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Afghanistan in 2010

Continuing Governance Challenges and Faltering Security

ABSTRACT

Afghanistan in 2010 witnessed a number of important events including cabinet changes, legislative elections, and several major international conferences focused on its problems. It continued to be confronted by long-term problems of insecurity, compounded by uncertainty about both the trajectory of U.S. policy and the legitimacy of its own rulers.

KEYWORDS: Afghanistan, governance, security, elections, Taliban

INTRODUCTION

Afghanistan in 2010 was haunted by four issues that shaped not only its politics but also the concerns of ordinary people. The first was the ongoing problem of insecurity arising from violent attacks by the Taliban movement, the so-called “Haqqani network” and the Hezb-e Islami (Party of Islam) led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, all of whom benefit from sanctuaries in Pakistan. The second was lingering doubt about the legitimacy of the Afghan government, given the scale of the electoral fraud that returned President Hamid Karzai to office in late 2009. The third was the question of whether it was desirable for the Afghan government and its international supporters to talk with the armed opposition and, if so, in what way and to what ends. The fourth was the commitment made by U.S. President Barack Obama in his major speech on Afghanistan on December 1, 2009, that after 18 months, American troops “will begin to come home.”¹ This evoked recollections of the loss of U.S. interest in Afghanistan after the withdrawal of Soviet forces

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1. *Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on the Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, December 1, 2009).

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in February 1989, and left Afghans uncertain whether the dispatch of an additional 30,000 U.S. troops to Afghanistan that President Obama also foreshadowed in his speech represented a genuine attempt to blunt the insurgency or simply an effort to save face before withdrawal.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

The new year began with much speculation over political appointments. President Karzai was required to present nominees for ministerial positions to the Wolesi Jirga (People's House), the lower house of Parliament, for ratification, but the process proved extremely laborious. It nonetheless resulted in a number of key personnel changes. Dr. Rangin Dadfar Spanta, foreign minister since 2006, was replaced by Dr. Zalmay Rasool, formerly the Afghan national security adviser. In return, Spanta, never a favorite with the Parliament, was shifted to Rasool's old position. A respected Canadian-trained economist, Dr. Hazrat Omar Zakhilwal, was appointed finance minister. A number of other nominees were rejected but were left in place by the president as "acting ministers."

Further personnel turnover came later in the year, most significantly with the removal in June 2010 of the interior minister, Hanif Atmar, and the head of the National Security Directorate, Amrullah Saleh. Each was reported to be opposed to Karzai's strategy of engaging with the Taliban, and both enjoyed considerable respect internationally. The new interior minister, General Bismillah Khan, formerly Army chief of staff, had been an associate of the late resistance commander Ahmad Shah Massoud, but many observers read his appointment as an attempt to weaken the position of Massoud's ferociously anti-Taliban followers within the military and not necessarily one to strengthen the Interior Ministry.

The main political event of the year was the September 18 election for the Wolesi Jirga. Under international pressure, there was a cleanout of the Independent Election Commission, which had performed lamentably in 2009, turning a blind eye to blatant fraud. Karzai concurrently moved to weaken the separate Electoral Complaints Commission, which had invalidated over 1.3 million fraudulent votes cast in the 2009 presidential poll (over three-quarters of which had ostensibly been cast for Karzai). By decree, the president sought to remove the international U.N. appointees who made up a majority of the Electoral Complaints Commission in 2009. Faced with an

outrage, Karzai backed down only to the extent of accepting that international appointees could serve, but as a minority within the body. When the Wolesi Jirga elections were finally held, around 1.3 million votes were again excluded on the basis of fraud, and preliminary returns suggested that the new house would be as fractious as the old one. Nonetheless, some impressive members secured re-election, such as Fawzia Kofi, a dynamic woman candidate who topped the poll in Badakhshan Province. The elections also stimulated vigorous debate about political issues in Afghanistan's robust electronic media.

