A CMS Village School in China.


A Chinese Village Boys School.

Frank Burden Collection, Ian Welch.
The CMS Compound, Fuzhou, c 1900.

The CMS Compound at Gutian, c 1900.

The Robert Stewart Memorial School, Gutian, c 1900.

Rev. J. C. Lancaster Collection, CMS Archives.
The China Inland Mission opposed any weakening of the role of missionaries in seeking individual conversions, and did not operate indigenous schools or medical services, and emphasised individual conversion above all other objectives. The CIM view was that secondary services, no matter how valuable in bridging the cultural gap weakened the primary task of seeking personal conversions.¹ The CIM established schools for the children of its missionaries, and others if there was room, at Chefoo (Yantai) in North China² and later, after the Japanese occupation of Chefoo, at Kuling.

**China Inland Mission School for Missionary Children, Chefoo, (Yantai), 1881-1945.**

![School for Missionary Children, Chefoo, 1881-1945.](image1)

**China Inland Mission School for Missionary Children, Kuling, 1947-1951.**

![School for Missionary Children, Kuling, 1947-1951.](image2)

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¹ Missionaries were not homogeneous in thought or action. Frank Burden, an Englishman living in South Australia was in the first party of Australians to join the China Inland Mission in 1890. Like other missionaries, Burden provided first aid and within ten years, after a variety of disagreements with CIM policies and practices, qualified as a doctor in the United States in 1900. He returned to Adelaide and established a very successful general practice. His papers are now held in the Manuscript Collection of the National Library of Australia.

In addition to education and literacy, almost all missionaries provided basic first aid, an approach that worked so well that it developed into full-blown Western medical provisions. The first missionary hospital was established in China c.1835 and by 1949 there were about 250 Protestant missionary hospitals and around 50 medical schools, most owing their origins to American missions.³ Archdeacon Wolfe wrote constantly to the CMS in London urging them to send out more missionary doctors and finance more mission hospitals arguing that it was essential to show the Chinese that: “Pure Christianity cares for the bodies as well as the souls of men.”⁴ An American study claims that: “In 1923, China had 53 percent of the missionary hospital beds and 48 percent of the missionary doctors in the world.”⁵

The establishment of American and British Protestant missionaries in establishing Western medicine in China and introducing nursing changed the nature of medical practice in ways previously outside Chinese experience.⁶ Li Shang-jen has indicated that in addition to the work of Protestant missionaries contributions to the Western practice of medicine in China were made by British military doctors and the Medical Service of the China Imperial Maritime Customs.⁷ The importance of foreign medicine, by missionaries in particular, is highlighted in Part Ten, where a number of the anti-foreign images deal with the supposed crimes of missionaries in gouging out eyes and other organs for foul reasons.

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⁴ Archdeacon John R Wolfe to Edward Higgens, CMS London, 15 November 1894, CMS East Asia Archives.


1.16 EVANGELISM AND SOCIAL RECONSTRUCTION.

Missions had enormous cultural problems to overcome and in a recent paper for the US Department of Defense, it appears that the underlying values of American society, grounded in fundamentally different cultural histories, have not changed

Even ordinary Chinese citizens, including Chinese students, bristle at the missionary-like U.S. vision of how to change China for its own good. Like those of the Christian missionaries of the 19th and early 20th centuries, U.S. goals for China (and other countries, as well) are based on the fundamental assumption that U.S. values are not only applicable to China, but also must be promoted regardless of the domestic consequences, such as revolution or widespread violence.°

In the 19th century Chinese anti-foreign prejudice and passions matched the sentiments of the foreigners.

In 1839, for example, an anti-British declaration issued in Guangzhou at the time of the first Opium War stated:

Our hatred is already at white heat. If we do not completely exterminate you pigs and dogs, we will not be manly Chinese able to support the sky on our heads and stand firmly on the earth. Once we have said this, we will never go back on it, even if frustrated ten thousand times. We are definitely going to kill you, cut your heads off and burn you to death. Even though you ask people to admonish us, we will not obey. We must strip off your skins and eat your flesh, and then you will know how tough(li-hai) we are . . . We ought really to use refined expressions. But since you beasts do not understand written characters, therefore we use rough vulgar words to instruct you in simple terms.°

This attitude of mind was encouraged throughout the century following by elements of the Chinese scholar-gentry, or literati, in or out of office.° This group, above all others, stood to lose the most by the impact on the Chinese traditional social order as a result of foreign incursions.° The Rev. John MacGowan, an experienced China missionary, wrote in 1889:

There is one…feature about the Chinese…that has always been a serious hindrance to the immediate reception of the Gospel in any place ... and that is the deep-rooted scorn and contempt they have for the foreigner.°

Breaking down the barriers produced major, deep-seated and irreconcilable tension between advocates of primary (individual conversions) and secondary evangelism (providing health and education services) emerged in the late 19th and early 20th centuries among Protestant missions in China.° It was driven by two

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11 Leaving aside for the moment the historic Confucian cultural order, the importance of the family context in which the Chinese literati group was formed should be understood, including its great antiquity and influence on the management of the Chinese State. See Creel, H G, (1964), 'The beginnings of Bureaucracy in China: The Origin of the Hsien,' pp 155-184 in Journal of Asian Studies, Vol 23, No 2, February 1964.
13 The definitive study to date is Cui, op cit.
distinct elements. First, the need to make worthwhile contacts with ordinary Chinese as a necessary prelude to conversions discussed above, and second, the theological rationalization of an American innovation, the “Social Gospel”—seeking the reconstruction of society along Christian principles to achieve the common good but, in 19th China, often regarded by conservative evangelicals as placing a lesser emphasis on individual conversions. The difference can be seen as a conflict between preparing people for the Kingdom of Heaven after death and the creation of a Kingdom of Heaven for the living.

The evangelical emphasis on a specific moment of conversion was inseparable from a 19th century intellectual tradition of categorizing everything by hierarchies—“real” Christians with a conscious personal religious experience were on a higher spiritual plane than people who were simply cultural Christians, accepting the outward forms of Christianity without any personal commitment. Religious writings worldwide were classified according to the emphasis placed on the Bible as the supreme revelation of God to humankind. All other religious writings or oral traditions as having little or no spiritual worth. Anglo-American Protestants identified their Christianity as superior to Catholic and Orthodox Christianity and condemned all other forms of religion as lesser beliefs—categorised as “heathen” or “pagan”. In the intellectual frameworks of the time racial and cultural hierarchies occupied an important place in the Euro-American view of the world, with Anglo-Saxons were at the top of the human racial hierarchy while Chinese sat mid-way above Africans who were above the generally bottom category of Australian Aboriginal people.

When these religious beliefs were coupled with Western technological, especially military, superiority and expressed in terms of imperialism, the missionaries approached their task with an inbuilt sense of superiority. One future Archbishop of Canterbury concluded that Britain was being guided by God to undertake the task of evangelising the world. There were enough evangelically-minded British Christians sharing that assessment to support a foreign missionary enterprise unmatched in any previous era. The British religious imperialist sense was shared in Protestant America where an earlier belief in “Manifest


15 This idea found modern expression in the famous British television series, ”Yes. Minister” and its follow-on series, “Yes, Prime Minister” The episode, The Bishop’sGambit involves the appointment of a Church of England bishop (a Crown appointment in England), where the view is expressed that Anglican Bishops do not necessarily believe in God and this does not affect their ability to perform the duties of a bishop.


17 There were Protestant missionary societies to countries where Orthodoxy and Roman Catholic beliefs were predominant as well as to Jews, Muslims, etc.

Destiny” (primarily territorial expansion to the Pacific Ocean) was subsumed into the civilising mission of the American Republic beyond the Pacific Coast to the Pacific islands, East Asia and the world.

Built into the complex Anglo-American Christian belief system was the certainty that God had fully revealed Himself to all humans in Christ and that the task of missionaries was to help people understand that their innate sense of religion and ethics was fulfilled only in Christianity and therefore their religions, while of passing intellectual interest, were irrelevant in the deeper issues of humanity. Much of the social reconstructionist theory was indebted to the views of Jean-Jacques Rousseau and his idea of a “social contract” that declares that “man is born free, and everywhere he is in chains.” Evangelical Christians affirmed the chains to be those of universal human sin that could only be resolved by the Atonement achieved through Christ’s death on the but left unanswered how social injustice could be corrected. One modern impact of the social gospel is a universal belief that humans can act collectively to change their worldly situation. Evangelicals and liberals concur in the need for personal and social decision-making to permanently reduce disadvantage.

The CMS missionaries in Fujian were opposed, in conformity to their evangelical views of the centrality of individual conversion, to providing schools and higher education to Chinese that would give Chinese young men an advantage without requiring a firm commitment to Christianity. Archdeacon Wolfe told CMS in London that he rejected any movement of the Anglican mission in Fujian towards an educational establishment. He emphasised that for the future growth of the church, Chinese must be educated as teachers, catechists and clergymen but only if they had established and genuine Christian identities. Wolfe condemned missions that downplayed individual conversions and became, to use what he described as an American slogan, missions engaged primarily in “Education and Civilization.” He might have added, as did an American, that Americans were engaged in an interdependent process of “Christianity, Civilization and Commerce.” The latter writer described the duty of Americans to be a “civilizing as well as an exploiting agency.”

An American Presbyterian missionary, seeking to clarify a growing debate, wrote expressing the dominant but shifting views of Protestant missionaries towards the end of the 19th century:

Missionary work in China falls naturally into five groups, viz., educational, evangelistic, literary, medical and pastoral. These overlap to some extent. One man may be engaged in all forms. He may dispense medicine in the morning, spend the rest of the forenoon in the school room; after dinner do literary work until three o’clock, then visit the street chapels, and in the evening lead his Church members in prayer service… The test of every form of missionary work must be, “Does it lead men to Christ and make them more able to understand, serve and glorify Him?”

As far as the CMS was concerned, the Fujian mission was an “Evangelistic, Preaching and Teaching” mission and matters such as education and medicine were a means to an end—individual conversions. The conservative evangelicals of the CMS and similar missions believed, against the evidence clear to us today, that once the Chinese (or other non-Christians) were made aware of the superiority of Christianity they would become active believers but they did understand the need to do more than just talk, i.e., to engage on a wider social and humanitarian level with the people they wished to convert.

By 1895, the need for social engagement was reflected in the preparation of Nellie and Topsy Saunders in practical nursing training through the Women’s Committee of the Melbourne Hospital. Mrs. Saunders told a journalist:

My eldest daughter spent six months in the Melbourne Hospital gaining medical knowledge, which has been invaluable to her.23

Later in the same interview Mrs. Saunders said that Nellie and Topsy had taken further “study” under Dr. James Gregory, the resident doctor in the Wiley Memorial Hospital supported by the American Methodist Episcopal Mission.24 Nellie and Topsy’s letters confirm that their medical activities were limited to basic first aid rather than trained medical work. An example of their efforts was given in a letter by Nellie Saunders to her mother in Melbourne.

In one house there was a little boy with a fearful pain in his inside who was crying and looking very bad. We made some inquiries, and then decided that we had some very simple medicine with us that would do him good. [castor-oil?] So the old Hui-mu (church mother) accompanied me back to our abode, and I got the medicine and a spoon to mix it with, and went back to the house. The old lady informed every one that asked our business, that I was going to give medicine to cure a little boy, and volunteered a good deal of information about the Kumiungs that I did not quite take in. The little chap took the stuff very well. They have the greatest faith in foreign medicines. Only one house we went into where there was not a friendly reception, and it was not so much that they were unwilling to let us in, but they did not want to listen to the doctrine.25

In another report some months later, she wrote.

The following morning visitors came in crowds from an early hour. It was eleven before we got upstairs, and then only for a few minutes, because a patient arrived on the scene to be doctored, i.e., a baby that had fallen down and scratched itself, and what with dirt and flies was pretty bad. However, we fixed it up, greatly to every one’s admiration. We asked for water to wash it with, and one small boy went and got us a large tub; another brought a bucket of water; another a large bowl of hot water; all this was for a sore the size of half-a-crown [a British coin worth 25 pence]26 on the baby’s face; really it was so funny we couldn’t help laughing. However, I hope it will get better; they have such faith in our medicines. I do think people ought to know something about it out here.27

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23 Mrs. Eliza Saunders—Interview with ‘Rita,’ in The Weekly Times, Melbourne, 10 August 1895.
24 Welch, Ian, Letters from China: Dr. J. J. Gregory, Methodist Episcopal Church Foreign Mission Board, Gutian, China, 2006, online 1 July 2010 at http://anglicanhistory.org
25 Berry op cit, p 83.
26 British coins were used in Australia until 1910 when Australian coinage was introduced.
27 Berry op cit, pp 102-103.
In the context of a discussion of social reconstruction it is important to recognise that, however inadequately as judge from today’s perspectives, the missionaries understood the importance of access to family life through education and medical assistance that is obvious in Nellie Saunders’ letters, written months apart. Robert and Louisa Stewart’s efforts to provide literacy to villages without any form of indigenous schooling must be seen as part of a desire to change the existing social order.

By 1899, the concept of the “White Man’s Burden” for the civilisation of the world was expressed in a poem by Rudyard Kipling linked to the American conquest of the Philippines. At its heart is the belief that Western “Christian” culture was a more advanced form of human civilisation than all the others.

Take up the White Man's burden--Send forth the best ye breed—
Go bind your sons to exile, To serve your captives' need;
To wait in heavy harness, On fluttered folk and wild--
Your new-caught, sullen peoples, Half-devil and half-child.

There are grounds for thinking that Euro-America, along with Australia and other countries of European settlement, remains wedded to the reconstruction of other societies without necessarily demonstrating a similar reconstructive passion at home. “Americans, for example, are said to see the spread of Western values as a sacred mission, based on universal principles which are guided by a higher order than the mere will of man.”

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29 Puska, op cit, p. 8.
The White Man’s Burden

Judge magazine, 1899
1.17 MISSIONARY FAMILIES AND HEALTH.

Married missionaries, when the option was available, tended to cluster around centres where one or another mission had Western doctors and medical facilities. By the 1880’s a growing number missionaries were working in the interior of China beyond the treaty ports but family isolation had to be balanced by providing a “normal” western lifestyle for missionary families. 30 Central to family lifestyle was access to western medical services, always in short supply with doctors averaging just six percent of all foreign missionaries. 31 Wherever there was a foreign doctor, a clustering of missions occurred although the vast majority of western-trained doctors, both foreign and Chinese, carried out their work in the Treaty Ports. Some indication of the importance of missionary access to western health services can be gained from a comparison of the mortality rates of missionary and Chinese children, keeping in mind that the Chinese associated with missions were usually of lower income backgrounds.

Table 2
Mortality of the Children of Missionaries and of Lower Class Chinese. 32

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHILDREN OF</th>
<th>TOTAL BIRTHS</th>
<th>NUMBER OF DEATHS</th>
<th>DEATHS PER 100 BIRTHS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>0-5 yrs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missionaries</td>
<td>3,254</td>
<td>451</td>
<td>366</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>8,468</td>
<td>2,751</td>
<td>2,203</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Number infant deaths unreliable because of Chinese method of counting ages. The Chinese count the age starting from the birth and every Chinese lunar year counts for one year. A baby born on December 24, 2010, for example, will be 2 years old on January 1, 2011, but its “Western” age is just one week.

Table 3
Infant Mortality Rates, England, and Missionary Children, China. 33

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PARENTS STATUS</th>
<th>TOTAL BIRTHS</th>
<th>NUMBER OF DEATHS PER 1,000 BIRTHS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0-1 Year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factory Labourers</td>
<td>80,949</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prof &amp; Business</td>
<td>8,658</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missionaries-China</td>
<td>3,204</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The early years of missionary children related more closely to people of similar social background in Britain. The increase in the later years of missionary children’s deaths is attributed to intestinal infections: dysentery, infectious diarrhoea, cholera and typhoid.

Lennox suggests the shift from breast milk to animal milk is the key to the increased deaths among the older children.

The collection includes many mentions of riots in Sichuan Province in June 1895 that succeeded in

31 Lennox, 1920, op cit, p 47.
32 Lennox, 1920, op cit, p 25.
33 Lennox, 1920, op cit, p 27.
driving out all foreign missionaries from Sichuan Province. No missionaries were killed or wounded at Chengtu but letters to family and friends highlight the anguish felt by missionary parents for their children and husbands and wives for each other. In the midst of the anti-foreign rioting was a young bride married just eleven days, parents whose children were all under three years of age, and one missionary wife who delivered a child while virtually imprisoned with 31 other foreigners in the Prefect’s Yamen in Cheng-tu. Although there were doctors among the missionaries, they had no medical supplies of any kind, other than a bottle of carbolic, purchased from a passing Chinese who had plundered the missionary hospital.\(^{34}\)

Foreigners all over China experienced permanent fear and today the situation would be recognized as contributing, for many foreigners, to traumatic stress syndrome. The extremes found in the collection need to be read with the stress factor continually in mind. What seems extreme language at the public reflects the ongoing anxiety of people who genuinely feared for their lives. China, for many foreigners, was a ship of opportunity floating in an ocean of fear. An excellent example of this is:—

Two members of the China Inland, with their young child, were in the country at the time; they heard of a plot to kill them, so thought it prudent to return. On arriving at Kia-ting the captain of their boat ordered them to leave it. Then they found a drawn sword at the door of the cabin. Everything was taken from them, no house would take them in, and hand in hand the father and mother, with their little child, had to run the gauntlet of the howling crowd, to find their mission premises a wreck, and be taken in by the charity of three old women, who kept them safe till it was dark, and they could rejoin the other foreigners in the Yamen.\(^{35}\)

Continuing grief from the loss of their only child just after birth in 1890 combined with the stress, for nearly a year, of the Vegetarian troubles in 1894 and early 1895, forced Mrs. Gordon, wife of Dr. J. J. Gordon to withdraw to Fuzhou and subsequently she returned to the United States. Gordon took part in the Kucheng Commission of Inquiry and then joined his wife in Clinton, Iowa. Mrs. Gordon died on 16 August 1896 and Dr. Gordon exactly three months later. He was just thirty-four years of age and his wife was thirty-six.

Some idea of the fears of foreign residents and particularly families can be seen in the published (and often exaggerated) accounts of the Huashan Massacre, exceeding the accounts of the earlier attacks in Cheng-tu and district in Sichuan Province. Women were said to have been cruelly ill-treated (rape was not specifically mentioned but clearly implied) and there was horrified comment about two small children dying of terrible injuries within days after the attack. It is impossible at the present time to access relevant archives examining the mental health of missionaries but it is possible that apart from the peculiar illnesses of China, notably dysentery and cholera, and the constant cultural disorientation of many missionaries, a major cause of missionary retirements was never-ending stress over family matters.

