



CHAPTER SIX

LAY CITIZEN DELIBERATIONS

Consensus Conferences and Planning Cells

Carolyn Hendriks

Ladies and gentleman, some politicians say that democracy is far too important to leave to the people. Well, you've just proven them wrong. Looking at all of you, you come from different places, you look different, you speak differently—I know some of you were terrified of standing up and asking questions. And yet you've had the courage, drive, initiative to come here, and not only wish that someone would do something to bring about change, you have brought about change. This forum, and others that may come afterwards, are a direct way of involving the people in decision making. I think not only on behalf of everyone here, but on behalf of everyone in this marvelous nation in which we live, and to which we belong, thank you.

FATHER DES COATES, AN ETHICIST, SPEAKING AT AN AUSTRALIAN CONSENSUS CONFERENCE IN 1999¹

These words marked the end of Australia's first consensus conference, at which fourteen citizens from across the nation came together to deliberate on the issue of gene technology in the food chain. March 1999 was a busy time for such deliberations. On other side of the globe, in Canada and Denmark, citizens were also participating in consensus conferences on the biotechnology of food.² The citizens at the Australian consensus conference came from diverse walks of life

In addition to secondary sources, this chapter draws on interviews conducted with a number of consensus conference and planning cell conveners. For their time and insights, I would like to thank Lyn Carson, Carole Renouf, Ronnie Harding, Jane Palmer, Silke Schicktanz, Jörg Naumann, Christian Weilmeier, and Peter Dienel. I am especially grateful to Hilmar Sturm for sharing his knowledge on the planning cell model and for his comments on a draft version of this chapter. The empirical research referred to in this chapter is supported by research grants from Land & Water Australia, and the Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst.

and included an artist, a stockbroker, an engineer, a tarot reader, and a furniture maker. As a panel, they confronted a barrage of information, difficult and incomplete science, and polarized partisan views. After two preparatory weekends and three days of deliberation, they presented their report, which stunned politicians, bureaucrats, and even the citizens themselves. As one citizen explained: “I just can’t believe we did it; we finally achieved what we set out to do. It’s the most important thing I’ve ever done in my whole life, I suppose.”³

Background

Public deliberation can extend well beyond the most active and expert members of a community. In this chapter, I review two closely related deliberative models, planning cells and consensus conferences, which specifically aim to include “ordinary” citizens in policy deliberations. Both models are intended to complement rather than replace existing forms of democratic decision making. They provide meeting spaces where the politically unorganized can come together to develop an informed and considered public voice on issues of social relevance. To achieve this, consensus conferences and planning cells rely on a highly structured deliberative procedure.⁴ They bring together a panel of randomly selected lay citizens for three to four days to deliberate on a particular matter. The panel is informed with briefing materials, field trips, and presentations from relevant government officials, academics, interest group representatives, and activists. With the assistance of independent facilitators, the citizens deliberate on the information put to them; after questioning presenters, they develop a series of policy recommendations. In the final stage, the citizens present their findings in the form of a report to decision makers. The report is then circulated to relevant policy elites in order to be considered alongside other forms of policy advice.⁵

The deliberative models considered in this chapter both emerged out of policy practice in Europe. In the early 1970s, Peter Dienel developed the planning cell model (Planungszelle®) with the aim of involving citizens in urban planning policy discussions.⁶ Dienel’s model is based on a series of concurrent four-day deliberative processes or planning cells, each involving around twenty-five participants. The total number of citizens engaged depends on the quantity of planning cells, with experiences to date varying from around one hundred to five hundred participants. Today, planning cells are primarily used to elicit citizens’ preferences on a broad range of policy issues. Some researchers also suggest that planning cells are useful social research instruments that can help them to understand the origins of specific attitudes and beliefs or to assess the likely public response to a proposed policy measure.⁷

It wasn't until the late 1980s that the Danish Board of Technology (Teknologirådet) developed a different deliberative model as part of its move toward participatory technology assessment. Their approach was based on the consensus development conference, an expert-based model developed in the United States in 1977 for assessing medical technologies.⁸ The Danes radically amended the American model by placing lay citizens at the center of the deliberations. This was done with two aims in mind: the deliberative output should provide policymakers with an improved understanding of the social context of emerging technologies, and the process should stimulate informed public debate on technology issues.⁹

What makes planning cells and consensus conferences so unusual but also so controversial is the nature of their participants. Lay citizens with no particular expertise or specialized knowledge regarding the issue are invited to sit at the policy table. Typically, the citizens are also unaffiliated in any substantial way with any of the key interest groups involved in the debate.¹⁰ This approach is the antithesis of elite, technocratic, and activist understandings of policymaking. Instead of engaging the extraordinarily specialized and the politically organized, consensus conferences and planning cells give priority to ordinary citizens.

How do disinterested citizens come to be involved in such projects?¹¹ Both models rely on random selection to choose who will be invited to attend. Participants are selected on the basis of chance, rather than on the basis of what they know or whom they represent. When sample sizes are small, as in consensus conferences, stratified random sampling is used to ensure that the sample reflects certain characteristics of the population; for example, an equal number of men and women are chosen. All those within each stratum or grouping have an equal chance being selected.¹² When sample sizes are larger, as is the case in planning cell projects, simple random sampling is usually employed and no adjustments are made to the sample to meet predetermined quotas.

Whereas random selection in politics might seem a novel concept today, it was a core democratic principle in ancient Athens and in the Italian republics of the Middle Ages.¹³ Contemporary advocates of random selection in politics are motivated by a desire "to incorporate greater political equality and better citizen deliberation in the process . . . [and] to make the decisions more responsive to the needs of constituents and more able to serve the public good."¹⁴ Random selection is inclusive and fair to the extent that it provides everyone with an equal chance of being selected to participate. It also serves deliberation well because it is more likely to select nonpartisans with relatively open preferences than a process that relies entirely on self-selection.¹⁵

In this chapter, I explore the basic features of consensus conferences and planning cells, and I discuss some of their impacts and limitations. This discussion

might generate more questions than it resolves, but my aim is to provide a starting point for further explorations. Over the years, the Danish consensus conference model and Dienel's planning cell model have evolved and been adapted to suit different issues and political contexts.¹⁶ As far as possible, I will represent the core features of both models as they now stand, recognizing that in practice variations and exceptions to the "standard model" abound.

The Danish Consensus Conference

The consensus conference procedure is well documented,¹⁷ so a brief outline will suffice here. The Danish model is based on a two-stage procedure that engages ten to twenty-five citizens in eight days of deliberation over a period of approximately three months. In the first stage, the citizens meet for two preparatory weekends to learn about the topic, the process, and the group. During these weekends, the panel also develops a series of questions for the conference to address and selects the conference presenters from a list of possible experts and interest group representatives.¹⁸ In the second stage of the process, the actual four-day conference takes place.¹⁹ On the first two days, various presenters appear before a plenary forum to respond to the questions set for the conference. Throughout this period, the citizens' panel retreats into nonpublic sessions to formulate further questions for the presenters and to clarify any misunderstandings or points of contention. On the last two days, the citizens work together to write a report outlining their key recommendations, which they then present to relevant decision makers before a public audience.²⁰ In some cases, the presenters have the right to reply, after which the citizens are free to reformulate their report.²¹

Facilitation is a central element of the consensus conference model. Facilitators must be impartial and, ideally, professionally trained, with good pedagogic skills. It is also important that the facilitators, like the lay citizens, not be experts in the issue under deliberation.²² The facilitator's primary function is to help the citizens to deliberate together to achieve their task. The facilitator is also expected to manage the proceedings—for example, by ensuring that the presenters adhere to the rules of the process and answer the citizens' questions. In some conferences, these two roles are separated: a facilitator works with and for the citizens, and a chairperson manages procedural matters.²³

Another important feature of consensus conferences is an external advisory committee. Apart from maintaining procedural integrity, an external advisory body adds legitimacy to the process.²⁴ The committee oversees a number of tasks, including selection of the citizens; compilation of the presenter list; development of briefing materials; selection of facilitators and evaluators; and relations with

the media and the public. Advisory committee members typically include academics and practitioners of public participation, as well as the least partial experts on the issue under deliberation. In some cases, representatives from relevant stakeholder groups also sit on the advisory committee. This strategy does make the procedure more vulnerable to partisan interests, but experience suggests that the active engagement of groups and experts in process planning can facilitate an appreciation of public deliberation and foster a sense of stewardship of the process.²⁵

Planning Cells


The planning cell model merits more attention in this chapter because there is relatively little English documentation on the procedure.²⁶ In general, planning cells are larger undertakings than most other deliberative processes considered in this book. They often include hundreds of citizens at multiple venues, although the model is quite flexible as to the number of participants as well as the length and intensity of the program.²⁷ On average, projects involve six to ten replicating planning cells, each containing around twenty-five citizens.²⁸ To simplify logistics, two planning cells are usually run one hour apart at the same location. This also maximizes the use of the presenters' time and reduces costs. Figure 6.1 shows the structure of a recent planning cell project conducted in Germany in 2001–2002 on the issue of consumer protection. The project was commissioned by the Bavarian minister for health, nutrition and consumer protection in the wake of 'mad cow' disease outbreaks in Germany.²⁹ Eighteen separate planning cells were conducted, involving 425 citizens in five different localities across Bavaria.³⁰

Each four-day planning cell is divided into sixteen discrete work units involving a mix of information sessions, hearings (with presenters), site visits, and, most important, small-group discussions. To ensure consistency, the structure of each planning cell within a project is identical. Figure 6.2 shows the sixteen work units for the aforementioned Bavarian project.

