

**PESANTREN AND
PARTICIPATORY DEVELOPMENT IN
INDONESIA**

BAMBANG BUDIWIRANTO

Sub-thesis submitted for the degree of Master of Arts (Asian Studies)
Faculty of Asian Studies of the Australian National University

June 2007

**This thesis represents the results of my own research
unless otherwise acknowledged**

Canberra, 29 June 2007

Bambang Budiwiranto

Abstract

This thesis focuses on the implementation of participatory development between 1978 and 1993 in the *Pesantren Annuqayah* of Madura and the *Pesantren Maslakul Huda* of Central Java during which they collaborated with LP3ES (*Lembaga Penelitian, Pendidikan, dan Penerangan Ekonomi dan Sosial*, the Institute for Social and Economic Research, Education and Information) and P3M (*Perhimpunan Pengembangan Pesantren and Masyarakat*, the Indonesian Society for *Pesantren* and Community Development). This study examines the effectiveness of the *pesantren* in accommodating bottom-up development as an alternative to the top-down development model of the New Order government. This study demonstrates that while both *pesantren* strengthened local people to participate more fully in their own development, in both cases the *pesantren* utilised participatory development to maintain their dominance over local society.

Acknowledgements

There are many people to thank for the completion of this thesis. My first thanks go to Dr. Patrick Guinness who supervised and encouraged me to build thesis arguments critically. He contributed greatly to the design of this thesis and provided critical readings of whole drafts of the thesis.

In Indonesia I also owe a debt of gratitude to my interviewees in Madura, Central Java and Jakarta, especially KH Syafi'i Anshory of the *Pesantren Annuqayah* who willingly gave me lots of information on participatory development activity his *pesantren* conducted.

I dedicate my thesis to my family: Slamet Sardjono, Almarhumah Sutarti, Subari, Hafsah, Alfiah, and Adib Mumtaz Irfani whose great support and love inspired me and made my study in Australia worthwhile. It is very sad, however, that my mother passed away when I was writing the thesis. May Allah bless and put her in the best place before Him.

CONTENTS

Abstract	iii
Acknowledgement	iv
Contents	v
CHAPTER I – Introduction	1
1.1. Participatory Approach to Development: Theoretical Perspective	4
1.2. Aim of Sub-Thesis	16
CHAPTER II - <i>Pesantren</i> : Continuity and Change	19
2.1. <i>Pesantren</i> Characteristics	19
2.2. <i>Pesantren</i> Reform	26
2.3. <i>Pesantren</i> , <i>Kyai</i> and Rural Society	35
2.4. Conclusion	41
CHAPTER III- The Origin and Paradigm of Participatory Development in <i>Pesantren</i>	43
3.1. The New Order Modernisation	43
3.2. LP3ES P3M and Origin of the Participatory Development in <i>Pesantren</i>	49
3.3. Paradigm of Participatory Development in <i>Pesantren</i>	55
3.4. Training Program for <i>Pesantren</i> Facilitators	62
3.5. Conclusion	69
CHAPTER IV – Participatory Development in the <i>Pesantren Annuqayah</i> of Guluk-Guluk Madura	73
4.1. A Brief Description of <i>Pesantren Annuqayah</i> and Guluk-Guluk Society	73
4.2. Participatory Development as <i>Dakwah Bil Hal</i>	79
4.3. <i>Pengajian</i> , the <i>Kyai</i> 's Authority in Participatory Development	82
4.5. Some Development Programs in the <i>Pesantren Annuqayah</i>	92
4.5. Participatory development and Social Position of <i>The Pesantren Annuqayah</i>	98

4.6. Conclusion	101
CHAPTER V – Participatory Development in the Pesantren <i>Maslakul Huda</i> of Kajen Pati Central Java	107
5.1. A Brief Description of Kajen Village and The <i>Pesantren Maslakul Huda</i>	108
5.2. Participatory Development and the <i>Pesantren</i> 's Social Service	113
5.4. The <i>Rukun Tetangga</i> and The Participatory Action Research	116
5.4. The <i>Kelompok Swadaya Masyarakat</i> and Development Programs	124
5.5. Participatory Development and Social Position of the <i>Pesantren Maslakul Huda</i>	131
5.6. Conclusion	134
CHAPTER VI – Conclusion	138
6.1. Participatory Development and Cultural Context	142
6.2. Continued <i>Pesantren</i> Domination over Society	150
6.3. <i>Pesantren</i> and Macro Social Political Transformation	158
Glossary of Indonesian Terms	164
Appendix 1: Currency Exchange from US \$ to Rp	169
Appendix 2: List of Interviewees	170
Bibliography	171

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Since the late 1970s participatory development has been promoted by non government organisations in Indonesia such as LP3ES (*Lembaga Penelitian, Pendidikan, dan Penerangan Ekonomi dan Sosial*, The Indonesian Institute for Social and Economic Research, Education and Information). Such organisations have sought to redress the failure of top-down modernisation of the New Order government as a strategy to bring about equality¹ in economic prosperity. Despite the fact that Indonesia's economy grew at 8.0 percent annually in the period of 1965-1980 (World Bank, 1991: 180), and at 5.1 percent during 1980-1988 (Budiman, 1988: 127), the New Order modernisation denied equality in sharing the process and product of development and denied politically meaningful participation in development (Santoso, 1992: 121-137). LP3ES used the *pesantren*² as an entry point to promote a participatory approach to social and economic development, and believed that the *pesantren* would be able to facilitate participatory development. LP3ES recognised that the significant role of the *pesantren* within rural society extended beyond provision of religious and social

¹Inequality in development is an unavoidable situation, although there were some government attempts to redistribute the fruit of development. Budiman (1988: 125) noted that the Gini Coefficient of income distribution has been increasing since the New Order came to power. It was 0.22 in 1964 and increased to 0.46 in 1980. The increasing concentration of income distribution also indicates the decline in share of the lower 40% income-group of the national income. It took 25.5 percent of the national income in 1964. After the share slightly increased to 1.3 in 1971, it declined dramatically to 12.7 in 1976. The lower 40% income group received only 10.4 percent of national income in 1980. Moreover, spatial inequality between Java and areas outside Java also became an economic development problem. Despite the fact that most of the economic activities are concentrated in Java, this region has high proportion of the population living below poverty line. In West Java, Central Java, Yogyakarta and East Java, the percentage of people living below the poverty line was 35.7%, 41.7%, 28.5%, 39.2% respectively (Hill and Weidemann, 1989: 42).

²*Pesantren* is an Islamic boarding school focused on religious knowledge transfer in Indonesia in general, and in Java and Madura in particular (Dhofier, 1980; Mansurnoor, 1990). However, as will be shown in this study, the *pesantren* is not merely as an educational institution, but more importantly a social institution.

services. The *pesantren*'s capacity to stimulate social mobilisation in pursuit of other purposes was seen as an important asset to the implementation of participatory development. The *pesantren* delivers religious sermons and lectures to its community in forums for children and adults (Rahardjo, 1975). It also gathers *zakat* (compulsory alms tax) from wealthy people and redistributes it to the impoverished (Fakih, 1985). The *pesantren* provides security for society in times of societal and personal crisis by organizing people in *thariqah* (*Sufi* orders) (Jones, 1996; Rahardjo, 1975). It was under such *thariqah* organisation that the *pesantren* mobilised a peasant protest movement to attack the Dutch colonists in West Java in 1883 (Bruinessen, 1995; Kartodirdjo, 1973).

The paradigm of participatory development, however, is inconsistent with *pesantren* characteristics and the reasons its adoption by the *pesantren* should be examined. On one hand, the *pesantren* life is strongly characterised by hierarchical and patron-client relationships in which the *kyai* is a charismatic leader highly respected not only by *santri* (*pesantren* students), but also by the surrounding society. This charismatic leadership encourages the people to obey the *kyai*'s order, and to avoid disappointing and opposing him, as these actions may impede *baraka* (blessing) and may even attract *kuwalat* (a curse). Furthermore, despite the *pesantren*'s significant social role within society, the services it conducts are intended to preserve its domination over society and enhance the *pesantren* leader's (*kyai*) social position (Horikoshi, 1976; Mansurnoor, 1990). In contrast, participatory development advocates self-reliance, self-determination and democratisation (Fakih, 1985), and requires the *pesantren* to relinquish to society the right to make decisions that affect people's lives (Hasan, 1985). In other words, the principles of participatory development require that

the *pesantren* only acts as a facilitator: it establishes the circumstances that enable the people to identify their own needs, to formulate their own purposes, to become the main executor of development, and to evaluate and share its results. This markedly differs from the paradigm underlying the *pesantren's* provision of social services to the society, that is, charity as a moral obligation from patron (the *pesantren*) to clients (society).

