

Lectures on Greek Philosophy 1928

The Lectures on Greek Philosophy of 1928 are among the earliest lectures we have of John Anderson's, delivered in the year following his arrival in Sydney in 1927. In these teachings he closely and critically followed John Burnet's classic work *Early Greek Philosophy*.

Anderson's complete course covered the pre-Socratics extensively before progressing to the Socratic Dialogues and Aristotle. The study of Greek Philosophy for Anderson provided an important corrective to the attitudes and forms of inquiry dominating modern philosophy.

The study of Greek philosophy was essential to Anderson because the Greeks "are far clearer on many questions than modern philosophers...they avoid many modern errors, and especially...they are not, like the moderns, obsessed with 'the problem of knowledge'... they do not set out to discover (that is to say, *to know*) how, or how much, we can know, before they are prepared to know anything."

Modern philosophers need to return to "the Greek consideration of *things*", to finally abandon epistemology as "an intrusion of mind into logic and of a false logic into psychology" and accept the direct realism of the Greek philosophers.



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Lectures on Greek Philosophy 1928

John Anderson

Graham Cullum

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Introduction (in *Lectures on Greek
Philosophy 1928 John Anderson*)

Edited and introduced by Graham Cullum

Lectures on Greek Philosophy 1928

John Anderson

Lectures on Greek Philosophy 1928

by

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Foreword to the John Anderson Series

In 2006 a senior academic advisory committee was established at the University of Sydney to oversee the publication of a series of books which would present the intellectual achievement and development of John Anderson, Challis Professor of Philosophy 1927–1958. In 2006–08 the committee members are Emeritus Professor David Armstrong, Emeritus Professor Paul Crittenden, and Professor Stephen Gaukroger. The committee is convened by the John Anderson Senior Research Fellow undertaking research into and publication of the papers of Professor Anderson.

To some extent a proper appreciation of Anderson's work requires an experience of his lecture room. From the notes in the University Archives we may be able to provide something of this experience. Many of these lecture notes have been transcribed and are available at the John Anderson Archive along with Anderson's previously published writings, allowing researchers and students to access the chief resources and to follow the course of his thinking over many years.

The published series to be selected from this material aims to provide scholarly editions of the most complete and significant lectures now available and will include works devoted to Anderson's metaphysics, logic, ethics, politics and aesthetics. The series will help younger students and scholars to understand why John Anderson was the most important, the most controversial and the most influential philosopher ever to have worked in Australia.

Ongoing research into Professor Anderson's unpublished writings and the series of books drawn from this research has only been possible due to the generous bequest to the University of Sydney by his son, Alexander (Sandy) John Anderson (1923–1996).

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University of Sydney 2007

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Introduction

The new age begins with the return to the Greeks.

—Friedrich Engels¹

In 1928 John Anderson delivered his first full-year lecture course as Challis Professor of Philosophy at Sydney University—a course on Greek philosophy with a coda consisting of several lectures on the ethics of Bishop Butler. Anderson began with a detailed account of aspects of the thought of the PreSocratics (as they had survived in fragments and doxological writings), moved on to address a number of the Socratic Dialogues of Plato—focusing on aspects of *The Euthyphro*; *The Apology*; *The Phaedo*, *The Parmenides* and *The Republic*, with passing references to some of the other Dialogues—and concluded the Greek section of the course with an account of aspects of Aristotle's ethical philosophy with particular reference to the *Nicomachean Ethics*. While not, in any sense, being an exhaustive account of these works or the history of early Greek philosophy, the course was both comprehensive and critically, philosophically engaged. Like Hegel², Anderson took the history of philosophy to be part of philosophy itself, and took seriously the need to engage with prior thought as a condition of working out his own philosophical position.

As an undergraduate at Glasgow University, Anderson took two honours degrees, one of them in mathematics and natural philosophy, the other in logic and moral philosophy. All four of these fields or 'subjects' inform his engagement with Greek philosophy in these lectures. Equally important is the work of John Burnet, Professor of Greek in the University of St. Andrews from 1892–1926, the year before Anderson arrived in Australia. In his Preface to the third edition of his *Early Greek Philosophy* Burnet had written

My aim has been to show that a new thing came into the world with the early Ionian teachers—the thing we call science—and that they first pointed the way which Europe has followed ever since, so that, as I have said elsewhere, it is an adequate

¹F. Engels, *Dialectics of Nature* (Lawrence and Wishart: 1946), translated and edited by Clemens Dutt with a Preface and Notes by J.B.S. Haldane, p.218.

