All Tarred with the Same Brush

The Convergence of Security and Development in Human Security

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ABSTRACT

The ongoing situation in Afghanistan highlights the deadly implications that the convergence of security and development can create. The article argues that prior to the current focus on the security-development nexus, the convergence was first evidenced by the creation of human security. The article reviews the power relationships involved in the processes that have affected understandings of security and development in the process of the creation of human security. By investigating how the securitisation process operates with regards to human security, the ongoing convergence of security and development will be made evident. The implications for humanitarian workers in Afghanistan will be used to highlight that a clearer delineation is needed between security and development, both in discourse and in practice.

Keywords: Securitisation, human security, security-development nexus.

Aid agencies rely on their sturdy white SUVs to brave the rough terrain. But though the vehicles offer robust protection from the rough terrain, they may expose humanitarian workers to another far more complicated danger: being mistaken for military personnel. Until recently, NATO forces also used white vehicles in their military fleet. So to the annoyance and alarm of many aid groups, there was no way of telling one from the other. (Husarska, 2009)

This observation encapsulates a larger issue with significant ramifications (Vaughn, 2009). The fact of both military and humanitarian vehicles being painted white in Afghanistan reflects a theoretical debate centred on the convergence of security and development actions and concerns. A large part of this debate has been the introduction of the concept of human security. This article examines both the empirical and theoretical implications of the concept. In investigating human security, the article seeks to answer how has the convergence of security and development been evident in security discourses? Is this process also reflected in an empirical example? What impact has human security had on the discursive convergence? What implications are there for humanitarian workers if development activities are being co-opted by the military?

It will be argued that a clearer delineation between security and development is more appropriate due to the securitisation process that is inherent in human security. This article seeks to explore how security¹ is being privileged in both discourse and empirics. Human security is a reflection of the securitisation process and therefore has elements that naturally privilege national security prerogatives. The power relationship within the security-development nexus shows us that security is privileged over the concerns of development. The issues that result from this are best reflected in Afghanistan, where the aims of security forces are converging with, competing with and threatening the work and aims of humanitarian groups.

This article will firstly examine the contested definitions of security and development. It will then analyse the original introduction of human security and the possible interpretations of the motivations for its creation. It will then look at how human security fits a secur-
itisation process and how security discourses, while empowering development discourses, also dominate them. Following this, it will look at how the security-development nexus is currently being perceived. Lastly, it will show how the convergence of security and development is creating very real problems in Afghanistan. It will conclude by arguing that approaching security and development would be preferable in the form of a clearer delineation within the security-development nexus rather than the convergence of human security.

DEFINING SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT

In order to explore the main concepts, an understanding of the contested concepts of security and development is needed. Security, firstly, is a broad-ranging and contested concept (Gallie, 1955; Baldwin, 1997, p. 10). Closely tied to notions of realism, it reflects also a tradition of analysis and security studies. Buzan, Waever and DeWilde defined the traditional military-political understanding of security as being ‘about survival. It is when an issue is presented as posing an existential threat to a designated referent object (traditionally, but not necessarily the state)’ (1998, p. 21). Waever (1995) argued that the traditional concept of security refers solely to that of the state (1995, pp. 48-51). From this argument, the traditions that surround the concept are ingrained and established within understandings that privilege national security as the referent object (Waever, 1995, p. 49). Caroline Thomas (2001, p. 161) echoes this argument, highlighting the orthodoxy of international security analysis that places the state as the exclusive and primary referent object. It is from this conceptualisation that security will be analysed in relation to development.

Development also represents a wide-ranging, contested and all-encompassing term. This article uses a limited definition for development taken from the United Nations General Assembly’s (UNGA) Declaration on the Right to Development: ‘Development is a comprehensive economic, social, cultural and political process, which aims at the constant improvement of the well-being of the entire population and of all individuals on the basis of their active, free and meaningful participation in development and in the fair distribution of benefits resulting there from’ (UNGA, 1986). Most notable from this definition is the lack of priority for state security, the reiteration of cosmopolitan values and lack of the prioritisation of any particular issue. States are, however, often involved in development practices along with non-governmental organisation (NGOs).

There is a clear connection and linear progression between humanitarian aid and development. Humanitarian aid is seen as the provision of aid to victims of emergencies in ‘accordance with the principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality’ (UNGA, 1991). The connection between the two was spelt out by the UNGA. For importantly the UNGA sought to clarify that:

There is a clear relationship between emergency, rehabilitation and development. In order to ensure a smooth transition from relief to rehabilitation and development, emergency assistance should be provided in ways that will be supportive of recovery and long-term development. Thus, emergency measures should be seen as a step towards long-term development. (UNGA, 1991)

This highlights the sequential relationship that progresses from humanitarian aid to development. This is a very important relationship to identify. It is especially important when comparing the long-term mission objectives of security and development in Afghanistan.
At first glance, security and development do not seem to pose any ambivalence for each other. The means by which they enact their aims however, and the relative understandings of the importance of the state, are fundamental to their operational differences.

