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COMENCEMENT
CONTINUATION
CESSATION

A conceptual analysis
of a set of English and French verbs
from an axiological point of view

by Bert Leo Irma PEETERS

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degree of Doctor of Philosophy
of the Australian National University
"All parts of the present thesis, with the exception of quotes identified as such, consist of original work undertaken by the candidate"

Signed: Bert Leo-irma PEETERS
ABSTRACT

The aims of the present work are manifold and various. It has been the author’s intention to provide a contribution to the study of linguistic meaning by slightly adapting the methodology of conceptual analysis (i.e., Anna WIERZBIKA’s approach to semantics), and looking at it from the point of view of axiology (i.e., André MARTINET’s approach to semantics); furthermore, to investigate the meaning of a set of verbs according to the methodology just referred to; finally, to indicate how conceptual axiology can promote the study of lexical relations (and, possibly, the study of translational adequacy as well).

Part One, essentially, describes how conceptual axiology differs from conceptual analysis. One difference is that the former makes a distinction between “formulas” and “glosses”: a formula reflects the meaning of a word in a particular syntactic frame (e.g., “X began to Z”), whereas a gloss expresses the meaning of a word in a particular sentence (e.g., “John began to run”). A gloss, therefore, is a “realized formula”. Formulas and glosses constitute a hypothesis of what speakers want to convey to their addressees. Another difference between conceptual axiology and conceptual analysis resides in the role that linguistic economy plays within the former. It is argued, among other things, that no two words can permanently have the same value (inherent economy of the language).

Part Two is the “backbone” of the investigation. It applies the methodology of conceptual axiology to verbs denoting a commencement, a continuation, or a cessation in English and in French. It is shown that there are some remarkable differences in the way in which both languages encode these concepts by means of verbs. Sixteen verbs were selected for this empirical study, of which eight are English and eight French.

Part Three provides a summary and an outlook. In the latter part, it is claimed that the empirical study of sixteen verbs undertaken in Part Two can, and as a matter of fact should, be enlarged to include all words denoting a commencement, a continuation or a cessation. The result would be a study of what the author, in earlier publications, has called an axiological field. A few remarks on the possibility of checking translational adequacy conclude the dissertation. It is hoped that a more comprehensive study of this kind could eventually lead to the publication of new translations, which are better than the existing ones.
AKNOWLEDGMENTS

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Bert Peeters
January 1989
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

PART ONE: THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

CHAPTER ONE: The state of the art in two approaches to lexical meaning

1. Axiology 3-11
2. Conceptual analysis 11-16
Notes 17-18

CHAPTER TWO: Conceptual analysis from an axiological point of view 19-41

1. The possibility of an axiological viewpoint 19-20
2. Formulas and glosses, and the notion of "overt mark" 20-28
3. Syntactic frames and their hierarchy 28-37
4. The inherent economy of language 37-39
Notes 40-41

PART TWO: THE LINGUISTIC EXPRESSION OF COMMENCEMENT, CONTINUATION, AND CESSION IN A SET OF ENGLISH AND FRENCH VERBS 42-387

CHAPTER THREE: Begin and start in English 46-107

1. "Begin" 46-79
2. "Begin" and "start" compared 79-87
3. "Start" 88-101
Notes 102-107

CHAPTER FOUR: Commencer and se mettre à in French 108-164

1. "Commencer" 108-137
2. "Commencer" and "se mettre à" compared 137-145
3. "Se mettre à" 145-160
Notes 161-164

CHAPTER FIVE: Continue and keep in English 166-221

1. "Continue" 166-191
2. "Continue" and "keep" compared 191-196
3. "Keep" 196-213
Notes 219-221
CHAPTER SIX : Continuer and ne cesser de in French 222-263

1. "Continuer"
2. "Continuer" and "ne cesser de" compared
3. "Ne cesser de"
Notes

CHAPTER SEVEN : Cease, stop, finish and end in English 265-324

1. "Cease"
2. "Cease" and "stop" compared
3. "Stop"
4. "Stop" (and "cease") and "finish" compared
5. "Finish"
6. "Finish" (and "stop" and "cease") and "end" compared
7. "End"
Notes

CHAPTER EIGHT : Cesser, (s')arrêter, finir and (se) terminer in French 325-387

1. "Cesser"
2. "Cesser" and "(s')arrêter" compared
3. "(S')arrêter"
4. "(S')arrêter" (and "cesser") and "finir" compared
5. "Finir"
6. "Finir" (and "(s')arrêter" and "cesser") and "(se) terminer" compared
7. "(Se) terminer"
Notes

PART THREE : SUMMARY AND OUTLOOK 388-485

CHAPTER NINE : The sixteen values revisited 391-430

1. Situations, thoughts, and knowledge before t
   391-407
2. Situations, thoughts, and knowledge at t
   407-418
3. A-temporal thoughts and wills (etc)
   419-423
4. Thoughts and knowledge in the case of frames
   423-427
   where no reference to time is necessarily implied
   427-430
5. General conclusions

CHAPTER TEN : Conceptual axiology and the study of lexical structures 431-485

1. "Fields" and "field semantics"
   431-445
2. The size of an "axiological field"
   445-458
3. The delimitation of an "axiological field"
   458-469
4. The structure of an "axiological field"
   469-479
5. Some final considerations on conceptual axiology
   479-480
Notes
   481-485
BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. References for Part One (Chapters 1 and 2) 487-493
2. References for Part Two (Chapters 3 to 8) 493-508
3. References for Part Three (Chapter 10) 509-527
4. References for the corpus examples (Parts Two and Three) 527-529
PART ONE

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Part One presents the methodological framework for the empirical study undertaken in Part Two. It introduces the reader to some basic assumptions proper to axiology (i.e. André Martinet’s approach to semantics), and to conceptual analysis (as envisaged by Anna Wierzbicka). It then looks at the latter from the viewpoint of the former, and proposes a few refinements, which ultimately lead to the creation of a method for which the name conceptual axiology has been chosen.
1. AXIOLOGY

1.1. Axiology, i.e. the "science of values", is, at least in linguistics (1), a kind of semantics which was originally created by analogy with what phonology is meant to be with regard to phonetics. It claims to be both "functional" and "structural". However, the latter labels are at the same time informative and insignificant: according to ŠKUR (1975: 174-175, 1978:97), the very nature of the lexicon imposes a synoptical, functional, and structural method (cp. ULLMANN 1952:30), and this is in fact the kind of method that all linguists apply, be it explicitly or implicitly. Differences opposing different schools of thought, then, are basically superficial. In the case of axiology, the epithet functional refers to the framework developed over the last four decades by André Martinet, who is, chronologically speaking, one of France's earliest structuralists.

Important work in axiology includes the following papers, quoted here in the order of publication, and with their titles— which, it must be admitted, show something of a lack of imagination on the authors' part.

"Sémantique et axiologie" (MARTINET 1975);
"L'axiologie, étude des valeurs signifiées" (MARTINET 1978).
1977):

"Éléments d'une sémantique structurale et fonctionnelle : l'axiologie d'André Martinet" (MOUNIN 1979);

"Réflexions épistémologiques et méthodologiques sur l'axiologie" (CHARRON/GERMAIN 1981);

"Axiologie et sémantique en linguistique fonctionnelle" (HERVEY 1982);

"Axiologie et sémantique" (STATI 1984a);

"Variantes sémantiques et unités axiologiques" (MARTINET 1984);

"Sémantique et axiologie" (WEYDT 1984);

"Sémantique et axiologie dans l'analyse lexicale des termes désignant la chaussure en français" (WALTER 1985a);

"Sémantique et axiologie : une application pratique au lexique du français" (WALTER 1985b).

All of these papers are in French - and four of them were published in proceedings which, alas, have had a very limited circulation. Those two facts help explain why, after more than a decade, axiology remains little known (2) : it suffers from self-imposed barriers. All authors, except one, discuss theoretical principles, and provide few illustrations. The only scholar to have undertaken, at the lexical level, a practical investigation (although on a limited scale) is Henriette Walter : she is, in empirical axiology, a leading specialist.

There is another reason for the undeserved indifference to which axiology has fallen victim : viz., the popularity (at least in functional and structural linguistics outside France) of Eugenio Coseriu's lexematics, to which axiology is by now no more than a "poor cousin". Back in Tokyo, in 1982,
Coseriu himself qualified his own approach to meaning, however indirectly, as "unique in its kind". He talked about lexical semantics, "en particulier sous sa forme fonctionnelle et structurale" (COSERIU 1983:137), and he summarized that paraphrase using the termlexematics, as if axiology was but "quantité négligeable". Supporters of the latter (e.g. STATI 1984b:703) have since given lexematics a similar treatment. But would it not be far better if both theories could peacefully coexist and acknowledge each other's inherent virtues?

1.2. Theoretical underpinnings are important. In what follows, I shall review four out of the seven most important assumptions or "thèses initiales" (cp. CHARRON/GERMAÎN 1981) which are basic to Martinet's view of semantics. The other ones - i.e. assumptions three, five and six - are fairly widespread and well-known: they are about commutation and relevance (cp. Prague school phonology), about the kind of relationship between information and redundancy (and how it is affected by situational variables), and about linguistic relativity (the way in which speakers perceive reality).

1) "Une langue est un moyen de communication doublement articulé" ['A language is a communicative tool characterized by two articulations', CHARRON/GERMAIN (l.c.:37-38)];

2) "Une langue est un système complexe" ['A language is a complex system', (ibid.:38-40)];

(...)

4) "Même en synchronie, la réalité vivante de la langue exige une approche dynamique" ['Even in synchrony, the living reality of language requires a dynamic approach', (ibid.:42-
7) "Les unités linguistiques sont entre elles dans deux types de rapports : syntagmatiques et paradigmatiques" ['Linguistic units are linked in two ways: syntagmatically and paradigmatically', (ibid.:48-50)].

Ad 1). Natural languages are characterized by a double articulation: they "articulate" the extralinguistic reality in monemes (i.e. lexemes and morphemes) and they "articulate" the latter in phonemes. From his first paper on axiology onwards, Martinet has defined it as the study of Saussure's signifiés - and these are said to belong to the level of first articulation (which is the level of monemes). A proposal by HERVEY (1982) to apply the name axiology to both levels of articulation has remained isolated and unchallenged (3). In recent years (e.g. MARTINET 1984), axiology has been subdivided into a lexical branch and a grammatical one. The former deals with lexemes, whereas the latter deals with morphemes.

A critical remark: double articulation is at the same time the most debatable and the least necessary of the assumptions underlying axiology and functionalism (in Martinet's sense) at large. Several authors, including myself (PEETERS 1984a), have proposed to define a third articulation; but the various proposals go in different directions. Currently, I believe that axiology will not get out of its isolation until it is recognized (cp. PEETERS forthcoming a) that language has four articulations (words, monemes, phonemes, and distinctive features) (4).

Ad 2). Language is a complex system; elsewhere (PEETERS...
1985a), I have defined it as a "système de systèmes où tout se tient". The phrase "système où tout se tient" first appeared in the writings of Meillet, although it is widely believed that its author is Saussure (5). The origins of the phrase "système de systèmes" (which may be related to Jakobson's "code of codes") remain to be explored; it amalgamates the two traditional definitions of language as a diasystem (cp. WEINREICH 1954) and a set of systems (such as phonology, morphology, axiology, syntax, and so on). How many of the latter systems there are will be left open in the present context.

Ad 4). The study of language change and the study of language as it functions are not dichotomic, as Saussure thought, but complementary. The Prague school of linguistics stresses, in its famous Thèses of 1929, that any language contains, at any moment of its history, the remnants of older systems, and the germs of forthcoming ones. Drawing on this early view, Jakobson has introduced the notion of a dynamic synchrony, which has its place next to a more traditional synchrony. Whereas the former deals with variation as well, the latter studies so-called "minimal systems", i.e. systems common to all the speakers of a peculiar language community. Martinet has integrated the concept of "synchronie dynamique" in his functionalist framework, however without recognizing his debt to Jakobson, with whom he has been more often than not in disagreement. Both the dynamics of language and its diachrony are accounted for in terms of economy, a notion that will be further explored in Chapter Two.

Ad 7). The assumption that the relations between linguistic units are either syntagmatic or paradigmatic is in fact not
yet a part of axiology, as can be inferred from the remarks of Charron & Germain, who talk only about the paradigms that are of importance to the axiologist. Empirical axiological studies such as the ones by WALTER (1985a,b) have paid no attention to syntagmatics at all: they are textbook examples of a strictly paradigmatic point of view. Presumably, here too, axiology will bear fruits if and only if the strictly paradigmatic orientation is abandoned, and replaced with a methodology that devotes as much attention to syntagmatics as it does to paradigmatics (cp. Part Three, Chapter Ten).

1.3. The present author’s own contribution to (lexical) axiology took shape in Canada, in August 1983, at the tenth colloquium of functional linguistics held at Laval University (Quebec). On Tuesday August 9, an appeal was launched for more contributions to the thematic session on semantics and axiology of Wednesday August 10. In response, on Tuesday night, I rewrote the conclusion of an earlier (unpublished) paper, and eventually made the following statement (PEETERS 1984b:143-144) (6):

"Le seul moyen - moyen paradoxal, en fait - permettant d'apporter dans ce domaine [i.e. field semantics] une clarté plus que désirable consiste, me semble-t-il, à ajouter aux théories existantes une nouvelle théorie sémantique du champ qui tient compte des diverses critiques qui ont été énoncées à gauche et à droite, et qui essaie d'éviter les écueils auxquels les autres théories se sont heurtées. Les difficultés dans la réalisation de cette tâche à laquelle je me suis mis depuis bientôt un an s'annoncent nombreuses, et je ne prétends pas pour le moment y voir très clair. Quel nom faut-il donner au nouveau type de champ ? La question m'a beaucoup fait méditer. Un nom déjà utilisé ne peut qu'augmenter la confusion que je veux enrayer. Il faut donc un nouveau nom. Et le présent colloque m'apporte peut-être la solution : pourquoi ne pas parler de champs axiologiques ? Je ne sais pas si ce sera là le terme
que je vais finalement retenir. Je ne sais pas
davantage s’il faudra l’employer pour désigner un
champ de mot (au singulier) ou pour désigner un champ
de mots (au pluriel); je crois que les deux types
doivent être pris en considération : n’est-il pas vrai
qu’en phonologie on attache la même importance aux
variantes de phonèmes particuliers (aux champs de
dispersion de Martinet) qu’à l’organisation des
phonèmes entre eux ? Le parallélisme entre
phonétique/phonologie et sémantique/axiologie me
paraît très digne d’intérêt, bien que pour le moment
je ne sache pas comment ce parallélisme va finalement
jouer dans l’explicitation de la structure lexicale
d’une langue particulière. (...) En ce moment, je me
sens un peu comme Diogène qui, la lanterne à la main,
se promène au beau milieu de la journée, à la
recherche d’un homme”.

[‘The only way - paradoxical though it may be - to
restore in this area of research a more than desirable
clarity consists, it seems to me, in adding to the
existing theories a new semantic theory of fields,
which takes into account the different criticisms
uttered in various places, and which attempts to avoid
the stumbling blocks hit upon by other theories. The
difficulties in the realization of this task, to which
I have already devoted myself for nearly a year,
appear numerous, and I do not claim to have a clear
overview of all of them right now. What is to be the
name of the new kind of field? A name already in use
cannot but enhance the confusion that I wish to
eliminate. Therefore, a new name is needed. The
present colloquium, possibly, provides an answer: why
not speak about axiological fields? I do not know
whether that is the name that I will finally retain. I
do not know either whether it will have to be used in
order to refer to a field of a word, or to a field of
words; I believe that both types of fields must be
considered: is it not the case that, in phonology,
variants of particular phonemes (Martinet’s
dispersive fields) and the organization of phonemes
among themselves are equally important? The analogy
between phonetics/phonology and semantics/axiology
seems to be interesting enough, although I do not have
the slightest idea yet as to how far that analogy will
have to be pushed when the lexical structure of a
particular language is to be explicated. At this
moment, I feel a little bit like Diogenes, who, with a
lamp in his hand, in the middle of the day, walks
around looking for a human being’]

Towards the end of 1984, the Revue roumaine de linguistique
printed a short paper (PEETERS 1984c), which had grown out of
another contribution to the Laval colloquium, and which I had
revised and expanded upon my return to Belgium (7). I wrote
as follows (l.c.:441):

"J'ai insisté ailleurs sur le parallélisme qu'il y a lieu de postuler dans le traitement des unités de sens et des unités phoniques. Seulement, je me comparais dans cet autre texte à Diogène, le vieillard grec qui, la lanterne à la main, scrutait les horizons (...) à la recherche d'un homme. (...) En sais-je davantage aujourd'hui ? Je n'aurais pas l'audace de répondre catégoriquement par l'affirmative. Mais il me semble utile de mettre un pas en avant, ne fût-ce que pour voir où cela nous mène".

['Elsewhere, I have stressed that units of meaning and units of sound must be treated along similar lines. In that other text, however, I compared myself to Diogenes, the old man from ancient Greece, who with a lamp in his hand searched the land, looking for a human being. Do I know more today? I am not brave enough to say categorically "yes". But it does seem useful to go a step further, just to find out where that may lead us']

The step further was an attempt to apply Martinet's notion of dispersions of field (champ de dispersion, field of dispersion) in the areas of morphology and lexicology: a distinction was made between phonological, morphological, and axiological fields according to whether the dispersion was phonetic, formal, or lexical. The axiological field had thus become a field of one word (8).

In 1985, not even a full year later, I published a review (9), in which I stated that the notion of "value" is "at the centre of the reviewer's actual research on 'axiological fields'". I referred to my first text on the matter (PEETERS 1984b), and expressed regrets that the authors of the book under review had so little to say about field semantics. It is perhaps not extremely clear, but what I had in mind right there were axiological fields as fields of words. Although dispersions of fields were not mentioned, they had not disappeared - as Chapter Two will show.
It is, on the whole, a rather strange coincidence that sworn functionalists such as Martinet and Walter in the Paris functionalist school, and Hervey in St. Andrews (Scotland) have hardly, if at all, spoken about semantic fields. Mounin, on the other hand, is well known for his studies (1965a,b) on the semantic fields of domestic animals and habitation. CHARRON & GERMAIN (1981) constantly refer to their 1975 study on the semantic field of seats. In addition, Germain is the co-author of a small volume on semantics (GERMAIN/le BLANC 1982), and the author of a book on "functional semantics" (1981); both works pay much attention to what has been achieved in semantic field theory. Stati's writings include a handbook of descriptive semantics (1978). WEYDT (1979) is a quite original study of German particles (1979) along the lines of the "Wortfeldmethode". None of these authors, however, looks at fields from a genuine axiological point of view. Mounin, of course, is to be excused: at the time he was writing, axiology did not yet exist. He, and the others, have done no more than apply the apparatus of componential analysis (cp. pp.12 and 19) to particular semantic fields. The results, of course, were new; but the methodology was not.

2. CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS

2.1. Conceptual analysis as envisaged by Anna WIERZBICKA needs hardly any introduction. It is sufficiently known thanks to the author's prolific writings, to which the reader is referred for detailed information. The following is an
exhaustive list of books applying the methodology:

"Semantic primitives" (WIERZBICKA 1972);

"Lingua mentalis. The semantics of natural language" (WIERZBICKA 1980a);

"The case for surface case" (WIERZBICKA 1980b);

"Lexicography and conceptual analysis" (WIERZBICKA 1985);

"English speech act verbs. A semantic dictionary" (WIERZBICKA 1987a);

"The semantics of grammar" (WIERZBICKA 1988a);

"Semantics and culture" (WIERZBICKA forthcoming a).

In section 2.2., we will briefly recall the essentials of conceptual analysis (cp. also PEETERS forthcoming c). Section 2.3. raises a problem of translation.

2.2. Basically, conceptual analysis accepts the existence of semes or distinctive semantic features; however, their number is cut down in a very significant way. In its latest version (WIERZBICKA forthcoming b), conceptual analysis operates with a set of thirteen to about twenty "semantic primitives", i.e. undefinables which are intended to be universal features of meaning. In most of Wierzbicka's work, the primitives look like English words: the metalanguage of conceptual analysis is "derived", in a way, from English. But the idea is that the primitives, as true universals, could be expressed in any language (cp. section 2.3.).

Unlike componential analysis, which describes the meaning or meanings of a word in terms of strings of "distinctive semantic features" (as in man = 'human' + 'male' + 'adult'), conceptual analysis uses syntax in its semantic explications. Syntax, however, is often highly language-specific. In order
to sidestep this potential problem, Wierzbicka has tried, at least in some of her most recent publications, to avoid the pitfalls of a too complex syntax (which presents the inherent danger of not being universal, but language-specific). It is interesting to compare the description of the verb lie in the frame "X lied to Y" according to WIERZBICKA (1985:342) (cp. [1a]) with what it would be today (cp. [1b]).

[1a]   X lied to Y =
   X said something to Y
   which X knew was not true
   because X wanted Y to think that it was true
   I assume people would say that this is a bad thing to do

[ 1b ] X lied to Y =
   X said something to Y
   X knew this : it isn't true
   X wanted this : Y will think this : this is true
   I think this : people would say this : this is a bad thing

Lexical meanings, it can be seen, are described by means of a formula, i.e. a set of "propositions" containing either the primitives alone, or primitives and other "concepts" which, in turn, are completely definable in terms of a syntactic combination of primitives. Punctuation and initial capital letters are avoided. Formulas may vary in length: they may exceed one or even two printed pages - or be restricted to a couple of lines. Most definitions of concrete lexicon in WIERZBICKA (1985) are of the former kind. For instance, the one of cup (l.c.: 33-34) has two main sections ("imagining things of this kind people would say these things about them" versus "... could also say these things about them"), whereas each section talks about aspects such as purpose, material, appearance, size, and use. The result is more than 500 words
long: it is an exhaustive formula, which is still extremely "reductive" (10).

2.3. Until quite recently, the translatability of the metalanguage and the formulas of conceptual analysis was not even an issue: ever since the publication of her Semantic primitives (1972), which is in itself a translation from a Polish original, Wierzbicka has continuously written in English, Polish, and Russian, using the same metalanguage, throughout its consecutive developmental stages, in an English, a Polish, and a Russian version, in order to explicate the meanings of words in these three languages, and in a host of others.

The situation changed with the publication of WIERZBICKA (1986a), where two "methodological principles" were proposed. I quote in extenso:

"There are two methodological principles which I should like to propose. (1) If the meanings encoded in one language A (...) are to be made intelligible to people from a different cultural and linguistic background B (...), then those meanings have to be expressed in semantic formulae constructed in simple and generally understandable words from language B. (2) If the semantic formulae constructed in simple and generally understandable words from language B (...) are to constitute plausible hypotheses about the native speakers' meanings encoded in language A (...), then those formulae must be readily translatable into language A" (1986a:35-36; emphasis added).

Eventually, the two principles were integrated in a broader framework (cp. WIERZBICKA 1987b). The second one came to be called principle of indigenization, and was introduced before the first, the so-called principle of translatability. I must add that I am rather puzzled by the way in which Wierzbicka chose her labels: translatability is at the heart
of her principle of indigenization much more than it is at
the heart of her "principle of translatability". In this
section, I am, as a matter of fact, dealing with the former.

In early 1988, the journal *Langages* published Wierzbicka's
first paper in French. WIERZBICKA (1988b) is about love,
anger, joy, and boredom as they are linguistically expressed
in French and in Ifaluk (a language spoken in the Pacific).
The paper had been prepared for publication in Polish, but
was eventually translated by Elżbieta Jamrozik, who was
responsible for the running text, and by Wierzbicka herself,
who assumed the more delicate task of rephrasing the formulas
(i.e. translating them in the "indigenous" language).
Unfortunately, Wierzbicka did not manage, for some reason, to
translate the formulas in an optimal way. I contend that the
fault for this fact is not with the formulas, but with the
translator; in order to illustrate my claim, I will look at
one particular formula, proposed for the French word *colère*
(which expresses a kind of anger). The English translation
is as literal as possible.

[2] \[ X \text{ ressent de la colère,} \]
(a) \( X \text{ pense : } Y \text{ a fait quelque chose de mal} \)
(b) \( \text{je ne veux pas que } Y \text{ fasse de telles choses} \)
(c) \( X \text{ ressent un mauvais sentiment envers } Y \)
\( \text{à cause de cela} \)
(d) \( X \text{ veut faire quelque chose de mauvais à } Y \)
\( \text{à cause de cela.} \)

'(a) \( X \text{ thinks : } Y \text{ has done something bad} \)
(b) \( I \text{ do not want } Y \text{ to do such things} \)
(c) \( X \text{ feels a bad feeling towards } Y \text{ because} \)
\( \text{of that} \)
(d) \( X \text{ wants to do something bad to } Y \text{ because} \)
\( \text{of that'} \)

Especially disturbing are the use of the paraphrase
*ressentir un sentiment* (which is as clumsy as the English
feel a feeling), and of the adverb mal next to the adjective mauvais (whereas both have basically the same meaning). The noun sentiment should be avoided altogether (except, perhaps, in the introductory line, to specify that song and colère are feelings). Ressentir is better than sentir: according to native speakers, the latter verb, if used in a paraphrase such as sentir qqch de bon ou de mauvais (11), refers to a good or a bad smell rather than to a good or a bad feeling (the verb sentir corresponds to English feel and smell). However, ressentir is a secondary formation (derived from sentir), and may therefore strike one as unnecessarily complex. It is surprising that Wierzbicka did not think of the verb éprouver (literally 'experience'), which Jamrozik uses up to seven times in the main body of the translated text. Ironically, Wierzbicka herself uses éprouver as a French equivalent of feel in WIERZBICKA (1986b:590).

In replacement of the formula in [2], whose correctness is taken here for granted, I propose the formula in [3].

[3]  X éprouve le sentiment de la colère =
  X pense ceci : Y a fait qqch de mauvais
    je ne veux pas ceci : Y
   fait cela
  X éprouve qqch de mauvais envers Y à cause
decela
  X veut faire qqch de mauvais à Y à cause
decela

The new formula not only takes into account the suggestions just made: it is also simpler in its syntax. Remember that it was originally written out in Polish; I have tried to show that, as an explication of a French concept, it is "readily" (and literally) "translatable into French" (cp. Wierzbicka's principle of indigenization).
NOTES to Part One, Chapter One

(1) For axiology within the realm of philosophy, see, for instance, BAHM (1980). An older work is HARTMAN (1967).

(2) WEYDT's (1984:153) observation that the term axiology was adopted, after Martinet, by several workers in structural semantics seems a little excessive.

(3) Harvey's aim was to achieve a consistent terminology, compatible with Saussure's truly broad use of the term valeur. Seven years earlier, however, MARTINET (1975:540) had argued that, since the study of the units of second articulation is now known world-wide as phonology, and since the latter does not make any technical use of the term valeur, there is no risk in reserving the label "linguistic value" to the study of meaning.

(4) With regard to this, STATI's (1984a:158) viewpoint according to which axiology should be the study of so-called sememes, the latter being "la face signifiée de lexèmes (les mots-invariants, unités de langue)" is to be welcomed.

(5) More details, together with an explanation of the origins of the "Saussurean myth", are given in PEETERS (forthcoming b).

(6) There is only one excuse for the lengthy quote that follows: the quasi-unavailability - or at least the restricted commercialization - of the proceedings of the Laval colloquium (cp. p.4).

(7) A summary of the original contribution, and an overview of reactions of other participants (partly taken into account in the revised version) may be found in DESHAIES (1984:232-234).

(8) According to BILE (1987:307), PEETERS (1984c) is the work of a "martinetiste trop convaincu" ['a too faithful follower of Martinet'], and lacks originality. Yet, in that same paper, I explicitly distance myself from the principle of double articulation (cp. p.6), apply the concept of a "dispersional field" in areas where it had never been applied before, defend (against Martinet) the idea of a formal dispersion in morphology, introduce the very idea of fields in axiology, and plead for a dynamic approach (cp. p.7) to the study of monemes and words. Bile's statement is clearly based on a too superficial reading.

(9) Printed in IRAL 23, pages 168 to 170.

(11) From now onwards, *qqch* will be used as an abbreviation for *quelque chose*. 
CHAPTER TWO
CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS
FROM AN AXIOLOGICAL POINT OF VIEW

1. THE POSSIBILITY OF AN AXIOLOGICAL VIEWPOINT

An initial warning is necessary before conceptual analysis can be looked at from an axiological point of view. It might be argued that the universal character of both the semantic primitives and the syntax with which Wierzbicka operates is evidence for the incompatibility of the two approaches. Indeed, axiology was created and is supported by linguists who are ready to swear that what linguistics is all about is the differences between languages, and not their presumed common properties.

The evidence would be compelling if primitives and syntax were the output of semantic research, as is the case for the distinctive features of traditional componential analysis. Supporters of the latter feel that their job is finished as soon as, for instance, the noun man is semantically described as it was on p.12. However, primitives and syntax are not the output, but the input of the search for meaning. The primitives were arrived at after years of trial and error, and their list is perhaps not yet final. It is wrong to believe that conceptual analysis merely reduces meaning to a set of primitives. Syntax holds the primitives together (in formulas). Semantic primitives and syntax are used as tools
in the description of meaning; for different languages, the
tools will be the same, but the resulting formulas different.

2. FORMULAS AND GLOSSES, AND THE NOTION OF "OVERT MARK"

2.1. A first point of departure between conceptual analysis
à la Wierzbicka and what I myself would like to call
conceptual axiology, viz. the distinction between abstract
and realized formulas, has its source in the distinction made
by axiologists between values and their realizations in the
act of communication. The former are to the latter what, in
phonological practice, phonemes are to allophones. In the
remainder of this study, "formula" equals "abstract formula"
(for examples, see Chapter One); "gloss" is the term for a
realized formula (examples are given in [3] and [9] below).

It is not claimed that formulas and glosses are a direct
reflexion of something that truly exists in the speaker’s and
addressee’s mind (be it permanently, or just for the duration
of the communicative act) (1). Yet, they have psychological
reality: formulas and glosses are a representation of what
the speaker wants to convey, either in a metalanguage based
on the language of the investigator, or (preferably) in a
metalanguage based on the object language: the formula of a
French word, as a representation of what a speaker of French
wants to convey, should, if possible, be rendered in a
metalanguage based on French. This must not raise any
special problems - I still do not understand why Wierzbicka
failed (cp. pp.15-16) to come up with "smoothly running"
"French" formulas. Semantic primitives, it must be
remembered one more time, are intended to be universal (and therefore perfectly translatable) features of meaning, and the syntax is kept simple enough to be expressible even in very different languages.

One of the most important assumptions of axiology is that, in their everyday speech, speakers do not systematically respect the value of the words they use. Similarly, glosses do not necessarily realize formulas in a systematical and perfect way. Notice the "short cut": throughout the present work, gloss will stand for "what a gloss is a representation of", and formula is to be read as "what a formula is a representation of". Most of the time, speakers are not aware of any deviation. The reason for this is quite simple: speakers are normally unaware of the existence of the (abstract) formula, too. All they do is "just speak". In that sense, it becomes understandable that, at times, they deviate from a given formula, without knowing that they do so. A deviation from a formula (or from what speakers believe is a formula for a particular word) may be deliberate, though: think of the work of poets, for instance, and of novelists or writers in general.

As a rule, it will be impossible for speakers to disrespect a formula, unless the hearer is given a clue. From now on, such a clue will be called an overt mark. Overt marks are contextual indications which inform the addressee that the speaker has used a word (consciously or not) in an unusually "liberal" way. In the absence of any such "overt mark", a deviation will result in anomaly (2), or at least in misunderstanding, for the addressee has no clue telling him or her that the norm interpretation (i.e. the interpretation
that conforms to the formula) does not apply. In both cases, the speech act remains unsuccessful. In brief, speakers may disrespect a formula, as long as they provide the addressee with a clue, i.e. an "overt mark".

2.2. A detailed look at some English data may illustrate the importance and nature of overt marks. The first example chosen involves the first one of the verbs studied in Part Two (3). Consider the unacceptable string in [1] :


The anomaly of [1] (cp. NEWMEYER 1975:35) results from the fact that, by uttering it, speakers would disrespect the semantic formula corresponding to the verb begin, while providing no overt mark which allows them to do so. It might be argued that the use of another subject (e.g. The guests, The crowd) or of another verb (e.g. run) does not result in unacceptability, and that therefore the subject John or the verb arrive are overt marks. The fact that [1] is rejected by native speakers proves that this is not the case. In no sense can either John or arrive be said to contradict any of the elements included in the formula for the verb begin.

MITCHELL (1978:235) "completes" Newmeyer's example in [1] by adding either an adjective, an adverb or an adverbial complement to the infinitive, as in [2] :

[ b ] John began to arrive punctually.
[ c ] John began to arrive on time.

Unshaven, punctually, on time, and other similar things, transform an unacceptable string into a fully acceptable
sentence. But they are not overt marks either: a closer analysis shows that, in [2a] to [c], the norm interpretation applies— as is shown by the gloss in [3], which contains no anomalous or contradictory statements. What exactly [3] realizes will be discussed later (Part Two, Chapter Three).

[3] before t, John did not arrive unshaven/punctually/on time
at t, John arrived unshaven/punctually/on time
one could think at t:
John will do more of that after now
one could not know at t:
John will do more of that after now

It is perfectly possible for a particular word to be an overt mark. BAUMGÄRTNER (1967:188) found that the utterance in [4] was "durchaus semantisch akzeptiert" ['absolutely semantically accepted'] by his informants, although the component 'fast' of the verb trippeln is "neutralized" ("aufgehoben") by the adverb langsam (which therefore, in the terminology adopted here, is an overt mark).

'The woman slowly trips across the room'

The material in [5] may be adduced in order to start the search for overt marks at the word level in English (4). It will be necessary to anticipate the analysis in Part Two, and to clarify first the contrast between begin and start, before any overt marks can be identified.

[5a] John suddenly began to run.
[ b] John gradually began to run.
[ c] John began to run.
[ d] John started to run.

[5a] and [b] give more information than [5c], where
nothing is said about the running except that it begins, and that the runner is John. [5d] seems to snare its meaning with [5a]. It may hence be inferred that start must have an internal, axiological, component 'sudden'. A very similar viewpoint appears in FRIEDERICH (1977:104), who talks about "der semantischen Nuancierung, die to start gegenüber to begin aufweist: es kennzeichnet ein intensives, oft plötzliches, Überraschendes Beginnen" ['the semantic nuance carried by start, as opposed to begin: the former marks an intensive, often sudden and surprising beginning']. It must be pointed out that the difference between a gradual and a sudden beginning is a relative one (WIERZBICKA 1988a:85) (5); but the components 'gradual' and 'sudden' are discrete units of the language and may therefore be used in order to define, in an informal (i.e. non meta-linguistic) way, a linguistic opposition such as the one between begin and start.

Now, let us assume for a while that, since start has something sudden, begin is its natural complement, and has, as [6] might suggest, an internal and axiological component 'gradual'.

[6] Blossom by blossom the spring begins.
/CC,23-09-87/

In terms of the new begin-hypothesis, both [5b] and [7a] below would be slightly pleonastic, in that they give more prominence to a particular component of the verb. [7b], on the other hand, confirms the presence of a suddenness-component in start.

[7a] John suddenly started to run.
[ b ] ?John gradually started to run.
(7b) did not strike my informants as unacceptable: but there was a great deal of discussion as to how acceptable it is, i.e., in what kind of contexts it might occur. It was agreed that (7b) is fine, for instance if it is implied that John, whose leg had lied in plaster for the last six weeks, gradually resumes his training as a runner, possibly at a time when most people would not have thought him fit enough to do so. The adverb gradually functions as an overt mark: it explicitly overrides the verb's suddenness, and creates the possibility (not to say the necessity) of an alternative, i.e. unexpected, reading. Now, if the new begin-hypothesis were correct, (5a) should have been as much debated as (7b). It was not: (5a) is a perfectly acceptable sentence. Begin appears to be unmarked as far as gradualness or suddenness are concerned. More details will be provided in Part Two.

Not only one word, but the context at large may function as an overt mark. GARCÍA (1967:860-861) considers (8a) correct, as (8b), in which it is inserted, is "perfectly normal", too.

(8a) He began to be from Boston.
(8b) John always struck you as a born New Yorker, but he began to be from Boston the minute you tried to place his accent.

According to GARCÍA (ibid.:861), no begin-sentence is ever "ungrammatical". By ruling out a sentence such as (8a), the linguist would have to take the "impossible step" of incorporating into the lexicon selectional restrictions across sentence boundaries. As a matter of fact, no impossible step has to be taken, and the "grammaticality" of (8b), as opposed to the "ungrammaticality" of (8a), is not hard to explain. (8b) is to be glossed as follows:
...John began to be from Boston... =
before t, one could think: John is not from Boston
at t, one could think: John is from Boston

The last components of the original formula (cp. the gloss in [3]) do not appear. Those components which do appear cannot be said to imply and/or replace the terms of a "literal" gloss. "Before t, one could think: John is not from Boston" does not imply "Before t, John was not from Boston". It was argued along the previous pages that an "alternative reading" is only possible if there is an overt mark which contradicts or overrides the elements included in a formula. [8b] provides such an overt mark: the context makes clear that the speaker uses the verb begin, not in its "literal" sense, or core meaning, but in a modified sense which comes quite close to the meaning of the verb appear.

In Part Two, Chapter Six, it will be shown that, at least in spoken French, even an emphatic stress on the first syllable of the verb continuer ['continue'] can be an overt mark.

2.3. It looks safe to assume that there are links between the notion of "semantic formula", taken from conceptual analysis, and the notion of "value", taken from axiology. In a first attempt to specify the relationship between "formula" and "value", it may be said that describing the value of a word equals giving the set of its semantic formulas. From the viewpoint of semantic field theory, the set of formulas describing the value of a word can be regarded as a kind of hard core, something like the center of a field (not of words, but of a word). Particular glosses either fully
correspond to the formulas, or "swarm" around them, i.e. are "dispersed" in the field’s periphery. That is where I got the idea of a dispersionsal field. applied at the level of words (cp. PEETERS 1984c).

The notions of "core" (or "center") and "periphery" are by no means new in semantics; but few authors have used them at the level of a field of one word (6). Even more rare seems to be the statement that the different realizations of one and the same value are also associated to one another, in exactly the same way as values are linked together among themselves. Associations of the former kind are accounted for in the associational field defined by GASTIL (1959). It includes the set of meanings that may be evoked by the use of a word.

Briefly, every word has its own associational field (7); in the present context, that field is called a dispersionsal field. The notion of lexico-semantic dispersion also appears in ADRADOS (1971a:10-11), who holds that the "contents" (Sp. contenido) of a word "se vierta en una serie de acepciones entre las que a veces no queda ningun lazo y otras veces quedan lazos poco claros" ['manifests itself in a series of meanings among which there are sometimes no links, or, in other cases, links that remain unclear'] (8). Adrados’ viewpoint is different from the "associational view" proposed here: according to the latter, if two "realizations" can be shown to realize one and the same value, there must be an associational link (Sp. lazo) between them. If no link can be discovered, two different values, i.e. two different words, are involved. Looking back at the utterances and glosses given earlier, we may say that the gloss in (9) is
clearly related to the begin-formula reflected in, e.g., the gloss in [3]. Hence, the meaning of begin in (8b) belongs to the periphery of the dispersional field of our verb: he began to be is to be understood as it appeared to us that he was, with appear meaning, as the dictionary says, "become visible" (= begin to be visible).

3. SYNTAXIC FRAMES AND THEIR HIERARCHY

3.1. Lexical items, especially verbs, may appear in several syntactic frames. An example of a syntactic frame can be found in Chapter-One, p.13. Now, with regard to verbs, to their value, and to the number of formulas per verb (and hence per value), consider the three following hypotheses:

   a) as a rule, the number of formulas per verb is higher than the number of frames in which that verb appears;

   b) as a rule, the number of formulas per verb is identical to the number of frames in which that verb appears;

   c) as a rule, the number of formulas per verb is lower than the number of frames in which that verb appears.

Hypothesis a) is self-contradictory: each frame, as a frame (i.e., as an instance of a syntactic construction), can have no more than one meaning, and one formula, associated to it; if it had two (or more) meanings, it would not be a frame, but a construction. On the other hand, if we had to accept as many formulas as there are syntactic frames in which a verb occurs (hypothesis b)), we would almost always enter into conflict with the principle of descriptive economy. at least if the verb considered belongs to the
category of aspectual verbs or aspectualizers, i.e. verbs which denote a commencement, a continuation, or a cessation. Descriptive economy is a methodological principle also known as simplicity. It implies that “if we were faced with two competing descriptions of the same semantic facts, we would, ceteris paribus, prefer the simpler, less complex one” (LEHMANN 1978:89).

The present study looks at a set of English and French aspectual verbs; it is therefore clear that hypothesis b) quoted supra must also be discarded. Aspectual verbs appear in a number n of syntactic frames, and yet most of them may have their value described by means of a set of n’ < n basic formulas (hypothesis c)). In any case, however, n’ > 1. In order to fully account for the value of an aspectual verb with n syntactic frames, it will be necessary, as the different analyses in Part Two will show, to construct more than one semantic formula per verb; on the other hand, it will be almost always sufficient to construct a number of formulas lower than n.

It is important to keep apparently identical frames apart: the utterances in [10] exemplify one and the same syntactic construction (subject-verb-object), but they belong to different frames (cp., for details, Chapter Three in Part Two).

[ b] The manager began the meeting.

The problem at hand can even better be illustrated by means of the example in [11], an utterance which has become famous in transformational circles (9).
The police stopped drinking on campus.

ROSS (1972a:73) comments: "This sentence is ambiguous: it can mean that the police ceased [!] to drink on campus, or that they prevented others from doing so". PRATHER (1977:56) almost copies Ross (her (54) is our (11)) : "(54) can mean either that the police ceased imbibing or that they stopped others from doing so". In other words, on one reading drinking is a verbal ING-construction, whereas on the other it is a nominal ING-form. Unlike the former, the latter reading implies causation. In its non-causative interpretation, (11) is parallel to the sentences in (12); drinking is a verb.

[12a] The police stopped drinking beer on campus.
[  b] The police stopped punching students out.

In its causative interpretation, (11) is parallel to the sentences in (13); drinking is a noun.

[13a] The police stopped beer-drinking on campus.
[  b] The police stopped drug abuse on campus.

3.2. Several "discriminating devices" were proposed by Ross and followers in order to state what type of ING-form is used in a given sentence. Ross himself notes that the use of a progressive (as in [14]) has a disambiguating effect.

[14] The police are stopping drinking on campus.

[14] has only one reading (according to Ross). It means "that the police are stopping other people from drinking on campus" (cp. also PRATHER l.c.). This is the causative
reading, in which drinking is a noun. As nouns are modified by means of adjectives, and the corresponding verbs by means of the corresponding adverbs, Ross's position implies that (15a) is fine, whereas (15b) would be "ungrammatical":

(15a) The police are stopping (public) drinking on campus.
(15b) The police are stopping drinking (publicly) on campus.

As a matter of fact, (15b) is considered "ungrammatical" by MILSARK (1972:542) and "odd" by KOSSUTH (1982:289). BOLINGER (1979:44), however, finds this particular example acceptable. Ross's device (substituting a progressive and looking at the result) is therefore apparently unreliable; his initial assumption according to which (14) has only one reading is probably false or, at best, inspired by his own particular speech habits.

Before we look at some other "discriminating devices", it may be useful to point out that, in his summary of the points raised by Ross, EMONDS (1973:40-41) misquotes the example in (14). He mistakenly adds the object beer, as in (16):

(16) The police are stopping drinking beer on campus.

According to Emonds, (16) is "ungrammatical" if police is the understood subject of drink. Hence, he, Milsark, and Ross agree that a non-causative stop cannot be used in the progressive. On the other hand, always according to Emonds, (16) is a correct sentence if police is not the understood subject of drink, i.e. if stop is a causative verb. The problem is that drinking in (16) is a verb (it takes an object at its right hand side) (7). If drinking is a verb,
police must be the understood subject of drink, and stop must have its non-causative reading. Any other interpretation is logically impossible, and [16] can by no means ever be correct. Whether this is so or not is irrelevant. I just want to show to what lengths transformationalists have gone in order to find out whether an ING-form is a noun or a verb.

MILSARK (1972) and EMONDS (1973) propose several other devices: both mention passivization and cleft. Millsark mentions "tough-movement", and Emonds coordination with an unambiguous NP. Consider, first of all, passivization and cleft. Millsark argues that these freely apply if the ING-form is a noun, but not if it is a verb:

[17a] (Public) drinking on campus was stopped by the police.
[ b] *Drinking (publicly) on campus was stopped by the police.

[18a] It was (public) drinking on campus that the police stopped.
[ b] *It was drinking (publicly) on campus that the police stopped.

Emonds, on the other hand, gets mixed up once more. He finds [19a] ambiguous (but it is not, because it has a direct object; cp. supra), and he accepts both [19b] and [ c], claiming that drinking is a "noun phrase gerund" (whereas it has to be a verb, again because there is a direct object).

[19a] The police stopped drinking beer on campus.
[ b] *Drinking beer on campus was stopped by the police.
[ c] *It is drinking beer on campus that the police will stop.

"Tough-movement" is a device which can only be applied after the initial sentence has been completed, as in [20a]. It is considered to be "ungrammatical" if the ING-form is a
verb, as in [20c].

[20a] It was hard for the police to stop drinking on campus.
[ b] (Public) drinking on campus was hard for the police to stop.
[ c] *Drinking (publicly) on campus was hard for the police to stop.

[20c] really sounds awkward. BOLINGER (1979:44), however, comes up with a counter-example, where "tough-movement" has applied to a constituent which is clearly verbal in nature (because of the presence of an adverb heavily):

[21] Smoking heavily is hard for a person to stop, once he gets hooked.

Bolinger dismisses [20c] as worse than [21] "only because [Milsark] chose a bad context in which to refer to a habit". A question which comes immediately to mind is whether the sentences in [20] do refer to a habit. It seems they do not. Bolinger, too, misses the point - but he convincingly shows that "tough-movement" is an unreliable device.

We are left with Emonds' proposal to add an unambiguous NP. Although Emonds himself does not provide an example of his own, one may assume that, if he had given one, it would have looked like the string in [22]:

[22] The police stopped drinking beer and blackmail on campus.

In Emonds' view, [22] would probably be correct if drinking is a "noun phrase gerund" - and this would be the only possibility, since drinking is coordinated with another NP, viz. blackmail. Alas, [22] cannot be right, for drinking is a verb followed - it is the same old story once again - by
its object bear.

A majority out of the discriminating devices proposed by Ross, Milsark and Emonds were shown in passing to be unreliable. What about the others? Are they any better?

Let us look at all of them from the point of view of speaker and addressee. Both play an important role in axiological reflexions: remember the distinction made between values and realized values. And, more basically, the assumption that language is a communicative tool. Now, where are speaker and addressee in the reflexions of Ross, Milsark, Emonds e.a.?

The answer, quite straightforwardly, is that they are not there. It has never occurred to Ross and followers that the real problem is to find out how addressees interpret ambiguous sentences. They do not substitute a progressive; nor do they passivize the utterance, apply cleft or "tough-movement" or anything else. The context is there to tell them what an ambiguous sentence (ambiguous if isolated from its context) really means. And if ever the context contains no clues, addressees use a disarmingly simple method to find out: they ask for more information ("do you mean that... or that..."). Once they have found out, they are perfectly able to interpret, say, the sentence in [11], either in its own terms, or in terms of a more basic frame, which ranks higher in the hierarchy of syntactic frames occurring with the aspectual verb stop. Unlike most authors who have worked on aspectual verbs, I explicitly assume the existence of such a hierarchy: I firmly believe, and I shall try to demonstrate below, that not all frames share the same degree of prototypicality.
3.3. Aspectual verbs usually do not denote processes or states, but they say something about them. Primarily, to use a formula coined by DIETRICH (1973:52), they are verbs about verbs. This, then, is an excellent criterion to retain as basic those frames which contain a second verb or VP. The latter is either a TO- or an ING-form, as far as English is concerned, or an infinitive, in the case of French. Using another terminology again, one could say that aspectual verbs are modifiers of a second verb (11), which acts as their head.

Several factors determine the distribution of a modifier. One of these is the distribution of its head: a modifier does not occur in contexts in which its head cannot occur alone. This holds true for the verbal heads of aspectual verbs as well (as was demonstrated for French by RUWET 1970: 78). Compare:

[23a] The crowd dispersed/began to disperse.
[  b] The demonstrators dispersed/began to disperse.
[  c] The solicitor *dispersed/*began to disperse.

[24a] Jonathan likes oysters/begins to like oysters.
[  b] My bathtub *likes oysters/*begins to like oysters.

[23a] to [  c] provide evidence for the fact that the verb disperse takes a subject which must be plural or collective; the insertion of a modifier such as begin does not alter the constraint. The examples in [24a] and [  b] similarly prove that the verb like takes an animate subject, irrespective of whether a modifier is present or not.

Modifiers sometimes do occur alone (e.g. in the case of
adjectives converted into nouns: *the rich*, *the Blacks*, etc.). In such a case, the nominal head which is understood must always be easily retrievable. Exactly the same thing happens in the case of *begin* (and other aspectual verbs, in English and French). It is perfectly all right (cp., for details, Part Two, Chapter Three) to say about Jill: "She begins a letter" - for addressees can readily guess that what Jill begins to do is *write* a letter, or *read* one (the context will direct the addressee towards the correct answer). On the other hand, *begin* cannot be used if the addressee does not know what kind of state or process is involved. In that respect, one could observe (cp., for French, DIETRICH 1973: 52-53) that, unlike [25c] and [d], [25b] is not a possible answer to the question in [25a]:

[25a] What is he doing there?
[ b] He is beginning.
[ c] He is looking for something.
[ d] He is working.

One might object, with DOMINICY (1977:922), that answers such as [26] would be anomalous as well:

[26] He hates mosquitoes.

This particular objection, however, rests on the false assumption that *begin* and *hate* are incompatible with the verb *do* in [25a]. Whereas this is true for *hate*, it is not for *begin*, as the following perfectly possible answers to the question in [25a] show:

[27a] He is beginning to look for something.
[ b] He is beginning to work.

The preceding remarks sufficiently prove that *begin*-like
verbs are first of all modifiers, or, as was said before, "verbs about verbs". DIETRICH (l.c.:52) also calls the latter verba adiecta, whereas "plain verbs" (which refer to either processes or states) are called verba denominativa (12). DOMINICY (l.c.:924), on the other hand, prefers the well-known transformational account which holds that verbs such as begin are "plain" verbs which are to be transformationally linked to entire sentences. [28a] thereby "derives" from [28b] through "subject raising":

[28a] Peter begins to sing.
[28b] Begin [Peter to sing].

The problem with the transformational approach is that aspectual verbs are not pure "raising verbs" (13).

4. THE INHERENT ECONOMY OF LANGUAGE

Descriptive economy (cp. p.29) must always remain subordinated to the inherent economy of language, which results from the unstable balance between the communicative needs of a language community and the principle of least effort. The economy of language is a key concept in Martinet's functional linguistics (cp. p.7, and also PEETERS 1983). There is nothing teleological about it (cp. PEETERS 1986), despite the fact that several claims in that sense have been made.

For conceptual analysis, redefined within an axiological framework, language economy is as important as descriptive economy. It mainly implies that no two words may permanently
have the same value (represented by the same set of formulas) throughout their entire distributional pattern. Since words are created in order to satisfy the speakers' communicative needs (cp. GUIRAUD 1956:281), any word which is found to be equivalent in meaning to another one, will either disappear, or change its meaning, or cause the other word to disappear, or to change its meaning. The previous remarks may well be considered as a modern restatement of the well-known, but often refuted, thesis of the "gegenseitigen Ausgliederung", i.e. the "codetermination of meanings" within a semantic or lexical field. The following is an often heard quote from KANDLER (1959:261): "Wie bestimmt sich A? Durch B. Und B? Durch A. Wie kann bei diesem Zirkel eine konkrete Sinnerfüllung in das Wort hineinkommen? Ex negatione nil ne sequitur" ['How is A to be determined? By means of B. And B? By means of A. How can, under such circumstances, a word receive a concrete meaning? Ex negatione nil ne sequitur']. According to KOCH (1984:117), Kandler should never have spoken, with regard to codetermination, about a logical difficulty, but rather about a logical impossibility: HOBERG's (1970:109) point of view, which holds that the problem of codetermination should not be confused with the philosophical problem of the genesis of meaning, is rightly rejected (14).

Pace Kandler, Koch, and many others, codetermination is a real thing (cp. within axiology WEYDT 1984; WALTER 1985a,b). However, not everything is related to, or codetermined by, everything else. Codetermination exists between the formulas (or rather, between what they represent), and not necessarily between their realizations in everyday speech (cp. p.28,
where *begin* was shown to interfere with *appear*). Furthermore, it only occurs in those cases in which there is a common basic meaning, or, as GECKELER (1976:142) puts it, "una especie de denominador común" (15). The basic meaning, which is either a generic one shared by all members of a field, or any more elaborate one shared by the members of a particular subset, is a kind of given. All additional information is there *because* of the existence of other words (belonging to the same field or to the same subset); and these only exist because they have a different *value*. 
(1) A distinction is to be made between an addressee and a hearer. The addressee is the one the speaker has in mind when communicating. A hearer can be just anyone who "hears" a message; whether it was intended for him or her in the first place is irrelevant. Notice, as well, that the word speaker is used here for speakers and writers; the word addressee, for intended hearers and readers.

(2) Ever since the rise of transformational grammar, utterances have been called grammatical or ungrammatical, depending on whether a particular grammatical framework "generates" them or not. I wish to distance myself from the generative paradigm in linguistics - it will soon become clear that I mostly disagree with the numerous assumptions relevant to my research topic which were made by generativists - and I will therefore talk about anomaly and/or (un)acceptable utterances. "(Un)acceptable" means: approved or rejected by native speakers.

(3) All references in section 2.2., with the exception of BAUMGÄRTNER (1967), are to works listed in the second part of the bibliography.

(4) Starting from Part Two, the majority of examples used will be drawn from a corpus (cp. the fourth section in the bibliography). In this mainly theoretical chapter, where clarity requires exact minimal pairs (not often found, even in large corpora), constructed examples were often preferred to real ones - but they were submitted to native speakers who established their acceptability or lack thereof.

(5) This might explain why Wierzbicka herself talks about a "gradual beginning" in a start-sentence such as [i] :

[i] In my second year in Alice Springs, I started understanding what people were saying in Aranda.

On the other hand, Wierzbicka's further explications (ibid.) may point to a confusion between the onset, which is sudden, and the process of understanding, "which goes on".

(6) For examples, see GANZ (1957) and BALDINGER (1958, 1959, 1964).

(7) BALLY (1940) and ULLMANN (1964) also define their associative fields as peculiar to each word. For a very explicit statement, cp. ULLMANN (1964:23). However, one must not overlook the difference between associative fields
linking words (Bally, Ullmann, and various other scholars), and associative fields linking meanings of just one word (Gastil).

(9) See also ESCOBEDO RODRÍGUEZ (1980:114).

(10) All references in the rest of section 3. are to works listed in the second part of the bibliography.

The argument, spelled out, runs as follows: if a direct object of the verb implied in the ING-form (e.g., beer, object of to drink) is added to the right (as in [13a]), the ING-construction is basically a verb, since verbs take their NP complements at their right hand side; if, on the contrary, that direct object is added to the left, by mere juxtaposition or by means of a dash (as in [13a]), the ING-construction is basically a noun, for nouns cannot take direct objects and must therefore integrate any complement of the corresponding verb into their own "body".

(11) This view was proposed independently by ROBERTS (1958:195) for English, and BUSSE (1974:156) for French. Cp. also PRATHER (1977:60-61), and BENNETT/PARTEE (1978:16-21). Although Emonds is right in arguing that an ING-construction after an aspectual verb is a VP, I cannot accept his claim that the second verbs are "complements to verbs of temporal aspect". Cp. EMONDS (1973:42-43; 1976:133; 1985:46), and also RUWET (1986:207,211).

(12) Dietrich's bipartition is incomplete: copulas such as être, rester, etc. belong neither with the verba adiecta nor with the verba nominativa. BUSSE (1974:149-168) calls the former verba adjecta (spelled with "j"), and the latter verba absoluta. He adds a category called morphematische Verben (= copulas; cp. GREEN 1979:499). Aspectual verbs belong with the verba adjecta.


(14) DORNSEIFF's (1938:127) rebuttal, written in his usual polemical style ("Jede Wortbedeutung eines Einzelwortes ist mitbestimmt durch irgendwelche Synonyma? Bitte wo? In irgendeiner der bekannten europäischen Sprachen bestimmt nicht"), cannot be taken seriously (cp. BERGENHOLTZ 1930:39). Translation of the German quote: "Each meaning of a word is codetermined by its synonyms? Where then? In any of the well-known European languages certainly not'.

(15) BONDZIO (1973:460) erroneously believes that Geckezer rejects the principle of codetermination: "Ebenso wird (...) die Wechselbestimmtheit der Bedeutungen aufgegeben" [The thesis of codetermination is abandoned, too; emphasis added].
PART TWO

THE LINGUISTIC EXPRESSION OF COMMENCEMENT, CONTINUATION, AND CESSATION IN A SET OF ENGLISH AND FRENCH VERBS
A lot has been written already about English verbs denoting a commencement, a continuation or a cessation. Much of that literature is concerned with "pure" syntax: it addresses the question, for example, whether two verbs begin have to be distinguished, a transitive and an intransitive one (PERLMUTTER 1970; ROSS 1972b) - or whether one verb will do (FISCHER/MARSHALL 1969; NEWMEYER 1969; IVIR 1976; etc.). On the other hand, it should have become clear by now that there is another area of research as well; and that one, too, has
received the attention it deserves. ANDERSON (1968), GIVON (1973), FREED (1979), and many others, have dealt with the meaning (I would say value) of verbs such as begin and stop. But they have done so either too superficially, or without serious consideration of alternative approaches.

The following analysis will try to go further: it will investigate fewer verbs than were analyzed in FREED (1979); but alternative accounts (i.e., accounts other than the combined axiologico-conceptual one pursued here) will be taken into consideration, developed and/or criticized. The set of verbs selected includes: begin and start; continue and keep; cease, stop, finish and end.

Theoretically speaking, it is possible, and even desirable, to study the entire set of relevant words (i.e., these words that are linked together by what we shall call “essential semantic associations”; op. Part Three, Chapter Ten). However, taking this stand would have resulted in the necessity of abandoning all attempts at in-depth analysis. It was felt that a better way of showing what is new in a particular analysis, and what is not, is to single out the words that are really representative, and to analyse nothing else but these, while constantly referring to earlier work in the same area.

It might be argued that, since within a particular field the cores of each one of the dispersional fields codetermine one another, an empirical study must turn out to be incomplete as soon as even one word which belongs to the set being studied happens to be overlooked. "Incomplete", yes: but not necessarily "incorrect" (to say just the least). The reality of codetermination notwithstanding, a semantic
analysis will not be biased in any major way if "peripheral" (i.e. less representative or less characteristic) members are excluded.

As was indicated in Part One, this study will not be limited to English. A great deal of attention will be devoted to French data as well. Empirical research, here, does exist - see, for instance, BLANCHE-BENVENISTE (1974), VERBERT (1979,1980), HECHMATI-ASHORI (1984), and LAMIROY (1987) - but it has received little attention. Blanche's paper belongs to what is nowadays called the "underground literature", and Hechmati's contribution is an unpublished thesis. Lamiroy's study is the only one that was published in a widely read journal, but it is too recent to have had a lot of impact. More importantly, it does not quote any of the other accounts; these, therefore, remain relatively unknown. For the present investigation, eight verbs have been selected: commencer and se mettre à; (se) continuer and ne cesser de; cesser, (s')arrêter, finir and (se) terminer.

In all, then, sixteen verbs will be described as to their value, and compared and contrasted with one another. It will be seen that French and English, which have Indo-European as a common ancestor and are therefore relatively closely related, display a number of interesting differences. The first ones of these will be highlighted in Chapter Four. As a rule, each one of the (even-numbered) "French" chapters will regularly refer to the preceding (odd-numbered) "English" chapter. Hence, the English verbs will be studied in and for themselves: the French verbs will be studied in their own right - and with cross-references to the English ones. We shall look at commencement verbs first.
CHAPTER THREE

BEGIN AND START
IN ENGLISH

1. "BEGIN"

1.1. An aspectualizer is primarily a verb about a verb (cp. p.35). A description of the value (cp. p.20) of the aspectual verb begin must therefore, in the first place, look at the meaning of the frame (cp. p.28) "X began to...". I wish to point out that there is little to be learnt from the highly formalized definitions for the verb begin worked out by Åqvist et altrí (1977, 1978). In contrast, in order to explicate the meaning of that same verb in a simple sentence such as [1a], a semantic formula à la Anderson (1968:402), in which the second line stands for "something / happens / which affects NP1", seems to be a handy starting point. [1b] gives the formula, whereas [1c] glosses the example in [1a].

[1a] Miss Warren began to write. /OE,66/

[ b ] \text{NP}_1 \text{not-VP} \\
\text{NP}_x V_x \text{NP}_1 \\
\text{NP}_1 \text{VP}

[ c ] Miss Warren did not write \\
something happened (affecting Miss Warren) \\
Miss Warren wrote

Thanks to a formula such as [1b], it appears easy to understand what is wrong with the sentences in [2]. Their unacceptability can be explained in terms of semantic
clashes, and/or redundancy (1). The assertive begin-clauses in [2a] and [c] imply that Max was not cooking (cp. the first line of [1b]), whereas the coordinated clauses say he was; the negative begin-clauses in [2b] and [d] imply either that Max was cooking already - the negation, in that case, bears on the first and the second lines of [1b], and the begin-clauses are redundant -, or that he did not cook at all - the negation bears on the second and third lines of [1b], and the propositions are self-contradictory (2).

[2a] *Max was cooking dinner, and then he began to cook dinner.
[ b] *Max was cooking dinner, and then he did not begin to cook dinner.
[ c] *Max began to cook dinner, and he was already cooking dinner.
[ d] *Max did not begin to cook dinner, and he was already cooking dinner.

Notice, on the other hand, that if we turn [2b] and [d] into acceptable sentences, merely by adding emphatic stress, and by dropping the conjunctions and and then (as in [3a] and [b]), the negative construction will unambiguously bear on the first and second components of [1b].

[3a] Max 'was cooking dinner; he did not 'begin to cook dinner.
[ b] Max did not 'begin to cook dinner; he 'was already cooking dinner.

Up to this point, then, everything looks fine. At least one problem, however, soon arises. Anderson's formula does not explain why, among others, NEWMeyer's (1975:35) example in [4a] (quoted already in Part One, Chapter Two, p.22), is unacceptable. It has a gloss ([4b]) which "sounds good" in all respects :
Although Newmeyer, by producing the example in [4a], provides evidence against GARCÍA’s (1967:860) assumption that begin "and its aspectual partners" are characterized by a total lack of selectional restrictions, he himself appears to believe that there is something like a semantic constraint holding that the verb begin is incompatible with verbs such as arrive (cp. also IVIR 1976:49). This is not entirely true either, as we will see below (examples [10a] to [c]). According to MITCHELL (1978:235), Newmeyer’s example is "incomplete" (cp. Part One, Chapter Two, 1.c.), except if arrive has a "metaphorical" reading (‘to “have it made”, to be materially successful’), or if reference is made to John’s birth ("the baby began to arrive" is an acceptable utterance). Thus, "the English sentence John began to arrive is perfectly acceptable if properly contextualized, it is nevertheless unacceptable if reference is to a particular arrival at a particular terminus" (MITCHELL 1979:165).

What really matters in the value of begin is its (often implicit) reference to a point in time, and to the speaker’s intuition that, for instance, the writing (cp. [1a]) did not occur before that point, whereas it did occur at that point and afterwards (3). Reference to time and intuition of what came first and what comes next are central in GIVÓN’s (1973:97) account of the sentence John began to work ("it implies John worked AFTER beginning to, and presupposes John was not working BEFORE beginning to") (4) and in WIERZBICKA’s (1988a:
78) semantic formula for the frame "X began to do \( Z \)"

[5]  \( X \) began to do \( Z \)  
before \( t \), \( X \) wasn't doing \( Z \)  
at \( t \), \( X \) was doing it  
one could think at that time:  
more of it will happen after now  

Wierzbicka's formula is superior to Anderson's in that it allows the scholar to nicely illustrate the scope of a negation with \textit{begin}: it is immediately clear, for instance, which parts of the formula are denied by the sentences in [3]. Both formulas are equally unsatisfactory insofar as Anderson's \textit{VP} is too comprehensive (cp. above), whereas Wierzbicka's \textit{do} \( Z \) is too restrictive. The examples in [6] may serve as an illustration for the latter claim.

[6a]  He began to despise \( Stein \). /OE,244/  
[  b]  It began to look as if no one had sounded any alarm to authority. /M,105/  

\textit{VP}'s such as \textit{despise} (someone) or \textit{look} (as if) cannot be paraphrased by means of the verb \textit{do} (cp. p.36). A generic \textit{happen} (the one which appears in the last component of [5]) offers no valid paraphrase either. As I failed to find a verb that was comprehensive enough to represent all the verbs which may take \textit{begin} as an aspectualizer, I decided to rewrite Wierzbicka's formula as follows (5):

[7]  \( X \) began to do \( Z \)  
before \( t \), \( Z \) was not happening/there was no \( Z \)  
at \( t \), \( Z \) was happening/there was \( Z \)  
one could think at that time:  
more of \( Z \) will happen after now/there  
will be more \( Z \) after now  

Thanks to its last line, where the verb used is \textit{think} (rather than \textit{know}), the formula in [7] enables us to account
for cases such as [8], where there is no continuation (6).

[8] We were beginning to rebuild our lives - then suddenly it was all blown apart again. /HI,20-08-88/

Secondly, in the introductory line of [7], as in the introductory lines of a considerable number of other formulas that will be proposed in this dissertation, the word time is used. It replaces Wierzbicka's moment, on the assumption that not all points in time can be considered to be moments (the year 1988 is a point, but not a moment, on the time axis symbolizing the Christian era). X represents a subject NP, and Z the event which is said to begin (e.g., writing in [1a]). Z stands for a verb (in the introductory line) or for a (mostly but not necessarily deverbal) noun (in the formula itself). Where Z in the introductory line stands for a verb which could not be paraphrased by means of the verb do, a gloss derived from the formula in [7] will contain a series of "be-components", i.e. components containing the copula be. Consider the glosses in [9].

[9a] He began to despise Stein = before t, there was no despising at t, there was despising one could think at t: there will be more despising after now

[ b] It began to look as if no one had sounded any alarm to authority = before t, there was no impression that (it did not look as if) no one had sounded any alarm to authority at t, there was an impression that (it looked as if) no one etc. one could think at that time: there will be more of the impression (it will look more as if) no one etc.

The formula in [7], as it includes no reference whatsoever
to the original subject NP X, also allows us to deal with cases where the subject of the verb Z would vary from one line to another. It would, for instance, in the case of the following sentences (quoted from MITCHELL 1978:235):

[10a] The spectators began to arrive.
[10b] The guests began to arrive.
[10c] The crowd began to arrive.

Mitchell's second example is about "arrivals of (...) guests spaced out at intervals of time after the appearance of the first guest or group of guests" (MITCHELL l.c.). It would be impossible that all the guests arrived together, and that after the reference point they went on doing so. In the case of punctual (but also of ongoing) processes, i.e. wherever Z could be paraphrased by means of the verb do, a gloss derived from the formula in [7] will contain a series of "happen-components" (components containing the verb happen). The glosses in [11] concern sentences with an iterative and a durative reading, respectively (7).

[11a] The guests began to arrive =
before t, the arrivals were not happening
at t, some arrivals were happening
one could think at that time:
more arrivals will happen after now

[11b] Miss Warren began to write =
before t, the writing was not happening
at t, the writing was happening
one could think at that time:
more of the writing will happen after now

As a result of the absence, in [7], of the subject NP X, even a sentence such as [12] (where the negative subject quantifier would normally interfere with the negation in the formula) (8) can be accounted for.
[12] No student began to shout.

If there had been no negative quantifier in [12], its gloss (in its most abstract form) would have looked like this:

[13] at time t, X began to shout =
    before t, the shouting was not happening
    at t, the shouting was happening
    one could think at that time:
        more of the shouting will happen
            after now

With a negative quantifier, several readings are possible. The scope of the indefinite pronoun no can be either the entire proposition (in which case the pronoun itself is stressed); or else the subject NP (student), the aspectualizer (began), or the second verb (shout) (in which case each one of these elements is stressed in turn). In [14], the four possible readings are presented visually; the letters between brackets refer to the comments that follow.

[14] No student began to shout.

          (a)
    ------
    (b)
    ----- (c)
    ------ (d)

(a) With the stress on the quantifier no, reference is to a group of students all of which kept quiet. The negation bears on lines two and three of the gloss in [13]: there was no shouting, there is no shouting, and one does not expect that there will be any shouting after that.

(b) With the stress on the NP student, reference is to a group of people some of whom are students. [12] now implies that a number n of non-students did begin to shout. The negation bears on none of the components of the gloss in [13]
(which is absolutely normal since the subject is not represented in the gloss).

(c) With the stress on the aspectualizer began, reference is to a group of students. The implication is that a number n of students (possibly the whole group) were shouting already. The negation bears on line one of the gloss.

(d) With the stress on the second verb shout, finally, reference is, once again, to a group of students. It is implied that a number n among them (possibly the entire group) began to do something, but what they did was not shouting. The negation bears on lines two and three.

1.2. If the elimination of the subject NP X has, as we have just established, nothing but favorable consequences, the use of "be-components" (cp. p.50) raises a problem similar to the one that Newmeyer identified with reference to the formula proposed by Anderson (cp. pp.47-48). The formula in [7] provides no explanation for the unacceptability of any of the following (9):

[15a] *Harry began to know the sum of 2 plus 2.
[ b] *Harry began to be tall.
[ c] *Harry began to have the book.

[16], for instance, is a gloss for the unacceptable string in [15b]. The "be-components" (e.g. "there was no being tall") were rephrased in natural language.

[16] before t, Harry was not tall
at t, Harry was tall
one could think at that time:
Harry will be taller after now

Another one of GARCÍA's (1967) "perfectly normal" sentences
(cp. p.25) could be added to the list, and provided with a
gloss (also rephrased) which looks grammatically sound:

[17a] *Harry began to be dead.
[ b] before t, Harry was not dead
    at t. Harry was dead
    one could think at that time:
    Harry will be dead more after now

In order to explain the unacceptability of [17a] and of
[15a] to [ c], one might appeal to the principle of inherent
language economy defined in Part One (p.37). The explanation
involves the two opposite forces of paradigmatic and
syntagmatic economy (10). At the lexical level, paradigmatic
economy prevails if the use of one highly specific word (the
storage of which implies an extra burden for the competence
of the language user) is avoided through the use of a
paraphrase - whereas syntagmatic economy prevails if, rather
than a paraphrase, a highly specific word is used. If we
assume, whenever the choice is between a complex VP starting
with an aspectual verb, on one hand, and a simple verb, on
the other hand, that syntagmatic economy is the strongest of
the two competing forces, we may have explained why speakers
find strings such as [15a] to [ c] and [17a] anomalous, and
why they use other (shorter) sentences instead, which have a
very similar meaning (11):

[18a] Harry learnt the sum of 2 plus 2.
[ b] Harry became tall.
[ c] Harry got the book.
[ d] Harry died.

The one point which jeopardizes the explanatory power of a
principle of syntagmatic economy is that it is no more than a
tendency, and a quite weak one for that matter. The
alternatives in the following sample-sentences are equally
acceptable - native speakers independently proposed one or
more of them as "corrections" for unacceptable "begin to be"-
sentences.

[19a] Harry became tall(er).
     Harry began to get tall(er).
     Harry began to grow.
     (*Harry began to be tall.)
[ b] The situation became tragic.
     The situation began to get tragic.
     (*The situation began to be tragic.)
[ c] The president became blind.
     The president began to go blind.
     (*The president began to be blind.)
[ d] The newspaper began to (go) yellow.
     (*The newspaper began to be yellow.)

It will have escaped nobody's attention that the
unacceptable strings in [15], [17] and [19], and these only,
contain a stative verb or stative VP (12). Know, be (as in
be tall etc.), have, be dead, and so on, refer to states, and
the English language seems to have special ways to denote the
beginning of such states (e.g. learn for know, become for be,
get for have, die for be dead). Therefore, since syntagmatic
economy is not satisfactory as a principle of explanation, we
might try to find out whether the various anomalies can be
accounted for in terms of a stative constraint (13). The
answer is again negative: the number of cases in which the
cooccurrence of an aspectual and a stative verb is not
unacceptable is too considerable to define a constraint. The
most obvious cases are listed below.

1) Sentences containing plural or collective NP's in
subject or object position:

[20a] School grammars began to consist of three
parts.
[20b] The majority of school grammars began to consist of three parts.
[c] John began to own several cars.
[d] John began to own an impressive collection of cars.

Sentences [20a] and [b] suggest that, after one school grammar appeared on the market consisting of three parts, other grammars followed. They express the gradual spread of a new custom. Sentences [20c] and [d] talk about a slowly but steadily growing number of cars all possessed by the same individual. It is interesting to note that precise quantification is excluded, as it is incompatible with the idea that the school grammars are affected and the cars acquired separately. All the strings in [21] are anomalous:

[21a] *This school grammar began to consist of three parts.
[b] *Five school grammars began to consist of three parts.
[c] *John began to own a car.
[d] *John began to own twelve cars.

2) Sentences containing generic NP's in subject position.

[22a] is fine, unlike [22b]:

[22a] White wine began to be popular even in the Australian outback.
[22b] *This bottle of white wine began to be popular even in the Australian outback.

The example in [22a] refers to the progressively spreading popularity of white wine in different households; as in [20a] and [b], a new custom finds its way.

3) Sentences containing the "connector" by (14). [23a] is acceptable, but [23b] is not:

[23a] John began by having only one restaurant (but he now owns an entire hotel chain).
[b] *John began to have only one restaurant.
As [23a], an example of a frame to which we shall return below, clearly illustrates, the connector by marks the subsequent state as the first one in a series of states or processes.

It may be useful to point out at this stage that punctual verbs (cp. p.51) and stative expressions behave alike. That is, the former too can occur with an aspectual verb, if its subject is plural, collective or generic, if its object is plural or collective, etc. Consider the following examples (which, unlike the ones in [20] to [23], are real, i.e. not constructed; this shows something about the relative frequency of each one of the sentence types concerned):

[24a] It was late afternoon, and here as elsewhere within the staff building, pressures of the day were easing, secretaries and others beginning to go home. /W.339/

[ b] The clock above Cologne station struck one, and a waiter began to turn out the lights on the terrace of the Excelsior. /OE.35/

Because of this similarity in use of punctual verbs and of stative expressions, we can reasonably assume that the solution to our problem (accounting for the unacceptability of the sentences in [15]) and the solution to the problem of the unacceptability of sentences such as [4a] are similar as well. The anomaly of [4a] is due to the anomaly of the third component of its gloss: [25] is semantically deviant.

[25] *one could think at that time:

John will arrive more after now

Hence, we need a fourth component. In order to discover what that component must look like, we have to be aware of the fact that not all stative expressions are impossible
after an aspectual verb and that, as we have just seen, those which are impossible under some circumstances can, if the conditions are different, be used freely. To the examples listed above, one may add some other sample-sentences which make it even more awkward to talk about a stative constraint.

[26a] Harry began to know his aunt very well.
[  b] Harry began to be in good health.
[  c] Harry began to have a bad time.

What these sentences do not contain is a collective, a plural or a generic NP, or else the connector by. What they do contain is the same second verb as is used in the examples in [15]. However, they are perfectly acceptable. The sentences in [27] were found acceptable, too - although the ones in [28] are more commonly used.

[27a] Mary began to be scared.
[  b] Johnny began to be impatient.

[28a] Mary began to become/get scared.
[  b] Johnny began to become/get/grow impatient.

The acceptable sentences share one feature, which is absent from the anomalous ones: there is a constant possibility of change (which, of course, also exists in the case of non-stative expressions - that is why we need, in the third component, the statement "one could think") (15). A complete begin-formula must include a component referring to the fact that there has to be such a constant possibility of change, that without that possibility a begin-sentence turns out to be unacceptable. As a final formula, I therefore propose:

[29] at time t, X began to Z =
before t, Z was not happening/there was no Z
at t, Z was happening/there was Z
one could think at that time:
more of \( I \) will happen after now/there
will be more \( I \) after now
one could not know at that time:
more of \( I \) will happen after now/there
will be more \( I \) after now

At first, it may seem that the formula in [29] does not account for cases such as "the impressive collection of cars" (cp. [20d]): an impressive collection to which some more cars are added remains impressive, and therefore one could know at \( t \) that John would "own an impressive collection of cars after now". The formula does work if we require that \( I \) represents the same state throughout the various components.

One last remark on the example in [30].


Without its adverb here, [30] could be glossed as follows:

[31] before \( t \), the sea is not getting deep
(lit. the getting-deep of the sea is not happening)
at \( t \), the sea is getting deep
one could think at that time:
the sea will get deeper after now
one could not know at that time:
the sea will get deeper after now

The interpretation in [31] applies, for instance, in the case of mother and child swimming for hours at the same area, until high tide compels the former to ask the latter to get closer to the beach. The mother, no doubt, could add the word here, even if what is involved is the changing depth of the sea over a certain lapse of time. This, in fact, implies that the "full" sentence is ambiguous. There is another meaning, which involves the changing depth of the sea according to the place where one is bathing or swimming. There is, in that case, no reference to time whatsoever.
What is realized is not the formula for begin in [29], but
rather a variant in which t has been replaced with l (a point
or a surface in space; cp. words such as local, location):

[32] before l, the sea is not getting deep
at l, the sea is getting deep
one could think at that place :
the sea will get deeper after here
one could not know at that place :
the sea will get deeper after here

If the adverb here is left unexpressed, [30] remains
acceptable, although it will not be understood as in [32],
for the hearer is not given a clue (the overt mark here)
telling him to look for a non-norm interpretation (cp. Part
One. Chapter Two, pp.21-22).

1.3. One might wish to argue that it is better not to have
a kind of unique formula which accounts for the entire range
of use considered up to now for the verb begin. After all,
as we have seen (cp. p.51), two rather different meanings are
involved: a durative meaning and an iterative one. This
does not mean, however, that two verbs begin must be defined,
one of which provokes a durative and the other an iterative
sentence reading. Most of the time, both readings are in a
kind of complementary distribution: the context makes clear
which one of the two is implied.

Some sentences may truly be ambiguous; in the case of [33]

[33] The guests began to eat their food.

it is not sure whether, at the reference point, all the
guests eat their food together, and go on doing so - or
whether one guest or group of guests eats first, and serves
as an example for the others. Very often, a clue will be found in the context in which the sentence as a whole is used. The instances in which no hint is available at all are far too rare to make a split attractive from the point of view of descriptive economy (as defined on p.29) (16). So far, therefore, we have looked at one particular syntactic construction, viz. "X began to Z", and we have devised one single formula for that construction. In other words, we have shown that the construction "X began to Z" consists of one frame only. It must be clear, however, that we have not seen but the tip of the proverbial iceberg.

As a construction and as a frame, "X began to Z" is at the highest level of an entire hierarchy of frames in which the verb begin can possibly appear (cp. p.34). The examples in [34] may give the reader an approximate idea of the variety of constructions, different from the one addressed above, in which the verb begin occurs. [34a] illustrates the construction "X began Z-ing", [34b] represents a construction containing begin by (cp. also pp.56-57), [34c] shows a direct object construction with no other verb but begin, and [34d] exemplifies an absolute use of our aspectual verb.

[34a] Everyone began talking at once. /OE,124/
[ b] "Let's begin by finding out about you"
/W,134/
[ c] He had begun the struggle with his collar.
/M,8/
[ d] A number of horses are out quickly, beaten before the ride really begins. /AM,03-09-88/

NEWMEYER (1975) basically argues that any structure in which the verb begin appears derives, through various "transformational operations", from an underlying structure in which begin is subject-embedding and intransitive. What
follows is a rather different account: I contend that the various begin-frames and begin-constructions are linked semantically only, not transformationally (17). In the rest of this section, I shall more or less briefly deal with the constructions (or rather frames) exemplified in 1) [34a] and 2) [34b]. Sections 1.4. and 1.5. are devoted to the constructions, which consist of more than one frame each, exemplified in [34c] and [d]. A frame to be assimilated to the construction described in 1.4. will be studied at the end of that particular section.

Ad a). Although "X began to Z" and "X began Z-ing" have different meanings, little has to be said about the latter in the present context (18). The use of one frame rather than the other one has no bearing on the value of the aspectual verb itself: there are not two verbs begin, one for each frame - just as there are not two verbs begin, distinguishable according to the durative or iterative interpretation conferred to the sentence. Speaking in terms of examples, this means that the formula in [29] applies to the "begin to show"-example in [35a], but also to the "begin showing"-example in [35b] (19).