²See, in particular, Hegel's General Introduction and the Introduction to Part I of *Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy* (abridged), translated by E.S. Haldane and Frances H. Simon (Humanities Press International, Inc.: 1996).

description of science to say that it is "thinking about the world in the Greek way." That is why Science has never existed except among peoples who have come under the influence of Greece.³

Such was Anderson's engagement with and esteem for Burnet's work that he paid tribute to it at the beginning of 'Socrates as an Educator' (1931), claiming that owing especially to that work "it is now possible for us not only to recognize the Greek philosophers as the founders of modern science, but to distinguish and appreciate the contributions of Socrates and Plato to science and general culture."⁴ In a much later essay, 'Classicism' (1960), Anderson recognized his continuing indebtedness to Burnet:

On the Socratic philosophy I very largely follow the view of John Burnet, whose work on Socrates and on Greek philosophy generally, neglected though it is in these days, seems to me to make a remarkable contribution both to classicism and to philosophy, and whose wholeness of view provides a striking contrast to the piecemeal "philosophies" which are now in vogue.⁵

Anderson's lectures strive for a comparable "wholeness of view" to that which he praised in Burnet when, in a later footnote, he talked of Burnet's "striking combination of philosophical and historical insight" which, in the case of the views of individual thinkers and the course of philosophical thought, "can help us to arrive at philosophical truths (to learn philosophy)."⁶ On the evidence of the lectures, Anderson's knowledge of the PreSocratic corpus was largely limited to Burnet's book and his translations. Even so, some of the most interesting moments in Anderson's lectures are those when he critically disagrees with, and the many instances when his own analyses and arguments take him well beyond, Burnet.

Reflecting on what he saw as "the renascent interest in ancient thought," in 1954, Erwin Schrodinger wrote of being "swept along... as happens so often, by a trend of

³ John Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy* (Adam & Charles Black: 1920), p. v. This work survived in Anderson's library.

⁴ 'Socrates as an Educator' in John Anderson, *Studies in Empirical Philosophy* (Angus and Robertson: 1962), p. 203. Henceforth referred to as *SEP*.

⁵ *Ibid.* f.n. to p. 193. It is interesting to note that Anderson seems to have been unaware of the remarkably original insights in John Burnet's lecture given as *The Second Annual Philosophical Lecture to the British Academy of January 26th 1916*. 'The Socratic Doctrine of the Soul'. The case put forward there for the Socratic notion of the soul or *psyche* is more complex and nuanced than that of Anderson in the lectures below.

⁶ *Ibid.* f.n. to p. 201.

thought rooted somehow in the intellectual situation of our time."⁷ It is true that a literal 'return to the Greeks' is hermeneutically and culturally impossible—for all of the labours of recuperative scholarship we cannot escape the fact that what passes for our knowledge of them is inescapably *our* understanding of *their* meanings, *our* belated understanding of *their* understandings of themselves. But it is also true that re-engagements with Greek thought have characterized much of what was most original and significant in the thought of the last century. Detailing, exploring and accounting for this in the fields of Philosophy, Literary Theory and, to go no further, Historiography is an important project for the present.

In these lectures, Anderson's 'return to the Greeks' was inseparable from his own working out of the contours of his Realist, Empirical philosophy. In the Introductory Essay to Anderson's *Studies in Empirical Philosophy*, John Passmore characterized that philosophy in the following way.

No total scheme, no simple units, no first principles, no ultimate objectives, no modes of being, no necessary truths—these, not the rejection of God, are the fundamental negations of Anderson's philosophy. To put it positively, there is, on his view, a single way of being: the complex activity of a spatio-temporal occurrence, within which discriminations can be made and which is itself discriminable within a wider system. To explain, to prove, is to draw attention to relationships which occur between such occurrences; to assert a proposition is to take something of a certain kind to occur; any proposition can be false; science proceeds by the critical examination of hypotheses; any objective has a variety of characteristics and it can always be pursued as part of a procedure for getting something else.