In this context, as the *pesantren* seeks to preserve its hierarchical solidarity and influence within its society, the adoption of LP3ES participatory development could become counter-productive. Such a contradiction raises the question of the capacity of the *pesantren* to conduct effective participatory development. By examining implementation of participatory development in the *Pesantren Annuqayah* of Madura and the *Pesantren Maslakul Huda* of Central Java between 1977 and 1993, this study answers three important questions: To what extent is the *pesantren* an effective vehicle to implement participatory development in rural society? Does participatory development change the *pesantren* domination in its surrounding society? To what extent does the participatory development paradigm introduced by LP3ES in the *pesantren* stimulate people participation?

This study argues that first, the effectiveness of the *pesantren* to stimulate people participation in development cannot be explained solely by formulaic participatory development procedures, but rather it should be considered in the specific cultural contexts where the *pesantren* exists. Secondly, despite the fact that participatory development in the *pesantren* creates people participation with different procedures and at different levels, participatory development does not change the *pesantren's* domination over their surrounding society. Before further elaborating such issues,

however, the theoretical perspective concerning participatory development will be discussed.

1.1. Participatory Approach to Development: Theoretical Perspective

By the mid-1970s, the concept of participation in development was emerging, promoting bottom up planning to ensure the success and sustainability of development projects.³ This concept was a result of dissatisfaction with the conventional top-down approach to development in bringing about economic prosperity. It was evident that from the late 1960s onward, economic development had not resulted in the promised ‘trickle down’ of growth to the poor.⁴ The development planners recognized that this conventional growth-centred model was insufficient to address the sweeping poverty in developing countries (Craig and Mayo, 1995). In this regard Sen (1999: xi) notes:

...we also live in a world with remarkable deprivation, destitution and oppression. There are many new problems as well as old ones, including persistence of poverty and unfulfilled elementary needs, occurrence of famines and widespread hunger, violation of elementary political freedoms as well as of basic liberties, extensive neglect of the interests and agency of women, and worsening threats to our environment and to sustainability of our economic and social lives.

³ Development in this context is about social transformation, and as Julius Nyerere emphasised “the political mobilisation of a people for attaining their own objectives” (quoted in Esteva, 1992: 7). The result of this development is emancipation, “a process whereby social actors try to liberate themselves from structurally defined hierarchical relations which are discriminating and as such give unequal access to material and immaterial resources” (Schuurman, 1993: 31). With these values underlying development, participatory and sustainable development is talking about a specific component of development for social transformation: that it includes participation that is sustainable.

⁴There are at least four weaknesses of centralised, service-delivery approach that increase demand for community participation in development. First, the limited reach of the top down approach due to inability of government staff to reach effectively every village in rural areas. Secondly, its inability to sustain necessary local action insofar as development projects only provided new facilities without developing local capacity for their operation and maintenance. Thirdly, its limited adaptability to local circumstances: government services generally are designed by central planners who have minimal knowledge of the needs of the intended beneficiary communities and their divergent needs. Finally, its creation of dependency insofar as the government programs attempt to improve the socioeconomic condition of the poor, not through assistance designed to enhance their capacity for self-help action, but by doing for them what they used to do for themselves (Korten, 1983: 181-183).

Participatory development aims at making people central to development by increasing the involvement of socially and economically marginalized people in decision making affecting their lives (Guijt and Shah, 1998: 1). In the 1970s, Paulo Freire advocated the 'pedagogy of the oppressed', allowing people to create new learning environments to define their needs and achieve their own development. He argues that the oppressed need to unite to find a way to improve their destinies (Freire, 1970). Likewise, the World Bank (1994: 6) perceives participation as a process through which stake-holders influence and share control over development initiatives, decisions and resources that affect their lives. This recognition and support for greater involvement of 'local people' perspectives, knowledge, priorities and skills presented an alternative to donor driven and outsider-led development that put local people as the object of top-down development (Mohan, 2002: 50). It was believed that participatory development would ensure development success and sustainability (Krishna, Uphoff, and Esman, 1997).

Participation, however, can mean different things to different people. The term is used to describe anything from cost recovery in service provision, to political empowerment at the other extreme. In terms of cost recovery, Dudley (1993: 8) argues that "with the realization that the scale of the problem is too great for government to handle by conventional means, participation has become an economic necessity". This has given impetus for many development actors, such as governments in developing countries and international agencies, to include participation in all their programs at the grassroots level. They consider participation simply as a means to accomplish physical

tasks more cost-effectively and with a greater likelihood of sustainability. UNCHS, for example, stated:

Clearly it is in the interests of governments to involve their clients in designing and creating support programmes and in sharing the responsibility for short term and long-term outcomes of development effort. In practical terms community participation directly benefits agencies such as social welfare departments, planning offices and local housing authorities, because it broadens their resource base in physical, financial and most importantly human terms...Through community participation, governments, despite limited outlays in per capita support, can assist a far greater number of the needy than can be reached by current conventional programmes (Quoted in Moser, 1989: 82).

In this context, participation is promoted and related to overall goals of cost-sharing, cost reduction for the public sector (that is, shifting costs from public sector budgets by persuading communities to make increased contributions through voluntary effort and self-help or voluntary paid labour) and through increased project efficiency. Participation is thus part of a wider strategy to promote savings, to target services towards those who have been identified as being most desperately in need of them, and to shift the burden of resource provision away from the public sector towards communities, including communities in greatest need themselves (Craig and Mayo, 1995: 4-5).⁵ As a result, power relations between those at the grass roots, or the target community, and the aid/government agencies, will be left largely untouched. Project design and management will be still in the hands of traditional authorities, while the role of those who are mobilised to participate will simply be to rally around to work for the predetermined goals of the project. Therefore, power relations between aid donors and

⁵This view espoused by free market, neo-liberal, New Right strategies to roll back the state, both in the Third World and in urban, industrialised contexts, aimed specifically to reduce state spending on social welfare and to promote alternative solutions based upon the private market, as well as upon the voluntary or NGO sectors and community based self-help. This has been a worldwide trend, with specific support from international organisations such as the World Bank and the IMF.

recipients remain the same as in traditional top-down models of development (Parfitt, 2004: 539).

At the other extreme of participation is transformation. Hickey and Mohan, echoing Participatory Action Research (PAR) theorists such as Rahman, Fals-Borda, and Freire, argue that the proper objective of participation is to ensure the ‘transformation’ of existing development practice and, more radically, of social relations, institutional practices and capacity gaps which cause social exclusion. In this context, participatory development is directly intended to challenge existing power relations, rather than simply working around the power with more technically efficient service delivery (Hickey and Mohan, 2004: 168-169). What is important here is that there is an explicit articulation of a radical project that focuses primarily on issues of power and politics: participation for empowerment. The rationale to focus on empowerment in participatory development is a result of the recognition that to sustain poverty alleviation, a greater role of the poor in the social, economic, and political spheres that shape their lives is needed. The poor see poverty in terms of a lack of well-being, or ill-being which is related to bad feelings by the poor about self, perception of powerlessness over one’s life, voicelessness, anxiety and fear for the future, and material and physical deprivation (World Bank, 1999:33).

This empowerment concept has three interrelated dimensions: agency, resources, and achievement. Agency is defined as either the ability to define one’s goals and act upon them, or a process by which choices are made and put into effect. This term also encompasses the meaning, motivation, and purpose which individuals bring to their activity (Kabeer, 1999: 438). Agency has positive and negative meanings. On one hand,

it refers to people's ability to make and act on their own life choices, even in the face of others' oppression (*power-to*). On the other hand, it describes the capacity of some actors to override the agency of others through the use of violence and other forms of coercion. In relation to empowerment, agency implies not only actively exercising choice, but also doing this in ways that challenge power relations. Due to the significance of beliefs and values, such as cultural and ideological norms, the process of empowerment begins from within (*power-within*). It is rooted in how people see themselves--their sense of self-worth.

Resources are media through which agency is exercised. Resources include not only material resources in the more conventional economics sense, but also the various human and social resources which serve to enhance people's ability to exercise choices. Resources are distributed through the various institutions and relationships in society. Some actors such as elites within a community have a position over others related to how rules, norms, and conventions are interpreted, as well as how they are put into effect. They have the authority to make decisions. The way in which resources are distributed depends on the ability to define priorities and enforce claims (Kabeer, 2005: 15; 1999: 437-8). Both resources and agency form people's capabilities: that is, the potential for living the lives they want.

