Promoting Private Entrepreneurship for Deepening Market Reform in China: A Resource Allocation Perspective

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Abstract

After more than three decades of rapid growth, China's economy is going through an important turning point, where structural imbalances in both supply and demand sides must be addressed for a more moderate and sustainable growth path. By focusing on the structural changes to its ownership, a central element in China's economic transformation under market reform, the present paper highlights the importance of private entrepreneurship in deepening market reform and, thereby, in driving economic growth in a more efficient and sustainable way. Based on a perspective of resource allocation and a conceptual framework of entrepreneurship, the paper elaborates on the evolution of the private sector and its performance in the context of ownership reform, making comparisons with the performance of the state sector. The analysis suggests that there is further room for more productive use of economic resources, especially capital, land and natural resources, by increasing the participation of private entrepreneurs in industries with high entry barriers in favor of state-owned enterprises. Moreover, more competitive and equal access to productive resources through reform is needed to promote more productive entrepreneurship and to reduce rent-seeking activities.

Key words: entrepreneurship, market reform, private enterprises, resource allocation, rent-seeking, state-owned enterprise, total factor productivity

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I. Introduction

Over the past three decades, market-oriented reforms in China have resulted in spectacular

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economic performance. Transforming the enterprise sector has been central to the market reform process. Entrepreneurship has emerged and expanded rapidly, with entrepreneurs making increasing contributions to economic growth and structural transformation in China.

Despite the rapid expansion of the private sector in the economy, state-led resource allocation has been an important part of China's economic reform strategy, having exerted substantial effects on the survival of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and the evolution of private enterprises. Focusing on capital, land, energy and utilities as key resources, we examine how the state has changed and reformed the institutional systems governing the supply and distribution of these resources during the market reform process. At the same time, we investigate the extent of outcomes that enterprises of different ownership have experienced with respect to access to these resources and the policy implications. Firm behavior and responses are examined in the sectoral and ownership patterns of investment activities, asset and output shares, and profit and productivity performance. This approach is used to shed light on the puzzle of China's rapid economic growth with an expansion of the private sector accompanied by the existence and the predominant role played by SOEs in some of the key sectors in the economy, such as oil, petrochemicals, aviation, steel, coal, finance, telecommunications and railway.

State control of the development of capital, land and resource markets has, in general, created substantial rents that have been directed to important infrastructure projects and provision of public goods, thereby facilitating economic transition and contributing to rapid economic growth. At the same time, such rents have also produced side effects due to the state control of resources, including rent-seeking activities by both governments and enterprises. The misallocation of resources has been linked to structural imbalances, such as overcapacity in certain sectors, and significant negative impacts on the development of private entrepreneurship, which holds the key to increasing the productivity and growth potential of China (Deer and Song, 2012).

II. Economic Transition, State-controlled Resources and Entrepreneurship

It has long been recognized that in a market economy entrepreneurship drives economic growth through a "creative destruction" process, a term coined by Schumpeter in the early 20th century (Carree and Thurik, 2003). Development economics views entrepreneurship as a driving force of economic growth and structural transformation (Gries and Naudé, 2008; Naudé, 2010). This view is particularly relevant for a country in the process of transition from a centrally planned economy to a market-based economy. The connection between

the market and entrepreneurship suggests that market transition is always associated with the emergence and evolution of the private sector in the economy. The progress of market reforms can be seen in the expansion and diversity of the activities of private entrepreneurs (Tanas and Audretsch, 2011). While there are commonly agreed traits of entrepreneurs, such as being alert to profit opportunities, creativity and risk-taking (Lu, 1994), some characteristics can be quite different, depending crucially on the institutional settings of an economy.

1. The Nature and Types of Entrepreneurship

The OECD defines entrepreneurship as a reflection of entrepreneurial activity, which is determined mainly by entrepreneurs (Ahmad and Hoffman, 2008). Entrepreneurs are those persons who own and manage businesses with the purpose of value generation through creation or expansion of economic activity, by identifying and exploiting new products, processes or markets.

The OECD definition of entrepreneurship is consistent with an observation made by Schumpeter in the early 20th century. Schumpeter (1934) considered entrepreneurship to be an innovative process in which entrepreneurs, as innovators with willingness to take risks, seek profits by creating new products or new production processes with better values to replace old ones, implying higher productivity. Therefore, entrepreneurship is associated with a value-creation process, which he referred to as “creative destruction,” which leads to true economic progress. In addition, introducing new products or processes is seen as creating disequilibrium in the existing market (Lu, 1994).

The Schumpeterian view of entrepreneurship, referred to as high-level entrepreneurship (Karlsson *et al.*, 2004), is, however, rather narrow, as it focuses only on new value created by new products or processes. Other processes that are not purely innovative can also contribute to value generation. Kirzner (1998) suggests that, being alert to market opportunities, entrepreneurs can make profits through filling the gap between supply and demand in the market, either with production or with trade. Through this equilibrating role of the entrepreneur (Lu, 1994), more value in terms of profit can be generated through contributing to flows of goods and services. This kind of entrepreneurship is referred to as low-level entrepreneurship, and an example is firms in the wholesale and retail trades (Karlsson *et al.*, 2004).

The two early views of entrepreneurship miss an important fact: not all entrepreneurial efforts bring benefits to society as a whole, despite profits brought to entrepreneurs themselves. Baumol identifies this feature of entrepreneurship in his seminal paper (1990). Baumol suggests that there are different types of entrepreneurship, including *productive*, *unproductive* and *destructive* entrepreneurship, due to the reward structure created by a

certain institutional setting with the existence of the market. Given a country's institutional structure, entrepreneurs can take market opportunities to profit from their talent. The entrepreneur's market-based activities will create more wealth or value for society; this is *productive* entrepreneurship. There are also profit opportunities in political and legal processes that could attract entrepreneurial efforts. Entrepreneurial efforts in political and legal arenas can result in the accumulation of personal wealth through changing government policy relating to taxation and subsidies. However, these efforts do not generate additional social wealth, but, rather, redistribute wealth; this is *unproductive* entrepreneurship.

Moreover, in some cases, entrepreneurial efforts involve illegal activities, which may result in the loss of social wealth (although not necessarily losses of private wealth), making entrepreneurship destructive. Whether entrepreneurial efforts are productive, unproductive or destructive depends on how profitable opportunities are in market and non-market situations. The reward outcomes depend entirely on the country's institutional structure, which determines the ways in which entrepreneurs allocate their time and effort. As discussed by Sobel (2008), productive entrepreneurship is more likely to expand in a market-supportive institutional framework that is characterized by secure property rights, a fair and balanced judicial system, effective contract enforcement, appropriate business regulation and effective control of government power.