These are definite and general doctrines. In taking it to be his task as a philosopher to enunciate, and to argue for, propositions of such a kind, Anderson is in total opposition to the view that philosophy is simply analysis, or that its object is purely therapeutic. So far he is an untypical figure in recent British philosophy.⁸

⁷ Ernst Schrodinger, *Nature and the Greeks* (Cambridge University Press: 1996), p. 4. ⁸ *SEP*, p. xxiii. It is not clear to me that Anderson would have agreed that he was a 'British' philosopher. See also J.L. Mackie, 'The Philosophy of John Anderson' in *Australian Journal of Philosophy*, vol. 40 no. 3 December 1962, pp. 265-82. For a more comprehensive account of the scope and themes of Anderson's Realism see A.J. Baker, *Australian Realism: The Systematic Philosophy of John Anderson* (Cambridge University Press: 1989). For Anderson's views on education, and other views on them, see D.Z. Phillips (ed.), *Education and Inquiry* (Basil Blackwell: 1980). For Anderson's fundamental views on Aesthetics see Janet Anderson, Graham Cullum and Kinon Lycos (ed.s.), *Art and Reality: John Anderson on literature and aesthetics* (Hale & Iremonger: 1982).

Engaging with early Greek philosophy was, for Anderson, a way of defining and engaging with what he took to be the central questions of philosophy. As he put it in his later essay 'The Place of Hegel in the History of Philosophy' (1932), "the nature of philosophical problems remains the same now as it was in 500 BC."⁹ From the perspective of Anderson's understanding of his Realist position, the early Greek thinkers would always be, in one way or another, deficient.

Perhaps the central feature of Anderson's position could be found in his insistence on what the Greeks called 'the common measure of things'—one sense of the word *logos* as it is used by Heraclitus. Kirk and Raven translate one of the Heraclitean fragments (their 198) as follows: "Therefore it is necessary to follow the common: but although the *Logos* is common the many live as though they had a private understanding."¹⁰ Anderson links this to his insistence that "there is only one way of being,"—that of ordinary things in space and time. As J.L. Mackie put it, for Anderson

There are no different degrees or kinds of truth. His propositional view of reality implies that things are irreducibly complex, that we can never arrive at simple elements in any field.¹¹

Anderson made an analogous claim for Heraclitus in arguing that "he solved the problem of Pythagorean dualism and asserted a common measure of reality, a coherent logic of being as one" (p.58). This insistence, and the logical reasons for it, are central to Anderson's treatment of much in early Greek philosophy, particularly to the lectures on Pythagoras, Heraclitus and Parmenides. Indeed, he takes Logic to be not merely a formal quality of successful arguments but connected to the very question of being. This, too, emerges in Lecture 17 on Heraclitus when he reflects that what the

Milesians were concerned with was the different types of explanation which are applied to physical phenomena and the insoluble problems that arise if explanation is made in terms of another way of being than the phenomena themselves.

⁹ SEP, p. 80.

¹⁰ G.S. Kirk and J.E. Raven, *The Presocratic Philosophers* (Cambridge University Press: 1975), p. 188. Robin Waterfield translates it as his F 6: "And so one ought to follow what is common, the majority of people live as though they had private understandings" in *The First Philosophers* (Oxford University Press 2000), p. 40.

¹¹ Mackie, *op. cit.*, p. 265.

In other words, if a distinction is made between ultimate and immediate being or between reality and appearance, and however indefinitely this problem is formulated, it is at the basis of all these investigations and it is a problem of logic. In fact the determination of the character of *what is*, or of the conditions of existence, is the whole object of the science of logic. (p.58)

Anderson's account of the emergence of philosophy is at the same time a particular kind of investigation into what philosophy is, and how it relates to what he (perhaps loosely) refers to, and means by, 'science'. In the first lecture he argued "it is important to have a general idea of what distinguishes the work of the early philosophers. Thought becomes philosophic when it ceases to be mythological", when it ceases, that is, to give an account of things in terms of 'higher powers' or when it ceases to be 'animistic'. Animism, he goes on, is

the theory which postulates an "anima" for every observable occurrence. The result of this animistic thinking is that anything in the nature of science is impossible. Inquiry can proceed only by reference to observation of facts and verification by means of these facts of theories formed in relation to facts. Now under conditions of animist thinking, it is quite impossible for this inquiry to proceed. (One person attributes an event to one spirit, another to another. There is no way of deciding.)

