RE-COLONISATION AND INDIGENOUS RESISTANCE

NEOLIBERALISM IN THE PACIFIC

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A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy of the Australian National University.

October 2002
Declaration

I hereby certify that this thesis is the result of my own independent research and all sources used have been duly acknowledged.

Signed: 
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Date:
Acknowledgements

The journey, which this thesis embodies, has taken me to so many geographical and intellectual spaces that it would be difficult to track all those who have made their imprints, be they wind, salty sea spray, scrub desert plains, libraries, pubs, air-conditioned offices, chefs, activists, politicians and economists. At one level I understand that most theses are caught up with and challenge the author’s identity and political visions, but somehow I have also been unprepared for having to negotiate through the difficult questions and re-visionary aspects of this thesis. Thankfully I have had wonderful support to both trouble me further and to point out some landmarks to follow.

I would like firstly to thank my supervisor Barry Hindess, for rescuing and inspiring me through so many of the tribulations and joys of the thesis process. He has made this project exciting right to the very end, even when he was overseas.

A great many thanks to my advisors Stephen Levine and Peter Larmour for reading drafts and providing helpful advice. For being supplementary advisors, enormous thanks to: Bruce Buchan, Jane Kelsey, Greg Rawlings and Damian O’Leary.

For interviews while on fieldwork, thanks to Michael J. Shapiro, Scott Kroeker, Claire Slatter, Henry Vira, Rex Horoi, Susan Cox, Francis Hickey, Alumita Durutalo, Shelly Rao, Robert Nicole and Hilda Lini.

I would also like to acknowledge several sources that provided me with the crucial financial assistance, which enabled me to begin and complete this work. Thanks to: the Aotearoa New Zealand Ministry of Education for the Maori Post-Graduate Award; The Maori Education Trust for the Rangiriri and Whiwhi Martin Winiata Scholarship; The New Zealand Federation of University Women for the New Zealand Fellowship of Graduate Women; the Faculty of Arts ANU for fieldwork funding; the Australian National University for the Graduate School PhD
Acknowledgements

Scholarship and last, but certainly not least, the Puawai Trust for their substantial and ongoing contribution.

Thanks to everyone in the Political Science Program, Research School of Social Sciences many of whom Wittily and often unwittingly inspired my progress, particularly thanks to Mary Hapel for the regular cups of ‘teeeeeea!’ and laughter. Special thanks also to all the postgraduate students, in the Faculty of Arts, RSPAS and RSSS who have made life at ANU immensely more enjoyable.

Particular thanks also to:
Kosuke Shimizu for initially encouraging my decision to pursue a PhD. For dancing, bakery trips, Baghdad eggs, digestive beers, Buffy and Angel, life advice, film theorisation, poetic inspiration and so much laughter and love, Katerina Teaiwa, Zoë Pearson, Katrina LeeKoo, Nelly Lahoud, Greg Rawlings, David Kennedy, Candie Tanaka and Catherine Mills – I owe you all too much – immeasurable thanks for keeping me alive. For delicious home cooked dinners, addictive cake at Bernadette’s, deconstructing and re-constructing Maori identity and loads of other wonderful encouragement and support thanks to Manu, Beth, Anateira and Tamaira Greener-Barcham, Bruce Buchan, Kathryn Seymour, Jo Diamond, Tanira Kingi and Brett Bowden. To Saeed Urrehman for unrelenting analysis and constantly challenging all the beliefs I ever held dear thank you. For musings over the definitions of justice, thank you Ted Thomas, Christos Mantziaris and Damian O’Leary, I continue to ponder the ‘perverse logic’ of the legal system. Big esso to John Harvey for showing me Uluru, by rain, stars and sun and providing me with, literally, the desert solitude to write my first chapter. To my grandfather Koro who also made room for me to write a chapter and debate Foucault with him at the Horohoro farm, lots of love. To Jane Kelsey for being such an inspiration and reassuring me that I could make it- thank you. To Matire Ropiha, Tere Harrison, Tanja Schutz and Teanau Tuiono for visiting, keeping me ‘activist-ing’ and sending mp3’s from Wellington on this hard road, ka nui te mihi, ka nui te aroha hoki.

Ki oku tupuna, ara, koutou kua wheturangitia, na koutou ano toku ara i whakamarama. Tena rawa atu koutou, awhina tonu mai. Ko te tumanako, ka rite tenei mahi oku ki tetahi puna wai, ma reira e whai kaha ai nga toa o nga ra kei te heke mai. To my ancestors who have become the stars, you have also helped me on this path. Thank you - I look forward to your continued support. The hope is that this work will be like a spring, which will help strengthen others in days yet to come.

To Robyn, Brian, my lovely ‘little’ brother Kapua and the rest of my family who always provide so much loving warmth, energy and enthusiasm for all that I do – kei te mihi. You have all helped navigate me through and put up with so much on the way: my ranting, tears, de-colonisation, paint cans, chattering, laughter, endless drafts and so much more, arohapounamu ki a koutou. At least now I can come home.
In this thesis I argue that neoliberal agendas and policies being embedded in the Pacific, utilising multiple authors, indirect rule, institutionalisation and normalisation, are akin to colonisation and can aptly be described as re-colonisation. Many of these practices are not new: rather they continue long-standing Western practices particularly relating to the perception of non-Western peoples.

I argue further that these neoliberal policies and agendas are inadequate for the Pacific in various ways. They are inadequate because the values and ideals underpinning neoliberalism contribute to narrow perceptions of Indigenous peoples in the Pacific as incapable of properly governing themselves and of Indigenous cultures as obstacles to ‘development’. These perceptions often continue to be expressed overtly, but are also newly articulated and govern through Indigenous structures and identities.

I argue that developing a broader understanding of Indigenous resistance assists us to comprehend Indigenous peoples and to see their cultures, not as rigidified structures fixed in time and awaiting foreign governing, but rather as dynamic and living practices. Re-imagining indigeneity and resistance also assists us in moving beyond a simplistic binary of re-colonisation and resistance to more nuanced understandings.

By complicating neoliberal agendas I seek to question how forms of knowledge, which dominate policies for states and academic disciplines that claim to be able to account for the Pacific, such as international relations and international political economy, come to dominate if they are based on and perpetuated utilising such inadequate ideas.

I suggest that if neoliberalism holds such currency in the Pacific and yet is so inadequate, then perhaps there are other forms of knowledge equally dominant, which require reconceptualising. By creating more complex propositions I hope not only to make neoliberal policies and agendas appear untenable, but also the more long-standing Western perceptions of non-Western people, of which neoliberalism is a powerful element.
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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION – IN FROM THE MARGINS

When I first began my studies in International Relations I had a hard task absorbing the foreign-ness of the literature considered ‘standard’. Theories from dusty white men from the other side of the world about the ‘major’ ‘powers’ and the centres of their universe, Britain and the United States were proffered as also of utmost relevance to my fellow New Zealanders and myself. Flipping through textbook after textbook I hunted fruitlessly for the Pacific, Indigenous theories or someone who would resemble the people I knew engaging in internationally concerned activities.

It also took me an extended period of time to realise that many of my experiences at home and overseas were actually part of this discipline called International Relations despite being marginalized or excluded altogether. I realised that the activities I had taken part in were considered ‘radical’ or marginal to the ‘actual’ operations of world affairs. I discovered that the knowledge and experiences I had absorbed and observed were not considered as reliable evidence. I had heard people’s stories; I had participated in people’s lives and in political struggles yet
these did not count. What counted, I learnt, were particular stories, particular peoples’ lives and particular political struggles, as laid down by the victor, so to speak. This situation was disconcerting to put it mildly.

My original purpose for pursuing a PhD had been based on the assumption that words could be weapons, and very useful ones. Later, Subcomandante Marcos attested to and provided further inspiration of this fact. Writing from the jungles of eastern Mexico, he articulated the fight of Indigenous peoples there against neoliberal policies, in particular the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). A collection of his words from Zapatista terrain in Chiapas entitled Our Word is Our Weapon captured his intense and personal struggle with neoliberalism and much of the injustice which accompanied it. Marcos’s articulations had several implications which are of significance here. Firstly, he reasserted the presence of Indigenous peoples in world affairs. He made blatant the very local connections between what was occurring for Indigenous peoples in Mexico and the ensemble of neoliberal policies being imposed on Mexico mainly by the United States government and companies. His words, sent around the world through cyber/internet space provided great inspiration for other Indigenous movements, including in the Pacific.

In addition, Marcos demonstrated the possibility of being an intellectual in a jungle. By analysing and providing a critique of NAFTA in a form familiar to academics he made that struggle plausible for academics. By implication he challenged the boundaries which governed what counts as academic work and what counts as activism. His work contributed to drawing together the strands of knowledge construction and exercises of resistance.

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I initially sought to equate all kinds of activism with academic work; ‘theory as practice’. And while I still believe that academic work can be activism, it also has a different timeframe from the more spectacular forms of activism, what I like to describe as a ‘plodding activism’.

My involvement in the anti-Multilateral Agreement on Investment and Tino Rangatiratanga movements in Aotearoa New Zealand provided me with my enemy, neoliberalism, and it would be difficult to deny that I began this thesis hoping to strike a lethal and academic blow at that enemy.\(^2\) I sought to construct my thesis as an overt and compelling account of not only what was wrong with neoliberalism itself, but also how destructive the effects of neoliberal policies are. I did not seek to direct my arguments at neoliberal advocates, rather I wanted to provide a literature for activists in the struggle against neoliberal policies being experienced on a daily basis in ordinary activities. In opposition to neoliberal policies I envisaged an Indigenous resistance which had to be solidly asserted.

I came to see however, that representing one’s opponent as a monolith is not always the best way to achieve one’s ends, particularly not in academic work. Attacking in an overt manner assumes a level of certainty which deflects nuanced understandings. And it is perhaps the same practice conducted by those one may be seeking to oppose. It is also difficult to attack a reification, a reified collection of practices when this may also be just what neoliberals argue it to be, devoid of social context.

From this view it became important to see neoliberalism in context, that is, to examine where it fits in practices of constituting knowledge and truth. If it was not a unity, on its own, an enclosed set of economic ideas prescribed to countries then what was it? It became apparent that neoliberal ideas do not stand alone and in

\(^2\) The Tino Rangatiratanga movement is the Maori independence movement.
many respects continue particular long-standing Western practices towards non-Western people. For this reason re-colonisation became an appropriate term to describe what is occurring in the Pacific, because the practices of colonisation were the initiation of these Western practices in most of the Pacific.

In this thesis I am not explicitly interested however, in identifying specific Western practices and attempting to trace them back to particular points in time. What I am interested in is something far more modest: the way in which neoliberal policies and agendas are part of re-colonisation in the Pacific and Indigenous resistance to these practices.

The policies and agendas I am describing in this thesis as neoliberal contain continuities and discontinuities with liberalism. It is not the central focus of this thesis however, to pinpoint these changes between neoliberalism and liberalism. Which aspects of neoliberalism are ‘new’ and if they are partially or completely ‘new’ and what even constitutes ‘new-ness’ is not my central concern. The differences which I would like to note largely concern the extent to which many neoliberal values are now more often articulated utilising the structures or identities to be reformed. Many liberal techniques of governing however, often involved to a greater extent the exclusion or elimination of different structures and identities as pre-requisites for reform. For this reason, as I will discuss in Chapter Two, perceptions of Indigenous peoples as less or incapable of, governing themselves underlie but are not as overt in neoliberal rhetoric as perhaps they were in liberalism. Neoliberalism also extends and applies market principles to far more areas of concern than liberalism, crucially shifting the boundaries between what constitutes public and private and political and economic spheres.

In addition to encountering problems with my attempt to construe and attack a neoliberal entity, I also discovered that I could not easily prescribe Indigenous
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resistance as possessing all the answers. As part of my elaboration of Indigenous resistance I have been forced to research areas which often deeply troubled me about indigeneity but which I had feared to confront in case the cohesion and therefore (in my mind) strength of Indigenous movements would fall apart. I did not want to be critical in a way that could be used against Indigenous movements.

I have realised that constructing a thesis as a project about good and bad is not only difficult to pursue, but that this very construction is part of a deeper issue concerning academic work, and the connection of academic work to the practices of domination that I was seeking to critique. The most serious pitfall of working in terms of a binary of this kind is that the researcher is tempted to reproduce a particular truth. In this sense, the researcher reproduces the idea that there is the potential for a singular truth to exist. And furthermore that some peoples possess this superior truth and others do not. What is reproduced is a hierarchy, standards of superiority through to inferiority.

I never assumed that neoliberal policies and agendas operated alone, rather they need the assistance of institutions, including academic ones to operate. What has become more apparent to me however, is the depth that the disciplines of knowledge within which I am working are also complicit in the context of the work. In many cases, this includes even seemingly progressive locations where these disciplines claim to be interested in ‘allowing’ or even helping marginalised voices to speak. Those who ‘allow’ these marginalised voices amplification are often not receptive to more radical suggestions for the entire restructuring of academic institutions and consequently their positions.

In this thesis therefore, I argue that Indigenous peoples are right to be suspicious of the terms of their inclusion and marginalisation in the theory and practice of International Relations (IR) and International Political Economy (IPE). I argue that
the inclusion of the thinking, practices and resistances of the Indigenous peoples of
the Pacific could enrich and benefit the studies of International Relations (IR) and
International Political Economy (IPE). The inadequacies of these areas of study,
particularly in light of the dominant role that neoliberalism plays in them, have very
real positive and negative implications ‘on the ground’. The inadequacies of
neoliberalism, IR and IPE make it vital, not that theorists ‘get it right’ for surely
there is never one single true account of the world, but that they consider many
alternatives. To also utilise more complex understandings of Indigenous practices
and resistances may enable a change in attitudes and practices towards Indigenous
peoples. This is the challenge facing the students, theorists and practitioners of IR
and IPE.

What is significant about Indigenous peoples in the Pacific is that, as mentioned
above, re-colonising attempts are being made to govern them through many kinds
of organisational structures, be it the state, tribes or a set of ideas which constitute
‘culture’. These attempts can never be entirely successful however, as Indigenous
organisations and relationships embody practices of resistance which undermine re-
colonisation. In the process of resisting, Indigenous peoples are seeking to
strengthen mechanisms and practices which further complicate future re-colonising.

By Indigenous resistance and culture I am referring to what James Scott has
described as “ordinary weapons of relatively powerless groups”,3 and Michel de
Certeau as the practices of “making do”4, that is, the living and continually
changing sets of activities including with particular kinds of continuities, practised
by Indigenous peoples. If Indigenous culture is categorised as a particular and fixed
set of practices then those practices become targetable, as aptly demonstrated by
Stephanie Lawson in her book, Tradition versus Democracy, in which she renders the

4 Michel de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, Berkeley: University of California Press,
1984, p. 29.
cultures, traditions and identities of Indigenous peoples as impediments, not only to democracy, but implicitly to the supposed grand benefits of the West: modernity and human improvement. She claims that this is, above all, not her intention. Rather she argues that she seeks to be critical for the benefit of those Indigenous peoples being oppressed by new expressions of ‘traditional’ tyranny.

There are several levels upon which Lawson’s work is problematic and discussion of her work will serve to introduce some of the major themes of this thesis. Lawson positions herself as a ‘neutral’ critic. She says her position is neither ‘insider’ nor ‘outsider’. She argues that she seeks to voice the concerns of many parties who fear to confront Indigenous ‘insider’ views. She claims to reject a “safe” or “popular” argument but rather claims to derive her understanding from being an “external supporter of democratic values” but also “from the perspective of those in Fiji, Tonga and Western Samoa who do not necessarily accept the eternal legitimacy of so-called natural Indigenous hierarchies and who have provided the major internal impetus for movements promoting democratisation”. She claims therefore, to be outside the contexts of colonisation or any necessary decolonisation.

Her critique focuses on ‘indigenous traditionalist elites’, whom she accuses of widespread hypocrisy relating to their decision-making and leadership positions. She accuses these Indigenous elites of utilising a rigid concept of tradition merely to maintain their privilege and political power. Traditions are deployed, she argues, “by political elites for particular purposes”. She claims that it is these elites which create dichotomies of ‘tradition versus the West’ and ‘insider versus outsider’, which are then used to protect those same elites by delegitimising criticism from

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‘external’ opposition, like herself, Lawson argues, but also internal calls for change. These dichotomies are false she argues, because elements of supposed ‘traditions’ have incorporated Western aspects and supposed insiders are often Western educated.

Lawson argues that her interest lies in examining the motivation of those involved in utilising the ‘tradition’ agenda. However, she displays little interest in the kinds of broader, historical and structural issues which might suggest restrained contexts for the kinds of ‘choices’ these leaders make. Lawson’s discussion is not contextualised with relation to colonisation and she produces a discussion in which the impact of international relations on the Pacific is not assessed. There is no suggestion that the kinds of impositions being made from external sources pose serious and real threats which may have to be catered for in particularly limited ways by Indigenous leaders. Lawson’s conflict appears to be more with peoples who may be expressing reluctance to continue to accord her Western values and worldview the privilege they may have held during colonial times.

The focus of Lawson’s argument appears misplaced. Whether there have been incidences of hypocrisy and corruption is not the central question here, these incidences exist everywhere. What appears to be more significant is the purpose of her charges. She specifically criticises Indigenous elites, but in a sense this extends to a wider Indigenous community, for their attempts to adopt and adapt various Western concepts and institutions while also rejecting others. Assuming that there is no consistency to Indigenous actions, why does Lawson insist that there should be across Pacific states and times? Why can Pacific leaders and people not determine in a changing or even irrational (if it is that) fashion which concepts and institutions to adopt and which to reject? Since Lawson’s critique implicitly creates a division between the ‘elite’ and the ‘rest’, one has to question why she did not conduct her analysis as a ‘class’ analysis. Perhaps the answer lies in the underlying implication
of her argument that it is largely Pacific traditions per se which frustrate development and human improvement, not merely the ‘elites’ she claims to be critiquing.

Lawson’s conflation of Pacific traditions, cultures and identities appears to commit the same form of reification which she accuses Indigenous peoples/elites of. ‘Tradition’ from this view is a tool which can be applied, appealed to and rejected at will. It is a tool, she argues, utilised by people for their own largely individualistic reasons. Is Lawson therefore arguing that ‘traditionalist’ arguments can be regarded as expressions of, and compatible with, the self-maximising behaviour attributed to individuals by some forms of liberalism? And that beneath a façade of ‘tradition’, Indigenous peoples could be improved to reveal their true nature? One aspect, which Lawson avoids addressing here, is what the customs practiced by Indigenous peoples across the Pacific are, if ‘tradition’ is what is acted out at the discretion of and by elites? Are they practising ‘culture’? Or is Lawson suggesting elites have a monopoly on ‘tradition’? Important to the discussion here is the perception that tradition (in this form) is attributed with a burden of proof; a burden to prove a set of characteristics (set by outsiders) and failing that is to be judged as not authentic.

To confound Lawson’s argument we could ask, in which ways could Indigenous peoples live their cultures, identities and traditions that would be acceptable to Lawson? Or put another way, what is unacceptable about Indigenous peoples basing their cultures, identities and traditions on past articulations and practices and determining ways to define and re-define these for the future? Asking these questions highlights Lawson’s critique as not the critical and neutral voice which she claims, rather it is indebted to a hierarchised perception of traditions and cultures, with European intellectual and political institutional structures at the pinnacle.
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At one point in the book Lawson compares the situations she has described as equivalent to what took place in “early English conservative thought”.\(^8\) What Lawson exposes here is not only a linear perception of history but one which assumes the superiority of Western systems. She implies these Western systems have been negotiated and perfected over hundreds of years, while Pacific states were still ‘primitive’. As a component of this hierarchical perception, Lawson argues that it is liberalism which has the potential for creating a more respectful community and interactions in the Pacific. She argues,

\[\text{(a)ppreciation and toleration of cultural or ethnic difference between groups is among one of the most positive aspects of liberal thought (broadly understood) and notions of cultural relativism have assisted enormously in overcoming the crudest forms of racism.}\]

While Lawson places considerable faith in liberal thought, I would like to argue however, that liberal thought does retain a hierarchy of peoples and cultures, which has not changed far from other arguments of colonialism and standards of civilisation.\(^9\) Lawson rightly points out that liberalism does appreciate and tolerate cultural or ethnic difference. Perhaps Lawson has therein provided a valuable clue as to how liberalism does consider these cultural and ethnic differences. First, they are viewed as appreciable, to place a price on or simply to commodify cultures, either as part of an opportunity cost or exploitable resources, and secondly as tolerable, to view as existing and different but as an obstacle to the ideals of ‘improvement’.

The most intriguing aspect of Lawson’s work is her insistence that any modifications or adaptations, minor or large, of tradition or democracy can only result in new forms of exploitation. There appears to be little hope for positive change in such a view. What Lawson is drawing on here is a literature which

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\(^8\) Lawson, 1996, p. 171-172.

remains committed to viewing Indigenous peoples and cultures as incompatible with the supposedly superior political and economic organisations of the West.\textsuperscript{10}

The way that Lawson has described Indigenous cultures seems to suggest that any discussion of indigeneity is opportunism. Being opportunistic in Lawson's terms means that traditions are invented specifically to maintain elite power and all claims to these ‘traditions’ must be inauthentic and any critiques by these elites of particular systems and institutions on the basis that they are incompatible with ‘tradition’, must be opportunistic.

I would suggest that the very reified concept of ‘tradition’, which Lawson proposes, lends itself rather too easily to being an obstacle to democracy and neoliberal policies for ‘reform’. Conceiving of Indigenous cultures, identities and traditions as more like dynamic exercises of resistance and power, may contribute to a removal of this sense of obstruction and easy prescriptions of reform. Exploring Indigenous resistances might demonstrate that they should at least be considered, not as ‘mere’ obstacles or separated as ‘mere’ culture. By emphasising Indigenous peoples’ cultures, traditions and identities as ‘resistance’ may help us to emphasise the active, dynamic nature of Indigenous identities, and move away from more fixed notions which render Indigenous peoples passive, as objects of their ‘culture’ or ‘elites’ and whose active nature can only be realised by liberal rule.

\textbf{BACK TO IR}

Lawson is not the first theorist of IR or other realms of study to demonstrate such doubt in the capabilities, cultures, identities and traditions of Indigenous peoples.

The issues raised here surrounding the ‘traditions’, which Lawson discusses are often considered by IR theorists, as best suited for Pacific area studies or

anthropology for analysis, while IR and its subsection of IPE remain unencumbered by ‘new’ areas of concern and committed to investigating ‘bigger’ issues,\(^{11}\) that is, bigger states, bigger economies and their balances of power. Robert Keohane’s speech to the International Studies Association in 1988 represented one of many examples recommending a ‘return to basics’ approach to IR, particularly later in the ‘wake’ of the Cold War. Keohane argued that while opponents, the ‘reflectivists’ of ‘rationalistic’ theories may have a worthwhile case regarding the expansion of areas of concern for IR and IPE, in particular a focus on the marginalised, they will remain on the margins of the field and largely invisible unless they formulate a “research program” with “testable theories” and “systematic empirical investigations”.\(^{12}\) In short, Keohane is arguing that the reflectivists and others marginalized in IR must conform to the dominant ways of theorising IR in order to be heard. This would in effect mean that they should place their values and beliefs to the side and become that which they are critiquing. For many on the margins this is untenable.

Keohane provides an apt example of the inability of dominant theorists to understand that defining does matter, that theorising about who gets to define and what is defined does not “take us away from the study of our subject matter”\(^{13}\), but instead matters a great deal for what is picked at all for our subject matter. The subject matter of IR is not a logical and natural selection of ‘what is’ in the ‘real

\(^{11}\) I use the capitalised International Relations and International Political Economy to indicate the academic areas of study. I am not suggesting that there is an absolute distinction between the disciplines and ‘practice of IR and IPE. In fact my argument here will be that the two are inextricable. Additionally I am not suggesting that IPE as a subsection of IR is separable from IR more generally.

\(^{12}\) Keohane explains that the reflectivists are those who “emphasize the importance of ‘intersubjective meanings’ of international institutional activity”. The rationalists he argues are realists and neorealists who accept that behaviour can be judged objectively and that ‘substantive rationality generates hypotheses about actual human behaviour only when it is combined with auxiliary assumptions about the structure of utility functions and the formation of exceptions’. Robert O Keohane, “International Institutions: Two Approaches”, *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 32, 1988, p. 381, 392-393.

\(^{13}\) Ibid, p. 382.
world’ rather it is picked by people for particular reasons: theories and theorists are inextricable from theorising.14

Marysia Zalewski argues that one avenue to move beyond the impasse of IR monologues could occur by taking seriously the voices of the peoples at the margins as a way of gaining a clearer insight into “how the artifices of international politics are constructed”.15 These kinds of strategies could “disturb the existing boundaries of both what we claim to be relevant in international politics and what we assume to be legitimate ways of constructing knowledge about the world”.16

The theoretical attempt to render Indigenous peoples to ‘culturally concerned’ areas of study removes the likelihood of investigating Indigenous resistances as providing serious options for political economic change.17 Likewise Indigenous incorporation in IR on Keohane’s terms would undermine the very issues Indigenous peoples are struggling for.

This was aptly captured by the now oft quoted phrase from Henry Kissinger about planned nuclear tests on Christmas Island in the Pacific Ocean, “(t)here are only 90,000 people there who gives a damn?”18 His comments suggest not only that Indigenous peoples are not as important as nuclear tests, but also that there would not be enough people to care about what would happen to them either.

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16 Ibid, p. 352.
17 Indigenous resistances take various forms through text, physical protests and through the promotion of Indigenous customs and alternatives.
For many conservative practitioners of IR and IPE, like Keohane, Indigenous peoples are welcome to explore diversities and complexities but these can be catered for most adequately in other disciplines such as cultural or area studies. And in cultural and area studies, Indigenous peoples have been able to develop theories incorporating the values and traditions of their societies. IR and IPE are still resistant however, to incorporating these ways of thinking. This may be because they consider the thought too complex or irrelevant, or because incorporation may expose the simplicity of the models being used to describe states and economies. This continues to have very real implications for the way in which Indigenous peoples and Pacific states are treated by international institutions and other states.

This is not to argue that Indigenous peoples and the Pacific are always absent from IR and IPE. They are mentioned, albeit in particular and brief ways, they are referred to as creating difficulties for the functioning of state and economy or as regrettable cases of the sometimes uneven nature of world economic growth. This conception of Indigenous peoples stems from very narrow notions of Indigenous cultures which lend these cultures to being defined as ‘obstacles’. In terms of the broader IR and IPE disciplines, Indigenous peoples, are not accorded any central significance however, over the play of the most ‘powerful’. As a result, a static, narrow picture of Indigenous peoples as obstacles is retained while broader complexities and other definitions of Indigenous resistance continue to be dismissed to the margins.

If we think about the location of Indigenous peoples; with states, within states, across the geographical terrain of states and as often disturbing state-making either in violent or non-violent ways, it appears odd to suggest that they best remain outside the boundaries of IR and IPE. Including Indigenous peoples within IR would raise, perhaps unwanted questions of how Indigenous peoples and Indigenous knowledge have been rendered to a marginalised position. Moreover,
questions would need to be raised over the forms of Indigenous knowledge and why they might be rendered inferior to other forms of knowledge. All these questions might subsequently raise doubts not only about what is studied in the discipline of IR and IPE, but also why the world is in the shape that it is.

In this sense IR and IPE provide an inadequate picture of the roles that Indigenous peoples could play in relation to wealth-making, world affairs and strategies for change. Advocates of neoliberalism, principally dominating the accounts of IPE, would argue that they do have the strategies for change. These strategies place the burden on Indigenous peoples to adapt and ‘keep up’ and to transform the obstacles embodied within their (narrowly defined) cultures as a significant step in the process. Neoliberal advocates acknowledge the differences and regional specificities articulated by Indigenous movements about cultures and ways of living insofar as these contribute to variations on a general theme of ‘obstacle-ness’. It has been argued that, in one sense neoliberal theorists often do not pay much attention to culture. And while this may be true in the sense that more complex understandings of culture are marginalized in accounts of the economy, neoliberals are increasingly finding it convenient to conflate ‘culture’ and ‘failing’ institutions in order to insist upon their ideas of ‘reform’. This fusion of Indigenous cultures with institutions which are ‘failing’ is part of a justification that these cultures are backward and obstacles to progressive (neoliberal) human ideals.

For Indigenous peoples this marginalisation and underestimation of their capabilities, alternatives and rights is frustrating and resisted on many levels. It is frustrating not to be accorded respect, even after achieving one of the supposed benchmarks for ‘civilization’: statehood. Placed with the burdens of proving ‘civilised-ness’, Indigenous peoples attempt on several levels to demonstrate their equality. Some of these strategies involve the acquisition of neoliberal institutions and the implementation of neoliberal policies. However, many also involve the
pursuit of alternatives which seek to strengthen cultures as they are being lived, through the promotion of customs and languages and which seek to interact with the market economy in ways that acknowledge the importance and active protection of the environment.

These issues are of particular relevance to the Indigenous peoples of the Pacific many of whom, as rulers of independent states, are presented with neoliberal policies and strategies as models for improvement. Neoliberal policies are insisted upon by a variety of sources, including international, regional and national institutions, as well as being espoused by more local sources such as a number of NGOs. These multifarious, yet prescribed sets of practices are perceived by many in the Pacific as strongly reminiscent of practices of colonisation. Numerous Indigenous scholars and Indigenous resistance movements have provided examples of ways that Indigenous thinking and practices could enhance livelihoods in the Pacific, and that an unwillingness to include these will be potentially detrimental to Pacific development, and thus constitute a form of ‘re-colonisation’.

For many Indigenous peoples it is difficult to separate the connotation of colonialism from research conducted amongst, about or suggested to Indigenous peoples. In this sense both the practices of neoliberalism, and the disciplines of IR and IPE are often seen as implicated in the context of colonisation by many Indigenous peoples. It is this combination of theory and practice which has been theorised as re-colonisation. Re-colonisation will be explicated in this thesis as involving multiple authors, and operating through indirect, largely non-military methods which are then institutionalised and normalised.
Chapter One: In From The Margins

Linda Tuhiwai Smith has argued that to stop theoretical re-colonising, any research which affects Indigenous peoples requires a decolonising of methodologies.\textsuperscript{19} Such a decolonising of methodologies in Smith’s view, would include not only a deconstruction of Western scholarship but also a focus on issues and activities being discussed and taking place in Indigenous communities, and thereby re-writing over one of the “underlying codes of imperialism and colonialism,”\textsuperscript{20} that being, research itself. Methodologies must be decolonised, she argues in order to understand more ethical research practices, which respect the rights of Indigenous peoples. The IR and IPE disciplines and dominant ways of thinking therein, like neoliberalism, could benefit from this process. They all require decolonisation, that is, to become more self conscious of the kinds of knowledge that are privileged over others and intrinsic to which is a more comprehensive investigation of Indigenous resistances and their potential. By better understanding Indigenous resistances we may understand how neoliberalism, IR, IPE and studies of the Pacific can potentially be reconstructed to understand and help re-shape the world. Conceiving of Indigenous cultures, identities and traditions as more dynamic and as resistances (either mini, everyday or huge resistances), may contribute to a perception of their potential rather than the ways in which they are supposedly obstacles.

The underestimation of Indigenous resistances by neoliberal advocates is significant not merely because it is a dimension considered less important, but is also relevant for what it tells us about the way that some regions, peoples and areas of study are perceived and taught as more important and superior than others. What is important, is that the basis upon which power relationships are developed and maintained, such as in the IPE ‘discipline’, is closely connected with similar power relationships in international political economic practices.


\textsuperscript{20} Ibid, p. 7.
My argument in this thesis is articulated in one sense on a regional scale. I am not utilising the conventionally segregated divisions of ‘Melanesia, Micronesia and Polynesia’. Instead I chose to leave the ‘Pacific’ somewhat permeable. This permeability supports my argument for the re-shaping of disciplines and their contents. Understandably the kind of study undertaken at a regional level may be unable to include specificities which a village level study might engender. The most significant benefit however, for analysis at this level is that it provides a view of neoliberal practices in the Pacific as not just random, nor isolated prescriptions and events but as containing some systematic nature, much like colonialism.

In Chapter Two, I outline neoliberalism and explore the continuities with liberalism, particularly the way that liberalism and liberal proponents have often been involved with or concerned about colonial enterprises. I then examine the two most common justifications for neoliberal policies, that is, to produce market efficiency and achieve economic growth. In the Pacific this is combined with justifications which suggest there is an urgency for Pacific states to ‘reform’ before they become ‘out of synch’ with the world. I suggest that it is exactly these kinds of neoliberal arguments which demonstrate the neoliberal perception that despite their status as independent states, Pacific peoples continue to be incapable of ruling or organising their countries, economies and people. This chapter establishes the way that I will define neoliberalism throughout this thesis and particularly with relation to re-colonisation.

In Chapter Three, I place the practices of neoliberalism firmly within the realm of colonisation and discuss the way that many Indigenous peoples view these practices as re-colonisation. This chapter seeks to establish firstly that the way in which neoliberal policies are implemented in the Pacific has similarities to colonialism. The sets of practices through which neoliberalism is transferred can be described as re-colonisation. Describing these practices as re-colonisation requires an explanation of
the ways in which this is seen to take place, as will be outlined in this chapter, through multiple authors, indirect rule, institutionalisation and normalisation. In this chapter I also seek to emphasise that using the term re-colonisation is strategic, as a reminder of the commonalities the implementation of neoliberalism has with colonisation. I also understand the limits to this application, that is, that if not qualified, it could perpetuate binaries which prevent possible avenues for critique and change.

Indigenous scholars describing practices of re-colonisation highlight the way that forms and hierarchies of knowledge are tied to political economic practices. This entanglement emphasises the inadequacy of a discussion of Pacific cultures without reference to historical and political economic practices such as colonialism and moreover without reference to knowledge construction itself. In this sense the association of colonisation and long-standing Western perceptions of Indigenous peoples is dispersed throughout political economic practices and the ways in which they interact with Pacific traditions and cultures.

I also argue in Chapter Three that neoliberal advocates attempt to narrow the potential policy options for Pacific state actions, and this in turn facilitates the neoliberal task of ‘reforming’ Indigenous structures. The necessity of creating stricter structures such as conditionalities, comes from the inherent distrust in the abilities of these Indigenous structures and an assurance that they are bound to prove inadequate for the task of securing economic growth. This fundamental distrust translates into a patronising attitude and way of operating towards Pacific states and peoples and one which could well be set to persevere if neoliberalism, IR and IPE more generally do not take note of broader alternatives. I argue that these dominant ways of understanding the world and the Pacific need to accept that broader understandings of Indigenous knowledge, resistances and cultures are
important in improving analyses of the Pacific and have the potential for shaping the Pacific better.

This chapter also seeks to outline the inextricable connection between forms and hierarchies of knowledge and political economic practices which I seek to maintain as a common theme throughout the thesis. In this regard I suggest that one of the important commonalities that Indigenous peoples in the Pacific view with colonisation, neo-colonisation and re-colonisation is the underestimation and marginalisation of Indigenous knowledge. This renders Indigenous knowledge and practices as therefore requiring neoliberal reform. In Chapters Five to Eight I will outline sites in which this ‘reform’ is taking place and is contested and entangled with Indigenous resistance.

In Chapter Four I argue that in the same way that re-colonisation is diverse, so too Indigenous resistance holds no unitary, unproblematic or solitary position. In this chapter I argue that indigeneity requires renegotiating, not as a negation but in order to understand its complexities and living, changing conditions. I argue that explicating indigeneity in more complex ways creates problems for neoliberal policies and agendas. It creates problems because the category of Indigenous ‘culture’ which these neoliberal policies and agendas seek to identify, work through and reform is singular and stagnant and by complicating it we subvert re-colonising practices. I also argue in this chapter that this broader conception of indigeneity can be coupled with a broader conception of resistance to include weapons of the weak and making do, which emphasises daily Indigenous living as countering re-colonisation on multiple levels. I argue that there is a crucial need, to understand both being Indigenous and forms of resistance in broader terms in order to continue rejecting the kinds of binaries put forward by work like that of Lawson; describing Indigenous cultures primarily as ‘obstacles’. Naming Pacific cultures and world
views as resistance to neoliberalism, re-imagines them as living, capable and continually changing sets of alternatives to neoliberalism.

The alternatives and activities and formulations of Indigenous resistance are found mixed up with most neoliberal activities in the Pacific. Chapters Five, Six and Seven, are sites of contestation where I explore how Indigenous resistance and re-colonising practices remain constantly in negotiation. I investigate these sites within a thematic framework which includes the three areas considered ‘standard’ in IPE: ‘trade’, ‘finance’ and ‘development’. Most IPE literature follows these three areas as the central areas of concern for the economy. In this way I seek to highlight the discrepancies between which topics may usually be covered under such themes and those that I will instead explore. In this way I hope to show not only what is underestimated by neoliberals but also what is currently located beyond, and should be included in, IPE.

If, as neoliberals do, we merely analyse trade and attempts to liberalise trade without much reference to what is distinctive about the Pacific, we underestimate the relationship between the subsistence sector and goods and services and how these are inextricable from Pacific peoples and the environment. This will be discussed in Chapter Five, in which I also expose the way that a neoliberal ideal of ‘freer’ trade severely impacts on the ability of Pacific people to maintain their livelihoods and quality of life. I suggest that the ‘free’ trade agreements promulgated by neoliberals pose a radical threat to social conditions in the Pacific, despite carefully narrow neoliberal assessments that effects will be ‘minimal’. In this chapter I explore the way that Indigenous resistance has articulated a rejection of the Pacific Island Countries Trade Agreement and the Pacific Agreement on Closer

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Economic Relations in terms similar to the response of other particularly Third world countries.

In Chapter Six, I explore the sites of complex financial networks which exchange across the Pacific and work beyond neoliberal policies and institutions of financial transactions. I will argue that the ways in which remittances are used by Pacific people suggests significantly different and potentially useful ways of conducting finance. Additionally in this financial area we can see that the neoliberal ideal of the ‘free’ mobility of capital can be seen as promoted and facilitated by several Pacific states which have used Offshore Financial Centres (OFCs) as a state strategy for economic growth. We also see how implied Pacific state support for this neoliberal ideal through OFCs is not approved by other (‘developed’) states; rather countries, especially within the OECD, seek the restriction of these OFCs. These kinds of contradictions indicate the bind in which Pacific states and leaders often exist, with their range of political economic options restricted. In this chapter, I also analyse the kinds of promotional materials used to attract investment that Pacific states utilise. I suggest that the targets of these promotions are largely non-Pacific investment, which I argue may have serious consequences for the continuation of stereotypes of Pacific peoples.

These potentially severe effects on Pacific livelihoods may be exacerbated by constant challenges to Pacific ‘property’ and ownership rights. Cultural and intellectual rights are not overlooked by neoliberals, but are systematically dismantled in order to accommodate more ideal neoliberal institutions. In Chapter Seven, I explore some of the different concepts and debates surrounding perceptions of property, resources and intellectual and cultural property rights and the way that Indigenous values in this regard problematise the more long-standing Western practices of commodification that neoliberalism in many ways perpetuates. I also explore the way that Indigenous peoples are creating legal protection
mechanisms to secure traditional knowledge and expressions of culture in forms that are separate from neoliberal commodified intellectual property rights legal structures, such as through the World Trade Organisation (WTO). I argue that Indigenous resistance on these issues has been successful in highlighting the inadequacies of neoliberal institutions to comprehend Indigenous cultures and laws, their unwillingness to accommodate these and their subsequent insistence on ‘reforming’ them.

In Chapter Seven I also argue that it is the broader significance that property and ownership of the land and sea have for Indigenous peoples which produces their understandings of development and avenues for development that diverge significantly from neoliberal accounts.

After covering the three regional and ‘conventional’ areas of concern, Chapter Eight will examine in a more detailed fashion the significance of neoliberal policies for the development of Maori, within a larger state. This chapter on Maori intra-state development exposes the potentially limited nature of Pacific state independence when Maori, an Indigenous minority within a state, are being prescribed the same kinds of neoliberal policies as independent states. Like the policies for other Pacific peoples, neoliberal policies for Maori view customs and traditions as requiring modification to achieve ‘reform’. In the context of Aotearoa New Zealand, emphasis will be placed on why the Government seeks ‘full and final settlement’ of Maori grievances as a pre-requisite for development. While many Maori also seek redress, it is not often perceived as full and final, nor merely an economic transaction. And Maori have achieved certain levels of progress towards self-determination because of, and in spite of, neoliberal policies. Implicit in this are the ways in which Maori rights have been protected by the Treaty of Waitangi.22 With Maori rights embedded in the international Treaty, it subsequently becomes a major impediment to

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22 The Treaty of Waitangi was signed between the British Crown and Maori in 1840.
neoliberal policies directed at Maori. I argue that in a sense the Treaty of Waitangi provides an opportunity for Maori to skew and manipulate neoliberal policies. In another sense however, the neoliberal attempts to render the Treaty obsolete by dividing ‘economic’ from political/constitutional concerns forces particular kinds of pressure on what is seen by most Maori and neoliberal advocates as the key facilitator of their respective versions of Maori development: the tribe.

The government and neoliberal advocates seek to ensure that the tribe conforms to corporate organisational features suitable for interacting in a neoliberal global economy. Some Maori also seek a corporatised form of the tribe, while others remain convinced that the symbolic and political role of the tribe as partner to the Crown, as per the Treaty of Waitangi, is of utmost significance. Maori resistance demonstrates both the inadequacy of neoliberal policies and strategies and also the way that Indigenous resistances constantly problematise and skew neoliberal attempts at reform.

The effect of neoliberalism on Maori, in a country where neoliberal policies have gone further than most other Pacific countries, also indicate potential future effects for other Pacific peoples. I argue that these effects on Maori confirm the suspicions of many Indigenous scholars, that re-colonisation may have destructive effects and that these effects will be similar to the practices of colonisation.

In this thesis, I am not attempting to create a new grand narrative, embodied as ‘Indigenous resistance’, which provides all the answers. I would like to argue that the accounts of Indigenous peoples might provide insights into alternative ways of conducting and accounting for IR, IPE and the Pacific. They may not. But it is not sufficient for them to be dismissed as ‘mere’ culture or ‘mere’ obstacles.
Implicit in my argument is the political nature of all knowledge, its formulation and status. It is not by chance that some knowledges and policies are accorded superior status over others. This situation could be changed by the inclusion of the views of Indigenous peoples in the literature of IR and IPE on their own multiple terms. Also implicit in my argument is the suggestion that if there is some significance to the underestimation and marginalisation of Indigenous peoples and the potential of Indigenous resistance, there may be other ways of thinking which are also being marginalized by neoliberal accounts, but which may also help provide a more adequate picture of world affairs. In addition, if neoliberalism is so inadequate, yet accorded much authority, perhaps there are other accounts of world affairs which claim an authoritative, commonsensical, natural position but which also require reassessment.

In this thesis I will demonstrate that once we understand neoliberalism in the context of these more complex propositions it becomes difficult to accept broader neoliberal claims to truth and authority. Likewise, the disciplines of IR and IPE must be re-examined if their dominant narratives, like neoliberalism, are so unable to account for Pacific and world affairs.

If we are responsible practitioners of world affairs, we will not allow these marginalised issues and Indigenous resistances to remain overlooked, undermined and underestimated. Indigenous resistance may offer ways of understanding world affairs which could not only suggest other avenues for organising IR, IPE and the hierarchies of knowledges but which may assist in the connected purpose of actively reshaping world affairs.

This thesis, like any thesis, is limited in many ways. One limitation in particular however, is worthy of special note. From its inception I sought to conform this thesis to the rules and regulations of Western academia. I sought out mostly written texts.
I wrote with paragraphs, with full stops and capital letters. I have included as many Indigenous authors as I possibly could, yet for some perhaps this thesis will not appear Indigenous ‘enough’. In response I would like to explain that I am unsure how I would make it more Indigenous and continue to conform to the requirements for the submission of a PhD. While some theses do use video footage as chapters, are there academics who would accept live performances and oral evidence as sufficient? And perhaps more importantly would these actually make the research more ‘Indigenous’ or merely more performative? And is this perceived as the same thing? And who gets to decide this? These questions may well be a challenge for future Indigenous academics to pursue.

I have attempted here to demonstrate a breadth of research, a range of ideas, and while I may not have produced as angry an analysis as some might have liked – and as I have often felt - I hope that I have initiated an over-bridge which could lead to more fruitful exchanges instead of violent impasses.
CHAPTER TWO

NEOLIBERALISM – AND ITS JUSTIFICATIONS

INTRODUCTION

The man who claims to have coined the term “Washington Consensus”¹ has since tersely argued that it is not being used as he intended. John Williamson argues that what he outlined to refer to the “lowest common denominator of policy advice being addressed by the Washington-based institutions to Latin American countries as of 1989”² has now erroneously become synonymous with ‘neoliberalism’ and ‘Market fundamentalism’. Despite a lengthy reassertion of the policies he was trying to outline: “Fiscal discipline … tax reform … trade liberalization … liberalization of inflows of foreign direct investment … privatisation”, Williamson nevertheless

describes what are commonly referred to as neoliberal policies. What Williamson demonstrates here is an idea that the distinctions amongst various factions of neoliberals are so significant that they prevent or restrict any notion of a coherent ‘neoliberal’ group. Williamson rejects broad commonalities between his work and ‘neoliberals’ by focussing on specific technical and economic differences such as the particular speed of privatisation, particular levels of inflation or full or partial capital account liberalisation. I suggest that to focus on such minor differences is to ignore the broad commonalities of these perspectives which become particularly apparent when historically contextualised. There has been an extensive liberal history of involvement in debates regarding forms of rule. And it is these liberal regimes of governing which have long seen and still perceive cultures and nations as specifically positioned at different stages of civilisation and therefore having different capabilities to govern.

In this chapter, I will explore the particular continuities between liberalism and neoliberalism and several implications of this political and cultural legacy. The policies of neoliberalism are liberal, yet with a particular focus. Neoliberal policies for example, seek to extend and apply principles of the market into areas of the community which have previously been governed in other ways. In this way it becomes apparent that neoliberal advocates continue the liberal interest in governing peoples using the market mechanisms. This legacy will be seen to complicate the implied claims of many neoliberal advocates to a technical, economic neutrality. For many neoliberal advocates the genealogy of the policies they encourage, that is, of liberal practices of government, is either not acknowledged or is considered unimportant. In the Pacific, this genealogy of liberal policies includes parallels both with the first European expeditions into the Pacific and also the subsequent colonial regimes.


Williamson, 2000, p. 251. Following quotes are from the same article, p. 257-258.
Chapter Two: Neoliberalism

My purpose here is not to dwell on the experiences of liberalism in the Pacific through the colonial enterprise of the 18th, 19th and early 20th centuries, but rather to work from the broad commonalities and focus on the constitution of the particular policies of neoliberalism in the Pacific. In this chapter I will provide examples of these neoliberal policies which are epitomised by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) structural adjustment programmes including: advocating ‘free’ trade in goods and services, ‘freer’ capital mobility, minimalisation and re-figuring of the state through privatisation and corporatisation and thus further limiting the policy options available to states in the future.

I will investigate in this chapter two of the justifications for neoliberal policies, that is, to produce market efficiency and to achieve economic growth. In the Pacific, these justifications are combined with explanations which suggest there is an urgency for Pacific states to ‘reform’ before they become ‘out of synch’ with the world. I suggest that it is exactly these kinds of neoliberal arguments which demonstrate the neoliberal perception that despite their status as independent states, Pacific peoples continue to be incapable of properly ruling or organising their countries, economies and people. While this perception may have become more covert since the state-hood of many Pacific peoples I will outline the ways it continues to be discernable.

Neoliberalism with a Past

Neoliberalism as a term has been used in numerous ways, and as Williamson’s protestations demonstrate, there is little agreement over a ‘correct’ usage. There are diverse perspectives regarding whether neoliberalism is a response to Keynesian welfare state policies, an ideology, a set of policies, governmentality, or whether it is a political or economic theory.\(^5\) There is a division between the usage by those who

understand neoliberalism as spanning political economy and those who view it instead as solely a set of economic policies. These scholars who view neoliberalism as a political theory or part of political economy emphasise continuities with liberalism in terms that I will outline below. Those scholars categorise neoliberalism as liberal, but also as placing a stronger emphasis on the market over the state as the engine for economic growth and more emphasis on the individual as a consumer with choices.  

Those who view neoliberalism as an economic theory describe neoliberalism as new or neo classical economics and stress specific economic or mathematical variations from Keynesianism and monetarism. It is rare that economists will describe themselves as neoliberals rather; they use the term neo-classical economist. In this sense ‘neoliberalism’ is more often than not used by critics.

My purpose here is not to provide an exhaustive elaboration on the differing usages of neoliberalism but simply to draw attention to issues of significance discerned amongst them in so far as they provide a platform for understanding the methods utilised for governing.

Michel Foucault’s article on liberalism and neoliberalism provides important insights for such a discussion. Foucault sought to analyse liberalism, not as a theory, or an ideology and even less, certainly, as a way for ‘society’ to represent itself…’-but, rather, as a practice, which is to say, as a ‘way of

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6 Susan George suggests that Friedrich von Hayek and Milton Friedman are at neoliberalism’s theoretical nucleus, with Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Regan playing a central role in further spreading the policies and ideas in Britain and the United States. She argues that the central features of neoliberalism are encouraging competition, downsizing the government, remunerating capital to the detriment of labour, and internationally supporting free trade in goods and services, free circulation of capital and freedom of investment. George, 1999.

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doing things’ orientated toward objectives and regulating itself by means of
a sustained reflection.\(^8\)

In Chapter Three I will extend on these ‘governmental’ perspectives in the process
of expanding an understanding of re-colonisation.\(^9\)

Foucault draws a contrast between the German liberalism of 1948-62 and American
neoliberalism of the Chicago school. Foucault argues that German liberalism
addressed what was seen as a single adversary; “a type of economic government
systematically ignorant of the market mechanisms that were the only thing capable
of price-forming regulation”.\(^10\) These liberals, he argues, attempted to
define what a market economy could be, organized (but not planned or
directed) within an institutional and juridical framework that, on the one
hand, would offer the guarantees and limitations of law, and, on the other,
would make sure that the freedom of economic processes did not cause any
social distortion.\(^11\)

Foucault argues that while American neoliberalism, also “developed in reaction
against ‘excessive government’”\(^12\) there was a crucial distinction from German
liberalism. Foucault explicates that while the German liberalism saw the need for
some management and “vigilant internal policy of social interventions” in the
market, “neoliberalism seeks rather to extend the rationality of the market, the
schemes of analysis it proposes, and the decisionmaking criteria it suggests to areas
that are not exclusively or not primarily economic”.\(^13\) From this insight we can draw
a broader distinction between liberalism and neoliberalism generally. Neoliberalism
is liberalism, but with a particular focus on the market as the mechanism which is
suited to a greater extent for managing, ordering and governing most aspects of
human life.

One of the reasons that I combine neoliberalism as a part of re-colonisation and as
understood as a way of governing in the next Chapter, stems from these ideas

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\(^8\) Michel Foucault, “The Birth of Biopolitics”, in Paul Rabinow (ed) Michel Foucault Ethics:

\(^9\) For further work on governmentality see Barry, (et. al), 1996. And Graham Burchell, Colin
Gordon and Peter Miller (eds) The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality, London:

\(^10\) Foucault, 1994, p. 78.

\(^11\) Ibid.

\(^12\) Ibid.

\(^13\) Ibid, p. 79.
posited by Foucault. Neoliberalism is not merely a collection of policies nor solely representative of a theoretical shift from Keynesianism, but is a combination of sets of policies, practices and agendas.

The liberal tradition has a long history of involvement in debates regarding the governing of different peoples and cultures, particularly through colonialism and imperialism. Such was the extent of this entanglement that Uday Mehta has even argued that the “British Empire is broadly coeval with liberalism itself”. While some of the liberal thinkers to be discussed below examined colonies as extending the market to other parts of the world, others also viewed it as central to governing in these places. The liberal debates over colonialism occurred on differing levels some more narrowly focussed on particular colonies than others. Three central liberal theorists, Adam Smith, David Ricardo and John Stuart Mill all discussed the issues surrounding Britain’s possession of colonies and questioned the fairness of trade between them. Each of these theorists took somewhat different stances on: these levels of fairness; the type of colony be it for settlement or extracting resources; and the potential for ‘free’ trade to rectify these inequalities. What is most significant about these debates however, is they demonstrate the liberal history of considering the expansion of markets, and the connection between market mechanisms and governing.

Adam Smith appears to have been concerned with two overriding concerns regarding the colonies, an economic claim of their unprofitability and the potential for peace between countries through ‘free’ trade not colonial monopoly trade. In An Inquiry Into The Nature And Causes of the Wealth of Nations Smith argues that colonies are supposed to benefit the Empire either by supplying the military force for its defence or through revenue. He argues that the colonies of Great Britain have not produced such benefits, and the purposes for keeping the colonies, such as for markets for British goods are not sufficient. Smith suggests that while it is “mortifying to the pride of every nation” to give up dominion over the colonies, the result will be a system of free trade which will be far more economically

beneficial for both countries and will ensure a continued peaceful and “filial” relationship between the mother country and ex-colonies.

Ricardo’s chief concern in his analysis of the colonial trade was not its moral significance: rather he viewed it as equivalent to any form of foreign trade. Ricardo took up Smith’s points on whether the trade is injurious to the mother country and its consumers. And while Ricardo conceded that it is “disadvantageous for a nation of consumers to be obliged to purchase of one particular country”, he did not argue against colonialism per se.

Smith and Ricardo are both discussing colonies as defined as British citizens living in other countries who trade with the ‘home’ country. As a result they are interested in the terms, conditions and profits of this trade and are not concerned with the Indigenous peoples of these countries. Unlike Smith and Ricardo, Mill’s perceptions of the colonies was not merely of a place from which British citizens interact with the ‘home’ country, but was based on his experiences in India where there were few British people who could constitute a colony as such, and where the control of the Empire was largely maintained by using Indians. Mill’s observations illustrate the liberal history of assessing the governing of different peoples.

Mill argued that Great Britain could in fact do well without the colonies and like Smith suggested, that allowing their independence was a small step towards “universal peace”. This suggestion for allowing independence was qualified by the idea that some of the dependencies were not yet at a “state of civilization” capable of self-government, and would require training to “render them capable of higher civilization”. He saw this training as required to focus on the culture and traditions of these people to render them capable of governing. In his discussion of India, Mill makes the observation that “Hindoos” are a people “indifferent to politics altogether” by contrast he describes the English as a “politically active people”.

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18 Ibid.
20 Ibid, p. 231.
22 Ibid, p. 408.
23 Ibid.
Chapter Two: Neoliberalism

This lack of interest in politics he argued would make Indians particularly vulnerable to exploitation by elites and produce low participation in government. Another way of approaching Mill’s assumptions could be to query whether they stemmed from an inability on his part to understand Indian society and therefore an inability to see forms of conducting politics that were different from British systems of government. Such a query has implications for other Indigenous peoples who may be perceived as incapable of governing because of their lack of participation in Western forms of government, but who may be politically active in other ways.

In the Pacific, the legacies of colonialism and liberalism are also intimately connected, with several scholars viewing the first European explorers, who began the colonial process, as also the first to contribute both to the extension of liberal type markets and the perceptions that Indigenous peoples required civilising which later paralleled and supported liberal ideals. Captain Cook is often attributed with the title of being one of the first people to contribute to this extension. Bernard Smith has noted the concurrence of Captain Cook sailing his third voyage to the Pacific and the publication of Adam Smith’s *Inquiry* in 1776. Bernard Smith argues that it was Cook who began the introduction of liberal principles to the Pacific and who attempted to put in place the liberal and market “rules and conventions where they did not exist or existed at the fringes rather than the center of the primitive polity”.

While Smith’s argument that Cook was a liberal may be difficult to fully accept given that the term was not used in its modern, political sense in Cook’s time, his point that Cook facilitated later liberal ideals, by establishing particular early impressions of Pacific peoples, appears convincing. Smith argues that Cook, “had

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28 Ibid.
come to the Pacific to spread the blessings and advantages of civilized Europe”. And it was this attitude of the Pacific requiring the ‘advantages’ of civilized Europe which did later permeate liberal thinking and continues in some forms. From this early beginning, colonial exploration facilitated liberal theory in the Pacific, which was also concerned with both introducing European conceptions of state and market and concurrently civilising Pacific peoples with these mechanisms. Liberalism has a long history in the Pacific therefore, as an ideology of governing people, and governing them according to the differentiations of their perceived degree of ‘civilised-ness’.

**GOING COVERT WITH INDIGENOUS STATEHOOD**

Neoliberals in the Pacific continue to perpetuate the spread of these ideas about degrees of civilisation and techniques of civilising, although now more covertly. While liberals could be relatively open about their perceptions of Indigenous peoples, neoliberal advocates in the Pacific now face the challenge that the ‘savage peoples’ with whom Cook transacted, now possess their own independent states. Having been admitted to the systems of states, Pacific countries now expect to no longer be treated as ‘savages’ but rather as equal as the rules of the state system purportedly operate. This position of statehood means that liberal policies which were previously applied to Indigenous peoples as subject populations are now applied to them as self-governing peoples through the structure of the state. This constitutes one of the distinctions between liberalism and neoliberalism as the principles of the market are applied to people as they are also applied to the

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29 Ibid.
30 There are cases where neoliberal advocates are still quite explicit about their aims. See for example, Roger Douglas, *Unfinished Business*, Auckland: Random House, 1993, p. 208-214. What I am trying to emphasise here however, is a shift in rhetoric and awareness that revisions and critiques of theories of progressions from ‘barbarism’ to ‘civilised’ as no longer acceptable or racist makes advocating them overtly problematic.
31 For a discussion of this in a broader context see Barry Hindess, “Liberalism: What’s in a Name?” Political Science Program, Research School of Social Science Seminar, 17 April, 2002, p. 9.
government itself.\footnote{This will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Three.} While these ‘savages’ are now the independent rulers of their own countries, it does not necessarily follow that those who had previously labelled them ‘savages’ believe them to be truly civilised. I will illustrate this point in the latter section of this chapter with regard to a leaked Australian government brief containing derogatory comments of Pacific governments. The statehood of these people has produced the problem for neoliberals of how to retain strict ‘influence’ while not appearing overtly paternalistic, as had been the case in many places under colonial rule and through the, largely official aid funded, ‘interfering’ Keynesian model of the state.

