Secondly, the term Anangu is used throughout this chapter (and the next) to refer to the Aboriginal people of the southern part of central Australia. Thirdly, more fine grained economic information is presented in this chapter than in others. This is primarily a result of three visits to Uluru. A great deal more quantitative information is available in the unabridged versions of these chapters (see CLC et al. 1987). Finally, less information is provided in this chapter than in others on the nature of tourist visitation to Uluru because two previous reports (CLC et al. 1987; Altman 1987a) include much information on this subject.

A brief history of tourism

The history of Aboriginal occupation of the Ayers Rock region has been comprehensively covered elsewhere (Layton and Rowell 1979; Toohey 1980; Toyne and Vachon 1984; Mutitjulu Community 1985; Layton 1986; and Rowse 1987) and will not be repeated here. With the passage of the *Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Amendment Act*, 1985, and the subsequent transfer of title to the Uluru-Kata Tjuta Land Trust, Anangu traditional ownership and association with the region is now recognised in Australian law.

Rowse (1987) provides some history on early tourism to Ayers Rock. Before 1946, only 21 people are known to have climbed Ayers Rock and as early as 1941, the tourism magazine *Walkabout* had published photographs and descriptions of the Rock. In 1948, a graded track was extended from Curtin Springs station to Ayers Rock. From 1952, enterprising coach operators took small groups to Ayers Rock from Alice Springs. At this time, the Ayers Rock-Mount Olga area was a part of the Petermann Aboriginal Reserve, gazetted as a reserve in 1920 under the *NT Crown Lands Ordinance*. Tour operators had to gain permission for access to the reserve from the Welfare Branch (to 1953, Native Affairs Branch) of the NT Administration. During the 1950s there was increasing pressure on the NT Administration by commercial tour operators

and pastoralists in the area east of Ayers Rock, to exclude the Ayers Rock-Mount Olga region from the Petermann Reserve. In 1958, the Ayers Rock-Mount Olga National Park was declared, and committed to the management of the NT Reserves Board under the NT *National Parks and Gardens Ordinance*, 1955. In that year, W.E. Harney was appointed first resident ranger of the Park (Harney 1963). The alienation of the Ayers Rock-Mount Olga area from Aboriginal interests has important analogies with the alienation of land by white commercial interests for pastoral and mining development. The growth of tourism in the region was regarded as incompatible with an Aboriginal presence; Aborigines were a mere constraint on unfettered development and growth. In such conflict of interest between business interests and Aboriginal interests, the former was regarded as more important and the latter disregarded.

The earliest statistics indicate that in 1958 2296 people visited Ayers Rock. In Table 4.1, data are presented on the growth of tourist visitation to the Ayers Rock-Mount Olga National Park.

Table 4.1
Uluru National Park visitors, 1960/61 to 1985/86

Year	Visitors	Year	Visitors
1960/61	4,332	1973/74	48,417
1961/62	5,432	1974/75	58,370
1962/63	5,462	1975/76	56,656
1963/64	8,380	1976/77	62,646
1964/65	10,427	1977/78	66,354
1965/66	12,388	1978/79	65,188
1966/67	18,963	1979/80	76,988
1967/68	21,515	1980/81	79,219
1968/69	23,051	1981/82	86,884
1969/70	27,450	1982/83	87,871
1970/71	30,201	1983/84	105,970
1971/72	42,705	1984/85	110,162 ^a
1972/73	50,287	1985/86	132,114 ^a

Footnote: a. In 1984/85 and 1985/86 there has been a divergence between YC's and CCNT's estimates (see Table 5.2).

Source: Conservation Commission of the Northern Territory.

The rate of growth during the 1960s (from a low base of 4332) was particularly significant, increasing at an annual average (non-compound) rate of 50 per cent. During this time the region gained national and international recognition as a tourist destination. In the 1970s, the rate of growth of tourism numbers decreased somewhat to an average of 25 per cent per annum for the decade. By the early 1970s there was sufficient concern about the numbers visiting Ayers Rock for a House of Representatives Standing Committee on Environment and Conservation to report on the National Park (Commonwealth of Australia 1973, 1977). As a result of these (and other) reports, a decision was made to accommodate tourists outside the boundaries of the National Park.

In 1976, the Yulara site of some 104 square kilometres was proclaimed, and in 1977, the Ayers Rock-Mount Olga area became a national park under the Commonwealth's *National Parks and Wildlife Conservation Act*, 1975. In 1978, the NT government allocated funds for the development of Yulara and in 1979 work began on the re-alignment and sealing of the Petermann Road from Erldunda to the new Yulara Village. Since that time, infrastructure development has proceeded at a fast pace - between 1979 and 1983 the NT government invested about \$30 million in the region. The new Connellan Airport with a sealed strip and a runway suitable for small jets was completed in 1981 and officially opened in June 1982 and in 1983 the sealed Lasseter Highway from the Stuart Highway at Erldunda to Yulara was completed.

In 1982, White Industries began constructing the Yulara Tourist Village at an estimated cost of around \$160 million. In July 1983, the Ayers Rock Campground at Yulara was completed, with a capacity for 3,500 visitors per night. At that time, the campground in Uluru National Park, located opposite the Ininti Store and adjacent to the Anangu living area, was closed down. By the end of 1983, the Ayers Rock Lodge (68 rooms) and the 100 bed Four Seasons Yulara Resort were completed and in November 1984 the Sheraton Ayers Rock Hotel (230 rooms) was finished. At this time the Yulara Tourist Village was officially opened.

The only challenge to this rapid development in the period 1979 to 1984 occurred in February 1979, when the Lake Amadeus/Luritja Land Claim, lodged on behalf of traditional owners by the Central Land Council in December 1978, was amended to

include the area of the National Park. However in August 1979, Mr Justice Toohey ruled that the Uluru (Ayers Rock-Mount Olga) National Park area was alienated Crown land and was not available for claim under s.50 of the *Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act, 1976*. Consequently the land claim was amended to exclude the National Park, the window leases within the Park and the Yulara township site (Toohey 1980).

Indications are that in the period since the completion of Yulara there has been a rapid growth in visitor numbers - in 1984/85 there were over 133,000 visitors to Yulara alone in comparison to 106,000 in 1983/84, and this figure does not include visitors to motels at the base of the Rock (operating to 31 December 1984) or day visitors travelling to the Park from Alice Springs, Curtin Springs, Erldunda or Mt Ebenezer (all locations with overnight accommodation). More recent visitor estimates and some projections are included in Chapter 5.

Data collected by the CCNT indicate that the majority of tourists travel to Uluru National Park by car or coach. The visitors that travel by air to Yulara would subsequently travel by either coach or hire car to Uluru National Park. There are no specific data on the number of visitors that come from overseas although in 1983/84 the NTTC (1984) estimated that about 18 per cent of visitors to central Australia are from overseas. A survey of some 807 visitors to Yulara and Uluru National Park undertaken by the CLC and Pitjantjatjara Council in June 1985 found that about 20 per cent of this sample were from overseas (CLC et al. 1987). Information on mode of transport and on visitor accommodation at Yulara is presented in some detail in Altman (1987a).

The mode of transportation of visitors is correlated to some extent with their accommodation requirements and the nature of their holiday (budget or luxury). Peat, Marwick and Mitchell (1984) projections of tourism growth for YDC assumed that 90 per cent of visitors that travelled to Yulara by air would stay in a hotel; 65 per cent of coach visitors and 25 per cent of car visitors. Data on Yulara visitor statistics and CCNT data on transport mode for 1983/84 suggest that these assumptions may have been high - 38.5 per cent of visitors to Yulara from November 1984 stayed at hotels in contrast to about 52 per cent that could have been anticipated.

Initially it appeared that visitors to Yulara were favouring budget accommodation to luxury accommodation. This may be linked to an observation made earlier that Australian visitors to Ayers Rock somehow associate the destination with 'The Outback Experience' not luxury hotels. However, by 1987, all resorts at Yulara were experiencing very high occupancy levels and some were expanding accommodation facilities. This growth was partly due to a rapid increase in overseas visitors to the Centre. Both the expansion of Yulara and the nature of tourist visitation have ramifications for tourism enterprises that could be established at Uluru National Park.

The Mutitjulu community economy

The economic structure of the Mutitjulu community is examined here by analysing data on individual employment and cash income collected in August 1985 (Altman 1987a), May 1986, and November 1986.

The establishment of the Aboriginal community

With the excision of the Ayers Rock-Mount Olga National Park from the Petermann Reserve in 1958, and the subsequent development of tourism facilities at Ayers Rock, the Welfare Branch of the NT Administration attempted to remove Aboriginal people from the area. This objective was consistent with the goal of assimilation that was official government policy towards Aborigines in the NT at that time. Aboriginal people from the Ayers Rock region were encouraged to centralise at settlements like Areyonga (to the north of Ayers Rock) and Ernabella (to the south). The unstated aim in this process was to minimise interactions between tourists and Aborigines both at Ayers Rock and along the road from Erldunda (Harney 1963; Rose 1965). It was easier to move Anangu from the region than to control tourism. In 1967/68, Docker River was established as a government settlement west of Ayers Rock and many of the traditional owners of the Uluru-Kata Tjuta region moved to this settlement from Areyonga and Ernabella.

While Anangu always maintained some presence in the Ayers Rock region during the 1960s, it was only in 1974 that a permanent camp was established near the eastern aspect of the Rock (Toyne

and Vachon 1984:135). This move from Docker River may have been precipitated by the establishment of the Ininti Store (July 1972) and a petrol station (August 1972) at Ayers Rock by the Docker River Social Club (Walpanya Trading Company). This project was financed by the Aborigines Benefits Trust Fund (ABTF 1973:17; Chapter 2). It is ironic that the assimilation policy that encouraged Anangu to leave the Park, now provided capital for Aboriginal interests to establish enterprises adjacent to Ayers Rock.

The Mutitjulu community has grown in an ad hoc manner and in a policy vacuum. Since 1974, the Department of Aboriginal Affairs (DAA) has had limited involvement in community development and funding, because the Mutitjulu community was regarded as the functional responsibility of park authorities. The NT Reserves Board (to 1977), and the CCNT who have administered Uluru National Park for the Commonwealth, have never encouraged an Anangu presence in the Park; the concentration of an Aboriginal population was regarded as somehow incompatible with the concept of a national park. Even the first ANPWS (1982:22-24) Plan of Management for the Park said nothing specific about Anangu residence in the Park.

The Mutitjulu community was originally incorporated in 1975 as the Uluru Community Inc. and re-incorporated in 1978 as the Mutitjulu Community Inc. Since its establishment, the community has been in a somewhat unusual situation; it is funded from a variety of sources and located within a national park. Available data suggest that the community has grown in size since the early 1980s. DAA community profiles enumerate 40 Anangu at Mutitjulu in 1981 and 97 in 1983. In August 1985, there were 140 people in the community. This growth is partly the result of the recognition of Anangu rights to the Ayers Rock region and partly because of Anangu perceptions of increased threats to their sacred sites from continuing tourism growth.

Population

Table 4.2 shows the size and demographic structure of the Mutitjulu community during the three survey periods. There are probably between 180 and 200 long-term residents at Mutitjulu. However, as in most Aboriginal communities in central Australia, the population of Mutitjulu is highly mobile. These people rarely co-

reside at the Mutitjulu community at one time; some people are either residing with kin at another community or are in Alice Springs for a number of reasons (including for education, hospitalisation, imprisonment, visiting kin or friends, and employment). In the November 1986 survey, the population of Mutitjulu was particularly low, as members of the community were residing elsewhere because of the death of the community chairman in October 1986.

Table 4.2
The Mutitjulu population, 1985 and 1986

Age	August 1985		May 1986		November 1986	
	number	%	number	%	number	%
0-14	47	33.6	47	31.1	36	30.8
15-64	74	52.8	84	55.5	66	56.4
65+	19	13.6	20	13.3	15	12.8
Total	140	100.0	151	100.0	117	100.0

Source: Field surveys.

Table 4.2 provides evidence of two important features of the Mutitjulu community. A high proportion of the population (between 31 and 34 per cent) is below 15 years of age and a significant proportion of the population is over 65 years of age. Whilst the former is not an unusual feature of an Aboriginal community, the latter is most unusual. In the 1981 Census, 10.6 of the Australian population and 2.8 of the total Aboriginal population were aged 65 plus. At the Mutitjulu community, between 13 and 14 per cent of the population was in this category. This has several implications that will be discussed in greater detail later. The structure of such a population suggests a high degree of social security dependence (on age pensions) and high dependency ratios.

Employment

Table 4.3 presents information on the number of Anangu in formal employment. No attempt is made to differentiate full-time from part-time or casual employment, primarily because most of the jobs at Mutitjulu are provided on an 'hours by request' basis.

During each of the survey periods there were about five positions held on a full-time basis: in August 1985, four Anangu were salaried employees, in May 1986 this number had declined to three and by November to only one. However, from June to October 1986, three Anangu were employed by ANPWS as full-time and salaried rangers.

Table 4.3
Employment at the Mutitjulu community, 1985 and 1986

Employer/ institution	August 1985 (number)	May 1986 (number)	November 1986 (number)
Malpa Trading	5	5	1
Maruku Arts	2	3	5
CEP	1	0	0
Community health	2	5	5
Education department	2	0	0
Police	1	1	0
CCNT	6	6	0
Homemaker program	5	3	7
Community office	1	1	1
ANPWS	0	29	10
Childcare program	0	0	3
Total	25	53	32

Source: Field surveys.

An important feature revealed by data in Table 4.3 is the rapid increase in formal employment in the community in early 1986 associated with a Department of Employment and Industrial Relations (DEIR) funded ranger training program administered by ANPWS. By November 1986 the numbers involved in this program had declined somewhat. Between August 1985 and November 1986, there was a significant increase in employment opportunities available in the community. During the first survey period, there was a ratio of only 0.27 jobs for every adult in the community aged over 15 years; by May 1986 this had increased to 0.51 jobs and in November the ratio stood at 0.4.

Data in Table 4.3 exclude from the analysis Anangu who were self-employed. During each of the survey periods, between 10 and 13 Anangu produced artefacts for sale by Maruku Arts and Crafts. While a number of these producers were also formally employed during the survey fortnights, the overall level of employment in the community increased markedly owing to such production for market exchange. No attempt was made to gauge the extent of Anangu involvement in hunting and gathering (subsistence) activities during these periods, although there was some evidence of weekend hunting, and no attempt was made to gauge the extent of Anangu involvement in ritual or other cultural activities that would make them unavailable for employment.

Cash income

Table 4.4 presents aggregate cash income in the community by source. These data indicate that with increases in employment opportunities, the community relies less on social security income. Social security income fell from over 70 per cent of community cash income to 58 per cent in a fifteen month period. The continuing high reliance on these government transfers can be partly explained by the significance of age pensions in total income. Perhaps the critical statistic in Table 4.4 is the decline in significance of unemployment benefits from 39 to 26 per cent of total income. This figure does not match the numbers actually unemployed, for a number of people in part-time or casual employment continue to receive some unemployment benefit payments.

It seems likely that the extent of social security dependence implied by Table 4.4 is overstated for a number of reasons. Firstly, there are indications that during May 1986 when a number of people were joining the DEIR-funded ranger work experience program, they continued to receive their unemployment benefits. At that time a Social Security Amnesty was operating from February 12 1986 to May 31. Because of this amnesty, and the work load associated with it, the Department of Social Security in Alice Springs was tardy in adjusting people's unemployment benefit entitlements. Not only did this exaggerate the extent of community reliance on unemployment benefits, it also gave Anangu joining the DEIR scheme an unrealistically high cash income. It seems likely that the significance of social security income in May 1986 would have declined to between 50 and 55 per cent if Anangu were

receiving their correct entitlements. Secondly, during both the May and November 1986 surveys, three Anangu rangers employed by ANPWS were excluded - in May, these three men were not yet on salaries and by November one had died and another had left the community.

Table 4.4
Aggregate cash income at Mutitjulu, by source, 1985 and 1986

Source	Aug. 1985 (%)	May 1986 (%)	Nov. 1986 (%)
Social security income			
Family allowance	3.6	3.3	2.7
Pensions	27.5	25.6	29.2
Unemployment	39.4	32.9	26.2
Wages, salaries, etc.	20.9	34.5	33.2
Other cash income			
Private enterprise ^a	3.7	0.0	0.0
Sale of artefacts	3.7	3.3	8.7
Services/royalties ^b	1.3	0.4	0.0

Footnotes: a. In 1985 three Anangu operated a drinks van at the base of the Ayers Rock climb. This venture ended in October.

b. Provision of services as film guides; royalties on sales of T-shirts designed by community members.

Source: Field surveys.

Table 4.5 presents information on four surveys undertaken for the fortnights ending 16 June, 30 June, 14 July and 8 September 1986. These data indicate that social security income only accounted for about 50 per cent of total community cash income. The one exception to this occurred in the survey on 30 June 1986 (Census night). However, this aberration was due to a one-off payment of \$3600 made to community members who had acted in the film 'Uluru An Anangu Story'. When this payment for past employment is deducted from current employment income, the average figure of

50 per cent dependence on employment and other income is maintained.

Table 4.5
Aggregate cash income at Mutitjulu, by source, 1986.

Survey period	Employment and other income		Social security income		Total
	(\$)	(%)	(\$)	(%)	(\$)
mid June 1986	9,038	50.0	9,037	50.0	18,075
late June 1986	16,110	56.4	12,451	43.6	28,561
mid Aug. 1986	11,183	50.7	10,878	49.3	22,061
early Sept. 1986	9,453	49.6	9,607	50.4	19,060

Source: CLC et al. (1987).

In Table 4.6 the information presented in Table 4.4 in percentages is presented in dollars.

Table 4.6
Cash income per fortnight at Mutitjulu, 1985 and 1986

Source	Aug. 1985	May 1986	Nov. 1986
	(\$)	(\$)	(\$)
Social security income	14,228	15,975	10,603
Employment income	4,228	8,940	6,056
Other cash income	1,750	960	1,580
Total cash income	20,205	25,875	18,239
Per capita cash income ^a	144.33	171.36	155.88

Footnote: a. Per capita cash income is total cash income divided by surveyed populations of 140, 151, and 117.

Source: Field surveys.

Over the three survey periods, total cash income at Mutitjulu did not change markedly, being little different in aggregate terms from data in Table 4.5. Measured per capita cash income levels increased by nearly 20 per cent between August 1985 and May 1986, but then declined by 9 per cent by November 1986. In real terms, adjusting for increases in the consumer price index, this decline would have been more substantial. However, the high variability in cash income levels (demonstrated by the differences in aggregate cash income in Tables 4.4 and 4.5) suggests that such a decline may have been only temporary. Table 4.5 indicates that employment and other cash income vary more than social security income. This in turn implies that community access to cash may fluctuate according to the extent of community involvement in the formal labour market.

Using community income data collected in August 1985, I compared average Anangu cash income levels with household income data collected by the ABS (1985) and the University of Melbourne's Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research on poverty (Altman 1987a).

Given the overall similarity in cash income levels at Mutitjulu in August 1985 and November 1986, the findings of the earlier comparative assessment remain valid. By average Australian standards members of the Mutitjulu community are extremely poor - average per capita income Australia-wide is nearly twice that of Anangu at Mutitjulu. Their low cash income status is partly reflected in the earlier observation that the salaried employment of three or four community members can markedly lower the overall significance of welfare transfers. However compared with other households dependent on welfare, members of the Mutitjulu community are relatively well off because part-time and occasional employment allows Anangu to supplement their social security entitlements.

In Table 4.7, employment income is disaggregated, by employer, to isolate the direct employment and income effects of tourism development.

Table 4.7
Employment income, by source, 1985 and 1986^a

Employer	Aug. 1985 (%)	May 1986 (%)	Nov. 1986 (%)
Maruku	5.9	5.8	12.0
Malpa	12.3	11.2	0.7
CCNT	23.0	11.0	0.0
Health centre	7.4	12.8	20.7
Community office ^b	3.2	7.3	12.3
Yulara school	18.7	0.0	0.0
NT police	15.1	7.6	0.0
CEP	4.5	0.0	0.0
ANPWS	0.0	42.0	35.7
Homemaker program ^c	9.8	1.3	11.1
Childcare	0.0	0.0	7.5
Total	99.9	99.9	100.0

Footnotes: a. Wages and salaries only.

b. A DAA funded trainee liaison officer is paid via the community office; he was employed in October 1985.

c. Funding for this program comes from both a Family Support Services Scheme (Community Homemaker) and the HACC (Home and Community Care) Scheme.

Source: Field surveys.

The direct employment effects of tourism are evident in Table 4.3 in the numbers employed by Maruku, CCNT and ANPWS. For the three survey periods, 32 per cent, 72 per cent and 47 per cent of employment opportunities were provided by these three institutions. Similarly, they provided (Table 4.7) 29 per cent, 60 per cent and 48 per cent of employment income. However, there were also indirect and induced employment and income effects associated with tourism. For example, in Table 4.4 it is estimated that over the three survey periods between 3 and 9 per cent of community cash income was earned from the sale of artefacts to Maruku Arts and Crafts. While such sales may have occurred irrespective of Uluru being a major tourist destination, immediate tourist demand facilitates the marketing of artefacts. Malpa Trading Company's involvement in the tourist trade also creates

employment, though today no Anangu work in Malpa's tourist outlets. Their employment at the community store and garage is partly funded by takings from tourists, and it also frees non-Anangu staff to work at the kiosk and souvenir outlets operated primarily for tourists. Employment with the Education Department and Police at Yulara can also be indirectly linked to tourism, although by November 1986 no Anangu were employed at Yulara. Finally, the funding of an Anangu trainee liaison officer, to mediate between the community and the Uluru-Kata Tjuta Board is indirectly attributed to tourism.

When all direct and indirect employment and income effects are calculated, the impact of tourism on the Mutitjulu community can be estimated. For the three survey periods, tourist-related employment totalled 64 per cent, 85 per cent and 75 per cent of formal employment.

This tourist-related employment provided 80 per cent, 86 per cent, and 61 per cent of employment income and all of the 'other cash income' quantified in Table 4.4. The only employment opportunities at Mutitjulu not directly linked to tourism were in the provision of community services at the Community Health Centre, in the Homemaker Program and at the Childcare Centre.

Mutitjulu and the tourism industry

In the previous section, the structure of the Mutitjulu community was examined, and the extent of linkage in formal employment and income terms between the community and tourism to Uluru National Park established. The concentration here is on the operations of Mutitjulu enterprises that are directly involved in the tourism industry, and the extent of Anangu involvement in employment schemes provided by ANPWS.

Maruku Arts and Crafts

Maruku Arts and Crafts was established in 1984 as a part of the Mutitjulu Community Incorporated to service the marketing needs of Pitjantjatjara and Yankuntjatjara producers throughout central Australia. It was funded by an Aboriginal Arts Board subsidy and an ADC seeding grant and ANPWS physical infrastructure. The non-

Anangu craft advisers who established this marketing enterprise within National Park had been located at Amata. The stated rationale for establishing the centre at Ayers Rock was to sell artefacts directly to a concentrated market of tourists (D'Aranjo and Yates 1983).

Since Maruku began operations in August 1984, its turnover has increased significantly, from \$102,023 in the 1984/85 financial year to \$225,473 in 1985/86. Turnover for the first quarter of 1986/87 already exceeds the total take for 1984/85 and is at an annual rate of over \$400,000 per annum. (The first quarter, however, falls in the peak visitor period.) Two main factors appear to have influenced this rapid growth rate. Firstly, there is the growth in visitor numbers to Uluru National Park. But secondly, and of greater significance, is the shift of the craft camp at the base of the Ayers Rock climb to its present location at the entry station. The shift included the development of the 'Craft Camp' with construction of *wiltjas* and other traditional Anangu shelters. In the period April to November 1985, \$72,770 was sold retail at the base of the climb. In the same period in 1986, \$174,169 was sold at the relocated Craft Camp. With proposed further development of this site into a cultural centre, and the projected growth in tourism, it seems that local demand will increase rapidly.

Today, Maruku Arts and Crafts services over twenty communities in central Australia, acting as a craft marketing agency for Anangu producers. It is thus imperative to differentiate the direct and indirect economic impacts of this enterprise and also local, from regional impacts (see Chapter 5). While jobs at Maruku are held by members of the Mutitjulu community (because of their proximity to the craft retailing and wholesaling outlets), from April 1985 to May 1986 only about 19 per cent of payments to producers went to residents of the Mutitjulu community.

The principal impact of Maruku on the Mutitjulu community is indirect; artefacts are procured on a weekly basis from local producers. From April 1985 to May 1986, some 58 weeks, \$26,522 was paid to Mutitjulu producers who could be readily identified in purchase books. The average price paid per craft item over the period was \$4.80. In Table 4.8, information is presented on the range of items produced by Mutitjulu craftspeople.

Table 4.8
Nature of artefacts produced for Maruku April 1985 to May 1986

Item	Number	Percentage of total
Bowls	743	13.2
Animals	2,418	42.9
Weapons	548	9.7
Music sticks (sets)	1,555	27.6
Tools	102	1.8
Paintinga	66	1.2
Handspun items	99	1.8
Beads (sets)	20	0.3
Music boomerangs	5	0.0
Sundry items	78	1.4
Total	5,634	99.9

Footnote: a. Since May 1986, production of paintings of a distinct Ayers Rock style has increased markedly.

Source: Purchase books of Maruku craft advisers. Data collated by Luana Johnston assisted by Pat D'Aranjo.

The average age of all producers is high, being 54 years. At Mutitjulu, the majority of producers (63 per cent) were women, who produced 83 per cent (by value) of artefacts. This is quite unusual and the reverse of the situation found in central Arnhem Land where 83 per cent of production (by value) was by males (Altman 1983b).

The information available for the 48 Mutitjulu producers can be differentiated on the basis of gender, and producers can be arbitrarily defined as major, minor and occasional. A major producer is one who received more than \$500 over the 58 weeks, a minor producer received \$100 to \$499, and an occasional producer \$0-99.

There are some differences between male and female producers at Mutitjulu. Most major producers (82 per cent) are women and so are the majority of minor producers. Female producers tend to be significantly younger than men, averaging 51 years to the men's 60 years of age. Occasional producers are much

younger than major or minor producers; for females the average age of occasional producers is 32 years, for men 51 years. This suggests that while younger people may possess the skills to produce artefacts for market exchange, this is an activity more popular with older people. A high proportion (47 per cent) of producers receive an age pension.

In November 1986, I updated this data base on producers. This more recent information indicates that in the 24 week period since May 1986, 43 Mutitjulu residents produced artefacts for sale. It is significant that 12 of these producers are new, and, of these, two have developed from non-producers to minor producers in a matter of six months. Of the twelve new producers, 10 are female, their average age is only 26, and average production per new producer totalled \$73 over the survey period. There has been a rapid increase in the number of producers in the Mutitjulu community since the period August 1984 to August 1985 when there were only 18 artefact producers. By May 1986, this number had increased to 48, and by November 1986, it remained at over 40. Between May 1986 and November 1986, the rate of production at Mutitjulu increased from \$450 per week to \$530 per week, an increase of some 18 per cent during a period when wage employment (particularly with ANPWS) was readily available.

This rapid increase in production has a number of important ramifications. Firstly, when there is an immediate demand for artefacts, supply is readily available. This is primarily because the skills necessary to produce artefacts are distributed throughout the adult population. Secondly, with market demand, innovative designs have emerged. In particular, a number of producers at Mutitjulu paint a distinctly Ayers Rock style of Western Desert art that include both abstract and representational designs. Artists are painting designs associated with both Uluru and Kata Tjuta. Like Papunya Tula and Yuendumu art, paintings are produced on boards and on canvas.

Table 4.9 shows retail sales at the Maruku Craft Camp. This craft camp was relocated from the base of the Ayers Rock climb and opened in April 1986. Sales averaged about \$1000 per day. Interestingly, the marked seasonality observed in the past in tourist visitation to Uluru National Park appears to be declining. While August remained the busiest month of the year, there were

significant average and daily sales during a number of other months. In particular, October and November, normally quiet months at the Park, were high visitation months according to sales figures. The advertising campaign by the Yulara Corporation aimed at reducing tourist seasonality may be having some success. This has an implication for Maruku. In 1986, the Craft Camp season was extended to the period April to November and in future years there may be a need to open for an even longer season.

Table 4.9
Retail sales at Uluru National Park, 1986

Month	Total sales	Days open	Mean daily sales	Standard deviation	Range in daily sales
April	\$15,063	23	\$665	\$342	\$100-1,688
May	\$24,483	27	\$907	\$340	\$357-1,640
June	\$19,796	22	\$900	\$324	\$500-1,721
July	\$28,152	24	\$1,173	\$484	\$392-2,743
August	\$42,754	26	\$1,644	\$592	\$607-2,647
Sept.	\$24,233	23	\$1,054	\$604	\$327-2,323
October	\$19,445	25	\$778	\$272	\$380-1,414
Nov. ^a	\$4,993	9	\$555	\$335	\$316-1,102
Total	\$179,162	179	\$1,001	\$412	\$100-2,743

Footnote: a. To 11 November 1986.

Source: Maruku Arts and Crafts, Mutitjulu.

The success of the Maruku Craft Camp has allowed it to employ a number of Anangu to assist with sales and to demonstrate artefact production skills (like stone tool making and painting) to tourists. In the twenty five weeks between April and December 1986 18 people were employed, earning a total of \$8165, an average of \$326 per week. About 60 per cent of craft income earned by Mutitjulu people was employment income. A two-tier employment system operates. Pensioners are paid a stipend of \$50 per week, while younger people are paid hourly wages for assisting with sales. The Craft Camp offers casual seasonal employment to Anangu who may be visiting kin at Mutitjulu. From July 1 to November 13 1986, four of eleven Anangu employed by Maruku were visitors.

Producers who demonstrate production skills are encouraged to sell artefacts directly to tourists. This is preferred by some older craftspeople people who sold artefacts in this way prior to the establishment of Maruku. It also allows producers to keep the total return rather than forego a proportion to Maruku. Indications from observations made at the Craft Camp suggest that tourists greatly appreciate interaction with Anangu artisans and painters. While no attempt was made to quantify the value of such sales, it seems likely that they did not exceed \$50-100 per week for all producers.

The tourism literature (Graburn 1976; Smith 1978b; de Kadt 1979), frequently suggests that mass tourism may lead to the degeneration of indigenous art forms. At Uluru National Park, however, the number of producers has rapidly increased over the two years since the establishment of Maruku Arts and Crafts. This suggests that mass tourism is resulting in cultural maintenance and diversification, rather than degeneration, in the artefacts sphere. This is particularly evident in the production of items such as bowls (coolamons), weapons, music sticks, tools and boomerangs (see Table 4.8). The reasons for this are complex. Maruku provides a ready market for such items and producers are guaranteed an immediate financial return. Maruku craft advisers insist that items for sale as souvenirs to tourists be of top quality. And producers of fine artefacts or paintings have social status within Anangu society so that the demonstration of traditional skills continues to have important cultural worth.

To what extent is the future supply of artefacts at Mutitjulu assured? Analyses undertaken elsewhere in the Northern Territory (Altman 1983b; Aboriginal Arts Board 1986) indicate that most artefacts are produced at outstations (homeland communities). At outstations there are very few competing cash income earning possibilities, supplies of raw material are relatively plentiful, and people maintain traditional skills and values. Maruku's artefacts are produced at Anangu homeland communities spread widely throughout the Pitjantjatjara lands. However, the Mutitjulu community, which would generally be regarded as a township rather than a homeland, remains a prolific source of artefacts despite the difficulty in obtaining raw materials, which must be collected outside the park boundary on Katiti lands. Anangu material culture is still produced at Mutitjulu despite mass tourism and the ready availability of other jobs.

It has been argued that for artefact production to be maintained, it is essential for producers to be distributed across all age grades (Altman 1983b). It is therefore of some concern that the average ages of both female and male artefact producers are relatively high. Nevertheless skills to produce artefacts are being passed onto the younger generation. For example, in the second half of 1986 some young people, caught without cash between employment with ANPWS and registering for unemployment benefits, produced artefacts for sale. While younger Anangu possess the skills to produce artefacts, they decide to get money in other ways. Furthermore, the relatively aged profile of artefact producers is partly a reflection of the aged nature of the Mutitjulu community (see Table 4.2; Altman 1987a:26-28). With such a high proportion of the adult population manufacturing artefacts for sale, it seems likely that production skills will be passed onto future generations, so assuring the future supply of artefacts.

Malpa Trading Company

The historical development of Malpa Trading Company is very different from Maruku Arts and Crafts. The Ininti Store and BP Ayers Rock were established by Walpanya Trading Company (wholly owned by the Docker River Social Club) in 1972 as a tourist enterprise. The grant and loan finance from the Aborigines Benefits Trust Fund (now the Aborigines Benefit Trust Account) was intended to assist Anangu to stake a claim in the growing tourism industry at what was then called the Ayers Rock-Mount Olga National Park. In 1975, Malpa Trading Company took over the operations of Walpanya, but the majority of the company's directors remained residents of Docker River.

When the Ininti Store and BP Ayers Rock were first established, there was no permanent Anangu community within Uluru National Park. In the period 1974 to 1984, Malpa Trading Company increasingly served the interests of both tourists and a growing resident Anangu population. In this period, tourist numbers nearly tripled, from 58,370 to about 133,000. Tourists were accommodated at four motels and a camp ground within the national park at the present location of the Mutitjulu community. Data in Table 4.10 show that for the period 1980 to 1983, the gross turnover of Malpa Trading Company increased rapidly.

Table 4.10
Gross turnover of Malpa Trading Company, 1980 to 1986

Year	Ininti turnover ^a (\$)	BP turnover ^b (\$)	Total turnover (\$)	Percentage change (%)
1980	375,363	261,277	636,840	
1981	501,821	335,500	837,321	+23.9
1982	629,176	524,666	1,154,842	+27.5
1983	701,213	954,065	1,655,278	+30.2
1984	690,131	670,421	1,360,552	-21.7
1985	853,522	190,982	1,044,544	-30.3
1986 ^c	800,000	140,000	940,000	-11.1

Footnotes: a. From April 1986, this includes sales at the souvenir outlet at the ANPWS park entry station and from June 1986 from the kiosk.

b. This includes sales at the BP Yulara temporary fuel depot operated by Malpa between December 1982 and August 1984.

c. Estimate only.

Source: Annual financial statements of Malpa Trading Company; recent estimates are based on discussions with managers.

This growth was suddenly reversed in 1984 for a variety of reasons. Firstly, from mid-1983, tourist accommodation was gradually shifted to Yulara, located some 25 kilometres from Mutitjulu. By December 1984, the leases of the four motels located within Uluru National Park expired. This had a dramatic impact on Malpa Trading Company because it was then physically isolated from the tourist trade. Secondly, in 1984, a supermarket and petrol outlet were opened at Yulara. Until August 1984, Malpa had operated the temporary fuel outlet at Yulara but its tender to operate this outlet permanently was unsuccessful, and the contract was offered to Mobil. Consequently, from 1984 Malpa Trading Company lost its monopoly over fuel and grocery sales in the Ayers Rock region.

The years 1985 and 1986, those of primary significance to this chapter, have been ones of rapid change for Malpa Trading.

With the establishment of Maruku, Malpa lost its monopoly over the sale of artefacts, a monopoly further eroded by the opening of an artefacts shop at Yulara in 1985. Maruku acted as a wholesaler to both the Ininti Store and Yulara Arts and Crafts (although the former did receive preferential terms). Throughout 1985 and until April 1986, tourists continued to patronise both the Ininti Store and BP Ayers Rock. The store was a particularly popular stop for tourists on coach tours, providing a unique opportunity to see an Aboriginal community and interact with Anangu. BP Ayers Rock supplied the cheapest fuel in the region (Altman 1987a:49) and advertised this at the base of the Ayers Rock climb.

In April 1986, the Mutitjulu community made a decision to close off the community to tourists. This decision was not sudden, having been mooted since early 1985 (Altman 1987a:93). However, two factors associated with this closure directly impinged on Malpa's operations. Firstly, there had been inordinate delays in completing a kiosk at the ANPWS park entry station. Construction began in October 1985 but was not completed until June 1986. Secondly, no alternative outlet for fuel was established within Uluru National Park. Overnight BP Ayers Rock changed from a garage serving Mutitjulu residents (Anangu and non-Anangu) and tourists, to a community garage with consequences for the garage's financial viability. When Malpa's tourist-oriented enterprises moved to the park entry station the Maruku Craft Camp also moved there, so that two Anangu owned enterprises competed with each other. The Mutitjulu community decided that Malpa's souvenir outlet would not sell artefacts, except when the Maruku outlet was closed. The loss of artefact sales further reduced Malpa's scale and viability.

It is difficult to differentiate Malpa's sales to tourists from those to the Mutitjulu community. During the years 1983 and 1984, Malpa's Ininti Store turnover was recorded by broad categories (Altman 1987a:48). On the basis of these figures it was estimated that in 1985 between 50 and 60 per cent of Ininti Store sales were to tourists and a much higher proportion of petrol sales from BP Ayers Rock would have been to non-Anangu. Since calendar year 1984, changes to recording procedures make it difficult to estimate the proportion of sales to tourists. All the records for the first half of 1985 were lost while being stored on a computer; the manager during this period ran up a substantial loss and was replaced first by interim management and then by the current managers. The

current division of turnover into broad categories does not allow a straightforward assessment of tourist and non-tourist sales. Since April 1986, when the community was closed to tourists, a number of temporary outlets have operated: a souvenir outlet has traded at the ANPWS entry station, but the kiosk built there was only opened in June 1986 and closed for the season in November. When the kiosk is closed, Malpa's sole food and beverage income from tourists comes from soft drink machines located behind the entry station. Currently, Malpa sells artefacts supplied and priced by Maruku when the Craft Camp is closed.

Sales to tourists are estimated in two ways. Firstly, information on turnover by broad categories for 1986 for the Ininti Store, souvenir outlet and kiosk indicates that 5 per cent of sales were artefacts, 2 per cent were film, 7 per cent were T-shirts, and 23 per cent were souvenirs. Overall, it is estimated that 40 per cent of Ininti (including souvenir outlet and kiosk) turnover was from the tourist trade; or 33 per cent of gross turnover including BP Ayers Rock service station takings. Secondly, disaggregated data are available for the kiosk and souvenir outlet sales for a three month period (August, September and October 1986). During these three months, 42 per cent, 38 per cent and 34 per cent of gross turnover occurred at these two outlets. However, it should be noted that both Anangu and ANPWS ranger staff patronised the kiosk.

What are the direct and indirect benefits that accrue to Anangu from Malpa's involvement in the tourist trade? And why is it that despite its locational advantage and commercial concession to operate enterprises within the Park, Malpa's turnover and viability is declining during a period of rapid tourism growth?

Currently, there are no direct employment benefits for Anangu from Malpa's tourist operations, primarily because no Anangu will take jobs available at the souvenir outlet and kiosk. In the past, when tourists patronised the Ininti Store, Anangu did serve them, but at present all Anangu who work for Malpa remain at the community store. In 1986, ten Anangu worked at the store, for periods ranging from one to 37 weeks (per employee). Regular employment was only taken up by two in the store.

These jobs were partly dependent on the overall viability of Malpa and so are partially assisted by tourism. Interestingly,

almost all Malpa's employees were female and young (average age 23 years); the only exceptions being a young man who worked for BP Ayers Rock as the mechanic's assistant and two male wardens who assisted with clearing outside the store and any disputes. Employment at Malpa was available to Anangu on an hours request basis; net pay rates were \$6.70 per hour at the store; \$5.80 per hour at BP Ayers Rock and \$4.65 per hour for juniors. Over a 38 week survey period in 1986, \$13,645 accrued to Anangu in wages at an average rate of \$359 per week. It is recognised by the managers that jobs at the store and tourist outlets are among the least popular in the community. This is partly because store work is regarded by Anangu as repetitive and boring, because staff members are often under pressure from kin to either not charge for goods or to exceed book-up limits, and because employees have limited autonomy, being in the shop constantly under the manager's supervision. Employment at the kiosk and souvenir outlet is unpopular because of the pressures to serve tourists quickly and communication difficulties.

The tourism literature (de Kadt 1979) suggests that mass tourism will frequently result in a rapid increase in prices (set for tourists rather than for long-term residents of tourist destinations). To test whether prices at the Ininti store were high, a survey was undertaken to compare prices for 72 items with their equivalents at the much larger Yulara supermarkets. In August 1985, this survey indicated that 35 items were cheaper at Mutitjulu, 30 were cheaper at Yulara, and 7 were identically priced. In a re-survey in May 1986 (when only 63 goods were directly comparable), 35 were cheaper at Mutitjulu, 22 were cheaper at Yulara and nine were identically priced. (For a list of the goods compared see Altman [1987a:101-102].) While there is no doubt that prices in central Australia are high owing to the region's remoteness, mass tourism has not forced up prices at the Mutitjulu community. The Mutitjulu community owns Malpa and the store committee maintains a policy to keep community store prices as low as possible by using variable markups to cross-subsidise store goods. Souvenirs are marked up 100 per cent and T-shirts 60 per cent, while goods at the Ininti store are only marked up 50 per cent. BP Ayers Rock is similarly cross-subsidised. However, after the closure of the garage to the public, petrol prices at BP Ayers Rock consistently exceeded those at Mobil Yulara petrol station.

Another indirect benefit that accrues to Anangu from Malpa is the sale of 'Handback' T shirts. Since October 1985 over \$12,000 in royalties (\$4 per T shirt) has been paid to a community account called Walkadjarra. This money is mainly used by the community for cultural purposes; for example, two artists were paid to paint large murals on the health clinic opened in 1986.

What factors have undermined Malpa's viability at a time when its commercial concession (as an Anangu-owned enterprise) to operate in Uluru National Park should have provided healthy profits? Firstly, mismanagement of Malpa in the first half of 1985 resulted in a rapid decline in Malpa's accumulated reserves. This meant that Malpa had no capital to take advantage of opportunities in the tourism trade. Even the kiosk built for Malpa by ANPWS required a loan of \$13,000 from the Aboriginal Development Commission (ADC). Malpa's reserves were further run down when it was required to pay \$20,000 to Docker River directors as part of a deal to transfer ownership of Malpa Trading to the Mutitjulu community. Another \$30,000 in this procurement was provided from a share of the annual rental of \$75,000 paid by ANPWS to the traditional owners of Uluru National Park.

At times, the community and store managers differ in their expectations of Malpa. The management argues that they need the tourist trade to maintain both the financial viability of the Ininti store and its competitiveness with the supermarket at Yulara. The Mutitjulu community appears to be less commercial and more socially oriented. For them, the social costs associated with tourist intrusion into the community (Hamilton 1984) outweighed the economic benefits of tourist business at the store and garage. With the store and garage closed to tourists the community is now more insulated. However, the decision to close the store in April 1986 was not commercially sound, because alternative enterprises had not been set up at the entry station. Perhaps the community did may not appreciate that the success of Malpa's tourism enterprises affects the viability of their community store.

This identifies one of the key decision-making problems for Malpa Trading; it is a private sector business, and it is located both within an Aboriginal community and national park, and is owned by the Mutitjulu community. This means that Malpa management are not only accountable to its Aboriginal owners, but also to the Uluru-

Kata Tjuta Board of Management and ANPWS. When Malpa Trading wants to pursue an entrepreneurial initiative (like the establishment of the kiosk) it is required to undertake prolonged negotiations with bureaucratic structures like the Board and ANPWS that can result in inordinate delays. Malpa's location in the national park restricts its ability to make quick commercial decisions.

Malpa's tourist-oriented enterprises are constrained by a shortage of suitable labour. Anangu are unwilling to work in direct contact with tourists, so Malpa must employ non-Anangu staff. However, it is impossible to attract white staff to Mutitjulu without providing reasonable accommodation. Malpa owns some housing at Mutitjulu, but is embargoed from building more because the community has decided that Anangu housing will have priority over staff housing in the building program. Malpa has looked for alternative sources of labour. It was expected that spouses of ANPWS ranger staff may be available as a part-time work force, but a high proportion of ANPWS staff appointed to Uluru have been single because of an acute housing shortage. The Yulara labour market is extremely tight (see Chapter 5), and has caused Malpa to operate its tourist enterprises on a marginal cost basis. When the kiosk at the ANPWS entry station was closed early in November because marginal revenue fell below marginal cost, the decision not only inconvenienced tourists, but also Anangu and non-Anangu members of the Mutitjulu community.

Malpa is unable to take full advantage of its commercial concessions within Uluru because concrete decisions about its tourist outlets have been delayed. There is still doubt about setting up a cultural centre at, or near, the entry station. And Malpa is short of accumulated capital reserves for investment purposes; it needs an injection of capital to upgrade and expand. Park rental moneys and gate moneys (20 per cent of total intake) paid to the Mutitjulu community could provide Malpa with much needed capital.

Australian National Parks and Wildlife Service

A Memorandum of Lease (Commonwealth of Australia 1985) signed between members of the Uluru-Kata Tjuta Land Trust and the Director of ANPWS on October 26, 1985 guaranteed the Mutitjulu community positive economic spinoffs. These income effects are

both direct (being linked to the number of tourists that will enter the Park) and indirect (being linked to employment opportunities that will be provided by ANPWS).

The direct financial benefits are made up of an annual rent, that is paid irrespective of the number of Park visitors, and a share of 'gate money' that is charged for all adult visitors. For the first five years the rental is set at \$75,000 per annum (payable in advance) and gate money equivalent to 20 per cent of all entrance fees collected (\$1.50 per adult) is paid quarterly.

Because gate money depends on the number of tourists, the proportion that pay the entry fee, the entry fee rate and the proportion of visitors that are adults, it is difficult to predict its value. In 1985 I estimated that the total value of the lease to Anangu would be in the range \$557,000 to \$886,000 to 1990 (Altman 1987a:77). This estimate was based on low and high projections of visitor numbers, fees varying between \$1.50 and \$3.00 per adult, and ratios of 0.7 and 0.8 for adult to total visitors. The rent and gate moneys, paid via sub-s.35(4) of the *Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act* 1976, may be used by traditional owners in any manner that they wish and represent an important source of discretionary capital.

The Memorandum requires that within six months of the commencement of the lease, ANPWS will begin to train a reasonable number of Anangu in Park management. Early in 1986, while Uluru National Park was still administered by CCNT, a three month work experience program was established with DEIR funding. In May 1986, owing to continuing differences between CCNT and ANPWS, the management of the Park was taken over by ANPWS. When ANPWS took over, three Anangu were employed (on three month renewable contracts) as salaried rangers. The DEIR work experience program became a twelve month ranger training program, although to date, most training has occurred on-the-job.

During 1986 there were several employment schemes for Anangu. From the beginning of the year, up until the end of May, the CCNT employed four Anangu as day labourers to clear rubbish around the Mutitjulu community, and to assist with general fire prevention work. Frequently Anangu employed by the CCNT were not supervised and paid for an eight hour day irrespective of the

amount of actual work undertaken. In 1985, the CCNT employed two base grade rangers, one of whom continues to work for them.

ANPWS has employed Anangu on one of three schemes. Firstly, under Commonwealth Public Service regulations, one man was paid as a senior ranger and two were rangers. These positions were part of the Uluru National Park establishment structure of 14 permanent positions; eleven of these positions were filled by non-local staff and three by Anangu. Anangu, like other ranger staff, work 7 hours 21 minutes per day and are required to fill in time sheets. Secondly, between 13 and 15 Anangu are employed under the DEIR funded ranger training scheme, with an annual budget of \$200,000 enough for up to 16 Anangu to partake in this scheme. Wage rates are set at \$7.87 per hour gross and trainees work a maximum of six hours per day, 30 hours per week. Finally, day labour is available in the Park from Project Officer's Advance (POA) account. Day labour is generally limited to environmental and advisory work, although Anangu have been employed to operate heavy machinery such as graders. The annual POA account will total \$100,000 and could provide full-time employment for up to seven Anangu at \$8.13 per hour gross for up to seven hours per day, 35 hours per week.

