Archived in ANU Research repository

http://www.anu.edu.au/research/access/

This is the accepted version published as:

* Neville Kirk  
* Donald M. MacRaild  
* Melanie Nolan

*Transnational Ideas, Activities, and Organisations in Labour History 1860s to 1920s*

*Labour History Review 74 (2009): 221-232*

This is a copy of an article published in Labour History Review Society for the Study of Labour History © 2009, Labour History Review is available at http://www.maney.co.uk.
Transnational Labour Patterns in the Age of Globalisation

In his inaugural address to the SSLH in 1960, Asa Briggs criticized the insularity of historical scholarship in Britain. Greeting the first issue of the new Society’s Bulletin, an anonymous commendation in Past and Present noted: ‘Perhaps this persistent insularity is the greatest problem which confronts British labour history. It is to be hoped that the new society will help to overcome it.’¹ In our last editorial (LHR, 74, 3, 2009) we described how the society’s conference in 2009 had yielded a great range of exciting papers on aspects of transnational labour history. However, we also wondered why there had been so few British contributions. Perhaps aspects of the insularity lamented by Briggs in 1960 remains an issue half-a-century later. As we ponder the nature of labour history in this, the society’s fiftieth anniversary year, we can still applaud authors from further afield for their contributions.

***

The last collection focused on transnational labour connections in the later nineteenth and early twentieth century, a period when a combination of migration and technological developments facilitated the flow of ideas and people which, in turn, underpinned transnational exchange. Transnational ideas, activities and organisations intensified in the period 1860s to 1920s with technological, communication and transport developments such as trans-oceanic shipping lines, trans-continental railway networks, trans-global cable telegraphy, falling printing costs, and the rise of literacy.
The last set of articles was about a particular phase of transnationalism, what has been described as the ‘transnational revolution’, or perhaps that should be described as the ‘turn of the 20th century’ transnational revolution. The December 2009 number reinforced what others have shown: that the origins of today’s transnationalism can be found in imperial history from the nineteenth century, emphasizing the role of migratory labour networks in fostering varieties of transnationalism.

The present collection focuses on the twentieth century. At this point, the impulse towards transnational exchange was driven further by yet more impressive technologies; by developments in transport; and by mass media, digital technologies and multi-national corporations. These developments were shaped by contingent cultural practices and ideologies, including post-colonialism which ultimately promoted transnational networks. The present volume, then, focuses on a particular phase of transnationalism in the twentieth century.

Behind these articles is a feeling that the globe shrunk in this period and that it continues to shrink. As communications’ systems speeded up and became more widespread, a ‘transnational consciousness’ also grew apace. But does the linking of transnationalism to features of modernity lend itself to a new ‘Whig interpretation’? We believe these articles suggest otherwise. Common problem faced by all of our authors are the checks and constraints upon transnationalism. These articles share a degree of scepticism with transnationalism and critically engage with limitations as well as possibilities. We would argue, therefore that the development of a transnational consciousness is neither a linear development nor uniformly positive. Transnationalism is a dynamic and evolving process, rather than a ‘thing’ which did not develop in one direction.
We have already defined transnationalism as the flow of people, ideas or commodities between nations involving concomitant networks across political borders that are maintained over time. Population flows are helpful, but not necessarily crucial, aids to transnationalism. Whilst there were persistent and distinct flows of people in the twentieth century, the previous volume also alluded to constraints on international mobility which were building in the same century. We mentioned how restrictions on immigration—in some cases allied to racialist policies of exclusion—limited free movement of peoples to Australasia and the United States. In this later period, an ‘Iron Curtain’ also came down, restricting population movement from Eastern Europe and China; post-colonial societies, such as the United Kingdom, regularly altered immigration laws in the period after 1945 to limit or alter inward migration flows.

On the other hand, some regions of free movement have developed such as the European Community or Australasia. Certainly the numbers of those able to hold dual citizenship is increasing. Despite restrictions, there are many large movements of people: for instance, 37 million Europeans are expatriates in OECD countries, 16.8 Asian-born, 15.6 million Latin American, 7.1 million African-born, 5.3 million Carribean-born, 2.4 million North American and 1.2 million Oceania. Overall, however, only three per cent of the world’s population lives in a country in which they were not born. Thus we can point to 80 per cent of the United Arab Emirates population being foreign-born, 33 per cent of Jordan and Israel, 25 per cent of Arabia, 23 per cent of Australia and New Zealand respectively; 20 per cent of Singapore and 18 per cent of Canada and so on. There is ample evidence of both globalization and internationalization in world labour markets as well as the pressures of movement from poor countries to riche ones. Regardless of laws prevent movement, the post-
1945 period truly has become an age in which migrants and technologies connected with identity politics to create a world of many diasporas.