This fact indicates what is fundamentally necessary for scientific thinking, and the investigation of what is necessary for scientific thinking is a fairly accurate description of the work of philosophy. What is necessary is that explanations of facts should be of the same order as facts themselves. (p.5)

As Anderson saw them, the relationships between philosophy and science are manifold. He raised the possibility that "until scientific thinking has begun there can be no philosophy," (p.8) but also saw that science is consequent upon a need to work out certain practical affairs, just as it is in a sense enabled by certain philosophic conditions in the sense that "if once a distinction is made between what is ultimately real and what is apparently real, then science... can't be thoroughly carried out." (p.10). More importantly, the relations between them might be thought of as complementary and symbiotic:

... in terms of scientific thinking we are no longer concerned with two types of reality, namely, ordinary facts and things, as opposed to powers of a higher order. What is implied is that throughout our investigations we are dealing with things and activities which are all of the same order—the order of fact. And it is in relation to this necessity of science that philosophy comes forward as the explicit study of what constitutes this single order of events—of what is implied in belonging to this order. Or, alternatively, science depends on there being some common denominator of things, on there being no fundamental division of reality but everything being real in the same sense. Philosophy then inquires into what this common denominator is. And this inquiry in its most general form is inquiry into what we mean when we say of anything that it *is* or *exists*, or what we mean by calling anything a *thing*. (pp. 6–7)

Some qualifications to this account might be appropriate here. While there is widespread agreement that the early Greek philosophers of nature practiced ways of thinking which are analogous to many of the practices of modern science, and while the conceptual domains of *phusis* or nature which are formulated in the writings that have survived have consonances with modern scientific conceptions, it would be misleading to imagine that these philosophers had any conception of what is thought of as the scientific method, that is the testing and refuting, or provisionally confirming, of hypotheses in terms of empirical data or facts. Nor do we have any evidence, or reason to suppose, that they saw themselves in terms that are at all congruent with the self images of modern science. The great historian of science, G.E.R. Lloyd, and others, have made it clear “just how strained it is to assimilate” what the practitioners of *phusike* did “under that rubric with what we now think of as physics.” Lloyd has pointed to the many ways in which these early thinkers, including the theorists and practitioners of medicine, did not have a conception of the scientific “way ahead,” or of the paths that later thought would take.¹²

In lecture 17, commenting on Heraclitus, Anderson linked what he saw as “a coherent theory of existence” with “an attempt to formulate a logic.” This important connection

¹²G.E.R. Lloyd, ‘The Invention of Nature’ in *Methods and Problems in Greek Science* (Cambridge University Press: 1991), pp. 417–8; 422 and 432. For further measured views of the ‘scientific’ status of early Greek thought see G.E.R. Lloyd, *The Ambitions of Curiosity* (Cambridge University Press: 2002) and J. Brunschwig and G.E.R. Lloyd (eds.), *The Greek Pursuit of Knowledge* (The Belknap Press: 2003).

can be seen in Anderson’s philosophy as well as in that of Heraclitus. We wish to avoid contradictions, Anderson claims, “because we recognise that there is no contradiction in nature.”

And again, if a proposition is to be significant, it must signify that which exists. So that inquiry into the conditions of coherent and significant thinking is in reality an investigation of the conditions of existence.... The attempt therefore to give a coherent theory of existence is really an attempt to formulate a logic, and that is what Heraclitus undertakes, and he recognises as the first condition of that theory that there should be only one way of being and correspondingly only one way of signifying. (p. 59)

Understood in this way, logic takes us to the question and nature of being, as Parmenides saw in Fragments 4 and 5 (which Anderson discussed in lectures 27 and 28): “thou canst not know what is not—that is impossible—for it is the same thing that can be thought and can be.” One consequence of this deep connection, as Anderson saw it, was that “things are not to be thought of as prior to propositions, but it is only in propositions that we know things at all.” (p. 90) So that, when commenting on Socrates’ attitude towards the need for propositions in reasoned dialogue, Anderson further claimed that “What we know when we know a proposition, may be described as a *thing having a character*.” (pp. 134–35) This ‘logical’ relationship between the proposition and the way things are was central to Anderson’s thinking, and he brought out part of its importance in lecture 43, arguing that

the most important implication of the recognition of the possibility of error is that all that we know must be considered as taking the propositional form: that the proposition must not be regarded as our peculiar way of dealing with things which are not in the propositional form, but as the way in which these things actually occur. For if we assume that things occur in a different form, then we cannot solve the problem of showing how the propositions we formulate apply to these things. (p. 139)

It is for this reason that Anderson criticises Socrates for not fully grasping the consequences of the propositional method in lectures 53–56.