One of the more striking differences between liberals and neoliberals is that the latter are not as openly elitist, but this elitism continues to be present nonetheless as I explore below. One reason for this difference is the acquisition of statehood by many Pacific peoples. Elitist sentiments are therefore targeted at states and their characteristics rather than at peoples.

Treating the former ‘savage peoples’ as supposedly equals has meant that the neoliberal discourse has diversified the tactics utilised for training and civilising Indigenous peoples to more covert and supposedly technical policies for states.\footnote{This will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Three.} Neoliberalism is therefore, a translation of many liberal beliefs, once expressed explicitly, into language and practices which are far more covert about their civilising mission.\footnote{Hindess, 2002, p. 9.} Neoliberal advocates are also more firmly convinced that the market is the most important mechanism in the civilising process, without any overtly accompanying colonial endeavours or official colonies, but rather operating with peoples ‘as if’ they are free and rational decision makers of independent states.\footnote{For discussions of how people are governed through their own choices as ‘free’ individuals but not specifically in the context of independent states see Barry (et al), 1996.}

A key feature of neoliberal policies therefore, is this conflict between not wanting to be or appear paternalistic, wanting to allow people the ‘freedom’/‘empowerment’ to govern themselves, but at the same time distrusting the abilities of some peoples,
especially those who are ‘Natives’ as will be demonstrated below.\textsuperscript{36} Two strategies have therefore been adopted; firstly, emphasising the technical, economistic and ‘rational’ nature of neoliberal policies, as more scientifically attuned than previous liberal or other models. And secondly, more firmly tailoring the appearance, the rhetoric, of neoliberal policies to the principles demanded by opponents of neoliberalism, and thereby appearing to empower people through reconnecting the avowedly ‘pure economic’ policies with more ‘political’ concerns to do with governing. However, this could also be seen as applying the rationale of ‘economics’ to spheres which have previously operated in other ways.\textsuperscript{37}

Neoliberal policies are largely articulated as though they are founded on neutral, technical and scientific ‘facts’ derived from nature.\textsuperscript{38} From this basis, neoliberal advocates subsequently reject criticism of their policies, as non-rational, non-logical, non-neutral and non-scientific. One substantial justification for neoliberal policies is the claim that economic relations are to a significant extent natural. When conceived in this way, policies like those devised by the World Bank, are not an imposition of one version of the world on another, for instance like a process of re-colonisation, but are instead supposedly “assisting in what is a natural course of development”.\textsuperscript{39} Paul Ormerod describes the usage of the term ‘rational’ by neoliberals as “a propaganda coup of the highest order... It carries the implication that any criticisms of it, or any alternatives put forward, are by definition irrational, and hence not worthy of serious contemplation”.\textsuperscript{40} And as will be explained in later chapters this

\textsuperscript{36} While this may appears somewhat incongruous from the perspective that Indigenous peoples currently appear to have far more formal autonomy and governmental power, yet as I argue throughout this thesis, these forms merely indicate changing articulations of distrust of Indigenous peoples.
\textsuperscript{38} Graham Burchell has argued that neoliberals admit the market is not natural but rather can only exist under certain political, legal and institutional conditions. Ibid.
\textsuperscript{40} Paul Ormerod, The Death of Economics, London: Faber and Faber, 1994, p. 111-112.
has been how neoliberal opponents have been delegitimised as ‘irrational’ in the Pacific.⁴¹

Some prominent neoliberal advocates, however, admit that their policies are artificially constructed, although as they describe it, to be beneficial not oppressive. Joseph Stiglitz for example argues that “true development entails a transformation of society”.⁴² He argues that a transformation must take place to draw developing countries into the international economy because it could be beneficial for them, if they and ‘developed’ countries adopt the appropriate policies. This perspective is that which links the need for ‘governance’ ‘reform’ to, what are for neoliberal advocates, supposedly technically conceived problems of economics. Stiglitz’s argument is reminiscent of Mill’s desire to also transform societies in order that they would be capable of governing. Both Stiglitz and Mill can bee seen as seeking the introduction of liberal values and institutions which will map over Indigenous ones. This involves the entrenching of the three central tenets of neoliberalism; ‘free’ trade and the ‘free’ mobility of capital accompanied by a broad reduction in the ambit and role of the state.

NEOLIBERAL POLICIES

‘FREE’ TRADE AND ‘FREE’ CAPITAL

The principles of ‘free’ trade and ‘free’ capital mobility form an integral part of both liberal and neoliberal thought, although neoliberalism is more likely to use international institutions, with a focus on increasing market influence and reducing government/state in the facilitation of these movements.

The principle of ‘free’ trade is essentially based on comparative advantage theory, and its origins are attributed to David Ricardo, who developed these ideas in his

book *The Principles of Political Economy and Taxation* in 1817. Most Western economists now argue that all countries can benefit from trade through comparative advantage, if they specialise in the production and export of those goods that can be produced at relatively low costs and import those goods which are expensive to produce, provided that the goods are able to move freely across borders. This perception is of ‘free’ trade as a discrete practice, not as a policy indistinguishable from political or more broadly imperial purposes. Ricardo argues that there are advantages of a country’s specialisation in the production of goods for which it is uniquely qualified, for example, wine-making in Portugal and cloth-making in England. Liberals and neoliberal advocates both claim that it is more efficient for countries to specialise and trade than to produce all goods themselves with closed borders.

With regard to trade, Ricardo pointed out his general understanding that most ‘men of property’ were not often willing to transact capital across borders. At that time, of course, capital did not flow freely from one country to another. The expansion of financial markets in the early 1900s and the current explosion of financial markets which now transact billions of dollars daily, renders this condition redundant. In addition, Ricardo made it clear that his assumptions relied on full employment and a balance of trade in each trading country and the inability to move capital and production facilities easily across borders. From this perspective, comparative advantage paradoxically depends on the impermeability of national borders.

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43 In their article, John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson argue that ‘free’ trade was a British policy which is not a singular activity but rather conjoined with “informal control if possible; trade with rule when necessary”. John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson, “The Imperialism of Free Trade”, *The Economic History Review*, Vol. 6, No. 1, 1953, p. 13.
47 Ormerod, 1994, p. 17
49 For further analysis on this point see David C. Korten, *The Post-corporate World: Life After Capitalism*, Sydney: Pluto Press, 2000, p. 49.
borders, which does not fit with the permeable borders required for the neoliberal conception of ‘free’ trade.\textsuperscript{50}

Therefore one important difference between Ricardo and neoliberals is that the latter live in a world of well-developed international financial markets, as did liberals in the latter part of the nineteenth century. According to neoliberals, the mobility of capital is an essential requirement for development and growth. For ‘developed’ countries, investment maintains existing conditions and promotes more growth, while for ‘developing’ countries, which neoliberals see as severely deficient in capital, investment is argued to be the key requirement for the initial ‘take off’ towards development and growth. For developing countries, investment comes from several sources: from governments as official development aid, from foreign direct investment and from institutions as loans.\textsuperscript{51} While some neoliberals can tolerate government-to-government official development assistance, to the majority this is often perceived as too much like ‘free’ money, like a welfare ‘handout’ to countries which have not worked for it. Leonidas Drollas, chief economist at the Centre for Global Energy Studies, says, “(i)t’s just human nature. If you haven’t had to work hard for your money, you tend to underestimate its value. And countries are no different than people”.\textsuperscript{52} Joseph Stiglitz also notes that “aid may have, in some cases, created a culture of dependency and discouraged countries from helping themselves”.\textsuperscript{53}

Some neoliberals have been encouraging the reduction of official development aid, arguing instead for the benefits achievable from foreign direct investment from Transnational Corporations (TNCs).\textsuperscript{54} The activities of TNCs as the principal

\textsuperscript{50} Herman Daly, “Free Trade: The Perils of Deregulation”, in Jerry Mander and Edward Goldsmith (eds.) The Case Against the Global Economy: and For a Turn Toward the Local, San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, p. 231.

\textsuperscript{51} There is a further diversity amongst these categories, such as long and short term distinctions, however an exploration of these distinctions is not essential to the argument here.


\textsuperscript{54} See for example James McMaster, “Strategies to Stimulate Private Sector Development in the Pacific Island Economies”, in Rodney Cole and Somsak Tambunlertchai (eds) The Future
providers of direct investment, moving trillions of dollars about the world daily are
often welcomed by these neoliberals who assume this movement to be a strong
component of the efficiency of the private sector, utilising investment in the market
far more efficiently than a government ever could. That is, the impetus and
increases in foreign direct investment flows often parallel the privatisation of
government owned assets. However, the movement of investment between
developed and developing countries has not been as neoliberal theorists have
predicted. Neoliberals argue that for developing countries “(f)oreign direct
investment can bring not only much needed additional capital but also access to
technology and know-how, as well as access to international markets,” but often it
appears that this is not the case.

The United Nations 1999 Human Development Report estimated that more than
$1.5 trillion is now exchanged on the world currency markets each day, although
not only by TNCs, and that foreign direct investment flows have also increased, but
this has remained predominately within the Organisation for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) countries. Many scholars in the Pacific argue that
technology transfer occurs more often through aid rather than private enterprises,
and that which does come from TNCs for example, is often “mature” and not of the
latest standards. Furthermore, as Martin Khor argues, the type of technology
which is transferred to developing countries is more often hazardous technologies
exploiting lax or nonexistent safety and environmental regulations. Foreign
investment therefore, does not always produce the kind of economic benefits
claimed by neoliberals.

Among the various international institutions which provide ‘investment’ for
developing countries the World Bank and the IMF are the most significant

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35 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, FDI in Developing Countries At A


37 See Tony Marjoram, “Technology Transfer” in Tony Marjoram (ed) Island Technology:
Technology for Development in the South Pacific, London: Intermediate Technology

38 Martin Khor “Global Economy and the Third World” in Mander and Goldsmith, 1996,
p.49.
institutions both in terms of access to loans and in terms of the infamous conditionalities, especially under Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), that are subsequently imposed on countries. While the World Bank provides loans specifically for development purposes, the IMF has always maintained that it is not a development institution and that its own legal mandate in fact does not give it that function. The IMF has a specific aim of maintaining ‘stability’ which will lead to expanding and encouraging foreign direct investment and providing capital input, i.e. loans, which are to promote and ensure

international monetary cooperation...facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of international trade...promote exchange stability...to assist in the establishment of a multilateral system of payments...and to shorten the duration and lessen the degree of disequilibrium in the international balance of payments of members.

In short, the IMF is not a development organisation but an institution whose key purpose is to ensure stability so that the international financial system continues and balances of payments are protected. This assists “to secure the growth and development of world trade”.

The global deregulation of financial markets and changes in telecommunications technology have led some analysts to argue that this is an age of “moral hazard” or a “casino economy”. The essential point about such financial markets is that they aim to ensure capital mobility. Like the mobility of goods and services, the mobility of capital is also claimed by neoliberals to be best left to the market for allocation.

George Soros argues however that “financial markets, left to their own devices, are liable to go to extremes and eventually break down. Therefore they cannot be left to their own devices; they must be supervised, and to some extent managed, by the monetary authorities.”

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61 George, 1988, p. 50.
64 Soros, 2002, p. 112.
Chapter Two: Neoliberalism

The mobility of capital has encouraged the development of financial instruments and communications technologies that enable this market to operate and flourish. It is this market which some theorists argue has taken investment away from productive activities and into mere speculation, which in turn detaches financial markets from social concerns and social consequences. Barney Warf argues that “(t)he ascendancy of electronic money has shifted the function of finance from investing to transacting, enhancing the attractiveness of speculation (e.g. in national currencies) rather than direct investments in productive capacity, and institutionalising the volatility in the process”.65 David Korten argues that this leads “financial markets and the owners of capital [to] become…detached from social concerns and abstracted from practical realities of commerce”.66 When the financial markets are detached in this way from the ramifications of speculative practices, these become merely ‘adjustment costs’.67

The so-called ‘Asian financial crisis’ from 1997 highlighted the potentially destructive nature of these financial flows. This crisis, which was not predicted by neoliberal forecasters, was then used by the IMF to provide extensive loans for Indonesia, South Korea and Hong Kong which then provided the IMF with leverage to further forcibly encourage these countries to embrace neoliberalism. Michel Chossudovsky cast the crisis as “financial warfare”68, arguing that, “(t)he international rules regulating the movements of money and capital (across international borders) contribute to shaping the ‘financial battlefields’ on which banks and speculators wage their deadly assaults”.69 Neoliberals argued that the ‘Asian financial crisis’ was not the fault of neoliberal policies but rather of distortions in the markets of Asian countries.70 If, the argument continues, they had

66 Korten, 2000, p. 51.
69 Ibid.
been truly free, the market would have naturally regulated to ensure there was no crisis. Walden Bello counters these arguments on the other hand, by saying that the East Asian economies were following neoliberal policies and it was precisely this which led to their crisis and was indeed exacerbated by the IMF. He argues that it was the IMF promotion of many kinds of financial liberalisation which led to uncontrollable and unpredictable flows of capital.

Despite its potential for instability, neoliberals continue to argue that the financial markets should essentially remain ‘free’ and that developing countries still benefit, regardless of some discrepancies. Barry Eichengreen argues:

(t)here is now overwhelming evidence that financial integration (opening domestic markets to foreign transactions) leads to financial deepening (that is, to more active, liquid, and efficient domestic financial markets), and that financial deepening encourages higher investment, faster growth, and more rapidly rising living standards.

While acknowledging that this “financial integration” does increase the risks for developing countries, rather than seeing the fault as inherent in neoliberalism Eichengreen views the problems as superficial and puts the solutions down to “good policy” and the IMF being “quicker on its feet” and “alert to problems in one emerging market that might spread…”

AMBIT OF THE STATE

Neoliberal policies seek to strictly limit the ambit of the state in particular ways. These include through privatisation and corporatisation of government assets, and through the corporatisation of remaining assets and the culture of the public service. For some liberals, the state was seen as able to play a productive role in the regulation of certain activities and in the process of supporting economic growth.

73 Ibid, p.381.
John Maynard Keynes for example, whose conception of the state is often criticised by neoliberals, argued that the state had an important responsibility in organising investment, as the fluctuations of the market need to be offset.\(^{25}\) For neoliberals however, the state should be limited to a far greater extent and be involved only in the regulation of services if absolutely necessary, and if so, in a form which is amenable to market interaction and transactions.

The World Bank’s 1998 *Pacific Islands Regional Economic Report* summarises regional neoliberal development prescriptions for governments in the Pacific. It also provides a clear reading of how a neoliberal institution like the World Bank expects governments to behave, what it expects them to provide and who appears to be the most important set of people to be provided for, namely, the private sector. The assumptions which the Report makes can be best summarised as minimal state, no ‘welfare’ for ‘citizens’, but a state which ‘provides’ for companies and deals with ‘problems’ like environmental ones which companies cause. It changes the fundamental reason for the existence of government in a democracy, from ‘of, for and by the people’ to ‘of, for and by the market’.

The report claims that one of its most important themes is on “enhancing the role of government”\(^{26}\): its form, the speed at which it should perform and additions it should make. It is a prescriptive document which is at times contradictory. Even the theme of ‘enhancing’ the role of government in reality means a reduction in the role of government. This is aptly demonstrated in the way that the Report describes how government will be enhanced; namely by “focussing the government on core functions”\(^{27}\), “raising the efficiency of public sector spending” and “implementing planning and budgetary procedures”. What the Report does not adequately explain is why it is the government that is being held to account. Why, for instance, is the market not being held to account, for its size, speed and additions? The Report begins with a vivid picture of the size of governments in the Pacific saying, “(t)oday this swollen public sector is in acute danger of sinking under its own weight”.\(^{28}\) Similar descriptions are espoused by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) in its own

\(^{27}\) Ibid, p. 5-6.
\(^{28}\) Ibid, p. 7.
reports where size orientated metaphors are also used to describe the state, calling it a “ballooning public sector”. These analogies, although not unfamiliar to neoliberal descriptions of the state, are somehow incongruent with their attempts elsewhere to retain scientific neutral style language.

Privatisation is one of the simplest avenues by which to achieve a large reduction of the ambit of the state. Conard Waligorski argues that privatisation fulfils three functions at once, “It expands the market; it shifts emphasis from public to private purposes; and it reduces the size of government by stripping it of the resources that allow regulation and intervention”. The reduction in the size of the state is seen by the World Bank in its Regional Economic Report and by neoliberals more generally, as occurring most efficiently by reducing the services the government provides.

The rationale behind privatisation is that “(p)riivate enterprise should be allowed to function competitively and not be crowded-out by the public sector”. The problem with this assumption is that in the ‘free’ market it will not be locally owned companies who win contracts or who are able to afford to buy government assets. These contracts and enterprises are more likely to be bought by TNCs who have the funding to be ‘competitive’. The telecommunications sector in the Pacific, dominated by TNCs like Cable and Wireless, Telstra Australia, and Vodafone is a good example of this. The other issue in the Pacific is that most of the services provided by governments are not profitable and would have little chance of being so, since they are often provided solely as necessities for the communities involved. Therefore as Bruce Knapman and Cedric Saldanha have argued, the process of contracting out government services has been far more successful in the Pacific than the privatisation of government assets because “private entrepreneurs are generally reluctant to take over unprofitable enterprises”. In the Pacific not only is the ‘market’ limited in terms of population numbers but also there are high transportation costs. These circumstances require that Pacific governments provide particular services to citizens out of necessity despite their potential unprofitability.

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Chapter Two: Neoliberalism

In most Pacific countries the size of the public sector has been substantially reduced over the past 10 years which has meant a scaling back of services with a consequent loss of jobs, and in turn impacting on the health, welfare and housing needs of the people. The statistics of the level of cut-backs, provided almost exclusively by the ADB are somewhat obscure however. In the Cook Islands, under the ADB assisted Economic Reform Program, 57 percent of staff are said to have “separated over 1996-98”\(^83\). This line of argument follows a neoliberal assumption that ‘protection’ of industry is an ‘artificial’ construction while the ‘free’ workings of the market are not so. This will be explored below. For Vanuatu, the ADB provides rather opaque statistics that the public service has been reduced from having 34 ministries to 9.\(^84\) In the Marshall Islands a 33% downsizing of the public service is described to have taken place and in the Federated States of Micronesia extensive public downsizing has also occurred.\(^85\) The definitions of ‘downsizing’ and ‘reduction’ remain elusive. It is unclear whether these account for the number of services reduced or the number of employees or other factors.

In the Pacific, what is occurring is not just what Nikolas Rose in another context has called the “de-statization of government”\(^86\) but a concurrent destruction of alternative avenues, which would previously have been both forces of government and also protection mechanisms. These include the environment and associated cultural norms which comprised the subsistence economy. For a variety of reasons, including commodification and colonisation, Pacific people are experiencing the destruction of the environment upon which the subsistence economy has been built, and in some places a removal of access to the land which may have sustained them previously. This has been accompanied by a loss of the specific knowledge of how to utilise the environment for survival. The destruction of the subsistence economy will increase pressure on Pacific societies to ‘reform’ in the way advocated by neoliberals.

\(^83\) Ibid, p. 21.
\(^84\) Ibid.
\(^85\) Ibid, p. 21-22.
\(^86\) Rose makes this point with regard to Britain and other Western states where there is no significant subsistence economy. Nikolas Rose, “Governing ‘Advanced’ Liberal Democracies”, in Barry, (et. al) 1996, p. 56.
While neoliberal advocates see much of the regulation by the state as adverse, they argue that it has a vital role in providing defence, law and order and particularly a sound legal system to protect property rights. Additionally, inter-state institutions, and international agreements facilitated within these institutions, are also perceived as playing an important role in further reducing the role of the state and embedding policies of ‘free’ trade and ‘free’ capital mobility. Neoliberal advocates see institutions like the WTO, IMF and World Bank as able to provide a mechanism by which those countries particularly in ‘need’ of neoliberal policies can have them introduced and monitored in conjunction with the aforementioned minimal requirements for governments.

The international agreements founded on neoliberal policies are used to increasingly limit the ability that the state has to modify or reverse these same policies. Knapman and Saldhana have argued a positive development in the Pacific is that the extent of neoliberal policies put in place by several Pacific governments “will make it very difficult for successor governments to reverse them”.87 The policies, which these agreements enshrine, are designed to withstand for example, changes of government which would disrupt the ‘continuity’ of the policies, or potentially do away with them.

JUSTIFICATION ONE OF NEOLIBERAL POLICIES: MARKET EFFICIENCY

Both liberals and neoliberal advocates view the market as a positive and productive mechanism to regulate the interaction of individuals and to encourage peace. However, neoliberals take this view further. Neoliberal policies are justified on the basis that the market is natural and generally more efficient at ‘enhancing individual freedom’, or put another way governing the interaction of individuals, than any other ‘regulation’, especially that imposed by the state.

According to neoliberals, the market’s potential for creating social harmony stems from its natural and orderly nature. Hayek argued that the market is spontaneous in its operation; it is self-creating and could be self-regulating if not interfered with. He argues that “to understand our civilisation, one must appreciate that the extended order resulted not from human design or intention but spontaneously…”88

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The market is not anarchic but ordered by certain laws, or as Adam Smith put it, “the invisible hand”.89 The laws of the market are perceived by neoliberals to be objectively observable laws of nature that just exist in the world. Trading is seen to occur in a market place where the market is seen as a machine that, once established, “glides along, each component part contributing to its serene process”.90 The market supposedly encourages more production with greater demand and limits supply with less. It was this small and particular part of Smith’s analysis, regarding the ‘invisible hand’ guiding the mechanisms of the market, which was translated into mathematics in the ‘marginal revolution’ by Leon Walras and William Jevons and has been highlighted as evidence of the natural function of markets.91

Like the individual pursuit of self-interest, the market is seen, above all, as being impersonal and as enhancing the freedom of the individual. In the market, it is claimed, “(w)ith the exception of rare and necessarily transitory monopolies, no one exercises control. Each participant is equally subject to the same impersonal forces. Outcomes are not the result of any one person’s or group’s actions or will”.92 In this way all individuals are equal in the eyes of the market. What is assumed by neoliberals is that people are acting voluntarily in the marketplace and that while they may at times be forced to make ‘difficult’ decisions, these are of their own free choice. Milton Friedman claims that difficult options, or a limited number of options, is not the crucial issue as “freedom has nothing to say about what an individual does with his [sic] freedom...a major aim of the liberal is to leave the ethical problem for the individual to wrestle with”.93 As Waligorski aptly puts it, the individual’s “freedom of choice does not include the idea that there will, or should be, a tolerable alternative, though there is always the existential choice between life and death”.94 Neoliberals essentially take the status quo of social and political economic relations in society as impermeable and leave individuals to their fate.

89 Smith, [1776] 1872.
90 Ormerod, 1994, p. 41.
91 Ibid, p.45. Regarding this point, Ormerod and Michael Shapiro argue that this version of Smith and his work fails to adequately reflect the emphasis he placed on moral issues which he saw as crucial to discussions of economics. Michael J. Shapiro, Reading “Adam Smith”: Desire, History and Value. London: Sage Publications, 1993.
92 Waligorski, 1990, p. 35.
94 Waligorski, 1990, p. 68.
Waligorski explains that this assumption arises because neoliberals equate “free with voluntary”.

He explains:

(i)n another example of either/or thinking, voluntary behaviour is the opposite of being coerced. All behaviour that is not coerced is free, voluntary, and self-chosen....It assumes that each person in an ‘economic’ relation is an autonomous, self-directing actor and views freedom from the perspective of the person acting, not the person acted upon. The notion of being acted upon – by manipulation, compulsion, subliminal suggestion, or passive receipt of externalities – hardly exists in this thinking. People outside market transactions are not considered.

Related to this particular relegation of individuals to their own choices is the exclusion from neoliberalism of an examination of ‘needs’ as opposed to ‘wants’ in the marketplace. An astute critique of the neoliberal assumption that the market responds to ‘supply and demand’ is made by Frances Moore Lappé and Joseph Collins when they argue that “the market...does not respond to individual preferences – or even needs. It responds to money....It responds to the tastes of those who can pay, the privileged minority.” Similarly Allan Engler argues that “(w)hen people are denied access to means of livelihood, the invisible hand of market forces does not intervene on their behalf. Equilibrium between supply and demand has no necessary connection with human need”. The neoliberal response to such claims is to reassert that those individuals who do participate in the market are helping the needs and wants of others by creating wealth which will eventually be redistributed, individual self-interest contributes to the greater good.

Critics from the Pacific have argued that many goods produced in some cultures are not “capital assets in an economic sense but social assets with political import”. Rather than seeking to maximise self-interest in the marketplace, Paul Sillitoe argues that Pacific economic behaviour is fundamentally different as “social considerations,

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95 Ibid, p. 55.
96 Ibid.
not mere economic ones, influence...behaviour and exchange rates". What neoliberals are overlooking with their broad generalisations of supply and demand interaction is also the difference between the “symbolic value of social exchange and the utilitarian value of economic exchange”. Much exchange that takes place in the Pacific is influenced by familial/cultural/social obligations which confound simple assumptions of supply and demand.

Additionally, in the Pacific, this condition is rendered even more problematic with the large subsistence sector and communally owned land, where the notion of formal employment is problematic as is private property. These issues will be discussed in Chapter Five and Six.

While largely ignoring claims of discrimination in the functioning of the market, neoliberal theorists often claim that “the free market is colour blind,”103 or “(c)onversely, if the market does not eliminate what appears to be sex or race discrimination, this means they are in some sense natural”.104 However, neoliberal theorists do focus their attention for potential discriminations to be created in the market with relation to the state, which is seen as most likely to inhibit political and economic freedom. Friedman argues that

(f)undamentally, there are only two ways of co-ordinating the economic activities of millions. One is central direction involving the use of coercion – the technique of the army and the modern totalitarian state. The other is voluntary co-operation of individuals – the technique of the market place.105 Friedman’s negative perception of the government is that it is most likely to have a tendency for monopoly and ‘artificial’ control as opposed to the natural functioning of the market. The government is perceived as impinging on a market which works most efficiently with minimal interference, but where perhaps the government could act as a preliminary instigator of the “rules of the game”.106 Waligorski argues that for neoliberals, “(g)overnments can do nothing to expand freedom except stay out of the market, avoid other coercive intervention, and enforce laws which apply

101 Sillitoe provides the example of one person loosing a canoe paddle. He argues this person would not simply approach a stranger who has spare to barter for it, but would more frequently exchange with someone who is related to them. Ibid, p. 172.
103 Waligorski, 1990, p. 58.
104 Ibid.
106 Ibid, p. 15.
equal to everyone. Anything else limits freedom”. By interfering in the natural market mechanism governments only distort economic performance.

**JUSTIFICATION TWO: ECONOMIC GROWTH IS HUMAN IMPROVEMENT**

The long term goal and justification of neoliberal policies is ‘economic growth’, that is an increase in the aggregate income to the country, which it is claimed will increase the well being of all people. For neoliberals, economic growth equates to development, and eventually to better standards of living. All indicators used in attempts to measure, whether this be economic growth, reductions in poverty or a multitude of other political, economic or social conditions are infinitely problematic. If such indicators are to be utilised however, then the ways in which they are each inadequate and for what purpose they are being used must be considered.

Growth for neoliberal advocates is essentially ‘economic growth’, or even more specifically “real movements in the amount of goods and services which are produced, or real movements in material living standards”. To gauge whether or not a country is achieving ‘growth’ or showing any signs of emerging from poverty and developing, neoliberals use increases in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as “the yardstick of an economy’s performance”. As a measuring tool GDP contains numerous flaws, such as being unable to perceive the distribution of wealth within countries, the long term consequences of transactions, differences between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ transactions, and transactions occurring ‘outside’ the market. The best indication of the failure of GDP as an adequate measure of real changes in standards of living is seen in Papua New Guinea. As a consultant for the ADB points out, “(d)espite a GDP per head higher than several of its neighbors, at around $1,250, PNG’s human development indicators are the worst in the Pacific”. A. V. Hughes also argues that because achievement of the United Nations ‘Least Developed Country’ status, which provides for concessionary loans and technical assistance, is based on annual GDP per head, some Pacific governments have “responded rationally to this incentive by making sure their countries do not appear too

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108 Ormerod, 1995, p. 27.
Despite having been widely criticised, GDP continues to be used to assess the progress of peoples, nations and states.

The key institutions using GDP, the World Bank, IMF and WTO dismiss claims that they are ‘killing the planet’ and perpetuating the “globalisation of poverty” instead arguing that the quest for economic development is fundamentally about fighting for “a world free of poverty”. Constructing the argument in this way means that the categorisation of the ‘problem’ essentially lies with ‘poverty’, removing the focus away from the wealthy, who benefit from the exploitation of the planet and other people to maintain their privileged positions. Additionally, with their trust in the equilibrating and fair nature of the market, the cause of poverty becomes a lack of access to the market, the solution to which can simplistically be the provision of market access to poor individuals. The Brundtland Report of 1987 contained such contradictions between arguing for fulfilling the “needs…of the world’s poor”, while simultaneously “reviving growth”. Ted Trainer provides an insightful critique, arguing that rich countries must reduce per capita energy levels and that “growth is the problem.”

As the culmination of neoliberalism’s prescriptions and foundations, the pursuit of economic growth as ‘development’ suggests broader and deeper questions should be asked about processes of cultural homogenisation and about the interaction between the local and international forces. Development in this sense is much more about governing the ‘exporting and importing of culture’ rather than merely ‘raising standards of living’. Most neoliberals do not deny such a connection, they merely

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111 Ibid, p. 45.
113 World Bank website: www.worldbank.org
114 World Bank website: www.worldbank.org
116 Ibid, p. 49.
claim it is all ‘worth it’ and point to research, which can, when narrowly interpreted support their assertions such as the fact that world growth has increased in the past decades.\textsuperscript{118}

\textbf{PACIFIC JUSTIFICATIONS}

In the Pacific, neoliberalism is justified on the basis that Pacific countries have economic ‘problems’, particularly low levels of economic growth, large governments, fiscal crisis and high population growth, for which neoliberal solutions are required.

\textbf{PACIFIC NEOLIBERALISM IN PERSPECTIVE}

In his article on “Global Imperatives and Economic Reform in the Pacific Island States”, William Sutherland raises what may be the most central issue regarding the changes from more reformist liberal to neoliberal policies and the subsequent rise to dominance of neoliberal policies in the Pacific. Sutherland argues that after decades of largely ignoring the changes in the global political economy, which principally accompanied the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), Pacific countries came under increasing pressure to accept neoliberal policies. Sutherland argues that it became apparent to two of the major donor countries to the region, Australia and New Zealand, and to the ADB which had become strongly in favour of neoliberal policies, that “(l)eft to their own devices, there was no guarantee – especially in view of their sub-optimal economic performance in the 1980s – that the islands would adjust, or adjust sufficiently”.\textsuperscript{119} Sutherland’s point is precisely on the mark. For Pacific countries, with aid covering much of the costs of government, low overseas debt and the government often providing a large proportion of employment, there were few reasons to make the kinds of radical changes to the political economy which had been made in Australia and New Zealand. As a result of these radical


policies, and a growing consensus within the Australian and New Zealand governments (both Labour and Liberal and Labour and National Parties respectively) it was largely unavoidable that the Pacific would become influenced by, and more importantly, seen as a target in need of neoliberal ‘reform’.

Being defined as ‘out of synch’ with global developments, Pacific leaders became increasingly pressured to ‘join in’ or get ‘left behind’. Like the previous label of ‘undeveloped’ or ‘developing country’, Pacific countries were once again defined in such a way that the ‘problems’, and the burden to rectify these, lay largely with them. This peer pressure was exacerbated by both the New Zealand and Australian governments who sought to encourage an additional feeling that there was a great deal of urgency to the situation that Pacific countries were in, an urgency that for some reason Pacific leaders were argued to be not fully comprehending. Conceived in this way, Pacific countries were the source of the problem and the Australian and New Zealand governments and various international institutions became the support team to ‘assist’ change. Gordon Bilney, when Minister for Development Cooperation and Pacific Island Affairs (1992-1996), provided a clear expression of this perspective. In an article on “Australia’s relations with the South Pacific – Challenge and Change” Bilney argues that Pacific countries had to understand the urgency of their situations. He labelled the most prominent of these problems as a paradoxical mix of “slow growth in real per capita incomes despite a generally favourable natural and human resource endowment, high levels of external assistance and generally sound economic management”.\textsuperscript{120} It appeared Bilney was convinced that if Pacific governments could comprehend the urgency of the situation they would be more willing to implement neoliberal policies. Bilney argues that

\begin{quote}
I do not seek to paint a picture of a region in a state of crisis. But…the need for serious and urgent action is already upon us…. No amount of regional and international assistance will bring about sustainable development in the South Pacific unless the countries of the region themselves play the leading role through the adoption of such national policies, including public sector reform and private sector development.\textsuperscript{121}
\end{quote}


\textsuperscript{121} Ibid.
This is reminiscent of the way in which neoliberal policies were implemented in Aotearoa New Zealand, in what has been labelled a ‘blitzkreig’, ‘lightning strike’ approach.\textsuperscript{122} That is, in an ‘urgent’ way which requires fast implementation and consequently little public negotiation or debate over policy options.

The discourse of urgency, which Bilney displays is entangled with the construction of neoliberal policies as essentially the only policy options for those countries in fiscal crisis. If Pacific countries can be convinced of an impending crisis, they may also be more easily convinced that “developing countries in the Pacific should not await the onset of an economic crisis to initiate the reform process”\textsuperscript{123} but should rather begin implementing neoliberal policies before ‘crisis’ strikes. This is closely related to the ‘thesis of inevitability’, persuading Pacific governments that neoliberal ‘reforms’ are inevitable so they might as well be implemented anyway.\textsuperscript{124} My point is not to suggest that some Pacific countries did not have difficult situations to deal with or ‘fiscal crisis.’ The Cook Islands government, for example, was virtually bankrupt when the government, assisted by the ADB, began implementing neoliberal policies.\textsuperscript{125} However, whether these incidences justify the pressure exerted from various sources, including Bilney on Pacific states is another matter.

The language of neoliberalism in the Pacific has come to be articulated in terms of concerns for structural and institutional issues, rather than criticising the actual cultures and practices of Pacific peoples. As discussed earlier in the chapter neoliberal are much more cautious about claiming that Indigenous peoples are incapable of governing although some are overt about the need to ‘transforming societies’.\textsuperscript{126} As mentioned above, Pacific peoples can no longer overtly be labelled unable to manage their own affairs, and it is partly for this reason that outside promoters of reform prefer to portray themselves as mostly concerned with

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\textsuperscript{123} Knapman and Saldanha, 1999, p. 5.
\textsuperscript{124} This ‘thesis of inevitability’ will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Five.
\end{flushright}
Chapter Two: Neoliberalism

‘technical’ and therefore ‘neutral’ ‘details’ of the ‘economy’. In this way they attempt to deny suggestions that their policies are culturally and politically loaded.

Australian governments have been particularly clear about encouraging neoliberal policies which transform Pacific countries into forms more compatible with Western models of governance. Once again Bilney provides a valuable insight into this perspective. He argues that what is required in the Pacific are “positive methods for improving governance through development assistance, by providing financial resources, advice and technical assistance for projects supporting better governance”.127 Bilney uses both the quest for human rights and democracy as cornerstones of his argument, as though the Australian government has a ‘duty’ to directly ‘encourage’ these ways of governing in the Pacific. He justifies Australia’s commitment to transforming Pacific countries in the name of ‘good governance’, by placing it in league with the practices of the United Kingdom, Sweden, the United States, Japan and the World Bank. Bilney rejects claims that the actions of the Australian government could be an ‘imposition’ and therefore ‘inappropriate and unsustainable’, rather he insists on the Australian government’s moral right to not have the effectiveness of aid compromised by “ineffective or unresponsive government administration”.128 This type of perspective accompanying neoliberal policies still renders Pacific peoples as not entirely capable of governing in ways deemed appropriate by Western standards of governance.

A rare and valuable insight into the enduring, but concealed nature, of disparaging perspectives of Pacific Island countries and Pacific peoples more generally, came in July 1997 with the leak of a Brief on the Pacific prepared by various Australian government departments.129 Compiled for the Australian Delegation to the annual Forum Economic Ministers Meeting in Cairns, the brief made detailed, personal and

128 Ibid, p. 17.
129 Some examples from the brief are as follows: “Used to ambitious but unrealised development plans, they may balk at settling for modest but achievable objectives”, “have generally shirked hard decisions”, “he is boastful and vain – having spent heavily on grandiose monuments- can irritate others”, “Temperamentally volatile, he is still given to Third World posturing against Western colonialism”. Australian Delegation brief prepared for the July 11 1997, Forum Economic Ministers’ Meeting, Cairns, Australia. Pacific Islands Report website http://166.122.164.43/archive/1997/August/08-04-11.html Accessed 24/4/02.
often derogatory assessments of Pacific countries and their leaders.\textsuperscript{130} The incident was portrayed in the media largely as a blunder on Australia’s part whilst the content of the brief either went uncommented on, or was supported. An article in Aotearoa New Zealand’s \textit{The Evening Post} noted, “(t)he Australians may not score highly for diplomatic finesse, but their intelligence is sound”.\textsuperscript{131} An article in the \textit{West Australian} even questioned the need for the brief when “(a)nyone who reads the newspapers or follows current affairs on the radio and television would already be fully aware that most South Pacific countries are economic basket cases and that their leaders are absolute rotters”.\textsuperscript{132}

Aside from highlighting racist perceptions of the Pacific, the most interesting aspect of the incident however, is that it publicly exposed the enduring perception of Pacific peoples as unable to govern their own affairs. While promoting democracy in some contexts the Australian government had problems with the view that Pacific Islanders themselves should be left to determine if and when systems of governance are dysfunctional. The brief itself, published in its entirety on the internet, provides an insightful perspective of the Australian governments’ belief that it understands which policies are best for Pacific countries, and also a desire to not be seen to be too aggressive or insistent on these policies. The brief continually reiterates the need to keep neoliberal policy options simple, and explained as political programs, which can easily be applied. Early in the brief it is noted that, “Island governments have had plentiful advice from foreign experts in the past, but often not in a form that they can readily grasp and translate into a political program”.\textsuperscript{133} The brief continues,

\begin{quote}
if our message on economic reform is kept simple – and we emphasize its potential benefits for their [Pacific countries’] prosperity and the preservation of their separate identities – economic ministers will find it easier to convince their colleagues to press on with it.\textsuperscript{134}
\end{quote}

Neoliberal policies therefore, despite persistent attempts to reject such connections, are firmly allied with a familiar paternalistic idea of governing Pacific peoples. Despite claiming to be enhancing the ‘freedom’ of individuals, the values inherent

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\textsuperscript{130} The Pacific Islands Forum Economic Ministers Meetings are held annually prior to the full Pacific Islands Forum Meeting.
\textsuperscript{131} “Truth Overlooked in Diplomatic Ruckus”, \textit{The Evening Post}, 30 July 1997.
\textsuperscript{132} Andre Malan, “South Pacific Hits Back”, \textit{The West Australian}, 22 July 1997.
\textsuperscript{133} Australian Delegation, 1997.
\textsuperscript{134} Ibid.
\end{flushright}
in the construction of this particular mode of ‘freedom’ continues to be paternalistic and colonial.

Moreover, the fact that the report was clearly marked “Australian Eyes Only” indicates the Australian governments’ awareness that such information would be offensive to Pacific government officials. While all government leaders may well commonly use such frank briefings for international meetings, it is doubtful that the kinds of comments made about Pacific officials, would be phrased in the same way as a briefing regarding government officials from London. This also connects to the unevenness of particular criticisms of Pacific leaders for corruption and faulty governance, when these are not also applied consistently throughout the Pacific or with other regions. Also telling is a perception amongst Australian and New Zealand diplomatic core officials that the Pacific is a ‘backwater’ and being posted there is often considered a demotion.

The ‘AUSTEO incident’ went a long way in making overt and public the types of patronising views which are inherently a component of neoliberal policies. Despite this, Pacific leaders pursued the neoliberal policies insisted upon by these multiple sources, presumably either under pressure or perceiving some disjuncture between patronising views and supposedly ‘technical’ policies. The encouragement and institutional support for the pursuit of these policies regionally was vital for their subsequent implementation in each country at a national level. Regional cooperation has been crucial for creating and maintaining an environment where neoliberal policies are not only continually reaffirmed as logical, but also continually taught. The different donors to the Pacific became increasingly interested in presenting policy packages to Pacific countries which could be implemented without too much action required on the part of Pacific government officials. Teaching the benefits of ‘free’ trade for example, as espoused by Adam Smith, could only influence Pacific policies to a degree, after which it seemed apparent to various donor institutions that actual policies had to be provided. Structural Adjustment Programmes became the most succinct way to provide Pacific governments with an entire ensemble of policies which, with the appropriate monitoring, could most efficiently correct the problems in Pacific ‘economies’. With the assistance of the World Bank, ADB, Australian and New Zealand governments, and particularly of the Pacific Islands Forum, Pacific countries began drastic cuts to the size of government.
In the same way that ‘welfare dependent’ individuals are induced to take responsibility for their own affairs, many analysts in the Pacific have expressed desires to tighten the conditionalities attached to official aid, to actually force Pacific peoples to ‘take responsibility’ for their affairs. Such an extreme argument certainly receives a hearing in the Pacific but is often more difficult to implement. Instead the rationality behind the promotion of loans is that these must be repaid, they therefore may not create as high a level of dependency. Pacific governments are forced to take responsibility for repaying loans and it is the role of international institutions to introduce further neoliberal policies, particularly privatisation to achieve this. Neoliberal advocates view the imposition of this difficult situation (of the pressure to ‘reform) on Pacific states as positive because it forces them to make ‘hard’ decisions, to take ‘responsibility’ and rid themselves of ‘dependency’. Forcing Pacific states to take ‘responsibility’ can be seen as part of the civilising, training mission. They are being ‘taught’ by economic force, supposedly a better way to live, in the long term. Such training neoliberals argue will eventually allow Pacific people to exercise their own autonomy.

REFLECTIONS

At the heart of neoliberalism are assumptions about the individual and the market as having particular natural identities. Being conceived as ‘objectively’ discovered and known in this way gives neoliberalism on one level a way of dismissing alternatives without great consideration.

The ‘factual’ scientific tone utilised for neoliberal arguments is indeed persuasive, appealing to an entrenched discourse which emphasises a set of theories and practices conceptualised in nineteenth century Britain. For those state makers in need of results to problems which are often framed as such by neoliberals, the political economic and intellectual pressure from other governments, economists
and the business sector to succumb to neoliberal prescriptions is great. In the course of their prescriptions for the economic development of countries, neoliberals and neoliberal institutions have taken on something of a dictatorial role. According to neoliberals, their ideas are positive for humanity. This means that they fervently believe that their prescriptions are not only right but that they have the ‘right’ or obligation to interfere in countries to provide them with the benefits of their wisdom. This is highly reminiscent of the process of colonialism, in which missionaries and others were deluded in the sanctity with which they perceived their own actions. The connections with colonial modes of reform do not cease there. Neoliberalism has a rich connection with colonial attitudes of civilising Indigenous peoples, even after their ‘independence’ from ‘colonial rule’.

In the Pacific, the embedding of neoliberalism required the formulation of certain discourses to construct the right kind of environment, of urgency, of potential crisis, of the ‘global’ impinging upon states which may previously have been, but can not again simply be ‘islands’, which could facilitate the implementation of neoliberal policies.

In this chapter I hope to have demonstrated the persistence of earlier assumptions of Western superiority. The kinds of values underpinning neoliberal claims are derived originally from specifically Imperial contexts imbued with assumptions about hierarchies of different cultures. It is the appropriateness of these policies and agendas in the Pacific which I will take up in greater detail in later chapters of the thesis.

If we accept that neoliberal policies and agendas are much more than discrete incidences then it becomes essential to understand how these multifarious policies and agendas fit together. In the next chapter I explore how these neoliberal policies
and agendas can be described as re-colonisation and how Indigenous peoples locate the construction of knowledge as crucial to these practices.
“Step 8: Eternal Policeman: Even after granting independence, Robinson cannot trust Friday. The master can never rest secure”.\textsuperscript{1}

INTRODUCTION

In the last chapter I explained the way that neoliberalism can not be seen as an ideology alone, but rather needs to be understood as operationalised and justified in the context of historical and geographical legacies. In this chapter I will expand on how this connects with understanding neoliberal policies and agendas as re-colonisation. The aim of this chapter is to extrapolate the concept of re-colonisation

in such a way that it is understood as a permeable set of practices, not totalising nor inevitable, yet still far from benign.

Since its publication, Epeli Hau’ofa’s essay “Our Sea of Islands” has generated profound debate in the way academics contextualise their work on Oceania. As might be expected with such an important work, there is little agreement on the issues he raises. While Hau’ofa never actually raises the term re-colonisation, many of the political economic practices he discusses might aptly be described as acts of re-colonisation. In the essay, he sets out to describe the control of Pacific Islands by outside forces and elites, and he discusses the effects of these actions on a mass of ‘ordinary people’ who are excluded from this world. He argues that there is a need to discontinue discussions of this type in order to reject hopelessness and belittlement. However, investigating re-colonisation can assist in understanding the potentially long-term consequences of these practices, and may contribute to a greater appreciation of the purposes of Indigenous resistance.

This chapter is not an explication of something solid, stagnant and singular. Rather, in this chapter I seek to outline the way that some Indigenous theorists in the Pacific have conceptualised a set of practices which they argue constitute re-colonisation. In order to assess the kinds of problems and potential from describing certain practices as re-colonisation, I will expand on the small range of ideas which the writings of these Indigenous theorists provide. In this way I will be able to more adequately contextualise re-colonisation. This includes outlining four features or practices which could comprise re-colonisation: indirect ‘peaceful’ rule, multiple authors, institutionalisation and normalisation. Usage of the term re-colonisation will then be examined to see how Indigenous theorists implicitly or explicitly locate it within a genealogy of colonisations. I will then explore the role of these Indigenous theorists and others describing similar practices. Because these theorists argue that practices of re-colonisation are negative and should be rejected, their role as theorists then also becomes one of activists. This has affected the way they perceive knowledge to be constituted and re-constituted to effect political economic change.

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INDIGENOUS CONCEPTUALISATIONS OF RE-COLONISATION

A number of Indigenous scholars discuss practices in the Pacific as types of colonisation or neo-colonisation or re-colonisation. While they may use a variety of terms, essentially they are discussing very similar practices which may aptly come under the rubric of the term re-colonisation. Linda Tuhiwai Smith describes colonialism as but “one expression of imperialism”.4 Conversely, Makere Harawira, in her article on ‘neo-imperialism’, states that “imperialism is the defining characteristic of colonialism in both its past and present forms”.5 Francis Bugotu uses ‘re-colonising’ as synonymous with ‘neo-colonialism’ and Powes Parkop views re-colonisation as the modern form of colonialism.6 There are other competing definitions amongst Indigenous writers of the Pacific regarding the colonial, neo-colonial and where any notion of decolonisation or post-colonial begins. What all these definitions have in common is a shared conception of these practices as negative. The practices that these terms signify are integral to the current Indigenous experience in the Pacific. The fact that they are used so often is indicative of the continuing relevance of these practices, and how they impact on the lives and struggles of Indigenous peoples.

The following articulations have been selected because they actually use the term ‘re-colonisation’. There are many more articles however, which I have used throughout the rest of the chapter which refer to these kinds of practices but which may not use the word in particular. The reason for utilising both the term re-colonisation and those discussions which appear similar but may not use the term stems from the commonalities amongst these terms and practices.7

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5 Makere Harawira, “Neo-imperialism and the (mis)appropriation of Indigenousness”, Pacific World, No.54, October 1999.
7 For other usages of the term not necessarily in the Pacific, and where the term itself is undefined see: “French Recolonisation Claim N.C. Kanaks”, Pacific Magazine, July 1987, v.12 no.4; Michel Chossudovsky, “The Recolonization of Korea”, http://emperors-
One of the first written usages of the term ‘recolonising’ in regard to the Pacific comes from Francis Bugotu who outlines the boundaries of the process in his article “Decolonising and Recolonising: The Case of the Solomons.” Bugotu makes three significant connections with the term: 1) as being synonymous with a statist project of neo-colonialism; 2) as part of a development project; and 3) as part of a racist cultural project which demeans Pacific islanders. Bugotu uses the term as synonymous with ‘neo-colonialism’ as a largely state-to-state imposition, a “reinforcement of a world-wide design of neo-colonialism which binds former colonies to metropolitan countries”. In this sense he firmly identifies the struggle of Solomon Islanders in a global context as part of the “colonised Third World”. Accompanying this process Bugotu points to the imposition of a development model “by colonial metropolitan countries”. He views this as an imposed model preventing “real progress”. He further argues that “(w)e must have faith in ourselves and our cultures”. Attempting to assert a local way of proceeding informed by multifarious cultural practices however, is blocked by the racism inherent in imposed developmental policies, for as Bugotu explains, “(i)t would be unconventional in the modern world to base any future development of an emerging nation on its own ‘simple’ culture”. Bugotu also maintains that, “(i)n a period of decolonisation in a country, a new spirit of colonisation is usually born disguised, to excuse the existence of colonial and paternalistic attitudes”. To which he adds, “(t)he trouble with us Solomon Islanders is that we are too black…’loveable little barefooted dears with fuzzy-wuzzy hair’”. For Bugotu the way to resist such recolonising lies in the recapturing of pride and identity and recognising the “hollowness of western-style ‘progress’”. In this way he clearly

8 Bugotu, 1975.
9 Bugotu, 1975, p. 77.
10 Ibid, p. 79.
11 Ibid, p. 78.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid, p. 79.
15 Ibid, p. 80.

identifies the cultural project of re-colonisation and the subsequent need for a culturally grounded resistance or responses to it.

More recent uses of the term ‘re-colonisation’ in the Pacific have focussed explicitly on the Structural Adjustment Programmes of the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the Comprehensive Reform Programmes of the Asian Development Bank. Referring to the situation in Melanesia, an anonymous commentator known simply as “A World Bank Watcher” describes what they see as “an era of recolonisation”. In the case of Papua New Guinea she/he dates this era from 1989,

the year when it could be said to have lost that independence, that is, the year when it was forced to accept a Structural Adjustment Policy designed and implemented by advisors sent from the World Bank/international Monetary Fund joint headquarters in Washington D.C [sic].

John Salong also places the term within an historical trajectory, designating 1985 as the year in Vanuatu when the “commitment to Melanesian Indigenous rights began to wane and the process of recolonisation began”.

All of these writers are describing a post-independence condition but not one in which colonialisms have at all faltered or weakened. The General Secretary of Melanesian Solidarity, Powes Parkop comments “becoming a post-colonial state does not mean that colonialism is over”.

Colonialism takes three forms in the Pacific today... ‘old European colonial rule’ continues in countries such as Tahiti (French Polynesia) and Kanaky (New Caledonia); ‘south-south colonialism’ by Indonesia in East Timor and

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17 A World Bank Watcher, undated.
West Papua; and the ‘recolonisation’ of the region by the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and transnational companies.\footnote{Ibid.}

This institutional and state focussed analysis has not eclipsed other perspectives however and A World Bank Watcher has also emphasised the long term strategy of re-colonisation through the promotion of ideas about development. She/he argues that these ideas “alienate the population in general and the youth in particular from the attitudes and work practices that are necessary for maintenance of viable communities and traditional prosperity on the land”.\footnote{A  World Bank Watcher, 2001.}

Likewise, Mililani Trask explains that “the most significant attribute of colonization and imperialism is the imposition of the colonizer’s values, laws and practices on the colonized”.\footnote{Mililani B. Trask “Indigenous Peoples, Self-Determination and Economic Development”, unpublished paper, 2000, p. 10.}

Renato Constantino has identified globalisation with re-colonisation as a system of global corporate control. He says

> Globalization... is simply this: Recolonization. It seeks to integrate every economy into a single world system under the direction of global corporations. Thus, its proponents seek to eliminate national and territorial borders to enable their products to avail of unlimited market access without paying the usual high tariffs. This way, too, a country's natural resources may be exploited without much hindrance.\footnote{Renato Constantino Jr. “Globalisation is Recolonisation”, a paper presented to the Asia Pacific Solidarity Conference, 10-13 April, Sydney, 1998.}

Here Constantino has added yet another term and other processes to this mixture of descriptions.

In a different sort of category comes Aziz Choudry’s article on re-colonisation directed at the protest movement itself. He analyses the way that activists can talk about “transnationals, the WTO, globalisation as recolonisation, and perhaps even the neoliberal agenda in the context of colonialism in the Third World”.\footnote{Aziz Choudry, “Bringing it all Back Home: Anti-Globalisation Activism Cannot Ignore Colonial Realities” Z net commentary, 3 August 2001. Z Magazine website, http://www.zmag.org/Sustainers/content/2001-08/03choudry.htm Accessed 8/10/02.} And yet, he explains, activists often avoid supporting Indigenous peoples’ rights to self determination. He suggests this is for a variety of reasons including as it might
implicate them in practices of exploitation they would rather remain ignorant of. Here Choudry clearly links re-colonisation not only to the work of transnational corporations and neoliberal institutions but firmly locates it within the context of anti-colonial struggles, particularly by Indigenous peoples.

At the United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing, which several Pacific representatives attended, the Indigenous Women’s Declaration also makes reference to re-colonisation. These women characterise re-colonisation as coming under the name of globalisation and trade liberalisation. The forces behind this are the rich industrialised nation-states, their transnational corporations, financial institutions which they control like the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organisation (WTO). In addition they categorise “Bio-prospecting” as “another feature of recolonisation,” “which is nothing but the alienation of our invaluable intellectual and cultural heritage through scientific collection missions and ethnobotanical research”. Once more there is a primary focus on states, TNCs and intergovernmental institutions as the primary instigators of re-colonisation.

EXPANSION OF THE CONCEPT OF RE-COLONISATION

The differences between these accounts of practices of re-colonisation suggest that some or all of them provide an incomplete picture of what re-colonisation is or could be. To fully assess whether or not these Indigenous scholars have a strong claim that re-colonisation is taking place we need to tease out all its potential aspects. Therefore, this section of the chapter will use their explications as bases from which to create a tentative narrative of how re-colonisation could be more fully conceptualised. We will then be able to assess whether such a concept is useful and/or plausible.

26 Ibid, Article 8.
Both components of the term re-colonisation, the ‘re’ and the ‘colonisation’, have definitional difficulties. The ‘re’ can perhaps imply a sense of ‘happening again’ as though there was a point, namely independence, at which the structures and practices of colonisation stopped, which is not the case. In his book on foreign affairs, Steve Hoadley paints a rather consensual and civilised picture of this process, arguing that “extremism” in the Pacific was “moderated by Christianity and a genuine respect for the colonial powers by local leaders” and that the “use of English and the establishment of British-inspired educational systems promoted consensus”. 27 More accurate accounts of the ‘transition’ to self-government see the process as requiring bloody struggles and often fraught with the realities of nuclear testing and dumping and the destruction of entire islands such as in the Marshall Islands or French Polynesia. 28 A. V. Hughes also makes the important point that the new boundaries and territory created through de-colonisation or ‘national independence’ had little impact on pre-colonial conflicts, many of which still present problems to ‘independent’ governments. 29 In this respect, many of the Pacific states are mixed coalitions of peoples, Fiji for example, is sometimes categorised as part of Melanesia, sometimes part of Polynesia and the people are neither exclusively. The use of the term re-colonisation should not be taken as accepting the premise that a real de-colonisation actually occurred. Rather the continued utilisation of the term ‘colonisation’ could act as a reminder that the destructive processes of colonisation are ongoing and reflected in re-colonisation.

The issue of whether there has or has not been a clear break or something of a reincarnation from the past is not the central point here. 30 What is at issue is which

30 In most Pacific Island states there has been an official legal withdrawal of the coloniser. Under international law therefore, there has supposedly been a break in colonialism through a change of ownership as it were, of the state, which makes the use of the term ‘re’
aspects of colonialism have changed and which have remained the same. This raises
the question of ‘what is new about re-colonisation?’ The principal condition, which
appears to be different, is that Pacific Islanders are now citizens of their own states.
This has not removed the existence of domination but it has increased the role that
local elites and international institutions play in embedding and re-embedding
neoliberalism. It means that much of re-colonisation takes place through state to
state mechanisms and as a result Indigenous peoples are treated as citizens of the
‘developing’ state in this construct instead of subjects of the empire. Also new to re-
colonisation appears to be neoliberalism, which is embodied by a more
sophisticated global marketing, and institutionalising regime than colonialism.