Achievement refers to the extent to which this capability is realised, or fails to be realised; that is, the outcomes of people's efforts. In terms of empowerment, achievement is defined as the agency exercised and its consequences. However, when someone fails to achieve certain goals due to laziness, incompetence or individual priorities, the issue of power will not be relevant. "It is only when the failure to achieve

one's goals reflects some deep-seated constraint on the ability to choose that it can be taken as a manifestation of disempowerment" (Kabeer, 1999: 438).

These two streams of participatory development are included by White (1996: 7-9) in her typology of interests in participation. Such a typology is useful in understanding the dynamic and the meaning of participation for different stakeholders (from service delivery to transformation/empowerment).

Table 1. Interests in Participation

Form	Top-Down	Bottom-Up	Function
Nominal	Legitimation	Inclusion	Display
Instrumental	Efficiency	Cost	Means
Representative	Sustainability	Leverage	Voice
Transformative	Empowerment	Empowerment	Means/End

This table distinguishes four major forms of participation where the first three are considered as non-political participation, and the last form is political participation. The second column shows the interest in participation from the 'top down': that is, the interest that those who design and implement development programs have in the participation of others. The third column shows how the participants themselves see their participation, and what they expect to get out of it. The final column characterises the overall function of each type of participation.

In explaining nominal participation White (1996: 8) uses an example from Zambia in which government departments have established a number of women's groups. The government's interest in participation is for legitimation, to show that it is doing something for its popular base. Such interest may be significant in its claims for personnel and financial support. For women as members of such a group, participation

means inclusion because they only keep their names on the book and rarely attend any meetings. The members only check in to see if any loans are offered. In this case, the group mainly serves the function of display.

Instrumental participation can be found in many African countries applying the structural adjustment program, in which the government reduces essential infrastructure and services funding significantly. The government asks local people to participate in constructing certain buildings (for example, schools) and only provides them with raw materials. The people's labour is taken as a local counterpart fund, which ensures the people's commitment to the project. Therefore, the program can be more 'cost-effective'. For the government it serves the efficiency interest. For the local people, participation is *cost* because their time in building the school reduces their time spent in paid employment, household work, or leisure. Participation functions as a means⁶ to achieve cost-effectiveness and a local facility. Hence, participation is instrumental, rather than valued in itself.

Bangladesh NGO activity in running cooperative programs is a kind of representative participation. Local people are invited to establish their own groups, and develop rules and plans for what they would like to do. This people participation allows them to have a voice in shaping the project. For the NGO, it will avoid an inappropriate

⁶ Moser (1983: 81-84) describes the tenets of community participation by distinguishing between participation as a 'means' and as an 'end'. According to her, where participation is understood as a means, it generally becomes a form of mobilisation to get things done. This could be state directed (top-down mobilisation, sometimes enforced) to achieve development objectives, or bottom-up voluntary (community based) mobilisation to obtain a larger immediate share of resources. Where participation is considered as an end, the objective is not a fixed quantifiable development goal but a process whose outcome is meaningful participation in the development process, where the real objective is to increase control over resources and regulative institutions in a given social structure (empowerment). Here, the problem is structural: it is both national and local institutions which most frequently limit participation. As Moser argues, in reality it is not the evaluation of participation either as a means or as an end which is important, but the identification of the process whereby participation as a means has the capacity to develop into participation as an end.

and dependent project and ensure sustainability. A group of fishing families decided to apply and wanted to establish a cooperative for loans and fish marketing. For these fishing families, attending group meetings and discussions with the NGO is important to ensure leverage and to influence the project shape and management. Participation became a representative form, an effective means through which the people could express their own interests.

Transformative participation entails the practical experience of being involved in considering options, making decisions, and taking collective action to fight injustice within society. It leads to greater consciousness of what makes and keeps people poor and greater confidence in their ability to make a difference (empowerment). This empowerment is seen as an agenda controlled from below and may also be identified as the interest from above, when outsiders or a local NGO work with the poor. Although the poor are more concerned with immediate and tangible interests or goals, it is through their experience that they see empowerment as being in their interest. This process never comes to an end, but is a continuing dynamic which transforms people's reality and their sense of it. At this level, participation is at the same time a means to empowerment and an end itself.

An example of this type is drawn from the Philippines community. After following conscientisation training, hillside families decided to form a co-operative in which to discuss problems, analyse situations, and reach consensus. They also challenged government officials who came to them with a development project for an explanation. In the period leading up to a presidential election the local Mayor and some officials visited this community and asked the people to vote for Marcos as president.

The officials had no time to discuss and listen to the villagers' questions. As a result, the villagers decided to boycott the election.

However, the capacity of participatory development to include marginalised people in development discourse and to bring about empowerment has not been without its critics. These critiques range from the technical limitations of the participatory approach (such as participatory rural appraisal (PRA)⁷, to the claim of empowerment made by participation (Kothari, 2001: 139). Guijt and Shah (1998) question the assumption in PRA which sees the community as a homogeneous, static and harmonious unit within which people share common interests and needs. PRA also focuses on the community as the site where empowerment is assumed to occur. By assuming that the community is a homogenous entity, and by uncritically exaggerating the local as the site for action, participatory development tends to ignore oppressive structures in gender, class, caste, and ethnicity that may operate at micro-scale. This, in turn, will discourage people from paying attention to wider power relationships that frame the construction of local development problems. Added to PRA critiques, Parpart argues that PRA tends to see knowledge as readily accessible in a community whereas knowledge is "embedded in social contexts, exerted in relations of power and attached to different power positions" (2004: 172). Control over knowledge is therefore intricately linked to power

⁷ PRA is "a family of approaches and methods to enable rural people to share, enhance, and analyze their knowledge of life and conditions, [and] to plan and to act" (Chambers, 1994: 935). Unlike traditional research information which is extracted from local people and taken away for analysis and interpretation, PRA stresses the sharing of data. PRA presents a series of reversals: from the *etic* to the *emic* in which local constructs and indigenous knowledge are valued over scientific taxonomies; from individual to group; from verbal to visual; from measuring to comparing; from reserve to rapport; from frustration to fun; from extracting to empowering; from top-down to bottom up; from centralised-standardised to local diversity; from blueprint to learning. In short, PRA entails a 'radical personal and institutional change' (Chambers, 1994: 958) and avoids the bias that results from the assumptions of the investigator and from difference in power, status, and culture between investigator and informant.

hierarchies that PRA may or may not reveal. PRA often overlooks people's daily lives and makes unsustainable demands on women's time. It also overlooks the skills needed to participate in all phases of planning, for example, report writing. In addition, not all issues can be dealt with using PRA techniques. For example, mapping cannot uncover gender issues or spousal abuses. Parpart goes on to conclude that PRA and participatory empowerment need to be theorised in relation to power "particularly the connection between power, voice/silence and gender, as well as the material and structural forces at play. The challenge is to develop techniques that retain the accessibility and practicality of PRA, yet incorporate the insights of current thinking on the material and discursive nature of power" (2004: 177).

Mosse, who observed the Kribhco Indo-British Farming Project (KRIBP), a donor-funded program of a large public sector organisation in India criticise local knowledge production in PRA. First, because participatory activities like PRA are often public events and open ended regarding target groups and program activities, it makes such participatory events political, and local knowledge produced from it is strongly shaped by local relations of power, authority and gender, and conceals a complex micro-politics of knowledge production and use (2001: 19). Secondly, local knowledge is shaped by outside agendas. Project facilitators are active in shaping and directing participatory activities. Therefore, villager 'needs' are often shaped by perception of what the project can deliver. Thirdly, there is local collusion in the planning consensus. Participatory exercise is overwhelmed by the complex nature of information production, which is often inconsistent with the project defined model. To avoid this complexity, diverging interests between villager and local livelihood needs are simplified and

rationalized by finding agreement between project staff and the villagers in the problem identification and planning processes. This enables the project staff and the villagers to create space where they can manipulate the program to serve their own interests. Both parties benefit: the beneficiaries get sanction for activities in the neighbourhoods, and the project staff wins local support by delivering desirable schemes and goods, and authenticates the wider project and performance of its staff. The preference for consensus results in excluding detailed design.