\(^{34}\) See Part 5, *The Times*, (London), 20 September 1895.

\(^{35}\) Ibid.
A 1920s report on missionary mental health by an American psychiatrist, observed:

Out of 203 missionaries in one single mission invalided back to the homeland from China, 25 per cent were sent back to America because of ‘neurasthenia’\textsuperscript{36}… About eight per cent more suffering from ‘insanity’ and almost three per cent from other neurotic ailments. Thus, out of all the cases of serious illness in this mission group, 36 per cent were suffering from mental and nervous conditions.\textsuperscript{37}

A New Zealand paper reprinted the following item expressing the level of fear.

A letter received from a lady missionary in China, dated June 24th, reports that the missionaries in the remotest parts were flying at that date… The fine mission premises at Hong Kong were burned, one of the Su Fui missionaries escaping by himself. He had all his goods in a boat, which the Chinese attacked and took everything. The missionary jumped into the river and hung on to the side of the boat, while the Chinese tried to kill him by poking him with a spear whenever he appeared about the water. Eventually he escaped, but it is feared he will lose his reason\textsuperscript{38}

\textsuperscript{36} An obsolete American term for what is commonly called a nervous breakdown or perhaps traumatic stress syndrome.

\textsuperscript{37} “Missionaries Suffer from ‘Nerves.’” \textit{The Science News-Letter}, Vol 14 No 382, August 1929, p 73.

\textsuperscript{38} Press Association report published in \textit{The Poverty Bay Herald} (New Zealand) and \textit{The Feilding Star}, 15 August 1895.
“The Yellow Terror in All His Glory, 1899”

The cartoon reflects the impact of anti-foreign riots in China, and seems to relate to the murders at Huashan, with the images of fire and murder of a young European woman.

Source unknown but see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:YellowTerror.jpg
In 1860, at the very beginning of a major expansion of Protestant missions following the Treaty of Tientsin, there were thirty-five mission stations in fourteen coastal treaty port cities. The number grew to 132 stations in sixty-five cities by 1880; to 498 stations in 345 cities in 1890 and by 1925 there were nearly 2000 mission stations across China with tens of thousands of outstations manned by Chinese.

Missionaries were not entirely motivated by their religious beliefs although those were central to their decision to offer their services to a missionary society. They were drawn to missionary service by a desire to enjoy: “An unusual career in an unusual corner of the world, free from the more prosaic patterns…at home.”

39 This led, for an unknown number of people, to disappointment, nervous trauma and even loss of faith, but more typically to short term service in foreign countries as individuals and families found the culture and lifestyle of the ‘heathen’ even more difficult to manage than a rejection of Christianity and “Western” values. The issue of family needs, especially the education and enculturation of their children, caused many missionaries, of whom the Stewarts were representative, to send their children back to family members at home for schooling.

Underlying all family anxieties of foreigners in China was the health and safety of family. Table 6 (p. 67) shows that the death rate of missionary children in China was nearly three times higher than the death rate of a similar cohort in England. The impact of this on the mothers of those children must have affected their emotional and mental health.40

A Canadian Methodist missionary noted her fears of her children suffering dysentery, a major killer of young missionary children, her constant fear of home invasion and her terror at hearing news of attacks and murders of other missionaries.42 She wrote:

We hear that a family in Foochow have asked for immediate furlough, two years and a half ahead on account of her health. It is the result of mental worry and strain, sleeplessness and so forth, which is quite serious in this country where people go over the border of mental balance more easily.43

As an example of the kind of everyday and continuing stress, she wrote in earlier letter home:

To be slapped or stoned in the streets, as well as reviled, to have their servants terrorised into leaving them so that supplies were cut off, to have to leave their homes with a few minutes notice and crowd on to the gunboat to go down river, sleeping on decks, to hear that their summer houses had been looted half an hour after leaving them is an ordeal to shake the stoutest.44

The looting of the CMS/CEZMS ruins at Huashan confirms the comment above about the hazards of life in the midst of people who saw the striking contrast in their own struggle for daily survival and the apparent wealth of the foreigners as legitimising theft.

40 For a very frank account of the concerns of a young missionary mother see Endicott, op cit.
41 Ibid p. 53.
42 Ibid p. 47.
43 Ibid, p 56.
44 Ibid, p 36.
The following summary of the life of one American Methodist missionary is taken from a PDF file, “Women’s Lives” Series 3, American Women Missionaries and Pioneers Collection, a microform collection in the University of Oregon Libraries.

The Emily Hatfield Hobart Papers, 1884-1943.

Emily Hatfield Hobart’s … papers are remarkable for the perspective they offer on the domestic affairs of missionary life in China. Born August 14, 1860, Emily Hatfield spent her young life in Evanston, Illinois, was educated at Northwestern University. She married Reverend William M. Hatfield in 1881, then joined him on a Methodist mission to China… Mrs. Hobart … studied Mandarin in order to better teach groups of native women the Christian doctrine, a task which she undertook with considerable disdain.

A dedicated daughter to her adoring parents, and a loving sister to her three siblings, Mrs. Hobart similarly committed herself to beginning and keeping a large family. She was pregnant for most of her young life, losing several children to prenatal and early childhood complications while also raising to maturity two daughters … and two sons. Since western elementary education was unavailable, Mrs. Hobart took responsibility for her children’s schooling, which added considerably to the demands of her daily life.

Although she made clear her devotion to raising her family in China, Mrs. Hobart grew increasingly lonely for her relations in the U.S. following another miscarriage in 1896. Her uneasiness was compounded by two months convalescence from a nearly fatal illness during the summer of 1898, and when Mrs. Hobart recovered she ended seventeen continuous years in China as she and her children went to live with her mother in Florida.

After her children were grown … Mrs. Hobart traveled back to her husband in Peking in 1909, returning alone to the U.S. in 1913. In 1927 she rejoined her husband for work in the large Shautung mission, just as major civil strife began with Chiang Kai-shek’s three-year terror campaign against hundreds of thousands of communists in Chinese cities. Although she was encouraged to leave Shautung for safety … on April 28, 1928, Mrs. Hobart felt she would be deserting her duty, and she remained along with her husband within the mission compound for protection. However, on the following day Mrs. Hobart was fatally shot through a window of her home by nationalist troops firing over the compound’s walls. Rev. Hobart succeeded her in death shortly after his return to the U.S. in April 1932.
1.18 LENGTH OF MISSIONARY SERVICE.

There is no comprehensive study of the length of service of missionaries in China, either generally or by specific fields but one study indicates that of 300 missionaries who had served in one American station in 1876 only twenty percent had served for more than fourteen years (Table 7 below).45

In the Australian Methodist mission in Papua the average length of service of women missionaries was five years and men just under seven years.46 Taken overall, it appears that the ‘average’ length of service of overseas missionaries was about ten years. This is an area of study requiring further study and in particular, the reasons for the withdrawal of missionaries although it can be hazarded that mental and physical health together with family concerns, were the major contributors.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4</th>
<th>China. Protestant Missionaries: Length of Service at 1876</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>+14 years.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64/300</td>
<td>230/300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(21%) (70%) (50%)

There is little evidence that 19th century missions had any systematic approach for retirement. Anglican clergy serving with the CMS in Fujian Province, especially those with regular Church of England ordinations, as distinct from those ordained only for overseas service, were usually able to retire to parish ministry in England, as did many of the men ordained by the Church of Ireland. Many clergy ordained for overseas service retired to the British colonies of settlement and the Australian church had quite a number of such appointments. The few medical doctors usually retired to a small practice at home. Qualified teachers could often find retirement jobs in Britain, or in some cases, in church schools in the British colonies.

The situation for women was more complex. Married women shared in whatever employment their husband obtained at home but in the normal course of events, often found themselves widowed. Single women with sufficient assets simply retired at home to live within a conventional life of single and widowed women. Nothing is known of the fate of single women with no private wealth but the majority probably returned to families to whatever life they could establish. Victorian novels are full of stories about single or widowed women working as unpaid servants for their wealthier relatives. The lives of former missionaries have not attracted much interest in academic studies of the 19th century.

45 Lennox, op cit.
46 Langmore, Diane, Missionary Lives: Papua, 1874-1914, (Honolulu, University of Hawaii Press, 1989), pp 178
1.17 ANTI-MISSIONARY EPISODES.

The Huashan or Kucheng Massacre was the worst attack, in terms of deaths, on British subjects in China prior to the massacres associated with the Boxer Rebellion in 1899-1901. The only comparable events in China’s 19th century history was the murder of foreign citizens (French and Russian) including ten single women missionaries of the Sisters of Mercy order, and a number of indigenous Catholics, at Tientsin in 1871. The Tientsin episode aroused the deepest fears of foreign residents and reified a growing mindset among foreign residents in China of the need for savage retribution following the explosion of anti-foreign rioting across China during the 1890s. The fear of another Tientsin-style riot recurs in the press reports of “indignation” meetings following the Huashan massacre. The second event, referred to earlier, was the anti-foreign riots in Sichuan Province just two months before the horror at Huashan although no foreigners were killed or wounded in those events. These riots in China were eclipsed by the horrors associated with the Boxer Rebellion (1899-1900) when at least two hundred foreigners, men, women and children, were killed in a series of episodes backed by the Empress Dowager and the Chinese Government. Many thousands of Chinese Christians, Protestant and Catholic, were killed by Boxers and related groups. The number of Boxers and other Chinese killed by foreign forces is simply unknown.

The killings at Huashan in August 1895 were unusual for two reasons. First, unlike every other anti-foreign episode of the 1890s (excluding the Boxer episode), the Huashan attack was aimed solely at foreigners with no attacks on Chinese Christians or their property although there had been robberies of local people in Gutian District in late 1894. The ‘Vegetarian’ movement near Gutian did not have definite anti-Christian values and attacked mostly non-Christians with only one specific but incidental attack on a Christian family. Second, it was aimed at, and clearly not instigated by, the local Chinese officials. Third, it involved the only incident of a planned killing of foreigners over a decade marked by increased anti-foreign rioting. The view of diplomats, and almost certainly the correct judgement, was that the underlying reason for the riots anti-foreign sentiment, and in general, the troubles were fomented by the scholar-gentry, or literati, the group from which the Chinese ruling elite was drawn.

It is not because of his religion that the missionary is attacked by mobs, it is because of his race. It is the foreigner, and not the Christian, against whom the mobs are gathered.

Despite fears widely expressed in the press and supported by U.S. Consul Hixson, Archdeacon Wolfe of the CMS and the British Consul, there were no other murders of foreigners in Fujian Province, a situation noted, among other somewhat more objective reports, by the CMS medical missionary, Dr. Birdwood van

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48 See Part Four: The Huashan Massacre: North China Herald Supplement, (Shanghai), 9 August 1895, The Kucheng Massacre, Great Public Meeting [Shanghai]
Sommeren Taylor. Huashan was also exceptional because it involved British missionaries while not targeting Americans in the same district. Miss Hartford, an American slightly injured at Huashan, was attacked by a single individual and he was driven off by Miss Hartford’s Chinese servants, suffering severe injuries in the process. The injury to Miss Hartford provided the excuse for Consul Hixson’s energetic involvement in the subsequent trial and executions of the Huashan murderers.

The burden of indemnity payments following anti-foreign riots fell on local people who were taxed by the offending officials to pay the reparations. Foreigners sought to overcome this unfair practice by insisting that responsibility for attacks on foreigners and related indemnity payments be paid personally by officials.

The assault on the Kucheng missionaries highlighted the emotional rather than physical stress that foreigners faced in the interior of China unless actively protected by local Chinese officials as was, it must be emphasized, generally the case. The early troubles involving the Vegetarian rebels around Gutian City saw the missionaries invited into the city by the District Magistrate in order to protect them from attack. It illustrates the fact that the vast majority of foreign Protestant missionaries in China, whatever their personal fears and anxieties, and whether living in the Treaty Ports or the interior, were protected by the local Chinese administrators.

The more vulgar criticisms made by Chinese against foreigners are represented visually in Part Ten: Anti-Christian and Anti-Foreign Cartoons from Hunan Province. Ter Haar has shown that the crimes that foreigners were accused of committing, and instances are mentioned in many of the newspaper clippings in the collection, were drawn Chinese traditions. The stories were so well known in the culture that it was relatively easy difficult to relate the devil-stories to foreigners instead of to the traditional sources.

In Chinese traditional culture, it was believed that there was a life-force … thought to be located, in concentrated form, in foetuses, inner organs, hair (etc) … (and) could be stolen in different ways, whether directly by removing the relevant parts of the body and transmuting them into a kind of medicine.

Ter Haar helps readers to understand why the cartoons in Part Ten accuse foreigners of the theft of child parts reflects the Chinese belief, not dissimilar to Western beliefs in the innocence of children, that the bodies of children contained the purest form of the life-force which in Western thought might be interpreted as a soul. Thus foreigners later reported that: —

50 Dr. B. van Sommeren Taylor, London, to Rev. Baring Baring-Gould, CMS Secretary, London, 26 November 1895. CMS East Asia Archives. Archdeacon Wolfe was insistent in almost every letter to London that it was (a) safe to send more women to Fujian, and (b) that the British Consul was unnecessarily cautious in refusing to allow single women to return to work outside Fuzhou.

51 US Consul Hixson suggested that the Americans were not a target for murder. Part Eight: Hixson Report, paragraph 579.


53 Ibid, p 95. This kind of activity is shown in a number of the images in Part Ten.

54 The transfer of traditional beliefs of this kind, almost invariably began with people familiar with the Chinese literary tradition, i.e. the literati or scholar-gentry, as in the case of the illustrations in Part Ten, attributed to the Taotai Chou Han of Hunan Province. Ibid, Chaper Four.
It is significant that, at the very time when foreigners here were informed that the telegraph line to Ch’entu was interrupted, an official telegram arrived from Ch’entu, addressed to all the telegraph centres in the country, stating that the mutilated body of a Chinese child had been found in one of the mission houses, thus justifying the rising of the people.55

55 *The Times*, (London), 9 August 1895.
1.20 MISSIONARY EXPLANATIONS OF ANTI-FOREIGN TROUBLES.

The point has been made that the anti-missionary riots of the later part of the 19th century did not arise because of a particular Chinese dislike of missionaries or Christianity. As Part Ten shows, anti-missionary sentiment and anti-foreign sentiment are inseparable in any attempt to explain the circumstances that eventually led to the Kucheng Massacre in 1895 and ultimately to the horror, for Europeans and Chinese, of the Boxer Uprising just five years later. In the following articles, an American Baptist missionary seeks to set the background to treaty arrangements under which foreigners lived and worked in 19th century China, and to the riots of the 1890s in particular, including the episode at Kucheng.

An occasional correspondent to the London Times, suggested that anti-foreign episodes, apart from the general dislike of the Chinese elite for foreigners, also included a struggle for power between regional power-groups within the Chinese elite, citing the Hunan interests symbolized by the Marquis Tseng, and the Ngan-whei provincial elite symbolized by Li Hung Chang. The struggle for internal power and influence within the Chinese literati elite in the 19th century is an area of research that might shed much more light on the contributions of different strands in the Chinese leadership and their hopes to control the decision-making of the Government in Peking.

BY Rev. WM. ASHMORE, D.D.
[American Baptist Mission, Swatow].

IN the treaties made with China by Western nations great breadth and enlightenment have been shown from the first. They are, and were intended to be, commercial treaties; but they were something more than that. They were indicators of the advancement made by those Western nations in all that pertains to intellectual emancipation. They made their very highest achievement when they stipulated for freedom of thought and freedom of opinion. It does not affect the issue that this came under the form of a provision for religious freedom. The right of free trade in ideas of every kind is contained in the principle laid down in those treaties.

In the British Treaty of 1858, Article VIII, it says: "The Christian religion, as professed by Protestants or Roman Catholics, inculcates the practice of virtue and teaches man to do as he would be done by. Persons teaching it, or professing it, therefore shall alike be entitled to the protection of the Chinese authorities, nor shall any such, peaceably pursuing their calling, and not offending against the laws, be persecuted or interfered with."

In the French Treaty of 1858, Article XIII, it says: "The Christian religion, having for its essential object the leading of men to virtue, the members of all Christian communities shall enjoy entire security for their persons and property and the free exercise of their religion; and efficient protection shall be given the missionaries who travel peaceably in the interior, furnished with passports as provided for in Article VIII. No hindrance shall be offered by the authorities of the Chinese Empire to the recognised right of every individual in China to embrace, if he so pleases, Christianity, and to follow its practices without being liable to any punishment therefor. All that has previously been written, proclaimed or published in China by order

56 The Times, (London), 20 September 1895,
of the governments against the Christian religion, is completely abrogated, and remains null and void in all provinces of the empire."

In the American Treaty of 1858, Article XXIX, it says: "The principles of the Christian religion, as professed by the Protestant and Roman Catholic Churches, are recognised as teaching men to do good and to do to others as they would have others do to them. Hereafter those who quietly profess and teach these doctrines shall not be harassed or persecuted on account of their faith. Any person, whether citizen of the United States or Chinese convert, who according to those tenets peaceably teaches and practices the principles of Christianity, shall in no case be interfered with or molested."

And in the Supplementary American Treaty of 1868, Article IV, it says: "The 29th article of the Treaty of the 18th June, 1858, having stipulated for the exemption of the Christian citizens of the United States and Chinese converts from persecution in China on account of their faith; it is further agreed that citizens of the United States in China, of every religious persuasion, and Chinese subjects in the United States, shall enjoy entire liberty of conscience, and shall be exempt from all disability or persecution on account of their religious faith or worship in either country."

It will be noticed that in all these stipulations there is no consideration shown to missionaries and their importations that has not already just been shown to merchants and their importations. The ruling principle is the same in both cases. In this there is both reason and common sense, as well as evenly balanced ethics. If it is lawful for a foreigner to introduce and sell commercial products it must be commensurately lawful for a native to buy those products. If it is lawful for a foreigner to impart ideas of any kind it must be equally lawful for a native to receive those ideas. The one right is a correlate of the other. After stipulating in the treaties that a Manchester man, or any other man, may bring n woolens and sheetings it would be a violation of treaty to allow any official or guild of native merchants to impose any exaction or infliction on the persons who might buy those wooleus or sheetings. If such a thing should be attempted the whole mercantile body, the whole consular body, and the whole diplomatic body would be up in arms in a moment. For this, they would say, is practically the nullification of a treaty.