[35a] As years go by, our skin begins to show the effects of time. /NI,07-05-88/
[b] The stress began showing in late summer. /WD,12-10-87/

Another illustration: not only TO-forms of punctual verbs but also ING-forms can occur after begin if they have, for instance, a direct object which is plural. Compare:

[36a] Adam began firing questions based on his product planner's training in critical analysis. /W,273/

62
He began ticking addresses which were reasonably near. /W,280/

Ad b). [34b] (and also [23a]) exemplified a construction in which, rather than an infinitive, an ING-form is used after the connector *by*. Another example is given in [37]:

[37] He began by taking and recording numbers bets each day in the area of Assembly where he worked. /W,353/

The state of "having only one restaurant" (cp. [23a]), the act of "finding out about you" (cp. [34b]), and the act of "taking and recording numbers bets" (cp. [37]) are viewed as the first of a series of consecutive states or acts. The formula in [29] does not apply. It could however be argued that, since only the last components of the formula seem to create problems (the situation before \( t \) and at \( t \) could apparently be adequately described), it is in fact unnecessary to devise a new formula. I was about to adopt the viewpoint that either by or possibly the discontinuous form *by-ing* are overt marks which allow the speaker to disrespect the original formula, when I suddenly realized that the meaning of my overt mark does not seem to contradict any of the components of the begin-formula in [29] (cp., for a similar kind of argumentation, pp.22-23). It seems more in line with the present analysis to propose an independent formula, which runs as in [38]:

[38] at time \( t \), \( X \) began by *Z-ing*
before \( t \), \( Z \) was not happening/there was no \( Z \)
at \( t \), before all other things, \( Z \) was happening/
there was \( Z \)
one could think at that time:
something else will happen/there will be
something else at \( t \), after now
one could not know at that time:
something else will happen/there will be
something else at t, after now

"Time t" is not just the time at which, for instance, "I is
happening" : it is the time at which I and all the other
events or states occur or exist. This, then, explains why,
in all but one of the components in [38], there is a
reference to time t.

1.4. It has often been assumed that sentences such as [39a]
and [b] (instances of the frame in [34c]) derive from a
more complex underlying structure, be it through a
transformation called redundancy removal (HARRIS 1965:388), a
process which, by means of zeroing, eliminates among other
things "appropriate words", i.e. words which carry no
information in the given sentence - or through deletion of a
so-called "pro-verb" (NEWMeyer 1975:43) (20).

[39a] Two years ago, when I was 14, I also began
a newspaper, called The Family, which was sent
each month to about 45 relatives and friends
in Australia, covering a wide range of topics
relating to our family's events. /WD,07-09-87/
[b] When we returned from our honeymoon, I began
the arduous task of cleaning all the items we
had worn. /HI,07-05-88/

The most stereotypically transformational account for these
sentences is the one by Newmeyer, who makes three
observations with respect to the possible verbal readings of
sentences similar to those in [39]:

1) "the reading may never correspond to that of a verb
which would cause an ungrammatical sentence if present in
lieu of the covert reading". This means that the meaning of
the verb persuade, for example, cannot be read into either
[39a] or [ b]. as [40a] and [ b] are "ungrammatical":

[40a]  *Two years ago, when I was 14, I also began to persuade a newspaper ...
[ b]  *When we returned from our honeymoon, I began to persuade the arduous task of cleaning ...

Many will find this a kind of unnecessary statement. It is a matter of common sense that a sentence may never be assigned an implicit verbal reading that, when made explicit, gives rise to "ungrammaticality" or even unintelligibility.

2) "the senses of perceptual verbs are never possible". Like so many other transformationalists, Newmeyer believes that this type of additions to the grammar has explanatory power. This one, for instance, is claimed to explain why the readings expressed by the sentences in [41] cannot be postulated in the case of [39a] and [ b].

[41a]  *Two years ago, when I was 14, I also began to watch a newspaper ...
[ b]  *When we returned from our honeymoon, I began to hear the arduous task of cleaning ...

In fact, Newmeyer does not explain anything at all: he merely describes. An adequate explanation must answer the question why the meanings of perceptual verbs are excluded.

3) "the reading is always that of a definable semantic class of verbs - the continuing activity (C.A.) verbs". A C.A. verb denotes "a non-instantaneous non-perceptual activity over which the subject has conscious control". The interpretations most likely attached to [39a] and [ b] are given in [42]:

[42a]  I began to write/compose/produce a newspaper.
[ b]  I began to perform/fulfil the arduous task of cleaning.
A reminder: according to Newmeyer, the verbs supplied in [42a] and [b] were, at some stage of the "generative process", deleted from a structure underlying the sentences in [39]. SHOPEN (1972:149), however, argues that "grammars using deletion rules to generate all well-formed elliptical utterances give a false account of linguistic competence". Before I present my own objection against deletion (objection involving another class of direct objects), I wish to say a word about Görna's (1979) verb insertion rule, and to rehabilitate the notion of a "natural pairing".

It has been claimed (e.g., by Görna 1979) that a sentence such as [43a] has no other reading than the last one in [43b] (i.e. the one involving the verb eat), and that only sentences such as [43c] can have more than one reading.

[43a] Max began dinner.
[43c] The cook began dinner.

What strikes me more than anything else about Görna's approach is that it is at odds with the assumption that aspectual verbs are first of all "verbs about verbs". Görna argues as follows: [43a] is the basic construction, dinner is to be eaten (rather than to be cooked or prepared), so the verb eat is to be extracted from dinner and to be inserted in the original sentence. No relevant information can be extracted from a subject such as Max, and therefore the only possible reading of [43a] is the last one in [43b]. In [43c], both object and subject contain valuable information: dinner is something to be eaten, and a cook is someone who cooks or prepares food, so the verb eat can be extracted from dinner, and the verbs cook and prepare from cook. Hence,
three different verbs can be inserted after begin.

I am equally disturbed by the fact that a verb insertion rule à la Gørna accounts for no more than a limited number of cases. Make and paint, for instance, are definitely not part of the value of the object nouns table and cloud: a table is not "something to be made", nor is a cloud "something to be painted". Similarly, not every John is someone who "makes" something, and not every Mary is someone who "paints". Still, the sentences in [44] are all right and understandable — as long as they are used in a context which informs the addressee that John is a carpenter or a do-it-yourself man, and that Mary is a painter or is painting at the time referred to by the speaker.

[44a] John began a table.
[ b] Mary began a cloud.

On a more general level, I contend that the interpretation of sentences such as [39a] and [ b], [43a] and [ c], and [44a] and [ b] always rests on an interpretation of the context (at large). Most often, one or two elements in that context will allow the addressee to proceed to a natural pairing (cp. p.66) of the direct object with a verb that the speaker left unexpressed. After the pairing, the formula in [29] applies. Pace MITCHELL (1979:165), the notion of a "natural pairing" (which can also be found in NEWMEYER 1975, although it there plays no more than a secondary role) (21) seems to be far more relevant than the concept of a "deleted" "C.A." verb. The former only involves such verbs as impose themselves in a given context, whereas the latter implies that a choice has to be made from a large set of verbs, the
majority of which do not fit the given context at all.

A few examples. In the case of [39a], the addressee proceeds to a natural pairing between the noun newspaper and a verb such as write, compose, or produce; in the case of [43a], to a natural pairing between the noun dinner and a verb such as cook, prepare, or eat. Whenever someone's words are quoted (cp. [45a] and [ b]), the quote in itself serves as an indication for the addressee that the verb say is to be supplied through natural pairing (cp. [45c]) (22).

[45a] "You must have my coat," he began reluctantly, but before he had time to limit his unwilling offer with "for a while" or "until you are warm", she slid to the floor. /OE,23/
[ b] "You don't believe ..." she began and her lips were trembling. /M,26/
[ c] "We've lived together for three years," Miss Warren began to say in a deep melancholy voice, "and I have never yet spoken to you harshly." /OE,35/

My objection against the hypothesis of a "deleted" (rather than simply unexpressed) verb - C.A. or not - is based on cases such as those in [46] (where the object NP is directly related to a verb):

[46a] Then he began his climb. /OE,94/
[ b] [They] seemed in no hurry to begin their search. /OE,168/
[ c] Barbara began work on the project. /W,159/

Newmeyer, here as elsewhere, consistently postulates an underlying and deleted C.A. verb - but he fails to reveal its identity. He then argues that the sentences in [46] derive from an underlying structure containing that mysterious verb. Newmeyer does not derive the object NP's in [46] from the equivalent VP's which appear in [47].
[47a] Then he began to climb.

[ b] They seemed in no hurry to begin searching.

[ c] Barbara began to work on the project.

One might legitimately wonder whether at all a C.A. verb was "deleted" from a structure underlying the examples in [46]. I would rather argue that the sentences in [46] (and those in [39], [43a] and [ c], [44] and [45]) are autonomous creations. The basic argument, then, is that only in the course of the interpretational process of, for instance, [46a] to [ c] will the addressee silently identify the object NP with its corresponding VP. There is, as far as I can see, no pairing which is more "natural" than the one between his climb and to climb, between their search and searching, and between work and to work.

It is important to realize that the presence, in direct object position, of a noun morphologically related to a verb is not a guarantee for a natural pairing similar to the one that has been described. Consider the example in [48]:

[48] As the salesman began his paper work, Smokey strolled away. /W,182/

We had no problem in relating the noun work in [46c] to the verb to work in [47c]. The noun work in [48] cannot be related to a verb, as it is preceded by a modifier (i.e. paper). Addressees supply the verb do (which is "naturally paired" to the NP paper work):

[49] As the salesman began to do his paper work, Smokey strolled away.

Notice that not all modifiers act as an "obstacle" to a noun-to-verb conversion. If the modifier is an adjective to
which corresponds an adverb in -ly, the conversion raises no problem. Compare [50a] to [50b] (23):

[50a] A team of four detectives assigned to the case began methodically sifting through names and employment dockets of some three thousand night shift employees. /W,414/

[ b ] A team of four detectives assigned to the case began sifting methodically through names and employment dockets of some three thousand night shift employees.

Let us look at something quite different now. Apparently similar to the sentences in [39] and [46] are those in [51a] and [51b/c].

[51a] It happened because after paychecks were handed out, usually on Thursday, many workers began a long boozy or drugged weekend. /W,17/

[ b ] The executive vice-president began the discussion. /W,12/

[ c ] Sometimes it seemed to Matt Zaleski as if McKernon had already begun his retirement, officially six months away. /W,21/

Just as before, we have a subject, the aspectual verb begin, and a direct object. However, addressees will inevitably interpret the sentences in [51] and those in [39] and [46] in a rather different way. What they understand in the case of [51a] is that the workers acted in such a way as to make their weekend begin before it actually should. The executive vice-president in [51b] did not begin to discuss, but, by speaking first, caused the discussion to begin. McKernon definitely had not yet "begun to retire" (the verb retire is a punctual verb, and therefore does not occur with an aspectual verb, unless its subject is plural, collective, or generic; cp. p.57); on the contrary, he was apparently acting as if his retirement had already begun (the noun retirement does not refer to a punctual event).
Stated otherwise, the examples in [51] have a causative reading. The transformationalist (e.g. NEWMEYER 1975:59) derives this type of sentences from a "remote structure in which the aspectual is commanded by a verb of causation" (24). I believe it would be a contradiction to reject deletion, and to accept a transformational process called "causativization". There is no evidence that the speaker who utters [51a] to [ c] proceeds from "remote structures" such as those imagined by Newmeyer.

As a semantic formula for a causative "X began Y"-frame, it might seem [52] is sufficient. [29], definitely, would be totally unsuitable. From now onward, Y will stand for any noun which is not the subject of the aspectual verb.

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{[52]} & \quad \text{at time } t, \ X \ \text{began } Y = \\
& \quad \begin{align*}
& \quad X \ \text{did something} \\
& \quad \text{because of that, } Y \ \text{began}
\end{align*}
\end{align*}
\]

Although the verb begin occurs not only in the introductory line, but in the formula as well, [52] is not circular: it exploits the fact that begin is a "reversible verb" (cp. ROTHENBERG 1974, and Chapter Four for discussion), and it "reduces" one frame to another (hitherto not yet described). The formula in [52] is therefore no more than an intermediate step towards the explication of the meaning of the verb begin in sentences such as [51a] to [ c] - and this very fact may be felt as being unsatisfactory. There is, at this stage, no compelling evidence leading to the conclusion that a longer, but autonomous, formula must be preferred to a shorter one (e.g., [52]). However, we must be prepared to expect that such evidence may appear when other verbs are studied. For the sake of consistency I therefore propose, in replacement
of [52], the semantic formula in [53]:

[53] at time t, X began Y:
before t, there was no Y
at t, X did something
one could think at that time:
because of that, there will be Y after now

There are, in this final formula as in the previous one, two variables, viz. X and Y. X is a subject NP, and acts, in the causative frame "X began Y", as an agent. Y, always in that same frame, is a direct object NP. There is no reference to a second verb Z.

In brief, we can now say that there are two distinct frames within the construction "X began Y". One is relatable to the frames "X began to Z" or "X began Z-ing"; the other one requires its own formula, and is causative. On the other hand, even though no more direct object frames are to be explicated, we have not finished yet with the construction "X began Y". Consider [54]:

[54] inspired by the mothers she met, she began her book and the first edition, rushed out in time for Mother's Day, was soon sold out.
/Ni,07-05-88/

It would be possible to insert a preposition-like particle on between the verb begin and the subsequent NP (25):

[55] inspired by the mothers she met, she began on her book and the first edition, rushed out in time for Mother’s Day, was soon sold out.

The verb begin in [55] is not part of a direct object construction; nevertheless, "X began on Y" is sufficiently close to "X began Y" to be, as we said on p.62, assimilated to it. Two questions now arise: what is the meaning of the
second construction, and in what relation does the particle on stand to the rest of the clause? We shall look at the second question first.

No links exist between on and begin (26), as is shown by the impossibility of [56], where the verb write (a "natural pairing" in the "begin a book"-context in [54]) has been inserted after on and before the NP:

[56] *She began on to write/writing her book.

On the other hand, it appears that there is a link between particle and NP, a link which allows us to identify the particle as a true preposition. In fact, it is not as much the preposition which counts in sentences such as [55]: the entire PrepP is important (27). The speaker knows that the addressee, upon hearing [55], will understand that the third person she began to work, or to struggle, or to sweat, on her book. NEWMEYER (1975) would have argued that a verb has been "deleted", and that the preposition on provides the hearer with a clue as to which kind of verb is understood: [55] implies an extraordinary amount of effort with regard to the normal activity undertaken in the context provided. I could find myself in agreement with the latter part of that claim - it could be the answer to the first question raised on pp.72-73; but the trouble is that not all "X began to Y"-sentences imply that "extraordinary amount of effort":

[57] At the restaurant, Bill was so hungry that he began on his salad while waiting for his soup.

Rather than effort, on suggests that the salad is eaten in parts. An effort-reading (impossible in this example) is a
derived reading: something that has to be done part by part has a reasonable chance of requiring considerable effort. Notice that a second verb (i.e. eat) can be supplied, but not inserted in a "begin on a salad"-context. After the pairing, once again, the formula in (29) applies.

1.5. The construction exemplified in [34d] (i.e. "X began") is the last one to be considered. Two frames are to be distinguished (28).

a) SHOPEN (1972) uses strings such as John began, an instance of frame number one, as the basis for his definition of definite ellipsis (29). The latter exists wherever an argument lacks, "the referent for which the speaker assumes to be in common focus for the hearer (= "the addressee", B.P.) as well as himself" (SHOPEN 1972:150). Further examples are given in [58] :

[58a]  We haven't lied to each other. Don't let's begin. /W,232/

[  b]  Miss Ballew's words were as neat and orderly as herself. She tended to begin at the beginning. /M,115/

[  c]  A fine rain had begun while he was telephoning; road surfaces were slick. /W,423/

The verbs to be supplied by the addressee are lie, speak, and fall respectively. There is no doubt that these can easily be found through a study of the context. Lie is simply "lifted out" of the previous sentence; speak and fall are natural pairings, suggested by the nouns words and rain (30). The formula in (29) applies.

b) Consider, after the sentences in [58], those in [59a] to [  c]. They illustrate subtype number two.
Knowledgeable buyers wanting a new model waited until four to six months after production began. /W.169/

Coffee service in the auditorium began with first arrivals. /W.402/

"One, one, ONE, ONE." The sound check begins. "Two, two, TWO, TWO, TWO, TWO." /AM.03-09-88/

Before I present my own semantic explication, I must acknowledge that several attempts were made in the literature aiming at assimilating frame number two to frame number one. NEWMEYER (1975:56), for instance, claims that "if there is an understood verbal reading at all (...), it is simply one of existence". I, for one, am extremely doubtful as to whether there is any understood verbal reading in [59a] to [c]: it appears rather counter-intuitive to state that a verb such as be or exist has been "deleted" (or even left unexpressed).

No verb - and even less a "set of semantic verbal features" - is to be supplied in any of the examples in [59] (pace IVIR 1976:45)

Quite different from the claims made by Newmeyer and by Ivir is DIXON's (1976:356) viewpoint according to which absolute begin-constructions similar to those in [59] "derive" from constructions containing an unspecified plural subject they ("they began to produce", "they began to serve coffee", "they began to check the sound"). A singular subject is said to be impossible ("Tom began grading papers does not yield The grading of papers began", ibid.), but that is certainly not a general truth. Without talking in terms of "derivations", one could say that "production began" may be associated to "the plant began to produce the new model"; "coffee service began", to "a waiter began to serve coffee"; "the sound check begins", to "a technician begins to check
the sound' (31). The problem with Dixon's account is that noun-to-verb conversions may be impossible, as in the case of, e.g., [60a] and [ b]. The verbs wrangle and trend do exist; however, the modifiers long and artistic oppose a conversion.

[60a] A long wrangle began beside the road.
/DE,190/
[ b] History showed that artistic trends - the latticework of all commercial designing - always began subtly and often when least expected. /W,304/

The referents of the subjects in [59] and in [60] do not begin to do anything at all. My own attempt towards a description of absolute begin (i.e. our second frame, not to be confused with the elliptical use of begin in the first subtype of the "X began"-construction) is based on that idea, and on an account proposed in the early years of conceptual analysis, when capital letters and punctuation (cp. Part One, Chapter One, p.13) were apparently not yet avoided. That specific account, in WIERZBICKA (1973:626), appeals to the semantic primitive part. Wierzbicka talks about boundaries in space, and glosses [61a] as in [61b]. Up to this particular point, her description looks quite attractive.

[61a] This is where X's property begins.
[ b] This is the first part of X's property.

A good deal less convincing is the further explication of the notion of "first part" (disavowed by Wierzbicka at the time of proofreading) (32) as "that part whose as-if part anything becomes before it becomes an as-if part of all the other parts". To the best of my knowledge, a revised and improved description never saw light - even though a better
alternative could easily be provided. It suffices to describe the "first part" as the one "before" which there are no other parts. Secondly, as the adequate formula must be broad enough to cover not only temporal but also spatial uses of absolute begin (cp. [61a]), there should be no direct reference to time (i.e. to a reference point t). As a (provisional) formula for the second frame of the construction "X began", [62] could therefore be proposed:

[62] X began = one can think of X as of something that has parts I am thinking of one part of X there are no parts before that part

Further investigation shows that, only in that particular syntactic frame which is presently under discussion, there seems to be a constraint on the choice of subject. It is impossible to say, for instance:

[63a] *The plum pudding began.
[63b] *The plum pudding began with no taste.

VENDLER (1967:143-144) describes the constraint illustrated in [63] by stating that "objects do not occur, begin, or end". The accuracy of such a statement depends on what we decide should be called an object. A plum pudding—certainly is an object, and a table and a chair and a bicycle are objects, too. But what about a property, a river, a desert, a forest, or a road? Presumably, they are objects — what else could they be? — yet they do begin (at some point 1 in space), although they do not occur. NEWMEYER's (1975:58) account, on the other hand, relies on the acceptance of the thesis (rejected in the above) that a verb of existence has
been "deleted". While discussing an account which he rejects for being ad hoc (in a transformational framework at least), the same author refers to a statement (and dismisses it) according to which the subject of an intransitive begin-sentence which cannot be completed by means of the phrase to do something must be an "eventive NP" (Newmeyer), i.e. an NP which is "limitable in space or time" (cp. also IVIR 1976: 44). Although it is impossible to say that the plum pudding took place or began at the bar, or after dinner, a plum pudding is still limitable in space - its "boundaries" can easily be perceived with the eye.

Hence, the problem appears not yet to have been solved. Its solution is perhaps so simple that nobody ever thought of it before. The difference between a plum pudding, a table, a chair, and a bicycle, on one hand, and a property, a river, a desert, a forest, and a road, on the other hand, is that only the "parts" of the latter can be thought of as being one "after" the other. All we need to do is insert that idea in the formula quoted in [62]:

[64] \[ X \text{ began} = \]
\[
\text{one can think of } X \text{ as of something that has parts}
\]
\[
\text{one can think of those parts as being one after the other}
\]
\[
\text{I am thinking of one part of } X
\]
\[
\text{there are no parts before that part}
\]

The formula in [64] provides what I believe to be a correct description of "X began"-frame number two.

1.6. We have, at this stage, reached the end of what is meant to be an exhaustive overview of the various frames in which the verb begin occurs. It may be useful to recall that
eight frames are to be distinguished, and that, for the
description of all these frames, four formulas were devised.
Five frames were shown to be describable in terms of the
formula originally constructed for frame (a). One other
frame (viz. (c)) was described in terms of a formula which
also includes a reference to an activity or a state $Z$. Only
frames (e) and (h) were given an explication in which there
is no second verb $Z$. All this, I would like to argue, is
additional evidence for the fact that the verb $\text{begin}$ is, at
least in the first place, a verb about a verb. Table One
lists the various frames and the formula proposed for each.

Table One

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frame</th>
<th>Formula</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a)</td>
<td>$X$ began to $Z$</td>
<td>[29]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>$X$ began $Z$-ing</td>
<td>[29]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c)</td>
<td>$X$ began by $Z$-ing</td>
<td>[38]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d)</td>
<td>$X$ began $Y$</td>
<td>[29]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e)</td>
<td>$X$ began $Y$ (causative)</td>
<td>[53]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(f)</td>
<td>$X$ began on $Y$</td>
<td>[29]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(g)</td>
<td>$X$ began (elliptical)</td>
<td>[29]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(h)</td>
<td>$X$ began (absolute)</td>
<td>[64]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total number of frames : 8
Total number of formulas : 4
Total number of formulas referring to a second verb : 2

2. "BEGIN" AND "START" COMPARED

2.1. Among the authors who devote to the value of the verbs
$\text{begin}$ and $\text{start}$ no more than a few lines (cp. Chapter Four
for FUCHS & LEONARD 1979), all but one - quite hastily -
appear to assume that there is no difference at all. ANDERSON
(1968:395), for instance, believes that both verbs are
"generated" by one and the same transformational device (the
one quoted here on p.46). R.J. HARRIS (1974:595-596) is
convinced that begin and start are synonyms expressing "inception". NEWMEYER (1975:51) argues that begin and start are "semantically indistinguishable" and denote "initiation of time-aspect" (id. 1970:179 = 1975:89). PARISI & ANTINUCCI (1976:54), finally, assume that both verbs have a component 'change', and that a begin-sentence is nothing else but a paraphrase for a start-sentence. Only MITCHELL (1979:173), who points to the "frequent substitutability of start for begin", is more realistic; he reflects a commonly received stand among lexicographers (33) and an intuition that seems to be shared by most language users (34). The question which must be answered is: from the viewpoint of conceptual axiology (cp. Part One), how do begin and start differ? It is a legitimate question because there can be no doubt whatsoever that they do differ, and that their values codetermine one another (cp. pp.38-39).

2.2. The idea of "frequent substitutability" (Mitchell etc.; cp. above) suggests that the difference between begin and start is more than once neutralized. The concept of neutralization plays a key role in DIXON's (1976:351) account of the difference, which is, according to him, a matter of "syntactic orientation". Consider the following sentences (his examples):

[65a] I'm going to settle down tonight and start reading Chomsky's new book again.

[  b] I'm going to settle down tonight and begin reading Chomsky's new book again.

Begin involves what Dixon calls object-orientation ("the commencement is with respect to the book", i.e. "I shall
commence tonight at page 1 again", ibid.:352): \textit{start} involves \textit{subject-orientation} ("the commencement is with respect to the reader", i.e. "I shall commence (...) wherever I left off last week", ibid.). This sounds quite all right in the case of a verb such as \textit{read}, which is transitive. In a footnote, DIXON (1976:362) admits he could have spoken about \textit{predicate-orientation} rather than about \textit{object-orientation} (35). If this terminological refinement is agreed on, it should be possible for one to describe the difference between [66a] and [b] by saying that the commencement is, in the first case, with respect to the \textit{running}, and in the second case with respect to the \textit{runner}.

[66a] John began to run.
[b] John started to run.

It seems hard to understand how both commencements differ. Possibly, then, this is one of those "many contexts" where the underlying distinction made by Dixon is "neutralized" (cp. ibid.:351). The problem is that no conditions for neutralization to occur are made explicit. In addition, Dixon's analysis could be challenged. It might be argued that each one of his sentences can be given the two interpretations (subject- \textit{and} object-orientation), and that the latter depend on a different reading ("repetitive" \textit{vs} "resumptive") of the \textit{adverb again} - which, in that sense, comes close to its German equivalent \textit{wieder} (36). The repetitive reading implies that the process expressed by the \textit{ING}-construction is \textit{repeated}: the resumptive, that a process interrupted before is \textit{resumed}. Intonation changes accordingly: "\textit{start/begin reading Chomsky's new book again}"
versus "start/begin reading Chomsky's new book again".

Unlike Dixon, FREED (1979), who shares with Dixon the conviction that the difference between begin and start does not always appear, specifies the conditions under which neutralization occurs. The view adopted is that events may be subdivided into an onset, a nucleus, and a coda. The nucleus of an event ("the time segment during which the event is "in progress" without reference to its beginning, its end, or its duration", l.c.:34) is viewed as having three parts: an initial, a middle, and a final stage. The onset is that particular temporal segment which precedes the initial stage of the nucleus of an event, and the coda is the segment which follows the final stage of the nucleus.

In order to illustrate Freed's claims, the following of her examples may be used:

[67a] Barbara began to study for her exams last week.
[ b] Barbara started to study for her exams last week.

Freed argues that "start refers to the onset of an event while begin refers to the initial temporal segment of the nucleus of an event" (l.c.:71); and indeed, [67a] implies that Barbara did do some studying (37). [67b] is said to possibly imply that Barbara did study, with start becoming identical to begin. Uttered under different circumstances, however, the same sentence might have as a consequence that, in reality, Barbara did not do any studying at all. The sentence in [68], pronounced with contrastive stress, has "a very natural reading" (FREED l.c.:71; cp. also BOERTIEN 1979:43).
Barbara started to study for her exams last week but then she didn’t do any studying.

"Very natural" may be an exaggeration - but [68], under the conditions specified by Freed, is certainly not unacceptable. [69], which I quote from the same source, is possibly even more "natural" (38).

Henry started to sneeze but quickly regained his composure without actually sneezing.

It is unfortunate for Freed that there are begin-sentences which seem to behave like her start-sentence in [67b]: they may imply that the "event" expressed by the second verb did not occur (39). In that sense, it is important to have a semantic formula the third line of which says (among other things) that "one could think at that time: more of I will happen after now". NEY (1981:39) quotes PIZZINI’s (1972) example John began to hit the cop, and argues that it may well be the case that John eventually did not hit the cop. Similarly, DIXON (1984: 591) claims that Mary began to hit John could be said when Mary "had merely raised the stick but had not yet brought it down upon [John’s] head (perhaps she will, or perhaps she won’t)". Interpretations such as those provided by Ney and by Dixon undermine Freed’s analysis of the difference between begin and start: they show that begin normally refers, in Freed’s terminology, not only to the initial temporal segment of a nucleus, but to the onset as well. In case of neutralization, there is no reference to the former.

On the other hand, it seems to me that, even if Freed’s analysis is modified along the lines suggested, the
assumptions put forward by her remain questionable. A major point of criticism is raised by VENZI (1981); it concerns the very possibility of subdividing events such as studying and sneezing in onsets, nuclei and codae. Freed herself is aware of the precariousness of her approach. Still, she believes that "a satisfactory analysis of aspektual verbs requires a description of events in terms of (...) temporal segments" (l.c.:29), or, at least, that such a description is "especially well suited to and perhaps even required by a discussion of aspektual verbs" (ibid.:37; emphasis added). With regard to neutralization, I would like to argue that [67a] and [ b ] are never identical (cp. below). In other words, there is no neutralization.

2.3. Despite the problems which may show up here and there, the possibility for events to be subdivided is taken for granted - not only by Freed, but by WIERZBICKA (1988a:77-78) as well. Wierzbicka's point of view is that begin is related to start, "with begin referring to the first part, and start, to the moment before the first part". Evidence is drawn from the language of horse or motor racing, or running events: if their initial moment is normally called 'start' rather than 'beginning', it is merely because "that what matters is the initial moment rather than the first part of the activity". This is undoubtedly a sound observation - although it seems to imply that races have to "start", and cannot "begin". [70a] and [ b ] show that such is not the case:

[70a] Now, most were clattering on typewriters, and Erica (...) wondered what they could be writing so much about when the race hadn't even started. /W,383/
[70b] Now, it was noon next day and the first of the two big races - the Canebreak 300 - would begin in half an hour. /W,381/

It is probably not advisable to draw conclusions based on differences found between members of different parts of speech. An often quoted dictionary of synonyms (HAYAKAWA/ FLETCHER 1971:38) does indeed associate the verb begin with the noun start, and the verb start with the noun beginning: begin "implies direction", and it often suggests "the start of a process in fulfilment of a purpose"; start "places more emphasis on the fact of making a beginning, the mere act of setting out" (emphasis added) (40).

Presumably, the difference between begin and start has something to do with first part vs first moment - but only in those cases where both verbs are used absolutely, i.e. with a subject that has boundaries in time and/or space (41). Consider the example in [71], where begin and start occur in a nice semantic opposition:

[71] Erica Trenton's affair with Pierre Flodenhale had begun early in June. It started shortly after their first encounter, when the young race driver accompanied Adam Trenton home, following the week-end cottage party at Higgins Lake. /W,317/

For the other frames, the question raised at the end of section 2.1. must be repeated: how do the verbs begin and start differ? In fact, the answer was given already in Part One, Chapter Two (pp.23-25). We shall re-establish it here by means of corpus examples similar to [71]. Such examples, it should be pointed out, carry more information than one would expect: at first sight, the cooccurrence of two related verbs might be explained in terms of "style" (authors
try to avoid using the same word twice); but in the process of selecting an alternative word, a writer may find that a particular verb "fits" better in some slots than in others - and that tells us something about their semantic content.

First of all, consider [72a] and [b].

[72a] In the last third of the night, the temperature begins to rise in anticipation of wakefulness. It continues to rise until mid- to late afternoon, when it starts to fall in preparation for sleep./NI,07-05-88/

[b] Infants this age also begin to discern the specific features of objects. Instead of treating all similar-size objects alike - banging, shaking and mouthing them - they start to touch different things in different ways./WD,07-09-88/

In [72a], begin occurs with a second verb rise indicating, in this context, a slow development; also, with a relatively well-defined point in time, viz. "the last third of the night". Start, on the other hand, occurs with the verb fall, which indicates a sudden change; and with a less well-defined point in time, viz. "mid- to late afternoon". In other words, the sudden event of falling - the one which is said to "start" rather than to "begin" - occurs at a time that can by no means be predicted with mathematical precision. In [72b], the situation is at the same time similar and dissimilar. Begin is followed by the verb discern, which refers to a process the beginning of which cannot be easily pinpointed. The experience of touching things in different ways refers to an event which can be observed, but which, once again, occurs at a time impossible to foretell. Hence, while begin seems to be unmarked, start refers to a change which is somehow unexpected, either because it was unknown that it would occur at the time it actually does (cp. [72a] and [b]), or
because it is unexpected in itself:

[73a] The lifesaver's expression changed from disbelief to incredulity as my legs began to run. The colour, that is; the dogs had licked clean long stripes of white, and I was starting to look like a zebra crossed with a barber's pole. /WD,12-10-87/

[ b ] I may begin with a classic recipe, but no sooner do I start combining fruit and cream, eggs and sugar and gelatine, than my head fills with ideas and off I go, creating something just for the occasion. /ibid./

In fact, in [73a], both the relevant events are unexpected; however, the second is probably the most unexpected one. [73b] comes from the pen of a housewife who, in the routine of making well-known desserts, suddenly finds herself busy mixing all kinds of things, an activity which triggers her sense of experimentation. Notice that, in [73b], neither verb is used in the frame "X began/started TO Z". In general, it appears that the difference between the two can be observed in any of the frames in which they occur. As a matter of fact, the start-sentence in [71] refers to a change unexpected in itself; the changes in [74a] and [ b ] are expected, but they occur at an unpredictable and unpredicted point in time.

[74a] Of course, there'll be more planning before filming can begin, but we hope to start in February or March. /W,152/

[ b ] "Unless anyone has a better suggestion, we might as well begin." He glanced at Hub Hewitson. "Who's starting?" /W,405/

The question we must address now is how to explicate in the metalanguage of conceptual axiology the difference between an unmarked verb, and another one which implies unexpectedness.
3. "START"

3.1. For the begin-formula in [29], our starting point was Wierzbicka's begin-formula in [5]. For our start-formula, the starting point will be the begin-formula in [29]. As begin is unmarked (cp. p.86), nothing is to be removed from [29]; only the unexpectedness-component that marks start has to be added. The easiest way to do so is as in [75]:

[75] at time t, X started to Z =
    before t, Z was not happening/there was no Z
    one did not know at that time:
       Z will happen at t/there will be Z at t
    at t, Z was happening/there was Z
    one could think at that time:
       more of Z will happen after now/there
       will be more Z after now
    one could not know at that time:
       more of Z will happen after now/there
       will be more Z after now

The formula in [75] reflects, as does the one in [29], the speaker's intuitions about what came first and what comes next (42). It has therefore more psychological reality than the glosses, in [76b] and [ c], of the sentence in [76a] (cp. WIERZBICKA 1973:621). The glosses concerned are Wierzbicka's earliest attempt to explicate the meaning of a simple start-sentence; they rely too heavily on the primitives "part" and "world" (see also p.76).

[76a] X started playing at 5 o'clock.
[ b] The first of the worlds of which the playing X was a part was the world of 5 o'clock.
[ c] The world of which the playing X was a part and which was becoming all the other worlds of which the playing X was becoming a part, was the world of 5 o'clock.

It would lead us too far to study in detail the entire set of frames in which the aspectual verb start occurs. It
occurs, in fact, in the same variety of frames as begin does (cp. NEWMEYER 1970:178-179, 1975:51,89), plus one. Given the close resemblance between the formulas in [29] and in [75], it is not at all surprising that the latter covers the same range of frames as the former. We shall look at these frames first, and provide comments whenever necessary. The reader is invited to keep constantly in mind what was said with reference to begin.

a) "X started to Z". Examples (cp. also [66] to [69], [72], and [73a]):

[77a] I vividly remember when she started to move. She'd kick so hard, my dress would move. /WD,12-10-87/

[ b] As he started to pour it out into a glass, he got this funny look on his face. /AM,10-09-88/

b) "X started Z-ing". Examples (cp. also [68a] and [73b]):

[78a] He yelled at me to get out of the way and started banging on the Land Rover to frighten the elephant off. /WD,07-09-87/

[ b] People would also do funny things. One woman, for example, just took her clothes off and started flashing. /AM,10-09-88/

JACKENDOFF (1983:199) errs, I think, when he says, about the sentence Ludwig started composing quartets, that the use of start, which is defined by means of the "primitives" GO and TO, implies that at (rather than before) the beginning of the event Ludwig was not composing quartets, whilst later on he was. This statement is self-contradictory. On the other hand, start, when used with either a TO- or an IMG-head, displays the same type of behavior as begin, both with regard to punctual verbs and with regard to statives (43):
When my daughter was about five months old, she started waking up once or twice a night. /WD,07-09-87/ (punctual verb with an AdvP)

When she wrote her bestselling book about it all, Hollywood producers started falling over one another to pick up the screen rights. /NI,07-05-88/ (punctual verb, subject plural)

Frances had an office job, which she gave up because "I started producing children". /WD,07-09-87/ (punctual verb, direct object plural)

This hotel foyer is starting to feel like a second home. /AM,03-09-88/ (stative verb, constant possibility of change)

So we went on trying, getting more and more worried and bad tempered and pretending it didn’t matter, and then Peter started having affairs and then he got this student pregnant and that was the end. /WD,12-10-87/ (stative verb, constant possibility of change)

c) "X started Y" (non-causative). Examples:

You’re never too old to start a new life. /NI,07-05-88/ (verb to be supplied: live)

I assure you, I will get pregnant only when we have decided to start a family, once we’re married. /WD,07-09-87/ (verb to be supplied: build up)

The trouble was I went over to New York just before we started rehearsals, and it was a terrible temptation being in New York – I went to parties every night. /AM,03-09-88/ (rehearsals > rehearse)

I didn’t start competitive cycling until I was about 18. /AM,10-09-88/ (competitive cycling > cycle competitively)

It may be useful to make a few observations right here on possible discrepancies in distribution of direct objects after the verbs begin and start. According to FREED (1979:84), the following are cases where begin is unacceptable (the examples are hers).

They like to start (*begin) the garden early in the spring.

I started (*began) an apple but couldn’t finish it.
Despite many praiseworthy efforts, Freed's account remains simply unconvincing. In one case, the "unacceptability" seems to be a matter of idiolect rather than a general fact. Among my examples, I found the ones in [84]:

[84a] Having passed the age when many feel as if they're "over the hill", I'm looking forward to moving north and beginning my fifth garden. /NI,07-05-88/
[ b] So when I begin to feel bored and want to begin another garden, I blast off and do it, just in case it's later than I think. /ibid./

As far as food is concerned, the situation seems to be far more tricky, and subject to individual taste (44). Obviously, the size of the food consumed has something to do with it. For the constructed examples in [85], NEWMEYER (1975:44) found, with many informants, a "decrease in acceptability from first to last":

[85a] John began dinner.
[ b] John began the pizza.
[ c] John began the tomato surprise.
[ d] John began a spoonful of soup.

On the other hand, as that same "decrease in acceptability" would be found if start had been used, another factor must be involved as well. There seems to be a difference between food that has to be prepared, and food that can be eaten without being previously prepared. Food of the latter kind can be eaten at any moment in time, which makes the verb start as a commencement verb extremely suitable. Food of the former kind cannot be eaten unless it was prepared or cooked; this very fact can (but does not have to) conflict with the idea of an unexpected change (one can be so hungry that one starts eating before the food is properly cooked).
d) "X started on Y". Example:

[86] Later, we talk about trust and then we start on the hassles. /NI,07-05-88/

I strongly disagree with FREED (1979:84-85), who considers [87b] to be one of the possible "underlying", "full" versions of [87a], together with [87c].

[87a] Paula started the wall-hanging three weeks ago.
[ b] Paula started working on the wall-hanging three weeks ago.
[ c] Paula started making the wall-hanging three weeks ago.

In order to convey the message expressed in [87b], the speaker can omit the ING-head working, but not the particle on. [87b] is an explication of [88], not of [87a].

[88] Paula started on the wall-hanging three weeks ago.

e) "X started" (elliptical). Examples (cp. also [74a] and [ b]):

[89a] He announced, "President is what we'd make you, old boy. You'd start at the top." /W,336/ (verb to be supplied: work)
[ b] I recall being asked how many times I'd smacked Bonnie. That was when alarm bells started. I thought to myself, "My God, they think I did it". /NI,16-07-88/ (verb to be supplied: go off) (45)

We must acknowledge, at this stage, the existence of instances of frame e) where begin, this time without even the slightest reserves, could not be used:

[90a] The engine of a gleaming, vivid red sedan, its identifying number 06 painted in high visibility gold, wouldn't start. /W,384/
[ b] I saw you when the train started. /OE,22/
Unlike absolute begin, absolute start has a marginal second reading 'start to move' (its only reading in older times, when start was a movement verb, and not an aspectualizer). Only absolute start allows subjects whose referents have physical motion as their prototypical activity. "Physical motion", here, means motion brought about by other than natural forces (such as gravitation; cp. [58c], where begin is used after the subject rain and without a second verb fall) (46).

3.2. All the frames to which the formula in [75] applies were briefly described in section 3.1. As in the case of begin, the remaining frames have each their own formula.

a) The frame "X started by Z-ing" needs no further comment; examples are given in [91]:

[91a] Start by carving one row of petals around the radish, leaving them joined at the base.
/WD,07-09-87/
[ b] Here are three stretches to include in a general fitness regimen. Start by holding each stretch for 10 seconds and advance up to 30.
/NI,07-05-88/

The use of the verb start in the imperative (as in [91a] and [ b]) has nothing unnatural: whoever uses an imperative does not know for sure whether (and when) his suggestion or order will be followed up. The formula in [92] closely resembles the one in [38] (pp.63-64). It differs from the latter in exactly the same way as [75] differs from [29].

[92] at time t, X started by Z-ing =
before t, Z was not happening/there was no Z
one did not know at that time:
Z will happen at t/there will be Z at t
at t, before all other things, Z was happening/
there was Z
one could think at that time:
  something else will happen/there will be
  something else at t, after now
one could not know at that time:
  something else will happen/there will be
  something else at t, after now

b) Within the direct object construction "X started Y", there are, as in the case of begin, two subtypes, one of which was described in 3.1. as frame c). The other one is inherently causative. Consider the examples in [93]:

[93a] About 60 per cent of depressed patients suffer from "phase-advance". They start their biological day about four hours earlier than normal. /NI,07-05-88/
[ b ] We could even start a new fashion trend! /NI,27-08-88/

Before we propose a formula, we have to make a few important remarks. First of all, one has to dismiss FREED's (1979:77-85) claim that whenever the verb start carries a connotation of causation, anomaly would result if begin were used instead (47). It is rather surprising that no better account is offered by a writer who is aware of the fact that "causation is ultimately relevant even to an analysis of begin" (FREED 1979:81; cp. pp.70-72). In reality, in a context of fights or troubles, or things such as earthquakes, landslides and fires, the naturalness of start (cp. [94a] to [ d]) - but not its exclusivity, as COLLINS's (1952:21) example in [94e] shows - is quite easy to explain: it is all due to the unexpectedness of their outburst.

[94a] [The] surprise attack succeeded in starting the war that resulted in the Mongols being overthrown. /WD,07-09-87/
[ b ] Furious university students started even more trouble after hearing the result of the poll.
[ c ] The earthquake started a wave of misery for thousands of people.
(94d) The flood started a landslide.
(94e) It was this remark that began the trouble.

Secondly, in the frame "\(X\) started \(Y\)", \(X\) may refer to the agent bringing about physical motion as a prototypical activity of \(Y\). In other words, there are numerous cases where, as a result of "\(X\) starting \(Y\)", \(Y\) starts (moving). This, again, reminds us of the origins of the verb \textit{start} (cp. p.93). Examples are given in (95).

(95a) Then he started the car and they drove the rest of the way to Quarton Lake in silence.
(95b) Slipping into the car, she started the engine, which fired instantly, and drove away.

In order to account for sentences as different as those in (93) and in (95), respectively, a formula is needed which is rather different from the corresponding formula for the verb \textit{begin}:

(96) at time \(t\), \(X\) started \(Y\) = one can think of \(Y\) as of something that one 
is \(Z\)-ing before \(t\), \(Z\) was not happening one did not know at that time : 
\(Z\) will happen after \(t\) at \(t\), \(X\) did something one could think at that time : because of that, \(Z\) will happen after now

c) Closely related to the formula in (96) (where \(Y\) acts as a direct object to \(Z\)) is the one in (97) (where \(Y\) acts as a subject to \(Z\)). The latter formula is needed in order to explicate the meaning of the verb \textit{start} in sentences such as those in (98).

(97) at time \(t\), \(X\) started \(Y\) \(Z\)-ing = one can think of \(Z\) as of something that \(Y\) does before \(t\), \(Z\) was not happening
one did not know at that time:
Z will happen after t
at t, X did something
because of that, at t, Z was happening
one could think at that time:
more of Z will happen after now

[98a] The clown started her laughing.
[b] She started them talking.
[c] Tomorrow, I'll start things moving in the
company, then it may be a week or two before I
get approval to go ahead. /W,120/

It is hardly necessary to point out that sentences such as
those in [98] have a causative reading (48). More important
is the observation that causation in itself is not enough to
explain why the verb begin does not occur in this particular
frame. WIERZBICKA (1988a:95) correctly points out that, in
an utterance like [98b], "the causer determined arbitrarily
the moment when the period of talking starts" (emphasis
added); there is a high degree of unexpectedness as to when
the change from "non-happening" to "happening" was to occur.
On the other hand, according to the same writer, begin would
be impossible because it suggests a "gradual development of
the action", irreconcilable with the implications carried by
the frame. It seems to me that Wierzbicka mistakenly conveys
a "gradualness"-component to a verb which was shown here to
be unmarked as far as suddenness or gradualness are
concerned. The only reason, I believe, why begin does not
occur in a frame *"X began Y Z-ing" is because, as an
unmarked verb, begin is simply not "coloured" or specific
enough.

d) The examples in [99] illustrate the second frame within
the construction "X started", viz. the one where start is
used as an absolute verb (cp. also [70a] and [71]).
He had better, Adam decided, reread the Emerson Vale news story before the press session started. /W,51/

He had asked, instantly alert, "When do the audits start?"
"First thing tomorrow, though no one's supposed to know." /W,278/

The Rover SE starts at $25,770. /CC,23-09-87/

[99c] has an elliptical subject: reference is made to the range of prices for the Rover SE. If, rather than start, begin is used, the same effect of unexpectedness can only be reached in a sentence which contains an adverb such as surprisingly:

Both the one and two-bedroom units are surprisingly priced in a range beginning at $75,000. /RE,18-09-87/

In order to account for sentences such as those in [99], FREED (1979:81) first forges a paraphrase with a direct object corresponding to the original subject, and with a new, unspecified, subject (49). The present account is quite different: it appeals to a semantic formula similar to the one in [64].

\[101\] \text{X started =}
\begin{align*}
\text{one can think of X as of something that has parts}
\text{one can think of those parts as being one after the other}
\text{I am thinking of one part of X}
\text{there are no parts before that part before time t, one did not know:}
\text{there will be a part of X after this at time t, one could think:}
\text{there will be parts of X after this}
\end{align*}

The last lines in [101] explicate the fact that we are now dealing, no longer with first parts, but with first (and unexpected) moments (cp. pp.85 and 87).
3.3. So far, nothing was said with regard to phrasal verbs such as start out, start up, and start off (50). Unlike on in "X started on Y", out, up, and off are particles belonging with the preceding (here, aspectual) verb - and that, in itself, is an excellent reason not to call any second element of a phrasal verb a preposition (51).

Particles may serve to prevent ambiguity (cp. MITCHELL 1971:56). [102a] is ambiguous between the readings in [102b] and [c]; but if a particle is added (cp. [102d]), the only possible reading which remains is [102c].

[102a] He started laughing.
[ b] He started to laugh.
[c] He started with laughter.
[d] He started off laughing.

The main function of a particle after the verb start is different, though. Start off, start out, and start up have different meanings, and none of these is identical to the meaning of start itself. Although all the combinations occur in several frames, I must limit myself to the commonest ones, and refrain from proposing elaborate semantic formulas. I shall look at start off first.

a) The phrasal verb start off can be followed by a second verb (as in [103a]), but does not have to (cp. [103b]):

[103a] From the beginning there have been a lot of different facets to her character. She started off being brash and arrogant. Then she came into the street, settled down a bit, gave up being a stripper, opened a coffee shop, had some romances, and now she's a wife with a baby. There's not a great deal more Daphne could move into unless she got divorced. /WD,07-09-87/
[b] When you've had a large dinner, starting off with caviar and working your way through six or seven courses, with fine wines, you don't feel hungry anymore. /ibid./
Semantically, the frame "X started off Z-ing" is closely related to the frame "X started by Z-ing". The activity or state Z is the first one in a series of activities or states; not just any series, but one the most salient feature of which is its length. One, so to speak, does not see the end of the series.

If no second verb follows, it is usually easy to supply one (e.g., eat in the case of [103b]). The verb to be supplied cannot be inserted. On the other hand, start off may be used absolutely as well, in which case - obviously - no second verb can be supplied. Its implications (viz. length) remain unchanged. Compare:

[104] When you’ve had a large dinner, which started off with caviar and which had at least five or six other courses, served with fine wines, you don’t feel hungry anymore.

b) Unlike start off, start out cannot be used absolutely (i.e. with an inanimate subject). The main reason for this fact is a matter of semantics. Start out has a volitional component: one starts out from somewhere or in a certain way because one intended to do so.

[105a] It was as if he had started out from home on a familiar walk (...). /OE,143/
[ b] Although turning on your stomach while you sleep can’t be helped, don’t start out the night that way. /WD,12-10-87/
[ c] Sure, you close the door in one sense and that can be a bit sad, but the times have been great and the prospect of going on to new things, starting out again, can be very exciting. /WD,07-09-87/

Second verbs are, once again, easy to supply.

c) A few words, finally, about start up, which mainly occurs in the frame "X started up Y", where it has a
causative meaning. This last phrasal verb in our set can take the same variety of direct objects as causative start in the frame "X started Y" (cp.94-95); but unlike the latter, start up requires, in that particular frame, an animate subject. That animate subject has a certain intention or certain intentions, and it undertakes the action of starting up as a step towards their realization. The act of starting up, in other words, is nothing but a means to get to a higher end. Consider the example in [106]:

[106] I think that will be the most important thing for me to be able to do, to start up my own little company. I mean a company of artists where you could do not only music but you could do theatre and film and television or whatever, it would be fantastic... /AM,10-09-88/

A verb such as run or operate or manage is to be provided by the addressee: they denote the kind of things one does with companies.

3.4. The study of start, our second aspectual verb, is now complete. Along the previous pages, we have looked at the verb start itself, and also at some phrasal verbs. Table Two lists, in the order of Table One (p.79), the different start-frames described in 3.1. and in 3.2. As before, the numbers between square brackets refer to the formulas which go with each of them.

Table Two

| (a) X started to Z           | 75 |
| (b) X started Z-ing         | 75 |
| (c) X started by Z-ing      | 92 |
| (d) X started Y             | 75 |
| (e) X started Y (causative) | 96 |
| (f) X started on Y          | 75 |
(g) X started Y Z-ing
(h) X started (elliptical)
(i) X started (absolute)

Total number of frames : 9 (begin : 8)
Total number of formulas : 5 (begin : 4)
Total number of formulas referring to a second verb : 4
  (begin : 2)

The five frames that can be described in terms of the formula in [75] correspond exactly to the five begin-frames that were described in terms of the formula in [29]. Three other formulas, viz. the ones in [92], [96], and [97], refer, as the one in [75] does, to an activity or state Z. Start is therefore, as much as begin, a verb about a verb.
NOTES to Part Two, Chapter Three

(1) Strings similar to these appear in GIVÓN (1973:898).

(2) For the sake of clarity, only the most common readings of the negative begin-clauses in [2] are taken into account. For a more complete analysis, cp., below, the interpretation of sample-sentence [12].

(3) ANDERSON (1968:403-404) is perfectly aware of the possibility of "attaching time statements"; these would eliminate the apparent contradiction between the first and the last terms of his begin-formula. No time statements are introduced, since this would give rise to a certain number of "problems" (which, upon closer inspection, appear to be peculiar to the transformational framework within which Anderson chose to work).

(4) Cp. also JACKENDOFF's (1976a:128) account of the sentence The car began sputtering (which exemplifies a frame to which we shall return below): "at some time the car was doing something other than sputtering, and (...) at a later time it sputtered".

(5) The alternative was to coin a new verb to verb, meaning 'to be or to happen'. That verb would have been reminiscent of GARDIES's (1981) verb effer ['to eff'] meaning 'fulfil the function of predicate'. Eff er will be used in a few quotes in Chapters Two, Four, and Six. On the other hand, I wish to emphasize from the very outset that no specific reason underlies my own decision to write out formulas for aspectual verbs using the past tense. For the explication in [7], my starting point was Wierzbicka's formula in [5], which I have adapted on crucial points only.

(6) The reader will appreciate the diversity of the corpus data: not only novels (of widely varied nature) were excerpted, but also some periodicals and weekly newspapers. For abbreviations, see the fourth part of the bibliography.

(7) It must be clear that the durative and the iterative meaning are carried by the entire sentence, and not by one particular element. As MITCHELL (1979:165) puts it: "It is not any putatively inherent feature of "punctuality" in arrive that decrees the unacceptability of [+John began to arrive]; it is rather the singularity of the subject John, together with the sentence-finality of arrive that does not permit an iterative reading for the sentence".

(8) This type of sentences came to my attention after I reread LERNER/ZIMMERMANN (1983), who write about the verb
stop, and my own comments in PEETERS (1986b:458).

(9) [15a] to [c] are taken from PETERSON (1974:5-6), who approvingly quotes GARCÍA (1967), yet admits (as his examples show) that begin imposes a number of restrictions on the following verb. It may well be the case that what García actually meant is that an aspectual verb imposes no selectional restrictions as far as its subject NP is concerned. The latter view has been often repeated, with or without reference to Garcia. C.p., for instance, KAJITA (1968:31), RUWET (1970:78), PETERSON (i.e.), VERBERT (1980:4), EMONDS (1985:79), and LAMIROY (1987:278).

(10) For details, see PEETERS (1982:232-233). The distinction, which I first found in the writings of André Martinet, is not originally due to him: he may well have found it in earlier (diachronically oriented) work (cp. PEETERS forthcoming d).

(11) Notice that, according to PARISI & ANTINUCCI (1976:54), [15c] is a "non-optimal paraphrase" for [15c].

(12) The highly theoretical remarks which appear in FUCHS & LEONARD (1979:324-325.329-330) with respect to begin and its cooccurrence with stative verbs make little sense. Similar observations are made with regard to Fr. commencer. The details are in Chapter Two.

(13) Such a constraint is not unknown to specialists of French; cp. Chapter Four.

(14) I avoid the use of the term complementizer, which suggests that the infinitive is the complement of the aspectual verb. The latter view is incompatible with the hypothesis that aspectuals are modifiers of a second verb which is their head.

(15) EMONDS (1985:103) proposes for the unacceptability of [i]  

[i] *John began must go.

a syntactic explanation founded on the theory of government and binding. His explanation fails to take into account the meaning of the verb must, and more particularly its incompatibility with the constant possibility of a change.

(16) The preceding argumentation applies, mutatis mutandis, to another distinction as well: GIVÓN (1973:903) argues that verbs such as begin "have a systematic ambiguity (...) whereby one sense implies intent or act while the other does not".

(17) If Newmeyer's claim was correct, there would be no need to postulate any semantic formulas different from the one in [29]: for the explanation of a particular use of the verb begin, nothing more would be needed than a description of the transformational operations that are claimed to give a begin-sentence its final form.

103
(18) The distinction between TO- and ING-constructions after begin has intrigued many linguists: see, for instance, FRIEDERICH (1977), FREED (1979), BOERTIEN (1979), BRINTON (1987), and WIERZBICKA (1988a). Cp. also BALTIN (1985:876), for an isolated but interesting remark. In Chapter Five, where we shall describe a verb which does not allow a TO-head, we shall have something more to say about the meaning of the connector to after an aspectual verb.

(19) It may seem that the formula does not apply to \(35a\): some will indeed argue that the effects of time on our skin are permanent, i.e. incompatible with a constant possibility of change. I do not believe that the argument is valid: the use of creams, powders and oils destined to hide the effect which time may have on the human skin is much older than the English language itself. \(35a\), as a matter of fact, is taken from a description of Helena Rubinstein’s "Skin Life Intensive Wrinkle Treatment".


(21) Newmeyer himself once believed (cp. 1970:180) that any C.A. verb which selects dinner as its direct object may be understood in a sentence such as \(43a\). The fact that chew is a C.A. verb which can select dinner as its object (NEWMEYER 1975:43-44) proves the contrary: even in an appropriate context, \(43a\) cannot be used to mean that "Max began chewing dinner". What is involved is the "natural pairing in most speakers’ minds of eat and dinner but not chew and dinner" (l.c.:44; emphasis added).

(22) Notice, in \(45a\), that the communicative event begins, but does not continue.

(23) It has been assumed that, of two sentences one of which has an object NP which ends in -ing and the other a verbal ING-head (as in the pair \(50a\)-\(50b\)), the latter is to be derived from the former. Cp. HARRIS (1965:398) and, more critically, ROSS (1972b:72). Clearly, such a hypothesis is again in contradiction with the "verbs about verbs"-approach (as was Görna’s hypothesis about a so-called verb insertion rule).

(24) HUDDLESTON (1969:260) expresses a similar view. He even imagines that causation could be invoked in the case of \(X\) began to \(Z\)-sentences as well, if their subject \(X\) is marked [+ agitative]. \(iia\) would have to be analyzed as in \(iib\):

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{\(iia\)} & \quad \text{Mary began to study Old Chinese.} \\
\text{\(iib\)} & \quad \text{Mary caused Mary to begin to study Old Chinese.}
\end{align*}
\]

Huddleston himself finds his own analysis "questionable". It surely is; but cp. also HUDDLESTON (1971:151).

(25) I am not saying that speakers actually start from \(54\) and add on at a very late stage of the "generative process".
I again assume that [54] and [55] are autonomous.


(27) The receiver of the message knows that hardly ever is anything done on, i.e. on top of, a book. Therefore, he or she has no trouble in selecting the right type of verb, and in grasping the exact meaning of the utterance. Although people can be, or sit, or stand on (top of) something, it is rather unlikely that this kind of interpretation should prevail if one refers to a book.

(28) IVIR (1976:44-45) presents several examples, but uses them in support of his claim that the verb begin is "semantically incomplete" and changes its contents from one sentence to another. Such a viewpoint, of course, must be rejected: rather than the verb begin, it is (at least in some cases; cp. below) the entire begin-sentence which is "semantically incomplete" (cp. ibid.:47).


(30) Compare [58c] to [iii]:

[iii] On her way back, a soft rain began to fall. /W,124/

(31) HARRIS (1969:204) considers a sentence such as [iva] as basic, and sentences such as [ivb] and [c] as transformationally derived:

[iva] His writing began.
[b] He began to write.
[c] He began writing.

Cp. note (23) for an appreciation.

(32) Footnote 7, added in proof, reads as follows: "At the time when I am reading the proofs of this article I consider the analysis of boundaries in space suggested here incorrect. I am unable, however, to present a revised version right now".


(34) FREED (1979:68) reports the result of an informal survey among native speakers of English: it indicates "that most believe begin and start to be close synonyms and almost entirely interchangeable".

(35) Anna Wierzbicka informs me (personal communication, July 1987) that, to her opinion, the term predicate-orientation lacks clarity. James D. McCAWLEY, introducing Dixon's paper, finds the use of the word object in the present context "a bit misleading".

(36) For details about the latter, see FABRICIUS-HANSEN
(1983), and my remarks in Peeters (1986b:453-455). Further literature on again is given by Dowty (1979:252), whose distinction between an external (i.e. 'repetitive') and an internal (i.e. 'resumptive') reading for this word is terminologically weak.

(37) This viewpoint is shared by Ney (1981:39), who quotes Pizzini's (1972) example John began to study.

(38) A similar sentence, with begin, is considered "strange"; Freed (1. c.:72) marks it with both a question mark and an asterisk.

(39) If the frame is "X began Z-ing", the situation may be different. Cp. Freed (1979) for details, and also Mittwoch (1988:243).

(40) Such statements, by the way, are rather uninformative as far as the difference between begin and start is concerned. The examples provided by Hayakawa & Fletcher are by no means illustrative.

(41) Cp. Mitchell (1979:172), where reference is made to this particular syntactic frame: "Start (cf. the phonoaesthetically related startle) is, unlike begin, associated as a non-auxiliary verb with a component of 'instantaneousness'."

(42) Cp. Parisi/Antinucci (1976:54): "Sentences such as ( . . . ) John started to smoke ( . . . ) mean that there has been a change such that first John did not smoke, and now he smokes".

(43) Fuchs & Leonard (1979:324-325) boldly confirm that start does not normally co-occur with states.

(44) It is remarkable that the "complete" version of [83b] is always fine, irrespective of whether begin or start is used (cp. Freed 1979:85).

(45) In its original context, [89b] stands as a comment next to a photograph. The "full" version (with the verb to go off) appears in the running text.

(46) I wish to make clear that the present analysis is not dealing with the verb start meaning 'to spring or move in a sudden way'. Pace Freed (1979:77), motion is no more than a contextual feature of aspecual start, and not part of its value (cp. Collins 1952:15).

(47) On start and causation, cp. also Mitchell (1979:172-173). Prather (1977:57) distinguishes two meanings for the verb start, viz. 'begin' and 'cause to begin'. Apparently, she also does not see that begin itself has these two meanings as well.

(49) Notice that, unlike DIXON (1976) (cp. p. 75), Freed allows for singular subjects (e.g. someone) as well.

(50) Start also occurs as the verbal head of the phrasal verb start in (which, apparently, is far less common than the other ones). It is not taken into consideration here.

(51) Cp. DIXON (1982b: 1-3) for more terminology, and for a different viewpoint.
CHAPTER FOUR

COMMENCER AND SE METTRE À

IN FRENCH

1. "COMMENCER"

1.1. In recent French linguistics (I refer to work undertaken in the late sixties, the seventies and the eighties) not much was said about the verb commencer that had not been previously said about the verb begin. The fact that particular remarks were made on the latter, only to be repeated later on with reference to the former, is of course no coincidence: it has to do with the fact that most new linguistic frameworks happened to be tested on English data rather than French. On the other hand, it reveals in a crucial way that begin and commencer are closely related, not only in their syntax, but even more in their meaning.

NEF (1980) and GARDIES (1981) not only offer formalized descriptions of the verb commencer, but they also provide a kind of semantic formula which it may be useful to consider more closely. In my own terminology, Nef's formula (1) is in fact a gloss for one specific sentence, viz. the one in [1a]. In the gloss in [1b], Lo refers to the speaker ("locuteur"), and to the time ("temps") of utterance (2).

[1a] Paul commence à écrire un roman.
    'Paul begins to write a novel'
CROIRE ((L₀, Paul écrit un roman à t < t₀)
(L₀, Paul écrit un roman à t₀)) S'ATTENDRE (L₀, Paul écrit un roman à t' > t₀)

Because reference is made to what happened before, happens at, and will happen after the time of utterance (rather than to what was the case before, at, and after the time of commencement), there is no negation in the gloss in [1b]. This is probably the most salient point of departure between Nef's gloss and the begin-formulas proposed by WIERZBICKA (1988a) and by myself (cp. Chapter Three). The claim that CROIRE ["believe"] and S'ATTENDRE ["expect"] are "semantic primitives" (cp. NEF 1980:23) sounds, in contrast, very "Wierzbickian" indeed; the trouble is that they are probably too language-specific to be serious candidates for the status of a primitive as understood by Wierzbicka.

A good point in Nef's gloss is the distinction made between CROIRE and S'ATTENDRE. That distinction (cp. also REQUEDAT 1980:28) is absent from GARDIES's (1981:118) formula in [2].

[2] à t₀ Pierre commence à effer =
1) pendant un certain espace de temps immédiatement antérieur à t₀, Pierre n'effe pas;
2) à t₀ et pendant un certain espace de temps immédiatement postérieur à t₀, Pierre effe.
'at t₀ Peter begins to eff =
1) during a certain lapse of time immediately anterior to t₀, Peter does not eff;
2) at t₀ and during a certain lapse of time immediately posterior to t₀, Peter effs'

The verb effer, coined by Gardies, ends - as all newly created French verbs do - in -er. Its stem derives, as was pointed out earlier (Chapter Three, note 5), from the first letter of the word "function". Good about [2] is that it has
more of a *formule* than of a gloss. Bad points are the non-
distinction between what was the case before and is the case
at *t₀*, on one hand, and *what one thinks* will be the case
after *t₀*, on the other hand (cp. above); and also the use of
a semantically too complex metalanguage (3).

Now, if we pick up all the good things from [1b] and [2],
and if we take into account certain preliminary findings of
Chapter Three (cp. below), we may propose the following
provisional formula for the frame "X commença à Z" (where X
is a subject NP, and Z a verb in the infinitive):

[3] au temps *t*, X commença à Z =
    avant *t*, Z n'avait pas lieu/il n'y avait
    pas de Z
    à *t*, Z.verbait/il y avait Z
    l'on put penser à *t* :
    plus de Z aura lieu après maintenant/
        il y aura plus de Z après maintenant

The formula in [3], written out in a metalanguage based on
the object language to which the verb *commencer* belongs (cp.
Part One, Chapter Two, p.20), calls, as its English
identical counterpart in Chapter Three (p.49), for a few
comments. Basically, however, these comments are the same.
Reference is made to the speaker's intuitions about the
future, rather than to sure facts. In the introductory line,
the noun *temps* ('time') is used rather than the noun *moment*.
X refers to a subject NP, and Z to a verb or to a noun
(deverbal or not). In the formula itself, a direct reference
to the subject X has been avoided in order to have a formula
that also applies to *commencer*-sentences which either carry
an *iterative* meaning, or have a negative subject. Finally,
in the first and second lines of the formula, a French simple
past (or *imparfait*) is used. The value of the latter is
often quite different from the value of an English simple past, but very close to the value of an English past progressive.

So far, no corpus-examples have been given which illustrate the frame "X commença à Z". The examples in [4] do contain instances of that frame, and the formula in [3] applies.

[4a] En bas, l'orchestre commençait à jouer et les dîneurs arrivaient. /VT,127/

'Downstairs, the orchestra began to play and the diners arrived'

[b] Lorsque j'ai enfin trouvé le courage de m'attaquer à mes kilos superflus, j'ai dû admettre que si j'avais commencé à grossir c'était d'abord parce que j'avais perdu ma fierté. /PM,11-03-88/

'And when I finally found the courage to declare war to my superfluous kilograms, I had to admit that if I had begun to put on weight it was first of all because I had lost my pride'

The formula also applies when the second verb is punctual. Punctual verbs do occur after commencer, as they do after begin - pace ROHRER (1976:168), who, without referring to NEWMEYER (1975), "rediscover[s] the so-called selectional restriction that appears to be violated in [5].


'John begins to arrive'

What makes [5] unacceptable is that "one could not think at t : more of Z will happen after now". Up to the present moment, no French MITCHELL (1978) has come forward to argue that a collective or plural subject, or an NP such as Le bébé ['The baby'], turns [5] into an acceptable utterance; that the sentence becomes correct if arriver has a metaphorical interpretation (4), or is completed by an adjunct (5).

Let us look at another punctual verb, viz. naître ['be
born']. The combination commencer à naître sounds fine with a plural subject:

'The babies began to be born in better circumstances'

The plural, observes VERBERT (1979:70), "provoque une interprétation itérative, une itérativité prenant la forme d'une répétition continue du procès" ['provokes an iterative reading, the iterativity taking the shape of a continuously repeated process']. In [6], needless to say, each new birth involves another baby. [7], where naître is used metaphorically, is perfectly acceptable, too.

'Hope began to be born'

Closely related to naître is the verb mourir ['die']: hope, in French, can very well "commencer à mourir", and so can rats, if exposed to poison - but one particular rat cannot, even if it is in agony for hours. Similarly, "commencer à sortir" and "commencer à entrer" ['begin to go out', 'begin to come in'] are impossible with a singular subject, except if the context is that of a stage direction; also in a case such as commencer à sortir d'un rêve ['begin to wake up from a dream']. It is probably true that, as VERBERT (l.c.:71) argues, "la transgression entre rêve et éveil se réalise devant nos yeux comme en slow-motion" ['the transition between dream and waking up occurs in front of our eyes, as in slow motion']; on the other hand, it must also be pointed out that sortir, in this particular case, has a metaphorical meaning. A plural subject is always possible:

112
Les pensionnaires valides commençaient à sortir de la chapelle, et, clopin-clopant, se groupaient de chaque côté du portail.
/LT, 214/
'The fittest patients began to come out of the chapel, and, limping along, gathered at each side of the portal.'

French and English differ with respect to punctual verbs after commencer and begin in just one case (highlighted by VERBERT l.c. : 69-70). Whereas [9a] is definitely anomalous, [9b] is all right:

[9a] *Le bébé commença à naître.
'The baby began to be born'

[9b] Le bébé commençait à naître lorsque, tout à coup, l'accouchement se compliqua.
'The baby began to be born when suddenly the delivery went wrong.'

The example in [9b] is an acceptable utterance, presumably thanks to the presence of the underlined temporal clause. It is noteworthy that a simple AdvP does not have the same effect as an entire clause. [10] remains unacceptable:

'The baby began to be born at 10.15 am.'

The question why [9b] is so much better than either [9a] or [10] is an intriguing one. Unfortunately, I have no answer for it right now, and must leave the problem unsolved.

Equally without referring to PETERSON (1974), NEF (1980:15) signals, by means of the unacceptable string in [11], the existence of a presumed incompatibility between commencer and a stative verb such as savoir ['know'].

'Paul begins to know the answer'

The unacceptability of strings such as [11] is evidence,
neither for the existence of a tendency towards syntagmatic economy (cp. above, p. 54), nor for the existence of a stative constraint (cp. LAMIROY 1987), but for the existence, in the meaning of the verb commencer as used in the frame "X commence à Z", of an invariant constant possibility of change, a component we also found in the meaning of begin as used in the frame "X began to Z". All the utterances in [12] and [13] are acceptable because there is a constant possibility of change:

[12a] De plus en plus de gens commencent à savoir la réponse.
'More and more people begin to know the answer'

[ b ] Paul commence à savoir la plupart des réponses.
'Paul begins to know most of the answers'

[ c ] L'humanité commence à savoir la réponse à tout un éventail de questions.
'Humankind begins to know the answer to an impressive number of questions'

[ d ] Paul commença par savoir une ou deux réponses (maintenant il n'en manque pas une seule).
'Paul began by knowing one or two answers (now, he does not even make a single mistake)'

[13a] (...) Angela commençait à avoir peur que Giuseppe ne s'inquiétât. /MS, 19/
'Angela began to be afraid that Giuseppe would worry'

[ b ] Il commençait à avoir, lui aussi, envie de rire. /LD, 90/
'He also began to feel like laughing'

[ c ] Elle commençait à être lasse, et de l'endroit et de son amant. /YS, 107/
'She began to be tired, of the place and of her lover'

[ d ] Par contre, en 2040 les écarts commencent à être considérables. /PM, 02-10-87/
'On the other hand, in 2040 the gap is beginning to be considerable'

The reaction of native speakers of English towards begin to be-sentences (cp. p. 55) is different from the one of native speakers of French towards sentences containing the
combination *commencer à être*. It is to be assumed (cp. VERBERT 1979:71; HECHMATIC-ASHORI 1984:95) that [13c], for instance, denotes the transition between the state of "- être las" and that of "+ être las". A stative expression is used, but the connotation it has is clearly dynamic. In fact, a *process* is being described in its inherent duration (BLANCHE-BENVENISTE 1974).

From what precedes, it may be inferred that the final main *commencer*-formula will look as follows ([29] in Chapter Three is an exact English counterpart):

[14] au temps t, X commença à Z = avant t, Z n'avait pas lieu/il n'y avait pas de Z à t, Z avait lieu/il y avait Z l'on put penser à t : plus de Z aura lieu après maintenant/ il y aura plus de Z après maintenant l'on ne put pas savoir à t : plus de Z aura lieu après maintenant/ il y aura plus de Z après maintenant

The last component explains why [15a] and [ b] are anomalous - but not why [16], on the other hand, is accepted by at least some native speakers of French (6).

[15a] *Jean commença à être capitaine.
'John began to be a captain'

[ b] *Jean commença à savoir qu'Anne était partie.
'John began to know that Anne had left'

[16] Jean commença à savoir qu'Anne le trompait peu avant de soutenir sa thèse.
'John began to know that Anne was unfaithful to him shortly before defending his thesis.'

[16] is similar to [9b]: it has a supplementary temporal clause which seems to "neutralize" the unacceptability of a "commencer à savoir"-combination with a singular subject. Again, I do not know why [16] should be better than either
[11] or [15b] (7), and must leave this question unanswered.

As the one in Chapter Three, [29], whose exact counterpart it is, the formula in [14] permits the scholar to have a clear idea of the scope of negation, this time with the verb commencer. [17a], for instance, in print and out of context, could be contextualized as in [17b] and [ c] :

[17a] Monsieur Dupont ne commença pas à boire son café.
'Mr Dupont did not begin to drink his coffee'

[ b] Monsieur Dupont ne commença pas à boire son café : avant d'être capable, il avait renversé sa tasse.
'Mr Dupont did not begin to drink his coffee : before being able to do so, he had knocked his cup over'

[ c] Monsieur Dupont ne commença pas à boire son café : sa tasse était déjà à demi vide.
'Mr Dupont did not begin to drink his coffee : his cup was already half empty'

In the first reading (the one in [17b]), both the second and the third line of the formula are being denied : at t, Mr Dupont was not drinking his coffee; nor could one think at t that he would do so afterwards (8). The second reading (cp. [17c]) implies a denial of the first line : even before t, Mr Dupont was already drinking his coffee. VERBERT (1980:19) questions the acceptability of sentences such as [17c]; she overlooks the existence, in French, of an "accent d'insistance" or emphatic stress. The latter gives prominence to the first syllable of a word (e.g. 'com-mença'), and coexists with the "normal" French accent (which affects the last syllable of every rytmical group).

It is clearly not true that negation with commencer always affects the infinitive which follows, rather than the verb commencer itself. On the other hand, pace VERBERT (1980:12),
it is perfectly possible, though not very frequent, to have a
nenegation on the infinitive, but not on commencer (cp.
HECHMATHI-ASHORI 1984:234-235 for details):

[18] Elle commençait à ne plus pouvoir se
defendre contre la contagion de cette ambiance
nenvenimee, ni refouler la colere qui la gagnait.
/LT,59/
'She began not to be able anymore to defend
herself from the contagiousness of that poisoned
ambience, nor to force back the anger that came
over her'

Even a double negation (i.e. a negation on both commencer
and the following verb) is acceptable. Compare the contrast
between [19a] and [ b ]:

[19a] Monsieur Dupont commençà à ne plus boire
du café.
'Mr Dupont began not to drink coffee
anymore'
[ b] Il ne commença pas à ne plus boire du café.
'He did not begin not to drink coffee
anymore'

1.2. So far, we have seen that, on a certain number of
fundamental points, commencer, in its use in the frame "X
commençà à Z", behaves like begin does in the frame "X began
to Z". We are therefore led to the conclusion that commencer
is a literal equivalent for the English begin, at least in
the frame considered. The foregoing remarks and examples
also abundantly demonstrate, I think, that it is impossible
to draw a sharp distinction between states and processes on
the sole basis of their (in)compatibility with aspeetual
verbs. Both states and processes occur with a verb such as
commencer, and the latter does not change its meaning
according to the kind of verb that follows.

Elaborate claims to prove an opposite viewpoint (viz., that
begin has different meanings according to the kind of verb that follows) have only been made in FUCHS & LÉONARD (1979) (9), who implicitly identify begin and commencer, and claim that the latter has different paraphrases with states and with processes (cp. l.c.:325,329-331) (10). [20a], for example, is paraphrasable by means of [20b]. The translations added are those provided by the authors, who appear to assume that they are perfectly acceptable.

[20a] La maison commence à être grande.
'The house is beginning to be large'

[20b] Il commence à être vrai de dire que la maison est grande.
'It is beginning to be true to say that the house is large'

"Il commence à être vrai de dire que" - reducible, so to speak, to a shorter "Il devient vrai de dire que" (cp. ibid.:330) - is said to be one of two prototypical paraphrases for stative expressions. A few seconds of reflexion, however, show that this paraphrase applies in the case of processes as well:

[21a] Et puis, après sa mort, on a commencé à parler de Bataille. /ML,06-87/
'And then, after his death, people began to talk about Bataille'

[21b] Et puis, après sa mort, il est devenu vrai de dire qu'on parle de Bataille.
'And then, after his death, it became true to say that people talk about Bataille'

The other paraphrase for stative verbs is illustrated in [22], [23], [24], and [25]. Again, the translations are those provided by Fuchs & Léonard.

[22a] Jean commence à aimer Marie.
'John is beginning to like Mary'

[22b] Marie devient aimable à Jean.
'Mary is becoming likeable to John'
[23a] Jean commence à détester Paul.
'John is beginning to dislike Paul'

[ b] Paul devient détestable à Jean.
'Paul is becoming dislikeable to John'

[24a] Jean commence à voir le paysage.
'John is beginning to see the view'

[ b] Le paysage devient visible pour Jean.
'The view is becoming visible to John'

[25a] Jean commence à comprendre le problème.
'John is beginning to understand the problem'

[ b] Le problème devient compréhensible à Jean.
'The problem is becoming understandable to John'

[20a] and [ b], and [21a] and [ b], may well be equivalent; the a- and b-sentences in [22] to [25], for sure, are not. "Il est douteux que ces deux phrases aient les mêmes implications et donc que l'une soit la paraphrase de l'autre" ['It is to be doubted that these two paraphrases have the same implications, and hence that the latter is a paraphrase of the former'], observes NEF (1980:14) with regard to [22a] and [ b]; it seems that this critical remark may even be extended to what is said with respect to processes. [26b] is claimed to be a paraphrase of [26a], and the second paraphrase for stative expressions (cp. [26c]) is shown to be unapplicable:

[26a] Les maçons commencent à construire la maison.
'The bricklayers are beginning to build the house'

[ b] Les maçons entreprennent la construction de la maison.
'The bricklayers are undertaking to build the house'

[ c] *La maison devient constructible pour les maçons.
'The house is becoming buildable to the bricklayers'

The trouble is not only that the verb entreprendre occurs with stative expressions as well, forcing, admittedly, a
dynamic interpretation, and the connotation of a hazardous undertaking likely to fail:

[27] Jean entreprend d'aimer Marie (mais elle reste froide comme glace).
'John undertakes to love Mary (but she remains cold as ice).

It also lays too much stress on the subject as agent acting on its own initiative. As a result, a paraphrase containing the verb *entreprendre* is not always available: [28a] is fine (pace NEF 1980:14; cp. pp.111-113), but [28b] is not.

[28a] Les bourgeois commencent à sortir.
'The buds begin to come out'
[ b] *Les bourgeois entreprennent de sortir.*

Clearly, then, Fuchs & Léonard make a number of assumptions - their theoretical framework and initial hypotheses oblige them to do so - which do not stand the test.

1.3. In very much the same way as *begin* and *start*, *commencer* has a number n of syntactic frames, and a number n' (with n' < n) of semantic formulas. A first formula was proposed in [14], and was said to correspond to the frame "X commença à Z". In fact, it corresponds, as will soon become clear, to some other frames as well - but not to all of them. The situation is identical to the one in English, where the main *begin*- and *start*-formulas correspond in a similar way to several different frames (11). Although much of what was said before, with regard to *begin*, remains valid here, there are differences between English and French. These will receive a fair amount of attention, whilst the basic common points will be repeated in brief. Basically, we shall
proceed as in Chapter Three: the construction "X commença Y" will be described in 1.4., and the construction "X commença" in 1.5.; the frames "X commença de Z" and "X commença par Z" will be considered hereafter.

The distinction between commencer à and commencer de, both followed by an infinitive, is as intriguing as the one between a TO- and an ING-construction after begin (12). However, as in the case of begin, the use of one construction rather than the other does not affect the meaning of the aspectual verb at all. The formula in [14] applies to the examples in [29] just as it would apply to the corresponding "commencer à"-sentences (which I do not quote in full).

[29a] Elle commença par exemple de me réciter des vers. /CP,51/
'She began for instance, to my intention, reciting poetry'

[ b] A l'instar des épouses de Mikhaïl Gorbachev et de Nicolaï Ryjkov, Nanuli Chevardnadzé a commencé à son tour d’accompagner son mari, le ministre soviétique des Affaires étrangères, lors de ses déplacements hors frontières. /P,15-02-88/
'Following the example of G's and R's spouses, C has now also begun accompanying her husband, the Soviet secretary of foreign affairs, on his journeys across the borders'

It is not unintentionally that I have chosen to translate commencer de by means of begin followed by an ING-construction. I suspect (notably on the basis of the fact that, as we shall see in Chapters Seven and Eight, cessation verbs usually take only ING-constructions in English and are followed by de in French) that the two constructions are closely related - although they are certainly not identical in meaning (13).

If reference is made, not to the beginning of a process or
a state (in which case *commencer à* or *de* must be used), but to the first process or state in a series, the construction to be chosen is *commencer par* (14). The frames "X commença par Z" and "X began by Z-ing" are equivalent. Both imply that one process is *completed* or that one state *no longer exists* when another takes over. Consider [30] and [b]:

[30a] La nature ne fait pas autrement, d'ailleurs, et je connais des gens qui, pour casser une noisette, ont commencé par se briser une molaire. /CP,43/

'Nature, besides, does not act differently, and I know people who, intending to crack a hazel nut, began by breaking one of their molars'

[b] Je commençai par faire descendre l'écriteau que l'on voyait de loin, sur le boulevard Pereire. /CP,145/

'I began by having the firm name removed which could be seen from far, on the boulevard Pereire'

As a formula, [31] may be proposed (a literal translation of [38] in Chapter Three):

[31] au temps t, X commença par Z =
avant t, Z n'avait pas lieu/il n'y avait pas de Z
à t, avant toutes autres choses, Z avait lieu/il y avait Z
l'on put penser alors :
autre chose aura lieu/il y aura autre chose à t, après maintenant
l'on ne put pas savoir alors :
autre chose aura lieu/il y aura autre chose à t, après maintenant

When DUBOIS (1961:33) writes that *commencer à* is used for "une action qui commence à se réaliser" ['a process which begins to occur'], he fails to explain what *commencer à* really means - for he uses the verb again in his explication; moreover, he does not take sentences with stative verbs into account. When he adds that *commencer par* is used for "une action qui commence à se réaliser avant une autre" ['a process
which begins to occur before another one'), he relapses, and makes a third mistake. Consider the sentences in [32].

[32a] Jean commença à boire un verre, puis il alla se coucher.
    'John began to drink a glass of beer, then he went to sleep'
[  b] Jean commença par boire un verre, puis il alla se coucher.
    'John began by drinking a glass of beer, then he went to sleep'

Of these two utterances, [32a] is the one which expresses 'une action qui commence à se réaliser avant une autre'; yet, à is used as a connector, not par. [32a] implies that John took only one or two draughts, and then went to sleep, leaving the rest of his glass untouched; [32b] implies that, before going to bed, John finished his drink.

