USE OF THESES

This copy is supplied for purposes of private study and research only. Passages from the thesis may not be copied or closely paraphrased without the written consent of the author.
THE STRUGGLE FOR FORMALIST ISLAM IN SOUTH SULAWESI: FROM DARUL ISLAM (DI) TO KOMITE PERSIAPAN PENEGAKAN SYARIAT ISLAM (KPPSI)

By

Hamdan Juhannis

A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Faculty of Asian Studies

Australian National University

July 2006
TABLE OF CONTENTS

THE STRUGGLE FOR FORMALIST ISLAM IN SOUTH SULAWESI: FROM DARUL ISLAM (DI) TO KOMITE PERSIAPAN PENEGAKAN SYARIAT ISLAM (KPPSI) i

TABLE OF CONTENTS ii
LIST OF MAP, ILLUSTRATIONS AND TABLES vi
ABSTRACT vii
STATEMENT OF ORIGINALITY viii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ix
TIMELINE xiii
NOTE ON SPELLING AND TRANSLITERATION xv
GLOSSARY AND ABBREVIATIONS xvi

INTRODUCTION 1
A. The Journey of Formalist Islam in South Sulawesi: From DI to KPPSI 3
B. How DI and KPPSI Have Been Observed 5
   1. Islamic-Discounting Discourses 6
   2. Islamic-Centric Discourses 10
D. Objectives and Methodology 17

Chapter One

ISLAMIC MODERNISM, KAHAR MUZAKKAR AND DI 22
A. The Modernist Setting 23
B. Kahar Muzakkar and Rebellion 32
   1. Kahar Muzakkar’s Life: Education and Personality 32
   4. Kahar Muzakkar and DI (1952-1965) 44
C. DI’s Supporters 54
Chapter Two

KAHAR MUZAKAKAR AND DI: REGIONALISM OR RELIGION? 60
A. Kahar Muzakkar’s Religio-Political Thinking 61
  1. From Defender to Opponent of Pancasila 63
  2. Islamic Democracy Versus Soekarno’s ‘Majapahatism’ 65
  3. Islam Versus Other Ideologies 67
  4. From Islamic Federalism towards a Caliphate System 69
B. The Genesis of DI: Islam, Tradition or Regional Assertion? 72
C. Ideological Rivalries 81

Chapter Three

DI’S EXPANSION, MODIFICATION AND CRISIS (1953 – 1965) 89
A. The Expansion of Ideological Influences 89
B. Joining RPI: Unfinished Islamised Rebellion 93
C. The Creation of RPII: Between Islamic Idealism and Illusion 98
D. The Road to the End of the Rebellion: an Ideological Perspective 106
E. Sanusi Daris’ RFS: An Obsessive Ideological Continuation 115

Chapter Four

IMPLEMENTING ISLAM: WHICH ISLAM? 123
A. The Formal Effort of Conception in Implementing Islamic Law 124
  1. Catatan Batin (Spiritual Notes): A Call for a Simple, Pious Life 124
  2. Piagam Makalua (Makalua Charter): An Islamist Framework 129
  3. Program Politik Islam Revolusioner (Revolutionary Islamic Political Programs): The Ten Guidelines 137
B. Institutional Efforts at Implementing Islamic Law 139
  1. Momoc Ansharullah: Law Enforcement Soldiers 140
  2. Dewan Fatwa: The Co-opted Ulama? 143

Chapter Five

KPPSI: NEWLY FORMALISED OR ROMANTICISED ISLAMIC MOVEMENT? 150
A. Post-DI Islamism: Changes and Continuities 151
B. The Road to KPPSI’s Establishment: The Failure of the New Order 157
C. KUI I: The Establishment of Wadah Perjuangan (Means of Struggle) 164
### Chapter Six

**KONSOLIDATING KPPSI: THE TRANSITION FROM MILITANCY TO MODERATION**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Pressing Formal Authority</td>
<td>187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>KUI II: An Intensified Demand for Syariat</strong></td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Distancing Themselves from the Claim of Terrorist Networking</td>
<td>197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>KUI III: Syariat at the Kabupaten (Regency) Level</strong></td>
<td>205</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Chapter Seven

**KPPSI’S VIEWS ON SYARIAT: TOWARDS A FORMAL AUTHORITY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Politico-Religious Concepts</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. ‘Political House’ for Formalised Syariat</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The Proposed Islamic Special Autonomy Constitution</td>
<td>213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>KPPSI’s Legal Concepts</strong></td>
<td>222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. The Nature of Formalised Syariat: The Enforcement of Nahi Mungkar</td>
<td>223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Dakwah against Secularism and Jihad</td>
<td>226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Intisari Syariat Islam: A Preliminary Concept of Islamic law</td>
<td>229</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Chapter Eight

**OPPOSITION TO FORMALIST ISLAM AND ITS IMPACT ON KPPSI**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Opposition from Muslim Intellectuals: Which Syariat?</td>
<td>269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>B. Opposition from the Minorities: Can Churches Still be Built?</strong></td>
<td>273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>C. Opposition from the Provincial Government: Is Formalist Islam accepted by society?</strong></td>
<td>277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>D. Opposition from Women Intellectuals</strong></td>
<td>282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>E. The Response of the Mainstream Muslim Organisations: An Ambivalent Attitude?</strong></td>
<td>286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>F. KPPSI’s Change of Strategies and Softening Stance</strong></td>
<td>292</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### CONCLUSION

**BIBLIOGRAPHY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. List of Interviews</td>
<td>317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>B. Primary Sources</strong></td>
<td>321</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. Archival Materials 321
2. Monographs and Articles 322
C. Secondary Sources 326
  1. Monographs and theses 326
  2. Articles and Unpublished Papers 333
  3. Articles without Specific Authors (Magazines and Newspapers) 340

LIST OF APPENDICES 344
LIST OF MAP, ILLUSTRATIONS AND TABLES

between pages

Map

1. Sulawesi Island 3 - 4

Illustrations

1. Kahar Muzakkar and Soekarno at Ikada gathering in 1945 38 - 39
2. Kahar Muzakkar and his staff in Yogyakarta in 1946 39 - 40
3. J.W. Gerungan 53 - 54
4. Cory van Stenus 58 - 59
5. Kahar Muzakkar at the Bonepute Meeting in 1961 112 - 113
6. Muhammad Jusuf and Cory van Stenus in 1962 112 - 113
7. Sanusi Daris at Makassar Court in 1984 117 - 118
8. Ulama of DI 144 - 145
9. Abdul Aziz Kahar Muzakkar 172 - 173

Tables

1. RPII's Governmental Structure 100 - 101
2. The Governmental Structure of South Sulawesi DI 110 - 111
   a. The Structure of DI's Military Force
   b. The Structure of DI's Governmental System
   c. The Structure of DI's Home Ministerial Representative
3. The Structure of KPPSI's Board 169 - 170
ABSTRACT

This thesis studies the dynamics of two Islamic formalist movements in South Sulawesi: Darul Islam (DI) (1953-1965) and Komite Persiapan Penegakan Syariat Islam (Preparatory Committee for the Upholding of Islamic law, KPPSI) (2000 – present time). This thesis challenges some of the existing literature on DI and KPPSI which has tended to discount Islam as an important factor and argues for religious sentiment as a primary factor shaping the two movements.

As formalist Islamic movements, both DI and KPPSI regard Islam as inseparable from state affairs. According to them, Muslims must struggle to make their faith a legitimate political power that can direct the life of the community, and Islamic symbols and practices should dominate the public sphere. The two movements differed only in the way they pursued their struggle. DI was strongly dependent on a single leader, Kahar Muzakakar, while KPPSI was led by a number of senior figures. The DI movement struggled to create an Islamic state, while KPPSI sought Special Autonomy in South Sulawesi in order to implement Islamic law. DI pursued its goal through revolutionary activity and rebellion while KPPSI employs largely constitutional means.

The section on DI focuses on the centrality of religious factors in the movement’s rise and demise, even though initially the rebellion (1950) had an obvious regionalist element as well. Through the discussion of the phases of its struggle, this section shows how formalistic Islamic teachings were implemented inside DI and how this commitment continued well after the movement’s collapse in the mid 1960s. In the post-Soeharto era, this formalist intent was reviewed with the founding of KPPSI. The second half of this thesis analyses the nature of this movement, its ideology and strategy. It provides a description of the political expediencies of the KPPSI movement to reach its religious objectives. It analyzes the movement’s concepts in its effort to meet its demand and the ideological opposition from elements of South Sulawesi society, included the accusation of its attachment to the so-called violent Islamic movement. However, the dynamics of the movement itself in re-orienting its socio-political role, enables it to survive and promote Islamisation in the province.
STATEMENT OF ORIGINALITY

This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma in any university or other institution.

To the best of my knowledge, it contains no material previously published or written by another person, except where due reference is made in the text of the thesis.

(Hamdan Juhannis)
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Many people have inspired me in preparing this dissertation. First and foremost, Dr. Greg Fealy, my lecturer and later my supervisor, has significantly shaped my views during my study at the Australian National University (ANU). Taking his lecturing and Reading courses on Indonesian Islam, prior to my candidature, then working under his supervision, have been a great chance for me to learn how to look critically at issues in Indonesian Islam. He taught me to be rigorous in analyzing and writing on Islam in South Sulawesi, especially when he saw me undertaking research on Islam in South Sulawesi, my home province.

There are many ANU staff that contributed to my intellectual development during my candidature. My advisors Dr. Kathryn Robinson, Prof. Barry Hooker and Prof. Harold Crouch, advisors who gave me enlightenment on Islamic law, and political and regional issues. I would also express my sincere thanks to Professor Virginia Hooker, who has acted as ibu (mother), by showing concern not only for my intellectual needs, but also dispensing valuable advice, especially in the earlier part of my study at ANU. I am also grateful to Professor M.C. Ricklefs, who offered some earlier critical views on my topic during my attendance at two of the ANU-Melbourne University workshops in Mount Beauty, Victoria.

I would like to express my gratitude to AusAID, which provided me with an Australian Development Scholarship (ADS), and allowed me to study in Australia with full financial support. The same appreciation also goes to the Faculty of Asian Studies that provided research funds for my one-year research in Indonesia and for attending several conferences.

I am deeply indebted to Dr. Christine Campbell, research fellow in the Faculty of Asian Studies, for giving me tutorials in writing and for editing this dissertation. She untiringly took care of my drafts, trimming and refining the text where necessary, and often putting aside her own writing to help me meet my own deadlines. They often also advised me on the thesis writing by providing her illuminating comments during the checking of my draft.

I also would like to mention the assistance of several staff who helped me adapt to the demands of studying at ANU. I have grateful memories of Dr. Marshall Clark, a visiting lecturer in Asian Studies at ANU in 2002-2003, who first gave an opportunity to be
a tutor of Indonesian language and culture where I could better explore academic life in Australia. I also thank Dr. Tim Hassell, who gave me further opportunities to continue my work as a tutor in the faculty, Dr. George Quinn who generously enriched my knowledge of teaching, and Mr. Amrih Widodo who offered me valuable advice on my research topic.

My special gratitude goes to Dr. Minako Sakai who gave me a chance to teach Indonesian at the Australian Defence Force Academy (ADFA), UNSW, where I was further involved by daily academic discussions with her and with academic staff, in sharpening my analysis of my research topic. Another ADFA staff, Dr. Edwin Jurens was also very helpful in advising on improvement in my research.

Of course, this thesis would not exist without the great help of many former DI leaders and present KPPSI activists. Of the former DI leaders, I would like to express my appreciation of Ahmad Marzuki Hasan, Nurdin Usman Pisof, Harun Rasyid Abdie, Jufry Hamzah, Muhammad Ali AT, Hasan Ridwan, Andi Ngawi, Jusuf Makmur, Muhammad Ridwan, Lanre Said, Tommy Thomson, and many others who were very obliging and friendly in narrating the journey of the DI rebellion. I would also like to express my thanks to two former wives of Kahar Muzakkar, the late Cory van Stenus and Rawe, who were very informative about the life of Kahar Muzakkar. I would like to thank several former wives of DI leaders, chief among them Hadeyang, for her information on the role of wives of DI leaders in the jungle.

KPPSI activists also deserve my thanks for providing data on the movement. I would like to thank members of the board of KPPSI, all of whom received me very warmly whether in their houses or offices. I will specially mention Prof. Abdul Muin Salim, Ir. Abdul Aziz Kahar Muzakkar, Ir. Nur Abdurrahman, Drs. Azwar Hasan, M.Si, the late Prof. Abdurrahman A. Basalamah, Prof. Jalaluddin Rahman, Dr. Noer Bahry Noer, Dr. Hasyim Aidid, Kalmuddin, S.Pd, and many other KPPSI branch activists in Parepare, Bone, Luwu, Enrekang, and Bulukumba.

However, among KPPSI figures, I am particularly grateful to H.M. Sirajuddin, the secretary of Advisory Council of KPPSI, for his unfailing good temper in receiving me any time I visited him and his willingness to pick up the phone any time I called. I would like to acknowledge his great help not only in giving me up to date information on the organisation, but also in supplying me with every single KPPSI document. Rahman Saleh, SE, an activist of KPPSI Parepare also deserves a mention for providing me with many newspaper clippings related to the movement.
Many figures including *ulama* and bureaucrats of South Sulawesi also need a mention for enlightening me through their vast knowledge of Islam and tradition in South Sulawesi. I would like to thank AG. Jamaluddin Amien, AG. Sanuci Baco, Prof. Andi Rasdiyanah, AM. Fatwa, Husein Umar, Dr. Anhar Gonggong, Drs. Yusri Abady, Drs. Muhammad Yunus Tekeng, A. Patabai Pabokori, and Prof. Abu Hamid. My thanks also go to figures with their balanced information through their critical thoughts concerning Islamic formalist movement in South Sulawesi. Among them are Prof. M. Qasim Mathar, Prof. Hamka Haq, Prof. Rahim Yunus, Dr. S. Ruslan, Dr. Zakaria J. Ngelow, Father Sopamena, and Dr. Nurul Ilmi Idris.

A number of institutions in Indonesia also deserve my thanks. I would like to express my gratitude to the staff of *Pusat Sejarah Tentara Nasional Indonesia* (Indonesian National Forces, TNI) Jakarta for providing me with many materials on South Sulawesi DI. My thanks also go to the staff of *Pedoman Rakyat* Newspaper and National Library of Jakarta for their hospitality in providing historical News of DI 1960s, and the staff of *Fajar* and *Tribun Timur* newspapers for providing contemporary news on formalist Islam in South Sulawesi.

There are a lot of colleagues and friends in the Faculty of Asian Studies, especially in the New Annex, who contributed to the creation of this dissertation. Their warm friendship made my research exciting and stimulating. They are Daryono, Lukmanul Hakim, Hae Jing Park, Rommel A. Curraming, Ros Matthews, Simon Creak, Dr. Tomomi Ito, and Yon Machmudi. I would like to express appreciation to Dr. McComas Taylor, my Australian best friend and great mentor. In my eyes, he is a person of whom I can ask all manner of questions relating to studying and living in Australia, from thesis writing to the use of the colloquial term ‘no worries’.

I would like to thank the kindness of my best friends in making my research a success. Special among them are M. Saleh Tajuddin, for being a good friend to discuss things with, Nurafiah, for helping me to make transcripts of recorded interviews, Arskal Salim for enriching my knowledge on South Sulawesi Islamism, Dr. Amin Samad for sharing his knowledge of normative issues in Islam, and Ashari Yahya for reading and checking my draft. I also thank Jennifer Donohoe, who shared with me some contemporary articles she got from Sulawesi for her honours thesis, Sahabuddin, Syamsul Maarif, and Sadik Sabri who supplied me with historical materials on DI. Finally, my thanks to
Mulyono Domopuli who kindly provided me with a number of historical accounts on Islam in South Sulawesi, accounts that I myself never expected to have in my hands.

No amount of thanks can properly be expressed to my mother, Hj. Madinah, and to my mother-in-law, Suaidah, who always offered me emotional support while I studied overseas. Finally, my deepest gratitude goes to my beloved wife, Tini, for her full support and understanding of my work, and was therefore, often found asleep with my cute daughter, Alena, at midnight, when I returned home from the office. Alena is a special part of my life in Canberra with her frequently ‘endearing distraction’ as I tried to write my thesis. I dedicate this work to these two closest persons in my life.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1605</td>
<td>Gowa</td>
<td>King of Gowa, I Mangngarangi, accepted Islam.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1611</td>
<td>Bone</td>
<td>Conquered by Gowa and accepted Islam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1667</td>
<td>Gowa</td>
<td>The defeat of Gowa by the Dutch and the creation of Bongaya Treaty.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905-10</td>
<td>South Sulawesi</td>
<td>The Dutch military conquest of the whole region.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td>Surakarta</td>
<td>Sarekat Islam (Islamic Union, SI) was founded.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td>Yogyakarta</td>
<td>Muhammadiyah was founded.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916</td>
<td>Makassar</td>
<td>Sarekat Islam was established.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>Luwu</td>
<td>Kahar Muzakkar was born.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>Surabaya</td>
<td>Nahdlatul Ulama was founded.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>Makassar</td>
<td>Muhammadiyah was established.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>Solo</td>
<td>Kahar Muzakkar started his Muallimin School.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>Luwu</td>
<td>Kahar Muzakkar was ostracised.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>Jakarta</td>
<td>The proclamation of Indonesian independence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945-49</td>
<td>Java</td>
<td>Kahar Muzakkar involved in nationalist activities against the Dutch.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>East Java</td>
<td>Kartosuwirjo proclaimed Negara Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic State, NII).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>South Sulawesi</td>
<td>The formation of Kesatuan Gerilya Sulawesi Selatan (South Sulawesi Guerilla Union, KGSS).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>The Hague</td>
<td>The acknowledgement of Indonesian sovereignty by the Dutch.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>South Sulawesi</td>
<td>Andi Aziz Affair.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>The establishment of the Unitary Republic of Indonesia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>Makassar</td>
<td>Kahar Muzakkar and his troops withdrew to the jungle.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>South Sulawesi</td>
<td>Cadangan Tentara National (National Reserve National Army, CTN) was formed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>South Sulawesi</td>
<td>The formation of Tentara Kemerdekaan Rakyat (People’s Liberation Army, TKR).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>Makalua</td>
<td>The formation of Kahar Muzakkar’s Darul Islam as part of Kartosuwirjo’s NII.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>South Sulawesi</td>
<td>The creation of Momoc Ansharullah, Darul Islam’s special military force.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>South Sulawesi</td>
<td>The formation of Darul Islam’s Dewan Fatwa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>South Sulawesi</td>
<td>Kahar Muzakkar published Catatan Batin</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1955 Makalua The drafting of Piagam Makalua (Makalua Charter).

1958 West Sumatera and North Sulawesi Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia. (Revolutionary Government of Indonesian Republic, PRRI) and Perjuangan Semesta (Total Struggle, Permesta) was established.

1961 West Sumatera The formation of Republik Persatuan Indonesia (Indonesian United Republic, RPI).

1962 South Sulawesi The formation of Republik Persatuan Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic United Republic, RPII).

1965 Southeast Sulawesi Kahar Muzakkar shot dead by Tentara Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Forces, TNI).

1966 Indonesia Gerungan was arrested. The rise of the Soeharto’s New Order.

1982 Pinrang Sanusi Daris was arrested.

1984 Makassar Sanusi Daris was set free.

1984-85 Indonesia The making of Pancasila as the sole ideology

1991 Makassar Abdul Aziz Kahar led Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (Muslim Students Organisation, HMI) Makassar Branch

1998 Jakarta Soeharto resigned as President.

2000 Makassar Several Muslims conducted Open Dialogue for formalised Islamic law.

2000 Makassar Kongres Umat Islam Pertama (First Congress of South Sulawesi Muslim community) and the establishment of Komite Persiapan Pemberlakuan Syariat Islam (Preparation Committee for the Upholding of Islamic Law, KPPSI).

2000 Makassar Laskar Jundullah appeared as a paramilitary wing of KPPSI.

2001 Makassar Kongres Umat Islam Kedua (Second Congress of South Sulawesi Muslim Community).

2001 Makassar Laskar Jundullah was formally excluded from KPPSI.

2002 Manila Agus Dwikarna was arrested at Manila Airport and convicted to carrying explosive material.

2002 Makassar Bomb exploded in McDonalds and Haji Kalla showroom, Laskar Jundullah involved.

2004 Jakarta Abdul Aziz Kahar was elected as one of the four Dewan Perwakilan Daerah (Regional Representative Council, DPD) members representing South Sulawesi in the national parliament.

2005 Bulukumba Kongres Umat Islam Ketiga (Third Congress of South Sulawesi Muslim Community).
NOTE ON SPELLING AND TRANSLITERATION

There are a number of orthographical problems in writing DI and KPPSI. These concern the spelling of Indonesian names and the transliteration of Arabic terms.

Indonesian terms are spelt in accordance with current conventions set out in Kamus Besar Bahasa Indonesia (Balai Pustaka, Jakarta, 1994). Names of organisations and places also use the modern convention. For example, ‘Komando Grup Seberang’ is used rather than ‘Komando Groep Seberang’. For personal names, the common usage of an individual’s name and the most frequently apparent in official documents has been preferred. This is to permit readers to understand easily which individual is referred to. For example, ‘Kahar Muzakkar’ is used, rather than ‘Abdul Qahhar Mudzakkar’, the name preferred by him. ‘Usman Balo’ is used rather than ‘Oesman Balo’. Choosing the commonly accepted names also avoids the complicated spelling required by some individual’s preferred spelling. For example, Kahar Muzakkar wrote his name in the old spelling, ‘Abdoel Qahhar Mudzakkar’, though others have adjusted the name to agree with the current spelling, ‘Abdul Qahhar Muzakkar’.

In keeping with Indonesian practice, this thesis will use terms such as ulama, pesantren, and kabupaten to indicate both singular and plural meanings.

Specific problems are encountered in dealing with Arabic terms. These usually omit diacritical markings. To solve this problem, the Indonesian spellings of the Arabic terms are used but transliterations are given in brackets when the term first appears in the text. The transliteration system used is that recommended by the Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University, Montreal, Canada.
GLOSSARY AND ABBREVIATIONS

*abangan*: nominal Muslims.

*akhlak* (Ar. *akhlāq*): ethics; norms regulating the relationship between God and human, between human themselves, and between human and other creatures.

*amar maʻruf* (Ar. *al-Amar bi ʻl-maʻrūf*) enjoining good, an obligation on all Muslims

*anakarung*: literally, ‘child of an aristocrat’, the aristocratic strata in Bugis society.

*API*: Angkatan Pemuda Indonesia, Indonesian Youth Movement.

*APIS*: Angkatan Pemuda Indonesia Sulawesi, Indonesian Youth Movement of Sulawesi.

*aqidah* (Ar. *‘aqīdah*): Islamic creed. The term is usually reserved for a more complex expression of Islamic doctrine.

*as-Sunnah* (Ar. *al-Sunnah*): another term for *ḥadīth*

*atta*: a Bugis word, meaning slave.

*BBM*: Barisan Berani Mati, Guard Ready to Die.

*BKI*: Batalion Kesatuan Indonesia, Indonesian United Battalion.

*BKPRMI*: Badan Komunikasi Pemuda dan Remaja Masjid Indonesia, Communication Body of Indonesian Mosque Youth.

*bupati*: regent.

*Catatan Batin*: (Spiritual Note); written by Kahar Muzakkar in 1955 to enhance the spirit of struggle of his DI followers.

*CTN*: Cadangan Tentara Nasional, National Reserve Army.

*cultural Islam*: the struggle of Islam that emphasises cultural, intellectual and artistic forms of Islamic activism rather than political means.

*dakwah* (Ar. *daʻwah*): Islamic missionary activities; proselytising efforts.

*Darul Istiqamah* (Ar. *Dār al-Istiqāmah*): The name of Pesantren established by Ahmad Marzuki Hasan, the former leader of DI, South Sulawesi.

*DDI*: Dār al-Daʻwah wa ʻl-Irshād. An educational institution based in Parepare founded by Abdurrahman Ambo Dalle, another former figure of DI.

*DDII*: Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia, Indonesian Islamic Dakwah Council.

*Dewan Fatwa*: Advisory Council.

*Dewan Khilafah*: ministry members of caliphate systems.

*Dewan Ulama*: Muslim Scholars Council.

*dhimmi* (Ar. *dhimmī*): non-Muslim peoples afforded security of life and property under the *syariat* on payment of a poll tax.

*DI*: Darul Islam (Ar. *Dār al-Islām*), literally, ‘house or abode of Islam’; refers to the armed separatist movement carried out in several regions of Indonesia which first broke out in 1948 under the leadership of Kartosuwirjo.

*deconfessionalised Islam*: term for Islamic discourse that avoids sectarian language and symbols.

*DPD*: Dewan Perwakilan Daerah; Regional Representative Council.


*DPRD*: Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah, Regional People’s Representative.
**Fisabilillah** (Ar. ḥāsīn Allāh): struggle in the way of Allah.

Fathul Muin: an Islamic institution under the Muhammadiyah which is now called Wahdah Islamiyah.


GEPIIS: Gerakan Pemuda Indonesia Sulawesi, Indonesian Youth Movement of Sulawesi.

**gerombolan:** marauding gangs.

**Hadith** (Ar. Ḥadīth): literally means ‘speech, report, narrative’. The traditions or reports of the sayings of the Prophet.

**Shahih** (Ar. Ḥadīth Ṣaḥīḥ): Sound Hadith.

**Haram** (Ar. ḥaraṣ): forbidden. Matter prohibited according to Islamic law.

**ḥijāb** (Ar. ḥiǧāb): screen; veil traditionally worn by Muslim women in public.

**ḥijrah** (Ar. ḥiǧrā): emigration of Muhammad from Mecca to Medina in A.D. 622; the beginning of the Muslim calendar.

**hirabah** (ḥiﾗb ﷲ): rioting.

Hizbul Wathan (Ar. Ḥiṣb 1-Wāṭan): youth scout of Muhammadiyah.

Hizbullah: (Ar. Ḥiṣb Allāh): literally, party of Allah; Soldiers of God

Hizbut Tahrir (Ar. Ḥiṣb al-Tahrir): founded in 1952 in Al-Quds in order to resume the Islamic way of life and carry the Islamic call to the world.

HMI: Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam, Muslim Students Association.

HMI-MPO: HMI – Majelis Penyelamat Organisasi (The Organisation Salvation Council), a breakaway group from HMI as a result of its rejection of Pancasila as the sole ideology of Indonesia launched by the New Order Regime.

**Hudud** (Ar. ḥudūd): specific punishments for certain major crimes mentioned in the Qur’ān.

**Hutan:** literally means ‘jungle’. But in the DI context, it refers to the community of DI, in contrast to the army in the city.

IAIN: Institut Agama Islam Negeri, State Institute for Islamic Studies.

**Ibadah** (Ar. ṭabāḥ): literally means ‘worship’; regulations in Islamic law governing religious observances.

**Ibadah mahdilah** (Ar. ṭabāḥah mahdilah): ibadah in which the times, methods, and conditions of performing actions have been fixedly determined by Qur’ān and hadith, such as in prayer.


**Ijtihad** (Ar. ijtihād): literally means ‘effort’; independent reasoning; authentic scholarly endeavor.

Ikhwanul Muslimin: Muslim Brotherhood.

**Imam** (Ar. imām): literally, a leader; a prayer leader; when capitalised, a founder of one of the Sunni law schools; a caliph.


Jamāāt Tablīghi: a grassroots Islamic movement in the contemporary Muslim world founded in Mewat, India in 1926 aimed at reawakening of faith and reaffirmation of Muslim religio-cultural identity.

**Jawanisasi:** java-isation, to make or adopt Javanese ways, ideas, or styles.

Jawatan Keagamaan: office of religious affairs.
jihad (Ar. jihād): literally, ‘to strive’. Holy war. It can have a purely spiritual sense of striving against sin and sinful inclinations but also can have the meaning of physical war.

jilbab: veil, the headscarf worn by Muslim women.

jinayah (Ar. jināyah): felonies, capital offences, penal laws.

jizya (Ar. jizyāh): poll tax levied on dhimmi in a Muslim-ruled society.

kafir harbi (Ar. kāfir ḫarbi): unbelievers that has must be fought against.

kalimatullah (Ar. kalimat Allāh): literally, words of God; the holy book.

Qanun Asasi (Ar. Qānūn Asāsī): Basic Constitution.

kabupaten: regency.

KAPS: Koalisi Aktifis Perempuan Sulsel, South Sulawesi Women Activists Coalition.

keakhiratan: concerning the hereafter.

KG: Komando Group Seberang, Group Command for the Outer Islands.

KGSS: Kesatuan Gerilya Sulawesi Selatan, Union of South Sulawesi Guerrillas.

khālidah (Ar. khālidah): calip; A leader of an Islamic polity, regarded as a successor of Muhammad and by tradition always male.

khāmar (Ar. khāmar): liquor.

khilafah (Ar. khilāfah): the era of Islam’s ascendency from the death of Mohammed until the 13th century; The territorial jurisdiction of a caliph; the office of a caliph.

khurafat (Ar. khurafāt): myth; superstition.

KNIL: Koninklijke Nederlandsche Indische Leger, Royal Netherlands Indies Army.

Kompak DDII: Komite Penanggulangan Krisis-DDII, the Crisis Center Committee.

Konsep Kemerdekaan Sejati: Pure Freedom Concept.

kota: city; town.

KPPSI: Komite Persiapan Penegakan Syariat Islam, Preparatory Committee for the Implementation of Islamic Law.

KRIS: Kebaktian Rakyat Indonesia Sulawesi, Devotion of Indonesian People of Sulawesi.

KUI: Kongres Umat Islam, Islamic Community Congress.

KWIS: Kesatuan Wanita Indonesia Sulawesi, The Unity of Sulawesi Indonesian Women.

Lā ilāha illā Allāh Muhammad rasūl Allāh: there is no God but Allah and Muhammad is the messenger of Allah.

Lajnah Tanfidziyah: Executive Body.

Laskar Jundullah: Army of God, the former paramilitary wing of KPPSI.

Laskar Penegak Syariat: Paramilitary for Enforcing Islamic Law.

Laskar Wanita: Women Fighters’ Corps.

Lontara: Bugis classical script.

makhmālah syari‘ah: Islamic court.


makassarisasi: makassar-isation.

Mapparibokoang Arung: a Bugis term meaning: guilty of self-importance and of abusing position.

Masyumi: Majelis Syura Muslimin Indonesia, Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims. Islamic party, often described as modernist or reformist, banned in 1961.
MMI: Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, Indonesian Mujahidin Council.
Momoc Ansharullah: Mobile Commando Movement of the army of God, special
force of South Sulawesi Darul Islam.
mpleo weleoe Arung: attempting the illegal overthrow of the ruler’s position.
MPR: Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, People’s Consultative Council.
mu’ahidun (Ar. mu’ahidun): People having equal position with other groups as a
result of agreement with each other, for example with a Muslim ruler.
muallimin (Ar. mu’allimin): teacher.
mualaalah (Ar. mu ‘amalah): civil law in syariat.
Muhammadiyah: Modernist Muslim organisation mainly involved in educational and
social welfare activities.
muhrim (Ar. muhtrim): degree of consanguinity between a man and woman that
renders marriage impossible but gives them the right of association.
MUI: Majelis Ulama Indonesia, Indonesian Ulama Council.
munafik (Ar. munafiq): hypocrite; unbeliever who pretends to be a Muslim.
munakahat (Ar. munakahāt): Marriage law in syariat.
murtad (Ar. murtadh): apostate; One who has abandoned one's religious faith
musu selling: a Bugis word, meaning 'Islamic war'.
nahi mungkar (Ar. al-naby ‘an al-munkar): prevention from doing evil deeds.
Nasakom: The acronym of Nasionalisme, Agama dan Komunis; Nationalism,
Religion, and Communism.
New Order: in Indonesian commonly called Orde Baru, the order since Soeharto took
the presidency from Soekarno in 1965 until his fall in 1998.
NII: Negara Islam Indonesia, Indonesian Islamic State.
Nippon Hodobu: Information agency during the time of Japanese occupation in
Indonesia.
NIT: Negara Indonesia Timur, East Indonesian State.
NU: Nahdlatul Ulama, Revival of Religious Scholars, a well known tradionalist
Islamic Organisation in Indonesia.
Paguyuban Lintas Fraksi: Trans-Faction Forum.
PAN: Partai Amanat Nasional, National Trust Party.
Pancasila: the five principles of the Indonesian state ideology. They are belief in
God, humanitarianism, nationalism, democracy, and social justice.
pangadereng: custom; customary system of Bugis and Makassarese people.
Pajung: the king of Luwu, South Sulawesi in the time of the kingdom.
Pemuda Islam Jihad: Islamic Youth of Holy war.
Perda: Peraturan Daerah, Local Regulation.
Perjuangan Kemerdekaan Sejati: Pure Freedom Struggle.
Perjuangan Rakyat Sejati: Pure People’s Struggle.
Permesta: Perjuangan Semesta, Total Struggle.
Persatuan Bekas Pejuang Islam Bersenjata: The Union of the Former Armed Fighters.
Pesantren: traditional Islamic school.
PETA: Pembela Tanah Air, Homeland Defender.
Piagam Jakarta: Jakarta Charter.
Piagam Makalua: Makalua Charter.
Piagam Persatuan: Unity Charter.
PKI: Partai Komunis Indonesia, Indonesian Communist Party.
Pokja: Kelompok Kerja, Working group.

political Islam: the struggle of Islam seeking to formally actualise it as an ideological basis for the state.

PPKI: Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia, Preparatory Committee for Indonesian Independence.


Program Politik Islam Revolusioner: Islamic Revolutionary Political Programs

PRRI: Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia, Revolutionary Government of Indonesian Republic.

PSII: Partai Serikat Islam Indonesia, Indonesian Islamic United Party.

PUPiR: Pertemuan Urgensi Pejuang Islam Revolusioner, Urgent Meeting of Revolutionary Islamic Fighters.

qadzaf (Ar. qadhaf): false accusation especially of fornication.

qanun (Ar. qānūn): constitution; law regulation.

qishash (Ar. qiṣāṣ): retaliation; punishment, chastisement.

quttattarīq (Ar. quttāt ‘u ʾ-ṭārīq): highway robbers.

rahmatan lil alamin (Ar. rahmatan lil ‘alamin): blessing for the universe.

Regionalism: Political division of an area into partially autonomous regions; Loyalty to the interests of a particular region.

RFS: Republik Federasi Sulawesi, Sulawesi Federation Republic.

RII: Republik Islam Indonesia, Indonesian Islamic Republic.

ripaoppangi tana: Bugis term meaning being ostracised or banned from the country forever.

RMS: Republik Maluku Selatan, South Maluccan Republic.

RPI: Republik Persatuan Indonesia, Indonesian United Republic.

RPPI: Republik Persatuan Islam Indonesia, Indonesian Islamic Unity Republic.

sabilillah: (Ar. sabīl Allah): the way of God.

santri: devout Muslim. It can also mean a student at a traditional Islamic school.

santrisasi: The process of being santri.

sariqah: (Ar. sariqah): theft.

shaum: (Ar. ṣawm): fasting.

Sekolah Rakyat: Elementary School.

shalat (Ar. salah): prayers.

syariat (Ar. sharī‘ah): the path to follow; a name given to the sacred law of Islam that governs all aspects of a Muslim’s life; Islamic law.

SI: Sarekat Islam, Islamic union.

siriṭ: a concept in Bugis-Makassar society embracing the idea of both self-worth and shame.

siyar Islam: Islamic mission.

suahada (Ar. shuḥadā‘): martyrs, people who die defending Islam.

Ta ‘mirul Mu’minin: the center of Muhammadiyah Islamic activities in Makassar.

ta’zir (Ar. ta’zīr): discretionary punishment given by judge administering syariat.

takbir (Ar. takbīr): the words ‘Allahu Akbar’ meaning ‘God is the greatest’.

tarekat (Ar. tārikah): the path; Sufi orders or brotherhoods.

tarikussalat (Ar. tārik al-ṣalāḥ): a person who neglects the five five daily prayer.

TII: Tentara Islam Indonesia, Indonesian Islamic Army.

TKR: Tentara Keamanan Rakyat, People’s Liberation Army.

TNI: Tentara Nasional Indonesia, Indonesian National Forces.
tomaradeka: a traditional Bugis' strata which means 'free people'.

TPKPSI (268): Tim Pengkajian pemberlakuan Syariat Islam, Discussion Team for the Concept of Upholding Islamic Law.

TRIPES: Tentara Republik Indonesia Persiapan Sulawesi, Republican Preparatory Army for Sulawesi.

trisila: three pillars: Belief in One God, Social Justice, and Humanitarianism.

ulama (Ar. ‘ulamā’): Muslim scholars; in particular, the guardians of legal and religious traditions.

ulil amri (Ar. ʿulīʾ-ʿamr): those who are in authority (in Islamic government).

UMI: Universitas Muslim Indonesia, Indonesian Muslim University.

ummah (Ar. ummah): Arabic term means Islamic community.


UUD 1945: Undang Undang Dasar 1945, 1945 Basic Constitution.

wadah perjuangan: means of struggle.

Wahdah Islamiyah: a foundation which was formerly known as Yayasan Fathul Muin (Fathul Muin Foundation), first established by Fathul Muin.

walimah (Ar. walimah): wedding banquet.

YPDI: Yayasan Pendidikan Darul Istiqamah, Darul Istiqamah Educational Foundation.

zakat (Ar. zakāt): alms or Islamic taxes.

zina: (Ar. zina): adultery, fornication.
INTRODUCTION

Our starting point is the fact that the local dynamics of Islam in Indonesia outside Java have suffered from a lack of contemporary studies. The majority of studies so far have focused on the phenomena of Islam in Java, and these studies cover various aspects of history, tradition, historical and contemporary movements. It is not an exaggeration to say that for many observers, Javanese Islam is Indonesian Islam itself. Yet the fact is that Javanese Islam does not always represent the characteristics of Islam in other parts or areas. Geertz’s thesis, which has so influenced us into seeing Indonesian Muslims divided into the categories of santri (devout Muslim) and abangan (nominal Muslim) may to some extent also be applied to non-Javanese Muslim people, but it may not be implemented automatically in other Muslim areas because of unique local traditions which have influenced the way in which they profess Islam.

The unique characteristics of Muslims in many local areas of Indonesia are the result of the journey of Islam and its interactions with the local culture of the society and the way in which it defines its identity. In South Sulawesi, for example, there have been significant developments in local Islam from historical Islamisation to contemporary times. However, accounts concerning the development of Islam from its encounter with the Dutch up to the time of the New Order government are very limited. The discourse on political Islam and cultural Islam, which appeared in post Indonesian independence, was almost not heard in the discussion of Islam in South Sulawesi. Furthermore, the face of socio-religious activism in that society, through organisations such as Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and

3 The term refers to the struggle of Islam that moves away from political rivalry and does not think of party politics, especially Islamic parties, as the only way to channel the Muslim aspirations and objectives. They are interested in issues which will have a significant impact to the Muslim community. For more information on this issue, see Nurcholish Madjid, Islam Kemodernan dan Keindonesiaan (Bandung: Mizan, 1987). See also Fachri Ali and Bachtiar Effendy, Merambah Jalan Baru Islam: Rekonstruksi Pemikiran Islam Indonesia Masa Orde Baru (Bandung: Mizan, 1986).
Muhammadiyah, which in Java have attracted the attention of many observers, have been peripheral only. The accounts available so far are mainly focused on the history of Islamisation, producing a number of overseas and local historians such as J. Noordyn,\textsuperscript{4} Leonard Y. Andaya,\textsuperscript{5} Anthony Reid,\textsuperscript{6} Christian Pelras,\textsuperscript{7} Mattulada,\textsuperscript{8} Zainal Abidin Farid,\textsuperscript{9} Abu Hamid,\textsuperscript{10} and Ahmad M. Sewang.\textsuperscript{11}

The only phenomenon of post-independence Islam in South Sulawesi which has widely attracted attention of observers is the movement known as Darul Islam (Ar. Dārul Islām, the Abode of Islam, DI). However, DI itself is not a purely South Sulawesi phenomenon. It is part of a broader Islamic insurgency in the period from the late 1940s to the early 1960s, which took place in areas where Islam is known to be culturally strong: West Java and Aceh. Furthermore, DI in South Sulawesi has been seen much more as complicated by other local factors such as military de-mobilisation and regionalism, that have all overshadowed its Islamism. From the eradication of DI (1965) to the period of the Soeharto government (1966-1998) observers no longer had an interest in characterising the development of Islam in the regions. It is after the collapse of the New Order government in 1998 that South Sulawesi Islam has attracted research through the emergence of efforts to struggle for Special Autonomy for the region and the implementation of Islamic law. Again, this model of Islam is not characteristic of Islam in South Sulawesi itself since many

\textsuperscript{4} See, for example, J. Noordyn, \textit{Islamisasi Makassar}, translated by S. Gunawan (Jakarta: Bhratara, 1972).
\textsuperscript{6} See, for example, Anthony Reid (ed.), \textit{Southeast Asia in the Early Modern Era: Trade, Power, and Belief} (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1993).
local areas in Indonesia have also launched a similar struggle, especially Aceh with its Special Autonomy which includes the power to comprehensively implement *syariat* (Ar. *shari‘ah*, Islamic law.)

My efforts to characterise South Sulawesi Islam are by connecting the historical DI with the contemporary movements of Islam, that is, by dealing with the historical rebellion of DI from 1953-1965 and the Komite Persiapan Penegakan Syariat Islam (The Preparatory Committee for the Upholding of Islamic Law, KPPSI) established in 2000, and this thesis will describe how formalist Islam in the region has been pursued. Through these two movements, this thesis will also show how Islamic law and symbols are formalised in the public sphere. Even though the South Sulawesi DI was initiated as part of the Negara Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic State, NII) which was first established in West Java in 1948, its dynamics were extraordinary, being the longest historical rebellion (1950-1965) to occur in Indonesia and the most internally dynamic, compared to other DI movements. It is also significant to discuss KPPSI as a *syariat* movement here, not only because of its relationship with DI but also because it seems to be the most dynamic local movement now existing in Indonesia to struggle constitutionally for the implementation of Islamic law. Before coming to the objectives of this study, it will be useful to see, through brief outlines of DI and KPPSI, how these two movements have been regarded by previous scholars and why I categorise them as formalist Islam.

**A. The Journey of Formalist Islam in South Sulawesi: From DI to KPPSI**

Darul Islam (DI) in South Sulawesi had its origins in a general rebellion which broke out in the province in 1950. This rebellion was primarily a reaction to the central government’s new military policy which called for the rationalisation and ‘professionalisation’ of Indonesia’s armed forces. In effect, this policy excluded large numbers of soldiers and officers from ex-guerilla and militia forces who had been involved in the war of independence (1945-1949) but who lacked the formal military training and physical standards needed to remain in the Army. In Sulawesi, these irregular units demanded to be incorporated into the national army, but this was rejected by Jakarta. Kahar Muzakkar, a South Sulawesi officer who had built his career in the central army was then sent to South Sulawesi by the central government to mediate with guerrilla units regarding
their future status. However, he decided to side with the guerrilla forces and, with some 15,000 militiamen, withdrew to the jungle in 1950 and rose in rebellion.

In 1952, contact was made with the central leadership of the DI movement based in West Java, which had proclaimed an Indonesian Islamic State in August 1949. This movement was driven in part by a belief that the Republic of Indonesia had betrayed Islamic ideals by having a secular ideological basis. DI had attracted support from other areas of Indonesia including Aceh, Central Java and South Kalimantan. The DI rebellion largely collapsed with the arrest of its paramount leader, Kartosuwirjo on 4 June 1962; he was found guilty of treason and executed by the Indonesian government on 4 September 1962.

Although formally part of the DI rebellion, Kahar’s movement in South Sulawesi had distinctive features and enjoyed a large measure of autonomy from the central leadership. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, Kahar changed the name and ideological content of his movement several times, though it was still regarded as part of the DI struggle. In 1961, the South Sulawesi DI, through Kahar Muzakkar tried to expand its alliances by joining the Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia (Revolutionary Government of Indonesian Republic, PRRI) and Perjuangan Semesta (Total Struggle, Permesta) - based in Sumatera and North Sulawesi. This allied movement was then called Republik Persatuan Indonesia (Indonesian Republic Federation, RPI) centred in West Sumatera. However, PRI was short-lived due to a successful military campaign by the republican army.

Kahar Muzakkar and his supporters continued their Islamic separatism. In 1962, he formed Republik Persatuan Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic Republic Unity, RPII), thought it barely operated as a state because of military pressure from the republican army. The effort of Islamic rebellion in the jungles of Sulawesi came to an end following the fatal shooting of Kahar Muzakkar near Lasolo River, Southeast Sulawesi on 3 February 1965. The efforts of Kahar Muzakkar’s key followers to continue the Islamic ideological battle against the republican government continued.

Between the mid-1960s and Soeharto’s downfall in 1998, there were still efforts of formalist Muslim activists in South Sulawesi. A former DI key leader, Sanusi Daris, even tried to organise a movement called Republic Federasi Sulawesi (Sulawesi Federation Republic, RFS) from his hiding place in Enrekang, South Sulawesi, though it had no significant impact and he was arrested in 1982. The New Order regime’s suppression of an
Islamic formalist orientation enervated the formalist movement in the region until its re-emergence after the downfall of Soeharto. The main vehicle for Islamic formalism became KPPSI.

With the dramatic change in Indonesia’s political system, many Islamic activists in South Sulawesi had long aspired to revive the demand for formal implementation of Islamic law, which they saw as a solution to the multi-dimensional crisis then facing Indonesia. On 28 May 2000, some formalist-oriented Muslims conducted an open dialogue on Islamic law. The dialogue was attended pro-syariat a leading Muslim intellectuals, and included the participation of Abd. Hadi Bin Haji Awang, the present president of Parti Islam se-Malaysia (Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party, PAS). This dialogue resulted the decision to hold a congress of South Sulawesi Muslim people. The Congress was then held on 21-23 October 2000 in Sudiang Makassar, South Sulawesi attended by about 700 people. The Congress decided to established a syariat movement called, KPPSI. The Congress mandated this movement to struggle for the implementation of Islamic law in South Sulawesi via means of a Special Autonomy package.

KPPSI is now five years old and its path has been controversial. It has faced claims that it is linked to terrorists, accusations of displaying thuggish behaviour in its former paramilitary wing, Laskar Jundullah, and of the existence of opposition from several elements of South Sulawesi society. In the course of its struggle, KPPSI has pursued a strategy of movement, which included a rally and the creation of certain propositions. KPPSI has held seminars, publications and dialogue to familiarise the nature of Islamic law. It has also pursued actions in its effort to gain political bargaining power. KPPSI is also signified by the issue of a romanticised genealogy, with the organisation being led by Abdul Aziz Kahar, the son of Kahar Muzakkar.

B. How DI and KPPSI Have Been Observed

If we analyze the way in which DI and KPPSI have been written about, studies may be placed in two main groups. The first is ‘Islamic-discounting discourses’, that is, an approach applied by several foreign scholars and a number of Indonesian educated academics, who see the two movements as phenomena more political than religionist, that is, as movements which are motivated by regionalism or mere political expediency. The
second is 'Islamic-centric discourse' which views the movements in such a way that the sentiment of religiosity is truly significant.

1. Islamic-Discounting Discourses

Of the available works, the category of Islamic-discounting discourses represents the mainstream. These discourses may be further broken down into 'scholarly' and 'unscholarly' ones. The scholarly Islamic-discounting discourses are to be found in most academic works, beginning in the early 1970s and pioneered by an American political scientist, Barbara Sillars Harvey, who wrote a Ph.D thesis on Tradition, Islam, and Rebellion: South Sulawesi 1950-1965. This is an excellent work since it successfully presents the rebellion from a variety of perspectives - history, local tradition, people and religion. Being the earliest work on this topic, it has become a reference for succeeding writers who work on DI in Indonesia, particularly in South Sulawesi. However, the thesis focuses more on DI as a result of the problem of center and regional relations, rather than to the Islamic elements of DI. There is also a lack of information on the dynamics of Islamic formalist idealism from the inside.

C. van Dijk is also included in this category, with his Rebellion under the Banner of Islam: The Darul Islam in Indonesia which is considered the most comprehensive work on DI in Indonesia. Even though he included the Islamic factor of the rebellion, his work does not regard DI as primarily Islamic, since he identifies the multiple causes of the rebellion. He followed a statement that: "It is always a plurality, a combination of factors, which leads to the final historical result." In discussing DI in South Sulawesi, van Dijk concentrates more on problems of incorporation into the formal military as the root of the problem, without looking at the significance of Islamism as a fact of demobilisation.

Ichlasul Amal's Regional and Central Government in Indonesian Politics: West Sumatera and South Sulawesi 1949 – 1979, a book adapted from his Ph.D thesis, is even

---


clearer in identifying the regionalist factors of DI in South Sulawesi, which he saw as the mere continuation of a general rebellion. Amal sees this rebellion simply as the problem of incorporation after the national revolution (1945-1949), in which the South Sulawesi paramilitary found themselves to be rejected by the formal military forces. Amal’s Islamic-discounting view on the rebellion was based on his argument that in South Sulawesi there was not a strong base for utilising Islam as a source of the movement. He argues that this was because of an absence of Islamic modernist and reformist penetration in the area, where, in the history of the kingdoms, an Islam of a traditional stamp was adopted. Amal further argues that the complicit role of the ulama (Ar. ‘ulamā’) and the low rates of literacy among South Sulawesi Muslims have been obstacles against a significant Islamic movement.

There are other scholarly works which attempt to put the case for the religiosities of DI in South Sulawesi but these still emphasise regionalist factors, and so may still be categorised as Islamic-discounting discourses. Anhar Gonggong’s *Abdul Qahhar Mudzakkar: Dari Patriot Hingga Pemberontak* (Kahar Muzakkar: From Patriot to Rebel)\(^ {16} \) concentrates on the key figure in the inception of the South Sulawesi DI. Anhar presents the Islamist orientation of Kahar Muzakkar and his followers through siri-pesse (the code of honor regulating personal dignity) of the South Sulawesi people which has been synthesised with Islamic teachings. However, Anhar has not been sufficiently precise, since siri itself is a phenomenon that may be applied to people of other religious affiliations, and therefore, the concept of siri is not strictly applied to Islamic teaching.

Another recent academic work which can be put in this category of ‘Islamic-discounting discourses’ is Esther Velthoen’s *Hutan and Kota: Contested Visions of the Nation-State in Southern Sulawesi in the 1950s.*\(^ {17} \) Velthoen argues for the lack of Islamist sentiments in Kahar Muzakkar and his DI by tracing the lack of Islamic support he received prior to the formation of the DI, and also to the existence of Christian support for him at that time. Velthoen suggests that Kahar revealed an ideological confusion and that he was forced to

---


choose Islam as the ideological basis of the movement merely to guarantee that he would receive the support of Muslim society.

Regarding KPPSI, there have been a number of scholarly studies putting the case for the movement as not motivated significantly by religious sentiment. There are two trends in these works. Some focus on the argument that the movement has been more of a local political project, exercising coercion if necessary, rather than a means for improving the religiosity of South Sulawesi. A work that sees KPPSI from a negative perspective is Dias Pradadimara and Burhanam Junedding’s Who is Calling for Islamic Law? which says KPPSI was established as a syariat movement – though in reality the syariat itself was never clearly defined and the organisation was busier facing its activists’ problems associated with violent movements. Similarly, Jennifer’s Donohoe’s Islamic Law and Competition for Power in the Reformasi Era: the KPSI of South Sulawesi argues that KPPSI is a movement of political expediency of formalist Muslims in South Sulawesi in which religion tends to be politicised. Donohoe’s work further draws the relationship between this syariat movement and violence, by its frequent use of intimidation in an effort to gain maximal political support from the Muslim community.

The second sub-category of the Islamic-discounting discourses are non-academic works. These take various forms: autobiographies, small books, journalistic works and papers referring to DI. They have been written either to praise Kahar Muzakkar as a nationalist rather than an Islamist, or to discredit him as misleading the Islamic idealism of DI. Many clearly side with the republican regime of the 1950s which was anti-DI. M.Ukkas Arifin and Sarita Paweloy’s Kahar Muzakkar dalam Masa Perjuangan Kemerdekaan (Kahar Muzakkar in the Time of the Independence Struggle) emphasises the nationalist contribution of Kahar Muzakkar prior to the formation of DI. This is a hagiographical work telling the story of Kahar Muzakkar’s involvement in the independence struggle prior to 1950 with the purpose of showing that he is basically a nationalist.

---

20 M. Ukkas Arifin and Sarita Paweloi, Kahar Muzakkar dalam Masa Perjuangan Kemerdekaan (n.p., n.d.).
Another notable work in this category is Bahar Mattalioe’s autobiography, *Pemberontakan Meniti Jalur Kanan* (Rebellion on the Route to the Right)\(^{21}\) which presents the author’s journey from the war of independence until his leaving the DI rebellion, from having been a subordinate to Kahar Muzakkar until becoming an important leader of DI, when he was brave enough to oppose Kahar Muzakkar in their conflict about the direction manner of the DI struggle.\(^{22}\) This book claims that Kahar Muzakkar violated the trust of both DI and his followers. Another work written in ‘self-defense’ by Bahar Mattalioe is *Kahar Muzakkar dan Petualangannya* (Kahar Muzakkar and His Rash Adventures)\(^{23}\) in which he presents ‘proof’ of the un-Islamic nature of Kahar Muzakkar. These books may be seen as an effort by the author to justify his departure from DI in order to side with the republican government, since the author published these books at the time when he sided with the republican government. Although these books are aimed at discrediting Kahar Muzakkar, they are unwittingly very helpful in presenting the Islamism among the activists of DI, not least in Bahar Mattalioe himself.

Another work that paints Kahar Muzakkar as a ‘sinful rebel’ is Radik Jarwadi’s *Kisah Kahar Muzakkar* (The Story of Kahar Muzakkar)\(^{24}\) which severely criticises Kahar Muzakkar’s political thought, including his misuse of Islam as a political force. Something similar is found in A. Moein MG et al.’s *Kilat Menghancurkan Kahar Muzakkar* (The Kilat Operation Destroys Kahar Muzakkar),\(^{25}\) a work produced by journalists of the pro-Indonesian republic which presents the chronology of the combat of Kahar Muzakkar, while at the same time nakedly blaming every aspect of Kahar Muzakkar’s struggle, including his efforts to ‘misuse’ Islamic teachings. These two works were clearly aimed at supporting the suppression of Kahar Muzakkar by the Soekarno regime and therefore their information should be carefully selected, especially in their descriptions of Kahar Muzakkar’s vision of formalist Islam.

---


\(^{22}\) Further information on their conflict will be found in Chapter Three, Sub-Chapter, “The Road to the End of the Rebellion.”


\(^{24}\) Radik Djarwadi, *Kisah Kahar Muzakkar* (Surabaja: Grip, n.d.).

2. Islamic-Centric Discourses

This category is not well represented in comparison with the Islamic-discounting category. So far, we do not have a well-acknowledged, systematic study of both DI and KPPSI together that may be called ‘Islamic-centric’. However, for KPPSI itself, there have been some Islamic-centric discourses. The first is Mulyani Mudis Taruna’s *Gerakan Islam Radikal Kontemporer Di Indonesia: Studi Kasus Komite Persiapan Penegakan Syariat Islam (KPPSI) di Sulawesi Selatan* (The Contemporary Radical Islamic Movement in Indonesia: A Case Study of the Committee for the Implementation of syariat in South Sulawesi)\(^{26}\) and M. Adlin Sila’s *Budaya Good Governance dalam Masyarakat Indonesia: Studi Kualitatif Tuntutan Pelaksanaan Syariat Islam di Makassar Sulawesi Selatan* (Good Governance Culture in Indonesian Society: A Qualitative Study of Demands for the Implementation of Islamic law in Makassar, South Sulawesi).\(^{27}\) Both sources give more significance to the religious nature of the movement as reflected by formalist Islam South Sulawesi Muslims. It discussed the challenges of the movement in achieving its objectives and its concern with the association of the movement to coercive action to reach its objectives. These works, however, deal with the movement and its encounters with government and opponents of Islamic law, and have little to say about the internal dynamics of the movement. Furthermore, these works often ignore fundamental events which have determined the Islamic nature of the movement, such as the moderate steps aimed at gaining wider acceptance of KPPSI in South Sulawesi.

A more positive attitude to KPPSI came from Endang Turmudi et al., who published research on *Pengaruh Modernitas terhadap Sikap Keberagamaan Masyarakat: Penerapan dan Diskursus Politik Syariat Islam: Studi Kasus Cianjur, Sulawesi Selatan dan Jombang* (The Influence of Modernity on the Society’s Religious Attitude: the Political Discourse and Implementation of Islamic syariat: A Case Study of Cianjur, South Sulawesi

---

\(^{26}\) Mulyani Mudis Taruna, “*Gerakan Islam Radikal Kontemporer di Indonesia: Studi Kasus Komite Persiapan Penegakan Syariat Islam (KPPSI) di Sulawesi Selatan,*” Jakarta, Departemen Agama Badan Litbang Agama dan Diklat Keagamaan, n.d.

and Jombang). However, this research lacks analysis on the contested views between the formalist proponents and the cultural proponents existing in South Sulawesi.

The Islamic-centric discourse has been also been found in many other accounts of DI. However, their discussion is less scholarly since they focused on the ways in which the religiosity of the movement is justified, as it is reflected in the personality of Kahar Muzakkar. These works may not be considered academic due to the weaknesses of their arguments. They tend to be unscholarly hagiographies, written by ex-DI activists and those who are sympathetic to DI’s ideals. They also tend to focus on the key figure of DI, Kahar Muzakkar and to exclude other associated factors, such as supporters of the movement.

Tommy Thompson (whose original name was Sanusi Abdullah), a former guard of Kahar Muzakkar, wrote his hagiographical *Menyingkap Misteri Abdul Qahhar Mudzakkar* (Unveiling the Mystery of Adul Qahhar Mudzakkar) which is a work that is unashamedly hagiographical. Kahar Muzakkar is presented as a ‘saintly’ person. This book is subjective in that it has no intention to critically evaluate the personality of Kahar Muzakkar or the nature of Islam implemented by DI, and yet the writer had a thorough acquaintance with the dynamics of DI. Another account is Wanua Tangke’s *Kahar Muzakkar Masih Hidup: Sebuah Mistery* (Kahar Muzakkar is still Alive: a Mystery) which claims that Kahar Muzakkar is still alive, based on myths developed in society. Some of its discussion is devoted to the Islamic power of Kahar Muzakkar. However, the reliance on anecdotal material in this work leads to a lack of intellectual argument which means that it is of little value as a reference.

The present study falls within the Islamic-centric discourse. By describing DI and KPPSI as formalist Islam movements, this thesis will challenge the existing Islamic-discounting discourses. It will argue for the significance of Islamist tendencies among the principal actors of the movements. Rather than concentrating on DI’s physical battles against the republican government, this thesis attempts to show the strong Islamic nature of DI by tracing the Islamic orientation of Kahar Muzakkar and his followers prior to the

---


formation of DI, the Islamic ideological sentiment underlying DI’s expansion, the implementation of Islamic law inside DI, and finally the perceived loss of Islamic spirit contributing to the movement’s decline. Similarly, this thesis will also show KPPSI’s formalism by examining the background of its activists and the movement’s commitment to syariat movement in South Sulawesi. Even though, in some parts, this thesis will also present non-Islamic issues regarding the two movements, these qualify but do not refute the significance of their formalist Islamic orientation.


Before characterising DI and KPPSI as movements of formalist Islam, I will first discuss the nature of this term and why I prefer this term rather than that other of Islamism. Formalist Islam can be defined as the belief that Islam must not be separated from state affairs. Muslims must struggle to make Islam a legitimate political power that can direct the life of the community. Islamic symbols and practices may be contested within an open public sphere, whether in political or social affairs. My motivation in employing the term formalist Islam in this thesis is to avoid the pejorative assumption of many existing terms already available to describe Muslim communities to denote Islamic movements whose central tenets are political projects, and the connotations of violence, such as extremism, radicalism, and the most common one, fundamentalism. I use the term formalist Islam, following a trend in other accounts of Islam which discuss fundamentalist ideas - without actually naming it ‘fundamentalism’. They may call it revivalism, integralism, Islamic identity and confessionalised Islam, all of which probably do not carry negative

connotations. Identifying the phenomenon of the political struggle of Islamic communities which I study here is part of my effort to avoid such negative assumptions.

However, more than a matter of my personal preference, there are several conceptual considerations in employing this term rather than the fundamentalist label. The term ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ itself is often “loosely and inaccurately” defined and “the wide diversity of individuals and groups associated with Islamic fundamentalism indicates that it is not a monolithic movement.” The definition of fundamentalism may apply to one case of an Islamic movement, but not to another. For example, a generalisation that fundamentalists are primarily political rather than religio-intellectual movements, by looking at the examples of movements such as Jamāʿat Islāmī and Jamāʿat Tablīgī in Pakistan, may not be applied to the case of Indonesian Hizbut Tahrir (Ar. Ḥizb ‘l-Tahrīr) which eschews formal political means in its caliphate idealism. Furthermore, the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI, Indonesian Council of Fighters for Islam) is, to many people, a fundamentalist movement which clearly does not employ any political manner of proceeding.

What is more, generalisations of ‘fundamentalism’ made by experts are often blurred. For example, Mahmud A. Faksh has put forward some major themes of fundamentalism, including the fusion of religion, politics and Islamic universalism. The

---

37 It is an Islamist revivalist movement party in Pakistan founded in Lahore in 1941 by Maulana Sayyid Abu al-A’lā Maudūdī. For more information of this movement, see Bahadur Kalim, The Jamaat-i Islami of Pakistan: Political Thought and Political Action (New Delhi: Chetana Publication, 1977).
38 A grassroots Islamic movement in the contemporary Muslim world funded in Mewat, India in 1926 aimed at the reawakening of faith and reaffirmation of Muslim religio-cultural identity. For detail information on this movement, see Muntaz Ahmad. “Islamic Fundamentalism in South Asia: The Jamaāt-i Islāmī and the Tablīghi Jamaāt,” in Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby (eds.), Fundamentalisms Observed, pp. 457 – 530.
39 It was founded in 1952 in al-Quds in order to resume the Islamic way of life and carry the Islamic call to the world. For the details of this movement, see Amnon Cohen, Political Parties in the West Bank under the Jordanian Regime, 1949 – 1967 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982).
inapplicability of this term is evident when it is related to other phenomena of Islam in Indonesia. Should Islamic political parties, obsessed with the hope of an Islamic state, like the historical Majelis Syura Muslimin Indonesia, (Indonesian Muslim Consultative Council, Masyumi) which was banned in 1960 and the present Islamic political parties such as Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (Social Justice Party, PKS) and Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United Development Party, PPP) be called fundamentalist? Looking at the moderate characters of the leading figures of the parties, and including their moderate characteristics, I will not label them as fundamentalists. Therefore, my preference for formalist Islam over ‘fundamentalism’ is to emphasise the varied approaches of Islamic movements seeking to institutionalise Islam in state affairs.

My further preference for employing formalist Islam rather than ‘fundamentalism’ is in relation to the notion that in many discourses on fundamentalism, Islam is contrasted to nationalism. On the contrary, many so-called ‘fundamentalist’ movements are often closely attached to nationalist activities. The history of nation building in many Muslim countries has witnessed the participation of many Muslim nationalists, while on the other hand, they have also struggled to establish an Islamic state. For example, Indonesia’s history of its quest for ideology in the first 20 years of independence witnessed the efforts of Muslim nationalists to propose Islam as the basis of the state and at the same time, to counter un-Islamic ideologies, such as communism.\(^{41}\) They were more formalist Muslim-nationalists committed to formalising Islam as the ideology of the state. Therefore, Muslim formalists may not be contradicted to nationalism, since they are also Muslim nationalists.

Furthermore, the rise of DI in Indonesia (1949-1965) which was seen by some scholars as the very root of fundamentalism in Southeast Asia\(^ {42}\) is also to be seen as a formalist Islam movement. It was an Islamic insurgency against the central government, in which the primary objective was to establish a separate government in Indonesia against the newly established United States of Indonesia as agreed to with the Dutch. It is more

\(^{41}\) A system of government in which the state plans and controls the economy and a single, often authoritarian party holds power, claiming to make progress toward a higher social order in which all goods are equally shared by people.

\(^{42}\) See, for example, Manning Nash, “Islamic Resurgence in Malaysia and Indonesia,” in Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby (eds.), *Fundamentalisms Observed*, 691- 739; International Crisis Group, “al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia: The case of the ‘Ngruki Network’ in Indonesia,” Asia Briefing, No. 20, 8 August 2002.
appropriately called a rebellion of formalist Muslims, wherein the conception of rebellion was also accompanied by nationalist sentiments.

Another important reason to speak of formalist Islam in this thesis is its wider coverage of models of Islamic movements, ranging from aspects identified as fundamentalism up to other terms to characterise an Islamist movement. So, the struggle for formalist Islam may aim for a complete change in Muslim society towards an Islamic state. However, some other Islamic formalist activists often struggle for the objective of gradual change within Muslim society. We may have revolutionary or evolutionary models. Further nuances are also possible: some of the activists of Islamic formalism do not see their target as to create an Islamic state but the incorporation of the *syariat* into secular state law, in which case they usually struggle through constitutional, not revolutionary means.

I mentioned several other terms above, such as a ‘confessionalised’ Islam which describes the efforts of Muslims in Indonesia to bring Islam into the public sphere. This term contrasts with van Nieuwenhuijze’s ‘deconfessionalisation’ of Muslim concepts in post-colonial Indonesia by offering the case of ‘Pancasila’ and the operations of the Department of Religious Affairs as examples of how Islam has been ‘deconfessionalised’. In these, Islam was acknowledged not through its own clear symbols but through the existence of an apparent secular ideology and organisation.43 ‘Confessionalised’ Islam, on the other hand, is the term which designates the ways in which Islam is openly acknowledged in political and social symbols. However, since this term tends to be related to a symbolic acknowledgement of Islam only, it is not as useful. Again, the term formalist Islam refers to groups of Muslims in Indonesia for whom there must be more than symbols; they want Islamic teachings to be formally implemented in society, such as in criminal law. Another term, such as ‘Islamic integralism’, focusing on the struggle to integrate religion and state is also useful. However, this term is not yet widely used in Indonesian Islam, compared to the currency of formalist Islam itself.

Despite my preference for formalist Islam over ‘fundamentalism’ to avoid negative perceptions, I do not mean to imply that movements of formalist Islam avoid expressions of intolerance. The case of Islamic insurgencies which took place in many parts of the regions of Indonesia from the late 1940s to the middle 1960s show how formalism was often locked into violent action. Furthermore, the paramilitary wings of contemporary formalist

Islam also often use violence. However, this is not necessarily true of all formalist Islamic groups.

Besides struggle to institute Islam as the ideology of the state, formalist Islam can also be limited to a particular community within a state in order to form an Islamic territory, whether through insurgency or through constitutional struggle. It can also be seen in the efforts of Muslim politicians to establish Islamic political parties in which the ideological basis is Islam without necessarily calling for an Islamic state. Islamic formalism can even be related to the more moderate groups of Muslim activists who struggle for Islamic law only as a part of state law.

These various forms of formalist Islam are more popular in contemporary Indonesian Islamic developments, and therefore this term is more applicable. Thus the history of Indonesian Muslims who struggle for the inclusion of Piagam Jakarta (Jakarta Charter) in the national constitution and the contemporary struggle for implementing syariat in certain regions (as already in place in Aceh, with its Muslim governor and mahkamah syariat (Ar. mahkāmah sharī‘ah, Islamic Law Court) may simply be called formalist Islam.

The political journey of establishing a separate Islamic state in South Sulawesi through DI is clearly such a formalist Islamic movement. Similarly, KPPSI is an Islamic movement focused on gaining Special Autonomy for the implementation of Islamic law. For this reason, too, it may also be called a formalist movement. formalist Islam covers their different characteristics in exercising their struggle, that is, on the one hand through separatism and rebellion and on the other through constitutional procedures acceptable to the Indonesian government. The term formalist Islam can simply generalise the main characteristics in their political project, that is, how Islamic symbols and practices may become a central tenet. It shows that Islam should be accepted in the public sphere, both socially and politically.

---

44 Piagam Jakarta has a preamble which is a compromise as a result of Muslim and secular nationalists who sat on the investigating committee for Indonesian independence on state ideology on 22 June 1945. This preamble contains the phrase ‘the obligation to carry out Islamic law for its adherents.’ For more information on the debate on the creation of this charter and its controversy, see Saifuddin Anshari, The Jakarta Charter 1945: The Struggle for an Islamic Constitution in Indonesia (Kuala Lumpur, ABIM, 1979).
What is more, it should be stressed that the phenomenon of formalist Islam in South Sulawesi is a phenomenon of Islamic modernism. From the first Islamisation in South Sulawesi in the early seventeenth century to the rise of DI in the mid 20th century, Islam has developed over three hundred years. Islam in South Sulawesi has experienced a long journey: the Islamic kingdoms, Islam under Dutch rule, Islam under Japanese occupation, and then the post-independence era. However, it was the global impact of Islamic modernism at the beginning of the twentieth century that significantly shaped strong formalist Islamic idealism and later shaped the movements observed in this thesis, DI and KPPSI. DI’s main actor, Kahar Muzakkar, is the product of a modern Islamic education received through schooling and activism under Muhammadiyah, the first Islamic modernist organisation in Indonesia. Indeed, formalist Islam in South Sulawesi is more a product of Islamic modernism than of the long journey of Islamisation. KPPSI, which will be examined in the second half of this thesis, has its roots in Islamic modernism in South Sulawesi, through the significant support of its activists with modernist backgrounds.

These two movements are the products of an Islamic modernism which has been very responsive to change in Muslim society. DI appeared as the result of demobilisation problems in immediate post-independence Indonesia, while KPPSI was a result of the failure of the New Order system, yet, being the ideological continuation of DI, including its elements of romanticism. However, more than simply appearing as modernist movements, they moved ahead into formalist movements, also drawing their support from many traditionalist Muslims. Furthermore, they are not only working for social empowerment which was the chief goal of the modernist movement, but as stated in the definition of formalist Islam, they are very political. Finally, these two movements show how one aspect of regional Islam, formalism, has always been shaped by aspects of the history of the Islamic community itself.

D. Objectives and Methodology

This thesis deals with two movements, the historical rebellion of DI (1953-1965) and KPPSI (2000-2005). DI will be examined at in different stages; the period of Negara Islam Indonesia (NII) from 1953 to 1960; the time from 1960 to 1961 in which Kahar Muzakkar abandoned NII and joined RPI and the year of 1962 when Kahar Muzakkar and his followers established RPII. However, since RPI and RPII were relatively short-lived and
had no significant impact, except for the symbolic, they will go under the term of DI (although this is a term generally referring to the era of NII).

There were then almost 40 years in which Islamic formalism was suppressed in South Sulawesi and elsewhere in Indonesia. The long interregnum of formalism between DI and KPPSI was mainly due to suppression during the New Order. Under the Soeharto regime, the mobilisation of formalist Islam was curbed. It was the downfall of Soeharto in 1998 and the beginning of the Reformation era which made room for the return of political Islam, and for the return of formalist Islam, despite the fact that the regime is still intolerant. In South Sulawesi, formalist Islam is pursued through the establishment of KPPSI in 2000.

My method of presenting my data is on the one hand by sketching the general events referring to formalist Islam in South Sulawesi after DI, in order to connect the two movements and to offer an understanding of how the formalist Islamic movements in South Sulawesi always operated. On the other hand, I also draw comparisons between the different nature of the two movements to show how formalist Islam is evolving.

This will be the first doctoral thesis to deal with the issue of KPPSI as a formalist Islamic movement. It will also be the first thesis that draws a historical relationship between DI and KPPSI. Unlike previous works, this thesis argues for the significance of Islamism among KPPSI activists by not seeing the movement as monolithic and intolerant, something found in many accounts dealing with Islamists. This study will argue that much of KPPSI's activities have in fact sought to persuade the community by peaceful means, such as publications, seminars, dialogues and moderate approaches to local figures and Muslim people.

As well, this thesis is also part of the effort to challenge the mainstream view which asserts that the two movements as motivated more by political expediency rather than by religiosity. I see the political perspectives of the two entities in which politics are not separate from religious affairs. I shall argue against previous writings on the two movements, in which they were often partially observed as a politicisation of religion, that is, employing Islam for certain political objectives.

The analytical approach of this thesis is that it looks at the interrelation of the political approach of the two movements with religion, from which the two movements' activism is inseparable. My central theme is that formalist Islam in the two movements is an effort to assert the Islamic identity of a certain community of Muslim people in South
Sulawesi in order to foreground the supremacy of Islam, which is held to be the religion of absolute truth. In fact, it is very difficult to prove the Islamic commitment of a movement, since the fact is that many Muslims often use an Islamic movement as a tool to achieve material or personal political gain. Being aware of this difficulty, this thesis will demonstrate that DI and KPPSI are not only political symbols, by focusing on the religio-ideological motives of the two movements, such as discussion on how they implemented Islamic law in their communities.

In looking at these religio-ideological motives, this thesis begins by tracing motives for the establishment of DI and KPPSI. Other observers have seen them as non-religionist, treating them as having been established either for regionalist sentiments or for the assertion of a narrower local identity. This thesis does not intend to reject the existence of regionalist or local sentiment against the central government. However, in tracing the roots of their establishment, I shall show that they were very serious in their Islamic formalism due to the depth of their Islamic commitment.

Major attention will be paid to the actors of the two movements. The judgment of DI and KPPSI as being expressions of regionalism has often been based on the key figures of the two movements. This thesis, however, is to oppose this judgment by presenting the Islamic nature of their leading actors, examining their religiosity, their historical lives, their religious practices and worldviews. These have often been ignored in previous accounts of the movements, especially by those observers within the Islamic-discounting discourse.

A third major focus of attention will be the political actions arising from these religious tendencies. The efforts of the two movements in expanding their political influence were usually in line with religio-ideological symbols. The use of such symbols can also be interpreted as politicising religion (as those who discounted Islamic discourse viewed the two movements) but the fact that for formalist Islamic movements, such as DI and KPPSI, these symbols were part of their religiosity, because for them to be a good Muslim had to be Islamicly symbolic. Therefore, an analysis of their symbolic nature in expanding their political influences of the two movements is part of the effort to evaluate the Islamic formalist tendencies of them.

A fourth important point of interest in the thesis is the efforts of DI and KPPSI to formalise Islam inside their communities. The thesis will show the struggle of the core leadership groups in Islamising them. To the best of my knowledge, there is no single account of DI which elaborates the dynamics of the implementation of Islamic law in the
‘jungle’ (1953-1965). This thesis will try to present both conceptual and institutional supports in realising the ideals of formalist Islam. In the case of KPPSI, furthermore, there has not been any effort to look at the movement properly regarding the nature of the Islamic law for which they struggle. A critical view will be exercised in this thesis in respect to other scholars’ negative perspectives on the movements, either towards DI or to KPPSI.

Compared to the accounts of DI, accounts of KPPSI have been more limited for the reason that KPPSI is a purely local organisation. Furthermore, since it is a newly established movement, work on KPPSI has been limited to smaller research papers and journalistic works, which do not engage with the movement’s religious perspective. Unlike DI, which already possesses a history, KPPSI is an organisation still living and growing at the time of writing this thesis. Most works focus on the earlier period of KPPSI. This thesis will argue that the organisation has changed considerably in the past two years, and that as a result, many previous descriptions of the movement are of less relevance now.

The present study is based on three kinds of sources: documentary evidence, interview materials, and my observations of the present KPPSI activities. For DI, the main documentary sources have been the holdings of the Dinas Dokumentasi, Pusat Sejarah TNI, Jakarta, which contain records of the uprising in South Sulawesi, the formation of and the defeat of DI, from the years 1950-1965. Most materials deal with DI rebellion from a counter-insurgency perspective. However, out of six large folders, there were still a significant number of files related to the Islamic nature of DI. These were important sources for an evaluation of the formalist tendencies of DI. Other documentary sources were acquired from private libraries which had books from DI in their possession, including Kahar Muzakkar's books, the regulations of DI, and items of Islamic legal advice of DI. For KPPSI, documentary sources of tremendous value were gained from several activists who had systematically documented the events and regulations associated with the movement so far.

Oral evidence was collected through traveling to major areas of the former DI and to the areas where KPPSI is most active, to conduct interviews. Most of this oral evidence was gathered between January-December 2004, with supplementary materials gained between January and February 2005. For DI, I visited four former strong holds: Luwu, Bone, Bulukumba, and Enrekang in addition to Makassar, where some other former DI activists still live. On my fieldtrip I was also able to interview about 70 former activists, retired army personnel and local people who had direct experience of DI. For KPPSI, I
traveled to the areas where it was politically and socially strong: Makassar, Bulukumba, Pare-Pare, and Luwu. The interviews conducted related to KPPSI and were directed to the important activists of both central and branch KPPSI. All of the recognised important leaders of KPPSI were interviewed. For the purpose of 'objectivising' the data (unlike DI, for which there were already numerous written sources by its opponents), KPPSI information was enriched by interviewing figures known to oppose KPPSI. The direct observation method was employed with KPPSI to understand the nature of KPPSI. The observations were carried out by grasping the opportunity to attend several meetings and gatherings concerning their efforts to implement Islamic law in South Sulawesi.

The structure of the thesis weaves theme and chronology together. The first chapter sketches the genesis of the DI movement in South Sulawesi as a formalist Islamic movement by presenting its key figure, Kahar Muzakkar and the rise of DI. The second chapter deals with the central issues of DI: regionalism or religiosity? The third chapter deals with the religious tendencies within DI’s expansion and its role in the rebellion up to the end of DI and its successors. The fourth chapter relates to the Islamic nature of DI through its efforts to implement Islamic law.

After the fourth chapter, we turn to KPPSI, with a preview of the post-DI period. This is discussed in chapter five, together with the background to its establishment and the various worldviews of its activists. The sixth chapter explains the struggle of the movement for its ideological survival. An attempt to assess KPPSI’s politico-ideological concepts to strengthen its demand for formalist Islam is provided in the seventh chapter. The eight chapter looks at the challenging discourses of Islamic law developing among South Sulawesi people, while looking at the dialectical responses of KPPSI to those challenges.
Chapter One

ISLAMIC MODERNISM, KAHAR MUZAKKAR AND DI

Two difficulties confront researchers in understanding the Islamic nature of Darul Islam (DI). First, how did DI appear in relation to the early history of Islam in South Sulawesi? Few scholars understood the significance of early Islamic modernism in South Sulawesi. Many scholars said that the South Sulawesi DI was merely one of the problems which resulted from by the newly established Indonesia as an independent state, that is a problem between the the regional and central government. These problems included the status of the paramilitaries who struggled for the revolution in the time of the post-Indonesian proclamation of independence in 1945. They saw that the unwillingness of the newly republican government to accommodate all of these paramilitaries created regional resentment. Therefore, they excluded the significance of Islamism in the inception of DI and saw that it as not related to the history of Islam of South Sulawesi.

Second, was Kahar Muzakkar an Islamist, nationalist, or ambitious rebel? Many researchers disagree about his true character by labeling him variously as a patriot, a rebel, a Muslim hero, or a hot-headed figure. The available works on Kahar Muzakkar are not yet enough to understand his views because their data were mostly gained from military documents and accounts which were written by Kahar Muzakkar’s opponents. Not many accounts have balanced sufficiently how people in South Sulawesi, including those from his former faithful followers, have characterised Kahar’s personality and included the journey of his life. This aspect is important to discuss in an effort to understand his life better, particularly his religiosity. This is also to understand why when one nowadays visits South Sulawesi, they will find people who still keep the memory of Kahar Muzakkar alive, or even believe Kahar Muzakkar to be still alive.

With the limited accounts of the coming of Islamic modernism to South Sulawesi, this chapter will provide a descriptive background of the arrival of the variant in the region and its relation to the formation of DI in South Sulawesi. Furthermore, this chapter will analyze Kahar Muzakkar’s personality and his involvement in DI rebellion and the support of modernist elements, before coming to a critical analysis of the existence of the movement as a formalist Islam movement, which will be found in the succeeding chapters.
A. The Modernist Setting

Islamic modernism has a significant role in the shape of DI in South Sulawesi. The phenomenon of Islamic formalism in South Sulawesi was introduced along with the emergence of Islamic modernism in Indonesia in the earlier twentieth century. Kahar Muzakkar, the main figure in the inception of DI as a struggle of Islamic formalism, is the product of Islamic modernism. With the emergence of DI in the mid 1950s, formalist Islam in the region became organised. Prior to modernism periods, Islamisation had not had much to do with DI’s Islamism.

As many historians observe, the spread of Islam in Indonesia went through a ‘top down’ and a ‘bottom up’ process. ‘Top down’ Islamisation means that Islam was adopted first by the elites of the kingdom, especially by the king then spread to the lower level, while ‘bottom up’ means Islam was converted by the people before it was formally adopted by the kingdom. Historians suggest that the process of Islamisation in South Sulawesi followed the first type.\(^{45}\) Islamisation occurred at the time when South Sulawesi comprised independent kingdoms. Islam was first formally introduced by the ulama from Minangkabau, West Sumatera.\(^{46}\) The ulama approached the strongest kingdom, Gowa, and converted its king in 1605. From then, Islamisation in South Sulawesi proceeded at a fast rate.\(^{47}\) The kingdom spread Islam over almost the entire South Sulawesi area with great


\(^{46}\) The three ulama were generally known as ‘three Datuks’: Datuk ri Bandang, Datuk Patimang, Datuk ri Tiro. For more information on these figures, see Abu Hamid, “Selayang Pandang Uraian Tentang Islam dan Kebudayaan Orang Bugis-Makassar,” in Andi Rasdiyanah Amir (ed.), *Bugis-Makassar dalam Peta Islamisasi*, 72-83.

\(^{47}\) Historians say that the king who first embraced Islam in South Sulawesi was the king of Luwu, the oldest kingdom in South Sulawesi, followed by the twin kingdoms, Tallo and Gowa. The historians state that the motivation of Luwu to ask the ulama from Minangkabau to approach Gowa was due to its political strength, so that it could encourage the Islamisation in South Sulawesi. See, for example,
success. The Islamisation process of the kingdoms of Gowa took less then ten years, from the time when king of Gowa accepted Islam in 1605 to the time of musu sellin (Islamic war) in 1611 to conquer Bone, the main rival of Gowa.

In terms of traces of Islamisation, the existence of classical scriptures called Lontara in the South Sulawesi kingdoms showed the existence of an Islamic identity. The most important scripture dealing with Islamic issues was Lontara Latoa of Bone. Furthermore, codes of ethics, pangadarangeng (customary law) were integrated with Islamic law, with the entering of syariat code, called sarak. It was commonly recognised in the local saying, pattuppu’i riade’e, pasanre’i ri syara’e (referring a matter to a costumary law, leaning it towards Islamic law).


The only region left for Islamisation in South Sulawesi was Tana Toraja (Tator), where at the present time the Christian are in the majority.

Islam spread in South Sulawesi was both through both peaceful ways and also by force. Gowa was the pioneer of Islamising other kingdoms. It spread Islam based on an agreement, whereby every kingdom to conveyed to the others any ‘good message’, which they received. During this time, Gowa received a peaceful welcome by the kingdoms, especially the small kingdoms. However, when conveying the message to Bone and its allies, Gowa faced a challenge. The three allied forces rejected the message of Islam. Since Gowa was a rival, the message was interpreted by Bone as an effort to put Bone under its hegemony. Gowa responded by exercising force. For detailed information of Gowa’s expansion of Islamisation, see Ahmad M.Sewang, “Islamisasi Kerajaan Gowa (Pertengahan Abad XVI sampai Pertengahan Abad XVII),” 142-154; Barbara Sillars Harvey, “Tradition, Islam, and Rebellion: South Sulawesi 1950 - 1965,” 34-37.

Lontara means a manuscript that tells a story concerning people of former times in South Sulawesi from different perspectives. Zainal Abidin Ahmad classified Lontara into Lontara Bilang (Daily note Manuscripts) and Lontara Attoriloang (Historical Manuscripts), and Lontara Moralitas (Morality Lontara). Andi Zainal Abidin Ahmad, “Lontara Sulawesi Selatan Sebagai Sumber Informasi Ilmiah,” 49-71. Of these various lontara, there are several lontara that were produced after the Islamisation process, and touched on issues of Islamisation including the model of Islam practiced by the South Sulawesi old kingdoms. It is from their Lontara that historians assessed the early shape of Islamisation in South Sulawesi.


For more information about integration between the local customs and the syariat, see ibid.; for information of the importance of Islam in South Sulawesi kingdoms, see Leonard Y. Andaya, The Heritage of Arung Palakka: A History of South Sulawesi (Celebes) in the Seventeenth Century, 34 - 35.
The problem with South Sulawesi's Islamisation is that it was applied from the 'top down' or in a structural way that in turn, led to a problem with the quality of Islamisation. Islam was mostly embraced by the people only after their kings had embraced it. It is different from the 'bottom up' or cultural way in which Islam tended to be more rooted in the heart of the public before it was formally adopted by the kings. Structural Islamisation at the grassroots level meant that people had not yet completely abandoned their old traditions which contradicted Islamic teachings, at the time when they embraced Islam. They began to perform Islamic rituals such as prayers, but at the same time, they still performed activities related to animistic beliefs.

The lack of militancy of early Islam in South Sulawesi also seems to be influenced by the domestication of Islam by the Islamic kingdoms themselves. Unlike Aceh where the ulama had strong political power and autonomy, the case of the Islamic kingdoms in South Sulawesi is different. The ulama there were under the hierarchy of the aristocracy. The ulama were given a rank as religious leader in the kingdom, who performed their job under the auspices of the king. This meant that the ulama did not have strong authority to expand their influence, and to reform the Islamic understanding of people beyond the corridor of the policy of the kingdoms. Furthermore, with the aristocratic positions, the ulama tended to enjoy the position and far from the idea of exercising Islamic reformism.

This domestication of Islam in South Sulawesi became more pronounced after the Dutch colonised the region, starting with the defeat of Gowa through the Treaty of Bongaya in 1667 and effectively after the military conquest 1905-1910 which was extended to the rest of kingdoms in South Sulawesi. The success of the domestication of

---

53 Even though Islam in South Sulawesi is not very strong compared to Aceh, there are several accounts which affirmed that the connection between Aceh and South Sulawesi was historically significant. See H.A. Moerad Oesman, "Masuknya Islam di Indonesia Bahagian Timur dan Hubungannya dengan Aceh Darussalam," in Andi Rasdiyah Ami (ed.), Bugis-Makassar dalam Peta Islamisasi Indonesia, 17-18; Muhammad Ahmad, "Hubungan Gowa Dengan Aceh dalam Proses Islamisasi Kerajaan Bugis – Makassar," in Ibid., 27-34.

54ikhlasul Amal described the mythology of Buginese-Makassarese in the power relations between the ruler, the ulama and the oppositionist, as three brothers. The oldest was an ulama, the youngest an oppositionist, but the real authority to rule was in the hand of the middle one. This mythology shows that the ulama is always respected but not to be powerful and his role is loyal opposition. See Ichlasul Amal's interview with Mattulada in Ichlasul Amal, Regional and Central Government in Indonesian Politics, 14.

55 For more information on this Treaty, see Leonard Y. Andaya, The Heritage of Arung Palakka: A History of South Sulawesi (Celebes) in the Seventeenth Century, 100-116.
Islam in South Sulawesi was based on Snouck Hurgronje's influence on the Dutch Islamic policy, through his appointment as the religious advisor in 1889. Hurgronje advised the Dutch government to separate Islam as a religion and political force.\(^{56}\) Islam was then domesticated through dissuading Muslim people from expressing Islam through politics. Ibadah (Ar. \(\text{i}\text{b}\text{d}\text{a}\text{h}\), the ritual) and muamalah (Ar. \(\text{m}\text{u}\text{\text{a}\text{m}\text{a}\text{l}\text{a}\text{h}\), civil law in \text{\text{sy}\text{a}\text{r}\text{i}\text{a}\text{t}}\)) are maintained but political Islam was not tolerated. Part of Hurgronje's advice to the Dutch government was not to worry about the Muslims who went to Mecca to perform the pilgrimage, returning to import pan-Islamism, since pilgrimage is merely ritual and does not bring with it any political implications.\(^{57}\)

The impact of Hurgronje's policy on Islam in Indonesia, then integralised with the Dutch ethical policy, led to the expansion of educational systems which was also a strategy to Westernise Indonesian Muslims. For this effort, the Dutch then facilitated the nobility to access Dutch education as a priority of westernisation.\(^{58}\) Local tradition was still strong where aristocratic people were more influential rather than devout Muslim leaders. Therefore, further distancing the aristocrats from Islamic teaching can bring significant consequences to society in general. The Dutch had even tried to punish the aristocrats who tried to oppose the Dutch policy on Islam.\(^{59}\)

The application of Hurgronje's scheme in South Sulawesi was successful. The Islamic kingdoms which were established early then became secular kingdoms in which, many aristocrats who were formally close to Islam were then replaced by those with a


\(^{58}\) Alwi Shihab, "The Muhammadiyah Movement and its Controversy with Christian Mission in Indonesia," 130. It is recorded that shortly after Snouck Hurgronje was appointed, the Islamic educational schools were predominant. However, twenty years after his appointment, he found that Western schools began to take over a number of Islamic schools. See Harry J. Benda, "Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje and the Foundations of Dutch Islamic Policy in Indonesia," 65.

\(^{59}\) This is based on the case of Opu Daeng Risadju who was said to be punished by the Hadat (the customary institution) of Luwu based on the pressure of the Dutch government. Daeng Risadju was known to be active as a Sarekat Islam activist, an organisation well-known to be anti-Dutch government. She was punished by first humiliating her, being forced to sweep roads before she was imprisoned. See Lahadjai Patang, *Sulawesi dan Pahlawan\(\text{n}\)ya*, (Jakarta: Yayasan Kesedjahteraan Generasi Muda Indonesia (JKGMI), n.d.), 42-50.
nominal Islamic understanding. This reality can be seen in South Sulawesi in present times at least in the descendants of the former kings who were generally unlikely to be called devout Muslims. The implementation of Hurgronje’s policy further undermined the Islamisation of South Sulawesi, which since the beginning did not penetrate deeply into the hearts of the people. Many Muslim people living in the villages continue to practice animism or at least their religious practices were limited to the five pillars of Islam.

Looking at the earlier journey of Islam in South Sulawesi in the early 17th century, Islamic kingdoms have actually made an effort to create ‘confessionalised’ Islam or ‘integralist’ Islam, that is the adoption of Islamic symbols (for example, the title of Sultan for the king), the creation of Islamic scriptures (Islamic Lontara), and the building of Islamic institution inside the kingdoms (religious advisors). However, it is hard to call this a model of formalist Islam according to the definition applied in this thesis. Rather than penetrating the hearts of the people, Islamic symbols were merely seen around the kingdoms. At the grassroots level, Islam is still more symbolic as a result of the ‘top down’ way of conversion. The presence of Islam is not yet able to genuinely ‘Islamise’ society as is evident in the persistence of old beliefs. The process of forming a pietistic Islamic identity both in the state and in the society was halted. At the state level, the adoption of formalist Islam as demonstrated by the kingdoms, was then blurred by the domestication of Islam by both the kingdoms and by the Dutch. Domestication may be seen in a framework of political tendencies. This is based on the claim that the high position of ulama in the kingdoms were to curb the possibility of ulama opposing the aristocratic system of the kingdoms. Then, during Dutch rule, the restriction of Islam to ritualistic practices alone was aimed at blocking Muslims who wished to employ religion for political opposition. Therefore, in reflecting the earliest history of Islamisation in South Sulawesi, it may be stated that Islamic identity in South Sulawesi was formulated but historically speaking, Islamic identity was not much held after Islam itself were embraced.

It seems that the success of Hurgronje’s scheme was not achieved without some setbacks. The fact was that the effort of separating ritual from politics did not always succeed in consigning Islam to mere ritual religion. The policy of the Dutch in allowing Muslims to travel to Mecca for pilgrimage was then used by the travelers to exchange

61 This is, for example, based on my interview with Abu Hamid, 26 March 2003.
ideas including nationalist ideas. Indeed, in the case of Islam in Indonesia, people who returned from pilgrimage are considered to be one of the important sources for modern and revolutionary Islamic ideas in the twentieth-century. Furthermore, the promotion of a westernised system of education by the Dutch was countered by the Muslims who activated an Islamic education. In South Sulawesi, the reality was the policy of the Dutch was to subsidise the Protestants and Roman Catholic Schools, while Islamic schools were unsubsidised which would directly and indirectly increase the antipathy of the Muslim people. Muslims saw this policy as also aiming at breaking down Islamic values.

It was through the response of Islam itself to the Dutch policy which was then fertilised by the global impact of Islamic modernism, that formed the genesis of formalist Islam in South Sulawesi, directly touching the grassroots Muslims. The Islamic modernism which emerged in the early twentieth century witnessed the efforts of modernising Islam through establishing both Islamic political and social movements. In South Sulawesi, Islamic modernism was not exercised by the ulama who were part of the aristocracy, but came more from the grassroots when people began to be involved in the activism of Islam through joining in the euphoria of Islamic organisations set up predominantly in Java. It is noted that the establishment of Sarekat Islam (Islamic Union, SI) established by Muslim merchants in 1912 was also imported into South Sulawesi in 1916. SI which later became a political party, was also founded in South Sulawesi in the early 1920s. Other secular nationalist political movements existed, such as Partai Nationalist Indonesia. However, during the first period of their existence, none of these movements constituted threats to the existence of the Dutch. The lack of nationalism impacted both in number of members and in its influence. The lack of nationalist enthusiasm in South Sulawesi could be related to the reality of literacy and education which

---


63 For a detailed account of the rise of Islamic modernism in South Sulawesi, see Deliar Noer, The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia 1900-1942 (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1973).


was that nationalist awareness was very low. At the end of the Dutch role in 1942, of the
1000 university graduates in Indonesia, none originated from South Sulawesi.66

Islamic modernist organisations were more influential than political organisations.
Muhammadiyah which was established in 1912 in Yogyakarta by Ahmad Dahlan, spread
among Indonesian Muslims and aimed at purifying the Islamic teachings from heresies,
spread among Indonesian Muslims. The influence of Muhammadiyah in Indonesian
archipelago was profound, especially with respect to Islamic education. Even though
Muhammadiyah reached South Sulawesi quite late - it was first established in Makassar in
1926 by a batik trader, Mansur al Yamani 67 its influence was becoming significant. In
1941 it was reported to have 4000 members. Its off-shoot organisations were also well
developed. Aisyiah had 2000 members and Muhammadiyah’s Scout organisation, Hizbul
Wathan (Ar. Hizbul Waṭān) had 1000 members. Branches were widespread in South
Sulawesi. This may be considered a success compared traditional Islamic movement,
Nahdlatul Uama (NU) which was established in Surabaya, 1926. In 1941, the NU had 50
members with only one branch in Makassar, the central city of South Sulawesi.68

The significance of the existence of Islamic modernism through the membership of
Muhammadiyah was strengthened by the coming of many modernist teachers from
Sumatera. Furthermore, a number of Muslim pilgrims who returned from Mecca were also
introduced, with their new understanding of Islam. The increasing numbers of
Muhammadiyah-operated schools also contributed to the modern understanding of Islam. It
was these waves that brought Islamic modernism to South Sulawesi which aims at
emphasising the purification of Islam from animism, and to some extent from secular
western influences.

The coming of Islamic modernism brought changes to the perspective of some
Muslim people in South Sulawesi. Its mission to reform Islam was relevant to the existence
of Muhammadiyah, which seems to challenge the existing tradition. It was, therefore, not
surprising that Muhammadiyah was said to have received strong opposition from the
aristocracy who saw the mission of purification as a threat to their authority especially with

66 Ichlasul Amal, Regional and Central Government in Indonesian Politics, 15; Christian Pelras,
Manusia Bugis, 341.
67 See Gema Muktaomar, January 17, 1975 in ibid., 16.
respect to the regalia, even though some aristocracy tried to maintain a relationship with Muhammadiyah.\textsuperscript{69} Furthermore, Islamic modernism had started to become popularly identified among Muslims. Islamic modernist ideas helped Muslim people in South Sulawesi to redefine their ‘Islamicness’. This included formulating their Islamic political identity. Since this time, there has been an effort to define Islam as a tool to fight against the domination of the Dutch overlord as kafir (unbelievers). It was reported that Islamic identity among Bugis Makassarese was starting to react to the intensive missionary activities of the Dutch Christians among the Toraja people. In relation to this, the educational activities which were strongly promoted by Muhammadiyah gave a positive content to this reaction.\textsuperscript{70} To some extent, this fact is to counter Amal’s thesis which found Islamic modernism in the early 20\textsuperscript{th} century was absent in South Sulawesi. Amal’s argument was that there never were Islamic social institutions which were able to counter elites.\textsuperscript{71} The fact was that the presence of the Muhammadiyah, with its schooling, slowly shaped the main group of Muslim people in that area, so that Islamic modernist idealism has been a significant force.

Kahar Muzakkar, the key leader of DI, was raised in a modernist tradition, was an example of the process. He was one of many young Muslims who began to access Muhammadiyah elementary school and gained youth training provided by Muhammadiyah’s Scout organisation, Hizbul Wathan. He joined the Muhammadiyah elementary school in his homeland, and continued on to Muallimin school in Java, also operated by Muhammadiyah. His Islamic modernist orientation appeared when he with his like-oriented companions joined the Islamic insurgency, called DI, first established by Kartosuwirjo in West Java. A number of his close followers were from a background of Islamic modernism.

\textsuperscript{69} The majority of the members of the nobility opposed Muhammadiyah because of its consistent attacks an existing beliefs on the sacred nature of the regalia of the Kingdom. The fact was that the regalia was the source of the legitimacy for these aristocrats in defending their power. Furthermore, Muhammadiyah was often accused of bringing the so-called ‘Javanese’ religion, since this organisation first emerged and was profoundly developed in Java. See Kementrian Penerangan, Republik Indonesia Propinsi Sulawesi, (n.d.), 597 – 598 in ibid., 16.


\textsuperscript{71} Amal’s further argument was that minor Islamic educational systems were not for political education but designed to educate children of aristocracy. Amal’s argument is also based on the historical account that the ulama had never been alternative leaders, opposed to nobles. See Ichlasul Amal, Regional and Central Government in Indonesian Politics, 199.
DI's relation to Islamic modernism is significant. As will be seen in Chapter Four regarding DI's ideology, the way DI formalised Islamic law was directly inspired by doctrines of Islamic purification as carried on by modernist Muslims. Furthermore, many leading sympathisers during the rebellion were from Muslim organisations with backgrounds in modernism. The Islamic modernist identification of DI is also measured by the suspicion of the Indonesian government towards Islamic political parties, such as Masyumi, many of them from Muhammadiyah; modernist element of Partai Serikat Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic Union Party, PSII), the former political party of Kartosuwirjo, and to Muhammadiyah, an organisation that forged Kahar Muzakkar in his early life, those who were suspected to have a contact with DI's rebel. The modernist nature of DI was further seen in the rejection of organisations with backgrounds of traditional Islam to give sympathy for DI. Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) which was known as traditional Islamic organisation openly disagreed with DI. Its open rejection to DI may be seen as the effect of conflict of ideological orientation among followers of modernist and traditionalist organisations during DI's time.