That said, it is important to see how at one level, and for all of their differences, the concerns of Socrates and

Anderson merge: in their preoccupation with the nature and conditions of meaningful discourse. That lies at the heart of Socrates' use of the dialectic, just as it is central to Anderson's engagement with early Greek philosophy.

It is only by reference to speech or discussion that we can understand the raising of any problem whatever, and therefore the solution of any problem must be equally expressible in terms of ordinary speech. In other words, the question of the conditions of existence can only be approached by a consideration of the conditions of intelligible discussion or of significant speech, since in any investigation and in any expression of things we require to use speech not merely to convey our views to others, but even to enable ourselves to understand at what point exactly we have arrived, and whether we have solved the problem or not. (p. 172)

In these lectures, and despite that focus on 'speech' as the site of what is now commonly called 'inter-subjectivity', Anderson pays little attention to the fact that Plato's Socrates exists for us as a dramatic figure in written dialogues, characteristically engaged in speech with others. It seems that Anderson was uninterested in, or deaf to, the artistry of Plato in his philosophical deployment of the Dialogue form—unaware of the kind of philosophical exercise that these dialogues embody, and occasion in and for the reader. On several occasions Plato's Socrates expresses detailed and serious doubts about the philosophical effectiveness and adequacy of the written word. The critique of *poiesis* (works of literary imitation or representation) in *Republic* is such that Socrates provisionally concludes that 'poets' or literary imitators should be politely banished from the philosophically just city until and unless "the kinds of poetry and representation which are designed merely to give pleasure can come up with a rational argument for their inclusion in a well governed community."¹³

Further, and perhaps more challenging, is the case against writing *per se* that Socrates relates in *Phaedrus*, that it will "atrophy people's memories"

Trust in writing will make them remember things by relying on marks made by others, from outside themselves, not on their own inner resources, and so writing will make the things they have learnt disappear from their minds. (275a)

¹³Plato, *Republic*, (Oxford University Press: 1993), translated by Robin Waterfield, 607c, p.361.

Against that dismissal of the written word (where Plato's own writing paradoxically preserves the question and difficulty in philosophical memory). Socrates points to another, better use of words, a figurative form of 'writing' which emerges from but goes beyond the dialectical engagement in speech, its "legitimate brother."

It is the kind that is written along with knowledge in the soul of the student. It is capable of defending itself, and knows how to speak to those it should and keep silent in the company of those to whom it shouldn't speak. (276a)¹⁴

It is part of Plato's artistry in the Dialogues to have them show, or enact rather more than what Socrates explicitly says by way of propositions or sustained logical argument.

For one thing, they seldom result in anything that resembles a formal conclusion or final resolution of a problem or question: in anything, that is, which amounts to coherent or settled *doctrine*. Characteristically, they record a certain dialectical process of examination, of question and attempted answers, wherein one or more of the 'characters' comes to recognise that they did not know what they thought they knew: Phaedrus in his dialogue, Euthyphro (on piety) in his, Laches (on courage) in his and Thrasymachus (on justice) in *Republic*, for example. In the face of Socratic questioning one character or another faces a certain kind of *aporia* where he is not only unable to give an account of what he thought he knew, but is also brought to see, so long as he continues the dialogue, that he faces certain real difficulties (of definition) if he is to *think more coherently* about, say, courage, piety, justice, moderation and wisdom or *sophia*. Now not all of the interlocutors are able to do this, and that is shown to be a philosophical failure on their parts. Thrasymachus angrily leaves Book II of *Republic* and Polus (in *Gorgias*) is shown to be unable to continue the *elenchus*, and so on.

It is this *aporia*, or intuition of an inability—a kind of ignorance—which faces the reader of the dialogues as he, in his soul as he reads, participates (or fails to) in the process of self-examination. The fully responsive reader faces a kind of test or *agon* (trial) commensurate with that described by Nicias in *Laches*:

¹⁴ Plato, *Phaedrus*, (Oxford University Press: 2002), translated by Robin Waterfield, pp.69-70.