A lingering uncertainty throughout the year revolved around how much genuine support the president enjoyed. The Wolesi Jirga polls shed little direct light on this question because Afghanistan's electoral system favored independent candidates rather than political parties,² and there was certainly no "president's party" running for office, Karzai having made no attempt to set one up. To a significant degree, Karzai was helped by the difficulty that his critics had in uniting behind a single leader. His main opponent in 2009, former Foreign Minister Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, remained a sensible public voice, but a number of public figures who might have been sympathetic to his views were effectively coopted into the government, leaving Abdullah somewhat isolated. However, throughout the year, Karzai carefully avoided major political initiatives that might have tested his own legitimacy, even "outsourcing" attempts to negotiate with the Taliban to a so-called High Peace Council headed by former President Burhanuddin Rabbani.

The issue of how to deal with the Taliban, including whether and how to negotiate, surfaced many times during the year. From June 2–4, Karzai convened an assembly of tribal and other leaders called the "National Peace Jirga" to authorize him to move forward, and subsequently set up the High Peace Council as an instrument of engagement. However, the various parties remained far apart. While press reports of meetings appeared from time to time, the core Taliban leadership remained steadfast that a precondition for negotiations was the withdrawal of foreign forces from Afghanistan. For their part, the Karzai government and its backers signalled that the Taliban would have to lay down their arms and commit to supporting the provisions of the Afghan Constitution of 2004. The push for talks also suffered a setback

2. On the peculiarities of the Wolesi Jirga electoral system, see William Maley, *Rescuing Afghanistan* (London: Hurst & Co., 2006), pp. 48–49.

when it was learned that an alleged Taliban participant in some discussions had been an impostor.³

Numerous Western leaders and politicians advanced the view that there was no military solution to Afghanistan's problems and that a negotiated settlement would be required to end the conflict. Nonetheless, it remained unclear exactly what they had in mind in terms of the eventual political outcome: power-sharing in Kabul; spheres of influence in a subdivided Afghanistan; or the acceptance of Afghanistan as part of the sphere of influence of the Taliban's Pakistani backers, with limited sovereignty of its own. It was equally unclear whether the Taliban with whom to engage were low-level figures or top leaders. It was also unclear why the Taliban would negotiate seriously, considering that they probably felt that they had "time on their side" in terms of an eventual U.S. and NATO withdrawal.

SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS

To a significant degree, Karzai's long-term position of power depends on the security situation in Afghanistan as a whole, and trends in 2010 were not especially encouraging. President Obama's commitment of 30,000 additional American troops offered commanders in the field additional manpower with which to confront the enemy, but the process was complicated when the U.S. commander in Afghanistan, General Stanley McChrystal, was forced to resign after some of his staff offered an American reporter explicit criticism of Obama and unflattering comments about many of his senior advisers.⁴ His replacement, General David Petraeus, inevitably required a certain amount of time to settle in. Well before the end of the year, military casualties for U.S. troops during 2010 reached an all-time annual high by exceeding 400,⁵ and the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) suffered heavy losses as well. Civilian casualties within the Afghan population averaged between six and seven per day. This is a tiny fraction of the carnage that Afghanistan experienced during the 1980s when on average

3. Dexter Filkins and Carlotta Gall, "Taliban Leader in Secret Talks Was an Impostor," *New York Times*, November 22, 2010.

4. Michael Hastings, "The Runaway General," *Rolling Stone*, nos. 1108–09, July 8–22, 2010.

5. Susan G. Chesser, *Afghanistan Casualties: Military Forces and Civilians* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, October 28, 2010), p. 1.

over 240 Afghans met their deaths daily,⁶ but civilian deaths remain a significant political problem nonetheless.

The withdrawal of the Dutch contingent from the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Uruzgan Province at the end of July 2010, leaving only 190 troops serving in regional command headquarters, highlighted another significant challenge to building security in Afghanistan—namely, the vulnerability of such multinational operations because of domestic political pressures. The Dutch coalition government of Prime Minister Jan Peter Balkenende had collapsed in February over the Afghanistan issue,⁷ and the value of continuing to contribute to the effort was being increasingly debated in other countries as well. Although the Dutch withdrawal did not trigger a cascade of similar actions by other European states as some had feared, the Karzai government's loss of legitimacy in the eyes of international powers became increasingly apparent as the year drew on.