The modernist significance of the South Sulawesi DI was especially strong in the former areas of DI such as Luwu and Sinjai/Bulukumba which are Muhammadiyah strongholds. Furthermore, ulama from modernist backgrounds chose to be voluntarily involved in DI, while many traditional ulama were forced to be involved only after being first kidnapped. Many ulama with traditionalists backgrounds tended to return to their traditional milieu, by establishing pesantren. However, despite the important role of modernist Islam in DI, rebellion also existed among Muslim people with traditionalist Islamic beliefs, for example, among DI in Bone, which is a traditional Islamic stronghold.72 Therefore, I would say that DI itself was to be modernist, but that grassroot support also came from traditionalists, many of them whom were not devout Muslims. They were, in fact, the target of Islamisation in the jungle, as launched by DI.

B. Kahar Muzakkar and Rebellion

Kahar Muzakkar not only determined the physical rebellion of DI in the ‘jungle’ but more importantly, he determined the ideological nature of the rebellion. The importance of discussing the personality of Kahar Muzakkar is due to his controversial character. The existing accounts look at his personality from different perspectives. Some look at him as a personally tendentious rebel. Others look at him as a brave, desperate hero, while some characterise him as a stubborn soldier. His former followers saw him as a heroic Muslim figure. This sub chapter is going to discuss the nature of his personality in an effort to understand the process of how he came to possess a higher ideological determination. Therefore, his life, background, education, and activities will be examined.

1. Kahar Muzakkar’s Life: Education and Personality

Kahar Muzakkar’s original name was Ladomeng, a Buginese word derived from dominoes. He was born in Luwu (South Sulawesi) in 1920 and the name Ladomeng was given by his parents because his father was playing cards at the time Kahar was born. In the earlier Buginese social stratification, three levels were recognised: anakarung (aristocrats), to-maradeka (free people), and ata (slaves). Kahar’s family came from a to-maradeka family. Therefore, Kahar did not come from the aristocratic tradition. Since his father was a successful businessman, his family was prosperous. His parents had a lot of rice fields, a factor usually perceived by local people as a symbol of wealth.

73 Mamie Rawe, Kahar’s former wife, corrected the information given by some accounts that Kahar was called Ladomeng due to his skill in playing cards when he was still a child. Interview with Mamie Rawe, 8 May 2003. Rawe’s correction seems to be accurate due to the tradition of people naming their child soon after birth, and due to the tradition of naming their children after a specific event which happened at the time their baby was born.

74 See Anhar Gonggong, Abdul Qahhar Muzakkar: Dari Patriot Hingga Pemberontak, 67.

75 According to Mamie Rawe, Kahar’s first cousin, who later became his fourth wife, their family was a mixture of anakarung and to-maradeka, therefore, they did not use aristocratic titles. Interview with Mamie Rawe, 8 May 2003. Rawe’s statement is in line with what Harvey writes about Kahar’s family coming from the lower aristocracy, Barbara Sillars Harvey, “Tradition, Islam, and Rebellion: South Sulawesi 1950 - 1965,” 181. See also Mattulada, “Kahar Muzakkar: Profil Patriot Pemberontak” in Taufik Abdullah et al (eds.), Manusiadalam Kemelut Sejarah, (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1981), 176.

76 One aspect of judging people in the village who have wealth by their possession of an expensive house. When I visited Kahar’s relatives in his village, I found that they were very ordinary in terms
Due to the prosperity and status of his parents, Kahar was among the few villagers to enjoy a formal education in his time. His earlier education was received in his village. He finished elementary school, Sekolah Rakyat, in 1934. His parents then sent him to study in the Muhammadiyah Standard School in Palopo (the capital of Luwu) for four years. After finishing Standard School, Kahar was sent to Solo, Central Java to study in the Muallimin (Ar. Mu'allimīn) School (Kweekschool) from 1938 to 1941. It was in this school that Kahar was introduced to a number of prominent ulama. He met a prominent modernist Muslim nationalist, Abdul Kahar Muzakkar, whom he admired for being wise and knowledgeable. It is said that his change of name from Ladomeng to ‘Kahar Muzakkar’ was gained when he studied under this prominent Indonesian ulama. He did not complete Kweekschool partly because he married Walimah, a Solo girl, as his first wife. After that, he decided to return to Palopo.

Kahar’s early academic record was unexceptional. Most accounts dealing with Kahar’s academic records indicate his intelligence was average. He did not finish his secondary school in Solo, indicating his lack of interest in formal education. This is in line with the psychological analysis given by the Komando Militer VI Siliwangi which also

of housing, especially Kahar’s parents. However, they said that about 50 years ago, Kahar’s house was considered to be luxurious.

77 According to Mattulada, his father was active in running a cross country business between South Palopo (Luwu) and Tawao (Malaysia). However, Mattulada does not elaborate on the type of business his father ran. See Mattulada, “Kahar Muzakkar: Profil Patriot Pemberontak,” in Taufik Abdullah (ed). Manusia dalam Kemelut Sejarah, 176.

78 According to the information of Sulaeman Habib, Kahar’s friends in the Muallimin Muhammadiyah Solo, he was very surprised when he first met Kahar whose name was Ladomeng. He then suggested a change of name. Sulaeman offered to take that of his prominent teacher, Abdul Kahar Muzakkar. The name ‘Muzakkar’ was alphabetically changed to ‘Muzakkar’ in which in Arabic refers to a male. Males have connotation of bravery, because Sulaeman was interested in the strong character of Kahar Muzakkar. Sabili, No. 12 TH, VII, 29 November 2000, 41. However, Habib’s information above, was countered by Tommy Thompson, Kahar’s former guard in the jungle. He said that it was his two closed friends, Jufri Tambora and Siddiq Bakri, who asked Ladomeng to change his name to Kahar Muzakkar. Tommy Thompson, Menyingkap Misteri Abdul Qahhar Mudzakkar (Surabaya: Lutfansah Mediatama, 2002), 38. Another information on the name change came from Kahar’s friend in elementary school in Palopo who claimed that it had already occurred when Kahar was still in Luwu. The change in Solo only occurred to his last name. Interview with Harun Rasyid Abdie, 7 May 2003.

confirms that his intelligence level was average. His strength lay, not in formal education, but in creativity and talent in dealing with problems.  

Looking at Kahar’s early name, raised the question of the ‘Islamicness’ of Kahar Muzakkar’s family. First, his name does not sound Islamic. Second, his father’s hobby of playing dominoes was often seen as not compatible with the beliefs of pious Muslims. To many Muslims, playing dominoes is seen as standing at the gate of gambling, because of the popular gambling tools is dominoes. However, on the other hand, the Islamic orientation of Kahar Muzakkar’s early family was seen in the description of Kahar’s educational background, where he was introduced to Islamic knowledge in childhood. His parents’ efforts to direct Kahar in having a good understanding of Islam is apparent. He was sent to study at the Muhammadiyah School in Java, which was very rare and difficult at that time, and this shows his parent’s commitment to his religious education. Therefore, it may be inferred that even though his parents, particularly his father was not pious, he wanted Kahar to be a serious Muslim, and to have a good understanding of Islamic teaching through sending him to Islamic school. 

This earlier stage of Kahar’s life may be divided into three parts: first, his Islamic activism through Hizbul Wathan, second, his anti-feudalism, and third, his falling out and subsequent ostracism by community elites. The first and the second may be related to the ‘Islamicness’ of Kahar Muzakkar in relating to his formation of DI, while the third factor may be seen as the setting up of the rebellion. In his homeland, Palopo, Kahar began to be involved in a local Hizbul Wathan, the youth organisation of Muhammadiyah. While he was active in Hizbul Wathan, he won great support from many Luwu youths for his opposition to feudalism. He was active until the Japanese arrived in Indonesia in 1942. During the Japanese occupation, Kahar worked under the Japanese at Nippon Hodobu, an information agency in Makassar. Due to his work, he had to travel between Makassar and Luwu.

---

80 Kahar’s oppositional attitude can be related to his personality. According to the psychological report, Kahar was not tied to conventional ways of thinking but relied on himself. He took a firm stand on principle. This brought consequences. Kahar often opposed and transgressed Adat (customary law) local law and the conventions adopted by society when he perceived that it contradicted what he believed. For more information see Document DI/TII Kahar Muzakkar, No. 163, Dinas Sejarah, Pusat Sejarah TNI, Jakarta.

In his position as an activist of Hizbul Wathan and as a Japanese clerk, Kahar often clashed with the local rulers. At this time, Kahar began to be critical of the social stratification in Luwu which he found very feudalistic. One version stated that Kahar often pointed his criticism the mythical ruler of Luwu, Sawerigading. In the old belief of Luwu community, He lived in heaven and came down to earth to form Luwu civilisation and those who only could rule Luwu are the descendants of Sawerigading, in which Kahar found the belief as being contradicted to the theological teaching of Islam. Kahar's attitude created antipathy and anger among the local aristocrats who were very powerful. The Pajung (king) called the Hadat (Advisory Council) members to discuss punishing Kahar for his attitude. It was decided that Kahar had to be ripaoppangi-tana, a Buginese term that means that a person is ostracised and banned from the country forever. Following his ostracisation, he and his wife went back to Solo and ran a business until the end of the Japanese occupation.

A detailed interpretation of Kahar's punishment in relation to the rules of the aristocracy was given by Mukhlis, who states that Kahar broke two main rules. First, he did Mapparibokoang Arung, which means that he was guilty of self-importance and of

---

82 Interview with Tommy Thompson, 4 February 2005. Furthermore, Tommy Thompson, Kahar’s former guard, writes that Kahar openly opposed the rule that the Luwu community could be ruled only by those who were descendents of Sawerigading. Sawerigading was believed to be the first mythical ruler of Luwu. According Thompson, Kahar explained that in the local language, the word Sawerigading originated from Sawe and Gading. Sawe meaning growing, and gading meaning yellow bamboo. He writes that Kahar sarcastically points that the only thing that usually grows from yellow bamboo is a lizard. Kahar said if a ruler of Luwu had to be descended from Sawerigading, it meant that Luwu society was very uncivilised, because they are kin to be ruled by the lizard.

Tommy Thompson, Minyingkap Misteri Abdul Qahhar Muzakkar, 40. There are some other number of versions of Kahar’s action to oppose the feudalistic system of his homeland at that time. Harvey states the versions are as many as the persons who spoke about it. Barbara Sillars Harvey, “Tradition, Islam, and Rebellion: South Sulawesi 1950 – 1965,” 182. Varied information can be gleaned from each account when dealing with this matter. Boland writes that Kahar Muzakkar married a Javanese girl at a time when cross cultural marriage was not common in Buginese tradition. It was considered siri (embarrassment). B.J. Boland, The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982), 63. Sulacha, Kahar’s sister, states that Kahar asked the aristocratic people to discard the use of aristocratic titles, such as opu because their use discriminated between people. Interview with Suleha, 9 May 2003. A similar account is given by the Military Documentation which states that Kahar rejected the tradition of bowing the knee before aristocrats. Document DI/TII Kahar Muzakkar No. 158, Dinas Sejarah, Pusat Sejarah TNI, Jakarta.

83 In the Buginese tradition, this term is used in the context of expelling people due to actions which made the family lose face, such as, a girl who was made pregnant by a boy before marriage.

84 One significant aspect of Kahar’s life is that he inherited his father’s skill of business.
abusing his position. Kahar abused his power as a clerk of the Japanese. Second, he did *mpleo weiote Arung* or attempted the illegal overthrow of the rulers’ position.\(^{85}\) Mukhlis’ two points of interpretation of Kahar’s punishment may be based on what he did in his capacity as a Hizbul Wathan, which was seen as a threat to the social hierarchy of Luwu society. Anhar Gonggong says that how basically there was a conspiracy between the Japanese and the local rulers to expel Kahar from Luwu due to his tough opposition to the feudalistic manners of the two rulers.\(^{86}\)

The conspiracy of the Japanese with the local rulers was due to their support of feudalism. Aswar Hasan who writes that it was Harada, the Japanese military leader who persuaded the local ruler to expel Kahar Muzakkar, due to Kahar’s refusal to bow to the Japanese when working with them.\(^{87}\) Despite the fact that Hasan originated from Luwu and was known as a formalist Muslim figure in South Sulawesi, his statement strengthened the impression that Kahar was a stubborn person. However, the ostracism might have contributed to his later rebellious character, as a man fighting for social respect. It is said that at the time he was expelled, he swore to return one day and marry a descendant of the Pajung.\(^{88}\) Kahar was claimed to be ambitious, and hot-headed and having a rebellious character. This characteristic was identified by Roeder when writing’s Soeharto’s biography. Roeder labeled Kahar as a hot-tempered and self-willed person when he was the deputy commander of Soeharto in Java during the revolution.\(^{89}\)

However, apart from the accusation of hot-headedness, Kahar was also equipped with an important quality in a leader, that is: charisma. Many of his former followers admitted that Kahar was an inspiring orator. He was able to speak clearly and simply in the language of the people and with a compelling emotional intensity which drew them to him. He was brave and bright, two key aspects of good leadership.\(^{90}\) Mattalatta, his former


88 He proved the truth of his oath by marrying Andi Haliah, the granddaughter of the king of Luwu.


90 Interview with Lanre Said, 7 April 2003. Mattalioe, who knew Kahar well, admitted that Kahar’s charisma deeply affected the hearts of his followers. He could mobilise them anytime and anywhere.
Buginese colleague during the revolution revealed that Kahar's speeches could rouse people to action.  

Apart from his personal capabilities, Kahar was forged by his cultural environment. He grew up within Buginese culture with strong social stratification and feudalistic attitudes. He had already encountered some traditional consequences as a result of his criticism of inequality. However, with a strong personality, he was able to develop a tough character to face life challenges, and so was able to demonstrate strong opposition. He was one of a few people in his homeland who had experienced a variety of cultures and people's attitudes based on his life in Java. These aspects of personality that could explain why he could shape an Islamic rebellion, DI, making his own key contribution.


When he went back to Java in 1943, Kahar focused on his business interests, building a merchandise company called Semangat Muda (Spirit of Youth). He established a shop called Toko Luwu (Luwu Shop) and, interestingly, it was this business that led him to enter the nationalist movement. He and his colleagues from South Sulawesi used the company to establish an organised movement against the Dutch after Independence proclamation in 1945. With his friends, Kahar established Gerakan Pemuda Indonesia Sulawesi (Indonesian Youth Movement of Sulawesi, GEPIS) then changed its name Angkatan Pemuda Indonesia Sulawesi (Sulawesi Indonesian Youth Movement, APIS).

He could also make decisions quickly and effectively. M. Bahar Mattaloe, *Pemberontakan Meniti Jalur Kanan*, 157. Furthermore, the psychological report of the Siliwangi looked at the ability of Kahar in different ways, finding that Kahar could easily adjust himself to any environment. He was like a chameleon, which can adapt itself to fit any situation. If he was dealing with a farmer, he would act like a farmer, and when he was with soldiers, he really acted like a soldier. Also, Kahar could separate what he believed from what he did not without being enmeshed in a psychological conflict. The report states that Kahar was not two-faced but had many faces. He was unpredictable. His strategic thinking required speed and dynamism. His decisions always looked logical but were in fact mixed with many pseudo-logical aspects. His logic which seemed logical made his followers easy to follow it. See Document DI/TII Kahar Muzakkar, No.63, Dinas Sejarah, Pusat Sejarah TNI, Jakarta.

---


92 This organisation was nationally accepted when it became part of API, led by national figures, such as Adam Malik, Sukarni, Charul Saleh, and Wikana. In historical accounts, they were progressive
Kahar Muzakkar and his organisation were part of a national scale youth organisation, Angkatan Pemuda Indonesia (Indonesian Youth Movement, API) and involved in nationalist activities. He stated in his writings that he was a member of Soekarno’s bodyguard when the latter gave one of his first mass speeches in September 1945. Kahar described that he was the person, armed only with a machete, who was prepared to protect Soekarno and Mohammad Hatta against the bayonets of the Japanese soldiers who tried to disperse the meeting and who encircled the car in which Soekarno and Mohammad Hatta were driving. Kahar’s role as a guard of Soekarno in the meeting was not in question, since many of the writings touching on this issue, always attached a photograph of Kahar Muzakkar guarding Soekarno at that moment. Even Ukkas Arifin, a former nationalist activist in Kahar Muzakkar’s movement, who later became a member of the republican military, revealed in his writing that he had witnessed the bravery of Kahar Muzakkar in guarding Soekarno at the same meeting. Since that time, Kahar began to emerge as a figure of great personal appeal. Andaya describes how he was considered to show reckless bravery in combat, unmatched skill in the use of arms and in sports, coupled with brilliant daring initiatives, while his ability to move men by his speeches compared favourably with that of Soekarno.

The leadership qualities and organisational skill of Kahar Muzakkar were apparent when he joined various movements during the nationalist activities in Java. In its formative stage during the revolutionary war against Dutch aggression, APIS was merged into Kebaktian Rakyat Indonesia Sulawesi (Devotion of the Indonesian People of Sulawesi, KRIS) a body which was also pioneered by Kahar Muzakkar in October 1945. Kahar was made secretary of KRIS. At KRIS, Kahar met young figures from Sulawesi who later played important roles on the national stage: Maramis (the advisor of KRIS), A. Ratulangi

---

93 Abdul Qahhar Mudzakkar, Konsep Negara Demokrasi Indonesia: Koreksi Pemikiran Politik Pemerintahan Soekarno (Jakarta: Madinah Press, 1999), 11.
94 M. Ukkas Arifin and Sarita Paweloy, Kahar Muzakkar Dalam Masa Perjuangan Kemerdekaan, 2.
95 C. van Dijk, Rebellion under the Banner of Islam: The Darul Islam in Indonesia, 156.
Kahar Muzakkar (X) guarded Soekarno at Ikada Meeting in September 1945

(Photo kindly provided by Cory van Stenus)
(chairman), Manai Sophian, and Saleh Lahade (the representative of KRIS) in the Youth Congress Organisation. KRIS functioned as a political and military organisation and quite successfully developed paramilitary units in several places in Java. However, while the existence of KRIS could be concealed, the internal conflict among its leaders could not be avoided. Kahar was among those who were unhappy with the organisation. The main problem was that KRIS was dominated by Minahasan and Menadonese people.\(^{97}\) It is very probable that the organisation was divided internally by ethnic and religious issues.

Upon leaving KRIS, Kahar founded the Batalion Kesatuan Indonesia, (Indonesian United Battalion, BKI) at the end of 1945. The core of BKI comprised many political prisoners of the Dutch from the Nusakambangan and Cilacap prisons, who originated from the outer Islands. Kahar met these people when he traveled to Cilacap and by his intercession, these prisoners were released and subsequently given brief military training. This Battalion became the core of Kahar Muzakkar’s army. It operated as President Soekarno’s protection guard when he moved to Yogyakarta.\(^{98}\) This Battalion later became the core of the Tentara Republik Indonesia Persiapan Sulawesi (Republican Preparatory Army of Sulawesi, TRIPES) which was formed in 1946. The release of these prisoners by Kahar Muzakkar may also explain the depth of loyalty that many troops had for Kahar Muzakkar when he rebelled against the republican government.

TRIPES was formed by Kahar on being assigned the task of preparing the formation of a republican army in Sulawesi by Sudirman, the commander of the republican Army, in March 1946.\(^{99}\) Some accounts of Kahar’s life touch slightly on his relationship with Sudirman. Mattulada, for example, writes that during the second Dutch police action, Kahar joined Sudirman in the war against the Dutch occupation of the Central Java.\(^{100}\) However, no single account clarified how the relationship was built, although information from many of Kahar’s cohorts stressed that the relationship between Kahar and Sudirman was very strong. Thompson’s description of the close relationship between the two men points to their similar Islamic organisation backgrounds, their Muhammadiyah education, their

\(^{97}\) The Minahasan and Menadonese are tribes of North Sulawesi and the majority of them are Christian. See Barbara Sillars Harvey, “Tradition, Islam, and Rebellion: South Sulawesi 1950 -1965,” 173.

\(^{98}\) Ibid., 174.


\(^{100}\) Ibid., 180.
experiences as Hizbul Wathan activists and their similar background of paramilitary training with Pembela Tanah Air (Homeland Defender, PETA).\textsuperscript{101}

Kahar himself was given the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, the highest rank achieved by a South Sulawesi person at that time. This is the starting point from which Kahar began to play a key role in the relationship between the Central and South Sulawesi regions in the revolutionary war. Kahar, helped by Major Andi Mattalatta and Major Saleh Lahade (both originally from South Sulawesi) began to organise the infiltration of soldiers from Java into South Sulawesi using boats in 1949. The infiltration was aimed at facing the mass killing of Dutch’ Westerling\textsuperscript{102} in South Sulawesi. The mass killings were the effect of a pacification campaign by the Dutch, who still wanted to defend their occupation of Sulawesi.\textsuperscript{103} Despite the problems faced during the trip, in which some were arrested by the Dutch, the expedition was significant because more than one thousand soldiers were successfully landed in South Sulawesi. Kahar, furthermore, organised a special military unit, called Barisan Berani Mati (Ready to Die Forces, BBM) consisting of members who had not yet joined the expedition in South Sulawesi.\textsuperscript{104}

At the time the troops from outside Java were organised into a brigade in 1950, it was expected that Kahar would be the commander. However, this appeared to be his first setback since he became a senior officer. He was only appointed as Vice Commander while the commandship was given to J.F. Warrouw, a Christian Minahasan who held the same rank as Kahar. Kahar thought he deserved the command because most of the members of the Battalion were his followers, but, it seemed that, as had happened previously with KRIS, the Manadonese were more dominant.

There seems to be two important reasons why Warrouw was appointed. First, to satisfy the need of the central army to improve its professionalism. The Manadonese senior officers, such as Warrouw, had a formal military training and as a former Koninklijke Nederlandsche Indische Leger (Royal Netherlands Indies Army, KNIL) troops, they had served in the Second World War. Kahar Muzakkar had either formal military training or battle experience in the war. Second, if Kahar was appointed, it would be an obstacle to the

\textsuperscript{101} Interview with Tommy Thompson, 4 February 2005.
\textsuperscript{102} The number of the murdered was estimated at 40,000 people. This moment was well recognised by South Sulawesi people as korban 40,000 jiwa (victims of 40,000 souls).
\textsuperscript{104} Mattulada, “Kahar Muzakkar: Profil Patriot Pemberontak,” 179.
integration of separate paramilitary under the supreme command of the central army, because Kahar Muzakkar with his rebellious character could direct their loyal followers to take a different side from the central leadership’s policy.

After Dutch police action ended in 1949, Kahar became commander of Komando Group Seberang (Group Commando for the Outer Islands, KGS) in October 1949. In this new capacity, Kahar was in charge of the coordination of the guerilla units in Kalimantan, Sulawesi, the Moluccas and Nusa Tenggara. Besides this, he was charged with the task of building up a military cadre in these areas. First Lieutenant Saleh Sjahban and Corporal Bahar Mattalioe, two Buginese people and Kahar’s close friends in the nationalist movement, were sent to Sulawesi to cement Kahar’s influence among the troops on the outer islands.\(^{105}\) However, KGS was disbanded due to the need to reorganise the army structure and due to internal conflict among the top army leaders.\(^{106}\) Still in 1949, Kahar Muzakkar on his own initiative consolidated the guerilla members in South Sulawesi by forming Kesatuan Gerilya Sulawesi Selatan (South Sulawesi Guerilla Union, KGSS). The paramilitary, which were formerly, divided were now united in this movement.


The initial cause of the rebellion pioneered by Kahar Muzakkar seems to have originated from a military policy that was unacceptable to ex-guerilla forces in the area. This problem can be traced to the transfer of Indonesian sovereignty in December 1949, the establishment of the federal state and the repatriation of the Dutch military forces which brought about changes in the region. Many elements in South Sulawesi began to worry about their future

\(^{105}\) For complete information on this event, see M. Bahar Mattalioe, *Pemberontakan Meniti Jalar Kanan*, 130-131.

\(^{106}\) Internal conflict occurred between A.H. Nasution (National Chief of Army) and Bambang Supeno (Vice Chief). Nasution stressed the importance of professionalism within the army, insisting it had to comprise educated individuals and a clear hierarchy. Supeno, on the other hand, saw that the Army had to consist of those who possessed revolutionary spirit and a strong relationship with the people. In this difference of vision, Supeno lost out and his failure affected Kahar Muzakkar’s military position in Java. Kahar was personally close to Supeno and since Supeno’s defeat, Kahar became more isolated among the senior officers in the Central Army and was no longer in an official position until he was sent to South Sulawesi in 1950, at the beginning of the rebellion. It is even suggested that the effort of putting Kahar in the KGS was only a strategy to draw him away from the structure of the Central Army. The KGS itself was only an informal position, and not a formal part of the Central Army. For more information, see Barbara Sillars Harvey “Tradition, Islam, and Rebellion: South Sulawesi 1950 - 1965,” 149.
in regional government. These specially affected members of the local aristocracy, many Ambonese and Manadonese, who had worked as civil servants under the Dutch, and no exception, the members of the KNIL, the military forces which had served the Dutch during the time of revolution.

The fear among these groups was based on the assumption that they would be the object of revenge by the local guerrilla people who fought against the Dutch and their local allies. These people most worried about their existence without the Dutch presence. Therefore, the continued existence of the State of East Indonesia which was formed based on the agreement of the Indonesian government and the Dutch as part of the state of the Republic of the United States of Indonesia, was their last hope. They assumed that despite the transfer of sovereignty and the absence of the Dutch, they still could preserve their interests because the structure of the state was not changed. However, the South Sulawesi guerrilla groups supported by the majority of the local people viewed the Negara Indonesia Timur (East Indonesian State, NIT) as a symbol of the colonialism that they had struggled against. The idea of defending the NIT would contradict their role as “defender of the Republic”.107 The resentment planted in them by those former Dutch supporters, invited the NIT supporters to rebel, resulting in the ‘Andi Azis Affair’. This rebellion occurred in April 1950 led by Captain Andi Aziz, a South Sulawesi aristocrat and commander of a KNIL battalion. However, due to the quick response of the central military government and supported by KGSS activists, the rebellion could be effectively handled.108

Would the dissolution of the NIT and the establishment of the unitary Republic in August 1950 bring the hopes of the guerrilla groups to fruition? KGSS demanded to be absorbed into the national army. Further, they demanded a separate military unit and the appointment of Kahar Muzakkar as its commander. However, the army leadership in Jakarta which was dominated by professional officers refused because it contradicted the government rationalisation program.109 Kawilarang, the military commander of East Indonesia, implemented the program. Kawilarang wanted only to recruit them on strict

107 Ichlasul Amal, Regional and Central Government in Indonesian Politics, 45.
108 For more information of the rebellion, see Christiaan Robert Steven Soumokil, Rondom de Affaire Kapitein Andi Abdul Aziz (s'Gravenhage, 1950).
109 It was Hatta’s cabinet during the Parliamentary Democracy in Indonesia at that time which put forward the rationalisation program. For information on Hatta’s cabinet see, Herberth Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962).
selection criteria. The government had set up regulations for entering the national army, based on educational criteria and military experience. If the criteria were adhered to, almost all of the KGSS members would be rejected. On the other hand, most of commanders of the battalion within the KGSS during the revolutionary period demanded the minimal rank of Captain, regardless of the level of their educational background. These commanders from aristocratic backgrounds clearly indicated that offers at the level of the ordinary army men would be insulting.\textsuperscript{110}

In June 1950, Kahar Muzakkar was sent to South Sulawesi by the central government to mediate the problem of incorporation in June 1950. However, he decided to take the side of the guerillas. Kahar met Kawilarang and stated their demand.\textsuperscript{111} Kawilarang remained consistent in central government’s policy. In his autobiography, Bahar Mattalioe\textsuperscript{112} describes how Kahar Muzakkar reacted to Kawilarang’s refusal. Kahar became very angry and in front of Kawilarang pulled off his insignia rank as a ‘Lieutenant Colonel’ saying: \textit{Ini tidak ada gunanya} (This is of no use). This response, again, showed the hot-headed character of Kahar Muzakkar. He then asserted that if the demand was not accommodated, he and KGSS would rise in rebellion.\textsuperscript{113}

Scholarly accounts also record that the problem was complicated by the ethnic and personal rivalries. Kawilarang was perceived as bringing the attitudes of his ethnic community, the Protestant Menadonese. The Menadonese occupied a number of prestigious positions in Makassar partly because they were better educated in comparison with the Makassarese. Incorporation, in which regional and ethnic tendencies emerged as a source of problems was seen by the South Sulawesi guerillas as unfair treatment by the central government. The spirit of rebellion was encouraged by the presence of Kahar Muzakkar who had been regarded as having a good record as a fighting soldier during the revolution, bearing the highest rank among the soldiers from South Sulawesi. His followers saw him as deserving sympathy, and of having been betrayed by the central government.

\textsuperscript{110} See Ichlasul Amal, \textit{Regional and Central Government in Indonesian Politics}, 47.

\textsuperscript{111} M. Bahar Mattaliaoe, \textit{Pemberontakan Meniti Jalur Kanan}, 141.

\textsuperscript{112} He was the former prominent commander of Kahar Muzakkar in the jungle but finally choose to return to the city and joined the government. For his complete experience of the process of the rebellion until his decision to leave Kahar.

\textsuperscript{113} M. Bahar Mattaliaoe, \textit{Pemberontakan Meniti Jalur Kanan}, 143.
During 1950-1952, rebellion was still much coloured by the internal military incorporation problem, but religiosity also emerged. Arrangements made by both republican government and Kahar Muzakkar that KGSS changed into Cadangan Tentara Nasional (National Reserve Army, CTN) as a preparatory organisation, prior to its incorporation in the national army. CTN resulted an agreement between KGSS and the republican government to end the conflict. This effort failed due to the different interpretation of how the incorporation was to be conducted. CTN maintained its demand that all members were to be incorporated, which was not accepted by the national military forces. CTN led by Kahar Muzakkar decided to change its name to Tentara Keamanan Rakyat (People Liberation Army, TKR). As will be seen below, it is during TKR times that transformation to an Islamic rebellion took place.

4. Kahar Muzakkar and DI (1952-1965)

The formation of the South Sulawesi DI movement was preceded by the contact of the region’s guerillas with the West Java DI, which was also commonly called Negara Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic State, NII). This DI is the origin of DI rebellion established and formally proclaimed in West Java in August 1949.\(^{114}\) This movement was driven in part by a belief that the Republic of Indonesia had betrayed Islamic ideals, but having a secular ideological basis. NII then spread out in areas of Indonesia including Aceh, Central Java, South Kalimantan and South Sulawesi.

It was initiated before 1952 by a letter sent by Kartosuwirjo to Kahar Muzakkar asking to join his DI before 1952. Kahar Muzakkar replied on 20 January 1952,\(^{115}\) and accepted the invitation of Kartosuwirjo to make Sulawesi part of the Islamic state of Indonesia. He also explained that he did not think Sulawesi ready to adopt DI movement formally. He stated that Muslim society in Sulawesi needed time to implement the ‘true Islam’. He described that of the five battalions he commanded, three were influenced by

\(^{114}\) According to some sources Kartosuwirjo’s idea of DI has been formed in August 1945, at the time of the proclamation of Indonesian independence, but he remained loyal to the Indonesian Republic. For more information on this issue, see C.van Dijk, *Rebellion under the Banner of Islam: The Darul Islam in Indonesia*, 84-89.

\(^{115}\) See Kahar Muzakkar’s correspondence to Kartosuwirjo in the Document DI/TII Kahar Muzakkar No. 129, Dinas Sejarah, Pusat Sejarah TNI, Jakarja. See also Appendix I.
‘red’ ideology, and that happened before his arrival in Sulawesi. Boland says that Kahar Muzakkar’s earlier troops were from Christian guerillas in North Sulawesi and South Maluku who did not want to accept the unitary state forced on them by the central government. In relation to Kahar’s earlier religious conditions of his followers, he states to Kartosuwirjo:

South Sulawesi Muslims still need time to plant the real soul of Islam, because what we see about Islam in South Sulawesi is very different from its inside reality, especially after the proclamation of 17 August 1945, so many false Islamic leaders that use Islam as a scapegoat....

Kahar mentioned his early commitment on Islamic struggle:

Actually, we also have wanted to initiate an Islamic revolution since 16 August 1951 (based on what I plan with Brother Abd. Fattach and Brother Saleh Sjahban), but unfortunately, these two brothers are not committed that made our effort failed and our power was defeated by stronger and more influential powers in society (Feudalism and Murba) which were unconsciously influenced by ‘reddish’ ideology.

Due to this condition, Kahar proposed to Kartosuwirjo:

I need flexibility to develop a Muslim soul in society soul according to the time and situation. I acknowledge the Islamic state of Indonesia and its program of struggle but I still need the freedom to implement my own strategy of struggle.

Even though he accepted being part of the Islamic State of Indonesia, Kahar was still reluctant to use the term publicly for his followers. During this time, he named his troops, Tentara Kemerdekaan Rakyat (People’s Liberation Army, TKR). He also referred to an ideological alternative to Pancasila, that is, Trisila (Three Pillars): Belief one the one and only God; Social Justice; and Humanitarianism. An army document also reported on

---

116 Ibid.
117 See B.J. Boland, The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia, 69.
118 Document DI/TII Kahar Muzakkar, No. 129. Dinas Sejarah, Pusat Sejarah TNI, Jakarja. See also Appendix I.
119 Ibid.
120 Ibid.
Kartosuwirjo’s reply to Kahar Muzakkar on 27 February 1952. In that letter, Kartosuwirjo had already appointed Kahar Muzakkar as the commander of Division IV, Hasanuddin of the Indonesian Islamic Army. In his letter, Kartosuwirjo stated:

you are given full authority to enhance the Islamic spirit of Indonesian Muslims in South Sulawesi Muslims in particular and Sulawesi in general until society becomes 100 % Islamic minded and 100 % Islamic state minded.

In terms of co-ordination, Kartosuwirjo states to Kahar:

You are given a full authority to do anything, appropriate along the lines of Islamic law during the martial law period (fi wakt ‘I harbi), with reference to the situation and condition, for the sake of the Islamic state of Indonesia.

Kartosuwirjo also gave full rights to Kahar Muzakkar to implement any strategy as long as it did not exceed the regulations for an Islamic state of Indonesia. In his reply, Kartosuwirjo was very grateful for Kahar Muzakkar acknowledging him as the supreme commander of the Islamic State of Indonesia. Besides accepting Kahar Muzakkar’s request, Kartosuwirjo, in his letter, also reminded Kahar Muzakkar of the importance of being under the banner of NII. First, NII had already been one nation. Therefore, the problems related to the Indonesian Republic had to be dealt with between the central government of the two entities. Second, if a person, party, or a group and others wished to approach DI, they should refer to the central government of NII. Third, care was needed with the above problem due to a number of anak cucu Iblis la’natullah (Ar. la’nat Allāh, descendants of the devils) who will always trap them and their movements go beyond the straight path.

Bahar Mattalioe described his first contact with West Java DI, but unfortunately he did not mention the exact date, though implying that it was important for Kahar in

---

121 Kahar Muzakkar’s position was seen in the heading of Kartosuwirjo’s letter to Kahar Muzakkar. See the copy of this letter in Document DI/TII Kahar Muzakkar No. 129, Dinas Sejarah, Pusat Sejarah TNI, Jakarta. See also Appendix II.
122 Ibid.
123 Ibid.
124 Ibid.
125 Ibid.
126 Ibid.
persuading him to join DI. Bahar adds that through his courier, he was successful urging Kahar Muzakkar to join the movement.127

The proclamation of South Sulawesi as part West Java DI occurred on 7 August 1953 at a gathering in Makalua. Kahar Muzakkar read the proclamation of 1949, claiming that Sulawesi and its surroundings were part of the Islamic State of Indonesia.128 This gathering was attended by guerillas and a number of South Sulawesian prominent ulama. It was noted that at least three prominent ulama joined the proclamation, they were Junaid Sulaeman, Rapi Sulaeman, and Ahmad Marzuki Hasan.129 It is interesting that, on the same date, Kahar issued an announcement that South Sulawesi was part of an ‘Indonesian Islamic Republic’ not an ‘Indonesian Islamic State’, and was based in West Java. It is hard to believe that the different name, as quoted by Kahar Muzakkar was as a mere misunderstanding due to a communication problem or that Kahar had his own idea concerning the differences between a ‘state’ and a ‘Republic’.

Kahar writes on behalf of the South Sulawesi Muslims who are called ‘revolutionary; and ‘committed fighters’.130 In his announcement, Kahar stated that he had abandoned the Pancasila ideology. He stated that Indonesian society was far from conferring social justice, and was not a pious society and that their problem were due to the

127 Bahar Mattalioe said that a person arrived to see him who was the representative of Arnaz, the candidate for commander of the Islamic State of Indonesia, based in West Java. The delegate brought the documents around for the implementation of the Darma Bakti of Kartosuwirjo and asked Bahar to be part of West Java DI. The person stated if Bahar was not interested in the idea of DI, he himself would proclaim it in South Sulawesi. Mattalioe asked for time to consider. He then sent the documents to Kahar Muzakkar through his courier. At that time, Bahar also asked Kahar to familiarise the document and urged him to proclaim the establishment South Sulawesi DI. Bahar states that if they were late, they would be preceded by that person. Bahar stated if the person implemented the ideal that they had previously had, there was no other way, except by supporting him.127 For more information, see ibid., 183.

128 See Document DI/TII Kahar Muzakkar No. 130, Dinas Sejarah, Pusat Sejarah TNI, Jakarta. For the original contents of the proclamation, see Appendix III.

129 Ibid., 183. Junaid Sulaeman and Rapi Sulaeman were brothers. They were well known as ulama in South Sulawesi especially in Bone Regent. Both were known to have a wide range of Islamic knowledge having studied Islam in Mecca for about fifteen years. Ahmad Marzuki Hasan is known to be an ulama in Kabupaten Sinjai, South Sulawesi.

130 See Document DI/TII Kahar Muzakkar No. 155, Dinas Sejarah, Pusat Sejarah TNI, Jakarta. The number of the letter indicates that the announcement is the first formal letter of Kahar Muzakkar, after his involvement of the DI movement.
existence of a false ideology, Pancasila.\textsuperscript{131} Therefore, there was a point in further following this ideology.

At the same gathering, Kahar also issued several primary regulations to start the new movement. He announced the new DI flag for South Sulawesi and surroundings. The state flag was to be red with a yellow crescent and three yellow stars, while the military flag was red with three yellow stars and number ‘24’. It may seem odd to have two different flags, but the explanation of a former DI troop was that it was to emphasise the military nature of the South Sulawesian government.\textsuperscript{132} Also, Kahar activated a curfew within the areas of DI. It is interesting to comment that the different name and flag that Kahar Muzakkar produced may suggest that the most important aspect for him was Islamic rebellion, regardless of the different name and symbols of the rebellion he joined. This is related to what he pursued later on, as will be seen further, in establishing a movement but still under the banner of Islam. Furthermore, the different flag may be seen as the implementation of Kahar’s autonomy in determining the symbol of his DI.

Furthermore, Islamic law was formally adopted. Kahar also determined that the existing guerrillas in the jungle who were not part of the Islamic army were categorised as quttanuthariq (Ar. quṭṭah’u ḍarʾīq, robbers).\textsuperscript{133} In his letter, Kahar Muzakkar invited the people to implement the teachings of God and the Prophet’s tradition, in an effort to fight against the followers of Pancasila.\textsuperscript{134} His earlier defence of Pancasila seems to be contradicted to his later opposition to the ideology, but one interpretation may be that the nature of Pancasila was first seen by Kahar Muzakkar as still ‘Islamic’, with the involvement of many Muslim nationalists in its creation, before Soekarno came to accommodate communism. This contradiction will be further explored in the next chapter.

Furthermore, Kahar called on those who were not Muslims to support the Islamic community voluntarily. He asserted that Islam is not against other religious followers due to its peaceful nature. However, war is directed against the so called munafik (Ar. munāfiq,

\textsuperscript{131} Ibid. Kahar Muzakkar’s criticism to Pancasila continued to take shape until his death. Many of his accounts contain criticism of Pancasila. For a complete account of his criticism, see Abdul Qahhar Muzakkar, \textit{Perang Ideologi di Indonesia} (n.p., 1960). See also the general sketch of his criticism to Pancasila in Chapter One of this thesis.

\textsuperscript{132} Interview with Hasan Basri Rahman, 4 October 2003.

\textsuperscript{133} Document DI/TII Kahar Muzakkar, No. 158, Dinas Sejarah, Pusat Sejarah TNI Jakarta.

\textsuperscript{134} Ibid.
hypocrite) Indonesian people who first attracted the Indonesian Muslim community to their ideology and made a fool of God’s religion, with their false ideology of Pancasila. Therefore, the Islamic community have been awakened to defend themselves from attack. Kahar Muzakkar quoted the Quranic verses relevant to the issue of war or jihad (Ar. jihād). In his letter, Kahar Muzakkar furthermore invited all Indonesian people and foreigners to make contact with the DI civil and military institutions in order to guarantee their security.

In the organisation of the whole DI in Indonesia, Kahar sat as the Deputy Minister of Defence, and Commander of the Fourth Military District (East Indonesia) and the fourth Division (Hasanuddin). In a number of documents he issued, he called himself as the Deputy Minister of Defense of the Republik Islam Indonesia, (Indonesian Islamic Republic, RII); Governor of Sulawesi; and Commander of Division Hasanuddin. Despite the formal joining of the South Sulawesi to the DI movement, it cannot be said that there was an active coordination between the central NII and the South Sulawesi NII due to the difficulties of maintaining contact at that time.

In 1945, one year after the proclamation, Kahar in the name of the East Indonesia DI issued a call to the Muslim community, ulama, and Islamic political parties to understand the content of God’s instruction of the jihad. Kahar Muzakkar, furthermore, concentrated on the creation of a legal basis in the application of the formalist Islamic system within the organisation. In 1955, DI held a conference at Makalua, near Palopo. In the conference, a constitution was drafted to guide the South Sulawesi people. This constitution was then known as the Makalua Charter. The existence of the Makalua Charter is very important to explain Kahar’s movements in connection with the Islamic state, and will be specially discussed in Chapter Four on DI’s implementation of Islamic law. There was another decision which came out of the conference, that is, the formation of the Dewan

135 The copy of Kahar Muzakkar’s “Pengumuman” (Announcement) No. 1/D/SP/TII/Co.PH/53. in Ibid.
136 Ibid.
Fatwa (Advisory Council)\textsuperscript{138} consisting of prominent \textit{ulama} chaired by K.H. Abdurrahman Ambo Dalle.\textsuperscript{139} The role of Dewan Fatwa will be dealt with also in Chapter Four.

Kahar created systems to support the existence of NII. He started collecting taxes; a development tax, a war tax, a livestock tax and an income tax, all in the name of the Islamic state. He also established organisations. He founded a youth organisation called Pemuda Islam Jihad and his wife Corry instituted a women fighter’s corps called Laskar Wanita. Furthermore, Kahar began to extend DI influences outside Sulawesi.\textsuperscript{140}

The expansion of Kahar Muzakkar’s DI was initiated soon after he was formally accepted as being under West Java DI. The area was divided into two; the \textit{terugval} (main bases) which comprise: Luwu, Bone, and Duri while the \textit{aannval} bases (supporting bases) were Makassar, Pare-Pare and its surroundings and Southeast Sulawesi. The area included South Sulawesi and Southeast Sulawesi.\textsuperscript{141} Southeast Sulawesi is a neighbouring province of South Sulawesi and it is very near to Luwu, the homeland and the main bases of Kahar Muzakkar.\textsuperscript{142}

These two provinces then became the bases of the DI movement. The two provinces were divided into two military divisions and commands. South Sulawesi was under the Divisi 40,000 Jiwa (Division of 40,000 souls) and Southeast Sulawesi was under the Divisi Hasanuddin (Division of Hasanuddin). These two names may be Kahar’s effort to make reference to past history, that is, to remind the people of the mass slaughter by Dutch’ Westerling in 1949. The latter was the name of the historical great Islamic king of South Sulawesi.

In the next development happened in around 1955, when Kahar was actively expanding his DI. It was designed partly to expand the Islamic ideology of DI in its effort

\begin{footnotesize}
\footnotesize
\begin{enumerate}
\item Complete account of the nature of Dewan Fatwa and its job will be discussed as a subchapter in the third chapter.
\item He was well known as the most prominent South Sulawesian \textit{ulama}, especially after the eradication of the DI movement. Other prominent members of the Council were Junaid Sulaiman, Ahmad Marzuki Hasan, Husain Ahmad, Abd. Rahman Matameng, and Abd. Muin; all also well known as knowledgeable ulama.
\item For information about the expansion of Kahar Muzakkar’s DI, see the section of ideological expansion in chapter two.
\item See the heading of the proclamation text in the “Sejarah Militer,” in Document DI/TII Kahar Muzakkar No. 169, Dinas Sejarah, Pusat Sejarah TNI, Jakarta.
\item Document DI/TII Kahar Muzakkar No. 158, Dinas Sejarah, Pusat Sejarah TNI Jakarta.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
to strengthen its political influence against the Indonesian Republic. Further argument will be explored in Chapter Three concerning this ideological expansion. The scope was widened and the term used was 'East Indonesia DI'. The number of command centres was increased to four: South Sulawesi, Southeast and North Sulawesi, Nusa Tenggara, Maluku and Irian Barat. It was also rumoured that Kahar Muzakkar created an international connections which included guns supplied from Britain, and the appearance of submarines in the gulf of Bone. The other clearer international connection of DI was active smuggling of the DI people under the nose of the British officials in Tawau (Sabah) who feigned ignorance of the matter.

However, international contact was clearly found in the effort of Kahar Muzakkar to connect with Hasan Muhammad Tiro, the DI ambassador who lived in the United States. The connection was seen later when Kahar made Hasan Tiro Minister of Foreign Affairs in his RPII. This seems to be an effort by Kahar Muzakkar to create an international acknowledgment of their existence as a governing force. Kahar was also very inspired by Hasan Tiro’s book, Demokrasi Untuk Indonesia (Democracy for Indonesia) which was largely read by the DI activists. This book then inspired Kahar Muzakkar to write Konsepsi Negara Demokrasi Indonesia (The conception of Indonesian Democratic State).

Furthermore DI's expansion was in line with the emergence of PRRI/Permesta rebellion against the central government in West Sumatera and Sulawesi in 1958. It was caused by the question of relationship with the Central Government and the individual regions, with their different ethnic, economic, and religious characteristics.

---

147 Abdul Qahhar Mudzakkar, Konsepsi Negara Demokrasi Indonesia: Koreksi Pemikiran Politik Pemerintahan Soekarno.
148 PRRI was based in West Sumatera and Permesta was in North Sulawesi. These two movements were usually attached due to their cooperation each other and their pioneers were mostly from the Senior Military of the areas.
149 Kahar Muzakkar described the two movements as two giant groups, of radical revolutionary Muslims: Karstosuwirjo, Muhammad Darud Beureueh, Ibnu Hajar, and Abdul Qahhar Mudzakkar and the PRRI Group, Zulkifli Lubis, Ahmad Husain, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara and others, Abdul
DI cooperation with Permesta was initiated when there was a meeting between Kahar Muzakkars’ DI and M. Salah Lahade’s Permesta. In 1959, DI made the relationship more intensive by sending M. Sadiq and his five members to North Sulawesi, where Permesta was based. From army documents, it was found that there was an active correspondence between Kahar Muzakkar and the leaders of Permesta (J.F. Warouw and H.N.V. Samual). Similar to PRRI, the meeting point of this cooperation was in their fight against what they called Soekarno’s communism. Samual’s letter to Kahar Muzakkar mentions the readiness Permesta to build military cooperation and to supply some military needs of Kahar Muzakkar’s DI. In fact, the cooperation between DI and Permesta was initially pioneered by the coming of Gerungan, a former prominent Christian soldier of Permesta with 200 well-equipped troops who came across to DI.

This cooperation between DI and PRRI/Permesta resulted in a new movement called the Republik Persatuan Indonesia (Indonesian United Republic, RPI) which was proclaimed on 21 March 1961. The movement was motivated by the same perception of the two movements that the Republic of Indonesia under Soekarno was their common enemy. RPI, on the other hand, did not survive more than one year due to the military pressure of the republican government and in 1961, the main supporters of RPI,


150 M. Saleh Lahade was a South Sulawesian nationalist who was active in Java and who built his military career in Sulawesi, becoming an important rival of Kahar Muzakkar in the time of the DI movement, before they united as RPI.

151 Document DI/TII Kahar Muzakkar No. 165, Dinas Sejarah, Pusat Sejarah TNI, Jakarta.

152 The correspondence mentioned the possible establishment of air forces between the two movements. Samual mentioned to Kahar of the availability of an air force plane which could not be yet operated due to their limited facilities. See, Kodam XIV Hasanuddin “Sejarah Militer” in the Document DI/TII Kahar Muzakkar, No. 169, Dinas Sejarah, Pusat Sejarah TNI, Jakarta.

153 According to Harvey, the arrival of Gerungan and his troops to join Kahar Muzakkar was not purposely planned. Gerungan, who was appointed as a chief of the Anoa Resimen of Permesta was supposed to operate in Poso, Central Sulawesi. However, the area was already occupied by the republican army. Gerungan and his troops then moved away until they reached the area of Kahar Muzakkar. Harvey states that the cooperation occurred due to an assumption that Gerungan knew that there had already been a meeting between DI and Permesta on the possibility of building a military cooperation. See Harvey, “Tradition, Islam, and Rebellion: South Sulawesi 1950 - 1965,” 310-311.

PRRI/Permesta leaders gave up to the republican government. RPI will be further analyzed especially its Islamic nature in Chapter Three on DI’s ideological expansion.

After the defeat of RPI, the DI leaders, Daud Beureueh and Kahar Muzakkar did not follow the decision of PRRI/Permesta leaders to give up to the republican government. Instead, they remained committed to their opposition of the republican government. To to gain his goal, Kahar Muzakkar invited his followers and the sympathisers to attend a meeting at Towuti, Luwu in 1962. The meeting was called as Pertemuan Urgensi Pejuang Islam Revolutioner III (the Urgency Meeting of the Islamic Revolutionary Fighters III, PUPIR III). The meeting resulted in the establishment of the Republik Persatuan Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic United Republic, RPII). The nature of RPII will be further explored in Chapter Three.

However, the idealism of RPII was not able to be realised in a practical form. In the period of 1962 – 1965, Kahar Muzakkar, his RPII leaders and limited followers were hiding around the jungle of South and Southeast Sulawesi, avoiding the republican army. During this period, Southeast Sulawesi areas were extremely important especially at the time republican army’s blockade of the DI basis in South Sulawesi was intensified. Many of its important activists were arrested in this province. The shooting to death of Kahar Muzakkar by republican army on February 1965 was in Lasolo river, where it was located in Southeast Sulawesi. It is therefore, not surprising that people from these two areas were familiar with the rebellion and its related story, included the myth of Kahar Muzakkar.

The end of Kahar Muzakkar’s rebellion came when he was shot dead. After his death, the RPII leadership was automatically taken over by Gerungan, who could not activate the movement due to the successful isolation strategy applied by the republican army. The subsequent arrest of Gerungan on 27 July 1965 brought an end to the rebellion of RPII. There were some ministers of RPII who were still moving around Southeast Sulawesi but they were not actively fighting. They were hiding merely from the eyes of the republican army.

---

155 See Abdul Qahar Mudzakkar, Tjatatan Batin Pedjoang Islam Revolucioner Jilid III, 2, Anhar Gonggong, Abdul Qahhar Mudzakkar, 197. Tommy Thomson, Menyingkap Misteri Abdul Qahhar Mudzakkar, 76.

156 For example, the arrest of a number of Kahar Muzakkar’s former ministers, such as Ahmad Marzuki Hasan, Sumarsono, Who were all in the area of Southeast Sulawesi. See Pedoman Rakyat, 28 Desember 1964; A. Moein MG et al., Kilat Menghancurkan Kahar Muzakkar, 95.
(Photo kindly provided by Cory van Stenus)

J.W. Gerungan (center)
C. DI’s Supporters

Understanding the people who join the South Sulawesi DI can help to assess the Islamic sentiment of the movement. The followers of DI can be categorised into those who are considered active supporters and passive supporters. The active supporters were those who were directly involved through physical rebellion while the passive followers were those who indirectly supported the rebellion or those who gave moral support to the rebellion, and even those who neither supported nor opposed the rebellion but lived in the areas under DI’s control.

The active members of DI can, furthermore, be classified into several elements. First, those paramilitary units who faced the problems of demobilisation in post-independence and became disappointed and finally joined Kahar Muzakkar in the jungle. There were those under the coordination of KGSS. They were core of Kahar Muzakkar’s active supporters and served as troops during the time of the rebellion. It is estimated that their numbers were up to 7000 people.158

Active members can be further divided into different groups according to their socio-religious perspectives. The first element was from the religiously oriented paramilitary. Some of these people joined Kahar Muzakkar since he was involved in nationalist activities in Java, and others had joined since the beginning of the rebellion. Religiously and ethnically, they were close to Kahar Muzakkar. Some had a similar Islamic education in Java, some were of the same ethnic origin as Kahar, and still others were ideologically interested in Kahar Muzakkar’s DI. They were generally not from the aristocratic strata. The important people in this group were Jufri Tambora, Kasso Gani, Bahar Mattalioe, Saleh Sjahban, Samsul Bahri, Sanusi Daris, M. Ali AT and Hamzah Pangerang. These people from the general rebellion (TKR) significantly contributed to the formation of DI.159 The second group were those corps who joined Kahar Muzakkar as a consequence of the incorporation problems, that is, those who were not to be incorporated

157 This categorization was first launched by Anhar Gonggong who classified Kahar Muzakkar’s followers into two; direct-active followers and indirect-passive followers. See Anhar Gonggong, *Abd Qahhar Mudzakkar: Dari Patriot Hingga Pemberontak*, 108.


159 For more information on the involvement of this figure in the nationalist activist in Java in post-independence, see M. Ukkas Arifin and Sarita Paweloy, *Kahar Muzakkar dalam Masa Perjuangan Kemerdekaan*.
by the republican government and those who proved their solidarity to their own corps. This group of people constituted the largest number of all Kahar Muzakkar’s paramilitary corps.

The second element of those who were considered active followers of DI were the civilian figures. They were important especially at the beginning of the formation of DI. Their involvement was in an effort to formalist nature of the movement. Most of these figures later occupied important positions in DI, including being minister’s representatives. These community leaders could be divided into religious leaders (ulama) and community figures from different regions. These ulama can also be divided into those who were involved voluntarily and those who were kidnapped by the DI troops. Those who entered voluntarily included: Abdul Kadir Daud, Ahmad Marzuki Hasan, Abdullah Hasan, Junaid Sulaiman, Rafie Sulaeman, Lanre Said, Husain Ahmad, Islamil Hasan, Ahmad Rahiem, Jusuf Usman, Kyai Sulaeman and Kyai Maksum. Several of these ulama became involved after they heard about the outbreak of the rebellion, like Kyai Sulaeman and Kyai Maksum, who traveled from Java to join Kahar Muzakkar. Others became involved after they were taken by Kahar Muzakkar’s delegates, such as: Ahmad Marzuki Hasan, Lanre Said, Junaid Sulaeman. 160 Those who were kidnapped included: Abdurrahman Ambo Dalle and Abdurrahman Matammeng. 161 Abdurrahman once sat as the Vice of Kahar Muzakkar and Abdurrahman Matammeng was once the head of Dewan Fatwa. 162 During the DI rebellion, almost all well-known ulama in South Sulawesi were involved and supported DI. 163

There were also civilians who were known as community figures. Their involvement in the jungle gave more intellectual colour to DI, and they played an important role in the structure of DI. These figures came from various regions in South Sulawesi, and included: B.S. Beranti, Ismail Hasan, Mohammad Noor, Zainuddin Patongai, Ahmad

---

161 For information about their kidnapping, see M. Bahar Mattalioe, Pemberontakan Meniti Jalur Kanan, 188-189. The position of Abdurrahman Ambo Dalle who first sat as Vice Commander of South Sulawesi DI was partly due to the effort of Kahar Muzakkar to preserve this figure so that he did not leave the jungle, and also to maximise his role as a community figure, including winning the support of the traditional elements of the Muslim community.
162 Information on the position of Abdurrahman Matammeng as the Head of Dewan Fatwa was provided by Sahabuddin’s private collection without a cover, containing the collections of Dewan Fatwa’s recommendations signed by Abdurrahman Matammeng.
163 This is based on the information given by Aswar Hasan who also wrote a thesis on Kahar Muzakkar and his radical thought. Interview with Aswar Hasan, 13 December 2004.
Makkarusu, Jufri Hamzah, and H.R. Abdie. They were all invited to hold governmental positions in DI and they generally accepted the call.

The third group of active supporters of DI were the aristocrats. Even though Kahar Muzakkar was always a strong anti-feudalist, he realised the need to embrace the aristocrats due to the wide range of their influence in society. Kahar Muzakkar had no other choice than associated closely with them, despite making an anti-feudalist policy in the jungle which affected those aristocrats, who included: Andi Tenriajeng, Andi Masse, Andi Patawari, Andi Haliah and others. They were not an important part of the DI conception, but they were important in the physical rebellion for DI and in preserving the existence of the movement.

Other important main followers of Kahar Muzakkar, especially before the inception of DI came from the aristocracy. They were pure nationalist. The important people in this group were: Andi Selle and Andi Sose. Andi Selle left the rebellion and was incorporated in the republican military in 1950, with his three companies. Andi Selle was one of five battalion commanders of Kahar Muzakkar in the early stage of the rebellion. Andi Sose, another commander, was commissioned into the republican army in 1952. This was similarly done by Aziz Taba in 1952, another commander of Kahar Muzakkar. Another figure who left Kahar Muzakkar was Usman Balo, though not aristocratic he was regarded as having wide range of influence in society. The departure of these nationalist from Kahar Muzakkar prior to the formation of DI was mainly because of their disagreement with Kahar Muzakkar who directed his rebellion into Islamic rebellion. Andi Selle is known as a former faithful follower of Kahar Muzakkar, but he was also known to lack Islamic ideological interest. He was purely nationalist activist. This is similar happening to Andi Sose and Aziz Taba. They decided to join the republican after they saw the agreement letter

---


166 There are five Battalion leaders and commanders that Kahar Muzakkar had in 1950 which were all under his Brigade Hasanuddin. They were: Battalion I, “Bau Massepe”, centered in Pare Pare, commanded by Andi Selle; Battalion II, “Batuputih”, centered in Palopo, commanded by Andi Tenriajeng; Battalion III,” Arief Rate”, centered in Bantaeng, commanded by Aziz Taba; Battalion IV, “Wolter Monginsidi”, centered in Enrekang, commanded by Andi Sose; and Battalion V, “40,000,” centered in Rappang, commanded by Sjaamsul Bahri.

167 Interview with Anhar Gonggong, 28 January 2005. Anhar Gonggong, whose original name was Andi Gonggong, is the sibling of Andi Selle.
signed by Kahar Muzakkar who decided to join Kartosuwirjo’s DI. Andi Sose, and Aziz Taba have been known also as nationalist with lack of Islamic ideological concern with the movement. It can therefore be said that the formal adoption of DI acted as a the filter for Kahar Muzakkar’s key followers, between those who preferred Islam and those who did not, as the ideology of the movement.

The fourth element of active supporters of DI were merchants and those having a strong business orientation. Kahar Muzakkar seems to have paid special attention to these figures. In DI, the role of the merchants is important to serve the economic needs of the movement, which included the purchase of weapons to wage rebellion against the republic. Kahar Muzakkar founded a special business organisation called: Usaha Rahasia Khusus Organisasi (Special and Confidential Business of Organisation, UNCOR). In the time of DI, their business activities included agricultural businesses which were managed by DI. These were usually operated by Kahar Muzakkar’s commanders, such as, Amien Larekeng and Abdul Wahid who had networks of business from Surabaya, Makassar, and areas in Southeast Sulawesi. The importance of merchandise in DI was seen in Kahar Muzakkar’s marriage to Sitti Hamie (his fourth wife) who was well known as a successful merchant in Southeast Sulawesi.

The fifth active element was woman activists. The role of women cannot be ignored in the jungle. It is said that women activists were also active in campaigning for the expansion of DI’s influence, by persuading male youths to join DI, and by persuading the republican armies who entered the villages to take sides with DI. The role of woman was also seen in the medical corps, serving as volunteers aiding DI troops who were injured in the war against the republican army. The significant role of woman activists in the jungle can be seen in the founding of Laskar Wanita (women - Fighter’s Corps) which was led by

170 Anhar Gonggong, Abdul Qahar Mudzakkar: Dari Patriot Hingga Pemberontak, 112. It should be noted that the attention to business activities within DI was surprising. Kahar Muzakkar and other main supporters of DI, such as Saleh Sjahban and KS. Ghani were all recognised as business men in Java, prior to the outbreak of the independence war.
171 Ibid., 112. For further information on the business activities of DI, see C. van Dijk, Rebellion under the Banner of Islam: The Darul Islam in Indonesia, 192-193.
Cory van Stenus, an Indo-European lady married by Kahar Muzakkar in Yogyakarta in 1947. Cory was Kahar's most active wife in the jungle. Besides, Laskar Wanita, It was also formed Kesatuan Wanita Indonesia Sulawesi (The Unity of Sulawesi Indonesian Woman, KWIS).

Passive followers of DI were also useful to the movement. They protected DI active followers from the republican army. They were those who did not directly join the movement but still supported the ideological orientation of the rebellion. They came from Muslim organisations and political parties. Several figures from Muhammadiyah passively supported DI\(^{172}\) since Kahar Muzakkar had a strong Muhammadiyah background. Many Muhammadiyah activists in the city supported DI ideologically. Daeng Maggading, for example, an activist of Muhammadiyah in Makassar, was a well known supporters of the Islamic ideology of Kahar Muzakkar. It is also said that many students of DI were sent to Muhammadiyah schools in Makassar.

Activists from political parties which were considered to have a connection with DI were both PSII and Masyumi. Haji Abdul Kadir Daud, the first *ulama* who supported the South Sulawesi DI was an activist in the modernist wing of PSII. Furthermore, a number of young PSII activists in Makassar held to the ideological line of DI. Masyumi was also to have linked with DI in the jungle. Mohammad Noor, a Masyumi activist with a Muhammadiyah background, was said to send to the jungle to lobby Kahar Muzakkar in 1957, and was known as an important person to Kahar Muzakkar.\(^ {173}\) He then sat as a Vice Minister of Home Affairs in South Sulawesi DI.\(^ {174}\) Masyumi was also known to have branches in South Sulawesi including in Islamic schools. The fact is that the greater number of Kahar Muzakkar’s supporters studied in Masyumi’s Islamic schools. Ideologically, Masyumi was the main Indonesian political party that opposed PKI, which was also the main enemy of DI. These kind of connections led to such an indirect support of DI. The relation between PSII and Masyumi with DI is not surprising, since Kartosuwirjo, the creator of DI was formely known to be a PSII activist (1931-1339) and a Masyumi activist (1945-1946).

\(^{172}\) For more information on the support of Muhammadiyah to DI, see Christian Pelras, *Manusia Bugis*, 342-343.


Cory van Stenus

(Photo kindly provided by Cory van Stenus)
The majority of passive followers were from the civilian communities. They were not involved in DI since they preferred their own jobs; teaching, farming, and fishing. There were also students studying in the regular schools operated by the government. Their relationship with DI was mainly due to their relatives being involved in DI. These were groups that became the most victimised during the time of the rebellion, since on the one hand, they often faced the republican army and asked about DI, while on the other hand, they had to keep silent for the security of their relatives involved in DI.

The other type of passive supporter is a group that one probably could not anticipate, that is, members of the republican army. Their relations with DI was firstly to many of their relatives being involved with DI, and secondly, ethnically, they were still connected with their Buginese rather than their Javanese military counterparts who were placed to combat DI. They separated because they had different ideological and personal orientations, but their blood relations were still strong. The indication of this passive republican soldiers’ support of DI was that some of them continued to idealise Kahar Muzakkar, right up to the present time.

This chapter concludes that DI was a result of the recent history of Islam in South Sulawesi. DI is the product of Islamic modernism in Indonesia. The emergence of DI as an Islamic formalist movement was first preceded by military problems left over in the post-Indonesian independence period and seen as a non-Islamic factor. However, the key leader, Kahar Muzakkar, had a strong background of Islamic modernism, being educated by Muhammadiyah. The support of the modernist elements was clearly seen in the movement both among the organisations and individuals. This chapter has shown that the shaping of DI in religious perspective not only originated from the modernism itself but also out of the personality of Kahar Muzakkar. This will be further discussed in the next chapter, which focuses on his Islamic thought and activities in an effort to identify DI’s Islamism.
Chapter Two

KAHAR MUZAKAKAR AND DI: REGIONALISM OR RELIGION?

The available studies of Darul Islam (DI) have generally offered readers the picture that DI in South Sulawesi was much more conditioned by regionalism, that is the post-independence problems of military incorporation, than by the religiosity of its activists. Speaking about the direct cause of the rebellion, this claim can be accepted. However, we should keep in mind Gottschalk's thesis that when looking at the cause of an event's emergence, differentiation should be made between its direct and indirect cause. Gottschalk asserts that the direct cause of a movement's emergence may not be named as the real cause, since it is just one point in the continuing process of moving towards an objective; in fact, the indirect cause may be more important to explain the nature of an event. In the case of the DI rebellion in South Sulawesi, then, should it be argued that military incorporation problems were only the direct cause of the rebellion, while the indirect cause was the strong religiosity of those involved?

The discussion in this chapter will examine the significant downplaying of religiosity in the formation of rebellion. Rather than following the general thesis that DI in South Sulawesi was a continuation of the early disappointment of guerilla leaders with the central government of Indonesia, this chapter will argue that it was a rebellion of a more significant Islamism. There are two aspects to explore here to support this thesis, first is the thought of its key leader, Kahar Muzakkar and how Islamic he perceived the movement that he shaped to be. Part of weaknesses of several accounts that discount the Islamism of DI is that none of them have tried to discuss systematically Kahar Muzakkar's thought whether from his books or his speeches. Second is the ideological dynamics behind the formation of DI and the significance of the role of Islam. This also lacks attention in the accounts dealing with the South Sulawesi DI.

A. Kahar Muzakkar’s Religio-Political Thinking

Kahar Muzakkar’s dominant influence in DI was not only in directing the rebellion, but more significantly in directing the ideological development of the movement through his thought. Kahar began to write after he was involved in the rebellion. His writings include monographs, speeches (very numerous) and regulations.\textsuperscript{176} His writings reflect his efforts to support the political and ideological existence of DI.

We may have the impression that the writings of Kahar Muzakkar were only aimed at strengthening the legitimacy of DI, since he appears not to have produced any Islamist ideas prior to his involvement in the rebellion. We might suspect that he became Islamist in order to justify the rebellion. However, it is entirely possible that Kahar’s Islamism may have been present earlier though not recorded until later in his career. The formulation of DI in 1953, when Kahar Muzakkar began to write on Islamic issues by quoting Qur’anic verses against the republican government occurred shortly after the outbreak of the rebellion in 1950. What is more, Kahar’s abilities to deal with issues related to current world ideological developments and his ability to argue on religion and state relations are an indication of his long possession of Islamic knowledge. Such broad expertise was by no means instantly acquired.

Despite the fact that his writing is sometimes more influenced by personal and emotional responses, Kahar tried to support his arguments by combining his understanding of both modern phenomenon and religious, particularly Islamic, teaching. It is further evidence that he possessed this knowledge long before, since it was difficult to acquire such expertise under rebellion in the ‘jungle’ with severely limited time and resources.\textsuperscript{177} There

\textsuperscript{176} Kahar Muzakkar was said to have written more then ten monographs. Up until I wrote this thesis, I could only get seven of these monographs and one formal speech. However, I was very grateful to obtain access to a large amount of the documents and letters to his commanders and to the republican army commanders supplied by Dinas Sejarah, Pusat Sejarah TNI, Jakarta.

\textsuperscript{177} Due to this limitation, we find some shortcomings in his ideas when dealing with various issues. Deliar Noer states that Kahar’s effort to express his Islamic political ideas was not complete. Noer states that Kahar was involved in the writings when he was still young. Furthermore, at the time he wrote he was involved with the armed struggle against the central government. Noer, however, sees that the good aspect of Kahar’s writing his ideas was that it was not only for the people of his time
are other reasons to argue that Kahar Muzakkar’s writings after his involvement in DI were part of his effort to strengthen his ideological orientation, his Islamic formalism. First, he needed to do so for his internal DI community, in order to ‘Islamise’ it. Then he also wrote for a general audience, to help outsiders understand the nature of formalist Islamic ideology. In addition to these, Kahar found himself limited by the considerable influence of non-Islamic oriented groups, such as what he saw as Communist and feudalist groups. This may well have limited Kahar’s expression of his Islamic idealism, but it does not necessarily indicate its absence.

The main characteristic of Kahar’s ideas is his revolutionary way of thinking. His ideas shifted fast from one idealism to another in supporting the Islamism of DI, revealing the uncertainty of his thoughts. As will be seen below, he did this due to his efforts to strengthen his Islamism. His writings tend to be rhetorical in an effort to carry the DI community with him. Sometimes his ideas are backed up by severe criticism of people or ideologies outside his movement, and these were used against the backdrop of his physical confrontation with the republican government.

In terms of the quality of Kahar’s writings, it may also be said that they were not well-prepared. Too often they show the influence of his quick-tempered personality, and this could extend to attacking his enemies. The following quote is an example of his emotional character in criticising Soekarno’s government. It is taken from a letter sent to Soekarno himself:

It turns out that Soekarno is not a person of integrity. Soekarno is not of good character. Soekarno is not a leader who recognises the true ideals of the nation. Soekarno does not understand wider brotherhood... Soekarno has been condemned by God, the light of his soul has been extinguished by God......

However, Kahar Muzakkars’ writings also demonstrate his broad knowledge. As will be seen below, his thoughts touch on many aspects of Islam and politics. The following categorisation will sketch general points in his Islamic political thinking:

—but that it was a lesson in idealism, expressed in fighting against the status quo, and at least a guide for later generations to continue his idealism. Deliar Noer, “Preface,” in Abdul Qahhar Mudzakkar, Konsepsi Negara Demokrasi Indonesia: Koreksi Penikiran Politik Pemerintahan Soekarno, ix.

Adul Qahhar Mudzakkar, Revolusi Ketatanegaraan Indonesia Memudju Persaudaraan Manusia, 20.
1. From Defender to Opponent of Pancasila

Kahar Muzzakar first outlined the ideological basis of the state in *Revolusi Kemerdekaan Sejati* (The Pure Independence Revolution) written on 4 August 1950,\(^{179}\) which was then used as the foundation of his movement, *Tentara Kemerdekaan Rakyat* (People’s Independence Army, TKR). He did not define what he meant by ‘pure independence revolution’ in any detail. He stated that the concept was designed to support the Indonesian Proclamation of Independence of 17 August 1945. Kahar saw himself as the proponent of Pancasila and of the nation’s basic constitution, *Undang-Undang Dasar 1945* (1945 Basic Constitution, UUD 1945).

The struggle and the sacrifice of the Indonesian people who have suffered so far has been set adrift from and falsified by opportunists who call themselves the people’s leaders. But they have no responsibility at all to the nation and have even become the enemies of the idealism of true independence. They have deviated from Pancasila and the Basic Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia which is the idealism of all Indonesian patriots and the need of the common people....\(^{180}\)

This concept was characterised by its terminology. It tended to use leftist terms, such ‘real struggle’, ‘real freedom,’ and ‘common people’ and ‘labourers’. This may be the reason why some accounts have linked Kahar Muzakkar to Communist-oriented thought.\(^{181}\) However, we cannot judge the influence of communism on this concept now, because at the time when Kahar had entered the DI movement and had eradicated accused Communist groups in the jungle, he still used certain leftist terms. This is why Aswar Hasan, a scholar who wrote a thesis on the thinking of Kahar Muzakkar, describes Kahar as more of ‘leftist Islamist’.\(^{182}\)

Even though the concept did not yet touch on the issue of an Islamic state, it made mention of all rebellions in Indonesia caused by what he saw as ‘cowards of the idealism of

---

\(^{179}\) Document DI/II Kahar Muzakkar, No. 117, Dinas Sejarah, Pusat Sejarah TNI, Jakarta. For the full content of this concept, see Appendix IV.

\(^{180}\) Ibid.

\(^{181}\) Document DI/II Kahar Muzakkar, No. 126, Dinas Sejarah, Pusat Sejarah TNI, Jakarta.

\(^{182}\) For further information about this issue, see the discussion of ideological rivalries in the chapter II.
true independence'. At this stage Kahar saw the position of rebellion in West Java as a counter to these so-called false patriots. Therefore, he had already recognised the existence of the Islamic movement which he was to join.

Ten years later, however, Kahar stated his open criticism of Pancasila in a book, *Konsepsi Negara Demokrasi Indonesia* (The Conception of Indonesian Democracy) which he launched in 1960. He wrote of his opposition to Pancasila as the root of conflict among the Indonesian people, and of Soekarno for forcing the acceptance of Pancasila as the ideological basis of the state. He stated that the half-hearted acceptance of Pancasila among the various religious followers caused dissatisfaction, while the main cause of internal conflict among Indonesians was the absence of a religious basis to the national ideology.

Kahar criticised the ambiguity of the ideological matter of Pancasila as put forward in its first point:

The first point of Pancasila, 'the oneness of God' is not accepted by Muslim people because it is not only obscure and unclear, but it also subject to many interpretations.

The changes in Kahar's perspective on the basis of the state may be seen by some as inconsistent. In the earliest stage of his work, he did not question the validity of Pancasila and he even tried to defend it. However, he then wanted to try to reinterpret Pancasila to be more Islamic. Kahar has often been criticised on the grounds that his struggle was not purely Islamic in orientation, since this did not emerge at the beginning of the rebellion. However, Anhar Gonggong has interpreted Kahar's motivation in defending Pancasila at the early stage of rebellion as being due to his understanding at the time that Pancasila was an 'Islamic' Pancasila, the ideological product of Muslim leaders involved in the *Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia* (Preparatory Committee for Indonesian Independence, PPKI). According to Anhar, Pancasila was appreciated by many Muslims before it became

---

183 Document DI/TII Kahar Muzakkar, No. 126, Dinas Sejarah, Pusat Sejarah TNI, Jakarta.
184 Abdul Qahhar Mudzakkar, *Konsepsi Negara Demokrasi Indonesia: Koreksi Pemikiran Politik Pemerintahan Soekarno*. Kahar Muzakkar wrote this book in 1960 and it seems that its republication in this year was related to the time of the downfall of Soeharto’s New Order in which the New Order banned to publish any of Kahar Muzakkar’s works.
185 Ibid., 25.
186 Ibid., 25.
influenced by Soekarno which Anhar saw tending to be Communist-oriented. Anhar is of the opinion that this changing nature of Kahar’s vision is due to the impact of Soekarno’s interpretation. The contribution of Soekarno to the change in Kahar Muzakkar might be seen in Soekarno’s attitude to Islam in Indonesia since 1953, when he often commented on the impossibility of Indonesia adopting an Islamic ideology. This attitude caused disappointment to many Muslim figures in Indonesia, leading to their positing Pancasila as non-‘Islamic’ ideology.

The efforts of Kahar Muzakkar to critique Pancasila became more intense in his *Revolusi Ketatanegaraan Indonesia Menuju Persaudaraan Manusia* (Nationhood’s Revolution Towards the Brotherhood of Mankind) which was written after the dismissal of the RPI movement in 1961. Kahar proposed a change in Pancasila to a base of ‘divine ideology’ or religious ideology. He also called it the ‘living Indonesian people’s ideology’, because it would be based on the religions of the Indonesian people. Kahar proposed the clear presence of religions professed by the Indonesian people, to include ‘Islamic teaching and other religious teachings professed by the tribal groups of Indonesian people. He explained that his reference to Islam first reflected the fact that the majority of the Indonesian people do profess Islam. It seems that he did not intend that the term ‘Pancasila’ should be abolished, because in another part of the work he stated that if Pancasila was to be defended, it had to be amended to include a clear religious foundation for its five points.

2. Islamic Democracy Versus Soekarno’s ‘Majapahatism’

Kahar Muzakkar also expanded his vision of democracy in relation to religion. This can be seen in the later stage of his movement, especially after 1960. In the development of Kahar’s thinking, this had to be a major concern. This is found in the *Konsepsi Negara Demokrasi Indonesia: Koreksi Pemikiran Politik Pemerintahan Soekarno* (The Conception

---

187 Interview with Anhar Gonggong, 28 January 2005.
188 Soekarno, for example, spoke of the nature of Indonesian societies with old agricultural systems rather than modern ones. He stated that the old agriculture was mystical and religious. For more information, see Saifuddin Anshari, *The Jakarta Charter 1945: The Struggle for an Islamic Constitution in Indonesia*.
190 Ibid., 10.
191 Ibid., 17.
of the Indonesian Democratic State: A Correction of the Political Thought of Soekarno’s Government), written in July 1960). The work is mostly focused on criticising the political actions of President Soekarno which it claimed sparked rebellion in Indonesia, especially among DI. Kahar criticised Soekarno of being too Java oriented. In his opinion, Soekarno was imposing a program of Jawanisasi\textsuperscript{192} upon the Indonesian people. He accused Soekarno of ‘Majapahitism’ that is, of being obsessed with the memory of the historical expansion of the medieval East Javanese kingdom of Majapahit into the outer islands.\textsuperscript{193}

Soekarno and his fanatical followers had certain objectives in asking the Indonesian people to return to ‘the Indonesian personality’ by masking the spirit of the Indonesian proclamation of 17 August 1945, and masking the great populations of the Javanese people to make fast a Majapahit oriented colonialism. The Proclamation is falsified by Soekarno in order to realise Javanese culture upon the Indonesian culture as a whole.\textsuperscript{194}

Even though this work tends to carry the stamp of Kahar Muzakkar being anti-Javanese, in other parts of the book he declares himself not anti-Javanese:

If I questioned a certain objective of Soekarno’s RI in this little book, it does not mean that I hate the Javanese people nor that I am anti-Javanese. Not at all. One sequence of my life’s struggle was in Java, where for four years I studied, from 1937 to 1940, where I was educated by teachers to study Islam so that I developed an Islamic personality, loving all human beings without discrimination and loving the Muslim community I love myself....It was also in Java that I became active and joined the physical struggle for independence, without wasting any time at all.\textsuperscript{195}

In the book, Kahar criticised Soekarno saying that his Javanese colonialist orientation was linked to a Communist ideology. He shows his strong objection to this ideology:

By co-operating with communism, by helping each other, and by ignoring the psychological pressure of the people in daerah bergolak, (areas of rebellion)

\textsuperscript{192} Jawanisasi refers to the Javanese as the major tribe in Indonesia who migrated to the outer islands.

\textsuperscript{193} Abdul Qahhar Mudzakkar, Konsepsi Negara Demokrasi Indonesia: Koreksi Pemikiran Politik Pemerintahan Soekarno, 1-3.

\textsuperscript{194} Ibid., 19.

\textsuperscript{195} Ibid., 10.
Soekarno and his groups, together with the Communists, have moved to occupy those areas with rich natural resources... The Communists who migrated outside Java, with the Javanese people, later on expanded their 'cellen' [cells] and spread chaos all over Indonesia. Everyone knows, where there are Communists there is chaos, since the foundation of communism is chaos.\(^{196}\)

Kahar Muzakkar went on to give an alternative democratic solution to Soekarno’s Javanese, Majapahitist and Communist orientations. He called this ‘God’s sovereign democracy’:

As long as Indonesian democracy, founded on the true democracy that is God’s sovereign democracy, based on Islamic teachings and other religious teachings professed by all Indonesian tribes and groups is not put into effect, the transmigration of Javanese people to other areas cannot be implemented well. After the formation of such a truly democratic Indonesia, the extra Javanese populations could be transferred to outer areas having the same religious background as the Javanese people who have transmigrated. For example, the Muslim Javanese can be moved to other areas like Aceh, Sumatera Barat, Tengah, Timur, and Selatan, Kalimantan Selatan, Sulawesi Selatan and Tenggara, and Maluku Utara and so on. The same could be done with the Javanese populations who are Christian, Hindu and Buddhist.\(^{197}\)

Even though this quote shows Kahar’s tendency to regionalism, it clearly shows how he prioritised religion in considering the harmony of Indonesian tribes and groups.

3. Islam Versus Other Ideologies

A still later work by Kahar Muzakkar, *Perang Ideology di Indonesia* (The Ideological Battle in Indonesia) elaborates on the contradictions of the three existing ideologies in Indonesia; Islam, Pancasila, and communism. If in his *Konsepsi Negara Demokrasi Indonesia* he focused on criticising Pancasila, in this work, he offers the superiority of Islam compared to other ideologies. (Pancasila and communism fought fierce battles in Indonesian ideological debates during the late 1950s.) He took up the issues of statehood, social justice, and democracy and then contradicted these three rival ideologies surrounding the Indonesian people. He claimed that the content of Pancasila should first be adjusted to

\(^{196}\) Ibid., 13.

\(^{197}\) Ibid., 21.
Islamic teaching, but he stressed that it was Soekarno and his followers who had tortured Pancasila and interpreted it as what he wanted, deviating from true Islamic teaching. Kahar called this "falsafah palsu (false philosophy) and semboyan-semboyan kosong (blank slogans)".198

In comparing Islam and communism, Kahar criticised the latter as anti-nationalist, because nationalist views challenged Communists to create a world egalitarian society without bourgeois groups. Islam, in Kahar's view, contradicted this idea because Islam admits the existence of nationalism, that is a nation based on the same religion.199 In terms of social justice, Kahar accused the Communists of falsely idealising the concept because they tend to use any method, even force, in order to ensure that people are all the same. communism, according to Kahar, is ready to reverse social hierarchies, even by violence, in its effort to create an egalitarian society. Islam, on the other hand, seeks real social justice. Kahar stated that the promotion of social justice should be without force or violence.200

On the question of democracy, Kahar pointed out the absence of the freedom of the people in a Communist country. Freedom is monopolised by the Communist state. People cannot demand their human rights, their individual development or improvements to their quality of life. The democratic characteristics of Islam lie in religion's respect for difference, including difference in religious belief. Islam also acknowledges individual rights and political and economic freedom. According to Kahar, democracy in Islam is an arena of competition where people can develop themselves.201 His concept of democracy was realised in a religious democratic system. He stated that a true democratic government was not one in the western style but one under God's sovereignty.

There are important things to know about the nature of this democracy; first the absoluteness of God's law, second, the government called ulil amri [Ar. ulf 'l amr, government] or conduct governance based on God's law and third, people called ummah [the Islamic community] implementing the law and upholding the right to form a government.202

198 Ibid., 40.
199 Ibid., 717
200 Ibid., 107-108
201 Ibid., 125-126.
202 Ibid., 20, 125-126.
It can, therefore, be stated that unlike several fundamentalists who do not see the compatibility between Islam and democracy, Kahar acknowledged the virtues of democracy, but democracy inspired by Islamic teaching. Kahar’s strong acceptance of the democratic system is clearly seen in his criticism of communism under which for him, the people lacked the voice of freedom. This is well in keeping with our definition in the introduction to this thesis that in Islamic conceptions, Kahar Muzakkar is much more a formalist Muslim.

4. From Islamic Federalism towards a Caliphate System

Kahar Muzakkar also presented his thoughts on his preferred model of the state, that is, a federalist system. This indicates that from the earliest time when he joined DI he tended towards directing DI along federalist lines. Further evidence of this was his preference for the federalist model when he accepted the concept of RPI offered by Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia, (Revolutionary Government of the Indonesian Republic, PRRI) activists.203 Here, Kahar showed his readiness to put aside his DI symbols of an united system towards RPI which he saw as a federalist one.204 Kahar’s first thinking about a federalist system was based on religious federation, under which the autonomy of each country is based on the religion of its people. He said that a federalist country could be a Muslim country or a Christian country and each country could fully manage its own affairs based on its major religion.205 Kahar thought of the importance of using religion as the basis of the state as follows:

Religion is the most essential characteristic of a nation. And that religion is a nation’s soul. Without religion, a nation cannot build real unity. Other dimensions allowing people to build a nationalist view, are history, geography, language, civilisation, political and economical interests etc. These characteristics are secondary factors in building a nation.206

203 The contents of the RPI constitution will be discussed further in the following chapter.
204 Abdul Qahhar Mudzakkar, Konsepsi Negara Demokrasi Indonesia: Koreksi Pemikiran Politik Pemerintahan Soekarno, 156.
205 Abdul Qahhar Mudzakkar, Revolusi Ketatanegaraan Indonesia Menuju Persaudaraan Manusia, 70
206 Abdul Qahhar Mudzakkar, Perang Ideologi di Indonesia, 8 - 9. In his explanation of the nature of nationalism, Kahar criticises all other definitions given by the experts due to the absence or due to the unstressed importance of religion for people to build nationalism.
Kahar elaborated further on how nationalism in Indonesia was to be built in his *Revolusi Ketatanegaran Indonesia* (Indonesian Nationhood Revolution). He argued about the main reason behind the need to establish the state based on religion. Kahar stated that due to the existence of tribal and religious groups in Indonesia, the most appropriate form of nationalism is religious nationalism with freedom for each believer to have their own form of nationalism based on their own religious beliefs.

Kahar became even more extreme in determining religious nationalism in his later work, *Tjatatan Batin Pedjoang Islam Revolusioner Jilid III* which was produced in 1962. He began to move from inclusive religionism to exclusive Islamism. His exclusive interpretation of the nature of religion was reflected in the same account, in which he criticised what he saw as the falsity of other religions, such as Christianity and Judaism:

Some of the causes of world conflict are the behaviour of the religious followers in changing the original teachings of these two religions. The only true religion is Islam. Therefore, religion as the basis of nationalism is Islam itself. By putting religion as the base ideology, there is an opportunity open to the people to support the creation of world unity, a world of brotherhood, that is an Islamic world.

Kahar’s views then moved on from the idea of a religious nation-state to the idea of the Islamic Caliphate. He described the structural process of forming the caliphate in three phases: first, the creation of *kesatuan* (unity) for one tribe of nation; second, the creation of *persatuan* (federation) for all tribes of nations, and third, the formation of a federative unity under the banner of an Islamic caliphate. He idealised the Islamic *khilafah* (Ar. *khilāfah*, caliphate) in the time of the Prophet Muhammad and the first four Caliphs. According to Kahar, the Islamic caliphate was destroyed by the influence of feudalism, Islamic schools and secularism by later generations. The only possible way to re-establish the Islamic caliphate was to adopt the Qur’an and the Hadith Shahih (Ar. Ḥadīth Ṣaḥīh, the trusted

---

207 Abdul Qahhar Muzakkhar, *Revolusi Ketatanegaraan Indonesia Menuju Persaudaraan Manusia*.
208 Ibid., 19.
209 Ibid., 29.
210 The nature of this concept will be discussed further in the section of RPII in chapter three.
212 Ibid., 37.
traditions of the Prophet) to create a new Islamic law and society.\footnote{Ibid., 37.} Kahar Muzakkar’s idea of caliphate system is not sophisticated. The question is, how can religion be a superior tool of unity when tribal identity is also prioritised? Also, this is an imaginary concept. How can Kahar Muzakkar spread the caliphate system, a time when secular nationalism has become a trend in Muslim countries?

Kahar Muzakkar was moving ahead in the search for a model of the state that he though compatible with Islam. At first, he found the concept of *kesatuan* sufficient. He was ready to fight for the defence of a united Indonesia with its Pancasila in which some of the founding fathers were Muslim leaders. Even when he was involved in DI, he supported a united Islamic state. In his contact with PRRI and Permesta, Kahar moved to the idea of federation. We will see that in the next chapter, in his efforts to propose an Islamic model of government through a constitution. Kahar’s further’s Islamism is his desire to form an Islamic caliphate This ideal was realised in his formation of the Republik Persatuan Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic Unity Republic, RPII) in 1962.

As reflected in Kahar Muzakkar's works, it is not accurate to say that DI is a purely regionalist sentiment. First, his nationalist sentiment was always very apparent.\footnote{For the argument of Kahar Muzakkar's nationalist sentiment, see Esther Velthoen, "Mapping Sulawesi in the 1950s," in Henk Schulte Nordholt and Gusti Asnan (eds.), *Indonesia in Transition: Work in Progress* (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2003), pp. 103-120.} In most of the writings produced by Kahar, he attached the word 'Indonesia' to the early rebellion of DI, as opposed to those of his writings concerning people whom he charged with being false patriots, secular and Communist, within the Indonesian nation. Even when Kahar was able to exercise an 'imaginary' caliphate system, he still used the term 'Indonesia'. Second and more important was his Islamism. The development of Kahar’s thought was an evolving process towards a strengthening of his Islamism. Even though the changes in his thought were in line with the changing nature of his rebellious activities, efforts towards Islamism were till very clear. For example, before 1953, when he was still in general rebellion, he recognised the existence of Pancasila and his rebellion was directed towards the defense of Indonesian independence. However, as shown above, his defense of Pancasila was part of his defence of Islamic ideology before Soekarno openly opposed any Islamic minded interpretation of Pancasila. Also, prior to 1960, he was still tolerant of other religious entities while developing his rebellion against communism and the central
government. However, as will be shown in the next chapter, his struggle to propose Islamic labels for his cooperative movements with other rebels is also an indication of his Islamism. Finally after the 1960s, he was becoming more Islamist exclusivist, with his belief in the absolute truth of Islam.

B. The Genesis of DI: Islam, Tradition or Regional Assertion?

Various analyses have developed on the genesis of Kahar Muzakkar and his followers' rebellion. Generally, they are similar in concluding that the initial reasons for the rise of the rebellion had little to do with the theological-political consciousness of the leaders or the supporters. There are a number of accounts giving as the basic cause of the rebellion the personal disappointment of Kahar Muzakkar and his followers over their unjust treatment by the central military authorities.

An influential academic assessment of Kahar Muzakakkar's rebellion is Harvey's *Islam, Tradition and Rebellion*. Harvey sees the rebellion far more as a problem of regionalism.

The belief that one has been treated unjustly has been fuel to many a rebellion. When a group believes itself to be suffering from injustice and is ethnically distinct from the group which it holds responsible for the injustice, it is perhaps inevitable that its response is in terms of ethnic hostility.215

In another part of her account, Harvey writes:

The reasons that the Javanese were disliked in 1950 and 1952 were that they appeared to be monopolising the top positions in the national and regional government and armed forces, and that it was largely Javanese troops who were shooting the *pejuang* and intruding into villages and homes. Anti-Javanese feeling was incited by Qahhar Mudzakkar in 1950 and 1952....216

Harvey indicates that anti-Javanese and Minahasan feelings in the South Sulawesian regional identity were the source of the rebellion against the central government. Harvey's idea is supported by Boland who sees that the motive for the rebellion could be interpreted

---

216 Ibid., 436.
as a conflict of prestige due to resentment among Buginese-Makassarese patriots over and against army authorities who came to this area from outside.\textsuperscript{217} Harvey shows that the rebellion would not have surfaced if the South Sulawesi guerillas’ demands were met. She indicates that apart from the question of ethnic identity, Kahar Muzakkar’s struggle against the injustice of the central government was an important reason for support of the movement.

C. van Dijk’s account similarly emphasises the problems of integration and demobilisation of the ex-guerillas in South Sulawesi that led to the rebellion.

In the initial stages it was simply a rising of former guerilla fighters who were disgruntled at the mode of their incorporation into the Republic Army, or partial demobilisation.\textsuperscript{218}

My criticism of the above accounts is against their one-dimensional views: first, rebellion was mainly caused by incorporation problems that led to a clash of tradition and regional assertion. There is no question that the rebellion was caused by Kahar Muzakkar and his followers’ disappointment over the central military policy, as both Harvey and van Dijk have stressed. However, from Kahar Muzakkar’s early letter writing, it is notable that there were strong nationalist overtones in his ideas. As for his followers, having joined the physical struggle for Indonesian independence, then facing problems of incorporation into the formal military seemed an insult to their dignity. They were insulted because their nationalist contribution was not valued by the central military authority. A former leader of DI directly involved in the problem of incorporation reported that what many paramilitaries demanded was not to be accommodated in the military forces, but respect for their contribution to the struggle for political independence. They made a regionalist assertion, but after all, it was founded in nationalist sentiment.\textsuperscript{219}

My second and main criticism of Harvey and van Dijk is that they see the role of Islam in the formation of DI as only an ‘ideologised’ tool. They maintain that for the DI activists, Islam was a political device, not recognising its formal value for creating an authority. They find that the DI movement was the modification of the early rebellion in South Sulawesi,

---

\textsuperscript{217} B.J. Boland, \textit{The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia}, 65.
\textsuperscript{218} C. van Dijk, \textit{Rebellion under the Banner of Islam: The Darul Islam in Indonesia}, 155.
\textsuperscript{219} Interview with Muhammad Ali AT, 14 April, 2003.
and they simplify motives for it as the same. None of the above accounts states that since the emergence of the rebellion, the chance to develop into an Islamic rebellion had a strong basis. For Harvey, the adoption of an Islamic ideology was merely to defend the Muslim community.

Harvey states that the justification used by Kahar Muzakkar in his early rebellion was no longer applicable for DI rebellion. Revolutionary slogans issued by Kahar Muzakkar such as social justice and ‘real’ democracy had become the common currency of political debates in the legitimate organs of government.\textsuperscript{220} In order to defend Kahar’s taking to the jungle, a reorientation of the rebellion had to be made, that is, by turning the rebellion to DI.\textsuperscript{221} However, the departure of Usman Balo and Hamid Ali from DI in 1953, thought to be with 1,200 – 1,500 of his armed followers, significantly weakened Kahar Muzakkar at the time when he decided to formally adopt DI and was based on the reason that they were still keen to defend the TKR orientation with revolutionary slogans.

Harvey also overlooks the Islamic factor in the TKR period prior to DI. In fact, she ignores the philosophical orientation of the movement as a whole. The fact is that Kahar referred to Pancasila as the state philosophy, then adapted it into \textit{trisila} as mentioned above. Pancasila was believed by many Muslim figures, including Kahar Muzakkar to be an ‘Islamic’ ideology, through its first point, belief in the Almighty God. To some former DI leaders, it was this understanding held by Kahar Muzakkar that made him stick to the state philosophy in the early days of his rebellion.\textsuperscript{222}

Another indication of the Islamic genesis of the rebellion was Kahar Muzakkar’s turning from TKR to DI, seemingly with short preparation. From the letters available, as soon as Kahar had adopted DI it was easy for him to modify his Islamic concepts, jargon and the concept of holy war against his enemy, the Indonesian republic. One conclusion is that this could only have been realised in longstanding idealism. This is seen in Kahar’s classification of the journey towards the formation of the DI movement in two stages; the first to run from 1951 to 1953, called \textit{masa penggalangan dan peralihan} (the time of

\textsuperscript{221} The ideological rivalries will be further discussed in the next subchapter.
recruitment and transition). The second stage, from 1953 until the end of the rebellion, Kahar named ‘moving revolusi Islam’ (Islamic revolution).\textsuperscript{223}

My point regarding Harvey’s thesis is that she does not see the emergence of DI as a natural process of the rebellion, due to the support of Islamic minded leaders against what Kahar saw as ‘un-Islamic enemy’. The inclusion of ‘Islamic discourse’ in Harvey’s thesis applies only to the earlier parts of the rebellion, and not to the process of the rebellion. She neglects the dynamics of the DI leaders in their efforts to actualise the Islamic values of the rebellion. She should have admitted the existence of the Islamic-oriented corps of Kahar Muzakkar, since she herself stated:

\begin{quote}
Indeed Islamic as opposed to Western-style education was one of the marks distinguishing the men in the hutan [jungle] from those in the kota [city]. As noted above, the number of persons in South Sulawesi with a Western-style education was very small; the number of those who had Western secondary education was probably only about 4,000 persons. Some ten percent of this group had been killed during the revolution, and another 15-20 percent jailed; about ten percent had fled to Java; many of the others had worked for the Dutch. Most of those who fled to Java did have a secondary education, and many of these had been accepted into the TNI in 1949 in Battalion Mattalatta. Those with a Western-style education were also favoured in the screenings in 1950 in which another 2,000 men were accepted into the TNI. Those who remained with Qahhar, and went into the hutan with him in 1950 and 1951, were largely those who had attended Islamic schools, or who had little or no education.\textsuperscript{224}
\end{quote}

van Dijk generalises the characteristics of the whole DI movement in Indonesia, which he believes was triggered by multiple factors, including the existence of Islam as the driver of the movement. But he casts Islam in a supporting role in the movement and only acknowledges it as a unifying factor for DI. He does not consider Islam to be central to the movement.\textsuperscript{225} He further questions the genuine Islamic sentiments of the activists in whom

\begin{footnotes}
\item[225] C. van Dijk, \textit{Rebellion under the Banner of Islam: The Darul Islam in Indonesia}, 393-94.
\end{footnotes}
orthodoxy was mixed with the heterodoxy of each local area of DI. Finally, he questions the Islamic values of DI activists for whom certain pious Muslims and Muslim mosques became the targets of violation and destruction.

My criticism of van Dijk is that the establishment of DI cannot be solely connected to the problem of demobilisation. There had been many efforts on the part of the republican government to find a solution to the conflict but they did not meet with significant results. In other words, if incorporation had been the only issue of the initial cause of the DI movement, the conflict would have ceased after the great number of efforts at incorporation made by the republican governments since the establishment of the DI movement up to its end. What is more, the statements of some of Kahar's former followers also refute van Dijk's thesis. In their opinion, Kahar's refusal of incorporation offered by the republican army was because he had wanted to continue the rebellion in the jungle under the banner of Islam. If their reasons seem subjective since they may all share a desire to praise Kahar Muzakkar, but another possible argument is that their view of the problem is consistent, even while they have scattered and now live in different areas in South Sulawesi. Also, if he questioned the genuineness of Islamism by looking at orthodoxy mixed up with the heterodoxy of the local area of DI, it is true but this was the target of the leadership of DI's Islamic mission, as stated before in the influence of DI's modernist leadership in many traditional Muslim communities occupied by DI.

Looking at DI in South Sulawesi, we find many regulations and decisions in which there was a more serious effort to implement Islam as the way of life, and to differentiate

---

226 C. van Dijk takes the case of Kartosuwirjo in which he believed *keris* (kris) to have magic power. He also believed the working of Ramalan Jayabaya. Among his followers, Kartosuwirjo was also believed to be as Ratu Adil (The Just King).


228 This included the time of Kahar's followers when Kahar Muzakkar and the Indonesian government agreed to form Cadangan Tentara Nasional (National Reserve Corps, CTN) in the late 1950s. The CTN was where those who became guerrillas to be transformed into formal military without being screened and still remained in existing units. At this time, the TT-VII military commander, Warouw and the Sulawesi governor, Sudiro, went to Baraka, Enrekang the camp of Kahar Muzakkar, to hold talks and finally they agreed that Kahar's CTN battalion were to be formally incorporated on 17 August 1951. However, Kahar did not fulfill this agreement. It was said that his reason was that he suspected that it was only part of tactics to arrest him.

