### Part III: Political Leadership at Work

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>23.</td>
<td>Civic Leadership</td>
<td>Richard A. Couto</td>
<td>347</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24.</td>
<td>Party and Electoral Leadership</td>
<td>Marina Costa Lobo</td>
<td>362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25.</td>
<td>Populism and Political Leadership</td>
<td>Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser</td>
<td>376</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26.</td>
<td>Performative Political Leadership</td>
<td>John Gaffney</td>
<td>389</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27.</td>
<td>Political Leadership in Networks</td>
<td>Erik-Jan Klijn</td>
<td>403</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28.</td>
<td>Political Leadership in Times of Crisis</td>
<td>Chris Ansell, Arijen Boin, and Paul 't Hart</td>
<td>418</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Part IV: Executive Leadership in the West

#### Presidential Leadership: The United States and Beyond

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>29.</td>
<td>Leadership and the American Presidency</td>
<td>David McKay</td>
<td>439</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30.</td>
<td>Presidential Communication from Husseys to Twitter</td>
<td>Jeffrey E. Cohen</td>
<td>455</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Prime Ministerial Leadership: Westminster and Beyond

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>32.</td>
<td>The Variability of Prime Ministers</td>
<td>Patrick Weller</td>
<td>489</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PART VII DEBATING POLITICAL LEADERSHIP

44. Can Political Leadership Be Taught?
   JEAN HARTLEY
   673

45. Does Gender Matter?
   PATRICIA LEE SYKES
   690

46. What Have We Learned?
   JEAN BLONDEL
   705

Name Index

Subject Index

739

745
List of Contributors

Rudy B. Andeweg is Professor of Political Science at Leiden University. He studied law and government at Leiden University and Political Science at the University of Michigan. He has published on personalization in voting behaviour, birth order and political leadership, legislative roles, political representation, and cabinet decision-making. He recently co-edited Puzzles of Government Formation: Coalition Theory and Deviant Cases (Routledge, 2011).

Chris Ansell is Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley. His fields of interest include organization theory, political sociology, public administration, and Western Europe. His current research focuses on risk regulation, collaborative governance, social network analysis, and crisis management.

David S. Bell is Professor of French Government at the University of Leeds and has published extensively about political parties in Europe and on political leadership in France and on leadership theory. Publications (authored or co-authored): two books on the French Socialist Party (OUP 1984, OUP 1988); a book on the French Communist Party (OUP 1994); French Fifth Republic (Palgrave 2013), with Professor J. Gaffney; articles on French politics, most recently on the presidential elections of 2002 and 2007 in Parliamentary Affairs. On leaders and leadership these include: François Mitterrand (Polity, 2006), and an edited volume, Political Leadership published in 2012 in the SAGE Library of Political Science series (Sage, 2012).

Andrew Blick is Lecturer in Politics and Contemporary History at King's College London. His works include People Who Live in the Dark: The History of the Special Adviser in British Politics (2004); and, with Peter Hennessy, The Hidden Wiring Emerges: The Cabinet Manual and the Working of the British Constitution (2011). He is writing Beyond Magna Carta: A Constitution for the United Kingdom, which will commemorate the 800th anniversary of Magna Carta.

Jean Blondel, born in France in 1929, was educated in Paris and Oxford. He was the first Professor of Government at the University of Essex in 1964, and Professor of Political Science at the European University Institute, 1985–94. He is now Professorial Fellow at the European University Institute and Visiting Professor at the University of Siena. He was awarded the Johan Skytte Prize in Political Science for Lifetime Achievement in political science in 2004. His publications are in comparative government, world-wide, with special reference to parties, governments, and leadership. Apart from a general text
on Comparative Government, second edition, 1995, his recent books include Political Cultures in Asia and Europe, with T. Inoguchi (Routledge, 2006); Governing New Democracies, with F. Mueller-Rommel and D. Malova (Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); Citizens and the State, with T. Inoguchi (Routledge, 2008); and Political Leadership, Parties and Citizens, with J. L. Thiebault (Routledge, 2010).

Arjen Boin is Professor of Public Governance and Crisis Management at the Utrecht School of Governance, Utrecht University, and an adjunct professor at the Public Administration Institute, Louisiana State University. He has published widely on topics of crisis and disaster management, leadership, institutional design, and correctional administration. He is the editor of Public Administration, a major journal in the field.

Maryke Botha is a former Masters student in International Studies in the Department of Political Science, University of Stellenbosch.

Geoffrey Brennan was trained as an economist but works now broadly across economics, political science, and philosophy. He has worked extensively with Noble Laureate James Buchanan (famous for his pioneering work in ‘public choice’). Brennan’s own work in rational actor political theory has emphasized the ‘expressive account’ of voter behaviour. He is currently Professor in the Research School of Social Sciences at the Australian National University and holds a regular visiting position jointly in the Political Science department at Duke University and the Philosophy Department at UNC-Chapel Hill. He is currently working on a book on Philosophy and Economics for Princeton University Press.

Michael Brooks is Associate Professor in the Tasmanian School of Business and Economics, at the University of Tasmania, Australia. Michael completed a Masters of Economics and Diploma of Education at Monash University and a PhD at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. He has lectured at the University of Tasmania for over 30 years. In recent years he has written on taxation, expressive voting, and the economics of esteem. One of Michael’s more recent publications is with Geoffrey Brennan on the ‘cashing out’ hypothesis and ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ policies, in the European Journal of Political Economy, 2011, 27 (4): 601-10.

David Brulé is an assistant professor of political science at Purdue University, Indiana. David’s research interests lie at the intersection of domestic politics and international relations. Specifically, he examines the effects of public opinion, economic conditions, and political institutions on national leaders’ conflict decisions.

Elton Chan is currently a doctoral candidate in the Department of Politics and Public Administration at the University of Hong Kong, where he received his undergraduate degree in political theory and history. His research focuses on Confucianism and political philosophy.

Joseph Chan is Professor at the Department of Politics and Public Administration, the University of Hong Kong. He is the author of Confucian Perfectionism: A Political

Philosophy for Modern Times (Princeton, 2014). He obtained his undergraduate degree in political science from the Chinese University of Hong Kong, his MSc from the London School of Economics and Political Science, and his DPhil from Oxford University. He teaches political theory and researches in the areas of contemporary liberalism and perfectivism, Confucian political philosophy, human rights, and civil society.

Jeffrey E. Cohen (PhD, University of Michigan, 1979) is Professor of Political Science at Fordham University specializing in the American presidency. He is the author of a dozen books and numerous articles that have appeared in leading journals. His recent book, Going Local Presidential Leadership in the Post-Broadcast Age (Cambridge, 2010) won both the 2011 Richard E. Neustadt Award and the 2012 Goldsmith Award.

Colin Copus is Professor of Local Politics and Director of the Local Governance Research Unit in the Department of Politics and Public Policy, De Montfort University. His main research interests are local political leadership, local party politics, local governance, and the changing role of the councillor, and he has published widely on these subjects in academic journals. He has carried out research work for government departments and worked with ministers and MPs on policy issues. He has worked closely with practitioners in local government on a range of consultancy and research projects. Colin has been the editor Local Government Studies since 2001. He has also served as a councillor on a London Borough council, a county and a district council, and three parish councils.

Marina Costa Lobo is a researcher at the Institute of Social Sciences at the University of Lisbon, and Guest Lecturer at the Lisbon University Institute (IUT) in political science. She obtained her DPhil at Oxford University in 2001. Her research interests include the role of leaders in electoral behaviour, political parties, and institutions. She is a co-director of the Portuguese Election Study. She has published articles in Electoral Studies, European Journal of Political Research, and Political Research Quarterly, as well as books on the topic in English and Portuguese.

Richard A. Couto is with Union Institute and University and a founding faculty member of the Antioch University PhD Program in Leadership and Change. Prior to that he was a founding faculty member of the Jepson School at the University of Richmond where he held the George M. and Virginia B. Modlin Chair in Leadership Studies, 1991–2002. His recent books include: Political and Civic Leadership: A Reference Handbook (Sage 2010); and (with James MacGregor Burns) Reflections on Leadership (University of America Press 2007). His work has won numerous national awards, including best book in transformational politics from the American Political Science Association, and the Virginia A. Hodgkinson Research Prize of the Independent Sector.

Karl DeRouen, Jr., is Professor of Political Science, Director of the International Studies Program, and was College of Arts and Science Faculty Fellow (2008–11) at the University of Alabama. His research interests lie within the field of International Relations, specifically conflict analysis and foreign policy analysis. He is the co-author of Understanding Foreign Policy Decision Making (with Alex Mintz; Cambridge University Press, 2010).
Chris Eichbaum is Reader in Government and Deputy Head of School in the School of Government at Victoria University of Wellington in New Zealand. His research interests include the role of political staff in executive government, governance, and public administration reform, and the politics of central banking. He and Richard Shaw have collaborated on an edited volume, *Partisan Appointees and Public Servants: An International Analysis of the Role of the Political Adviser*. In 2008 he was appointed as a non-executive Director to the Board of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand.

Robert Elgie’s research career has centred on the systematic study of institutions on political outcomes. Recently, his work has concentrated on whether semi-presidentialism helps or hinders the process of democratization in young democracies. He is the author of *Semi-presidentialism: Sub-types and Democratic Performance* (Oxford University Press, 2011). He is also a very active blogger at presidential-power.com. In addition, he has considerable expertise in the study of contemporary French politics; he is the editor of the journal *French Politics*, published by Palgrave Macmillan; and he is the lead co-editor of the forthcoming *Oxford Handbook of French Politics* (Oxford University Press).

John Gaffney is Professor of Politics at Aston University, UK. He is also a political commentator and author. He specializes in UK and French politics and the discourse and rhetoric of leadership. He regularly contributes to TV and print media. In July 2012, he was awarded £75,000 by the Leverhulme Trust for a two-year study of UK political leadership. His latest book is *Political Leadership in France: From Charles de Gaulle to Nicolas Sarkozy* (Palgrave, 2012). He is the author of three other monographs on UK and French Politics. He has written 50 journal articles and chapters, and has edited a dozen books, his two most recent being *Stardom in Postwar France* (Berghahn, 2011, with Diana Holmes), and *The Presidents of the French Fifth Republic* (Palgrave, 2013, with David Bell).

Francesca Gains is Professor of Public Policy at the University of Manchester and researches political management arrangements and their impact on policy outcomes. She won the 2008 Herbert Kaufman award for the best paper in public administration at the 2007 American Political Science Association Meeting in Chicago and the 2012 best paper in Comparative Policy at the 2011 APSA meeting in Seattle. She has published work on political leadership in *Public Administration, Political Studies, Parliamentary Affairs, Policy and Politics, and Public Administration Review*.


Jean Hartley is an organizational psychologist by background, who is Professor of Public Leadership at The Open University Business School in the UK. Her research centres on two main themes: public leadership (political, managerial, professional, and community leadership) and also innovation and improvement in public services. Her book with John Benington, *Leadership for Healthcare*, provides a framework for theory and practice in relation to leadership and its development. She has researched and created, based on research, instruments for the development of both national and local political leaders. She is also engaged in cross-national research about leadership with political astuteness for public managers. Jean is the author of six books, and numerous journal articles, book chapters and reports on leadership, leadership development, and innovation and organizational change and improvement, mainly in public services.

S. Alexander Haslam, Professor of Social Psychology, University of Queensland. Alex has been influential in developing the social identity approach to group processes, which has become the dominant paradigm in the field. *The New Psychology of Leadership*, with Alex Haslam and Michael Platow, was published by Psychology Press in 2011 and was awarded the best book prize at the International Leadership Association conference in 2012.

Ludger Helms is Professor of Political Science and Chair of Comparative Politics at the University of Innsbruck, Austria. His research focuses on political institutions and democratic governance in liberal democracies, and his recent publications in the field of leadership studies include *Comparative Political Leadership* (ed., 2012) and *Poor Leadership and Bad Governance: Reassessing Presidents and Prime Ministers in North America, Europe and Japan* (ed., 2012).

Frank Hendriks is Professor of Comparative Governance and Research Director at the Tilburg School of Politics and Public Administration, and Co-director of Demos-Center for Better Governance and Citizenship at Tilburg University. His research and teaching is focused on the design and quality of democratic governance, more particularly on the quality of political leadership and democratic citizenship, on the reform and innovation in democratic institutions—at the level of the city and the state at large. He is the author of *Vital Democracy* (Oxford University Press, 2010) and the co-editor of *The Oxford Handbook of Local and Regional Democracy in Europe* (Oxford University Press, 2011).