... whoever comes into close contact with Socrates and has any talk with him face to face, is bound to be drawn round and round by him in the course of an argument—though it may have started at first on a quite different theme—and cannot stop until he is led into giving an account of himself, of the manner in which he now spends his days, and of the kind of life he has lived hitherto; and when once he has been led into that, Socrates will never let him go until he has thoroughly and properly put all his ways to the test. (188a)¹⁵

Nicias tells us that he delights in such philosophical discourse. Much less comfortable with its insistent logical and moral pressure is Alcibiades in his complex, moving speech—rich with contextual, dramatic significance and irony—in the *Symposium* (215a–222b). He says of other great speakers (including Pericles) that “they never disturbed my mental composure or made me dissatisfied with the slavishness of my life,” whereas Socrates has “made me think that the life I lead isn’t worth living... to admit that I busy myself with Athenian politics when I’m far from perfect and should be doing something about myself instead.” Alcibiades does not, and cannot, do so at the deepest level of discourse, and so he speaks as a failed lover (*erastes*) and one who is incapable of philosophy—“I make myself block my ears and run away”.¹⁶

Part of what the dialogues represent, then, is an *exemplary* life and it is in terms of that life, which ‘grounds’ and illuminates the propositions and discourse of Socrates, that his full ethical significance is to be found and evaluated. Even the notorious Socratic paradoxes—that wisdom (*sophrosune*) is bound up with knowing that one does not know; that no-one commits evil knowingly; that it is better to suffer injustice than to act unjustly—gain much of their force and significance from their ‘dramatic’ contexts, from the fact that Socrates’ discourse (as Plato presents it) is informed by the desires and drives, the motives and incapacities of his interlocutors and antagonists.¹⁷

Nonetheless, the Socratic life is characterised by its ability to “give an account” (*didonai logon*) of itself. In

¹⁵ Plato, *Laches*, *Protagoras*, *Meno*, *Euthydemus* (Loeb Classical texts no. 165, 1924), translated by W.R.M. Lamb.

¹⁶ Plato, *Symposium* (Oxford University Press: 1994), translated by Robin Waterfield, p.61.

¹⁷ A detailed and comprehensive account of the philosophical dynamics of this is provided by Roslyn Weiss, *The Socratic Paradox and its Enemies* (University of Chicago Press: 2006).

an illuminating comment on the passage from *Laches* I quoted above, Michel Foucault observed:

... giving an account of your life, your *bios*, is... not to give a narrative of the historical events that have taken place in your life, but rather to demonstrate whether you are able to show that there is a relation between the rational discourse, the *logos*, you are able to use, and the way that you live. Socrates is inquiring into the way that *logos* gives form to a person's style of life, for he is interested in discovering whether there is a harmonic relation between the two.¹⁸

Laches, who has not as yet heard or entered into discourse with him, prefigures the kind of harmony which is the philosophical virtue (*arête*) of Socrates.

I have but a single mind, Nicias, in regard to discussions, or if you like, a double rather than a single one. For you might think me a lover, and yet also a hater of discussions: for when I hear a man discussing virtue or any kind of wisdom, one who is truly a man and worthy of his argument, I am exceeding delighted; I take the speaker and his speech together, and observe how they sort and harmonize with each other. Such a man is exactly what I understand by “musical”—he has tuned himself with the fairest harmony, not that of the lyre or other entertaining instrument, but has made a true concord of his own life between his words and his deeds, not in the Ionian, no, nor in the Lydian, but simply in the Dorian mode, which is the sole Hellenic harmony. Such a man makes me rejoice with his utterance, and anyone would judge me then a lover of discussion, so eagerly do I take in what he says: but a man who shows the opposite character gives me pain, and the better he seems to speak, the more I am pained, with the result, in this case, that I am judged a hater of conversation.¹⁹

Socrates is presented as just such a man: there is a harmonic relation between his words (*logoi*) and his deeds (*erga*), the quality and bearing of his life. Or, to put it another way, there is no discrepancy, no asymmetry, between what he says and what he does. He is the *mousikos aner*—one whose discourse and life are in perfect accord. In that way alone does he become “worthy of his argument.”