HUMAN SECURITY

One of the first articulations of the concept of ‘human security’ is often attributed to the United Nations Development Program’s (UNDP) Report in 1994 (Liotta, 2002; McCormack, 2009; Paris, 2001; United Nations Development Program, 1994). In its simplest terms, human security is the attempt to focus on the security of individuals, rather than the security of the state. This article will not review all interpretations and definitions of human security. This section looks at the fundamental elements of human security along with its inherent associations and the related implications that stem from its creation, and the ensuing debate to define human security. Seen as a discursive struggle between security and development, it is argued that the creation of human security is an example of the convergence of the two concepts that can both privilege and silence.

The UNDP report articulated the very essence of the discursive struggle that epitomises the interplay between security and development discourses. The UNDP report attempted to change the referent object of security from that of a state-centric approach to one that concerned the preservation of individuals (United Nations Development Program, 1994). It also attempted to wrest the focus from security thinking to a wider conception: ‘We need another profound transition in thinking—from nuclear security to human security. The concept of security has for too long been interpreted narrowly’ (United Nations Development Program, 1994, p. 23) This highlights the recognition by the authors that prioritisation had been placed upon national security interests and not development concerns. The UNDP 1994, attempted to reprioritise the importance of human development by reconceptualising development in security terms.

The emergence of human security is one that originates in the discursive realm. The year 1994 did not see a defining empirical event that motivated invoking the individual as the primary referent of security. The end of the Cold War certainly changed strategic thinking; however the evolution of the concept’s challenge to ontological assumptions of security occurred over time rather than in response to significant events that dealt with referent objects of security. Burgess saw that ‘there is thus no essential empirical basis for explaining the emergence of the concept of human security. Rather, it is a question of perceptions and of awareness’ (2008, p. 51). The fields of security or development had not encountered any world event that challenged the notion of what should constitute the referent object of security.2 This debate only occurred in the discursive circles of international relations theory. Rather than a paradigm shift that radically altered understandings of the nature of security, human security was ‘a change in emphasis’ (MacLean, 2006, p. 68). There was no evidence to suggest that there was an increase in people dying from human security issues, rather that less people were dying from inter-state warfare and therefore, relatively, the saliency of human security became more prevalent. In fact, human security’s emphasis on the dangers of underdevelopment is not new, but can ‘be found in nineteenth-century fears of social breakdown as well as the claimed link between poverty and communism at the time of decolonisation’ (Duffield, 2007, p. 115). Despite the aspects of this neologism being evident in the past, defining the term remains contentious.
In the years that have followed, no common definition has emerged of human security (Acharya, 2004; Burgess & Owen, 2004; Thomas, 2004). While this definitional expansiveness has been useful as a galvanising tool (Grayson, 2004) and as a means to ‘offer a little bit of something to everyone’ (Christie, 2010, p. 170), it is still open to criticism of its relevance as a concept (Paris, 2001). Acknowledging that there are many definitions of human security, the issues at stake here are the implications that all definitions of human security must encounter in relation to the securitisation process.

Broad interpretations of human security that look at more pervasive threats to individuals have been classed under the title ‘Freedom from Want’, whereas narrow interpretations that primarily, but not exclusively, look at violent threats to individuals have been classed under the ‘Freedom from Fear’ banner (Nishikawa, 2009; Thomas, 2007). Exploring how either narrow or broad definitions of human security reflect engagement with the securitisation process is necessary because of the operational implications, which will be examined below in the example of Afghanistan. If human security moves so far away from traditional understandings of security, what motivations are there for securitising development in the first place?

Firstly, the Freedom from Want conception of human security can be seen as having less ‘political purchase’ than narrower conceptions (Nishikawa, 2009). The most prevalent argument against the relevance of ‘Freedom from Want’ conceptions is that it broadens the frame of reference so wide as to become analytically empty (Paris, 2001, p. 93). By not prioritising, it inhibits policy creation and this is seen as being ineffectual. The securitisation process has as its raison d’être the power to prioritise issues, to take them from the realm of normal politics and imbue them with a sense of urgency. The problem with a wide definition of human security is that it does not distinguish itself from the ‘normal politics’ of development. The simple question is, then, why utilise security discourse to describe the normal politicisation (development) process? Being clear on the advantages and pitfalls of invoking security is needed if one is to utilise human security.

Freedom from Fear or narrow interpretations of human security have recently gained ascendency for arguably two reasons. Firstly, by invoking a narrow conception of human security, discrete policy choices can be established (Thomas & Tow, 2002). Secondly, due to their state-centric nature, narrow conceptions are more amenable to state concerns (Bellamy & MacDonald, 2002, p. 373). This is based upon their simplicity and clarity, a trait that defines security. As the human security debate continues, the narrower and realist conceptions are given more credence for they inform and cohabitate with statist national security interests. This controversy has been the main stumbling block in the many attempts to define human security in either narrow or wide definitions (Thomas & Tow, 2002; Tow & Trood, 2000).