Margaret G. Hermann is Gerald B. and Daphne Cramer Professor of Global Affairs and Director of the Moynihan Institute of Global Affairs at the Maxwell School of Syracuse University. Her research focuses on political leadership, decision making, and crisis management. Hermann has worked to develop techniques for assessing the leadership styles
of heads of government at a distance and has such data on over 450 leaders from around the world. She has been President of the International Society of Political Psychology and the International Studies Association as well as editor of the journals Political Psychology and the International Studies Review.

Leslie Holmes is Professor of Political Science at the University of Melbourne, and a recurrent visiting professor at the University of Bologna, the Graduate School of Social Research in Warsaw, and the People's University in Beijing. His principal research specializations are post-communism and corruption. Among his numerous publications are Post-Communism (Oxford University Press, 1997); Rotten States? Corruption, Post-Communism and Neoliberalism (Duke University Press, 2006); and Communism: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford University Press, 2009). He was President of the International Council for Central and East European Studies (ICCEES) 2000–5, and has been Fellow of the Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia since 1995.


Christen Karlsson is Associate Professor of Political Science and Lecturer at the Department of Government, Uppsala University in Sweden. He has published books, articles, and book chapters in his principal research areas: climate change politics, European Union studies, constitutional politics, and democratic theory. His work has appeared in journals such as Acta Politica, Ambio, European Law Journal, Global Environmental Politics, and Journal of Common Market Studies. His latest publication is Fragmented Climate Change Leadership: Making Sense of the Ambiguous Outcome of COP-15, Environmental Politics, 21 (2): 268–86.

Niels Karsten is Assistant Professor at the Demos-Centre for Better Governance and Citizenship, Tilburg University. He specializes in local political-executive leadership. His PhD thesis, entitled 'Decide and Defend' (2013) investigates public leadership accountability in consensual democracies, with an international comparative case study of how local executives regain authority when making controversial decisions. He has published in journals such as Administration & Society, Lex Localis, and Local Government Studies.

Nannerl O. Keohane writes and teaches in political philosophy, leadership, and feminist theory. She has served as president and professor at Wellesley College (1981–1993) and then at Duke University (1993–2004). She is the author of Thinking about Leadership (Princeton University Press, 2010), Higher Ground: Ethics and Leadership in the Modern University (Duke University Press, 2006), Philosophy and the State in France (1980) and co-edited Feminist Theory: A Critique of Ideology (1981). Keohane has also taught at Swarthmore College, the University of Pennsylvania, Stanford University, and Princeton University. She is a member of the Harvard Corporation, on the board of directors of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and on the Board of Trustees of the Doris Duke Charitable Foundation. Her recent research interests concern leadership and inequality, including gender issues. B.A. Wellesley College; M.A. St. Annes's College, Oxford University; Ph.D. Yale University.

Erik-Hans Klijn is Professor at the Department of Public Administration at Erasmus University Rotterdam. He has research and teaching activities focus on complex decision-making, network management, public private and branding, and the impact of media on complex decision-making. He published extensively in international journals and is the author, together with Joop Koppenjan, of the book Managing Uncertainty in Networks (2004, Routledge) and of Branding in Governance and Public Management (Routledge, 2012) together with Jasper Eshuis.

Harvey F. Kline is Professor Emeritus of Political Science at the University of Alabama. He has studied Colombia since 1964 and has written eight books about Colombian politics, most recently Historical Dictionary of Colombia, Showing Teeth to the Dragons: State-Building by Colombian President Álvaro Uribe Vélez, 2002–2006, and Chronicle of a Failure Foretold: The Peace Process of Colombian President Andrés Pastrana. In addition he was contributing co-editor of Latin American Politics and Development, which has been published in eight editions, and co-author of Introduction to Latin American Politics and Development. Currently he is researching the second term of Colombian President Álvaro Uribe.

Steve Leach is Emeritus Professor of Local Government at the Local Governance Research Unit at De Montfort University. He has a long and respected record of research and consultancy in the politics, management, and reorganization of local government. He has researched and published widely on local political leadership and has worked closely with a range of local political leaders on political and policy matters. Steve has also researched, studied and written about the development of overview and scrutiny in local government and has supported many councils in revising and strengthening their scrutiny function by which political leaders are held to account.
Steve is a former editor of *Local Government Studies* and is still a member of the editorial board of the journal.

Rose McDermott is Professor of Political Science at Brown University and President of the International Society of Political Psychology. McDermott received her Ph.D (Political Science) and MA (Experimental Social Psychology) from Stanford. McDermott has taught at Cornell, UCSB, and Harvard, and has held fellowships at Harvard’s Olin Institute for Strategic Studies and Harvard’s Women and Public Policy Program. She was 2008–9 Fellow at the Center for Advanced Studies in the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford University and a 2010–11 Fellow at the Radcliffe Institute for Advanced Study at Harvard University. She is the author of three books, a co-editor of two additional volumes, and author of over 90 academic articles across a wide variety of academic disciplines encompassing topics such as experimentation, identity, emotion, intelligence, decision-making, and the biological and genetic bases of political behaviour.

David McKay is Professor of Government at the University of Essex. He is the author of numerous books and articles on American and comparative politics including *Designing Europe: Lessons from the Comparative Experience* (2001) and *American Politics and Society* (Eighth Edition, 2013).

Alex Mintz is Dean of the Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy and Strategy at IDC-Herzliya, and Director of its Program in Political Psychology and Decision Making (POPDPM). An expert on foreign policy analysis, he has published ten books and many articles in this area, including *Understanding Foreign Policy Decision Making* (with Karl DeRouen), Cambridge University Press, 2010.

Cas Mudde holds a PhD from Leiden University and is Associate Professor in the Department of International Affairs of the University of Georgia. His book *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe* (Cambridge University Press, 2007) won the Stein Rokkan Prize and was named a *Choice* Outstanding Academic Title in 2008. His most recent publications include the readers *Political Extremism* (Sage, 2014; 4 volumes) and *Youth and the Extreme Right* (Idebate, 2014).

Charles E. Parker is Associate Professor of Political Science at the Department of Government and serves as a primary investigator in the Centre for Natural Disaster Science at Uppsala University. His research has focused on climate change politics, the origins and consequences of the warming–response problem, and post-crisis accountability procedures. His work has appeared in the *Journal of Common Market Studies*, *Political Psychology*, *Global Environmental Politics*, *Foreign Policy Analysis*, *Public Administration*, and the *Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management*. His most recent publication, ‘Fragmented climate change leadership: making sense of the ambiguous outcome of COP-15’, appears in the journal *Environmental Politics*.

Michael J. Platow, Professor of Social Psychology, Australian National University. Michael has been influential in developing the social identity approach to group processes, which has become the dominant paradigm in the field. His book, with Alex Haslam and Michael Platow, *The New Psychology of Leadership* was published by Psychology Press in 2011 and was awarded the best book prize at the International Leadership Association conference in 2012.

Jerold M. Post is Professor of Psychiatry, Political Psychology and International Affairs and Director of the Political Psychology Program at the George Washington University. He has published widely on crisis decision-making, leadership, and on the psychology of political violence and terrorism. His other books include *The Psychological Evaluation of Political Leaders, With Profiles of Saddam Hussein and Bill Clinton* (University of Michigan Press, 2003) and *Leaders and Their Followers in a Dangerous World: The Psychology of Political Behavior* (Cornell University Press, 2004).

Stephen D. Reicher is Professor of Social Psychology, University of St. Andrews (Scotland). He has been influential in developing the social identity approach to group processes, which has become the dominant paradigm in the field. His book, with Alex Haslam and Michael Platow, *The New Psychology of Leadership* was published by Psychology Press in 2011 and was awarded the best book prize at the International Leadership Association conference in 2012.

Bob Reinalda is Senior Researcher at the Department of Political Science and Public Administration at Radboud University Nijmegen, The Netherlands. He has co-edited studies about autonomous policy-making by, decision-making within, and implementation by international organizations (with Bertjan Verbeek and Jutta Joachim), He has published the Routledge *History of International Organizations: From 1815 to the Present Day* (2009) and has edited the Ashgate Research Companion to Non-State Actors (2011) and the Routledge *Handbook of International Organization* (2013). Together with Kent Kille, the College of Wooster, he is editor of IO BIO, the Biographical Dictionary of Secretaries-General of International Organizations.

Stanley A. Renshon is Professor of Political Science at the City University of New York, and a certified psychoanalyst. He has published author of over 100 professional articles and 16 books in the areas of presidential leadership, American foreign policy and immigration, and American national identity. His most recent book is entitled *Barack Obama and the Politics of Redemption* (Routledge, 2012). His psychological analysis of the Clinton presidency *High Hopes: The Clinton Presidency and the Politics of Ambition* (Routledge, 1998) won the American Political Science Association’s Richard E. Neustadt Award for the best book published on the presidency and the National Association for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis’ Gradiva Award for the best published work in the category of biography.

R. A. W. Rhodes is Professor of Government (Research) at the University of Southampton (UK); Professor of Government at Griffith University (Brisbane, Australia); and Emeritus Professor of Politics at the University of Newcastle (UK). He is the author or editor of some thirty books including most recently: *Everyday Life in British Government* (Oxford
Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser holds a PhD from the Humboldt University of Berlin and is Associate Professor at the School of Political Science at the Universidad Diego Portales in Santiago, Chile. His co-edited volume (with Cas Mudde) Populism in Europe and the Americas: Threat or Corrective for Democracy? has just been published by Cambridge University Press and his publications have appeared in Democratization, Government & Opposition, the Latin American Research Review, and Political Studies, among others.

Mark Schaefer is a Professor of Political Science at the University of Central Florida. His primary research interests include groupthink, the operational code, and psychological correlates of foreign policy behaviour. His two most recent book projects are Groupthink vs. High Quality Decision Making in International Relations (Cambridge University Press, 2011; co-authored with Scott Crichlow), and Rethinking Foreign Policy Analysis (Routledge, 2011; co-edited with Stephen G. Walker and Akan Malici).

Richard Shaw is Associate Professor in Politics at Massey University in Palmerston North, New Zealand. With Chris Eichbaum he has published widely on the various consequences of the growth in the numbers of political advisors in Westminster executives. His most recent publication, concerning the institutional consequences of the public value approach to public management, will appear in a forthcoming edition of Public Management Review (http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14719037.2012.664017).

Cris Shore is Professor of Social Anthropology at the University of Auckland. His research focuses on political anthropology and organizational cultures in a contemporary European and global context. He has published on the politics of the European Union, the anthropology of public policy, and higher education reform. He is author of eleven books including Building Europe: The Cultural Politics of European Integration (Routledge 2000), Corruption: Anthropological Perspectives (with Dieter Haller, Pluto, 2005), and Policy Worlds: Anthropology and the Analysis of Contemporary Power (with Susan Wright and Davide Pero, Bergahn 2011). He has held research fellowships at the European University Institute, Harvard, Aarhus and Bristol Universities. He currently leads an EU-funded project entitled University Reform, Globalization and Europeanization and another project examining the impact of commercialization on universities.

Laura Sjoberg is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Florida. Her teaching and research focuses on the area of gender and international security, where she has written or edited eight books and dozens of journal articles, including, most recently, Gendering Global Conflict: Towards a Feminist Theory of War (Columbia University Press, 2013). Her current research on gender and leadership looks to combine the insights of feminist work in leadership theory and feminist work in International Relations to build a more comprehensive understanding of the role of gender in diplomatic politics.

Gerrit Swart lectures in African Politics and Political Conflict at the University of Stellenbosch, situated in the Western Cape, South Africa. He has published extensively on a wide array of topics related to the study of African affairs, including peace, conflict, and security matters, with specific emphasis on the African Union. His publications include A Vanquished Peace? Prospects for the Successful Reconstruction of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Adonis and Abbey Publishers, 2010); ‘Conflict Resolution Counselling’ in Counselling People of African Ancestry edited by Elias Mpolu (Cambridge University Press, 2011). He is also the Founding Editor of the newly established Journal of African Union Studies published by Adonis and Abbey in London.

Patricia Lee Sykes is Associate Professor of Government in the School of Public Affairs at American University in Washington, DC. She is the author of two books: Presidents and Prime Ministers: Conviction Politics in the Anglo-American Tradition and Losing from the Inside: The Cost of Conflict in the British Social Democratic Party and numerous articles in scholarly journals such as Studies in American Political Development, and Presidential Studies Quarterly. She is currently writing a book on female executives in six Anglo-American systems.