Here we find aspects of Heraclitus’ cosmic “attunement” (which Anderson considers in lecture 19, pp. 64ff.) embodied as qualities of the ethical life. Moreover, that life has affinities

¹⁸ Michele Foucault, in his account of *parthésia* in early Greek thought, *Fearless Speech* (Semiotext(e): 2001). Edited by Joseph Pearson, p.91.

¹⁹ Plato, *Laches*, op.cit., 188c–189a.

with the Pythagorean view (as Anderson put it) that 'goodness' is related to the different elements of the soul being in right relationship with each other—that it "consists in a harmony or attunement of the parts of the soul" (p.54). Yet even for the Pythagoreans, that theory was inescapably linked to ethics and to conduct.²⁰ In his treatment of Pythagoras, Anderson argues that "according to him, philosophy is a way of life and what the philosopher seeks is a right way of living." More generally, a student of Anderson's philosophy would find it illuminating to consider the importance that he places on "ways of life" in *Studies in Empirical Philosophy* in relation to these lectures.

Yet it might also be argued that in them Anderson underestimates the nature and concern of early Greek philosophy with "ways of life". One of the most eminent of contemporary Classicists, Pierre Hadot, has reminded us that ancient philosophy "is, at the same time and indissolubly, a discourse and a way of life which tend towards wisdom without ever achieving it," so that philosophical discourse was always part of, and anchored within, particular ways of life. To that extent, he argues, it is misleading to

oppose discourse and way of life, as though they corresponded to theory and practice, respectively. Discourse can have a practical aspect, to the extent that it tends to produce an effect on the listener or reader. . . . Insofar as way of life is concerned, it cannot, of course, be theoretic, but it can be theoretical—that is to say, contemplative.²¹

This, however, should not be seen as a contradiction of Anderson's view of, and engagement with, the early Greek philosophers. Both they and he were, in their different ways, in agreement that to "be thoroughly philosophic one must accept the consequences of any view which one holds" (p.192)—and that was to live them out, as it were.

Graham Cullum
June 2008

²⁰ For a recent account of the Pythagorean legends see Arnold Hermann, *To Think Like God: Pythagoras and Parmenides* (Pamereides Publishing: 2004).

²¹ Pierre Hadot, *What is Ancient Philosophy?* (The Belknap Press: 2004) translated by Michael Chase, pp.4-5. See also, Pierre Hadot, *Philosophy as a Way of Life* (Blackwell: 1995), translated and with an Introduction by Arnold I. Davidson. Relevant auxiliary material may be found in Marcel Detienne, *The Masters of Truth in Archaic Greece* (Zone Books: 1989), translated by Janet Lloyd; and Jean-Pierre Vernant, *The Origins of Greek Thought* (Cornell University Press: 1982).

Note on the text

There are two versions of the 1928 lectures on Greek Philosophy. The version in Anderson's handwriting held by the University of Sydney Archives is the source for this book (Personal Papers of John Anderson, Series 3, Item 4). There is also a typed version of student notes taken by Gaius McIntosh in the Philosophy III (Day) course of 1928. The typed notes correspond very closely to Anderson's handwritten notes and have been used to check against unclear passages in the handwriting. There are also informal statements made by Anderson included within the student notes which have been incorporated into the lectures presented here. Following the practice of earlier books in this series these informal comments appear in slightly smaller font and indented from the left. Three figures illustrating Pythagorean unit figures are adapted from the student notes rather than the handwritten notes and appear on page 47 below.

The McIntosh notes are in two sections. The section on the Pre-Socratics is 177 pages of typed lectures beginning in Lent Term 1928, Lecture 1 dated Tuesday 13th March. The course continued to meet on Tuesdays, Wednesdays and Fridays until Friday 6th July. This typescript section of the course was among the papers included within the Anderson Family Library at the University and has been transferred to the University Archives. The second section on the Socratic dialogues and on Aristotle's ethics was originally found at the Anderson family home at Turrumurra. A copy has been transferred to the University Archives. This second section is missing pages 178 to 201 and begins with Lecture 21 on Plato's dialogue *Euthyphro*. This lecture corresponds to Lecture 45 in Anderson's handwritten notes and in this book. That is to say, Lectures 40 to 44 introducing the Socratic dialogues are missing from the student notes.

The second section of the student notes also includes a handwritten covering note by Ruth Walker who speculated on the provenance of the notes. Missing the first section on the Pre-Socratics, Walker could only suggest that the notes may have been taken by G. F. McIntosh but then remarked