INDIRECT ‘PEACEFUL’ RULE

In the accounts of Indigenous scholars, re-colonisation takes place in an indirect and
supposedly peaceful way.31 It works through the mechanisms of the state, restricting
the ability of Pacific states to venture too far from the track laid down by neoliberal
institutions. As David Fidler points out, neoliberal Structural Adjustment Policies
have a fundamental message, “to engage fully in international relations, your
behaviour has to conform to expectations, policies, and rules established by the
prevailing powers”.32 And as Robert Nicole has also highlighted there is moreover
little need for brute force when opinions can be assimilated and ‘common sense’

applicable. In another sense however the ‘re’ should emphasise that there was a change in
the form, a revision, a reincarnation, but not a break from the past.
31 If we adopted Christina Rojas’s concept of violence however, as implicit in the practices of
naming, interpreting, and silencing we could understand that these practices are as violent
as a military attack. See Christina Rojas, Civilization and Violence: Regimes of Representation in
Nineteenth-Century Colombia, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2002. In addition this is
not to say that resistance hasn’t been violent or that there haven’t been occasions, such as
Bougainville where the Pacific government involved (PNG government) has defended the
property of foreign investors. These policies can be seen as violent to those who feel their
effects, particularly through the creation of insecurity in peoples lives but the way in which
these policies are transmitted does not utilise formal military personnel. Additionally there
are actions taking place in the world which could be seen as acts of re-colonisation, for
example, the United States force in Afghanistan. However, many of these involve direct
military force which I have not included in my definition.
Adjustment Policies, and the Standard of Liberal Globalized Civilization” Texas International
discursively internalised.\textsuperscript{33} When governments do stray from the pre-ordained path, agents are required on the ground.\textsuperscript{34} In this way re-colonisation is indirect rule through two types of agents or ‘forces’ that appear on the ground. The first are easily identifiable as policy advisors or self-styled ‘experts’ from neoliberal international institutions, like the World Bank. The others are those who have an ambiguous presence, what Homi Bhabha has described as a “\textit{metonymy of presence}”\textsuperscript{35} or simply “mimicry”.\textsuperscript{36} In this regard some Indigenous leaders are surely complicit in the process of embedding neoliberalism but simultaneously they are “not quite,”\textsuperscript{37} as they defend Indigenous rights. Bhabha quotes Freud who mentions the position of people of mixed race, “who taken all round resemble white men but who betray their coloured descent by some striking feature or other and on that account are excluded from society and enjoy none of the privileges”.\textsuperscript{38} Likewise some Indigenous leaders for example display a certain level of conviction regarding neoliberal policies but may speak at formal meetings in traditional oratory which assert an Indigenous worldview.\textsuperscript{39} As with most mimicry, the purpose often remains complex or obscure as some Indigenous leaders may mime the forms of policy but it is unclear whether they actually wish to be complete adherents. It appears more probable that they wish to receive the alleged benefits of neoliberalism, but do not wish to be subsumed.

In his theorising about hegemony, Antonio Gramsci argued that hegemonic groups would attempt to co-opt leaders of the subaltern social groups, along with any ideas which they held that were potentially threatening to the regime

\textsuperscript{34} As Stephen Hymer notes in his parable about Robinson Crusoe and Friday, “(t)he master can never rest secure” and must continue to survey the practices of embedding and re-embedding particular understandings. Stephen Hymer, quoted in Pettman, 1996, p. 59.
\textsuperscript{35} Homi Bhabha, \textit{The Location of Culture}, London: Routledge, 1994, p. 89, original emphasis.
\textsuperscript{36} Ibid, p. 85.
\textsuperscript{37} Ibid, p. 89.
\textsuperscript{38} Sigmund Freud quoted in Bhabha, Ibid, p. 89.
of truth. Aziz Choudry argues that “if you can co-opt you can set the agenda. If you cannot then people might set their own”\(^\text{41}\). The theory of co-opting can suggest a passive ‘object’. There is an interaction which takes place however, between the subject and object or people and hegemonic theories. Co-option is never complete and is subject to revision as Bhabha’s concept of mimicry suggests. Aimé Césaire argues that whether the actions and intentions of people correspond should not be a crucial consideration. With regard to the significance of whether these people believe they are doing the correct, ethically ‘proper’ thing, Césaire says,

> do not seek to know whether personally these gentlemen [sic] are in good or bad faith, whether personally they have good or bad intentions...because the essential thing is that their highly problematical subjective good faith is entirely irrelevant to the objective social implications of the evil work they perform as watchdogs of colonialism.\(^\text{42}\)

Updating Césaire’s point, we might say that regardless of their quest of betterment of all people, neoliberal advocates still do harm by fully implementing their policies. However, if we accept Césaire’s argument, then we once again segregate people into camps, demonise them, make dialogue and compromise difficult and give up on those who have been co-opted, or potentially even the mimicrists.

Re-colonisation can be seen as not just the embedding of neoliberalism, but more specifically the embedding of these policies in the previously colonised states of the Pacific.\(^\text{43}\) The way neoliberalism is embedded in the Pacific is radically different from the way in which it is introduced and perpetuated in say the United States

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\(^{40}\) This kind of process Gramsci described as trasformismo, See, Quinton Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith, (eds) *Selections From the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci*. London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1971, p. 58. André Béteille expresses the recognition of similar fear in the working class, he says, “Leaders of working class movements have everywhere been haunted simultaneously by two fears: the fear that their movement will be dominated by intellectuals from other classes with no true spiritual kinship with the working class; and the fear that intellectuals originating in the working class will be tempted away from their own class by the attractions of professional life”. André Béteille, *Ideologies and Intellectuals*, Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1980, p. 233.

\(^{41}\) Aziz Choudry, “From Ottawa to Wellington: APEC, Co-option, Control and Colonization”, unpublished article, February 1999.

\(^{42}\) Aimé Césaire *Discourse on Colonialism*, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972, p. 34.

\(^{43}\) While the Kingdom of Tonga was never formally colonised it was a British Protectorate from 1900 until 1970 and I will include it in discussions, as they are still involved in these processes.
(US) or the United Kingdom (UK). In addition the type of neoliberalism introduced in the Pacific is specifically articulated for ‘development’. Categorised as ‘developing’ states, the problems of Pacific states highlighted by neoliberal advocates as requiring solutions, are different from those which would be found in the US or UK. Corruption for example, highlighted in many Pacific islands by donors is not as rigorously pursued in say the governments of OECD members. Another example is money laundering, which has been highlighted in the Offshore Financial Centres of several Pacific islands state, and is often rigorously examined by the OECD officials, but the financial activities within OECD countries, which may also encourage and support money laundering are not perceived as dangerous. This desire to ensure adherence to neoliberal policies, or put another way, this distrust in the capabilities of Pacific peoples, makes the issue of co-opting agendas more crucial to re-colonisation. If Pacific peoples have space to create their own agendas, there is no certainty that these will conform with the needs and requirements of neoliberalism.

MULTIPLE AUTHORS

If the term ‘re-colonisation’ is employed, the question then also arises, who is the coloniser? The colonial power is not merely a state or companies or particular regions of the world, but involves a larger ensemble of sometimes contradictory forces. Some scholars have argued over the difficulties with perceiving “colonialism as a ‘text without an author’” or alternatively with a singular and monolithic author. In this way colonialism becomes a self-automated machine, not entirely different from Adam Smith’s conception of the naturally functioning market and his

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45 This will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Six.
infamous “invisible hand”. 47 In Foucault’s lecture on “Governmentality” he explicates the difference between conceiving of rule as promulgated by a prince, like Machiavelli’s prince who “stood in a relation of singularity and externality, and thus transcendence, to his principality” 48 as opposed to an “art of government”. 49 Foucault argues that “the multiplicity and immanence of these activities distinguishes them radically from the transcendent singularity of Machiavelli’s prince”. 50 In this work Foucault appears to suggest that the art of government is solely immanent to the state. Re-colonisation however appears as both within and external, the point to utilise from Foucault however is the multifarious nature of this governing. What is being explicated in this thesis is not a singular author/coloniser, but processes of governing, the practices of which are “multifarious and concern many kinds of people”. 51

This multifarious and multipurposed nature of governing contrasts starkly with the arguments of neoliberal advocates who suggest that the implementation of neoliberal policies is simply for the betterment of life for all peoples. Neoliberals see no shame in admitting that their policies seek to modify societies into forms which differ radically from their original conception. As discussed in Chapter Two, Joseph Stiglitz for example, has in a positive sense called development a “transformation of society”. 52 This feeds in to broader perspectives which view states without the infrastructure for neoliberalism and the institutions appropriate to embed it, as requiring intervention. Paul Johnson goes so far as to argue that “colonialism…is a trend that should be encouraged”. 53 While Max Boot argues that countries like “Afghanistan and other troubled lands today cry out for the sort of enlightened foreign administration once provided by self-confident Englishmen in jodhpurs and

49 Ibid, p. 89.
50 Ibid, p. 91.
51 Ibid, p. 91.
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pith helmets”. The purpose of neoliberalism therefore includes what Uday Mehta, referring to nineteenth century liberalism, calls a “deep impulse to reform the world”. Mehta argues this impulse creates tensions at the heart of liberalism; its impulse to better the world clashes with the other tenets of liberalism, which alone would potentially not cause the grief that the entire ensemble of ‘reform’ does. Needless to say the bettering, or civilising, goal of neoliberalism outweighs the other notions, such as “tolerance, the right to representation, equality, and crucially...consent and the sovereignty of the people”. The policies for the betterment of all peoples are in turn institutionalised and intermittently backed up by a physical presence of advisers, as previously mentioned, all of which are justified by claims to certain underlying truths.

INSTITUTIONALISATION

Neoliberal claims to truth cannot categorise and reify the world alone; they require numerous agents and institutions to transform knowledge into power. In the Pacific the truth claims underlying re-colonisation come mainly from institutions which could be labelled as ‘Western’ or from ‘outside’ of the region. In this sense re-colonisation becomes clearer through a comparison of the various political economic prescriptions for island countries. In a political economic context this involves: neoliberal institutions like the World Trade Organisation (WTO), International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank (ADB); the more subtle United Nations; and regional organisations, the state and Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs). By examining these institutions we can discern the materiality of discourse which “makes possible disciplines and institutions which in turn sustain and distribute those discourses”.

56 Ibid, p. 80
economy should be constructed, which are articulated in the policies they encourage their member/client countries to adopt. These policies are epitomised by the World Bank and IMF Structural Adjustment Programmes and the ADB’s Comprehensive Reform Programmes. While there is some competition amongst these institutions, they mostly co-operate with each other to ensure some degree of uniformity in policy prescriptions. As most Pacific states are members of a combination of these multilateral institutions, they closely follow their prescriptions and advice on how to organise the state and its citizens. And the Pacific states are not alone, for the ways that developing countries in other parts of the world are dominated by such institutions is well documented elsewhere.58

Regional multilateral organisations like the Pacific Islands Forum59 also provide an avenue through which Pacific government leaders can receive neoliberal policy advice. The Pacific Islands Forum is the most prominent regional institution in this regard, comprised of Pacific Island government officials who position the organisation as a logical policy adviser for all Pacific Island countries. The Forum’s regular meetings with international institutions, like the WTO and then subsequently with Pacific governments, connects these governments with the latest neoliberal requirements.

NGOs are also placed in a compromising position in the process of institutionalising neoliberalism. They are heavily involved in this advisory process and also play a mediating role between international development agencies, or donor countries and local governments and communities.60 In this way Pacific NGOs, much like Pacific governments themselves, follow a fine path of representing the perspectives of, and pursuing the goals of local communities, and mediating externally imposed expectations. Most NGOs operating in the Pacific are local Indigenous organisations, small and comprised of volunteers seeking to enhance the lives of

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59 Previously the ‘South Pacific Forum’.
60 I have not on the whole included churches in this definition. I have included comments from those which do play a regional political role.
people locally through more sustainable and wider forms of development. Representing many of these groups, the regional association of NGOs, the Pacific Islands Association of Non Governmental Organisations (PIANGO) has as one of its aims to “assist NGOs to strengthen and develop Pacific cultures and forms of social action...” This leaves open the possibility to resist policies which threaten Pacific peoples and cultures. The larger and often international NGOs working in the Pacific, particularly those working directly on trade and investment issues like those connected with United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) are more likely to be complicit in the re-colonisation process and are viewed with caution and hostility by many Indigenous NGOs. They are more likely to be pursuing neoliberal policies and projects and have strong links to multilateral agencies or aid donor agencies, like the Australian Agency for International Development. Often these NGOs have contracts with the government of countries in which they operate, meaning they are not directly accountable to local communities.

International development agencies do attempt to use both the smaller local NGOs and the larger ones to facilitate the introduction of Neoliberal policies. The local NGOs have a direct influence on people, for example, through education programmes, while the larger ones have more of a focus on governments and other regional level organisations. After significant failures of the larger scale projects of development agencies, recent years have seen these agencies re-focussing development projects to emphasise a ‘bottom-up’ approach. This has meant smaller projects with a greater role for local Indigenous NGOs. This has benefited these NGOs in several ways by enabling them to grow and to arguably provide better implementation of development projects, but has also burdened them with larger workloads while not providing the commensurate funding. There is a strong feeling of resistance amongst these NGOs against Neoliberal policies. For example,

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63 For a frank explication of the tensions between these NGOs see World Wildlife Fund For Nature, 1997, p. 47-50.
64 Ibid, p. 48.
PIANGO openly rejects neoliberal policies and argues that they are “not the way to go”.\(^{66}\) Instead PIANGO suggests a more active role for the state in the support of community projects and protecting communities from the impacts of integration with other economies. PIANGO also warns that contractual relationships should be treated with caution by NGOs as they may distort the priorities of that NGO in serving the objectives of the funding body which may not coincide with the needs of NGO members.\(^{67}\)

The multifaceted position of NGOs highlights the difficulty of continuing to trace re-colonisation practices, after the seemingly ‘apparent’ first generation of policies coming from ‘outside.’ The difficulty arises as these practices are re-designed for local consumption by regional and national institutions and some Indigenous leaders. Or as Pastor Paiaporu argues there is an “indigenisation of the policies”.\(^{68}\) In this way levels of mimicry become important but so does the lingering connection of both the neoliberal agenda and Indigenous cultures. Some government leaders are more willing to accept neoliberal policies than others. Few are enthusiastic about such policies but rather see their role as managing or mitigating the negative aspects of these policies.\(^{69}\) As Antony Hooper argues

\begin{quote}
(p)oliticians and policymakers in Pacific countries do what they can to adapt the development recommendations to social and political realities (or, as some would insist, to their own ends), but it is often an inexact and disruptive process, beset by many unintended consequences.\(^{70}\)
\end{quote}

Hooper’s comments remind us that there are Indigenous leaders who may not be wholly convinced of the benefits of neoliberal policies but in a crisis situation may be forced to take these policies as the simplest and most simplistic option and the only one which neoliberal agencies will agree to support.

In contrast to Hooper, Stewart Firth argues that;

\(^{66}\) Ibid, p. 5.
\(^{67}\) Ibid, p. 11.
Governments often claim, for example that the pressure of globalisation leaves them with no alternative but to privatise, sell off government-owned assets, and to reduce the role of the state in the economy...There is much truth in this claim but it is also true that governments want to privatise and deregulate anyway, and find it convenient to claim that globalisation forces their hand... Firth’s point indicates the pressure Pacific leaders are under but also raises the question of why do governments actually want to follow these neoliberal prescriptions? It appears noteworthy that these leaders believe and have been encouraged to believe that they are pursuing the best option for their countries, and they are encouraged in this direction as they may have been included in receiving some of the benefits of such practices. Hence the practices of re-colonisation have become mixed with local power struggles over, for example, land or inter-family rivalries making them almost indistinguishable from historical and continuing local struggles. Ultimately, however, these practices or their residue are identifiable as they are institutionalised and held up for assessment by neoliberal agencies. As a cultural project, re-colonisation is a much slower process and inhibited by mutation at the local level which serves to subvert the neoliberal agenda. In a formal legalistic sense however, neoliberal policies do become operationalised as laws, which make them much more readily enforceable. And this constitutes the first stage in the process towards the normalisation of these ideas.

NORMALISATION

The normalising or internalising of such specific truths and practices occurs over a long term and is never a discrete project, that is, it cannot be finished or total. An important component of this normalising is the training of people through their own decision-making processes. Stephen Gill describes this process as ‘disciplinary neoliberalism’ connected to the power of capital through the redefinition of public policy so that governments seek to prove the credibility and the consistency of their policies according to the criterion of the confidence of investors. Gill is referring to something of a Foucauldian analysis, although he appears to take the term ‘disciplinary’ somewhat more literally than Foucault might have intended to imply.


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He views discipline as “discipline exercised on…”73 whereas Foucault focuses also on the productive character of discipline and its role in the formation of the self.74

This can be seen in the Pacific with relations to transnational corporations (TNCs) and their interactions with Indigenous people, some of whom facilitate environmental exploitation. In this way TNCs benefit substantially from neoliberal policies and often work closely with international institutions and governments to further their interests. For Pacific countries the role of TNCs is most openly seen in the area of environment where re-colonisation has proven to have serious effects. In the larger Melanesian countries the mining of natural resources by TNCs leaves little revenue for local peoples and pollutes waterways and land. TNCs encourage governments to pursue neoliberal policies and are in turn significantly advantaged by these policies, which put pressure on Pacific governments to attract and pander to these companies. The complexity here is that many locals are also complicit in the destruction/sale/exploitation of these resources for their own purposes.75 In this sense Colin Filer’s caution to both activists and Melanesians should be heeded. He argues that environmental activists can not romanticise the actions of Melanesians as simply being betrayed by corrupt political leaders and not active participants, nor can Melanesians solely blame environmentalists for ‘robbing them’ of economic opportunities by fighting TNCs.76 Many Indigenous leaders are attempting to balance their needs and responsibilities but are heavily swayed by their creditors and binding international agreements, along with the pressures of competition for access to markets for the sale of resources, as well as meeting the needs of their peoples.

The environment also provides an example of the full extent to which the power relations inherent in re-colonisation provides a life and death situation for Pacific islanders. Climate change and rising sea levels threatens the very existence of some

73 Ibid, emphasis added.
76 Ibid, p. 12.
Pacific Islands as a World Bank study Cities, Seas and Storms: Managing Change in Pacific Island Economies found. The authors noted that,

(t)he Pacific Islands are already experiencing severe impacts from climate events. This is evidenced by cyclone damage of more than US$1 billion during the 1990s and by the impact of recent droughts in Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, and Palau. Such immediate pressures are ignored however, by major greenhouse gas emitters like the United States, whose President George W. Bush is quoted having said, “(w)e want to reduce greenhouse gases. ... But first things first, as far as I’m concerned… Our strategy must make sure working people in America aren’t going out of work”. This highlights the destructive potential of global inequalities and just how lethal dominating techniques like those of re-colonisation can be.

Normalisation also works through knowledge, as Antonio Gramsci and Michel Foucault have both emphasised, albeit from different perspectives, the production of knowledge is crucial to the maintenance of a regime of truth. Therefore while neoliberal ideas are pursued overtly through the aforementioned financial institutions, they are also pursued covertly, particularly through key mind-making institutions such as universities. Of these educational institutions those most closely linked with the government and/or big business or those which are perceived as having been officially mandated to tell the truth, are crucial to the re-production of certain truths. These educational institutions and to a larger extent ‘think tanks’ re-generate and affirm the prevailing world order while simultaneously marginalising perspectives that diverge. Individual governments are, in turn essential in validating particular claims by incorporating them in law.

Within this mind-making dimension people are (literally) taught and assimilated into the dominant discourses, those with alternative ideas being either co-opted or radically marginalised. As Gramsci explained, intellectuals or professional

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80 This is not to say that there is not a significant number of people in universities who are critical of those in positions of power, just that their abilities to check these dominant discourse are limited by the kinds of legitimacy possessed by dominant discourses.
‘experts’ who are in this case the holders of neoliberal ‘truth,’ are crucial in this process. They act to deter and co-opt forces of resistance by using their privileged status and positions. In the Pacific such techniques are never particularly successful in the islands themselves as the unreality of neoliberal rationalities are manifest in island lifestyles. For example, individualistic behaviour is still held in check in many places by communal obligations; there are small local markets, and large subsistence economies on communal land. Where normalising techniques have a better rate of entrenchment is through people being removed from the islands and educated in Australia, the United States or New Zealand where such policies already operate. This indicates the socially connected nature of knowledge which will be addressed later in the chapter.

Normalising techniques are complicated as, in a sense, both re-colonisation and Indigenous cultures can be said to be haunted by the other, both ever-present but not entirely visible. Of colonialism Nicholas Thomas notes, “colonial rule was frequently haunted by a sense of insecurity, terrified by the obscurity of ‘the native mentality’ and overwhelmed by Indigenous societies’ apparent intractability in the face of government.” In describing development discourse as an integral component of a process akin to re-colonisation, Hooper notes, “decay of custom and impoverishment of culture are often seen as wrought by development while failures of development are haunted by the notion that they are due somehow, to the

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81 Intellectuals were for Gramsci crucial in the reproduction and maintenance of hegemony and essential to resistance. They maintain and strengthen the hegemony and are called upon to support and legitimise the existence of the hegemons. They also supply intellectual and moral support to the hegemon’s dominant political role. Gramsci placed intellectuals into two categories: traditional, those who reinforced and supported the hegemon, either by determination or default. The second group Gramsci called ‘organic intellectuals’ who were drawn from within the proletariat. Gramsci claimed that the organic intellectual originated in and remained within her or his own class. Hoare commenting on Gramsci’s conception says,

Gramsci’s general argument here as elsewhere in the Quaderni is that the person of peasant origin who becomes an “intellectual” ((priest, lawyer, etc.) generally thereby ceases to be organically linked to his class of origin...ideally, the proletariat should be able to generate its own “organic” intellectuals within the class and who remain intellectuals of their class.

It appears that Gramsci’s idea, at least as expressed here, was that an intellectual is grown organically from a particular class, knows her or his people, puts forward their view of the world and participates in the local practice. Hoare and Smith, 1971, p. 6 and p. 5-23.

82 This will be discussed in greater detail in Chapters Five to Seven.

83 Thomas, 1994, p. 15.
darker, irrational influences of culture”. In both colonisation and re-colonisation, a fear exists that at some point Indigenous peoples will forcibly reject the system being imposed rendering the systems inoperable for the Pacific. Despite neoliberal policies being implemented in a legalistic sense, it remains that few people have a limited awareness of the way these connect together except in very localised examples. But it is the case that these policies have very distinct and harmful impacts on localised communities. Nevertheless the practitioners of re-colonisation are seeking to ensure a tighter control on structuring the ‘reality’, ‘climate control,’ and the ‘native mentality’ to ensure that this “prescriptive unreality” becomes a firmer sort of ‘reality’ to Pacific peoples.

There is general unawareness within Pacific populations about the strength, implications and implementation of neoliberal policies. While there is this limited awareness, re-colonisation, as was discussed earlier in the Chapter, operates nevertheless through Indigenous structures and the Indigenous identity. At another one level re-colonisation is a top down structure therefore, a large number of neoliberal policies can be implemented without much need for any consultation, action or understanding on the part of Islanders. The Fiji Council of Churches Research Group notes that, “it is our people’s experience that present economic policies ‘operate above their heads’, marginalizing many from the decision making processes of government…” Likewise PIANGO argues that (deregulation and privatisation means that foreign interests can take over and control the supply of important assets and services in a country. This often happens without the knowledge and understanding of the majority of the population and even decision-makers themselves often lack an understanding of the implications of the decisions they are making. It is these sentiments which indicate the sense of powerlessness by many in facing these policies.

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84 Hooper, 2000, p. 1.
85 Ibid, p. 3.
86 The practices of re-colonisation through Indigenous identities will be discussed in a detailed example in Chapter Eight.
An important indication of the successful embedding of neoliberal policies can be seen when the language of NGOs is co-opted by neoliberal institutions and fed back to NGOs with disguised neoliberal frameworks. The general population may have little idea that if they call for ‘good governance’ that this will be manipulated into a call for a very specific notion of good governance, pre-determined by agencies like the World Bank, rather than a local and culturally specific version of this concept.\(^\text{90}\) People are being implicated in taking responsibility for ‘owning’ and directing policies, despite the concealed pre-formulation of these policies originating from elsewhere. Haunani-Kay Trask raises an insightful point about neo-colonialism which easily applies to re-colonisation that

\[(p)art \text{ of neo-colonialism, of course, is the ideological position that all is well; in other words, that decolonisation has occurred. Therefore, problems and conflicts are post-colonial and the fault of the allegedly independent peoples. Nothing could be more inaccurate.}\(^\text{91}\)

By attempting to persuade Pacific peoples to ‘own’ neoliberal policies the responsibility and potential blame for any failures of development then lies squarely with Pacific peoples. One of the clearest examples of such a manipulation is the use of the term ‘democracy.’ The World Bank insists that democracy is an essential component for the good governance of Pacific countries. And as Suliana Siwatibau notes, “I think that most of us believe in democracy…Democratic processes are needed if people are to control their own development”.\(^\text{92}\) Here democracy is conceptualised, as formal independence once was, as being on the path to emancipation. However, the neoliberal conception of democracy does not necessarily allow Indigenous people to take control of their own development. This conflict between differing underlying values and subsequent forms of development will be explored in Chapter Seven.

\(^{90}\) For example AusAID’s definition of ‘good governance’ is provided for Pacific countries in the “Good Governance Guiding Principles Document”. Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Alexander Downer provides some insight to how narrow this definition is in his speech upon the release of the booklet, 4th December 2000. See [http://www.ausaid.gov.au/media/release.cfm?BC=Speech&Id=9570_9807_3876_7823_403](http://www.ausaid.gov.au/media/release.cfm?BC=Speech&Id=9570_9807_3876_7823_403) Accessed 8/10/02.


Chapter Three: Articulations of Re-colonisation & Resistance

RE-COLONISATION AND RELATED CONCEPTS

How does a concept such as re-colonisation contrast and compare next to conceptualisations of colonisation, neo-colonisation and post-colonial theory? And how have Indigenous scholars responded to these previous shapes that colonisation has been described to have taken?

COLONISATION

A variety of interrelated concepts become important when attempting to describe and identify re-colonisation. These concepts are important not just in terms of a historical change of types of rule in global history, but also in terms of continuities and discontinuities in thinking about the world. In this sense the practices and theories of colonisation, neo-colonisation, and post-colonial theories all have a significance and impinge upon what re-colonisation ‘is’ and how it can be conceptualised. These multiple traditions can not be fully investigated here, it is only possible to draw on the broad continuities and specific debates which have the most significance for describing re-colonisation. Of most significance in the conceptualisation of re-colonisation are the changes from colonialism to neo-colonialism and critiques of post-colonial theory by Indigenous scholars. Also of significance is an analysis of how these different theoretical positions differ on the role and purpose of knowledge in modes of ruling and domination.

Colonialism has been conceptualised in a variety of often contradictory ways, as has been partially explained above. Some theorists have described colonialism as: a smaller adjunct to imperialism; as power; as state based exploitation; as racism; as a global project and as military or physical occupation. Edward Said argues that “imperialism’ means the practice, the theory and the attitudes of a dominating metropolitan centre ruling a distant territory; ‘colonialism’, which is almost always a consequence of imperialism, is the implanting of settlements on distant territory”. As a policy, colonisation involved direct rule through the occupation of land with people and or troops, and indirect rule of the Indigenous cultural terrain with a Western political cultural and governmental regime. A variety of policies were utilised differently by the British, French, United States, Portuguese,

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Indonesian, Australian and New Zealand governments, during their formal possession of Pacific states, to either assimilate, eradicate or control Indigenous peoples. In some countries in the Pacific the coloniser romanticised and supported what they believed to be particular Indigenous structures through which they could manipulate their local operations, ruling indirectly, for example the Great Council of Chiefs in Fiji. In other countries they removed all Indigenous inhabitants to other islands, for example, in order to mine the land as on Banaba Island.

One central distinction between re-colonisation and colonisation is that re-colonisation does not involve large-scale immigration to the Pacific from a specified colonial base. Anthropologist Greg Rawlings has argued however, that this could be set to change as governments seek to entice investors to locate not only their money in the Pacific, but also themselves. Such immigration, Rawlings argues, is having a significant impact on land tenure in Vanuatu, which colonisation had previously failed to overwhelmingly change in the Pacific. He argues that “customary land – organised according to Indigenous property concepts – is being reclassified, as a tradeable leasehold commodity and sold to expatriates who are encouraged to settle and invest in the country by its tax free status”. There is limited evidence however, to suggest that extensive emigration to the Pacific is taking place from investors enticed by financial or other incentives.

Besides often involving a military process, colonisation was also a cultural project to ‘civilise’ and ‘modernise’ the so-called ‘barbarous’ or uncultured Natives. As Otto Heim notes, “(i)n the course of New Zealand’s colonisation, writing, primarily non-

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97 The nature of Indigenous land tenure is also widely changing in the Pacific due to demands from investors, although not usually for their own settlement. This will be discussed further in the Chapter Six. Also see Peter Larmour, (ed) The Governance of Common Property in the Pacific Region, Canberra: National Centre for Development Studies, 1997.
fictional, arguably played a more important role than direct violent confrontation”.99

This constructed societal roles which people were relegated to. Likewise Sina Vaai argues that representations, particularly by writers such as Herman Melville with *Moby Dick* and artist Paul Gauguin’s *Noa Noa* painting, ranked Pacific Islanders into “varied shades of attractiveness and repulsiveness”.100 Vaai argues that these representations of Islanders legitimised colonial paternalism and continue to perpetuate “stereotypical images of the carefree and hospitable, friendly Islander”.101

**NEO-COLONISATION**

The formal independence of colonies meant that colonial modes of domination had to be diverted from a focus on ‘nations’ of people to states. This created an illusion of equality, at least in certain aspects of state to state interaction. The achievement of statehood was seen as emancipation by many Indigenous peoples, as the way to be free of oppression. Statehood was seen as a way to achieve freedom and possibly retain some aspects of Indigenous culture even while merging them with Western political structures. Many of these newly independent states accepted dominant models of development like those espoused by Walt Rostow which emphasised a formulaic method to achieve economic growth.102 In the pursuit of such policies new patterns of dependence became apparent to many of those who had been involved in the movements for independence. Many began to question the significance of state independence when it was evident that they were still being exploited by the ‘metropole’ for resources. Immanuel Wallerstein has described in detail this relationship, as largely one in which the metropolitan power drains its dependent satellites of vital resources.103 Tracking the creation of the term ‘Third World’, Aijaz Ahmad also clearly locates this state building exercise within the context of the tensions between the communist world powers and capitalist world powers. He

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100 Sina Vaai, *Literary Representations in Western Polynesia: Colonialism and Indigeneity*, Samoa: The National University of Samoa, 1999, p. 19
101 Ibid, p. 23.
argues that during the consolidation of newly independent states, anti-imperialism
and therefore part of the purpose of newly independent states was redefined,

not as a socialist project to be realized by the mass movements of the popular
classes but as a developmentalist project to be realized by the weaker states
of the national bourgeoisies in the course of their collaborative competition
with the more powerful states of advanced capital.\textsuperscript{104}
This redefinition was necessary to ensure that new states became part of the
capitalist sphere not the socialist sphere. As Vanuatu discovered, the Cold War also
provided new states with a certain amount of bargaining potential with other states
by threatening to cooperate with the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{105}

The state based analyses of exploitation provided ground for dependency theorists
who included transnational corporations and their exploitation of the ‘Third World’
for the benefit of their ‘home’ countries. In her poem “Vatu Invocation” Grace Mera
Molisa notes those implicated in such a process

\begin{verbatim}
Heavenly Father
omnipresent
in London
Paris
and Canberra

Look down.
with mercy
upon us
your naïve
and gullible servants
doomed
to the colonial legacy of
watching
passively
from the periphery
our prime resources
raped
for the gratification of
corporate greed
\end{verbatim}

\ \textsuperscript{104} Aijaz Ahmad, \textit{In Theory: Classes, Nations, Literatures}. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1992, p. 293.
\textsuperscript{105} In 1980s Vanuatu entered into dialogue with the Soviet Union regarding fisheries
agreements. The United States felt threatened and encouraged the governments of Australia
and New Zealand to provide greater aid to Vanuatu to ensure it didn’t ‘turn communist’.
See Graeme Gill, “Soviet Interests in the Pacific: Implications for the ANZUS Partners” in
Ravenhill, 1989.

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and individual pleasure seekers...[sic] Transnational corporations were perceived by dependency theorists as predators seeking to control governments in order to protect their own assets and profits. Accompanying such analysis was an emphasis on the role of Indigenous elites in supporting the new colonisers in the way some had already done under indirect colonial rule. Dependency theorists often utilised Lenin’s analysis which examined the use of capital as the highest stage of capitalism. Some of the Marxist assumptions which underlie these theories are that the export of capital was required because of the contradictions inherent in capitalism; namely the tendency toward over production and under consumption. This scenario was said to require the establishment of new markets with surplus capital to encourage greater global consumption and support further production. Critics pointed out what they saw as several flaws in this theory such as the boom of consumption in the ‘first world’ and the fact that transnationals were not all powerful and totally monopolistic but often dependent on conditions beyond their control. In turn, other critics of dependency theory have focussed on the over emphasis in these theories on the mode of production and state based analysis to the detriment of “modes of practice” in which political economic and cultural structures are constituted.

**POST-COLONIALISM**

In contrast to dependency theorists, post-colonial theorists strategically highlight the implications of the connections between identity, culture and ways of knowing the world. The importance of post-colonial theory to a conception of re-colonisation lies in the claims of post-colonial theorists to be ‘opening up space’ for Indigenous scholars to constitute their own knowledges in their own ways. Paul Grace Mera Molisa, *Blackstone*, Suva: Mana Publications, 1983, p. 66.


Paul James, “Postdependency? The Third World in an Era of Globalism and Late-Capitalism”, *Alternatives* 22. 1997, p. 211

Ibid.


A similar argument has been used by international relations theorists regarding a variety of ‘dissident’ voices, supposedly including Indigenous peoples’, that “Over the past decade, International Relations has been subject to the proliferating voices of dissent” And further
Spoonley argues that post-colonial theory is “a project by those who want to critique and replace the institutions and practices of colonialism, whether traditional or contemporary in nature”. In this way there is supposedly a broader perception of legitimate ways of theorising to include Others previously dominated by European scholars and scholarship methods. While diverse, many post-colonial theorists seek to challenge totalising understandings and attempt to analyse the hybridity and diversity of individual experiences which constitute post-colonial positions.

Robert Young argues that “postcolonial theory is designed to undo the ideological heritage of colonialism not only in the decolonised countries, but also in the west itself”. However, post-colonial studies and the post-colonial condition which theorists attempt to describe have been highly criticised by Indigenous scholars. Many see it firstly in academia as a continuation of “academic imperialism” and in a broader political economic and state sense as not actually existing in the Pacific.

Some post-colonial theorists attempt to support Indigenous resistance claims by acknowledging that

(a)ll post-colonial societies are still subject in one way or another to overt or subtle forms of neo-colonial domination, and independence has not solved this problem. The development of new elites within independent societies, often buttressed by neo-colonial institutions; the development of internal

that “the opening up of ‘thinking space,’ a space of thought...is exploited by a variety of dissident voices”. Jim George and David Campbell, “Patterns of Dissent and the Celebration of Difference: Critical Social Theory and International Relations”, International Studies Quarterly, No. 34, 1990, p. 269


115 Edward Said has drawn a distinction between post-colonialism and post-modernism arguing that it is the latter which suffers more from a Eurocentric bias “as well as a preponderance of theoretical and aesthetic emphasis stressing the local and contingent, as well as the almost decorative weightlessness of history, pastiche, and above all consumerism”. Post colonial theories were, from their earliest, he argues, based on “studies of domination and control made from the standpoint of either a completed political independence or an incomplete liberation project”. If we follow his distinction then perhaps it is ‘postmodernism’ which Indigenous scholars are directed more of their critiques at instead of post-colonial theories. See Edward W. Said, Orientalism, London: Penguin Books, 1995, p. 351.

Chapter Three: Articulations of Re-colonisation & Resistance

divisions based on racial, linguistic or religious discriminations; the continuing unequal treatment of Indigenous peoples in settler/invader societies – all these testify to the fact that post-colonialism is a continuing process of resistance and reconstruction.\footnote{Bill Ashcroft (et. al) (eds) The Post-Colonial Studies Reader, London: Routledge, 1995, p. 2.}

Despite such assertions of a post-colonialism sympathetic to Indigenous peoples’ situation, Indigenous peoples still remain critical of post-colonialism.\footnote{For further criticism from beyond the Pacific see for example Saeed Ur Rehman who calls postcolonial studies “safe postcoloniality” arguing that this field of theorising continues to attempt to neutralise Indigenous theorising by trying to “contain all forms of radical expression within its own monocivilisational structures”. Like Simione Durutalo, Ur Rehman also questions the luxury of such scholarship quoting Aijaz Ahmad who states that “those who constantly speak of ’the pleasures of the text’ are never poor”. Saeed Urrehman, “On the (Im)Possibility of Constructing a Postcolonial Praxis”, in Greg Ratcliffe and Gerry Turcotte (eds), Compr(om)ising Post/colonialism(s), Sydney: Dangaroo Press, 2001, p. 299, p. 297 and p. 299 respectively.}

Some Indigenous scholars have questioned the ‘post’ in post-colonial and refuse to accept that this is synonymous with the withdrawal of the coloniser, or that history is a linear progression in which the effects of colonisation can one day be ‘over’.\footnote{Linda Tuhiiwai Smith attributes the saying “What? Post-colonialism? Have they left?” to Roberta Sykes, in Smith, 1999, p. 24.}

Linda Tuhiwai Smith argues that amongst some Indigenous academics there is suspicion that

the fashion of post-colonialism has become a strategy for reinscribing and reauthorising the privileges of non-Indigenous academics because the field of ‘post-colonial’ discourse has been defined in ways which can still leave out Indigenous peoples, our ways of knowing and our current concerns.\footnote{Ibid.}

Mililani Trask is more direct in that she refuses the condition of ‘post’ coloniality and says, the “old battle of the Indigenous vs. the colonizer is with us today. Economic colonization continues on our lands”.\footnote{Mililani B. Trask, 2000b, p. 10.}

So too Vilsoni Hereniko argues that it is “Euro-American scholars” who use the term post-colonial and labels the term problematic because, there are “evidences of neo-colonial practices even in independent or self-governing nations”.\footnote{Vilsoni Hereniko, “Representations of Cultural Identities”, in Hereniko and Wilson, 1999, p. 148.} He then goes on to assert that for countries like New Zealand, Hawai’i and the French colonies where Indigenous peoples are still struggling for their own land against the colonising majority, the term is in fact meaningless. These criticisms
indicate a legitimate disbelief on the part of Indigenous scholars that anything has really changed in the way that post-colonial theorists tell them it has. The rejection of a state of complete post-coloniality by Indigenous scholars indicates their perceptions of the intimate connection between re-colonising practices with the continued hierarchisation of knowledges.

**INDIGENOUS CONNECTIONS: KNOWLEDGE AND SCHOLARS**

This section pursues the role Indigenous scholars are playing, both as part of elaborating re-colonisation but also as resisting the negative process being described and lived.

**CONCEPTUALISING AS ONE COMPONENT OF RESISTANCE**

In describing re-colonisation Indigenous scholars are raising important issues about their own roles and the connection between knowledge and the social context in which it is produced, embedded and contradicted. What these scholars are grappling with in the debates over re-colonisation practices is the nature of an ever-present Pacific context supporting and impinging upon their work. Teresia Teaiwa provides a poignant example of this in her article “Scholarship from a Lazy Native”. She explains that

after Professor Greg Dening had delivered a brilliantly poetic ethnographic rendering of Pacific Island History at a Pacific History Association conference in Suva, a young Fijian scholar by the name of Simione Durutalo responded by saying something to the effect that under prevailing colonial and neo-colonial conditions Islanders could not afford the luxury of that type of scholarship.\(^\text{125}\)

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\(^{123}\) Within post-colonial studies a hierarchy also exists amongst the ‘subalterns’ themselves with some assuming that their cultures are more civilized, sophisticated and literary than others.


\(^{125}\) Ibid, p. 68-69.
Durutalo’s proposition is that conditions surrounding Indigenous scholarship affect what can and should be studied. Teaiwa goes on to acknowledge this context impinging on the potential scope of her work, she says that she continues to be haunted by this “desire to contribute real work, true scholarship to the archive and the impulse to refuse the burden of (native) representation…” She asks “Why should only white men have the privilege of writing about anything they take a fancy to?” The burden of context that Teaiwa raises here reflects on the various ways Indigenous scholars discuss re-colonisation or practises like re-colonisation.

There is a sense that for Indigenous scholars the politico-economic physical realities are so urgent and immediate that there is no time to engage in theorising which detracts from a political position or the struggle at hand. In this sense there is an urgency to convey an idea, to educate people but also an assumption that the community already has some awareness of what these processes are. It is the communication of the general idea of what appears to be happening, to the Indigenous community, which is of paramount concern to many Indigenous scholars. Paradoxically however, there is, despite the urgency, an overriding perception of the constitution of knowledge including academic and creative writing, as a direct challenge to oppression in a long-term perspective. Ironically, after the independence of most Pacific countries such a view was overridden by the requirements of development. At the regional University of the South Pacific for instance, the Indigenous government administrators were of the view that “creative writing courses were not a priority for regional or national development”. This lead to a strong support for professions which could contribute to the economy rather than building the “self confidence and self esteem of Islanders”.

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126 Subramani has also made comments in a similar vein to those of Durutalo. He remarks A literature in which the movement is away from meaning, content and order towards the pleasures of form and style, towards the playful and pastiche, that talks of the ‘death of man’ and the ‘end of history,’ is not very useful for postcolonial societies where the real problem is the threat posed by transnational capital, its capacity to destroy all values.


127 Vaai, 1999, p. 27.

128 Ibid.
What is being displayed by Indigenous scholars is a particular perception of the role of knowledge as both disenfranchising and emancipatory. From Indigenous experience, education as established and created by colonial administrations was used as a tool of disenfranchisement, civilising or a means of discipline. A connection still lingers between the education systems created by colonial administrations which initially marginalized, stole and/or destroyed Indigenous knowledge and the surviving remnants of those systems. In certain education institutions around the Pacific currently “there seems to be a built-in assumption that Western knowledge has greater validity and legitimacy than other knowledges”. Konai Thaman highlights they way the education she received was to “educate us kids, to change us and make us more like them: European, civilised and ‘educated.’” Higher education institutions, that appear in the same form as these earlier institutions which did so much damage, are therefore often viewed by Indigenous scholars with caution or hostility. There is progress being made however, in the restoration of Indigenous stories to their place in Pacific curricula. Simultaneously, reconstituting knowledge is seen as emancipatory and has been used as a tactic of Indigenous peoples to reclaim self-confidence and cultural strength. Academic Sina Vaai argues that something positive such as, Pacific literature for example, which is bound with political critiques, “had its genesis in the need that Islanders felt to address the legacy and impact of colonialism”.

The scholar/intellectual can also be seen to have a particular political purpose in these Indigenous authors’ works about practices of re-colonisation. Not all these texts comment in an overt way on the role of scholar and intellectual, and admittedly they all begin from a position of resistance, but it remains significant that they all see their own articulations as political ones. Their roles as scholars are seen to be not only to resist but also to encourage others to take the Indigenous or resistance position seriously. Through this education of the broader population, these authors see the potential for change in the political economy and a potentially positive change for Indigenous cultures and their strength.

129 G.R. Bob Teasdale, “Education and Cultural Rights”, in Wilson and Hunt, 2000, p. 120.
131 Hereniko, in Borofsky, 2000, p. 83.
This differs significantly from the image of the intellectual as a ‘disinterested scholar’. Max Weber argues there is an inherent distinction between the purpose of an activist (“prophet and the “demagogue”\textsuperscript{133}) and an academic. The activist is one who clearly takes one standpoint and the words of whom “are not means of scientific analysis but means of canvassing votes and winning over others...such words are weapons”.\textsuperscript{134} In his view this contrasts sharply to the academic whose words are “plow-shares to loosen the soil of contemplative thought”.\textsuperscript{135} Herein lies the crucial distinction between the activist and academic for Weber, the former attempts to push their own singular agenda through an attack on their opponent in an attempt to destroy that opponent. While the academic teacher in Weber’s view, should “serve the students with his knowledge and scientific experience and not to imprint upon them his personal and political views”.\textsuperscript{136} Weber appears to refuse any suggestion of the political nature of any kind of knowledge or education institution. Rather he accepts them as having the potential for neutrality. He also appears to dismiss the positive potential of overt critique, not to destroy an opponent, but to work around prevailing power and interrogate alternatives.

Several of these Indigenous scholars negotiate these conflicts over the purpose of knowledge and the context of scholarship from within a binary between ‘Western academics’ without a political purpose and Indigenous scholars with contextualised political purposes. Indigenous scholars argue that intellectual activity can not take place in isolation from one’s society or community. Haunani- Kay Trask argues that “(w)hat we have lost, as Hawaiian people and as a Hawaiian nation, shapes my vision and provides the context for all I write. The same is true for other Pacific Island writers”.\textsuperscript{137} In Pacific societies, where extended families play a central role, Indigenous scholars are inextricably involved in the community’s’ issues (although sometimes less so when based outside the Pacific). As André Béteille argues, “the content of intellectual activities cannot be understood in isolation from the context of social arrangements in which they take place”.\textsuperscript{138} Moreover, because Indigenous

\textsuperscript{134} Ibid, p. 145.
\textsuperscript{135} Ibid
\textsuperscript{136} Ibid, p. 146.
\textsuperscript{137} Trask, 2000a, p. 52.
\textsuperscript{138} Béteille, 1980, p. 27.
peoples are attempting to achieve basic rights and needs, such as literacy, particularly as developing states, it appears unrealistic to expect ‘disinterested scholarship’ from those who are primarily seeking to ‘decolonise their minds’. On this point PIANGO emphasises a pressing need to educate Indigenous islanders in order to build their self-esteem and cultural awareness. Starting an education or educating from such a position is radically ‘interested’ scholarship and relegates the possibility of disinterested scholarship not only as distant, but also in this context, as socially irresponsible. Teaiwa’s explication again becomes relevant, that “white academics”, as the majority class, often do not have to cope with pressing needs such as illiteracy or the knowledge that they are the only ones in the village with the capability to combat such situations.

Despite such conflict this has not rendered Western style academia as useless in the eyes of many Indigenous scholars. The majority of Indigenous intellectuals theorising about processes of colonisation have been educated in Western-style tertiary institutions. Pacific governments have supported many of these scholars financially for governmental purposes or as part of, for example, Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) development scholarships. Many Indigenous scholars perceive operating within Western education institutions as a worthwhile project, among other things, to not only challenge the structure from within, but also to legitimate Indigenous knowledge inside and beyond the institution. This means critiquing work which deliberately excludes or marginalises Indigenous voices, but also re-affirming that Indigenous work is as sophisticated as dominant perspectives claim to be.

In Teaiwa’s account there is a correlation drawn between “white men” and burden-less or disinterested scholarship, combining both race and privilege. This returns us to Durutalo’s aforementioned statement, since he appears to mean it is ‘you’ ‘white man,’ as opposed to ‘we’ islanders, who have the privilege, the space,

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139 And as Hereniko points out “(d)ecolonizing the mind…is not easy”, Hereniko, 2000, p.83.
141 Teaiwa, 1995, p. 68.
142 Illiteracy is in fact central to these debates on this see Konai Helu Thaman “Heilala”, Kakala, Suva: MANA Publications, 1993, p.11.
143 For an example of an attempt to incorporate Indigenous ideas into a new form of conceptualising see Smith, 1999.
144 Teaiwa 1995, p. 68.
the time, the food, the land, the access and the resources to spend on theorising. Adding race to the debate is a reminder of the hierarchies produced by colonialism in the Pacific. In order to make a place for themselves to ‘speak’ or make ‘legitimate’ contributions to scholarship and disciplines, Indigenous people have had to offer something ‘new’, something which had to be defined as absent from “white privilege”. This became correlated with an Other identity as this was the key defining feature which distinguished Indigenous peoples. Indigenous peoples attempting to speak for themselves then became premised on the prior displacement or critique of dominant western voices. This project is not complete however for as Donald Denoon notes, foreign scholars continue to dominate knowledge construction of the Pacific by “weight of tomes” to the irritation of “insiders whose immediate concerns deny them the chance to publish”. While academics should retain the ability to write on a variety of topics, it appears that what Indigenous scholars are seeking is an acknowledgment of the positions, privileged or otherwise, from which these analyses have been formed.

Teaiwa’s question “(w)hy should only white men have the privilege of writing about anything they take a fancy to?” poses several propositions which may detract from what could be more central issues. She positions the debate as one between Indigenous and “white men”. While there is certainly a broad reality to this situation another crucial struggle seems to be between those seeking a further broadening of possibilities and change and those who entrench and perpetuate existing inequalities, including other Indigenous peoples. Teaiwa does brilliantly expose that those writing with privilege can potentially ignore the consequences of their work. This disregard can only be a short term project however, as those feeling the effects of dislocated scholarship begin to resist. What we could ask alongside Teaiwa’s question is ‘In what ways are Indigenous scholars restricted, by particular truth claims of the dominant power?’ In this way we may investigate the connection between the ability of some scholars to pursue certain areas of interest and their possession of greater legitimacy than that afforded to others. This returns us to the political importance of knowledge in processes of legitimation and marginalisation. Using knowledge and re-constituting it, like labelling neoliberal practices as re-

145 Ibid.
147 Teaiwa 1995, p. 68.
colonisation, then becomes seen as a much more important struggle than as merely ‘playing with words’. Moreover, we are reminded of the way that neoliberal dominance is perpetuated, by conferring legitimacy to neoliberal versions of ‘best’ solutions over others, including Indigenous ways.

Neoliberal advocates are not the only ones who selectively legitimate and marginalise perspectives in order to advance their claims. Indigenous scholars must also be wary of those issues within Indigenous communities and independence struggles which also marginalise. Women’s issues, for example, including domestic and other violence are often overshadowed in sweeping claims to preserve the coherence and strength of certain Indigenous independence movements.148

REFLECTIONS

This chapter has elucidated the way in which some Indigenous scholars in the Pacific have conceptualised sets of practices as re-colonisation. By extending the analysis of several Indigenous theorists I have explored which practices could actually be included in the term and the political purpose and potential of the concept.

The danger of using the term re-colonisation is that it implicitly creates and perpetuates binaries, such as ‘them’ and ‘us’, which may isolate people and block potential avenues for change and critique. Such binaries place a level of judgement over the work of people in constrained and heterogeneous circumstances in the Pacific and resists internal critiques. These rigidities create more tension than they do space for understanding. It relegates some people as beyond hope and some beyond questioning.

I have shown that while re-colonisation is a problematic concept, its use has value. The value in viewing neoliberal practices as re-colonisation, rather than as isolated incidences of prescriptions for ‘betterment’, or ‘good governance’ or so on, is that

we glimpse the potential enormity of them. It also becomes apparent that many of these practices are systemic, not merely unconnected events and prescriptions. Naming these practices as re-colonisation helps us understand that for Indigenous scholars in particular these practices appear negative, have identifiable impacts and long-term implications for Pacific cultures and peoples.

Neither neoliberal advocates nor Indigenous people in the Pacific deny the radical impacts neoliberal policies are having and will have. Where they differ is over whether such changes are helpful or destructive. Many Indigenous people strongly conceptualise re-colonisation as a negative process. This conceptualisation is informed by an understanding that knowledge can have multiple uses: to reinforce neoliberal power but also in the re-constitution of knowledge to criticise and resist re-colonisation.

An analysis of re-colonisation is not passé. Nor should it be construed as encouraging hopelessness. The despondency Hau‘ofa argues he felt while educating students about what economists had convinced him were immutable realities of the Pacific should be strongly rejected as he suggests. Re-colonisation’s failures and permeabilities should remind us that these practices have little chance of becoming totalising, but are also far from benign. It is important to continue conceptualising these practices and the ways they continue to be operationalised, mutated and resisted. As Indigenous scholars have emphasised, such work is a strategic component of re-constituting knowledge and power. Understandings of the processes of neoliberal knowledge construction and its legitimisation are essential in order to comprehend not only neoliberal practices but also the methods employed to resist it.

Whether we fully accept the notion of re-colonisation or not, it would be difficult to say that the Pacific is free of colonisation. Likewise although there are several areas of complexity which show us that practices of re-colonisation have little chance of becoming all powerful, the fears of Indigenous scholars still appear well founded. That is, that these practices of re-colonisation are perpetuating similar practices of domination to those of colonialism and bringing potentially more devastating long term consequences and little improvement in the lives of Indigenous peoples.
In this chapter I suggested that neoliberal policies and agendas can aptly be described as re-colonisation. I also emphasised Indigenous perspectives on the inextricability of the role of the scholar and knowledge from re-colonisation. In the next chapter I will attempt to give further voice to Indigenous expressions of resistance and how these interconnect with re-colonising.
CHAPTER FOUR

RE-IMAGINING ‘INDIGENOUS’ ‘RESISTANCE’

“Who are you?” said the Caterpillar.
This was not an encouraging opening for a conversation. Alice replied, rather shyly, “I - I hardly know, sir, just at present – at least I know who I was when I got up this morning, but I think I must have been changed several times since then.”
“What do you mean by that?” said the Caterpillar sternly. “Explain yourself!”
“I can’t explain myself, I’m afraid, sir,” said Alice, “because I’m not myself, you see”.¹

“And so I say to Indigenous people, tell your stories of difference to break away from where they wish us to be. Because where they wish us to be is somewhere between being dominated and apparently equal, somewhere between laughter and tears”.²

INTRODUCTION

In the previous chapter I suggested that the role of the Indigenous scholar and Indigenous knowledge was central to re-colonisation and resistance. In this chapter I will investigate what kinds of debates surround claims to indigeneity and forms of resistance.

An account of re-colonisation is incomplete without an accompanying exploration of resistance. The investigation of Indigenous resistance therefore assists in understanding where the limits of re-colonisation lie. Without such an exploration re-colonisation appears to be something which it is not: all powerful and monolithic. However, Indigenous resistance is not monolithic or coherent either. Contested are the claims made to indigeneity and its status as a form of resistance. These two contested areas are intimately connected, because many Indigenous peoples argue that long term acts of decolonising require a continued elimination and dismantling of the colonial and a strengthening of the Indigenous.

Critics however, question both the ability to purge the colonial and the notion and usefulness of an Indigenous identity. These critics suggest that the acts involved in Indigenous de-colonising and Indigenous state building are opportunistic and that they utilise particularly narrow and exclusionary conceptions of indigeneity.

In this chapter I propose that an expanded conception of indigeneity to include more mixed identities may assist to negotiate through what appears in many ways to be an impasse between these diverse perspectives. This could be combined with a broader conception of resistance, to include ‘everyday acts of resistance’ and strategies of ‘making do’. By articulating aspects of Indigenous resistance which are beyond the purview and bounds of re-colonisation, the potential strength of this resistance is exposed, as are the spaces over which re-colonisation does not have

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3 In this chapter I will not directly address the distinction between Indigenous state building and Indigenous nation-building including the differentiation of nations from states and diversities of Indigenous nations within a federal polity. For a discussion leading in to these issues from an American context see Iris Marion Young, “Hybrid Democracy: Iroquois federalism and the Postcolonial Project”, in Duncan Ivison, Paul Patton, Will Sanders (eds) Political Theory and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
control. From this perspective, the limits of re-colonisation may become more visible and the authority of re-colonising sets of practices may become more questionable.

BEYOND DICHOTOMIES: DEFINING ‘INDIGENOUS’

Any definition of the term ‘Indigenous’ is complicated by the range of conflicting values and expectations arising from its multifarious uses. The tensions which result from these conflicts are unlikely to be resolved, but these same tensions may enable avenues of resistance and offer opportunities for redress by Indigenous peoples. This chapter discusses a medley of competing definitions and demonstrates the complex and interwoven ways that Pacific Indigenous peoples must be described.

‘INDIGENOUS’ IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

There are many different definitions of the term ‘Indigenous’. Those which hold the greatest currency within international law however, are important because of the ways they affect the ability of Indigenous peoples to describe themselves, and their rights and relationships with other communities, particularly in relation to the international institutions which adhere to these definitions.

The definitions used by the United Nations, the International Labour Organisation and other international institutions like the World Bank have relevance for the discussion here as they predominate international definitions. The UN, ILO and the World Bank, utilise definitions of ‘Indigenous peoples’ that refer almost exclusively to peoples who have become minorities after having been forcibly incorporated into a larger state. The working definition used by the UN comes from a Report by UN Special Rapporteur Martínez Cobo who states,

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4 As the Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples is still to be completed and ratified it can not yet be enforced.
Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those which having a historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their territories, consider themselves distinct from other sectors of societies now prevailing in those territories, or parts of them. They form at present non-dominant sectors of society and are determined to preserve, develop, and transmit to future generations their ancestral territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis of their continued existence as peoples, in accordance with their own cultural patterns, social institutions and legal systems.\(^5\)

What is central to the UN definition is the reference to ‘pre-colonial’ societies, which highlights the significance of colonialism to being indigenous. It falls short however, of rigidly correlating a continuing colonial situation as a requirement for being Indigenous, which therefore also renders less significant the distinctions between those peoples who continue to be colonised and those who formally have independent states. Moreover, while the definition also makes reference to Indigenous peoples as forming ‘non-dominant sectors of society’, this could be interpreted either in a numerical sense or with regard to relationships of power.

The ILO definition is more explicit about referring strictly to peoples in independent states, while leaving open the specification of whether the current state is dominated by the same colonial power or another. Article One of the ILO Convention 169 describes Indigenous peoples as:

(a) tribal peoples in independent countries whose social, cultural and economic conditions distinguish them from other sections of the national community, and whose status is regulated wholly or partially by their own customs or traditions or by special laws or regulations;
(b) peoples in independent countries who are regarded as Indigenous on account of their descent from the populations which inhabited the country, or a geographical region to which the country belongs, at the time of conquest or colonisation or the establishment of present state boundaries and who, irrespective of their legal status, retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions.\(^6\)

Like the UN definition, the ILO also reaffirms the presence of colonisation as a component of indigenous identity. In many ways the ILO definition, by indicating that these ‘tribal peoples’ or simply ‘peoples’ may be practising to differing extents certain customs and traditions, or may retain ‘some or all of their social, economic, cultural and political institutions,’ encourages an interpretation which does not insist upon a rigidified practice, appearance and organisation of Indigenous peoples. It allows some flexibility in the Indigenous identity. Under the ILO definition, if there are customs which are no longer practiced, it cannot be assumed that these peoples are therefore no longer Indigenous. Furthermore for this reason it appears that the ILO has stressed the need for self-identification as a fundamental criterion in determining to whom the term applies. Point 2 of Article One states:

Self-identification as Indigenous or tribal shall be regarded as a fundamental criterion for determining the groups to which the provisions of this Convention apply.  