Paul 't Hart is Professor of Public Administration at the Utrecht School of Government and Associate Dean at The Netherlands School of Government in The Hague. Between 2005 and 2010 his main appointment was Professor of Political Science at the Australian National University, and he is a core faculty member at the Australia New Zealand School of Government (ANZSOG). His main books on leadership include: Groupthink in Government: A Study of Small Groups and Policy Failure (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994); The Politics of Crisis Management (co-authored with Arjen Boin, Eric Stern and Bengt Sundelius, Cambridge University Press, 2003); Dispersed Democratic Leadership (co-edited with John Kane and Haig Patapan, Oxford University Press, 2009); The Real World of EU Accountability (co-edited with Mark Bovens and Deirdre Curtin, Oxford University Press 2010); Understanding Prime-ministerial Performance (Oxford University Press, 2013; co-edited with Paul Strangio and James Walter); and Understanding Public Leadership (Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).

John Uhr is an Australian who completed his graduate research at the University of Toronto, Canada. He is the Inaugural Head of the Centre for the Study of Australian Politics at the Australian National University, Canberra, Australia. He contributed to and co-edited the 2011 Palgrave book, How Power Changes Hands: Transition and Succession in Government, with former ANU colleague Professor Paul 't Hart. He has directed the ANU's master of public policy program and now teaches political theory and Australian politics. His recent publications cover leadership, parliament, and government ethics.

Jo-Annie van Wyk is Associate Professor at the Department of Political Sciences, University of South Africa, Pretoria, South Africa. She has obtained an MA (Political

Bertjan Verbeek is Professor of International Relations at the Department of Political Science and Public Administration of Radboud University Nijmegen, The Netherlands, and Visiting Fellow of Criminology at the Swedish National Defence College, Stockholm, Sweden. He has co-edited studies about autonomous policy making by, decision making within, and implementation by international organizations (with Bob Reinalda and Jutta Joachim). He has published Decision-Making in Great Britain during the Suez Crisis (2003) and Italy’s Foreign Policy in the Twenty-First Century: The New Assertiveness of an Aspiring Middle Power (2011, edited with Giampiero Giacomello). His major research projects are When the Cavalry Comes In: A Comparative Analysis of Foreign Policy Crises, and International Organizations in Contemporary Global Politics.

James Walter is Professor of Political Science at Monash University, Melbourne, and previously held chairs at the University of London and at Griffith University, Brisbane. Fellow of the Academy of Social Sciences in Australia, and former President of the Australian Political Studies Association, he has published widely on Australian politics, political history, the history of ideas, leadership, and political biography. His most recent books are What Were They Thinking? The Politics of Ideas in Australia (2010, winner of the APSA/Mayer prize for Australian Politics, 2011) and Understanding Prime Ministerial Performance (2013, with Paul Strangio and Paul Hart).

John Wanna is the Sir John Bunting Chair in Public Administration at the Australian National University. His research interests include Australian politics and public policy, budgetary systems and reforms, policy implementation, and comparative government. His many books include The Reality of Budgetary Reform in OECD Nations: Trajectories and Consequences (Edward Elgar Publishing 2009), and Policy in Action: the Challenges of Service Delivery (UNSW Press 2009).

CHAPTER 11

RATIONAL CHOICE APPROACHES TO LEADERSHIP*

GEOFFREY BRENNAN AND MICHAEL BROOKS

1 The Dog that does Not Bark?

In Dennis Mueller's encyclopedic survey (2003) of the field of 'public choice' (or more generally rational choice theory of politics) (RCT in what follows) there is no chapter on leadership and no such category mentioned in the index. There is a section of one chapter dealing with the relations between President and Congress, a brief mention of 'political entrepreneurship', and a chapter on 'dictatorship' largely following Wintrobe (2000).1 Writers in the tradition of 'rational choice institutionalism' (see Shepsle 2006) suggest that leadership may be an important theme in that tradition (see, specifically, Florina and Shepsle 1989); but the associated literature is small. Taking a bird's-eye view of rational choice literature, 'leadership' is, if not a dog that does not bark, at least one that does not bark very loudly!

In some ways, the silence is surprising. A primary focus of RCT is democratic electoral competition; and casual observation suggests that features of rival leaders are significant elements in electoral races. It might be observed that RCT sets itself

---

* We are grateful to the editors for detailed and incisive comments on earlier drafts of this chapter.

1 The 'rational-choice theory' (RCT) enterprise goes by a number of names and the various titles have their own nuances. For a discussion of some of the nuances and commonalities, see Mitchell (1988) and Diermeier and Krehbiel (2003).

2 Arguably, the analysis of dictatorship, emphasizing the role of loyalty and repression, does involve leadership issues. Our interest here, however, is with leadership in democratic systems and with political institutions that meet some broadcontractarian test.

3 Public choice does not stand alone in its failure to address the leadership feature of economic landscape. In mainstream economics, leadership is hardly a major analytical category either—though see Hermelin (2013) for a survey of the small set of technical papers in the field.
to explain the systematic features of political processes—and so the idiosyncracies of particular leaders (though no doubt of considerable 'human interest') do not fit this bill. In explaining the 'actions' of governments (policy outcomes in the broadest sense), 'biographical politics' and RCT stand as rival approaches.

Nevertheless, virtually all democratic systems exhibit a 'representative' structure, with political parties, majority coalitions, and government 'leaders', and this structural feature does demand some explanation and justification. These institutional features are systematic and structural, so they would seem to fall naturally within the RCT explanatory domain.

There is a further notable feature of the RCT approach to leadership. Within the RCT tradition, and in contrast to most other traditions in political theory, 'leadership' is an (often implicitly) negative category. In Section 2, we seek to explain and expose this negative attitude.

The explanation/justification of leadership involves two questions: one is the issue of delegation (that is, why democracy is representative rather than direct); the other is the issue of hierarchy (that is, why representative institutions are organized with 'leaders' at the top). In what follows, we shall investigate what the RCT tradition has to say on both these aspects of leadership—delegation in Section 3; and hierarchy in Section 4.

Much of RCT literature on leadership involves reference to the 'principal/agent' problem and the incentives that systems of delegation imply. In Section 5 we explore 'selection' as another dimension of the 'agency' issue. In Section 6, we offer an alternative view of leadership based on 'expressive voting' (the account of voting that we regard as the uniquely best account of voting within RCT logic). Section 7 offers a brief conclusion.

2 Leadership and the Benevolent Despot

Public choice theory—that variant of RCT associated with Nobel Laureate James Buchanan and his disciples—began life as an attack on what Buchanan (following Wickesell 1896) termed the 'benevolent-despot' model of government. In standard public economics, the object of analysis was to determine among a set of policy options that which is best, given certain normative criteria. The public-choice critique of this approach involved two elements. The first involved insisting that policies should be treated, not as directly chosen, but rather as emerging from political processes. So the working properties of those political processes must be a core piece of proper analysis. The second strand involved a rejection of differences in the motivational assumptions used to characterize policy-makers and policy-takers: individuals should not be assumed to behave differently in their political and market roles. In particular, if policy-makers were 'despots', in the sense that they could make unilateral decisions about policy unencumbered by electoral (and other 'political') constraints, then methodological principles of consistency required that similar 'despots' should be modeled in self-interest terms (exactly as their market counterparts are modeled).

Put another way, RCT regards the appropriate framework for treating 'leadership' as involving a broad principal/agent approach, in which it is assumed that 'political power will be abused to promote the particular purposes of the holder', as J. S. Mill (1861: 505) put it, or as Hume remarked, 'every man ought to be supposed a knave and have no other end in all his actions than private interest' (Hume 1751: 117). Simply put, 'leadership' implies some discretion on the part of political agents. Given the methodological strictures on which the public-choice approach insists, such discretion is a presumptively bad thing!

This negative presumption colours much of the public choice literature on leadership, sometimes more so than is evident. So consider, for example, the various points in the RCT corpus outlined below where 'leadership' enters.

Non-Dictatorship

When Arrow (1951) develops his well-known 'impossibility' theorem, he stipulates several apparently simple and compelling desiderata that any 'aggregation' process of individual preferences should meet. Non-dictatorship is one of those desiderata. Other desiderata, under various descriptions, include: completeness; transitivity; Pareto postulate; independence of irrelevant alternatives. Arrow's theorem shows that not all of these desiderata can be satisfied simultaneously, but that a subset of any four can be (that aspect of his theorem is the 'possibility' dimension). The conclusion is that (at least) one of the desiderata (possibly non-dictatorship) has to be jettisoned: this is what gives the theorem its tragic bite.

Agenda-Setting

A related RCT result is that, when the policy space has two or more dimensions, there is in general no political outcome that cannot be defeated under majority rule (or indeed under any decision rule short of unanimity). McKelvey's classic 1976 formulation begins by showing that, for any two points in policy space, there will be a finite sequence of majority approved moves that can take the policy from one to the other (so no policy outcome under majority rule can be entirely ruled out); and hence that a strategic agenda-setter can secure any outcome she wants by putting the items on the agenda in an appropriate order.

Of course, the particular sequence of issues on the agenda required for manipulation will be influenced by voters' preferences. In that sense the citizenry's preferences

---

4 One significant result in RCT is the median voter theorem—and the thrust of that theorem is that candidates are forced by the process of electoral competition to adopt more or less identical policy positions. Hence, in explaining policy positions, any distinctive characteristics of parties and their leaders become essentially epiphenomenal.
represent a structural constraint on the agenda-setter's behaviour. This structural constraint is, however, a shadow tiger, because the agenda-setter/ruler is able to achieve any outcome she desires.

This is bad news—both for democracy's credentials as a means of directing political power to citizens' ends and for analytical political science, because where there is no political equilibrium, there can be no robust predictions as to how changes in underlying parameters will affect political outcomes.5

Principal-Agent Models

As Fiorina and Shepsle (1989) rightly emphasize, leadership is typically modelled in RCT circles as a principal-agent problem. The 'problem' at issue here is how the 'principal' (in this case the citizens) can constrain the agent (political 'leaders') to act as far as possible in the principal's interests. In economic applications, such constraint is secured by a contract that embodies the relevant set of incentives. In the political case, constraint is usually secured by some institutional arrangement—but again the focus is on structuring incentives so as to bring agents' interests into line with those of principals. As Hamilton put it, 'the best security for the fidelity of mankind is to make their interest coincide with their duty' (Hamilton 2012: 210). Strictly speaking, principal-agent theory purports to explain the type of contract that principals will rationally seek to impose: the 'problem' of agent discretion is a problem for the principal, not necessarily a 'problem' in any wider normative sense.

Note that the principal-agent formulation presupposes agency. It is just taken as given that agents can do things that principals cannot do for themselves.

Political Entrepreneurship

The notion of political entrepreneurship entered the public choice literature at the hands of Richard Wagner (1966) in a review of Mancur Olson's (1965) The Logic of Collective Action. Olson's 'logic' emphasizes the role that apparently 'incidental' private interest must play in any provision of public goods: public goods for a group are more likely to be provided if they come with incidental 'selective' private benefits available for contributors. Wagner conceives of the political entrepreneur as the broker—the one who conceives and delivers the peculiar package of selective private (and general public) benefits. Wagner emphasizes (in the Olsonian spirit) that such entrepreneurs are more likely to be forthcoming if they themselves will receive 'selective benefits'—either electoral advantage or rents from office.

6 Many empirical applications of RCT seem simply to ignore this fact and employ the one-dimensional median voter model, even when there appear to be multi-dimensions in policy space.

Political entrepreneurship tends to interpret 'leadership' in a somewhat more favourable light than elsewhere in the RCT corpus.6 Certainly, entrepreneurship in its market setting receives quite a favourable gloss, but that is because there is a presumption that market discipline will channel agent discretion into desirable activities. In the political setting, whether an analogous presumption is in place is precisely what is at issue.

Political entrepreneurs will broker deals involving provision of public goods to the extent that activity is profitable to them. Entrepreneurial behaviour will track the incentives prevailing under the existing arrangements. Unless those incentives favour the provision of public goods specifically, then political entrepreneurship in itself offers no solution to public goods problems. The chief implication of political entrepreneurship for leadership, then, is, as Shepsle remarks, that 'it invites us to scrutinize some of the less obvious motives of those who assume the mantle of leadership' (Shepsle 2006: 31).

The general point we seek to underline in this section is that, wherever themes in RCT intersect with issues of 'leadership', there is a negative connotation. In that sense, on the few occasions in RCT where 'leadership' 'barks', it remains pretty clearly a 'monogrel'!