Suppose now the protesting consuls and diplomats should be confronted by an argument of this sort. "But you foreign officials must have observed that the Chinese do not care lo observe certain provisions of the treaties. Therefore they are always getting around them, evading them, ignoring them, or riding over them. A deal of official correspondence is called for in consequence which might be spared. Now then the way to do is to revise the treaties and leave out those particular articles which the Chinese are always breaking and which they prefer not to keep at all; after that you will have no infraction to complain of. If they do not like your arrangement about a single transit due, but want to erect new barriers at the borders of each new magistrate's district and extort new 'squeezes,' why, let them do it and knock the prohibition out of the treaty." If any man should really make such a proposition the first suggestion would be as to an appointment of the well known commission to inquire about lunacy.

And yet that very proposition has been soberly made about one particular article of the treaties—the one which recognises the respectability of Christianity equally with the respectability of trade and commerce, and which claims for those introducing the teachings of Christianity the same protection that is extended to those who import piece goods, shark's fins, petroleum, or any other of some hundreds of products which may come from the outside. That article it is proposed to wipe out, as a sop to the Chinese officials and literati.

As we face this most remarkable suggestion that comes from certain quarters we are led to ask on what ground the action would be based if the Religious-Liberty Articles are to be expunged from the treaties?

(1). Could it be put on the ground that a wrong estimate had been placed on Christianity at the time by those who made the treaties? Is it not true then that Christianity inculcates the practice of virtue, and that it teaches men to do good? that it teaches men to do as they would be done by? that it has for its essential object the leading of men to virtue? Those things are just as true of Christianity to-day as they were when the treaties were framed. We certainly cannot affirm that Christianity has changed, so that what was virtue then has ceased to be virtue now. We cannot go back on truth of that kind. If we are to take up a treaty and run a pen-knife through a whole article the world will expect us to give some better reason than that—a reason which will not stand examination for a moment.
(2). It has been said that it is next to impossible to secure protection for persons "inland and away from the treaty ports and Consulates, therefore it is better to cross out what is an impracticable stipulation." But now it is not true that it is next to impossible to secure protection. It is a plea sedulously put forward by the Chinese authorities, and they sedulously endeavor to make it appear well founded, and have winked at the troubles that foreigners are made to encounter inland. For over a quarter of a century has dust been thrown into the eyes of Western cabinets without a let-up. It has been a pretence all along. Making all due allowance for the inefficiency and maladministration in distant places, and for the stubbornness of high provincial officers, which sometimes makes them reluctant to obey edicts, yet it has been demonstrated beyond all question that when the Peking government puts its foot down in real earnest it can control the provincials, and the provincials can control the common people. Peking can degrade a viceroy if it chooses, can send him elsewhere, or take away his seal, and the viceroys stand in awe on that account. All they need is an order that is free from shilly-shally and double meaning. It is not necessary that the police of the West, whether in the form of a "gun-boat" or a plenary commission, should be able to run up creeks and rivulets or trot over interminable ranges of hills. China, in all its parts, including Sz-chuan, Yun-nan and Kan-suh, is to be reached from Peking. That is the position taken ever since the first war with China, when it was decided to transfer operations from the provincial to the central government in future. The method needs qualifying to-day, and a combination of the two may yet be found indispensable to the common welfare, but there it is, such as it is. A rigorous dead-in-earnest "touch of the button" by the diplomatic representative and the Cabinet will respond to the diplomatist, and the provincial will respond to the Cabinet. If China can no longer control her outlying provinces then her organization is a failure; demoralization is preparing the way for anarchy. To revoke the missionary article of the treaty or any other article for any such reason as that would only be making preparations for administrative suicide on our part, and would be helping the Chinese also to commit felo-de-se. It would be a proclamation to the nations at large that China has reached a stage when the appointment of a guardian has become a necessity.

(3). Some frankly avow, with more or less plainness, quite another reason. We are not interested in missionary operations, they say; and we do not care to be bothered with them. There is no money in it. What we want is trade and nothing but trade. So let us have the missionary article of the treaty wiped out, and there will be an end to all that trouble. That is very much as if an importer, whose specialty is woolens, should say, "I am opposed to all extra transit dues on woolen goods, but am quite willing that the Chinese should impose as many as they like, at as many barriers as they like, on all other sorts of goods, such as metals, and drugs, and petroleum, for I have no interest in those things; "and as if the metal and drug man should say, "Put as many transit charges as you like on all woolen goods, for I never deal in them, but keep them off my tin and lead and ginseng and iron and quinine and don't bother my oil tanks, then the treaty will be administered to my satisfaction, and we shall all get along peaceably."

It seems never to occur to persons who have reasoned in this same way about missionaries and their mission that there are many millions of Christian people in England, Scotland and America who are back of them all. These millions of Christian men and women may own no stock in Manchester or Sheffield, and none whatever in the Standard Oil Company, yet they are intensely interested in missions. They form a vast component part of the tax-payers of both countries, and pay their full share in the cost and maintenance of all those agencies out here in the east, by which law and order are maintained, and crimes, such as robbery, piracy and mobs are suppressed, whether those agencies be Ambassadors, Consuls, with their expensive establishments, or those police of the high seas, the men-of-war and the gunboats with their very costly armaments and supplies. They pay their full share. They are not to be taxed like other people and then be denied all the benefits and protections that accrue from that taxation at the behest of somebody who says he takes no interest in what concerns some fifteen or twenty millions of his countrymen, but is quite willing to appropriate to himself the avails of their taxes. These millions of people at home, if called on for an expression of sentiment, will decline, without honeyed phrase, the implication that they themselves are a lot of hangers-on who ought to be very thankful for crumbs. In asking for protection for their missionary

57 An old term relating to suicide or any act of self-destruction.
representatives, whom they have sent out here, they are only asking for what they have paid for, and what they are entitled to, because they have paid for it.

Apart from the injustice done to others, those who reason in this way ought to consider the reproach they fix upon themselves.

It is like putting themselves on record that as far as they are concerned the one supreme and the sole object they have in view is gain—get money—find a market for manufactured products, and that utterly irrespective of whether the peoples we deal with are morally benefited by contact with our nation or not. If it will improve our markets to shut out religion and shut out missionaries who teach the faith of our fathers then let us have them shut out. Withdraw all protection from them and let them take their chances for life or death; trade must not be hampered; a market for T-cloths and gunny bags must be secured, and must not be imperiled on account of the lives of any number of missionaries, As for ideas and teachings which are intended to benefit mankind, as they call it, what is all that to us? So that we sell our goods we don't care a rap about their moral or spiritual condition, or whatever it is. We look on these great peoples exclusively with an eye to the enlarged markets they are likely to furnish us. That is what we are here for, and nothing else under the sun interests us in comparison with trade and money making, etc., etc.—can anything more delusingly sordid be conceived of?—and be it noted this is not the way that missionaries talk about them, but it is the way they paint themselves. Missionaries do not ask our merchants to take an active part in helping them bear their responsibilities, nor do they expect them to take so high an estimate of missionary work as they do themselves, but do expect them to be at least fair-minded and to be generously inclined to a recognition of the loftiness of moral as well as of mercantile enterprise.

(4). "But"—those same objectors continue—"But religion is not to be propagated by force of any kind, political or material. It is matter of conscience, and should he left to every man's conscience to decide for himself." Precisely, and for that very reason the propriety of those religious freedom articles is made apparent. That is just what they provide for, nothing less and certainly nothing more. Their function is not to be promotive but preventive. If they intended to call forth any official help in building up Christianity to the disparagement of any other form of religion then the complaint might be put forward, but if they are intended to put all on equality, so far as the law is concerned, then the complaint does not hold. It is the latter which is true and not the former. The articles in question are insisted only on a common tolerance, and are preventive of any intolerance. What they mean is religious freedom for anybody alike, and that involves intellectual freedom for everybody alike, freedom of thought, liberty of soul for all mankind. They mean simply NO INTERFERENCE WITH ANOTHER MAN'S RIGHT OF OPINION. That is a matter for every man to settle with his Creator and Judge. Therefore a Christian will not interfere with the religious freedom of a Confucianist, nor shall a Confucianist interfere with the religious freedom of a Christian. In Britain and in the United States a Mahommedan, a Hindu and a Buddhist have the same religious liberty that is guaranteed to a Protestant or a Roman Catholic. Under the flag of the former nation are many tens of millions, not Christians, who are thus protected. In Singapore and other British colonies multitudes of Chinese have the same protection. When the toleration article was inserted England and America, and the other countries too, were only asking what they had long been most freely giving to others.

The use of the word "force" therefore in this connection is wholly out of place. There is no "force" about it; it is just the other way. It is not an enjoinder—Thou shall help, but simply Thou shall not persecute. No force shall be used on anybody. Whatever seeks admission to the human intellect or the human understanding, no matter what it is, shall succeed or fail on its own intrinsic merits. The kind of talk that has at times been so freely indulged in about forcing our faith and forcing our views of theology and ethics on the Chinese, only indicates a marvelous blur of discernment as to the actual facts of the situation. No missionary ever wishes for or will accept a disciple whose faith has been forced upon him. Nobody is obliged to believe, nobody is obliged even to listen to a missionary, even in the open air, he can pass him by and ignore him altogether; nobody is obliged to buy his tracts or accept them as a present or even look at them in somebody's else hands. The man who does not want to hear has his perfect right not to hear guaranteed to him, but let him not interfere with another man's right to listen if he wants to.

But now we rejoice most heartily in being permitted to say that in civil and official life among our own countrymen out in the East, a mighty current of sentiment runs in another channel.
These persons say, It is true we are here in the pursuits of an honorable and elevating commerce, profitable not only to ourselves but equally so to the Chinese. While thus engaged in business we cannot be indifferent to the moral and intellectual debasement of the common people. We are not all sordidness as some might suppose. The missionaries are our countrymen—they represent the uplifted Christian sentiment of our own land—as indeed we ourselves are privileged to do in another department if we choose to. Whether everybody among them always does the wisest thing is not the question. Let us recognise the fact that here is an appalling moral need, and they are doing what they can to remedy it. We all recognize the lack of moral stamina in Chinese official administration, and we all feel that we must have China fully opened. The missionaries are doing a pioneer work in both directions, and we wish them all possible success. We certainly shall not begrudge them their legitimate share of the common protection for life and property provided for us all, and for which their supporters have paid as well as ourselves. If as we think China needs us it also needs them; if Christianity finds a mighty helper in trade and commerce, so trade and commerce need the benign and healthful influence of Christian civilization, and all this independent of that greater and supreme spiritual need of all mankind. The success of missions means the greater triumph and success of commerce the world over. Therefore we will be fair-minded and not illiberal, and we will not be counting as enemies to trade those who are among its best and real friends.

For such reasons we shall stand by the treaty articles on missions the same as any other, and shall point to them not only as proofs that our commercial treaties are not all for mere gain, but that in them we have given exaltation to a principle reached by ourselves only after centuries of moiling, a principle of soul freedom to which no man can object, and which, as accepted, will benefit more than anything else from the West, except Christianity itself, all these low grade millions of China.

Which of these attitudes towards the treaty articles is the better and more just one let each one decide for himself.

In all this reasoning we are dwelling on the question of rightfulness, pure and simple. To put the subject in another form, if we at all understand the sentiment among missionaries, generally, it is this:—

I. They do not ask that any favor of any kind should be shown to themselves or their converts above what is shown to any and all others in like circumstances.

II. They do ask that neither they themselves, nor their converts, be discriminated against in a way that is never done to others in like circumstances.

III. As regards the truths and ideas they inculcate they do not ask for any official endorsement or backing to help them gain acceptance. These truths and ideas are to be accepted or rejected on their own intrinsic merits exclusively. Beyond liberty of speech to be exercised always with the utmost and most unfailing courtesy, missionary utterance asks for nothing whatever.

IV. But missionaries do feel that they have reason to demur whenever they see it proposed to have an official stigma and a brand of outlawry put upon their teachings, because they happen to be Christian and not Hindu or Buddhist, or Confucian, or some other of the variety of faiths known in this land of China.

While these are the rightful claims in themselves yet what the missionary is willing to put up with, and does put up with in discharging his obligation to his Master, is quite another thing.


WE are slowly getting out of the woods. There is a basis for a better understanding than has existed. There are things to be said on both sides—some things to be said on the side of the Chinese as well as on the side of the missionary. We will not blink them, nor underrate them. We shall come to them in due time, and when we do we shall point out certain hopeful signs that in the future these troubles will be minimised greatly. Material exists to-day which did not exist a quarter of a century for a better estimate of the missionary as a factor in preparing the way for trade and commerce in the full opening of China, in addition to his own distinctive work as a religious teacher in things of the world to come. Missionaries appreciate very highly the
kindly tone in which their work is being spoken of in this day by various diplomats, consuls, editors and members of the community in general. The latter may not approve of all they see going on, but neither do the missionaries themselves approve of some things in their own ranks; but only let it be a fair and candid and friendly examination, and every fair-minded and candid missionary will bid it welcome.

It will do no harm, and it may do some good to dig up a little buried history so as to give the full truth its proper due; after that we can come down to the improved conditions of our own day and find a deal of common ground for missionary and community convictions to stand upon.

We go back to the times of Sir Rutherford Alcock. He devoted special attention to what he called "The Recent Missionary Disturbances." The various details of these "disturbances" are spread out in the Blue Books of some four consecutive years. A satisfactory explication of the causes of these same disturbances was not given, and yet material for it was at hand. Let us round out the story.

The trouble broke out unexpectedly; the transition was abrupt from a state of tranquillity to one of stormy violence. There was, too, a method in the madness—a marked similarity in the manner of getting up a "trouble" and of precipitating a crisis. There was also evidence of their having been desired to effect some common end as yet unknown to the public. The disturbances assumed different phases at different times—rising into prominence, then subsiding then resumed with greater violence than before; first appearing in Chinese diplomacy, then dropped by them for a time, but passing over into the despatches of foreign Ministers with harsh crimination of missionaries, and finally taken up again by the Chinese with fresh zeal and new expectations.

It is this agitation that we are now to investigate in its origin, its progress, and its culmination in ferocity and bloodshed.

At the beginning of the year 1867 we find the Protestant missionaries plodding along in their usual way, and without, "disturbances." Availing themselves of the privilege secured by the French treaty some of their number had located themselves inland, and were teaching the tenets of Christianity in quietness and peace. In some places they had been admitted with apparent indifference, if not actually welcomed. In other places, though received with coldness, it was evidently the conclusion of the people to extend to Christianity the same toleration hitherto shown to Buddhism and other exotic forms of faith introduced among them. Many of the movements of the missionaries were tentative, like similar arrangements by the diplomatists. When a given course was found not to work to advantage the missionaries at once sought to remedy the evil in the most speedy and judicious way, just as Sir Rutherford Alcock and Mr. (now Sir) Robert Hart would seek to correct any inadequacies in new movements in their own departments. Such a degree of success was attending their efforts that a general good feeling towards them was gaining in the minds of the people. The friction perceptible at times was no more than must be expected from the introduction of new ideas, such, for example, as those associated with the working of new treaties and new revenue laws. There was also a natural antagonism of religious beliefs which required cautious procedure, and cautious procedure was being observed, so that there was no trouble arising on that account. Certain it is that no general or serious complaint against the missionaries had been made up to the time of Tseng Kuo-fan's memorial to the throne, made in the autumn of that year (1867), for he entertained no apprehensions and referred to them with a half contemptuous indifference, saying, "They will after all get hat few supporters and converts." (U. S. Dip. Cor. 1868, part I., page 521).

And so we come to the memorable year 1868. Two occurrences of note are embraced within its limits. In the first part of the year were held the various meetings of the Commission on the Revision of the British Treaty of 1858—the ten years of trial stipulated for having now elapsed; in the latter part of the year there broke out a storm of Chinese hostility to missionaries residing inland away from treaty ports. The former was of course the leading event, for which provision had been made; the latter was an unexpected consequence growing out of the former.

When the revision question came up both sides were ready for the struggle. English policy was progressive. Chinese attitude was obstructive. Though not yet informed officially of the demands of the British Minister the Chinese knew perfectly well what these demands were to be. The petitions and memorials of the previous year had been published in the papers of Shanghai and Hongkong and the ministers of the Tsung-li Yamen had posted themselves on points being discussed in Chambers of
Commerce. As Wen Ta-jin, at a later day, replying to a remark of Sir Rutherford Alcock that "both the merchants and his colleagues deemed further concession essential" observed dryly enough, "Yes, no doubt, I see what your newspapers say sometimes." As a result of this information the Chinese had marshalled, ready for presentation, every objection that had any ground to stand upon. If, at that time, the inland residence of missionaries had been deemed dangerous to the empire the Commission would certainly have heard of it.

The campaign opened on the 3rd of March, 1868, when the Commission first met to arrange the preliminaries. The meetings were continued at various times through five months, the thirteenth session being held on the 15th of July.

At the very outset the questions of INLAND RESIDENCE and INLAND NAVIGATION were put forward as of the first importance. The strength of the English onset was directed to the attainment of these two points, and the strength of Chinese resistance was exerted to prevent it. Throughout the entire contest we find these two questions continually coming up, sometimes in one aspect and sometimes in another, until every possible argument was exhausted.

The subject was introduced at the second meeting held April 20th. The British members of the Commission attempted shrewdly to turn the Chinese position. After some other discussion "a general permission to navigate inland waters was then proposed as essential to avoid dues in excess of treaty." Their opponents were on the alert and replied, "A general permission they could not bring before the Minister." (Blue Book No. 5, 1871, page 194). On the next day the third meeting was held. Fortified by a memorandum of instructions the British Commission entered boldly upon the discussion of inland navigation and its attendant privilege of inland residence. The Chinese raised all manner of objections; those against navigation being based upon "shallows," "rapids," "danger of steamers overrunning native craft, etc., etc." The determination to refuse these things was so apparent that in making his report Mr. Frazer said, "Inland residence was evidently the concession most difficult to entertain."

This obstructiveness called forth fresh instructions from Sir Rutherford to renew the attempt, under cover of the privilege hitherto accorded to missionaries. From that moment the missionaries were dragged into the struggle and were destined to soon find the Chinese batteries turned to dislodge them, and, like all unfortunates placed between two fires, fated to suffer, first from the one and then from the other. Here is the way Sir Rutherford's commission led off: "The right to reside in the interior conceded to missionaries, what is this more than the merchants require for the peaceable pursuits of their occupation? Of the two the merchant is probably the safer tenant of a fixed, location in the interior. He is bound by the interests of his trade to keep the peace, apart from all surveillance or exercise of authority over him, because only under such conditions can the commerce in which he is engaged prosper. The missionary has other objects above all restraint from his own personal interests, and the teaching of a creed and introduction of a new religion, have always been held to be more dangerous to the public peace and more likely to bring the teachers and their converts in conflict with the civil power than the occupation of the merchant. Having then accepted the greater would it be wise in the government to refuse the lesser and less hazardous venture in the interests of peace?" (B. B. No. 5, page 107, 1871).