Institutions and organisations which use both the UN and the ILO definitions recognise that there is no firm and exclusive definition of Indigenous peoples, but rather a mixture of all these elements is required to achieve a sufficiently wide applicability for the term. The World Bank follows such an approach by broadly classifying Indigenous peoples as “social groups with a social and cultural identity distinct from the dominant society that makes them vulnerable to being disadvantaged in the development process”. There is an implied suggestion by the World Bank here that it is largely Indigenous peoples who distinguish themselves from the dominant society, rather than the dominant society determining and shaping particular social and cultural identities. In addition, this broad classification appears to suggest that it is the distinctness of Indigenous peoples which could prevent them from fully participating and therefore being disadvantaged in the positive process of development. This could be interpreted as suggesting that Indigenous people should become more like the dominant society in order to ‘successfully’ participate and contribute to development. The World Bank definition goes on to state that Indigenous peoples have the following characteristics:

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7 Ibid. Point 3 of Article 1 states that “The use of the term peoples in this Convention shall not be construed as having any implications as regards the rights which may attach to the term under international law”.

Chapter Four: Re-imagining ‘Indigenous’ ‘Resistance’

a) a close attachment to ancestral territories and to the natural resources in these areas;
b) self-identification and identification by others as members of a distinct cultural group;
c) an Indigenous language, often different from the national language;
d) presence of customary social and political institutions; and
e) primarily subsistence-orientated production.\(^\text{9}\)

Unlike the ILO definition, the World Bank creates a much stronger picture of Indigenous peoples as more primordial and rigidified. The most significant indicator of this picture is the reference to Indigenous being primarily engaged in ‘subsistence-orientated’ production. Interestingly, this would exclude most Indigenous peoples in ‘developed’ states for instance in Canada and the US, but also those in many developing countries living in newly urbanised areas. In addition, the requirement for the ‘presence of customary social and political institutions’ could be used to argue that some peoples, no longer utilising those customary institutions, or using them in ‘un-customary’ ways, may not be considered Indigenous. This rests oddly beside the broad World Bank classification of Indigenous as minorities in their lands. Being a minority could well have significant impacts on the ability of Indigenous peoples to practice ‘customary’ ways, and therefore a likelihood that these would be changed in form to adapt to different circumstances.

For the purposes of this thesis, one of the most striking consequences of the tendency of international institutions to define Indigenous peoples as minorities in their own land, is that many of the peoples of the Pacific would not be considered as ‘Indigenous peoples’ in this regard. Most Pacific states are independent or self governing territories and Pacific people are mostly majorities of the population. What they share with Indigenous minorities elsewhere is the continuity with pre-colonial societies. We shall see, that there are strong cultural and political economic commonalities between the histories and experiences of these peoples and those of Indigenous minorities within larger states.

The second significant feature of these definitions is the general tendency, with the World Bank as the significant omission, to locate the term in the context of a history and continuity of colonisation or dominance.\(^\text{10}\) If we examine the way that Pacific

\(^{9}\) Ibid.

\(^{10}\) The World Bank definition makes no mention of colonisation.
states continue to be influenced through re-colonisation, as suggested in Chapter Three, it becomes apparent that colonisation is a continuing feature in the lives of the supposedly ‘independent’ peoples in the Pacific. Pacific states have all come through a trajectory which includes colonialism or closely related forms of external dominance. This has meant that they have all experienced the process of racial and civilisational ‘Othering,’ the forced unification of their identity as ‘one’ people in opposition to another dominating identity and their subsequent ranking according to the dominant. For those taken (by coercion or otherwise) to the Pacific as part of the imperial project, like the Indo-Fijians, for example, a double othering was involved as they became marginalized in their new land. This continued reference to colonialism assists in a continued locating of Indigenous peoples and rights with relation to continuing effects of colonisation and re-colonisation.

Under these international definitions Indigenous peoples are conferred certain rights, although these are strictly tempered by the fact these are often “declarative and only bind states which wish to adhere to them”. While these are outlined systematically in the Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, the fact that it is still to be finalised and ratified means that Indigenous peoples must rely on rights endorsed through other forums. The UN Study of the Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations concluded that Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination as well as the right to their territories and the right to claim land taken from them. Numerous subsequent conferences have also endorsed the right of Indigenous peoples to maintain economic and cultural rights as well as their natural resource. It is these rights and the potential for leverage which accompanies them, which many Pacific Indigenous peoples wish to remain entitled to.

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11 Tonga claims that it was never colonised. It was however, a British Protectorate and at several points had British officials strongly involved in political affairs. See K. R. Howe, Robert C. Kiste, and Brij Lal, (eds) Tides of History, Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1994.
The ILO explicitly distances Convention 169 from the right to self determination by stating that “(...)the use of the term peoples in this Convention shall not be construed as having any implications as regards the rights which may attach to the term under international law”. The term ‘populations’ is therefore generally used to avoid any implicit recognition of the right to self-determination and therefore potentially secession. Benedict Kingsbury argues however, that self-determination does not always have to imply secession or separation, but more often is used as referring to “autonomy and control of the group’s own destiny and development than to formation of independent states”. Likewise Duncan Ivison from his analysis surrounding Aboriginal sovereignty in Australia suggests that “claims to self-government are not reducible to claims for national sovereignty in the form of independent statehood”.

In a Pacific situation of re-colonisation, where the ability to control the independent state’s destiny and development is externally manipulated in a number of ways, these rights remain crucially important. Pacific peoples also claim many of the rights conferred on and claimed by Indigenous peoples in resistance to neoliberalism, for example regarding cultural property rights as will be discussed in Chapter Seven. Pacific peoples see themselves as possessing the rights conferred on other Indigenous peoples, and therefore as also entitled to protection mechanisms in the face of challenges to those rights, particularly by international institutions.

**DEBATES OVER WHO DEFINES AND WHO IS DEFINED**

The issue of who, exactly, is conferred with the rights that may accompany being identified as an Indigenous person in the Pacific is quickly conflated with who it is that defines such limits. This situation is made even more complex as many people perceive themselves as interchangeably ‘Indigenous’, ‘Native’, or ‘Islander’ depending on the context. These contexts shift as the differences or commonalities

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which these terms can create are highlighted or obscured in different situations: with other Islanders in the Islands to distinguish familial connections; conflict between Islanders and Indigenous peoples on Indigenous land; between Indigenous and Native as a reclamation and source of commonality, and so on.

Such perceptions move beyond the state-relational categorisations of identity, which international institutions adopt and require for their assessments for Indigenous rights. The contentious nature of the debate surrounding ‘Indigenous’ therefore also rests on the subject position of who is conducting the categorising. While the subtle distinctions regarding who is Indigenous, Native and/or Islander are of great significance to Indigenous peoples, equally, if not more important is the issue of who is able to make these definitions.

The issue of who has the right to define is often caught up with debates over the ‘invention’ of tradition. The debates surrounding the ‘invention’ of pasts and culture in the Pacific focuses on three key claims that: Indigenous culture is irrevocably tainted by colonial practices and stereotypes; Indigenous peoples appear to be deliberately selecting aspects of culture to appear more oppositional to Western culture than they really are; and Indigenous peoples are seeking to highlight difference largely for political gain.20

Roger Keesing’s article “Creating the Past: Custom and Identity in the Contemporary Pacific” is typical and explores each of these points. Keesing centres his attention not just on Pacific peoples generally, but selects those involved in the struggles of what he terms “postcolonial nationalism”21 and “indigenous Fourth World peoples, now minorities in their own homelands”. It is the people involved in these struggles, and the arguments they put forward which he appears to find most essential to critique. Keesing seems to believe that these people most categorically display the discourse of ‘inventing traditions’ and utilise “myths of ancestral ways of life”.22 What he is critiquing therefore is the mobilisation of indigenous identity in political struggles. While it seems relatively innocuous to advocate caution in

22 Ibid.
assessing the use of identity for political claims, Jeffery Tobin suggests that while struggles against oppression may rally around “national, ethnic, racial or gender pride” this is hardly surprising as “The role of victim does not tend to inspire people to social action, but Native national identity does”. 23 It does not always hold however, that because identity claims may be mobilised for particular action that they are therefore false.

Keesing argues that “Pacific Island peoples asserting their identity and their continuity with the past are led to seek, characterize, and proclaim an ‘essence’ that has endured despite a century or more of change and Westernization”. 24 Here Keesing demonstrates once again his perspective that not only is it unlikely to have ‘continuity’ with the past, that is defined as unchanged traditions, but more importantly he articulates his view that this is what Pacific peoples are arguing. One has to question however, whether many Indigenous groups are arguing the existence of such a solid and untainted set of traditions and if so, in which circumstances such claims are made. One may also ask whether they are a response to efforts to divest them of certain rights. Moreover, it is often western institutions of law that insist upon Indigenous peoples proving a link of continuity with the past to justify their possession of rights in the present. 25

To counteract such tendencies for Indigenous peoples to ‘invent’ traditions, Keesing urges, “Pacific Islanders to be more relentlessly radical and sceptical – not that they relinquish it to the ‘experts’”. 26 And further that, “A more radical Pacific discourse would also be more deeply self-reflexive about the hegemonic forces of Western education, of Christianity ... of Western pastoral myths as appropriations of otherness”. 27 However, when a Native academic, Haunani-Kay Trask, does attempt to respond to each of Keesing’s arguments but perhaps not in a form that Keesing would sanction, (that is, by attempting to exclude him) he responds by arguing that

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24 Keesing, 1989, p. 33-34.
Trask’s argument hides issues of class and power. He suggests that “Indigenous academics in the Pacific have risen to positions of considerable power, prestige and privilege” sharing institutional power with “white colleagues” and “separated from their rural poor cultural cousins by wide gulfs of class interest, political power, perception, life experience and material circumstance.”

While Keesing’s assertions do highlight some potentially real distinctions amongst Indigenous peoples, whether this can subsequently be used to argue that the Indigenous academics only ever exploit the ‘native point of view’ as a political strategy for personal gain or that they will not contribute substantively different critiques and expression than their “white colleagues”, is questionable. It also places Keesing’s argument in the unfortunate position of perhaps recreating the point he was trying to critique, by ascribing an Indigenous essence to ‘rural poor cultural cousins’ which is supposedly lost on those in academia. By extension, Keesing seems to be implying that those Indigenous peoples within western academia who stress their Indigenous connections may be interpreted as being part of a political quest or an Indigenous exclusionary elite.

Trask argues that while Keesing claims Natives are essentialising and rigidifying culture, in the Hawaiian context there are in fact many ongoing and internal Hawaiian debates about issues such as which genealogies and cosmologies have been used in differing ways. Trask’s main rebuttal however, is that the “invention’ criticism has been thrown into the public arena precisely at a time when Hawaiian cultural and political assertion has been both vigorous and strong-willed”. She claims that the response of anthropologists in particular reflects a fear that their positions as experts on Native issues will be diminished. She argues that, like entomologists without insects, anthropologists would be rendered speechless without silent Natives.

29 Ibid.
30 Regarding the role of Indigenous intellectuals see discussion in Chapter Two.
32 Ibid, p. 163.
Jeffrey Tobin questions whether a dialogue can even be conducted between anthropologists and their subjects. He argues that the result of Keesing style reactions to anti-anthropological critiques is that, “(t)he ‘native point of view’ is inevitably constituted as an interesting object for study rather than as a legitimate voice to be reckoned with”.\textsuperscript{34} As a result, it is difficult for Native perspectives to be taken seriously when phrased as critique, or not seen as an “informant – a voice to be interpreted”.\textsuperscript{35} Geoffrey White and Ty Kawika Tengan make the point that when Natives do cease to be viewed as ‘merely’ Natives it is when they are perceived as having lost their exotic-ness. They argue for instance, that when Kanaka Oiwi (Native Hawaiians) became perceived by anthropologists as “too racially mixed” they were no longer seen as “culturally distinct (or exotic)” enough to be of interest to the discipline.\textsuperscript{36}

In the Pacific, particularly in Hawai‘i, Aotearoa New Zealand and Australia, deconstructions or challenges to Indigenous identity and ethnicity have often met with fierce resistance from Indigenous peoples involved in the independence movements. Many of the people in these movements interpret the negotiations and re-negotiations of their identities as more than merely theoretical explorations and more akin to attacks on Indigenous identity per se and therefore as extensions of the colonial project. When those involved in independence movements respond in this way they also become more defensive and guarded about negotiating on any issue additional to identity. Tobin rightly asks, “whose interests do such arguments serve?”\textsuperscript{37} Often they serve to reinforce ruling ideas and stereotypes. The location of ideas with relation to prevailing powers needs to be kept at the forefront of discussions regarding identity.

Hawai‘i provides a good example of the problems with who defines identity, as Native Hawai‘ians do not even have the right to define their identity in a basic sense. As Haunani-Kay Trask argues American law stipulates that “Hawaiians of 50 percent blood quantum are Native, those with less blood are not Native”.\textsuperscript{38} She adds,

\textsuperscript{34} Tobin, in Wilson and Dirlik, 1995, p. 160.
\textsuperscript{35} Ibid, p. 160-161.
\textsuperscript{37} Tobin, in Wilson and Dirlik, 1995, p. 164.
“(b)ecause of colonization, the question of who defines what is Native, and even who is defined as Native has been taken away from Native peoples by Western-trained scholars, government officials and other technicians” 39 Kehaulani Kauanui adds that in the 1990 US census this lead to 96 percent of Hawaiians describing themselves as “racially mixed”40 thereby further contributing to the invisibility of Hawaiians. Moreover, Kauanui argues that Hawaiian identity is further complicated by their inconsistent inclusion in various US Congressional Acts that address Native American concerns but contradictorily they are classified as Asian Americans by the Office of Budget and Management.41 Jonathan Kamakawiwo’ole Osorio also counters that since genealogy is of utmost importance to Indigenous peoples’ in identity, he asks “what if anything does blood quantum have to do with who we are?”42

The issue of having a definition of ‘Indigenous’ imposed upon Indigenous people in order to restrict their ability to access certain rights, sits oddly when compared with other Pacific islands, where blood quota restrictions have been put in place by Indigenous governments to prevent non-Indigenous from accessing rights and resources. In Palau, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Northern Mariana Islands and Vanuatu, specific levels of blood quota are required to qualify for citizenship.43 In many Pacific states, such as the Cook Islands, those without Indigenous blood can not own land, despite being born in that country.44 In this regard, caution is required if articulating identity and certain exclusions using ‘blood’. While Indigenous peoples often use genealogy as a way of shaping identity, using the term ‘blood’ locates the debate in a realm where ‘blood’ carries scientific and supposedly natural connotations, while genealogy would reaffirm connections with a social context.

39 Ibid, p. 54.
41 Ibid, p. 686.
43 Ron Crocombe, The South Pacific, Suva: University of the South Pacific, 2001 P. 485. This is unless you are sold a passport see also Crocombe, p. 374-375.
In order to reconceptualise the notion of indigeneity, James Clifford has argued that by conceiving of indigeneity as “articulated” helps to “recognize the diversity of cultures and histories that currently make claims under this banner”.\(^{45}\) He argues that this reconceptualisation questions two other approaches to indigeneity. Firstly, that indigeneity is largely about “primordial, transhistorical attachments”\(^{46}\) and secondly, that it is merely a formulation of “post-sixties, ‘postmodern’ identity politics”.\(^{47}\) Clifford argues that both these approaches neglect the “pragmatic, entangled, contemporary forms of indigenous cultural politics”\(^{48}\) and the long history of Indigenous resistance and struggles. He suggests that an articulated view of indigeneity therefore, accepts the “partial truth” of the above claims but also keeps the notion of diversity as pre-eminent. Clifford’s ‘articulated’ approach appears to contain elements which could bridge the divisions between essentialism and negation of Indigenous identities. The notion of essentialist identities was once utilised because it was “strategically essentialist”\(^{49}\) but its use continues to require a critical stance as one form of identity rhetoric may return or create new forms of oppression which are being resisted. There is a fine line between essentialising culture which creates worse oppression, and that which helps preserve customs and customary ways of thinking about the world which might be useful to future generations of Indigenous peoples.

**AUTHENTICITY**

Beyond the debate over who has the right to represent Indigenous peoples, within the Pacific there are strong arguments amongst Indigenous peoples over who is an authentic Native. The practice and use of language and customs, skin colour and area of residence are all used as measures of indigeneity. Hilda Lini articulates a view that urbanised, Indigenous peoples are somehow lesser in their ‘indigeneity’ than those living in the rural area. She argues that the

full extent of the Indigenous world and spirituality that has never been colonised, Christianised or modernised can still be found in the highlands of


\(^{46}\) Ibid.

\(^{47}\) Ibid.

\(^{48}\) Ibid.

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West Papua, Papua New Guinea and Vanuatu. The rest of the Pacific community is continuing the search for personal prosperity and national progress based on Christian ‘spirituality’, western values and modernisation taught in western education institutions.  

Lini is positing the un-Christian, un-modernised, rural, isolated, Indigenous against those who interact in a Christian, Western, modernised world. While there are some recognisable differences between those who live in the highlands and those who live in cities and towns where contact with ‘westerners’ is more common, this is unable to adequately explain the confusing way in which identities are made and re-made. It also uncritically accepts a simplistic binary of ‘western’ and ‘Indigenous’ identities. Why is it assumed to be merely negative to have explored and absorbed knowledge from other peoples? Not all cultural interaction is ‘bad’, not all of it is ‘colonisation’, although this is not to say that we should not be constantly wary for such power structures and relationships.

Moreover, David Gegeo makes the point that while Indigenous peoples who interact with other peoples, or who live abroad, are assumed to somehow have a diminished indigeneity, the same standard is not always applied to say “the metropolitan [Western] citizen who lives in another culture or is born abroad”. Often for Indigenous peoples, adapting to change is considered as diminishing, or diluting culture, whereas for Western people the acts of living in a different place or acquiring knowledge of other peoples is largely not perceived as destroying their culture but as enriching their personal experiences.

Lini argues further that despite the continuing practice of Indigenous ways they have somehow become tainted. She comments, “(w)hile we assert our identity by speaking our languages, wearing our Indigenous costumes, making crafts, singing

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51 Interestingly many would now argue that the West is now defined by its secular rather than religions identity. See Saeed Urrehman, “Secular Knowledge Versus Islamic Knowledge and Uncritical Intellectuality” Cultural Dynamics, Vol. 14 No. 1, 2002.
53 There is of course the common colonial concern of officials who seem to ‘go Native’, yet in many ways this is frequently seen as reversible rather than the kind of permanent change Indigenous peoples are supposedly affected by.
and performing our dances, most of these have lost their originality and are valued and used to suit modern expectations.\textsuperscript{54} Here she echoes an assumption that somehow these practices are more for show than actually for practical or ‘real’ reasons. This perspective does not perceive culture as a moving/changing and everyday practice, but rather as a product retrievable for particular purposes on specific occasions.\textsuperscript{55}

Tensions also exist between those Indigenous people in states where they are a minority and those with their own independent states. Those Indigenous peoples who are minorities in their own lands often view commonalities with other islanders on the basis of their living within similar dependency relationships. Meanwhile, islanders with independent states view those Indigenous peoples within the ‘developed’ state as receiving all the benefits of ‘development’ but as deserving pity for still being colonised. Anecdotal evidence suggests that there is a perception amongst some islanders that Indigenous peoples living in Australia, Aotearoa New Zealand, or Hawai‘i are just subjugated peoples and not really Islanders.\textsuperscript{56}

Lini’s quote regarding the greater authenticity of those who live on rural ‘untouched’ land than those on more urban and alienated land, suggests a perception of differing levels of authenticity based on location and site of living. Those Indigenous peoples in certain countries where they may constitute a minority are not entirely landless however. Some Maori tribes for instance, retain land which is defined as ‘Maori freehold land’ and has a ‘Maori title’, administered by the Maori Land Court.\textsuperscript{57} This land may not necessarily be used to directly provide the tribe with isolation or physical and edible sustenance, however, in many cases it does help with the long task of ensuring Maori have a home, a turangawaewae - a place to stand, as contentious as this site may be. Although not commonly expressed


\textsuperscript{55} The World Bank’s insistence that one aspect of the definition of Indigenous should be “primarily subsistence-orientated production” indicates the way that institutions like the World Bank can participate in locking Indigenous peoples in to definitions which do not permit change as a natural aspect of identity.

\textsuperscript{56} It is difficult to obtain published sources of such views.

in written literature, this discourse of pitying those who do not live in an isolated rural setting, which permeates the authenticity/identity debate, is not constructive for Indigenous peoples in the process of resistance and re-strengthening Indigenous knowledge and property.

An alternative way of examining the issue could utilise the distinction that David Gegeo presents between ‘place’ and ‘space’. ‘Place’, he argues, refers to a geographical, genealogical, location, but it also refers to a perspective or can mean having certain rights to access land and speaking rights. Place in this conception is portable, “a person can be anywhere and still be inextricably tied to place…‘its in our blood’”. Space, Gegeo argues however, is a location for dwelling which is “not of one’s identity or origin”. In these conceptualisations it becomes perhaps not less problematic, but less contentious which customs and traditions Indigenous peoples are able or choose to continue practicing in different locations, be they urban or rural.

Gegeo’s ‘place’, ‘space’ distinction fits well with another avenue to begin to bridge these tensions and divisions; one which acknowledges and emphasises the roots and routes which have linked Pacific peoples throughout centuries and continue to do so. Vicente Diaz and Kehaulani Kauanui have suggested that such linkages can be corroborated through the strengthening of a mixture of “Natives study/Native Studies”. Diaz and Kauanui are emphasising the importance of Indigenous intellectuals/ Natives who study in a process of “the identification and dismantling of colonial structures and discourses variously conceptualised and theorized, and cultural reclamation and stewardship”.

The definitions of ‘Natives’ however, as Lini’s comments suggest, do not always resolve these tensions. In addition, David Gegeo has argued that the two terms,

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60 In Chapter Eight I will discuss in a more detailed example the questions surrounding how urban Indigenous peoples negotiate Indigenous identity if they are dislocated, including through several generations from their ‘place’ and ‘space’.
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid.
‘Indigenous’ and ‘Native’ are often used to divide Pacific peoples more often than to unite. He suggests that ‘Indigenous’ comes both with the connotations of being “Fourth World” but also in other contexts with being “not of mixed blood”.

‘Native’ instead, he argues, refers to those with “mixed ancestry living in the place or land of one or other parent,” or in Melanesia its use may also be an insult. These regional complexities lead to the terms being used in significantly different ways throughout the Pacific, making any Native studies difficult, albeit potentially very constructive. The concern for ‘authenticity’ can be seen either as a reaction to colonial effacement of Indigenous peoples; or, as a colonial essentialising, and hence confinement, of Indigenous identity.

MIXED IDENTITIES

There is no specific, eternal Indigenous or ‘Pacific way’, it is permeable and enhanced by the movement of Pacific people, what has been described as the diaspora. The connection of diaspora with indigeneity is problematic if conceptualised as if the movement embodied in diaspora negates the rooted belonging of indigenousness. The two can survive in an entwined manner however, without negation. As Clifford has shown, Native Pacific people and their struggles “exist in a multiplex modernity, but with a difference, a difference derived from cultural tradition, from landedness, and from ongoing histories of displacement, travel and circulation”. Due to their migration to other countries Pacific islanders are building up varied communities around the Pacific, integrating and creating new (although not therefore ‘inauthentic’) traditions and political economic structures. Vaine Rasmussen articulates this diversity and continuity aptly in his poem “Our Pacific”:

There is not one Pacific
There are many...
Chapter Four: Re-imagining ‘Indigenous’ ‘Resistance’

There is not one Pacific
Only one common theme
That development is certain
Though foreign
And coconuts will continue
to fall,
the Pacific ocean will camouflage
superficial dreams
and the faint sound of drums
will still be heard
if we pause a while to listen.  

As a result of such movement throughout the Pacific, in many senses being ‘Indigenous’ in the Pacific is equated at a regional level with being ‘Pacific peoples’. In his poem “Waka 68”, Robert Sullivan illuminates links in Polynesia through common ancestors.

Is it a myth – the idea of Polynesia,
a colonial construct partitioning the Pacific?

What does it matter when there are other myths
that have more influence on our lives?

At least ‘Polynesians’ can embrace
a continuity outlined in genealogies stretching
back to the gods. Nga Puhi, for instance,
have Matahourua in Kupe’s time, which was re-adzed

in his grandson Nukutawhiti’s time to become
Ngatokimatawhaorua. In that case Polynesia returned
to Aotearoa.  

‘OPPORTUNISM’: EXPLOITING INDIGENEOITY?

As with most claims to legitimacy there are a variety of reasons and contexts in which claims to Indigenous rights in the Pacific are made. Some claims to Indigenous rights are not necessarily pursued to enrich all Indigenous peoples, or

all aspects of their lives in the broadest sense. Rather, some claims on behalf of Indigenous peoples are more about attempts to enrich a few and to entrench elitism.

Many Fijians find the term ‘Indigenous’ highly tainted by suggestions of elitism. Jone Dakuvula argues that “(n)owadays I sometimes feel it is a matter of shame rather than pride to be associated with the word ‘Indigenous’ in Fiji. Since the coup [1987], the word has been associated with authoritarianism and racism, fascism and even apartheid”. After the May 2000 Fijian coup Teresia Teaiwa also argued,

George Speight claims to represent Indigenous Fijian interests. Sporting his European name, speaking exclusively in English, drawing on his Australian and American degrees in business for mana, and wearing his designer clothes, Speight does indeed represent Indigenous Fijian interests. But Speight's Indigenous Fijian interests are clearly neither the Indigenous Fijian interests of Ratu Mara nor those of the late Dr. Bavadra.

Teaiwa’s conception here of ‘Indigenous’ is strongly linked with what she perceives as a particular usage of the term for elite interests in Fiji. Her reference to Ratu Mara and Dr Bavadra indicates the power struggles within Indigenous Fijian communities and also hints that there is the potential for more genuine conceptions of ‘Indigenous’.

Allan Hanson has provided a now-renowned argument of Indigenous opportunism in the New Zealand context. He has produced a complex argument, which at times appears contradictory, by arguing both that Maori opportunistically invent their culture and their resistance but also that inventing culture is an “everyday process”. He argues that “the present image [of Maori] has been invented for the purpose of enhancing the power of Maoris [sic] in New Zealand society, and is largely composed of those Maori qualities that can be attractively contrasted with the least desirable aspects of Pakeha culture”. Here Hanson argues that Maori culture, and by implication resistance, is designed to be the opposite of Pakeha culture; designed in a binary way. Implicit in his argument is the concept that

71 Clare Slatter, personal communication, November 2000.
75 Ibid.
having Maori power enhanced is not a positive development but a situation to be treated with caution, particularly if based upon what may be invented evidence. Hanson’s proposition is that Maori claims are stimulated by “political agendas”, which presumably would make Indigenous resistance to re-colonisation also part of a political agenda. As explained in Chapter Two it is difficult to view any theories as apolitical.

Conversely however, Hanson argues that “the invention of culture is no extraordinary occurrence but an activity of the same sort as the normal, everyday process of social life”.76 The question which then emerges is why therefore call the process an ‘invention’, if it is such a common occurrence? This aside, inventions and reinventions of culture as an everyday process, suggests a significantly different form of culture to the one outlined through the rest of Hanson’s article.

It would be difficult to resolve or absolutely distinguish whose claims to indigeneity are for which particular purposes, and while it is important to identify who has manipulated the discourse of ‘Indigenous rights’ to their advantage, and in which circumstances, perhaps it is less important than understanding what effects this has. In international relations, Indigenous peoples are increasingly gaining greater formal acknowledgment. As a result of a strong push from Indigenous groups, the UN continues to allow the expansion of Indigenous rights through the establishment of a Permanent Forum on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples which will be an advisory body to the UN Economic and Social Council.77 Several international institutions have recognised Indigenous peoples as being components of not only their negotiation with states in the implementation of neoliberal policies, but also as embodying and having access to commodifiable and exploitable knowledge and resources. The operational directives of the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank for dealing with Indigenous peoples in the process of projects and loans highlight this fact.78 In addition, the World Trade Organisation is

76 Ibid, p. 899.
anxious for all Indigenous intellectual and cultural knowledges to be enshrined as part of their property, patenting and other legal systems.  

While it is clear that there should be flexibility over the definition of the word ‘Indigenous’, at the same time this debate must be secured from sliding in to relativist debates where analysts can use such subtle and complex definitions to pursue their own attempts at arguing for further injustice by claiming that Indigenous peoples do not exist. In this regard, the debates over blood quota or judgements based on skin colour are well known, ongoing and particularly painful for many Indigenous peoples. An interesting contrast can be drawn here between the experiences of Hawaiians and Maori. Hawaiians still live under the U.S. government definition of blood quota, Maori on the other hand have to a large extent achieved some structuring to the debate on the use of terms like ‘full blooded’. Some Maori have argued that the ‘blood debate’ is merely racism, as Ross Nepia Himona argued during a debate on a prominent Maori independence email discussion list. He stated that,

(a)ll Maori are full blooded. The concept of a human person with less than the usual volume of blood is quite ridiculous, unless dead of course ....’Blood’ or ‘bloodness’ is a totally spurious notion used only by white people to denigrate those who choose to live within non-white cultural frameworks.

Additionally, attempting to locate ‘indigenous’ delicately between essentialism and non-existence may facilitate the claims of those seeking to reduce indigeneity to the equivalence of mere associations of people. Chandran Kukathas, has argued that there are no cultural rights, except insofar as these are expressions of individual rights. He perceives “cultural communities more like private associations or, to use a slightly different metaphor, electoral majorities”. This dismisses the kinds of linkages which Indigenous peoples claim exist between them. This will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Seven.

While it is precarious to chart an account of Indigenous peoples and indigeneity around romanticism and essentialism that may rigidify culture, it is possible. These

79 See Chapter Seven.
are not issues which should be seen as requiring eternal resolution, merely explanations which contextualise particular reasons behind certain claims and some of the effects of these. In many ways Indigenous peoples are pressured to more forcefully assert claims to their rights when their indigeneity is brought into question to undermine access to these same rights. The reasons for continuing to utilise the term ‘Indigenous’ may appear somewhat contradictory, to re-assert complex and changing indigenous identities, in recognition of multiplicity and to simultaneously draw together the commonalities between Indigenous peoples which may in other contexts be divisive. Although Indigenous existence has perhaps been confused in recent years by location, movement, displacement, colonisation, state-hood, economics and violence, it would be erroneous to suggest that therefore Indigenous peoples are not entitled to an Indigenous identity and rights or that they do not continue to exist.

RESISTANCE

INDIGENOUS CLAIMS TO INDIGENEITY

It is Indigenous claims to indigeneity which form the basis of Indigenous resistance. The use of the word ‘resistance’ unavoidably raises the question: what is being resisted? In a context of colonisation, the word immediately incites a binary between the resistance and colonisation/re-colonisation. Partially this can be seen as a benefit of the word, it acts as a reminder of the continuing and dialectical relationship of these practices. More importantly however, it recreates a binary between the resisters and the colonisers, creating a situation where all people are categorised to a camp of ‘us’ and ‘them’, despite their potentially overlapping identities.

Indigenous cultural practices are not contained by the sum total of colonialism (or a dominator –dominated binary) and did not come into existence at the first point of interaction/attack/intrusion from ‘the colonial’. The practices of culture exist in a

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82 This is not to argue that the colonisers did not use and manipulate Indigenous structures, as explained in Chapter Three.
space where the colonial is not always of the greatest concern. In a different context Ashis Nandy has argued that:

India is not non-West; it is India. Outside the small section of Indians who were once exposed to the full thrust of colonialism and are now heirs to the colonial memory, the ordinary Indian has no reason to see himself as a counterplayer or an antithesis of the Western man.83

Admittedly there were colonial constructions which continue to exist and have been absorbed into some cultural frameworks. However, to then claim that all cultural frameworks and institutions are irrevocably modified into a colonial mould is to produce an unproductive debate of proving or failing to prove purities. Another way of approaching these issues is to accept an intermingling of the colonial and Indigenous and then to discuss the strategies and tactics of Indigenous resistance. This intermingling has been highlighted in research by Vincent O’Malley where he has noted that Maori in the late 1800’s sought to establish committees and have these recognised by the Crown, “not because they were simply looking to mimic Pakeha structures, but because they sought a place for themselves in the new colonial order that would not involve being entirely subsumed by it”.84 The fact that these committees were very similar in structure to traditional tribal structures was not intended but allowed Maori to feel more able to engage with the colonial order.

**DECOLONISATION**

Resistance to re-colonisation takes multiple forms, including attempts to decolonise, to both dismantle colonial structures and supposedly purify aspects of Indigenous culture which are seen to have been contaminated by colonial practices. Linda Tuhiwai Smith argues that decolonisation is primarily a “long-term process involving the bureaucratic, cultural, linguistic and psychological divesting of colonial power”.85 From this perspective decolonisation is ongoing resistance.

Decolonising is often seen as firstly requiring the dismantling of colonial infrastructure. With statehood not having achieved this in the Pacific, the

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“decolonising of the mind”\textsuperscript{86} becomes an even more essential target. Haunani-Kay Trask argues that, “(t)he first stage of resistance involves a throwing off, or a peeling apart of a forced way of behaving. Layers of engineered assimilation begin to come loose in the face of alternatives, \textit{Native cultural alternatives}”.\textsuperscript{87} Trask is describing what she sees as a dialectical process in which the decolonising of the mind is aided by the reinvigoration of Native cultures and traditions.

In a more generalised context, Paul Bové argues that, “culture is always and everywhere a struggle, a struggle of resistance and for the production of identities...”\textsuperscript{88} In this sense the production of cultural identity in a self determined sense, which confronts and complicates or instigates change from neoliberal agents, can be seen as successful resistance. It is the dual process of affirming Indigenous alternatives while confronting others. Haunani-Kay Trask adds another dimension to Bové’s point when she argues, “in the colonial context, all native cultural resistance is political: it challenges hegemony”.\textsuperscript{89} While it seems difficult to see how native cultural resistance would not be political, it appears important to add to Trask’s point that native culture itself is political and can challenge hegemony, but does not always do so. Cultural resistance therefore, as the production of identity becomes not something dislocated from the practices and effects of the political economy, but as concurrently something restricted by it, as challenging it and as disconnected.

Reasserting and strengthening particular cultural ways, that is, through the teaching and preservation of Indigenous languages, philosophy, science, dances, artistic and ceremonial activities, is the second dimension of uncovering and recovering practices which in turn, because of their active difference, challenge the neoliberal form of world construction and force the neoliberal/re-colonisation construction to negotiate a way around it. Most often the reason for having to strengthen or reassert cultural ways is a consequence of colonisation and is therefore re-active. This means as an act, cultural reassertion is inextricable from this historical context impinging and building on the present. This does not mean that cultural strengthening is

\textsuperscript{87} Trask, 1993, p. 115.
\textsuperscript{89} Trask, 1993, p. 54.
merely, and always therefore, re-active, an act or acts of anti-colonial, (or anti re-colonial) resistance. Sometimes cultural strengthening operates for more local, deontological or familial reasons. In this regard cultural strengthening is about perceived commitments to such things as maintaining the operation of communal land, sites of significance, language etc … for very practical purposes for example, continuing to be able to conduct tribal/community funeral ceremonies. Cultural strengthening in this regard is located within a historical context, but is also very pragmatic. In no way does re-colonisation have a monopoly on Indigenous peoples exercising their resistance.

In an African context, Pal Ahluwalia has also argued that decolonisation “cannot be equated with ‘after colonialism’”\textsuperscript{90}. He argues that decolonisation is a process which involves both the culture of the colonisers and colonised, and is essential to liberation and theories of resistance. He insists however, that this form of decolonisation must also recognise “cultural hybridity”\textsuperscript{91} as an avenue through which to pursue forms of identity which do not merely reproduce the xenophobia and exclusionism of the older national liberation struggles.\textsuperscript{92}

To bridge the impasse and move beyond a strict colonial – anti-colonial/un-colonial binary, while continuing to acknowledge that practices of re-colonisation may be taking place, requires a broader understanding of resistance. Decolonising may still be perceived by many Indigenous peoples as integral to resistance but a broader conception of the Indigenous identity (which is central to this decolonising) and of resistance must be combined to heed Ahluwalia’s valuable insight.

**BROADER CONCEPTION OF RESISTANCE**

A broader understanding of resistance could highlight the inextricable connection between formal/visible and deliberate acts of resistance (the traditional conception) and the “everyday acts of resistance”\textsuperscript{93} or acts of “making do”.\textsuperscript{94} Both everyday acts


\textsuperscript{91} Ibid, p. 51.

\textsuperscript{92} Ibid, p. 50-51.


and acts of making do emphasise the daily and ‘ordinary’ practices of people as actively reshaping and actively participating in power relationships. De Certeau uses the example of Indigenous Indian cultures which even when they were subjected, indeed even when they accepted their subjection, the Indians often used the laws, practices, and representations that were imposed on them by force or by fascination to ends other than those of their conquerors; they made something else out of them; they subverted them from within – not by rejecting them or by transforming them (though that occurred as well), but by many different ways of using them in the service of rules, customs or convictions foreign to the colonization which they could not escape.\(^95\)

By re-configuring anti-colonial resistance as including everyday acts and acts of ‘making do’ we can attempt to avoid the kinds of binary positions which produce an impasse between Indigenous and other peoples. A definition of resistance which emphasises these acts and strategies highlights that they are not merely practices in response to colonial practices, but exist beyond such a dichotomy; they are exercises of Indigenous power. By highlighting strategies that overlap in different ways with colonialism, we can potentially achieve a wider picture of what takes place in the Pacific and highlight practices normally obscured by overemphasis on the dominating and ‘all powerful’ colonial machine.

In addition, by highlighting a multitude of Indigenous everyday acts of resistance and strategies of ‘making do’ we can reconfigure these practices as more than stagnant, opportunistic acts of invented tradition. Viewing these acts in this newly reconfigured way helps to reconfigure the Indigenous traditions as more than stagnant and rigidified practices with no ‘modern’ relevance and more as everyday negotiations, dynamic and changing cultural practices.

\(^{95}\) Ibid, p. 31-32.
**BROADER DEFINITIONS COMING TOGETHER**

Broader and more fruitful conceptions of resistance correlate with broader and more entangled conceptions of being Indigenous. If we perceive “off-island” Natives, the diaspora, as also Natives and ‘off-street’/non formal, everyday acts as legitimate resistance and exercises of power, then we can gain a better understanding of the way that ‘Indigenous resistance’ does not have to only imply a narrow and essentialised Native and a romanticised form of protest.

**RESISTANCE ‘OFF-ISLAND’ VS THE ‘ON-ISLAND’**

Kehaulani Kauanui’s article describing the divisions between Hawaiians living in Hawai’i and those living on the ‘mainland’ highlights the correlation which is sometimes drawn between living on the Indigenous homeland, and thereby being more authentic and more closely associated with Indigenous values, than those living elsewhere. Overlaying this perception is the consequential assumption that those engaged at the ‘coal face’, on the land are more authentically resisting, because they are not as compromised by being partially within the colonial system (literally as in living there and therefore as educated within it).

Another way of examining this however, is by seeing the resistance ‘on-island’ as directed at local manifestations while those ‘off-island’ can direct their critique at other levels. This certainly does not imply that all diasporas are involved in this way, in fact it is apparent that some go ‘off-island’ precisely to escape the sense and pressures of being Indigenous with the associated responsibilities. The tensions in this division are exacerbated in Hawai’i, as Kauanui explains by calls from Hawaiian nationalists for those living off-island to return home, in a large part to assist in the anti-colonial pro-sovereignty movement. And those Hawaiians living on-island are conferred, Kauanui argues, with greater authenticity than those living away and “(s)ome Hawaiians argue that you’re less Hawaiian if you live away from Hawai’i”.

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97 Ibid.
Being physically located ‘off-island’ however, has been noted by several scholars as actually providing the space, and the luxury to theorise and assist textually in resistance. Teresia Teaiwa notes that her location at one point in Santa Cruz was an “intellectual luxury”.\textsuperscript{100} She argues that “Away from the immediacy of nationalist struggles in Hawai‘i for instance, I could afford complex and theoretical formulations”.\textsuperscript{101} Additionally Kauanui argues “(i)n the course of their politicisation, off-island Hawaiians often produce critical insights into their own location in relation to their host society”.\textsuperscript{102} And further, “(m)any within the diasporic component of the Hawaiian communities see themselves as active contributors to the nationalist movement – not despite their off-island position but because of it”.\textsuperscript{103} These two scholars bring in to question the nature of location while simultaneously continuing to support Indigenous accounts, a combination of resisting and avoiding simplistic binaries.

**WRITING RESISTANCE**

These contributions to Indigenous resistance from ‘off-island’ often occur through literature and the textual element. Literature, both in English, and in Pacific languages has been central to providing a voice for the complexities involved in both being Indigenous and resisting processes of colonisation. The fact that much of this literature also comes from writers who are or have been part of the Pacific diaspora encourages the potential for a more negotiated conception of Indigenous resistance.

Literature has proven to be an avenue for Indigenous resistance, around and subverting ‘official’ accounts which have on many occasions excluded Indigenous perspectives and expressions of alternative worldviews. The everyday theorising that goes on in the village, town or city incorporates personal accounts of how issues, which become important in local peoples’ personal lives, resonate with the


\textsuperscript{101} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{102} Kauanui, 1998, p. 685.

\textsuperscript{103} Ibid, p. 687.
Chapter Four: Re-imagining ‘Indigenous’ ‘Resistance’

theorising about neoliberalism and re-colonisation at a different level.\textsuperscript{104} Although often supposedly ‘fictional’, literary theorising continues to be a legitimate avenue for understanding and reflecting realities of Pacific life, international relations and international political economy. The ‘personal’ in this sense is essential to the public.\textsuperscript{105} As many feminist scholars have long argued, the two concepts cannot be separated without a demeaning of one and the violent imposition of the other into a hierarchy of power which maintains that one of the levels of analysis is more legitimate than the other.\textsuperscript{106} By resisting in this textual way, several prominent Indigenous authors have confounded the divisions which are supposed to exist between fiction and non-fiction.\textsuperscript{107}

The work of writers like Sia Figiel, Epeli Hauofa, Patricia Grace, Witi Ihimaera, Keri Hulme, Albert Wendt, Satendra Nandan, Sudesh Mishra, Teresia Teaiwa and numerous others have become a central source of knowledge which is both connected to resistance but can also be critical of indigenous customs and traditions. By raising crucial issues of corruption, governance and oppression in supposedly fictional terms, the work of these writers suggests the significance of the relation between the form and substance of the work.\textsuperscript{108} Lemu Darcy in her poem “Cars You Have My Wantoks” aptly highlights the rising problems of class in newly independent states where there exists in Darcy’s view “an earth full of eyeless kin”.\textsuperscript{109} Most of these authors are involved in ‘decolonising the mind’ and decentering the institutionalised educational practices as discussed in the Chapter Three.


\textsuperscript{105} For an exposition of the private as the public see Teresia Teaiwa, \textit{Searching For Nei Nimanua}, Suva: Mana Publications, 1995.


The oral texts of Indigenous peoples are also conceived as components of this ‘writing back’. One of the main significances for perceiving oral literature texts as important sources of knowledge stems from the way that they have often historically been regarded as inferior in a hierarchy of texts, which Houston Wood has argued was created largely from colonial assumptions about what constituted “the great works,” and an education system which emphasised that oral texts were not quite the “higher works of the imagination” which were found in written literature.

For Pacific oral cultures however, the oral text was and continues to be an important site of resistance. In this sense many speeches given by Pacific leaders and scholars, particularly in traditional settings can be argued to be a subtle resistance. Selina Tusitala Marsh argues that “Our oral knowledge and experiences, must be validated as formal centers of indigenous thought, our cultures, our ‘ways of knowing,’ as the starting point of indigenous theory”. The connection of oral text to resistance then returns us to the fact that speaking one’s Indigenous language, is also part of resistance, and is another component of the entanglement of exercises of Indigenous power with resisting. Pacific literature, oral and written, provides a forum for the expression of critical analysis by Indigenous writers alongside the views sanctified by prevailing academics, publishers and bureaucrats, as well as the ‘problems’ and ‘solutions’ described by neoliberal advocates.

RECONCILING SCHISMS

In her article “Scholarship From a Lazy Native”, Teresia Teaiwa helps to highlight the reconcilability of the schisms between hierarchies of text and the other hierarchies amongst different levels and forms of resistance. In her article she creates a “resistance model for ‘lazy natives’” in which she humorously describes

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111 These debates are too extensive to be included here, although it should be further noted that Wood also makes the argument that attempts which have been made to establish an Indigenous Pacific literary canon may have the “unintended effect of reinforcing the same hierarchies and structures of taste that many new canon makers wish to depose”. There is always a fine line between critique and mimicking the structures of critique. Ibid, p. 386.
three ‘types’ of natives, A, B and C and the ways that laziness can be used strategically to rebel against stereotypes of Pacific Island scholars.\footnote{Teaiwa describes the A, B, C types in these ways. Lazy native A’ is the classic case: resisting discipline, surrendering to flux, leisure-orientated…Lazy natives of the ‘B’ type are not people we normally think of as lazy since they are work-orientated; but surrendering to discipline out of a fear of flux and creativity can constitute a form of intellectual laziness. ‘Lazy native C’ is a possible hybrid of the two major types. This native mixes business with pleasure as a matter of principle.} Her comical portrayal of a model native, critiques the ways that some scholars assume they can simplistically categorise Indigenous peoples. Furthermore, she comically challenges the division between intellectual and physical struggle or apathy and the presumption that intellectual laziness is not as important as physical laziness, especially as resistance.

By extending Teaiwa’s categorisations, we can challenge particular assumptions about the nature of being a scholar but also the assumption that only by physically participating in meetings and going on street marches is one a ‘real’ activist and perhaps a ‘real’ Native too. This is reminiscent of Michel De Certeau’s explanation of his concept of “making do”\footnote{Michel de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984, p. 29.}, where he describes the way that work and leisure flow in to one another. He argues that a distinction between these two things is required other than one which refers to place or locations. He suggests that they should be distinguished on the basis of the modalities and formalities of each of these areas of activity. De Certeau’s categorisations are reminiscent of Teaiwa’s explications of the need to view work and leisure in tandem. Teaiwa explains that being “LEISURE-orientated, embracing of flux and creativity and keeping (p)leasure and work in comfortable tension are the most conducive to resisting colonial/neo-colonial/nationalist/capitalist abuses of power”.\footnote{Teaiwa, 1995, p. 65-72.} What she appears to be articulating here is the everyday practice of resistance. By embracing flux and creativity, and pleasure, work and everyday acts of resistance, including textual and diasporic, potentially creates ways of overcoming easy binaries and simplistic solutions.
Indigenous resistance would be limited indeed if its aims were restricted to merely ‘decolonising’ if that means only state independence or even just ‘decolonising the mind’. What is needed, as Pal Ahluwalia suggests, is a syncretism; an emphasis on valuable aspects of pre-colonial culture, melded with contributions from other cultures and a healthy synthesis of them all.116 In the Pacific, the existence and connections between the Pacific peoples, ‘off’ and ‘on’ island may have the potential to begin bridging this kind of synthesis.

**REFLECTIONS**

In this chapter, I examined the concepts of ‘Indigenous’ and ‘resistance’ and discussed the debates and tensions over legitimacy and authenticity. I have indicated the many ways that Indigenous resistance is intertwined with what many Indigenous peoples see as a long-term process of de-colonising, which emphasises the removal of the colonial and the strengthening of the Indigenous. This anti-colonial – colonial binary and its implications have created an impasse between Indigenous peoples and critics who accuse them of exploiting and manipulating their claims to indigeneity. I have proposed that to move beyond this impasse requires a broader understanding of indigeneity, one which includes a more complex set of identities, accompanied by a broader understanding of resistance, including everyday acts of resistance and making do. Bringing these two broader categories together may generate a better understanding of the subtle relationship between the everyday acts of resistance and the living practices of indigeneity.

If Indigenous acts of resistance are understood as active expressions of power, then indigeneity can be understood as not merely a stagnant way of being belonging to the past, but a dynamic and changing way of living in the present. This in turn implies that Indigenous ways of governing can be just as relevant to the present day as those of exponents of neoliberalism.

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By exposing the many tensions of Indigenous resistance, we also expose the potential for criticism which they provide, the potential for accusations of corruption, authoritarianism and practices of oppression. Conversely, ignoring these tensions only provides an opportunity to dismiss Indigenous people: to dismiss their grievances and to dismiss their having to continually accommodate the dominant privileged positions. It is a dismissal of the potential of Indigenous peoples and any attempts they may make to express a ‘native point of view’. And most importantly it underestimates the potential benefits that may arise from the inclusion of other political views and structures.

In this chapter I established the definitions of Indigenous and resistance which I will use in the following chapters as I examine sites of contestation. I argued that resistance does not merely exist in a binary with re-colonisation but beyond such a dichotomy, exposing vast tracts of activity outside re-colonising and therefore neoliberal view and control. By highlighting such activities I have endeavoured to weaken the authority of re-colonising neoliberal agendas. Most importantly I seek to demonstrate the inadequacy of neoliberal agendas and policies in the Pacific, which result from the limited understanding of the kinds of activities taking place in the Pacific and the manipulation of the structures and identities they do encounter.
INTRODUCTION

In Chapter Two I sought to connect neoliberalism as an ideology with a legacy of colonialism, which in Chapter Three I then extrapolated as re-colonisation. In Chapter 4 I explored the debates surrounding Indigenous peoples and how to conceptualise broader acts of resistance beyond a simplistic binary with re-colonisation. In the following chapters I will explore four sites of contestation where re-colonisation and Indigenous resistance overlap and diverge and where Pacific experiences burgeon beyond neoliberal accounts.

This chapter is the first of the sites of contestation. In this chapter I will outline the inadequacy of neoliberal policies and agendas in the areas of production and trade when neoliberalism can not account for Pacific livelihoods and production. Additionally, the arguments surrounding the need for and potential consequences of ‘free’ trade for the Pacific demonstrate the pervasive and persuasiveness of re-colonising practices.
The myth of the lazy native has survived in the Pacific. The image of tropical bliss, scantily clad, lazy and ‘unworking’ Natives has now been articulated as a labour force with low productivity and efficiency. The image of exchanging beads, blankets, muskets and nails for Pacific land has been replaced with exchanging the less tangible gift of ‘economic growth’ for new forms of environmental destruction and new conditions of ownership. There is some concern in the Pacific about the potential loss in this exchange of the Indigenous forms of production to “‘capitalism’ (literally, ‘life [determined by] money’ or ‘eating [i.e., consumption] with money’)”. And these views are justified in the face of neoliberal prescriptions to move Indigenous peoples from the subsistence economy to more ‘formal’ ways of producing and trading. In addition neoliberal ‘free’ trade agreements are pursued on the basis of reforming Pacific peoples and are justified utilising three theses of inevitability and preparedness. These less than compelling neoliberal visions for production and trade, while being implemented, do not necessarily bode well for Pacific peoples or the environment.

With the world moving to rapidly changing forms of production and, according to some accounts, dividing in to separate trading blocs with states eager to be included in one or more of such coalitions, the Pacific has been purportedly lying in a sea of complacency. Pacific states are being encouraged to allow factors of production to be more flexible and to reduce trade barriers. These pressures are coming from the World Trade Organisation (WTO), Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (Forum), Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and transnational corporations (TNCs). The majority of Pacific states agree as many government officials see it as being the ‘only option”.

With the commercial sector a process of downward levelling is occurring: workers are being asked to work for reduced wages and conditions, environmental standards are being eroded and the distinction between domestic and foreign companies is being contested as preferences for local companies are removed. With regard to trade, the larger Pacific Island countries are pursuing

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4 As discussed in Chapter Three. Also see South Pacific Forum Secretariat “Question and Answer Brief” Forum Trade Ministers Meeting June 1-2 1999, Suva.
neoliberal trade policies, a ‘free’ trade area is being established, and Pacific Islands’ trade policies are systematically being aligned by the Pacific Islands Forum with those of the WTO and APEC, even though most Pacific Islands are not even members.

In reaction to, and as a part of this global political economic transformation, Indigenous resistance, NGOs and the nuclear free movement in the Pacific are arguing that the policies of downward levelling and neoliberal ‘free’ trade are fundamentally foreign to Pacific island values. They argue that the cultural values at the core of Pacific island production are detrimentally changed by the introduction and embedding of competition over cooperation. Neoliberal trade policies mean that Pacific island countries may be set to be locked within Western mechanisms of money exchange and commodification.

The goal of this chapter is to bring in to focus the discrepancies between the Pacific realities of producing livelihoods and neoliberal policies. Additionally, this chapter seeks to highlight the way that ‘free’ trade in the Pacific may not provide the benefits claimed and to show that the theses used to justify it are ill-defined and contradictory.

**PRODUCTIVE LIVELIHOODS**

The inclusion of an area called production in a critique of neoliberalism may appear incongruous, as neoliberals do not talk about ‘production’ as such. In the Pacific context such a discussion also appears somewhat incongruous if ‘production’ is held to be merely ‘formal’ production, that is, in urban centres and in areas such as manufacturing. The production of goods and services in the Pacific largely takes place within the ‘semi-subsistence’ economy and can be more aptly categorised as a component of livelihoods.

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5 The term ‘semi-subsistence’ better describes the multiple activities taking place in the Pacific than merely ‘subsistence’. Families depend on among others a mixture of cash.
Locating Pacific ‘production’ within the concept of livelihoods enables us to better understand the kind of employment/work which takes place in the Pacific. Nick Purdie has described the concept of livelihood as assisting to facilitate broader understandings, which note the linkages between livelihoods and sustainable development. He defines a livelihood as “a complex of social, economic, political and environmental relationships which occur through space and time, the nature and process of which are governed by socio-political and cultural mechanisms”.

From this perspective we can better appreciate the connection between the physical and cultural environment within which goods and services are produced in the Pacific as well as the inextricability of the ‘economic’ from the physical and cultural contexts. These kinds of interconnections are marginalized when conceiving of production as merely a singular detached activity. As Purdie argues, a ‘livelihoods’ approach maintains a perspective of supporting the organisation, constructions and reconstructions of Pacific people and makes problematic attempts, such as neoliberal policies, to reorder these practices in ways which are detrimental to many of the foundations upon which livelihoods rest. Utilising the concept of livelihoods also highlights the incongruence of neoliberal policies of export-orientated productions and the impacts these policies have on the way subsistence agriculture and fishing is organised.

The vast majority of production in the Pacific is subsistence production. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) estimates that 70 percent of the population of the region live in rural villages and sustain themselves through subsistence production, typically taking up wage employment specifically for cash.

Neoliberals do not often consider this form of production as being ‘real’ production because it does not exist as part of the ‘cash’ economy. However, their distinction

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7 Ibid, p. 78.
9 However, neoliberals do see that the semi-subsistence sector (as ‘agriculture’) has the potential to be drawn in to the cash economy. See Office of the Prime Minister, Republic of
between industrial production and subsistence production as corresponding to ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ requires rethinking.

Neoliberalism follows a long-standing Western view which identifies transactions of money with a ‘civilisation’ and the lack of monetary transactions with barbarism persists within the binary of develop/industrialised and developing/subsistence. Those peoples and countries which engage in widespread subsistence, non-industrial production are not considered as civilised. There is little scope in such a view to perceive other cultures and political economic systems with respect. In an analysis of “Labour Productivity and Growth in Pacific Island Economies”, Neil Vousden makes the comment that there are two significant reasons in the Pacific for “low labour productivity”, these being “a large public sector with a suboptimal governance structure and a strong culturally determined preference for leisure”. Another way of looking at what Vousden perceives as a “culturally determined preference for leisure” could be that perhaps there are types of activities which are considered work for Pacific peoples which Vousden interprets as leisure. Penelope Schoeffel argues that craft production in the Cook Islands for example, is not orientated towards the tourist market but rather orientated towards requirements for traditional forms of exchange. The weaving of mats may perhaps be considered a leisure activity in Vousden’s view if these mats will not be sold and have no ‘purpose’. However, mats have a great cultural importance in the Pacific, being used in various types of ceremonies.

The concept of employment and having a ‘job’ is not appropriate for a Pacific context where most people are involved in the semi-subsistence economy. The

12 Or alternatively, people are allocated different roles, some of which may not be production. Jacqueline Leckie, “Precapitalist Labour in the South Pacific”, in Clive Moore, Jacqueline Leckie and Doug Munro, (eds) Labour in the South Pacific, Townsville: James Cook University of Northern Queensland, 1990, p. xxv.
UNDP points out that statistics which label people in the Pacific ‘unemployed’ “wrongly suggests that a large number of people in some countries are not economically active, and they under-represent the value of semi-subsistence production”. It is this misperception of the Pacific context which makes neoliberal policies regarding ‘employment’ much more problematic. The UNDP argues that the persistent focus on the formal sector for jobs has “drawn attention away from the repercussions that commercial ventures can have on other forms of livelihood”. In this sense it becomes apparent that the ‘informal’ economy or the livelihoods of Pacific people are detrimentally affected by policies which fail to recognise their existence and value. The UNDP suggests that with regard to inshore fisheries for example, if these can be managed in a small scale and in a sustainable manner it is possible to provide a reliable source of cash for people, without large scale investment or major disruption to people’s lifestyles. Moreover, by appreciating that those people engaged in the ‘informal’ sector are working and can work in a sustainable way with the environment we can better understand that neoliberal policies are not the most appropriate for the Pacific.