The definition debate is important for it articulates the operational implications of certain conceptions of human security. The operational convergence of security and development is most present in narrow definitions. Therefore if the definitional debate presents narrow interpretations that are largely based on traditional notions of security, the operational privileging of security concerns can occur more easily.

Kyle Grayson (2004) highlights that the polarity in the definitional debate is a reflection of the power that security studies (and national security) has in marginalising competing definitions of security. By deriding the lack of conceptual clarity, the relative clarity of national security may be then seen as preferable. David Black (2006) supports this conception of the power relation as he sees that the need for an analytical definition will return any defining of security back towards notions of state-centrism. Analytical simplicity, relative to
human security, makes creation of policy easier in this regard. Yet how do the different definitions of human security forward development concerns?

**SEURITIZATION**

The following section looks to map the securitisation process and how particularly each part of the process is applicable to human security. It will be argued that rather than a challenge to security, human security is an example of the securitising of development concerns. Rather than compare the Copenhagen school to definitions of human security, this section will apply the explanatory process of securitisation to human security. This section will examine the initial concepts of the securitisation process and then show how the concept of security has inherent securitising power. Examining the discursive role of security studies and development theorists as securitising actors will highlight the emerging convergence of the terms.

The Copenhagen school, lead by the works of Ole Waever (1995) and Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (1998) developed securitisation to explain how discourses of security have the power to manipulate and control the agenda of politicisation. By using this notion, it should be evident that the uneven power relations that are operational between security and development motivated the creation of human security. It is this relationship that highlights the power of security discourses within the security-development nexus. By looking at the characteristics of the securitisation process and its relationship to the evolution of the human security concept, the hegemonic power of security over development concerns within the security-development nexus will become evident.

Securitisation has many aspects, one of the most important being its operation in the discursive realm. By anointing a political issue a ‘security issue’, the process of securitisation has begun. Waever sees those in a powerful position, who articulate what constitutes a security issue through a speech act, are then able to invoke special needs in order to address that issue (Waever, 1995, p. 55). Once an issue becomes labelled as a security issue, its importance is elevated, thereby affecting the resources and ways in which that issue is dealt with. Securitisation occurs when an issue ‘is presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure’ (Buzan et al., 1998, pp. 23-24). As will be highlighted later, the application of securitisation to development was a deliberate attempt to provide human security with a means of dealing with the problems of development, from ‘normal’ approaches.

Taking the first uses of human security—the UNDP report of 1994—the securitisation process can be applied to its creation. In this case, the UNDP itself can be considered the actor and the UNDP report ‘the speech act’. Articulating development with the term security, implies that the ‘normal politics’ of development can no longer be seen to be sufficient to warrant approaching problems in development terms. Therefore development needed to be reconceptualised in order to gain purchase, power and resources in contest with security discourses and agencies.

Another element of the securitisation process is the enabling of special measures to address the securitising element. McDonald concurs that a securitising speech act ‘enables emergency measures and the suspension of “normal politics” in dealing with that issue’ (McDonald, 2008, p. 567). With human security therefore, the suspension of ‘normal politics’ can be referred as the suspension of normal approaches to development. With the articulation of human security, the normal and traditional forms of conceptualising development are seen
as inadequate in preference to approaches with security discourses that use referent object, threat and relevant solution.

By elevating development in such terms, the securitisation process has both the power to prioritise and to exclude. Buzan, Waever and De Wilde see securitisation as normatively undesirable for it elevates those issues out of the scrutiny of the public sphere (1998, p. 29). Once again with the securitisation of human security, development is no longer within the purview of development actors, it now belongs in the sphere of security professionals. Kyle Grayson normatively argues that human security should securitise issues but 'done in order to prioritize them within the bounds of normal politics while leaving policy open for discussion and constant scrutiny' (Grayson, 2004, p. 340). Therefore it is important not to securitise development in such a way that sees it prioritised as to exit the normal bounds of political procedure (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 22). If securitisation is used as a prioritisation process it therefore has a dangerous silencing effect.

Whilst the referent object of human security is clear, the audience for the securitisation process of human security is contestable. The referent object ‘of securitization is something that is considered to be existentially threatened’ (Burgess, 2008, p. 57). While human beings are the intended referent object for human security, the audience for whom the securitisation process of human security was intended is less clear (Tadjbakhsh & Chenoy, 2007). Often overlooked is the issue of identifying who the intended audience is, an aspect that is essential to understanding the process (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 41). The referent object and the audience are two distinct groups for analysis.