Similarly in the twentieth century, as in the nineteenth, some nations and regions are more likely to be ‘donor’ populations. One of the largest expatriate groups is the nearly 9.5 million born in Mexico but living elsewhere, mostly in the United States. Yet only 0.5 per cent of the population of Mexico is foreign-born. In the year 2000, around 24 per cent of Irish-born lived outside Ireland, 16 percent of New Zealanders resided beyond their native shores, 13.7 per cent Portuguese and 12.8 per cent of Luxembourgers. And there are some groups within populations which are more likely to migrants, in terms of age, gender and skills. From the longer-term perspective selective migration is not a new phenomenon. While transnational migration is increasing groups of migrations are joining new configurations or patterns of movement during the twentieth compared to the nineteenth century.

The pace and scale and movement leads us towards a view that more people are migrants than are not. However, the overwhelming majority of people in the world are not transnational, permanently or temporarily. Most people in the world live in the country in which they were born, even today. The United States, the great recipient nation of the nineteenth century, now only has 13 per cent of its population born other than in the US. Nations do not determine the dynamics of cultural change but, spurred on by government policies, a number of transnational groups in the nineteenth century have now assimilated.

Some claim that ethnicity is central to transnationalism. In part this is because transnationalism is often related to population movements or the creation of diasporas. In reality, the relationship is not so simple. Transnationalism can involve a certain exchange between networks across national borders that does not involve large
population movement in itself. Thus labour historians have considered the effects of industrialization, which originated in parts of the United Kingdom and spread to other similar areas on the continent. Arguably the ideas and technologies flowed even more readily than migrants. During the Industrial Revolution, nodes of industrialism, rather than whole industrial nations, became linked through networks of technology and trade to an extent which was more important than the migratory labour flows which accompanied capital movements.

While transitory and transient populations have promoted interconnectivity between peoples, ideas, movements and institutions can be independently transnational. The diffusion of the welfare state and its subsequent downsizing occurred with little population movement. Yet the ideas behind both its rise and reduction flowed easily enough across national borders. The rise of social democratic parties is an example of ideological transfer considered in this volume. Some examples are more complex: the fall of the Eastern Bloc and the formation of the European Union have been held to have promoted transnationalism.

The movement of people, ideas and commodities is not new. Slavery and evangelical religion are two examples of persistent movements: the first shifting people against their will; the other promoting Christianity as an adjunct of Empire. In geopolitics, ideological transnationalism lurches towards simply international exchange, thus perhaps undermining any notion that transnationalism will become the hegemonic control for understanding all exchanges of this type. We can see this in international affairs, where transfers of power or ideas require neither mass population movements nor the triumph of one belief system over another. Environmentalist tendencies around the problem of global warming provide another example in which governments are acting inter- rather than trans-nationally. The
same might not be said for the climate-change protestors who have formed international networks to voice their opinions by pursuing government officials around the world at G8 summits.

Some ideas and institutions have moved more widely than others but few movements are truly global. Moreover, the facilitation of ideas and commodities has developed so much in the last century that there are now many sources for ideas and commodities, not simply from Europe or the US or from East to West. In population terms, this has been described as ‘super-diversity’. In terms of transnationalism, it is relatively easily to see the effects of super-diversity in, for example, individual biography and at the national level transnational labour networks between Australia and Britain in the late nineteenth century. But the same observations are more difficult in the dizzying context of twentieth-century diversity. We believe there are patterns. Labour historians need to turn to recovering them.

***

A number of cultural practices and ideologies have governed transnationalism and will continue to do so. The papers here put the spotlight on at least three kinds of geopolitical or ideological forces mediating transnationalism: city or place; regional cultural institutions established prior to the nation; and nationalism itself. The articles which follow, rather than focusing on particular transnational networks, are all intrinsically comparative.

John Belchem emphasizes place. His essay focuses on the city and port of Liverpool, that hub of British, Irish and indeed European interactions with the wider world. The setting has been explored most fully and recently in Belchem’s own
remarkable study of the Irish in Liverpool. His case-study of the Liverpool Irish, whose connections and comparisons with Irish communities elsewhere in the world, notably the United States, provides a critical test-bed for the application of transnational theory to historical research. Belchem begins by lamenting that he has tried to incorporate recent best practice in transitional history into his research on Liverpool, without always being successful.