For most of the year, the capital city of Kabul remained relatively quiet: a systematic and well-devised strategy of checking vehicles in the city reduced the possibility of suicide car-bombings. Yet, there were exceptions. On February 26, a massive blast demolished a guesthouse facing Shahr-e-Naw Park in northern Kabul, killing 18 people, including a number of Indian aid workers. This blast also caused extensive damage to the nearby Safi Landmark Hotel and Kabul City Center shopping mall. In another incident, an attack on a NATO convoy on May 18 also killed 18 people. But on the whole, Kabul functioned without severe disruption by insurgents. Residents were, in fact, more likely to be inconvenienced by the activities of private security companies, which often operated in arrogant disregard of their legal authority, than insurgent attacks. For this reason, many Afghans in the capital responded with relief after President Karzai moved to shut down their operations in Afghanistan, although he later backed down on some of his demands.⁸

6. For data on civilian casualties, see the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), *Afghanistan Mid-Year Report on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, 2010* (Kabul: UNAMA Human Rights, August 2010), p. 27. On mortality in the 1980s, see Noor Ahmad Khalidi, "Afghanistan: Demographic Consequences of War, 1978–1987," *Central Asian Survey* 10:3 (1991), pp. 101–26.

7. Nicholas Kulish, "Dutch Pull-Out from War Expected after Government Collapse," *New York Times*, February 22, 2010.

8. Alissa J. Rubin, "Afghanistan Softens Ban on Private Security Firms," *ibid.*, December 6, 2010.

Outside Kabul, the security environment was not nearly so encouraging. Banditry remained a lingering problem. Taliban strikes were often particularly brutal. For example, in June, 11 members of the Hazara community were murdered in Uruzgan, their decapitated bodies left by the roadside.⁹ Hazaras have historically been the victims of discrimination in Afghanistan because of their physical distinctiveness and their adherence to the Shiite rather than Sunni school of Islam. They found themselves under attack in other parts of the country as well. In Wardak Province, Hazara houses were torched by ethnic Pushtun *kuchis* (nomads) who demanded access to lands the Hazaras occupied. Attacks on Hazaras in the Daimirdad District of Wardak reportedly involved heavy weapons and sophisticated military tactics, suggesting Taliban involvement.¹⁰ With such attacks being accompanied by mounting talk of the need to engage with the Taliban, it was no surprise that Hazara refugees began fleeing the region to other parts of the world. Many Hazara refugees entered Australian territorial waters in boats, as they had earlier done following Taliban massacres in the 1990s.¹¹

One particularly alarming development was the spread of violence beyond established conflict areas such as the southern and eastern provinces of Helmand, Kandahar, Zabul, Uruzgan, and Ghazni to areas in the north and west that had long been thought relatively secure. The town of Kunduz in northern Afghanistan witnessed numerous incidents, although this was not surprising in retrospect, given that the Taliban had signalled their intention to turn it into “the Kandahar of the north.” In October, suicide bombers attacked the U.N. office in the western city of Herat. The month of August saw perhaps the most shocking attack of all: the murder in Badakhshan Province of a team of 10 aid workers from the International Assistance Mission, a Christian charity that had been supplying optometric services to Afghan communities since the 1960s. The team leader, Tom Little, had lived in Afghanistan for decades, spoke fluent Persian, and was well-versed in the local culture.¹²

A number of Western countries looked to further developing the Afghan government’s security capabilities as a roadmap to eventually withdrawing

9. “Police Find 11 Beheaded Bodies in Afghan South,” Reuters, June 25, 2010.

10. Fabrizio Foschini, *The Kuchi-Hazara Conflict, Again* (Kabul: Afghanistan Analysts Network, May 2010).

11. See William Maley, “Security, People-Smuggling, and Australia’s New Afghan Refugees,” *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 55:3 (November 2001), pp. 351–70.

12. Rod Nordland, “Gunmen Kill Medical Aid Workers in Afghanistan,” *New York Times*, August 7, 2010.

from the country. Australia, for example, recast its mission in Uruzgan Province from one predominantly focused on reconstruction into one of training the Fourth Brigade of the ANA, thus building on wider support for expanding the ANA coming from the U.S. and other NATO states. While the ANA's numerical strength increased, by the end of the year it was still in no position to handle security on its own. The under-representation of southern Pushtuns in its ranks and high desertion rates, not to mention questionable operational readiness, remained lingering problems for the ANA. Nonetheless, it remained well ahead of the ANP in terms of institutional development.