229 This is based on an interview with several former activists of South Sulawesi DI. Interview with Marzuki Hasan, 7 April 2003; Muh. Ali AT, 14 April 2003; Jufri Hamzah, 11 November 2003; Nurdin Pisof, 22 November 2003.
between those who they considered to be 'DI Muslims' and who were their enemies.\textsuperscript{230} Islam was not merely a unifying symbol, but there was an attempt to implement Islamic law: the guidelines of the Dewan Fatwa included the implementation of *hudud* (Ar. ُ hudūd),\textsuperscript{231} the regulations of *ibadah mahdah* (Ar. ُ ibādah maḥdah)\textsuperscript{232} such as prayer and fasting, and the establishment of institutions to support the implementation of Islamic law, such as Momoc Ansharullah (Ar. ُ Anṣār Allāh). These issues will be further explained in Chapter Four).

Anhar Gonggong interprets the motives as connected with the basic culture of South Sulawesi people, that is *siri*. *Siri* is a code of honor and dignity which is important in the culture of South Sulawesi.\textsuperscript{233} Anhar relates the discussion of this to the emergence of Kahar Muzakkar’s rebellion:

The motives of the rebellion were partly to allow Kahar Muzakkar to regain his dignity, whether as activist or as individual. As nationalist activism, the rebellion functioned as Kahar Muzakkar’s revenge on the central government for their unjust treatment, especially when he was in Java. Furthermore, the rebellion was his moral obligation to his people in South Sulawesi who were also unfairly treated by the central government. As an individual, the rebellion allowed Kahar to appear an important person in his local area. It allowed him to

\textsuperscript{230} The more detailed Islamic regulations of South Sulawesi DI will be specially discussed in chapter four.

\textsuperscript{231} Specific punishment for certain major crimes mentioned in the Qur’an.

\textsuperscript{232} Worships in which times, methods, and conditions of performing them have been fixed and regulated by the Qur’an and Hadith, such as prayer.

\textsuperscript{233} They tend to translate that the essence of life is having dignity. In other words, if an individual finds that he no longer has any dignity he find that life is no longer useful. There are at least three elements that are usually reflected from *siri* in the South Sulawesi’s people’s action; feelings of shame, feelings of revenge, and moral obligation. For more information on the nature of *siri*, see M. Laica Marzuki, *Siri: Bagian Kesadaran Hukum Rakyat Bugis Makassar (Sebuah Telaah Filsafat Hukum)* (Ujung Pandang: Hasanuddin University Press, 1995). Based on these elements, it can be said that *siri* contains the potential to do either constructive or destructive action. If a rich person helps a poor one due to his *siri* (moral obligation), these means that the implementation of this culture is constructive. However, if a person kills the other due to his *siri* (revenge) that means that the implementation of this culture is destructive. However, the implementation of *siri* can cause by a mixture of the above three elements. Often if a person act in a way considered to be revenge, it may be due to his feeling of shame and part of his moral obligation as a member of a family or society.
regain the dignity lost in his local area due to his being expelled by the local ruler in his early life.\textsuperscript{234}

Anhar, too, acknowledges that there were many other inter-related factors in the emergence of the movement, including the role of Islam in Kahar Muzakkar’s bid to gain support from the wider Islamic community.\textsuperscript{235} However, in Anhar’s account, there is no more explicit explanation of what role Islam played in the formation of DI. He shows that \textit{siri}, an initial cause of the rebellion, was also the cause of the formation of DI. And it is true that the DI movement was the continuation of the earlier general rebellion. However, the early rebellion had its own characteristics and orientation which was intended by Anhar, and caused by \textit{siri}. However, more than \textit{siri}, the formation of the DI movement had more to do with the theological and ideological motives seeded in the earlier rebellion. The reorientation of the movement from general rebellion to a religious revolt was not shaped by accident.

Religion aside, psychological factors are important in any assessment of the formation of the rebellion. To state that Islamism is dominant does not mean rejecting other factors, such as material disappointment. However, it would be altogether too simple to see the cause of such a long rebellion as a matter of Kahar Muzakkar’s continuing personal disappointment as several writers have suggested. It would have been impossible to build a collectivity without strong mutual interests.

There are still other key arguments to posit the Islamism of DI, as reflected in the actions of Kahar Muzakkar. First, the analysis which sees in Kahar no theological ideological involvement ignores his early Islamic education. We should also mention his nationalist phase, marked by the relationship between Kahar and General Sudirman as stated in Chapter One) who had a Hizbullah (Ar. Hizbu Allāh, soldiers of God) background. Kahar declared that it was General Sudirman himself who appointed him to arrange the formation of the Preparatory Army to be expedited in South Sulawesi in 1946.\textsuperscript{236}

Military documents also show the Islamism of the early rebellion. In one its reports it was revealed that one of the purposes of infiltration of the South Sulawesi paramilitary

\textsuperscript{234} Anhar Gonggong, \textit{Abdul Qahhar Muzakkar: Dari Patriot Hingga Pemberontak}, 220.
\textsuperscript{235} Ibid., 8.
\textsuperscript{236} Document of DI/TII Kahar Muzakkar No. 114, Dinas Sejarah, Pusat Sejarah TNI, Jakarta.
from Java in 1949, besides struggling against the Dutch and the Andi Aziz revolt, in which Kahar was appointed as a commander to South Sulawesi, was to plan the establishment of an Islamic authority.\textsuperscript{237} This document accords with another account which reveals that the suspicion of the central army of Kahar Muzakkar was based on the grounds of his plan to create a social revolution in South Sulawesi.\textsuperscript{238} The effort to establish an Islamic revolution may also be related to the relationship between Kahar Muzakkar and Sudirman, well known to be an Islamic minded commander. Yusri Abady, a former young activist of DI, has his own interpretation that Kahar’s strategy to modify the early movement as non-Islamic was merely a move to accommodate his many followers whose nationalist views were still strong. In spite of his subjective position as a former member of DI, Abady’s account is validated by the document in which, when he received the offer from Kartosuwirjo, Kahar states that he had conceived his idealism long beforehand. But he mentions to Kartosuwirjo the unreadiness of his people and his own treason as going beyond the Islamic struggle.\textsuperscript{239} Kahar Muzakkar himself writes to Kartosuwirjo in 1952, announcing his plan for an ‘Islamic revolution’ in South Sulawesi but of the lack of support among his followers.

Secondary data on the relationship between Kahar Muzakkar and Sudirman in terms of Islamic expedition is quite hard to assess. First, there is a lack of reliable primary data on the issue. Second, the extent of Kahar’s Islamicness in Java has not been well explored or systematically dealt with, few documents being available from that time. However, it may be argued that the closeness between Kahar Muzakkar and Sudirman was based on religious solidarity. Ukkas Ariffin, the former nationalist and an associate of Kahar in Java, wrote that at the time when Kahar Muzakkar was given the mandate by the Supreme Military Commander Sudirman to form TRIPS, one important reason was their shared religious background:

...that the great commander of the Indonesian Republican Military, General Soedirman, together with Kahar Muzakkar, was of the big family of

\textsuperscript{237} For more information on this relationship see Document of DITII Kahar Muzakkar No. 114, Dinas Sejarah, Pusat Sejarah TNI, Jakarta; Tommy Thompson, \textit{Meningkap Misteri Abdul Qahhar Mudzakkar}, 47.

\textsuperscript{238} See A. Wana Tangke, \textit{Jejak-Jekak Radikal Kahar Muzakkar} (Makassar: Pustaka Refleksi, 2004), 77-84.

\textsuperscript{239} For more information, see Kahar Muzakkar’s letter to Kartosuwirjo made on 20 January 1952 in the copy of the army document no. 129.
Muhammadiyah. Colonel K.H. Iskandar Idris, uncle of Kahar Muzakkar’s wife, was also of the big family of Muhammadiyah... That is why Kahar Muzakkar obtained the mandate.\textsuperscript{240}

The Islamism of DI is not only revealed in the personality of Kahar Muzakkar, but also in others. It has been mentioned that among the Sulawesi youth involved in the nationalist revolution in Java, there were Islamic minded and educated groups.\textsuperscript{241} The so-called educated included Warouw, Saleh Lahade and H. Pieters Worang, while among the Islamic minded were Kahar Muzakkar, Saleh Sjahban, and Andi Tenriadjeng.\textsuperscript{242} This document confirms Harvey’s claim that of Kahar Muzakkar’s followers who first joined him in the jungle, a number had a strong background of Islamic education.

Finally, it is also important to bring forward the statements of Kahar Muzakkar against the many claims of his rejection of accusations of abusing DI for his own interest:

> Since my childhood, I have never bowed my head to any of my enemies in any fight and as an adult, I will never obey a command outside Islamic teachings.\textsuperscript{243}

Furthermore he states:

> Let alone Soekarno with the Proclamation of 17 August 1945, even Imam (Ar. \textit{Imām}) S.M. Kartosuwirjo and Tengku Muhammad Daud Beurueh, the only two that I acknowledge to be great leaders of the Indonesian Muslim people, I will abandon these if they prove not to base their life’s faith on the Qur’an and Hadith.\textsuperscript{244}

He answered his accusers that opposition based on Islamic belief was customary for him, even prior to the adoption of DI. His confession may have been subjective, and he said this later after he became involved in DI. However, this was his own statement and could be matched by his life history, even several years after uttered it. Kahar proved this, when at a later stage, he decided to establish a new Islamic movement of his own, on the grounds that

\textsuperscript{240} M. Ukkas Arifin and Sarita Paweloy, \textit{Kahar Muzakkar dalam Masa perjuangan Kemerdekaan}, 10.

\textsuperscript{241} The two words seems not be in antithesis. However, what the document means in Islamic-minded are those who are not learned and vice versa.

\textsuperscript{242} The Document DI/TII Kahar Muzakkar No. 130, Dinas Sejarah, Pusat Sejarah TNI, Jakarta.

\textsuperscript{243} Abdul Qahhar Mudzakkar, \textit{Revolusi Ketatanegaraan Indonesia Menudju Persaudaraan Manusia}, 3.

\textsuperscript{244} Ibid.
in his judgment Kartosuwirjo had deviated from Islamic teachings. This matter will further be touched on in the next chapter.

To conclude, I will posit that there are multiple factors in operation in the course of the DI rebellion, including the issues put by scholars above. However, the role of Islam in the conception of the DI movement became more dominant, while other aspects of the early phases of the rebellion became complementary. In other words, if Kahar Muzakkar and some of his followers were not Islamist, DI of South Sulawesi would never have appeared and the rebellion would only have lasted in the form of when it was first initiated. The role of Islam in the formation of DI was not merely to ‘ideologise’, in the sense that Islamic values had not previously existed. It was to ideologise in order to direct the movement towards being a religious movement. However, even beyond this strategy, Kahar Muzakkar and his main activists found themselves more comfortable in their newly ideologised movement which could facilitate the implementation of the Islamic values which they already held dear.

C. Ideological Rivalries

Three ideological bases deserve a mention in discussing the background of the formation of the South Sulawesi DI: Islam, \(^{245}\) Pancasila, \(^{246}\) and communism. \(^{247}\) There have been many

\(^{245}\) It has been known that Islam became the issue to become the movement’s ideology. Since Indonesian independence, there have been efforts by many Muslim nationalists to direct the independent nation to become an Islamic state. The drafting of Piagam Jakarta as a gentleman’s agreement between the secular nationalists and the Muslim nationalists shortly before the proclamation of Indonesian independence in 1945 proved their serious efforts at implementing Islamic values in state affairs. For detailed information on Jakarta Charter, see Endang Saifuddin Anshari, *The Jakarta Charter 1945: The Struggle for an Islamic Constitution in Indonesia.*

\(^{246}\) Pancasila had been considered as an ideology that could unify the people from different ethnic groups and religions. Nationalism brought by Pancasila is considered the middle way of unifying two mainstreams of Indonesian oriented nationalism, Islamic nationalism and secular nationalism. Kahar Muzakkar in his early rebellion adopted Pancasila as the ideological basis of the movement. He saw Pancasila at this time as an Islamic ideological state. The idea of Pancasila was still defended even until the formal adoption of DI.

\(^{247}\) Communism also appeared to be an alternative ideology in the jungle. In the early 1950s, despite the fact that a Communism revolt failed in Madium in 1948, the Communists successfully emerged as a political party. Moreover, this was supported by the momentum of Soekarno’s Guided Democracy with the obsession of unifying these three ideologies, commonly known as Nasakom (*Nationalisme*)
accounts of the rivalries of the above three ideologies before the formal adoption of DI. In Bahar Mattalioe’s account, Kahar stated that there had been many suggested by his followers. There was an effort to offer Kahar the ideology of communism because its reference was already apparent in the jungle among some new recruits. Mattalioe states that other followers also urged Kahar to direct the movement to be Islamic, partly because they did not want Kahar Muzakkar to be trapped by communism. Mattalioe finally identifies a group who preferred neither Islam nor communism, naming them ‘opportunists’, without a clear ideological orientation.248

The existence of communism within Kahar Muzakkar’s Tentara Keamanan Rakyat (People’s Liberation Army, TKR) has been traced by many writers to the creation of the Perjuangan Kemerdekaan Sejati (Pure Freedom Struggle). First, the concept is considered leftist for its usage of jargon and slogans similar to communism, such as ‘peoples’ democracy’, ‘anti-feudalism’, ‘social justice’, etc.249 One published military document also mentions that the conception of Perjuangan Kemerdekaan Sejati by Kahar Muzakkar was aided by a Chinese who had been known to be leftist. Third, there was a suspicion that the Communist party was taking its part in finding a solution to the problems of military incorporation. Salawati Daud, a Partai Komunis Indonesia (Indonesian Communist Party, PKI) activist, who was eager to meet Kahar to urge him to see that the way out of the problem lay with the Communist party.250 A number of learned persons with very leftist orientations approached him in the jungle.251 In the early stage of the rebellion, it was

---

248 M. Bahar Mattalioe, Pemberontakan Meniti Jalur Kanan, 179.
249 See the copy of Intelligence Report “Organisatie dan Tjorak Perdioangan Pengatajau S/S” Document DI/TII Kahar Muzakkar, No. 126, Dinas Sejarah, Pusat Sejarah TNI, Jakarta. See also the copy of Kahar Muzakkar’s Instructie No. 006/IE/CoBH/Iia51 in the above document.
claimed that there was an attempt by some activists around Kahar Muzakkar to open up relations with the People’s Democratic Republic of China.

To what extent were Kahar Muzakkar and his leaders influenced by these ideologies? Harvey indicates Kahar’s early relationship with Socialist ideology in nationalist revolutionary times, during which he worked in the Biro Perjuangan under the influence of Amir Syarifuddin, Djoksujosono and others closely allied with the Left.\(^{252}\) Army documents also claim that Kahar had a meeting with a leftist activist, Soekarni in Prambanan in the late 1948.\(^{253}\) However, it is not explained what the meeting was for and what his role was in the meeting.

An indication of ideological rivalries was also identified by the military document of the copy of Kahar Muzakkar’s announcement in the late 1951, when he denied the claim of the republican army that he had joined Kartosuwirjo’s DI.\(^{254}\) In this announcement, Kahar accused the republican army in turn of it being only a reason to isolate the movement and to convince the people that he had gone beyond the struggle for independence.\(^{255}\) Kahar’s denial at this stage has been seen by some because he was attracted to ‘communism’ as a basis for the rebellion.\(^{256}\)

The army’s claim that Kahar Muzakkar had a tendency towards so-called ‘Communist’ idealism is based on his correspondence, in which proletarian slogans were dominant. A letter dated 15 March 1952 to a Mr. Laoh, documented by the republican military, was considered by them as a evidence. From the contents of the letter, Mr Laoh was a person living overseas. Kahar told Laoh the need to keep up the Perjuangan Rakyat Sejati (The True People’s Struggle), including he should build relationships with revolutionary political parties only. Kahar also stressed that South Sulawesian society stood


\(^{253}\) See Document DI/TII Kahar Muzakkar, No. 116, Dinas Sejarah, Pusat Sejarah TNI, Jakarta.


\(^{255}\) See ibid. The other part of the above army document also gives an indication of the orientation of Kahar Muzakkar’s rebellion against Communism, in which in one of his letters of instruction, he quoted Lenin. Kahar writes that Lenin teaches the proletarians to strive against robbers, lazy people, rich bourgeois groups and those who want to get more but do not want to sacrifice anything. Kahar, furthermore, quotes Lenin’s statement that weakness, doubt, and sentiment are bad deeds in socialist teaching.\(^{255}\)

strongly against imperialism, capitalism and feudalism, and that his fight would be for those of the proletarian caste.\textsuperscript{257} The issue of the ‘proletariat’, commonly known as a socialist term, was stressed by Usman Balo, an important figure in the early rebellion. In his letter to Kahar, he promised to remain loyal to Kahar as long as his struggle was for the sake of the people. He reminded Kahar of his statement that they were both proletarians, fighting for the proletarians and ready to die with them. These terms were all familiar from communism in the 1950s.

Kahar Muzakkar’s dilemma in determining which ideology to adopt was indicated in his reply to the letter of Kartosuwirjo in which he states:

… of the five battalions that I have, three of them were influenced by ‘red’ ideology already, before my arrival in Sulawesi. I also question the reality of the Islamicness of South Sulawesian society in which many leaders only politicised the Muslim people. I have planned the Islamic revolutionary movement since 16 August 1951, together with Saleh Sjahban and Abd. Fattah, but these two men were not steadfast. Their power was defeated by the more dominant one in Sulawesi, that is, feudalism that is strongly and unconsciously influenced by the red groups.\textsuperscript{258}

The rivalries of ideology, especially the presence of communism before adopting Islam, have not only been exposed by academic scholars and those who take different sides from Kahar Muzakkar, such as his DI’s opponents, and the republican military who tend to discredit Kahar Muzakkar and his followers as Communist oriented rebels. The confession was also given by those who later became the main leaders of DI until its demise, such as Marzuki Hasan (Representative of the Minister for Information), M. Ali AT (Battalion leader), Jufri Hamzah (Secretary General of the Minister of Law), Hasan Ridwan (Cadet of the Defense Minister), H.R. Abdie (The Junior Attorney General) etc. These figures admitted that the Communist style activities could be traced to Kahar Muzakkar and other

\textsuperscript{257} See Kahar Muzakkar’s letter in the army document, Document DI/TII Kahar Muzakkar, No. 128, Dinas Sejarah, Pusat Searah TNI, Jakarta.

DI leaders, but it is very hard to trace the Communist networks due to their infiltration strategy.259

In terms of nationalist and Islamic influences, these are indisputable in Kahar’s life, as has been described above concerning his education, his nationalist activities as found in his works, but as for Kahar’s early attachment to Communist ideology has to be corrected. First, Kahar’s own opposition to communism, and that of many of his prominent followers, has been shown since the beginning of the era of communism in Indonesia. In the Communist rebellion led by Muso and Alimin in 1948 in Madiun, Kahar Muzakkar and his troops helped to put it down.260 The suspicion through his working under Amir Syarifuddin is premature, because hypothetically, the approach of Kahar Muzakkar to Amir Syarifuddin may not be known as a communism influence. The argument is that from the emergence up to the significant influence of PKI in Indonesia, which reached its peak in 1955, many of its members had not really delved into Communist ideology. It often occurred that those who were charged as Communists merely held to socialist or leftist idealism. This may be the case who Kahar Muzakkar, who learned about socialism or leftist thought under the influences of the time. The same analogy can be made of Kahar during the Japanese occupation. Kahar worked under Japanese management, but he cannot be claimed to be collaborationist. Part of the reason for his ostracisation was the action of Japanese military authority who saw Kahar opposing the Japanese tradition of bowing.261

The reason for the military’s inaccuracy in determining the Communist tendencies of Kahar Muzakkar is their failure to trace his work. From the outbreak of the rebellion up to the uprising of DI, Kahar made not a single confession that he had thought of adopting Communist ideology. But in my opinion, the influence of communism on his life was not in terms of official adoption, rather it is to be found in his efforts to put Socialist teachings to use in his endeavours towards a more people-oriented movement. Others have pointed out

259 This is found in my interviews with many former leaders of DI. Interview with Nurdin Pisof, 22 November 2003, Hasan Ridwan, 9 May 2003.

260 Tommy Thomson, Menyingkap Misteri Abdul Qahhar Muzakkar, 51 - 52. Hasan Basri Rahman who interviewed Samsul Bahri, one of Kahar Muzakkar’s former battalion leaders and later one of the most important people in the jungle, where he was a division commander, who are directly involved in the eradication action, also admitted this story. Interview with Hasan Basri Rahman, 4 October 2003.

261 For more stories of the chronology of Kahar Muzakkar, see Aswar Hasan, “Analisis Wacana Tentang Pernikiran dan Perlawanan Radikal Abdul Qahhar Muzakkar,” 44-47.
that his own practices such as anti-feudalism, socialism and his pro-common people stance paralleled aspects of communism. This influence persisted until the emergence of DI, and was in accordance with the Islamic teachings that he wished to implement. In this case, Kahar Muzakkar can be better said to be a Muslim inclined towards so-called ‘leftist Islam’.  

Bahar Mattalioe’s account tends to be more objective on the question. The importance of his testimony is the fact that he was the most faithful follower of Kahar Muzakkar before becoming his main rival. He wrote a number of books after he disengaged himself from the DI movement, quitting the rebellion and returning to the city. His accounts are, at least in part, aimed at purifying himself from his ‘sin’ against the republican government or the republican army of being involved with DI. In each account, Bahar exposes what he saw as the personal and ideological deviation in Kahar Muzakkar’s leadership of the South Sulawesi DI. Bahar Mattalioe’s objectivity lies not so much in the information he provides as in his position when writing. His aim is to devalue Kahar Muzakkar in the eyes of the republican army.

Bahar Mattalioe makes mention of the ideological rivalry between communism and Islam, claiming to have urged Kahar to simply adopt DI and to destroy any opposition to his efforts. If, in his eyes, Kahar had any attachment to the practices of communism, he would have put it in his accounts. Or he would have disclosed any such tendencies on Kahar’s part since his time in Java. However, he only admits that communism had an active campaign of caderisation in the jungle, not that it was part of Kahar’s program. It may be that he realised that infiltration by communism in the jungle was beyond Kahar’s control, coming as it did as various powerful influences from many group leaders. Kahar Muzakkar admits in one of his letters of his inability to prevent Communist infiltration. He states that

262 This is also admitted by Aswar Hasan, an academic who wrote a thesis on the thought of Kahar Muzakkar. Interview with Aswar Hasan, 13 December 2005.

263 There are three important accounts that Bahar Mattilioe wrote to betray Kahar Muzakkar, those are: Tabir Terbuka, Kahar Muzakkar dan Petualangannya and his most recent writing is the Pemberontakan Meniti Jalur Kanan. Many of the academic accounts were much based on Bahar’s accounts. B.J. Boland, for example, relied greatly on Bahar Mattalioe’s accounts in analysing how Islamic Kahar Muzakkar and his DI movement were. See B.J. Boland, The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia.

264 Bahar Mattalioe, Pemberontakan Meniti Jalur Kanan, 179.

265 Ibid., 179
the coming of a Communist activist called Pitoyo was not his own wish due to efforts of several people holding Communist ideology who joined him in the jungle. 266

What is in Mattalioe’s accounts, on the other hand, is the record of serious efforts by Kahar to destroy Communist oriented groups in the jungle, once the decision to join the Kartosuwirjo’s DI had been taken. He exposes Kahar Muzakkar’s murdering of all suspected Communist hands in the jungle, included all those connected to the suspects - family, relatives and friends, no matter of what age or gender. 267

According to a statement by Ahmad Marzuki Hasan, one of the very few important leaders of DI still alive at the time of writing this thesis, Kahar Muzakkar’s interest in leftist jargon had three main purposes: first, to motivate his followers for the fight, second, to gain the support of the people and third, to discover who in the jungle was maintaining Communist involvement. Marzuki states that this strategy was very important to the solidarity of the early rebellion. 268 This oral confession may be mere rhetoric to support the Islamism of DI, but it should also be considered that this information has not yet been accommodated by scholars studying DI in the New Order years, when these former activists had been severely curtailed. Rather, military documents and other writings from opponents or those negative to DI have been used.

It is more clearly stated in a letter by Kahar Muzakkar to Kartosuwirjo in 1952 that since early times he had been attracted to Islamic ideology, as is indicated in his mentioning of the inconsistencies of Kahar Muzakkar’s leaders, Saleh Syahban and Abd. Fattah to launch an Islamic revolution. Therefore, it can be concluded that Kahar’s statement of his intention to begin the Islamic revolution from that date indicates that he already had the idea beforehand. One may argue that his mind was already made up when he first sent his troops led by Saleh Sjahban to South Sulawesi 1949. There is no clear statement from Kahar Muzakkar of a hidden mission for Saleh Sjahban, but military documents recognise

266 See Document DI/TII Kahar Muzakkar No. 119, Dinas Sejarah, Pusat Sejarah TNI, Jakarta.
267 The destruction of Communist groups in the jungle began in the groups of Putera Rimba, the communist oriented group in Biccuwu, and finally the groups called Sakkoli in Wajo and Dompe in Kajang. ibid., 263. Another account, such as 25 Tahun Kodam X1V Hasanuddin says that soon after the adoption of DI, the main targets of the violation were those who were leftist and red-oriented.
268 Interview with Ahmad Marzuki Hasan, 7 April 2003
the existence of an Islamic mainstream among Kahar Muzakkar’s group in the expedition.269 In the same letter to Kartosuwirjo, Kahar also mentions another impediment against directing the movement towards Islamic, namely, the dominant influence of feudalism within his ranks. This may mean that there had been a longstanding clash between the feudalistic system and his intention to implement an Islamic revolution.

After the formal adoption of DI, Kahar displayed an extreme anti-communism. In so doing, he would first cleanse himself as a former Communist sympathiser. His Islamic struggle would be ‘pure’. Second, it would prove his understanding of the nature of the Islamic ideology for which he was fighting. His demonstrative actions against Communist followers in the jungle was not because prior to DI he was pro-Communist and had since reformed, but simply that now he had the power to destroy them.

To conclude this chapter, Islamism of Kahar Muzakkar’s rebellion cannot be judged if it is seen only as a military de-mobilisation problem, or one of ideological wavering prior to the adoption of DI. Such rivalries existed in the jungle, in the sense that Islam, nationalism and communism had their own followers who later turned to the DI movement. Islamism has been significantly downplayed by scholars, in the figure of Kahar Muzakkar and some of his prominent followers. Kahar Muzakkar and his prominent people clearly saw Islam as the future ideological basis of their movement. The clashes of ideologies at the grassroots level of his movement and Kahar’s strategies to eliminate any other ideological threats contributed to the lateness of his joining DI. From that moment, the adoption of Islamic formalism by the rebellion was just a matter of time. The expansion of its area of influence up to its critical stage will be discussed in the next chapter, strengthening the argument of the religiosity of this rebellion.

---

269 Document DI/TII Kahar Muzakkar, No. 130, Dinas Sejarah, Pusat Sejarah TNI, Jakarta.
Chapter Three

DI’S EXPANSION, MODIFICATION AND CRISIS (1953 – 1965)

Following the discussion of the significant ideological motives in the formation of Darul Islam (DI) in the preceding chapter, the next question to deal with is the extent of Islamic sentiment in the expansion of the political influence of DI. As formalist Islam is by its very nature political, we should ask how consistent was DI in South Sulawesi in emphasising Islam as its important political project within the expanding areas of its influence?

If we follow several accounts, it was found that the South Sulawesi DI tried to spread its influence mainly in an effort to improve its political position without strong religious motives. For example, no significant account has analyzed the religious motive of South Sulawesi DI to build work with the PRRI/Permesta rebellion which emerged in 1958 in Sumatera and North Sulawesi. The lack of religious analysis of the South Sulawesi DI’s motive in expanding its cooperation with these two rebellions was seen because these movements were never attached to any religious ideology. Lack of analysis in many DI accounts is also found in the downfall of the rebellion which was seen as the military defeat of the rebels and nothing to do with the degradation of the ideological motives of its followers.

This chapter will reveal the extent to which DI activists, and particularly the key figure of Kahar Muzakkar, promoted formalist Islam, where the symbolic aspect was the predominant issue, and Kahar’s continuing efforts to formalise Islam as an ideology of life. This includes several modified movements that he joined and created for the purpose of maintaining his Islamism. This chapter will further assess the significance of the ideology that led to the end of the rebellion and its aftermath.

A. The Expansion of Ideological Influences

Expansion of DI’s control is important to discuss because along with the expansion, an Islamic symbolic campaign as part of the characteristics of Islamic formalism was apparent. There are significant indications of promoting Islamic ideology by DI activists in many
regions in Sulawesi. These may be interpreted from material in the available military
documents, which should be treated with care, realising that they were prepared for official
purposes. They mention the efforts of DI troops to plant their influence in regions where
there was strong adherence to Islam, such as Sumbawa, West Nusa Tenggara and North
Maluku. One document even reports the efforts of the South Sulawesi DI to infiltrate areas
not necessarily containing Muslim majorities. Further expeditions were sent to Ternate,
Ambon, Kepulauan Aru, Kei, Timor, Sumbawa, Bima, Lombok, Bali, Sangir Talaud and
up to Sulu and Moro in the Philippines.\textsuperscript{270}

Another republican army account also points out that the expansion of DI to Maluku
went with a plan to form a Komando Seberang Lautan (Overseas Commando) in Maluku
and cantoned in Ternate.\textsuperscript{271} It is hard to judge the validity of this document, because there is
the suspicion that there was an interest in exaggerating the DI threat in Indonesia. Even so,
the placement of the Commando centre in Ternate must be due to the fact that it was known
to be the strongest Muslim base in the Maluku islands.

There are several possible interpretations regarding the interests of DI in the Maluku
islands. First, a separatist rebellion called Republik Maluku Selatan (South Molucca
Republic, RMS) was already active there, having been set up on 25 April 1950. It was
established by Dr. Soumokil, the former Minister of Judicial Affairs of NIT who rejected
incorporation into the Republic of Indonesia. Kahar Muzakkar’s interest in the RMS
became evident at the time when he discussed the nature of RPI; he mentioned the
possibility of inviting the involvement of the RMS in his newly formed movement.\textsuperscript{272} Even
though DI’s interest in joint contact with the RMS appeared contradictory with Kahar’s
Islamic mission, it may still be interpreted that DI wanted to Islamise RMS to strengthen its
position against the republican government. Van Dijk writes that Kahar’s efforts with the
RMS rebels were not successful,\textsuperscript{273} though he does not explain why the DI troops were not
successful. It may be inferred that the failure was due to the ideological rejection of DI by

\textsuperscript{270} Document DI/TII Kahar Muzakkar No. 130, Dinas Sejarah, Pusat Sejarah TNI, Jakarta.

\textsuperscript{271} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{272} See, Abdul Qahhar Mudzakkar, \textit{Konsepsi Negara Demokrasi Indonesia: Koreksi Pemikiran Politik
Pemerintahan Soekarno}, 38.

\textsuperscript{273} C. van Dijk, \textit{Rebellion Under the Banner of Islam: The Darul Islam in Indonesia}, 208.
RMS, since the two were basically of the same nature in their rebellion against the central government.

DI’s clearer Islamist tendencies in expanding into Maluku may be assessed in the way that it concentrated on areas known to be Muslim, which were spread throughout many districts. One military document states how DI sent delegates into an area in order to establish command of it, entering the island by stages through merchandising, marriage and smuggling. In Ambon, the capital of Molucca, for example, the strategy of expanding influences was by making use of the proxy of Masyumi, an existing Islamic political party, to target Islamic youth. It is even stated that in Ambon there were DI cells in almost every village. In the islands outside Ambon, the influence of DI was even stronger. In Manipa, for instance, it was found that there had been intensive military training of Muslim youths. Even though the reliability of this document should be questioned, several former DI activists confirmed the expansion of DI into outer islands with predominant Muslim communities and supplied the supporting data.

The military document shows that one aspect of DI’s ideological influence in Maluku was the interest of the youth involved there. It is reported that in mid-1954, the Communist Party used the local people as their right hand. The report continues that it was reaction to the propaganda of the Communist party that led Muslim youths to join an Islamic party, such as Masyumi and Islamic United Party (PSI). The Communist activists put it about that shalat (Ar. šalāt, the daily prayers) were nothing else than movements of the body and therefore useless. The offense led to a turning to the Islamic political parties. DI activists found this an opportunity to involve the youth, and were aided by the fact that the movement maintained close cooperation with the Islamic political parties in the area. There had already been an effort to organise the youth into a paramilitary called Persatuan Bekas Pejuang Islam Bersenjata (Union of the Ex-Muslims under Arms). The reliability

274 Those districts are: Ambon, Haruku, Saporua, Seram, Manipa and Buru.
275 “Laporan Perkembangan DI/TII Di Kepulauan Maluku,” in Document DI/TII Kahar Muzakkar No. 155, Dinas Sejarah, Pusat Sejarah TNI, Jakarta. According to the report, there were two villages in which DI did not spread, Kampung Tengah and Kampung Toal, where the resistance of youth was strong.
276 Ibid.
277 Interview with Hasan Ridwan, 10 May 2003; Interview with Yusuf Makmur, 9 May 2003.
278 Document DI/TII Kahar Muzakkar No. 155, Dinas Sejarah, Pusat Sejarah TNI, Jakarta.
of this report or otherwise may be seen in the wish of the military to talk about what had happened within its own forces, that is, the leaning of some military personal towards communism, the bitterest ideological enemy of Kahar Muzakkar.

Other efforts at strengthening ideology were found in building networks with other DI areas, such as Aceh and South Kalimantan. The army document reports that Kahar Muzakkar sent three of his couriers to Kota Baru, South Kalimantan in a bid to help Ibnu Hajar’s rebellion. Further contact between South Kalimantan and the South Sulawesi Rebellion was Ibnu Hajar’s attempt to escape to South Sulawesi. The same initiative was also made to DI of Aceh; however, here Kahar seemed to seek mutual cooperation in the effort to strengthen their respective ‘Islamic’ rebellions. The significance of this report is not in question, since it was not only the republican army who talked about the cooperation among the existing DI branches but Kahar Muzakkar himself often mentioned the need to establish what he called “siji’ar Islam” (the words of God) with other DI rebels in all the other areas of Indonesia.

DI’s expansion in building relations with PRRI also had something to do with ideological concerns. As stated in Chapter One, the PRRI/Permesta rebellion was caused by problems in relations between the central government and the individual regions, each with their own ethnic, economic and religious characteristics - fundamentally a similar cause to that of the emergence of Kahar Muzakkar’s DI. However, PRRI/Permesta was never attached to any religious ideology. Kahar says in his writings that even though the two movements were of a different nature, it was not impossible for them to unite. The meeting point between them was their antipathy towards Soekarno’s communism.

The expansion of DI was in accordance with its defensive program, which was to proceed from its defensive nature to a public mobilisation, again as mentioned. Yet more

---


280 “Proses Perkembangan DI/TII Sulawesi Selatan Tenggara,” in Document DI/TII Kahar Muzakkar, No. 130, Dinas Sejarah, Pusat Sejarah TNI.


282 Kahar Muzakkar described the two movements as two groups: the radical revolutionary Muslims (Kar stosuwirjo, Muhammad Darud Beureueh, Ibnu Hajar and Abdul Qahhar Mudzakkar) and the PRRI Group, Zulkifli Lubis, Ahmad Husain, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara and others). Abdul Qahhar Mudzakkar, *Konsepsi Negara Demokrasi Indonesia: Koreksi Pemikiran Politik Pemerintahan Soekarno*, 35.
expansive influences were needed to strengthen the movement. The data referred to above shows that DI activists ‘Darul Islamised’ the Muslims in an area and then mobilisation ran well. This indeed took place in Muslim Maluku. However, in areas where non-Muslims were dominant, such as Minahasa, North Sulawesi, the aim was to consolidate the existing movements against Soekarno and communism, the meeting point being their shared anti Communist ideology.

Along with its move into islands beyond Sulawesi, Islamic ideology remained the most important issue. Only in some cases did DI seem to be tactical, such as in the approach to the RMS, which was mainly made up of Christians. Similarly, tactics were employed in approaching rebellions mounted on regional issues, such as Permesta and PRRI. The significance of South Sulawesi’s DI’s religiosity here is its ability to relate to the ideological opposition of these movements, that is, anti-communism. What is more, Islamising did take place among the Christian rebels who joined Permesta. One of the leading figures, Gerungan embraced Islam, along with several of his followers. A former DI leader estimated that around 200 people joined the conversion to Islam.283

Because of this, in analyzing the cooperation between Kahar Muzakkar’s DI and PRRI/Permesta, I disagree with Boland who states that it was not a matter of principle and not based on DI ideology.284 However, in practice, Kahar and the DI activists were triggered into ideological expansion. Two high points in this development were first, when Kahar pioneered cooperation with Permesta and PRRI by establishing RPI, in which he no longer depended on the rule of the central NII and second, when he established RPII. With RPI, he was more focused in contributing to Islamising the movement, as we will see later. Similarly, in RPII, Kahar abandoned NII and focused entirely on an Islamic government, as will be seen in the following discussion.

B. Joining RPI: Unfinished Islamised Rebellion

The Republik Persatuan Indonesia (Indonesian Unity Republic, RPI) in 1961 was not established in order to clarify the ideological orientation of the movement. It was a movement created by PRRI/Permesta and Aceh and South Sulawesi DI against the

283 Interview with Nurin Pisof, 22 November 2003.
284 See B.J. Boland, The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia, 68.
Soekarno government. The founding agreement explicitly stated that such subjects as the form of government, the state ideology and international status would for the time being be left out of consideration. These matters would be discussed by the governments of the two states at some future point in time when the situation permitted. The movement was first aimed at cooperating to oppose what Kahar called “Soekarno’s Communist oriented government,” agreeing on mutual help in the struggle against the perceived common enemy.

For Kahar Muzakkar’s DI, it may have appeared that inclusion in RPI was a deviation from Islamic ideology. The name of the movement no longer included the term ‘Islam’. However, examining what occurred within DI, we can say that an Islamic formalist orientation still existed. It might also be argued that inclusion in RPI was more a political tactic than a departure from its Islamic orientation. For Kahar, the newly formed movement served to strengthen his ideological opposition to the central government. It seems that even though he was ready to abandon NII, he viewed RPI as its continuation. This is seen in his account of RPI, where he remained concerned with the ideological nature of the movement, a matter which had to be decided first:

The readiness of the two groups to join forces had to be formulated very carefully, because the two movements had their own ideological entities and to unite two ideologies in one movement was not an easy job.

Kahar stated more precisely the different natures of the movements involved in RPI:

---


286 Abdul Qahhar Mudzakkar, Konsepsi Negara Demokrasi Indonesia: Koreksi Pemikiran Politik Pemerintahan Soekarno, 19.

287 Kahar Muzakkar states that the consequence of accepting RPI was that NII was changed into RPI. He states that Tentara Islam Indonesia (TII) was changed into Tentara Persatuan Indonesia (TPI). The form of NII which was kesatuan (united) was changed into Persatuan (federation). Abdul Qahhar Mudzakkar, Konsepsi Negara Demokrasi Indonesia: Koreksi Pemikiran Politik Pemerintahan Soekarno, 36.

288 Ibid., 37.
There were at least two aspects to be solved for the progress of the movement, that is, the state ideology and the symbols of the state. If the two aspects were blurred and without mutual understanding, the idealism of unity would only be a daydream.\textsuperscript{289}

Therefore, even though there was mutual agreement not to discuss the matter of ideology, Kahar was firm within himself that the ideological clarity of the movement remain important.

In order to reach an ideological solution, Kahar first proposed a ‘joint proclamation text’.\textsuperscript{290} This was aimed at revising the \textit{teks piagam persatuan} (federated charter text) drafted by PRRI leaders. In it, Kahar proposed that RPI be established as a law of state based on:

First, Islamic teaching and belief in one God for all tribes and groups in Indonesia, in accordance with their own religious teachings. Second, social justice, along with Islamic teachings and other religious teachings held by Indonesian tribes and groups. Third, pure democracy, along with Islamic teaching and other religious teachings held by all tribes and groups in Indonesia.\textsuperscript{291}

Kahar Muzakkar’s other effort towards Islamising RPI was his proposal to change several chapters of the constitution.\textsuperscript{292} He revised the nature of RPI sovereignty which was to be in the hands of the people and implemented by the people’s representatives. In his words: “RPI’s sovereignty is the sovereignty of God brought down to people and implemented by the peoples’ representatives.”\textsuperscript{293} Another part of the constitution to be revised was that of the state symbols and ideological basis. To the proposed flag, which was red and white, it was suggested that stars and a crescent be added to. The reason for this was that the colours red and white alone did not represent all the tribes and groups in the Indonesian community. The colours merely referred to the ‘pride’ of the nation and did not reflect the religiosity of the Indonesian people.\textsuperscript{294}

\textsuperscript{289} Ibid., 38.
\textsuperscript{290} See the concept of the joint proclamation text in Ibid., 140-141.
\textsuperscript{291} Ibid., 144.
\textsuperscript{292} For more information on the RPI constitution, see ibid., 41-103.
\textsuperscript{293} Ibid., 145.
\textsuperscript{294} Ibid., 152
The revision of the constitution further concerned the issue of the Head of State and the People’s Representative Council, found in the general rules of the constitution. It states: “the President is Head of state and the holder of government authority.” Kahar proposed: “the President and Vice-President are the holders of the governing authority, entrusted with carrying out God’s law.” Kahar proposed: “the President and Vice-President shall be Muslims.” The chapter on the President’s oath was also to be revised. The drafted constitution said that the President simply stated ‘I swear...’ but in Kahar’s proposal, the President and Vice-President should state ‘I swear, in the name of Allah...’ Kahar proposed that whenever the President and Vice-President were to take a new oath they were to swear in the name of God. Finally, the constitution stating that the people’s representatives, together with the government, carried the people’s sovereignty, was changed to be the People’s Representative Council, together with the government, carried the trust of God’s sovereignty on behalf of the people.295 This proposed revision shows the formalist nature of Kahar Muzakkar, who clearly stated that Islam was the most important influence on the constitution, as in the mention of ‘Allah’.

It is clear that Kahar regarded religion as the very foundation of the constitution. To satisfy this obsession, Kahar inserted the term ‘Islam’ in many points of the constitution relevant to religious matters, as shown above. He redefined the nature of sovereignty, which in the constitution was based on the general concept of the ‘hands of the people’, to become ‘in the hands of Allah’ in his draft. Furthermore, he was mindful of the importance of symbols to reflect the nature of the Islamic state. He was aware that the effort to adopt Islam as the ideology of the nation would be forgotten if the draft constitution carried no guarantee of the role of religion.

It may be said that Kahar Muzakkar’s withdrawal of commitment to NII was a matter of strategy, and designed to strengthen his ideological movement against the central government. To do this, he accepted ‘de-Islamised’ model of rebellion. Furthermore, he proposed ‘religion’ rather than the exclusive term of ‘Islam’. However, he clearly wanted ‘Islam’ to be dominant in its symbols. Kahar was aware that the draft concept of the state’s ideological basis, that is ‘belief in the oneness of God’ was not enough. This is consistent with his argument for rejecting Pancasila earlier in his movement, which he criticised as

295 Ibid., 46.
obscure and abstract.\textsuperscript{296} It can be interpreted that he did not propose an exclusive use of ‘Islam’ for the movement’s name was because there were non-Muslims and pure nationalists present within his movement.

Kahar’s proposal of Islam in the RPI constitution was not desperate. It is a fact that the leaders of RPI included Islamic state oriented Muslims, Nationalist Muslims and Nationalist Christians. This categorisation is important to keep in mind, yet among the RPI figures, the Islamic wing was the more dominant. The logic behind the proposal of a religious constitution was that DI and Masyumi activists could be expected to welcome the offer. However, Kahar failed in his attempt to Islamise the RPI constitution. RPI, considering the PRRI/Permesta side, was not able to put aside the ideological orientation of the movement, due to the religious diversity the people involved. In the end, it did not have a chance to explore the issue because of its swift eradication by the republican government.

The fact remained that the origin of RPI’s establishment was not to create a religious state. Despite the motives of RPI in fighting against what it called ‘Soekarno’s communism’,\textsuperscript{297} the movement was for a a nation state and not necessarily an Islamic one. Kahar Muzakkar was also not one of the main drafters of the constitution. He became involved after the concept of RPI was formulated by Permesta and PRRI leaders to fight against the Soekarno government, no matter if they were from Christian or Muslim backgrounds. Kahar was soon aware that he had sacrificed much by being ready to discard his DI uniform, but if his Islamic idealism was also to be set aside, it would be too much to sacrifice. Thus he said: “Islam can never be exchanged with politics.”\textsuperscript{298}

It is not only the various contesting ideological positions that he was up against that made Kahar Muzakkar’s proposal of a religious constitution difficult to implement. The history of many personal differences among the figures of RPI made the movement too fragile to set a solid constitution. Many of the leaders of Permesta had been Kahar’s rivals at an earlier stage. Kawilarang, a former military commander of the Territorial VII (East Indonesia Military Command) had played a significant role in Kahar Muzakkar’s flight into

\textsuperscript{296} In terms of his criticism of Pancasila, see the previous subchapter on Kahar Muzakkar’s political thought.

\textsuperscript{297} For further information on the objectives of establishing Permesta see Jarah Dam XIV Hasanuddin, 25 Tahun Kodam XIV Hasanuddin 1957-1982, Ujungpandang: Kodam Hasanuddin, 1982, 71-76.

\textsuperscript{298} Abdoel Kahar Muzakkar, Konsepsi Negara Demokrasi Indonesia: Koreksi Pemikiran Politik Pemerintahan Soekarno, 14.

97
the jungle. J.F. Warouw, another former commander of the East Indonesia military after Kawilarang, left records of rivalry with Kahar. In addition, there were also unresolved issues between the PRRI/Permesta leaders and DI. It was difficult for Daud Beureueh, the key leader of Aceh DI, to forget how many Masyumi leaders in the national government had contributed to the absorption of the province of Aceh to become the Province of North Sumatera. This was at the time when Muhammad Natsir became Prime Minister of Indonesia and had stood together with Daud Beureueh in the RPI movement. The accumulation of all these differences has led Anhar Gonggong to describe the RPI phenomenon as *kerapuhan sebuah cita-cita* (the fragility of an idealism).\(^{299}\)

The RPI movement could not survive after the republican army swept up the leaders in 1961 and PRRI/Permesta handed them over to the republican government. For Kahar Muzakkar, the failure of RPI was that on one hand, the movement was a rebellion formulated by figures from diverse regions and religions, while on the other, he openly showed his desire to bring the movement into one advancing formalist Islam, which he hoped would become the ideological continuation of DI.

C. The Creation of RPII: Between Islamic Idealism and Illusion

The DI leaders, Daud Beureueh and Kahar Muzakkar did not follow the decision of PRRI/Permesta leaders to surrender to the republican government in 1961. They remained committed in their physical opposition to the republican government. Kahar even criticised the attitude of PRRI and Permesta leaders. In his writing he described the mentality of these leaders in sarcastic language, as ‘*api yang tidak berasap*’ (fire without smoke).\(^{300}\)

People say that where there is smoke there is fire, but it seems the fire burnt by some Indonesian people is a fire without smoke, easy to burn, and easy to go out, without leaving any smoke. That is the description of the PRRI/Permesta rebellion in Sumatra, Sulawesi Utara and Maluku Utara in 1956 and 1957. They reached a peak in 1958 and ended in 1961. We describe this as fire that burns


bright at the beginning, but at the end, ceases without leaving any smoke, without even being detected.\footnote{Ibid., 6}

Kahar, however, states that RPI and PRRI/Permesta might have gone but the idealism of RPI would be kept alive under what he calls "the radical revolutionary Islamic fighters, even without PRRI/Permesta."\footnote{Ibid., 7.} This implies that Kahar Muzakkar was still preoccupied with his ideal of a federated Islamic state, as reflected in his proposals to the basic constitution of RPI. And it is what he implemented in the formation of the Persatuan Republik Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic Unity Republic, RPII), using a name similar to RPI but with the addition of 'Islam.' It may be argued that RPII was to realise the Islamism which he had proposed to RPI and with a similar form of state as persatuan (Union).

The idea of RPII was then implemented by Kahar Muzakkar by gathering his followers and sympathisers to attend a meeting at Towuti, Biau in 1962, PUPIR III. The meeting resulted in the establishment of the Republik Persatuan Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic United Republic, RPII),\footnote{See Abdul Qahar Mudzakkar, *Catatan Batin Pedjoang Islam Revolusioner Jilid III*, 2; Anhar Gonggong, *Abdul Qahhar Mudzakkar: Dari Patriot hingga Pemberontak*, 197. Tommy Thomson, *Meningkap Misteri Abdul Kahar Mudzakkar*, 76.} the purpose of the establishment of which was seen in the contents of the proclamation text.\footnote{Kahar Muzakkar noted that the proclamation was signed by ulama and Islamic figures from various areas: Java, Sumatera-Aceh, Kalimantan, Nusa Tenggara, Maluku Sulawesi Utara, Sulawesi Tenggara, and Sulawesi Selatan. It was attended by about 465 people. Abdul Qahar Mudzakkar, *Tjatatan Batin Pedjoang Islam Revolusioner Jilid III*, 41.} There are two other proclamations, which Kahar refused to acknowledge - the Proclamation of 17 August 1945 (the proclamation of the Republic of Indonesia) and the Proclamation of 7 August 1949 (the proclamation of the Islamic State of Indonesia). Kahar elaborates his reasons for repudiating these two proclamations. The reason to abolish the Proclamation of the Republic of Indonesia rested on a number of causes:

the proclamation was abused by Soekarno’s group to violate the basic rights of the Indonesian people, comprising tribes and groups who were forced by Soekarno’s group to unite under one totalitarian government. The proclamation was utilised by Soekarno’s group to inflame civil war, burning the villages of
the people and robbing the wealth of Indonesian nature endowed by the God Almighty. The proclamation was used by Soekarno to suppress other tribes and groups, especially the Muslim people who had the most 'share' in the Indonesian fight for independence. The proclamation was misused by Soekarno to destroy religious morality and religious life in Indonesia. The proclamation was used by Soekarno to free his Communist-oriented army to suppress the Indonesian people and to cooperate with Communist countries. That all led to the deterioration of the people's lives. The proclamation was used by Soekarno to bribe the Muslim people to destroy their Muslim brothers and to follow the teachings of the false Pancasila.\textsuperscript{305}

These reasons were nothing new. Kahar’s resentment of the central government, his criticism of the regional problem and communism and his anti-Pancasila stance were all documented. His rejection of the proclamation of independence was an attempt to claim authority for his own new proclamation.

Similarly, Kahar’s rejection of the proclamation of the Islamic State of Indonesia was an attempt to separate his previous DI and his RPII, a vital step since the two movements were based on common Islamic ideology. Kahar had to do this without relying on NII:

The Qanun Asasi, the Basic Constitution of NII created by Kartosuwirjo and other West Java DI leaders did not reflect the truth of Islamic nationhood. Also, Kartosuwirjo, in his efforts to unite the Indonesian Muslims, ignored the feudalistic schools, the tarekat [Ar. \textit{tarīkah}, sufi order], the quarrels among Islamic political parties and other khurafat [Ar. \textit{khurafat}, superstition] practices that cannot be justified in either this life or the hereafter. The NII proclamation did not reflect an Islamic caliphate structure, and therefore ignored the effort to unite the Muslim people. The proclamation contributed to the ignorance of the Muslim people to \textit{fi sabillillah} [Ar. \textit{sabil} \textit{Allah}, the fight in the way of Allah] that consequently led to the destruction of the Muslim people under the totalitarianism of Soekarno.\textsuperscript{306}

\textsuperscript{305} There are thirteen arguments made by Kahar why he thought that Muslim people abolish proclamation of independence of 17 August 1945. For the complete contents of his argument, see \textit{Ibid.}, 55-56.

\textsuperscript{306} \textit{Ibid.}, 59.
(Seturan Schema)
Republik Persatuan Islam Indonesia
Bentuk Negara

(Segara Segara)
This quote strengthened Kahar Muzakkar’s modernist nature as the base of his formalism by rejecting the practice of tarekat and khurafat which is what modernist Muslims fought against.

Unlike the constitutional changes Kahar offered to RPI, which were based on general Indonesian religious beliefs, RPII’s Basic Constitution was established on Islam. The adoption of an Islamic reference was clearly seen in the sections on the model of state sovereignty, the ideological foundations of the state, state idealism and the basic framework of the state. As stated in the chapter on the model of state sovereignty: “the state has rule of law, free and sovereign, based on the Qur’an and the Hadith”. In another chapter it says: “RPII is based solely on the Qur’an and the Hadith”. Any regulation outside the Qur’an and the Islamic Traditions was not acknowledged.

However, the foundations of RPII remained as in RPI, with only the addition of Islam. This is stated in a chapter of the constitution:

The state shall be founded on keakhiratan [concerning the hereafter], social justice and pure democracy, which are all in accord with Islamic teachings. The state is aimed at creating a united Islamic world under the Islamic caliphate, that is, a united republic of the Islamic world.

Kahar did not define a caliphate but what he meant, based on his book, is what is generally understood, that is, a single governance of the Islamic world under one supreme leader. However, he talks about the governmental system, and a federalist system of the state is seen in the chapter on state structure:

---

307 This constitution consists of the Muqaddimah (preface) and the contents. The contents consists of 56 chapters covering various aspects of nationhood. However, for the purpose of this discussion, I only specify the chapters related to formalist Islam and the chapters that can be compared to Kahar’s RPI constitution.

308 See chapter I of the constitution in Kahar Muzakkar, Tjatatan Batin Pedjoang Islam Revolusioneer Jilid III, 44.

309 See chapter 2 of the constitution in Ibid., 44.

310 See chapter 4 of the constitution in Ibid., 45.
The state structure consists of a united structure for one tribe and group, a federalist structure for the various tribes and groups and a united states of those tribes and for the Islamic world.²³¹

These two quotes demonstrate the overt Islamism of Kahar Muzakkar, despite the fact that what he was offering was more of a gesture towards a utopia of the unity of the Islamic world than the local rebellion in which he found himself. Even though he had in view the concept of a caliphate system, it was little more than wishful thinking. It was doubtful how he could have realised this in 1962, when his movement was weakening due to a decrease in popular support and increasing isolation by the republican army. However, the concern of this subchapter is to see only how Kahar Muzakkar strengthened his ideals for Islamic formalism at such a critical time.

First, in terms of the symbols of state, Kahar Muzakkar used indisputably Muslim symbols and culture. In the constitution, the flag was no longer to be red and white with stars and a crescent, but to be green with white Arabic writing of the words Là ilāha illā Allāh Muḥammad rasul Allāh ("There is no God but Allah and Muhammad is the messenger of Allah). As for the formal languages of the state, Kahar proclaimed Arabic as compulsory for the Indonesian population, besides keeping Indonesian as the national language.²³² The reason to enshrine Arabic in the constitution is that it is the language of the Holy Qur'an. Kahar himself had not mastered Arabic. There is no evidence of his ability to speak or read Arabic. In none of his writings did he refer to Arabic literature. The only data available of Arabic competency is his own claim of passive use.²³³ Some of his followers also mentioned this passive ability. However, that Kahar studied Arabic can be inferred from his motivation to learn Islam seriously, which was never in question among all of his former leaders.

Furthermore, the adoption of the system of an Islamic caliphate in the Basic Constitution was more specific when referring to the sections of the state apparatus. The chapter states: "the state apparatus shall consist of khalīfah (Ar. khāliṭah, head of state), dewan khalīfah (ministry cabinet), majelis syura ((Ar. majlis shūrā, consultative council)

²³¹ See chapter 6 of the constitution in Ibid., 46.
²³² Ibid., 46.
²³³ He claimed to understand passively two other foreign languages in addition to Arabic, those are, Dutch and English. See Abdul Qahhar Mudzakkar, Revolusi Ketatanegaraan Indonesia Menudju Persaudaraan Manusa, 3.
and *dewn fatwa* (advisory council)."\(^{314}\) The constitution makes the caliphate the paramount power in the state. It stipulates that "the Caliph is the President, the military supreme and the supreme judge."\(^{315}\) Another chapter states:

> As President, the Caliph legalises the application of the constitution. As Supreme Commander, the Caliph determines the declaration of martial law and war. As President, the Caliph can make proposals to the People's Council to appoint the *dewan khilafah* [ministers] and can dismiss them.\(^{316}\)

However, there are a couple of chapters stipulating the more dominant area of the caliph's authority. "the caliph is the supreme judge who can determine the application of the death penalty."\(^{317}\) Furthermore, it states: "the caliph shall sit in his position for life."\(^{318}\) "Even though the members of the people's council shall be appointed by people, it can be dismissed by the caliph."\(^{319}\) "If there is any condition approved by Islamic teaching, the people's council can even be dismissed by the caliph."\(^{320}\) Based on the above, it may be said that Kahar's statement of the continuation of RPI into the PRII was not entirely true. The fact that, in many aspects of his RPII constitution, Kahar changed from implementing a democratic system, as reflected in his concept of the Constitution of RPI, to become dictatorial system, giving absolute power to the Caliph.

Kahar's Basic Constitution of RPII came with an explanation of its special features compared to the previous constitution:

First, state sovereignty hinges on the holy Qur'an and the Hadits Shahih [verifiable traditions of the prophet]. Second, state idealism is based on morality and politics. Third, state frameworks reflect the totality of Islamic teachings, and

---

\(^{314}\) See chapter 10 of the constitution in Abdul Kahar Muzakkar, *Tjatatan Batin Pedjoang Islam Revolusioner Jilid III*, 47.

\(^{315}\) See chapter 14 of the constitution in *ibid.*, 47.

\(^{316}\) See chapter 15 of the constitution in *ibid.*, 47.

\(^{317}\) See chapter 15 of the constitution in *ibid.*, 47.

\(^{318}\) See chapter 16 of the constitution in *ibid.*, 47.

\(^{319}\) See chapter 22 of the constitution in *ibid.*, 48.

\(^{320}\) See chapter 23 of the constitution in *ibid.*, 48.
fourth, the state structure is more comprehensive in comparison to that of the present nation state.\footnote{321}

Looking at the RPII model, we may say that it was basically a development of Kahar Muzakkar’s earlier Islamic activism and rebellion. First, it was a continuation of NII in which Islamic symbolism was re-adapted. Second, RPII was a continuation of the RPI movement in which the federalist model was defended in order to accommodate the variety of ‘tribes and groups’ of the Indonesian population. Kahar even thought that the federalist model could be implemented within the Muslim world under a caliphate. Third, Kahar maintained his attack on the Soekarno government, which was Communist oriented.

RPII was more concerned with its goals in comparison to DI, in which Kahar held authority over his own area of East Indonesia. RPII maintained the ideal of the formation of an Islamic *khilafah*.\footnote{322} In Kahar’s view, the creation of RPII was to unite any Muslim groups through a federal system, while RPII itself would later unite with other international Islamic movements. Second, the motive of its establishment was not only to oppose Soekarno’s government but also to oppose Kartosuwirjo’s DI, for Kahar no longer felt comfortable with the strategic movement as defined by Kartosuwirjo.\footnote{323}

The reasons for this are given in the account by Anhar Gonggong, which is considered a reliable academic work. Anhar states that idea of establishing RPII had long been prepared by Kahar since the time when he joined Kartosuwirjo.\footnote{324} Kahar and his activists proposed the amendment of *Qanun Asasi* (Ar. *Qānūn Asāsī*, Basic Constitution) in December 1953. Kahar proposed that NII be changed into Republik Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic Republic, RII) and follow the state structure in the form of the caliphate as practiced by the Prophet and his first four caliphs. Even though van Dijk’s account relates that Kahar’s early joint proclamation was incorrectly stated as the Islamic

\footnotetext[321]{Abdul Qahhar Mudzakkar, *Tjtatan Batin Pedjoang Islam Revolusioner Jilid III*, 53.}
\footnotetext[322]{Ibid., 34-39. The *khilafah* was a classical concept in the Islamic world. It was held after the death of the Prophet Muhammad. During the caliphate era, the Muslim people were bound by the religion they professed. There was no separation of nation states or nationality. For more information on the nature of caliphate, see Wilfried Madelung, *The Succession to Muhammad: A Study of the Early Caliphate* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 1997.}
\footnotetext[323]{Ibid., 57.}
Republic of Indonesia, not the Islamic State of Indonesia, it may be seen as being purposely set up by Kahar in his ideal for a federated model of Islamic government, as he was to implement in RPII.

Another indication of Kahar Muzakkar’s commitment to Islamism in relation to his disregard of Kartosuwirjo’s NII is also to be found in Anhar’s account of Kahar’s disappointment at Kartosuwirjo’s religious attitude. Anhar says that Kahar frequently sent official requests to Kartosuwirjo, referring to the Qur’an and Hadith, about not tolerating any feudalistic or heretical practices within the Muslim community. However, Anhar’s account states that Kahar’s requests were refused by Kartosuwirjo, based on his reasoning that change had to be brought about slowly and with patience and that such practices could not be destroyed all at once.

The chief problem of the RPII rebellion was its early loss of momentum. It was established at the time when Kahar had been abandoned by many of his prominent followers. At the same time, the rebellion in the outer islands was becoming weaker and the republican army more consolidated. PRRI/Permesta had been abolished and the DI movements of Aceh and East Java had almost met their end. Kahar Muzakkar’s RPII constitution met the same destiny as his offer of changes to the RPII constitution for these very same reasons.

Based on the conditions of Kahar Muzakkar’s rebellion and his personal characteristics, it may be said that the idealism of RPII was vital for him to fulfil his obsession in creating a formalist Islamic ideological movement, fully under his own control. Kahar must have been aware of the impossibility of implementing this ideal. He realised that now he controlled only small parts of the jungle and with just a small number of followers. His strong leaders were no longer with him. He simply stuck to his ideological guns, while ignoring whether or not the newly formed movement could be implemented. I agree with Anhar Gonggon’g’s description of his psychological state when establishing RPII

325 C. van Dijk, Rebellion Under the Banner of Islam: The Darul Islam in Indonesia, 189.
326 Anhar Gogonggong, Abdul Qahhar Muzakka: Dari Patriot Hingga Pemberontak, 58.
327 Information on the weakening of Kahar Muzakkar’s movement will be touched upon in the discussion following issues of the end of the rebellion.
328 For more information on the prominent figures who left Kahar after 1961, see The Document DI/TII Kahar Muzakkar No. 159, Dinas Sejarah, Pusat Sejarah TNI, Jakarta.
as ilusi dalam kesendirian (illusion in his loneliness). Kahar seems only to be able to hold a meeting to proclaim RPII, and to draft a constitution and create a structure of government. However, the governance structure remained unrealised in any real state until his life ended on 3 February 1965 in Sungai Lasolo, Southeast Sulawesi.

After Kahar Muzakkar was killed, the RPII leadership was taken over by Gerungan, but he could not activate the movement under the successful isolation strategy applied by the republican army. Gerungan too was left with only a few of his followers, who were forced to move continuously from one place to another. His capture on 27 July 1965 brought an end to the physical rebellion of RPII. There were some ministers of RPII still abroad in Southeast Sulawesi after that time, but they merely hid under a wink of the republican army’s eyes.

D. The Road to the End of the Rebellion: an Ideological Perspective

The signs of the decline of Kahar Muzakkar’s struggle can be traced from the late 1950s. In general, these signs were the departure of many of his prominent leaders and the absence of strong support from the people. They may be traced from religio-ideological perspectives. Despite the key leadership of Kahar Muzakkar, DI’s development cannot be separated from rivalries grounded in ideological causes.

The departure of many TKR leaders from Kahar Muzakkar, prior to 1953, was mainly caused by their objection to Kahar’s Islamic formalism. I see this rather as ideological rivalry. Usman Balo, the main leader of the faction, refused to take part in the transition of the TKR to DI and chose to form his own rebellion, naming his troops the TKR because he was only ready to fight under Kahar Muzakkar only if the ideology remained pro-Pancasila and its aim was to defend the essence of the Indonesian proclamation of 17 August 1945. Usman Balo’s TKR later fought against DI troops. If Kahar Muzakkar could have worked with Usman under the banner of DI, he would have

329 Anhar Gonggong, Abdul Qahhar Muzakkar Dari Patriot Hingga Pemerintah, 196. Anhar’s term appears to have been inspired by Holk H. Dengel, who described Kartosuwirjo’s movement as ‘the failure of illusion’ see Holk H. Dengel, Darul Islam dan Kartosuwirjo: Langkah Perwujudan Angan-Angan Yang Gagal (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan), 1995.

330 For further information on the structure of the RPII governance, see Documents DI/TII Kahar Muzakkar No.162, Dinas Sejarah, Pusat Sejarah TNI, Jakarta.

331 Harun Rasyid Jibe, Oesman Balo Mengabdi Proklamasi, 35.
doubled his strength.\textsuperscript{332} Kahar, however, was able to cope with the defection and to create a strong DI corps which reached its peak in 1956, when the area under DI control covered almost all of South Sulawesi.\textsuperscript{333}

The next personal rivalry that contributed to the decline of DI was that between Kahar Muzakkar and Bahar Mattalioe, which started in 1957.\textsuperscript{334} It is estimated that the departure of Bahar Mattalioe led to the loss of more than 3000 of Kahar’s DI troops.\textsuperscript{335} The clash was grounded in ideological factors but exacerbated by ethnic sentiment. Bahar Mattalioe and his followers were based in the ‘south’ area of the rebellion, comprising mainly Bone, Soppeng and Wajo while Kahar and his main troops were based in the ‘north’ area around Luwu. The ‘southern’ groups insisted that they have their own identity. They felt they had ‘better’ people, more \textit{ulama}, and a more thorough understanding of Islam. They were not inclined to be led by the people of the ‘north’. \textsuperscript{336}

As can be seen in his manifesto, Bahar Mattalioe was committed to increasing the religious piety of his troops and saw the fight against Kahar Muzakkar as a holy war, whose consequence was \textit{s jihad atau menang} (to die in the name of God or to prevail). Bahar Mattalioe’s criticism of Permesta, of which many of the members were Christians, was interpreted by his sympathisers as a charge that Kahar Muzakkar had relinquished the purity of Islamic idealism. Choosing to follow Bahar Mattalioe was the right way, since

\footnotesize

\textsuperscript{332} Usman (Oesman) Balo explained that at the time he separated from Kahar Muzakkar, his troops were better equipped than Kahar’s.

\textsuperscript{333} See Document DI/TII Kahar Muzakkar No. 132, Dinas Sejarah, Pusat Sejarah TNI, Jakarta. See also Esther Velthoen, “Mapping Sulawesi in the 1950s,” p. 106.

\textsuperscript{334} Bahar Mattalioe was one of the most faithful followers of Kahar Muzakkar. He joined Kahar in nationalist activities in Java. He knew Kahar’s character thoroughly. He became a key figure on the road to rebellion, since he and Saleh Sjahban were sent by Kahar to coordinate the guerillas in South Sulawesi, later on to become the DI troops. By the time Kahar entered the jungle, Bahar Mattalioe had risen further in importance. He progressed in his military career in DI from Group Leader to Division Commander. When the clash with Kahar Muzakkar occurred in 1958, Bahar Mattalioe was a Division Commander of four regiments.

\textsuperscript{335} It should be noted that not all the units under the leadership of Bahar Mattalioe followed him. However, their defection had a significant impact on the declining power of DI. For more information on the members of DI who joined Bahar Mattalioe, see Document DI/TII Kahar Muzakkar No. 149, 14, Dinas Sejarah, Pusat Sejarah TNI, Jakarta.

\textsuperscript{336} Interview with Dr. Hasan Rahman, 4 October 2003.

'pure' Islam no longer existed in the jungle. This rivalry impacted on the Islamic credibility of Kahar Muzakkar, since many DI from the 'south' chose to join Bahar.

On the other hand, Kahar Muzakkar, in his reply to Bahar Mattalioe's Manifesto in the same year saw his actions as much more a matter of personal ambition to take over the DI leadership. Kahar accused Bahar of misusing Islam, of "bringing a hypocritical attitude into the struggle of Islam in South Sulawesi"338 and of being a "munafik besar" (great hypocrite).339 It is difficult to assess the extent of the influence of the two figures' personal ambitions, rather than religiosity, in the conflict. Many of the former DI members I met, tended to see Bahar Mattalioe as a rival of Kahar Muzakkar due to his increasing influence in the jungle. This acknowledgement might be subjective, coming as it did from the former DI rebels who had sided with Kahar Muzakkar. However, one of Bahar Mattalioe's former guards also stated that he saw just that tendency in his leader. However, I would rather relate it to the ambitious personality of Kahar Muzakkar. He found the rising influence of Bahar Mattalioe a threat his influence in the jungle. Bahar was also known to have a leadership background prior to entering the jungle, as stated in my first chapter on DI's supporters. The fact is that Bahar, who is not aristocratic, could become a division commander in the jungle and led several aristocratic troop leaders. Bahar was also known to have a strong religious background prior to entering the jungle, as stated in my first chapter on DI's supporters. This rivalry, however, shows DI's significant Islamism, since the religiosity of the two men is not in question.

Besides the above political and ideological conflicts, the collapse of the rebellion was significantly influenced by the decline in the effectiveness of the DI system. From the limited written resources available and interviews held with former activists, as well as from the physical traces still available, it was indeed functional. Written sources show the existence of a governmental structure. The way in which the government operated could be judged from the account of DI leaders, such as Marzuki Hasan, DI's former minister of information. He walked around the DI areas to check how Islamic law was being implemented. Furthermore, hudud was implemented. Up to the time when this thesis was

338 See Kahar Muzakkar's "Pengumuman" in Bahar Mattalioe, Kahar Muzakkar dan Petualangannja, 105.
339 Ibid., 105.
written, there were still one or two people living without hands, due to the enforcement of the Islamic law of hand amputation for thieves and robbers.\textsuperscript{340}

DI had a system of military governance. The structure of military bureaucracy existed down to the village level. They have Islamic court systems from the supreme court to the district level. The economic details of how DI was run was based on the basis of several sources. They operated several businesses and sent agricultural products to other islands, including Java and Makassar through smuggling. The funds were used to support the operation of the DI government and to support war necessities through an exchange of products for weapons and bullets from certain army officers with strong business affiliations. An account of the governmental system of DI which included its financial management to support the movement, can be found in the \textit{Pedoman Revolusi} (Manual of Revolution) consisting of three volumes, created by DI’s Ministry of Information. While this may not be proof of true governance, it serves to show that some system of rule prevailed.

However, due to the conditions under which the rebellion struggled, we cannot expect that the DI governmental system worked as in an established state. Abdul Aziz, a young Muslim activist and and son of Kahar Muzakkar says:

DI strove for the formal implementation of Islamic values, but its strategy was not an ideal one. It was not established on empowerment. It was more of an ideological reaction.\textsuperscript{341}

The confession of Yusri Abady, a former member of DI who was sent to Makassar for his formal education while being given the task of intelligence gathering, is important. He admits to the ineffective system of DI:

the caderisation among the members of DI did not run well. There had been an effort to establish educational institutions in the jungle up to the level of university, but due to the lack of those in the jungle who understood the modern management of education, it could not be maintained. There had been an effort to send many of the leaders to study abroad or to infiltrate the city while studying, but the rebellion came to an end before these people came back to the

\textsuperscript{340} Taken from my interviews with people who had experienced life under DI; they mentioned a number of people, and they were still alive.

\textsuperscript{341} \textit{Suara Hidayatullah}, “Abdul Aziz Qahhar Mudzakkar Angkat Bicara,” 22.
jungle. Furthermore, due to the nature of the movement as a rebellion, its people could not divide their concentration, while facing the republican army.\textsuperscript{342} There was an effort to strengthen the DI educational system by the arrest and kidnapping of three Europeans in South Sulawesi to be employed as teachers in the jungle. They were Dr. Whal from Germany and Dr. V.d. Wetering from the Netherlands, arrested in Malino in 1954. Sibenus Treep, also from the Netherlands was arrested in the middle of 1955. In Kahar Muzakkar’s account, the three Europeans were taken under the claim that they had entered the DI de facto areas in Malino. They made an agreement with DI to teach general knowledge to the DI community for five years.\textsuperscript{343} In addition to these three Europeans, DI also arrested H. Versteeden from the Netherlands in 1952, when the rebellion was still under the name of TKR. Kahar states that Versteeden was taken because he carried out missionary action in Toraja Timur and tried to Christianise some Muslim people of the area. Versteeden escaped execution by being ready to convert to Islam and to change his name to Abdul Hakiem.\textsuperscript{344} The capture of Versteeden may be seen to strengthen the Islamism of Kahar Muzakkar’s early rebellion, since it took place before the formation of DI in 1953. According to several former DI activists, the presence of these foreign teachers was helpful in extending the modern knowledge of DI members, either by their teaching in the emergency university established by Kahar Muzakkar or in formal education for the communities. But again, the teachers could not work well under the physical hardship of living in the jungle. Whal died in 1957, while Weteering and Treep died in 1958.

The fragility of the system was increased to by the decline in Islamic commitment of many DI activists. This is not to discount the significance of DI’s Islamism. As was seen in the early years of the movement, signs of a lessening of commitment were anticipated by Kahar Muzakkar by issuing Catatan Batin (Spiritual Remarks) and could win the immediate support of his followers. However, in later developments, as Hadeyang, a former wife of a DI activist states, the fighters began to lose what she called as ‘moral commitment’ for DI. Hadeyang related this morality with the influence of the material promises launched by the republican government. According to Hadeyang, they began to

\textsuperscript{342} Interview with Yusi Abadiy, 3 November 2003.

\textsuperscript{343} Abdoel Qahhar Mudzakkar, \textit{Konsepsi Negara Demokrasi Indonesia: Koreksi Pemikiran Politik Pemerintahan Soekarno}, 16. For complete information on this kidnap, see Document DI/TII Kahar Muzakkar, No.133, Dinas Sejarah, Pusat Sejarah TNI, Jakarta

\textsuperscript{344} Ibid., 17.
SKEMA KOMANDEMEN WILAYAH BESAR
ANGKATAN PERANG REPUBLIK ISLAM INDONESIA

PANGLIMA PERANG
KOMANDEMEN TERTINGGI
ANGKATAN PERANG
REPUBLIK ISLAM INDONESIA

PANGLIMA BESAR
KOMANDEMEN WILAYAH
BESAR (KWB)

DEWAN KOMANDEMEN WILAYAH BESAR (DKWB)
dan PERWAKILAN KABINET PRESIDEN RII

PANGLIMA
KW SS

PANGLIMA
KW STTU

PANGLIMA
Persiapan
KW NT

PANGLIMA
Persiapan
KWM & IB

Keterangan:
KWSS = Komandemen Wilayah Sulawesi Selatan
KWSTTU = Komandemen Wilayah Sulawesi Tenggara/Tengah & Utara
KWNT = Komandemen Wilayah Nusa Tenggara
KWM & IB = Komandemen Wilayah Maluku & Irian Barat

(Copied from KPK Penerangan RII, Pedoman Revolusi Jilid I, n.d., n.p., 12)
(Copied from KPK Penerangan RII, Pedoman Revolusi Jilid I, n.d., n.p., 17)
STRUKTUR PERWAKILAN KEMENTERIAN DALAM NEGERI
REPUBLIC ISLAM INDONESIA

Secara Skena

KPK PRESIDE RII

KPK DALAM NEGERI
RII

SEKJEN

SEK I

SEK II

Bagian
PEMERINTAHAN
UMUM

Bagian
DESENTRALISASI

Bagian
KEPEGAWAIAN

Bagian
KEUANGAN

Bagian
DESA

Bagian
PERUNDANG-UNDANGAN

Bagian
AGRARIA

Bagian
UMUM

JAWATAN UBUDIYAH

JAWATAN KEPOLISIAN NEGARA

JAWATAN UBUDIYAH

JAWATAN KEPEGAWAIAN

JAWATAN KEPOLISIAN NEGARA

(Copied from KPK Penerangan RII, Pedoman Revolusi Jilid III, n.d., n.p., 27)
look at prospects of business in the city. Many others were obsessed with the promise of military positions offered by the republican army. Muhammad Ridwan, a former unit leader of the troops, on the other hand, thinks that the decline of DI was caused by the loss of religious commitment of many DI figures. They no longer relied on the implementation of Islamic law, least of all on the accuracy of its criminal law. Many of the leaders left DI and ran away to the city to avoid punishment by the DI system, for charge of theft of wealth of the DI community.

Leadership in the jungle was a ‘one man show’ by Kahar Muzakkar. However, those who sustained the movement were not all coming from the same ideological loyalty. Even though the modernists controlled DI, the traditionalist ulama recruited were also influential, especially at grassroots level. Furthermore, there was no guarantee for Kahar about how Islamic his followers were, due to the fact that the Islamically minded people were found mainly within the leadership. Boland stated that the followers in general might come from robbers in Makassar who sought refuge by joining Kahar’s troops. He states that these people who contributed to give the movement a bad name were murdering, plundering and burning.

An important part of the effort which put an end to DI was the contra-ideological campaign carried out by the national army. The army always termed the DI fighters ‘gerombolan’ which means ‘marauding gangs’. The army also tended to associate the DI activists with murderers, and always described Kahar Muzakkar as the inhumane leader of an authoritarian dictatorship. This is part of an effort on the part of the republican government to dissolve the support of Muslim communities otherwise well disposed towards him.

Regarding the religio-ideological aspects of the rebellion, Muhammad Jusuf played a significant part in bringing about its end. The increase in the republican army’s attacks on the DI troops coincided with the time in 1959 when Muhammad Jusuf became the head of the Military Command of South and Southeast Sulawesi. He came from Bugis Bone and

345 Interview with Hadeyang, 8 May 2003.
346 Interview with Muhammad Ridwan, 9 April 2003.
347 B.J. Boland, The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia, 67.
built his military career in Java, somewhat later than Kahar Muzakkar.\textsuperscript{348} The personality of Jusuf as a military commander was important in shifting the ideological preferences of the South Sulawesi Muslims to the TNI. Jusuf was born an aristocrat but had discarded his title of ‘Andi’. This action was seen by the people as a mark of his egalitarianism – something for which Kahar had once similarly campaigned. Jusuf was also known to be a santri, and thus religiously observant, which was helpful in showing the people that an Islamic orientation was also present in the republican military. Furthermore, it was in the time of Muhammad Jusuf that the process of Makassarisasi (Makassar-isation) of the leadership became more pronounced. Many military and civil positions were now held by the local people. This situation contributed to an increasing support of the republican army; what they had seen as Jawanisasi (Javanisation) which led them to support DI, was now finished.

Muhammad Jusuf was also successful in pressing his religio-political program. He was, of course, not a formalist Muslim. The importance of mentioning this fact is to show how aware Jusuf was of DI’s Islamism in his efforts to destroy the rebellion. First, Jusuf was trying to run a process of santrisisasi (santrisation) within the republican army. The troops sent to fight against Kahar Muzakkar who entered the people’s villages were also devout Muslims. Before being sent out they were trained to understand the nature of the traditions of the local people, in which religious values were very strong.\textsuperscript{349} This strategy seemed to be successful. Many of the former DI activists who decided to enter the city offered the reason that the local leadership of the republican army they had fought against was basically made up of the same good Muslims as themselves.

Jusuf’s most important religio-political success was his realisation of an agreement with Kahar Muzakkar through the ‘Bonepute meeting’, leading to a ceasefire in 1961,\textsuperscript{350}

\textsuperscript{348} At the time Kahar Muzakkar had the military rank of Lieutenant Colonel, Jusuf was still at the rank of Lieutenant. Jusuf had even been trained by Kahar Muzakkar’s TRIPS in Yogyakarta at the time of the war of independence in 1947. It was even said that Jusuf was once Kahar’s ‘golden boy’ among young armies in Java.

\textsuperscript{349} Jusuf realised that to stop Kahar Muzakkar’s rebellion, the first thing to do was to gain the support of the local people. Jusuf saw that it was from them that the republican army got information about DI. He saw that the first thing to do was to plant a perception among the local people that the republican army was no less Islamic than the DI troops.

\textsuperscript{350} For more information on the meeting, see the Document DI/TII Kahar Muzakkar, No. 152, p. 3, Dinas Sejarah, Pusata Sejarah TNI, Jakarta. See also Document DI/TII Kahar Muzakkar, No, 150.
Khalid Muzakkir at the Bonegatie Meeting in October 1961

(Photo kindly provided by Cory van Stenus)
(photo kindly provided by Cory van Stenus)

Kahar’s father, right at the Bonneville Meeting in October 1961

M. Justul (left), Cory van Stenus (center), and Mahranga
with two successive meetings in 21 October 1961 and 12 November 1961. At the meeting, Kahar showed an inclination to halt the rebellion as long as his demands could be met.\textsuperscript{351} One of these was a demand to outlaw communism in Indonesia. This demand was then modified by Kahar, so that the first \textit{sila} of Pancasila, \textit{Ketuhanan yang Maha Esa} was to be replaced by the word ‘Islam’. Jusuf gave an indication that if Kahar allowed his troops to enter the city, he would follow up this demand. This offer as merely face saving, since he himself also seemed to know that they were impossible to meet. Kahar needed an acknowledgement from the central government of his serious intent to make Pancasila become more Islamic.

After a hard struggle, Jusuf persuaded Kahar make a formal statement to ensure his troops would return to the city. Kahar insisted that after realising the need to create security for the people of South and Southeast Sulawesi and of all the DI community, which he called Mujahidin Ansharullah (Ar. Mūjāḥidīn Anṣār Allāh, the Hard Working Army of God) consisting of Indonesian Islamic Army, the Indonesian Islamic Police and the South Sulawesi DI government, the Muslim people of South Sulawesi were now under the responsibility of the Army Regional Commander, Muhammad Jusuf.\textsuperscript{352} Kahar also stated that based on his ideological beliefs

I will withdraw from the crowd and wander as an idealist and Islamic revolutionary fighter, struggling for the implementation of Islamic law based on the Qur’an and legal Prophetic Traditions all over the world.\textsuperscript{353}

Kahar finally promised that as long as the Communists did not make an attempt to eradicate religious life in Indonesia, he would swore, in the name of Allah, not to make another attempt at rebellion against the legal republican government.\textsuperscript{354} However, Jusuf well

\textsuperscript{351} See the demands that Kahar Muzakkar put to Jusuf in the Document DI/TII Kahar Muzakkar No. 156, Dinas Sejarah, Pusat Sejarah TNI, Jakarta.

\textsuperscript{352} Abdul Qahhar Mudzakkar, \textit{Revolusi Ketatanegaraan Indonesia Menuju Persaudaraan Manusia}, 33.

\textsuperscript{353} See Document DI/TII Kahar Muzakkar, No. 156, Dinas Sejarah, Pusat Sejarah TNI, Jakarta.

\textsuperscript{354} However, Kahar soon felt cheated by Jusuf when he heard no news from Nasution. Kahar was only invited to see President Soekarno in Makassar, the invitation coming through Jusuf’s vice-commander. It seems that Jusuf’s focus was to bring Kahar Muzakkar’s troops to the city, and that was achieved. In relation to Kahar’s feeling of being cheated, many of his former followers stated that Jusuf was only obsessed with his duty to end the rebellion. He was not much concerned with
realised that Kahar’s ideological demands would never be accepted by the central government, since communism had held a strong position in the government since 1959. Even Soekarno was committed to his agenda of *Nationalisme, Agama dan Komunisme* (Nationalism, Religion and Communism) which he commonly abbreviated to *Nasakom*. This immense ideological obstacle made the process of DI’s total solution unrealisable; Kahar Muzakkar once more decided to remain in the jungle.

Finally, Kahar Muzakkar’s rebellion ended with his shooting, but it can be said that after the Bonepute meeting his troops no longer posed a serious threat. One of the result of the meeting was the undertaking of the DI troops to leave the jungle. Almost twenty thousand DI members entered the city at this time, and many fewer remained with Kahar. Kahar Muzakkar, disappointed with Jusuf for not passing his ideological demands on to the central government, now arranged to reconsolidate and to invite his prominent former members to form RPII, which was then established in 1962. However, aside from the great number of troops who had gone to the city, many of his former members refused the invitation. Muhammad Ali AT, for example, was now brave enough to counter the idea of RPII. One of Kahar’s leading figures, he discovered that the situation outside the jungle was not less Islamic. As stated above, prior to the establishment of RPII, several figures of the rebellion had already left the jungle.

There are a number of interpretations about why Kahar Muzakkar was prepared to make an agreement with Jusuf, and about why he was ready to let his followers come out of the jungle, leaving his demand simply to be channeled by Jusuf. Perhaps Kahar had already made his plans. Kahar himself never admitted this, but the fact was that since 1960 combat with the republican army grew more intensified. DI was becoming more isolated. Yusuf Makmur, one of the former troops of DI, commented that for Kahar, the Bonepute meeting was the only way for him to save the lives of his followers. There is also an explanation issued by H.R. Abdie, another former important leader of DI, that the Bonepute meeting was used by Kahar to filter out those who were still loyal to the Islamic struggle from those

---

Kahar’s ideological demands. They further stated that Jusuf wanted to build his military career in the central government. For more information, see *Ibid.*, 34.


357 Interview with Yusuf Makmur, 9 May 2003.
who were not.358 However, the first comment here is more reliable than the second, since many of the former leading figures I met, who had left DI as a result of Bonevote meeting, were still proud of DI they had left in 1961.

Another religio-ideological strategy employed by Muhammad Jusuf in eradicating DI was his anti-Communist campaign. During an intensive meeting between Kahar and Jusuf to find a way out for the rebellion in 1961, Jusuf asserted before Kahar and his activists that they did not need to rely on the central government’s hand to find a solution.359 Jusuf informed Kahar that people from the central government who wanted to offer a solution were leftist-oriented.360 Furthermore, Jusuf offered proof that his army regarded communism as its main enemy. This is very important to bear in mind: it was not only DI that made communism its enemy but also the republican army. It was also significant in the decline in support given to Kahar Muzakkar, both from within his movement and from the local people at large.

E. Sanusi Daris’ RFS: An Obsessive Ideological Continuation

It would appear that with the death of Kahar Muzakkar the physical rebellion came to an end. However, the ideological rebellion remained. Two prominent leaders were mindful of the importance of continuing the ideological fight. They were Kasso Gani and Sanusi Daris. Kasso Gani was one of the most important thinkers of the movement, especially in economic matters. In the DI government and in RPII, he sat as the Minister of Economic Affairs. Kasso Gani was said to manage this kind of economic activity. He was also known to have overseas networks. He moved easily from the jungle to areas outside Indonesia, especially Malaysia. At the time when Kahar Muzakkar was shot dead, Kasso Gani was believed to be in Kuala Lumpur.361

One document mentions the role of Kasso Gani in carrying on the DI ideology. On 24 March 1965, about seven weeks after Kahar’s shooting, Kasso Gani established Republic Persatuan Sulawesi (The United Republic of Sulawesi) to continue the bid for

358 Interview with H.R. Abdie, 7 May 2003.
359 See Dokument DI/TII Kahar Muzakkar, No. 150, Dinas Sejarah, Pusat Sejarah TNI, Jakarta.
360 See ‘Laporan Khusus’ in ibid.
361 See Document DI/TII Kahar Muzakkar, No. 162, Dinas Sejarah, Pusat Sejarah TNI, Jakarta.
Sulawesi to separate from the Indonesian government, as had occurred previously in DI. The name was made non-Islamic in order to win international support. Batubara said in his account that in 1967, in Mecca, there had been a meeting between Kasso Gani and the former leader of DI Aceh, Daud Beureueh in which the two men agreed to commit to the struggle against the Republic, which in their eyes was too secular with its Pancasila, and to establish an Islamic state beginning with a regional basis.\[^{362}\]

Sanusi Daris was another important person around Kahar Muzakkar, especially in the later stages of development of the movement. In 1954, Sanusi was to become vice-commander of the Momoc Ansharullah, a special force formed by Kahar in 1954. Because of its crucial role in relation to the implementation of Islamic ideology, this unit will be specially discussed in the next chapter. At the time of Kahar’s death, Sanusi and his troops chose to hide out in Duri, Enrekang, which was his base area. Kyai Sulaeman, the great Mufti of RPII, once said that the role of Sanusi Daris was that Kahar gave him authority as vice-

\[ vice-khalifah \]

\] to continue the movement after his departure.\[^{363}\] Sanusi had more time left to continue working, while Kasso Gani passed away around 1977, nine years after the meeting with Daud Beureueh. Attention should be given then to Sanusi Daris, who continued to play a role in the struggle of the ideology of DI until the early 1980s.

Who was Sanusi Daris? He was born in Malua, Kecamatan Anggeraja, Enrekang. He pursued his education in Dutch and Japanese schools in Makassar. On completing his studies he returned to his homeland and became a teacher. His first contact with Kahar Muzakkar was in 1950, and in 1953, at the time Kahar had decided to rebel, and became formally involved in DI. Seeing his potential, Kahar entrusted him with important positions in the jungle. He held the rank of brigade commander of Enrekang and Tana Toraja. In RPII, he was staff chief and vice-commander of the Momoc Ansharullah, while he was also the commander of Combat II Latimojong, comprising Duri and South Palopo.\[^{364}\] He was


\[^{363}\] See Interview with Kyai Sulaeman by *Sabili*, No. 12 TH. VIII 29 November 2000.

\[^{364}\] *Harian Fajar*, 1 November 1984.
one of the few of the former DI leaders with a good education, so that is not surprising that Kahar chose him to continue the ideological movement.

Sanusi Daris had three main reasons why he and his troops chose to stay in the jungle. First, it was a mandate given by Kahar Muzakkar prior to his death. Second, they could indirectly support republican development while they were in the jungle with their own ideological orientation, since they never disturbed the community or eradicated any republican development. They could however only be consistent in implementing Islam as their way of life in the jungle; residing in the city would mean that they accepted the Republic's ideology.

In his confession before the Makassar court, Sanusi Daris told how he arranged a movement which was the continuation of DI, first pioneered by Kasso Gani, who formed the emergency government of the United Republic of Sulawesi. However, after Kaso's death in 1969, Sanusi took over the leadership and modified the movement to become the Republik Federasi Sulawesi (The Federated Republic of Sulawesi, RFS). He acknowledged that RFS was supported by those former DI activists who were still active and retained an ideological commitment to the cause.

---

365 According to Bahrul, a veteran of DI, Sanusi Daris was the second person after Kahar Muzakkar to influence his world view. Interview with Bahrul, 9 September 2003.

366 See A.Wanua Tanke, *Kahar Muzakkar Masih Hidup: Sebuah Misteri*, 56-57. The story of his twenty years living and hiding in the cave was interpreted by people in different ways. In my interviews with Mama Samsi, Sanusi Daris' niece, she said that Sanusi Daris did not hide in the sense that he never appeared. He would sometimes attend a wedding party at night or visit his relatives in the village. However, nobody knew his face, especially the army troops. Interview with Mama Samsi, 11 September 2003.

Bahrul stated that the hiding of Sanusi Daris was not as horrifying as we might think, because his hiding place was known by people in the village. but nobody would talk about it. People around the area chose to keep silent to protect him. Interview with Bahrul, 9 September 2003.

Similar to Bahrul, Sulaeman Saat, an academic from the area, commented that we do not need to think how isolated Sanusi Daris was from modern life because he was not obsessed with modern systems. He felt comfortable living in his cave. For Sanusi, according to Saat, the important thing was how he could live with his own principles.Interview with Sulaeman Saat, 15 September 2003.

Many people in Duri believed that Sanusi Daris was still supported by the village people. This was proved by their readiness to supply his needs. They simply put the essential goods somewhere and Sanusi Daris' people came and collected them.
Yusri Abady (left) and Sanusi Daris (right) at Makassar Court in 1984

(source: Fajar, 1 November 1984)
The arrest of Sanusi Daris by the military in 1982, after exhausting efforts, further revealed the ideological program he maintained while in hiding. His arrest forced him to expose the activists who had worked with him. The army then arrested them. As was to be expected, they were former prominent figures in DI. However, there were some other activists of the younger generation who supported DI ideals. Sanusi Daris was jailed for two years before he was brought to court in 1984. 'Home arrest' was imposed on Yusri Abady, but after due process by the Makassar court it was decided to let him go free. It was considered that Sanusi’s living in the jungle since DI and hiding out in the cave for 30 years constituted punishment enough, that is, in social isolation. The International Crisis Group (ICG) reports he was let go free due to the intervention of General Muhammad Jusuf. My own memory confirms this report; I often heard people discussing the matter and that Jusuf indeed had a part in the freeing of Sanusi Daris. However, Jusuf’s reasons for setting free the rebel who openly rejected Pancasila were never explained.

How far did the realisation of the RFS program go? In an interview, Yusri Abady, one of the thinkers of RFS, admitted that the road to RFS at the time of Sanusi Daris’ arrest existed only an abstract concept, put down on paper. Abady stated that the RFS activists did not even think about whether they wanted to exercise a physical rebellion or to work as an underground movement. He continued however, that physical rebellion would probably

---

367 The republican army, on the other hand, realised they had not eradicated the whole Sanusi Daris group. Efforts to chase them were then redoubled for a couple of years, but Sanusi Daris himself avaded arrest. The army than changed strategy, having been informed that Sanusi could be called out from the jungle without military forces, because with his potential, he was believed to contribute to national development.

Between 1969 and 1970, the army then pioneered to send three Muslim figures from Enrekang, homeland of Sanusi Daris. The meeting took place in a valley in the Latimojong mountains. They convinced Sanusi of their intention to find a better way out. They said that jihad could be achieved through educating younger generation in the application of Islamic values of DI, or through establishing pesantren. However, this failed again and caused pesimism in the army.

368 After investigation, it was determined that two people were accused, Sanusi Daris and Yusri Abady. Yusri Abady was the second person accused, due to his involvement as the one who conceived RFS. Other former figures of DI were only called as witnesses.

369 The decision to apply 'home arrest' was due to his contribution to national development.

370 Harian Fajar, 1 November 1984; Interview with Yusri Abady, 3 November 2003.

have been impossible since a number of the RFS activists had already become part of the Republic’s apparatus.\footnote{Interview with Yusri Abady, 3 November 2003.}

The chief reason for avoiding overly overt symbols of Islam in the movement was in order to garner support, not only from other Islamic countries but also from western countries. A magazine, \textit{Facta}, reported that while Sanusi Daris was in the jungle he made contact with many outsiders. He is reported to have sent Abd. Fattah Buchari, his ambassador to Middle Eastern Countries to gain financial and moral support for the effort to form a state based on the Qur’an and Hadith.\footnote{\textit{Facta} 030, 14.} Buchari was a young Islamic scholar equipped with a university degree from Baghdad. According to Yusri Abady, this too remained much more a plan than fact.\footnote{It was further reported that, to realise the plan, Sanusi Daris contacted former DI activists. Through a courier, he first approached Nurdin Pisof and Yusri Abady to make a structure like that of DI, which was not sent back to Sanusi Daris until 1980, via Islamuddin, another former DI activist. Sanusi found the structure incomplete, due to the omission of many deputy positions. He wrote and asked Jusuf Pasi, a young Islamic activist and sympathiser with the movement, to complete the earlier structure. After Jusuf Pasi sent the revised structure, Sanusi completed the structure by himself. Both in the early structure and the revised version, the name Sanusi Daris was placed as president of RFS. He finalised the structure by including more than 50 people in his cabinet.} Sanusi was finding channels to establish his networks; many of those close to him state that he could still move around, even though his main base was the jungle cave.

The people included by Sanusi Daris in the RFS structure were again mainly former activists of DI.\footnote{According to Yusri Abady, besides former DI activists, there were also other names of intellectuals not directly involved in DI but who were committed to implementing Islamic values in their lives. Yusri did not mention their names but indicated that they were well known in Makassar. Interview with Yusri Abady, 3 November 2003.} These included Jufri Tambora, as Home Minister. He had been a commander under Kahar in the Southeast Sulawesi area.\footnote{Jufri Tambora was also the brother-in-law of Kahar Muzakkar. Kahar’s fourth wife, Sitti Hamie, was Jufri’s elder sister.} M. Ali AT was Finance Minister, a former regiment commander of DI, while Nurdin Pisof was one of the former battalion and Momoc commanders of DI and RPII.

It can be stated safely enough that RFS was meant to continue the ideology of DI but it did not follow its model of rebellion. Sanusi Daris was well aware that DI had failed. Any effort to exercise rebellion was irrelevant. He never pioneered any efforts of physical
revolt, even though there was such a possibility due to the presence of at least silent support from many local people in his area. Sanusi Daris’ creation of RFS was designed to mediate his position in the cave as the representative of the former DI and to find a means to actualise Islamic values.

Part of the phenomenon of RFS was as a tool to romantise for the DI veterans. RFS was a reflection of the enjoyment of these activists of their former suffering, living in the jungle and striving against the republican army for many years, as they believed, as defenders of an Islamic ideology. This was reflected clearly in my interview with a former member of DI and RFS, when I asked whether he regretted his commitment. His colleagues who chose to stay in the republican army had now retired as senior officers, some as Major-General or Brigadier-General. He answered emotionally that he had been fortunate to be part of DI. What he did regret was that DI’s failure had been caused by the rebellion. He said that should its idealism ever return, he would be its first supporter, but he would also be the first one to remind those in leadership not to take up any form of armed rebellion.377

Finally, RFS formed a meeting point of former DI activists and the younger generation who supported the idealism of DI. Even though the new organisation was more moderate and less overtly Islamic in its symbolism, it did not have the chance to prove its effectiveness on the ground. However, the involvement of young activists made RFS a basis of continuing underground efforts to struggle for a religious and ideological identity in the area.

Sanusi Daris’ efforts to carry on the DI ideals did not to stop on his arrest. An ICG report mentions his connections with Pondok Ngruki leaders, Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Baasyir, both ideological followers of DI.378 ICG states that the connection began when Sanusi Daris traveled to Java, shortly after his release, in the company of Andi Mohammad Taqwa, a student of Pondok Ngruki. Taqwa was then said to have brought Sanusi to meet Abdullah Sungkar. The ICG reports that the two figures agreed to establish a fusion organisation called Republic Persatuan Indonesia (the name adopted by the former DI leaders who joined PRRI/Permesta leaders in the 1960 rebellion against the Soekarno

ICG also reports that when Sanusi moved to Malaysia, he stayed briefly with Sungkar from time to time and continued to maintain their connection up until his death in 1988.\textsuperscript{380} ICG is right in that shortly after he was released Sanusi traveled to Java, before moving to Malaysia, as is admitted by Sanusi’s relatives. It was also admitted that he remained active in attending religious gatherings in Malaysia, where he possibly met with Abdullah Sungkar as ICG reported. However, according to Mama Sarullah, Sanusi Daris’ sister, during the rest of his life, in Sabah, Sanusi was only observant of religious ritual and no longer paid attention to any sort of activities related to his previous movement. Mama stressed that Sanusi was more concerned with the basic moral principles of Islamic teaching, such as honesty, patience and the ritual obligations. This is how Sanusi Daris occupied himself for most of the time until his death.\textsuperscript{381} This zeal for ritual observance by Sanusi was also seen by Mama Samsi, his niece, who often visited him in Sabah.\textsuperscript{382} Therefore, my perception of Sanusi Daris’ commitment to continue DI was at the level preserving ideology, by no means any longer a practical movement. An indication of this is his growing involvement with the Sufi aspects of Islamic teaching. In Malaysia he found a place more conducive to maximise the practice of his Islam. This he could not enjoy as long as he was concerned with opposing Pancasila at home. We might conclude that he found it better than a life of hiding in his cave for almost twenty years.