The first part of Belchem’s article offers a thoroughgoing overview of recent historiography. For him, it is a problem that the Liverpool Irish have been portrayed as the ‘scum’ of the Irish Diaspora, the lowest of the low. Whilst some of the convict Irish who went to the Australian colonies may have questioned this designation for the Irish in Liverpool, the latter nevertheless suffered from extraordinarily negative external images, which, in turn, shaped a defiant, alienated self-image. It seems plausible to suggest that the tensions created around the images of the Irish in the city also went on to influence Liverpool’s popular culture more broadly and to encourage a culture of defiance within the city. The city thus consciously views itself as different.

Within a historiography heavily influenced by Irish-American scholarship, the Irish in Britain more generally are considered to be the least fortunate of Ireland’s millions of free migrants. Unlike those who fled to America, the Irish in Britain continued to languish in thrall of the British state, too poor and downtrodden to emancipate themselves fully from the circumstances which had led to their flight in the first place. As the pre-eminent scholar of Irish emigration writes, ‘For hordes of Irish deck passengers disembarking at Liverpool, Bristol, or the Clyde, Britain was seldom the desired or promised land.’ Ruth-Anne goes further; for her, as for commentators at the time, Britain was nothing more than ‘the nearest place that
wasn’t Ireland.22 If this was true for the Irish in Britain, it was yet truer still of the Irish in Liverpool. The great port city was the first footfall for the largest portion of the Irish who left Ireland and a major processor of re-emigrants who went onto the New World from there.

Belchem, however, holds out for a different vision of the Irish of Liverpool. The Irish in Belchem’s Liverpool were not simply passing through. They were there to stay. He suggests the need for a model that takes account of the lack of assimilation of the Liverpool Irish over time: ‘a multi-generational study of migrant communities’ in which the Liverpool Irish eschewed the ‘narrative ethic of individual material advancement in favour of the communality, solidarity and charity benefits available only at the bottom of the social, but not the spiritual, scale’ (p.XX). In proposing his schema, Belchem strikes a cautionary note about transnationalism. In his narrative, it is the specificity of the Liverpool Irish, rather than then their comparability with other Irish or non-Irish groups, which has the greatest implications for labour history. Rather than ‘class, confessional or gaelic alternatives, such as Labour Party, the Catholic Federation or Sinn Fein’ the Irish National Party of Austin Harford ‘was the hegemonic political force in Edwardian Irish Liverpool’. The Nat-Labs rather than the Lib-Labs were in the ascendancy, while ‘the terms Irish, Catholic and working-class had acquired synonymic force, strengthened in opposition to secular (often middle-class) socialism’ (p.??).

The case of the Irish in Liverpool raises more generic questions about assumptions over the diffusion of ideas or issues of translation that necessarily occur as ideas, narratives and models travel and are implemented across national boundaries. Belchem is asking, in effect, can macro and transnational developments such as the concept of an Irish Diaspora really be conflated with a more micro-level
understanding of transnational history?²³

***

Our authors also put the spotlight is also put on regional cultural institutions that have mediated the imposition and introduction of more recent national ones in this college. We are reminded here that many nations were established relatively recently: Italy in 1861, Australia in 1901, Norway, disconnected from Sweden in 1905, Canada in 1910, and so on. Natasha Vall explores the transition from voluntaristic to state-led cultural provision after 1945 with the emergence in Britain of the Arts Council and its regional representatives, assessing those against Swedish and German counterparts. In her article we see some of the differences in levels of regionalism and in variant notions of the nation, new and old.