3 Why Agency? The Logic(s) of Delegation

Standard principal-agent literature presumes that there is a reason for agency: that the agent has some skill, knowledge, or rational advantage that the principal does not.7 Within the marketplace, such a division of labour will be a routine feature of economic organization. In the case of political delegation, however, the grounds for specialization are not so self-evident. Defenders of direct democracy, for example, have long insisted that 'representative' institutions involve a level of agency lacking a clear explanation/justification. Any capacity to exploit the citizenry that political agents possess is a self-inflicted wound on the part of the citizenry: direct democracy allows the citizens to avoid the agency problem. Under direct democracy, there will remain a need to contract out the provision of public services: principal-agent problems will arise between the decision-making and 'bureaucratic/functional' aspects of government. The decision-making itself, however, does not necessarily require representative assemblies; or 'leaders' within them. Any such delegation needs to be argued for.

We canvass five possibilities in this regard: a 'transactions cost' possibility; a vulnerability possibility; an epistemic possibility; a 'strategic' possibility; and a 'leadership habit' argument. We examine these in turn.
Transactions Costs Possibility

The transactions cost line begins with the claim that collective decision-making is a matter of perpetual problem-solving. New situations are constantly arising that require collective decisions, and organizing plebiscites at short notice is too costly. Governments must act and often act quickly; and, so the claim goes, they must therefore be assigned the power to do so.8 Perhaps there is something to this argument in modern democracies, though both the demand-side and the supply-side elements are questionable. To be sure, natural disasters occur and various social conflicts arise; quick decisions are occasionally required. In such settings, however, the decisions are not typically taken by representative assemblies: they are delegated to agents closer to the locus of action—to the executive branch, or within it to ‘chief’ or ‘emergency teams’ or generals. Such cases seem the exception rather than the rule. Lots of collective decisions can be, and are, taken over an extended period, allowing sufficient time for plebiscites to be mounted.9 Modern technology is such that collective decisions can be made very quickly and quite cheaply—as coordination of the Arab Spring demonstrations suggests. The least we can say is that, aside from emergency situations, the ‘transactions cost’ argument alone does not seem persuasive in explaining representative institutions.

Vulnerability Possibility

A second argument takes off from the principal-agent problem between legislature and executive with an eye to the specific case of the military. The idea is that political power is always vulnerable to military takeover, and that an institutionalized representative body serves to keep the military in its place in a manner that the citizenry directly cannot do effectively. Call this the ‘vulnerability’ argument (VA). We think this argument carries some weight. It is, after all, one of the non-negligible accomplishments of most Western democracies that the political influence of the military is minimal.10 However, the argument is vague on the source of the comparative advantage that smaller political bodies are supposed to have in exercising oversight.11 There is an obvious question, moreover, as to why, if VA constitutes the primary rationale for representative government, the ‘representative’ bodies are elected rather than appointed by lot. We note these questions but do not attempt here to answer them.

Epistemic Possibility

The third argument for representation revolves around the idea of a division of labour in politics. One version of the argument of the division of labour argument is that there is some kind of talent in the business of exercising political power over others: some people are, so the argument goes, just ‘better rulers’. This version has a dubious history, since it has long been used as a justification for the retention of political power by the aristocratic classes.12 An alternative version focuses on epistemic considerations.13 The cost of every voter acquiring all the information necessary to deal with the complicated issues of public policy would be exorbitant. In that sense, it is, we think, self-evident that a representative assembly will be more efficient in dealing with relevant policy information than the entire citizenry. It was one of the central claims in Downs’s seminal work (1957) in RCT that voters will be predictably under-informed about policy issues: the point we would underline is that, within a representative system, it is not just rational but also efficient that voters be so! Of course, to see representation as grounded in an epistemic division of labour presupposes that information about political decisions and/or participation in the decision-making process are not ends in themselves. There is a long-standing tradition in political theory that citizens ought to be engaged in political processes (and presumably informed about them) either in itself or for the sake of the intrinsic virtue that such participation instills in them. RCT has never expressed much sympathy with such claims—but if anything the argument would seem to support direct rather than representative procedures.

As noted above in relation to VA, if the primary rationale for representative institution lies in the informational aspect, the principles that govern selection of ‘representatives’ could well be statistical14 rather than elective.15

Strategic Possibility

A fourth possibility invokes the idea of ‘strategic’ representation. The idea here is akin to that of an abandoned spouse employing a divorce lawyer, precisely because the lawyer will inflict greater losses on the suet partner than the abandoned spouse would herself be able to inflict. She knows that, if she pursues mediation, she will find herself ‘having to be reasonable’—that her better nature will intervene and prevent her from inflicting the full fury the house deserves! Divorce lawyers, so the thought goes, are skilled in suppressing any ‘better nature’; and so the vindictive party uses court procedures and the most aggressive lawyer she can find to inflict losses on her former partner of a severity that she herself would not inflict.

8 It is, for example, not surprising that Leeson (2009) finds that sixteenth- and seventeenth-century pirate-ship captains, a position that was routinely elected by the entire crew, held absolute decision power—though only when engaged with the ‘enemy’.
9 To continue the pirate example, Leeson reports that, except in conflict situations, the crew on pirate ships took unanimous decisions on a range of issues and the captain as leader had no privileged position in their resolution.
10 See Finer (1962) for an account of the role of the military in the democratic state.
11 An interesting incidental question in the present setting is why military institutions themselves are so rigidly hierarchical.
12 See Levy (2001) for an examination of one such argument when economists first earned their label of being from the ‘vis驾al science’ when they fought against slavery.
13 See Baumann and Brennan (2009) for an extended discussion.
14 See Burgess (2012) for an examination of the use of a lottery to appoint political representatives.
15 In the manner of Fishkin’s ‘deliberative polls’ (1991).
The political analogue is that when policy is determined directly by voting procedures the ideal of the median voter will tend to emerge as equilibrium. All voters may, however, prefer an agent who will deliver an outcome different from that. In a close analogue to the divorce lawyer case, Hamlin and Jennings (2007) suggest why, in situations of conflict, a group may select a leader who is more bellicose than the group itself: such a leader is expected to be more successful in negotiating with the opposition than the group itself would be.\footnote{For treatments in the same spirit, see Persson and Tabellini (1992) and Chari, Jones and Martim (1997).}

**Leadership-as-Habit Possibility**

The final consideration makes appeal not to directly justificatory arguments but more to matters of historical fact. Begin with the observation that, in our immediate non-democratic past, political power was exercised by a small number of persons highly hierarchically organized. In the process of institutional evolution from that past, some of these hierarchical features remained—either because of a purely 'political need' to buy off the existing power elite, or because of the social capital tied up in familiarity with existing ways of doing things. In a detailed study, relined, at times, of Tsebelis's work (2002) on the role of players in determining the size of the set that can defeat all other proposals, Congleton (2001) explains how non-democratic rulers could attempt to retain effective veto power over the final outcome, even when they had traded off some elements of their decision-making domain in return for access to additional finance or favour. Over the centuries, hereditary monarchs gave way to popularly elected ones, with much of the rest of the prevailing institutional structure remaining in place. On this view, we more or less inherited a 'leadership habit': at any point, leadership structures now operate as a fact—even though the discretionary power possessed by the holders of political power is being gradually whittled away. The normative issue, on this view, is less 'what justifies leadership?' and more the question: 'how much reduction in the discretionary power of leaders (and representative assemblies) would be "optimal" given the factors that give rise to the historical stickiness?' This conception of the issue is doubtless attractive to 'direct democrats': they become the vanguard in casting off the remaining shackles of a non-democratic past.

### 4 Why Hierarchy?

Agency is one thing; hierarchy another.\footnote{Laver and Shugle (1990) offer an account of how coalitions and cabinet structures limit the set of outcomes that can emerge when there is more than one dimension. The analysis is primarily concerned with how political hierarchies structured along different policy dimensions actually work. Strem (2000: 70) claims without any attempt at justification that one of the justifications for delegation is to avoid McKelvey's chaos theorem.} It is perfectly possible to imagine the representative assembly, whether selected on statistical grounds or via popular election, making collective decisions as if by committee, without any office of 'leader' as such at all. What then makes for hierarchy in the structure of that assembly? Perhaps there is a person who manages the discussion—orders the speakers, ensuring that they do not speak beyond their allotted time, and so on—but that person (the 'Speaker in Australian/British parlance') is not a 'leader' in the conventional sense.\footnote{Proponents of deliberative democracy do not address the question, though it seems clear that, though deliberative democrats support delegation (as conducive to 'ideal speech conditions'), they will not support hierarchy within the deliberative process itself.} To make a case for leadership in that common-sense version requires something else.

It is useful here to distinguish between those considerations that arise from the nature of the problems concerning which collective decision-making is required; and those that reflect features of voter psychology. In this section, we focus on the former supply-side aspects. The demand-side aspects are postponed to the next section.

One important supply-side argument is the argument from 'coordination'. On a certain view, the central problem of social order revolves around the need for individuals to coordinate their activities so that each can know what others will do. The classic example of such predicaments is choice of which side of the road to drive on: in this case, everyone is assumed to be indifferent between 'all drive on the left' and 'all drive on the right', but there is a need for a clear rule (one that everyone believes all others will follow) in order to minimize risk of accidents. Assigning determination of that choice to a single person is an apparently efficient solution to this problem (not quite): alternatively put, if there is someone already designated as leader, we can justify her role in terms of her delivering determinations on the many such coordination problems that arise in social life. Typically, different equilibria will be differentially beneficial to different players—as in an n-person version of the 'battle of the sexes'.\footnote{Cox (1987) argues the rise of cabinet was an institutional response to controlling the open-access problem that had emerged when individual members started to use the floor to make speeches that might receive an airing in the emergent press.} A collectively preferred solution to such coordination games may evolve spontaneously.\footnote{If no such leader exists, then there is a prior coordination problem as to whom to appoint—with as many contenders in principle as persons. There is then a radical asymmetry between cases in which there is a leader and those where the collective enquiries as to whether to retain her/select a leader.} This cannot be guaranteed, however; and then, despite the inherent element of conflict of interest, it may be better for all players that one of them be 'dictator' (and choose her own preferred equilibrium) than for individuals to squabble over who will be the choosier. This predication is redundant of Hobbes's picture of the state of nature and has the same presumptive solution.

Hobbes's point seems to be that whoever (by whatever means) emerges as the 'dictator' should be endowed with presumptive authority—essentially because of the superior...
efficiency of hierarchical decision-making. Although Hobbes’s discussion allows that his ‘dictator’ could be a collective body of some kind, the problem with any such solution is that the coordination problems seem likely to resurface within the collective body: Hobbes’s logic is in that sense especially hospitable to specifically individual leadership. An elegant recent treatment of ‘leadership’ grounded in the coordination game approach can be found in Dewan and Myatt (2007, 2008).

An alternative source for insights into hierarchy might be thought to lie in the economics literature, but again the papers are sparse and not very helpful. As Radner states in his survey on the economics of hierarchy:

I... have to admit that research to date has not provided an adequate explanation on economic grounds alone of the conditions under which one expects to see a hierarchical organization of business firms. In fact, the explanation of hierarchy may in many cases be more sociological and psychological than purely ‘economic’ in the mainstream sense.

(Radner 1992: 1384)

Radner may have had in mind predispositions such as servility and authoritarianism (redolent perhaps of Adorno et al. (1950) that lie somewhat outside the RCT lexicon. One strand in economics that may be relevant is the ‘tournament’ literature. The idea is that one may solicit greater effort from a group of agents by structuring rewards in a manner that assigns very high rewards to the ‘best’ performer and low rewards to all others. Each then strives to be the tournament winner because of the disproportionate rewards; and each thereby expends more effort than she would if rewards were distributed more equally. This reward structure will, of course, be defendable only if the criteria for determining the winner track closely enough the features that it is desirable to promote. So, if the most public-spirited, trustworthy, and competent person is the one who wins the tournament, then incentives to develop and exhibit those characteristics will be encouraged by the competition. Here, however, the primary function of the ‘hierarchical structure’ is to provide incentives to contenders all the way down the chain rather than to provide for ‘leadership’ as such.

5 Selection versus Incentives

In standard principal-agent theory, principals respond to the fact of agency by devising appropriate incentives for the agent. There is another way of thinking about principal–agent problems—less in terms of incentives and more in terms of selection effects.


26 For a more recent treatment that explains leadership-by-example as a way of credibly communicating to subordinates the special knowledge held by individuals at the top of a hierarchy, see Hermelin (1998, 2013).