The intended audience of the securitisation process is, at times, case specific. It is an area of securitisation that is under-theorised (Vaughn, 2009, pp 273-274). While there may be a multiplicity of intended audiences for the securitisation process (Roe, 2008, p. 616), assigning the intended audience is contestable. In analysing the publication of human security, however, one has to ask, who was the intended audience? The UNDP report, which tried to change security thinking, was not published in a security journal, and therefore arguably not directed to an audience of security professionals. It was published in a major development report. Rather than a call for security scholars to use development discourses, it can be seen as the reverse. Aimed at development practitioners, it clearly states an intention to use security discourse, and its related ontology, to address development concerns. In doing so there is recognition of the power and priority that security discourses have over development discourses. While this securitising process is not a fait de accompli, its implications are considerable.

The securitising actor in this regard can be seen as the development community. The institutional character of the UNDP itself, and subsequent human security reports, lends this securitising move more authority, despite not being a traditional securitising actor (either a state or a security organisation), for all the reports subscribe to an institutional author as opposed to an individual (Vaughn, 2009, p. 274). This enhances the possibility of success for the securitising action (Buzan et al., 1998; Vaughn, 2009). The institutional character of the securitising actor in this case highlights that securitisation is not a singular direction of power application.

The interaction between the UNDP, as a representative of the development field, and the discourses of security, highlights that the securitisation process is not a one-way discursive action. The problem arises as to whether the whole development community was willing to have development articulated in security discourses or whether this was an action of a single institutional securitiser? It also highlights that the securitisation process is not necessarily a
process an actor places on an issue, for an audience, but rather a procedural dialogue of legitimacy that negotiates power. An articulation of security does not come without attending consequences. For the negotiation of discursive power between security and development has been, and continues to, occur.

From within the academic field came an understanding that security studies had to evolve in order to continue to be relevant, and to maintain its policy dominance in the post-Cold War peace dividend. Indeed Walt saw that the end of the Cold War might ‘divert financial support and research energies in other directions’ (1991, p. 22). A concern to redirect the focus and money from security studies to development highlights the power that security and development contest. Wibben identifies that human security in this instance was not a challenge to the primacy of established approaches to security but rather a framework ‘too easily co-opted by political elites’ (2008, p. 455). The potential monetary and material advantage highlights the importance that security studies placed on adapting the analysis of security to serve the tenets of security studies. This area is one that needs to be engaged with more within the academic field of human security.

Indeed, capturing the discursive element holds great advantages. Capturing the discursive definition of security in either national or human terms implies that ‘security, from this perspective is often less an objective condition and more the way in which professional groups compete for visibility, influence and scarce resources’ (Duffield, 2007, p. 3). The first of these groups to utilise security for their own ends through human security was the UNDP and it has since become a cause adopted by countries and organisations alike. This has created considerable benefits and should not be perceived as a purely negative process (McDonald, 2008, p. 564). It is rather a process of empowerment, one that an audience can enact on itself to gain attention.

The attraction of the securitisation process is its ability to appropriate resources. Hampson argues that the UNDP saw the end of the Cold War and resulting peace dividend as an opportunity to ‘bring to the development field many of the resources that had gone into military expenditure during the Cold War’ (Hampson, 2002, p. 160). Thus the creation of human security, which can be seen as the securitising of development, was able to gain more political and theoretical saliency, as it became empowered utilising security discourses. A major issue that extends from this process is that by framing development concerns within a security discourse, these concerns become conceptualised as threats to security.

The securitisation of a threat is a discursive element that operates within the power of security discourses in a subtle and indirect manner. Yet this process needs a political influence in order to drive the securitisation process. Black sees that ‘human security, by “securitizing” a wide range of global dangers, opens the door to their being constructed as “threats” and thereby gives licence to a much more permissive approach to the application of force by those in a position to use it’ (2006, p. 59). This is not to say that the very existence of human security predicates that this securitisation will inevitably follow. For human security to be operationalised in such a manner it requires a contingent reliance on political motivations. Though the fact that human security, by its very creation within security discourses, may create such a situation, it is one that needs addressing if the convergence of security and development is to continue.

By enjoining notions of development to a conceptual framework based on security notions, human security reflects the ontological assumptions inherent in security studies. Waever (1995) warned against expanding the notion of security threats upon a traditional concept that has innate assumptions that are not easily transferable. Traditional security in this sense
has an established ontology that clearly, and continually, concentrates on the state. Therefore the tradition of security is one that refers to the state (Waever, 1995, p. 49). By enacting the notion of security, one is accepting the tradition that follows from that concept. Yet it is not only the tradition of the referent object that follows the use of security but also the nature of the interactions associated with security.