Information on Anangu employment by ANPWS under the DEIR and POA schemes for a 39 week period from 21 February 1986 shows that 29 males worked on these two schemes to November 1986, earning a total \$36,903; 16 women worked, earning a total \$32,077. On top of this, the three male rangers earned a total of \$18,395, and a further \$3805 (from 21 February to 29 May 1986) when employed as casual staff. All told, over \$90,000 was paid by ANPWS to members of the Mutitjulu community (including four visitors) over the 39 week period, at a weekly rate of about \$2338. Of the total, 64.8 per cent was paid to men and 35.2 per cent to women; the three salaried staff themselves earned 24.4 per cent of total payments to Anangu.

There are three important features of Anangu employment with ANPWS. Firstly, on a week-by-week basis the total labour pool available for training and park management purposes is unstable. Secondly, Anangu employment with ANPWS appears to have peaked (in 1986) around April to May, but the overall trend in employment appears to have been downwards since then. Finally,

though women joined the ANPWS workforce two weeks later than men, they were more regular employees. On average, women worked 17 out of 37 weeks, whereas men worked 11 weeks out of 39.

The Anangu workforce is not particularly aged, male employees average 44 years, and females 42. A high proportion of Anangu employed by ANPWS are pensioners. Eight of the 29 men employed over the 39 week period were aged over 65 and received age pensions, while 5 of the 19 women employed were in receipt of aged wife's or widow's pensions. Anangu work particularly short hours for ANPWS; males average 14 hours per week and females 12.5 hours.

The Anangu workforce can be divided into two categories: pensioners and non-pensioners. Pensioners tended to work only for a few weeks during the 39 week survey period (men averaging 7 weeks, women 10 weeks) and for only a few hours per week (averaging seven and six hours, respectively). Non-pensioners on the other hand tended to work more regularly (13 weeks for men, 20 for women) and for longer hours (17 for men, 15 for women). ANPWS employment did not affect the pension entitlements of men and women, but did reduce the unemployment benefit entitlements of non-pensioners. Furthermore, a significant number of Anangu employees (13 men and 13 women) earned additional cash from artefact production. All the pensioners were artefact producers.

According to the Memorandum of Lease, the Director of ANPWS must not only engage Anangu in running the Park, but also adjust working hours and conditions to Anangu needs and culture, and use the traditional skills of Aboriginal individuals and groups in the management of the Park (Commonwealth of Australia 1985:6-8). ANPWS employment is 'culturally sympathetic'. For example, when on *Tjilpi* (or elders) patrols, ANPWS staff consult with accompanying Anangu on environmental and cultural matters. It is the pensioners who, by and large, go on *Tjilpi* patrols because they are recognised in Anangu society as the most knowledgeable for such advisory work. As more park management issues are resolved, *Tjilpi* patrols have been organized less often.

The DEIR ranger training scheme appears to be having mixed success. The majority of training is on-the-job and informal,

because of the low level of functional literacy among trainees. Given the lower educational status of Anangu at Uluru, the training program may be understaffed. At present there are only two whites (a training officer who is also the deputy superintendent and a projects officer) working with Anangu, a similar number as at Kakadu National Park. But there are more trainees at Uluru and they may require more individual training. Anangu trainees undertake a range of jobs that include 'bush tucker' interpretative walks, interpretative work at the ANPWS ranger station, environmental work, maintenance work on community and park infrastructure, and patrolling of high density tourist visitation areas. In the second half of 1986 a core of women trainees have been receiving regular on-the-job training.

There are two main problems associated with the training program. Firstly, trainees do not regularly attend work. The flexibility evident in all employment at Mutitjulu extends to the training program. Secondly, when Anangu complete the 12 month on-the-job training program, it seems likely that they will not be suitable for employment as base grade rangers, positions which require a level of administrative skill and literacy that few Anangu possess. They also require regularity in work attendance and a willingness to accept shift work, for the park is open 365 days in the year.

ANPWS faces a dilemma here. Uluru National Park, with an establishment ceiling of 14 salaried staff, appears relatively under-resourced given that visitor numbers are in the region of 200,000 per annum and growing. It is important that a two tier workforce, with non-Anangu filling the permanent salaried positions and Anangu filling the lower status, casual positions, is not established. However, if Anangu rangers are appointed full-time, this must not be tokenistic, using scarce staff resources inefficiently, and putting additional pressure on non-Anangu staff and undermining staff morale. This dilemma is problematic because Anangu do not necessarily want formal full-time employment. There is a need to investigate the possibility of developing permanent part-time positions (as community rangers) in the Commonwealth Public Service (see Morgan, Smyth and Butler 1986).

ANPWS employment programs will take time to stabilise. Over the last nine months of 1986, a number of issues have arisen

that need to be addressed. Demand for Anangu labour in the park service cannot be met from the current supply of labour at the Mutitjulu community. In November 1986 there were three salaried and up to 23 DEIR and POA positions available for Anangu. Yet only one ranger position was filled (one ranger having died and another having left the community after this death) and about half the other positions were occupied on a day-by-day basis.

It may take time for Anangu to adjust to ANPWS work practices. When they first started working for ANPWS, new rangers were heard to comment that ANPWS is 'too hard' compared with CCNT. Anangu had worked unsupervised by CCNT with little regard to time worked. Under ANPWS, Anangu and non-Anangu work side-by-side and people are paid only for hours worked. The co-operation between all levels of staff is clearly evidenced when all staff, from the Superintendent down, partake in rubbish collection duties. Anangu were confused about ANPWS employment when the initial work-experience scheme commenced during the national social security amnesty, for this meant that Anangu social security entitlements were not income tested as quickly as normal. In May 1986, Anangu misunderstood their ANPWS wages thinking they were a supplement to social security entitlements, rather than a substitute.

Since May 1986 the role of Anangu in the park service has changed, especially at the entry station, where Anangu enterprises are now located. Anangu staff find this location more hospitable and their presence results in spontaneous interaction with visitors. This interaction usually occurs in conjunction with the screening of the community film 'Uluru: An Anangu Story' and appears to be the only interaction with Anangu experienced by visitors to Uluru.

The economic impact of Yulara

The Yulara Aboriginal community consists of a housing estate of ten houses, a community centre and craft work shelters constructed by the Yulara Corporation and the Housing Commission at a cost exceeding \$1 million. The construction of this housing estate has been a contentious issue: the CCNT, who supervised the overall development of Yulara, believed that both tourists and Anangu should be relocated outside the national park. When the Aboriginal

housing estate was planned and constructed it was thought that Anangu would take jobs at Yulara and thus would relocate there.

Since the completion of Yulara in 1984, no more than three or four houses at the Aboriginal housing estate have ever been occupied. At times, they have been used by Anangu employed at Yulara, at other times by visiting Anangu who had come to utilise the services (particularly the tavern) at Yulara. There has never been an Aboriginal community at Yulara in any sociological sense of the word; the Mutitjulu community has remained the social locus of all Anangu in both Uluru National Park and Yulara.

Yulara's economic impact on the Mutitjulu community has changed dramatically since 1982. Initially, during the construction phase between 1982 and 1984, the Yulara Corporation, and more particularly White Industries, needed Anangu labour, and purchased goods from Anangu enterprises, like BP Ayers Rock that ran the temporary fuel outlet at Yulara.

Mutitjulu community records for the two financial years 1983/84 and 1984/85 have been analysed in an attempt to isolate the employment and income effects of the Yulara construction phase (Altman 1987a:41-43). With the construction of the township, part-time and contracting work was available to Anangu with the Yulara Development Company (now Yulara Corporation), primarily in landscaping and tree planting work. In 1983/84, at the height of Yulara's construction, over half cash income (51.9 per cent) came from employment sources. Of employment income, 38 per cent was paid by YDC and White Industries; this accounted for 20 per cent of total Anangu cash income.

By 1984/85, the employment and income effects of Yulara appear to have abated significantly. Mutitjulu community records indicate that employment income declined to 28 per cent of total cash income, and social security income increased from 48 per cent of income in 1983/84 to 69 per cent of all income in 1984/85. There are a number of reasons for this dramatic shift. Firstly, it is likely that social security entitlements were more fully bestowed in 1984/85. Secondly, Anangu were less attracted to jobs at Yulara during 1984 because tourist resort jobs were less suitable for, or appealing to, Anangu. Furthermore, relations between the Yulara Corporation and the Mutitjulu community deteriorated during 1984

because of the failure of the Malpa Trading tender for the Yulara service station, because the Corporation opposed the federal government decision to recognise Anangu ownership of the national park, and because of disagreement over the location of housing and services such as the school. Furthermore, from 1984, as white enterprises moved from Uluru National Park to Yulara, there were more jobs for Anangu at Mutitjulu in both the tourist industry and in community services. It is of particular significance that while there was a shift in the primary source of Anangu income from employment to non-employment sources between 1983/84 and 1984/85, there was no discernible change in Anangu income status. Yulara's construction phase provided people with some employment opportunities, but it did not provide people with long term means to increase their marginal economic status.

Since 1984/85, continuing employment opportunities for Anangu at Yulara have arisen. Over the three survey periods shown in Table 4.3, Anangu were employed by the CCNT, the Education Department and the NT Police. Of the CCNT positions, only two, for base grade rangers, were located at Yulara. In May 1986 this had declined to one, and by November 1986, no Anangu were employed by CCNT (this being due to the shift of residence of the remaining ranger). Employment with the Education Department declined from two in 1985 (a teaching assistant and school cleaner) to none in 1986 and employment with the Police similarly declined from one (police aide) in August 1985 and May 1986 to none by November 1986.

This is somewhat paradoxical, for it is argued in the tourism development literature (de Kadt 1979) that the major spinoff of tourist development is the employment generated for the long-term residents of a region. It is interesting in this context that Anangu took more jobs at Yulara during its construction phase than during its current phase as a growing tourist centre. The employment available during the construction phase suited Anangu because it was extremely flexible and on a contract basis. Now jobs at Yulara not only require direct contact with tourists, but must also fit in with the rigorous requirements of the tourist service industry. Also the distance of Yulara from Mutitjulu (25 kilometres) means that people have to commute to work, and are socially isolated from their community. Their lack of formal training for the tourism industry means that they are only suitable for lowest positions in

the occupational hierarchy. Consequently, Anangu find employment opportunities at Mutitjulu and at Uluru National Park more appealing. Since the completion of Yulara in 1984, and since Anangu ownership of Uluru was recognised, Anangu have tended increasingly to view Yulara as a non-Anangu domain.

Since 1984, the economic impact of Yulara on the Mutitjulu community has become indirect. The Yulara Corporation has set out to maximise tourist visitation to the resort and subsequently to Uluru National Park. As tourist visitation to the Park increases, Anangu income through their 20 per cent share of Park entry fee, rises and Anangu enterprises like Maruku and Malpa prosper. In a commercial sense, the Yulara Corporation and Anangu enterprises share a similar objective to maximise income from tourism.

These indirect impacts must be balanced against the competition that exists between Anangu and white-owned businesses when they provide similar goods and services. Despite the apparent competition between Yulara and Anangu enterprises, there are indications that the tourist market is large enough for both to remain viable and profitable; and that they cater for tourists at different times and places; Anangu enterprises are based within Uluru National Park while Yulara enterprises are in the township. There are complications to such neat segmentation. Firstly, Maruku wholesales artefacts to the Yulara outlet, which subsequently retails to tourists who have not had the opportunity to visit the Craft Camp, which is only open seasonally and for shorter hours than the Yulara outlet. It is difficult to state unequivocally whether Maruku should maintain its monopoly in the region by not wholesaling to Yulara, or whether its clients (Anangu craftspeople) are best served by maximising turnover. Secondly, more Anangu and non-Anangu from the Mutitjulu community are patronising businesses at Yulara. Anangu in salaried positions, not dependent on the 'book-up' (or credit) system operating at the Ininti Store, are likely customers at Yulara. While the manager of the Yulara supermarket estimates that Anangu only account for about one per cent of his turnover, this is business lost by Malpa Trading. The larger range of goods that are available at Yulara (due to scale and more diverse clientele) appeals to those Anangu who can afford the higher prices. It would be premature, however, to refer to this as a 'demonstration effect'.

There are other benefits from Yulara for Anangu at Mutitjulu and their enterprises. Many of these are difficult to quantify and must be counter-balanced by possible negative spinoffs. In the period 1979 to 1983, the NT government invested about \$30 million in physical infrastructure specifically linked to the establishment of Yulara. Though intended primarily for the tourist industry and the 480 whites who reside at Yulara, a number of these services, like the sealing of the Lasseter Highway, the construction of Connellan Airport, the availability of STD phone links, and so on, also benefit members of the Mutitjulu community.

The provision of housing, health and education services at Yulara, ostensibly for the benefit of both Anangu and Yulara residents, is contentious. Anangu are adamant that their priorities are to have adequate housing, health services and schooling at Mutitjulu itself and not 25 kilometres away in a predominantly white township. A community health centre (funded by ANPWS and DAA) was established at Mutitjulu (in conjunction with Imanpa community) in 1986. In the 1986/87 financial year, a housing program financed by the ADC and the NT Housing Commission commenced. It is paradoxical that while ten new houses stand vacant at Yulara, five are being built at Mutitjulu. In 1986, a childcare centre (with some pre-school functions) was established at Mutitjulu. While Mutitjulu owns a school bus and has a contract to transport children to school at Yulara, most passengers are non-Anangu children. There are indications that Anangu will not utilise the predominantly white school of Yulara which is both physically and socially isolated from the community. The community wants its own school and recently (1987) the NT Education Department agreed to fund a community school. The success of the childcare centre suggests that when a community school is established, Anangu attendance would rise above the currently low and fluctuating, level at Yulara. This would have positive effects on future Anangu educational status, and their job chances.

Alcohol consumption at Yulara by some members of the Mutitjulu community is a problem. While no quantitative data on Anangu expenditure patterns were collected, a significant proportion of some families' limited cash incomes appears to be spent on alcohol. Possibly of greater economic significance is the community upheaval that is often associated with drinking bouts. Such upheaval can result in people being unable to turn up for work

on a regular basis, or even in their shifting to another community, making them unavailable for work at Uluru. Some of the most able Anangu at Mutitjulu move away from the community for a time because of alcohol-related disputes. These social costs may outweigh some of the economic benefits that Anangu derive from Yulara.

Although most of the economic impact of Yulara on the Mutitjulu community is indirect, there appears to be a growing awareness that the business interests of Anangu at Mutitjulu and non-Anangu at Yulara are interdependent. For while Anangu are dependent on tourists who are accommodated at Yulara, Yulara's existence relies on access to Uluru National Park, owned by Anangu. Over the past two years, the relationship between the Yulara Corporation and the Mutitjulu community has changed from one of adversary to that of symbiosis and interdependence. This has been primarily because the Yulara Corporation became less politicised and more distant from the NT government's anti land rights policies, and to the Mutitjulu community's growing acceptance that Yulara and tourism are a reality that can be utilised to improve Anangu economic wellbeing.

Conclusion

This chapter ends by discussing policy issues of specific significance to the Mutitjulu community. Their relevance to other Aboriginal communities contemplating involvement in the tourism industry is discussed in Chapter 9.

Currently, the Maruku retail outlet and Malpa's souvenir outlet and kiosk are the only Anangu tourist enterprises. Maruku provides artefact manufacturers with a market outlet and provides some jobs for Anangu. Its operations are complicated by two factors. Firstly, as a regional marketing agency, it is accountable to regional producers as well as those resident at Mutitjulu (Chapter 5). Secondly, it is subsidised by the Aboriginal Arts Board; to date, Maruku has earned no net profits despite recent spectacular increases in turnover.

The economic impact of Malpa is totally indirect as it employs no Anangu in its tourism enterprises. However, the operating

surplus it generates in the tourist trade is used to provide community services and employment for Anangu within the Mutitjulu community.

While both Maruku and Malpa are part of the Mutitjulu Community Incorporated, they serve different clienteles (regional and local respectively) and this creates problems, particularly since both started trading at adjacent locations in 1986 and since Maruku stopped wholesaling artefacts to Malpa. Malpa is wholly owned by the Mutitjulu community; Maruku, on the other hand, remains an unincorporated body that receives its funding via the Mutitjulu community. A clear definition of the objectives of both Malpa and Maruku is needed urgently. The two enterprises should co-operate particularly as they are interdependent in attracting tourists. Both need to recognise that the tourist industry is a seven days a week industry and that tourism is becoming less seasonal. They could open for longer each week and for more months in the year.

A number of issues face the Maruku committee. Because Maruku is subsidised by the Aboriginal Arts Board, the prices it charges for artefacts do not represent their total economic cost. As Maruku's operations expand it will need to decide to what extent producers should finance the marketing of output. Already, producers only receive 60 per cent of the retail price of artefacts sold. There are uncertainties in Maruku's supply. If the AAB subsidy is reduced rapidly output may fall. However, because most producers live on homeland communities where it is not easy to earn cash (above social security entitlements) production may remain constant. As tourist demand for artefacts continues to grow supply may not increase because pensioners can only earn a little before their pensions fall dollar for dollar. Producers on unemployment benefits should be given the option of producing artefacts under the Community Development Employment Program (CDEP). Because CDEP is not income tested recipients will not be constrained in their artefact production. Maruku markup policy may be biased against Mutitjulu residents, for the cost of retailing their output is far lower than that from outlying areas. However, this is balanced by the Mutitjulu producers' opportunity to work for Maruku and to sell directly to tourists.

Malpa's tourism operations, particularly its souvenir outlet, are operating suboptimally, partly because of difficulties in

accommodating non-Anangu staff. It seems that the financial difficulties experienced by Malpa in the first half of 1985, the cost of buying out Malpa's Docker River directors, and the financial impact of closing off the community to tourists have left Malpa in a marginal trading position. Malpa needs a capital injection because its current facilities are not big enough to cope with current tourist numbers. Capital for expansion could come from loans or from community funds.

Maruku and Malpa's commercial concessions in Uluru National Park impose costs. Any entrepreneurial decision made by either requires ANPWS and Board approval which delays establishing, or expanding business opportunities. The commercial decisions made by Anangu enterprises should receive the swiftest consideration by the Uluru-Kata Tjuta Board.

Malpa and Maruku should analyse the data collected by the Ayers Rock Tourism Impact Study (CLC et al. 1987). To increase tourist awareness, particularly among certain segments of the industry, both enterprises should advertise. However, resulting increasing consumer demand would have to be matched by an increase in the scale of operations.

Anangu have a unique advantage in the provision of cultural tourism. Maruku markets distinctly Anangu artefacts and Malpa uses Anangu designs in souvenirs. ANPWS employs Anangu knowledge of the environment and cultural landscape within the Park. Anangu knowledge of hunting and gathering practices is demonstrated to tourists on bush tucker tours; Anangu interpretations of the Uluru totemic landscape and of rock art are incorporated in ANPWS ranger tours; and park management recognises Anangu concepts of environmental managements and protects sites of significance.

The ANPWS's problem is to employ Anangu staff outside normal patterns of public service employment and training. ANPWS must establish occupational categories that can utilise Anangu knowledge and skills, without marginalising Anangu employees. Some Anangu could be employed cultural advisers (as at Kakadu National Park), others as community rangers with full public service benefits. Teams of Anangu could contract to work for ANPWS. ANPWS must experiment to give Anangu culturally

appropriate opportunities in the park service. However, there will be pressure to utilise resources in conventional work practices during a time of budgetary restraint. It may be necessary to earmark funds for Anangu employment, assuming there is sufficient Anangu demand for jobs.

The Mutitjulu community should establish a cultural centre so Anangu can respond in their own terms to the demand for cultural tourism. Such a centre would probably be financially viable, particularly if a number of interested parties (Maruku, Malpa, the Mutitjulu community, and possibly ANPWS or the Yulara Corporation) contribute to its establishment costs. However, such centres are renowned for being financially marginal enterprises. The Mutitjulu community will need to carefully identify its primary goals in establishing such a centre and specify the relationships between the bodies co-operating in the project.

The Mutitjulu community, like many Aboriginal communities is restricted in its access to capital. Anangu poverty and priorities make it difficult to generate capital from household savings. Because Uluru National Park is leased to ANPWS it may not be possible to use the land as collateral for commercial loans. These restrictions place added pressure on the Mutitjulu community to effectively utilise its only source of discretionary capital, the moneys paid by ANPWS in accordance with provisions in the Memorandum of Lease. I have estimated that the value of lease moneys is in the order \$106,000 to \$199,000 per annum for the period 1985 to 1990. This amount is likely to increase however after park entry fees increase from 1 January 1989. The range in annual payments makes financial planning difficult. It is important that a fee collection system is devised that ensures all visitors pay for park entry. When the Memorandum of Lease is renegotiated in 1990, Anangu may bargain to have the bulk of lease payments from a rental (pegged to inflation) rather than partly relying on unpredictable gate takings.

Moneys paid by ANPWS are forwarded to the Central Land Council. There are no stipulations in the lease regarding the application of these moneys; the Council is merely required to apply these moneys to or for the benefit of traditional owners (of Uluru National Park). The discretion that Anangu are allowed in the utilisation of these public moneys is laudable. However, as a

number of researchers (Kesteven 1983; Altman 1983a; AIAS 1984) have observed, the payment of totally discretionary funds to Aboriginal communities results in a great deal of acrimony, and so it is unfortunate that the Memorandum of Lease attached no conditions to the expenditure of Park rental and gate moneys.

When ANPWS first paid rent early in 1986, the CLC maintained that it was their statutory responsibility to distribute these moneys. The Mutitjulu community, on the other hand, was adamant that they should supervise distribution. After negotiation, the CLC and the Uluru-Kata Tjuta Land Trust reached an agreement in which the Mutitjulu Community Inc. was to gain income tax exempt status to distribute the rent, and to report to the CLC annually on how it expended these moneys. The moneys must be spent according to guidelines set out in the agreement.

Receipts of about \$100,000 (for the 1986 calendar year) have been spent in three main ways. \$30,000 was used to acquire a proportion of Docker River interests in Malpa. (The remaining \$20,000 was paid from Malpa's operating surplus.) This expenditure represents a community investment in Malpa Trading which is now wholly owned by the Mutitjulu Community Inc. A further third was spent on the provision of reticulated water at Anangu outstations on Katiti and Petermann Lands; another third was expended on community (as distinct from private) vehicles. Small payments of \$2000 (per community) have been made to traditional owners residing at Areyonga, Imanpa and Indulkana.

Given the scarcity of development funds at Mutitjulu, lease moneys must be maintained in critical masses. This chapter has canvassed a number of options for possible Anangu investment. Capital injections into Malpa's tourist enterprises or a cultural centre could give these enterprises an important competitive edge. To develop outstations with this money, as a recent meeting of Anangu proposed, is to relieve government of its funding obligations. Yet early in 1987, the DAA funded further outstation development, a hint that the initial commitment of Anangu capital may hasten government's response to service delivery requests. Anangu may consider investing all (or a part) of their lease money to generate a future stream of income for project financing. Alternatively, the community could commit funds forward as collateral on debt financing of projects.

During the first year of the Memorandum of Lease, there was increasing friction between those who wanted to dissipate the money on a per capita basis (both within and beyond the community) and those wanting social and economic returns to the community as a whole. Anangu mobility exacerbates the issue: a number of recognised traditional owners of Uluru do not reside at Mutitjulu but have legal rights to lease moneys. When the financial clauses of the Memorandum of Lease are renegotiated with ANPWS in 1990, the beneficiaries of the lease should be defined and broad categories specified for use of funds.

Until 1990, the CLC and traditional owners should ensure that lease moneys are expended in accordance with the spirit, if not the ambiguous letter of, the law. The Lease of Memorandum arguably intended these moneys to be used to maximise commercial opportunities and to minimise tourism's negative effects. The CLC could intervene in decision-making processes by prohibiting individual distributions. Recurring disputes about the distribution of money are a waste of resources. Elsewhere in central Australia, distributions to individual traditional owners have not been successful, resulting in community discord and financial waste. The CLC and traditional owners should try to agree on the use of these moneys.

The economic development option of tourism must be considered in the broader framework of Anangu response to non-Anangu intrusion. In the past, and today, hunter-gatherers have been reluctant to take up opportunities in the mainstream economy because of the demands of their resilient cultures in the face of the requirements of alien economic institutions.

This chapter has looked at options for indirect Anangu involvement in the tourism industry. While Anangu might use their human and capital resources in the ways outlined, they may also seek to minimise the impact of tourism. For example, Anangu may invest in outstations to allow people to withdraw from Uluru, or they may establish an independent community school. Anangu know that employment in the formal labour market, particularly for future generations, is severely constrained by falling levels of literacy. If the Mutitjulu community finances an independent school, this may in turn hasten a government commitment to such a school. This happened in the case of the Gagudju Association in

1982 (O'Faircheallaigh 1986). An investment in Anangu human capital may, in the longer run, provide returns equivalent to, or higher than, those available in the tourist industry.

The Mutitjulu case is rich in policy implications. Anangu at Mutitjulu are in an extremely powerful bargaining position; not only are they the only long-term residents of Uluru National Park, but they also own it, have majority on the Uluru-Kata Tjuta Board of Management and have access to discretionary capital resources. They are in a unique position to improve the economic status of current and future generations of Anangu, and to demonstrate to other Aboriginal groups and Australian society at large what Aboriginal people can achieve if allowed to own resources.

Anangu decisions in the Park have been slow and deliberate, an appropriate pace after the rapid social and political changes that have occurred in the region in recent years. Now Anangu are faced with rapid tourism growth over which they have limited control. The challenge will be to minimise the negative social impacts of tourism, while accruing social and economic benefits from direct or indirect involvement in the industry.

Chapter 5

The Ayers Rock region

This chapter examines current and potential wider economic impacts associated with tourism at Uluru National Park, on other Aboriginal communities in central Australia. Chapter 4 concentrated exclusively on the Aboriginal residents of the Mutitjulu community. However, there are other Aboriginal people who are affected by developments at Ayers Rock and Yulara. Uluru National Park is surrounded by land owned by Aboriginal people (the Petermann and Katiti land trust areas shown in Map 4). As with all issues of 'affectedness' it is difficult to determine and demarcate who is affected by tourism development at Yulara and Uluru National Park. Similar difficulties have been evident in attempts to define Aboriginal communities and people 'affected' by mining (AIAS 1984; Altman 1983a).

To describe the regional effects of Uluru tourism I have drawn an arbitrary boundary to include all communities (townships and homelands) serviced by Maruku Arts and Crafts; Aboriginal communities on the two main routes to and from Uluru National Park (Docker River west of the Park and Imanpa east of the Park); and Aboriginal communities within the proposed Kings Canyon National Park. Kings Canyon is a tourism destination in its own right, and, with the major developments planned there, it will increasingly become a separate tourist destination. However, at present, almost all who visit the Canyon also visit Yulara and Uluru National Park.

There are about 1200 people residing on Pitjantjatjara Lands serviced by Maruku, 660 at Docker River and homelands, 150 at Imanpa and 90 at three community living areas within Kings Canyon National Park. At a minimum a total of over 2000 Anangu are affected by developments at Uluru National Park.

Developments in the direct vicinity of Uluru National Park affect Aborigines throughout the region. Furthermore, there are plans to open up central Australia, particularly its more remote and

'unspoiled' parts, to the adventure tourist market. Already a number of Aboriginal associations and companies such as the Ngurratjuta Association (the body that distributes Mereenie mining moneys), the Ngaanyatjara Council, and Centrecorp, the business arm of the Central Land Council, are investigating and/or investing in tourism enterprises.

Several broad issues are addressed in this chapter. Firstly, given that all Aboriginal communities in central Australia are poor and extremely dependent on government welfare assistance, can tourism at Uluru create economic development outside the public sector? Secondly, a number of destinations have important Aboriginal cultural features and some are also on Aboriginal land. To what extent can this distinctly Aboriginal component of the industry be used for financial gain to Aboriginal people? Is there potential for a central Australian Aboriginal Tourism Association to co-ordinate commercial activities, foster co-operation between communities and even jointly market cultural tourism provided by Aborigines? Finally, lest it appears that commercial priorities are receiving too much emphasis, to what extent can Aboriginal involvement in tourism regulate tourist use of land which has cultural worth that remains of paramount importance to Aborigines?

It should be emphasised that the research for this chapter was originally undertaken on a consultancy basis (like Chapter 4) when I was engaged by the Central Land Council on the ANPWS sponsored Ayers Rock Region Tourism Impact Study. A version of this chapter was included in *Sharing the Park: Anangu Initiatives in Ayers Rock Tourism* (CLC et al. 1987).

The regional impact of Mutitjulu enterprises

The previous chapter showed that the two main Anangu commercial enterprises geared to tourism are owned by Maruku Arts and Crafts (selling artefacts to tourists at the park entry station) and Malpa Trading Company (a souvenir outlet and kiosk at the same place). Maruku and Malpa have different objectives. Wholly-owned by the Mutitjulu Community, Malpa's main objective is to provide for the store needs of the Mutitjulu Community, while trading with tourists within Uluru National Park.

Maruku Arts and Crafts, established in 1984 and also part of Mutitjulu Community Inc., aims to market the products of Pitjantjatjara and Yankuntjatjara people. Maruku is based on the proposition that it is more profitable (for producers) to sell the region's artefacts to a concentrated tourist market at Uluru National Park than to southern outlets. Maruku sends craft advisers to about twenty communities in the NT, Western Australia and South Australia to procure craft either directly from producers or from community craft advisers (employed under the Community Development Employment Program [CDEP] Scheme). Artefacts are transported to a warehouse at Mutitjulu and are either retailed at the Craft Camp (Punu Ngura) or wholesaled to galleries elsewhere in Australia. Special collections of particularly fine artefacts and paintings, collected since the establishment of Maruku, were sold at exhibitions in Perth, Sydney and Canberra at the end of 1986.

In Table 5.1 data are presented on payments to producers by Maruku Arts and Crafts from April 1985 to May 1986. Five hundred and ninety producers in central Australia (outside the Mutitjulu community) were serviced by Maruku and 22,281 artefacts were collected from regional producers for a total payment of \$115,067; 81 per cent of payments by Maruku went to regional producers. While the average amount earned by each producer was just under \$200, this was a significant source of discretionary non-government income. A number of communities serviced by Maruku sell artefacts through other channels: at Warakurna, in the community store and at Imanpa, directly to tourists (on the Lasseter Highway), and through the Imanpa Store and Mt. Ebenezer Roadhouse. Ernabella has established markets for its artefacts in Alice Springs (Tamura 1985).

Without visiting each of the communities served by Maruku and collecting detailed social accounts it is difficult to know the significance of artefact production. Analysis undertaken elsewhere (Altman and Taylor 1988) suggests that in the homelands the production of artefacts for market exchange is the most significant optional cash-generating activity. While social security payments or government funded schemes such as CDEP generate more cash, artefact production remains one of the few ways homelands residents can influence their cash income. The non-cash or subsistence sector at outstation communities provides a proportion of the diet and so makes a contribution to economic status.

Table 5.1

Regional production of artefacts bought by Maruku Arts and Crafts,
April 1985 to May 1986

Community	Craftspeople	No. of items bought	Total amount paid	Share (%) of total purchase
Wingellina	85	3,534	\$17,252	12.1
Docker River	61	1,557	\$6,593	4.6
Blackstone/Jamieson/ Warburton	16	166	\$1,220	0.9
Kalka/ Pipalyatjara	53	1,787	\$8,061	5.7
Amata/Cave Hill	59	2,236	\$12,409	8.7
Warakurna ^a	34	2,615	\$12,289	9.0
Fregon	75	3,381	\$18,478	13.0
Imanpa ^b	22	642	\$2,010	1.4
Mimili	42	2,990	\$11,281	7.9
Umpukulu/ Kulgera/Katji	18	n/a	\$2,898	2.0
Kanypi	12	501	\$2,554	1.8
Ernabella/Eagle Bore/Ngarutjara	25	825	\$6,079	4.3
Mutitjulu residents	55	5,634	\$27,521	19.3
Mutitjulu sales ^c	87	2,497	\$13,403	9.4
Total	645	27,915	\$142,048	100.0

Footnotes: a. A further \$9,599 was sold directly to the Warakurna Store

b. Significant sales were made either directly to tourists at Mount Ebenezer or to the Imanpa Store or Mt. Ebenezer Roadhouse.

c. These producers are visitors to Mutitjulu who are neither regarded as residents of Mutitjulu nor of any of the other communities listed.

Source: Purchase books of Maruku craft advisers. Data collated by Luana Johnston and Pat D'Aranjo.

With growth in the tourism industry and the expansion of Maruku, economic benefits for regional producers will increase. To protect

the interests of these producers a high proportion of sales are retailed locally (where returns are greatest) rather than wholesaled interstate, and an Aboriginal Arts Board subsidy must remain until Maruku can be financially self-sufficient. In 1984, retail sales accounted for only 39 per cent of total turnover, but by 1985/86 this proportion had increased to 51 per cent. Currently (1986/87 to end of November) retail sales are accounting for 86 per cent of total sales. The greater proportion of sales made retail, the greater the amount that can be charged for items.

The Aboriginal Arts Board (AAB) continues to subsidise Maruku, although the rate of subsidisation (\$78,000 in 1986/7) has decreased since 1984/85. AAB subsidy has allowed average markup to remain at a relatively low 68 per cent so that producers have not seen items selling at the craft camp at grossly marked up prices.

Maruku also provides opportunities, taken up mainly by Mutitjulu residents, to produce items at the craft camp and sell directly to tourists. This not only allows producers to receive the full retail price for items sold, but it also provides visitors with a chance to see Anangu artists and artisans at work. Maruku employs Anangu to assist with selling. Although it is mostly Mutitjulu residents who benefit from this opportunity, at times regional visitors to the community are employed. From July to December 1986, four of eleven people currently employed at the craft camp were visitors to the Mutitjulu community; they were employed during the seasonal peak in tourism.

An important issue is whether the assured growth in demand resulting from increased numbers of tourists will be matched by increased supply. Experience elsewhere indicates that frequently regional craft centres expand to a certain point and then turnover stagnates or declines. This is usually because of supply problems, management difficulties, or a rapid reduction in subsidy.

Maruku is now the largest regional craft centre in Australia. As long as there is no radical change in the economy of homelands and communities in the region, there will probably be an ever increasing supply of artefacts for sale. Information was collected on the sex and broad age categories of producers in the region serviced by Maruku. Furthermore, producers were divided into

three broad categories, major, minor and occasional producers. (These data are presented in detail in CLC et al. 1987.) The demographic information shows that, though producers are of all ages, the ages grades 21-30 years and 50 years plus are the most significant. Interestingly, 68 per cent of regional producers for whom demographic information was available were women. Perhaps this is caused by a combination of traditional specialisation and the greater formal employment of males. Only 15 per cent of producers in the region are major producers, that is, those who sold to Maruku four or more times over the thirteen month survey period. That the rest of the producers were either minor (2-3 times) or occasional (once only) suggests that there is great potential for increasing the supply of artefacts. However, this observation is made with certain provisos. Firstly, I did not collect data on the social characteristics of the different categories of producer. Consequently it was not possible to attempt a correlation between demographic variables and the significance of individual producers. Secondly, no assessment of the availability of raw materials for increased levels of artefact production was made. And finally, no assessment of alternative employment opportunities, either in the subsistence sector or in formal employment schemes was undertaken.

Maruku Arts and Crafts creates real economic benefits for Aboriginal homelands and communities in central Australia. It is taking full advantage of its monopoly control over the marketing of artefacts in Uluru National Park; its commercial concession (as an Aboriginal enterprise) to operate within the Park; and its direct access to almost 200,000 tourists per annum. Maruku now faces two issues. Firstly, to what extent should it operate to suit the tourist industry? Maruku opens six days a week for eight months of the year (at the Craft Camp), but there are demands from the industry to open seven days a week, year round, as the seasonality of tourism becomes less marked. Secondly, Maruku needs to establish a corporate structure that makes it accountable to craft producers throughout central Australia, rather than only at Mutitjulu. Maruku's Management Committee is drawn from residents of Uluru National Park, yet most producers come from other communities. There is a need to establish a structure whereby outlying communities have greater influence over Maruku's policies and management decisions.

The only other economic activity in Uluru National Park with some regional economic impact is the ANPWS's management of the Park. Since June 1986, a total of 32 men and 16 women have worked for ANPWS, but of these all but four men are regarded as being residents of the Mutitjulu community. In future there may be greater regional demand for employment opportunities with ANPWS. This increased demand may be matched by employment opportunities for Anangu as community or park rangers.

The regional impact of Yulara

To what extent has Yulara benefited the Ayers Rock region and the Northern Territory? In particular what financial returns have Aboriginal interests reaped from Yulara, a town whose success is totally predicated on unhampered access to Aboriginal land and especially Uluru National Park?

There are no reliable statistics on Yulara. Even the most basic statistics, like visitor numbers to Yulara and to Uluru National Park, are problematic. Statistics are kept by the Yulara Corporation (YC) on tourist visits to Yulara and by the Park authorities (CCNT to 1 June 1986, ANPWS since then) based on visitor payments of the Park entry fee. As noted in the previous chapter, there is a significant discrepancy between these two sets of data.

Until June 1986, YC gave researchers information on the number of visitors to each of the four resorts (Sheraton, Four Seasons, Ayers Rock Lodge and Ayers Rock Campground). However, even then, while data for the two hotels were based on actual visitor registration, at the Lodge and Campground visitor numbers were estimated by dividing actual visitor nights by estimated average length of stay (ALS). This means that if the ALS at either resort was higher than estimated, actual visitor numbers would have been overestimated. CCNT, and more recently ANPWS, estimate visitor numbers on the basis of takings of Park entry fees (for adults) and a question put to paying visitors about the number of persons under the age of 16 in their party. Fees are either collected at the park entry station (located some 14 kilometres inside the Park) where all private vehicle visitors should pay their fee, or else by tour operators. There has been some dispute in recent months between some bus tour operators and ANPWS about

bulk collection of fees. The system at the entry station is unregulated; there is no boom gate or attendant in a road side booth to ensure fee collection.

It is not at all surprising, therefore, that there is a difference between the enumeration of visitors by Park authorities and that of the YC. In 1985/86 for example, YC estimated that there were 185,932 visitors to Yulara while the CCNT estimated 132,114 persons visited the Park. For the year 1986, YC expected 186,000 visitors, but recorded 203,000, an increase of 22 per cent over 1985. The superintendent of the Park estimates maximum visitor numbers of 145,000. While there is always the possibility that large numbers of visitors travel to Yulara but do not visit Uluru National Park, it seems more likely that YC figures are an absolute maximum while ANPWS figures are a minimum.

Projections of tourism growth are equally varied, as Table 5.2 illustrates.

Table 5.2
Actual and projected visitation to Uluru National Park and Yulara

Year	Uluru ^a	Uluru ^b	Yulara ^c	Yulara ^d	Yulara ^e
1984/85		110,162	130,820		133,101
1985	144,000				168,983
1985/86		132,114	160,976		185,932
1986	171,000	145,000		175,300	203,000
1986/87			190,583		
1987	188,000			191,340	
1987/88			216,386		
1988	202,000			212,687	
1988/89			238,127		
1989				236,676	
1989/90			258,565		

Footnotes: a. NTDC/NTTC (1984) estimate.

b. ANPWS data; the 1986 figure is an estimate.

c. Peat, Marwick, and Mitchell (1984) high estimate

d. From the Capel Court feasibility study of the Kings Canyon Wilderness Lodge Development; March year.

e. Yulara Corporation estimate.

All records and estimates in the table show a rapid increase in actual and projected visitor use of both Yulara and Uluru National Park. To date, YC's visitor numbers are running above Peat, Marwick and Mitchell's (PMM) high estimate. However, the general manager of YC acknowledges that by 1988/89 growth at Yulara may taper off to be about equal with the high PMM projection. Though Yulara can hold 5000 visitors on any one night, about 3500 of them would be sleeping in the Campground. Currently, there are 234 rooms at the Sheraton, 100 at the Four Seasons and 230 beds at Ayers Rock Lodge. Already, during the 1986 peak season, there were room occupancy rates of 87 per cent at the Sheraton, Four Seasons and Lodge. On some nights accommodation other than the Campground was booked out. The Yulara Corporation moved quickly to consider expansion of the resort; by 1987 additional accommodation facilities were available.

What is the value of the resort in total revenue, or in gross tourist expenditure? An answer to this question is useful for a number of purposes: to compare total tourist expenditure at Yulara with expenditure at Uluru National Park; to assess total Anangu expenditure at Yulara; and to investigate the effects of Yulara on both Anangu and whites in central Australia.

However, to answer the question requires an educated guess. I have data only for the twelve months to April 1986; from May 1986, YC stopped giving information on visitor numbers by resort. It has always been impossible to obtain turnover data for enterprises at Yulara; both individual operators and the YC Board of Directors regard such information as strictly confidential. Nevertheless, some information on scale was obtained in May 1986 when all resort and enterprise managers were interviewed.

YC estimated that 190,324 visitors stayed at Yulara in the twelve months to April 1986 - approximately 27 per cent at the Sheraton, 21 per cent at the Four Seasons, 17 per cent at the Lodge and 35 per cent at the Campground. The ALS for visitors over this period was 1.6 days. This means that during the period there were 304,518 visitor/nights spent at Yulara. In addition a resident population averaging 480 spent about 150,000 resident/nights at Yulara. This in itself is an interesting statistic for it shows that there was a ratio of 1:2 resident to visitor nights, suggesting that the tourism industry at Yulara is exceptionally labour intensive.

There is no straightforward formula for estimating the expenditure of tourists at the Yulara resort. One possibility is to use the average visitor/night expenditure estimated by McNair Anderson Associates for the NT Tourist Commission in the *NT Travel Monitor, 1985/86* (NTTC 1986). Their questionnaire, administered to nearly 4000 visitors, allowed them to estimate that the average expenditure per visitor/night in the NT was \$45. Using this figure for Yulara, gives an estimated gross tourist expenditure of \$13.7 million. This figure appears to be a conservative estimate, for two reasons: firstly, Yulara is renowned in the industry for being expensive; secondly, such a gross tourist expenditure (not profit) on an investment of \$160 million appears to be too low. It may be more realistic in the Yulara case to double the average figure (to \$90 per visitor night) which gives an estimate of \$27.4 million.

From a more disaggregated estimate, based on industry standards contained in the Pannell, Kerr, Forster publication *Trends in the Hotel Industry - International Edition, 1985*, and from interviews conducted at Yulara, a more reliable figure of \$28.6 million per year can be derived. However, the estimates of hotels' turnover is complicated by the fact that the hotels at Yulara offered various rates (\$75 to \$135 per room) and various discounts (a preferred rate of 24-29 per cent discount, offered to groups on inbound packages; discounts to NT residents and members of some automobile clubs; a stand-by rate). Using industry standards, it can be assumed that for the two hotels food revenue was 70 per cent of the tariff paid, beverage revenue 40 per cent and other revenue 10 per cent. Taking the industry average room rate per guest night of \$65, and subject to reservations stated above, I estimated a \$20 million take for the two hotels in 1985/86. At the Lodge and Campground where rates are far lower (being \$8 and \$4 per night respectively) gross revenue would have been in the order of \$4 million.

Then there are the Yulara businesses with the following estimated annual turnovers for 1985/86: supermarket \$1.5 million; tavern and takeaway \$2.0 million; Mobil service station \$1.7 million; and other enterprises (newsagency and gift shop, hire cars, travel agency, charter flights, fast photo, Ayers Rock Touring) \$3.5 million. This adds up to a total turnover of \$30.7 million, but the expenditure of Yulara residents must be deducted to give gross

tourist expenditure. Managers of the supermarket, service station and tavern estimated that residents' share of the turnover amounted to 50 per cent, 60 per cent and 15 per cent, respectively, giving a total estimated tourist expenditure figure of \$28.6 million.

This figure can be contrasted with the turnover of Anangu tourist enterprises at Uluru National Park. In 1985/86, Maruku's retail turnover was about \$107,000 and Malpa's sales to tourists totalled about \$250,000. The Mutitjulu community is also paid 20 per cent of the Park entry fee paid by tourists. For the period October 1985 (when this arrangement was initiated) to 30th June 1986, this amounted to only \$14,562. My conclusion is that Anangu interests are collecting about 1.3 per cent of total tourist expenditure at Yulara and Uluru National Park. (As no information on the net profitability of Yulara is publicly available, it is impossible to estimate Anangu share of profits).

What are the benefits, or multiplier effects, of tourist visits to Yulara on the regional economy? There are indirect returns, discussed in the next section, to owners and operators of roadhouses and alternative accommodation in the region, due to the overland flow of visitors to Uluru National Park. The concentration here is on employment, income and output multipliers.

A survey in May 1986 found that there were 408 persons employed at Yulara out of a population of 477. Table 5.3 presents this information by employer. Only a small proportion of this staff are Territorians; the town manager of Yulara, himself a long-term NT resident, estimated that at the most 30 of the 408 would be fellow Territorians. There are limited spinoff benefits for the NT, particularly as few staff recruited to Yulara subsequently become long-term NT residents. On average, staff stay at Yulara for only three to five months - the average stay is estimated at 140 days. Furthermore, the big employers, especially the hotels and YC, recruit almost all their staff from Sydney and Melbourne. An attempt by the Sheraton to recruit 20-30 staff from the Commonwealth Employment Service in Darwin ended in failure. The high rate of staff turnover is of concern to YC given that recruitment costs average \$4000 per employee.

Table 5.3
Employment at Yulara, May 1986

	Employer	No of staff
1.	Sheraton Hotel	133
2.	Four Seasons Hotel	63
3.	Yulara Corporation (resort managers)	48
4.	Ernest Giles Tavern and takeaway	27
5.	The CCNT ^a	18
6.	Bemac Engineering	15
7.	Supermarket	13 ^b
8.	Newsagency/gift shop/post office	12
9.	Ayers Rock Touring	12
10.	Ayers Rock Lodge	11
11.	Rock 'n Ride (bicycle, moped hire, cleaning, general labouring)	8
12.	Ayers Rock Campground	6
13.	Mobil Service Station	5
14.	Nipper's Cleaning Service	5
15.	Education Department	5
16.	Police	5
17.	Ayers Rock Air Service	5
18.	ANZ Bank	3
19.	Territory Colour (photo processing)	3
20.	Heenan-Landscapers	3
21.	A & R. Garbage contractors	3
22.	Chair-Air (air charter)	3
23.	Yulara Travel	2
24.	Health Department	2
25.	NT Electricity Commission	2
26.	Transport and Works	2
27.	CA Helicopters (air charter)	2
28.	Ansett NT	1
Total		408

Footnotes: a. CCNT employment in May 1986 included rangers working in Uluru National Park.

b. Nine people working at the supermarket were working part-time and had full-time employment elsewhere in Yulara.

Source: Yulara Corporation.

Yulara's pattern of short-term employment affects the Territory economy's income from the resort. Like mining towns, Yulara seems to miss out on many of the secondary effects expected from tourist expenditure. Typically, staff recruited from another state appear to target save for a short time before leaving the NT with their savings. For example, the manager of the Sheraton estimated that with the penalty rates that are common in the hospitality industry, his staff of 133 earned an average of \$25,000 per annum, or \$3.3 million, more than 10 per cent of gross tourist expenditure at Yulara. A very high proportion of this, minimal living expenses aside, would have been remitted outside the NT. It seems likely that many of the multiplier effects of Yulara are accruing to the national rather than the regional or NT economy.