Suppose that agents are not routinely self-interested. Suppose they are heterogeneous in just the features in which principals are interested: their trustworthiness; their competence; and their ‘public-interestedness’ (TCP features). Then citizen–voters will select for these things. On this basis, the right way to think of electoral competition is in terms of less of the incentives it creates for agents to do what voters want, and more of the capacity of voters to select agents with higher TCP. If voters are reasonably good at discerning TCP, then not only will agents exhibit more of such features than the average citizen, but aspiring candidates will tend to self-select for possession of the features and indeed will have incentives to cultivate TCP in themselves. To be sure, candidates will have an incentive to pretend to have the relevant features whether they possess them or not, but this may have the effect of their being as if they possessed those features. Besley (e.g. 2006) is the RCT scholar who has developed this set of thoughts most formally.25 As he puts it, his account offers a defence of the idea of ‘principled agents’. Principled agents are worthy of greater delegation than unprincipled ones.26 More to the point perhaps, the possibility of selection allows an independent argument for ‘representative’ institutions—namely, that it allows the citizenry to select the best from among themselves for ‘leadership’ roles. Unlike some other arguments for delegation, this argument relies on electoral processes specifically to select representatives—not mere random selection.

One noteworthy aspect of this selection story relates to its epistemic demands. We said earlier that voters’ assessments of alternative policies are likely to be ill-informed. Arguably, the cost of acquiring information about policies is more complicated and less engaging than information about candidates. After all, people have to make judgements of the qualities of others in ordinary arenas of life; and have been doing just this throughout their evolutionary history. Of course, the capacity to dissemble has also evolved, but our evolutionary legacy is likely to help us assess the character of other persons. Little in that evolutionary legacy is likely to equip us, however, to make the fine judgements of policy issues demanded by direct collective decision-making.

6 Leadership and Expressive Voting

A remark finally about the ‘demand’ side of delegation and leadership. A standard part of (most) RCT is an account of electoral demand in which voter behaviour is extrapolated directly from market settings. Hence, the ultimate object of voter concern is the policy outcome and the effect of that outcome on the individual voter’s material interests. So
RCT models of political process typically treat candidates and parties simply as ciphers for policy platforms. Electoral options are often referred to as ‘party/candidate/policy’, as if the three were coterminous.

We believe that the appropriate account of voter behaviour involves seeing voting much more as an expressive act than an instrumental one. Because each individual vote is highly unlikely to be decisive, it is not appropriate to treat electoral and market choice identically. Voting is rather more like cheering at a football match than choosing an assets portfolio.

Accordingly, electoral candidates will maximize their ‘cheerability’ — and this may include an array of features independent of policy platform (such as candidate charisma and party identification). The expressive underpinning has implications specifically for leadership — both for the fact of it and the sorts of features that successful ‘leaders’ will tend to exhibit. Suppose party A has a charismatic ‘leader’ while party B has none (and simply stands as a collection of individuals); and suppose (plausibly) that the leader’s charisma garners (some) additional votes. Then A will do better against B than otherwise. Hence, competitive parties will tend to have leaders and to seek, for these leadership roles, those individuals with the most vote-catching features.

In this sense, we think the (true) expressive account of voting is extremely hospitable to a highly personality-based account of electoral competition; and hence to an account of leadership that is grounded in vote-maximizing party strategy. Rather than leaders’ personal characteristics being epiphenomenal features of the electoral process, they can be crucial for at least some voters and influential for almost all. ‘Leadership’ exploits the human interest dimension of electoral competition — and casual observation suggests that this dimension is quite significant. RCT tends to background such features because of its reliance on a particular view of electoral behaviour that, we think, is itself faulty on RCT grounds.

7 Leadership: Unfinished Agenda

RCT, in its emphasis on the systematic features of political processes, has tended to set aside the personal features of leaders in explaining policy outcomes. In that sense, leadership as an explanatory category receives little attention in the RCT literature. However,

at a more institutional level, leadership is a structural feature of virtually every Western democratic system, and, as such, calls for explanation/justification in itself.

There are two basic facts to be explained here: delegation (that is, representative as against direct democracy); and hierarchy within delegated bodies. In this chapter, we have canvassed the kinds of considerations that RCT addresses to see what light can be thrown on each element.

The ‘principal-agent’ approach, characteristic of RCT treatment of leadership, has tended to emphasize the scope for all delegated power to be directed to the purposes of the agent. In that sense, leadership has tended to be regarded disparagingly in the RCT literature: leadership implies delegation; and delegation is presumptively costly. We might ask, however, what positive features of delegation can be put on the other side of the ledger to justify this cost or explain why it might be worth bearing.

The RCT literature engaging this issue explicitly is sparse. Accordingly, we see ourselves here sketching out a landscape for future research and pointing to some possible resources, rather than reporting on well-established findings. One relevant element with a distinctively RCT flavour is the phenomenon of Downsian ‘rational ignorance’: but this phenomenon in itself does not justify delegation unless it is the case that ‘rationally ignorant’ voters are better at selecting competent and trustworthy agents than at selecting appropriate policies. We think there are reasons why this might be so; but, given its centrality in the analysis of delegation, it is surprising that the issue has not received more explicit attention among RCT scholars.

Even if voters are no better at evaluating persons than they are at evaluating policies directly, they may find the exercise of evaluating persons more ‘interesting’ and ‘engaging’ — in which case representative institutions may emerge even where they offer no normatively relevant advantage. The ‘expressive’ account of voting behaviour, which we favour, is hospitable to this possibility.

Recommended Reading


References

CHAPTER 1

PUZZLES OF POLITICAL LEADERSHIP*

R. A. W. RHODES AND PAUL 'T HART

Leaders...can conceive and articulate goals that lift people out of their petty preoccupations carry them above the conflicts that tear a society apart, and unite them in pursuit of objectives worthy of their best efforts.

(Gardner 1968: 5)

Most disasters in organizational life can be attributed to leaders, and being a leader has corrupted more people into leading unattractive lives and becoming unattractive selves than it has ennobled.

(March and Well 2005: 11)

1 Why Bother?

The contradiction between the epigrams is typical of the puzzling nature of political leadership. Is it a force for good or bad? Is it a pivotal or a marginal influence on public life? If leadership matters, how does it do so? Are leaders born or made? Political leadership is a tricky subject to understand, let alone master. Puzzles abound, and contradictory answers multiply, without clear evidence of a growing consensus about any of them. What we do know is that in democratic societies leadership has always been treated with

* We owe a massive 'thank you' to our contributors. The study of political leadership may be a slightly bewildering enterprise but we learned along the way that it is populated by many exemplary colleagues. Prospective authors overwhelmingly responded enthusiastically to our request to add yet another item to their already long to-do list, delivered the goods we sought promptly, and merrily put up with our editorial 'suggestions'. We also would like to thank Dominic Byatt at Oxford University Press for urging us to 'think big' in devising this Handbook, and thus signing away a year or so of our lives. Finally, we thank our desk editors, Eleanor Rivers and Jennifer Mohan, for their assistance in preparing the final manuscript. Any remaining errors are the responsibility of the editors and authors.
mixed feelings. Pleas for ‘strong’, ‘transformational’, ‘authentic’, ‘visionary’, or other allegedly benign forms of public leadership are not hard to find in public debate in most modern democracies, challenged as they are by a debilitating economic crisis. Yet not long ago, after the horrors of the Second World War, the opposite pleas were voiced with equal vigour. We must protect societies so that they are not at the mercy of all-too ambitious, ruthless, cunning, and above all dominant rulers. Democracy needs good leaders, but has no clear theory of leadership to counter its inherent suspicions of strong leaders (Korosevic et al. 2009; Hendriks 2010; Kane and Patapan 2012). Democratic leaders are caught in the cross fire between the hopes placed in them and the challenges to, and constraints on, their authority.

Through the ages, theorists and practitioners of government have wondered how to promote ‘leadership’ while constraining ‘leaders’, especially in democracies (Keane 2009; Kane and Patapan 2012). The sheer number and variety of offices and platforms for exercising political leadership in liberal democracies has produced political structures that are both complex and opaque. The many spheres of political leadership—party, government, civic, and networks among many—coexist, interact, reinforce, and neutralize one another. Moreover, in open societies, many people who are ostensibly ‘non-leaders’ inside and outside government also perform leadership roles; for example, ‘advisers’, ‘administrators’, and civic entrepreneurs.

Promoters of good governance wonder how much scope can be granted to individual officeholders and to leadership when designing democratic institutions (see also Helms, Chapter 13, this volume). They argue that, in governance systems, multiple leadership roles exist in parallel (distributed leadership), with inducements to act in concert (collaborative leadership) as well as going in to bat against one another (adversarial leadership). Such systems look messy to other commentators who prefer the clarity of hierarchy, and leadership as command and control from the centre. But, so the argument goes, like any resilient sociocultural or sociotechnical system, governance systems thrive on variety, overlap, and competition among loci of initiative, voice, authority, and accountability (Bendix 1985). Admittedly, these systems have their transaction costs. Aligning enough people and organizations behind any particular set of ideas or policy proposals can be a time-consuming and convoluted process. As many have argued, however, such institutional pluralism produces smart, robust public policies as well as keeping the arrogance of power at bay (Kane, Patapan, and Hart 2009).

In contrast, governance systems built around top-down, great man leadership are said to be inherently unstable and deemed normatively objectionable. They also lack the institutional capacity for effective social problem-solving (Lipman-Blumen 2004). They are governed well only when the supreme leader and her clique are smart, wise, and honest. They are, however, quick to slide into the abyss of tyranny, stupidity, and corruption when the ruling elite becomes addicted to its own power, or when enlightened leaders are replaced by less capable and morally upright characters. In this Handbook, Klimes’s (Chapter 41) and Swart, van Wyk, and Botha’s (Chapter 43) accounts of Latin American and African political leadership refer to many studies documenting such abuses.

Before we can get around to (re)designing the institutions that both empower political leaders and hold them to account, however, we must first understand the nature of the beast. How do we know ‘political leadership’ when we see it? How do we describe, explain, evaluate, and improve it? The study of leadership became both a field and a fad during the late twentieth century (Kellerman 2012). This period left us with a bewildering array of concepts, frameworks, propositions, stories, assessments, prescriptions, and clichés about leadership across many academic disciplines and professional domains. Inspirational books by leadership ‘gurus’ and biographies of celebrity Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) litter main street and airport bookstores around the world. There is an entire industry of leadership training and consulting. It began in the corporate sector but spilled inexorably into the government and third sectors. Because the study of leadership studies is such a complex and disjointed interdisciplinary enterprise, it is important to locate this Handbook in this vast domain. What are the key characteristics and debates of ‘leadership studies’ in and beyond the realm of politics? To answer this question, we survey how the field has addressed the key puzzles of political leadership by discussing several key dichotomies that have been the focal point of scholarly inquiry and debate past and present: leaders and leadership; democrats and dictators; causes and consequences; actors and context; personal qualities and luck; success and failure; and art and science.

2 LEADERS AND LEADERSHIP

The first issue concerns what it is we want to understand: is it the people we commonly call leaders, or the process we call leadership? For many scholars and practitioners understanding political leaders comes down to studying the characteristics, beliefs, and deeds of people formally occupying the top roles in political life. Foremost, there are senior politicians: heads of government, cabinet ministers, senior legislators, and key party officials. In this category, we should also include key advisers to these senior politicians, who stay behind the scenes but are often said to be influential (see also Eichbaum and Shaw, Chapter 34, this volume).

Less obvious to outside observers, but all too obvious to those who know how executive government works, senior public officials are influential actors. This category includes top officials in the departments that advise ministers and prepare and administer policies and programmes. It also includes the heads and senior ranks of administrative organizations with the task of implementing policy and delivering public services. Although their institutional role and professional ethos is to be public servants, there is little dispute that the upper echelons of the bureaucracy are important in shaping what governments do, when, how, and how well (Rhodes, Chapter 7).

Finally, many political leaders do not hold any formal public office at all. The penumbra of non-government organizations is vast, varied, and vigorous. Democracies nurture a big and active civil society. They value its contributions to the political process even
when its leaders are critical of the government of the day. The individuals at the helm of trade unions, churches, social movements, mass media, community organizations, and even business corporations are widely thought of as important public leaders. They do not have the power of office. They do have the power of numbers, supporters, and money. They also have the ideas, access, and moral authority, to shape public problem-solving in important ways (see also Couto, Chapter 12; see also Rucht 2012).