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENTS

Opium remained a major cash crop in Afghanistan in 2010, but its aggregate yield fell sharply from an estimated 6,900 metric tons in 2009 to 3,600 metric tons, in part because disease spoiled a large chunk of the poppy crop.¹³ However, opium was a major source of revenue, albeit in relatively small individual amounts, for many farmers and poor laborers. The heated debate between various international actors over whether to try to eradicate the opium crop tailed off to some degree during 2010, perhaps because of the new American focus on a "population-centric strategy," recognizing that the support of the population is essential to countering insurgency. This drove home the notion that there were no quick-and-easy solutions to the problems narcotics posed. Nonetheless, no one doubted that opium significantly distorts economic activity in Afghanistan; the fear remains that profits from drugs are fueling the insurgency.

The year 2010 also saw significant progress in parts of the legal economy. The agricultural sector performed quite strongly in quantitative terms. For example, Afghanistan's cereal crop, estimated at 5.7 million tons for 2010, vastly outweighed the raw opium harvest in physical terms.¹⁴ A number of major economic and development projects advanced during the year. One was the laying of railroad tracks between the cities of Mazar-e Sharif and

13. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *Afghanistan Opium Survey, 2010* (Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, September 2010).

14. United States Agency for International Development (USAID), *Afghanistan Food Security Outlook: July to December 2010* (Washington, D.C.: Famine Early Warning Systems Network, USAID, 2010), p. 1.

Hairatan, funded by a \$165 million Asian Development Bank (ADB) grant. This was part of an effort ultimately designed to link Afghanistan to rail transport networks in the Middle East and Europe and also to South and Southeast Asia.¹⁵ There was a flurry of interest in reports that Afghanistan might have vast unexploited mineral wealth,¹⁶ but it was clear that years of further exploration would be required before the potential benefits of such riches could reach ordinary Afghans, especially given the slow progress on the Aynak copper mine, in which the Metallurgical Corporation of China had committed to invest heavily.

The year was much rockier in the financial sector. Many Afghans have become extremely wealthy in the period since 2001, and some have engaged in high-return but high-risk financial enterprises. September 2010 witnessed a run on the commercial Kabul Bank after unsettling reports about its management and record-keeping surfaced in the international press. The Afghan government stepped in to guarantee its solvency.¹⁷ Nonetheless, this incident revealed how loose the management of some new enterprises had been, with overinvestment in declining value assets such as residential property in Dubai. Even the Afghan government's support package proved controversial because one of President Karzai's brothers, Mahmoud Karzai, was a major shareholder in the Kabul Bank.

This particular episode also drew attention to the ongoing problems of corruption and nepotism in Afghanistan. A number of studies carried out during the year suggested that corruption had reached alarming levels, although more through the soliciting of bribes than through the misappropriation of state assets. In Transparency International's 2010 Corruption Perceptions Index, only Somalia secured a worse ranking than Afghanistan.¹⁸ Nepotism proved as much a problem for international actors as for Afghans. In Kandahar, foreign forces debated whether they should work with President Karzai's brother Wali Karzai, chair of the Kandahar provincial council, or seek to marginalize him. A similar debate occurred in Uruzgan over the

15. ADB, *ADB President Inaugurates Rail Line Linking Afghanistan to Central Asia* (Manila: ADB, May 25, 2010).

16. James Risen, "U.S. Identifies Vast Mineral Riches in Afghanistan," *New York Times*, June 13, 2010.

17. James Fontanella-Khan and Robin Wigglesworth, "Kabul Steps in to Stop Run on Biggest Bank," *Financial Times*, September 6, 2010.

18. Transparency International, *Corruption Perceptions Index, 2010* (Berlin: Transparency International, 2010).

position of the strongman Matiullah Khan.¹⁹ The dilemma posed by such actors is that they enjoy a degree of power because of their connections (or perceived connections) to Hamid Karzai's administration in Kabul, but backing them militates against institutional development and often infuriates those of different ethnic or tribal backgrounds.