In the Pacific the ‘subsistence’ sector enables people to support themselves in periods of ‘unemployment’, that is employment beyond the market where labour is bought and sold. To complicate matters for neoliberals, the subsistence sector also means that those who rely on it do not have the inclination or perhaps the time to ‘diversify’ into market activities. In a report commissioned for Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID), The South Pacific: Finance, Development and the Private Sector, Michael Skully suggests that, “…in most [Pacific] countries it is not so much encouraging people to become commercially active, but rather commercially active in a Western sense. This involves conducting business on a daily basis…”. Skully’s comments perhaps suggest a perspective which continues to perceive Pacific people as un-ordered in contrast to Western ‘efficiency’. Encouraging people from semi-subsistence to more urban and/or ‘formal’ productive activities can be seen therefore as ordering this unfamiliar terrain.

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14 UNDP, 1999b, p. 74.  
16 The UNDP defines informal as “they are mostly unregistered and unrecorded by official statistics”. See UNDP, 1997, p. 1.  
17 Ibid, p. 52.  
SELLING THE PACIFIC SHORT

While a large part of work in the Pacific is conducted in the semi-subsistence economy, in the urban areas and in the Pacific countries which have experienced large scale resource extraction, neoliberal policies are affecting the methods of production. The globalisation of production of goods and services has been variously labelled as a “new international division of labour”\(^\text{19}\) a “globalisation of poverty”.\(^\text{20}\) As discussed in Chapter Two, this has been facilitated by the interrelationship between neoliberal policies benefiting TNCs and TNC’s requirements to transnationalise to reduce production costs and remain competitive.

To a large extent, TNCs are seeking countries where production conditions may be maximised, and Pacific developing states are trying to provide these conditions. However there are complexities in the Pacific. The ‘new international division of labour’ is not visible in some of the smaller islands in the Pacific. The ‘new international division of labour’ is apparent in the Pacific in terms of the diaspora of islanders in cities like Auckland, Sydney and Honolulu. The changes resulting from neoliberal policies in Aotearoa New Zealand, Australia, Fiji, Samoa and the US, impact on the Pacific through their effects on these islander communities. Many islanders are in low paid jobs in other countries and are often the first to be ‘cut back’ under restructuring or company downsizing caused by companies either struggling or relocating to ‘maximise production’ elsewhere. A similar scenario is visible in the more industrial islands like Fiji, Papua New Guinea (PNG), Samoa and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI).

The competitiveness between states which emerges under this new division of production begins the process of downward levelling particularly for developing countries as they race to attract TNCs to produce goods and services in their

\(^{19}\) James A. Caporaso, (ed) *A Changing International Division Of Labor*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1987, p. 188. Whether this is a ‘new’ or ‘old’ phenomenon is open to extensive debate, but due to space constraints can not be elaborated upon here. See Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson, *Globalization in Question*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996.

countries as part of their prescribed task for development. Brecher and Costello argue that this “race to the bottom” is in part an unintended consequence of millions of unconnected decisions made by individuals and businesses pursuing their private interests. But it is also a deliberate policy objective of global corporations, which have sought to impose a “Corporate Agenda” on local and national governments and international institutions. This Corporate Agenda aims to reduce all barriers to downward levelling of environmental, labor and social costs. It has been incorporated in trade agreements like NAFTA and GATT, in World Bank and IMF policies of “shock therapy” and “structural adjustment”, and in government policies that lower conditions for the majority in pursuit of “competitiveness”.

The process of downward levelling is perhaps not as simple however, as Brecher and Costello argue it to be. Pacific states and people are both caught between conflicting pressures from aid donors, landowners and so on. Downward levelling may be an outcome and may support a corporate agenda, but each location where it occurs continues to exercise resistance and make the imposition of this agenda problematic.

The encouragement for downward levelling comes from a neoliberal discourse which views the economy as taking precedence over the sustainability of the environment or the lives of people, in the sense that neoliberals believe these will be taken care of after the economy. Put another way, neoliberals are only concerned with the environment and social ‘matters’ if they are of relevance to the strength, growth and sustainability of the economy. These matters, supposedly ‘external’ (external to economics) consequences, are secondary. Neil Vousden argues that, “it is … important that governments wishing to promote growth should try to reduce cultural, institutional and policy impediments to a healthy inflow of foreign investment”. This kind of argument is a result of the assumption that securing the well-being of the economy will create positive changes for people and the

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22 Ibid.


environment. The World Bank states that for the Pacific, “establishing the conditions for recovery first, followed by more rapid sustained growth, will be essential to alleviate poverty”. However, evidence suggests that neoliberal policies do not result in either recovery or the alleviation of poverty but they have produced an array of other detrimental effects, including the cheapening of labour and the degradation of the environment.

CHEAPENING LABOUR AND THE ENVIRONMENT

To remain competitive, particularly to be attract TNC investment, states are required to offer extreme concessions and incentives which make production cheaper for investors. The two factors most likely to contribute to this cheapening are labour and the environment. Wages in the Pacific are often claimed to be too high, “held artificially high”, especially in comparison to other countries like Vietnam, Mexico or China which are seen as being at the ‘leading edge’ of competitive wage rates. Schoeffel rejects such claims and argues that “generally these ‘high wages’ buy less than a lower wage in Asia will buy, so that in terms of purchasing power wages in the Pacific islands are not higher than in Asia”. The World Bank has encouraged wages to be lowered according to what are argued to be market principles. In the 1998 Regional Economic Report, the World Bank recommends that, “Governments … need to ensure that labor markets are flexible and that firms have the ability to hire and dismiss or reallocate workers easily and that pay is determined by market forces”. The World Bank is assigning the burden of flexibility to ‘labour’, not to capital. It is the market, in the World Bank view, which has the most efficient capability of allocating labour to jobs, and which will subsequently achieve economic growth.

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28 Schoeffel fails to adequately substantiate this claim, although she does indicate that it is a result of the importation of food. Schoeffel, 1996, p. 94. Original emphasis.
The Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI) government is one of the most explicit in the Pacific in supporting policies of downward levelling by encouraging TNCs and other, particularly South East Asian companies, to locate in CNMI specifically to exploit labour and trade access arrangements with the US. The CNMI currently have quota free access on their products shipped to the “mainland United States”. The signing of the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between Canada, the US and Mexico and the filing of several major lawsuits has led the CNMI government into difficulties however, after opting to cast itself as a site for cheap labour. The NAFTA agreement has resulted in US companies relocating to Mexico in order to exploit the workforce there. This has given rise to some concern within the CNMI government that they may lose business. The CNMI government is therefore now trying vigorously to attract and retain companies.

At the same time however the CNMI government is coming under increasing pressure from the US to improve its human rights record regarding allegations of slave-wage conditions. Several US companies have been taken to court charged with instituting ‘slave-wage’ conditions in their factories. Nine companies have settled one of the law suits taken, saying they would set up a US$1.25 million fund to help monitor conditions at foreign owned factories on the island of Saipan. In March 2000, Levi Strauss and Co and Calvin Klein Inc were added to a class action suit alleging sweat shop labour conditions. The US Department of the Interior’s Annual Report concludes that US Federal immigration law and minimum wage laws should be extended to CNMI in order to stem the multiple and rising breaches of human rights. The Report described the situation as CNMI’s “heavy and unhealthy dependency upon an indentured alien worker program”. However it was the US that initially created this situation. When the Covenant between the US...
and CNMI was devised, the US specifically excluded Federal immigration and minimum wage laws from application in CNMI. This in effect created a loophole for exploitation.

Regardless of the various costs of competition neoliberals continue to see the CNMI government attempts at competitiveness as appropriate. Wali M. Osman, Vice President and Regional Economist of the Bank of Hawaii argues that government and business leaders must “separate the issue of politics and economics”. Richard Pierce, executive director of the Saipan Garment Manufacturers’ Association also argues that “(a)ll personalities and politics aside, it is just a matter of cost of doing business”. This becomes a familiar argument in neoliberal discourse, a separation of ‘politics’ from ‘economics’, an attempt to separate the policies from the social consequences. This allows a detachment of people’s well-being from ‘productivity’.

Another argument used by neoliberal analysts is that the migration of labour is the self regulating market in action, moving resources to where they can be most efficiently utilised. This perspective fails to consider the potential social costs of mass migration and the ‘market in action’. The movement of workers, between islands and within islands has produced social problems for many Pacific islands. Today this movement is a result of recent neoliberal pressures to incorporate islanders into the market economy, however it has also previously come from older colonial pressures too. The crises in Fiji and the Solomon Islands reflect the kinds of complications which arise from relatively large groups of labour movement and inadequate resolution of their rights. The consequences of migration are that issues of identity and place become tense and problematic, especially if not openly dealt with. This is where the division between ‘politics’ and ‘economics’ becomes ‘efficient’ for neoliberalism. Neoliberals are able to separate the effects of their

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38 That is, Indo-Fijians taken as indentured labour to Fiji or encouraged to emigrate there under various work schemes, while many Malaitans were encouraged by the British to move to Guadalcanal to work on plantations and land allocation was not adequately arranged at that time. See for example, Robert C Kiste, “Pre-colonial Times” in K R Howe, Robert C Kiste and Brij V. Lal, (eds) Tides of History, Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1994. And Ian Frazer, “Maasina Rule and Solomon Islands Labour History” in Moore, Leckie and Munro, 1990.
policies which are social and political from their supposedly detached ‘neutral’ ‘economic’ prescription.

Environmental destruction from governments attempting to pursue policies specifically for economic growth is visible in Papua New Guinea affecting both the environment and the people who depend on this environment to live. The Ok Tedi mine is perhaps the most prominent example of the entangled nature of the pursuit of these kinds of policies. Thos dependent on the mine, including come local communities and the PNG government, are seeking to participate in further exploitation of resources by keeping the mine open with Prime Minister Mekere Morauta describing the mine as a “national asset”.

While these groups view potential costs of the mine as worth it, other landowners and environmentalists are campaigning for both the mines closure and a ‘clean up’ of the environment by BHP, who until recently was the largest shareholder in the mine. It has now become the PNG government which is most interested in ensuring the mine’s continued operation, while BHP Billiton which divested its shares in the mine in late 2001 is avoiding responsibility for the environmental effects of the mine. In an attempt to keep BHP investments in the mine and thus keep it operating, the PNG government even passed legislation which removed any obligation or responsibility for environmental damages from BHP.

Another illustration is Bougainville which is one of the Pacific’s most famous cases of Indigenous people struggling for land and also for a halt to an exploitative production process. The people of Bougainville experienced the forces of the company and the PNG government in attempts to reopen the mine. In this case, the Indigenous people achieved the objective of forcing the mine to stop production and also eventually signed a peace accord which will produce a referendum on independence from PNG.

In Fiji, the exploitation of labour, particularly women’s labour has been entrenched in the garment manufacturing and food processing sectors as part of the

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government’s quest for national growth. Several studies of the Pacific Fishing Company Ltd (PAFCO) have indicated that increasing competitiveness in the ‘global market’ is demanding cost-effective operations and higher output and productivity levels which places increasing burdens on the labour standards for women workers.\(^{43}\) The women in the PAFCO factory at Levuka are subjected to low working conditions as a result of the policies of the Fijian government for a ‘competitive’ labour force. In her examination of the Fijian fisheries sector, ‘Atu Emberson-Bain argues that the working conditions of the women manufacturing workers and those at PAFCO highlight the urgent need for a reassessment of the labour implications, and the “worker-unfriendly climate”\(^ {44}\) of neoliberal policies. She argues that contradictions between neoliberal policies and Pacific values are obvious and a more holistic approach is needed which incorporates the dignity of work and the rights of workers to sustainable livelihoods.\(^ {45}\)

Although the distinction between ‘local’ and ‘foreign’ investment may be increasingly difficult to discern, it is still possible to perceive large scale foreign ownership and control in the Pacific. In the fisheries sector Philip Muller, Director of the South Pacific Applied Geoscience Commission, argues that foreign ownership is set to continue well into the next decade with the US, Japanese, Taiwanese and Korean vessels dominating the long line fishing licences.\(^ {46}\) This control is not limited to the fisheries sector, however. The control wielded by foreign corporations in Melanesia was highlighted in the Barnett Commission of Inquiry into the timber industry in PNG in 1990.\(^ {47}\) The findings of the Inquiry were highly embarrassing for several politicians and only two out of seven interim reports were ever published.\(^ {48}\) Additionally in PNG the mining sector, as noted above, is notorious for its ownership and control by foreign companies and especially for its

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\(^{44}\) Ibid, p. 167.

\(^{45}\) Ibid, p. 167-9


\(^{48}\) Also for an analysis of the World Bank’s role in this see Colin Filer, The Thin Green Line, Canberra: National Research Institute and Australian National University, 2000.
exploitation by Australian companies. There is extensive literature on the detrimental effects of such practices on local Papua New Guineans.\textsuperscript{49}

Closely related to widespread TNC’s control is the role which technology plays in the production process. The extensive foreign ownership of major industries in the production sector means that the technology used in production is also foreign owned. Tony Marjoram, a programme specialist at UNESCO, argues that technology is the major engine of development and economic growth in all countries, with finance or capital as the “fuel for that engine”.\textsuperscript{50} If this proposition is accepted then the failure for such technology to be transferred to Pacific and other developing countries becomes an even more crucial factor. Development academic Benjamin Higgins argues that there is no significant technological lag in the islands in such activities as copper or phosphate mining, sugar refining, manufacture of beer, rum, vodka and gin, banking or consulting services.\textsuperscript{51} This shows that the types of technology which are transferred to the Pacific island countries are transferred for a reason; namely by companies for their own profit. Higgins argues, “As anywhere else in the world, there is no shortage of either capital or advanced technology in resource based industries if the resources are there and can be exploited profitably”.\textsuperscript{52} Neoliberal advocates do acknowledge the role technology plays in increasing the growth of GDP. The focus however, is on allowing the private sector rather than the state to finance technological research and development. This removal of the government from research and development means that the public sector can be more easily excluded from new technologies in favour of large companies. Neoliberals argue that part of the role of restructuring the state involves their removal from research and development financing, as the private sector is the best judge of which technologies are in demand in the market place.\textsuperscript{53}


\textsuperscript{50} Marjoram, 1994, p. 4.

\textsuperscript{51} Benjamin Higgins, “Technology and Economic Development” in Marjoram, p.31.

\textsuperscript{52} Ibid.

GOVERNMENT PRODUCTION

In many Pacific islands, the major employer is the government. This often places local production in their control but also places them in the position of a significant ‘producer’. The World Bank’s 1998 Pacific Islands Regional Economic Report lays down some clear guidelines for government productivity in the Pacific as also discussed in Chapter Two. Their latest proposal includes the recommendation for Pacific states to implement “performance orientated budgeting” which they argue “holds the potential to improve the productivity of public expenditure in the PMCs [Pacific Member Countries]”. The Report explains that performance budgeting was developed in the US in the 1950s and is now most often associated with “the New Zealand public management reforms of the 1980s and 1990s, which are built around a contractual relationship between ministries as purchasers of goods and services, and departments as providers”. This new relationship between ministries as purchasers and departments as providers, or more recently of the private sector as providers, conceals one of the original purposes of government, namely the redistribution of goods and services in a manner consistent with the public good.

Curiously the Report fails to further investigate the Aotearoa New Zealand connection. If it had done so it would discover a burgeoning literature on the failure of this inherently neoliberal policy program. In Aotearoa New Zealand this program produced a continuous restructuring process within the public service which became disruptive for government departments and reduced their productivity. This neoliberal agenda of introducing ‘market practices’ including competition to the public sector, where ministries act as purchasers of services actually increased expenditure, due to staff being made redundant from

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55 Ibid, p. 33.
departments and then being contracted back as ‘consultants’ charging higher fees.\textsuperscript{58} This pattern is similar in most countries which have implemented neoliberal policies; there is no shortage of evidence on the resulting failure of these.\textsuperscript{59} For neoliberals however, these policies are conceived as having been a success as they have stimulated the private sector.

While the World Bank criticises Pacific governments for being too involved in the economy and production sector it is exceedingly quiet on the matter of the military production which takes place in the Pacific. There have been no recommendations to date by the World Bank, for the Marshall Islands, Belau, or Te Ao Maohi,\textsuperscript{60} for instance, to end the governmental and continued colonial arrangements in production. For Belau, and the Marshall Islands the expenditure for this military production and occupation is somewhat concealed as ‘aid’ from the US. Their Compacts of Association are however, better described as financial arrangements between contractor and contracted parties. Ross Prizzia describes this arrangement as more appropriately categorised as one of rent:

\textquote{t}he 15-year Compact of Free Association with the United States beginning in 1986 includes US grants/aid programs that will pay US$1 billion by 2001 to the Republic of the Marshall Islands, a country with fewer than 57,000 people...The terms of the Compact, an economic and political agreement, are more of a business transaction than the typical aid package requiring no reciprocity between nations.\textsuperscript{61}

A significant number of people are employed in military production in the Pacific making its exclusion from World Bank employment sector analysis an interesting issue. In the Marshall Islands 1,200-1,500 people are employed at the missile range.\textsuperscript{62} This accounts for approximately 2.1-2.6 percent of the population.\textsuperscript{63} France has ceased to test at Te Ao Maohi; however the material previously gathered there and

\textsuperscript{58} This operates in tandem with the lowering of other wages as discussed above.
\textsuperscript{59} See Ferguson, 1994.
\textsuperscript{60} Te Ao Maohi is the Indigenous name for ‘French’ Polynesia and Belau and Palau are both used for Belau.
that which continues to be created there contributes substantially to their nuclear production process. In Guam, one third of the land is controlled by the US, and the World Bank makes no comment of that as a barrier to productive enterprise. The extension of traditional ‘trade’ concerns to include ‘services’ and the reorientation of production to specifically ‘export’ production increase the linkages between trade and production. Additionally if companies receive preferential access to markets for their products they will specifically locate and ‘produce’ in Pacific countries to exploit this opportunity. These export focussed policies emphasise again the neoliberal perception that production is really about its subsequent utilisation as exchange.

TRADE

In this section of the chapter I will investigate several arguments being promoted in the Pacific regarding the directions for trade regionally. The promotion and implementation of neoliberal policies for ‘free’ trade are filtered in the Pacific through two related theses: of inevitability and of preparedness. I will examine the way the current Pacific Island Countries Free Trade Agreement (PICTA) and Pacific Agreement for Closer Economic Relations (PACER) have been supported by and justified utilising these three theses.

THESIS OF INEVITABILITY

The central foundation upon which the justification for trade liberalisation, including the PICTA and PACER rests is a thesis regarding the inevitability of changes occurring in the global world. These changes have been variously characterised as globalisation, a ‘new world order’, the ‘post cold war world’ and so on. What they all hold in common is an unstated perception of change as both inevitable and all powerful, a fatal tide. ‘Change’ is not however, a neutral concept or process which takes place beyond the polity. Instead types of change are

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politically, historically, culturally and economically constituted. Central to the production of this thesis is the Pacific Islands Forum.

The Pacific Islands Forum and particularly its Secretariat, play a vital role in the promotion and facilitation of neoliberal trade policies in the Pacific. In part this is achieved through relations and the intellectual support of international institutions, particularly the WTO and APEC. The Pacific Islands Forum has an intricate web of ways in which it absorbs and reproduces neoliberalism. The Forum has 16 member countries and five dialogue members who participate in the Post-Forum Dialogue, in which ideas and pressure is transmitted. The most significant ways however, in which neoliberalism is transmitted to the Forum is through the Forum’s connections with APEC, the WTO and the advice which is commissioned by the Forum and given to member countries.

The Pacific Islands Forum has three members who are also members of APEC: Aotearoa New Zealand, Australia and PNG, and five countries that have membership with the WTO: Aotearoa New Zealand, Australia, Fiji, PNG and the Solomon Islands. Samoa, Tonga and Vanuatu have observer status. This means that the majority of the Pacific states, who are not members of these organisations, should theoretically have no restrictions required of them by either of these organisations. However, although the majority of Forum countries are not members of the WTO or APEC, the Forum as their regional representative, has extensive interaction with the two and Pacific Islands are encouraged to align their policies. The Forum has observer status at APEC meetings and in this way keeps up-to-date with APEC policies. It has been argued that all the Pacific island’s major trading partners are members of APEC and for this reason it is imperative for them to have an understanding of the types of policies being pursued which may affect their interests. However, there are many other organisations in which all of the Pacific’s major trading partners are also members, so the policies of APEC and WTO are only some of those that need to be considered.

Modelled on the Action Plans created within APEC, the Forum has created an Action Plan for the Pacific region and encourages Pacific Island states to develop

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65 Observers must start accession negotiations within five years of becoming observers. See World Bank website, [www.wto.org](http://www.wto.org).
similar Plans. This modelling of Forum principles on those of APEC was encouraged and advanced by the 1995 Forum Finance Ministers Meeting (FFMM), which became the Forum Economic Ministers Meeting (FEMM) in 1997. The 1997 FEMM devised the Forum Economic Action Plan which seeks to achieve “free and open trade and investment” and to commit Pacific island countries to APEC and WTO consistency. Forum members were encouraged at this meeting to be consistent with APEC non-binding investment principles and to implement them rapidly to avoid ‘diluting’ reforms. At the 1998 FEMM a review of the 1997 FEMM Action Plan took place and it was again reiterated that member countries should be “implementing domestic measures consistent with WTO and APEC principles and obligations” and that they would report progress at subsequent meetings. 1999 saw a Forum Trade Ministers meeting take place which endorsed the Free Trade Area (FTA) principle, consistent, of course with APEC and WTO requirements. In 1999 Noel Levi, Secretary General of the Forum Secretariat, met with the Executive Director of the APEC Secretariat Tim Hannah and agreed to strengthen links between the two organisations keeping the avenue for neoliberal policies open.

This persistent pursuit by the Forum of APEC-consistent policies is troubling given the Pacific Islands’ limited membership. However, the Forum appears determined to follow this path and is being encouraged to do so by the European Union (EU). As part of the EU’s preconditions for a renegotiated agreement of the Lome IV Agreement, there was pressure for Pacific Islands to join APEC. The EU has said specifically that it wishes to see Pacific members of ACP integrated into APEC.

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66 This is similar to what occurred in Aotearoa New Zealand in the 1980s. The Pacific islands are reducing barriers faster than they are even required to, as part of the neoliberal ideal of ‘fast implementation’. This places them in an even more vulnerable position. Aotearoa New Zealand’s experience of this process has been negative for the large percentage of the country’s population. The fast implementation in Aotearoa New Zealand meant that public debate on the changes being made was sidelined and halted. This allowed politicians to virtually ‘cut and paste’ neoliberal policies from text books.


APEC has currently imposed a moratorium, however, on new membership after the entrance in 1999 of Peru, Russia and Vietnam, so it is unlikely that further membership will become an issue until the lifting of this. Perhaps much of the Forum’s rhetoric regarding APEC and WTO consistency is due to the opportunity it provides for Pacific Island governments to push through unpopular policies even though people do not realise these obligations are voluntary and non-binding.

The Forum Action Plan has been squarely criticised by Pacific groups which attended the Fourth NGO Parallel Forum. The participants argued that the Action Plan was

based on narrow economic models which take little or no account of the central importance of systems of customary land tenure or the traditional ‘subsistence’ economy for Pacific peoples ... APEC Non-Binding Investment Principles are not a sound basis for Pacific island development.

The Principles referred to here stemmed from the Jakarta APEC meeting in November 1994. They include aspirations for the promotion and increase of foreign investment, ‘national treatment’, and a specific commitment for governments not to “relax health, safety and environmental regulations as an incentive to encourage investment”. The last point appears somewhat ironic in the face of apparent reductions of regulations to attract investment.

The Forum’s thesis of the inevitability of ‘globalisation’ becomes apparent in their relations with the WTO and arguments for WTO consistency. The Forum desire for WTO consistency is driven, less by an agreement that neoliberal policies will be immensely successful in the Pacific, and more by a perception that there is no escape from what the Forum labels, but never fully defines, as ‘globalisation’. These two points of the lack of definition of globalisation and the perception that this process is nonetheless inevitable are interrelated. The inadequacy of the Forum’s definition of globalisation suggests that there is some confusion in fact regarding this phenomenon. This significantly weakens then their arguments of inevitability. How can it be inevitable if the phenomenon is not adequately or convincingly

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72 Kelsey, 1999.


explicated? Greg Fry argues against the perceptions of some scholars and policy makers, that the future does not bode well for the Pacific if countries do not restructure and follow the prescriptions as laid down by neoliberals and strive to be included in the ‘new world order’. Being WTO consistent therefore is part of a range of policy prescriptions based on negative scenarios created for the Pacific if they do not become consistent. The Forum inevitability thesis and resulting advice encourages the entrenchment of neoliberal policies and resists a comprehension of alternatives.

The relationship between the Forum and the WTO is made more complex by the fact that Australia, Aotearoa New Zealand, Fiji, PNG and Solomon Islands are members. The fact that the largest, but still not the majority, of the Pacific Island states are members of the WTO adds an apparent legitimacy to Forum calls for ‘WTO consistency’. By encouraging WTO consistency in trade policies, the Forum is emphasising that it believes neoliberal policies, and the values that are embodied in the WTO, are positive for Pacific development and Pacific peoples. These values are being challenged by Pacific groups like the Pacific Network for Globalisation (PANG), which argues that neoliberal policies are erroneous and misguided in the Pacific. In early 2000 the Forum held a meeting with WTO officials to “assist in the development of unified policies on WTO issues relevant to the Forum Island Countries for the consideration of Forum Trade Ministers”. The establishment of a Forum office in Geneva to facilitate Pacific participation in WTO negotiations will no doubt add to the amount of neoliberal policy prescriptions being circulated and calls for WTO consistency.

The interaction between the Forum, APEC and WTO reflects the importance of these institutions in the entrenchment of neoliberal ideas in the Pacific. Although the Forum does not officially have a mandate to commit Pacific Island states to policies or organisations that they do not agree with, it is binding them to neoliberal policies

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76 Ibid, p. 305.
by participating to the current extent, especially when most Pacific Islands are not members of these organisations. Additionally, the type of advice provided to regional governments by the Forum is strongly connected with neoliberal intellectuals. In 1993 at Seattle, the US proposed setting up APEC Study Centres in every member ‘economy’ which were intended to promote APEC. This connected academia with APEC and added intellectual legitimacy to neoliberal policies. The Forum commissioned advice in the form of a report titled *Free Trade Options for the Forum Island Countries*, from the Aotearoa New Zealand APEC Study Centre, located at Auckland University, regarding the issue of a free trade area. Hence the type of advice provided was strongly neoliberal. This process of legitimisation assumes an air of objectivity and value neutrality however, the context for the production of such advice shows that advice is usually procured from sources which share the neoliberal discourse. An additional point needs to be made here that while the Forum may not be overtly making decisions for Pacific Island governments, many governments are eager to be part of ‘global liberalisation’; encouraged by and as part of the practices of re-colonisation as discussed in Chapter Three.

The thesis of inevitability promoted by the Forum and normalised through the rhetoric of affiliated institutions creates the thesis of preparedness. This thesis is founded on the acceptance that global change is inevitable and therefore countries must implement particular trade policies in order to avoid adverse effects. Simply put, Pacific countries must be prepared, and the most efficient way to become prepared is by being part of a ‘Free’ Trade Area.

**THESIS OF PREPAREDNESS**

The trade debate in the Pacific is currently pervaded by discussions on the PICTA and the PACER. The idea of a Pacific ‘free’ trade area has been mooted for many years. Previous negotiations produced the South Pacific Regional Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement (SPARTECA) in 1981 but now the PICTA and PACER are in place. Several factors combined to produce an agreement for the ‘free’ trade area including: the perceived failure of SPARTECA, the EU Green Paper on the Lome IV, the ending of the Lome IV convention, and increasing level of

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79 The PICTA will come into force after it has been ratified by six members, it currently has four (Cook Islands, Fiji, Samoa, Tonga, PNG). The PACER requires seven ratifications and now has seven (Cook Islands, Fiji, New Zealand, Samoa, Tonga, PNG and Niue). See “Pact to Come into Force” *The Daily Post*, 17 September 2002.
neoliberal research being conducted by the Forum and the subsequent advice provided by them.

The SPARTECA agreement has yielded few benefits for Pacific island states other than Fiji, and calls have steadily increased for another agreement to be devised that is more appropriate for the needs of Pacific countries.\footnote{158} It has been shown that despite trade liberalisation, ‘real renewable exports’ declined from Forum island countries to Australia and Aotearoa New Zealand since the promulgation of SPARTECA.\footnote{80} The Fijian garment sector was perhaps the only sector which benefited from SPARTECA with an increase in exports to Australia.\footnote{82} There is some debate however, whether the benefits of SPARTECA truly accrues for the country or is merely exploited by Australian companies using transfer pricing and other tariff avoiding techniques.\footnote{83} Other Pacific countries have failed to see an increase in exports to Australia or Aotearoa New Zealand. There is some debate whether this is a result of Pacific countries’ small economies, unable to ‘take advantage’ of such preferences, or if the principles of the agreement itself were faulty.\footnote{84}

The scheduled ending for the Lome IV convention in 2000 led to the European Commission’s *Green Paper on EU-ACP Relations: a New Partnership For the 21st Century*.\footnote{85} The EU Green Paper and Lome IV re-negotiations are reminiscent of pressure to incorporate the Pacific into neoliberal structures. The Lome IV is not

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\footnote{81} Grynberg, 1996, p. 81.


\footnote{84} In a study conducted for the Australian government, Ron Duncan argues that Pacific island states have failed to take advantage of Article VIII of the agreement which provided Pacific states the opportunity to apply for assistance for trade promotion purposes. Additionally the rules of origin clause caused problems for Pacific states. Quoted in AusAID (1996) “SPARTECA—Where to Next? A Commentary”. Unpublished paper.

\footnote{85} The new Lome IV Agreement was scheduled to be signed in May 2000 in Suva, Fiji, however this was disrupted by the coup.
compatible with WTO regulations and therefore necessitated a re-negotiation. How much of this is actually directed primarily at the Pacific island countries which make up part of this group is difficult to determine. It appears that many of the conclusions drawn in the Green Paper were primarily written for the purpose of defining a policy for Africa and that many of the conclusions of the Green Paper have limited applicability in the Pacific. In order for the Pacific as a member of the ACP group to participate in further negotiations regarding the Lome convention three options were proposed in the Green Paper of which an FTA was one. Part of the pressure therefore, for an FTA can be traced directly to this proposal.

The EU Green Paper also recommended structural adjustment policies for Pacific Island countries and suggested that Pacific governments invest in the “improvement in the credibility of government”. The issue here is credibility in whose eyes? The answer appears to be for investors. Stephen Gill’s discussion of disciplinary neoliberalism, for example, suggests that it is working on countries to enforce consistency of policies for the benefit of companies, under the guise of ensuring the “confidence of investors”.

The other issue which has accompanied FTA discussions has been not just consistency but also accession to the WTO. The WTO and the consolidation of the system which has built up around it since 1994 has been extremely problematic for the Pacific. As previously discussed, Fiji, PNG, Solomon Islands, (Samoa, Vanuatu and Tonga are pending) and Australia and Aotearoa New Zealand have joined the WTO system which increases the pressure on other Pacific island countries, to if not follow suit then to follow the policies it promulgates. Additionally, on a regional basis this pressure also means that regional organisations and Forums (like the Pacific Islands Forum and the Pacific Island Leaders Conference) become increasingly receptive to neoliberal policies. Neoliberal ideas of international ‘competitiveness’ and ‘efficiency’ for countries are disseminated and perceived as being appropriate.

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87 Ibid, p. 7.
The mobility of these ideas shifts the regional discourse of IPE, strengthening the dominance of neoliberal discourse and flows through to government policies and strategic direction. Vanuatu has been a notable exception to pressure to join the WTO. After rejecting WTO accession at the WTO meeting at Doha, Qatar, Vanuatu did not agree to the conditions of accession and therefore would not join, despite having fulfilled the Protocol of Accession. The conditions being insisted upon extended, in the opinion of the Vanuatu government, far beyond ‘preparedness’ to blatant exploitation. Vanuatu was asked by the US to join the Agreement on Government Procurement and the Agreement on Civil Aircraft both plurilateral agreements, which are optional for WTO members to sign. In addition as a Least Developed Country, Vanuatu should not have been required to comply with the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement before 2006, however the US demanded Vanuatu implement legislation at accession. As Vanuatu would have been the first Least Developed Country to join the WTO, its reasons for declining demonstrate the inadequacies of neoliberalism and perhaps suggest why no other Least Developed Country has joined the WTO.

In his role as Secretary General of the Pacific Islands Forum Noel Levi has espoused his ideas for the formation of a free trade area as follows:

A PARTA offers theoretical advantages in overcoming the fundamental constraint to the development of the FICs - namely their small size. The PARTA expands the size of the home market through giving preference to other FICs and results in greater economic integration of FICs. Additionally a PARTA creates more potential for business people and so encourages intra-FIC trade and business growth, so reducing the vulnerability of FICs to external shocks. A PARTA will give a stronger foundation for responding to globalization and universal trade liberalization.

The first reason PARTA was proposed is that the world is undergoing a period of globalization and liberalization. It was felt that an FTA would help prepare FICs for this process. It was felt that two of the pillars of our economies in the region - trade preference and aid flows - were being undermined by the process of globalization. The formation of an FTA would

90 Ibid.
allow the FICs to deal with this and hopefully arrest the process of political and economic marginalization. Second, it would create a market of six million which, while still small, would be large enough to allow more local production and thereby large enough to shift away from our dependence upon aid and trade preference towards more solid, production oriented foundations for our economies. Third, because the FTA was intended to be based on a stepping stone approach to trade liberalization, members would make a small adjustment through liberalization towards FICs, which would then allow them to liberalize towards other larger trading partners when they are in a position to do so. Thus PARTA was intended to act as a vehicle for eventually dealing with other trading partners as a group.  

There appear to be three themes reoccurring in the Forum’s arguments as articulated by Levi, for a FTA: collective security, “global liberalisation” and arguments for more production and trade. The collective security argument is compelling in many ways. As many groups of people and states have found, including the Association for Small Island Developing States, there can be strength in likeminded states forging alliances to advocate a shared position on an issue. However, structural constraints still exist to such attempts, as developing countries have already found within the current structures of the WTO where the most important decisions are in fact brokered in discussions solely between the ‘powerful’ countries, as also demonstrated in the case of Vanuatu. Several developing countries walked out of the December 1999 Seattle meeting of the WTO in protest at such manipulation of supposedly democratic, egalitarian WTO process of one country, one vote.  

There are structural restraints which ensure the dominance of the current system and are designed to eliminate opposition. That said however, there is no reason why countries should not try to unite to pressure changes but they must be aware of the constraints.

The second point expressed by the Forum about the strength and widespread nature of global liberalisation presumes, as argued above, an inevitability and strength which has not been proven. It is undeniable that global political economic changes are taking place; however, as previously discussed, whether a particular direction for these could be described as inevitable is highly dubious. Like the larger

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agencies on which it draws the Forum does little to provide adequate proof to substantiate such claims.

The third point, of pursuing the stimulation of production and trade demonstrates the underlying neoliberal assumption that there is a direct correlation between more production and trade and better standards of living. Once again, such a link has not been adequately proven, either by the Forum or in the broader Pacific neoliberal literature. Additionally there is no proven correlation between ‘open’ trade and economic growth, or between economic growth and economic development.

Moreover when seen as a stepping stone, an FTA demonstrates a neoliberal claim that with the incremental application of neoliberal policies a higher level of freedom and independence will be achieved by Pacific states within the global market economy. A Pacific FTA is not an end in itself. It is a ‘stepping stone’ to integration with a global market economy. Recent difficulties with APEC, the failure to begin a new round of negotiations in the WTO and the general slowing down of the implementation of neoliberal policies has led to a new strategy of negotiating smaller agreements worldwide which can lock together to achieve the larger goal.94 Noel Levi emphasises that the Pacific Regional Free Trade Agreement (PARTA)95 is part of a larger plan to maintain the agreement as open regionalism. He states that “(a) long-term visionary approach, which could encompass options for both the broadening and deepening of the PARTA, is required”.96 This expansionary future purpose is also evidenced by the Forum’s desire for the FTA to be APEC and WTO compatible. This not only facilitates future assimilation into these organisations but also definitively excludes alternatives to the neoliberal trade regime.

Before the negotiations of the PICTA and PACER, neoliberal theorists were increasingly expressing frustrations with their perception of a lack of willingness on the part of some island governments to substantially change their attitudes on issues of ‘macroeconomics’. Roman Grynberg argues that Pacific Islands are not doing enough and that “it is difficult to argue that there will be significant and tangible benefits to Pacific Island Countries from the Uruguay Round, given the present

95 Pacific Regional Free Trade Agreement (PARTA) was the original name for the PICTA.
96 Levi, 2000d.
attitude towards economic policy reform in the South Pacific”. There is an apparent level of frustration from neoliberal theorists who believe that the failure of neoliberal policies will be from incorrect implementation rather than incorrect policies. Despite the frustrations of neoliberal proponents there are many Pacific leaders who are following neoliberal prescriptions. The Pacific Leader’s annual conference and the Forum Secretariat Ministers Meeting are conspicuous for their determination to follow neoliberal prescriptions. The reports which are issued from these meetings consistently utilise language which disguises, but fails to change, its neoliberal bias. Gill has helped to explain this seeming variation of neoliberal thought. He argues that far from being a new set of policies, this rhetoric is simply a cover for neoliberal prescriptions, especially those which must pass through public institutions. As discussed in Chapter Two, neoliberal arguments are not static. They are rhetorically adaptive to criticism and mutate accordingly. That is, they incorporate the wording of criticism into their discourse and rearticulate it to their critics as though they have accepted these points. However, their underlying assumptions remain the same.

PICTA, PACER AND SOCIAL COSTS

An important aspects which is marginalised in these two theses are the actual effects of an FTA. In 1999 when the PICTA and PACER were approved, the Trade Ministers Meeting also requested a study in to the potential economic and social consequences of the Agreements. It appears that this Social Impact Assessment actually took place some time after this date, well in to the process of drafting the text for the PICTA and PACER. One crucial feature of the study appears to have been glossed over by the Forum, and that is, that while the study is explained by its author’s as having to be “readily adaptable to analysis of an enlarged FTA”, the purpose of the study remained; to determine the potential future ramifications of the PICTA, not the PACER. This subtle distinction is significant as the PACER includes Australia and Aotearoa New Zealand and would likely have much greater effects.

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97 Grynberg, 1996, p. 64
100 Ibid. Original emphasis.
The main finding of the Assessment conflicts with some of the evidence provided in the Assessment itself. Early in the Assessment it is argued that “any social consequences of membership of the FTA are likely to be extremely limited”. The reason for this, it is explained is that “the economic impacts of dismantling trade barriers within the fourteen FICs [Forum Island Countries] over the next decade – from which most of the social effects derive – are themselves of relatively small magnitude”. However, the subsequent evidence of the Assessment does not at times reflect this, often contradicts this and produces several uncomfortable juxtapositions. The argument that changes will be minimal, rests oddly next to concessions that the “extensive ripple impact of economic change via trade agreements, and import/export structures, on the other aspects of society are not immediately visible”. The authors are indicating that while they may be highlighting as many impacts as possible there will be implications which they are not able to predict. This hints at the potentially restricted and inefficient ambit of Assessment itself, unable to indicate in very specific terms the outcomes of the FTA as it elsewhere claims.

Several other broader and serious cultural effects related to “social structures” and “social institutions” are hinted at, but not fully developed in the Assessment. These social structures and institutions are noted to be “underpinned by sets of values and norms which, to a large extent, determine social (and economic) behaviour”. It is the combination of these social structures, institutions and their underlying values that the authors argue may pose a problem to the FTA and further trade liberalisation. The authors note:

These socio-cultural values are not necessarily economic, and prevailing loyalties to them, and to the social institutions that they underpin, can be problematic to trade-agreement-related investment, production and distribution. Trade liberalisation can impact on these values and institutions and vice versa, with positive-or negative- consequences.

Regardless of their refusal to predict whether these impacts will be positive or negative, what the authors are indicating is that there are likely to be profound

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101 Ibid, p. 3.
102 Ibid.
104 Ibid.
105 Ibid.
cultural effects from the FTA. It is difficult to understand on this evidence therefore, how the authors come to their main finding, that social impacts will be minimal.\textsuperscript{106}

The Assessment is also problematic in what it tells us about countries which have already implemented a substantial number of neoliberal policies. The authors highlight that these countries (namely the Cook Islands, Marshall Islands and Samoa) will be least able to exploit the FTA.\textsuperscript{107} This raises serious questions about why countries which have deliberately implemented neoliberal policies, often on the advice of the ADB, in order to avoid the likelihood of economic crisis (i.e. for ‘preparedness’), should be in such a position.

Furthermore, the Assessment emphasises that trends in the global economy suggest that the years immediately following the formation of the FTA are likely to be characterised by slower growth than in the previous decade – possibly even by recession...The relevance of this forecast to the FTA is that declining ROW [rest of world] demand for FIC [Forum Island Country] exports may impair the capacity of FICs to import from fellow members.

Here the authors are clearly indicating the potential failure of the Agreements to achieve their goals of stimulating and facilitating trade liberalisation. In this sense we can also see the inadequacy of the terms of reference for this Assessment, and the deceptive nature of the main finding, that the social consequences will be limited.

Moreover, while the authors stress that the effects of the FTA itself may be minimal, they also argue that the same cannot be said of the “collateral economic policies”\textsuperscript{108} which are required to accompany the FTA. It is argued that the essential elements of these policies require Pacific states to “Remove domestic supply constraints”, “Correct macroeconomic imbalances”, “Downsize the public sector”, “Direct public spending into areas offering high economic returns”, and “reform legal and institutional arrangements.” These collateral policies are argued to have “significant economic – and social – consequences in their own right, over and above the purely trade-related phenomena referred to thus far.” This concession by the authors

\textsuperscript{106} At this point the authors imply that the distinction between ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ lies in the fact that developing countries have “enduring traditional values” and for this reason alone social structures and institutions need to be investigated. Ibid, p. 13.
\textsuperscript{107} Ibid, p. 33.
\textsuperscript{108} Ibid, p. 54-55. And following quotes in this paragraph.
Chapter Five: Production and Trade

acknowledges serious flaws not only in the ambit of the Assessment as a whole but also in the consistency of their analysis, rendering the purpose of the study relatively inappropriate.

The difficulties with this Assessment are significant as the main finding has been utilised by the Forum as providing a strong component of the rationale for pursuing the PACER and PICTA. What is most disturbing in this regard is not only that the Forum attempted to mislead Pacific people about the findings of the Assessment, nor that the Assessment itself is so flawed, but that the PACER and PICTA have been finalised, demonstrating the strength of re-colonising practices.109

RESISTANCE ARTICULATIONS

Resistance specifically to neoliberal production and trade policies in the Pacific have been countered by neoliberal advocates in a similar way to which they are being framed in other countries. Neoliberal backlash to criticisms of ‘free’ trade have argued that opponents are ‘anti-trade’. This neoliberal discourse has trapped opposition groups into having to fight their way out of the neoliberal constructed dichotomy of free trade vs. protectionism. In the Pacific, the response which resistance groups are taking has been that they are not anti-trade, just anti-neoliberal trade. This argument attempts to build other alternatives outside the neoliberal planned binary. Fei Tevi from the Pacific Concerns Resource Centre (PCRC) argues, "(w)e do not oppose trade liberalization, but we are more concerned that it deals without a safety net for industries and without social ramifications

109 The other pieces of research the Forum contracted to assess the ‘economic’ benefits and costs of a ‘free’ trade area, clearly demonstrates the kinds of views they were interested in obtaining and which they considered most legitimate. Two significant reports were written; one by Rob Scollay, Director, and John Gilbert, Research Economist, from the APEC Study Centre in Auckland, and the second by Andrew Stoeckel, Executive Director, and Lee Davis, Research Economist, for the Centre for International Economics. See Andrew Stoeckel and Lee Davis, Costs and Benefits of a Free Trade Area Between Forum Island Countries and Australia and New Zealand, Canberra: AusAID, 1998. The choice of these authors to provide analysis of an FTA indicates the intellectual closeness between those in decision-making positions and those providing supposedly ‘objective’ information of issues. The work was prepared in two parts first initiated at the 1997 FEMM. The two studies used the same data and methodology for consistency. The Forum Secretariat itself has also conducted studies for discussion of an FTA but has not for instance requested impact analysis studies from community groups in the Pacific.
considered, such as increased unemployment and social unrest”. The NGO Parallel Forum which takes place simultaneously alongside the Pacific Islands ‘official’ Forum stated that they viewed the establishment of an FTA with caution, not because they are anti-trade but because they feared the area “may not be based on mutual respect, fair trade and appropriate environmental standards”.

The participants of the NGO Parallel Forum are not arguing against trade in itself, but against the types of trade which they perceive as producing oppression. As an alternative they advocate bilateral trade agreements leading to “healthy integration” as opposed to “dominating by imposed economic models”. Tevi adds: "APEC is simply not feasible for us. Unbridled free trade affects the common life of Pacific Islanders". He notes that the values of competition which are promoted by neoliberal trade have not been a part of the Pacific way. He says "(a)t this stage the Pacific has the choice to opt not to be part of APEC. We shouldn't jump on the bandwagon - there are no bandwagons in the Pacific. We have canoes". Entering into bilateral agreements contains the same risks however, if neoliberal principles are also being intended for use and endorsement there. Tevi’s argument nonetheless, does indicate a willingness to take up alternatives and reject the pressures of the thesis of inevitability and preparedness.

The PCRC takes a similar position on the WTO as do other ‘developing’/‘Third world’ activists. Tevi reiterates the arguments made by Martin Khor of the Third World Network, for the “review, repair and reform of the WTO”. Tevi argues that the WTO policies have not produced benefits for the Pacific or most developing countries. He argues that 1.6 billion people are economically worse off today than 15 years ago with the 1999 Human Development Report supporting this position by stating that “many millions of people are being further marginalized”.

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112 Ibid.
113 Phelan, 1999.
Chapter Five: Production and Trade

REFLECTIONS

In the Pacific the extent of semi-subsistence livelihoods makes neoliberal attempts to construe ‘production’ as simply ‘production for exchange in the market’ appear farcical. Pacific livelihoods are inextricable from cultural ways of organising work and exchange. By excluding other forms of production from their analysis, neoliberals demonstrate the inadequacy of neoliberal policies to fit a Pacific context.

At the same time in the production sector in the Pacific it is apparent that labour and the environment are coming under pressure to be cheapened in order to become more competitive to attract investment. Often being the largest employer, the governments in the Pacific are also caught up in this process as neoliberal policies of reducing the ambit of the state are applied to them.

The discussions regarding trade in the Pacific, dominated by the two theses which reinforce the embedding of neoliberal agendas and policies can also be seen as inadequate. The two theses of inevitability and preparedness used to justify the PICTA and PACER is most aptly demonstrated in the Assessment commissioned by the Forum. The Assessment demonstrates that the consequences of these Agreements may not even be predictable, let alone necessarily beneficial to Pacific peoples. What is of even greater significance in this instance however, is that this case demonstrates the persuasiveness of re-colonising practices. The Forum generated a discourse which excluded particular groups, privileged others and implemented the neoliberal agenda regardless of opposition.

The opposition to neoliberal policies and agendas occurring in these areas highlights the connections between the arguments made in the Pacific and in other Third World countries. The Vanuatu’s government’s rejection of WTO accession also provides an example where a state is exercising resistance suggesting that there are alternatives.

In the next chapter I will explore other acts of state strategies which interpolate with neoliberal policies but which can also be seen as resistance. I will also explore further areas which are beyond a neoliberal purview and further demonstrate the inadequacy of neoliberal agendas and policies.
In this chapter I argued that the significance of subsistence livelihoods in the Pacific renders neoliberal assumptions regarding the production of goods for exchange as highly problematic. I also suggested the justifications for ‘free’ trade are ill-defined and inadequate.

In the next chapter I will map the neoliberal policies and agendas in the area of finance, which are often heavily supervised by neoliberal institutions. I also explore activities which lie on the edges of and beyond neoliberal institutions and control. I also seek to examine particular state strategies in the area of finance which support neoliberal policies, but which also simultaneously skew them.
INTRODUCTION

In this chapter I will highlight the way that neoliberal policies and agendas greatly influence the flow of capital in the Pacific but, as I have similarly shown in the last chapter, also fail to recognise a wide array of activities of enormous significance to Pacific people and political economies.

The area of finance is perhaps where re-colonisation takes its most obfuscated form. The re-colonisation taking place through financial mechanisms and the financial system is not always tangible or visible to the general public. Massive changes are taking place in financial markets at an international level. Susan Strange aptly described it as resembling a “vast casino”.¹ These changes include substantial creativity with financial instruments and mechanisms, particularly via currency, asset and debt swaps. Lowered barriers to foreign investment and advances in communication technology have produced an estimated trillion dollars being transacted daily by 1999 in the world’s currency exchange markets.²

Pacific countries are certainly not powerful or advanced players in this casino and few of the more striking international financial changes are reflected in Pacific realities. Currently the Pacific does not have the financial infrastructure, namely stock-markets, or in some cases an independent currency by which to become part of these new mechanisms. In part this is also indicative in the Pacific of a dualism whereby financial transactions go through a few key centres and are not evenly distributed within countries. In addition, financial tools in the Pacific are not as complex or as removed from the productive base as they are in many parts of the world. Most investment in the Pacific is directly tied to productive enterprises, such as mining, forestry or fisheries. Money does not circulate as freely or utilise currency to make more money as it does in, say, OECD countries. This does not mean that Pacific states are completely disconnected from these changes however. Pacific states do feel the pressures from neoliberal financial institutions which are seeking to both continue their policies while also aiming to be seen as safeguarding some aspects of the international financial sector. Pacific peoples are also connected through migration and remittances and some Pacific states are attempting to access mobile capital by offering tax haven services.

In this chapter I want to emphasise the discrepancies between the kinds of policies for the financial area prescribed by neoliberals and the actual outcomes these have in Pacific countries. This chapter will, first, outline the policies and conditions which neoliberal advocates argue are required to create and maintain a financial system which supports neoliberal programs of continual reform. It will then explore the way that many financial flows coming in to the Pacific are used as mechanisms by

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3 Six Pacific states have their own currency (Fiji, PNG, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Vanuatu) the rest use the currency of Australia (Kiribati, Nauru and Tuvalu), New Zealand (Cook Islands) and the US (FSM, Marshall Islands, CNMI). See Ron Duncan, “Hedging Against Commodity Price Shocks: Towards an Improved Economic Policy Environment” Development Bulletin, Vol. 31. Canberra: Australian Development Studies Network, 1994.

4 As discussed in Chapter Five. Also see Manuel Montes and Gerard Finin, The Pacific Islands’ Trade and Investment: A Brief Historical Review and Discussion of Prospects, Honolulu: East-West Center, Pacific Islands Development Program, 1993. The focus of this chapter will be less on the transactions between Pacific states and more on those flows in and out of the region as a whole.

5 The kinds of financial mechanism available in the Pacific are limited. For a discussion regarding expanding this range see Duncan, 1994.
which governments or neoliberal institutions can further impose neoliberal policies. These policies centre around the themes of stability and supervision.

The provision of official aid is used by governments in tandem with conditionalities in order to influence Pacific governments and their policy options and benefit to companies from the donor country. Foreign direct investment is perceived as very positive by neoliberal advocates as it is working within the market mechanism, that is, using the private sector and the market as the indirect means by which Pacific governments and businesses are trained in the ‘realities’ of the marketplace.

Intertwined with these practices of re-colonisation however are also the skewing and resistance practices of Indigenous peoples. The financial networks which travel across the Pacific operate beyond neoliberal policies and institutions of financial transactions. Remittances for example, utilising a multitude of formal and informal avenues to move capital and goods, contribute to the livelihoods of people and to development in ways underestimated by many neoliberal advocates. These movements may be recognised by neoliberal theorists but they are not seen to constitute alternative ways of achieving a livelihood or increasing national finance. This chapter will highlight these resistances throughout but will also outline how the transfer of remittances from the edge of the Pacific to island countries can be seen as working around the disciplinary training techniques of the market. In the latter section of the chapter I will investigate how Offshore Financial Centres are being used as a state strategy for economic growth, which both facilitates neoliberal international policies for the unrestricted movement of capital, and also supports what may enable an alternative avenue for economic growth for several Pacific countries.

**FINANCIAL FLOWS**

The claim that neoliberal advocates provide for being directly involved in establishing and promoting particular financial systems and institutions in the Pacific is that such systems and institutions are required elements to support ‘free’
trade, poverty reduction, and in general the overall well-being of the ability of Pacific states to govern. The World Bank states that, “(g)reater openness in trade and capital markets has been associated with the development of financial systems …”.\(^6\) And that “financial development is central to poverty reduction”.\(^7\) Neoliberal advocates argue that capital, like the factors of trade, should be able to move without restrictions as the market dictates as discussed in Chapter Two. A common neoliberal assessment is that capital should be ‘free’ to move, as required to those places where it is most needed, or to the most profitable locations, ensuring the efficient allocation of the world’s resources.

By examining the policies that neoliberals advocate for the Pacific financial sector, it becomes more apparent how re-colonising practices are taking place. There are two thematic areas around which neoliberal policies revolve: stability and supervision. For neoliberal advocates, the performance of the financial sector is linked to the overall economic growth of the country. Or seen another way, neoliberals determine the low performance of Pacific countries in terms of economic growth as the ‘problem’ and then provide their own policies as the ‘solutions’. With ‘unsatisfactory’ growth in Pacific countries over the past 10 years, labelled as a “Pacific Paradox”\(^8\) by many economists, neoliberals seek to reform the financial sectors in ways which provide more ‘stability’, ‘credibility’ and ‘competitiveness’ for (foreign) investors.\(^9\) Increasingly, financial stability is becoming specifically constructed and is seen as best ‘supervised’ by financial institutions.\(^10\) For the World Bank, these institutions are defined as primarily “institutions that support market transactions”.\(^11\) In the World Bank’s Building Institutions for Markets: World

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\(^7\) And further that arguments that the “development of the formal financial system only benefits the rich”, this is not “supported by the empirical evidence”. Ibid, p. 75.


Chapter Six: Finance

Development Report 2002, emphasis is placed on supporting the market to operate as a central global mechanism. It is the markets themselves which are being asserted to be the most efficient and key to “boosting economic growth for nations and to reducing poverty for individuals”.

FINANCIAL STABILITY

‘Stability’ is claimed to be an essential cornerstone to neoliberal financial sectors. The form of stability that is advocated is of a particular kind, which ironically, is incompatible with most human and environmental conditions. The ‘stability’ advocated by neoliberals is primarily for the benefit of foreign investors. It is a stability which aims to provide guarantees and reduced risk for investors, whose investment in turn is claimed to help produce economic growth. In another sense however, it could be argued that the freedom of movement for capital, derived from outside, and its entrenchment within the Pacific however, creates instability through these very neoliberal policies designed to attract and protect it.

An understanding of the boundaries of this concept of stability can become clearer by firstly highlighting for whom ‘stability’ is required. Essentially neoliberals argue that ‘stability’ is crucial for making a country attractive to foreign investment and therefore achieving economic development. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) argues that “(f)inancial sector soundness and stability has emerged as one of the principal themes of economic policy and international cooperation in the world”.

Likewise, the Pacific Islands Forum notes that the “achievement, and maintenance, of sound financial institutions and a stable financial sector is basic to the financial sector contributing to growth and development and is a key objective of financial sector reform”. Investors need to be sure, not only that their investments and capital will make a profit, but also that these will be safe in the Pacific, and will not be nationalised or confiscated.

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12 Ibid, p. 3.
15 Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, 2001a, p. 4.
This concept of stability indicates that investors need assurances, guarantees, and protection. Those governments (ironically the peoples’ representatives) seeking to attract investors therefore need to have legal systems of protection in place for investors.\textsuperscript{16} The Asian Development Bank (ADB), for example, offers guarantees on investment in the Pacific, but also transfers some risk to states by categorises some risk as “sovereign risk”, which includes, “nationalization, currency convertibility and transferability, strikes and civil disturbances and non-performance by government of contractual obligations such as the non-delivery of inputs or non-payment for outputs”.\textsuperscript{17} Chris Adams argues that the system is inadequate as the levels of protection provided for investors are not extended to the state involved. He says the guarantees protect “private sector actors... backed by national governments using tax payer funds. This protects private sector actors – and the ADB itself - from market discipline”.\textsuperscript{18} He argues that this shifts the burden of risk to the host government. Public-private partnership contracts typically accentuate this transfer of risk from the private sector to the public sector, particularly through externalizing social and environmental risks but also where possible shifting market risk to public actors as well. Contract conditions may include shifting responsibility for social and environmental impact mitigation to host governments, limiting a private company’s liability for compensation, fixing the price and quantity of project outputs to be purchased by state utilities and prioritizing the distribution of revenues, typically privileging private companies and lenders ahead of host governments and shareholders.\textsuperscript{19}

The ADB argues that guarantees for private sector investment are “credit enhancements designed to cover those risks that the private sector cannot easily absorb or manage on its own”.\textsuperscript{20} In this sense the ADB appears to believe it necessary to protect the private investor in order to stimulate economic activity in areas which would otherwise appear too risky. In addition the ADB argues that it is

\textsuperscript{16} Several Pacific states are members of the MIGA; Fiji, Federated States of Micronesia, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa and Vanuatu and Solomon Islands pending.
\textsuperscript{17} Chris Adams, “Cofinancing: Debt and Dependent Development,” in Creating Poverty: The ADB in Asia, Bangkok: Focus on the Global South. 2000, p. 44.
\textsuperscript{18} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid, p. 47.
in a unique position to mobilize private capital to developing countries, which it argues are increasingly interested in attracting such investment.  

Indigenous peoples in the Pacific are marginalised in this neoliberal picture of stability. This is the group in the Pacific which most often bears the burden of the flow on negative effects of financial crisis on Pacific states. Reductions in tourism shortly after the ‘Asian’ crisis prompted calls for greater control of financial flows or for the implementation of a Tobin tax on international financial transactions. This reflects a level of awareness that those who lose out in financial crises are most often those with the least. The stability, that is the security of culture, livelihoods, and environmental integrity are integrally connected however, with the neoliberal picture of stability.