Understanding political leadership through the lens of leaders takes one to the province of psychology. It rests on the idea that it matters who governs us. It entails an agent-centred view of politics and government. In other words, public debates and decisions are shaped by the views, drives, skills, and styles of individuals who occupy formal office. Comparisons of different leaders in similar circumstances show how their beliefs and practices have an impact on the lives of citizens. Think of Helmut Kohl seizing the historical moment and forging a German reunification that almost no one in Germany, Kohl included, even deemed possible before November 1989. He was in the right position at the right time to make a difference. Counterfactual questions about the roles of leaders at such critical historical junctures may be unanswerable, but they pose interesting conundrums. What if James Callaghan not Margaret Thatcher had still been the British prime minister when the Argentinean junta invaded the Falklands Islands? What would have happened to the course of the Vietnam War or to American-Chinese relations if Robert Kennedy, not Richard Nixon, had won the 1968 US presidential election? Would America have waged war in Afghanistan and Iraq following the September 11 attacks if Al Gore had won the Florida recount during the 2000 presidential election? Would gay marriage be a much more widely accepted practice in the US today if Hillary Clinton and not Barack Obama had become president in 2009?

Once we allow the thought that leaders matter, a whole range of questions about leaders’ arise (see also Hermann, Chapter 8, this volume). Why do people aspire to hold high public office? What keeps them going in the face of unmanageable workloads, relentless public criticism, and an often-toxic public opinion and irate stakeholders? Why do some leaders take huge gambles with history? Why do they act in sometimes blatantly self-defeating manner? For example, US President Woodrow Wilson undermined his own burning desire to create a League of Nations after the First World War by treating anyone expressing reservations about American accession to the new body with hostility and contempt. In effect, he organized his own opposition, and eventual Congressional defeat (George and George, 1996). Why do some successful, long-serving heads of government, such as Koizumi Junichiro or Tony Blair, cling to office long past their political sell-by date, dragging down their party, their government, their successor, and their reputation in the process? (’Hart and Uhr, 2011)?

To answer such questions, leadership scholars have delved into the personalities of leaders, and their underlying motives. They explore the ends or purposes for which they mobilize their personal skills and resources. Some have turned to psychoanalysis and biographical methods (see also Post, Chapter 22; Walter, Chapter 21, this volume). Others have turned to experimental methods, psychometrics, and other modernist-empiricist modes of 'measuring' personalities, motives and behaviour (McDermott, Chapter 18; Schäfer, Chapter 20).

The behaviour of people holding high public office has been and will be observed incessantly by leadership scholars. ‘Reading’ leaders’ behaviour is seen as the key to understanding what makes them tick, and a predictor of what impacts they might have. Peers, advisers, subordinates, opponents, and other stakeholders all watch how they allocate their attention, make decisions, interact with people, deal with pressure, conflict and criticism, and perform in public. They do so for good reasons. Like all of us, leaders are creatures of habit. During their personal and professional lives, they develop distinctive styles of thought and action. Such habits allow others to make educated guesses about what they may feel and how they will act when a new situation comes along. The more intimate one’s knowledge about a leader’s personal style, the more accurate those educated guesses are likely to be.

Questions about the individual leaders’ psychological make-up abound. Many scholars display boundless enthusiasm for trying to answer them. Why do individuals holding the same or similar leadership roles display such widely different behavioural styles? The answer almost has to be: because of who they are. What is it, however, about leaders that drive them to the top? Are leaders smarter than ordinary people? Are successful leaders smarter than unsuccessful ones? Do they have greater self-confidence? Are they morally superior? In present-day democratic societies, few will answer these questions with a simple, ‘Yes’ (Winter 2005). Not only are we reluctant to concede their superiority, but there is much casual evidence to the contrary. Wherever and whenever we look, we see a minister who can only be described as ‘thick’. A few American presidents suffered from low self-esteem rather than the reverse (Greenstein 2009: 8). Some presidents, like Coolidge, were clinically depressed (McDermott 2007: 34).

Easy answers don’t exist. Ronald Reagan is an interesting case. He had no great desire for information before he acted. Many dismissed him as a second-rate mind. In his second term, the effects of his advanced age and the onset of Alzheimer’s disease became more obvious (McDermott 2007: 28, 31). Nevertheless, he is one of the most highly-rated American presidents of the twentieth century, mainly because his robust and high emotional intelligence (EQ) compensated for what may have been a modest intellect (IQ). By contrast, intellectually gifted but emotionally impaired individuals such as Richard Nixon and Bill Clinton consistently rank much lower than Reagan, mainly because they failed to control their darker impulses while in office. Jimmy Carter and Gerald Ford were widely seen as both bright and morally upright. Both were consigned to the dustbin of presidential history, the former because of a glaring lack of political skills, the latter mainly because of sheer misfortune (Greenstein 2009). Two of the America’s most revered presidents—Franklin D. Roosevelt and John F. Kennedy—were effectively crippled. The latter, holding office in the television age and not the radio age, took irresponsibly high doses of strong medication to hide his condition from the public (McDermott 2007; Owen 2008).

Leader-centred analysis has proved hugely popular in the United States despite its failure to deliver definitive answers. Writing in 1978, political scientist James MacGregor
Burns (1978: 22) was scathing about the bias created by this emphasis; 'If we know all too much about our leaders, we know far too little about leadership. We fail to grasp the essence of leadership that is relevant to the modern age and hence we cannot even agree on the standards by which to measure, recruit, and reject it.'

Over the past 35 years, the balance has been redressed. There is now a growing body of thought and research that understands leadership as an interactive process between leaders and followers: institutions and their rules of the game; and the broader historical context (e.g. Elgie 1999; Goethals, Sorenson, and Burns 2004; Messick and Kramer 2005; Masciulli, Mochanov, and Knight 2009; Couto 2010; Keohane 2010; Alquist and Levi 2011; Bryman et al. 2011; Emslie 2012; and Strange, 'Hart and Walter 2013; 'Hart 2014). Once we escape the preoccupation with the individual, a new agenda for the study of political leadership emerges. The focus on interactions leads inexorably to the question, 'Who are being led?' The focus switches to followers. Social psychologists and political communication scholars ask when, how, and why particular groups of people come to accept some people as their leaders. It considers leadership as a two-way street. It explores the process by which some people demand that some individuals come to be given the authority or support they need to lead others effectively. It also explores how leaders seek to persuade others to think and act in certain ways. In its most radical form, the follower perspective views leadership processes as primarily a product of the identities, needs, desires, and fears of followers and constituencies. More commonly, leadership is viewed as an interactive process between leaders and led, revolving in no small measure around the degree to which leaders succeed in appealing to, embodying or modifying the social identities of their followers (see also Reicher, Haslam and Platin, Chapter 10; Uhr, Chapter 17; Gaffney, Chapter 26; Cohen, Chapter 30, this volume).

Interactionist approaches also accord a significant role to institutional and contextual factors (Elgie 1999; Bennister 2012). In democracies, for instance, many 'event-making' decisions and policies have a whole host of fingerprints on them because power and responsibility are institutionally dispersed across many actors and institutions (Korotz, Slomp, and Fermia 2009; Kane, Patapan, and 'Hart 2009). Institutions provide the rules of the political game. Organizational cultures provide actors with sets of beliefs about the nature and role of leadership. The historical context and present-day dilemmas and crises offer opportunities to some leaders while constraining others (see also Elms, Chapter 13; 'Hart, Chapter 24; Ansell, Boin, and 'Hart, Chapter 28, this volume).

All these factors come into play when, say, a cabinet meets. When, how, and to what extent a prime minister 'leads' that cabinet, is variable (Rhodes, Wann, and Weller 2009; Strange, 'Hart, and Walter, 2013). Few heads of government in democracies get their way all of the time, even within the executive. They know that if pushed too far for too long their cabinet members and parliamentary colleagues would have ways of undermining their leadership (see also McKay, Chapter 29; Weller, Chapter 31; Blick and Jones, Chapter 33, this volume). Ministers can be powerful leaders in their own right, offsetting prime-ministerial predominance, even if only in some policy domains and only some of the time (see also Andrew, Chapter 35, this volume). Party rules for leadership selection and removal can limit the job security of leaders even if they are prime ministers. Thus, Margaret Thatcher in the UK and Kevin Rudd as well as Julia Gillard, both Australian Prime Ministers, were ousted from office by their erstwhile supporters in their parties ('Hart and Uhr 2011; Cross and Blais 2012).

For many students of political leadership, Greenstein (1975) heuristic for the study of leadership holds as true today as it did on its publication almost 45 years ago. He suggested that it only makes sense for a student of politics or policy to delve into personal characteristics and leadership styles of individual political actors if there was appreciable scope for choice and action for individual actors. The individuals in question must not only have the intention but also the formal roles, and/or the informal power resources (including personal strength and skills) to make a potentially decisive contribution to the handling of the issue at stake. The extent to which these conditions are met varies from issue to issue, leader to leader, and context to context. Often, it will simply not make sense to pay much attention to the personal characteristics of a particular leader because the leader is either not motivated or not powerful enough to make a difference; in short, not indispensable (Greenstein 1975). Leader-centred explanations of public events are most likely to be powerful where leaders have a reputation for holding and wielding much power and influence. They will wield that influence on issues that are of strong personal interest or strategic importance to them; and that cannot easily be handled by routine, institutionalized procedures. Such windows of opportunity arise with unprecedented, acute, risky, and contentious issues, in particular issues seen as ‘crises’.

### 3 Democrats and Dictators

Is political leadership inherently desirable in democratic politics? Following Burns (1978, 2003: 15–16) can we distinguish between ‘interactive leaders’ and ‘power wielders’? The former rely on bargaining, persuasion, and genuine engagement with followers, and accept the constraints of democracy and the rule of law. The latter are ruthless Machiavellians and cold-hearted narcissists who do not shy away from manipulation and force to prevail on the led. If we adopt this explicit normative, even moral, distinction, people like Napoleon, Hitler, Stalin, and Mao disappear off the leadership map. Each authorized the use of brutal force against millions they thought unworthy or dangerous. Still, to brand them mere power-wielders would be to overlook their ability to communicate a political vision and persuade millions to comply and even share it. Indeed, followers acted on the leader’s vision at great risk to their own lives and limbs. Their values and purposes are morally repugnant to our present-day democratic sensibilities but that must not blind us to their exercise of leadership. Conversely, democratically elected leaders such as George W. Bush and Tony Blair were widely criticized for using deception to launch the war in Iraq and for condoning torture. Does that disqualify them from leadership analysis, or is it more productive to see them as examples of ‘bad’ leadership (Kellerman 2004)?

Political leaders holding office in democratic societies live in a complex moral universe. Democracy requires good leadership if it is to work effectively. Yet the idea of
leadership potentially conflicts with democracy's egalitarian ethos (see also Hendriks and Karsten, Chapter 3, this volume). The more democratic leaders lead from the front, the less democratic they appear; the more they act like good democrats, the less they seem like true leaders. Confronted with this dilemma, the general tendency among scholars has been to accept the need for leadership in practice while overlooking it in theory. As a result, they fail to offer a yardstick for assessing leadership in democracy. Leadership cannot be dispensed with without jeopardizing the conduct of public affairs. In practice, democracy's tendency is not to manage without leadership, but to multiply leadership offices and opportunities, and keep office-holding leaders in check by a web of accountabilities (Geer 1996; Bovens 1998; Ruscio 2004; Wren 2007; Kane, Patapan, and 't Hart 2009; Korosenyi, Slomp, and Femina 2009).

Yet at times democratic leaders have to make tricky trade-offs such as using debatable means to achieve inherently respectable (if politically contested) ends. Some succumb to the fallacy of thinking that the power of their office alone provides them with moral authority to lead. Indira Gandhi was an authoritarian, even repressive, yet elected, prime minister of India (Steinberg 2008). The same applies to all too many post-colonial leaders of the Latin-American 'caudillo' or African 'big man' ilk (see also Kline, Chapter 41; Swart, van Wyk, and Botha, Chapter 43, this volume). If the President orders it, it cannot be illegal; Richard Nixon famously claimed, in his attempt to justify to interviewer David Frost his authorization of the Watergate break-in and cover up. Going too far is a grave error for which many—including the leaders themselves—may pay a serious price. The story does not end there, however. The same Richard Nixon is credited with several bold, historic policy initiatives that have met with broad and lasting acclaim. It is unhelpful to ignore the full complexity of this man and his period in office by refusing to consider him a political leader.

Similarly, heads of government who have gained power by non-democratic means and occasionally govern by fear, intimidation, and blackmail may also aim for widely shared and morally acceptable goals (see also Ziluwe, Chapter 40; Holmes, Chapter 42, this volume). They may even pursue those goals with respectable means and with the consent of a majority of the population. Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms and eventual dissolution of the Soviet Union and Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's efforts to create and modernize the Turkish state are cases in point. Neither came to power through democratic election. Are such leaders not exercising leadership? Understanding leadership requires us to take in all its shades of grey: leading and following, heroes and villains, the capable and the inept, winners and losers.