The discursive hegemonic position that security discourses have over development discourses has significant policy and analysis implications. Anthony Burke (2001) illustrates the privilege that security discourses has is that security studies is a hegemonic concept in policy-making. Security studies hold policy primacy. The willingness of security studies scholars to maintain this position can be seen in its commitment to reformulate itself in the post-Cold War period to maintain ascendancy. The main process for this was identified by reconceptualising security through threats outside of traditional notions of national security (Mathews, 1989; Miller, 2001; Walt, 1991). Pettman (2005) tried to invert this relationship, by seeing security studies as subordinate to human security. Yet it is problematic for security studies to still hold a primacy in analysis. It seems difficult to conceive of how human security, while shaping itself in security studies discourse, could suddenly be master of it. Security studies has demonstrated a reflexive nature to address the challenge of competing issues in international relations.

In framing development concerns in security terms there has been a change in the ethical nature of the interaction. Burgess sees that by uncritically borrowing notions of threat from security, human security has accepted ontological distinctions that position development in adversarial terms (Burgess, 2008). The very nature of security is one that creates an adversarial other (Dannreuther, 2007) and prioritises the interests of states (particularly strong ones) (Benedek, 2008). It is this power discourse relation that sees security in opposition to notions of development. An adversarial approach appears to be in opposition to the intended objectives of the definition of development advocated by the UN. A return of the adversarial and statist assumptions of security is always a problem.

There have been warnings about the prevalence and power of realist assumptions to operate within the securitisation of human security. Burke sees that there should be careful consideration of the situation where ‘human security approaches might be co-opted by or quarantined within a realist-cum-traditional framework whose assumptions remain fundamentally intact’ (Burke, 2001, p. 222). There is a danger that the conceptualising of human security can create a situation where ‘realist ontology “trump[s]” the security of the individual’ (Bellamy & McDonald, 2002, p. 374) by automatically privileging the state. As Waever notes, the very ‘concept of security is the state’ (Waever, 1995, p. 49). This circular argument highlights the challenges that the securitisation process presents for any conceptualising of security in terms outside of its traditional definition, despite the attempts to define human security differently.

THE SECURITY-DEVELOPMENT NEXUS

If the human security reflects a securitisation process, then in what ways can the relationship between security and development be defined? The dilemma of the security-development nexus is where their interrelationship and convergence creates problems both in theory and practice (Stern & Ojendal, 2010). In recent years, the security-development nexus has highlighted the contested issue that ‘you cannot have security without development, while development without security is impossible’ (Duffield, 2007, p. 119). Their perceived inter-
dependence, along with constructions of human security, has seen the discursive field re-evaluate the implications of this nexus. This dilemma places significant pressure on ascribing value, and priority, to either security or development.

An initial problem is the notion that the underdevelopment of countries is a threat to the security of developed ones. Duffield (2007) argues that there is an implied power relationship that powerful nations have with underdeveloped nations, whereby the security of the former is based on the development of the latter. This line of argument sees that rather than cosmopolitan concern for the individual as the referent object, human security is merely an inverse of the security-development nexus in favour of developed powerful states (Mccormack, 2008, p. 118). If this is true, then the actions of militaries will only reflect narrow self-interest in development work. The obvious implications for this can be seen in Afghanistan.

By utilising the security-development nexus there is a clearer delineation between the politics of security and the humanitarian space of development. While human security was an attempt to mould security and development together, one definition of the security-development nexus would maintain their separation while acknowledging their interdependence and avoiding the myriad of problems associated with their combination (Stern & Ojendal, 2010, p. 21). While they are highly interrelated and interdependent, they are not conflated or conjoined to the analytical detriment of the other. There is a problem when trying to find common solutions to the—at times—conflicting notions of security and development.

Kaldor (2007, p. 183) illustrated this problem by highlighting that while security and development have common goals, there are no common terms, or even a common approach. Kaldor (2007) goes on to argue that there needs to be a cognitive shift in both military and development thinking if this relationship is going to work safely or effectively for either end. The security-development nexus is both a problem that requires analysis, while also being a useful tool for understanding the interrelated nature of the two concepts.

The relationship that human security holds to the security-development nexus is most clearly evident in narrow understandings of human security. Alkire (2003), Hampson (2002, p. 30) and Owen (2008, p. 37) outline that while there is a similarity between human security (in narrow terms) and development, their execution diverges greatly. Rather than combining the two concepts into an all-encompassing concept such as human security, an understanding of how they are interrelated, though at times oppositional, is needed. It is for this reason that a clearer delineation is needed in understanding the security-development nexus.

While human security was an attempt to refocus the security discourse within development lines, a significant actualisation of this can be seen in the military, as there is a growing recognition that from the human security perspective, ‘instead of conventional military threats, international security is menaced by the modalities of underdevelopment—such as poverty, health crises, environmental collapse or migration’ (Duffield, 2007, p. 111). As such, in order to deal with these threats there is a growing perception that the military needs to adapt. As a result, military force reorganisation has seen a significant shift toward non-military tasks and functions (Cheeseman, 2005, pp. 70-71). The problems of this development will be seen in the example of Afghanistan.