An important implication of Baumol's theory is that entrepreneurship growth is not always translated into economic growth and the healthy expansion of entrepreneurship is determined by a sound incentive structure of institutions. Baumol's view of entrepreneurship has particularly relevant implications for the analysis of entrepreneurship development in a transitional economy like China's, in which institutional change to a market economy is central to the transition process. The transitional institutional framework has created many non-market profit opportunities that have attracted business-minded people who have been able to exploit institutional loopholes and become entrepreneurs under market transition. Moreover, the transition from a centrally planned economy to a market-based economy has created many rent-seeking opportunities that are conducive to unproductive entrepreneurship.

2. Market Transition and Evolution of Entrepreneurship

Market transition is a long process involving several stages to establish a system with market rules and emerging private firms with different forms to those of state firms (Kolodko, 2000). While it is complex to delineate the transition process and corresponding entrepreneurship, a typology of different stages of transition with different types of entrepreneurship would be useful. Estrin *et al.* (2008) provide such a typology by suggesting

three stages of transition in which different kinds of entrepreneurship exist. The initial stage or early transition is characterized by initializing market channels of goods distribution and abandoning planned channels of resource allocation. There are frequent adjustments of relative prices and gaps between demand and supply, creating opportunities for mainly Kirznian types of entrepreneurs: entrepreneurs that see opportunities in highly uncertain environments and unknown territory (Kirzner, 1973). As a result, there is a lot of uncertainty due to macroeconomic instability and the lack of market information.

In the second stage, uncertainty is reduced as a result of the availability of more market information, less extreme price fluctuations and a more stable macroeconomic environment. The fundamentals of a market system, such as property rights, are established, providing incentives for Schumpeterian entrepreneurship to emerge. The third stage follows with further development of market institutions, which become the main force of resource coordination and information provision for market participants. Contract enforcement becomes more dependent on the legal system. Entrepreneurs have better access to resources through financial institutions and market exchange. This stage of market transition provides an institutional environment conducive to the expansion of Schumpeterian entrepreneurship. As Estrin *et al.* (2008) note, however, the early forms of entrepreneurship may continue to exist in the later stage of market reform due to the inertia of institutional changes with respect to market development and the required rules and regulations.

3. Determinants of Entrepreneurship

In an analytical framework of entrepreneurship development, Ahmad and Hoffman (2008) suggest six factors determining the path of a country's entrepreneurship development: regulatory framework, market conditions, culture, access to finance or capital, technological capability and entrepreneurial capabilities. The first three factors could create a suitable environment for the emergence and evolution of entrepreneurship. A regulatory framework comprises laws and regulations that govern the entry and operation of business activities. A regulatory framework is necessary to deal with issues such as business entry and exit, product standards, taxation, social health and security, safety, health and environmental protection. Market conditions are actually market opportunities created through the establishment and evolution of a market economy. Market opportunities are driven by factors such as competition, access to domestic and foreign markets, and government participation in the market (i.e. supply of public goods and procurement). A culture for entrepreneurship growth includes society's attitudes towards entrepreneurs, and desire for business ownership.

The emergence and expansion of entrepreneurship cannot happen without resource availability, which is determined by access to finance, technology and entrepreneurial

capabilities. Entrepreneurial supply depends first on entrepreneurial capabilities, which are established and accumulated with the training and experience of entrepreneurs, business and entrepreneurship education, and migration of entrepreneurs. R&D and technological advances create opportunities for entrepreneurs and their businesses to flourish. Technological capability contributes factors such as R&D investment, technological cooperation between firms, technology diffusion, development of information technology and a patent system; however, to take advantage of business opportunities and create a successful business, the availability of capital is the crucial factor. This factor depends on the entrepreneur's access to financial resources, such as a banking system, stock markets and other financial institutions.

The above analytical framework would be useful for examining the nature, characteristics and performance of entrepreneurship in an economy with an established system of market institutions; however, there are some missing elements in the framework for a transitional economy. The analysis of the performance of entrepreneurship in transition would need to take into account two important processes: (i) the process of setting up and building market institutions, including laws and regulations to recognize and ensure private property rights and to govern market transactions; and (ii) the parallel process of ownership transformation. The next subsection will explain why it is important to incorporate these processes into analysis of entrepreneurship performance.

4. State Control of Resources and the Development of Entrepreneurship in Transition

Market-oriented reform basically involves changing the relative role of the state and the market in the coordination of production, exchange and distribution activities with the main objective of improving efficiency and promoting economic growth. In China, like other former centrally planned economies, market-oriented reform started from a point of “only state, no market” (Zhang, 2002, p. 10). At this starting point, the centrally planned economy is characterized by state control of all productive resources, from fixed assets, such as plants, buildings, machinery and equipment, to land and other natural resources. The state's control of productive resources takes the form of sole ownership and is carried out through SOEs and agricultural collectives. While savings are limited due to non-market, state-coordinated transactions of goods distribution under central planning, production surplus is captured by the state through setting inter-sectoral terms of trade, mainly between agriculture and industry or rural and urban areas. Therefore, one crucial dimension of market-oriented reform has been the shift in the state's control of resources through ownership transformation of public assets, reducing the role of SOEs and changing the ways government intervenes in production and exchange activities based on market rules

and orders. Consequently, on the one hand, market-oriented reform provides an environment for the emergence of entrepreneurship through market opportunities and the incentives attached to the establishment of private property rights. On the other hand, market transition gives rise to entrepreneurship by reducing the extent and changing the forms of the state's control of resources: in particular, physical and financial capital, land and other natural resources.

The reduced state control of resources under market conditions gives rise to the fundamental question of the interaction of the state and the market. While it is generally expected that the scope of state intervention will be reduced, an important observation is that in economic transition the state plays an indispensable and guiding role in the establishment of the market system, which aims to provide open competition for all firms. This is particularly true of China's experience, with its gradualist approach to market reform. The continued leading role of the state is needed because market reform is basically a process of institutional change. Institutional change is a long process and it takes time to build new market institutions and entrench them in an economic system (Murrell and Wang, 1993; World Bank, 2001). More specifically, Arrow (2001, p. 91) explains the state's market-guiding role:

Although the role of government in directing economic activity in a healthy economy is limited, transition does require guidance. The only source of general guidance for the economy is the state, and there is no denying that appropriate policy and leadership could considerably smooth transition.