The high rate of leakage from Yulara is also evident when one examines output multipliers, a means to estimate the direct, indirect and induced effects of expenditure on a regional economy. For Yulara I consider the impact of tourist expenditure on the regional or NT economy. Again the multiplier effects from expenditure at Yulara benefit other state economies. For example, the manager of the supermarket estimated that 90 per cent of his stock (by value) is imported directly from Adelaide; the remaining 10 per cent is ordered from Alice Springs when there is a sudden shortage. Almost all of the latter stock would itself be imported into the NT. Similarly, much of the food and beverage consumed at the hotels would be imported directly from interstate suppliers. Perhaps the only business at Yulara that has links with the NT economy is the newsagency/gift shop whose owner is a long term NT (and Ayers Rock region) resident. This enterprise retails souvenirs marketed by the owner's wholesale business (although the souvenirs are often produced overseas) and Aboriginal artefacts usually wholesaled by Maruku. While output multipliers are not estimated here because insufficient input/output data are available, it can be argued that they are extremely low. This is primarily a reflection of the small size of the manufacturing sector in the NT. Some of the highest multipliers occur no doubt in artefact manufacturing, although even here the impact is not only on the Territory economy but on South Australia and Western Australia, where many producers are resident (Table 5.1).

The benefits of Yulara to Anangu (direct sales at Uluru National Park notwithstanding) are limited. In 1985/86, only five

Anangu were employed at Yulara - two base grade rangers with CCNT, one teaching aide and a school cleaner with the Education Department and a police aide with the Police. All these positions are fairly peripheral to tourism. By November 1986, for reasons discussed in the previous chapter, none of these were filled by Anangu.

Similarly, as consumers, Anangu make limited use of facilities at Yulara; the manager of the supermarket estimated that Anangu accounted for less than 1 per cent of the turnover and the manager of the Tavern estimated sales to Anangu at less than five per cent of trade. Anangu in general, but Mutitjulu residents in particular, use their own retail outlets partly because they own them, partly because they are given credit, and partly because of the outlets' locational advantage. Anangu also feel more comfortable and less public shopping at their community store.

This brief overview of Yulara indicates that tourist expenditure at the resort is not strongly linked with the regional or NT economy; the greatest benefits from the Yulara development seem to flow to the national economy. (Why was a vast amount of public money used by the NT government to subsidise the resort's development?) It is important for Anangu to be made aware that, despite the imposing appearance of the resort, it is not profitable to date. While a number of the resorts at Yulara, like the Sheraton, expect to reach break-even point only in the early to mid 1990s, Anangu, given their poverty, should consider whether such long-term investments are worthwhile.

Other Aboriginal tourism enterprises

One of the most significant benefits to the region from tourist visits to Uluru National Park occurs because a high proportion of people visit the region overland. In 1983/84 CCNT collected data on how people get to Uluru. In that year, the majority of visitors came by coach (52.6 per cent) with a further 33 per cent coming in private (or hire) cars and 14 per cent by air. Since that time, the strip at Connellan Airport near Yulara has been extended and hardened so that it is now classified as a major domestic airport by the Department of Aviation; it is ranked 31st most busy domestic airport in Australia. The upgrading of the airport has led to a rapid

increase in airport traffic. According to the Department of Aviation's *Provisional Statistics of Domestic Airline Scheduled Performance*, 38,074 revenue passengers were uplifted and discharged at Yulara in the year ended 30th June 1985. In the year ended 30th June 1986 there were 60,931 passengers - an increase of 60 per cent, the fastest growth rate recorded at the 49 major domestic airports. This figure translates to 30,465 passengers (assuming each one arrives and departs by air) although a proportion of these would be Yulara and Mutitjulu residents. The provisional figures do not include passengers carried by smaller commuter lines, estimated to total 3 per cent of passengers. Including this estimate gives a total figure of 31,379 passengers, 90 per cent of whom (28,241) could be assumed to be tourists. Using the estimates of tourist visitation in Table 5.2, it seems that between 15 and 21 per cent of visitors to the region come by aircraft.

This means that the remainder come overland, a traffic with benefits for regional enterprises, the roadhouse at Erldunda, Mount Ebenezer and Curtin Springs (see Map 4) and tourist accommodation at Wallara Ranch and Kings Creek Station (both en route to Kings Canyon National Park).

By early 1987 the Stuart Highway that links Alice Springs to Port Augusta was completely sealed, and it is estimated that between 20,000 and 60,000 extra visitors will come to the NT in 1987. A high proportion of these visitors will travel to Uluru National Park and a smaller number to Kings Canyon National Park.

There are three enterprises in the region involving Aborigines: the proposed Watarka (Kings Canyon) Wilderness Lodge development; a camping area being developed at Docker River on the only access road west from Uluru; and the Mount Ebenezer Roadhouse, recently procured by the Imanpa community. In each of these developments Aborigines are involved in the regional tourist industry in different ways.

Watarka (Kings Canyon) Wilderness Lodge

Kings Canyon, 120 kilometres north of Uluru, is part of the George Gill range; its main geological features are spectacular canyons, gorges and valleys. While Kings Canyon is a visitor destination in

its own right, most of its current visitors also travel overland to Uluru. In 1986 (March year) an estimated 21,000 people visited Kings Canyon, 53 per cent in private vehicles and 47 per cent by coach. Kings Canyon has yet to be formally declared a national park; at present there is almost no development there. There is a camping ground at the base of the canyon, another at Kings Creek station some 32 kilometres away, and accommodation at Wallara Ranch.

In September 1983, the NT government announced that the Conservation Land Corporation had acquired 750 square kilometres from the western section of Tempe Downs pastoral lease in order to establish the Watarka (Kings Canyon) National Park. For a number of reasons, by the end of 1986 the national park had not yet been declared and the Kings Canyon National Park Plan of Management is still in draft form only. Part of the problem is that there are mining leases (Onshore Oil Permits 175 and 236 and Mining Reserve 340) covering much of the central and northern parts of the proposed park. The NT government has not yet resolved how to deal with these prior mining interests, given Aboriginal and conservation interests' opposition to mineral exploration and mining in these areas. A further complication has been the prior interest of Aboriginal people in the Kings Canyon area. In 1974, the Luritja Land Association was formed, and before 1983 this association had negotiated with the owners of Tempe Downs with a view to purchasing the whole station. The Conservation Land Corporation's purchase of the western section of the pastoral lease effectively ended Luritja hopes of acquiring their traditional lands.

In 1984, however, the Central Land Council won major concessions from the NT government in relation to Kings Canyon in return for an assurance that the traditional owners of Lake Amadeus and Katiti Lands would allow an easement for a gas pipeline from the Mereenie oil fields to Yulara. These concessions included: 1. Three small living areas in the proposed Kings Canyon National Park for recognised traditional owners of the park; 2. Joint management of the national park, with traditional owner representation on the Board of Management; and 3. Twenty per cent equity in any proposed development at Kings Canyon.

Since 1984, the NT government has honoured most these commitments. In November 1985, three small residential living

areas were granted under NT freehold title to three groups of Luritja people. The excisions at Lila (Reedy Rockhole), Ulpanyali and Wanmerra (Bagot Springs) average just over 100 acres each. Because the proposed park area is alienated Crown land and under the Land Rights Act cannot be claimed, these concessions are important. Similarly, a proposed Local Management Committee for the park will consist of six Aboriginal members (two each from each of the three living areas), two representatives from CCNT and one from the on-site commercial development interests. An interim Management Committee currently consists of six members, with the member from Mingatjuta (the joint venture company of CLC and Destination Australia) yet to be appointed. Already there is some disagreement between CCNT and Aboriginal interests about the precise role of the Management Committee. The CCNT takes the view that the Committee should have a purely advisory function, while traditional owners want it to have full responsibility to formulate management objectives and policies (like the Uluru-Kata Tjuta Board of Management). People living at the three Kings Canyon communities (currently about 90) have close ties with Aboriginal people both at Mutitjulu and Imanpa. Many of the claimants in the Lake Amadeus (Pantu) Land Claim are members of all these communities.

The greatest delays have occurred in finalising arrangements for commercial developments in a designated park facilities reserve some six kilometres due west of Kings Canyon and in surveying park boundaries. The CLC and Bill King's company Destination Australia Marketing originally put forward a joint proposal for a wilderness lodge development at Kings Canyon in 1985. The intention of this proposal was to establish a resort at Kings Canyon markedly different from the Yulara development, with emphasis on a low key development accommodating Aboriginal cultural tourism. Destination Australia Marketing Pty Ltd had undertaken market research and identified a particular market segment, the 'venturer' who would be interested in a longer stay and various environmental excursions.

The Kings Canyon Wilderness Lodge was meant to be open by the 1986 tourist season. In February 1986, the NT Development Corporation magazine *INDUS* carried a front page story that the development was to proceed. However, in June 1986, the NTDC was disbanded. Subsequently the NT government withdrew its

commitment to provide community infrastructure (including a medical centre, school, visitors' centre, some housing and power, water and sewerage facilities) valued at over \$9 million. Late in September 1986 the NT government issued a press release that confirmed that the Joint Centrecorp/Destination Australia Marketing proposal will go ahead. Kings Canyon will be the first development in the NT that will not be dependent on NT public sector subsidisation or 'soft' loans if it can attract venture finance.

The CLC and Destination Australia Marketing formed Mingatjuta ('many ants') to develop the Watarka Wilderness Lodge. Mingatjuta will need a partner to provide up to \$10 million in venture capital to finance the development. Recently, Centrecorp raised a loan with the ADC to finance its proposed 20 per cent equity share in the development. This loan, from Commonwealth funds, will in fact introduce a soft loan component into the development, for it is at a favourable interest rate of 8 per cent and is repayable over 14 years after a four year repayment holiday. The ADC, for its part, has agreed that the loan will be repayable only from Centrecorp's share of assets in the Wilderness Lodge development. A non-recourse clause has been included in the loan agreement which means that the collateral for the loan will be Centrecorp's 20 per cent equity in the Wilderness Lodge; the ADC will not have recourse to any other assets or funds belonging to Centrecorp.

In late 1986, Mingatjuta was offered a park facilities reserve, an area of about 10 square kilometres within the boundaries of the Park that was to be leased from the Conservation Land Corporation. The CCNT presented Mingatjuta with a complicated lease agreement that stated, among other things, that approval for development within the Park Facilities Reserve would occur only if there was appropriate Aboriginal involvement. CCNT was stipulating this condition to a company currently half-owned by Aboriginal interests; when Yulara was developed the joint venturers (the Yulara Development Company) were not required to directly involve Aboriginal people.

By early 1987, it seemed possible that Mingatjuta's proposed Wilderness Lodge development would not be supervised by the CCNT, because of continuing delays. It seems likely that Mingatjuta will lease an area for the resort development from the Development

Land Corporation (rather than the Conservation Land Corporation). Irrespective of these lease arrangements (a park facilities reserve or a development lease), Aboriginal interests appear assured of direct economic benefits when the Watarka Wilderness Lodge development begins. Aboriginal interests will have a 20 per cent equity in the projects and financial assessments by Capel Court (1985) predict that it will be extremely profitable. Already Destination Australia Marketing have 10,000 bed nights booked by major tour operators for the year starting 1st April 1988. Capel Court estimate that by 1989 there will be nearly 95,000 visitors to Kings Canyon National Park. It is envisaged that once Centrecorp has met annual loan repayments to the ADC, its share of profits will be distributed to the Central Australian Aboriginal Charitable Trust, possibly for re-investment.

In the proposed Plan of Management for the park, first preference is given to Aboriginal commercial initiatives and already there are plans for a commercial horse trail operation and a cattle herd. Each of the three communities have plans for tourist enterprises. At Wanmerra, Anangu plan guided tours on horseback in the Bagot Springs Gorge area, with the potential for expanding tours and trails into other environmentally appropriate areas at the eastern end of the Park. People at Lila intend to develop interpretive and cultural tours including 'bush tucker' walks in the Lila (Reedy Rock Hole) area. They may also construct a small interpretive visitor centre near the Lila living area. Similarly, people at Ulpanyali are keen to provide tours at the western end of the Park.

In 1986, there were no financially viable tour operations undertaken by Aboriginal people in the NT. Aboriginal people lack the managerial skills, tourist industry expertise and marketing experience to establish such ventures. Furthermore, tourism enterprises have long lead times, often require high capitalisation, and are extremely demanding during periods of high tourist interest. These factors could make the proposed developments within Kings Canyon National Park commercially marginal. However, Aboriginal equity interests in the Wilderness Lodge development could assist prospective Aboriginal entrepreneurs on two counts. Firstly, Mingatjuta will brochure and market Anangu initiatives when advertising the wilderness lodge. As the lodge is intended as a long stay tourist destination, it will depend partly on

Aboriginal involvement to attract tourists. Secondly, Mingatjuta will be able to assist Anangu involved in these enterprises with training as tour guides and with management services. The ultimate success of these small-scale local tours will depend on visitor demand and on Anangu willingness to maintain regular, direct contact with visitors.

As the Lodge development has not yet begun, it is a little early to predict whether direct employment will be available for Anangu or whether there will be demand for such employment. Already CCNT has employed one person as a base grade ranger and it is proposed to employ a member of each of the three communities as a community ranger - a flexible, part-time appointment (Morgan, Smyth and Butler 1986). With more visits to the Park, it may be possible to employ more community rangers.

Docker River

Docker River community, established in 1968, is well placed to take advantage of overland tourist traffic, on the only access road west from Ayers Rock. To date, Docker River has only a marginal involvement in the tourism industry. A number of researchers (Latz 1983; Cane and Stanley 1985) have noted that Aborigines in this area have actively discouraged tourism and in a recent preliminary report, Doohan and Vachon (1986) report concern in a number of communities in central Australia about uncontrolled tourist trespass on to Aboriginal land.

It seems likely that tourist visits will increase. There will be pressures on the state governments to upgrade roads in central Australia in keeping with the policy assumption that tourism generates economic growth. The NT and WA governments are discussing upgrading the road through Docker River (the Docker Road) that joins the Gunbarrel Highway in Western Australia. Both Perth and Darwin wish to see greater two-way tourism traffic between WA and the Territory. People using this route have been primarily 'four wheel drivers' who are in search of remoteness, the 'outback experience' and unregulated tourism.

Davey, Helman and Vachon (1986) present data from the NT Department of Transport and Works surveys of road use in the Ayers Rock region. Extrapolation from these data allows estimates

of traffic between Uluru National Park and Western Australia. Over three periods - peak season (May, June and July 1984), low season (March 1986) and during the Halley's Comet period (April 1986) - Transport and Works found that traffic to Docker River (and back) was 2 per cent, 4 per cent and 4 per cent respectively of all traffic to Uluru National Park. The Docker River traffic count was taken west of Kata Tjuta and was assumed to be through traffic although Anangu traffic between communities could not be differentiated from tourist traffic. The only available traffic figures imply that between 14 and 20 vehicles per day drive to and from Docker River. Assuming (as a generous estimate) that half these vehicles contain Anangu, and that each vehicle carries an average of three passengers, then between 7665 and 10,950 tourists per annum are currently driving through Docker River. Furthermore, the change from 2 per cent of all traffic in 1984 to 4 per cent in 1986 suggests a rapid growth in traffic flow. These figures are much higher than the number of permits processed by the Central Land Council in 1985 when permit applications totalled 613, 96 per cent from private applicants. While most permit applications would have been for more than one person, it is unlikely that permit carriers are a significant proportion of travellers on the Docker Road. This finding is consistent with comments in Doohan and Vachon's (1986) preliminary report. They rang up government tourist agencies in WA, SA and Yulara to enquire about permit requirements for the Docker Road and Aboriginal land. They were informed that permits were required from the CLC if one wanted to travel off the main road to look around or go camping.

Docker River residents' antipathy to tourism has limited tourist-related commercial development. There now appear to be two different plans. On the one hand, the Docker River Social Club is looking to take advantage of the tourist trade passing Docker River. On the other hand, the Docker River Outstation Council, concerned about tourist trespass onto Aboriginal land (and on occasions sacred sites and homeland communities), is considering setting up camping facilities on the Docker Road. The only services on the road between Warburton and Yulara are at Docker River. As people often have to stop at Docker to procure petrol and supplies, a camping area has been established near the township. However, few people stop there and pay a \$10 fee to stay overnight, preferring instead to camp off the road en route to Uluru, often at or near Lasseter's Cave. While Docker River store and fuel outlet is

used by through traffic, the ex-manager of the store (who worked at the Mutitjulu community in 1986) stated that tourist business has not been of financial significance over the past few years.

The Social Club is thinking of building an ablution block and, possibly, accommodation at Docker, to be linked, perhaps, to tours out of Docker River to some unrestricted rock art sites some 10 kilometres from the township, and to an old amethyst mine. Such tours would have to be marketed at Yulara. A weekly flight delivers perishables to Docker River via Yulara. Arriving on Wednesday, the plane could bring up to a dozen passengers from Yulara for a two night, three day visit. A feasibility study is needed to investigate the cost of investment, the level of community support, tourist demand, and the supply of suitable local labour willing and able to work in the enterprise. As at Kings Canyon, the constraints on such an enterprise would include the long time required to become commercially viable, the current high cost of capital, and the shortage of Anangu labour with managerial and tourist industry expertise.

The Outstation Council is also considering involving the NT government in tourism regulation. In June 1986, after ANPWS took over the running of Uluru National Park, the CCNT office at Yulara was renamed Petermann District Headquarters with jurisdiction over all the area of the Territory south of Kings Canyon National Park, extending to Western Australia, Queensland and South Australian borders. As much of this area is Aboriginal land, CCNT's conservation work will include more liaison with Aboriginal communities. As the CCNT's Assistant-Director in Alice Springs emphasized in an interview in May 1986, both conservation and tourism interests will have to recognize that a high proportion of NT land and population, is Aboriginal.

CCNT interest in Docker River residents' concern about tourism may foreshadow a change in its focus, from national parks to all Territory land. CCNT, after preliminary talks, is willing to fund a community ranger position at Docker (with a vehicle) to patrol the Docker Road. The Outstation Council has also discussed with CCNT the possibility of funding to establish camping areas along the Docker Road. Perhaps the CCNT will make Docker River itself the site of increased tourism, a possibility further discussed below.

Cane and Stanley (1985:212) note that Aborigines at desert homelands (such as Docker River outstations) are now against tourism, but that over the next ten years or so they may wish to become involved in the directions and development of the industry rather than passively resist developments that may take place anyway. The pressure from tourism over the past two years has prompted Docker River people to seek advice and a role in regulating tourism. The objectives of Docker River people to date appear to be of a socio-cultural rather than commercial nature; they want to regulate tourists' movements without necessarily seeing a connection between this and commercial development.

Mt. Ebenezer Roadhouse

Mt. Ebenezer Roadhouse, on the Lasseter Highway about 200 kilometres east of Yulara and 35 kilometres from the intersection of the Stuart and Lasseter Highways, occupies a special purpose lease of about one hectare designated for tourist accommodation and ancillary purposes. The SPL No. 166 (NT Portion 899) was converted to NT freehold title by its owners Kunoth Pastoral Company Pty Ltd in 1982. It was leased (until 31st December 1986) to Mt. Ebenezer Investment Pty Ltd.

Mt. Ebenezer Roadhouse is near the half-way point between Alice Springs and Yulara, and so enjoys some advantage over both Erldunda and Curtin Springs. It is a particularly popular stopping point for tour operators, such as Ansett Trailways, a tour company that carries about 10,000 tourists from Alice Springs to Yulara per annum.

Mt. Ebenezer Roadhouse is on the border of Mt. Ebenezer and Erldunda pastoral stations and some 16 kilometres from Imanpa, an Aboriginal community with a population of about 150. Many Imanpa residents are recognised traditional owners of Mt. Ebenezer station, not available for claim under the *Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act*, 1976. The Imanpa community is on a six square kilometre excision from Mt. Ebenezer station, one of the earliest (1979) community living areas granted on a pastoral property. Since 1982, the community has been interested in acquiring Mt. Ebenezer Roadhouse from Kunoth Pastoral Company, the group that also owns Mt. Ebenezer station.

Late in 1986, as the lease of Mt. Ebenezer Investment was coming to an end, Imanpa Community Inc. negotiated to procure the Roadhouse. Feasibility studies by both the ADC and Westpac indicated the Roadhouse was profitable and a viable concern. The Imanpa community had saved a deposit (of between 14 and 16 per cent of purchase price) from a variety of sources including profits from the community store, profits on contracts undertaken for the Department of Housing and Construction and from community 'chuck ins' from social security benefit receipts. Aboriginal communities, impoverished and dependent on social security for the majority of their income, do not usually tap such sources of money as a deposit for investment purposes. The bulk of the finance to purchase the Roadhouse has been raised from commercial sources. The willingness of a bank to loan these funds to Imanpa indicates the potential value of the Roadhouse (that was mortgaged as loan collateral) and the creditworthiness of the community.

At a public meeting that I attended at Imanpa in November 1986, community members articulated a dislike for tourism and were adamant that their living areas will remain restricted to tourist entry. The community was realistic about the present need for white management and staff to run the Roadhouse on their behalf; it wants six to eight white management and other staff. Anangu who want jobs at the Roadhouse will get them, but not if they drink and are troublesome. People at Imanpa sell artefacts directly to tourists at the Roadhouse, to the current lessees, to the Imanpa Store and to Maruku. The community sees potential for a craft camp at Mt. Ebenezer but there is no craft adviser to market artefacts on their behalf. The sale of alcohol at the licensed Roadhouse is an important issue and the community has discussed the possibility of introducing a restricted licence for Anangu.

The community's real objective in procuring the Roadhouse is not to be involved in the tourist industry, but to accumulate capital to buy a pastoral station (preferably Mount Ebenezer) near Imanpa. With the increase in traffic expected due to the sealing of the Stuart Highway, the community should be able to pay off a substantial portion of its loan in three years. Then Imanpa's equity in the Roadhouse could raise further finance to buy a cattle station. Members of the Imanpa community see the Roadhouse purchase as a real test of community commitment to this primary longer term

objective. Mt. Ebenezer Roadhouse could be highly profitable - a well-placed combination of old style 'homestead charm' and an Aboriginal presence. However, they also know that standards will have to be maintained, a sentiment echoed by the manager of Ansett Trailways in Alice Springs when interviewed in May 1986. It is not yet clear what management structure will be established for the Roadhouse. At other locations it is often left to white management to enforce rules on Aboriginal owners of enterprises; this can place an enormous burden on management that is subsequently reflected in lack of commitment and poor financial practices. The challenge facing the Imanpa community is to give its managers broad policy guidance and support to ensure that the Roadhouse continues as a profitable enterprise.

Future developments and regional issues

Central Australia is growing rapidly as a tourist destination. In the past, a visit to the Ayers Rock-Mount Olga National Park (now Uluru) was a true 'outback experience'. But with the sealing of the Lasseter Highway, the development of Yulara as a resort of international standard, and the expansion of the Connellan Airport, a visit to Uluru has less appeal to the adventure tourist, unless he or she travels from Western Australia via the Gunbarrel Highway and Docker Road. The tourism industry now wishes to open up new frontiers for the 'adventure' market, for example a wilderness ring route for four wheel drive coaches, starting at Alice Springs and travelling in an anti-clockwise direction via Papunya -> Kintore -> Docker River -> Uluru National Park -> Kings Canyon -> Areyonga -> Finke Gorge National Park -> Hermannsburg and back to Alice Springs. Smaller four wheel drive groups could branch off this route to the Lake Amadeus region and to Gosse's Bluff.

Table 5.4 presents figures from a number of sources to predict the growth in tourism to national parks. Some of these projections are conservative. Most of the destinations planned for the circuit route are either on Aboriginal land (or dependent on access to Aboriginal land, as with Yulara) or Conservation Land Corporation areas where Aboriginal interests have major concessions. In the case of Finke Gorge National Park, a land claim has been lodged by the CLC over a northern portion of the park that remains unalienated.

Table 5.4

Expected visitor numbers at national parks on a possible regional circuit, 1985 to 1990^a

Park	Estimated visitor numbers		Percentage growth
	1985	1990	
Uluru National Park ^b	144,000	202,000	40%
Yulara ^c	168,983	258,560	53%
Kings Canyon ^d	20,238	31,000	53%
Kings Canyon ^e	21,036	94,671	450%
Finke Gorge ^d	46,000	69,000	50%
Gosse's Bluff ^d	2,500	3,800	52%

Footnotes: a. These estimates do not assume any marked improvement in tourist routes. None of the estimates utilise sophisticated modelling; for example, no probability to a world recession and a rapid decline in tourist visitation to central Australia.

b. NTDC/NTTC (1984) estimate. The 1990 figure is in fact for 1988; see Table 5.2.

c. Yulara Corporation estimate.

d. Estimated by Taylor (1986).

e. Capel Court (1985) estimate assuming the development of the Kings Canyon Wilderness Lodge.

The key issue is to what extent Aboriginal interests in central Australia will choose to (or be able to) use their rights in land to gain financial returns from possible tourism developments? There are a number of different Aboriginal approaches that are emerging in the regional tourism industry.

Each community has evolved a different strategy to cope with the tourism industry, because each has experienced different numbers of tourists under a variety of circumstances; in particular the communities enjoy different kinds of land tenure. Aboriginal ownership of the land is not a necessary condition for Aboriginal power in the industry. For example, Anangu at Docker River own the Petermann lands, and have the right to prevent trespass. However, a major access road crosses their land and there are not sufficient resources to regulate visitor use of it. On the other hand, the Imanpa community has no statutory rights to the Mt. Ebenezer

Roadhouse, but has bought it with commercially-raised capital. In the two cases where Aboriginal interests have benefited from tourism, Uluru and Kings Canyon, commercial concessions have been won from Commonwealth and NT governments. At Uluru the Memorandum of Lease between members of the Uluru-Kata Tjuta Land Trust and the Director of ANPWS included these concessions. At Kings Canyon, where Aborigines had no statutory rights, the Central Land Council bargained with rights to other land to win concessions for the Canyon area's traditional owners. The lesson of Yulara, a negative example, is that some developments ignore Aboriginal priorities, particularly if those developers can alienate land. Nothing was more effective in excluding Aboriginal interests from Yulara than the Governor-General's 29 July 1976 proclamation of the Yulara township site. This action nullified any Aboriginal property right to the 104 square kilometre area.

Aborigines in central Australia must now consider the tourist industry's unprecedented demand for access to more isolated places where visitors can enjoy 'the outback experience'. The industry believes that over the next ten years tourism will grow rapidly in central Australia, a belief shared by the Territory government, which nonetheless has put less money into tourism development since July 1986. At present, Aboriginal people have unprecedented discretion about what developments occur on Aboriginal land: s.19 of the Land Rights Act gives them a right to veto any tourism development on their land.

Aborigines should carefully consider use of this power for two reasons, if they wish to shape tourism development. Firstly it is easier to win concessions from the industry when it is expanding. Tourism is notorious for its instability; consumer preferences change, other destinations are substituted for current ones, and economic conditions and disposable incomes fluctuate. A sudden decrease in tourist interest in central Australia would weaken the bargaining position of Aboriginal interests. Secondly, there is the possibility (more remote after the 1987 election) of a change in federal government and patriation of the federal Land Rights Act to the Territory government. One cannot rule out a legislative weakening of Aborigines' bargaining position, with possible amendments allowing compulsory acquisition of Aboriginal land for commercial developments.

The existence of these uncertainties means that Aboriginal people must consider any possible involvement in the tourism industry carefully. Pressure from tourist interests, like pressure from mining interests, can be relentless, and the ill-effects of tourism can be as great, or greater, than those of large-scale resource development projects. Aboriginal people should be in a position to make informed decisions about involvement in tourism, about the social costs, the financial benefits and the risks.

After such consideration, Aboriginal interests will have three options: to veto any tourism development on Aboriginal lands; to allow regulated development; or to allow unregulated development. Aborigines are likely to prefer the first two options to the last. If Aborigines decide to veto a particular tourism development then it will be imperative to defend their right to that decision, just as it has been necessary to defend the veto over mineral exploration against the concerted efforts of the mining industry. If, on the other hand, Aborigines attempt to regulate development, then concessions won at Uluru and Kings Canyon should be minimum benchmarks for negotiations.

This chapter concludes by briefly examining four regional policy issues. Firstly, there should be more information available to Aboriginal communities about ways to get involved in the industry. There has been too much emphasis on Aboriginal employment in the industry, an option that may not appeal and does not seem to contribute significantly to Aboriginal interests. Other options include: using the leverage provided by the Land Rights Act to get equity in projects (as at Kings Canyon); using commercial concessions, prior interests or commercial capital to acquire tourist enterprises (as at Mt. Ebenezer Roadhouse); playing a central part in the management of tourism (as at Uluru and Kings Canyon); and indirect involvement, such as that afforded regional producers by Maruku. Central Land Council involvement in the Kings Canyon development must be publicised to Aboriginal communities. The CLC used the powers of the Land Rights Act to win significant concessions for Aboriginal interests, mobilizing high quality commercial advice available within the organisation and elsewhere. As the CLC becomes more involved (either directly or through Centrecorp) in the development of Aboriginal land, it should acquire greater commercial expertise to assist traditional owners. Two of the traditional owners of Kings Canyon are also members of

the CLC executive, allowing a close liaison between traditional owners and the Land Council.

Secondly, Aborigines will be involved in tourism in three different circumstances: national parks, Aboriginal land (in the statutory sense), and non-Aboriginal land. In some cases land tenure types overlap. Uluru is a national park and Aboriginal land; Kings Canyon is alienated land and a national park. Nearly all tourism in central Australia has occurred in national parks or on other land not recognized as Aboriginal land.

Tourism in national parks and Aboriginal prerogatives are not incompatible. In such Northern Territory national parks as Uluru (Chapter 4), Kakadu (Chapter 6) and Gurig (Chapter 7) tourist access to living areas are prohibited, sacred sites are strictly protected, and the land-extensive subsistence economy is being maintained by restricting tourist access to hunting areas.

While the Land Rights Act allows communities to restrict tourist access, they find that, particularly when roads dissect their land, such restrictions are extremely difficult and expensive to police. Communities with this experience should consider how their involvement in tourism may assist them to control tourists' movements, at the same time giving financial returns. Aborigines on land not crossed by major roads, and insulated from tourist traffic, are not under such pressure to consider this option.

When tourism occurs on land not recognized as belonging to Aborigines they have two options: to get involved in tourism on the open market, without concessions (Mt. Ebenezer) or to use rights in Aboriginal land elsewhere as leverage in dealings off Aboriginal land (Kings Canyon). The latter option is unlikely when developments do not involve the public sector.

Thirdly, it is important that Aboriginal interests take a longer term perspective of developments in the tourism industry. In the central Australian context, this will also require the adoption of a regional perspective. Currently, both the industry and the Territory government are considering regional development options. It is crucial that Aboriginal communities have an integrated approach when negotiating with private or public sector interests. This does not mean that Aboriginal communities must

have common or identical goals. Aboriginal communities differ in aims, objectives, expectations, current standards of living and economic aspirations. There may also be differences in all these variables within communities. Such differences should be articulated to the tourism industry through a regional tourism association representing all central Australian communities currently, or potentially, affected by tourism. Such a body could be established autonomously or preferably within an already incorporated structure, such as the Central Land Council.

The final policy issue is how to deal with incomes. The distribution of mining royalty equivalents and agreement moneys in central Australia has been extremely problematic and divisive. On one hand there has been pressure to distribute such moneys in small amounts to all people with an interest in the land (despite extraordinary difficulty in defining who these people are). This could be seen as the culturally appropriate approach. On the other hand, there has been pressure to maintain these moneys in critical masses that can be utilised to improve the marginal economic status of Aboriginal people. This is the economically rational (and frequently socially equitable) approach. As Aborigines begin to own profitable tourism enterprises, it seems likely that the same issues evident with mining moneys will recur.

Distribution policies should be devised, either generally or tailored to each enterprise, to pre-empt problems that will arise from this dilemma. In particular, such policies should specify direct beneficiaries and the proportion of profits to be spent on current, rather than future, objectives. Aboriginal groups involved in tourism enterprises must recognise the potential for community dissension. Expenditure, financial and investment policies should be decided early in any proposed development, certainly before profits begin to flow.

Conclusion

The information in Chapter 5 is somewhat different from the other case studies in this monograph. Firstly, the investigation is regional, rather than being demarcated by national park boundaries or the coastline (in the Melville and Bathurst Islands case). Secondly, many of the locations discussed do not have direct contact

with tourism, but have indirect economic opportunities generated by the popularity of Uluru and the development of Yulara. Thirdly, a number of communities discussed here do not own Aboriginal land. It is interesting that this handicap does not appear to preclude their involvement in tourism.

The cases in this chapter also differ from others in Part B because detailed primary data for Pitjantjatjara homelands, Docker River, Imanpa and Kings Canyon communities were not collected during fieldwork. The lack of detailed population, employment and income data have not allowed a rigorous appraisal of the economic impact of tourism at these localities; this remains an area for further research especially when some of the enterprises described become fully established.

Map 5 Kakadu National Park, Stages 1 and 2

Chapter 6

Kakadu National Park

Kakadu National Park is north Australia's best known tourist destination. It is generally recognised that the development of Kakadu is of critical importance to the Northern Territory tourism industry and to the northern economy more generally (ANPWS 1986a:14).

The Kakadu case study is of particular importance on a number of grounds. Firstly, since the establishment of Kakadu Stage 1 in 1979, Aboriginal people have been closely linked with the development of the park. This is primarily because nearly all of Stage 1 is Aboriginal land, the exception being the Jabiru township site that is within the Park but is not owned by Aboriginal people. While Aboriginal people only own about 8 per cent of Stage 2, this was proclaimed much later than Stage 1 (in 1984). Furthermore, most of the key visitor destinations are currently within the boundary of Stage 1. However, it is important to note that under sub-section 12(2B) of the Land Rights Act, the granting of Aboriginal ownership to land within the boundary of Stage 1 was conditional on a lease-back to the Director of the Australian National Parks and Wildlife Service.

Secondly, Aboriginal people elsewhere in north Australia frequently look to Kakadu as an example of how Aboriginal people can both participate in and accrue financial benefit from the tourism industry. There is a commonly held belief in many communities that I visited in 1986 that Aboriginal residents of Kakadu National Park do extremely well from tourism. This perception requires rigorous evaluation.

Thirdly, there are special features of the Kakadu situation that encourage Aboriginal participation in tourism. In particular, there are guarantees for employment and training within Kakadu National Park contained in an agreement signed between the Northern Land Council and the Director of ANPWS on the 3rd November 1978. There are also provisions for consultation with

Aboriginal interests and facilitation of Aboriginal initiatives in the tourism industry in the current plan of management for the park. ANPWS (1986a:70-71) states that the management prescription is to facilitate appropriate tour operations and to enhance visitor appreciation of Kakadu while ensuring the protection of the park environment, its natural and cultural assets, as well as taking into account the views of traditional Aboriginal interests. There are provisions for liaison with Aboriginal interests represented by the NLC, the Gagudju Association, other relevant Aboriginal Associations and traditional Aboriginal owners. Aboriginal initiatives for participation in the tourism industry are to be encouraged, and where they do not conflict with Park values minor developments associated with such initiatives will be facilitated.

Finally, many of the Aboriginal residents of Kakadu National Park are members of the Gagudju Association that receives mining royalty equivalents with respect to the nearby Ranger uranium mine. The Gagudju Association is currently the richest royalty association in the Northern Territory; it receives over \$3 million per annum in income under sub-ss.64(3) and 35(2) of the Land Rights Act. These funds provide capital that can be, and to a great extent has been, invested in the tourism industry.

It is recognised by many commentators that the Kakadu region is extremely politically complicated (AIAS 1984; Hill 1985; Lea and Zehner 1986). Von Sturmer (1982:69) refers to the region as an 'uneasy blend of uranium, conservation, tourism, Aboriginal rights'. Gale (1983:4) states that 'Kakadu National Park opened in a blaze of publicity and has been forced to establish itself in a difficult political environment. In many ways it has become the buffer between miners, Aborigines and ecologists'. This was certainly the intention explicitly stated in second report of the Ranger Uranium Environmental Inquiry (Fox et al. 1977). Issues that remain politically contentious include the desirability of uranium mining within a national park; the environmental battle for the protection of Stage 3; the recent disputes over World Heritage listing for Stage 2 between the federal and the NT governments; the rapidly escalating (and grossly underestimated) growth of visitor numbers in recent years; and the renegotiation of Park lease-back terms and conditions that will be completed in 1988.

My own perceptions of these complications are that historical factors have exacerbated an already complex interaction between Aboriginal, environmental and mining interests. On one hand, there is the history of Aboriginal settlement, depopulation of the region, and its repopulation since 1979 (see Keen 1980; Levitus 1982; Altman 1983a). The current Aboriginal population of the Kakadu region is extremely heterogeneous; some people have had long term contact with non-Aboriginal society and are of mixed descent; others have migrated to the region from Arnhem Land and remain traditionally oriented. On the other hand, there is the recent history of legislative and political resolution of the 'uranium debate' following the Ranger Uranium Environmental Inquiry (Fox et al. 1977). This inquiry (and the federal government's decision to allow mining of uranium at Ranger) pre-dates self-government of the NT. Consequently, the ownership of the NT's uranium resources has remained vested in the Crown in the right of the Commonwealth. Furthermore, the management of Kakadu National Park has been the responsibility of the federal ANPWS since its proclamation in 1979. The role of the Commonwealth in the Alligator Rivers region over the past decade has frequently resulted in Aboriginal interests and people being used as pawns in acrimonious relations between the federal and NT governments. Von Sturmer (1982) has documented vividly the plethora of government departments and other bodies that Aborigines in the region must deal with in their everyday lives. Many of these political complications have been outlined in more detail in Chapter 3.

From the Aboriginal perspective, the key issue until recently appears to have been mining, and not tourism. This is primarily because under the Land Rights Act local Aboriginal people are provided with the means to negotiate for compensatory royalty payments for projects on Aboriginal land. Despite the existence of two important uranium prospects at Jabiluka and Koongarra (on mining leases excised from Kakadu) and the completion of mining agreements between Aboriginal traditional owners and mining companies, federal government policy has disallowed export approvals for these mines. Consequently, only the Ranger mine has proceeded and only the Gagudju Association receives 'area affected' moneys from mining in the Kakadu region. Issues linked to uranium mining in the region have resulted in friction both at the formal political level (between NT and federal governments) and at

the regional level (between Aboriginal royalty associations and the Northern Land Council, and between Aboriginal residents themselves).

All these issues make the isolation of tourism as a research topic in this region extremely difficult. In 1982, I made two visits to Kakadu National Park when the emphasis of my work was the utilisation of mining royalties; I made a brief return visit in 1983 to undertake some work for the Gagudju Association. In July 1986, I spent three weeks at Kakadu concentrating on the tourism issue. However, just as in 1982 when the issue of mining royalties could not be divorced from tourism (Altman 1983a), so in 1986 the reverse situation was equally valid. Aboriginal involvement in tourism cannot be separated from a comprehensive analysis of the operations of the Gagudju Association that acts in many respects as a regional Aboriginal government.

My research in Kakadu had the approval and support of the Northern Land Council, the ANPWS and the Gagudju Association. However, my visit to Kakadu coincided with a change in Gagudju management and administrative difficulties at Cooida Hotel. As a consequence information on the Gagudju Association's commercial interests was less forthcoming than anticipated and was largely limited to publicly available information. On the other hand, I was extremely fortunate to receive the greatest possible assistance from ANPWS staff.

It should be noted that the discussion of Kakadu National Park in this chapter is largely limited to the areas covered by Stages 1 and 2, as in 1986, when fieldwork in the region was undertaken, Stage 3 had not yet been proclaimed.

Tourism in the region

Kakadu National Park (or what is generally referred to today as Stage 1) was proclaimed on 5 April 1979 under the *National Parks and Wildlife Conservation Act* 1975. It covers an area of some 6144 square kilometres, almost all of which is Aboriginal land owned by the Kakadu Aboriginal Land Trust. The main area that is within the park but is not owned by Aboriginal people is the Jabiru

town site. Stage 2 was proclaimed on 28 December 1984 and covers an area of some 6929 square kilometres, 8 per cent of which is Aboriginal land. Stage 3 was proclaimed on 5 May 1987 and covers an area of 4479 square kilometres. A land claim over Stage 3 which covers the two former pastoral leases Gimbat and Goodparla has been lodged by the Northern Land Council. Stage 1 was accepted for entry on the World Heritage List in 1981 and Stage 2 in December 1987.

The history of the region is discussed in some detail in the first and second plans of management (ANPWS 1980, 1986a) and will not be repeated here. Gale (1984:32) notes that up until the 1960s very few people came into what is now the Kakadu region. The early tourist incursions into the region were by hunters who visited the lodges at Nourlangie and Patonga and took part in hunts for buffaloes organised by shooters who had been in the region for decades. During the 1960s and 1970s these visitors were shown the rock art sites at places like Obirri and Nourlangie. It was only after the Arnhem Highway was sealed in 1974 that there was a rapid increase in visitors to the region, although no accurate visitor statistics are available for the period prior to 1982.

Tourist numbers and projections

Early estimates of visitor numbers are contained in the second report of the Ranger Uranium Environmental Inquiry where figures of 19,000 visitor days for 1972 and 60,000 visitor days for 1976 are mentioned (Fox et al. 1977:209).

Since 1982 the ANPWS have collected comprehensive statistical information on visitor numbers. The methods used to collect these data are explained in ANPWS (1987a) and Gillespie (1988). Information on visitor numbers and visitor days are summarised in Table 6.1. The most important feature of the table is the growth rate in both visitors and visitor nights. Since 1982, the former has increased by a factor of 4.0 and the latter by 4.4. It is unlikely that many tourist destinations in Australia would have seen such a rapid growth in visitation over the past five years.

Table 6.1
Visitors to Kakadu National Park, 1982 to 1987

Year	Visitor numbers (annual increase) ^a	Visitor days (annual increase) ^a
1982	45,800	150,800
1983	57,850 (26%)	185,750 (23%)
1984	75,200 (30%)	268,300 (44%)
1985	101,600 (35%)	370,150 (38%)
1986	131,000 (29%)	500,450 (35%)
1987	185,000 (41%)	666,000 (33%)

Footnote: a. Percentage change calculated as $\text{Year 2/Year 1} \times 100$.

Source: ANPWS (1987a); Dan Gillespie (pers. comm.).

Available data indicate that there has been gross underestimation of the rate of visitor growth to Kakadu National Park. Peat, Marwick and Mitchell (1985) estimates made in 1985 suggested that by 1996 203,568 visitors would come to Kakadu. The Peat, Marwick Mitchell projection for 1988 was exceeded in 1986 and their projection for 1995 was exceeded in 1987. Gillespie (1988) refers to another Peat, Marwick and Mitchell study undertaken in 1982 that made projections that were reasonably accurate until 1985. Fox et al. (1977:209) refer to a projection made in 1972, that twenty years after the establishment of a regional centre (Jabiru), 708,000 visitors would spend 2.1 million visitor days in the region. In 1977, this estimate seemed unbelievable; in 1987, few would dispute that such numbers may be reached by the year 2000.

The reasons for the rapid growth in visitation include the aggressive marketing efforts of the NT Tourist Commission and of tour operators like AAT Kings; the impact of the movie 'Crocodile Dundee' both domestically and overseas; the depreciation of the Australian dollar; the perceived safety of north Australia (from terrorists, not reptiles) as a tourist destination; the World Heritage listings of Kakadu Stage 1 (in 1981) and more recently the nomination of Kakadu Stage 2 (and its subsequent listing in December 1987); the improvement in access to north Australia particularly after the sealing of the Stuart Highway early in 1987 (reflected in the marked increase in visitors with caravans from

inter-state in the 1987 season, Peter Wellings pers. comm.); and the media fascination with crocodile attacks, disputes over mineral exploration in Stages 2 and 3, and Aboriginal and environmental issues. Interestingly, the possibility of attack by estuarine crocodiles appears to encourage rather than discourage visitation.

Many of these factors influence overseas visitors to come to Australia and up until 1987 about 1 per cent of them visited Kakadu National Park. Overseas visitors from 1982 to 1986 accounted for about 10 per cent of private visitors to the park and 15-18 per cent of tour participants (ANPWS 1987a:18). However, it is estimated that in 1987 overseas visitors accounted for a significantly increased 25 per cent of tour visitors and 15 per cent of total visitors. In 1987, nearly 3 per cent of overseas visitors to Australia visited Kakadu. However, the vast majority (85 per cent) of visitors to Kakadu remain domestic visitors.

The nature of tourist visitation

There has been a great deal written about the nature of tourist visitation to Kakadu National Park in Sullivan (1984), Gale and Jacobs (1984, 1987), AIAS (1984), Palmer (1985), ANPWS (1986a, 1986b, 1987a) and Gillespie (1988). This section sets out to provide a brief overview for readers of visitor origins, visitor activities and destinations, length of stay and means of transport.

Who are the visitors? Gillespie (1988) notes that the pattern of origin for visitors has remained relatively constant over the years 1982 to 1987. Of visitors who come in private vehicles, about 20 per cent come from the NT, 70 per cent from inter-state, and 10 per cent from overseas. Of visitors who come in commercial tours, 75 per cent are domestic and 25 per cent come from overseas. For the period 1982-86, about 85 per cent of visitors came independently; in 1987, this proportion decreased to 75 per cent. Tour participants increased from an average 15 per cent of visitors to 25 per cent.

What do people do? The ANPWS (1986a:74) suggests that visitor activities concentrate on appreciation of wildlife, landscapes and rock art. Actual activities include pleasure driving, nature appreciation via short walks and 'watching' periods, rock art and

landscape viewing. Gillespie (1988) notes that 36 per cent of private visitors surveyed carried fishing equipment implying that a high proportion fish within the Park.

Where do people go? The ANPWS (1986c:25) presents a table that provides information on the popularity of different locations in Kakadu National Park. The most popular included Jabiru town (visited by 65 per cent of visitors that took part in a mail back survey); Ubirr art sites (63 per cent); the East Alligator River adjacent to Ubirr (57 per cent); and Nourlangie art sites (50 per cent). The Ranger mine site is also a relatively popular destination with about 15 per cent of visitors taking part in a tour organised by the mining company. Visitor pressure on the small number of easily accessible rock art sites is reported by Gale and Jacobs (1984, 1987), Brady (1985) and Allen and Harris (1987).

How long do they stay? ANPWS (1987a:6) estimates that 84 per cent of visitors in 1986 stayed in the park overnight. Of the day visitors, about 27 per cent are estimated to be Jabiru residents, 49 per cent on tours and the remaining 24 per cent private visitors (most presumably from within the NT). For the period 1982-87, average length of stay for private visitors is estimated at 4.3 days and for tour visitors at 1.8 days.

Where do people stay? In 1985, the ANPWS (1987a:14) estimated that 77 per cent of overnight visitors to Kakadu stayed at camping grounds, while 22 per cent stayed at hotels or motels. The majority of tour visitors (61 per cent) stayed in hotels/motels while only 22 per cent of private visitors stay in such accommodation.

How do they travel? Four wheel drive vehicles represent a high proportion of vehicles used by private visitors to Kakadu. Gillespie (1988) presents data for the period 1982-85 that indicate that 39.7 per cent of private visitors came in conventional vehicles, 33 per cent in four wheel drive vehicles and 14.1 per cent in vans. Brady (1985:15) notes that many in four wheel drive vehicles do not want roads within the Park upgraded as this would undermine its 'wilderness' attraction.

When do people visit? There is a significant seasonality in visitor use of Kakadu. The ANPWS (1987a:12) presents estimates

for two periods, June to August (the peak period) and May to October (the dry season) from 1982 to 1985. On average, 53 per cent of visitors come during the three month peak and 84 per cent during the six month dry season. Gillespie (1988) notes that while there is some increase in park use during the wet season, particularly by tour groups, seasonality is not going to go away. He also notes that in July 1987 more people visited Kakadu than in the whole of 1982.

Visitor satisfaction

The available evidence, primarily from interviews conducted by Gale and Jacobs (1987) and from ANPWS mail-back questionnaires is somewhat contradictory. This can be explained in part by their differing objectives and the timing of research: Gale and Jacobs concentrated on visitor use of rock art sites and their research was conducted some five years ago, while the ANPWS is interested in visitors' perceptions of the quality of the services provided by the park authority and their monitoring is ongoing.