In some respects, each planning cell is similar to a consensus conference. Over a four-day period, the twenty-five or so citizens in the planning cell are informed about an issue and have the opportunity to hear from a range of different experts and interest group representatives. Unlike in consensus conferences, however, the presenters and the specific topics for deliberation are determined in advance by the commissioning body and the conveners, not by the citizens. In more recent projects, experts and interest groups have been involved in determining the topics through a roundtable process.³¹

Facilitation is another point of difference between planning cells and consensus conferences. In each planning cell, there is a male and a female process

**FIGURE 6.1. EIGHTEEN PLANNING CELLS
ON CONSUMER PROTECTION IN BAVARIA**



steward (*Prozessbegleiter* or *Tagungsleiter*), whose role is more to manage and chair the proceedings than to facilitate discussions. One of their primary tasks is to collate the outputs from small group discussions; for this reason, it helps if they have a good understanding of the policy issue.³² One planning cell project might involve up to forty different process stewards, much like the numerous group moderators in the deliberative polling model (discussed in Chapter Five). Rather than worrying about consistency, Dienel celebrates the use of multiple stewards because it arguably minimizes the effects of moderator bias.³³ In some urban planning projects, planners and technical experts also assist the citizens in their deliberations.³⁴

When all the planning cells have been completed, the conveners collate and synthesize the citizens' outputs into a project report called the *citizens' report* (*Bürgergutachten*). Drafts are circulated and approved by a group of citizens nominated

FIGURE 6.2. SIXTEEN-UNIT PLANNING CELL STRUCTURE FOR BAVARIAN CONSUMER PROTECTION PROJECT

Day 1	Day 2	Day 3	Day 4
Unit 1: Introduction to consumer protection	Units 5 & 6: Food production, additives, and labeling	Unit 9: Product safety (for example, mobile phones)	Unit 13: Responsibilities of consumers
Unit 2: Health and environment		Unit 10: Needs of special groups	Unit 14: Consumer information and advice
Unit 3: Consumer protection in health	Unit 7: Food control and safety	Unit 11: Advertising	Unit 15: The meaning of consumption
Unit 4: Nutrition and agriculture	Unit 8: Product safety (for example, clothing)	Unit 12: Presentations from politicians	Unit 16: Summary and priority setting

from each planning cell. Once the report is finalized (usually weeks after the last planning cell), the citizens or representatives from the cells reconvene to formally hand the collective product of their deliberations to the decision makers. The report is published and made available to the broader public, and it is directly distributed to the presenters, politicians, and other relevant organizations and associations.

There are a number of distinctive features of the planning cell model; I will highlight four here. First, as in the deliberative poll (Chapter Five) and Citizens Jury (Chapter Seven) processes, citizens are remunerated for their commitment to the process, usually through a fixed honorarium. For example, in the Bavarian project mentioned earlier, the citizens all received about 165 U.S. dollars for participating.³⁵ Remuneration—an integral part of Dienel's model—was originally intended to motivate citizens to participate. However, years of experience have found that participants tend to place more value on the money's symbolic meaning than on the money itself. According to Dienel, it provides citizens with a sign

that their contribution is valued by society and that the project is a serious political undertaking.³⁶

A second notable feature of the planning cell model is its emphasis on small-group work. The bulk of the citizens' deliberations occurs in groups of five.³⁷ The principle here is that when citizens participate in small constellations, they have more opportunities to offer their opinions and to interact.³⁸ Small-group work also enables citizens to participate freely without the fear of having an audience.³⁹ Throughout a four-day planning cell, the citizens break into small groups to record their preferences on different scenarios, reach collective decisions, or develop written recommendations.⁴⁰ Group membership rotates for each exercise in order to enable direct dialogue between all participants and to minimize dysfunctional group dynamics, such as the formation of factions or hierarchies.⁴¹

Also worth noting is the minimal level of facilitation used in the planning cell process. For all their structure, the planning cells are surprisingly loose when it comes to managing group dynamics. Unlike the facilitators of consensus conferences, process stewards invest little or no time in preparatory empowerment or group-building exercises. The literature is ambiguous on this matter, but my discussions with practitioners suggest that facilitation of this kind is not viewed favorably. According to Dienel, facilitation and group building is intentionally avoided. He argues that such "games" only provide opportunities to manipulate the citizens.⁴² Practitioners explain that the citizens learn to deliberate together as they work on their allocated tasks.⁴³

A final noteworthy feature of planning cells is that the citizens' output is aggregated. In other deliberative processes, like the consensus conference, the citizens deliberate as one group and work together to write their collective report. This approach encounters problems in a planning cell project because the citizens are not privy to all the deliberations. In theory, each cell could prepare a written report, but eventually the recommendations, suggestions, and preferences would need to be collated and synthesized in some way. As Dienel himself admits, one downside of having so many cells and small working groups is that it produces enormous amounts of data that need to be aggregated by the conveners in some way.⁴⁴ The aggregated reports from planning cell projects tend to be more quantitative and less qualified than those prepared directly by citizens. When it comes to aggregative outputs, the planning cell model has some commonality with a deliberative polling process.⁴⁵

Convening Activities

Despite their procedural differences, consensus conferences and planning cell projects require similar activities on the part of those who convene them. Both are highly planned one-time deliberative events that can take from six to eighteen

months to prepare, depending on the complexity of the project. Conveners ideally are neutral bodies with the necessary resources and administrative capacity to conduct a range of activities, such as booking venues; organizing meetings; selecting citizens and presenters; and engaging politicians and the media. Conveners are commonly research institutes or consulting groups, but in some cases, they may be state-funded institutions, such as museums, or advisory bodies, such as the Danish Board of Technology. The steps involved in preparing for consensus conferences and planning cells are well documented;⁴⁶ here I focus on how such projects are instigated and where they are typically conducted.

The stimulus for consensus conferences varies from context to context. In Denmark, consensus conferences are just one of a number of participatory mechanisms employed by the Danish Board of Technology.⁴⁷ In general, topics are selected through an annual consultation process in which state and nongovernmental organizations, as well interested individuals, may contribute suggestions. In some cases, conferences have been directly instigated by a member of parliament or by a parliamentary committee.⁴⁸ Outside of Denmark, it is far more common for consensus conferences to be instigated by an organization other than the parliament or the central government, such as a university or an association working on an issue.⁴⁹ In these cases, the instigators or sponsors select topics on the basis of their immediate relevance to society.

Planning cells, by definition, are commissioned and sponsored by an organization with a concrete policy problem to address. The stimulus almost always comes from a government official—such as a mayor, minister, or senior bureaucrat—who is seeking public input on a particular administrative task. Advocates are quick to point out that planning cells engage citizens in real political problems, not hypotheticals.⁵⁰ This does, however, present a dilemma. On one hand, close ties to the state enable planning cells to directly influence policy, but on the other hand, it makes them more vulnerable to the imperatives of the state.⁵¹

Consensus conferences and planning cells demand slightly different kinds of venues, although both require enough space for plenary discussion and small-group work. Since one of the goals of consensus conferences is to stimulate public debate, they are typically high-profile public events, held at venues of great public significance, such as national or provincial parliaments. Consensus conferences also require enough space for an audience of fifty to a hundred people to observe the plenary sessions. Venues for planning cells are comparatively modest and are locally based. They are usually held in a public building such as a town hall, library, or school. The venue must also have the capacity to house at least two concurrent planning cells. It is also common for conveners to establish local project offices in the regions where planning cells are to take place. This provides a local presence for the project and a point of contact for interested citizens. It

also takes advantage of local knowledge in arranging services such as caterers, child care facilities, and transportation and, if necessary, site visits.

Historical Uses of Consensus Conferences and Planning Cells

Planning cells and consensus conferences were each developed in a specific political context for particular kinds of issues. However, since they were first introduced some twenty to thirty years ago, their use has expanded considerably. Both models appear to travel sparingly but well outside their country of origin, with impacts varying in different contexts.

It is no accident that consensus conferences evolved in Denmark. Over the past 150 years, the country has developed a democratic tradition characterized by an active and informed public.⁵² In response to rising public concern about the social consequences of technologies such as nuclear energy, the Danish parliament (*Folketinget*) established the Board of Technology in 1985 with a specific charter to stimulate public debate.⁵³ Whereas many countries prefer to restrict technology assessment to the scientific realm, the Danes emphasize the social context of technological development. Thus, the consensus conference is a product of Denmark's republican tradition and a particular participatory approach to technology assessment.⁵⁴ Since the model was first tested in 1987, it has been applied in Denmark in relation to at least twenty-two controversial technology issues, including gene technology in industry and agriculture (1987), air pollution (1990), infertility (1993), teleworking (1997), electronic surveillance (2000), and road pricing (2002).⁵⁵ Over the past decade, the model has generated significant international interest. To date, at least fifty consensus conferences have been conducted in sixteen different countries, including Argentina, New Zealand, Korea, Israel, Japan, Canada, and the United States.⁵⁶ The consensus conference model has also proven its adaptability in diverse political contexts—Western and non-Western, regional and national.⁵⁷ The most popular consensus conference topic worldwide is gene technology in food and medical testing.

Planning cells have enjoyed a slightly longer history than consensus conferences. Since Dienel first proposed his model in the early 1970s, most planning cell projects have been commissioned by local government agencies and concentrated on urban infrastructure problems.⁵⁸ A handful of projects have been sponsored by state and federal agencies on a broader range of policy issues, including information technology, energy, waste management, gene technology, and health. According to Dienel, it has only been in the last fifteen years that planning cells have “truly gained momentum.”⁵⁹ Interest is growing outside of Germany, with experiences with planning cells occurring in Austria, Switzerland, Spain, and the

United States.⁶⁰ To date, there have been over fifty planning cell projects conducted worldwide, although the vast majority of these have been in Germany. This amounts to an estimated three hundred separate planning cells, involving about seven thousand citizens in 1,200 days of public deliberation.⁶¹

With each experience, the planning cell model continues to evolve. One dynamic element of the model is the length of the citizens' deliberations. In Dienel's original proposal, planning cells were to be conducted over a twelve-week period. This was reduced to three weeks, then to four days, which is now standard.⁶² Project experiences have shown that citizens cannot afford to devote large amounts of time to planning cells; however, they have also revealed that citizens are fast learners.⁶³ Another noteworthy development in Germany over the past few years has been the substitution of the term *citizens' report* (*Bürgergutachten*) for *planning cells* (*Planungszelle*).⁶⁴ Practitioners have found the "planning" label unnecessarily restrictive and have discovered that the reference to *cells* can evoke prison imagery. Recent project experiences suggest that the term *citizens' report* provides a useful, descriptive title that shifts the emphasis toward the outcomes.⁶⁵