Given the leading role of the state in economic transition, the interaction between market liberalization and state control of resources could strongly affect entrepreneurial activities in both positive and negative ways. The impact is positive when the state moves the economy towards more market-oriented changes such as perfection of market mechanisms, including market entry, providing further room for entrepreneurs to flourish; and it can be negative if the state strengthens its control over the allocation of key resources, preventing private entrepreneurs from accessing those resources for development. As discussed above, due to state-dominated ownership of all economic activities during the central planning era, enterprises had to rely on the state for their access not only to production factors (capital, land and other natural resources), but also to basic inputs (energy and utilities). In China as well as other transitional economies, market reform led to the development of markets for these resources, and the emergence of entrepreneurship would not have been possible if the state had not reduced its control of and restriction on the access to these resources. Therefore, the dynamics and performance of the private sector would depend significantly on the extent and means of releasing the state's control of these key resources. Moreover, state dominance through sole ownership or SOE presence

means state monopoly in the markets, implying distortions of factor markets and the existence of substantial rents. The literature on rent and rent-seeking suggests that the existence of rents due to state interventions during market transformation is inevitable and there are certain rents that are growth-enhancing (Khan, 2004), but a lot of rent-seeking activities are damaging the economy. The existence of rampant corruption is a testimony of this development. A crucial question here is whether the state is able to manage and utilize these rents to enhance economic development. For example, the state can promote private investment by transferring the rents to entrepreneurs through market entry and participation or the state can use the rents for financing public goods provision. In addition, the existence of rents leads to another important question of how these rents can be distributed and used in an equitable manner. The way in which the state deals with the rents in transition in terms of the allocation and distribution will influence the ways in which private entrepreneurial activities take place. We will examine these issues in the context of China's market transition and the evolution of private entrepreneurship.

III. State Control of Resources and Private Entrepreneurship in the Initial Stage of Reform: 1978–1992

One key feature of the early stage of reform in China was the dual-track price system with partial market liberalization. Following the rapid and successful transformation of agricultural cooperatives under the commune system to a household-based production system, market exchanges were gradually allowed to take a greater share along with planning channels in economic activities, in line with the application of a contract responsibility system in industrial enterprises later on. Liberalization took place progressively in the product markets, from consumer goods to materials and inputs for agricultural and industrial production. Gradual marketization created ample opportunities for the expansion of non-state private businesses through exploiting the huge gaps between demand and supply resulting from the acute shortage problems under the planning mechanism (Garnaut *et al.*, 2001). Observing the ways private business activities emerged outside the state sector, Lu (1994) concludes that new private businesses in this period had many features of Kirznian entrepreneurship. Additional market opportunities, although limited, came from the government's initial steps to open domestic markets to the outside world, with a focal policy of attracting foreign direct investment (FDI), especially overseas Chinese FDI from Hong Kong and Taiwan to the coastal areas. Total FDI increased from US\$7.4bn in the period 1979–1985 to US\$18.6bn in the period 1986–1991 (Wu, 2009). Initial opening to FDI promoted trading activities between local entrepreneurs and their counterparts in Hong Kong, which emerged in the

late 1970s (Tsai, 2007).

In the 1980s, China's non-state sector experienced rapid expansion and an increased contribution to output and employment.¹ Song (2015) indicates that, in the period 1978–1992, the share of SOEs in gross industrial output value decreased from 78 to 48 percent while that of the non-state sector grew from 22 to 52 percent correspondingly. It is notable that of the change in the share of the non-state sector, collectively-owned enterprises accounted for most, while private enterprises expanded to answer for nearly 10 percent of the change. During the first stage of reform, the institutional setting allowed limited formal recognition of the position that private entrepreneurs and their business activities took. Their subordinate or auxiliary position resulted from the Chinese Government's experimental approach while a dominant perception of private entrepreneurs as capitalists and exploiters prevailed (Garnaut *et al.*, 2001). Most importantly, property rights were not clearly defined (Huang, 2008). The rapid expansion of non-state enterprises despite their institutionally disadvantageous position has been a puzzle to many economists. From an institutional perspective, Huang (2008) suggests that in the context that the security of property right was not institutionalized, what made potential entrepreneurs willing to do business was *directional liberalism*; that is, policy promises and symbolic actions made by government leaders show the government's reform intentions. In addition, as a way of responding to ideological and regulatory obstacles, many privately-owned enterprises were registered as collectively-owned enterprises, leading to a phenomenon of “red hat” firms in the 1980s and 1990s (Garnaut *et al.*, 2001).

Productivity performance is both an indicator of and a contributing factor to overall performance. In this early period of transition, non-state enterprises, particularly township and village enterprises (TVEs), had better productivity performance than SOEs, as shown in Table 1. In the period 1980–1988, and the sub-periods 1980–1984 and 1984–1988, the collective sector always had a growth rate of total factor productivity (TFP) nearly doubling that of the state sector. It has been widely agreed among scholars that the collective sector is in the marketized section of the economy, facing more competition and hard budget

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¹Conceptually, the non-state sector includes collectively owned enterprises, private enterprises, joint-venture enterprises, overseas Chinese enterprises and foreign enterprises (Lin *et al.*, 1996). Among them, collectively-owned enterprises can be urban non-state and township and village enterprises (TVEs). The term TVE was used for the first time in 1984 by the State Council to describe commune and brigade enterprises (Song, 2015). TVEs constitute a major part of the non-state sector in terms of output, employment shares and the number of enterprises (Lin *et al.*, 1996). This feature will be elaborated on below. Despite the differing types, the essence of all these enterprises is entrepreneurial as they are exposed to market rules in their operation. Lu (1994) and Huang (2008) describe entrepreneurs as those operating private enterprises and TVEs.

Table 1. Annual Average Growth Rate of Output and Total Factor Productivity (Percent)

	1980–1988	1980–1984	1984–1988
State sector			
Output	8.49	6.77	10.22
TFP	2.40	1.80	3.01
Collective sector			
Output	16.94	14.03	19.86
TFP	4.63	3.45	5.86

Source: World Bank (1992).

Note: TFP, total factor productivity.

constraints; however, there would be no less important factors contributing to the high growth of output and productivity of the non-state sector in terms of the government's role in resource allocation during this early stage of transition. This can be viewed in three dimensions.