Cleaver (2001: 37-38) questions the claim of empowerment in participatory development. Since development discourse absorbs the rhetoric of empowerment, this term is depoliticized and the concept of action is individualized and pertains mainly to service delivery. Echoing Freirean philosophy Cleaver asserts that radical empowerment discourse is related to the individual and with class action structural subordination is transformed through significant changes in law, property rights and social institutions. Such empowerment implies challenging the oppressive state. However, because mainstream development projects are mainly technical, practical and localised, empowerment has become a buzzword in development and its radical transformative purpose is lost. Cleaver also asserts that the beneficiaries of empowerment are ill-defined: whether they are individuals, communities, women, the poor or the socially excluded.

Although the critiques of participatory development important to improve its capacity to address power relations within society, there are, however, some limitations to the critiques as outlined by Williams (2004: 565-566). First, participatory development may become an international and powerful discourse of development, and

it may be abused by certain interest groups and local elites in developing countries. However, it is misleading if participation is portrayed as an intentional project under the potential control of policy makers in the international agencies. He also noted that participatory development has no predetermined outcomes, and the possibility of positive and negative unintended consequences is always present.

Secondly, the critique of participatory development tends to repeat the weakness of Chambers' own work in its reductionist view of power. Unlike Chambers who does not problematise reversals in participatory development, some of the critiques are too derogatory in their accounts of participation as subjection. It is undeniable that participatory development will include people "as bit-part players within a development process that is far less benign than the promoters of participation might suggest" (Williams, 2004: 565). However, people involvement and configuration of power/knowledge gained will open up particular spaces and moments for resistance.

Thirdly, such methodological critiques of participatory development have a tendency to reduce 'participation' to one particularly visible and mainstreamed variant. These fail to appreciate those historical moments and contemporary developments in participation that can offer ways around the failures of populist approaches. Furthermore, the critiques take Chambers' work at face value and thereby ignore both the strategy that underpins it (to fight the economism, 'professionalism' and other biases that pervade mainstream development thinking and research) and the genuine gains that might be had for marginal people from such approaches (Hickey and Mohan, 2004: 11-12).

This study contends that participatory development has the potential to allow empowerment that challenges injustice in political structure within society. In this regard, Williams (2004: 572) argues that empowerment, however, should not be treated as a change in status created at a particular moment in time: the once-and-for-all loosening of hierarchical power relations represented in many accounts of participation. Rather, empowerment should be seen as a relative (reversible) process built from within longer term political struggle. Moreover, transformation does not necessarily invoke reversal of power relations but strengthens bargaining power of the poor within this relation (Williams, 2003). An example from South Sri Lanka shows that participatory research by farmers leads to transformation after undergoing a longer process (Wickremaarachchi, 1991: 277). Wickremaarachchi notes that once people's organization becomes stronger, they move beyond the local level and begin to exert pressure on other social institutions, officials, politicians and such. They begin to assert their rights against injustice. This is the beginning of countervailing power against those in the establishment that have stood in their way. Likewise Rahman (1993) shows that the *Bhoomi Sena* movement succeeded in reclaiming occupied lands after undergoing certain participation processes.

1.2. Aim of Sub-Thesis

Considering the theoretical perspective on participatory development, this study will examine the effectiveness of the *pesantren* in conducting participatory development by looking at the implementation of participatory development in the *Pesantren Annuqayah* of Madura and the *Pesantren Maslakul Huda* of Central Java during their

intense cooperation with LP3ES/P3M between 1977 and 1993. In conducting this study I use primary and secondary data. The primary data are gathered through interviews, reports, documents and CD ROM available through LP3ES, P3M, the *pesantren Annuqayah* and *Maslakul Huda*. Primary data related to participatory development were collected between 1977 and 1993. During my fieldwork from 8 December 2006 to 22 January 2007, I conducted interviews with key people directly involved in participatory development both from the NGOs and from the *pesantren* (see appendix for the list of interviewees). To complete the data I utilised secondary sources related to participatory development in the *pesantren* from magazines (such as *PESAN* and *PESANTREN* published by LP3ES and P3M), research reports written by LP3ES and P3M staff and scholarly works related to the topic.

The research findings from this study will be presented as follows. This introduction will be followed by an explanation of the characteristics of the *pesantren* and its dominant position in surrounding society (Chapter II). This chapter also shows that the *pesantren* has the capacity to survive by adjusting to social changes in the society without abandoning its traditional values. This chapter gives some background on why NGOs such as LP3ES are interested in supporting the *pesantren* to implement participatory development. Chapter III discusses the origin and paradigm of participatory development in the *pesantren*. This paradigm is regarded as an alternative to the top-down model of modernization which is transferred to the *pesantren* through facilitator training. The next two chapters discuss the implementation of participatory development in the *Pesantren Annuqayah* of Madura (Chapter IV) and the *Pesantren Maslakul Huda* of Kajen Central Java (Chapter V). These chapters compare how

participatory development is implemented within different cultural contexts. This includes the involvement of the *kyai* in participatory development, the facilitation process and the impact of participatory development on *pesantren* domination over society.

CHAPTER II

PESANTREN: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE

This chapter will focus on the development of the *pesantren* as a traditional educational institution. The aim is to explain the main features of the *pesantren* and its ability to adjust itself to changes occurring in the surrounding society. The first part of this chapter discusses characteristics of the *pesantren*, and *pesantren* reform. The second part deals with the *pesantren*, *kyai* and villagers.

2.1. *Pesantren* Characteristics

The *pesantren* is considered to be a traditional¹ Islamic institution in Indonesia. ‘Traditional’ in this context refers to an adherence to Islamic conventions strongly bound to the thoughts of *ulama* (Muslim scholars) who lived between the 7th and 13th centuries in Islamic jurisprudence, Islamic theology, *Qur’anic* exegesis, and *hadith* (Prophet Tradition) (Dhofier, 1982:1). However, whilst the strength of Islamic education is in the *madrasah* (modern religious school)² system in other Islamic regions, the strength of Javanese Islamic education is in the *pesantren* system. Before the introduction of mass education of a Western style in the early twentieth century, and the *madrasah* at the end of the 1920s, the *pesantren* was the only available educational institution for the native Javanese. As an educational institution, the *pesantren* aims at understanding, discussing and applying Islamic teachings, with

¹ In addition, ‘traditional’ also refers to the existence of the *pesantren* which dated from Indonesian Hindu-Buddha. It was used for education and religious teaching activities of Hindu in Java (Steenbrink, 1986: 20-21). After the coming of Islam in the archipelago, Indonesian Muslims have maintained and adopted such institutions into Islamic tradition. Therefore, culturally, the *pesantren* was born from Indonesian culture as a result of its interaction with Islam (Madjid, 1997: 3).

² *Madrasah* in Indonesian contexts is not the same as that in the medieval Middle East despite employing the same term. In Java or Indonesia, the *madrasah* is designated to provide basic religious education from early school-age children to senior high school students, whereas in the Middle East the *madrasah* is intended to provide higher learning (Muhaimin, 1995: 17). The latter is a natural development from the role of the *masjid* (mosque) as a college of law and its nearby *khan* as residence of the law students in attendance (*masjid-khan* complex). Also see George Makdisi (1981).

stress on the importance of Islamic morality as the guidance for daily life (Mastuhu, 1994: 6). It becomes an important agent of Islamisation in Java by producing numerous highly qualified *ulama* imbued with the calling to spread Islam and to strengthen the faith among nominal Muslims. The *pesantren* also trains teachers of the *madrasah* for other informal Islamic courses such as *pengajian*³ and for Friday prayer sermon.

In his study of the *pesantren* in Java, Dhofier (1980, 1982) identifies five basic characteristics distinguishing the *pesantren* from other institutions: *kyai*,⁴ mosque, *pondok* (students' dormitory), *santri* (students), and teaching and learning from classical Islamic books (*kitab kuning*,⁵ yellow books). Dhofier's characteristics define the simplest form of the *pesantren*. It is clear that the *kyai* has a central position in the *pesantren* community, because the *kyai* is considered as owner, leader, classical Islamic book teacher, and *imam* (religious leader) in religious activities. The other elements--mosque, *pondok*, *santri*, and teaching from classical Islamic books--are under the control and supervision of the *kyai*. To foster the *santri*'s acquisition of Islamic knowledge and to control their Islamic practices, the *santri* must live in the *pondok* within this *pesantren* complex. The relationship between these elements forms the *pesantren* sub-culture which has different internal

³*Pengajian* is religious course, though informally organised, and held mostly on regular basis (weekly) in mosques or private houses after evening prayers.