Fitting into wider European trends at the time, organisations in the UK, such as Arts Council and regional versions or variants, tried to develop widespread access to culture—but not working-class cultures, such as football and popular cinema, but middle-brow aspects of music and art. Vall offers an exercise in comparative regional history, focusing not upon the metropolitan zones of various European countries, but instead by alighting on three important industrial areas, each of them places of heavy manual work and traditional industrial working-class communities: North East England, Skåne in Sweden, and, to a lesser extent, the Ruhr in Germany. The fulcrum of her examination is the balance between the perpetuation of existing regional institutions of culture and the attempts to impose or introduce national versions. Vall’s article demonstrates how, in the post-WWII period, there was a desire to give the working class more than better wages and conditions; moreover, the evolution of cultural policy aimed at the working classes chimed with the wider enlarging of the
state, which was a feature of the post-war settlement. Yet haziness around definitions of culture emerge: is culture about making higher forms available at cheaper prices; does it laud indigenous, working-class art; or is a combination of the two? Certainly, Mary Glasgow, one of the main actors discussed by Vall, was very concerned that state/middle-class intervention in the arts might either deprive workers of a role or ‘undermine didactic ambitions’ (p.XX). The zeal and interventionism of arts brokers in the post-war north east of England—where Vall tells us elite arts patronage was historical weak—even stretched as far as a concern with how to introduce arts (presumably meaning higher forms of art) to workingmen’s clubs. Since the Club and Institute Union had been reborn against middle-class control the desire, though perhaps noble, was at least naive.24

Vall examines the concern over the cultural deficit of the industrial working class expressed by leading figures in the new arena of cultural policy, Glasgow and Lord Keynes. Drawing upon research from the North East Association for the Arts (established in 1961), which maintained links with the North East’s political and economic establishment, her article explores the experience of such metropolitan cultural imperatives in the Labour stronghold of north-east England. It also seeks to examine how far a civic concern to improve popular cultural sensibilities after 1945 was peculiar to British cultural policy. It asks whether there were similar movements to realise the improvement of working-class culture in comparable European regions, and considers the possibilities for a comparative or transnational approach to the history of European cultural policy during the twentieth century. She argues that various national cultural policies failed to have any lasting impact upon regional popular tastes.
A number of the articles emphasize the role of nationalism upon potentially transnational developments. Despite attempts being made to organise labour internationally, European workers and their unions, it seems, preferred to work in national contexts and feared that the internationalization of labour organisations would undermine local/national structures. While examining different nations, none of the articles assumes that transnationalism is always a positive force in history or historiography. Several authors consider the extent to which the nation-state retained its importance as the primary ‘identity space’ and the repercussions this has had for transnationalism.

Whilst dealing with quite different material in the Danish-US linkages, Sissel Bjerum Fossat’s article shares many similarities with Vall’s on the interactions of governments, agencies and the working class around the provision of culture. Certain connections also exist to Belchem’s work. If he considers the natural comparisons between the Irish in Liverpool and in America through the filter of some of the latest thinking on Diaspora and comparative ethnic history, Fossat examines a more contained or specific flow of communication between America and Europe: the ways in which Danish society was influenced by the successes of post-war American consumer capitalism. She examines the interplay between Danish desires, on the one hand, for American standards of living and, on the other, their pride in Danish social security and welfare provision—a safety net they considered superior to America’s. The current debate in the United States around universal health care and current Republican denigration of the UK’s National Health Service, as part of their assault on Barak Obama’s welfare mission, makes this article particularly topical.
In the aftermath of World War II, Danes also admired Marshall Plan America as a model of modernity. American politicians, businessmen and others made their way across the Atlantic to help with reconstruction and to spread the gospel according to American free market economics. As they travelled in one direction, Danish trade unionists and socialists were funded to make numerous study visits to the US in order to be imbued with the America sense of labour relations: a spirit of cooperation between workers and management was stressed at the expense of transformative, socialist principles. Whilst the Danes took away answers about how to go forward in peace-time, they also imbibed their own lessons on what not to do, rejecting aspects of American culture and practice. ‘We have much to learn’ was one of the conclusions of a group of Danish trade unionist who had been on a study visit to the US. The high standard of living the group had seen during their stay impressive the European onlookers. American workers could afford TVs, cars and luxury goods, things the average Dane could only dream about. Still, when it came to social security and welfare, the Danes were ahead.

Fossat’s article clearly articulates something quite different from the articles in our first collection in that here we see the governments and official agencies of the US and Denmark interacting around reconstruction. The travelling democrats who investigated the American way of life were themselves official, in terms of representing unions, parties and the like. This was a much more robust, organised and organisational transnational interconnection than had been apparent prior to World War I. But nationalism or Danish pride governed the transnationalism of postwar American consumer capitalism. Fossat shows how Danish trade unions ‘negotiated, accepted, rejected and changed’ American ideas.
Social movements, non-trade union political struggles, single-issue pressure groups, politicised charities, and a plethora of others gleaned international support by showing awareness of non-national frameworks of communication. Even before the internet (which has further radicalised communications), real-time TV, or quickly-relayed recordings allowed mass media to bring movements, such as that against South African Apartheid, or events, such as Tiannamen Square (1989), to our living rooms with great rapidity.