The ANPWS (1986b:69-75) notes that since proclamation (1979) over 3000 visitor survey forms have been returned representing the views of 9,000 visitors. Of respondents, 85 per cent made positive comments and 6 per cent expressed general disappointment with Kakadu. The majority of visitor comments concentrated on the high quality of amenities at camping grounds (currently provided free), park staff and interpretative displays. Allen and Harris (1987:59) note that the majority of respondents to the (ANPWS) Kakadu visitor survey revealed that they did not want changes to the park. This reinforces the ANPWS finding of a high level of visitor satisfaction.

Gale and Jacobs (1987) on the other hand document visitor disappointment about two aspects of the park - misleading advertising and the limited contact with Aboriginal people. They note that

Information available in southern cities is at best misleading often resulting in disappointment among visitors. At Kakadu, for example, many of the visitors we interviewed were initially attracted to the Park by publicity showing areas such as Jim Jim Falls, Twin Falls and Deaf Adder Gorge. On arriving they were bitterly disappointed to discover that Deaf Adder was closed to the

public and that Jim Jim and Twin Falls could be reached only by four wheel drive vehicles (ibid:41).

Earlier, Gale and Jacobs (1984:102) had noted severe criticism of the NT Tourist Commission's advertising, saying it depicts spectacular places that are inaccessible to ordinary visitors.

Gale and Jacobs (1987:51) also note that 'many visitors expressed disappointment at the apparently low level of Aboriginal involvement in the management of the Park. It seems that visitors from overseas and southern areas of Australia had expected to see and meet Aborigines during their time in the Park.' Later they state that 'Kakadu introduced seasonal rangers in 1985 to act as guides at the main art sites. Visitors frequently ask for Aboriginal guides...' (ibid:94). Brady (1985:18) makes a similar point when she observes that the NTTC is evidently aware of the market's growing demand for Aboriginal cultural tourism and is endeavouring to supply it. She is critical of the marketing of Aboriginal culture noting that a demand is being created for cultural tourism, with glossy brochures and booklets, which is preceding Aboriginal involvement in the industry.

The economies of Aboriginal communities

The main issue addressed in this chapter is whether tourism in Kakadu National Park has a positive economic impact on Aboriginal people who reside in communities within the Park. Initially a general overview of economies of Aboriginal communities is provided; later an attempt will be made to isolate employment and income opportunities that can be attributed to tourism development.

The following analysis is based on an assumption that 'Aboriginal' communities within Kakadu can be defined and quantitatively isolated. However, making such a simplifying assumption is problematic. People at Kakadu do live in some communities whose residents are all Aboriginal. However, people also live in urban settings (in Jabiru and Jabiru East) where they are the minority; at a number of ranger stations dotted throughout the Park (where Aboriginal people rarely form discrete communities); and at other miscellaneous locations like the old

Patonga hunting lodge and in staff quarters at the Cooinda Hotel. Another important feature of the Aboriginal population is that it is composed of people of full descent and mixed descent; of people who are traditional owners of parts of Kakadu Stages 1 and 2 and people who are not; and people who have resided in the area for several years and who now have some residential rights according to Aboriginal custom and those who are recent arrivals living in the region principally because they are employed by Ranger Uranium Mines (RUM). It is also important to note that there are a number of households within Kakadu that are currently mixed. The concentration here on the Aboriginal component of the population is not intended to imply that this component is homogeneous.

Population

Information on the Aboriginal population of Kakadu has been collected at fairly regular intervals since 1981. The time series data indicate that there was a rapid Aboriginal repopulation of the Kakadu region between 1976 (when the Census enumerated only 44 Aboriginal people in the region) and November 1982 when the population reached 273. The results of six population surveys are presented in Table 6.2. Over the period 1981 to 1986, the Aboriginal population of the Park increased by about 30 per cent. However, as Wellings (1987:1-2) notes, the largest increase in recent years has been among Jabiru residents. Wellings estimates that if one discounts these residents, who are in the main of Aboriginal descent and from outside the Kakadu region, then the increase for the 1981-1986 period is only 15 per cent.

These data do not reveal the extraordinarily high mobility of the resident population. This is indicated to some extent in Table 6.3 where the population range of each community within Kakadu is indicated. However, even these figures do not show the changes in actual people living in the Park. I was acutely aware of population mobility within the Park when I arrived in June 1986 armed with copies of population surveys that I had helped compile in 1982. For some communities (like Cannon Hill, Patonga, Deaf Adder, Spring Peak and Mudginberri) these lists were of some use. For others like Jabiru, Jabiru East and Manaburduma they were useless. The Aboriginal populations at ranger stations were also different, but this was often linked to occupational requirements.

Table 6.2
The Aboriginal population of Kakadu National Park, 1981 to 1987

<u>Researcher(s)</u>	<u>Date of survey</u>	<u>Aboriginal population</u>
Stanley	June 1981	214
Altman, Gillespie and Sullivan	July 1982	230
Altman, Gillespie and Sullivan	November 1982	273
Gillespie, Levitus and Russell-Smith	October 1983	273
Levitus and Sullivan	December 1984	259
Wellings and others	December 1986	278

Source: Stanley (1982); Altman (1983a); Wellings (1987); and ANPWS file 1-12, Kakadu National Park headquarters.

The information in Table 6.3 lists the occupied communities within Kakadu National Park in 1986, the sizes of which range from 5 to 58. The camp at Gulungul occupied by only one person is not regarded as a community and the populations at a number of localities (but particularly Jabiru) are not discrete. Overall there were 15 localities with Aboriginal populations in the Park.

Perhaps the most interesting population survey is the one undertaken by Gillespie, Levitus and Russell-Smith in October 1983 (ANPWS file 1-12, Kakadu National Park) that enumerated the Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal population of Kakadu National Park and environs. Of the 17 locations that were included in that survey, five were populated by Aboriginal people only; two by non-Aboriginal people and ten by composite populations. It was estimated in this survey that the Aboriginal component of the population (273 persons) accounted for 15 per cent of the regional population (estimated at 1765). However if the two urban centres

Jabiru and Jabiru East are excluded from the calculation, the Aboriginal proportion of the population increases markedly to 59 per cent of the remaining regional population.

Table 6.3
Aboriginal residents of Kakadu National Park, by community

Community	Population range 1981 to 1986 ^a	Aboriginal population (Dec. 1986)
Cannon Hill	14-19	19
East Alligator ranger station	7-17	9
Mudginberri (Madjinbardi)	37-58	58
Jabiru East	19-39	19
Jabiru town	11-45	45
Manaburduma (Jabiru town camp)	26-46	26
ANPWS headquarters	2 - 7	7
Nourlangie camp/ranger station	15-37	27
Patonga	4-12	7
Patonga Airstrip	9-30	17
Jim Jim ranger station	2-12	11
Spring Peak	5-13	5
Deaf Adder (Golondjorr)	6-18	8
Cooinda / Jim Jim billabong	3-17	7
Bluey's camp	0-13	13
Gulungul ^b	0 - 1	1
Other ^c	1-12	0
Total		278

Footnotes: a. From surveys listed in Table 6.2.

b. Not regarded as a community in this chapter.

c. Camps no longer occupied.

Source: Wellings (1987).

One of the more significant findings of the December 1986 population survey is that a markedly decreased proportion of the Kakadu population are either full or juvenile (aged under 18 years) members of the Gagudju Association. In 1982, I calculated that between 50 and 60 per cent of the regional Aboriginal population

were members of this Association and thus traditional owners of a part of the Park. This calculation was made by correlating the names of individuals with a schedule of Gagudju Association members maintained by the Association. A similar exercise was carried out after the December 1986 population survey; it indicated that only 35 per cent of the current population are Association members. This suggests that a number of Association members are now residing elsewhere outside the Park, although it is not clear whether this is a permanent situation or one linked to short term residential shifts. If the move is permanent, it may be linked to dissatisfaction with tourism growth, although this observation cannot be substantiated without interviewing the migrants.

Employment

Opportunities for Aboriginal employment in the Alligator Rivers region are guaranteed in two agreements.

The first was signed between the Northern Land Council and the Director of ANPWS on 3 November 1978. This agreement (often referred to as the 'lease-back agreement') sets out terms and conditions under which the Kakadu Aboriginal Land Trust would lease Aboriginal land in Kakadu Stage 1 to ANPWS for 99 years. Of particular relevance here are employment and training provisions contained in section 4 of this agreement. Paragraph 4(a) guarantees to set up a programme for training reasonable numbers of local Aborigines in skills necessary to enable them to assist in the management and control of the Park; para.4(b) undertakes to engage as many of the traditional owners as is practicable to provide services to the Director in and in relation to the Park; and para.4(c) states that all practicable steps will be taken to adjust working hours and conditions to the needs and culture of Aboriginals employed in the park (Commonwealth of Australia 1978).

The second is what is generally termed 'the s.44 agreement' signed between the Commonwealth of Australia and the Northern Land Council, also on 3 November 1978. This agreement was entered into pursuant to sub-s.44(2) of the Land Rights Act and sets out terms and conditions under which mining at Ranger could proceed. Of particular significance is s.12 of this agreement that

deals with employment and training. Under para.12.1(a) the Commonwealth requires the Joint Venturers (RUM) to ensure that as many Aboriginals as is practicable are employed where those Aboriginals are capable of carrying out in a satisfactory manner the particular work required; under para.12.1(b), the Joint Venturers are required to establish an 'operator training scheme'; and under para.12.1(d) it is required that all practicable steps are taken to adjust working hours and conditions to suit the needs and culture of Aboriginal employees (Commonwealth of Australia 1979).

The wording of these two agreements (with respect to employment and training) is remarkably similar and both utilise Aboriginal ownership of land as leverage to extract employment agreements in park management and at the Ranger uranium mine respectively. However there are also some important differences between the two agreements. For example, the former refers to traditional Aboriginal owners of land and is to be renegotiated after 10 years, whereas the latter only refers to Aborigines and is valid for the life of the Ranger mine (26 years). The most significant difference for this study is that the agreement with ANPWS is linked to tourism in so much as Kakadu National Park is a major destination, whereas the s.44 agreement is part of a mining agreement that is unrelated to tourism.

In Table 6.4, information is presented on Aboriginal employment in Kakadu National Park in December 1986. It is immediately evident that the two major employers in the Kakadu region are the ANPWS and RUM and that the only other employer of note is the Gagudju Association. In July 1986, there were 52 persons employed by ANPWS, 19 of whom were Aboriginal. These numbers increased somewhat by December as five more people were engaged on a DEIR training scheme on a part-time basis for 12 months. Aboriginal people hold a variety of positions in the Park labour force: as cultural advisers; senior rangers; rangers; DEIR trainee rangers; contractors and as casual consultants or day labourers. In accordance with the lease-back agreement, four training courses have now been completed with almost all graduates being employed by ANPWS (ANPWS 1985, 1986b, 1987b).

Table 6.4
Aboriginal employment in the Kakadu region, 1986

Employer	Full-time	Part-time	Casual	Total
ANPWS	16	5	4	25
RUM	13	1	7	21
Gagudju ^a	4	5	-	9
NLC	1	-	-	1
DEIR (DEET) ^b	1	-	-	1
NT Library Service	-	1	-	1
Total	35	12	11	58

Footnotes: a. The Gagudju Association employed a number of women on a casual basis at the Women's Resource Centre in July 1986. Data for December 1986 are not available. The casual positions with Ranger Uranium Mines were administered by the Gagudju Association.
 b. DEET (DEIR in 1986) funds a number of ANPWS positions.

Source: Field survey, July 1986; Peter Wellings (1987).

A high proportion of the ANPWS's Aboriginal staff are members of the Gagudju Association and traditional owners. All told, 12 of the full-time staff, four of the part-time staff and two of the casuals in Table 6.4 are traditional owners - overall, 18 out of the 25 ANPWS Aboriginal staff are traditional owners.

Employment in the mining industry is not the concern of this study, except in so far as RUM may be attracting Aboriginal labour that could be employed in the Park workforce or in the tourism industry. RUM's employment policies and performance have been analysed elsewhere by Cousins and Nieuwenhuysen (1984) and O'Faircheallaigh (1986). The main point of relevance here is that in meeting its s.44 agreement commitments, RUM is importing Aboriginal labour from as far afield as Perth and the Torres Strait Islands. Discussions with the manager and Aboriginal liaison officer of RUM indicated that there was a feeling that most traditional owners preferred working for ANPWS rather than at the uranium mine. The available statistics certainly reinforce this observation. In employment surveys conducted monthly by RUM, there is little

evidence of Gagudju members being employed permanently in the mine workforce. In 1986 only one member of the Gagudju Association was permanently employed by the company. On the other hand a number of local Aborigines worked on a casual basis at the mine site on a revegetation project. This work is funded by RUM, but the Gagudju Association is responsible for the engagement of Aboriginal labour. Analysis of monthly employment returns for 1986 prepared by RUM indicated that casual Aboriginal staff only worked an average of about 21 hours per week. Indications are that the flexibility inherent in the day labour scheme and supervision by the Gagudju Association is popular among local Aborigines.

The third most significant employer in the region is the Gagudju Association itself which employed nine Aboriginal staff in December 1986. In July 1986, the association had 83 staff on its payroll (including administrative staff in Darwin and staff at the Cooinda Hotel), but only 14 of these (17 per cent) were Aboriginal. A further seven Aborigines were employed by Gagudju but funded by RUM at that time and three women were employed on a casual basis at the Women's Resource Centre. This is despite the fact that the Association has an affirmative employment policy whereby if Aboriginal people want jobs and are willing to undertake them on a regular basis, they will be provided.

There are a number of fairly general, but pertinent observations that can be made about the Aboriginal employment situation at Kakadu. Firstly, there does not seem to be a particularly high demand for jobs from some of the communities. This is partly because people lack the skills for many of the jobs currently available. Secondly, it is interesting that there are marked discrepancies between the levels of formal employment at different communities within the Park. At a number of communities, like Jabiru, Jabiru East, Nourlangie, Patonga and the ANPWS ranger stations, there is a relatively high rate of employment of Aboriginal people. At others like Mudginberri, Manaburduma, Patonga Airstrip and Deaf Adder there is almost no employment and adults are either on the dole or receiving pensions. Within the region there is a great deal of difference between communities in formal employment levels.

An interesting development that is evident when the above data are compared with information collected in July 1982, is the change in Aboriginal employment levels over the four year period. In 1982, 12 Aborigines were employed by ANPWS, seven by the Gagudju Association, eight by RUM and one by the NT government. Total Aboriginal employment in the region totalled 28 persons; by December 1986 this number had more than doubled with most the increase being in Park employment and at the Ranger mine. However much of the increase at the mine has been a result of a migration of Aboriginal people into the region.

Cash income

Information on cash income sources was collected during fieldwork at Kakadu and in conjunction with the population and employment survey undertaken by Wellings and other ANPWS staff in December 1986 (Wellings 1987). The Gagudju Association provided data on social security recipients although it is possible that there is some underenumeration here as some people were receiving benefits directly and not via the Association. Information on individuals wages were provided by ANPWS, RUM and the Gagudju Association.

It should be noted that there are a number of problems associated with collecting accurate data on people's cash incomes in Kakadu. Firstly, there is a high degree of population mobility particularly at locations like Mudginberri, Jabiru town, Manaburduma (Jabiru town camp) and Jabiru East. Secondly, there is a high degree of occupational mobility, particularly into and out of jobs with RUM and the Gagudju Association. The most stable component of the Aboriginal labour force are those people who work for ANPWS. Thirdly, there is irregular cash income that comes from a number of sources; this is discussed below under the heading royalties and rentals. A final conceptual problem is linked to the existence of composite households where there are both Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal income earners. In the analysis here, only Aboriginal cash incomes are enumerated. For these reasons, it must be emphasised that the cash income data presented here are general estimates only. It should also be noted that it is only weekly (or fortnightly) cash income that is measured here; other sources of cash and imputed incomes are described below.

Table 6.5
Sources of cash income for Aboriginal people, December 1986^a

Income source	Amount (\$ per week)	Per cent
Social security	8,271	31.1
Employment	18,120	68.1
Family allowances	202	0.8
Total	26,593	100.0

Footnote: a. These figures do not include any cash income from mining royalty equivalents or other royalties and rents.

Source: Wellings (1987); ANPWS, Kakadu and Canberra; Gagudju Association, Jabiru; RUM, Jabiru; field survey, July 1986.

The most significant feature of Table 6.5 is that 68 per cent of regular cash income comes from employment sources. This figure is particularly high for Aboriginal communities. Of the social security income, 54 per cent comes from pensions and 46 per cent from unemployment benefits.

Despite the relative significance of employment income, the average per capita income of Kakadu residents is still only \$5000 per annum, or about half the annual disposable household income of NT residents in general (ABS 1987). There are two obvious reasons for this low cash income status. Firstly, average cash income status is reduced by the low income of those communities (like Mudginberri, Bluey's camp, and Patonga Airstrip) that are totally dependent on social security. There is a marked discrepancy between income status at communities where there is relatively high employment and others where there is high unemployment. Overall, communities could be divided into 'high employment' and 'high unemployment' categories. The former, which included East Alligator, Jabiru East, Jabiru, Nourlangie, Cooida, Jim Jim ranger station, Patonga and Park headquarters, had average weekly per capita income of \$123; the latter, which included Cannon Hill, Mudginberri, Manaburduma, Spring Peak, Deaf Adder, Patonga Airstrip and Bluey's camp, averaged only \$59.

Secondly, even at those communities where there were high levels of employment, cash income status tended to be low because of people's low occupational status. Furthermore, as data in Table 6.4 indicate, a high proportion (40 per cent) of those employed are in part-time and casual jobs. The marginal rate of return that these individuals would receive over welfare entitlements is relatively insignificant.

A further factor that may affect cash income status is dependency ratios. However, indications are that the juvenile population at Kakadu Aboriginal communities is not particularly high. In the December 1986 survey, only 35 per cent of the population was aged under 18 years, a proportion that is low for Aboriginal communities.

Royalties and rentals

Residents of Kakadu National Park receive cash income from a variety of other sources, although these payments only affect a relatively small proportion of the regional population. Perhaps the most significant payments are those made by the Gagudju Association to its adult members. Individual payments in 1986 were \$2000, with employed members receiving a lump sum and members in receipt of social security payments receiving quarterly payments of \$500. The entitlements of juvenile members were invested in a Children's Trust Fund from which juveniles could draw a share on attaining the age of 18 years. In December 1986, there were 65 adult and 32 juvenile members of the Gagudju Association resident in the Park.

In December 1986 there were also 16 members of the Djabulukgu Association living in the Park who received annual payments of \$1000 per annum from their investment in the Kakadu Holiday Village on the South Alligator River (see below). The Djabulukgu Association has a membership that totals about 50, one third of whom reside within the Park.

There are other sources of cash that are made to Kakadu traditional owners; for example the annual report of the NLC for 1985/86 (NLC 1987a) notes that buffalo royalties totalling \$123,591 were made to Kakadu traditional owners. There is also an

annual park rental of \$7502 made by ANPWS to Kakadu traditional owners. Traditional owners also receive royalties from gravel used to upgrade roads within the Park, although there is no record of such payments in 1985/86 (NLC 1987a).

Some people who reside in Kakadu National Park also have financial interests in the Kunwinjku Association (that receives royalties and rents with respect to the Nabarlek uranium mine) and the Gurig Association (that receives royalties and rents with respect to Gurig National Park). However there are no records of what proportion of these moneys are paid to Kakadu residents.

Most royalty and rental payments in Kakadu at present are not correlated with tourist visitation. This is in marked contrast to other locations like Gurig and Uluru National Parks. Furthermore, their overall impacts on household cash income is not particularly marked, although they can be of great significance for those households that are totally dependent on social security. The payouts enumerated here total nearly \$278,000 per annum and these payments would increase average per capita cash income at Kakadu communities by some 20 per cent. However at some communities the significance of these payments is greater. For example, nine of the 17 persons living at Patonga Airstrip in December 1986 were adult members of the Gagudju Association. Their individual payouts from Gagudju alone would have raised their per capita income by 30 per cent.

Of greater significance perhaps than the impact of these payments on household incomes are their impacts on people's incentives to work regularly, especially during those times when they receive lump sum payments. Given that many members of the Association only work on a casual basis, these payments provide them with the financial means to enjoy periods without working. Another related issue is the continual pressure on the Gagudju Association by sections of its membership to have individual payments increased. To date, effective politicking by the Gagudju Association leadership at annual general meetings (when general policy decisions are made) has limited the scale of individual distributions.

Subsistence income

There is another source of income that must be added to cash income to give a realistic assessment of the income status of residents of Kakadu National Park. This is imputed income that can be attributed to subsistence activities (hunting, fishing and gathering).

There are indications that the subsistence economy remains of economic significance particularly at Nourlangie camp, Patonga, Patonga Airstrip, Mudginberri, Deaf Adder, and Jim Jim ranger station. However, there is no reliable and long term quantitative assessment of the impact of subsistence activities on people's diets and economic status. The most comprehensive data available have been collected by Peter Wellings (pers. comm.) on 15 hunting trips with Nourlangie people in 1986. These data are particularly interesting because they indicate the range of indigenous and introduced flora and fauna that is still utilised by local people. Lawrence (1985:80) notes that although there are no figures on Aboriginal resource utilisation in the Park, it was obvious from observations at outstations that a considerable proportion of people's food is derived from local wildlife. He also notes (ibid:81) that bush tucker, like buffalo, barramundi and geese, was the preferred diet. Allen and Harris (1987:53) suggest that for many residents of the Park, subsistence provides up to fifty per cent of their diet. However this estimate appears extremely high and is unsubstantiated with either quantitative data or a reference.

Given the absence of quantitative data on subsistence, its overall economic significance cannot be assessed. It is likely that subsistence returns are highly variable depending on the location of communities, the ages of residents, their access to equipment, the availability of local knowledge and skills and rights to hunt, gather and fish. The fact that the issue of hunting in Kakadu National Park by non-local Aborigines (from Oenpelli and beyond) has been contentious suggests that hunting is still of economic significance. There is also some feeling at Aboriginal communities that their hunting and fishing rights are not adequately protected. Kesteven (1984:17) notes that Mudginberri residents have complained about the overutilisation of Mudginberri billabong by tourists. I have also heard the opinion expressed that the ANPWS camp ground at

Gadjaduba on Magela Creek (see Map 5) has restricted Mudginberri people's access to an important subsistence resource.

There is no doubt that with increased tourist visitation this source of imputed income could be threatened. This is partly because local Aboriginal people are extremely reluctant to hunt or fish within view of tourists, for both safety and public relations reasons (Gangale 1984; Neijie 1984; Gillespie 1988). Aboriginal traditional owners face something of a dilemma here because while they are extremely keen to maintain access to their hunting and fishing areas, they are acutely aware of the negative repercussions of closing off parts of the park to visitors, particularly Jabiru residents (Mick Alderson, pers. comm.; Lea and Zehner 1986; Brady 1985).

It should also be noted that there are strong indications that participation in subsistence activities remains an important means by which Aboriginal people differentiate themselves from non-Aboriginal people. Participation in subsistence has important cultural worth: when hunting, fishing and gathering local people are making important statements about their identity. One interesting transformation that has occurred in Kakadu is the extent that females participate in hunting with rifles for large game that was traditionally hunted by men only.

Economic status

There are some interesting responses in Lea and Zehner's (1986:146-150) surveys of Jabiru residents' perceptions of the economic status of Aboriginal people within the Park. There is a general feeling that the 'unearned' income that Aborigines receive under the Land Rights Act and the Ranger Agreement is somehow unfair. Closely related to this is a concern about how these moneys are spent and the role of alcohol in the Aboriginal community which is perceived to be directly linked to these payments.

The only quantitative investigations of how the Gagudju Association spends its income of over \$3 million per annum by Stanley (1982), Altman (1983a) and more recently O'Faircheallaigh (1986:6-12) indicate that these resources have been utilised in a fairly effective manner. Besides limiting royalty distributions to

individuals, the Association has spent money on the provision of basic services (particularly housing and household equipment); on outstation development (like airstrips, vehicles, water reticulation, power generation and communications equipment); and on service delivery to outstations (including education, health and mobile retail facilities). Recently the Association has also started to assist with meals for pensioners and with boarding facilities for children who want to attend the Jabiru school. All this expenditure has assisted to raise the economic status of Aboriginal residents of Kakadu above the levels indicated by their cash income status.

It is of significance that all these goods and services, many of which would be covered by normal federal, state and local government expenditure in other situations, have been provided by mining royalty equivalents and not from tourism. The role of ANPWS in providing housing, roads and facilities for outstation communities must also be recognised. However these have primarily been provided to Aboriginal staff residing at ranger stations (Cannon Hill being the major exception) as part of their public service employment conditions. It is also significant that the Gagudju Association has provided facilities both for its members and non-members who are long term residents of the Park. The Association has always had to balance the interests of Aboriginal residents of Kakadu, many of whom are not members of the Association against the interests of its members, most of whom do not reside in the Park. To date, it has managed to maintain this balance admirably, partly because the Chairman of the Association and most of its Executive Committee have always resided within the Park, and partly because these individuals have been willing to make the hard, and at times unpopular, decision to invest.

The economic impact of tourism

Tourism enterprises

The Gagudju Association has also invested substantial sums in tourism enterprises within Kakadu National Park. Over the period June 1980 to June 1985, O'Faircheallaigh (1986:9) calculates that nearly 50 per cent of Gagudju's income (of about \$13 million) was retained to finance short and long term investments. Information

in the Gagudju Association's financial reports indicate that this rate of investment appears to have been maintained to 30 June 1987 (Gagudju Association 1987).

By far the most significant investment has been the Cooinda Hotel originally purchased in 1980 for \$387,000 and subsequently upgraded in three stages, with renovations and landscaping only being completed in 1987. At 30 June 1986, loans to Cooinda from the Association totalled \$4.3 million; in 1985/86, a further \$1.2 million was borrowed from Westpac and the NT Development Corporation. Overall it is estimated that \$5 million has been spent on the hotel by the Gagudju Association. The hotel was originally purchased for a variety of commercial and social objectives- as an investment, to control the only regional liquor outlet (at that time), to provide employment and training for local Aboriginal people, to procure a lease that was excised from the Park for Aboriginal interests and as an investment. To date, the hotel has not been a commercial success: according to annual financial statements, the Gagudju Association has not yet received any income from Cooinda. It is likely that if this asset was sold now it would not provide a return that would exceed the opportunity cost of the capital invested in it and the need to repay unsecured loans. Indeed while the Association has moved to dramatically reduce its unsecured loans to unit trusts in 1986/87 (by over \$3.5 million), the auditors note that it is unlikely that unsecured loans would be fully recoverable in the event of a winding up of the Trusts. However, the auditors feel that the balance of the loan to the Cooinda Hotel Unit Trust should be recoverable over a number of years provided the hotel trades profitably (Gagudju Association 1987).

The reasons for the hotel's lack of success are complex and cannot be analysed in detail here. However, an analysis of the profit and loss statements for the Cooinda Hotel Unit Trust for the years ended 30 June 1985 and 1986, show that total expenses in both years exceeded gross profits, with wages and salaries accounting for nearly 50 per cent of expenses. The hotel has also had recurring management difficulties (evidenced by a turnover that has exceeded one manager per annum) and has failed to employ more than a handful of Aboriginal people. The existence of a liquor outlet on the premises and limits on the alcohol that Association members (who are the owners of the hotel) are allowed

(according to rules imposed by the Association) have always been contentious. Invariably it has been non-Aboriginal management that has had to police these rules. The Cooinda Hotel has also suffered from its small scale (only 48 rooms that are overbooked during the dry and gross turnover of just over \$2 million to the year ended 30 June 1986) and seasonality (that affects all Top End tourism enterprises). When I was undertaking fieldwork in Kakadu in July 1986 there was yet another management crisis at Cooinda and the then current manager was set to leave in a month. It also seemed at that time that the level of employment at the hotel (with about 50 staff) was high given its size.

Other investments in tourism enterprises in the Park have included Yellow Waters tours that have operated in conjunction with Cooinda and have been extremely popular and profitable. These boat tours on Yellow Waters billabong provide visitors with an opportunity to view spectacular birdlife, flood plain flora and other fauna including estuarine crocodiles. It was estimated by the Gagudju executive officer that in 1985/86 nearly 30,000 visitors took a boat tour on Yellow Waters grossing the Association income of nearly \$400,000. In 1986/87, it was estimated that 75,000 visitors took a boat tour in the Park (Dan Gillespie, pers. comm.).

The Border Store (also called Manbiyarra), near the East Alligator River and Ubirr (Obirri), has also been operated by the Gagudju Association on a lease agreement from the Oenpelli based Gunbalanya Nominees. O'Faircheallaigh (1986:9) notes that when Gagudju took over its operations in 1982 loans to it that had stood at \$238,000 were written off. The Border Store has been marginally profitable returning \$60,980 to the Association in 1984/85 after making no recorded return in 1983/84 (Gagudju Association 1985). More recently, the store's profitability has declined and its contribution to the Association fell to \$31,345 in 1985/86 and \$33,726 in 1986/87 (Gagudju Association 1987). There are a number of factors that influence the Border Store's profitability. Firstly, its operations are greatly influenced by seasonal flooding of Magela Creek and the East Alligator River that isolates the store. In 1984/85, the tourist season only extended over six months and in 1985/86 the store was cut off for eight weeks. Secondly, the store has a dual function being partly a tourist enterprise and partly a community service for local

Aboriginal people. The manager of the store (interviewed in June 1986) estimated that the bulk of turnover was due to Aboriginal patronage and believed that the store's viability depended on the Aboriginal trade. However she also noted that Aboriginal 'book up' at the store tended to be excessive because they felt that it was their store. In the past bad debts have been written-off because of such practices. Thirdly, the Gagudju Association has been reluctant to upgrade facilities at the store because it is only leased on a three year plus three years option basis.

From 1982 to 1986, the Gagudju Association operated the Coonjimba hostel in Jabiru East in demountables leased from RUM. This venture was profitable, primarily because it was the only commercially available accommodation facility in Jabiru or Jabiru East. The facility was not available to tourists, but to numerous visiting bureaucrats, politicians and researchers; some Aboriginal people working at Ranger were also accommodated at Coonjimba. It is not clear whether Coonjimba should be termed a 'tourist' enterprise or a 'visitor' enterprise, but it was consistently profitable. In 1983/84 it returned \$166,475 to the Association, 1984/85, \$150,177 and in 1985/86, \$134,399 (Gagudju Association 1985, 1986). In July 1986 when the Coonjimba lease was up for renegotiation, the Association decided to wind this enterprise down. This decision was linked to the probable establishment of a hotel in Jabiru (see below) and to the need for extensive refurbishing at Coonjimba if it was to continue to operate.

The only other tourism enterprise operated by Gagudju in 1986 was a screen printing enterprise called 'Daluk Daluk' ('women' in Gunjeitmi). This enterprise was established during the 1985/86 wet and in July 1986 it was only six months old. It was based at the Women's Resource Centre in Jabiru and was jointly funded by the Gagudju Association and RUM. In July 1986 the enterprise seemed relatively successful but small-scale. In 1985/86, it made a contribution of \$7239 to Association income and in 1986/87, its first full year, \$35,377 (Gagudju Association 1987). A number of Aboriginal women worked at the Centre on hourly wages of \$5 screen printing designs prepared by senior men onto T shirts, singlets, table cloths, place mats and sarongs. Output was marketed exclusively via the shops at Cooida and the Border Store. Employment at this enterprise was on a casual basis and there were

indications that work there was more popular during the wet when between five and eight women worked than during the dry when only three women worked there part-time. Daluk Daluk seems an important enterprise in the regional context because it is the only business in the region that concentrates on producing Aboriginal art, albeit in a highly stylised form, for the tourist market. Managers of both Cooina and the Border Store reported that there was a heavy tourist demand for items produced by Daluk Daluk.

The only other Aboriginal investment in a tourism enterprise in the Kakadu region is the interest of the Djabulukgu Association acquired in the Kakadu Holiday Village (formerly the South Alligator Motor Inn) in 1985. The Djabulukgu Association was incorporated under NT legislation in August 1982 and has a membership of people comprising the traditional owners of the area affected by the proposed Pancontinental mining venture at Jabiluka. An agreement for mining at Jabiluka was reached in July 1982 and an up-front payment of \$1 million was made by Pancontinental following Ministerial assent to the signing, 80 per cent of which was paid to the Djabulukgu Association (see Altman, 1983a:132-33). Mining at Jabiluka has not proceeded because of a change in the uranium export policy of the Hawke Labor Government.

In 1985, the Djabulukgu Association acquired a one-third stake in the Kakadu Holiday Village owned by a white entrepreneur. This share cost \$690,000 and has been used primarily to upgrade facilities (*INDUS*, February 1986). The Djabulukgu Association has entered into an agreement with the majority owners of the enterprise whereby they receive stipulated (and inflation-proofed) monthly dividends that are adjusted on the basis of annual profits. While the details of the agreement between the majority owners and the Djabulukgu Association are not public, it appears that the Association's investment is sound, for it provides its members with income (from dividends) while maintaining an investment in an enterprise that was valued at \$5 million in 1985. The benefits for the white majority owners are that they were provided with a capital injection to continue upgrading the facility, and they have Aboriginal equity partners which gives them some political and economic leverage in the Kakadu region.

Table 6.6
Tourism enterprises owned by the Gagudju and Djabulukgu Associations, 1986

Enterprise	Initial objectives	Commercial assessment	Social assessment
Cooinda Hotel	alcohol control; investment; land; employment	marginal returns	some alcohol control; few jobs created
Yellow Waters	employment; income	profitable	no jobs
Coonjimba	investment; some accommodation; employment	profitable	some jobs, accommodation
Border Store	investment, regional store	some profits	regional store
Daluk Daluk	employment; cultural	marginal	jobs; culture maintenance
Kakadu Holiday Village	investment; income	profitable profitable	minimal spinoffs

Source: Gagudju and Djabulukgu Associations staff.

In Table 6.6, a summary is presented of Aboriginal investments in tourism enterprises in the region. For each enterprise, a general assessment is made of establishment objectives and commercial and social success.

This summary suggests that investments by the Gagudju Association have not been particularly successful according to both commercial and social criteria. However, this assessment must be qualified by a number of considerations. Gagudju's investments in tourism enterprises have always been influenced by regional politics. In a number of interviews I had with the Chairman of the Association he always emphasised that tourism at Kakadu is going to get bigger and bigger and that local people must have a stake in this industry if they are to control it. There is no doubt that all Gagudju's investments would return large capital gains, but it seems unlikely that enterprises like Cooinda will be sold in the foreseeable future to realise these gains.

An important role that investments like those in Cooinda and the Kakadu Holiday Village play is that they provide Aboriginal people with an opportunity to invest in the regional economy in a highly visible manner. Such investments are more popular than short and long term investments on money markets precisely because of their visibility. However, local Aboriginal ownership can result in management problems for non-Aboriginal operators of these enterprises. What is of crucial importance is that such investment opportunities provide a reason for royalty associations not to spend money in the short run but to invest in assets for future generations. It has been observed elsewhere that there is no point in having access to discretionary capital if this is only going to be spent (Altman 1983a; O'Faircheallaigh 1988).

While one may want investments in tourism enterprises to be more profitable, it is illuminating to compare these investments with those in other enterprises. For example, the Gagudju Association has also invested in two enterprises that are totally independent of tourism, Gagudju Contracting Pty Ltd and a service station in Jabiru East. As O'Faircheallaigh (1986:9) notes, the Association has encountered serious problems in placing Gagudju Contracting on a sound operational and commercial footings. This is in fact an understatement, for this enterprise has been a financial disaster - in 1985/86 its operating loss was \$436,414 and to 1 July 1985 it accumulated losses of \$763,078. In 1986/87, Gagudju Contracting ceased operations and in the opinion of Gagudju's auditors, the unsecured loans of \$1,387,311 made by the Association to Gagudju Contracting are not recoverable. Similarly the service station incurred substantial losses of \$218,175 in 1983/84 and \$19,476 in 1984/85. In 1985/86 there was a marked turnabout with a contribution to Association of \$101,556, followed in 1986/87 with income of \$82,261. It is important to note that the service station operates under a restricted covenant; Mobil in Jabiru has a regional monopoly and the Gagudju service station cannot trade with the public. In the regional and Aboriginal contexts tourism investments have been relatively successful for Gagudju.

Employment and income

The most direct economic impacts of tourism accrue from the income effects of employment in tourism-related activities. It was

demonstrated in Table 6.4 that the major employer of Aboriginal people in the Kakadu region is ANPWS. There is no doubt that the high levels of Commonwealth funding to Kakadu (which is the best financed national park in Australia) is largely dependent on its domestic and international popularity. Of the 58 employed people in the December 1986 survey, 25 (or 43 per cent) were employed by ANPWS and a further six (10 per cent) by Gagudju in tourism-related employment. Overall, tourism related activities accounted for over half the jobs filled by Aboriginal people. In Table 6.5 above, data on cash incomes are provided. ANPWS payments amounted to about \$6800 (net) per week in December 1986; this accounted for 26 per cent of total cash income (from wages, salaries and social security) and 38 per cent of employment income.

The most important economic impact of tourism is supposedly the employment opportunities provided for Aboriginal people. While these opportunities have an income effect, it should be noted that if people were not employed they would receive social security benefits; the marginal income effect of employment would not be as great as the aggregate effect calculated above. It is important to recognise that to date Aboriginal people have preferred employment with ANPWS to direct involvement in tourism enterprises.

This preference is partly linked to the flexibility in ANPWS employment practices that are stipulated in the lease-back agreement. It is also due to a general perception (held by Aboriginal rangers) that employment with ANPWS is linked to managing the Park (which is largely Aboriginal land). Nevertheless, the employment of Aboriginal people as rangers has had problems. Perhaps the most commonly articulated (and documented) is that Aboriginal people are too shy to be effective rangers (Kesteven 1984:15; Weaver 1984). Aboriginal people themselves feel that they are too shy to participate in sustained direct social contact with strangers (Brady, 1985; Neijie 1984; AIAS 1984). As the AIAS (1984:62) notes, Aboriginal people feel particularly uncomfortable in ephemeral relations; tourists (by definition) are short term visitors and it is impossible to establish meaningful relationships with them. Much Aboriginal 'shyness' is associated with communication difficulties with non-Aboriginal people, particularly from overseas. Tourists are also generally unaware of

appropriate codes of behaviour from the Aboriginal perspective and they frequently (and inadvertently) act in an inappropriate manner. This is not to say that some Aboriginal rangers do not enjoy direct interaction with tourists.

There are a number of other issues linked to the potential for employing Aboriginal rangers. There are indications that there is a very limited career path for Aboriginal people within the Park service, partly because they frequently lack formal educational qualifications and administrative experience. Currently, the career path for trainees seems to end with promotion to senior ranger (at the clerical administrative four level). This issue is frequently exacerbated because while Aboriginal traditional owners may have a fairly low status in the ANPWS occupational hierarchy, they are frequently important in regional political terms. For example, a number of rangers are members of the Gagudju Executive Committee that plays a major role in liaison between local Aboriginal people and ANPWS. In the absence of a formal park management structure (like a Board of Management) at Kakadu, these individuals are frequently placed in ambiguous decision-making situations. A further issue is that while the ANPWS has regularly organised and run DEIR (now DEET) funded ranger training schemes, it has had difficulties in finding permanent public service positions to assign to graduates because of staff ceilings. However, to date the ANPWS has always fulfilled its obligations. A problem that has arisen in the aftermath of the Miller Report (1985) is that a position is now required for a trainee before the trainee will be funded by DEET. At the same time overall Approved Staff Levels (ASLs) are being reduced by the federal government as part of the Australian Public Service efficiency reviews. It seems important that at a time when federal government policy is attempting to increase Aboriginal employment levels, qualified Aboriginal rangers should be able to find positions in Kakadu (and other national parks) irrespective of ASLs.

Aboriginal aspirations and objectives

The economic impacts of tourism cannot be divorced from the economic, social and political aspirations of Aboriginal people resident in the Park. The fieldwork that I have done at Kakadu is insufficient to provide a comprehensive account of the objectives of

all Aboriginal people in the Park. What is certain is that there is no unified perspective on the impacts of tourism and how economic opportunities in this industry could or should be utilised.

Kesteven (1984:9-10) notes the variety in people's attitudes to tourism: some were fatalistic about tourism; others felt that it was important to gain control over tourism before it happens. She suggests that in general Aboriginal people differentiate tourists (who come for a short time to look around), from visitors (who do not reside in the area but come with a definite purpose) and from Jabiru residents who were only regarded as tourists when they left the town. Negative feelings were generally reserved for tourists, but not for visitors or residents.

Lawrence (1985:62) observes that ideas about 'tourism' and 'tourists' are not uniform in Aboriginal thought. Tourism is regarded as 'a lot of people', as a massive group, and Lawrence observed people frequently state 'we don't want tourism'. Tourists on the other hand have the potential to be identified as individuals; they have always been more or less welcome when they can be dealt with singly.

It was fairly evident to me that people were fatalistic about the growth in tourist numbers, but they were also keen to know how numbers could be limited and how people can be controlled. In a meeting with the Gagudju Executive Committee at Coonjimba in June 1986 a number of members were keen to find out how Aboriginal people at Ayers Rock controlled tourism. As already noted the Chairman of the Association is adamant that investment will provide a means to control tourism in the future, but Gagudju have not devised any control policies primarily because the Association is too aware of the political sensitivity of this issue; it is easier to leave the hard park management decisions and prescriptions to the ANPWS.

While no simple typology is possible, there are some Aboriginal people who actively seek out tourists; they could be termed 'tourist seekers' because they appear to enjoy the social interaction with them. Tourist seekers nevertheless usually expect some return from this interaction with strangers, even if only an informal in-kind payment (like a drink at the Cooina bar). Other

people are 'tourist avoiders'. They reside at remote locations and rarely socially interact with visitors. Tourist avoiders tend to pursue relatively traditionalist lifestyles. The majority of Aboriginal people in the Park probably fall between these two extremes, they neither actively seek out or actively avoid tourists. People at locations like Jabiru, Jabiru East, Manaburduma, and Mudginberri who are frequently recent arrivals, or just transitory visitors, seem fairly indifferent about tourism.

While it is all too easy to suggest that employment opportunities should be created for local people, particularly at Gagudju-owned tourism enterprises, the current reality is that very few Aboriginal people want such work. This is partly linked to the intensity of social interaction and partly to the rigorous demands of the hospitality industry with respect to punctuality, regularity and appearance. There is in fact an acute shortage of suitable (Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal) labour for accommodation enterprises throughout the Top End, and Cooinda (like most) experiences an extremely high turnover of staff. This can be costly in terms of staff recruitment and training, but it is also cost effective given the need to lay off staff during the seasonal wet season trough in visitation. It is worth emphasising that there were only 36 persons in Park communities in December 1986 who were receiving unemployment benefits; many resided at locations that were remote from employment opportunities. There are indications that there is a shortage of Aboriginal people who are actively seeking employment in the region (Kesteven 1987).

Recent developments

Since July 1986 when fieldwork at Kakadu was completed, two important enterprises have increased Aboriginal involvement in the tourism industry. These are the establishment of a small Aboriginal tour company called Bamurru Djadjam or Wild Goose Tours and the participation of the Gagudju Association as majority owner in a 110 room hotel under construction in Jabiru. Another development has been the appointment of the Four Seasons Group as managers of the Cooinda Hotel. Information on these developments were collected during a brief visit to Darwin in November 1987 and is not based on fieldwork in the region.

Wild Goose Tours

When I was at Kakadu National Park in July 1986 Mick Alderson, the Chairman of the Gagudju Association who is also employed as an adviser by ANPWS, was examining the feasibility of establishing a small tour company to take tourists from Cooinda on a day tour to a restricted location called Goose Camp within Kakadu National Park (Bamurru Djadjam on Map 5). Alderson's reasons for establishing this enterprise were diverse. He had a long service leave entitlement from ANPWS coming up in 1987 and he appeared interested to try his hand at being a tour guide; he was familiar with the operator of Top End Heritage Safari Tours (Wiyendji Roberts) who had worked as a tour guide in 1985 and 1986. Alderson had also worked as a young adult at the hunting lodge run by Don McGregor at Patonga in the 1960s and had enjoyed this work. Another important reason that Alderson gave for establishing such an enterprise was to create a job for a younger brother whom he wanted to have work experience in the private sector and saw the option of ranger training and a (public service) ranger position as 'the soft option'.

Bamurru Djadjam or Wild Goose Tours started operations in July 1987. The tour enterprise was funded with a loan from the Aboriginal Development Commission (ADC), not Gagudju, to procure a small 18 seater bus. The tour has been brochured with an emphasis on birdwatching, traditional culture (mainly hunting and gathering techniques) and the history of buffalo shooting in the region. Alderson did not draw a wage from the enterprise but did create one position for an Aboriginal man (not his brother) who assisted him. The ADC also appointed a non-Aboriginal to assist in organisational matters during the enterprise's first year.

Reports from the NT Tourist Commission are that this enterprise has been extremely successful during its establishment phase with good reviews from tour participants. The feasibility study for the operation estimated that break even point during year one would require about 330 passengers paying \$100 each; in fact during the 1987 season 540 passengers were carried, but the tour price began with an introductory offer of \$60 before increasing to \$90 and then dropping back again to \$78. Most bookings were arranged by the Cooinda Hotel (with a booking fee of 15 per cent)

and the hotel also provided morning tea and lunch packs (at a cost of \$10 per head).

While this individually-owned tour enterprise has been successful to date, it is only during the 1988 and 1989 seasons that normal lead times in the tourism industry will allow its longer term financial viability to be evaluated. By the 1988 season, Mick Alderson had returned to work for the ANPWS, and the tour was being run by his younger brother and a non-Aboriginal resident of the Park.

The Jabiru Hotel

Since 1984 there have been protracted negotiations about the feasibility of establishing a hotel in Jabiru. As long ago as March 1985, the NT Development Corporation magazine *INDUS* ran a story with the heading 'Aboriginals to own \$15 million Kakadu Motel'. In July 1986 there was still some doubt about Gagudju's involvement in this venture. This doubt was due to a number of factors including fairly pessimistic projections about a hotel's financial viability owing to seasonality; the rapid withdrawal of the NT government from participation in accommodation ventures (and the axing of the NT Development Corporation) and ongoing negotiations about what proportion of Jabiru's headworks (power, water, sewerage) paid for by RUM should be met by the hotel developer.

It took until 1987 for all these issues to be resolved, but in August 1987 construction of the hotel began with Gagudju holding the majority equity interest. The hotel is a joint venture between the Gagudju Association and Melbourne-based industrial Equity Limited (*The Canberra Times* 14 October 1988). It was developed by a consortium that included Gagudju, John Holland Constructions, and Wilkins, Klemm and Morrison. The hotel was completed in September 1988 and with the rapid increase in tourism growth to the region it is already fully booked for the 1989 tourist season. The estimated cost of the 110 room hotel, designed in the shape of a crocodile, is between \$12 and \$13.5 million.

The hotel is run by the Four Seasons Group (that are currently managing Cooida) and it is called Four Seasons Kakadu. The agreement between Gagudju and Four Seasons requires the

operator to provide training and employment opportunities for local Aboriginal people. It is rumoured that the overall Gagudju and Four Seasons strategy will be to develop the larger Jabiru hotel into an accommodation centre and the smaller Cooinda Hotel into a luxury resort.

Four Seasons management agreement

From August 1986, the Cooinda Hotel has been run by the Four Seasons Group under a management agreement with the Gagudju Association. The hotel is now referred to as Four Seasons Cooinda in advertising. The agreement is for a five year period ending in September 1991 and allows for a review of terms and conditions in September 1988. While this agreement is supposed to be confidential, some of its clauses are fairly widespread knowledge. In particular, it is known that the Four Seasons Group takes as its management fee a fixed percentage of food, beverage and accommodation revenue (at 5 per cent) and of other revenue (boat tours, store, fuel sales) at 2 per cent. After year one of the agreement Four Seasons will receive 15 per cent of gross operating profit as an incentive. It is not clear whether the agreement has provisions for Aboriginal employment and what role the Gagudju Association retains in the pricing and other policies of the hotel. The cost of accommodation and the Yellow Waters boat tours increased markedly in the 1987 season.