First, there was no clear focus for industrial strategy associated with SOE reform. Instead, governments at various levels aimed their reform efforts at improving the efficiency performance of all existing SOEs through creating incentives for managers and workers. The gradual and experimental approach resulted in the dual-track price system, with the planned track and the market track. Importantly, as a result, the dual-track system created channels for transferring resources, especially raw materials from the state sector, and industrial enterprises to the non-state sector through flows between planned allocation and market channels (Jefferson and Rawski, 1995). Moreover, the secular problem of shortage under planning (Kolodko, 2000) contributed to excess demand in the market for goods, especially industrial products. The excess market demand combined with improved access to materials created highly profitable opportunities for non-state firms. As suggested by Jefferson and Rawski (1995), the high price gap due to shortages implicitly generated quasi-rents that were partly captured by non-state firms. The side effect of the dual-price system, however (and also evidence of rent-seeking), was the emerging rampant corruption of SOE managers and bureaucrats (Lu, 1994).

Second, local governments played an active and significant role in promoting the TVEs through providing access to land, production sites, local utility services and flexible taxation. An important impetus for local governments, especially at township and village levels, to become more involved in non-state business activities was fiscal reform (Xu, 2011). In the 1980s, fiscal reform was carried out by dividing the responsibility for and allocation of budget revenues and expenditures between the central and local governments (province, county and municipality). Local governments were given more autonomy in collecting revenues and making spending decisions. This was called the fiscal contracting system or the third contract responsibility system (World Bank, 1992), or “fiscal federalism

with political centralization” (Zhang, 2002). Local governments were encouraged to generate revenues depending on local conditions. Therefore, the fiscal contracting system created incentives for local governments and bureaucrats to promote the development of local businesses (Bouckaert, 2007). With the unfavorable institutional setting for private enterprises, the result was that local governments increased their nominal stake in local collectively-owned enterprises. The involvement of local governments created favorable access for TVEs to land, production sites and local utility services, and created a more equal footing for TVEs compared with SOEs. As an example, compared with TVEs, private entrepreneurs had to pay higher electricity prices and 2.5 times higher taxes in 1985 (Chang and Wang, 1994). This fact further explains why private entrepreneurs often adopted the red-hat strategy.

Third, TVEs had favorable access to credit due to the active role of local governments in the context of limited credit and a partly commercialized banking system. In the 1980s, initial reform of the banking sector took place to establish the central bank, the People’s Bank of China (PBC) and four state commercial banks, which were assigned to focus on lending to major corresponding sectors: agriculture, industry, construction and foreign trade (Riedel *et al.*, 2007). There was also a considerable network of rural and urban credit cooperatives. With limited household savings, rural credit cooperatives had strong links with the Agricultural Bank of China for their source of funding (Huang, 2008). The close connections with local governments gave TVEs a strong position from which to access capital provided by rural credit cooperatives. Urban collective enterprises experienced a similar situation. Facing a hostile business environment with low status, private entrepreneurs understandably used the red-hat strategy to overcome constraints on access to the most important resources. Arguably, TVEs could be an important platform for private enterprises to emerge and grow in the later period of reform.

It is obvious that TVEs outperformed SOEs, due both to being exposed to market conditions with the significant involvement of private entrepreneurship and to some favorable access to resources created by local governments.

The dual-track reform had produced a latently vibrant emergence of private entrepreneurs through releasing some productive resources wholly controlled by the state sector. Importantly, non-state enterprises contributed to the adjustment of industrial structure due to their labor-intensive activities (Lin *et al.*, 1996). The unexpected outcome in the sense of “growing out of the plan” (Naughton, 1995) placed strong competition pressure on SOEs (Jefferson and Rawski, 1995). That became an important factor contributing to the deteriorating performance of the state sector, with many SOEs posting losses in the late 1980s, prompting a course of comprehensive reform for SOEs after 1992.

III. State Control of Resources and Private Entrepreneurship in the Stage of Comprehensive Market Reform: 1993 to Present

Since 1993, China has undertaken a series of market-oriented reforms and has established market mechanisms applying to all economic activities; however, the extent of market rules and competition varies significantly across sectors of the economy. The important aspect is the extent of the role of market forces in resource allocation, which can be seen in the structure of the enterprise system with a growing share of the private sector. Under the overarching framework of institutional reforms, changes in the ways the state controls key resources have been a key determinant shaping the evolution of private entrepreneurship, in the form of private sector development.

1. Conducive Changes in the Institutional Environment and Market Opportunities for Private Enterprises

Major changes in political ideology and the legal framework to recognize the private sector occurred after Deng Xiaoping's tour of southern China in 1992, during which he made several important speeches signaling the supportive view of the Chinese leadership of the role of private entrepreneurs in generating the nation's prosperity (Naughton, 2007). Following this event, there were fundamental changes in the political mindset on private entrepreneurs. For example, in September 1992, the 14th Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Congress officially adopted a "socialist market economy." The 15th CCP Congress (in 1997) recognized private ownership as an important component of the economy. This marked a significant change in the official ideology towards being supportive of private entrepreneurs. In a related move, there were marked changes in the legal framework. The amended 1999 Constitution acknowledged the important role of private businesses in China's economy (Qian and Wu, 2000). Related laws followed, enacted to govern the operation of private businesses.

The leadership's continued commitment to the market economy promoted the completion of the marketization process of the economy in three dimensions. In the first dimension, there was further completion of liberalization of domestic goods and product markets. Price liberalization was implemented in 1993 and 1994 after the market-oriented reform gained momentum in 1992. In 1997, 85 percent of agricultural output, 95 percent of retail products and 96 percent of production materials were sold at market prices (Zhang, 2002).

The second dimension is China's foreign trade liberalization. Before accession to the WTO in 2001, China took major steps to reform its foreign trade regime to remove distortions

and to become consistent with the international trading system. Important reform measures included unification and devaluation of the foreign exchange rate, increased access to foreign exchange for domestic producers, removal of entry barriers to export and import activities by granting trading rights to manufacturing enterprises, expanded tariff reduction and removal of many other kinds of trade barriers, as well as the application of other trade policy instruments, such as import substitution and export promotion (Naughton, 2007). China's WTO accession in 2001 marked another boom of market opportunities for domestic enterprises in terms of foreign market access, technology transfer and the entrance of foreign investors into the Chinese economy. While China's substantial welfare gains from the WTO accession have been generally acknowledged, deepening trade integration has imposed competition pressure on domestic enterprises, especially SOEs. Joining the WTO has induced the Chinese Government to carry out more domestic reforms to make the country's business rules and regulations consistent with international standards. This resulted in significant reforms of the SOEs in the 2000s. Moreover, the WTO principle of national treatment further promoted the status of domestic private enterprises in the Chinese economy.