It is often abuse of power, rather than simply corruption or nepotism, that enrages ordinary Afghans. Within this context, the judiciary and law enforcement agencies remained pathetically weak in the face of political power. For example, following the arrest of an associate on a charge of soliciting a bribe in July, Karzai pressured the prosecutors and the American anti-corruption team with which they had been working. The president's chief of staff explained he wanted these units to work "within an Afghan framework."²⁰ One sense of what this might entail surfaced in October when a damaging report appeared in the *New York Times* suggesting that the same chief of staff had been receiving large plastic bags of money from the Iranian ambassador to Afghanistan.²¹

Some of the problems of poor governance afflicting Afghanistan came to light through the efforts of younger Afghans using new media of mass communication. During the Wolesi Jirga election, a number of candidates, most notably the 30-year-old former U.N. political officer Janan Mosazai in Kabul, mixed traditional with modern campaigning methods to capture the attention of younger voters. In 2010, expanding domestic television outlets provided venues for young, energetic journalists to break important stories. Furthermore, in a society with millions of mobile-phone users, even grainy footage of electoral fraud could be disseminated to a wide audience, thanks in part to the courage of activists from the Free and Fair Election Foundation of Afghanistan, the principal organization of indigenous election observers. These new communications technologies, which were used in 2010 on a greater scale than ever before, have the potential to transform Afghan society more broadly, networking people of very diverse backgrounds and even threatening the segregation of women in at least the urban areas. Nonetheless, progress for women in Afghanistan was slow in 2010, although figures

19. See James Risen, "Karzai's Kin Use Ties to Gain Power in Afghanistan," *New York Times*, October 5, 2010; Dexter Filkins, "With U.S. Aid, Warlord Builds Afghan Empire," *ibid.*, June 5, 2010.

20. Rajiv Chandrasekaran, "Karzai Seeks to Limit Role of U.S. Corruption Investigators," *Washington Post*, September 9, 2010.

21. Dexter Filkins, "Iran Is Said to Give Top Karzai Aide Cash by the Bagful," *New York Times*, October 23, 2010.

such as Dr. Sima Samar, chair of the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, remained vigorous contributors to Afghan public life.

PUBLIC ATTITUDES

Gauging public attitudes in Afghanistan remains difficult. But a survey released by the Asia Foundation in November offered some interesting insights, although sampling difficulties resulting from insecurity mean that the results should be viewed as indicative rather than definitive. The Afghan government received a rather favorable assessment: asked how they felt about the way the national government was carrying out its responsibilities, 73% of respondents gave a positive assessment, including 17% who said that the government was doing a “very good” job and 56% who said it was doing “quite a good” job. However, 62% also agreed that it was generally not acceptable to talk negatively about the government in public, which may have skewed their assessments. Attitudes toward what some would see as “Western” values were also positive: some 83% agreed that it was a good thing that the government should allow peaceful opposition, and 81% agreed that every one should have equal rights under the law, regardless of their gender, ethnicity, or religion.²²

Results from polling conducted in late-October and early-November for a range of Western news outlets suggested that only 9% of respondents would prefer to have the Taliban ruling Afghanistan, with 86% preferring the current government. In fact, 64% saw the Taliban as the biggest threat to the country. Furthermore, 62% supported the presence of U.S. military forces in the country, although this level had declined from a high of 78% in 2006.²³ Both polls detected widespread perceptions that corruption in Afghanistan was an endemic problem. Polling data from Afghanistan are often dismissed out of hand, and responses may well be contaminated by respondents’ fears of speaking candidly. However, it is also possible that polls of this sort pick-up undercurrents of opinion that are not immediately apparent to observers based in cities and towns rather than in smaller villages, where expectations of what the state can deliver are likely to be low. In fact, some of Afghanistan’s graver problems seem remote.

22. Asia Foundation, *Afghanistan in 2010: A Survey of the Afghan People* (San Francisco: Asia Foundation, 2010).

23. Rajiv Chandrasekaran and Jon Cohen, “Afghan Poll Shows Falling Confidence in U.S. Efforts to Secure Country,” *Washington Post*, December 6, 2010.

REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

Afghanistan was at the forefront of international attention for most of 2010. On January 28, an international conference on Afghanistan was held in London. Its unstated aim was to rebuild relations between the Karzai government and the wider international community, ties that had been strained following the fraud-ridden 2009 presidential election. The conference communiqué anticipated that by early 2011, the ANA would reach a target strength of 171,000 soldiers, and the ANP, a target of 134,000 personnel. It was also anticipated that international force levels would reach 135,000 by 2011. The conference endorsed a new “Afghan Peace and Reintegration Trust Fund” to offer economic incentives to enemy combatants willing to lay down their arms and reintegrate into mainstream Afghan society. Participating governments also supported the Kabul government’s goal “whereby donors increase the proportion of development aid delivered through the Government of Afghanistan to 50% in the next two years.”²⁴

Another international conference was held in Kabul on July 20, at which the Afghan government presented an “Afghan Peace and Reintegration Program” to underpin its push to engage with the Taliban, although this proved quite vague on specifics. There was also a significant change in U.N. leadership. A Swedish U.N. official, Staffan de Mistura, was appointed as the new special representative of the Office of the Secretary-General and head of the UNAMA.²⁵ This mission had been in crisis since the very public dispute between the former special representative, Kai Eide of Norway, and his American deputy, Peter Galbraith; the latter was dismissed after protesting what he saw as an insipid U.N. reaction to the flawed 2009 election.

Afghanistan’s regional relations remained difficult. Although Pakistan continued to host several million Afghan refugees, its apprehensions about the growth of Indian influence in Afghanistan prompted it to continue its covert support for the Taliban insurgency. Pakistan’s arrest of a senior Afghan Taliban leader, Mullah Baradar, in February prompted speculation that it might be moving away from its support for the Taliban, but it subsequently became clear that Baradar had been within hours of defecting to

24. UNAMA, *Communiqué of “Afghanistan: The London Conference”* (Kabul: UNAMA, January 28, 2010), paragraph 19.

25. United Nations, *Secretary-General Appoints Staffan de Mistura of Sweden Special Representative for Afghanistan* (New York: Secretary-General, United Nations, SG/A/1217; AFG/350; BIO/4163, January 28, 2010).

the Kabul government.²⁶ Thus, his arrest was apparently designed to avert that possibility and reassert Pakistani dominance of the so-called “Quetta Shura,” the main Pakistan-based council of Afghan Taliban leaders. During the course of the year, a number of studies appeared demonstrating how Pakistan’s powerful Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) directorate remained heavily involved in orchestrating instability in Afghanistan, but there was little to suggest that key Western countries were any closer to working out a solution to this problem.²⁷

Iran’s relations with Afghanistan were superficially cordial, with Karzai meeting on a number of occasions with President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Nonetheless, weapons of Iranian provenance continued to reach the Taliban, although this paled in insignificance when compared with the support the Taliban received from Pakistan. Iran’s involvement may have been designed to signal what potential mischief it could make if Israel attacked its nuclear installations. Iran, after all, as a Shiite state has no real interest in allowing the radically anti-Shiite Taliban to return to power in neighboring Afghanistan. Much like Pakistan, Iran continued to host Afghan refugees but has no desire to see their numbers swell. Iran also remained a major route of egress for narcotics being exported from Afghanistan, while nonetheless continuing to work with Afghan authorities to block the opium trade.

The U.S. clearly remained Afghanistan’s most important ally. American global interests meant that a hasty U.S. exit from Afghanistan remained unlikely. Yet, for much of the year, the Obama administration found President Karzai to be an erratic partner. Playing to a domestic political audience, Karzai proved prone to attacking the U.S. over civilian casualties, while often describing the Taliban as “brothers”—even though their fighters were responsible for about three-quarters of civilian deaths in the country.²⁸ He was also slow to fill the position of Afghan ambassador to the U.S., vacated by the dismissal of the long-term Afghan representative, Said T. Jawad. Nonetheless, with no alternative Afghan leader on the horizon, the U.S. has little option but to do the best it can in Afghanistan, considering its increasingly difficult options.

26. Mark Mazetti and Dexter Filkins, “Secret Joint Raid Captures Taliban’s Top Commander,” *New York Times*, February 16, 2010.

27. See Matt Waldman, *The Sun in the Sky: The Relationship between Pakistan’s ISI and Afghan Insurgents* (London: Discussion Paper, no. 18, Crisis States Research Centre, London School of Economics and Political Science, June 2010); Bob Woodward, *Obama’s War* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2010).

28. UNAMA, *Afghanistan Mid-Year Report on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict*, 2010, p. i.