The Impacts of Consensus Conferences and Planning Cells

The consequences of any deliberative process are multidimensional. A deliberative process may have direct effects, for example, on substantive policy outcomes or on the citizens involved. It might also have more indirect results by influencing public discourse or the ideas of policy elites.⁶⁶ Space limitations do not allow me to fully address and elaborate on the performance of consensus conferences and planning cells along these sorts of impact dimensions. Instead, I will provide a flavor of some of the direct and indirect impacts that have been reported in various evaluations. Before proceeding, it is important to note that while the impacts of some specific projects have been evaluated, few comparative analyses exist.⁶⁷

I will look first at the direct impact of these deliberative models on citizen participants. Project evaluations report that when invited to attend a deliberative forum, many randomly selected citizens in the community choose to participate.⁶⁸ These citizens come from a broad range of social groups that roughly correspond to local demographic patterns with respect to sex, age, education, occupation, and household size.⁶⁹ Commentators explain that when citizens enter the deliberative forum, they take their role very seriously and are willing to learn and discuss the issue at hand.⁷⁰ As a result of their deliberations, citizens reportedly learn about the broader dimensions of the policy issue under consideration, and many shift their preferences.⁷¹ Evaluations also indicate that consensus conferences and planning cells can have a profound impact on participants. Although the deliberations

are intense, most participants report the process to be a fulfilling experience, one that positively influences their self-confidence, knowledge of policy issues, and level of political awareness.⁷² Some citizens have felt empowered to join associations and groups, while others have been invited to sit as lay representatives on committees and boards.⁷³ Studies have also found that participants can have an impact on their immediate social world as they share their experiences with family, friends, and work colleagues.⁷⁴ Overall, most participants who have been surveyed support the use of further deliberative processes such as planning cells and consensus conferences. They are, however, not uncritically accepting and are keen to offer constructive criticism on how the deliberative processes could be improved.⁷⁵

The impacts of consensus conferences and planning cells on substantive policy outcomes and public debate is far more difficult to ascertain. Citizens' reports are conceived as advisory, and their recommendations invariably compete with other forms of advice from political parties, expert committees, and interest groups, for example. Moreover, when some of these other sources of policy advice happen to recommend the same policies and celebrate the same values articulated in the citizens' reports, it can be difficult to determine which recommendation held more sway.

In any case, the capacity for a citizens' report to influence actual policy outcomes and public debate is contingent on political circumstances. Such impacts are shaped by contextual factors, including the willingness of decision makers to listen to lay citizens; the salience and ferocity of competing agendas; and the nature of public discourse. Given the significance of context, I will first discuss the impacts of consensus conferences and planning cells in their respective countries of origin and then consider how they perform in other policy settings.

In Denmark, the impact of consensus conferences on substantive policy outcomes has varied. One common misconception is that Danish parliamentarians are bound to consider the citizens' recommendations.⁷⁶ Although this is not the case, the unique political position of the Board of Technology facilitates close and regular contact with parliamentarians and various parliamentary committees.⁷⁷ In some projects, these linkages have enabled consensus conferences to trigger the development or amendment of relevant legislation.⁷⁸ There are however, other consensus conferences in Denmark that have resulted in little or no direct policy impact.⁷⁹ Empirical studies suggest that consensus conferences stimulate public debate throughout Denmark, primarily through media dissemination, but also through related local and regional debates.⁸⁰ In the Danish context, then, consensus conferences provide a viable mechanism for participatory technology assessment, not only because they help to inform decision makers but also because they facilitate public discourse.⁸¹

When we look beyond Denmark, there is little evidence to suggest that consensus conferences result in substantive impacts on policy.⁸² Institutional setting

and political culture appear to be influential factors. Outside the Danish context, the model represents a dramatic shift away from the elite and technocratic models of conventional technology assessment. It is often the case that conferences lack an institutional anchor such as the Danish Board of Technology. Although some consensus conferences (for example, in the Netherlands and France) are convened by an equivalent institution, most are instigated by entities outside the legislature and central governmental agencies—for example, by research institutions (Canada); public museums (United Kingdom, Germany); foundations (United States); international development agencies (South Korea); and advocacy groups (Australia).⁸³ The advisory capacity of conferences convened by nonstate actors can be relatively weak, particularly when key decision makers are not engaged. Often, poor timing also limits impact. In some countries, consensus conferences have had minimal political or public resonance simply because they entered the political and public arena after decisions had been made or after the issue had reached its saturation point in the media.⁸⁴

Although direct policy impacts might be rare, international experiences demonstrate that when lay citizens are given a voice, a chorus of indirect impacts on public discourse and policy elites can result. Some projects have resulted in subtle political impacts; for example, a few conferences have initiated public discourse on the issues under deliberation or provided support for reforms already in the pipeline.⁸⁵ Media coverage, though variable, is generally positive and in some projects equivalent to the levels experienced in Denmark.⁸⁶ In a number of cases, media coverage focused less on the issue under deliberation and more on the novelty of the participatory process.⁸⁷ In a similar vein, evaluations indicate that consensus conferences influence the way that different policy elites view lay citizens and public deliberation in general. Elites, however, rarely appear to shift their preferences on the policy issue itself as a result of lay citizen deliberations.⁸⁸

The impacts of planning cells in Germany are positive, although independent evaluations are scarce. Early evaluations concluded that citizens produce outcomes oriented toward the common good.⁸⁹ According to Dienel, planning cells have “proved themselves to be a cost-effective means of resolving a range of urban planning problems. They have led to a significant reduction in the total costs of planning, statutory and legal processes.”⁹⁰ Practitioners report that governments, especially at the local and community level, are willing to adopt the citizens’ recommendations to the extent that they are technically feasible and economically viable.⁹¹

One of the most extensive evaluations of the planning cell model was conducted from 1982 to 1985 as part of a three-year project that examined the preferences of West German citizens on four energy scenarios that had originally been developed by a parliamentary advisory body.⁹² An evaluation team comprising

scientists, stakeholders, and administrators concluded that the planning cell model provides a suitable method of assessing preferences when citizens have a direct relationship or local experience with the issue. However, opinion was divided on the utility of planning cells for regional and national issues. It seems that at higher levels of the political system, planning cells provoke more controversy than their local equivalents. National and state-based projects tend to address broader issues and irritate more political actors. Under these circumstances, the recommending force of the citizens' report can be more easily weakened by the competing claims of different groups and advisory bodies. However, more recent experiences suggest that when politicians and administrators are committed to the project, planning cells have the potential to shape policy outcomes at all levels of government.⁹³

Planning cells have traveled far less on the international scene than consensus conferences. The only known U.S. planning cell project was conducted in 1988 and 1989 in New Jersey on the issue of sewage sludge management.⁹⁴ This project sheds light on some of the unintended impacts that can result when planning cells are conducted in controversial political settings. In this case, the program was considerably altered when the selected citizens began to distrust a procedure run by an external third party. They rejected the organizers and the facilitators and developed their own report, which they then handed to the commissioning body. The project achieved its desired outcome in that it gave administrators a clearer idea of the citizens' preferences, but the panels' response highlights the fact that not all communities and stakeholders are willing to entrust a deliberative process to an external party.⁹⁵

Experiences elsewhere have been more promising. For example, in Spain, planning cells have made a valuable contribution to resolving disputes over a freeway controversy in the volatile Basque region.⁹⁶ Like consensus conferences, the planning cell procedure appears to adapt well to different political contexts. For example, in one Swiss project, the commissioning body was concerned that random selection would not be perceived as legitimate in Switzerland. Instead of randomly selecting participants, the organizers ran a series of town hall meetings in different locations, from which a number of community representatives were nominated.⁹⁷

Reflections on Consensus Conferences and Planning Cells

Consensus conferences and planning cells aim to elicit considered input from lay citizens on complex policy issues. While many people applaud the democratic goals of these deliberations, it is important to acknowledge that in practice, lay citizen engagement can be a demanding and challenging enterprise.

Cautionary Notes

Consensus conferences and planning cells are not simple events to convene. Practitioners report that although they are rewarding, these types of events are resource-intensive and administratively demanding.⁹⁸ As innovative processes, they require champions to instigate and foster their development. More significantly, they need strong financial support from a commissioning body.⁹⁹ Depending on travel and accommodation requirements, one consensus conference (including preparatory weekends) is estimated to cost between \$70,000 and \$200,000 (U.S. dollars). The cost of a project involving eight planning cells (approximately two hundred citizens) is estimated at \$180,000—\$240,000 (U.S. dollars).¹⁰⁰ While these figures might compare unfavorably with the costs of opinion polls, town hall meetings, or stakeholder roundtables, their outputs are qualitatively different. Further research would be well served by comparisons of these figures with the costs of running an expert advisory committee or parliamentary inquiry.