We can now conclude that various dynamics coloured the existence of DI, but efforts to establish formalist Islam were significant. In expanding its area of influence, it has shown DI’s political interest to get wider support from the people in surrounding areas of Sulawesi. However, Islamic symbols as part of its formalistic nature came along with its expansion. Similarly, when Kahar Muzakkar pursued movements beyond NII and entered into non-Islamic oriented movement as seen in RPI, Kahar even tried to Islamise the movement, even though with no success. The ultimate goal of his Islamism was further

\textsuperscript{379} Ibid., 10.
\textsuperscript{380} Ibid., 11.
\textsuperscript{381} Interview with Mama Sarullah, 12 September 2003.
\textsuperscript{382} Interview with Mama Samsi, 11 September 2003. This perception is strengthened by Amrullah Mahdi, one of the community figures in Mahua, Enrekang, a friend of Sanusi Daris since childhood, who once visited him in Sabah. Interview with Amrullah Mahdi, 11 September 2003.
seen in his imaginary Islamic movement by idealising caliphate system of Islamic government. The fall of DI can be seen in the perspective of Islamism, with the existence of religio-ideological rivals inside the movement and of that run by the national army under Muhammad Jusuf. Finally, the continuation of DI through the efforts of Sanusi Daris was also much more grounded with his Islamic orientation by idealising and romanticising DI. Since Islamism has been seen in the interaction of DI with other groups and movements in its time, it is useful to discuss how Islamic teaching is implemented in the community of DI as will be seen in the following chapter.
Chapter Four

IMPLEMENTING ISLAM: WHICH ISLAM?

A little information has been provided by scholars regarding the efforts of Darul Islam (DI) to implement Islamic law in the jungle, but it is not more than a few paragraphs,\(^{383}\) nor has there been any systematic effort to present clearly the nature of DI in running an Islamic government in the jungle. This lack is to be found especially in the academic works mentioned in my introduction, which mainly discount the Islamism of DI.

An important reason of the existence of many works on South Sulawesi DI so far which discount the significant role of Islam in the formation of the rebellion is that they lack attention to the dynamics of the real implementation of Islamic law inside DI. Their research strongly depended on the military documents which were not intended to record the Islamic aspects of DI. Many important documents on DI were not yet used, as in for example, DI’s *Pedoman Revolusi* (Revolutionary Manuals) which consists of three volumes and work as a guide for the governance of DI. Works which discounted Islam were also not equipped with information from the former *ulama* of DI, several of whom are still alive at the present time. Their problem in dealing with these two aspects might be caused by their writing at a time when Soeharto’s New Order strictly controlled works and activism related to DI. The fact is that after the fall of Soeharto in 1998, Kahar Muzakkar’s monographs were widely published and DI’s *Pedoman Revolusi* appeared in public.

To demonstrate the significance of DI’s Islamic formalism – which is what this thesis aims to do - requires an examination of the reality of Islamic law in the jungle, since it is there that its Islamic nature was most apparent. The following discussion will argue that DI in South Sulawesi attempted to implement Islamic governance, and that in implementing Islamic law, it was supported by what I call ‘conceptual efforts’ and ‘institutional efforts’. This discussion will first look at the concepts that had a significant effect on the implementation of Islamic law in the jungle. Similarly, with respect to institutional support, it will discuss the most significant institutions that dealt directly with

Islamic law. By tracing both conceptual and institutional efforts, this chapter will assess the model of Islamic government preferred by DI of South Sulawesi.

A. The Formal Effort of Conception in Implementing Islamic Law

Despite the fact that many of the concepts were very political in nature, they may be seen as part of the conception of formalist Islam held by DI. A number of these concepts were created by Kahar Muzakkar himself. However, broader aspects of the conceptional efforts can be seen in the dynamics of the responses of leading DI figures and in their implementation within the DI circle. There were at least three such efforts in implementing Islamic authority: Program Politik Islam Revolusioner (Revolutionary Islamic Political Programs), Catatan Batin (Spiritual Remarks) and Piagam Makalua (Makalua Charter). The discussion of each of these concepts is arranged chronologically.

1. Catatan Batin (Spiritual Notes): A Call for a Simple, Pious Life

One important point of momentum in bringing the South Sulawesi DI to greater Islamisation was Kahar Muzakkar’s Catatan Batin of 1955. He named his remarks ‘Catatan Batin’ on the consideration that the purpose of the DI fighters was different from that of those motivated by pure materialism. Catatan Batin was also called Revolusi Batin since it called on the people of DI to undertake spiritual introspection. Kahar stated that materialism was not able to satisfy human life itself. He also asserted that in many cases, people were enslaved by their greed, and those enslaved by materialism could not work for the creation of a just and humane way of life.

Catatan Batin was produced only two years after Kahar formally joined the DI movement. The background to Catatan Batin is his tour of DI-held areas, where he found

---

384 During his fight for an Islamic authority, Kahar Muzakkar produced three volumes of Catatan Batin. In this subchapter, I will concentrate on Catatan Batin volume I, due to the importance of its concepts for the internal consolidation of DI in the effort to create a formalist Islamic society. Unfortunately, I could not obtain a copy of Catatan Batin volume II, which was said to be on the protection of DI from destructive ideologies. Catatan Batin volume III dealt with the concept of khilafah, the aim of Kahar Muzakkar’s struggle at a later stage. Catatan Batin volume III is not discussed here, see my remarks on his ideological thought in Chapter Two.

385 Bahar Mattalioe, Kahar Muzakkar dengan Petualangannya, 50.

religious deviation and a moral crisis among his followers. Kahar saw the deviation in the tendency, especially among his top ranking commanders, to lead a luxurious life, to amass wealth and to ignore the simplicity appropriate to times of revolution. In his journeys, Kahar also received a number of reports from the community concerning physical violation and the suppression of the people by his commanders. This might take the form of forcing a certain family to collect their wealth for DI, when in fact it was intended for the commander himself.\(^{387}\)

In one speech, Kahar showed his concern for such excessive material interests among his followers, which alienated the community towards the DI movement. In the speech, he saw that this antipathy was justified when his movement struggled for Islam without providing a model of good Islamic character, by living as simply as the ordinary people. In his speech, Kahar was also mindful of the importance of the support of the wider community. It was the people’s support that had made the movement self-governing and that had blocked the republican government’s infiltration into the de facto areas of DI. Furthermore, it was the people who worked to supply many of the daily needs of the DI fighters. Kahar knew that if the hearts of the people could no longer be touched, the movement would fail.\(^{388}\)

The motto of Catatan Batin was that worldly improvement could not be realised without spiritual awareness.\(^{389}\) Catatan Batin was, therefore, the reflection of Kahar’s concerns about spiritual deviation from the objectives of struggle among his followers and other entities outside his movement. There are several other aims as well. In one of his speeches, Kahar stated that he wrote Catatan Batin to assess the extent of outsiders’ strategies to turn DI activists away from Islamic teaching, in order to destroy the movement.\(^{390}\) He wanted to strengthen the implementation of Islamic values among the revolutionary fighters by protecting his people from excessive material influences.\(^{391}\)

---

\(^{387}\) This case was agreed by many of the former DI leaders. Interview with Harun Rasyid Abdie, 7 May 2003.

\(^{388}\) “Pidato Pendjelasan SDR. Abdul Qahar Mudzakkar Dimuka Konferensi Ke (II) Pedjuang Islam Revolusioner Se Wilayah Indonesian Bagian Timur.”

\(^{389}\) See this motto in Bahr Mattalioe, Kahar Muzakkar dengan Petualangannja, 50.

\(^{390}\) “Pidato Pendjelasan SDR. Abdul Qahar Mudzakkar Dimuka Konferensi Ke (II) Pedjuang Islam Revolusioner Se Wilayah Indonesian Bagian Timur.”

\(^{391}\) For more information, see Catatan Batin Pejuang Islam Revolusiner, passim.
In general, the contents of Catatan Batin were ordinary, since they do not indicate the quality of Kahar Muzakkar’s knowledge of Islam. Furthermore, they did not reflect the intellectual capacity of KaharMuzakkar. Advice was given only to the DI activists about what not to do in relation to material possessions. However, as will be seen later, an interesting aspect of this remark was its impact on the religious journey of DI.\textsuperscript{392}

There were, again, 10 points concerning wealth and limitations on possessions, and each point was followed by notes. If at first glance, Catatan Batin was merely a formal regulation of customs, wealth, possessions, etc., to Kahar Muzakkar, it was the gate to the purification of the soul of his people:

An excessive interest in material things indicates an attitude of ignorance. It is impossible to foster spiritual awareness in the minds of people holding such an attitude. It is the degradation of spirituality among people that has created world disorder. Within only forty years, the world has faced two world wars and humanity has deteriorated. The degradation of spirituality has caused people to hold an obscured view of themselves as creatures of humanity and justice. The nadir of the loss of spirituality was when people realised they had abandoned humanity and justice. The purification of spirituality through the prevention of materialism will became the strongest element in defending humanity and justice. Catatan Batin is designed to become the fortress of the DI fighters in defending humanity and justice, in directing my people to avoid excessive materialism equipping them with a glorious attitude.\textsuperscript{393}

Controversy arose at the time when Catatan Batin was first launched. In a meeting discussing its ideas, Junaid Suleman, an ulama and the Treasurer of the DI organisation, stated his criticised the word \textit{dilarang} meaning ‘prohibited’. Junaid Sulaeman mentioned the words of the Prophet Muhammad, who taught us to express gratitude to God when enjoying food or the other good things of life. Now, this term contradicted the spirit of the Prophet’s teaching. Ahmad Marzuki Hasan, another ulama and Minister of Information of DI at that time, then countered Junaid’s criticism, saying that the word choice was correct. The word \textit{dilarang} does not mean \textit{diharamkan} (forbidden in religion). Marzuki stated that

\textsuperscript{392} For the full content of Catatan Batin, see Appendix V.

\textsuperscript{393} “Pidato Pendjelasan SDR. Abdul Qahar Mudzakkar Dimuka Konferensi Ke (II) Pedjuang Islam Revolusioner Se Wilayah Indonesian Bagian Timur,” 4.
the term *dilarang* refers to an action temporarily prohibited because of certain factors. He continued that the word *diharamkan*, however, was God's law which prevails eternally and which can only be departed from by exception. Marzuki asserted that every thing which was not allowed in Catatan Batin was not *diharamkan* but only *dilarang* because people were living in a time of revolution. According Marzuki, when the DI revolution ended, the possession of wealth would no longer be prohibited.  

Marzuki records that Junaid Sulaeman finally understood and accepted Catatan Batin.

In relation to the above polemic, Kahar replied that having gold, diamonds, delicious food and luxurious clothes were indeed not *diharamkan* by Islamic teaching. Islam allowed and even commanded Muslims to work hard for the sake of physical prosperity. Therefore, Kahar stated that besides bearing arms in physical revolution, the members of DI were obliged to work hard in order to prosper and to facilitate and equip the organisation as a condition of mobilising the revolution.

Kahar stated that in Catatan Batin, the DI members were called upon to restrain from wearing clothes that could cause people around them to feel jealous; to limit their consumption of rich food, to avoid causing grief to the people who lived in poverty; to avoid the abuse of power that could cause antipathy in society; to avoid being arrogant and behaving like 'Karun' and 'Fir'aun' in ancient Egypt. Kahar hoped that Catatan Batin would motivate his people to work hard, which was a good way to enjoy life bestowed by God. Catatan Batin also sought to motivate DI members to learn more of life in order not to be left behind and not to be mocked by modernity. It motivated the members to have a spirit of *jihad*, to sacrifice honestly in the name of Allah and to build solidarity and unity amongst themselves. These points were aimed at imitating the behaviour of the Prophet Muhammad, the world's greatest revolutionary fighter and pioneer of the Islamic revolution, who gained victory not only through the sword but chiefly through the glory of his other first acts and attitudes.

---

394 Interview with Ahmad Marzuki Hasan, 7 April 2003.
396 Ibid., 7. Karun and Fir'aun (also commonly known as 'Pharoah') were two figures in the time of the Prophet Moses who were associated with greed; Karun with and while Fir'aun with power.
397 Ibid., 7
Catatan Batin also functioned as a guide to strategy among the Islamic revolutionary fighters.\textsuperscript{398} It was intended for DI activists and their families, but was also strongly recommended for the Muslim public, though without obligation. Its recommendations were to be applied for six months from the issue of the remarks, that is from March 1, 1955. It seems that the purpose of the six months’ limit was related to the debate among the ulama, mentioned above, that is, as a temporary regulation. However, during the time of its operation, it was implemented strictly. A heavy punishment was meted out to any fighter and his or her family who did not follow its guidelines.

Despite the criticism later launched by Bahar Mattalioe regarding the implementation of Catatan Batin,\textsuperscript{399} he admitted that it contributed significantly to the survival of the DI revolution, due to its strict implementation, especially among the DI leaders. In line with Bahar, many former DI activists were excited with the result of the implementation of Catatan Batin. They were convinced that it not only put into practice the

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[399] Criticism of Catatan Batin came from Bahar Mattalioe, who wrote after his separation from Kahar Muzakkar. Bahar states that the issue of Catatan Batin was the only effective way to pressure the fighters against greed (since opportunities for greed were great among those bearing arms). He was sad to see how the wives of the members of DI had to be forcefully relieved of their gold, an important decoration and provision against want in their lives. He was sad to see the ill health of the wives of the DI members who had just delivered babies, who by observing Catatan Batin, might not consume nutritious food from the city. He was very sad to see the members of DI who did not seek wealth for the sake of revolution. He was sad to see fighters who followed his decision to return to the republican side with unhealthy bodies due to the lack of vitamins.

Bahar acknowledged the ideological reasons behind the issue of Catatan Batin. His criticism was directed to the social effects on the members of DI. The weakness in Bahar’s criticism was its timing and his personal tendencies. He made this criticism after he was already back on the republican side. When Catatan Batin was issued, Bahar was still the Division Commander of DI and one of its toughest defenders. He proved this by asking his parents to burn down their houses and to sell their lands and give the money to DI.

So Bahar Mattalioe’s criticisms of Catatan Batin and other of Kahar Muzakkar’s actions in DI were in part his effort to ‘cleanse’ himself from his ‘sin’ of involvement in DI in the eyes of the Republic. It was also as part of his effort to continue his rivalry with Kahar Muzakkar that he denigrated the Islamic values held by Kahar.

Another who was hostile was Radik Jawardi, who stated that the prohibition on wealth and on running private business was due to the personal wishes of Kahar Muzakkar. Radik points to Kahar’s own business mentality in wanting to monopolise trading in the jungle through his \textit{Usaha Rahasia Chusus Organisasi} (Confidential Special Business of the Organisation, U.R.C.O.R.). He claims that through this organisation, Kahar became rich and his wealth spread in many places in a short time. Businesses were run by many members of his family in the interests of the struggle.\textsuperscript{399}
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
spirit of Islamic teachings but that it was also an effective strategy to support the movement’s basic financial needs. They found that the implementation of Catatan Batin by DI activists served as a basis of Islam in ways that could be understood by them. One former member suggested that through Catatan Batin, Kahar Muzakkar sought to create an egalitarian society, which was an important aspect of Islamic teachings. He justified the use of force if it was the only way to call the people to be more aware of the Islamic nature of DI. 400

The Islamic aspects of Catatan Batin are a reflection of their creator. Apart from the argument that Kahar would use any means to win the support of the Muslim community, several accounts state that he lived in a very simple way. 401 All that made him different from his followers were his boots and his transistor radio. 402 He avoided the accumulation of personal wealth. Furthermore, in my observation of the surviving members of Kahar’s family, I found no evidence that they had inherited any wealth from DI.

2. Piagam Makalua (Makalua Charter): An Islamist Framework

Piagam Makalua was the charter produced at the meeting called Pertemuan Urgensi Pejuang Islam Revolusioner I (The First Urgent Meeting of the Islamic Revolutionary Fighters, Pupir I) held in Makalua at the end of 1955. The meeting was attended by all DI ranks, from ordinary members to the top commanders. The charter was signed by representatives of DI from all over Eastern Indonesia. 403 Piagam Makalua might be compared to the Qanun Asasi 404 of NII created by Kartosuwirjo. As this latter name stated, both functioned as a basic constitution. However, Piagam Makalua was not a copy nor an elaboration of the Qanun Asasi. It was formulated differently. Unlike the Qanun Asasi, which was simply a basic constitution of state, Piagam Makalua also dealt with Islamic

400 Interview with Andi Ngawi, 8 May 2003.
401 See for examples, Document DI/TII Kahar Muzakkar No. 136, Dinas Sejarah, Pusat Sejarah TNI, Jakarta.
402 Harvey points out that another difference was Kahar’s collection of larger number of wives than other activists. See Barbara Sillars Harvey “Islam, Tradition and Rebellion: South Sulawesi 1950 – 1965,” 196. The Discussion of the motives behind Kahar Muzakkar’s polygamy will be found in the subchapter on Piagam Makalua.
403 Piagam Makalua contained representatives of the Eastern Indonesia DI. See list of the activists who signed the charter in the KPK Penerangan RII, Pedoman Revolusi Jilid I, xiv-xv.
404 For the contents of the Qanun Asasi, see Irfan S. Awwas, Menulusuri Pejalanan Jihad SM. Kartosuwiryo (Yogyakarta: Wiidah Press, 1999), 75-86.
criminal laws. It was a reflection of the autonomy of the East Indonesia DI in building its own Islamic government as part of Kartosuwirjo’s DI. It was to strengthen the implementation of Islamic law and to free it from any factors which might potentially weaken, shift or destroy Islamic teachings. As will be analysed later, it also focused on uniting the wider Muslim community under DI Islamic authority.


In an effort to protect DI’s ideology, Piagam Makalua had several unique features. First, it reproduced a detailed explanation of the early regulations, that is Catatan Batin and Program Politik Islam Revolusioner. It determined the legal consequences of actions banned in the early regulations. Furthermore, it strengthened the creation of equality among the DI community. For example, if in Catatan Batin it was only prohibited to collect excessive wealth, then in Piagam Makalua, the punishment for doing so was also stated, that such wealth would be assumed by force by the DI government. If in the Program Politik Islam Revolusioner the implementation of Islamic law was merely mentioned, then in Piagam Makalua, the punishment of those who ignored prayer, etc was set out. The punishment for ignoring prayer is capital punishment.

Secondly, the charter did not tolerate any differing views about how Islamic regulations were to be understood and applied. The homogeneity was enforced in the regulations by which members had to hold the same political views and belong to the same organisations. There was no space for anyone with different political affiliations. To the DI leaders, to be a member of DI was sufficient. Nor was there room for theological differences. Islamic theology might be differently understood, but had to be similarly followed. There was no space for intellectuals to have a different perspective from that of the government. In terms of religious practice, this had to be regulated by DI government.

\textsuperscript{405} See the original contents of Piagam Makalua in Appendix VI.
For example, *doa qunut*, an observance in prayer practised by traditionalist Muslims was not allowed in the jungle, since the South Sulawesi DI was more oriented towards modernism. According to a former DI leader of modernist background, DI traditionalist ulama who often read *qunut*, consequently stopped practicing it. In many of his writings, Kahar Muzakkar shows how differences in political and social organisation, theological schools, etc. split Muslim unity into different groups and factions and weakened the Muslim people. Kahar Muzakkar refers to the different law schools in Islam, where the followers of one school decry the followers of another. In fact, this reflects an authoritarian character, but it is important to show Kahar’s obsession to unify the DI practice of Islamic formalism, as discussed in my section on Program Politik Islam Revolucioner.

The third characteristic was that Piagam Makalua clearly opposed established local tradition. The charter fought for the eradication of the local usage of titles as a result of the feudal system. For example, the charter did not tolerate the use of titles indicating class difference. It banned the use of aristocratic titles, such as *andi*. The charter emphasised the enforcement of the spirit of Islam to create an egalitarian society; the ways of feudalism were foreclosed by the charter.

Fourth, for DI, Islamic law might be imposed by force if necessary. They were of the opinion that if a person was ready to enter the Islamic system implemented in the jungle, he or she had to adopt Islamic law absolutely, including accepting the range of punishments set out in the Qur’an. As we have seen in the chapter related to punishments, any one breaking the law, or opposing, or disagreeing with its definition by DI was considered to be an enemy of the revolution. According to DI, the followers of other religions could not be forced to convert to Islam, but if someone already professed Islam, they had to adopt Islamic law. If they refused, they had to be forced. The charter clearly set out the political and social organisations, religious practices, religious groupings, etc. that might not be formed in the jungle. Furthermore, to forbid a certain deed, the charter applied simple, harsh language to qualify the level of the punishment, such as *dibunuh* (to be

---

406 Especially in the dawn prayer, which modernist Muslims considered heresy because it was not practiced by the Prophet Muhammad. The question of *Doa qunut* was historically a point of tension between traditionalist and modernist Muslims in Indonesia.

407 Interview with Ahmad Marzuki Hasan, 7 April 2003.

408 Anonymous interview, 16 March 2003.
killed), *diperangi* (to be fought against), *dibasmi* (to be abolished by force), *dilarang* (to be forbidden) and *dihapuskan* (to be erased).

Finally, the charter contained some controversial features of Islamic teachings. For example, in the case of polygamy, which was practised in the jungle, any one who opposed it could be prosecuted in court. The reason of allowing polygamy was to save the lives of widows who had lost their husbands and of orphans whose fathers had been killed in the revolution. The charter also controversially implemented a system of punishment for those who did not observe the prescribed prayers and fasts. The question that could be directed to this regulation is how the DI government could check up on whether a person prayed or not. Could this be done on the reports of its apparatus? How could it be guaranteed that the reports were valid? Another controversial aspect was the level of punishment. The charter clearly stated the punishment for a particular misdeed, where other Muslims might hold different views on what kind of punishment should be applied. For example, those who did not pray five times a day were punished with the death penalty. The question is: how many Muslim people rightly practice the five daily prayers?

In reviewing the contents of Piagam Makalua, one might conclude that the system of Islamic law practised by DI was authoritarian. One might question whether it was really the correct way to implement Islamic teachings in society. Bahar Mattalioe had his own views. He stated that the charter was implemented in a very harsh manner. Many DI leaders were put to death for deviation from the regulations determined by the charter. Mattalioe mentions the death penalty brought down upon the wife of B.S. Baranti, another leader of South Sulawesi DI, who was accused of adultery. Mattalioe claims that the charter was grounded in the personal interests of Kahar Muzakkar. According to Mattalioe, through the charter, Kahar himself often acted as prosecutor and shot people dead in the name of DI Islamic law. For example, he shot Mohamamd Sofyan on the accusation of infiltration, even though he had a strong defense plea.409 Mattalioe’s account of the direct action taken by Kahar Muzakkar in frequently prosecuting an offender against DI Islamic law has been freely admitted by other members who were pro Kahar. But what they refuted was the accusation that he prosecuted without any evidence to hand. My question of Kahar’s authoritarianism lay in the way he applied capital punishment to a certain member of DI without careful legal process, for example based only on the report of Kahar’s close people.

Harsher criticism of the content of Piagam Makalua has emerged from the account of Radik Jawardi. It was addressed to Kahar Muzakkar as the main creator of the charter, arguing that it violated Islamic teachings in all aspects, such as the feudalism in Islam, political views, polygamy, etc. Radik wrote that Kahar’s anti-feudalism was only symbolic. Kahar was against the use of feudal titles, and it made him appear revolutionary and egalitarian. Radik further states that Kahar, however, never touched the substance of feudalism, that is the exploitation of small farmers and poor people by a small number of privileged persons. Radik asserts that Kahar never stated his intention to fight against such an exploitation for the sake of greater production.⁴¹⁰

Radik’s criticism on the feudalist nature of Kahar Muzakkar needs to be verified. It contradicted with Kahar’s personality based on the discussion in this chapter. If Kahar had never tried to stop the exploitation of the people inside DI, he would never have created Catatan Batin - one of its basic objectives being to end all exploitation. Furthermore, available accounts by former DI members of the simple way of life of Kahar Muzakkar included his avoidance of any use of titles of honour.

Radik also criticised the restrictiveness of DI, claiming that Kahar was not a tolerant follower of Islam as found in Piagam Makalua. He was very dogmatic. Islamic teaching was understood as black or white. Radik confirmed that any Muslim who had different perceptions from that of Kahar was considered contra-revolutionary and had to be fought against. One could imagine, said Radik, Kahar’s severe attitude to those who held different religious beliefs.⁴¹¹ Radik’s remarks are in line with other accounts of DI’s implementation

⁴¹⁰ Radik Jawardi, Kisah Kahar Muzakkar, 11.
⁴¹¹ Ibid., 14. Hostility to religious minorities was an important discourse. There were many claims of the intolerance of Kahar Muzakkar and his DI activists towards other religions in South Sulawesi, especially the animist Tana Toraja in the North. It is true that at the time he pioneered RPI, Kahar Muzakkar began to be intolerant of other religious beliefs. However, from the beginning, DI avoided physical hostility to religious minorities.

Kahar Muzakkar admitted that he once attacked the area of East Toraja which was peopled by Christian Torajanese and Javanese migrants, as a result of violations by them. They were incited by the republican army to infiltrate the de facto areas of DI, abusing and killing Muslims. Kahar questioned accusations made against him by stating that if his motive was to suppress the Christian community itself, why had he not continued his attack into West Toraja, which was dominated by Christians?

Criticism directed against him over the kidnap of three foreign professors: Dr. Wahl (German), Dr. V.D. Wetering (Dutch), and Dibenus Treep (Dutch) and a Christian pastor, H. Versteeeden was also answered by Kahar. He explained that the arrest of these people was a
of Islamic law. As I stated before, Kahar’s authoritarian attitude was very clear. However, what Radik saw as the black and white implementation of Islamic law was the way Kahar Muzakkar understood it, and not only Kahar, but many of his leaders also believed in this implementation of Islamic law, even by force. For example, several former leaders I met still believed that what made the Islamic community disunited nowadays was the fact that there was no effort on the part of their leaders to unify the practice of Islamic teaching. One may not agree with this statement because it is impossible to do so in the present Muslim community.

The positive views of many people who experienced life under the charter should also be presented. One interviewee stated that even though the implementation of the charter was tough and consistent, the result was very satisfying. The option of polygamy was misused by certain people, but its positive effects were more significant. There were many women forced to marry soldiers, but the grievances were of a personal nature, common in the culture of arranged marriage. Marriages to support the lives of widows and

consequence of fighting between the DI troops and the republican troops in Malino. The three professors were arrested and subsequently agreed to stay in the jungle to teach the DI community for five years. They were freed after the agreed time. The arrest of Versteeden, according to Kahar, had more to do with religious motives. Versteeden entered a DI area on missionary duty, persuading Muslims to leave Islam and to convert to Christianity. When capital punishment was pronounced on Versteeden, he asked to convert to Islam. Kahar declared that Versteeden was now a pious Muslim among the DI community with a new name, Abdul Hakim. Furthermore, Kahar Muzakkar answered the criticism of his DI for forcing J.W. Gerungan’s Christian troops (former Permesta troops) to convert to Islam. Kahar admitted that this mass Islamisation occurred in 1960, but that it was due to their understanding of the true nature of Islam. Abdoel Kahar Muzakkar, *Konsepsi Negara Demokrasi Indonesia: Koreksi Pemikiran Politik Pemerintahan Soekarno*, 14.

Kahar Muzakkar’s own defence is supported by several other accounts. Boland has admitted that the persecution of Christians in South Sulawesi by the DI troops was exaggerated and much publicised outside Indonesia. According to Boland, they were partisans of rebellious factions who committed atrocities against Christian Torajanes and attempted to convert them to Islam by violent ways. Boland then referred to information he received from Muslims in South Sulawesi who assured him that Kahar himself condemned that kind of behaviour. Boland even received information from a Christian that he could meet Kahar’s leaders without any ideological problems, especially in the early stage of DI.

The tolerant attitude of DI troops to religious minorities was acknowledged by van Dijk, who wrote that while it was true that many Christians were victimised by DI troops, they were only fought against if they refused to cooperate with DI. They were generally treated like civilian Muslims. van Dijk wrote that wrote only Muslims were pressured to perform Islamic observances, not Christians. C. van Dijk, *Rebellion under the Banner of Islam: The Darul Islam in Indonesia*, 194-195.
orphans were part of the implementation of Islamic teachings and guaranteed that the social system of DI worked. Finally, the way in which Kahar Muzakkar practised polygamy was controversial, with his nine marriages and some of his critics saw him abusing the polygamy rule, but he had religious grounds and was supported in this by several ulama in the jungle.\textsuperscript{412}

Kahar Muzakkar had his own motives for marrying nine times, as he explained in a letter to all of his wives after he married the last two. He said that his motives were to follow the Prophet Muhammad, who married nine times. It was to maximise the reward of God and to offer proof of his anti-feudalism, because one of the women he married was of a lower status. His marriage with an old widow was also intended to show to his followers that he married not because of the sexual interest alone.\textsuperscript{413}

This raises the question about exactly how good a Muslim he was, since the mainstream interpretation of polygamy permits only four wives. The debate on this issue indeed occurred in the jungle. Abdurrahman Ambo Dalle once had a difference of opinion with Kahar Muzakkar concerning polygamy and maintained his independent judgment. Kahar believed that paragraph 3 of chapter an-Nisā allowed men to marry up to nine times. Kahar interpreted that God’s command to marry nine times was based on his interpretation of the verses’ content, that is, ‘mithnā, wa thulātha, wa rubā’, which means ‘two, three, and four’.\textsuperscript{414} For Kahar this meant that two, plus three, plus four gave the total of nine, an interpretation possibly influenced by an expert in Hadith, Kyai Maksum, the ulama from Solo who later joined Kahar Muzakkar in the jungle around the mid 1950s. Ahmad Marzuki Hasan, another leader and ulama in the jungle had the same view as Maksum. For Ambo Dalle, however, the limitation on polygamy in the verse was only four. The practice of marriage of nine times was exceptional to the Prophet Muhammad and due to his religious mission. It was not motivated by sexual need.\textsuperscript{415} Kahar believed that the spirit of

\textsuperscript{412} Interview with Nurdin Pisof, 22 November 2003.

\textsuperscript{413} See Kahar Muzakkar’s letter to his wives in A. Moein MG., et al, Kilat Menghancurkan Kahar Muzakkar, 44-45.


\textsuperscript{415} See the criticism by Ambo Dalle of Kahar’s nine marriages in A. Modin M.G. et al., Kilat Menghancurkan Kahar Muzakkar, 101; Radik Jawardi, Kisah Kahar Muzakkar, 32. In these two accounts, it is claimed that Dalle severely criticised Kahar for violating Islamic law. Yusri Abady, said that Dalle’s contradiction of Kahar led to his isolation in an area in Southeast Sulawesi.
religious mission also applied to himself, because he did not marry women out of sexual interest. His mission was to protect the continuity of the DI struggle. He also argued that he took an aristocratic women, Andi Haliah, as part of an effort to win the support of those who were of an aristocratic background.\textsuperscript{416}

In looking at Kahar’s polygamy practice, it may be argued first that it was part of Kahar’s character to undertake an unusual practice for the sake of fulfilling his ambition. Second, it may be wise to say that Kahar is a good Muslim but he is not always perfect. His problem is in the practice of polygamy due to following an interpretation which most serious Muslims would not accept. I agree with Hadeyang, the former wife of a DI leader, who admired the Islamic force of Kahar Muzakkar’s personality, except for his marrying nine times and she questioned why he did it.\textsuperscript{417}

The other positive confession of the strict implementation of Islamic law is related to the regulation of family life and social relations. It was claimed that sexual crimes, such as \textit{zina} (Ar. \textit{zina}, adultery, fornication) and other sexual irregularities hardly took place.\textsuperscript{418} According to Ahmad Marzuki Hasan, the most fascinating result of the tough implementation of Piagam Makalua was the significant drop in crime within DI society. Marzuki states that after Islamic law was formally adopted in the jungle he only found seven cases of the amputation of the hands of thieves during his position as representative of the Minister of Information. In his position, Marzuki traveled to the de facto areas of DI where he trained activists to understand the nature of Islamic law. He says that the community was never haunted by the threat of robbery. The cattle of the people were let free in open places to grow and multiply naturally.\textsuperscript{419} Another leader of the DI reported that eighty percent of the people in the jungle did not find it necessary to lock or even close the doors of their houses.\textsuperscript{420} This might be seen as subjective evidence by former activists.

\footnotesize

However, Ambo Dalle was later called back by Kahar to return to his circle. Yusri Abady was surprised at Ambo Dalle’s hostility to Kahar, because, as an \textit{ulama}, he was treated very considerately in the jungle. Yusri Abady suspected the accounts were made up by writers who were against DI.

\textsuperscript{416} Kahar’s argument was stated by Ahmad Marzuki Hasan, another former DI \textit{ulama} who agreed with this interpretation.

\textsuperscript{417} Interview with Hadeyang, 8 May 2003.

\textsuperscript{418} Interview with Hajjah Sitti Arafah and Haji Muh Arif, 2 March 2003.

\textsuperscript{419} Interview with Marzuki Hasan, 7 April 2003.

\textsuperscript{420} Anonymous interview, 14 April 2003.
However, when I asked laymen who experienced DI, they also felt a security from criminality that was the result of the strict implementation of Islamic criminal law.

Marzuki Hasan's acknowledgement was in line with that of Nur Abdurrahman, a retired academic who experienced the security of life in the de facto areas of DI. Another person experiencing DI stated that the only threat came from the republican army, and this was chiefly among those who lived on the borders of DI territory. In many cases the daughters of the people were forcefully taken and raped. So when the republican soldiers appeared, young women's faces were made unattractive with dirt in order not to incite the lust of the soldiers. A more balanced confession came from a previously nominal Muslim, who said that he had really suffered during the revolt of DI. However, it was the rigid enforcement of the charter that made him a 'true' Muslim who prayed faithfully five times a day.

Based on the views that have been put forward in analysing the content of Piagam Makalua and the pro- and contra- information of those who experienced life in DI, I choose to agree with the authoritarian nature of Kahar Muzakkar. By this, I mean that a democratic system, with freedom of speech, did not apply to DI, nor to Kahar Muzakkar's leadership. Islamic law was implemented strictly and by force if necessary. Piagam Makalua was an effort to show exactly how Islamic regulations would affect the life of the DI community. Despite its authoritarian nature, and despite both the destructive and constructive views of those who experienced it, the implementation of Piagam Makalua proves that formalist Islamic authority really existed and operated in the jungle.

3. Program Politik Islam Revolucioner (Revolutionary Islamic Political Programs): The Ten Guidelines

The Program Politik Islam Revolucioner was an agreement reached by the conference of the East Indonesia DI, the Second Conference of the Islamic Revolutionary Fighters, held

---

422 My conversation with the Muslim community in a place called Mallari Bone, 10 February 2003.
423 Anonymous Interview, 10 January 2003.
in Gattareng in 1958. The program was called ‘emergency’, because its contents had to be implemented and responded to as soon as possible within the DI community. There were three considerations behind the program: the responsibility of the Indonesian Islamic revolutionary leaders, especially in the eastern part of Indonesia, to guarantee the implementation of Islamic law; the efforts stated in Kahar’s Catatan Batin and the revolutionary considerations to improve what he called: *dini̱l haq li yuhdirahū alā dini kullihī* (the implementation of the true religion over all others).\(^{425}\)

The *Program Politik Islam Revolutioner* consisted of only one chapter, stating that the second conference of the Islamic Revolutionary Program decided to support, help and give full trust to Kahar Muzakkar, as the Junior Defense Minister, the Governor of Sulawesi and the Commander of the Hasanuddin Division in an effort to introduce Islamic law by implementing the “Revolutionary Islamic Political Program”.\(^{426}\) What lay behind the claim for full trust was Kahar’s ambition to obtain full authority to shape DI into a more Islamic movement, and he gave his guarantee not to misuse this authority.

Kahar Muzakkar’s ambition is not surprising, since as we saw in Chapter One, he was an ambitious man. However, the authority he sought was only to run his Islamisation program in the community. There were ten points in the Islamic political program:

First, activating the unity of the Islamic community. Second, strengthening the refusal of any effort towards general elections outside the sovereignty of the Indonesian Islamic republic, and calling for those who were involved in the general elections of the republican government to return to Islamic teaching and with the revolutionary Islamic fighters, to establish the *dini̱l haq li yuhdirahū alā dini kullihī*. Third, strengthening the fight against any school of jurisprudence misleading the Muslim community and destroying Islamic teaching. Fourth, strengthening the refutation of such Islamic schools of law and political parties. Fifth, strengthening the refusal of emancipation (according to the western model) between male and female in Islam. Sixth, strengthening the effort to raise the spirit of *jihad* (sacrifice and *hijrah*, migration), the work ethic for self help and an enthusiasm for study among the Islamic revolutionary fighters. Seventh, strengthening the effort to implement the so-called

---

\(^{424}\) See the heading of this regulation in the South Sulawesi, KPK Penerangan RII, *Pedoman Revolusi Jilid I*, 33. For the original contents of this program, see Appendix VII.

\(^{425}\) Ibid., 33.

\(^{426}\) Ibid., 33.
revolutionary working guides, that is, rewarding and dismissing revolutionary senior officers based on their achievements, contributions or infractions and banishing corruption, profiteering, and opportunism. Eighth, guaranteeing the social welfare of the revolutionary society and families. Ninth, implementing the idealism of Islamic nationhood, that is, towards world peace. Tenth, guaranteeing the implementation of Islamic law.427

These were the general guidelines of Kahar’s work, without elaboration on any point. This seemed to based on the fact that the detailed regulation had been found in Catatan Batin and Piagam Makalua. The function of this program is to strengthen Kahar Muzakkar’s authority in directing the DI community along more Islamic lines of DI. It is to strengthen Kahar Muzakkar’s effort to block any external influences that can blur his Islamisation program in the jungle.

**B. Institutional Efforts at Implementing Islamic Law**

Like his conceptional efforts, the institutional efforts at implementing Islamic law by DI in South Sulawesi were also the creation of Kahar Muzakkar, either through his own initiatives or following the model of the central DI. The Pedoman Revolusi volume 1, 2, and 3, published by the information authority of the South Sulawesi DI provides, comprehensively, its system of Islamic military government, from the position of Kahar Muzakkar, as the highest commander, down to village government.428

The institutional efforts with direct responsibility for implementing the Islamic authority of the South Sulawesi DI consisted of two institutions: Momoc Ansharullah, the creation of Kahar Muzakkar and Dewan Fatwa, following the model of the Central DI in West Java, which had a Dewan Fatwa. These two institutions are to be examined for their contributions in supporting the implementation of Islamic law. The discussion which follows will include the various responses among those who were involved in DI.

---

427 Ibid., 34.

428 For more information on the governmental system of South Sulawesi DI, see *Pedoman Revolusi Jilid 1* (n.p., n.d.); *Pedoman Revolusi Jilid 3* (n.p., n.d.).
1. Momoc Ansharullah: Law Enforcement Soldiers

Momoc Ansharullah was a military institution within DI, created as a special force under the direct command of Kahar Muzakkar. The word Momoc is an abbreviation of Mobile Operatie Commande. The word Ansharullah is an Arabic term meaning ‘soldier of God.’ Momoc Ansharullah, therefore, indicates a mobile soldier on God’s mission. Momoc (pronounced momo’) has become a common word, used by Bugis people to indicate a person with a frightening or haunting personality and has come into use because of the nature of Momoc within the DI movement.

Momoc was created as a special force by Kahar Muzakkar in the early times of the movement. It took a more important position when it was reformed through the Second Urgent Meeting of Islamic Revolutionary fighters in 1954.\(^{429}\) In its reformation, Momoc consisted not only of combat soldiers but comprised a triple function of military, police and prosecution work by judges.\(^{430}\)

It should be noted here that even though DI permitted the practice of polygamy it was not permitted for those who wanted to be members of Momoc.\(^{431}\) Was this not contradictory? A former commander of Momoc explained that since the duties of Momoc were heavy, it was anticipated that they should not be burdened with several wives. He wanted to show that even though polygamy was allowed, it was regulated, so that the Momoc should not misuse the considerable authority they had in the DI community. More than anything else, he said, it was a matter of guaranteeing the lives of widows, orphans and unmarried girls in the jungle.\(^{432}\)

When I asked another former Momoc activist about the effectiveness of this regulation, he answered that it worked but it was difficult to implement fully. I made reference to two former members of Momoc from Bone, who, although deceased at the time, I knew had married only once. Regarding the question of the formal educational background of the Momoc, this is hard to explain, due to the fact that not many DI activists had a good formal education. However, again I thought of two Momoc veterans, whom I

\(^{429}\) Six decisions resulted in the conference: Anti guerilla war-fare, pledge of loyalty to the DI central government, Momoc Ansharullah, the agreement with PRRI, and others. For the full contents of this decision, see Appendix VIII.

\(^{430}\) See section three of the decision of the meeting in Appendix VIII.

\(^{431}\) See ibid.

\(^{432}\) Interview with Nurdin Pisof, 22 November 2003.
met in the post DI era, who were known to have had wide ranging Islamic learning, even though they were not commonly called ulama.

The details of Momoc Ansharullah were drawn up in the emergency regulations based on the decision in DI’s Second Urgent Meeting. The regulations elaborated the structure and job responsibilities of Momoc and indicated the role of Momoc in creating the Islamic community of the DI movement. Also given were the rights and functions of Momoc as voluntary, special soldiers of God based on the teachings of the Qur’an and the most reliable Hadith. The Momoc were free of government regulations, except by military commanders. The Momoc were expected to manage themselves and to contribute to education, development, society, economy etc. They were led by a council called Dewan Hak Revolutioner Momoc Ansharullah (Momoc Ansharullah Council of Revolutionary Rights). This council discussed all matters related to the revolutionary jihad. To discuss other aspects of the DI movement, the council was equipped with experts of different disciplines. It consisted of seven members: the leader, experts from Islamic law, secular law, military, history, politics and economy, and finally, the secretary general.

In fulfilling the triple functions of Momoc, the military, police and justice apparatus had to conduct themselves well. In their military position, Momoc had to be able to move very quickly, with mobile troops and coordination with TII. However, the task of Momoc in the effort to establish Islamic law lay more in its police functions. Momoc was called the ‘jihad police’ or ‘revolutionary police’. They had to guard over the safety and security of the people within the East Indonesia Islamic state. They had also to control and investigate the activities of the members of the revolution. They took action and punished decisively

433 For the reason behind the establishment of Momoc Ansarullah organisation, see “Emergency regulations No. 15/PD/77 Tahun 1377 H” in KPK Penerangan RII, Pedoman Revolusi Jilid III, 98-104.

434 See chapter 1 of the regulations in ibid., 98.

435 See chapter 2 of the regulations in ibid., 98.

436 See chapter 4 of the regulations in ibid., 99.

437 To guarantee the commitment of Momoc members to Islamic teaching, on appointment they had to say on oath that in the name of Allah they honestly wished to be a member of Momoc only because of religious and DI interests. They also had to swear that they were ready to face any troubles without complaint for the sake of DI and were able to withstand the temptations of life, such as formal rank. They were answerable to the special courts of Momoc Ansharullah should they deviate from their oath. They were also ready to be declared ‘Islamic deniers’ by believers of other ways in Islam. See chapter 5 of the regulation in ibid., 99.
any member of the Indonesian Islamic revolution who broke the Islamic law or committed any prohibited act, as determined by the revolution. In Momoc was equipped with a body called Jawatan Rahasia Khusus (Special Intelligence Office) who investigated the charges.

In conducting the tasks of justice, processing and prosecuting a case, the Revolutionary Justice Court of Momoc always based its decisions on the Qur'an and Hadith sahih. In determining legal decisions, special justice only applied to three levels of crime and punishment: revolutionary law/death, military internee law, in which the guilty individual was forced to work as a military internee until freed, and not guilty/made free from any accusation. This seems to be very harsh, but it is not surprising, since the Islamic conception of DI was rife with rigid regulations. The Momoc system of justice did not recognise imprisonment, due to conditions of war. For the sake of effectiveness, punishment was given within 24 hours of the decision being made.

How effective was Momoc Ansharullah in implementing Islamic law? According to Nurdin Piso, one of the former leaders of Momoc, members performed their task well because those who became members were known to have a good understanding of Islam. Piso said that the way they implemented the regulations was consistent and responsible, because the punishments for those who did wrong were legally in place. The decisive actions of Momoc made them known as very frightening troops. However, the republican army reversed the facts, claiming that Momoc could kill any one at any time they wanted. In actuality, Momoc followed procedures determined by the organisation. Nurdin gave an example of the arrest of a person breaking Islamic criminal law. Guilt was determined by the Momoc court at the lowest level of Battalion. There was no problem in deciding the punishment, because regulations were clearly set up. Nurdin went on to add, however, that the most important job of Momoc was maintaining the stability of the DI community.

It may be expected that Piso would be positive about the nature of Momoc, since he formerly led the institution. Piso might be right in explaining the Islamic background of

---

438 See chapter 10 of the regulation in ibid., 100.
439 See chapter 11 of the regulation in ibid., 101.
440 See chapter 17 of the regulation in ibid., 102.
441 See chapter 18 of the regulations in ibid., 102.
442 Interview with Nurdin Piso, 22 November 2003.
443 Interview with Nurdin Piso, 22 November 2003.
Momoc personnel, since Momoc was not established immediately after the proclamation of DI. They were DI troops recruited in later years, who probably had received a good formal education. What I had doubts about was the kind of Islamic training Momoc required of its members who would become first and foremost multi-functional soldiers in the jungle. Despite my suspicions, I can accept the strongly Islamic nature of Momoc. Besides the example of the ‘Islamiceness’ of the former Momoc activists whom I knew, I also refer to what Muhammad Arief, a former member of the community under DI said: it was the existence of Momoc, as policemen, soldiers and prosecutors, that made DI an Islamic movement.444

Looking at the regulations conceived by Kahar Muzakkar, a number of contradictions can be found. How could Momoc be formed into one division totaling, 22,000 troops, if the regulations were so strict? For example, the regulation regarding veterans of the 1945 national war of independence. How many DI members, especially after the return of the 1945 fighters to the city, had experienced the war? Furthermore, in its authoritative functions, Momoc appears to have been an exclusive unit in the jungle, operating at the expense of other DI apparatus. I will, therefore, simply conclude that the presence of the Momoc institution strengthened the tendency of DI to be an exclusive Islamic movement of rebellion. However, with its exclusive nature and the excess and controversy that resulted, Momoc itself remains proof of just how military force was brought to bear in support the Islamic military government.

2. Dewan Fatwa: The Co-opted Ulama?

Dewan Fatwa was an institution within DI which worked to issue legal opinions on Islamic law in the jungle. It was the authority of this institution to interpret verses of the Qur’an and Hadits shahih which could then be implemented in the community. It comprised the most notable ulama of DI: Abdurrahman Ambo Dalle,445 Ahmad Marzuki Hasan,446 Junaid

444 Interview with Muhammad Arief, 5 February 2003.

445 Abdurrahman Ambo Dalle was a charismatic ulama and the longest lived in Indonesia. He died at nearly 100 years of age. According to many sources, he entered the jungle unintentionally. In 1954, he was kidnapped by DI troops to strengthen their Islamic ideology. He stayed there until 1963, when DI was no longer well organised and its personnel became scattered. After the demise of DI he lived in Pinrang, South Sulawesi and was a well known ulama leading Darul Dawah wal Irsyad (DDI), one of the most Islamic educational institutions in South Sulawesi.
Sulaeman,⁴⁴⁷ Abdurrahman Matammeng,⁴⁴⁸ and Abdul Muin.⁴⁴⁹ Dewan Fatwa was established one year after the proclamation of the East Indonesia DI.⁴⁵⁰

Dewan Fatwa was regulated by the DI government.⁴⁵¹ It had a coordinating position with the highest commander of the East Indonesia Islamic Military. Its task was to answer all questions related to Islamic law. It also had authority to give advice to the government. Dewan Fatwa created regulations from Islamic law as a guide to the DI community. It consisted of seven ulama entrusted to produce interpretations from the Qur’an and Hadith on their ijtihad (Ar. *ijtihād*, authentic scholarly endeavor). The advice most called upon by DI was for decisions based on *māntūq* (spoken or literal meanings) of the Qur’an and the trusted Hadith.⁴⁵² The regulation also stated that besides members of Dewan Fatwa, the

---

⁴⁴⁶ Ahmad Marzuki Hasan was a Muhammadiyah oriented ulama. He entered the jungle at his own wish in 1953 after he heard that the movement espoused an Islamic ideology. He left the jungle when he was arrested in 1965. After he was freed, he established Pesantren Darul Istiqamah and now in his old age he still leads a pesantren called Darul Istiqamah in Sinjai, South Sulawesi.

⁴⁴⁷ Junaid Sulaeman was a well known ulama in South Sulawesi, especially in Kabupaten Bone. His involvement in DI was of his own volition. He entered the jungle with his older brother, Rapi Sulaeman, who was also a prominent ulama. His Islamic knowledge was not in question. He had lived in Mecca for more than ten years to deepen his learning. At the time he was freed after the cessation of DI, he also led a pesantren in Bone, called Ma’had Hadith (Modern Islamic Boarding House). He died in the early 1990s.

⁴⁴⁸ Abdurrahman Matammeng was the first ulama who entered the jungle, several months after the proclamation of DI. It was not his wish to be in the jungle, but he was brought there by his nephew on the instructions of Bahar Mattalioe. He was also known as a traditionalist ulama.

⁴⁴⁹ Abdul Muin was also a traditionalist oriented ulama based in Sidrap, Sulawesi Selatan. He entered the jungle on the persuasion of many of his colleagues active in DI. After its demise, he return to Sidrap, where he worked as a prominent ulama.

⁴⁵⁰ According to an Army document, it was established on 1 January 1954. See “Proses Perkembangan DI/TII Sulawesi Selatan Tenggara” in *Biro Paban II*, 32. However, in Bahar Mattalioe’s book, it was formed in the first PUPIR, at the same time as the declaration of Piagam Makalua, at the end of 1955. See M. Bahar Mattalioe, *Pemberontakan Meniti Jalur Kanan*, 222. These two different dates only indicate that Dewan Fatwa was formally declared in 1955. Dewan Fatwa had been formed in 1954, because its regulations on Islamic law were dated 1954. It was signed by its temporary chief, Abdurrahman Matammeng. In the formal declaration of Dewan Fatwa in 1955, it was led by Abdurrahman Ambo Dalle.

⁴⁵¹ Unfortunately, I could not find the original regulations of Dewan Fatwa. However, a general sketch of the regulations was offered in the Paban Documentation “Proses Perkembangan DI/TII Sulawesi Selatan Tenggara” in Documentasi Paban, 32.

⁴⁵² Interview with Ahmad Marzuki Hasan, 22 February 2005. He is the former member of DI’s Dewan Fatwa.
Ulama of D1

(Photo kindly provided by Cory van Stenus)
members were also members of the organisation in general and that their obligations were the same as other ordinary members of DI.

The existence of Dewan Fatwa in the body of DI was brief. According to Marzuki Hasan, the vice chair of Dewan Fatwa at the time when it was first formed, Dewan Fatwa existed up until the formalisation of the so called Perwakilan Kabinet Presiden (KPK, Presidential Cabinet Representatives). KPK was formed in 1955, through the regulation of the East Indonesian DI governmental structure. The KPK were cabinet representatives of East Indonesia DI, while Kahar Muzakkar sat as chief of the KPK and supreme Military commander of East Indonesia DI. KPK was attached to the cabinet of the central DI of West Java, under Kartosuwirjo. Dewan Fatwa existed only between 1954 and 1955. The members of the Dewan Fatwa were drawn from KPK chiefs; for example, Marzuki Hasan was the KPK information representative and Junaid Sulaeman KPK social representative. Abdurrahman Ambo Dalle was the vice chief of KPK.

It may be asked why Dewan Fatwa was dismissed after the formation of the KPK, especially as the work was apparently still of significance in giving religious advice to Kahar Muzakkar and to the DI leadership, beyond the scope of the KPK. Moreover, advisory councils were a normal feature of modern Islamic movements and organisations. However, according to Marzuki Hasan, the work of Dewan Fatwa was considered settled; it had already set up regulations that were being continuously implemented. Furthermore, the job of legal advisor could be now conducted by bodies of the KPK. Marzuki gave the example of the Jawatan Keagamaan (Office of Religion) within KPK Home Affairs that dealt with internal religious matters. He also stated that the KPK could now produce any regulations based on Islamic teachings.

Even though Dewan Fatwa was short-lived in Kahar Muzakkar’s DI, it was not insignificant in the wider DI community. It was always referred to when DI dealt with matters of Islamic law. Furthermore, it gives an indication of the type of Islamic law followed, especially the way Islamic criminal law was determined. Through it we can also trace how genuinely the interpretations of the ulama were based on the Qur’an and Hadith.

453 Interview with Marzuki Hasan, 21 February 2005.
454 For further information on this regulation, see Peraturan Darurat No. 1/PD/75 Tahun 1375, in KPK Penerangan RII, Pedoman Revolusi Jilid I, 1-9.
455 Interview with Marzuki Hasan, 22 February 2005.
and how consistent was its claim not to be influenced by the thought of the classical jurists or figures of the prominent Islamic schools, a position with a general modernist orientation of the movement.

The further significance of Dewan Fatwa is its relevance to the charter, remarks and other Islamic regulations produced by Kahar Muzakkar. This includes the fatwa on jihad,\textsuperscript{456} marriage issues, including the question of allowing polygamy with up to four wives, as found in classical Islamic jurisprudence,\textsuperscript{457} the conducting of walimah or wedding parties,\textsuperscript{458} zina (Ar. zinā, adultery, fornication),\textsuperscript{459} tarekat (the mystical orders),\textsuperscript{460} criminal

\textsuperscript{456} See Dewan Fatwa’s regulation on jihad Law No.:01/PH/DF/RILBAG.T/XII/74.

\textsuperscript{457} The fatwa on polygamy is found in chapter 8 of the Marriage Regulations produced by Dewan Fatwa. The law of the polygamy was valid for up to four wives, based on the verse 3 of Sura an-Nisa. The regulations stated the criteria of polygamy, that is, the husband being able to be fair in arranging housing, clothing, food, and fulfilling all other appropriate needs of his wives. To strengthen the position of the man in the polygamy, Dewan Fatwa also ruled that 1) a husband could stay longer with one of his wife after gaining the permission of another wife who would give up her turn, following the Prophet’s tradition; 2) a husband was allowed to stay seven nights with his new wife and three nights with his original wives; 3) for a husband who wanted to make a trip accompanied by a wife, she should be chosen by lottery.

\textsuperscript{458} See chapter 9, ibid.

\textsuperscript{459} See Dewan Fatwa’s regulation on Zina Law No.: 01/HZ/DF/TT IV/TII/VIII/73.

\textsuperscript{460} The fatwa on tarekat was issued after the launching of Kahar Muzakkar’s Program Politik Islam Revolusioner. Tarekat practices were forbidden in the de facto area of DI. Dewan Fatwa said that the purpose of the fatwa was to block these practices which were considered contradictory to Islamic teaching and to avoid disunity in the Islamic community of DI. In fact, the tarekat referred to was the Tarekat Chalwatiah the only tarekat developed in South Sulawesi, which operated especially in village areas.

Tarekat Chalwatiah was a way to approach God through certain religious practices.\textsuperscript{460} It was developed by H. Abdullah Bin Abd. Razak, who proclaimed himself a descendant of the Prophet Muhammad and even of the Prophet Adam. Dewan Fatwa’s criticisms were: First, that this tarekat separated the syariat, tarikat, haqiqah (Ar. haqlqah, essence) and ma’rifat (Ar. ma’rifah, gnosis) while in Islamic teachings, these were all one under the syariat, the law.\textsuperscript{460} Second, the tarekat performed takliq to the wali mahjub (denied guardians), wali who had lost their conscious selves through their remembrance of Allah). Dewan Fatwa ruled that this way deviated from the Qur’an and Hadith.\textsuperscript{460} Third, the tarekat had recourse to books of classical Islam that bore the influence of mysticism.

The deviations of this tarekat had the potential to disunite the Muslim community. Dewan Fatwa found that 1) the tarekat chalwatiah followers claimed they were the only people to be saved in the hereafter; 2) only the chalwatiah teachers could give syafaat (safety) to their followers. The chalwatiah claimed to be in possession of a secret truth which could not be gained by outsiders, whether ulama or laymen. The only way to know the secret was to enter the tarekat.\textsuperscript{460} Dewan Fatwa also regulated the way to face this misleading tarekat: 1) the followers had to be taught true
laws which included: khamar (Ar. khamr, liquor),\textsuperscript{461} qutta uthariq (Ar. quṭṭāʾu ‘l-ṭarīq) (robbery),\textsuperscript{462} theft,\textsuperscript{463} murtad (Ar. murtadd, apostasy),\textsuperscript{464} murder,\textsuperscript{465} and tarikussalāh (Ar. tārīk al-ṣalāḥ, neglect of the obligatory prayers)\textsuperscript{466} and black magic, or sorcery.\textsuperscript{467}

Even though there was an appreciation of ijtihad in presenting a legal opinion, it was found that Dewan Fatwa was very scriptural. It did not interpret the Qur’ān based on modern developments. In presenting punishments which did not come under hudud, for example, Dewan Fatwa used ‘ex-communication’ as a punishment. It regarded the practice of isolating the offender as most relevant to the DI environment. It did not see prison as an alternative to exile. Also, in regulating the punishment of theft and robbery, it stuck with capital punishment and the cutting off of hands, again, not offering the possibility of prison as an alternative to the hudud. In launching the punishment of tarikussalāh offenses, it did not explain how to determine someone as an offender. In what way can someone be judged as omitting the prayers, since the conduct of this ritual tends to be private and beyond the control of the government and out of public view?

According to Hasan Basri Rahman, an activist who had an interest in DI, the formalist DI interpretations of the Qur’ān were relevant to its situation. He said that it was

\textsuperscript{461} See Dewan Fatwa’s regulations on chamr law (alcoholic drinks) No.:07/II/DF/RII/BAG.T/II/74.

\textsuperscript{462} See Dewan Fatwa’s regulations on qutta uthariq (robbery) Law No.: 06/II/DF/RII/BAG.T/II/74.

\textsuperscript{463} See Dewan Fatwa’s regulations on laws on theft No.: 04/H/RII.BAG.T/IV/74.

\textsuperscript{464} The discourse on murtad was important in the DI movement, since in implementing its Islamic law program, there was a need to draw a distinction between the true followers of Islam and the infidels. Dewan Fatwa needed to elaborate in detail the nature of apostasy. See Dewan Fatwa’s regulation on the law on apostasy No.:03/H/RII.BAG.T/IV/74.

\textsuperscript{465} See Dewan Fatwa’s regulation on criminal law No.:08/H/DF/RII.BAG.T/XII/74.

\textsuperscript{466} Dewan Fatwa saw the importance of controlling the conduct of the five prayer times in the community. It regulated the process of praying up to the time when the prayer is obliged and the punishment of those who left off the prayer, tarikussalāh. Thus Dewan Fatwa strengthened the obligation of prayer as the foundation of Islamic teachings. It ruled that the age for children to begin performing prayer was from 7 to 10 years old, and should be taught by parents. It ruled that parents had to emphasise the obligation to perform prayers, if the child ignored this, he or she could be beaten. If a person reached mature age and still did not perform the prayers, he or she was first called to ask forgiveness to God, if he or she refused, capital punishment was prescribed. See Dewan Fatwa’s regulation on Thariqussalāh Law No.:10/II/DF/RII/BG.T/I/75.

\textsuperscript{467} See Dewan Fatwa’s regulation on Sorcery No.:01I/DF/RII/BAG.T/75.
not effective to apply the prison system, when the whole DI apparatus moved from one place to another. Furthermore, ex-communication was also effective because people lived in the jungle with scarce means of transportation and communication.\textsuperscript{468} Lamre Said, a former supreme judge in the jungle, stated that the purpose of the punishments was to create a secure society and their effects had to be demonstrated to the people. Therefore, a formalistic understanding of the Islamic criminal law was relevant to life in the jungle.\textsuperscript{469}

The formalistic approach of Dewan Fatwa reflected the nature of the DI movement itself. The movement was formally understood as \textit{jihad} against the ‘infidels’. The infidels were understood to be whoever refused the call to establish an Islamic government; thus it can be concluded that the formalistic legal opinions of Dewan Fatwa were an effort too to secure the continuity of the DI movement. The inconsistencies in its regulations were mainly due, on the one hand, to the basic religious training of the \textit{ulama}, and on the other, their duty to participate in creating a uniformity of the Islamic perspectives of the movement – always, \textit{nota bene}, under the strong military leadership of Kahar Muzakkhar. Many traditional \textit{ulama} were in fact under the pressure of Kahar’s strong background in Islamic modernism. A considerable dilemma lies in the fact that DI pointedly disregarded the orthodox schools of jurisprudence, which the \textit{ulama} were generally known to have mastered and on which they were accustomed to basing their opinions. The co-opting of many of the \textit{ulama}, however, is sealed by one final fact. When they had a chance to return to the city after DI had been disbanded they returned to lead their traditional style of legal practice.

This chapter has shown the efforts of DI to implement formalist Islam in the jungle. By providing conceptual efforts and institutional efforts DI could truly implement Islamic law. One effort to control the implementation of Islamic law was by unifying it. To do this, the DI leadership provided regulations and decisions in a manual for the implementation of Islamic law. The implementation of Islamic law affected the life of DI community as its former members admitted. However, the way it formalised Islam was through its authoritarianism of DI which forced uniformity in the implementation of Islamic law with a rigid practice of punishment, as informants with direct experience of DI revealed. This is

\textsuperscript{468} Interview with Hasan Basri Rahman, 5 September 2003.

\textsuperscript{469} Interview with Lanre Said, 7 April 2003.
the important aspect of DI which will be compared later to the nature of KPPSI's formalist Islam, discussed in the rest of this thesis.
Chapter Five

KPPSI: NEWLY FORMALISED OR ROMANTICISED

ISLAMIC MOVEMENT?

The second part of this thesis will focus on more recent developments in the movement for formalist Islam in South Sulawesi and particularly on the time after the collapse of Soeharto’s New Order regime in 1998 when it regained its momentum. In the post-1998 period, a body called Komite Persiapan Penegakan Syariat Islam (KPPSI) was to determine henceforth the journey of Islamic formalism in the region.

This chapter argues that the emergence of this movement was influenced by both the re-emergence of Islamic formalism and KPPSI’s historical relations with DI. The following discussion will trace ‘romanticised’ elements existing in the movements, including references to many former DI figures, the DI movement itself, and in it the important role of the son of Kahar Muzakkar. I refer to these elements as ‘romanticism’ since they represent a nostalgia to recall the ‘glory’ of DI. This romanticism is a political tool, used to gain support from former DI strongholds by utilising the legendary name of Kahar Muzakkar. This term further refers to the efforts to valorise and exaggerate the ideals of the DI movement and especially of the figure of Kahar Muzakkar, while ignoring balanced efforts to overlook the movement’s and the figure’s faults. The term is also employed to see how several supporters of KPPSI look to DI’s ideals as a model of the movement that they were to achieve and to see Kahar Muzakkar as the ideal of a formalist Islamic leader.

However, this chapter also demonstrates the involvement of local Islamists who are not necessarily related to DI, but who were concerned with the importance of Islamism as an alternative ideology to solve moral crises in South Sulawesi. This latter aspect is the real trigger for the emergence of the movement. The discussion of these local Islamists will be seen through the continuing influence of Islamic modernism since the inception of DI. The non-monolithic nature of KPPSI will also be seen which not only consist of supporters of intolerant attitudes, but with the majority of its activists who may called to be more moderate than some people might expect. As will be seen in more detail in the discussion of figures inside KPPSI, the organisation functioned as a meeting point for many elements.
in the contemporary struggle for Islamic formalist activism in post-DI of South Sulawesi. It is therefore not surprising that inside KPPSI many of the activists shared similar ideological backgrounds.

A. Post-DI Islamism: Changes and Continuities

Formalist Islam in post-DI was significantly linked to the ideological remnants of DI. When Sanusi Daris was arrested in 1984, it became clear that there was already a young generation involved in his movement but without direct involvement in the DI rebellion. This meant that the ideological legacy of DI in the post Sanusi Daris period was transformed by the younger Muslim generation. Furthermore, ICG argues that at the time of the effort to implement Islamic law formally in South Sulawesi, some young followers of the movement, especially from the paramilitary wings, were sympathetic to both Kahar Muzakkar and Sanusi Daris. ICG even elaborated that among the important followers of DI, there were two factions that later attracted separate followings among the younger generation; that is, followers of K.S. Gani and those who supported Sanusi Daris. ICG argues that K.S. Gani had moderate supporters while Sanusi Daris had extreme followers.

However, the split faction hypothesis of ICG is inaccurate, since there is documentary evidence suggesting that Kasso Gani cannot be said to have taken a moderate stand compared with Sanusi Daris. A monograph indicates that in a meeting with Daud Beureueh in 1967, he agreed to continue the struggle to oppose the republican government and Pancasila and remained obsessed with working for the creation of Islamic states, starting with a regional Islamic struggle. If the supposed moderation of Kasso Gani is due to his modification of the movement into non-Islamic symbols, then Sanusi Daris also had the same strategy. This is seen in their similar style of implementing their

470 See sub-section, ‘Sanusi Daris’ RFS’ in Chapter Three.
472 Interview with Sidney Jones, 30 July 2003.
474 Ibid., 154.
commitment to Islamism. Despite the claim of the existence of the two contrasting factions, the important thing is that these two leaders had followers among the younger generation. It was then these young followers who made an effort to continue the ideological struggle of DI. However, no further information is available pertaining to the extent of the younger generation’s activities to preserve the DI ideology during Soeharto’s New Order.

Besides the unveiling of Sanusi Daris’s RFS, another existing organisation purporting to have historical links with DI was the Yayasan Pembinaan Darul Istiqamah (Foundation of Darul Istiqamah Education, YPDI). founded by Ahmad Marzuki Hasan, a former leader of great importance in DI, the YPDI established a pesantren called Darul Istiqamah. This pesantren spread to many places in South Sulawesi and, with its center in Macopa, Maros, it was led by Arief Marzuki, the son of Marzuki Hasan. Marzuki Hasan led Darul Istiqamah located in Kabupaten (Regency) Sinjai. Other major places in which Darul Istiqamah functioned included Makassar, Gowa and Bulukumba.

The relationship of the YPDI to DI can be seen from the important figures within it and from its name. Furthermore, Darul Istiqamah is strictly committed to the ideology of DI. The Pesantren Darul Istiqamah was known to oppose the New Order government which was in its eyes un-Islamic. For example, it rejected the implementation of Pancasila as the sole ideology of the Indonesian nation. Unlike other Islamic boarding houses in South Sulawesi, which were usually supported financially by the New Order government, Darul Istiqamah funded itself through its own efforts.

The ideological continuation of DI through Darul Istiqamah is not in the sense that the DI model is taught in the pesantren, but is reflected in the teaching of Marzuki Hasan, who often romanticised the idealism of DI in its effort to create an Islamic state. It is committed to DI ideology through dakwah (Ar. da’wah, missionary activities) and education. After the fall of Soeharto, Darul Istiqamah had freedom to express its Islamic identity, either by supporting local governments to create an Islamic government, such as in producing Islamic local regulations or by being active supporters of local KPPSI activists to implement formalised Islamic law. This is particularly seen in Kabupaten Bulukumba, in which the leader of the YPDI was also the leader of the local KPPSI.

---

475 Interview with Nasrullah, 7 April 2003. Nasrullah is one of the teachers in Darul Istiqamah of Sinjai. He is very close to Ahmad Marzuki Hasan.
476 Interview with Ahmad Marzuki Hasan, 22 February 2005.
Another ideological link to DI in the post DI period was the Ta’mirul Mu’minin, the center of Muhammadiyah Islamic activities in Makassar, South Sulawesi. Despite not having being involved in DI, in his speeches in the late 1960s, the leader of Ta’mirul Mu’minin, Fathul Muin Daeng Maggading was very sympathetic to and openly supportive of DI idealism. Daeng Maggading created militant activists such as Muhsin Kahar, who was the cousin of Marzuki Hasan and sympathetic to the DI struggle, through his caderisation in Ta’mirul Mu’minin. Muhsin Kahar appeared as an important militant Muslim activist in the late 1960s through his leadership of a devastating demonstration against ‘lotto’ (gambling), which had been legalised by the Makassar Mayor, Daeng Patombo. The demonstration resulted in chaos in the urban center of Makassar. It led to the escape of Muhsin Kahar who fled to Kalimantan, which was under the command of Daeng Maggading, where he was arrested by Makassar authorities.\footnote{Daeng Maggading asked Muhsin to escape to Kalimantan because he saw the potential of this figure for the Islamic struggle in the future. If he were arrested by the New Order government, he could no longer contribute to the future of the Islamic formalist struggle.}

When Fathul Muin Daeng Maggading passed away in 1970, the younger generation of Ta’mirul Mu’minin established a foundation called Yayasan Fathul Muin to commemorate the dominant role of Daeng Maggading in the Islamic struggle and to continue the work he had pioneered.\footnote{Yayasan Fathul Muin recruited some young Muslim activists, notably Agus Dwikarna, who was well known as a KPPSI activist and commander of Laskar Jundullah.} Fathul Muin then changed its name to the Wahdatul

\footnote{Interview with Ahmad Marzuki Hasan, 22 February 2005. I began to learn more about him and his escape to Kalimantan through his speeches at HMI around 1989-1990 at the time when I attended caderization at HMI.}

\footnote{In Kalimantan, Muhsin Kahar changed his name to Abdullah Said and established the Pesantren Hidayatullah. Hidayatullah had a significant role in the emergence of the discourse of contemporary Islamic formalism in South Sulawesi through KPPSI, since many of the young activists who were later involved in KPPSI joined Hidayatullah in Kalimantan, such as Abdul Aziz Kahar and Sumadiyono. Abdul Aziz, as many people know, was the former leader of Hidayatullah Makassar branch. Interview with Muhammad Saleh Tajuddin, 16 April 2005. Muhammad Saleh Tajuddin has carried out preliminary research on ‘Contemporary Fundamentalist Muslims in South Sulawesi’.}

\footnote{See the information on Fathul Muin in Muhammad Saleh Tajuddin, “Wahdah Islamiyah”, Unpublished Paper, 3.}

\footnote{Muhammad Saleh Tajuddin, “Wahdah Islamiyah,” 4.}
Ummah Foundation and again, to Wahdah Islamiyah, on 14 April 2002. During the 1990s, despite the fact that it was directly related to the figure of the late Daeng Maggading, Fathul Muin, now known as Wahdah Islamiyah, detached itself from DI romanticism, concentrating instead on improving Islamic education.

Efforts aimed at promoting an Islamic ideology in the region were seen more clearly in the early 1990s among the younger generation of Muslims, notably from the Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (Muslim Students Association, HMI), Makassar branch. This body was led by Abdul Aziz Kahar Muzakkar and Tamsil Linrung, who later joined the hardliner faction of HMI called HMI MPO (a breakaway group from HMI), and the Pelajar Islam Indonesia (PII, Indonesian Islamic Students), which were bodies which steadfastly upheld Islam in their organisational ideology, at the same time refusing to adopt Pancasila as the sole ideology of the state. However, the purview of these two student organisations was not limited to South Sulawesi. These organisations emerged nationally and, therefore, could not be directly attached to South Sulawesi DI ideology.

Similarly, PII also represented a formalist Islamic ideology of the early 1990s which cannot be attached to DI. The important leaders of this organisation included Mansur Semma and Aswar Hasan. These figures were very active in opposing the sole ideology of Pancasila in Makassar. Despite the fact that Aswar was originally from Luwu, the main pocket of DI, and was close to Aziz Kahar, the son of Kahar Muzakkar, the rise of formalist Islamic ideology in this local area was not directly related to DI idealism. Rather, it was influenced more by the global emergence of formalist movements, such as Wahabism and the Iranian revolution, and opposition to the secular orientation of the New Order regime.

The figure of Andi Muhammad Taqwa is also related to the emergence of Islamism in South Sulawesi. As mentioned in Chapter Three, the role played by Taqwa was to

---

481 Ibid., 3.
483 For more information on the genesis of HMI-MPO, see M. Rusli Karim, HMI MPO dalam Kemelut Modernisasi Politik di Indonesia (Bandung: Mizan, 1997).
485 I still remember that when I attended the basic training of HMI, there was a large photograph of Ayatullah Khomaini, the spiritual leader and the pioneer of Iranian revolution was displayed inside the building of the quarter of HMI Makassar. This indicates the use of the leader as a figurehead.
connect Sanusi Daris with the Ngruki leaders. ICG stated that Taqwa traveled through Java and Sumatra to meet former DI activists. This included a meeting with Daud Beureueh in 1985, who had strongly influenced Taqwa. Soon after, Taqwa was reported to have established a movement based on the DI model.\textsuperscript{486} ICG also reported that Taqwa moved around different countries, including Malaysia, Sweden and Afghanistan. According to ICG, Taqwa was also inspired by the Free Aceh Movement to establish a movement called Negara Sulawesi Raya (Great Sulawesi State) though there is no indication that he was successful in realising this.\textsuperscript{487} ICG was not sure when this took place, but it seems to have happened after the quashing of B.J. Habibie’s Presidential nomination in 2000, when many South Sulawesi university students protested and raised the prospect of separatism under the name Sulawesi Raya. However, Taqwa’s failure to expand the separatist movement based on the model of Sanusi Daris appears to have been due to the changing paradigm of Islamism in the region. The lack of interest among Muslim youths in South Sulawesi was likely based on their reasoning that establishing a separatist movement would only damage Muslim people and would spark a harsh crack down from the republican government.\textsuperscript{488}

It can be concluded that formally oriented young Muslims in South Sulawesi in the post DI era were always committed to promoting Islam as the ideology of the state. Their activism, moreover, was to some extent supported by other Muslim figures, such as PSII.\textsuperscript{489} While PSII activists such as Abdul Muin Salim were never attached to DI ideology, the SI should be seen as maintaining a similar ideology to that of DI.\textsuperscript{490} Another factor leading formal Muslim activists onwards was the global influence of Islam, particularly the imported thought of Islamic radicals and ideas associated with the Iranian revolution of the late 1970s. Furthermore, books on Ikhwanul Muslimin (Ar. Ikhwān al-Muslimīn),\textsuperscript{491} figures, such as Hasan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutub, as well the radical Pakistani thinker,

\textsuperscript{486} International Crisis Group, “Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia: The Case of the “Ngruki Network” in Indonesia,” p.10.
\textsuperscript{487} Ibid., 10.
\textsuperscript{488} Anonymous interview, 15 December 2004.
\textsuperscript{489} Interview with Nurman Said, 16 December 2004.
\textsuperscript{490} I quote this from the statement of Abdul Muin Salim in the “Interactive Dialogue on Islamic Formalism in Indonesia in the Newly Elected President,” held by LINTAS in Makassar on 14 December 2004.
\textsuperscript{491} For more information on this movement, see Hasan al-Banna, \textit{Risalah Pergerakan Ikhwanul Muslimin} (Solo:Intermedia, 1997).
Abu A’la al-Maududi, were especially popular in South Sulawesi. Despite these young activists being Sunni Muslims, the figure of the Shi’ite Ayatollah Khomaeni was prominent, and the thoughts of the Iranian pro-Khomaeni socialist thinker, Ali Shariati, were much discussed.\(^\text{492}\) However, the import of ideas was not in terms of the shi’ite ideological influence among Muslim youths, but the emphasis was on the success of Iranian Islamic revolution and its resistance to secular and western influences. This is not the place to discuss the transformation of imported radical thought on local young Islamists, for the issue is very complex. However, the global influence of Islamism, combined with the local history of Islamism in South Sulawesi cannot be doubted.

In addition to the involvement of former DI figures like Nur Abdurrahman, many efforts of KPPSI are aimed at justifying the historical significance of the syariat movement in South Sulawesi, based on the role of DI.\(^\text{493}\) At the same time, others – especially those activists from DI areas – attach themselves to the ideological commitment of DI. These people promoted the idea that KPPSI could achieve the ideology of DI without rebellion.\(^\text{494}\) However, in spite of owing much to the legacy of DI, the model of KPPSI’s struggle included critical views on the factors contributing to the failure of Kahar Muzakkar’s rebellion, and thus led to contemporary leaders changing the paradigm of struggle. Their involvement in KPPSI is seen as a contribution to maximise the role of Islam in governing society in a movement that is quite separate from the designs of DI. The figures included here are Abdurrahman A. Basalamah, Jalaluddin Rahman, and Fuad Rumi, who have nothing to do with the old DI nor the HMI-MPO or PII.\(^\text{495}\)

From the diverse range of activists in KPPSI, it can be seen that, like DI, KPPSI was also grounded in Islamic modernism. The formalist oriented Muslims needed to redefine their Islamic identity, which had been curbed by the New Order regime. Some needed to refer to early Islamisation, where adat and Islam were largely integrated, to justify their identity, while others referred to the everlasting glory of DI. The establishment

\(^{492}\) For more information on the transformation of Middle Eastern Islamism in Indonesia, see Antohony Bubalo and Greg Fealy, *Joining the Caravan? The Middle East, Islamism, and Indonesia* (New South Wales: Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2005).

\(^{493}\) Interview with Aswar Hasan, 13 December 2004.


\(^{495}\) Abdurrahman A. Basalamah is commonly known as a member of NU, Jalaluddin Rahman and Fuad Rumi are also not well known as ex-HMI or PII activists.
of KPPSI created a meeting point for those who shared formalist thinking, and most KPPSI members were sympathetic towards DI. KPPSI was supported by local Muhammadiyah and PSII activists with modernist thinking, such as Abdul Muin Salim. Of course, some supported the old DI leaders with Muhammadiyah backgrounds. Even though there were some NU activists who supported KPPSI, such as Hasyim Aidid, they were opposed by organisations with traditionalist backgrounds, NU and Darul Dakwah wal Irsyad (Ar. Dār al-Da‘wah wa ’l-Irshād, DDJ). Since KPPSI was a more contemporary Islamic formalist movement, its nature was much coloured by new philosophies of Islam, in particular in reasserting Islamic identity. This is often found in campaigns based on Islamic modernism. Finally, the fall of the New Order was the trigger for the emergence of new Islamic formalism as will be discussed in the following section.

B. The Road to KPPSI’s Establishment: The Failure of the New Order

In South Sulawesi, shortly before the fall of Soeharto, some Muslims saw signs of the potential for radical change in Indonesia. These included student activists, who had been longing for change from the ‘stagnant’ situation of the New Order and the opportunity to express their critical views. It may be argued that Muslims in South Sulawesi responded to the mood for change by offering an alternative vision aimed at relieving the nation’s suffering, caused by the multi-dimensional crisis of the New Order government which led to its fall in 1998.

Many Muslim activists in South Sulawesi believed that the New Order had failed to improve the lives of the Indonesian people. Abdul Aziz Kahar Muzakkar stated that the state had failed in every aspect of people’s life: political, economic, and cultural. Furthermore, he detailed the New Order’s failure by pointing out the failure of law enforcement, the economic crisis, the hegemony of secular and western culture, the arrest of many Muslims, and the widespread nature of corrupt practices.496 Ironically, the failure of the state in the eyes of Abdul Aziz Kahar Muzakkar created problems in Islam, yet the

---

majority of these problems were caused by followers of this religion.\footnote{Abdul Aziz Mudzakkar, “KPPSI dalam Wacana dan Praksis,” \textit{Fajar}, 20 Oktober 2003} Ahmad Ali, a law professor at the University of Hasanuddin and well-known Muslim intellectual states:

the failure of the New Order was mainly caused by the failure of its national law to defend the integrity of the nation which was endemic with corruption, nepotism and collusion throughout the country.\footnote{Ahmad Ali, “Syariat Islam sebagai Solusi Mengatasi Keterpurukan Hukum”, Paper presented in a seminar discussing the Islamic syariat in various disciplines held at STAI DDI Mangkoso on 9 June 2002.}

Aziz’s and Ali’s criticism of the New Order’s corrupt regime can be seen as a relevant argument in the context of the need for an Islamic form of Special Autonomy in South Sulawesi. However, this kind of argument is risky. If, for example, such Special Autonomy also failed to deliver good governance, would it be reasonable to blame Islamic teaching? This is an important question of which to be aware, since the argument of these formalists is that the failure of the New Order was mainly because Islamic teachings were not well implemented well in the Muslim community.

Besides the perceived failure of secular law, some Muslim activists also argued that Islam struggled culturally during the New Order regime. Abdurrahman A. Basalamah criticised what he saw as the achievement of cultural Islam, saying that while Islamic ceremonies were taking place, the substance of Islam was neglected:

At \textit{maulid} [Ar. \textit{maulid}, the Prophet Muhammad’s birthday] celebration, Muslims celebrate the moment everywhere, but what do we gain from the ritual other than eggs [eggs are freely given out, decorated and coloured]? This tradition does not contribute to the Islamic enlightenment.\footnote{Interview with Abdurrahman A. Basalamah, 20 February 2003. See “Akomodasi Mayoritas tanpa menyisihkan Minoritas,” \textit{Fajar}, 26 November 2000.}

Jalaluddin Rahman, another local Muslim intellectual, also points out the cultural struggles of Islam:

Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama are mainstream mass Muslim organisations which struggled for Islamisation through cultural ways and did not achieve any great result. These organisations have fought for cultural Islamisation in Indonesia for more than 50 years but the result is no more than
what we see today. Islam has only changed the numbers of its adherents; the values of Islam are not well actualised.

... the endemic corruption among Muslim people in the bureaucracy and criminality in society are part of the failure of cultural Islam. The problem of the cultural method is that Islamic values were only practised beyond the state, while certain Islamic teachings had to be reinforced by the state; therefore, to make Islamic law effective it has to be formally implemented, a situation in contrast to the New Order regime's interference in the enforcement of the law through the use of formal regulations. 500

However, both Basalamah’s and Rahman’s critiques should be seen as exaggerations, and there may be more Muslims who reject them because it can also be argued that many Islamic activists in Indonesia, especially in South Sulawesi, also had a background in these organisations. Therefore, despite being culturally oriented, these Muslims also helped to shape formalist Islam at least in the foundation of the Islamic knowledge of the Islamist activists. Furthermore, Basalamah and Rahman seem not to be aware of the fact that the emergence of cultural Islam in contemporary Indonesian Islamic history was the response of Muslim thinkers who recognised the failure of the political Islam that was active prior to the Soeharto regime (1966). 501 If cultural Islam failed in the New Order, what can these Islamists say for the performance of political Islam before the Soeharto regime in its effort to create good governance? One may say that there was not much success, if not an outright failure.

The emergent belief in the need to implement Islamic law in South Sulawesi was further triggered by broader political events in the country. Soon after the reformation era began, the Habibie government (Soeharto’s successor) introduced decentralisation plans in which local government would have greater political and economic autonomy to build and improve their own local areas. Islamic law activists considered this policy to be an effective way of facilitating their participation in local and regional processes. They, therefore, hoped to be able to bring about change in local areas, despite the fact that local autonomy

500 Interview with Jalaluddin Rahman, 15 March 2002.
regulations did not include religion as an area to be managed by local government. This is related to what Morrell states:

Rebuilding local cultures is a means of overcoming the weakening of the daerah (regional communities), which occurred during the Soeharto years, when members of those communities had little control over their own affairs, and were permitted only limited political participation.

Although Morrell seems to refer to local cultures more as regional identities, among Islamists, they saw that South Sulawesi might not be separated from Islamic culture. Therefore, when they have asserted the importance of Islamism in the post-Soeharto era, they saw it as part of their efforts at rebuilding their local culture. In addition to this, another political event that contributed to the idea of Islamic law in South Sulawesi was the autonomy given to Aceh to implement Islamic syariat law through the Special Autonomy Regulation No. 18 2001.

To realise the perceived need for a vehicle for the implementation of Islamic law in South Sulawesi, a mass organisation called Forum Ukhuwah Islamiyah, (Islamic Brotherhood Forum, FUI) was formed. This body was led by the senior Muslim intellectual, Abdurrahman A. Basalamah, who had long been known as a formalist Muslim. The fall of Soeharto and the emergence of the reformation era also encouraged the Forum to enhance dialogue among Muslim activists to discuss possible steps to be taken in response to this radical change. Through dialogue, a perception emerged among local Islamists of the need to implement Islamic law. These Muslim activists thought that now was the time to offer the formal implementation of Islamic law as the best solution for the multidimensional crisis facing the country. According to them, the enforcement of

---

502 For more information on the Local Autonomy Regulations, see Minako Sakai, Beyond Jakarta: Regional Autonomy and Local Societies in Indonesia (Belair, South Australia: Crawford House, 2002). For an account by an Indonesian writer experiencing the application of regional autonomy in Indonesia, see S. Usman, “Regional Autonomy in Indonesia: Field Experiences and Emerging Challengings,” Paper prepared for SMERU Research Institute, Bali, 2002.


504 For further information on Islamic Autonomy granted to Aceh see, Rifyal Ka’bah, Penegakan Syariat Islam di Indonesia (Surabaya: Khairul Bayan, 2004), 16-35.

Islamic principles could solve the endemic corruption in the government and bureaucracy, the corruption of the legal system, and the degradation of morality caused by uncontrolled modernisation and globalisation.506

The efforts of these Muslim activists and thinkers to implement Islamic law began, to some extent, to spread throughout the wider Muslim community. Furthermore, the newly established FUIJ forum included activists from Islamic mass-organisations, and not only from pro-formalist Islamic organisations, but also from mainstream Islamic organisations such as NU and Muhammadiyah.507 FUIJ activists in 1999 created a committee called Komite Persiapan Pembentukan Syariat Islam (Preparatory Committee for Upholding Islamic Law, KPPSI) with the express purpose of implementing Islamic law.508 This small committee was described by Kalmuddin, the vice secretary of KPPSI, as part of the long dialogue required to exercise the formal implementation of Islamic law. Kalmuddin stated that the discussions even touched on the issue of a model for the implementation of Islamic law. Also emergent were discussions on making an effort to support an Islamic political party that had a program of implementing formalist Islamic law. According to Kalmuddin, this discourse was strengthened by the idea that forming or supporting a political party would make the movement more inclusive, because the supporters of formalised syariat from secular parties or other elements of society could also be embraced.509 Furthermore, he stated that existing political parties were not attractive as they did not gain sufficient votes for parliamentary seats.510 This is in line with the view of Jamaluddin Amien, the prominent leader of Muhammadiyah, who said that the Islamic syariat movement had to be formulated to include all political and social elements.511

These Muslim activists intensified their efforts to realise an Islamic formalist movement. The FUIJ Forum conducted an open dialogue on Islamic law on 28 May 2000. The aim of the dialogue was to strengthen the commitment of syariat activists to struggle for the formal implementation of Islamic law. This dialogue was an important phase of the

507 Mulyani Mudies Taruna, Gerakan Islam Radikal Kontemporer di Indonesia, 27.
509 Interview with H. M. Sirajuddin, 6 Maret 2003.
510 Interview with Jamaluddin Amien, 3 Maret 2003.
511 Interview with Abdul Aziz Kahar, 23 Juni 2004.
struggle for Islamic formalism in South Sulawesi. First, these activists brought together Muslim intellectuals and figures from various areas to discuss the significance of establishing Islamic law. Tuan Guru Hji Abd. Hadi Bin Haji Awang, the former Chief Minister of Trengganu (in Malaysia) and the current president of the Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS), offered the model of political Islam in Malaysia through the example of the PAS victory in Trengganu; Mattulada, the well known Muslim anthropologist and historian, discussed the historical perspectives that supported the need for Muslim people in South Sulawesi to implement Islamic law; Ahmad Ali, Dean of the Faculty of Law at Hasanuddin University, emphasised the importance of formalising Islamic teachings from a legal viewpoint; Abdurrahman A. Basalamah, an economist and chair of the UMI Foundation, talked about the nature of Islamic teaching from an economic perspective; and Husein Umar, General Secretary of DDII, focused on the political aspects of Islamic teaching.⁵¹²

A possible criticism of the dialogue among these figures is that it represented much more of an effort to strengthen the ideas of the Islamists, rather than looking at the feasibility of implementing Islamic law in South Sulawesi. Most of these people were known to be pro-formalist Islam. Even Mattulada and Ahmad Ali, despite being known as Muslim intellectuals, were known to be in favour of formalist Islam. If these activists had wanted to be more objective in the dialogue and therefore more genuinely inclusive, they would have done better to invite intellectuals such as Qasim Mathar and Hamka Haq, who were well known opponents of Islamic formalism. It may have been feared that the participation of these intellectuals in the dialogue might have caused too much dissent, which would have blurred the perception of the need for formalist effort that will blur the perception of formalist Islam among the dialogue participants.

Despite this criticism, the open dialogue resulted in a recommendation that strengthened the importance of enforcing formalist Islamic law in South Sulawesi. The recommendation stated:

---

⁵¹² KPPSI “Rumusan Hasil Dialogue Terbuka Penegakan Syariat Islam di Sulsel,” Unpublished Report by KPPSI, 2000. For the result of this dialogue, see Appendix IX.
every social problem faced by Muslim peoples was mainly caused by their being separated from Islamic principles,…\textsuperscript{513}

The recommendation added:

It should be realised that today saw the beginning of the setting into momentum of the enforcement of Islamic law and an effort to actualise it through the conduct of the Kongres Umat Islam Sulawesi Selatan [South Sulawesi Islamic Community Congress].\textsuperscript{514}

The Kongres Umat Islam was conducted in October 2000 and the Komite Persiapan Pemberlakuan Syariat Islam (KPPSI) formally established.\textsuperscript{515}

For Islamic syariat activists in South Sulawesi, the emergence of KPPSI in South Sulawesi could be seen within the framework of the long journey of Islam and the nation state. Abdul Aziz Kahar stated:

The phenomenon of KPPSI is a variant of the long dialogue between nationalism and Islam which took place in South Sulawesi. It is the result of the

\textsuperscript{513} See ibid.
\textsuperscript{514} See ibid.
\textsuperscript{515} The details of Kongres Umat Islam will be further discussed in the next section of this chapter. The long process toward establishing an Islamic law movement in South Sulawesi was part of the desire of many Muslims to establish an Islamic syariat movement in the global context. It should be noted that within these times of dialogue, many other Muslim activists in the rest of the country campaigned for the implementation of Islamic law to solve national problems. In formal politics, it was found that in 1999 the Islamic political parties elected to parliament struggled for the return of the ‘seven words’ of the Piagam Jakarta in order to gain a constitutional basis for Islamic law in the country. Outside of formal efforts, there had been many Muslim organisations who united to form a movement to implement Islamic law, such as Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI). For more information about the organisation and its First Congress, see Irfan Suryahardi Awwas, ed., \textit{Risalah Kongres Mujahidin I dan Penegakan Syariat Islam} (Yogyakarta: Wihdah Press, 2002).
The relationship of South Sulawesi Islamic syariat activists with other Islamic syariat activists was seen in the MMI Congress in Yogyakarta, in August 2000 which Muslim scholars from South Sulawesi attended and became part of its board. Some scholars saw the efforts of the Majelis Mujahidin to portray itself as an umbrella organisation for all pro-syariat groups. Many people speculated that the idea of formalist Islamic syariat in South Sulawesi was part of these national influences. However, Husein Umar countered that the idea was earlier than the MMI congress and therefore the formation of KPPSI as an Islamic law movement was more genuine. Open dialogue with Islamic law had begun in May 2000, while the MMI congress was held in August. Husein Umar argued that the Kongres Umat Islam in South Sulawesi in October 2000 was just the continuation of the previous open dialogue. Interview with Husein Umar, 7 August 2003.
effort of some local activists to employ formalist Islamic teachings in national affairs. It is a meeting point of the long logical seeking between national politics and Islamic politics.\textsuperscript{516}

Jalaluddin suggested that KPPSI and the idea of formalised Islamic syariat owed their launch to the conception of a democratic sphere which created the opportunity to express constructive ideas to address the crisis faced by the nation. He stated, therefore that Indonesian people should embrace and appreciate this democratic sphere.\textsuperscript{517} However, this statement would appear to be overly idealistic if applied to many other Muslims in South Sulawesi. As will be seen in the next chapter, many activists and activities of KPPSI are stigmatised as being undemocratic.

C. KUI I: The Establishment of Wadah Perjuangan (Means of Struggle)

A systematic effort to facilitate the comprehensive implementation of Islamic law in South Sulawesi province was initiated by the Kongres Umat Islam Pertama (First Congress of South Sulawesi Muslim Community, KUI I), held in Makassar from the 21-23 October 2000. The Congress was preceded by a rally at the al-Markaz al-Islami Mosque attended by hundreds of people. The congress procession was held at the Asrama Haji (Pilgrimage Hostel) at Sudiang, on the outskirts of Makassar. The Congress was opened by the Vice Governor of South Sulawesi, H. Asnawi and attended by about 750 people from almost all districts in South Sulawesi. They came from various organisations, including Muhammadiyah, NU, FUI, HMI, and Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia ( Indonesian Intellectual Muslims Association, ICMI). The Congress was supported by the presence of national-level Muslim politicians, such as AM Fatwa, the present Vice Speaker of Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (People’s Consultative Assembly, MPR) from Partai Amanat Nasional (National Trust Party, PAN), Jusuf Kalla, the present Vice President, and Tosari Wijaya, a senior politician from the Islamic political party, PPP. There were many pro-formalist Islamic law intellectuals, such as Husein Umar of Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic Dakwah Council, DDII), Abu Bakar Baasyir and Irfan


\textsuperscript{517} Endang Turmudi, (ed.) Pengaruh Modernitas Terhadap Sikap Keberagamaan Masyarakat: Penerapan dan Diskursus Politik Syariat Islam Studi Kasus di Cianjur, Sulawesi Selatan dan Jombang, 73.
S.Awwas of MMI and special guest Tuan Guru Abdul Hadi Bin Haji Awang, senior Minister of Trengganu Malaysia.\textsuperscript{518} The Committee set out three aims for the Congress; first, it was to strengthen Islamic brotherhood and to unify the vision and mission among South Sulawesi Muslims to uphold Islamic syariat; second, to incorporate Islamic syariat into the legal system, thus giving formalist Islam constitutional means to govern the life of Muslims in South Sulawesi, and third, to form working institutions to monitor the enforcement of Islamic syariat in South Sulawesi.\textsuperscript{519} Besides this, congress organisers adopted an explicit theme or slogan embodying their goals: ‘Otonomi Khusus, untuk tegaknya syariat Islam di Sulawesi Selatan’ (Special Autonomy for the enforcement of Islamic syariat in South Sulawesi).

The KPPSI board included diverse elements of the Islamic community in South Sulawesi.\textsuperscript{520} However, this inclusive approach meant that the board included many Muslim figures who did not actively support the Congress. For example, the inclusion of Muis Kabri, the leader of Darul Dakwah wal Irshad (DDI) as a member of the Advisory Council, appeared to contradict his well-known opposition to the idea of formalised Islamic syariat. Muis Kabri believed that the presence of KPPSI continued DI’s ideals, which he saw as historically very harmful, especially to the founder of the DDI and prominent South Sulawesi ulama, Abdurrahman Ambo Dalle, who was kidnapped by DI members. However, many of the local Islamist activists viewed Kabri’s opposition as political rather

\textsuperscript{518} Abdul Hadi’s presence seems to indicate his moral support of the effort to enforce Islamic law. His visit to the Congress was his second participation in the conception of Islamic syariat in South Sulawesi. His first visit, as explained, was in the open dialogue.


\textsuperscript{520} The structure of the board of the Congress, the activists of formalist Islamic law focus to gain support from the major Muslim intellectuals and activists in South Sulawesi. The board consists of an Advisory Council, Steering Committee, and Organising committee. The Advisory Council was made up of Muslim intellectuals and academics, such as Abdurrahman A. Basalamah, Abdul Muin Salim, Mattulada, Ahmad Ali, Ali Yafie, HM Ide Said, Mansyur Ramli etc. It also contained ulama such as Jamaluddin Amien, Sanusi Baco, Bakri Wahid, Muhammad Nur, Abduh Pabaja, Farid Wajid etc. It included a number of former DI activists, such as K.H. Marzuki Hasan, K.H. Sulaeman and M. Ali AT. The Steering Committee was filled with young Muslim activists. Abdul Aziz Qahhar was the coordinator, with Agus Dwikarna, Aswar Hasan, Hasan Basri Rahman etc. The Organising Committee also included young activists, many of whom were still active in Islamic student organisations. The structure of the board indicated that at this First Congress, the organisers focused on gathering together individual Muslim figures in South Sulawesi as stated in the first aim and objective of the Congress. In the Advisory Council, there were no official names from the provincial bureaucracy.
than historical. These activists asserted that Kabri really saw the presence of many KPPSI activists as a threat to his bid to gain political support from the Muslim community in the area where DDI was concentrated.\textsuperscript{521} It is difficult to determine which of these views was true, but the fact that Muis Kabri had a political interest was beyond doubt. He stood as a DPD candidate in the 2004 general election, although he was not elected.\textsuperscript{522}

The Congress resulted in several decisions, each confirming the efforts to implement syariat. First, KPPSI was officially formed as a Muslim community institution in the struggle for the implementation of Islamic law. It was intended that this institution would coordinate with other sections of the Muslim community. Membership was to be based on Islamic brotherhood. Any Muslim agreeing with the struggle-oriented nature of KPPSI could thus become a member without the need for the process of a system of membership.\textsuperscript{523} To the congress participants, the objective of this membership model was to bring together the voices of South Sulawesian Muslims around a single and unified belief in the enforcement of syariat as the principal matter in life. In a related matter, the Congress also decided that the organisation should be an alliance, comprising any organisation and individual that was involved in enforcing Islamic law in the province.\textsuperscript{524} In addition to forming KPPSI, the Congress detailed eight fields of action that KPPSI would involve itself with: politics, law and the constitution, economics and commerce, education, society and culture, institutional and social relations, and laskar (paramilitary), intended for

---

\textsuperscript{521} Anonymous interviews with several activists of KPPSI in Pare-Pare and Pangkep; 22 June 2003 and 10 September 2002.

\textsuperscript{522} The arguments of the Organising Committee stated that the selection of the Committee was based on the perception of their position as Muslim figures of importance to be listened to and treated as congress references, whether they agreed to the Congress or not. Interview with Kalmuddin, 13 February 2003.

This argument, however, seems only to justify names included in the board of the Congress without their confirmation. Whether a person agreed or disagreed on the formalization of Islamic law in South Sulawesi, their inclusion required their assent. Moreover, this kind of reality on the board of the Congress, was also much influenced by the lack of organised preparation of the Congress committee, due the fact that Sanusi Baco admitted not having been confirmed when he was included in the board, while he himself had no problem with the efforts of formalised syariat in South Sulawesi. Interview with Sanusi Baco, 22 February 2003.


guarding the implementation of Islamic law. At the Congress, these eight fields were only sketched out; how they would be utilised in the struggle was yet to be elaborated in any detail.

The Congress also made six internal recommendations that called on the elements and institutions within the Muslim community to uphold Islamic *syariat*. It first stated that the reason for upholding the Islamic law was to create a prosperous society. Second, Muslim people were called upon to publicise the struggle for *syariat* through the constitution. The third recommendation was that Muslim scholars contribute to the spread of Islamic law, without being ensconced in Islamic law schools. Fourth, the Congress demanded that educational institutions create a milieu conducive to the implementation of Islamic law. Fifth, political organisations were called to participate actively in the effort. Related to this was the sixth internal recommendation, which specifically mentioned the need for Laskar Jundullah and other Muslim groups to defend the enforcement of Islamic law. It was through this recommendation that Laskar Jundullah obtained authorisation to undertake paramilitary action in the name of upholding Islamic law in South Sulawesi. Laskar Jundullah will be discussed more specifically below, in the section on the factions inside KPPSI.