The management of Cooinda by a large company such as Four Seasons makes sound commercial sense, particularly as the Gagudju Association did not appear to have the capability to appoint appropriate management. Without access to the management agreement and up to date information on Cooinda's commercial performance, it is difficult to comment on this development. It would be interesting to know though whether the Association's aims for Cooinda have changed since 1980 when it was purchased for a mix of commercial and social objectives, to what extent Gagudju can influence the hotel's management policies and what rate of return is being realised on the unsecured loans by the Gagudju Association to the Cooinda Hotel Unit Trust.

Conclusion

The complexity of the Kakadu National Park situation make it impossible to provide an unequivocal statement about the economic impact of tourism on Aboriginal communities in the region. Preliminary indications incorporated here suggest that tourism is having beneficial, though limited, economic impacts. However the rapid escalation in tourist visitation since my visit in 1986 may have resulted in increased negative social and economic repercussions.

There is no doubt that there are commercial opportunities for Aboriginal interests in the Park and that in the immediate future these are likely to increase. In particular, there are investment opportunities in the accommodation sector, in the Aboriginal artefacts industry and in the provision of Aboriginal-led tours.

A limited Aboriginal response to these commercial opportunities is already evident with the development of the Cooinda Hotel, the construction of the Jabiru Hotel, financial support for the screen printing enterprise and the establishment of Wild Goose Tours. Further opportunities exist, particularly in the presentation and sale of Aboriginal culture and material culture. A proposal for a cultural centre that has been discussed for several years now may provide an important outlet for artefacts, not only from the Kakadu region but also from Arnhem Land.

However, a number of issues must continue to be regularly appraised and addressed by both the Gagudju Association and other Aboriginal interests in the region.

The Gagudju Association has pursued a mixed financial strategy to meet a variety of objectives. The Association has made individual payments to its members, invested in enterprises, and provided a range of goods and services (community infrastructure, vehicles, education, health) both to its members and other residents of the Park. The Association has now evolved to a stage when it must decide whether it is acting as a charitable institution or commercial trader. It may be appropriate to consider establishing a subsidiary tourism company (as a trader); its profits could be paid to a trust. Such a division of function may allow the Association to

run its commercial operations on a strict business basis and to maintain its non-commercial operations as a charitable trust. An arrangement like this could result in important tax concessions and the resulting functional differentiation may assist decision-making.

In 1987, the first individually, and Aboriginal, owned tourism enterprise was established by a resident of Kakadu. While it is too early to assess the longer term financial viability of this business, it does demonstrate that Aboriginal enterprises can be established independently of the Association. However, this tour company is run in close collaboration with the Cooida Hotel. Similarly, the screen printing enterprise was marketing its output exclusively at the Cooida Hotel and Border Store. It is important that Aboriginal entrepreneurship in the Park is encouraged. This could be done through close collaboration between large scale Association investments and smaller scale individually-owned and operated enterprises.

There are indications that the rapid growth in tourism in 1987 was outstripping the ability of ANPWS to cope with tourism pressure at high visitor areas. There may be a need to encourage private sector involvement in the provision of Park services and greater restrictions on unregulated visitor use of parts of the Park (ANPWS 1986a; Gillespie 1988). This raises a number of issues for local people ranging from the possibility for new commercial opportunities to the likelihood of further revenue streams from Park entry fees. The latter possibility is linked to the renegotiation of the financial component of the lease-back agreement and a statement made in the federal budget of August 1988 that park entry fees will be introduced at Kakadu from 1 January 1989. It is likely that Aboriginal interests would receive up to 50 per cent of such a fee. However, as this monograph is being completed, the entry fee issue is being reviewed and no final agreement has been concluded between the ANPWS and Aboriginal interests.

The rapid growth in tourism is resulting in some social and economic costs. Economic costs result primarily from a reduced Aboriginal access to subsistence resources. Lawrence (1985:107-8) notes that there is strong support among Aborigines, residing almost exclusively in Stage 1 of the Park, for greater development of Stages 2 and 3. Decentralisation of visitation could relieve

pressure at the more popular destinations, but it could reduce the Aboriginal role in decision-making. This is because Aboriginal political leverage is strongest within Stage 1 which is almost entirely Aboriginal land. The establishment of a formal decision-making institution (like a board of management) with Aboriginal representation could overcome this problem. In 1988, negotiations between the ANPWS, NLC and traditional owners for the establishment of a board had commenced.

A similar issue relates to the seasonality of tourist visitation. There are widely diverging objectives here, with the longer term (Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal) residents of the Park and Jabiru appreciating the visitation trough during the wet season, while commercial interests view this as a financial constraint that is limiting their scale of operations during seasonal peaks. The seasonal downturn in tourism from November to May is also an important period for ANPWS, because it allows limited resources to be utilised for Park maintenance and development. The issue of visitor growth and seasonality are important to Aboriginal people because they are both long term residents of the Park and owners of commercial interests within it. There are indications that Kakadu is slowly becoming a part of the national and international tourism industry. This is reflected locally in the involvement of the Four Seasons Group in Cooida and Jabiru hotels. The Association must decide when its objectives are the commercial success of enterprises, the well-being of its members or a combination of both (as with seasonality tradeoff).

Aboriginal interests must also decide if it is desirable to abrogate direct management control of enterprises in favour of outside interests. It is important that the Association, as owner of hotels within the Park, should maintain control over such enterprises. Even if management agreements with skilled hotel operators are preferred, it is imperative that these agreements leave enterprise policy formation with Aboriginal owners. If not, it is likely that the advantages of ownership as a means to control the nature of tourism development will be foregone. It is also important that such agreements incorporate the objectives of the Association with respect to employment, training and so on.

It was noted at the start of this chapter that Aboriginal interests in Kakadu are at the forefront of Aboriginal involvement in tourism in north Australia. With the Gagudju Association expanding its investments in the accommodation sector, it appears that developments in the Park are remaining at the cutting edge of Aboriginal tourism involvement. The increased scale of current investments indicates that the present situation may represent something of a watershed for Aboriginal interests. It is crucial that under these circumstances, the Gagudju Association articulates the role that it perceives for itself and its membership in tourism. It is only in this way that the Association will have an active and positive role in tourism policy formation and play an important leadership role for other Aboriginal groups that frequently view the interaction between Aborigines and tourism at Kakadu as ideal.

Map 6 Gurig National Park

Chapter 7

Gurig National Park

Gurig National Park is located on the Cobourg Peninsula, some 200 kilometres by air, or 570 kilometres by road, from Darwin (Map 6). The Park occupies some 2207 square kilometres and includes almost all the Peninsula and some of the surrounding islands.

This case study is important because along with Kings Canyon (Chapter 5) it is the only example in this monograph of tourism development in a national park administered by the NT. It provides an important opportunity to examine the interaction between the NT government's parks authority, the Conservation Commission, and Aboriginal interests. Unfortunately, developments in Cobourg are not strictly comparable with those at either Kakadu or Uluru because the scale of visitation to Kakadu and Uluru is far greater than to Cobourg. In 1987, visitor numbers to Gurig National Park accounted for less than 1 per cent of the numbers entering either Kakadu or Uluru. There has never been unrestricted access to Cobourg Peninsula.

The *Cobourg Peninsula Aboriginal Land and Sanctuary Act*, 1981 (henceforth the Cobourg Act) established NT title to an area that had been called the Cobourg Peninsula Wildlife Sanctuary from January 1964 to December 1979. In 1979 the area was renamed the Cobourg Peninsula National Park. More recently it is referred to as Gurig National Park, (with Cobourg Peninsula often suffixed) in accordance with the wishes of traditional owners.

The Cobourg Act has important similarities to the leaseback arrangements discussed in Chapters 4 and 6. In 1981, when this legislation was passed it was regarded as both innovative and progressive. For on one hand, it demonstrated that the NT government and Aboriginal interests could resolve a land claim lodged under the federal Land Rights Act without recourse to the Aboriginal Land Commissioner. On the other hand, the policy making role created for Aboriginal traditional owners on the Cobourg Board of Management (with an Aboriginal majority)

exceeded the power vested with Aboriginal interests anywhere else in Australia at that time.

In 1986 when I visited this remote national park the optimism with the Cobourg Act had waned significantly. This was primarily due to political disagreements between the NT government and the Northern Land Council that had hampered and delayed the completion of a plan of management for Gurig National Park. The Peninsula's tourism potential was nowhere near being realised; it was undeveloped.

The sources of information about this national park are limited, with the recently published *Cobourg Peninsula Sanctuary Plan of Management* (CCNT 1987) being the most comprehensive. This document, used extensively in this chapter, is referred to here as the Cobourg POM. A consultancy report, *Gurig National Park: An Assessment of the Plan of Management* by Foster and Tegg (1985) and the *Cobourg Peninsula and Adjacent Islands Land Claim* prepared by Peterson and Tonkinson (1979) are the only other substantial reports on the area.

When I visited the Cobourg region in June 1986, the Cobourg POM was only in a final draft for (CCNT 1986). It took more than a year for the plan to be completed and tabled in the Legislative Assembly. It finally seems that with the tabling and acceptance of the Cobourg POM tourism development in Gurig National Park is set to expand rapidly.

The establishment of Gurig National Park

History

The early history of contact in this region has been described in some detail by Spillett (1972), Peterson and Tonkinson (1979:8-21) and Powell (1982). The earliest foreign contacts in the area were with Dutch seamen in the early 17th Century. Trepang fishermen, mainly from Macassar, visited the Peninsula regularly from the 18th Century. A number of camps were established on the Cobourg Peninsula. The marine explorer King surveyed the Cobourg Peninsula in 1818. In 1827 Fort Wellington was established on the

Cobourg Peninsula at Raffles Bay as an outpost from Fort Dundas on Melville Island (see Chapter 8). Both forts were abandoned in 1929. Subsequently, Victoria settlement at Port Essington was established in 1838 and occupied till 1849. Cobourg Peninsula was the site of the first two European mainland settlements in the NT between 1827 and 1849.

Trepangers continued to visit the region throughout the 19th Century. In 1871, John Lewis took a pastoral lease over part of the Peninsula and subsequently constructed the Cobourg Cattle Station. From 1874, a series of miscellaneous leases, grazing licences and agricultural leases were let over areas within Cobourg Peninsula (CCNT 1987:161).

The Macassans began trading for pearls and pearl shell in the area and in the late 19th Century a local industry was established. Pearling has continued in the Peninsula region throughout this century except for brief periods in the 1940s and 1950s. In 1963 the Paspaley Pearling Company and the Japanese Arafura Pearling Company made an agreement to take out a lease for pearl culture; this lease was granted in 1966. Pearling operations continue in the waters off Cobourg Peninsula today and land bases have been established at two locations (Map 6) in the Park (CCNT 1987:80).

From the 1920s, small-scale timber milling was undertaken in the region, with a timber mill operating on the Peninsula until 1962 (Peterson and Tonkinson 1979:21). In 1924, the area was declared a flora and fauna reserve. In December 1940, a part of the reservation was revoked for the use of Aboriginal people. On 1 January 1964, Cobourg became a Sanctuary under the *Wildlife Conservation and Control Ordinance*, 1962-67. Previously, in 1962, the area reserved for Aboriginal use had been revoked. On 10 September 1979, the entire Peninsula, excluding the Victoria Settlement Historical Reserve and the Fort Wellington Settlement Historical Reserve, was renamed Cobourg Peninsula National Park.

Cobourg Peninsula Aboriginal Land and Sanctuary Act

The Park declared in 1979 was not a national park under s.12 of the *Territory Parks and Wildlife Conservation Act*, 1978 because a land claim over the region had been lodged under the federal Land

Rights Act on 31 March 1978 (Peterson and Tonkinson 1979; CCNT 1987). This claim was lodged despite the Peninsula's status as public purpose (but unalienated) Crown land. In September 1981 the *Cobourg Peninsula Aboriginal Land and Sanctuary Act*, 1981 (the Cobourg Act) was passed in the NT Legislative Assembly. This Act was a negotiated settlement of the land rights claim completed between NT government and the Northern Land Council acting on behalf of Aboriginal traditional owners. The Cobourg Act is a complex and lengthy piece of legislation, not least because it attempts to combine some of the institutional structures created by the federal Land Rights Act with a Territory Act. Some understanding of the Cobourg Act is essential in any discussion of the development of tourism.

The Cobourg Act establishes the Cobourg Peninsula Sanctuary Land Trust (CPSLT). Under s.7 the entire Peninsula is granted to, and vested in perpetuity in, the CPSLT in trust for traditional Aboriginal owners and Aborigines entitled to use or occupy the sanctuary (referred to as 'the group'). Under s.16 of the Cobourg Act, the title to the sanctuary is inalienable and can only be leased in pursuance of the plan of management. Members of the CPSLT (three members and a Chairman) must be members of 'the group' and are appointed by the NLC. The sanctuary was simultaneously established in perpetuity as a national park (s.12).

An annual rental fee of \$20,000 is paid by the NT government to the NLC for the use of the sanctuary as a national park. This fee is inflation-proofed under s.15 of the Act. The entire fee must be applied by the NLC to or for the benefit of 'the group'.

The Park is administered by the Cobourg Peninsula Sanctuary Board (the Cobourg Board) established by s.18 of the Cobourg Act. Half the members of the Cobourg Board are nominated by NLC (from within the membership of 'the group'), with the others being nominated by the Minister for Conservation. The Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the Cobourg Board are nominated by NLC, with the Chairman having the casting vote in the event of an equality of votes. To date, the two chairmen of the Board nominated by the NLC have been Aboriginal; hence there is a potential Aboriginal majority on the Cobourg Board. The role of the Cobourg Board is primarily to prepare plans of management for the control and

management of Gurig National Park; it is the policy forming body for the Park. Weaver (1984:7) notes that a unique feature of Cobourg is the existence of the Cobourg Board that has a policy function and an Aboriginal majority.

The Park is run on a day-to-day basis by the CCNT. In reality, since the establishment of Gurig National Park in 1981 it has been effectively controlled by the CCNT. Weaver (1984:7) and Foster and Tegg (1985) note that as yet Aboriginal traditional owners are unable to use the formal legal powers that the Cobourg Act gives them; only some of the younger generation (who are not Board members) have English literacy and numeracy skills and none have the political or bureaucratic skills which would enable them to play a role equal to the CCNT members of the Board.

The Plan of Management (the Cobourg POM) for the Park was to be prepared by the Cobourg Board, but in reality it has been prepared by park planners within CCNT in close consultation and collaboration with the Board. The Cobourg POM must be consented to by the NLC and then must be forwarded to the NT Legislative Assembly which may pass a resolution disallowing the POM.

In summary, Gurig National Park is vested in a trust whose members are Aboriginal traditional owners; the NLC has a role in the Park because it nominates members of the Trust (and the Cobourg Board) and because it must approve all development on the Cobourg Peninsula Sanctuary Land Trust after consultation with traditional owners (s.4). The Cobourg Board is responsible for preparing the POM and setting broad policies for the running of the Park and protecting Aboriginal interests; the CCNT is responsible for the control and management of the Park. While the Board is empowered to make by-laws, these cannot be inconsistent with any other act of the NT; and a large part of the *Territory Parks and Wildlife Conservation Act* applies to Gurig National Park as though it were a park within the meaning of this Act.

In the Cobourg Act, the prior interest of Paspaley Pearling Company Pty Ltd in the Park is recognised and renewed for at least 25 years. Exploration and mining can proceed in the Park, but only with the consent of the Cobourg Board.

There was a long delay in completing the Cobourg POM which took over six years to be finalised. This delay was partly due to the complexity of the legislative framework. When a draft was completed by CCNT, there were further delays while an explanatory version of the POM (with a video) was prepared for Aboriginal traditional owners and while the NLC had the POM assessed. The NLC maintained that it did not have the expertise to assess the draft plan and in 1985 two consultants (Foster and Tegg 1985) were employed specifically for this purpose. In 1986 there were prolonged negotiations over changes to the draft, most of which are incorporated in the final plan printed in April 1987. The Cobourg POM was not approved by the NT Legislative Assembly for a further six months.

Two issues that were problematic are now partially resolved. Firstly, under the Cobourg Act, the Cobourg Board, which has an Aboriginal majority has a right to deal with exploration and mining issues within the Park. This right was reiterated in the draft plan of management, but approval for the plan stalled in 1987 because the Department of Mines and Energy opposed these provisions and wanted amendments to streamline the exploration process ('NT moves to streamline mining in sanctuary', *Land Rights News*, September 1987). Another unresolved issue related to the waters surrounding the Peninsula that were declared the Cobourg Marine Park in July 1983 under s.12 of the *Territory Parks and Wildlife Conservation Act*, 1978. The area of the Marine Park is some 2290 square kilometres, a little larger than Gurig National Park. It is unclear whether authority over the Marine Park will be vested with the Cobourg Board (with its Aboriginal majority) or with a separate board. It is stated in the Cobourg POM that the management of the Marine Park and National Park are inextricably linked and that management of the Marine Park should come under the Cobourg Board (CCNT 1987:136). Again the issue of mineral exploration looms large, because it seems that the NT government is now reluctant to allow the Board the controls over exploration and mining that it was granted in 1981.

In 1981, the Cobourg Act was an extremely important political coup for the NT government because it demonstrated that Aboriginal and NT government interests could come to mutually beneficial accommodations. In 1987, when the Cobourg POM was

finally approved, prolonged delays had undermined this spirit of co-operation. Nevertheless, there are still indications that the policy objectives of the NT government, particularly with respect to tourism growth, and Aboriginal aims can be reconciled.

Tourism in the region

Since 1964 there has been a statutory requirements that permits must be issued for entry into the Peninsula region. Permits were issued by the Territory Parks and Wildlife Authority until 1980, and then by the Conservation Commission. The overland route crosses the East Alligator River at the Border Store (see Maps 5 and 6) and heads east, then north to Murganella through Arnhem Land. From 1931 to 1977 Arnhem Land was an Aboriginal reserve and under the *NT Aboriginals Ordinance*, 1918 a permit was needed to enter the reserve. Since 1977, Arnhem Land has been held under inalienable Aboriginal title; a permit is still required to enter this land. For many decades Cobourg has been insulated from unrestricted overland visitation by the permits system.

Visitor numbers

It is noted in the Cobourg POM (CCNT 1987:87) that there is no accurate information on visitor numbers, characteristics or activities. Nevertheless some information is presented in the Cobourg POM that is reproduced in Table 7.1. Since 1978 there has been a growth in tourist visitation to Gurig National Park. There appears to have been rapid escalation in visitation in 1981 (after passage of Cobourg Act) and in 1986 when a number of lease and licence agreements were signed between the Northern Land Council and a limited number of tour operators. Under sub-s. 31(2) of the Cobourg Act, such agreements are allowed even in the absence of a plan of management.

Brady (1985:48) provides information about permits issued by the Northern Land Council for overland access to Murganella and Cobourg. However, NLC data refer to number of permits, not number of people and do not differentiate Cobourg from Murganella. But they do differentiate permit applications for work, as distinct from recreational, purposes. The data show some

increase in recreation permits from 46 in 1979 to 185 in 1984, although 124 were issued in 1980. All told, only 628 permits for overland travel to Murganella/Cobourg for recreational purposes were issued in the period 1979-84; a further 567 permits were issued for work purposes.

Table 7.1
Visitors to Gurig National Park, 1978 to 86

Year	Visitors	Growth rate (%)	Visitor days	Growth rate (%)
1978	317	-	1,418	-
1979	335	5.7	1,458	2.8
1980	344	2.7	1,686	15.6
1981	426	23.8	3,287	94.8
1982	621	45.8	4,268	29.9
1983	732	17.9	5,726	34.2
1984	939	28.3	6,451	12.7
1985	1,058	12.7	7,453	15.5
1986	1,347	27.3	10,409	39.7

Source: CCNT (1987:89).

Data on permits are most unclear. For example in the final draft Cobourg POM (CCNT 1986) information is presented on permits issued during the period 1978 to 1982. Permit numbers grew from 57 in 1978 to 131 in 1982. The correlation between permits issued and visitors is not specified. It appears that permits were (and are) issued per group irrespective of group size, hence they are of limited use in gauging visitor numbers. However, reference to permits can cause confusion. For example, Weaver (1984:6) refers to 621 permits issued in 1982, which is a great deal higher than the 141 referred to in the draft Cobourg POM. It seems likely that she was referring to visitors rather than permits (Table 7.1).

Recently, Taylor (1986:32) estimates that 908 persons visited the Peninsula in 1985. In 1986, the Senior District Ranger (interviewed on 29 June 1986) estimated that about 1000 people were visiting the region. Taylor notes that while figures are fairly accurate, boats do arrive at the Park without permits. It should

also be noted that Black Point has always been a private haven for the NT government and its cabinet (Weaver 1984). It appears that the facilities at the ranger station have been used by the CCNT to win favour with NT politicians and to lobby for adequate funding for the National Park. It is unclear whether official visitors are included in estimates of visitor numbers.

The lack of available visitor information is of concern not only for park management, but also because there is a charge levied per visitor (and per visitor night) by the Cobourg Board under by-law regulations passed in July 1986. No system currently exists to ensure that the Cobourg Board receives all fees due for Park use.

For historical and political reasons, Cobourg Peninsula is the CCNT's domain and there is almost no NT Tourist Commission involvement in the region. Recently, and particularly since the establishment of the Gurig Association in 1986 and the completion of the Cobourg POM, the Northern Land Council has maintained a higher profile at Gurig. In 1986, Gurig National Park started to be marketed in tour operators brochures. Blanket permits were provided to a limited number of operators to fly and boat people to the Peninsula.

Taylor (1986:Appendix 3) estimates that by 1990, 1300 people will visit the Peninsula. Information in Table 7.1 shows that Taylor's 1990 projection was exceeded in 1986. Any current projection of tourism growth to the Peninsula would be speculative given the developments planned for Coral Bay (see below), the discretion of the Cobourg Board in regulating numbers, and the need for permits from the NLC for overland access.

The nature of tourist visitation

The Cobourg POM (CCNT 1987:87) notes that visitors to Cobourg represent only a narrow segment of the potential user population. Major users at present are travellers on private boats, people on commercial tours and private overland visitors.

Since July 1981, two safari companies have operated in the area; banteng, deer, buffalo and pigs are hunted and trophy fees are paid to the traditional owners via the Cobourg Board. It has been

estimated that 10 per cent of permits issued in 1982 related to these activities (CCNT 1986:para.399).

Overland access to Cobourg Peninsula is not easy, even though 'the Cobourg track' was upgraded in 1986. Firstly, one requires a permit from the Board that meets only every six weeks; permit requests must be in writing. Currently, overland access is limited to 12 vehicles per week and permits are generally issued on a first-come-first-issued basis. The Northern Land Council issues a permit to travel from the East Alligator River to Murganella (through Aboriginal land) after approval is granted by the Cobourg Board. Secondly, until 1987 no fuel supplies were available for sale to the public on the Peninsula; the last refuelling point was at the Border Store, some 280 kilometres from Black Point. Thirdly, the road is frequently impassable owing to seasonal flooding; the overland route is only open for about 30 weeks a year and to four wheel drive vehicles only. Currently, a maximum of about 360 tourist vehicles can travel to Cobourg per annum. In Table 7.2 information is provided from the Cobourg POM on mode of visitor access to Gurig National Park.

Table 7.2
Mode of visitor access to Gurig, 1978 to 1986

Year	Air	Sea	Overland
	(percentage share of total visitation)		
1978	36%	18%	46%
1979	46%	34%	30%
1980	59%	22%	19%
1981	42%	50%	8%
1982	36%	53%	11%
1983	49%	30%	21%
1984	53%	18%	29%
1985	37%	20%	43%
1986	34%	17%	49%

Source: CCNT (1987:89).

It is not specified how this information was collected in the POM. An interesting feature of the table is the increase in overland access

since 1981. This is partly linked to an increase in permits issued by the Cobourg Board. There appears to have been a decline in boat access to the Peninsula in recent years despite the operations of a boat charter tour company.

The CCNT publishes two leaflets *Gurig National Park (Cobourg Peninsula)* and *Advice for travellers by road to Cobourg Peninsula (Gurig National Park)* that provide information on permit application, road conditions and so on. The main recreation activities listed for the area include camping, fishing, walking, photography, nature studies and bird watching. There are interesting historical and archeological sites at Smith Point and at Victoria settlement, Port Essington, although a boat is needed to reach the latter. Accommodation at Smith Point is limited to a camp ground run by CCNT (for private visitors) and two camp grounds and four cabins (for visitors on commercial tours). The Gurig Store at Black Point (where the CCNT ranger station is located) is open to visitors and now also supplies fuel to visitors.

The Cobourg POM (CCNT 1987:86) presents an assessment of the recreational attractiveness of Cobourg Peninsula. Major recreational/landscape features with a high attractiveness rating include the coastal landscape, the open forests with Kentia palms and cypress pine, the diversity of indigenous and introduced animals for wildlife viewing, suitable areas for fishing, safari shooting, and historic ruins, particularly at Victoria settlement. All of these activities, except for fishing, are assessed to be 'not readily available' elsewhere in the Top End. The Cobourg POM also notes the potential for encountering and learning about Aboriginal culture as a high attractiveness feature of the Peninsula that is not readily available elsewhere in the Top End; it is currently not available at Gurig National Park either.

Taylor (1986) estimates that average length of stay (ALS) at Cobourg was 6.4 days in 1985. Average length of stay per visitor can be calculated from information in Table 7.1; it has increased from 4.5 days in 1978 to 7.7 days in 1986. This is partly because the packages offered by tour and safari operators are frequently for a seven day period. Private visitors to the Peninsula also make relatively long visits owing to the permit system and the time that it takes to get to the Park. The ALS at Gurig is higher than at other

national parks like Uluru and Kakadu. At the former, the ALS is less than two days and at Kakadu it is 4.3 days for private visitors, 1.8 days for tour visitors.

While there are no data on seasonality of visitation to Gurig National Park, it is likely that it is similar, but more marked, than at Kakadu. During the wet season there is no road access and storms limit air and sea access. In the Cobourg POM a detailed list is presented of constraints on recreation in the Park. Seasonal constraints include access limitations, the general discomfort associated with wet season high temperature, humidity and rainfall and the possible danger of cyclones (CCNT 1987:88). Camping under canvas is not a particularly appealing leisure activity during the wet. Year-round constraints include limits on the quantity of potable drinking water available, the danger of crocodiles, boating hazards (especially reefs), limited availability of transport (both to and within the Park), and limited availability of information (ibid:88).

It seems to me that one of the key attractions of Gurig National Park is its isolation; this is perhaps best experienced by overland visitors. Similarly the extremely low numbers of tourists and the low key nature of accommodation facilities are factors that enhance Gurig National Park's 'wilderness' appeal for the limited number of people who visit the area. It will be important to recognise the relative significance of this speciality when development proposals for the Park are considered.

Aboriginal communities and economic issues

Only three small Aboriginal communities (or outstations) are permanently occupied in Gurig National Park at Araru Point, Gul Gul (Danger Point) and Gumuragi (Reef Point). Aboriginal people employed by CCNT reside at Cape Don lighthouse (now a CCNT outpost) and at Black Point (see Map 6). When I visited Gurig in June 1986, I was able to visit Araru Point and Gumuragi outstations; the outstation at Gul Gul was temporarily unoccupied as all residents were at a regional ceremony on nearby Croker Island.

Population

Peterson and Tonkinson (1979:31) estimate that the original Aboriginal population of Cobourg Peninsula was in the region of 200-250. Disease, conflict and migration have reduced the regional population markedly (Kesteven and Smith 1983; Powell 1982; Peterson and Tonkinson 1979). In 1979, only 48 traditional owners of the Cobourg Peninsula (or claimants) were listed. However, there was a possible underenumeration of Muran clan members (Foster and Tegg, 1985). Peterson and Tonkinson (1979:53) estimated that 150 people were likely to benefit if Cobourg Peninsula was granted Aboriginal title. In the Cobourg POM this figure is taken to define the limits of 'the group' of traditional owners, and other Aborigines, entitled to use or occupy the sanctuary (CCNT 1987:67). It is unlikely that these two groupings are identical.

From the early 1950s, welfare authorities attempted to persuade local Aboriginal people to move away from Cape Don lighthouse where most were living. Initially it was suggested that they move to the government settlement at Snake Bay (Milikapiti) on nearby Melville Island and then the mission at (culturally more appropriate) Croker Island or to Bagot in Darwin. Peterson and Tonkinson (1979:23-27) document the reluctance of Cobourg people to move and the extremely gradual depopulation of the area in the period 1953 to 1970.

Repopulation of the region occurred from 1982, although it should be emphasised that Aboriginal people regularly visited the Peninsula from Croker Island (Peterson and Tonkinson 1979:49). Today there are four clans whose members are recognised traditional owners of Cobourg: Agalda clan (Araru Point); Madjunbalmi clan (Gumuragi); Ngaindjagar clan (Gul Gul); and Muran clan (Gul Gul). According to Peterson and Tonkinson (1979:37) a fifth clan group, the Mandilari, also have an interest in land near Araru Point but they do not figure on the Cobourg Board or in the distribution of Park moneys. Members of the Muran clan now living at Gul Gul are not on their traditional land and there are plans to establish one or two more outstations at Raffles Bay in the future (Foster and Tegg 1985:96). The decision to establish three outstations was part of an agreement with the NT government to resettle traditional owners to Cobourg. Each outstation has one

house built by the CCNT, water reticulation, a generator and communications equipment. It appears that the Muran clan was disadvantaged by these arrangements because the CCNT is unlikely to fund further outstation development.

Since 1982, the Aboriginal population of the Peninsula has consistently numbered between 40 and 50 people. Weaver (1984:6) numerated 43 Aboriginal people residing in the Park in 1984 and the CCNT (1987:63) states 45 Aboriginal people now live permanently on the Peninsula. The data in Table 7.3 for June 1986 is of similar magnitude. An interesting feature of Gurig National Park is that the resident non-Aboriginal population is extremely small, although more recently non-Aboriginal employees of tour and safari operators now live on the Peninsula on a seasonal basis.

Table 7.3
Resident population of Gurig National Park, June 1986

Community/location	Aboriginal population	Non-Aboriginal population
Black Point	2	5
Gumuragi (Reef Point)	11	0
Gul Gul (Danger Point)	10	0
Araru Point	13	0
Cape Don	6	2
Total	42	7

Source: Sue Sangetry, Black Point ranger station.

The demographic breakdown of the population indicates that there were 13 Aboriginal juveniles (aged under 15 years) residing in the Park accounting for 31 per cent of the population. There were only two Aborigines aged over sixty in the Park in June 1986.

Mobility of people between outstations in the Park and to communities outside the Park is high. Internal mobility is linked to the close kinship links between outstation residents, with a number of affinal ties between them. There are strong historical and kinship links to Croker Island (Minjilang), Oenpelli (Gunbalanya) and Kakadu communities like Cannon Hill. There has been a recent

trend for people to centralise at Black Point and Gumuragi during the wet season when tourism in the region is almost non-existent. This centralisation is partly linked to a desire for access to services (especially the school and the Gurig Store) and partly to a traditional wet season tendency for small groups to agglomerate for sociability and cooperation in subsistence activities.

Employment

Paragraph 27(4)(h) of the Cobourg Act requires regard for the employment and training of Aboriginal people in the preparation of the plan of management. In the Cobourg POM (CCNT 1987:110) it is stated that wherever possible the number of Aboriginal employees and opportunities for different kinds of employment will be increased. Employment opportunities are also guaranteed in leases and licences that have been signed with a number of commercial operators. Licences invariably require the licensee to make all reasonable efforts to employ local Aboriginal people and often stipulate rates of pay.

The level of formal employment at Gurig National Park is not high. In June 1986, three Aboriginal rangers (at Cape Don, Gumuragi and Gul Gul) were employed on a full-time basis by the CCNT. An Aboriginal man with a long association with the area was employed as a full-time labourer at Black Point and one man residing at Gul Gul was employed on a casual basis on the upgrading of 'the Cobourg track'. Two Aboriginal women residing at Gumuragi shared a full-time teaching assistant position at Thunder Rock school funded by the Education Department. Casual employment is available for Aboriginal men on a seasonal and short-term basis with CCNT; a team regularly works on Park roads and visits Victoria settlement to clear vegetation off the ruins. Casual employment is also available with safari operators as guides, but these jobs are not popular. Four outstation residents are members of the Cobourg Board that meets at least four times a year; Aboriginal Board members also frequently attend monthly supervisor's meetings.

Aboriginal residents of the Park also engage in informal economic activities. While there are no quantitative studies of Aboriginal involvement in the subsistence economy, exploitation of

flora and fauna, particularly marine species, remains high. The Cobourg POM lists a number of species that are utilised for food and presents an illustrative map that shows the locations where crabs, turtle, dugong, barramundi, oysters and cockles are hunted and collected (CCNT 1987:32,42,65). Peterson and Tonkinson (1979:38-39) note that there is a very strong coastal orientation in the subsistence economy; this is evident in the strategic location of all three outstations in the Park near important marine resources. While it is impossible to gauge the economic importance of subsistence activities today, personal observation and discussions with community members at Araru Point and Gumuragi indicate that they remain significant.

At least five of the adult women at outstations are highly skilled in the weaving of pandanus baskets, dilly bags and mats. Men produce artefacts, particularly fish spears. However, current production levels are limited. This is partly because marketing arrangements are on an ad hoc basis with occasional sales to tourists and to CCNT staff. While the Cobourg POM recognises the potential economic significance of craft sales to tourists, no mention is made of the significance of subsistence activities (CCNT 1987:109).

While in formal terms the unemployment rate at Park outstations is high, it appears little different from other outstations in the Top End (Altman and Taylor 1988). The overall supply of labour within the Park seems limited by the low Aboriginal population and the remoteness of two of the three outstations from employment opportunities. Aboriginal people do not want jobs with safari and tour operators. There are also indications that people are not looking for regular full-time employment, even with CCNT. A new employment category of community ranger is currently being considered by the CCNT and it is possible that these positions will prove more appealing; however, in 1987, this classification was dropped in favour of a program that will employ Aboriginal people in the usual ranger categories. There are indications that traditional owners of Gurig National Park do not want formal employment, preferring the role of 'landlord' to 'employee'. Kesteven (1987) notes a similar phenomenon among some residents of Kakadu National Park.

Income

In Table 7.4 cash income from employment and social security sources is estimated at June 1986. These estimates have been made from social security records, employment records (held by the CCNT and the Education Department) and from discussions with outstation residents.

Table 7.4
*Cash incomes of Aboriginal residents of Gurig National Park,
June 1986*

Income source	Amount ^a (\$ per week)	Per cent
Social security	1,156	45.0
Employment	1,330	51.8
Family allowance	82	3.2
Total	2,568	100.0

Footnote: a. These figures do not include lease, licence, rental, and royalty payments, or Cobourg Board sitting fees.

Source: CCNT staff at Black Point.

Per capita cash income (from these sources) for Aboriginal residents of Gurig is in the vicinity of \$3200 per capita per annum. However there are marked variations between communities, from a high of \$140 per capita per week at Black Point (where a CCNT employee and his wife reside) to a low of \$58 per capita at Araru Point. It is likely that there is a great deal of redistribution between communities owing to close kinship ties between their members. Overall, a little more than half of regular cash income comes from employment sources. It is likely that in June 1986 Aboriginal residents of Gurig were not receiving their full social security entitlements because there was no regional resource organisation representing their interests.

People receive additional cash income from a diverse range of other sources including lease and licence agreements for commercial activities on the Peninsula; annual park rental

payments; individual payments from the Gagudju Association; and sitting fees as Board members. Outstations have also received non-cash benefits from the Kunwinjku Association that provided Araru Point and Gul Gul outstations with vehicles.

It is extremely difficult to accurately quantify the overall significance of this range of miscellaneous payments. It is estimated that in 1986 'the group' received about \$150,000 from all these sources and that about \$100,000 was distributed to members of the three Park communities. This \$100,000 could have been further redistributed, particularly by members of the Muran clan to people residing at Croker Island and in Darwin. Per capita cash income would have increased to about \$5600 per capita with these supplementary payments, with 43 per cent coming from these various non-employment sources. The imputed value of subsistence foods and occasional income from casual employment and sale of artefacts would have further supplemented these incomes.

The distribution of moneys from these various sources will be discussed further below. But two observations can be made here. Firstly, in per capita cash income terms, the direct economic impact of tourism is probably greater at Cobourg than anywhere else in the NT, despite the current low level of development. Secondly, the observation by Foster and Tegg (1985:12) that the traditional owners of Cobourg exist on very meagre incomes and that most are dependent on welfare cheques and intermittent work can be updated. This may have been the case in 1985, but by 1986 a range of other payments were being made that provided cash incomes comparable with Kakadu communities and higher than at most outstation communities in the NT.

The CCNT's role in community affairs

The agreement reached between the NT government and the Northern Land Council in 1981 required a government commitment to fund the resettlement of Cobourg traditional owners at outstations in the Park. As the CCNT had the responsibility for day-to-day administration and as it was the only public authority in the region it was charged with establishing physical infrastructure at outstations. As already mentioned, three outstations were

established and refurbished with a house each, water reticulation, power generation and communications equipment. In 1982, when these three outstations were occupied they represented something of a political coup for the NT government. Not only was it evident that traditional owners would co-operate with the NT parks authority, but Cobourg outstations were also intended to demonstrate how 'model' outstations should be equipped. There is no doubt that by early 1980s standards these outstations were exceptionally well furnished. Given that outstations were (and to a great extent remain) a federal government funding responsibility, Cobourg outstations were used in an attempt to establish an ideal benchmark for the Commonwealth to follow.

Over the five years since 1982, the NT government's desire to make political mileage from this situation has waned considerably. This is partly because it was assumed by the NT government that the 1981 agreement with the NLC would only require a one-off capital outlay in establishing outstations. There were no provisions made by the CCNT for depreciation of outstation facilities or for the recurrent expenditure (like fuel for diesel generators) required by the equipment provided. Over the years, there have been repeated requests from traditional owners both for replacement of equipment that has broken down; for the expansion of facilities (especially housing) at existing outstations; and for the establishment of one or two new outstations on Muran clan land. The CCNT has been hard pressed to respond to these requests particularly since 1986 as the NT government has restricted overall funding that it has been willing to allocate to outstations throughout the NT (Altman and Taylor 1988).

A major problem has been the nature of relations between the CCNT and Aboriginal residents of the Peninsula. Weaver (1984:8) noted that in 1984 the Aboriginal owners of Gurig National Park were dependent on the park agency for employment income, for linkages to social welfare benefits and government program funding and for advice on park-related issues. The CCNT has had an important role in the establishing and running of the Gurig Store at Black Point and in the construction of Thunder Rock school. The paternalistic relations between the CCNT and outstations have primarily resulted from the lack of a regional organisation (like an outstation resource centre) for Aboriginal residents of the Park; the

lack of a plan of management to clearly specify functional responsibilities within the Park exacerbated this paternalism. It is hardly surprising that Aboriginal people became excessively dependent on CCNT given that it was the only regional organisation with discretionary resources at its disposal.

There were sections within the CCNT that became critical of the paternalistic relations between CCNT and outstations and by 1986 it was generally agreed that these must be phased out. Indeed both Weaver (1984) and Foster and Tegg (1985) had recommended the establishment of a regional association to represent outstations. In January 1986, the Gurig Association was incorporated with a constitution that was not dissimilar to that of the Gagudju Association. The Association was incorporated under the *NT Associations Incorporation Act, 1978*. The Association's primary role is to act for its membership (listed in Schedule 1 of its constitution) on a wide ranging number (forty six in all) objectives. The Association's activities are to concentrate on 'the region' (defined as the Cobourg Peninsula) on behalf of traditional Aboriginal owners (as defined in the Cobourg Act). An important function that the Association fulfils is a liaison role with the CCNT, the NLC, and other government departments. It is intended that the Association actively seeks funds from government departments and public authorities for outstation development. As will be shown below the Association also plays a crucial role in the distribution of Park rentals, lease and licence moneys.

The establishment of the Gurig Association could be a harbinger of change in relations between outstation communities and the CCNT. However, it appears that the Association has only played a minor role on the Peninsula since its incorporation. This is partly because the Association has not received funding for its administration and consequently has no full-time staff (unlike the Gagudju Association that meets its administration expenses from its mining royalty equivalent receipts). More recently the Association has received greater assistance from the NLC primarily because its public officer is currently deputy chairman of the land council.

The CCNT also has an important role on the Cobourg Board because the four non-Aboriginal members of the Board are all employed by the CCNT. Foster and Tegg (1985:33-36) criticise this

concentration of non-Aboriginal membership because they feel that CCNT staff are likely to be united (because of bureaucratic power relations) whereas Aboriginal members of the Board represent the interests of four separate clans. This situation is unavoidable given the discretion that the Minister for Conservation has in appointing Board members; it is also offset to some extent by the attendance of an adviser from the NLC at Board meetings. Given that there is an effective Aboriginal majority on the Board it is important that Aboriginal members vote for general Aboriginal interests in Board deliberations. Furthermore, in the Cobourg POM the Board is excluded from primary responsibility for many programs that directly affect outstation communities (CCNT 1987:146-54).

Tourism enterprises

From 1981 to 1986 there was a very slow growth in tourism enterprises in Gurig National Park. This has been primarily a consequence of the absence of a plan of management. In 1986 and 1987 there was rapid escalation in activity. Developments in 1986 were primarily due to the Northern Land Council taking a more active role in the region, particularly after the incorporation of the Gurig Association and agreement between the NLC and CCNT about the final draft of the POM. In that year, the NLC moved to formalise commercial relations between Aboriginal interests and tour operators in a number of licence agreements.

There are two features of all enterprises in the region. Firstly, despite agreement conditions that employment opportunities must be provided to local Aborigines, currently none choose to work for any tour operator. The involvement of Aboriginal interests in tourism at Gurig National Park is principally indirect; Aboriginal people are receiving moneys from the industry (in rentals, licence fees and entry charges) without any direct involvement. Secondly, all operators in the region desire exclusivity (or restricting covenants) in their licence agreements. This desire for exclusivity began with banteng safari operators because their service is a 'luxury service' that is commercially dependent on monopoly or duopoly. The fact that all operators want such exclusivity conditions says something about the potentially limited commercial viability of tourism enterprises at Cobourg.

Safari operators

In 1986 licence agreements were signed between the Cobourg Board and the CCNT and two safari operators, called Nimrod (Thoran Pty Ltd) and Wimray Pty Ltd who were already operating in the region. It may seem somewhat paradoxical that hunting is permitted within a national park that was a wildlife sanctuary. However, it is only introduced feral species that are hunted, and safari operations serve to cull herds and thus to protect the environment from degradation. Current culling rates aim to maintain viable herd size. Four species are hunted, feral banteng cattle (*Bos banteng*), buffalo (*Bubulus bubulus*) and pig (*Sus scrofa*) all introduced by early European settlers in the 19th Century and sambar deer (*Cervus unicolor*) introduced to the wildlife sanctuary in the early 20th Century. The two safari operators are each limited to kill 10 banteng, 10 sambar deer and 10 buffalo per annum although these numbers and species can be varied. Unlimited number of feral pig can be shot. The prized trophies are the banteng and traditional owners are paid a trophy fee of \$2000 per head for this species; trophy fees for sambar are \$500 and \$200 for buffalo.

Almost all the clients for these safaris come from Europe and North America; according to the partners in Wimray Pty Ltd (R. Alright and N. Bleakley interviewed at Cobourg, 29 June 1986) safari participants pay an all-up fee of between \$7000 and \$8000 for a week's hunt with trophies guaranteed. According to Turnbull (1985:24-25) this fee is \$9000. The trophy fee paid to traditional owners comes out of this amount as does the cost of personal marketing in Europe and North America.

Each safari operator is required to make an up-front payment of \$20,000 per annum plus additional fees for any extra trophies taken. In 1986, \$48,000 was paid by both to the NLC and distributed to traditional owners.

Tour operators

Besides the two safari companies, three other operators have signed licence agreements to bring tourists to Gurig National Park. Kakadu Air Services has a licence to transport passengers from Darwin and

Jabiru to the airstrip at Smith Point. This operator provides the main air link for tourists with the Park. The sea link is provided by the Saltmarshs who run Cobourg Peninsula Sailing Safaris (trade name Cobourg Marine); this company also has permission to take tourists to the ruins of Victoria settlement. Whereas accommodation for sailing safari participants is offshore, air passengers link up with Wimray (and at times with the sailing boats) who runs one of the camp grounds at Smith Point. Besides hunting safaris, Wimray also offer camping and fishing tours to Gurig National Park.

The financial arrangements for each of these licence agreements are in accordance with by-laws declared under the Cobourg Act in July 1986. An entry fee of \$10 per person is payable, plus a camping site fee of \$4 per day (for groups of one to three people) with an additional \$1 per day for each person in excess of three.

Tour operators are supplied with books of entry permits and are responsible to pay fees in advance to the Northern Land Council. Private visitors must pay similar fees to the CCNT for permits to visit Gurig and to stay at the camp ground near Smith Point administered by the CCNT.

Cabins and store

In 1985 Watco Pty Ltd built four cabins to lock up stage near Smith Point. The cost of these cabins (about \$180,000) was met by the CCNT. They were intended to be a tourism enterprise for traditional owners. In 1986, these cabins were leased by the Cobourg Peninsula Sanctuary Land Trust and the Cobourg Board to the Gurig Association for a nominal rent for a period of 25 years. An agreement was subsequently signed between the Association and Wimray Pty Ltd which rented the cabins to the tour operator for a fee of \$12,000 per annum. A similar arrangement has been made with the Gurig Store which is also leased to the Gurig Association and then sub-leased to Wimray for a rental of \$12,000 per annum. Both sub-leases have optional clauses which allow the operation of these enterprises to revert to the Gurig Association in five years time (from 1986).

Distribution of Park moneys

In Table 7.5, an estimate is presented of all lease, license, rental and by-law moneys paid to Aboriginal interests in Gurig National Park in 1986.

Table 7.5
Lease and licence payments at Gurig National Park, 1986

Source	Amount	Distribution method
Park rental	\$30,000	Divided by NLC between four clans.
Safari operators	\$48,000 ^a	Divided by NLC between four clans.
Paspaley Pearling	\$31,500	Divided by NLC between four clans affected.
Wimray (for store and cabins lease)	\$24,000	Half to Gurig Association and half to Cobourg Board.
Tourists/operators ^b	\$15-20,000	Half to four clans, half to Cobourg Board.

Footnotes: a. There is some annual variation in this amount depending on actual game taken.

b. In accordance with Cobourg Peninsula Aboriginal Land and Sanctuary (Entry and Camping) By Laws.

Source: Northern Land Council file 85/273; CCNT, Darwin.

All told about \$150,000 was paid from various sources. Not all these payments are linked to tourism. For example, the NT government pays an annual rental as specified in the Cobourg Act irrespective of visitor numbers. This inflation proofed payment currently totals about \$30,000 per annum. Similarly, the Paspaley Pearling Company pays rents for pearl oyster cultivation leases. These leases pre-date the Cobourg Act and are given 'prior interest' status. Three areas are leased at a fee of \$10,500 per annum per area.

Payments that are linked to tourism activity are the safari operators' fees, the rental fees (for cabins and the Gurig Store) and park entry and camping fees paid in accordance with by-laws. The distribution arrangements for these moneys are complex. Foster and Tegg (1985:36) note that the Cobourg Board resolved in 1983 that moneys derived from safari operations are to be disbursed in accordance with the wishes of 'the group'. In 1985, it was resolved that moneys from camping fees should be divided, with 50 per cent being paid to the clans and 50 per cent to be retained in trust for future use as determined by the Cobourg Board.