"In der Tat impliziert ja Jean a commencé par boire un verre und Jean n'a pas commencé par boire un verre, dass noch weitere Handlungen folgen" ['It is implied in both Jean a commencé par boire un verre and Jean n'a pas commencé par boire un verre that more actions will follow']. This claim, by ROHRER (1976:169), is correct if and only if the negation, although it goes with commencer, affects the VP boire un verre. Compare, in this respect, sentences [33a] and [33b].

[33a] Jean n'a pas commencé par boire un verre,
    il a commencé par boire un café.
    'John did not begin by drinking a glass of beer, he began by drinking a cup of coffee'
[  b] Jean n'a pas commencé par boire un verre,
    il a fini par en boire un.
    '...he ended up drinking one'

With regard to the scope of negation, commencer par behaves rather like commencer à (cp. pp.116-117). More than one interpretation is available, and in each case the negation
carries on different parts of the formula.

1.4. Direct object constructions such as the ones in [34] are to be completed by means of a second verb (cp. [34a] and [34b]), or to be rephrased (cp. [34c], where the head of the direct object is morphologically related to a verb). In all cases, the second, i.e. non-aspectual, verb suggests itself to the addressee through a natural pairing based on an interpretation of the context. The formula in [14] applies.

[34a] Ils s'étaient connus à Paris, jadis, alors qu'ils commençaient l'un et l'autre leur médecine. /LT,193/
'They had known one another in Paris, a long time ago, when they both began their studies at the medical school'

[34b] Il lit à sa façon. Il commence plusieurs livres à la fois, essentiellement des ouvrages d'histoire ou des biographies. /P,15-02-88/
'He reads in his own way. He begins several books at the same time, essentially history books or biographies'

[34c] Laval est à Berchtesgaden en conversation avec Hitler quand Abetz lui apprend, à 4 heures du matin, que la Wehrmacht a commencé l'invasion de la zone libre. /ML,06-87/
'Laval is in Berchtesgaden in conversation with Hitler when Abetz informs him, at 4 am, that the Wehrmacht has started the invasion of the free zone'

The verbs to be supplied – HECHMATHI-ASHORI (1984:100-107) calls them "appropriate verbs" (15) – are faire (as in faire sa médecine ['study to be a doctor']), lire ['read'], and envahir ['invade']. Faire and lire were left unexpressed (POTTIER 1974:176), and have to be reconstructed (VERBERT 1979:68 = 1980:5) (16). In [34c], on the other hand, the object invasion itself calls to mind the verb envahir ['invade']; notice however that, as in the case of begin, the mere presence of a deverbal noun is not a sufficient reason
for a natural pairing with the verb that is morphologically related to that noun (cp. VERBERT 1979:66-67 = 1980:17). 

Opérer, for instance, cannot be the verb understood in [35], whereas entreprendre ['undertake'] is fine.

/PM,02-10-87/
'The guys are beginning the operations of filling the tanks of the third stage: liquid oxygen and hydrogen'

According to BUSSE (1974:154), addressees proceed from [36a], which is "metonymisch", over [36b], to [36c]:

[36a] Il commence plusieurs livres à la fois.  
'He begins several books at the same time'
[ b] Il commence la lecture de plusieurs livres à la fois.  
'He begins the reading of several books at the same time'
[ c] Il commence à lire plusieurs livres à la fois.  
'He begins to read several books at the same time'

An example such as [37], however, shows that Busse's reconstruction of the process of interpretation is incorrect.

[37] Vous ne maigrirez jamais si vous ne commencez pas un régime.  /PM,11-03-88/
'You will never lose weight unless you begin a diet'

There is no deverbal noun which can at a later stage be reduced to the verb suivre (as in suivre un régime ['follow a diet']). Besides, with direct speech (where the verb dire ['say'] has to be supplied), Busse's hypothesis becomes even more unlikely:

[38a] - Je vous ai dit, commençaï-je, qu'il nous fallait, en ce qui vous concerne, distinguer
deux problèmes et les considérer séparément.
/CP, 130/
'I told you, I began, that we had, with regard to your case, to distinguish two problems and to consider them separately'

[38b]  Ma chère Margaret, commença-t-il, si vous admettez...  /YS, 204/
'My dear Margaret, he began, if you admit...'

It was observed in Chapter Three that English has a causative direct object frame (cp. pp. 70-72), and also a kind of prepositional commencer-construction (cp. pp. 72-74). French has neither one (17). A string such as [39] is rejected by native speakers, and an example like [55] in Chapter Three is untranslatable on a word-for-word basis.

'The president began the meeting'

On the other hand, there is one particular French direct object frame involving the verb commencer, which does not exist in English. Consider the examples in [40a] to [c]:

[40a]  Un long monologue commence la pièce.  
/BLINKENBERG 1960:119/
'A long monologue begins the drama'

[ b]  Le rapport du trésorier commença la séance.  
'The report by the treasurer began the meeting'

[ c]  Il me semblait (...) que cette soirée commençait une ère, resterait comme une triste date.  /CS, 38/
'It seemed to me that this evening began an era, would remain upright as a sad date'

The literal translations in [40a] to [c] struck my English informants as unacceptable. French informants insisted that the examples in [40] are fine, but do sound "old" (an impression confirmed by the fact that my only corpus-example, i.e. [40c], is from a novel first published in 1913). It must be clear that, in [40b] for instance,
neither the report nor the meeting can be said to begin to undertake any action; the report does not even begin, for presumably it is read in full. BLANCHE-BENVENISTE's (1974) suggestion to "reconstruct" a deverbal noun is of no help whatsoever (cp. note 14). Even the reading of the report does not begin to do anything at all, neither does it begin "tout court": it is completed at the start of the meeting. The meeting, as a matter of fact, may be considered as beginning. But that is not what the sentence is about. [40b] is used not to inform the addressee that the meeting began; it is meant as an indication of how it began (viz., with the report by the treasurer). [40b] is therefore to be understood as in [41] (18):

[41] La séance commença par (or : avec) le rapport du trésorier.
    'The meeting began with the treasurer's report'

The formula which explicates the meaning of commencer in the frame exemplified in [41] will be proposed below.

1.5. Examples for the first of the two frames which must be distinguished within the construction "X commença" (they are, as we shall see, the same as those that were distinguished within the construction "X began") are gathered in [42].

[42a] Joëlle commença comme infirmière il y a deux ans.
    'Joëlle began as a nurse two years ago'

[ b ] Qui parlerait le premier ? Quelqu'un suggère de s'en tenir à l'ordre alphabétique. C'est donc Raymond Barre qui commencera. /PM, 06-05-88/ 
    'Who would speak first? Somebody suggests to respect the alphabetical order. Hence, Raymond Barre is the one who will begin'
Improving upon the accounts provided by DIETRICH (1973) and DOMINICY (1977), we may say that [42a], [42b] and [42c] would be or were produced on the understanding that the addressee is able to realize a natural pairing with a second verb (i.e. *travailler* ['work'], *parler* ['speak'], and *tomber* ['fall']). The last part of [42b] would remain uninterpretable without the support of a larger context (19). On the other hand, because Mantha & Mel'čuk do not consider aspectual verbs as "verbs about verbs" (cp. Part One, Chapter Two, pp.35-37), they are obliged to reinterpret the subject of [42c] (20). Their example would be equivalent to [43]:

[43] La chute de neige a commencé à trois heures.
'The snowfall began at three o'clock'

[43] is no longer an instance of frame number one: it exemplifies, as a matter of fact, the second frame within the construction "X commence", i.e. the one which requires a formula based on the semantic primitive 'part' (cp. below). The Mantha/Mel'čuk analysis will not be adopted here, not only to avoid unnecessary discrepancies between the descriptions in Chapters Three and Four, but also because Mantha & Mel'čuk themselves openly recognize that their reinterpretation is not unproblematical. The main *commencer*-formula in [14] applies to all the examples in [42]. Instances of frame number one usually have an animate subject, although that is not necessarily the case (cp., for a counter-example, [42c]). The examples in [44] have an animate subject as well:
Le voyageur commença par une visite à l'église.
'The tourist began with a visit to the church'

Le voyageur commença par l'église.
'The tourist began with the church'

According to HECMATHI-ASHORI (1984:119-123), both [44a] and [b] should be understood as in [45] (an instance of the frame "X commença par Z"; cp., for details, pp.122-124).

Le voyageur commença par visiter l'église.
'The tourist began by visiting the church'

The supporter of this simplistic account overlooks the fact that "par + noun" and "par + infinitive" are not always related. This is indirectly confirmed by the fact that the former is replaceable with avec (HECMATHI-ASHORI 1984:117), and translatable by means of with, whereas the latter is not. Unlike [44a] and [45], [44b] and [45] may have different implications, even if the tourist in [44b] does what tourists do by definition: viz., see places (21). In a context of people visiting places, [44b] necessarily implies that the tourist was to go on visiting other places of interest. [44a] and [45] could imply exactly the same thing, but they are in fact non-committal with regard to the kind of activity undertaken by the tourist after the visit to the church. In fact, the only implication in [44a] and in [45] is that the tourist went on doing something else (not compulsorily visiting interesting places). Compare:

*Le voyageur commença par l'église; ensuite il s'en alla vers son hôtel et ne sortit plus.  
'...then he returned to his hotel and stayed in’

Le voyageur commença par visiter l'église/par une visite à l'église; ensuite il s'en alla vers son hôtel et ne sortit plus.
[45] could represent a step in the interpretation by addressees of [44a], though it could not represent a step in the interpretation of [44b]. Apparently, an analysis of the latter could take into account a not unattractive suggestion made by Hachmi Ashori: viz., that a construction such as commença par l'église is also equivalent to a slightly longer commença sa visite par l'église ['began his visit with the church'] (22). Ça visite would appear as the result of a natural pairing—there is no reason to believe that natural pairings should by definition be restricted to verbs (23). It seems more reasonable, however, to say that addressees simply supply a second verb (or rather VP) visiter la ville (or le village) ['visit the town/the village']. Both [44a] and [ ] are instances of the first frame within the construction "X commença", and the formula in [14] applies. The formula applies to all of the following as well:

[47a] - Nous commençons par un bordeaux blanc !
   Ensuite, château-pâtrus ! Ça va ? /8C,115/
   'We begin with a white bordeaux! Then,
   château-pâtrus! OK?'
[b] - Et toi ? interrompit Kurt, commençons par
   le plus important. Où en est ta pièce ?
   /LD,70/
   'What about you? Kurt interrupted, let's
   begin with the main thing. How's your drama
   going?'
[c] - Mille pardons, dit-il. Je m'appelle
   Cyril Doublestreet. J'aurais dû commencer
   par là. /MS,97/
   'A thousand excuses, he said. My name is
   Cyril Doublestreet. That is what I should
   have begun with'.

The first example nicely illustrates that, if no deverbal noun is present (as in [44b]), the implication is that the subject goes on with activities (or at least one activity, i.e. drinking) similar to the one performed first. In [47b]
and [ c], **commencer par** is followed by an **adjective** (used in the superlative) resp. an **adverb**. Both, however, assume the function of a genuine NP, viz. *la chose la plus importante* ['the most important thing'] (in [47b]), and *ce détail-là* ['that particular detail'] (in [47c]).

Up to this point, only frame number one was taken into consideration, i.e. the one which is elliptical (or at least "pseudo-elliptical", in case a verb is to be supplied but cannot be inserted). If the **subject** of an "X commença"-sentence is **inanimate**, there is a reasonable chance that that sentence exemplifies **frame number two**, i.e. the **absolute "X commence"-frame**. Consider the utterances in [48].

[48a] A Calgary, où les jeux Olympiques d'hiver viennent de commencer, entraîneurs, météorologues et techniciens du ski auront peut-être plus d'importance que jamais. /P,15-02-88/

'In Calgary, where the Winter Olympics have just begun, trainers, meteorologists and ski technicians will perhaps be more important than ever before'

[ b] La scène s'éclaire, le rideau s'écarte, le parquet disparaît, un escalier surgit peuplé de danseuses... La revue *Dans notre miroir commence (...)*. /BC,37/

'The stage is being lit up, the curtain drawn, the floor boards disappear, a flight of stairs rises crowded with dancing girls... The musical "In our mirror" begins'

[ c] Une nouvelle vie aurait pu commencer à partir de cette nuit-là. /VT,166/

'A new life could have begun from that night onwards'

No meaningful second (active) verb can be supplied to any of the sentences in [48] (cp. **begin**). It could be argued that the **Winter Olympics** in [48a] "commencent à avoir lieu" ['begin to take place'] - but **avoir lieu** is not very informative as a verb : it belongs (with **être** ['be'] and **exister** ['exist']) to the set of existential verbs which, as

131
we saw in Chapter Three (p.75), Newmeyer would like to append
to absolute *begin*-sentences with a time-bound subject.

What about sentences with a subject which has first of all
boundaries in *space*? *Commencer* is similar to *begin* in that
it can appear in an absolute frame and refer to either type
of boundaries – time or space. Examples where reference is
made to boundaries in space are given in [49a] and [b].

[49a] Au-delà de la rivière commence une série de
maisons caduques.
'At the other side of the river begins a
series of decaying houses'

[ b] Un pré, coupé d'arbustes, dévale vers une
gorge boisée, au delà de laquelle commencent
des bois, qui bornent l'horizon. /LT.180/
'A grassland, cut up by bushes, slopes down
towards a wooded gorge, beyond which woods
begin that mark the horizon'

BUSSE (1974:154) argues (24) that [49a] (his example,
slightly adapted) is *elliptical*, and that the verb *être* has
to be added in the course of interpretation. At the same
time, he is ready to envisage (ibid.:155) the possibility of
a "more complex" interpretation in the case of a sentence
such as [50] (where reference is to boundaries in time):

[50] La séance commence.
'The session begins'

Unfortunately, Busse does not tell us which "more complex
interpretation" he has in mind. In fact, it is quite
irrelevant (as in the case of *begin*) whether reference is
made to boundaries in time or to boundaries in space: once
again, no *informative* second (active) verb can be supplied.

It would be possible to identify, through a study of the
context, the *agents* hidden behind the events or developments
described in [48a] to [c]: it is clear that, in [48c] for
instance, *someone* could have begun, i.e. begun to live, a new life. Such rephrasings, however, are not always possible, especially if there is (or there seems to be) no agent. A case where this is particularly clear is given in [51].

[51] Les ennuis de la prostate peuvent commencer à 40 ans, mais ils sont plus fréquents vers 50. /PM.06-05-88/ 'Prostate troubles may begin at the age of 40, but they are more frequent towards 50'

Obviously, where no events or developments are described (as in [49a] and [ b], where the subject has boundaries in space), it is equally impossible to identify an agent and to propose a rephrasing. Finally, rephrasings are excluded in cases where the agent is in reality a "causer" : a causative direct object frame, as we have seen (p.126), does not exist. Quite understandably, then, I am not very pleased with ROTHEMBERG's (1974:130-132) definition of reversible verbs (Fr. "verbes à renversement"; *commencer* is a relevant example) as verbs which can be used either "transitively" or "intransitively", but in such a way that the relation between a transitive and a corresponding intransitive sentence "peut être considérée comme une relation de causalité" ['can be considered as a relation of causality'; emphasis added] (25). [52a] is not an instance of a causative frame, although its NP *le professeur* is definitely the agent who is responsible for the development described in [52b].

[52a] Le professeur commence la leçon. 'The teacher begins the lesson'
[ b] La leçon commence. 'The lesson begins'

Misunderstandings regarding the status of particular
sentences are likely to arise; they could have been avoided if the relation between utterances such as [52a] and [ b] had been called "une relation d'agentivité" ['a relation of agentivity'].

[52b] is undeniably an acceptable utterance. [53a] and [ b] are not acceptable at all:

[53a] *Une cigarette commença.
   'A cigarette began'
[ b] *Le verre de champagne commença.
   'The glass of champagne began'

English and French are marked by similar restrictions on the choice of subject in an absolute commencer-frame. BLANCHE-BENVENISTE (1974) observes that subjects in this particular frame must be compatible with ideas such as "progression" ['progress'], "déroulement" ['development'], "durée" ['duration'], "extension" ['extension'], "trait" ['route'], and a few others. Such a statement is correct, but it is quite cumbersome. Incorrect is the claim that the nouns progression and déroulement are systematically allowed to appear in pre-subject position, i.e. to increase the volume of the subject and to change its head (26). All of the following a-sentences are correct, but the b-sentences are definitely extremely strange (strange enough, anyway, to be marked with an asterisk) (27).

[54a] A partir de 1880, le grand massacre commence.
     /PM,11-03-88/
     'From 1880 onwards, the genocide begins'
[ b] *A partir de 1880, le déroulement du grand massacre commence.

    /PM,02-10-87/
    'At 1 am begins the return flight'
[ b] *A une heure du matin commence la progression du vol de retour.
[56a] En France, les déportations commencent.
/ML, 06-87/
'In France, the deportations begin'
[ b] *En France, le déroulement/la progression
des déportations commence.

The same author (Blanche-Benveniste) makes another sweeping
statement: she argues that pluralization of singular
subjects which are incompatible with the idea of development
or progress (as in [53a] and [ b]) restores acceptability.
It is not hard to see that this is not correct: [57a] and
[ b] are by no means better than the strings in [53].

[57a] *Des cigarettes commencèrent.
[ b] *Les verres de champagne commencèrent.

As in the case of absolute begin, in order to account for
the anomaly of [53a/b] and [57a/b], we need the idea that the
parts of which the subject's referent consists can be thought
of as being one after the other. [58] is a literal
translation of the begin-formula in Chapter Three, p. 78.

[58] X commença =
l'on peut penser à X comme à qch qui a des
parties
l'on peut penser à ces parties comme à des
parties qui sont les unes après les
autres
je pense à une partie de X
il n'y a pas de parties avant cette partie

I am not the first one to talk about commencer in terms of
"first part" (or, more explicitly, "part before which there
are no other parts"). VERBERT (1985:198) examines the
difference between [59a] and [ b]:

[59a] Le pull rouge commence à déteindre sur la
jupe.
'The red pullover begins to come off on the
dress'
Le pull rouge commence sur la jupe.
'The red pull begins on the dress'

The second utterance is slightly strange (probably because it is difficult to think of the parts of a pullover, as of the parts of a cigarette or the parts of a champagne glass, as being one after the other), but could be paraphrased, according to Verbert, as in [60].

La première partie du pull rouge se situe à tel endroit, c'est-à-dire sur la jupe.
'The first part of the red pullover is at that particular spot, that is, on the dress'

More importantly, Verbert claims that [59b] is **not elliptical** : a quite uncommon viewpoint in the literature on French aspectual verbs.

1.6. As with begin and start, the description would be incomplete (28) without a table summarizing the various frames, and the formula devised for each.

**Table One**

(a) X commença à Z  [14]
(b) X commença de Z  [14]
(c) X commença par Z  [31]
(d) X commença Y  [14]
(e) X commença Y (= Y commença par X)  [58]
(f) X commença (elliptical)  [14]
(g) X commença (absolute)  [58]

Number of frames : 7
Number of formulas : 3
Number of formulas referring to a second verb : 2

A comparison with Tables One and Two in Chapter Three shows that six out of the seven different commencer-frames (i.e. all frames except frame (e)) have an English counterpart with the verbs begin and start. On the other hand, such a
comparison reveals that begin has two and start even three frames which have no equivalent with the verb commencer (for begin and start, a causative direct object frame and a "prepositional" on-frame; for start only, a frame "X started Y Z-ing"). We are therefore entitled to draw the conclusion that, from the point of view of its value, commencer has more in common with begin than with start.

2. "COMMENCER" ET "SE METTRE À" COMPARED

2.1. The idea that there is a semantic difference between commencer and se mettre à is of course not new. However, both verbs are in a situation similar to that encountered in the case of the verbs begin and start: an extremely widespread viewpoint seems to be that commencer and se mettre à are just synonyms, i.e., in axiological terms, that their values are not really different. A fairly recent dictionary of synonyms (GENOUVRIER e.a. 1977:264) indicates no distinction at all. According to BAUSCH (1963:263-268), commencer and se mettre à denote a "Beginn der Handlung", an "Aktionsbeginn", an "Eintritt des Geschehnisses", or "die Anfangsphase". Anfangsphase is equivalent to 'initial phase', whereas the three other phrases can be translated as 'beginning of an action or a process'. REQUEDAT (1980:105) uses the phrase "début du process" ['beginning of the process']. Both Bausch and Réquédat disregard states (cp., for Bausch, note 14). Writers such as HENRICHSEN (1967:54), SCHOGT (1968:9), CORBEIL (1969:29) and MARTIN (1971:53), finally, describe commencer and se mettre à in terms of
"inchoation": both verbs express inchoation, they are inchoative verbs, or they render the inchoative aspect.

Implicit in FUCHS & LEONARD (1979), who hold the view that commencer and se mettre à are "des bornes spécificateurs de gauche" ['marks specifying left hand side limits'] (29), is the idea that the difference between the two verbs (a difference on which they do not comment) is similar to the difference (on which they do not comment either) between begin and start. Fuchs & Léonard translate all their examples with commencer into sentences with begin (cp. note 10), and their examples containing se mettre à into sentences with start; they seem to assume that the best translation of commencer is begin, and that the best translation of se mettre à is start. That, however, is a wrong assumption.

Unlike start, se mettre à does not enter into any construction with a direct object and a second verb, in that order (cp. "X started Y Z-ing"). This is due to the compulsory presence of a reflexive pronoun se, which itself assumes the function of a direct object. [61a] and [ b] are fine, but [61c] (where another direct object has been added) and [61d] (where the pronoun se has been replaced with the other object) are unacceptable (30).

[61a] Le professeur s’est mis à chanter.
   'The teacher began to sing'
[ b] Les étudiants se sont mis à chanter.
   'The students began to sing'
[ c] *Le professeur s’est mis ses étudiants à chanter.
   'The teacher started his students singing'
[ d] *Le professeur a mis ses étudiants à chanter.
   'The teacher started his students singing'

On the other hand, it might seem that se mettre à possesses an unexpectedness-component: COSEIUI (1976:104) does not
hesitate to claim that se mettre à contributes to the expression of "der Geschwindigkeit oder der 'Plötzlichkeit' der Verbalhandlung" ['the swiftness or 'suddenness' of the action expressed by the (sc. second) verb']. Examples where our verb occurs with adverbs such as brusquement, aussitôt etc. can easily be found.

[62a]  - Il n'est jamais trop tard, dit-il bâtement et, à sa propre stupeur, il se mit brusquement à rougir. /YS,17/
  "It's never too late", he said foolishly and, to his own amazement, he suddenly began to blush'
[ b ]  Il me posa cette question avec lassitude et se mit aussitôt à bâiller. /BC,104/
  'He asked me that question with weariness and immediately began to yawn'
[ c ]  Ils se considérèrent ainsi une bonne minute et se mirent à parler tout à coup ensemble. /MS,149/
  'They watched one another like that for a bit more than a minute and suddenly began to talk simultaneously'
[ d ]  On tournait en plein air cet après-midi et lorsqu'il se mit à plevoir subitement et à seaux, chacun courut chercher refuge dans les cafés ou les maisons avoisinantes. /LD,156/
  'They were filming in the open air that afternoon and when it suddenly began to rain cats and dogs, they all ran for shelter in the neighbouring cafés or houses'

In [63a], however, se mettre à occurs with the adverb lentement ['slowly']. [63a] is to be contrasted with [63b], taken from the same source. The French sentences are published (but free) translations of the English text added between single quotation marks.

[63a]  Lentement, elle se mit à ôter les bijoux. 'Slowly, she began to take everything off again' /M,31/
[ b ]  Il se mit à marcher, rapidement, les mains enfoncées dans les poches de son manteau. 'He began to walk, fast, hands dug in his coat pockets' /M,40/
Both (62a) to (d) and (63a) are equally natural — and that is a strong (although possibly not entirely convincing) argument against the claim that the adverb lentement could be an overt mark (cp. Part One, Chapter Two, pp.21-26) overriding the unexpectedness-component of the verb se mettre à. Another argument against that same claim is that, if the adverb brusquement is lifted out of (62a), the unexpectedness-reading is no longer the only possible one: there is a clear semantic difference between il se mit à rougir and il se mit brusquement à rougir, to such an extent that only the latter, but not the former, is necessarily equivalent to the English he started to blush. It must therefore be clear that start and se mettre à are different. The question must be raised: how does se mettre à differ from commencer?

2.2. There is, as far as I know, no serious contrastive analysis of the verbs commencer and se mettre à in the published literature so far. Henri BENAC’s (1956) dictionary of synonyms, which remains a standard work of reference, holds the view that commencer implies duration, whereas se mettre à means “commencer à accomplir une action sans idée de durée” ['begin to accomplish an action without an idea of duration']. Let us replace, in Bénac’s example (reproduced in [64a]), se mettre à with commencer (as in [64b]): can we say that suddenly there is an idea of duration? No evidence whatsoever is provided for such a claim. Notice, by the way, that Bénac’s example might be misleading in that it has a stative expression, in which case it is indeed difficult (but surely not impossible) to think of duration at all.
La déesse se mit à être ridicule.
La déesse commença à être ridicule.
'The goddess began to be ridiculous'

In unpublished sources, the only comparison that was available to the present author is the one undertaken by HECHMATIC-ASHORI (1984). Hechmati does acknowledge the existence of differences between commencer and se mettre à, but she adds that they are not a matter of semantics, but of syntax: there are no de- or par-constructions with the latter (cp. section 3.), and the constructions which do exist are syntactically and semantically identical (!) to the commencer-frames with either an infinitive or a direct object (l.c.:128). Semantically speaking (ibid.:58), both commencer and se mettre à "expriment la phase initiale d'un procès" ['express the initial phase of a process']. This is a statement which does not add anything new to what had been claimed in earlier published work, either in everyday language or in technical jargon (cp. pp.137-138).

LAMIROY (1987:281) observes that, with se mettre à, inanimate subjects (as opposed to animate subjects, i.e. human beings, animals and plants) are often not allowed. This could possibly be a good starting point for the search of differences between se mettre à and commencer. The strings in [65a] and [ b ] are taken from Lamiroy and from Fuchs & Léonard respectively; the one in [65c] is new.

[Cette situation se met à embêter Marie.
'That situation begins to bother Mary'
La maison se met à être grande.
'The house begins to be large'
L'armoire se mit à être poussiéreuse.
'The cupboard began to be dusty'

As a matter of fact, the correlation between anomaly with
se mettre à and inanimacy of subjects is far from strict.
The following, where the subject is either animate or refers
to living organisms such as plants, are by no means better
than the strings in [65]:

[66a]  *Jean se met à être capitaine.
  /LAMIROY 1987:293/
  'John begins to be a captain'
[ b]  *Le chien de nos voisins se mit à être sourd.
  'Our neighbours' dog began to be deaf'
[ c]  *Les fleurs se mirent à être agréables à voir.
  'The flowers began to be nice to watch'

The unacceptability of [66a] and [ b] could be explained
in terms of the absence of a constant possibility of change.
The same account would be possible in the case of [65b], but
not in the case of [65a] or [ c], and not in the case of
[66c] either. Notice, however, that all the strings in [65]
and in [66] have, as their second verb, a stative expression.
Actually, FUCHS & LEONARD (1979:325) ascribe the anomaly of
their example (our [65b]) to the fact that the second verb is
a stative one. In general, it seems that se mettre à can
only be used if the second verb refers to a process (rather
than to a state). The virtuoso in [67a], the horses in
[67b], the chimney in [67c] and the snow in [67d] all have
one particular feature in common: they do something.

[67a]  Lorsque Kochanski et Artur Rubinstein décident de fuir la Russie des soviets, c'est
au violon, sur lequel le virtuose se met à jouer des hymnes révolutionnaires pour amadouer
les gardes-frontière, que les deux amis doivent de franchir sains et saufs les barrages de
police. /P.15-02-88/
  'When K and AR decide to escape from Soviet
Russia, it is to the violin, on which the
virtuoso begins to play revolutionary hymns
in order to soften the frontier guards, that
the two friends owe a safe and sound crossing
of the police barriers'
Il voulait ajouter quelque chose, respira profondément, mais se tut : les chevaux s'étaient mis à trotter, et les secousses lui coupaient le souffle. /LT,216/

'He wanted to add something, took a deep breath, but kept quiet: the horses had begun to trot, and the jolts took his breath away'

La cheminée se mit à fumer.

'The chimney began to smoke'

Les jours passaient autour de lui, les yeux s'allumaient de plaisir anticipé, et la neige se mit gaiement à tomber. /YS,162/

'The days passed around him, the eyes lit up with anticipated pleasure, and the snow began merrily to fall'

It might seem that acceptability depends on the existence of a particular relation between subject and second verb. A virtuoso, in French as in English, is in the first place a musician, and playing is the kind of activity that musicians undertake when they perform their professional activity.

Similarly, horses have a certain number of ways in which they can possibly move forward — and trotting is one of them. Finally, speakers and addressees associate a chimney with smoke, and snow with a downward movement. There is no relation of a similar sort, however, in either one of the strings in [65] and in [66]. Reconsider, for instance, [65a] to [ c], where the subjects are inanimate. A situation is not normally viewed as causing embarrassment, nor is a house supposed to be big. A cupboard is not inevitably linked with the presence of dust either.

The preceding argument is not generally valid: the utterances in [68] are perfectly acceptable, in spite of the fact that there is no special relation whatsoever between subject and second verb.

Le trajet était très bref et, comme je ne disais rien, mon compagnon se mit à chanterner. /CP,105/

143
'The journey was very short and, as I did not say anything, my partner began to hum'

[68b] C'est alors que les nerfs d'acier du célèbre banquier craquèrent, qu'il se mit à ravager le salon à coups de pied en hurlant qu'elle l'avait épousé uniquement pour son argent (...). /YS,73/

'It is then that the iron nerves of the banker cracked, that he began to ruin the drawing-room with his feet, shouting that she had married him for his money only'

[ c] Nous décidâmes de faire repeindre les volets qui, désespérés, s'étaient mis à pendre, de blais, aux fenêtres, comme des bannières. /YS,119/

'We decided to have the shutters repainted, those shutters which, desperately, had begun to hang obliquely at the windows, like banners'

[ d] Resté seul à la maison, Michel se résolut à regarder la télévision. Il venait de voir le journal lorsqu'il eut un sursaut : derrière lui, le vieux plancher s'était mis à craquer.

'Left alone at home, Michael decided to watch TV. He had just seen the news when he suddenly started from his chair: behind him, the old wooden floor had begun to crack'

As important as the existence of a do-component, and far more important than the existence of a special relationship between subject and second verb, is the existence, in the invariant part of the meaning of se mettre à, i.e. in its value, of a component of personal involvement. That component explains why se mettre à scores low in scientific texts and in newspaper reports (cp. ROY 1976:284). In fact, by using the verb se mettre à rather than the verb commencer, the speaker wants to make clear that the occurrence of the event denoted by the second verb must not leave the addressee unimpressed, but must be a source of, say, joy or worries. [68d], for instance, sounds all right in a horror story in which innocent people suddenly have to face the trauma of living in a haunted house. Consider also [69a] and [ b] :
[69a] Et alors il s'est mis à gueuler, not'adjutant, comme si nous étions tous sourds comme des pots. 'And then he began to shout, our adjutant, as if all of us were as deaf as posts.'

[69b] Vers 15 h, le soleil s'est mis à briller. 'At about 3 pm, the sun began to shine.'

[69a] would be very natural when uttered by a soldier who begs the addressee's compassion about the fact that his well-deserved lunch-break was abruptly ended by the yelling of his superior. [69b] would be strange in the bulletin of a meteorologist, who is supposed to give an objective account of the weather details; but if that same meteorologist, out of the reach of microphones or television cameras, tells a friend that, in spite of heavy rain over the weekend, his usual stroll with wife and children on Sunday afternoon was a success, he might well use the verb se mettre à, in order to let his friend share his delight about the unexpected breakthrough of the sun. Conclusion: personal involvement is, together with a do-component, a recurrent feature in the value of the verb se mettre à — with inanimate and with animate subjects. Commencer, on the other hand, is unmarked as far as these two components are concerned.

3. "SE METTRE À"

3.1. Native speakers of English, when confronted with the verb form start, immediately think of an aspeccual verb, not of the "plain verb" implying a sudden (startled) movement. Native speakers of French, when confronted with the verb form mettre, do not think of an aspeccual verb, but of a verb meaning something like 'put'. Basically, this is because
mettre, if it denotes a commencement, never appears without both the pronoun se (or me/te/nous/vous, i.e. the French reflexive pronouns), and the preposition à ['at', 'to'] (or its pronominal substitute y) (31). Diachronically speaking, se mettre à and mettre are related. Synchronously, they are not (except at the morphological level). The same holds true for the two verbs start: morphologically, they are related, but not semantically.

Two of Coseriu's students disagree, or at least seem to disagree, with their teacher when he claims (COSERIU 1976: 125-126) that, whenever mettre is used in the combination se mettre à, it loses its lexical meaning and becomes part of a grammatical paraphrase (32). Although DIETRICH's (1973:145) position is not really clear, one has the impression that he treats se mettre à as a verbum denominativum (or "plain verb", with a "plain" lexical meaning) rather than as a verbum adiectum (or "verb about a verb"), just because mettre itself belongs to the former category. However, exactly like commencer, se mettre à is primarily a verb about a verb, i.e. a modifier of another verb. It has therefore its place among the verba adiecta (33). SCHMID (1984:56), on the other hand, does consider se mettre à as a verbum adiectum; but she adds that, though "die Funktion des In-Bezug-Satzens" ['the function of relating to', sc. 'another verb'] is foregrounded with se mettre à, the "semantische Entleerung" ['semantic emptying'] is not complete: "Wäre "se mettre à..." semantisch entleertes Tempus-Morphem, könnte es auch in seiner Anwendung völlig neutral und mit allen Verben kompatibel sein" ['If se mettre à were a semantically emptied tense-morpheme, it would have to be fully unmarked in its use
and compatible with all verbs'). That, as we have seen in section 2., is clearly not the case. As a matter of fact, se mettre à shares with mettre its inchoative component (the event "mettre un cheval à l'écurie" ['put a horse in its stable'] implies that the horse will be in the stable for at least a while once the event has been completed), and its do-component.

What mettre probably does not have is a component of personal involvement (as defined on p.144). Se mettre à has therefore a meaning of its own, and must be considered apart. GROSS (1975:164) is undoubtedly right when he observes that, at least in its aspectual use, se mettre à "ne peut être le réflexif de mettre" ['can by no means be mettre's reflexive counterpart']. SCHOGT (1968:6), however, misleads his reader when he says that the literal meaning of se mettre à ['put oneself to'] is more difficult to retrieve if réfléchir is used rather than travailler, as in [70a] vs [70b]:

[70a] Il se mit à réfléchir.
'He began to think' / 'He put himself to think'?

[ 70b] Il se mit à travailler.
'He began to work' / 'He put himself to work'

Even in [70b], se mettre à is not to be given its most literal interpretation.

3.2. The reflexive pronoun on its left, and the preposition à on its right hand side, force se mettre à into a kind of strait-jacket which hampers its freedom to a considerable extent. The verb appears in no more than two frames, the most important one of which may be represented as "X se mit à Z", with X being an animate or an inanimate subject NP, and Z
a verb in the infinitive. We now have to devise a semantic formula for this frame, and check (cp. section 3.3.) whether it also reflects the value of se mettre à in its other frame, which, roughly speaking, corresponds to the non-causative direct object frame in the case of the aspectual verbs begin and start, and to the first direct object frame in the case of the aspectual verb commencer, and which is to be represented as “X se mit à Y”, with both X and Y being NP’s.

What should the formula look like? As in the case of, for instance, the unexpectedness-component characteristic of the verb start, the terms do-component and personal involvement cannot be used just like that. The idea behind these terms must be expressed by means of a proposition consisting of semantic primitives (or at least quasi-primitives) - and that proposition is then to be added to the commencer-formula corresponding to the frame "X commença à Z", in order to mark in an optimal way just how both verbs differ. With regard to punctual verbs (cp. pp.111-113) and to negation (cp. pp.116-117), se mettre à and commencer do not differ at all.

First of all, if the subject of a se mettre à-sentence does something, it seems we could simply cancel all the "être-components" in the main formula for the verb commencer. Not only the various examples given in section 2., but also the following could still be accounted for:

[71a] Après un instant la foule se mit à murmurer.sourdement. comme si elle eût répruvé la timide audace ou le faux courage de ce garçon presque blond, nouveau torero à Barcelone, et qui s’appelait Rodriguez Serra. /YS.219/

‘After a moment the crowd began to mumble softly, as if it disapproved the timid boldness or the false courage of that almost blond boy, new torero in Barcelona, and whose name was Rodriguez Serra’
M. Capoulié venait presque chaque jour, en revanche, ce qui n’était pas dans ses pratiques ordinaires. Il chaussait des besicles, s’installait au bureau dans un fauteuil réservé pourtant aux visiteurs, aux clients, puis il se mettait à lire les feuilles. /CP,81/

'Mr Capoulié, to the contrary, came almost every day, and that was not his usual way. He would put his glasses, sit down at the desk in a chair normally reserved for visitors or customers, and then begin to read the papers'

La presse officielle s’est mise à évoquer les horreurs de la guerre, et la télévision a également levé le voile sur le conflit. /P,15-02-88/

'The official press has begun to evoke the horrors of the war, and television has also lifted the veil on the conflict'

Elle appuya sur l’accélérateur et la Maserati bondit, siffla, se mit à geindre puis à ronronner vers les 200 km/h. /YS,110/

'She pressed the accelerator and the Maserati jolted, whistled, began to whine and then to purr toward the 200 km an hour'

With weather verbs (cp. the examples in [73]), there are no difficulties either: they answer the question "Quel temps fait-il?" ['What’s the weather like?']

Il se mit à pleuvour.
'It began to rain'

Il se mit à faire froid.
'It suddenly began to be cold'

Unfortunately, [74a] and [ b] do raise a problem (34).

Alors pourquoi, brusquement se mettait-il à transpirer et à avoir soif et à avoir peur?

'Why, then, suddenly, did he begin to sweat and to be thirsty and scared?'

Elle s’est mise à sentir des douleurs hier.
'She began to feel pains yesterday'

Clearly, one cannot think of being thirsty, being scared, and feeling pains, as of something that someone does. On the other hand, there is an activity in which the subject in [74a] really is involved, viz. the activity of sweating.
Sweating could be seen as an externalization of thirst and fright, as something one does when one is thirsty or scared. Notice that, taken in isolation, avoir peur and avoir soif behave differently with se mettre à :

[75a] Il se mit à avoir peur.
    'He began to be scared'
[ b] ?? Il se mit à avoir soif.
    'He began to be thirsty'

What this shows is that it is easier to think that when one is scared one does something, than to think that when one is thirsty one does something (35). In [74a], however, there is no problem for the context suggests what the subject does (viz., sweating). Similarly, when one feels pain (cp. [74b]), one can do something (e.g. make involuntary movements or scream); this is probably what makes [74b] acceptable (at least to my informants). I suggest we might cancel the "être-components", but add the component in [76] :

[76] quand X Z, X fait qqch
    à cause de cela, l'on peut penser à Z comme
    à qqch que X fait
    'When X is Z-ing, X is doing something
    because of that, one can think of Z as of
    something that X does'

The first line in itself ("quand X Z, X fait qqch") is insufficient. It is possible to have [77a], but not [77b] :

[77a] Quand mon grand-père est fatigué, il
    s'installe dans son fauteuil.
    'When my grandfather is tired, he sits
    down in his chair'
[ b] Mon grand-père se mit à être fatigué.
    'My grandfather began to be tired'

In other words, "Z" and "faire qqch" refer to simultaneous events (in the broadest sense of the word), not to events
which are consecutive. [76] still fits the examples in [72] and [73], and it fits statements about the weather such as those in [74]. It also allows us to account for the acceptability of [75], and for the anomaly of the following:

[78a]  *Cette situation se met à embêter Marie. (= [65a])
[b]  *L’armoire se mit à être poussiéreuse. (= [65c])
[c]  *Il se mit à être nécessaire de travailler dur.
    'It began to be necessary to work hard'
[d]  *Il se mit à être douteux qu’il ne vienne.
    'It began to be doubtful that he would come'

The situation in [78a] and the cupboard in [78b] are not involved in any activity. The same holds true for the X’s in [78c] and [d], i.e. the infinitival clause travailler dur and the subordinate clause qu’il ne vienne (36). [79a] and [b] are simply unintelligible.

[79a]  *quand travailler dur est nécessaire, travailler dur fait qch
     'when working hard is necessary, working hard is doing something'
[b]  *quand qu’il ne vienne est douteux, qu’il ne vienne fait qch
     'when that he would come is doubtful, that he would come is doing something'

What about combinations of se mettre à with a verb which, exactly like the aspectual one, takes a reflexive pronoun? I originally thought that two such pronouns within one clause were incompatible, for anything but semantic reasons, and that the following would hence not occur with se mettre à :

[80a]  Les choses commençaient à s’éclaircir.
     /ML, 06-87/
     'Things began to get clearer'
[b]  Le danger pourrait venir de Suisse ou de Belgique, où la location des robes est chose courante. La tendance commence d’ailleurs à s’implanter en ce qui concerne l’habit du marié. /EA, 24-06-88/

151
The translations do not reflect why se mettre à is indeed impossible in [80a] and [b]. The reflexive pronoun is an instance of what is known in French grammar as "se-moyen", an element more or less equivalent to the English middle voice: it has a value which closely resembles that of an "ordinary" passive. In other words, the subjects choses and tendance are not doing anything. Rather, something is done to them.

In fact, se mettre à is not as "incompatible" with a second, pronominal, verb as I was first inclined to believe. Consider the quasi-minimal pair in [81]:

[81a] Didier commençait à se plaindre de son coeur. /CP,68/
    'Didier began to complain about his heart'

[b] Elle s'est mise à se plaindre de ses voisines, des soeurs. /LT,218/
    'She began to complain about her neighbours, about the sisters'

Se mettre à is possible here because se plaindre is something that one does. For a similar reason, se mettre à would be possible in [82a] and [b], were it not for the fact that the former is taken from an eyewitness report (which is supposed to be objective), whereas the latter is part of a fictitious historical reconstruction.

[82a] Des hommes descendent aussitôt des deux voitures et commencèrent à se quereller.
    /CP,202/
    'A few gentlemen immediately got out of the two cars and began to quarrel'

[b] Pendant que les Britanniques et éventuellement les Soviétiques commencent à s'organiser, l'armée française peut déjà intervenir très efficacement.
    /PM,11-03-88/
'While the English and possibly the Soviets begin to organize themselves, the French army can already very efficiently intervene.'

The examples in [82] bring us to the other component to be incorporated in a formula which reflects the meaning of the verb se mettre à in the frame "X se mit à Z" : viz., the component of "personal involvement". Because of the latter, se mettre à is often used in the first person : the speaker wants the addressee to share his or her own feelings.

[83] En revenant d'Afghanistan, je me suis mis à boire, raconte un jeune. Mais c'était impossible d'oublier la guerre, impossible de reprendre une existence normale, d'aller dans les magasins ou au bureau. Pour moi, la vie est devenue l'attente de la fin de mes jours. /P, 15-02-88/

'Upon my return from Afghanistan, I began to drink, tells a youth. But it was impossible to forget the war, impossible to resume a normal existence, to go shopping or to go to office. For me, life has become waiting for the end of my days'

Se mettre à frequently occurs with verbs which themselves express somebody's feelings, e.g. rire or pleurer. Compare :

[84a] Elle sa mit à rire, de ce rire qu'Edouard détestait. /LD, 182/

'She began to laugh, using that laughter which Edward hated'

[84b] Ce souvenir lui était extrêmement pénible, puisqu'il s'est mis à pleurer. /BC, 106/

'That souvenir was extremely distressing for him, for he began to weep'

Finally, where no sufficient indications are available as to the kind of feeling the speaker wants to provoke in the addressee, highly specific adverbs may be added :

[85] Heureusement, elle s'est mise à parler des complications de sa vie sentimentale. /BC, 124/

'Fortunately, she began to talk about the complications of her love life'
The best way to express personal involvement in the semantic metalanguage of conceptual axiology is as in (86a) - which means that the formula for the verb se mettre à in the frame "X se mit à Z" will look as in (86b).

(86a) je veux ceci :
   tu éprouves qqch à cause de cela
   'I want this :
   you feel something because of that'

(86b) au temps t, X se mit à Z =
   quand X Z, X fait qqch
   à cause de cela, l'on peut penser à Z comme
   à qqch que X fait
   avant t, Z n'avait pas lieu
   à t, Z avait lieu
   je veux ceci :
   tu éprouves qqch à cause de cela
   l'on put penser à t :
   plus de Z aura lieu après maintenant
   l'on ne put pas savoir à t :
   plus de Z aura lieu après maintenant'

'when X is Z-ing, X is doing something because of that, one can think of Z as of something that X does before t, Z was not happening at t, Z was happening
I want this :
   you feel something because of that
   one could think at t :
   more of Z will happen after now
   one could not know at t :
   more of Z will happen after now'

I am not sure whether we really need the last component of (86b) at all : the "l’on ne put pas savoir"-component was added to account for the impossibility to use commencer with stative expressions incompatible with a constant possibility of change. The do-component of se mettre à seems to assume that role already, though it does so more or less implicitly.

3.3. The formula in (86b) was devised for the frame "X se mit à Z", where, as before, X is an NP and Z a verb in the infinitive. It soon becomes clear that the formula does not apply if se mettre à is followed by an NP as well. There
are, it seems, some severe restrictions on the use of noun phrases after se mettre à, restrictions which look different from those that exist for the frame "X se mit à Y".

First of all, the frame "X se mit à Y" is heavily restricted if the subject is inanimate. It is impossible to have something like [87a], whereas [87b] is fine:

[87a] *L'avion s'est mis à la descente.
 'The plane began its descent'
[  b] L'avion s'est mis à descendre.
 'The plane began to descend'

Notice, in contrast, that both of the following are acceptable:

[88a] L'avion a commencé sa descente.
[  b] L'avion a commencé à descendre.

With animate subjects, there are restrictions as well. HECHMATHI-ASHORI (1984:131-132) notes - without any attempt at an explanation - that "se mettre à + NP" is only possible in the areas of intellectual and artistic activities. Consider the examples in [89a] to [ d] :

[89a] Dès mon entrée au collège, je me suis mis à l'anglais.
 'Immediately upon entering college, I began (to study) English'
[  b] Simenon était très jeune lorsqu'il s'est mis à son premier roman.
 'Simenon was very young when he began his first novel'
[ c] Le médecin m'a conseillé de me mettre aux sports.
 'The doctor advised me to take up sports'
[ d] Soudain, tous les jeunes se mettent à la danse.
 'Suddenly, all young people take up dancing'

The verbs to be supplied by the addressee are étudier ['study'], écrire ['write'], faire ['do'], and apprendre
[’take up’]. The use of commencer rather than se mettre à is systematically possible except, perhaps, in [89d] (although, if a broader context were provided, the result would undeniably be better).

It seems difficult to define in which way se mettre à may be used if what follows is an NP. Still, the various restrictions can be accounted for in an entirely coherent way. I therefore disagree with SCHMID (1984:57), who calls the very existence of a second “aspectual” frame for the verb se mettre à into question. She does so on the basis of German translations (!), and on the basis of the possibility of having, next to “se mettre à + NP”, “mettre quelqu’un à + NP”, but not, next to “se mettre à + infinitive”, “mettre quelqu’un à + infinitive”. Compare:

[90a] On s’est mis au travail.
    ’We began working’
[b] Le professeur nous a mis au travail.
    ’The teacher gave us work’
[c] On s’est mis à travailler.
[d] *Le professeur nous a mis à travailler.

Schmid does not realize that, in fact, “se mettre à + NP” and “mettre quelqu’un à + NP” do not have the same distribution at all. [89a] to [d] were all fine, but [91a] to [d] are unacceptable:

[91a] *Dès mon entrée au collège, mes professeurs m’ont mis à l’anglais.
    ’Immediately upon entering college, my teachers got me to study English’
[b] *Simenon était très jeune lorsque son père l’a mis à son premier roman.
    ’Simenon was very young when his father got him to write his first novel’
[c] *Le médecin m’a conseillé de mettre nos enfants aux sports.
    ’The doctor advised me to get our children to do sports’
[91d]  *Soudain, tous les jeunes mettent leurs amis à la danse.
     'Suddenly, all young people get their friends to take up dancing'

A closer look at what is possible and what is not teaches us that, once again, the do-component plays a crucial role: $X$, in the frame "$X$ se mit à $Y$", must refer to something that $X$ does. Let us look at our examples again. A "descente" (cp. [87a]) is not something that a plane does: in French, one can say [92a], but not [92b].

[92a]  L'avion descend.
     'The plane descends'
[ b]  *L'avion fait une descente.
     'The plane does a descent'

The expression *faire une descente* is reserved for police raids and skiing routines:

[93a]  La police a fait une descente dans le bungalow du gangster.
     'The police has raided the gangster's bungalow'
[ b]  Les skieurs viennent de faire leur quinzième descente.
     'The skiers have just done their fifteenth run'

In [89a] to [ d], the Y-constituent is compatible with the verb *faire*:

[94a]  Dès mon entrée au collège, j'ai fait l'anglais.
[ b]  Simenon était très jeune lorsqu'il a fait son premier roman.
[ c]  Le médecin m'a conseillé de faire des sports.
[ d]  Soudain, tous les jeunes font de la danse.

Apparent counter-examples could easily be found. Each one of the following a-sentences is fine, whereas each one of the b-sentences (with the verb *faire*) is odd or unacceptable.
However, the c-sentences (with the verb *commencer*) show that the verb form used in the a-sentences is not an instance of the aspectual verb *se mettre à* with which we are presently dealing (for further comments, cp. below).

[95a]  Le roi se mit à la poursuite de ses ennemis.  
'The king chased after his enemies'

[ b]  ?Le roi fit la poursuite de ses ennemis.
[ c]  ?Le roi commença la poursuite de ses ennemis.

[96a]  La voiture doit être en terrain plat, la jument s'est mise au petit trot.  /LT,136/
'The cart must be in flat country, the mare has broken into a trot'

[ b]  *La jument fait le petit trot.
[ c]  *La jument a commencé le petit trot.

[97a]  Les chevaux s'étaient mis au pas pour longer un grand mur.  /LD,221/
'The horses had fallen into step to pass along a big wall'

[ b]  *Les chevaux font le pas.
[ c]  *Les chevaux avaient commencé le pas.

It is noteworthy that, this time, *mettre* could be used with a non-reflexive direct object:

[98a]  Le roi a mis ses mousquetaires à la poursuite de ses ennemis.  
'The king has sent his musketeers in pursuit of his enemies'

[ b]  Le cocher a mis la jument au petit trot.  
'The driver has put the mare into a trot'
[ c]  Le cocher a mis les chevaux au pas.  
'The driver has put the horses into step'

I did say that the verb forms in [95a], [96a], and [97a] do not belong to the aspectual verb *se mettre à* described in this section. I did not say that they do not have an inchoative component or a do-component. They do (exactly like the verb *mettre* which we glossed earlier on as 'put') (37). I now claim that what they really do not have is a component of personal involvement: they could appear in even the most objective report. In contrast, the difference
between [89a] to [d] and the corresponding commencer-sentences is a pure matter of personal involvement, and [89a] to [d] could not be used as fully objective statements. In other words, the do-component and component of personal involvement are important constituents of the meaning of se mettre à even in the frame "X se mit à Y", for which I propose the semantic formula in [99] (where the do-component is implied by the absence of components such as "avant t, il n'y avait pas de Z" ['before t, there was no Z']):

[99] au temps t, X se mit à Y : l'on peut penser à Y comme à qqch que l'on Z avant t, Z n'avait pas lieu à t, Z avait lieu je veux ceci : tu prouves qqch à cause de cela l'on put penser à t : plus de Z aura lieu après maintenant l'on ne put pas savoir à t : plus de Z aura lieu après maintenant 'one can think of Y as of something that one is Z-ing before t, Z was not happening at t, Z was happening I want this : you feel something because of that one could think at t : more of Z will happen after now one could not know at t : 'more of Z will happen after now'

3.4. HECHMATI-ASHORI (1984:248) claims that "plus un verbe est neutre, plus il s'applique à des domaines différents" ['the more neutral a verb, the more areas it can be applied to']. It is strange that, while being the author of such a statement, she has remained unaware of the semantic distance between commencer (which is unmarked), and se mettre à (which, as has just been shown, is marked). The latter exists in only two frames, and requires two formulas:
Table Two

(a) X se mit à Z
(b) X se mit à Y

Number of frames : 2
Number of formulas : 2
Number of formulas referring to a second verb : 2

Start (see Table Two in Chapter Three) and se mettre à are totally unrelated (except for the fact that they are both aspectual verbs denoting a commencement). It would be quite useless to try to draw parallels of any kind. I just wish to recall that while start is marked with unexpectedness, se mettre à is marked with a do-component and with personal involvement.
NOTES to Part Two, Chapter Four

(1) Nef himself is not quite happy with it. His own framework is a model-theoretical semantics founded on the use of intensional logic (cp. NEF 1980:11).

(2) In what follows, translations of French examples are always as literal as possible. A compromise has been sought between direct translation and intelligibility.

(3) It is noteworthy that Gardès himself recognizes that his formula is to a certain extent arbitrary.

(4) The metaphorical use of arrive in English (cp. Chapter Three, p.48) has, as a matter of fact, its origins in French.

(5) BLANCHE-BENVENISTE (1974) and HECHMATI-ASHORI (1984:238) merely note that a punctual verb such as arriver is possible with a plural subject.


(7) LAMIROY's (1987:287) account disregards the fact that, in English, this type of construction is considered unacceptable by native speakers (pace FUCHS & LEONARD 1979:330,333). Lamiroy still has to explain why a temporal clause in English has not the same "power" as a temporal clause in French.

(8) Obviously, one could expect that he would offer himself (or be offered) another cup - but that is a different story: Mr Dupont is clearly not expected to drink the coffee he just spilled.

(9) The authors of this work provide a comprehensive analysis of aspect in French and in English that has been more than once referred to by specialists of French, but that has had next to no impact on the study of aspectuals in English, not so much because it was written in French (although that might have played a role), but rather (cp. NEF 1979:73,77) because of the theoretical framework it adheres to.

(10) For every step in their analysis, after any example containing the verb commencer, they give a close English translation containing the verb begin.

(11) As in the case of begin and start, sentences with related frames will, their apparent similarity
notwithstanding, be considered as independent creations. The transformational problem, signalled by GROSS (1975:145), ceases to exist.


(13) Within the framework of a dissertation dealing with the meaning(s) of a set of aspectual verbs in English and in French, I cannot insist on this particular point, the analysis of which would lead too far away from the topic.

(14) Cp. BAUSCH (1963:262), HECHMATHI-ASHORI (1984:113), and ASHORI-HECHMATHI (1985:56). Bausch limits his observations to processes, and does not talk about states. Notice that commencer par may also be followed by an NP (cp. 1.5.). Our analysis of the construction with an infinitive has nothing in common with the one in BLANCHE-BENVENISTE (1974), whose remarks on commencer par in particular, and on commencer in general, are hopelessly counter-intuitive, as will become clear below.

(15) Cp., in Chapter Three, Harris's terminology with respect to the operation called redundancy removal (p.64).

(16) Cp. also ZRIBI-HERTZ (1978:111-112), who argues at the same time that the frame "X commence Y" is a "reduction" of a "primitive structure" "X commence à + V + qqch", from which the infinitive and the connector à were "deleted". The terms réduction ["reduction"] and effacement ["deletion"] appear furthermore in VERBERT (1985), who undertakes an interesting attempt to find out which second verbs can possibly be left unexpressed, and when.

(17) VERBERT (1985:198) has some startling observations on possible interpretations of the strings in [ia] and [b].

[ia] Il commence à la gare.  
'He begins on (sic) the railway station'

[b] Il commence à un chameau.  (??)  
'He begins on a camel'

According to the author, [ia] could mean, among other things, 'il commence à peindre la gare' ["to paint"]; and [ib], 'il commence à manger un chameau' ["to eat"].

(18) Cp. BLINKENBERG (1960:119), and DOMINICY (1977:928). VERBERT (1979:59,62-64; 1980:2-4) groups both subtypes together under the heading "COMMENCER 1".

(19) A similar point was made by several authors. Cp., for instance, PINCHON (1972:228), BUSSE (1974:154), ROTHEMBERG (1974:20), and GROSS (1975:161).

(20) Mantha & Mel'čuk include in their observations the verbs continuer (cp. Chapter Six) and cesser (cp. Chapter Eight) as well.
(21) I disregard the kind of interpretations which would only be possible in highly specific contexts (interpretations such as 'he began to destroy the church, while his wife began to destroy the court house', etc.).

(22) The assumption is, as before, that our tourist is there just to see places, not to destroy them or to do anything else to them, which is not expected to do in a "neutral" context.

(23) HECHMATICASHORI (1984:122-123) works with verbs mainly. However, it seems awkward to say that commencer par l'espagnol ['begin with Spanish'] is a short form for the unacceptable phrase *commencer à apprendre des langues par l'espagnol ['begin to study languages with Spanish']. Commencer l'apprentissage des langues par l'espagnol ['begin the study of languages with Spanish'] seems far better.

(24) For a similar viewpoint, cp. DOMINICY (1977:923).

(25) Ever since ROTHENBERG (1974), the verb commencer has often been identified as a "reversible verb". Cp., for instance, VERBERT (1979:79-80 = 1980:6-7), and HECHMATIASHORI (1984:90-92). Reversible verbs are those which LAGANE (1967) (and others) called verbes symétriques ['symmetrical verbs'].

(26) HECHMATICASHORI (1984:80) takes over this argument without even questioning its correctness.

(27) Similarly, [iia] is not equivalent to [iib]:

[iia] Le travail commença.
'The work began'.

[iib] Le travail commença à progresser.
'The work began to progress'.

The verb progresser 'progress' is not what BLANCHE-BENVENISTE (1974) thinks it is: a "mot adéquat" ('appropriate word') which is "prévisible dans le contexte" ('inferable from the context'). Cp. note 14.

(28) BLINKENBERG (1960:127) and BLANCHE-BENVENISTE (1975:156,249-250) talk about a pronominal se commencer (fortunately without giving examples). This construction no longer exists - although it was not uncommon in medieval texts.

(29) "Left hand side" refers to a section of the time axis.

(30) REQUEDAT (1980:42) approves (!) [iii]:

[iii] Paul a mis Marie à peindre la cuisine.
'Paul started Mary painting the kitchen'.

My own informants found [iii] extremely bizarre, and rejected it. Cp. also SCHMID (1984:57), and section 3.3. below.

(31) Remember that commencer may be followed by à, but also
by de, by par, or by no connector at all. Only with
aspectual mettre is the connector â an inalienable part of
the verb. For another view, cp. ROY (1976:181), who
distinguishes three different "coverbs" (commencer
â/commencer de/commencer par).

(32) Coseriu's assumption (ibid.) that commencer keeps its
lexical meaning, "even" in an inchoative function, sounds
awkward: commencer, clearly, has no other functions than the
inchoative one. Coseriu probably refers to a particular
commencer-frame, viz. the one in which commencer is a genuine
verb about a verb, i.e. is followed by an infinitive.

(33) On the terminology, cp. Part One, Chapter Two, note
12.

(34) SCHMID's (1984:56) claim that the meaning of mettre
has not disappeared from se mettre à (cp. pp.146-147) rests
on the unacceptability (?) of [74b]. My own conversations
with native speakers revealed that [74b] is not as
unacceptable as Schmid thinks it is. In other words, Schmid
makes a correct point, but uses very weak "evidence".

(35) According to Anna Wierzbicka (personal communication),
"what really matters is an (inner action) that CAUSES the
feeling (i.e., a thought), not an action which manifests the
feeling." I do not wish to discuss whether thoughts are
actions. More importantly, I can suddenly think of a glass
of cool beer, and therefore feel thirsty. Still, [75b] remains a rather strange sentence.

(36) There is an important difference, in French and in
English, between the il resp. it introducing weather verbs,
and the il (sometimes ce) resp. it introducing so-called
"unpersonal verbs" such as être nécessaire/be necessary and
être douteux/be doubtful.

(37) The do-component must, however, have a slightly
different form: if it were the same, the unacceptability of
the b-sentences in [95], [96] and [97] would remain
unaccounted for. On the other hand, it is clear that the
king, the mare, and the horses do something.
The most commonly used English and French verbs denoting commencement were described in Chapters Three (begin and start) and Four (commencer and se mettre à). Roughly speaking, the same methodology was used in both chapters. One verb (begin or commencer), analyzed in detail, was taken as a starting point, and then compared with another closely related one (start or se mettre à). Finally, the second verb was analyzed more briefly, as it was possible to refer constantly to what had been said about the first verb and about the difference or differences between both.

The topic of Chapters Five and Six is continuation, more particularly, once again, its linguistic expression by means of English and French verbs. Basically, both chapters (on continue and keep, and on continuer and ne cesser de) will be presented, as Chapters Three and Four, in three sections: "Verb number one" / "verb number one" and "verb number two" compared / "Verb number two".  

165
CHAPTER FIVE

CONTINUE AND KEEP
IN ENGLISH

1. "CONTINUE"

1.1. The first and main formula proposed in Chapter Three for the verb begin was based on Wierzbicka's semantic formula for the frame "X began to do Z" (cp. pp. 48-59). Wierzbicka's formula is repeated in [1a] and followed, in [1b], by the formula (as proposed by WIERZBICKA 1988a:82) for the verb continue in the frame "X continued to do Z".

[1a] At moment $t$, X began to do Z. $\Rightarrow$
before $t$, X wasn't doing Z
at $t$, X was doing it
one could think at that time:
more of it will happen after now

[ 1b ] After time $t$, X continued to do Z. $\Rightarrow$
before $t$, X was doing Z
one could think then:
more of it will happen after now
at $t$, one could think this:
more of it will not happen after now
after $t$, more of it happened

Surely, the fact that the formulas in [1] are so different needs to be explained. Why is it that Wierzbicka situates beginnings at, and continuations after $t$? The necessity to distinguish between two points in time which both precede the continuation prompted her to take such a decision. To safeguard overall readability, a change in time perspective became a practical necessity.
The formula in [1b] is based on the example in [2]:


According to WIERZBICKA (l.c.), [2] implies "that some process (the painting of some particular car) could be expected to last for a certain time (until the whole car was painted); and that at some point during that time something occurred that could have caused an interruption (but didn't cause it)". The process is expressed in line one, the expectation in line two, and the continuation in line four. The occurrence of a (possibly disrupting) event is (quite meagerly; cp. below) explicated in line three. Clearly, Wierzbicka's interpretation of [2] is far more explicit than the formula in [1b]. I would like to argue, however, that the information added between brackets is misleading.

The phrase "but didn't cause it" implies that there was no interruption, not even a momentary one existing only at \( t \). The formula in [1b] is less explicit: it says that, after \( t \), \( X \text{ was doing } Z \) - but it has no information as to whether, at \( t \), \( X \text{ was doing } Z \). If so, there was indeed no interruption. In the other case, there \text{ was an interruption, but only at } t. [2] is fine in both cases and Wierzbicka's interpretation of it is therefore incorrect.

[3a] (After eating a sandwich,) Mary continued to paint her car.
[ b ] (Mary began to paint her car at 9 am, and) she continued to paint it until noon.

On the other hand, the phrase "until the whole car was painted" expresses what might be called a "reasonable expectation" : the process of painting is expected to occur
until it will have reached its "natural endpoint". I would like to submit that there is a component of expectation in the verb continue, but not one of reasonable expectation. Wierzbicka’s formula for the verb continue does not express any reasonable expectation, and is therefore, once again, closer to a correct explication than the interpretation of the example in [2].

Imagine, in support of the argument on expectations, that a friend of Mary’s (say Joan) watches Mary painting her car. After a while, Joan observes how Mary interrupts her activity and sits down to eat a sandwich. After that, Mary resumes her job. Before the whole car is painted, Joan is called away; she does not know what will happen after she leaves the scene, and she has no reason to believe that Mary will work until the whole car is painted. Still, it is perfectly all right for her to explain to a third party that, after Mary ate her sandwich, she "continued to paint her car". No reasonable expectation is implied, nor can be implied: Joan does not know whether Mary worked until the car was completely painted, or whether she had to stop as she was running out of paint, or even whether she painted and painted irrespective of whether the work was finished or not. The only knowledge that Joan has is that Mary was painting her car, then sat down to eat a sandwich, then painted again; and she can only presume that the painting went on after she was called away.

There are at least three reasons why Wierzbicka’s formula in [1b] leaves me as unsatisfied as her interpretation of the example in [2]. First of all, it does not state why one’s expectations at t were different from any earlier ones.
Surely, it would not be necessary to point out that one’s expectation changed because of something happening in or to X, or because of an event outside of X which either had an effect on X’s behavior, or at least could have had such an effect. It would be sufficient to spell out that something happened, and that one could think that there would be no continuation after that (not necessarily because of that; cp. the "sandwich-analysis" of the example in [2]).

Secondly, the formula in [1b] says nothing at all about expectations after \(t\) (i.e. at the time of continuation). At that very moment, one definitely expects that "more of it will happen after now" — although one could not know that such would be the case. These two components, it seems, should be added (but cp. below).

My main objection to the formula in [1b] has to do with the change in time perspective (cp. p.166). The idea of such a change is highly incompatible with the claim that formulas and glosses are representations of something that exists in the minds of speakers and addressees (cp. p.20). The fact that two verbs belonging to the same "axiological field" (cp. Part Three, Chapter Ten) are described along different lines is unacceptable, because it would be very strange indeed if one and the same speaker had in mind, for two verbs which are definitely closely related, values reflecting different time perspectives. This, automatically, raises another question with regard to the time perspective to be preferred. If it is the one chosen for the verb continue, the formulas in Chapter Three, although they were shown to be adequate, will have to be revised. Let us see what happens if we revise the begin-formula proposed in [1a]. It then reads as in [4]:

169
[4] After moment t, X began to do Z.
   at t, X wasn't doing Z
   after t, X was doing it
   one could think at that time:
      more of it will happen after now

At first, this new formula may look fine. As a matter of fact, it is quite complex: in line three, "at that time" refers to "after t", which means that "after now" is to be read as "after after t". Therefore, the begin-formula as it stands in [1a] is better - and we have to make a choice: either we accept the idea of a change in time perspective, although such a change strikes one as counter-intuitive, or we try to avoid the necessity of distinguishing two points in time before the continuation. I really believe the problem can be solved in an entirely satisfactory way. I propose a new formula for the verb continue as it is used in its most prototypical frame "X continued to Z". A comparison with the main begin-formula on pp.58-59 reveals a different content for the first line, the appearance of a new second line ("one could think..."), and the disappearance, altogether, of the last line.

[5] at time t, X continued to Z =
   before t, Z was happening/there was Z
   one could think at that time:
      something could happen after now
      after that, Z will not happen anymore/
      there will be no Z anymore
   at t, Z was happening/there was Z
   one could think at that time:
      more of Z will happen after now/there
      will be more Z after now

It could be argued that, if the use of a T0-head possibly implies continuation after a (temporary) interruption, there is a clash with the first line of the formula proposed in [5]. However, the statement that "before t, Z was happening"
does not imply that \( Z \) was happening all the time. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that the second line of the formula spells out that the speaker could have (but did not necessarily have) the idea that the existing situation could at any time be reversed into its opposite if and after some disrupting event occurs. In other words, the constant possibility of a change (cp. p.58) is already expressed here, and therefore the last line of the main begin-formula does not re-appear.

By now, it must be clear that the formula in [5] is an adequate replacement for the formula in [1b]. It explicates the meaning of the verb continue in the frame "X continued to Z", as illustrated in [2], and in the examples below:

[6a] The convent has existed since 1510, and today the five remaining sisters of the order continue to practise their faith. /WD,07-09-87/

[ b] And when she jumped to her death over the parapet walls, those soldiers continued to do exactly what they had been told: they followed her. /AM,03-09-88/

Not only is the formula in [5] better than the one in [1b], but it is also (far) better than the formula in [7], suggested by ANDERSON (1968:403):

[7] \begin{align*}
\text{NP}_1 \; \text{VP} \\
\text{NP}_x \; \text{V}_x \; \text{NP}_1 \\
\text{NP}_1 \; \text{VP}
\end{align*}

Anderson himself underlines that "by any standard, such components as NP\(_1\) VP and NP\(_1\) VP must be considered tautological" (ibid.). His formula has no time statements, and, hence, cannot account for the unacceptability of strings such as [8] (cp. also p.48):

In terms of the formula in [5], the unacceptability of [8] could easily be explained: one cannot arrive before a certain time and after that time. Notice, however, that punctual verbs are possible after continue under exactly the same conditions as those outlined in the case of the verbs begin and start. [9a] and [ b] have an additional AdvP which "completes" an otherwise unacceptable utterance, while [10a] and [ b] have a plural and a generic subject, respectively. The effect of an AdvP and of a subject which is either plural or generic is well-known: they provoke an iterative sentence-reading.

[9a] Rollie continued to report most days of the week to the assembly plant. /W,193/
[ b] Through the remainder of June, and well into July, they continued to meet at every opportunity, both in daytime and during evenings, the latter when Adam had told Erica in advance that he would be working late. /W,317/

[10a] [Automobiles] continued to flow from the Chrysler plants at Hamtramck and elsewhere. /W,14/
[ b] There were days, however, after reading the masculine-oriented advertising (...) which continued to appear, when Barbara was convinced that she had failed totally. /W,86/

In order to account for sentences such as [10a] and [ b], explicit references to X were avoided in the formula in [5].

The second line of Anderson's formula in [7] expresses that something happened which affected NP₁. As a result, [10] cannot account for sentences which imply that NP₁ peacefully V-ed all the time: one cannot say that NP₁ is affected if there is no interruption. It is true that the anomaly of strings such as those in [11] can be easily explained by

[11a] *Max was not cooking dinner, and then he continued to cook dinner.
[ b ] *Max was not cooking dinner, and then he did not continue to cook dinner.

However, the explanation for the anomaly is possible in terms of [5] as well: there is a clash between the negation with the verb *cook* and the first line of the formula, which, if transformed into a gloss for the second clause, says that Max *was* cooking dinner.

As in the case of *begin* and *start*, the scope of a negative particle with *continue* is unpredictable as long as a *continue*-sentence is considered in isolation. If the order of its clauses is reversed, and the conjunctions are dropped, the string in [11b] becomes acceptable (at least if uttered with an appropriate stress), and the negation carries on the entire formula in [5]: there was no cooking at any moment in time (2). Compare:

[12] Max did not continue to cook dinner: he was not cooking dinner.

On the other hand, the negation *could* undeniably bear on the third and fourth components only, as in [13] (where the event of cooking occurs before, but neither at nor after t).

[13] Max was cooking dinner when his deep-frier exploded; as he got burnt on his face and his hands, he had to be rushed to hospital and, of course, did not continue to cook.

Before we look at a variety of other *continue*-frames, there is one last similarity with the verb *begin* that must be mentioned. As pointed out, the constant possibility of a

173
change plays an important role. It was correctly observed (by PETERSON 1974:9; cp. Chapter Three, p.53) that sentences such as the following are wrong:

[14a] *Harry continued to know the sum of 2 plus 2.
[  b] *Harry continued to be tall.

Generally speaking, the conditions under which the aspectual verb continue and a stative expression such as know, be, have etc. are compatible are not different from the ones given for the verb begin on pp.55-57. In [15a], continue is used with the verb dislike; in [15b], with the expression be short of money.

[15a] For this, Matt blamed the people his daughter associated with, including Brett DeLosanto whom he continued to dislike. /W,310/
[  b] Despite this, he continued to be short of money himself. /W,354/

As both second verbs in [15] are compatible with a constant possibility of change, they can be freely used after the aspectual verb continue. In the formula in [5], the "be-components" were added in order to make the formula applicable in those cases where nothing "happens".

1.2. No comments were made in Chapter Three on the distinction between TO- and ING-constructions after begin and start. The assumption was that the use of one construction rather than the other one had no bearing on the semantics of the aspectual verb (cp. p.62). The case of continue is not different: whenever it is followed by another verb, it has one and the same basic meaning (a meaning which is part of its value). The formula proposed in [5] remains valid.
However, there is one interesting difference (3) between continue to V and continue V-ing on which, I feel, it is necessary to make some brief comments.

It has been argued (cp. FREED 1979:94) that "following an interruption we would expect someone to state that NP continued to VP"; with an ING-construction, however, "an interruption is at most potential". Stated otherwise, "where an interruption is explicit, continue V-ing is less comfortable than is continue to V" (ibid.). Freed illustrates her claim by means of the examples in [16] (where the acceptability judgments are hers):

[16a] The band began to play at 9 pm. They continued to play (?playing) until 1 am, stopping for 5-minute breaks every half an hour.
[16b] When the bell rings, ignore it and continue reading (?to read).

Obviously, the example in [16a] does not support Freed's claim at all: it refers to a series of interruptions which occur during the continuation, rather than to one single interruption separating, so to speak, the beginning from the continuation. [16b], on the other hand, is uttered by a teacher and refers to the future: the students should not interrupt their reading when they hear the bell. I am not so sure that the infinitive could not be used in this particular situation, especially if the example is rephrased as in [17] (an utterance approved by native speakers):

[17] When the bell rings, you must ignore it and you must continue to read until I tell you.

In my own corpus, I found several examples (all of which have a commencement verb - begin or start - and the verb
continue) which contradict Freed's evidence: there is, as in [16b], no interruption in any one of them, yet continue is followed by an infinitive. In [18a] and [ b], the commencement verb used is the verb begin. Both begin and continue take a TO-head in [18a], whereas begin in [18b] is used elliptically:

[18a] Anna put her hand to her throat and began to scream, looking away from the body. Herr Kolber had fallen on his knees with his forehead touching the floor; he wriggled once between the shots, and then the whole body would have fallen sideways if it had not been propped in its position by the wall. 'Shut your mouth,' said Josef, and when the woman continued to scream, he took her by the throat and shook her. /OE,103/  
[ b] Marshalling thoughts, choosing words carefully, Adam began. They were too experienced - all of them in the group - to go overboard, instantly, for a single idea. Yet he was aware of a sudden tension, missing before, and a quickening interest as he continued to speak. /W,246-247/

The examples in [19], on the other hand, contain the verbs start and continue. Notice that, in both [19a] and [ b], start is followed by an ING-construction, and continue by an infinitive.

[19a] My problem started when I was 14. A "friend" of the family started molesting me and, as I was too scared to tell anyone, continued to do so until I was 16. /WD,07-09-87/  
[ b] One of their charms is that they start flowering in winter in all but cold districts and continue to carry flushes of blooms throughout the year. /WD,12-10-87/

The example in [19a] brings us to another problematical point. According to Freed, the instances of a reiterated event are separated by "interruptions"; the infinitive should therefore "feel more natural" than the ING-construction. The
problem, here, is that the reality of the English language is different. (20a) and (b) have an iterative reading, yet continue is followed by an ING-construction.

(20a) It was true she did nothing specific to set the machinery of divorce in motion, and did not move out of the Quarton Lake house, though she continued sleeping in the guest bedroom. /WD,07-09-87/

(b) She has been teaching dancers for 33 years and even though she resigned as dean of the dance school last year, she still continued taking master classes. /WD,07-09-87/

The occurrence of sentences such as those in (20a) and (b) can easily be explained if one abandons the view that "a series suggests a stop-and-start progression of events (all identical in nature) requiring an interruption between occurrences of the event" (FREED 1979:94). If something is done over and over again, on a more or less regular basis, one can still say that the entire iterative process occurs without interruptions. In other words, it seems that continue to V can be used in all kinds of contexts, irrespective of whether an interruption occurs or not; continue V-ing, on the other hand, does not occur where a (genuine) interruption is implied. I do not think that [21] is a counter-example: the process of trimming can be seen as an essential part of the process of carving (just as the process of covering the windows with brown paper can be seen as an essential part of the process of painting one's car).

[21] Start by carving one row of petals around the radish, leaving them joined at the base. Carve the next row of petals so they occur between the petals in the first row. Trim the surface to make it smooth and continue carving rows of petals, gradually making them smaller as you come to the centre. /WD,07-09-87/
We are now able to understand why [22a] and [b] are both correct, although BOERTIEN (1979:46) observes that different interpretations may not be possible. "since Mary must continuously hold the money in both cases".

[22a] Mary continued to hold the money until the bet was decided.
[b] Mary continued holding the money until the bet was decided.

Boertien's apprehension is illegitimate, for the reading provided is compelling in the case of [22b] only. [22a] could also imply that Mary first held the money, but that due to an argument it was then passed onto someone else, who after a while did not want to be involved any longer, and returned the money back to Mary. The latter then kept it "until the bet was decided" (4).

1.3. The different frames in which continue appears are "similar" (FREED 1979:95) to those that are characteristic for begin and start. Next to the TO- and ING-constructions, which were treated in sections 1.1. and 1.2., a series of other frames will have to be examined. One frame containing an ING-construction, but different from "X continued Z-ing", will be described below. Two direct object frames - and a related one - will be looked at in 1.4., and the elliptical and absolute continue-frames will be considered in 1.5. A conscious effort has been made to make the structure of section 1. in Chapters Three to Five a recurrent one.

The continue by-construction illustrated in [23] is fairly rare and not generally accepted by native speakers.

[23] Tim continued by talking about his bad luck.
Although it contains a second verb, this frame differs from the "ordinary" TO- and ING-constructions in a major way. At the same time, it is different from the by-ing-constructions with begin and start (cp. pp.63-64 and 93-94). PALMER (1965: 190) paraphrases sentences such as [23] by means of a TO-construction used after the verb go on (5). [23] is similar in meaning to [24a], not to [24b].

[24a] Tim went on to talk about his bad luck.
[24b] Tim went on talking about his bad luck.

The difference between "go on + infinitive" and "go on + ING-construction" is a very obvious one: whereas [24b] implies (as both the TO- and ING-constructions after continue do) that Tim was already talking about his bad luck, [24a] implies that Tim began to talk about it, and that before doing so he had been talking about something else. In fact, [24a] and [23] share the same implications (6): as with begin and start, it seems reference is made to a series of events. However, in the present case, the event referred to in the communicative act is not the first one in the series, and all the events in the series must be of a similar kind, or at least be part of one and the same global act. For the following examples, I am indebted to Avery Andrews:

[25a] The actor walked on stage, took off his clothes and stood on his head. After falling over on his back, he continued by reciting the first page of the Moscow Telephone Book while staring at the ceiling.
[25b] They started setting up their defenses by putting up barbed wire and digging trenches, and continued by laying a mine-field.

For some of my informants, there seemed to be one more restriction. They told me that only verbs which have to do
with manifest human communication can appear in this frame, i.e., verbs such as talk, speak, sing, but also paint (as an art only): painting is a form of manifest human communication, in that a painter always has a message to convey, or "wants to express him- or herself".

A tentative formula for the frame "X continued by Z-ing" is given in [26].

[26]  

\[
\text{at time } t, \ X \text{ continued by } Z\text{-ing } = \\
(\text{when } X \text{ is } Z\text{-ing, one could think this:} \\
X \text{ wants to say something}) \\
\text{before } t, \ Z \text{ was not happening} \\
\text{at } t, \text{ after other things, } Z \text{ was happening} \\
(\text{one could think of the other things as of} \\
\text{something } X \text{ wants to say}) \\
\text{one could think at that time:} \\
\text{more of } Z \text{ will happen after now} \\
\text{one could not know at that time:} \\
\text{more of } Z \text{ will happen after now}
\]

I am not at all sure that I have captured all the relevant information that should be expressed in an adequate formula. The main reason for this is that a by-construction with the verb continue is rarely used, and that native speakers do not necessarily agree on what can be said and what cannot be said (cp. above, p. 178).

1.4. "In a manner similar to begin, continue is unspecified for causality". FREED's (1979:98) statement appears to be quite correct as far as continue is concerned, although the comparison with begin is misguided. Unlike begin, continue seems to have no genuine causative direct object frame (1). Some "prototypical" examples for the first of its two (!) existing direct object frames are given in [27a] and [ b], whereas examples containing direct speech appear in [27c] and [ d].
[27a] [Her] eyes dwelt for a moment on the Jew's girl, as a tired motorist might eye with longing the common inn, the scarlet curtains and the watered ale, before continuing his drive towards the best hotel, with its music and its palms. /OE,56/

[ b] It would, however, be wise to seek help for your problem before falling pregnant, as it is certainly not advisable and may be dangerous, to continue your habit during pregnancy. /WD,07-09-87/

[ c] He hesitated and then continued, 'I was looking for money, Herr Czinner.' /OE,134/

[ d] She continued, unperturbed. 'Mr Vale quotes the Bible about air pollution.' /W,8/

Apparently, the formula in [5] applies to all the examples in [27]: in the course of interpretation, addressees proceed to natural pairings with verbs such as drive, follow, and say (twice). FREED (1979:96) confirms our impression: "Where a noun form occurs as the object of continue, an appropriate verb can normally be found that is associated with the noun-object" (8). We will shortly see, however, that there are some complications, and that the formula does not apply. According to Freed, a difference has to be made between direct objects which are singular, and direct objects which are plural: "In those cases where the noun is singular, the corresponding complement form must be V-ing, as in all such cases reference is made to a single event and not to a series of events" (FREED 1979:ibid.). Hence, [28a] would be equivalent in meaning to [29a], but not to [29b]; [28b] would be equivalent in meaning to [29a] or [29b] (but not to both of them simultaneously).

[28a] The senators continued their discussion.
[ b] The senators continued their discussions.

[29a] The senators continued discussing.
[ b] The senators continued to discuss.
Freed's view seems to be incorrect, particularly if direct objects are considered which are introduced by an indefinite article. Notice that the use of such objects with the verb continue is normally impossible, unless a relative clause of the restrictive type is added.

[30a] *We continued a conversation.
[  b]   We continued a conversation that we already had two nights ago.
[  c] *They continued a war.
[  d]   They continued a war that would last for another three years.