⁴ Traditional *ulama* who lead *pesantren* in Central and East Java and have a sphere of influence that is local and regional. The *ulama* are Islamic scholars in Java proficient in Islamic knowledge. In West Java, they are called *ajengan*. Nowadays, there are some influential *ulama* who do not lead the *pesantren* but are nonetheless called *kyai*. However, with its strong association with the *pesantren* tradition, the term *kyai* commonly refers to the traditional *ulama* (Dhofier, 1995: 24; Mansurnoor, 1990).

⁵The term *kitab kuning* (*kitab*, Arabic language meaning book), the most popular and standardised term among the *santri*, are the materials offered in the *pesantren* and generally referred to as the "yellow books". The term "yellow" denotes the condition of the books that are very old, and were usually poorly preserved. Nowadays, many new similar books are re-printed deliberately on yellow paper (Abdurrahman, 1997: 2).

values, life patterns, and internal authority from those of the outside society (Wahid, 2001: 1-32).

The formation of values within the *pesantren* is mostly influenced by *fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence) with the concept of *halal-haram* (lawful and unlawful), *makruh-mubah* (inappropriate-neutral), and *wajib-sunnah* (compulsory-strongly encouraged). The implementation of *pesantren* values must be achieved through *sufism* (Islamic mysticism) customs. *Fiqh* and *sufism* together lay the foundations for perfect values within the *pesantren* as they meld the intrinsic and extrinsic dimensions of Islamic teachings. The formation of the *pesantren* values is influenced by the ideology of *Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jama'ah* (the follower of the Prophet tradition and Muslim society). The *pesantren*'s preference for this ideology is based on three elements (i) one of four *madzhab*⁶ 'schools in Islamic jurisprudence' (in Indonesia most Indonesian Muslims adhere to *madzhab* Syafi'ite); (ii) the writings of Imam Abu Hasan Al-Asy'ari and Imam Abu Mansur al-Maturidi in Islamic theology⁷; and (iii) those of Imam Abu Qasim al-Junaid in Islamic Sufism (Islamic mysticism)⁸ (Musthafa quoted in Dhofier, 1995: 26-27). All contrary values to these are rejected by the *pesantren*.⁹

⁶*Mazhab* is a school of Islamic law. There are four *madzhab* in Sunni tradition, i.e. Hanafite, Malikite, Syafi'ite, and Hanbalite

⁷ This theology known as Asy'ariyah theology is close to fatalistic theology such as *Jabbariyah* (predetermination). Although Asy'ariyah theology endorses the people to maximise their efforts in achieving certain goals, it argues that such efforts will not be able to change God's pre-determined destiny for human beings. This theology is dismissed by reformist Muslims as unprogressive, and detrimental to people's efforts to achieve better lives.

⁸ In *sufi* tradition the important element in this life is pursuit of spiritual happiness. The focus of unworldly activity often leads the followers of Sufism to neglect the importance of achieving the worldly affairs. Many Reformist Muslims attributed the decline of Islamic civilization to the rise of Sufism following the golden age of Islamic world in 13th and 14th century. To counter the side effects of Sufism, reformist scholars such as Fazlur Rahman advanced neo-Sufism, which balances two aspects of people's life: material and spiritual achievements.

⁹For example, to *pesantren* members 'loyalty' means someone's willingness to obey someone's orders (as long as it is not sinful), whereas in social life the loyalty means defending

The first important value in the *pesantren* is that all life activities must be conducted under the framework of *ibadat* (worship) of God. Every student is taught to regard Islamic ethics above all else. Therefore, the purpose of education in the *pesantren* is not to obtain power, money, or glory; rather, learning is a religious obligation dedicated to God. The *kyai* fills the *santri* mind with information, refines their morals, educates their spirits, propagates virtues, teaches them propriety, and prepares them for a life full of sincerity and purity (Dhofier, 1995: 25).

The *ibadat* would be absurd without *ikhlas* as the second value. This encourages the *santri* to act for the sake of Allah alone, not for worldly purposes. The *pesantren* members should reorient their life mostly for the achievement of happiness in life after death. It does not mean, however, a hatred of life in this world; rather, only lack of love for worldly life. The Javanese *kyai* say “If you orient your life to worldly gain, you will fail to obtain a happy life either in this world or in the hereafter, but if you orient your life to the hereafter you will enjoy a happy life both in this world and in the hereafter” (Dhofier, 1995: 34-35). The internalisation of the *ibadat* and *ikhlas* encourages the *santri* to have a strong love for religious knowledge acquisition. Muslims will not be able to perfectly perform *ibadat* (worship) unless they have religious knowledge and spread it to other people. This sense of love is manifested in various ways such as the *santri*'s deep respect for their *kyai* and *ustadz* (religious teacher), the willingness to spend time and labour to learn more throughout life, and building their own *pesantren* after graduating as a place for disseminating Islamic knowledge.

Independence and self reliance (*watak mandiri*) are other important values of the *pesantren* education. These encourage the *santri* to place a higher value on

someone else in all situations. Likewise, the *santri*'s submission to the *kyai* is none other than the continuation of *sufi*'s submission to their *mursyid* (spiritual guide) who has the authority to lead *sufi* to the essence of God.

entrepreneurship (self-employment) than on working in bureaucracy. The *pesantren* ethics of *watak mandiri* are to be connected to some *hadith* (the Prophet tradition) emphasizing the value of working with one's own hand or the value of trade¹⁰ (Wahid, 2001: 97-103). This *watak mandiri* also becomes an important principle for the *pesantren* to rely on, as it increases its ability to finance educational activities without being dependent on government or other outsiders in society.

The life pattern in *pesantren* culture is different from that of outside society. Because teaching and learning of Islamic classical books--*pengajian*, as the main activity--is conducted at the end of every prayer time all other activities must be suited to this *pengajian* time. Unlike societies in which time is organised on the basis of a 24 hour day, in the *pesantren* prayer times--*subuh* (dawn), *zhuhur* (noon), *ashar* (afternoon), *maghrib* (evening) and *isya'* (night) are used as standard. Hence, any activities or appointments will be arranged after *maghrib*, before *ashar* or after *isya'*, for instance. It is even appropriate for *pesantren* culture to schedule appointments or hold interviews after *subuh* (5.30 am) (Mastuhu, 1994: 57).

The most striking feature of the *pesantren* life is its leadership, which relies on a centralistic and hierarchic model with the *kyai* at the top, below him his family, then assistants of the *kyai* and at the bottom the *santri* (students). Historically, it is shown that many *pesantren* were founded by the *kyai*'s own efforts. He is the owner and manager of the *pesantren*, and is very active in *pesantren* development. In addition, many *kyai* in Java consider that the *pesantren* is similar to a small kingdom in which the *kyai* is the source of power and authority--often based on charisma. Within the *pesantren* community, a *kyai*'s authority can be challenged only by a *kyai*

¹⁰ Related to *watak mandiri* Castles (1966: 31) writes "(The *kyai*) urges boys not to make 'public service' their objective and becomes angry if they still want to be *pegawai* (government officials). The reason he gives is that the *pegawai* is not free. In the Dutch time, officials, through taking orders from the Dutch all the time eventually came to think like them."

with higher authority (Fadjar, 1997: 114; Dhofier, 1982: 56). In spite of the important position of the *kyai* in the *pesantren*, his influence and seniority beyond the *pesantren* depend on his relative ranking among all *kyai*. The hierarchy is clearly shown in the positions of the *kyai* in the *Nahdhatul Ulama* (NU, lit. the resurrection of Islamic scholars) organisational structure which includes most of the *kyai* throughout Indonesia in its network. In this organisation the highest position is held by the most respected *kyai*. In short, there are *kyai* who hold influence at national, regional, and local levels. The hierarchy in the *pesantren* structure and network enables the elites at the top of structure, i.e. national level, to exert influence on those who are below them.

As the *pesantren* leader, the *kyai*'s position in Javanese society is generally sustained and institutionalised by a genealogically inherited mechanism. This inherited character of the *kyai* is strongly palpable in Madura, in which an educated Muslim who would like to establish a *pesantren* has difficulty gaining societal recognition unless he comes from a *kyai* family (Mansurnoor, 1990: 217). In Java, the pattern is similar to that of Madura, but only at the highest level where the *kyai* has a wider role and range of responsibilities (such as the heavily resourced construction of *pesantren* facilities). A higher level *kyai* uses the *pesantren* as an important institution for the establishment of patronage patterns between himself and the *santri*, and the surrounding society (Turmudi, 2006: 6, 23).