On top of these internal recommendations, the Congress produced several points of external recommendation. In general, these points represented demands on the external political and institutional elements within the state to pave the way for the implementation of Islamic law, particularly in South Sulawesi. It urged both local and national government to approve the aspirations of Muslims to practice the teaching of their own religion. It similarly demanded the provincial people's representative to accept the aspirations of the Muslim people to uphold the Islamic law. Finally, the external recommendation urged the central people's representative to draft a constitution of Special Autonomy assigning the implementation of Islamic law to the South Sulawesi government.

The need to realise these demands of the legislature and executive were sharpened by the inclusion of another point, in effect a barely veiled threat. If, within one year, there was no realisation of their demands, the Muslim people in South Sulawesi would hold a


526 For the whole contents of the Recommendation see Appendix X.
referendum for independence. When I asked one of the leaders of KPPSI about this daring move, he answered that it was only a strategy, targeted at the national government. In fact, events have confirmed that this was no more than a bluff. Up to the present time (2006), more than three years after the threat was made, the referendum issue had still not been raised with the central government. The lack of any move towards a referendum on independence also demonstrated that while formal implementation of Islamic syariat in South Sulawesi was a goal among congress participants, it did not hold the same significance for the majority of South Sulawesi Muslims.

The failure by KPPSI activists to carry through the referendum idea demonstrated that they had decided to struggle for formalised syariat through constitutional means without threatening the integrity of the nation. Furthermore, the idea of the referendum was seen by KPPSI as emerging from the congress participants and, thus, from the people of South Sulawesi. They were even of the opinion that the idea of the referendum, which became an alternative option, was part of the effort to minimise a revolutionary action if the move for Special Autonomy was rejected.

The external recommendations were also critical of the government’s system of leadership, arguing that it was hampering the implementation of formalist Islamic law. One recommendation rejected the model of President Abdurrahman Wahid and Vice-President Megawati Soekarnoputri, stating it did not reflect Islamic morals and ethics. The recommendation also demanded that the government ban any immoral and destructive activities such as gambling, pornography, prostitution, and the sale of narcotics.

The Congress also made an external recommendation relating to recognition of the historical and contemporary tragedies suffered by their ‘Muslim brothers’ in Indonesia and around the world. The Congress protested against Israeli attacks on Palestinian land and the perceived double standards of the United States of America in this conflict. Another decision was to urge the government and Human Rights Commission to solve the problems relating to human rights abuses suffered by the Muslim community both in the past and

528 Ibid., p. 27. This critical tone seems to be potentially hampering the effort of KPPSI to deal with the central government for the demand of the Special Autonomy, since on the one hand, KPPSI needed the political decision of the central government to grant Special Autonomy given for a certain province, while, on the other hand, central government leadership was rejected.
529 Ibid., p. 27.
present. The Congress thus called the Muslims in Southeast Asia and other parts of the world to work together in implementing Islamic law around the world.

The formal effort to promulgate formalist Islamic law in South Sulawesi was signified by a declaration for the Implementation of Islamic law that was signed by the congress participants. The declaration was called ‘Deklarasi Makassar’ (the Makassar Declaration).\(^{530}\) The contents of the declaration were as follows:

We, the Islamic Community of South Sulawesi through the Congress of the Muslim people and with the grace of God, are prepared to enforce Islamic law in the province of South Sulawesi. The preparation of a mechanism to carry out its enforcement will be arranged as soon as possible and in a constitutional manner.

To strengthen efforts to enforce Islamic law in South Sulawesi, the Congress also produced the ‘Memorandum of Islamic law’, containing signatures of support from three prominent leaders of Muslim organisations: Sanusi Baco (NU), Djamaluddin Amin (Muhammadiyah), and A. Rahman Basalamah (FUI). The content of the Memorandum was as follows:

Referring to the Qur’an and the Hadith, enforcing Islamic law is an absolute obligation. Therefore, we agree and support the effort to enforce Islamic Law in South Sulawesi.\(^{531}\)

The Congress was finally completed by the election of the inaugural KPPSI board. The board was mainly composed of two elements: a Majelis Syura and a Lajnah Tanfidziah (Ar. Lajnah Tanfidhiyyah, Executive Body). Abdurrahman A. Basalamah (FUI), Sanusi Baco (Majelis Ulama Indonesia (Indonesian Ulama Council, MUI) and NU, and Ahmad Ali (Dean of the Faculty of Law Hasanuddin University) were elected as members of the Majelis Syura. Meanwhile, Lajnah Tanfidziah was chaired by Abdul Aziz Kahar Muzakkar, and Agus Dwikarna and Aswar Hasan were elected vice chairman and general secretary respectively. The Lajnah Tanfidziyah was also equipped with several departments, including the Departemen Kelaskaran (Paramilitary Department).\(^{532}\) Through the formation

---

\(^{530}\) For the original contents of this declaration, see Appendix XI.

\(^{531}\) See the original form of this memorandum in Appendix XII.

\(^{532}\) For the structure of the board of KPPSI inaugurated in the First Congress, see Adlin Sila, “Budaya Good Governance dalam Masyarakat Indonesia: Studi Kualitatif tuntutan Pelaksanaan Syariat Islam di Makassar Sulawesi Selatan.”
(Copied from KPPSI, "Seri Berkat Ekonomi Islam: Top. Sulsel, Mekanisme 2003)

Struktur Komite Pendidikan Pemegang Syariah Islam Pusat Sulawesi Selatan

Pascakongres II Ummat Islam SE-Sulsel
of this department, the influential Laskar Jundullah was included as a formal wing of KPPSI.

KPPSI was considered by congress participants to be trust and support of the Congress. To do this, KPPSI first gave priority to popularising the results of the Congress through a variety of methods, which included delivering speeches in mosques, organising forum for dialogue and extending silturrahim (hospitality) to Muslim figures. Furthermore, KPPSI announced a plan to set up branches of KPPSI in every district in South Sulawesi and to form a representative committee outside South Sulawesi. Under this conceptualisation, KPPSI would activate discussions, seminars, and symposia to draft the theoretical concepts of Islamic syariat. On the political side, KPPSI began dialogue with DPRD in order to persuade them to accept their demands. On a more popular level, KPPSI undertook a million-signature petition as proof of the widespread support for the enforcement of Islamic law.

While KPPSI could point to these efforts as evidence of mass support for its objectives, the holding of this First Congress brought criticism from some Muslim figures. First, critics claimed that the congress participants were not properly representative of the Muslim people. Muhammad Qasim Mathar, a liberal Muslim figure who also attended the Congress, openly criticised the use of the term umat Islam, stating that it had been manipulated. There were many other elements of society which had not yet been included. Qasim argued that in the context of the broader Muslim community, it was not possible to claim representation from all Muslims, given the diversity of Muslim elements themselves, especially when dealing with legal issues, an important part of people’s lives. In criticising the kongres umat Islam, Qasim stated that he was hesitant to declare Islamic law without talking first to historians, cultural and social experts, and Muslim figures in South Sulawesi. If Qasim directed his criticism to KPPSI which did not talk to these of intellectual group, then it was misdirected. The fact that KPPSI, as mentioned previously, was formed based on the dialogue, held by Islamists who invited experts from various perspectives. Also, the board of KPPSI included a prominent historian, professors of both Islamic and secular law, and an economist. What KPPSI did not do in the dialogue was including those who opposed formalist Islam.

---

In his writings, Qasim also criticised the style in which the ‘Makassar Declaration’ was produced:

One of the characteristics of Islamic teaching is not declaration/statement, because a declaration ignores the efforts that have been made by many other Muslims.\(^{534}\)

The claim of KPPSI to be a mainstream organisation was also questioned. The presence of two of the provincial chairs of NU and Muhammadiyah in the Congress was seen as not representing their organisations but merely representing themselves, therefore suggesting that support for KPPSI was really only personal support for these figures. This criticism was voiced by Professor Hamka Haq, the vice chair of the NU of South Sulawesi, who saw the inclusion of Sanusi Baco in the Congress as only a personal matter. Hamka Haq himself was seen by KPPSI as an opponent of the efforts towards formalised *syariat* in South Sulawesi.\(^{535}\)

Despite the criticisms directed at the Congress and its results, the presence of many intellectuals supporting the Congress had contributed to the Congress’s maintenance of the Islamist spirit. As will be seen in the discussion of KPPSI figures in the latter part of this chapter, the presence of these intellectuals also contributed to the conceptualisation of how to conduct the struggle. The Committee emerged as an institution responsible for the formulation of program of action. It may be said that the formulation of the committee into an institution dedicated to the struggle was the most visible aspect of the fight for the implementation of Islamic law in South Sulawesi, despite the doubts over whether the demand could realistically be achieved in the short term. It is said that these Islamists had chosen to attach themselves to an Islamic political party, they would have been affected by the poor performance of Islamic political parties in Indonesia. Also, joining political parties would have created the impression that they were seeking formal power. Even though it is understood that, according to the nature of the Islamism, formal power is a condition for running Islamisation, for KPPSI this power-based approach would likely not have been conducive to gaining support from Muslim society because it would create a competition for power among Muslim leaders and groups. Furthermore, by establishing this form of

---


\(^{535}\) Interview with Hamka Haq, 7 February 2003.
committee, these Islamists could maximise their alliances with other Muslim figures in South Sulawesi, not only in Islamic political parties but also in secular parties such as the Golkar Party. Looking at this strategy, doubts about the success of KPPSI’s demands are based on the negative responses of the provinces and on the central government’s reactions. They may have viewed the movement as politically threatening.

Therefore, due to the political nature of KPPSI’s mission, it may be useful for KPPSI to avoid threatening existing political power at the local and national level. The Committee also seems to be able to accommodate ongoing rivalries between the two mainstream Muslim mass organisations in South Sulawesi, NU and Muhammadiyah. Most importantly, through it bears the name of ‘Committee’, its nature is temporary. Once its mission of Special Autonomy for the implementation of Islamic law is achieved, the institution will disband. It can be argued that this aspect of the Islamist project in the region has been a success. The problem, as will be further seen in KPPSI’s Islamic law in the Chapter Seven and Eight, is the manner in which this committee has brought the discourse of Islamic syariat into a wider community, where there is a religious diversity.

D. Abdul Aziz Kahar Muzakkar: A Romanticised Figure?

The figure of Abdul Aziz Kahar, Kahar Muzakkar’s son, is critical to an understanding of the nostalgia for DI within the KPPSI movement. He is the figure who has featured most in news coverage concerning KPPSI and his name is the most familiar among South Sulawesi Muslim activists. This section explores in more detail the central role of Abdul Aziz Kahar in linking the historic DI movement with the creation of KPPSI.

From an early age, Abdul Aziz was drawn to Islamic activism. In 1987, while studying fishery at Hasanuddin University, Makassar, he joined the HMI. His Islamist orientation became apparent when he rejected the HMI’s decision to comply with the Soeharto regime’s orders to replace Islam as the association’s basis with the ‘religiously neutral’ Pancasila ideology. He subsequently became a leader in HMI-MPO, which was denied recognition by the government. Another revealing decision during this period was Aziz’s joining of the Pesantren Hidayatullah, based in Balikpapan. Established by Abdullah Said, this institution had a reputation for teaching a literalist interpretation of Islam and for championing the enactment of Islamic law.
Sidney Jones of the International Crisis Group has remarked that the closeness between Aziz Kahar and Pesantren Hidayatullah came about because Abdullah Said, also of Bugis background, had idolised Kahar Muzakkar. However, I would suggest that many former HMI-MPO members, Abdul Aziz included, saw in Hidayatullah a place to operate an Islamic ‘community’, make a viable livelihood, and accommodate their Islamic idealism in a time of pressure from the New Order regime. Abdul Aziz said as much when asked the reasons for involving HMI with Hidayatullah. For him the HMI was a channel for caderisation, to disseminate Islamic values and political thought, and many former activists used their HMI experience as the basis of their political careers in the bureaucracy and parliament. To answer doubts about his activism as being a mere reflection of his famous father’s name, as an individual, Abdul Aziz Kahar has forged his own identity, especially in his ability to demonstrate his ideological opposition to the ‘secular’ regime of his day.

Interest in the figure of Aziz Kahar began when he was elected Chairman of KPPSI in 2000. It became most intense when he was elected member of the DPD in 2004, prompting various comments concerning his election. There are at least three areas of speculation regarding his appointment. The first is that his popularity was mainly brought about by the dynastic factor. This claim is held by some activists who are well aware that many people in South Sulawesi still romanticise the figure of Kahar Muzakkar and indeed, there are members the syariat movement themselves who think of it as a continuation of the DI program.

---

536 International Crisis Group, “Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia: The Case of the ‘Nguku Network’ in Indonesia.”


538 ICG report stresses the genealogical relation between KPPSI and DI through the father-son relation of Abdul Aziz Kahar and the late Kahar Muzakkar. See International Crisis Group, ‘al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia: The Case of the ‘Nguku Network’ in Indonesia, p. 17.

See also Dias Pradadimara and Burhaman Junedding who state that no wonder the movement found it hard to deflect accusations of ‘nostalgia’. See Pradadimara and Junedding, “Who is Calling for Islamic Law?” Inside Indonesia, October-December 2002, p. 25. See also the role of genealogical relationship in his election, Pare Post, “Putra Kahar Muzakkar serukan syariat Islam”, 26 August 2002.

539 They saw that the election of Aziz Kahar invited the impression that KPPSI’s struggle was the continuation of Kahar Muzakkar’s DI idealism, that is, the establishment of the Islamic state in Eastern Indonesia. Moreover, the idea to choose Aziz Kahar was a way for KPPSI activists to gain support from the Muslim community in general, through the romanticization of Kahar Muzakkar, who was a legend to many of his former followers in the area. Sopamena pointed out that besides
A second comment has arisen regarding the personality of Aziz Kahar. According to the late Abdurrahman A. Basalamah, the most important figure in the syariat movement in South Sulawesi, the election of Aziz Kahar, was not related to his father. Basalamah argued that if Aziz Kahar had been inspired his father, why should he be the only one when Kahar Muzakkar had a number of other sons? Basalamah described Aziz' personality, which had long come to the attention of the syariat activists, as being deeply committed to Islamic teachings. Basalamah had known Aziz since his earliest activities as a young man in Islamic organisations, when he established charitable pesantren, taking in orphans and caring for them. He also said that Aziz was a simple and polite Muslim, who had sound perspectives in struggling for Islam. The comment on Aziz's personality is also related

Aziz, there were many other potential leaders of KPPSI but the motive was to to tap into the romanticism surrounding Kahar Muzakkar. Interview with Sopamena, 17 March 2003.

The election of Aziz Kahar was further seen as aimed at repairing the historical trauma of Kahar Muzakkar’s rebellion. It was to show the people that Kahar Muzakkar's fight was a noble one to establish an Islamic state through revolutionary means. Therefore, the appearance of Aziz Kahar as the son of Kahar Muzakkar was to enact the historical struggle, this time not through rebellion, but through constitutional methods. Interview with Sidney Jones, 30 July 2003.

Abdul Aziz Kahar’s formal political career began with his election as one of the 4 members of Dewan Perwakilan Daerah (Regional Representative Council, DPD) in the 2004 legislation elections. His election was directly connected with being an activist in KPPSI which proposed his candidature. The success of the more than 600 thousands votes given by South Sulawesi voters and his sitting in second position indicated the great support given to him.

Abdul Aziz Kahar’s success was much discussed when compared to the slight difference in results between Aksa Mahmud, the first elected, who was well known as one of the richest business man in South Sulawesi and who was claimed to spend billions of rupiah to gain support in South Sulawesi. Should the support given to Aziz Kahar indicate support for KPPSI? Sirajuddin, the Vice Secretary of Advisory Council of KPPSI stated that Aziz’s election had a direct relation with the Islamic syariat ideals of KPPSI. Interview with Sirajuddin, 23 June 2004.

Abdul Aziz said that there were three factors in his favour as a candidate: he was a reformist, KPPSI activist, and the son of Kahar Muzakkar. He was considered by many voters to bring change to political life in South Sulawesi. He gained support from the majority of the inhabitants of the intellectuals' housing complex in Makassar. Aziz further stated that his contribution to KPPSI was also significant. Aziz stated that it could be certainly determined that all members of KPPSI in all districts of South Sulawesi voted for him. However, Aziz admitted that the most significant aspect of his support was the Kahar Muzakkar factor. All former pockets of DI, such as the western part of Bone and all areas in Luwu, the birthplace of Kahar Muzakkar, voted for Aziz. Interview with Abdul Aziz Kahar, 25 June 2005.

Sirajuddin, however, said that Aziz was a well known activist of KPPSI, adding that it was possible that another son of Kahar Muzakkar offered himself as a candidate but did not receive many votes,
to his leadership skills in being able to lead HMI and HMI-MPO, where many former activists of HMI in Makassar admitted of Aziz’ charisma. The third view combines the first two, arguing that Aziz Kahar’s appearance in local and national politics was not only accounted for by his father’s name but also by the credibility and suitability of Aziz himself. Several intellectuals of KPPSI sided with this response. It is very understandable that Aziz Kahar should always be thought of in relation to his father, since there is a tradition in South Sulawesi society of valorising historical figures like Kahar Muzakkar. However, I also see Abdul Aziz’s popularity as a Muslim activist to have been based on the reputation which he forged for himself. One clear example is his winning votes in the DPD election from most of the residential areas in Makassar city, an educated electorate which could, of course, have been critical of him if it had so chosen.

Yet negative views have also arisen around Abdul Aziz Kahar, not merely on account of his rebel father, but also due to perceptions based on his involvement in the reputed extremist organisations HMI and Hidayatullah. Some say that he had been a fundamentalist.\(^{541}\) To others it would seem that the image of Islam in these movements is nothing more than Aziz Kahar’s own Islamic vision.

However, if we explore something of what the man has written and said of his Islamic struggle, we will find that he may be more moderate than people might expect. Despite his being a pro-formal syariat Muslim, Aziz appreciates the existence of cultural struggle of Islam, where Islam seeks to distance itself from politics. In 2003 he wrote:

> the existence of KPPSI was a meeting point of the efforts to differentiate between substantialist and formalist Muslims. KPPSI is a formalist movement which selects its members on a cultural basis due to its accommodation of many institutions that use cultural methods. The cultural process is important to reach the formalist stage of the movement. However, formalist efforts at empowering Islam are needed since the cultural movement itself needs the formalist way to operate maximally.\(^{542}\)

---

\(^{541}\) Interview with Abu Hamid, 26 March 2003.

In comparing the claim of KPPSI that it is always being attached to DI as an extremist Islamic rebellion, Abdul Aziz stated:

The idealism of KPPSI was towards the creation of civil society. The existence of KPPSI is ideal compared to that of DI. DI emerged as a reactionary Islamic movement against the Soekarno government and, therefore, its membership was not formed of prepared cadets. Maximum discipline of DI members could be imposed in times of physical war against the republican army.\footnote{543}

The figure of Aziz Kahar brought multiple benefits to the pro-syariat activists of South Sulawesi. They appreciated his capacity to lead the movement because of his long involvement in Islamic organisations. They also saw him as an acceptable figure in the interaction of the movement with broader political forces in Indonesia. In spite of his recently acquired position as a DPD member in Jakarta, syariat activists see him as lacking any real political nous. They cite two reasons for this: first, his refusal to continue to join the government-approved HMI in his student days due to the organisation’s adoption of Pancasila as its ideology, and second, the fact that his involvement in the DPD has been not so much of his own doing but more a matter of KPPSI’s political maneuvering. They hoped that the presence of Aziz Kahar would help to avoid perceptions that the syariat movement posed an open political threat.

Aziz Kahar is also used by the syariat campaigners as a nostalgic figure. First and most obviously, the movement expects to retain the allegiance of his father’s previous DI support base. Furthermore, they anticipate that Aziz Kahar may become a figurehead Islamist like his father, not against the Indonesian Republic and the central government, but against the current moral crisis which they feel must be fought against by the formal implementation of Islamic law. It is on these considerations that the syariat campaigners, in promoting Aziz Kahar to the arena of local politics, cherish the expectation of a bright future for the syariat in South Sulawesi.

E. Inside KPPSI: Factions and Worldviews

To discuss the figures driving the Islamic orientation of KPPSI is much more complex than discussing the central figures of DI. As has been found in the chapters concerning DI’s history, its ideology was strongly determined by its main leader, Kahar Muzakkar. Therefore, the various ideological complexities inside DI were not so apparent, because final decisions tended to adhere to the ideas of one man.

By contrast, the key figures in KPPSI are a diverse group. The movement has been coloured by figures from different backgrounds that, in turn, have shaped their worldview. It is important to recognise the various factions and worldviews of KPPSI in order to understand that this formalist Islamic movement is not monolithic. Furthermore, it was through the diverse nature of the people involved that the movement could strengthen its effort to avoid being labeled overall with the pejorative claim of being ‘fundamentalist’, which was often applied to only a small group of people within the movement.

This section attempts to group KPPSI activists according to their ideological orientations. The ideological groupings of activists were determined by external factors, such as their educational backgrounds, which considerably shaped their worldview. The figures included in this discussion are those who were formally attached to the organisations, despite the fact that there were other important figures who openly supported KPPSI but were not included in the structure of the movement. Its members ranged from those figures with a strongly formalist orientation, some with intimidating qualities, to moderate factions, and even to those who were associated with DI. The four groups discussed here are: young formalist constitutionalist, Laskar Jundullah, old Islamist, and moderate wings.

The young formalist constitutionalist group are figures found mainly in Executive Body of KPPSI. This is the group that, due to the vocal nature of promoting its ideas, was most commonly associated with KPPSI. These leaders applied an open approach to voicing their demand for the implementation of syariat, even calling for the implementation of Islamic law without further explanation of the nature of Islamic law itself. Their ability to voice their demands in an articulate manner was largely due to their background as Islamic activists. They were mainly graduates of secular universities, where they had previously used the campus organisation as the base of their Islamic activism. The main supporters of
KPPSI from the youth group were the activists of the hardliner faction of the Muslim Student Organisation, HMI-MPO.\textsuperscript{544}

However, they saw that their struggle for formalist Islam was not to be directed to revolutionary means and resorting to violence. They see DI, for example, as an effort to establish religious authority. They did not agree with his strategy of rebellion against the republic.\textsuperscript{545} Therefore, in conducting their struggle for syariat, the young constitutionalist group tend to use peaceful and legal means, such as writing in the mass media or gaining political positions for the improvement of their movement’s bargaining position.\textsuperscript{546}

The main figures in the group are the chair, Abdul Aziz Kahar Mudzakkar, the secretary Aswar Hasan\textsuperscript{547} and the deputy secretary, Kalmuddin.\textsuperscript{548}

The element of Laskar Jundullah, at the time of writing this thesis in 2006, was no longer part of KPPSI. The militia group Laskar Jundullah was not exclusively connected to KPPSI, as the term, meaning ‘God’s Soldiers’, has been used by many paramilitary groups in areas Indonesia operating in conflict areas such as Poso, Central Java and Maluku.\textsuperscript{549}

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{544} This is at least seen in the executive board of KPPSI 2002. Abdul Aziz Kahar, chair of executive board and Kalmuddin vice secretary were former prominent activists of HMI MPO. Interview with Kalmuddin, 22 January 2005.

\textsuperscript{545} Interview with Abdul Aziz Kahar, 23 June 2003; Aswar Hasan, 14 December 2004; Kalmuddin, 22 January 2005.

\textsuperscript{546} Abdul Aziz Kahar and Aswar Hasan have often written in the local newspapers to explain the nature of KPPSI.

\textsuperscript{547} Aswar Hasan is also known as a Muslim activist, academic and writer in Makassar. Besides being active in KPPSI, he is also the chairman of the Komite Penyiaran Indonesia (Indonesian Broadcasting Committee) South Sulawesi region. His background is in the department of Politics, Hasanuddin University, where he later taught. He was a former activist of PII where he was close to Abdul Aziz Kahar and Tamsil Linrung.\textsuperscript{548} His thoughts spread through his seminar papers, his comments as a political analyst and his writings in both local and national newspapers. His ideas on the implementation of Islamic law can be gained through his seminar papers.

\textsuperscript{548} His formal educational background is the faculty of Education, Teachers’ Training Institute which was commonly known as IKIP (Institute Keguruan dan Ilmu Pengetahuan) now known as UNM (Universitas Negeri Makassar, State University of Makassar). It was in this university that he began his Islamic activism, through his involvement in the HMI MPO of the commissariat of IKIP since 1991. His formalist Islamic vision was gained through his long involvement in this organisation. He was even the general chair of the HMI MPO Makassar from 1995-1996. From 1997, he was active as secretary up to the present in the Forum Ukhawah Islamiyah (FUI), while the chair was held by the late Abdurrahman A. Basalamah. FUI was an organisation established early 1997 with the mission to strengthen the Muslim brotherhood, and with an Islamic formalist orientation.

\end{footnotesize}
However, in spite of the term’s widespread use, the largest and best known Laskar Jundullah was the one that appeared as the paramilitary wing of KPPSI.\footnote{Information on the establishment and development of Laskar Jundullah is difficult to provide since little research has been done on it. A problem is the reluctance of many informants to tell their side of story due to rumours of the spread of foreign intelligence at the time when the terrorism was related to Muslim fundamentalists and also that it would be used in intelligence work. Indeed, some scholars admitted the distribution of several Western agencies in the suspected areas. However, Jennifer Donohoe found out how Laskar Jundullah was first established. She states it was the result of the cooperation of the Yayasan Wirabuana, a charity organisation connected to the Wirabuana Seventh Regional Military Command based in Makassar Kompak. Kompak was established to distribute aid from Middle Eastern countries to Indonesian conflict areas, especially Ambon and Poso. According Donohoe, the two organisations then established the Laskar Jundullah paramilitary group to help facilitate the transfer of ‘volunteers’ to the Poso and Ambon conflicts. See Jennifer Donohoe, “Islamic Law and Competition for Power in the Reformasi Era: The KPSI of South Sulawesi,” 69 - 70.}

Laskar Jundullah members were recruited from various backgrounds. ICG reported that they had backgrounds in radical Islamic groups and maintained several networks of recruitment. First, members were sourced from youths who were sympathetic to Kahar Muzakkar’s DI, especially from the faction of Sanusi Daris, Kahar Muzakkar’s Defense Minister. The second group was those who were from the hard line faction, known as HMI-MPO.\footnote{International Crisis Group, “Indonesia Backgrounder: How the Jamaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network Operates,” p. 21.} Greg Fealy of the Australian National University holds a similar opinion to ICG on the relationship between the laskar and DI, quoting the laskar’s claim that members were also members of local gangs in South Sulawesi who acted as semi-criminal vigilante groups.\footnote{Greg Fealy, “Radical Islam in Indonesia,” a paper presented in the conference on From Terrorism to Revolution - The JiHadith Threat to Regime Survival in Societies: Historical Cases and Current Prospects,” held in Washington D.C., on 22 November 2002.}

Both ICG’s and Fealy’s reports, however, fail to paint a complete picture of Laskar Jundullah. Like the figures of KPPSI in general, Laskar Jundullah was not monolithic, at least in their recruitment patterns and religious attitudes. Concerning Laskar Jundullah’s recruitment, it has already been seen that many members had a background in paramilitary actions in Maluku and Poso. It is true that some Laskar Jundullah members had a gang background, especially those members who usually guarded KPPSI congress. Many of them came from KPPSI branches where they were not necessarily from gang backgrounds.
For example, members of Laskar Jundullah of Parepare who often participate in guarding KPPSI’s congresses were recruited from several Remaja Mesjid (Mosque Youths).

There has been an effort on the part of KPPSI to overcome the stigma of Laskar Jundullah. This has been especially apparent since the entry of many moderate intellectuals, many of whom proposed to modify the youth wing of the organisation.\textsuperscript{553} A committee member registered his objection to being joining KPPSI if Laskar Jundullah was still supported. At the Second Congress, it had already been proposed that Laskar Jundullah be changed into Laskar Penegak Syariat Islam (Islamic law Enforcement Brigade) to obviate the impression that the paramilitary wing was focused on war. When the Second Congress board was launched; \textit{laskar} was no longer mentioned. The youth wing of the organisation was plainly referred to as \textit{kepemudaan} (youth department), whose members were nothing to do with Laskar Jundullah.

The old constitutionalist group is another group of KPPSI activists who have a history of long involvement in Islamic activism in South Sulawesi. In KPPSI, they sit mainly as members of the Majelis Syura. The Majelis Syura, besides doing conceptual work, also oversees the young activists in Lajnah Tanfidziyah so that the latter do not act rashly.\textsuperscript{554} It is no exaggeration to say that for many of the young radical activists in KPPSI, this group of senior Islamists has been the most influential in the organisation. Besides being more experienced, this group is considered by the young activists to be critical to the movement’s authority, and, therefore, to the credibility of their struggle. Many young formalists often seek advice from activists of this group before conducting activities related to the implementation of Islamic law in the province.

Old constitutionalist Islamists have often expressed concern at any sign of unjust treatment received by the Muslim people from followers of other religions, whether in political or economic life. They were also concerned with defending Islam from the stigma of violent actions.\textsuperscript{555} Their constitutionalist view, however, was seen in their abandonment of any effort to enforce \textit{syariat} through revolutionary or forceful means. Even though they might have held radical ideas, their prominence in Islamic formalist activities is only

\textsuperscript{553} Interview with Jalaluddin Rahman, 15 March 2003.
\textsuperscript{554} Interview with Noer Bahri Noer, 4 March 2003.
known among internal activists, since their activism was not expressed in the form of rallies, strikes, or demonstrations, but in their writings. Moreover, as in the majority of cases they were not in the operational body of KPPSI, they mostly worked behind the scenes. Their formalistic views were also, to some extent, influenced by their previous activism, whether in connection with the DI movement or with militant factions within the Muhammadiyah and NU organisations. There are several ‘old Islamists’ who can be placed in this group. They are the prominent figures, the late Abdurrahman A. Basalamah, Noer Abdurrahman and H.M. Sirajuddin.

---

556 Abdurrahman A. Basalamah can be considered the most important figure in KPPSI. He was called ‘the father of Islamic law in South Sulawesi’ within KPPSI circle. If this title is related to his contribution to the struggle for the implementation of syariat, it is not an exaggeration. Basalamah came from a family traditionally oriented towards Islam. His interest in formalist Islam was due to his involvement with modernist Islamic movements, in which he saw the significance of formalist Islam in Indonesia, especially in South Sulawesi. He was involved in the early pioneering efforts to establish KPPSI through the organisation he led, Forum Ukhuhwah Islamiyah.

Abdurrahman A. Basalamah has long been known for his academic and social activities. He was a prominent economist, the former Rector of UMI Makassar, and until his death he was the chair of UMI foundation. In social organisations, he was also the vice-chair of ICMI, South Sulawesi. He was very active in local and national seminars. His thought contributed much to efforts to establish syariat, especially in its economic aspects. His death in 2004 significantly affected the dynamics of Islamic intellectualism in South Sulawesi and particularly KPPSI activism, the movement that he pioneered.

557 Noer Abdurrahman is well known as a Muslim activist and columnist. In Muslim organisations, he was active in Ikatan Majelis Muslimin Indonesia Mujahidah (IMMIM) an organisation working on da'ī (Muslim speakers) and in other religious activities. He is a weekly columnist for the newspaper Fajar. His main interests are the topics of ‘wahyu and akal’ (revelation and reason). He is a retired academic of the Hasanuddin University. He was a graduate of engineering and a former dean of the Engineering Faculty. His Islamic knowledge began in childhood, studying with his grandfather, who was a well known ulama in Selayar, South Sulawesi. His thorough understanding of Islam is reflected in his mastery of the Arabic language. Interview with Noer Abdurrahman, 16 March 2005.

558 Sirajuddin was vice-secretary of the Consultative Body of KPPSI. He attended secular schools and finished his studies at Teacher’s Training College in Yogyakarta. Due to his background in teaching he once served as an instructor to the PLN, the state electricity company in Makassar, where, because of his concern for Islamic activism he stopped working as a permanent employee. His Islamic knowledge was gained through cultural education. His father was an activist of Muhammadiyah in South Sulawesi during the time of the Dutch, and Sirajuddin was also a Muhammadiyah youth activist. At the time this thesis was written, he was the vice chair of Muhammadiyah, Makassar Branch.

It was through his involvement in Muhammadiyah that Sirajuddin’s views on formalist Islam became more pronounced. Muhammadiyah, as a modernist organisation, had been working to modernise Muslims’ understanding of their religion through education. Since this was only a culturally-based
Finally, a moderate group existed in KPPSI, and their important role in the organisation concerns ideology.\(^{559}\) Although some of the activists in this group studied at secular educational institutions, the majority consists of academics and graduates of the State Islamic Institutes; therefore, their Islamic knowledge has been gained within a formal framework. They have often specialised in the Islamic sciences, such as Islamic law, renewal of Islamic thought, Islamic history or Islamic education. Most are professors in Islamic institutions, especially the Institut Agama Islam Negeri (State Institute for Islamic Studies, IAIN). They have often studied Islam since childhood, through all formal educational levels up to that of university.

The ‘moderate group’ in KPPSI is interpreted as such because of their flexibility in interpreting Islamic teachings. Unlike those who seek the full replacement of national secular law with Islamic law, this group focuses more on the efforts to Islamise national law or to insert Islamic law gradually until the law is completely Islamic.\(^{560}\) Rather than criticising the western hegemonies, the moderates tend to focus on consolidating the Muslim community from within in order to challenge western hegemony. Therefore, they see the role of KPPSI as not only to gain special provincial autonomy, but also to voice the need for the Muslim community to adopt Islamic law, including its criminal code.

The moderation of this group is also seen in efforts to argue for and defend the relevance of Islamic syariat in the modern world, using modern interpretations. This includes their guarantee of the safeguarding of religious minorities if syariat were to be formally implemented.\(^{561}\) They emphasise the need for KPPSI to employ modern systems of campaigning for syariat, including the necessity to avoid terms of struggle that depict images of force or violence.\(^{562}\)

\(^{559}\) Dias Pradadimara and Burhan Junedding, “Who is Calling for Islamic Law?: The Struggle to implement Islamic Law in South Sulawesi,” p. 25.


\(^{561}\) Jalaluddin Rahman, “Posisi Non-Muslim Di Tengah Masyarakat Islam Dalam Kehidupan Berbangsa,” a paper presented in a One Day Seminar, held by the South Sulawesi Provincial Government in Maranu City Hotel, 8 November 2001.

The most prominent figures among the majority of KPPSI board members, who belong to the moderate faction are Abdul Muin Salim (Chair of the Consultative Council), Jalaluddin Rahman (Vice Chair of the Consultative Council), Ahmad Ali (chair of the Intellectual Body), and Fuad Rumi (vice chair of the Executive body).

Abdul Muin Salim is a former rector of IAIN Alauddin Makassar and now rector of the University of East Indonesia. He is a professor of Islamic law, holding his doctorate in the Politics in the Holy Qur'an, already published. He is active in academe and in Muslim organisations. He holds the chairs of Majelis Syura in KPPSI and Persaudaraan Muslim Sedunia (International Moslem Brotherhood, PMS) in South Sulawesi. He is very active in attending seminars, speaking out on the need for Muslims to uphold syariat. His double expertise in syariat and politics has stimulated many people into thinking about the issues around formalised syariat.

Jalaluddin Rahman is well known as the professor of Renewal of Islamic thought at IAIN Alauddin Makassar. Though his ideas are usually launched in Muslim gatherings, he is widely known as the most controversial Muslim intellectual in the region. He holds a doctorate from IAIN Jakarta (now known as UIIN) with a thesis on exegesis on human deeds in the Quran. He is also known as an active writer in local newspapers. He writes especially on social and political developments in relation to Islamic teachings and promotes his ideas on the need to formalise Islamic law. He is active as the chair of the South Sulawesi Association of Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI) and as the vice chair of Majelis Syura, KPPSI. His involvement in KPPSI began in the Second Congress of KPPSI. His later involvement was based on his conviction of the infectivity of KPPSI but shortly before the Second Congress, he felt that he could help to empower the movement in line with his own interests.

Unlike the majority of the figures of KPPSI, Ahmad Ali is prominent at both local and national levels. Locally, he is known as an academic, as dean of the faculty of Law, Hasanuddin University, the most prestigious university in South Sulawesi. He is also known as the columnist for Fajar, the local newspaper on legal and social problems in society and promotes his views on the need for syariat to be formalised. Nationally, he is known as an expert in legal studies, and is recognised as among the few national figures with great personal integrity.

Ahmad Ali's sympathy with the struggle of KPPSI dates to the time when it was pioneered. In an open dialogue held by KPPSI, he spoke in support of the efforts of the demands for Special Autonomy and formalised syariat, issues which he also supports in his frequent writings. As a graduate of a secular university from bachelor to doctorate, his knowledge of Islam was acquired culturally, through his parents. His understanding of Islamic law calls upon his tremendous acquaintance with Islamic and secular law and believes that formalised Islamic law is natural to the life of Muslim people.

Fuad Rumi is vice chair of the Executive Body of KPPSI. He is an academic at the Muslim University of Indonesia (UMI). He was active in the foundation of UMI, which was led by the late Abdurrahman A. Basalamah. He graduated as a technical engineer from Gajah Mada University. His Islamic schooling was received at the Muallim school of Muhammadiyah at Toli-Toli. Southeast Sulawesi. He admits that he was never active in well known student organisations or in Islamic organisations, such as HMI or PII. Although he was a pivotal figure at UMI, his Islamic understanding was not as radical as Basalamah's. He too is a weekly columnist for Fajar under 'gelitik' ('The Goad') where he discusses matters from the trivial to the serious, followed by his own analysis in the light of Islamic teachings.

The position of these figures is based on the structure of KPPSI board 2002.
Hasyim Aidid (Secretary of the Intellectual Body) and Ahmad M. Sewang (a member of the Majelis Syura). To sum up the characteristics of the moderate figures of KPPSI, first they are quite open at making internal criticism of the organisation for the sake of its future improvement. Second, they prioritised strategically the positive benefits of Islam rather than the harsh punishments of syariat when raising society’s understanding of Islamic law. Finally, they continually attempt to plot steps for the movement to take in order to achieve better results.

This chapter has examined the dynamics of the formation of KPPSI, its emergence and the character of its supporters. It can be concluded that the legacy of DI is clearly observable in the former DI followers who supported the establishment of the movement. Aziz Kahar Muzakkar is the son of Kahar Muzakkar. However, the DI factor cannot wholly explain the emergence of KPPSI. My discussion has shown that there were many other Islamists in KPPSI who had no DI connection. This attests to the continuing influence of Islamic modernism, including the role of Muhammadiyah educational training in the radicalisation of Islamism in the region. Furthermore, young Islamists have begun to be shaped by broader Islamist movements due to their access to global Islam. To some extent, KPPSI also attracted young activists with attitudes of intolerance to others.

In looking at the activists of KPPSI, one can state that they have various organisational and professional backgrounds but were brought together by their shared belief that the only way to maximise the implementation of Islamic teachings was through formalist Islam. This awareness was triggered also by their belief that the failure of the New Order Regime in 1998 represented the failure of secular law to manage Indonesian society effectively. Syariat was the alternative and might be achieved through an Islamic autonomy. KPPSI saw its decision to mould their movement into a temporary committee as the right one, as it was the way to accommodate all comers, from no matter what

---

568 Hasyim Aidid is the secretary of the Intellectual Body of KPPSI. He is a senior lecturer in Islamic law at IAIN Alauddin Makassar. His master degree is from The Australian National University and his Ph.D from Hasanuddin University. He is also an activist of NU. He gives much of his time to political activities, being a former member of PPP and PKB.

569 Ahmad M. Sewang is a member of Majelis Syura of KPPSI. At the time this thesis was written he was the director of Post Graduate Studies at IAIN Alauddin Makassar. He is also a well known Islamic historian, and his Ph.D was on the Islamisation of Gowa, awarded by IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah, Jakarta.
background. However, to achieve the ultimate goal of autonomy, KPPSI would have to face many more complexities than first imagined. It is these issues that we will consider in the next chapter.
Chapter Six

KONSOLIDATING KPPSI: THE TRANSITION FROM MILITANCY TO MODERATION

KPPSI’s early existence was coloured by several controversies. There arose the perception that it used physical intimidation, strong arm-tactics or threats to achieve the goal of Special Autonomy for the implementation of Islamic law. During this period, a mass mobilisation campaign for *syariat* was among KPPSI’s activities. This mobilisation was seen by KPPSI’s critics as likely to create anarchic action, especially among in its paramilitary wings. KPPSI worked to activate seminars and dialogues with people in South Sulawesi, but what is more apparent in its early years is its tendency to show its power in the streets.

In its first two years (2000-2002), KPPSI has even been accused of being involved in violent networks, first, in the bombing incidents which occurred in Makassar, and second in the arrest of one of its important figures who was convicted of carrying explosive materials. These then created a stigma and suspicion attached to KPPSI and its activities. In consequence, during its early period of existence, KPPSI posed a serious challenge of survival as an organisation, as well as for its main struggle to champion *syariat* in South Sulawesi. This challenge then reflected the changing strategy of this movement from the third year of existence, especially after the active contribution of the moderate wings of the movement.

This chapter will show the development of KPPSI’s struggle in promoting formalised *syariat*. It will describe how after its First Congress (October 2000), the movement emerged with the use of mass mobilisation. It also employed political pressure, such as visiting local and national parliaments in an effort to have its demand legalised. It will also examine how the movement has made an effort to rid itself of the stigma of a violent orientation. As part of its consolidation, this chapter will analyze the conduct of its last two congresses (the second and the Third Congresses) in its efforts to create programs to shift from a militant to a more moderate disposition.
A. Pressing Formal Authority

During the year after its First Congress (2000-2001), KPPSI still lacked recognition in South Sulawesi, and it concentrated on internal consolidation. The central board made strong efforts to establish branches throughout South Sulawesi, hoping to make available KPPSI representatives in every area. The activists also approached Muslim leaders and ulama to gain their help in spreading the call for the upholding of Islamic law. These initial steps were expected to gain wider support from the community to further pressure the South Sulawesi government to assist KPPSI to fight for the Special Autonomy to institute Islamic law.

As a first strategy in an effort to gain open support, KPPSI focused on mass mobilisation. KPPSI arranged an informal gathering on 15 April 2001 at al-Markaz al-Islami (Islamic Center) Mosque, Makassar, the most splendid mosque in South Sulawesi. The gathering had several items on its agenda. First, KPPSI leaders gave a number of speeches to remind the people of the obligation to implement syariat. Secondly, the gathering was to inaugurate the formal establishment of KPPSI branches in all areas of South Sulawesi. The central and branch committees then stated their ikrar (commitment) to the implementation of Islamic law.570

KPPSI likes to mark the stages in its struggle by issuing declarations. Besides the 'Deklarasi Makassar' produced during the First Congress, this gathering was closed with a ‘Deklarasi Muḥarram’ (Muḥarram Declaration), because it coincided with the month of Muḥarram, the first month in the Islamic calendar. Its aim was to back up the concrete steps of the central and branch committees at the First Congress.571 The demands of the

570 For the contents of the Ikrar, see Appendix XIII.

571 It urged the government and parliament to follow up the demand of implementing Islamic law through Special Autonomy (point one). It demanded that the government and the local Parliament produce regulations to create a conducive environment for the implementation of syariat (point two). It urged the government and the parliament to consider seriously these demands, or it would create complicated problems (point three). (This point seems to refer to the call for a referendum already instigated in the First Congress.)

Besides the above three points, the declaration also contained two calls, the call of the Muslim people to implement Islamic syariat (point four) and the call to appreciate those Muslims who were not in agreement with the effort (point five). This last point anticipated possible extreme reactions of many KPPSI members in responding to the disagreement of certain local Muslim intellectuals with KPPSI demands. See the full contents of the declaration in Appendix XIV.
declaration to both the government and parliament to involve themselves in upholding Islamic law were directly followed up on the following day, 6 April 2001. On 24 April 2001 Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah (the Provincial Parliament, DPRD) issued a letter of recommendation for the Implementation of Islamic law in South Sulawesi, No. 160/309/DPRD/2001.\textsuperscript{572} The recommendation was addressed to the President of the Republic of Indonesia and the chairman of the Central Parliament.

As will be seen below, the recommendation issued by DPRD which KPPSI hoped would support its demand of Special Autonomy for the implementation of Islamic law to the central government was, in fact, ineffective. This ineffectiveness can be described in the words of one activist of KPPSI, Noer Bahry Noer, who said that as bringing such a recommendation to DPR was like kicking a `flat ball`.\textsuperscript{573}

The recommendation functioned to channel the aspirations of KPPSI to the national government, since there is a law that only the central government can fulfill the demands of Special Autonomy. The recommendations were issued on the results of both the First Congress of KPPSI and the Muharram Declaration (point one). It was in accordance with the regulation on local autonomy, No. 22 tahun 1999, under which religious affairs are in the hands of the central government (point two). The recommendation was furthermore based on DPRD’s request to the governor of South Sulawesi to study the aspirations of Islamic syariat (point three). A recommendation was further needed to follow this up in accordance with the national constitution (point four). The recommendation was based on the fact that all branches of KPPSI had already been installed to uphold Islamic syariat (point five). Based on these considerations, DPRD recommended that these aspirations be further processed in a constitutional manner. The recommendation was then signed by the Chair and all factions of DPRD.

KPPSI representatives and DPRD traveled to Jakarta to deliver the letter to the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, (the National Parliament, DPR). KPPSI was led by the coordinator of its Advisory Council, Abdurrahman A. Basalamah, while DPRD was represented by its vice chairman, Edy Baramuli and all chairs of DPRD’s Commissions. The Speaker of the Central Parliament, Akbar Tanjung received the delegation. KPPSI then stated their demands for an Aceh-style Special Autonomy Package. Both Edy Baramuli and

\textsuperscript{572} For complete information on the recommendation, see Appendix XV.

\textsuperscript{573} Interview with Noer Bahri Noer, 4 April 2003.
Akbar Tanjung were Golkar figures who were hardly to going support Islamism. Edy Baramuli was even well known in South Sulawesi for not having record of religious pity at all.

In responding to this, Akbar Tanjung, while agreeing to put the proposal to the House, stated that Special Autonomy could be given to a province only as long as the province concerned presented its own specialty. He explained that the case of Aceh was unique and should be viewed differently from the case of South Sulawesi. KPPSI representatives, however, were not satisfied with this. For them, the circumstances of South Sulawesi were not very different from those of Aceh in the case of religiosity. They believed that South Sulawesi was second only to Aceh. Azwar Hasan sharply opposed the logic of Akbar:

When Aceh and Papua gained their Special Autonomy, they were persuaded by the central government not to exercise rebellion against the centre. The logic of the policy had to be safeguarded. Otherwise, if the demand of Muslim people in South Sulawesi to gain Special Autonomy was not met in a constitutional manner, some people might develop the idea that it was only by revolutionary and rebellious movements that Special Autonomy might be gained. I hope such logic does not emerge in the people here. We, KPPSI, believed in the legislative and political processes towards Special Autonomy.\textsuperscript{574}

KPPSI continued to struggle to pave the way for its demands by approaching South Sulawesi politicians in DPR. They approached all members of the National Parliament from South Sulawesi. On 26 April 2001, a meeting was held, led by the deputy speaker of the DPR, A.M. Fatwa. A.M. Fatwa was from South Sulawesi and he was known to support the demands of KPPSI. Besides KPPSI, the Paguyuban Lintas Fraksi (Trans-Faction Forum) Sulawesi Selatan, DPR attended.\textsuperscript{575}


\textsuperscript{575} At first, the creation of Pokja was viewed positively by KPPSI. However, later, KPPSI began to suspect the political motives behind it. Abdurrahman A. Basalamah discovered a tendency in Pokja to rival KPPSI. He pointed out that there were a number of KPPSI activists who became involved in
A Pokja (Kelompok Kerja, Working group) was created in DPR to follow it up. It appears that the DPR merely responded by asking Muslim politicians of South Sulawesi to learn more of the nature of the demands for Special Autonomy. It cannot be said to have promised anything for the realisation of the demands. It did not work as formal support of DPRD to KPPSI demands. There was no statement of House support. Rather, the House only emphasised it to channel aspirations. The recommendation also did not have any legal power. The secretary of the Advisory Council of KPPSI, Noer Bahry Noer, who was aware of these weaknesses, commented that the recommendation should also have been accompanied by a letter of support from the government and the Muslim community leaders of South Sulawesi to have any bargaining position.

In addition to the failure of recommendation, the early campaign of KPPSI for its demands was also undermined by the lack of support from many local governments in South Sulawesi. Even though KPPSI attempted to appear that it was supported by local governments and Islamic organisations, the reality was that this was quite limited. Statements given by both the governor and the speaker of the DPRD were very vague. The governor once said that as a Muslim he supported the demands which was balanced by the statement of the speaker of the DPRD who said that as a Muslim he supported the demands but as the leader of an organisation he need to consult with other members. The government’s lack of support was admitted by many KPPSI activists. The provincial government did not immediately respond to the decisions made by the DPRD. KPPSI pointed out that when the DPRD asked the government to follow up their demands with

the Pokja and had withdrawn under suspicion. Adlin Sila, “Budaya Good Governance Dalam Masyarakat Indonesia,” 20.

KPPSI’s suspicions were based on the tendency of the Pokja to support the demands of KPPSI but to then block them. The Pokja decided on its own initiative whether the demand of KPPSI really represented the aspirations of South Sulawesi Muslims as a whole. In implementing the work of the Pokja, the leader, Harifuddin Cawidu found that the Muslim people of South Sulawesi were not ready for the formal upholding of Islamic syariat. Harifuddin Cawidu’s information was suspected by KPPSI as subjective, since he was a strong opponent of Formalization. The finding of Cawidu was viewed by KPPSI as a way for the Pokja to curb the demands of KPPSI. The Pokja was then rejected by many branches of KPPSI, as in Bulukumba and Pare-Pare. Due to the ineffective work of the Pokja, it was then decided to access the aspiration of the Special Autonomy of Islamic law as KPPSI formally demanded. Fajar, 10 December 2001.

576 Tempo interaktif, 8 November 2001.

other related institutions, local government was very slow to react. The support of both provincial and district governments, on the other hand, was seen in its readiness to assist the KPPSI program financially, such as in accommodation for guests invited to KPPSI’s Second Congress 2002 and the help of the Makassar Mayor at its annual gathering held in 2004.

This tepid attitude on behalf of the government seems to have been based on conflicting considerations. On the one hand, KPPSI was viewed as a political threat, due to its agenda of Special Autonomy which could open up a new political space in the province. On the other hand, the government probably needed to harmonise its relations with KPPSI, which contained many intellectual elements. It continued to facilitate KPPSI activities without giving direct support in lobbying the central government for Special Autonomy, which was really needed. To this point, KPPSI activists seem to have become more aware of significant barriers in realising their demands. They began to be more realistic that the journey to achieve its goal of formalised syariat still required a long struggle. However, they also began to see that the most important thing was that the discourse of Islamic syariat had been opened up to society in so far as they were aware of their obligations to perform it. This is a start: realistically, syariat in South Sulawesi could not be achieved by means only of rallies.

B. KUI II: An Intensified Demand for Syariat

Kongres Umat Islam Kedua (Second Congress of Muslim Community, KUI II) of KPPSI was held at a time when the idea of formalist Islam was loaded with controversies. While the First Congress had ridden on the momentum of the post-Soeharto reformation era in Indonesian politics, the Second Congress was challenged with greater criticism of Islamic radicalism. The Congress was held on 29-31 December 2001, in the same venue as First

579 Interview with Jalaluddin Rahman, 6 March 2003.
581 Greg Fealy has put so called Islamic radicalism into three general categories; literal understanding of Islamic law; reactive and violent responses to secular, materialist or deviationist forces; and hostile attitudes to the status quo. However, he differentiates between radicalism and
Congress, Sudiang, Makassar, South Sulawesi. Its political demands were similar to those of the First Congress, that is, Special Autonomy for the Implementation of Islamic Law in South Sulawesi. KPSSP strengthened this demand, canvassing political support from various prominent figures in South Sulawesi. In the First Congress, KPSSP had only concentrated on winning support from the intellectual elements, but in the Second Congress, the provincial bureaucracy, national businessmen and politicians of South Sulawesi origin were invited to sponsor the Congress.\footnote{582}

However, the commitment of these figures to the objectives of the Congress needs to be scrutinised. The Congress had already been hampered in its efforts to bring in the former Vice President of the Republic, Hamzah Haz, well known as an Islamist activist (the present chair of the Islamic party, PPP and a sympathiser with formalist Islam).\footnote{583} It is said that the date of the Congress was adjusted to coincide with a formal visit made by Hamzah Haz to South Sulawesi in his capacity as Vice President. In the event, however, Haz was

fundamentalism. Radicalism has more political and militant overtones while fundamentalism is for those committed to the religious or spiritual fundamentals of their faiths. If this definition is followed, many scholars seem to see the Muslims who strive for the formal implementation of Islamic law as radical Muslims since some members of syariat movements often use violent means in campaigning for their concept. See Greg Fealy, “Islamic Radicalism in Indonesia: The Faltering Revival?” Southeast Asian Affairs, 2004, pp. 105 – 121.

Radical Muslims’ have been associated with terrorism. The case of September 11, claimed by the US government to be the responsibility of the radical Muslim group, al –Qaeda has been telling enough. The holding of the Second Congress only three months after the terrorist attack in the United States, had had an impact on the perception of Muslims supporting syariat as associated with terrorism. See Jennifer Donohoe, “Islamic Law and the Competition for Power: The KPSI of South Sulawesi,” 45.

\footnote{582} Its advisory council included the Governor of South Sulawesi, the chair of the Provincial Parliament and the Mayor of Makasar as Members of the Advisory Committee. Muhammad Jusuf Kalla, successful businessman and politicians, A.M. Fatwa, the present vice chair of MPR, H.M. Aksa Mahmud, successful local businessman and Tamsil Lirung, businessman and Muslim activist were also included. The steering committee was taken from the rectors of all of Makassar’s prominent universities and leaders of Muslim mass organisations, notably Muhammadiyah and NU. The lists of members of the various committees were described by Dias Pradadimara and Buhuran Juneddin as reading like a “who’s who (male) of South Sulawesi.” See Dias Pradadimara and Buhraman Junedding, “Who is Calling for Islamic Law?,” p. 26. The inclusion of these people seems to have followed the traditional ways of organising events based on the political structure in South Sulawesi.

\footnote{583} Hamzah Haz led an Islamic political party, PPP, which was one of political parties in the 1999 elected parliament that strove for the inclusion of Piagam Jakarta in the 1945 Constitution. In many of his comments prior to his appointment as Vice-President, Haz often made his pro-Islamic formalism stance known in Indonesia.
reluctant to open the Congress and the task fell to Jusuf Kalla, the Coordinating Minister of Peoples’ Welfare who was part of Haz’ official visit. Haz made an informal visit to the Congress, which may be interpreted that he was now not in favour of the formal implementation of Islamic law. During his visit, Haz appealed to the congress participants to delay their demands until the political situation was more conducive. Jusuf Kalla also had the same message. In his opening speech, Kalla stated that the role of Islamic law in state affairs was already going well and that there were no barriers against any Muslim following Islamic teachings.

Besides Haz’ and Kalla’s soft opposition to the demand for formalised Islamic law, the commitment of many local identities to the Congress was also questioned. Many of these people appeared in the Congress only long enough to present a speech during the time allotted to them. Some, like the governor, only sent a representative while others made an appearance merely to avoid ill-feeling. Sanusi Baco, the chairman of NU stated that he came to the Congress as a participant merely because he was invited, not as a pioneer.

The enthusiasm of the congress participants was interpreted by KPPSI to be enthusiasm for formalising Islamic law. Compared to the First Congress, which was only attended by about 750 people, the Second Congress was far larger, attracting more than 2000 people who had been ready to pay 50 thousand rupiah to the congress committee to attend. The organising committee formally invited only three delegates from each district, though many districts sent up to 10 delegates. Sirajuddin, a member of organising committee, commented on this strong attendance with surprise.

The Second Congress also produced more systematic efforts to achieve Islamic autonomy. The first and most important result was the draft of the Constitution of Special Autonomy of South Sulawesi. (This draft will be discussed further as part of KPPSI’s concept of syariat as outlined in Chapter IV.) The draft was then handed to the vice

584 See Harifuddin Cawidu, “Penegakan Syari’at Islam Secara Kultural dan Substantial,” 7. See also “Wapres: Jangan Latak Terapkan Syariat Islam,” Kompas, 16 April 2002. Kompas reported that Hamzah Haz asked the South Sulawesi PPP to stop preparations for the implementation of Islamic law in South Sulawesi.


586 Interview with Sanusi Baco, 22 February 2003.

587 Interview with Sirajuddin, 16 March 2003.

588 For the whole contents of the draft, see Appendix XVI
chairman of the MPR, A. M. Fatwa, who had come to support the Congress and represented Amien Rais, the chair of the Council. The handing over of the draft was accompanied by emotional outbursts among the congress participants. Some wept while calling takbir (Ar. takbir) ‘Allahu Akbar’. The Congress also produced a more detailed outline of the course of action in order to achieve its goal. Concrete actions to support the implementation of Islamic law were suggested.\textsuperscript{589} The details included the call to all Muslims to start implementing aspects of Islamic teachings through cultural endeavours while consistently striving to gain constitutional ratification for the formal implementation of syariat. In cultural efforts, the struggle would include any matters of Islamic teaching that could be undertaken individually, such as, in economic practice Muslims were called to use syariat rather than conventional banks. The program of struggle also called on Muslims to start using legal structures for Islamic business while waiting for the Special Autonomy constitution, such as which would involve applying to the Bupati to create an Islamic Peraturan Daerah (Local Regulation, Perda).\textsuperscript{590} The case of Perda will be further touched on later last chapter of this thesis, in the discussion on KPPSI’s moderate strategies.

To support the program of struggle, the Congress also produced a program of socialisation, comprising dakwah (Ar. da’wah, Islamic missionary activities).\textsuperscript{591} The socialisation program also covered methods of approaching society. First, it asserted the voluntary action of KPPSI activists to help the law enforcement apparatus, either by reporting any law breaking action or by pressuring the law enforcement apparatus to act decisively to ban any evil actions. This voluntary action, however, emphasised politeness and avoiding discretionary actions.\textsuperscript{592} Interestingly, this program did not specify this task to be that of Laskar Jundullah, as was formally recommended in the First Congress. This

\textsuperscript{589} For the complete contents of KPPSI’s programs of struggle, see Appendix XVII.

\textsuperscript{590} For the information of this issue, see also Appendix XVII.

\textsuperscript{591} The dakwah is actualised in two ways: dakwah bil-lisan (oral mission) and dakwah bil-hal (action mission). The dakwah bil-lisan is an intensification of the Islamic syariat which covers every aspect of human life: ibadah, manhaj, politics, education and economy. The dakwah bil-hal is emphasised through practicing Islamic syariat by KPPSI activists. KPPSI activists should be in the vanguard of doing good deeds and avoiding bad deeds. The dakwah bil-hal includes welfare activities by the mosque, providing role models of working hard and not depending on other people. See “Program Sosialisasi” in Hasil Keputusan Kongres II Ummat Islam Sulawesi Selatan, December 21, unpublished Report received from KPPSI, 16 March 2003. See the complete contents of this socialisation program in Appendix XVIII.

\textsuperscript{592} Ibid.
may be an indication of the pressure put on several members of KPPSI, who now participated in the Second Congress, who were not happy with its attachment to KPPSI.

The socialisation program called on the Muslim people to create a model of implementing Islamic law which could be pioneered by Muslim figures or by local administrative leaders such as the Bupati, by giving priority to congregational prayers, wearing Muslim clothing, by an Islamic model of social intercourse and the practice of Islamic exegesis. The pilot project was to be initiated at university campuses, pesantren, housing complexes and villages.\textsuperscript{593} The socialisation was to be done in such a way as to avoid rousing antipathies in Muslim communities. The Congress also decided that it was to be not only directed to Muslims but also to non-Muslims, in order to ensure that the formal implementation of Islamic law gave them freedom to perform their own religious and worldly activities.\textsuperscript{594} The Congress also decided that the local autonomy as it currently existed was insufficient to implement Islamic law. Special Autonomy was required.

The Second Congress also issued a recommendation\textsuperscript{595} that KPPSI activists form Muslim merchants’ organisations and establish alms acceptance institutions in every district.\textsuperscript{596} An internal recommendation was to change the name of Laskar Jundullah to Laskar Penegak Syariat (Syariat Enforcing Paramilitary), and second the change of the name of KPPSI to KPSI.\textsuperscript{597} However, the Laskar itself was finally omitted from the structure of the organisation, as will be seen in the next subchapter.\textsuperscript{598} The recommendation to omit the word ‘persiapan’ (preparation) was also disregarded by the organisation and its name remain KPPSI, since following the Congress, the Majelis Syura saw that the main job of KPPSI was still to prepare for the implementation of Islamic law in South Sulawesi, after which it would automatically cease to function. These recommendations reflect KPPSI’s efforts to clear the organisation of claims that it was a violent, radical organisation. An additional point was the proposal to use the motto of ‘serambi Madinah’

\textsuperscript{593} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{594} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{595} See the original contents of the recommendation which resulted from KPPSI’s Second Congress in Appendix XIX.
\textsuperscript{596} See the section of “Rekomendasi,” in KPPSI, “Hasil-Hasil Keputusan Kongres II Ummat Islam Sulawesi Selatan,” Unpublished Document, 2001. For more information on this recommendation, see point 4 and 5 of the internal recommendations in Appendix XIX.
\textsuperscript{597} See internal recommendations, point 6 and 7 in Appendix XIX.
\textsuperscript{598} For more information on this, see the discussion of Laskar Jundullah in the next subchapter.
in South Sulawesi Province, both to label the province more Islamic,\textsuperscript{599} and also because the term could be related to a good acronym. ‘Serambi Madinah’ stands for: \textit{Serankaian amal kebajikan menuju masyarakat agamis dinamis, aman dan harmonis} (a number of good actions toward religious, dynamic, safe, and harmonious society). A menacing tone was, however, found in the repetition by the Congress of the threat to make concrete steps towards pressing for a referendum if the central government did not legalise Special Autonomy for the South Sulawesi government. This idea of referendum may be seen as a tactic of KPPSI to pressure the central government since KPPSI leaders must be aware of its impossibility of doing this. The campaign for formalised \textit{syariat} in the whole of South Sulawesi was not yet well acknowledged by Muslim society. It is very possible that this idea of referendum was reiterated by participants of the congress who were not aware of its nature.

Clearly, the effort of the KPPSI congress to demand Special Autonomy was intensified. The draft of Special Autonomy and the outline of the course of the action was seen by KPPSI as a blueprint for the implementation of Islamic law in South Sulawesi.\textsuperscript{600} It can be stated that even though the demand did not much differ from that of the First Congress, the strategy of implementation was richer. As seen by its board, the institution of KPPSI became more organised as a result of the Congress.\textsuperscript{601} Besides the Majelis Syura and Lajnah Tanfidziyah, KPPSI was also equipped with an Expert Council, to solve possible problems in the concept of Islamic law. Its networking and access to government was now wider. This is very apparent in the presence of many leading local and national politicians and bureaucrats. The wider enthusiastic support of many Muslim community in the area to join the Congress increased the motivation of KPPSI activists. The effort of the Congress to produce a draft for Special Autonomy was also a way to pressure the central government and parliament to legalise their demands. However, the view of the Congress itself seems to offer more work on the organisation to establish how constitutional it could become. In addition to the tone of threat of referendum among the participants, a bomb

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{599} Madinah is the second Islamic city known by Muslims after Mecca. The term “Serambih Mekah” was already applied to Aceh.
\item \textsuperscript{600} See, “Abdul Aziz Muzakkar, “KPPSI dalam Wacana dan Praksis”, \textit{Fajar}, 20 October 2003.
\item \textsuperscript{601} For the complete composition of the board see, Appendix XX.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
exploded on the second day of the Congress.\textsuperscript{602} As a result of the explosion, there was significant speculation about what many people thought about the separation of \textit{syariat} activism from violent action.

\textbf{C. Distancing Themselves from the Claim of Terrorist Networking}

Two cases, Agus Dwikarna's detention and the Laskar's Jundullah's involvement in the Makassar bomb, are important to an understanding about how these two issues impacted on the Islamism agenda of KPPSI. Rather than implementing the program that it elaborated in the Second Congress, the organisation was set back and sought to overcome the issues. The cases had elevated the name of KPPSI at the national and international level as a terrorist network organisation. The case faced by KPPSI was described by Abdul Aziz Kahar, chair of the Executive Council of KPPSI, "as \textit{pemain local} [local player] which was trapped in the arena of political hegemony".\textsuperscript{603} Abdul Aziz Kahar admitted that these all accusations directly weakened the existence of the internal organisation. The case also impacted on the external aspect, that is, degrading the strong initial support of society for KPPSI.\textsuperscript{604} Many of the figures who formerly supported the organisation were now withdrawing from active membership.\textsuperscript{605}

While the criticism of Laskar Jundullah was not yet handled by KPPSI, the issue of Agus Dwikarna emerged. Dwikarna together with two Muslim activists, Tamsil Linrung and Muhammad Jamal Balfas were arrested at Manila airport and accused of illegal possession of explosives on March 2002.\textsuperscript{606} Agus Dwikarna is an important figure in KPPSI, being the former leader of Laskar Jundullah and at the time he was arrested he was still member of the Consultative Council of KPPSI. Tamsil Linrung is also important in KPPSI, being an inspirational figure and has been known to fund the activities of KPPSI.

\textsuperscript{602} For more information concerning the bomb, see "Bom Meledak di Arena Kongres Umat Islam," \textit{Pedoman Rakyat}, 31 December 2001.


\textsuperscript{604} Ibid. The down-grading of support from the Muslim community who first enthusiastically supported the organisation were also admitted by many KPPSI board such as Jamaluddin Amien, Abu Hamid, H.M. Sirajuddin, and Kalmuddin.

\textsuperscript{605} Interview with Kalmuddin, 13 February 2003.

\textsuperscript{606} For information about the arrest of Agus Dwikarna, see "Laporan Khusus," \textit{Tempo}, 14 April 2002.; \textit{Sabill}, No. 02 TH. X, 8 August 2002.
Tamsil and Jamal were later freed while Agus Dwikarna remained in jail due to the explosive materials found in his suitcase. During the struggle for Agus' freedom, two bombs exploded in Makassar in which some of Laskar Jundullah were accused of involvement, and later found guilty. The bomb exploded just after sunset on 5 December 2002, the last day of Ramadhan. One exploded at a MacDonald's restaurant in the Ratu Indah shopping mall, killing a bomber and two patrons. The other wrecked the Toyota showroom of a car dealership. The mall and the car showroom were owned by a well known Muslim businessman and politician, Jusuf Kalla.

KPPSI activists focused on obtaining the freedom of Agus Dwikarna at the Second Congress arguing that he was purposely detained and that the accusation of carrying a bomb was untrue. Furthermore, their efforts included intensifying lobbying to both the central and provincial governments to approach the Philippines government on the matter. KPPSI even pressured Parliament to work for Dwikarna's freedom. KPPSI activists helped by some Muslim elements activated the hearing in Parliament by questioning the motive behind his detention. KPPSI activists convinced the provincial government that Agus was never known to be involved in any criminal activities. A letter from Makassar district police stated that Agus had no criminal record. KPPSI received a message from the Department of Foreign Affairs that Agus' detention was merely a mission order. However, the Department of Foreign Affairs did not elaborate on who had ordered it.

How important is Dwikarna to KPPSI's relation to its syariat agenda? Defending Dwikarna is an effort by KPPSI to remove the stigma that can undermine its struggle for Special Autonomy for formalised syariat. To do this, KPPSI activists were drawn into the arguments about the political motives behind Agus Dwikarna's, which was to curb Islamist activism. Some of its activists believe that the explosive materials found in Agus' suitcase were planted by the Philippines authorities to detain him. Tamsil Linrung also stressed that the accusation was merely a pretext. Dwikarna was seen as a dangerous due

---

609 Interview With H.M. Sirajuddin, 16 March 2003; Interview with Tamsil Linrung, 14 June 2003.
to his mobility and networks.\footnote{612}{Interview with H.M. Sirajuddin, 16 March 2003.} Aswar Hasan said that his detention was the result of a conspiracy between overseas media and a Western intelligence operation. He stated:

A wrong impression was given by the collaboration of overseas media in the intelligence operation, as could be seen in the report of a number of Indonesian mass media in describing the detention of Tamsil and his friends. It had been planned by journalists, together with the Philippines' police that they would publicise the detention of the terrorists from Indonesia, due to the discovery of explosive materials in Agus' suitcase. Ironically, the reports of the journalists were even seen as the result of the police investigation. This conspiracy completely violated the Muslim activists and physiologically, violated people tend to defend themselves with any manner of protection.\footnote{613}{Azwar Hasan, “Ekspose Terorisme dalam Justifikasi Stereotipe Aktivis Islam,” Kompas 19 April 2002.}

In defending Agus Dwikarna, there was also an element in KPPSI which had tried to take a moderate stand. Ahmad Ali, a law expert and KPPSI figure, stated that Agus Dwikarna was now convicted of being in possession of explosive materials. Ahmad Ali suggested that the process now was to defend him not as the Laskar Jihad leader, but as an Indonesian citizen with equal rights to protection in law.\footnote{614}{Ahmad Ali, “Upaya Bebaskan Agus Dwikarna,” Kolom, Sabili, No. 2 X, 8 August 2002, pp. 12 –13. For more information on this issue, see Ridyaasrama, Rizki, et al., “Bebaskan Agus Dwikarna,” Sabili, No. 02 TII X 8 August 2002, pp. 14 – 19.} The effort to defend Agus Dwikarna still coloured many KPPSI gatherings even up to its Third Congress, when it was becoming less intense. KPPSI has tried all means but without any result. This case is seen by KPPSI as the inability of the local movement to face the international conspiracy.\footnote{615}{Interview with Abdul Aziz Kahar, 23 June 2004.}

The above description of Dwikarna's issue shows that there were more than local issues of syariat at stake. KPPSI had been led into global issues of violence, and a terrorist network. The efforts of KPPSI to struggle for the freedom of Agus Dwikarna is the way in which KPPSI distances itself from the claim of its international terrorist network. The fact is that the issue of Dwikarna's network of terrorism has been launched by an ICG report, "A-Qaeda in Southeast Asia: The Case of the 'Ngruki Network' in Indonesia." The central figure focused on by ICG was Agus Dwikarna who was closer to Abu Bakar Baasyir, as the top figure of Jamaah Islamiyah in Southeast Asia. ICG reported that Agus Dwikarna's
connection to the Nguruki Network began through Irfan S. Awwas. They were friends since both were student activists against the New Order regime’s campaign of Pancasila as the sole ideology. The organisational link was further related to the important activities of Agus Dwikarna in both KPPSI and MMI before he was arrested. In KPPSI, Agus sat as the vice chairman and leader of the Laskar, while in MMI he was formerly the secretary of the Executive Council.

Agus Dwikarna’s link was further related to Umar al-Faruq who is claimed to be his closest friend. Umar al-Faruq has been the key figure in unveiling the terrorist link in South Asia. He has been arrested by the US government after being deported by the Indonesian government for having a fake passport. After several months of pressure by the US government, on September 9 2002, al-Faruq confessed that he was al-Qaeda’s senior representative in Southeast Asia. He further confessed that he planned a large scale attack on US interests in South East Asia. In operating his mission in South East Asia, he mentioned the Jamaah Islamiyah led by Abu Bakar Baasyir, as his counterpart in assisting his operation. Agus Dwikarna was also claimed to have links with al-Faruq, when Time reported that al-Faruq lived in Makassar near Agus Dwikarna soon after he began running into trouble. Al-Faruq at that time had just failed in an attempt to kill President Megawati Soekarnoputri at a meeting between Megawati and other ruling party leaders. He

616 Ibid., 17
617 Al-Faruq’s original name was Mahmud bin Ahmad Assegaf. It is said that he was originally an Ambonese Muslim and raised by Kuwaiti Arabs. He returned to Indonesia in 1981. He married Mira Agustina, a girl living in Cejeruk, Bogor in 1999. According to the information of his wife, he is an Indonesian because he has an Indonesian citizenship card. See Interview with Mira Agustina. See “Semua Ini Fitnah”, Gatra, 28 September 2002.
618 Time, September 23, 2002.
619 The terrorist link of Agus Dwikarna was further fabricated by the CIA when a month after his arrest, Abu Zubaydah, the senior al-Qaeda official was seized by the U.S. and Faisalabad, in Pakistan. The CIA then reported that cell-phone number 081-2957-6852 which is al-Faruq’s number had been programmed into the handsets of both Dwikarna and Abu Zubaydah. Time, September 2002. Another report that can be associated to Agus Dwikarna is the confession of Faruq that Abu Bakar Baasyir was behind the series of bombs in Indonesia 1999 and 2000. Baasyir has had a long-term relationship with Dwikarna, whether through the pondok Nguruki or Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia. However, when the CIA report above was confirmed with al-Faruq’s wife, Mira Agustina, the result was conflicting. Mira refused to be considered to be very close to Dwikarna’s family. She said that she met only once with Dwikarna’s wife but only to talk about business. Mira stated that both Abu Bakar Baasyir and Agus Dwikarna were never mentioned to her. Gatra, September 2002. She even refused to admit that her husband had so far been involved in the terrorist activities. Tempo, 29 September 2002.
failed due to the bomb blowing up prematurely near the Atrium Mall in Jakarta in August 2001. The designated bomber lost his leg.  

The key question is that many KPPSI saw the reports as invalid. Besides its rejection of the accusation of Agus Dwikarna that the evidence was purposely put in Dwikarna’s suitcase since prior to Dwikarna’s arrival and before his suitcase was checked, there had already been put in place apparatus to arrest him; the figure of al-Faruq himself came into question, concerning whether he really exists or is merely fictitious character, created by the US government. They stated that the questions start with the different names that al-Faruq had. Further speculation is whether the US government purposely fabricated this information to remind people that Indonesia is a terrorist base. They state that the process of investigating al-Faruq was questioned. Al-Faruq’s information should be verified in Indonesia and Baasyir should confirm its validity. Furthermore, the quality of the report should also be questioned and it is almost impossible to verify.

Despite the criticism of KPPSI to the reports on Dwikarna, further irrelevant information in the report is the significance of the attempt to kill President Megawati. Why should Megawati be killed, instead of the former President Soeharto who was well known to have long pressured radical Muslims in Indonesia, or Arroyo who pressured the Moro Muslims. At the time of the designated bomb, Megawati did not have any record of violating Muslims in Indonesia. It may be interpreted that the report is part of the effort of the US government to trigger the Indonesian government to take more action to sweep any Muslim and organisation suspected of terrorist networking. This argument is no more than a possibility due the existence of two contradictory claims in Dwikarna’s issues.

The importance of the figure of Dwikarna is not only due to the claims of his network. It is also related to the central role of Dwikarna himself in Islamic formalist activism in South Sulawesi. This greater attention to Agus Dwikarna was criticised by an activist, KPPSI’s problem was that it strongly depended on Agus Dwikarna. Some people speculated about how Agus Dwikarna helped to fund the operations of KPPSI. In

---

620 This Time’s report was commented on cynically by the well-known Indonesianist, Harold Crouch, at the Indonesia Update Conference held on September 27-28, 2002 at the Australian National University. He questioned the validity of the information based on its irrationality. He asked how a bomb could be powerful enough to kill Megawati and several by standers when the bomber lost only a leg.

621 Interview with Suryadarma, 10 October 2003.
the case of the ex-KPPSI’s Laskar Jundullah, the ICG report claimed that it was funded by Agus Dwikarna’s Komite Penanggulangan Krisis, The Crisis Center Committee, Kompak) part of DDII that had relations with many wealthy politicians. It is not, therefore, surprising that part of the issue colouring the Second Congress was the demand of KPPSI activists to pressure both the Philippines and the Indonesian Governments to free Agus Dwikarna.

The other stigma of violence on behalf of KPPSI was the case of the Makassar Bomb, where perpetrators were claimed to be mainly from Laskar Jundullah. The report launched by ICG stated that the bomb was planned, long before the Bali attack, at the home of Agung Hamid, the leader of Laskar Jundullah.\textsuperscript{622} ICG related Laskar Jundullah’s involvement in the bombs and KPPSI, by looking at the existence of the Laskar Jundullah as the security arms of KPPSI should be verified. Even though Laskar Jundullah still participated in the Second Congress, the fact is that the new structure of the committee of KPPSI launched in August 2002, excluded Laskar Jundullah from their organisation. The Makassar bomb, however, exploded in December 2002. Furthermore, the people involved in the bomb incident were not included in the names of those on the board of KPPSI which was issued before the bomb. A further weak point of ICG was its mentioning of Aziz Kahar in connection with Laskar Jundullah. It may be possible that he figured among Laskar members, but Aziz himself has nothing to do with paramilitary activities exercised by the Laskar. His closeness to Agus Dwikarna, as the creator of Laskar Jundullah was due to his HMI activism not to the Kompak DDII where Laskar Jundullah according to the ICG claims, originated. Aziz admitted to being with Pesantren Hidayatullah.\textsuperscript{623} In other words, Abdul Aziz Kahar and Agus Dwikarna have the same HMI and KPPSI connections.

\textsuperscript{622} The meeting was attended by Muchtar Daeng Lao who had been introduced to Agung through Agus Dwikarna in 2000. Others such as Hisbullah Rasyid, Anthon, and Ilham Riyadi, had met at the Second Congress of KPPSI. ICG, however, incorrectly stated that time of the Second Congress which was December 2002, while the true one is December 2001. ICG further reports that Agung Hamid suggested possible targets in Makassar but it is decided that McDonald’s and the showroom. The former was recognised as an American brand, which suited the idea for anti American product campaign. The showroom had been chosen due to the their disappointment with the Malino Agreement on Poso conflict. Jusuf Kalla appeared as a pioneer of the meeting. However, ICG was not sure of whether disappointment was due to the reduced possibility of using Poso as a focus of jihad or the failure of the government to prove the agreement. International Crisis Group, “Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: Damaged but Still Dangerous,” Asia Report, No. 63, p. 15. See also “Tiga Bulan Bom Makassar,” Fajal, 5 March 2003.

\textsuperscript{623} Telephone Interview with Abdul Aziz Kahar, 23 June 2004.
However, those figures have other, more separate lines, Aziz with Hidayatullah and Agus Dwikarna with Laskar Jundullah.

Unlike the defense of Agus Dwikarna, which included KPPSI’s full support, attempts to defend Laskar Jundullah were lacking even among the activists of KPPSI. The Makassar Bomb was the largest problem KPPSI was facing that directly set back the formalised syariat struggle. Not many of its figures were ready to appear on behalf of KPPSI. Fortunately, there were still a number of activists able to view the existence of the organisation in a positive way, and who remained committed to the mission of the movement. This is proven by the wish of some of its figures to appear in the mass media to deny KPPSI’s involvement.

The leaders of its Advisory Council and the Executive Board asserted that KPPSI did not tolerate any violent action in bringing about its mission. The leaders stated that any member of KPPSI who was accused of involvement in the violence was not acting under their authorisation, because it was not part of the organisation’s policy. They stressed that the accusations directed at Laskar Jundullah should not necessarily be directed to KPPSI, since the organisation had had no formal relations with the Laskar since the Second Congress. Aziz Kahar even stated his belief in the irrationality of KPPSI activists who were involved in the bombs. These places which were bombed belonged to Jusuf Kalla, a well known Muslim figure. Many KPPSI activists were close to him, and Jusuf Kalla often helped in the activities of KPPSI. The effort of KPPSI supporters to clarify that they were not involved was successful, and later the Makassar chief police publicly stated that KPPSI was not involved in the bombing.

Further efforts to relate KPPSI to the network occured through the figure of Abdul Wahid Kadungga, the son in law of Kahar Muzakkar who appeared in KPPSI’s First Congress as a honored guest. The important position of Kadungga in the network was revealed by his role in organising the visit of Abu Bakar Baasyir when he was exiled to Malaysia. His mobility was claimed to be due to the activities involved in building up his network. In 1971, he was a student in Cologne, Germany, and participated in the founding of the Muslim Youth Association of Europe. He then became close to many Muslim

---

624 Interview with Kalmuddin, 13 February 2003.
625 Interview with Noer Bahri Noer, 4 March 2003.
626 Interview with Abdul Aziz Kahar, 14 June 2003.
activists in the Middle East, and he also had close ties to activists of Parti Islam Se-
Malaysia (Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party, PAS). It is through Wahid Kadungga that the
contact between KPPSI and PAS was built. It was through Kadungga that Tuan Guru Hadi
bin Haji Awang, the current president of PAS Malaysia was brought to the First Congress
of KPPSI. The suspicion that Kadungga was being part of a terrorist network was clearly
demonstrated by the Indonesian authorities when he was interrogated by the local police at
the Balikpapan airport on arrival from Tarakan, on 24 December 2002. According to the
chief local police, Abdul Wahid was interrogated on suspicion of involvement in either the
Makassar or the Bali Bomb. Kadungga was then sent to Jakarta to be questioned further.

Suspicion was directed at Kadungga due to his radical Islamic involvement. However, there is no evidence of his using a terrorist approach in his activism. After his
arrest, he was long interrogated lengthily by the Jakarta police and was then let free, due to
the absence of any proof of his involvement. Further indication that Kadungga was not
involved in the so-called terrorist networks was through the ICG reports. Many parts of the
ICG report on the activism of Kadungga had already been corrected by itself. Kadungga,
who was first claimed to be closer to the radicalism of the movement of Abu Bakar Baasyir
with his counterpart, Abdullah Sungkar, when he was close to Gama Islami, a breakaway
faction of the Egyptian Ikhwanul-Muslimin (Muslim Brotherhood) in 1995, had now been
deleted from reports. Kadungga was cleared of any involvement, due to Rusdi of Gama
Islami who told ICG that he was not familiar with Wahid Kadungga. ICG, however, was
correct in saying that through the wide channels of Kadungga, KPPSI received a special
visit from the leader of PAS Malaysia at the First Congress. Basically, Hadi Awang had
been involved in the discourses of syariat in South Sulawesi, ever since the open dialogue
at FUI, four months prior to first the Congress. Nevertheless, the presence of Kadungga at
the Congress was only to ensure the presence of a PAS figure.

---

Kadungga, as has been noted previously, was the son in law of Kahar Muzakkar. This family relation with Abdul Aziz Kahar was intended to make it easier for KPPSI to succeed in the Islamic syariat campaign in South Sulawesi. Wahid himself proved not to have any further contribution in the conception of KPPSI programs. Furthermore, the name of Kadungga is not familiar to many KPPSI activists. I accepted the report of ICG that KPPSI was aware that Wahid had wide channels with many international figures. However, KPPSI had still not been able to build any international linkages especially in the effort to raise financial assistance, where Wahid could participate. When I asked one of its figures about the overseas financial assistance, he answered that it was thought to exist but that no one had tried to probe it. Therefore, Kadungga’s importance is only familial, and due to his closeness to a PAS figure. KPPSI is obsessed with the achievement of this Islamic political party in winning support in two states in Malaysia; Kelantan and Trengganu in the 1999 elections. Despite the fact that KPPSI was not a political party and was not formed to be a political party, the experiences of PAS would be of interest to KPPSI activists in socialising their ideas.

D. KUI III: Syariat at the Kabupaten (Regency) Level

Unlike the First and the Second Congresses which were held in Makassar, Kongres Umat Islam Ketiga (Third Congress of Muslim Community, KUI III) of KPPSI was held in Kabupaten Bulukumba, approximately 150 km south of Makassar, three years later, 26 – 28 March 2005. It was opened by the present chair of Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (People’s Consultative Council, MPR), Dr. Hidayat Nurwahid and attended by other provincial government apparatus. It was also attended by several known Islamist Activists, such as Fauzan al Anshari of MMI (Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, Indonesian Mujahidin Council).

There are several arguments that can be provided about why the Third Congress was held outside Makassar. First, KPPSI wanted to show that the syariat issue in South Sulawesi was no longer centered on Makassar, but was now accepted at the kabupaten level. This is important for KPPSI, to ensure the provincial and national government of

---

631 Interview with H.M. Sirajuddin, 16 March 2003.
632 Kompas, 28 March 2005.
wide support among the Muslim society, especially at the level of kabupaten. Furthermore, KPPSI seems to believe that the holding of the Congress in kabupaten level is a message that syariat-isation is located not only at the central KPPSI organisation but also in KPPSI’s activities at this level. The holding of the Congress in Kabupaten Bulukumba is related to KPPSI’s concern for Muslim community. If it were held in kabupaten level, Muslim society around could participate and aid in the running of the Congress, by ensuring the security of the Congress, and by accommodating congress participants.

Second, KPPSI was interested in showing that there was public acceptance of demands for formalised syariat among local political leaders. This Third Congress has revealed a different management committee. The First and the Second Congresses were organised by internal KPPSI activists. However, this Third Congress was managed by a division of the central committee which was organised by the central board of KPPSI and the local committee, which was chaired by the Bupati of Bulukumba. From this committee arrangement, KPPSI had shown a breakthrough in the support of political leaders for formalised syariat in South Sulawesi. It is also said that the neighbouring Kabupaten Bulukumba, Bantaeng, through its Bupati, had asked that the following congress be held in this kabupaten.633

Third, the holding of the Congress in Bulukumba was related to the existence of the area becoming the pioneer of formalised syariat by producing a number of Islamic Perda.634 In addition to this, the KPPSI Bulukumba branch is seen to be one of the most active in campaigning for formalised syariat among KPPSI branches which were supported by many local figures and the bureaucracy. The role of the Bupati of Bulukumba, A. Patabai Pabokori, in promoting Islamisation has made the area a model for KPPSI to implement in other kabupaten in South Sulawesi. Some KPPSI activists admitted Patabai had two important achievements of Islamisation in the kabupaten. First, the increase in local origin income, through the introduction of zakat regulation, from only 2 billions rupiah per year to 40 billions rupiah. Second, the significant improvement in Quranic reading ability among Muslims from 30 % in 1995 to 100 % in 2005.635 Patabai himself Led Bulukumba for two

633 Telephone Interview with H.M. Sirajuddin, 2 April 2005.
634 For more details, see the discussion of Islamic PERDA produced by Kabupaten Bulukumba in the section of “Moving Ahead with Moderate Concept and Strategy” in Chapter Eight.
635 “Saat KPPSI Menggandeng Bupati,” Tribun Timur, 8 September 2005.
election periods (1995-2000 and 2000-2005) and is now sitting as the chair of the office of education. These two achievements were mentioned by a number of people from Bulukumba with whom I talked.

Like the First and the Second Congresses, there are also several decisions that the congress participants made. The Congress emphasised its decision that the only way to accelerate the implementation of Islamic law in South Sulawesi was through Special Autonomy regulations. It then decided that the target date for KPPSI to gain a Special Autonomy package from the central government for the implementation of Islamic law should be the year 2008 at the latest.636 This means that KPPSI’s target year is only three years after the Congress. KPPSI’s optimism seems to be based on a belief in support among KPPSI at the level of the province. I myself see this increasing support. However, I do not see it as a promising factor, since a Special Autonomy grant is not only related to the province’s wider demand, but much also is related to the political structure of the province and to the political considerations of central government. For example until 2008, DPRD will still be dominated by Golkar members, where clearly Islamic Special Autonomy is not its main priority, since the party is not its Islamic party. Therefore, KPPSI’s target seems to be difficult to achieve. Nevertheless, KPPSI regards the target as an important issue of motivation in the campaign for Special Autonomy.

In terms of programs, the Third Congress also recommended that it repeated the demands of the first and the Second Congress, except for the points that KPPSI has now rejected, for example, the issue of Laskar Jundullah.637 To some extent, the recommendation emphasised KPPSI’s attention to empowering local issues for the implementation of Islamic law. The issue of Islamic brotherhood was not openly mentioned, but as in the First Congress, the issue of Palestinian freedom is important.

An important development was found in the social and cultural recommendations. The Congress touched on the moral issues of corruption, mystical TV shows and the pornography against which the Muslim community has to fight. I see this as an effort by KPPSI to combat contemporary issues related to its formalised syariat demand. This is also to impress society that KPPSI is not only concerned with religious symbolism, such as the

636 I cannot obtain the original document of the Third Congress, but the points of decision and recommendation were published by Fajar. See “Otonomi Khusus Paling Lambat 2008,” Fajar, 30 March 2005.

637 See the contents of recommendations of KPPSI’s Third Congress in Appendix XXI.
wearing of the jilbab (Ar. jilbab, veil) for women Muslims and Islamic greetings. KPPSI’s touching on the issue of corruption seems to be influenced by its active involvement during the past two years against such practices.\textsuperscript{638} Besides the repetition of the demand mentioned in the first and the Second Congress, the recommendations included its concern for mystical and pornographic entertainment. This point of recommendation is related to KPPSI’s increasing concern with the media which has become bolder with programs related to mysticism and pornography.\textsuperscript{639} Furthermore, voicing this concern is related to the position of KPPSI’s former secretary general, Aswar Hasan, who is now sitting as the Regional chair of the Broadcasting Committee.

In its legal and constitutional recommendations, the Congress emphasised the role of local government to produce regulations supporting the implementation of Islamic law. It emphasised that local authority should produce Islamic Perda in order that the regulation had legal force. It recommended that kabupaten made Perda on Qur’anic reading for all Muslims in kabupaten. The concern of KPPSI for the creation of such as Perda, criticised by opponents of formalised syariah as being symbolic, will be examined in the next chapter.\textsuperscript{640} This is based on the assumption that the teaching of Qur’anic reading has long been long done privately by Muslim society. However, it should be argued that since KPPSI is concerned with the large number of the Muslim community who are not yet been able to read the Qur’an, and so formalising the regulation is the best way to accelerate Qur’anic reading ability. This is to argue that KPPSI has proved its formalist Islamic nature which is symbolic. Qur’anic reading ability is a symbol of being a good Muslim, since the Qur’an is the holy book for the Muslim people.

\textsuperscript{638} The KPPSI’s activities against corruption have also been publicised by a local media. See, for example, “Deklarasi Aksi Resolusi Korupsi,” Fajar, 3 December 2004; “GeRak Desak Kapolda Selesaikan Korupsi Dewan,” Fajar, 9 November 2004.

\textsuperscript{639} The concern of KPPSI in this problem has been seen in the result of its Musyawarah Kerja (workshop) held in Makassar on 12-13 March 2004, in which one of its decisions was to ask the media to stop the broadcasting of tv programs which were related to mysticism and pornography because they would cause social unrest. See “Hentikan Penayangan Pornografi dan Mistisisme: Rekomendasi Musyawarah Kerja KPPSI,” Tribun Timur, 14 June, 2004. The related news of this issue can also be found in “Hasyim Aidid Pimpin KPPSI ke Mapolwiltabes: Minta Tayangan Mistik Televisi Dihentikan,” Tribun Timur, 17 June 2004.

\textsuperscript{640} For more criticism of PERDA, see the discussion of Islamising PERDA in the subchapter “Moving ahead towards Moderate Strategies” in Chapter Eight.
The political recommendation is also expanded. On the issue of regional elections for Bupati and Governor, KPPSI recommended the Muslim community to vote for candidates with strong Islamic conviction who could support the implementation of Islamic law in the kabupaten or city that they led. This recommendation is not surprising since many KPPSI activists have already voiced in the local newspapers of the need to be governed by a pro syariat government in local newspapers.\textsuperscript{641} Also recommended was the formation of an arbitration institution to facilitate Muslims with private law problems. This was a follow up of what was first offered by the late, Hartono Mardjono, who came to a KPPSI seminar on the implementation of Islamic law with respect to private law.

Another interesting issue is the inclusion of the Ambalat Block conflict between the Indonesian and Malaysian governments. The Congress supported the national government to defend the sea from a take over by the Malaysian government. They believed that it was legally possessed by the Indonesian government. This recommendation shows the loyalty of KPPSI to the national government, since the majority of Indonesian and Malaysian people are Muslims. This recommendation is to show the existence of the movement as a local Islamic movement, not to idealise an Islamic state, like DI. In addition to the Ambalat issue, the case of Agus Dwikarna’s freedom still coloured the political recommendation, showing his importance to KPPSI, discussed earlier in this chapter.

What is more interesting, however, is that the Congress closed without any election of a new board for KPPSI. This is surprising because many of KPPSI’s main activists, especially young Islamists, had gained formal positions, such as the chair of Executive body, Abdul Aziz Kahar Muzakkar has become a member of DPD and the former secretary, Azwar Hasan has become a chair of the Provincial Broadcasting Commission. It may be argued that even though Aziz Kahar is now a member of DPD, his position in Jakarta is to support the struggle of KPPSI in the national parliament, and therefore, holding the chairmanship in KPPSI is still important. However, the latest composition of the KPPSI board was that the secretary was another Islamic activist, Aminuddin Ramli.

The Third Congress shows clearly the shift of the movement to moderating concepts and strategies and in campaigning for Islamic law in South Sulawesi. This has been done by going through all possible channels to maximise Islamisation in an effort to accelerate the formal implementation of Islamic law in the province. The importance of the

\textsuperscript{641} See, for example, “Hari ini KPPSI Rumuskan Kriteria Capres Islami,” \textit{Tribun Timur}, 13 June 2004.
Congress was to demonstrate open support of the bureaucracy, through their direct involvement. However, the most important aspect is the momentum of consolidation of the activists in the kabupaten. This was seen soon after the Third Congress in Bulukumba, when the fifth commemoration of the movement was held in Kabupaten Pangkep on 23 September 2005. This commemoration was followed with a seminar for building the perception of syariat on 24-25 September 2005. These activities were chaired by the Bupati of Pangkep.\(^{642}\) The activities of KPPSI in the kabupaten shows the effort of the movement to pave the strategy of Islamising locals for support to voice its demands to the national government. It is this kind of strategy that may be related to the moderate strategies and concepts that will be further analyzed in the last part of the Chapter Eight as a response by KPPSI to the opposition of several elements.

KPPSI’s campaign to raise a demand for syariat has been active. The movement used pressure through parliamentary and governmental approaches for formalised syariat. This showed no significant results as seen by the weak responses of the provincial government and parliament. Then, since its Second Congress, KPPSI produced a recommendation for implementation, by referring to Muslim society as its main target of syariat-isation. Parts of the effort to do this was by distancing themselves from the stigma of violence and terrorism. Between the Second Congress and Third Congresses, KPPSI became bolder in approaching local governments and society. To some extent, several local governments responded to this as an opportunity to seek political support from the Muslim community. As a result, they have been openly involved in several activities of KPPSI, as seen in the Third Congress and its fifth commemoration. However, what is seen here is only the dynamics of KPPSI’s struggle to get its syariat campaign accepted for South Sulawesi Muslims, in an effort to strengthen its demand for Islamic Special Autonomy. Therefore, it is important to see what concept of syariat is possessed by KPPSI, and the extent of its applicability in South Sulawesi, and this as will be done in the next chapter.

---

Chapter Seven

KPPSI's Views on Syariat: Towards a Formal Authority

KPPSI, as a formalist Islamic organisation, has produced a number of materials dealing with the implementation of Islamic law in South Sulawesi. It will now focus on two important materials which reveal KPPSI's concepts. These are the proposed draft for Special Autonomy which KPPSI produced in its Second Congress and the Intisari Syariat Islam (Core Book of Islamic Law) In addition to these two sources, It will examine other writings by KPPSI activists to provide detail of the strategies of the movement in their effort to implement Islamic law in the region. This chapter will assess the genuineness these concepts and how applicable they are to formalise Islamic law in the South Sulawesi Muslim community. It also provides several analyses on the visibility of the concepts in trying to extract Special Autonomy regulations from the national government. It will show some of the shortcomings in KPPSI which indicate the movement's lack of seriousness in producing concepts other than political mobility, as described in chapters five and six of this thesis.

I divide the discussion into two sections: politico-religious concepts and legal concepts. The politico-religious concepts are those of KPPSI which deal with Islamising the government, including a political strategy in struggling the establishment of formalised syariat. It also includes the concept of the structure of Islamic governance that it targets. The legal concepts are those dealing with the nature of syariat, materials of syariat, as well as selecting which syariat is to be formalised. The development of KPPSI's concept of formalised syariat went through a dialectical process with the involvement of KPPSI activists, their proponents and opponents. KPPSI had modified and revised its concepts in an effort to pave the way for formalised syariat in the region.
A. Politico-Religious Concepts

1. ‘Political House’ for Formalised Syariat

When KPPSI was first established, an issue which emerged was whether KPPSI would be as obsessive about establishing an Islamic state as Kahar Muzakkar’s DI had been. This issue was raised understandably due to the fact that the leader of the Executive Body of KPPSI is Abdul Aziz, the son of Kahar Muzakkar. Also, many KPPSI sympathisers were from former DI areas. However, KPPSI had already emphasised that its struggle was not to create an Islamic state, but to gain a province with Special Autonomy for the implementation of Islamic law. This target was re-emphasised in its Second Congress. The question next often addressed by those who were not in favour with KPPSI’s demand is which and how Islamic syariat should be implemented in the pluralistic society of South Sulawesi today. This later question became the major issue surrounding KPPSI.

How does KPPSI respond to this question? KPPSI did not emerge with a fixed concept of Islamic law. At its First Congress, KPPSI activists believed that Special Autonomy had to be granted first, then Islamic law should be further discussed by South Sulawesi Muslims. The importance of Special Autonomy was in acting as ‘a political house’ for the implementation of Islamic law. Many KPPSI activists have described this in terms of ‘a house’. The house is filled first with the most basic needs, such as a kitchen and beds. Then, it can be better equipped later, according to the preference of its owner.\(^\text{643}\)

Based on this analogy, KPPSI activists argue that the importance of a political house is that it is impossible to provide all the facilities before the house has been built. Therefore, the implementation of Islamic law must be preceded by a grant of Special Autonomy. This analogy gives the impression that Islamic law can be applied at the stage when it will be fully worked out, and also indicates the complexity of Islamic law, in which its implementation should be based on the Muslim people’s consensus.\(^\text{644}\) KPPSI was of the opinion that it was not difficult to produce concepts of Islamic law since many of its


\(^{644}\) Interview with Nur Bahri Nur, 4 March 2003 and H.M. Sirajuddin, 6 March 2003.
committee members are experts on legal studies, including Islamic law,\textsuperscript{645} but the problem that KPPSI sees that if it produces a concept, it will bear the claim that the implementation of Islamic law in South Sulawesi was created by KPPSI alone, while the job of KPPSI was mainly to erect a framework. KPPSI states that if the concept of Islamic law were launched, then other communities might claim that it was only KPPSI’s version, and that they had another different version.\textsuperscript{646} KPPSI believes that when Islamic law is to be implemented, it should be based on the consensus of the community of South Sulawesi.

At first, KPPSI activists seemed to be reluctant to respond the challenges, but later, they began to talk and write more about KPPSI’s concepts. It was only when several elements of society\textsuperscript{647} responded to KPPSI by questioning its concepts of Islamic law and challenged it by showing the complexity of Islamic law that KPPSI began to work on refining the concepts that it promoted. Even though the analogy of the ‘political house’ was still used, KPPSI now realised the importance of stressing the nature of the Islamic law to which it aspired KPPSI. The provincial government had also asked KPPSI to discuss concepts of Islamic law, because the government saw that KPPSI’s analogy was insufficient to convince the central government of the nature of KPPSI’s demands. The former chief of the Research Body of the provincial government, H.S. Ruslan, for example, in responding to their analogy, stated that the implementation of Islamic law could not be granted by the central government if the concept of this implementation was not yet clear.\textsuperscript{648}

2. The Proposed Islamic Special Autonomy Constitution

The proposed draft legislation produced by KPPSI at its Second Congress (2001) is important in understanding the nature of the formalised Islamic law for which KPPSI was struggling, because it embodies the key principles of KPPSI’s struggle for formalist Islam. This draft follows the model of the Special Autonomy Act which has been given to Aceh. KPPSI’s chair of the Executive Body stated that the Special Autonomy status granted to

\textsuperscript{645} It refers to the fact that a number of prominent members of the boards of KPPSI are law experts. For more information, see the discussion in the section on who the activists of KPPSI are in Chapter Five.