The third dimension is the surge of FDI inflows into the Chinese economy, which is in line with the government's clear commitment to market-oriented reform and extensive and progressive trade liberalization. According to Chen (2009), China experienced a dramatic increase in annual FDI inflows since the early 1990s, while there were a temporary slowdown and decline between 1997 and 2000 when the Asian financial crisis hit. China's accession to the WTO led to a sharp increase of annual FDI inflows, from US\$33bn in 2001 to US\$80bn in 2008. It is notable that FDI was mainly concentrated in the manufacturing sector, accounting for 63 percent of the total FDI inflows (Chen, 2009). Large FDI inflows intensified domestic competition and demand for China's production factor endowments.

It appears there have been many favorable changes in the institutional setting for the development of private entrepreneurship. Marketization and trade liberalization have generated ample market opportunities, but have significantly increased competition.

2. Lack of Reform in Factor Markets and the Evolution of Private Entrepreneurship

It is argued above that transformation from a centrally planned economy to a market-based economy can be seen as a process of releasing productive resources from the state to the market. Restructuring SOEs is part of such a process. In addition, the progress of market reform has coincided with market liberalization in all economic sectors. China's gradual approach has, however, shown the proactive and dominant role of the state in the direction and speed of market liberalization. It has been identified that complete liberalization has only occurred in product markets, and not factor markets (Huang and Wang, 2010). The

factor markets are the areas where the state exerts significant control in influencing the resource flows and the pattern of economic growth, with consequences not in favor of private entrepreneurs. This can be seen in the context of SOE restructuring.

3. State-owned enterprise Restructuring and the Expansion of the Private Sector

In the 1990s and 2000s, SOE restructuring was implemented in tandem with promotion of private enterprises. In 1995, radical reforms of SOEs began, following their deteriorating performance (particularly in terms of profitability and output growth) since the late 1980s (Qian and Wu, 2000). Reform directions were gradually developed over the years. For example, in November 1993, the CCP's *Decision on Issues Concerning the Establishment of a Socialist Market Economic Structure* set forth the direction for SOE reform that emphasized property rights and separation of ownership and enterprise management, and allowed for liberalization and diversification of ownership. In October 2003, the Third Plenum of the Sixteenth CCP Congress issued the *Decision on Issues of Perfecting the Socialist Market Economy*, which was aimed at deepening SOE reform by focusing on shareholding ownership and corporatization of SOEs. Importantly, the SOE reform in this period was different from the previous period in terms of the ownership transformation, called *gaizhi*, and the wide scale of SOE transformation. Various measures have been adopted, ranging from bankruptcy and liquidation, to auctioning and sales to private firms. In the latter half of the 1990s, the process of transforming TVEs to private ownership took place progressively as many TVEs were facing losses due to their weak competitiveness, rigid management structure and poor decision-making due to collective ownership (Qian and Wu, 2000). Moreover, the government's official recognition of private property rights and support for private entrepreneurship had encouraged many privately run collective enterprises to take off their "red hats" to become private firms. As a result, the number of private enterprises increased rapidly. At the same time, the number of TVEs declined at a rather rapid pace. The share of SOEs in total gross output continued to decline, giving way to the rapidly emerging private sector.

Figure 1 indicates the trend of a more dramatic increase in private enterprises in the industrial sector from 1999 to 2010. The number of SOEs and TVEs declined continuously. At the same time, the number of foreign-funded enterprises increased quite significantly.

From the perspective of resource reallocation, SOE restructuring could be considered successful as the process led to a significant transfer of state assets to private entrepreneurs using the market mechanism, reducing the state's fiscal burden created by loss-making SOEs. The process was also successful in terms of both making room for expansion of the private sector (Xiao *et al.*, 2009) and exploiting the dynamics and strength of private entrepreneurship so that resources (assets) are used more efficiently. There was also

Figure 1. Number of Industrial Enterprises, 1999–2010

Sources: CEIC Database and authors' compilation.

significant concern about the loss of the state's assets and corruption through *gaizhi*. Obviously, the problem of rent-seeking associated with unproductive entrepreneurship is unavoidable. However, there is some evidence suggesting that the losses could be counter-balanced or mitigated in some cases by employment protection for existing workers as an important objective of local governments in their SOE restructuring programs (Garnaut *et al.*, 2006). Moreover, it has been found that the expansion of the private sector contributed to a reduction in the unemployment problems created by SOE restructuring.

4. Industrial Strategy and Asymmetric Sectoral Distribution of State-owned Enterprises and Non-state Enterprises

An important feature of the SOE reform in the 1990s was the government's introduction of an industrial strategy. In 1994, the State Council approved "An Outline of the State Industrial Policies in the 1990s." The renewed industrial policy identified machinery electronics, petrochemicals, automobile manufacture and construction as "pillar industries." Later, specific policies for pillar industries were developed, such as the industrial policy for the auto industry (Lu, 2000). This policy would be one of the key factors underlying the approach of SOE reform under the slogan of "grasping the large, letting go the small," put forward by the Fifteenth CCP Congress. Consequently, some 1000 SOEs were identified as large SOEs to be retained with whole state ownership when the SOE restructuring began. Subsequently, a group of key sectors have been identified as pillar industries, including energy, electricity, utilities, telecommunication, aviation and shipping. Since the 1990s, there have been some changes in the list of the pillar industry group, which now includes

equipment, autos, electronics, information technology, construction, steel, metals and chemicals (World Bank and DRC, 2013; Baston, 2014).

Industrial policy has become one of the main tools guiding the Chinese Government's new approach to the control and allocation of key resources, especially production factors. Different policy measures have been deployed to implement the government's industrial policy. First, in line with SOE restructuring, various barriers have been erected to prevent or limit the entry and competition of non-state enterprises, especially private enterprises into certain industrial sectors. Apart from some industries with natural monopoly characteristics, several oligopolistic or monopolistic industries have been created through administrative measures, generating an "administrative monopoly." Administrative barriers include permits and business regulations such as administrative inspection, monitoring of firms' registered business activities and local governments' purchase of goods and services from targeted firms (World Bank and DRC, 2013).

Second, the government has controlled the financial system, especially banking, to direct credit to targeted industries, especially SOEs. Consequently, the introduction of pillar and strategic industries has had a significant effect on the participation of private firms and enterprises of other kinds in different sectors of the economy. The outcome is the skewed distribution of firms by industry. Based on the data from representative sample surveys of private enterprises between 1994 and 2005, Yang (2012) shows that private firms are concentrated in manufacturing, retail trade, small services and catering. Nevertheless, it is possible that there are not many private firms in some manufacturing industries that were designated as "pillar" industries. In contrast, very few private enterprises operated in sectors such as power, construction, finance and insurance, and geology and water supply, which are key utility sectors whose output is used by all other sectors. This situation remained unchanged from the start of SOE restructuring to the time when the deepening SOE reform was going on. The pattern of asymmetrical distribution of SOEs and private firms will be further discussed below.