4 CAUSE AND CONSEQUENCE

There are two fundamentally different points of departure in understanding political leadership. One is to see it as a shaping force of political life, and explore how, when, and why it works and to what effect. Leadership is commonly portrayed as a source of dynamism in the polity, breathing life into parties and institutions as they struggle with major changes. In this view, leadership is about injecting ideas and ambitions into the public arena. It is about grasping existing realities and recognizing that they can affect transformations. Leadership produces collective meaning and harnesses collective energy for a common cause. Great leaders are thus often conceived of as being 'event-making' (Fook 1943). They have the ability to garner momentum for the hopes and ambitions of their followers. Their presence affects the course of history. They have many names: Picc Pipers, visionaries, entrepreneurs, and reformers. Leaders are seen to both read and change their followers' minds, causing them collectively to go on journeys which they would otherwise never have contemplated.

Many accounts of leadership focus on leaders as the supreme decision makers. When an organization or a nation faces high-stakes' decisions that no one else is willing or able to make, somebody has to take responsibility. The buck stops here, read a sign on Harry Truman's Oval Office desk. He practised what he preached, committing the United States to using two atomic bombs in one week and proudly claiming never to have lost any sleep over so doing. Some leaders revel in that position. They do what they can to make sure that every big decision crosses their desk. They feel confident in analysing complex problems. They work through the risks and uncertainties, probing the vested interests and unstated assumptions of the experts, advisers, and colleagues pushing them into (or away from) specific courses of action.

Others leaders may loath deciding. They avoid risk. Some may feel overwhelmed by the complexity of the issues and by the policy-making process itself. George (1974) quotes US President Warren Harding confiding to a friend on how stressful he found his job.

John, I can't make a thing out of this tax problem. I listen to one side and they seem right, and then God! I talk to the other side and they seem just as right, and there I am where I started. . . . I know somewhere there is an economist who knows the truth, but hell, I don't know where to find him and haven't got the sense to know him and trust him when I find him. God, what a job.

(George 1974: 187)

The point is whether they enjoy it, and whether they display sound judgement. The notion of leaders as strategic decision makers portrays them as being at the helm, in control, reshaping the world around them.

Trying to understand leadership as a cause is important. Although much of social life is governed by shared traditions, rules, and practices, there are always public problems that defy routine solutions. Identifying the novel, understanding it, and making a persuasive case for adapting or abandoning routines is a leadership task. Study the history of every great reform and you will find leadership at work. Commonly, it will be a form of collective or distributed leadership rather than the single 'heroic' activist who gets all the public credit for it. Understanding political leadership as a cause raises many important analytical and practical questions about the impact of different leadership
styles and discourses in different contexts. What 'works', and when? Can it be copied and transplanted? How do particular people or groups matter? What characteristics and skills make them matter?

The other main point of departure for understanding political leadership is to look at leadership as a consequence. In modernist-empiricist jargon, leadership is the dependent variable, and we seek to explain variations in it by looking at the other variables that have an impact on it. So we ask who becomes a leader. How do they consolidate their hold on office? When, how, and by whom are they removed? How do people make it to the top in political parties, social movements, and public bureaucracies? How are they selected? What happens to leadership aspirants along their path to the top? How are they socialized? What debts do they incur, and how do these debts affect their ability to exercise leadership? What are the consequences if access to leadership roles is biased towards people of certain social or professional backgrounds (Borchert and Zeiss 2003; Bovens and Wille 2009)? We may also want to know about the offices. What responsibilities, expectations, and resources are attached to them? What are the implications of varying responsibilities, expectations, and resources for the occupant's authority and support among the led? How have they changed?

Finding out who gets to lead can teach us much not just about those leaders but about the societies in which they work. The elevation of Mary Robinson, Nicolas Sarkozy, Evo Morales, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, and, most conspicuously, Barack Obama to the presidency of their respective countries would not have been possible only a few decades ago. Making it all the way to the top is evidence of upward social mobility and of the political influence of women, peasants, workers, immigrants, and ethnic minorities. In turn, these changes influence the policy agendas of leaders, and change the structure of incentives for hopefuls to the top job.

Knowledge about the ebb and flow of leadership careers is a source of lessons for future leaders. Leadership becomes possible because the populace select individuals with whom they identify, or whom they trust, or whose claims to authority they respect. Each of these levers for leadership, however, is conditional and temporary in all but the most spellbinding cases of charismatic leadership (see also Gaffney, Chapter 26, this volume). Leaders have to build carefully and maintain their leadership capital. On this view political capital is a resource of the leader who accumulates to spend. The focus of the analysis is the leader, her narrative skills, and personal qualities. Alternatively, political capital can be seen as an attribute of followers who cede reputation, trust, and so on to the leader. It is a loan that cannot be banked but must be spent, and inevitably the borrower ends up in debt and the leader forecloses. It matters whether the focus of analysis is the leader or the leader's characteristics because the latter switches attention away from the leader's personal qualities to such key influences as the media and the zeitgeist. On both views, political capital is contingent and uncertain. Leaders cannot and will not please everyone always. They sometimes teach unpleasant realities, make trade-off choices, and embrace some values and interests while disowning others. Moreover, leaders hardly ever succeed in doing all that they promise. Seldom do they meet all of their followers' hopes. In fact, some scholars argue

that reducing followers' expectations at a rate they can absorb is an essential leadership quality (Heifetz, Grashow, and Linsky 2009).

5 Actors and Contexts

Our discussion of leadership as cause makes assumptions about the importance of human agency in any explanation. Does their ability to influence people and events stem from their personal characteristics and behaviour? If so, studying their personalities and actions in depth is essential or, do we see them as frail humans aloof on a sea of storms larger than themselves that sets the stage for their rise, performance, and fall? In that case, it is as essential to study the context they work in (see also Hart 2014; and Chapter 14, this volume).

Of course, the study of political leadership is no different from that of any other social phenomenon. The so-called agency-structure duality lies at the heart of the social sciences, as does the closely related duality between ideas and realities. Is human action shaped by objective physical and social realities, or by socially constructed, contingent, and contestable interpretations of those realities? Academics have debated this topic for over a century, and we cannot review it in full here or offer any resolution. We can note the implications for the study of leadership.

Who governs matters, but not always or all the time. Economic and political context may constrain the range of policies leaders can pursue, but that context is variously understood, as are its effects. Leaders can and do go against the prevailing tide. They may be written off as quixotic. They may have been sent to jail. But they do take a gamble on history.

Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brains of the living. (Marx 1954: 10)

Despite this weight of tradition, sometimes leaders win against all odds. It pays therefore to explore political leadership as a fundamentally disruptive force, and examine how some leaders challenge existing beliefs, practices, and traditions (Skowronek 1993; Bevir and Rhodes 2003; Heifetz, Grashow, and Linsky 2009). An interpretive approach will argue that traditions are not immutable. Traditions are a set of understandings, a set of inherited beliefs and practices, which someone receives during socialization. They are mainly a first influence on people. Social contexts do not determine the actions of individuals. Rather traditions are products of individual agency. When people confront unfamiliar circumstances or ideas, it poses a dilemma to their existing beliefs and practices. Consequently, they have to extend or change their heritage to encompass it, so developing that heritage. Every time they try to apply a tradition, they have to reflect on it, they have to try to understand it afresh in today's circumstances. By reflecting on it, they open it to change. Thus, human agency can produce change even when people think that they are sticking fast to a tradition which they regard as sacrosanct.
Leaders similarly are heirs to traditions. They inherit beliefs and practices: about their office in particular and the polity in general. As they confront the dilemmas of office, they modify that heritage, even when they choose not to openly challenge it. Such an ability to 'smuggle in' change incrementally, indeed almost inadvertently, means that they can survive at the helm when few thought that possible. They achieve policy reforms and social changes against the odds, and the inherited wisdom persists.

6 PERSONAL QUALITIES AND LUCK

Are political leaders relatively autonomous actors able to make their own luck? The temptation is always to attribute their success to their special qualities or traits—the 'great man' (sic) theory of leadership. Trait theories have had a chequered and largely unsuccessful history (see also Reicher, Haslam, and Platow, Chapter 10, this volume). On close inspection, explanations based on the leader's personal qualities are not persuasive. No public leader achieves all her objectives always, yet presumably she had the same personal qualities throughout. Even heroes of history like Catherine II, Empress of Russia, Winston Churchill, Mahatma Gandhi, Abraham Lincoln, and Margaret Thatcher experienced many vicissitudes and made many discernible errors of judgement before their finest hour arrived and they achieved greatness. No public leader ever worked alone. They are embedded in webs of beliefs and dependence. Behind every 'great' leader are indispensable collaborators, advisers, mentors, and coalitions: the building blocks of the leader's achievements.

We also have to entertain the possibility that these allegedly 'great' leaders might have been just plain lucky; that is, they get what they want without trying. They are 'systematically lucky'; that is, although they have resources which they can use if they want to, often they do not have to use them because they occupy an advantageous position. They get their own way by doing nothing (see Dowding 1996, 2008). Leadership and luck are often a matter of perceptions and reputations. Leaders and their reputations can be made or broken by events over which the leader is in question exercised little or no control; but we have to understand how reputations are formed. They are not given, objective facts. Rather, they are narratives constructed by the leaders and their followers. They hinge on myths and symbols (Edelman 1985). The most pervasive and pernicious are the myths and symbols of nationalism, but race and religion are rarely far away. We concede that leaders may attend football games because they like the game. Indeed, few would have the sheer disdain for sports of New South Wales Premier, Bob Carr, who was caught reading Dostoyevsky's Crime and Punishment while attending one of the Sydney Olympics finals. More likely, political leaders attend expecting the national side to win, thus bolstering the association between leader and country. They are constructing their image and their reputation, trying to ensure that their narrative of events prevails. Opponents have their preferred narrative. Both will draw on deep-seated traditions in telling their stories and to legitimize their view of the world.

All seek to manage meanings and influence followers. Successful leaders are skilled storytellers (see also Rhodes, Chapter 7; Grint, Chapter 16, this volume).

7 SUCCESS AND FAILURE

How do we know when a political leader has been successful? Again, there are no easy answers, or even agreement on the best way to seek an answer. The simplest criterion of all is longevity in office: getting re-elected, maintaining the support of party barons and keeping potential rivals at bay. The literature on leadership succession in both democracies and non-democracies is based at least implicitly on the premise that success equals political survival (Buono de Mesquita et al. 2004; 't Hart and Uhr 2011). Why do some leaders succeed, that is, survive, so spectacularly? Swedish Prime Minister Tage Erlander's 23 years in office, Helmut Kohl's 16 years as German Chancellor, or Robert Menzies' 17 years as Australian Prime Minister are a few examples. We can also mention the even longer reigns of dictators such as Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe or Cuba's Fidel Castro. Are they smarter, more persuasive, more persistent, more opportunistic, more ruthless, or just luckier than less 'successful' leaders? Did Kim Campbell, party leader and Prime Minister of Canada for a mere four months, fail to hold on to office because she lacked such skills? Or is it not personal qualities at all, but rather institutional rules of, for example, leadership selection and election, and circumstances that determine leaders' fates?

However, many would agree that office-holding is not a sufficient and perhaps not even a necessary condition for success (Heifetz 1994). We need more criteria. The traditional way of assessing leadership success is, of course, the tombstone biography with its measured tone and, usually, an author of forbearing even forgiving disposition (Marquand 2009). British Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, was seen as devious, vacillating, pragmatic to the point of unprincipled, and prone to conspiracy theories. His reputation was rescued by his biographer Ben Pimlott (1992) and much greater credence is now given to his tactical skill in managing divisive issues. Likewise, Fred Greenstein's careful archival research led to a complete overhaul of the predominant image of Dwight Eisenhower as a hands-off, do-nothing president, revealing his 'hidden-hand' style that was far more engaged and activist than contemporary media coverage had revealed (Greenstein 1982). The problem with biographies is that, when compared, there are no clear criteria of success or failure (see also Walter, Chapter 21, this volume). They are specific to the individual and his or her times. Undeterred, there is a mini-industry in, among others, the United Kingdom and the USA surveying the views of academics and other experts about the relative standing of prime ministers and presidents (for an overview, see Strangio, 't Hart, and Walter 2011). Belying the scientific trappings of a survey and quantitative analysis, the method is inter-subjective. It sums experts' judgement allowing much latitude on the criteria for those judgements. In effect, it fuels debate not only about relative standing, but also the criteria for judging. Such reputational techniques have been
widely criticized; for example, they are skewed towards recent political figures. Also, the rankings make some big assumptions; that leaders are 'in charge,' 'in control' and, therefore, 'responsible' for their records (see, for example, Bose and Landis 2011). Yet at least they provide a platform for debate and reflection about what values, styles, and accomplishments we seek in leaders past and present.