THE SECURITY-DEVELOPMENT NEXUS AND AFGHANISTAN

Husarska’s (2009) observation at the beginning of this article that both military and humanitarian vehicles in Afghanistan are painted white is a poignant symbolic starting point for
investigation. This observation is representative of the converging security-development nexus. That ‘US airplanes [were] dropping food into Afghanistan, while others were simultaneously dropping bombs’ (Dalby, 2005, p. 424) is a critical illustration of the convergence (and simultaneous contradiction) of security and development in an empirical, and ongoing, example. The US invasion, and subsequent tactics in Afghanistan, has brought to light some of the operational problems of two competing concepts—security and development—using converging means but disparate, and at times oppositional, aims. The ramifications for this convergence are not only deadly but can serve to undermine the long-term objective of both concepts.

Afghanistan has long been a hotbed of foreign intervention from both governments and NGOs alike. For many years NGOs have operated within greater geo-strategic concerns. In a study that spanned from 1979 to 1990 it was found that, ‘many of the nearly 300 NGOs involved in the Afghan crisis have provided badly needed humanitarian aid. When studied more closely, however, one realises that NGO “humanitarian” work has, to varying degrees, been used for political purposes’ (Baitenmann, 1990, p. 82).

There has long been a connection between the humanitarian goals and related national interest benefits. It is important to note however, as Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy (2005, pp. 57-77) illustrate, that within this war zone there are genuine human security concerns. Unfortunately, this section cannot deal with all of the attending operational implications that are affected, but rather highlight the issues of convergence. While human security has highlighted the convergence of security and development in the discursive realm, the present situation in Afghanistan reflects convergence of security and development in the practical sense.

The appropriation of development methods and objectives for national interests can be seen in the convergence of security and development forces in Afghanistan. While only one form of the convergence between security and development, armed occupation is a crux point of the interaction of security and development empirically. While the post-Cold War period saw the relative increase in concern for development issues, the Global War on Terror, enacted by the United States of America (USA), placed the security interests of the state firmly over notions of development (Duffield, 2007, p. 132-137). As a result, ‘development and human security are subordinated to the War on Terror and national security concerns. This convergence of military and development objectives, and the subordination of the latter to the former, has in turn had consequences for civil society’ (Howell & Lind, 2008, p. 35). While the USA has not formally adopted a human security approach, the implications of human security on the national security of the USA are evident.

The invasion of Afghanistan, the overthrow of the Taliban government and subsequent development actions of the USA were all framed in discourse that saw that the security of the USA was dependant on the development of Afghanistan (Duffield, 2007, p. 128). More importantly, this development, along with others, had contributed to the perception that human security discourses have been superseded by concerns for national security (De Larринaga, 2008, p. 518).

The convergence of security and development are evident in the discourse surrounding the Afghanistan invasion despite not being attributable to a singular actor or action. Burnell (2007, p. 57) cites George W. Bush stating that the USA would use foreign aid to promote US values. The use of foreign aid and military budgets for humanitarian relief in line with national interests is well documented (Howell & Lind, 2008; Rubin, 2006; Shannon, 2009; Vaughn, 2009). Duffield (2007, p. 128) has noted that the strategic framework for Afgh-
anistan ties closely national security objectives and development goals in a way that privileges the political security concerns of the USA. Notions of human security have affected the concept of ‘space’—either humanitarian or political—in the convergence and contradiction between military and humanitarian forces in Afghanistan (Dalby, 2005, p. 424). Klingebiel and Roehder (2004) state that there is evidence that development is not only subordinate to security concerns but also that development funds are being co-opted for security ends. There is no singular action, or actor, that has created this contingent political decision to override development with particularistic security concerns; there are contesting claims that this is occurring. The unspecified nature of the convergence reflects an understanding of power that does not require an actor to operationalise the domination; rather, that there is power inherent in security which enacts this process. The implications of this can be seen in the actions of NGOs, both humanitarian and development groups.

There are several concerns that the convergence of security and development has in this case. This has greater implications for NGOs than the military (although these will be further discussed below). An initial implication is that there is a perceived shrinking of ‘the humanitarian space’ (Phelan & Wood, 2005, p. 6). Humanitarian space is, like most concepts, contested. Shannon defines it as a term ‘used to convey the extent to which an environment is conducive to humanitarian operations and the principles of neutrality and impartiality’ (2009, p. 20). While humanitarian space is a concept related to development practices, it illustrates and connects well with notions of securitisation. They are both speech acts, as humanitarian space refers to the discourse that surrounds the principles of humanitarian action (Barry & Jefferys, 2002). It is the principles of neutrality and impartiality, and therefore the safety of humanitarian workers, that is being directly threatened by the convergence of security and development. As such, belligerents in a war zone target humanitarian workers due to a perceived lack of neutrality and impartiality.