It is rather hard to think of the sentence in [30b] as covering "a series of events": still, the verb to be added would have to be a TO-construction, since it is clear that the conversation was continued after an interruption. Compare the utterances in [31]:

[31a] We continued to have a conversation that we already had two nights ago.
[  b] *We continued having a conversation that we already had two nights ago.

A first restriction on the use of direct objects after continue, therefore, holds that they must take a definite article (or other determiner), or at least incorporate a restrictive relative clause. This explains why [32a] (quoted from FREED 1979:97) is unacceptable, whereas [32b] is fine.

[32a] *They continued dinner throughout the storm.
[  b] They continued their dinner throughout the storm.

Compare also the following contrasts:

[33a] His mistake had wasted precious seconds, and he continued his descent with a reckless disregard of his icy shoes, two steps at a time. /OE,94/
[33b]  *...he continued a descent...
[  c]  ...he began a descent...

[34a]  If he continued his journey to Constantinople,  
      he would run the risk of three more customs  
      examinations.  /D.163/
[ b]  *...he continued a journey...
[ c]  ...he began a journey...

No real explanation is provided by FREED (1979:97): it is quite pointless and void of any meaning to say that, in those cases where a direct object is impossible, "we may conclude that the particular verbal activity in question must be specified and not elliptically referred to".

Further anomalous strings provided by FREED (ibid.) include the following:

[35a]  *The FBI continued trouble.
[ b]  *The anarchists continued fires in isolated neighborhoods.

There is a considerable difference between the strings in [35] and those in [26], [28a], [30b] and [  d], [32b], [33a] and [34a]. In all of the latter, only one referent is involved: one drive, one habit, one discussion, one conversation, one war, one dinner, one descent and one journey. On the other hand, the direct object trouble in [35a] is generic, whereas [35b] refers to different fires. More importantly - as this does not seem to be the reason for the unacceptability of either [35a] or [ b] (cp. [28b], which is fine, although different discussions are referred to) - they are causative. What FREED (l.c.) says is true: a second verb could be added. The reader is told that the "particular verbal activity" is making in [35a], and to set in [35b]. Pace Freed, it could just as well be to make in [35a] and setting in [35b]. Whatever verb form is preferred
does not really matter: the main thing is that the verbs supplied are causal verbs ("make trouble" = "cause trouble"; "set fires" = "cause fires").

One more restriction has to be considered. It can best be illustrated by means of the following string (again quoted from FREED 1979:97):

[36] *Mike continued the book all morning.

Direct objects after continue must have parts in time: one must be able to think of their parts as being consecutive. As we saw in Chapters Three and Four, a similar restriction exists for the absolute frames of the verbs studied there; it also exists, as we will see below, for the absolute continue-frame. The "parts" of the objects listed on p.183 all fulfil that condition; the parts of a book, however, do not. As a formula for the frame "X continued Y", I propose [37]:

[37] at time t, X continued Y =
   I know this:
   you know more about Y than what I say now
   one can think of Y as of something that has parts
   one can think of those parts as being one
   after the other
   before t, there was Y
   one could think at that time:
   something could happen after now
   after that, there will be no Y anymore
   at t, there was Y
   one could think at t:
   there will be more Y after now

Not the formula in [37], but the one in [5], applies to the examples of a second direct object frame, which seems to have a certain popularity in British English only (9). Consider the examples in [38] (quoted from BALD 1972):

[38a] The two men continued friends.
[38b] He was too honest to continue my partner.

BALD (l.c.:91) observes that [38a] is "völlig akzeptabel" ['completely acceptable'], whereas [38b] "dem Bereich des divided usage zugeteilt werden muss" ['must be situated in the area of divided usage']. Both utterances are understandable (what is meant is continued to be friends and continue to be my partner). As I observed just now, the formula in [5] applies, although it must be added that utterances such as those in [38] are remnants of an older stage of English (18th century), and do not appear to be representative of Modern English at all.

In Chapter Three, the begin on-construction (cp. pp.72-74) was assimilated to the non-causative frame "X began Y". The verb continue can equally well be followed by a preposition on, as in [39] :

[39] As he was constantly pressured by his editor, he continued on his book with unabating energy.

The string in [40], on the other hand, seems unacceptable :

[40] *He put his soup aside when he saw his curried chicken arrive. Having finished his chicken, he continued on his soup.

Apparently, continue on cannot be used as freely as either begin on or start on. The preposition on carries two semantic components : the first one is the idea of parts, which the frame "X continued on Y" shares with the corresponding begin- and start-frames; the second one is the idea of extra effort (on could be seen as the prepositional element of combinations such as work on, struggle on, or sweat on).
1.5. In its elliptical and absolute uses, much more than in its direct object frames, the verb continue behaves like the verbs begin and start (or like the French verb commencer, for that matter). The elliptical "X continued"-frame is illustrated in [41], and the absolute one in [42].

[41a] Still driving the car, mechanically, Erica continued through Birmingham, uncaring where she went. /W,324/
[  b] Outside, the rain continued drearily, as it had since afternoon. /W,341/

[42a] Filming continued for another hour. /W,255/
[  b] I wanted my career to continue and I could see that I was killing myself through drugs. /AM,10-09-88/

Exactly like the other verbs examined in the present study, continue is basically a verb about a verb. Therefore, neither of the frames illustrated in [41] and in [42] ranks at the top of the hierarchy of constructions in which the verb continue is used. For that reason, it is impossible for us to accept JACKENDOFF's (1976a:125) assumptions about sentences similar to those in [43a] to [  c].

[43a] Darren continued to shout.
[  b] Darren continued shouting.
[  c] Darren's shouting continued.

According to Jackendoff, [43a] "may be an instance of either [[43b] or [  c]], depending on whether it is derived by Raising or Equi". The problem with this claim is that aspeetual verbs are not pure "raising verbs" (cp. Part One, Chapter Two, p.37). Alternatively, sentences such as the ones in [43] must not necessarily be viewed as linked together by means of various transformations: they may just as well be considered as autonomous creations (cp. Part Two,
Chapter Three, p.62). Finally, it is quite hard to imagine how, in terms of meaning, (43a), which may imply interruption, "derives" from either (43b), which is incompatible with the idea of an interruption, or from (43c), which can be given the two interpretations.

There are some similarities between Jackendoff's archi-
transformational position and the stand taken by Zellig Harris in various writings. HARRIS (1969:220) argues that "the -ing of verb-operators (He continued running) [is] derived from the -ing of sentence nominalization (His running continued)" (10). Where the TO-construction comes from is a question that is not even raised. Is it a basic frame, together with the frame in (43c) ? There is at least one indication which may lead one to believe that it is not. HARRIS (1976a:245) talks about the "likelihood" of the verb arrive with the verb continue in terms of the frame in (43c) only: he observes that, under continued, "eat has ordinary likelihood and arrive low likelihood: His eating continued, but hardly His arriving continued" (cp. also HARRIS 1976b: 257). No other author except Harris describes the occasional incompatibility of continue with a verb such as arrive in this form; one is led to the conclusion that (43c), in Harris's view, must be a basic frame. The main difference with Jackendoff is that [43b] is derived, whereas Jackendoff considers it as basic as [43c]. Harris faces a problem similar to the one pointed out for Jackendoff: that of answering the question why [43b] cannot but imply continuity without interruption, whereas its so-called underlying form in [43c] has two readings.

From the viewpoint of conceptual axiology, addressees who
wish to interpret sentences such as the ones in [41] and in [42] will either have to look for clues in the context (driving in [41a]), or else they will have to add an infinitive (e.g. fall in [41b]). In both cases, the original continue-formula in [5] becomes applicable as soon as the required natural pairings have been realized. For the examples in [42], however, another formula is needed:

[44] X continued =
one can think of X as of something that has parts
one can think of those parts as being one after the other
I am thinking of one part of X
there are parts before that part
before time t, one could think all the time:
there will be no parts of X anymore after this
at time t, one could think:
there will be more parts of X after this

Except for the fact that it refers to another part, there is no real difference between the formula in [44] and its counterparts proposed in Chapters Three and Four.

It may be useful to add a few observations on sentences such as those in [45]. The adjective in sentence-final position answers the question "how".

[45a] The smallest Holden sedan continued unchanged (for two years).
[  b] Unfortunately, the dictionary continued unrevised (for half a century).

Explicit reference to a certain lapse of time is not indispensable. Nevertheless, [45a] and [  b] do sound better if the AdvP's are added. It may seem that the formula in [5] applies, provided the hearer establishes a natural pairing with the verb to be. But the picture changes rather dramatically if the unacceptable strings in [46] are taken
into account.

[46a] *The emergency exit continued jammed.
[  b] *My father's head continued bald.

A close comparison of the sentences in [45] and in [46] reveals some interesting differences. One thing is that, unlike the subjects in [46a] and [  b], those in [45a] and [  b] are not only inanimate, but also generic. [45a] talks about a particular type of Holden sedan, and [45b] about all the printed copies of a particular dictionary. [45a] could be uttered by someone who takes a look at the smallest Holden sedan of the year, say, 1986, and at the 1987 model of the same type of car, and who then finds out that they are identical (11). [45b] refers to the fact that a certain dictionary was reprinted at least once, but without either being revised or updated. Readings such as these are impossible in the case of [46a] and [  b], probably because my father's head and the emergency exit are non-generic. Neither exists in two or more consecutive models or editions. Notice, however, that [47a] and [  b] are acceptable, though their subjects are non-generic:

[47a] The ringing continued unanswered, and he hung up. /W,422/
[  b] The weather continued fine over the weekend.

There is a rather nice contrast in acceptability between [47a] and [48]:

[48] *The telephone continued unanswered, and he hung up.

It is relatively easy to see what is really going on. The telephone has parts, but these cannot be thought of as being
one after the other. The ringing and the weather do have parts which can be thought of as being one after the other. The subjects in [45] are like those in [47]: each instance of the smallest Holden sedan, and each instance of the unrevised dictionary can be thought of as being a part of the total set of all such Holdens and all dictionaries compiled by author A in year B for editor C. These "parts" were produced, i.e. came into existence, one after the other (12). In other words, the formula proposed in [44] also applies to sentences similar to those in [45] and in [47]. The anomaly of strings such as [46a] and [b], as compared to the acceptability of sentences such as [45a] and [b], left BALD (1972:94) puzzled. Thanks to the formula in [44], the puzzle may be considered as solved.

1.6. At the outset of section 1.3., we said, while referring to FREED (1979), that the different frames in which the verb continue appears are similar to those we met in the case of begin and start. Table One below certainly reflects that viewpoint.

Table One

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) X continued to Z</td>
<td>[5]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) X continued Z-ing</td>
<td>[5]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) X continued by Z-ing</td>
<td>[26]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) X continued Y</td>
<td>[37]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e) X continued (to be) Y</td>
<td>[5]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(f) X continued on Y</td>
<td>[5]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(g) X continued (elliptical)</td>
<td>[5]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(h) X continued (absolute)</td>
<td>[44]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Number of frames : 8
Number of formulas : 4
Number of formulas referring to a second verb : 2

The main difference between begin/start and continue is in
the area of their respective direct object constructions. The commencement verbs were shown to have a causative direct object frame next to a non-causative one. Continue has no causative direct object frame, but it has frame (e), which it does not share with either begin or start. The restrictions built into its main direct object frame (d) are responsible for the fact that a separate formula is required for it; the formula in [5] does not apply.

2. "CONTINUE" AND "KEEP" COMPARED

2.1. According to PARISI & ANTINUCCI (1976:64), the utterances in [49] are "paraphrases":

[  b] John continued to smoke.

The same authors claim that the verbs continue and keep mean the same thing: "not to change to not" (ibid.:57,63). PALMER (1974:177), on the other hand, calls the two verbs "almost synonymous", and FRIEDERICH (1973:35) considers keep on and continue as synonyms. The views expressed by Parisi & Antinucci and by Friederich are probably mistaken; however, it is interesting to note that, unlike continue, keep is among those verbs that can occur with a particle (not a preposition!) on, which has continuation as one of its most salient meanings (cp. note 5, and section 3.1. below).

The adverb "almost" (used by Palmer; cp. above) is entirely legitimate: FREED (1979:88) points out that "native speakers do not consider [continue and keep] synonyms the way they do
begin and start”. The two verbs differ from one another in a way that many scholars seem to find too hard to express. None of the dictionaries of synonyms that was looked at when this chapter was written have lexical entries for either continue or keep. JACKENDOFF (1976a:122-127), on the other hand, talks about both continue and keep; but no attempt whatsoever is made to write out different paraphrases for both verbs. One and the same “semantic primitive” (viz. STAY; cp. section 3.2. for details) is used to gloss each one of the sentences in [50].

[50a] David kept working.
[  b] Laura continued screaming.

Rather than to point to differences, authors such as Bald, Newmeyer and Schopf prefer to single out what they presume is common to both verbs. It seems to me that BALD’s (1972:89-90) observations are rather arbitrary. The following examples show that continue and keep do not have to be “durational”, and that neither verb implies that the on-going state or event is “endangered”.

[51a] The guests continued to arrive.
[  b] The guests kept arriving.

[52a] Roger continued writing songs.
[  b] Roger kept writing songs.

It must be clear that continue and keep are neither inherently durative nor inherently iterative. Depending on the verb that follows, and on the extra-linguistic context, both verbs convey to the sentence a durative or an iterative reading. Hence, as with begin and start, duration and iteration are readings carried by the entire sentence, and
not by just one of its elements (cp., for begin, Chapter
Three, note 7) (13). On the other hand, it is quite unlikely
that the event of writing songs in either [52a] or [ b] is
endangered. If so, by what?

NEWMEYER (1975:25) proposes another generalization, which
makes more sense, though it is not entirely accurate either.
He claims that keep and continue "assert occurrence after the
temporal reference point, where occurrence before that point
is normally presupposed". If Newmeyer had written that
occurrence is asserted at the temporal reference point, he
would have made a correct statement. Occurrence after the
reference point is only presumed in the case of continue (cp.
p.169); with keep, as we shall shortly argue, taking over
WIERZBICKA's viewpoint in this matter, nothing is said or
implied with regard to what still has to come.

We are left with the observations made by SCHOPF (1976:37-
38). In part, they are closely related to Newmeyer's, though
they were apparently formulated independently. First of all,
one common "presupposition" (G. "Präsupposition") is "dass
der prädiizierte Sachverhalt schon vor der Referenzzeit, auf
die die Aussage sich bezieht, Bestand hat" ['that the
predicated situation exists already before that point in time
to which the utterance refers']. This claim is further
illustrated by means of the following statements:

[53a] The weather can only continue calm if it has
been calm.
[ b] You can keep well only if you are (or have
been) well.

On the other hand, according to Schopf (but in another
metalanguage) (14), there is a common component of
expectation before \( t \) that "I will not happen anymore after now".

2.2. As far as the present writer is aware, only two authors have tried to explicate the difference between \textit{continue} and \textit{keep}. FREED (1979) and WIERIBICKA (1988a), who, however in a less successful way (cp. pp.82-85), also dealt with the difference between \textit{begin} and \textit{start}, chose to side with the native speaker, who finds that both verbs, although close in meaning (cp. FREED 1979:88), are different. It will soon become clear that there are valuable suggestions in what each of them has to say about the difference between \textit{continue} and \textit{keep}, especially with regard to the latter. A synthesis of these suggestions may lead to what is hoped to be a correct account of the relationship between the two most basic English verbs denoting continuation.

FREED (1979:88) believes that the comparison of \textit{keep} and \textit{continue} is "in some ways less interesting than that of \textit{begin} and \textit{start}". On the level of meaning, she points first of all to a \textit{common} property: both verbs can refer to the \textit{nucleus} of an event, in which case they provoke a durative reading, or to the repetition of an \textit{entire} event (ibid.:88,92). As the tripartition between onset, nucleus and coda (cp. p.82) is not relevant here, one can hardly have any objection against the way in which Freed explicates what features are shared by \textit{keep} and \textit{continue}. It is argued, next, that "among the differences between \textit{keep} and \textit{continue}", there is the "quality of interruption implied by \textit{continue}" (l.c.:95). Freed's claim has to be slightly adapted in the light of what was said in section 1.2. (pp.174-178): \textit{continue} itself does not
have any "quality of interruption", but it does have a frame involving a second verb (viz. the frame "X continued to Z") which can denote continuation after an interruption (but does not have to). Entirely correct is Freed's view that keep just cannot imply interruption. Her own examples, reproduced in [54], provide the most striking evidence one can think of.

[54a] Don't stop. Just keep running.

[ b] *If they stop now, they won't keep working later.

The foregoing is the only semantic difference Freed refers to. However, there is more to the difference between continue and keep than unmarkedness versus impossibility of interruption.

WIERZBICKA (1988a:82) undertakes the analysis of the two sentences in [55]:

[55a] Mary continued to paint her car.

[ b] Mary kept painting her car.

The way in which Wierzbicka interprets [55a] was discussed at length on pp.167-168. According to her, a change of verb (from continue to keep) triggers a change in "expectations": whereas [55a] refers to a "reasonable expectation", a point of view with which I find myself in disagreement (cp. above), [55b] suggests "an arbitrary and unpredictable behaviour on Mary's part". Again I tend to disagree: rather than "unpredictable", I would say "unpredicted". Keep expresses the idea that an event which was initially presumed not to occur or to exist any longer at a particular moment still occurred or existed at that time. On the other hand, it is not entirely accurate to say that [55b] "suggests that
Mary painted her car many times" (l.c.:82). This is one possible reading, but it is not the only one. Very often, keep refers to a single event which - what follows is another quote, and there Wierzbicka is right - "can stop at any moment, because it has no natural boundary" (l.c.:95).

In conclusion, we may say that both continue and keep are marked. The situation is thus different from the one encountered in the case of begin/start and commencer/se mettre à, where one member of each set (viz., the first) was unmarked, whereas the other one was marked. Continue has in its value a component of expectations for the future (a component which, for instance, also exists in the case of begin and start, but not in the case of keep). Keep has in its value a component of "unpredictedness", and it is negatively marked with respect to interruptions.

3. "KEEP"

3.1. Begin, start, and continue are aspectual verbs which, as pure verbs about verbs, are followed by either a TO- or an ING-construction. Keep is the first aspectualizer studied in this dissertation which does not take a TO-construction. PALMER (1965:153,157,162; cp. 1974:178) repeatedly signals that utterances such as [56a] are acceptable, whereas strings such as [56b] are not allowed.

[56b] *John kept to run.

Palmer's (1974) comment is sadly disappointing: he says
that "sometimes (with no obvious semantic explanation) there is no choice". I submit that Palmer is wrong. There is, in the semantics (or more precisely the value) of keep, one particular factor which is responsible for the non-existence of a frame in which keep is followed by an infinitive. That factor is not the one identified by FREED (1979) (cp. p. 195) as the impossibility of interruptions: since continue was shown to occur with a ТО-construction even in contexts where any idea of an interruption is positively excluded, it would be normal that there were a frame "X kept to Z" as well. Still, when we attempt to write out a formula for the verb keep, we have to complete the first line of the continue-formula in [5], so as to make the occurrence of an interruption impossible. [57] shows the result of the alteration:

[57] before t, Z was happening/there was Z all the time

Next to the impossibility of interruptions, keep has in its value the idea of an unpredictable (WIERZBICKA 1988a) or rather an unpredicted behavior. There is something unexpected about keep. In fact, it seems that speakers almost use it in the same way as they use the verb start: whereas the latter is used in order to mark that, at any earlier moment, it was not to be expected that a process or state would occur or exist at t (cp. pp. 86-87), the former is used in order to mark that, at any earlier moment, it was to be expected that a process or state would not occur or exist anymore at t. Compare the start-component in [58a] with the keep-component in [58b], which replaces the continue-component in [58c]:

197
one did not know at that time:

$Z$ will happen at $t$/there will be $Z$ at $t$.

one could think at that time:

$Z$ will not happen anymore after now/there will be no $Z$ anymore after now

one could think at that time:
something could happen after now

after that, $Z$ will not happen anymore/there will be no $Z$ anymore

The unacceptability of *keep to $V$* is now no longer a mysterious property of the verb *keep*: all we need to do is recall that, with aspectual verbs (and with a whole lot of other verbs as well), *to* implies, for instance, that "one could think at that time: more of $Z$ will happen after now" (cp. WIERZBICKA 1988a:81). There is, in other words, a semantic clash.

Before we write out the formula for *keep* as it is used in the frame "X kept Z-ing", we still have to point out that the last line of the formula in [5] is not part of it: *continue*, but not *keep* (cp. p.196), expresses expectations for the future. The first *keep*-formula must hence look as follows:

$at\ time \ t, \ X \ kept \ Z{-ing} =$

$before \ t, \ Z \ was \ happening/\ there \ was \ Z \ all \ the \ time$

one could think at that time:

$Z$ will not happen anymore after now/

there will be no $Z$ anymore after now

$at \ t, \ Z \ was \ happening/\ there \ was \ Z$

(Constructed) examples for the frame "X kept Z-ing" were given in section 2. (cp. [49a], [50a], [51b], [52b], [54a] and [55b]). [60a] to [60c] are drawn from my own corpus.

I keep wondering, though: Is it all worth it? /W,77/

Everything in the icefall keeps shifting, crumbling and shattering. /AM,03-09-88/

I just keep asking myself if the product would be something that I would buy. /WD,07-09-87/
Second verbs which are punctual can freely be used after 
keep, at least in sentences which refer to a repeatedly 
occuring event (cp. BRINTON 1987:204). This is not at all 
surprising, although Freed, for example, would have a lot of 
trouble explaining what is going on here (remember that she 
defines a series as a "stop-and-start progression" marked by 
interruptions; cp. p.177). Consider the following examples:

[61a] Hammer throwers now rotate five times 
instead of three and shot putters now rotate 
instead of gliding across the circle - and the 
world records keep coming. /AM,10-09-88/

[ b] Their brains get flooded like carburettors; 
they figure the purse money'll keep coming in 
for ever. /W,172/

[ c] Why do you keep going back to that? 
/WD,07-09-87/

[61a] is acceptable thanks to its plural subject; [61b], 
thanks to its generic subject; [61c], thanks to the fact that 
it is "completed" (cp. *He began to arrive vs He began to 
arrive unshaven). For some reason (perhaps, the fact that 
its keep-sentence was pronounced by a 5-year old, and the 
fact that the context tells us that reference is to a habit), 
even the anecdote in [62] sounds good.

[62] My daughter is a thumbsucker. Her father 
and I have been trying to get her out of the 
habit. One day I told Miss Five she should 
remember not to suck her thumb. "I'm trying, 
Mummy," she replied. "But my mouth keeps 
finding my thumb." /NI,27-08-88/

I do not wish to repeat here too much of what was said in 
section 1., as there are too many peculiarities with the verb 
keep which all deserve a closer look. Nothing will therefore 
be said with regard to negation and to stative expressions, 
since, with regard to these, keep behaves exactly like

One area in which keep and continue differ in a rather radical way is in their (im)possibility to occur with the particle on (15). Consider the examples in [63]:

[63a] He said, "Nobody's going to hurt you, Bunny. Don't cry."
But she kept on crying. /M, 59/

[ b] "Anyhow," said Nell moodily, "he only tried to kiss me once. He just kept on drinking and drinking." /M, 133/

[ c] And you'll keep on repeating it until you get it right! /AM, 03-09-88/

Clearly, on is not a preposition here, since on crying in [63a], on drinking and drinking in [63b] and on repeating in [63c] cannot be categorized as prepositional phrases (cp. PRATHER 1977:65). It is worthwhile to point out that there are no restrictions whatsoever on the use of on in a frame "X kept on Z-ing". Durational (cp. [63a] and [ b]) and iterative sentence-readings (cp. [63c]) are both allowed. MITCHELL's (1979:176-177) surprise at NEWMEYER's (1975:54-55) claim that on "may not appear at all if keep does not directly precede its complement" is justified. The sentences in [64] are not incorrect at all.

[64a] Mary's condition kept on steadily worsening.
[ b] Jack kept on not working.

In fact, in some cases, keep on may be better than keep, especially if the ING-construction is negated. PALMER (1965:159) observes that [65a] is acceptable, but less so than [65b] (16).

[65a] He kept not going.
[ b] He kept on not going.
What is the difference between keep and keep on? From the outset, I was convinced that DIVER (1963:160) underestimates the contrast when he says that it is a "stylistic" one. I also felt that on had to be more than just an "otiose insertion" (MITCHELL 1979:176). I tended to believe that by adding the particle on, the speaker emphasizes the idea of a continuation beyond expected limits. But I soon discovered that talking in terms of emphasis is not much better than relegating the difference into the area of style. Keep and keep on present a semantic difference, which is exactly the same as the one between babble and babble on, work and work on, fight and fight on, etc.

FRASER (1974:59) claims that on in, for instance, fight on "contributes a sense of continuance to the action of the verb" (cp. also p.191). Furthermore he "derives" [66a] from [66b], and argues that both have the same interpretation.

[66a] The man fought on.
[ b] The man kept on fighting.

There can be no doubt that the on in [66a] and the on in [66b] are instances of one and the same particle which has "a sense of continuance". However, I do not believe that the two utterances in [66] are transformationally related, nor that they have the same meaning. [66a] seems to be closer to either [67a] or [ b] than to [66b].

[67a] The man continued to fight.
[ b] The man continued fighting.

The only component of continue which, without causing a semantic clash, could be added to the meaning of keep as it is used in the frame "X kept Z-ing" is the fourth one,
repeated in [68]:

[68] one could think at that time:
more of I will happen after now/there will be more I after now

I firmly believe that [68] gives us the meaning of the particle on (which is indeed, as a rule, incompatible with punctual verbs, i.e. verbs to which the component in [68] does not apply; cp. FRASER 1974:59). I am not saying that there is a verb keep on, or that keep on is a phrasal verb, similar to other phrasal verbs such as start off, start out and start up (17). In the combination keep on, the verb keep and the particle on preserve their own autonomy. If keep on were a verb, rather than a verb-particle combination (18), it would have as a formula something consisting at least of the sum of [59] and [68], and as a result keep on would be compatible with a TO-construction. That, clearly, is not the case (cp., for the meaning of to, p.198):

[69a] *But she kept on to cry.
[ b] *He kept on to drink.
[ c] *You’ll keep on to repeat it.

Let us apply what we have found so far to the examples in [63]. In all of the latter, there is a change of expectations: the speaker realizes that, at a certain point in time, it is to be expected that more of the crying, more of the drinking and more of the repeating will occur, whereas before that point the expectation was that at that point there would be no crying, no drinking and no repeating anymore. If only the verb keep is used, there are negative expectations before a certain point in time, and no expectations at that point. An example where keep and keep
on appear together, may be quoted in a final attempt to make the difference entirely clear.

[70] Over the next eight agonising months, the little girl became a pin cushion for blood transfusion needles; and still the blue smudges under her skin kept multiplying. George Bush kept on taking the night plane from Texas to be by his daughter. /AM,10-09-88/

Although it was originally expected that the smudges would not indefinitely multiply, at some later point in time they still did. And although it was originally expected that George Bush would not indefinitely be flying from Texas, at some later point in time it became clear that he would not stop, driven as he was by pity for his little daughter.

3.2. The question which other frames are attested for aspectual keep, next to the ING-construction, is not an easy one, essentially because the verb keep is highly polysemous. As a result, there seems to be no a priori justification "for thinking that all occurrences of keep are aspectual and to be equated with the auxiliary in some way" (MITCHELL 1979:175). Yet, this is what Ray Jackendoff has repeatedly attempted to achieve (19) : to subsume all the "apparently disparate uses" of the verb keep "under a single semantic analysis" (JACKENDOFF 1983:199). Elaborating on the framework proposed before him by GRUBER (1970), and on his own earlier work, he distinguishes a series of five "semantic fields" in which keep finds its place. In all five fields, keep is systematically defined in terms of stay, which is written in capital letters (STAY), and considered a "semantic primitive" (JACKENDOFF 1976a:104) (20). The spatial field, where keep
expresses maintenance of position (as in (71a) and (b)), is taken as a starting point.

(71a) She still kept the porter to her side with a muscular grip. /OE,39/
(b) While he stumbled slowly through the message she kept an eye on the clock. /OE,40/

Jackendoff argues (l.c.:188) that "the semantics of motion and location provide the key to a wide range of further semantic fields". With regard to keep, these are:

1) the temporal field, where keep expresses stability of temporal location, as in (72):

(72) We kept the party on January 1.

2) the possessive field, where keep expresses continued possession, as in (73):

(73) Uncle John kept horses.

It is probably wrong to define possessive keep by means of an epithet derived from the past participle of the verb continue. Furthermore, not all possession is "continued possession"; it may seem awkward to use Jackendoff's label in the case of (74):

(74) She kept the world record for just three minutes.

3) the identificational field, where keep expresses maintenance of a property, as in (75):

(75a) The woman out there would keep Nell busy. /M,126/
(b) He had deliberately kept his voice low key. /W,59/
4) the circumstantial field, where keep denotes coercion, as in [76]:

[76a] Fun and games are the essence of your home and family affairs this week and many unplanned events will keep you guessing about what will happen next. /WD,07-09-87/
[b] Matt's own pride, plus a conviction that a parent should not have to make the first move, kept him from calling her. /W,358/

Several critics have been less than impressed by Jackendoff's efforts to force the identificational and the circumstantial field into the mould of the spatial field (21). It is true that Jackendoff's account of the "analogy" between [77a] and [77b] is rather unconvincing.

[77a] Louise kept Fred composing quartets.
[ b] Louise kept Fred in the attic.

Jackendoff comments: "The lexical parallel (...) suggests an analysis in which "Louise" is agent, "Fred" is theme, and "composing quartets" serves as a kind of [PLACE]". The circumstantial field "defines just what kind of [PLACE] it is: an [EVENT] in which Fred is a character" (1983:198; cp. 1976b:70, and 1978:224). To this type of analysis, WIERZBICKA (1986c:311) objects that, for a definition of the verb keep, "there is no need to invoke any 'location', real or imaginary ("metaphorical", "abstract", "circumstantial" or whatever)". Still, Wierzbicka's own approach has to be abandoned, as it uses the verb cease (cp. Chapter Seven) in order to spell out the "real similarity" (ibid.) between keep in [77a] and keep in [77b]. According to Wierzbicka, the statement in [78] (where X = 'Louise', Y = 'composing quartets'/'in the attic', and Z = 'Fred') holds true in
either case (circumstantial and positional location):

[78] X caused Y not to cease [!] to be sayable
    truly about Z

In [78], next to the verb cease, the adverb truly is used; both concepts (together with Jackendoff's "STAY") are probably too language-specific to be part of a metalanguage based on true semantic primitives.

3.3. One particular use of Jackendoff's "identificational keep" not mentioned by Jackendoff himself appears in [79b]. PALMER (1974:176; cp. 1965:152) correctly observes that sentences such as those in [79] are similar, and must be compared.

[79a] Susan kept talking.
[  b] Susan kept quiet.

There is one major difference overlooked by Palmer (cp. HUDDLESTON 1976:364): [79b] is necessarily durative, whereas [79a] can be either durative or iterative. In order to obtain an iterative interpretation in the case of [79b], one has to add the verb be, as in [80]:

[80] Susan kept being quiet.

Hence, [79a] is ambiguous between two different readings; [79b] and [80] have one reading each. Notice that it is impossible to have continued for kept in [79b]:

[81] *Susan continued quiet.

The string in [81] is an (anomalous) instance of the absolute "X continued"-frame; the anomaly is caused by the
fact that the subject cannot be thought of as having parts
which are consecutive in time. [79b], on the other hand, is
not an instance of an absolute frame, but of a frame "X kept
so-and-so" in which the verb be is left unexpressed, and has
to be supplied (but not to be inserted) by the addressee
(22). This explains the contrast in acceptability. From the
viewpoint of conceptual axiology, no new formula is needed.
[79b] may be glossed in terms of the formula in [59].

[82] Susan kept quiet =
before t, Susan was quiet all the time
one could think at that time:
  Susan will not be quiet anymore after now
at t, Susan was quiet.

It might seem as though the frame "X kept so-and-so",
illustrated in [79b], occurs with a limited set of
semantically closely related adjectives such as quiet,
silent, still, and calm only. Examples where these
adjectives are used are given in [83]:

[83a] If you cannot take a holiday, try to keep as
quiet as possible. /OE,130/
[ b ] He might have broken the thin steel with a
jemmy, but Anna would hear the blows and he
could not trust her to keep silent. /OE,98/
[ c ] She began to laugh gently, and when Dr
Czinner whispered her to keep calm, she said,
'Ve not hysterical' (...) . /OE,213/

Other adjectives, however, also appear:

[84a] The prisoners passed out. They kept close
to each other in the storm of snow which struck
them. /OE,200/
[ b ] By her own wish, they had no live-in help,
and Erica kept busy (...). /W,38/
[ c ] Now the dialogue is harsh and snarly, and
points are scored by overstatement, so if you're
listening - and smart - you under-react and
keep cool. /W,226/
[ d ] Before the show, I was doing jazz ballet
regularly to keep fit. /WD,07-09-07/
Consider furthermore the examples in [85]: they are all perfectly acceptable (23).

[85a] You better keep out of it, Ma. /M,98/
[ b] Others, like Adam and Brett at this moment, did their viewing to keep abreast of design changes and to seek inspiration. /W,241/
[ c] The emphasis on work and unyielding standards were reasons why auto makers respected the college and kept in touch with faculty and students. /W,299/
[ d] So I kept to myself and I had a lot of things to prove. /AM,03-09-88/

Only cases such as the following are positively excluded, and the formula in [59] can account for their anomaly.

[86a] *Harry kept tall.
[ b] *The water kept boil.t.
[ c] *The cupboard kept brown.

At the heart of the matter is, once again, a semantic clash. States such as tall and boil.t are incompatible with the second component (one cannot think before t that Harry will not be tall anymore), and with the concept "all the time" in the first component (a person is tall and water is boil.t "tout court", not *"tall/boil.t all the time").

In the case of [86c], only the second component raises problems: one does not normally expect that the cupboard's colour will change. GRUBER (1976:178) provides an interesting minimal pair which illustrates a similar point. There are, according to him, no problems with [87a]; [87b], however, is wrong.

[87a] The ball kept in the room.
[ b] *The box kept in the room.

In order to clarify the nature of the contrast, Gruber introduces the notion of "mobile properties". If a subject
which is located in space has got such properties, it can occur with the verb keep. From our point of view, that is understandable enough: a subject located in space, and which has "mobile properties", is obviously in a kind of state that could change from one moment to another.

With regard to [86c], it could be argued that someone may come along and repaint the cupboard. Such an observation is not without importance, as will become clear further below, when we look at the causative frame "X kept Y so-and-so". The two uses of keep which were compared at the outset of this section (p.206) have each a causative counterpart (24), and of course the causative frames are to be compared as well. In [88a], Carol acts in such a way as to cause the event described in [79a]. Related to [79b] is [88b], a sentence in which the idea is expressed that Carol acts in such a way as to make Susan keep quiet.

[88a] Carol kept Susan talking.
[ b] Carol kept Susan quiet.

The examples in [89] and in [90] provide further illustrations of the relationship between the non-causative and the causative frames.

[89a] They rested until twilight and somehow found the resources to keep going. /AM,03-09-88/
[ b] He discovered that more than half of the people working around him smoked two to three joints a day and many admitted it was the drug which kept them going. /W,357/

[ b] And my coat - you must take that. It will keep you warm. /OE,29/

Two remarks have to be made about the frame "X kept Y
"ing" (i.e. the one illustrated in (28a) and in (29b)). One thing is that **start** has a similar kind of frame, which it does not share with **begin** (cp. pp.95-96). **Keep** does not share this frame with **continue** either (25). WIERZBICKA (1988a:93) points out that the contrast existing between **continue** and **keep** with regard to the frame under investigation, "far from being idiosyncratic and arbitrary, makes perfect sense, semantically". However, as in the case of **start**, and although there is no causative **continue**-frame, it is not sufficient to invoke causation in order to explain the contrast. As important as causation is the **unexpectedness** of the causer's act. Both ideas are clearly expressed in the formula in [91] :

[91] at time t, X kept Y **ing** =
one can think of **ing** as of something that Y does/is
before t, I was happening all the time/
there was Z all the time
one could think at that time :
I will not happen anymore after now/
there will be no Z anymore after now
one did not know at that time :
I will happen at t/there will be Z at t
at t, X did something
because of that, at t, Z was happening/there was Z

The other observation about the frame explicates in [91] concerns the scope of the verb **keep**, which "might not be immediately clear" (NEWMEYER 1975:62). I believe that this observation is correct. If one looks at the example in [28a], for instance, one **must**, at least for a moment, wonder whether the verb **keep** refers to Susan's talking only, or to both Susan's talking and the activity undertaken by Carol in order to **keep** Susan talking. In his own attempt to show that **keep** refers only to the event brought about, and not to an
activity undertaken by the subject, Newmeyer asks his reader to think of the sentence in [92] (the only one on which he bases his claims):

[92] The worker kept the machine running.

According to Newmeyer, [92] could be used even if our worker had pressed just one button to start the machine, and had died instantly. In reply, I wish to ask my reader to imagine a machine which, if switched on, provides itself with energy while running, and which then runs for one full month. At the end of the month, our worker has been buried for about four weeks. Does he still keep the machine running? Not at all. Newmeyer provides an inadequate contextualization.

Imagine, alternatively, that our worker, after pressing the button, sits back in an office chair, and spends his working hours for the whole one month reading magazines. Does he keep the machine running? Again, he does not: he started it running, and that is about all we are allowed to say. We can only claim that the worker kept the machine running if the machine had been running before (if only for a short while), and if the worker regularly pressed the button whenever the pace of the machine was slowing down. Stated more generally, the scope of keep is limited to the event brought about by the subject. Newmeyer's evidence is unconvincing, but his statement is true. It is, I believe, properly reflected in the formula in [91].

I must spell out that, in the frame "X kept Y Z-ing", it is possible to insert the preposition from between Y and Z-ing (cp. GRUBER 1976:180). A quite dramatic change of meaning results, as a comparison between [93a] and [ b] may show.

211
[93a] Carol kept Susan talking.
[93b] Carol kept Susan from talking.

Whereas Susan did talk in [93a] (cp. FREED 1979:98), she did not do so in [93b]. In [76b], which has another example of what we shall term a from-phrase, Matt did not call.

As a formula for [93b], [94] may be proposed:

[94] at time t, X kept Y from Z-ing =
    one can think of Z as of something that Y wants to do
    before t, Z was not happening
    one could think at that time:
        Z will happen after now
    one did not know at that time:
        Z will not happen at t
    at t, X did something
    because of that, at t, Z was not happening

A comparison of [94] and [91] reveals that all the components (or parts thereof) which contain the verb happen now say the opposite of what they said at first. This is consistent with the meaning of from, which, if used with verbs such as keep, "is a manifestation of negation" (GRUBER 1976:194). On the other hand, [91] has be-components (unlike [94], and [97] in Chapter Three). The reason for their presence will become clear below.

If we now turn to the frame "X kept Y so-and-so" (as in [88b] and in [90b]), we may, first of all, say that [95] is related to [86c]; this newest example is acceptable because an (external) agent is identified who, one could expect, might change the cupboard's color.

[95] Margaret kept the cupboard brown.

The acceptability contrast in [96] can be explained in a similar way (except for the fact that the agent is not
exactly "external").

[96a]  *While he stumbled slowly through the message, her eye kept on the clock.
[ b]  While he stumbled slowly through the message, she kept an eye on the clock. /OE,40/

On the other hand, both the non-causative a- and the causative b-sentences in [97] and [98] are correct.

[97a]  My stomach doesn't keep quiet.
[ b]  I can't keep my stomach quiet. /OE,20/

[98a]  You better keep out of it, Ma. (= [85a])
[ b]  It would be better if I could teach them art and they could have reading and writing classes here. It would keep them out of trouble. /WD,07-09-87/

As in the case of the frame "X kept so-and-so", the verb be is to be supplied by the addressee, but not to be inserted: it is systematically understood that the cupboard was brown, that "her eye" was on the clock, that "my stomach" is not quiet, and that "they" would be out of trouble. Therefore, the formula in [91], with its be-components, applies.

It is useful to recall, at this stage, that the formula just referred to has a component which says that "at t, X did something". The present account is hence different from the one in CHEN (1986), where keep is classified as a "[- active] action verb", on the basis of a sentence such as [99], which contains an instance of Jackendoff's "spatial" keep.

[99]  John kept his car in the garage.

"[- active]" verbs, in Chen's framework (cp. l.c.:134), denote "the agent's 'disposal' rather than his 'manipulation' of the patient". Chen adds that "nothing physical happens". Is it because the car, presumably, does not move that
"nothing physical happens"? Clearly, there is some physical activity: John acts in such a way as to prevent a situation where the car would not be in the garage anymore. For instance, he takes care that the garage doors are closed.

It would seem that, as in the case of "X kept Y Z-ing", the preposition from can be inserted in the frame "X kept Y so-and-so". The head of a from-phrase, obviously, is the preposition from. The latter's dependent can be a verb (or VP), as in [76b] and in [93b]; but it can also be an NP, as in [100a] and [b] (cp. NEWMEYER 1975:55-56).

[100a] Carol kept Susan from the cookies.
[b] Carol kept the cookies from Susan.

The sentences in [100] are equally acceptable. Notice, however, that the same sentences without the preposition from are unintelligible: in that sense, we were wrong, just now, when we said that it looked as if the preposition from could be "inserted". Notice, on the other hand, that there are cases in which the construction portrayed in [100a] is awkward. The reality of ball-games reveals why [101b] is odd, whereas [101a] is fine.

[101a] We kept the ball from the opposing team.
[b] ?We kept the opposing team from the ball.

It may seem that, whenever the dependent is an NP, from marks distance in space: in one case, Susan is kept away from the cookies, in the other case the cookies are kept away from her. Actually, NEWMEYER (l.c.) and GRUBER (1976:179) do claim that keep from, if used with an NP, equals keep away from. One may be tempted, then, to analyze the from which appears before a verb or VP as marking distance in time. If
anybody talks at all, it is definitely not Susan. The latter will only talk after Carol "stops keeping" her from talking. What should "keep us from" (!) arguing along such lines is the fact that from, with a dependent being an NP, does not mark (at least not systematically) distance in space.

Reconsider the utterance in [100a]. It could very well be the case that Susan has the cookies within her reach. But Carol is on stand-by at the doorstep, and warns Susan that she will scream as soon as she dares only touch one of the cookies. There is no real distance in space, then. Carol exerts control over Susan’s will. [100a] means nothing more or less than [102]:

[102] Carol kept Susan from touching the cookies.

Touching is an ING-construction added by the addressee on the basis of a natural pairing conditioned by the context of the scene described in [100a]. The formula in [94] applies:

[103] Carol kept Susan from the cookies =
before t, Susan did not touch the cookies
one could think at that time:
Susan will touch the cookies after now
one did not know at that time:
Carol will do something at t
because of that, at t, Susan will not
touch the cookies
at t, Carol did something
because of that, at t, Susan did not touch
the cookies

If the situation is the one sketched in [100b], the concept of distance in space becomes unavoidable. Carol is bad enough to take the cookies and run away whenever Susan is about to have one. This time, Carol exerts control over the cookies, not over Susan’s will (26). from stands for away from, and the verb be is to be supplied (the cookies were
away from Susan). This time, the formula in [91] applies:

[104] Carol kept the cookies from Susan =
before t, the cookies were all the time
away from Susan
one could think at that time:
the cookies will not be away from Susan
any more after now
one did not know at that time:
Carol will do something at t
because of that, at t, the cookies will
be away from Susan
at t, Carol did something
because of that, at t, the cookies were away
from Susan

At this point, we are almost at the end of our analysis of
aspectual keep. Section 3.4. deals with some elliptical
uses.

3.4. The assumption that instances of the frame "X kept" do
not exist (FREED 1979:95) is not entirely correct. One must
not overlook examples such as [105] (borrowed from NEWMEYER
1975:40):

[105] The butter kept.

It is true that this frame has a very restricted use: its
subject must denote an item for consumption, and the hearer
is supposed to add after the verb keep adjectives such as
good, fresh, or crispy.

Keep on may be used elliptically, too – although not all
my informants found the examples below acceptable. It is
hardly necessary to say that, as second verbs to be supplied
(27), only ING-constructions are allowed:

[106a] The rain kept on for hours. (verb to be
supplied: falling)
[ b] He kept on as Prime Minister until the age
of 70. (verb to be supplied: working)
An **absolute** *keep*-frame does not exist. The following are unacceptable:

[107a]  *The meeting kept until 5 pm.
[  b]  *The meeting kept on until 5 pm.

Thus, we see that, as far as syntax is concerned, *keep* is extremely "flexible" despite the fact that one particular frame (the absolute one), which is quite common with all the English verbs studied up to now, is not found at all.

3.5. Generally speaking, the overall impression one gets at the end of an analysis of *keep* stretching over more than twenty pages is surely very different from the one that appears in FREED (1979:95). According to the latter, *keep* is "extremely limited in its syntactic distribution". It definitely is, if the only frames considered are the ones illustrated in [60] and in [93b]. There is, as we have seen, more to aspectual *keep* than that. Table Two presents an overview:

Table Two

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frame</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) X kept Z-ing</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) X kept on Z-ing</td>
<td>59 + 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) X kept so-and-so</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) X kept Y Z-ing</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e) X kept Y from Z-ing</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(f) X kept Y so-and-so</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(g) X kept Y from Y'</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(h) X kept Y from Y' (bis)</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(i) X kept</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(j) X kept on</td>
<td>59 + 68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Number of frames : 10
Number of formulas : 3
Number of formulas referring to a second verb : 3

"[59] + [68]" means that two formulas apply in conjunction. One covers the verb *keep*, the other one the particle *on.*
Indirectly, Table Two reveals that only "possessive" *keep* (Jackendoff's terminology; cp. p.204) is not aspectual. All the other categories defined by Jackendoff are represented by at least one frame. One final remark: I believe there are good reasons to claim that our description is superior to the one provided by Jackendoff— not only because of the facts exposed on p.205, but also because we needed only *three* formulas, whereas he distinguishes *four* meanings (apart from the possessive one). Even from the viewpoint of descriptive economy, then, Jackendoff's account is unconvincing.
NOTES to Part Two, Chapter Five

(1) For similar constructs, see, once again (cp. Chapter Three, note 1), GIVÓN (1973:893).

(2) JACKENDOFF’s (1976a:126) statement that the "complement" of negative continue is always denied "for some time" is clearly false.

(3) For other differences, see FRIEDERICH (1973) (incorrect), FRIEDERICH (1977), BOERTIEN (1979), Brinton (1987), and WIERZBICKA (1988a).

(4) An excellent criterion to distinguish between the two readings of the verb continue is provided by KITTREDGE (1972:405): if an adverb such as suddenly can be added, there has been an interruption; if it cannot, there has been no interruption.

(5) Go on seems to be a rather common verb in the paradigm of verbs denoting continuation. However, it is, essentially, the particle on, and not the verb go, that carries the idea of a continuation (cp. carry on, babble on, etc.). Some more details are given in section 3.

(6) Everything seems to indicate that both frames are synonymous, although I have not tested that particular assumption far enough to draw straightforward conclusions of any kind.

(7) At least in its everyday use as a verb about a verb, PRATHER (1977:57) signals the existence of a "special legalistic sense of continue which is causative". Her example is reproduced in [i].

{i} Judge Lynch continued the case until next Tuesday.

(8) The term "apropriate word" was first used by HARRIS (1965) (cp. p.64). Freed uses the term "appropriate verb" at the end of her discussion of begin and start, and at the very beginning of her section on continue and keep. There is no reference to Harris whatsoever, although this author is duly represented in Freed's bibliography, which lists three publications by Harris, the first one of which is HARRIS (1965).

(9) That, at least, is a viewpoint I found expressed in ROBERTS (1958:178) and in BALD (1972:91). Some people might argue that the frame considered here is not a direct object frame (cp. the examples). Still, the terms friends and my partner are in direct object position, and they are not
introduced by a preposition. I therefore consider them as a kind of direct object, although they cannot (for instance) be passivized.

(10) For a similar viewpoint with regard to the verb begin, in Harris, see Chapter Three, note 31. Cp. also HARRIS (1969:198, 231-233; 1976a:241).

(11) My apologies to the Holden manufacturers. I have not the slightest idea of whether there is any smallest Holden sedan that remained unchanged over the years considered. [45a] is no more than a linguistic example which is given some probability of occurrence by means of a reference to an existing type of cars.

(12) Even if the Holden is produced on several different production lines, it would be a quite rare coincidence (rare enough for people not to think of it) if two of its instances or "parts" came off two different lines at exactly the same point in time.

(13) The fact that keep-sentences may denote both duration and iteration has been endlessly repeated. The present writer found it expressed in DIVER (1963:160), HUDDLESTON (1969:263; 1976:364), TALMY (1978:17), MITCHELL (1979:176-177), JACKENDOFF (1983:247), and MORROW (1986:432-433). Bald bases his own view on GRUBER's (1970) assumption, also taken over by JACKENDOFF (1976a), that keep is "durational", and he then extends it so as to cover both keep and continue.

(14) Schopf makes his point in a fundamentally incorrect way. I shall have more to say about this in Chapter Seven.


(16) Of course, [65a] would be unacceptable if it were used to express the idea that somebody "did not keep going". ROBERTS (1958:195) has only the latter meaning in mind when he rejects this utterance.

(17) Nobody would sensibly argue that babble on, work on and fight on are "verbs" in exactly the same way as babble, work, and fight.

(18) My use of the term "verb-particle combination" is different from the one in FRASER (1974). What he calls a verb-particle combination is for me a phrasal verb.

(19) See, for instance, JACKENDOFF (1976a, 1976b, 1978), and (most extensively) JACKENDOFF (1983:188-203). The terminology used in the following survey is the one found in JACKENDOFF (1983). There have been a few changes over the years. Jackendoff's conceptual semantics is not to be confused with Wierzbicka's conceptual analysis nor with my conceptual axiology.

(20) It is also observed (id. 1983:198; cp. 1985:26) that "just as spatial 'keep' means 'maintain in a position over
time', circumstantial 'keep' means 'maintain in a role in an event or situation over time'. What links there are between STAY and "maintain over time" is not made clear.

(21) See, for instance, ANWARD (1980:67), WERTH (1987:147), and WIERZBICKA (1986c:310-311) (on the latter, cp. also below). Similarly, KIEFER (1980:252) condemns Gruber's descriptive apparatus for being "simply too crude for the description of all lexical relations". Gruber, who has exerted a profound influence on Jackendoff's way of thinking, arrives at "lexical structures that are sometimes unmotivated and counterintuitive" (ibid.:255).

(22) Several authors have argued that at some stage of the "transformational" process, the verb be is either "deleted" or "merges" with the verb keep: cp. HUDDLESTON (1971:132; 1976:364-365), NEWMEYER (1975:54), and GRUBER (1976:179). BAUSCH (1963), who is not a transformationalist, postulates ellipsis of to be even in the case of a subsequent ING-construction (cp. l.c.:145); he also makes the sweeping claim (ibid.) that at any moment to be can be reinserted.

(23) NEWMEYER (1975:55) probably misanalyzes [ii] when he claims that "there is an implicit verbal sense of nonperceptual continuing activity". In other words, a so-called C.A. verb (cp. p.65), most likely doing, is deleted from its position in between kept on and the job.

[ii] Harry kept on the job.

Newmeyer's analysis turns keep into a circumstantial verb, with on being a particle. It is a problematic account for there is no evidence that keep on occurs with NP's at all.

(24) According to BRESNAN (1982:402), "like other intransitive verbs in English, keep undergoes a lexical rule of Causativization".


(26) GRUBER (1976:179) is presumably wrong when he proclaims [iii] an ambiguous utterance.

[iii] John kept the book from Bill.

According to Gruber, John may exert "control over the book's mobility or control over Bill's will". The latter reading would rather be conveyed by means of [iv]:


(27) Once again, it would be a mistake to argue that what is to be supplied was formerly deleted. This type of argument appears in MITCHELL (1979:177).
CHAPTER SIX
CONTINUER AND NE CESSER DE
IN FRENCH

1. "CONTINUER"

1.1. Just as commencer appeared to be a close equivalent to begin, continuer appears to be a close equivalent to continue. According to BAUSCH (1963:268), one condition for the use of the French verb is "dass die im Infinitiv bezeichnete Aktion (...) bereits im Gange gewesen sein muss" ['that the action denoted by the infinitive must already have been occurring']. If, for the time being, we disregard the fact that infinitives following continuer do not necessarily denote actions, we may say that Bausch's statement is correct. It is valid for the English verbs continue and keep as well, and it must be part of a successful semantic formula for the verb continuer. It is part of the glosses in [1]. A slightly different version of [1a] was proposed (and rejected) by NEF (1980:24) (1); [1b] and [c], on the other hand, appear in GARDIES (1981:118) (2).

[1a] a) Paul écrivait son roman (avant t)
b) Paul écrivait son roman (à t)
c) Paul a continué à écrire son roman (après t)

'a) Paul was writing his novel (before t)
b) Paul was writing his novel (at t)
c) Paul continued to write his novel (after t)'

222
[1b] 1) pendant un certain espace de temps immédiatement antérieur à \( t_o \), Pierre effa
2) à \( t_o \) et pendant un certain espace de temps immédiatement postérieur à \( t_o \).
  Pierre effa
  '1) during a certain lapse of time immediately before \( t_o \), Pierre effa
  2) at \( t_o \) and during a certain lapse of time immediately after \( t_o \), Pierre effa'

[ c]  durant un certain espace de temps commençant avant \( t_o \) et finissant après \( t_o \), Pierre effa
  'during a certain lapse of time beginning before \( t_o \) and finishing after \( t_o \), Pierre effa'

[1a] is supposed to explicate the meaning of the utterance in [2a]; [1b] and [ c] are supposed to do the same thing for the quasi-utterance in [2b].

[2a]  Paul continuait à écrire son roman.
  'Paul continued to write his novel'

[ b]  Pierre continue à effa à \( t_o \).
  'Pierre continues to effa at \( t_o \),

I have several reasons for not accepting any of the glosses in [1] as my starting point for a semantic formula à la Wierzbicka. [1a], for instance, is particularly poor because of the repetition (in c) of the verb to be defined (3). It is not much better, on the other hand, to define continuer in the way Gardiès does it, i.e. in terms of commencer and finir, as in [1c].

Another weak point is that the glosses in [1], unlike all the formulas proposed in Chapters Three, Four, and Five, make a statement about what is the case after \( t \), rather than about what might be the case. In other words, they talk about an established fact, rather than to express an intuition about the future. A hic-et-nunc-perspective has been introduced (cp. the sequence avant \( t / à t / après t \) : [1a] c) and part of
[1b] 2) describe a state of affairs which does not yet exist at either time "t" (Nef) or "t₀" (Gardies), i.e. at the time at which the continuation in [2a] and [b] occurs (4).

Finally, perhaps the most important shortcoming is the use, in [1b] 1), of the adverb immédiatement. That particular adverb implies continuity, and thereby precludes the possibility of a continuation after an interruption. GARDIES (1981:131) does acknowledge the possibility of this type of continuation; he does not find it worthwhile, however, to revise his gloss. REQUEDAT (1980:29), on the other hand, seems to think in terms of interruptions only, when he says that, with continuer, what is involved is a "reprise", a "second commencement" ["a resumption", "a second beginning"].

In fact, if followed by an infinitive, continuer is as neutral or unmarked with regard to interruptions as the English verb continue followed by a TO-construction. BAUSCH (l.c.:268) observes that continuer can express either "dass [die im Infinitiv bezeichnete] Aktion [!] ohne Unterbrechung fortgesetzt wird" ["that the action denoted by the infinitive is continued without interruption"] or "dass diese Aktion [!] (...) nach einer Unterbrechung wieder aufgenommen und fortgesetzt wird" ["that the action is resumed and continued after an interruption"] (see also BENAC 1956:184). Consider, for an example of continuer expressing uninterrupted continuation, the text in [3a], and, for an example of continuer expressing interrupted continuation, the text in [3b].

[3a] Dans un effort qui lui semblait énorme, il tendit la main de nouveau pour éteindre la radio, pour "tuer" cette femme qui chantait et qui aurait pu être (...) sa mère, sa
femme, sa maîtresse, sa fille. (...) La femme continua à chanter et, contre son gré, il laissa retomber sa main virile et bien manucurée sur son genou (...). /YS,134/

'In an effort which struck him as enormous, he again stretched his hand to switch off the radio, to "kill" that woman who was singing and who could have been his mother, his wife, his mistress, his daughter. The woman continued to sing and, against his will, he dropped his virile and well manicured hand onto his knee'

[3b]  
- Tant mieux, avait conclu Jolyet. A mon avis, il est déjà très bête de se demander si quelqu'un vous aime, et il est encore plus bête de se demander si vous, nous l'aimons.

Et ils avaient parlé d'autre chose.

Mais en marchant dans la rue, en rentrant chez elle, cette pensée avait continué à troubler l'esprit de Béatrice. /LD,197-198/

'- Much better, Jolyet had concluded. To my idea, it is already very stupid to wonder whether somebody loves you, and it is even more stupid to wonder whether we love that person. And they had talked about something else. But while walking along the streets, on her way home, that thought had continued to trouble Beatrice's mind'

Both [3a] and [ b] have continuer à + infinitive. Next to the frame "X continua à Z", there is a frame "X continua de Z", but the connector de is less frequently used (5). As usual, X refers to a subject NP, and Z to a verb in the infinitive. Compare the examples in [4a] and [ b] :

[4a]  
Zamian m'écoutait à peine. Il continuait de rêver. /CP,154/

'Zamian hardly listened to me. He continued dreaming'

[ b]  
Je n'y croyais pas et continue de ne pas y croire. /ML,06-87/

'I did not believe in it and I continue not believing in it'

The de-constructions were translated into English by means of ING-constructions (cp., for an exlanation, p.121). Once again, the choice of connector has no bearing at all on the semantics of the aspectual verb - pace BUSSE (1974:197), who
claims that, with *continuer à*, emphasis is on what still has to come, whereas with *continuer de* the continuation is considered from the viewpoint of what has already passed (6). With the verb *commencer*, *everything* is still to come, and *nothing* has passed; yet, *commencer de* is not impossible (cp. also p.121).

1.2. Some more illustrations for the frame "X continua à Z" are provided in [5]. Others were given in [2a] and in [3].

[5a] Stioppa continuait à leur parler. /80,30/
'Stioppa continued to talk to them'

[ b] L'autre continuait à taper. /80,104/
'The other one continued to type'

[ c] Les deux Brésiliennes continuaient à agiter leurs éventails en chantonnant. /75,75/
'The two Brazilian servants continued to shake their fans while humming'

In accordance with the remarks made in 1.1., the following formula may be proposed for these and similar utterances:

[6] au temps t, X continua à Z =
avant t, Z avait lieu/il y avait Z
l'on pouvait penser alors :
qqch pourrait avoir lieu après maintenant
après cela, Z n'aura plus lieu/il n'y
aura plus de Z
à t, Z avait lieu/il y avait Z
l'on peut penser à t :
plus de Z aura lieu après maintenant/il
y aura plus de Z après maintenant

[6] appears to be nothing else but a literal translation of the main *continue*-formula suggested in Chapter Five (p.170). It differs from the main *commencer*-formula proposed in Chapter Four (p.115), and repeated in [7], in three respects, viz. : 1) the absence of a negation in line one; 2) an entirely new second line; and 3) the absence of a "one could

226
not know”-component at t. In other words, when followed by an infinitive, *continuer* stands to *continue* as *commencer* stands to *begin.*

\[ (7) \] au temps t, X commença à Z =
\hspace{1cm} avant t, Z n'avait pas lieu/il n'y avait pas
\hspace{1cm} de Z
\hspace{1cm} à t, Z avait lieu/il y avait Z
\hspace{1cm} l'on put penser à t :
\hspace{1cm} plus de Z aura lieu après maintenant/il
\hspace{1cm} y aura plus de Z après maintenant
\hspace{1cm} l'on ne put pas savoir à t :
\hspace{1cm} plus de Z aura lieu après maintenant/il
\hspace{1cm} y aura plus de Z après maintenant

There are two groups of "special verbs" that deserve our attention if used after the verb *continuer.* *Continuer,* in that particular sense, is by no means different from the commencement verbs studied in Chapters Three and Four, and from *continue* and *keep.* One group consists of punctual verbs (e.g. *arriver* ['arrive']), the other one of stative expressions (e.g. *savoir* ['know']). Punctual or momentary actions *cannot continue*; therefore, the use in subject position of a noun which is morphologically and semantically singular must result in unacceptability. Notice, however, that, unlike [8a], [8b] is fully acceptable: the second verb has lost its punctualness. According to LAMIROY (1987:285), "the perspective is one of 'slow motion', whereby the boundaries of the situation are outside the view".

\[ (8a) \] *Max continua à arriver.*
\hspace{1cm} 'Max continued to arrive'
\[ (8b) \] L'avion continua à tomber.
\hspace{1cm} 'The plane continued to fall'

The unacceptability of [8a] is correctly predicted by the impossibility of a gloss which states at the same time that, before t, Max arrived, and that, at t, he arrived as well.
But if momentary actions (e.g., lancer in [9]) cannot continue, they can occur many times (7):

[9] Nous continuerons de lancer des auteurs inconnus, même jeunes. /ML,06-87/
'We shall continue launching unknown writers, even young ones'

Normally, an iterative reading appears as soon as the subject of a continuer-sentence containing a punctual verb is morphologically and/or semantically plural; also, as soon as the second verb has a direct object of that same nature; finally, if the second verb is "completed", either by means of an AdvP (cp. LAMIROY l.c.), or by means of an infinitive (if the second verb is one of those which can normally be followed by an infinitive). The details will not be repeated here; for the verb commencer, they are given on pp.111-113.


'Max continued to know the answer'

According to Gross, there is definitely a constraint; the question raised by him is whether or not it is a semantic one. In fact, Gross's question is idle: there is no constraint, and no second verb is a priori excluded. What really matters is, as before, that the second verb and whatever follows it must be subject to a constant possibility of change. This is not the case in [11a], which is therefore unacceptable (and judged so by LAMIROY 1987:282). [11b], however, is fine: the subject il may at any time come to know more of the sonata, even without explicitly charging an artist with the task of playing it just for him.
[11a]  *Jean continue à connaître Anne.  
'John continues to know Ann'.

[ b]  [11] avait renoncé à son projet de se faire jouer par un artiste la sonate entière, dont il continuait à ne connaître que ce passage.  
/CS,218-219/  
'He had abandoned his project to have the entire sonata, of which he continued to know nothing but that particular passage, played for him by an artist'.

[12a] and [ b] are both acceptable. Notice the contrast between continuer à (in [12a]) and continuer de (in [12b]).

[12a]  Ce qui différencie Nietzsche de Bataille c'est que l'un a un langage extatique tandis que l'autre continue à avoir un langage en partie subjectif.  
/ML,06-87/  
'What differentiates Nietzsche from Bataille is that the former has an ecstatic language whilst the other continues to have a language which is in part subjective'.

[ b]  Et Novy Mir aussi a eu, et continuera d'avoir, une ligne culturelle marquée par le réalisme.  
/ibid./  
'And Novy Mir also had, and will continue having, a cultural line marked with realism'.

Examples such as the ones in [12] necessitated the use, in [6], of what we have called "be-components": nobody is doing anything in this particular utterance, nothing is happening. The conditions under which continuer occurs with a stative expression are similar to those spelled out for commencer (cp. pp.113-115).

1.3. Not much will be said with regard to frames which continuer shares with either the French verb commencer or the English verb continue. More emphasis is to be laid on those frames which are peculiar to the verb continuer. The latter is, as far as its co-occurrence with constructions other than those involving a second verb is concerned, at the same time
richer and poorer than *commencer* and *continue*. It is "richer" in that it has, until today, and unlike the verb *commencer*, a pronominal construction of the type *se continuer*, as in [13]:

[13] La leçon se continuera la semaine prochaine.  
'The class will continue next week'

The example in [13] is related and has to be compared to both [14a] and [b] (more details will be provided below).

[14a] La leçon continuera la semaine prochaine.  
[ b] Le professeur continuera sa leçon la semaine prochaine.

*Continuer* is "poorer", on the other hand, in that it has no "par + infinitive"-construction similar to *commencer par* or *continue by* : whereas [15a] and [b] are both acceptable, [15c] does not exist.

[15a] Il commencé par peindre une nature morte.  
'He began by painting a still-life'
[ b] He continued by painting a still-life.  
[ c] *Il continua par peindre une nature morte.

It may be interesting to observe that, in this particular respect, French is different from three other closely related Romance languages, all of which have a construction consisting of their counterpart for the verb *continuer* (Italian *continuare*, Spanish and Portuguese *continuar*) and their connector *par* (Italian *per*, Spanish and Portuguese *para*).

We shall first, as before, look at frames involving a direct object. Consider the examples in [16].

[16a] Je n'ai pas continué ma phrase.  
'I did not continue my sentence'
- Oui, continua-t-il, maîtrisant mal ses sanglots. Je sais que vous savez... /CP,193/
  'Yes, he continued, struggling to control his sobs. I know that you know...'

Je continue le vol jusqu'à Paris avec Mme Chirac, qui a conservé tous les bouquets et les délicates couronnes canaques qu'on lui a offerts. /PM,02-10-87/
  'I continue the flight to Paris together with Mrs Chirac, who has kept all the bouquets and the delicate Kanaka crowns that were given to her'

Additional infinitives are easy to supply : addressees proceed to natural pairings with, for instance, prononcer ['pronounce'] (in [16a]) and dire ['say'] (in [16b]). In the case of [16c], the original direct object (le vol ['the flight']) can be replaced by means of the verb voler (['fly']). I must once again point out that a direct object which has a deverbal noun as its head is not necessarily equivalent to the morphologically related verb :

Mais il [a professor in medicine] se refuse toujours à toute déclaration publique et continue normalement ses consultations. /PM,11-03-88/
  'But he still refuses to make any public statement, and he normally continues his consultations'

Obviously, the professor in [17] is not consulting anybody; his patients are consulting him.

Generally speaking, direct objects after the verb continuer must be of the same nature as direct objects after its English counterpart (cp. pp.181-184). A separate formula is needed to account for the various constraints :

au temps t, X continua Y =
  je sais ceci :
    tu sais plus de Y que ce que je dis maintenant
  l'on peut penser à Y comme à qqch qui a des parties
l'on peut penser à ces parties comme à des parties qui sont les unes après les autres
avant t, il y avait Y
l'on pouvait penser alors :
qqch pourrait avoir lieu après maintenant après cela, il n'y aura plus de Y
à t, il y avait Y
l'on put penser à t :
il y aura plus de Y après maintenant

No translation is added to the formula in [18] : it is a literal transposition of the formula for the frame "X continued Y" provided in Chapter Five, p.184.

Continuer differs from commencer and continue in that, to a limited extent, it allows direct objects referring to human beings. [19a] is a classic example; [19b] was suggested by an informant (who added that the historical truth is quite different; this need not concern us here).

'Mazarin continued Richelieu'
[19b] Rousseau continua Voltaire.
'Rousseau continued Voltaire'

Both Mazarin and Richelieu exerted a profound influence upon the French monarchy. The direct object Richelieu is elliptical for la politique de Richelieu [Richelieu's political line'] - and this looks like a "normal" case, similar to the one in [16a]. But it is not: [19a] is not equivalent to [20].

'Mazarin continued to follow Richelieu's political line'

Whereas [20] refers to any particular part (except the first) of Mazarin's career as a political leader, [19a] covers the latter's entire political career. Similarly,
Voltaire in [19b] is elliptical for les idées de Voltaire
['Voltaire’s ideas'], and [19b] as a whole is not equivalent
to [21] (the difference between both being equivalent to the
difference between [19a] and [20]).

'Rousseau continued to follow Voltaire’s ideas'

It may safely be concluded that the verb continuer in [19a]
and [b] has to do with the continuation of something begun
by somebody else. The possibility of continuations of events
begun by someone else was not mentioned in those sections of
Chapter Five dealing with the verb continuer because the main
formula for a direct object frame remains valid. The very
existence of textbook examples like [19a] pushed me to say a
word about such continuations here. In the earliest stages
of my research, I was convinced that different formulas were
at work, and that [20] and [21], but not [19a] and [b],
exemplified the most prototypical continuer-sentence one can
think of. For [19a], I had in mind the gloss in [22a] and
the formula in [22b] (with a use of the verb continuer to be
reconsidered later on). The same formula and a similar gloss
would have applied in the case of [19b].

[22a] Mazarin fit qqch (e.g., he took over from
Richelieu without changing anything)
à cause de cela, la politique de Richelieu
continua

[ b] X continua Y =
X fit qqch
à cause de cela, Y continua
'X did something
because of that, Y continued'

The reasons why this analysis was eventually abandoned are
various. First of all, the impression of circularity (cp. p. 71) had to be avoided. Secondly, the "spirit" of the formula soon appeared to contradict the facts about the French language: **continuer** is like **commencer** in that it has no causative use (cp. p. 126). Finally, I found out that there was no need for a new formula at all. The formula in [18] remains applicable, as long as we assume (as we did on several occasions before) that a second verb is to be supplied by the addressee, but not to be inserted. Hence, in the case of [19a], we obtain [23] (8):

[23] Mazarin continua Richelieu =
(....)
avant t, il y avait la politique de Richelieu
(i.e. Richelieu menait sa propre politique)
l'on pouvait penser tout le temps:
qqch pourrait avoir lieu après maintenant
(e.g. Richelieu's death, or, less drastically, a change of mind)
après cela, il n'y aura plus de politique de Richelieu (i.e. the one he followed while alive, or before changing his mind)
à t, il y avait la politique de Richelieu (that is: although Richelieu had died, his political line was still upheld, viz. by Mazarin)
l'on peut penser à t :
Mazarin mènera la politique de Richelieu après maintenant

At least theoretically, [24] could be given **each one** of the interpretations valid for the examples in [19] and [20]/[21] respectively (9).

[24] Jean de Meung continua le Roman de la Rose.
'Jean de Meung continued the Roman de la Rose'

If I were to write a kind of entertaining biography on Jean de Meung (assuming I would, one day, have enough information or imagination to do so), I could use [24] to refer to a
continuation of an activity already begun by the same person. The verb that addressees would have to supply could be something like rédiger or composer ['write out', 'compose']. On its more common reading, [24] refers to Jean de Meung's total contribution. The formula in [18] applies once again, but the second verb which is to be supplied (i.e. rédiger or composer, or something similar) cannot be inserted. Notice, finally, that [25] sounds distinctly odd:

[25] ??Jean de Meung continua Guillaume de Lorris. 'Jean de Meung continued Guillaume de Lorris'

Continuer quelqu'un, in other words, means something like 'continuer la politique/les idées/les principes... de cette personne' ['continue his/her political line/ideas/principles etc.'](10).

1.4. At the lowest steps of the hierarchy of frames attested with the verb continuer are those frames in which there is no direct object. Sometimes, an infinitive can still be added without too much guessing. Consider the examples in [26]. In [26a], the addressee adds marcher ['walk']; in [26b], écrire (rédiger, composer,...) sa pièce ['write/write out/compose his drama']. Frédéric is one of the characters in the drama referred to.

[26a] Elle se retrouva sur la Promenade des Anglais, endroit où elle n'allait jamais, marchant du même pas décidé, comme si, arrivée à la mer, elle n'eût qu'à continuer pour la traverser à pied sec et retrouver la maison de ses parents. 'MS,11/

'She realized she was at the Promenade des Anglais, a place she had never went to before, walking with the same confident step, as if, after arriving at the sea, all she had to do was continue in order to cross it with dry feet

235
and to find back her parents' home'

[26b] (...) savoir que Frédéric existait déjà en
dehors de lui, que ce n'était pas seulement
un phantasme, le rassurerait et l'aiderait à
continuer. /LD,67/
The knowledge that Frédéric existed already
outside of himself, that he was not just a
fantasy, would reassure him and help him to
continue

Elsewhere, no infinitive can be added. As was to be
expected, continuer has an absolute frame as well, and that
one is exemplified in [27a] to [ c].

[27a] Il en venait une dizaine, souvent plus, à
l'improvisée, vers minuit, et la fête commencée
dans un autre chalet continuait de plus belle.
/80,191/
'About ten of them came, often more, without
warning, towards midnight, and the party begun
in another chalet continued in an even greater
atmosphere'

[ b] Si l'on ne se met pas sur la voie d'une
solution politique, la violence continuera et
une véritable révolte armée n'est pas à exclure.
/P,15-02-88/
[ c] Les forêts continuaient à perte de vue.
The forests continued as far as the eye
could reach'

The examples in [27a] and [ b] refer to continuation in
time, the example in [27c] to continuation in space. The
formula required for utterances such as the ones in [27]
should look familiar at this stage. It appeals, among other
things, to the notion of "parts", and it says that one must
be able to think of those parts as being consecutive in time.

[28] X continua =
l'on peut penser à X comme à qch qui a des
parties
l'on peut penser à ces parties comme à des
parties qui sont les unes après les autres
je pense à une partie de X
il y a des parties avant cette partie
avant temps t, l'on pouvait penser tout le
temps :
il n'y aura plus de parties de X
après ceci
l'on peut penser à t :
   il y aura plus de parties de X après ceci
   'one can think of X as of something that has parts
   one can think of those parts as being one after the other
   I am thinking of one part of X
   there are parts before that part
   before time t, one could think all the time :
   there will be no parts of X anymore after this
   at time t, one could think :
   there will be more parts of X after this'

It is because the formula must account for continuations in time as well as for continuations in space that, as in the case of the absolute frames existing with begin, start and continue, no reference to time is made in the introductory line.

1.5. The most challenging frames of all remain to be explored : viz., the ones where continuer is preceded by a reflexive pronoun se. I should probably start out by saying that se continuer is "losing ground" - it may in fact be following pronominal commencer which, at this very moment, is not part of the French language anymore (cp. Chapter Four, note 28). Interestingly, it is not used in the following examples where continuer is in a main clause to which a concessive clause, introduced by (même) si ['even though'] and containing a pronominal verb, is subordinated.

[29a] Car la fuite des cerveaux continue, même si elle semble s'atténuer : 1488 scientifiques partis aux États-Unis en 1982, 1388 en 1983, dont 859 Britanniques. /ST.06-87/
    'For the brain drain continues, even though it seems to fade : 1488 scientists left for the U.S.A. in 1982, 1388 in 1983, 859 amongst them being British'
[29b] Aujourd'hui, l'exode, s'il s'est ralenti, continue, et dans des conditions tout aussi effroyables. /PM,06-05-88/
'Today, the exodus, even though it has slowed down, continues, and in equally frightening conditions'

In many cases, the reflexive pronoun se looks like, but is not identical to, so-called "se-moyen" (cp. p.152), the mark of the French middle voice. The similarity is to be found in the meaning: se continuer in each one of the following examples is virtually synonymous with the passive infinitive être continué ['be continued'].

[30a] La même politique financière se continua avec le nouveau gouvernement.
'The same financial policy continued with the new government'
[ b] La leçon se continuera la semaine prochaine avec un autre professeur.
'The class will continue next week with another teacher'

[31a] Le style de Marcel Proust se continue dans (celui de) Claude Simon.
'Proust's style continues in Simon [his style]'
[ b] Voltaire se continue dans Rousseau.
'Voltaire continues in Rousseau'

Besides, the sentences in [30] and in [31] are equivalent to their respective counterparts in [32] and in [33], except for functional sentence perspective, i.e. questions relating to new and old information, or theme and rheme).

[32a] Le nouveau gouvernement continua la même politique financière.
'The new government continued the same financial policy'
[ b] Un autre professeur continuera la leçon la semaine prochaine.
'Another teacher will continue the class next week'

[33a] Claude Simon continue le style de Marcel Proust.
'CS continues MP's style'
Rousseau continue Voltaire.
'Rousseau continues Voltaire'

The equivalence referred to is far from general, though. First of all, [34a] is a perfectly normal French utterance - but [34b] is totally unacceptable. [34a] is about the transmission of cultural and other values from parent to child, and is therefore a lexicalized abbreviation for [34c].

[34a] Les parents se continuent dans leurs enfants.
'Parents continue in their children'
[ b] *Les enfants continuent leurs parents.
'Children continue their parents'
[ c] Les valeurs culturelles (etc) des parents se continuent dans celles de leurs enfants.
'The cultural (and other) values of parents continue in those of their children'

On the other hand, the utterances in [30] and in [31] differ from one another in a certain number of respects. One thing is that two different prepositions are used (avec vs dans). Avec appears when subject and "agent" are of a different nature (as, for instance, in [30a], where "le gouvernement continue une politique"); dans appears when subject and "agent" are similar (as, for instance, in [31a], where "un style continue l'autre").

Secondly, an explicit reference to the agent (or, at least, to the subject of the corresponding non-pronominal sentence) is not systematically compulsory in utterances containing se continuer. If no agent is identified, no non-pronominal sentence carrying the same amount of information can be found. Next to the utterances in [30], we have those in [35]. [36a] and [ b], however, are unacceptable.

[35a] La même politique financière se continuera.
[ b] La leçon se continuera la semaine prochaine. (= [13])
Only [35a] and [ b] can be freely used, and are understandable out of context, though they are not necessarily unambiguous. Addressees can figure out that the agents are a particular government or a particular teacher. They need more information, however, in order to know whether a current government or teacher are involved, or a new one. The very fact that the sentences in [30] and in [31] cannot undergo the same "truncation" is evidence for the claim that se in se continuer is not an instance of se-moyen, which, as a rule, is incompatible with an explicit reference to the subject of the corresponding active sentence (cp. LAMIROY 1987:283).

A third and last difference between the utterances in [30] and those in [31] also points to the fact that the reflexive pronoun which precedes the verb continuer is different from se-moyen. The latter, it should be noticed, is never optional; [37a] is fine, but [37b] cannot be said:

[37a]  Son nouveau livre, à ce qu'il paraît, se vend très bien.
[ b] *Son nouveau livre, à ce qu'il paraît, vend très bien.

'His new book, it seems, sells very well'

In [30a] and [ b], but not in [31a] and [ b], the reflexive pronoun can disappear. Hence, the sentences in [33] are correct, but those in [39] are unacceptable. The acceptability pattern of [35] and [36] reappears in [38] and [39].

[38a]  La même politique financière continua avec le nouveau gouvernement.

240
[38b] La leçon continuera la semaine prochaine avec un autre professeur.

[ b] *Voltaire continue dans Rousseau.

The anomaly of the various strings in [36] and in [39] can easily be explained. [36a] and [ b] are unintelligible: no agent can be reconstructed by means of a natural pairing (11). [39a] and [ b] are faulty because their subject does not consist of parts which could be thought of as being consecutive (as is required for the subject of the frame "X continua"). As a formula for the frame "X se continua" (which can most often be rewritten as "Y continua X"), I would like to propose [40]:

[40] X se continua (cp. Y continua X) =
 l'on peut penser à X comme à qqch que l'on Z
 l'on peut penser à X comme à qqch qui a des parties
 je pense à une partie de X
 je pense à cette partie comme à qqch que Y Z
 il y a des parties avant cette partie
 avant temps t, l'on pouvait penser tout le temps :
 il n'y aura plus de parties de X
 après ceci
 à temps t, l'on peut penser :
 il y aura plus de parties de X après ceci
 'one can think of X as of something that one is Z-ing
 one can think of X as of something that has parts
 I am thinking of one part of X
 I am thinking of that part as of something that Y is Z-ing
 there are parts before that part
 before time t, one could think all the time :
 there will be no parts of X anymore
 after this
 at time t, one could think :
 there will be more parts of X after this'

Z, in the first and fourth lines, is a verb (meager in the
case of a political line, donner ['giver'] in the case of a lecture, avoir in the case of someone's style or ideas). The parts before the part of which I, as a speaker, am thinking are those in which the agent \( \mathcal{X} \) was possibly not involved. No time statements are added in the introductory line, as such statements could not be added to just any of the utterances to be glossed by means of the formula (sentences such as [31a] and [ b] are atemporal). Notice that the component in [41] is not a part of the formula in [40]:

[41] l'on peut penser à ces parties comme à des parties qui sont les unes après les autres

[41] is absent because \( \mathcal{X} \) in "X se continua" can stand for things such as a style or ideas, i.e. things which have no parts consecutive in time.

Consider, next, another set of se continue-verbal utterances. The reflexive pronoun is no longer related to se-moyen, since none of the examples has a quasi-passive meaning. There is no agent involved in any action.

[42a] Le Sahara se continue depuis le Maroc jusqu'en Egypte.
'\( \text{The Sahara continues from Morocco until Egypt} \)'.

[ b] Le sentier se continue jusqu'au prochain village.
'\( \text{The track continues until the next village} \)'.

[ c] La côte se continue sans escarpements.
'\( \text{The coast line continues without steeps} \)'.

Se continue, in [42a] to [ c], seems to convey more than a simple continuation. [42a] is about the entire desert, [42b] about the entire track, [42c] about the entire coast. [42a] would be unacceptable without the pronoun se; [42b] and [ c] would acquire a different meaning, and refer to a part of the work.
rather than to the whole thing. For sentences such as [42a] to [c], one last new formula is required. Notice, in the French version, the use of a French "imparfait" (the past tense used, among other things, for descriptions) rather than a "passé simple" or "simple past".

[43] X se continuait (≠ Y continua X)
l'on peut penser à X comme à qqch qui a des parties
l'on peut penser à ces parties comme à des parties qui sont les unes après les autres
l'on peut penser à X comme à une chose qui a deux parties
je pense aux deux parties de X
one can think of X as of something that has parts
one can think of those parts as being one after the other
one can think of X as of a thing that has two parts
I am thinking of the two parts of X'

What I am saying when I make the statement in [42a] is that the Sahara has one part which comprises Morocco, and a second part which comprises Egypt. Similarly, the statement in [42c] implies that both parts of the coast that are being thought of are without steeps.