Consensus conferences and planning cells are not the participatory solution to all kinds of issues, nor are they appropriate in every context.¹⁰¹ Both models are best suited to deal with issues that are publicly significant and relevant to the lives of lay citizens. Planning cells are considered appropriate when the problem is relatively urgent and when there are different options available, each posing different benefits and risks. They are less likely to be successful when the options are restricted to binary (yes-or-no) outcomes, when the issue is highly polarized, or when large inequalities may exist between different communities.¹⁰² Consensus conferences are best suited to issues that pose a complex mix of social, ethical, and technical consequences for society.¹⁰³ The Danish Board of Technology finds appropriate consensus conference topics to be those that present unresolved issues of attitudes, applications, and regulation. The board finds that the model works best when the issue is of current interest, steeped in expert knowledge, well demarcated, and controversial.¹⁰⁴

Context is also an important consideration, especially when lay citizen involvement is uncommon or likely to be controversial. Some settings are hostile to lay citizen deliberation. This may occur when distrust in organized public participation is high or when powerful interest groups have captured the issue. Some political contexts are unsuitable because there is insufficient support from decision makers and policy elites.¹⁰⁵ Consensus conferences are more flexible on this front, since they have been used successfully outside the state to stimulate public debate and policy reform.¹⁰⁶

The highly planned nature of consensus conferences and planning cells may also mean that these processes are not always suitable or welcome. As well-choreographed events, they may not be as spontaneous or flexible as some policy issues

and groups demand. There are several issues to consider here. First, consensus conferences and planning cells are one-time events that rarely sustain any contact with citizens after the process.¹⁰⁷ Second, the planned nature of consensus conferences and planning cells provides opportunities for organizers to manipulate the process, especially if the procedure is not transparent and inclusive of the broader public. In terms of flexibility and transparency, consensus conferences are likely to fare better than planning cells because citizens in a consensus conference are given more autonomy to frame the problem in their own terms and select the presenters whom they believe are relevant to the issue. The presence of an external advisory committee can also ensure that procedural matters of a consensus conference or planning cell project are transparent and open to scrutiny. Third, structure does not always fit well with the more informal kinds of deliberation in the public sphere.¹⁰⁸ This is a limitation of which some advocates of consensus conferences are well aware. Joss, for example, warns that the model's "relatively rigid" format "could have its draw-backs: for example, it might not relate or contribute to wider public debate, and it might be perceived by the public as just another remote administrative institution."¹⁰⁹

Challenges

Planning cells and consensus conferences seek to create a workable deliberative forum by limiting participation to a group of randomly selected lay citizens. Given that not everyone who wants to participate can, how legitimate is the process to those outside the forum? This is a question that continues to plague theories of deliberative democracy. The legitimacy of consensus conferences and planning cells is rarely a given, and conveners work hard to demonstrate their impartiality and rigor.¹¹⁰ Despite such efforts, these processes fly in the face of technocratic and elite forms of policymaking and thus may fuel resentment among powerful policy actors.¹¹¹ There will almost always be politicians who are reluctant to open up an issue to public debate; experts who worry about the competence of lay citizens; and stakeholders and "expert activists" who feel excluded from the process.¹¹²

Skepticism toward consensus conferences and planning cells is heightened in contexts in which public participation is unfamiliar or in which experts or interest groups have long since captured the issue. My comparative research, which draws on interviews with more than seventy different policy actors, suggests that these sorts of deliberative models have at least three controversial features.¹¹³ First, some technocrats and elites reject the idea that nonexperts and unaffiliated citizens can make legitimate contributions to public policy. They raise concerns about the capacity of lay citizens to comprehend complex material, and they criticize lay citizens' accountability, authority, and representativeness as a microcosm of

the community. Second, deliberative designs assign policy actors a new role as presenters and, in doing so, change the use of power in the policy arena. This role serves to contain and expose coercive forms of power by encouraging experts and representatives of interest groups to use communicative and collective power. A number of policy actors resist taking up this new role because it constrains their control of and influence on the policy debate and their ability to participate freely in policy discussions. Third, deliberative designs seek to transform communicative conditions from a state of competition to one based on reasoned argument and reflection. Skeptics tend to understand public opinion as the sum of individual static preferences and are therefore challenged by the notion of collective will formation. Also unfamiliar and contentious is the notion that deliberation is a social process that promotes learning and collective outcomes.

Not only can these challenges undermine the perceived procedural legitimacy of planning cells and consensus conferences, but they can also affect how such deliberative events function. On one hand, the models rely on policy actors to present their perspectives to the forum; on the other hand, they insulate these same players from actively participating in the citizens' deliberations. This tension between partial involvement and insulation makes securing commitment from policy actors no straightforward matter.¹¹⁴

This is not to say that policy actors always resist deliberative forums involving lay citizens. Evidence suggests that experts, elites, and interest groups willingly engage when there are incentives to participate.¹¹⁵ For example, some interest groups welcome the opportunity to publicly advocate their message; a few commercial organizations appreciate consumer feedback; and in some cases, scientists feel the need to publicly defend their technology. In order for stakeholders and policy elites to appreciate the benefits of public deliberation, practitioners have found that it is important to involve them at an early stage—for example, through project briefings or as members of an advisory committee. It is also important to accurately communicate to them what the process is seeking to achieve, as well as its limits.

An often-misunderstood aspect of consensus conferences and planning cells is their claim to representativeness. The relatively small sample of citizens in a consensus conference is not expected to be statistically representative, but it is designed to be demographically diverse.¹¹⁶ Since the sample sizes used in planning cells are much larger, they can make more legitimate claims to representativeness, but even so, assertions that participants are statistically representative of the population are exaggerated.¹¹⁷ Misconceptions about what and whom the citizens represent distract attention from the citizens' deliberative role in the forum. It is for this reason that commentators on deliberative designs caution against describing

citizens' panels as 'representative microcosms'.¹¹⁸ In the end, it is diversity that appears to matter most in these processes. When a group of deliberators are heterogeneous, it is less likely that they will enter into enclave deliberation and reinforce their own positions.¹¹⁹

Areas for Further Development

The participatory models discussed in this chapter supplement the various ways in which public voices enter the policymaking process. They provide an avenue for unaffiliated citizens to express their ideas, and in doing so, they add a further dimension to existing forms of policy advice such as expert opinions or polling data. The challenge for practitioners and decision makers is how to integrate these different kinds of policy inputs, especially when they pose competing claims.

An important first step would be to further integrate lay citizen models with other forms of public deliberation. The three-stage cooperative discourse model, developed by Ortwin Renn and his colleagues, provides a useful starting point.¹²⁰ Under this model, stakeholders, experts, and the lay public are sequentially involved in policy deliberations. Stakeholder groups are involved initially to elicit values and criteria. Experts are then brought in to develop performance profiles of different policy options. In the third stage, randomly selected citizens evaluate and design policies. Carson proposes a fourth stage in which feedback is sought from the broader community for purposes of accountability and public education.¹²¹ This three- or four-stage discourse model aims to increase the accountability of policy elites by sandwiching their involvement between input from randomly selected citizens and the broader public.

Consensus conferences and planning cells could easily be hybridized with other deliberative methods. Network technology may open up some interesting options by enabling deliberative designs to be convened simultaneously at different locations. Such networking could overcome the isolation that exists between separate planning cells in the current planning cell model. Such technology could also be used to increase the numbers involved in consensus conference events. Greater use of the media and the Internet would also expand the impacts of a deliberative forum on public awareness and discourse. Although some deliberative projects have successfully used Internet discussion forums, they could be improved by using on-line facilitation and by integrating Web-based input with lay citizens' deliberations.¹²² A step in this direction has been taken by a group of researchers from North Carolina State University who studied the differences between participants in a face-to-face consensus conference and participants in an on-line consensus conference on the topic of genetically modified foods.¹²³

Where to from Here?

Planning cells and consensus conferences are not participatory panaceas. Like all forms of public involvement, they are open to the dangers of manipulation, paternalism, and “alibi participation” (using token citizen involvement as an alibi to justify autocratic decision making).¹²⁴ Certain elements of these processes are likely to be more controversial in some political and cultural settings than others, but on the whole, experiences in Denmark, Germany, and elsewhere demonstrate that lay citizens are willing, capable, and valuable deliberators. Planning cells are especially appealing because they can engage a large number of citizens while still maintaining deliberative conditions through small-group work. This is a useful approach, especially when citizens are widely dispersed across a given region or nation. What consensus conferences cannot offer in terms of numbers, they make up for in deliberative quality. Through a two-stage procedure, citizens are empowered to think critically about the information that they receive and are free to determine the questions and presenters for the final conference. Apart from providing policy advice, consensus conferences can stimulate public debate outside the forum through media and audience involvement.

As suggested in Chapter One, skeptics may continue to wonder whether public deliberation, especially among lay citizens is a possibility, yet prospects do exist even in the most unlikely of places. For example, in December 2003, the U.S. Congress passed the 21st Century Nanotechnology Research and Development Act, which requires that the newly established National Nanotechnology Program provide opportunities for “regular and ongoing public discussions, through mechanisms such as citizens’ panels, consensus conferences, and educational events, as appropriate.” While the legislation does not necessarily ensure that public concerns will be taken on board, it at least formally stipulates that policymakers provide spaces for citizens to meet and voice their perspectives.¹²⁵

With their tentative beginnings more or less behind us, it is no longer a question of what consensus conferences and planning cells can achieve. More pertinent now are questions about finding their optimal location within a larger democratic system and discovering how to secure their legitimacy and funding for the long term.

Notes

1. Father Des Coates presented at the 1999 Australian consensus conference on gene technology in the food chain. This quote is taken from the Australian Broadcasting Corporation’s Radio National program “Life Matters,” which aired a story on the consensus conference May 3–7, 1999. Recordings are available from <http://www.abc.net.au/rn/contact.htm>. See