\textsuperscript{646} Interview with H.M. Sirajuddin, 6 March 2003,

\textsuperscript{647} For more information on KPPSI’s challenges and criticism, see Chapter Eight.

\textsuperscript{648} Interview with A.S. Ruslan, 26 February 2003.
Aceh for the implementation of syariat had paved the way for South Sulawesi to demand the same status, since these two provinces have significant similarities. The proposed constitution is the work of parliament, to be signed by the President. However, it was prepared by the KPPSI congress in order to pressure parliament.

The proposed Constitution for Special Autonomy in South Sulawesi consisted of draft legislation and an explanation. Triggered by Aceh, the draft seems also to be influenced by the Act No. 18 year 2001, concerning the grant of Special Autonomy which was given to Aceh, with several modifications. One significant modification is the inclusion of the role of ulama, which was not found in Aceh’s Act. This body will be discussed later in this section. The draft consisted of ten sections, elaborated into 38 chapters. However, only the key aspects of Islamic syariat offered in the draft that deserve close analysis in relation to the formalist Islam will be discussed here. The discussion will be related to considering the extent of their applicability in South Sulawesi with the spirit of Islamic teaching.

2.1. Qur’an and Hadith Sources

Sources of governance are found in the second section of the draft on the characteristics and objectives of Special Autonomy. Chapter 2 paragraph 1 states: “The government of South Sulawesi characterised by Islamic law is based on Qur’an and as-Sunnah (Ar. al-Sunnah).” In chapter 4, it says “the objectives of South Sulawesi government are: to uphold Islamic law in all governance and social affairs; to uphold all governance based on an Islamic constitution and to protect the people and social interest with systems based on Qur’an and Hadith.”

It did not specify other possible sources of Islamic law even though the majority of Sunni Muslim accept two other sources of Islamic law; ijma (consensus) and qiyas (analogy) as alternative sources of law, especially when matters are not clearly defined in


652 Ibid.
the two main sources. These general characteristics can, therefore, invite questions on the process of implementing Qur’anic verses in the life of the people of South Sulawesi since it offers only general guidelines. It is this aspect that has become the concern of liberal Muslim intellectuals in South Sulawesi, in their questioning of the possibility of KPPSI actualising the abstract teachings of the Qur’an in the lives of contemporary Muslims.653

2.2. Qanun (Canon)

Qanun (Canon) is aimed at implementing the Qur’an and Hadith as its main source. The draft outlines the general characteristics of governance. Details of its operating system will be arranged in qanun. The position of qanun was elaborated in chapter 3, paragraph 1. It states: “the South Sulawesi constitution is in the form of qanun and or regional regulations based on Islam which was transformed from this constitution and/or of other constitutional regulations.”654 Furthermore, it was also mentioned in the section on regional authority, chapter 5 paragraph 2: “the authority to govern all governmental affairs will be elaborated in the South Sulawesi qanun.” The qanun was also needed at the district level as stated in chapter 5 paragraph 3 of this section: “the district and municipality’s qanun comprise all aspects of governance under the responsibility of the district based on Islamic syariat.”655

Based on these paragraphs, it can be stated that even though qanun was mentioned in the draft legislation, KPPSI seems not yet to have thought much about the nature of qanun.656 This lack of attention to its nature, despite Special Autonomy not yet being granted, may give the impression that syariat campaigners in South Sulawesi were unprepared due to their lack of concern. It may be this strategy of avoiding talk about qanun was not effective, due to the need to explain how the Islamic regulations might work if Special Autonomy is granted. It is important to assure the Muslim community of the

653 See the discussion of the liberal Muslim intellectuals of the nature of syariat in the sub-chapter of challenges of liberal Muslim intellectuals in the Chapter Eight.

654 “Rancangan Undang-Undang Otonomi Khusus,” in KPPSI, “Hasil-Hasil Keputusan Kongres Kedua Umat Islam Sulawesi Selatan.”. For the original contents of this issue, see Appendix XVI.

655 Ibid.

656 The important thing for KPPSI was to anticipate how distinctive Qanun was from the general regulations available. Are they, for example, able to elucidate Qur’anic teachings on economics and trade, as distinct from the available national law of economics? It is, therefore, not wise to ignore thinking on the nature of Qanun when promoting Special Autonomy regulations, otherwise, it will produce symbolic implementation of Islamic law but with no substantial difference to other ‘secular’ provinces, especially in districts already produced ‘Islamic’ PERDA.
applicability of Islamic law. One senior governmental figure questioned how demand for Special Autonomy could be granted as a political umbrella for the implementation of Islamic law, if KPPSI itself did not know which Islamic law should be formalised.\textsuperscript{657}

Furthermore, \textit{qanun} raises questions of its applicability if it is related to the present national 1945 Constitution. In the case of Aceh, for example, all Regional regulations for either the districts and provinces are called \textit{qanun}.\textsuperscript{658} In many districts in South Sulawesi, there are already several Perda for establishing Islamic law. The available Indonesian legal system regulates that Perda can be directly dismissed by the central government if they should contradict to the national law, while the Special Autonomy Act can only be dismissed by a new national law. However, the problems is the constitutional power of \textit{qanun}. Since it is similar to the works of Perda it may only have weak legal power because \textit{qanun} is a lesser legal force than the Basic Constitution, UUD 1945. However, Islamists do not believe that the position of \textit{qanun}, which is taken from Qur'an and Hadith, can be supervised by the UUD 1945 which is a man made constitution.

\textbf{2.3. Mahkamah Syariat (Syariat Court)}

\textit{Mahkamah syariat} is an important body proposed by KPPSI in an effort to make South Sulawesi autonomous with the aim of implementing Islamic law. \textit{mahkamah syariat} is a judicial body based on Islamic law which can be formed only by a province granted Special Autonomy for Islamic law, such as, \textit{mahkamah syariat} in Aceh. \textit{mahkamah syariat} is intended to be an alternative judicial body in place of a national civil system of justice. It is expected that through the \textit{mahkamah syariat}, all legal issues possessed by Muslim people will be dealt with under Islamic law.

In the draft legislation proposed by KPPSI, the articles of \textit{mahkamah syariat} are stated in section six, chapter 25 to chapter 28. However, an important issue that needs further discussion is the nature of \textit{mahkamah syariat} proposed in chapter 26 paragraph 1 which stipulates: "\textit{mahkamah syariat} in South Sulawesi Province is part of the national justice system."\textsuperscript{659} This paragraph indicates that Islamic law is to be implemented under national law. However, a problem that might be later be encountered with this stipulation is

\textsuperscript{657} Interview with A.S. Ruslan, 26 February 2003.

\textsuperscript{658} See Rifai Ka’bah, \textit{Penegakan Syariat Islam di Indonesia}, 30.

\textsuperscript{659} "Rancangan Undang-Undang Otonomi Khusus," in KPPSI, "Hasil-Hasil Keputusan Kongres Umat Islam Sulawesi Selatan." See also Appendix XVI.
how effective the mahkamah syariat would be when proposed as an alternative legal institution and considered to implement the law of God, when it is under the auspices of the national ‘secular’ law.

Another question concerning the nature of mahkamah syariat is found in chapter 28 paragraphs 1 and 2, stipulating the authority of the Institution. Paragraph 1 states: “The judicial authority of the district and Province mahkamah syariat covers all conflicts in which the subjects are Muslims.” \(^{660}\) Paragraph 2 states: “The authority of the district and high court covers all conflicts in which the subjects are non-Muslims.” \(^{661}\) The aim of KPPSI is to guarantee that mahkamah syariat applies only to the Muslim community and that, Christians should not worry about discriminatory legal treatment because the state civil court would still exist for them. However, the dualism of the court justice proposed by KPPSI can also bear other consequences. Since the province is predominantly occupied by Muslims, how effective would the existence of state justice be when previously it was well equipped with legal apparatus but that it would now deal only with a small number of non-Muslims? Legal experts would probably be transferred to mahkamah syariat but their background would be in secular law. Could they realistically be expected to establish Islamic law? However, this dualism of the courts in South Sulawesi province could still be justified since there are a non Muslim citizens. What about Aceh, where nearly all Acehnese are Muslims who will of course, abandon work in the state court? Further problems in dualism exist in possible emergence of complicated religious issues. For example, the reality is that some married couples will have different religions. This will be problematic if the judicial process is based on their religious backgrounds. It will possibly result in a province with an autonomous Islamic law, banning inter-religious marriage, which will also create opposition among Muslims, since some of them will follow the teaching that Islam allows a Muslim man to marry a non-Muslim woman.

2.4. Governor
The election of a governor is an interesting aspect of the draft legislation. Chapter 12 paragraph 2 states: “eligible candidates to be governor or vice governor in the South

\(^{660}\) Ibid.

\(^{661}\) Ibid.
Sulawesi province are Indonesian citizens who are Muslims. This paragraph is supported in one of the eight conditions for gubernatorial candidates, as stipulated on paragraph 3, that is, “who perform their religious teachings.” Even though this condition does not mention a specific religious teaching, it was clearly mentioned in the earlier paragraph that the religion referred to was Islam. This paragraph indicates the wish of KPPSI to stress the Islamic piety of the provincial leader. This is, furthermore, an effort by KPPSI not to invite interpretations of its ulama’s political ambitions, because it does not stress the need to ‘master religious teaching’ which could only apply to ulama.

The controversy is, however, over the stipulation that the governor has to be a Muslim. This brings about further suspicions. Do other political positions in the region also have to be held by Muslims, from bupati (district head) to village head? Further questions are related to regencies in the province which are predominantly inhabited by Christians, such as Tana Toraja in South Sulawesi. Will Special Autonomy still provide a space for other religious followers to hold political positions in South Sulawesi?

KPPSI argued that it was necessary to stipulate that the governor had to be a Muslim because it would be impossible to create Islamic Special Autonomy if the provincial leader were not a Muslim. They needed a guarantee that the governor was a ‘good’ Muslim. Other political positions need not be necessarily held by Muslims because only the governor was mentioned in the constitution. This argument seems to be quite weak because if only a Muslim governor were needed, and other office leaders were not Muslims, it would be quite difficult to establish a strong Islamic culture. The constitution

662 “Rancangan Undang-Undang Otonomi Khusus,” in KPPSI, “Hasil-Hasil Keputusan Kongres Umat Islam Sulawesi Selatan.” See also Appendix XVI.

663 Ibid.

664 This problem reminded me of the controversy concerning the demand of Indonesian Muslim nationalists in discussing the draft of 1945 Constitution in July 1945, when Wahid Hasyim debated the proposed article on religion that only Muslims could be elected as President or Vice President of the Republic. He was, however, challenged by Muslim nationalist, Agus Salim arguing that if the President had to be a Muslim, then what about the Vice President, the ambassadors, etc, and what then was the point of the promise to protect other religions? See B. J. Boland, The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia, 30. It can, therefore, be said that the proposed stipulation that the governor had to be a Muslim will possibly bring about consequences on the question of the political position of the minorities in the region. They will defend their rights strongly since historically, they are part of the birth of the region.

665 Interview with Nur Abdurrahman, 16 March 2003; Sirajuddin, 6 March 2003; As’ad Salam, 3 April 2003.
draft of KPPSI was heavily influenced by the case of Aceh, even though they were not yet aware that Aceh’s population was almost a hundred percent Muslim (about 97%).

2.5. Dewan Ulama (Ulama Council)

In the draft legislation, the position of dewan ulama could be considered controversial. The ulama were one of the authorities in the South Sulawesi governmental system. This gave the impression that KPPSI sought to gain control of this body when the province was granted Special Autonomy. In section One of the General Condition, chapter 1 paragraph f, dewan ulama is defined as an independent body functioning to offer fatwa and advice, whether written or oral, in determining the South Sulawesi governmental policies. The position of dewan ulama was discussed in part seven of the section of the proposed draft legislation, chapter 29 and 30. Chapter 29 paragraph 1 states: “the South Sulawesi Province forms a body consisting of ulama.” Paragraph 2 states: “dewan ulama is formed in each district/city within South Sulawesi province.” Chapter 30 paragraph 1 states: “dewan ulama is an independent body functioning to give continuous advice and to control regional policies, including governmental affairs, development, society and matters of Islamic life order.”

The above draft legislation shows KPPSI’s efforts to increase the power of the ulama. KPPSI proposed that if Special Autonomy were granted, dewan ulama should be a formal part of the governmental system. The draft did not propose absolute power for the ulama, because its main duty was to be to advise the government. But it cannot be denied that the body would hold significant political power, since it also works as a controller for the government. Since the other functions of dewan ulama are not mentioned and will be elaborated in qanun, its position as a monitor can be interpreted as an institution more powerful politically than the governor as an executive leader of the province, because while it is an advisor, it can also be interpreted to have a legislative function. If dewan ulama is

666 This is criticised by Jennifer Donohoe who claimed that the body was not elected. However, her criticism was premature because KPPSI was not going into greater depth to show how the body was formed. If the case of the Ulama Council of Aceh is followed, then Donohoe was wrong, since members of the Ulama Council in Aceh was elected through democratic procedure. Interview with Muslim Ibrahim, 2 September 2004.

667 “Rancangan Undang-Undang Otonomi Khusus,” in KPPSI, “Hasil-Hasil Keputusan Kongres Umat Islam Sulawesi Selatan.” See also Appendix XVI.

668 Ibid.
formed with this kind of role, it may shift the balance of power between Islamic institutions, political parties, and social elites in South Sulawesi.

There is also controversy on the issue of this body not being subject to regular election. Jennifer Donohoe criticised the proposed body for contradicting democratic reform by placing an unelected body in control of government decision-making.\textsuperscript{669} She argued that Special Autonomy should reflect the opening up of democratic reform in Indonesia, while the existence of an unelected body of the government contradicts the spirit of the reform itself. Donohoe criticised the absence of any indication of how members of \textit{dewan ulama} would be chosen, or how they would be kept accountable for their actions. Other criticism of this body was the model of governance practiced by the shi’ite system of governance in Iran in which the position of \textit{mullah} were that of authoritative leaders. It is, therefore, not surprising, if the proposed draft for Special Autonomy proposed by KPPSI is identified by scholars to be closer to Iran’s model.\textsuperscript{670} However, the argument they developed is related to KPPSI’s belief in the authority of the \textit{ulama} as ‘heirs of the prophets’ who could direct the common people.

The criticism of the possible unaccountability of \textit{dewan ulama} was answered by KPPSI. When I asked Jalaluddin Rahman, vice chair of the Advisory Council, about the nature of \textit{dewan ulama}, he explained that they should not be identified as purely religious scholars. It consisted of Muslim scholars from various perspectives and disciplines. \textit{dewan ulama} would also contain those Muslim scholars from the province who were considered the most knowledgeable. However, Jalaluddin was not clear about who could determine whether a person were knowledgeable or not. Jalalaluddin’s explanation is aimed at neutralising the tendency to claim the absolutism of the body. It is also to counter the claim of political tendencies behind the draft proposal on \textit{dewan ulama}.

Donohoe’s criticism that the proposed body is unelected remains only a suspicion since the draft did not yet determine the way in which the body would be formed. KPPSI activists may realise that if \textit{dewan ulama} is formed without open election, it will be even more complicated for democratisation in the province, since the criteria for selection are not stated. The body existing in Aceh was formed through election in which several \textit{ulama}

\textsuperscript{669} Jennifer Donohoe, “Islamic Law and Competition for Power in the Reformasi era: The KPSI of South Sulawesi,” 47.

from the lowest administrative government (village) were recommended by their village community to attend a gathering of *ulama* at the district level to elect representatives to attend a higher meeting. In the meeting, the *ulama* elected several of their number to the *dewan ulama*.⁶⁷¹

My concern with the proposed *dewan ulama* is not only in terms of the election process, but also of the scope of authority given to them. *dewan ulama* will consist of Muslim figures from different disciplines, as stated by Jalaluddin Rahman, which seems difficult to implement. First, *ulama* are seen by the community as consisting of only those who were considered to be clerics and who specialise in Islamic disciplines. Those who are good Muslims with a background of ‘secular’ knowledge were not considered to be *ulama*. Second, few Muslim figures with a good understanding of Islamic law have a good knowledge of governance and political and economic matters. The other problem is how the local community can judge an *ulama*’s Islamic knowledge and integrity. Taking the case of Aceh, *dewans ulama* were chosen partly because they could read and discuss kitab kuning (classical Islamic texts).⁶⁷² Using *dewan ulama* criteria, how many Muslim figures could read classical Islamic texts while also having a good understanding of modern sciences?

Further problems concerning the representativeness of *ulama* could exist if they are elected through democratic procedure. Should membership be based on the proportion of regencies in the province if *dewan ulama* are not only representatives but also require intellectual and moral eligibility? What if some regencies have more *ulama* than others who are eligible to be members of the Council? In short, the proposed issue of *dewan ulama* will become a controversial aspect of the activities of the *syariat* movement in South Sulawesi. It may be better for KPPSI to elaborate on the nature of this body, otherwise, they are only distinctive symbols of the province in its implementation of Islamic law and are far from having appropriate jobs for upholding Islamic law in the governmental system. Also, the proposal to allow *dewan ulama* more authority would alter the structure of government. Many politicians would consider that the proposal for Special Autonomy itself is, in fact, a political threat to their existence. If the proposal of *dewan ulama* and its scope of authority

---

⁶⁷¹ Dewan Ulama in Aceh is called *Majelis Permusyawaratan Ulama* (Ulama Consultative Council, MPA). This body consists of 27 *ulama* as representatives of the Aceh districts. Interview with Muslim Ibrahim, chair of MPA, 2 September 2004.

⁶⁷² Interview with Muslim Ibrahim, 2 September 2004.
is supported for Special Autonomy, I suspect, many provincial politicians will remain suspicious and consequently continue to seek reasons to reject the demand. It may be that for these reasons, the *dewan ulama* issue has not been voiced often by KPPSI due to the challenge it offers to the South Sulawesi government.

KPPSI has tried to arouse religious sentiments to gain Special Autonomy for the implementation of Islamic law. This is seen in its effort to refer to the main sources of Islamic teaching (Qur’an and Hadith). It is also seen in its effort to transfer these teachings to more applicable regulations (*qanun*) and its strong wish to have an Islamically oriented ruler (Muslim governor). As well, a religious motive is found in its pushing for the increased power of the *ulama* as the guardian of the Muslim people and in the effort to maximise the judicial court system (*mahkamah syariat*). The criticism that KPPSI have a political interest, being governor and members of *dewan ulama*, should not necessarily be exaggerated, since the nature of religiosity needed for the two positions is not yet well defined by KPPSI. This is, however, to show that KPPSI as a formalist Islamic movement is political and therefore, targeting formal political power is part of the nature of this movement.

**B. KPPSI’s Legal Concepts**

KPPSI’s presence has often been questioned by Muslims elements concerning its concepts for the implementation of Islamic law in South Sulawesi. Many critics question whether KPPSI understands the nature of the Islamic law for which they are struggling. This will be discussed in detail in the next chapter. The question was raised because many KPPSI activists did not come from a background in Islamic studies, particularly Islamic law. Furthermore, in the early stage of its existence KPPSI was pictured as an organisation struggling for the implementation of Islamic law, but also as being reluctant to explain the nature of that Islamic law.

This section will argue that KPPSI had valid concepts of Islamic law. Some of its concepts have been part of it ever since its establishment, and others were produced later, as a result of dialectical interaction with many elements, including those who challenged its existence. However, many of the concepts were not well explained by KPPSI itself. They have not paid significant attention to this matter. As will be discussed below, this problem
is not caused by their weak understanding of syariat but by the concentration of their struggle on establishing the movement.

1. The Nature of Formalised Syariat: The Enforcement of Nahi Mungkar

In the introduction of its core book on Islamic syariat, KPPSI defines what it means by syariat, the scope of syariat, the objectives of syariat, and which syariat is to be formally implemented. KPPSI defines syariat as a path leading to the water or source of life and quotes Muhammad Syaltut’s definition:

...regulations and law and its principles defined by God and obligating Muslim people to follow the regulations in their daily life in their relations with God and human beings.

KPPSI defines syariat as based on wahyu [revelation]. Syariat was revealed to the messengers before Muhammad, and the revelation was especially for Muhammad. It is the second syariat that obligated Muslims to being the ummah of Muhammad. KPPSI regarded syariat as different from fiqh. It states:

Fiqh emerged by involving logics [Ar. ‘aql] to understand the syariat. Therefore, fiqh is the law based on the understanding of an Islamic law expert (mujtahid). That is why fiqh law is an applicable law which was produced by jurists which was based on the understanding of Islamic syariat.

Based on the different nature of syariat and fiqh, KPPSI countered the implied criticism of Muslim intellectuals when they asked which Islamic syariat was to be implemented, because according to KPPSI, syariat was one and absolute. The question should be rather, which Islamic fiqh or Islamic schools should be implemented. KPPSI’s separation between syariat and fiqh is not new in Islamic scholarship. Many legal scholars, both Muslims and Westerners have defined syariat as divine and fiqh as human. When Muslims seek to understand syariat on a particular matter in Islam, their conclusion is no longer divine

---

673 He is a former Rector of al-Azhar University, Egypt.
674 Ibid., 1.
675 Ibid., 1.
676 Ibid., 1.
revelation because it has already received human interpretation and it is this interpretation which is called *fiqh*.\(^{677}\)

KPPSI stresses that *fiqh* elaborates aspects of *syariat*. It states that Islamic law regulates two main aspects: first, deeds performed by Muslims to approach the creator, God. This is called *ibadah mahdah*. This includes: *shalat* (prayer), *shaum* (fasting), *zakat* (Ar. *zakāt*, alams), and *haj*. Second, deeds performed by Muslims to preserve benefits and to avoid harm include the call to do good deeds (*amar ma’ruf* At. *Amr bil-ma’rūf*) and to prevent evil deeds (*nahi mungkar*, Ar. *al-nabī ‘an al-munkar*). This is called *muamalah*. *Muamalah* is part of the Islamic law regulating relationships among people.\(^{678}\)

KPPSI’s definition of *syariat* made clear that it does not have a narrow understanding of Islamic law as several of its opponents charge. However, this definition is not yet enough if it is related to the effort of formalising Islamic law in South Sulawesi. The question is can *syariat* be regarded as divine and be implemented in real life without the interference of human interpretation? Therefore, does implementing *syariat* mean implementing *fiqh*? Here then is seen the weak aspect of KPPSI’s documents on formalised Islamic law, since these important questions are not yet elaborated, and this will remain the question for many people, especially opponents of Muslim intellectuals.

The most important aspect of KPPSI’s view of *syariat* in its effort to formalise them is found in the following:

*Ibadah mahdah* and *amar ma’ruf* do not need any formal legitimacy in order to practice them. They may be practiced in cultural ways. Any Muslim individual may perform it without being controlled by authority. The *nahi mungkar*, however, can only be performed by formal authority, because if it is performed by the community, it will create social disorder. It is the formalisation of the establishment of *nahi mungkar* that KPPSI seeks, since Islamic law can only be established if *nahi mungkar* is upheld, and only the government can do this.\(^{679}\)


\(^{678}\) *Ibid.*, 2.

Therefore, KPPSI’s struggle is different from that of other Islamic formalist groups, particularly DI. DI even tried to regulate ibadah mahdalah, where KPPSI saw that it was difficult to enforce because it was not a social aspect of Islamic teaching. This different perspective is caused by the fact that KPPSI aimed at Islamic Special Autonomy whereas DI wanted a complete Islamic state. KPPSI’s focus in the implementation of Islamic law is limited to amar ma'ruf, in which it sees the importance of governance to establish it.

Strengthening formalised nahi mungkar shows that KPPSI emphasises the political power of Islam to curb the criminality that detracts from life in Muslim communities. Unfortunately, KPPSI does not clearly define what it means by aspects of nahi mungkar. This is not because of its lack of conceptualisation of nahi mungkar, since it has members with a strong grasp of Islamic law. It may be because the establishment of nahi mungkar is a sensitive issue.

A more elaborated opinion about why nahi mungkar has to be established formally, came from KPPSI’s vice chairman of Majelis Syura, Nur Abdurrahman states:

There are three things to do to be a community with established Islamic Law: yad‘un ilā al-khayr (call for good thing), ya‘murūn bi ‘l-ma’rūf (command good deeds) yanhawn ‘an al-munkar (to preventing bad deeds). The first two have been practiced by Muslim communities. yad‘un ilā al-khayr and ya‘murūn bi ‘l-ma’rūf have been performed for years by Muslim organisations, figures, teachers, etc., through seminars, speeches, and advice. The problem that causes Muslim society to deteriorate is the absence of yanhawn ‘an al-munkar, in which, Muslim communities are reluctant to prevent people from committing criminal acts. The government has the formal power to enforce it but failed to do so under secular law. Formalised Islamic law institutionalises the Islamic teaching of nahi mungkar to legitimize the government to uphold it. 680

Nur Abdurrahman shows how KPPSI activists believe in the superiority of syariat to manage the life of Muslims. Unfortunately, he does not mention the reality of Muslim countries, such as Saudi Arabia, which implements several aspects of Islamic law and which claims that as a result, there are fewer criminals in the country. The fact is that many Muslim countries which implement Islamic law cannot be considered to have less criminality than Western countries with their secular laws.

KPPSI’s struggle to establish formalised Islamic law in the aspect of *nahi mungkar* is a view not held by formalist Muslim groups. Muhammad Abid al-Jabiri, a well known Muslim thinker from Morocco, also accepted that the Qur’an consists of laws and some parts of laws could only be established by the power representing Muslim society in punishing wrong doers. Al-Jabiri stresses that this aspect of *syariat* laws had to be enforced and that is not changeable in Islamic teaching.\(^{681}\) Al-Jabiri states this in criticising the belief of some Muslim communities that establishing an Islamic state and caliphate is obligatory in Islamic teaching. In fact, it became only a matter of *ijtihad* among Muslims after the death of the Prophet. There is no text which obliges or bans certain models of government. Therefore, al-Jabiri states that no matter what the government model is, as long as the power holder could enforce certain aspects of Islamic law, that aspect must be reinforced.\(^{682}\) Is the opinion of al-Jabiri coherent with the effort of KPPSI to demand not an Islamic state, but a special autonomous province which will establish *nahi mungkar*? The demand would be right, because KPPSI has already committed itself to struggle under the United Republic of Indonesia, which is not an Islamic state.

2. *Dakwah* against Secularism and *Jihad*

One of KPPSI’s documents explains the nature of *dakwah* and *jihad* that it is pursuing. The organisation finds it important to carry out *dakwah* in establishing *syariat* due to the problems of the Muslim people in defending the teachings of religion. KPPSI explained that the urgency of *dakwah* is due to the flow of secular thinking that penetrates the Muslim community, pioneered by the so called ‘Orientalists’, that is Western people who study Islam. KPPSI sees orientalism as trying to destroy the faith of Muslim people:

> *Ghaswul fikri* [Ar. *ghazw al-firk*, war of thought] has been pursued by Western orientalists for hundreds of years ago....to weaken the faith, the *mahabbah* [Ar. *mahabbah*, love] of Muslims for their religion...one of their efforts is through claiming that Islam is limited to *ibadah mahdalah* that there is no economic system or no political system in Islam etc., and this makes it easy for them to

---


\(^{682}\) Ibid., 68.
penetrate the Muslim community with the ideology of capitalism and secularism. They separate worldly life from religious aspects.\footnote{683} KPPSI believed that secularism was brought by Western-educated Muslims, who were the right hand of the orientalists, and who promoted interpretations which could mislead the Muslim community. KPPSI also regards the case of those scholars who later advance the belief that all religions were equal. KPPSI sees that the criticism of these western secularist scholars created conflicts among Muslim people, including labeling those who were to struggle for formalised Islamic law as fundamentalists.

One of the secular missions of these scholars is to develop terminology to divide the Muslim communities, labeling as moderates those who refuse the formalisation of \textit{syariat} in the state’s constitution, and radical or fundamentalists, those who are pro-formalised \textit{syariat}.\footnote{684}

KPPSI asserts that through \textit{dakwah} activities, the Muslim people can be guarded from the effects of secularist thinking. KPPSI also elaborates the strategy in implementing Islamic law in South Sulawesi. First, \textit{bil-lisan}, that is, inserting the understanding and awareness of the importance of \textit{syariat} being established among the Muslim community in South Sulawesi. They offered an awareness that Islam covers all aspects of life. Second, \textit{dakwah bil-hal} concentrated on the actions of the real implementation of Islamic law by the Muslim community. For this, KPPSI invited all Muslim elements, especially Muslim scholars, da’i, and Muslim figures to become models in daily life in an effort to show the complete truth of the Islamic teaching, which included being pious Muslims, enforcing religious rituals and avoiding evil deeds, working hard, and not depending on other people, or being contaminated by corruption and nepotism.\footnote{685}

Besides the efforts of \textit{dakwah} to impose \textit{syariat} in South Sulawesi, KPPSI asserts that \textit{jihad} is at the heart of Islamic teaching which should be practiced by Muslim people. KPPSI documents show their concept of \textit{jihad}:

\footnote{684} Ibid., 4.
\footnote{685} See the Program of Struggle which resulted from the Second Congress of KPPSI in Appendix XVII. See also H.M. Sirajuddin, “Penegakan Syariat Islam di Sulsel,” \textit{Fajar}, 22 Oktober 2004. 227
In Islamic teaching, *jihad* is the soul. Erasing *jihad* from Islamic teaching means killing the soul of Islam itself. As long as *jihad* still exists, true Islam will exist. However, when *jihad* is lost, the Islam professed is only symbolic Islam, Islam without a value.  

KPPSI rejects the identification of *jihad* with terrorism. KPPSI states that in Islamic teaching, the term terror or terrorism is not recognised, because terror is the effort to threaten, scare, and do violence to an individual or people, while in Islamic teaching, that sort of activity is contradictory, and affection among people is part of the important value of the religion. However, KPPSI does not explain how *jihad* is interpreted in some Muslim groups as violent action against the enemies of God. KPPSI did not consider whether or not the *jihad* issues in Islamic texts incite violence and are intimidatory in nature. The fact is that those who bombed and killed innocent people, as in the case of Bali bombings, justified their actions in the name of *jihad*. KPPSI only emphasised the holy nature of *jihad*:

*Jihad* in Islam is holy teaching. It is clean of violent tendencies or revenge. *Jihad* is allowed in Islam as a way of self-defense, defending the faith to gain a proper life with dignity in this world. There is no single verse or prophetic tradition that allows Muslim people to attack those who have different ideologies or religions since Islam is a blessing for them.

This quotation shows that there is a tendency for KPPSI to interpret *jihad* as physical efforts of defending the religion. KPPSI refers to *jihad* as the sacrifice of wealth and soul for the sake of religion. KPPSI does not further elaborate what *jihad* could be. However, *jihad* can be widely defined when its document attaches the legal advice (*fatwa*) of MUI on the terrorism. The *fatwa* states two kinds of *jihad*, *al qital/al-harb*, that is waging physical war against unbelievers for the sake of establishing the religion of God. Second is *al-islah*,

687 Several Muslims interpret that *jihad* is waging war against those infidels who attack Islam, for example, the interpretation of *jihad* held by Bali bombers. See Greg Fealy and Virginia Hooker (eds.), *Voices of Islam in Southeast Asia: A Contemporary Sourcebook* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2006), pp. 373-377.
688 Ibid., 6.
689 Ibid., 6.
that is, the serious and continuous effort to protect faith, wealth, justice, dignity, the individual, family, and society. The fatwa also defines the difference between jihad and terrorism, where terrorism destroys while jihad improves. Terror is launched where there is rule, while jihad is conducted according to regulations determined by Islamic teaching. Furthermore, the fatwa states that terrorism is banned in Islam, while jihad is compulsory for the Muslim community.

This fatwa was not issued by KPPSI. However, attaching this fatwa to a KPPSI document implicitly means that KPPSI agrees and follow the contents of it. This assumption was strengthened by interview with Abdul Aziz Kahar, the chairman of Executive Body of KPPSI, who said that one important reason for people outside Muslim community to know that why we struggle for formalised syariat is due to the concept of jihad.\(^{690}\) Other figures often state that their involvement in KPPSI is not merely concerned with how Special Autonomy could successfully be implemented in South Sulawesi, but more importantly, struggling for formalised law through constitutional efforts is one form of jihad that can be applied in South Sulawesi. They often state that it all depends on God but the fact is that they have already performed what they believed in. Finally, the concept of jihad held by KPPSI is one aspect to assess the movement. Apart from the criticism that KPPSI is being politicised by several of its figures,\(^{691}\) the concept shows its commitment towards the supremacy of religious belief.

3. Intisari Syariat Islam: A Preliminary Concept of Islamic law

For the purpose of elaborating the implementation of Islamic law in South Sulawesi by KPPSI, including its answers to the challenges of several groups mentioned, it has already produced Intisari Syariat Islam (the Essence of Islamic Syariat). This core book emerged out of the meeting between KPPSI and DPRD on 20 January 2003 in which it was agreed that KPPSI would decide what and which Islamic law would be upheld.\(^{692}\) It is expected

---

\(^{690}\) Interview with Abdul Aziz Kahar, 14 June, 2003.

\(^{691}\) Despite the available works that have been mentioned before, pointing to the politicization of KPPSI movement, this criticism was once launched by a young activist in South Sulawesi, Samsu Rijal in the interactive dialogue held by LINTAS on Islamic Formalism in the Post Indonesian Presidential Election 2004, who states that some KPPSI activists were aware of the figures who merely involved in the organisation only for temporary political activity. Unfortunately, Rijal did not mention which activists of KPPSI were meant.

to be a preliminary source for the activists who struggle for the implementation of Islamic law. It can further be used as a source book to unite the vision and mission of the activists in campaigning for the implementation of Islamic law.693 Besides these guidelines, KPPSI’s concept of Islamic law can also be seen from the writings of its activists in newspapers and seminars.

It should be noted that the book is still provisional. Also, aspects of Islamic syariat are not explained in details. In other words, it was only a general sketch of aspects of Islamic law, and does not give much indication about how it is to be implemented. It is drawn from many Islamic law books already widely used by society. It does not always touch on the issues of Islamic law in contemporary Muslim Society, especially in South Sulawesi society for whom the book was written. Therefore the book may not be more than general guidelines of Islamic law. The book was not well conceived. It does not clarify how a certain law is drawn while in fact, it adopts many opinions of classical jurists.694 KPPSI admitted that it was created cooperatively but it did not explain how.695

However, since book is the most organised document of KPPSI for the implementation of Islamic law, it is still very useful as an indication of the concept of Islamic law pioneered by KPPSI. Other documents, such as the ideas concerning Islamic law as conceived by KPPSI’s activists will also be included to support the core book. However, their use will be strictly limited. These documents tend to offer personal opinion rather than revealing KPPSI’s concepts. These concepts of syariat are also expected to reveal how well KPPSI discussed several aspects of Islamic law which were questioned by those groups rejecting formalised Islamic law.

Even though this book does not state its sources, this can still be identified. According to KPPSI activists, the book was mainly adapted from Garis-Garis Besar Syariat Islam (General Guidelines of Islamic Law) written by activists of Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI).696 KPPSI, therefore, displayed a lack of seriousness in preparing a real workable concept of Islamic law which is relevant for South Sulawesi

693 Ibid., i.
694 It distributes various ideas of jurists, without offering KPPSI’s reflection of views.
696 See Mawardi Noor, et al., Garis-Garis Besar Syariat Islam (Jakarta Selatan: Khairul Bayan, 2002).
Muslims. This shows that KPPSI did not really address those issues as a main priority, compared to its political struggle.

There are several reasons why KPPSI adapted Garis - Garis Besar Syariat Islam. The publisher’s introduction states that the book has been discussed by several Muslim activists in South Sulawesi. It says that it is to be the main reference for the program of socialisation of formalised Islamic law in South Sulawesi.\textsuperscript{697} H.M. Sirajuddin, the vice chairman of the Majelis Syura of KPPSI said there had been an agreement between the writers of Garis – Garis Besar syariat Islam and KPPSI and that it was in terms of the activists’ commitment to uphold Islamic law in Indonesia.\textsuperscript{698} However, apart from massive adaption of the Garis-Garis Besar Syariat Islam, the book is enriched a discussion on the nature of syariat, and about the life of the religious minorities.

\textit{Intisari Syariat Islam} offers general guidelines in relation to the efforts of KPPSI to establish Special Autonomy for the implementation of Islamic Law especially with its priority of activating the mission of nahi mungkar as mentioned before. In the book, the discussion of ibadah mahdalah is not detailed. The view of the exclusion of ibadah mahdalah formalisation is a clear indication of the strong motivation by KPPSI to employ Islamic nahi mungkar as a condition for upholding Islamic law in South Sulawesi. It explores aspects of muamalah where the mission of enforcing Islamic law can be strengthened. It discusses polygamy, the position of women, wealth, criminal punishment, Islamic leadership. Besides muamalah, the guidelines also explore akhlak (Ar. akhlāq, enjoining good) and the position of non Muslims, which is always an important issue in the discourse of formal implementation of Islamic law.

\textbf{3.1. Polygamy}

In the guidelines, KPPSI offer religious arguments for formalised syariat. In the case of polygamy, KPPSI follows the trend of formalist Muslim groups who usually justify the importance of polygamy by claiming that it is for the sake of women. It states:

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{697} Ibid., iii.
\textsuperscript{698} Interview with H.M Sirajuddin, 10 January 2005.
\end{flushright}
Banning polygamy can only cause social problems; increasing the number of unmarried woman, and number of children born from illegal marriage, free sex, prostitution…… Banning polygamy has high social costs.\textsuperscript{699}

KPPSI has tried to relate its Islamic concepts to recent problems in the Muslim community but only briefly. Furthermore, the above argument is still very debatable, not only because of the national marriage constitution, but also because of the local Muslim customs. The local marriage system tends to avoid the practice of polygamy. However, formalism seeks to regulate polygamy as it did in the DI times. DI regulated polygamy because some wives were widowed when their husbands killed in fighting against the republican army. KPPSI related polygamy to its present condition, in which there were increasing numbers of unmarried women.

\textbf{3.2. Women's Issues}

In promoting the formalisation of Islamic law, KPPSI asserts that Islam teaches high respect for women:

The focus of Islam on family matters refer to the position of women as a whole. The discussion of Qur'an on the issue of women takes up more than ten chapters. Women had a wide range of responsibility for \textit{dakwah}: individual, household, and society. Women's opinion is equal to men's. Women are allowed to go to war. Women are allowed to sign a contract.\textsuperscript{700}

This is to counter the claim that if Islamic law were implemented, women would not be allowed to be involved in social activities, such as driving a car.

A problem that has not yet gained clarification from KPPSI is that they have not offered a clear concept of women's rights, whether they are limited or equal to men. KPPSI does not elaborated on the position of \textit{muhrim} (Ar. \textit{muhrim})\textsuperscript{701} which is considered by many woman activists to be a controversial aspect due to its possible limitation of the freedom of women.\textsuperscript{702} It seems quite clear that it has to focus more on the issue. Apart

\textsuperscript{699} KPPSI, "Intisari Syariat Islam," 23.
\textsuperscript{700} Ibid., 15.
\textsuperscript{701} Degree of consanguinity between a man and woman that renders marriage impossible but gives them the right of association.
\textsuperscript{702} Interview with Nurul Ilmi Idrus, 15 September 2004. She is a Makassarese origin who completed a Ph.D in Gender Studies at the Australian National University.
from normative concepts in its book, none of prominent activists of KPPSI have written on issues related to women’s existence, if syariat should be formalised in South Sulawesi. KPPSI has a women’s department, but it has made little contribution to the discourse on women in Islam. There is only one writing that I have found so far by a woman activist of KPPSI, but it confines itself to explaining the normative role of woman as wife or mother.\textsuperscript{703} It should deal directly with issues questioned by ‘secular’ woman intellectuals, as described above.

Even though this core book is only a preliminary work to be further discussed by the Muslim community in South Sulawesi, it may have been good for KPPSI to enrich its perspective on many legal aspects of women’ life, such as its understanding of aurah, the use of hijab (Ar. hijāb, veil worn by Muslim women in public) and position of muhrim. This is very important, because, as will be discussed, some woman activists question the limitations on women’s activities outside the home, because they will always be limited by the presence of muhrim in their activities.

\textbf{3.3. Criminal laws}

KPPSI says that there are many kinds of criminality that could lead to punishment: \textit{murtad},\textsuperscript{704} \textit{zina} and \textit{qadzaf} (Ar. qadhaf, false accusation of unlawful intercourse),\textsuperscript{705}

\textsuperscript{703} Masniar Khadijah, “Cerdaskan Ibu dengan Syariat,” \textit{Fajar}, 23 December 2005.

\textsuperscript{704} \textit{Murtad} is any action opposing Islam in the form of riddah (apostate), that is abandoning religious obligations that have already been acknowledged or by looking down or lying about the truth of religion. KPPSI also joined jurists’ thoughts on capital punishment for the offence of murtad. It stated that this punishment is based on the prophetic tradition. More explanation is expected, however, on the opportunity of repentance to show the complexity of Islamic law in terms of apostasy.

\textsuperscript{705} Modern jurists define it as sexual intercourse between a man and a woman who are not, and are not suspected to be, in a state of legal matrimony. That KPPSI did not regulate the definition of \textit{zina} may be caused by the understanding of Muslim people on the nature of this criminal action. The absence of an explanation of the nature of \textit{zina} because it is very important to know which exactly practices are considered as unlawful intercourse, since in recent times, the practices of unlawful intercourse are more varied. Rather than explaining this, KPPSI regulated the well known categories: \textit{zina} of an unmarried person (gairu mukhsan) and \textit{zina} of a married person (mukhsan). The punishment of the culprit of \textit{zina gairu mukhsan} is 100 lashes, which is referred to in the Qur’an chapter an-Nur verses 2-3. The punishment of \textit{mukhsan} refers to the practice of the prophet, that is, stoning. The tendency of the premature creation of the work is that it does not try to deal with the issue of the modern practices of unlawful intercourse, such as homosexuality and sodomy as well as the kinds of punishment.
sarikah (theft) and hirabah (Ar. ʰɪʳᵃᵇᵃʰ, dacoit and robbery), \textsuperscript{706} khamar.\textsuperscript{707} However, the discussion is not be related to the reality of Muslim society in South Sulawesi. This seems to be based on the consideration that aspects of criminal law are controversial and sensitive issues that cause KPPSI to discuss norms and leave further discussion to wider Muslim society. I have found that KPPSI activists hold different views about how hudud is implemented. Moderate figures in KPPSI see the possibility of interpreting texts based on modern developments, such as the use of prison instead of cutting off the hand for theft. Furthermore, KPPSI activists often voiced their opinion that nahi mungkar should not be initiated through punishment but by gradual implementation, included inserting an understanding of the nature of Islamic law into Muslim communities.

Therefore, KPPSI’s problem in elaborating criminal laws in Islam may be related to the problem of consensus among its figures. However, I do not see a problem in what Bahtiar Effendy observes, that when KPPSI talks about a working concept of Islamic law, they will dismiss, because of the various ideas on how syariat is to be formalised developing inside KPPSI.\textsuperscript{708} They have started to talk about their concepts, such as the creation of intisari syariat Islam, but they still stick together. I see that their difference is more a strategy to get Islamic law in South Sulawesi formalised.

\textsuperscript{706} They are defined as taking away the property of another person surreptitiously without the knowledge and consent of that person.\textsuperscript{706} KPPSI determined that based on the holy Qur’an chapter al- Maida, verses 38-39, a theft with certain conditions, the punishment applied to him/her is the cutting off of the hand. Hirabah literally means to quarrel, to fight. It is defined as taking way property from a person openly by using or threatening to use force. It includes robbery, bloodshed, high treason, dacoit. KPPSI simply asserts that the person can either have his hand and foot cut off on both sides, or be executed, or banished, depending to the level of their criminal activities.\textsuperscript{706} This explanation seems to be too theoretical. The discussion does not relate to the modern practices of anarchical actions, such as provocateurs.

\textsuperscript{707} It is explained that the punishment for wine drinking is based on the Hadith of the prophet Muhammad, and consists of 40 lashes. KPPSI also mentioned that Umar bin Khattab, the second caliph after the Prophet, awarded 80 lashes. Furthermore, KPPSI also refers to one other version of the prophetic tradition, that the prophet did not determine the exact punishment of the khamar consumer. KPPSI has yet to explain why it occurs in different versions, maybe because the important thing is not the numbers of lashes but the social effect of lashes to social security. However, KPPSI did not further elaborate on the possibility of applying this punishment, due to the process of executing the culprit, which seems to be made difficult by the required proof that the act was voluntary; therefore, the hadd cannot be applied, without further proof, to a person found drunk and incapable.\textsuperscript{707}

The argument that KPPSI avoids the details of Islamic criminal law is understandable, but suitable concepts of Islamic criminal law seem to be still far off. Aceh which was Special Autonomy several years ago has made only three Qanun on criminal laws, and they only touch on the peripheral issues; Qanun on khamar (liquor) through UU No. 10/2002, Qanun on maisir (gambling) through UU No. 13/2003, and Qanun on khalwat (indecency) through UU No. 14/2003.\footnote{For more information on these three Qanun, see Dinas Syariat Islam Provinsi Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam, Himpunan Undang Undang, Keputusan presiden, Peraturan Daerah/Qanun, Instruksi Gubernur Edaran Gubernur Berkaitan Pelaksanaan Syariat Islam, 279-330; Interview with Muslim Ibrahim, 2 September 2004; see also, “Sebagian Tugas Peradilan Umum Diserahkan ke Mahkamah syariat,” Suara Pembaruan, 13 Oktober 2004. In relation to the position of Qanun here, it should be added that the implementation of these Qanun are still far from the obsession of implementing Islamic law to resolve endemic corruption and the lack of legal certainty, which are the major concerns of today’s people. These Qanun, should, however, be seen as not merely matters of individual worship and symbolic matters as several scholars have criticised them,\footnote{But because the matters of gambling and decency are related to the issue of the economic consequences and morality of Muslim society. My concern, is however, with the possible centralism of interpretation of Islamic law which is only held by the government who produced Qanun. What if other sections of society had interpretations which were different from those of government? Furthermore, how are the campaigners of formalised Islamic laws going to implement these rules and how seriously are they going to touch on the more substantial problems of Muslim society such as corruption and the lack of legal certainty that directly effect the security of Muslim life?} but because}

3.4. Clean Governance

The Intisari Syariat Islam is also concerned with clean governance, an anti corruption concept. To create clean government, KPPSI proposes: first, not accepting gifts and corruption. In discussing this aspect, KPPSI offered the analogy of corruption as the wrong practice of people in the Prophet’s time when they took war reparations, when the wealth was not for themselves. Then, the Prophet threatened them with severe punishment in the hereafter. KPPSI also categorised that gifts are corruption. Besides corruption, bribery (riswah) is also something the government should avoid. KPPSI referred to the threat of the Qur’an and Hadith for this wrong action.

Cheating people, ignoring the needs of people, making people difficult, and nepotism are also nominated by KPPSI as things which are clearly banned by Islamic teaching. KPPSI has sought to counter the criticisms of liberal Muslims that formalist Muslims were trapped in a symbolist religion, rather than confronting the real problems of the country, such as corruption. In fact, many figures of KPPSI are thought to have clean
track records especially when considering that they have held important bureaucratic and political positions.\textsuperscript{710} Therefore, one may see that for many of KPPSI's figures, discussion on clean governance issues is more than mere words.

Unfortunately, this seems to lack discussion, and bears the impression of a lack of attention to this issue. KPPSI does not voice the model of punishment to be applied for a corruptor which is more effective than secular positive law. It does not stress how relevant a formalist Islamic movement can solve the practice of endemic corruption in the core book and in the voices of KPPSI activists, question will arise about syari'at can tackle the corruption.

3.5. Attitude to the Non-Muslims

KPPSI also regulated the position of Non-Muslims in Islamic law. This is done as an effort to answer the suspicion that KPPSI is not concerned with the welfare of non-Muslim followers in South Sulawesi when promoting Islamic law. It shows KPPSI's acceptance of religious tolerance in social affairs:

In the view of Islamic law, the position of Muslim and non-Muslim before the law is the same in all aspects. Non-Muslims are free to practice their religion, to perform administrative and political activities, and their existence is protected. The terms 'Muslim' and 'non-Muslim' are only for political administration and have nothing to do with differences in their personal rights.\textsuperscript{711}

Jalaluddin Rahman elaborated on the question often addressed by the non-Muslim people of possible religious discrimination through the term dhimmi (Ar. dhimmī)\textsuperscript{712} which will be discussed in the next chapter. Jalaluddin refers to Madinah Charter where the term 'dhimmī' was not implemented for non-Muslims in Madinah at the time when the Prophet established a state. Jalaluddin states that the case of the non-Muslim people in Madinah is more mu'ahidun (Ar. mu'ahidūn, non-Muslims who joined an agreement in one society). The non-Muslim people were not conquered, but they occupied the place earlier than

\textsuperscript{710} This refers to at least three of its most important figures, the late Abdurrahman A. Basalamah (the former Rector of Muslim Indonesian University, Makassar), Abdul Muin Salim (the former Rector of Islamic State University, Makassar), Ahmad Ali (the former Dean of Hasanuddin University), and Abdul aziz Kahar Muzakkar (the present member of DPD).

\textsuperscript{711} KPPSI, "Intisari Syariat Islam," 68.

\textsuperscript{712} Non-Muslim peoples afforded security of life and property under the syari'at on payment of a poll tax.
Muhammad and his prophets.\footnote{713} Rahman shows that Madinah Charter can be implemented in South Sulawesi where a similar situation exists with non-Muslims who have also been part of the province since their birth, and therefore, they are united with the Muslim community. Rahman states that when the syariat is formally implemented in South Sulawesi, Christian people in Tana Toraja and other Christian people in the province may not be treated as dhimmi but more as mu‘ahidun.\footnote{714} Rahman concludes:

In a governmental system which seeks to formalise Islamic law in the community where Muslims are in the majority, non-Muslim people do not need to worry, be suspicious or afraid. They do not have to feel like a second class of citizens because they all have rights and obligations based on equality, justice, and security.\footnote{715}

Rahman’s moderate views may be seen that first, he is part of the moderate group in the movement. Second, he responds to people with pluralistic concerns about when Islamic law will be implemented in South Sulawesi, especially since KPPSI’s former laskar wings who were religious intolerant. However, KPPSI’s concept of religious tolerance strictly limited:

However, in matters of faith, there is no bargaining. In upholding principles, they have to hold firmly to their faith and defer to the holy Qur’an and prophetic tradition, because for Islam, for toward Muslim people, they have to be graceful while towards non-Muslims, they have to be decisive and gruff, but not rude.\footnote{716}

KPPSI also adds the importance of being aware of the absolute truth of Islamic teaching, and the consequence of believing in this doctrine is that other religious followers’ beliefs and professions are “ditolak kebenarannya bukan keberadaannya” (rejected in their truth not in their existence).\footnote{717}

KPPSI seems to have made an effort to assure that formal implementation of Islamic law should not necessarily burden other religious followers, and this is stressed by its moderate activists. However, the worry of pluralist Muslim groups and non-Muslims

\footnote{713} KPPSI, “Intisari Syariat Islam,” 68.
\footnote{714} Interview with Jalaluddin Rahman, 15 March 2003.
\footnote{715} See the discussion of “Inside KPPSI,” in Chapter Five.
\footnote{716} KPPSI, “Intisari Syariat Islam,” 69.
\footnote{717} Ibid., 69.
seem to continue to take shape not concerning KPPSI’s concepts but in what these people have seen of the intimidatory activities of KPPSI activists. This is exaggerated by KPPSI’s provision of a clear-cut ideological belief for non-Muslims. Exposing a clear cut religious belief in a more open way will always invite suspicion among other religious followers. This will be a handicap for the struggle, because KPPSI does not only want to do its holy job in struggling for the implementation of Islamic law but it also wants to see results where Islamic teaching becomes a blessing for the people in South Sulawesi.

KPPSI is not interested in talking about the Islamic state in terms of what has been done by DI. KPPSI is even not programming the total formalisation of the contents of Islamic law, such as the control of praying and fasting. What KPPSI means is the formalisation of criminal law in Islam where nahi mungkar could be established formally by the government. It is through this idealism that Special Autonomy regulation is needed for what it calls a ‘political house’.

KPPSI should have been more articulate in presenting aspects of criminal law, such as how hudud would be implemented in society. If not, it will remain a question about whether it is any more than the expression of their ambition to gain local political hegemony, by playing on the issue of syariat rather than an argument on strong religiosity. In spite of the effort in this chapter to argue the significant religiosity of KPPSI, it still needs a good working concept. It will not only minimise criticism as will be found in the following chapter, but more importantly, it will give more space to assuming that a formalist Islamic movement is not only a political movement but that it also manifests a particular religious zeal.
Chapter Eight

OPPOSITION TO FORMALIST ISLAM AND ITS IMPACT ON KPPSI

Formalist Islamic groups such as KPPSI are often seen as uncompromising and intractable on issues of doctrine and strategy. This perception is evident in the frequency with which scholars and journalists use of terms such as ‘hardline’, ‘militant’ and ‘fanatical’ to describe these groups. In the case of KPPSI, criticism of its uncompromising attitude is further related to its perspectives on its ideological demand. The criticisms circle on the problems and negative impact if formalised Islamic law is implemented in South Sulawesi. The elements of society who criticise KPPSI’s agenda generally questioned the reliability of formalised Islamic law as a solution for improving Muslims’ lives in the province, while at the same time, the movement itself has been stigmatised with its negative record, such as being intolerant to people who oppose formalised Islamic law.

For KPPSI, however, there are strong grounds for querying this view. As is clear from the previous chapter, the organisation has changed its thinking and tactics in response to political conditions and particularly criticism from liberal Muslims, non-Muslim groups and other elements of society. This chapter will examine in greater detail the present opposing groups and individuals against formalised syariat in the province. This discussion is important in understanding which aspects of implementing Islamic law which they opposed and how influential the criticisms in Muslim society was. The elaboration of these criticisms become significant because there have been writings that represent opposing groups in South Sulawesi, but they are not yet well-discussed. The rest of the chapter will then discuss how a dialectical process occurred between KPPSI and its opponents which brings about a shift KPPSI’s strategy, so that they then employed new means of expanding their public support, so furthering the cause of implementing Islamic law in South Sulawesi.
A. Opposition from Muslim Intellectuals: Which *Syariat*?

Like the challenges by many national Muslim intellectuals to the discourse of formalised Islamic law in Indonesia,¹ the response of Muslim intellectuals to KPPSI’s struggle for formal implementation of Islamic law was also a significant challenge. Even though there were only a small number of Muslim intellectuals voicing their concerns, their ideas were known largely due to the fact that they were considered to be authoritative in issues of the Islamic law. These people were academics from Universitas Islam Negeri (Islamic State University, UIN), with a background in Islamic law and theology. Furthermore, they expressed their criticism directly to the public through their writings in newspapers and seminars. There were a few academics expressing their criticism of formalist Islamic law,²

---


² These other local Muslim intellectuals who once voiced their opposition to the efforts of formalised Islamic law in South Sulawesi, are Andi Nuzul, “Formalisasi *Syariat* Islam Ataukah Penegakan Perilaku Muslim? *Fajar*, 6 Juni 2003. Andi Nuzul is a lecturer in Islamic law at the State Higher School of Islamic Studies, Bone. Another prominent intellectual who opposed the effort of KPPSI is Nazaruddin Razak. He was the former provincial chairman of Muhammadiyah. He stated that basically South Sulawesi Muslims had already implemented Islamic law in their daily life as seen by the fact that they established mosques, performed their rituals, building their Islamic brotherhood on all parts of Islamic law. This statement shows that KPPSI’s effort had been already actualised by Muslim society. Razak’s other form of opposition could be seen in his criticism that KPPSI was not yet ready. See *Fajar*, 19 January 2002.
but the best known are three liberal intellectuals from UIN Alauddin Makassar who were: Hamka Haq (Professor of theology and Islamic law), M. Qasim Mathar (Ph.D. in Theology), and Harifuddin Cawidu (Ph.D. in Theology).

In general, these intellectuals questioned the methods and interpretations of Islamic law which KPPSI sought to implement. The most productive and systematic challenge of these intellectuals comes from Hamka Haq. His critique is contained in his book, *Syariat Islam: Wacana dan Penerapannya* (Islamic Law: Its Discourse and Implementation). His other writings are also found in newspapers. Hamka Haq argued that people should understand the nature of Islamic law if they wanted to formalise it, because misperceptions would make their struggle ineffective:

The term law itself was part of the *syariat*. In other words, the word *syariat* was not identical with law. Therefore, we can say that in Indonesia, *syariat* from the perspective of *aqidah* [Ar. *aqīdah*, Islamic creed] and *akhlak* has been implemented, even though not yet to the maximum.

Furthermore, he states:

Maybe the aspect of Islamic law which has not been touched on is *jinayah* [Ar. *jīnāyah*, criminal law] that cover sanctions such as *qishash* (retaliation), *hadd* (prescribed penalty) and *ta'zir* [Ar. *ta'zīr*, deterrence], that is, the discretionary penalties determined by judges. The *jinayah* was only a small part of *syariat*. Therefore, it would easily be understood if the effort of upholding Islamic law was merely defined as upholding the Islamic criminal law without using the term *syariat*, which is larger in scope.

Hamka also described the application of the legal aspects of *syariat* in the life of Indonesian Muslims. He pointed out the legalised applications of *munakahat* (marriage and divorce), *mawaris*, (Ar.*mawārith*), *hibah* (Ar. *hībah*), *waqaf* (Ar. *waqf*), which are all charitable endowment, as found in the regulations No. 1 1974 in the Compilation of Islamic Law. Hamka also showed of the application of Islamic law in the aspect of *muamalah*, in which the prevailing constitution allowed the application of economic transactions based on

---

4 Ibid., 4.
5 Ibid., 5.
6 Ibid., 5.
Islamic law, such the establishment of syariat bank and insurance institutions.\textsuperscript{7} Hamka pointed out other aspects of national law such as anti-monopoli regulations, environmental law, workforce regulations and some parts of criminal law which reflected syariat.\textsuperscript{8} The only aspect which was not implemented is the jinayah, and therefore, as quoted initially, implementation of Islamic syariat should only be directed to the effort of implementing the jinayah.

Hamka Haq, however, contended that the implementation of Islamic law had to be discussed with the new spirit of ijithad. Hamka states:

The spirit of jihad in implementing Islamic law which is not equipped with the spirit of the true ijithad can make the effort appear threatening, forceful, and thus, the spirit of Islamic syariat as rahmatan lil’alamin \textit{[Ar. rahmatan lil’alamin, a blessing for all the world]} was not well reflected.\textsuperscript{9}

Direct criticism of KPPSI’s understanding of the scope of Islamic law was also voiced by M. Qasim Mathar.\textsuperscript{10} He stated that there are a number of understandings developed among Muslim people on the definition of syariat. He set them out as: first, Islamic teaching itself; second, Islamic jurisprudence; and third Islamic criminal law. Qasim worried that many KPPSI members understood syariat superficially as only the Islamic criminal law. Like Hamka, Qasim stated that the Islamic criminal law was only a small part of Islamic law. However, Qasim was more specific in criticising what he saw as the improper understanding of many KPPSI activists regarding the nature of syariat which they struggled to implement. Therefore, he stated that limiting understanding on Islamic law to the Islamic criminal law, could only result in the view that when the criminal law was not upheld properly, Islamic law itself was not upheld.\textsuperscript{11}

Qasim questioned the model of implementation of Islamic law in South Sulawesi demanded by KPPSI activists as an effort to return to the idealism of the Prophet

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{7} Ibid., 5
\item \textsuperscript{8} Ibid., 5
\item \textsuperscript{9} Ibid., 3.
\item \textsuperscript{11} Interview with M. Qasim Mathar, 23 February 2003.
\end{itemize}
Muhammad’s time, but this idealism is, in fact, contradicted to the sociological method of the Prophet in practicing Islam. He writes:

One of the characteristics of implementing Islamic law was through sociological and cultural roots. We are of the Malay people, Bugis-Makassarese, Mandar, Toraja, Sunda, Batak, Ambonese, Acehnese, Minangkabau and others who are neither Arabs nor Barat (Western people). Islam in Indonesia had to be based on Malay nuances not on Arabic or Western ways, because existing values based on sociological and cultural aspects of society will last longer.\(^{12}\)

Harifuddin Cawidu, another liberal and influential Muslim intellectual in South Sulawesi also voiced his opposition to the idea of Islamic formalism. In a seminar paper, he dealt in detail with the cultural struggle of Islamic law in Indonesia, as performed by the NU, the organisation in which he was active and his reference to the ideas of many contemporary Muslim substantialists in Indonesia, that is in implementing the values of Islam and not trapped in the pure expression through symbols alone. Like Hamka Haq, Harifuddin Cawidu described the activists of cultural Islam in Indonesia as contextual, not as many KPPSI activists understand the nature of Islamic law, which had to be understood textually. Cawidu writes:

The implementation of Islamic law should not necessarily be translated in textual ways, especially the *hudud* as found explicitly in the Qur’anic paragraph. The establishment of *hudud* is not the substance of the religion but it motivates the Muslim people to be properly Islamic. This means that if the Muslim community could live well without being threatened by *hudud*, the wish to implement Islamic law had been achieved.\(^{13}\)

Cawidu’s more obvious opposition to Islamic formalism was found in his other writing, in which he stated that holding to formalistic Islam could also lead to intolerance by people with different religious beliefs. He writes:

The existence of intolerant attitudes is due to the degradation of the understanding of basic Islamic values. Islam is only understood in the formal

---


\(^{13}\) Harifuddin Cawidu, “Penegakan Syariat Islam Secara Kultural dan Substansial,” a paper presented at the seminar on Pioneering the Upholding of Islamic Law from Different Perspectives, held by STAI DDI Mangkoso, Makassar, 9 June 2002.
meaning not in the substantial; Islam is only understood in a literal way, not in the contextual meaning; Islam is only understood partially, not comprehensively. It is these ways of understanding Islam which create a poor image of this religion, so relating it to terrorism, fundamentalism, and radicalism.\(^{14}\)

Cawidu did not directly accuse KPPSI of being religiously intolerant. However due to this characterisation of KPPSI as formalist, it may be concluded that his vision indicated that the existence of KPPSI tends to degrade the substantial values of Islam. However, unlike M. Qasim Mathar, Cawidu’s writings never openly opposed the existence of KPPSI. Cawidu also never pointed to any particular action of KPPSI activists showing a negative image of the formalistic Islam for which they struggled. What is clear about his opposition is that he was in favour of the cultural struggle for syariat enactment, not a legalistic one.

The explanations of these three local Muslim intellectuals on the nature of Islamic law showed a questioning of which mazhab (Ar......school of Islamic law) law should be supported by KPPSI. Their explanation of the complexity of the definition of the Islamic law, various methods of implementing Islamic law which are historically justified and the need to understand the substance of Islamic law showed that they disagreed with an extreme interpretation of aspects of formalised Islamic law. They believed that there might be more excesses in the lives of Muslims who had a low level of understanding of Islamic teaching and of a religiously pluralist society. Furthermore, their questions on which Islamic law should be implemented was based on their assumption that many parts of Islamic law had been legalised by the Indonesian government and further aspects of Islamic law are on the way to being formalised through careful steps.

**B. Opposition from the Minorities: Can Churches Still be Built?**

Religious minorities are another major source of opposition to KPPSI. Even though Islam has become the major religion, numbering 87.46 percent of the total population of South Sulawesi (7,802,732), four other religions are also acknowledged in Indonesia and all exist

in South Sulawesi. 8.73 percent of the province population is Protestant.\textsuperscript{15} Due to this significant percentage in the province, it is not surprising if this community should voice their misgivings concerning the efforts of KPPSI to struggle for formalised syariat in an area where other religious adherents exist.

At least two prominent South Sulawesi Protestant clergymen voiced their challenges to the efforts of KPPSI’s proposals. They were Zakaria J. Ngelow and M. Soepamena, both lecturers at the Sekolah Tinggi Teologi Indonesia Timur (East Indonesian Institute of Theology) in Makassar. Zakaria J. Ngelow is also well known as a Christian theologian. Their ideas were expressed in a paper in which they presented and their research on the discourse of implementing Islamic law. Often, they claimed that their ideas represent the perceptions of many Christian communities in South Sulawesi.

Their concerns about Islamic formalism focused on whether it could still guarantee the freedom of religious followers to perform their own religious rituals. Their concerns on religious freedom originated in the Islamic law activism in this country, which was characterised by discrimination and violent behaviour towards religious minorities. In commenting on KPPSI’s demand of Special Autonomy for formalised Islamic law, J. Ngelow states:

Sulawesi Selatan is not the same as Aceh. Aceh had almost 100 percent Muslims but in South Sulawesi, there are other religious followers. Tana Toraja, one kabupaten in South Sulawesi, is even predominantly Christian. We were, since early times, part of the province and contributed to the establishment of South Sulawesi identity.\textsuperscript{16}

Based on this, J. Ngelow fears that Christians might become ‘second class’ citizens in South Sulawesi. He stated that if Islamic law is implemented, the Christian community and other religious minorities would automatically be discriminated against because they would have limited political rights compared to the Muslim majority.\textsuperscript{17} J. Ngelow’s rejection can be related to one item of the Special Autonomy regulation proposed by the Second Congress of KPPSI that clearly stated that the governor of South Sulawesi must be a

\textsuperscript{15} Other religious followers were less than 2 percent: Catholics (1.75 %), Hindu (1.65 %), Buddhists (0.41 %). See Sulsel Dalam Angka, 2000.

\textsuperscript{16} Interview with Zakaria J. Ngelow, 16 March 2003.

\textsuperscript{17} Interview with Zakaria J. Ngelow, 16 March 2003.
Muslim.\textsuperscript{18} He criticised the term \textit{dilindungi} (protected) which was often used by Islamists when speaking about religious minorities, due to the connotations of this term, meaning to a weak community and thus downgraded to the second class.\textsuperscript{19}

Similarly, Soepamena also voiced the worry of the Christian people about being discriminated against, while the reality was that Christians in South Sulawesi were historically equal with Muslim community. Soepamena stated:

In Islamic law there is a term \textit{dhimmi} for the minority in the area of Muslim authority. However, this referred to the time when Muslims were politically dominant or when a non-Muslim group was taken by force by a Muslim kingdom, while the Christian existence in South Sulawesi is different. We have the same homeland and we were equally colonised by the Dutch.\textsuperscript{20}

Soepamena supported J. Ngelow’s rejection of a second class community. Soepamena stated that \textit{dhimmi} is not a concept incorporating sameness, because the concept is talking about \textit{melindungi} (to protect) and \textit{dilindungi} (to be protected). He interpreted protected people to imply that they were not equal to those who protected them.\textsuperscript{21} According to Soepamena, in spite of the fact that Christians are a minority in South Sulawesi, equality with Muslims is due to the need to acknowledge that the Christian community contributed to the building of the nation in general and the South Sulawesi province in particular, along with the major Muslim community. This acknowledgement enhances religious tolerance in the area which can bring peaceful relationships with it.

Soepamena’s concern about KPPSI’s demand for formalised \textit{syariat} through Special Autonomy is further indicated by his small survey of 37 Christians in Makassar.\textsuperscript{22} Soepamena found that among the Christians there were three main attitudes. First is the ‘wait and see’ response. According to Soepamena, this response reflects contentiousness in the Christian community. Soepamena stated that this response comes mainly from the Christians who are not sure what Islamic law is and what is meant by formalised Islamic law. The second view is to support KPPSI’s agenda. According to Soepamena, the

\textsuperscript{18} See the discussion of this issue in the discussion of the proposed draft constitution by KPPSI in Chapter Seven.

\textsuperscript{19} Interview with Zakaria J. Ngelow, 16 March 2003.

\textsuperscript{20} Interview with Soepamena, 17 March 2004.

\textsuperscript{21} Interview with Soepamena, 17 March 2004.

\textsuperscript{22} Unfortunately, I cannot get the written report of the survey conducted by Soepamena.
Christians who held this opinion are those who had an extensive understanding of the nature of Islamic teaching, including an understanding of its significant teaching on religious tolerance. The third opinion is fear of discrimination. Soepamena stated this feeling was based on Christians who saw the reality of many radical Islamic movements, which used the Christian minority as a target at the national and local level.

Soepamena stated that of these three opinions, fear of discrimination is the dominant one. He offered several reasons for the strength of this opinion. First, there is the concern of the Muslim community that even with non-formalised Islamic law, churches were already difficult to establish; this would be even harder under a full syariah system. Second, the reality that these Christian people saw the intolerant attitude of many KPPSI members in campaigning for their demand. Soepamena stated that the rude and intolerant attitude of many KPPSI’s former Laskar Jundullah towards people who had different beliefs concerning Islamic law from those of KPPSI, which was shown in the discussion on the discourse of Islamic law in South Sulawesi. Soepamena even adopted a Christian’s comment on this attitude by saying that if they are already intolerant now, what it will be like later if Muslim formalists become rulers. This is in line with the comment of Anto Obe, the adviser of the South Sulawesi Indonesian-Chinese Association, who suspected that if syariah were to be formally implemented, then religious minorities and Chinese-Indonesians would be trampled on in the future. He stated that violation of minority rights had happened in the past.23

Soepamena, however, did not state that an intolerant attitude could have been exercised by KPPSI members, especially among youth wing, which was not yet aware of the nature of Islamic law. The fact is that the policy of KPPSI itself clearly stated the obligation of KPPSI members to appreciate other people’s opinion of Islamic law as stated in its ikrar. Soepamena, however, said that despite the suspicion of many Christians that KPPSI activists would utilise the movement merely to gain political power in the province, he himself believed KPPSI was a movement with religious motivation.25

The opposition of the Christian community to the demands of KPPSI is very apparent in the issue of discrimination. Even though Jalaluddin Rahman, a moderate figure

23 Interview with Soepamena, 17 March 2004.
of KPPSI, had already explained the solution for the religious minority to the efforts to put them in the image of second class, by calling them as *muahidun* rather than *dhimmi*, the concern still exists. Their worry about this was not only based on the concept of Islamic law itself, especially the concept of *dhimmi* and being 'protected' but also from the sad memory of the journey of this community in South Sulawesi as described by J. Ngelow, who referred to the case of DI, where he saw the DI activists being intolerant to Christians, and as described by Seopamena whose Christian community feel limited to the performance of their religious rights. The ideas of these Christian figures seem to reflect their expectation that discourse on formalised Islamic law would end pluralistic society in South Sulawesi. This is also reflected in the statement by another Christian activist, Eli Sambominaga, a young activist of the church in Mamasa, who stated that this demand is contradicted by the national political stream which consistently rejects any effort of formalism. This view is also supported by David Y. Meyners and Liberthin Palulungan, who believe that the discourse of formalised *syariat* should have ended at the state level.\(^{26}\)

**C. Opposition from the Provincial Government: Is Formalist Islam accepted by society?**

Provincial government as a formal authority also showed action that may be seen inconvenient to formalist Islam. One important activity conducted by the government in response to KPPSI's demand was to conduct a poll. The opinion poll was aimed at discovering the aspirations of some of the Muslim community in South Sulawesi with respect to the implementation of Islamic law.\(^{27}\) The survey was in response to a DPR request to the provincial government to examine KPPSI's proposals.\(^{28}\) Even though this seems to be a positive response to formalised *syariat* by KPPSI, its nature was, in fact, to challenge it. As will be seen below, the poll opposed formal Islamic law.

The provincial government's response was through the formation of a team called Tim Pengkajian Pemberlakuan Syariat Islam (Discussion Team for the Concept of

---


\(^{28}\) Interview with M. Qasim Mathar, 23 February 2003.
Upholding Islamic Law, TPKPSI). Polling was conducted from October 2001 to January 2002. The respondents were those who were considered to be representative of South Sulawesi. They were 24 Bupati (regents), 60 legislative members, 81 religious leaders, and 60 community leaders.

The TPKPSI determined that the opinion poll should gain input from local figures in South Sulawesi as well as seeking a policy and social system for implementing Islamic law acceptable to all elements of society in the region.\(^{29}\) The result of the poll would also provide a source for experts, religious and community leaders to established the agreed norms of *syariat* to create a peaceful society.\(^{30}\)

The questions fell into two categories. First, they covered the perceptions of respondents to the discourse of Islamic law in South Sulawesi. This includes their response, their understanding of the governmental and economic system in relation to Islamic law, and the model of Islamic law desired. The second category covered the application of Islamic norms to be implemented in a pluralistic society. This includes the extent of the application of Islamic law which was already regulated in the constitution and that which was not yet regulated. It also covered the efforts of law enforcement.\(^{31}\)

KPPSI believed that TPKPSI was unbalanced in its representation between Muhammadiyah and NU, two mainstream organisations. The TPKPSI was dominated by NU people who were known to strongly oppose KPPSI’s demands.\(^{32}\) Besides its complaints about the body of TPKPSI, KPPSI opposed the process of the opinion poll.


\(^{30}\) Ibid., 5.

\(^{31}\) Ibid., 4.

\(^{32}\) The existence of TPKPSI was criticised by KPPSI as merely to degrade the demand for formalised Islamic law in South Sulawesi due to several factors. KPPSI saw those who were active in the TPKPSI were known to oppose Islamic law, especially the presence of M. Qasim Mathar in the team. Interview with Sirajuddin, 6 March 2003. M. Qasim Mathar was seen by many KPPSI members as the ‘main enemy’. Interview with Jalaluddin Rahman, 15 March 2003. His presence was questioned by KPPSI since he did not represent any organisation or element, while the government already regulated that all members should be delegates of an organisation or political party. The leader of TPKPSI, A.S. Ruslan, on the other hand, noted the significance of the presence of Qasim in the team. He saw Qasim as a brilliant intellectual who had an extensive Islamic knowledge. Ruslan also rejected KPPSI who criticised the secular nature of Qasim. Ruslan stated Qasim’s Islamicness was not in question. He said that it has due to Qasim’s ideas that the religious nature of South Sulawesi was explicitly stated in the South Sulawesi development plan. Interview with A.S. Ruslan, 26 February, 2003.
KPPSI saw that the poll had methodological problems. It was qualitative, but was analyzed by the TPKPSI in a quantitative manner. In the light of these criticisms, KPPSI is concerned that the result of the poll might indicate that KPPSI does not have public support.

KPPSI argued that the poll was not concerned with gaining input on upholding Islamic law in South Sulawesi. It asks respondents' opinions of certain aspects of Islamic law but it did not ask the respondents to answer on whether Islamic law should be formalised or not. Criticism of the questionnaire by KPPSI seems to be evident, since one item on TPKPSI's questionnaire was on the issue of law enforcement in society but it was not directed to whether Islamic criminal law enforcement was wanted or not. In addition to KPPSI's methodological criticism, the apparent weakness of this poll was the question of minorities' perceptions which was only gained from the aforementioned four elements in which the various religious followers were not well covered. KPPSI wanted the team to be balanced by those who were proponents of formalist Islamic law, and those who opposed the idea. KPPSI finally rejected and withdrew its involvement with TPKPSI. The formal rejection of KPPSI was seen in one of its external recommendations in its Second Congress. It stated that it emphasised the rejection of the existence of TPKPSI, due to its unrepresentative nature and false methodology.

KPPSI's criticism of the poll's methodology was countered by S. Ruslan, the chair of TPKPSI. He stated that he had an academic background in field research and he understood the scientific procedure of opinion polling. He stated that putting open questions rather than closed questions was an effort to gain the perceptions of Muslims on the Islamic law, rather than asking them to choose from available answers, none of which they may not have favoured. He also stated that by asking them open questions was an attempt to let respondents define what they meant by 'Islamic law'. Ruslan stated that their definition was important, since the position of the respondents was very important in upholding Islamic law.

---

33 Interview with Noer Bahry Noer, 4 March 2003.
34 Interview with H.M. Sirajuddin, 6 March 2003; Kalmuddin, 13 February 2003.
35 KPPSI, "Hasil Keputusan Kongres II Ummat Islam Sulawesi Selatan."
36 Interview with S. Ruslan, 26 February 2003.
In spite of the opposition of KPPSI, TPKPSI continued with the poll and reported on the results. What is apparent is the tendency of TPKPSI to direct the results of the polling against the demands of KPPSI. The opinion poll can be seen more as an effort by the government to discredit the demands of KPPSI rather than to be neutral in examining the demand. The analysis of the answers of the respondents given by TPKPSI shows the tendency to direct that society representatives in South Sulawesi did not strongly support the formal implementation of Islamic law. Rather, TPKPSI concluded that respondents favoured existing efforts of struggling for Islam in a cultural manner, and the available Indonesian constitution already supported the practice of Islamic teaching properly.

There are several indications for the above judgment. The report of the poll emphasises that the understanding of Muslims in South Sulawesi is varied. The question on the poll questionnaire however, showed that of the respondents, more than fifty percent shared a similar definition of Islamic law. They generally defined Islamic law as life guidance in Islam, with teaching and regulation determined by the Qur’an and the Prophetic Traditions and codes which ordered human life and relationships which covered all aspects of Islamic law. TPKPSI also analyzed this answer which related to norms but did not touch on the empirical practices of Islamic law in Muslim countries. For example, TPKPSI does not question whether they agree with a certain country or province like Aceh, in their efforts to formalise Islamic law.

The clearly prejudicial attitude of TPKPSI to KPPSI’s demands is seen in its presentation of respondent’s answers to the item on discourse in Islamic law in South Sulawesi. TPKPSI emphasised only the importance of having a debate but it was, however, reluctant to present the total percentage of respondents’ answers. If the various answers of the respondents were added up, they showed that 91.11 % favoured the implementation of Islamic law with 58.67 % agreeing that it should be in a structural or formalistic way, and 32.44 % agreeing that it should be through cultural way or without state interference. When I asked the chair of TPKPSI about the absence of a total percentage, he answered that the variety of respondents’ answers had to be seen independently and not calculated

37 See for examples, “KPPSI Pare-Pare Tolak Tim Bentukan Provinsi,” Fajar, 7 December 2001; KPPSI Desak Pemberlakuan Syariat Islam,” Fajar, 10 December 2001.
39 See the table of the respondents answer to this item in ibid., 24.
because the nature of their answers was different. However, my opinion is that if the results of the poll are to be presented in a statistical manner, then total percentages must be given. Moreover, this reply was also contradicted by the analysis of TPKPSI where in many cases total percentages were supplied for similar answers to an item.

The subjectivity of TPKPSI is evident in the conclusion of the report, which stated:

The present autonomy governance in the framework of a united Republic of Indonesia based on Pancasila does not forbid the implementation of Islamic law for the Muslim community in South Sulawesi.

Another conclusion which emphasised the importance of cultural struggle is:

To actualise an Islamic life, the Islamic law is implemented by its followers, starting with ourselves, family, social community, in a substantial and formal way.

Despite the fact that this conclusion mentioned two ways of Islamic struggle, judging from how the statement is formulated, it emphasises the substantial struggle.

On the other hand, there is also an inconsistency in the KPPSI case, in regard to the results of the poll. Initially, it rejected the polling system. It later used the result of the poll to strengthen its syariat campaign in South Sulawesi. It refers to all respondents’ answers which, if aggregated, result in indicating their agreement with syariat implementation (91.11 %). KPPSI showed that 58.67 % agreed with syariat being formalised while 32.44 % who wanted it to be substantially enforced. Sirajuddin, the secretary of the Advisory Council board of KPPSI said that they had first rejected the poll but they later accepted the result because it was beneficial to them. My criticism of KPPSI and of Sirajuddin especially, relates to how the polling result can be accepted after it has already been rejected by the organisation, due to methodological problems.

---

40 Interview with A.S. Ruslan, 26 February 2003.
42 Ibid., 61.
43 Interview with H.M. Sirajuddin, 16 March 2003.
44 The indication of KPPSI’s acceptance to the polling has been recorded in “KPPSI Minta DPRD Teruskan Hasil Jejak Pendapat,” Tribun Timur, 7 September 2005.
TPKPSI’s interpretation of the result of the opinion poll as opposing formalised Islamic law, could be related to the active personnel of the team, who preferred to avoid the formal implementation of Islamic law.\textsuperscript{45} The government is in favour of these figures, due likely to it being part of its mission to keep the struggle for Islam within cultural channels. It could be interpreted that supporting KPPSI for legislation of Special Autonomy for the implementation of Islamic law would bring the consequence of changing the governmental structure of South Sulawesi. This may be considered as a political threat to the existing authority, especially when several items of the proposed draft of constitution discussed in the previous chapter give space for such an interpretation.

D. Opposition from Women Intellectuals

The discourses of formal implementation of syariat are often regarded as controversial especially if they relate to its implementation among women. There are many controversial issues adopted by scholars on the implementation of syariat and its effects on women’s lives. It is not surprising, therefore, that arguments against the implementation of syariat are often looked at from the perspective of women. Many Muslim intellectuals believe that if syariat is formalised, it will limit the freedom of woman, such as in terms of dress. Even Muslim Abdurrahman, a well known Muslim intellectual, asserts that the first victims of formalising Islamic law will be women, due to the greater number of regulations that would burden the life of Muslim women.\textsuperscript{46}

Countering syariat implementation and its effects on women in Indonesia, commonly comes from Muslim gender activists. These activists usually administer a series of problems if a certain method of formalising syariat is to be implemented. Musda Mulia, an Indonesian gender activist, stated the possible effect of any effort of formalising syariat through Peraturan Daerah (Regional Regulation, Perda) in many kabupaten in Indonesia would be discriminatory to women. She did not find any fundamental justification in Islamic teaching for forcing woman to wear jilbab. Furthermore, the efforts to ban ‘immoral’ activities usually had ill effects on woman. She gave an example of how

\textsuperscript{45} They were included: Hamka Haq, M. Qasim Mathar, M. Rahim Yunus, A.S. Ruslan, and Harifuddin Cawidu.

prostitution is blamed on woman alone, while the fact is that prostitution can only occur when men are also involved. Furthermore, the regulation banning woman from going out at night time is also discriminatory, because it will curb the activities of women in gaining their livelihood. Musda argues if it is to eliminate criminality, then criminality involving woman, such as prostitution, does not necessarily occur only at night, but could happen in the day time.

In South Sulawesi, women's groups address the criticism of intellectuals of efforts for formalised Islamic law. At the time when KPPSI emerged, there had already been an effort by a group of woman to mobilise against formalised Islamic law. Their movement is called Koalisi Aktifis Perempuan Sulsel (South Sulawesi Women Activists Coalition, KAPS). According to this movement, religion is a personal matter and Muslims should be allowed to follow whichever interpretation of Islam with which they are comfortable. The coordinator of this movement, Zohra Andi Baso, even argued that the ratification of bylaws on syariat would restrict woman's roles and could lead to violence against them, such as the one on a mandatory dress code for women. This movement also insisted that DPRD acknowledged its opposition to formalised Islamic law in South Sulawesi as a balance to the vocal pressure of KPPSI in DPRD. The effort of this organisation to counter the steps of KPPSI seems to be ineffective because it did not gain support from many other woman activists, and its vocal criticism has had little influence in the last few years.

There seem to be several factors leading to KAPS' lack of impact. Unlike other gender activists, KAPS is not filled with the woman activists with sufficient understanding of Islamic law. Its voice seems to be easily countered by KPPSI. KAPS was then easily degraded and irritated by KPPSI accusing it of being 'overly emotional' and its criticism was claimed to lack religious arguments. However, the problem of KPPSI in tackling KAPS was its falling back on clichéd gender stereotypes such as women's irrationality and emotiveness. This is a problem due to the possibility of KPPSI's discriminatory beliefs. The other factor is that the issue launched by this women's group was not supported by other figures, including intellectuals who also criticised the demand for the implementation

of Islamic law. The groups who challenge KPPSI never talked about the effects on women when offering their arguments.

The opposition of women to Islamic law in South Sulawesi was not only voiced by women’s organisations, but it was opposed by individual activists. Nurul Ilmi Idrus, an academic of Hasanuddin University who wrote her Ph.D thesis on gender issues in South Sulawesi, also openly opposed formalised Islamic law in South Sulawesi. Her first criticism is that KPPSI has a vague interpretation of the position of women in everyday life. She believed that since the issue of syariat was launched in South Sulawesi, there has been no clear explanation of questions usually addressed; should women wear jilbab? Shouldn’t women drive? Can women go out at night time without muhrim? Should women be limited to only a few jobs? Nurul Ilmi asserts that if such an understanding developed in implementing Islamic law in South Sulawesi, there would be more opposition from women because their rights would become more limited. She stated that its consequences would affect men, because women who were previously independent would now be dependent on their brothers or parents and men would have to accompany their sisters if they wanted to go out.

Ilmi’s strong criticism is about forcing women to wear jilbab. She admires a woman who wears jilbab voluntarily without being forced, but states that wearing jilbab is not always an the indication of piety. She stated that those who wear jilbab were motivated by various factors; religious motives, following the trend, pretending to be pious. Therefore, regulating women to wear jilbab, found in many kabupaten in South Sulawesi through Perda, will not have a significant effect on the improvement of the religious piety. Ilmi’s worry is related to the case of Aceh in which jilbab are required wear, according to the regulations of Qanun. She states that the issue developed in the province is a blind implementation of the regulation. Ilmi even states that if this kind of the implementation of Islamic law occurs, it may even be rejected by those who already wear jilbab.50

---

This phenomenon is found in the top leadership of KPPSI, none of whom are women. In its First Congress, KPPSI also decided to form a women's body, called Institusi Muslimah (Muslim Women's Institution) but this seems to be only a symbol and its activity was not heard at all. A further problem with KPPSI is that the woman issue seems to be not seriously considered. None of the prominent KPPSI leaders wrote on the issue of women. Furthermore, there were two departments especially to take care of the women's sections. In the intellectual body of KPPSI, there is a women's empowerment office which are filled by a number of prominent woman activists, such as Nurhuda Noor and Nurcahaya Tandang. Nurhuda Noor is a well-known Muslim activist but unfortunately, none of her writings are on perspectives of woman and syariat. Nurcahaya Tandang is also widely-known but her commitment to the work under KPPSI struggle is still in question. Another women's institution is Korps Muslimah under the Lajnah Tanfidziyah, but this body is also weak and seems to be taking no steps to show its own perspective on women in Islam, especially if Islamic law is formalised. Therefore, it can be stated that women are symbolically admitted to the organisation but in practice, KPPSI have no intention to empower them in their role of implementing Islamic law.

The matter of the lack of attention by both the campaigners of syariat to the position of women, is probably due to their perception that if syariat is formalised, it would positively effect women, because women in Islam are respected. This concept can be found

---

51 If the implementation of Islamic law in the aspect of jilbab in South Sulawesi followed the system of Aceh, the response by women activists is relatively the same. In Aceh, some activists already offered open opposition. Suraiya Kamaruzzaman, for example, said that the position of woman in Aceh is probably the most difficult, compared to other provinces. The women there find themselves between the ongoing armed conflict and Islamic law. While Suraiya criticised the Islamic law as not the solution of the conflict in Aceh since it is more for regional motives than religious ones, she criticised the implementation of the jilbab regulation by the government as more Arabisation than Islamisation. Suraiya sees the formalised Islamic effort is to bring symbols of Arabs in which all Muslim woman there wear jilbab, while no effort was made to see critically the context of women's dressing based on the cultural roots of Acehnese and the Islamic spirit. Suraiya criticised the implementation of the regulation which was interpreted by the hands of each element of society. Consequently, there are many different attitudes shown by those who find it right to punish women who do not wear jilbab. Suraiya even reported that women accepted violence against them. Suraiya saw ironically that the enforcement of law for women was not balanced by the participation of women. Women is not enough listened before enacting a regulation. Suraiya's criticism seems to be quite accurate because among the members of ulama council who discussed the Qanun, only 2 of them was from women, and none of them were active. See Suriya Kamaruzzaman, “Women and Syariat in Aceh,” Inside Indoensia, July – September, 2004, pp. 9-11.
previously in the chapter of KPPSI’s views on the position of women. This may be the reason why KPPSI countered KAPS by asserting the latter lacked understanding of *syariat*. Furthermore, the campaigners feel that implementing *syariat* will also be consistent with the traditions of the South Sulawesi people in which women are also treated similarly.

The problem for women in South Sulawesi when *syariat* is formally implemented is whether women can fully participate in the enactment of the regulations. This question is raised as a real problem, since in the conduct of Congresses, women’s factors were not considered significant. The Congress of *umat Islam*, held three times by KPPSI, was a congress of male Muslims. In many other gatherings held by KPPSI, only men attended. This seems to be a reflection of the understanding of KPPSI that women’s issues are discussed by and represented by men. The women’s public sphere is represented only by men. This will invite questions from women activists about how it could be a representative body if women were not involved.

The other problem for women in South Sulawesi in relation to KPPSI’s demand is tradition. If the implementation of Islamic law is formalised, is there any change in tradition? Should tradition be abolished or defended? In the Bugis and Makassarese traditions, women are usually seen as a family symbol and a *siri* (code of honor) symbol. Women are perceived to be liable to causing things related to *siri*. Therefore, women in the Bugis and Makassarese tradition are conceived of as needing protection. This protection is, however, not considered as to be the equivalent of being bridled. In reality women in South Sulawesi may also earn a living. They may work in business, even in work usually performed by men, such as in agriculture. Will the issue of *syariat* re-interpret the traditional position of women? KPPSI needs to explore this issue further, directly touching on the context of Muslim woman in the province, not only on normative issues as was found in the previous chapter.

E. The Response of the Mainstream Muslim Organisations: An Ambivalent Attitude?

The general attitude of the mainstream Muslim organisations, such as NU and Muhammadiyah towards the effort to formalise Islamic law is quite clear at the central

---

52 Interview with Nurul Ilmi Idrus, 15 September 2004.
board level, that is, to the commitment to struggle through cultural means. The central leaders of these two mainstream organisations, Hasyim Muzadi of the NU and the former Muhammadiyah chairman, Ahmad Syafi'i Maarif, have rejected formalised *syariat* by stating that Islamic values can be implemented in a more substantial way without being legally bound by the constitution. Islamic teaching is universal and so can be accommodated to any model of statehood and governance as long as it emphasises justice, equality, social responsibility, and the protection of the weak which is the essence of Islamic teachings.

In the case of South Sulawesi, the response of the two major Muslim organisations varies from that of the central boards. Many activists of the NU and Muhammadiyah in South Sulawesi describe their central board as like a fat man with a big stomach who cannot bow and look down. They stated that the NU and Muhammadiyah have been well established at the central level and therefore, they no longer have sensitivity to the voices of Islam developing in the branches. Adlin Sila of the Research and Development Body of the central Department of Religious Affairs, writes that many of the South Sulawesi NU and Muhammadiyah activists have seen that the two central boards have been very busy with the many political interests of their activists. They are reluctant to show their Islamic symbols openly and even to struggle for the interests of the Muslim community in the country. Therefore, many NU and Muhammadiyah activists in South Sulawesi seem to ignore the attitudes of the two leaders of the organisations against the formalist Islamic campaign. These activists remain involved in the effort to implement *syariat* in the region.

The participation of many NU and Muhammadiyah activists in the campaign for formalised Islamic law in South Sulawesi occurred in its early stages. Indeed, many activists of KPPSI emerged from these two organisations. However, their participation cannot be considered to represent the official attitude of their organisation. At the First Congress of KPPSI, both the provincial chair of NU and Muhammadiyah made a speech concerning formal efforts to implement Islamic law. Together they signed a memorandum on the implementation of Islamic law in South Sulawesi. However, they admitted that they attended the Congress as individuals, not as representatives of their organisations. Hamka Haq who was the secretary of the NU South Sulawesi stated that Sanusi Baco's

---

participation was not that of a formal representative of NU.\textsuperscript{54} I myself saw, especially after I interviewed them that these two provincial mainstream organisation leaders were trying to support both ways of campaigning for Islamic teachings in the region. On the one hand, they personally were happy with KPPSI's agenda of Islamic formalism, but on the other hand, they were also influenced by the party line of their organisations which tended to avoid formalist ways of approaching Islam.

A clear sign of the attitude of the provincial NU in maintaining a purely cultural struggle is seen in the \textit{fatwa} that it formally produced. The \textit{fatwa} consists of four points on the implementation of \textit{syariat} using cultural ways. It states that the \textit{syariat} should be established through individual awareness and that if \textit{syariat} is based on understanding and implementation by the individual, it will grow to be a cultural ethic in the social life that inspires the attitude of the Muslim community in all aspects of their lives. Furthermore, the \textit{fatwa} stated the society that had a strong culture of \textit{syariat} which is not implemented by force, would serve as an inspiration to its people by encouraging good deeds and preventing evil deed. Finally the \textit{fatwa} called on Muslim leaders to use their authority to create a situation conducive to the implementation of \textit{syariat} through persuasion, culture, and upholding the \textit{amar ma'rif} and \textit{nahi mungkar}.\textsuperscript{55}

Interestingly, this \textit{fatwa} was signed not by the top leader of NU of South Sulawesi, Sanuci Baco, but by one of the deputy chairmen, Makmur Ali and its secretary Abd. Rahim Yunus. The absence of Sanusi Baco's signature may indicate his ambivalent attitude to the contents of the \textit{fatwa}. Furthermore, this \textit{fatwa} may also tell us that in the leadership of the NU South Sulawesi, Sanusi Baco is perhaps in a minority. Even though Sanusi Baco stated that the cultural and the structural processes of Islamisation should be created simultaneously,\textsuperscript{56} he may be seen by the provincial NU board to offer greater support for a structural or formalised way. This is seen when he did not refuse appointment as a member of the Advisory Council of KPPSI. Sanusi did not also object if his position in KPPSI was related to his position as chair of the NU South Sulawesi. Sanusi only criticised the way the young activists of KPPSI included his name without contacting him prior to doing so.\textsuperscript{57}

\textsuperscript{54} Interview with Hamka Haq, 7 February 2003.
\textsuperscript{55} For the complete contents of this \textit{fatwa}, see Appendix XXII.
\textsuperscript{57} Interview with Sanusi Baco, 22 February 2003.
Even though Sanusi Baco has a different perspective from many leaders of the NU, this does not necessarily affect his position as the chair. His high repute compared to the other main leaders seems to have been considered, rather than his difference in perspective on an Islamic formalist agenda in South Sulawesi.

Since the top leadership in the provincial NU was dominated by those who were culturally oriented Muslims, the fatwa is directed to the efforts of the provincial board of the NU to focus on cultural efforts. However, this fatwa does not reject formal efforts as long as they do not cause any conflict among religious followers. Of the two bases on which to judge the cultural perspective of the NU South Sulawesi, there is still an ambivalent attitude in responding to efforts to create formalised syariat. First, the provincial NU does not clearly reject the formalist way of implementing Islamic law. For example, on its last point, it urged the government to use its authority to create milieu conducive to the implementation of Islamic law. The fact is that this call on the government to formally implement Islam is a strategy used by KPPSI to persuade both local and provincial authority to create an ‘Islamic regulation’ while continuing to struggle for Special Autonomy.

An ambivalent attitude is also found in Muhammadiyah of South Sulawesi. The former Muhammadiyah leader, Nazaruddin Razak, once questioned syariat campaigners on the issue of what ‘to formalise’ meant, since as far as he was concerned, South Sulawesi Muslims had already implemented Islamic law. This is in line with the ambivalent statement of the central leadership that it chose the ‘middle way’ to respond to formalised syariat. The term ‘middle way’ here is to open various interpretations. However, the most respected figure of Muhammadiyah of South Sulawesi, Jamaluddin Amien, also a former provincial chair of the PAN, stated his support for the movement. He said that he was invited to the Congress as the chair of Muhammadiyah and that he agreed. He believed the demand for a working committee on syariat was the best way to involve all aspects of Muslim society. Like that of the NU chair, the response of Jamaluddin Amien cannot be considered to be the formal attitude of Muhammadiyah in South Sulawesi, since he did not speak as a Muhammadiyah leader, but as a Muslim figure. Furthermore, being a former PAN leader, Jamaluddin’s attitude to the formalised syariat campaign is different, since

59 Interview with Jamaluddin Amien, 3 March 2003.
PAN had rejected syariat-isation. However, Jamaluddin's support Islamic of syariat activism cannot only be seen from the point of view of PAN. His Islamic formalist perspective has been formed by his leadership of Muhammadiyah of South Sulawesi for many years. Many of Muhammadiyah leaders continue to support Jamaluddin because of his good reputation, just like Sanusi Baco in NU.

The indirect involvement of these two organisations in KPPSI can also be assessed in several KPPSI branches where their activists usually belong to these two organisations. In the case of KPPSI branch in Kabupaten Bone in 2003, the chair of KPPSI was the chair of NU while its secretary was a Muhammadiyah activist. In KPPSI branch of Bulukumba, the leader and secretary of KPPSI were Muhammadiyah activists. It is not surprising that KPPSI was very motivated to include the chiefs of these organisations on the board of KPPSI. KPPSI saw the two organisations as partners to work for the formal implementation of Islamic law.\(^{60}\)

After the Second Congress, the KPPSI board consisted of both the leader of the NU and Muhammadiyah on the Advisory Council, together with the provincial leaders and all rectors of the prominent universities in South Sulawesi. The Elder Members board consisted of five prominent Muslim men of South Sulawesi, two of them, Sanusi Baco and Jamaluddin Amien. The other three are KH. Ali Yafie, Abdurrahman A. Basalamah, and Halide. Apart from Sanusi Baco and Jamaluddin Amien, these three are well-known as South Sulawesi Muslim figures. Ali Yafie is a national Muslim figure who originated in South Sulawesi in which KPPSI often saw him giving moral support to the organisation.\(^{61}\) However, his name is merely symbolic. He is not active in attending any KPPSI gatherings. Abdurrahman A Basalamah and Halide are local Muslim economists who often give their perspectives on aspects of Islamic economy.

Of the two mainstream Muslim organisations in South Sulawesi, Muhammadiyah is closer to KPPSI than NU. Even though there are several NU figures on the board of KPPSI, such as Hasyim Aidid, many prominent leaders have a background in Muhammadiyah. It may be caused by the historical factor of Islamic modernism, in which


formalised Islamic law is part of the modernist perspective. This perspective can be assumed to be closer to Muhammadiyah which has been known to be a Islamic modernist organisation, while NU is a traditional organisation.\footnote{For an account tracing the emergence of Islamic modernism in Indonesia, see Deliar Noer, \textit{The Modernist Muslim Movements in Indonesia, 1900-1942} (Singapore: O.U.P., 1973).}

What could be stated from this phenomenon in South Sulawesi is the bluring of the lines that have developed in NU and Muhammadiyah. Many of NU and Muhammadiyah activists in the province are no longer faithful to the cultural struggle. The provincial board of the two organisations themselves show their ambivalent attitude. On one side, they support the existence of the organisation with the direct and indirect support of its leaders and with the involvement of its activists. On the other side, some leaders are still sticking to the basic objective of their movements, that is through cultural struggle. To do this, they do not produce any formal action to support the existence of KPPSI. My view is that this happened in South Sulawesi because many NU and Muhammadiyah activists entered these organisations without understanding the line of their organisation. Instead, their activism is based on their own opinion on transforming Islamic activism, away from the influence of the central board.