At lower level, in Java (including West Java) the *kyai*'s position is likely to be attained on the basis of personal achievement and status, not just genealogy. The position could be gained by well educated Muslims who have gained social recognition. The promotion of *kyai* in places such as in Jombang (but not in Madura) is based on social recognition: as long as the *santri* not from the *kyai*'s family has

significant Islamic knowledge, society members will recognise him as the *kyai*. It is common to find that a *santri* marries a daughter of a wealthy farmer and is asked to establish the *pesantren*. Likewise, in Kajen, Central Java, there are *kyai langgar* (*kyai* of mosque) who leads the religious activities for the surrounding society. His authority is far below the *kyai pesantren* (*kyai* of the *pesantren*) who leads the *pesantren* and who usually enjoys supra local authority (Dirdjosanjoto, 1999).

In the *pesantren*, the *kyai* is recognized not only as a teacher for the *santri* in Islamic knowledge but also as a father or parent who is always respected, and obeyed by the *santri*. To pursue *pesantren* education, the *santri* have to be submissive and gain the *kyai's* *ridha* (approval) and *barakah* (blessing) through being prepared to obey the will of the *kyai* and to serve his interests. Such service, which shows the *santri's* submission, is regarded as an honourable duty. Indeed, a *kyai* in such a position constitutes a patron for the *santri*. This relationship is defined by religious teachings¹¹ as the relationship between *mursyid* (teacher) and *murid* (student). In *Sufi* tradition the *mursyid* is an infallible person who has sole authority to guide the *murid* to reach God. Due to such authority, the *santri* is a client who can neither argue nor dispute the *kyai's* actions towards, or orders to him (*sami'na wa atha'na*, we listen to and we obey).¹² The *santri's* disobedience of the *kyai* results in imposition of a *kuwalat* (a curse), and the religious knowledge they get does not give them spiritual benefit and *barakah* in the future. This is why the *santri* never argue with the *kyai*.

¹¹ This is based on the *Kitab of Ta'lim Muta'allim Taqiq Al-Ta'allum* (Teaching the Students: The Method of Learning). For English translation of some chapters of this *kitab* see Mansurnoor (1990: 433-442).

¹² Patron-client relationships last for the *santri* long life. The *santri* consider the *kyai* as the only person who is able to save them from their life going astray, and as an inspiration source and moral support for their private life. It is not surprising that after graduating from the *pesantren* the *santri* still consult the *kyai* about their problems such as finding a spouse, jobs and other private affairs.

The asymmetric nature of ties between the *kyai* and their *santri* is obvious in the religious educational system applied in the *pesantren*, especially in *kitab kuning* activity. The *kyai* has a monopoly on explaining and interpreting Arabic texts, and this is done in such a way that every point has to be understood according to a fixed meaning. Interpretations of religious texts are accepted only because of the authority of the *kyai* (Slamet-Velsink, 1994: 49-50). The *santri* believe not only that the *kyai* will not mislead them, but also that the *kitab* is right. Unlike *watak mandiri* emphasised in the *santri* life, religious education in the *pesantren* is not always aimed at making students think independently; students must memorize Arabic text, with a focus on grammar. The *kyai* usually employs a method of teaching and learning *kitab* based on *bandongan* or *wetonan*, *sorogan*, and *halaqah* (Mastuhu, 1994: 61). In the *bandongan* system, a group of *santri* listens to the *kyai* who reads, translates (using Javanese language) and comments on certain Arabic religious texts (*kitab*). The *bandongan* system is intended for the *santri* who are at the middle or high level; therefore, before using this method the *santri* need to attend intensive lessons in the *sorogan* system. The *sorogan* system is used for new *santri* who need more attention and guidance in their understanding of the *kitab kuning*. *Halaqah* is a group of *santri* who discusses the content of certain *kitab* in an uncritical way with the *kyai* to deepen their understanding.

2.2. Pesantren Reform

Azra (1997: ix) raised the interesting question “why have the *pesantren* survived until today?” In Malaysia the number of the *pesantren* has declined gradually to around 40. These *pesantren* exist outside the modern school system and only focus on religious education (ritual). However, society needs not only religious

knowledge acquisition but also access to formal education aimed towards attainment of vocational certificates or diplomas (Tim Kompas, 1997: 123). Indonesia, in contrast to Malaysia, has seen an increase in numbers of *pesantren*, as shown in the following table (Dirjen Binbagais Depag RI, 1997).

Table 2. The growth of *pesantren* and *santri*, 1977 to 1998

Year	Number of <i>Pesantren</i>	Number of <i>Santri</i>
1977/78	4,195	677,384
1981/82	5,661	938,397
1985/86	6,239	1,084,801
1997/98	9,388	1,770,768

The survival of the *pesantren* in Indonesia is due to its ability to adjust itself to the modernisation of Islamic education and Indonesian socio-economic development. In other words, the *pesantren* has undergone *dinamisasi* and *modernisasi* (dynamisation and modernisation) (Wahid, 2001:38-39). *Dinamisasi* means revitalisation of the available positive values. Modernisation refers to the replacement of old values with newer and better ones. In other words *dinamisasi* means changes towards improvement by using the available world-view and tools as its basis. Therefore, *pesantren* reform is not achieved by rejecting the traditional approach and is not necessarily associated with an intention to reformulate outmoded medieval Islam to make it more acceptable to modern world (Dhofier, 1995: 90-91). In this regard it is worthwhile to consider what *Kyai Syamsuri of Pesantren Tebu Ireng* of Jombang, East Java said about the *pesantren* and social changes. He noted:

...the *pesantren* is concerned with worldly affairs. We must organize our worldly affairs as correctly and in as up-to-date a fashion as possible...For more than five hundred years the *pesantren* tradition has produced and trained high quality community leaders. Only if we understand the real

requirements of the people can we maintain our *pesantren's* role as an educational institution which trains community leaders. It is our intention that this *pesantren* should produce SMA (ordinary public high school) graduates who can continue their studies as engineers, doctors, lawyers, soldiers, etc., who are faithful to Islam...Of course we do not eliminate the teaching of religious texts. *Tebu Ireng* provides you with extensive *bandongan* classes: in the morning, afternoon and at night. Please all of you, *santri*, do not forget to participate in the *bandongan* classes. You are sent here by your parents because they want you to become learned religious persons. (Quoted in Dhofier, 1995: 93-95)

The process of *dinamisasi* and *modernisasi* as noted by Wahid was encouraged by the situation in the 1970s in which the *pesantren* stood at the crossroads and was in grave danger of being steadily extinguished. This disarray and uncertainty in the *pesantren* circle has a dual origin. First, to a certain extent, it was a reflection of intellectual stagnation of Indonesian Muslims who faced social changes as a result of modernisation.¹³ Secondly, it arose out of awareness that the capacity of the *pesantren* to face the challenges of modernity was inadequate. The *pesantren's* structural elements were in a state of stagnation and were ill-equipped to respond to change, with over-reliance on centralistic and hierarchical leadership in the hands of the *kyai*. The *pesantren* was usually established by the *kyai's* own initiative and effort; as a result, this not only led to asymmetric social interaction between the *kyai* and the *santri* which was based on a traditional authority relationship (charisma), but also led to narrowed creativity and strengthened rigidity. This, in turn, hindered internal dynamics. Renewal activity became difficult because every decision was dependent on the *kyai* (Madjid, 1997: 95-96). In addition, this type of leadership created the attendant problem of determining succession when the *kyai* died.

¹³ Fachry Ali and Bahtiar Effendy (1986: 123-125) note that one of causes of the Islam renewal movement in 1970s is that all Islamic social political organisations such as NU, *Muhammadiyah*, *Al-Irsyad*, *Persis* were stagnant and had lost their psychological striking forces in responding to modernization of Indonesian.

Although the *pesantren* was perceived as the educational institution model which embodied excellence in knowledge and moral transmission, it only produced unsystematic knowledge accumulation (Madjid, 1997: 6). This was due to weaknesses in learning methods, such as memorising a number of classical books without critical thinking. Many *pesantren* also did not formalise their education and vision in a structural order and were dependent on the vision and personality of the *kyai*. As a result, the academic relationship among the *pesantren*'s members was not organised, and there was a lack of standardisation of curriculum, syllabus, references, registration and grading system. Moreover, the *pesantren* graduates who were equipped only with religious knowledge, had no clear trajectory after finishing their education; hence, "it is tragic to notice that most of the students educated in religious institutions such as the *pesantren* were experiencing difficulties in finding 'modern occupations' outside the religious sphere" (Ibrahim quoted in Steenbrink, 1986: 215). All this contributed to the *pesantren* being burdened with a system ill-equipped to respond to the demands of a rapidly changing society (Barton, 1995: 57).