- also Australian Broadcasting Corporation. (1999). "Waiter, There Is a Gene in My Food . . ." [<http://www.abc.net.au/science/slab/consconf/forum.htm>]. Retrieved May 28, 2004.
2. Einsiedel, E. F., Jelsøe, E., and Breck, T. (2001). "Publics and the Technology Table: The Australian, Canadian and Danish Consensus Conferences on Food Biotechnology." *Public Understanding of Science*, 10(1), 83–98.
 3. Lay citizen participant, 1999 Australian consensus conference on gene technology in the food chain, quoted on the "Life Matters" radio program. See note 1 for more information on how to obtain a copy of this program.
 4. Planning cells and consensus conferences share a number of common features with the Citizens Jury model (see Chapter Seven of this volume). There are, however, important differences between the three models, especially with respect to participant numbers and small-group work.
 5. See Diemel, P. C., and Renn, O. (1995). "Planning Cells: A Gate to 'Fractal' Mediation." In O. Renn, T. Webler, and P. Wiedemann (eds.), *Fairness and Competence in Citizen Participation*. Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer, 127; Joss, S. (1998). "Danish Consensus Conferences as a Model of Participatory Technology Assessment: An Impact Study of Consensus Conferences on Danish Parliament and Danish Public Debate." *Science and Public Policy*, 25(1), 21.
 6. Peter Diemel is based at the Bergische Universität Wuppertal in Germany. He first published his ideas on planning cells in 1971. See Diemel, P. C. (1971). "Wie können die Bürger an Planungsprozessen beteiligt werden? Planwahl und Planungszelle als Beteiligungsverfahren" [How can citizens participate in planning processes? Plan choice and planning cells as methods for public participation]. *Der Bürger im Staat* [The citizen in the state], 3, 151–156. To standardize the methodology and ensure quality, *Planungszelle* was registered as a trademark by CitCon Citizen Consult, an independent self-financing institute in Germany. See Diemel, P. C. (1999). "Planning Cells: The German Experience." In U. Khan (ed.), *Participation Beyond the Ballot Box: European Case Studies in State-Citizen Political Dialogue*. London: UCL Press, 87.
 7. Renn, O., Stegmann, H. U., Albrecht, G., Kotte, U., and Peters, H. P. (1984). "An Empirical Investigation of Citizens' Preferences Among Four Energy Scenarios." *Technological Forecasting and Social Change*, 26(1), 43.
 8. Jørgensen, T. (1995). "Consensus Conferences in the Health Care Sector." In S. Joss and J. Durant (eds.), *Public Participation in Science: The Role of Consensus Conferences in Europe*. London: Science Museum, 17–29.
 9. Joss (1998), "Danish Consensus Conferences," 5, 19.
 10. This characteristic of lay citizens is sometimes described with the term *non-committed* (for example, in Diemel and Renn [1995], "Planning Cells," 126).
 11. By *disinterested*, I mean impartial, not holding a particular position.
 12. If stratified random sampling is used, citizens in smaller stratum groups—for example, ethnic minorities—are more likely to be selected than citizens in larger stratum groups.
 13. See Carson, L., and Martin, B. (1999). *Random Selection in Politics*. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 31–33; Manin, B. (1997). *The Principles of Representative Government*. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 42–93.
 14. Mansbridge, J. (2000). "What Does a Representative Do? Descriptive Representation in Communicative Settings of Distrust, Uncrystallized Interests, and Historically Denigrated Status." In W. Kymlicka and W. Norman (eds.), *Citizenship in Diverse Societies*. Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 106. Some contemporary advocates of random selection include Burnheim, J. (1985). *Is Democracy Possible?* Cambridge, U.K.: Polity Press; Carson and Martin

- (1999), *Random Selection in Politics*; Dahl, R. (1985). *Controlling Nuclear Weapons: Democracy Versus Guardianship*. Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press; Fishkin, J. (1997). *The Voice of the People: Public Opinion and Democracy*. (2nd ed.) New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press; Goodwin, B. (1992). *Justice by Lottery*. New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf.
15. Self-selection occurs when participation is open to anyone willing to volunteer. It is a common form of selection for many community consultation events and tends to attract partisan members of the community who have a particular interest in the issue, such as activists and representatives from interest groups. Of course, the deliberative procedures discussed in this chapter are not devoid of the effects of self-selection, since even those selected at random have to be willing to participate and volunteer their time. However, conveners of planning cells and consensus conferences try to reduce the effects of self-selection—for example, by following up with reluctant citizens to encourage them to participate. As I discuss later in this chapter, in some projects, participating citizens are remunerated for their time.
 16. For variations of the consensus conference model in different contexts, see Einsiedel, Jelsøe, and Breck (2001), “Publics and the Technology Table”; Guston, D. H. (1999). “Evaluating the First U.S. Consensus Conference: The Impact of the Citizens’ Panel on Telecommunications and the Future of Democracy.” *Science, Technology & Human Values*, 24(4), 451–482; Joss, S. (2000). *Die Konsensuskonferenz in Theorie und Anwendung* [The consensus conference in theory and practice]. Stuttgart, Germany: Center for Technology Assessment. Less comparative research has been conducted on planning cells, but see Diemel, P. C. (2002b). *Die Planungszelle. Die Bürger als Chance* [The planning cells: The citizen as chance]. (5th ed. with status report). Opladen, Germany: Westdeutscher Verlag, 291–293; Renn, O., Webler, T., Rakel, H., Diemel, P. C., and Johnson, B. (1993). “Public Participation in Decision Making: A Three-Step Procedure.” *Policy Sciences*, 26, 204–205.
 17. See Anderson, I.-E., Klüver, L., Bilderbeck, R., and Danielsen, O. (eds.). (1995). “Feasibility Study on New Awareness Initiatives: Studying the Possibilities to Implement Consensus Conferences and Scenario Workshops.” [http://www.cordis.lu/interfaces/src/feasibil.htm]. Retrieved Oct. 31, 2003]; Grundahl, J. (1995). “The Danish Consensus Conference Model.” In S. Joss and J. Durant (eds.), *Public Participation in Science: The Role of Consensus Conferences in Europe*. London: Science Museum; Joss (1998), “Danish Consensus Conferences”; Joss (2000), *Die Konsensuskonferenz in Theorie und Anwendung*; Joss, S., and Durant, J. (eds.). (1995). *Public Participation in Science: The Role of Consensus Conferences in Europe*. London: Science Museum.
 18. Citizens select the presenters from a list of potential speakers developed by the conveners in conjunction with a steering committee. Commentators point out that in practice, citizens find this a difficult task, so conveners usually provide some assistance. See Grundahl (1995), “The Danish Consensus Conference Model,” 39; Mayer, I., and Geurts, J. (1998). “Consensus Conference as Participatory Policy Analysis: A Methodological Contribution to the Social Management of Technology.” In P. Wheale, R. von Schomberg, and P. Glasner (eds.), *Social Management of Genetic Engineering*. Aldershot, U.K.: Ashgate, 291.
 19. Three-day consensus conferences are also common. See Klüver, L. (1995). “Consensus Conferences at the Danish Board of Technology.” In S. Joss and J. Durant (eds.), *Public Participation in Science: The Role of Consensus Conferences in Europe*. London: Science Museum.
 20. In the report-writing process, the citizens are not expected to reach a unanimous decision. The term *consensus* is a somewhat misleading descriptor of this model, because there is room for dissent. In Denmark, the idea is to see how close the panel can come to consensus, but it is not forced on them (Klüver [1995], “Consensus Conferences at the Danish Board of Technology,” 46–47). Elsewhere, differences in opinion are recorded in the form

- of majority and minority statements. In some cases, dissent provides interesting insights into potential social or demographic differences. For example, in the 2001 consensus conference in Germany on genetic diagnostics, all of the eleven female participants were against the introduction of pre-implantation genetic diagnostics—(genetic testing performed on embryos in vitro before implantation). All the males except one supported the technology. Interestingly, this was a gender difference that had not yet surfaced in all of the expert committees and broader public discourse on the issue. See Schicktanz, S., and Naumann, J. (eds.). (2003). *Bürgerkonferenz: Streitfall Gendiagnostik* [Citizens' conference: Conflict over genetic diagnostics]. Opladen, Germany: Leske & Budrich.
21. Renn, O., and Webler, T. (1998). "Der kooperative Diskurs—Theoretische Grundlagen, Anforderungen, Möglichkeiten" [The cooperative discourse—Theoretical foundations, requirements, and opportunities]. In O. Renn, H. Kastenholz, P. Schild, and U. Wilhelm (eds.), *Abfall Politik im kooperativen Diskurs: Bürgerbeteiligung bei der Standortsuche für eine Deponie im Kanton Aargau* [Waste policy in cooperative discourse: Public participation in the search for a landfill site in Canton Aargau]. Zurich, Switzerland: VDF, 33–34.
 22. Grundahl (1995), "The Danish Consensus Conference Model," 34.
 23. In Denmark, facilitation and chairing are usually combined into one role, whereas in other countries, such as the United Kingdom and Australia, these roles are separated. See Grundahl (1995), "The Danish Consensus Conference Model," 34; Joss (2000), *Die Konsensuskonferenz in Theorie und Anwendung*, 24.
 24. See Joss (2000), *Die Konsensuskonferenz in Theorie und Anwendung*, 22.
 25. This was the case for the 1999 Australian consensus conference on gene technology in the food chain, according to interviews conducted by the author with steering committee members between November 2002 and March 2003. In the planning stages of the conference, various stakeholders on the steering committee championed the project within their own organizations and policy networks. See also Crombie, A., and Ducker, C. (2000). *Evaluation Report: Phase 2*. Report commissioned by the Consensus Conference Steering Committee of the First Australian Consensus Conference: Gene Technology in the Food Chain, Canberra, March 10–12, 1999. Available at <http://genetechnology.chirp.com.au/concon.html>.
 26. The majority of literature on planning cells is in German, with the most detailed accounts provided by Diemel, P. C. (1997). *Die Planungszelle. Eine Alternative zur Establishment-Demokratie* [The planning cells: An alternative to establishment-democracy]. (4th ed. with status report.) Opladen, Germany: Westdeutscher Verlag; and Bongardt, H. (1999). *Die Planungszelle in Theorie und Anwendung* [The planning cell conference in theory and practice]. Stuttgart, Germany: Center for Technology Assessment. English articles on planning cells include Diemel, P. C. (1989). "Contributing to Social Decision Methodology: Citizens Reports on Technology Projects." In C. Vlek and G. Cvetkovich (eds.), *Social Decision Methodology for Technical Projects*. Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer, 113–155; Diemel (1999), "Planning Cells"; Diemel and Renn (1995), "Planning Cells"; Renn and others (1984), "An Empirical Investigation of Citizens' Preferences"; Renn and others (1993), "Public Participation in Decision Making."
 27. Diemel (1997), *Die Planungszelle*, 108.
 28. Diemel (1999), "Planning Cells," 88.
 29. 'Mad cow' disease (bovine spongiform encephalopathy, or BSE) is a fatal cattle disease that emerged in Britain in the mid-1980s. The consumption of affected meat has been linked to a new variant of the human neurological disease Creutzfeldt-Jacob disease (vCJD).