What manner of reply the Chinese made at that time to this adroit assault upon the missionary position, Sir Rutherford does not inform us, but we do know what they said to him afterwards when he repeated the argument. On the 8th of September, after the various Ministers Resident had sent in their observations on the inadequacy of the concessions, Sir Rutherford proposed still another memorandum for transmission to Prince Kung, in which he enunciates substantially the same thing contained in his instructions of April 26 just quoted, "As to any more general objections to the permanent residence of foreigners in the interior, this right has been so fully conceded to one class—the missionaries—with liberty to acquire both land and houses, that it seems inconsistent and invidious to deny a modified privilege of the same kind to merchant who, besides being under consul control, furnish, in the interests and property they would have at stake, security for good conduct. The French treaty stipulating, Art. VI., that it is permitted to French missionaries to rent and purchase land in all the provinces and erect buildings thereon at pleasure, what is permitted to French missionaries is permitted to all other missionaries; and why therefore should a similar right be denied to the merchants? Of the two classes it is impossible to doubt the latter are the least likely to give trouble to the
authorities or create popular disturbance, as all past experience tends to prove." (B. B. No. 6, 1871, page 224).

To this repetition of the argument from the concession made to missionaries Prince Kung made an official reply. This reply, be it noted, was made about the 1st of December, long after the Yangchow affair. It will be seen that even so late as that, notwithstanding the Prince now desired the dislodgment of the missionaries in consequence of the embarrassment in discussion their privileges occasioned him, he was not yet educated up to the point of calling them "rogues or enthusiasts," as did a certain member of the House of Lords, nor of charging them, as did a certain diplomat, with being "in part responsible for all the trouble and bloodshed there had been in Tai-wan." (B. B. No. 9, 1870, page 21); nor yet of dwelling on the revolutionary tendencies of Christianity to such an extent as to say that, unless hostility could be surmounted it would be decidedly for the peace of China if CHRISTIANITY AND ITS EMISSARIES were, for the present at least, EXCLUDED ALTOGETHER, (B. B. No. 9, 1870, page 27). The inculcation of such sentiments was reserved for titled officials claiming to represent truly the government of Her Majesty Queen Victoria, by the grace of God Defender of the Faith.

To the above despatch Prince Kung replied as follows: "The conditions of the interior are not identical with those of the open ports, and it is certain, to say nothing of the difficulties connected with a continued residence in the interior, that even a temporary renting of houses and godowns would be attended with almost the same harmful consequences as such residence." After speaking of the necessity of such godowns being "under the jurisdiction of native officials," and the further necessity of investigating disputes that should arise "in accordance with Chinese modes of procedure," he continues: "In all these instances it would be necessary to enforce the same laws that are binding on the native people; and again, in case of local officials altering the ordinary mode of procedure according to circumstances," meaning (we suppose) to suit foreign usages, and thus showing from what source they dreaded the imperium in imperio, "they would have to obeyed every particular. The lead refusal to do so would impair the authority of the government and still more inflict injury upon the native trader, thus leading to difficulties in the transaction of public business and a refusal on the part of the Chinese merchant to bear his losses in silence, in which refusal he would surely he justified by the principles of every nation under the sun. Smuggling and corruption may further he mentioned as still more unavoidable consequences. This is not a parallel case with that of the missionaries whose energies are directed to the propagation of their doctrines, and cannot affect the revenue of the country; moreover, one is a case of preaching the practice of virtue, the other of seeking after gain. Two cases of so different a character can never be regarded in the same light. In view of the present missionary troubles is it right to heap further difficulties upon those which already exist? The permission of foreign merchants to hire boats and lodge at inns for the purpose of the transport of goods would be attended with no inconvenience, but it is impossible to accede to the proposition of His Excellency to rent godowns, etc., etc."

(B. B. No. 5, 1871, page 233).

We have introduced in advance of its proper place this last quotation, because it is the first official record we have of the Chinese mode of parrying the force of the argument from missionary residence inland. We now continue the thread of the narrative, showing how the struggle continued over these same issues of INLAND RESIDENCE and INLAND NAVIGATION.

On the 30th of April Mr. Frazer presented a summary of the various proposals made to the Yanen. Sec. III., referring to facilities for transport, includes demands for (1) the right to have unimpeded access to trading marts in the interior, (2) certain specific places to be named, (3) British merchants shall own warehouses in the interior, (4) foreign employees shall be permitted to reside therein (page 202).

On the 5th of June the Commission again met to hear the reply of the Yanen to the preceding summary, which on one point was rendered toothy enough. Concerning inland navigation they said, "The traffic on the ocean and great rivers being now in the hands of foreigners they ought to be satisfied and leave the navigation of the inner waters to the native junk men." Further, "they replied the Chinese government had the strongest objections to inland navigation as a general proposition, but would consider specific demands on their individual merits. The proposal of residence or warehouses in the interior, it was said, would depend, upon the decision taken on the question of inland navigation." The Report concludes: "It is clear the Chinese government is indisposed to accede to any of these proposals." (B. B. No. 5, XII, page 204).
Various other meetings were held, but no new arguments were advanced and no new objections raised. No further progress was made save that the Chinese "volunteered a general permission to foreigners to navigate inland waters in their own ships, provided these were not steamers."

For the present, then, we may drop the history of the Commission and proceed to offer some comments upon its developments thus far. We have been specific in noting its proceedings, not only for what was said, but equally so for what was not said. Taking these proceedings in connection with Tseng Kwo-fan's memorial we find the Chinese making determined opposition to inland residence, and also disclosing their reasons for it. "They have established places of business throughout China and trafficked or become carriers of all kinds of produce, simply that they may carry out their unscrupulous schemes of injury which will end in depriving our merchants of their means of livelihood. Since the time when we raised troops against them our people have suffered every grievous calamity. If we now open three or five more ports to their trade, and the entire length of the Yang-tze river, it will daily add to the distress and indigence of our poor people who, Alas! are now quite driven to the wall. If we listen to the proposal of the foreigners to open the trade in salt, our own trade in our transportation of the article will presently he brought to nought. If we consent to their scheme of building warehouses (in the country) the occupation of those who keep the inns and depots will likewise suffer. Their demand to have their small steamers allowed access to our rivers will involve the ruin of our large and small boats and, the beggary of sailors and supercargoes. So also if we allow them to construct railroads and set up telegraph lines the livelihood of our cartmen, muleteers, innkeepers and porters will be taken from them." (Tseng Kwo-fan's Memorial, United States Dip. Cor., Part I., 18G8, page 519).

These words of the great viceroy are quoted, not because of a particle of sympathy with the fears they express. The views are narrow and mistaken. There were no political and economic Rontgen rays known to him to pierce the opaque sides of a purse and show him gold coin inside. Yet the coin is there. Bating the single article of opium, about which we must differ with our mercantile friends, we consider that such an enlargement of the sphere of trade as that Commission contemplated will be an inexpressible boon to the poor people" of China. The opening of China in that full and comprehensive sense must come some day, and China will not be lifted out of the bog where she now flounders until something of the kind does come, when her statesmen shall cast away their blind-bridles, smother their pride and be willing to learn of the West. Unless they do this, and do it soon, they will find themselves confronted with multitudes of men who will want to know the exact value of the right by which a small mandarinate deprives some three hundred millions of men of all the advantages of some sort of association with the rest of mankind; but now we make the quotation here to show that it was not simply missionaries against whom objection lay. Tseng Kwo-fan leading off enlarged our commercial disadvantages. The Yamen followed it up and added to it their apprehension of political perils arising from a sovereignty impaired by having in the interior one set of laws and regulations for the foreigner and another for the native, which the latter would refuse to submit to in silence, and "in which refusal he would surely be justified by the principles of every nation under the sun."

Next observe what was NOT said among all these objections to inland residence. No mention is made of complications likely to arise from the presence of missionaries inland. If up to this time they had been found so perilous to international comity, such mischief makers and meddlers as Sir Rutherford at a later day represented them to be, why was not the fact put forward by the Chinese during these days of anxious discussion? There was not an available stone left unturned; there was not a shot in the locker that was not fired off. " Shoals and rapids," "difficulties in the transaction of public business" and all other objections were put forward unremittingly, but it was not said that missionaries would present a chief barrier to the granting of the minister's proposal. There is but one way of accounting for this omission, and that is by supposing that serious apprehension, arising from their presence inland, did not then exist. Whether this was because the missionaries were not numerous, or their converts few, or their doctrines untested does not matter. The point is that the missionaries inland had not then become a disturbing element to the Chinese officials.

But now mark what a discovery the Chinese had made while the discussion was going on. The concession that had been made in favor of missionaries, and which the latter had availed themselves of up to the present time without exciting complaint, was now being used by the British minister as the most formidable
argument in support of that demand for inland residence and inland navigation they were themselves so stubbornly opposing. Precedent, that ultima ratio in Chinese controversy, had been found, and was now being pressed into their teeth. Their own guns were being turned against themselves. By some means or other they must retake them. What else could they think of? Ponder a moment their dilemma. If they continued to allow one class of foreigners to come in, it would seem "inconsistent and insidious" to deny a modified privilege of the same class to others. Plainly it had come to this—EITHER ALL FOREIGNERS MUST BE ADMITTED FREELY INTO THE INTERIOR, OR ALL MUST BE EQUALLY RESTRICTED TO THE OPEN PORTS. The former they had resolved should be "strenuously resisted;" the latter alone remained, and how to accomplish it "without hazarding the safety of the present situation," or "giving these parties reason to suspect (their) plans" became now the absorbing topic of their councils.

And now commence these “disturbances,” inaugurated for the purpose of making the residence of missionaries inland no longer safe, and thus of crowding him back to the open ports.
1.21 MISSIONS, COMMUNICATIONS AND THE TABLOYD PRESS.

The general issue of submarine telegraphy and diplomacy in East Asia has been discussed in recent publications and the detail is best sought in the works listed.58

The emergence of tabloid style journalism in Europe and America did nothing to improve foreign understanding of events in China. Many reports in this collection demonstrate how journalists sought to titillate prurient imaginations through hints of “unspeakable atrocities” to innocent and unworldly young women. Despite the deliberate inflammation of foreign opinion not one foreign woman was sexually assaulted in 19th century China but the press and people with no specific knowledge of conditions in China generated many statements on the wrongheadedness of missionary societies in sending young women into “unimaginable dangers.”59 Cabled reports, usually from unnamed correspondents, were taken at face value and despatches were repeated around the world shaping popular opinion about missions and the supposed risks of missionary service, especially for gentle, well mannered, middle-class women of limited life experience. As Mark Twain said: “Get your facts first, and then you can distort them as much as you please.”60

The rise of tabloid journalism paralleled the growth of “world news” via the virtually instant connection by the 1880s, of all the major cities in the world through submarine cables carrying telegraphic traffic.61 It was the 19th century equivalent to the dramatic shifts in communication in the late 20th century—the World Wide Web and internet. Syndicated news reporting was well-established with Reuter’s for example, establishing a Shanghai office as early as 1871. The international submarine cable system and newspapers spread the news of the Huashan massacre within days and even hours.62 A report in a Canadian paper in the week following the Huashan massacre highlighted the growth and importance of submarine telegraphy.

THE PACIFIC CABLE.
J. W. Mackay, the Telegraph Magnate, on the Proposed Connection by Wire with Australia and Japan.

SEATTLE, Aug. 8.—In an interview yesterday, J. W. Mackay, the millionaire telegraph magnate, said: “A great enterprise, which is sure to be soon carried out, will be the laying of a cable across the Pacific ocean from some point on the Pacific Coast to Australia and Japan. Independent cables may be laid to each country. The opening up of commercial relations with a great country like Japan with 45,000,000 people, who are making rapid strides in arts, science and commerce, and needing as they

62 Part Eight: Hixson Report, paragraph 1,002. “The telegraph wires flashed the news to all parts of the world.”
do so many of our products in exchange for what they can give us, means more than one can conceive in a great country like our. Telegraphic communication directly to Australia will have wonderfully stimulating effect on the lumber trade of your country, for while one ship laden with lumber goes now, ten will then plow the waves, and you can easily judge what effect that will have on the country. As it is now, telegraphic communication with Australia is very expensive, as a message has to go about 22,000 miles, almost girdling the earth. It will only cost about $10,000,000 to build a cable to Australia, and it would be a good paying investment.63

As one study puts it: “The connections between telegraphs, cables, urban media, new journalism;” opened the way to the first era of a global world-view as more and more reports appeared providing an unprecedented flow of information from around the world including the foreign “city-states” in China. Until the 1880s missionary and religious journals had been the main purveyors of information about China by publishing first-hand, if carefully edited, letters and reports from missionaries in the field that reached, as noted before, a relatively small part of the population of Euro-America. Like the tabloid press, the missionary journals reflected most of the cultural prejudices of Europeans of the period although the religious press generally insisted on the interdependency of all human beings. The key text of the time, used in almost every missionary context as Christian doctrine fought a rearguard action against the prevailing views of a hierarchy of human civilisation, was that God: “has made of one blood all nations of men” (Acts 17:26).

The Kucheng Massacre was one of the first major events to be reported closely around the world after the international submarine telegraph linked Fuzhou in 1883 to the major cities of East and Southeast Asia and through them to the world cable network. Australia and New Zealand were linked to Hong Kong and Shanghai and on through Bombay to London (via Cornwall), the central receiving point for British Empire cables and from London were repeated to the United States, Europe and elsewhere. As part of the Asia-Pacific “Extension” a submarine cable linked Singapore to Java and then to Darwin. Within Australia, the overland telegraph line from Darwin to Adelaide and the eastern colonies was completed in 1872 and extended to Western Australia in 1877. An Australia-New Zealand cable began operations in 1876. The importance of this link is indicated by the extensive reporting of the Huashan massacre in the New Zealand press. Over 500 reports on the Huashan Massacre, mostly from press agencies and frequently passed on from Australia, appeared in New Zealand during 1895.

By 1890 there were two distinct telegraphic systems in China, the external international links controlled by foreign companies and the Chinese Imperial Telegraph Administration domestic system, using Chinese language telegraphic codes. While the Chinese Government could not control external links, local authorities could, and did control the internal networks, giving priority to Chinese official despatches and none at all to those of foreigners. The political importance of the cable system can be seen in the frequent telegrams

63 The Daily Colonist, (Victoria, British Columbia), 9 August 1895. See also (online 1 August 2010), http://ns1763.ca/guysbco/commcable.html
foreign consuls and ministers in China and in exchanges between London and Washington and their respective Legations in Beijing found throughout the collection under the relevant date of despatch. The different treatment of foreign messages produced a shut-down between Sichuan and Shanghai associated with the anti-foreign riots of June 1895 that prevented news sent from Sichuan reaching foreigners in Shanghai. The embargo lasted ten or eleven days. A similar event occurred in Fujian in August 1895 where three days elapsed before the Viceroy of Fuzhou allowed the cables from Kucheng to become public. It didn’t matter in local contexts because messages from the Rev. H. S. Phillips in Huashan reached Fuzhou on the evening of the day of the massacre but it was quite a problem elsewhere, and particularly in exchange of despatches between consuls and their ministers in Beijing.

There were other challenges. The cost of sending messages required a telegraphic “shorthand” to be developed to reduce the length and hence the charges. Consuls and diplomats, private citizens and journalists all used ciphers or specialist codes, relying on groups of letters to convey a sentence. Sometimes, messages contained a mixture of clear text and code. Two examples from Fuzhou, undecoded, are given below.

Churchill (U.S. Vice-Consul, Foochow), to Denby, Peking, August 19, 10.50 a.m. The following received. JXD CYW BIB NUY KLO CBT MFK SGE NTE ORS ESZ JKF F Hixson wired you this morning Churchill.

Churchill (U.S. Vice-Consul, Foochow), to Denby, Peking, August 23, 5.50 p.m. Denby, Peking. IGE OWN WKC RUV ETW KZK NHK FMS NCZ QIF YRS ILF KNI EAD KMO CQK NTF IQO HTL YDW. Churchill.

As Churchill was later to observe when queried by the audit staff in Washington there were frequent exchanges of coded messages, long and short, during the Huashan era, to the point where the cable companies were threatening to withhold further messages until the accounts outstanding by the U.S. Consulate in Foochow were paid.

Many of the English language messages in this collection, from either official records (FRUS) or Consul Hixson’s Report, (Hixson Report), were sent originally as coded messages. Some that would have been sent in code, as indicated above, were sent ‘clear’ with the intention that Chinese officials would read them and note any implied threats. It is evident from other references that foreign consular and diplomatic messages provided Beijing and provincial capitals with information they did not get from their local who avoided reporting embarrassing events. Many officials, as was the case with Taotai Hsu, the senior official in Kucheng during the trials, and perhaps the Viceroy and the most senior officials in Fuzhou, had no grasp of...
their obligations under the Treaty system and chose to ignore diplomatic and consular conventions. Clear language messages provided foreigners with one way of bypassing the secrecy preferred by local officials.

Sending coded messages involved many ‘repeater’ stations because of the limitations of cable technology at the time. Messages were retransmitted at regular intervals and keeping the integrity of the original, or translating coded messages back into standard Chinese or English produced frequent transcription and translation errors. Foreign governments had only basic maps of China and there were wide variations in rendering of place names in the American cables shown by confusion about the location of Kucheng. The complexity was not helped by the repetition of identical place-names across China. A mixture of ignorance and confusion created an impression abroad that anti-foreign riots were occurring in almost every town in China. In fact most episodes in the 1890s occurred along the Grand Canal leading to the north from Shanghai and along the Yangtse River upriver from Shanghai, with some trouble in the southern provinces of Fujian and Guangdong. Baark notes wryly that as with so many scientific and technological innovations, the first report in Chinese about the telegraph was written by a medical missionary, an American Baptist, Dr. Daniel MacGowan, another reminder that missionaries were almost the only foreigners in inland China.68

The worldwide press reaction to the anti-foreign events in China reflected growing ethnic and racial fear sustained by a smug belief in superior foreign military power. The superior firepower of modern weaponry allowed the British and other foreigners, fed a constant diet by the popular press, to maintain their position in Asia and Africa. As the illustration on the next page indicates, naval superiority was the primary goal of the Foreign Powers.