There are at least three ways by which the *pesantren* have undergone internal reform. First, inclusion of the *madrasi* (classical) system allowed students' access to religious and non-religious subjects, including vocational training. These are taught to the *santri* using non-traditional methods. The *madrasi* (classical) system was introduced by Javanese students who returned from Mecca and Medina at the beginning of the twentieth century. *Pesantren Tebu Ireng* of Jombang (East Java) established *Madrasah Salafiyah* (*Salafiyah* School) in 1916 in which a modern educational system was applied. It also included non-religious subjects within the curriculum such as Malay language and writing, and earth science. This system was also adopted by the *Pesantren Darul Ulum* of Jombang, which established a

madrasah in 1927 in which religious and non-religious subjects were taught (Azra, 1997: xii-xv). This development was perceived as a positive response from the *kyai* to the new educational system introduced by both the Dutch colonial government in 1865 and reformist Muslims such as *Muhammadiyah*. At that time the Dutch colonials set up *volkscholen*, village schools with three-year study programs to give educational opportunity to Indonesian people (usually from the *priyayi* class), and qualify them for the fulfilment of various postings within the East Indian government. This educational system was similar to the Christian missionary schools found in Maluku and Minahasa in Eastern Indonesia. In the meantime the reformist Muslims adopted the Dutch school model, but combined it with additional Islamic knowledge and the modern *madrasah* system to counter the development of colonial education.¹⁴

The introduction of vocational training in the *pesantren* was the second step in *pesantren* adjustment to social change. This effort was initiated by Haji Abdul Halim who established *Santri Asrama*, a *pesantren* in West Java, in 1932. Between the 1950s and 1960s, when Indonesia experienced an economic crisis, the *pesantren* intensified such vocational training for its *santri*. Apart from equipping the *santri* with skills for strengthening their self-reliance after graduating from the *pesantren*, this vocational training was also intended to support the self-financing *pesantren* to run educational activities. Rural-based *pesantren* such as *Tebu Ireng* and *Darul Ulum* involved their *santri* in agricultural activities: paddy, coconut, and coffee cultivation. At the same time, *Pesantren Gontor*, *Denanyar*, *Tambak Beras* of East

¹⁴Abdullah Ahmad of Padang set up *Sekolah Adabiyah* (*Adabiyah* School) in 1909 and *Jami'atul Khairiyah* of Padang Panjang established *Sekolah Diniyah* (religious school) or *Sumatra Thawalib* for women *santri*. In 1910, *Pesantren Denanyar* of Jombang introduced reform through opening religious classes to women *santri* (Dhofier, 1982: 38).

Java and Tegalrejo of Central Java set up co-operatives to develop the spirit of entrepreneurship among the *santri* (Azra, 1997: xviii).

The third type of reform was institutional, and saw the diversification of educational institutions and of *pesantren* leadership. This reform was stimulated by post-independence educational development. In this period, Indonesian government expanded public education for citizens and created access to modern administrative occupations for graduates of this type of education. Furthermore, in the 1950s the Department of Religious Affairs created many modern *madrasah*--religious schools--for Muslims. These *madrasah* included some non-religious subjects in their curricula in accordance with the stipulation (no. 3/1950) of the Minister of Religious Affairs.¹⁵ This development resulted in a significant decrease in enrolment of students in the *pesantren*. As noted by Dhofier (1982: 41), many small *pesantren* could not sustain their educational process.¹⁶

In response to such development the *pesantren* founded the *madrasah* (religious school) system from *ibtida'iyah* (primary), *tsanawiyah* (secondary) to *'aliyah* (high school) combining its own curriculum with that of the Ministry of Religious Affairs, in which both religious and non-religious subjects were taught. Therefore, the *pesantren* functioned primarily as a traditional institution for the *santri* who wanted to deepen their Islamic knowledge (*tafaqquh fi al-din*), but also as the *madrasah* for the *santri* and children around the *pesantren*. In a later development many *pesantren* also set up ordinary schools (primary, secondary, and tertiary level---SD, SLTP, SLTA and *Universitas*) administered by Department of

¹⁵ KH A Wahid Hasyim ---Minister of Religious Affairs from 1949 to 1952--- issued *Peraturan Menteri Agama* (Minister of Religious Affairs Stipulation) no. 3/1950 which required schools and *madrasah* to give non-religious subjects in *madrasah* and to give religious subjects in public and private schools (Tebba, 1985: 276).

¹⁶Dawam Rahardjo (1975: 33-34) also noted that in Bogor area (West Java) at the turn of the sixties, many *pesantren* were on the decline but from 1964 to 1972 adopted the *madrasah* system which absorbed many children from the villages.

Education and Culture besides the *madrasah*. Among the pioneers of the later effort is *Pesantren Darul Ulum* of Jombang, East Java that established a university in 1965. As a result of this development, the leadership of the *pesantren* became diverse. Traditionally, leadership of the *pesantren* is under one or two *kyai* who are the founders of the *pesantren*. However, establishment of the *madrasah* and public schools increased demands on leadership. In response, many *pesantren* developed *yayasan* (foundations) in which the leadership was collective. However, as the owner of the *pesantren*, the *kyai* and his family still hold important positions in decision-making.

Finally, the *pesantren* reformed its function from a specialised educational institution to an economic and social institution. The New Order asked Indonesian Muslims (constituting the majority of the population) to participate in national development. This focused on economic growth, taking an active role in setting an example, and promoting modernisation within Islamic institutions (Federspiel, 1991: 237). In accordance with the ideology of developmentalism, education in the *pesantren* should be aimed at developing a world view responsive to social needs, such as the creation of progressive theology encouraging achievement and a strong work ethic. Furthermore, while education remains the primary mission of the *pesantren*, with this national development demand the *pesantren* has developed a new role as an agent of modernization in rural society. With its influential position in rural society, the *pesantren* will become an alternative agent of people-centred development. In this regard, Mukti Ali (former Minister of Religious Affairs) noted that “the government is now endeavouring to ensure that the *santri* who graduate from the *pondok pesantren* or the *madrasah* will be able to become true leaders or modernizers of the rural society. This policy is part of the sphere of the rural

development effort as a whole”(Quoted in Rahardjo, 1975: 40). Since the early 1980s many *pesantren*--in partnership with NGOs--have been involved in social and economic activities such as agribusiness, environmental preservation, animal husbandry, and co-operatives.

The reformation of *pesantren* challenged urban Islamic reform movements such as *Muhammadiyah* and *Persis (Persatuan Islam, Islamic Union)* that regarded the *pesantren* as a hindrance to the development of a modern Islamic society. The perceived threat stemmed from the *pesantren*'s adherence to the four classical schools of Islamic jurisprudence, 'fatalistic' theology (*Asy'ariyah*) and more mystically oriented religious practices. Noer (1973: 301) described the reformers as modernists who were always adapting to the modern contexts, whereas the *kyai* were traditionalists who held concerns about maintaining old practices such as classical Islamic teachings and *thariqah* (the *sufi* order).

Based on the recent developments, the Department of Religious Affairs classifies the *pesantren* into four types (Muhaimin, 1995: 14-15). Type A embodies the most traditional characteristics of the *pesantren*: the *santri* stay in *pondok* near the *kyai*'s house, there is no fixed curriculum, and its effectiveness is dependent on the *kyai*'s authority in teaching and learning materials. The method of learning is *sorogan* and *bandongan*. The *kyai* also reads, translates and explains the religious subjects and Arabic language from *kitab kuning*, and *santri* are required simply to repeat and follow the *kyai*. In Type B, the *pesantren* includes all Type A characteristics, but also sets up a *madrasah* (religious school). The *madrasah* combines its own curriculum with the Ministry of Religious Affairs' curriculum, in which both religious and non-religious subjects are taught. The Type C *pesantren* establishes ordinary public schools administered by the Department of Education and

Culture at primary, secondary, and tertiary levels (*Sekolah Dasar, Menengah to Universitas*). It also retains *sorogan*, *bandongan*, and the *madrasah* system. In Type D, the *pesantren* only provides the *santri* with boarding accommodation (*pondok*) and they pursue their education outside the complex. No formal instruction is given in this *pesantren* and the function of the *kyai* is as spiritual guide and religious counsellor who establishes a religious atmosphere inside the complex. Such categorisation focuses on the internal reform of the *pesantren* as an Islamic educational institution; however, it fails to acknowledge the expansion of the *pesantren*'s social and economic roles. Moreover, according to the five basic elements of the *pesantren*, Type D cannot be considered a type of *pesantren* because it is simply student accommodation in which a religious atmosphere is established.