Summarizing, we may say that, next to its non-pronominal uses, the verb continuer has two pronominal frames. Although the proposed formulas do not contain any time statements in their introductory line, one of the two frames does refer to a continuation in time. The other one refers to a continuation, or rather, a tract or a range in space.

1.6. On p.222, we pointed out, by way of introduction to the analysis of the French verb continuer, that the latter is a close equivalent to the verb continue in English. Table

243
One lists its various frames.

Table One

(a) X continua à Z  [6]
(b) X continua de Z,  [6]
(c) X continua Y  [18]
(d) X continua  [6]
(e) X continua (absolute)  [28]
(f) X se continua (cp. Y continua X)  [40]
(g) X se continuait  [43]

Total number of frames : 7
Total number of formulas : 5
Total number of formulas referring to a second verb : 2

2. "CONTINUER" AND "NE CESSER DE" COMPARED

2.1. From what precedes, one might draw the conclusion that, in spite of a few minor differences between the French verb continuer and the English verb continue (one difference which was not yet mentioned will be examined below), both verbs are quite similar. On the other hand, in French translations from the English, continuer (in its frames "X continua à Z" and "X continua de Z") is often used for keep (in the frame "X kept Z-ing") - in spite of the fact that keep is a verb which, as we saw in Chapter Five, does not imply any expectations for the future. Consider the following examples (the translations were published as such, and are not my own):

[44a] They kept muttering together. /M,142/
     'Ils continuaient à s'entretenir à voix basse'

[b] "Keep talking." /M,162/
     '- Continue de parler.'

[c] In the meantime, does everybody keep working? /M,26/
     'En attendant, tout le monde continue de travailler?'

244
[44d] Now it was growing dark. Their headlights were among many slicing homeward from the country to the city. 'No,' Adam said. 'If we stop, it will waste time. Let's keep going.' /W,233 /
'(....) Continuons plutôt de rouler'

The translator of /W/ also transposed another use of the verb keep by means of continuer :

[45] Big Rufe kept his voice low. /W,362/ 'Big Rufe continua à voix basse: ...'

What the translation literally says is 'Big Rufe continued softly: ...'. The original in [45] and its translation are therefore not equivalent. It could be argued that the translations in [44] are not equivalent to the originals either, and that, apparently, there is no way in French to express continuation beyond expected limits by means of an aspectual verb. I shall deal with the first part of this claim later on. First, I want to dismiss the second part, merely by pointing out that three keep-ing-utterances from /M/ appear in translation with the verb ne cesser de. As I hope to show in section 3., the latter is, morphologically but not semantically, a negation of the verb cesser - an aspectual verb to be studied in Chapter Eight.

[46a] Her carefully reddened lips kept smiling (...). /M,1 /
'Ses lèvres soigneusement fardées ne cessaient de sourire'

[ b ] And Bunny kept screaming. /M,93/ 'Bunny ne cessait de hurler'

[ c ] She kept watching the blank metal door beyond which the floors were sliding by. /M,156/ 'Elle ne cessait de regarder la porte métallique et désespérément anonyme au-delà de laquelle les étages se succédaient, rapides, les uns aux autres.

245
It is quite unsatisfactory to state, with GENOUVRIER/Dezière/HCRDE (1977:104), and without providing any further explanation, that ne cesser de is "stronger" than continuer. Both verbs are semantically different (i.e. have different values), except if continuer, as I shall argue below, is used with an emphatic stress on the first syllable. Everywhere else, one might say that, at least as far as their prototypical frames (the ones where a second verb follows) are concerned, continuer is equivalent to continue, and ne cesser de related to keep.

Let us look at a quasi-minimal pair. In [47a] and [b], the same second verb is used, but with two different inanimate subjects.

[47a]  Cette mort de Kennedy continue à me tourmenter. /PM,06-05-88/  'Kennedy's death continues to trouble me'

[b]  Depuis cinquante ans, les accords de Munich ne cessent de tourmenter la conscience des Français : fallait-il vraiment céder à Hitler, abandonner la Tchécoslovaquie ? /PM,11-03-88/  'After fifty years, the Munich agreements keep troubling the conscience of the French: was it really necessary to give in to Hitler, to abandon Czechoslovakia?'

A few short comments on the examples in [47] may be useful. [47a] implies that Kennedy's death will still upset the speaker, although one could have expected that the mysteries surrounding his assassination should have long been solved. There are no expectations for the future as far as feelings about the Munich agreements are concerned. What has worried the French over the last fifty years (an unexpectedly long period) is whether the agreements should have been signed or not. [47b] gives us the words of a historian claiming with authority that the Munich conference should never have taken
place. This, in turn, implies that the French should not worry anymore; but whether they will or will not after now depends on whether or not they will read the historian's book, and believe the claims it contains.

2.2. For the utterance in [48a], LAMIROY (1987:284) provides the translation in [48b]:

[48a] Jean continue à chanter cette chanson.
[48b] John keeps singing the same song.

The following comment is provided: "This sentence [i.e., [48a]] is ambiguous: either John is singing a song without interruption, or he sings it repeatedly. (...) What basically distinguishes the two readings is that one refers to the successive internal stages of the situation, while the other refers to successive moments at which the same situation takes place at the level of external time". It should be clear that this account fits the keep-sentence, but not the French original (12). First of all, a third possible reading (viz., continuation after an interruption), reading which does not exist for [48b], is simply overlooked. Secondly, an emphatic stress on the first syllable of the French verb continuer ("Jean 'continue..."') is required before original and translation are really equivalent.

Emphatic stress, which functions as a kind of overt mark, is hardly ever indicated in print. Therefore, a detailed study of the context in which a sentence containing "continuer + infinitive" appears is necessary before we can confirm whether what a writer meant is closer to continue or to keep. The corpus examples quoted in sections 1.1. and
1.2. were chosen so as to avoid ambiguity. Most of the time, there is no ambiguity if a sentence in which *continuer* is followed by an infinitive is introduced (or, at least, contains) a sentential connector expressing either opposition or concession. Examples are given in [49a] to [49d], and involve the connectors *mais* ([49a]), *néanmoins* ([49b]), *malgré* ([49c]), and *n'empêche que* ([49d]).

[49a] Elle ne parvenait pas à réfléchir. Mais elle continuait à voir. L'image restée devant ses yeux avait le relief indiscutable de la réalité (...). /LT,13/

'She did not manage to think. But she kept seeing. The image left in front of her eyes had the undeniable dimensions of reality.'

[49b] Il s'évertuait à respirer régulièrement, profondément, comme sont censés le faire les dormeurs; mais, bizarrement, cette régularité forçée l'essoufflait. (...) Néanmoins, il continuait à respirer comme un vrai métronome. /MS,193-194/

'He tried his best to breathe deeply and regularly, as sleepers are supposed to do; but, surprisingly enough, that self-imposed regularity got him out of breath. Yet, he kept breathing like a real metronome.'

[49c] Je continuais à distinguer les arbres, malgré l'obscurité.

'I kept seeing the trees, in spite of the darkness'.

[49d] N'empêche que Didier continuait à me donner du "mon garçon" ou du "mon petit ami", en vertu sans doute d'habitudes irrevocables. /CP,148/

'Nevertheless, Didier kept talking to me using the words "my boy" or "my little friend", probably by virtue of an irrevocable habit.'

For the text quoted in [50], I was able to see two different translations. The context, here, clearly indicates that, in reading, *continuer* should be given an emphatic stress. None of the translations, however, has *keep*: the oldest one, viz. /SM,II:167 = SK,367/, has "was still gazing" (which is too strong, too "intense"); the more recent one, viz. /G,270-271/, has "could not take his eyes off" (which is
semantically more adequate). The translation provided here was made by myself, and is, to the same extent as all the other translations in this thesis, as close as possible to the French.

[50] Vous trouvez ? Elle est jolie à croquer, dit le général qui ne perdait pas Mme de Cambremar de vue. Ce n'est pas votre avis, princesse ?

- Elle se met trop en avant, je trouve que chez une si jeune femme, ce n'est pas agréable (...), répondit Mme des Laumes (...).

Mais la princesse voyant que M. de Froberville continuait à regarder Mme de Cambremar, ajouta (...) : “Pas agréable... pour son mari! (...)” /CS,337/

"Do you think so? She is so beautiful," said the General, who did not lose sight of Mme de Cambremar. "You do not share my opinion, Princess?"

"She wants to be noticed too much; for a woman as young as she, I do not find that very nice," answered Mme des Laumes [i.e., the Princess].

But as she saw that M. de Froberville [i.e., the General] kept looking at Mme de Cambremar, she added: "Not very nice... for her husband!"

The examples quoted up to now involved non-stative verbs. In the quote given in [51], this is no longer the case.

[51] Rodríguez Serra tapa du pied d’un peu loin, le taureau ne le remarqua pas, un léger rire s’éleva d’un coin quelconque de l’arène. Il fit trois pas, quatre, cinq vers le taureau et recommença, mais soit manque de chance, soit faute d’acoustique, ou de vent ou de sang, le taureau ne broncha pas et continua à lui tourner le dos. /YS,220/

‘Rodríguez Serra stamped with his foot from a little too far, the bull did not notice it, a soft laughter arose from one corner of the arena. He put three steps, four, five in the direction of the bull and started all over again, but either because of bad luck, or because of lack of acoustics, of wind or of blood, the bull did not move, and kept his back turned against him’.
In itself, tourner le dos ('turn one's back') is either a process or a state. After the aspectualizer continuer, however, the same expression is necessarily stative. The closest English equivalent of the entire construction (continuer à tourner le dos à qqn) is the one suggested in the translation (viz. keep one's back turned against someone).

The point that I am making can be summarized as follows. In order to refer unambiguously to an uninterrupted continuation beyond expected limits, in writing, ne cesser de is the verb to be used. Continuer can be used, and is a valid alternative for ne cesser de, especially in oral speech but also in writing, if and only if the condition of the emphatic stress is met. If not, continuer marks a continuation, possibly after an interruption, with expectations for the future.

3. "NE CESSER DE"

3.1. The origins of ne cesser de are as transparent as those of se mettre à. Ne cesser de consists of the verb cesser, preceded by a negative particle ne, and followed by a connector de. Ne and de do to cesser what se and à do to mettre: they force the verb into a strait-jacket which hampers its syntactic freedom (cp. p.147). The construction ne cesser de appears in only one frame, viz. "X ne cessa de Z", with Z being an infinitive (13).

Besides value, the main difference between se mettre à and ne cesser de is that the former is by no means a reflexive
counterpart to mettre (cp. also p.147), whereas ne cesser de.
at least morphologically, is still a negation of cesser (cp.
below). It is not the negation of cesser, though. What is
of interest to us here is the difference between ne cesser de
and the "prototypical" negation ne pas cesser (14).

The difference, according to David Gaatone, the author of
what is now considered to be a standard work on French
negation, is a pure matter of style. GAATONE (1971:69) does
not hesitate to write that "il faut voir dans l'emploi de ne
en tant qu'élément unique de négation, l'utilisation, à des
fins stylistiques d'un fait grammatical appartenant à un état
antérieur du français" ['one must see in the use of ne as a
unique marker of negation the application, for stylistic
reasons, of a grammatical fact which belongs to a previous
state of the French language']. Elsewhere (ibid.:9), he
writes that ne has become a linguistic unit which has no
distinctive function and is rather unstable. This is clearly
an exaggeration: although the instability of ne is a fact
(the negation of cesser, for instance, becomes pas cesser
rather than ne pas cesser), this particle still has a
perfectly distinctive function in a considerable (though
strictly limited) number of cases (15).

Gaatone's viewpoint raises some more questions. If the
difference between ne and ne pas is purely stylistic, how are
we to explain that it only exists in some well-defined cases,
and not everywhere else? Notice, on the other hand, that ne
cesser occurs at least as frequently as, or possibly more
frequently than, ne pas cesser (16). How can one reasonably
claim that a stylistically marked form (17) is as often or
more often used than its unmarked pendant?
I would like to challenge Gaatone’s view that, with the verb *cesser*, *ne* can “alterner avec *ne...pas* sans changement de sens” ['alternate with *ne...pas* without change in meaning']. Whenever *ne...pas...cesser* shows up in my corpus, there is a quite explicit reference to an opposing force, an obstacle or a barrier of any nature. Almost by definition or at least by convention, that force, obstacle or barrier should interrupt the ongoing event or state, but does not. In none of the *ne cesser*-sentences, an opposing force was defined as such. In [52a], *en dormant* ['sleeping'] is the opposing force which should stop one’s thoughts; [52b] has no *pas*, and no opposing force. Both sentences make up a quasi-minimal pair (18).

[52a]  
[Je] n’avais pas cessé en dormant de faire des réflexions sur ce que je venais de lire, mais ces réflexions avaient pris un tour un peu particulier (...). /CS,3/  
'I had not stopped reflecting, in my sleep, upon what I had just read, but my reflections had taken a slightly peculiar turn'

[ b ]  
On connaissait tellement bien tout le monde, à Combray, bêtes et gens, que si ma tante avait vu par hasard passer un chien “qu’elle ne connaissait point” elle ne cessait d’y penser et de consacrer à ce fait incompréhensible ses talents d’induction et ses heures de liberté. /CS,58/  
'Everyone was so well known in Combray, animals and people, that if my aunt, by mere fortune, had seen a dog pass by that "she did not know at all" she kept thinking about it and devoting to this incomprehensible fact her talents of induction and her free hours'

Whereas sleep is by definition an obstacle to thinking, marriage is by convention an obstacle to womanizing. [53] has a negative particle *pas* :

[53]  
[Tout] le monde savait que dès le lendemain du jour où le prince des Laumes avait épousé sa ravissante cousine, il
n'avait pas cessé de la tromper. /CS,338/

'Everybody knew that, from the day after he married his ravishing cousin, the Prince des Launes had not stopped betraying his wife'

On the other hand, [54] has no pas :

[54] Il n'avait cessé depuis d’en rêver, mais ce n’était que maintenant qu’il s’en rendait compte (...). /LD,7/

'He had been dreaming about it ever since, but only now did he find out he had'

Even if people do not normally think when they sleep, but dream, dreaming can very well be a daytime activity, too, and daylight is no obstacle to it.

Finally, consider the following - subtle - example of use of ne pas cesser as opposed to ne cesser de.

[55] Tout au long des 2000 premiers numéros de son aventure, "Paris Match" n’a pas cessé de mêler la grande Histoire et la moins grande, de réfléchir aux problèmes de fond de notre époque et de se pencher sur les écumes de la mode, d’envoyer des reporters sur les lignes de combat les plus violentes et des photographes sur le front des idylles les plus émouvantes. /PM,02-10-87/

'All along the first 2000 issues of its venture, "Paris' Match" has not stopped mixing the important History and the less important one, [it has not stopped] thinking about the basic problems of our era and studying the waves of fashion, [and it has not stopped] sending reporters to the most violent battle lines and photographers to the front of the most touching romances'

At first, it might seem as though there was no opposing force or obstacle here. This, however, is not quite true.

In French, the adverb tout ['all'] is used, not only to reinforce AdvP's such as au long (or participial phrases such as en travaillant ['while working']) - this is what dictionaries often claim - but also (although not
systematically) (19) to mark a certain degree of unusualness or unexpectedness. The whole idea behind [55] is that it is not an easy task to present the public with a table of contents that is always full of contrast and variety, and that doing so for about 40 years (Paris-Match being a weekly magazine) is in fact a tremendous performance. No obstacle is explicitly named, but it is at least suggested that the enterprise was a hazardous one, and that many difficulties must have arisen every now and then, and had to be sidestepped.

3.2. On p. 251, it was mentioned that, from a morphological point of view, ne cesser de is a negation of cesser. There is some evidence to substantiate that claim. Ne cesser de cannot be negated any further. [56a] is fine, but [56b] is unacceptable.

[56a] Et donc ils ne cessaient de recommander au gouvernement présidé par Jimmy Carter de le soutenir à tout prix. /PM, 06-05-88/ ("le" = the Shah of Iran) 'And therefore they kept advising the Jimmy Carter government to support him at any price'

[56b] *Ils ne ne cessaient pas de recommander au gouvernement présidé par Jimmy Carter de le soutenir à tout prix.

Theoretically, a negation with pas alone would seem all right. However, the result would not be a negation of ne cesser de, but of cesser. More importantly, ne cesser de and negation with pas alone belong to different speech levels: those people who, in their everyday speech, omit the negative particle ne, and use pas alone, will never ever, in a similar sociolinguistic environment, use the phrase ne cesser de. They will stick to continuer with emphatic stress. For the
same reason (i.e. mixing up of speech levels), the argument that ne in ne cesser de cannot be omitted without destroying the negative effect, is inconclusive as counter-evidence to the claim that ne cesser de is a negation of cesser.

As ne cesser de is not just the negation of cesser, it is perfectly legitimate to propose an independent formula for it. The one that springs to mind is identical to the first keep-formula devised in Chapter Five, except for the fact that it is in French.

[57]  X ne cessa de Z =
     avant t, Z avait lieu/il y avait Z tout le temps
     l'on pouvait penser alors :
     Z n'aura plus lieu après maintenant/il n'y aura plus de Z après maintenant
     à t, Z avait lieu/il y avait Z

By means of this formula, it is possible to account for all sentences containing ne cesser de, irrespective of whether they refer to the duration of one event, or to the iteration of a series of identical events. Most examples quoted above are of the former type; [58], on the other hand, is clearly iterative:

[58]  Et pour cela Serge Olevitch, l'hiver, ne cessa de tousser, de se cogner aux meubles,
de parler très fort tout seul, de sonner à grands coups à sa propre maison et mille autres précautions. /MS,45/

'And so Serge Olevitch, in winter time, kept coughing, kept knocking against the furniture, kept talking aloud while being alone, kept banging at his own door, and took a thousand other precautions'

One meaning component, viz. the one that we explicated in Chapter Five (p.202) for the particle on in the frame "X kept on Z-ing", seems never to appear with ne cesser de. I

255
found in my corpus no more than two keep_on-utterances
translated into French by means of utterances containing an
aspectual verb. Twice, the verb used was continuer.

[59a] He said, "Nobody's going to hurt you, 
Bunny. Don't cry."
But she kept on crying. /M,59/
'- Personne ne va te faire de mal, Bunny, 
dit-il. Ne pleure pas.
Mais elle continuait à pleurer'
[ b] He kept on talking. /M,142/
'Il continuait de parler'

At this point, we have to ask ourselves whether the formula
in [57] is not too broad. GAATONE (1971:70) observes that ne
cesser is unacceptable "lorsque cesser lui-même est à
l'infinitif ou encore si la négation porte sur un terme autre
que l'infinitif objet" ["when cesser itself is used in the
infinitive or else if the negation carries on a term
different from the direct object infinitive"]. I myself
could not find any sentence in which ne cesser de is used in
the infinitive. But does that mean that such a use would be
unacceptable? My first thought was that, if that were the
case, the major French dictionaries would not, as they do,
unanimously talk about the meaning of ne cesser de, quoted in
the infinitive, when trying to come to terms with the meaning
of cesser. However, as dictionaries often do invent
artificial canonical forms, I eventually decided to put
Gaatone's claim to the test. Native speakers were provided
with the following (constructed) examples:

[60a] Ne cesser ni d'aimer ni d'être aimé : voilà
le plus doux des rêves!
'Keep loving and being loved: that is the
sweetest of all dreams!'

[ b] Enfin la vie me souriait : j'étais au centre
de l'attention du public. Ne l'avais-je pas
toujours voulu ainsi ? Non pas louer mais être
loué ? Cesser de louer et ne cesser de l'être...

At last life smiled at me: I was at the center of public attention. Was that not what I had always wished? Not to praise but to be praised? Stop praising and keep being praised...

None of my informants knew beforehand what exactly was to be tested. They unanimously found both [60a] and [b] acceptable (20), and unanimously declared, after I had explained to them where the problem was, that the use of ne cesser de in the infinitive had by no means struck them as impossible. This must teach the scholar a lesson: a corpus as such always risks being unrepresentative, and should, whenever possible, be complemented with constructed examples approved by informants.

The second part of Gaatone's claim (quoted on p. 256) is quite puzzling, too: even if the negation carries on the infinitive, one has to use ne pas cesser. [61] is unacceptable:

[61] *Il ne cessait de boire, il cessait de manger.

'He did not keep drinking, he kept eating'

It is not at all surprising that sentences such as [61] are faulty: their anomaly confirms the view that ne cesser de is not semantically a negation of cesser, but only morphologically. Semantically, ne cesser de is closer to continuer than it is to cesser – which is the very reason why it was incorporated in this sixth chapter. If, finally, the scope of the negation is neither the aspectualizer nor the second verb, the impossibility of ne cesser is perfectly understandable, too: ne is a negativizer for verbs, and not for anything else. Non-verbal clause constituents are negated by means of pas, non, or non pas. In [62a], the
negation carries on un jour; in [62b], on un instant.

[62a] [Croire] qu'il ne cesserait pas un jour de
la voir. c'est tout ce qu'il demandait.
/CS,247-248/
'To think that he would not one day stop
seeing her was all he asked for'
[ b] [Il] n'avait pas cessé un instant d'imaginer,
d'espérer, de lutter, de parer, de se débattre
afin de nourrir, de combler sa propre famine
sentimentale (...). /LD,232/
'He had not stopped for one moment imagining,
hoping, fighting, parrying, struggling, in
order to feed and gratify his own sentimental
starvation'

Pas un jour and pas un instant are semantically close to
jamais. Compare:

[63a] Une chose est tout à fait certaine, en
revanche, c'est que depuis la guerre, la C.i.a.
n'a jamais cessé d'intriguer par tous les
moyens en Amérique latine, afin d'empêcher
les communistes d'y prendre le pouvoir.
/PM,06-05-88/
'In return. one thing is completely sure,
viz. that ever since the war, the CIA has
never stopped intriguing by all means in Latin
America, in order to prevent the communists
from seizing power there'
[ b] Ce n'est pas une coïncidence : les gens qui
ont été impliqués dans l'affaire de l'Iragate
étaient tous des anciens du Sud-Est asiatique,
qui avaient fait connaissance là-bas et, depuis,
n'avaient jamais cessé de se fréquenter. /ibid. /
'It is not a coincidence : those involved in
the Iragate scandal were all veterans of South-
East Asia; they had met down there and ever since
had never stopped seeing one another'

The difference is that ne jamais is a complex negation
which has the aspectualizer, and not any other element, as
its scope. In that particular respect, ne jamais cesser (and
ne plus cesser, and so on) are closer to ne cesser de (and to
continued) than to ne pas cesser.

So far, I have not said that the formula in [57] is not too
broad. I have merely stated that Gaetone's appreciation of
the facts must be taken cautiously. In fact, the formula is too broad, as it does not explain why [44b] to [ d] would be unacceptable if ne cesser de rather than continuer was used. One might assume that this has to do with speech levels, i.e. with the fact that ne cesser de does not really belong to the spoken language - or else one could think that, perhaps, we need to add a component expressing in one way or another that ne cesser de is incompatible with imperatives and questions. The latter claim is incorrect. The restriction referred to can be most easily expressed by means of the component in [64].

[64]  je dis ceci à tout le monde  
'I am saying this to everybody'

If one wants to address everybody, one will not generally choose the spoken word, but record the message down ("verba volant, scripta manent"). The component in [64] helps us express the idea that ne cesser de is quite a lot more formal than ne pas cesser, and it accounts for the unacceptability, in case ne cesser de rather than continuer is used, of [44b] to [ d] (where the continuer-sentences are not addressed to just everybody). [65a] and [ b] are an exhortation (in the imperative) and a question addressed to posterity (i.e. to everybody "who comes after me and will read this message") :

[65a]  Vous, générations futures, ne cessez de vous préoccuper du sort de notre planète !  
'You, future generations, be always concerned about the future of our planet!'

[ b]  Mes petits amis, je viens de vous expliquer ce qui arrivera si vous détruissez les nids et si vous cassez les oeufs que vous y trouvez : ne cesserez-vous donc de jouer ce vilain jeu ?  
'My little friends, I have just told you what will happen if you destroy nests and if
you break the eggs you find in them: will you then keep playing that nasty game?'

The examples in [65] are constructed—exactly like those in [60]. They were not rejected, however, by my informants.

3.3. For the first time in this dissertation, the analysis of a particular verb will not end with a table summarizing the analysis itself. The verb ne cesser.de appears in only one frame (i.e. one less than in the case of the already heavily restricted verb se mettre à; cp. Chapter Four), viz. the frame "X ne cessa de Z"—for which the formula in [66] may be proposed:

[66] au temps t, X ne cessa de Z =
    avant t, Z avait lieu/ il y avait Z tout
    le temps
    l'on pouvait penser alors :
        Z n'aura plus lieu après maintenant/ il
        n'y aura plus de Z après maintenant
    à t, Z avait lieu/ il y avait Z
    je dis ceci à tout le monde
    'before t, Z was happening/there was Z all
    the time
    one could think at that time :
    Z will not happen anymore after now/
    there will be no Z anymore after now
    at t, Z was happening/there was Z
    I am saying this to everybody’

The main difference of meaning between the frame explicated in [66] and its closest English counterpart "X kept Z-ing" is in the last line: the verb keep is not restricted to utterances which are addressed to everybody. The difference between ne cesser.de and ne pas cesser., on the other hand, is a matter of obstacles identified as such. The prototypical negation (cp. p.251) is used if an obstacle is referred to; elsewhere, ne cesser.de is used instead (or, as we have seen, continuer, with an emphatic stress on the first syllable).
(1) The adaptation was necessary because Nef starts from a (constructed) sentence which strikes my informants (and myself) as unacceptable. Instead of the possessive pronoun used here, Nef has an indefinite article un.

(2) The glosses suggested by Gardies contain the verb effor, which also occurs in the same author's glosses for some other verbs. Cp. Chapter Four, p.109; and also Chapter Three, note 5.

(3) A similar mistake was denounced in Chapter Two (pp.122-123) with regard to DUBOIS's (1961) description of the verb commencer.

(4) For the sake of simplicity, I temporarily assume that [2b] is as "utterable" as [2a].

(5) RUWET (1983:18,35-36) reports that, for one of his informants, both constructions have a different syntax. This is probably a matter of individual speech habits rather than a real distinction. On continuer à vs de, cp. also BENAC (1956:184), BLINKENBERG (1960:227,230), BAUSCH (1963:264), ROY (1976:341), and (incorrectly) GENOUVRIER/DESIRAT/HORDE (1977:104). REQUEDAT (1980:8) observes that the preposition à after continuer is entirely predictable, and carries no information. Yet, the same author (ibid.:105) opposes continuer à to continuer de.

(6) "die Fortdauer der Handlung [...] wird, wenn continuer mit de bzw. à verbunden wird, jeweils aus einer anderen Orientierung heraus gesehen : einmal aus der Perspektive des schon vollzogenen Handelns, dann aus der Perspektive des noch zu vollziehenden Handelns".

(7) DEJAY (1986:155) believes that repetition is the primary meaning of continuer. The example that goes with this statement makes one wonder what meaning Dejay conveys to the word repetition:

[i] Les eaux du Parana ont continué à monter. 'The water level of the Parana continued to go up'

(8) The gloss in [23] makes us aware of the fact that if overall intelligibility and readability are important, reductiveness is paramount. The latter may lead us to prefer to a fully "natural" gloss a slightly "unnatural" one. Normally, someone's death in French arrive, rather than to avoir lieu - simply because it is a punctual event. Both
arriver and avoir...lieu are possible translations of the English primitive happen. For my French metalanguage, I have adopted the one that seems to have the widest range of use.

(9) In order to make the ambiguity plain, I should add, for readers who are unfamiliar with French medieval literature, that a poem called Roman de la Rose (lit. 'Novel of the Rose') was written by Guillaume de Lorris (4000 lines), and that, half a century later, Jean de Meung wrote a "second part" or "continuation" (13000 lines).

(10) Besides, both NP's (subject and object) must refer to "well-known" human beings. [ii] remains totally unintelligible, and is therefore unacceptable.

[ii] *Durand continua Dupont.
'Peters continued Jones,'

Stated otherwise, the acceptability of [19a] and [b] depends on whether or not the addressee knows who Mazarin and Richelieu, and Voltaire and Rousseau are. Most people do.

(11) The pairing between Proust and Simon, and the one between Voltaire and Rousseau is not a natural one; it rests on a historical truth (or a historical fiction) which can only be recognized as such by specialists (i.e. not by the average native speaker).

(12) Lamiroy translates all her continuer-sentences into keep-sentences, none into utterances containing the verb continue. It is to be feared that, as a result, those readers of Lamiroy's paper who are insufficiently familiar with French will be led astray.

(13) Cp. GAATONE (1971:70), who, however, talks about a direct object infinitive ("un infinitif objet"). In his view (and in that of many other authors), cesser, and not the infinitive, is the main verb. In my framework, as exposed in Part One, Chapter Two, the infinitive is the main verb, and cesser is a modifier, or verbum adiectum.

(14) I strongly disagree with MULLER (1984:72), who claims that ne...V results from a conditioned deletion of pas ("un effacement conditionné de pas").

(15) Several authors specifically dealing with negation find "ne employé seul" ["ne used alone"] exceptional enough to leave it aside, mainly for reasons of "simplicity". Cp., among others, TASHOWSKII-de RYCK (1973:205), and MILNER (1979:80). The latter explicitly refers to the existence of ne cesser; the former does not.

(16) CRISTEA (1971) examined a corpus of 300,000 running words and found eight occurrences of each form (cp. l.c.:65). My own corpus had more occurrences of ne cesser de than of ne pas cesser.

(17) Cp. MULLER (1984:72): "une construction ne...V sans pas est toujours marquée en français contemporain" ["a
construction ne V without gap is always marked in modern French). See also CRISTEA (1971:53,65), who, besides, qualifies the use of ne alone as archaic and literary.

(18) /SM,I:1/, /SK,3/ and /G,1/ all translate faire des réflexions in [50a] by means of the verb think, which is used by /SM,I:76/ and /SK,62/ to translate penser in [50b] as well.

(19) The French language is very sensitive to questions of rhythm. Tout au long tends to become a simple replacement for au long where rhythm favours it. The utterance in [iii] is better with the introductory tout than without it - simply because it sounds better, it is more rhythmical.

[iii] Tout au long de la crise de 1938, elle [= the Soviet Union] n’avait cessé d’affirmer qu’elle remplirait ses engagements envers la Tchécoslovaquie si la France de son côté remplissait les siens : cette condition était d’ailleurs stipulée par le traité d’alliance russo-tchèque. /PM,11-03-88/

All along the 1938 crisis, the Soviet Union kept saying that it would fulfil its engagements towards Czechoslovakia if France on its side fulfilled its own: this condition, after all, was part of the Russo-Czech alliance treaty.

(20) An anecdote of a more personal nature. One of my informants asked me where I had found [60a]. I asked him to have a guess, and was extremely flattered to hear he thought it was in Alfred de Musset, the well-known French 19th century poet.
Chapters Seven and Eight deal with four of the commonest verbs denoting cessation in English and French respectively. Chapter Seven looks at cease, stop, finish and end, in that order; Chapter Eight, at cesser, (s’)arrêter, finir and (se) terminer. Although cease and finish, clearly, go back to cesser and finir, they have gone their own way. This will become apparent as soon as all the verbs have been looked at.

We shall proceed in basically the same way as in Chapters Three to Six, except for the fact that there will be more sections. In the case of Chapter Seven, we shall analyze cease, then compare cease to stop, analyze stop, compare stop (and cease) to finish, analyze finish, compare finish (and stop, and cease) to end, and finally analyze end. Chapter Eight will be built up in exactly the same way.
1. "CEASE"

1.1. To a large extent, English cease behaves in very much the same way as either begin (see Chapter Three), or continue (see Chapter Five). It is, for instance, impossible to draw any inferences from a negative cease-sentence considered out of context (cp. JACKENDOFF 1976a:128). On the other hand, utterances in which cease is followed by a punctual verb or by a stative expression are unacceptable except where the conditions apply that were exposed before in the case of begin and continue. [1a] is fine because of its subject, which is plural; [1b], even though it has a stative verb, is fine too, for there is a constant possibility of change.

[1a]    (With less air pumped into them,) the balloons ceased to burst.
[1b]    Mary ceased to like horror films.

[1a], which has a punctual verb but an iterative reading, obliges us to look for a formula which does not refer to the subject \( X \): not only are the first balloons that burst different from those that followed; those that did not burst at all (because less air was pumped into them) are obviously different again. [1b], on the other hand, makes it necessary to have a formula that contains be-components as well, as
nothing "happens" in this particular case. Notice, in this respect, that the combination cease to be, as exemplified in (2), is fully acceptable.

(2) Though Detroit's populace was forty per cent black, only in most recent years had its police ceased to be nearly a hundred per cent white (...). /W,131/

From the acceptability of examples such as the one in (2), we may infer that cease is not entirely parallel to either begin or continue (1). It also seems impossible to predict once and for all whether a process or state which ceases at t still occurs or exists at t, or whether it does not, whereas a process or state which begins or continues at t does occur or exist at t. At times, the situation is quite clear: when a newspaper announces on its first page "We cease publication today", it is obvious that it is still published on that very day. But if someone utters the sentence in (3) (with an understood reference to a point in time t):

(3) They ceased to fire.

it is not at all sure whether, at t, "they were still firing" or not. This may explain why WIERZBICKA (1988a:88) decides for a gloss which does not state what happened at t.

(4) before that time (t), they had been firing one could think then: 'more of it will happen after now' at that time (t), one could think this: 'more of it will not happen after now' after that time (t), more of it didn't happen

At first, the gloss in (4) may look like Wierzbicka's formula for the verb continue (cp. p.166). But caution is required: remember that Wierzbicka situates continuations
after $t$, whereas the time perspective adopted for cessations is identical to the one used for commencements. If that is the case, the question must be raised as to whether it is justifiable and/or necessary to speak about what happened or what did not happen AFTER $t$. A sequence before $t$ / at $t$ / after $t$ is evidence for the introduction of a "hic-et-nunc-perspective (cp. p.223). In her begin-formula, Wierzbicka moved along the time-axis - as would language users do when they try to figure out what they express when they say (not when they said!), for instance, that John began to run. In [4], Wierzbicka looks back from her own hic-et-nunc-position at the implications of [3] at different moments in time. There is, I believe, no advantage in adopting this new viewpoint.

Before I write out my own gloss for the string in [3], I wish to point out that there is more to the value of cease than reference to time and intuition of what came first and what comes next. JACKENDOFF's (1976a) paraphrase according to which "at some time the car was moving", whilst "at a later time it was not" probably does not correspond to his sample sentence in [5a], which sounds slightly odd (cp. WIERZBICKA 1988a:80), but to the stop-sentence in [5b].

[5b] The car stopped (moving).

A successful gloss must, as the one in [4], refer to an "ongoing process which at first can be expected to continue but which at a certain point can be expected to come to an end" (WIERZBICKA 1988a:81). That is what cease is all about: it implicates a change in expectation. We need nothing
more than what is expressed in [6].

[6] before t, they were firing
    one could think at that time:
    they will fire more after now
    one could not know at that time:
    they will fire more after now
    one could know at t:
    they will not fire anymore after now

The first abstract cease-formula runs as follows:

[7] at time t, X ceased to Z =
    before t, Z was happening/there was Z
    one could think at that time:
    more of Z will happen after now/there
    will be more Z after now
    one could not know at that time:
    more of Z will happen after now/there
    will be more Z after now
    one could know at t:
    Z will not happen anymore after now/there
    will be no Z anymore after now

Without line two, it would be impossible to explain why cease can be followed (and, indeed, is most often followed) by a TO-construction (cp. p.198). On the other hand, line two is instrumental in indicating that there is a change in expectation. The third line expresses the idea that there must be a constant possibility of change.

As forthcoming changes are easily detectable especially when, for instance, an activity gradually decreases in intensity, before becoming non-activity, we may understand why cease often comes to refer to gradual changes. [8] provides, I believe, an excellent example.

[8] [He] had ceased to pay any attention to
    the questions, nodding and hiccuping and
    nodding again. /OE,194/

Cease is also very natural in sentences which have an iterative ([9a]) or a generic ([9b]) reading.
Regulars who worked in Design-Styling claimed that after a while they ceased to notice the smell (...). /W,67/

[In] stray corners here and there, in Western Europe, the Jew could show that other quality he shared with the Arab, the quality of the princely host, who would wash the feet of beggars and feed them from his own dish; sometimes he could cease to be the enemy of the rich to become the friend of any poor man who sought a roof in the name of God. /OE,28/

I am not saying that cease is incompatible with sudden or immediate changes. [10] illustrates:

Immediately, because this was something which concerned his safety, he ceased to think either humorously or grandiloquently (...). /OE,163/

We shall have more to say on sudden and gradual cessations in section 2., where cease is compared to stop.

1.2. As in the case of English verbs denoting a commencement or a continuation, no separate treatment shall be given here of the ING-construction after cease, as opposed to the TO-construction. The assumption is, once again, that the differences have been sufficiently laid out in the existing literature (2), and that the use of one construction rather than the use of the other one does not affect the semantics of the verb cease as such. One example:

As a result, the press, which had relied on Vale for colourful copy, became more wary and eventually some reporters ceased trusting him at all. /W,53/

Both frames ("X ceased to Z" and "X ceased Z-ing") rank at the highest levels of the hierarchy of constructions attested with the verb cease. However, there are several lower
ranking frames which have been studied in less detail. Each one of them deserves a closer look.

First of all, I wish to distance myself from WIERZBICKA's sweeping (1983a:84) statement that cease does not take any direct object nouns. A first counter-example appears on p. 266 ("cease publication"). A second one is implicit in Wierzbicka's own work. If "in a war one speaks of a cease-fire rather than a 'stop-fire'" (WIERZBICKA l.c.:80), one can also say that the two armies involved ceased fire. This is, no doubt, military jargon. However, there are better examples. Even if it also talks about war, there is no jargon-like collocation in [12b].

[12a] The gang ceased its activities after its boss had been arrested.
[12b] It took ten years and thousands of lives before the two countries ceased hostilities.

As a matter of fact, it is rather premature to draw a conclusion if it only rests on the string in [13]. The question mark is taken over from Wierzbicka.


What makes [13] unacceptable, I believe, is that its direct object, unlike the ones listed above, can by no means be given a plural meaning. In "cease publication", different newspapers (i.e. different "publications") are concerned, and in "cease fire" different shots (i.e. different acts of firing). The objects in [12a] and [12b] are grammatically and semantically plural. I now believe (3) that the idea of a plural meaning is essential to the frame "X ceased Y", for which I therefore propose the formula in [14]. [14] also
expresses the idea that cease will not normally allow any
direct objects that are not allowed after continue.

[14] at time t, X ceased Y =
  I know this:
    you know more of Y than what I say now
    one can think of Y as of something that has
    parts
    one can think of those parts as being one
    after the other
    one can think of a part of Y as of Y
    before t, there was Y
    one could think at that time:
    there will be more Y after now
    one could know at t:
    there will be no Y anymore after now

The following examples contain instances of the
construction (as opposed to the frame) "X ceased":

[15a] The rain ceased.
[  b] It took ten years and thousands of lives
    before the hostilities finally ceased.

When compared to those in [15], sentences such as [16a] and
[  b] sound highly artificial, and may strike one as
constructed in order to satisfy the needs of a particular
linguistic theory. The question marks are mine.

[16a]?His writing ceased.
[  b]?Bill’s working ceased.

HARRIS (1969:203) considers [16a] as "descriptively prior"
to a much more "normal sounding" He ceased writing (as in my
corpus-example quoted in [27] below). What he means is that
the absolute construction which has an ING-form as its
subject ranks higher than the ING-construction properly (4).
[16b], on the other hand, is one of FREED’s (1979) working
examples. In general, one may say that absolute cease is
even less common than "cease + direct object NP", and that,
once again, change of expectation is not the only factor involved. If there were nothing more to it, ROSS's (1972b: 576) string in [17] ought to be correct in a context in which the answer given gradually degenerates into empty talking.

[17] *He began answering me, but then he ceased.

According to CARLSON (1982:152), X in "X ceased" "must denote an activity of some sort, and cannot simply denote an object". Carlson too works with constructed examples, judging [18a] as "strange" in a way that [18b] is not:

[18a] The man ceased.
[18b] The game ceased.

In order to remain consistent with the analyses proposed in earlier chapters, we shall again propose a distinction between two frames, viz. an elliptical one (illustrated in [15a]) and an absolute one (illustrated in [15b]). The subject of both frames must be inanimate, but only for the elliptical frame will this have to be spelled out as such (5). The formula for the latter is related to the one in [7], except for the fact that it does not have any b_components. On the other hand, it does have a supplementary introductory line.

[19] at time t, X ceased =
   one can think of X as of something that Z
   before t, Z was happening
   one could think at that time : more of Z will happen after now
   one could know at t :
   Z will not happen anymore after now

Let us look once again at example [15a]. It is clear that the rain, before ceasing, was "doing something" - and it is
perfectly clear what it was "doing": viz., nothing but falling. My own gloss for [15a] runs as follows:

[20] The rain ceased =
    one can think of the rain as of something that falls
    before t, the rain was falling
    one could think at that time:
    more rain will fall after now
    one could know at t:
    no more rain will fall after now

WIERZBICKA (1988a:81) has a rather different gloss:

[21] The rain ceased =
    before t, it was raining
    one could think then:
    more of it will happen after now
    at t, one could think this:
    more of it will not happen after now
    after t, more of it didn't happen

[21] not only suffers the drawbacks signalled in 1.1.; it also, in fact, glosses a sentence similar in construction to, for instance, They ceased to fire. [21] is an interpretation of It ceased to rain, not of [15a] (6). As to [15b], it requires another formula, viz. the one in [22]:

[22] at time t, X ceased =
    one can think of X as of something that has parts
    one can think of those parts as being one after the other
    before t, there were parts of X
    one could think at that time:
    there will be more parts of X after now
    one could know at t:
    there will be no parts of X anymore after now

The presence of a temporal marker ("at time t") is noteworthy. Cease never applies to boundaries in space: it would be impossible to say, for instance, that "the forests cease at the riverside".

273
1.3. Table One gives a summary of existing cease-frames.

Table One

(a) X ceased to Z
(b) X ceased Z-ing
(c) X ceased Y
(d) X ceased (elliptical)
(e) X ceased (absolute)

[7] [7] [14] [19] [22]

Total number of frames: 5
Total number of formulas: 4
Total number of formulas referring to a second verb: 2

2. "CEASE" AND "STOP" COMPARED

2.1. ANDERSON (1968:397) remarks that, if in his begin-
formula (here quoted on p.46), "the first and third sentences
were interchanged, the definition which would result would be
that of cease or stop, not of begin". Or in "cease or stop"
is ambiguous. It may be exclusive, in which case Anderson
means that cease and stop have different formulas, only one
of which corresponds to the paraphrase for begin; or
inclusive, in which case the argument implies that cease and
stop are equivalent, or synonymous. A close analysis of
Anderson's viewpoint pays off, in that it provides a clue as
to what is really meant. Anderson, it was signalled in
Chapter Three (p.79), believes that one and the same formula
"generates" both the aspectual verb begin and the aspectual
verb start. As no indications to the contrary are given, one
may assume that the case of cease and stop is not different.
Or, therefore, is inclusive, and both verbs are considered to
be synonyms.

Pace Anderson (and possibly Dixon) (7), it must be clear
that there are differences. Wierzbicka’s example in [12] and Ross’s example in [17] sound fine if the verb stop is used rather than cease:

[23a] Mary stopped her lecture.
[  b] He began answering me, but then he stopped.

Before the latest viewpoints as to possible differences are investigated, it may be useful to look at some earlier views, especially the ones that appear to be popular among lexicographers.

COLLINS (1952:173) calls stop an "ordinary working word". What he means is more elegantly expressed by HAYAKAWA & FLETCHER (1971:573), who say that, in a set of words including, among other items, the verb cease, stop is "the most general, least formal, and most commonly used". In its generality, it has "few specific implications", and it is "open to any colouring context gives it" (ibid.:572). Cease, on the contrary, "most often suggests an abrupt stopping" (!); and it "carries the specific implication of a total extinction" (ibid.:573; emphasis added) (8).

Consider some of the examples given by HAYAKAWA & FLETCHER (1971) in support of their thesis on abruptness:

[24a] As suddenly as it began, the rain ceased.
[  b] The officer ordered him to cease his whistling immediately.

Now, reconsider the statement quoted earlier: cease "most often suggests an abrupt stopping". Clearly, Hayakawa & Fletcher convey to the verb a meaning which is carried by some other meaningful element, viz. the adverbs suddenly and immediately). Notice, furthermore, that [24b] is another
counter-example to Wierzbicka's statement about the impossibility of a direct object noun after cease (cp. p.270).

The idea of a total extinction brought about by the verb cease is as unrealistic as the idea of abruptness. Hayakawa & Fletcher talk about a newspaper that ceases publication (my example on p.266 is borrowed from them); but it is not impossible to have [25] as part of a news report:

[25] After a fire destroyed its offices, the Times temporarily ceased publication. But it was reissued two months later, with a different heading and a new outlook.

Freed (1979), who believes that both stop and cease refer to some temporal segment of the "nucleus" of an event, shares the idea that cease implies "complete termination": "although something can be stopped for a period of time and then resumed, it does not seem natural to claim that we cease something for a while and then resume it" (l.c.:121). The "evidence" is reproduced in [26]:

[26a] We stopped discussing the case until some new information could be obtained.

[26b] We ceased discussing the case until some new information could be obtained.

The unacceptability of [26b] is probably again a matter of peculiar speech habits. According to my own investigations, cease appears to be fine, even if the activity ceased is later resumed. Compare:

[27] Dr Czinner ceased writing for a little more than a minute. (...) He wrote for ten minutes more and then folded the paper and slipped it into the pocket of his mackintosh. /OE,164-165/
It may be quite interesting to contrast [28a], where the cessation is temporary, and [28b], where it is final:

[28a] Two weeks earlier, production of cars had ceased. Specialist contractors had promptly moved in, their assignment to dismantle the old assembly line and create a new one on which the Orion would be built. /W,306/

[ b] An inventory audit, before production of the previous year’s models ceased, had revealed stock shortages so huge as to touch off a major investigation. /W,307/

From section 1, we know that cease implies a change of expectation, which is one of its most salient features. How about stop? The latter is not as unmarked a verb as Collins, and Hayakawa and Fletcher, believe. On the other hand, it is obviously insufficient to define stop as "change to not" (cp. PARISI/ANTINUCCI 1976:57) (?). Such a definition masks the differences between cease and stop, as it applies to the former as well as to the latter. According to WIERZBICKA (1988a:80), stop "refers to a sudden change from action to non-action" (emphasis added). The exact nature of the suddenness (i.e. the absence of any expectations) is often indicated by means of an extra adverb or AdvP:

[29a] The soldier suddenly stopped shuffling and said, in a puzzled voice, 'I'm glad I wasn't in Belgrade.' /OE,154/

[ b] The cries then stopped, most abruptly. /M,128/

[ c] The assembly line stopped. It stopped without warning, without sudden sound or jolting. /W,199/

However, those extra adverbs do not have to be there. Compare [30a] to [30b].

[30a] If I get really fed up with Newsworld, if people cease listening to me, I might say, "Right, that's it". /NI,07-05-83/
If we start thinking so, and stop listening, we'll be back where we were five years ago. /W.218/

Clearly, the cease-clause in [30a] (viz. People cease listening) implies a change of expectation. Before the reference point in time, the speaker may have thought that if fewer people were listening to him, that was perhaps nothing to be really worried about ("they will come back"). But at the reference point in time, it had become clear that the listening public had lost interest. In [30b], on the other hand, the first person plural we denotes a board of directors of an automobile plant who make their decisions together and decide together whether or not to listen to the needs of the public. The cessation is therefore, if it occurs at all, a sudden or unexpected one.

Consider also the following, all Wierzbicka's, examples (or rather, constructed minimal pairs). The acceptability judgments are those of her informants.

The noise stopped/?ceased as suddenly as it had started.
Gradually, imperceptibly, the tremor/rain ceased/?stopped.
Stop/*cease (it) at once!

Cease is not at all incompatible with suddenness (cp. [10], and also [24a] and [ b]). If [31a] sounds odd at all with the verb cease, this is probably due to the fact that cease and stop contrast poorly. Start implies suddenness, and the cessation verb which does so too is stop. Not infrequently, the two occur together:

'Sensible or not,' Smokey growled, 'you'll likely start something you can't stop, and afterwards wish you'd done it some other way.'
It may also be useful to think of DIXON's (1976) allusion to somebody's poor driving ("it's all stopping and starting") - and this brings me to a difference between cease and stop which I have not mentioned hitherto (viz., the contrast in acceptability between the *The car ceased and The car stopped), a difference which will be given due attention in section 3. On the other hand, I presume that [31b] was found acceptable with cease, for it seems to be the better alternative (stop would indeed be very strange). Finally, cease in [31c] is wrong because of the animacy of its implied subject (cp. p.272).

3. "STOP"

3.1. In Chapters Three and Five, the main formulas for start and keep were worked out starting from the formulas for begin and continue. The same procedure can be followed here, if we want to express our findings in a formula which marks the contrast existing between the two verbs cease and stop. All we need to do is take over the "neutral" parts of the cease-formula in [7], and replace the "marked" ones. The contrast, now, will be one, not of "one could think that p" vs "one could know that not-p" (change of expectation), but of "one did not know that not-p" versus "one could know that not-p" (suddenness/unexpectedness). In other words, start and stop have a similar second line, viz. one which is introduced by means of [33]:

279
one did not know at that time: ...

As a formula, [34] may be proposed:

\[
\text{at time } t, X \text{ stopped Z-ing = before } t, Z \text{ was happening/there was } Z
\]
\[
\text{one did not know at that time:}
\]
\[
Z \text{ will not happen anymore after } t/
\]
\[
\text{there will be no Z anymore after } t
\]
\[
\text{one could think at that time:}
\]
\[
Z \text{ will not happen anymore after now/}
\]
\[
\text{there will be no Z anymore after now
}\]
\[
\text{one could know at } t:
\]
\[
Z \text{ will not happen anymore after now/}
\]
\[
\text{there will be no Z anymore after now}
\]

In Wierzbicka's work, there are two attempts at describing the meaning of stop in the frame "X stopped Z-ing". One (cp. [35]), and also, for instance, p.88) is in WIERZBICKA (1973: 622), and relies too heavily on the primitives "world" and "part":

\[
\text{X stopped playing at 6 o'clock}
\]
\[
\text{= The world that the worlds of which the playing X was a part were becoming and that itself was not becoming any worlds of which the playing X was a part, was the world of 6 o'clock.}
\]

The other one (cp. [36]) is in WIERZBICKA (1988a:88), and is far better, but still unsatisfactory.

\[
\text{At time } t, \text{ they stopped firing = before that time } (t), \text{ they had been firing for some time}
\]
\[
\text{at that time, one couldn't know this:}
\]
\[
\text{'more of it will not happen after now' after } t, \text{ more of it didn't happen}
\]

My objections against the gloss in [36] are mainly concerned with the hic-et-nunc-position of the linguist, and the absence of a component expressing the constant possibility of a change.

280
3.2. In order to explicate the meaning of stop, ANDERSON (1968:403) provides the two formulas reproduced in [37].

[37a] NP₁ VP  
     NPₓ Vₓ NP₁  
     NP₁ not-VP  

[37b] NP₁ not-VP  
     NP₁ moves  
     NPₓ Vₓ NP₁  
     NP₁ not-moves  
     NP₁ VP  

[37a] is a formula for "stop -ing" (with "-ing" being a verbal ING-construction); it expresses "cessation of activity". [37b] is a formula for "stop to"; it expresses "cessation of motion". Anderson implicitly acknowledges (cp. p.274) that [37a] could very well be a formula for the verb cease as well. This is hardly surprising, since there is no separate term which expresses either the change of expectation implied by the verb cease or the inherent suddenness-component of the verb stop. The fact that no particular remark is made with regard to [37b] seems to suggest that, according to Anderson, there are two verbs stop which are clearly distinct in meaning, and that only the one corresponding to the formula in [37a] belongs to the set to which also begin, start, continue, and cease belong (10).

More explicit than, but quite similar to, Anderson's position is the stand taken by DIXON (1976:351). According to the latter, [38a] and [ b] are closely related, whereas [38c] and [ d] are different.

[38a] He ceased reading.  
[ b] He ceased to read.  
[ c] He stopped reading.  
[ d] He stopped to read.
Dixon's point of view is that the verb stop in [38c] is homonymous with the verb stop in [38d]. Apart from Anderson and Dixon, no other linguist seems to have pushed the difference in meaning between stop + TO-construction and stop + ING-construction as far. SVARTVIK (1966:19), for instance, observes that stop "has different meanings when followed by to V and Ving" (emphasis added). Hence, Svartvik's position is one of polysemy, not of homonymy. Whereas [39a] and [b] are reasonably close, [39c] and [d] are not:

[39a] He started fighting.
[b] He started to fight.
[c] He stopped fighting.
[d] He stopped to fight.

PALMER's (1974:178) statement that [40a] and [b] have "a different sense" is clearly similar to the position taken by Svartvik. An exclamation mark is Palmer's (useful) indication for an utterance which is "grammatical", but not in the relevant meaning.

[40a] He stopped talking.
[b] !He stopped to talk.

NEY (1981:57), finally, counts stop among the verbs that "show a semantic shift" when used with a TO- rather than with an ING-construction. Sentences [41a] and [b] contrast in "grammaticality" (11):

[41a] I stopped to go to the speakeasy but I didn't ever go.
[b] *I stopped going to the speakeasy but I didn't ever go.

The question why [38c] and [39c] are not equivalent to [38d] and [39d] (12) has received various answers, only the
latest one of which seems to give a correct account of what is going on. The "semi-auxiliary" stop is an exception, argues KAJITA (1968:119); the inability for stop to take a TO-construction is "unsystematic" and "cannot be described in any general terms". Kajita does not claim that he himself is unable to provide an explanation: he boldly states (ibid.:115) that for the differences in syntactic behavior between cease and stop "there is no general explanation conceivable". PALMER (1974:178) is much more careful than that: putting keep and stop on the same line, he observes that their non-occurrence (as aspectuals) with a TO-construction has "no obvious semantic explanation" (cp. pp.196-197) (13).

In order to explain why (aspectual) stop does not take TO, DIXON (l.c.:351) refers to "interference from the paradigm of the homonymous item indicating cessation of motion". [39d] does exist, but it can only mean, for instance:

[42] He stopped at the library in order to read.

WIERZBICKA (1988a:79) disagrees: "Every natural language is full of ambiguities, and normally a form is not preempted from having an otherwise expected meaning just because it has also another meaning". The same author provides what I believe is the most reliable answer to the problem at hand: there is, as in the case of keep (cp. p.198), a semantic clash between the verb stop (and there is only one such verb) and the connector to. This statement remains true, even if the formulas involved are adapted as they were in the present investigation.

The whole point is that, after the verb stop, the connector
to is not equivalent to the one that follows begin, start, continue, and cease. To, if used after the verb stop, does not introduce the head of which stop is a modifier or verbum adjectum. It introduces a new clause. Notice that stop to see in [43a] is nearly equivalent to stop and see in [43b] (cp. PALMER 1965:176).

[43a] Maybe he’d break his cross-country trip and stop to see the family. /M,177/
[ b] So, here was Towers, skipping the whole middle of the country, tomorrow, letting it flow under his plane, not planning to stop and see the family. /M,89/

Whereas and indicates a succession of events (first stop and then see), to indicates a purpose (stop in order to see).

I am not proposing a new analysis: there is, in the previous pages, an explicit reference to an identical equation made by DIXON (1976). The latter, in turn, is not the only author who links stop + infinitive to stop in order to (14). Before Dixon, TWADDELL (1963:23) had stated that, next to [44a], "there is a grammatical English sentence, with the same truth value, containing 'in order to'" (viz., [44b]).

[44a] He stopped to eat.
[ b] He stopped in order to eat.

FRIEDERICH (1977:104) recalls "dass der Infinitiv in Verbindung mit to stop immer nur Zweckbedeutung haben kann" ['that the infinitive after to stop cannot denote anything else but purpose']. FREED (1979:125), in a footnote, argues that "sentences such as He stopped to catch his breath are not instances of stop + to V but stop in order to V".

I wish to make one further little step, by claiming (with MORRISSEY 1979:95) that in sentences such as [45], "the main
verb can usually be expanded to include a participial complement", i.e. an ING-form.

[45] John stopped to pick up the ball.

[45] says that John stopped doing something (e.g. walking or running or driving or whatsoever) in order to pick up the ball. What he stopped doing is implied or expressed in the immediate context.

3.3. Stop does not occur with ING-constructions alone. An extremely frequent stop-construction is the one which involves no second verb, but a direct object which immediately follows the aspectual verb (15). As in the case of begin, start and cease, a distinction must be made (cp. FREED 1979:118-119). The two (!) most important frames are causative (16). Examples of one of them were given already in Chapter Two, p.30. The following could be added.

[46a] He said she had to stop that noise.
/M,134/
[ b] The screams continued, fiendishly, unceasing, while someone hit an alarm button to stop the line, another the UP control to raise the engine assembly.
/W,205/

In order to explicate the meaning of the stop-frames which appear in [46a] and [ b], we need more than one formula. The first one is given in [47].

[47] at time t, X stopped Y = one can think of Y as of something that one is Z-ing before t, Z was happening one did not know at that time : Z will not happen anymore after t at t, X did something one could know at that time :
because of that, I will not happen anymore after now

By means of [47], we can account for the meaning of the stop-frame in [46a] (where someone — not the subject she — makes the noise referred to). In [46b], however, the line itself is doing something, viz. moving. And not only things can move, but people can move, too. Examples such as the following are uncountable:

[48a] All you'll be thinking of is a way to stop me, and it won't work. /W, 287/
[48b] If you really want to get away, what is stopping you? /NI, 07-05-88/
[48c] I stopped her as she was leaving. /W, 327/

For utterances such as these, and for utterances such as [46b], the formula in [49] is needed. As we will argue below, this formula is not too broad. The only difference with the one in [47] is in the first line.

[49] at time t, X stopped Y =
one can think of Z as of something that
Y does
before t, Z was happening
one did not know at that time:
Z will not happen anymore after t
at t, X did something
one could know at that time:
because of that, Z will not happen anymore after now

Some utterances may be ambiguous: they require, for their explication, one formula in one case, and either one in the other case. [50] is a clear, and often quoted, example.

[50] John stopped the car.

[47] applies when John himself is the driver; both [47] and [49] are applicable when John signals a car driver to stop
(one can think of the car as of something that one, i.e. a particular driver, is driving - and one can think of driving as of something that the car does).

So far, nothing was said with respect to the third direct object frame, except for the fact that it appears less often than the two other ones. It is a non-causative frame, and it is exemplified in [51] (17).

[51] "And the child did stop her screaming rather abruptly," said Miss Ballew. /*M,119/

Consider, in an attempt to explain why non-causative direct object sentences involving the aspectualizer stop are rather uncommon (but not quite that rare), the following sentences, quoted from FREED (1979:119).

[52a] We stopped eating/serving lunch at 2:00.
[ b] They stopped making trouble after reaching an agreement.
[ c] Goldie stopped eating the cookies last night.

If start had been used, the second verbs could have been left unexpressed without any difficulty. With stop, however, the situation is different (the acceptability judgments are Freed's):

[53a] We stopped lunch at 2:00.
[ b] *They stopped the trouble after reaching an agreement.
[ c] *Goldie stopped the cookies last night.

[53a] has only one reading, viz. that "we stopped eating" (non-causative). [53b] sounds all right although, unlike [52b], it will for most native speakers be causative, i.e. imply that "the trouble stopped" because of some action undertaken by the subject/agent they. [53c], finally, must
be causative, and could only be used, for instance, if the cookies had started moving but were "stopped" by Goldie. Freed's "?*" must be interpreted with caution: [53c] is not unacceptable, but appears in a highly specific context only. It is not equivalent to [52c] because, as in the case of continue and cease, a direct object in a non-causative direct object frame must refer to something which has parts that are consecutive in time (something which can certainly not be said with regard to cookies). The formula in [34] does not apply. Instead, I propose [54].

[54] at time t, X stopped Y :
   one can think of Y as of something that has parts
   one can think of those parts as being one after the other
   before t, there was Y
   one did not know at that time:
     there will be no Y anymore after t
   one could know at t:
     there will be no Y anymore after now

A notable difference between the two causative frames and the non-causative one is that in their explication the former but not the latter include a reference to a second verb.

3.4. After looking at the direct object frames, let us now investigate the construction "X stopped" (where no argument appears after the aspectual verb). Consider the examples given by Ross (1972a:69-70):

[55a] You can go on working if you want, but I've got to stop/stop it/stop working.
[b] You can go on watching this if you want, but I'm stopping/*stopping watching.

Ross himself does not know whether the "anaphoric complement rule" which he devised in order to "explain" how
the elliptical versions in [55a] and [ b] are to be "generated" "deletes the repeated complement directly, or whether the complement must first have been converted to it". The answer is entirely irrelevant: the rule itself does not exist, for ellipsis does not result from deletions (cp. p.66) (18). A few more examples containing an instance of elliptical stop are given in [56].

[56a]  My watch has stopped. Could you tell me how long we have been back here? /OE,211/
[ b]  Erica froze. Her heart seemed to stop. /W,110/
[ c]  "I just love swimming," she said. "I find it hard to know when to stop!" /WD,07-09-87/

It is not hard to supply, for each one of the utterances in [56], a second verb (namely, for instance, work, beat, swim, in that order; cp. also MOREY 1985:196-197) (19). Notice that, quite often, exactly like start (cp. Chapter Three), stop appears as an abbreviation, in the present case for a longer "stop + movement verb", as in [57a] and [ b].

[57a]  He left his table and out in the street heard the screams more clearly, but the taxis went hooting by, a few hotel porters staggered down the slippery pavement carrying bags: no one stopped, no one heard. /OE,107/
[ b]  The train stopped as she reached her seat, and she looked out of the window at a small muddy station. /OE,168/

The absolute frame is illustrated in [58]. Twice, the suddenness-component of stop is contextually reinforced:

[58a]  Her laughter stopped, not coming gradually to an end, but vanishing so that he wondered whether he had imagined the sound or whether it had been a trick of the glancing wheels. /OE,144/
[ b]  The cries then stopped, most abruptly. /M,128/
As NEWMEYER (1975:56) correctly observes, [59] surely does not imply that "the noise stopped doing something". A similar remark could be made about the examples in [58] as well.

[59] The noise stopped when the teacher entered the room.

Unlike Newmeyer, who postulates the "deletion" of an "underlying" verb of existence, I believe that there is no understood verbal reading at all. I propose the formula in [60] (to be contrasted with the formula for the frame "X ceased", as given in [22]).

[60] at time t, X stopped =
    one can think of X as of something that has parts
    one can think of those parts as being one after the other
    before t, there were parts of X
    one did not know at that time:
        there will be no parts of X anymore after t
    one could know at t:
        there will be no parts of X anymore after now

There is not so much of a difference between the formulas in [22] and in [60]. Line four is different. It expresses unexpectedness in the case of stop, and it helps establish a "change of expectation"-reading in the case of cease.

3.5. One more stop-frame remains to be considered. It also exists for the verbs start and keep, and it involves a direct object and an ING-construction, in that order. For the third time in a row, pace MITCHELL (1979:173) and WIERZBICKA (1988a:95), causation is not the only reason for the non-existence of this frame with the verb cease (as noted by PALMER 1965:166). There is an additional component of
unexpectedness which only the verb stop has as an invariant part of its value. Consider the examples in [61]:

[61a] I would like to know whether I can still participate in sport and if there is any way to stop the disorder progressing. /WD,07-09-87/

[  b] To stop me worrying too much, the doctors said it was a side effect of the spinal anaesthetic. /WD,06-09-88/
[  c] "Yes," she said, and just managed to stop herself adding the word please. /WD,12-10-87/

I have no other formula to propose than the one in [49], which was devised for the second one of the causative direct object frames "X stopped Y". This may sound problematical, although it soon appears that the two frames ("X stopped Y" bis and "X stopped Y I-ing") are very similar indeed. Notice, first of all, that in both frames Y is the subject of a or else of the verb Z. If it is left unexpressed (i.e. in the case of "X stopped Y" bis), that verb is to be supplied by the addressee, through a natural pairing. Sometimes, where Z is explicitly present, it could be left away without any loss of information. [61a] is equivalent to [62].

[62] I would like to know whether I can still participate in sport and if there is any way to stop the disorder.

Elsewhere, Z must remain present, even if the context prevents misunderstanding. [63a] and [  b] are unacceptable.

[63a] *To stop me, the doctors said it was a side effect of the spinal anaesthetic.
[  b] *I had worried too much, and to stop me, the doctors said it was a side effect of the spinal anaesthetic.

One difference between [61a] and [61b] is that the verb progress expresses a movement, whereas the verb worry (or
worry too much) does not express any movement. It could then be argued that, since all our examples for the frame explicated in [49] refer to some movement, the formula (as proposed on p. 286) is too broad, i.e. must be restricted to a subset of verbs Z. This would be an overgeneralization, though, since the second verb in [61c] (a verb of communication) could be left unexpressed, though there would be some loss of information.

[64] "Yes," she said, and just managed to stop herself.

We are entitled, I believe, to conclude that "X stopped Y" bis and "X stopped Y Z-ing" are closely related (more closely than, in Chapter Three, "X started Y" and "X started Y Z-ing"). It is perfectly all right to propose only one formula, and to argue that movement verbs and verbs of communication can be left unexpressed provided they can be supplied through natural pairings by the addressee.

3.6. In comparison with cease, stop has a greater number of frames. For reasons of consistency, Table Two does not respect the order in which the stop-frames were taken up, but the order that has prevailed throughout this dissertation.

Table Two

(a) X stopped Z-ing [34]
(b) X stopped Y [54]
(c) X stopped Y (causative 1) [47]
(d) X stopped Y (causative 2) [49]
(e) X stopped Y Z-ing [49]
(f) X stopped (elliptical) [34]
(g) X stopped (absolute) [60]

Total number of frames : 7 (cesser : 5)
Total number of formulas : 5 (cesser : 4)
4. "STOP" (AND "CEASE") AND "FINISH" COMPARED

4.1. It is probably an exaggeration to state that finish, stop, and cease "seem to have roughly the same meaning" (ROSS 1972b:576), or to call stop and finish "synonyms" because they happen to mark "termination" (R.J. HARRIS 1974: 595-596) (20). In fact, there is a considerable difference which must be spelled out right now (21).

On an informal level, the dissimilarity of stop and finish may be illustrated by the observation that HAYAKAWA & FLETCHER (1971) have separate entries for both verbs, and no cross-references between both. COLLINS (1952:173-174), however, groups all the verbs studied in this chapter under one unique heading. The dissimilarity may also be further explicated by means of the (quite unnatural or, at best, artificial) paraphrases in [65a] and [ b].

[65a] When two minutes had passed, Bill's combing stopped.
[ b] When two minutes had passed, Mike's combing finished.

McCAWLEY (1973b:402) links the paraphrases in [65] to the utterances in [66] (where the emphasis is mine).

[66a] Bill combed his hair for two minutes.
[ b] Mike combed his hair in two minutes.

Consider, to tackle the problem more seriously, the stop-sentences in [67]:
Rebecca was running a mile, but she stopped.
Richard was drawing a circle, but he stopped.

VENDLER (1957:145) observes that "if someone stops running a mile, he did not run a mile; if someone stops drawing a circle, he did not draw a circle" (22). Stop, in other words, seems to imply that an ongoing process is being interrupted. But this is not always the case. Compare [68a] and [b].

Rebecca stopped running the marathon; she had just sprained her ankle.

Rebecca stopped running the marathon; the doctor had forbidden her to run too far.

Running the marathon can be seen as a single and interruptable process, as in [68a]. But it might also be viewed as a regularly repeated performance in the career of a sportsman or -woman, as in [68b]. In the latter case, Rebecca ran the marathon for a certain number of times, but at a certain moment she was not allowed to do so anymore. Stop still carries the idea of an interruption, then, not however the interruption of an event, but the interruption of an entire series of separate (but similar) events.

Consider, next, [69a] and [b].

Rebecca stopped running.
Richard stopped pushing the cart.

The interruption-component explains why stop is so natural in the utterances in [69]. Running and pushing carts are among those processes that can go on for an indefinite period of time. They are, in a more scientific terminology, atelic, i.e. they have no "set terminal point" (Vendler), but they
have to be interrupted in order not to occur any longer. Notice that "the man who stops running did run, and he who stops pushing the cart did push it" (VENOLER 1957:145). The effect of an interruption differs from case to case.

[69a] and [ b] become unacceptable when stop is replaced with finish.

[70a] *Rebecca finished running.
[ b] *Richard finished pushing the cart.

The unacceptability of [70a] and [ b] suggests that finish has a component which is incompatible with the absence, in running and pushing carts, of a natural endpoint. It appears that finish can only be used whenever there is a set terminal point beyond which the same event cannot go on or be resumed. The events (or series of separate events) in [67] and [68] all have that set terminal point. Stated otherwise, they are telic. It is possible to have:

[71a] Richard finished drawing his circle.
[ b] Rebecca finished running the marathon, although she had sprained her ankle on the way.
[ c] Rebecca finished running the marathon, although the doctor had forbidden her to run too far.

Unlike [68b], [71c] does not refer to a regularly repeated performance. MITCHELL (1979:180-181) notes that, with the verb finish, there is "more than a tendency for reference to be to a single event or process": finish involves a "necessary singularity of event or process", whereas stop does not. Nothing else, in fact, was to be expected: in the case of iteration and of habits, there is no natural endpoint, and therefore finish cannot be used.
(71b) and (c) both imply that Rebecca did run the marathon, and (71a) implies that Richard did draw a circle: the time at which the activities involved are finished necessarily follows (i.e. cannot collide with) any time at which they could have been stopped or interrupted (23). An activity which, at least theoretically, could be finished, but is interrupted and not resumed, will never come to its natural endpoint. Consider [72], where the activity is "articulating a sentence":

[72] '(...) I should have enjoyed...‘ He stopped in his stride with creased brows and seemed to forget what he was saying; (...) they began to walk back along the train. He was still frowning and he never finished his sentence. /OE,170/

On the other hand, interruptions can also be for a few seconds only, as in [73].

[73] Nimbly, he brought himself up against a door, stopped the second or two it took to rearrange his own rhythm, tugged the door in upon himself, and stepped steadily out to the sixth-floor corridor. /M,136/

If the interruption is of a temporary nature, the process can still be finished, even after the interruption, provided it could have been finished without interruptions as well. Compare:

[74a] Rebecca finished running the marathon without ever stopping to catch her breath.

[74b] Rebecca stopped running the marathon after she sprained her ankle; still, she finished the run within the time limits set by the organizers.

[74a] and [74b] talk about one unique event, interrupted in one case, but not so in the other.
4.2. We have just looked at the difference between finish and stop. The difference between finish and cease must also be explicated. In the literature, only one author seems to have looked for differences between the latter, but without making the link connecting both verbs to the verb stop. It is in order to account for the contrast between finish and cease that DIXON (1976) introduced the concepts of subject-orientation vs object-orientation, discussed in Chapter Three (pp.80-82). Consider the following sentences (Dixon's examples):

[75a] John has finished shelling the peas.
[ b] John has ceased shelling the peas.

[76a] John has finished reading the book.
[ b] John has ceased reading the book.

The finish-sentences imply, according to DIXON (l.c.:349), "object-orientation": the discontinuation is due "to some property of the referent of the object" (there are no more peas to be shelled/John has read the entire book). The cease-sentences imply "subject-orientation": the discontinuation is due "to the referent of the subject NP of the sentence" (all the peas have not been shelled yet/some chapters of the book remain to be read - but John has decided he should go for a break).

Defining two contrasting "syntactic orientations" proves far more useful in the case of finish and cease than in the case of begin and start. It appears, furthermore, that Vendler's intuitions on finish and stop are not at all incompatible with Dixon's explication of the contrast between finish and cease. In the sentences with object-orientation (cp. [75a] and [76a]), the shelling and the reading have
reached their natural endpoint: John cannot go on unless he is provided with new peas, or with another book. On the other hand, in the sentences with subject-orientation (cp. (75b) and (76b)), John has merely interrupted his activity: he can choose to get back to work at any moment, or he can decide not to work on (because he does not like shelling peas or because the book is lousy). BRINTON (1985:162) correctly states that "with finish, the goal has been achieved, but with stop or cease, it has not".

4.3. One question now remains to be answered. Cease and stop differ in terms of expectations (change of expectation vs no expectations); but where do we put finish as far as expectations are concerned? The answer is straightforward: as the verb finish refers to the natural endpoint or, in Vendler's terminology, the "set natural point" of a process, there is neither a change of expectation (as with cease), nor no expectation at all (as with stop). The expectations before t and at t are the same — and hence we can talk about unchanged expectations. According to HAYAKAWA & FLETCHER (1971:210), finish means "to bring to an anticipated end by doing all things that are necessary or appropriate to achieving that end" (24). Thus, the change is perfectly predictable, and in most cases no suddenness or surprise are involved. Basically, that is what MOREY (1985:196) states when she says that "English 'to stop' implies a more abrupt ending that [sic] 'to finish'".
5. "FINISH"

5.1. More than any other aspectual verb, finish has been the topic of formal descriptions. Dowty (1979), for instance, believes that the meaning of this verb may be "rather accurately" described in terms of Montague's intensional logic, by means of a so-called "meaning postulate" or MP. There are two such MP's in Dowty's book (pp.181 and 363); both claim to be explications of the same verb. The trouble is that they are different, and that no clue is provided as to which MP should be preferred and why. To my own idea, formalizations produce nothing but an illusion of understanding. If, besides, such formalizations use one aspectual verb in order to shed light (if they do) on another (as is the case in Åqvist & Guenthner 1978, who present a formalization which heavily relies on the component "ceases A", meaning 'it ceases in this moment to be the case that A'), they become even more dangerous and misleading. Semantic formulas à la Wierzbicka are not misleading; we will at present attempt to construct such a formula for the verb finish. Our starting point, however, will not be the gloss in Wierzbicka (1973:622) - a gloss which is of the same quality as Wierzbicka's gloss for the verb stop (p.280):

\[77\] X finished playing at 6 o'clock
   = The last of the worlds of which the playing X was a part, was the world of 6 o'clock
   = The world of which the playing X was a part and which all the other worlds of which the playing X was becoming a part were becoming, was the world of 6 o'clock.

Finish, as we have seen, can only be used if there is a
natural endpoint and if there are unchanged expectations. The notion of "natural endpoint" implies that an event I not only will not happen anymore, but more importantly that it cannot happen anymore after that point. The notion of "unchanged expectations", on the other hand, implies that we will need two components with a basically identical content, but referring to different points in time. [78] expresses the meaning of \_finish in the frame "X finished Z-ing". Whereas the first line refers, as with the other verbs, to the situation before \( t \) (25), the second line expresses that the change occurs at the set terminal point of the event. The third line talks about the situation at \( \_t \) (note that this component was not present in any of the formulas proposed for the verbs cease and stop) - and the fourth line precludes the possibility of a resumption at a later moment of time.

\[
\text{[78] \quad \text{at time } t, X \text{ finished } Z-\text{ing}=}
\]
\[
\text{before } t, I \text{ was happening for some time}
\]
\[
\text{one could know at that time :}
\]
\[
I \text{ cannot happen anymore after } t
\]
\[
\text{at } t, I \text{ was happening}
\]
\[
\text{one could know at that time :}
\]
\[
I \text{ cannot happen anymore after now}
\]

There are no be-components in the formula in [78]; for an explanation, cp. section 5.2.

5.2. Finish shares with \( \text{stop} \), but not with \( \text{cease} \), its inability to occur with TO-constructions denoting the event which is being finished. According to BENNETT & PARTEE (1978:17), speakers use [79a] rather than [79b] "so as to avoid suggesting" [79c]. This viewpoint reminds one of the homonymy-thesis adhered to by DIXON (1976), and must be
rejected (cp. pp. 281-282).

[79a] John finishes eating the fish.
[ b] John finishes to eat the fish.
[ c] John finishes in order to eat the fish.

An even more unconvincing account for the anomaly of *finish to and *stop to appears in EMONDS (1985), who opposes
the two cessation verbs to begin, start, and continue, and
claims that the verbs of the first group are different from
those of the second group in that they have different
features or syntactic subcategorizations (l.c.:103). At no
point does Emonds try to explain why both groups have
different features: he merely formalizes the difference.
His observation that the syntactic subcategorizations "seem
to accord well with the semantics of individual verbs"
becomes highly suspect if one considers that, probably not
unintentionally, Emonds does not talk about cease and the way
in which it differs from finish and stop — nor about keep and
the way in which it differs from continue. The true
explanation (there is one, pace KAJITA 1968; cp. p.283) is,
as in the case of keep and stop, entirely semantic: there is
once again a clash between the semantic formula of the
connector, and the semantic formula of the verb.

What about the syntax of the second verb Z? MITCHELL
(1979:180) notes that there seems to be "some tendency for
the main verb following finish to require an object noun".
This is, I believe, a very weak tendency indeed. It is
perfectly all right to say that "John finished eating"
(Mitchell’s own example) or that "John finished walking to
the park" (cp. DOWTY 1979:61). In the latter case, John had
a particular place to walk to, and once he arrived there, his

301
walk was "over". The event or process described has reached its natural endpoint. Further examples (which I found in my corpus) are given in [80a] to [c]. Allusion is made in [80b] to a particular message that had to be communicated, not to the act of speaking in general (which has no natural endpoint).

[80a] Janet Pardoe had nearly finished dressing. /OE,255/
[ b] As he finished speaking, they were airborne. /W,12/
[ c] Remove from heat, and without uncovering pan, let the chicken finish cooking in the stored heat for 1 hour. /WD,07-09-87/

Finally, I should say something about punctual verbs and stative expressions. In the formula in [78], the words for some time were added in order to account for the anomaly of strings containing a punctual verb. The test examples in [81a] and [b] are taken from DOWTY (1979:180-181) (the acceptability judgments are his).

[81a] ??John finished finding a penny.
[ b] ??John finished recalling Bill's nickname.

One might expect that substituting plurals in subject or object position, and other similar "tricks", would enhance the acceptability of, e.g., [81a]. Nothing is less true, for reference would then be to an event with no natural endpoint, or to more than one event. Compare:

[82a] *John finished finding lots of pennies.
[ b] *All of them finished finding a penny.

Let us have a look at stative expressions. Regardless of the nature of their subject and/or object, stative expressions, i.e. those expressions for which in previous
formulas be-components were introduced. always remain stative. As such, they can never have a natural endpoint, and, exactly like punctual verbs, do not appear with an aspectualizer such as finish. It is not hard to see that this is a purely semantic explanation, very different from the syntactic explanation in ROSS (1972b). [33a], quoted from FUCHS & LEONARD (1979:324-325), is faulty not only because it has a stative expression - cease, according to the authors (ibid.:332), would be "beaucoup plus acceptable" ['much more acceptable'] - but probably even more because it has a TO-construction after finish (a fact of which the authors do not even seem to be aware). [83b] and [ c], on the other hand; are due to Ross and to ALLAN (1985:461), respectively (26).

[33a] *The house is finishing to be large.
[ b] *It finished being muggy.
[ c] *Max finished living.

In conclusion, we are entitled to say that punctual verbs and stative expressions did occur with the aspectualizers studied up to now, but that they do not occur with finish.

5.3. Finish itself occurs not only in the frame "X finished Z-ing", but in three other frames as well. The first one of these is a non-causative direct object frame. Examples are given in [84a] to [ c].

[84a] It was a long time before she had the courage to finish her work. /OE,218/
[ b] When Daddy read to her, it was interesting, too, although Daddy never did finish a story. /M,28/
Addressees have no trouble in supplying the missing ING-constructions: all of them (e.g. doing in [84a], reading in [84b], reading or writing or composing in [84c]) are naturally paired with the direct object which follows the aspectualizer (27). Notice that my position is identical to that of MOREY (1985), and not really different from Dowty’s. The latter also observes (1985:296) that not just anybody’s reading or writing is involved in the meaning of [84c], but John’s reading or writing only.

The frame "X finished Y" is very common when reference is made to the consumption of food, drinks, or tobacco:

[85a] He was about to sit down and finish his coffee when he heard it again. /OE,107/
[ b] Wingate finished his drink, poured another and pushed the bottle towards Rollie. /W,420/
[ c] He paid the bill and they went to the flat, looked at the moon, finished the champagne and went to bed. /WD,12-10-87/
[ d] He must have finished his cigarette by now, Coral thought. /OE,174/

It is noteworthy that the direct object Y may refer to the consumed goods even in an indirect way:

[86a] Finish the bottle with me? /M,110/
[ b] Erica touched her glass. "Let me finish this. I need it." /W,141/

That direct objects such as those in [85] and in [86] are common after finish is not at all that strange. A natural endpoint (e.g., an empty cup or glass or bottle) can be easily identified – and visualized (28).

At this stage, we are left with two frames, both of the type "X finished". Pace FREED (1979), the construction "X finished" is not too uncommon. Consider, first of all, the examples in [87] (29):

304
Acceptability is guaranteed as soon as addressees are able to come up with fitting second verbs: viz., for instance, reading, blossoming, and studying. The formula in [78] applies. It does not apply, however, in the case of [88a] to [c]. The latter contain an absolute, not an elliptical, use of the verb finish.

For the frame exemplified in [88a] to [c], the formula in [89] is needed.

One final remark with regard to the elliptical frame. In order to explain the unacceptability of [90a] (used for
[90b]), FREED (1979:136) oostulates that "deletion" is only possible if "the subject is animate or a personified inanimate".

[ b] The sun finished setting at 6:48.

The question must be raised as to whether the sun is a "personified inanimate", and if so, in what sense (do people ever set ??). In fact, [90a] is impossible just because the second verb setting cannot be supplied by means of a natural pairing. The only verb that could be supplied is shining, and, as the verb shine denotes an event without any natural endpoint, the ING-construction shining is incompatible with finish.