INSTABILITY AND INSECURITY

While neoliberal advocates construct their argument in terms which suggest that foreign investors seek out and benefit most from a particular conception of financial stability, at the same time some investors quite clearly seek to exploit and do maximise their profits from instability. Tarcisius Kabutaulaka has outlined the way that exploitation of forestry by big corporations in the Solomon Islands interpolated with local disputes and fighting.

Two areas which are often defined by neoliberal advocates as impediments to stability for investors within Pacific states, are people and the environment. At one level, social, political and cultural issues constantly create conflict and debate in Pacific societies over the kinds of behaviour and governance models appropriate for Island people. At another level, the environment has a huge influence on the lives of

\[\text{\textsuperscript{21}}\text{ Ibid, p. 1.}\]
Island people reliant on it for food and other sustenance, as well as for maintenance of cultural traditions.

Intertwined with people and the environment, another major source of ‘instability’ has been caused by disputes over the ownership and occupation of land. In several countries, namely the Solomon Islands, Bougainville and Fiji these conflicts have caused disruption to the financial system and profits of foreign companies. For instance, in Bougainville the Panguna mine was forced to close down its operations in 1989, in the Solomon Islands the Solomon Taiyo cannery was forced to close during fighting in August 2000.25 To create stability in the Pacific therefore would appear to require the resolution of the very difficult debates and conflicts over land. In the view of many in the Pacific this involves creating a property rights system which can accommodate communally and customarily held land, as the majority of land is in the Pacific.26

Resistance to the creation of individualised land title in the Pacific, has come largely from the vocal claims from Indigenous people of their strong communal and spiritual connections with the land. The long-term leasing of land has however, become more widespread as the Pacific Islands Forum and certain government leaders have argued that investors require greater security and stability on the land issue. Many groups have greeted calls for the ability to use land as collateral for loans with caution. In June 2001 the Pacific Islands Forum placed the collateralisation of land back on the regional governmental agenda as part of financial sector stability.27 A report prepared by the Forum argues that “access to land plays a vital role in promoting investment and development of the private sector”.28 This report held up the land titling system in Thailand as a positive example, where it was argued, “land titling has significant positive long-run effects

26 As discussed in the previous chapter.
on financial development”. A similar example from Thailand is provided by the World Bank.\textsuperscript{29}

Using land as collateral for loans is being promoted by the World Bank. In their 2002 \textit{World Development Report} they support collateralisation of both land and machinery, using the prevalence of such practices in the US as their evidence that it can work.\textsuperscript{30} They give insufficient attention to the potentially harmful effects of collateralisation of land which could easily result in Indigenous peoples actually losing possession of it if they default on loans. Using land as collateral also requires an enforcement regime, which will take the responsibility, criticism and potential violence which may become associated with actually taking Indigenous land if this is legally required. The World Bank brushes over such issues in their \textit{World Development Report 2002} highlighting the types of laws involved rather than discussing the potential consequences of a community losing access to its land.\textsuperscript{31} Many other Indigenous peoples throughout the world, who have lost their land through the individualisation of land title, would argue vehemently that such moves only produce the loss of land and cultural heritage for Indigenous peoples.\textsuperscript{32} The question here becomes \textit{for whom} is collateralisation most beneficial?

The neoliberal ‘stability’ which may be attractive to investors therefore, is not necessarily compatible with the stability and security of Indigenous peoples. To achieve the stability/security, culturally and environmentally, Pacific peoples need to be able to control their own lives and not be subservient to foreign investors through a narrow neoliberal conception of financial stability. Mililani Trask argues for example that “traditional standards and cultural teachings can provide the

\textsuperscript{29} World Bank, 2002, p.17.

\textsuperscript{30} Ibid, p.92.

\textsuperscript{31} Ibid, p. 92-93. One investor advertising land in Vanuatu on the internet already claims that the government in Vanuatu is prepared to act as such an enforcer. The advertisement argues, “In Vanuatu, the government simply can’t take the land from the indigenous people. But the government can and does act as an efficient and fair mediator between custom land owners and foreign investors”. Real Estate Website. \texttt{http://www.waterfront-plantation-for-sale.com/waterfront%20real%20estate%20vanuatu%20land.html} Accessed 25/02/02. What is being insinuated is that the government will give priority to compensating investors.

framework for ethical investment guidelines and policies”. Likewise, stability, including ‘financial’ stability can not easily be achieved without the concomitant security of Indigenous peoples in the Pacific.

SUPERVISION

Like the implementation of most neoliberal policies in the Pacific, the continued direct and indirect supervision of such policies is seen as vital, by neoliberal advocates to achieve their correct outcomes. The need for a supervisory regime raises questions regarding the role of sovereignty and government. Arguments in favour of a supervisory regime reflects a desire by neoliberal institutions to restrict the potential policy avenues Pacific governments might take and additionally reflects their distrust in the capabilities of Pacific people to maintain neoliberal policies. If governments aim to both attract and protect investors from factors that occur within a state, and this requires the repression of local peoples, why are international financial institutions promoting democracy?

‘Supervision’, is not argued by neoliberal institutions like the IMF to be ‘regulation’, as such, but rather, as a supposedly neutral form of advice provision and monitoring. As Pacific leaders are seen as somewhat unpredictable and incapable of managing their own affairs, neoliberal advocates see the need to clearly follow their policies throughout and after implementation.

Such supervision for the financial sectors is seen as best provided by the IMF. Much of this takes place through “consultations” every year between the Fund and its members. These consultations focus not only on members’ “macroeconomic policies” but also on policies which “affect the macroeconomic performance of a country, such as those that affect the labor market, the environment, and governance”. In a more ‘globalised economy’ the majority of policies and decisions made ‘within’ a country could have effects on the ‘macroeconomic performance’ of a country. As a result, the IMF argues it must interfere and dictate

34 These forms of supervision are reminiscent of the kinds of surveillance described by Foucault as “panopticanism”. See Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish, London: Penguin Books, 1991 [1977].
much of a country’s political economic direction. This has huge ramifications for Pacific peoples.

In February 2000, the IMF supported the establishment of the Pacific Islands Prudential Regulation and Supervision Initiative. The Initiative cites as its key regional concern, the “establishment and maintenance of sound financial sectors and institutions”. They also note the “desirability and practicality of an eventual harmonization of financial sector regulation and supervision” across the Pacific. Supervision in this sense then becomes more about enforcement of the required ‘sound’ policies.

Indirect supervision can be seen to be conducted automatically by the marketplace, rewarding ‘efficient’ and ‘competitive’ behaviour by providing profits, and punishing inefficiency and laziness by reduced profits and potentially bankruptcy. If however, the market is interfered with by the government, the market can not function as it should, and for this reason neoliberal financial institutions are needed for direct supervision.

OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT AID

For many islands in the Pacific the largest form of financial flows are from official development aid. The provision of aid provides an opportunity: for openly influencing the governing of Pacific states, creating markets for goods and services from donor countries and providing work and financial returns for businesses located in donor countries. Australia’s international development agency AusAID, for example, is open about the fact that it is in Australia’s interests to provide aid. The conditions attached to aid have commonly been acknowledged by donor and recipient countries as the means by which donor countries exert direct influence

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36 Pacific Islands Prudential Regulation and Supervision Initiative Declaration on Cooperation, Appendix I in Riechel, 2001, p. 15.
37 As discussed in Chapters Two and Three.
over the recipient countries’ political economic policies. These links have been well established elsewhere and I shall provide only an overview of them here.

Aid to the Pacific is heavily laden with neoliberal prescriptions and is one of the most overt displays of re-colonisation. Premjeet Singh has provided a valuable account of such practices emphasising the tied nature of the regime. She argues that “aid flows have been motivated primarily by their own interests rather than the priorities and needs of recipient countries”. And further that aid is used to maintain a dependency relationship between developing and developed states. Singh draws the conclusion that if aid has “undermined efforts to build self-reliance and economic independence by involving trade-offs such as the acceptance of World Bank/IMF prescriptions” then the decline in aid may be “opportune”.

While her argument claims that the independence of Pacific states will be enhanced by making them insular, this line of argument is reminiscent of a neoliberal agenda to encourage ‘independence’. The discrepancies between Indigenous and neoliberal versions of independence will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Eight.

Australia is the largest aid donor in the South Pacific in. And the returns are not feeble, particularly from PNG which is, by far, the largest recipient of Australian aid. In the year 1999-2000 PNG received A$321million from the Australian government, far ahead of the next recipient East Timor which received A$161 million. The rest of the Pacific Islands combined received only A$137 million from Australia that same year. By comparison, the Australia Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade estimated that Australian “merchandise exports to PNG were

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40 As discussed in Chapter Two.
43 Ibid, p. 54.
44 Ibid, p. 60.
45 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
worth $1.05 billion, an increase of 13.2 percent over the previous year. And as noted in Chapter Five many Australian companies are involved in resource extractive industries in PNG.

**INVESTMENT**

Despite the corporatisation of public services increasing the overlap between what is considered the public and private sectors, ‘investment’ for neoliberals is primarily seen as conducted by the private sector in the market place, while what governments do is considered as distinctly ‘aid’ or ‘assistance’. Encouraging and attracting foreign private investment is a key neoliberal prescription for economic growth. Apart from the Solomon Islands, PNG and Fiji (where mining and larger industries accrue billions of dollars annually) most Pacific states attract low levels of private sector investment. As a result, numerous tactics have been employed to highlight the distinctiveness of the Pacific islands and to create ‘niche markets’ to attract specific types of investment, for example by selling a variety of products, from passports to stamps.

Foreign investment is seen both by neoliberal advocates and many Pacific leaders as crucial for economic development. A commonly held assumption is that foreign investment is required to stimulate the private sector to assist in the development of infrastructure and in the strengthening of businesses in each country, thus providing ‘growth’. The kind of private sector businesses which are widely perceived as best suited for funding are low level industrial projects. Graeme Dorrance claims that the “(d)iversification of a developing economy by stimulating

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49 Some mining companies in PNG, such as the Porgera Joint Venture (Placer Dome manages the project for itself, PNG government and some landowners) appear to blur this distinction as they provide services for the local community such as schools and clinics. This is described as ‘community development. However, these services only exist for the duration of a project, that is, until the minerals are depleted and leave with the company. See Placer Dome *Sustainability Report: Caring for the Future*, 1999, Placer Dome website [http://www.placerdome.com/sustainability/downloads/reports/1999/99porger.pdf](http://www.placerdome.com/sustainability/downloads/reports/1999/99porger.pdf). Accessed 17 September 2002.


industrial investment is one of the products of beneficial development strategy”.

However, many islanders argue that industrialisation is not always more beneficial, particularly for smaller island states where manufacturing industries and tourist ventures would have huge impacts on the surrounding environment. For this reason several Pacific states have created Offshore Financial Centres so that their physical environments do not have to be destroyed.

In the promotion of direct investment, Pacific countries are being encouraged to enter into arrangements by which investors are provided protection or the investment is co-financed by a variety of companies and agencies. Several Pacific countries are members of the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), a member of the World Bank Group which specifically aims to “promote foreign direct investment into emerging economies to improve people's lives and reduce poverty”.

The MIGA has come under criticism however, for supporting transnational corporations that have poor environmental and social records and who are involved in “extractive industries - oil, gas and mining – which tend to cause severe environmental and social problems for communities”. The ADB is encouraging similar kinds of strategies by co-financing projects to overcome the limited ability of some of its member countries to attract and supposedly manage domestic and external investment. Although such an aim may appear likely to enhance the ability of Pacific Islands to retain the wealth of their countries, Chris Adams argues that co-financing policies: increase debt; increase debt servicing levels; promote inappropriate development models; reduce sovereignty in macroeconomic and social policy planning; reduce the capacity of the government to deliver accessible, affordable and relevant social and physical infrastructure; and socialise risks. He argues that moves to this framework rearranges financing away from participatory approaches to development which are primarily financed through domestic sources, which are responsive to local needs, which

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53 MIGA website, http://www.miga.org/screens/about/about.htm Accessed 11/03/02.


55 Adams, undated.
incorporate local technologies and expertise and which are consistent with institutional capacity at the national and sub-national level.\textsuperscript{56}

Encouraging investment in the Pacific is increasingly being seen by Pacific government leaders as strongly connected to the potential of new information and communication technology. Prime Minister of Vanuatu, Edward Natapei has noted that,

\begin{quote}
(t)his role that ICT [information and communication technology], including the Internet, could play in more effective investment promotion, by reducing costs and providing access to potential investors on a global level is being recognized by both the private sector and the public sector.\textsuperscript{57}
\end{quote}

Government leaders see communication technology, particularly the internet, as a positive mechanism by which Pacific states may promote themselves as investment and tourist locations. These technologies are also heralded as having the potential to “reduce isolation and exclusion”.\textsuperscript{58} As Janet Toland argues, “(t)he use of ICT means that ‘niche’ players are no longer constrained by the cost of breaking through geographic barriers”.\textsuperscript{59} However, information and communication technologies are not accessed or expanding evenly across the Pacific.\textsuperscript{60} Whilst internet cafes are appearing in increasing numbers in the more populated centres of the Pacific, like Suva and Port Vila, this technology is largely catering for the needs of tourist rather than local populations. The ownership of, or access to, computers in the Pacific is certainly not widespread; let alone access to the internet.\textsuperscript{61} This unevenness is a reminder of who benefits most from the enticements for investment and a reminder that there is a separation between the images portrayed for tourists and potential investors and the landscape which is lived by Pacific peoples.

\textsuperscript{56} Ibid, p. 47.
\textsuperscript{59} Ibid.
INVESTMENT PROMOTION

Promotional materials to attract foreign investment to the Pacific, are used by Pacific states to manipulate what Arjun Appadurai has called “mediascapes”\(^{62}\) a "landscape of images" where the “lines between the realistic and the fictional landscapes are blurred”.\(^{63}\) These mediascapes provide specifically tailored images and perceptions of what the Pacific ‘is’, to differentiate the Pacific from other, particularly developing countries, in the bid to attract investment.\(^{64}\)

An analysis of promotional materials attempting to lure investors to the Pacific produces some disturbing accounts. In most of these materials there is the perpetuation of stereotypes of the Pacific either as romantic abundant paradises or where the inhabitants are extremely friendly, hospitable and by all accounts innocent and naïve, much like happy children.\(^{65}\) The exploitation of women as exotic and sexual objects is also entrenched in this process.\(^{66}\) It is disturbing that these are seen as the best ways of enticing investment to the islands, particularly as investors are never primarily interested in alleviating poverty, as Ganesh Chand insightfully puts it, “TNCs are ventures whose sole aim is the maximization of surplus values. They are not humanitarian organizations concerned with the growth and development of their host nations”.\(^{67}\) While it is understandable that different investment promotion boards may wish to emphasise that foreign investment is welcome, and will not be subjected to protest from local people, to portray islanders as passive, simple ‘friendly natives’ creates certain difficulties. It encourages racist attitudes towards islanders as ‘traditional’ cultures awaiting foreign ownership and

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\(^{63}\) Ibid.

\(^{64}\) Thomas Klak and Garth Myers have applied Appadurai’s concept to the analysis of Caribbean and African country promotional materials. See Thomas Klak and Garth Myers, “The Discursive Tactics of Neoliberal Development in Small Third World Countries”, \textit{Geoforum}, Vol. 28, No. 2, 1997.

\(^{65}\) See for example Vanuatu Foreign Investment Board \url{http://www.vfib.com.vu/}


control and a patronising atmosphere in wider negotiations, not merely regarding finance.  

One of the most interesting points is the advertisement of freehold land. While presenting luxurious leisure activities, such as golf and scuba diving these advertisements also offer to provide security for these “gated communities”. Attempting to lure people to the Pacific, but also encouraging them to live within artificially created gated and secure ‘communities’ separate from the Indigenous peoples does not bode well for future societal and racial relations. Meanwhile in a Cook Islands investment advertisement there is a direct encouragement for people to live and raise children in the Cook Islands. This suggests that some islands see potential economic benefits from investors immigrating to the Pacific which may prove to be correct in the Cook Islands where lease have no ‘betterment’ clauses that allow Islanders to retain any improvements made on land at the expiry of leases. In other countries such as Vanuatu there are ‘betterment’ clauses and Ni-Vanuatu must compensate lessees for any improvements, the costs of which often prevents them from re-acquiring their land.

Such enticements for immigration to the Pacific create several potential areas of conflict. The leasing of significant areas of land to foreign investors could increasingly become a source of greater instability and tension in Pacific countries. As discussed above, the inability of some Islanders to reacquire their land on the expiry of a lease because they are unable to compensate for ‘betterment’ as well as population increases, are already placing great pressure on traditional land systems of ownership and usage. In this sense neoliberal prescriptions conflict with each other, that is, FDI is promoted but its consequences, such as instability and tension

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70 Cook Islands Development Investment Board Advertisement, Pacific Magazine (South Edition), January 2002, p. 27.

over land usage as in Port Vila, is not taken in to account.\textsuperscript{72} Here we find an ironic connection with colonial days when traders (the ‘private sector’), sought agreements and sales from Indigenous peoples directly and were impeded by the colonial sovereign (government). Now however, the government is constituted by Indigenous peoples and the norms of international society are the only ones which could act as any control on the private sector.

The kinds of attitudes displayed in investment material could be significantly different if investment were targeted at other Indigenous peoples or Pacific Islanders who have immigrated to the edges of the Pacific. Kolone Va’ai makes the important point that

> raising and mobilising domestic capital or attracting savings from private remittances from overseas Pacific island communities…would require the rethinking of most investment incentives which have been designed mainly for attracting foreign investors.\textsuperscript{73}

Taholo Kami has also suggested that, in the case of Tonga, the internet could be an avenue through which Tongans can keep more closely in contact with relatives overseas in order to ensure the continuation of investment in the form of remittances back to the Pacific.\textsuperscript{74} This highlights that the way Pacific governments attract investment is linked to a kind of social environment they subsequently create.

While the attracting of particular types of investment and that investment itself produces problems for stability and land tenure, there is another equally prevalent form of investment in Pacific political economies through remittances which can be seen as a resistance mechanism.


REMITTANCES

There are two components central to remittances. Firstly, remittances enable Pacific peoples to skew the disciplinary mechanism of neoliberal policies and secondly, remittances are a contribution to economic development around and beyond neoliberal prescriptions. Remittances are important private transfers of capital, as literally ‘embodied’ in migrants who return to their homelands. Although remittances play a significant role in national economic development this is not their explicit purpose. The purposes of remittances are varied. Remittances play a huge role in supporting families, but also as importantly in maintaining familial connections and sustaining the pre-eminence of the family over the individual. Remittances are not merely capital assets in an economic sense but are social assets with political import. Often remittances enable local families to remain on rural land which may otherwise become untended if people move to towns for work. Bernard Poirine argues that “Pacific Island peoples and governments should not feel guilty about accepting aid and remittances, because, in a way, such external resources represent revenues from ‘invisible exports’ [labour and ‘geostrategic services’] to industrialized countries”. It is not crucial here to support a particular theory regarding the purpose of remittances, rather it is what they enable and what

75 I understand that remittances pre-date the introduction of neoliberal policies and agendas. My purpose is to demonstrate the way they operate beyond the control of neoliberal policies and agendas.

76 Subramani has highlighted the interconnected relationship of remittances with the Pacific diaspora. He calls immigration itself an investment. In this sense, the physical bodies which move across and beyond the Pacific become the investment, become the finance to contribute to economic growth and the wealth of Pacific people. Subramani, “The Diasporic Imagination” in Cynthia Franklin, Ruth Hsu and Suzanne Kosanke, (eds) Navigating Islands and Continents: Conversations and Contestations in and Around the Pacific, Honolulu: College of Languages, Linguistics and Literature and the East – West Center, 2000.


they potentially signify which is of importance. What is significant about remittances is that they are evidence of a substantial world of exchange and investment existing beyond the explicit purview of neoliberalism.

The continued significance of remittances can be seen as a rejection of neoliberal attempts to marketise the relationship between kin groups. The use by Pacific peoples of remittances brings in to question the applicability of the market as an adequate mechanism to cope with Pacific realities. Pacific peoples by implication refuse to be disciplined by the market mechanism and skew its supposedly natural functioning by sending money and goods around the market. This then frustrates the functioning of the attempts to discipline (people as) labour with the market, in the Pacific as an incentive to reduce indolence and ‘dependency’. In this way neoliberalism can only see movements of people as labour, not for instance as cultures, races of people. People become obscured to the role they play in the market place. Remittances may therefore be conceptualised as “self-determined and relatively autonomous ‘resistances’ of people ... attempting to survive in a crisis-ridden structure of dependent capitalist relationships with their destructive potential; a new version of weapons of the weak”. In this sense we can view remittances as a reaction and a tool in order to ameliorate the situations of people under a system which is conflicting with this very ability to survive.

What is significant about remittances is the large role they play in the political economies of several Pacific countries, skewing neoliberal prescriptions which place a strong emphasis on any form of ‘dependency’, including remittances, as negative. Tonga, Samoa and the Cook Islands have the highest rates of remittances. In Samoa remittances totalled $50 million in 2001, an increase of 22 percent compared

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80 Many liberals would consider this a great advancement, a liberation of the individual from the constraints of culture, tradition or racial identity. See Chapter Two.
81 Marxists would also see migration in the same terms, the economic-ness of world affairs is privileged over others.
82 Connell and Conway, 2000, p. 62.
to 1999.\textsuperscript{84} Niue and Tonga have also maintained stable levels in the past two years. The remittance of money to Tonga from out migrants constitutes as much as 60\% of the Tongan economy and the flow of remittances to Tonga shows no sign of decline.\textsuperscript{85} Remittances to Tuvalu are approximated as 11 per cent of GDP and also show no sign of decline.\textsuperscript{86} In Kiribati remittances from seafarers amounts to close to A$12 million per annum, or over 25 per cent of GNP.\textsuperscript{87} For Samoa the ADB reports that, “annual remittances have been increasing steadily in recent years and are the single most important source of income to the economy”\textsuperscript{88}. Richard Brown has argued that in Tonga and Samoa “remittances are possibly greater than all other sources of foreign exchange combined”.\textsuperscript{89} What these significant levels of remittances indicate is that there are ways of achieving development which can work around neoliberal institutions and to some extent state boundaries.

Recent work has emphasised the positive role that remittances can play in economic development. Analysing remittances throughout North and South America, Susan Martin argues that “hometown associations”\textsuperscript{90} collect communal resources sent from migrants, and while beginning on a small scale, they accumulate to produce significant and tangible effects for local people. She argues that in South America such collections “have helped villages improve roads, water and sanitation systems, health clinics, schools and other community infrastructure”.\textsuperscript{91} To date there is no evidence that Pacific peoples have created similar associations, although they may operate on an informal and smaller scale.

\textsuperscript{84} Central Bank of Samoa quoted in Radio Australia “Increase in Remittances for Samoa” Pacific Islands Report, January 12 2001. \texttt{Http://pidp.ewc.hawaii.edu/PIReport}
\textsuperscript{85} In 1997 the National Reserve Bank of Tonga estimated that remittances amounted to Tongan Pa’anga $70 million. National Reserve Bank of Tonga, “Remittances in Tonga”, August 1998, p. 32.
\textsuperscript{87} Secretariat of the Pacific Community, “Battling Against Time to Keep Jobs for Seafarers”, SPC Website. \texttt{www.spc.org.nc/artseafarers.htm} Accessed 16/4/02.
\textsuperscript{91} Ibid.
Research on the Pacific suggests that while remittances alone may not be sufficient for national development goals,\(^2\) they are a “fundamental private transfer of capital, and return migrants represent people endowed with human capital, capable of enriching the social and cultural capital stocks of their island communities”.\(^3\) John Connell and Dennis Conway have suggested that remittances support the improvement of basic needs, economic activities and the well-being of others.\(^4\) In this sense remittances encourage behaviour which neoliberals argue is inefficient in the marketplace.

Remittances are not often incorporated in a substantial way into neoliberal accounts of finance and investment in the Pacific and if they are, they are seen pejoratively as parts of an informal economy which hinder the success of neoliberal policies. Denise Aldous suggests that remittances from Pacific Islanders create dependency whereas there need to be proper incentives for people to “work hard”.\(^5\) When they are seen as positive is with relation to their connection to migrants who provide cheap labour in ‘developed’ countries. Geoff Bertram and Ray Watters placed remittances within a model which they claim is able to explain the nature and situation of Pacific countries; Migration, Remittances, Aid, Bureaucracy (MIRAB).\(^6\) Through this model Bertram and Watters have argued that Pacific countries are destined to remain as dependent on migration, remittances, and aid to survive and will continue to have ‘bloated bureaucracies’.

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\(^3\) Connell and Conway, 2000, p. 53.

\(^4\) Ibid, p. 71.


We can see just how pejoratively this is intended when we recall remarks made by neoliberal advocates like Roger Douglas regarding the implied links between dependency and intellectual and cultural inferiority. The pessimism of the MIRAB model has come under extensive criticism from scholars who have seen it as both racist and as promoting despondency. As Claire Slatter argues:

(t)he suggestion here of an indolent population spoiled by hand-outs from abroad totally ignores the redistributive values inherent in Pacific cultures which lie behind kinship remittances. It also fails to account for the principle of non-accumulation or sufficiency that is part of traditional resource-use ethics. Slatter’s statement highlights the fundamental discrepancy in assumptions made by neoliberals and Pacific peoples. The importance of social connections in the Pacific means that people conduct themselves quite differently from the individuated citizens of much of the Western world. In addition, it reiterates the way that the basic neoliberal conception of the ‘rational self-maximising and accumulating man’ is far from valid in much of the Pacific.

Bernard Poirine provides an extensive critique of the MIRAB model, highlighting its flaws and underlying assumptions. What his study suggests is that the MIRAB model is stacked with negative stereotypes about Pacific peoples. He refutes such assumptions and argues that being a MIRAB economy should not be considered pejoratively, but as positive in an economic sense, as a “pareto-efficient, welfare-maximising strategy to export labor services and geostrategic services when this is in line with the comparative advantage of a given country”.

The most significant concern that neoliberal advocates have regarding remittances is that they artificially maintain wages at rates which are not determined by the market. Remittances enable some Islanders to live comfortably without having to ‘work’, particularly not for low wages. There is almost disgust amongst neoliberals that people could be acquiring money ‘without working for it’ and certainly an

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100 Ibid, p. 91.
insinuation that remittances produce laziness.\footnote{101} In addition neoliberals have difficulties with remittances as they have argued that they are merely ‘wasted’ on consumer goods and not invested in productive enterprises. This also reflects similar neoliberal concerns that development aid is wasted when directed to government expenditure rather than reinvested in the private sector.

Neoliberal perceptions of remittances are limited by more than a discrepancy between which issues they and Islanders consider significant. The importance of remittances in the Pacific, indicates a radically different way of conducting social relations. An examination of remittance transfer highlights the way that neoliberalism is unable to account for, or even comprehend, this aspect of the Pacific. As Antony Hooper points out, the large percentage of remittances to island nations contains a double irony for neoliberals.

First, although the whole process has relied on essentially ‘cultural’ linkages, it has also been an exercise in pure textbook economic rationality, as people have simply deployed their labour resources to places where they can get the best return. Second, overseas remittances have come to be of great importance in the macroeconomic sense, greatly exceeding in some states the earnings from visible exports, and providing about half GDP.\footnote{102} Hooper’s first point demonstrates the discrepancy between what islanders may consider the ‘best return’ for their investment and what may be monetarily ‘best’. As Hooper further explains, remittances also enable Pacific Islanders to subvert the ‘top down’ development process which operate through both state and market avenues. Remittances avoid many state and market mechanisms and measures. Often physically taken as cash across the Pacific, remittances also often avoid any controlling systems such as taxation or quantification.\footnote{103} Hooper is suggesting here that ‘cultural’ factors are producing the ‘economic’ results, in stark contrast to neoliberal claims that cultural factors overwhelmingly impede economic growth.

This discussion of remittances illustrates the way in which neoliberal and Pacific worldviews are once again starkly contrasted and often unintelligible to and

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{101} Bertram and Watters, 1985, p. 512.}  \footnotesize{\textsuperscript{102} Antony Hooper, “Introduction”, in Antony Hooper (ed) Culture and Sustainable Development in the Pacific, Canberra: Asia Pacific Press, 2000, p. 9.}  \footnotesize{\textsuperscript{103} Richard P. C. Brown, “Hidden Foreign Exchange Flows: Estimating Unofficial Remittances to Tonga and Western Samoa”, Asia and Pacific Migration Journal, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1995. It is important to note here that wire transfers are also common, often costing Aus$50 per transaction hence the reason banks like Westpac maintain small branches in the Pacific.}
incompatible with one another. Additionally remittances support alternative political economic structures which operate around neoliberal policies and agendas. I will now examine another illustration of the way in which Pacific strategies, in this instance state strategies, Offshore Financial Centres (OFCs), skew while simultaneously appearing to support neoliberal policies and agendas.

**OFFSHORE FINANCIAL CENTRES (OFCS)**

The issues surrounding OFCs or tax havens have received heightened international exposure over the past few years as they are argued to have become central to the operation of global financial markets.\(^{104}\) The International Monetary Fund has defined OFCs as essentially having the following characteristics:

- Jurisdictions that have financial institutions engaged primarily in business with non-residents;
- Financial systems with external assets and liabilities out of proportion to domestic financial intermediation designed to finance domestic economies; and more popularly
- Centers which provide some or all of the following opportunities: low or zero taxation; moderate or light financial regulation; banking secrecy and anonymity.\(^{105}\)

The complexity involved in the maintenance of tax havens exposes a large area where Pacific Islanders are both actively conforming to policies which are agreeable to neoliberals, but at the same time are complicating and undermining such policies. In fact, the tax haven issue highlights the entangled nature of neoliberal policies with other issues, emphasising once again that re-colonisation could never be a discrete project.

While Pacific financial sectors may not have the technical infrastructure that other countries have, this has not meant that Pacific countries are excluded from the

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networks of global neoliberal financial practices. Thomas Klak and Dennis Conway have argued in a Caribbean context that island states which have successfully attracted offshore banking and associated activities can be viewed as “exemplars of neoliberalism”. They argue that by opening up their economies, tying their development closely to the vagaries of international finance, and adopting social policies designed to maintain political stability, a very few Caribbean territories have managed to ensure their place in the circuits of international finance. What Klak and Conway are arguing here is applicable in the Pacific. By supporting the mobility of capital through circuits of finance, Pacific countries can be seen as assisting neoliberal aims of the ‘free’ circulation of such capital. They are also therefore increasingly exposing themselves to the risks of such movements.

There are several ways which OFCs can be seen as perpetuating a neoliberal global financial system. The abundance of OFCs firstly, supports and facilitates the mobility of large corporations particularly TNCs and their ability to use the threat of relocation to ensure tax rates are kept low so they may maximise their own profits. This means that countries, particularly developing countries, are forced in to competition to provide the lowest tax rates, which subsequently affects their own national savings and ability to provide services for their citizens. Secondly, OFCs facilitate the rapid mobility of capital which use currency markets to make profits and increase the potential for financial crises. Thirdly, in the Pacific tax havens support the values underpinning neoliberal policies for example as Anthony van Fossen has argued they; “valorize individual appropriation rather than public distribution, minimize state regulation and privilege private ownership”. While Pacific states can be seen as perpetuating neoliberal policies in this way, they are also skewing these for their own aims.

**STATE STRATEGY FOR GROWTH**

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107 Ibid.


The establishment of tax havens has been a strategy of Pacific states in the pursuit of economic growth. Hosting tax havens is perceived by some Pacific leaders as a cleaner and potentially easier way of achieving economic growth than through environmentally exploitative industries, which are often not viable on islands with limited resources for exploitation or too small to remain inhabitable if polluted. Dwyer has supported such a perspective arguing that “a country such as Vanuatu with pristine coral reefs might be expected to prefer clean industries like financial services to dirty factories which might damage its tourism income (as well as the environmental amenity enjoyed by its citizens)”. Although tourism itself creates problems with related to urban growth and concomitant pollution.

A component of this state strategy has relied on exploiting a discourse of distance which epitomises the Pacific as remote. Being significantly less infamous than the ‘Bahamas’, and instead being obscure dots on a map, has been extremely beneficial for those Pacific island states that have tax havens. Island tax havens have in fact been described as “Dots” by James Hines and Eric Rice in their article “Fiscal Paradise: Foreign Tax Havens and American Business”. This perpetuation of a long-held stereotype of Pacific islands as merely ‘dots on a map’, or dots ‘falling off the map’ highlights the perception that the Pacific is the “middle of nowhere” as opposed to the “centre of civilisation”. Pacific countries however, have used this stereotype for their own advantage in terms of secrecy and obscurity from centres of regulation.

111 Ibid, p. 49.
112 Pacific countries with Offshore Financial Centres (OFCs) include: the Cook Islands, Nauru, Marshall Islands, Palau, Samoa, and Vanuatu.
114 Ibid.
How successful this state strategy has been is somewhat unclear as a result of the shortage of statistics concerning the profits raised from the offshore financial centres. Estimates made by the Asian Development Bank suggest however, that in Vanuatu for example, the OFC contributed approximately 2.5 percent of Vanuatu’s GDP in 1997. Erna Va’ai has argued that Samoa’s OFC is also successful and strongly linked to their economic reform and promotion of the private sector as the “engine of economic growth”. In 1993, the ADB reported that the Cook Islands OFC was generating around $1.7 million, while additional indirect revenue was estimated at approximately $1 million. Nauru is reported to have around 300 banks registered, but there is limited information regarding the revenue this contributes nationally.

PACKAGE DEALS

As an avenue for economic growth, the OFCs are also promoted by governments as part of a broader package to attract further investment in areas also often considered ‘clean’, such as tourism. As Ronen Palan, Jason Abbott and Phil Deans argue, smaller countries utilising the tax haven strategy are not merely about offshore finance, but are selling “a package combining finance, tourism and construction”.

This marketing of themselves as ‘package deals’, seeks to sustain the neoliberal ideal metaphor of efficiency and ‘one stop shops’, which are often portrayed as the most desirable type of locality for investors. In Vanuatu, the Foreign Investment Board has argued that it has “streamlined” its activities in order to act as a “one-stop shop, by not only authorising various investment proposals, but also the number of work and residency permits and business licenses relating to each project”. One-stop-

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120 Hughes, 1998, p. 77.
shops are designed to ‘save time’ and achieve ‘efficiency’; time being a key but often unspoken component of neoliberal policies.

THREATS TO PACIFIC OFCS

The proliferation of tax havens has led several authors to describe them as parasitical.\(^{123}\)

Lord Palmerston ... once lamented that Queen Victoria’s colonies were multiplying so fast he had to ‘keep looking the damned places up on the map’. Today’s international investor, banker and fund manager could be forgiven for echoing that sentiment, as they survey the world’s offshore financial centres.\(^{124}\)
The advantages, which OFCs offered when there were limited numbers of them were: lower tax rates, less demanding regulations and controls and anonymity. These factors may now being eroded as competition has increased and more countries offer similar services.\(^{125}\)

The increasing number of OFCs throughout the world has created growing concern from governments that they are missing out on large amounts of taxable revenue. Large corporations channel billions of dollars through OFCs annually to avoid tax in their ‘home’ countries.\(^{126}\) Although as Hines and Rice argue, US tax law enables the US government to actually receive more revenue from US companies locating money in tax havens than they would have earned if the profits went to a foreign high taxing country, such as other OECD countries.\(^{127}\) Philip Laidlow has also argued that there is a “groundswell of opinion in Europe, North America and beyond that the perceived excesses of tax havens ought to be addressed”.\(^{128}\) Such opinions could well mean that governments in Europe and North America are experiencing pressure to appear to act to curb the perceived excesses of tax havens but not to the extent that they damage their own interests or that of their own large corporations.

\(^{124}\) T. Peagam quoted in Ibid.
\(^{125}\) Riechel, 2001, p. 7.
\(^{127}\) Hines and Rice, 1994.
The OECD has argued that the secrecy involved in OFCs has made them attractive and increasingly utilised for money laundering. It is estimated that up to $500 billion from the global narcotics trade passes through tax havens annually. There are also reports that some government officials or leaders in developing countries use OFCs to steal public funds, although there is unsurprisingly minimal official evidence of tax havens being used in this regard in the Pacific. These two activities of tax evasion and money laundering have become the focus of numerous international agencies and initiatives such as the UN, G-7, IMF, OECD, Financial Action Task Force (FATF). There are several prominent initiatives attempting to regulate the activities of Pacific OFCs.

In 1998 the OECD issued a report entitled *Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue* which led the way for OFCs to be highlighted as ‘global’ issues, most significantly encompassing non-member states of the OECD. In 1999 the OECDs Harmful Tax Competition Initiative ‘black-listed’ several Pacific Island countries as having tax policies which were ‘harmful’ according to the definitions formulated in the *Harmful Tax Competition* report. The criteria argued in the report to correspond with harmful tax regimes were the following:

a) the regime imposes a low or zero effective tax rate on the relevant income;  
b) the regime is ‘ring fenced’ of regimes [preferential tax regimes which are partly or fully insulated from the domestic markets of the country providing the regime];  
c) the operation of the regime is non-transparent; d) the jurisdiction operating the regime does not effectively exchange information with other countries.

The criteria argued in the report to correspond with harmful tax regimes were the following:

- This is also not to say that financial corruption is not taking place using different mechanisms in the Pacific.  
- Also see Frances M. Horner, “The OECD, Tax Competition, and the Future of Tax Reform,” Tax Competition Unit, Fiscal Affairs, OECD.  
- OECD, 1998, p. 27.
the fairness, neutrality and broad social acceptance of tax systems generally”. The Pacific countries which were later listed were the Cook Islands, Nauru, Niue, the Marshall Islands, Samoa, Tonga and Vanuatu. Pacific countries were not the only ones listed, several Caribbean and European jurisdictions were also named. Those countries listed were given a limited time period to implement recommendations made by the OECD before sanctions were to be imposed.

The OECD has argued that Pacific Island countries have ‘harmful’ tax practices. According to neoliberal assumptions however, if unhindered, people and companies will locate their capital where they can gain the highest rate of return. Terry Dwyer argues that while the OECD claims that tax competition is harmful he argues that “tax competition is a healthy and natural economic process which weeds out stupid and inefficient taxes”. From this perspective it is not the ‘fault’ of tax havens that other countries have taxes which lead companies and individuals to move their investment offshore in order to maximise their gains. Seen in this light, the proliferation of tax havens are merely a response to demand. By attempting to impede ‘supply’ rather than questioning the demand, the OECD countries can be seen as contradicting a fundamental principle of neoliberalism, of allowing the market to determine and balance supply and demand.

The Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF) an intergovernmental organisation set up by the G-7 Summit in Paris 1989 is also pursuing OFCs. The FATF seeks to identify and monitor countries in the “fight against money laundering” and seeks to “encourage” countries who are not configured to what it has deemed ‘international standards’ to implement its Forty Recommendations. In February 2000, the FATF produced a report which outlined rules and practices which it considered detrimental and an impediment to

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136 There have been a variety of threats of sanctions from the OECD with varying deadlines which have all been extended.
137 Dwyer, 2000, p. 52.
138 See Chapter Two.
140 The Forty recommendations can be found at http://www1.oecd.org/fatf/40Recs_en.htm Accessed 18/2/02.
“international standards in this area”\textsuperscript{141} From this Report a list of non-compliant countries and jurisdictions was compiled. This list was much more diverse than the OECD and included Russia, Indonesia, Egypt, to Panama. The Pacific countries listed by the FATF were the Cook Islands, Marshall Islands, Nauru and Niue.

Pacific states and their regional organisation the Pacific Islands Forum have stated that they will cooperate with the OECD and FATF but have argued that they are being unfairly treated regarding this issue. Those Pacific countries listed have not been altogether sympathetic to OECD and FATF claims that their motives are a result of lost tax revenue and the need to clamp down on criminal activity. In the “Regional Position Statement” made through the Pacific Islands Forum those states listed by the OECD argued defiantly that,

(a) ll nations have the right to compete in the international financial markets, through the provision of both onshore and offshore financial services ... ensuring basic standards are met needs to be done in a way which does not compromise the right of countries to provide these services.\textsuperscript{142}

This argument reasserts the sovereignty of Pacific states, supposedly imbued with the right to freely determine policy and be treated equally as states. In addition they argue that they have been treated unfairly in relation to the standards applied to OECD countries themselves. They argue that they are being pressured to make legislative changes under threat of sanctions “while OECD nations with offshore financial centres are not required to make an identical commitment”.\textsuperscript{143}

In response to OECD and FATF moves these Pacific states have also responded with a threat that any substantial reduction in their ability to create revenue for their own countries could result in a larger reliance on development assistance. This appears to be one of the few arguments which could strike a cord with those countries pressuring for changes, if fearful that they may have to increase levels of aid. Oxfam have supported such a response in a report on tax havens. One of Oxfam’s recommendations for dealing with tax havens, which they argue are helping to


\textsuperscript{143} Ibid.
Chapter Six: Finance

perpetuate poverty in the developing world, is to support tax haven countries “diversify away from reliance on harmful tax practices ... including financial assistance as well as broader reforms to the international trading system, with sanctions as a last resort”.  

It is difficult to see the actions of the OECD and the FATF as other than a direct impingement or intervention on the sovereignty of the countries involved. Vanuatu Finance Minister Joe Baumond has argued that OECD operations display “a neo-colonial attitude all over again”. Pacific countries have been persuaded to make legislative changes, with limited timeframes for public consultation or notification. This brings the question of sovereignty and democracy sharply in to focus. Who has the greatest ability to influence Pacific governments? The actions of the OECD and the FATF are questionable when they target non-members. As Klaus Riechel notes in his IMF Policy Briefing Paper, the full responsibility for OFC activities cannot be shouldered by ‘host’ countries alone but must also be up to ‘home’ countries to address these issues in their own jurisdictions.

The issue of sovereignty and jurisdiction is central to these deliberations. While finance may be becoming increasingly mobile and levels of “homeless money” are increasing, tax structures are still firmly state-based. The Pacific Islands Forum has taken a careful stance, by both supporting the Pacific countries involved and the initiatives by the OECD and FATF. Secretary General of the Forum Secretariat Noel Levi in a press statement suggested that “anti-money laundering measures be carefully targeted to ensure they did not over-ride the sovereign right of nations to determine their tax regimes”.

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Chapter Six: Finance

The situation for OFCs in the Pacific is a difficult one. In order to ‘upgrade’ their legal and regulatory regimes and meet the standards being insisted upon by different international agencies, Island states face significant costs and the prospect of a significant decline in the number of their customers and the income derived from it. For Nauru, Niue, Vanuatu and the Cook Islands, financial services contribute a large percentage of revenue to their respective GDPs and their removal poses a threat to the governments’ abilities to function.\textsuperscript{149} Non-enforcement of OECD and FATF ‘recommendations’ is an even more precarious option, as it could lead to international sanctions such as those currently being imposed upon Nauru.\textsuperscript{150}

A blurring of the distinction between the legal and illegal business conducted through OFCs, appears to work in the interests of OECD countries as it strengthens the moral and legal pressure they are able to apply. There is obviously some contention then about whether in fact Pacific tax havens are used predominantly for money laundering or legitimate businesses, albeit on the margins of the law.

Recent moves by the US to connect the issues of money laundering to ‘terrorism’ makes the situation of Pacific countries with OFCs even more precarious. The U.S. government has indicated that they are seeking to “cut the terrorists from their financing”.\textsuperscript{151} In this case Pacific countries do not want to be perceived as supporting or harbouring money that is involved in the funding of those people and groups that the US deems as terrorists. It seems likely that these moves to unearth and eliminate ‘terrorists’ will be used as a catch-all mechanism to eliminate any behaviour that the US deems unacceptable to its interests.\textsuperscript{152}

\textsuperscript{149} Niue has repealed its offshore banking licensing legislation in order to satisfy OECD demands. “Niue Offshore Finance Center Being Dismantled,” \textit{Niue Economic Review}, 7 February 2002.

\textsuperscript{150} “Four American banks, led by the Bank of New York, have banned the transaction of American dollars in Nauru, Vanuatu, Niue and Palau, after a report claimed US$ 70 billion was laundered through Nauru alone”. Pacific Islands Report. 9 February 2000. \url{http://166.122.164.43/archive/2000/February/02-09-10.htm}. Accessed 18/4/02. These bans were revoked four weeks later.


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REFLECTIONS

The international financial system may appear to be approaching a neoliberal utopia of freely moving capital. However, this chapter has shown that neoliberal policies, which attempt to prescribe a particular and narrow form of ‘stability’ and ‘supervision’ for Pacific countries, clash with several elements of Pacific realities, including culture and the environment. These clashes create conflict and further instability in the lives of Pacific peoples. The ingredients which would contribute to the security of Indigenous peoples in the Pacific and thereby diminishing ‘instability’, are not adequately addressed by neoliberals. What many countries and peoples see as direct intervention in their affairs, in the form of a policy prescription, neoliberal exponents deflect as merely neutral supervision and neutral advice. And regulation is supposedly only what governments do, rather than what neoliberal institutions with remarkably similar logistics do.

Pacific states are being directly encouraged to implement neoliberal policies through a combination of investment and conditionalities from governments and institutions, and through the expectations and desires of private investors operating through the market.

The flow of particular forms of capital, through private investment is acceptable to neoliberals while other forms, such as remittances, are seen pejoratively as creating dependency in the Pacific, in contrast to neoliberal desires to create populations of individuated and ‘independent’ citizens. Remittances demonstrate the way that Pacific people are working around state and market systems and are thereby promoting and maintaining livelihoods different from neoliberal ones.

The issues surrounding tax havens are a complex way in which Pacific states are in a sense skewing neoliberal policies, in the pursuit of their own way of achieving economic growth, but are also in some ways complicit with neoliberal policies. They are complicit in the creation of a neoliberal global financial system, with capital able to move as the market supposedly dictates, which consequently supports the profits of TNCs and increases the level of competition between developing states to downward-level tax levels to encourage investment.
Practices of re-colonisation through finance are perhaps the most insidious of the areas discussed so far, as they are the most faceless and the most obscured from the critical gaze and resistance forces of the Pacific. However, as this chapter has shown, they can still be skewed.

In the next chapter I will further demonstrate the inadequacy of neoliberal policies and agendas in the Pacific and Indigenous resistance. I will highlight the incongruence of neoliberal policies and agendas in the Pacific by mapping out the significance of intellectual and cultural property rights and the centrality of their protection to Indigenous resistance strategies. In tandem I will explore the inextricability of the values many Indigenous people place on property, ownership, land and sea from wider conceptions of development being actively pursued in the Pacific. These values and subsequent Indigenous conceptions of development demonstrate the way that neoliberal development agendas are premised upon significantly different values which prove inappropriate in the Pacific.
CHAPTER SEVEN

DEVELOPMENT

INTRODUCTION

In the last chapter I explored an array of Indigenous resistance and state strategies some of which are viewed pejoratively by neoliberals and others which problematise neoliberal policies and agendas for capital mobility. In this chapter I argue that neoliberal policies and agendas are also problematic in the Pacific because of the values underpinning them in particular the commodification of intellectual and cultural property and land and sea.

In International Relations theory and practice, development is seen simplistically as the central quest for developing states. The origin of the term is often attributed to former President of the United States, Harry Truman’s speech in 1949 where he espoused the benefits of being developed and the need to reconstruct those countries which were under-developed.¹ Truman’s speech inaugurated a new way

¹ Arturo Escobar, hinting at an even longer history has compared development discourse to that of colonialism. He says, “…the development discourse is governed by the same principles [as colonialism]; it has created an extremely efficient apparatus for producing knowledge about, and the exercise of power over, the Third World”. Arturo Escobar, Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World, Princeton: Princeton
of expressing the older correlation between Indigenous peoples and lower levels of civilisation. What it also created was an avenue through which neoliberal policies became correlated with the ‘developed’ category, while Pacific states were fitted into the ‘developing’ category. These categories have assisted the implementation of neoliberal policies and agendas in the Pacific.

In this chapter I will discuss the relationships that Indigenous peoples of the Pacific have with land and sea and other resources, including intellectual and cultural property. I will also explore the way that the differences in perceptions between neoliberals and many Indigenous peoples regarding these resources leads to different views of how to exploit/develop these resources resulting in quite different ideas of what development is or should be in the Pacific. Neoliberal policies and agendas most often reflect a broader agenda of Western commodification of various resources in the process of ‘developing’ while in the Pacific much of the land and resources are communally held, with Indigenous peoples valuing these resources as much more than mere commodities. These complexities are indicative of broad discrepancies between Indigenous and neoliberal worldviews.

**COMMUNICATING AND RESISTING SIMPLICITY**

**OWNERSHIP AND PROPERTY: DOES EVERYTHING HAVE A PRICE?**

My mother has never worked for money
Preferring to till the soil

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University Press, 1995, p. 9. Following the same comparison Edward Goldsmith also claims, “(i)f development and colonialism…are the same process under a different name, it is largely because they share the same goal…” Edward Goldsmith, “Development as Colonialism”, in Jerry Mander and Edward Goldsmith (eds) *The Case Against the Global Economy and For a Turn Toward the Local*. San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 1996, p. 254.
To feed our mouths.²

Many Indigenous peoples argue that several of the key differences between Indigenous and neoliberal conceptions of development come from different perceptions of forms of ownership and what constitutes property. Indigenous conceptions of ownership have changed due to colonisation, re-colonisation and changes in technology, necessity and pragmatism. However despite change, Indigenous systems of exchange and ‘ownership’ continue to exist problematically alongside Western ones.

Peggy Fairbairn-Dunlop argues that the issue is not so much one of different conceptions of property as different concepts of ownership. She argues “(i)n the Pacific, ownership of traditional knowledge and expressions of culture is not based on individual rights, as postulated by Western copyright and patent laws, but on a system of collective rights that are managed on a custodial basis according to customary laws”.³ In this sense Fairbairn-Dunlop is arguing that the differing forms of ownership are incompatible, making subsequent intellectual property laws based on Western values inappropriate. She provides the example of particular medicines, the components of which have been passed down through generations as typical of ‘property’ whose owner is the entire community, not an individual. Clark Peteru suggests that the “communal nature of Indigenous societies has at its core the values of exchange and sharing of things, including knowledge”.⁴ In this sense there is no specific ‘owner’ of property, and that property may be distributed for reasons other than monetary payment. Similarly Debra Harry, Stephanie Howard and Brett Lee Shelton argue that

in many Indigenous societies, people may not be free to sell their knowledge because either the knowledge cannot be sold according to the group’s ethical principles, or because permission of a larger group is required first. Also, there may be responsibilities that go hand-in-hand with the holding of traditional knowledge…\(^5\)

These kinds of issues demonstrate that community agreement and social responsibilities are often inextricable from ownership, which in the Western world are claimed to be more easily divisible. These concepts of ownership are in stark contrast to the Western and subsequently neoliberal view of private ownership, an integral component of which is the potential to alienate knowledge and resources which are part of the community.

Neoliberal arguments for property rights also contain a requirement for a legal system that sets and enforces its own boundaries. The legal regime is essential, not only for institutionalising the values of private property, but also enshrining these as norms which come to be equated with the way that things are fairly and systematically conducted. For the World Bank, for example, it is essential for development that “strong property and personal rights laws”\(^6\) are institutionalised in Pacific countries and that these are “supported by efficient legal and judicial processes…”\(^7\) In a discussion of property rights in their *Regional Economic Report*, the World Bank states that “effective property rights” have three basic characteristics:

\[(p)ublic security and protection from theft; protection from arbitrary government actions, ranging from unexpected and *ad hoc* changes in regulations and taxes to outright corruption; and a fair, independent and predictable judiciary.\(^8\)\]

These characteristics appear part of a dual process, both the encouraging of Pacific people to conceptualise property as protected by particular types of legal systems, namely Western ones, as well as providing protection for foreign investment.

This difference in forms of ownership and what can be owned is of significance for development particularly in the case of intellectual and cultural rights, largely

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\(^7\) Ibid.

because Indigenous peoples are specifically seeking to protect intellectual, cultural and biological property from commodification and exploitation.

INTELLECTUAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS

There is growing concern amongst Indigenous peoples in the Pacific about intellectual and cultural property rights and their appropriation by governments, companies, individuals and consortiums. One of the first international agreements formulated by Indigenous peoples on the issues of intellectual and cultural rights took place in 1993 in Aotearoa New Zealand with over 150 Indigenous participants. The resulting Mataatua Declaration called for a moratorium on further commercialisation of intellectual and cultural rights as well as of traditional plants, medicines and human genetic material, until protection mechanisms could be established.9 The Preamble to the Declaration states that

Indigenous peoples of the world have the right to self determination, and in exercising that right must be recognised as the exclusive owners of their culture and intellectual property... [and] are capable of managing their traditional knowledge themselves, but are willing to offer it to all humanity provided their fundamental rights to define and control this knowledge are protected by the international community.10

The assertion that such knowledge will be shared with non-Indigenous is a response to claims that Indigenous might be selfishly inhibiting access to knowledge which could assist humanity. I will return to this point below.

Numerous incidences in the Pacific of attempts to patent either cultural or biological material have heightened Indigenous concerns for protection mechanisms. Perhaps the most renowned of these cases involved the approval of patents by the U.S. Patent and Trademarks Office for cell lines from a Hagahai man from Papua New Guinea. Research conducted by Debra Harry, Stephanie Howard and Brett Lee Shelton has determined that the patents were granted to the U.S Department of Health and Human Services and the National Institutes of Health in 1994. Despite international condemnation, Harry et. al discovered that “the Hagahai cell line is now available to the public at the American Type Culture Collection as ATCC

Chapter Seven: Development

Number: CRL-10528 Organism: Homo Sapiens (human) for $216 per sample”.\textsuperscript{11} This example demonstrates the extreme forms of commodification that Indigenous peoples are trying to protect themselves against. Similarly, they are concerned at the likely commercial exploitation of Indigenous knowledge apparent in the search for plant materials combined with Indigenous knowledge on their use, which will possibly assist pharmaceutical companies develop new medicines. The kava plant in particular is being targeted.\textsuperscript{12}

TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AGREEMENT

There are several international neoliberal agreements which affect Pacific peoples with regard to intellectual and cultural property, the most notable being the WTO Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Agreement (TRIPs Agreement).\textsuperscript{13} The TRIPs Agreement not only facilitates the ability of companies to exploit indigenous peoples’ rights and property but also entrenches countries into a legal system which once entered into does not easily allow an exit. The Agreement, finalised by the WTO member states in 1994, became operative in 1995 with leeway for developing and least developed countries to join, and requires all countries to adopt minimum standards of protection for intellectual property rights.\textsuperscript{14} In many Pacific states these kinds of minimum standards for restricting property rights have begun to be implemented. And in those Pacific states which are members of the WTO these were initiated as part of the WTO admission process.\textsuperscript{15}

\textsuperscript{11} Harry, (et. al) 2000, p. 22-23.
\textsuperscript{12} See for example Clark Peteru, “Protection of Biological Diversity and Genetic Resources”, in UNESCO, Symposium on the Protection of Traditional Knowledge and Expressions of Indigenous Culture in the Pacific Islands, Noumea New Caledonia, UNESCO and Secretariat of the Pacific Community, 1999.
\textsuperscript{13} Particularly Article 27, Paragraph 3 (b), which states that: “plants and animals other than micro-organisms, and essentially biological processes for the production of plants or animals other than non-biological and microbiological processes. However, Members shall provide for the protection of plant varieties either by patents or by an effective sui generis system or by combination thereof. The provisions of this subparagraph shall be reviewed four years after the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement”[emphasis added]. TRIPS Agreement, Part 2, Section 5, Article 27. WTO website, www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/t_agm3_e.htm Accessed: 13/8/2002.
\textsuperscript{14} It covers copyright and related rights, trademarks including service marks, industrial designs, patents including the protection of new varieties of plants, trade secrets and test data. World Trade Organisation Website, www.wto.org.
\textsuperscript{15} For individual country details of these laws see UNESCO, 1999.
Clark Peteru argues that one of the central problems with the TRIPs is the requirement to introduce patent protection for the protection of plant varieties through a *sui generis*\(^{16}\) system based on the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants 1961.\(^{17}\) With relation to plants, Peteru argues this produces an imposed system that “overturns a custom of sharing planting material and fails to understand the communal system of innovation through which farmers select, improve and breed diverse crop varieties”.\(^{18}\) He also notes however that a *sui generis* system could be developed by Indigenous peoples to take advantage of this TRIPs requirement. How significantly different such a system could be however, if expected to be in some form compatible with the conventions already in existence is questionable.

Fairbairn-Dunlop argues that a *sui generis* system should be separate from the current intellectual property regime, “giving indigenous peoples’ rights unknown (outside) the common law”.\(^{19}\) A *sui generis* system must also be founded she argues, on a broad education program for Indigenous peoples about the significance of protecting their cultural heritage and knowledge. In this sense Fairbairn-Dunlop links ideas regarding property rights to colonialism. She argues that Indigenous underestimation of their own knowledge and heritage is connected to the discrimination of this knowledge and heritage during the process of colonisation, a period in which Indigenous peoples were convinced that their knowledge was not as valid or scientific as Western knowledge. From this perspective, we can perceive particular parallels between the colonial legacy which not only affected the valuing of Indigenous knowledge but also now impinges on the possibilities for its protection.

**SEGREGATION**

The TRIPs Agreement assumes that intellectual property and ‘inventions’ can be owned by individuals because they are just ‘things’. They are not usually acknowledged to have spiritual or cultural value. If objects (such as the cell lines of the Hagahai man) were invested with, for example, cultural value it would be more

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\(^{16}\) Sui generis; meaning of its own kind or unique.

\(^{17}\) For more information on the Convention see World Intellectual Property Organisation website, [www.WIPO.org](http://www.WIPO.org).