One initial problem is that the convergence threatens the safety of humanitarian workers. As Shannon (2009, p. 16) and Vaughn (2009, p. 264) have documented, the killing of aid workers has been linked with the perception problem between non-aligned development/humanitarian organisations and the occupying multi-national force. Stoddard, Harmer and DiDomenico (2009, p. 34) conclude that there has been an increase in attacks on humanitarian workers, based on motives of political association of humanitarian groups with coalition forces. This has raised concerns within humanitarian groups that protection is now becoming a vital and existential concern of NGOs (Vaughn, 2009, p. 267). Rather than being concerned with the safety of their intended referent object, the humanitarian groups are increasingly forced into devoting time, resources and priority to the protection of staff. This was demonstrated by the withdrawal of aid agencies from Afghanistan (Duffield & Waddell, 2006, p. 43).

The impartiality distinction is now harder to make in Afghanistan, and there has been recognition that this is a result of the converging nature of security and development forces (Barry & Jefferys, 2002; Phelan & Woods, 2005). The USA military is engaging in a civilian reconstruction and development agenda based on the use of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) (Barker, 2004). This convergence is seen as problematic due to the negative influence it has on neutrality, impartiality and safety (Ogura, 2004, p. 62). The rise of this indistinguishable process between PRTs and humanitarian organisations has been a twoway process. There have been accusations that NGOs are complicit in the failure to disassociate their actions from the military forces (Vaughn, 2009, p. 277). On the other hand, there is still overwhelming consensus that within Afghanistan the militaries have been delib-
erate using humanitarian tactics (hearts and minds tactics) to achieve military goals (Munslow & O’Dempsey, 2009; Shannon, 2009; Vaughn, 2009). While a clearer delineation is necessary between the development/humanitarian organisations and the PRTs, which are backed by the US military, it may not be likely or even possible (Hilhorst & Jansen, 2010, p. 1118). Ideally the actions of both security and development organisations should be separated, however the issue is not whether this is possible, it is whether it is desired. It is an important issue of perception that is causing many of the related problems.

The audience for this perception problem is not the security or development agencies; it is the insurgents who, understandably, may conflate the actions of both. This distinction may be so close in the situation of Afghanistan that attempts to delineate security and development agencies may be futile. Howell and Lind see development organisations—by placing themselves in such a politicised zone—in a situation where the ‘illusion of neutrality may not be an option’ (2009, p. 36). This line of argumentation sees that any external intervention in Afghanistan is always going to be conflated as being closely associated with military forces. Larissa Fast’s review of the literature sees that there is currently a lack of worldwide empirical evidence to suggest that the decrease in humanitarian space is accountable for the increase in violence against workers, for she sees this issue as ‘context and situation-specific’ (2010, p. 61). However the context of Afghanistan is a contested occupation that has implications not only for workers associating with the invading force but also with the long-term goals of both groups.

The long-term goals of development are being affected by the involvement of the military in humanitarian activities. Husarska (2009), Shannon (2008, p. 30) and Ogata (2001, p. 4) all identify that this securitisation of aid affects not only impartiality but also the long-term goals of development, as once the military achieves its security aims they will desert their civilian actions. One example highlights that while NGOs work to improve literacy rates, the US army built ‘an impressive classroom in the name of “winning hearts and minds” but… [left] no teachers behind to staff it’ (Husarska, 2009). With the growing recognition of multiple forms of security, namely human security, the military is now expected to engage in non-military actions in a way that is subservient to national security goals (Cheeseman, 2005, pp. 71-72). While the short-term development achievements of security forces may be admirable, once ‘security’ (for their political referent object) has been established in that area (by the killing of enemy troops or the creation of a school) they will withdraw. The involvement of the military in counterinsurgency tactics illustrates the growing convergence of actions yet disparity in aims. Added to this disparity in aims, is the Westernised and centralised system of state-building imperatives that do not reflect the ‘traditional political and social norms and structures’ (Grissom, 2010, p. 505); whereas humanitarian objectives, once achieved, are then passed onto development organisations with similar long-term and local objectives. These outcomes appear counter to arguments that human security could be used for ‘narrowly defined short-term goals’ (Christie, 2010, p. 170). This is not to say that the building of the school was not beneficial and that all intended and unintended outcomes have been negative. Rather if humanitarian organisations use that building, issues of neutrality are raised as the locals may associate not just the army and humanitarian groups as one, but also development groups.