Wu Ting-Fang69 Chinese Minister to the United States, responding to the horror aroused by the killing of foreign and Chinese Christians during the Boxer Rebellion,70 commented upon the difficulty for a Chinese diplomat dealing with the mindset created by the racial and technological values of the popular media.

I cannot help adverting to the character of the foreign press in China. Its general tone is calculated to set the whole Chinese nation against foreigners and things foreign. Take up any foreign newspaper published in China and you will find that columns are devoted in almost every issue to denouncing the Chinese Government and its officials.71

It is one of the unfortunate facts of Chinese 19th century history that, unlike the Japanese, the Qing Government succeeded in controlling rebellion at home but was unsuccessful in controlling the activities of foreigners in their country. The inefficient Chinese government lacked the military capacity to defeat the foreign powers.72

69 An overview of this very distinguished Chinese leader is at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wu_Tingfang
70 182 Protestant missionaries (including wives and children) and 500 Chinese Protestants and 48 foreign Catholic missionaries and 18,000 Chinese Catholics and 222 Chinese Eastern Orthodox Christians; were killed
71 Wu Ting-Fang 1901, op cit, p 9.
72 The right of all nations to trade freely with China within the frameworks of the “unequal treaties”. 
The Maritime Arms Race.

http://www.uh.edu/engines/bignavy.jpg
Great Powers fight over China.

Any power which chooses may, according to our contention, maltreat the Chinese as much as it choose and carve up their inheritance to suit itself. All that we ask is that we shall hereafter be permitted to trade there, as now, on the footing of the most favored nations, which is to say, on the same footing as the conquering and partitioning power.”


Securing Spheres of Influence after the Boxer Rebellion.

Russia (bear), Germany (eagle), Britain, (lion), Japan (leopard at left), and other powers struggle over the fallen China.

_Puck_, USA, 15 August 1900
China’s Nineteenth Century Troubles.
The misplaced superiority of the Euro-American world was reinforced by the spread of what proved to be nonsensical 19th century intellectual movements such as phrenology (the shape of the skull determines e.g., intellectual ability, criminal tendencies); eugenics, along with versions of racially biased ethnology; anthropology and sociology, reinforced during the century by the widespread influence of the theory of human evolution, etc. As these intellectual currents emerged in Euro-America popular thought was strongly influenced by a worldview proclaiming Europeans as the most advanced form of humankind and Negroes (United States) and Australian Aborigines (British) the lowest, with the Chinese, whose long historic cultural achievement were undeniable, placed somewhere in the middle. From this emerged a vision, closely linked to the missionary movement, of the duty of the Euro-Americans to release the light of Christian (read Western) civilization. The classic expression of this is the famous missionary hymn, “From Greenland’s Icy Mountains.” The third verse reads, in part:

\[
\text{Shall we, whose souls are lighted} \\
\text{With wisdom from on high,} \\
\text{Shall we to men benighted} \\
\text{The lamp of life deny?}
\]

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73 Hixson’s Report is full of comments about the physical and intellectual attributes of Chinese, especially the officials involved in the Huashan trials and its aftermath.

74 See discussion of the impact of 19th century racism in schoolbooks is Elson, Ruth Miller, *Guardians of Tradition: American Schoolbooks of the Nineteenth Century*, (Lincoln, University of Nebraska Press, 1964.) See Chapter Four, “Races of Man.”

75 Lyrics written in 1819 by Anglican Bishop of Calcutta, Reginald Heber
1.22 FOREIGNERS AND SECRET SOCIETIES. 76

The unexpected deaths of a preponderantly young female group of missionaries at Huashan/Kucheng deeply shocked the Euro-American world and reified the negative portrayal of China referred to by Minister Wu Ting-Fang. Despite the enormous number of foreign press items included in this it is still not understood, even in academic circles, that many more Chinese died at the hands of enraged American mobs in the United States than Europeans in China for most of the 19th century—until the mass murders of mainly British missionaries associated with the Boxer Rebellion. This balance is essential in approaching the outrage expressed by foreigners in China and the cavalier way in which foreigners in North America and Australia, to take the major 19th century instances, treated the Chinese immigrant communities.

The foreign response to the Huashan massacre centred on the broader issue of the behaviour of Great Britain and the United States to the anti-foreign riots of the 1890s and, in particular, the attempts of the two foreign governments to deal with the Sichuan troubles of June 1895—although in that case no foreigners were injured or killed. The diplomatic challenge of dealing with Sichuan and Huashan must have influenced the decision of the foreign powers in their military response to the Boxer Rebellion governed by the unwillingness of the Foreign Powers to bring about the total collapse of the Chinese government. None of the foreign powers wished to add China to their colonial empires—it was enough to secure spheres of economic influence. 77

US Consul James Courtney Hixson of Fuzhou (Foochow) was insistent, (See Part Eight), that there was more to the Huashan episode than a local uprising against incompetent local officials. 78 This presupposition reflects a deeper sense that all such episodes were produced by the Chinese elite, reflecting yet another foreign prejudice that the Chinese masses, without elite leadership, were incapable of coordinated resistance. Archdeacon Wolfe cited the British Consul that:

Consul assures me that he has good reason to know that the High Authorities in Peking have issued instructions to all the officials…to oppose and hinder in every possible way the further extension of missionary work or missionary stations…especially English missionary work. 79

Hixson, Commander Newell of the US Navy and Archdeacon Wolfe and others, totally ignoring a long history of peasant rebellions, believed that Chinese ethnic nationalists, through various nation-wide “secret

76 Ownby, David, Brotherhoods and Secret Societies in Early and Mid-Qing China: the Formation of a Tradition, (Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 1996). Traces the origins of the Tiandihui in the context of other secret societies in SE China prior to the first Opium War and provides insights into the reasons why these societies were formed.

77 There were around 8000 foreign missionaries in China overwhelmingly from Great Britain and the British colonies of settlement and the United States of America.

78 There is a reference to a possible wider rebellion in a memorandum from Minister Denby to the Tsungli Yamen dated 1 October 1895. See Part Nine, Aftermath. FRUS, Legation of the United States. Peking, October 1, 1895. (Received Washington Nov. 8), No 2379, Denby to Olney, Enclosure No 3.

societies” were engaged in an anti-foreign movement. Among the leading “secret societies” nominated by some sources were two groups, the shadowy Gelaohui, (Ko Lao Hui—Elder Brother’s Association), and its apparent predecessor, the Tiandihui (Heaven and Earth Society), both apparently with roots in the earlier Eight Diagrams or “White Lily” movement, a rebellious Buddhist movement that reputedly carried out at least one major rebellion against the Qing in the early 19th century. The Tiandihui apparently later morphed into an essentially criminal society, the Triads.

While there are doubts whether the Gelaohui ever actually existed as a distinct organisation Europeans in China at the time of the Huashan Massacre, including American Consul Hixson, had no doubts about its existence. An unknown missionary wrote:

As to the Ho-lao Hui theory, I can only say that I have never been able to attach any importance to it. It does not account for the facts. That the sect does exist I know. That some of its members have been active of late I also know. They may have had something to with striking the match which has set so many places in a blaze during these four or five years. But what about the combustibles which they have found everywhere so near at hand and so ready to take fire? Without the preparation which has gone before, what serious mischief could they have perpetrated in this and other provinces? Let it not be forgotten that this preparation has been going on for years under the very eyes of the officials, and with their approbation.

Following the Huashan Massacre, an article in Blackwood’s Magazine, remarked:

The “White Lily” Association…concentrates its forces in particular districts, with organised branches planted in congenial environments, and not be any means always appearing to the outer world under the same title as that of the parent society. “The Vegetarians,” for instance, who lately committed such ruthless murders on English missionaries in the neighbourhood of Foochow, form part of this confederation.

Hixson placed the Fujian headquarters of the “Vegetarians” or perhaps “White Lily” in a temple on an island (San Hsien Chou) in the Min River in Fuzhou, under the patronage of the Viceroy.

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81 “The Vegetarians of Ku Cheng,” Dublin University Missionary Magazine op cit. See also Part Ten: Anti-Christian Propaganda: The Cause of the Riots in the Yangtse Valley: A Complete Picture Gallery, (Hankow, Hankow Mission Press, 1891.) If the “Gelaohui” was a Chinese Government invention it raises a passing question of how significant the “Boxers” actually were in the “Boxer” Rebellion of 1900.
82 This paragraph is based on the assumption that the Buddhist “White Lily” movement, cited in many references, existed prior to the emergence of the Tiandihui in Fujian Province in the mid 18th century. See discussion in Murray, Dian H, the Origins of the Tiandihui: The Chinese Triads in Legend and History, (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1994), pp 38-88. Note that Murray (p. 16) suggests that the Gelaohui may have existed in Sichuan Province as early as 1743 and the embryo body may have preceded and contributed to the formation of the Tiandihui.
83 Murray, op cit, p 115.
death, Robert Stewart identified the Vegetarians as being allied to “one of the most dangerous of the Secret Societies.” The Dublin University Fukien Mission specifically mentioned the “Elder Brothers Society” (Ko Lao Hui-Gelaohui) as the real identity of the Vegetarian rebels at Huashan. There was, as will be seen in Part Five, evidence given at the Kucheng trial that Liu Hsiang-hing, the new leader of the Kucheng Vegetarians, was unknown to people in Kucheng District having arrived in Gutian just three days earlier from Fuzhou. He was originally from Kiangsi Province.

There is a suggestion that the Gelaohui was a fiction created and sustained for many years by the Chinese Government to shift the responsibility for anti-foreign episodes to a non-existent “secret society.” A comment in 1891 suggests this possibility:

The effect of it was that the fear of helping to pull down the Central Government, and of throwing a vast Empire into a state of anarchy, induced the Powers to hold their hand, and promised to give China full freedom in the matter of rioting without being called to account.

Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) wrote in March 1926:

The Triad Society, the Society of Brothers, the Big Sword Society, the Rational Life Society and the Green Band [Shanghai] were primitive secret organizations among the people.

It is certain that secret societies, formed for a variety of reasons and perhaps including the overthrow of the foreign Qing ruling dynasty, were widespread in 19th century China. China as a country, if not a unitary state in Euro-American was under enormous pressure from rebellious elements within and imperialist pressures from outside. The following map illustrates the extent of 19th century internal rebellion and foreign aggression. The final nail in the contempt of nationalist Chinese was almost certainly the ignominious defeat of China in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 illustrated in these British cartoons in which the tiny Japanese defeats the giant China.

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89 Ibid, p. 28.
90 Hixson addresses the links between the Vegetarian Society (proper) and the Kutien rebels. Part Eight: Hixson Report, paragraph 573 includes a reference to the Gelaohui secret society.
94 Murray op cit, p 16 suggests that there were around 200 societies formed during the 18th century.
Sino-Japanese War 1894-5. Tiny Japan Defeats the Giant China.

*Punch*, London, c1895.
1.23 THE FOREIGN POWERS AND MILITARY RESOURCES.

It is an open question whether the Anglo-American inability to intervene militarily in Sichuan and Huashan in 1895 encouraged the Dowager Empress and her advisers to view the foreign powers as “paper tigers”\(^95\) and encouraged them to support the Boxer Rebellion (1900-1901).\(^96\) One unconfirmed source suggests that in 1926, there were 1,000 foreign legation guards.\(^97\) The limited British military resources in China available to tackle the Boxer episode was emphasised by the appearance of Australian colonial elements.\(^98\)

In 1895 the British garrison in Hong Kong comprised a battalion of the Rifle Brigade (c1000 men), and a local volunteer militia unit, The Hongkong Regiment—“The Volunteers,” a local defence unit (c500 men). There was a garrison artillery element from either the British or the Indian Army (c400 men). British land forces—Army and Royal Navy including the Royal Marines—numbered perhaps 3000 men.\(^99\) In 1895 the Americans claimed to be able to put at least 1000 sailors and marines ashore to deal with anti-foreign unrest and this number appears in a number of reports in the collection, along with references to “gatling guns” (a hand-operated multi-barrelled machine gun) suggesting technological superiority.\(^100\) The suggestion that the Chinese authorities were: “terrified by the threat of the Americans to land armed forces,” issued by the sensationalist Dalziel journalist connections and the gatling gun, demonstrated the almost universal ignorance of foreign residents about foreign military capacity in China.\(^101\)

The first attempt to relieve the siege of the foreign legations in June 1900 during the Boxer Rebellion comprised just over 2000 men from eight foreign nations (just 114 Americans) and was easily repelled by the Chinese.\(^102\) A larger force of 20,000 foreign troops in the second, and successful assault in August 1900, totalled more than 40,000 men (about half were Japanese) including those in Tientsin and along the lines of communication. It was a clear indication to the foreign powers that maintaining their 19\(^{th}\) century domination of China was increasingly problematical.

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95 From a Chinese phrase zhǐ lǎohǔ (simplified Chinese: 纸老虎; traditional Chinese: 紙老虎). The English equivalent might be “his bark is worse than his bite.”
96 The Speaker, (London), 10 August 1895. U. S. Consul Hixson believed that the failure of the Foreign Powers to make a major response to the Huashan killings gave Chinese officialdom confidence, mistakenly as events were to prove, that the murder of missionaries during the Boxer Rebellion in 1900 would also pass without a major reaction by the Foreign Powers. Part Eight: Hixson Report, paragraph 934.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_history_of_Australia#Boxer_Rebellion.2C_1900.E2.80.931901
100 The New York Times, 27 August 1895. See subsequent comment, 31 August 1895.
101 The Hong Kong Weekly Press, 15\(^{th}\) August 1895.
Australians at the Boxer Rebellion.

Her Majesty’s Colonial Ship *Protector*, South Australia.

New South Wales Marine Light Infantry

Victorian Naval Brigade.

Ian Welch
The dominance of foreign naval forces in the two “Opium Wars” gave rise to the term “gunboat diplomacy” that Chinese nationalist mythology subsequently interpreted to mean that foreign warships regularly bombarded Chinese cities to intimidate local officials and if necessary evacuate foreign citizens when all other measures seemed ineffective. A classic example was the response to an assault on the British interpreter at Newchwang (Yingkou):

Mr. Davenport, consular interpreter at Newchwang, unmindful of the fate proverbially befalling those who in others’ quarrels interpose, and more particularly when the quarrel is of a domestic nature, on seeing a Chinaman furiously beating his wife, interfered on the lady’s behalf, and was immediately set upon by the combatants and their neighbors, who with their billhooks and scythes and other agricultural implements, attacked the unfortunate interpreter, the injured wife taking a prominent part in the assault upon her champion. He was left for dead by the roadside. On redress being demanded the mandarin of the district defended the outrage and declined to accede to the consul's request for punishment of the offender. Mr. Meadows thereupon, feeling that a lesson was necessary to inculcate respect for the persons of Europeans in this remote part of the country, ordered up a gun-boat, the crew of which was landed, and after repeated refusals to punish the guilty, burned the principal houses of the village. This brought the mandarin to reason, and ever since the people of Newchwang have entertained the greatest respect and regard for us.

It is easy to accept a widely held view that such events were regular events but it is necessary to keep in mind the note above that the navies had very limited capacity to provide landing parties. A report from the city of Wuchang, where the security of foreign residents was threatened and the local officials, from the Viceroy down, were prepared to ignore their responsibilities under the Treaty arrangements, was described in the following terms:

I never believed the riots were an official movement till I saw how they were put down in our city. First, we had the antiforeign literature circulated, and the rumours. The people were greatly excited by them; crowds collected and stoned the Roman Catholic establishment, and the authorities said they could not prevent it. Then, we had the splendid joint proclamation by the Viceroy and Governor, but the people tore it down. Then, soldiers were brought into the city in great numbers, and strong guards were placed over the Missions, but this only made matters worse. After that came the Imperial Edict, which was also torn down, and then proclamation after proclamation, but they did no good. This went on for months. All the ladies had been removed, and the Viceroy had several times warned the Missionaries also to leave as they could not be protected. ... We felt we were living on the mouth of a volcano, and many a sleepless night did I pass waiting for those rioters whom we were warned on all hands to expect. But, just when it seemed as if the outbreak could not be stave off another day, there came a great change. On leaving my house one morning I became conscious that something had taken place. The people looked pleasant and agreeable again; the very dogs seemed friendly. I learned that on the previous evening the Viceroy had summoned the Mandarins to his Yamun, and that they had been rushing about all night in consequence. Nest, I was told of a remarkable interview which the British Consul and the commander of the Archer had had with the Viceroy in the afternoon. They had gone and told him plainly that the firing of a single Missionary establishment would be the signal for instant retaliation, on the part of the warships in the river. His Excellency, it was said, had manifested

103 See Part Nine: Aftermath: US Minister Denby provides a list of the occasions when he asked the Admiral commanding the US Asiatic Squadron to send ships. FRUS, Legation of the United States. Peking, October 9, 1895, No 2392, Denby to Olney.
104 Williams, op cit, p. 425.
105 See Parts Ten and Eleven.
great incredulity, and pointed out that such an unwarrantable proceeding would be quite contrary to international law. However, he was fortunately convinced they were in earnest, so he called for his subordinates, issued his instructions, and all was changed in a night. From that time not only has there been no more trouble threatened, and no more talk of uncontrollable soldiers and people, but there has hardly been a hostile rumour even to be heard. This was what convinced me the whole movement was under official control all the time.106

The single great event of “gunboat diplomacy” was the French destruction of Fuzhou Naval Arsenal in 1884. As U.S. Consul Hixson put it, relations with China were inseparable from the threat of force.

Friendship for foreign nations having been at first extorted from China at the point of the sword, it has ever since been necessary to employ the same means to preserve that “friendship”.107

It is curious, given the importance attributed to gunboat diplomacy and foreign imperialism in China, that no comprehensive listing of foreign assaults is readily available. It seems to be a term in the modern war of words in diplomacy in which fact and fiction become intertwined and inseparable.

It that context it is relevant to note that Hixson noted the virtual impossibility of landing a force beyond the immediate environs of the Treaty Ports.

It was out of the question to delay so long; moreover, it never would have done to have carried along any unacclimated body of foreign soldiers or marines, for not half of them could have survived the heat and fatigue of the trip, to say nothing of the difficulty of keeping them in supplies.108

That sense of China’s humiliation by foreign military force has changed little:”

I must say frankly that the first introduction of international law in China from the western world in the late 19th century left the Chinese with little fond memories, as it was done through cannons and warships.109

The foreign military presence in China, considered by foreigners to be normal and lawful but by the Chinese a constant reminder of national humiliation, remained in effect well into the second half of the 20th century and after 1945, and the defeat of Japan, is said to have numbered a transient force exceeding 150,000 troops, almost all American.