\(^{18}\) Peteru, 1999, p. 171.

\(^{19}\) Fairbairn-Dunlop, 2000.
difficult to perceive their commodification as acceptable.\textsuperscript{20} The TRIPs Agreement therefore follows the neoliberal belief that the world can be generalised, value neutral and implicitly morally neutral.\textsuperscript{21} Part of this neoliberal reification and its product, the TRIPs Agreement, is that it allows for the assumption that it is not only possible to segregate genes, for example, from the totality of a human being, but also that this process may potentially be acceptable. Tonga provides an interesting illustration.

Tonga, whose admission to the WTO is pending, is in the process of altering the copyright and patenting laws and is also debating a move by one section of the government to allow an Australian company, Autogen Limited to collect DNA samples in the country.\textsuperscript{22} The Company allegedly intends to analyse Tongan genes to identify any predispositions to medical conditions such as obesity, diabetes and heart disease. The Tonga Human Rights and Democracy Movement condemned the agreement in the “strongest possible terms”\textsuperscript{23} because the implications have not been discussed publicly. Spokesperson Lopeti Senituli argues that “What is involved is the sanctified blood of human beings and not the genetic make-up of our pigs (with all due respect), so there should have been prior public discussions”\textsuperscript{24} The most crucial argument however, from opponents of the agreement were that with Autogen already claiming “35 genes related to obesity and diabetes at various stages of patent protection”\textsuperscript{25} Tongan genes would come under the same kinds of exclusive control. Tongans would therefore be contributing to a system in which “a person is reduced to their genetic make-up and their God-given dignity and rights

\textsuperscript{20} Also see the literature on the Human Genome Diversity Project for example, Aroha Mead, “Genealogy, Sacredness, and the Commodities Market”, \textit{Cultural Survival Quarterly}, Summer 1996. Additionally this is not to argue that culture is not also commodified, as the tourist industry best illustrates. See Teresia Teaiwa “Reading Paul Gauguin’s Noa Noa with Epeli Hau’ofa’s Kisses in the Nederends” in Vilsoni Hereniko and Rob Wilson (eds) \textit{Inside Out: Literature, Cultural Politics and Identity in the New Pacific}. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1999.


\textsuperscript{23} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{25} Ibid, p. 14.
become meaningless”.\textsuperscript{26} This illustration provides us with an example of the kinds commodification which TRIPs facilitates and presumably views as acceptable. In addition, it demonstrates the way the Pacific/Indigenous state can act as the facilitator for neoliberal policies and values, in spite of resistance from Indigenous peoples.

**INDIGENOUS STRATEGIES FOR PROTECTION**

The significance of the threat posed by the TRIPs Agreement has not been lost on Pacific activists and policy makers. Ralph Regenvanu, Director of the Vanuatu Cultural Centre, acknowledges this threat arguing that, “(g)iven the bias of these initiatives towards multinational corporations and away from indigenous people, we now find ourselves at a crucial point in our efforts to protect indigenous intellectual property”.\textsuperscript{27}

Indigenous groups have made numerous attempts to protect Indigenous knowledge. In the past this often took the form of limiting the numbers of recipients of precious knowledge. Since colonisation, these practices have often been modified to accommodate changes, for instance due to migration. After countless appropriations however, either by governments or researchers, Indigenous peoples have been struggling with the option of incorporating knowledge into international structures of ‘protection’ like the TRIPs Agreement or whether to refuse participation at all.

The UNEP Ad Hoc Open-ended Inter-Sessional Working Group on Article 8(j) and Related Provisions of the Convention on Biological Diversity\textsuperscript{28} has acknowledged the pressures on Indigenous peoples and the threat posed by the TRIPs Agreement. The Working Group suggests that “In essence, Article 27, paragraph 3 (b), of the TRIPs Agreement defines the legal framework for the ownership of life, and is

\textsuperscript{26} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{28} Hereafter cited as the Working Group.
therefore of critical importance to the interests of indigenous and local communities”.  

The Working Group outlines various concerns over current arrangements regarding intellectual property rights and what is explained as “a tendency of pharmaceutical and agro-industrial multinational corporations to appropriate indigenous knowledge, build upon it, and patent it without compensating the original owners of that knowledge”. All of which has occurred in the Pacific. Further, the Working Group suggests that there should be a, “combination of legal and non-legal forms, existing and novel techniques and mechanisms should be considered for the protection of the knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous and local communities”. And Indigenous peoples in the Pacific are pursuing a mixture of these strategies for their protection of which Vanuatu provides a significant example.

PROTECTION

The Vanuatu Cultural Centre is engaged in seeking ways in which to protect Indigenous knowledge from commodification and exploitation, and most importantly from disappearance. Director Ralph Regenvanu says, “(t)he cultural Centre has recorded large amounts of information which is rapidly disappearing from daily island life ... Our field work has encouraged local people to re-value their traditional knowledge and re-apply it”. In this sense the active protection of Indigenous knowledge and expressions of culture and biodiversity, can once again be seen as components of everyday resistance. By protecting and re-valuing these aspects of their own lives Indigenous peoples are asserting alternative structures which challenge the assumptions upon which neoliberalism is based.

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31 See Peteru, 1999.
33 The Vanuatu Cultural Centre is statutory body under Vanuatu law, established in the early 1960s. See Regenvanu, 1995.
35 As discussed in Chapter Four.
The Vanuatu Cultural Centre has devised one of the most thorough and developed systems of protecting intellectual and cultural ‘property rights’ in the Pacific. The Centre has written a Vanuatu Cultural Research Policy which seeks to “preserve through documentation – the indigenous knowledge of ni-Vanuatu communities, while maintaining the communities’ control over and rights to this knowledge during and subsequent to its documentation”. 36 As part of this policy the Centre has attempted to delineate a notion of “Traditional copyright” which is defined as,

the traditional right of individuals to control the ways the information they provide is used and accessed .... The issue of traditional copyright arises when individuals either own or are the custodians of specialised (and usually tabu) knowledge and its communication. The knowledge can include names, designs or forms, oral traditions, practices and skills. The traditional copyright concept leaves the knowledge in the hands of Indigenous peoples and implicitly requires that they are an indivisible component of its use. While this kind of system may not be as simple for foreign investors or researchers to negotiate through, it does mean that negotiation is more likely to take the place of appropriation. The research policy enables Ni-Vanuatu greater control and coordination over research being conducted in Vanuatu and suggests one avenue in which Indigenous strategies are working. 37 As a statutory body the Centre is a legal entity with enforcement capabilities, able to revoke a researcher’s visa if the terms of the Cultural Research Policy are broken.

At the same time, the Pacific Islands Forum has commissioned the drafting of a regional model law regarding intellectual property rights. The draft model law sets out the terms for the formation of a Cultural Intellectual Property Organisation in the Pacific which aims, with the support of a disciplinary tribunal, to prevent exploitation and misappropriations of Indigenous knowledge. In the Guidelines for the Model Law, author Kamal Puri argues that the need for a regional regime for protecting ‘traditional knowledge and expressions of culture’ stems largely from the inappropriate national laws which Pacific countries have adopted, largely from the

37 Where this system may become problematic is if there is disagreement over who possesses the knowledge or the right to distribute this. The research policy does not have an explicit dispute resolution mechanisms however, it appears that this would be negotiated by the Cultural Centre. See Article 3 (x) Vanuatu Cultural Research Policy, in Regenvanu, 1995, p.74.
The reason for the unsuitability of these laws, Puri argues, lies not merely in their derivation from the Western world but also from the fact that they are designed for the “protection of economic interests”. The regional model law that he proposes would aim at supporting ‘traditional knowledge and expressions of culture’ outside a neoliberal system of property rights and “consistent with customary laws and practices of PIPs [Pacific Island Peoples]”. Puri’s proposal is yet to be implemented. However, for my argument here, what is most crucial regarding the regional model law, the institutions which it proposes and the values that underpin it, are that these would be inconsistent with the TRIPs Agreement which commodifies such rights, and therefore despite the fact that it may not be implemented its existence creates discussion and poses numerous avenues for Indigenous peoples to explore.

Despite these efforts by Indigenous people to protect their rights, these moves are not universally accepted as positive. In his article “Can Culture be Copyrighted?” Michael Brown suggests that Indigenous peoples’ moves to protect intellectual and cultural property rights are merely opportunism. Brown argues that a range of Indigenous Declarations and strategies to broaden the notion of copyright, threaten the principles of liberal democracy. He argues that two of the key principles threatened by the proposed Indigenous restrictions are, transparency and freedom of information. He suggests that while in a liberal democracy there are often reasons for ‘secrecy’, these are usually circumstances when it is ‘warranted’, namely in “matters of national security”. This is the point at which it is best to begin an exploration of Brown’s argument because often the reason for Indigenous calls for greater protection of their knowledge does ironically stem from the pursuit of a form of national security. Indigenous peoples can be seen to have experienced the exploitation of their knowledges for such long periods of time that they are attempting to re-secure them for Indigenous nations. These protection efforts also

38 For instance see the Copyright Acts around the Pacific, most are based on Copyright Act UK 1956.
accompany ever-increasing cases of exploitation and wrongful appropriation of Indigenous knowledge and natural resources particularly by TNCs.

Brown suggests however, that Indigenous claims are opportunistic because they imitate the practices of transnational corporations – seeking exclusive control and benefiting economically from intellectual and cultural property. Brown treats the participation and interaction of Indigenous peoples in a market economy as somehow qualitatively different from others, or somehow wrong. Contrary to Brown’s suggestion, Indigenous peoples are often more concerned however, about reclaiming knowledge wrongly taken or exploited, as a move to redress these grievances and take control over how these will be used in the future. This is not to argue that Indigenous peoples do not seek monetary compensation. However, these claims are most often about symbolic recognition or redress, since monetary compensation is often insufficient. For this reason apologies from governments to Indigenous peoples often become a central concern of many claims.

The suggestion that anthropologists or other scholars might be prevented or restricted from writing on certain Indigenous topics under Indigenous protection regimes might not be simply negative as Brown suggests, but may bring about a rethinking and as Darrell Posey argues, encourage scholars to negotiate with those who will be affected by their research. This might also lead them to develop, Posey argues, research questions that address the political problems of Indigenous people. By insisting upon negotiation with Indigenous peoples these strategies could contribute to providing Indigenous peoples with greater control in the face of neoliberal commodification policies. I will now explore Indigenous ideas and values surrounding two other ‘resources’ under great pressure to be commodified by neoliberal policies, land and sea.

THE LAND

Compatriot,

42Ibid, p. 204.
43 As will be explored in the case of Maori in Chapter Eight.
46 Ibid.
you see that white-man coming?
His name is
WHITE-LAND
He was here before too,
during our grandfathers’
days,
and again during our
fathers’ times.
He is here again
to help you,
help you in selling your
land,
in selling your beach
and in selling your place
to him
so that you may have lots of money.
But what about it
in times to come
when WHITE-LAND
is well-established
where will you be?
In the bank?
And compatriot,
keep a good look-out,
for this WHITE-LAND
also comes
in black skin.\(^{47}\)

There are three significant issues for the discussion here regarding land. In the Pacific, most land is held communally making the strategies for extracting resources from this land for development contentious. For Indigenous peoples the land is not a mere commodity but connected to other cultural and political structures and practices. The concept of land and ‘home’ is not just a place, it is also a compilation of ideals, responsibilities, memories, people and genealogy. The land and ‘home’ are constructions in time and place, this still does not make them illusionary and ‘unreal’ as discussed in Chapter Four. For those engaged with the ‘land’ on a daily basis for survival, for instance, ‘living off the land’, there may not be such an objectification of the meaning of land. However its significance remains beyond pragmatic requirements and decisions. For example, the Maori word for umbilical

cord, whenua, is the word for land and the tradition of burying that cord on tribal land continues for many families despite most Maori living in urban areas.

In Papua New Guinea John Kawowo insists on the continued importance of the land as a symbolic and real treasure he says,

(s)ince the land is the basis to survival in Papua New Guinea, it is worth fighting for the land rather than letting it to be destroyed by multinational corporations. A very clear example is the Bougainville Crisis where it had cost a lot of lives for only one reason – the ‘LAND’.

In a working paper for the United Nations Economic and Social Council, Special Rapporteur Erica- Irene A. Daes acknowledges the “profound spiritual, cultural, social and economic relationship that indigenous people have to their total environment...” and that “United Nations organs and Member States have increasingly acknowledged that lands and natural resources are essential to the economic and cultural survival of indigenous peoples...”. She argues that there is an “urgent need for understanding by non-indigenous societies of the spiritual, social, cultural, economic and political significance to Indigenous societies of their lands, territories and resources for their continued survival and vitality”. Daes is linking the two issues of the multiple connections that many Indigenous peoples have with the land and their dependence on that land for survival. These connections and need for the land makes the issues relating to the ways that this land is divided and utilised even more crucial.

Indigenous peoples have resisted and in some cases have assisted in the exploitation of land in a variety of ways. In PNG and Solomon Islands for example, some Indigenous people have negotiated logging or mining contracts with large companies. The monetary ‘benefits’ of this exploitation have not been divided

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50 Ibid.
equally and have largely have accrued to the companies rather than the Indigenous peoples involved. Such examples include the Ok Tedi mine and other large scale operations in PNG and Solomon Islands. Those who have borne the majority of the costs have also been Indigenous peoples such as those downstream from mines, or those in Nauru and Banaba Island where half the phosphate which constituted land is gone.\textsuperscript{52} As Tarcisius Kabutaulaka points out with regard to the Solomon Islands

\begin{quote}
(t)he fact that foreign logging companies swamped the Solomon Islands at a time when logging was mostly on customary land is an indication that they have established a means of acquiring ‘security of access’ and maintaining it for a period long enough for them to accumulate substantial profit.\textsuperscript{53}
\end{quote}

If companies have formulated ways to exploit land even if supposedly protected under communal ownership then perhaps these systems require modification. A similar incident has occurred in Fiji where a highly politicised joint venture between American and Fijian landowners for the logging of the mahogany forests took place.\textsuperscript{54} The deal was finalised despite contentious circumstances including one of the officials involved in the negotiations, George Speight, also having perpetrated the May 2000 coup. The pre-coup government had decided to give the contract to the Commonwealth Development Corporation.\textsuperscript{55}

While many Indigenous peoples may be arguing for more appropriate levels of compensation for the exploitation of land, this can not completely detract from the fact that Indigenous peoples have different and interconnected ideas about this land. The issues of central concern for Indigenous peoples therefore are often questions of justice, moral concerns over the rights to land rather than concerns for economic compensation. In his research on Indigenous peoples and the Ok Tedi mine in PNG, Stuart Kirsch has argued that Indigenous peoples “frame their conflict with the mine in moral rather than economic terms”.\textsuperscript{56} In this sense the Indigenous

\textsuperscript{52} On the issue of Banaba see Katerina Teaiwa, “Paying the Price for Other Peoples’ Development”, \textit{Indigenous Affairs}, No.1 January-February-March 2000.


\textsuperscript{55} Matelita Ragogo “Mahogany Mayhem”, \textit{Wansolwara}, November 2000, p. 13.

people hold the mine responsible for the destructive environmental effects on their land but it is the destruction rather than compensation which appears to be of utmost importance.

The communal status of land tenure in the Pacific is an enduring frustration for those who would rather divide it into individual title. The communal status of the land is often acknowledged as one of the most significant reasons for the lack of ‘absolute poverty’ in the Pacific and as providing an informal social security mechanism. The World Bank laments that this status has also meant that these systems “constrain market-based activity by reducing the incentive to work hard, save and engage in entrepreneurial activity”. The assumption here is that people must be pushed as it were, to be independent. Like the “enabling environment”, there is a requirement to specifically control, in this case the incentives that people have to enter into ‘entrepreneurial activity’, in order for neoliberal policies to actually function. From this perspective we can see the need for training people and reconstructing cultures in order to convince them to conform to neoliberal policies; encouraging entrepreneurship, business and therefore economic growth.

One component of this training has been the rhetorical shift from describing people as Indigenous peoples to describing them as ‘landowners’. As an anonymous author, the “World Bank Watcher” outlines, the importance of neoliberal rhetoric and its ensconce in the World Bank’s attempts to commodify land. The author argues,

...today, many Melanesians, with the active encouragement of the WB [World Bank] and the companies, are referring to themselves as ‘landowners’, not realising that their uncritical acceptance of that name represents a major victory for the WB/IMF in its persistent drive to enclose the consciousness of Melanesians around the commodification of their land.

Even such a small rhetorical shift may assist in a process of re-colonisation.

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Chapter Seven: Development

THE SEA

The ocean that surrounds us is the one physical entity that all of us in Oceania share ... When our leaders and planners say that our future lies in the sea, they are thinking only in economic terms, about marine and seabed resources and their development ... But for us in Oceania, the sea defines us, what we are and have always been.60

For Pacific peoples the ocean is significant in terms of subsistence, history and spirituality. For those island peoples who travel frequently across large tracts of it, the preservation and health of the ocean remains of concern, it also represents a crucial source of food and income.

There is a substantial history which connects Pacific people that is often inseparable from the concept of the ocean. There is a consciousness that islanders are connected by the ocean and by their ancestors who traversed the ocean in many ways creating and renewing alliances and connections between ‘Micronesia’, ‘Melanesia’ and ‘Polynesia’. Despite changes in customary marine tenure, there are new practices taking place which strengthen customary arrangements.61 For Fiji, Joeli Veitayaki says that an “association with the supernatural ensures that the sacred [fishing] grounds are respected and protected at all times ...”.62 He adds “developments taking place in the management of inshore resources illustrate the incorporation of traditional practices into contemporary resource-use arrangements”.63 Edvard Hviding argues that customary marine tenure is so interconnected with “cultural identity and community life”64 that it is inescapably part of fisheries development. Hviding also argues that in a number of locations in the Pacific traditional knowledge which indicates these areas are spiritual may be connected with their

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63 Ibid, p. 121.
concurrent significance as spawning or nursery areas for particular species. In this way, customary marine tenure and knowledge should not be considered fanciful but inextricable from a range of other values and issues.

In contrast to land, calls for the commodification of the sea have not been as prevalent or substantially forthcoming from neoliberal institutions. The Pacific countries have huge areas of sea attributed to them from the Law of the Sea and for those countries that qualify, they have until 2004 “to extend maritime claims from their 200-mile EEZ to the limits of the continental margin”. This is seen by many neoliberal economists as one of the next most significant of the Pacific resources to be exploited for development. There has been extensive commodification of its fisheries. This may increase in the future as the pressure from over-fishing in the northern hemisphere impinges upon the relatively plentiful Pacific fisheries stocks, particularly of tuna. There exists in this regard a distinction between inshore and offshore fisheries, inshore fisheries are more extensively governed by customary law while deep sea fisheries have been accessible for exploitation.

In his essay “The Ocean in Us”, Epeli Hau’ofa captured the extensive significance of the ocean for many in the Pacific. His criticism of the narrow and limited definitions ascribed to the ocean and its importance by development ‘experts’ and regional officials emphasises the contrasting definitions of where rights and boundaries lie in the Pacific. He argues that for Pacific people the most important role “should be that of custodians of the ocean, and as such we must reach out to similar people elsewhere for the common task of protecting the seas for the general welfare of all living things”.

For Hau’ofa, the ocean does not ‘belong’ to any particular territory rather it is in the custodianship of people and he adds, “… there are no more suitable people on earth to be the custodians of the oceans than those

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67 Women writing on the fisheries sector in the Pacific have noted that regional development planning strategies for the sector have largely ignored the important role that women play in the sector “both in subsistence and commercial-artisanal activities” as discussed in Chapter Five. Also see Vivienne Taylor, Marketisation of Governance, South Africa: SADEP, University of Cape Town, 2000, p. 83
for whom the sea is home”.

Hau’ofa’s purpose is to strengthen a regional identity with the ocean as a base, and which encompasses a collective attitude for its preservation. While the essay could be criticised as being somewhat romantic, it does embody a common Pacific view of the significance of the ocean.

Hau’ofa’s observation regarding the realm of territories over the ocean has particular significance for Pacific countries which have ratified the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty 1985. The signatories of the Treaty undertake to reject the testing, stationing, dumping and shipment of nuclear weapons and waste and bases in the Pacific. The transportation of plutonium over the Pacific ocean is continually rejected by Pacific Indigenous peoples, however there is a limit to their ability to deal with shipments which traverse the ‘high seas’, such as the shipment of waste from Europe to Japan.

WIDER CONCEPTIONS OF DEVELOPMENT

These divergent values lead to differing views about the form and breadth of development. The first part of this chapter has elaborated on the divergent neoliberal and Indigenous ideas surrounding property/resources and how they should be treated, utilised and protected. Contrary to neoliberal ‘best practice’ prescriptions for development, Indigenous peoples in the Pacific are both proposing and living examples of potentially more sustainable systems of development.

In Epeli Hau’ofa’s Tales of the Tikongs, the politics of development are laid bare in the fictitious but somehow very familiar landscape of the Tikongs. “Tiko [Manu’s island

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69 Ibid, p. 408.
70 The signatories are Australia, the Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu and Samoa.
Manu declared, “unless the ancient gods are killed.” 73 Manu, the local revolutionary rides his bicycle all round town trying to persuade people against the evils of development. “WHY ARE YOU DESTROYING MY COUNTRY?” 74 Manu asks the Doctor of Philosophy who is an “Expert”. The only thing that is developed on Tiko Manu claims is sex, “why else would Tiko have the highest population growth rate in the Pacific?” 75 In this comical yet cynical exposition of the clash of concepts of development in the Pacific, Hau’ofa emphasises the reality of islander acceptance of development prescriptions, in some cases unaware of the long term effects. 76 Hau’ofa’s explication emphasises the way in which culture plays an enormous role in Pacific societies and more comprehensive conceptions for development.

The cultural implications of development are highlighted by Toa Qase, another character in Hau’ofa’s satire. Toa is provided with a loan to establish a chicken farm. The difficulty arises when, “under the guidance of a Development Expert, who was Elite and a Wise Man to boot, Toa aimed to become a Modern Businessman, forgetting that in Tiko if you give less you will lose more and if you give nothing you will lose all”. 77 The cultural expectation in Tiko is that you share produce and profits with others, if you fail to fulfil these obligations then the cultural system reminds you that you must do these things in order to survive. In this story, because Toa refuses to freely give them, the other Tikongs steal his chickens and his business collapses. The point is significantly made, that cultural expectations are far more important in the Pacific than the functioning of ‘the market’.

Similar criticisms of development have been articulated by Pacific organisations including the Pacific Islands Association of Non-governmental Organisations, (PIANGO) who propose that “economic development in the Pacific be changed to become more clearly inclusive of people and run in their interests”. 78 And there has

74 Ibid, p.19.
75 Ibid.
76 See also Trevor Pare Matheson, “Aid in an Island Microstate” PhD thesis. Canberra: Australian National University, 1986.
been some acknowledgement on the part of institutions like the United Nations that the kinds of indicators used to assess development may not be entirely adequate.

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has attempted to broaden the definition and evaluation of development over the years by establishing the Human Development Index, Human Poverty Index and the Vulnerability Index which all have additional factors to assess, from literacy to access to water. The Human Development Index “measures achievements in a country along three dimensions of human development: longevity, knowledge, and a decent standard of living”. The Human Poverty Index was introduced by the 1997 Human Development Report and “avoids the issue of financial wealth by combining various other forms of human deprivation”. The Vulnerability Index creation is a response to the need for an assessment of who qualifies as a Least Developed Country. At present the criteria for being defined as a Least Developed nation is comprised of a Quality of Life index, an Economic Diversification index and relevant features specific to each country, such as population size.

While providing certain levels of information, these statistics still fail to adequately account for differences in fundamental understandings about property for example. With regard to their various indexes, the UNDP make an astute point regarding the fallacy and yet the necessity of statistics for the Pacific region,

(statistics are sometimes dismissed as esoteric, misleading or a waste of time compared to getting on with the real work of development. Yet they figure in the justification for almost every policy decision, both nationally and internationally, including the distribution of aid resources.)

Therefore while the UNDP is attempting to extend the kinds of factors used to assess ‘development’ there is a realisation of the limitations involved, under pressure from neoliberal institutions. The acknowledgement of this situation however, does not directly translate to the modification of UNDP or broader neoliberal policies. The UNDP’s definition of sustainable human development is “enlarging people’s choices by expanding human capabilities”. Ironically there is little that is ‘sustainable’ in this definition which continues to rest upon the

80 Ibid, p. 18.
82 Ibid, p. 32.
83 Ibid, p. 4.
perception of Indigenous peoples as individuated and freely choosing individuals, reflecting a neoliberal worldview.\textsuperscript{84}

The Pacific Concerns Resource Centre (PCRC), another significant organisation in the regional development discourse, also uses the term ‘sustainable human development’ as opposed to simply ‘development’. Their definition is outlined in their 1999 Annual Report and is worth quoting in its entirety:

The sustainable human development approach recognises that development is a process of economic, social and cultural change. It seeks to build on the strengths of traditional social structures, promoting their development to enable them to meet new challenges. It recognises community participation as an indispensable component of a human development strategy.

Sustainable Human Development is the increased availability of choices to enhance the well-being of human beings and quality of life in general. The basic choices for any individual are to live long healthy lives, to acquire knowledge, and to have access to the resources needed for a decent standard of living. These basic choices determine the concept of equality in sustainable human development that enables people to have equal opportunities, both political and economical, to improve standards.

Sustainable Human Development is ensuring that these choices will be available for future generations with the same standards presented to today’s members of the human family. Intergenerational equity is therefore an essential component of Sustainable Human Development. This would eventuate in the equitable distribution of benefits of development, the conservation of sound environment and the sustainable utilisation of limited resources of the Pacific Islands.\textsuperscript{85}

The PCRC approach essentially comprises three dimensions: the strengthening of traditional social structures, increasing choice and intergenerational equity. These dimensions place the priority and details of the ‘economy’ behind those of the needs of people. The focus is on what is needed for the community involved, which is the reverse of a neoliberal perspective which is on the economy first and then the achievements which neoliberals see inevitably stemming from there, providing for the people second. The logic of this approach is reversed.

\textsuperscript{84} Ibid.
Chapter Seven: Development

The PCRC has been cautious with its language, but for social movements not engaged in academic theorising it is unclear to what extent words are utilised strategically. For some theorists to continue to talk about ‘sustainable development’ for instance is to “remain within the same model of thought that produced development and kept it in place”. Such an argument could place the PCRC’s work on a more contentious footing. Alternately however, there are differing sites of resistance and this use of language could well be just another of these levels.

As part of these broader accounts of development, Indigenous peoples encourage support to be focussed at local levels, reiterating a focus on Indigenous aspirations to strengthen Indigenous strategies and practices of resistance.

THE LOCAL

The Resolutions from the 8th Nuclear Free and Independent Pacific Conference in Tahiti held in 1999 regarding Sustainable Human Development placed a strong emphasis on supporting the local economies. Resolution 47 declared, “local economies, including agriculture, manufacturing and services should be strengthened and be the basis of economic development in [the] Pacific”. The conference resolved to “(u)rge the peoples of our Pacific region to support local industries and locally made products”. It is unclear whether Pacific Island governments will fully take up the challenge to be more firmly reliant on locally made products than they are now. The huge subsistence sector means that people do support the local, although not always through using a monetary transaction. The current interest in goods produced in other countries appears set to continue which suggests the continued implementation of hybrid and evolving Indigenous models of development. Many indigenous groups in the Pacific still view solely Indigenous ways as the best development models available. Ralph Regenvanu argues that,

our indigenous cultures offer an alternative path for social change while the world seems to be heading into increasing social and ecological crisis. Our

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87 See Chapter Four.
89 Ibid.
indigenous cultures offer an alternative path particularly well-suited to our social and ecological milieu.\textsuperscript{90}

The “Peace Vision” developed on board the Peace Boat in September 2000, which was convened by the PCRC and attended by different community movements from around the Pacific, encouraged Indigenous peoples to develop and implement alternatives such as the Bougainville Peoples Integrated Peace and Economic Self Reliance System and the Turaga Nation peace model of Vanuatu.\textsuperscript{91}

The Bougainville Community Based Integrated Humanitarian Program (BOCBIHP) model was developed under the Papua New Guinean blockade as a self help integrated community based program to combat continued deprivation of essential medical drugs, clothing, safe water supply, food and security.\textsuperscript{92} During the war with Papua New Guinea there were few options for Bougainvillians and to some extent the development of this Program must be kept in the context of the knowledge that a large number of people died during this period.\textsuperscript{93} The population however, have developed this model for and by their own community and in terms of any potential interference with this system from non-Bougainvillian sources, Havini asserts that,

(t)o over ride or compete with the existing infrastructure will not only waste valuable resources on duplication of services, but it will challenge the whole philosophy of self reliance to a people who will reject dependency in any new guise that is presented.\textsuperscript{94}

The BOCBIHP aim of self-reliance can be seen as a challenge to neoliberal policies aimed at ‘integrating’ all nations into a global political economy. Producing goods and providing services locally, but also creating a system which encourages work which is unpaid and which rejects the neoliberal concept of the maximisation of

\textsuperscript{90} Regenvanu and Hickey, 1999, p. 21.
\textsuperscript{91} “Peace Vision”, Forum for Pacific Peace and Human Security, 21-25 September 2000 held aboard the Peace Boat.
\textsuperscript{94} Ibid, p. 23.
profit and production is a serious affront to a neoliberal global system. As the BOCBIHP system came to fruition under an externally imposed isolation, multiple questions must be asked regarding the official development ‘aid’, and accompanying international development structures. However, while the Bougainvillian people creatively demonstrated a form of alternative development without necessarily receiving ‘aid’ this also needs to be considered in relation to the loss of life mentioned above.

The Turaga Nation in Vanuatu is another example of the way in which an Indigenous community is actively practicing an alternative system to neoliberalism. The Turaga Nation is based on the island of Pentecost and has its own education and banking system. The nation’s main challenge to neoliberalism can be seen to stem from their education system, particularly the Melanesian Institute of Philosophy and Technology established in 1997, which, like the Bougainvillian model, advocates self-reliance. The institute is a “co-ordinating centre for indigenous education and its relationship to all indigenous systems of living”. The Institute takes children and adults and teaches them indigenous laws for a minimum of four years before specialisation. Hilda Lini, Director of the Pacific Concerns Resource Centre who is from the Turaga Nation says,

(t)he overall aim of the institute is to preserve, teach and promote Melanesian indigenous values. This is a community initiative set up after 20 years of analytical researching and piloting which proved that [the] indigenous education system [is] yet the most appropriate for Vanuatu because it safeguards respect, human values, leadership qualities and economic empowerment for self reliance.

The Nation’s education system is intricately connected to their banking and economic system as it specifically teaches people what is required to be

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95 The film An Evergreen Island documents different strategies developed on Bougainville including the fermenting of coconut oil which was then used as fuel for generators and adapted vehicles. For a discussion of the film see Aziz Choudry “Mekin Na Savvy: Bougainville – Small Nation, Big Message”, Z net Commentary, December 11 2001, Z Magazine website, www.zmag.org/sustainers/content/2001-12/11choudry.cfm Accessed 7/10/02.

96 As has been discussed in Chapter Six.


98 Ibid.
“economically self-supporting”.99 The Turaga Nation’s inclusion of the concept of peace in their development alternative is in contrast to the discourse of neoliberal development which not only pays scant attention to peace, but as some scholars have argued, actually increases violence in societies as unemployment rates rise, or in neoliberal parlance, “adjustment costs”, take effect.100

REFLECTIONS

“Now, is that progress? Cutting down trees to make money and then having to spend more money to get enough food?”101 In Dirk Spenneman’s story “Progress: Dream or Reality”, Jebdrik “an old man of nigh over 90”102 watches as the felling of breadfruit trees takes place for the establishment of a chicken farm so that the Marshall Islands can become independent from egg imports, and remain on the “road to self-sufficiency and economic progress”.103 The fact that the Marshallese need breadfruit trees for food, for canoes, or to build houses is swept away by the pre-formulated arguments of the foreign-expert and his local minion. The story highlights the inappropriateness of many development projects and the numerous ways in which Pacific realities and values are misperceived. In another incident in the story, Jebdrik’s grandson buys an outboard motor boat after getting a loan from the Development Bank. The outboard motor subsequently breaks down repeatedly and requires maintenance that Jebdrik’s grandson can not sustain. Although in this case ‘fictional’, stories like these are far from uncommon in the Pacific. While this story expresses what may seem to many a familiar argument against the inappropriate nature of the development projects of the World Bank, the fact that this story reflects a still familiar occurrence in the Pacific, some ten years after it was written, illustrates the continuity of the development problem.

99 Ibid.
100 As discussed with relation to instability in Chapter Six.
102 Ibid, p. 93.
In this chapter I sought to explore the difference between the neoliberal policies, which are underpinned by a belief in the benefits of private property and commodification, and Indigenous conceptions of ownership and development with the associated relationships with the environment and cultural practices.

I sought to demonstrate that the threats faced by Indigenous peoples for the commodification of their resources are being perpetuated by a neoliberal reform agenda. These Indigenous resources are under threat because of the divergent values Indigenous peoples and neoliberals place on them. This divergence of values leads to different ways of understanding how to utilise these as components of development which subsequently leads to different modes of development. Indigenous peoples are pursuing different kinds of development, the complexities of which confound the simplicity of neoliberal prescriptions.

Development and the prescriptions given expressly under this banner are crucial to a Pacific of countries considered ‘developing’ and ‘Least Developed’. Perhaps even more so than the prescriptions under production, trade and finance, it is ‘development’ which most overtly defines and dictates the world or the ‘utopia’ that is often prescribed by neoliberal advocates. It is the development discourse which draws the threads of neoliberal intent, limitations and contradictions most distinctly together. As ‘development’ is also clearly about creating worlds it comes to the heart of the issue of re-colonisation: the imposition of one world view on (an)other, that ‘other’ here being the Pacific. It is this contrast of different world makings in practice which is what re-colonisation and Indigenous resistance both are; struggles over ways to live in this world.

In the next chapter this examination of world makings in practice will focus on the contradictory developments going on within the ‘developed’ Pacific state of Aotearoa New Zealand and the ways that Maori are being encouraged to develop and what the pre-requisites for this development are. In many ways the next chapter is a culmination of the complexities discussed so far in this thesis. It provides a more detailed analysis of the example of Maori development and how, re-colonising practices and resistance are entangled to such an extent that we come to see that each is present in the other.
CHAPTER EIGHT

INTRA-STATE INDIGENOUS DEVELOPMENT: MAORI

INTRODUCTION

In the last chapter I argued that one of the central agendas of neoliberalism is to commodify and thus colonise over other conceptions of ownership and concepts of property. I suggested that Indigenous notions of property differ significantly from this commodified version which leads to very different conceptions of development from those neoliberal advocates propose. In this chapter I seek to further explore the commodifying ideas of neoliberalism by examining how they get applied in cases made for Maori development. I suggest that neoliberal ideas work through many forms of identity or organisational structures in the pursuit of neoliberal policies and agendas which may bring the significance of state sovereignty into question when Maori an Indigenous minority within a larger state are prescribed the same neoliberal policies as Pacific states.
Once called “Chile without the gun”\(^1\), Aotearoa New Zealand is one of the ‘world leaders’ of neoliberalism.\(^2\) The Aotearoa New Zealand governments since 1984 have pursued neoliberal policies with a faith, vehemence and confidence of their success that few other governments appear to possess. In this way Aotearoa New Zealand can be seen as having gone further with neoliberal policies than many other countries, particularly in the Pacific. Those same governments have been keen, as are Maori, to progress the settlement of Maori claims against the Crown for breaches of the Treaty of Waitangi — both historical and recent. In this chapter I will discuss the impact of neoliberal policies on Maori in such a context. I suggest that the Government’s neoliberal agenda permeates the Treaty of Waitangi settlements process resulting in the separation and neglect of various intrinsic issues such as constitutional change and the commodification of the process. Maori resistance and participation in this settlement process I argue expresses a desire for the process itself to be recognised as symbolic and inclusive of issues of self-determination through constitutional change.

Firstly the settlements process is described in detail because although Maori have been demanding solutions to their grievances since the Treaty of Waitangi was first signed in 1840, the implementation of the settlements process since 1984 provides an excellent example of aspects of Indigenous resistance to a concerted neoliberal programme. The settlements process is at the heart of the debate. A central understanding of both the Government and Maori is that a prerequisite for Maori development is the resolution of particular policies of colonialism, most specifically the return of land deemed to have been wrongfully taken and the redress of other grievances. In this chapter, I will explore the assumptions and the boundaries which form the basic structure of the settlements process, namely the commodification of Maori claims and rights, and the corporatisation of the structure of the tribe. This exploration will continue to return to the question of how neoliberal policies have been used in the Government of Indigenous peoples, in this case Maori, through their dual identities, as citizens and as tribal members. Particular attention will be paid however, to the way in which neoliberal policies and agendas are continually resisted and skewed by Maori in their attempts to govern themselves.

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2 Aotearoa is the Maori word for New Zealand. I use the term Aotearoa New Zealand to indicate the significance of the two nations, Pakeha and Maori. Pakeha is the Maori word for New Zealanders of European decent.
I will secondly argue in this chapter that there has been a wide diversity of responses from Maori to the settlements process. Maori have continually disrupted the Government’s neoliberal agenda by both seeking to protect Maori structures from exploitation utilising the Treaty of Waitangi, and by viewing the settlements process as interconnected with constitutional change and therefore decolonisation. It is with regard to this latter issue that some Maori view the settlements of claims as a prerequisite for a Maori development premised upon tino rangatiratanga (sovereignty). Maori have continually challenged the Government’s neoliberal agenda using both direct protests and legal challenges in the Courts. By exerting constant pressure through litigation and seizing on mistakes by the Crown, Maori have forced the Government to address Treaty issues on Maori terms, while offering compromise on some key components of the debate. Thus Maori have been able, to some extent, to take advantage of a new, poorly conceived and speedily implemented settlements process. Conversely Maori engagement in the settlements process has show the influence of some aspects of neoliberal discourse into Maori political consciousness. This will be discussed with relation to those Maori advocating the corporatisation of the tribe.

The response from the Government to Maori resistance, I will argue in this chapter has been to embed the neoliberal agenda firmly into the settlements process. Promoted as a ‘full and final’ resolution of grievances, the Government claims this is an opportunity for “long-term economic benefits for Maori”.

The separation of Treaty settlements, from broader Treaty issues of sovereignty and power sharing suggests the Government’s efforts to ignore issues of shared sovereignty and constitutional change.

A few preliminary explanations may be in order regarding the Treaty of Waitangi before examining the legacies stemming from it. The Treaty of Waitangi signed between the British Crown and Maori in 1840 exists in two versions which continue to produce significant deviations on how to understand which rights are guaranteed and what behaviour is appropriate for both parties. The two versions are in English and Maori and are known as the Treaty of Waitangi and Te Tiriti o Waitangi.

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respectively. Most Maori chiefs signed the Maori version.\textsuperscript{4} It is not my intention here to provide an exhaustive account of the significance of the versions however, there are three points which are pertinent to my later discussion. Firstly, it is commonly understood that the \textit{Tiriti} established a partnership between Maori and Pakeha. In 1987 the \textit{New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-General} case found that the partnership required the Government to actively protect the interests of Maori. While the English version of the Treaty states that Maori ceded sovereignty, the Maori version uses the word \textit{kawanatanga}, government, rather than \textit{tino rangatiratanga}, sovereignty.\textsuperscript{5}

From the beginning this meant that there were vastly different interpretations of what the partnership between the peoples meant, most importantly whether it was merely between two parties, or between equal nations. Many Maori understood it to be the latter while the Crown have largely favoured the former. For Maori therefore, the achievement and maintenance of \textit{tino rangatiratanga} as an equal nation within the state of Aotearoa New Zealand has long been a central goal, which is now often articulated as being broadly synonymous with ‘Maori development’.\textsuperscript{6}

**LEGACIES OF COLONIALISM AND THEIR EXACERBATION SINCE 1984**

Maori development and the settlements process are set in a context of inequality in Aotearoa New Zealand.\textsuperscript{7} The political economy is based on the colonisation and re-colonisation of Maori. Such structures mean that many Maori are already more vulnerable than Pakeha to the effects of neoliberalism and instead of reversing them

\textsuperscript{4} I shall specifically refer to the \textit{Tiriti o Waitangi}, hereafter simply the \textit{Tiriti}, when indicating the particular points made in that specific version.

\textsuperscript{5} See the Appendix for the text of the Treaty. In his translation of the Maori text Hugh Kawharu’s argues that “There could be no possibility of the Maori signatories having any understanding of government in the sense of ‘sovereignty’”. Kawharu translates \textit{tino rangatiratanga} as “unqualified exercise of the chieftainship”. See I. H. Kawharu (ed) \textit{Waitangi: Maori and Pakeha Perspectives of the Treaty of Waitangi}, Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1989, p. 319. Rangatiratanga is often used as synonymous with \textit{tino rangatiratanga}.

\textsuperscript{6} See Leith Comer, “Te Puni Kokiri”, \textit{Kokiri Paetae}, August 2002, p. 3.

\textsuperscript{7} By ‘Maori development’ I am here referring to both the ability and the actual strengthening of cultural practices and ways of organising as well as the improvement of the health, education and general well being of Maori.
neoliberal policies have exacerbated them.\(^8\) As a result Maori ‘choices’ are restricted from the outset. Maori have low formal educational achievement rates compared to Pakeha and are based in industries where labour is often temporary, insecure, low paid and expendable. Consequently under neoliberal policies of the mid-1980s, many of the industries where Maori workers were concentrated were forced to lay off staff in order to compete. Companies like Ford and Mitsubishi relocated elsewhere as tariffs were taken off imported cars. In these cases it became apparent that foreign ownership does not guarantee more jobs as neoliberals often suggest, as discussed in Chapter Two. In fact, it quite often adds to unemployment. US-owned Telecom has reduced its Aotearoa New Zealand workforce by over 40 percent.\(^9\) Though overseas companies own half to two-thirds of the commercial economy, they provide fewer than one job in five, and the numbers of jobs they have offered have grown much more slowly than the profits of those companies.\(^10\)

The neoliberal restructuring process resulted both directly and indirectly in the loss of approximately 100,000 jobs, mainly in the manufacturing sector and state industries such as railways, forestry, and public works where the majority of Maori were employed in the mid-1980s.\(^11\) During the period between 1988 and 1992 the level of Maori unemployment nearly tripled, rising from 7.4 percent in December 1987 to a high of 23.4 percent in March 1992.\(^12\) Additionally during this period the rates of long-term unemployment for Maori also rose dramatically.\(^13\) Neoliberal policies continue to perpetuate the inequalities felt by Maori as they continue to experience high levels of unemployment.\(^14\) From a neoliberal analysis these changes in employment figures merely mean that “the labour market was not flexible


\(^10\) Rosenberg, 1999.


\(^13\) Te Puni Kokiri, 2000b, p. 24.

\(^14\) Ibid, p. 21.
enough in the short term to respond effectively”. Neoliberal policies also extended the gender inequalities amongst Maori. As The Ministry of Maori Affairs (Te Puni Kokiri) notes, “(e)conomic restructuring and recession had a greater impact on the labour force participation rates of Maori women than Maori men”.

The result of job losses has now expanded Maori reliance on assistance from the Government. Estimates suggest that 44 percent of Maori are on the ‘dole’ signifying that neoliberal policies designed to reduce ‘dependency of citizens on the state actually reduced average incomes and increased State ‘dependency’. And there are high social costs from this situation impacting on housing conditions, education, health, and criminal justice statistics.

THE SETTLEMENTS PROCESS: FIXING COLONISATION AND RE-COLONISING

Maori have continually argued, protested and lobbied for the correction of injustices, restitution and the return of land and other resources taken during colonisation. The Treaty settlements process for most Maori is therefore premised upon notions of justice and redress; in this regard the form that the settlements process takes is of central significance, not merely the end result.

Paul McHugh argues that there is a divergence however, between the way that the settlements process is viewed by Maori and Pakeha or the Government. He argues, the “Maori discourse is highly historicized, the Anglo-settler one is calculatedly

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16 Te Puni Kokiri, 2000a, p. 13.
18 See Te Puni Kokiri, 2000b.
McHugh argues that the Government’s neoliberal position fits appropriately with this dehistoricism as settlements are most importantly emphasised as final, much like a contract. There is a perception he argues, that once the settlement contract has been completed then the past is to be forgotten. And as McHugh argues elsewhere, the settlements completed with the Crown to date have not appeared particularly concerned with establishing mechanisms by which a relationship between Crown and tribes can be extended beyond the settlement itself. He argues, “(t)heir purpose has been to settle or silence the claim; their goal has been the quietening of complaint rather than the discovery of a mechanism for continual dialogue”. McHugh suggests that the extended preamble in the Tainui tribe’s settlement outlining Tainui grievances for example, was more significant for Tainui as recognition of historical injustices which continue to be relevant in the present. However, he suggests that for the Crown these were peripheral; outside the actual text of the document and of secondary relevance to the finality of the agreement and the past. While McHugh’s argument certainly resonates with the way many of the Deeds of Settlements have been written, it would be difficult however to conclude that the Government has completely ignored the obvious significance that a thorough investigation and acknowledgement of the past represents for Maori, the establishment and continued funding of the Waitangi Tribunal being a case in point.

A watershed in the settlements process has been the establishment of the Waitangi Tribunal in 1975. The Tribunal was established to “inquire into and make findings upon a claim and, if it decided the claim was well founded, to recommend to Government measures to redress”. Initially the Tribunal could only hear claims relating to events that had occurred after 1975. In 1985, the Waitangi Tribunal Act was amended so that claims since 1840 were included. For the Government at the

23 W. H. Oliver, Claims to the Waitangi Tribunal, Wellington: Waitangi Tribunal Division, Department of Justice, 1991, p. 10.
time, the Waitangi Tribunal seemed to some to be an appropriate avenue to placate Maori, in a politically and economically inexpensive way. As W.H. Oliver dryly observes, “(i)t was not expected to hear many claims, to meet often or to cost much”.\(^{24}\) This proved seriously incorrect, evidenced by the consequences of several Waitangi Tribunal findings and recommendations as will be elaborated below. One consequence has been that nearly the entire operation of the Native Land Court, established in the 1860s to create individual title to communally owned Maori lands so they could be sold, was found to be acting contrary to the *Tiriti*.\(^{25}\)

It has been the Tribunal which has been at the nexus of the interplay between neoliberal policies and greater autonomy and transfers of ‘assets’ to Maori. As Paul Joseph has argued, the Tribunal’s work has evolved in the midst of a collision between two contradictory forces: on the one hand, a genuine political will to improve the situation for Maori; on the other, a new commitment to neo-liberal economic policies that transformed state structures and undermined the capacity to fulfil the promises generated by that political will.\(^{26}\) Despite being placed in this potentially conflicting position the Tribunal has continued to be viewed and utilised by Maori as an avenue to have historical injustices investigated and redressed, evidenced by the continual registering of new cases. In this sense we can understand that many Maori view the function of the Tribunal as one of historical and societal significance.

And the Tribunal Reports have contributed significantly to a systematic documentation of Maori grievances and greater legitimation of redress and compensation. In addition, the Tribunal has not been constrained to historical investigation but has allowed investigation into present and future rights, such as those relating to minerals and future technologies. Tribunal reports have therefore often been critical of Government actions. The Tribunal has even acknowledged the commodifying nature of the Government’s neoliberal policies.\(^{27}\) In the *Muriwhenua Report*, the Tribunal highlighted the discrepancies between the kinds of values

\(^{24}\) Ibid.


enshrined in the *Tiriti* and the commodifying nature of the Government’s neoliberal policies. \(^{28}\) The Tribunal argued that not only was the fisheries quota management system, established by the Government fundamentally in breach of the *Tiriti*, but that “fishing has become corporatised. The Government has issued shares in a resource that was once seen as publicly owned ... it has created a property interest in the right to harvest”. \(^{29}\)

This perception of the role of the Tribunal as an ‘activist’ diverges from the Aotearoa New Zealand government’s view of it as merely a pacification mechanism and a facilitator for finalising agreements. Recent governments have become impatient with the speed with which the Tribunal is investigating and reporting on cases, in tandem with general Pakeha public opinion. \(^{30}\) This has led to recent governments expanding the significance placed on the work of the Office of Treaty Settlements, encouraging Maori to enter into direct negotiations with the Crown, thus sidelining the Tribunal.

One of the most insightful cases involving the Tribunal in the nexus between Maori and the neoliberal agenda came as the Government sought to implement ‘reforms’. As a central cornerstone to the Government’s neoliberal agenda, the State Owned Enterprises (SOE) Act 1986 sought to corporatise and privatise state owned assets. Many of these State Owned Enterprises owned lands which were subject to Maori claims through the Waitangi Tribunal, or lands which Maori may have intentions of claiming in the future. The New Zealand Maori Council took the Crown to court highlighting section 9 of the SOE Act which states that “Nothing in this Act shall permit the Crown to act in a manner that is inconsistent with the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi”. \(^{31}\) In the *New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-General* case the Court of Appeal ruled that the principles of the *Tiriti* included protecting land from alienation which was subject to claim under the Tribunal. \(^{32}\) As a result the Act was found by the Court of Appeal to be unlawful in breaching the principles of the *Tiriti*.

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29 Oliver, 1991, p. 34.
The case was settled by Parliament enacting the Treaty of Waitangi (State
Enterprises) Act 1988 which required that all Crown land which was sold was
required to carry memorials when privatised, which meant the land could be
returned to the Crown and subsequently to Maori if a claim was proven. The
precedent was set however that “the duty of the Crown is not merely passive but
extends to active protection of Maori people in the use of their land and waters to
the fullest extent possible”.33 This decision was a far cry from the judgement of
Judge Prendergast in 1877 who ruled that the Treaty was a simple nullity.34 It is also
an important indication, not merely that perceptions of the Tiriti and potential scope
of settlements and Maori development has changed, but also who is deemed
actively responsible.

Sections 9 and 27 of the SOE Act were enacted in such a hurried way that it has been
argued that the Government in fact conceded much more than they would have
under ordinary circumstances. As Jane Kelsey argues,

\[(g)iven \text{ the urgency there was little opportunity for a detailed scrutiny of the}
\text{two clauses by other officials or consultation with Maori. Neither Cabinet}
\text{nor caucus was involved ... Indeed it is quite possible that the clauses would}
\text{not have survived the normal vetting processes.}\]35

Thus, the legal action taken by the New Zealand Maori Council ensured that the
Treaty of Waitangi was incorporated into common law and Courts were enabled to
make rulings on it. Ironically, this change with significant benefits for Maori,
emerged out of hasty legislative change, a tactic often used by the Labour
Government to hurry neoliberal policies through Parliament without public
consultation.

The New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-General case may have highlighted to the
Government that if the settlements process proceeded through the courts and in an
ad hoc fashion this could be financially disastrous. More expedient would be a more
formalised process. Therefore the initiation of the settlements process was in a sense
a Government concession forced by Maori. Some Maori interpreted the
Government’s moves as a “damage control strategy to neutralise court imposed

\[33\] Ibid, p. 663-664.
\[34\] Wi Parata v Bishop of Wellington [1877] NZJR (NS) 78.
legal settlements”. As Alan Ward observes, “(t)he Maori demand for justice in terms of the Treaty was overwhelming, and Parliament could not turn its back.”

More importantly however, when the National Government resumed the Settlement process in the early 1990s the country was feeling the effects of extreme neoliberal policies. Unemployment had risen significantly, particularly amongst Maori, leading to increased numbers of people receiving government assistance. At the same time the number of government benefits was being reduced. These realities, combined with the National Government’s equally neoliberal approach, were leading to increased animosity amongst the population to ‘dependency’ on the state, particularly Maori dependency. Between 1989 and 1990, the total number of benefit payments to unemployed workers increased by 20 percent. In 1991, receipt of benefits was also increasingly disparate rising to 15 percent for Pakeha and 31 percent for Maori. The settlement process was influenced therefore by a desire to make Maori ‘independent’ from the state in a very restricted and monetary sense. The debates surrounding ‘state dependency’ only increased racist attitudes within Aotearoa New Zealand about Maori as ‘lazy dole bludgers’, draining the hard earned resources of others.

In 1994, in an attempt to place limits on Treaty settlements, Maori were offered a settlement package which became known as the “Fiscal Envelope”. The Crown’s proposal stated that a limited sum of one billion dollars was being made available for the settlement of all Maori claims. The proposal sought to clarify, who could bring claims to the Waitangi Tribunal, restrict the types of claims and finalise the preliminary boundaries for negotiation. The proposal also outlined particular kinds of governance structures which have come to be required structures before the transfer of assets takes place. Essentially, the Fiscal Envelope proposals sought to

38 Lashley, 2000, p. 32.
41 Ibid.
limit and govern Maori claims and future structures in forms and ways determined by and expedient to the Government.

The proposal was rejected outright by tribes throughout the country at meetings called by the Government and Maori. Not only was the sum perceived as astonishingly low to many Maori, but also no formula was provided as to how the sum had been determined, and many assumed it was merely arbitrary. Alan Ward makes the point that if all Maori claimants argued for ‘just compensation’ in the legal sense of the value of the asset cost plus compound interest the figure of one billion dollars is ridiculously low. Additionally, the way in which the Government claimed to be seeking consultation while making it clear that much of the offer was non-negotiable was widely resented. This was contrary to the forms of consultation laid down in the Waitangi Tribunal Manukau Report in which the Tribunal noted, “(a) failure to consult may be seen as an affront to the standing of indigenous tribes”.

In response to the Fiscal Envelope and the Government’s separation therein of broad Treaty implications from the settlements, participants at the 1995 Hirangi meeting in Turangi attempted to reconnect the issues. They proposed various models for constitutional change, including a senate, regional representation and separate Governments. In reply, the Government “rejected the suggestion that the settlement process was in any way a constitutional matter”. This once more enabled the Government to limit the potential avenues and scope for settlements as well as future Maori development.

**SEPARATION FOR COMMODIFICATION**

Not only is the historical nature of the settlements process important for Maori development, so too is the potential for further future political development

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through constitutional change. This aim conflicts sharply with Government ideas about limiting the potential scope of settlements and the potential scope of *tino rangatiratanga* as a component of Maori development.

A key strategy of the Government Treaty settlements process has been to allow negotiation on only a narrow range of issues which it has deemed acceptable. They have separated the settlements process from broader *Tiriti* issues like constitutional change. This parallels a neoliberal claim of removing the ‘political’ from the economic, while increasingly applying the economic to areas previously governed in other ways as discussed in Chapter Two. Such separations inherently favour the Government position and allows Maori only limited scope to actually achieve what they consider important. Even Treasury noted in 1988 that “Maoridom is often distrustful of the separation of social and economic goals”.  

Maori have sought to resist such a separation of the issues, continually reasserting that broad *Tiriti* issues must always be contextualised and examined holistically.

To counteract such a skewing of the debate, members of the *Tino Rangatiratanga* Maori Independence movement have counter-targeted the normative level and persisted in negotiating in terms of justice and rights.  

(a)ny agreement that sees financial return as the equivalent of rangatiratanga, or that accepts as its values-base the beliefs that profit is the same as redress for colonisation will not be full and final – and it will sadly cause division and discontent.  

Jackson argues that issues surrounding the *Tiriti* and rights derived from it must always be located in the political economic context as they come from a process of colonisation, of dispossession of one people, land, culture and law by another. He says, “(t)he attempt to isolate the Treaty of Waitangi from that political reality is to remove it from its truth. It is to confine Maori people forever to that limbo, somewhere between laughter and tears”.  

Jackson’s argument relocates the legacy of colonialism as centrally important overriding solely commodity concerns.

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Chapter Eight: Intra-state Indigenous Development

The New Zealand Law Commission also supports an understanding of the Settlement process as more holistic. In their report on *Maori Custom and Values in New Zealand* Law they state,

(i) if society is truly to give effect to the promise of the Treaty of Waitangi to provide a secure place for Maori values within New Zealand society, then the commitment must be total. It must involve a real endeavour to understand what tikanga Maori is, how it is practised and applied and how integral it is to the social, economic, cultural and political development of Maori still encapsulated within a dominant culture in New Zealand society. 51

What they appear to be arguing for here is not merely an incorporation of the broader political and constitutional implications with the economic but for Maori culture to be seen on its own terms. 52 Actually doing so may be more productive in achieving lasting settlements if people feel that their grievances have been accorded greater recognition and resolution.

Part of the Government’s broader categorisation tactic has been the separation of the Articles of the *Tiriti*, which is a complex process in several respects. 53 It is part of the Government’s tactic to redefine the meaning of the *Tiriti*, but is also about the withdrawal of provisions for its citizens as facilitated by neoliberal policies. Gina Rudland argues that it is “unhelpful and unfaithful to the Treaty to talk in a disjunctive sense about Article I rights, Article II rights and Article III rights. Rather it is important to see the Treaty, as Maori see all things, as interrelated threads of the same story”. 54

The partitioning of the Articles appears to parallel what occurred in the Fiscal Envelope Proposal. 55 The Government did not refer to the Articles or the Principles of the Treaty as expressed for example in *New Zealand Maori Council vs. Attorney-

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52 A similar point was made in the Canadian *R v. Sparrow* judgement which stated that “it is possible, and indeed crucial, to be sensitive to the aboriginal perspective itself on the meaning of the rights at stake”. *R v. Sparrow*, [1990] 1 SCR. 1075.
53 In Article Two Maori are guaranteed the “full exclusive and undisturbed possession of their lands and estates, forest, fisheries and other properties…” Article Three guarantees Maori “all the rights and privileges of British subjects”. For the full text of Te Tiriti see the Appendix.
55 Although often denied publicly, anecdotal evidence suggests the fiscal envelope proposal continues to be government policy.
General, although the versions of the Treaty were included in an appendix to the Summary Proposal. Instead they carefully re-wrote seven principles which were used in lieu. Mason Durie has argued that these new seven principles most importantly provided reassurances for non-claimants and only two "gave any indication of fairness to the claimants". This meant an imposition of principles that the Government found acceptable. Durie notes that this encourages the debate further towards commodification as, "(t)he Settlement Principles do not reflect a primary focus on justice as a principle for remedying past injustices".