5.4. One further peculiarity of the verb finish remains to be dealt with. I shall look at it very briefly, without proposing any further formulas. Finish differs from cease and stop in its ability to appear in the combinations finish off and finish up (30). Both combinations occur before an ING-construction (and in an elliptical frame); finish up occurs in an absolute frame as well.

The difference between, first of all, "X finished off Z-ing" and "X finished up Z-ing" is not hard to perceive: the former is related to "X finished Z-ing", and refers to the last part of a process; the latter is vaguely similar to the by-ning-frames with begin and start, and refers to the second (possibly the only truly existing) process or state in a set of two (31). [91a] and [ b] illustrate the contrast:

[91a] The attorney finished off selling his cars.
The attorney finished up selling his cars.

Apparantly, finish off can only be used with processes the realization of which requires either a more than ordinary effort (cp. [92a]) or a not so short lapse of time (cp. [92b]). This is entirely consistent with our observations on start off, which also implies length.

The attorney finished off reading the newspaper.

The attorney finished off reciting the limerick.

It may be useful to quote a few more corpus examples. Both [93a] and [ b] imply a "not so short lapse of time":

He looked sheepish and turned to Isobel to continue the story. "I came back from overseas and we haven't been separated since," Isobel finished off. /WD,07-09-87/

But the opportunity to set up an advanced dancing school, so that Swiss students no longer need to go elsewhere to finish off their ballet training, was too good to pass up. /WD,07-09-87/

There is nothing really new to be said about elliptical uses of the type Let's finish up/Let's finish off. Therefore, I pass on to the absolute finish up-frame exemplified in [94].

I'm sure all like-minded viewers will be devastated to know that the series is finishing up tonight. /CC,09-09-87/

Paul McKenzie finished up with more fish than Wally Krikowa. /CC,23-09-87/

Roughly speaking, finishing up in [94a] is equivalent to "coming to its end" (32). Finished up with in [94b] stands for finished up being with, which in turn stands for finish up having : an ING-construction (i.e. a stative expression)
is to be and can be supplied. Notice, finally, that finish up is not only compatible with stative, but also with punctual verbs:

[95] He had dreamt he would find a ten dollar note; instead, he finished up finding a penny.

Thus, while one cannot *"finish finding a penny" (cp. p. 302), it is perfectly possible for one to "finish up finding one". With respect to punctual and stative verbs, finish and finish up behave in entirely different ways.

5.5. Disregarding, as we did in Chapter Three, the frames involving a phrasal verb (i.e. finish off and finish up), we may summarize as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table Three</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) X finished Z-ing</td>
<td>[78]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) X finished Y</td>
<td>[78]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) X finished (elliptical)</td>
<td>[78]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) X finished (absolute)</td>
<td>[89]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total number of frames : 4 (cease : 5; stop : 7)
Total number of formulas : 2 (cease : 4; stop : 5)
Total number of formulas referring to a second verb : 1 (cease : 2; stop : 3)

6. "FINISH" (AND "STOP" AND "CEASE") AND "END" COMPARED

6.1. The verb cease is not treated by NEWMEYER (1975). Among the verbs which "assert non-occurrence after a presupposed occurrence" (i.c.:25), he quotes stop, finish and... end. The latter are COLLINS's (1952:173) "ordinary working words" (cp. p.275). At this point, we must examine how end relates to the other verbs hitherto studied.
While discussing the difference in meaning between stop and end in sentences such as [96a] vs [96b], WIERZBICKA (1976: 151) talks about "natural limits". She condemns the view that both verbs are synonyms "in the case of phenomena which do not have any natural limit" (33).

[96a] The rain stopped.  
[ b] The rain ended.

According to Wierzbicka, [96b] (but not [96a]) suggests "that the rain in question is viewed as a natural phenomenon which has a natural course, and a natural limit" (emphasis added). This, then, would suggest that end is closely related to finish, a stand explicitly taken in Wierzbicka's latest book (cp. below). Notice that the idea of a natural limit is easy to conceive in a context of rain (the limit is reached as soon as the entire cloud has "rained down"). Consider however the following cases:

[97a] Michele Benson had everything it takes to be "a loser" : a turbulent childhood; an underprivileged family; an alcoholic father who suicided when she was 15; an education which ended at 16.  /AM,03-09-88/

[ b] Later still, there would be more reprisals on both sides before the white-black Mafia war ended, if it ever did.  /W,362/

It seems difficult to think of an education and of a war as of "natural phenomena" with a "natural course" and a "natural limit". End, in other words, does not have the kind of meaning WIERZBICKA (1976) thinks it has.

As stated above, WIERZBICKA (1988a:77) asserts that end is closely related to finish: "both these verbs involve the idea of 'the last part', that is of the part after which there are no other parts (of the thing referred to)". As the
main difference, she quotes the fact that "end refers to the point immediately after the last part, whereas finish refers to the last part itself" (ibid.). The difference is similar to the one Wierzbicka postulated between begin (which refers to the first part) and start (which refers to the first point). The evidence provided is similar as well ("in a race the finish comes before the end"), and so is our objection to that kind of evidence: the finish and the end are nouns, and nouns are not the correct place to look for differences between verbs. In the case of begin and start, the objection rested on nothing more but an intuition. However, in the present case there is some evidence: one can end something before finishing it, but not finish something before ending it (cp. FREED 1979:132). In other words (ibid.:140), "end refers to a segment that occurs earlier in the chronology of an event than the segment to which finish refers". Notice, furthermore, that where in my corpus a commencement and a cessation verb occur together, begin is usually coupled with end, and start with finish - rather than begin with finish (part/part according to Wierzbicka), and start with end (point/point according to Wierzbicka). Consider the examples in [98] and in [99].

[98a] He knew she was right, that what had begun here would end here. /W,232/
[ b] Steve grinned, acknowledging defeat. Penny giggled and poured some more wine, and the evening ended more amiably than it had begun. /WD,12-10-87/

[99a] And it looked as if there was time aplenty for any of the guys and broads (...) to finish whatever their job happened to be on one car, rest a drumbeat, then start work on the next. /W,195/
[ b] He managed to start turning the single bolt; before he could finish, or insert the other, the
wrench cord tightened as the car moved forward.
/W,195/

I do not wholeheartedly subscribe to Freed’s views any more than I support Wierzbicka’s analysis. According to Freed, “the difference between end and finish is that end refers to a last temporal segment of the nucleus of the event named in its complement whereas finish refers to the coda of its events” (l.c.:129). What this suggests is that ending is not just “prior to finishing” (l.c.:132), but immediately prior to it. More correct seems to be the claim that stop and end (and also cease) refer to some segment of the nucleus of the event named in their complements, possibly (but not necessarily) the last (34).

Let us use the marathon-example introduced in section 4. in order to prove the point just made. Imagine that Rebecca sprains her ankle after just one kilometer, i.e. roughly 41 kilometers away from the finish. Her doctor decides she cannot go on. His advice will be similar to either [100a] (addressed to Rebecca) or [100b] (addressed to the organizers, if without Rebecca the marathon loses its attractiveness):

[100a] You’d better stop running.
[ b] You’d better end the run.

Obviously, the doctor will not address Rebecca using either [101a] or [101b].

[101a] You’d better finish running.
[ b] You’d better cease running.

[101a] is not unacceptable, since the context spells out that there is a set terminal point (the “finish” of the
marathon). More importantly, [101a] implies that Rebecca is urged to run the remaining 41 kilometers with a sprained ankle. On the other hand, cease in [101b] conveys a change of expectation, and is thus inadequate in the context of a run which is quite clearly interrupted by only one person in a rather unexpected or sudden way. The verb stop does denote an unexpected interruption, and apparently, since both stop and end can be used, the verb end does so, too. The difference is that stop, as we know, "allows a reading which implies a possible resumption of the event" (cp. FREED 1979: 139): after a minute or so, Rebecca may decide to resume her run. End, on the other hand, does not allow such a reading: it suggests the termination of an activity, a termination which is often premature (35). The contrast may be further clarified by means of the utterance in [102]:

[102] The ice-cool Swede has been sowing his wild oats since his four-year marriage to Mariana ended in divorce after he stopped playing professionally and suddenly had time to notice "other women", showing a penchant for teenage models in particular.

Borg’s divorce (the reader will have understood that [102] is about the great tennis player) ended his marriage rather than to *stop it; a divorce is by definition an irrevocable break-up between husband and wife (36). On the other hand, no dramatic (or other) event ended his professional career, which could at any moment resume (although it would be hard for Borg to get back to the top).

6.2. Contrasting the verb end with the verbs cease, stop, and finish, turned out to be an easy task: no new semantic
dimension had to be added. In fact, we merely had to fill up a kind of empty slot. Semantically speaking, there is a quasi-perfect symmetry among the verbs involved. Indeed:

CEASE implies a change of expectation, and does not preclude resumption;

STOP implies no change of expectation (for there was no expectation); it does not preclude resumption;

FINISH implies unchanged expectations, and does preclude resumption;

END implies no change of expectation (for there was no expectation); it does preclude resumption.

The picture may change, although not dramatically, if other cessation verbs are taken into account. Looking at these, however, would lead us too far.

7. "END"

7.1. Of all the English verbs described in Chapters Three, Five, and Seven, end is the only one which, as such, has no frames involving a second verb. Both [103a] and [ b] are unacceptable:

[103a] *The senator ended to talk.  
[ b] *The senator ended talking.

The impossibility of a TO-construction (as in [103a]) is due to the kind of reason that made this frame unacceptable with stop and finish as well. But what about [103b] ? Why is only [104], clearly related to the strings in [103], accepted by native speakers?

[104] The senator ended his talk.
In an attempt to answer our question, let us quote FREED's (1979:128) observation that end "can take only derived nominals and a limited number of primitive nouns as arguments". No reason is given for this state of affairs. However, at a later point in her description, Freed identifies end as a **causative** verb (l.c.:134). This appears to be a crucial point. I submit that end has a restricted syntactic behavior because, as a verb about a verb, it is exclusively causative. It would be wrong to conclude, from the unacceptability of [103a] and [b], that end is entirely different from the seven other English aspectual verbs studied in the present work. We will see below that, as soon as end is equipped with the particle up, an ING-construction can follow.

Consider, for a beginning, the following examples containing a frame "X ended Y" (where Y is a direct object):

[105a] Yours truly. That was the way to end a letter. /M,181/

[ b] Mostly he moved in urgent, precise, clipped movements (...) and talked the same way, from the time of rising early in his Grosse Pointe home until ending each active day, invariably well into the next. /W,185/

[ c] At this moment she had a mixture of emotions - the foremost, hurt pride because she had assumed that if either of them chose to end the affair it would be herself. But she wasn't ready to end it, and now, along with the hurt she had a sense of loss, sadness, and awareness of loneliness to come. /W,323/

Subjects of end-sentences such as the ones in [105] are not necessarily animate. [106] has an inanimate subject:

[106] Miss Warren's pen ended the letter in a large pool of ink. /DE,84/

314
The most important thing, however, is that all the utterances given possess some inherent causation. The main end-formula is given in [107] (which shows that end is a verb about another - unexpressed - verb Z).

[107] at time t, X ended Y =
one can think of Y as of something that one
is Z-ing
one can think of Y as of something that has
parts
one can think of those parts as being one
after the other
before t, Z was happening
one could think at that time :
more of Z will happen after t
at t, X did something
one could know at that time :
because of that, Z cannot happen anymore
after

Notice that all the examples given up to now are similar in nature: each time, a subject is involved, not merely in the end of a process, but from beginning to end. Concretely speaking, one could say that the senator in [104] gave his talk before he ended it, that the same person in [105a] wrote and ended the letter, in [105b] spent and ended the day, in [105c] had and ended the affair, etc. This permanent involvement of the subject is not an invariable feature of the verb end. Compare the utterance in [108] (and see also FREED 1979:134).


The thunderstorm in [108] obviously did not exist at the time everything was silent. It is an external factor which brings about the termination, not an internal one, as in the other cases. The formula, however, remains applicable.
7.2. Let us have a look at absolute end. The latter is not less infrequent than end + direct object. Compare:

[109a] They had a warrant out for his arrest for perjury twelve hours before the trial ended.  
/OE, 44/

[b] The meeting had ended fifteen minutes ago.  
/W, 366/

[c] Nine out of 10 depressions are 'self-limiting', with most ending within nine months to a year.  
/NI, 07-05-88/

In all the examples in [109], reference is made to a boundary in time. End may however be used to refer to boundaries in space as well:

[110a] This is where John's property ends.  

[b] Suddenly the wasteland ended in a giant wall of trees.  
/AM, 15/16-10-88/

[110a] is the kind of sentence used by WIERZBICKA (1973: 626) in her explication of absolute end. The explication, similar to the one for absolute begin quoted on p. 76, is rather difficult to understand, and therefore unsatisfactory (37). As a more comprehensive - and comprehensible - formula, I propose [111].

[111] X ended =  
one can think of X as of something that has parts  
one can think of those parts as being one after the other  
I am thinking of one part of X  
there are parts before that part before time t, one did not know: there will be no parts anymore after this at time t, one could know: there can be no parts anymore after this

It is difficult or even impossible to distinguish different and distinct parts in the acts of laughing and breathing. This, and no other reason, explains the following
acceptability judgments provided by FREED (1979:140):

[112a] ?Their laughing ended.
[ b] *His breathing ended.

On the other hand, the last lines in [111] express the suddenness of the change. No allusion is made to any causal factor: in the case of boundaries in space, there is no cause which could result in X having no parts anymore. The verbs cause and end are even fully compatible:

[113] Also he realized: while the sheer number of lesser unsolved crimes caused police investigations to ease or end, murder was in a different league. /W,413-414/

Summarizing, we may say that whilst end was shown to be causative in its use as a verb about a verb (cp. p.314), it is not causative in its absolute use.

7.3. The very existence of a frame "X ended up Z-ing" (where Z is a process or a state) is evidence for the fact that the end of end up is not a causative verb either. Consider the following examples:

[114a] Since electric power plants are usually built in the suburbs, what could happen is that you’d end up taking the smog from the cities and transferring it out there. /W,58/
[ b] We might even end up learning something. /W,226/
[ c] Would the money be used to fund another arts project or would it end up being used to dig up a road? /CC,09-09-87/

Instead of end up, finish up could have been used. However, there is a difference in meaning (pace MITCHELL 1979:175). Exactly like end, end up has a component of
unexpectedness. [114c], for instance, is about an allowance made to a Canberra arts society, which declined to accept it. It was everybody's guess whether the money would be pumped into another arts project - as would be normal - or (more unexpectedly) into some other non-cultural business.

Unexpectedness is not the whole story, though. The phrasal verb end up modifies an event (process or state) which, although unexpected, is a consequence of the first event in a set of two. Thus, in [114a], the sudden appearance of smog in the suburbs would be the unexpected result of an increase in the number of newly constructed electric power plants.

Up may be left unexpressed if there is another end up in the immediate surroundings. Compare:

[115] You end up with a bare ass. It's how I'd end here if I didn't play hard, for real, the way you've seen. /W,179/

The end up-frames which, rather than an ING-construction, have a PrepP (cp. [115] and [116a]), an AdjP (cp. [116b]), an AdvP (cp. [116c]), or an NP (cp. [116d]) usually refer to states following from an event realized earlier.

[116a] His souped-up MG Metro careened off the Silverstone track at 195 km/h and ended up on its roof. /WD,12-10-87/

[ b ] You will learn how some financial deals work and should end up considerably wiser and in a stronger position. /WD,07-09-87/

[ c ] She said that most marriages end up like our relationship and I should learn to cope with it. /NI,07-05-88/

[ d ] You might shoot a lot of film about a person who ends up a failure. /W,160/

Verbs such as being and having (again, as with finish up, for being with) are easy to supply.
7.4. For the verb end, we found no more than two frames (at least if we do not take into consideration the phrasal verb end up).

Table Four

| (a) X ended Y                  | [107] |
| (b) X ended                    | [111] |

Total number of frames: 2 (cease: 5; stop: 7; finish: 5)
Total number of formulas: 2 (cease: 4; stop: 5; finish: 3)
Total number of formulas referring to a second verb: 1
(cease: 2; stop: 3; finish: 1)

Notice that end is the only English verb in our set of sixteen which requires, for an accurate description of its value, as many formulas as it has frames. The verb end is one of the exceptions to which hypothesis c) on p.28 does not apply.
NOTES to Part Two, Chapter Seven

(1) It may be useful to recall that, in the case of begin, native speakers seem to favor the syntagm begin to get rather than begin to be. For details, cp. Chapter Three.

(2) Cp., in the first place, FREED (1979), BOERTIEN (1979), and WIERZBICKA (1988a). The remarks in FRIEDERICH (1973:63-64; 1977:104) point to a mere tendency, but have no general validity.

(3) At first, I thought that [13] was found questionable by Wierzbicka's informant(s) because it contains a verb which is not in everybody's idiolect, and which many people would probably never use spontaneously. Wierzbicka, however, tells me (personal communication, January 1989) that her informant(s) would probably accept the statement that "Mary ceased to lecture". Her argument does not take into account that this statement is fully acceptable if and only if it implies that "Mary ceased to be a lecturer", or "to give lectures" (more than one).

(4) This should sound familiar: Harris defends a similar position in the case of his other "operators", e.g., begin. For the concept of "descriptive priority", see also HARRIS (1976a).

(5) The absolute frame has a formula stating that the subject has parts that one can imagine as being consecutive in time. This automatically excludes animacy as a feature of the subject X.

(6) Additionally, it must be noted that [21] is a good example of inconsistency in the application of the hic-et-nunc-perspective: there should have been a past perfect in the first line, not a simple past.

(7) The assumption implicitly made by Anderson does not stand alone in the literature, although the idea that cease and stop are synonyms seems to be far less widespread than the same idea with respect to begin and start. In print, only DIXON (1976:351) claims that cease "appears to be synonymous" with stop - and that, in fact, is an ambiguous statement, too.

(8) There are two different entries in HAYAKAWA/FLETCHER (1971) for the verb stop and its "affiliates": one groups the words referring to the act of "bringing something to an end"; the other, the words referring to the act of "breaking off previous activity". Our quotes stem from both entries. The first entry discusses causative uses, whereas the second
one concentrates on non-causative uses. Details about the
distinction follow in section 3.

(9) From there (cp. p.191), the same authors define
continue and keep as "not to change to not".

(10) Anderson (1968) has nothing to say about the aspectual
verb keep. For that reason, it is not mentioned here.
Besides, his stop-formulas are as unsatisfactory as his
formulas for the verbs begin and continue. Due to the
absence of time indications, there are a total of three blunt
contradictions in the two formulas taken together. Moreover,
not all anomalies can be explained.

(11) According to the same author (l.c.:68), the verb stop
is either [- AFFIRMATIVE] or [+ AFFIRMATIVE], depending on
what kind of complement it governs. [- AFFIRMATIVE] and [+ 
AFFIRMATIVE] are said to be instances of Weinreich's much-
discussed transfer features. In this respect, it may be
useful to refer to Stump's (1983:923) claim that Ney's
analyses "make virtually no use" of transfer features as
Weinreich saw them. Mallinson (1983), on the other hand,
finds transfer features as such a questionable device.

(12) The difference is overlooked by Schopf (1976:38), who
argues that one "presupposition" contained in the verbs
continue and keep (cp. Chapter Five, note 14) is "that x
might stop TO BE y" (emphasis added). A similar error
appears in Gilwood's (1978:113) translation of a famous
sentence drawn from /CS.3/, and in Dayan/Hunt (1986:31).

(13) In the quotations from Kajita and Palmer, the emphasis
is mine.

(14) Palmer (1965:176) opposes the two constructions,
calling the infinitive in [ia] an infinitive of result, and
the one in [ib] an infinitive of purpose.

[ia] He stopped to talk.  
[ b] He stopped in order to talk.  

Notice that this viewpoint is unique. Palmer himself seems
to have abandoned it quite soon. It does not appear in

(15) I intentionally say "aspectual verb", for I wish to
exclude from the analysis those uses of "stop + direct
object" where occurrence before the reference point is not
part of the meaning of stop. Stop is, in those cases,
related to prevent.

(16) On stop and causation, cp. also Newmeyer (1975:59),
Prather (1977:54-55), and Jackendoff (1978:224).

(17) Harris (1969:205) quotes the string in [iia] (clearly
a string constructed for the needs of his analysis, cp. p.
271) as one of the possible "bases" for [iib]. The other
"basis", as artificial as the first one, appears in [iic].
Recall that, from our point of view, [iib] is basic and does
not "derive" from anything else.

[iii] He stopped his writing us.
[ b] He stopped writing us.
[ c] His writing us stopped.

(18) It may be interesting to note that, if the rule existed, one would have to accept that "grammatical" utterances may "derive" (as in the case of (35b)) from "ungrammatical" ones, and that "the rule must be lexically governed - that is, that it can have exceptions". It applies in the case of _continue_, but not in the case of its "near synonym" _keep_. With _keep__on_, on the other hand, the anaphoric complement could be "deleted". For further restrictions, cp. the recent observations by LÖBECK (1987:36) and ZAGONA (1988:98).

(19) WIERZBICKA's gloss in [iv] is at best valid for the sentence in [iiib], not for the one in [iiia]. Still, it suffers several of the drawbacks outlined above.

[iii] The rain stopped.
[ b] It stopped raining.

(iv) before _t_, it was raining
    at _t_, one could not know this:
    more of it will not happen after now
    after _t_, more of it didn't happen

(20) Cp. also the following, rather amazing, statement by FRIEDERICH (1973:63) : "Zu der Synonymengruppe _to continue_, _to finish_ gehören nicht nur _to stop_, sondern auch _to cease_, sowie die Antonyme _to begin_, _to start_" ['To the set of synonyms _discontinue/finish_ belong not only _stop_ but also _cease_, and their antonyms _begin_ and _start_ as well'].

(21) The following discussion of the difference between _stop_ and _finish_ is largely based on a few illuminating remarks that appear in VENDLER (1957). They are among the earliest of a series of largely identical statements, e.g. in DOWTY (1979), FREED (1979), MITCHELL (1979), BRINTON (1985), MOREY (1985), and WIERZBICKA (1988a). Freed makes her observations in terms of nuclei and codas.

(22) The examples in [67] show that the use of a past progressive (rather than a simple past, as in Vendler's quote) would be all right (cp. also DOWTY 1979:57). Thus, Rebecca _was_ running a mile _until_ she stopped doing so, and Richard _was_ drawing a circle _until_ he stopped doing so.

(23) Vendler's statement that "running a mile and drawing a circle have to be finished" is obviously incomplete. Our first quotation shows that Vendler is well aware of this fact. The statement is correct if and only if one adds: "before one can say that X ran a mile or that Y drew a circle".

(24) Notice the use of the noun _end_ in a definition of the verb _finish_, and cp. p.85.
(25) According to WOJESTSCHLAEGER (1977:40), [va] "entails" [vo]. In a way, he also defines one aspeactual verb in terms of another.

[va] Walter finished filing the day's mail.
[ b] Walter began filing the day's mail.

(26) DIXON (1976:358) argues that "die is clearly related to finish living" (rather than to cease living or cease to be alive; cp. also MCCAWLEY 1968). Allan correctly questions the acceptability of the combination finish living, and goes on to argue that this "mistake" of Dixon's, and some others, make it "hard to justify the reprinting of this essay [i.e. DIXON (1976)]".

(27) DIXON (1976:354-355), once again, claims that the ING-constructions have been "deleted". The quality of his "evidence" is debatable.

(28) Finish can take an animate direct object, but then it is no longer an aspeactual verb. It takes the meaning of 'make harmless or powerless to act', as in the following examples:

[via] On the way to rushing him to the hospital he said two things that just about finished me.
/WD.12-10-87/
[ b] That course was not to cover up and retreat but to go for Callejas like a bull and finish him before he could do any more damage.
/AM.10-09-88/

(29) [87b] may be profitably compared to FREED's (1979:136) sentence in [viia], used for [viib] (the question mark is hers).

[viia] ?The flowers finished in late May.
[ b] The flowers finished blooming in late May.

(30) Off and up also appear after start. It should be no surprise that another particle, viz. out, appears after start but not after finish. Remember (cp. Chapter Three, p.99) that out implies volition or intention, and is therefore future-bound (unlike finish).

(31) For details, see MITCHELL (1979:174-175). I totally disagree, however, with the claim that the ING-construction after finish off is an NP. On the other hand, one could say, about finish up + ING-construction, that it refers to what one does after one did not do it (whereas finish + ING-construction refers to what one is about not to do anymore after one did it).

(32) One would not say that the series is coming *"to a finish". This is extra evidence for the fact that the verb finish is semantically different from the noun.

(33) It is this kind of phenomena which DOWTY (1979:75) must have had in mind when he was talking about "END (or STOP
or whatever the inverse of *BECOME* is called)".

(34) Freed makes a proviso for one particular *cease-frame*: "In the case of *cease*... it appears that *cease* refers to the entire event including the onset (and the coda if there is one) since the to... complement implies a generic reading indicating the cessation of a series of events, not the cessation of a single event that is in progress" (Freed 1979:125). However, a series of events can always be viewed as a complex event, and thus *cease* + to-construction will, exactly like *stop* and *finish*, refer to some segment of the nucleus.

(35) On *end* and premature termination, cf. Hayakawa/Fletcher (1971:210), and Freed (1979:139). Notice that the former, and Morris (1969:272), also define *end* in terms of *finality*. There is little to be learnt from such a definition, extended by Collins (1952:173) to *finish* as well.

(36) Even if husband and wife remarry after having been divorced, it is not quite the same marriage which goes on, but another one: it would be impossible to state that "after their much-publicized divorce, Mr X and Mrs Y continued to be married".

(37) Freed (1979:140) observes that *end* "requires a bounded activity noun as its subject or as its second argument". Are *property* in [110a] and *wasteland* in [110b] bounded activity nouns?...
CHAPTER EIGHT

CESSER, (S’)ARRETER, FINIR AND (SE) TERMINER
IN FRENCH

1. "CESSER"

1.1. In Chapter Four, we saw that commencer is roughly equivalent to begin. Continuer was shown, in Chapter Six, to be slightly more different from continue. What is the relationship between cesser and cease? Several authors (1) tacitly assume that both verbs are equivalent. However, the true facts appear to contradict that assumption. Consider the following example:

[1] (...) Edouard sentit son coeur cesser de battre, son sang se diluer, et il hésita une minute avant de déchetter l’enveloppe. /LD,53/ 'Edward felt his heart ??cease beating and his blood dilute, and he hesitated one minute before opening the envelope'

The proposed translation uses the verb cease, which ultimately derives from cesser (cp. p.264) - but it is more than clear that there is something not quite right. While thinking about the English version, one of my informants spontaneously added: "You would use stop, wouldn’t you?" It seems, indeed, that one’s heart, in English, stops beating (cp. WIERZBICKA 1988a:80). In French, cesser can be used (cp. [1]), but also s’arrêter. The utterance in [2] is originally English and uses the verb stop; the French
translation (not my own) renders the cessation by means of the verb cesser (2).

[2] Erica sentit son cœur s'arrêter de battre. 'Erica froze. Her heart seemed to stop'

Other indications for the fact that cease and cesser must cover different concepts are not hard to find. For instance, when reference is made to meteorological phenomena, and also in imperatives, cesser sounds far more natural than cease (3). Once again, the utterances in [3] (meteorological phenomena) and in [4] (imperatives) are originally English, and the French translations are not my own.

[3] La neige avait cessé de tomber et restait amoncelée sur les talus, éclairant l'obscurité. 'The snow had stopped falling and lay piled along the banks and between the sleepers, lightening the darkness' /OE,121/

[4a] Alors, cessez de faire l'imbécile, Knight. saisissez cette chance, et accrochez-vous. 'Stop being a damn fool, Knight, and grab this chance' /W,138/

[ b] Cesse de débiter ton sermon, accouche, à la fin! 'Stop making like you're in a pulpit, and get on!' /W,157/

A second piece of evidence in support of the claim that cesser and cease are different is to be found in the impossibility of *"cesser à + infinitive"*: only cesser de occurs. In English, as we have seen, cease is unique in that, as a cessation verb, it does occur with both TO- and ING-constructions (unlike stop and finish). Cesser conforms to the "general rule" which spells out that French cessation verbs which can be followed by an infinitive have the infinitive introduced by means of de. If we assume, as we did before, that the difference between de- and à-
constructions with aspectual verbs is reminiscent of the one between ING- and TO-constructions, in that order, we are led to the conclusion that, unlike cease, cesser does not include (the French equivalent of) [5]:

[5] one could think at that time:
more of Z will happen after now/there will be more Z after now

Thirdly, there is the fact that cesser is very often (but not exclusively) used for punctual changes (cp. NEF 1980:21). While cease, with adverbs such as immediately, is rather exceptional (but not impossible; cp. p.269), cesser occurs quite naturally with adverbs such as aussitôt, brusquement, immédiatement, soudain and tout de suite - all of which express suddenness. Wherever the translations are my own (4), the verb stop has been used, as this verb is more "natural" with sudden changes.

[6a] Mais dès que je l'eus appelée (...), ses larmes cessèrent aussitôt de couler. /CS,123/
'But as soon as I had called her, her tears immediately stopped flowing'

[ b ] Décreté illégal pour avoir omis de déclarer trente de ses huit mille comités locaux, l'Organisation nationale des Malais unis (UMNO), au pouvoir depuis l'indépendance de 1957, a brusquement cessé d'exister. /P,15-02-88/
'Decreed illegal for having failed to declare thirty out of its eight thousand local committees, the United Malays National Organization (UMNO), in power ever since the independence of 1957, has suddenly stopped existing'.

[ c ] Comprends-tu que ta réponse, je ne dis pas aura pour effet que je cesserai de t'aimer immédiatement, bien entendu, mais te rendra moins séduisante à mes yeux ? /CS,290/
'Do you understand that your answer, I do not say will have as a result that I will immediately stop loving you, of course, but will make you less attractive to my eyes?'

[ d ] Et la petite a cessé de crier d'une façon très soudaine, dit Mlle Bailey.
"And the child did stop her screaming rather abruptly," said Miss Ballaw. /M.119/

Swann palpitait les bronzes par politesse et n’osait pas cesser tout de suite. /CS,208/

'Swann was touching the bronzes out of mere politeness, and he did not dare to stop right away'

Notice that the case of se mettre à (cp. pp.139-140) and the case of cesser are different: although either is frequent with adverbs denoting suddenness, cesser keeps its suddenness-reading, even when the adverb is no longer used. This is very obvious in the case of [6b], which without its adverb still refers to a sudden non-existence.

It might seem that the idea of a suddenness-component clashes with the use, after the verb cesser, of an AdvP such as peu à peu ('gradually') (cp. [7]). The AdvP could be seen as an overt mark overriding the suddenness-reading of cesser.

[7] Puis il en fut du nom de la Maison Dorée comme de celui de l'île du Bois, il cessa peu à peu de faire souffrir Swann. /CS,372/

'Then, what had happened to the name of the island in the Bois [de Boulogne] also happened to that of the Maison Dorée: it gradually ceased to make Swann suffer.'

In fact, there is no clash and peu à peu is not even an overt mark. Although the change was not quite unexpected, it was impossible to predict at which particular moment Swann would no longer suffer.

On the basis of the preceding evidence, I submit that the meaning of "cesser + infinitive" is more like that of "stop + ING-construction" than like that of cease followed by either a TO- or an ING-construction (5). I therefore propose the formula in [8] (a counterpart to the stop-formula on p.280):
[8] au temps t, X cessa de Z =
avant t, Z avait lieu/il y avait Z
l'on ne savait pas alors :
  Z n'aura plus lieu après t/il n'y aura
  plus de Z après t
l'on pouvait penser alors :
  Z n'aura plus lieu après maintenant/il
  n'aura plus de Z après maintenant
l'on put savoir à t :
  Z n'aura plus lieu après maintenant/il
  n'aura plus de Z après maintenant

The formula in [8] has considerable advantages over the one
proposed by GARDIES (1981:118) :

[9] A t₀ Pierre cesse d’effe =
   1) pendant un certain espace de temps
      immédiatement antérieur à t₀, Pierre effe
   2) à t₀ et pendant un certain espace
      de temps immédiatement postérieur à t₀.
      Pierre n’effe pas
'1). during a certain lapse of time
immediately before t₀, Pierre effs
'2) at t₀ and during a certain lapse
of time immediately after t₀, Pierre does
not eff.’

[9] is a very imperfect attempt at describing the value of
cesser. The same formula would apply in the case of the
"utterances" in [10], a fact which makes any further
discussion of the formula unnecessary.

[10a] A t₀ Pierre s'arrête d'effe.
[ b] A t₀ Pierre arrête d'effe.
[ c] A t₀ Pierre finit d'effe.

The third line of the formula in [8] expresses the constant
possibility of a change which must be there for a cesser-
sentence to be acceptable. This shall be further illustrated
as soon as we look at stative verbs after cesser - one
element given earlier is [6b].

1.2. Semantically, "cesser + infinitive" is very close to
"stop + ING-construction". On the other hand, with respect to its compatibility with punctual verbs and stative expressions, and with respect to its behavior under a (full) negation, 

cesser goes together with stop and with cease (6).

[11], which contains a punctual verb, is unacceptable (cp. ROHRER 1976:168):

   'Jeffrey stopped arriving'

In contrast, the string in [12], where \( Z \) is stative, merely sounds odd (cp. LAMIRGY 1987:293) - but not because of a so-called stative constraint.

   'John stops being a captain'

As before, the anomaly is due to the absence of a constant possibility of change. Wherever that possibility does exist, the combination cesser d'être is fully acceptable (like the cease to be-combination in English):

[13a] Pourtant, Israël, s'il ne lâche pas les territoires occupés, se condamne un jour à un choix douloureux : ou cesser d'être un Etat juif, ou renoncer à rester une démocratie. /P,15-02-88/
   'However, if it does not release the occupied territories, Israel, one day, condemns itself to a painful choice : either to stop being a Jewish state, or to give up democracy'

[ b ] Chacun sait que Marcel cessa d'être, avant d'avoir dix ans, un enfant comme les autres : une crise de suffocation lui avait défendu pour toujours de "se laisser aller à son élan". /PM,02-10-87/
   'All of us know that Marcel stopped being, before he was ten, a child like all the others : a sudden case of suffocation had forbidden him for ever to "give in to his natural impulses"'

[ c ] Il a cessé d'être un devin pour devenir un ingénieur. /PM,11-03-88/
'He stopped being a fortune-teller and became an engineer'

Elsewhere in her paper (ibid.:282), Lamiroy contrasts [14a] and [ b]; the latter is, again according to the author's acceptability rating, worse than [12].

[14a] Jean cesse de travailler.
'John stops working'  
[ b ] ??Jean cesse de posséder un lopin de terre.
'John stops owning a piece of land'

[14b] is unacceptable for the same reason as [12]. Once again, where there is a constant possibility of change, a stative expression (even different from être) is perfectly all right - as is shown in [6b] and also in [15].

[15] J'avais cessé de me sentir médiocre, contingent, mortal. /CS,45/  
'I had stopped feeling mediocre, contingent, mortal'

Finally, Lamiroy opposes [16a] to [16b], claiming that the use of "se-moyen" "weakens" the stative constraint, or even makes it disappear (ibid.:283).

[16a] La mini-jupe a cessé de se porter.
[ b ] ??La mini-jupe a cessé d'être portée.
'The miniskirt has stopped being worn'

Apparently, Lamiroy (together with many other authors) distinguishes different "degrees" of so-called grammaticality (OK, "?", "??", "?*", "*"). I do not see any good reason for doing so, if one does not explain what one intends with each specific symbol or chain of symbols. The main point to be made, however, is entirely different: the acceptability contrast between [16a] and [ b] subsists when no aspectual verb is being used.
[17a] La mini-jupe (ça) se porte.
[  b ] *La mini-jupe est portée.

[17a] has a meaning: it talks about an existing fashion
for ladies, and it approves that fashion. [17b], on
the other hand, has no meaning, or rather "lacks" meaning:
it is not informative enough.

One final remark before some other frames will be
considered. Semantically, cesser is negated in exactly the
same way as thousands of other French verbs, viz. by means of
ne...pas. The latter has no set scope, but can bear on the
aspectualizer itself, or on the following infinitive (if not
on any other element (see the details on pp.257-258):

[18a] En dépit de la température, mon frère ne
cessa pas de sortir (+ il 'continua à sortir).
'In spite of the temperature, my brother
did not stop going out (= he kept going out)'
[  b ] Mon frère ne cessa pas de sortir le soir,
il cessa de rentrer le matin (= il cessa de
faire une chose plutôt qu'une autre).
'My brother did not stop going out at
night, he stopped coming back in the morning
(= he stopped doing one thing rather than
another)'

Ne used alone is a morphological negation bearing on the
aspectual verb alone. One of the differences between ne pas
cesser and ne cesser de, therefore, as shown in Chapter Six,
has to do with the scope of the negativizer.

1.3. With regard to non-infinitival frames, cesser behaves
like cease alone (i.e. it occurs more often with a following
infinitive than with anything else). However, we must look
at its other frames as well. The direct object construction
"X cessa Y" is exemplified in [19].
Rayer prétend que Bethmann-Hollweg aurait convoqué Sudekum, le 29, pour obtenir de lui que la social-démocratie cesse son opposition...

"According to Rayer, Bethmann-Hollweg has formally spoken to Sudekum, on the 29th, in order to obtain from him that the social-democrats stop their opposition..."

- Voyons, reprit Faye d'une voix apaisante, cessez ces propos libidineux, Geoffrey. Il est temps de dormir. "MS, 146/"
- "Come on", replied Faye with a cooling voice, "stop these libidinous remarks, Jeffrey. It is time to sleep"

As in the case of **continuer** (and **cease**), we need a separate formula, viz. one which states, among other things, that the addressee knows more about the direct object than is actually said (the direct object must not contain any new information), and that the object refers to things which have parts that could be thought of as being consecutive in time.

All of the following are unacceptable:

*La social-démocratie cesse une opposition.

*Voyons, cessez des propos libidineux, Geoffrey.

*Il cessa sa bicyclette.

'He stopped his bicycle'

*Nous avons cessé la table.

'We stopped the table'

*La social-démocratie cesse une opposition.

*Voyons, cessez des propos libidineux, Geoffrey.

*Il cessa sa bicyclette.

'He stopped his bicycle'

*Nous avons cessé la table.

'We stopped the table'

Interestingly, the **translations** of [20c] and [d] are correct on another reading: the one which implies that the bicycle and the table were **moving** and that the subject (**he** and **we**, respectively) **caused** the movement to stop. The formula is given in [21]:

au temps \( t \), \( X \) cessa \( Y \) =

\[ \begin{align*}
&\text{je sais ceci ; } \\
&\text{tu sais plus de } Y \text{ que ce que je dis maintenant } \\
&\text{l'on peut penser à } Y \text{ comme à qch qui a des parties } \\
&\text{l'on peut penser à ces parties comme à des parties qui sont les unes après les} \\
\end{align*} \]
I know this:
you know more about Y than what I say now
one can think of Y as of something that has parts
one can think of those parts as being one
after the other
one can think of a part of Y as of Y
before t, there was Y
one did not know at that time:
there will be no Y anymore after t
one could know at t:
there will be no Y anymore after now'

LAGANE (1967:28-29) provides evidence showing that cesser
has no causative direct object frame (cp. commencer,
continuer). [22a] is fine, but [22b] is unacceptable.

[22a] Les ouvriers cessent leur travail.
'The workers stop their work'
[ b] *(La pluie cesse le travail des ouvriers.
'The rain stops the work of the workers'*

For a causative reading to appear, the verb faire must be
inserted. Whereas the workers in [22a] stop working, the
rain in [23] does not stop doing anything at all: it causes
the workers to stop working, or the work to stop.

[23] La pluie fait cesser le travail.

The same VP (viz., faire cesser) is also illustrated in
[24a] and [ b]. The English originals are added between
inverted commas.

[24a] Il a simplement fait cesser ses cris.
'He just made her stop crying' /M,134/
[ b] Personne ne comprenait très bien comment
ces ondulations faisaient cesser les roulements
de tambour du pare-brise (...).
'No one, including the engineers, knew exactly why the crinkle stopped the windshield drumming' /W,102/

It may be useful to notice that, in [24a], the use of cesser for faire cesser would result in a change of meaning:

    'He just stopped his screams'

[24b], on the other hand, would become unacceptable. The crinkle in itself cannot do anything at all; therefore, it cannot stop doing anything either.

1.4. Writing about sentences such as La pluie a cessé (an instance of the first frame within the construction "x cessa", RUWET (1986:201) comments as follows: "the idea expressed by the verbs fall or tomber is already present within the semantic content of the nouns pluie or rain (...); rain, among other things, is a downward movement". In a footnote, he adds that the sentence quoted "does not seem to imply an understood complement" (7), and that it is "more natural" than La pluie a cessé de tomber, which strikes him as "redundant". Clearly, Ruwet relied on his own intuitions, and did not check them with those of others. The two-verb sentence is redundant, but it is not "less natural" than the other one: both utterances are perfectly all right (as is shown by the French translation in [3]). It becomes difficult, then, to assume that there is no understood "complement" in either one of the following corpus-examples (similar to the one in [6e]):

[26a] Déjà l'averse avait cessé, déjà au dehors on l'appelait, et elle se redressa. /LD,156/
'The shower had stopped already. She was being called from outside, and rose'

Dans la pièce blanche aux meubles clairs, Madame Walser vient servir le café, découpe le gâteau aux pommes et au miel qu'elle a confectionné. La pluie a cessé. /ML,06-87/

'In the white room with the light-coloured furniture, Mrs Walser comes and serves coffee, and divides the apple and honey cake which she has prepared. The rain has stopped'

Addressees will unmistakably understand that Swann (in [6e]) did not stop **touching** the bronzes, and that the shower and the rain, respectively, had stopped **falling**.

One more frame remains to be considered. The examples in [27] are instances of the **absolute** frame "X cessa".

Le combat va donc cesser, non pas faute de combattants, mais faute de champ de bataille. /LD,221/

'So, the fight is going to stop, not for lack of fighters, but for lack of a battle field'

Mais la discussion théorique, ou plutôt idéologique, ne cesse pas. /ML,06-87/

'But the theoretical, or rather ideological, discussion does not stop'

Two more examples deserve to be quoted in full: both contain the **AdvP d’un coup** ['at once'], in the immediate ([28a]) and the not so immediate ([28b]) context of the aspectual verb respectively.

Tout en éternuant, il attendait le cri perçant ou les supplications inévitables, mais ses éternuements cessèrent d’un coup quand il entendit une voix gaie, amusée — semblait-il —, prononcer : "God bless you!" /MS,148/

'While sneezing, he waited for the shrill scream or the inevitable supplications, but his sneezes stopped at once when he heard — it seemed — a cheery, amused voice pronounce "God bless you!"

Marrakech a ses sorcelleries. Elle devient, au moment où le jour cesse, une ville triste et froide, une ville d’enfer. La nuit ne prévient pas. Elle tombe d’un coup, sans
crepuscule. /PM,06-05-88/
'Marrakech has its sorcery. It becomes, at the time that the day ends, a sad and cold city, an infernal city. The night does not warn. It falls at once, without twilight.'

As a formula, I propose [29] (which differs from the formulas for the corresponding frames with cease and stop):

[29] \[ X \text{ cessa} = \]
\begin{align*}
& \text{l'on peut penser à} \ X \text{ comme à qqch qui a des parties} \\
& \text{l'on peut penser à ces parties comme à des parties qui sont les unes après les autres} \\
& \text{je pense à une partie de} \ X \\
& \text{il y a des parties avant cette partie} \\
& \text{avant temps t, l'on ne savait pas :} \\
& \hspace{1cm} \text{il n'y aura plus de parties de} \ X \text{ après ceci} \\
& \text{à temps t, l'on put savoir :} \\
& \hspace{1cm} \text{il n'y aura plus de parties de} \ X \text{ après ceci} \\
& \text{'one can think of} \ X \text{ as of something that has parts} \\
& \text{one can think of those parts as being one after the other} \\
& \text{I am thinking of one part of} \ X \\
& \text{there are parts before that part} \\
& \text{before time t, one did not know :} \\
& \hspace{1cm} \text{there will be no parts of} \ X \text{ anymore after this} \\
& \text{at time t, one could know :} \\
& \hspace{1cm} \text{there will be no parts of} \ X \text{ anymore after this'}
\end{align*}

Thanks to the formula in [29], we can also account for cesser-sentences where there is no reference (not even an implied reference) to time. [30] is a good example:

[30] Le pavé cesse : la rue redevient une route, large, sans trottoirs, bordée de maisons basses et de jardins. /LT,173/
'The stoned road ends : the street becomes once again a sandy road, large, without footpaths, bordered by low houses and by small gardens'

Roads are among the kinds of things that have parts in space rather than parts in time; road parts can be thought
of as being one after another - and that is all we need.

1.5. Cesser, in short, viewed from an English angle, is rather hybrid: to some extent, it recalls one of the verb stop; on the other hand, it recalls one of the verb cease as well. From a strictly linguistic viewpoint, taking into account the history of English and French, it is of course more correct to say that cease and cesser have their own specific values. Table One presents a summary:

Table One

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) X cessa de Z</td>
<td>[8]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) X cessa Y</td>
<td>[21]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) X cessa (elliptical)</td>
<td>[8]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) X cessa (absolute)</td>
<td>[29]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total number of frames: 4
Total number of formulas: 3
Total number of formulas referring to a second verb: 1

2. "CESSER" AND "(S')ARRETER" COMPARED

2.1. LAVANDERO BRAVO (1987:V-VI), while proposing a classroom exercise aiming at eliminating the "énorme confusion" which exists, among students, between verbs such as cesser and arrêter, presupposes that the (non-native) French teacher she addresses knows the distinction, and knows how to teach it in clear language. It may well seem that Lavandero Bravo presumes too much. In general, even for French linguists - let alone native speakers and teachers who do not usually think about such matters - the contrast between both verbs must not be crystal clear, for they have systematically refrained from talking about it. I have seen only one
attempt at a differentiation (3), and that one (in DEJAY 1986) is a bright instance of intellectualism.

Let us have a look at the verb arrêter: it expresses, according to DEJAY (l.c.:143), "la participation de A dans la localisation de B" ['the participation of A in the localisation of B']. "A" is the subject, "B" an object or verb. "Localisation" involves (ibid.:129) a place or a state (sic) where B is in non-motion. S'arrêter, for some reason analyzed about fifteen pages before arrêter, presents the peculiarity of a coreference of A and B, which makes it the expression of a "contact" between A and the place or state of non-motion (ibid.:130). Cesser, finally, "exprime la localisation du sujet dans l'arrêt" ['expresses the localisation of the subject in (the place or state of) non-motion'].

I shall not even try to criticize Dejay's account, although I did try to present it as faithfully and completely as possible. Descriptions such as the one by Dejay are discouraging and do not look at the facts. I suggest that that is what we should do, in a renewed attempt to discover how cesser and (s')arrêter really differ.

2.2. It is rather difficult not to be struck by the fact that, of the two verbs that are to be contrasted, one is an "ordinary" verb, whilst the other may be pronominal. The pronominal verb in Chapter Four (viz., se mettre à) was shown to have, as a particular aspect of its value, a do-component. It was not mentioned, however, that do-components appear to be of considerable relevance in a vast group of pronominal verbs (including (s')arrêter). On the other hand, in the
case of (s’)arrêter, there is something much more important that we must try to grasp.

Consider the following (quasi-)minimal pairs opposing cesser and s’arrêter.

[31a] [Il] passait son doigt sur ses paupières fatiguées comme il aurait essuyé le verre de son lorgnon, et cessait entièrement de penser.

/CS,31a/

'He moved his finger over his tired eyelids as, on some other occasion, he might have wiped his eyeglass, and he entirely stopped thinking'

[ b] Les regrets que j’en éprouvais (...) me faisaient tellement souffrir, que pour ne plus les ressentir, de lui-même par une sorte d’inhibition devant la douleur, mon esprit s’arrêtait entièrement de penser aux vers, aux romans, à un avenir poétique sur lequel mon manque de talent m’interdisait de compter.

/CS,178/ .

'The regrets that I felt because of it made me suffer so much that, in order not to feel them, my mind, by itself and by a sort of inhibition in the face of pain, entirely stopped thinking of verses, of novels, of the poetic future on which my lack of talent forbade me to count'

[32a] Edouard sentit son coeur cesser de battre. (cp. [1])

[ b] Erica sentit son coeur s’arrêter de battre. (cp. [2b])

There is a neat difference in context between the cesser-clause in [31a] and the s’arrêter-clause in [31b]. The latter’s, but not the former’s, context refers to a cause which is responsible for the cessation, viz. the sufferings brought about by thinking too much of an unattainable goal. I am not saying that the use of cesser in [31b] would have been unacceptable; all I am trying to convey is that the verb which was actually chosen (i.e. s’arrêter) was the most natural one in the context provided. However, even in contexts where a cause is explicitly identified as such, cesser could be used. If Edouard Maligrasse’s heart stops
beating (cp. [32a]), it is because he has just discovered a letter from his (all too volatile) girlfriend, and is expecting the worst; Erica Trenton's heart, on the other hand (cp. [32b]), stops beating because she is in the middle of her first act of shoplifting, and suddenly thinks someone has caught her stealing.

In some contexts, the choice of one verb rather than the other is particularly fortunate. Consider the following examples ([33a] and [c] are originally English):

[33a] L'étudiant pensif cessa de tracer des cercles sur la nappe (...).
'The pondering male student stopped making patterns on the tablecloth' /W,74/

[ b ] Puis la poignée cessa de bouger et elle se rendit compte avec horreur que quelqu'un était venu, avait cru, à bon escient d'ailleurs, l'endroit occupé, et était reparti tout aussi tranquillement. /YS,152/
'Then the handle stopped moving and she realized with horror that somebody had come, had (not unjustifiably) concluded that the closet was engaged, and had left without suspecting anything'

[c] "Budapest." Le docteur Czinner s'arrêta d'écrire une minute.
"Budapest." Dr Czinner ceased writing for a little more than a minute'

[33a] is a snapshot of a change in behavior of a particular person, in the context of an ongoing conversation. The conversation is running smoothly, and nothing interrupts it: nothing actually causes the "pondering student" to stop drawing patterns. In [33b], there surely is a cause (somebody is trying to open the door of a closet in which the third person elle is locked up), but it is not perceived as such. The lady in the closet is not fast enough to call for help: she is too late in linking the movement of the door handle with the presence of a potential saviour on the other
side. [33c], finally, translates the English verb cease, probably quite unexpectedly, by means of s'arrêter (9). The effect, however, is just nice. The train in which Dr Czinner is travelling enters Budapest railway station, and even the reader of the English original understands what exactly happens: Dr Czinner is literally interrupted in his writing by that voice shouting "Budapest". He would have kept on writing if the announcement had not been made. The English text is an understatement, whereas the French translation makes the causal link more explicit.

It should no longer be problematical now why the cessation of weather phenomena is mostly expressed by means of cesser rather than by means of s'arrêter (cp. above, pp.326 and 335-336). S'arrêter does occur, though, for instance in [34]:

[34] Je ne suis rien. Rien qu'une silhouette claire, ce soir-là, à la terrasse d'un café. J'attendais que la pluie s'arrêtât (...).

/80,7/ 'I am nothing. Nothing but a clear silhouette, that evening, at the terrace of a cafe. I was waiting for the rain to stop.'

The choice of the verb s'arrêter is a good one. The narrator is overpowered by what happens around him ("Je ne suis rien"), and he seems to be awaiting some miraculous force which will "stop the rain".

Summarizing, we may say that the verb arrêter, at least if it is preceded by a reflexive pronoun and if it is followed by an infinitive, differs from all the other French verbs which were studied hitherto. Reference is made, more in particular, to a cause which is ultimately responsible for the change. That causal factor, however, is not - as I shall try to demonstrate in section 3. - an invariant of the value
of the verb \( s' \)arrêter.

3. "(S')ARRÊTER"

3.1. In standard French, the aspectualizer arrêter, when followed by an infinitive, usually occurs with a reflexive pronoun (whereas se mettre à, in contrast, does not occur without). Several examples were given in section 2., and the following can be added to the list:

[35a]    Elle s'arrêtait de taper et se retournait.  
/BO,141/  
'She stopped typing and looked back'

[ b]   Tous deux, me voyant entrer, s'arrêtèrent de parler.  
/CP,122/  
'Both of them stopped talking as soon as they saw me come in'

The alternative construction, in which arrêter precedes an infinitive and does not take a reflexive pronoun, is often considered incorrect. There are, however, a few cases where the very use of the pronoun, though not incorrect, would certainly strike one as rather unnatural. These cases, it appears, can be neatly categorized. I have been able to identify two "groups".

Group one consists of imperative clauses and of jussives. The latter are non-imperative sentences which have the illocutionary force of an order. Compare:

[36a]    "Nous descendons sur Munich, regagnez vos' places, attachez vos ceintures et arrêtez de fumer, s'il vous plaît."  
/YS,11/  
'We will shortly be landing at Munich airport, please go back to your seats, fasten your seatbelts and stop smoking'

[ b]   Aux médecins je dirai qu'ils devraient arrêter de se cacher derrière leur science et
leurs blouses blanches, qu'ils devraient empêcher les malades de souffrir et travailler de façon plus humaine et moins utiliser les appareils médicaux de survie. //PM,02-10-87/
'To the doctors I want to say that they should stop hiding behind their science and their white blouses, that they should avoid that patients suffer, that they should work in a more human way and use less often their medical machinery to keep people alive'

In the second group, arrêter is used negatively. The whole verb phrase acquires a meaning close to keep (or to ne cesser de and ne pas cesser), as in [37a] and [ b ]:

[37a] - Ce n'est pas "pour une fois" que tu me parles, dit-il d'une voix douce (...). Tu n'arrêtés pas de me parler sérieusement. //MS,191/
'It is not "once" that you are talking to me," he said softly. "You do not stop talking seriously to me".

[ b ] Trente ans, trente livres - Francis Ryck, oui, n'arrête pas de proposer de grandes et formidables histoires - et ce n'est pas un hasard si elles intéressent tant les cinéastes. //ML,06-87/
'Thirty years, thirty books - Francis Ryck indeed does not stop proposing great and formidable stories - and it is not a coincidence if they attract film makers so much'

A tendency exists in modern French also to allow cases like [38] (in which reflexive s'arrêter might have been used) (10).

[38] J'ai arrêté de fumer depuis une semaine...
C'est mon docteur qui m'a recommandé de sucer des Valda... Vous fumez, vous ?
- J'ai arrêté moi aussi... //80,198/
'I stopped smoking one week ago... My doctor actually advised me to suck Valdas... And you, do you smoke ?'
"I stopped as well..."'

The existence of such cases seems to suggest that arrêter, if followed by an infinitive, has a meaning of its own (11).
The problem is that there is apparently little or no similarity between the utterances in [36], [37] and [38]. A renewed look at the data, however, pays off in that it reveals that there is a remarkably close parallel between the overall meaning of most of the examples quoted. In all but one of them, arrêter implies conscious volition on the speaker's side. This can be explicated as follows:

\[39\] au temps t, X arrêta de Z =
avant t, Z avait lieu
l'on ne savait pas alors :
\[39\] \(Z\) n'aura plus lieu après t
\(à\) t, je voulu ceci :
\[39\] \(Z\) n'aura plus lieu après maintenant
l'on put savoir alors :
\(à\) cause de cela, \(Z\) n'aura plus lieu après maintenant
\'before t, Z was happening
one did not know at that time :
\(Z\) will not happen anymore after t
at t, I wanted this :
\(Z\) will not happen anymore after now
one could know at that time :
because of that, \(Z\) will not happen anymore after now' 

What the explication also shows is that arrêter is incompatible with stative expressions (cp. the absence of be-components, and see LAMIROY 1987:282,293) and with punctual verbs combined with singular subjects. The "problem case" referred to is [37b]. There are no indications that anybody (including Francis Ryck himself) wants the activity of producing novels to stop at all. To the contrary, it is to be expected that both the public and he himself want his career to go on for a while. Consider also the example in

\[40\] : 

\[40\] Depuis une semaine, il n'arrêtait pas de neiger. J'éprouvai de nouveau cette impression d'étouffement que j'avais déjà connue à Paris. /80.194/
For one week, it had not stopped snowing. Again, I had that impression of suffocation which I had known already in Paris.

There is probably some kind of conscious volition in the case of [40]. However, as we just saw, conscious volition is not an invariant of the meaning of negative arrêter (i.e. ne pas arrêter). For "X n'arrêta pas de Z" in general, I propose the formula in [41]:

[41] au temps t, X n'arrêta pas de Z =
    avant t, Z avait lieu tout le temps
    l'on pouvait penser alors:
    Z n'aura plus lieu après maintenant
    à t, Z avait lieu
    'before t, Z was happening all the time
     one could think at that time:
     Z will not happen anymore after now
     at t, Z was happening'

It may seem as if this was a formula for ne cesser de.

Another look at [57] in Chapter Six will convince the reader that such is not the case.

Let us get back to the verb s'arrêter (the one with the reflexive pronoun). As outlined in section 2., by means of s'arrêter (followed by an infinitive), reference is made to a cause which is responsible for the cessation. The one and only formula which is required runs as in [42].

[42] au temps t, X s'arrêta de Z =
    avant t, Z avait lieu
    l'on ne savait pas alors:
    Z n'aura plus lieu après t
    à t, qch eut lieu
    non pas parce que X le voulait
    l'on put savoir à t:
    à cause de cela, Z n'aura plus lieu
    après maintenant
    'before t, Z was happening
     one did not know at that time:
     Z will not happen anymore after t
     at t, something happened
     not because X wanted it
     one could know at t:
because of that, I will not happen anymore after now

I am aware of the fact that there are anomalous sentences which cannot be blocked by means of the formulas in [39], [41], and [42] (e.g. punctual verbs with plural subjects). However much I tried, I have been unable to find an elegant means to block such sentences, and I must leave the question open for further investigation.

3.2. It is time, once again, to turn to some other frames. When followed by a direct object (and no second verb), the aspectualizer arrêter never takes a reflexive pronoun. As in the case of stop, many instances of the direct object construction are causative. Illustrations are provided in [43] (where the objects are inanimate) and in [44] (where they are animate).

[43a]    Nous n'avions pas arrêté le tourne-disque et il diffusait une chanson frénétique. /VT,129/
    'We had not stopped the turntable, and it produced a frenzied song'

[ b]    Et les chars allemands de 1938 étaient pour la plupart des chars légers, très vulnérables; nos armes anti-chars n'auraient pas eu beaucoup de peine à les arrêter. /PM,11-03-88/
    'And the German tanks in 1938 were mostly light, extremely vulnerable tanks; our anti-tank artillery would not have had much trouble stopping them'

[44a]    Seul, le Magritte l'avait arrêté vraiment. /LD,40/
    'Only the Magritte painting had really stopped him'

[ b]    La voix d'Edouard l'arrêta à la porte (...). /LD,275/
    'Edward's voice stopped him at the doorstep'

Unlike stop, arrêter has only one causative direct object frame, viz. the one in which Y is the subject of a verb to be
supplied by the addressee through a natural pairing. The
formula in [45] is equivalent to the formula for the second
causative direct object frame "X stopped Y" (cp. p. 286 for
the English counterpart).

[45] au temps t, X arrêta Y =
l'on peut penser à Z comme à qqch que Y fait
avant t, Z avait lieu
l'on ne pouvait pas savoir alors :
Z n'aura plus lieu après t
à t, X fit qqch
l'on put savoir à t :
à cause de cela, Z n'aura plus lieu
après maintenant

In the examples in [43] and in [44], various verbs could be
supplied (but not inserted). The most obvious ones would be
diffuser (une chanson) (a VP suggested by the context
itself), avancer ['advance'], se promener ['walk'] and se
diriger (vers la porte) ['walk to the door'].

Diametrically opposed to the direct objects in [43] and in
[44] are those in [46]. They are, in one way or another,
linked to the subject, and do not lead any independent
existence. They would, if the subject were not there, simply
not exist.

[46a] Il arrêta sa phrase au milieu, tenta de
la reprendre et se tut. /MS, 127/
'He stopped his sentence in the middle,
tried to take it up again, and kept quiet'

[ b ] Je n'osais montrer ces pages à personne.
Puis, au cours d'un film "Jane B." que nous
tournions, je les ai fait lire à Agnes. On
a immédiatement arrêté le film pour commencer
cette histoire-là. /PM, 11-03-88/
'I did not dare to show these pages to
anyone. Then, while we were filming "Jane
B.", I asked Agnes to read them. We
immediately stopped the film in order to
start that story'

Obviously, the formula in [45] cannot account for the
utterances in [46]. On the other hand, although the third person *il*, for instance, stops uttering his sentence (a second verb *I* can be supplied), the formula in [39] does not apply either. I propose the following explication (which is the French counterpart of the *stop*-formula in Chapter Seven, [54]):

\[47\]
\[
\text{au temps t, } X \text{ arrêta } Y =
\]
\[
l'\text{on peut penser à } Y \text{ comme à qqch qui a des parties}
\]
\[
l'\text{on peut penser à ces parties comme à des parties qui sont les unes après les autres}
\]
\[
\text{avant } t, \text{ il y avait } Y
\]
\[
l'\text{on ne savait pas alors :
}\]
\[
il \text{ n'y aura plus de } Y \text{ après } t
\]
\[
l'\text{on ne sait pas } t :
\]
\[
il \text{ n'y aura plus de } Y \text{ après maintenant}
\]

The formula in [39] does not apply for there is not always (cp., e.g., [46a]) a conscious volition on the part of the speaker.

3.3. With no direct object and no second verb, the reflexive pronoun usually resurfaces. It does not in a few cases (12) which, it appears, are identical to the ones in which "*arrêter* + infinitive" occurs without *se*. The examples in [48] are jussives:

\[48a\]
\[
\text{Ça ne vous fait rien si nous arrêtons ?}
\]
\[
J'ai la tête qui tourne. /80,37/
\]
\[
'\text{"You do not mind if we stop? My head is spinning' }\]

\[b\]
\[
\text{On arrête, Basil, cria-t-elle. Ah non, un instant, je veux faire une photo de vous deux : Edouard et vous. /LD,182/}
\]
\[
'\text{We stop, Basil, she shouted. Oh no, just a minute, I want to take a photograph of you two : Edward and you’}
\]

[48a] and [b] are instances of what we have hitherto
defined as an elliptical frame (it must be clear by now that, as before, two frames will have to be distinguished). The formula in [39] applies. [49a] and [ b] belong here as well, but have s’arrêter rather than arrêter.

[49a]  Je ne dispose que de deux heures. Mais, pourquoi non ? Je suis libre... Là-dessus, je m’arrêtai, stupéfait.
/CP,109/
"I have no more than two hours available. But, why not ? I am free..."
Then, stupefied, I stopped’

[ b]  Il tournait. Il ne pouvait plus s’arrêter et devenait écarlate. /VT,163/
‘He reeled round and round. He could not stop anymore and turned purple’

From a synchronic point of view, unlike cesser and cease, elliptical s’arrêter and elliptical stop are more often than not lexicalized abbreviations of a longer “s’arrêter (stop) + movement verb”. Examples with s’arrêter are given in [50] (13).

[50a]  Parfois, me trouvant seul sur les routes, et seul dans ma voiture au milieu d’un paysage désert, je m’arrêtai, regardant la terre, les arbres, le ciel et les nuages. /CP,216/
‘Sometimes, all alone on the road, and all alone in my car in the midst of a deserted landscape, I used to stop, watching the soil, the trees, the sky and the clouds’

[ b]  Elle poussa la porte, entra dans le salon et s’arrêta un instant, stupéfaite, sur le seuil. /YS,59/
‘She pushed the door, entered the sitting-room, and stopped for a second, stupefied, on the doorstep’

[ c]  Le train s’est arrêté pour la première fois. Dijon. /80,182/
‘The train stopped for the first time.
Dijon’

Finally, more than once (cp. the examples in [51]), elliptical s’arrêter can be found after an occurrence of se mettre à (possibly because both verbs are pronominal and both
have a do-component). Compare:

[51a] [Elle] se mit à pleurer de rire, toute seule, sans pouvoir s'arrêter, et sans savoir pourquoi (...). /YS,152/
'She began to weep with laughing, all alone, without being able to stop, and not knowing why'

[b] Il s'est mis à siffler les premières mesures. Puis il s'est arrêté. /80,22/
'He started to whistle the first bars. Then he stopped'

The formula which applies in all these cases ([49a/b], [50a/b/c], and [51a/b]) is the one in [42]. Second verbs can easily be provided, and will not be listed here. It is more useful to talk about **absolute s'arrêter**, instances of which appear in the following sentences:

[52a] Les bruits de la maison s'étaient arrêtés un par un. /CP,229/
'The noises in the house had stopped one by one'

[b] Leur carrière cinématographique s'était arrêtée là. Beaucoup d'appelées. Peu d'élues. /VT,115/
'Their cinematographic career had stopped there. Many are called. Few are chosen'

[c] Et si un accord intervient, avec des garanties, si le terrorisme s'arrête, je pense que la majorité de la population ne s'opposera pas à ce genre d'accord. /P,15-02-83/
'And if an agreement is reached, with guarantees, if terrorist actions stop, I believe that a majority of the population will not oppose that kind of agreement'

It would seem as though the formula in [53] offers a good account:

[53] au temps t, X s'arrêta =
      l'on peut penser à X comme à qqch qui a des parties
      l'on peut penser à ces parties comme à des parties qui sont les unes après les autres
      avant t, il y avait des parties de X
      l'on ne savait pas alors:

351
il n'y aura plus de parties de X après t
à t, qqch eut lieu
l'on put savoir à t :
à cause de cela, il n'y aura plus de
parties de X après maintenant
'on can think of X as of something that has
parts
one can think of those parts as being one
after another
before t, there were parts of X
one did not know at that time :
there will be no parts of X anymore
after t
at t, something happened
one could know at t :
because of that, there will be no parts
of X anymore after now'

The problem with [53] is that it disregards the existence
of cases such as [54a] and [ b ] (where reference is made to
space - metaphorical or not) :

[54a]
Mais, ses connaissances en botanique
s'arrêtant aux coquelicots, aux roses et aux
tulipes, Lucas allait passer devant lui avec
un sourire niais et admiratif, quand l'homme
se redressa. /MS,205/
 'But, with his knowledge in botany stopping
at red-weed, roses and tulips, Lucas was about
to pass in front of him with an inane and
admirning smile, when the man stood up'

[ b ]
Pour eux comme pour elle, la peinture
s'arrête-t-elle aux impressionnistes, la
musique à Debussy, la philosophie à Alain,
l'architecture à Garnier ? /P,15-02-88/
 'For them as for her, does painting stop
with the impressionists, music with Debussy,
philosophy with Alain, and architecture with
Garnier ?'

A formula is needed which is close to both [27] and [53] :

[55] X s'arrêta :
l'on peut penser à X comme à qqch qui a des
parties
l'on peut penser à ces parties comme à des
parties qui sont les unes après les
autres
je pense à une partie de X
il y a des parties avant cette partie
avant temps t, l'on ne savait pas :
il n'y aura plus de parties de X après
ceci
l'on put savoir à t :
  il n'y aura plus de parties de X après ceci
one can think of X as of something which has parts
one can think of those parts as being one after another
I am thinking of one part of X there are parts before that part
before time t, one did not know : there will be no parts of X anymore after this
one could know at t : there will be no parts of X anymore after this'

Unlike [53], [55] does not contain a causality-component. Where reference is made to boundaries in space, it is indeed impossible to define an event which "causes" X to stop (cp. Chapter Seven for a similar remark concerning the verb end).

3.4. After se mettre à, which is exclusively pronominal, and continuer, which is predominantly non-pronominal, we have now looked at arrêter/s'arrêter, a verb which is predominantly pronominal, although it has more non-pronominal than pronominal frames. The following frames were found :

Table Two

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frame</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a)</td>
<td>X arrêta de Z [39]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>X n'arrêta pas de Z [41]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c)</td>
<td>X s'arrêta de Z [42]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d)</td>
<td>X arrêta Y [47]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e)</td>
<td>X arrêta Y (causative) [45]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(f)</td>
<td>X arrêta [49]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(g)</td>
<td>X s'arrêta (elliptical) [42]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(h)</td>
<td>X s'arrêta (absolute) [55]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total number of frames : 8 (cesser : 4)
Total number of formulas : 6 (cesser : 3)
Total number of formulas referring to a second verb : 4 (cesser : 1)
4. "(S')ARRETER" (AND "CESSER") AND "FINIR" COMPARED

4.1. It was shown in section 1. that cesser and cease are rather different, and in section 3. that (s')arréter and stop are different, too. Nevertheless, it appears that finir differs from cesser and (s')arréter in very much the same way as finish differs from cease and stop: it refers, as BENAC (1956:392) points out, to a set terminal point.

Most of the explications offered by Bénac fail to single out the differences between finir and the other cessation verbs (14). Twice, finir is defined in terms of the noun fin (cp. l.c.:393): the verb means either prendre fin ['take an end'] or mettre fin à ['put an end to']. The translations show that, presumably, the nearest equivalent of fin is end; but the latter, of course, makes one think of the verb end, to which the verb finir does not correspond. Whether it is linguistically correct to make the link between the noun end and the verb end is irrelevant: for many (non-native French) users of Bénac's dictionary, these definitions (of finir in terms of fin) will be misleading.

Finir is also defined (ibid.) as "faire qu'une action ou une chose s'arrêtent" ['make an action or a thing stop']. This explication is more understandable than the one which says (l.c.:392) "faire qu'une chose soit faite et non plus à faire" ['make that a thing be done and not anymore to be done'] (15); but as the verb faire is causative, it may lead one to the conclusion that finir is causative too, and identical in meaning with arrêter (which in itself is equivalent to faire s'arrêter). The only remaining attempt undertaken by Bénac in order to explicate the meaning of the
verb *finir* (ibid.) does not refer to particular cessation nouns or cessation verbs, but to a natural endpoint: "ne plus se préoccuper d’une chose, ne plus y travailler, parce qu’elle est arrivée à son *term*e *natural*" ["not bother about a thing anymore, not work on it anymore, because it has reached its *natural endpoint*"] (emphasis added).

MAHLER (1985:17) does not quite make that kind of observation, but she gets close to it. Why, she wonders, is it impossible to say [56] (the acceptability judgment is hers)?

[56] *Je vais finir de nouveau.*

'I am going to finish again'

For Mahler, the answer is obvious: the use of a modifier (i.e. *de nouveau*) is possible only if there is something to be modified. This slightly cryptic claim seems to be the not so self-evident major of a syllogism readers have to complete for themselves, essentially by means of guesswork (16). I presume the syllogism goes as follows:

Major: the use of a modifier is possible only if there is something to be modified;

Minor: once one has "fini" ["finished"] something, there is nothing left;

Conclusion: one cannot "finir" something "de nouveau".

It may seem that, if [56] were not anomalous, the entire syllogism would become invalid. The fact of the matter is that [56] is not anomalous. The marathon-runner of Chapter Seven may well have finished last year’s marathon, and be on the verge of finishing this year’s one as well. Notice, however, that in that case we are talking about two different
instances of one and the same thing (called "a marathon"),
not about one particular instance of one particular thing.
The syllogism, which talks about instances rather than about
things (in a more linguistic or semiotic terminology: about
tokens rather than about types), remains valid. Mahler,
hence, has at least the intuition that finir refers to a set
terminal point.

4.2. The question remains to be asked as to whether finir
is closer to cesser (which refers to an unexpected change),
to (s')arrêter (which refers to an unexpected change as well,
but one which is either wanted or caused), or to neither one.
In the linguistic literature, two authors have opposed (or
rather, juxtaposed) the verbs cesser and finir, without
mentioning the verb (s')arrêter. HENRICHSEN (1967:54) talks
about cesser de and finir par (!), and finds that they both
express the "aspect terminatif" ['terminative aspect']. They
certainly do. Compare:

[57]  Je finis, non sans peine, par tourner la
tête à droite et, tout aussitôt, la magie
cessa d'opérer. /CP,101/
'Not without trouble, I finally managed
to turn my head to my right hand side; at
once, the magic stopped operating'

BAUSCH (1963:273-274), on the other hand, looks at cesser
de and finir de, and observes that these verbs are
"egressive", refer to the "Endpunkt" ['endpoint'] or the
"Endphase" ['final stage'] of a particular process. Both
verbs also denote "ein blosses Aufhören" ['a pure
cessation'], whatever that may be. Similar remarks could be
- and have been - made with respect to (s')arrêter : PINCHON
(1972:220,225) claims that cesser, arrêter and finir denote "la fin" or "la phase finale d'une action" ['the end or final phase of a particular action'].

Clearly, there is nothing much to be learnt from the kind of observations made by Henrichsen, by Bausch, and by Pinchon. However, we can make a link with finish in English, and make a similar claim. As the verb finir implies the existence of a natural endpoint - say t -, the expectations before t and at t are the same: before t already, one can know that after t, Z will not happen anymore. We can once again speak about unchanged expectations - and we must draw the conclusion that finish is neither closer to cesser than it is to (s')arrêter nor vice versa. Finir is rather different from both.

5. "FINIR"

5.1. In Chapter Seven, we saw that the Z-component in the frame "X finished Z-ing" is telic in nature, i.e. refers to a process which, rather than to last for an indeterminate or unlimited period of time, sooner or later reaches a point beyond which it cannot extend. The same holds true in the case of finir - a fact which is not at all surprising if one considers that both verbs include the idea of a set terminal point. Telic expressions often consist of an infinitive followed by a direct object, as in [58].

[58a] Josephine était dans une chambre d'hôtel et finissait d'écrire un petit mot pour son mari : ... /YS,76/
'Josepha was in a hotel room and finished writing a note to her husband'

Yasko a fini de peindre les volets puis il a disparu. /YS,124/

'Yasko finished painting the shutters and then he disappeared'

Simple infinitives, however, can just as well be telic (cp. Chapter Seven, pp.301-302):

[59a]  [Mon] Dieu ! il est au moins dix heures, on doit avoir fini de dîner ! /CS,6-7/

'My goodness! it is at least ten o'clock, they must have finished their dinner'

[ b]  Une ou deux fois par mois, à Paris, on m'envoyait lui faire une visite, comme il finissait de déjeuner (...). /CS,72/

'Once or twice a month, in Paris, I was sent to visit him, just as he finished taking his lunch'

For the utterances in [58] and in [59], the following formula may be proposed:

[60]  au temps t, X finit de Z =
  avant t, Z avait lieu pour quelque temps
  l'on pouvait savoir alors :
    Z ne pourra plus avoir lieu après t
  à t, Z avait lieu
  l'on put savoir à t :
    Z ne pourra plus avoir lieu après maintenant

Not unexpectedly (cp. section 4.), the formula in [60] has the same content as the main formula for the verb finish (Chapter Seven, p.300); therefore, no translation was added.

5.2. The use of the verb finir with a negation is a point on which I would not have said anything, were it not for the fact that there is a frame "X n'en finissait pas de Z" which I cannot omit from the description (17). The use of n'en pas finir followed by an infinitive is not infrequent in French, and can be exemplified as in [61] and [62] (18).
[61a] Presse, il avait été un homme pressé, mais là, dans cet après-midi de printemps, étendu, il n’en finissait pas de mourir. /YS,45/

‘Pressed for time, he had been a man pressed for time, but there, on that spring afternoon, stretched out, he did not finish dying’

[ b]  Quand, après la mort de Josué, Dieu permit aux Hébreux de conquérir le pays de Canaan, il laissa subsister plusieurs peuples hostiles afin d’éprouver les Juifs. Aujourd’hui, l’Histoire se répète. Avec ce sentiment, au fond de la conscience collective juive, que toutes ces épreuves ne sont pas fortuites. Que le peuple hébreu n’en finit pas d’effectuer son retour d’Egypte. /P,15-02-88/

‘When, after Joshua’s death, God allowed the Hebrews to conquer the land of Canaan, he let several hostile nations exist in order to put the Jews to the test. Today, History repeats itself. With that feeling, deep in the Jewish collective conscience, that all these tests are not in vain. That the Hebrew people do not finish returning from Egypt’

[62a] Il n’en finissait pas de me regarder.

‘He did not finish watching me’

[ c]  Elle n’en finissait pas de parler.

‘She did not finish talking’

Whenever ne pas finir takes an extra clitic en, the idea of a natural endpoint is either present (as in [61a] and [ b]) or it is not (as in [62a] and [ b]). That, however, does not require special attention. The idea of a set terminal point can disappear with ne pas finir as well. Compare :

[63a] Le pétrole n’a pas fini de jouer un rôle directeur. /ST,06-87/

‘Fuel has not finished yet playing a leading role’

[ b]  On n’a jamais fini de compter les îles grecques. En voici une toute nouvelle, du moins pour les touristes, bleue, blanche et pure : Amorgos. /P,15-02-88/

‘One has never finished counting the Greek islands. Here is a completely new one, at least for tourists, blue, white and pure: Amorgos’

The VP playing a role is atelic by definition. Counting the Greek islands, on the other hand, would seem to be an
activity with a set terminal point - but the meaning behind [63b] is that there are so many of these islands that they are in fact uncountable.

It is not at all surprising that ne pas finir (and n’en pas finir) can take atelic VP’s. The negation does not affect lines one and three of the formula in [60] : [63a], for instance, implies that fuel did play a leading role before and at a certain reference point. It does affect lines two and four, which, with ne pas finir, will read as in [64] :

[64] l’on ne pouvait pas savoir alors : ...
l’on ne put pas savoir à t : ... 

If at some point in time one could not know that an event could not anymore take place after that point, one could not know either whether that particular event has its own natural endpoint or not. Therefore, after ne pas finir, all sorts of VP’s (telic and atelic) may be used (19).

Let us go back to our main argument, viz. the frame "X n’en finissait pas de Z". The examples in [61] and in [62] show that BRIEER-van AKERLAKEN (1967:215) is wrong in claiming that at times it is possible to replace the second verb by means of en (20). En in n’en pas finir does not result from a pronominal substitution. The question is of course : what does en mean, i.e. what is its function?

Although it is frequently dismissed as purely idiomatic, I would like to argue that en does have a function of its own. It is far more than a substitute for terms introduced by de (its usual but rather incorrect definition). Obviously, our en is identical to the one that appears in the following utterances - also dismissed as idiomatic:
One of the implications of sentences such as those in [65] is that the processes referred to last longer than one had originally expected. That component of unexpected length is conveyed by the element which is of interest to us here, viz. the clitic en. Without the latter, the meaning of the sentences in [65] will change quite dramatically: [65a] will ask for somebody’s location in space, [65b] will convey the message that Peter is not present yet, and [65c] will mean that the speaker is finally successful in wondering whether someone else is right or not.

Hence, n’en pas finir implies unexpected length, a component which is fully compatible with the verb finir itself, and with its negation ne pas finir. There is no contradiction between the statement that, at one stage ("before t"), one could know (finir) or not know (ne pas finir) that some event could not take place after a point in time to come ("after t"), and the statement that one could think at that stage ("before t") that the same event would not take place at that point in time to come ("at t"). There is no contradiction either between the latter statement, and the statement (cp. line three in the formula in [60]) that "at t, Z was happening". Punctual verbs such as mourir in [61a] are allowed to appear after n’en pas finir, even though finir in itself (but not finir par; cp. below) is strictly incompatible with either punctual verbs (which have no
identifiable endpoint) or states (which have no natural endpoint at all) (21). With n’en pas finir, even a punctual event is transformed into a process with an unexpected length. For the frame in general, I would like to propose the following explication:

[66] au temps t, X n’en finissait pas de Z = avant t, Z avait lieu
l’on pouvait penser alors : n’aurait plus lieu après maintenant
l’on ne pouvait pas savoir alors : ne pourra plus avoir lieu après t
à t, Z avait lieu
l’on ne put pas savoir à t : ne pourra plus avoir lieu après maintenant

'before t, Z was happening
one could think at that time :
Z will not happen anymore after now
one could not know at that time :
Z cannot happen anymore after t
at t, Z was happening
one could not know at t :
Z cannot happen anymore after now'

The formula in [66] does not refer to any "pleasant or unpleasant feeling", a component which lexicographers also find in the construction n’en pas finir. Such a component is not essential, as it is a mere consequence of the component of unexpected length. It is indeed so that a process which lasts longer than expected may easily trigger, according to the circumstances, a feeling of comfort or discomfort.

5.3. Further below, we shall deal with the positive counterpart of n’en pas finir, viz. en finir, a construction which is never followed by an infinitive. First, we must look at another frame in which finir can be used with other than telic expressions. At first sight, "X finit par Z" may remind us of a similar commencer-frame (viz. "X commença par
Z"; cp. pp.121-124); however, there are more affinities with finish-up and end-up followed by an ING-construction (on the latter, cp. pp.306-308 and 317-318), even if one's impression after consulting the literature is likely to be rather different.

BENAC (1956:832), first of all, glosses finir par as "réussir à la longue" ['finally succeed']. It is not hard to find examples where this gloss is fully appropriate:

[67a] Les Français finiront par comprendre que la France est une idée dès maintenant dépassée, tout comme le sont, depuis longtemps, les idées de Bourgogne, d'Aquitaine ou de Normandie. /CP,112/

'The French will end up understanding that France is from now onward an old-fashioned idea, just like the ideas of Burgundy, Aquitania and Normandy, which have been old-fashioned for a long time'

[ b] Se peut-il qu'on ne finisse pas par reconnaître un endroit où l'on a vécu ? /80,98/

'Is it possible for one not to end up recognizing a place where one has lived?'

According to DUBOIS (1961:33), finir par refers to a "résultat acquis" ['an established result']. In support of his claim, one may consider the examples in [68] (and perhaps the one in [67b] as well).