Of course, there are efforts to identify systematic criteria for measuring success or failure. Hennessy (2000: 528–9) identifies five sets of criteria: backdrop to the premiership; management capacity; insight and perception; change and innovation; and constitutional and procedural. These five categories are further sub-divided into seventeen criteria. However, this 'celestial chief justice,' remains unhappy with the exercise, calling his rankings 'crude.' Hart (2011, 2014) proposes the much simpler 'assessment triangle' composed of three families of criteria. First, there is impact or smart leadership, which requires the leader to deliver effective policies that solve problems. Second, there is support or accepted leadership, which requires the leader to win and keep the support not only of the electorates, but also of other key actors in governing. Finally, there is trustworthiness or accountable leadership, which requires leaders to be responsive to multiple overlapping accountabilities. Despite obvious limitations, these approaches have two marked advantages. First, they are explicit about the criteria for judging political leaders. If you disagree, then you need to suggest alternative criteria and the discussion is consequently on a much sounder footing. Second, they highlight the ways in which the criteria conflict. There are trade-offs between, for example, smart leadership introducing new policies and preserving support among key actors and from the electorate. Such trade-offs underline the besetting problem of this area; the criteria are not only subjective but change with people and circumstances. All compete for standing in Congress or parliament, in the party, and in the country. Gossip is a key but unreliable currency for all. The media are fickle. Standing and performance are contingent as is the dominance of the president or the prime minister, or the standing of any of his or her colleagues. Command and control is always a possibility. Rivals rise and are vanquished, but, equally, regicide happens.

8 Art and Profession

From the West to East, many observers of political leadership have chosen to portray leadership as an art (see also Keohan, Chapter 2, Chan and Chan, Chapter 4, this volume). They claim leadership cannot be captured in law-like generalizations based on neutral data and analytical detachment. By inference, it cannot be taught in the cerebral environment of an academic classroom or executive seminar. As so often, Max Weber (1991: 315) was on the mark when he suggested that the challenge of leadership is to forge warm passion and cool judgement together in one and the same soul. In practice, this maxim condemns aspiring leaders to a life of tough judgement calls between the passion that fires them up, the feeling of personal responsibility that drives them on, and a sense of proportion that is necessary to exercise good judgement.

Leadership is conceived by some of its most authoritative scholars as involving a large measure of practical wisdom; of insight that can be gained only through direct personal experience and sustained reflection. The core intangibles of leadership—empathy, intuition, creativity, courage, morality, judgement—are largely beyond the grasp of 'scientific' inquiry, let alone comprehensive explanation and evidence-based prescription. Understanding leadership comes from living it: being led, living with and advising leaders, doing one's own leading. Some understanding of leadership may be gained from vicarious learning; digesting the experiences of others: hence the old and steady appetite for the biographies and memoirs of politicians, and the contemporary market for 'live encounters' with former leaders who strut their stuff at seminars and conferences. When we cannot get the real thing, we are still willing to pay for the next best thing: books and seminars by the exclusive circle of leadership 'gurus' who observe and interrogate the great and the good. Even academia is not immune. Academics, too, seek to get up close and personal in ethnographic fieldwork (see also Gains, Chapter 19, this volume, Rhodes 2011).

In sharp contrast to this long-standing view, a 'science of leadership' has sprung up in the latter half of the twentieth century. Thousands of academics now make a living treating leadership as they would any other topic in the social sciences. They treat it as an object of study, which can be picked apart and put together by forms of inquiry that seek to emulate the natural sciences (see also Blondel, Chapter 46, this volume). Their papers fill journals, handbooks, conference programmes, and lecture theatres. Many among them make in-roads into the real world of political leadership as consultants and advisers, often well paid. Much of this activity prompts a bemused response. It is of little help to know that 45 variables completely explain three cases. It would not persist, however, if such knowledge did not help in grasping at least some of the puzzles that leaders face and leadership poses. Alternatively, it could meet the insatiable need of leaders to understand their world and talk to outsiders 'because they are so worried about whether it makes sense or, indeed, whether they make sense' (Rawnsley 2001: xi).

It is this 'scientific' understanding of leadership that we now see echoed in widespread attempts to erect a leadership profession (see also Hartley, Chapter 44, this volume). The language of leadership has pervaded the job descriptions, training, and performance management of public servants at even junior management levels. Many public service commissions or equivalent bodies have embarked on developing integrated leadership frameworks. These frameworks stipulate bundles of leadership skills, which are linked to performance indicators for each different leadership role. People wanting to move up must meet these criteria of successful performance. They must also attend set courses, accept a set of shared values, and subject themselves to standardized tests. When they manage to get all the boxes ticked, they get ushered into a fraternity rather like a Masonic Lodge. Uniformity is nurtured and celebrated through lucrative rewards packages. Leadership education is ubiquitous. Everyone regularly attends meetings where leadership gurus perform. The aim is not to impart knowledge, but to solidify a shared
9 Transcending the Dichotomies?

Clearly, when taken to extremes both the art and the science assumptions about 'understanding leadership' lead to absurd results. The mystifications of wisdom and judgement untainted by evidence confront the quasi-scientific 'one size fits all' generalizations that sustain allegedly evidence-based leadership training and reform. Both privilege one form of knowledge over all others. Both generate their own quacks and true believers. Both do well out of their trade. Sadly, both pay too little attention to what we know and how we know it. Their certainties defy the limits to knowledge and the resulting failures, big and little, do a disservice to practitioners and academics alike. The best we can offer is not prediction but informed conjecture. So caveat emptor for those seeking solutions from the study of political leadership. There is much on offer: insight, careful analysis, and lessons for the wary. As Greenleaf (1983) suggests, however:

The concept of a genuine social science has had its ups and downs, and it still survives, though we are as far from its achievement as we were when Spencer (or Bacon for that matter) first put pen to paper. Indeed it is all the more likely that the continuous attempts made in this direction serve only to demonstrate...the inherent futility of the enterprise.

(Greenleaf 1983: 286)

So, leadership studies have no 'solutions'; nor do leaders. They acquire office by promising to solve problems, but more often than not end up presiding over problem succession as another problem emerges from the one they thought they had just solved. There is no unified theory of leadership. There are too many definitions, and too many theories in too many disciplines. We do not agree on what leadership is, how to study it, or even why we study it. The subject is not just beset by dichotomies; it is also multifaceted, and essentially contested.

Such is the world of leadership, and its contingency and complexity are why so many leaders' careers end in disappointment. In the study and teaching of heroic and transformative leadership, hubris is all too common, so perhaps the final lesson should be: 'A leader is best when people barely know that he exists, not so good when people obey and acclaim him, worst when they despise him. Fail to honour people. They fail to honour you' (Lao Tzu, The Tao Te Ching).

10 Summary

As this Handbook demonstrates, political leadership has made a comeback. It was studied intensively not only by political scientists, but also by political sociologists and psychologists, Sovietologists, political anthropologists, comparative and development studies by scholars from the 1940s to the 1970s. Thereafter, the field lost its way with the rise of structuralism, neo-institutionalism, and rational choice approaches to the study of politics, government, and governance. Recently, however, students of politics have returned to studying the role of individual leaders and the exercise of leadership to explain political outcomes. The list of topics is high endless: elections, conflict management, public policy, government popularity, development, governance networks, and regional integration. In the media age, leaders are presented and stage-managed—spun—as the solution to almost every social problem. Through the mass media and the Internet, citizens and professional observers follow the rise, impact, and fall of senior political office holders at closer quarters than ever before.

This Handbook encapsulates the resurgence by asking, where are we today? It orders the multidisciplinary field by identifying the distinct and distinctive contributions of the disciplines. It meets the urgent need to take stock. Our objectives are straightforward:

- to provide comprehensive coverage of all the major disciplines, methods, and regions;
- to showcase both the normative and empirical traditions in political leadership studies;
- to juxtapose behavioural, institutional, and interpretive approaches;
- to cover formal, office-based as well as informal, emergent political leadership;
- to cover leadership in democratic as well as undemocratic polities;
- to draw on scholars from around the world and encourage a comparative perspective.

There was no fixed template for every chapter, but we encouraged contributors to take stock of their topic by covering most, if not all, of the following:

- the historical, intellectual and practical context of political leadership;
- key ideas, questions, and debates;
- landmark contributions—the classics, the mavericks, and the avant-garde;
- the state of the art in each field and its practical import;
- future areas of research.

In our view, a Handbook chapter should not be a cataloguing exercise. Nor is it an advertisement for the contribution of the author and like-minded scholars. Authors were
encouraged to air their own views, and not be shy about their own work, but they also had to do justice to the breadth and variety of scholarship in the area.

In Part II, we provide a discipline by discipline survey of the field. Although it is a Handbook of political leadership, our survey cannot be limited to political science, which is not even the major contributor to the subject. We cover leadership in Western and Eastern political thought, democratic theory, feminism, public administration, psychology, psychoanalysis, social psychology, economics, and anthropology. This section demonstrates the range of insights available and the vast amount of careful analysis. As important, it highlights that there are incommensurable perspectives not only between the several disciplines but also within each one. We believe it supports the case for 'genre blurring' (Geertz 1988): that is, for several disciplines to draw on one another's theories and methods.

In Part III, we focus on analytical perspectives and methods. We cover institutional analysis, contextual analysis, decision-making analysis, social constructivism, rhetorical analysis, experimental analysis, observational analysis, at-a-distance analysis, biographical analysis, and political personality profiling. Given the persistent desire to emulate the natural sciences in much political science, we believe that this section demonstrates the value of a broad toolkit with which to explore the diverse phenomenon that is political leadership.

In Part IV, we turn from theory and methods to look at leadership in several contexts. We examine political leadership at work in civic leadership, political parties, populist movements, the public sphere, policy networks, and during crisis situations. This section demonstrates that a key trend in the present-day study of political leadership is its broader compass. Moving well beyond classic preoccupation with executive government elites, political leadership eludes into the broader notion of public leadership. A positional approach has given way to a functional approach (see Hart and Uhr 2008). For some, this trend courts the danger of leadership becoming every action that influences others. As a result, leadership loses its distinctive character. For others, it highlights the ubiquity and complexity of leadership.

In Part V, we look at executive leadership in the West. We begin with varieties of presidential leadership in the USA and then examine presidential communication. Then, we turn to semi-presidential polities, followed by an examination of the varieties of prime ministerial leadership in Westminster and related forms of parliamentary government. Finally, we look at the contingencies of prime ministerial power in the UK, prime ministers and their advisers, and ministers. The aspiration to a comparative science of political leadership confronts the diversity and contingencies revealed by these chapters. Not only has any comparative study to encompass the differences between presidential, semi-presidential, and parliamentary polities, but it must also cover the daunting diversity within each category. Idiographic studies offering plausible conjectures seem at least as plausible as nomothetic studies claiming to explain the variations and even to predict.

While the attractions of examining national leaders and leadership are obvious, political leadership below and beyond the national level is also important. So, in Part VI, we examine local political leadership, regional political leadership, and international leadership. Then, in Part VI, we look at political leadership in China, Latin America, Russia and the Caucasus, and Africa.

We end in Part VII with three reflective pieces on training political leaders, leadership and gender and a review of what we have learned about political leadership over the past 50 years. We end where we started our overview—with the questions of whether leadership is good or bad and how in democratic societies we contain its worst excesses. The present-day abuses of power in Latin America and Africa should not blind us to the less than auspicious histories of Western democracies which have supported and suffered from some of the worst despots in human history. As the populace of Northern England would phrase it, 'when push comes to shove' the study of political leadership is about the constitutional and political role of leaders in a democratic polity; about how we want to be governed, not about methods, training, and leadership skills.

Even this briefest of bare summaries should indicate the scope of this Handbook, whether we are talking about major disciplines, methods, or regions. For those readers who want abstracts for each chapter, they are available at Oxford Handbooks Online (OHO), soon to be renamed Oxford Research Reviews (ORR). Please visit <www.oxfordhandbooks.com/> and search under 'Political Science'. You will also be able to carry out a keyword search on the volume to identify those chapters most closely aligned with your interests. Finally, and an exciting innovation, the site has changed from an e-book database to an article delivery service and you will be able to download individual chapters through the university library just as you now download articles from journals.

References