30. For more details on the Bavarian planning cells on consumer protection, see Bavarian Ministry for Environment, Health and Consumer Protection. (2002). "Bürgergutachten zum Verbraucherschutz" [Citizens' report on consumer protection]. [<http://www.stmugv.bayern.de/de/verbraucherschutz/buergergutachten/buergergutachten.htm>].
31. Hilmar Sturm, planning cells practitioner; Munich, personal communication, May 30, 2004.
32. Bongardt (1999), *Die Planungszelle in Theorie und Anwendung*, 9–10.
33. Diemel (1999), "Planning Cells," 88.
34. Diemel (1997), *Die Planungszelle*, 98.
35. The citizens received 130 Euro each for participating in a four-day planning cell on the topic of consumer protection in Bavaria (Englisch, R. [2002, Mar. 6] "Begeisterung ist unerwartet groß" [Enthusiasm is unexpectedly large]. *Erlanger Nachrichten*).
36. Diemel (1997), *Die Planungszelle*, 82.
37. Diemel (1999), "Planning Cells," 85–86.
38. Diemel (2002b), *Die Planungszelle*, 279.
39. Hilmar Sturm, planning cell practitioner; Munich, personal communication, May 30, 2004.
40. Diemel (1989). "Contributing to Social Decision Methodology," 144–149.
41. Diemel (1999), "Planning Cells," 86. See also Thompson, S., and Hoggett, P. (2000). "The Emotional Dynamics of Deliberative Democracy." *Policy and Politics*, 29(3), 351–364.
42. Peter Diemel, interview with author; Wuppertal, Germany, Feb. 26, 2002.
43. Author interviews with planning cell practitioners Peter Diemel (Feb. 26, 2002, Wuppertal); Christian Weilmeier (Jan. 22, 2003, Munich); and Hilmar Sturm (Jan. 23, 2003, Munich).
44. In contrast, deliberative democrats usually promote collective rather than aggregated political outputs from a deliberative forum.
45. For a comparative discussion of planning cells and deliberative polls, see Price, V., and Neijens, P. (1998). "Deliberative Polls: Toward Improved Measures of 'Informed' Public Opinion?" *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*, 10(2), 145–176.
46. Details on how to plan both types of events are well documented. For planning cells, see Bongardt (1999), *Die Planungszelle in Theorie und Anwendung*; Diemel (1997), *Die Planungszelle*; Diemel (1999), "Planning Cells"; and Renn and others (1984), "An Empirical Investigation of Citizens' Preferences." For consensus conferences, see Einsiedel, E. F. (2000). "Consensus Conferences as Deliberative Democracy." *Science Communication*, 21(4), 323–343; Grundahl (1995), "The Danish Consensus Conference Model"; Joss (1998), "Danish Consensus Conferences"; Joss (2000), *Die Konsensuskonferenz in Theorie und Anwendung*.
47. The Danish Board of Technology also uses committees of experts, scenario workshops, and voting conferences. See Anderson, I.-E., and Jæger, B. (1999). "Scenario Workshops and Consensus Conferences: Towards More Democratic Decision Making." *Science and Public Policy*, 26(5), 331–340; and Klüver (1995), "Consensus Conferences at the Danish Board of Technology." See also Teknologirådet [The Danish Board of Technology]. (2005). "Methods." [<http://www.tekno.dk/subpage.php3?survey=16&language=uk>].
48. Joss (2000), *Die Konsensuskonferenz in Theorie und Anwendung*, 18–19.
49. Joss (2000), *Die Konsensuskonferenz in Theorie und Anwendung*, 21, states that outside of Denmark, consensus conferences have been conducted by a number of private and public institutions.
50. Author interviews with planning cell practitioners Peter Diemel (Feb. 26, 2002, Wuppertal); Christian Weilmeier (Jan. 22, 2003, Munich); and Hilmar Sturm (Jan. 23, 2003, Munich).
51. According to Dryzek, J. S., Downes, D., Hunold, C., Schlosberg, D., and Hernes, H.-K. (2003). *Green States and Social Movements: Environmentalism in the United States, United Kingdom*,

- Germany and Norway*. Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 1–2, the imperatives of the modern state include domestic order, survival, revenue generation, securing economic growth (accumulation), and legitimation.
52. Danish political culture has been strongly influenced by Danish priest, poet and philosopher Nicolai Grundtvig (1783–1872). Grundtvig encouraged a “people’s enlightenment” (*folkeoplysning*) in which ordinary citizens participate in cooperatives and “folk high schools” to learn about public issues. See Cronberg, T. (1995). “Do Marginal Voices Shape Technology?” In S. Joss and J. Durant (eds.), *Public Participation in Science: The Role of Consensus Conferences in Europe*. London: Science Museum, 125; Klüver (1995), “Consensus Conferences at the Danish Board of Technology,” 41.
 53. Klüver (1995), “Consensus Conferences at the Danish Board of Technology,” 43.
 54. Joss (1998), “Danish Consensus Conferences.”
 55. Danish Board of Technology. (2002). “Consensus Conference.” [http://www.tekno.dk/subpage.php3?article=468]. Retrieved May 15, 2004.
 56. See The Loka Institute. (2004). “Danish-Style, Citizen-Based Deliberative ‘Consensus Conferences’ on Science & Technology Policy Worldwide.” [http://www.loka.org/pages/worldpanels.htm]. Retrieved May 15, 2004.
 57. For example, regional rather than national consensus conferences have been conducted in Canada (Einsiedel, Jelsøe, and Breck [2001], “Publics and the Technology Table,” 88) and in the United States (Guston [1999], “Evaluating the First U.S. Consensus Conference”).
 58. According to Diemel (2002b), *Die Planungszelle*, 282–283, decision makers at the local government level are most willing to engage with the public.
 59. Diemel (1999), “Planning Cells,” 92.
 60. For a discussion of the only U.S. experience with planning cells, see Diemel and Renn (1995), “Planning Cells”; Renn and others (1993), “Public Participation in Decision Making.”
 61. These figures represent averages drawn from Diemel’s list of processes in Diemel (2002b), *Die Planungszelle*, 280–282. See also Diemel, P. (2004). “Bisherige Bürgergutachten” [Previous citizens’ reports]. [http://www2.uni-wuppertal.de/FB1/planungszelle/liste.html].
 62. See Diemel (1997), *Die Planungszelle*, 83; Diemel (1999), “Planning Cells,” 88.
 63. Diemel, P. C. (2002a, Apr.). “Die Planungszelle—Zur Praxis der Bürgerbeteiligung” [The planning cells—On the practice of public participation]. *FES-Analyse*, 6, observes that the learning that takes place in planning cells is much faster than that in schools or universities. He accounts for this by observing that the citizens take their task seriously, like they would if they were in a commercial situation, in love, or faced with a life-threatening situation.
 64. The term *citizens’ panel* is also used in some English publications; see for example Renn and others (1993), “Public Participation in Decision Making.” Planning cells are also often incorrectly equated with citizens’ juries; see note 4.
 65. Hilmar Sturm, planning cells practitioner, Munich, personal communication, May 30, 2004. In German, the term *citizens’ report* (*Bürgergutachten*), can refer to both the process and its outcomes.
 66. This list is adapted from Guston’s categories of impact in Guston (1999), “Evaluating the First U.S. Consensus Conference,” 457–461—a schema he developed to evaluate the impact of the first U.S. consensus conference.
 67. More analysis of impacts has been conducted on consensus conferences than on planning cells. See Einsiedel, Jelsøe, and Breck (2001), “Publics and the Technology Table”; Joss, S., and Bellucci, S. (eds.). (2002). *Participatory Technology Assessment: European Perspectives*. London: Centre for the Study of Democracy.

68. Citizen response rates vary from project to project. Consensus conference evaluations report response rates of 3 percent in Germany from random mailings (Zimmer, R. [2002, Feb.]. *Begleitende Evaluation der Bürgerkonferenz "Streitfall Gendiagnostik"* [Accompanying evaluation of the "Conflict over Genetic Diagnostics" citizens' conference]. Karlsruhe, Germany: Fraunhofer-Institut für Systemtechnik und Innovationsforschung, 11); about 6 percent in Denmark from random mailings (Anderson and Jæger [1999], "Scenario Workshops and Consensus Conferences," 335); and 12.5 percent in the United States from random phone calls (Guston [1999]. "Evaluating the First U.S. Consensus Conference," 455). For consensus conference recruitment via newspaper advertisements, response rates are reported as follows: 200 citizens in Australia (McKay, E. [1999]. *Evaluation Report: Phase 1*. Report commissioned by the Consensus Conference Steering Committee of the First Australian Consensus Conference: Gene Technology in the Food Chain, Canberra, March 10–12, 1999. Canberra: P. J. Dawson & Associates, 20); 323 citizens and 111 citizens for two different projects in the Netherlands (Mayer, I., de Vries, J., and Geurts, J. [1995]. "An Evaluation of the Effects of Participation in a Consensus Conference." In S. Joss and D. John (eds.), *Public Participation in Science: The Role of Consensus Conferences in Europe*. London: Science Museum, 112); and over 400 citizens in the United Kingdom (Joss, S. [1995]. "Evaluating Consensus Conferences: Necessity or Luxury?" In S. Joss and J. Durant (eds.), *Public Participation in Science: The Role of Consensus Conferences in Europe*. London: Science Museum, 101). For planning cell projects involving random mailings, response rates vary, for example, from 8 percent (Sturm, H., Weilmeier, C., and Roßkopf, K. [2002]. *Bürgergutachten zum Verbraucherschutz in Bayern* [Citizens' report for consumer protection in Bavaria]. Munich, Germany: Bayerisches Staatsministerium für Gesundheit, Ernährung und Verbraucherschutz, 29) to 20 percent (Renn and others [1984], "An Empirical Investigation of Citizens' Preferences," 27).
69. In neither the consensus conference nor planning cell model are the samples intended to be statistically representative of the community—an issue I explore later in this chapter. However, this is a claim that advocates tend to make more for planning cells than for consensus conferences. The literature reports that participants in planning cells come from a wide variety of social groups, even in the absence of stratified sampling. See Diemel (2002a), "Die Planungszelle," 15–16; Diemel and Renn (1995), "Planning Cells"; Garbe, D. (1992). "Social Compatibility of Telecommunication Technologies." *Telecommunications Policy*, 16(8), 646–656; Renn and others (1984), "An Empirical Investigation of Citizens' Preferences," 27–29; Sturm, Weilmeier, and Roßkopf (2002), *Bürgergutachten zum Verbraucherschutz in Bayern*, 48–54. The only reported sampling bias is in relation to participants' occupations. One project reported overrepresentation of white-collar workers and also found that more students and retired people attended than self-employed people (Renn and others [1984], "An Empirical Investigation of Citizens' Preferences," 27–29). More recent projects however, report a diverse range of occupations (see for example, Sturm, Weilmeier, and Roßkopf [2002], *Bürgergutachten zum Verbraucherschutz in Bayern*, 249–254).
70. See Diemel (2002a), "Die Planungszelle"; Einsiedel (2000), "Consensus Conferences as Deliberative Democracy"; Joss (1995), "Evaluating Consensus Conferences," 101–104; Zimmer (2002), *Begleitende Evaluation der Bürgerkonferenz "Streitfall Gendiagnostik"*, 14–18.
71. Several evaluations report how after participation in consensus conferences or planning cells, citizens have an increased awareness of the uncertainties and risks associated with policymaking as well as the limitations of expert knowledge. Citizens also report greater appreciation of the policymaking process and its social ramifications. See, for example,