5. Controlled Financial System and Private Entrepreneurs' Access to Capital

While market liberalization led to the retreat of the state in directing goods flows between economic sectors and regions, price liberalization made it increasingly impossible for the state to distort relative prices between sectors and regions for corporatization (Zhang, 2002). With growing household and firm incomes as a result of marketization, the allocation of financial resources has become the main device for the state's control of resources. On the one hand, in line with market reform, the Chinese Government gradually promoted the financial system, including banking, stock markets and the emergence of non-bank financial firms, to mobilize and channel savings for investment demand in the growing economy. On

the other hand, the government took the monopoly position in the financial system by using state-owned commercial banks and financial corporations with strict entry barriers and regulations. In fact, in line with developing the financial system of a market economy, the government has continued to consolidate its dominant position in the financial system since the central-planning period. The key state-controlled financial institutions are state-owned commercial banks and rural and urban cooperatives. In the 1990s, the government started to allow the market participation of the non-state sector, including shareholding commercial banks and foreign banks (Bonin and Huang, 2002; Song, 2005). The participation of non-state commercial banks increased in the 2000s; however, state-owned financial institutions have been major players in the financial markets. It is clear that controlling the financial system enabled the government to channel most savings to SOEs, particularly SOEs in pillar and strategic industries, and to undertake big infrastructure investment projects. As a result, the private sector had limited access to capital from the formal banking sector. For example, in 1999, private enterprises received less than 0.5 percent of loans from state-owned banks, which is in stark contrast to their contribution of nearly 35 percent of industrial output in 1998 (Song, 2005). Consequently, private enterprises had to rely on informal financing, paying much higher borrowing costs.

The monopoly position in the financial markets allowed the government to impose financial repression. Using its monopoly of state-owned commercial banks, the government has been able to set low interest rates for bank deposits and lending (Riedel *et al.*, 2007). Moreover, “the maintenance of interest rates at artificially low levels has made it difficult for domestic savers and investors to see the true price of capital” (Song, 2005, pp. 115). Cheap credit has been used to keep many loss-making SOEs viable, leading to the well-known problem of non-performing loans in the banking system (Riedel *et al.*, 2007).

By imposing low ceilings on borrowing and lending interest rates, the government has created significant rents, which can be defined by the differences between the actual and the would-be market clearing interest rates. The rents would be much higher when taking into account the potential value of profitable projects for private entrepreneurs. There has long been recognition that the extent of capital market distortions would be significant (Young, 2000; Zhang and Tan, 2007; Brandt and Zhu, 2010; Brandt *et al.*, 2013). Huang and Wang (2010) claim that distortions caused by government interventions are not confined to the capital markets, but are also in the labor and natural resource markets. Notably, these distortions are substantial. For example, their estimates show that the value of factor market distortions was approximately RMB2.1tn in 2008: equivalent to 7 percent of GDP. Moreover, capital-market distortions accounted for the biggest share in the total since 2000 (Huang and Wang, 2010). An important issue here is how to view these distortions in terms of their impact on private sector development.

6. State-led Development of Land Markets and the Private Sector's Access

In China, land is owned and managed by local governments in urban areas and by collectives in the countryside. Due to its sole ownership of land on behalf of all the people, the government has control of land supply and land-use rights transfer (Tao, 2014).

The land market is a contrasting case with the capital market in terms of accessibility for private enterprises despite the similar feature of government monopoly in the market. As a common practice, local governments have the authority to determine and collect land-use fees. Many local governments have used access to land as one of the main instruments to promote industrial and economic growth. Local governments have actively promoted land developments for industrial sites. To attract manufacturing enterprises, many local authorities have set low land-use fees. In many cases, land-use fees have been only equal to or even lower than the cost of land development (including compensation for existing land users, land-clearing costs and infrastructure building costs). Over the past two decades, due to local competition in pursuit of rapid economic growth, many local governments have tried to reduce the cost of land development to create low land-use fees. The main method used is paying low land compensation fees to local farm households as most land transfers involve agricultural and rural land. Low land-use fees have been considered an important factor in promoting rapid industrial development in many localities; however, the consequences of industrial land development are soaring land disputes and demonstrations. Land grabs are becoming a big concern for the Chinese Government. On this aspect of land market development, it appears that governments at various levels have used their monopoly position of sole ownership to release land resources at low prices for industrial enterprises, including private enterprises. Conceptually, distorted industrial land prices have implicit government subsidies, which are equivalent to implicit rents. Otherwise, industrial development would have been constrained by rising land prices due to rising demand from industrial investment.

Another aspect of land market development is urbanization and residential land expansion (Tao, 2014). Rapid corporatization has promoted urbanization through attracting millions of rural migrants (Wang and Wan, 2014). Urbanization, in combination with increasing income levels, has created huge demand for new housing and residential land. Excess demand for urban and industrial land use has caused land prices to soar due to the government-controlled supply of land. Recognizing the rapid growth of demand for land, local governments have actively managed the supply of land for urban and industrial uses. Being able to control land supply has enabled local governments to determine land-use prices and collect substantial revenue. Importantly, soaring land prices in many locations with rapid industrial and urban expansion have generated substantial rents, which can be

defined here as the difference between the market price and the cost of land supply by the government. Moreover, there could be additional rents when the actual market value of land is higher than the sale price determined by the government. Revenues for local government from residential land sales or auctions have been used mainly for building infrastructure. On this aspect of land market expansion, the government's monopoly in land supply has generated rents that were captured by the government for public investment, but it is achieved at the expense of rural farmers.

In relation to land, the government also has monopoly power over other natural resources such as energy (electricity and oil) and public utilities and other natural endowments. It has been argued that government control of key sectors (coal, electricity, oil and water) has distorted the markets in favor of industrial development. Huang and Wang's (2010) estimates suggest that these distortions were significant during the period 2000–2008, ranging from 3.6 to 6.4 percent of GDP. Again, government control of resources has created significant economic rents, which have been used to support corporatization.