Any analysis of the perils that confront the convergence of security and development in Afghanistan needs consideration of the impact on the military. Barker (2004, pp. 1-3) forcefully argues that the current utilisation of PRTs has adverse affects on the goals of security. By presenting the mix of aims as mutually inhibiting, Barker deftly illustrates the
lose-lose situation. By not having the time or training to enact long-term and effective development projects, the military undermines its own integrity as a provider of security. The situation arises that by diverting military funds to development projects it is unable to prioritise the security of the country and therefore undermines the military’s legitimacy as the provider of security (Barker, 2004, p. 2). This perception sees that the convergence of security and development, while prioritising development, actually inhibits the operational objectives of the military and NGOs.

**IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE**

The problem of political motivation in humanitarianism is not new. In a phrase that could be spoken today, ‘the question remains as to whether in a setting of conflict such as the Afghan war, the provision of humanitarian assistance in any form can retain its integrity’ (Baitenmann, 1990, p. 82). Twenty-one years on, the increasing convergence of security and development poses, and will continue to pose, significant challenges in not only the Afghan situation but also in understandings of security in all contexts.

What of the future? If the statement, ‘that outside intervention can save lives and reduce suffering without advancing anyone’s political agenda is at best an outmoded assumption’ (Pasic & Weiss, 2003, p. 112) is true, what now? This article has highlighted the importance that the discursive constructions of human security may have on shaping action. Frederick Rosén’s third generation civil-military relations approach engages ‘the vanishing difference between military and civil work areas’ (2009, p. 607), though questions remain as to the fundamental ontological imperatives that derive from privileging either security or development concerns. While human security was successful in promoting and privileging individuals over the concerns of states, the current rise of national interests indicates that a new and clearer delineation between the two is still needed. Unfortunately this article cannot deal, due to brevity, with how this should occur or who should be responsible for it.

To use the UNDP report again, ‘we need [yet] another profound transition in thinking—from nuclear security [and] human security’ (UNDP, 1994, p. 23) to a concentration on the development of humans without the ontological and political constrictions of security. By engaging a higher level of metacognition, understandings of how the hegemonic power of security discourses can impose themselves on development can be made clearer. While human security has been beneficial to understandings of security, it has negative implications as well. The securitisation of development, as evidenced by the co-opting of narrow conceptions of human security, has helped refocus attention back to military solutions to, and involvement in, development issues. With such implications it appears imperative that a recalculation is needed of the cost and benefits that human security has on development issues.

**CONCLUSION**

This article explored the relationship between security and development in both the discursive realm of human security and empirical application of Afghanistan. In re-examining the relationship it is evident that a clearer divide is required discursively and empirically between security and development. That security has a dominant and hegemonic position with the human security discourse does not axiomatically preclude it as a useful tool with regards to prioritising development concern. Rather if there is to be utilising of the securitisation process, be it in the form of human security, an awareness and continual reappraisal of this process...
must also be taken into account. Human security has been very influential in the discursive realm to highlight the many notions of threat to security. However, by engaging with security there are significant concerns that need to be addressed. If there is a formulation that is too narrow, human security concerns may easily be co-opted by state-centric security concerns. Wide notions, on the other hand, may remove the prioritisation advantage that comes with securitisation. The direct implication that this debate has on empirical examples is not being argued here; rather that the convergence of security and development concerns in discourse are being reflected in empirics.

This article highlighted the process of how human security reflects the securitisation process. It also highlighted the convergence that is occurring currently in Afghanistan. While no causal line can be directly drawn between the discursive and empirical examples of the convergence of security and development, the fact that both have undesirable outcomes is a concern. While there are deadly ramifications for humanitarian workers in Afghanistan, the conceptual integrity of human security is threatened in the discursive world. Contrary to Buzan, Waever and De Wilde’s (1998) position that the securitisation process is inherently problematic and undesirable, this article, while highlighting the problems, suggests a reinvestigation of the process. What is needed is a level of metacognition that calls for a reinterpretation of the power relations that created human security. Any interpretation of, or attempt to define, human security needs to engage with the fundamental elements of security and securitisation in order to understand the wider implications that stem from the securitising move within human security.

In conclusion I would like to return to Afghanistan, where both NATO and humanitarian vehicles were painted white. This situation is symbolic of the convergence of security and development both in discourse and practice. As a result of this being identified as problematic, NATO agreed to repaint their vehicles another colour (Husarska, 2009). While this will not entirely overcome the operational problems of convergence, it does highlight the need to delineate security from development. Repainting vehicles is a concrete solution, though such a solution may not be so easy in the discursive realm, despite its necessity. Now the only question is, how do we repaint human security?

NOTES

1 ‘Security’ in this article reflects the practice of traditional security studies, which privileges military-state centric conceptions of security.
2 For a detailing of the contesting and varied understandings of ‘development’ see Stern and Ojendal (2010)
3 I am not claiming that human security became a dominant discourse that competed on equal footing with analysis of traditional security studies. Rather by its very existence it posed a challenge to the orthodoxy, however small its popularity at its infancy. The impact of the Human Security Reports of 2003, 2005, 2009/10 went on to reinforce human security’s position within International Relations.

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