107 Part Eight: Hixson Report, paragraph 999.
108 Part Eight: Hixson Report, op cit, paragraph 282. See also note by British Minister to Japan, Sir Rutherford Alcock, that Asiatics respect only force. Nicholls, op cit, p. 9, footnotes 43 and 44.
The Chinese Navy Arsenal at Fuzhou, Destroyed by the French, 1884.

http://www.gnudoyng.net/christianity/1884_foo-chow.php

French Bombardment of Foochow, 23 August 1884


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The naval and military superiority of the Foreign Powers in China was grounded upon the ease with which Britain had earlier captured key coastal cities in the First (1840) and Second (1860) Opium Wars when, with minimal force balanced by Chinese military weakness, the foreign powers were able to secure commercial access to China through “Treaty Ports” and trading settlements along the coast and later along navigable inland rivers. U. S. Consul Hixson acknowledged the caution of the Foreign Powers, notably Great Britain and the United States, when he complained of the failure to send naval vessels to “train their guns upon the provincial capital” while presenting the viceroy of Fujian province with a severe ultimatum over the Huashan massacre.  

British governmental attitudes towards military intervention in China was summed up as follows:

How far was the British government to undertake responsibility for the enforcement of treaty provisions and local order whenever British subjects were involved in China? Using gunboats to overawe local officials and Chinese mobs led straight down the road to empire. If this practice continued, Britain would eventually be trying to govern China—an impossible prospect, especially as foreigners moved inland beyond the reach of gunboats . . . The Clarendon Declaration of December 28, 1868 elaborated this theme. Consular and naval officers in China were sharply commanded to avoid all warlike acts—blockade, reprisal, landing armed parties, or other forms of coercion.

Had mass anti-foreign murders of the Huashan kind occurred across China—the apparent hope of Chinese nationalist groups—the foreign powers could not have suppressed it without a major invasion that would have set Britain, as the dominant influence in the region, not only against the Chinese but equally against major European powers such as Russia, France and Germany and perhaps, the United States. By the 1890s the naval strength of the foreign powers in East Asia was aimed at maintaining a balance of foreign power in the region rather than dominating China important as that function was believed to be and proved to be when the Japanese conclusively defeated both the Chinese and Russian fleets in naval battles a few years later.

British Consul Mansfield was supported by British Minister O’Conor in Beijing on 6 August, just five days after the massacre at Huashan, when he asked for a British warship to be sent to Fuzhou as a demonstration of force and perhaps a reminder of the French bombardment a decade earlier. Like other European diplomats in China O’Conor believed, rightly as events demonstrated, that the threat of force was the only way that the foreign governments could influence the decision making of the Qing Government. When he became infuriated with the response from the Zongli Yamen (Chinese Foreign Office) in regard to

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111 Part Eight: Hixson Report, paragraph 933.
113 Part Eight: Hixson Report, paragraph 933.
115 Mansfield to O’Conor, 5 August 1895. Foreign Office Archives, FO228 1895.
June 1895 anti-missionary riots in Sichuan Province the Royal Navy brought a squadron up the Yangtze (Yangzi) River to the river port of Wuchang.  

The American position on military or naval action in China was essentially the same as the British although there was no American equivalent to the British Clarendon rule. The United States had absolutely no interest in colonial-style intervention in China. In the wake of the Huashan massacre, United States Minister Charles Denby suggested an immediate naval bombardment of Fuzhou if an American warship was present but otherwise bombardment of the "nearest seaport" would be a suitable response. He received no encouragement from Washington although in due course the cruiser Detroit joined the small British presence at the Pagoda Anchorage, the nearest point to Foochow that ocean going vessels could reach.

This collection contains many instances of demands from foreigners for a military response to the Huashan massacre including a suggestion that the city of Gutian be completely destroyed and its population killed by a major invasion. The impossibility of actually carrying out a major inland assault was fully understood by military commanders in China, London and elsewhere. To attack, in Fujian Province in particular, meant a confrontation with a modern Chinese army, organized to resist a potential Japanese invasion in 1894-1895. An attack on Gutian would have involved sending small parties of soldiers or marines, as few as ten or twenty per boat, up the Min River to the river port of Shuikou followed by a thirty-mile march in single file to Gutian with a vast supply column carrying food, ammunition, etc. When the foreign commission left Gutian in October 1895 the departing procession of supporting coolies carrying baggage etc., was eight miles long compared to the smaller distance of one mile taken up by the members of the investigating committees and their Chinese military escort. These processions had none of the heavy equipment that would have accompanied a foreign military formation in unfamiliar territory.

Consul Hixson believed that the British failure to extract heavy indemnity payments (none at all when the Church Missionary Society refused to make a claim) after the Huashan Massacre contributed to the belief of Chinese officials that the Foreign Powers, and Britain in particular, were little more than “paper tigers” to use a later term widely used after 1949. A century and a half of bluff by the Foreign Powers was finally ended by the Chinese Communist Revolution in 1949 and the departure of most foreigners by 1952.

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116 Wehrle, op cit, pp 84-85.
117 Only the President could authorize military force. State Department, Despatches from United States Ministers to China, 1843-1906. Denby to Hixon, 12 December 1895 contains a statement of US State Department principles. Denby was free to request US naval assistance. On 6 August, and again on August 1895 he asked the US naval commander, Admiral Carpenter, to send a ship to Foochow in a threat of force following the Huashan Massacre. US State Department, Despatches from United States Ministers to China, 1843-1906, Denby to Secretary of State, 6 August 1895; 9 August 1895. US Secretary of State, 5 September 1895.
118 A US report in 1895 observed of the pathways: “heir condition is such that passage over the m is virtually stopped…” cited in Varg, 1968, p 743.
119 In a 1956 Chairman Mao used the phrase to describe America: ‘In appearance it is very powerful but in reality it is nothing to be afraid of; it is a paper tiger.’ Selected Works of Mao Tsetung, online 1 September 2010 at http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-5/mswv5_52.htm
AN ENGLISH-SPEAKING ALLIANCE?

The linguistic and cultural similarities of the British and Americans in China highlights the diplomatic complexity underlying the English-speaking foreign presence in China. A demonstration of the emotional ties between the British and Americans in China is the story of Commodore Tattnall, of the United States Navy (later of the Confederate Navy of Georgia) assisting the British in the naval assault on the Taku Forts in the Second Opium War on the grounds of shared ethnicity or as the Peking and Tientsin Times header put it: “Blood is Thicker Than Water.” In early 1896, U.S Minister Denby and the then British Charge d’Affaires, separately but in cooperation, supported a Protestant proposal for an end to the publication and distribution of anti-Christian literature, sought permission for mandarins and gentry to become Christians, and called for greater friendliness between missionaries, mandarins and gentry. English-speaking residents in China were encouraged by the Shanghai English-language press, in particular, to believe in an Anglo-American alliance when their common business interests appeared threatened by the growing naval power of other European countries and the threat, only just emerging, of Japan.

There were key differences in political and diplomatic matters as well as minor competition in trade and commerce where the British were dominant foreign players dominating business in the Treaty Ports and with a massive economic advantage in the Yangtse River Valley.

In their response to the Huashan Massacre the American and British Ministers, Denby and O’Conor, pursued cooperative but not joint diplomatic negotiations with the Zongli Yamen (Chinese Foreign Office). US Minister Denby was specifically instructed by Washington not to join in any “course of policy which, however important to British interests, did not concern the United States.” The extent of collaboration in the Huashan investigation is difficult to assess without access to private discussions.


*Peking and Tientsin Times*, 14 July 1894 (Citation courtesy Haruka Nomura, Australian National University. For an exchange of relevant letters see: Jones, Charles, The Life and Services of Commodore Josiah Tattnall, (Savannah, Morning News Steam Printing House, 1878.) pp 98 ff. Online 1 June 2010 at http://ia361300.us.archive.org/19/items/josiahtattnall00jonerich/josiahtattnall00jonerich.pdf


Part Twelve: Appendix No. 2.

The total tonnage of Royal Navy ships in East Asia was 58,908 tons comprising more than 20 warships. The total tonnage of the American Asiatic Squadron was 18,553 tons, comprising 8 warships. Only the Russians, with 58,838 tons and 17 ships was a serious challenge to British supremacy in East Asia. See Part Seven: Appendices: Appendix 2. The Russians were destroyed by the Japanese Navy in a series of engagement in 1904–1905 culminating in the Battle of Tsushima Strait.

See Part Five: The Commission of Inquiry: FRUS, Legation of the United States, Peking, August 15, 1895. (Received Washington Sept. 26), No 2310, Denby to Olney, Telegram from Department of State, Washington.

U.S. Consul Hixson states that there was an agreement between the British and American Consuls “that they should act jointly in everything as long as their instructions permitted” and this seems to have applied until c10 October when British Consul Mansfield, assured of the Chinese agreement to all executions demanded by the Consuls, and under instructions from O’Conor, softened the British position. Part Eight: Hixson Report: paragraphs 453-455. Mansfield was presumably following his Minister’s telegraphic advice of 2 October that the British Government did not “want wholesale butchery but insisted upon all principals being sentenced to death Great Britain, Public Record Office: FO 228/1194, O’Conor Peking, to Mansfield, Suikow, Cypher. Despatched
provided the most extensive report on the Huashan Massacre\textsuperscript{127} and it is clear that he found the overall behaviour of the British less than satisfactory starting with British Consul Mansfield’s lack of energy in helping the survivors immediately after the killings through to Mansfield’s conduct during the hearings of the Commission of Enquiry in Huashan.\textsuperscript{128} Careful reading of the various diplomatic and consular telegrams, as well as the thinly veiled criticisms by Hixson, reveals two very different approaches to the investigation of the Huashan massacre and the punishment of those involved. The British were anxious to contain the Huashan investigation to the execution of the key offenders and not to risk wider commercial interests by over-reacting to the deaths of the missionaries.

Great Britain (England, Scotland and all of Ireland in the 19\textsuperscript{th} century) and three of the British colonies of settlement (Australia, New Zealand, Canada) and the United States between them provided over ninety percent of all Protestant missionaries in China and, it must be emphasized, half of all foreign English-speaking residents in China and almost all the foreigners living outside the various Treaty Ports.\textsuperscript{129} By the 1890s there were nearly five hundred Protestant mission stations sharing 345 provincial and prefectural cities among perhaps a million Chinese villages, towns and cities in almost every province and prefecture.\textsuperscript{130} There was extensive cooperation—not always free of deep disagreement—in Bible translation work and goodwill is obvious in the addresses delivered at the many missionary conferences held in China. There were few American or British Catholic missionaries in 19\textsuperscript{th} century China.\textsuperscript{131}

There was, for the most part, a good relationship between members of British and American Protestant missions reflecting their very similar theological and world outlooks. In Gutian, for example here was a joint quarterly meeting of British Anglicans and American Methodists and weekly shared prayer meetings. The same kind of links existed wherever missionary societies shared locations such as the hill-station of Kuliang where missionaries joined in church services, prayer meetings, children’s evangelism and Keswick events.\textsuperscript{132} Cooperation between missionaries extended to medical arrangements in Gutian, where Dr. Gregory of the American mission provided, on a prepaid fee basis, medical care for all the foreigners. Topsy Saunders wrote:

They do such a queer way here with doctors; every house pays them a certain amount a year, and they come and see everybody all round once a week whether they are sick or not. The doctor here [Dr. J. J.

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\textsuperscript{127} Part Eight: Hixson Report.
\textsuperscript{128} Part Eight: Hixson Report, paragraph 320.
\textsuperscript{129} The United States Minister in China, Charles Denby, credited missionaries with providing the world with almost all that was known of 19\textsuperscript{th} century inland China. Denby, op cit, p 219.
\textsuperscript{130} Latourette, op cit, pp 226; 245.
\textsuperscript{131} Denby, op cit, p. 223-224.
\textsuperscript{132} Berry op cit, p 48.
Gregory] belongs to the American Mission. In reviewing the anger of foreign residents in China it is easy to overlook the key point that the real problem was not the behaviour of the Chinese ‘mob’ but the exploitation, by China’s intellectual elite, of a foreign community whose presence resulted from military force to achieve the “opening” of China and maintained by the continuing threat of force, i.e., “gunboat diplomacy.” An American Methodist missionary wrote in 1900:

Much of the prejudice and hatred of Western men and Western institutions of which we so bitterly complain in the Chinese is due to ourselves, to the way in which we introduced ourselves among them, and to the way in which we have often since treated them.

The Chinese literati/scholar-gentry class feared that their privileged way of life was threatened. A later American Consul in Fuzhou, observing their decline remarked:

They find the ground slipping from under them by the impact of Western civilization … Forcing upon them reforms … Great changes in their cherished beliefs, customs, learnings, and methods, and they cannot see whereunto all this is leading them.

The fears of the privileged few were not the only challenge of the ever-expanding foreign presence. A Scottish Presbyterian missionary wrote in 1902 that missionary interference in everyday Chinese affairs, i.e., “missionary cases” was a main source of Chinese hatred for foreigners:

Some members of our Protestant Church, following an evil example, have taken our names to yamens. These men, who as ordinary Chinese could not even approach the mandarins, treated the magistrate with contempt; and instituted legal proceedings against people with whom they had nothing to do, in order to extort money. When they got all they dared to “squeeze” they stopped legal proceedings. By means of our name they dictated to the mandarin and compelled him to set the machinery of the law in motion; and he brought it to a standstill when, and only when, they declared themselves satisfied.

The difficult question of missionary intervention in legal disputes with their neighbours produced a Fukien (Fujian) pastoral letter in 1896 to all Protestant Christian congregations stating that missionaries would not become involved in Chinese internal affairs and in particular, in legal disputes between Chinese.

It took little to promote anti-missionary rumours. During the Vegetarian unrest in 1894 and early 1895 it was advanced that Robert Stewart’s reluctant discussion with the magistrate on behalf of Christians who had been attacked by the Vegetarians in 1892 was a contributing factor to the murders on 1 August 1895. The

133 Berry op cit, p 55.
135 Smyth, George B., “Causes of Anti-Foreign Feeling in China,” The North American Review, Vol 171 No 525, August 1900, pp 182-197. Dr Smyth was a missionary of the American Methodist Episcopal Church and President of the Anglo-Chinese College, Foochow, Fukien Province. He was an American with little respect for British officials in China.
District Magistrate’s inept handling of the episode resulted in the arrival of a small party of Chinese soldiers from Fuzhou in response to his fear that he was losing control of the Vegetarian situation—he was replaced not long before the massacre occurred and his successor only lasted a few weeks before he too was replaced. It perhaps illustrates another of the wider problems of the Chinese military that the final group of Chinese soldiers sent comprised two mutually incomprehensible elements, half of the troops being from Hunan and the other half from Foochow, with no common language.
A recurring criticism throughout the collection was the responsibility of missionary organisations in encouraging men and women, usually under thirty years of age with limited life experience—the Saunders Sisters are typical examples, if a little younger than normal—to take up isolated posts in a country governed by an elite bitterly opposed to Christian teachings and the cultural influences in which Christianity was encapsulated. Charles Denby, the American Minister, wrote that the only Americans living in the interior of China, i.e., outside the Treaty Ports, were missionaries and there was no way that the Legation in Beijing could know what the circumstances were everywhere across the country, still less advise missionaries whether or not they should withdraw to the coast. The same situation applied to British missionaries. In places as close to the coast as Gutian, only ninety miles inland, evacuation of women and children was only possible if sufficient warning was available with or without consular advice and, even then, there was the problem of the Chinese refusing access to boats. Evacuation of women and children overland was considered impossible. The British and Americans did evacuate Gutian in early 1895 but when it was believed that the threat of the Vegetarians had passed, the British women and children returned only to face the assault on the 1st of August. The key issue, as Denby and others pointed out, was that if missionaries withdrew every time there was a rumour of trouble, rumours of riots would become everyday events and missionaries would, effectively, have to cease their work altogether. If, as is mentioned in several of the London Times entries, the goal of the anti-missionary riots was to force foreign missionaries and traders to withdraw into the Treaty Ports at the coast, the riots would have achieved the effective end of foreign influence in China.

The missionaries at Gutian understood the risks they faced. Nellie Saunders wrote:

The Vegetables, I may remark, en passant, are not made of sugar. They are a fearful set of men, and all the cut-throats in the place seem to belong to them. They are held in great dread by the Mandarins, on account of their utter defiance of all law and order. They go about with long knives concealed under their clothes. The Stewarts have been through some extraordinary experiences, but they have never heard of anything like this. It is far the most serious thing that has ever been, and it is the first time that the city gates have ever been blocked for any reason.

Her sister, Topsy, Topsy Saunders told her mother:

Mr. Stewart … speaks of it as a revolution in the country, not a religious persecution or anything to do with Christianity in particular. The Vegetarians have grown to an immense force of reckless, lawless men, incited by their leaders to seek for plunder and rebel against all authority. Missionary societies attracted criticism in the world press for leaving “helpless” women and children exposed to danger. The response from the missions was that they obeyed the biblical mandate of Christ that

139 See comments by US Consul Hixson, Part 8: pp 914 ff.
140 Part Nine: Aftermath. Charles Denby to US Secretary of State Olney, 14 November 1895.
141 Ibid.
142 Berry op cit. pp 212 ff.
the world should be evangelised, on the one hand while declaring, in the face of difficulties and disasters on the other, their complete reliance on the Will of God. An American missionary summed up the underlying mission values and outlook.

19th century Protestant Christians, mostly British, American and Northern European evangelicals, saw the ‘opening’ of China to Protestant Christian missions as, ‘an inevitable issue not of the will of man altogether, but ... of the Providence of God’. 144

Both versions are persistent in the letters of the Stewart family, the Saunders Sisters, and those of Elsie Marshall, all published after the massacre. 145 ” The diplomatic view, given the indefensible situation in which missionaries chose to live and work, was that it was for the missionaries alone to decide whether to stay or leave although the British Consuls did have the option of withdrawing the passports required to live in the interior. The passport issued to the Australian journalist, George E. “Chinese” Morrison is included in the collection.

Part Three deals with issues prior to the massacre on 1 August 1895, including the anti-missionary riots in Tientsin in 1871 and similar riots in Sichuan Province in May and June 1895 and some of the reactions to those events. The reaction of the British and Americans to the anti-foreign riots in Sichuan in June 1895 remained unresolved when U.S. Minister Denby’s initial attempt to appoint a joint British-American investigation led by the British Consul in Chungking collapsed under political pressures generated by Americans in China who rejected the initiative. The Sichuan episode strengthened a universal foreign belief that the anti-foreign riots would only end when senior Chinese officials in the affected areas were held personally accountable and punished. Understanding foreign diplomatic approaches to resolving the Sichuan situation is central to the way the Chinese authorities and the foreign governments approached a settlement over the massacre at Huashan after 1st August 1895.