7. Beneficial Aspects of the State Control of Resources during Market Reform

Since the SOE restructuring process started in the 1990s, the government has made effective interventions in factor markets, which have created substantial rents. Its dominant position in these markets has helped the government to mobilize resources, especially financial resources to build large scale infrastructure. Large SOEs have considerable undertakings in building public infrastructure. Government-led infrastructure investments have had both short-term and long-term effects on economic growth through long-term productivity growth as these projects have reduced firms' transaction costs. In this sense, government control of resources to generate key infrastructure has been supportive of the development of private entrepreneurship. Xiao *et al.* (2009) show the impressive achievements of China in infrastructure building. For example, the total length of highways increased from 1.16 million km in 1995 to 3.46 million km in 2006. At the same time, the railway network expanded from 59 700 km to 77 100 km, and there was a huge increase in mobile phone subscribers, from 8 million to 610 million. In terms of value, Zhang *et al.* (2012) report that the annual amount of public expenditure increased from RMB73.2bn in 1997 to RMB1.270bn in 2010 at the 2005 constant price. This observation is consistent with one made by Naughton (2010, p. 446) about China's approach: "Public ownership can be used to exploit market power and generate revenues for investment and public goods' creation." The active and effective role of the Chinese Government in undertaking market transition has given rise to a notion of China's development model. To some extent, Khan's (2004) observation that a state with strong capacity can generate and manage rents that are growth-enhancing seems to be relevant to China's experience.

In another dimension, the rents created by government control of resource and factor markets, despite being a market distortion, have been used as strong incentives to attract and support investment from the non-state sector. Many studies have suggested that this has been an important factor contributing to China's investment-driven pattern of growth.

8. What Are the Inefficiency Effects of the State Control of Resources?

Distorted Investment Patterns

Despite generating investment effects for growth, state-maintained low resource prices appear to have led to some overinvestment in manufacturing (Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2006), resulting in lower investment returns. From the 1990s to the 2000s, the investment cost of US\$1 additional growth increased from US\$3 to US\$4 (Zheng *et al.*, 2009). Excessive investment has gradually accumulated to generate China's structural imbalances of economic growth (McKay and Song, 2010). While there is a certain rationale for the intervention of the government in some industries with natural monopoly characteristics, the growth of the private sector and its superior performance has caused concerns about the government's dominance in these industries. Figure 2 presents the share of the state sector in total assets

Figure 2. Sectoral Distribution of State-owned Enterprises, 2011
(Percent of Total Assets and Output)

Source: Zhang and Freestone (2013).

Figure 3. Asset and Gross Output Share of State-controlled Enterprises (Percent)

Sources: CEIC Database; authors' estimates.

and output in a number of industrial subsectors in 2011. It suggests a clear difference between the total asset share and the output share of SOEs. There are only four subsectors in which the asset share is equal to or greater than the output share: petroleum and gas, processing of nuclear and petroleum materials, tobacco, and water supply (these industries appear to be pure state monopolies). In several other subsectors, the output share is significantly smaller than the asset share held by the SOEs. This means that where there is some participation of the non-state sector, the state control of resources (capital or assets) becomes less efficient due to competition and the inherent weaknesses of some SOEs. This situation suggests that further reduction of state control in these industries would enhance the output growth of those sectors.

The above situation is consistent with information in Figure 3. From 2000 to 2013, the state's share of assets and output in the industrial sector declined steadily. Moreover, there is always a gap between the asset share and the output share, with the asset share always being higher than the output share. It would therefore be growth-enhancing if there were some further reduction in the state's holding of assets in some industrial subsectors.

Unequal Access to Resources, Rent-seeking and Unproductive Entrepreneurship

It is well known in the literature on entrepreneurship that access to credit or capital is one of the most important issues for a private enterprise to succeed in the market. The lack of capital prevents private firms from taking up profitable opportunities for business start-ups or expansion. Deepening SOE reform has forced state-owned commercial banks to operate on a commercial basis and look for profitable private enterprises to which to lend (Firth

et al., 2009). The tradition of favoring SOEs has remained, however, meaning access to bank credit is a significant challenge for private enterprises, especially small and medium enterprises (SMEs), which are the main form of private entrepreneurship (Shen *et al.*, 2009). Financial repression in China has created a contradiction in China's financial markets: there is substantial excess demand on the one hand and a limited supply of credit for entrepreneurs on the other. Therefore, there exist rents that could be significant due to the gap between the market clearing level and the regulated interest rate. The rents could be much larger if we take into account the opportunity costs of forgone market opportunities identified by entrepreneurs.

To overcome credit constraints, many private enterprises have used informal channels to obtain loans or credit, for instance, through the *guanxi* network of Chinese entrepreneurs (Liao and Sohmen, 2001).² Because the state has significant control over bank credit and other resources, government officials in charge of managing resources have an advantageous position from which to access capital and resources. Consequently, the *guanxi* approach has been expanded to overcome the constrained access to key business resources among many private entrepreneurs, with benefits of sharing the available rents going to both government officials and private firms. The scope of *guanxi* has also been extended to seeking government subsidies and market opportunities through contracts in developing infrastructure projects. In fact, rent-seeking and corruption has become a worrying trend as a result of the market transition process (Wu and Huang, 2008).

Several studies have documented evidence of private firms trying to get bank loans or to gain access to government subsidies through political connections (Bai *et al.*, 2006; Zhou, 2009; Wu and Cheng, 2011). Similarly as for other resources, especially land and property development, state control is likely to create unproductive entrepreneurial activities due to the speculative nature of the market in the context of the government's controlled supply of land in localities with high demand for housing and residential land. In a sense, there should be concern as there have been some entrepreneurs who have concentrated their investment in political connections to generate profitable opportunities. While quantitative evidence remains a challenge, this kind of unproductive entrepreneurship, conceptualized by Baumol (1990), is a real issue in China's fast growing private sector, as already mentioned by several scholars (see Wu and Huang, 2008).

Some evidence has been found showing that private enterprises with political

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²Guanxi is a Chinese term referring to interpersonal or social relationships and connections (Calisle and Flynn, 2005).

connections perform better than those without (Choi and Zhou, 2001; Faccio, 2006). Whether this trend is consistent or not, what matters is that this better performance is not based on competition and efficiency grounds, which is crucial for long-term productivity growth. A more important issue is the disincentive and negative spillover effects of the unequal and restricted access to productive resources. Private firms are induced to invest in political connections for potential profitable opportunities. Those private firms, especially SMEs with high potential for innovation and productivity growth but without political connections find it hard to get start-up capital and other forms of government support for R&D while less-productive firms with political connections continue to stay in the industry, preventing the process of technological change from taking place in many industries.