One of the best, long-living campaigns emerged in Poland in the 1980s. The struggle of Polish trade union, Solidarność (Solidarity), led by Lech Walesa, captured the imagination of trades’ unionists, political activists, and others who raised money for their Polish brethren. But the movement’s main actors, its various strikes and protests, and the actions of its major enemy, General Jaruzelski, were headline news items with which ordinary people became familiarised. As Idesbald Goddeeris argues, however, the reception of Solidarity was patchy across the world. Whilst Solidarity was, to use Benedict Anderson notable phrase, a ‘global imagined community,’25 not all states were equal members of that community. French and Italians, in particular, forged mass movements in support of the Poles. The ICFTU, WCL and the ILO were consistently supportive. However, Britain and Germany (to name but two) were much less supportive.

Indeed, labour organisations seem to behave in a less transnational, less global, way than equivalent social movements. Why did a social democratic movement like Solidarność behave less transnationally than a new social movement like anti-apartheid? At first appearances the differences between the two movements might be thought to be result from timing. The anti-apartheid movement began earlier in 1956 two and a half decades before Solidarność. Goddeeris suggests that the
differences lie in the nature of the movements, what is described as ‘transnationalism from above’ and ‘transnationalism from below’. The anti-apartheid movement is described as a new social movement establishing grassroots networks, organisations and collective action, the legacy of which had resonances for the contemporary protest against globalization, neo-liberalism and apathy over climate change. It was ‘transnationalism from below’. The western response to Solidarność movement from the summer of 1980, however, was more structured, formal and institutionalised, led by the labour movement, much more varied and less multinational transnationalism. It was transnationalism from above. The development of a formal structure hampered the rise of transnational labour solidarity at the lower levels, as occurred in the more mass groundswell of anti-apartheid. Internationalism in the case of Solidarność then did not lead to a ‘multi-cultural grassroots transnational consciousness’ because of the extent of its institutionalisation.

As Goddeeris skilfully reveals, the different levels of support reflected national political cultures and so reduced the transnational potentiality of what potentially was a model transnational movement. National differences also meant a varied range of bilateral national reactions developed in support to Solidarność. Apartheid was removed from the struggle against communism in the twentieth century Europe while Solidarność was from within and contested. A greater division of opinion obstructed solidarity across Western borders over Solidarność. There were fundamental differences between the East-West and North-South which proved an obstacle to multi-national transnationalism.

The first volume of articles on transnational history (LHR, 74, 3, 2009) focused on instances of extra-national activity which were, to some degree, specialist and organic. Whilst we argued that this collection suggested a much earlier start to the
history of globalisation than would once have been mooted, we also recognise that the twentieth century was a crucible for inter-, trans-, and cross-national activities under the banner of labour. It is an old adage in the history of labour relations that some activists believed workers must internationalise their organisations and their struggles in the face of the internationalisation of capitalism.

In a rigorous, persuasive and detailed study of cross-border union activity in the automobile industry, Thomas Fetzer argues that it was in the 1950 and 1960s that clear signs of this type of activity first emerged. In highlighting the cases of Ford and General Motors, Fetzer moves against the suggestion that these early forms of ‘national internationalism’ were inferior to later forms of transnational activity. Yet he describes vividly the attempts which were made by unions to create international solidarity or at least international coordination, and the efforts of employers to scotch such developments. He also brings to light the restrictive, nationalist viewpoints of many in the trade union movement. The result is a rich article which covers enormous ground, by country, union and dispute; an interesting evocation of the difference trade union cultures of, for example, Britain and German, measured, in one instance in the later 1970s, by British unionists’ attempts ‘to convert their German counterparts to the UK brand of trade unionism’ (p.XX). If such enterprises had their roots in earlier times, the progress of multi-national companies, and the recent near-collapse of the world finance system, has meant that, since the 1990s, transnational engagements of labour have become more urgent and relevant than ever.

Whilst the transnational movements which were discussed in LHR 74, 3 were mostly either discrete or specialist—a factor explained partly by the nature of communications’ networks in the later nineteenth century—the movements which grabbed our attention in the post-war period were far more apparent to much larger
audiences. Clearly, the advances in communications also enable the high degree of mobility and discussion which was behind the regular and complicated series of exchanges which Fetzer described in the global car industry. But there were other instances too.