[68a] - En tout cas, c'est le grand rôle, dit Béatrice (...). En fait, je vais sûrement finir par le faire. /LD,84/  
   "Anyway, this is the great role", said Beatrice. "In fact, I will for sure finish up interpreting it"

[ b] [La silhouette] rapetisse, rapetisse, et finit par se perdre. /80,135/
   'The silhouette shrinks, shrinks, and finally disappears'

Yet another gloss is provided in GENOUVRIER/DESIRAT/HORDE (1977:193), where finir par is glossed as... "commencer à".
For the third time in a row, examples where this gloss is possible are easy to find. Consider the utterances in [69]:

[69a] Jérôme était à présent si fatigué depuis huit heures qu’il pourchassait ou qu’il suivait, il ne savait plus, cet animal bizarre, qu’il finissait par parler à voix haute. /YS,22/
Jérôme was by now so exhausted after eight hours of chasing or following, he did not know anymore, that bizarre animal, that he finished up talking aloud

[ b ] Peu à peu ils entrèrent si bien dans leur rôle qu’ils finissent par y croire et par le dépasser (...). /LD,87/
Bit by bit they get so well into their role that they end up believing in it and transcending it

All the previously quoted attempts at defining the value of finir par were by native speakers of French. The few scholars who establish, explicitly or not, a link with commencer par are speakers of either Dutch (see LAMIROY 1987: 284), or German (see BAUSCH 1963:271, and WANDRUSZKA 1969: 337-338,348) (22). In Lamiroy’s words, finir par presents the “final (...) stage in a series of states or events”. A few examples:

[70a] Et, à force de suivre un autre gibier que le gibier officiel, il finit par tomber bêtement et tout seul devant ce dernier, loin bien sûr, très loin de lui. /YS,21/
And, after constantly following another game besides the official one, he finally hit, stupidly and completely alone, upon the latter, far of course, very far away from him

[ b ] Néanmoins, la froideur de Josepha qui, au début, avait plus que n’importe laquelle de ses qualités séduit Arnold von Krafenberg, finissait par lui faire peur. /YS,72/
Nevertheless, the frigidity of Josepha which, at first, had more than any other of her qualities attracted Arnold von Krafenberg, eventually frightened him

[71] may be compared to [114b] in Chapter Seven:
Since it is possible to illustrate each one of the glosses appearing in the literature, it might seem that all of them must be correct to some extent. It would, however, be quite unattractive to consider finir par as four times polysemous. The descriptions provided are just too detailed: they are highly specific instances of one, viz. the meaning of finir par. Notice that in [72] none of the previously quoted glosses applies:

Et même il savait que c'était dans cette différence entre ce qu'il aurait voulu dire et ce qu'il finissait par dire, (...) que c'était là que résidaient son style, sa voix, et peut-être son talent. /LD, 64/

'And he was even aware that in the difference between what he wanted to say and what he eventually said, that there resided his style, his voice, and perhaps his talent.'

Probably the best way to describe finir par is as follows: it refers to a process or state which did not occur or exist before, but which, unexpectedly, does occur or exist at a particular moment in time. Thus:

au temps t, X finit par Z = avant t, Z n'avait pas lieu/il n'y avait pas Z
l'on ne savait pas alors :
    Z aura lieu à t/ il y aura Z à t
    à t, Z avait lieu/ il y avait Z
    'before t, Z was not happening/there was no Z
    one did not know at that time :
    Z will happen at t/there will be Z
    at t
    at t, Z was happening/there was Z'
Line one does not exclude that $X$ tried to $Z$ (and failed before finally succeeding, at $t$); nor that, before $t$, $X$ was involved in other processes or states (preceding stage(s) in a series). One possible interpretation of line two is that one could know that $X$ would $Z$ without knowing that the process or state would occur or exist at $t$ (established result). Finally, line three does not exclude that more of $Z$ would happen after $t$ or that there would be more $Z$ after $t$ (i.e. that $X$ began to $Z$ at $t$). The formula in [73] is flexible and comprehensive enough to accommodate all possible cases, yet at the same time it provides a rigorous definition for a frame which enjoys a great popularity in French, and is far more frequent than its pendants in English (23).

5.4. After "finir...par + infinitive", the first construction we meet on our way down the hierarchy of finir-frames is, as with all the other aspectual verbs studied (except sa mettre à and ne cesser de), the direct object construction (24). It soon appears that there are two different frames, the first one of which looks familiar and is exemplified in [74]. An example of the second frame (not a causative one) appears in [75]. Notice that, although [74a] is negative, it is suggested that there should have been a continuation and a natural endpoint.

[74a] Il ne finissait pas sa phrase comme si je devais comprendre la suite instantanément.
/BO,36/
'He did not finish his sentence as if I had to understand the rest of it instantly'

[74b] Tu ne sais pas comme je peux m'ennuyer à Paris, maintenant que j'ai fini ma pièce...
/LD,147-148/
'You do not know how bored I can feel in Paris, now that I have finished my drama...'

366
Il aurait dû se rendre compte lui-même que cela ne pouvait durer. Qu'elle, Letitia Garett, née Eastwood, (...) ne pouvait raisonnablement finir sa vie avec un commissaire-priseur!

/YS,142/

"He should have realized by himself that this could not last. That she, Letitia Garett, born Eastwood, could not reasonably end up living with an auctioneer!"

The verbs to be supplied through natural pairing are, for instance, and in the correct order, prononcer ['pronounce'], écrire ['write'], and vivre ['live'] (the latter in lieu of sa vie). The formula in [60] applies in the case of [74a] and [ b], but not in the case of [75], where finir sa vie is equivalent to finir par vivre (cp. the English translation). Hence, the formula in [73] applies. It is noteworthy that we are dealing here with a frame which does not seem to exist with the verb commencer. "Commencer + direct object" never equals "commencer par + infinitive".

5.5. Among the elliptical finir-frames, one is also related to finir par rather than to finir de, and it may therefore be better to describe it as the first one in our set of elliptical and absolute frames. Consider [76a] and [ b].

[76a] Pouvait-il, lui, élevé à Eton, finir paysan dans une plaine italienne? /YS,212/

"Could he, an Eton graduate, end up as a farmer on an Italian plain?"

[ b] Décidément, tout finissait dans de vieilles boîtes de chocolat ou de biscuits. Ou de cigares. /80,81/

"Obviously, everything ended up in old boxes for chocolates or biscuits. Or cigars."

Addressees understand that the Eton graduate expresses fear at the idea that he might "finir par être paysan", and that medallions, photographs etc "finissent par se retrouver" in
all kinds of old boxes. A peculiarity of the frame exemplified in [76] is that the verb to be supplied must be stative. Its subject is either animate (as in [76a]) or inanimate (as in [76b]).

Next, there are those frames which have a recognizable counterpart containing another aspectual verb. As soon as, in [77a] and [b], and in [78], the correct kind of verb is supplied (e.g. jouer ['play'], tracasser ['disturb'], and tomber ['fall'], in that order), the main formula in [60] becomes applicable (25).

[77a] Aussi quand le pianiste eut fini, Swann s’approcha-t-il de lui pour lui exprimer une reconnaissance dont la vivacité plut beaucoup à Mme Verdurin. /CS,212/

'Therefore, when the pianist had finished, Swann got near to him in order to express a gratitude the liveliness of which delighted Mme Verdurin'

[b] Mais as-tu bientôt fini ? Qu’est-ce que tu as aujourd’hui ? /CS,362/

'But will you soon have finished? What is the matter with you today?'

[78] Cette pluie va-t-elle enfin finir ?

'Is this rain going to finally finish?'

The difference between the former and the latter is that the subjects in [77] are animate, whereas the one in [78] is inanimate. The verb to be supplied is not a stative one.

It may be useful to point out that, once again, it is important not to confuse "finir par + noun" (as in [79a]) with "finir par + infinitive" (as in [79b]). The reader will remember that in Chapter Four a parallel warning was issued with regard to commencer par (cp. pp.129-131).

[79a] Il finissait par quelques mots de consolation.

'He finished with a few words of consolation'

[b] Il finissait par nous dire quelques mots de consolation.
'He ended up addressing us a few words of condolence.'

Pace BRIEËR-van AKERLaken (1967:216), from whom [79a] and [b] are taken, both sentences are not equivalent. In [79a] it is implied that the third person il was giving a speech which ended with a few words of compassion. The same implication is not invariably present in [79b], which merely says that the expression of condolence was an unexpected event occurring at a particular point in time.

For the examples in [80a] and [b], we need the ‘X eut des parties’-formula in [81]:

[80a] Ensuite j’ai attendu en me disant que peut-être le cauchemar finirait. /BC,119/
    ‘Then I waited, telling myself that perhaps the nightmare would come to an end’

[ b ] Et lorsque le morceau finissait, il relevait la tête brusquement, la bouche ouverte, comme un homme qui suffoque. /VT,128/
    ‘And when the music finished, he suddenly looked up, with open mouth, like one who is about to suffocate’

[81] au temps t, X finit =
    l’on peut penser à X comme à qqch qui a des parties
    l’on peut penser à ces parties comme à des parties qui sont les unes après les autres
    avant t, il y avait des parties de X
    l’on pouvait savoir alors :
        il ne pourra plus y avoir de parties de X après t
    il y eut une partie de X à t
    l’on put savoir à t :
        il ne pourra plus y avoir de parties de X après maintenant
    'one can think of X as of something that has parts
    one can think of those parts as being one after the other
    before t, there were parts of X
    one could know at that time :
        there can be no parts of X anymore
        after t
    there was a part of X at t
    one could know at t :
        there can be no parts of X anymore
after now'

As before, if finir is used negatively, the formulas remain applicable, though the idea of a natural endpoint may not be present. Compare [82], to which the formula in [81] applies:

[82] Et Stirner est très important, parce qu'il a été le premier à dire de façon draconienne que la sécularisation est l'une des illusions les plus grotesques où l'on puisse tomber : elle se considère comme l'achèvement d'un processus, qui, en fait, par sa nature, ne finit jamais, et elle laisse agir de manière sauvage cela même qu'elle prétend avoir éliminé. /ML,06-87/

'And Stirner is very important, for he was the first to say in a draconian way that secularisation is one of the most grotesque illusions one may have: it considers itself as the achievement of a process which, in fact, by nature, never finishes, and it allows the powers which it claims it has eliminated to act wildly'

The negation jamais ['never'] has the same effect as when finir takes an infinitive: it affects the lines which explicate what one could know, so that, for instance, ne jamais finir implies that one could not know that such and such would be the case after t. On the other hand, it may be added that the elliptical and absolute frames which are not related to finir par (i.e. all of them but one) can be enriched by means of an extra clitic en. An example containing absolute finir is given in [83], and the new formula in [84].

[83] Mieux vaut n'en rien dire pour le moment : j'aurais lieu, sans doute, de formuler des griefs et des critiques, cela n'en finirait pas. /CP,29/

'For the time being, it is better not to say anything about it: I would no doubt have to formulate griefs and criticism, there would be no end to it'
au temps t, X n'en finissait pas =
l'on peut penser à X comme à qqch qui a des parties
l'on peut penser à ces parties comme à des parties qui sont les unes après les autres
avant t, il y avait des parties de X
l'on pouvait penser alors :
il n'y aura plus de parties de X après maintenant
l'on ne pouvait pas savoir alors :
il ne pourra plus y avoir de parties de X après t
il y eut une partie de X à t
l'on ne put pas savoir à t :
il ne pourra plus y avoir de parties de X après maintenant
one can think of X as of something that has parts
one can think of those parts as being one after another
before t, there were parts of X
one could think at that time :
there will be no parts of X anymore after now
one could not know at that time :
there can be no parts of X anymore after t
there was a part of X at t
one could not know at that time :
there can be no parts of X anymore after now

At this stage, one frame remains to be considered. It is closely related to the previous one, but it has no negation.
Some well-chosen examples show that the feature of unexpected length remains present.

- Si tu veux vraiment faire cet article, coupa Béatrice, il vaudrait mieux que nous en finissions : pose-moi des questions, je te réponds et après on n'en parle plus. Depuis dix jours j'ai l'impression de vivre une perpétuelle interview, ça m'épuise. /LD,161/
  
  "If you really want to write that article", interrupted Beatrix, "it would be better if we cut it short : ask me questions. I'll answer you and then we won't talk about it anymore. For ten days, I have had the impression of living a perpetual interview, it exhausts me".

Alors débranchez-le, qu'on en finisse ! a dit M. Louette à bout de désespoir, je préfère le voir mort qu'handicapé toute sa vie.

/PM,11-03-88/
'Then take him off the machine, cut it short! said Mr Louette, who had lost every hope, I'd rather see him dead than handicapped for the rest of his life.'

There is a possibility in French to express what has to be cut short. The frame "X en finit" can be followed by a PrepP introduced by avec (which, in turn, takes a noun or pronoun which refers to either animate or inanimate objects; cp. PINCHON 1972:270). Compare:

[86] — Je me suis permise d’entrer car Cathy m’a dit que vous étiez seuls, — déclara-t-elle d’emblée, pensant ainsi en finir avec les assomments règlements de la bienséance. /LD, 279-280/

"I allowed myself to come in, as Cathy told me that the two of you were alone", she announced straight off, thinking she could thereby cut short the tedious rules of decency.

It is always possible to expand en finir into, and to understand en finir avec qqn as en finir avec qqch (e.g., in [85a] : avec cette interview) (26). A second verb can be easily supplied: en finir avec une interview = finir de faire une interview (+ unexpected length); en finir avec des règlements = s’arrêter (27) de respecter les règlements (idem). The formula for this frame runs as follows:

[87] au temps t, X en finit (avec Y) =
  l’on peut penser à Y comme à qqch que l’on Z
  l’on peut penser à Y comme à qqch qui a des parties
  l’on peut penser à ces parties comme à des parties qui sont les unes après les autres
  avant t, Z avait lieu
  l’on pouvait penser alors :
    Z n’aura plus lieu après maintenant
  l’on pouvait savoir alors :
    Z ne pourra plus avoir lieu après t
  à t, Z avait lieu
  l’on peut savoir alors :
    Z ne pourra plus avoir lieu après maintenant
'one can think of Y as of something that one is Z-ing
one can think of Y as of something that has parts
one can think of those parts as being one after the other
before t, Z was happening
one could think at that time:
Z will not happen anymore after now
one could know at that time:
Z cannot happen anymore after t
at t, Z was happening
one could know at t:
Z cannot happen anymore after now'

As far as I can see, there is no aspectual verb in English which can express this kind of meaning.

5.6. Thanks to its possibility to appear with the clitic en, the verb finir has a huge number of different frames:

Table Three

(a) X finit de Z
(b) X n’en finissait pas de Z
(c) X finit par Z
(d) X finit Y (cp. de Z)
(e) X finit Y (cp. par Z)
(f) X finit (cp. par Z)
(g) X finit (elliptical)
(h) X finit (absolute)
(i) X n’en finissait pas (elliptical)
(j) X n’en finissait pas (absolute)
(k) X en finit (avec Y)

Total number of frames: 11 (cesser: 4; (s’)arrêter: 8)
Total number of formulas: 6 (cesser: 3; (s’)arrêter: 6)
Total number of formulas referring to a second verb: 4
(cesser: 1; (s’)arrêter: 5)

6. "FINIR" (AND "CESSER" AND "(S’)ARRETER") COMPARED TO "(SE) TERMINER"

6.1. No reference was made, in the preceding section, to a possible occurrence of the verb finir with a reflexive
pronoun. ROTHEMBERG (1974:170), however, proposes the following (constructed) examples:

[88a] Le repas se finit en silence.
’The meal was finished in silence’
[ b] Le travail ne se finira pas tout seul.
’The job will not get finished all by itself’

The same author found a real example of se finir in Flaubert (cp. ROTHEMBERG 1974:197). However, what Flaubert wrote in the 19th century does not necessarily conform anymore to what native speakers today find acceptable. And as a matter of fact, my own intuitions as to the anomaly of [88a] were confirmed by native speakers. [88b], on the other hand, is not outright unacceptable, but it is extremely unlikely that it represents a frame on its own. AdvP's semantically different from tout seul are impossible, there is no positive counterpart, and negations such as ne...plus ['not anymore'] or ne...jamais ['never'] cannot be used.

[89a] *Le travail ne se finira pas en silence.
’The job will not get finished in silence’
[ b] *Le travail ne se finira pas avant dimanche.
’The job will not get finished before Sunday’
[ c] *Le travail se finira tout seul.
[ d] *Le travail ne se finira plus tout seul.

In fact, [88b] is an example of the use of irony in language. It implies that somebody will have to finish the job: the job "cannot finish itself". Grammatically, se refers to le travail; semantically, in this unique occurrence of se finir, the subject is personified, but the reflexive pronoun refers to a non-personified subject.

The reason that there is no verb se finir is not the one suggested by DONALDSON (1973:26-27). He suggests that
"transitive verbs which undergo reflexivization (...) are subject to the same selectional restrictions as their non-pronominal counterparts". As the verb finir does not occur with animate direct objects (28), a sentence such as [90] (Donaldson’s example) is unacceptable:

[90] *Elle s’est finie.
   'She finished herself'

But what if elle stands for la toile ['the painting'] or la tâche ['the task']? Donaldson’s "explanation" fails to take these cases into account. In reality, quite simply, *se finir probably does not exist anymore because the notions of causality (often linked to the presence of a reflexive pronoun) and natural endpoint are irreconcilable.

Conclusion: the verbs to be contrasted are finir and (se) terminer. For Genouvrier and collaborators (l.c.:193), this is the umpteenth case of an absolute synonymy, and a similar viewpoint appears more implicitly in PINCHON (1972:270) as well. BENAC (1956:393) points out that both of them imply "une action ou une chose formant un tout dans laquelle on distingue un commencement, un milieu et une fin" ['an action or a thing making up a whole and in which one can distinguish a beginning, a middle, and an end']. There is undoubtedly no better illustration for this claim than the quote in [91]:

[91] De quel chaos, de quels désordres aussi, cette œuvre bizarre n’était-elle pas née ? Comment avait-elle fait pour ne pas devenir secondaire un instant, alors qu’il l’avait commencée avant de retrouver Beatrice, et que c’était pendant leur liaison et ses bourrasques qu’il l’avait continuée et terminée ? /LD,230-231/
   'From which chaos, from which disorders, too, did in fact spring this bizarre work? How had it managed not to become secondary
for just one moment, since he had begun it before finding back Beatrix, and that it had been during their stormy relationship that he had continued and finished it?'

Bénac's observation also amounts to saying that, with finir and terminer, there is no resumption. However, whilst finir, at least according to Bénac, denotes "une action douce et naturelle" ['a smooth and natural action'], terminer denotes "une action plus autoritaire et violente qui consiste surtout à empêcher de continuer" ['a more authoritarian and violent action which primarily consists in preventing from continuing']. There is a grain of truth in the latter statement, but I would submit that it is not entirely correct. Terminer has nothing authoritarian or violent, unless it implies external causation (as in terminer la discussion, terminer les échauffourées ['end the discussion', 'end the riots']). It is quite clear that no violence is involved in an utterance such as [92]:

[92] [Construisant] une phrase comme celles qui dans les grammair es étrangères n'ont d'autre but que de nous faire employer un mot nouveau, elle la termina par mon petit nom. /CS,403/
'She constructed a sentence like those which, in foreign grammar-books, have no other scope but to make us use a new word, and she ended it with my Christian name'

A feature which terminer does imply - and one which it shares with end - is unexpectedness. Once again, [92] is a good example, though [93a] is much better, especially if one knows that it is preceded in its original context by [93b].

[93a] Il va en avoir terminé avec ce monde difficile, décevant; avec l'autre difficile, décevant, qu'il a été... /LT,130/
'He will soon have come to terms with that difficult, disappointing world; with
that difficult and disappointing human being that he has been..."

[93b] Brusquement, un calme étrange se fait en lui. /ibid./
'Suddenly, a strange peace settles in his heart'

As in the case of cesser and (s')arrêter, it is not necessarily the change in itself which is unexpected, but it may be just as well the time at which the change occurs.

6.2. In section 6. of Chapter Seven, a summary was provided of the main features of the English cessation verbs taken into consideration. It may be useful to have a similar survey for the French verbs studied in Chapter Eight.

CESSER implies an unexpected change, does not preclude resumption, and does not apply to states;

(s')ARRÊTER implies an unexpected change, does not preclude resumption, and does not apply to states;

FINIR implies unchanged expectations, and does preclude resumption;

(SE) TERMINER implies an unexpected change, and does preclude resumption.

Among the most striking differences between the English and the French verbs are the fact that, rather than change of expectation (for cease), we have unexpectedness (for cesser); and the fact that two of our French verbs are often used with a reflexive pronoun. Terminer - to which we now turn - is one of them.

7. "(SE) TERMINER"

7.1. Unlike (s')arrêter, which nevertheless also occurs
with or without a reflexive pronoun, and unlike cesser and finir, (se) terminer never appears before an infinitive (29). In this respect, the analogy with the verb end is complete. Both (se) terminer and end, as verbs about verbs, are exclusively causative - and this explains why *(se) terminer + infinitive* does not occur.

An important consequence of the distributional limitation just described is that terminer and se terminer never "compete" : terminer is confined to the direct object and elliptical frames, and se terminer to absolute constructions. Let us look at the former first.

[94a] Le pianiste qui avait à jouer deux morceaux de Chopin, après avoir terminé le prélude, avait attaqué aussitôt une polonaise. /CS,335/
'The pianist who had to play two Chopin pieces, after having finished the prelude, had immediately gone into a polonaise'

[94b] Il disait, en terminant, qu'il espérait faire parvenir cette lettre par les soins d'une personne charitable qui devait aller prochainement dans le nord et qui mettrait la lettre à la poste de Paris. /CP,149/
'He said, to finish, that he was hopeful to have this letter sent to its destination through the kindness of a charitable person who had to go north shortly, and who would mail the letter in Paris'

[94b] has to be replaced in its context : addressees will invariably understand that what the third person il was about to finish was the letter referred to twice in the example itself. But why "finish"? Simply, because end seems unsuitable as a translation - and this, of course, suggests that there is a difference in meaning between end and terminer which we have not highlighted yet.

"To end something" means, as we saw in Chapter Seven, to interrupt something which, without the intervention of the
interrupting cause, would have continued. The key elements of the formula are as follows:

[95] before t, one could think:
more of Z will happen after t
at t, X did something
one could know at that time:
because of that, Z cannot happen anymore after now

As a matter of fact, "terminer qqch" means a slightly different thing. There is no idea of an interruption, but one of a delimitation (in time or in space) with no possibility of resumption. In a metalanguage based on English, this could be expressed as follows:

[96] before t, one did not know this:
Z cannot happen anymore after t
at t, X did something
one could know at that time:
because of that, Z cannot happen anymore after now

The explications show that terminer is closer to finir (and thereby to finish; it has two "cannot happen"-components) than end is to finish. Corpus data confirm that claim: finish, which could have systematically been translated by means of finir, is quite often translated by means of terminer, e.g. in /W/.

[97] finish one's breakfast = terminer son petit déjeuner
finish a story = terminer une histoire
finish reading = terminer sa lecture

As a formula, I suggest [98]:

[98] au temps t, X termina Y =
l'on peut penser à Y comme à qqch que l'on Z
l'on peut penser à Y comme à qqch qui a des parties
l'on peut penser à ces parties comme à des parties qui sont les unes après les
7.2. Se terminer, i.e. terminer preceded by a reflexive pronoun se, is not only used in grammar, with the meaning of "avoir telle ou telle désinence" ['have such and such ending'], which is what BENAC (1956:393) mistakenly claims.

At the other end of the same dictionary (ibid.:932), another (very different) statement is issued: namely, that se terminer "indique simplement qu'une chose s'arrête à un certain point" ['simply indicates that a thing stops at a certain point']. This claim is not correct either, since (s’)arrêter implies a possible resumption, whereas se terminer does not. Compare the examples in [99]:

[99a] Sans doute valait-il mieux que cette première rencontre se terminât sans explication... /LT,50/
'It was no doubt better that this first meeting ended without an explanation'

[ b] L’escale à Nouméa n’aura duré que neuf heures comme prévu. Elle se termine par un dîner chez le haut-commissaire. /PM,02-10-87/
'The stop-over in Noumea will have lasted for nine hours only, as scheduled. It ends with a dinner at the high commissioner’s residence'
Reference to boundaries in *space* (rather than to boundaries in time, as in the case of [99a] and [ b]) is quite common with *se terminer*:

[100a] La combe *se terminait* par une sorte de rocher extrêmement escarpé, presque vertical, devant lequel l'isard se tenait immobile.  
/YS, 24-25/  
' The decline ended in a kind of steep-sloped rock, almost vertical, in front of which, motionless, stood the lizard'

[ b]  
J'ai ouvert le cartable, glissé une main à l'intérieur et ramené un vieux crayon à moitié taillé qui se terminait par une gomme grisâtre.  
/VT, 155/  
'I opened the book case, slipped my hand inside and brought to the surface an old pencil, sharp on one side only, and which ended in a greyish eraser'

The examples just quoted show that STEFANINI (1971:112) is right in stating that *se terminer* has a "passive interpretation" : it is, for instance, the rock which ends the decline in the landscape. The last but one formula to be proposed in this part of our dissertation runs as follows:

[101] *X se termina =*

l'on peut penser à *X* comme à qqch qui a des parties
l'on peut penser à ces parties comme à des parties qui sont les unes après les autres
je pense à une partie de *X*
il y a des parties avant cette partie
avant temps t, l'on ne pouvait pas savoir :
   il n'y aura plus de parties après cette partie
au temps t, l'on put savoir :
   il n'y aura plus de parties après cette partie

The formula in [101] corresponds exactly to the absolute *end-formula* quoted under [111] in Chapter Seven. The last lines express the unexpectedness or suddenness of the transition (e.g., from decline to rock).
7.3. There is one last frame on which I should briefly comment. I found only two instances of it in my own corpus. One was quoted on p.376; the other one is a translation from the English. I quote the French text, and add my own English backward version.

[102]  - Tu vas la fermer, oui ! Sois tranquille, je m'occuperai de toi tout à l'heure, une fois que j'en aurai terminé avec ton ami.
/Wéblé (W), 238/

'Will you just shut up! Keep quiet, I shall deal with you afterwards, once I am ready with your friend.'

En terminer avec is, as could be expected, closely related to en finir avec. According to PINCHON (1972:270), it was created by analogy (30). The main difference is in the suddenness with which the change is realized:

[103] au temps t, X en termina avec Y =
l'on peut penser à Y comme à qqch que l'on Z
l'on peut penser à Y comme à qqch qui a des parties
l'on peut penser à ces parties comme à des parties qui sont les unes après les autres
avant t, Z avait lieu
l'on pouvait penser alors :
  Z n'aura plus lieu après maintenant
l'on ne savait pas alors :
  Z ne pourra plus avoir lieu après t
à t, X fit qqch
l'on put savoir alors :
  à cause de cela, Z ne pourra plus avoir lieu après maintenant
one can think of Y as of something that one is Z-ing
one can think of Y as of something that has parts
one can think of those parts as being one after the other
before t, Z was happening
one could think at that time :
  Z will not happen anymore after now
one did not know at that time :
  Z cannot happen anymore after t
at t, X did something
one could know at that time :
  because of that, Z cannot happen anymore
after now'

There is of course one other difference between *en finir avec* and *en terminer avec* which was not spelled out just now. The latter, but not the former, clearly refers to a causal factor which is responsible for the change.

7.4. *Terminer*, the last verb in a set of four which either have to or can take a reflexive pronoun (31), has more frames than its closest counterpart *end*:

Table Four

| (a) | X termina Y            | [98] |
| (b) | X termina (elliptical) | [98] |
| (c) | X se termina (absolute)| [101]|
| (d) | X en termina avec Y    | [103]|

Total number of frames: 4 (cesser: 4; (s')arrêter: 8; finir: 11)
Total number of formulas: 3 (cesser: 3; (s')arrêter: 6; finir: 6)
Total number of formulas referring to a second verb: 2 (cesser: 1; (s')arrêter: 5; finir: 4)
NOTES to Part Two, Chapter Eight

(1) E.g., FUCHS & LEONARD (1979); RUWET (1986); LAMIROY (1987).

(2) Incidentally, the original and its translation can be seen as evidence for the claim that certain frames are elliptical and can be brought back to other more fundamental ones.

(3) More cesser-utterances referring to weather conditions will be given below, for they belong to different frames. With regard to imperatives, I wish to stress that the use of cesser is not the only possibility, as I shall demonstrate in section 3.

(4) With the exception of [6d], all the examples which follow are originally French. [6d], on the other hand, is the published French translation of the English example identified as /M.119/. It is noteworthy that the English sentence does have the verb stop.

(5) I am aware that [6e] does not have an infinitive after the verb cesser. However, it must be clear that the infinitive palper is left unexpressed.

(6) FUCHS & LEONARD (1979:333), however, assimilate cesser to commencer as far as its co-occurrence with processes and states is concerned. Their paraphrase for "cesser + stative verb" is "il n'est plus vrai de dire que" ['it is not true anymore to say that']: for "cesser + process", they have "arrive à la fin du procès" ['arrives at the end of the process'].

(7) I wish to emphasize once again that I disagree with the idea that the second verbs are "complements"; rather, they are the unexpressed heads of an aspectual modifier.

(8) The two dictionaries of synonyms that I consulted provided little information. BENAC (1956) treats both verbs in separate entries and in independent terms (i.e., he does not contrast them in any sensible way), and he disregards stative expressions (which, as we have seen, are not at all that infrequent after cesser). GENOUVRIER e.a. (1977), on the other hand, leave their readers with the impression of a more or less considerable degree of synonymy.

(9) Translations from stop into cesser are far more frequent than translations that work the other way round.

(10) A similar example (where the two verbs would be fine)
appears in LAMIRDY (1987:283). She notes that, although her example contains a stative expression, the "stative constraint" does not apply, the reason for this being the presence of a temporal clause (as in the case of commencer; cp. p.115).

(11) BENAC (1956:59) observes that both verbs (i.e. arrêter and s'arrêter) are "sometimes synonymous". This is not only an uninformative statement (it is not specified when); it is a false statement as well.

(12) The constructed examples in ROTHENBERG (1974:157) and in PINCHON (1976:44-45) are uninformative and even misleading. Rothenberg seems to assume that the adverb net ['neat'] is used after arrêter (in arrêter net ['stop suddenly']) but not after s'arrêter. In my corpus, s'arrêter net occurred quite frequently, whilst arrêter net did not occur at all.

(13) If the unexpressed second verb is a movement verb, even first person plural imperatives are often found with the reflexive pronoun. Compare:

[i] - Arrêtons-nous là.
   Il leva la main et, dans le soleil couchant, les deux voitures derrière s'arrêtèrent, juste à temps. /MS,134/
   "Let's stop over there."
   He raised his hand and, in the sunset, the two cars behind stopped, just in time'

(14) The relationship between finir and (se) terminer, obviously, will not be addressed here but in section 6.

(15) For readers who do not speak French, it may be necessary to point out that Romance languages do not distinguish between do and make.

(16) For nouns, there seems to be a problem. On Mahler's assumption, it would be "ungrammatical" to talk about, for instance, a "stubborn unicorn", simply because unicorns do not exist; but "the stubbornness of the unicorn" would be fine, because stubbornness is the head of the entire NP, and not a modifier.

(17) On the other hand, in the French frame just referred to, the verb is in the "imparfait" rather than in the "passé simple". N'en pas finir does not seem to occur in the latter tense at all.

(18) [62a] is quoted from COLLINOT (1966:6). Collinot's aim is different from ours: he tries to establish the value of the verbs voir ['see'] and regarder ['look'] by means of several commutation tests relying on the existence of particular syntagmatic constraints (e.g., possibility of use after n'en pas finir).

(19) A similar argumentation applies where finir is used in a question, as in [ii]:

385
Quand finiront-ils de nous ennuyer ?

'When will they finish annoying us ?'

The example quoted is the only instance of the frame "X finit de Z" to be found in GENOUVRIER/DESLRAT/HORDE (1977). It is because that one utterance is a question that Genouvrier and collaborators have nothing else to say about finir except that it can freely alternate (sic) with either cesser or arrête (l.c.:193).

(20) STEPANOFF (1964) makes a relatively similar claim. He "transforms" ne pas cesser de into n'en pas cesser. The trouble is that the latter construction simply does not exist; not all terms introduced by de can be pronominalized by means of the clitic en. For further critical observations, cp. also PINCHON (1972:244-245).

(21) FUCHS & LEONARD (1979:324-325,332) oppose [iiia], which is unacceptable, to [iiib], which is "far more acceptable" ("beaucoup plus acceptable"). The first translation added is by the authors (cp. Chapter Seven, p. 303).

[iiia] *La maison finit d'être grande.

'The house is finishing to be (!!) large'

[ iiib] La maison cesse d'être grande.

'The house stops being large'

(22) It is important to point out that Bausch is far more cautious in his formulations than Wandruszka (who happened to be his supervisor). Wandruszka bluntly claims that, where French has finir par, English has "nur das adverbiale Register" ['only the adverbial register'; emphasis added], i.e. adverbs such as finally, eventually, and AdvP's such as in the end or at last.

(23) Cp. BAUSCH (1963:272). English has a preference for adverbs or AdvP's such as finally, at last, in the end (Wandruszka's "adverbial register"; cp. note 22).

(24) VERBERT (1985) extends her observations on "X commence Y" to "X finit Y" as well. For details, see Chapter Four.

(25) [77b] and [78] are questions. [77b] is uttered by a lady who is getting "tired" of her friend's insistence on what she considers to be a trivial matter. As he keeps asking the same question over and over again, it is clear that there is no natural endpoint. [78] is taken from GENOUVRIER/DESLRAT/HORDE (1977:193), who observe that finir is here synonymous with s'arrêter. It is, in fact, the choice of this particular example that, once again, prevented the authors from establishing the true meaning of finir and its difference with (s')arrêter.

(26) En finir avec lui may mean, for instance, 'en finir avec une affaire à lui, avec sa vie à lui', etc. ['cut short an affair of his, cut short his life', and so on].

(27) Respecter les règlements is an atelic expression, and
therefore does not normally occur after *finir* (cp. p.357).

(28) The direct object frame is to be analyzed in terms of the "*finir* + infinitive"- or the "*finir par* + infinitive"-frame (cp. pp.366-367), and the infinitive is to be supplied through a natural pairing. It appears there are no animate direct objects depending on a verb that can be supplied in such a way and can therefore remain unexpressed.

(29) RÉQUEDAT (1980) refers up to two times (l.c.:30,105) to a construction *terminer de*. Such a construction does not exist, whatever RÉQUEDAT may say.

(30) The example in [iv] is, I suspect, another illustration of the working of analogy.

[iv] [Le] Russe sera réduit à un rôle de chat pour le plaisir d'un enfant, puis terminera souris pour distraire le chat. /ML,06-87/
'The Russian will be reduced to playing the role of a cat to please a child, and will end up as a mouse to distract the cat'

This particular usage of *terminer* (cp. *finir Y*, used as an "abbreviation" for *finir par *être* Y*) appears entirely isolated and is probably a short-lived creation rather than an established part of the French language.

(31) Reference, here, is made to *se mettre à*, *(se)* continuer, *(s')*arrêter, and *(se)* terminer.
PART THREE

SUMMARY AND OUTLOOK
We have, in an analysis stretching over six chapters of approximately fifty pages each, described the value of sixteen English and French verbs denoting a commencement, a continuation, or a cessation. Sporadic comparisons from one language to the other were made, but it may certainly be useful to compare the description and explications proposed for each language in a more careful and consistent way. That is what Chapter Nine is about. It was repeatedly stressed in various chapters of Part Two that the aspectual verbs studied are, in the first place, "verbs about verbs". There is, however, one element which holds these verbs even more tightly together: viz., the reference to a point in time conventionally called t. Chapter Nine will "revisit" the
value of all the verbs in function of this common element, sketching in different sections what situations can possibly arise, and what the speaker may either think or know, before and at τ. Those uses of our verbs which do not necessarily imply any reference to time will be treated apart. In each section (except the last, which offers some general conclusions), the reader will find a table, and a set of specific, mainly contrastive, observations.

Chapter Two provides an outlook, and is more theoretically oriented. Its aims can best be understood if we realize that the eight English verbs studied in Part Two are semantically related: they belong to a vast lexical structure or field which, in turn, is but a tiny fragment of the entire English lexicon. A similar remark could be made about the eight French verbs also studied in Part Two. However, because of an often inadequate and/or arbitrary use of the term field in semantics, modern semantic theory needs, more than ever before, a new field notion and a new field terminology. I myself have been using the term axiological field in various writings (cp. Part One, Chapter One, pp.8-10), but I never had the opportunity to describe what an axiological field should look like, and why it should be called like that. Chapter Ten makes various proposals for a new semantic field theory, and the examples provided in sections 2. to 4. will be drawn from the axiological field to which the sixteen verbs belong that were analyzed in Part Two. Hence, Chapter Ten will raise the issue of structures in the lexicon, and try to sketch how conceptual axiology, via the notion of an axiological field, may contribute to the study of such structures.
CHAPTER NINE
THE SIXTEEN VALUES REVISITED

1. SITUATIONS, THOUGHTS, AND KNOWLEDGE BEFORE T

1.1. Table One lists the various situations before t which were found to be relevant for the explications offered in Part Two. Each component is preceded by a bracketed letter and a bracketed number. The letters refer to the (approximate) order in which the components appeared in Part Two; the numbers refer to the specific observations which follow the table. I wish to point out that frames which can be related to the first frame studied for each verb (be it a TO- or an ING-construction, and exception made for end and (se) terminer) are not listed in the observations. The reader is referred to the various summarizing statements in Part Two to find out which "related frames" are concerned.

Table One

(a) (2) before t, Z was not happening
(b) (1) before t, there was no Z
(c) (3) before t, there was no Y
(d) (2) before t, Z was happening
(e) (1) before t, there was Z
(f) (3) before t, there was Y
(g) (2) before t, Z was happening all the time
(h) (1) before t, there was Z all the time
(i) (4) before t, there were parts of X
(j) (2) before t, Z was happening for some time
Specific observations

(1) (b) before t, there was no Z
(e) before t, there was Z
(h) before t, there was Z all the time

Component (b) (for stative verbs) expresses non-existence before the reference point. It appears in the explication of the following frames:

\[\begin{align*}
X \text{ began/started to } Z \text{ (etc)} & \quad X \text{ commença/se mit à } Z \text{ (etc)} \\
X \text{ began/started by } Z \text{-ing} & \quad X \text{ commença par } Z \\
& \quad X \text{ finit par } Z \\
& \quad X \text{ finit } Y \text{ (cp. par } Z) 
\end{align*}\]

At first sight, one would not even expect component (b) to appear in the formula of a frame containing a cessation verb. As a matter of fact, however, there is a surprising similarity of meaning between the frames "X started to Z" (top left) and "X finit par Z" (bottom right). They do not share components (a) to (d) in 2.2., which are peculiar to the verb start and express expectation of occurrence or existence after the reference point; but they share all their other components: cp. (a) in this section, (a) in 1.2., and (a) and (b) in 2.1. The two French finir-frames do have a few English counterparts which are phrasal verbs. No formulas were proposed for the latter in Part Two.

Existence before the reference point is expressed by two components, the first one of which logically functions as a positive counterpart to (b). The list of frames for which component (e) is relevant is given below. As both components exclude one another, there can be - and there are - no overlappings between both lists.

\[\begin{align*}
X \text{ continued to } Z \text{ (etc)} & \quad X \text{ continua à } Z \text{ (etc)} 
\end{align*}\]
X ceased to Z (etc)  
X stopped Z-ing (etc)  
X cessa de Z (etc)

It is because *cesser* and *cease* are so different that the frame "X cessa de Z" appears in the list vis-à-vis a *stop*-frame, and not vis-à-vis the corresponding *cease*-frame.

The second of our two components expressing *existence* before the reference point is component (h). It appears in the explication of the following frames:

X kept Z-ing (etc)  
X kept Y Z-ing  
X kept Y so-and-so  
X kept Y from Y'

(h) differs from (a) in that the latter does not preclude interruptions, whereas the former does.

(2)  
(a) before t, Z was not happening  
(d) before t, Z was happening  
(g) before t, Z was happening all the time  
(j) before t, Z was happening for some time

Component (a), similar to (b) but restricted to processes, expresses *non-occurrence* (rather than non-existence) before the reference point. It appears in the explication of the *same* frames, plus the following:

X started (causative)  
X started Y Z-ing  
X continued by Z-ing  
X kept Y from Z-ing  
X kept Y from Y' (bis)

Notice, in the top section of the preceding list, the presence of two causative *start*-frames, and the lack of the corresponding one *begin*-frame. The latter's formula contains component (c) rather than (a), a fact to be explained in terms of the existence, with the verb *start*, of a "start +
unexpressed movement verb"-reading. No such reading exists with the verb begin.

It is equally noteworthy that there is no second (= French) column at all. This is because commencer, se mettre à, and ne cesser de cannot be used causatively - and because there is in French no frame */"X continua par Z".

Component (a) stands to component (b) as component (d) stands to component (e). (d) expresses occurrence before the reference point and is to be found in the explication of the same frames as were given for (e), plus the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>X ceased (elliptical)</th>
<th>X (s’)arrêta de Z (etc)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>X stopped Y (causative 1)</td>
<td>X arrêta Y (causative)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X stopped Y (causative 2)</td>
<td>X n’en finissait pas de Z</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X stopped Y Z-ing</td>
<td>X n’en finissait pas (elliptical)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X ended Y</td>
<td>X en finit (avec Y)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>X termina Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>X termina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>X en termina avec Y</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This time (cp. above), we have causative frames even in our right hand column: I am talking not only about the frame */"X arrêta Y" (which has two counterparts with stop, although it is most closely related to the second one of them), but about the different terminer-frames as well.

A short explanation may be in place for some of the remaining "gaps" in the list. Elliptical cesser follows the main cesser-frame (cp. observation I). */"X stopped Y Z-ing" is a kind of construction unknown to French, and the same is also true, mutatis mutandis, for the three finir-frames, and the last two frames containing the verb terminer.

There are two more components (not just one) which are
relatively closely related to component (d). For one of them, there is a counterpart treated sub (l), in such a way that the following statement may be proposed:

\[
\begin{array}{cccc}
  a & d & g & j \\
  -- & -- & -- & -- \\
  b & e & h & 0
\end{array}
\]

Component (g) appears in the explication of the frames listed for (h), plus the frame "X n'arrête pas de Z". It expresses existence before the reference point, but without interruptions of any kind. Component (j) is relevant for one English and one French verb only, more particularly for the following frames in which these verbs appear:

X finished Z-ing (etc) \hspace{1cm} X finit de Z (etc)

As all the other aspectual verbs, \textit{finish} and \textit{finir} take punctual verbs under certain specified conditions only. Everywhere else, unacceptabilities could be eliminated by means of some other part of a formula (i.e. not a first component). The case of \textit{finish} and \textit{finir} is different: the most elegant way to eliminate the same type of unacceptabilities happens to be by means of a "modified" first component.

(3) \hspace{0.5cm} (c) before t, there was no Y  
     (f) before t, there was Y

Components (c) and (f) logically exclude one another, in exactly the same way as (a) excludes (d), and (b) excludes (e):

\[
\begin{array}{cc}
  c & a & b \\
  -- & -- & -- \\
  f & d & e
\end{array}
\]

Component (c) ("there was no Y") appears in the \textit{causative} frame "X began Y". The causative \textit{start}-frames require
component (a). (f) occurs in non-causative frames only:

\[ \begin{align*}
X & \text{ continued } Y & X & \text{ continua } Y \\
X & \text{ ceased } Y & X & \text{ cessa } Y \\
X & \text{ stopped } Y & X & \text{ arrêta } Y
\end{align*} \]

After the verbs continue, cease, and stop (and their French counterparts), the use of a direct object ("Y") is subject to a number of constraints that do not exist in the case of begin (whose direct object frame is to be assimilated to its main frame "X began to Z"). This is where component (f) ("there was Y") comes into play.

(4) (i) before t, there were parts of X

Component (i), the only one in this section which refers to "parts", appears in the following frames, all of which are absolute:

\[ \begin{align*}
X & \text{ ceased } \\
X & \text{ stopped } \\
X & \text{ finished } & X & \text{ finit}
\end{align*} \]

The two "holes in the pattern" are due to the fact that, unlike the frames listed, "X cessa" and "X s'arrêta" are not confined to boundaries in time. Component (i) expresses the existence of parts before the reference point.

1.2. Table Two lists the various thoughts and pieces of knowledge before t which were found to be relevant for the explications in Part Two. For the meaning of bracketed letters and numbers, cp. section 1.1.

Table Two

(a) (7) one did not know at that time:
Z will happen at t/there will be Z at t
(b) (7) one did not know at that time:  
Z will happen after t
(c) (3) one could think at that time:  
something could happen after now  
after that, Z will not happen anymore/there  
will be no Z anymore
(d) (4) one could think at that time:  
something could happen after now  
after that, there will be no Y anymore
(e) (3) one could think at that time:  
Z will not happen anymore after now
(f) (3) one could think at that time:  
there will be no Z anymore after now
(g) (2) one could think at that time:  
Z will happen after now
(h) (5) before time t, one could think all the time:  
there will be no parts of X anymore after this
(i) (2) one could think at that time:  
more of Z will happen after now
(j) (2) one could think at that time:  
there will be more Z after now
(k) (11) one could not know at that time:  
more of Z will happen after now/there will be  
more Z after now
(l) (4) one could think at that time:  
there will be more Y after now
(m) (4) one could think at that time:  
there will be more parts of X after now
(n) (8) one did not know at that time:  
Z will not happen anymore after t
(o) (8) one did not know at that time:  
there will be no Z anymore after t
(p) (8) one did not know at that time:  
there will be no Y anymore after t
(q) (8) one did not know at that time:  
there will be no parts of X anymore after t
(r) (10) one could know at that time:  
Z cannot happen anymore after t
(s) (10) one could know at that time:  
there can be no parts of X anymore after t
(t) (6) one could not know at that time:  
Z cannot happen anymore after t
(u) (5) one could think at that time:  
there will be no parts of X anymore after now
(v) (9) one did not know at that time:  
Z cannot happen anymore after t

Specific observations

(1) All thoughts and pieces of knowledge before t (except one; cp. below) have to do with the speaker’s expectations or
with the unexpectedness of the situation at $t$. More clearly than in Part Two, we will be able to distinguish between two kinds of expectations (viz. expectation 1 and expectation 2), and between two kinds of unexpectedness (viz. unexpectedness 1 and unexpectedness 2). Observations (2), (3), (4), and (5) deal with expectation 1 ("one could think"). Observation (6) is about unexpectedness 1 ("one could not know"). Observations (7), (8), and (9) bear on unexpectedness 2 ("one did not know"), and observation (10), finally, on expectation 2 ("one could know"). From the sheer number of observations devoted to each kind of thought or knowledge, the reader will infer that expectation 1 and unexpectedness 2 are the most prototypical forms of expectation and unexpectedness, respectively.

(2)  (g) (i) (j) one could think at that time:
    (g) Z will happen after now
    (i) more of Z will happen after now
    (j) there will be more Z after now

The first component of cluster (g) is a quite simple one: it expresses the speaker’s expectation regarding the future occurrence of a process which does not yet occur before $t$. (g) is related to various components in 2.2., although it is not identical to any of them. Most importantly, reference is made to different points in time ("before t" in the case of (g), "at t" in the case of the components in 2.2.). Cluster (g) appears in the explication of the two following frames:

X kept Y from Z-ing
X kept Y from Y' (bis)

Slightly more complex than the previous one (say (g)1) are components (i), which expresses the speaker’s expectation of
a continuing occurrence ("Z will happen" vs "more of Z will happen"), and (j), which expresses the speaker's expectation of a continuing existence ("there will be more Z"). (j) appears in the explication of the main cease-frame "X ceased to Z" - and is relevant for those cease-frames whose explication is identical. (i), on the other hand, appears in the explication of the same, plus the following frames:

\[
\begin{align*}
X & \text{ ceased (elliptical)} \\
X & \text{ ended } Y
\end{align*}
\]

Together with components (k) and (l) in 2.2., components (i) and (j) express a change of expectation. It is not surprising, then, that they occur in several of the formulas devised for the verb cease (but not in any formula devised for the French verb cesser). Furthermore, component (i) is instrumental insofar as the distinction in meaning between the frames "X ended Y" and "X termina Y" is concerned. Cp. component (v) and observation (9).

\begin{align*}
(3) \quad & (c) \quad (e) \quad (f) \text{ one could think at that time:} \\
& (c) \text{ something could happen after now} \\
& \quad \text{after that, Z will not happen anymore/there} \\
& \quad \text{will be no Z anymore} \\
& (e) \quad \text{Z will not happen anymore after now} \\
& (f) \quad \text{there will be no Z anymore after now}
\end{align*}

Components (e) and (f) are the negative counterparts of components (i) and (j) (on the latter, cp. observation 2). It is perfectly possible to state that

\[
\begin{align*}
& e \quad f \\
& i \quad j
\end{align*}
\]

Whereas (i) expresses the expectation of a continuing occurrence, (e) expresses the expectation of a non-occurrence after an occurrence. Similarly, (j) expresses the
expectation of a continuing existence, and (f) the expectation of a non-existence after an existence. It is important to note that (e) and (f) occur more frequently than (i) and (j). (f), for instance, is part of the explication of the following frames:

X kept Z-ing (etc)    X ne cessa de Z
X kept Y Z-ing
X kept Y so-and-so
X kept Y from Y'

X stopped Z-ing (etc)    X cessa de Z (etc)

Component (e), on the other hand, is part of the explication of the same, plus the following frames:

X n'arrêta pas de Z
X n'en finissait pas de Z
X n'en finissait pas (elliptical)
X en finit (avec Y)
X en termina avec Y

A comparison of the distribution of components (e) and (f) shows that, in English, they often occur in the explications of the continuation verb keep, and twice in an explication proposed for the verb stop. The case of French is quite different: (f) occurs in the only explication proposed for ne cesser de, and in two explications proposed for cesser. Component (e) is part of the value of all four the French cessation verbs studied in this dissertation, and is especially important for the value of the verb finir.

Related, in a sense, to (e) and (f) is cluster (c), which refers to someone's expectation of a possible non-occurrence after an occurrence ("something could happen, and after that, etc"). Cluster (c) is relevant for the following frames:
X continued to Z (etc)  X continua à Z (etc)

With the verbs begin, start, commencer and se mettre à, the constant possibility of a change is expressed in our formulas at t ("one could not know at that time: ...”). That same possibility is, in the case of continue and continuer, expressed with reference to an earlier point in time.

(4)  (d) (l) (m) one could think at that time:
(d) something could happen after now
after that, there will be no Y anymore
(l) there will be more Y after now
(m) there will be more parts of X after now

Cluster (d) immediately calls to mind cluster (c) (on which see observation 3). Reference is not to Z, but to Y, and not to a non-occurrence, but to a non-existence. Cluster (d) therefore naturally complements the previous one, although the latter occurs more often. It is restricted to the most prototypical direct object frames that can be found with our continuation verbs, i.e.

X continued Y  X continua Y

Unlike (d), (l) refers to the speaker’s expectation of a continuing existence of Y (rather than a possible non-existence). Component (l) appears in the explication of just one frame, viz. "X ceased Y". It expresses the first part of the component which, for the sake of simplicity, we call change of expectation. The second part is expressed by means of component (m) in 2.2. Cp. also observation (2).

From component (l), we may now move on to component (m), which refers to "more parts of X" rather than to "more Y". Component (m) also occurs in no more than one explication, again of a cease-frame. As it talks about "parts", it is not
surprising that the frame referred to is the absolute cease-construction "X ceased". (m) has the same kind of function as (l): here, however, the "second part" is expressed by means of component (n) in 2.2.

(5) (h) before time t, one could think all the time:
    (u) one could think at that time:
    (h) there will be no parts of X anymore
    (u) after (h) this
    (u) now

Component (h) is related to component (m) (cp. observation 4), of which it is, by and large, a negative counterpart ("no parts of X anymore"). (h) appears in the explication of a frame for which there is no English equivalent, viz. "X se continua". The reflexive pronoun se is related to so-called se-moyen, and the frame as a whole to a frame "Y continua X". Notice that (m) has "after now" whereas (h) has "after this". The difference is due to the fact that, although (h) refers to boundaries in time, it is less bound to time than (m).

Most other components which are part of the formula for the frame "X se continua" can be found in section 3.

If we take from (h) the part "no parts of X anymore", and from (m) the part "after now", we obtain as a result the essence of the first component of cluster (u) - the last one in our set of components expressing expectation in its first (most prototypical) version. This time, the verb involved is neither continue/continuer nor cease: cluster (u) (as a whole) appears in the explication of just one finir-frame, viz. "X n'en finissait pas" (absolute). It helps express that a certain expectation valid before $t$ will be proven false.

(6) (t) (u) one could not know at that time:
(t) I cannot happen anymore after t
(u) there can be no parts of X anymore after t

Until now we have confined our attention to components expressing "expectation 1". The second component of cluster (u) is one of the few components expressing unexpectedness in its less prototypical form (i.e. "unexpectedness 1", or "one could not know"). (u)2, as we could call it (cp. observation 2), expresses that the non-existence of parts of X after t is unexpected; it is best considered together with component (t), as both complement one another. Where cluster (u) occurs was mentioned above (observation 5); component (t), not surprisingly, occurs in the explication of two other finir-frames, viz.

X n'en finissait pas de Z
X n'en finissait pas
(elliptical)

Component (t) does not talk about the non-existence of parts of X, but about the non-occurrence of a process Z.

(7) (a) (b) (g) one did not know at that time:
   (a) Z will happen at t/there will be Z at t
   (b) Z will happen after t
   (g) Z will not happen at t

The first part of cluster (g) was given consideration in observation (2). Its second part is the first (though not in the order of appearance in Table Two) of a set of components which express unexpectedness in its most prototypical way, i.e. "unexpectedness 2", or "one did not know" (vs "one could not know"). Notice that, for the first time in this list of observations, we are dealing with a component which talks about a non-occurrence at t: in all cases considered up to now, and also in the case of observations (8) to (10), reference is made to (non-)occurrence or (non-)existence

403
after \( \tau \), or after now. Component (g)2 is relevant for the two following frames (cp. observation 2):

\[
\begin{align*}
X & \text{ kept } Y \text{ from } Z\text{-ing} \\
X & \text{ kept } Y \text{ from } Y' \text{ (bis)}
\end{align*}
\]

The second part of cluster (g) is a negative counterpart to the first part of cluster (a): instead of \( Z \) not happening at \( \tau \), we have \( Z \) happening at \( \tau \). Stated otherwise, and more explicitly, the future occurrence of a process is described as being unexpected. Cluster (a) appears in the explication of the following frames:

\[
\begin{align*}
X & \text{ started } Z \text{ (etc)} \\
X & \text{ started by } Z\text{-ing} \\
X & \text{ kept } Y Z\text{-ing} \\
X & \text{ kept } Y \text{ so-and-so} \\
X & \text{ kept } Y \text{ from } Y' \\
X & \text{ finit par } Z \\
X & \text{ finit } Y \text{ (cp. par } Z) \\
\end{align*}
\]

The preceding list reveals that cluster (a) is relevant for a majority of start-frames, for a few causative keep-frames, and for the typically French finir par-construction as well. The "gaps" in the list are easy to explain: none of the French commencement and continuation verbs studied in Part Two contain an unexpectedness-component, and for the English counterparts of the finir par-frame no formulas were devised.

Clusters (a) and (g) are the only ones referring to something happening or existing at \( \tau \). If we change the at of the first part of cluster (a) into after, we obtain component (b). The latter is relevant for two frames only:

\[
\begin{align*}
X & \text{ started } Y \text{ (causative)} \\
X & \text{ started } Y Z\text{-ing}
\end{align*}
\]
Why is it that causative keep and causative start do need different unexpectedness-components? The answer is that, in the case of start, Z does not happen at t; before t, it can only be presumed that Z will happen after the point at which the cause is or becomes operational. Cluster (a) is therefore impossible with causative uses of start. If it does occur with causative uses of keep, it is because Z is, in that particular case, a continuing process or state.

\[(8) \quad (n) (o) (p) (q) \text{ one did not know at that time:} \]
\[(n) Z \text{ will not happen anymore after t} \]
\[(o) \text{ there will be no Z anymore after t} \]
\[(p) \text{ there will be no Y anymore after t} \]
\[(q) \text{ there will be no parts of X anymore after t} \]

Components (n), (o), (p) and (q) express the unexpectedness which is part of the value of the verbs stop, cesser and (s')arrêter. Component (o), for stative expressions, is relevant for the following frames:

\[X \text{ stopped Z-ing (etc)} \quad X \text{ cessa de Z (etc)}\]

Component (n), for processes, appears in the explication of the same, plus the following:

\[X \text{ stopped Y (causative 1)} \]
\[X \text{ stopped Y (causative 2)} \]
\[X \text{ stopped Y Z-ing} \]
\[X (s')arrêta de Z (etc) \]
\[X \text{ arrêta Y (causative)} \]

The preceding lists clearly show, once again, that (s')arrêter can only be used for processes, and not for states. Cesser and stop have no such restriction as far as their use is concerned.

Component (p) appears in the explication of three non-causative direct object frames:

\[X \text{ stopped Y} \quad X \text{ cessa/arrêta Y} \]

405
Component (q) is relevant for one frame only, viz. "X stopped" (absolute). The equivalent French frames with cesser and arrêter do not necessarily involve boundaries in time: their components are to be found in section 4.

(9) (v) one did not know at that time:
  Z cannot happen anymore after t

Between components (v) and (n) (cp. observation 8), there is a close resemblance: "Z cannot happen" versus "Z will not happen". (v) is relevant for the following frames:

\[
\begin{align*}
X & \text{ termina } Y \\
X & \text{ termina} \\
X & \text{ en termina avec } Y
\end{align*}
\]

The English frame which corresponds more or less to the first one of the frames listed (the others have no English counterpart) is "X ended Y". It does not appear here, for there is an important difference. The role of component (v) is assumed, in the case of the end-frame just referred to, by component (i) (cp. observation 2).

(10) (r) (s) one could know at that time:
  (r) Z cannot happen anymore after t
  (s) there can be no parts of X anymore after t

Three components remain to be considered, two of which are instances of "expectation 2" ("one could know"). The latter only appears in explications referring to a natural endpoint (viz., finish and finir). The "expectation" that, after the reference point, there can be no occurrence of a process, or no parts of something anymore is not just a simple thought that could cross the speaker’s mind before t: it is a piece of knowledge. Component (r) appears in the explication of the following frames:

406
X finished Z-ing (etc)  X finit de Z (etc)  X en finit (avec Y)

There are more French frames involving the verb finir than English frames involving the verb finish. The preceding list illustrates this fact one more time.

Component (s), while complementing (r), is relevant for no more than two frames, both absolute:

X finished  X finit

From the obvious necessity in which we are to distinguish two variants of expectation, we may now understand why it is just as compelling that we distinguish two variants of unexpectedness : (u)Z is a negation of (s), and (t) a negation of (r).

(11)  (k) one could not know at that time:
more of Z will happen after now/there will be more Z after now

We are left with cluster (k) which, despite its outlook, does not express unexpectedness. Considered in itself, it could do so; but we have to take the rest of the formula into account. In conjunction with components (i) and (j), it merely expresses the constant possibility of a change. and has therefore a function similar to the one of clusters (c) and (d) (cp. observations 3 and 4).

2. SITUATIONS, THOUGHTS, AND KNOWLEDGE AT T

2.1. Table Three lists the various situations at T which were found to be relevant for the explications offered in
Part Two. For the meaning of bracketed letters and numbers, cp. section 1.1.

Table Three

(a) (1) at t, Z was happening  
(b) (1) at t, there was Z  
(c) (2) at t, before all other things, Z was happening/there was Z  
(d) (3) at t, X did something  
(e) (4) because of that, at t, Z was happening  
(f) (2) at t, after other things, Z was happening  
(g) (5) at t, there was Y  
(h) (4) because of that, at t, there was Z  
(i) (4) because of that, at t, Z was not happening  
(j) (5) at t, there was a part of X  
(k) (6) at t, something happened not because X wanted it

Specific observations

(i) (a) at t, Z was happening  
(b) at t, there was Z

Component (b) (for stative verbs) expresses existence at the reference point. It is related to component (e) in 1.1. (which expresses existence before the reference point). (b) is part of the explication of the following frames:

X began//started to Z (etc)    X commença à Z (etc)
X continued to Z (etc)         X continua à Z (etc)
X kept Z-ing (etc)             X ne cessa de Z
                                X finit par Z
                                X finit Y (cp. par Z)

The preceding list shows how frequently component (b) occurs - and how important it is. (a) is even more frequent, and hence more important. It is part of the explication of the same frames, plus the following:

X se mit à Z  
X se mit à Y
X n'arrêta pas de Z
X finit de Z (etc)
List number two includes *se mettre à*, *ne pas arrêter*, *finish* and *finir*. It was observed in different chapters of Part Two that there is, for each one of these, an incompatibility (or at least a quasi-incompatibility) with stative expressions. Component (a), as a matter of fact, expresses *occurrence* rather than existence, always at the reference point; it corresponds to component (d) in 1.1. (occurrence before the reference point).

(2)  (c) at t, before all other things, Z was happening/
     . there was Z
     (f) at t, after other things, Z was happening

Cluster (c) is relevant for the following frames:

X began/started by Z-ing     X commença par Z

Component (f), on the other hand, appears in the explication of just one frame, viz. "X continued by Z-ing". The latter has no French counterpart. It is to be remembered that t, with by-frames, is the point at which several processes and/or states occur and/or exist, not just one.

(3)  (d) at t, X did something

Component (d) refers to an action undertaken by the subject X. It is part of the explication of the following frames:

X began Y (causative)
X started Y (causative)
X started Y Z-ing

X kept Y Z-ing
X kept Y so-and-so
X kept Y from Y'
X kept Y from Z-ing
X kept Y from Y' (bis)
X stopped Y (causative 1)
X stopped Y (causative 2)
X stopped Y Z-ing
X ended Y
X arrêta Y (causative)
X termina Y
X termina
X en termina avec Y

Not surprisingly, all the frames in the preceding list are causative. Component (d) is the prototypical component marking causation. Here again, we have some obvious "holes in the pattern", to be explained in terms of the non-existence of causative frames for French commencement and continuation verbs.

(4) (e) because of that, at t, Z was happening
(h) because of that, at t, there was Z
(i) because of that, at t, Z was not happening

Components (e) and (h) express one possible result of the causation marked by component (d) (cp. observation 7 in 1.2.); they do not appear in any of the formulas proposed for begin, continue, and the cessation verbs. Begin and continue cannot be causative, and with the cessation verbs which do have causative frames, there is certainly no component expressing occurrence of a process or existence of a state at reference point t. Component (e) (for processes) appears in the explication of each one of the following frames; component (h) (for stative expressions) is part of the explication of the two last keep-frames only.

X started Y Z-ing
X kept Y Z-ing
X kept Y so-and-so
X kept Y from Y'

The following general statement holds true:
Closely related to (e) is component (i), which is a negation of the former. As was to be expected, (i) appears in the explication of two keep-frames which are negative counterparts to the frames which contain component (e) in their explication, viz.:

X kept Y from Z-ing
X kept Y from Y' (bis)

(5)  (g) at t, there was Y
     (j) at t, there was a part of X

Just as (a) and (b), components (g) and (j) have a pendant in 1.1. (cp. components (f) and (i), respectively). They also naturally complement components (a) and (b) discussed here, in observation (1). (g) appears in the explication of two direct object frames which are non-causative:

X continued Y
X continua Y

Component (j) is relevant for the verbs *finish* and *finir*, more particularly for the following absolute frames:

X finished
X finit
X n'en finissait pas

(6)  (k) at t, something happened
     not because X wanted it

Cluster (k) is instrumental in establishing the difference in meaning between "X s'arrêta de Z" (etc) and "X arrêta de Z". For the latter, which does not have a reflexive pronoun, we need component (s) in 2.2.

2.2. Table Four lists the various *thoughts* and pieces of
knowledge at t which were found to be relevant for the explications offered in Part Two. For the meaning of bracketed letters and numbers, cp. section 1.1.

Table Four

| (a) | (1) one could think at that time: |
|     | more of Z will happen after now |
| (b) | (1) one could think at that time: |
|     | there will be more Z after now |
| (c) | (3) one could not know at that time: |
|     | more of Z will happen after now |
| (d) | (3) one could not know at that time: |
|     | there will be more Z after now |
| (e) | (1) one could think at that time: |
|     | something else will happen/there will be something else at t, after now |
|     | (3) one could not know at that time: |
|     | something else will happen/there will be something else at t, after now |
| (f) | (2) one could think at that time: |
|     | because of that, there will be Y after now |
| (g) | (2) one could think at that time: |
|     | because of that, Z will happen after now |
| (h) | (8) (one could think of the other things as of something X wants to say) |
| (i) | (2) one could think at that time: |
|     | there will be more Y after now |
| (j) | (2) one could think at that time: |
|     | there will be more parts of X after this |
| (k) | (6) one could know at that time: |
|     | Z will not happen anymore after now |
| (l) | (6) one could know at that time: |
|     | there will be no Z anymore after now |
| (m) | (6) one could know at that time: |
|     | there will be no Y anymore after now |
| (n) | (6) one could know at that time: |
|     | there will be no parts of X anymore after now |
| (o) | (7) one could know at that time: |
|     | because of that, Z will not happen anymore after now |
| (p) | (5) one could know at that time: |
|     | Z cannot happen anymore after now |
| (q) | (5) one could know at that time: |
|     | there can be no parts of X anymore after now |
| (r) | (7) one could know at that time: |
|     | because of that, Z cannot happen anymore after now |
| (s) | (8) at t, I wanted this: |
|     | Z will not happen anymore after now |
| (t) | (4) one could not know at that time: |
|     | Z cannot happen anymore after now |
| (u) | (4) one could not know at that time: |
|     | there can be no parts of X anymore after now |
Specific observations

(1) (a) (b) (e) one could think at that time:
   (a) more of Z will happen after now
   (b) there will be more Z after now
   (e) something else will happen/there will be
       something else at t, after now

Components (a) and (b) express the speaker’s intuition at
reference point t that a process or state will still occur or
exist after that point. Component (b) (for stative
expressions) appears in the explication of the following
frames:

X began/started to Z (etc)  X commença à Z (etc)
X continued to Z (etc)      X continua à Z (etc)

Component (a) is relevant for the same frames, plus the
following:

X set mit à Z
X se mit à Y
X started (causative)
X continued by Z-ing

For obvious reasons, (a) and (b) do not occur in the
various formulas proposed for our cessation verbs. They do
not even occur in the various keep-formulas or in the formula
for the frame "X ne cessa de Z". The reader will remember
that, when using either keep or ne cesser de, the speaker has
no intuitions as to what will be the case after the reference
point. (a) and (b) correspond to (i) and (j) in 1.2.,
respectively.

Related to (a) and (b) is the first component of cluster
(e). The cluster itself appears in the following frames:

X began/started by Z      X commença par Z
Cp., for comments, component (c) in 2.1. (observation 2).

(2) \[(f) (g) (i) (j)\] one could think at that time:
(f) because of that, there will be Y after now
(g) because of that, Z will happen after now
(i) there will be more Y after now
(j) there will be more parts of X after this

Components (f) and (g) express the intuition by the speaker that, because of something happening at \(t\) ("X did something"), a process or state will occur or exist after that point \(t\). Component (f) appears in the first one of the following frames; component (g), in the second one. Needless to say, both frames are *causative*.

\[
\begin{align*}
X & \text{ began } Y \\
X & \text{ started } Y \\
\end{align*}
\]

On the other hand, if we take away the causal relationship ("because of that"), and we add the primitive "more", component (f) becomes identical to component (i). The latter expresses the idea that Y is presumed to exist even after \(t\), and appears in the following frames:

\[
\begin{align*}
X & \text{ continued } Y \\
X & \text{ continua } Y \\
\end{align*}
\]

Component (i) is related to component (j), which is part of the explication provided for the frame "X se continua". For further comments on the latter, cp. observation (5) in 1.2. Both (i) and (j) naturally complement (a) and (b), and they have a counterpart in 1.2. (viz., components (l) and (m)).

(3) \[(c) (d) (e)\] one could not know at that time:
(c) more of Z will happen after now
(d) there will be more Z after now
(e) something else will happen/there will be something else at \(t\), after now

Components (c) and (d), acting as counterparts to cluster
(k) in 1.2., express the constant possibility of a change. The present version of that particular possibility appears in the first place with commencement verbs. (d) (for stative expressions) is relevant for the following frames:

\[
\begin{align*}
X \text{ began/started to } Z \text{ (etc)} & \quad X \text{ commença à } Z \text{ (etc)} \\
\end{align*}
\]

Component (c) appears in the explication of the same, plus the following:

\[
\begin{align*}
X \text{ se mit à } Z \\
X \text{ se mit à } Y \\
\end{align*}
\]

X continued by Z-ing

Related to (c) and (d) is the second part of cluster (e). It also expresses the same constant possibility of a change. The following statement holds true:

\[
\begin{align*}
\begin{array}{llll}
a & b & e_1 \\
\cdot & \cdot & \cdot & \cdot \\
c & d & e_2 \\
\end{array}
\end{align*}
\]

(4) (t) (u) one could not know at that time:

(t) Z cannot happen anymore after now

(u) there can be no parts of X anymore after now

Although introduced — just like (c), (d), and (e)2 — by "one could not know", components (t) and (u) do not refer to the constant possibility of a change; they express unexpectedness, and are to be related to components (t) and (u)2 in 1.2. They have the same distributional pattern.

(5) (p) (q) one could know at that time:

(p) Z cannot happen anymore after now

(q) there can be no parts of X anymore after now

Components (p) and (q) express the speaker's expectation that a natural endpoint is about to be reached. Component (p) appears in the explication of the following frames:
X finished Z-ing (etc)  
X finit de Z (etc)  
X en finit (avec Y)

For comments, cp. component (r) in 1.2. (observation 10).
Component (q), on the other hand, a complement to the previous one, is relevant for two absolute frames:

X finished  
X finit

The following statement can be made:

\[
p \sim q  
\sim t \sim u
\]

More explicitly, components (t) and (u) are negative counterparts to components (p) and (q). The latter correspond to components (r) and (s) in 1.2., respectively.

(6)  
(k) (l) (m) (n) one could know at that time:  
(k) Z will not happen anymore after now  
(l) there will be no Z anymore after now  
(m) there will be no Y anymore after now  
(n) there will be no parts of X anymore after now

Where there is no natural endpoint, the speaker can still expect that a situation (process, state) is about to change (i.e. neither to occur nor to exist anymore). This expectation is contained in components (k), (l), (m), (n).

Component (l) (for stative expressions) appears in the explication of the following frames:

X ceased to Z (etc)  
X stopped Z-ing (etc)  
X cessa de Z (etc)

_Cesser_ is placed vis-à-vis _stop_ for reasons outlined above (cp. component (e) in 1.1., i.e. observation 1).

Component (k) (for processes) is relevant for the same, plus one other frame: "X ceased" (elliptical). Component
(m) is clearly related to component (l). It has a similar
distributional pattern:

\[ X \text{ ceased } Y \]
\[ X \text{ stopped } Y \]
\[ X \text{ cessa/arrêta } Y \]

Component (n), finally, is relevant for the following
frames:

\[ X \text{ ceased (absolute)} \]
\[ X \text{ stopped (absolute)} \]

The equivalent French frames, it must be repeated, do not
necessarily involve boundaries in time; the components which
are part of their explication are given in section 4.

In order to conclude this observation, it may be good to
draw attention on the following analogies:

\[
\begin{array}{cccc}
a & b & i & j \\
- & - & - & - \\
k & l & m & n \\
c & d \\
- & - \\
k & l \\
\end{array}
\]

(7) (o) (r) one could know at that time:

- (o) because of that, \( Z \) will not happen anymore
  after now
- (r) because of that, \( Z \) cannot happen anymore
  after now

Components (o) and (r) are related to the ones discussed in
observation (6), except for the fact that there is an
additional relationship from cause to effect. Component (o)
appears in the explication of the following frames:

\[ X \text{ stopped } Y \text{ (causative 1)} \]
\[ X \text{ stopped } Y \text{ (causative 2)} \]
\[ X \text{ arrêta } Y \text{ (causative)} \]
\[ X \text{ stopped } Y \text{ } Z \text{-ing} \]

It is noteworthy that component (o) is part of the
explication which goes with two very prototypical frames such as "X arrêta de Z" and "X s'arrêta de Z". This, of course, has to do with the very specific value of the French verb arrêter. Component (r), on the other hand, is relevant for the explications of:

X ended Y
X termina Y
X termina
X en termina avec Y

I have one last general statement to make, at least in this section:

\[
\begin{array}{cccccc}
\text{k} & \text{l} & \text{m} & \text{n} & \text{o} \\
\hline
\text{p} & \emptyset & \emptyset & \text{q} & \text{r}
\end{array}
\]

(8) (h) (one could think of the other things as of something X wants to say)
(s) at t, I wanted this:
I will not happen anymore after now

Very different from anything considered so far, and therefore left until the end, are components (h) and (s). The former one is placed between brackets. Below, we will meet one more such component (viz., component (e) in section 3.), to which I refer the reader for further comments. Both components - (h) and (e) - appear in the same formula, viz. the one for the exclusively English frame "X continued by Z-ing".

Component (s), the last one to be mentioned in the present set of observations, appears in the explication of two frames only:

X arrêta de Z
X arrêta (elliptical)

For comments, cp. cluster (k) in 2.1. (observation 6).
3. A-TEMPORAL THOUGHTS AND WILLS (ETC)

A-temporal thoughts and wills (etc) are those which are valid before and at \( t \), and which can be presumed valid after \( t \) as well. All the components in Table Five express a-temporal thoughts and wills (etc), and appear in the formulas devised throughout Part Two. For the meaning of bracketed letters and numbers, cp. section 1.1. The components are not repeated in the observations, for the order in which they are treated is identical to the order in which they appear in the table itself.

Table Five

(a) (1) one can think of \( Y \) as of something that one is Z-ing
(b) (2) one can think of \( Z \) as of something that \( Y \) does
(c) (3) when \( X \) is Z-ing, \( X \) is doing something because of that, one can think of \( Z \) as of something that \( X \) does
(d) (3) I want this :
you feel something because of that
(e) (4) (when \( X \) is Z-ing, one could think this :
\( X \) wants to say something)
(f) (5) I know this :
you know more about \( Y \) than what I say now
(g) (6) one can think of \( Y \) as of something that has parts
one can think of those parts as being one after the other
(h) (7) one can think of \( Z \) as of something that \( Y \) is
(i) (8) one can think of \( Z \) as of something that \( Y \) wants to do
(j) (9) one can think of \( X \) as of something that one is Z-ing
one can think of \( X \) as of something that has parts
I am thinking of one part of \( X \)
I am thinking of that part as of something that \( Y \) is Z-ing
there are parts before that part
(k) (10) I am saying this to everybody
(l) (11) one can think of a part of \( Y \) as of \( Y \)
(m) (12) one can think of \( X \) as of something that \( Z \)
(n) (13) one can think of \( X \) as of something that has parts
one can think of those parts as being one after the other
Specific observations

(1) Component (a) is used in explications devised for frames which contain no explicit reference to a second verb Z. The following frames are involved:

- X started Y (causative)
- X stopped Y (causative 1)
- X ended Y

X se mit à Y
X en finit (avec Y)
X termina Y
X termina
X en termina avec Y

The function of component (a) is to introduce a second verb, and to define Y as its (mostly direct) object. Notice that this first a-temporal component occurs predominantly with causative frames.

(2) Where component (b) is used, Z may or may not be explicitly present in the introductory line - it is present more often than not. (b) appears in the explication of the following frames:

- X started Y Z-ing
- X kept Y Z-ing
- X stopped Y (causative 2)
- X stopped Y Z-ing

X arrêta Y (causative)

Y is now defined as the subject of Z, and no longer as its object. All the frames in the preceding list are causative.

(3) Component (c) is a more complex variant of do-component (b). Component (d), on the other hand, expresses personal involvement or subjectivity. Both are peculiar to the verb se mettre à; (c), however, appears in the first frame listed only.
(4) Component (e), placed between brackets, appears for some speakers at least (hence the brackets) in the explication of the continu_by-frame "X continued by Y-ing". It shares with component (d) its reference to what a particular person (either the speaker, or the subject) wants. A reminder: the explication of which component (e) is part belongs with a frame which has no equivalent in French.

(5) Component (f) appears in the explication of the following frames:

- X continued Y
- X ceased Y
- X continua Y
- X cessa Y

The four frames listed are closely related: all of them are direct object frames, and none is causative. Component (f) limits the set of possible direct objects to those of which the addressee knows more. In other words, Y must not include any "new information" - it must be thematic, not rhematic.

(6) Component (g) is relevant for the following frames:

- X continued Y
- X ceased Y
- X stopped Y
- X ended Y
- X continua Y
- X cessa Y
- X arrêta Y
- X en finit (avec Y)
- X termina Y
- X termina
- X en termina avec Y

Clearly, where component (f) appears, it is always followed by component (g). However, the latter does not necessarily
follow the former, as is shown by the size of the lists containing each one of them. Component (g) also restricts the set of possible referents for Y: Y must have parts that one could imagine as being consecutive in time.

(7) Component (h) appears in the explication of two frames only:

\[
\begin{align*}
X & \text{ kept } Y \text{ so-and-so} \\
X & \text{ kept } Y \text{ from } Y'
\end{align*}
\]

It complements component (b). \textit{I} is now an attribute of \(Y\), which in itself acts as a subject.

(8) Component (i) appears also in two explications only, viz. the ones corresponding to the frames

\[
\begin{align*}
X & \text{ kept } Y \text{ from } Z\text{-ing} \\
X & \text{ kept } Y \text{ from } Y' \text{ (bis)}
\end{align*}
\]

As noticed in Part Two, Chapter Five, there are two frames "X kept Y from Y'": the formula which applies changes in function of the verb which is to be supplied. Components (h) and (i) belong to different formulas.

(9) Cluster (j) appears in the frame "X se continua" (where the reflexive pronoun is related to se-moyen). It consists of five components four of which have counterparts in this section or elsewhere:

- for component 1, cp. component (a) (observation 1)
- for component 2, cp. the first part of components (g) and (m) (observations (6) and (13))
- for component 3, cp. component (b) in section 4
- for component 5, cp. component (e) in section 4

(10) Component (k) is peculiar to the explication which belongs with the frame "X ne cessa de Z". It is through this
component that this frame differs from the English frame "X kept Z-ing".

(11) Component (1) formulates a restriction on the direct object which follows the verbs cease and cesser in

\[ X \text{ ceased } Y \quad \text{and} \quad X \text{ cessa } Y \]

To be allowable, \( Y \) must consist of parts each of which can be treated as instances of \( Y \).

(12) Component (m) formulates a restriction on the subject \( X \) of the elliptical frame "X ceased".

(13) Cluster (m) appears in the explication of the following frames (all of which are absolute):

\[ X \text{ ceased} \quad X \text{ stopped} \quad X \text{ finished} \quad X \text{ finit} \quad X \text{ n'en finissait pas} \]

As before, the "holes in the pattern" are easy to explain. There is, on one hand, no English equivalent to an en finir-construction, while, on the other hand, cesser and \( s'arrêter \) have absolute frames which do not necessarily presuppose boundaries in time.

4. THOUGHTS AND KNOWLEDGE IN THE CASE OF FRAMES WHERE NO REFERENCE TO TIME IS NECESSARILY IMPLIED

In this last section are considered those components which appear in formulas that have no reference to time in their introductory line. The relevant components are given below.
For the meaning of bracketed letters and numbers, cp. section 1.1.

Table Six

(a) (1) one can think of X as of something that has parts
    one can think of those parts as being one after the other
(b) (1) I am thinking of one part of X
(c) (3) there are no parts before that part
(d) (4) before time t, one did not know:
    there will be a part of X after this
    at time t, one could think:
    there will be parts of X after this
(e) (3) there are parts before that part
(f) (4) before time t, one could think all the time:
    there will be no parts of X anymore after this
    at time t, one could think:
    there will be more parts of X after this
(g) (2) one can think of X as of something that has two parts
    I am thinking of the two parts of X
(h) (5) before time t, one did not know:
    there will be no parts of X anymore after this
(i) (5) at time t, one could know:
    there can be no parts of X anymore after this
(j) (5) at time t, one could know:
    there will be no parts of X anymore after this

Specific observations

(1) (a) one can think of X as of something that has parts
    one can think of those parts as being one after the other
(b) I am thinking of one part of X

Cluster (a) (which coincides with cluster (m) in section 3) is relevant for all of the following; component (b) (cp. the third component of cluster (j) in section 3), for the same—except the one marked with an asterisk.

\[
\begin{align*}
X & \text{ commença } Y (= Y \text{ commença par } X) \\
X & \text{ began/started } Y \text{ (absolute)} \\
X & \text{ continued (absolute)} \\
X & \text{ commença (absolute)} \\
X & \text{ commença (absolute)} \\
X & \text{ continuó (absolute)} \\
X & \text{ se continuó (absolute)} \\
X & \text{ cessa (absolute)} \\
X & \text{ s'arrêta (absolute)} \\
\end{align*}
\]
X ended (absolute)  X se termina

The explication which belongs with the frame "X se continuait" requires cluster (g) rather than component (b). Cease and stop are not to be found in the preceding list: their absolute frames, as observed earlier, are confined to boundaries in time. This is not the case for the French verbs cesser and s'arrêter - which therefore do have their place in the list.

(2) (g) one can think of X as of something that has two parts
I am thinking of the two parts of X

Cluster (g) appears in the frame "X se continuait" only. "X se continuait", which does not refer to boundaries in time, is not to be confused with "X se continua". Se, this time, is not related to se-moyen, and the frame in itself is not related to a frame "Y continua X".