Financial Performance of the State-controlled and Non-state Sectors

State-owned enterprise restructuring has played an important role in promoting SOE performance, and the growth of SOEs still contributes to economic growth and government revenues through taxation. Given their large share of fixed assets in many industries, especially key and pillar industrial subsectors, an important question is how the SOEs performed compared with non-state firms.

Figure 4 shows industrial enterprise performance in terms of profit rate during 2000 – 2013. Before the global financial crisis (GFC) in 2008, the SOEs had a substantially higher and faster growing profit rate than non-state enterprises. One explanation could be the SOE

Figure 4. Profit Rate (Profits/Sales) of Industrial Enterprises, 2000–2013

Sources: CEIC Database; authors' estimates.

Figure 5. Returns on Assets of Industrial Enterprises, 2000–2013 (Percent)

Sources: CEIC Database; authors' estimates.

reform in the early 2000s, as well as their favorable access to cheap bank credit and other support provided by the government. Their performance quickly worsened, however, after 2008, becoming closer to that of the non-state sector.

Figure 5 shows the performance of industrial enterprises in terms of returns on assets (ROA) during 2000–2013. Before 2008, SOEs showed significant improvement in their ROA, which could have been due to the reasons given above; however, the SOEs appeared to have consistently lower ROA than the non-state sector. There was a similar trend to that with the profit rate in that the SOEs' performance in terms of ROA worsened after 2008. The ROA gap between the SOEs and the non-state sector became larger. Baston (2014) suggests that the trend of worsening performance of the SOEs after 2008 indicates the structural problems of the SOE sector, with loss-making SOEs, despite the fact that deepening SOE reform had helped boost the performance of many SOEs through corporatization and improved corporate governance. This suggests that state control of assets should be reduced by restructuring inefficient SOEs and allowing more participation by private enterprises. This would result in the more competitive and productive use of capital and assets employed in industries dominated by SOEs.

Changes in Resource Control and Productivity Performance

Further assessment of the efficiency of the state control of resources can be seen in the

TFP performance in relation to financial performance.

Based on the estimation of labor productivity and growth accounting simulations, Brandt and Zhu (2010) provide evidence of the impacts of state control of resources on the productivity performance of SOEs compared with non-SOEs, as shown in Table 2. In the period 1988–1998, the labor productivity of non-SOEs was nearly double that of SOEs (6.17 vs 3.46 percent). The TFP growth of the non-SOEs had a greater impact on the growth of the TFP of the two sectors. Notably, the data show that capital distortions played a more important role in promoting the productivity of SOEs, while they had a much smaller effect in terms of promoting the productivity of non-SOEs. In contrast, an increase in investment had little effect on the labor productivity of both sectors. Therefore, capital control, which caused capital market distortions as suggested in Table 2, was a significant factor after TFP for the labor productivity performance of SOEs.

During 1998–2007, SOEs had substantially higher labor productivity growth than non-SOEs. This could be due to the deepening of SOE reform that makes SOEs larger with more access to credit. In this period, the TFP growth of non-SOEs and SOEs had a similar effect on the labor productivity of other sectors. Again, investment had less impact on the labor productivity growth of non-SOEs than SOEs. It appears that, compared with the 1988–1998 period, the SOEs' TFP performance improved significantly and was the main contributor to labor productivity growth, rather than investment. Most importantly, capital market distortions had a significant negative impact on the labor productivity growth of non-SOEs. In contrast, SOEs clearly benefited from capital market distortions. Therefore, in line with the development of factor markets, the state control of resources had significantly negative effects on the performance of non-SOEs, and private enterprises in particular (Fu and Mu, 2014).

Overall, the examination of the financial and productivity performance of the SOE and non-state sectors has shown that the state's control of resources, in terms of interventions

Table 2. Reforms Related to Resource Control and Labor Productivity Growth
(Counterfactual Simulations) (Percent)

Item	1988–1998		1998–2007	
	Non-SOEs	SOEs	Non-SOEs	SOEs
Benchmark model	6.17	3.46	8.48	11.15
No TFP growth in non-state sector	2.00	−0.71	1.87	4.54
No TFP growth in state sector	5.52	2.82	4.95	7.62
No capital market distortions	6.10	−0.34	9.01	9.03
No increase in investment rates since, 1988 or 1998	6.00	3.29	7.91	10.58

Source: Brandt and Zhu (2010).

Notes: SOE, state-owned enterprise; TFP, total factor productivity.

in the factor markets, has had negative impacts on the performance of private enterprises, despite their better performance in general as compared with SOEs. This means that SOE restructuring and the change in focus of state resource control have promoted the performance of the state sector, but at the expense of efficiency losses of private enterprises in the non-state sector.

IV. Concluding Remarks

We have used the framework of entrepreneurship development to analyze the pattern and impact of change in the state's control of resources on the emergence and evolution as well as outcomes of private entrepreneurship in China during market transition over the past 30 years. In this framework, entrepreneurship development depends on two sets of factors: business environment (legal and regulatory framework, market opportunities and cultural factors) and enterprise resources (factors of production and entrepreneurial ability). State-led resource allocation during transition is considered to play a central role in determining the resources needed for the emergence and evolution of private entrepreneurship in China.

The examination of SOE reform and change in the state's control of resources has shown that private entrepreneurship has emerged and developed robustly in the context of China's market reform. Apart from improving the environment for private entrepreneurship, the change in the ways the government controls key productive resources has had significant impacts on the performance of private enterprises. In the most recent years, when the product markets have been liberalized, state interventions in factor markets have had more negative impacts on the performance of the private sector. Given a larger share and better performance of private enterprises, reducing the state's control of key resources would promote productivity and economic growth in the future.

The analysis suggests that more competition and better use of productive resources would require lowering and removal of entry barriers to private enterprises in key or pillar industries and services, particularly financial and banking systems. Increased participation of private firms in key industries and services will improve the access of the whole private sector to key resources, especially capital and credit. Recent growing investment and participation of private firms in financial and banking activities show positive signs of financial resource allocation.³ However, the change

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³See <http://www.canberratimes.com.au/action/printArticle?id=62634635> .

in the government's regulation and policy to increase the private sector's role in allocation of key resources would not be possible without its links with the broader framework of institutional changes designed to direct more entrepreneurial efforts into more productive uses. Institutional changes and adjustments should be initiated whenever there are gaps and loopholes found in developing the market system for better protection of private property rights and a more effective regime of contract enforcement. In addition, regulations should be put in place to ensure the social accountability and transparency of the government's administrative system in managing the transition.

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