It is stated in the Cobourg POM that all income is income of the Board. The distribution of the annual fee paid by the NT government for the use of the Park as a national park is specified in s.15 of the Cobourg Act. These moneys are to be paid to or for the benefit of 'the group'. Moneys paid with respect to any mineral exploration or mining activity are to be distributed as in the federal Land Rights Act, while any other payments are to be paid to a trust account of the Gurig Association and are to be applied for the benefit of traditional owners (CCNT 1987:142).

All the moneys paid to the four clans in Table 7.5 are now paid to the Gurig Association which has five funds: the Gurig Association fund, and the Agalda clan, Madjunbalmi clan, Ngaindjagar clan and Muran clan sub-committees funds. Most moneys are paid to the Association either annually or quarterly, with the exception being safari moneys that are paid every two months. Paspaley lease payments are not distributed to the four clans, with the Agalda clan whose land is not affected by the pearling operations receiving no money from this source. Moneys payable to the Gurig Association from store and cabin rentals are placed in the Gurig Association fund; this is the main source of income for the Association to date. Moneys paid to the Cobourg Board are placed in a trust account.

There are a number of issues and tradeoffs that need to be resolved with respect to the distribution of Park moneys. A problem created by the Cobourg Act is that members of 'the group' do not need to be residents of Gurig National Park. Consequently moneys generated by the Park can be distributed to members of the four clans who do not live in the region. This is a situation that

has analogies to the distribution of mining royalty equivalent moneys under sub-s.35(2) of the federal Land Rights Act. While the federal Act intends that these moneys are distributed to people in the 'areas affected' by mining, Aboriginal priorities and custom results in payments to traditional owners. This was evident in Chapter 6 with individual payments made to members of the Gagudju Association irrespective of residence. The issue at Cobourg is that moneys payable to 'the group' are currently limited and are an important source of supplementary cash for residents of the Park. Arguably, it may have been preferable if the Cobourg Act had limited distributions to residents of the National Park. Controls on the extent of distribution have been effective to date because of the power of the Board, whose Aboriginal members are traditional owners and residents of Gurig.

The sub-committees structure adopted by the Gurig Association to distribute funds to the Agalda, Madjunbalmi, Ngaindjagar and Muran clans may prove to be effective. However, it should be noted that a similar sub-committee system was used by the Kunwinjku Association to distribute mining royalty equivalents paid with respect to the Nabarlek uranium mine; in the Kunwinjku case, the system proved to be both ineffective and problematic (O'Faircheallaigh 1988).

To date, the sub-committee system has not faced any tests of its effectiveness, although the distribution of Paspaley lease moneys to only three clans could have established a dangerous precedent. There is a proposal (see below) for a lucrative development on Agalda land at Coral Bay that could result in marked distortions in distribution if paid on the current principle applied to Paspaley moneys. Such a distortion could in turn result in marked variability in income status at Cobourg outstations and acrimony between the four clans.

It is evident to date that the distribution of monetary resources has favoured payments to the four clans (for income support). This has meant that the Gurig Association has remained underresourced, partly because the four clans have been reluctant to allocate funds to 'their' Association. This reluctance is partly linked to a perception that the Association is a Darwin organisation and partly to the extremely broad objects of the Association which

could result in moneys being widely disbursed. An accurate schedule of Association members is also required. Narrower objectives and a greater Association presence in the region may allay some of the fears of Park residents.

Clan groups themselves have not devoted resources to the development of outstations, partly because while there is a correlation between clan members and outstation residents, the two groupings are far from identical.

Both the Gurig Association and individual clans and outstations need to urgently formulate expenditure, financial and investment guidelines. In particular, while distributed moneys are intended for income support, there is evidence that there are limited controls on expenditure when lump sum payments are made. In particular, there has been excessive expenditure on alcohol following some allocations. Similarly, there has been no clearly stated aim to divide income into expenditure and investment categories; indications are that all clan payments are spent and there is little saving. It is particularly important that the status of these moneys for taxation purposes is assessed. Mining royalty equivalents are taxed with mining withholding tax at source; it is far from clear if any tax is paid on moneys distributed at Cobourg. It may be important for individual outstations to incorporate as charitable trusts to gain relief from sales and income tax, particularly as none are trading.

These issues need immediate consideration because it seems likely that with the growth in tourism to Gurig National Park, payments could accelerate rapidly. It is important that appropriate and effective systems for distribution and policies for expenditure and investment are devised as soon as possible. An effective means must be found to convert 'clan' moneys to 'family' or 'outstation' moneys.

Aboriginal aspirations and expectations

It was my perception after a brief visit to Gurig National Park that Aboriginal people are keen to make lots of money out of tourism, but do not want direct involvement in the industry and want to

limit the social and environmental impacts of tourism on their lifestyles. These aims are clearly articulated in the Cobourg POM in Section 3.1, 'Management for Aboriginal interests' (CCNT 1987:102). Under the heading 'economic base', the two objectives are 'to allow the traditional owners to pursue a course leading to self-determination and self-sufficiency if they so desire' and 'to allow the traditional owners to earn an income from their land' (ibid:102).

Foster and Tegg (1985:83-84) note that the CCNT adhere to the common belief that tourism is an important growth area that will contribute to the overall economic development of the NT. What is surprising is their statement that traditional owners not only subscribe to this view, but that many believe it more strongly than CCNT officials. Foster and Tegg (ibid:84) go on to suggest that the traditional owners strong attachment to the tourism development panacea is founded on very obvious misunderstandings of market forces, competition and the capitalist system. This lack of understanding is hardly surprising given that traditional owners have no occupational experience in business and extremely limited formal education. The CCNT has attempted to broaden the perspectives of Board members and have taken them on a tour to Queensland to see developments along the Gold Coast. While such an excursion may be admirable from as a 'learning experience', it can also give unrealistic impressions. Cobourg is not the Gold Coast; it is remote, experiences marked seasonality and is disadvantaged by the overall expense of getting to the NT. Indeed it is places like the Gold Coast that are the main competitors for the NT tourism industry (Gerritsen and Jaensch 1986). While an automatic link between tourism development and income for traditional owners already exists, the share of income in Table 7.5 that is linked to actual visitors is small. It does seem that Cobourg traditional owners need a great deal more information about tourism, the possible social costs of large scale developments and the potential risks of commercial development at places like Cobourg. It is surprising that traditional owners have not heard of these risks from their kinsfolk living at Kakadu National Park.

The unrealistic expectations of traditional owners can be demonstrated with three examples. Foster and Tegg (1985:84) record a discussion with Nelson Muluring, the then Chairman of the Cobourg Board about a proposed resort at Coral Bay. When the

consultants asked Muluring what would happen if the resort did not provide as much money as he expected, he responded 'we'll finish him up'. Muluring stated that the only justification for a resort was a high level of income and if this did not eventuate he would not want it around anymore. I had a remarkably similar conversation with Robert Cunningham the current Chairman of the Cobourg Board at Araru Point. He showed me a billabong near his outstation and suggested that he would like to cement it into a pool similar to one he had seen in Queensland; tourists could come and pay to take pictures of people feeding fish to green-back turtles. When I suggested that an influx of tourists to a billabong adjacent to his outstation may be disruptive he commented that he would not allow tourists there all the time and if it became too much he would close down the enterprise. Earlier Cunningham had been adamant that he did not want tourists trespassing on his fishing and residential areas.

A further example of the above occurred while I visited Black Point. A superb pandanus basket had been woven by a woman living at Gumuragi and was for sale at the Gurig Store. The weaver was adamant that the retail price for the basket was \$500 which was quite an unrealistic price by regional standards. But the perceptions of local people is greatly influenced by the visible wealth of visitors, particularly safari hunters who come all the way from the USA or Germany and pay \$2000 to shoot a trophy banteng.

Developments at Cobourg to date have been fairly small scale, and the large area of the Park and the small resident Aboriginal population have meant that there has been little negative interaction to date. In particular, residents of Cobourg outstations with their coastal orientation rarely utilise the wooded hinterland of the Peninsula and it is here that safaris are undertaken. Outstation residents currently feel that there is sufficient room for tourism development and outstation development. One issue that must be addressed in the Cobourg context is whether tourist utilisation of marine resources will have a negative long-term impact on the availability of subsistence resources. A recent advert for Peter Saltmarsh's Sailing Safaris in a glossy catalogue (*Australia's Northern Territory for the Independent Traveller 1986-1987*) emphasised fishing and oyster picking at Coral Bay.

Proposed developments

For some time now there has been discussions of a development at Coral Bay, an area that is not regularly utilised by traditional owners. In 1986, a proposal was put to the Cobourg Board by Sail Safaris/Shiralee Charters (Cobourg Marine) to construct a marina, a restaurant and a 25 room floating motel at Beckley Bay. By early 1987, this proposal does not appear to have received the go-ahead and the Cobourg Board invited proposals for a development at Coral Bay. This invitation received a great deal of media coverage in March 1987 with stories like 'A paradise in the wilderness' (*Northern Territory News*, March 21, 1987) and 'Paradise found - sand and crocs for tourists' (*The Weekend Australian*, March 21-22, 1987).

There was obviously a positive response acceptable to both the Cobourg Board and the NLC, because in the 1987/88 budget speech the NT Treasurer referred to the Coral Bay Wilderness Lodge that will be developed at a cost of \$6 million (*The Northern Territory of Australia Budget Speech, 1987-88*, 15 September 1987). The proposed development was subsequently also reported in *Land Rights News*, September 1987 with the successful tenderer being named.

Little can be said about the agreement between the developer of the Coral Bay Wilderness Lodge and the Northern Land Council as it is confidential. However it is rumoured that the agreement will provide traditional owners with a 10 per cent equity in the project; a share of profits; and rental payments. It is anticipated that income to traditional owners could be as high as \$20,000 in Year 1 of the development (possibly 1989) increasing to over \$100,000 by Year 5. These estimates are dependent on the Lodge's establishment and its financial viability. Traditional owners will have an option to buy a further 40 per cent equity stake in the project that will increase their share to 50 per cent.

While the financial aspects of the Lodge's development appear favourable to Aboriginal interests, are there social and environmental costs that may be associated with this tourism enterprise? It appears that the Cobourg Board, the CCNT and the NLC have explored this issue in some depth and that the

development is of an appropriate nature. It is planned that the Lodge will be located in an isolated locality away from any Aboriginal living areas; it will be small scale; and it will depend for its viability on the natural values of the Park (Mike Butler, pers. comm.).

As this monograph is being completed, it appears that the white entrepreneur that was to finance the Coral Bay Wilderness Lodge development has withdrawn his proposal and that the Lodge will not be completed in the immediate future. There are some similarities between the tardiness of this development and the Kings Canyon Wilderness Lodge development discussed in Chapter 5. There has been no offer of public sector finance for this development from the NT government.

Conclusion

Tourism at Gurig National Park in 1986 was still relatively undeveloped primarily because the Cobourg Board was unable to function effectively in the absence of a plan of management. There are indications that with the completion of the Cobourg POM in 1987 developments may escalate rapidly. There are numerous issues that need to be addressed by the Cobourg Board and traditional owners of the Peninsula before these proceed.

The primary attractions of Gurig National Park are its remoteness, its wildlife and unique and unspoilt environment, and its historical sites. In the marketing of Gurig National Park it is important that environmental and historical tourism is emphasised and not ethnic or cultural tourism; traditional owners currently seem to want no direct involvement with tourists, but rather to indirectly gain financial returns from the leasing of their land.

Traditional owners have expectations of high financial returns from tourism ventures, especially from the proposed Coral Bay Wilderness Lodge. There is a belief that financial independence and improved economic status will result from tourist development. Already returns from tourism and other developments at Gurig are providing Aboriginal people with income (on a per capita basis) that exceeds that received by any other group in the Northern Territory.

An initial issue that the Cobourg Board must face is whether sufficient resources have been allocated to the Park to ensure that these management objectives can be fulfilled. As tourist visitation expands, it will be necessary not only to increase the Park workforce, but also to develop systems to monitor visitor use of the region. It was evident in 1986 when I visited Gurig that CCNT were not aware of who was actually in the Park, what planes were landing at the Smith Point airstrip and what boats were anchored offshore. It will also be important from the Aboriginal perspective to monitor the impact of tourism on the environment and on marine resources that remain an important component of the subsistence economy.

The Gurig Association and outstations in the Park appear to face many issues similar to those that NT royalty associations have had to resolve since the early 1980s. For example, while traditional owners at Cobourg have received income from tourism, there are also indications that they have missed out on the normal government funding of their communities for essential services and local government functions. As Aboriginal communities they have received little funding from the DAA (for a regional resource centre) and from the ADC (for housing).

The Cobourg Board appears to have addressed the important issue of what projected scale of tourism development is desired in the Park. The NT government has demonstrated elsewhere that it wishes to encourage large scale development that will have linkages with other sectors of the NT economy, but traditional owners of Cobourg have very different preferences. In selecting the developer for the Coral Bay Wilderness Lodge, the Board opted for a small-scale highly regulated development; the Board has also decided that there will be no similar developments in the Park for some time. It is only when the Coral Bay development is completed and operating that an assessment will be possible of its economic and social impacts on the Aboriginal residents of Gurig National Park.

A more general issue of concern to Aboriginal interests is linked to the management of returns from the tourism industry. To date, traditional owners have viewed the securing of financial returns to the four clans as an end in itself, but as the scale of these

returns increases it will be important to devise mechanisms to manage and invest these resources. There are potential problems here because financial provisions in both the Cobourg Act and the Cobourg POM emphasise the interests of traditional owners rather than residents of the Park. In future there may be greater pressure from non-resident traditional owners for a share of returns from tourism at the expense of residents who are not traditional owners. Aboriginal interests must also decide whether they wish to invest in tourism developments within the Park (as the Gagudju Association has done at Kakadu) as a means of controlling the nature of such enterprises. A related issue is what financial policy the Gurig Association wishes to pursue; do traditional owners wish to expend all income from tourism developments (as a means of income support for the current generation) or do they wish to save and invest for future generations? And what role do Aboriginal traditional owners want in the park workforce or in tourism enterprises?

It is likely that in the near future many of these issues will be addressed. The positive feature of the Gurig case is that the traditional owners of the region have a majority on the Cobourg Board that is safeguarded by legislation. This majority should allow Aboriginal interests to control the nature of developments and to ensure that tourism development is compatible with their aspirations.

Map 7 *Melville and Bathurst Islands*

Chapter 8

Melville and Bathurst Islands

Melville and Bathurst Islands are located 80 kilometres directly north of Darwin and are cut off from the mainland by the Clarence Strait; Melville, the larger island, has a land area of some 5700 square kilometres, while Bathurst has an area of some 2070 square kilometres. These Islands are the home of the Tiwi people, a linguistically homogeneous group that numbers about 1650 persons (residing on the Islands), and that has a distinctly Tiwi culture that differs from mainland Aboriginal groups in a number of ways (including language, social organisation and religious system).

This case is important because Melville and Bathurst Islands are Aboriginal land; under the *Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act*, 1976 both islands were automatically transferred to Aboriginal ownership because they were Schedule 1 lands (Aboriginal reserves) until 1977. The significance of this is twofold. Firstly, up until 1977, and to the present, a permit is needed to visit the Islands. This means that tourist visitation to the Islands can be easily controlled and to date it has been restricted. There has never been unrestricted access to the Islands because they were never totally alienated from Aboriginal ownership. Secondly, as traditional owners of the Islands, Tiwi people have absolute control over development. The vesting of inalienable title to Melville and Bathurst Islands in the Tiwi Land Trust has not required a negotiated agreement as at Uluru, Kakadu, and Gurig. At Melville and Bathurst Islands, Aboriginal people are at liberty to decide on the nature and pace of tourism development to a greater extent than in any other case study in this monograph. The statutory rights that Tiwi people have to land gives them complete discretion over the nature of development on that land.

The Tiwi Land Council (TLC) plays an important role in tourist development. It is a pan-Islands organisation that has statutory responsibilities to administer the Tiwi Land Trust. Since its establishment in 1978, the TLC has evolved into a regional para-government. The issue of tourism development cannot be isolated

from role of TLC and in particular the ways that it has utilised mining royalty equivalent surpluses that it is paid under sub-s.64(1) of the Land Rights Act.

It is interesting that in the absence of a parks authority, there is very little information available on the nature of tourist visitation at Melville and Bathurst Islands. Indeed the most detailed quantitative data presented here were collected by the owner/operator of Tiwi Tours who was happy to make this information available to me. Similarly there is no 'plan of management' or overall strategy for tourism development on the Islands. Instead of an integrated plan there have been a number of feasibility studies for individual resort proposals. These studies are of variable quality and frequently appear to argue a case for development rather than presenting an objective commercial analysis. Few of the proposals have proceeded.

I spent only a limited time in the Tiwi region primarily because there was little tourism development there in 1986. Only a day was spent at each of the three main communities Nguiu, Milikapiti and Pularumpi discussing tourism issues. On another occasion, I visited Nguiu as a 'participant observer' on a Tiwi Tour. In Darwin, I was assisted by the Tiwi Land Council, Financial Advisory Consulting and Training Pty Ltd (FACTS) and by the owner/operator of Tiwi Tours, Stephen Marshall.

The Tiwi region

Brief recent history

Melville Island was the first part of north Australia settled by Europeans; Fort Dundas near Pularumpi was occupied from 1824 to 1829. Despite this early attempt at settlement, the Tiwi Islands have remained fairly isolated from the mainland of Australia to the present. From 1894, a European buffalo hunter, Joe Cooper operated on Melville Island and in 1905 he established a base near the current location of Paru (see Map 7). By 1916, the size of the feral buffalo herd on Melville had declined and Cooper left the Island as his operation was no longer viable. In 1910, a portion of Bathurst Island was declared a native reserve and in 1911, a

mission was established by the Roman Catholic Sacred Heart Order on Bathurst Island.

In 1937 a small government depot was established at Garden Point. The Department of Native Affairs chose this as a location to send 'incurrigibles' from Darwin; it was also felt that an official European presence on Melville Island was needed, particularly after trouble with Japanese pearl divers in the early 1930s. No offenders were sent to Garden Point. In 1939, the Protector of Aborigines in the NT introduced a policy that each church denomination should look after its own part-coloured children (Pye 1985:109). In 1940, Garden Point was taken over as a mission by the Catholic Church; it became a home for part-Aboriginal children from throughout the NT and western Queensland.

The government depot moved from Garden Point to Snake Bay in 1941; this became the location where 'incurrigibles' were sent. In 1942, this settlement became an army/naval base, but again became a government settlement in 1945. In the 1950s and 1960s Snake Bay was frequently used as a location where Aboriginal offenders (who were 'wards of state' under the NT *Welfare Ordinance*, 1953) were sent for isolation sentences. In 1947, a timber mill was established at Snake Bay and subsequently in 1958 a large re-forestation program was started by the Forestry Branch of the NT Administration. In 1960, a small forestry camp was established at Snake Bay, but in 1964, this was shifted to Picketaramoor.

In 1967, the Catholic Church relinquished its control over the mission at Garden Point and the community became a government settlement. A brief history of the Islands has been compiled by Pye (1985) while Goodale (1971), Grau (1983), Stanley (1983), and Harrison (1986) have all included histories of individual communities in their research.

Tiwi communities

In Table 8.1, information is presented from the 1981 and 1986 Censuses on the Aboriginal populations of the Islands. It is evident that the majority of the population lives at three communities, Nguui, Milikapiti and Pularumpi. In 1981 and 1986 only a few

people lived at outstations, with Paru on Melville Island being the only outstation regularly occupied in the past six years. Stanley (1983:6) refers to four outstations, Kukini-Munkara (Cape Fourcroy), Rangku-Portaminni, Woolunga (Woolawunga) and Paru; Grau (1983:45) lists Paru, Tikelaru and Rangku. A number of other locations are regularly used by Tiwi as seasonal camps, particularly during the dry season school holiday period from mid June to August.

The information in Table 8.1 only numerates Tiwi living in the Islands. There are no accurate data on the number of Tiwi living in Darwin, but it is estimated that between 200 and 300 are permanent mainland residents. Many Tiwi people are relatively well integrated into urban living in Darwin having regular employment, primarily in the public service.

Table 8.1
*The Aboriginal population of Melville and Bathurst Islands,
1981 and 1986*

<u>Community</u>	1981	1986
Pularumpi	199	226
Nguiu	1,004	1,008
Milikapiti	218	397
<u>Outstations</u>	54	20
Total	1,475	1,651

Source: ABS Northern Territory Census Counts - 30 June 1986.

Despite the use of the term 'Tiwi' to refer to all the Aboriginal inhabitants of Melville and Bathurst Islands, there is some racial heterogeneity in the population. This is primarily a result of the functioning of Garden Point (Pularumpi) as a mission for part-Aboriginal children from 1940 to 1967. There was a marked migration of Tiwi from Garden Point in the 1960s and a subsequent return (particularly to Pularumpi) in the mid 1970s (interview with Tim Brennan, 25 July 1986). It is of interest that some people who are now residing at Kakadu and Gurig National Parks spent some time at the mission or government settlement on Melville Island.

Tiwi economic status

The brevity of my visits to Melville and Bathurst Islands in 1986 did not allow collection of primary economic data; thus this section relies on secondary sources. Fortunately, Stanley (1983), an economist, has published a monograph that provides detailed information on the economic situation at Nguu township in 1981; Harrison (1986), a nutritional anthropologist also conducted some economic surveys while undertaking fieldwork at Milikapiti in 1982 and 1983.

In 1981, 201 of 613 Tiwi aged over 15 years and residing at Nguu were employed, with the vast majority of these (95 per cent) being employed on a full-time basis (Stanley 1983:3). While Stanley does not provide information on the proportion of the population that is aged, he does indicate the number of social security benefits paid. In 1981, 198 benefits were paid to Tiwi, but of these many could have been paid to couples (the exceptions being widow's pensions, wife's pensions and supporting parent's benefits that must be paid to individuals). It is difficult to estimate levels of unemployment from Stanley's data; 50 Tiwi (individuals and/or couples) were receiving unemployment or sickness benefits. The overall unemployment rate was about 50 per cent.

Stanley (ibid:33) estimates that per capita income was \$1855 per annum or about one-third of Australia-wide per capita income. He notes (ibid:33-35) that the divergence in cash income levels between Tiwi and other Australians may be exaggerated because Tiwi housing costs are heavily subsidised, transport costs are low, Tiwi cultural norms [and the climate] require lower expenditure on dress, furniture and so on, health and other community services are provided free and imputed income from food gathering is not estimated.

Stanley calculated comprehensive social accounts for Nguu and noted that net subsidies (from government and mission sources) are \$2.6 million which is a little higher than the net value of local production (\$2.5 million). Export income of \$0.4 million is far lower than the cost of imports (\$2.2 million), leaving a substantial trade deficit of \$1.8 million.

Harrison (1986:101) indicates that 52 Tiwi at Milikapiti were employed in December 1983 and 101 were receiving social security benefits. About 30 per cent of the population aged 15 to 59 was employed. Unlike Stanley, she estimated incomes over two fortnightly periods rather than for a whole year. She calculated that total cash income at the 59 households at Milikapiti was \$36,640 or \$123 per capita per fortnight. This converts to an annual rate of \$3198 per capita.

Harrison's income estimate is significantly higher than Stanley's. This can be partly explained by increases in the consumer price index which are reflected in changes in wages and social security benefits. However, even adjusting for inflation, her estimate is some 69 per cent higher than Stanley's. The reasons for this are twofold. Firstly, Harrison notes that 50 per cent of cash income at Milikapiti came from social security. At Nguui, in 1980/81, the corresponding figure was only 23 per cent because at least 100 adults were not receiving any employment or social security income. This implies that social security benefits were not as widely endowed at Nguui in 1981 as at Milikapiti in 1983. Secondly, Tiwi employed at Milikapiti seemed to have earned higher annual incomes (of about \$9160 in 1983) than those at Nguui in 1981 (of about \$7500). However, these incomes are almost identical when adjusted for inflation.

There have been no detailed economic surveys conducted at Pularumpi, despite three feasibility studies of a proposed tourism enterprise conducted there by MacFarlane (1984, 1986) and Turnbull (1985). MacFarlane (1984:10-18) does provide a profile of the Pularumpi community, but quantitative data appear to have been gleaned from DAA community profiles. She estimates (ibid:14) that 68 Tiwi at Pularumpi were employed and 24 unemployed. This implies that the other 98 adults in the community aged between 15 and 60 were either outside the labour force or else were receiving social security benefits other than unemployment benefits. She provides no estimates of cash income levels.

The main difference between the three communities in economic terms appears to be the greater export of goods from Nguui than from Milikapiti or Pularumpi. This difference can be

directly linked to the establishment of a number of enterprises at Nguu (Bima Wear, Tiwi Designs, Tiwi Pottery and Tiwi Pima Art) that export goods. These enterprises will be discussed in greater detail later. Both Milikapiti and Pularumpi have established screen printing enterprises recently (in 1985) and a pottery has also been established at Pularumpi. However neither of these communities have the production expertise or marketing experience evident at Nguu.

The three communities appear to have a similar standard of living, which is low (in formal economic terms) by mainstream Australian standards, but which may be quite acceptable to Tiwi. Little research appears to have been conducted about Tiwi aspirations for formal employment and cash income, although a concern articulated by Aboriginal leaders at all three communities was that government support would decline in the future and that Tiwi need to develop independent sources of income to ensure that current living standards are maintained. There was some visual evidence that some sections of the Pularumpi community (namely employed people) had a higher standard of living than others. This observation contrasts with a comment made by Grau (1983:45), who lived at Pularumpi, that resources appeared to be fairly equitably distributed.

Political institutions

Two types of institution dominate Tiwi politics. These are the Tiwi Land Council, a pan-Islands organisation, and the three elected community governments of Nguu, Pularumpi and Milikapiti.

With the passage of the Land Rights Act early in 1977, the Aboriginal reserves of Melville and Bathurst Islands became Aboriginal land. Statutory responsibility for administering this land was vested in the Northern Land Council located in Darwin. In 1978, the Tiwi Land Council was established under sub-s.21(3) of the Land Rights Act and the boundaries over which the land council was established (the Tiwi Land Trust consisting of Melville and Bathurst Islands) was published in the *Gazette* (No. S162 of 18 August 1978). From that time, the Tiwi Land Council has had the statutory functions of a land council (as per s.23 of the Land Rights Act) and under sub-s.64(1) has received 2 per cent of mining

royalty equivalents received by the Aboriginals Benefit Trust Account to meet its administration costs. The amounts received are documented in Table 8.2.

It has been suggested elsewhere (Altman and Dillon 1988; Chapter 3) that land councils are increasingly operating as regional Aboriginal paragovernments. This seems to be particularly so with the Tiwi because the TLC draws its members from all land owning groups on the Islands who share a common language and culture. The seven Tiwi estates each nominate five members to the TLC and three seats are reserved for the council presidents of Nguju, Milikapiti and Pularumpi. Currently, the seat reserved for the Pularumpi council president is vacant as he holds a seat as a member of the Murnupi land holding group. All told then there are currently 37 members of the TLC, all of whom are male.

The TLC has two important roles that are linked to tourism development. Firstly, under s.23 of the Land Rights Act it must manage the land in accordance with the wishes of the traditional owners and negotiate on their behalf with respect to any proposed development on that land. These functions are no different from those undertaken by the NLC and CLC for other Aboriginal land trusts, except that the TLC being made up of senior traditional owners of the Islands is a far more homogeneous council than the other two. Secondly, under sub-s.35(1) of the Land Rights Act, the TLC is required to distribute any surpluses mining royalty equivalents it receives from the ABTA under sub-s.64(1) to Aboriginal Councils. Up until 1986 the TLC was the only land council with such surpluses to distribute. The extent of these surpluses are shown in Table 8.2. These moneys are of particular significance because they are a source of capital that is available for investment purposes that is totally independent of government funding cycles.

TLC access to income from mining royalty equivalents means that it can engage independent consultants to assess proposed developments. Since 1986, the TLC has engaged a Darwin-based company FACTS to manage its affairs. This company has also undertaken feasibility studies on the Islands for Tiwi communities. The role of FACTS and the need for independent assessment of proposals will be discussed in greater detail later.

Table 8.2
Funds available for distribution by the Tiwi Land Council

Year	Sub-s.64(1) payments (\$)	Approved budgets (\$)	Actual expenditure (\$)	Surplus for distribution (\$)
1978/79	22,716	12,215	6,620	16,096
1979/80	39,280	21,460	21,764	17,516
1980/81	76,714	42,200	24,104	52,610
1981/82	108,297	65,108	57,906	50,391
1982/83	303,637	72,000	61,720	241,917
1983/84	320,803	72,920	49,263	271,540
1984/85	340,415	107,100	108,429	231,286
1985/86	380,624	119,889	105,647	274,977
1986/87	374,661	112,040	132,602	242,059

Source: Altman (1985); Monica McDonald, DAA, Canberra.

It is not my aim to review the financial activities of the TLC, but the data in Table 8.2 do raise some issues. The annual surpluses of the TLC have been distributed to Aboriginal communities for a wide range of purposes that have included the establishment and subsidisation of enterprises, the purchase of community infrastructure, funding of education, health and cultural programs and the inevitable purchase of vehicles for individual clans for outstation development. Given that the Land Rights Act requires that budget surpluses to be distributed within six months of their receipt the TLC has not been able to accumulate these moneys. Moneys are distributed to incorporated communities or groups that make applications for grants on an annual basis; the only criteria that the TLC must use in its distribution determinations are the needs of Aboriginal applicants. It has been noted previously (Altman 1983a:101) that the current wording of sub-s.35(1) does not allow land councils to accumulate budget surpluses to invest them in large scale regional projects. It is also far from clear why sub-s.64(3) moneys paid to Aboriginal groups can be saved and invested, whereas sub-s.64(1) moneys cannot.

In 1986, there was some variability in the nature of community government on the Islands, with Pularumpi and Milikapiti being community governments under Part VIII of the

Northern Territory *Local Government Act*, 1985 while Nguiu remained an incorporated council under the federal *Aboriginal Councils and Association Act*, 1976. These different arrangements for local government funding did not seem to result in any substantive differences between communities; the major difference was that non-Tiwi were members of the Pularumpi and Milikapiti community councils whereas at Nguiu the council was all Tiwi.

As in all communities, there are divisions represented informally by factions. At both Pularumpi and Milikapiti there are factions that seem to be particularly development-oriented. These faction leaders are also community spokesmen and in discussions with outsiders they frequently present themselves as typical of Tiwi. There is no doubt that there are Tiwi who have aspirations for both formal employment and material success; in fact, many Tiwi have adapted successfully into life in Darwin. But there are also people who do not seek long term full-time employment. One of the interesting features of Tiwi community politics are the informal links between community leaders and outsiders. For example, the leadership of Pularumpi appears to have strong links with the Territory government, while at Nguiu the links are with the Territory Opposition. At Milikapiti there appear to be links with federal departments (like DAA) and statutory authorities (like ADC), partly because the council president was an ADC Commissioner, is a member of the ABTA Committee and had worked for DAA in Darwin. This man has acted as an extremely effective representative of Tiwi interests. This is evidenced by the significance of grants to all Tiwi communities from the ABTA (Altman 1985:45) and from the ADC, primarily for housing (ADC 1987:105-6).

There are a number of cross-cutting cleavages evident in community politics that are in part a result of residence mobility and of a Tiwi willingness to live away from their traditional country. At one level, the TLC represents all Tiwi in decision-making about the land and its development, but at another level land council members attempt to avoid any involvement in the politics of individual communities. Similarly, while all traditional owners are keen to protect general Tiwi interests on the land council, there is a keen rivalry between communities (and smaller alliances within communities) and an expressed desire for decision-

making autonomy from the TLC. The rivalry between communities (and within communities) is legend on the Islands and is reflected in the keenly contested Tiwi football competition. It is also evident in the rivalry between community leaders to demonstrate their ability to attract venture capital and establish new and profitable enterprises.

This rivalry can be counter-productive on two counts. Firstly, the significant budget surpluses that the TLC has been required to distribute since 1978 have generally been spent on community or clan projects rather than on pan-Tiwi investments. This has meant that blocks of capital have been divided when they may have been more effectively used on large scale investments. Secondly, there has been a tendency for Tiwi communities to attempt to emulate each other when commercial enterprises are successful. This has been evident in the past with market gardens, bakeries and fishing projects; it is currently evident in screen printing enterprises. Such competition not only undermines the ability of individual communities to specialise but it also fragments the regional Tiwi market that can be of importance to the commercial viability of enterprises.

The history of tourism development

For some years now Melville and Bathurst Islands have been regarded as having a potential for tourism development. This potential has been linked to the proximity of the Islands to Darwin, their natural beauty, the interesting material culture of the Tiwi, the relatively unrestricted nature of Tiwi ceremonial life, the existence of historic sites adjacent to Pularumpi at Fort Dundas and the relatively open demeanour of many Tiwi. Goodale (1971:12-13) notes that Snake Bay and Melville Island were earmarked for intensive development programs in the early 1950s. This was because of the positive attitude of Tiwi to education and change and the (perceived) commercial potential of the Islands themselves.

In 1972, as part of the general development push within the Welfare Branch of the NT Administration and interest in tourism after the report by Harris, Kerr, Forster and Company (1969a) a proposal to establish a tourism enterprise at Garden Point

(Pularumpi) was floated. The instigators of the proposal were Ansett Airlines and Connair (an NT-based airline). As the development was to occur on an Aboriginal reserve, it was submitted to the Welfare Branch. The then manager of the NT Tourist Bureau was also involved in the subsequent feasibility study for proposed day trips to Garden Point to view Fort Dundas, to buy Aboriginal artefacts and to cruise in the Apsley Strait with the possibility of fishing. It was intended that the Garden Point Progress Association would be responsible for the itinerary on Melville including tours, lunch and refreshments. It was noted at the time '... that both the Progress Association executive and the local Council are keen to see the proposal implemented...and that a number of Aborigines at Garden Point have shown interest in employment in the tourist trade' (DAA file 72/7921).

A five page feasibility study was prepared by an investigation officer of the Economics and Business Management division of the Welfare Branch (DAA file 72/7921). This study was both realistic and well researched; it suggested that employment and income spinoffs from the project would be limited and that it would only be profitable from year 5. It was noted at that time that artefacts would need to be imported to Melville Island from Bathurst until local production began. The proposal appears to have stalled for over a year after the feasibility study.

In 1974 it resurfaced when the Northern Land Council (in its pre-land rights guise) passed a resolution to support the Pularumpi community's desire for a tourism development and approached the DAA for assistance (correspondence dated 8 October 1974, DAA file 72/7921). The response from the DAA was swift as the community adviser at Pularumpi immediately raised the possibility of the venture again. He noted that interest in tourism at the community had waned because the community had other priorities. The main reason given to postpone any tourism development was that local housing was poor and that this would be an embarrassment to the community. It was decided that the matter should be discussed further in a few years time (correspondence dated 11 November 1974, DAA file 72/7921).

The next development was a proposal put to the Nguju Council in 1978 by Stephen Marshall who was then manager of Connair.

Marshall's proposal was that Connair would market Nguu as a tourist destination and would fly passengers to Bathurst, but that the Island portion of the tour would be undertaken by Tiwi. This proposal was rejected by the Nguu Council in 1978 and again in 1979 (interview with S. Marshall, 19 July 1986). In 1980, Marshall resigned from Connair and put forward a new proposal to establish and operate a tour company. This proposal was accepted by the Nguu Council and Tiwi Tours was established in 1980. From 1980 to 1983 Tiwi Tours visited Nguu and Pularumpi (Fort Dundas). In 1984, after a disagreement over site fees and frequency of visitation with the Pularumpi Council, Tiwi Tours rescheduled its tours to visit Nguu and Milikapiti. The Tiwi Tours enterprise is discussed in greater detail below.

The 'cultural tourism' push

In the early 1980s, the NT government was extremely keen to establish tourism enterprises on Aboriginal land (see Chapter 3). In 1984, Helen MacFarlane was commissioned as a special consultant to the Chief Minister to look at economic development options for three Aboriginal communities. One of her case studies was Pularumpi.

MacFarlane (1984:5) identified tourism as having the greatest potential in terms of appropriate economic development for Tiwi people. Her reasons for this assessment included the proximity of Melville Island to Darwin, the ready availability of resources (land, sea and 'culture'), the potential to utilise traditional skills and the potential to redevelop previously failed enterprises. MacFarlane (ibid:6) recommended the development of a small lodge to cater for a low volume, elite and primarily international market segment who desire to experience an indigenous culture first hand in a local environment.

MacFarlane's report was based on an assumption that there was a demand for Aboriginal cultural tourism. Given this demand, she set out to establish whether Tiwi at Pularumpi would supply Tiwi culture for the market. Her reasoning was that if Aboriginal people have a comparative advantage in the provision of any service it is in the provision of their own culture. MacFarlane's definition of Tiwi culture concentrated on the Tiwi interaction with

the environment, particularly in the hunting, fishing and gathering of indigenous flora and fauna with traditional technology.

MacFarlane's original proposal was based on some questionable assumptions. Most problematic was a skills survey that she conducted at Pularumpi in March 1984 based on a questionnaire administered to 64 adults (ibid:59-63). In this questionnaire Tiwi were asked questions such as 'do you hunt?', 'do you make your own tools?', 'do you participate in ceremony?', and 'do you dance for the public?' to establish the availability of traditional skills in the community. People were then asked whether they were interested in working, what kind of work they preferred and whether they would find 'Aboriginal' work (like hunting and tool-making) preferable to other work. The positive responses to these questions were used to argue that Tiwi would participate in a cultural tourism enterprise. However, her assessment of the supply of Tiwi labour appears to have been unrealistically optimistic. MacFarlane made no attempt to correlate the results of the questionnaire with actual work (and subsistence) practice at Pularumpi. In particular, no mention was made of the experiences of Tiwi Tours in the local labour market.

A major shortcoming of the MacFarlane report is that she treated the provision of cultural tourism as somehow different from the provision of other services in the tourism industry. Hence potential problems between Tiwi and clients like communications and regularity in service delivery were overlooked. Even if Tiwi did have a comparative advantage in the provision of Tiwi culture, this could be cancelled out by their comparative disadvantage in the hospitality industry. If these two components of tourism are to be separated (with Aborigines providing culture and non-Aborigines hospitality) then the relative financial returns to each must be calculated. A positive feature of MacFarlane's proposal was that she recommended a site for the tourist lodge some 20 kilometres away from Pularumpi and low visitor numbers to minimise any possibility for negative social impacts. However, this meant that Tiwi would have to commute to work and that an exclusive 'product' was needed to ensure financial viability.

MacFarlane's original report was followed up and refined in a feasibility study with the working title 'Australian Aboriginal

Adventure Tours' undertaken for the NT Development Corporation by Shann Turnbull (1985). Turnbull (ibid:3) recommended the establishment of a lodge with 12 motel rooms to be built at a capital cost of around \$1 million. He accepted MacFarlane's assumptions and recommendations as unproblematic and merely expanded her report findings into a development package. Like MacFarlane, Turnbull assumed that the lodge development could gain access to cheap finance (from the NT government and ABTA); that there was a high market demand for experiencing traditional Aboriginal activities and that people would be willing to pay in the region of \$1500 for a five day package ex-Darwin. Turnbull's feasibility study appears to have been based on particularly optimistic marketing assumptions that were questioned by the NT Tourist Commission. In particular Turnbull (ibid:40) forecasted substantial income to Tiwi people from the project. Not surprisingly, in a letter (appended to Turnbull's report) to the Chief Minister the then manager of the TLC states 'The TLC wishes to advise you that the proposal has their enthusiastic support'.

Early in 1985, Turnbull's study was endorsed by the NTDC and operators were sought for the proposed resort. The NTDC magazine *INDUS* gave the proposal media coverage with stories like 'Hunt with Aborigines holiday proposed' and 'Operators sought for planned resort - hunt with Aborigines' holiday' (*INDUS* March 1985 and June 1985). Despite possible NTDC financial backing for the project no entrepreneurial operator was found for the project. Interestingly, this was a potential risk identified by Turnbull (1985:43). It appears that the market judged these feasibility studies less optimistically than the Development Corporation, the Tiwi Land Council, and the consultants.

Tiwi expectations for a tourist development near Pularumpi had been fuelled by the two reports and discussions that both consultants had at the community and with members of the TLC. Subsequently in a further consultancy in mid 1986, MacFarlane Research Pty Ltd prepared another feasibility study for the NT Development Corporation, this time for a tourist camp. This more conservative proposal with a development cost of between \$115,000 to \$167,000 (MacFarlane 1986:2) formed the basis for the enterprise established at Putjamirra (Putrimirra) by Australian Kakadu Tours late in 1986.

It is of some concern that no critical assessments of the proposal by MacFarlane (1984) and the feasibility study by Turnbull (1985) were undertaken by the NTDC or the Tiwi Land Council. Indications are that the NTDC did not have staff with sufficient expertise on Aboriginal matters to critically assess the lodge proposal; the TLC could have sought independent assessment of the proposal.

Tourism enterprises in 1986

In 1986 when I visited Melville and Bathurst Islands two very different tourism enterprises were operational, Tiwi Tours and Finz Remote Fishing Tours.

Tiwi Tours

Tiwi Tours was established in 1980 and began regular operations to Bathurst and Melville Islands in 1981. Tiwi Tours has an exclusive touring licence granted by the Tiwi Land Council. In the past this licence has been renewed annually, but in 1986 it was granted for three years (to the end of the 1989 season) with a further three year option. The company is owned and operated by Stephen Marshall, a Darwin-based entrepreneur who has had a long association with the Islands linked to his earlier employment with Connair. Up until 1986, all tours were personally conducted by Marshall; in 1986 another person was employed full-time to assist with tour guiding.

Tiwi Tours has changed somewhat in its format over the past six years. Initially, mainly half day tours were offered, with some special charter overnight camping tours being available in conjunction with Bill Kings. Full-day tours were subsequently introduced, first on a once a week basis, then twice a week, and so on as the enterprise grew. Tiwi Tours links in with regular scheduled flights to the Islands; both day and half day tours begin at Nguiu, with the half day participants returning to Darwin at about 1 p.m. and the day tourers crossing by boat to Paru before proceeding for lunch and a swim at Turacumbie and departure from Milikapiti at about 4 p.m. From 1981 to 1983, Tiwi Tours visited Fort Dundas near Pularumpi and departed from the airport there.

Milikapiti became the departure point from 1984 after a disagreement between the Pularumpi Council and Tiwi Tours over a proposed entry fee to view the ruins of Fort Dundas. Furthermore, the Pularumpi Council was unwilling for Tiwi Tours to increase the frequency of their visits beyond two visits per week. On the other hand, in a move that partly reflects inter-community rivalry, the Milikapiti Council gave permission for Tiwi Tours to use their community and airstrip as a departure point on an unlimited basis.

Currently no overnight camping tours are on offer because of a lack of suitable accommodation on the Islands; indeed even Tiwi Tours staff have had difficulty in finding sleeping quarters at Nguiu. A feature of the costing for this tour (\$185 for a full day and \$125 for a half-day tour in 1987) is that a high proportion of the cost is taken up by the airfare; according to the manager of Tiwi Tours this large airfare component is the major factor limiting tourist demand. The emphasis in the marketing of the tour (primarily via brochures) is on seeing Aboriginal communities (Nguiu and Milikapiti), interacting with Tiwi, seeing industry workshops, buying Aboriginal material culture, learning about the history of the region and learning something about Tiwi culture, with a highlight being a visit to a Tiwi Pukamani burial site. Tiwi Tours operates a variable monthly schedule from February to November. During the tourism peak from April to September tours are available Monday to Friday, and on Saturday during August. Seasonal road access restrictions limit the tour to Nguiu only in February and no tours are offered in December and January.

In Table 8.3, information on the number of Tiwi Tours visitors to the Islands is presented. These records are kept by the tour operator. It is evident that there has been a steady growth in visitor numbers since 1981; in 1987, about 2733 Tiwi Tours patrons visited the Islands (Stephen Marshall, pers. comm.). In 1986, about 45 per cent of tourists took the half day trip with the remainder being full-day visitors; in 1987 this situation changed markedly with only 21 per cent of visitors taking the half day trip. The various impacts of tourism are greater at Nguiu (where all visitors arrive and spend half a day) than at Milikapiti (where full-day visitors depart but spend only an hour).

Table 8.3
Tiwi Tours visitors, 1981 to 1987

Calendar year	Number of passengers	Growth rate
1981	454	-
1982	805	77%
1983	1,213	51%
1984	1,117	-8%
1985	1,497	34%
1986	2,516	68%
1987	2,733	9%

Source: Stephen Marshall, Tiwi Tours, Darwin.

There is a heavy emphasis in the marketing of Tiwi Tours on the opportunity to see Tiwi people manufacturing screen prints, pottery and artefacts. The visit to Nguiu also provides tourists with an opportunity to purchase Tiwi material culture at wholesale prices that are at least 40 per cent below Darwin retail prices for identical items. Information on purchases by tourists at four outlets on Bathurst are presented in Table 8.4. These sales increased five fold between 1982 and 1985. In 1986, sales to Tiwi Tour visitors doubled again and exceeded \$100,000 (Stephen Marshall, pers. comm.). It is of interest that average sales per tourist increased from \$13.20 in 1982 to \$35.20 in 1985; in 1986, it is estimated that tourists spent \$50 per head on artefacts and Tiwi textiles. Tiwi Tours staff frequently sells items on behalf of Tiwi enterprises (particularly at Tiwi Pima Art and at the pottery) but no commission is charged on sales.

Sales that result directly from Tiwi Tours are significant for local enterprises. While Tiwi Tours figures are in calendar years and turnover data are for financial years, an indication of the significance of sales to Tiwi Tours can be calculated. For this exercise 1985 calendar year data are presented as a proportion of sales for the four enterprises for 1984/85; 11.5 per cent of Bima Wear sales, 35.8 per cent of Tiwi Pima sales, 32.9 per cent of Tiwi Pottery sales and 19.8 per cent of Tiwi Design sales respectively were to Tiwi Tours passengers. Overall, 17 per cent of aggregate sales by these four enterprises were to consumers brought to Nguiu by Tiwi Tours. These were almost all cash sales. It is likely that

the availability of goods at wholesale price and the opportunity to see Aboriginal people working at Tiwi Designs, Tiwi Pottery and Tiwi Bima would have encouraged tourists to purchase goods.

Table 8.4
Expenditure by Tiwi Tours visitors at Nguiu, Bathurst Island

	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986 ^a
	(\$)	(\$)	(\$)	(\$)	(\$)
Bima Wear	5,000	9,600	13,700	19,720	8,723
Tiwi Designs	1,841	7,902	8,910	16,744	8,257
Tiwi Pima Art	2,201	5,310	6,633	12,466	7,167
Tiwi Pottery	1,553	2,633	2,004	3,787	1,601
Total	10,595	25,445	31,247	52,717	25,748

Footnote: a. To June 1986

Source: Stephen Marshall, Tiwi Tours, Darwin.

Other economic spinoffs to Tiwi from this tour operation are more limited. In 1986, two Tiwi women were employed on a part-time basis to prepare morning tea for visitors. While in the past Tiwi have been employed as guides and to assist with transportation of visitors, currently there are no Tiwi that desire such employment. This is partly linked to the extremely tight schedule on which Tiwi Tours operates, with a need to link up with regular commercial flights. A coaster bus is leased from the Milikapiti community to transport visitors from Paru to Milikapiti, although Tiwi Tours now also has its own buses on both Islands.

Visitor satisfaction with Tiwi Tours has been assessed by Moscardo and Pearce (1985) in a brief analysis of a sample of 126 questionnaires. The results of their report are interesting because they are the only available visitor response to a tour in Australia that emphasises Aboriginal cultural tourism. Tour participants were asked to assess their overall satisfaction with the tour on a scale of 1 to 5 with 5 being top; 81 per cent put 5, 15 per cent 4, and only 4 per cent less than 4. Overall comments are extremely positive, with the social interaction with Tiwi people rating as a major attraction and the majority stating that enough information

had been provided. An open-ended question indicated that the main highlights of the tour included, meeting Tiwi people (16 per cent), meeting particular Tiwi (10 per cent) and Turacumbie Falls (14 per cent). A long list of other highlights were listed including everything about the tour, seeing Tiwi life, Tiwi children; learning about the Islands; artefact and screen-printing outlets. (There was obviously a great deal of multicollinearity in responses.)