To sum up, the various conceptual challenges by elements of the society above concentrated on the methodological aspects of promoting Islamic law in society, that is, on their preference for cultural implementation which they consider relevant to the structure of Muslim society in South Sulawesi. Furthermore, the focus of the challenge is also directed at possible human rights violations if Islamic law is formally implemented, that is, a tendency towards religious as well as gender discrimination. Also, there has been a relation with political aspect in criticising KPPSI, as the movement is regarded as having the potential to hold a power in the region and to pose a threat to the existing political structure in South Sulawesi. Furthermore, the concern about discrimination against religious minorities is also a politico-religious matter, since the religious minority expressed concern about being curbed in their political participation if syariat is formalised. Therefore, this indicates that the struggle for Islamic formalism reveals its nature to be religious and political, especially from the perspective of its critics.
F. KPPSI’s Change of Strategies and Softening Stance

From 2002, KPPSI began to pursue a moderate agenda. Moderation here refers to the efforts of the movement to show a softer attitude towards formalising Islamic law. For example, it has attempted to control its activities so that it should not be identified with employing violence. It is also seen in the effort not to voice the implementation of Islamic criminal law. This tendency towards moderation is already observable in KPPSI’s outline of actions in its Second Congress in 2002. Even in its Third Congress in 2005, when talking of various strategies of Islamisation. KPPSI was no longer strictly speaking Special Autonomy. It began to be more aware that struggling for formalist Islam in South Sulawesi could be pursued better by employing various efforts rather than strictly focusing to the efforts to gain Special Autonomy package.

There are several aspects that led to KPPSI's change to more moderate views and actions. First, KPPSI was more aware more aware that it was unlikely that the central government would accede to their the demand. KPPSI was concious of the present political structure of both South Sulawesi and central government which did not respond significantly to the need to struggle and to grant Special Autonomy to South Sulawesi province. Second, the increasing participation of mainstream elements in the movement contributed to its moderation in demands. Moderation is a strategy of KPPSI in order to survive, since keeping up the pressure on government, to struggle for the direct fulfillment of the implementation of Islamic law, seems to be not yet visible. The movement that it now stood was overloaded with images of violence, such as the report of ICG, Laskar Jundullah, and the Makassar bombing. Third and most important, the impact of criticism from several elements of society as discussed above, on the nature of the Islamic law for which KPPSI was struggling, inspired this movement to re-orient itself.

As a result, KPPSI activists did not pursue any movement directed towards physical confrontation with the central government. KPPSI avoided the image of being intimidatory in making its demands, especially when Laskar Jundullah was detached. Also, the issue of the referendum in response to uncertainty about central government reaction was not followed up as proposed in its two Congresses as an alternative step if Special Autonomy was not granted. Jalalauddin Rahman had already observed that the function of proposing a referendum was only to pressure the central government to legalise the demands of Special
Autonomy. KPPSI now advocated moderation by not emphasising Islamic criminal law, Islamising Perda, Islamising bureaucracy, and employing formal political channels.

1. Not Emphasising the Implementation of Islamic Criminal Law

KPPSI activists began to realise the complexities of formalising Islamic law, as voiced by liberal Islamic intellectuals, such as Hamka Haq. Through discussions and debates with those who challenged the formal implementation of Islamic syariat, KPPSI began to become aware of the implications of demanding the implementation of Islamic law in the context of South Sulawesi province.

The criticism of Muslim intellectuals, which previously many KPPSI activists had considered to be destructive, was now slowly beginning to be accepted as an instructive contribution. Jalaluddin Rahman advised many other KPPSI activists to see criticism, such as that which Qasim Mathar addressed to the organisation, as the way to improve and to make KPPSI more creative in its demands. Part of its awareness is its beginning to concentrate on aspects of the Islamic law that could be upheld while waiting for the opportunity to gain a rumah politik (political house). The moderate views of KPPSI are seen in its interpretation that the present constitution permits the Muslim people to struggle to formalise most aspects of Islamic law. With the present constitution, the only aspect of Islamic law that they could not directly struggle to uphold was Islamic criminal law. KPPSI is now more aware that Special Autonomy was needed only in upholding the criminal law of Islam. Therefore, KPPSI saw that this was still very important, because it was impossible to make a maximum effort for the implementation of Islamic law if the criminal law were not upheld.

KPPSI now realised that the struggle for this should not be given a high priority, since the reality was that Indonesian government would refuse. Second, it was more conducive to uphold aspects of social enforcement through formalisation of dakwah and the educational system. Third, as the chairman of its Executive Body, Aziz Kahar had said, the Islamic criminal law proves to consist of less than ten percent of all aspects of Islamic law. The efforts of KPPSI to enforce Islamic private law was actualised by holding a seminar on 14 December 2003. KPPSI presented the late, Hartono Mardjono, a prominent

---

64 He stated this at the time he addressed his opening remarks in the Seminar of upholding Islamic Syariat in Private Law, held by KPPSI and MUI Sulawesi Selatan on 14 June 2003.
Islamic legal expert, to explain the parts of Islamic civil law that could be implemented within sections of the national constitution.  

Even though KPPSI continues to consider the importance of gaining Special Autonomy for the implementation of Islamic law in Islamic criminal law, it responded positively to Mardjono’s concept of Islamic private law within a national constitution, and its significance by pioneering the establishment of an institution of arbitration. Mardjono’s idea therefore encouraged KPPSI to be more moderate in its strategy for implementing Islamic law in South Sulawesi. For the purpose of the arbitration body, KPPSI first invited MUI South Sulawesi to work together with them to establish the institution. Marjono’s influence on KPPSI is also reflected in Aziz Kahar’s statement that struggling for Islamic private law could now be prioritised to make society more Islamic in its daily activities, and that to achieve this would depend on the political will of the Muslim politicians and bureaucrats. Aziz Kahar said that to realise this, they must prepare concepts, provide human resources and socialise wider Muslim society. When this has been actualised, society will become more Islamic. However, since Hartono Mardjono, who was ready to help in the preparation of human resources, passed away at the time of the seminar, the plan waned. Nevertheless, it showed the effort of KPPSI to enlist aspects of existing civil code to implement Islamic law.

65 For more information on Hartono Mardjono’s ideas in KPPSI seminar, see Hartono Mardjono, “Hukum Nasional & Impelementasi Syari’at Islam: Strategi Politik dalam Legislasi & Implementasi Syaria’t Islam dalam Bingkai UUD Negara RI Tahun 1945,” a paper presented at the Seminar of upholding Islamic Syariat in Private Law, held by KPPSI and MUI Sulawesi Selatan on 14 June 2003. For more information of Hartono Mardjono’s ideas on implementing Islamic private law in Indonesia, see Hartono Mardjono, Menegakkan Syariat Islam dalam Konteks Keindonesiaaan (Bandung, Mizan, 1997).

66 KPPSI especially invited the late Hartono Mardjono to speak on this issue at its seminar in Makassar as mentioned in the previous footnote.

67 The significance of KPPSI’s approaching MUI was due to first, the importance of the Islamic law scholars’ involvement in the arbitration Institution, and second, the central MUI has already established an arbitration Institution called ‘Body of Syariat Arbitration’, under the auspices of central MUI and led by Hartono Marjono.


69 Ibid.

70 Interview with Abdul Aziz Kahar, 23 June 2004.
2. Islamising Peraturan Daerah (Perda)

The campaign for syariat-isation without forcing the issue of Special Autonomy legislation was seen in KPPSI’s effort to outline for struggle at the Second Congress. KPPSI saw that the Regional Autonomy Regulation No. 22 year 1999, could be used to work with local governments to produce Perda that upheld the implementation of Islamic law. KPPSI also activated one other point of its struggle in the constitution, that is, active participation to help local government and the DPRD to produce an Islamic Perda. Even though aspects of religion are still centralised, Perda is part of the autonomous rights of the kabupaten governments in the province, in an effort to maintain the stability of the regions, such as the regulation of many of the activities that affected religious matters. These then are aspects of the autonomous rights supported by KPPSI branches which created ‘Islamic’ Perda in several kabupaten in South Sulawesi. KPPSI saw the possibility of producing Perda to strengthen Islamic law as a promising channel for syariat-isation.

KPPSI has directly supported the creation of Islamic Perda in several kabupaten in South Sulawesi. In Bulukumba, South Sulawesi, for example, the local government had already produced four Perda; Liquor (Minuman Keras), Veil (Jilbab), Gambling (Judi), and Alms (Zakat). It is said Perda on Baca Qur’an (being able to read Qur’an) is now being processed. Bupati of Bulukumba, A. Patabai Pabokori, when these Perda were produced, said that the creation of several Islamic Perda, such as on liquor and gambling, significantly reduced crime in the regions by up to 80%, especially among the young. Patabai supported his statement by referring to the statistics of the kabupaten police.

---

71 See “Program Perjuangan,” in KPPSI, “Hasil Keputusan Kongres II Ummat Islam Sulawesi Selatan.” See also Appendix XVII.

72 See ibid.

73 Another impact of KPPSI’s effort to look to PERDA as a channel of Islamic law is seen in Maros, the outskirts of Makassar, a Kabupaten in South Sulawesi. In this city, there had already been PERDA on liquor and PERDA on Qur’anic reading ability. The local apparatus in these areas discussed with society leaders and other elements of society, potential for implementation of aspects of Islamic law. Even the Bupati was very active in calling Muslim community in the area to uphold Islamic law. He started, with his staff, to ask all his Muslim female members to wear veils, and asking the Muslims to practice congregational prayers. He also advised Muslim people to save their money in the syariat bank and not in the secular conventional banks that still use interest which is prohibited under Islamic law. See Andi Nadjamuddin Aminullah, “Memegang Kekuasaan, Kesempatan Tegakkan Syiar Islam,” Laporan Khusus Suara Hidayatullah, 02/XVI/June 2003, p. 40.
office. Similar statements had also been made by other people in the region. Several youths who were not involved in syariat movement at all also admitted to the impact of Perda in that Kabupaten. Furthermore, there is no other variable to explain the drop in crime in the area, except for the introduction of the Islamic Perda.

It is interesting to note that Perda on liquor consumption in Bulukumba does not forbid its consumption but legislates its usage. According to A. Patongai, the former member of the local DPRD, the word ‘prohibition’ should not appear in the regulation, to accommodate other religious followers who may wish to consume alcoholic drinks, especially overseas tourists who visit the area. The regulation required only that alcoholic drinks should not be served less than five hundred meters from mosques and housing. A. Patongai felt that this regulation should be sufficient to preserve the Muslim community from consuming alcohol. Asaad Salam, KPPSI head in the area, saw that even though this regulation did not state that the consumption of liquor was haram (Ar. harām, prohibited), it helped to protect the Muslim community from this prohibited drink. He stated that there would no longer be an opportunity for the Muslim community to consume alcoholic drinks, because mosques and houses would no more than 500 meters away. Iwan, a youth in Bulukumba, stated that the issue of the regulation there was a significant improvement in the security of the people, since there were no more liquor parties held by the juvenile delinquents.

The seriousness of KPPSI in looking at the kabupaten as an important base for the implementation of Islamic law is the result of meetings held on 12 – 13 June 2004 attended by all KPPSI branches. They concentrated on anticipating political events in the country, following the 2004 legislative general elections, and not on Special Autonomy demand. At this meeting KPPSI focused on how other kabupaten in South Sulawesi could produce more Perda like Bulukumba within two years. This expectation is taken from the growing

---

74 Telephone interview with A Patabai Pabokori, 17 February 2006.
76 Interview with Asaad Salam, 3 April, 2003.
77 Interview with M. Ridwan, 4 April, 2003.
number of branch KPPSI activists, who were elected as members of local DPRD. These activists could later on struggle to produce Islamic Perda. These strategies anticipate that if local leaders and politicians are made more aware of syariat-isation, they will support the position of KPPSI with respect to the national government, to legislate for Special Autonomy. Minimally, KPPSI will have set in place support for the common concern of South Sulawesi Muslims on the importance of the implementation of syariat in the region. In addition to this objective, the above meeting was also aimed at preserving the struggle for the formal implementation of Islamic law, especially among activists who lacked his motivation.

However, the struggle for implementation of Islamic law through the channels of Perda was much criticised by many liberal intellectuals. Zakaria J. Ngelow criticised the issue of the Islamic Perda in several areas, seeing it as a symbol, rather than as the substance of Islamic teaching. He questioned the concern of the kabupaten government supported by Islamic syariat activists, to regulate symbolic aspects of Islamic teachings such, as veiling regulations rather than more urgent aspects of concern to Muslim people, that is, corruption and collusion. J. Ngelow saw that even though this was part of the criminal law, it could only be upheld through the political will of the kabupaten government, and there seems to be no serious concerns regarding these aspects, rather than symbolic Islam.

Further criticism of the phenomenon of Islamic Perda was the ‘insubstantial’ aspect of its regulations. This view is, for example, held by a well known Muslim intellectual, M. Dawam Rahardjo. He saw the implementation of Islamic law as ridiculous. He pointed out that most kabupaten in Indonesia implementing Islamic law produced Perda concerning the wearing of veils for the female staff of the kabupaten government and also obliged the staff to read Qur’an before starting to work. These kinds of regulation, according to Rahardjo, violated Islamic teachings because they would bring about permanent regulations, when they were not obligatory in Islamic teaching. Rahardjo pointed to the

---

78 When I asked Abdul Aziz Kahar, he could not give the exact number of KPPSI activists elected to be members of the DPRD since many of them were not the board of KPPSI branches but supported the KPPSI’s agenda.


297
case of reading Qur’an, which is a noble deed, but there is no obligation to read it prior to work.\textsuperscript{81}

Moreover, critics saw this Islamic Perda as a distortion of Islamic Law. This is held, for example, by Azyumardi Azra who argued that the regulation will cause the spread of the wrong kind of understanding of Islam, if it is to be limited to these regulations.\textsuperscript{82} Azra, furthermore, saw that such Islamic Perda were contradicted by the national basic constitution, UUD 1945, because the constitution regulated freedom to perform religious rituals, without specifying the implementation of Islamic law. Azra’s opinion on this issue seems to be contradicted by Mardjono’s understanding based on the UUD 1945, since in his opinion, the term \textit{ibadah} in the chapter 33 of the UUD 1945 would mean the implementation of Islamic law. Azra seems also to contradict the background of many Islamic Perda which were motivated by the autonomous rights of the \textit{kabupaten} to maintain stability of society as long as this was still in the corridor of regional autonomy, and regulations were not explicitly stated to be under the authority of the central government.

The criticism by these intellectuals of the symbolic nature of \textit{syariat} may be based on the political motives of several \textit{kabupaten} authorities in backing the Perda. However, criticism of the violation of Islamic teaching through Perda seems to be exaggerated. Even though there is a little scientific data to prove the impact of the Perda in Bulukumba, information of several figures will help. For example, Perda on liquor and gambling by the \textit{kabupaten} government, which worked hand in hand with the local KPPSI branch were acknowledged by local society to directly impact on the security of the people. Many housewives were very happy that their husbands no longer went out gambling or bought alcoholic drinks.\textsuperscript{83}

Indeed, claims that \textit{syariat} activists focused on symbols could not be avoided, since the nature of their struggle was the gaining of formalised Islamic law through such symbolist expression. My concern is more with the extent of the symbolic nature of the objectives of Islamic teaching and with whether the symbolic nature of the struggle could bring Islam itself to operate as \textit{rahmatan lil alamin}, in which the role of Islam was accepted


\textsuperscript{82} \textit{Panji Masyarakat}, 27 November 2002- 12 December 2002, p.38.

\textsuperscript{83} Interview with H. Tjamiruddin, 5 April 2003.
by both formalist and cultural Muslims. It may be that syariat activists will be trapped in the symbolism of Islam, and would not fare any better, in comparison with the existing system of governance, which they consider to be still un-Islamic. However, its symbolist identity might direct Muslims to be more motivated to understand the nature of Islamic teaching. Also, its moderateness is part of its promising attitude to go hand in hand with cultural Islam proponents.

Furthermore, a constructive view should be offered rather than criticism that they are them as merely symbolic, especially when it could provide a positive. In Kabupaten Bulukumba for example, it was claimed to lower the crime rate, while improving the understanding of youth of Islamic teachings. However, my concern with the phenomenon of Perda, is directed at the effectiveness of the regulations in the district, since the case of Bulukumba seems to be more influenced by the position of its Bupati, who is known to be strongly religious. How efficient will Perda be if in the future local leadership portions are filled with those who are lack of interest in formalised syariat? This suggests a difficult job for KPPSI in many other districts, if it expects Perda to be an effective channel, since the reality is that many district officials apparatus would not necessarily think much of the significance of Islamic Perda.

3. Islamising Bureaucracy
In its efforts to Islamise the bureaucracy, KPPSI implemented the strategy of approaching bupati in South Sulawesi. It believes that when the bupati had been ‘Islamised’ with syariat, then it would be easy for them to produce Islamic regulations in their regencies. When this thesis was being written, there were a large numbers of bupati who had been approached by KPPSI for the implementation of syariat in their local areas. Leaders such as Bupati Wajo, Enrekang, Sinjai, Barru, Pare-Pare have given open support in KPPSI’s struggle for formalised syariat.

To activate this strategy, KPPSI appointed Patabai Pabokori, the former Bupati of Bulukumba, as the ‘ambassador’ of KPPSI’s campaign for formalised syariat in the regencies where syariat still lacks recognition. Patabai was appointed due to his achievement of syariat in Bulukumba. Besides his success in creating Islamic Perda, as mentioned before, he was successful as host of the Kongres Umat Islam Ketiga Sulawesi Selatan organised by KPPSI. He also proved successful at increasing the local income of the regency after implementing local regulations on zakat and erasing the obligation of
tax.\textsuperscript{84} Patabai’s task was to approach local bureaucrats while giving them more teaching on syariat based on his own experience as a Bupati in Bulukumba for two elected periods, 1995 – 2000 and 2000 to 2005. According to KPPSI, the job of Patabai was effective because many of the regents in South Sulawesi have tried to follow the model of Islamisation that Patabai pioneered in Bulukumba.\textsuperscript{85}

However, the job of approaching bupati for the syariat program by KPPSI was not without opposition. KPPSI itself admitted that there had been one Bupati who had rejected the program, Bupati Luwu, Basmin Mattayang.\textsuperscript{86} This seems to be a paradox for the syariat movement in South Sulawesi, since many KPPSI activists came from Luwu, notably: Aziz Kahar and Aswar Hasan. This seems to disturb KPPSI’s move to approach bupati and local bureaucrats in South Sulawesi, despite the evidence that it has gained more acceptance than rejection.

Part of KPPSI’s effort to strengthen its position in many districts has been to approach local governments, including the police force, to work together to realise the program. For example, when it ran an education program on the nature of Islamic law, it was often conducted in a government office. I think this has two purposes. First, it is an effort to Islamise bureaucracy by making the government apparatus closer to syariat. Furthermore, KPPSI’s branch is also active in recruiting new activists from civil servants, such as local teachers. This is also aimed at avoiding the suspicions of the local government, especially in the police and military districts.\textsuperscript{87}

\textbf{4. Activating Formal Political Channel}

Apart from the above strategy to implement Islamic law in district areas, this last strategy shows KPPSI acting as a formalist Islamic movement, that is, using political means to reach its ultimate goal of Islamic autonomy. This political move is revealed by placing Abdul Aziz Kahar in national politics, being a member of DPD could also be seen as a progressive step by KPPSI to preserve the demand for formal implementation of Islamic law. Through his DPD membership, Abdul Aziz is expected to be a voice for the demand of

\textsuperscript{84} Telephone interview with A. Patabai Pabokori, 17 February 2006.


\textsuperscript{86} \textit{Tribun Timur}, 27 December 2005.

\textsuperscript{87} Interview with Kaharuddin, 2 July 2004.
KPPSI, since by his presence, the political bargaining power of KPPSI can at least improve. However, the effectiveness of Aziz’s presence in Jakarta in channeling KPPSI’s experience of barriers in its national struggle, due to the lack of strong support in the parliament. KPPSI has felt this in the new parliament, in which none of its leaders were concerned about formalised syariat. The institution of DPD itself still brings no significant impact to the regional improvement, including its contribution to the formalised syariat demand in the province.

In efforts to anticipate this weakness, KPPSI personnel traveled to Jakarta on 8 October 2004 to approach the newly elected government. The KPPSI team was represented by figures from various organisations in the province, such as Muhammadiyah, NU, Wahdah Islamiyah, Badan Komunikasi Pemuda dan Remaja Mesjid Indonesia (Communication Body of Indonesian Mosque Youth, BKPRMI), MUI and Forum Masyarakat Islam (Islamic Society Forum, Formasi), which was led by the chairman of Majelis Syura, Abdul Muin Salim. This team successfully met the speaker of MPR, Hidayat Nurwahid and newly elected Vice President, Jusuf Kalla accompanied by the elected vice chairmen of MPR, A.M. Fatwa. KPPSI’s objective was to renew its demand and to remind the newly elected government of the need to channel the aspirations of the Muslim community in South Sulawesi for formalised syariat, as was permitted in Aceh.

This strategy showed the efforts of KPPSI to take an early active approach, in order to put political pressure on them concerning their demand. KPPSI used this opportunity since the Speaker of MPR is from an Islamic political party, PKS, and the elected vice president is from South Sulawesi, he knew of the nature of the demand and once opened a KPPSI congress. Despite the lack of certainty gained from the central government, since KPPSI did not get satisfaction from its journey to Jakarta, moderate action in South Sulawesi can be seen as conducive of putting pressure on the central government to release legislation for Special Autonomy for formalised syariat.

Another of KPPSI’s activities to pursue political channels for implementing syariat is its active role in campaigning for the need for South Sulawesi to elect political leaders; a governor and bupati who will support the formalised syariat in South Sulawesi. As found in its political recommendation in the Third Congress, KPPSI called for the Muslim community to vote for candidates for a governor and Bupati who are Islamic and supportive

---

88 Interview with Aziz Kahar, 23 June 2004.
of syariat. This recommendation was issued close to the time when elections for the bupati were to be held in South Sulawesi.

Regarding the political moves of KPPSI, it can be argued that this will be risky for KPPSI's Islamic formalism commitment due to the possible suspicion that the movement is now busy thinking of political power rather than religiosity. At the end of 2005, KPPSI's rhetoric was loaded with discourse on candidates of South Sulawesi for gubernatorial election to be held in 2007. KPPSI has debated whether it can receive benefit for the leadership by bringing forward its popular candidate, Abdul Aziz Kahar, who proved to have gained significant votes in the elections for DPD membership. Since this is a new development, this thesis cannot report on the result of KPPSI's move. There has been criticism among KPPSI activists of the concern that KPPSI is to be trapped in these political manoeuvres and that it will forget its main target of formalist Islam.

This political manoeuvre will not worry KPPSI activists that it will put its main proposal to one side, because as a formalist Islamic movement, using political struggle is part of its nature. They see the DPD elections as only part of the political effort of its demands. Even though it has begun to be more moderate, political manoeuvres will always colour its activities, except that they will be wrapped in moderate ways.

This chapter has discussed religious opposition to the efforts of promoting formalist Islam in South Sulawesi, launched by KPPSI, which has significantly influenced its performance. It has been shown that in looking at the oppositional elements in relation to KPPSI activists, there has been a movement towards a dialectical relation. As shown above, the moderation of KPPSI is significantly influenced by the existence of this opposition. Therefore, my concluding point is that the existence of the opposition cannot be seen as a destructive aspect of the promotion of formalist Islam in South Sulawesi. They did not reach the stage of seising the demand for formalist Islam in the province. Instead, they have worked on a constructive input that brought the movement to a moderate strategy. Its result is seen in the opening up of the shari'asation issue among the Muslim community and in regaining the support of local Muslim figures and Muslim society in general.

---

89 Tribun Timur, 7 February 2006.
CONCLUSION

This thesis has studied the dynamics of the struggle for formalist Islam in South Sulawesi. It focuses on the historical rebellion of Darul Islam (DI) (1953-1965) led by Kahar Muzakkar and the contemporary Komite Persiapan Penegakan Syariat Islam (KPPSI) (2000-2005). DI has been examined at several critical stages of its development: the Negara Islam Indonesia (NII) period from 1953 to 1960; the Republik Persatuan Indonesia (RPI) era after Kahar left NII, 1960 to 1961; and from 1962 to 1965, when Kahar and his followers established Republik Persatuan Islam Indonesia (RPII). However, since the latter two movements were relatively short-lived and had little impact on events in South Sulawesi, these are placed under the general rubric of DI. KPPSI is a contemporary movement which was established in 2000 and still exists up until now. For the intervening 35 years between the collapse of DI and the emergence of KPPSI, the spirit of formalist Islam continued to live in sections of the Muslim community, even though expression of this was harshly suppressed by New Order regime. Due to this suppression, formalist Islam had little real impact, and the 1965-2000 period has not been closely analysed here.

The main argument of this thesis is that the Islamic formalism is central to the two movements. Thus, this thesis challenges many existing works on the movements, which discount the importance of Islamic sentiment. Several scholars have portrayed DI and KPPSI as movements that use Islam largely for symbolic or rhetorical effect rather than as the substance of their struggle. Whereas some scholars are skeptical about or critical of these movements’ wielding of Islamic symbols and language, I contend that these symbols are intrinsically important to formalist movements, precisely because those movements seek to bring faith into public life. Moreover, this thesis argues that DI and KPPSI have put into practice their Islamic concepts, particularly through the attempted implementation of syariat. This thesis also includes the political issues of these movements as an important part of the discussion, since formalist Islam is quintessentially political in nature. This thesis has traced these efforts through the Islamic spirit of their leaders and supporters, Islamic ideology and concepts of the movement, and their formal efforts to implement Islamic law in the community where these two movements exist.

Starting with DI, the Islamism of its leadership has first been seen in its main actor, Kahar Muzakkar, whose Islamism can be traced throughout his life. It should be acknowledged that scholars dispute on his Islamic commitment due to the lack of
conclusive evidence of his formalism. His nationalist activities (1945-1949) and his involvement in the military demobilisation problems (1950) which led him to take to the jungle seems at odds with his purported Islamism. However, there are a number of arguments discussed in this thesis which show his Islamic commitment. First, he grew up within a strongly Islamic culture, with an appropriate education. Even though there are a number of arguments indicating his lack of religiosity, such as the un-Islamic names given to him by his parents, his early Islamic commitment was very apparent in his involvement in Muhammadiyah secondary schooling. It may be argued that he went to a Muhammadiyah school because his parents sent him there and there were few other choices at that time. This argument can be countered by the fact that when his parents sent him to Java, where he could choose a secular education, he remained at the Muhammadiyah school, Muallimin. This is evidence of his seriousness about gaining an Islamic modernist education, the impact of which was later seen in the development of DI.

Kahar Muzakkar’s formalism may further be seen in his interest in Islamic symbols in names and movements. When he was in Java, he changed his name to the Islamic one of ‘Kahar Muzakkar’, whereas previously he had been known as ‘Ladomeng’, a Bugis name, meaning: ‘the card player’. Prior to the growth of his nationalist sentiments, he was involved in Hizbul Wathan, the scout movement of Muhammadiyah, after his return from Java in the beginning of 1940s. At this time, there are numerous other organisations he might have joined but he chose to be active in Islamic movements. Furthermore, his criticism of the feudalistic system in his homeland, that led to him being ostracised by Luwu aristocrats, can also be related to the egalitarian aspects of Islam that he studied before. This is based on the way he criticised feudalism by referring to Islamic teachings, particularly that of not seeing humans as competing with God for the people’s adoration. His overt nationalism after being expelled from his homeland in Luwu may be seen as an indication of the dispensability of his Islamism. However, his nationalist activism does not necessarily cancel out his Islamism – like many Islamists of the time, he saw the two as compatible, as reflected in many of his writings. This is further seen by the inclusion of the name ‘Indonesia’ in each movement in which he was involved. His Islamic commitment while being active in nationalist activities was also seen in Kahar Muzakkar’s close relations to Muhammadiyah figures, such as General Sudirman. In fact, his first wife, Walimah, was the daughter of a Muhammadiyah activist in Java.
Besides Kahar Muzakkar, other key DI leaders came from a similarly strong formalist Islamic outlook. Those who were purely nationalist and who had first joined Kahar Muzakkar, had already withdrawn during the periods of general rebellion (1950 – 1953) mainly because of their rejection of an Islamically oriented rebellion. The establishment of DI in South Sulawesi was mainly supported by those who already had an Islamic orientation. This fact counters the existing accounts which state that DI was shaped only after the actors were drawn to other ideologies, especially communism. The existence of communism was admitted by some figures in DI, but this thesis has shown that both Kahar Muzakkar and his main supporters saw communism as a barrier to the establishment of an Islamic state, rather than as a serious ideological element in their struggle.

The next argument concerning DI’s Islamism concerns its Islamic ideology. The choice of Islam as the ideology of rebellion was an effort to allow, at least partly, the movement to survive in the local Muslim community. However, this argument does not necessarily indicate the effort to politicise Islam, because those who were involved in the rebellion and held deep Islamic sentiments had practiced Islamic teachings long before they involved in the rebellion. The argument that DI paid little heed to Islamic ideology due to not being pioneered by ulama may also be countered. As shown in the thesis, conservative ulama in South Sulawesi were historically part of the aristocracy and so there was no tradition of opposing authority. This historical fact was evident in DI’s case, where many conservative ulama resisted any challenge to the aristocratic system in South Sulawesi which ensured their privileged position in the religious bureaucracy. The DI movement was pioneered by modernist oriented Muslims, many of whom had a military background. It was their modernist background that led them to promote Islamic formalist ideas. Some ulama later backed the movement and played a role in strengthening formalist Islam in the jungle redoubts of DI. Soon after the movement was established, ulama were directly involved in helping to conceptualise the formalist orientation of the movement. The presence of ulama in DI also had a profound impact on the Muslim masses in the rural areas where its forces operated and where Islamic formalist idealism was not yet well-recognised.

The next argument for DI’s formalist Islam is its introduction of Islamic symbols and the implementation of Islamic syariat. This thesis showed that DI’s expansion of influence was initiated in an area with strong Islamic sentiment. This strategy was aimed at attracting support from the Muslim community for DI’s effort to establish their political
influence and later to implement Islamic law. Islamic law was not only enforced among the Muslim community, but DI efforts to expand its authority were also seen in the promotion of religious conversions. For example, several non-Muslim professors were forced to convert to Islam. The former Permesta leader, Garungan, with several hundred of his followers were asked by Darul Islam leaders to convert to Islam and they agreed to do so. Garungan was later known as one of Kahar Muzakkar’s important Islamists in closing stages of the rebellion. The strategy of forcing religious conversation, in fact, showed Kahar’s authoritarian nature, as admitted in this thesis, but it also reveals DI’s Islamic formalism.

There is also the question of the Islamic consistency of Kahar Muzakkar in directing the rebellion, especially in his joining RPI which was a fusion of separatist movement which brought together PRRI and Permesta in 1960. However, when analyzing RPI further, it is apparent that Islamic ideology was ever-present. This is seen in Kahar’s efforts to Islamise RPI’s ‘secular’ constitution drafted by its leaders. Even though Kahar’s proposal was rejected by other RPI leaders, the thesis shows that his purpose in introducing an Islamised constitution was to ensure the movement’s formalist orientation. He seemed to be aware that RPI was a non-religious movement, but as a formalist, for him, symbols of Islam must be reflected in its constitution. Further examples of Kahar Muzakkar’s Islamic sentiments are found in his justification for leaving Kartosuwirjo’s NII, which was based on his belief in the un-Islamic practices prevailing under Kartosuwirjo, such as superstition and millenarianism that Kahar Muzakkar has fought against since he first declared South Sulawesi DI. Despite the question that it was Kahar Muzakkar’s effort to move away from the shadow of Kartosuwirjo, the superstitious practices that Kahar Muzakkar criticised were also acknowledged by other observers of Kartosuwirjo’s belief in superstition.

The most notable statements which clearly outline Islamic ideology are found in the efforts of Kahar Muzakakr to re-organise his troops in 1962 into an independent Islamic movement, called RPII, and to pioneer a caliphate. Even though this movement was clearly an unachievable obsession, it is an important example of the desire for ‘total’ Islamic solutions. This indicates that, for Kahar Muzakkar and his followers, winning or losing the battle against the central government may have been secondary to the goal of strengthening ideological belief. Its Islamic ideology became more radicalised as DI’s position became more desperate and the movement abandoned its earlier religious pluralism.
DI was able to hold out only until 1965, when Kahar was shot by government forces, making it one of the longest Islamic rebellions in Indonesian history. There was an effort to uphold its governmental system to be like a normal state, as well as to establish an education system up to university level. Furthermore, there was an attempt to set up social and political institutions down to the lower levels of society. However, human resources were inadequate to maintain the system. The main problem was that DI was established as a separatist movement in which part of its task was to wage war against the central government. It was established as a rebellion where the people were not well-prepared to support the system and therefore, the scope for implementing formalist Islamic concepts was limited.

Even though there was a lack of support for the movement among people with modern education, efforts to uphold the legal system to run the Islamic state were apparent. This thesis has offered evidence that the rebellion was not only a symbol, but that it truly implemented and profoundly influenced the life of people inside DI. DI revealed just how strictly Islamic law was implemented. Some people had their their hands cut off after they were convicted of theft; others were executed due to being charged with offences against DI.

The driving force for the implementation of formalism came from Kahar Muzakkar and his ability to produce key conceptual tracts such as Spiritual Remarks, Makalua Charter, and Revolutionary Islamic Political Program, all directed towards the creation of a revolutionary Islamist effort. These concepts were supported by his ability to act as a model to others. For example, his character leading a simple life was reflected by his Catatan Batin, a spiritual note to enable members of DI to practice living in a humble way in the jungle. A further explanation of the possibility of implementing Islamic law by DI is the rebellion in which the most prominent ulama in South Sulawesi joined, which easily enabled DI to produce concepts and models for the implementation of Islamic law. This was seen in the institutional support for DI where supporters with a keener knowledge of Islam could participate, notably at Dewan Fatwa and Momoc Ansharullah. Even though Dewan Fatwa existed for a relatively short time (1954-955), the regulations it formulated were to determine the implementation of Islamic law. The presence of Momoc Ansharullah (1954) as a special force, in which its main task was to guard the implementation of Islamic law in the DI community was an effort by DI to integrate state affairs with Islamic affairs.
However, discussing Kahar Muzakkar and his DI in terms of formalist Islamic idealism does not necessarily generate the same idealism in other groups of Muslim people. There are also other groups of pious Muslims in South Sulawesi who disagreed with the DI’s ways of implementing Islamic law, especially the character of Kahar Muzakkar in leading the rebellion. Therefore, DI, for other people, may mean a story about the authoritarian personality which Kahar Muzakkar adopted in order to implement his political role. Thousands of people became victims of the rebellion, including pious Muslims who opposed DI’s way. DI left a view of how ulama, who practiced traditional Islam, were forced to present a model of Islamic formalism which was clearly not their preference. It was not their choice, since when they returned after DI ceased to exist in 1965, they also returned to the traditional ways which had been banned by DI, such as kissing the hand when greeting an ulama.

DI left a trail of horror stories in its wake. People were executed without fair trial. DI forced private rituals in Islam to be implemented without any details being supplied. It issued documents for example, about how prayers were obligatory for Muslims, presenting capital punishment for those who ignored it. This regulation was set up without any detailed explanation about exactly how such a private ritual might be controlled. DI left a negative impression on people concerning Kahar Muzakkar’s frequent marriages. He made nine which some people felt had violated Islamic law. DI was sharply criticised on the question concerning exactly how Islamic law could be established by religious coercion, something which was clearly banned by the holy Qur’an.

The continuing efforts of DI were further seen in the time after Kahar Muzakkar was shot dead in 1965. Two key followers of DI, Kasso Gani and Sanusi Daris, reformulated the Islamic movement, called Republik Federasi Sulawesi (RFS). This movement seems to lack a visionary plan and much of the romanticism of the involvement of DI with Kahar Muzakkar. However, its Islamic formalist sentiments remained. It was not Islamic in name but remained Islamic in nature. That is, it made efforts to detach itself from the Indonesian Republic which did not adopt Islam as the ideology of the state. However, the arrest of its key leader, Sanusi Daris put an end to this idealism.

---

1 According to A. Moein MG, et al., it is estimated 400,000 people became victims during the time of the rebellion, including those who fled from the main conflict areas. See A Moein MG, et al, Kilat Menghanjturkan Kahar Muzakkar, 106.
The ideology of Islamic formalism in South Sulawesi was suppressed during the Soeharto period, from 1966 to 1998. The New Order regime was particularly harsh on Islamist groups. Islamist orientation was further curbed by the success in introducing the ideology of Pancasila in 1985. However, this does not mean that formalism disappeared as an aspiration, but rather, open discussion of it was largely curtailed. It was only due to the strong control of the New Order they were unable to form an organised movement. Many of the former members of DI and their sympathisers, for example, were still in favor of formalist idealism. Several young sympathisers of DI in the city promoted the ideal of formalist Islamic ideology under the tight control of the New Order regime. Since the early 1980s many young activists of Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (HMI) and Pelajar Islam Indonesia (PII) had been obsessed with Islamic ideology, inspired by the contemporary emerging Islamist movement around Islamist words. The most notable open effort for formalist Islam in South Sulawesi was during the weakest phase of the New Order that led to its fall in 1998. During this time, there were efforts at organising formalist Islam through gatherings among formal proponents. This culminated in the establishment of KPPSI in 2000, aimed at struggling for Special Autonomy for formalist Islam through constitutional means.

The presence of KPPSI could further explain changes and continuities in the journey of Islamic formalism in South Sulawesi. However, this thesis has shown that the Islamism of its figures was also apparent in its activists, programs, and the efforts for its implementation in society. Several of their activists were from DI, whether genealogically or geographically. Some former DI activists gave their open support and so did other activists from the main area of DI. There is a contemporary genealogical connection between Islamism in South Sulawesi and historical DI through the figure of Abdul Aziz Kahar, the son of Kahar Muzakkar, who was later to become an important person in the contemporary formalist movement in South Sulawesi. He was an opponent of the New Order and was active in Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam - Majelis Penyelemat Organisasi (HMI - MPO), due to the opposition of the mainstream HMI that accepted the Pancasila ideology. He was also very critical of New Order authoritarianism in his speeches. His election as the chairmen of KPPSI showed his influence and authority within formalist circles.

Abdul Aziz Kahar has become an important issue in relation to the connection between DI and KPPSI. Many KPPSI figures were aware of the influence of the name of
Kahar Muzakkar. They found that Kahar Muzakkar remained a legend among the Islamic leaders of South Sulawesi. They were pleased to have Abdul Aziz as the chairman of KPPSI, with a number of justifications, notably, that they felt that Aziz deserved to lead the movement, due to his good record in Islamic oppositional movements. Also and more importantly, they could, at the same time, trade on Kahar Muzakkar's reputation, as a way to gain support for their organisation. This can be seen when KPPSI proposed Aziz Kahar as the Dewan Perwakilan Daerah (DPD) candidate representing South Sulawesi, and he then received great support from voters of the former DI strong areas. He himself said that votes were gained from different channels: KPPSI networks and his reformist record, but the most important channel was his relationship with Kahar Muzakkar.

Some figures from the organisations which had historically and indirectly supported DI, such as Muhammadiyah and PSII also supported the new movement. Some ordinary activists regard the movement as a continuation of DI, looking at their similar objective of establishing formalist Islam. However, some KPPSI Islamists distanced themselves from DI. They want KPPSI to have nothing to do with DI. They believe that the presence of Aziz Kahar was not because he was the son of Kahar Muzakkar, but much more because he was well known to be an Islamic activist and had been so since the New Order time. Some look the movement as a more enlightened way of promoting Islamic formalism and refused to be associated with the movement if KPPSI was connected to DI, either through its members or through the manner of the movement. They stated that Abdul Aziz Kahar may not simply be linked with his father, since he had his own record of Islamic activism. They saw that the shared family connection was incidental. Furthermore, they say that the way in which KPPSI struggled with Islamic formalism cannot be compared with DI, once they chose to act through the constitution and in a peaceful manner. Furthermore, they saw that KPPSI was not so much a movement of action, but more an intellectual and political response to the failure of the New Order.

The polarisation of KPPSI figures due the issue of the connection between Aziz Kahar and his father, Kahar Muzakkar, is very necessary to KPPSI. Besides to maintain support from grassroots Muslims who were loyal to the memory of Kahar Muzakkar, it is designed to show that it was a more modern movement, avoiding rebellion, more intellectual, and constitutional, in gaining support from urban Muslims. Looking at this polarisation, the presence of Aziz Kahar was an asset. Therefore, even though Aziz Kahar
had been elected as a DPD member, KPPSI still remained in favor of his leadership of KPPSI.

In spite of the above polarisation, KPPSI figures were supported by strong Islamists, who cannot be cast as those who were DI nostalgias and those who were more intellectual. This thesis has shown that despite the different worldviews of these Islamists, they held similar views about how formalist Islam should be promoted. They agree to act constitutionally, but their views on how formalist Islam was to be achieved varied. Some of them clearly showed their puritanism, especially those with a background in Islamist organisations. Others tended to adopt a moderate perspective. The majority of them were forged beyond the dichotomy of modernist-traditionalist backgrounds. However, many of them are different in their perspectives. Some have a literal understanding of the Qur’an, while others interpreted the Qur’an in context. Some showed an anti-Western bias, others accommodated. Therefore, Inspite of their being Islamists, they were not monolithic.

Has a constitutional and peaceful manner been truly demonstrated by KPPSI? From the point of view of its procedures in its demand, it acted in a constitutional manner. This was seen in the way it consolidated itself through congresses, which produced vehicle of struggle (First Congress), strengthened its demand for Special Autonomy, through proposals in the draft for Special Autonomy (Second Congress), strengthening the demand by broadening its campaign and support and involving kabupaten government and targeting Special Autonomy in 2008 (Third Congress). These congresses were supported by actions of KPPSI activists who traveled to Jakarta several times to keep up political pressure on the central government to legalise their demands, while keeping active contact with the provincial government and parliament to support its demands.²

However, its peaceful manner was in question during the first two years when it was related to its increasing paramilitary activities. The case of Laskar Jundullah, which was once the paramilitary wing of KPPSI became a stigma, due to its use of intimidation and coercion in maintaining a campaign for syariat formalisation. Furthermore, the arrest in the Philippines of Agus Dwikarna who was the chief of Laskar Jundullah and an important leader in KPPSI, connected KPPSI to alleged terrorist networks. KPPSI responded by

---

² Among the national leaders that KPPSI met were Akbar Tanjung, the former speaker of DPR, Hidayat Nurwahid, the speaker of MPR, and the vice President of Indonesia, M. Jusuf Kalla.
slowing down its main project of demanding Special Autonomy for formalist Islam. Many of the figures who were at first sympathetic to KPPSI then withdrew their support.

KPPSI responded to these challenges by promoting a more acceptable concept of implementing syariat, showing a serious effort towards Islamic formalism in the province. At first, KPPSI was reluctant to talk about nature of the syariat that is struggled for, since for KPPSI, the important thing was to establish what this organisation called a rumah politik (political house) where syariat could be further discussed. After being overloaded by the above mentioned problems, KPPSI became more aware of focusing on concepts of why syariat had to be introduced. Its figures were more active in talking about the security that Islamic law would bring, included guaranteeing the lives of the minority. Its moderate leaders even related to the case of corruption, which could be solved by promoting syariat. Its moderate activists spoke of their belief in the minimal success of Islamisation that was presented by culturally oriented Islamic organisations. KPPSI even produced a core of Islamic syariat, a preliminary work for the guideline of the debates by which syariat could be implemented.³ KPPSI was even clearer in stating that it was a struggle not for the full implementation of Islamic law but of the aspects where the government should directly interfere for its implementation, that is, the criminal law. KPPSI saw that it was only through Special Autonomy for formal syariat that this demand could be met.

KPPSI’s views of syariat was opposed, notably, by the government, Muslim intellectuals, leaders of Christians, women activists, and Muslim mainstream organisations. They questioned the practicality of promoting formalised syariat in South Sulawesi, which would threaten the cultural efforts of practicing Islamic teaching and the existing pluralistic system of society. They also questioned how formalist Islam could be campaigned for by constitutional means and remain peaceful if it was still coloured with the intimidatory actions of its supporters. This period of challenge was considered by KPPSI activists to be the most difficult time in its existence. KPPSI responded to these challenges which were mainly efforts to survive. In responding to the challenge a terrorist network, KPPSI was busy in detaching itself from the indication that it was a terrorist network, either by erasing

---

³ KPPSI had already brought the syariat guidelines to DPRD for further discussion on 28 June 2003, but it seems the DPRD paid little attention to it. This caused KPPSI, led by the chair of Consultative Body, Abdul Muin Salim, to visit DPRD on 23 November 2004 to pressure the South Sulawesi people’s representatives. Fajar, 28 June 2003 and 24 November 2004.
the presence of Laskar Jundullah on its board or in keeping on the struggle to free Agus
Dwikarna, whom they believed to be merely victimised.

KPPSI continued softening its concept of implementation of Islamic law. This is
seen in its effort not to get bogged down in the discussion of criminal law in Islam but to
begin to discuss private aspects of Islam seeking the possibility of establishing Islamic
arbitration institutions, activating its branches to campaign on the nature of Islamic law,
and approaching local governments to produce local regulations inspired by Islamic law.
KPPSI was also very active in supporting an anti-corruption campaign which was very
much an issue with the Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono government. KPPSI seems to show
that while remaining active in campaign against immoral activities, such as pornography
and gambling, it has also been active in helping to create clean governance which was seen
as a serious problem in the country. It is not easy to discover the true commitment of
KPPSI activists in fighting against corruption, since most of them have not yet been
involved in formal bureaucratic positions, where charges of corruption are frequent.
However, looking at its main figures, for example, Abdul Muin Salim, Abdul Aziz Kahar,
Ahmad Ali, H.M. Sirajuddin, and Azwar Hasan, they were people far from the lure of
material prosperity, who found it necessary to campaign against corrupt practices in South
Sulawesi.

The ability of KPPSI to expand its syariat campaign showed significant results, at
the very least in spreading an awareness among people in South Sulawesi of the nature of
syariat throughout its existing branches in South Sulawesi. At most, it had the ability to
cause intellectuals, those in local government and politicians from central government, to
pay attention to its consistent demands. This is reflected in its recent Third Congress, held
and chaired by a Bupati and supported by local society, without raising any more issues
concerning intimidation or of paramilitary parades. Rather, there were claims that it was

---

4 During the early times of its establishment KPPSI often launched rallies to protest against immoral
activities. However, since 2002, KPPSI has acted by approaching the government apparatus. See,
“Hentikan Penayangan Pornografi dan Mistisisme,” Tribun Timur, 14 June, 2004; “KPPSI tak Ingin

5 See “GeRak Desak Kapolda Selesaikan Korupsi Dewan,” Fajar, 9 November 2004; “Deklarasi Aksi
spied upon by both national and international intelligenes, certainly concerned to see whether the potential for terrorism still existed.\textsuperscript{6}

Looking at DI and KPPSI, it may be said that these two forms of struggle to establish formalist Islam were, in some ways, different. DI emerged as a reactionary movement which was mixed up with issues of regionalism and religiosity, and which was preceded by many non-religious sentiments. However, KPPSI appeared as a more intellectual and political response which was supported by elements with a strong religiosity. The backgrounds of people who supported the two movements also created difference. DI did not receive the support of many educated people who had received a pure, modern education. KPPSI was better equipped with educated people. DI strongly depended on its key leader, Kahar Muzakkar, with more radical ideas of Islamism, while KPPSI used collective leadership and influence, and where its Islamic idealism was diverse. DI established a separate Islamic state and therefore it was separatist, while KPPSI struggled for Special Autonomy under a republic.

However, these two forms of struggle for formalist Islam shared several characteristics that fit with the definition of formalist Islam as illustrated in this thesis. Formalist Islam has been defined in this thesis as a belief that Islam must not be separated from state affairs. Islam must struggle to become a legitimate political power that can direct the life of the community. Thus, Islamic symbols and practices may be contested within an open public sphere, whether in political or social affairs. These two movements shared their formalistic efforts in approaching Islam, by offering aspects of Islamic teachings which might be formalised. The thesis has shown that in DI, all aspects of Islamic teachings may be formally controlled by the state. KPPSI, on the other hand, offered regulations concerning how certain aspects of Islamic law could be established by the government, such as Islamic criminal law. Furthermore, both DI and KPPSI share a belief in the importance of having Islamic symbols in state and society. This is seen in the crescent and star as symbols on the Islamic flag and in institutions with Islamic names, such as Ansharullah. This is similar to KPPSI which has also adopted the crescent and star as its symbols. Furthermore, in its proposals for a Special Autonomy constitution, it offered clearly Islamic symbols, such as the need to have a Muslim government.

Both DI and KPPSI share a belief in the importance of political power to implement Islamic teachings. This is clear in DI which proclaimed the need for a separate state called NII. This is also clear in KPPSI with its ultimate goal of gaining Special Autonomy for the implementation of Islamic law, and where Muslim people in South Sulawesi will be given legitimate power to run a governance based on Islamic teaching. Another part of their Islamic formalist orientation is that both DI and KPPSI share the idea that Islam has to be implemented in the public sphere rather than being a purely private matter. This is, for example, seen in their regulations concerning women’s clothing whilst in public. In DI, the regulation is that women must wear *kerudung* (traditional veil). It is similar in KPPSI, where women must wear *jilbab*. This was the recommendation of their congresses and Perda. The two movements emphasised the importance of the open acknowledgment of Islamic expressions, such as that an Islamic greeting should be red before public announcements or printed in every letter that they produced.

Even though the two movements share a history of violence, where DI carried out rebellion against the state, with the story of war, and their actions often included violence against those Muslims who opposed DI, it was also similar to the intimidations of Laskar Jundullah, with their violent networks, thought they were not stigmatised by fundamentalism. These two include followers and activists who might simply be called formalist Muslims without being loaded with the idea of physical violence against their ‘un-Islamic’ enemies. Finally, they are interconnected. Many KPPSI figures continue to see the phenomenon of DI as being an historical inevitability for the establishment of strong roots in formalist Islam while some former DI activists have shown regard for the KPPSI model of activism by direct and indirect support.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

A. List of Interviews


Abdurrahman A. Basalamah, Prof., Dr., Makassar, 20 February 2002.


Abu Hamid, Prof., Dr, Makassar, 26 March 2003.

Ahmad M. Sewang, Prof., Dr., 7 May 2003.


Ali Imran, dr., H., Pare Pare, 7 September 2003.


Andi Bohang, Bulukumba, 3 March 2003.


Andi Ngiwi, Palopo, 8 May 2003.


Andi Patongai, H., Bulukumba, 4 April 2003.

Andi Rasdiyanah Amir, Prof. Dr., Makassar, 10 July 2003.

Andi Rating, Bulukumba, 2 April 2003.

Anhar Gonggong, Dr., Jakarta, 28 January 2005.


Asaad Salam, H., Bulukumba, 3 April 2003.
Asri Akkas., H., Drs., M.Ag., Watampone, 8 September 2003.


Bahroul, Enrekang, 9 September 2003.


Hadeyang, Hj., Palopo, 8 May 2003.

Hamka Haq, Prof., Dr., Makassar, 7 February 2003, 14 December 2004.


Hasan Ridwan, Belopa, Luwu, 10 May 2003.


Imam Tolhah, Dr., Jakarta, 6 August 2003.


Iskandar, Tompo, Drs., H., Makassar 27 February 2003.


Jamaluddin Amin, KH., Makassar, 3 March 2003.

Jufri Hamzah, Watampone, 8 September 2003.

Kaharuddin, Bone, 4 November 2004.


Kamaluddin, H., Bulukumba, 4 April 2003.

Khaerullah, Palopo, 10 May 2003.


Mahdi KH., Bulukumba, 3 April 2003.


Mama Sarullah, Pinrang, 12 September 2003.


Matahari, Bone, 5 February 2003.

Muh. Yunus Tekeng, Drs., H., Makassar, 10 February 2002.


Muhammad Alwi Fatahillah, S.Ag, M. Pd., Makassar, 22 June 2003.


Muhammad Ruddin Emang, Drs., H., Makassar, 23 February 2005.

Muhammad Said, Palopo, 7 May 2003.

Muhammad Zahir, Bulukumba, 8 April 2003.

Muhlis, S.E., Gowa, 5 February 2005.

Muslim Ibrahim, Prof., Dr., Canberra, 2 September 2004.

Mustamin Arsyad., Dr., H., Makassar, 14 December 2004.

Mustari, Dr., H., Makassar, 14 December 2004.

Nasrullah, Sinjai, 7 April 2003.

Noer Bahri Noer, Dr., H., Makassar, 4 March 2003.


Nurdin Usman Pisof, Makassar, 22 November 2003.


319
Nurul Ilmi Idris, Dr., email interview, 25 September 2004.
Paulus Gareso, Canberra, 10 June 2005.
Qasim Mathar, Prof., Dr., Makassar, 23 February 2003.
Rahim Yunus, Prof., Dr., Makassar, 20 February 2004.
Rahman Saleh, H., S.E., Pare Pare, 7 September 2003.
Rauf, Enrekang, 9 September 2003.
Rawe, Lanipa, Luwu, 8 May 2003.
Ridwan, H., Bulukumba, 5 April 2003.
Ridwan, S.Ag., Bulukumba, 4 April 2003.
Ruslan, Drs., M.Ag., Watampone, 8 September 2003.
S. Ruslan, Dr., Makassar, 26 February 2003.
Sanusi Baco, KH., Makassar, 22 February 2003.
Sitti Arafah, H., Bone, 5 February 2003.
Sopamena, Father, Makassar, 17 March 2003.
Sulaeha, Palopo, 9 May 2003.
Suryadarma, Makassar, 17 September 2003
Tjamiruddin, Drs., H., Bulukumba, 5 April 2003.
Tommy Thomson, Watampone, 4 February 2005.
Ummu Kalsum, Lanipa, Luwu, 8 May 2003.
B. Primary Sources

1. Archival Materials

Dinas Sejarah, Pusat Sejarah TNI, Jakarta.


Documents consisting the legal advice of the Dewan Fatwa of South Sulawesi Darul Islam (n.t., n.p., n.d).


---------. Pedoman Revolusi Jilid II. n.p., n.d.


2. Monographs and Articles


------. “Mengapa Sekularisme Bertentangan dengan Syari’at Islam?” Fajar, 1 September 2002.


------. “Taliban yang Menerapkan Syari’at Islam.” Fajar, 2 March 2003


------. “Syariat Islam di Malaysia dan Indonesia.” Fajar, 12 July 2002.


"Quo Vadis KPPSI?” Fajar, 4 January 2002.


-------. “Hukum Belanda Saja Bisa, Apalagi Hukum Islam.” Interview, Republika, 1 April 2005.


-------. Revodi (Revolusi Dunia Islam), n.p., 1961.


--------. “Korupsi, Terorism, dan Jihad.” Opini, Fajar, 29 Januari 2005


C. Secondary Sources

1. Monographs and theses


2. Articles and Unpublished Papers


337


### 3. Articles without Specific Authors (Magazines and Newspapers)


“Abu Bakar Baasyir: Kasus Agus Dwikarna Skenario AS.” *Kompas*, 14 July 2002


“Akomodasi Mayoritas tanpa Menyisihkan Minoritas: Penegakan Syariat Islam di Sulsel.”  
Fajar, 26 November 2000.


“Dari Kongress Umat Islam Sulawesi Selatan: Upaya Menegakkan Syariat dar Daerah.”  


“Govt authorized to Revoke Bylaws on Syariat.” The Jakarta Post, 10 February 2006.


“Ia telah Menemui Panglima Tertingginya.” Sabili, No. 15 TH. VIII, 5 January 2001,  
pp.81-82.


“Mengadili Presiden RFS.” Tempo, 4 August 1984.
"Rekomendasi Kongres Umat Islam." Media Dakwah, Desember 2000, p.27.
"Syariat Advocates Await their Day of Triumph in S. Sulawesi." The Jakarta Post, 10 February 2006.
LIST OF APPENDICES

Appendix I: Kahar Muzakkar’s Letter to Kartosuwirjo
(Source: Document DI/TII Kahar Muzakkar No. 129, Dinas Sejarah, Pusat Sejarah TNI, Jakarta). 347-348

Appendix II: Kartosuwirjo’s Reply to Kahar Muzakkar
(Source: Document DI/TII Kahar Muzakkar No. 129, Dinas Sejarah, Pusat Sejarah TNI, Jakarta). 349-350

Appendix III: Proclamation Text of South Sulawesi DI
(Source: Document DI/TII Kahar Muzakkar No. 130, Dinas Sejarah, Pusat Sejarah TNI, Jakarta). 351

Appendix IV: Konsep Kemerdekaan Sejati (Concept of Pure Independence)
(Source: Document DI/TII Kahar Muzakkar, No. 117, Dinas Sejarah, Pusat Sejarah TNI, Jakarta). 352-353

Appendix V: Tjatatan Batin (Spiritual Remarks)

Appendix VI: Makalua Charter

Appendix VII: Revolutionary Islamic Political Program

Appendix VIII: Decisions of the Second Urgent Meeting of Islamic Revolutionary Fighters

Appendix IX: Decisions of Open Dialogue for Implementing Islamic Law in South Sulawesi

Appendix X: First Congress’ Recommendations
Appendix XI: Makassar Declaration

Appendix XII: Memorandum Syariat Islam

Appendix XIII: Ikrar

Appendix XIV: Muharram Declaration

Appendix XV: Recommendations of DPRD

Appendix XVI: Proposed Draft legislation for Special Autonomy

Appendix XVII: Program of Struggle

Appendix XVIII: Program of Socialisation

Appendix XIX: Second Congress’ Recommendations
Appendix XX: Boards of KPPSI  405-410

Appendix XXI: Third Congress’ Recommendations  411-413
(Source: Fajar, 30 March 2005).

Appendix XXII: Fatwa of South Sulawesi MUI  414-417
(Source: Pemerintah Provinsi Sulawesi Selatan, “Seminar Sehari Jajak Pendapat
Konsep Pemberlakuan Syariat Islam di Sulawesi Selatan,” 8 November 2001,
Marannu City Hotel, Makassar).
Appendix I: Kahar Muzakkur’s Letter to Kartosuwirjo

**Komando Pasukan Hasanuddin**

Tanggal 20 Januari 1952.
Dari: Kmd. Kom. PaA. "H"
Kepada: Panglima Tertinggi T.I.I.
Pihak: Djawaban surat 2;
Sifat: Amat penting/Rahasia
Lampiran: -

**Bismillahirrahmanirrahim**

Assalamu’alaikum w.w.


2. Kami sangat bersyukur dan sangat mendjundjung tinggi kepertjajaan dan keputusan Panglima Tertinggi (tersebut dalam petikan daripada daftar 2 Piagan dalam Kommdemen Tertinggi A.P.H.I.I. No. 10IX/51), dan atas harapan sujji itu kami kemukakan beberapa soal 2 pokok untuk dipertimbangkan seperti berikut:

a. Sebelum kami mengamalkan keputusan Panglima Tertinggi T.I.I. terlebih dahulu kami kemukakan bahwa Pasukan 2 ang kami Pimpin dewasa ini ada 5 (lima) Bataljon, dan diantara 5 Bataljon itu ada 3 (tiga) Bataljon jang terdiri dari beberapa golongan (bukan Islam) dan telah dipengaruhi aliran merah (sebelum kami tiba di Sulawesi)


3. Kesimpulan dlm ajat 2 sub a, b, dan c diatas, kami sampaikan kepada Panglima Tertinggi T.I.I. jaitu:

a. Kami meminta kesempatan seluas- luasnja untuk mengembangkan dan mngisi dijwa ummat kita di Sulawesi seluruhnya, dan kami akan ber tindakan menurut keadaan dan waktu.

b. Kami......

347

4. Inna fatah-na laka fathan mubian, insja Allah, amien ja robbal-alamien.

5. Wassalam.

KOAMANDAN PASUKAN HASANUDDIN.

Komandan,

tttd.

(KAHAR-MUZAKKAR).
20/1-1952.

Tjap sementara
Brigade Staf Kwartier
HASANUDDIN.

Jang mengambil turunan:
Sub. Bagian Arsip/Exbiditie K.D.N.
t.t.d.

MARGONO.

Turunan ke II.
oleh Anrg. Citibiel S.U.A.D.-I.
KOMANDEN TERTINGGI
ANGKATAN PERANG NEGARA ISLAM INDONESIA.

BISMILLAHIRRAHMANIRRAHIM

Noor: 23/9/52.
Al: Sambutan.
Ifat: Rhs.
Ati: Plm.T.
Epada: Plm. Div. IV, HSD.TII.
Arich: 27 Febur. 1952. jum. 11.45.

7 Agustus 1949. PROKLAMASI NEGARA ISLAM INDONESIA,
--------------------------------------------------

Wa’alaikumussalam w.w.

1. Alhamdulillah.


Allahumma. Iyakana’budu, wa-iyaka nastain, indinasskiotat-
mustaqim.

2. Sjahdan, maka waraqaat Saudara, No. 1057/SB/C0/BH/II/52, ter- 20 Djanuari 1952, alhamdulillah, sudahlah sampa i ditangan saja, dengan selamat dan sempurna, Terima kasih.

3. Mengingat isi surat saudara tab., angka 2, a.b. dan s., serta angka 3, a.b., dan memperlengkap instruksi2 jang terdahulu, maka dengan ini saja njatakan :

   a. Saudara diberi hak dan kesempatan jang seluas-luasnya, ut mengembangkan dan mengisi djiwa Ummat Islam Banasa Indone- sia, di Sulawesi Selatan chususnya dan Diseluruh Sulawesi umumnya, hingga Islam minded 100%, Negara Islam Minded 10

   b. Dalam pada itu, saudara boleh melakukan tindakan anapun djuga, sepandjang hukum Islam dimasa perang (fi-wachtih-
harby), dengan mengingat keadaan dan waktu jang Saudara hadapi, bagi kepentingan Negara Islam Indonesia.

   c. Saudara mempunjai kebebasan jang penuh, dl. menentukan ta- tik dan sijasat perdujuan asal djangan melampaui babas dari pada ketentuan2 dan peraturan2 Negara Islam Indonesia (periksalah: Maklumat2 jg bersangkutan) dan hukum2 Sja-
ra’ Islam.

   d. Atas perjataan Saudara : Ta’at kpd Komandan Tertinggi sebagai Ulil-Amri - selainnya kpd Allah dan Rasulnya....
4. Selain daripada itu, perlu pulalah saja njatakan, kepada Saudara
   a. Bahwa soal2 antara Negara Islam Indonesia dan Republik Indonesia
      dan sual2 tjabang (nevenvaagstukken) hanjalah dapat diselasaikan antara Pemerintah Kedua Negara itu.
   Tegasnya antara Negara dengan Negara, inteegraal dan tidak lokal
   Dalam hal ini, adalah tanggung djawab dan wadjibnya Komandemen
   Tertinggi sendiri;

   b. Oleh sebab itu, djika ada orang2, party2, golongan dan lain,
      yg tjoba2 hendak "menjelesaikan/mendamaikan"nya, silahkanlah
      mereka berhubungan langsung dg. Pemerintah Pusat R.I. sebab se-
      sunggunja-penjelealaan segala sual "keamanan"-itu hanjalah ter-
      gantung kepada sikapa dan pendirian Pemerintah R.I. sendiri.
     Lebih landjut, hendaklah Saudara ketahui, bahwa dari pihak Peme-
     rintah Negara Islam Indonesia sudah tjukuplah "good will" terba-
     dapa kepada pemerintah R.I., sanggup amsal memuaskan Nona M.
     sia hingga 2 (dua) kali, semasa kabinet Natsir, ja'ni : pd. tr.
     22 October 1950 dan 17 Febr. 1951. Kedua Nona Naniah itu ditar-
     da tangani oleh Imam Negara Islam Indonesia dan dialamatkan ke-
     Presiden Republik Indonesia, sedang tembusan-nya dikerim kpd.
     P.M. (R.I.) ja'ni Saudara M.Natsir.
     Dalam pada itu, baik djuga peringatan kepada Saudara : hendak
     Saudara berhathi2, tertib dan teliti serta bidjaksana dalam mes-
     hadapi2 sual2 ini, sebab anak-tjutju Ibis Ia natullah menang-
     engadja hendak memasang perangkapnja dan meakah tan tipsudja at-
     kaun Muslimin, dan Mu'minin, terutama Madjahidin.
     Hendaklah lebih dhjau saudara ingati pula, bahwa "tentara tidak
     ngengan kompromi".
     Tjamkanlah baik2!

5. Semoga Allah selalu berkenan membenarkan, memberkahi dan memasil-
    kan usaha sutji kita : menggalang dan mendukung Negara Kurnias Allah
    Negara Islam Indonesia ! Insja Allah Amin.

6. Selamat berdjidh ! Selamat berperang ! Ila merlotillah !
    Insja Allah. Amin.
    Bismillahi.......ALLAHU AKRAH !.......JUATAL au JAALIS;

    Wassalam
    KOMANDENEN TERTINGGI.

Angkatan Perang
Komandemen
Plm. T.
Tertinggi.
Negara Islam Indonesia.

Tjap stercpel
Jang menaambil turunan :
Sub. Bagian Arsip/Expidite K.D.N.
ttd. Margono.

rusan : 
K.S.U.-

Turunan ke II.
Jang menjalin.

(M.Hassan).

350
PROKLAMASI
DI/TII SULAWESI SELATAN TENGAH

Tanggal 7 Agustus 1953

DENGAN NAMA ALLAH JANG MAHA MURAH DAN PENGASIH


ALLAHU AKBAR !

Medan Djihad, 27 Dzulhdjja 1372
7 Agustus 1953.

ATAS NAMA UMMAT ISLAM DAERAH SULAWESI
DAN DAERAH SEKITARNYA

t.t.d.

(ABDUL QAHAR MUZAKKAR).

Sumbor i Bagian 1/506.

Hakassar, 7 December 1960.
REKONSTRUKSI KEMERDEKAAN SEJATI

Sesudah kita menginsinyu keadaan yang senjata nyata dari pada nasib patriotis Indonesia setelah berdjung bertahun-tahun dengan pengorbanan dan dana dari dunia yang sangat dibayai djamahum telah dikorbankan untuk kebenda dan dianggap bagal seluruh bangsa yakni orang Indonesia dan terutama rakyat jalat yang hidup malat dari abad ke abad menderita kesesuaarmen dan penindaspani dan belumlah ada perubahan perda-bahan keadaan dalam negeri yang sedangseria, sesuai prinsip proklamasi kemerdekaan 17 Agustus 1945.


Sudahlah tjkup djelas paria nenasan pangitkan dan tempat sedjati proklamasi kemerdekaan 17 Agustus 1945, yaitu:
1. Diatu pikah adlah golongan rakyat kebendaan yang kiasan Kemerdekaan sedjati) dan pelalau pantja Sila jatiu-U.N. Negara Republik Indonesia yang mendjadi tuduhan pendjajahan Patriotisme.
2. Diatu pikah adlah Patriotisme yang melayu pada pendjapi kemerdekaan yang lebih baik dibangkitkan dan diuatkan.

Dijka Patriotisme dan rakyat diatu tajat yang peluh raya tak disebabkan oleh rakyat jalat yang djalat pertama maka sebarusan multj pelakor di Djaan Tengah dan Timbu Gerilla di Kaimantan. Dijka Patriotisme dan rakyat rakyat jalat yang peluh raya tak disebabkan oleh rakyat jalat yang djalat pertama maka sebarusan multj pelakor di Djaan Tengah dan Timbu Gerilla di Kaimantan.

Sebelum kita melaksanakan tdk lebih djahub dalam revolusi kemerdekaan sedjati yang harus diserang digiokan, maka terlebih dahulu kita harus selidiki kekuatan ditaag pelakor pelakor tanah airjana berarti kekuatan (tempo pokok diri ujiu) dari rakyat jalat yang peluh raya tak disebabkan oleh rakyat jalat yang djalat pertama maka sebarusan multj pelakor di Djaan Tengah dan Timbu Gerilla di Kaimantan. Dijka Patriotisme dan rakyat jalat yang peluh raya tak disebabkan oleh rakyat jalat yang djalat pertama maka sebarusan multj pelakor di Djaan Tengah dan Timbu Gerilla di Kaimantan.

Perlu djahub diketadin bahag menurut penjelasan pada ujaran fossilis (jang bangun mengerjakan /reaksi) diatu tajat untuk membantu dewangan agen usaha2 pilah raya, maka terhadap kaum fossilis lang meneru ejah serta tersebut ditaag aikja kita berdiri diri ujiu dan adait mulai bekerja sama diatu tajat menguburkan kapal perda-gerja seangkatan kita, Sebab dengan menilangka kaum fossilis lang bergerak dan revolusioner berarti mengerang kekuatan, sedang tujut dari kaum itu dajat maka apargukan pula oleh pilah raya menguburkan agen usaha2 pilah raya,
Usaha usaha jang harus ditjapai dan ditempuh dalam tempoh jang ses-
singkat-singkatnya:-
"segasaja, adakah lebih baik banjak kawan dori pada banjak lawan", dan dalam sah itu terutama terhadap tanah tanj, huruh, pemuda, dan sepening lamian majnirakat harus segera tergali dalam suatu pem-
inasai pertahanan todatl supra kawen kita dijen gun tempoh usah
jang berarti meradakan pihak lawan sentjekel lebih kita dengan dit-
lan mempersyukuran kawan kita sendiri. Dan untuk kencetraan itu peri
lur kimja usaha2 perdoangan kita dibagi dalam 3 (tiga) tingkap-
kan jaitu:
1. Voorbereidings phase (tingkat persiapan).
2. Finderlaags phase (tingkat pengali).
3. Achterboelings phase (tingkat penihuan/ pembersihan).

Dan diantarana 3 (tiga) tingkatn tersebut diatas adalah tingkat per-
tara jang terpenting, oleh kareen segala usaha2 dalam tingkat kedua
dan ketiga akan ditentukan dengan hasil usaha dalam tingkat pertama
dan setelah itu baru hal menunjuk pengalasannya tingkat dua dan tiga
jang harus didjalanakan dengan penun rasa tanggung jawab dan dis-
suankan kekeadaan.
Demikianlah concept ini dadasun setjara tingkap untuk menambahkan
tekad dan wreerin sama dori seluruh golongan. Patietisme disi-
luruh pelosok kepulauan Indonesia.

Note:
Tjatetan ini majis untuk diperhatikan kepada orang2/
golongan jang tidak bersangkuta.

Dibikin : Di Medan Bakti.
Tanggal : 4 Augustus 1951.
Djam : 11.00
COFPS TAHDAKAN NASIONAL INDONESIA
KOMANDO PRES. BRIT. PASAMUDEK.


Untuk salinan jang sama,
ttd:
R.T. K-L-U-N-G A-N.

Untuk salinan ke II
dengan sama bunjin:
oleh,

("M. Zan Sandinian")

Doc. Supp--

353
Appendix V: Spiritual Remarks

TJATATAN BATIN

Motto: PERBAIKAN DHAHIR TIDAK MUNGKIN TERWUDJUD TANPA KESADARAN BATHIN

1. TJARA HIDUP KELUARGA ORGANISASI REVOLUSI.


Revolusi Bathin bertudjauan untuk mentjapai kesadaran bathin setiap pedjoan Islam revolusiner dan setiap mudjahidin Ansharullah dalam tudjuan besar mentjapai hitakuna Kalimatullahi Hijjal ‘ulja, dan dalam tudjuan besar mewudjudkan “Mardhatillah” Negara Kurnia Allah s.w.t. dimuka bumi Indonesia Insja Allah! Amin!

Untuk maksud dan tudjuan kita bermohon kehadirat Allah s.w.t. semoga melapangkkan dada dan membukakan hati setiap Mudjahidin Ansharullah untuk memasuuki dan melaksaanakan segala program “Revolusi Bathin” dengan sepenuhnya Taqwa dan Tawakkal ‘Allah semata, dan kejakinan dan Iman sepenuhnya. Insja Allah! Amin!

Dan untuk factor-faktor psychologies dan principieel dibawah ini:
1. Setiap anggota dan pegawai (termasuk keluarga) tantara Islam, Gerilja Islam, Pemerintah Militer, Partai al-Qashash, BTII dan Gerwais dilarang memakai segala matjam tjintjin, perhiasan emas, intan berlian, arlodji tangan, dengan tjatatan dalam pengertian Islam revolusiner jaitu:
   a. Tjintjin jang boleh dipakai hanjaljah matjam tjintjin perak, tembaga dan besi jang tidak berpermata

Tjatatan:
Arlodji tangan jang berkelebihan/tidak terpakai supaja segera didjual dan didjadikan kas organisasi revolusi.

   c. Semua keluarga djoang revolusi Islam (termasuk Ibu-Bapak, Mertua perempuan dan laki, anak, adik, ipar) dan demikian keluarga hubungan nama lainja jang hidup bersama dalam rumah tangga sesorang tenaga. revolusi Islam, dilarang memakai segala tjintjin emas atau pelatina, subang, giwang, kalung, gelang, dan peniti mas atau intan berlian dalam masa revolusi.

Tjatatan:
Menurut tingkatan kesadaran sebagai ummat Islam maka setjara suka, tulus ichlas dan rela, atas nama pemerintah Republik Islam Indonesia di Bhg.
Timur mengandjurkan kepada segenap keluarga revolusi Islam untuk memindjaman kan segala matjam perhiasan emas dan intan berlian tersebut diatas kepada pemerintah Militer Republik Islam Indonesia di Bhg. Timur, dengan nilai menurut taksiran harga pasar sekarang.


2. Dalam setiap rumah tangga tenaga revolusi (tidak terketjuali) dilarang memakai lampu-gas, dilarang memelihara/menjimpan radio, dan dilarang menjimpan uang lebih dari Rp. 30,- (tiga puluh rupiah) setiap bulan.

Tjatatan:


3. Setiap anggota organisasi revolusi kaum laki-laki (tidak terketjuali) dilarang memakai/menjimpan:

a. The excellent stock of material (berupa wool dan lain-lain bahan pakaian tuan-tuan besar a-la kota-kota besar).

b. Pakaian dinas tantara lebih dari 2 (dua) pasang dalam setahun

c. Sarung plekak lebih dari 3 (tiga) lembar dalam setahun

d. Sarung tidur lebih dari 1 (satu) lembar dalam setahun.

e. Handuk lebih dari 2 (dua) lembar dalam setahun.

f. Badju kaus dalam lebih dari 3 (tiga) lembar dalam setahun.

g. Tjelana dalam lebih dari 4 (empat) lembar dalam setahun.

h. Sapu tangan (seperlunya sadja).

i. Djas hudjan lebih dari 1 (satu) lembar dalam setahun.

Tjatatan:

a. Kelebihan pakean dapat disumbangkan kepada rakjat jang lebih membuthukan dan atau didjual untuk kas organisasi.

b. Majam pakaian jacket, trousers, etc., bagi pedjoang revolusioner saatnya bukan waktu sekarang.

4. Setiap anggota organisasi kaum wanita (tidak terketjuali) dilarang memakai/menjimpan:

a. Especially women stock of materials berupa kain bulu matjan dan lain-lain pakean njonja-njonja besar a-la di kota-kota besar.

b. Blouse (kebaja) lebih dari 4 (empat) lembar dalam setahun.
c. Sarung pelekat dan atau batik lebih dari 4 (empat) lembar dalam setahun, diluar pakean shalat.
d. Sarung tidur lebih dari 1 (satu) lembar dalma setahun.
e. Handuk lebih dari 2 (dua) lembar dalam setahun.
f. Kutang lebih dari 4 (empat) lembar dalam setahun.
g. Women’s breeches lebih dari 4 (empat) lembar dalam setahun.
Tjatatan:
a. Kelebihan pakaian dapat disumbangkan kepada sesame kaum wanita dalam masjarakat jang lebih membutuhkan dan atau didjual untuk organisasi.
b. Matjam pakean women’s jacket, skirt, fur coat, evening-dress, etc. dan demikian alat ketjantik sebaiknya bertukar dengan pedoman hidup Wal Aachiratu Chairun Wa Apqaa (terutama dalam masa revolusi sekarang ini).

5. Setiap anggota organisasi revolusi dilarang merokok escort, British American Cigarettes, dan segala matjam rokok luar negeri.
7. Setiap anggota organisasi revolusi dilarang memiliki sawah, kebun atau lading, dan tebat jang bukan hasil keringatnja sendiri.
8. Setiap anggota organisasi revolusi dilarang mempunjai usaha pentjaharian sendiri, umpamanja perahu lajar ukuran besar atau ketjil, oto truck dan toko-toko besar atau ketjil.
Tjatatan:
Segala matjam perusahaan tersebut diatas dan segala matjam usaha pentjaharian tersebut dalam ajar (8) diatas, wadjib diusahakan dan diatur langsung oleh Dewan Haq RII Bag. Timur seksi Perusahaan revolusi dibawah pimpinan sdr. Patawari.
10. Selain daripada gubuk ditempat-tempat Kubu/Pertahanan dan Asrama di-medan-median dinas revolusi, segenap anggota organisasi revolusi dilarang mendirikan dan atau memiliki rumah jang kelihatan baik dalam pandangan mata segala orang (selama dalam masa revolusi).
BISMILLAHIRRAHMANI RAHIM

“PIAGAM MAKALUA”

IKRAR BERSAMA DALAM USAHA PELAKSANAAN
PROGRAM POLITIK ISLAM REVOLUSIONER

Muqaddimah


1. Surat An Nur ayat 55
2. Surat Al Hujarat ayat 9,10, dan 13
3. Surat An Nisa ayat 1, 34, dan 59
4. Surat Al Imran ayat 26, 79, 103, 118, dan 159
5. Surat Syura ayat 38
6. Surat Al Kahfi ayat 110
7. Surat Fathir ayat 43
8. Surat Al Maidah ayat 50
9. Surat Al Tahrim ayat 9

Maka pejuang Islam Revolusioner di Indonesia Bhg. Timur bertekad bulat dengan keyakinan teguh dalam Jihad Fisabilillah mewujudkan Negara Kurnia Allah Republik Islam Indonesia yang memberi hak inisiatif dan hak kekuasaan penuh kepada segenap golongan Ummat Islam dalam lingkungan daerah bahagian Negara untuk mengatur dan membangun dirinya kedalam. Untuk dapat mewujudkan tekad keyakinan itu dan untuk menjamin berlakunya Syariat Islam dimuka bumi Indonesia maka dengan izin kehendak Allah SWT. “Piagam” ini disusun dan diatur dalam pokok ketentuan seperti berikut:

BAB 1

TENTANG KETATA NEGARAAN
PASAL 1
Bertegas memajukan usul pandangan kepada Pusat bahwa Negara Islam Indonesia tetap berbentuk Republik Kesatuan.

PASAL 2
Untuk dapat memenuhi hasrat keinginan setiap golongan suku bangsa Indonesia dalam lingkungan Republik Islam Indonesia maka gaya ikhtiar pelaksanaan cita-cita kemerdekaan, kebajakan hidup dan kemuliaan setiap golongan Ummat wajib disalurkan menurut kodrat sifat, tabiat dan rezeki anugerah Allah kepada golongan suku bangsa itu masing-masing dengan jalan:
(1) Supaya diadakan/dibuat undang-undang pokok otonomi daerah-daerah yang memberi hak kekuasaan penuh kepada daerah-daerah Propinsi membangun dan mengatur dirinya kedalam
(2) Supaya diadakan/dibuat Undang-undang perimbangan Keuangan antara Pemerintah Pusat dan Daerah-daerah Propinsi (yang disesuaikan dengan sumber penghasilan dan kebutuhan biaya pembangunan di daerah-daerah).

BAB II
TENTANG PEMERINTAHAN NEGARA DALAM KEADAAN DARURAT

PASAL 3
Dengan tidak mengabaikan tugas kewajiban dan pertanggungan jawab pemerintahan kepada pemerintah Pusat, maka selama dalam keadaan darurat perang (revolusi) pemerintahan daerah-daerah Propinsi dipusatkan pada pemerintahan Territorium.

PASAL 4
Dalam keadaan Darurat perang (revolusi) pemerintahan Territorium menjelma menjadi Perwakilan Kabinet Presiden.

PASAL 5
Selama dalam keadaan darurat perang (revolusi) maka hak menetapkan peraturan-peraturan ketertiban pemerintahan Militer Territorium dipegang sepenuhnya oleh Perwakilan Kabinet Presiden.

PASAL 6
Sesudah keadaan darurat perang (revolusi) berakhir maka tugas dan pertanggungan jawab pemerintahan Militer Territorium/Perwakilan Kabinet Presiden beralih kepada Pemerintahan Pusat.

358
BAB III

TENTANG ALAT PERTAHANAN NEGARA

PASAL 7

Selama dalam keadaan darurat perang (revolusi) maka Tentara Islam Indonesia (meliputi Angkatan Darat dan Laut) yang ada dalam lingkungan Territorium langsung dibawah pemerintahan Militer Territorium (Panglima Tentara & Territorium).

PASAL 8

Selama dalam keadaan darurat perang (revolusi) maka Polisi Negara dan Barisan Pertahanan Rakyat Pasukan Territorial &Pasukan Suka rela dalam lingkungan daerah-daerah Propinsi langsung dibawah pimpinan pemerintahan Militer Propinsi (Gubernur Militer).

PASAL 9

Selain dari yang telah tercantum pada Pasal 8 diatas diberikan lapangan jihad sesuai dengan kodratnya.

PASAL 10

Selama dalam keadaan darurat perang (revolusi) maka tidak dibenarkan seseorang Ummat Islam revolucioner pasif di dalam segala macam tugas revolusi.

BAB IV

TENTANG KEPARTAIAN DAN ALIRAN MASYARAKAT NEGARA

PASAL 11

Selama dalam keadaan darurat perang (revolusi) maka partai-partai ditiadakan dalam negara Republik Islam Indonesia, kecuali Organisasi Massa yang diakui oleh Pemerintah Militer Territorium/Perwakilan Presiden.

PASAL 12

Semua partai-partai politik, golongan munafik, fasik, dzolim, dan kafir Syarraddawab (ala PNI, MURBA, PKI, dan partai-partai golongan munafik lainnya) yang ada dalam masyarakat wajib diperangi (dibasmi).

PASAL 13

Semua partai-partai politik golongan Islam contra revolucioner (ala Masyumi, Nahdatulah Ulama, PSSI, dsb) yang ada dalam masyarakat wajib dilumpuhkan (dilenyapkan).

PASAL 14
Semua organisasi Massa seperti: (Persatuan Alim Ulama, Organisasi Tani, Buruh, Pendidikan, Sosial, dsb) yang bertendensi Mahzab dan conta revolusioner, misalnya: As Adiah, DDI, SBII, STII, dsb yang ada dalam masyarakat wajib dilumpuhkan (dilenyapkan).

PASAL 15

Setiap golongan fanatic feodalisme, tarekat, berhala, dan sihir/pemali yang ada dalam masyarakat wajib diperangi (dibasmi).

PASAL 16

(1). Segenap pejuang Islam revolusioner dan segenap lapisan masyarakat RRI Bhg Timur yang sengaja atau tidak sengaja melaparkan istilah kebanggaan/gelaran feudal, misalnya: ibu-bapu, ana, opu, bau, puang, karaeng, petta, andi, daeng, haji, laode, gedetake, gedebagus, eanggu, bohoki, saijjed, teuku, raden, adji, dan lain-lain istilah kebanggaan gelaran feodal setempat, wajib diperangi.
(2). Segenap keturunan bangsawan (feodalisten) yang bermasa bodoh dan tidak membantah istilah kebanggaan feodal yang ditujukan kepaddanya wajib diperangi.

PASAL 17

Semua oknum yang menyebarkan dan atau memakai azimat yang berupa benda-benda sakti (batu-batu, keris, dsb), wajib diperangi.

BAB V

TENTANG PELAKSANAAN HUKUM SYARIAT

PASAL 18

(1). Setiap anggota tentara, polisi, GII, pemerintah dan demikian pula rakyat yang mengabaikan sholat lima waktu wajib dijatuhi hukum bunuh.
(2). Setiap anggota tentara, polisi, GII, pemerintah maupun rakyat yang mengabaikan puasa wajib tanpa uzur wajib dijatuhi hukum bunuh.

PASAL 19

Setiap anggota tentara, polisi, GII, pemerintah demikian pula rakyat yang mencampuri dan atau dengan sengaja menyebarkan perjudian, perampokan, dan kejahatan lainnya dalam masyarakat, ditangkap dan dikonsinjer dalam “war comps” (kamp tawanan perang gerilla) dan jika mereka membantah dan atau memberontak boleh dibunuh.

PASAL 20

Setiap persoalan Furu’ dalam ajaran Islam dengan ketentuan pokok yang dijalankan dalam masa keadaan darurat perang (revolusi) misalnya: tarwih, dijalankan menurut pedoman dan atau putusan peraturan yang dikeluarkan oleh dewan pemerintahan Militer Territorium/PK Presiden RII
PASAL 21

Segala peraturan pelaksanaan hukum Syariat yang tidak keluar dari Dewan Pemerintahan Territorium/Perwakilan Kabinet Presiden RII dipandang tidak syah dan tidak boleh dijalankan dalam masyarakat/Negara (revolusi).

PASAL 22

Setiap Alim Ulama atau Cendikiawan yang tidak mau bersatu langsung atau tidak langsung dalam melaksanakan Syariat untuk melancarkan revolusi, maka kepadanya wajib diperangi.

PASAL 23

Semua perbuatan bid'ah yang masih terdapat dalam masyarakat, wajib segera dihapuskan.

PASAL 24

Untuk hal-hal yang bertendensi hukum Syariat/Ibadat hanyalah dapat diadakan menurut ketentuan pemerintah Militer Territorium/Perwakilan Kabinet Presiden RII

BAB VI

TENTANG PERBAIKAN TATA TERTIB ORGANISASI KE DALAM

PASAL 25

Setiap Pejabat Panglima Divisi, KPDAD, KPSAL, dan KSD, ditetapkan atas persetujuan bersama antara Menteri Pertahanan Muda RII dan atau KPK Presiden RII dengan Dewan Pemerintahan Militer Territorium/Perwakilan Kabinet Presiden RII

PASAL 26

Setiap pejabat Kmd Brigade, kepala-kepala SU dan SC Divisi Kepala Staf Brigade, Kmd Polisi Militer dan Kmd Batalyon ditetapkan oleh Menteri Pertahanan Muda RII

PASAL 27

Semua perwira yang menjabat kepala staf Bn Kmd Kompi dan Kmd Peleton dan atau yang setingkat dengan itu ditetapkan oleh Kepala Perwakilan Staf Angkatan Darat & Laut (KPDAD & KPSAL).

PASAL 28

Semua Bintara ditetapkan oleh Panglima Divisi.

PASAL 29

Semua pejabat Kmd Regu dan Prajurit ditetapkan oleh Kmd Brigade.
PASAL 30

Setiap pejabat Gubernur Militer, Kepala Staf Pertahanan Total, Kepala Staf Pertahanan Pemerintahan Militer, Sekertaris Propinsi, Kepala Polisi Negara, Ko Wherkreise, Kepala-kepala Staf Wherkreise, Ko Sub Wherkreise, Ko Sub Wherkreise ditetapkan oleh KPK Presiden RII.

PASAL 31

Setiap Kepala Jawatan Propinsi/Wherkreise, Sekertaris Wherkreise ditetapkan oleh masing-masing Kepala Perwakilan Kementerian RII yang bersangkutan pada Perwakilan Kabinet Presiden RII

PASAL 32


PASAL 33

Semua pegawai-pegawai jawatan dan tenaga-tenaga pembantu dalam jawatan tingkatan Propinsi kebawah ditetapkan oleh Kepala Jawatan yang bersangkutan di Propinsi.

PASAL 34

Semua pegawai-pegawai bawahan/tenaga-tenaga pembantu dalam staf pemerintahan Militer tingkat Wherkreise kebawah selain yang tersebut dalam PASAL 33 tersebut diatas ditetapkan oleh Ko Wherkreise.

PASAL 35

1. Mutasi/penetapan untuk pejabat-pejabat Militer dilaksanakan oleh masing-masing yang berhak memberi penetapan atasnya.
2. Dalam keadaan mendadak Ko. Brigade/Wherkreise dapat mengangkat pejabat sementara dalam lingkungan Brigade/Wherkreise dapat mengangkat pejabat sementara dalam lingkungan Brigade/Wherkreise sambil menunggu mutasi/penetapan pemecahan resmi untuk itu dari yang berwajib.
3. Pemecatan/pemindahan dalam lingkungan instansi pemerintahan Militer dilaksanakan oleh yang berwajib/berhak menetapkannya.
4. Pemindahan dari satu instansi ke lain instansi untuk propinsi keatas dilaksanakan oleh KPK Dalam Negeri, dan untuk Propinsi ke bawah, dilaksanakan oleh Jawatan Kepegawaian Propinsi.

BAB VII

TENTANG HUKUM DISIPLIN

PASAL 36
Setiap anggota tentara, polisi, GII, pemerintah demikian pula rakyat yang merintangi, melanggar, membantah dan menentang segala perintah peraturan dan penetapan yang dikeluarkan oleh Dewan Pemerintahan Militer Territorium/Perwakilan Kabinet Presiden RII, Gubernur Militer, dan Kmd Wherkreise dijatuhi hukum bugat (pemberontak) boleh dibunuh.

PASAL 37

Setiap anggota tentara, polisi, GII, pemerintah demikian pula rakyat yang mengadakan kontak (hubungan) dengan musuh secara tidak syah, kepadanya di cap penghianat/bugat dituntut hukum bunuh.

PASAL 38

Yang dipandang syah masuk kota-kota tempat musuh menjalankan dinas revolusi yang tersebut dalam BAB VII PASAL 37 diatas hanyalah tenaga S.S.; BRN.; dan Pos-Kota: kurir keluar daerah/keluar negeri dan tenaga-tenaga pedagang revolusioner.

PASAL 39

1. Setiap anggota tentara, polisi, GII, Pemerintah, demikian pula rakyat yang meninggalkan kesatuan/pemerintahannya tidak dengan izin, wajib ditangkap dan dituntut dalam pengadilan.
2. Setiap anggota revolusi yang membuat perghasutan yang mengakibatkan kekacauan dalam organisasi revolusi, maka kepadanya wajib ditangkap dan dimasukkan kedalam “War Camps” dan kalau melawan/memberontak wajib diperangi (dibunuh).
3. Setiap anggota tentara terkecuali yang merangkap jabatan pemerintahan tidak boleh mencampuri urusan-urusan pemerintahan.

PASAL 40

Setiap laporan yang bertendensi pelanggaran politik dan criminal wajib dipertanggungjawabkan dengan ganti sangsi.

BAB VIII

TENTANG KESEJAHTERAAN SOSIAL

PASAL 41

1. Semua janda syuhada/musihab dan anak yatim (korban revolusi) wajib ditanggung oleh Jawatan sosial setempat.
2. Setiap penanggung jawab revolusi (KPMD, dan SWK/Batalyon ke atas wajib menerima, (3) orang anak yatim yang diserahkan oleh Jawatan Sosial setempat atas dirinya.
3. Janda syuhada/anak yatim yang dimaksud dalam ayat 1 di atas, dapat dipertanggung jawabkan kepada muhrimnya yang berkesanggupan untuk memelihara dan menanggung beban hidupnya.

363
5. Setiap penanggung jawab yang menolak atau mengabaikan janda-janda syuhada/musibah dan anak yatim yang dipertanggung jawabkan kepada diperbolehkan dipecah dari jabatannya, dan ditutup selaku penghianat.
6. Setiap janda-janda syuhada/musibah dan anak yatim yang tidak mau/menolak untuk ditanggung/dipertanggung jawabkan dapat dipaksa dan atau dimasukkan kedalam "Camp Interneor".

PASAL 42
Setiap Impaliden (korban revolusi) wajib ditanggung oleh jawatan sosial setempat untuk dipertanggung jawabkan kepada penanggung jawab staf SWK/Batalyon keatas dan diberikan jaminan hidup yang agak istimewa (dari fonds negara yang khusus untuk itu).

PASAL 43
Setiap Muhajirin wajib ditanggung di daerah PMD oleh jawatan sosial setempat untuk diberikan/diatur tempat peningkatan keamanan, dan jaminan hidupnya untuk waktu sepeletunya.

BAB IX
BEBERAPA KETERTIBAN HUKUM PERKAWINAN DAN KETERTIBAN PERGAULAN

PASAL 44
Barang siapa melanggar ajaran Islam mengenai pergaulan berumiah tangga dan pergaulan antara laki-laki dan wanita, dituntut dimuka hakim.

PASAL 45
Setiap orang yang anti poligami wajib dituntut dimuka hakim.

PASAL 46
1. Setiap lamaran wajib diterima, kecuali dengan alasan:
   a. Karena dibawah umur 15 tahun.
   b. Karena impotent
   c. Karena berpenyakit menular
   d. Karena berbudhi pekerti/berakhlak rendah.
2. Barang siapa yang menolak lamaran tanpa alasan tersebut di atas, harus ditawan.

PASAL 47
1. Maximum uang mahar Rp.125,-(seratus dua puluh lima rupiah)
3. Dilarang melaksanakan waktu lebih dari satu hari untuk pelaksanaan walimah perkawinan.
4. Barang siapa melanggar ketentuan ayat (1), (2), dan (3) di atas dapat dihukum Bab VII PASAL 36

PASAL 48

Barang siapa membuat perceraian tanpa alasan hukum dan atau yang menggantungkan isterinya, dan wanita yang memboikot suaminya, maka dituntut dan dihukum menurut Bab VII PASAL 36.

BAB X

TENTANG CARA HIDUP DAN HAK MILIK MUJAHIDIN DAN KELUARGANYA DALAM PROSES REVOLUSI

PASAL 49

Segenap pejuang Islam revolusioner (tidak diberikan antara atasan dan bawahan) selama dalam proses revolusi tidak dibolehkan:
1. Membeli dan memiliki binatang ternak diluar urusan dan pertanggungan jawab Organisasi revolusi.
2. Membeli dan atau memiliki tanah penghasilan berupa ordemening sawah, kebun, ladang, dan tebat yang bukan usaha tetesan keringatnya sendiri dan bukan urusan pertanggungan jawab revolusi.

PASAL 50

Segenap pejuang Islam revolusioner (tidak diberikan antara atasan dan bawahan) selama dalam proses revolusi diwajibkan mengatur cara hidup sesuai dengan ketentuan-ketentuan revolusi Batin jilid I, dengan ketentuan itu maka segenap pejuang Islam revolusioner (termasuk keluarga-keluarganya yaitu: anak, isteri, ibu, bapak, ipar, kemenakan dari saudara kandung) tidak dibolehkan:
1. Memakai atau menyimpan perhiasan seperti: emas, intan berlian, kaca mata reyben.
2. Memakai pakaian serba lux seperti kain wool, sutsuita, kain mengkilat, kain bulu macan, dan kain yang tipis.
3. Memakai segala macam pomade, lipstik, face powder (kecuali untuk kesehatan).

PASAL 51

Kepada siapa yang melanggar ketentuan tersebut diatas, dalam PASAL 49 dan 50 kepadanya akan diambil tindakan tegas revolusioner dan tegas revolusi berhak menyita segala barang tersebut.
PASAL 52

Sesuatu macam barang yang dinyatakan dalam PASAL 49 dan 50 yang ada dalam lingkungan pejuang dan keluarga pejuang Islam revolusioner akan diatur dalam organisasi revolusi dengan jalan:

1. Sesuatu macam barang yang sah milik perseorangan sebelum revolusi akan dipinjam atau dibeli oleh organisasi revolusi.

2. Sesuatu macam barang yang dibeli, digadai atau diterima selaku hadiah oleh seseorang keluarga pejuang Islam Revolusioner dari seseorang (dalam masa revolusi) akan dipinjam atau dibeli oleh organisasi revolusi.


BAB XI

DAN LAIN-LAIN

PASAL 53

Segala PASAL-PASAL yang tercantum dalam piagam ini yang di ikrarkan bersama, barulah dapat dirubah sesudah melalui musyawarah pada penanggung jawab piagam ini.

PASAL 54

Lembaran ikrar bersama ini, resmi dinamakan : “Piagam Makalua”.

PASAL 55

Segala hal yang tidak dinyatakan dalam Piagam ini, dipercayakan sepenuhnya kepada Menteri Pertahanan Muda (1) RII selaku KPK Presiden RII atas merencanakan bersama dengan Dewan Perwakilan Kabinet Presiden RII untuk megatur dan menjelaskan segala sesuatu atas itu.

PASAL 56

Piagam Makalua ini berlaku mulai pada tanggal 1 Rajab 1376.

Dibuat di : Makalua
Pada tanggal : 1 Rajab 1376 H.
Appendix VII: Revolutionary Islamic Political Program

Bismillahir Rahmanir Rahim

PERATURAN DARURAT No. 4/PD/75

TENTANG

PROGRAM POLITIK ISLAM REVOLUSIONER

BERDASARKAN HUKUM ISLAM

MENGINGAT dan MENIMBANG:

1. Tanggung jawab pimpinan Revolusi Islam disuruh dan permukaan bumi Indonesia dan di Indonesia Bahagian Timur khusus untuk menjamin berlakunya Syariat Islam.

DENGAN PERSETUJUAN SIDANG KONFERENSI KE II PEJUANG ISLAM REVOLUSIONER SEWILAYAH INDONESIA BHG. TIMUR PADA TANGGAL “2 RABIUL AKHIR 75”

MEMUTUSKAN

Menetapkan peraturan Darurat No. 34/PD/75 tahun 1375 yang memuat Pasal satu-
satunya yaitu:

MEMBERI DORONGAN DAN BANTUAN SERTA KEPERCAYAAN PENUH KEPADA MENTERI PERTAHANAN MUDA I MERANGKAP GUBERNUR SULAWESI DAN PANGLIMA “DIVISI HASANUDDIN” DALAM USAHA MENJAMIN BERLAKUNYA SYARIAT ISLAM DENGAN JALAN MELAKSANAKAN “PROGRAM POLITIK ISLAM REVOLUSIONER” yaitu:

1. Menggalang persatuan Ummat Islam.
3. Bertegas dan menentang dan memerangi segala macam partai.
4. Bertegas Menolak pengaruh Mazhab dalam Islam dan segala macam partai.
5. Bertegas menolak tuntutan persamaan hak (emansipasi ala barat) antara laki-laki dan wanita dalam Islam.
6. Bersikap tegas dalam usaha membangkitkan semangat jihad (berkorban dan hijrah), semangat bekerja untuk menolong diri sendiri; dan semangat belajar dikalangan Pejuang Islam Revolusioner.
7. Bersikap tegas dalam usaha melaksanakan Pedoman Bekerja Revolusioner yaitu:
   a. Melantik dan membebaskan atau memecat pejabat-pejabat penggerak Revolusi (sesuai kesanggupan, jasa, dan kesalahan pelanggarannya).
   b. Memberantas korupsi, lintah darat, dan parasite masyarakat.
8. Menjamin kesejahteraan sosial masyarakat Revolusi, keluaraga revolusi.
10. Menjamin berlakunya syariat Islam.

Ditetapkan dimuka Konferensi ke (II)
Pejuang Islam Revolusioner Se Wilayah
Indonesia Bhg. Timur, pada tanggal 2 Rabiul Akhir 1375.