A question permeating the collection is the capacity of the Qing Central Government in Peking to effectively govern a country that for more than three hundred years was managed by a devolved administration relying heavily upon the highly educated Chinese administrative class—the literati or scholar-gentry whose local interests often were far removed from those of Beijing. By early August 1895 the Zongli Yamen, a late arrival (1861) to the six traditional administrative bureaus of the Qing Dynasty, acknowledged it was unable to ensure the protection of foreigners in China even within the Treaty Ports. Many senior Chinese officials saw the Zongli Yamen as a temporary arrangement that would end when foreigners were expelled. Its decisions were subject to the overriding will of the emperor advised by officials who served in the more prestigious bureaus most of whom shared the hatred of the foreigners and longed for their

departure. The Zongli Yamen was abolished in 1901 when a formal Chinese Foreign Office was established after the Boxer Rebellion.

Another theme is the reported hostility towards missionaries of the Chinese population but this is not supported by reports of missionaries who, on the whole, speak favourably in both official and private correspondence of their reception by ordinary Chinese and, in addition, by many of the Chinese officials. Physical hostility was rare and reports are consistent in saying the anti-missionary riots were linked to anti-foreign sentiment among China’s educated elite— the scholar-gentry, or literati. The rarity of missionary murders, just over twenty in nearly one hundred years, is strong evidence that Chinese people as a whole were not troubled by the presence of missionaries or foreigners generally. Most Chinese, in fact, never saw a foreigner and the few that did found them, as missionaries wryly and consistently observed, rare entertainment on the odd occasions when they did.

The preferred management pattern of the Qing Government was a decentralised administration and by the 1890s Beijing was determined to shift accountability for managing missionary issues from the national government to the provincial authorities. As missionary cases made up the major source of diplomatic irritation the Peking authorities hoped that the provincial authorities would deal with missionaries locally and avoid the diplomatic (and military) issues of international relations. An Imperial decree of 3 January 1899 stated:

The Tartar-Generals, Viceroyos, and Governors of the maritime and riverine provinces of the Empire, having under their jurisdiction the treaty ports, naturally have considerable additional work in relation to international intercourse, while those of the inland provinces are constantly appealed to in cases regarding disputes between missionaries and the converts against the masses. In this connection the high provincial authorities often seem to be inclined to shirk responsibility and trouble by sending all such cases to the Tsungli Yamen to be dealt with, thereby frequently causing much delay before any arrangement can be arrived at. To obviate this I, the Empress Dowager, have now decided to increased the powers of all Tartar-Generals, Viceroyos, and Governors of provinces and make them ex-officio members of the Tsungli Yamen so that they may decide matters without loss of time, while at the same time they are also expected to communicate with the Princes and Ministers of the Tsungli Yamen there-anent [about the matter].

Under the extra-territorial rights acquired through treaty agreements foreign residents were placed beyond the reach of Chinese law but equally, it can be argued, their extraterritorial privileges limited the extent to which Chinese officials felt obliged to offer protection to foreigners or grant a special status to Chinese Christians who often persuaded missionaries to help them to evade accountability under Chinese law.

It is necessary to balance respect for the genuine idealism and achievements of foreign missionaries with the realities and the adequacy and accuracy of their assessment of their circumstances. These were not always as perfect as presented in the religious media not as ill-considered as suggested in the secular media.

146 See Parts Ten and 11.
The oversight of Anglican missionaries in Fujian Province was divided in practice between Archdeacon John Richard Wolfe and the Rev. Robert Stewart, a situation that the hierarchically minded Wolfe found thoroughly objectionable. This had a negative impact not only on relations between the two men but on Wolfe’s understanding of the activities of the Vegetarians in and around Gutian. He referred frequently in his correspondence with CMS London to the problems of divided authority centred on his inability to set the agenda of the CEZMS. The symbolic focus for their disagreement, already discussed, was Wolfe’s complete rejection of women missionaries wearing Chinese costume. It was at its worst, perhaps, after Stewart’s death during a conflict with the Rev. William Banister over Wolfe’s behaviour towards two CEZMS ladies. This led to an effort by Wolfe, without authorization from the committees in London to whom he was accountable, to have Mansfield’s successor in Fuzhou, Mr. C.F. R. Allen, to advise the British Minister in Beijing to issue an official ruling that Anglican women missionaries were not to wear Chinese dress on penalty of withdrawal of their internal passports.

In its dealing with Banister, the Parent Committee was very sensitive to his exhaustion after three intense months of work with the joint Anglo-American consular group (usually referred to, somewhat inaccurately, as the Commission of Enquiry) investigating and participating in the examination, trial, conviction and execution of the offenders. Wolfe seems to have little or no emotional interest in the Huashan episode beyond seeking, once again without authorization from London, to persuade the British Legation in Beijing to secure redress for his past grievances with the local Chinese authorities, notably over the loss of the original mission property at Wu Shih Shan.

Mansfield was later reported to have accused the CEZMS women of a “want of discipline,” a remark that was almost certainly the result of the Wolfe’s cultivation of successive British Consuls that led to Mansfield’s, and later Allen’s acceptance of the opinions of Archdeacon as semi-official Anglican policy. Allen description of Wolfe as the “Pope” of Fuzhou conveys his influence with the Consulate.

Wolfe’s position was strengthened by the instructions of the Church Missionary Society committee in London that all correspondence between individual missionaries and the British Consul in Fuzhou should go through the Archdeacon who read the letters and offered his own views to the Consul upon the contents. The same rule was applied to correspondence with the Committee in London. Decisions were made by the Fujian Sub-Conference (the East Asia CMS Conference was based in Hong Kong) but all correspondence with the Sub-Conference and with London also had to be forwarded through Wolfe although this seems to have been done without authorization from CMS.

149 See Part Nine: Aftermath: October 29 1895: Denby to Olney. The US Minister to China, Charles Denby, confirmed that under the Treaty of 1858 all foreign citizens were required to contact Chinese officials through their consulate. The US Article 28 of the US-China Treaty of 1858 is cited. The CMS requirement followed British Government policy that contacts between CMS missionaries and the Chinese officials were to be properly framed and about serious issues.
have been more honoured in the breach than in practice. His authority was reinforced by for his age and seniority as the longest-serving CMS missionary. His status can be viewed as a permanent conflict with his nominal role as an equal of the CMS missionaries in Fujian province. The size of Wolfe’s house (below) points to a lifestyle far removed from his social origins in Ireland and is an indication that for many missionaries, service abroad marked a major upward movement in social circumstances.

Archdeacon Wolfe’s House in Fuzhou.

The coordination of the work of the Anglican missionaries in Fujian Province and implementing the decisions of the Sub-Conference was explicitly given, by CMS London to Archdeacon Wolfe.\textsuperscript{150} He was, unquestionably, the most powerful individual in the Anglican (and British generally) missionary community and men of equal ability such as Stewart, his contemporary the Rev. Llewellyn Lloyd and the Rev. William Banister were secondary figures notwithstanding the fact that all CMS missionaries were subject to the corporate decision-making of the Fujian Sub-Conference. Wolfe was normally the Chairman of the Sub-Conference but wrote independently to London challenging decisions to which he had publicly assented but privately repudiated.\textsuperscript{151} At other times he simply ignored decisions with which he disagreed. This was

\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{150} Rev. Baring Baring-Gould, CMS Secretary, London, to Miss Amy Oxley, (New South Wales Church Missionary Association,) Sydney. 18 October 1895. CMS East Asia Archives.
\item \textsuperscript{151} Archdeacon John R. Wolfe to Rev. Baring Baring-Gould, CMS Secretary, London, 23 December 1895. CMS East Asia Archives. Wolfe rejected a transfer of some responsibilities to Rev. William Banister and chose to focus his objection around his obsessive opposition to women missionaries wearing Chinese costume and Banister’s refusal to ban the practice. Banister’s comments are in Part 4, CMS East Asia Archives. Rev. William Banister to Rev. Baring Baring-Gould, CMS Secretary, London 26 December 1895.
\end{enumerate}
sometimes a problem for the London Committee. Dr. John Rigg, a long-serving medical missionary with the CMS in Fujian, wrote to the London Committee recommending changes in the authority relationships of the mission, citing Wolfe’s “strong personal bias, forgetfulness and unbusinesslike methods.”

The Reports of the ‘Kucheng Commission of Investigation’ were written by the Rev. William Banister, an ordained minister of the Church of England, serving with the CMS. Banister acted, contrary to CMS policy and apparently against Wolfe’s views, as the official interpreter assisting the British Consul at the Enquiry. He served as the CMS superintending missionary in Gutian (Kucheng) in 1882-1884 and again between 1888-1893 while Stewart was on extended sick-leave in Great Britain. He understood the local Chinese dialect and had extensive contacts within the local Chinese Christian community as did Dr. James J. Gregory of the Methodist Episcopal Church mission who interpreted for the American Consul. A network of church members across the Gutian and Ping Nang districts provided information to the Commission of Inquiry that would never have surfaced if they had had to rely on the selective work of Chinese officials. Wolfe pursued a Sub-Conference recommendation that Banister should return to Kucheng (Gutian) after the Commission of Inquiry. Banister refused the posting as he felt his position as a missionary had been irretrievably compromised by his work as the interpreter for the British Consul. His position was endorsed by the Parent Committee in London and over Wolfe’s objections the Rev. John Martin was appointed.

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1.27 CHINESE COURTS OF JUSTICE.

Part Four comprises the Rev. William Banister’s letters and reports on the proceedings in the Chinese court in which, after much argument, the members of the joint British-American Commission of Inquiry were permitted to observe and examine witnesses. Chinese courts were, in European eyes, unjust institutions, controlled by the literati in their own ultimate interest, and relying on systematic torture to obtain confessions. Herbert Giles, a prolific 19th writer on China, remarked:

Torture is commonly supposed to be practised by Chinese officials upon each and every occasion that a troublesome criminal is brought before them. The known necessity they are under of having a prisoner's confession before any "case" is considered complete, coupled with some few isolated instances of unusual barbarity which have come to the notice of foreigners, has probably tended to foster a belief that such scenes of brutality are daily enacted throughout the length and breadth of China as would harrow up the soul of any but a soulless native. The curious part of it all is that Chinamen themselves regard their laws as the quintessence of leniency, and themselves as the mildest and most gentle people of all that the sun shines upon in his daily journey across the earth--and back again under the sea. The truth lies of course somewhere between these two extremes. 154

In addition to the widespread contempt of Europeans about the behaviour of Chinese judges, the collection reveals the universal distrust of Europeans for the behaviour of minor official employees, notably the court clerks and the yamen runners (more or less local policemen). It is of considerable interest to observe that Banister reports the assistance given to the foreign Commissioners by clerks in the Chinese yamen administration. This assistance seems to have been given freely, without bribery, and arose from the anger felt by locally recruited officials against both the rebels and the literati, particularly those sent from Fuzhou.

A Baptist report written two years after the Kucheng trials stated:

Under the patriarchal ideas which lie at the basis of the Chinese system of government much larger powers are given to the Judge of the Court than is common with us. His power is in fact almost despotic, and limited only by the customary practices of Chinese courts. He can show great mercy or he can exercise great severity; he can dispense justice or he can take bribes from the most wealthy party, and give the most unjust decisions without being called in question, unless his conduct should be too flagrant or his contributions to the support of the higher authorities too limited. The cut which we give of a Chinese court of justice is representative. The Judge is the only one who is seated. Behind him, and on either side, stand the officers of the court. The two kneeling figures are the criminal and the accuser; both alike show the greatest humility in the presence of the Judge, and in cases where specially favorable consideration is desired, they prostrate themselves upon the floor. Witnesses give their testimony in the same position. 155

In characteristic bureaucratic fashion, common in all parts of the world, those in positions of authority in the Chinese legal system were more than ready to blame any perceived failings in the judicial system on the

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inadequacy of subordinates whom one official referred to as “verminous runners.”

Banister points to local efficiency in the identification and capture of the key figures in the massacre who were identified within a day or two by information provided by local villagers. There is no indication that the runners failed to apprehend the guilty men.

It was, after all, the clerks and runners who carried out the multitudinous tasks associated with judicial investigations and the daily court proceedings of the county yamen.

In a letter to Eugene Stock, the Editorial Secretary of the Church Missionary Society, Banister wrote that the British and American Commissioners had received intelligence from the local Christians—members of the Church Missionary Society (Anglican) mission and the American Methodist Episcopal Mission—attracting an angry reaction from Chinese officials involved in the hearings:

District Magistrate and the Prefect who have openly expressed their disapproval of the Native Christians in supplying us with names of criminals and other important information without which the foreign portion of the Commission would have been completely at the mercy of the native officials and corrupt Yamen underlings.

The Consuls were aware within days of the massacre, through the local Christians and some other local Chinese informants, of the names of many of the Vegetarians who participated in the planning and carrying out the attack at Huashan. The deliberate obstruction of evidence by the Chinese officials at Kucheng encouraged the foreigners to pursue private investigations in parallel to those conducted by the Chinese authorities.

The English and American Consuls, Captain Newell and myself examined twenty-eight different witnesses brought from different parts of the district.

Banister’s reports highlight the difficulty of following the evidence given by the members of the Vegetarian movement in court proceedings totally different to those understood by the foreign representatives. In almost every case the ‘confessions’ were negotiated between the accused and local Chinese officials in examinations outside the court process to which the foreign observers were not admitted. Chinese examinations were invariably associated with torture including whipping with bamboo canes until the man gave the “right” answers. Banister’s version of the evidence of the men who participated in the murders reveal the difficulties of the joint British-American Commission of Enquiry at Kucheng forced to operate within the overall Chinese legal system with foreign representatives engrained in the common law tradition of Britain and the United States.

The foreign Commission model was intended to ensure, as far as was possible, that the men put on trial

157 Ibid p 346.
158 Rev. William Banister to Mr. Eugene Stock, 7 October 1895. CMS East Asia Archives.
159 North China Herald, 20 September 1895, pp 484-489.
160 For descriptions of the operations of the Chinese courts see Scarth, John, *Twelve Years in China: the people, the rebels and the mandarins,* (Edinburgh, Thomas Constable, 1860), Ch XIV, p 145. See Reed, op cit for fuller discussion of the operations of the Chinese system.
and subsequently sentenced were the real offenders i.e., officials, and not substitutes although there is little indication, judging by Banister’s reports, that any substitutes were involved at Kucheng.\textsuperscript{161} An American missionary wrote to his family:

> The Chinese have a way of offering to kill any number at a time like this. But they take no pains to find the guilty ones. Indeed they pick up coolies and beggars, any worthless friendless fellow, and he head counts one. But Consul Hixson insisted on a fair trial. He found by cross examination one of the men whom the Chinese wished convicted was a professional beggar. Under torture such a man would confess or say that he was one of the guilty party.\textsuperscript{162}

The joint commission process was intended to overcome the frustrations of foreigners in dealing with Chinese officials who acted as prosecutor, judge and jury in matters in which, in foreign views, they should have been the defendants. Chinese officialdom not surprisingly regarded the participation of foreigners as an unwarranted interference in Chinese affairs.

Part Five deals with general reports about the Commission of Inquiry and the wider issue of holding the Chinese Government in some way accountable, as a consequence of the “Unequal Treaties,” for the treatment of foreign residents of China. It was a difficult time for the Chinese authorities in the aftermath of other anti-foreign riots including Sichuan and Huashan and their long-term impact on foreign attitudes to and relations with China which ultimately rested, to the continuing irritation and humiliation of China, on the superior gunpower of the foreign powers and their enforcement of “rights” under the ‘unequal treaties’ which secured their presence in China.

\textsuperscript{161} The Saturday Review of Politics, Literature Science and Art, 10 August 1895. The Speaker, 10 August 1895.
\textsuperscript{162} Beard, Willard L, Letter to relatives, 10 November 1895, Day Missions Library, Yale University.
1.28 THIS COLLECTION AND MEDIA STUDIES.

This collection provides a microstudy in the relationship between diplomacy and the views of ordinary citizens influenced by the media. The collection includes “official” messages between the foreign diplomats and Chinese officials in Peking, foreign military commanders, consular officials in the Treaty Ports and foreign settlements and governments in Washington and London. The bulk of the information included is from foreign media reporting. Readers may form a view about the difference between those newspapers which are regarded as newspapers of record\(^\text{163}\) and the general run of papers simply reprinting items scanned from other papers. This is particularly noticeable in the New Zealand borrowings from the Australian press and in the general reports of the United States papers.

The reports of *The Times* of London are given priority over other press reports to indicate that newspapers very high standard of reporting including accuracy of facts and the quality of the analysis in the reports. *The Times* reports stand in strong contrast to many of the ungrounded hypotheses and errors of fact published in many other papers. The ongoing confusion over the riots at Cheng-tu (Chengdu, Sichuan province), in May-June 1895 and the murders at Kucheng (Gentian) on 1 August 1895, are important when assessing the response of foreigners, diplomats, residents, and governments at home to anti-foreign episodes during 1895.\(^\text{164}\)

Readers will note the distinct difference in tone between the official responses and the views expressed in *The Times* editorial articles and the close to hysterical and the utterly unrealistic demands of foreign residents in China for some kind of massive naval/military attack. Some residents called for major naval attacks similar to the French destruction of the Chinese Navy base at Fuzhou in 1884 while others demanded the complete destruction of Kucheng (Gentian) and the summary killing of the entire Chinese population of the city. It is worth reflecting on the subsequent Boxer episode from 1899-1901, including the famous siege of the foreign Legations in Peking. To what extent the decision of the Chinese Government to engage in the attack on the foreign legations was prompted by their assessment of the weak response of the foreign powers, Great Britain in particular, to the series of riots of 1895, including the Kucheng Massacre, requires further consideration.

The 19\(^{th}\) century media did little to lessen the prejudice of the general population about governments and civil servants and pursued an ambivalent line about missions and missionaries as well. Serious mistakes and

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163 A “newspaper of record” has consistently high standards of journalism, publishing trustworthy information which is vital, important, and interesting. The prestigious New York Times rejects the title of a “newspaper of record” although majority opinion accepts it as such. Most other papers are effectively republishers of articles written and published in a “newspaper of record” or relied on correspondents employed by other papers or operating as freelance reporters.