Suggestions for tour improvements included the desire for an information booklet (literature is available for sale at Nguiu), Tiwi guides, more information on Tiwi, and so on. In summary, Moscardo and Pearce (1985) note that there was a high level of satisfaction with the tour and tour equipment; the major highlights/positive features were meeting Tiwi people, Turacumbie Falls and the guide and the major suggestion for improvement was to have more information about the Tiwi and the environment.

A personal assessment of the Tiwi Tour I took (with the prior knowledge of the owner/operator who was one of two guides that day) is extremely positive. Highlights for me included the chance to learn something about the mission history of Nguiu, and to visit the four craft outlets and to discuss production techniques with Tiwi screen printers. The tour guide kept us tourists tightly controlled, but there was a chance for informal social interaction at the morning tea (hosted by Tiwi women), at the Tiwi Designs and Bima Wear factories, and on a stroll between the Bima Wear Factory and Tiwi Pima artefacts outlet. The overall interaction with Tiwi was very pleasant; Tiwi approach visitors to say 'good day' and at Milikapiti children even voluntarily hold hands with tourists on a walk along the beach. All quite idyllic and the friendliness appears to be no masquerade; the Chairman of the Tiwi Land Council told me in no uncertain terms that Tiwi know how to make people feel unwelcome if they want to (interview with Jimmy Tipungwuti, 29 July 1986). Tipungwuti also stated that he had never heard any complaint from local people about Tiwi Tours.

On the other hand, there is a feeling among influential Tiwi that the owner/operator of Tiwi Tours is making big profits. In 1986, Tiwi Tours was required to renegotiate with the Tiwi Land Council for a licence to operate on Aboriginal land. In negotiations, the TLC requested that a \$50 per head charge for full-day visitors

to the Islands be introduced. This levy was opposed by Tiwi Tours, primarily on the grounds that no commission was taken on sales of Tiwi goods (interview with S. Marshall, 19 July 1986). Subsequently, the levy required was dropped to \$10 per full-day passenger and introduced in April 1987. In calendar year 1987, about \$20,000 was paid by Tiwi Tours to the TLC.

There are a number of important lessons that can be learnt from the Tiwi Tours experience. Firstly, tourism does not create many jobs directly, especially if there is no accommodation component. Tiwi Tours was in its sixth year of successful operation in 1986, and a second full-time position had just been created. In 1986, Tiwi Tours generated two and a half positions for the owner/operator, his wife and one employee and two very part-time positions for Tiwi. Secondly, tour enterprises are part of the extremely tight and demanding service industry. The owner/operator of Tiwi Tours emphasised that he was keen to employ a Tiwi guide full-time but that punctuality and a willingness to work a long day were required. Tiwi have been employed on the tour driving a bus from Paru to Pularumpi and from Paru to Milikapiti without success. It appears that Tiwi have limited aspirations for longer term involvement on a regular basis with Tiwi Tours as currently constituted. Finally, the brochure produced by Tiwi Tours could provide a model for other enterprises on Aboriginal land. It emphasises the need for tourists to wear presentable attire; discretion and politeness in photography; a prohibition on alcohol; the need to stay with the driver/guide at all times and the opportunity to both view and procure local products.

A key feature of Tiwi Tours is that it has had no obvious negative social impacts and has positive economic impacts on the Tiwi. The Chairman of the TLC noted that the behaviour of tourists is the responsibility of the tour guide from the moment people step off the plane at Nguju (interview 29 July 1986). To date this responsibility appears to have been met satisfactorily.

Port Hurd fishing lodge

Early in 1986, the Tiwi Land Council completed an agreement with Remote Fishing Tours Pty Ltd. This agreement granted the company exclusive rights to develop a tourism and recreational

fishing base at Port Hurd on Bathurst Island. The agreement runs from 1 April 1986 to 1 April 1989 in the first instance. While the agreement refers to development of tourism and recreational fishing, it is primarily concerned with the latter. The development at Port Hurd is now called 'Barra Base' and is marketed solely as a fishing location. Its brochure is headed 'I only went to "*Barra Base*" to catch barramundi'. The Tiwi Sport and Gamefishing Club is located at the lodge. Barra Base is marketed primarily through the NTTC and Australian Airlines.

The agreement between the TLC and Remote Fishing Tours allows the construction of demountable accommodation (removable infrastructure) at Port Hurd about 70 kilometres by seasonal vehicle track from Nguiu. Permission is also granted for the clearing of an airstrip for single engine planes. Returns to the Tiwi Land Council appear limited and are \$50 per tourist who stays over 3 days; \$20 per tourist who arrives via the airstrip; and \$10 per day for a tourist who stays up to three days. The manager of the TLC estimated that in 1986/87 returns from these fees would total \$12,000, growing to \$30,000 in 1987/88 (interview with John Hicks, 10 June 1986). Average return per visitor was estimated to be \$70 suggesting that there would be in the region of 200 visitors in 1986/87 and 400 in 1987/88. This enterprise is obviously low key and is totally independent of any direct Tiwi involvement.

By August 1986, a 12 room bunkhouse with common central facilities block had been constructed at Port Hurd and by year's end an unsealed airstrip had been completed. It is estimated that the initial development of the facility cost about \$160,000 (FACTS, 1986a:19). Indications are that the development costs of this resort escalated markedly in 1987 and may have exceeded \$700,000. Furthermore, it appears (see below) that the commercial arm of the TLC established in December 1986 is now joint owner of this resort, and has provided much of this development capital.

The exclusivity guaranteed in the Port Hurd agreement was seen by Tiwi as a means to control unregulated fishing by Darwin people within two kilometres of the Islands (interview with Jimmy Tipungwuti, 29 July 1986). However there was also concern expressed that there was no Aboriginal employment generated by the project and no Aboriginal presence at Port Hurd to check on

developments (interview with Robert Tipungwuti, 23 July 1986). People at Milikapiti also expressed concern that the exclusivity guaranteed to Remote Fishing Tours may preclude them from establishing a fishing venture. However, this exclusivity clause does not appear to have extended to a more recent development at Putjamirra on Melville Island.

It is difficult to make any other comment on the Port Hurd development, because it was only at an early establishment phase in 1986 and because I did not visit the location nor interview any of its non-Tiwi owners. While initial Tiwi involvement in the project appears limited, the Tiwi Land Council has a future option (now taken up) to buy a 50 per cent equity in the development.

Recent developments

There have been three important recent developments since my visits to the Islands in 1986. The proposals for the establishment of a lodge at Milikapiti and a 'safari camp' at Putjamirra were being considered in 1986; the establishment of a commercial arm of the TLC was in keeping with a trend among land councils to move into the economic development arena (Chapter 3).

Milikapiti Lodge

In July 1986 when I visited Milikapiti there was a great deal of interest in the possible establishment of a lodge near the township. The community's objectives for this enterprise were both diverse and unclear. Members of the Milikapiti Council and the town clerk whom I interviewed emphasised that they were keen to utilise tourism development as a means for employment creation and income generation. There was a perception at Milikapiti that tourism spinoffs were accruing to Nguu from Tiwi Tours and that Milikapiti which was the final stop on the tour was missing out on opportunities because visitors had already shopped. There is certainly some justification for this view, although it should also be noted that enterprises at Nguu are highly developed. Milikapiti only has a fledgling screen printing enterprise underway and the manager of the store (interview with Paul Loeven, 23 July 1986) estimated that tourists only accounted for 10 per cent of sales.

People at Milikapiti were also aware that negotiations were underway for a development at Putjamirra (see below). There was a feeling that Milikapiti must also participate in tourism or it will miss lucrative commercial opportunities; the proposal was a local political response to developments at Pularumpi.

The Milikapiti proposal is somewhat different from other developments on the Islands because it plans to site the lodge adjacent to the town. This strategy is linked to the aim of using the lodge as both a destination for tourists and as an accommodation facility for people visiting Milikapiti for official business; there is an acute shortage of guest accommodation at Milikapiti as at most Aboriginal communities in north Australia.

In 1986, the ADC funded a detailed feasibility study to assess the commercial viability of a lodge. The study was co-ordinated by FACTS (1986a), with separate input from Destination Australia Marketing Pty Ltd, who undertook the tourist market appraisal and a Darwin-based economist who provided the general economic appraisal. The feasibility study recommended that a 24 bungalow facility be constructed with the suggested name 'Tiwi Island Lodge'; it was estimated that the total cost of construction would be \$1.2 million. It was recognised in the feasibility study that the lodge would not be financially viable without access to cheap finance; it was even suggested that loan repayments may need to be limited to a financial availability level for three to five years (FACTS 1986a:12).

This study can be criticised for a number of reasons. Firstly, it makes no mention of the potentially competing development at Putjamirra, the feasibility studies undertaken by MacFarlane (1984, 1986) and Turnbull (1985) and the downgrading of the Putjamirra proposal from a lodge to a camp because of a lack of development finance.

Secondly, it appears that potential economic spinoffs are overstated. Provision is made in costings for 12 staff. However, the jobs listed include managers, food and beverage staff, house staff, sales staff, clerical administration and maintenance, all jobs that are currently held by non-Tiwi in Milikapiti. As in previous studies, the integration of the local labour force into the development is

regarded as unproblematic; it is stated that 'in time it would not be unrealistic to expect the majority of these positions to be locally filled' (FACTS 1986a:73). There is an uncritical acceptance that Aboriginal articulation of interest in employment will convert to a ready supply of local labour for the hospitality industry. There is reference in the study to an art and craft shop that does not exist; it is not recognised that Tiwi Designs is Bathurst Island based (ibid:74); and it is not acknowledged that most Tiwi Tours visitors would have completed their shopping at Nguuu.

Finally, there is a great deal of variability within the report in estimates of visitor numbers, revenue, possibilities for loan repayment and development costs. Finally, it is assumed that the provision of 'Tiwi culture' as a component of the tourist experience is unproblematic, whereas experience elsewhere suggests that local participation will not be sustained in the longer run on a regular basis. While it is intended that tourists will be strictly regulated to limit negative social impacts, it is also proposed that tourist activities like bicycle riding and bush walking (that are difficult to control) will be offered. The proximity of the proposed site to Milikapiti would make the regulation of tourists extremely difficult, especially as the study proposes to mix tourists and visitors on official business at one location.

Putjamirra (Putrimirra)

When I visited Pularumpi in July 1986 a great deal of frustration was expressed at delays in implementing the MacFarlane (1984) and Turnbull (1985) proposal by the Council chairman (interview with Cyril Rioli, 24 July 1986). I was shown the ruins of Fort Dundas that has recently been cleared by Operation Raleigh and informed that the community was ready to participate in tourism. However, Rioli emphasised that the community was only interested in an initial limited involvement in tourism. It seems that the original wilderness lodge proposal was not only too ambitious for potential developers but also for Tiwi people themselves.

Late in 1986 Australian Kakadu Tours (AKT) completed an agreement with the Tiwi Land Council to set up 'an African style safari camp' at Putjamirra (called Putrimirra in earlier studies). The proposal for this camp was modelled closely on MacFarlane's

second study for the NT Development Corporation. The agreement allows AKT to operate alone for a three year period from 1 April 1987, after which the TLC will have the option to buy a 50 per cent share in the enterprise. The major financial benefits from the development are a fee of \$10 per visitor per day that AKT pay to the Pularumpi Council (not the Tiwi Land Council) and guaranteed employment for up to eight Aboriginal guides.

Putjamirra is marketed with a heavy emphasis on cultural tourism. A brochure *Putjamirra - a Glimpse of the Dreamtime* begins 'The Tiwi people are inviting you to venture into the unique world of the Australian Aboriginal, whose lifestyle and cultural wealth has existed for thousands of years...your stay at Putjamirra will provide you with a glimpse into their culture. Participate in the foreshore foraging, hunting and fishing and the day to day life of the Tiwi people...' The tour operates from May to October and standard tours extend over two and three days with the former costing \$499 per person and the latter \$699. These charges are all inclusive and include airfares, all meals, permit fees, guiding fees, use of boats and equipment and accommodation. The facilities at Putjamirra have a capacity for only 20 visitors at a time.

Putjamirra has operated for a short time and early indications are that it is a commercial success. In 1987, an average of 5 visitors were at the camp every day; over the six month season there were about 360 visitors at the camp who stayed a total of 900 visitor nights (Darrell Tutty, pers. comm.). Aboriginal guides were employed by AKT at a ratio of one guide to every two tourists. Tutty reports that guides turned up for work regularly on all days bar two and that he was extremely pleased with the level of Tiwi commitment to the enterprise, particularly as the camp operates seven days a week for the 30 weeks it is open. His only concern is that it is primarily older people in the 50-60 age bracket who are working as guides; this could be linked to the extent of their knowledge about traditional subsistence activities since this is the focus of guided tours. While a maximum of eight guides could be employed, on occasions groups of 15 to 20 took tourists on excursions. During much of the dry season many of the guides camped at Woolawunga some 2 kilometres south of Putjamirra. Three whites were employed at the camp full-time to provide the hospitality component of the enterprise.

The economic spinoffs to Tiwi from the project are primarily limited to permit fees (with \$9000 being paid to the Pularumpi Council), wages to guides (about \$22,500 gross) and purchases by AKT (fuel sales totalled between \$5000 to \$6000) and visitors at Pularumpi. A small outlet has been established at the Putjamirra camp for the sale of artefacts and T shirts screen printed at Pularumpi; Tutty estimates that in the region of \$3000-4000 worth of goods was sold at this outlet (interview on 29 January 1988).

As the Putjamirra enterprise only started in April 1987 it is a little early to assess its longer term viability; the emphasis during the first year has been on product development and marketing. Nevertheless with an infrastructure investment of \$200,000 Tutty reports that AKT broke even on the venture, partly due to a \$30,000 development grant from the NT government.

An early problem with the enterprise that will need to be resolved is the possible impact of continual predation pressure on flora and fauna in the Putjamirra area for six months of the year. It is highly unlikely that under traditional conditions Tiwi would have camped at the one location for six months. The problem is that Aboriginal guides are a little too keen to demonstrate their foraging skills. It will be necessary for guides to provide demonstrations in future without actually overutilising resources.

It is also evident that the main component of Tiwi culture that is being demonstrated is food hunting, gathering, and fishing skills; there is no demonstration of the art and craft making, dancing and singing anticipated by MacFarlane (1986:4). Part of the problem (as in 1972) is that Pularumpi people have not developed a regular art and craft industry. This means that they are missing out on an important opportunity to market artefacts directly to tourists.

Indeed the support for the enterprise, primarily from the traditional owners of the Putjamirra site, appears to vindicate MacFarlane's optimistic assessment of Tiwi demand for jobs in 'cultural tourism'. However it must be emphasised that the Putjamirra enterprise has only operated at 20-25 per cent of its small capacity. A more realistic assessment of Tiwi response to jobs in the tourism industry can only be made when the enterprise is fully established and operating with higher visitor levels.

Pirntubula Company

Late in 1986, the Tiwi Land Council established a company Pirntubula whose shareholders are the Council's members, traditional owners of Melville and Bathurst Islands. This company is similar to the commercial arms of the CLC (Centrecorp) and the NLC (Northern Aboriginal Investment Corporation). In the TLC case, Pirntubula was established to invest sub-s.64(1) surpluses on behalf of all Tiwi people. The TLC has moved to save a proportion (50 per cent) of its budget surpluses in a manner that is similar to a recommendation made for the ABTA (Altman 1985:129-47).

There is little information available on the operations of Pirntubula, but its principle investment policy appears to be to gain an equity stake in all tourism developments on the Islands. Pirntubula has bought a 50 per cent equity in the Port Hurd fishing lodge (TLC 1988) and the Tiwi Land Council has options to buy up to 50 per cent of both Tiwi Tours and Putjamirra in 1990.

While the rationale for establishing a commercial arm to the TLC is understandable, the new company's policies and objectives have not been explicitly stated (TLC 1988). It is important that the Tiwi Land Council develops an integrated and coherent plan for tourism development on Melville and Bathurst Islands. There appear to be some anomalies in the licence agreements that the TLC has completed with tour operators to date. For example, AKT pays its visitor fees directly to the Pularumpi Council, whereas Tiwi Tours and Remote Fishing Tours pay the TLC.

The current relationship between FACTS and the TLC is unclear; for example, is FACTS the TLC's sole source of commercial advice? If FACTS, an Aboriginal owned company, continues to manage the TLC, then it is important that the TLC gets independent consultants to assess the feasibility of tourism projects. Too many of the specific studies undertaken on the Islands (and elsewhere in the NT) appear to advocate tourism development rather than providing a realistic assessment of the viability of projects.

The economic impact of tourism

Direct impacts

The direct economic impact of tourism at Melville and Bathurst Islands is currently limited. This is partly because visitor numbers are small (being in the region of 3500 visitors or 4900 visitor days) and partly because the Tiwi population is relatively large for an Aboriginal owned tourist destination. For example, at Cobourg Peninsula, visitor days are more than double the number on the Islands, whereas the resident Aboriginal population is only three per cent of the Tiwi population. The ratio of Tiwi to visitor days is approximately 1: 0.008 whereas at Cobourg this ratio is 1: 0.67.

Direct economic impacts are defined as those linked to tourist visitation to the Islands; these are limited to employment opportunities, sales of goods to visitors and the payments of entry levies imposed since 1986.

The employment spinoffs from tourism development are very limited; Tiwi Tours employs two women part-time (for about 3 hours a day) for 9 months of the year, and AKT employs up to eight part-time for six-months of the year. This converts to about 5 part-time positions on an annual basis. The income generated by this employment is in the region of \$28,000 per annum.

There are greater employment spinoffs from the direct buying of Tiwi Tours clients from enterprises at Nguu. Stanley (1983:24) estimated that 34 Tiwi were employed by the art and craft enterprises at Nguu; it is likely that a great deal more are engaged on a casual or occasional basis, particularly in the manufacture of artefacts for Tiwi Pima. It was shown earlier that in 1985, 17 per cent of the turnover of the four art and craft enterprises at Nguu was from direct sales to tourists. By 1987, it is likely that this proportion will have increased to between 25 and 30 per cent because of the rapid growth in Tiwi Tours (see Table 8.3). This means that up to 10 positions at enterprises could be attributed to the activities of Tiwi Tours. In monetary terms, Tiwi Tours visitors spent in the region of \$100,000, but not all of this income would flow to producers/employees of enterprises. Tiwi Tours is adamant that much more could be sold if regular supplies were available.

In 1986, entry levies were only paid with respect to the fishing lodge at Port Hurd; given that this venture only started in April 1986 it is unlikely that more than about \$6000 was paid to the TLC in that calendar year. From April 1987, both Tiwi Tours and AKT (that only started at Putjamirra in May) were required to pay entry levies. In 1987 these payments amounted to about \$40,000 although it is unclear how or if they were distributed to Tiwi. A per capita distribution would have only amounted to \$25 per annum.

The Putjamirra tourist camp also resulted in the sale of some artefacts and screen printed items from Pularumpi and expenditure by AKT and visitors at the general store. It is unlikely that these expenditures exceeded \$14,000 in 1987.

All told, tourist expenditures, levies and wages would have provided less than \$200,000 to the Islands' economy in 1987. The uppermost figure of \$200,000 can be contrasted with Stanley's (1983:36) estimated of gross domestic product. Expanding Stanley's data to both Islands on a per capita basis and even ignoring the effects of inflation since 1980/81, the direct economic impact of tourism accounted for less than 5 per cent of Islands' gross domestic product.

Indirect impacts

The indirect impacts of tourism refer to sales of goods and services by Tiwi to tourists who do not visit the Islands. Stanley (1983:37) notes that almost all the goods exported from Nguu (\$184,000 in 1980/81) were produced by the art and craft enterprises. By 1984/85 craft sales had increased to about \$316,000 (Aboriginal Arts Board, 1986:722). This represented about 17 per cent of total craft centre sales in the NT. It is estimated that about 82 per cent of Tiwi sales occurred in the NT (AAB 1986:722), with about 20 per cent occurring at Bathurst.

It is impossible to estimate what proportion of sales were to NT residents (white and black) as distinct from inter-state and international visitors, but it is likely that tourists are important clients; and vice versa, Tiwi enterprises would have spinoff benefits for tourism and the NT economy. Furthermore, a high proportion of

Tiwi items that are exported inter-state (particularly to southern state capitals) would be subsequently sold to tourists.

The importance of the tourist trade to these enterprises cannot be overstated. An examination of the financial accounts of Bima Wear (FACTS 1986b), Tiwi Designs, Tiwi Pima and Tiwi Pottery for the five years 1980/81 to 1984/85 shows that none have become financially independent. Indeed, all have had financial problems and have been dependent on operating subsidies from a variety of sources. These have included the ADC, the Tiwi Land Council, the DAA, The Aboriginal Arts Board and the NEAT (National Employment and Training) Scheme. It is likely that in future these sources of subvention will either decline or disappear. Consequently, a growth in tourism (not necessarily to the Islands) could become an increasingly important means to achieve financial viability.

Conclusion

There is a general and clearly articulated feeling among the Tiwi leadership that government subvention of Aboriginal communities will decline in the future. This view was expressed independently at Nguiu, Pularumpi and Milikapiti. Tourism is seen as an important means to get some financial independence and to maintain living standards rather than improve them. But there is also a feeling that tourism is a necessary evil, because there is concern expressed at all communities about unrestricted visitation and the need to keep tourism closely regulated so that it does not impinge on the lives of Tiwi people.

Visitation to the Islands is currently limited and small scale; Tiwi Tours has the largest potential for expansion because its clients are day visitors and do not require overnight accommodation. There is no danger that tourism to the Islands will increase rapidly in the short term because existing enterprises have a limited capacity. With maximum occupancy Putjamirra (as currently constituted) could only provide about 4000 visitor nights per annum, and Port Hurd's Barra Base even less, despite the potential to remain open for a longer season. A feature of both of these developments is their remoteness from Tiwi communities.

In the absence of a parks authority, there is need for a central agency to collect information on tourist visitation. In 1986, the best available data were provided voluntarily by Tiwi Tours; the Tiwi Land Council appeared to collect no reliable statistics on tourist visitation to the Islands. The onus is on the Tiwi Land Council to collect data on visitor numbers and to monitor the economic, environmental and social impacts of tourist enterprises. This responsibility is at least partly linked to the statutory functions of the land council specified in the Land Rights Act. But it is also important because the TLC is the body that ultimately approves or rejects tourist proposals. At present, all tour operators are required to pay an entry levy (per visitor day) but it is far from clear how the TLC is receiving accurate returns in the absence of information on visitor arrivals and departures.

Accurate historical and contemporary information is also important for informed debate on the impact of tourism. This issue is of special importance at Melville and Bathurst Islands because these Islands are Aboriginal land and tourism can be restricted or stopped if its overall effect is judged to be negative. A number of unrealistic feasibility studies appear to have been accepted uncritically by the TLC since 1984, although a simplified version of MacFarlane's (1986) study was used to establish a low-key development at Putjamirra. The TLC has financial resources provided by the Land Rights Act that could be used to gain independent assessment of proposals. It was of some concern that in 1986 FACTS was retained as managers of TLC while engaged to undertake feasibility studies; there was clearly potential for conflict of interest. An important question that needs to be addressed immediately is the impact of predation pressure at Putjamirra on subsistence resources near the tourist camp. Subsistence resources are renewable, but at a certain critical level they become non-renewable. In the longer term the TLC should look to developing a regional tourism development plan for the Islands.

Currently, the TLC is in the process of developing financial and investment policies that either favour tourism enterprises, or provide an option to invest at some future date. So far, the TLC's commercial arm, Pirntubula Company, has only invested in the Port Hurd Barra Base. In moving to procure an equity stake in tourism, the TLC must clarify its objectives in making such investments. The

crucial issue is whether investments in these joint ventures are being made for commercial or social reasons. If commercial objectives are paramount, then the TLC must make sure that these joint ventures are profitable; otherwise Aboriginal interests will merely be providing cheap development capital to non-Aboriginal joint venturers. If these enterprises are being procured for social reasons, particularly to control tourists, then an equity stake may be unnecessary; lease and licence agreements can stipulate employment, financial and other conditions for development on Aboriginal land. The problem of control is not overcome, however, by equity or by stringent conditions in lease agreements. In the former case, Tiwi people (or their representatives) would need to function effectively on the Board of Directors and in the latter case conditions would need to be policed.

Woodward (1974:93) notes that there is a danger in creating too many competing tourist enterprises on Aboriginal land. This danger is of particular relevance in this case study because of the intense competition between Tiwi communities. There are examples from the 1960s and 1970s of the three communities competing with each other, rather than specialising, and consequently undermining the critical mass necessary for enterprise viability.

Currently, the three existing tourist enterprises do not compete; they provide three distinctly different products that appeal to different market segments. Tiwi Tours emphasises contemporary Tiwi life and contact history, artefact manufacture and sale and the environment from a scenic perspective; this tour operation is based purely on half and full-day trips. Putjamirra also emphasises the environment, but its speciality is cultural tourism, with pre-contact Aboriginal society emphasised in marketing, and contemporary foraging practices being demonstrated to visitors by Tiwi. The fishing lodge at Port Hurd is simply marketed on its unique location and access to game fish; in this enterprise there is no contact with Tiwi; Barra Base is strictly for sports fishing enthusiasts. The only competition at present occurs in the production of items of material culture for sale. In particular, all communities have screen printing enterprises, although these have local, as well as tourist, clientele.

It is early days in tourism on Melville and Bathurst Islands, but an important policy issue is already emerging. The relatively large and concentrated population of the Islands means that the economic impacts of tourism on a per capita basis are limited. This in turn means that the TLC and community councils must decide how the returns from tourism are to be distributed. An advantage of indirect involvement in tourism is that artefact producers are rewarded by the immediacy of a market for their goods; in this way, work effort in artefact manufacture is rewarded with sales. The emphasis on Tiwi equity involvement in tourism raises a problem, because it will mean that all Tiwi will be part-owners of enterprises. It is a little difficult to see how pan-Islands enterprises jointly owned by over 1600 Tiwi will result in economic status improvement. For example, annual profits of \$1 million equitably distributed will only increase per capita income by about \$600. This raises an important policy dilemma: should developments at a smaller clan or family-based level be supported to ensure a correlation between work effort and returns or should the emphasis be on large scale Tiwi investments that will result in limited returns to all?

Part C

Conclusion

Chapter 9

Policy issues

This chapter highlights some of the policy issues raised in previous chapters. In Part B, particular issues pertinent to each case study were canvassed. The emphasis here will be on a range of broader issues that are applicable primarily to Aboriginal people in north Australia, but may also be of interest to other groups contemplating involvement in tourism. The issues raised in this chapter are intended as a point of departure for further discussion and future research. It is not my aim to pre-empt any Aboriginal decision-making in the tourism arena, but rather to heighten awareness about the experiences of a number of communities in the NT. Discussion in this chapter is taken mainly from the perspective of Aboriginal interests, including individuals, groups, communities, incorporated bodies and land councils. Hopefully, it will also be considered by NT and federal governments, parks authorities, bureaucracies involved in tourism development, and tourism interest groups.

A number of specific, and largely inter-related, policy questions will be raised. Is involvement in the tourism industry resulting in improved Aboriginal economic status? Does the nature of involvement allow Aboriginal interests to minimize the social, cultural and economic costs of tourism? Can Aboriginal interests use their land rights to either totally insulate themselves from tourism, or to extract a fair share of tourism rent raised on their land? Can Aboriginal people realise a fair return from the sale of elements of Aboriginal culture? What are the hurdles that Aboriginal people face in the provision of normal tourist industry services? And finally, what are the broad options available to Aboriginal people contemplating involvement in the Northern Territory tourism sector?

It should be noted that the comparative data used here are mainly drawn from Uluru, Kakadu and Gurig National Parks and Melville and Bathurst Islands; the Ayers Rock region discussed in Chapter 5 is largely ignored. This is because the bulk of primary

information was collected at the three national parks; and because these localities (and Melville and Bathurst Islands) form reasonably discrete jurisdictions (national park boundaries, islands) that facilitate regional analysis.

The economic impact of tourism

There is no one infallible method for measuring the economic impact of tourism. For example, economic impact can be measured in cash income terms. But this measure tends to focus on the direct economic benefits of tourism, rather than on the indirect benefits that may be more evident in an assessment of (reduced) expenditure. A further problem with cash income assessment is that it frequently ignores the significance of imputed subsistence income at those locations where Aboriginal people continue to hunt, fish and gather. The assessment of the impact of tourism on incomes requires the demarcation of a study population. However, if income effects are assessed in aggregate regional or community terms, or in average per capita terms, they ignore income distribution. Other problems include the choice of time frame: should one examine current income or future income streams that will result from successful investment? Ideally, an assessment of the Aboriginal share of total tourism income, or tourism rent, would provide a useful measure of economic impact; however the necessary data for such an analysis are unavailable for the mainstream NT economy, let alone its Aboriginal component.

It was estimated in Chapter 2 that Aboriginal interests only accrue between 1 and 2 per cent of total tourist expenditure in the Northern Territory. This Territory-wide figure was replicated using more detailed primary data for one region in central Australia in Chapter 5. The economic impact of tourism on community income will obviously vary. In Aboriginal communities that do not participate in the tourism industry the economic impact of tourism will be nil. However, at Uluru, Kakadu and Gurig National Parks, and Melville and Bathurst Islands, the economic impact of tourism is significant.

The findings at these four regions can be briefly summarised as follows. At Uluru National Park, employment linked to tourism

provided over half the jobs at the Mutitjulu community and a high proportion of employment income. Overall, tourism related activity accounted for 24 per cent of household income at the Mutitjulu community. Traditional owners of Uluru also received lease-back moneys that totalled about \$100,000 in 1986. These moneys were paid to the Mutitjulu Community Inc. In aggregate terms, lease-back moneys increased per capita income by about 15 per cent. But these moneys were not paid to individuals: a third was spent on a community enterprise, a third to provide reticulated water at some outstations, and most of the balance to procure community (as distinct from household) vehicles. A small part of these moneys (about 6 per cent) was distributed to communities in the region where traditional owners of Uluru resided. The net economic impact of tourism may have been lower than these figures suggest, for in the absence of tourism-related employment, people would have received welfare, and in the absence of lease-back income, normal government programs may well have funded many of these expenditures.

The situation at Kakadu National Park communities is somewhat different than at other localities, because the regional Aboriginal economy is dominated by the impact of the Ranger Uranium Mine and the \$3 million of royalty equivalents paid to the Gagudju Association each year. Employment opportunities exist at the Ranger uranium mine. In general, local Aboriginal people do not work at the mine, but prefer employment with ANPWS and the Gagudju Association. In 1986, tourism related activities accounted for over half the jobs held by Aboriginal people in the Kakadu region. Overall, it was estimated that 26 per cent of regular cash income (excluding quarterly royalty payments) came from ANPWS employment alone. Again, the net income effect of tourism employment would be far less than this if people chose welfare in preference to employment. An interesting distinction can be made at Kakadu between the income status at Park communities where people are mainly employed, and those where people are mainly on welfare. Per capita cash income at the former was double that at the latter. It is unclear whether this is a result of variable opportunities or of a variable desire for regular full-time jobs.

The economic benefits from tourism are most significant at Gurig National Park. The bulk of tourism income here comes from

lease payments and from royalties levied on the hunting of game. Overall, it was estimated that per capita community income increases by 43 per cent as a result of tourism. However this significant impact must be qualified as there are less than 50 Aboriginal people residing at Gurig National Park.

The economic benefits of tourism appear smallest at Melville and Bathurst Islands, because tourist visitation is limited, while the population is relatively large for an Aboriginal owned tourist destination. It is estimated that tourism income only adds a maximum 5 per cent to Islands' gross domestic product. This figure cannot be readily translated to either community or per capita income terms, but it implies that the current economic impact of tourism is extremely small.

The empirical evidence shows that there is a great deal of variability in the economic impact of tourism. This variability results from a number of factors including the size of the host community (varying from about 50 at Gurig to 1650 at Melville and Bathurst Islands); the number of visitors (ranging from 4000 per annum at Gurig and Melville and Bathurst Islands to over 200,000 at Uluru and Kakadu); the ratio of Aboriginal resident days to visitor days (ranging from 1:0.008 at Melville and Bathurst Islands, to 1:0.67 at Gurig National Park, and about 1:6 at Uluru); economic opportunities both in tourism and other sectors of the regional economy; and the Aboriginal response to tourism opportunities.

The nature of Aboriginal tourism involvement

Aboriginal involvement in tourism occurs in a number of different ways. These include the leasing or sale of resources owned, the sale of elements of Aboriginal culture (also a resource), the ownership of enterprises, and employment. There is no straightforward means to classify these differing activities, or of correlating them with different types of tourism. Nevertheless, in general, the lease of resources is linked to environmental tourism, the sale of elements of Aboriginal culture to cultural (or ethnic) tourism, and the operation of enterprises to normal tourist sector demand for goods and services. However, this broad categorisation is ambiguous for a variety of reasons. For example, environmental and ethnic tourism

are frequently closely linked. Furthermore, as noted in Chapter 1, goods and services provided to visitors are often identical to those provided to residents. In the cases examined in this monograph there are some obvious overlaps. Enterprises (like stores) that provide a service to tourists usually have Aboriginal people as their primary clients; Aboriginal owned enterprises may be involved in the supply of Aboriginal cultural tourism in the form of material culture; and so on.

These various components of Aboriginal involvement in tourism are disaggregated in the next three sections which examine the economic leverage provided by land rights; economic opportunities in the provision of cultural tourism; and economic issues that influence the Aboriginal provision of mainstream tourism services. Whether contact between Aboriginal people and tourists is direct or indirect is emphasised; this distinction has policy implications.

Direct and indirect tourism

Aboriginal involvement in tourism can be divided into direct and indirect types. This typology is frequently used with reference to tourism multipliers (see Chapter 1), but it is modified for this monograph. The terms direct and indirect tourism have been used by Aspelin (1977) in his study of the impact of tourism on Indians in Brazil.

Direct tourism involvement requires a physical interface between hosts and guests whereas indirect tourism does not. In both types, the economic link between Aboriginal interests and tourism is direct. This typology emphasizes the different levels of face-to-face contact between Aborigines and tourists because this is frequently articulated by Aboriginal people as a significant consideration (see Part B). The matrix in Table 9.1 demonstrates the range of possibilities for Aboriginal participation in tourism; there are some important differences in the effects of each. For example, lease payments made for the use of Aboriginal land (at all locations) require no direct interface between Aboriginal people and tourists; this is a form of indirect tourism. Provision of Aboriginal cultural tourism can require direct interaction, as in the performance of dance at Springvale Homestead, or in the

demonstration of hunting or fishing (at Putjamirra) or artistic skills (at the Maruku Craft Camp). But it can also be indirect when the residents of a tourist destination (like Mutitjulu or Nguju) choose to market artefacts they produce without direct interaction with tourists.

Table 9.1
The nature of Aboriginal tourism involvement

Nature of involvement	Direct	Indirect
Lease/sale of resources	No	Yes
Sale of artefacts	Yes	Yes
Sale of hunting/ritual culture	Yes	No
Employment	Yes	Yes
Enterprises	Yes	Yes

The employment and enterprises generated by tourism can also be direct and indirect. Employment with parks authorities at Kakadu or Uluru may involve direct interaction with tourists (for a park ranger), but requires no such interaction for people employed in environmental work. Similarly, an enterprise like Malpa Trading Company may employ Aboriginal people to sell goods directly to tourists; alternatively people may be employed away from retail outlets to make or package goods without social interaction. Indirect tourism can also have a somewhat different meaning with respect to enterprises. Aboriginal people may invest in enterprises (owned by Aboriginal or non-Aboriginal interests) without any direct involvement in tourism.

In assessing the nature of economic opportunities in tourism, there is a tendency to emphasise the role of the host community. However, wider impacts which could be termed 'induced' also occur. For example, the opportunity to sell artefacts is provided to producers who may live several hundred kilometres from Uluru National Park; their involvement in tourism is indirect, but it is indirectness that is of a different order from that experienced by producers who live within Uluru National Park. Drawing boundaries when assessing economic impact is always an arbitrary decision and

it must be recognised that indirect multiplier effects can not only occur elsewhere, but may also exceed the direct effects on the host region. An extreme example of this occurs at Uluru, where the bulk of tourist expenditure accrues to non-Aboriginal interests at Yulara. But visitors to Uluru or Kakadu invariably spend time at urban centres like Alice Springs and Darwin and subsequently income accrues to extra-regional business interests, especially if visitor length of stay at the primary destination is short.

The major Aboriginal involvements in tourism are currently indirect; environmental tourism demand is met by allowing access to Aboriginal land and Aboriginal cultural tourism demand by the supply of elements of Aboriginal culture. In policy terms, Aboriginal people have two major avenues to maximise financial returns from indirect tourism: the economic leverage provided by land rights and the comparative advantage they enjoy in the provision of cultural tourism.

Land rights and economic leverage

Many Aboriginal people believe that land rights should automatically provide them with economic leverage to gain a significant share of tourism rent that is accrued from their land because the environment is the principal attraction at visitor destinations owned by Aboriginal people. In a questionnaire administered as part of a tourism impact study at Uluru, CLC et al. (1987) found that 86 per cent of respondents stated that they were visiting the Park to see the Rock (see Chapter 4). ANPWS (1986b:74) research at Kakadu suggests that visitor activities concentrate on appreciation of wildlife, landscapes, and rock art (which has a cultural component). Similar environmental attractions are listed by the CCNT (1987:86) as the recreational attractions of Gurig National Park. It is only at Nguiu, Bathurst Island, that cultural tourism appears of primary significance.

Yet people's ability to levy charges on the utilisation of their resources is circumscribed both by political and economic realities, and whether tourism is imposed or invited. It is important to recognise that one means that is not available to Aboriginal people to realise an economic return from their land is its sale; at all the

locations investigated in this monograph, land is held communally and generally under some form of inalienable title.

Empirical evidence

At all four locations there are some payments to Aboriginal interests in the form of park rentals, land lease payments, entry fees, or bounties on feral species hunted in licence agreements.

Kakadu received the least; an annual lease payment of \$7502 stipulated in a leaseback agreement signed with ANPWS in 1978. At Uluru National Park under a memorandum of lease signed between members of the Uluru-Kata Tjuta Land Trust and the Director of ANPWS in 1985, traditional owners receive \$75,000 per annum plus 20 per cent of any gate fees; in 1986, this amounted to about \$100,000.

At Gurig National Park, traditional owners received lease and licence payments from a variety of sources including a park rental paid by the NT government, park entry fees, lease and licence payments, and royalties paid by two safari operators. All told about \$120,000 was paid with respect to tourism activities in 1986. At Melville and Bathurst Islands, visitor fees were introduced in 1986 in association with a fishing lodge established at Port Hurd. From the start of 1987 entry fees of \$10 per visitor per day were also levied on tourists travelling with Tiwi Tours and with Australian Kakadu Tours (to Putjamirra). In 1987, these payments amounted to about \$40,000.

There is enormous variability in both the nature and levels of payments for access to, and use of, Aboriginal land. The financial provisions in the Kakadu agreement are in the process of being renegotiated, but for the ten year period 1978-88, only small lease payments were made. This appears to have been acceptable to traditional owners because they had access to substantial mining royalty equivalents; because tourists were not charged access to the park; and so on. With park entry fees to be introduced in 1989, traditional owners will receive a substantially higher lease payments and a share of gate takings; however, services that were provided free by the ANPWS may require payment from 1989.

How does one measure the relative economic value of the lease and licence payments? In Table 9.2 some relevant data are presented on important parameters at each location including lease and licence payments (excluding safari operators at Gurig), approximate area leased, visitor numbers, and resident Aboriginal populations.

Table 9.2
Factors influencing the value of lease and licence payments

Location	Payments (\$, 1986)	Area leased (sq. kms)	Visitor numbers	Aboriginal population
Uluru	100,000	1325	200,000	150
Kakadu	7,502	6698	200,000	270 ^a
Gurig	50,000	2207	4,000	50
Tiwi Islands	40,000 ^b	minimal	4,000	1,650

Footnotes a. Residents of Kakadu; about 300 members of the Gagudju Association are traditional owners.

b. 1987 estimate of entry fees; only two small areas at Port Hurd and Putjamirra have been leased.

It is clear from this table that there is no correlation between any one variable and the actual moneys received by Aboriginal interests. For example, in dollars per square kilometre terms, lease payments vary from about \$1 at Kakadu to \$75 at Uluru; in dollars per visitor the amount paid varies from \$0.04 at Kakadu to \$12.5 at Gurig; and in dollars per resident Aboriginal person the amount varies from \$27 at Kakadu to \$1000 at Gurig. It should be stressed that the payments at Melville and Bathurst Islands are a levy per tourist per day, and not a rental combined with gate payments (as at Uluru and Gurig) or a rental (as at Kakadu).

Invited and imposed tourism

Can the returns that Aboriginal people receive from their land be linked to any particular factors? Land rights is supposed to provide economic leverage because traditional owners have a right to veto any commercial developments on their land; this includes tourism development. Of the cases examined in this study however, it is

only the Tiwi of Melville and Bathurst Islands that have an absolute veto. A general distinction has to be made between locations where tourism is invited and imposed.

Table 9.3 provides a summary of the following factors at the four locations being examined: land tenure, tourism management, Aboriginal controls over tourism, and nature of access.

Table 9.3.
*Factors influencing the economic leverage provided by
the Land Rights Act*

Factor	Location			
	Uluru	Kakadu	Gurig	Tiwi
Land tenure				
federal Land Rights Act	X	X	-	X
NT legislation	-	-	X	-
lease-back arrangements	X	X	X	-
Tourism management				
Aboriginal Board/Council	X	-	X	X
ANPWS	X	X	-	-
CCNT	-	-	X	-
private sector	-	-	-	X
Aboriginal controls				
veto of tourism	-	-	-	X
no veto	X	X	X	-
permit system	-	-	X	X
Nature of access				
sealed roads year round	X	X	-	-
seasonal roads	X	X	X	-
air	X	X	X	X
sea	-	X	X	X

These four localities can be divided into two broad categories. In the cases of Uluru and Kakadu National Parks, ease of access and national and international recognition have resulted in a rapid

growth in tourism and visitor numbers. While Aboriginal interests have a degree of political and economic leverage at these two locations, they have limited means to stop or reduce tourist visitation. The only option available is to limit access to parts of each park. There have been recent decisions to increase entry fees at Uluru, and to introduce payments at Kakadu. However, in the current NT political environment (Chapter 3), these charges could not be used to limit tourist visitation. Tourism at these two locations is imposed, principally because tourism preceded statutory land rights, and because the granting of land rights was conditional on lease-back to the ANPWS.

The situation at Gurig and on the Tiwi Islands is somewhat different and Aboriginal interests have far greater economic leverage. While a leaseback arrangement also exists at Gurig National Park, the historically low and restricted tourist visitation levels to Cobourg Peninsula provide more scope for control. At Melville and Bathurst Islands permits are required to enter Aboriginal land and there is no overland access. At both, visitation rates are currently low and tourism facilities are relatively undeveloped. At these localities, tourism is invited rather than imposed. At Melville and Bathurst Islands tourism development started in 1980, after land rights; at Gurig, tourism was extremely limited until 1981, when the Cobourg Act was passed.

While precise data on tourism rent or profits raised on Aboriginal land are not available, it does seem that where tourism is invited Aboriginal interests are able to accrue a higher proportion of tourism rent than where it is imposed. The implication of this is that where tourism is invited Aboriginal interests have greater economic leverage. However, market forces play a crucial role in limiting the returns that Aboriginal people get from their land. For example, a \$10 fee was introduced at Melville and Bathurst Islands in 1987 for each Tiwi Tours visitor, but an earlier suggested figure of \$50 per visitor was commercially unrealistic and unacceptable to the tour operator; such a fee would have made Tiwi Tours uncompetitive (if the fee was passed onto tourists) or unviable (if the fee had been absorbed by the operator). At Uluru and Gurig, boards of management with Aboriginal majorities are empowered to set fees. However, both boards face massive political constraints that preclude their raising fees to generate substantial income.

The policy implications of this variability are numerous. It is evident that there is no rational economic explanation for the different returns Aboriginal people receive for the lease of their land. This in turn means that there is no formula for Aboriginal groups to use when setting fees for the use of their land. The ad hoc nature of agreements, which have been based on historical and political factors, as well as economic considerations, is similar to the ad hoc nature of financial arrangements for mining on Aboriginal land (Altman 1983a). There is certainly no correlation between returns to Aboriginal interests, and the social, cultural, environmental or economic costs that may be associated with tourism. And there is no statutory protection for Aboriginal people as in the case of mining. Under s.63 of the Land Rights Act, Aboriginal interests are guaranteed royalty equivalents from mining on Aboriginal land; this provides Aboriginal people with a share of mineral rent raised on their land. However, no such legislative guarantees are assured in the case of tourism.

The reasons for this oversight appear to be twofold. Firstly, tourism rent raised from Aboriginal land is extremely difficult to assess accurately in marked contrast to the revenue (or profits) earned by a mining company. The disparate nature of the tourism industry makes liability for use of Aboriginal resources extremely difficult to estimate. Take the extreme case of Uluru National Park. Tourists flock to Uluru to see Ayers Rock and the Olgas, but almost all services are provided at Yulara on land alienated from Aboriginal ownership. In the abstract 'perfect competition' model of neoclassical economics, Aboriginal interests should be entitled to set the park entry fee at a point where the marginal revenue from tourism equals its marginal cost. But in the highly imperfect NT political economy, where government and the tourist industry are allied, such a strategy is impossible.

Secondly, the distinction between mineral and tourism rent appears to be based on an assumption that mineral resources are finite, whereas tourism resources are inexhaustible. However, such an assumption may prove false in situations where excessive tourism pressure results in environmental degradation. The underpricing of entry fees to national parks like Uluru and Kakadu will increase the extent of environmental damage associated with overuse and the depletion of an Aboriginal-owned resource. Again,

the use of market forces to limit environmental impacts is extremely contentious in Australia generally, let alone at Aboriginal owned tourist destinations.

It appears that land rights are essential to ensure that Aboriginal interests have economic leverage in tourism in the current NT political economy. However, these rights can be used both directly and indirectly to Aboriginal economic advantage. The important case of Kings Canyon National Park was discussed in Chapter 5. In this situation, Aboriginal people had no statutory rights to the park area which had been alienated by the Conservation Land Corporation. However, the Central Land Council was able to trade economic leverage elsewhere (on Aboriginal land) to gain both living areas and commercial concessions for 'traditional owners' of the Kings Canyon area. This case provides an important example of how economic leverage can be used to serve Aboriginal interests off Aboriginal land; but the leverage is still entirely dependent on the existence of the Land Rights Act.

Aboriginal cultural tourism

Aborigines have a definite comparative advantage in the production of genuine Aboriginal cultural tourism; however, substitution is possible, and is occurring. Aboriginal culture is heavily emphasised in the marketing of the NT as a tourist destination, irrespective of whether visitors 'get a glimpse of the Dreamtime'. As noted above though, at present, Aboriginal culture seems to be of secondary importance to tourists; their principal reason for visiting is environmental rather than cultural. The policy issues that need to be addressed are what is the nature of the demand for cultural tourism; what are Aboriginal people willing to supply; and is there any correlation between demand and supply? Are Aboriginal people able to convert their comparative advantage in this area to reasonable financial benefits?

The demand for Aboriginal culture

Almost no systematic research to gauge tourist demand for Aboriginal culture has been undertaken. Burchett (1988:5) notes that government surveys in the early 1980s indicated that

approximately 30 per cent of all visitors to the NT were listing Aboriginality as a factor influencing their choice of destination. This estimate appears to be based on quantitative survey work conducted by Morgan (1983). Hamilton (1984) notes figures of a similar magnitude in the central Australian context: 40 per cent of overseas visitors and 33 per cent of visitors from interstate want to experience Aboriginal culture first hand.