MENTERI PERTAHANAN MUDA (I) RII

ttd

(Abd. Qahar Muzakkar)
Appendix VIII: Decision of PUPIR II

PUTUSAN PERTEMUAN PENTING
PEJUANG ISLAM REVOLUTIONER (II)
SEWILAYAH INDONESIA BAHAGIAN TIMUR
PADA TANGGAL 7 sd 11 Dzulqaidah 1377 H

Sesudah mendengar penjelasan beberapa persoalan pokok yang dikemukakan oleh Pimpinan Organisasi Revolusi (Sdr. Abdul Kahar Muzakkar) dalam PUPIR (II) pada tanggal 7 sd 11 Dzulqaidah 1377 H, ditambah dengan pandangan/pendapat tenaga-tenaga Pimpinan dan Pelopor Revolusi Islam Indonesia Bahagian Timur tentang:

1. Counter Under Ground Movement
2. Limit & pledge of loyalty terhadap Pemerintah Pusat (dalam proses revolusi)
3. Rencana usaha memperkuat Pasukan-pasukan MOMOC
4. Rencana usaha memperkuat disiplin Pasukan-pasukan TII, PII, GII, Pemerintah, dan BARIS.
5. ABC perundingan dengan Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia (PRRI)
Maka segenap peserta PUPIR (II) yang berkompeten menetapkan dan mensahkan putusan-putusan dibawah ini:

I. PERIHAL ANTI GERILYA WAR-FARE

I. A. COUNTER UNDER GROUND MOVEMENT
1. Menggiatkan penyelidikan kedalam, meliputi:
   1.1 Pejabat/Pegawai yang dicurigai
   1.2 Ikatan famili/keluarga musibah
2. Menggiatkan penyelidikan terhadap segala orang penduduk Daerah, meliputi:
   2.1 Eks anggota partai-partai Kafir/Munafiq, pengasut tarekat dan berhala
   2.2 Nelayan
   2.3 Sel UGM musuh/penduduk Daerah yang berbuat serba mencurigakan.
3. Menggiatkan penyelidikan terhadap tenaga-tenaga selundupan dari luar Daerah, meliputi:
   3.1 Pedangang
   3.2 Wanita yang keluar-masuk Daerah
   3.3 Nelayan
4. Melakukan "raaion system" secara tertib dengan jalan:
   4.1 Mengadakan kartu anggota penduduk
   4.2 Setiap Kepala rumah tangga di seluruh perkampungan daerah de facto kita supaya diactiveve sebagai pembantu Pemerintah yang bertanggung jawab.
7. Memindahkan Pejabat-pejabat, Pegawaipegawai, dan orang-orang penduduk Kampung/desa-Daerah yang dicurigai, yang selalu dihubungkan/diberitahuakan pada BRN.
8. Kembali mengadakan garis pemiesah yang kuat, rapi, dan tegas.
10. Menjalankan sistem pendidikan tauhid ala tarekat yang dipelopori oleh Muballighin/Muballighat revolusi kita.
11. Mengadakan jam malam di seluruh perkampungan daerah de facto kita.
12. Memperkuat dan menyempurnakan BRN.
13. Menggiatkan pasukan patroli PII dan GII di waktu malam (mulai dari jam 18.30 malam sampai 05.30 pagi) di seluruh perkampungan-perkampungan Daerah de facto kita.
14. Menggiatkan BARIS dalam dinas penjagaan Keamanan Kampung-kampung Daerah de facto kita di waktu siang (mulai dari jam 06.00 sampai 17.30).
15. Sewaktu-waktu mengadakan “Konsentrasi Umum” secara “at the moment”.
16. Pendaftaran senjata api/alat peledak yang ada dalam tangan rakyat.

I. B. COUNTER ANTI GERILYA WAR-FARE
1. Mengharuskan kepada segenap Pimpinan/Pelopor Revolusi Islam Indonesia Bahagian Timur untuk suka mempelajari kembali “PEDOMAN PERANG GERILYA” buah tangan sdr. Abdul Kahar Muzakkar pada tahun 1953 lalu, bernama TOTAL PEOPLE DEFENCE.
2. Mewajibkan kepada segenap Pimpinan/Pelopor Revolusi Islam Indonesia Bahagian Timur untuk:
   2.1 Menjalankan Siasat perang Gerilya, dengan taktik “timbul tenggelam”, yaitu sewaktu-waktu timbul dan sewaktu-waktu pula tenggelam dalam garis Daerah pertempuran (front-line), dan dalam daerah basis pertahanan Gerilya kita.
   2.2 Menjalankan taktik “gerak cepat”, yaitu taktik imbangke kelemanaha kita dalam kelengkapan alat-alat perhubungan dan kondaran bermotor yang ada pada musuh dan tidak ada pada kita, dengan jalan mengatur gerakan kita dalam kelompok-kelompok kecil yang mudah bergerak cepat menghadapi, mengaca-balaukan, menghancurkan dan mengalahkan musuh yang berkekuatan lebih besar; serta menggagalkan rencana gerakan kekuatan besar musuh yang sedang bergerak maju ke dalam daerah basis pertahanan Gerilya kita.
   2.3 Menjalankan taktik “Moment Movement” (Gerakan Serentak Mendadak) dalam sesuatu gerakan-tindakan tegas dan tepat menurut waktu, keadaan dan tempat.
   2.4 Menjalankan taktik “Situation Movement” (Gerakan Keadaan Setempat/lokal), untuk sewaktu-waktu mengimbangi keadaan, kedudukan dan rencana gerakan musuh setempat.
   2.5 Setia menjalankan tugas tanggung jawab menduduki Lini-lini basis pertahanan Gerilya kita yang diatur dalam tiga lini, yaitu:
   a. Lini I diduduki oleh TII/MOMOC
   b. Lini II diduduki oleh PII/GII
   c. Lini III diduduki oleh BARIS/Rakyat
2.6 Berusaha memelihara dan mempertahankan tetap berlakunya Komandan Stsel dan yang berkala sekaran ini.
   Dan jika sukar oleh karena kemungkinan sewaktu-waktu perubahan keadaan diluar dugaan, maka di sepanjang garis daerah basis pertahanan Gerilya kita dalam tempo perubahan seketika itu juga menjelma menjadi “Medan Perang Gerilya”, dimana pihak kita di segala waktu dan tempat wajib selalu menjadi “Subjek” (Pelaku/Pemegang peranan).
3. Mewajibkan kepada segenap Pimpinan/Pelopor Revolusi Islam Indonesia Bahagian Timur, untuk:
3.1 Kembali sadar dan bersungguh hati, berusaha melaksanakan rencana UKR (Urusan Kemakmuran Rakyat) dua tahun ke dua tahun dan seterusnya.
3.2 Menyadari dan menjauhi segala pantangan jihad revolusioner (at the moment) yang digoreskan oleh sdr. Abdul Kahar Muzakkar di dalam Catatan Batin Pejuang Islam Revolusioner Jilid I.
3.3 Berusaha dengan sepenuh hati dan kesadaran menggunakan segala alat-kekuatan yang ada padanya untuk membasmi segala sifat dan tindakan kontra revolusioner yang ada bercokol dalam tubuh kalangan kita.

II. PERIHAL LIMIT & PLEDGE OG LOYALTY TERHADAP IMAM/PEMERINTAHAN PUSAT (SELAMA DALAM PROSES REVOLUSI)

Putusan satu-satunya adalah:

Berdasarkan usul-pandangan Panglima KW IV APNII/Divisi Hasanuddin (Kolonel Abdul Kahar Muzakkar) yang ditujukan kepada Imam/Panglima Tertinggi APNII tersebut dalam surat No. 099/A/PLM/DH/TH IV/76 pasal 7, berbunyi

Jika ternyata bahwa usul-pandangan saya tersebut dalam III. 1.a, 1.b, III. 2, dan III. 5 di atas tidak dapat tertampung dalam lubuk sanubari Panglima Tertinggi yang tercinta dan saya muliakan, serta tidak dapat diterima dan dimengerti baik oleh sdr. Kecintaan Tengku Muhammad Daud Beureuh yang saya muliakan, maka terakhir usul-pandangan saya dalam lembaran usul-pandangan ini, ialah SELAMA DALAM KEADAAN PERANG DAN DARURAT PERANG (REVOLUSI) SEBAIKNYA KITA SEPENDAPAT SAMA UNTUK MEMBEASKAN DIRI DARIPADA IKATAN KETATANEGARAAN YANG MENGIKAT DAN MEMBATASI LANGKAH TINDAKAN MASING-MASING SEHINGGA HUBUNGAN KEELUARGAAN DI ANTARA KITA HANYALAH BERLAKU DALAM HUBUNGAN ADMINISTRATIF- KENEGARAAN YANG TIDAK MENGIKAT/BEBAS ALA LIGA (League of state of the Islamic Indonesia).”

Dan demikian dengan surat balasan Imam/Panglima Tertinggi APNII dalam surat No. 2002-IXAA/KT/57 pasal 4.A, berbunyi:

Jadikanlah daerah tugas sdr., Sulawesi dan sekitarnya menjadi bagian daripada Negara Islam Indonesia, yang patut menjadi contoh dan tauladan bagi bagian-bagian negara lainnya.

Maka atas nama Pimpinan dan Pelopor Revolusi Islam Indonesia Bahagian Timur yang turut bertanda tangan dalam lembaran putusan ini, memberi dorongan dan kepercayaan penuh kepada Pimpinan Organisasi Revolusi Islam Indonesia Bahagian Timur (sdr. Abdul Kahar Muzakkar) beserta dengan anggota Perwakilan Kabinet Presiden RII lainnya untuk segera mengambil langkah bijaksana menjalankan kandungan-maksud usul pandangannya tersebut dalam surat No. 009/A/PLM/DH/TH.IV/76 pasal 7 di atas.

III. PERIHAL MOMOC
1. Menyetujui kedudukan MOMOC sebagai Pasukan Istimewa Ansharullah di samping Indonesia, yaitu Tentara Penolong Allah dan bukan Tentara Islam Indonesia; berpedoman hidup kepada Qur’an & Hadits Shahih, dan mempunyai hak istimewa bebas dari segala macam Peraturan Pemerintah (kecuali Peraturan dan Ikatan Pimpinan Militer); dan tetap terikat dalam verband APNII KWB Bahagian Timur.

2. Menetapkan syarat penerimaan anggota MOMOC, yaitu:
   2.1 Umumnya Pemuda dan orang yang mempunyai hanya satu isteri
   2.2 Berpendidikan Agama
   2.3 Mujahidin yang telah mengikuti gerakan bersenjata di Indonesia sejak tahun 1945
   2.4 Bagi mereka yang dapat meyakinkan dirinya tidak akan dipengaruhi oleh kehidupan dan kepengkatan dunia.

3. Menyetujui bahwa semua senjata otomatis-sedang dan senjata berat inventaris TII yang ada sekarang ini (berupa Water mental, 12, 7, Mortar 3 inch dan PIAT) yang ada dalam dislokasi Divisi Hasanuddin/KWSTTU dan Divisi 40.000/KWSS, diperliahkan menjadi inventaris MOMOC.

4. Menyetujui bahwa 5% (lima persen) dari pada senjata-api berupa Karabay, Stepgun, Own-gun, Madsen, Jungle-rille, segala macam Pistol dari segala Kaliber, dan senjata api “non automatic personal defence” lainnya yang ada dalam dislokasi Divisi Hasanuddin/KWSTTU dan Divisi 40.000/KWSS sekarang ini, diperliahkan menjadi inventaris MOMOC untuk menjadi kekuatan dasar persenjataan MOMOC. Peralihan mana harus berlaku dalam tempo selambat-lambatnya 2 (dua) bulan dari pada tanggal dan hari penetapan putusan ini.

5. Menyetujui bahwa Co MOMOC diberi hak istimewa untuk sewaktu-waktu menunjuk/menetapkan sesuatu daerah (KD. KDS DAN K.Dt) dalam dislokasi Divisi Hasanuddin/KWSTTU dan Divisi 40.000/KWSS, untuk menjadi daerah-konsentrasi dan atau Daerah Dislokasi tidak tetap MOMOC.


7. Menyetujui & menetapkan sdr. Abdul Kahar Muzakkar langsung memimpin MOMOC, dengan ketentuan:
   7.1 Diberi pengecualian istimewa untuk tidak menggauli/mengurus keempat istrinya yang ada sekarang (selama dalam tugas jihad MOMOC)
   7.2 Dibebaskan dari pada segala tugas dan tanggung jawabnya selaku KPK Presiden RII, Menteri Pertahanan muda I RII/Panglima Perang APNII KWB Bahagian Timur, dan Kepala BRN (selama tugas jihad MOMOC)
   7.3 Bahwa selama sdr. Abdul Kahar Muzakkar dalam tugas jihad MOMOC, maka dalam pada waktu inilah diwajibkan kepangannya belajar, untuk mempelajari segala vak-Pelajaran yang ada dipandang bsertial dan berguna untuk Revolusi dan Ummat Islam.

CATATAN PERINGATAN:

TUJUAN/DASAR POKOK IDE PEMBENTUKAN MOMOC ANSHARULLAH IALAH:
1. Bangkit menghadapi rencana 2 (dua) tahun Komunis
2. Membela/menegakkan segala peraturan Pemerintah yang telah ada
3. Membasmi jiwa Tauhid dalam rangka dada setiap anggota TII dalam proses rencana 2(dua) tahun Komunis
4. Membasmi jiwa benalu, jiwa masa bodoh dan jiwa kaum Nabi Musa yang ada dalam lingkungan kita

IV. PERIHAL RENCANA USAHA MEMPERKUAT DISIPLIN PASUKAN-PASUKAN TII, PII, GII, BARIS, DAN PEMERINTAH

1. Mendesak dan mendorong kepada Panglima Perang APNRII KWB BAG TIMUR untuk segera mengadakan “Training Centre” dengan jalan membentuk 2 (dua) Depot Brigade TII (yaitu satu meliputi dislokasi Divisi Hasanuddin/KWSTTU dan satu lainnya meliputi dislokasi Divisi 40.000), langsung di bawah Pimpinan/Pemeliharaan PSAD.
2. Semua tamtaman dari Depot Brigade TII akan disalurkan pada satuan-satuan Militer, sesuai keadaannya atas persetujuan bersama antara pengasuh Depot Brigade TII, Panglima Divisi dan KPSAD APNRII.
3. Menyetujui untuk mengambil tindakan keras dan tegas kepada siapapun yang melanggar setiap Peraturan Pemerintah Islam, melanggar Hukum Pergaulan Islam, dan melanggar Hukum Disiplin TII.
4. Menyetujui untuk mengambil tindakan keras dan tegas kepada siapapun anggota Pemerintah yang melalaikan dan menghianati tugas-tugas yang diamanahkan kepadanya.

5. V. PERIHAL PERUNDINGAN DENGAN PEMERINTAH REVOLUTIONER REPUBLIK INDONESIA (PRRI)

5. Untuk perundingan lebih jauh dengan delegasi PRRI, disesuaikan dengan kesediaan pihak Pangerang dan Jusuf cs.
VI. DAN LAIN-LAIN

1. Menyetujui bahwa berlaku dalam waktu yang tidak ditentukan maka tugas kewajiban PSAL (Perwakilan Staf Angkatan Laut) dipasifik, sedang Pejabat KPSAL Insya Allah akan diaktifkan memimpin Depot Brigade dalam dislokasi Divisi 40.000.

2. Perkawinan dengan anak di bawah umur, terlarang menurut Piagam Makalua tersebut dalam Bab IX Pasal 46 ayat 1 sub a.


4. Konsep Struktur Perwakilan Menteri Negara dan PK Keuangan akan dibicarakan dalam Sidang PKP RII VI.


6. Menyetujui memperkuat berlakunya jilbab, sesuai dengan Penetapan yang telah dikeluarkan oleh KPK Penerangan RII bernomor : 009/A/PK Pn/RII/TH III/77

Dibuat di : Medan Jihad
Pada Tanggal : 11 Dzulqaidah 1377 H
RUMUSAN HASIL DIALOG TERBUKA
PENEGAKAN SYARIAT ISLAM DI SULSEL
Di Hotel Berlian Bosowa Makassar, Tanggal 28 Mei 2000

NARASUMBER :
1. Tuan Guru Haji Abd. Hadi Bin Haji Awang (Menteri Besar Negara Bagian Terengganu/ Timbalan Presiden Partai PAS Malaysia)
2. Prof. Dr. H.A. Mattulada (Guru Besar Antropologi Unhas)
3. Prof. Dr. Ahmad Ali, SH, MH (Dekan Fak. Hukum Unhas)
4. Prof. Dr. Abdurahman A. Basalamah (Ketua Yayasan Badan Wakaf UMI)
5. H. M. Hussein Umar (Sekjen Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia Pusat)

1. Islam tidak dapat dipisahkan dengan politik dan persoalan kenegaraan lainnya. Syariat Islam tidak membedakan antara yang bersifat individu dan yang berdimensi kemasyarakatan. Oleh karenanya syariat Islam harus dilaksanakan secara menyeluruh (kaaffah), dalam seluruh aspek kehidupan.


7. Rendahnya pengetahuan keislaman masyarakat tidak perlu menjadi alasan untuk tidak atau menunda pelaksanaan syariat Islam. Untuk melaksanakan hukum positif (Belandia) juga tidak meminta kesiapan masyarakat untuk menerimanya. Masyarakat yang pendidikannya rendah cenderung paternalistik dan menyerahkan nasibnya kepada elite politik.


Appendix X: First Congress Recommendations

REKOMENDASI KONGRES I UMAT ISLAM

Kongres ummat Islam Sulawesi Selatan berketetapan untuk menegakkan Syariat Islam sebagaimana tertuang dalam butir-butir rekomendasi di bawah ini:

A. Internal

1. Ummat Islam Sulawesi Selatan diwajibkan menegakkan Syari’at Islam dalam kehidupan pribadi, keluarga dan masyarakat, sehingga tercipta kehidupan yang adil, aman dan sejahtera yang diridhai oleh Allah SWT.

2. Ummat Islam Sulawesi Selatan diwajibkan memperjuangkan tegaknya Syari’at Islam dengan konsisten secara aspiratif-konstitusional.

3. Para da’i dan ulama wajib mendakwakan tegaknya Syari’at Islam di Sulawesi Selatan kepada seluruh lapisan masyarakat Islam dan di manapun dengan tetap memelihara kesatuan Ummat (ukhuwah Islamiah) tanpa mempertentangkan perbedaan mazhab.


5. Mendesak seluruh lembaga pendidikan untuk menciptakan kondisi yang kondusif bagi penegakan Syari’at Islam.


B. External

1. Pemerintah dan seluruh instrument lembaga kenegaraan yang bewenang harus memberikan legalisasi terhadap hak Ummat Islam Sulawesi Selatan untuk menegakkan Syari’at agamanya.


3. Mendesak DPR RI untuk segera membuat dan mengajukan Rancangan Undang Undang (RUU) tentang otonomi khusus pemberlakuan Syari’at Islam di Sulawesi Selatan kepada pemerintah, begitu pula sebaliknya.

4. Berdasarkan kepada tuntutan pada point 3 di atas, maka apabila dalam jangka waktu satu tahun sejak rekomendasi ini diajukan, pemerintah dan DPR RI tidak menerima tuntutan tersebut, maka Ummat Islam Sulawesi Selatan akan mengadakan referendum untuk merdeka.


7. Mendesak pemerintah agar segera menghentikan dan mencabut kebijakan perizinan dan menutup peluang terjadinya kemaksiatan (miras, narkoba, perjudian, pornografi dan prostitusi) dna hal-hal yang bersifat destruktif lainnya.
8. Mengutuk dan mengecam keras aksi brutal dan tindakan sewenang-wenang bangsa Zionis Israel dan sikap ganda (double standard) Amerika Serikat dalam konflik Zionis Israel dengan Muslim Palestina.


10. Mendesak pemerintah dan Komnas HAM untuk segera menyelesaikan secara tuntas berbagai tragedy kemanusiaan yang menimpa ummat Islam, baik di masa lalu maupun yang sedang berlangsung.
DEKLARASI
MAKASSAR

Muqaddimah
Bahkan Penegakkan Syari'at Islam di bumi Allah Swt, yang metujuk kepada Al-
Quran dan As-Sunnah adalah kewajiban seluruh Ummat Islam di mana dia
berada.

Oleh sebab itu, maka seluruh usaha yang berkenaan untuk Penegakan Syari'at
harus dilakukan sesegera mungkin karena telah sesuai dengan situasi dan kondisi.

Perjuangan Ummat Islam di seluruh Indonesia telah sampai pada tahap untuk
menyatakan pemberlakan Syari'at Islam dalam wilayah Negara Republik
Indonesia.

Dengan mengharap Ridha dan Rahmat Allah Swt, maka peserta Kongres Ummat
Islam Sulawesi Selatan menyatakan Deklarasi Ummat Islam Sulawesi Selatan yang
diberi nama "Deklarasi Makassar".

DEKLARASI

Kami Ummat Islam Sulawesi Selatan melalui Kongres Ummat Islam dengan menyebut Asma
Allah Yang Maha Suci menyatakan bahwa Ummat Islam telah siap menegakkan Syari'at Islam
di wilayah Sulawesi Selatan. Hal-hal mengenai mekanisme pemberlakan Syari'at Islam akan
diusahakan dalam waktu yang secepat mungkin dan dengan cara konstitusional.

Makassar, 23 Rajab 1421 H/21 Oktober 2000

Atas Nama Ummat Islam Sulawesi Selatan

Ttd

Peserta Kongres
20 Oktober 2000 M
Makassar, 22 Rajab 1421 H

Arena Konferes Ummat Islam Sulawesi Selatan

Menyadari bahawa upaya penegakan Syari'at Islam di Sulawesi Selatan, memerlukan bantuan yang memadai. Untuk itu, kami menyatakan bahwa

Merujuk kepadanya, Al Qur'an dan As-Sunnah, penegakan Syari'at Islam

MEMORANDUM

SYARI'AT ISLAM
Appendix XIII: Ikrar

IKRAR BERSAMA AKTIVIS/PENGURUS
KOMITE PERSIAPAN PENEGAKAN SYARIAT ISLAM
SE-SULAWESI SELATAN

BISMILAHIR RAHMANIR RAHIM

Saya bersaksi bahwa tiada tuhan selain Allah
Dan saya bersaksi bahwa Muhammad adalah utusan Allah

Aku tidha Allah Tuhanku, Islam Agamaku,
dan Muhammad SAW adalah Nabi dan Rasul Allah.

Insyaf akan tanggung jawab sebagai umat Islam, bahwa syariat Islam adalah kewajiban azasi yang harus dan mutlak segera diwujudkan dalam segala aspek kehidupan.

Olehnya itu, kami selaku aktivis/pengurus KPPSI se-Sulawesi Selatan dengan penuh kesadaran bersendikan keikhlasan dan kesungguhan yang senantiasa mengharapkan pertolongan Allah SWT menyatakan IKRAR bahwa:

1. Senantiasa memperjuangkan penegakan syariat Islam berdasarkan Al-Qur'an dan As-Sunnah dalam setiap aspek kehidupan, baik secara pribadi, keluarga, masyarakat, bangsa dan negara.

2. Senantiasa mengutamakan perjuangan penegakan syariat Islam diatas segala kepentingan pribadi dan golongan, demi mencapai keridhoan Allah SWT semata.


5. Senantiasa berjihad dengan penuh konsentrasi dalam perjuangan penegakan syariat Islam, khususnya untuk memperoleh otonomi khusus di Sulawesi Selatan secara konstitusional, demokratis dan tetap dalam bingkai Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia sesuai amanah Kongres Ummat Islam se-Sulawesi Selatan.

Sesungguhnya shalatku, perjuanganaku, hidup dan matiku hanya kepada Allah serta sekitarilah alam.

Demikian IKRAR ini kami nyatakan, semoga Allah SWT meridhoi dan merahmati perjuangan ini. AMIN YAA RABBAL ALAMIN.

Makassar, 21 Muharram 1422 H/15 April 2001 M.

KAMI ATAS NAMA AKTIVIS/PENGURUS
KPPSI SE-SULAWESI SELATAN.
Appendix XIV: Muharram Declaration

DEKLARASI MUHARRAM
KOMITE PERSIAPAN PENEGAKAN SYARIAT ISLAM
SE SULAWESI SELATAN

Bismillahir Rahmanir Rahim.

Bahwa sesungguhnya tuntutan penegakan syariat Islam di Indonesia, khususnya di Sulawesi Selatan adalah merupakan hak azasi keimanan umat Islam, yang sepatutnya dapat dipenuhi secara konstitusional oleh pemerintah.

Oleh karena itu berdasarkan tuntutan aspirasi penegakan syariat Islam tersebut, maka kami selaku pengembang amanah Kongres Umat Islam Sulawesi Selatan, yang saat ini tergabung dalam Majelis Syuro dan Lajnah Tanfidzriyah KPPSI Kabupaten/Kota se Sulawesi Selatan, Mendeklarasikan hal-hal sebagai berikut:


3. Kepada Pemerintah, DPR-RI dan elit politik, agar tidak mengabaikan tuntutan aspirasi perjuangan penegakan syariat Islam di Sulawesi Selatan yang dikenal sebagai Serambi Madinah, karena mengabaikan dapat menimbulkan persoalan baru bagi Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia yang kita kita cintai.


5. Seandainya ada pihak yang tidak sepandang terhadap tuntutan penegakan syariat Islam bagi umat Islam di Indonesia dan Sulawesi Selatan pada khususnya, adaah merupakan hak dan kewajiban umat Islam yang harus dihargai dan sepatutnya dipahami secara demokratis.

Demikian DEKLARASI ini kami nyatakan, yang kemudian disebut sebagai DEKLARASI MUHARRAM AL MARKAZ AL ISLAMI KPPSI se Sulawesi Selatan.

*Inna shalati wanusuki wa mahyaya wa mamati illahi rabbil alamin
Sesungguhnya shalatku, Perjuanganku, Hidup dan Matiku
hanya kepada Allah seru sakalian alam.

Nasrul minal Allah wa fathun qarib'e
La haula wa la quwwata illah billah

Makassar, 21 Muharram 1422 H/15 April 2001 M

KAMI ATAS NAMA AKTIVIS/PENGURUS KPPSI SE SULAWESI SELATAN

381
Pimpinan Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah bersama Ketua Fraksi-fraksi DPRD Propinsi Sulawesi Selatan dalam Rapat Konsultasi yang diadakan pada hari Senin tanggal 23 April 2001, setelah mempefajari dan mempertimbangkan hal-hal sebagai berikut:

1. Aspirasi masyarakat yang disampaikan oleh Komite Persiapan Penegakan Syariat Islam (KPPSI) Propinsi Sulawesi Selatan, masing-masing:

2. Bahwa kewenangan bidang Agama sesuai Undang-undang No. 22 tahun 1999 tentang Pemerintahan Daerah adalah Kewenangan Pemerintah Pusat dan tidak diserahkan menjadi kewenangan Daerah Otonom.


Demikian Rekomendasi ini dibuat untuk dimaklumi sebagaimana mestinya.

Makassar, 23 April 2001

PIMPINAN DEWAN PERWAKILAN RAKYAT DAERAH PROPINSI SULAWESI SELATAN

[Signatures and names of officials]

383
Appendix XVI: Proposed Legislation Draft for Special Autonomy

DEWAN PERWAKILAN RAKYAT
REPUKLIK INDONESIA

RANCANGAN
UNDANG-UNDANG REPUBLIK INDONESIA
NOMOR TAHUN 2002

TENTANG
OTONOMI KHUSUS
PEMBERLAKUAN SYARI'AT ISLAM
BAGI PROPINSI SULAWESI SELATAN

DENGAN RAHMAT ALLAH YANG MAHA KUASA
PRESIDEN REPUBLIK INDONESIA

Menimbang:

a. bahwa Undang-undang Dasar 1945 mengakui, mengormati dan melindungi setiap pemeluk Agama untuk menjalankan Agamanya masing-masing baik dalam kehidupan bermasyarakat, berbangsa dan bernegara;

b. bahwa Pemerintah Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia memurut Undang-undang Dasar 1945 mengakui dan mengormati satuan-satuan Pemerintah Daerah yang bersifat Khusus dan atau bersifat Istimewa yang diatur dengan Undang-undang;

c. bahwa kehidupan beragama bagi masyarakat Sulawesi Selatan merupakan system nilai dan sebagai bagian dari pada kehidupan berdemokrasi berbangsa dan bernegara;

d. bahwa semangat kehidupan relegius (Kehidupan Islami) masyarakat Sulawesi Selatan untuk melaksanakan Hukum-hukum Islam dalam semua urusan kenegaraan atau pemerintahan Propinsi Sulawesi Selatan merupakan suatu kehidupan yang dijamin oleh Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia;

e. bahwa untuk Penyelenggaraan Pemerintah Daerah yang memerlukan adanya jaminan kepastian hukum dalam melaksanakan segala urusan dan hal-hal yang termaktub pada huruf a, b, c dan d diatas, maka perlu ditetapkan Undang-undang untuk pemberian Otonomi Khusus pelaksanaan Syari'at Islam bagi Propinsi Sulawesi Selatan.

Mengingat:

1. Pasal 1 ayat (1), Pasal 5 ayat (1), Pasal 18 dan Pasal 18 B ayat (1), Pasal 20 ayat (1) dan Pasal 29 Undang-undang Dasar 1945;
2. Ketetapan MPR-RI No.IV/MPR/1999 tentang Garis-garis Besar Haluan Negara;
4. Ketetapan MPR Nomor VI/MPR/2001 Bab I Pasal 1 huruf c tentang Etika Kehidupan Berbangsa;
5. Undang-undang Nomor 28 Tentang KKN;
6. Undang-undang Nomor 22 Tentang Kepolisian;

384
7. Undang-undang Nomor 47 Prp Tahun 1960 Tentang Pembentukan Daerah Tingkat I Sulawesi Selatan-Tenggara (Lembaran Negara Tahun 1964 Nomor 7) menjadi Undang-undang, terakhir dengan Undang-undang Nomor 2 Tahun 1964 tentang Pembentukan Daerah Tingkat I Sulawesi Selatan (Lembaran Negara Tahun 1964 Nomor 7);
8. Undang-undang Nomor 22 Tahun 1999 tentang Pemerintahan Daerah (Lembaran Negara Tahun 1999 Nomor 60, tambahan Lembaran Negara Nomor 3839);
9. Undang-undang Nomor 25 Tahun 1999 tentang Perimbangan keuangan antara Pemerintah Pusat dan Daerah (Lembaran Negara Tahun 1999 Nomor 72, tambahan Lembaran Negara Nomor 3848);
10. Undang-undang Nomor 14 Tahun 1970 tentang Ketentuan-ketentuan Pokok Kekuasaan Kehakiman (Lembaran Negara Tahun 1970 Nomor 74, Tambahan Lembaran Negara Nomor 2951);
Appendix XVI: Proposed Legislation Draft for Special Autonomy

DEWAN PERWAKILAN RAKYAT
REPUlik INDONESIA

RANCANGAN
UNDANG-UNDANG REPUBLIK INDONESIA
NOMOR TAHUN 2002

TENTANG
OTONOMI KHUSUS
PEMBERLAKUAN SYAR'IAT ISLAM
BAGI PROPINSI SULAWESI SELATAN

DENGAN RAHMAT ALLAH YANG MAHA KUASA
PRESIDEN REPUBLIK INDONESIA

Menimbang:

a. bahwa Undang-undang Dasar 1945 mengakui, mengormati dan melindungi setiap pemeluk Agama untuk menjalankan Agamanya masing-masing baik dalam kehidupan bermasyarakat, berbangsa dan bernegara;
b. bahwa Pemerintah Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia menurut Undang-undang Dasar 1945 mengakui dan mengormati satuan-satuan Pemerintah Daerah yang bersifat Khusus dan atau bersifat Istimewa yang diatur dengan Undang-undang;
c. bahwa kehidupan beragama bagi masyarakat Sulawesi Selatan merupakan system nilai dan sebagai bagian dari pada kehidupan berdemokrasi berbangsa dan bernegara;
d. bahwa semangat kehidupan relegius (Kehidupan Islami) masyarakat Sulawesi Selatan untuk melaksanakan Hukum-hukum Islam dalam semua urusan kenegaraan atau pemerintahan Propinsi Sulawesi Selatan merupakan suatu kehidupan yang dijamin oleh Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia;
e. bahwa untuk Penyelenggaraan Pemerintah Daerah yang memerlukan adanya jaminan kepastian hukum dalam melaksanakan segala urusan dan hal-hal yang termaktub pada huruf a, b, c dan d diatas, maka perlu ditetapkan Undang-undang untuk pemberian Otonomi Khusus pelaksanaan Syari’at Islam bagi Propinsi Sulawesi Selatan.

Mengingat:

1. Pasal 1 ayat (1), Pasal 5 ayat (1), Pasal 18 dan Pasal 18 B ayat (1), Pasal 20 ayat (1) dan Pasal 29 Undang-undang Dasar 1945;
2. Ketetapan MPR-RI No.IV/MPR/1999 tentang Garis-garis Besar Haluan Negara;
4. Ketetapan MPR Nomor VI/MPR/2001 Bab I Pasal 1 huruf c tentang Etika Kehidupan Berbangsa;
5. Undang-undang Nomor 28 Tentang KKN;
6. Undang-undang Nomor 22 Tentang Kepolisian;

384
7. Undang-undang Nomor 47 Prp Tahun 1960 Tentang Pembentukan Daerah Tingkat I Sulawesi Selatan-Tenggara (Lembaran Negara Tahun 1964 Nomor 7) menjadi Undang-undang, terakhir dengan Undang-undang Nomor 2 Tahun 1964 tentang Pembentukan Daerah Tingkat I Sulawesi Selatan (Lembaran Negara Tahun 1964 Nomor 7);

8. Undang-undang Nomor 22 Tahun 1999 tentang Pemerintahan Daerah (Lembaran Negara Tahun 1999 Nomor 60, tambahan Lembaran Negara Nomor 3839);

9. Undang-undang Nomor 25 Tahun 1999 tentang Perimbangan keuangan antara Pemerintah Pusat dan Daerah (Lembaran Negara Tahun 1999 Nomor 72, tambahan Lembaran Negara Nomor 3848);

10. Undang-undang Nomor 14 Tahun 1970 tentang Ketentuan-ketentuan Pokok Kekuasaan Kehakiman (Lembaran Negara Tahun 1970 Nomor 74, Tambahan Lembaran Negara Nomor 2951);

Dengan Persetujuan Bersama

DEWAN PERWAKILAN RAKYAT REPUBLIK INDONESIA DAN
PRESIDEN REPUBLIK INDONESIA

MEMUTUSKAN:

Menetapkan: UNDANG-UNDANG OTONOMI KHUSUS PEMBERLAKUAN
SYARI’AT ISLAM BAGI PROINSI SULAWESI SELATAN.

BAB I

KETENTUAN UMUM

Pasal 1

Dalam Undang-undang ini yang dimaksud dengan:

a. Pemerintah pusat, selanjutnya disebut pemerintah, adalah perangkat negara kesatuan
   Republik Indonesia yang terdiri atas Presiden berserta para Menteri;

b. Pemerintah Propinsi Sulawesi Selatan adalah Gubernur berserta perangkat lain
   Pemerintah sebagai badan eksekutif Propinsi Sulawesi Selatan;

c. Propinsi Sulawesi Selatan adalah Propinsi Daerah Sulawesi Selatan yang diberi
   otonomi khusus untuk pelaksanaan Syari’at Islam dalam kerangka Negara Kesatuan
   Republik Indonesia;

d. Otonomi Khusus adalah kewenangan untuk mengatur, mengurus dan
   menyelenggarakan kehidupan bermasyarakat, berbangsa bernegara berdasarkan ajaran
   Syari’at Islam yang khusus berlaku di Propinsi Sulawesi Selatan;

e. Syari’at Islam adalah tuntutan ajaran Islam dalam semua aspek hidup dan kehidupan;

f. Dewan Ulama adalah Lembaga Independen yang berfungsi memberi pertimbangan
   berupa fatwa atau nasihat baik secara tertulis maupun lisan yang digunakan dalam
   penetapan kebijakan Pemerintah Propinsi Sulawesi Selatan;

g. Gubernur Propinsi Sulawesi Selatan adalah Gubernur propinsi daerah otonomi khusus
   Sulawesi Selatan, sebagai badan eksekutif propinsi otonomi khusus Sulawesi Selatan;

h. Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah selanjutnya disebut DPRD adalah Badan Legislatif
   Daerah Propinsi Otonomi Khusus Sulawesi Selatan, yang dipilih melalui Pemilihan
   Umum;

i. Mahkamah Syari’ah Propinsi otonomi Khusus Sulawesi Selatan adalah lembaga
   peradilan berdasarkan Syari’at Islam dalam wilayah Propinsi Otonomi Khusus Sulawesi
   Selatan yang berlaku untuk pemeluk agama Islam lewat Mahkamah Syari’ah;

j. Qanun Propinsi Otonomi Khusus Sulawesi adalah aturan daerah sebagai pelaksanaan
   Undang-undang di Wilayah Propinsi Otonomi Khusus Sulawesi Selatan dalam rangka
   Penyalenggaraan otonomi khusus untuk pelaksanaan Syari’at Islam.

k. Kabupaten adalah daerah otonomi dalam Propinsi Sulawesi Selatan, yang dipimpin oleh
   Bupati/Wakil Walikota atau nama lain;

l. Kota adalah Daerah Otonomi dalam Propinsi Sulawesi Selatan, Yang dipimpin oleh
   Walikota/Wakil Walikota atau nama lain;

m. Kecamatan adalah perangkat daerah Kabupaten dan Kota, yang dipimpin oleh Camat
   atau nama lain.
n. Desa adalah kesatuan masyarakat hukum dalam Propinsi Sulawesi Selatan yang terdiri atas gabungan beberapa dusun yang mempunyai batas wilayah tertentu dan harta kekayaan sendiri, berkedudukan langsung di bawah kecamatan atau nama lain, yang dipimpin oleh Kepala Desa atau nama lain.
o. Kelurahan adalah perangkat Pemerintahan Kecamatan dalam Kabupaten dan Kota, yang dipimpin oleh Lurah atau nama lain;

BAB II

CIRI DAN TUJUAN

Pasal 2

(1) Pemerintah Propinsi Sulawesi Selatan bercirikan Syari’at Islam merupakan pemerintahan yang dibangun atas dasar Al-Qur’an dan As-Sunnah;
(2) Sistem Perundang-undangan Pemerintah Propinsi Sulawesi Selatan Berasaskan dan bersumber pada Al-Qur’an dan As-Sunnah.

Pasal 3

(1) Perundang-undangan Propinsi Sulawesi Selatan berbentuk Qanun dan atau Peraturan Daerah yang materinya sesuai prinsip Islam yang dituangkan dari Undang-undang ini dan atau berbagai ketentuan perundang-undangan lainnya;
(2) Materi muatan pada Otonomi Khusus Propinsi Sulawesi Selatan yang bersumber pada perundang-undangan, mempunyai kekhususan yaitu mernafaskan Syari’at Islam.

Pasal 4

Tujuan Pemerintahan Propinsi Sulawesi Selatan adalah:
a. Melaksanakan hukum-hukum Islam dalam semua urusan pemerintahan dan kemasyarakatan;
b. Melaksanakan urusan pemerintahan berdasarkan perundang-undangan Islam;
c. Melindungi kepentingan rakyat dan masyarakat dengan system yang telah digariskan Al-Qur’an dan As-Sunnah.

BAB III

KEWENANGAN DAERAH

Pasal 5

(1) Kewenangan Propinsi Otonomi Khusus Sulawesi Selatan mencakup kewenangan dalam seluruh bidang pemerintahan yang menjadi otomominya dan dilaksanakan menurut Syari’at Islam;
(2) Kewenangan sebagaimana dimaksud pada ayat (1) diatur lebih lanjut dengan Qanun Propinsi Sulawesi Selatan.
(3) Qanun Kabupaten dan Kota mencakup kewenangan dalam seluruh bidang pemerintahan yang menjadi kewenangan Kabupaten dan Kota dilaksanakan menurut Syari’at Islam.
BAB IV

BADAN LEGISLATIF

Bagian Pertama

Legislatif Propinsi

Pasal 6

(1) Kekuasaan Legislatif di Propinsi Sulawesi Selatan dilaksanakan oleh Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah;
(2) Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah Propinsi Sulawesi Selatan mempunyai fungsi legislasi Penganggaran, dan Pengawasan Kebijakan Pemerintah Propinsi.

Pasal 7

(1) Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah Propinsi Sulawesi Selatan mempunyai wewenang dalam pemilihan Gubernur dan Wakil Gubernur sesuai dengan undang-undang;
(2) Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah Propinsi Sulawesi Selatan mempunyai hak angket dan hak mengajukan pernyataan pendapat, mengajukan pernyataan, menyampaikan usul dan pendapat, serta hak penyidikan dan hak inisiatif;
(3) Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah Propinsi Sulawesi Selatan mempunyai kewajiban untuk mempertahankan dan memelihara keutuhan Negara Kesatuan RI serta mewujudkan demokrasi dan kesejajeraan ummat;
(4) Pelaksanaan ketentuan sebagaimana dimaksud pada ayat (1), (2), dan (3) pasal ini diatur lebih lanjut dengan Qanun Propinsi Sulawesi Selatan.

Bagian Kedua

Legislatif Daerah Kabupaten dan Daerah Kota

Pasal 8

(1) Kekuasaan Legislatif di Daerah Kabupaten dan Daerah Kota dilaksanakan oleh Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat daerah Kabupaten dan Kota;
(2) Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah Kabupaten dan Kota mempunyai fungsi legislasi, penganggaran dan pengawasan Kebijakan Pemerintah Daerah Kabupaten dan Kota.

Pasal 9

(1) Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah Kabupaten dan Daerah Kota mempunyai wewenang dalam pemilihan Bupati dan Wakil Bupati, Walikota dan Wakil Walikota sesuai dengan undang-undang;
(2) Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah Kabupaten dan Daerah Kota mempunyai hak angket dan hak mengajukan pernyataan pendapat, mengajukan pertanyaan, menyampaikan usul dan pendapat, serta hak imunitas;
(3) Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah Kabupaten dan Daerah Kota mempunyai kewajiban untuk mempertahankan dan memelihara keutuhan Negara Kesatuan RI serta mewujudkan Keadilan dan kesejahteraan masyarakat;
(4) Pelaksanaan ketentuan sebagaimana dimaksud ayat (1), (2), dan (3) pasal ini diatur lebih lanjut dengan Qanun daerah Kabupaten dan Daerah Kota.

BAB V
BADAN EKSEKUTIF

Bagian Pertama

Eksekutif Propinsi

Pasal 10

(1) Badan Eksekutif Propinsi dilaksanakan oleh Gubernur yang dibantu oleh seorang Wakil Gubernur;
(2) Gubernur Propinsi Sulawesi Selatan bertanggung jawab dalam penetapan kebijakan ketentuan, ketentraman dan keamanan di luar yang terkait dengan tugas tehnis kepolisian dan TNI;
(3) Gubernur Propinsi Sulawesi Selatan karena jabattannya adalah juga wakil pemerintah.

Pasal 11

(1) Dalam menjalankan tugas dan kewenangan sebagai Gubernur bertanggung jawab kepada DPRD Propinsi Sulawesi Selatan;
(2) Dalam kedudukan sebagai Gubernur senantiasa dikontrol langsung oleh Dewan Ulama.

Pasal 12

(1) Gubernur dan Wakil Gubernur Propinsi Sulawesi Selatan dipilih secara langsung setiap 5 (lima) tahun sekali dan paling lama dua periode melalui pemilihan yang adil, bebas, rahasia, serta dilaksanakan secara jujur dan adil;
(2) Seseorang yang dapat ditetapkan menjadi calon Gubernur dan calon Wakil Gubernur Propinsi Sulawesi Selatan adalah warga negara Republik Indonesia yang beragama Islam;
(3) Syarat-syarat calon sebagaimana dimaksud ayat 2 pasal ini adalah:
   a. Mejalankan Syari’at Agamanya;
   b. Setia dan taat kepada Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia dan Pemerintah yang sah;
   c. Berpendidikan sekurang-kurangnya sekolah lanjutan tingkat atas atau yang sederajat;
   d. Berumur paling rendah 35 (tiga puluh lima) tahun dan paling tinggi 65 (enam puluh lima) tahun;
   e. Sehat jasmani dan rohani;
   f. Tidak pernah di hukum penjara karena melakukan tindak pidana;
g. Tidak sedang dicabut hak pilihnya berdasarkan keputusan pengadilan yang telah mempunyai kekuatan hukum yang tetap; dan
h. Tidak pernah dan menjadi warga negara asing.
(4) Prosedur dan tata cara pemilihan Gubernur akan ditetapkan tersendiri dengan Qanun dengan tetap memperhatikan ketentuan perundang-undangan tentang pemilihan.

Pasal 13

(1) Pemilihan Gubernur dan Wakil Gubernur Propinsi Sulawesi Selatan dilaksanakan oleh Komisi Independen Pemilihan dan diawasi oleh Komisi Pengawas Pemilihan, yang masing-masing dibentuk oleh DPRD Propinsi Sulawesi Selatan;
(2) Anggota Komisi Independen dalam Pemilihan terdiri atas anggota komisi Pemilihan Umum Sulawesi Selatan dan anggota masyarakat;
(3) Anggota Komisi Pengawas Pemilihan terdiri atas unsure anggota DPRD, unsure Pengawas Pemilu Nasional, dan anggota masyarakat yang independent;
(4) Hal-hal lain mengenai Pemilihan Gubernur dan Wakil Gubernur Propinsi Sulawesi Selatan yang belum diatur dalam undang-undang ini akan diatur Qanun (Perda) Propinsi Sulawesi Selatan.

Bagian Kedua

Eksekutif Daerah Kabupaten dan Daerah Kota

Pasal 14

(1) Badan Eksekutif Daerah Kabupaten dan Daerah Kota dilaksanakan oleh Bupati dan Walikota yang dibantu oleh seorang Wakil Bupati dan Wakil Walikota;
(2) Bupati dan Walikota bertanggung jawab dalam penetapan kebijakan ketentuan, ketentraman dan keamanan di luar yang terkait dengan tugas tehnis kepolisian;
(3) Bupati dan Walikota karena jabatannya adalah juga wakil pemerintah pusat.

Pasal 15

(1) Dalam menjalankan tugas dan kewenangan sebagai Bupati dan Walikota bertanggung jawab kepada DPRD kabupaten dan Kota.
(2) Dalam kedudukan sebagai Bupati dan Walikota senantiasa dikontrol langsung Dewan Ulama Daerah dan DPRD Kabupaten dan Kota.

Pasal 16

(1) Pemilihan Bupati/Wakil Bupati dan Walikota/Wakil Walikota atau nama lain dilakukan sesuai dengan ketentuan Pasal 12 dan Pasal 13 Undang-undang ini;
(2) Pelaksanaan ketentuan Pasal 12 dan Pasal 13 disesuaikan dengan kepentingan Pemilihan sebagaimana dimaksud pada ayat (1) Pasal ini, kecuali;
   a. Penyerahan hasil pemilihan oleh DPRD Kabupaten/Kota atau nama lain kepada Menteri Dalam Negeri;
   b. Pengesahan Bupati/Wakil Bupati dan

(3) Penyesuaian sebagaimana dimaksud ayat (2) diatur dalam Qanun Propinsi Sulawesi Selatan.

BAB VI

OTONOMI KUSUS PEMBERLAKUAN SYARI’AT ISLAM

Bagian Pertama

Prinsip Umum

Pasal 17

(1) Penyelenggaraan urusan pemerintahan yang telah menjadi urusan rumah tangga Propinsi Sulawesi Selatan dilaksanakan guna memberlakukan Syari’at Islam meliputi:
   a. Penyelenggaraan kehidupan beragama;
   b. Penyelenggaraan kehidupan adat istiadat;
   c. Penyelenggaraan bidang Pendidikan;
   d. Penyelenggaraan bidang Ekonomi dan perdagangan;
   e. Penyelenggaraan Mahkamah Syari’ah;
   f. Peran dan kedudukan Ulama dalam pemerintahan.

(2) Ketentuan sebagaimana dimaksud ayat (2) pasal ini diatur lebih lanjut dengan peraturan perundang-undangan dalam bentuk Qanun Propinsi, Kabupaten dan Kota.

Bagian Kedua

Agama

Pasal 18

(1) Penyelenggaraan kehidupan bermasyarakat di Propinsi Sulawesi Selatan diwujudkan dengan kewajiban melaksanakan Syari’at Islam;

(2) Pemerintah Sulawesi Selatan mengatur dan mengembangkan penyelenggaraan kehidupan bermasyarakat, sebagaimana pada ayat (1) dengan tetap menegah kerukunan hidup antar umat beragama.

Bagian Ketiga

Adat Istitiadat

Pasal 19

(1) Pemeliharaan pelestarian dan pengembangan adat istiadat di propinsi Sulawesi Selatan diwujudkan sesuai dengan Syari’at Islam.

(2) Pemeliharaan pelestarian dan pengembangan adat istiadat serta lembaga adat sebagaimana pada ayat (1) diatur dengan Qanun.
Bagian Keempat

Pendidikan

Pasal 20

(1) Pendidikan pada prinsipnya diselenggarakan dengan system Pendidikan Nasional;
(2) Pelaksanaan pendidikan di Daerah Propinsi Sulawesi Selatan diatur dan dikembangkan melalui Qanun sesuai Syari’ah Islam.

Pasal 21

(1) Pemerintah Propinsi Sulawesi Selatan melakukan pengembangan, khususnya Pendidikan Agama Islam pada setiap jenis, jalur dan jenjang pendidikan.
(2) Busana pendidikan berdasarkan busana muslim;
(3) Penyelenggaraan system pendidikan sesuai pada ayat (1) dan ayat (2) diatur lebih lanjut oleh Qanun.

Bagian Kelima

Ekonomi dan Perdagangan

Pasal 22

(1) Dewan Ulama, Legislatif dan Eksekutif membentuk Mahkamah Syari’ah di Propinsi Sulawesi Selatan;
(2) Mahkamah Syari’ah sebagaimana ayat (1) ada di setiap Kabupaten/Kota di Wilayah Propinsi Sulawesi Selatan;
(3) Struktur dan kedudukan Mahkamah Syari’ah sebagaimana pada ayat (1) dab ayat (2) pasal ini diatur dengan Qanun.

Pasal 26

(1) Mahkamah Syari’ah adalah Lembaga Peradilan Syari’ah Islam di Propinsi Sulawesi Selatan sebagai bagian dari sistem peradilan nasional.
(2) Kewenangan Mahkamah Syari’ah didasarkan atas Syari’at Islam yang diatur lebih lanjut dengan Qanun Propinsi Sulawesi Selatan.
(3) Kewenangan sebagaimana yang dimaksud pada ayat (1 dan 2) diberlakukan bagi pemeluk Agama Islam.

Pasal 27

Di wilayah Propinsi Sulawesi Selatan selain Mahkamah Syari’ah Propinsi, Kabupaten dan Kota terdapat juga Pengadilan Tinggi untuk Propinsi dan Pengadilan Negeri untuk setiap Kabupaten dan Kota.

Pasal 28
(1) Kewenangan dam mengadili; Mahkamah Syari’ah Propinsi atau Kabupaten dan Kota mencakup semua sengketa yang subyeknya adalah pemeluk agama Islam;
(2) Kewenangan mengadili Pengadilan Tinggi dan Pengadilan Negeri sebagaimana dimaksud Pasal 27 mencakup semua sengketa yang subyeknya seluruhnya non Muslim.

Bagian Ketujuh

Kedudukan dan Peran Ulama dalam Pemerintahan

Pasal 29

(1) Propinsi Sulawesi Selatan membentuk sebuah Dewan yang terdiri dari para Ulama.
(2) Dewan Ulama sebagaimana dimaksud pada ayat (1) ada di setiap Kabupaten/Kota di Propinsi Sulawesi Selatan.

Pasal 30

(1) Dewan Ulama adalah Lembaga yang bersifat independent yang berfungsi memberi pertimbangan dan pengawasan terhadap kebijakan daerah secara terus-menerus, termasuk bidang Pemerintahan, Pembangunan dan Kemasyarakatan serta tatanan hidup yang Islami.
(2) Dewan Ulama dalam menjalankan tugasnya membentuk Badan-badan Pelaksana Dewan Ulama.
(3) Syarat dan tata cara pembentukannya sebagaimana dimaksud pada ayat (2) pasal ini diatur dengan Qanun.

BAB VII

KEPOLISIAN DAERAH PROPINSI SULAWESI SELATAN

Pasal 31

(1) Tugas kepolisian dilaksanakan oleh Kepolisian Daerah Propinsi Sulawesi Selatan sebagai bagian dari Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia;
(2) Kepala Kepolisian Propinsi Sulawesi Selatan melaksanakan kebijakan teknis kepolisian sebagaimana dimaksud pada ayat (1) di bidang keamanan;
(3) Kebijakan mengenai keamanan Propinsi Sulawesi Selatan dikoordinasikan oleh Kepala Kepolisian kepada Gubernur Propinsi Sulawesi Selatan;
(4) Hal-hal mengenai tugas fungsional kepolisian di Sulawesi Selatan sebagaimana dimaksud pada ayat (1) di bidang ketertiban dan ketentraman masyarakat diatur lebih lanjut dengan Qanun Propinsi Sulawesi Selatan.

Pasal 32

Hal-hal mengenai pendidikan dan pembinaan anggota Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia dilaksanakan berdasarkan keputusan Kepala Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia, sepanjang tidak bertentangan dengan Syari’at Islam.
BAB VIII
KEJAKSAAN
PROPINSI SULAWESI SELATAN

Pasal 33

(1) Tugas kejaksaan dilakukan oleh kejaksaan Propinsi Sulawesi Selatan sebagai bagian dari Kejaksaan Agung Republik Indonesia;
(2) Pengangkatan dan pemberhentian Kepala Kejaksaan Tinggi Propinsi, Kepala Kejaksaan Negeri Kabupaten dan Kota Sulawesi Selatan dilakukan oleh Jaksa Agung dengan persetujuan Gubernur Propinsi Sulawesi Selatan;
(3) Hal-hal mengenai tugas tehnis Kejaksaan Propinsi Sulawesi Selatan dilaksanakan berdasarkan ketentuan perundang-undangan yang berlaku berdasarkan Syari'at Islam.

BAB X
KETENTUAN PENUTUP

Pasal 35

(1) Ketentuan pelaksanaan undang-undang ini yang menyangkut kewenangan Pemerintah ditetapkan dengan Peraturan Pemerintah menurut Syari'at Islam;
(2) Ketentuan pelaksanaan undang-undang ini yang menyangkut kewenangan Pemerintah Propinsi Sulawesi Selatan ditetapkan dengan Qanun Propinsi Sulawesi Selatan.

Pasal 36

Ketentuan pelaksanaan undang-undang ini secara bertahap harus telah dibentuk paling lambat dalam masa satu tahun setelah undang-undang ini diundangkan.

Pasal 37

Perubahan atas undang-undang ini dapat dilakukan dengan memperhatikan pertimbangan Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah dan Dewan Ulama Propinsi Sulawesi Selatan.

Pasal 38

Undang-undang ini mulai berlaku pada tanggal diundangkannya, agar setiap orang mengetahuiinya, memerintahkan, pengundangan Undang-undang ini dengan penempatannya dalam Lembaran Negara Republik Indonesia.
DEWAN PERWAKILAN RAKYAT
REPUBKLIK INDONESIA

PENJELASAN
RANCANGAN
UNDANG-UNDANG REPUBLIK INDONESIA
NOMOR.......... TAHUN 2002

TENTANG
OTONOMI KHUSUS PEMERBLAKUAN SYARI'AT ISLAM
BAGI PROPINSI SULAWESI SELATAN

UMUM

I. Dasar Pemikiran


b. Undang-undang ini disebut Undang-undang Otonomi Khusus Pemerlakuan Syari’at Islam Bagi Propinsi Sulawesi Selatan. Undang-undang ini lebih mengutamakan pelaksanaan asas desentralisasi dengan bercirikan Syari’at Islam.

c. Berdasarkan ketentuan TAP MPR RI Nomor VI/MPR/2001 dan TAP MPR RI Nomor XV/MPR/1998, maka penyelenggaraan otonomi Daerah dilaksanakan dengan kewenangan daerah yang luas, nyata dan bertanggung jawab kepada daerah secara Proporsional yang diwujudkan dengan pengaturan, pemanfaatan sumber daya daerah dengan prinsip demokrasi dan peran serta masyarakat yang berkeadilan dengan memanfaatkan potensi sesuai dengan nilai-nilai yang berkembang di masyarakat (Syari’at Islam).

d. Undang-undang ini mendorong pemberdayaan masyarakat menumbuhkan prakarsa dan kreatifitas sesuai dengan sistem nilai di masyarakat, untuk meningkatkan peran serta masyarakat memberi peran dan fungsi Dewan Ulama disamping DPR (Daerah). Oleh karena itu Otonomi Khusus di Sulawesi Selatan memberi kewenangan pengaturan dan Pemelkaruan Syari’at Islam.

e. Otonomi Khusus Pemerlakuan Syari’at Islam memberi kewenangan dan keleluasan untuk membentuk dan melaksanakan kebijakan berupa Qanun atau Keputusan Kepala Daerah menurut prkarsa dan aspirasi masyarakat berdasarkan Syari’at Islam.

f. Pemberian Otonomi Khusus pelaksanaan Syari’at Islam di Sulawesi Selatan dilakukan dengan pertimbangan:

(1) Untuk memelihara keserasian hubungan masyarakat, dengan Pemerintah Daerah dan dengan Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia (NKRI);
(2) Secara Historis Syari’at Islam telah berlaku dan berjalan dengan baik di daerah Sulawesi Selatan sejak abad 17-19 M. Namun pemberlakuan ini dihentikan oleh colonial VOC-Belanda sejak masuknya di Sulawesi Selatan, diusul dalam era kemerdekaan RI hingga sekarang;

(3) Sejarah mencatat pula Kongres Pembangunan Masyarakat Islam yang berlangsung di Malino, tanggal 07-11 Desember 1957 yang disponsori oleh Raja Gowa, Pimpinan AD KDMST, dan Gubernur Militer SST, yang bermaksud untuk menegakkan Syari’at Islam di tengah masyarakat Sulawesi Selatan dan Tenggara;

(4) Masyarakat Sulawesi Selatan, utamanya suku Bugis, Makassar dan Mandar sejak lama terkenal sebagai suatu komponen bangsa Indonesia yang amat kuat berpegang teguh pada ajaran Agama Islam sebagaimana daerah-daerah lain, seperti Aceh, Sumbar, Kalsel, NTB, Banten, sehingga Sulawesi Selatan dikenal sebagai serambi Madinah;

(5) Masyarakat Sulawesi Selatan sadar sesadarnya bahwa kini di era reformasi sudah tiba saatnya untuk mengambil Syari’at Islam sebagai alternatif. Masyarakat Sulawesi Selatan merasakan bahwa sejak kemerdekaan hingga sekarang sistem yang diberlakukan dalam penyelenggaraan negara sangat tidak memuaskan dan tidak memberikan ketentraman serta kesejahteraan, sehingga diperlukan jalan keluar sesegera mungkin;

(6) Aspirasi masyarakat Sulawesi Selatan yang sangat kuat ini amat perlu disambut baik oleh pemerintah, sebab merupakan sebuah upaya untuk memelihara dan mempertahankan NKRI dan aspirasi ini dijalankan secara damai dan konstitusional. Kalau tidak, maka suara-suara atau aspirasi yang ingin memisahkan diri nantinya bisa semakin membesar bermakna bila salju dan lama kelamaan semakin mudah untuk diatasi;

(7) Pemberian Otonomi Khusus dengan pemberlakuan Syari’at Islam merupakan solusi tepat sekaligus menjadi alat perekat bangsa dan merupakan sebuah usaha untuk memperluas partisipasi masyarakat Sulawesi Selatan dalam membangun bangsa khususnya di Sulawesi Selatan.

g. Dengan memperhatikan pelaksanaan Otoda selama ini yang didasarkan pada asas desentralisasi, tanpa memberi keleluasaan mengembangkan hukum dengan Syari’at Islam menjadi petunjuk nyata pentingnya pemberlakuan Syari’at Islam di Sulawesi Selatan, untuk lebih mewujudkan maksud penggunaan asas desentralisasi;

h. Tujuan pemberian Otonomi Khusus pelaksanaan Syari’at Islam adalah meningkatkan pelayanan dan kesejahteraan masyarakat, pengembangan kehidupan demokrasi, keadilan dan pemerataan dan pemeliharaan hubungan yang serasi antara pusat dan Sulawesi Selatan sebagai daerah yang penduduknya agamis sebagai sarana melanggengkan keutuhan NKRI;

i. Prinsip-prinsip pemberian pemberlakuan Otonomi Khusus di Sulawesi Selatan adalah:
   1. Penyelenggaraan didasarkan dengan prinsip demokrasi, keadilan, pemerataan dan kesejahteraan yang bermakna Syari’at Islam;
   2. Pelaksanaan Otonomi Khusus Pemberlakuan Syari’at Islam didasarkan pada otonomi seluas-luasnya dan bertanggung jawab sesuai prinsip Syari’at Islam;
   3. Pelaksanaan Otoda lebih meningkatkan kemandirian sehingga Propinsi, Kabupaten, dan Kota berwenang mengatur pelaksanaan Syari’at Islam dalam kehidupan berbangsa dan bernegara.

II. Pembagian Daerah
Sesuai dengan jiwa Pasal 18 dan Pasal 18 B UUD 1945, maka penyusunan UU ini didasarkan pada pokok pikiran sebagai berikut:
a. Berdasarkan sistem pemerintahan menurut UUD 1945, maka prinsip pembagian kewenangan didasarkan pada asas desentralisasi dalam kerangka NKRI;
b. Daerah yang dimaksud dalam UU ini yang didasarkan asas desentralisasi adalah daerah Propinsi dan Kabupaten dan Kota.
c. Untuk Kabupaten dan Kota berlaku asas dekonsentrasi terhadap propinsi disamping asas desentralisasi.

III. Prinsip Penyeleenggaraan Otonomi Khusus
a. Digunakan asas desentralisasi dan asas dekonsentrasi;
b. Penyeleenggaraan asas desentralisasi seluas-luasnya dilaksanakan di Propinsi;
c. Pelaksanaan asas dekonsentrasi dan desentralisasi daerah Kabupaten dan Kota;
d. Selain dari pada butir a, b dan c, berlaku prinsip sebagaimana pada UU No. 22 Tahun 1999 sejauh tidak bertentangan dengan prinsip a, b dan c tersebut di atas.

IV. Susunan Pemerintahan Daerah, Hak-hak DPRD dan Dewan Ulama
a. Susunan pemerintahan dan hak-hak DPRD berlaku ketentuan UU No. 22 Tahun 1999, sejauh tidak bertentangan dengan point I s/d III.
b. Kedudukan Dewan Ulama adalah partner dan setara dengan DPRD dalam struktur pemerintahan baik Propinsi, Kabupaten, dan Kota.
c. Dewan Ulama berwenang:

1. Bersama dengan DPRD membuat produk legislatif;
2. Memberi pertimbangan kepada eksekutif dalam menjabarkan dan melaksanakan fungsi Pemerintahan dan pelayanan.
3. Sebagai pengawas dalam pelaksanaan pemerintahan;
PROGRAM PERJUANGAN

A. TUJUAN

- Meyakinkan kepada seluruh Ummat Islam khususnya di Sulawesi Selatan bahwa pelaksanaan syari’at Islam secara utuh (kaффаh) adalah wajib hukumnya.
- Memperjuangkan syari’at Islam menjadi aturan kehidupan masyarakat, berbangsa dan bernegara di Wilayah Sulawesi Selatan.
- Memperjuangkan disetujuihins UU Otonomi Khusus pelaksanaan syari’at Islam di Sulawesi Selatan oleh DPR RI dan Pemerintah Pusat.

PROGRAM PERJUANGAN

1) Bidang Politik

- Membangun kekuatan Ummat Islam untuk bersatu padu dalam upaya memperjuangkan tegaknya Syari’at Islam di Sulawesi Selatan secara konstitusional.
- Mengupayakan terwujudnya pemerintahan yang bersih yang menjamin Pelaksanaan Syari’at Islam di Wilayah Sulawesi Selatan.
- Melakukan dialog terbuka terhadap komponen legislatif dan eksekutif tentang penegakan syari’at Islam di Sulawesi Selatan.
- Selama masa transisi sebelum berlakunya Otonomi Khusus Sulsel perlu dimanfaatkan peluang Otoda sesua UU. No. 22 tahun 1999 demi terwujudnya kehidupan bermasyarakat yang kondusif untuk tegaknya Syari’at Islam dengan melahirkan PERDA-PERDA yang sesuai dengan Syari’at Islam misalnya larangan miras, narkoba, prostitusi, perjudian dan lain-lain.

2) Bidang hukum dan Perundang-undangan

- Merumuskan aturan-aturan hukum dan perundang-undangan berdasarkan Syari’at Islam yang menjamin keadilan dan menjadi rahmat bagi seluruh ummat manusia.
- Membangun dan meningkatkan kesadaran ummat Islam untuk berpegang teguh pada aturan-aturan hukum dan perundang-undangan berdasarkan Syari’at Islam.
- Melakukan sosialisasi tentang hukum dan perundang-undangan berdasarkan Syari’at Islam.
- Melakukan langkah-langkah persiapan pembentukan Mahkamah Syari’ah termasuk SDM.
- Mengambil peran aktif untuk membantu Pemerintah dan DPRD setempat dalam menyusun PERDA-PERDA yang bermakna akan Islam.
- Membentuk lembaga Pelayanan dan Advokasi hukum untuk ummat Islam.

3) Bidang Ekonomi dan Keuangan

- Merumuskan aturan-aturan perekonomian dan perdagangan berdasarkan syari’at Islam dan mensosialisasikan kepada seluruh masyarakat.
• Menghimbau dan mewajibkan masyarakat Islam untuk senantiasa menegakkan aturan aturan Syari'at Islam dalam menjalankan aktivitas perekonomian dan perdagangannya.
• Menghimbau masyarakat sedapat mungkin tidak menabung dan menyimpan uang di bank-bank dan koperasi yang tidak berdasarkan syari'at Islam, melainkan pada bank-bank Syari'ah (Bank Muamalat, Bank Syari'ah Mandiri, Bank BNI Syari'ah, dll.)
• Melakukan langkah-langkah persiapan pembentukan Dewan Syariah Ekonomi dan Perdagangan.
• Untuk mendukung pelaksanaan program KPSI diupayakan pencarian dana melalui donator baik perorangan maupun lembaga dan usaha-usaha produktif.

4) Bidang Pendidikan
• Merumuskan sistem pendidikan Islam yang menjaga ummat dari pola piker sekularisme dan materialisme yang sangat mengancam aqidah ummat Islam.
• Menghimbau ummat Islam untuk tidak menyekolahkan anaknya pada lembaga atau yayasana yang dikelola oleh non muslim.
• Menuntut kepada pemerintah dan sekolah/lembaga non-Muslim untuk tidak menghalangi para siswa dalam menjalankan Syari'at agamanya.
• Memajukan dan memandirikan pesantren sebagai basis utama pendidikan Islam.
• Mendesak pemerintah/Dept. Pendidikan untuk melakukan perbaikan kurikulum pendidikan dengan menambah jam pelajaran Agama Islam dan menghilangkan dikotomi ilmu agama dan ilmu umum dalam kurikulum pendidikan dan semua jenjang pendidikan.
• Mendorong terwujudnya lembaga-lembaga pendidikan Islam mulai dari tingkat TK (Bustanul Atfal) s/d Perguruan Tinggi.
• Mengupayakan lembaga Islam (yayasan) untuk membantu biaya pendidikan Anak Muslim yang kurang mampu.

5) Bidang sosial budaya
• Merumuskan aturan kehidupan bermasyarakat Muslim dan Non-Muslim dalam batas-batas Syari'at Islam.
• Menghimbau kepada masyarakat Islam terutama kaum wanita untuk menutup aurat.
• Menghimbau kepada lembaga pemerintah, perusahaan-perusahaan di tempat-tempat kerja untuk menjaga kehornatan wanita dan tidak menghalangi ummat Islam dalam lingkungan kerja mereka dalam menjalankan agamanya.
• Mengusahakan agar masyarakat tidak terpengaruh terhadap budaya-budaya yang bertentangan dengan ajaran Islam baik berasal barat maupun nativisme.
• Menuntut kepada pemerintah untuk menutup semua tempat-tempat usaha yang merusak kehidupan masyarakat dan bertentangan dengan ajaran Islam, antar lain: Bar, tempat penjualan minuman keras, tempat perjudian, panti-panti pijat dan tempat-tempat prostitusi.
• Menuntut pemerintah dan swasta yang bergerak dibidang industri pariwisata untuk menertibkan semua bentuk obyek pariwisata yang bertendensi maksiat dan mendorong terwujudnya wisata Islam.

6) Bidang Hubungan Kelembagaan dan Masyarakat.
• Membentuk perwakilan KPPSI di luar Sulawesi Selatan
• Membuka hubungan komunikasi dengan lembaga-lembaga baik Parpol, Ormas, Lembaga-lembaga dakwah, pesantren-pesantren untuk bersama-sama mendukung upaya penegakan syari'at Islam.
• Menghidupkan lembaga-lembaga dakwah dan pendidikan melakukan latihan kader Da'I Penegak Syari’at Islam dan pembinaan kemasyarakatan.

7) **Bidang Laskar Penegak Syari’at Islam.**
• Membentuk Laskar Jundullah sebagai pengawal penegakan Syari’at Islam di Sulawesi Selatan.
• Ikut aktif menjaga keamanaan, ketertiban dan perdamaian masyarakat.
• Melakukan koordinasi antar laskar-laskar Ummat lainnya dalam upaya membangun kekuatan pertahanan ummat sebagai langkah antisipasi konspirasi global yang mengancam eksistensi Islam dan Ummat Islam.
Appendix XVIII: Program of Socialisation

PROGRAM SOSIALISASI

1. DAKWAH

a. Dakwah bil-lisan

b. Dakwah bil-Hal
Dakwah ini lebih dititik beratkan pada pengalaman ajaran atau Syari’at Islam melalui perilaku. Setiap warga dan anggota KPSI hendaknya menampilkan diri sebagai seorang sosok yang mengamalkan ajaran Islam secara baik. Ia hendaknya memulai pada diri sendiri mengamalkan seluruh ajaran Islam seoptimal mungkin sambil melangkah menyeru atau mengajak orang lain untuk menegakkan syari’at Islam. Dia hendaknya menampilkan diri sebagai seorang yang patuh pada perintah-perintah agama dan menjauhi larangan-larangan agama. Ia merupakan sosok yang rajin beribadah, memakmurkan masjid, hanya mau mengambil haknya, suka bekerja keras dan tidak bergantung pada belas kasihan orang lain dan lain-lain.

2. MEMBANTU PENEGAK HUKUM

a. Memberikan informasi atau laporan kepada penegak hukum atas setiap pelanggaran hukum yang terjadi.

b. Mendesak agar aparat penegak hukum melaksanakan aturan secara konsekwen dan tegas demi kebaikan masyarakat. Desakan ini bisa dalam bentuk penyampaian sendiri-sendiri atau bersama-sama. Dalam hal ini dilakukan dengan cara yang santun dengan menghindarkan tindakan anarkis dan main hakim sendiri.

3. MEMBENTUK MASYARAKAT ISLAMI

a. Menghimbau kepada Pemda/Tokoh masyarakat muslim di Sulawesi Selatan untuk berfastabiqul Khairat guna terbentuknya Pilot Proyek Penegakan Syari’at Islam, dengan prioritas menunaikan shalat jama’ah, berbusana muslimah, pergaulan Islami, peningkatan pengajian dan dakwah secara bijaksana dan nasehat yang baik.


Mereka ini perlu mengetahui bahwa penegakan Syari'at Islam sama sekali tidak merugikan pihak manapun. Bahkan pemberlakuannya sangat memberi kebebasan kepada non-Muslim untuk mengamalkan ajaran agama dan budaya serta pekerjaannya masing-masing. Model otonomi, untuk mewajibkan penegakan Syari'at Islam secara bertahap di SulSel hanya dapat tercapai melalui pemberian otonomi khusus dan tidak cukup dengan otonomi (daerah) yang diberlakukan sekarang ini. Demikian keputusan ini untuk disebarkan dan diamalkan dengan penuh kesadaran dan rasa tanggung jawab.

Makassar, 16 Syawal 1422 H/31 Desember 2001 M
Appendix XIX: Second Congress’ Recommendations

REKOMENDASI

Berdasarkan pada fakta historis, dimana Sulawesi Selatan digelar “Serambi Madinah”, berbarengan dengan itu proses perjuangan Penegakan Syari’at Islam tidak pernah berhenti dan keedepan tidak akan pernah berhenti. Dan kondisi obyektif dewasa ini proses perjuangan tersebut mendapat rekomendasi dari DPRD Propinsi Sulawesi Selatan, serta dukungan kuat dari semua komponen dan lapisan masyarakat. Oleh karena itu Kongres II Umat Islami yang berlangsung dari tanggal 29-31 Desember/14-16 Syawal 1422 H di Makassar, tetap Istiqomah dan mempertegas komitmen perjuangan penegakan Syari’at Islam sebagaimana tertuang dalam butir-butir rekomendasi di bawah ini:

INTERN

2. Bahwa perjuangan penegakan syari’at Islam ditempuh secara konstitusional dengan tetap menuntut pemberian otonomi khusus untuk pelaksanaan Syari’at Islam di Sulawesi Selatan.
4. Membentuk perserikatan perdagangan/pengusaha muslim
6. Perubahan nama Laskar Jundullah menjadi Laskar Penegak Syari’at (LPS)
7. Perubahan nama KPPSI (Komite Persiapan Penegakan Syari’at Islam) menjadi KPSI (Komite Penegakan Syari’at Islam)

EXTERN

1. Mempertegas penolakan terhadap keberadaan Tim Jajak Pendapat yang dibentuk Pemerintah Daerah Sulawesi Selatan, karena Tim tersebut tidak representatif serta metodologi yang keliru.
2. Menuntut tim pokja lintas fraksi DPR RI untuk segera memperjuangkan lahirnya UU otonomi khusus penerapan SI di SulSel dengan sungguh-sungguh dan sepenuh hati.
3. Mendesak kepada pemerintah pusat untuk tidak menjual atau swastanisasi BUMN ke pihak asing terutama di daerah SulSel.
4. Menghimbau kepada institusi pendidikan agar setiapsiwi muslimah mengenakan busana muslimah (jilbab).
5. Menuntut media cetak dan elektronik untuk tidak menjadi agen penyebaran budaya barat (maksiat) dan sekulerisme.
6. Meminta kepada Penda agar menetapkan motto Sul-Sel “Serambi Madinah” yang merupakan kependekan dari Serangkaian amal kebajikan menuju masyarakat agamis dinamis, aman dan harmonis.
7. Mendesak DPRD Sulawesi Selatan, Pemerintah Daerah SulSel serta DPR RI dan pemerintah pusat RI, untuk menerima aspirasi ummat Islam Sulawesi Selatan dan
memutuskan/menetapkan undang-undang otonomi khusus bagi pelaksanaan Syari’at Islam di Sulawesi Selatan.


9. Mengutuk dan mengecam keras aksi brutal AS dan Israel yang menyerang rakyat Afghanistan dan Palestina dan meminta kepada Pemerintah RI untuk memutuskan hubungan diplomatik dengan Amerika Serikat.

10. Mengingat aspirasi penegakan Syari’at Islam SulSel telah mendapat rekomendasi DPRD Propinsi SulSel, maka kepada pemerintah dan DPR RI untuk segera menerima aspirasi ummat Islam tersebut dan apabila tidak diakomodasi maka kongres Ummat Islam memutuskan untuk melakukan langkah-langkah kongkrit guna mewujudkan Referendum dengan opsi yang ditentukan melalui Kongres Ummat Islam Sulawesi Selatan selanjutnya.

Rekomendasi tersebut diatas adalah tindak lanjut perjuangan Ummat Islam Sulawesi Selatan untuk tetap konsisten memperjuangkan legalitas formal konstitusional penegakan Syari’at Islam di Sulawesi Selatan.

Dari maksud tersebut diatas maka KPPSI bersama Ummat Islam Sulawesi Selatan bertanggung jawab menindak lanjuti kegiatan Kongres II Ummat Islam SulSel dengan langkah kongkrit, membawa aspirasi ini ke DPRD Propinsi dan DPR RI untuk diperjuangkan terwujudnya otonomi khusus bagi penegakan Syari’at Islam di Sulawesi Selatan.

_Disahkan dalam Sidang Pleno_
SURAT KEPUTUSAN
Nomor : A.2/01/KEP/KPPSI/2002
Tentang :

KOMPOSISI DAN PERSONALIA PENGURUS
KOMITE PERSIAPAN PENEGAKAN SYARI'AT ISLAM
KPPSI PUSAT SULAWESI SELATAN
HASIL KONGRES II UMMAT ISLAM SULAWESI SELATAN

Menimbang : Bahwa dalam rangka mengembangkan visi dan misi KPPSI, serta terlaksananya program perjuangan dengan sukses menuju tercapainya penegakan syariat Islam melalui otonomi khusus di Sulawesi Selatan, maka dipandang perlu menyusun dan menetapkan pengurus KPPSI Pusat Sulawesi Selatan.


Berdasarkan : Hasil pertemuan-pertemuan Tim Formatur pasca Kongres II Ummat Islam Sulawesi Selatan.

Dengan memohon rahmat, hidayah, dan inayah Allah SWT,

MEMUTUSKAN :


2. Surat Keputusan ini disampaikan kepada masing-masing yang bersangkutan agar diterima dengan ikhlas sebagai amanah dari Allah SWT, dan untuk dilaksanakan sebagaimana mestinya.

SUSUNAN PENGURUS
Komite Persiapan Penegakan Syariat Islam
KPPSI PUSAT SULAWESI SELATAN

DEWAN PENASEHAT

1. Menteri Koordinator Bidang Kesejahteraan Rakyat
2. Menteri Agama
3. Menteri Dalam Negeri
4. Ketua DPRD Propinsi Sulawesi Selatan
5. Gubernur Propinsi Sulawesi Selatan
6. Ketua Majelis Ulama Indonesia Propinsi Sulawesi Selatan
7. Ketua Muhammadiyah Wilayah Sulawesi Selatan
8. Ketua Nahdatul Ulama Wilayah Sulawesi Selatan
9. Ketua Persatuan Islam Wilayah Sulawesi Selatan
10. Ketua Persatuan Tarbiyah Islamiyah Wilayah Sulawesi Selatan
11. Ketua Syarikat Islam Wilayah Sulawesi Selatan
12. Rektor Universitas Hasanuddin Makassar
13. Rektor Universitas Negeri Makassar
14. Rektor Institut Agama Islam Negeri Alauddin Makassar
15. Rektor Universitas Muslim Indonesia Makassar
16. Rektor Universitas Muhammadiyah Makassar
17. Rektor Universitas 45 Makassar
18. Rektor Universitas Veteran RI Makassar
19. Rektor Universitas Islam Makassar
21. Koordinator Wilayah ICMII Sulawesi Selatan
22. Para Ketua DPRD Kabupaten/Kota se Propinsi Sulawesi Selatan
23. Para Bupati/Walikota se Propinsi Sulawesi Selatan

DEWAN PEMBINA

1. Prof. Dr. K.H. Ali Yafie
2. Prof. Dr. H. Abdurrrahman A. Basalamah, M.Si.
3. K.H. M. Sanusi Baco, Lc
4. K.H. Djamaluddin Amin
5. H. Andi Hamzah Puang Nippi
6. Prof. Dr. H. Halide
MAJELIS-SYURO

Ketua : Prof. Dr. H. Abd. Muin Salim
Wakil Ketua : Ir. H.M. Nur Abdurrahman, M.Sc
Wakil Ketua : Prof. Dr. H.M. Ide Said, DM. M.Pd.
Wakil Ketua : Prof. Dr. H. Jalaluddin Rahman, MA

Sekretaris : Dr. H. Noer Bachri Noor, M.Sc.
Wakil Sekretaris : Drs. H.M. Siradjuddin

Anggota :
1. K.H. Arief Marzoeki Hasan
2. K.H. Bakri Wahid
3. Drs. K.H. Harisah
4. Drs. H.M. Saleh Putuhena
5. KH. Faried Wajedi, MA
6. Dr. H. Ahmad M. Sewang, MA
7. Drs. H.M. Dahlan Yusuf
8. Drs. H. M. Samad Syuaib
9. H.M. Zaitun Rasmin, Lc
10. H.M. Said Abd. Samad, Lc
11. Drs. M. Alwi Uddin M.Ag.
12. Drs. H.M. Yahya Yacub
13. Drs. H.M. Yunus Tekeng
14. Drs. H. Andi Bachtiaer
15. K.H. Syamsuddin Latief
16. Agus Dwikarna
17. Drs. Mansyur Semma. M.Si

DEWAN-PAKAR

Ketua : Prof. Dr. H. Achmed Ali, SH, MH.
Wakil Ketua : Prof. Dr. dr. H.M. Asaad Maidin, MSc, Sp.Mk.
Wakil Ketua : Dr. H. Marzuki, DEA
Wakil Ketua : Prof. Dr. H. Abu Hamid.
Wakil Ketua : Prof. Dr. H. Radhy Al Hafidz

Sekretaris : Drs. H. Hasyim Aidid, MA
Wakil Sekretaris : Arifin Hamid, SH, MH
Wakil Sekretaris : A. Abdullah Rahim, ST

KOORDINATOR BIDANG

A. Bidang Ekonomi Islam

1. Dr. H. Minhajuddin, MA
2. Drs. Taslim Arifin, MA
3. Dr. H.M. Natser Hamzah, SE
4. Rahmat Hasanuddin, SE, MM
5. Drs. Abd. Majid Sallatu, MA
6. Drs. H. Najamuddin Madjid, SIP.
B. Bidang Hukum & Perundang-undangan Islam:

1. Prof. Dr. H. Djalal Abubakar
2. Prof. Dr. H. Hamka Haq, MA
3. H.A. Muin Fahmal, SH, MH
4. Dr. H. Mustamin Arsyad
5. H. Abd. Latief, SH, MH
6. S.M. Noor, SH, MH
7. Sukarno Aburaerah, SH
8. Dr. Amiruddin, SH, MH

C. Bidang Pendidikan Islam:

1. Prof. Dr. H. Abd. Rahman Getteng
2. Prof. Dr. H. Yahya Hiyola
3. Prof. Dr. M. Akil Malla, M.Sc
4. Prof. Dr. H.A. Makkulau
5. Prof. Dr. Hj. St. Hawang Hanafie, MS.
6. Drs. H.M. Darwis, MA. DPS.

D. Bidang Adat Istiadat dan Masyarakat Islam:

1. Prof. Dr. H. Tahir Kasnawi, SU
2. Dr. H.M. Arfah Shiddiq, MA
3. Dr. H. Kadir Gassing
4. Drs. Abdurrahman Kotta, SU
5. Dr. Arifuddin Ahmad, M.Ag
6. Drs. H. Paita Halim, M.Ag
7. Drs. Aminuddin Ram, M.Ed
8. Drs. H. Agung Wirawan, MS.

E. Bidang Science & Technologi:

1. Prof. Dr. H.M. Arif Tiro, M.Sc
2. Prof. Dr. dr. H.A. Halim Mubin, M.Sc. DSPD.
3. Prof. Dr. dr. H. Rusli Ngatimin, MPH.
4. Dr. Ing. Ir. M. Yamin Jinca, MStr.
5. Ir. H.M. Ridwan Abdullah, M.Sc.
6. Dr. Amiruddin Aliah, Sp.S, MM.
7. Dr. Ir. Reza S. Sajad,
8. Dr. A. Thamsil

F. Bidang Pemberdayaan Perempuan dan Pembinaan Generasi Muda dan Anak:

1. Drs. K.H. Muhammad Ahmad
2. Drs. H. Azhari Rasyid, M.Si.
3. Dra. Hj. Aisyah Ismail, SH.
5. Dra. Hj. Nurhuda Noor
7. Dra. Hj. Yuliani Paris, MS
LAJNAH TANFIDZIYAH

Ketua : Ir. H. Abd. Azis Qahhar Mudzakkar, MS.
Wakil Ketua : Ir. H. Fuad Rumi, M.Sc.
Wakil Ketua : Dr. H. Syahruddin Nawi, SH, MH

Sekretaris : Drs. H. Aswar Hasan, MS
Wakil Sekretaris : Kalmuddin, S.Pd
Wakil Sekretaris : Syamsul Bachrial, S.Sos.
Wakil Sekretaris : Drs. H.M. Junaid Sahib.

Bendahara : Syaiful Kasim, SE, Ak
Wakil Bendahara : Drs. Purnama Asadih
Wakil Bendahara : Ir. Amihwanuddin, M.Sc.

Bagian - Bagian

Humas & Hubungan Kelembagaan :
1. Husein Abdullah
2. Syamsuddin
3. Das'a'ad S.Latief, S.Sos
4. Idham Khaiik

Dana dan Keuangan :
1. Ir. Hamzah Saleh
2. Drs. H. Sahabuddin
3. Drs. A t w a r
4. H. Amir Attas

Da'I Penegak Syariat Islam :
1. Ust. H. Haris Abdurrahman
3. Khalid A. Basalamah, Lc, MA.

Advokasi MI :
1. Abraham Samad, SH
2. Iswari Al Farisi
3. Saefuddin Al Mughni, MS
4. Muh. Rusmin Subagus, SH.

Kepemudaan :
1. Ir. H. Abd. Majid
2. Amruddin Ambo Enre, M.Pd.
3. Anwar Razak
4. Muhammad Nur Bongkang
Korps Muslimah

- Arfah Tholleng, SH
- Rosmini, S. Ag
- Dra. Kasmawati

Makassar, 23 Jumadilula 1423 H
03 Agustus 2002 M

TIM FORMATUR
PENERIMA AMANAH KONGRES II UMMAT ISLAM
SULAWESI SELATAN

Prof. DR. H. Abdurrahman A. Basalamah, M.Si

Prof. DR. H. Abd. Muin Salim

Prof. DR. H. Achmad Ali, SH, MH.

Prof. DR. H. Jalaluddin Rahman, MA.

Ir. H. Azis Qahhar Mudzakkar

Ir. H. Fuad Rumi, M.S.

Drs. H. Aswar Hasan

Drs. H. Hasyim Aidid, MA

Drs. H. Dahan Yusuf
Appendix XXI: Third Congress’ Recommendations

REKOMENDASI KONGRES III UMAT ISLAM

Bidang Sosial Budaya
1. Mengimbau segenap komponen umat Islam, baik secara pribadi maupun kelompok, untuk menjadi "rahmatan lil alamin" - sumber kedamaian, kesejukan dan kebahagiaan bagi segenap pihak, baik sesama muslim maupun sesama warga negara beragama lainnya.
3. Mendesak kepada pihak pemerintah untuk segera menghapuskan ekspresi seni budaya yang bermuatan kekerasan, mistik, pornografi dan pornoaksi melalui media cetak, elektronik dan pertunjukan langsung (live), yang tidak sesuai dengan nilai budaya Islam dan ajaran Islam. Seiring dengan itu, kepada para pelaku, pengembang dan pendukung seni budaya tersebut agar dikenakan sanksi sesuai dengan hukum yang berlaku.
5. Mendukung sepenuhnya segenap upaya pemerintah dan lembaga masyarakat dalam menuntashibiskan budaya korupsi melalui jalur hukum yang dilaksanakan secara tegas dan seadil-adilnya demi kepentingan bangsa dan tanah air.
7. Mengimbau segenap komponen bangsa dan umat beragama lainnya untuk berperan serta bersama umat Islam dalam ikhtiar menumbuhkembangkan industri pariwisata Indonesia, yang bertumpu pada nilai-nilai budaya yang seiring dengan tuntutan agama Islam, yang dianut oleh mayoritas rakyat Indonesia.

Bidang Pendidikan
3. Mendukung kebijakan pemerintah dalam pemberian bantuan kepada lembaga pendidikan Islam (pesantren, madrasah, dan sejenisnya serta menyarankan agar kebijakan tersebut tetap dilanjutkan).

411
5. Menyarankan agar kebijakan pemerintah menyangkut pengintegrasian IPTEK dan IMTAK semakin ditingkatkan pada semua jenjang pendidikan.
6. Menganjurkan kepada lembaga pendidikan dan kantor-kantor untuk memberikan keluasan kepada umat Islam guna melaksanakan salat berjemaah pada waktunya
7. Dianjurkan kepada segenap lembaga pendidikan, kantor, dan tempat umum untuk menyiapkan sarana ibadah yang memadai.

**Bidang Hukum dan Perundang-Undangan**
1. Mendesak kepada lembaga eksekutif dan legislatif agar dalam menyusun aturan hukum dan perundang-undangan senantiasa dijwai syariat Islam.
2. Meminta kepada pemerintah, DPRD Provinsi, kabupaten dan kota se-Sulawesi Selatan agar dalam penyusunan Perda senantiasa searah dengan syariat Islam.
3. Mendukung kebijakan pemprov dan pemkab atau pemkot menyangkut pemberantasan buta aksara Alquran bagi peluluk agama Islam dan menyarankan agar kebijakan tersebut dijadikan Peraturan Daerah sehingga memiliki kekuatan hukum.
4. Menerbitkan pembagunan rumah ibadah dengan memperhatikan aspirasi masyarakat setempat.

**Bidang Ekonomi dan Keuangan**
1. Mengimbau umat Islam untuk senantiasa mengamalkan syariat Islam dalam kegiatan dunia usaha.
2. Mengimbau umat Islam agar lebih memanfaatkan jasa lembaga keuangan yang berbasis syariah, seperti bank, koperasi, asuransi, dsb.
3. Menyusun kepada pemerintah untuk meninjau kembali keberadaan lembaga keuangan yang berlabel Islam tapi tidak beroperasi secara syariat.

**Bidang Politik**
2. Meminta kepada pemerintah/DPRD provinsi Sulawesi Selatan untuk membentuk Tim Sosialisasi Syariat Islam sebagaimana yang telah disepakati bersama antara pemerintah provinsi Sulawesi Selatan, DPRD dan KPPSI.
4. Meminta kepada pokja pengkajian pemberlakuan syariat Islam yang dibentuk oleh paguyuban lintas fraksi anggota DPR RI asal Sulawesi Selatan untuk menindaklanjuti konsep rancangan autonomi khusus pemberlakuan syariat Islam di Sulawesi Selatan
5. Berkaitan dengan Pilkada, diserukan kepada segenap muslim dan muslimah untuk memilih pemimpin yang memiliki ikatan (komitmen) kuat terhadap penegakan Syariat Islam, dan track record yang baik (bersih dari KKN dan tidak pernah terlibat dalam pelanggaran HAM). Di samping itu, memiliki perilaku shiddiq (jujur), amanah, tabligh (transparan, komunikatif), dan fathanah (cerdas, terampil).
7. Mendesak pemerintah untuk mengoptimalkan usaha pembebasan Agus Dwikarna
8. Mendesak Pemerintah untuk lebih meningkatkan upaya mempertahankan Blok Ambalat dan menumpas secara tuntas segala bentuk gerakan terorisme dan separatisme yang mengancam keutuhan Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia (NKRI).
II. FATWA TENTANG PELAKSANAAN SYARIAT ISLAM

II. FATWA TENTANG PENERAPAN SYARIAT ISLAM

1. Dasar

1. Pengertian Syariat

Menurut istilah, perkataan syariat mempunyai arti yang luas, tidak hanya berarti hukum, tetapi mencakup pula akidah dan segala yang diperintahkan Allah. Dengan denikian, syariat mengandung arti mengesakan Allah, menyata-Nya, beriman kepada rasul-rasul-Nya, kitab-kitab-Nya dan harap pembalasan. Pendeaknya syariat mencakup segala sesuatu yang membawa seseorang menjadi Muslim. Atau dapat ditegaskan bahwa syariat itu tidak lain dari ajaran Islam secara keseluruhan yang disebut al-adl seperti yang diregaskan dalam a.1/2:13 (Surah: 13) SZA.

شرع لكم من الدين ما وصي به نوح والذى أوصينا إليك وما وصينا به إبراهيم وأوصينا به دويسى ووعيسي أن أقيموا الدين ولا تغرقوا فيه

Artinya “Dia telah menawatikan kepada kamu tentang agama, apa yang telah diwasiatkannya kepada Nabi Nuh, dan apa yang telah Kami wahi untuk kepada Ibrahim, Musa dan Isi, yaitu: tegakkanlah agama dan jangan kamu berpecah belah tentangnya”

2. Asas Penerapan Syariat

Ada tiga asas yang disepakati oleh para ahlul usul dalam menerapkan syariat yakni:

a. Asas Tidak Memberatkan

Bahtu segenap ajaran Islam tidak akan memberatkan manusia dalam pelaksanaannya. Hal ini disebabkan karena syariat selalu mempertimbangkan faktor-faktor yang memungkinkan manusia melaksanakannya, terutama faktor kemampuan (al-qudrab). Allah SWT menegaskan hal ini (Q.S.Al-

Hajj:78):

(And Dia tidak mengadakan atasma suatu kesulitan dalam agama)

Firmannya pula (Al-Baquardi: 185).
(Allah menghendaki bagimu kemudahan dan tidak menghendaki bagimu kesulitan).

Berdasarkan itu, maka segempat amal yang diperintahkan syariat selalu disertai dengan syarat kemampuan (istith‘ah) bagi orang mukallaf, baik istith‘ah secara individu maupun istith‘ah secara kolektif sosial. Seperti diketahui bahwa syariat Islam bertujuan mewujudkan kemashlahan bagi manusia. Karena itu, maka perintah dan larangan sudah harus bebas dari kesan memberatkan manusia, sehingga satu aspek dari kemashlahan itu sendiri ialah terwujudnya kemudahan-kemashlahan.

Sehingga syariat Islam mengandung berbagai kesulitan atau membiarkan kehidupan manusia mengalami kesulitan, niscaya syariat Islam itu sendiri kehilangan misinya untuk mewujudkan kemashlahan bagi manusia. Dan jika ini benar maka syariat tak akan pernah menyulitkan manusia.

b. Asas Tidak Memperbanyak Beban

Sejalan dengan asas pertama di atas, syariat tidak mempunyai banyak tuntutan atas manusia. Syariat datang demi kepentingan manusia, bukan untuk mengeksploitasi mereka. Karena itu tuntutan tuntutan syariat tidak lebih dari batas kewajaran yang menurut kadarnya akan memberi manfaat bagi kemashlahan. Dengan demikian, syariat tidak akan memberi perintah dan larangan yang dapat memerankan atau memudahkan manusia ibadah-ibadah yang diperintahkan Tuhan tidak pernah melebihi kemampuan manusia itu sendiri, sebagaimana firman Allah Q.S.Al-Baqarah: 286):


(Allah tidak membebankan sesorang melainkan sesuai dengan keseimbangannya. Ia mendapat bala (dari kelujurungan) yang dinaikanannya dan ia mendapat siksa (dari kejahanan) yang dikeluarkannya (Mereka berdosa): "Ya Tuhan kami, janganlah Engkau hukum kami jika kami lupa atau kami tersalah. Ya Tuhan kami, janganlah Engkau bebankan kepada kami beban yang berat sebagaimana Engkau bebankan kepada orang-orang yang sebelum kami. Ya Tuhan kami, janganlah Engkau pukulkan kepada kami apa yang tak sanggup kami memikulnya. Beri mal ahli kami, ampunilah kami, dan rahmatilah kami. Engkaulah Penolong kami, maka tolonglah kami terhadap kaum yang kafir".)

415
c. Asas *Al-Tidarruj* (Bertahap)


Salah satu kasus yang paling sering dijadikan contoh menyangkut asas bertahap ini ialah larangan minum khamar. Khamar dilarang tidak seketika, tetapi melalui tiga tahap. Tahap pertama ialah ketika Tuhan menunjukkan bahwa khamar itu mengandung lebih banyak dosa daripada manfaatnya. Hal ini ditunjukkan oleh Al-Qur'an (*Q.S. Al-Baqarah*): 219-

> يسألونك عن الخمر والبيسر قل فهما إثم كبير ومنافع للناس وإنهم ما أحكموا من نفعهما

Artinya: Mereka bertanya kepada kamu tentang minum khamar dan judi, katakan bahwa di dalamnya terdapat dosa besar dan manfaat bagi manusia, dan dosanya lebih besar daripada manfaatnya.

Pada tahap pertama ini, larangan minum khamar belum tegas, dan terkesan mentolerir. Akan tetapi, ketika ternyata kebiasaan buruk itu mengganggu pelaksanaan shalat lima waktu, maka larangan tahap berikutnya pun datang lagi (*Q.S. Al-Nisa*): 13-

> يا أيها الذين عاصروا لا تقربوا الصلاة وأنتم سكارى حتى تعلموا ما تقولون

Artinya: Hai sekalian orang beriman, janganlah kamu mendekati shalat sedang kamu dalam keadaan mabuk, sampai kamu menyadari apa yang kamu katakan.

Larangan dalam ayat ini masih menyisahkan kesan bahwa syariat masih membolehkan minum khamar, asal tidak mabuk dalam shalat. Namun, kesan itu akhirnya dihapus sama sekali dengan datangnya larangan pada tahap ketiga, setelah adanya penegakan dalam ayat yang berikut (*Q.S. Al-`ai`Adh*: 90):

> يا أيها الذين عاصروا إنا الخمر والبيسر والأنصاب والأزلام رجس من عمل الشيطان فلتنجبوت

Lelakukan Tertahap

Artinya: Hai sekalian orang beriman, sesungguhnya khamar, judi, penyembahan berhala, dan
Undi nasib adalah perbuatan keji, termasuk perbuatan Syaitan, maka tinggalkanlah agar kamu dapat beruntung.


MENFATWAKAN:

Berdasarkan alasan — alasan di atas, maka Musyawarah Daerah Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI) Propinsi Sulawesi Selatan, dengan bertawakkal kepada Allah SWT, memfatwakan sebagai berikut:

1. Bahwa Syairat dalam arti luas, harus dilaksanakan dan ditegakkan dengan melalui dari kesadaran peribadi individu masing — masing, meliputi aqidah, ibadah dan akhlak.

2. Syairat Islam, dengan bertumpu pada pemahaman, penghayatan dan pengamalan dari invidiu, akan tumbuh menjadi etos kultural dalam kehidupan sosial yang menjiwa segenap perilaku umat Islam dalam segala tataran dan aspek kehidupannya.

3. Dari masyarakat yang memiliki kultur Syairat Islam itu, tanpa disertai kekerasan, niscaya akanlah norma dan produk lukum yang dijawi sepenuhnya oleh Syairat itu sendiri yang pada gilirannya mendinkung penerapan Syairat secara persuasif dan damai dalam menumbuhkan kebijakan dan memberantas munkarat.

4. Para Pemimpin Muslim, utamanya Pejabat, hendaknya menggunakan kewenangan yang ada untuk menciptakan suasana yang kondusif di lingkungannya bagi tumbuhnya Syairat Islam secara persuasif, kultural, dan bertahap dalam menjalankan amar ma'ruf nabi munkar.

Makassar, 18 Nopember 2000.

DEWAN PIMPINAN MAJELIS ULMIA INDONESIA
(MUI) PROPINSI SULAWESI SELATAN

Ketua

Sekretaris Umum


DR. H. Abd. Rahim Yunus, MA.