Melanie Nolan’s article visits one of the most interesting features of labour politics in the post-war period: the emergence of ‘Third Way’ politics. Her focus is upon New Zealand and the extent to which, during the 1980s, the ministries of the Labour Prime Minister, David Lange and of Geoffrey Palmer, and particularly of Lange’s Finance Minister, Roger Douglas, transformed the country’s political landscape and essentially drew a line under the socialist essence of the New Zealand Labour Party. But this was in the 1980s. Elsewhere in the world, right-wing parties were delivering in vehicles, such as Thatcherism or Reaganism, cuts, reforms, reductions in the social state and welfare services, deregulation and privatisation. But in New Zealand, Labour delivered these objectives.

Later, New Zealand’s ‘Third Way’ followed Clinton and Blair, but not simply by aping them. The New Zealand Labour Party, which under Helen Clark won three elections between 1999 and 2009, also picked up the ideas of Anthony Giddens, the thinker most credited with Britain’s ‘New Labour’. As Nolan shows, the New Zealand Labour Party went through the stages of development associated more generally with the rise of such parties across the world, delivering socialist and statist programmes around health, education, nationalisation and welfare generally. The drift away from ‘First’ and ‘Second’ way labourism was a general one in global social democracy; yet it was especially attuned in New Zealand. Whilst Antipodean commentators have regularly drawn analogies between British and Australian Labour Parties, Nolan is correct to assert that such comparisons are incomplete without the
case of the New Zealand Labour Party. After all, Helen Clark was very much part of the ‘Third Way’ club, receiving invitations to various international forums which examined ‘Third Way’ political approaches.27

Nolan is arguing, in effect, that scholars have missed key components of nations’ political histories by taking a nation-centered approach and by ignoring the transnational flow of ideas and actors. The significance of various strategies or programmes, such as social democracy, cannot be grasped by focusing on the nation-state alone. In the contemporary context, the opening of labour history to present debates regarding transnationalism, networks, and other dimensions of globalization will enable us to engage in a fruitful dialogue with scholars outside of New Zealand who explore similar issues from their particular angle. While Belchem resists a transnational perspective because of its limitations, Nolan embraces it despite them.

***

Finally, it would seem that all of the articles here are about the effects of what we term the ‘locality impact’ on transnational forces and networks. Place, nation, and region mediate transnational forces, though the effect is not only one-way, albeit not always reciprocal.28 The authors here seem to agree about non-national dynamics of their particular areas of interest but still stress the importance of the national unit of enquiry. The likeliest conclusion, therefore, is an appeal to engage sub-national, national and extra-national factors in a continuing dialogue. The effect, we believe, would be to emancipate each level of analysis without incarcerating the others. International identities have long co-existed with national identities. This volume offers a new perspective on national as well as transnational history. More than that, it also leads us to think of transnationalism as not a simply deterministic phenomenon:
we accept that is a site of conflict, especially between transnational influences within the social, political and cultural arenas of the nation-state (or supra or sub national groupings). Shelley Fisher Fishkin's term ‘crossroads’—by which she means constant sites of exchange—is useful in this regard. The place, nation or region should be considered a crossroads where the multi-directional exchanges between national and transnational forces are played out.

Each of the articles in this collection considers different aspects of what is a complex, interwoven blend of ideology, activity, organisation and individual, spread across countries and continents. It is undoubtedly easier for labour to express transnationalism ideological sympathy, or to make donations to a cause across national boundaries, than it is successfully to create a durable system of cooperation between institutions of labour. Fetzer's article contrasts with the others in this respect, since his subject matter is the attempt by workers to form consistent and persistent frameworks for addressing employers on the level of the trade union negotiator whilst doing it internationally. What we learn from all the contributors, though, is that among the noble aims and the durable structures which emerged in labour movements and were promoted in transnational networks, there are also many instances of local and nationalist thinking among workers, their unions, communities and parties. Despite all the forces intensifying transnationalism, Fetzer warns against ‘a reading of events as heralding a new age of labour transnationalism destined to overcome union parochialism’. It is not the case that the new era of transnational labour is well beyond the ‘national internationalism’ of the past. There is an increased mutual inter-dependence between labour movements which are still nationally defined.


26 In this respect he is developing certain arguments presented by: Stefan Berger, ‘Solidarność, Western Solidarity and Détente: A Transnational Approach’, European Review, 16 (2008), 75-84.