This government agenda may be designed to curb the boundaries of the principles of the Tiriti which are constantly expanding as they are explicated by the courts and in each new Report from the Waitangi Tribunal. In 1989 the Aotearoa New Zealand government made an attempt to suggest five base principles from a variety of judicial decisions and Tribunal Reports:

- The Principle of Government…The Government has the right to govern;
- The Principle of Self-Management…iwi have the right to organise as iwi, and, under the law, to control their own resources as their own;
- The Principle of Equality…all New Zealanders are equal before the law;
- The Principle of Reasonable Cooperation…Both the Government and iwi are obliged to accord each other reasonable cooperation on major issues of common concern;
- The Principle of Redress…The Government is responsible for providing effective processes for the resolution of grievances in the expectation that reconciliation can occur.

These principles have been greatly expanded by Tribunal Reports, perhaps most crucially the Manukau Report which stated that “The Treaty of Waitangi obliges the Crown not only to recognise the Maori interests in specified in the Treaty but actively to protect them”. For the Government to actively protect Maori rights would require much more to be vested in the Settlements process, in terms of resources for Maori, and also with regards to the terms upon which negotiation takes place moving away from a merely commodified realm.

57 Office of Treaty Settlements, 1994, p. 31-33.
59 Ibid.
60 Mason Durie, “Proceedings of a Hui Held at Hirangi Marae, Turangi”, in McLay, 1995, p. 22
In a more significant respect, there is another way of looking at the distinction between Article Two and Article Three rights, as a distinction between private property rights as opposed to citizenship rights. By ignoring the implications of some of the Article Two and Article Three rights, the Government is able to essentially devolve the responsibility of governing, the responsibility of caring for its Maori citizens, to Maori organisations. Te Whanau o Waipareira Trust and Manukau Maori Urban Authority have subsequently claimed that reductions in funding breach the Crown’s Tiriti responsibilities to Maori.\(^{63}\) Article Two of the Tiriti relates to Maori property rights whereas Article Three relates to Maori as citizens of the country. Under Article Three, Maori are entitled to all the rights of citizenship that other New Zealanders hold including for basic services like health and education. As an unnamed former Tribunal member stated,

\[(p)roviding social justice and equity is the responsibility of Government, not the tribal authorities. If welfare organizations, such as the UMAS, [Urban Maori Authorities] need further resources, funds ought to be provided by Government, not taken from private or tribal collective estates.\(^{64}\)]

Some tribal groups are willing to accept some of this responsibility on the grounds that there is no equity for Maori under Article Three. They point to social status indicators that show Maori to be disadvantaged in almost all areas of achievement: education, health, criminal justice as discussed above.\(^{65}\) Others maintain that it continues to be the Government’s role and it should provide better services.

**COMMODIFICATION AND AFFORDABILITY**

Once a large part of the settlements process became defined by the Government in commodified terms, the essence of the process has moved from one of grievance and violation of rights, to one of transfer and management of capital assets and the redistribution of the dividends acquired from this capital. There are quite different sets of possibilities and solutions for Maori development which stem from each of these definitions of the Settlement process. As was outlined in the Fiscal Envelope Proposal, the issue then becomes one of price and affordability.

\(^{63}\)Lashley, 2000, p. 35-38.

\(^{64}\) An unnamed former tribunal member quoted in Ibid, p. 40. Original emphasis.

\(^{65}\) See for example, Te Puni Kokiri, 2000b.
As Ian Macduff points out, the ‘debate’ surrounding the Fiscal Envelope became one of bargaining over differing solutions, one of which will be pursued until a ‘better’ alternative is suggested. He says this is,

a familiar pattern of the kind of bargaining where all that is at stake is an eventual agreement on price and each knows by some kind of convention that the ‘right’ price is somewhere less than is demanded and more than is offered. But that kind of bargaining does not readily carry over into the negotiation setting where something more than a commodity is at stake.\(^{66}\) Macduff highlights here the very distinction which the Government attempts to conceal, that they are quite strategically offering merely commodities in place of actual rights for Maori. As Macduff argues this has clear implications for how the process of ‘negotiation’ takes place, it is itself a cultural activity, in this case offered as non-negotiable. He suggests that as the negotiation is designed to be one of commodities, it becomes acceptable according to the Government to negotiate as one would regarding commodities. We can surmise however, that if the debate was redesigned to take into account the entire ensemble of Tiriti grievances, including constitutional change as argued by Tino Rangatiratanga advocates, then the process would be required to be more democratic, consultative and slow.\(^{67}\)

One of the central arguments contained in the Fiscal Envelope was the need for the ‘affordability’ of settlements.\(^{68}\) Many Maori responded to this with offence. Mira Szaszy argued, ”Money can never wipe away the blood that has been shed. No settlement can ever efface the tears that have fallen. And those that have suffered most are no longer with us. No, money is not everything”.\(^{69}\) They felt that bargaining over price once again demeaned a process, which should be essentially about justice and not narrowed into monetarism. Sandra Lee argues that narrow ways of looking at the settlement process is unacceptable. She argues,

the Treaty is unique. It is not like any other Government policy. This is ultimately about rights of ownership, rights to possess property. It must therefore be treated in a realm quite distinct from all other policy-making. Treaty settlements should be approached from a statesperson level rather than a political party level. The debate should be elevated to the same level as the GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] Treaty. That was

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\(^{67}\) This point regarding base assumptions producing very different solutions parallels my argument in the next chapter regarding particular types of theorising.

\(^{68}\) See for example Douglas on the next generation not having to pay, Douglas, 1993, p. 208-214

\(^{69}\) Te Puea, quoted in Dame Mira Szaszy, “Comment” in McLay, 1995, p. 113.
overwhelmingly out of the hands of the New Zealand general public. They had no say whatsoever and parliament never had a vote on whether or not we would enter that very significant Treaty.\textsuperscript{70}

Lee raises two significant points here. One is an awareness that the process has been customised away from a moral argument to a monetary one. She argues that this is a “nation to nation issue”.\textsuperscript{71} In this sense, as she suggests, the debate would most aptly remain one over sovereignty and justice not merely monetary claims. As such, this kind of negotiation would potentially exist beyond the ‘normal’ sphere of rigid government boundaries and embody a special status. Such a status would require wider and open negotiation on processes and potential solutions. The second point Lee raises is that in signing the GATT and subsequent neoliberal trade agreements the Government has argued the crucial ‘necessity’ of such agreements, despite potential ‘adverse adjustment costs’ which they may entail. They have signed such agreements in spite of widespread disagreement among the general public. This is not to suggest that such agreements or others should be negotiated in these ways, beyond the say of the general public, just that if the Government was genuinely sincere about the importance of \textit{Tiriti} issues to the future of the nation they should be prepared to go further for a long term settlement.\textsuperscript{72}

**CORPORATE WARRIORS**

The Government is not alone in encouraging the commodification of the Settlement process. The significance of ‘corporate warriors’ in this regard should not be neglected. The term ‘corporate warriors’ has been coined to refer to Maori who claim that the ‘economic’ development of their \textit{iwi} (tribe) is the most important component that will lead to greater social and political development. The corporate warrior perspective claims to attempt to combine a ‘social’ and an ‘economic’ position. Corporate warriors believe that Maori involvement in business can support social ends, without being solely about profit, thus attempting to establish some form of middle ground between ethics and business. Some have argued that


\textsuperscript{71} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{72} Lee’s last point regarding the position of the Settlements at a statesperson level resonates with comments made in the Waitangi Tribunal Fisheries Settlement Report and then later reiterated by the Privy Council in the \textit{Manukau Urban Maori Authority and others v Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries Commission and others} and \textit{Reuben Brian Perenara v Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries Commission and others} judgement 2 July 2001, where it was stated that “treaty matters are more for statesmen than lawyers”.
this fusion of the social back into business ethics means that the presence of Maori business provides a new perspective from which “dominant ethics of the Western order can be questioned”.73

Corporate warriors often agree on a neoliberal avenue for the achievement of social ends, at times articulating these views in terms of Maori self-determination and independence. Prominent Maori member of the extreme neoliberal party ACT, Donna Awatere-Huata perhaps best demonstrates the way that neoliberalism can co-opt or just utilise a discourse of self determination. She says, “I see Rangatiratanga as the right to do your own thing, the right to determine your own destiny. Not to have bureaucrats making those decisions for you”.74 She positions the two options of ‘bureaucrats doing it’ on one side, or ‘doing it yourself’ on the other. In doing so she creates a narrow binary with relationships of implied superiority, that is ‘independence’ and ‘free’ choice over regulation. In addition she casts the discussion as one about rangatiratanga linking the possibility of achieving Maori self-determination through neoliberalism’s ‘self help’. Former Minister of Maori Affairs, Tau Henare extends such a concept of neoliberal principles wider to potentially apply to all Indigenous peoples. He argues that “(b)usiness is a primary medium through which indigenous peoples can achieve some sense of self-determination over their social and economic outcomes”.75 The inadequacy of this view has been explored in the previous chapters demonstrating the greater complexity of particular forms of business when located in cultural terms with values and practices potentially contrary to neoliberal ones.

Awatere’s comments also link more overtly the notion of self-determination with neoliberal devolution. Decentralising Government and shifting service delivery to the private sector is a key neoliberal strategy as described in Chapter Two. Articulating ‘self-determination’ as self-management reduces it to the issue of service delivery by Maori, rather than actual policy formulation or decision-making by Maori. The argument that Maori should provide services to Maori which has been picked up by some Maori, like Awatere, facilitates the Government’s promotion of neoliberal policies to Maori as though they are about wider issues.

The Labour Government’s plans of devolution for the country were taken up with enthusiasm by Maori, when translated into what appeared to be Maori control. In 1984 the Labour Government organised a Hui Taumata to discuss Maori needs and priorities. As Roger Maaka argues,

(t)he call from the conference was quite clear: Maori people wanted to break the dependency cycle of Government welfare schemes and have control over their own destiny. As it happened, this call for autonomy gelled with the free-market policies – “Rogernomics” – espoused by then Minister of Finance Roger Douglas. In this way many Maori unwittingly accommodated neoliberal policies because of their aim to achieve tino rangatiratanga.

Presenting the settlements merely in commodified terms constructs Maori claims as ‘demands’ which are somehow caught up in a neoliberal binary of ‘needs’ and ‘wants’; what are not needs are wants. This makes Maori claims appear unreasonable, selfish and pursued merely for commercial gain, as explored with regard to Indigenous rights more generally in Chapter Four. It is here that the structure of the institution which receives the settlement becomes crucial to determining how these resources will be ‘managed’ for future generations. It is to a consideration of this issue that I now turn.

CORPORATISING THE TRIBE

Several commentators have noted that Maori are not merely ‘citizens’ of the state but possess a dual identity not available to other New Zealanders. It is for this reason that neoliberal advocates must pay so much attention to the structure of the tribe, because it governs that part of Maori and Maori identity which is not directly

or easily governable through the state apparatus. Maori are therefore under pressure to be ruled as citizens and as tribal members.

Throughout the Settlement process the tribe itself has held a dual personality, not only as the entity which is the contracting party to the Tiriti and therefore the central entity with which the Government should be negotiating and settling. But it is also perceived by the Crown and many Maori as the central agent to facilitate Maori development, economically and culturally. Both of these personalities of the tribe have been challenged and both the Government and different Maori groups have sought to actively shape the structure of the tribe in often conflicting ways.

**TRIBE AS DEVELOPMENTAL AGENT**

The role of the tribe as the agent of development is where its identity has been revealed as most problematic. Multiple forces are pressuring the structure and nature of the tribe in different directions concomitant to their versions of development. The Crown and corporate warriors are concerned that the tribe must, most importantly, be able to manage the assets and finances transferred under the settlements in particular ways which keep them within the ambit of prevailing business norms. To this end they seek to ensure that the tribe, or at least a significant branch of it has commercial ends as the ultimate priority.

Some have argued that the settlements process has assisted the revitalisation of the tribe and thereby increasing tribal activity and developing stronger tribal networks. The Maori Economic Development Commission claimed that the settlement process is resulting in the “strengthening of the iwi as the primary unit of Maori society”. And as Kirsty Gover and Natalie Baird argue, the entire Settlements process can not merely be construed as a process of the transfer of assets, because in the process Maori structures, like the tribe, are strengthened because of increased participation. They argue that “claimant groups are likely to remain as significant expressions of Maori autonomy even after a settlement has been negotiated”.

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78 Besides the argument regarding whether the Treaty was more an agreement between hapu subtribes rather than iwi. See for example Watson, 1996, p. 618.


There are also others who conceptualise the identity of the tribe as a nation and as an equal to the Crown, with the continued possession of *tino rangatiratanga* at the forefront of their idea about how the tribe should assist in Maori development. McHugh argues that “*tino rangatiratanga* clearly involves Maori control of Maori assets and resources”.

There have been various attempts by the Crown to regulate and govern the form of the tribe since the *Tiriti*. However, my interest here is more specifically the way that the neoliberal policies of governing have contributed to the corporatisation of the tribe, that is, the way that principles of the market are being applied and are being incorporated within the structure of the tribe.

**NEW ROLES FOR THE TRIBE**

The Labour Government’s plans for the devolution of the services of the Department of Maori Affairs between 1984 and 1990 and subsequent roles of tribal organisations as service providers placed new burdens and roles on those tribal organisations. Initially it appeared that the Government was giving more power to *iwi* (the tribe) in line with Maori demands for control over their own resources. Many Maori perceived these moves as providing them with greater opportunities for the development of “‘Maori solutions to Maori problems’, thus enhancing *tino rangatiratanga* at the local level”. In reality what devolution meant for Maori and *iwi* in particular was

a taking over, on a voluntary basis, work that had been done by the Government departments funded by taxpayers. The theory was that Maori communities could handle Maori problems on their own and the under-resourced groups could implement social policy.

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84 Maaka, 1994, p. 324.
This devolution occurred throughout the country not just to Maori. However in the case of Maori it was the tribe which was essentially left as the organisation to play this role of facilitator or service provider.

During this period, organisations in urban areas were established which had forms less like traditional tribes and more akin to associations or other kinds of companies. Te Whanau o Waipareira Trust and the Manukau Urban Maori Authority were established to help deal with issues for Maori living in Auckland, and these ‘Urban Authorities’ as they have come to be known essentially argue that they are the modern manifestation of the tribe. However these Authorities are not based solely on genealogical links (whakapapa) and Te Whanau o Waipareira acknowledges that they do not only work with Maori but rather the Trust “services predominantly Maori people in West Auckland”. Urban authorities claim that with 25 percent of Maori unaware of their tribal affiliation and now living in cities, and the majority of these being centralised in Auckland, the tribe is no longer a rural based organisation to protect the people, but rather is required to evolve to cater for the changing dynamics of the Maori population. While acknowledging this, many Maori continue to see a role for iwi based on whakapapa and even if based in another region, a role which continues to connect with the traditional tribe.

Shane Jones argues that the urban organisations view this changing environment as requiring the traditional institutions to be modified to cater for the changing needs of Maori. As a result Jones argues that they view the settlements process as essentially to “compensate individual Maori and to assist them to break out of dependency”. In this sense their role as organisations may be one of cultural support, but more importantly is providing programs and services which facilitate the distribution of economic resources to Maori individually and which facilitates individual ‘independence’.

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88 See again Maaka, 1994 on the role of Ngati Kahungunu in the South Island.
One of the Government’s prerequisites before a Settlement agreement is signed is that iwi must restructure the organisation which will receive and administer the settlement. In the Crown Proposals for the Settlement of Treaty Claims, the Crown argued that it wished to be sure that the assets and resources transferred to Maori were “managed and administered within a proper legal structure”\(^9\) This kind of structure includes forms of accounting and representation which the Government deems acceptable.\(^9\) The Government does not directly insist on a particular model for this restructuring, however there are other ways of manipulating this process by encouraging a particular mode of ‘good governance’ through the direct negotiation process with claimants.\(^9\) Anecdotal evidence suggests the Office of Treaty Settlements establishes particular guidelines during negotiations which are non-negotiable. This creates new relations of power and regulation. As part of this restructuring most iwi have accepted a basic division of the ‘social’ from the ‘economic’ arm of the tribe.\(^9\) What this reasserts is a separation of the moral issues of rights, justice and distribution away from the issues of money and money making.

For the Ngati Awa tribe, one of the aspects of their settlement which the Government defined as non-negotiable was that Ngati Awa’s status under Te Runanga o Ngati Awa Act 1988 which brought them in to line with the status of other iwi under the Maori Trust Boards Act 1955, would be repealed. Ngati Awa initially restructured and became a Runanga in 1988 in order to begin negotiations with the Crown. Whilst originally there existed disagreement about conforming to Crown legislation the position came to be viewed as attributing a particular form of authority and legitimacy to the Runanga above any other organisation. Insisting upon Ngati Awa’s agreement for the repeal of this legislation therefore and replacing the current structure with a “general trust”\(^9\) angered Ngati Awa chief

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\(^9\) Ibid, p. 45-46.
\(^9\) This is reminiscent to the way good governance is also prescribed to Pacific states as described in Chapter Two.
\(^9\) See Ngai Tahu, for example, which is comprised of a Ngai Tahu Holding Corporation and a Ngai Tahu. Ngai Tahu Development Corporation. Ngai Tahu website, www.ngaitahu.iwi.nz. Accessed 8/8/02/.
\(^9\) Hirini Mead, Speech on the occasion of the initialling of the Ngati Awa Deed of Settlement, Wellington, 8 July 2002.
negotiator Hirini Mead. Mead argued that this move to a general trust insulted the status of Ngati Awa as a nation. He argues that such a Trust is “not designed to meet the needs of Maori groups such as our iwi. In our view this proposed Trust belittles us”. Central to the Government’s purpose in this instance is the issue of tax which Te Runanga o Ngati Awa as a Charitable Trust, currently does not pay. The Government is ensuring that the new “Governance entity” to take possession of assets and funding from the Settlement will pay tax to the Government in the future, thus in effect remaining to a certain degree accountable to government and within a certain ambit of government regulation. What is significant about this component of the settlement is both the implications it has for settlements between the Government and other tribes but also the comment that it makes on how the tribe gets defined. In this instance Ngati Awa is being treated as synonymous with an association of individuals. Being rendered in this way reduces Ngati Awa’s identity as a nation and re-categorises it within a conception of society that is not so much comprised of nations as of individuals, reiterating a neoliberal understanding of society. While some within Ngati Awa were in fact agreeable to this idea, because it made Ngati Awa ‘free’ from the previous legislation, the grounds upon which this ‘freedom’ was granted must seriously be questioned.

The Fisheries Commission (Te Ohu Kaimoana) which is a result of a pan Maori settlement with the Crown regarding fisheries has been instrumental in the perpetuation of a corporate structure for the tribe. Te Ohu Kaimoana has identified “fundamental principles of organisation and governance relationships that iwi must comply with, in order to receive fisheries assets”. If iwi do not comply they will not receive their portion of the settlement. To date no allocations have been made due to litigation. They insist that iwi registers should be established to account for tribal members. While such registers at one level may be productive in reconnecting Maori with the tribe, this move fundamentally restructures Maori identity by, in this

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96 Mead, 2002.
97 In line with Article 24 (B) of the Maori Trust Boards Act 1955.
98 Initialled Deed of Settlement, Section 2.
99 The Ngati Awa Deed of Settlement will also become legislation, including the specifications for the governance entity.
100 As is also the case with the terms of the Indigenous inclusion in IR and IPE.
102 Allocation may now take place after the High Court removed an injunction see, “Court Clears Way for Fisheries Commission” The Dominion Post, 31 July 2002.
instance a single entity, redefining the tribe and the relationship Maori can have with it, the effects of which are as yet unclear. With the introduction of iwi registers, many Maori who are unaware of their tribe risk losing the ability to ‘earn’ or be part of their tribe despite the fact that they should have access. For young urban Maori out of communication with their ‘traditional’ tribe, but who participate within pan-Maori urban authorities, the risks are the greatest.

These changes have modified the form of the actual iwi organisation, but perhaps more importantly they have also changed the relationship that members of the tribe have with it. The relationship has shifted from communitarian conceptions or interaction towards a contractual relations between individuals and agencies. The concept of iwi is a cornerstone of the very way that Maori interact to support their turangawaewae103 and other cultural values. By corporatising iwi, Maori can expect to experience a radical variance in the way that such an organisation survives and how people relate with it.

Tipene O’Regan has argued that the best form for the tribe is one in which tribal members are seen as shareholders who are allocated dividends accruing to them in the form of a voucher. They are then able to choose, either to redeem their voucher for cash or for a share in the company/tribe. O’Regan argues that “By this mechanism (or something like it) individuals, families or groups of kin could build their own personal stake and hold assets in their own right”.104 This kind of structure places a large emphasis on property and dividends and on the choices of individuals even though they may be made in relation to other individuals.

O’Regan’s corporate version of the tribe demonstrates a significantly different kind of relationship amongst tribal members than one outlined by Eddie Durie. Durie argues that tribal relations in the past and which have relevance to the current situation were more concerned with relationships than property. Durie argues that the “common feature … of Maori law was that it was not in fact about property, but about arranging relationships between people”.105 Furthermore, he argues that the “standard contract was gift, with the expectation of a return in due course. The

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103 Translated as ‘a place to stand’.
104 O’Regan, 2001, p. 16.
purpose was to establish a permanent and personal relationship with reciprocal obligations where the main benefit to both sides would come in the course of time.\textsuperscript{106} While Durie’s explanation primarily regards tribes in the 19th century, many of these concepts continue to have relevance and be seen in the modern context in tribal activities and on marae.\textsuperscript{107} Additionally Durie is referring to relations between different tribes, however these kinds of concepts have similar implications within the tribe itself and are significantly different from those espoused by O’Regan. This highlights the particular ways that O’Regan’s version of the tribe is corporate and primarily concerned about property and profit and the distribution of this to individuals. Despite O’Regan’s attempt to demonstrate how a tribal and corporate structure are successfully merged, the fundamental differences remain, that relationships and genealogy remain of utmost importance for many tribal member interactions while corporate structures on the whole tend to create individual relations for monetary dividends.

Corporate bodies are said to be “representing tribal membership”,\textsuperscript{108} but even if elected questions of accountability and mandate are significant. Te Ohu Kaimoana for instance, is fundamentally a Government appointed body, coming under the Treaty of Waitangi (Fisheries Claims) Act 1992, and reporting to a Minister of the Crown, which makes the question of sovereignty and mandate critical here. What kind of mandate does Te Ohu Kaimoana have to insist on restructured tribal structures if each \textit{iwi} are said to hold their own \textit{tino ranagatiratanga}? The Government has exploited such divisions to ensure those who do not adhere to their perspective are sidelined.

\textsuperscript{106} Ibid, p. 455.
\textsuperscript{107} Marae are tribal meeting houses/places.
\textsuperscript{108} Jones, 2000, p. 165.
THE TIRITI: RELEVANCE AS INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION MECHANISM

The Treaty settlements process has contributory effects for what Maori expect from the Government when negotiating at an international level. The kinds of successes achieved through using the Tiriti and associated rights as a protection mechanism at a national level have also been translated to the international arena by Maori. Since the completion of the GATT and as a result of the various developments discussed above Maori have begun to actively attempt to apply the kinds of mechanisms for consultation they are accustomed to and the kinds of clauses in national legislation, to international neoliberal trade and investment agreements such as the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) and the Singapore–New Zealand Closer Economic Partnership. In this sense, despite the Government’s intentions, the Treaty settlements process has increased Maori expectations of the level of their involvement in international negotiations and their ability to use the Tiriti for leverage in these negotiations.

During the negotiations of the MAI, an agreement on investment which would make it easier for foreign investors to operate as well as be more rigorously bind governments to its terms, was protested by Maori utilising the Tiriti.¹⁰⁹ Those Maori who rejected the deal highlighted the inappropriateness of the Government entering into an international Treaty which would “give foreign investors enforceable priority over resources and intellectual property that Maori were fighting to control”.¹¹⁰ In this case the Government conceded to inserting a reservation clause into a footnote to the Agreement, which made reference to the Tiriti and Maori. This was a significant step for Maori resistance to their exclusion and set a precedent which the Government has had difficulty ignoring. Now that these negotiations have broken down it remains moot whether the clause would remain in a newly conceived form of the Agreement.

The Singapore-New Zealand Closer Economic Partnership Agreement which proposed among other things to support general neoliberal policies, “to liberalise bilateral trade in goods and services and to establish a framework conducive to

bilateral investments”\textsuperscript{111} and to ‘liberate’ trade and investment between Singapore and New Zealand, also ignited active protests from Tino Rangatiratanga advocates.\textsuperscript{112} These advocates argued that this agreement would marginalize Maori further by damaging industries where Maori predominate and once again ignored Maori as a Treaty partner nation.\textsuperscript{113} Eventually a clause was inserted into the Agreement which states that “nothing in this Agreement shall preclude the adoption by Aotearoa New Zealand of measures it deems necessary to accord more favourable treatment to Maori in respect of matters covered by this Agreement including in fulfilment of its obligations under the Treaty of Waitangi”.\textsuperscript{114} As Benedict Kingsbury notes, despite its limited nature this article does present a potentially important precedent for Maori and other Indigenous peoples seeking to be included in the negotiation of international agreements.\textsuperscript{115}

Many Tino Rangatiratanga advocates argue that for the Crown to be actively upholding the partnership inherent in the \textit{Tiriti} they would need to obtain the consent of Maori before any agreements or treaties were entered into. Mason Durie also suggests that in exercising their indigeneity “Maori might wish to establish closer relations with many other groups, apart from the Crown, including other indigenous peoples, even to sign treaties with them”.\textsuperscript{116} These assertions using the \textit{Tiriti} strengthen Moana Jackson’s argument that, “(t)he Treaty is not an illusion of political authority, it is a re-affirmation of the rights of Maori to determine their own lives”\textsuperscript{117} and this includes their international relations.

\textsuperscript{111} Part 1, Article 1 (b) Agreement Between New Zealand and Singapore on a Closer Economic Partnership, see Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade website for the full text, \url{http://www.mfat.govt.nz/foreign/regions/sea/singcep5.html}. Accessed 15/08/2002.

\textsuperscript{112} Aotearoa Educators [AE!] “Prague Style Protests to Hit Aotearoa if Singapore Deal Continues” Press Release, 26th September 2000. See also Aotearoa Educators [AE!] “Potential Threat to Singaporean Investment by Maori”, Press Release, 4\textsuperscript{th} August 2000.

\textsuperscript{113} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{117} Moana Jackson in McLay, 1995, p. 157.
Corporate warriors are quick to emphasise the positive potential of international neoliberal agreements and institutions. They claim that Maori are more dependent on primary export industries than Pakeha, which makes international trade and finance agreements even more crucial to their survival. Corporate warriors argue, “Maori have a powerful self-interest in promoting trade liberalisation”. Their essential claim is that Maori assets have a heavier reliance on exporting than the average Aotearoa New Zealand producer. They point to statistics which suggests that “the typical Maori produced export faces a 9.2% tariff from the major industrial nations compared to a figure of 6.1% for New Zealand exports in general”. The conclusion they draw from these statistics is that Maori should therefore support tariff elimination in general. The hosting of APEC in 1999 also led many Maori Government officials to become seriously involved in the promotion of neoliberal policies for Maori. Minister of Maori Affairs at the time, Tau Henare reiterated that, “Maori have a lot to gain from trade liberalisation”. The statistics and proposals put forward by those Maori advocating neoliberalism however, remain questionable given the evidence above regarding the detrimental effects of these polices on Maori to date.

In the same way that some Pakeha are involved with rejecting neoliberal policies and agendas and supporting Maori claims at a domestic level, this cooperation has also translated to the international level. Significant cooperation is beginning to take place as anarchists, environmentalists, animal rights activists, trade unionists and Tino Rangatiratanga advocates begin to work together and in combination with international movements against neoliberalism. Maori representatives have been active participants in international anti-neoliberal forums such as the Peoples Global Action Against ‘Free’ Trade and the World Trade Organisation, (PGA) and have adopted various tactics from these forums. Global days of action, have become a common practice, where the Tiriti and a Tiriti partnership is recognised by those involved as more productive than a sale of assets to investors with a limited stake in

\[\text{Chapter Eight: Intra-state Indigenous Development}\]

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119 Ibid.
120 Henare in Kia Mohio, 1999, p. 12.
the country. This provides hope for the potential to overcome the difficulties described above.

**REFLECTIONS**

Put simply, to ‘develop’ is largely about the future. It is about focussing on the way that people want their society to be. To get there however, Maori require a fundamental redress of the past. For Maori the pre-requisites for development are the return of land and resources which were wrongfully taken and the political economic power to determine how Maori society will be constructed therein. For the Government the redress of what they perceive as historical claims are also central to ideas of Maori development. The Government however, appears to adhere to the understanding that the past can be settled, fully, finally and ‘economically’.

Treaty settlements and questions of tino rangatiratanga are therefore inextricable from Maori development. Despite the Government’s agenda to separate and narrowly categorise, commodify and dominate these issues, it appears likely that they will continue to be disrupted by Maori. Maori, in all their diversity including corporate warriors, reconnect the past with their current obligations, whether these are within cities, whanau, hapu or iwi, and what Maori are due in the current political economy.

Resistance has come from Maori independence advocates: through a reconnection of the political and the economic, by maintaining an articulation of rights and constitutional change which rests beyond the confines of neoliberal acceptability, through the utilisation of the courts, and through using the Tiriti as a protect mechanism at both the national and international levels.

In this chapter the divergences regarding the Settlements process have demonstrated that a Maori conception of tino rangatiratanga as guaranteed under the Tiriti is incongruous to a neoliberal reform agenda and conception of sovereignty.
Chapter Eight: Intra-state Indigenous Development

The principle divergence rests upon the Maori assumption that *tino rangatiratanga* is both political and economic and it is the ability of the individual to determine types of laws and organisation structures but does not necessarily require territorial integrity. Neoliberal advocates on the other hand, have a version of sovereignty/self-determination which revolves around the concept of ‘economic’ sovereignty and the ability to determine economic choices from which other benefits will supposedly follow.

On the question of sovereignty, the case of Maori may demonstrate that while neoliberal policies of reform are articulated differently in different countries and circumstances, the commonalities between Maori and other Indigenous peoples in the Pacific are that they have all been treated as though they are in need of neoliberal reform and have been denied the opportunity to continue to pursue forms of governance which are contrary to neoliberalism. They are treated as citizens but only insofar as this allows them to be neoliberal citizens. They are treated as tribal members but only insofar as this allows them to be corporatised. While neoliberal policies recognise and pay attention to Indigenous structures of governance; this is not a respectful interaction, it is not a two-way interaction, only insofar as neoliberal advocates make rhetorical concessions in order to maintain the implementation of their policies.

In a very intimate example what this chapter has demonstrated are the kinds of conditions upon the visibility of Indigenous peoples. We can see that to achieve recognition, visibility, credibility and therefore inclusion within a neoliberal vista and regime Indigenous peoples are pressured to accept neoliberal values and policies. Like the previous three chapters I have attempted to explore in this chapter the kinds of values and realities which are underestimated or ignored by neoliberal advocates and the way that resistance is always present in this process. In this chapter I suggested that neoliberal commodifying ideals have been applied to Maori through the Government’s Treaty settlements process and that this is having serious repercussions for Maori organising techniques and the structure of the tribe. I highlighted Maori actions and strategies as resistances inextricable from re-colonising practices.

An even broader conclusion we can draw here is that neoliberal advocates are not discriminatory in the sense of what they *work through*. They utilise many kinds of
identities or organisational structures and attempt to ‘reform’ them. For Maori this has meant through their identity as citizens and as members of tribes. In the next concluding chapter I will suggest some implications this has for the way we think about the relationship between governing and the hierarchies of knowledge which support the neoliberal agenda.
As I was re-writing this Conclusion in Canberra, the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs Alexander Downer gave a speech regarding Australia’s aid program. In the speech, Downer argued that some states in this world succeed while others fail. Those that succeed he argued, do so through economic growth, by implementing outward looking policies and good governance that is, by conforming to neoliberal policies. He suggested, of course, that the states of the Pacific were not these successes but rather fit the category of “poor performers” “beset by problems that will continue for the foreseeable future”.¹ Downer appeared very disappointed with the poor performers but gloomily conceded that perhaps the Australian community should “match our expectations with the reality on the ground”.² I laughed, and cried, at the fact that Downer had managed to prove many aspects of this thesis, particularly regarding derogatory perceptions of Indigenous peoples, all over again in a very short and simplistic speech.

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² Ibid.
I began this thesis by making several observations about how many of my initial assumptions have been irrevocably challenged and my quest to fight evil has become considerably more complex.

Recognition of this complexity has also produced some surprisingly positive results. My desire to destroy a thing called neoliberalism blurred and in the course of research I came to see neoliberalism in many ways as a smaller component of something larger – re-colonisation, and something even larger again – long standing Western practices. The kinds of linkages between these components hinted at a genealogy of particular kinds of perceptions about Indigenous peoples. Put simply, these perceptions hint that Indigenous and other non-Western people are inferior and require reform of their political economic and cultural organisation in order to achieve human betterment. One of the conditions associated with a small measure of this human betterment was statehood. In the Pacific it soon became apparent that statehood merely brought new kinds of state hierarchies and a continuation of the original Western perceptions articulated in new ways. The embedding of neoliberal policies and agendas in the Pacific in many ways continues these Western perceptions by now ascribing to the state and state functions criticisms which previously were more overtly directed at Pacific peoples.

The recognition of more complex propositions and the utilisation of broader understandings of re-colonisation and Indigenous resistance makes those scholars who are resistant to complexities more noticeable. These scholars reject complexities if they do not produce a solution, a model for change or a policy prescription. They see the work of seeking and exploring complexities as saying nothing, concluding nothing and progressing nowhere. Many Indigenous peoples however, argue that generalised models and policy prescriptions which claim to be able to explain all elements of world affairs are not only presumptuous but could not ever be suitable for all regions, everywhere. In addition, while neoliberal advocates seek models, Indigenous peoples are often already living mediated and negotiated lives, beyond and different from neoliberal models. As each of the chapters in this thesis demonstrated, articulating the current status of Pacific countries from a model with ‘problems’ requiring ‘solutions’, creates a very different kind of analysis than starting from the premise that there are complex ways of operating with differing consequences for different peoples at different points. By arguing this more nuanced understanding in the thesis I have problematised the binary of ‘problem’
and ‘solution’ which too neatly maps an idea of ‘bad’ and ‘good’. As I argued in the Introduction, articulating complex ideas as good or bad tempts researchers to reproduce particular truth claims and thus maintains particular kinds of hierarchies of knowledge.

The role of academia and research in the process of legitimising not only neoliberalism but also wider Western assumptions and practices is central to re-colonisation. Mainstream interpretations of International Relations (IR) and International Political Economy (IPE) are particularly implicated as neoliberal accounts dominate these disciplines. To support these claims, I constructed the chapters in this thesis according to a framework considered ‘standard’ in IR and IPE. These ‘standard’ areas of enquiry are, as I have demonstrated, expected to contain particular kinds of components and to utilise particular methods to assess them. In the Pacific these expectations, pre-requisites and standards are not present or are inadequate to account for what takes place. I have argued that the categories of production and trade, finance and development, considered the centre of IPE by neoliberal and many other scholars are more than inadequate for the task of explaining the international political economy of the Pacific. What are defined as impermeable, practical categories for studying IPE can be seen to be modelled on Europe, these categories either do not exist in the Pacific or exist in radically different forms. Deeper than a mere discrepancy over ‘what is’, these inadequacies demonstrate the dangers of theorising using singular and supposedly unproblematic versions of what exists, when this precondition itself does not.

I have shown in this thesis that forms of knowledge matter. And the scholar matters. The experiences, subjectivities and strategies of the scholar are important components of understanding what kinds of activities are taking place in the international political economy. For neoliberals to utilise a form of knowledge which ignores multiple techniques, and purports to possess neutral, objective solutions, is inadequate. The inadequacy does not end there. I have also shown in this thesis that the kinds of values underpinning neoliberal assumptions also overlook, underestimate and construct inadequate accounts and subsequent solutions for the Pacific. It is these practices which I have shown are integral to re-colonisation.
Paralleling the use of knowledge hierarchies in re-colonising practices, Indigenous scholars have seen their role in the act of naming re-colonisation as crucial to resisting these practices, marking connections between activism and academia. Articulating claims which actively seek to bring about change suggests that many Indigenous scholars are resisting through academia. Likewise they have highlighted the centrality that particular conceptions of the claimed neutrality of knowledge and the scholar have for re-colonising practices. As I argued in Chapter Two and Three, the conflict between many Indigenous and other intellectuals often revolves around conflicts over who does or does not admit the political nature of their knowledge and the position from which theorising takes place. I have shown that one way to negotiate through this seeming impasse may be to highlight the inextricable nexus of “power/knowledge”\(^3\) and thus the social consequences of knowledge, particularly knowledge that is privileged.

Furthermore, my research shows that understanding Indigenous strategies in terms of resistance can assist in understanding that these cultures are living and dynamic and suggests that Indigenous peoples do not merely exist in a binary with a singular, all-powerful re-coloniser. Much Indigenous resistance skews this binary notion by operating on overlapping and multiple ‘sides’. Indigenous resistance strategies are constantly re-creating the very identities and organisational structures that neoliberalism seeks to work through, problematising this re-colonisation.

It would not be enough however for neoliberal accounts, or the disciplines of IR and IPE to acknowledge Indigenous forms of knowledge and Indigenous peoples. Such acknowledgement from pre-existing frames already occurs, but does not change re-colonising practices. As I have shown neoliberalism instead works through many kinds of organisational structures and identities, for example, using calls for empowerment to equate to a narrow ‘economic’ independence, using tribal structures but attempting to make them corporate, and writing social impact assessments after the deal is done. The compromises and concessions supposedly made by neoliberals are merely rhetorical however; new articulations of old practices.

**THEMES OF THE SITES OF CONTESTATION**

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Chapter Nine: Conclusion

The most significant of the themes of this thesis has been that neoliberal policies and agendas are inadequate in the Pacific. I suggested this inadequacy stemmed from two underpinning neoliberal assumptions. Firstly the assumption discussed in Chapter Two, that Indigenous peoples, even as rulers of their own states are not entirely capable of ruling themselves. The reasons given for treating Indigenous peoples as though they are not entirely capable emerge from claims that Indigenous cultures and traditions are rigid and fixed in time. Further it is claimed that these countries have problems which rigid ‘traditional’ methods are unable to manage and which neoliberal policies and agendas are best placed to alleviate. This leads to the second problematic underpinning assumption of neoliberalism regarding property and ownership.

As I argued in Chapter Seven, reflecting long-standing Western perspectives neoliberal advocates have particular ideas about the potential for resources, such as intellectual and cultural property rights, land and sea, to be owned in ways that are inconsistent with the way Indigenous people perceive these. I have shown that this leads to very different subsequent conceptions of development which make the economic development advocated by neoliberals often incongruous to Indigenous conceptions. Since development is such a central issue for Pacific states categorised as ‘developing’, I have shown that these quite fundamental differences indicate that neoliberal policies and agendas are not as suitable as neoliberals claim.

The next significant recurring theme in these different sites is that neoliberal assessments of the Pacific overlook and underestimate a range of fundamental activities taking place. In Chapter Five I outlined the importance of the concept of livelihood as it includes semi-subsistence work which is prevalent in the Pacific but which is viewed pejoratively by neoliberals. In Chapter Six I argued that remittances play a huge role in the movement of capital throughout the Pacific and yet these are not perceived as serious avenues for economic development by neoliberals, but are viewed negatively as encouraging dependency. I have shown that because neoliberals overlook and underestimate these activities which play an extremely significant role in the Pacific, then their conception of Pacific realities must be brought into question.

The next argument I make is that the practices of re-colonisation and resistance are entangled. By demonstrating this entanglement I extended both the concept of re-
colonisation and that of Indigenous resistance to highlight that neither is monolithic or all-powerful but constantly under negotiation. In Chapter Six I explored the Offshore Financial Centres in the Pacific and the way that they could be perceived not only as exemplars of neoliberalism but also as pursuing such policies as a state strategy for a form of growth that could move away from neoliberal prescriptions. In addition, in Chapter Eight I argued that Maori corporate warriors advocate self-determination for Maori but that they also view this as largely financial and as involving the corporatisation of the tribe.

Another argument in this thesis has been that neoliberal policies and agendas work through many different kinds of identities and organisational structures. In Chapter Eight I argued that the Government of Aotearoa New Zealand and corporate warriors seek to restructure the tribe in ways conducive to corporate and neoliberal standards. These kinds of changes I suggested will have significant effects on the kinds of relationships tribal members have with each other and with the tribal entity. Additionally I argued that the call from many Maori for self-determination was entangled with the process of reducing the ambit of the state and encouraging non-governmental entities to accept this work. In light of neoliberal policies working through many kinds of organisational structures and identities, including Indigenous identities based on calls for independence from these very policies, I have shown that recognition and visibility alone are not sufficient. Visibility, both in practice and in the disciplines of IR and IPE, must be tempered by a critical gaze at the terms under which this visibility is made possible. This was also borne out in Chapter Eight where I showed how the Treaty Settlements process perpetuates the subordination of Maori tribes to Government control and design. Maori are visible in the process, but are now being disenfranchised as they are rendered as corporatised associations of individuals.

The final argument which has perhaps more implicitly entwined each of these chapters has been that the effects of neoliberal policies to date in the Pacific have been detrimental to people and the environment. In Chapter Five, I showed that neoliberal policies to encourage investment were putting pressure on governments to accept environmental destruction as a necessary cost. Additionally in Chapter Five I argued that neoliberal advocates even acknowledged the likelihood of ‘adjustment costs’ from their ‘free’ trade policies, but also proclaimed them necessary. In Chapter Six I argued that the way in which investment is being
encouraged by Pacific governments perpetuates particular kinds of stereotypes about Pacific peoples which may also have an impact on the perceptions of the abilities of Indigenous people to govern themselves. In Chapter Eight I concluded that Maori have experienced a quite specific worsening of their standards of living as a result of neoliberal policies.

**SO WHERE DO THESE THEMES LEAVE US?**

From these themes we can see that despite the dominance of neoliberal policies and agendas, and neoliberalism’s claims to be the keeper of a superior truth, there exist serious inadequacies. This raises the question of how forms of knowledge, which dominate policies for states and academic disciplines, (such as IR and IPE), that claim to be able to account for the Pacific, come to dominate if they are based on, and are perpetuated utilising, such inadequate ideas.

I conclude by suggesting that if neoliberalism holds such currency in the Pacific and yet is so inadequate, then perhaps there are other forms of knowledge equally dominant elsewhere, which require reconceptualising. One example of these forms of knowledge may be the dominant state-centric theories which are committed to viewing states as the most significant actors in international society. These theories continue to dominate in for instance IR, despite the evident inadequacies of states often demonstrated by the important role that transnational NGOs now play in the recognition and resolution of cross-border dilemmas. By creating more complex propositions I hope not only to have made neoliberal policies and agendas appear untenable, but also the more long-standing Western perceptions of non-Western people, of which neoliberalism is a powerful element.

Accordingly, I think the current need is for the continued questioning and exploration of the way that certain ideas which span the globe become ways of dominating. Of particular importance is the way that particular ideas come to be considered ‘True’ and hence respected and normal, and then used dogmatically to judge others, particularly those resisting the ‘True’. In this thesis I hope I have contributed to questioning the constitution of practices of dominating and resisting.

What I have shown in this thesis is that sites, forms and authors of theorising are important to the political economy in the Pacific. I have shown that producing more
nuanced understandings regarding re-colonisation and Indigenous resistance has been productive. One significant implication of this is that being more critical and insisting on nuancing many kinds of theories and theorising may be a way to create new forms of knowledge and thus political economic practices. I have shown in this thesis that these new forms of knowledge and political economic practices are needed in the Pacific if we are to move beyond simple binaries and destructive policies.

How would we go about theorising these new forms? My research indicates that a greater incorporation of oral testimonies, stories and performance into academic structures and processes of learning and validating knowledge could assist in the production of new forms of knowledge. While I have incorporated a diverse range of material in this thesis such as speeches, poetry, fiction and material from NGOs and Indigenous peoples as well as more ‘formal’ dominant accounts as a small step in the direction of utilising multiple sites and forms of knowledge, much still needs to be done.

I have shown one way in which a number of forms, such as ‘fiction’, can be utilised as legitimate accounts of what takes place in the international political economy. What I have highlighted is an abundance and diversity of living, dynamic, non-neoliberal, non-dominant accounts. I have indicated the sites about which future research may inquire and multiple articulations could stem.

The incorporation of these different forms may change the nature of theorising and require more time to formulate and articulate, making problematic both current obsessions with speed and many of the current funding arrangements for academic institutions. But these forms will provide insights not garnered from a supposedly neutral and ‘objective’ standpoint. This inclusion of multiple sites and forms would also appear to be one avenue to make institutions of academia more Indigenous friendly in the sense that theorising could have a greater potential for coping with, rather than exploiting, Indigenous theorists and theorising. These forms may create significant problems for the way academic institutions currently operate but would also radicalise future potentials for new forms of knowledge and practicing political economy.
Perhaps then, we have come full circle. The institution of academia, after being implicated in re-colonisation and Indigenous resistance has become reaffirmed as having potential. The act of theorising, shown to be so precarious throughout this thesis has hope, to be shaped and re-shaped in a dynamic and living fashion. Having set out to destroy neoliberalism, I hope instead to have encouraged the querying of the kinds of question we ask and an openness to what we might find if we asked different questions.

As I draw to a close I feel that two of my experiences during this research project pose fitting sites from which to conclude.

The first was the bizarre mental shift I encountered in Port Vila, Vanuatu where, through a friend of a friend, I had managed to organise myself a place to stay for the duration of my visit. Unexpectedly, this friend of a friend was Deputy (and during my visit Acting) High Commissioner for Australia. The house where she lived was snuggled on a hillside, neighbouring other High Commission houses, overlooking Erakor Lagon and Le Lagon Parkroyal resort. In the day I would look through documents at the Pacific Island Association of NGOs, talk with people at the Vanuatu Cultural Centre and trudge through dusty streets to the Asian Development Bank office. While in the evenings I either watched re-runs from Australian television or attended High Commission functions with my host. One such function, to discuss the significant issue of future directions for Vanuatu took place at an expensive French restaurant. The President of Vanuatu gave an address to the intimate, formal and mostly Australian invitees who proceeded to ponder the relationship between culture and Ni-Vanuatu productive capabilities. The experience showed me the physical and mental division operating in the Pacific; the discrepancies operating based on very different values and assumptions about the Pacific, “close as skin, distant as horizons”.

Finally, as I prepared to leave Fiji, after interviews with activists, struggling with my backpack and books, through rain, military checkpoints and the open-air bus from Suva, I discovered an art exhibit at Nadi airport. The primary schools of the area had organised a painting competition as part of Tourism Week November 2000. Children had designed and painted their impressions of their town Nadi, complete with McDonalds, Cost U Less and streets busily filled with cars. I was enthralled and eagerly began asking airport staff for permission to photograph, to which I was
waved away and ahead. Tourists at the airport stared at me quirkily; they were
drawn instead to the cabinet filled with dusty traditional Fijian artefacts, frozen
behind glass. I instead was left staring at the living exhibition of vibrant change; a
dynamism to which I hope this thesis contributes.
APPENDIX

THE MAORI VERSION

TE TIRITI O WAITANGI

Ko Wikitoria te Kuini o Ingarangi i tana mahara atawai ki nga Rangatira me nga Hapu o Nu Tirani i tana hiahia hoki kia tohungia ki a ratou o ratou rangatiratanga me o ratou wenua, a kia mau tonu hoki te Rongo ki a ratou me te Atanoho hoki kua whakaaro ia he mea tika kia tukua mai tetahi Rangatira – hei kai whakarite ki nga Tangata maori o Nu Tirani – kia whakaetaia e nga Rangatira maori te Kawanatanga o te Kuini ki nga wahikatoa o te Wenua nei me nga Motu – na to mea hoki he tokomaha ke nga tangata o tona Iwi Kua noho ki tenei wenua, a e haere mai nei.

Na ko te Kuini e hiahia ana kia wakaritea te Kawanatanga kia kaua ai nga kino e puta mai ki te tangata Maori ki te Pakeha e noho ture kore ana.

Na, kua pai te Kuini kia tukua a hau a Wiremu Hopihona he Kapitana i te Roiara Nawi hei Kawana mo nga wahi katoa o Nu Tirani e tukua aiane, amoa atu ki te Kuini, e mea atu ana ia ki nga Rangatira o te wakaminenga o nga hapu o Nu Tirani me era Rangatira atu enei ture ka korerotia nei.

KO TE TUATAHI

Ko nga Rangatira o te wakaminenga me nga Rangatira katoa hoki ki hai i uru ki taua wakaminenga ka tuku rawa atu ki te Kuini o Ingarani ake tonu atu–te Kawanatanga katoa o o ratou wenua.

KO TE TUARUA

Ko te Kuini o Ingarani ka wakarite ka wakaee ki nga Rangatira ki nga hapu--ki nga tangata katoa o Nu Tirani te tino rangatiratanga o o ratou wenua o ratou kainga me o ratou taonga katoa. Otiia ko nga Rangatira o te wakaminenga me nga Rangatira katoa atu ka tuku ki te Kuini te hokonga o era wahi wenua e pai ai te tangata nona...
te Wenua--ki te ritenga o te utu e wakaritea ai e ratou ko te kai hoko e meatia nei e te Kuini hei kai hoko mona.

KO TE TUATORU
Hei wakaritenga mai hoki tenei mo te wakaetanga ki te Kawanatanga o te Kuini--Ka tiakina e te Kuini o Ingarani nga tangata maori katoa o Nu Tirani ka tukua ki a ratou nga tikanga katoa rite tahi ki ana mea ki nga tangata o Ingarani.

[signed] William Hobson Consul & Lieutenant Governor

Na ko matou ko nga Rangatira o te Wakaminenga o nga hapu o Nu Tirani ka huihui nei ki Waitangi ko matou hoki ko nga Rangatira o Nu Tirani ka kite nei i te ritenga o enei kupu, ka tangohia ka wakaaetia katoatia e matou, koia ka tohungia ai o matou ingoa o matou tohu.

Ka meatia tenei ki Waitangi i te ono o nga ra o Pepueri i te tau kotahi mano, e waru rau e wa te kau o to tatou Ariki.

THE ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF THE MAORI VERSION

THE TREATY OF WAITANGI

Victoria, the Queen of England, in her concern to protect the chiefs and the subtribes of New Zealand and in her desire to preserve their chieftainship and their lands to them and to maintain peace and good order considers it just to appoint an administrator one who will negotiate with the people of New Zealand to the end that their chiefs will agree to the Queen’s Government being established over all

2 ‘Chieftainship’: this concept has to be understood in the context of Maori social and political organization as at 1840. The accepted approximation today is ‘trusteeship’.
3 ‘Rongo’: ‘Peace, Maori ‘, seemingly a missionary usage (rongo - to hear i.e. hear the ‘Word’ - the ‘message’ of peace and goodwill, etc).
4 ‘Chief’ (‘Rangatira’) here is of course ambiguous. Clearly a European could not be a Maori, but the word could well have implied a trustee-like role rather than that of a mere ‘functionary’. Maori speeches at Waitangi in 1840 refer to Hobson being or becoming a ‘father’ for the Maori people. Certainly this attitude has been held towards the person of the Crown down to the present day - hence the continued expectations and commitments entailed in the Treaty.
parts of this land and (adjoining) islands and also because there are many of her subjects already living on this land and others yet to come. So the Queen desires to establish a government so that no evil will come to Maori and European living in a state of lawlessness. So the Queen has appointed “me, William Hobson a Captain” in the Royal Navy to be Governor for all parts of New Zealand (both those) shortly to be received by the Queen and (those) to be received hereafter and presents to the chiefs of the Confederation chiefs of the subtribes of New Zealand and other chiefs these laws set out here.

THE FIRST
The Chiefs of the Confederation and all the Chiefs who have not joined that Confederation give absolutely to the Queen of England for ever the complete government over their land.

THE SECOND
The Queen of England agrees to protect the chiefs, the subtribes and all the people of New Zealand in the unqualified exercise of their chieftainship over their lands, villages and all their treasures. But on the other hand the Chiefs of the Confederation and all the Chiefs will sell land to the Queen at a price agreed to by the person owning it and by the person buying it (the latter being) appointed by the Queen as her purchase agent.

THE THIRD
For this agreed arrangement therefore concerning the Government of the Queen, the Queen of England will protect all the ordinary people of New Zealand and will give them the same rights and duties of citizenship as the people of England.

5 ‘Islands’ i.e. coastal, not of the Pacific.
6 ‘Making’ i.e. ‘offering’ or ‘saying’ - but not ‘inviting to concur’.
7 ‘Government’: ‘kawanatanga’. There could be no possibility of the Maori signatories having any understanding of government in the sense of ‘sovereignty’ i.e. any understanding on the basis of experience or cultural precedent.
8 ‘Unqualified exercise’ of the chieftainship - would emphasise to a chief the Queen’s intention to give them complete control according to their customs. ‘Tino’ has the connotation of ‘quintessential’.
9 ‘Treasures’: ‘taonga’. As submissions to the Waitangi Tribunal concerning the Maori language have made clear, ‘taonga’ refers to all dimensions of a tribal group’s estate, material and non-material - heirlooms and wahi tapu (sacred places), ancestral lore and whakapapa (genealogies), etc.
10 ‘Sale and purchase’: hokonga’. Hoko means to buy or sell.
11 ‘Rights and duties’: Maori ‘tikanga’ while tika means right, correct, (eg ‘e tika hoki’ means ‘that is right’), ‘tikanga’ most commonly refers to custom(s), for example of the marae (ritual forum); and custom(s) clearly includes the notion of duty and obligation
12 There is, however, a more profound problem about ‘tikanga’. There is a real sense here of the Queen ‘protecting’ (i.e. allowing the preservation of) the Maori people’s tikanga (i.e.
Chapter One: In from the Margins

[signed] William Hobson Consul & Lieut. Governor
So we, the Chiefs of the Confederation of the subtribes of New Zealand meeting here at Waitangi having seen the shape of these words which we accept and agree to record our names and our marks thus.

Was done at Waitangi on the sixth of February in the year of our Lord 1840.

THE ENGLISH VERSION

THE TREATY OF WAITANGI

Her Majesty Victoria Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland regarding with Her Royal Favour the Native Chiefs and Tribes of New Zealand and anxious to protect their just Rights and Property and to secure to them the enjoyment of Peace and Good Order has deemed it necessary in consequence of the great number of Her Majesty’s Subjects who have already settled in New Zealand and the rapid extension of Emigration both from Europe and Australia which is still in progress to constitute and appoint a functionary properly authorized to treat with the Aborigines of New Zealand for the recognition of Her Majesty’s Sovereign authority over the whole or any part of those islands.

Her Majesty therefore being desirous to establish a settled form of Civil Government with a view to avert the evil consequences which must result from the absence of the necessary Laws and Institutions alike to the native population and to Her subjects has been graciously pleased to empower and to authorize “me William Hobson a Captain” in Her Majesty’s Royal Navy Consul and Lieutenant Governor of such parts of New Zealand as may be or hereafter shall be ceded to Her Majesty to invite the confederated and independent Chiefs of New Zealand to concur in the following Articles and Conditions.

ARTICLE THE FIRST
The Chiefs of the Confederation of the United Tribes of New Zealand and the separate and independent Chiefs who have not become members of the Confederation cede to Her Majesty the Queen of England absolutely and without reservation all the rights and powers of Sovereignty which the said Confederation or Individual Chiefs respectively exercise or possess, or may be supposed to exercise or to possess, over their respective Territories as the sole Sovereigns thereof.

customs) since no Maori could have had any understanding whatever of British tikanga (i.e. rights and duties of British subjects.) This, then, reinforces the guarantees in Article 2.
ARTICLE THE SECOND
Her Majesty the Queen of England confirms and guarantees to the Chiefs and Tribes of New Zealand and to the respective families and individuals thereof the full exclusive and undisturbed possession of their Lands and Estates Forests Fisheries and other properties which they may collectively or individually possess so long as it is their wish and desire to retain the same in their possession; but the Chiefs of the United Tribes and the individual Chiefs yield to Her Majesty the exclusive right of Preemption over such lands as the proprietors thereof may be disposed to alienate at such prices as may be agreed upon between the respective Proprietors and persons appointed by Her Majesty to treat with them in that behalf.

ARTICLE THE THIRD
In consideration thereof Her Majesty the Queen of England extends to the Natives of New Zealand Her royal protection and imparts to them all the Rights and Privileges of British Subjects.

[Signed] W Hobson Lieutenant Governor

Now therefore We the Chiefs of the Confederation of the United Tribes of New Zealand being assembled in Congress at Victoria in Waitangi and We the Separate and Independent Chiefs of New Zealand claiming authority over the Tribes and Territories which are specified after our respective names, having been made fully to understand the Provisions of the foregoing Treaty, accept and enter into the same in the full spirit and meaning thereof in witness of which we have attached our signatures or marks at the places and the dates respectively specified

Done at Waitangi this Sixth day of February in the year of Our Lord one thousand eight hundred and forty.
This thesis is based on information from printed, oral and electronic media including books, journals, magazines, Acts of Parliament, cases, Reports, minutes of meetings, websites of government and Non-Government Organisations, and personal communications. These references are listed in alphabetical order to ensure ease of use for the reader. This list also avoids the hierarchy that can be implicit in a Bibliography which separates books from journals, supposedly ‘academic’ from ‘non-academic’ work or written from oral sources.


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