164 The most detailed account of the Cheng-tu riots is at Part Five: *The Times*, (London), 20 September 1895. Accounts are also found in Part Four: The Huashan Massacre, at 10 and 12 August 1895.
misrepresentations occurred when editors did not systematically check the accuracy of reports before publication—the standard explanation of deadlines seems to continue unchanged in all forms of modern media. Getting a “scoop” before competitors was and remains a powerful media motivation.

One example where media reporting had a significant impact on public opinion and official behaviour was U.S. Minister Denby’s idea to appoint a British Consul to represent American interests in the commission of inquiry into the Sichuan riots. It was widely presented, or misrepresented, in press reports of American public meetings in China as a serious failure of Minister Denby’s diplomatic skill and of U.S. government will while ignoring the fact that the United States had no consul available anywhere near Sichuan Province—the nearest was at Shanghai. The issue was then thoroughly confused in American public opinion with Denby’s management of the Huashan/Kucheng enquiry.

The media pursued a narrow and perhaps deliberately ill-informed perspective in reporting the behaviour of the British. Published reports of British Consul Mansfield’s apparent disinterest in early reports of the Huashan massacre created a minor storm in Fuzhou. Mansfield was criticized for taking no part in U.S. Consul Hixson’s initiative in sending a relief team to Kucheng and British dignity was saved only when Archdeacon Wolfe and the Rev. William Banister of the Church Missionary Society joined the Americans. Upon arrival in Foochow the survivors were interviewed by Hixson who passed on their statements to Mansfield. Hixson was bemused by changes made by Mansfield when the statements were eventually published,\textsuperscript{165} Despite his critics Mansfield remained a significant member of the British Consular Service in China. American policy in regard to the Kucheng-Huasang Massacre, and the related outbreak of anti-missionary violence six weeks earlier is set out at FRUS. Department of State, Washington, September 21, 1895, No 1152. Olney to Denby setting out the joint American (and British) position.

There are reports, particularly but not exclusively those that carried the Dalziell tag, that were figments of imagination intended to boost newspaper circulation—they certainly had nothing to do with fact or truth. Examples of racist and cultural prejudice abound in statements that all attacks on foreigners in China were generated by the Chinese literati (scholar-gentry) to limit the spread of foreigners inside China with the ultimate objective of expelling them from China. This was strengthened, and perhaps justified, by the anti-foreign publications, particularly those from a Chinese Taotai from Hunan named Chou Han, that circulated across China in the last half of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century.\textsuperscript{166}

The Church Missionary Society advised readers of its publications.

\textsuperscript{165} Part Eight: Hixson Report, para 250.
We feel constrained by the experiences of the first week in August to warn our readers that they must not accept everything that appears in the newspapers as necessarily true. When the news of the Ku Cheng disaster first came, our press agency published a telegram purporting to come (and for aught we knew really did come) from Shanghai, suggesting the occurrence of shocking horrors in addition to the cruel deaths of our sisters. Now Shanghai is for telegraphic purposes, little nearer to Fuh-chow than London is; and a Shanghai correspondent would not necessarily know more than we did. Of the statements made there was at the time no evidence, and there is since no confirmation. Again, strange and quite imaginary notices appeared in some papers on Tuesday, Aug. 6th., of what was going on in Salisbury Square. A “Council” or Committee was said to have been in long and anxious consultation with the Foreign Office. Nothing of the sort occurred. It was bank-holiday, and only one Secretary, one clerk, and the hall-porter were at CM House; and the Secretary merely called at the Foreign Office to inquire if they had any additional news. So is current history written! 167

There were many other anti-foreign and anti-missionary riots in other parts of China during the 1890s168 most of which involved property losses and were resolved by payment of cash indemnities by Chinese officials. The foreign powers understood that the money to pay the indemnities was collected, and usually more besides, by taxing people who had nothing to do with the riots. Paying the indemnities imposed no personal burden on the Chinese officials and literati who were believed to orchestrate many of the anti-foreign episodes. The Rev. William Banister stated:

The weekly edition of the Times, dated the 9th of August, in due time reached me at Kucheng and in that issue I find it stated that Sir H. Macartney gave assurances to the Foreign Office that the Tsungli (Zongli) Yamen were fully alive to the gravity of the case and proclamations and instructions had been issued to the provincial authorities to punish the offenders and protect the lives and property of missionaries and residents in China. This was intended for the British public, but the writer knows as well as any resident in China that the Emperor’s writ does not run in this Empire and that orders issued by the Tsungli Yamen can only be carried out by the will and at the pleasure of the Viceroy or Governors of the provinces—and that any one of these Viceroy or Governors can snap his fingers at the Tsungli Yamen and alter, or evade, or comply with the instructions just as it pleases him.169

Foreigners in China, and as a result of media coverage elsewhere, believed that it was only when the official class was held individually accountable for the rioting that anti-foreign episodes would cease—an argument aided by judicious saber-rattling. When the Sichuan Viceroy, Liu Ping Chang, was eventually dealt with by the Peking authorities he was required to pay reparations amounting to more than one million ounces of silver out of his own pocket.170

Chinese policy is evident in the collection—to keep the British and Americans apart and negotiate with them separately and this is illustrated by many references by Chinese officials to the minor involvement of American citizens in the Sichuan and Huashan events.171 The American State Department advised Minister Denby that:

167 The Church Missionary Gleaner, London, September 1895, p 130.
168 The terms “anti-foreign” and “anti-missionary” are synonymous as missionaries were the overwhelming foreign population in inland China.
169 North China Herald, 20 September 1895, pp 484-489.
171 Part Eight: Hixon Report, paragraph 899 states that there were 103 American citizens in the Foochow Consular District in 1895, 102 of whom were missionaries. It is not surprising that missionary issues made up the majority of the workload of the United States Consulate in Foochow.
The effective localization of official responsibility for the non-execution of the stringent imperial orders whereby the Tartar generals, viceroy, and provincial governors were enjoined to see to it that foreigners within their jurisdiction should suffer no harm. The instruction telegraphed to you on the 12th of August last relative to the cooperation of representatives of this Government with those of Great Britain in the investigation of the murders and injuries at Kutien, showed that the essential aim was to discover and fix any responsibility existing in high places, leaving measures of reparation and indemnity for subsequent consideration; and your own dispatches, as far back as July last, show that you yourself had formed much the same view with regard to official accountability for the looting of the foreign missionary premises in the province of Szechuan. You have yourself adverted to the disposition of the Chinese authorities to cover up the responsibilities of the viceroy and generals in such cases by punishment of obscure individuals upon more or less conclusive appearance of having taken part in the outrages, and your demand for the degradation and punishment of ex-Viceroy Liu rested clearly upon the assumption that effective redress could only be sought in those quarters where effective responsibility existed and where dereliction of duty was manifest.

Foreign opinion in 19th century China was almost unanimous that the Chinese leaders and intellectuals—the scholar-gentry or literati—used the cover of secret societies to implement their policy of forcing foreigners (of whom missionaries were the most widespread), out of rural areas and eventually out of China altogether. The Sichuan and Kucheng assaults were viewed as part of a systematic nationalist anti-foreign policy, encouraged if not directly planned by Chinese officialdom and supposedly implemented across the country by organisations collectively labelled “secret societies.” While the popular media accounts of these societies portray them as anti-government there is an indication in the Huashan archives that Chinese Viceroy used them, or created an image of them, for their own purposes. It is far from clear whether this deception involved the Chinese Government in Beijing but there is no doubt that foreign officials treated such accusations from the Qing administration with caution. This is discussed at some length by US Consul Hixson in his 1896 report that centred the Fujian Vegetarian movement in Fuzhou where, Hixson declared and advance some evidence that it enjoyed the protection of the Governor-General and senior officials.

All foreigners in 19th century China shared the view that, notwithstanding the use of force by foreign powers to impose the “unequal treaties” upon the Chinese, the Chinese Government was bound to secure their “rights” as set out in the treaties. The media reports portray “might is right” values and argued that the foreign powers had the right, and even a ‘civilizing’ duty, to impose their worldview upon China. Foreigners ignored, assuming they ever thought about it, the humiliation felt by ethnic Chinese leaders at the double-barrelled nature of their domestic inferiority. China had been ruled since the 17th century by a foreign (Manchu-Qing) governing regime sustained by an extensive military occupation force that suppressed resistance by Chinese or ethnic minorities. With that forever in their minds, ethnic Chinese humiliation was reinforced by the failure of the foreign Qing Dynasty to repel the foreign incursions of the 19th century. All this resentment came to a head in the Japanese defeat of China in the War of 1894-1895, also marked by a nationalist Chinese attempt at revolution in South China, led by Sun Yat-sen.

172 The Saturday Review, etc. 10 August 1895.
173 Wang, Dong, China’s Unequal Treaties: Narrating National History, (Lanham MD, Lexington Books, 2005.)
Chinese intellectuals nurtured a strong sense of nationalist injustice that culminated in the two major Chinese revolutions of the 20th century—the “Nationalist” revolution in 1911 and the “Communist” seizure of power in 1949. One of the first acts of the Chinese Communist Government was to expel foreign missionaries and most other resident foreigners. This nationalist action built on the wartime (World War II) agreements between the then Guomintang (Nationalist) Government and the Allied powers to bring an end to foreign privileges encompassed by the 19th century unequal treaties.

Foreign diplomatic notes show a nuanced approach to that of the media reflecting an official determination not to risk national commercial and strategic interests. The protection of isolated missionary nationals in China was a secondary task for diplomats who saw their primary task as pursuing their country’s political, military and economic interests.176 Diplomats were constantly irritated, and Consulates preoccupied with, complaints by missionaries who put themselves at risk by going to isolated places, involving themselves in Chinese domestic affairs, provoking legal disputes over renting or purchasing property and demanding consular assistance when Chinese officials failed to protect them and perhaps most irritating of all, by constantly asserting their divine purpose and moral ascendancy even when ‘providence’ was apparently unwilling to bail them out.177

For British diplomats, in particular when reflecting on how the British chose to hose down demands for a massive punitive reaction to attacks on missionaries, national interests included restraint on German and Russian influence in East Asia—not to mention the French and later the Japanese. The British and American Governments believed, perhaps not publicly but certainly privately, that missionaries were responsible for their own safety. One prominent British diplomat put it very directly:

I hope I may be left to pursue my own line in respect of missionaries, and to say to my colleagues, as I did yesterday, that tho’ I have no prejudices against the missionaries, I regard the insertion in the Tientsin treaty of clauses about mission work as the most impolitic thing ever done in China.178

The attitude of Lord Salisbury, who was both Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary at the time of the

174 US Minister Charles Denby reported in 1895 that missionaries were the ‘only Americans residing in the interior.’ Denby to Secretary of State, 14 November 1895. US State Department, Despatches from United States Ministers to China, 1843-1906.


Huashan event, was made clear in 1900 when, after comparing the earliest days of Christian missionary work, he remarked that the missionaries of his era were all too ready to “appeal to the Consul and the mission of a gunboat.” He implied missionaries in China should be as willing to be martyrs as the missionaries of early Christianity.

Although business-people did not always have a positive view of the missionaries they accepted that any attack on missionaries that was not adequately dealt with opened the door to wider anti-foreign policy by the Chinese authorities. At an ‘indignation’ meeting in Shanghai, it was remarked that:

Some of us, I hope all of us, believe that what threatens one foreigner in China threatens all foreigners that we have invited foreigners of all nationalities in Shanghai to attend this meeting.180

The murder of the ten women and children at Huashan/Kucheng highlights 19th century assumptions about the status of women in Western society already mentioned and this is very obvious in the collection.

There has been reference in many works of 19th and 20th century Chinese history of Edward Said’s notion of ‘cultural imperialism.’ It is a topic inseparable from the issue of ‘gunboat diplomacy.’ Both combine to highlight the woes of Qing and Republican China as, ethically, the results of foreign intervention—military, economic-commercial and culturo-religious. As far as religion is concerned, the vast mass of the Chinese population was totally unaffected by Christian missionary efforts but when the focus is on the social reconstructive, as distinct from evangelistic, efforts of American missions in particular, the story is quite different—not as a story of American imposition or imperialism as Said suggests, but rather a consequence of the deliberate choices of Chinese families about the best opportunities for their sons to advance family economic interests. There is no doubt that China embraced everything the West could offer that was an improvement on domestic provisions without, and this must be emphasized, throwing out their baby with the Western bathwater.182 The Chinese clung tenaciously to their traditions and behaviours and nowhere is this more evident today than in the resurgence of Chinese Communist official support for Confucian Institutes around the world.183 In cultural terms, the reality of foreign relations with the Chinese for the past two centuries has centred on the failings and not upon the successes of interaction between East and West now so

180 North China Herald Supplement, (Shanghai), 9 August 1895 (see below)
182 Stuntz, Hugh, (1944), ‘Christian Missions and Social Cohesion,’ pp 148-188 in The American Journal of Sociology, Vol 50 No 3, November 1944. For a recent Western assessment of the 20th century Chinese response to the outside world see Dikotter, Frank, (2008), The Age of Openness: China Before Mao, Hong Kong, Hong Kong University Press. The first Australian missionary of the China Inland Mission, the Rev C H Parsons of Melbourne, described a room in the Chinese Magistrates House in Paoning. “We are in splendid quarters, occupying what is called the ‘Flowery Parlour,’ a fine room, 44 feet by 18, with a carpet in the center, two full length mirrors, and two of the finest Rochester lamps I have ever seen. Some beautifully mounted scrolls hand on the walls, and a foreign clock stands on a side table.” Melbourne, The Missionary, At Home and Abroad, Vol XXII No 21, September 1895, pp 354-5. Rochester lamps were made in America and burned kerosene supplied by American oil companies.
readily demonstrated in China’s adoption of commercial capitalism without feeling the necessity to embrace every aspect of Western civilisation.

But the vision of 19th century foreigners was one of constant frustration and irritation with what seemed a devious and backward society that led to frequent contemptuous remarks about China and its people. As Minister Denby wrote to the Secretary of State, in the aftermath of the Huashan Massacre, the speakers at the various Huashan protest meetings spoke in generalities and too often demanded “blood-letting and warlike measures,” without thinking about the consequences—political, military and commercial.\(^{184}\) As Parts Ten and Eleven of this collection indicate, the Qing Chinese elite, ultimately a tiny minority, wanted to prevent change wherever possible and protect their own wealth and privileges, ignoring the reality of their situation and the impossibility of preventing what proved to be a revolutionary desire for change.

In Australia and America there were interviews with ethnic Chinese, former missionaries, or people who had visited China although it is soon apparent that none of these people had any first-hand knowledge of the causes or effects of the massacre and knew even less about the “Vegetarians” who carried out the murders. Archdeacon Wolfe was emphatic that the massacre was carried out by a group who simply adopted the name of ‘Vegetarians’ to conceal their real purposes behind an existing and apparently respectable Buddhist sect.

The day after the massacre at Wha Sang they changed their assumed name of Vegetarians and inscribed upon their banners the name “Paik Kwa Kau” i.e., the Sect of the Eight Diagrams.”\(^ {185}\)

There is no source given by the Archdeacon for this comment but the view was widely shared by other missionaries. In her account of the C.E.Z.M.S work in China, Irene Barnes may have been quoting Wolfe when she wrote:

> The so-called “Vegetarians,” who enacted the fearful deed, were really the members of “The Eight Diagrams Guild,” a secret rebellious organization.\(^ {186}\)

The Eight Diagram or Eight Trigram Guild has a long history and the use of its name may have been no more than an effort by the local groups in Ku Cheng and district to legitimize their resistance to the local authorities by claiming a respected rebel heritage, e.g., the Guild, under the name of “White Lotus” had carried out an anti-dynastic rebellion in 1813.\(^ {187}\)

The White Lotus secret oaths shared with other Chinese cults the supposed power to make members invulnerable to weapons, fire or drowning that became best known in the West through identical claims made by the Boxer rebels in 1900. Guilds or associations claiming links to the Eight Trigrams tradition claimed they could help men overcome addictions such as opium—mentioned in a number of confessions

\(^ {185}\) Archdeacon John R. Wolfe to Mr. Eugene Stock, Editorial Secretary, CMS London, 19 September 1895. CMS East Asia Archives.
\(^ {186}\) Barnes, op it, p 150.
during the Kucheng Commission of Inquiry. The original White Lotus guild at the beginning of the 19th century promised members it would act to restore order in times of social upheaval and even replace the existing Imperial System. Vegetarianism was a common feature of many rebel guilds and had no significance other than to assert some kind of link with the White Lotus and broad Buddhist tradition.

A member of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions [Congregational], the Rev. S. T. Wooden heard about a short-lived new emperor in Gutian during the earlier troubles in 1894.

The story goes that on the deposition of the magistrate there arose a man among them who thought he would be emperor. This was in the fall. He set up a court, and in the summer the missionaries with their women and children, were obliged to leave, and Ku Cheng itself was threatened by the insurgent vegetarians. The reign of this self made emperor was as short as it was inglorious. It lasted, indeed, but a day and a half, and the missionaries had not been able to reach Foo Chow before they received information that they could return to Ku Cheng in safety, which they did. Nobody ever knew what became of the emperor. It is supposed he ran away. All this occurred only ten months ago, and the incident supplies some idea of the character of the vegetarians and their regard for law and order.

There are other passing references to this event in published articles that mention the adoption of literary degrees by rank and file without educational achievements. There was a supposed imperial edict published in Gutian stating that the Emperor in Beijing had resigned and this may have been part of this short-lived imperial gesture. It is unclear who this “emperor” was among the inner circle and there is no mention of this episode in Banister’s reports of the Huashan trials or in U.S. Consul Hixson’s Report.

A common feature of these secret societies was a tightly controlled inner core dominating a mass outer membership who had no idea of the detailed plans of the leaders. Naquin wrote of the original movement that:

The core of believers who initiated this rebellion amassed ten times as many new followers and eventually themselves constituted only a fraction of the total rebel population.

This pattern will be seen in Parts Five-Seven in the reports of the trials and the conclusions of key figures such as Banister, Hixson, Mansfield and Newell.

The cartoon on the next page summarises the feelings of ‘white’ “Christian” Australians towards 19th century Chinese immigration. “The Mongolian Octopus” was drawn by Phil May, an English artist who worked in Sydney for some years until returning to England where he worked for the London satirical journal, Punch. Dozens of similar illustrations appeared in American journals as the two Pacific Rim countries sought to deal with their prejudices.

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188 The Brooklyn Daily Eagle, New York, 18 August 1895.
189 Naquin, op cit, p 194.
The Mongolian Octopus: His Grip on Australia.