(3) (c) there are no parts before that part
(e) there are parts before that part

Component (c) is part of the explication of the following frames:

X commença Y (= Y commença par X)
X began/started (absolute)  X commença (absolute)

There is no need, I believe, to state explicitly why component (c) does not appear in the formulas proposed for continuation and cessation verbs. For the latter, we need component (e) - i.e. its positive counterpart (cp. the fifth component of cluster (j) in section 3). (e) is relevant for the following frames:

X continued (absolute)  X continua (absolute)
X cessa (absolute)  
X s'arrêta 
X se termina

For the "holes in the pattern", cp. my comments in (1).

(4)  (d) before time t, one did not know:
there will be a part of X after this
at time t, one could think:
there will be parts of X after this
(f) before time t, one could think all the time:
there will be no parts of X anymore after this
at time t, one could think:
there will be more parts of X after this

Cluster (d) appears in only one frame, viz. the absolute frame "X started". Part of cluster (d) talks about unexpectedness and the entire cluster about "parts after this". That explains why only one frame is to be mentioned here. Cluster (f), which is quite similar, occurs in two explications:

X continued (absolute)  
X continua (absolute)

The first part of (f) is identical to component (h) in 1.2.; its second part is identical to component (j) in 2.2. For further comments, the reader is referred to these two sections.

(5)  (h) before time t, one did not know:
there will be no parts of X anymore after this
(i) at time t, one could know:
there can be no parts of X anymore after this
(j) at time t, one could know:
there will be no parts of X anymore after this

Component (i) is part of the explication of two absolute frames:

X ended  
X se termina
Component (j), which is hardly different (will vs can after the dots) is characteristic for the French verbs cesser and s’arrêter:

\[
\begin{align*}
X \text{ cessa (absolute)} \\
X \text{ s’arrêta (absolute)}
\end{align*}
\]

Component (h) has the distribution of components (i) and (j) taken together. Their main difference is that (h) refers to a point in time anterior to the reference point \( t \), whereas (i) and (j) refer to \( t \) itself.

5. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

At the end of our introduction to Part Two, we stated that French and English, with respect to aspektual verbs, display a number of interesting differences (cp. p.45). If we were to put labels on each one of them, we could say that English is the language of unexpectedness, causality, and phrasal verbs, whereas French is the language of speaker- and subject-involvement (not to be confused with Dixon’s subject-orientation).

Unexpectedness is a feature of the English aspektual verbs studied, much more than it is a feature of their French counterparts. It is part of the value of start (as opposed to begin), of keep (as opposed to continue), of end (as opposed to finish). As far as French is concerned, it is part of the value of ne cesser de (as opposed to continuer), and of (se) terminer (as opposed to finir). It is noteworthy that ne cesser de appears in one frame only, whereas keep appears in many more. Although claims to the effect that one
language is more "reasonable" than the other should be taken "cum grano salis". I cannot help thinking that the relative rarity of inherent unexpectedness-readings in French (I exclude explicit references to unexpectedness by means of, for instance, adjectives and adverbs) has to do with what the French like to call the "raison" of their language. By definition, the unexpected cannot be reasonably predicted, and is therefore, to put it deliberately in a rather blunt way, not French.

Causation is, as unexpectedness, relevant for the English verbs in the first place. In the descriptions in Part Two, we came across one causative begin-frame, two causative start-frames, several causative keep-frames, and none of all these have any French counterpart. In French, causation is relevant in the area of the cessation verbs studied, but again to a lesser degree than in the case of English. One example: stop has three causative frames, whereas arrêter has got only one. The English language, finally, has three frames which combine unexpectedness and causation in a highly language-specific way: there are no French equivalents to the frames "X started/kept/stopped Y Z-ing". I will not attempt to make any generalizations here.

Phrasal verbs such as those defined in Part Two (start up/off/out, finish up/off, end up) are a typically English phenomenon. It is no surprise that aspectual verbs can be phrasal verbs. Other Germanic languages such as Dutch and German mainly use prefixation to the same effect, as in the case of go out, for which Dutch has uitgaan (lit. out-go), and German ausgehen (also out-go). French has no phrasal verbs at all, and its use of prefixation is much more
restricted than in the case of Dutch and German. For *go out/*
*uitgaan/*ausgehen, it has a separate root (*sortir*).

What I mean by speaker-involvement, in the case of French,
will become clear if one looks at the values of *se mettre à*
(with its component of personal involvement), *ne cesser de*
("I say this to everybody"), and *arrêter* (as opposed to
*s'arrêter*, where conscious *volition* is irrelevant). In the
case of the English aspectual verbs, speaker-involvement is
much less obvious, although it is not absent (cp. "I know
this: you know more about Y than what I say now", etc.). We
could try to link speaker-involvement to something more
general by stating that the French have always felt very
cconcerned about the first person. I am thinking, more in
particular, of Louis XIV's *L'État, c'est moi*, of Descartes's
*Je pense, donc je suis*, of Sartre's *Je est un autre* ['I is
another one'], etc.

Subject-involvement is equally important, and is reflected
in the prolific use that the French language makes of
*reflexive* pronouns. There are subtle differences between *se*
·*continuer* and *continuer*, *s'arrêter* and *arrêter*, differences
which cannot be expressed in a similar way in English. I
once read a paper (but I have forgotten where it was
published) on French reflexive pronouns. In it, sentences
such as [1a] and [ b] were compared - and found different.

[1a] Le bourreau a fait évanouir sa victime.
[ b] Le bourreau a fait s'évanouir sa victime.
'The executioner made his victim faint'

The difference between both sentences has to do with the
involvement of the victim. [1a] could be used if the
executioner *provoked* the "évanouissement" (for instance, by

429
beating his victim up). [1b] refers to an unintentional act: the torturer did not want to make his victim faint.

I would like to add one final remark. When looking for differences, one tends too easily to disregard similarities. It may be useful to point out that both the English and the French aspectual verbs studied in this dissertation rely heavily on happen- and on be-components, on reference to time, and on the constant possibility of a change. Even though the differences seem to outnumber the similarities, the importance of the latter must not be underrated.
CHAPTER TEN
CONCEPTUAL AXIOLOGY
AND THE STUDY OF LEXICAL STRUCTURES

1. "FIELDS" AND "FIELD SEMANTICS"

1.1. Scholars commonly talk about discourse semantics, semantics and syntax, and lexical (or word) semantics; but the term "field" has established itself in the study of meaning in such a solid way that it has now become possible to talk about field semantics as well. The latter enjoys a certain autonomy: it has its own subject matter and its own methods and principles. But it is not, alas, the prototypical example of a coherent discipline.

The term semantic field covers a rather vague notion, observes BAGGE (1983:392); she adds that there are probably "autant d'interprétations de cette notion que de linguistes qui l'ont étudiée" ['as many interpretations as linguists who have studied it']. This is not so much due to the fact that field semantics is no longer the monopoly of a certain number of structuralist schools (more and more theories sprung from the Chomskyan way of thinking start to raise, once again, the problem of lexical structure): as a matter of fact, there has never been any such thing as a general agreement (cp. LUTZEIER 1983a:148). The easiest way to become aware of this is by looking at the terminological insecurity which now reigns in a domain in which too many linguists wanted to
gain authority, often at each other's expense.

"Fur eine terminologische Vielfalt und Unklarheit hat schon der Grunder dieser Forschungsrichtung (...) gesorgt" ['The existence of a terminological plurality and unclarity is ultimately due to the founder of this research area']. BERGENHOLTZ (1975:278), in a way, blames the German philologist and etymologist Jost Trier, who was the first one to propose a somehow consistent theoretical framework. MALKIEL (1974:275), too, hints at "traces of confusion in Trier's terminology"; his accusations, however, are based on a too hasty reading of GECKELER (1971). It is true that Trier uses, in the title and in the introduction of his 1931 monograph (see .TRIER 1931:1-26), about ten different paraphrases. But this may well be a strategy, or an attempt to represent personal views by means of a huge amount of images and from as many different perspectives as possible (cp. HOBERG 1970:62). On the other hand, it is also the result of Trier's year-long search for the most adequate terminology - which was finally found in IPSEN (1924) (cp. TRIER 1968:14).

It is at the very moment that other scholars came up with their formulas, and defined them according to their caprices, that the plethora turned into confusion. Despite DRETTAS (1981:7), that happened long before Ullmann wrote about semantics. Trier himself denounced (1934:431) the "perfect Babel of tongues" which, after IPSEN (1932), JOLLES (1934), and PORZIG (1934) published dissimilar viewpoints, was about to obscure the discussion; and he violently combatted the stands taken by his "competitors". But Trier's voice was hardly heard: hundreds of authors, pupils and competitors
alike, took over the term field, added one or another meaningful element, and used the new compound in an often arbitrary way. They are the ones to be blamed - whereas Trier himself goes free. However, what is the point of making these accusations? New ideas are not necessarily less fruitful - and an a posteriori condemnation does not repair the original situation. The terminological confusion is and remains a fact: it simply cannot be wiped out.

One must be careful not to underrate the role played in all this by Trier's mutism. The Münster Germanist did not take any new stand on semantic field theory from the late thirties until the late sixties (at least not in print); nor did he try to stop the "traditionsreiche terminologische Schöpferfreude" ['the well-entrenched and cheerful creation of new terms', BERGENHOLTZ (1975:284; cp. id.: 1980:39)] that marks the often complex history of field semantics. The real "tragedy", however, is to be looked for elsewhere: it is hidden in the fact that more "reserved" scholars did not react earlier, and rose their voices at a time when the situation had grown out of control. It is at the beginning of the sixties only that a genuine "wave" of terminological observations suddenly made its way.

The terminological confusion hinted at has been pointed out in different places, often little known: I am thinking of reviews (e.g. WISSEMMANN 1960:46), and of unpublished dissertations (e.g. PAQUOT 1973:2-3). That also must have enhanced the proliferation of new coinages. Those who were lucky enough to see their reservations as to the "Schöpferfreude" printed in books or readers, or in the more popular sections of linguistic journals (1) were not more
successful: it must be repeated that they shouted too late.

At the present time, the situation is particularly unsettled; and it is once again the same author (BERGENHOLTZ 1975:280-281) who has stressed this fact in the most straightforward way. Two remarks must be made:

1) "dass viele (...) Bezeichnungen entweder nicht näher bestimmt werden oder dass dieselben Bezeichnungen von verschiedenen Autoren verschieden verwendet werden" ['Many terms are not properly defined, or else the same terms are used differently by different authors’, (l.c.:280)] - a similar, but more condensed, observation can be found in RICKEN (1961:206);

2) "dass die terminologische Verwirrung erheblich ist und zu Unklarheiten führen muss" ['The terminological confusion is considerable, and must lead to lack of clarity’, (ibid.: 281)] - a fear also expressed by FAISS (1967:20) (cp. PEETERS 1984c).

A third point should be added: "Auch für diejenigen Begriffe, die klar erfasst und allgemein als bedeutsam anerkannt sind, wechseln die Termini von Autor zu Autor" ['Even for those concepts that are perfectly clear and generally recognized as significant, names may vary from author to author’, WISSEMANN (l.c.); cp. MESSELAAR (1963:7)].

1.2. NAGY (1973:59) is well aware of the terminological confusion surrounding the field, but restrains himself from pointing to it in too explicit a way. Walking in the footsteps of J. Filipec (who writes in Czech), he prefers to use the term koordinierte Wortreihe. This denomination, however, may cause misunderstanding: a clause is also, in
its own way, a koordinierte Wortreihen. On the other hand, it is no exaggeration to say that the label field has been blackened for the most various reasons. Passed have the years when MEILLET (1931) could talk about a "terme technique à noter", which "dit bien en effet ce qu’il veut dire" ['a technical term to be remembered, one which says exactly what it has to say'] (2). Notice, in this respect, that MALKIEL (1974:271) does consider the term "Feld" as a "word of proven suggestive power"; he nevertheless remains critical as to its use: "it certainly grates on everyone's nerves that E. field methods and G. Feldmethoden should refer to radically different matters" (3).

The deplorable absence, in a constantly increasing number of works, of motives explaining "perché un dato approccio sia da ritenersi di campo e perché l'autore consideri come teoria di campo alcune affermazioni indimostrate" ['why a given approach must be considered as a field approach, and why its author considers as a field theory a few unproven hypotheses', SCUR (1978:21)] has led to a series of criticisms directed at the notion of "field", and has, unfortunately, pushed several people - DRETTAS (1981:16) mistakenly claims that Hoberg is one of them - "a negare legittimità al termine "campo"" ['to deny the legitimacy of the term field', (ibid.)]. It has been claimed that the writer who uses the term provokes in his reader's mind the feeling of, e.g., a harmonious grouping (BETZ 1954:191) (4), immobility (SCHOLLER 1959: XXXII-XXXIII), a mosaic (MOUNIN 1965a:43), bi-dimensionality (WAGNER 1967:8; LEISI 1973:100), and neatness or lack thereof in delimitation (LEISI 1973: ibid. vs BIDU-Vranceanu 1974a:322). Surprisingly enough,
JÄGER (1959:8) favours the term "field", because it carries an extremely clear connotation of mutual delimitation without either gaps or overlappings.

Sinnbezirk ['semantic area'] is the most important substitute that semantic theory over the past three and a half decades has offered in order to replace an unduly criticized terminology. It was first proposed by BETZ (1954:198), but abandoned starting from the sixties, until it was "rediscovered" by LEISI (1973:100). Substitute and original term are practically as old as one another: in 1931 already, both occur together. However, Bezirk ['area'], Bereich ['reach', another proposal by Leisi], and their compounds - Sinnbereich (BECKER 1964:14), semantisches Bereich (SCHOLLER 1959:1.c.) - are ambiguous: whereas some contrast them with the term field, others treat the former and the latter as synonymous. As substitutes, they are therefore totally inadequate. Sinnbezirk, on the other hand, is bound to evoke the same kind of misunderstandings as Feld presumably does: "In der Bezeichnung Sinnbezirk klingt mir zu stark eine klare Abgrenzung eines Gebietes mit" ['The term Sinnbezirk makes me think too much of a neat delimitation of an area', BECKER (1964:1.c.) - cp. VALENTIN (1966)]. Hence the choice of the term Sinnbereich, which alternates here and there with the term Feld.

Authors writing in English have played no role in terminological issues: but Romance languages have as many substitutes as German: systême ['system'] and structure ['structure'], structuralist labels par excellence, are suggested by MOUNIN (1965a:1.c., 1965b:20), ensemble ['set'] and sous-ensemble ['subset'] by BIDU-VRANCEANU (e.g. 1974a:
The term *système* appears, after Mounin, in *ALINEI* (1974), together with the term *domain* (it. *sistema, dominio*). Are we facing true substitutes here? It is hard to say yes or no, for Alinei himself nowhere discards Trier's terminology, but only criticizes the latter's theory. However, *ADRADOS* (1975b:483) assumes that *sistema* and *dominio* are "dos ejemplos de los que hasta aquí han venido llamandose campos semánticos" ['two examples of what up to now has been known as semantic fields']. Alinei is criticized by the same author (ibid.:484) for using a term which is too comprehensive, a remark which obviously applies just as well to Mounin (5). As to Alinei, it seems that, for a couple of years or so (roughly speaking since the eighties), he has taken Adrados' criticism into account, even if he has never admitted that he did so. He does not appear to be willing to acknowledge that, in *ALINEI* (1974) but not in *ALINEI* (1971), his stand vis-à-vis field theory was marked by an almost damaging reluctance: *ALINEI* (1982:42) sends his reader back to several of his earlier texts "in connection with semantic fields". As far as Bidu's terminology is concerned, it is all borrowed from the exact sciences, more particularly from mathematics. In later texts (but not in *BIDU-VRANCEANU* 1977), the same author returns to the use of the term *field* apparently without the slightest reserve.

Most of the criticisms directed at our term rest, in fact, on an interpretation which is fallacious to a certain extent. That is to say, the term *field* is taken (see e.g. *BECKER* 1964:13) in its most common acceptation, i.e. the one which is more or less identical with the meaning of Lat. *AGER* (cp. Fr. *agriculture*). The lands which farmers cultivate are
indeed immobile stretches, whatever interpretation one may
give to the adjective **immobile**; they are very often
harmoniously grouped together, without either gaps or
overlappings (cp. the metaphor of the mosaic); more than
anything else, they are bi-dimensional. That this is really
the interpretation underlying the above-mentioned criticisms
becomes totally clear when we look at the literature itself.

HOFMANN (1930:106) aims "die einzelnen Bedeutungsfelder
festzustellen, auf denen die Steigerungsadverbia erwachsen
sind" ['to determine the particular semantic fields where the
intensifiers have grown up']. "Auf dem einen Feld", he then
adds, "**wuchert** die eine Sprache, auf dem anderen hat sie
spärlich Fuss gefasst" ['A particular language grows wild on
one field, on another it has scarcely rooted']. He finally
notes (l.c.:150) that one particular field has furnished a
maximum of elements: it is, of all fields, "das
fruchtbarste" ['the most fertile']. In fact, formulations
such as these are of all times. GOOSSENS (1963:213) signals
the difficulties involved by "het **bewerken** van semantiche
velden door een groep vorsers, die elk een afgebakend **perceel
van het **taallandschap (...) afharken" ['the tilling of
semantic fields by a team of searchers who each rake up a
clearly traced out plot of the language landscape']. POHL
(1964:516-517) warns of the difficulties raised by the
"**opération moisson**" ['the harvest operation']. LATAZJ (1966:
16) discards words which, "in anderen Wortfeldern **wurzelnd,
das Wortfeld Freude nur peripher Überlagern" [which, 'since
they root in other lexical fields, cover no more than the
periphery of the lexical field of **joy**']. BOURQUIN (1983:81)
mentions the "**foisonnement** des champs sémantiques et/ou
notionnels" ['the wildgrow of semantic and/or conceptual fields']. MALAPERT (1981:130) has the most poetic formula of them all: "Que M. Schüle me permette cependant de lui offrir tels quels, en une gerbe glanée pour lui au cours de ma promenade à travers différents champs sémantiques. ces quelques mots de chez nous, qui sont aussi de chez lui, et qu'il connaît mieux que moi!" ['May Mr Schüle, however, allow me to offer him just like that, in a bouquet collected for him during my walk across various semantic fields, these few words that belong to my dialect, and also to his, and that he knows better than me!'].

The appeal to equations of this kind sometimes takes excessive proportions, especially in the case of authors who make conscious comparisons. To his readers' great surprise, IBLER (1968:83) leads his pupils over fields of beets, corn fields, and others, and then formulates the following conclusion: "Auf unserem Feld wachsen Worte. Wir heissen es Wortfeld" ['On our field grow words. We call it a word field']. In fact, no true field semantist ever thought of creating any analogy whatsoever between a lexical field and, say, a corn field. GEWEHR (1974:11) justly attacks this kind of misleading discourse: "Es drängt sich die Frage auf, wem schon damit gedient ist, wenn der Gedanke vom Wortfeld seine wesenhaften Merkmale einbüßen muss, nur um sich kindgemässen Vorstellungen anzupassen" ['The question must be raised whose purpose is being served when the notion of lexical field is deprived of its essential features, just to be adapted to a school child's way of thinking']. There is a comparison, for sure: with a field for horse-racing (TRIER 1968:14, 1975:11-12), or with a magnetic field (in several other studies).
The Kraftfeld image, particularly, has encountered a great success - which is not a surprising thing for whoever remembers that the term field became first popular in the physical sciences.

It should be clear that the comparison is an implicit one. This amounts to saying that, despite BALLWEG-SCHRAMM (1981: 464), the term field is a metaphor (6), in fact an imperfect metaphor (as are most metaphors and comparisons). The term is non-committal in at least two respects:

1) "It gives no guarantee that anything we do know about divided plots of land or about the properties of space in general, or again about the structure of nets or mosaics, could necessarily or even usefully be applied to word-groups" (SEIFFERT 1968:95);

2) "it is a metaphor that cannot be pressed to say much about the pattern of structure exemplified by any particular set or cluster" (ibid.).

The use of metaphors is unavoidable, even in scientific discourse. It is therefore important to recognize a metaphor as such, and not to be misled by its intrinsic traps (cp. GECKELER 1976:296) : "In der wissenschaftliche Fachsprache kann der metaphorische Ausdruck natürlich immer nur dienende Funktion haben" ['In scientific discourse, obviously, metaphor can never have any other than an auxiliary role', SCHOLLER (1959:XXXII)]. It is equally important not to condemn in the case of field semantics a device which is tolerated elsewhere, in so-called ultra-modern theories. In the latter as well, there are uncountable metaphors for which no uniform interpretation can be offered (cp. GIPPER 1975: 121). Rather than to banish the use of metaphors from
science, an impossible enterprise to undertake ("der metaphorische Prozess liegt tief im Wesen der Sprache", ['the process of metaphor belongs to the essence of language'], TRIER 1968:16) (7), we must hope that some day or other the metaphor "field" will follow the track of other metaphors: that is, that soon the links between "comparant" and "comparé" will fade, and then disappear (ibid.). That day, perhaps, is not too far away: right now, the term field has become "quasi-opaque" (BIDU-VRANCEANU 1981:350), and that opacity is not devoid of certain advantages (GECKELER l.c.).

1.3. "Nicht durchgesetzt hat sich in der Sprachforschung die Verwendung des Feldbegriffs auf das einzelne Wort, auf dessen "semantische Struktur"", observes HOBERRG (1970:n.547) ['The use of the field concept with regard to single words, to their "semantic structure", has never been of any importance in linguistics']. This is probably an exaggeration: within the realm of linguistic semantics (as opposed to other realms such as logical and philosophical semantics), the term "field" usually denotes, despite SCHNEIDERS (1978:88), either a set of words (that is, a "lexical structure" or "macrostructure") which corresponds to a more or less fundamental semantic notion, or the meaning - if not the set of meanings - corresponding to one word (that is, a "semantic structure" or "microstructure") (8). The idea of a field "of words" is both older and better known than the idea of a field "of a word" - but that does not mean that the latter has not acquired a firm place in the science of meaning (9).

Several authors use the term field in both the acceptations
referred to, but without making the slightest distinction (10). A handful only have consciously tried and/or still try to prevent misunderstanding by means of a reasoned choice of appropriate epithets. It is paramount for the progress of research in semantics to study the two kinds of fields, and - that goes without saying - to keep them apart (cp. PEETERS 1984b, quoted on pp.8-9). Kurt Baldinger (11) is probably among those who were particularly aware of this (12). Still, he did not hesitate to change his labels: in his earlier period, he was constantly looking for better terms and better definitions.

"Fields of a word" were called by Baldinger Bedeutungsfeld and Wortfeld in 1958, semantisches Feld, champ sémantique and champ formel [] in 1959, Bedeutungsfeld from 1960 onwards, and (next to an occasionally reappearing champ sémantique) champ sémasiologique from 1964 onwards. Champ sémasiologique reminds one, much more than is desirable, of a painful episode in the history of semantics, viz. the clash between "onomasiologists" and "semasiologists", or advocates of the Bezeichnungslehre and advocates of the Bedeutungslehre. All the other terms may bring about a fair amount of confusion, for they are mostly used with regard to fields of words, with words being a plural noun. All of Baldinger's labels, therefore, present some disadvantage. Moreover, they do not refer to an obviously essential point: in the present context, the notion of a "realized value". In Part One, Chapter Two, I have suggested to use the term dispersional field, with the notion of "dispersion" referring to the way in which values are realized (i.e. dispersed around a hard core, which is the value or set of semantic formulas
corresponding to a word).

Begriffsfeld and Bezeichnungsfeld in 1958; champ notionnel, champ onomastique, onomastisches Feld in 1959; Begriffsfeld or Bezeichnungsfeld from 1960 onwards (13); champ onomasiologique from 1962 onwards. These are the different names which Baldinger gave, throughout the years, to his "field of words". The term champ onomastique, and its German counterpart, are inadequate: confusion might arise with what other scholars have (far more aptly) called a Namenfeld, or an onomastic field, i.e. a set of proper names (mostly toponyms). KRATZ (1970:108) rejects the label onomasiologisches Feld, for which Bezeichnungsfeld is a less learned equivalent, and which is the literal translation of champ onomasiologique: it is used by WOLF (1968) in a rather peculiar, if not incorrect, way. Another thing is that all three of these terms are reminiscent of the dispute between onomasiologists and semasiologists (cp. above). Only Begriffsfeld and champ notionnel then remain: in English, one could speak about a conceptual field (or a notional field, or even a notion field). The reason why it is not indicated to do so is that these translations (and also those of all the other terms used by Baldinger) fail to draw attention to one of the most prominent features of any field of words: viz., that there exist associations between all the members of such a field.

It might be good to talk about associational or associative fields. Once again, however, major terminological difficulties arise. At least six different authors (14) have, with regard to fields of words, proposed a champ associatif (campo asociativo, Assoziationsfeld, ...) of their
own (15), and each one of these field types differs slightly or more considerably from any one of the others. Moreover, nothing prevents associations from being extralinguistic (16), or else formal, i.e. phonological, morphological, etymological, or syntactic (17). For a field of words based on associations between values, I propose to reserve the term axiological field (18). VARDAR (1985:265-266), who believes that the notion of "field" may well come to play an important role in lexical axiology, introduces another terminology. His proposals, however, are needlessly complex and relatively unpromising. The label "associative field", on the other hand, can be no more than a (useful) cover term for all kinds of fields of words.

A better, but still succinct, definition for the notion of an "axiological field" will be constructed in what follows: ŞÇUR's (1975:171, 1978:31) warnings against a too liberal use of the term field, especially in semantics, are indeed to be taken seriously (19). An attempt will be made to define a new field notion starting from what others have said and written about fields in semantics. I have chosen to formulate my hypotheses (cp. DERVEZI-BASTUJI 1982:VIII) "par intégration critique d'un nombre important de travaux déjà produits, et en veillant à ne tomber ni dans l'éclectisme, ni dans l'inconsistance" ['through critical integration of an important number of works already produced, and taking care to be neither eclectic nor inconsistent']. OSSWALD (1970:49) wisely states: "Der Sprachwissenschaftler hätte demnach, wenn er ein Problem angeht, zu wissen und doch zunächst einmal zu vergessen, um möglichst frei zu sein für seine Beobachtungen" ['The linguist should, when tackling a
problem, know and yet also forget, in order to make his own
observations in a maximally unprejudiced way'). The
observations that will be made concern problems of size,
delimitation, and structure.

2. THE SIZE OF AN "AXIOLOGICAL FIELD"

2.1. According to WILSKE (1984:167), one of the basic
features of a true field is its "completeness" (German
Integralität). This means that no obstacles at all may
withstand the complete description of semantic relations. As
far as I can see, there are at least two prerequisites for
completeness, viz. :

a) inclusion, within one field, of words belonging to
different parts of speech (cp. sections 2.2. and 2.3.);

b) inclusion of all the relevant words, irrespective of
whether they are basic roots or secondary formations (cp.
sections 2.4. and 2.5.).

Wilske himself recognizes only one prerequisite, namely our
a) : the "Integration verschiedenartiger semantischer
Beziehungen zwischen sprachlichen Mitteln verschiedener und
gleicher Wortart".

2.2. Jost Trier, while criticized for his (1931:24)
decision to delay the study of verbs until a later date,
considered nouns and adjectives within (distinct subsections
of) one field (20). If one takes into account that fields
similar to Trier's, or even more complex than that, were
successfully studied after him, it is quite surprising to
find out that most linguists nowadays (21) tend to believe that a fair field analysis should not deal with more than one grammatical category at a time. However, a closer look at the literature reveals that the "one-grammatical-category-view" has always been predominant. Strangely enough, theoretical considerations in support of this choice were mainly offered starting from the seventies only, and essentially within the so-called "Tübingen school of linguistics", centered around Eugenio Coseriu. Two arguments are to be distinguished:

a) A lexical field is a paradigm (22), i.e. its members create a system of oppositions (ZATELLI 1978:19-20); therefore, all members must belong to the same part of speech, "because otherwise they could not enter into minimal oppositions with each other" (KASTOVSKY 1981:437).

b) Practical considerations invite the scholar to simplify his method of investigation by taking into account only one grammatical category at a time (VIVIAN 1978:112-113) (23).

Ad a). The entire first argument sounds unconvincing; however, its last part - which depends on the definition of the notion of "minimal oppositions" - is especially weak. SCHWARZ (1959:254), for instance, writing long before either Zatelli or Kastovsky, assumed that minimal oppositions between members of different grammatical categories do occur, even though it remains true that "Wortgut derselben Gattung [i.e. "Wortart, B.P.] am leichtesten feldhaft zusammenschliesst" ['that those words which belong to one and the same grammatical category most easily come together in fields']. Schwarz, hence, was sympathetic to both the positions which are here being contrasted: he acknowledged
that a grammatical category is highly "feldbildend" ['field constructing'], but he also underlined that the boundaries set by such a grammatical category are often trespassed (24).

Something else, too, is wrong with Zatelli's and Kastovsky's argument: it relies too heavily on Coseriu, and on his viewpoint according to which a lexical field is a "paradigm" (and not a set of paradigms, for instance). Coseriu's definition, it was claimed, provided, as GECKELER (1971:218) puts it, the "Lösung zur Frage nach dem Verhältnis zwischen den Wortarten und dem Wortfeld" ['the solution to the problem of the relationship between grammatical categories and lexical field']. Appraisals of the "monoparadigmatic viewpoint" greatly differ: they range from full support (ADRADOS 1971b:338) to complete disagreement, at least where particular field types are concerned (WIEGAND/WOLSKI 1975:83, with reference to Trier). It is hard to understand how Adrados can find the monoparadigmatic approach "plenamente aceptable", whereas he himself urges us to believe that nouns, verbs and adjectives have to be studied together (25). BIDU-VRÂNCEANU (1981:351) opts for an intermediate position: she argues that certain fields consist of one paradigm only, whereas an overwhelming majority of them include more paradigms; the same author calls the former type of fields "monoparadigmatic" and the latter type "polyparadigmatic". One of several examples of the polyparadigmatic view is offered by BIDU-VRÂNCEANU (1976). Or should we say "a polyparadigmatic view"? As a matter of fact, closer inspection reveals that the author's only reason to speak about the "polyparadigmatic field" of colour terms in Rumanian lies in the number of words being
studied together (cp. BIDU-VRĂNCEANU l.c.:188). Thus, a kind of correlation seems to exist between the number of words in a field and the number of paradigms. If this is true, how do we define where, e.g., a monoparadigmatic field ends, and where a "biparadigmatic" field takes over? Is there any proportion which needs to be respected? The fact that these and other similar questions are not answered at all by Bidd-Vrănceanu should render us suspicious. It appears far more plausible not to postulate any a priori correlation between number of words and number of paradigms at all. In order to define such a correlation, we would have to study first a considerable number of fields, if possible in different languages, and then, on a statistical basis, draw certain conclusions.

Right now, I myself can think of no reason why a field should be equivalent to a lexical paradigm - which is what Coseriu wants. His definition is aprioristic, and hence unjustified. Whoever accepts it must come to the conclusion that fields are "one-category-sets". It is not without good reasons that JUSTICE (1982:71) speaks about the "a-priori limitation of word fields to a single part of speech".

Ad b). What Vivian (and Lutzeier; cp. note 23) have in mind when they talk about "simplification" remains far from clear. Does "simplification" mean "cutting down the quantity of materials to be investigated" (cp. WYLER 1955:24)? That, for instance, seems a noble thing to aim at, lest one "grasp all, lose all" (as the proverb says). The problem is that the limitation to one part of speech is, despite LUTZEIER (1980: 295), counter-intuitive, as was pointed out by BECKS (1981: 361). Very often, morphological similarity between parts of
speech is an indication for the existence of associational links which are \textit{semantic} in nature. On the other hand, whenever such semantic links exist and are not taken into account, simplification goes hand in hand with a considerable loss in \textit{descriptive} economy: BECKS (ibid.) correctly argues that "il risultato di una strutturazione in sistemi grammaticali separati è poco economico poiché gli stessi tratti semantici si ripetono in ogni campo semantico" ['the result of a structuration in separate grammatical systems is rather uneconomical in that the same semantic features are to be repeated in each semantic field']. Descriptive economy is worth while to achieve, as long as no conflict arises with the inherent economy of a language (as defined in Part One, Chapter Two, p.37).

Pace Coseriu, nouns, adjectives, verbs, adverbs and so on \textbf{must} be studied together. That, precisely, is where the notion of an "axiological field" becomes relevant. The student of an axiological field finds him- or herself in agreement with WYLER (l.c.), who considered the overall study of several grammatical categories in one field as "wünschenswert, und für die weitere Erforschung der Felder im ihrer Gesamtkonzeption geradezu unerlässlich" ['desirable, and for the further exploration of fields in their global structure even indispensable']. Wyler, who was preaching in the desert, drew the conclusions which some authors (e.g. EPPERT 1963), even though they considered their own approach to be unsatisfactory, were more than reluctant to draw.

2.3. On the assumption (made already on pp.369-370, and to be tested by means of the delimitational criterion developed
in section 3. below) that the English aspectual verbs studied in Part Two belong to one axiological field, we may now venture that a study of the entire field must also embrace:

a) verbs such as commence, resume, quit, complete, and many others; phrasal verbs such as set (in/off/out), go on, carry on, stick at, etc.;

b) nouns such as those that appear in the title of this dissertation (commencement, continuation, cessation); also nomina agentis (e.g. beginner, starter) - and many others;

c) adjectives such as initial, continuous (as opposed to continual), final, and so on;

d) adverbs (including the ones that can be obtained from the adjectives in d) by adding -ly) - and AdvP’s (such as first of all, in the end, etc.);

e) particles such as on (which marks continuation) and over (which marks cessation or termination).

Proper delimitation must confirm whether the examples mentioned in a) to e) are real members of our field. It must be clear, on the other hand, that the description of the entire field is a lengthy task. However, its total length should not, for two reasons, be measured with reference to the space devoted in Part Two to the English verbs. One thing is that it is not strictly necessary for the scholar to integrate and/or to criticize earlier work: an axiological study can very well be self-contained and still offer valuable suggestions. Secondly, a study of verbs is usually (though not necessarily) lengthier than a study of any other part of speech: verbs, as a matter of fact, occur, more often than other parts of speech, in several syntactic frames, and change their meaning accordingly. Notice, also,
that it is not necessary for all the work to be done by one and the same scholar. This, too, might be called the principle of "division of linguistic labor" (term used by PUTNAM 1975a in an entirely different way).

Some additional comments to a), b), c), d), and e) may be in place (26).

Ad a). For useful information on the meaning of the verbs resume, quit, and complete, one may consult either FREED (1979) or WIERZBICKA (1988a). Commence is not included in any of the accounts of aspectual verbs that I have seen, although lexicographers have occasionally made a number of statements. COLLINS (1952:19) and HAYAKAWA & FLETCHER (1971:38) both underscore the "formal character" of the verb commence. Collins holds commence for a "translation into language that is held more suitable for public exhibition". Hayakawa & Fletcher add that the verb is "sometimes used vulgarly or humorously in other than solemn contexts" (their example: "We commenced to drink our beer"). Finally, according to MORRIS (1969:119), begin and commence are equivalent in meaning, "though commence is sometimes felt to be stronger in suggesting initiative".

A few examples for the verb commence from the local press:

[1a] If your investment commenced after September 19, 1985, you will have no CGT liability until the investment is terminated. /CC, 09-09-87/

[ b] Official statistics released last week show that 88 per cent of people who commence work with a university or college degree find a job in their preferred occupation. /ANU Reporter, 11-09-87/

[ c] The Canberra Masonic Homes Ladies Auxiliary is holding its annual fete on September 26 1987 commencing at 9 am. /CC, 23-09-87/

It is surely useful to point out that commence does not
belong to the written language only (although it is no doubt more frequent in written than in oral communication). At the Housing Office of the Australian National University, I was once asked "when I had commenced to rent"...

Ad b). When searching for the meaning of particular verbs, WIERZBICKA (1988a), as we saw, draws on several occasions information from the meaning of morphologically related nouns. I wish to stress once again that it is not always wise to do so. Remember, for instance, from Part Two, Chapter Seven (p.310), that the difference between to end and to finish is not the same as the one between the end and the finish. Consider, furthermore, the difference between the nouns beginner and starter. The former suggests lack of experience (cp. [2a]); the latter refers to an animate being about to start (cp. [2b]), or to someone ([2c]) or something ([2d]) causing someone else or something else to start (27).

[2a] The purpose of this book is to teach you how to write computer programs in PASCAL. It is intended to be a genuine introductory text for beginners. /McGREGOR/WATT, Simple PASCAL, p.27/

[ b ] In the race for better investments, there are many starters. /from a TV commercial/

[ c ] At the Los Angeles Olympics in 1984 seven men, tuned as tight and sweet as Stradivarius strings, heard the starter's call for the ultimate test of human propulsion - the men's 100 metres final. /AM,10-09-88/

[ d ] After the starter has been dismantled and the clutch and pinion assembly removed proceed to dismantle as follows. /from a car service and repair manual/

The verb start is rather like the noun (causative or non-causative); the verb begin has no component 'lack of experience' - and can be causative (unlike the noun). All this shows that nouns and verbs must be examined apart.
Ad c). Whereas there is only one verb continue, there are two adjectives: continual (meaning 'regularly occurring'), and continuous (meaning 'uninterrupted'). Each adjective corresponds to a particular reading of the verb continue. Also to be examined is, for instance, the distinction between two quasi-synonyms such as incessant and unceasing.

Ad d). The adverb (and adjective) first is not just a numeral. It belongs in our axiological field, where it is to be opposed to things such as then, next, afterwards, finally etc. As a numeral, on the other hand, it is part of the axiological field of words related to the activity of counting (cp. first, second, third etc.).

Ad e). Particles are a fascinating area of research. On, over, out etc. should be carefully studied in each one of their aspectual uses. Notice that particles are extremely versatile: on, for instance, marks continuation (not only in go on and carry on, but also in They talked on for hours; cp. Part Two, Chapter Five, pp.201-203); on the other hand, it has an entirely different meaning in the slogan (used in a recent AIDS awareness campaign) "Tell him if it's not on [sc. the condom] it's not on [i.e. we don't make love]."

In their versatility, particles (but also, as we noted sub "ad d)", an adjective/adverb such as first) belong to different axiological fields. Where meanings are related, we have to admit overlap of fields; where the opposite is the case, fields do not overlap. The whole problem is that precise criteria are needed in order to establish whether and how meanings are related. One thing is certain - and we will not say more about it in the present context: axiological fields are not as self-contained as, say, phonological
correlations (which could also be viewed as fields).

2.4. Most languages have a lexicon which consists of both "primary words" (i.e. roots, unmotivated or arbitrary elements – in Saussure's sense), and "secondary words" (i.e. motivated or transparent forms, derived from or composed with the primary words). The question must be raised – and has recently been raised, in the Tübingen school (GECKELER 1981) and elsewhere (LUTZEIER 1983b) – whether a field consists of primary and secondary material indiscriminately, or whether only primary words are to be described. Completeness (as defined in section 2.1.) requires the description of all relevant words; two linguists, however, have argued against this position. Their names are Knud Togeby and, once again, Eugenio Coseriu.

Coseriu's position has changed over the years. GSELL (1979:54) quotes a passage from COSERIU (1973:16), in which it is said that, as long as the linguist looks for lexical structures, secondary words must be "ausgeklammert" ['eliminated']. GECKELER (1981:63-64), on the other hand, finds some vague indications in COSERIU (1975) which could lead one to the conclusion that "secondary paradigmatic structures" may truly be incorporated in lexical fields (which are "primary paradigmatic structures"). Geckeler himself avoids taking a stand, though in his own major investigation (GECKELER 1971) he tacitly assumes the "inclusive point of view". LIPKA (1981), KASTOVSKY (1981), and DRESSLER (1981) all stress that the primary and the secondary structures must not be sharply separated. LIPKA (1981:375; cp. id. 1980) introduces a terminological
distinction: "lexical fields" are "inclusive sets" (my terminology), whereas so-called "simple lexemes" can be grouped together in "word-fields". A highly suspect viewpoint indeed, if one recalls how lexical gaps in "word-fields" may easily be filled with "complex lexemes", transforming as by miracle the "word-field" into a "lexical field". KASTOVSKY's position is less innovative: his (1981: 441-443) examples abundantly support the inclusive point of view, which is also Coseriu's, at least starting from the year 1982 (28).

I am not aware of any change in Togeby's point of view. He, after several other authors, proposes (TOGEBY 1953-54: 226) to get rid of the traditional definition of semantics as the "étude des significations lexicales ou significations des mots" ['study of lexical or word meanings']. Semantics is to be the study of the meanings of morphemes ("l'étude des significations des morphèmes"). What makes the change desirable is, according to Togeby, the fact that grammatical and derivational morphemes, and also particles, represent a kind of minimal "semantic fields", "d'où une description complète semble mieux réalisable que celle des champs nominaux et verbaux" ['a complete description of which seems more feasible than the description of nominal and verbal fields']. The important thing is thus, here as in the case of the discussion around the number of parts of speech to be allowed within one field, simplicity. "D'enormes séries de "mots" sont reléguées au second plan parce qu'ils sont décomposables en plusieurs mots (les locutions), en plusieurs racines (mots composés), en racine et suffixe (mots dérivés), etc. Une fois ces constructions écartées, les champs
sémantiques primaires seront plus aisément accessibles”
('Enormous sets of "words" are relegated to the background
because they can be divided in several words (idioms), in
several roots (compositions), in root and suffix (derived
words), etc. Once these constructions are discarded, the
primary semantic fields will be more easily accessible').

Against Togeby, it must first of all be argued that the
study of meaning ("semantics") cannot be restricted to either
words or morphemes: more complex "units" (phrases, clauses,
sentences, an entire discourse) are carriers of meaning, too,
and semantics has to account for these complex supports of
meaning as it has to account for the meaning of words.
Secondly, there are several reasons for saying that the
minimal meaningful units, for languages which do have words,
must be words (i.e. cannot be morphemes). KOCH (1984:ch.1)
aptly discusses the most important of these reasons; her
evidence and examples support our claim that, by studying
"semantic fields" of morphemes, the linguist pushes too far
the legitimate search for descriptive economy or simplicity,
and comes up with descriptions which do not reflect the
internal economy of the language he or she works on. I
therefore submit that "semantic fields" must be fields of
words. It is not an exaggeration to claim that completeness
requires the description, within a particular axiological
field, of all relevant words, irrespective of their
morphological status - i.e., irrespective of the fact that
some of them, e.g. derived words and compounds, while
remaining minimal meaningful units, will inevitably consist
of distinct morphemes.
2.5. Apart from the preceding theoretical remarks, there is ample empirical evidence to show that it is impossible for one to accept the "primary-vocabulary-only-view" while also adhering to the idea that an axiological field should include words belonging to several parts of speech. Let us look at just a few examples.

The French verb commencer is clearly primary, and the noun commencement secondary: supporters of the "primary-vocabulary-only-view" will have to discard the latter. However, in the case of a quasi-synonym such as débuter, which has début as its nominal counterpart, what criterion is available allowing one to decide which word is primary and has to be retained, and which one is secondary and has to be put aside? Diachronically speaking, débuter appears to be primary because it is older: it is attested from the 16th century onwards, i.e. one century earlier than the noun début. This, then, looks fine: both verbs (commencer and débuter) are primary, and both nouns (commencement and début) are secondary. Synchronically speaking, though, débuter seems to derive from début rather than the opposite: it makes indeed much more sense to define débuter in terms of début ('faire ses débuts') than to define début in terms of débuter (??'point dans le temps ou l'espace où qqch débute').

On the assumption that synchronic considerations should prevail in a synchronic description, this would mean that the verb is secondary and must be discarded. It appears difficult to propose a consistent analysis which includes the verb commencer and the noun début, but not the noun commencement nor the verb débuter.

Notice that, in English, the situation is even more
complex, due to the fact that a great number of verbs can "act" as nouns, and vice versa. Supporters of the "primary-vocabulary-only-view" would have to decide whether they describe the nouns start, finish, end, and stop, or the verbs. Decisions are likely to be arbitrary or aprioristic. It will, once again, be impossible to arrive at a consistent description. Finally, if secondary material is to be rejected, one will have to account elsewhere for the fact that restart and recommence both exist, whereas *rebegin does not (cp. COLLINS 1952:21). Clearly, this must be a matter of semantics. If there is any place where this "exception" is to be explained away, it is within the axiological field to which all these verbs belong.

3. THE DELIMITATION OF AN "AXIOLOGICAL FIELD"

3.1. According to FAISS (1967:20), it would be impossible to consider the notion of "field" as a semantically based classificatory device for the lexicon, unless its boundaries are accurately fixed. There can be no doubt that this statement is correct — at least if it is not meant to imply that the boundaries must be known before the analysis gets underway. According to BIDU-VRÂNCĂIANU (1981:350), whose claim is strikingly illustrated in the analyses undertaken by OKSAAR (1958) and DERVILLEZ-BASTUIJ (1982) — who both carried out their investigations while explicitly assuming that no objective criteria were available for the delimitation of their field (29) —, "la recherche peut être faite sans que l'on connaisse les limites extérieures du champ" [research
can be undertaken without the scholar knowing the outer limits of the field', emphasis added). As I will show below, it even seems to be the case that boundaries cannot be objectively fixed until after some key members of the field have been properly described.

What could be, in the case of an axiological field, an accurate delimitational criterion? I believe that not less than three conditions must be met:

a) recurrence: the criterion retained must be applicable for any axiological field - i.e. not only the one part of which was studied in Part Two;

b) internality: the criterion retained must be "internal" - all attempts to delimit fields in terms of other fields must fail in that they are doomed to end in a vicious circle, and in that they rely on the assumption (which cannot be made at this stage) that boundaries are clearcut;

c) compatibility with the claim for completeness (i.e. with the prerequisites for the study of lexical structures outlined in the previous section).

Pace LOHMANDER (1981), who does not believe in the existence of what he calls "objective" criteria for delimitation - according to him, each field must be delimited in itself and for itself, according to principles that are never the same -, there seems to be at least one criterion (among the dozens proposed in the literature) which does meet each one of the conditions just spelled out. Surprisingly enough, it is a criterion which is almost as old as field semantics itself. The wesenhafte Bedeutungsbeziehungen - LYONS (1977:261) calls them 'essential meaning-relations' - which PORZIG (1934) identified between words belonging to
different parts of speech (condition c) can be found in all areas of the lexicon (condition a), and they allow the scholar to fix the boundaries of an axiological field on a field-internal basis (condition b). In what follows, I shall prefer to speak about "essential semantic associations" (rather than "relations"), on the assumption, made already by others (30), that Porzig's "Beziehungen" are in fact "Assoziationen", more particularly associations between values (cp. p.444).

3.2. The concept of an "essential semantic association" can probably be best illustrated in terms of Porzig's own examples, in English translation. It is the kind of association that exists between the two words of each one of the following couples: walk and feet, see and eye, hear and ear, kiss and lips, blond and hair. It can be seen that, in all sets, the meaning of the second word (invariably a noun) is "implied" by the meaning of the first (which is either a verb or, more rarely, an adjective). In Porzig's view, each set makes up a two-word-field, called Bedeutungsfeld in 1934, einbegreifendes '['inclusive'] Bedeutungsfeld in 1950, syntaktisches Feld (Wortfeld) in 1957. Only the second one of these consecutive terms proved to be a good choice: the others had already (pace Škor 1972:409) been used with different meanings.

Porzig has always acknowledged, from the very start (1934), the possibility of enlargements, i.e. of fields built on more than one essential semantic association. However, in this particular respect, he has all too often been entirely misunderstood. One author (SPITZOVA 1965-66:190) did not
even hesitate to dub Porzig’s approach “rather primitive”. BAUMGÄRTNER (1967:166-167) and LEKOMCEV (1980:142), on the other hand, certainly exaggerate when they state that the co-ordination of two of Trier’s fields can be considered to be, by definition, a field à la Porzig. Finally, and most importantly, several scholars who, after Porzig, came up with their own field type, while calling the former either a forerunner or an affiliate, proposed in fact a field definition which Porzig himself had never had in mind, and a field type which was different from the “einfleieifende Felder” not only in size but even more in spirit. I am referring, in particular, to: a) Müller’s Sprachfelder, b) Ducháček’s champs syntactiques (31) and c) Graz’s champ d’emploi.

It is important to point out briefly how different Müller’s, Ducháček’s and Graz’s fields are from Porzig’s. The “nucleus” of a Sprachfeld is a word around which are grouped “alle [!] Wörter als auch syntaktischen Konstruktionen” [‘all words as well as syntactic constructions’] which occur with that word in meaningful utterances (cp. MÜLLER 1957:157). A syntactic field à la Ducháček includes the totality [!] of syntactic [!] links that a noun (or an adjective, verb, adverb... : the so-called nucleus of the field), irrespective of its function, has or can have with its surroundings (32). Finally, Graz’s champ d’emploi (cp. GRAZ 1965:39) comprises, together with the “syntactic correlates” [!] of the nuclear word, the latter’s substitutes that appear, in a given corpus, with each one of the correlates listed.

Pace MÜLLER (1965:222), who postulates a complete identity
between his own field type and Porzig’s "eintragenende Felder", the notion of an "essential semantic association" is totally irrelevant in his work (and, it must be mentioned, in that of Ducháček and Graz as well). In an axiological field, on the other hand, essential semantic associations continue to play a paramount role, especially for matters of delimitation. Still, there is a difference with Porzig’s "eintragenende Felder" : in our field type, essential semantic associations exist between words belonging to the same part of speech as well.

3.3. The concrete (but partial) delimitation, in what follows, of an axiological field will show that associations between verbs are not as neat as associations similar to those referred to by Porzig; nevertheless, they are "quite" recognizable.

Let us look at the verbs begin and continue first. Both occur in eight different frames (cp. pp. 79 and 190). Four out of the eight begin-frames are closely related to four out of the eight continue-frames. Six begin- and continue-frames (three of each kind) are less closely related, and each verb has one frame to which no frame at all corresponds with the other verb. Where the correspondence is most outspoken, the respective formulas contain either one of the following sets of components :

[3a]  at t, Z was happening/there was Z
      one could think at that time :
      more of Z will happen after now/there will
      be more Z after now

[ b]  one can think of X as of something that has parts
      one can think of those parts as being one after
      the other
I am thinking of one part of X

The non-causative direct object frame "X began Y" and the frame "X continued (to be) Y" also have the set of components in [3a]. The latter appears therefore in all the frames listed in [4a], whereas [3b] appears in those listed in [4b].

[4a]  
X began to Z  
X began Z-ing  
X began Y (non-causative)  
X began on Y  
X began (elliptical)  
X continued to Z  
X continued Z-ing  
X continued (to be) Y  
X continued on Y  
X continued (elliptical)

[ b]  
X began (absolute)  
X continued (absolute)

[3a] and [ b] are, one might say, the metalinguistic expression of a semantic association which exists between the verbs begin and continue in English. Theoretically, one could refuse to consider this particular association as being essential. It is that theoretical possibility which I had in mind when I said, just now, that associations between words belonging to the same part of speech are not - I quote myself - "as neat as associations similar to those referred to by Porzig". However, both [3a] and [ b] contain, in twelve cases out of twelve, at least half the number of lines contained in the formula of which they are a part. It is therefore rather difficult to reject either [3a] or [3b] as an indication for the existence of an essential semantic association, and to relegate the verbs begin and continue in separate fields.

By saying that two verbs belong to one and the same field,
we are, as a matter of fact, delimiting that field: we are trying to establish what belongs to it and what does not. It would have been impossible, on the other hand, to provide the data in [3a] and [b] if we had not described the verbs begin and continue beforehand. This is evidence for our claim (p. 459) that the analysis of an axiological field must be on the way before any attempt at a delimitation can be undertaken.

Consider, next, the verbs start and keep. A glance at their semantic formulas confirms that both must be field members. First of all, it appears that the semantic association between start and begin is extremely close, i.e. is really essential. In the metalanguage, it can be expressed as in [5]. [5a] equals [3a], plus one component; [5b] simply equals [3b]. The two sets together are relevant for twelve out of a total of seventeen frames (eight for begin, nine for start; cp. pp. 100-101).

[5a] before \( t \), \( Z \) was not happening/there was no \( Z \)
at \( t \), \( Z \) was happening/there was \( Z \)
one could think at that time:
more of \( Z \) will happen after now/there will be more \( Z \) after now
one could not know at that time:
more of \( Z \) will happen after now/there will be more \( Z \) after now

[ b] one can think of \( X \) as of something that has parts
one can think of those parts as being one after the other
I am thinking of one part of \( X \)

The case of keep and continue is rather different. Out of seventeen frames (cp. pp. 190 and 217), ten share the set of components given in [6]. Notice, however, that the first line of [6] is not present as such in any of the explications provided in Part Two, Chapter Three for the verb keep: it is merely implied in the statement that "before \( t \), \( Z \) was
happening/there was Z all the time".

[6] before t, Z was happening/there was Z at t, Z was happening/there was Z

So far, we have compared begin and continue, begin and start, and continue and keep, and we have found that, within each couple, there are enough common components to talk about an essential semantic association, and to conclude, therefore, that all four verbs belong to the same axiological field. This conclusion should not become suspect if one considers that begin and keep, if followed by an ING-construction, share nothing more than the component in [7]:

[7] at t, Z was happening/there was Z

"Discoveries" such as this can do no more than confirm the intuitions of any native speaker that begin and keep are not as closely related as begin and start, or continue and keep.

Instead of extending the demonstration to the other verbs studied in Part Two - it would be relatively easy to establish that they also are linked, through associations important enough to be called essential, to the verbs discussed hitherto in this section - it may be wise to consider some other verbs. I must remain brief, and I shall therefore talk about commence and launch only. Although no semantic formulas were proposed for either one of these two verbs, it is possible, I believe, to decide whether they do or do not belong in our field, whether, in other words, there are essential semantic associations between commence resp. launch, and begin and start.

Let us first look at the verb commence. The reader expects
a positive answer, for the verb was explicitly mentioned as a field member on p.450, and analyzed to some extent on pp.451-452. There can be no doubt that *commence* is a field member: the examples given supra demonstrate that it is a "verb about a verb", and that its formula must contain the components contained in [3].

The verb *launch* does not belong in our axiological field. It *derives* that part of its meaning which comes close to the value of words such as *begin* and *start* from its core meaning, which is present, for instance, in phrases such as "launch a sea vessel" or "launch a rocket". Once a sea vessel or a rocket is launched, it *begins* its first cruise, or exploration, or flight etc. *Launch* itself can assume, by extension, the meaning of the verb *begin*, but it keeps at the same time its connotation of "fanfare publicity" (as in *launch a business*, which means approximately the same as *begin/start a business*; cp. HAYAKAWA & FLETCHER 1971:39).

Stated otherwise, the *dispersional field* (cp. Part One, Chapter Two, p.27) of *launch* may interfere with that of, e.g., *begin* or *start*.

Very briefly, I wish to raise the question as to what happens as soon as we no longer talk about verbs only. Speaking in general, one could say that each verb (or noun, adjective, adverb, etc.), before it can be declared a member of our axiological field, must enter into an essential semantic association, either with at least one other verb (noun, adjective, adverb...), or with at least one field member belonging to another part of speech. Obviously, it is not enough that all verbs are linked together among one another, and all nouns and adjectives etc. also, without
there being any relations between words belonging to different parts of speech. Some nouns, for instance, might be quite isolated in our field: the noun *starter* is a field member, in one of its readings because of an essential semantic association with other nouns (such as *beginner*), and in the other one because of its essential semantic association with the verb *start* in its causative use.

3.4. Whereas Porzig's fields usually consist of only one essential semantic association, an axiological field contains many more such associations, not only between words belonging to different parts of speech, but also between words belonging to the same part of speech (cp. above). As the presence, in one field, of words belonging to several parts of speech is a prototypical feature of the Porzigian approach, and as, on the other hand, the presence of several words of the same part of speech is typical for a Trierian field, an axiological field is nothing else but a synthesis between the views of Jost Trier and all of his followers, on the one side, and those of Walter Porzig and some of his followers, on the other side.

Sadly enough, a majority of semanticists, even today, still consider the Trierian and Porzigian approaches as fundamentally opposed and entirely antithetic. A sterile question which could be avoided by opting for a synthesis is the one which asks which field type is primary, and which one secondary. As so many questions raised by linguists, this one has been answered in totally opposite ways. According to MÜLLER (1965:219-220), Porzig's fields and his own "Sprachfelder" are primary; for KÜHLWEIN (1967:49) on the
other hand, Porzig's approach builds "die zweite Dimension" ['the second dimension'; emphasis added].

Those who really have underlined the complementarity of both viewpoints can be counted on the fingers of one hand. Porzig himself believed, from 1950 onwards, that the two field types (einbegreifend and aufteilend ['dividing'] in 1950, and syntaktisch and parataktisch in 1957) naturally complement one another: there is no competition (33). SCHWARZ (1975:359-360) quotes part of a letter in which Porzig approves the decision (34) to bring the structure of a lexical paradigm to the surface by means of an extended application of his (Porzig's) methodology. The same technique has been used by KÜHLWEIN (1967), whose method (not "whose field"!) rests (cp. 1967:50) on a "Synthese der beiden grossen Feldtheorien im Lichte der jüngeren Linguistik" ['a synthesis of the two important field theories in the light of the latest developments in linguistics'] (35).

There has been, as far as I can see, only one attempt (previous to mine) at a synthesis, not of methodology, but of actual field types: that synthesis is in one of the earliest papers by Adrienne Lehrer (cp. LEHRER 1969). In it, one does encounter some references to Lyons - but these, unfortunately, are misleading: only in 1977 will Lyons talk about the "totality of syntagmatic and paradigmatic relations in a particular lexical field" (LYONS 1977:264), and define a lexical field as a "paradigmatically and syntagmatically structured subset of the vocabulary" (ibid.:268). Echoes of this textbook definition can be found in theoretical work, e.g. SIDU-VRANCEAHU (1981:357) (36), and in the introduction to VILELA's (1980) investigation of a "lexical field" in
Portuguese (37).

Lehrer herself states (l.c.:39) : "Syntagmatic presuppositions (kick with a foot, lambs bleat) and productive or partially productive word-building processes also constitute an important part of the lexical field and should be studied along with the paradigmatic sets". This is not an empty declaration of principles : the author's analysis of cooking terms includes "a basic set of verbs and formally and semantically related nouns and adjectives" (ibid.). Lehrer's field and, I believe, the notion of an axiological field, are the natural outcome of, roughly, fifty years of field semantics.

4. THE STRUCTURE OF AN "AXIOLOGICAL FIELD"

4.1. It cannot be doubted that there is more to semantic description than "the mere relating of all the items of a field to a common concept" (BALLWEG-SCHRAMM 1981:464). "Lexical fields", as LUTZEIER (1983b:148) puts it, "are not just collections of words, lexical fields are structured sets" (emphasis added) (38). Elsewhere, Lutzeier correctly points out that the notion of "structure" is to be further defined : "we shall not achieve anything by merely paying lip-service to the term 'structure' - which always sounds good" (1982:13). It is probably true that, for an axiological field as for any other field type, several structures can be proposed (cp. GARRIGUES/BONAN 1971:72). But all those structures would not be equivalent (39). Therefore, a choice must be made : we have to establish the
structure of an axiological field, the one that is better than all the others (40).

When one thinks about it, the following conditions have to be met (about the same as in section 3., where we were dealing with matters of delimitation):

a) recurrence: in the interest of uniformity, and in order to facilitate contrastive research, all axiological fields in the lexicon must have the same basic structure;

b) "linguisticity": the structure of an axiological field must be purely linguistic - and this implies, among other things, that it is not to be represented by means of circles, ovals, graphics, trees, matrices or anything like that;

c) compatibility with the claim for completeness (i.e. with the prerequisites for the study of lexical structures outlined in section 2.).

Until a short time ago, it was generally believed that recurrence was a feature that no field structure could ever possess. Somehow, everybody (not just a handful of rather uninformative authors, as in the case of delimitation) seemed to subscribe to BETZ's (1954:198) claim that problems of structure had to be dealt with each time again, and on an independent basis ("ohne ein vorgefasstes Feldschema") (41). A great deal of authors writing right now still come up with structures peculiar to their own field, i.e. to no other field but theirs. All of them are unfamiliar with (or do not believe in) the works of Mario Alinei (42).

4.2. There was a time when Alinei spoke of a "semantic field" (It. campo semantico) including words belonging to just one part of speech (ALINEI 1971). That view was soon
replaced, with the publication of Alinei’s monograph (again in Italian) on the structure of the lexicon (ALINEI 1974). There, for the first time, the author proposed to define lexical structures (which he did not call “fields”; co. p.437) centered around several parts of speech. The idea was further developed, and gave ultimately rise to what Alinei himself came to call (1984a:155) “il modello proposizionale” ['the propositional model']. I feel I must shortly describe what that model is about, since much of Alinei’s work on semantics has up to now simply been ignored, possibly because most of it was written in Italian (43).

Not yet in 1974, but starting from 1980, Alinei describes the structure of a semantic field as follows:

a) a **semantic** field has a **syntactic** structure, i.e. a structure which, in all respects, looks like a **proposition**;

b) each **constituent** of that proposition is to be viewed as a "cover term", i.e. as a representative for an entire taxonomy.

Ad a). Alinei’s first suggestion is so novel that, in 1984, he still feels he has to repeat it on various occasions (44). There is, according to ALINEI (1984a:138), a fundamental identity between the **implicit** structure of a semantic field and the **explicit** structure of a (simple or complex) sentence. The sentence constituents, on the other hand, contract among one another a number of syntactic relations, and it is these relations which convey to a field its structure (45).

In general terms, the structure of any semantic field would be "an abstract and fixed syntactic structure" (1980a:79) such as [8] - where the suspension dots ("...") express the
possible presence of other complements.

[8] Someone does something in a certain way in a certain place with a certain tool because of a certain cause...

At the most basic level, the general syntactic structure would consist of at least an SB (subject), PD (predicate), OB (object), IO (indirect object), LOC (locative), TIME, INSTR (instrumental), COMIT (comitative), CAUS (complement of cause), MANN (complement of manner), and AM (complement of amount), each one with their possible modifiers. For Alinei, SB, PD, DO etc. are "axiomatic", and result from a set of "rewriting rules".

If we take as an illustration Alinei's own example, we obtain, for the "drinking field", an "analytic sentence" (ibid.:92) such as [9].

[9] Drinkers drink drinks in drinking places at drinking time from drinking vessels...

This, admittedly, does not sound very attractive. But that does not matter at all. A sentence which is at the same time more complete and less analytic, while still representing the structure of the drinking field, would be [10] (ibid.:79).


[10], probably, exhausts the structure of the drinking field: one has to consider that some constituents are not represented in particular fields (for instance, COMIT in the case of the drinking field).

Ad b). In order to describe what it means to say that the
different constituents of the propositional structure of a particular semantic field are "cover terms", nothing is better than a concrete example. Always in [10], the subject drinker represents, for instance (in an arbitrary order; cp. ALINEI 1980a:80):

[11] drinker, boozar, wino, sipper, taster, bibber, lush, tippler, alcoholic, dipsomaniac, drunkard, bloat, sponge, soaker, sot, toper, tosspot, teetotaler, teetotalist...

Alinei himself calls the set of words of which a subset appears in [11] a taxonomy. In the case of an axiological field, that is probably an inappropriate name (cp. below). Besides, in conceptual axiology, SB, PD, DO etc. are certainly not the "axiomatic features" Alinei says they are: they will by no means, at least not as such, be part of the meaning or value of any word found in any axiological field.

Apart from all that, Alinei's suggestions are everything we need in order to define what the structure of our own field type looks like: notice that the coordination of two field members belonging to several parts of speech can be seen as a short form or reduction of a proposition (cp. HARD 1969:7), or at least of a syntagm (i.e. part of a proposition). The three requirements listed in section 4.1. (p.470) are largely satisfied: recurrence and compatibility with the claim for completeness were guaranteed already in the 1974 model (46), and remain so in the propositional model itself; on the other hand, there is nothing more linguistic than a sentence or a proposition. I was particularly pleased to find the following statement in ALINEI (1980a:81): "it is obvious that comparison of the same L[exical] S[ystem]s in different
languages offers a scientific approach to interlinguistic studies (including translation), as well as useful materials for structural semantics" (emphasis added).

I must add, before returning to our "test field", that Alinei's framework is in fact much richer than what I have tried to express just now. It should be pointed out that much of it is strictly irreconcilable with the non-transformational and conceptual approach to semantics espoused in this dissertation. In fact, I only take over Alinei's most fundamental idea: viz., to repeat it once again, that the structure of a field is basically a syntactic structure.

4.3. I found it relatively easy to write out in full the propositional structure of the axiological field, part of which was studied in Chapters Three, Five, and Seven. One possible representation is the utterance in [12]:

[12] In the end, the starting beginner persistently kept on with his co-starter until the finish.

All parts of speech (nouns, adjectives, verbs, adverbs, particles) are represented, and so too are the different sentence constituents for which there are words in our field. Beginner is SB (with its modifier), keep is PD (with its modifier MANN persistently), finish is LOC, end is TIME, and co-starter is COMIT. For the other categories (the complete list is at p.411), there seem to be no lexicalizations as far as English is concerned. Notice that, at least in the axiological field under scrutiny (but probably in other fields as well), modifiers of SB can also
occur as modifiers as COMIT. Furthermore, a noun such as end

As in Alinei's propositional model, each syntactic

constituent of the utterance in [12] has a representative

function. However, what is represented is not, as I must now

try to show, a taxonomy (47). In order to keep the

argumentation simple, I shall limit myself to verbs only, and

look at their most prototypical use (TO- or ING-

constructions).

Consider the verbs begin, start, and commence. For begin

and start, formulas were proposed from which it can be

inferred that start equals begin, plus the component in [13].

[13] one did not know at that time:
       Z will happen at t/there will be Z at t

In other words, following BAUMGÄRTNER (1967:174), one could

say:

[14] When one starts to do something, one begins
to do something.

Begin and start would be at different levels of a taxonomy,

a situation which could be represented as in [15]. (A branch

leading to dots is an indication for an unspecified number of

branches.)

[15]

   begin
     /   \
    start ... 

For the verb commence, no formula was proposed. Still, it

is clear that it would not be at the same taxonomic level

with begin (it is too marked for that). However, at this

475
stage, without further research, it appears impossible to say whether the taxonomy, after *commence* has been included, would have to look as in [16a], [16b], or [16c].

![Diagram](image)

[16a]     begin
       / \
      /   \
start - ...

[16b]     begin
       / \
      /   \
commence - ...

[16c]     begin
       /|
      / |
commence - start - ...

The situation is entirely different in the case of *continue* and *keep*. Either verb has components which the other one does not have, and therefore they are not related in the same way as, say, *begin*, *start*, and *commence*. Their relationship would have to be expressed on a horizontal line:

[17]     continue - keep

Similarly, each one of the verbs *cease*, *stop*, and *finish* (we do not consider *end*, which does not occur in the frames considered in the present argumentation) has at least one component which at least one of the other verbs does not have. Again, we would have only one level:

[18]     cease - stop - finish

In itself, all this is no evidence against the "taxonomic approach" : *keep*, for instance, (and possibly *continue* as well) has branches leading to lower levels, so that [17] would have to be completed as follows:
[19] \( \text{continue} \rightarrow \text{keep} \)

? \( \rightarrow ? \) \( \rightarrow \ldots \) \( \rightarrow \ldots \)

[18], most likely, could be completed as well, and assume the shape of a taxonomy. We now have three taxonomies, and we may wish to link them together. There is no problem as long as only \text{begin}, \text{continue}, and \text{keep} are taken into account. As both \text{continue} and \text{keep} have components which \text{begin} does not have, whereas \text{begin} has components which \text{continue} and \text{keep} do not have, all three verbs must belong to one taxonomic level. That one level is given in [20]:

[20] \( \text{begin} \rightarrow \text{continue} \rightarrow \text{keep} \)

Now, the whole idea behind a taxonomy is that all the "taxonyms" (i.e. words belonging to one and the same level) share at least one common component which represents a higher level, and is lexicalized or not. Thus:

[21] \( \text{begin} \rightarrow \text{continue} \rightarrow \text{keep} \)

Clearly, there is one component which is shared by the three verbs in [21], viz. the component in [7]. Problems arise as soon as we also look at the verbs in [18], which do not have that component. Hence, no component can be found which is shared by all seven verbs. They are, therefore, not part of one and the same taxonomy. From all this, we can only draw the conclusion that at least two taxonomies are involved. PD, in [12], must then be viewed as a representative of two taxonomies, and this is an untenable
viewpoint. The only practical solution to this problem is to abandon the concept of a taxonomy altogether, and to replace it with a notion introduced in section 2. viz., the notion of paradigm.

In conceptual axiology, a paradigm is not defined à la LOUNSBURY (1964) (cp. note 22). It is merely a set of words belonging to the same part of speech, and apt to fill the same slot in the propositional structure of the axiological field. As a consequence, an axiological field (unlike a lexical field à la Coseriu) consists of several paradigms; more precisely, it consists of as many paradigms as there are slots in the propositional structure.

One final question arises: how are the different members of one paradigm linked to one another, if not as "taxonyms" in a taxonomy? Here, another suggestion by BAUMGÄRTNER (1967) (cp. p.475) could be integrated in our conceptual framework. He says (l.c.:194) that words within one paradigm (for him, as for so many others, a field is a paradigm) can be linked together in several ways, but mainly on the basis of the relations "X is Y", "X is not Y", "X has Y". In the field to which belong the aspectual verbs studied in Part Two, relations of the type "X has Y" apparently do not appear. "Is" is to be understood in its most natural acceptation, not in its mathematical (i.e. symmetrical) sense. With regard to begin and start, we will be allowed to say both [22a] and [22b]:

[22a] start is begin
[22b] begin is not start

This may look a little surprising; in fact, it is no more
surprising than the statement that a rose is a flower, but
that a flower is not per se a rose.

On the other hand, consider, as we did before, begin,
continue, and keep. All the statements in [23] will be
correct, and acceptable:

[23a] begin is not continue
[ b] continue is not keep
[ c] keep is not begin
[ d] begin is not keep
[ e] keep is not continue
[ f] continue is not begin

In my opinion, it does not make much sense to look for more
structure within particular paradigms. If we want to know
just in what sense "begin is not continue", it is sufficient
for us to look at the semantic formulas of the two verbs, in
order to discover where the differences are. The main
structure of an axiological field is in the way its paradigms
are linked together.

5. SOME FINAL CONSIDERATIONS ON CONCEPTUAL AXIOLOGY

In a private letter (dated 18/08/1987), Peter Rolf Lutzeier
states with slight bitterness: "I still think the theory of
lexical fields has not got the kind of attention it really
deserves in modern linguistics". Probal Dasgupta (private
correspondence, letter dated 28/12/1984) is more optimistic:
"I have a feeling", he writes, "that theoretical work on
semantic fields in the lexicon will come to occupy the centre
of linguistic attention in the 1990s". The present
dissertation was written at the end of the '80's - and its
author hopes that the notion of an "axiological field" will prove useful in many areas.

As a matter of fact, semantic field theory has already been shown to be of interest to language teachers (see, among many others, GEWEHR 1974, and MAIGUASHCA 1984), and there is no doubt that translators and translation theorists too should be "versed in field theory" (co. NEWMARK 1980:11, and, for a classic work, MOUNIN 1963). I believe, however, that for the study of translational adequacy an analysis, as exhaustive as possible, of one or more axiological fields in both the language of the original work and the language of its translation(s) should be available. Once enough preliminary studies such as the one in Part Two have been undertaken, it will be worth while to evaluate entire translations, to point out where they are successful, and where they fail. Hopefully, it will even be possible to write out new translations, which pick up the qualities of the existing ones, while preserving none of their various flaws.
NOTES to Part Three, Chapter Ten


(2) In comparison with Meillet, BETZ (1941:92) takes a slightly more reserved stand. For a reply, see SEIDEL (1941:27-28).

(3) VEITH (1971:348-355) studies, among other things, the use of E. field (and G. Feld-) in expressions such as field work, field techniques, field research etc. MALKIEL's (1974:271) remark on the "irksons conflict between G. Feld and E. field (as in field work, for which Geems use Aufnahmen an Ort und Stelle)" proves that, at the time of writing, he had not seen Veith's highly informative contribution on linguistic terminology.

(4) SCHEEL (1955:257) and JÄGER (1959:7-8) comment upon Betz using exactly the same words - which seems to indicate that there has been plagiarism. For both authors, Betz suggests "grundsätzlich nur von "Sinnbezirken" zu sprechen, da es Felder im geometrischen oder physischen Sinn des Begriffs in der Sprache nicht gibt" ['to speak in terms of "semantic areas" only, for in language there are no fields in the geometrical or physical sense of the word'].

(5) GUIRAUD's (1955, 2nd ed.:86; 9th ed.:91) remarks on système have lost their actuality (cp. GECKELER 1976:139). Guiraud says that the notions of field and system must not be mixed up: "le champ sémantique est bien un ensemble de relations d'où chaque terme tire sa motivation, mais de relations non nécessaires et non systématisques" ['A semantic field is a set of relations on which every term relies for its motivation; but these relations are neither necessary nor systematic']. Notice that GUIRAUD (1956) makes full use of the terms système and structure; but he warns his readers not to give them their phonological or morphological meaning.

(6) See, e.g., SPITZER (1942:197); ÖHMAN (1951:85); MOUNIN (1965a:43); TRIER (1968:16); SOUR (1969:945); PAQUOT (1973:2).

(7) See also SCHURF (1982:6), and GIPPER (1984:18).

(8) Both microstructure and macrostructure are used in about the same way as in CAZACU (1957), G. WOTJAK (1970), B. WOTJAK (1982), andvardar (1985). BALDINGER (1984) has a different option: according to him, even a set of words may be a micro-structure. GSELL (1979:44) finds the distinction artificial, but his arguments are unconvincing.
(9) **Begriffsfeld**, used for single words, already appears in MEYER (1932). FIERZ (1943) uses **Bezeichnungsfeld** with reference to one word. For some extremely early occurrences in Italian, see MERIGGI (1934, 1938). Other early work (pre-Baldinger, cp. below) includes STAUB (1949) and KOLL (1958).


(12) Other authors include REICHELT (1964) and B. WOTJAK (1982).

(13) Two papers of Baldinger's, both published in 1960, provide a nice illustration of this "blending": the words hospes and hôte (Lat. and F. resp.) belong to a **Begriffsfeld** (1960b:125); the words malifatius and mauvais (same remark), to a **Bezeichnungsfeld** (1960c:89).

(14) See BALLY (1940); ULLMANN (1951, 1952, 1962, 1964 etc.); DUCHÁČEK (1960a,b); de BUSTOS TOVAR (1967); ULRICH (1969), HOLEC (1974).

(15) Cp., for an "associational field" at the level of one word, Part One, Chapter Two, p.27.

(16) This is particularly obvious in the case of both Bally's and de Bustos Tovar's field.

(17) See Ullmann, Ducháček, and Ulrich.

(18) A theoretical paper (PEETERS forthcoming e) is currently being prepared, which sketches, with far more details than it is possible to provide here, **how** the notion of "axiological field" grew out of the concepts of "associative field" and of "value".

(19) HIDORTH (1956:58) proposes a distinction between "field research" and "special word investigations". In the latter case, "a group of words is investigated, but without asserting that the group is a linguistic field". A suggestion worth while to be remembered?

(20) PORZIG (1957:120) errs when he states that the early attempts to describe fields involved "nur Substantive oder nur Adjektive oder nur Verben oder nur Adverbien oder nur Prapositionen" ['only nouns or only adjectives or only verbs or only adverbs or only prepositions']. A similar statement (about all [!] fields previously described) can still be found in RAIBLE (1981:32). The criticisms referred to came from reviewers such as WITTE (1932:28), and from later authors such as ÖHMAN (1951:83) and LYONS (1963:48).
(21) Cp. e.g., BERGENHOLTZ (1980:39) and VILELA (1980:218), and also the references quoted below.

(22) Cp. COSERIU (1966), and also id. (1968:8, 1971:304-305, 1977:185). It has become quite common in linguistics to identify the notions of "field" and "lexical paradigm". I refer the reader to, for instance, APRESJAN (1966:45); ERBEN/MOSER (1971:241); ESCOBEDO RODRÍGUEZ (1980:115); GECKELER (1971:218); LUTZEIER (1980:294-295, 1982:passim, 1983b:48-49); ULLAND (1970:10); VERMEER (1972:60); WIEGAND/WOLSKI (1975:34); ZATELLI (1978:19). In none of the works quoted is the notion of "paradigm" defined as a kind of "ideal" taxonomy, as is often done in linguistic anthropology (cp. LOUNSBOURY 1964).

(23) A similar search for "simplicity" appears outside the Tübingen school as well: cp. LUTZEIER (1982:17, 1983a:157). The same author holds (1982:11) that the study of one part of speech instead of two or more provides "more interesting semantic information".

(24) One sentence in Schwarz's paper was lost sight of by GECKELER (1971:218), and by those who referred to him. As a result, Schwarz was made an advocate of the "one-grammatical-category-view". The sentence overlooked says "dass die Kluft zwischen den Wortarten nicht unüberwindlich ist, dass selbst für die idg. Sprachen polaren Gattungen Nomen und Verb (...) sich manchmal als Feldnachbarn zusammenfinden" ['that the gap between the parts of speech is not unbridgeable, that even in the IE languages the opposite categories of noun and verb often meet as neighbors in one field'; emphasis added].

(25) The inclusion of names (ADRADOS 1977:9), as opposed to nouns, is probably a less wise thing to do.

(26) References in 2.3. and in 2.5. are to the second part of the bibliography.

(27) In American English, the word starter also refers to what is known elsewhere as an appetizer or an entree, i.e. the first part of a multi-course meal. Compare:

[i] Whether you call them entrees or starters, choosing the right appetiser when planning a meal is a question of balance. /AM,22/23-10-88/


views. "Champ contextuel", in Ducháček, is a new name for an older champ sémantique (as defined in DUCHÁČEK 1959, 1960a, 1960b).


(33) Cp. PORZIG (1950:73), and (1957:125).

(34) Illustrated at length in SCHWARZ (1953); cp. also the theoretical considerations in SCHWARZ (1959:251-252, 1975:356).

(35) Other authors who view the Trierian and Porzigian approaches as complementary include BARTH (1974) and LYONS (1977). The latter talks about "the apparently opposed, but in fact complementary, views of Trier and Porzig" (LYONS 1977:266-267). Pace LYONS (ibid.:261), Trier’s own position always remained quite obscure, and deliberately vague.

(36) Elsewhere in her paper (1981:352), Bidu-Vranceanu makes the bizarre observation that the network of associations would become too small if no other than paradigmatically related "lexemes" were taken into account. Rememoer that the same author, five years earlier, had decided for a "polyparadigmatic view", apparently because the number of paradigmatically related lexemes to be considered was too high (cp. pp.447-448).

(37) Vilela’s definition does not correspond to anything palatable at all: the body of his work is devoted to the analysis of a field which in all respects is a paradigm of words.

(38) The same or a similar point is made by a variety of other authors: see, e.g., KÜHLWEIN (1967:36), BRAUN (1968:166), GÜCUR (1969:945,951), BURGER (1972:12), and BALLWEG-SCHRAMM (l.c.). Braun and Burger both believe that the term "field" is only to be used for sets of words which are clearly structured. According to Braun, the term "Sinnbezirk" is not subject to any such condition; the same writer’s discovery of "Sinnbezirke" which are no "Wortfelder" is due to the fact that Braun is not sufficiently aware of the distinction between values and realized values.

(39) This, again, has been often underlined. Cp., for instance, ADRADOS (1971a:22), and VILELA (1980:306-308).

(40) In his "sprachliches Feld", ROSENGREN (1966:101) finds "nicht nur eine semantische Struktur, sondern mehrere sich Überschneidende Strukturen, die alle etwas über die Bedeutungen der Wörter aussagen" ['not only one, but several interpenetrating structures, all of which have something to say about the meanings of the words considered']. I myself consider this type of result to be unsatisfactory: an axiological field must have one global structure.

verzichten, ein durchgehendes Schema welcher Art auch immer finden zu wollen" ['We do have to give up every hope ever to find a recurrent scheme of any kind']; PETERS (1967:20): "Das Gefüge jedes Wortfeldes ist zweifellos einmalig, und so lässt sich keine allgemeingültige Regel aufstellen, wie man Wortfelder aufzugliedern hat" ['The structure of each word field is beyond any doubt unique, and therefore no generally valid rule can be devised telling one how to articulate word fields'].

(42) A quasi-recurrent model for structuring fields ("un cadre théorique souvent valable") based on GREIMAS’s (1966) "modele actancial" appears in POTTIER (1988). I still find it quite less attractive than the suggestions made by Alinei, and I will not deal with it here.

(43) Alinei’s two English papers on semantics (ALINEI 1980a & 1980b) were published in the Quaderni di semantica, a journal which, in my opinion, has not really come "off the ground". Its Italian title may well have deterred the average Anglo-Saxon reader, so that Alinei’s views remain relatively unknown outside Italy, and Holland (where Alinei teaches). What is better: to be ignored, as Alinei is, or to be misunderstood, as Porzig was?

(44) What follows is just a selection of quotes intelligible even without translation: "la struttura primaria del campo semantico è quella della proposizione" (1984a:143); "la natura del campo semantico è proposizionale" (ibid.:146); "il campo semantico ha la struttura di una proposizione" (ibid.:147).

(45) Cp. ALINEI (1984a:147): "sono questi rapporti che determinano la strutturazione del campo e lo identificano in quanto tale" ['these relations determine the structuration of the field and identify it as such'].

(46) An American reviewer (LEE 1977:474) wrote, with regard to recurrence: "Alinei’s most important advance is that he sets out to find a structure for the entire lexicon - rather than merely limited sections of it, which may have an easily recognizable structure, but which do not shed light on the vocabulary as a whole". Cp. also, on ALINEI (1974), BECKS (1981:351).

(47) On the concept of "taxonomy", see now CRUSE (1986:136-156), and also my comments in PEETERS (1988).
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