- Einsiedel (2000), "Consensus Conferences as Deliberative Democracy"; Guston (1999), "Evaluating the First U.S. Consensus Conference," 469–471; Mayer, de Vries, and Geurts (1995), "An Evaluation of the Effects of Participation in a Consensus Conference"; McKay (1999), *Evaluation Report: Phase 1*. Some studies report how citizens' preferences shift as a result of deliberation. See, for example, Dienel (2002b), *Die Planungszelle*, 279; Mayer, de Vries, and Geurts (1995), "An Evaluation of the Effects of Participation in a Consensus Conference"; McKay (1999), *Evaluation Report: Phase 1*; Zimmer (2002), *Begleitende Evaluation der Bürgerkonferenz "Streitfall Gendiagnostik"*, 40–46.
72. See, for example, Einsiedel (2000), "Consensus Conferences as Deliberative Democracy"; Guston (1999), "Evaluating the First U.S. Consensus Conference"; Mayer and Geurts (1998), "Consensus Conference as Participatory Policy Analysis."
 73. See, for example, Crombie and Ducker (2000), *Evaluation Report*, 24; Einsiedel (2000), "Consensus Conferences as Deliberative Democracy," 337.
 74. See, for example, Einsiedel (2000), "Consensus Conferences as Deliberative Democracy," 336; Garbe, D. (1980). *Die Planungszelle und ihre Umwelt: Analyse des Beziehungsgefüges zwischen Verfahren, Teilnehmern und Planern* [Planning cells and their environment: Analysis of networks between processes, participants and planners]. Frankfurt am Main, Germany: Lang, 272–279; Zimmer (2002), *Begleitende Evaluation der Bürgerkonferenz "Streitfall Gendiagnostik"*, 47–48.
 75. Several evaluations report overall positive feedback from participants. See, for example, Einsiedel (2000), "Consensus Conferences as Deliberative Democracy," 337–338; Garbe (1980), *Die Planungszelle und ihre Umwelt*, 257–266; Mayer, de Vries, and Geurts (1995), "An Evaluation of the Effects of Participation in a Consensus Conference," 293; McKay (1999), *Evaluation Report: Phase 1*. In some projects, citizens are overwhelmingly supportive of future deliberative forums. For example, after the 2001–2002 Bavarian planning cell project on consumer protection, 99.5 percent of participants said that they would recommend participating in such a process to others (Sturm, Weilmeyer, and Roßkopf [2002], *Bürgergutachten zum Verbraucherschutz in Bayern*, 31–32). In other cases, where the involvement and commitment from decision makers was minimal, citizens conditioned their support for future deliberative forums by adding "if the government listened to the panel and acted on what we did" (Guston [1999], "Evaluating the First U.S. Consensus Conference," 471).
 76. For a detailed discussion of the role of consensus conferences in the Danish parliament, see Joss (1998), "Danish Consensus Conferences."
 77. See Einsiedel, Jelsøe, and Breck (2001), "Publics and the Technology Table"; Joss (1998), "Danish Consensus Conferences"; Joss (2000), *Die Konsensuskonferenz in Theorie und Anwendung*, 19.
 78. This is the overall conclusion reached by Joss (1998), "Danish Consensus Conferences," who conducted extensive empirical research on the effects of consensus conferences on policy decisions and public debates in Denmark.
 79. See, for example, Klüver (1995), "Consensus Conferences at the Danish Board of Technology," 44.
 80. See Joss (1998), "Danish Consensus Conferences," 16–18; Klüver (1995), "Consensus Conferences at the Danish Board of Technology," 44–45. One Danish opinion poll revealed that 17 percent of the surveyed population ($n = 1000$) had heard of consensus conferences and could cite a number of different topics that the conferences had addressed (see Joss [1998], "Danish Consensus Conferences," 16–17).
 81. See Joss (1998), "Danish Consensus Conferences."
 82. This conclusion is drawn in evaluations in the United States (Guston [1999], "Evaluating the First U.S. Consensus Conference"); the Netherlands (Mayer and Geurts [1998], "Consensus Conference as Participatory Policy Analysis"); the United Kingdom (Joss [1995],

- “Evaluating Consensus Conferences”); and in Australia and Canada (Einsiedel, Jelsøe, and Breck [2001], “Publics and the Technology Table”).
83. For details on these and other international experiences with consensus conferences, see The Loka Institute (2004), “Danish-Style, Citizen-Based Deliberative ‘Consensus Conferences.’”
 84. This was the case for consensus conferences conducted in the United Kingdom on plant biotechnology; in the Netherlands on predictive human genetics (Mayer and Geurts, [1998], “Consensus Conference as Participatory Policy Analysis,” 296); and in Germany on genetic diagnostics (interviews conducted by the author with several policy actors associated with this project in Berlin, Munich, Dresden, and Stuttgart between January and March 2003); see also Schicktanz and Naumann (2003), *Bürgerkonferenz*; Zimmer (2002), *Begleitende Evaluation der Bürgerkonferenz “Streitfall Gendiagnostik,”* 52–53).
 85. This was the case for the Australian and Canadian consensus conferences on gene technology. See Crombie and Ducker (2000), *Evaluation Report*, v; Einsiedel, Jelsøe, and Breck (2001), “Publics and the Technology Table,” 93–94; McDonald, J. (1999). “Mechanisms for Public Participation in Environmental Policy Development: Lessons from Australia’s First Consensus Conference.” *Environmental and Planning Law Journal*, 16(3), 258–266.
 86. In Denmark, consensus conferences often result in “more than a hundred press clippings” (Klüver [1995], “Consensus Conferences at the Danish Board of Technology,” 44). This figure has been matched by some experiences outside of Denmark. For example, the 1994 U.K. consensus conference on plant biotechnology resulted in 152 news items (including 128 newspaper articles) (Joss [1995], “Evaluating Consensus Conferences,” 95); the 1999 Australian consensus conference on gene technology in the food chain resulted in 287 media items (including 53 newspaper articles) (Crombie and Ducker [2000], *Evaluation Report*, 37). Other consensus conferences have struggled to attract media attention—for example, the 2001 German consensus conference on genetic diagnostics was covered by only 37 news items (Zimmer [2002], *Begleitende Evaluation der Bürgerkonferenz “Streitfall Gendiagnostik”*). Media coverage was also very poor for the U.S. conference on telecommunications and the future of democracy in 1997; only 5 news items were recorded (Guston, [1999], “Evaluating the First U.S. Consensus Conference,” 472–473).
 87. See, for example, Guston (1999), “Evaluating the First U.S. Consensus Conference,” 473; and Mayer and Geurts (1998), “Consensus Conference as Participatory Policy Analysis,” 295–296.
 88. See, for example, Guston (1999), “Evaluating the First U.S. Consensus Conference,” 464–469; and Crombie and Ducker (2000), *Evaluation Report*, 21–24.
 89. See, for example, Garbe (1980), *Die Planungszelle und ihre Umwelt*.
 90. Diemel (1999), “Planning Cells,” 91.
 91. Diemel and Renn (1995), “Planning Cells,” 130–131.
 92. See Renn and others (1984), “An Empirical Investigation of Citizens’ Preferences.”
 93. Practitioners in Germany report that since the mid-1990s, there has been increasing interest in planning cells from politicians and agencies at federal and state levels (author interviews with planning cell practitioners Peter Diemel [Feb. 26, 2002, Wuppertal]; Christian Weilmeier [Jan. 22, 2003, Munich]; and Hilmar Sturm [Jan. 23, 2003, Munich]). Since 2000, a number of state governments in Germany have committed resources to planning cell projects. For example, the Bavarian state government has commissioned two large planning cell projects, each involving over four hundred citizens. One of the projects, undertaken in 2001–2002, was on consumer protection; the other project, completed in 2004, was on health reform (see Bavarian Ministry for Environment, Health and Con-