The NTDC/NTTC study of initiatives for tourist facilities singled out the need to establish ways of introducing tourists to Aboriginal culture. This could range from the provision of museums and cultural centres in major urban areas to the performance of traditional dancing at various localities (NTDC/NTTC 1984:1). The study's recommendations are to introduce tourists to Aborigines and Aboriginal culture as the attraction, rather than to involve Aboriginal people in economic aspects of the industry. This perspective is not surprising given that the report primarily provided an industry view of tourism needs.

The only study that has comprehensively surveyed tourist attitudes and expectations in the NT was undertaken in 1985 and 1986 as part of the Ayers Rock Region Tourism Impact Study (CLC et al. 1987). While this study concentrated on the Ayers Rock region, its findings have far wider implications. There is an unwritten rule that new information should never be included in a concluding chapter, but this rule is broken here because the data collected in the Ayers Rock study are extremely important, and because they are not yet widely available. The following is only a brief synopsis of the survey's findings and interested readers should refer to the report *Sharing the Park: Anangu Initiatives in Ayers Rock Tourism* (CLC et al. 1987).

A questionnaire 'Tourist Attitudes and Expectations at Uluru/Kata Tjuta' was administered in 1985 and 1986. The questionnaire included 64 questions of yes/no, multiple choice, and open-ended types. In June 1985, 803 tourists answered the questionnaire; in July, August and September 1986, there were 1978 respondents. The survey was stratified by location (interviewers chose a number of contact sites) and by time (the survey was conducted during four different months). Overall, it was estimated that the response rate was 90 per cent. The main

group not polled was non-English speaking overseas visitors; multilingual guides at Yulara that were asked to assist with the survey returned blank questionnaire forms. Nevertheless, 24 per cent of the visitors in the survey came from overseas.

In a question about people's main reason for coming to Uluru, seeing Ayers Rock and the Olgas (86 per cent) and climbing Ayers Rock (49 per cent) figured highly. A number of tourists also came to experience the desert (42 per cent) and to have contact with Aboriginal people (15 per cent). Given the national and international standing of Ayers Rock and the Olgas, it is hardly surprising that only a small proportion listed contact with Aborigines as their main reason for visiting Uluru. However, a high proportion of visitors were either very interested (36 per cent) or somewhat interested (54 per cent) in Aboriginal people and their lifestyle. Furthermore, a high 76 per cent indicated a desire to be better informed, with Aboriginal lifestyle (62 per cent), religion and mythology (52 per cent), cave paintings (52 per cent), bush foods and hunting (48 per cent), art and craft work (45 per cent), and ceremonies (38 per cent) figuring highly in a multiple response question.

Tourists were asked what experiences would interest them when visiting. The responses to this question are summarised in Table 9.4.

Table 9.4
Preferred tourist activities involving Anangu, 1985 and 1986

Activity	Percentage expressing interest	
	1985	1986
Bush tucker tours	36	40
Speak to Anangu	36	40
Tours of cave art sites	46	45
Overnight camp with Anangu	28	31
Walking tours with Anangu	44	41
Camel rides	25	27
Illustrated lectures	28	19

Source: CLC et al. (1987:149).

While the term 'cultural centre' was not used, tourists were informed that the Mutitjulu community was considering expanding the Maruku Craft Camp (see Chapter 4) to include a small museum, interpretative displays, and a theatre to show videos. A high proportion of visitors indicated a willingness to pay an entry fee to such a centre; overall, 84 per cent indicated a willingness to pay some fee, with the modal amount being \$2 to \$3 per adult.

Tourists were asked three open ended questions at the end of the questionnaire. The first asked if there were any activities that people would have liked to experience; of respondents, 34 per cent specified more activities relating to Aboriginal culture and lifestyle, and 24 per cent specified more contact with Aboriginal people. The opportunity to learn about Aboriginal people and lifestyle did not figure highly as the best thing about the visit (3 per cent specified this), nor did the lack of exposure to Aboriginal culture figure significantly as the worst thing about the visit (6 per cent of respondents).

The supply of Aboriginal culture

There has been even less systematic research into what elements of their culture Aboriginal people are willing to supply. The only study that has systematically surveyed Aboriginal attitudes to tourism and the industry was conducted, again, as part of the Ayers Rock Region Tourism Impact Study (CLC et al. 1987:7-34). A 48 question survey was administered to 58 Anangu adults at Mutitjulu in 1985 and 1986. This sample represented either 67 per cent or 85 per cent of the adult population, depending on which population data are used. The questionnaire was administered by a researcher employed by the CLC who resided at Mutitjulu and a Pitjantjatjara-speaking interpreter assisted when dealing with any Anangu who were not fluent in English. It is recognised that any attitudinal survey has potential shortcomings. For example, people's aspirations may be inaccurately informed; they may state they want a particular form of employment without recognising its requirements, or their responses may reflect an ideological position divorced from reality. Although such surveys are clearly problematic, the Anangu attitudinal survey provides important, and rare, insights into Aboriginal perceptions of tourism. Some survey findings linked to the cultural tourism issue are briefly summarised.

The survey indicated that very few Anangu (three of the 58 adults interviewed) felt that tourists came to see them. A relatively high proportion of respondents have had some experience in the tourism industry, with a number having multiple work experiences and diverse occupational histories. However, of the total sample, less than half indicated a willingness to work in the tourist industry in the future. The range of jobs that Anangu wanted were limited to park rangers' work, working at Maruku selling artefacts, manufacturing artefacts, and taking tourists on 'bush tucker' interpretative walks. A substantial portion of the sample (69 per cent) felt that it was good for tourists to learn about the Anangu way of life; of these 70 per cent felt that tourists should learn about bush tucker, while there was more limited support to suggestions that tourists should learn about the Past/Dreaming (35 per cent); the country (20 per cent) and the Pitjantjatjara language (10 per cent). It seems that Anangu feel that secular topics like hunting and gathering practices may be easier to explain to tourists than language or religious topics. Of those who felt that tourists should learn about Anangu, there was a preference as to who should be teachers, with Aboriginal rangers preferred by 98 per cent, followed by white rangers (90 per cent), Anangu working at Maruku (83 per cent), whites working at Maruku (75 per cent) and white bus drivers (60 per cent).

A number of questions were asked that related specifically to tourist-oriented commercial activities. There was very strong (93 per cent) support for the decision to close off the Mutitjulu community to tourists and even stronger support (98 per cent) for the two Aboriginal owned enterprises (the Maruku Craft Camp and the Malpa souvenir outlet) located away from the community at the ANPWS park entry station. A specific question was included in the questionnaire about the possibility of establishing a cultural centre which would include a museum, interpretative displays and an artefacts retail outlet; there was strong support (85 per cent) for this concept.

The findings of this survey can be contrasted with the low direct involvement of Anangu in tourism described in Chapter 4. It seems that Anangu are willing to share elements of their culture with tourists, with the motivation being primarily economic; while 72 per cent of respondents felt that too many tourists came to

Uluru, 79 per cent felt that this was good for Anangu because of the economic benefits. However, Anangu willingness to participate in tourism does not mean that they want full-time and regular employment; participation can be in the form of part-time or occasional employment in direct (working for ANPWS as rangers) or indirect (producing artefacts) tourism. Aboriginal attitudes to employment in cultural tourism cannot be differentiated from general attitudes to regular employment.

A very different approach to assessing the supply of Aboriginal cultural tourism is to assume that market forces will determine what is provided. The problem with this approach is that it fails to recognise the structural, locational, and cultural hurdles that Aboriginal enterprises must overcome (see below) and the overall artificiality of the NT tourism industry where business interests are frequently provided with direct or indirect subsidies (see Chapter 3). Nevertheless a review of what is supplied is worthwhile because it provides insights into the elements of Aboriginal culture that are being provided to tourists. These elements can be broadly divided into indirect and direct types (Table 9.1).

Indirect cultural tourism requires no interaction between producers and consumers; it is most clearly evident in the manufacture of Aboriginal material culture for sale. Retailing of items can occur at tourist destinations or elsewhere. The two important examples of artefact retailing on Aboriginal land discussed in Part B occurred at Uluru and at Nguiu, Bathurst Island. Maruku Arts and Crafts was established by the Mutitjulu community in 1984 to act as a wholesaler/retailer for Aboriginal people throughout the Pitjantjatjara lands. In 1985 and 1986, 645 people in over twenty communities in the region marketed artefacts via Maruku. It is of policy relevance that Maruku was able to use a locational advantage (access to a large market) and a commercial concession (to operate at Uluru) to service a large region; less than 20 per cent of Maruku payments were to local people with the rest being to regional producers. Another interesting feature of the Maruku operation was that with the growth of tourism at Uluru, an increasing proportion of turnover was sold locally. In 1984/85, only 39 per cent of total turnover was sold retail; by the first half of 1986/87 this proportion had expanded to 86 per cent.

Bathurst Island has a range of tourism enterprises that include Tiwi Pima Art, Tiwi Designs, Tiwi Pottery and Bima Wear. These enterprises manufacture and market artefacts, cloth and garments, screenprinted with both Tiwi and modern designs, and distinctively Tiwi pottery. In 1984/85 the turnover of these four enterprises totalled about \$316,000, with about 20 per cent being sold directly to tourists who visit the Islands with Tiwi Tours. There is no doubt that tourism to Bathurst Island assists these enterprises, as most direct sales are for cash and accrue limited freight and packaging costs.

At the other case study communities examined in Part B, there was a marked absence of artefact retail outlets. This is partly because there was little local production of artefacts at Kakadu and Gurig. As noted in Chapter 2, a feature of the artefacts industry is that a high proportion of total output is produced at remote outstation communities. While in central Australia outstations are able to utilise Maruku as a marketing outlet, at other places community craft centres must wholesale to retailers in urban centres like Alice Springs and Darwin. There are exceptions; for example, Mimi Arts and Crafts, a regional operation like Maruku, sells through a retail outlet in Katherine. A result of marketing away from tourist destinations and Aboriginal land, at white or Aboriginal owned outlets, is that a lower proportion of retail sales accrues to producers.

Two important features of the artefacts industry are that almost no community craft enterprise is financially independent, and this includes Maruku and Bathurst Island operators; all receive operating grants from the Aboriginal Arts Board, the Aboriginal Development Commission or the DAA. In the Bathurst Island case, the Tiwi Land Council has also provided funds to support enterprises. Secondly, as shown in Part B and elsewhere (Altman and Taylor 1988), while some artefact producers work full-time, most receive other income from welfare entitlements; in general, manufacture of artefacts is a supplementary economic activity.

Direct cultural tourism requires Aboriginal people to socially interact with tourists, explaining and demonstrating Aboriginal hunting and gathering practices, Aboriginal ritual (in the performance of public ceremonial dance and song cycles),

Aboriginal perceptions of the environment, and artefacts manufacture. The last is frequently linked to artefacts retailing as at Uluru National Park. Tour operators, resort managers, and the NT Tourist Commission (NTDC/NTDC 1984) are adamant that there is a high tourism demand for direct cultural tourism. Consequently, these facets of Aboriginal culture feature significantly in marketing tourism.

The range of direct cultural tourism enterprises has been described in Chapter 2 and Part B. Bush tucker tours are available at Uluru (in Liru Walks funded by ANPWS), at Kakadu (with Wild Goose Tours), at Putjamirra, Melville Island (with Australian Kakadu Tours), out of Alice Springs with Dreamtime Tours, and at Gummulkban, western Arnhem Land (with Terra Tours). Aboriginal dancing is regularly provided at Springvale Homestead, near Katherine and at Mandora, near Darwin; a tour that emphasises the environment and its relation to myths is provided at Ipolera; and a tour that concentrates on the manufacture of material culture (and other aspects of Tiwi culture) is run by Tiwi Tours.

The main features of these enterprises are that they are all small scale, frequently involving Aboriginal family groups only; most have been started in the past two years, and their longer term financial viability is not yet established; all are closely linked with non-Aboriginal owners, co-owners, entrepreneurs, or managers. These direct cultural tourism ventures can be divided into three corporate categories. The Liru Walks are provided free and are not run for profit; the Aboriginal women who work as guides on this tour are employed by ANPWS. Enterprises like Wild Goose Tours, Ipolera, and the Andutjmi (Springvale) Dancers are wholly Aboriginal owned, but are operated in close collaboration with non-Aboriginal managers. Tiwi Tours, Dreamtime Tours, and Terra Tours are white-owned companies that provide regular part-time or casual employment for Aboriginal people. There is little evidence that any of these enterprises are providing substantial financial returns to Aboriginal people.

Conundrums

Three conundrums are evident in an examination of Aboriginal cultural tourism. The three conundrums are the marketability of

Aboriginal culture, the maintenance of Aboriginal cultural practices, and the impact of tourism on culture. Each is linked to a degree of incompatibility between the demand for cultural tourism from the industry or visitors themselves, and the Aboriginal supply of cultural tourism.

Aboriginal culture in much of north Australia cannot be easily marketed to tourists. It is complex and difficult to package. Many aspects of Aboriginal culture cannot be marketed because they are not available for public consumption; much Aboriginal ritual is restricted to sections of the local Aboriginal population. Communications are problematic. Data collected by the CLC et al. (1987) indicate that only two Anangu (out of 233 respondents in four censuses) identified English as a first language and 138 as a second language. Only 62 per cent of respondents could communicate in English. At Uluru, between 20 and 25 per cent of visitors are from overseas and many would not be English speakers. It was noted in Chapter 6 that research at Kakadu indicated that Aboriginal people feel particularly uncomfortable in ephemeral relationships; tourists are generally extremely short-term visitors and it is difficult to establish meaningful relationships with them. Hence despite high tourist interest in religion, mythology, and ceremonies, these elements of Aboriginal culture cannot be supplied for tourist consumption either because they are secret or because more permanent relations must be established before people will discuss such topics.

There are components of Aboriginal culture described above that can be marketed, but there is a disjunction between Aboriginal concepts of supply (on a flexible basis) and the requirements of the tourism industry (regularity, punctuality, long hours, and long term commitment for brochuring purposes). Tourists in general want to see authentic Aboriginal culture. Yet the very resilience of Aboriginal value and belief systems (to varying degrees at various locations) requires that commercial considerations are not paramount. Elements of Aboriginal culture in north Australia, especially the kin-based social system and the religious domain, remain relatively unchanged. The maintenance of kin and ritual links mean that people remain mobile. This is evidenced in the fluctuations in longitudinal population data in Chapters 4 and 6. The priority that people place on mobility means that they also

place a high value on autonomy, including autonomy from tourism employment. Access to welfare, and the ability to move rapidly between formal employment and social security sectors, enhances people's autonomy. There is also a distinct possibility that with the growth in tourism, improved communications, and increased opportunities to earn supplementary cash income, mobility has increased. There is an obvious incompatibility between residential shifts and the regular supply of cultural tourism.

Other cultural factors constrain the desire of many Aboriginal people to seek full-time employment, and the associated rewards, full-time pay. This is linked to the resilience of kin-based modes of distribution and consumption in many areas. At a time of rapid economic and social change it is difficult to overgeneralise, but there are indications of material aspirations that differ from mainstream norms at all case study locations. Aboriginal values stress economic inter-dependence rather than independence; the dominant value system continues to stress anti-accumulation and egalitarianism, despite the aspirations and financial success of many individuals. This in turn dampens individual employment and income aspirations. The conundrum is that the very reproduction of Aboriginal culture limits the incorporation of Aboriginal people into the tourism industry. It is for this reason that the provision of indirect cultural tourism is particularly acceptable; not only is this compatible with Aboriginal practices, but it is also a form of cultural reproduction.

The final related conundrum is linked to the impact of tourism sector demands on Aboriginal culture. There is a growing literature (Graburn 1976; Smith 1987b; Nash 1981; Cohen 1984) which examines the impact of tourism on indigenous cultures. The international case study material is indeterminate. To simplify considerably, there are two broad schools of thought: one suggests that the demands of the tourism industry will inevitably transform indigenous cultures; the other suggests that tourism will strengthen indigenous culture as people reproduce their culture for material gain and as a means to differentiate themselves from outsiders. The crucial variable though is whether people are willing to alter elements of their culture to suit the requirements of the tourist industry. This will vary from place to place.

The greatest pressure for cultural change observed during fieldwork was at Uluru. A number of tour operators interviewed at Alice Springs and Yulara commented that there was nothing spectacular about desert culture, unlike South Pacific or Balinese culture. The then manager of the Sheraton Hotel was more blunt. He had observed Anangu ritual dances and associated song cycles (collectively termed *Inma*) at the Mutitjulu community and suggested that if Anangu were to interest the average tourist in *Inma* they will need to 'jazz it up'. There is also continual pressure on Maruku to encourage artefact producers to adapt items to make them more transportable. To date, Anangu at Uluru have made it quite clear that they will not modify their culture for the requirements of tourists. At other places, people have been more willing to adapt their culture and material culture for tourists.

There is a degree of correlation between tourist demands for components of Aboriginal culture and the supply of these components. However, the available evidence indicates that at present the supply of cultural tourism results in limited financial returns to Aboriginal people. The dilemma is how can cultural tourism be provided in manner that increases financial returns while ensuring that the very items demanded are not altered to such a degree that they lose their integrity? There is no easy solution to this dilemma, and Aboriginal individuals and groups will need to decide on their own tradeoffs between cultural and economic prerogatives. There is a distinct possibility that in some areas there is an incompatibility between the demands of the industry and Aboriginal supply.

Some economic issues

The involvement of Aboriginal people in commercial aspects of tourism is little different from other Aboriginal involvement in the mainstream economy, except that the structural problem of remoteness is partially overcome by 'the market' (tourists) coming to the producers. Tourism is little different from other mainstream economic activities; indeed there are features of the industry that make it even more difficult for Aboriginal interests to be commercially successful in tourism than in ordinary enterprises. In particular, tourism is a demanding service industry that must cater

for visitor requirements seven days a week for long hours; industry lead times are long, which means that a medium term commitment of at least three years is required before enterprises are viable; and the quality of services are constantly being assessed by the visitor. The mainstream services that Aboriginal people can provide include accommodation, meals, tours, transport and entertainment. Aboriginal interests often enjoy locational advantages in the provision of such services especially when they are linked to commercial concessions to operate on Aboriginal land.

The more general economic issues that are associated with Aboriginal underdevelopment in north Australia cannot be comprehensively addressed here; a number of recent studies including Stanley 1983; Cousins and Nieuwenhuysen 1984; Miller 1985; Altman and Dillon 1986; Altman 1987c; Young 1987, 1988; and EKIAP (in press), among others, should be referred to in relation to these wider issues. The emphasis here will be on some special tourism-related economic issues that are addressed under the general headings employment, enterprises, capital, and entrepreneurship.

Employment

The federal government's Aboriginal Employment Development Policy (AEDP) is currently stressing the need to improve Aboriginal employment status so as to achieve statistical employment equity between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal Australians. The problem of Aboriginal unemployment, at least in formal terms, is most acute in remote parts of north Australia where communities are isolated from population centres and mainstream economic activities. Under these circumstances, the tourism industry appears an ideal sector to create an employment niche for Aboriginal people; employment opportunities are frequently near Aboriginal communities, the sector is expanding, and Aboriginal people are often the statutory owners of destinations. The empirical evidence in this study suggests that tourism may provide Aboriginal people with some employment opportunities, but it seems that in the immediate future, the demand for Aboriginal labour may exceed its supply.

Tourism-related employment is most evident at Uluru and Kakadu National Parks. At Uluru two employment surveys were

undertaken in May and November 1986. In the former, tourism-related employment accounted for 72 per cent of jobs and 60 per cent of employment income; in the latter for 47 per cent of jobs and 48 per cent of employment income. At Kakadu, 53 per cent of Aboriginal people employed in December 1986 were in tourism-related jobs; ANPWS wages alone accounted for 38 per cent of employment income.

These positive findings can be juxtaposed with a great deal of evidence that there are a number of supply-side factors that are inhibiting Aboriginal involvement in tourism employment. These factors could be termed problems from the labour market or policy makers perspective, but there is little concrete evidence that they unduly concern Aboriginal people at the communities investigated.

The most straightforward supply side problem is that Aboriginal people frequently lack the skills required for employment in tourism. The requirements of the industry are diverse. The requisite skills can range from basic skills such as the ability to communicate in English and functional literacy and numeracy, to more complex skills such as commercial and managerial expertise. For example, in the Ayers Rock Study, the CLC et al. (1987) found that only 30 per cent of adults had functional English reading skills and 27 per cent functional writing skills. (The extent of reading and writing skills in Pitjantjatjara were even lower than these levels.) As already noted, communication is a problem, especially with non-English speaking visitors. Furthermore, many Aboriginal people do not like the intense social interaction with visitors required in many jobs (Kesteven 1987). However, while there are many people who could be termed 'tourist avoiders', there are others who are 'tourist seekers' (see Chapter 6).

Welfare also plays a role in people's reluctance to seek full-time jobs in tourism. It has been argued elsewhere that for many Aboriginal people in remote Australia welfare has an unintended, but positive, consequence: it enables people to pursue their own priorities while receiving the equivalent of a minimum income from the state (Altman 1987c; Altman and Taylor 1988). This could be termed 'welfare entrapment' except entrapment has connotations of compulsion, whereas the welfare option may be a deliberate choice.

When on welfare people can supplement their income by participating in other activities like hunting and gathering and artefact manufacture. The autonomy of welfare also allows people to pursue their own priorities; the flexibility of the system allows people to take up employment for short times and then move back onto welfare. Such switching is evident at Uluru. In 1986 data were collected for a prolonged period on Anangu employment with ANPWS. On average, men worked on 11 weeks in a 39 week survey period; women on 17 out of 37 weeks. Anangu did not attend work regularly and are not interested in weekend work. This example can be juxtaposed against the ANPWS experience at Kakadu where a number of Aboriginal ranger staff have been employed for a number of years, and have worked in regular full-time positions.

The overall shortage of skilled Aboriginal labour seeking full-time employment often results in excess demand for people with requisite skills. At the Mutitjulu community, for example, there are jobs available with the local store and service station, at the health centre, with the community councils, and at the local childcare centre. Many local people who could hold jobs in the tourism industry prefer jobs within the community rather than outside it. A combination of low formal educational status and limited work experience often means that Aboriginal people will only be eligible for menial jobs in the tourism industry. Under these circumstances, people frequently choose welfare supplemented with some part-time work, to full-time tourism jobs. At Uluru for example, people will not commute the 25 kilometres from Mutitjulu to Yulara for menial jobs in the unfamiliar environment of the tourist resort.

One area where there is a demand for jobs (especially at Kakadu) is in employment as park rangers (after completion of a formal ranger training course). However, as noted in Chapter 5, it is paradoxical that Approved Staff Levels at Kakadu are being reduced and that these reductions may limit future employment opportunities for Aboriginal graduates of the training course. There is also some need to consider schemes that will realistically modify Australian Public Service requirements with Aboriginal employment patterns. There is greater room for coordination between the AEDP and federal government departments if employment maximisation is a priority.

Enterprises

One of the main recommendations made by Miller (1985:19-20) was the need to broaden the economic base of Aboriginal communities. Tourism enterprises appear an ideal means to achieve this end, especially on Aboriginal land where such enterprises may enjoy commercial concessions and locational advantages. However, these advantages need to be weighed against the comparative disadvantages faced by Aboriginal community enterprises.

The empirical evidence indicates that Aboriginal interests are investing in enterprises that provide regular tourist industry services like accommodation (Four Seasons Cooina and Kakadu, Kakadu Holiday Village, Mt Ebenezer Roadhouse, cabins at Gurig National Park) and food and beverages (Malpa Trading, Mount Ebenezer Roadhouse, general stores at Nguu, Milikapiti, Pularumpi, the Border Store and Cooina store and Gurig stores; the Docker River general store). However, it is only at high visitor destinations (like Uluru and Kakadu) that tourist expenditure accounts for a significant (more than 10 per cent) proportion of turnover. These two locations provide the most significant examples of Aboriginal interests broadening their communities' economic base.

At Kakadu, the Gagudju royalty (and regional) association is outright owner of the Cooina Hotel, Yellow Waters boat tours, the Border Store and a small screen printing enterprise. Some of these enterprises are of a mixed nature; for example, the Border Store services tourist needs and those of Aboriginal communities in the region. Another regional royalty association, the Djabulukgu Association, has a one-third stake in the Kakadu Holiday Village whose majority owner is a white entrepreneur. At Uluru, Aboriginal people own Malpa Trading Company and Maruku Arts and Crafts. Both of these enterprises have retail branches (selling souvenirs, take-away foods and artefacts) that deal almost exclusively with tourists at Uluru National Park. However, Malpa is also the local Aboriginal community store, and Maruku wholesales artefacts throughout Australia.

The enterprises option has been problematic on a number of counts. The major problem is linked to the corporate structure of

Aboriginal enterprises. These enterprises are usually community-owned and policies are made by management committees. This means that any profits from enterprises, most of which are extremely small, have to be widely distributed. Furthermore, there is a frequent tension between commercial and social objectives in the running of these enterprises. Perhaps the outstanding example is the Gagudju Association's \$5 million investment in the Cooinda Hotel. On financial grounds alone this has been a poor investment because it has generated little income for Association members; many of the 300 Aboriginal owners of Cooinda still live on welfare. It could be argued that Cooinda has been a good investment because of potential capital gains, but in reality it is unlikely that this enterprise will be sold, and capital gains realised, because it was bought primarily to increase the Aboriginal land base in Kakadu and to increase political leverage in the region. In short, Cooinda was bought for a combination of commercial and social reasons.

The tension between commercial and social objectives is further heightened because all Aboriginal enterprises are managed (and frequently totally staffed) by non-Aboriginal people. Owners and managers frequently pursue divergent and incompatible objectives. Most managers see commercial success as the primary consideration, as their performance is usually measured in these terms. However, owners, many of whom are poor and have a limited understanding of commercial realities, frequently have other social or cultural priorities. This problem is particularly evident when Aboriginal-owned enterprises serve multiple clienteles, like Aboriginal communities and tourists (see Dillon 1987; Altman 1987b).

In some situations, when there is a relatively clearcut functional distinction made between the tourist enterprise and the community enterprise, this problem can be ameliorated. For example, at Uluru, Malpa Trading Company uses profits from its tourist-related activities to cross-subsidise the community store. In other situations though, financial viability may be threatened. For example, a senior traditional owner of Kakadu ran up an enormous debt at the Border Store. This resulted in tensions between owners and managers which was eventually resolved when the debt was written off and a credit limit was enforced. However, the onus was on the manager to police the limit placed on a person who is their

employer. Similar tensions have been evident at Cooinda where managers have been required to enforce the restrictions on sale of alcohol set by Gagudju Association policy. The disjunction between owners and managers is particularly acute because of differing priorities informed by different value systems. The common result is mismanagement and inefficiency linked to high manager turnover and occasional embezzlement.

The options available to overcome this problem are limited. One possibility is to clarify objectives when investing in a tourist enterprise, another is to differentiate tourist-related from community enterprises. The Gagudju Association's problems with management turnover at Cooinda became so acute that in 1986 it entered into a management agreement with the Four Seasons Group and divested itself of management responsibility for the resort. This approach can provide a partial solution, especially if the agreement reached guarantees Aboriginal commercial and social interests. In the agreement to operate the Four Seasons Kakadu Hotel, a clause was included to ensure training of Aboriginal people in hotel management. However this approach may also cause future problems, especially if trained Aboriginal staff are owners.

The policy objective of widening the economic base has become a bit of a catch-cry in the Aboriginal affairs arena, but its aims are infrequently addressed. They appear to be twofold: to improve current economic status and to increase future economic options.

The first aim may be more readily achieved with smaller scale family or individually-owned, rather than community owned, enterprises. Such tourism enterprises may provide more incentives for success, but they are only likely to work with small kin-based groups (like outstations) or with small groups that are able and willing to economically and socially distance themselves from a larger community. A result of successful small-scale operations may be greater income inequality within Aboriginal communities; this is a likely outcome of any government policies that aim for statistical equality between Aborigines and other Australians.

The desire to increase future economic options for Aboriginal groups is important. Some groups are achieving this goal without

current investment by ensuring that buy-in or buy-back clauses are included in all lease and licence agreements with non-Aboriginal operators. This strategy has been used by the Tiwi Land Council in its agreements with Tiwi Tours and Australian Kakadu Tours (in both cases an option to buy a 50 per cent equity in 1990 exists); and by the Gurig Association in its dealings with Wimray Pty Ltd and in relation to the proposed Coral Bay Wilderness Lodge. In the case of the Kings Canyon development discussed in Chapter 5, Aboriginal interests represented by the Central Land Council have managed to gain an unfinanced equity stake in the proposed lodge by using their economic leverage in dealings with the NT government.

Capital

Significant capital resources are needed to establish tourism enterprises and this is a major hurdle for poor people. In the cases examined in Part B, a great deal of variation was evident in the financial resources available to different groups; these varied from the significant mining royalty equivalents that the Gagudju Association receives each year under sub-s.64(3) of the Land Rights Act, to the venture capital that the Imanpa community has borrowed from commercial sources to purchase the Mt Ebenezer Roadhouse. The question of capital raises a number of policy issues.

Even where Aboriginal interests have access to significant amounts of discretionary capital (like royalty equivalents) there is a continual tension in financial policy between spending now and investing for the future. This tension is exacerbated by two factors. Firstly, it has been noted previously that there is considerable debate, depending on one's perspective, whether mining royalty equivalents are public or Aboriginal moneys (Altman 1983a, 1985). Payments made to Aboriginal interests for the lease of Aboriginal land (as at Uluru, Kakadu, and Gurig) or in lease and licence agreements (as at Melville and Bathurst Islands or at Gurig) are little different from royalty equivalents and are of a similarly ambiguous nature. The consequence of this ambiguity is that Aboriginal interests frequently feel that they should have complete autonomy in the expenditure of these moneys whereas governments hold that they should be held publicly accountable for any expenditures.

Secondly, many Aboriginal people who have access to discretionary community capital are individually poor. This paradox was graphically captured in the headline 'Bush millionaires still dirt poor' in the *Launceston Examiner* of 18 November 1982; the article attacked popular press stories of uranium sheikhs in Kakadu (Altman 1983a:123). The tourism-related dilemma is whether Aboriginal people should invest their scarce community capital in tourism enterprises or in alternative investments that may yield higher financial returns. This dilemma can be demonstrated with the case of the Cooida Hotel. The Gagudju Association has invested over \$5 million in this venture, but so far no dividends have been paid to Association members, many of whom continue to live on welfare. If these moneys had been invested in the money market they would have returned at least \$500,000 per annum to Association members.

What financial strategy would provide the greatest returns (in both financial and human terms) to the Association's membership? And what divisions between expenditure and investment are politically acceptable? Will future newspaper articles carry headlines like 'Kakadu hoteliers still dirt poor'? The range of issues that influence the expenditure, financial, and investment policies pursued by different groups are extremely complex; they include the crucial role played by Aboriginal rights to land (through descent, affinal ties, kin ties, residence, and so on) that never complicate commercial decision-making in mainstream enterprises where property rights are more clearly demarcated. Aboriginal poverty and the communal ownership of financial resources are two other factors that complicate decision-making.

Aboriginal interests also appear handicapped in their quest for capital from public sources. It is generally recognised that the development of the north requires governmental intervention (Altman and Dillon 1988:144); in Chapter 3 it was documented that many of the big tourism developments in the NT, at Yulara, Alice Springs and Darwin, have received significant financial backing from the NT government. Aboriginal ventures on the other hand have received almost no support from this source. Aboriginal interests do have special sources of finance, the most notable being the Aboriginal Development Commission (ADC) and the Aboriginals Benefit Trust Account (ABTA). However, the ADC and ABTA have

limited financial resources and have not provided any significant loans or grants to tourism ventures. Aboriginal interests are often caught in a funding limbo; the NT government prefers to fund big and potentially profitable corporations while funds earmarked for Aboriginal people are often used for non-commercial purposes.

Sources of private sector finance are also limited. This is partly because many Aboriginal groups have limited collateral, although those in receipt of mining royalty equivalents or lease payments could use these future income streams as collateral. As noted in Chapter 3, the NT generally has had problems in attracting private finance for tourism development; the problems for Aboriginal interests are compounded by many of the reasons described above. It has been argued elsewhere that the NT land councils may be the only organisations with sufficient size and expertise to take on development opportunities on behalf of Aboriginal people; as paragovernments they also have the political clout that is necessary in intergovernmental negotiations (Altman and Dillon 1988:143). The land councils' recently established investment corporations may provide a means to gain greater access to both public and private capital for tourism development.

Entrepreneurship

An important economic policy issue that is rarely addressed is the almost total absence of Aboriginal entrepreneurs in north Australia. This absence is particularly evident in the tourism arena. It was noted above that management of Aboriginal enterprises is a perennial issue; reliance on outsiders frequently results in financial mismanagement. Similarly, the lack of Aboriginal entrepreneurs means that most the profits from tourism enterprises are accrued by non-Aboriginal interests.

The reasons for the absence of Aboriginal entrepreneurs (the term is used in preference to businessmen or businesswomen to avoid any ambiguities with the ceremonial domain) are not difficult to ascertain. The absence of Aboriginal entrepreneurs is a result of historical and economic factors. As a general statement, in the past, Aboriginal people were either protected in institutional settings or exploited. More recently, Aboriginal people have come under the new protective umbrellas of welfare and program funding regimes.

Aboriginal people are generally poor, they lack formal business qualifications, and they have had almost no experience in running private sector enterprises. These historical conditions do not breed entrepreneurs, and the sudden availability of commercial opportunities in tourism will not create instant experts.

Under these circumstances, it is interesting that there are some recent examples of emerging Aboriginal entrepreneurship in the tourism arena. This is evident in small tour companies such as Wild Goose Tours at Kakadu, Ipolera in central Australia, and Wigram Island; and in dancing troupes such as the Andutjmi and Belyuen dancers. Importantly, the Aboriginal individuals or family groups involved in these ventures have all had some experience in private sector employment. Some are wholly Aboriginal owned with some management assistance being provided by non-Aboriginal people; others are joint ventures between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal interests. All these ventures are at an early stage and their commercial viability cannot yet be assessed.

While there is no short-term solution to the critical shortage of Aboriginal entrepreneurs, it does seem that the joint venture may provide a means whereby Aboriginal people could learn commercial skills. However, the evidence in this study suggests that only a small proportion of Aboriginal people in the NT will choose this mode of direct involvement in tourism in the immediate future.

Assessing benefits and costs

This policy discussion ends by examining three broad tourism options that Aboriginal people face and the different costs and benefits associated with each. The broad options are:

1. To actively seek involvement in the tourism industry on Aboriginal land with the primary aim of economic advancement;
2. To actively seek involvement in the tourism industry as a means to become economically and politically empowered to limit its negative social, cultural, economic and environmental impacts;
3. To prohibit tourism development on Aboriginal land by using the veto provisions embodied in the Land Rights Act.

The first and second options are available to all the case studies, whereas the third it is limited to locations on Aboriginal land, like Melville and Bathurst Islands and Docker River community, where prior interests in tourism do not predate the Land Rights Act. Rather obviously, exercising the third option precludes the first two; without tourism there is no direct tourism economic spinoffs, and no associated costs. This veto option has been chosen by many communities located on Aboriginal land.

Generally, in areas where tourism is imposed rather than invited, individuals, groups, or communities are at liberty to seek involvement in the industry. For example, at Uluru, some members of the Mutitjulu community choose involvement in tourism, others do not. Similarly at Kakadu, there is a tendency for whole communities (with average populations of less than twenty) to either seek tourism employment or reject it. On the other hand, the second and third options are generally made at broad community or regional levels. In particular, individuals or family groups may be precluded from direct involvement in tourism on Aboriginal land if traditional owners as a group do not consent to such an involvement (under s.19 of the Land Rights Act). Any Aboriginal community or group that may be affected by a tourism enterprise (even if owned and operated by traditional owners) must also be consulted before any enterprise can proceed.

It is generally accepted that people need information before making informed decisions. The discussion here summarises some of the potential tourism benefits and costs that should be considered before considering involvement in the industry.

Tourism and economic advancement

Do opportunities in the tourism industry provide a means to alleviate relative Aboriginal poverty and high welfare dependence? This question has to be qualified. Economic options in the NT economy in general are limited; but the opportunities at remote Aboriginal communities are far more circumscribed. In many ways tourism represents a Hobson's choice for Aboriginal people seeking economic betterment: it is tourism or nothing. The dilemma is that while greater Aboriginal involvement in tourism provides access to cash that is independent of welfare agencies and government

departments, its net economic impact may still leave Aboriginal people relatively poor compared with average Australians, and extremely poor in comparison with domestic and international visitors; indeed it is possible that Aboriginal people will be poorer with tourism than without. The calculation of net benefit needs to include economic costs as well as economic benefits.

The direct economic impact of tourism on Aboriginal communities is limited, but positive. The limited direct spinoffs are a result of the numerous factors outlined above. In assessing the potential benefits of tourism it is important that indirect benefits are given due consideration. This was shown most clearly in Chapter 4; the development of Yulara specifically for tourists has indirect benefits for members of the Mutitjulu community and their enterprises. These benefits include improved communications and an increased range of services available at the township. A similar phenomenon is evident at Kakadu, although the establishment of Jabiru was initially precipitated by a large resource development project rather than tourism. However, such indirect benefits may also have associated social costs (see below).

It is the economic costs of tourism that are most frequently overlooked. One potential cost is linked to reduced Aboriginal access to the land if it is used by tourists. At all the case study locations people continue to participate in subsistence activities to varying degrees. These activities provide an income-in-kind. Hunting and gathering remains of cultural and economic significance and there are indications that Aboriginal people are reluctant to participate in such activities within view of tourists both for safety and public relations (in national parks) reasons. Some Aboriginal people at Kakadu feel that their hunting and fishing rights are not adequately protected (see Chapter 6). Hence when imputed income from subsistence activities is recognised, there is a real economic cost associated with tourism.

Another cost is linked to the operation of the needs criterion used by the federal and NT governments as the basis for funding Aboriginal communities. A consequence of this funding regime is that in situations where communities gain access to discretionary financial resources, this often results in a reduction in normal program support. Hence while the greatest economic benefits from

tourism in per capita terms occur at Gurig National Park, these positive impacts are partially negated by reduced Aboriginal access to normal government funding. A similar offset has been identified in the Kakadu situation, although in this case it results from the payment of substantial mining royalty equivalents rather than tourism-related income.

A cost that cannot be readily quantified is linked to the value that many Aboriginal people place on the economic autonomy provided by welfare. When on welfare, people can supplement their incomes with subsistence activities and cash earnings from part-time tourism employment or artefact manufacture. Burchett (1988) has referred to the combination of welfare and tourism-related cash supplementation as 'alternative tourism'. This option may provide the ideal means to reduce overall dependence on the state and generate supplementary cash income, especially as it can be linked with indirect cultural tourism (Altman 1987b, 1987c).

The dilemma for Aboriginal people contemplating the tourism road to economic betterment is that the benefits from tourism may be offset by costs; it is possible that involvement in tourism may result in a negative net economic benefit. Ultimately benefits and costs will need to be calculated on a case-by-case basis and at different levels (community, group, individual). The empirical findings of Part B show that there is no evidence of radical change in Aboriginal economic status linked to tourism.

Limiting non-economic impacts

Will commercial involvement in tourism provide Aboriginal communities with greater regional political and economic power and the means to minimize the social, cultural, environmental and economic costs that can result from tourism? The issue here is whether to get involved in commercial enterprises for non-economic reasons, or whether to allow non-Aboriginal interests to run enterprises with the associated risk that Aboriginal people will accrue all the social costs and none of the economic benefits of tourism.

Initially, it must be recognised that the economic risks associated with allowing non-Aboriginal developers onto Aboriginal

land are reduced by provisions of the Land Rights Act. In particular, Aboriginal land cannot be alienated and the terms of lease and licence agreements cannot exceed five years except under special circumstances. These limits are being used by Aboriginal interests to ensure that buy-in or buy-back options are included in agreements with non-Aboriginal developers.

A discussion of non-economic costs is extremely complicated because these costs are difficult to quantify. Three recent reports have looked at the social impacts of mining and tourism in the Alligator Rivers, Ayers Rock, and East Kimberley regions respectively (AIAS 1984; CLC et al. 1987; EKIAP in press); all have identified costs associated with rapid economic change. These costs are diverse and may include environmental damage and desecration of sacred sites, tourism trespass into Aboriginal communities, and the negative social impacts frequently associated with access to liquor outlets intended primarily for tourists. There are also the additional social costs that are experienced by all who live at popular visitor destinations: busy roads, busy retail outlets, and so on. All three studies provide evidence that the establishment of white (mining or tourism) townships adjacent to remote Aboriginal communities precipitates massive social upheaval.

At both Uluru and Kakadu, Aboriginal people have attempted to reduce the negative impacts of tourism by direct involvement in the industry. For example, the Mutitjulu community is closed off to tourists and a popular retail outlet at the community was moved to another location. This shift had a real economic cost, because the community's service station became a financial liability without the tourist trade. Nevertheless, the community felt that the improved quality of life, resulting from the absence of tour buses driving through living areas, more than compensated for this cost. As already mentioned, the Gagudju Association bought Cooina as much for social as for economic reasons. In particular, senior members of the Gagudju Association were keen to own the hotel so that they could control liquor sales. This strategy has only been partially successful because of the existence of other liquor outlets in the region, and because of difficulties in policing the Association's policies. The danger in seeking commercial involvement to meet non-economic objectives, is that financial viability may be

jeopardised; commercial failure will mean that neither economic nor social goals are fulfilled.

The question that Aboriginal interests must ask is whether to become actively and directly involved in tourism in order to control it, or whether there are other means available to limit the social costs of tourism. One alternative is to gain a majority on policy formulating bodies like the Uluru Kata Tjuta Board or the Gurig Board. At Gurig in particular, the Board (with its Aboriginal majority) is empowered to make by-laws to regulate tourism. At Uluru, the Board can regulate tourism within the Park, but it is powerless at Yulara which is outside its domain.

Another alternative is to seek legislative protection and empowerment in legally binding leaseback agreements with park authorities. This implies that Aboriginal people may need to ensure that their interests are given statutory recognition and legal protection before, and not after, tourism development. This necessity is amply demonstrated in the distinction made earlier between imposed and invited tourism. At locations like Kakadu and Uluru, Aboriginal interests have extremely circumscribed options; at locations like Gurig National Park and Melville and Bathurst Islands there is far greater potential to control any economic and non-economic costs linked to tourism.

Prohibiting tourism

The costs associated with tourism can obviously be restricted if tourism is discouraged, although of the cases in this study, it is only at Melville and Bathurst Islands that Aboriginal interests are empowered to totally veto visitation. The obvious tradeoff here is that the more tourism is discouraged the more limited are the options for economic improvement. As the most heavily populated of the tourist destinations discussed here, the Tiwi face a special problem: significant per capita returns from tourism will require an extremely rapid growth in visitor numbers. In turn, rapid tourism growth raises the possibility that significant social and cultural costs will be incurred.

At Gurig, senior traditional owners believe that tourists should be limited to certain areas, but that there is enough room for

tourism growth and the land needs of local people. While the Aboriginal majority on the Board can veto any tourism development, the current policy is to allow some concessions, but on condition that Aboriginal interests receive a reasonable share of profits generated by any enterprises. The greatest potential for positive economic spinoffs from tourism exists at Gurig because of the region's small Aboriginal population. The dilemma is that tourists come to Gurig to enjoy the wilderness, and a rapid increase in tourist numbers may prove to be commercially counter-productive. Recognising this, the Board has chosen a limited development option for this national park.

Are there risks associated with tourism avoidance? There are two possibilities that may result in tourism avoidance today being costly in the future. The first, and more likely, is that a future federal government may reduce program funding to remote Aboriginal communities. This is a possibility that has influenced Tiwi involvement in tourism (see Chapter 8). The benefit/cost calculation of involvement in tourism, versus non-involvement, will change markedly under a different public sector funding regime. The second possibility is that a future federal government will patriate the Land Rights Act to the NT. While this is a likely possibility, it is less likely that the Act will be amended to such an extent that Aboriginal economic leverage on their land will be drastically reduced. While it is impossible to estimate the probability of either eventuality, both are worthy of consideration in strategic planning for the future.

Conclusion

This monograph set out with two interrelated objectives: to collect empirical data on the economic impact of tourism on Aboriginal communities in the NT, and to canvass the policy implications of Aboriginal ownership of major tourist destinations. In particular, I was keen to investigate whether the Land Rights Act provided Aboriginal people with economic and political leverage in the tourism arena that could be used to improve their economic status.

The study's general findings can be summarised as follows. Firstly, it is often argued that property rights to tourist destinations

will provide Aboriginal people with considerable leverage that could be used either to provide Aboriginal interests with commercial concessions, if they chose to become directly involved in the tourism industry, or to extract a significant proportion of tourism rent from tourist visitation onto Aboriginal land. The empirical evidence presented here suggests that property rights cannot be automatically converted into financial returns. While they may be used to provide Aboriginal interests with commercial concessions, there are numerous factors that inhibit the conversion of resulting comparative and locational advantages to financial gain. It may appear self-evident that given the extent of Aboriginal poverty and dependence on welfare and program funding, economic opportunities in tourism should be maximised. But such a strategy opens up a new range of dilemmas for Aboriginal people: there is the possibility that the autonomy enjoyed under a welfare funding regime is preferable to direct involvement in tourism employment; returns from tourism enterprises and leasing arrangements may jeopardize government program funding; and there are the ever-present problems of distributing proceeds in situations of corporate ownership of resources, be they Aboriginal land, culture, or enterprises.

Secondly, another argument is that where tourism is imposed, Aboriginal interests should become commercially involved in the industry so as to gain regional political power to control tourism and minimise any associated economic and non-economic costs. The evidence from north Australia suggests that legislative protection and legally binding lease-back agreements may provide far more effective means to control negative tourism impacts.

Thirdly, the involvement of Aboriginal people in tourism has been marred by political conflict between the NT government and the land councils which operate as Aboriginal paragovernments. With the growth of the tourism sector, it seems likely that there will be an increased need for Aboriginal interests to be represented by land councils in financial dealings with governments and the tourism industry. However, the statutory mediating role of land councils should not preclude individual Aboriginal initiative and entrepreneurship. A growing Aboriginal involvement in tourism will require greater cooperation between the NT government and Aboriginal interests.

Fourthly, Aborigines in north Australia are experiencing increasing pressures to participate in the tourism industry from governments, Aboriginal affairs policy makers, business interests, and development-oriented individuals and groups within the Aboriginal population. Even Aboriginal leaders, having watched while some profitable commercial enterprises have been established in the north, are keen to utilise the growing tourism sector to improve the economic status and political power of their people. It is important that Aboriginal communities resist these pressures. The economic impact of tourism is extremely variable, and associated development dilemmas faced by Aboriginal communities in north Australia, are complex; these are influenced in particular by the nature of the involvement (direct or indirect), and its scale. Under these circumstances, uniform policy prescriptions will not suit all situations; it is imperative that tourism options are assessed case-by-case, with potential costs as well as benefits informing decision-making.

The empirical findings of this monograph suggest that Aborigines may be justified in their reluctance to rush headlong into tourism. Just as there is a real risk that tourism may not be the panacea for the economic problems of north Australia, it may likewise not be a panacea for Aboriginal poverty and dependence on the state. The tourism option needs careful consideration, particularly by those communities that can still exercise the right to limit tourism development on their land. This study began with a quotation from the Woodward Aboriginal Land Rights Commission; to reiterate:

There will be no immediate and dramatic change in the Aborigines' manner of living. In truth, the granting of land rights can only be a first step on a long road towards self-sufficiency and eventual social and economic equality for Aborigines (Woodward 1974:138).

The indications are that the tourism option, even when combined with land rights and access to mining royalty equivalents, will not provide a dramatic shortcut along this long road.

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