- sumer Protection. [2004]. "Bürgergutachten für Gesundheit" [Citizens' report for health]. [http://www.stmugv.bayern.de/de/gesundheit/buergergut_ges.htm]. Similarly, in the state of Rhineland-Pfalz, the Ministry for Work, Social Affairs, Family and Health has commissioned a series of planning cells to address the issue of demographic change in an aging society (see Rhineland-Pfalz Ministry for Work, Social Issues, Family and Health. [2004]. "Bürgergutachten: Miteinander der Generationen in einer alternden Gesellschaft" [Citizens' report: Together as generations in an aging society]. [http://www.masfg.rlp.de/Funktionsnavigation/Dokumente/Buergergutachten/Gutachten_Inhalt.htm]).
94. Diemel and Renn (1995), "Planning Cells," 135–136; Renn and others (1993), "Public Participation in Decision Making," 204–205.
 95. Whereas citizens in German planning cell projects tend to welcome the idea of a structured participatory process, the citizens in the U.S. project "distrust[ed] prefabricated participation models and suspected[ed] hidden agendas" (Renn and others [1993], "Public Participation in Decision Making," 205).
 96. See Diemel (2002b), *Die Planungszelle*, 291–293; Diemel and Renn (1995), "Planning Cells," 134–135.
 97. Diemel and Renn (1995), "Planning Cells," 132–134.
 98. See Joss (2000), *Die Konsensuskonferenz in Theorie und Anwendung*, 15; Renn and others (1984), "An Empirical Investigation of Citizens' Preferences," 43.
 99. Cost is one of the largest impediments to further expansion of planning cells and consensus conferences (Diemel [1999], "Planning Cells," 91; Zimmer (2002), *Begleitende Evaluation der Bürgerkonferenz "Streitfall Gendiagnostik"*, 61). According to Diemel (2002b), *Die Planungszelle*, 280, a number of planning cell projects have collapsed during preparations due to a sudden lack of resources from the commissioning body.
 100. These figures do not include the salaries of the project conveners, who may work on preparations for six to eighteen months. They represent averages from figures found in the literature. For consensus conferences, see Guston (1999), "Evaluating the First U.S. Consensus Conference," 454; Klüver (1995), "Consensus Conferences at the Danish Board of Technology," 47; Zimmer (2002), *Begleitende Evaluation der Bürgerkonferenz "Streitfall Gendiagnostik"*, 34–35. For planning cells, see Bongardt (1999), *Die Planungszelle in Theorie und Anwendung*, 18–21; Diemel (1999), "Planning Cells," 91. Costs vary significantly, depending on the travel distances. In the case of planning cells, costs are reduced when there are fewer planning cell locations (Hilmar Sturm, planning cell practitioner, personal communication, Munich, May 14, 2004).
 101. For more discussion on the limitations of the models discussed in this chapter, see Hennen, L. (1999). "Participatory Technology Assessment: A Response to Technical Modernity?" *Science and Public Policy*, 26(5), 303–312; Renn and others (1984), "An Empirical Investigation of Citizens' Preferences," 45; Rippe, K. P., and Schaber, P. (1999). "Democracy and Environmental Decision Making." *Environmental Values*, 8(1), 75–88; Seiler, H.-J. (1995). "Review of Planning Cells: Problems of Legitimation." In O. Renn, T. Weibler, and P. Wiedemann (eds.), *Fairness and Competence in Citizen Participation*. Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer, 141–155.
 102. Diemel and Renn (1995), "Planning Cells," 128–129; Renn and others (1993), "Public Participation in Decision Making," 207.
 103. Mayer and Geurts (1998), "Consensus Conference as Participatory Policy Analysis," 290.
 104. Anderson and Jæger (1999), "Scenario Workshops and Consensus Conferences," 334.
 105. Diemel and Renn (1995), "Planning Cells," 129–130.

106. For example, the 1999 Australian consensus conference on gene technology in the food chain was instigated by a not-for-profit community organization, the Australian Consumers' Association. See Renouf, C. (1999). "Rebirthing Democracy: The Experience of the First Australian Consensus Conference." *Consuming Interest*, 79, 16–19.
107. There have been some instances in which citizens have maintained informal contact among themselves (author interviews with planning cell practitioners Peter Diemel [Feb. 26, 2002, Wuppertal]; Christian Weilmeier [Jan. 22, 2003, Munich]; and Hilmar Sturm [Jan. 23, 2003, Munich]). In the case of the 2001–2002 Bavarian planning cell project, a group of citizens has been formally reactivated to provide further advice to the Bavarian government on consumer protection issues. See Gesellschaft für Bürgergutachten [Society for Citizens Report]. (2003). "Detail-Bürgergutachten zur Lebensmittelqualität im erweiterten Europa" [Detailed citizens' report on food quality in a broader Europe]. [<http://www.buergergutachten.com/Buergergutachten/DetailBG%20Lebensmittelqualit%E4t.pdf>]. Retrieved Feb. 5, 2005.
108. Several democratic theorists have drawn attention to the tensions between deliberation in structured procedures and deliberation in the public sphere. Some argue that deliberation in formal venues can ostracize those unfamiliar with structured debate or poised speech (Sanders, L. M. [1997]. "Against Deliberation." *Political Theory*, 25(3), 347–376; Young, I. M. [1996]. "Communication and the Other: Beyond Deliberative Democracy." In S. Benhabib (ed.), *Democracy and Difference: Contesting Boundaries of the Political*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 120–135), or it can exclude oppressed groups who may need to assert their self-interest (Mansbridge, J. [2003]. "Practice-Thought-Practice." In A. Fung and E. O. Wright (eds.), *Deepening Democracy: Institutional Innovation in Empowered Participatory Governance*. London: Verso, 175–199). For a good overview of the tensions and differences between deliberation in formal procedures and deliberation in the public sphere, see Fraser, N. (1992). "Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy." In C. Calhoun (ed.), *Habermas and the Public Sphere*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 109–142; Young, I. M. (2001). "Activist Challenges to Deliberative Democracy." *Political Theory*, 29(5), 670–690.
109. Joss (1998), "Danish Consensus Conferences," 21.
110. On legitimacy problems with planning cells, see Renn and others (1984), "An Empirical Investigation of Citizens' Preferences"; Renn and others (1993), "Public Participation in Decision Making"; Seiler (1995), "Review of Planning Cells"; on legitimacy issues in relation to consensus conferences, see Cronberg (1995), "Do Marginal Voices Shape Technology?" For a discussion on legitimacy problems in deliberative democracy and deliberative designs in general, see Parkinson, J. (2003). "Legitimacy Problems in Deliberative Democracy." *Political Studies*, 51(1), 180–196; Parkinson, J. (2003). "The Legitimation of Deliberative Democracy." Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Australian National University, Canberra.
111. The reactions of different policy actors to planning cell projects are discussed by Diemel and Renn (1995), "Planning Cells"; Renn and others (1993), "Public Participation in Decision Making"; and Garbe (1980), *Die Planungszelle und ihre Umwelt*, chaps. 7 and 8.
112. The term *expert activist* is borrowed from Bang, H., and Sørensen, E. (2001). "The Everyday Maker: Building Political Rather Than Social Capital." In P. Dekker and E. Uslaner (eds.), *Social Capital and Participation in Everyday Life*. London: Routledge, 148–161.
113. This research draws on my doctoral dissertation, which investigated the responses of stakeholders and policy elites to four different deliberative designs (two in Germany and two

- in Australia): two consensus conferences, one planning cell project, and a citizens' jury (Hendriks, C. M. [2004]. "Public Deliberation and Interest Organisations: A Study of Responses to Lay Citizen Engagement in Public Policy." Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Australian National University, Canberra). Other researchers who have touched on similar issues include Dienel (2002a), "Die Planungszelle," 19–20; Dienel and Renn (1995), "Planning Cells," 27–28; Garbe (1980), *Die Planungszelle und ihre Umwelt*, 215–221.
114. For more on this tension, see Hendriks (2004), "Public Deliberation and Interest Organisations"; Hendriks, C. M. (2002). "Institutions of Deliberative Democratic Processes and Interest Groups: Roles, Tensions and Incentives." *Australian Journal of Public Administration*, 61(1), 64–75.
 115. See Hendriks (2004), "Public Deliberation and Interest Organisations," chap. 9.
 116. Grundahl (1995), "The Danish Consensus Conference Model," 39; Klüver (1995), "Consensus Conferences at the Danish Board of Technology," 46.
 117. According to Parkinson (2003), "The Legitimation of Deliberative Democracy," 108, a sample size of at least 399 is required in order to achieve a statistically representative sample that reflects gender proportions at a 95 percent confidence level. This is to say nothing of the sample sizes needed to achieve the same confidence level for other demographic characteristics such as age, education, occupation, and ethnicity.
 118. For example, Smith and Wales prefer to highlight the panel's inclusivity as opposed to its representativeness (Smith, G., and Wales, C. [2000]. "Citizens' Juries and Deliberative Democracy." *Political Studies*, 48(1), 56–57). Elsewhere, Smith argues, "It is important that citizens are not necessarily seen as representing 'people like them' in any strong sense" (Smith, G. [2000]. "Toward Deliberative Institutions." In M. Saward (ed.), *Democratic Innovation: Deliberation, Representation and Association*. London: Routledge, 34).
 119. Sunstein, C. (2002, June). "The Law of Group Polarization." *Journal of Political Philosophy*, pp. 175–195; Sunstein, C. R. (2000). "Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes." *Yale Law Journal*, 110(1), 71–119.
 120. Renn, O. (1999). "A Model for an Analytic-Deliberative Process in Risk Management." *Environmental Science & Technology*, 33(18), 3049–3055; Renn and others (1993), "Public Participation in Decision Making."
 121. Carson, L. (1999, Aug. 31). "Random Selection: Achieving Representation in Planning." Paper presented at the Alison Burton Memorial Lecture, Royal Australian Planning Institute, Canberra. [<http://activedemocracy.net/articles.htm>]. Retrieved Jan. 4, 2005.
 122. In some projects, Web sites have been used to promote a particular deliberative project—for example, the 1999 Canadian consensus conference on food biotechnology (Einsiedel, Jelsøe, and Breck [2001], "Publics and the Technology Table," 330). Web forums have also been used in conjunction with some projects; for example, during the weeks before and after the 1999 Australian consensus conference on gene technology in the food chain, an unfacilitated on-line discussion forum was hosted on the Australian Broadcasting Corporation's Web site for the conference. This forum provided an on-line deliberative space in which members of the broader public could interact with the conference speakers and the lay citizens. See Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1999), "*Waiter, There Is a Gene in My Food. . .*"
 123. For more on the North Carolina Citizens' Technology Forum, see Center for Information Society Studies, North Carolina State University. (2002). "Sponsored Research." [<http://www.ncsu.edu/chass/communication/ciss/sponsored.html#ncctf>]. Retrieved Feb. 7, 2005.
 124. The expression *alibi participation* is adapted from the word *Alibiveranstaltung*, which was used by one of my German interviewees.



125. The “21st Century Nanotechnology Research and Development Act” establishes the National Nanotechnology Program and charges it with ensuring that “ethical, legal, environmental, and other appropriate societal concerns, including the potential use of nanotechnology in enhancing human intelligence and in developing artificial intelligence which exceeds human capacity, are considered during the development of nanotechnology by . . . providing . . . for public input and outreach to be integrated into the Program by the convening of regular and ongoing public discussions, through mechanisms such as citizens’ panels, consensus conferences, and educational events, as appropriate” (Public Law 108–153, Dec. 3, 2003). See Library of Congress. (2004). “Thomas: Legislative Information on the Internet.” [<http://thomas.loc.gov>].