Based on its research in 1997, the Centre for the Study of Islam and Society (PPIM, *Pusat Pengkajian Islam dan Masyarakat*) of the State Islamic University of Jakarta separated the *pesantren* into three categories (Jabali and Jamhari, 2003). The first is the *pesantren* that focuses on the religious studies curriculum, and is motivated by the conviction to preserve and develop the Islamic legacy (*tafaqquh fi al din*). *Pesantren* reforms should not distract from the school's main objective of providing the *santri* with religious education. The second type is the *pesantren* which is primarily concerned with socio-economic development within its local community. This *pesantren* aims to provide its *santri* with the ability to understand the social and economic situation in rural society, and to initiate community based development. Although there is some religious learning and activity, this is not regarded as its main priority. The *Pesantren Darul Fallah* of Bogor, West Java, exemplifies this model. The third model is the *pesantren* that combines its religious educational mission and social services to surrounding society. In addition to

religious studies the *santri* are given the opportunity to participate in social and economic activities such as agriculture, cooperatives, and environment conservation. *Pesantren Annuqayah* of Madura and *Pesantren Maslakul Huda* of Central Java are among the examples of this model. This last model broadens the role of the *pesantren*: on one hand, it provides educational services, and on the other it enhances the community's capacity to deal with social and economic problems.

This categorisation revises the dichotomy of *pesantren* suggested by Dhofier (1982:41-42) who classified the *pesantren* into *Pesantren Salafi*¹⁷ and *Pesantren Khalafi*. Dhofier's dichotomy is insufficient to explain the recent response of the *pesantren* to social and economic development. However, PPIM's categorisation only focuses on the expansion of the *pesantren's* roles--from mere educational mission to provider of social and economic services to its surrounding society. It neglects the internal reform of the *pesantren* as discussed in Department of Religious Affairs' categorisation. To complete the categorisation of the *pesantren* coined by PPIM, it is worthwhile to include the type of *pesantren*: A, B, or C of the Department of Religious Affairs' categorisation in the PPIM's first category.

2.3. *Pesantren, Kyai and Rural Society*

Dhofier (1995: 25) argues that most *pesantren* are established in, and attract most of their students from, the rural areas that are home to around 80% of the Javanese population. In his research in Mojokuto of East Java, Jay (1969: 273-274, 419-421) treats the *pondok pesantren* as a boarding school and a corporate group

¹⁷ *Pesantren Salafi* is type of the *pesantren* that focuses on religious knowledge transfer and this is conducted by learning *kitab kuning* as the core educational activity, whereas *Pesantren Khalafi* apart from keeping *kitab kuning* learning activity, it also establishes *madrrasah* or school in which non-religious subjects are taught.

with an important role in the village setting.¹⁸ The *pesantren* provides security in times of societal and personal crisis by organizing its society in *thariqah* (*sufi* order) such as *Naqshabandiyah* or *Syadziliyah*. This *thariqah*, attracting old people, rich and poor alike, has the main purpose of cleansing their hearts for approaching God (Jones, 1996: 24-25). An example of such a practice can be found in *Pesantren Darul Ulum* of Jombang, East Java which is the foremost *pesantren* for the *thariqah* of *Qadiriyyah wa Naqsyabandiyah* under the leadership of KH. Musta'in Romli. Every Thursday night, thousands of people from far afield come to the *pesantren* to conduct *ratib* (chanting), a practice of the *thariqah* school (Rahardjo, 195: 34). This *thariqat* had a political role in the protest movement in Cilegon of West Java in 1888. The movement signified the common political and economic grievances of rich and poor peasants during that time, when both experienced an increasing burden of rural taxation. Under the leadership of many *hajj* and *kyai*, the followers of the *thariqah* of *Qadiriyyah wa Naqsyabandiyah* were involved in attacking the Dutch colonists in this battle. The solidarity of the *santri* in this 'holy war' was ensured by the absolute role of the *kyai* who issued *fatwa* (religious obligation) of *jihād* (holy war) in the critical time (Bruinessen, 1995: 27, Kartodirdjo, 1973).

There are also a number of forums which act as channels through which the *pesantren* services and influences the local community. First, children's religious education is delivered from house to house by senior *santri*; secondly, women's and adults' religious education is conducted in the *pesantren* complex, in homes, in mosques or in a school room outside the *pesantren*. This type of recitation is usually

¹⁸While the *pesantren* is considered as a village institution, it should be noted; however, that some *pesantren* are not village institutions although they were established in the village area. *Pesantren Darussalam* of Gontor, East Java is not considered as a part of its village structurally. This *pesantren* is an enclave in the middle of society and is beyond village institution due to its modern building, system of education, and its *santri* who are not from its village but from all over Indonesia, especially the middle class (Rahardjo, 1985: 20).

conducted by a young *ustadz* (religious teacher); thirdly, the *majlis ta'lim*, a kind of public lecture is given by the *kyai*, usually the principal of the *pesantren* (Rahardjo, 1975: 34). The *pesantren* also holds performances of certain rituals in which the *kyai*'s attendance is of great importance to the villagers. Every year villagers need to clean their village of evil spirits, and to celebrate *lebaran* (religious celebration held after fasting in holy month of *Ramadhan*) by providing the ritual meal or *slametan*. They invite the *kyai* to lead these rituals.

The *pesantren* leader (the *kyai*) becomes the most influential and respected individual in the village structure with a status elevated above other village elites (such as wealthy farmers) (Dhofier, 1982: 56). Such respect derives from his wealth and religious education. The economic position of the *kyai* determines his elite status in the village. The modest size of some *pesantren* buildings demonstrates that there are some less wealthy *kyai*, especially at the beginning of their teaching activity, but many *kyai* come from well off families (Turmudi, 2006: 68). To sustain their religious position, and to provide their offspring and villagers with religious instruction and services, the *kyai* need significant financial resources to construct religious facilities such as mosques, *pondok*, and *madrasah*. Land inherited from their parents helps the *kyai* to fulfil such demands, especially early in their career. By virtue of their religious position the *kyai* are prevented from using the *pesantren* to generate conspicuous profit.

However, the *kyai* who enjoys supra-local fame has no serious problem in getting financial sources, as shown by Madurese phrase “*Mon kuala kabbih ngawula pessek, pessek ngawula ka kyai*” (while we all seek money, money seeks the *kyai*) (Mansurnoor, 1990: 254). A common contribution of villagers to the *kyai* is endowment (*waqf*) in the form of agricultural land. This is donated for the purpose

of financing mosques, *pondok* or *madrasah*. Such endowments constitute permanent financial sources, and ensure the survival of the *pesantren*. In addition, having lots of *santri* also assists accumulation of the *kyai*'s wealth. Annual donations received by the *kyai* from the parents of *santri* usually take the form of agricultural lands (Dhofier, 1982: 58). The *kyai* also often employs *santri* to earn their educational and living costs. Most *santri* or workers are afraid of embezzling funds or ignoring agriculture maintenance, because they usually believe that the *kyai* possesses extraordinary powers to detect wrongdoing and punish wrongdoers--particularly those who transgress the *kyai*'s rights (Mansurnoor, 1990: 256, 260).

The most important strength of the *kyai* lies in his ability to acquire religious knowledge which can be imparted to the villagers. This ability attracts many followers such as *santri*, who learn religious studies in his *pesantren*, and the villagers who attend his religious sermons in mosques, the *thariqat* meeting and the *pengajian* forum. In Islamic tradition, the spirit of pursuing knowledge (both religious and non-religious) has become part of Muslim obligation, and those who have acquired such knowledge are respected by society.¹⁹ Moreover, the *kyai* often has divine ability (*ilmu laduni*), that is, knowledge acquired without learning. This ability is visible when he is still very young and studying at certain *pesantren*, or after becoming *kyai*. This type of ability gives him legitimacy—it is as if God has given a sign to mark him as a religious leader (Turmudi, 2006: 68-69).

This factor influences community perception of the *kyai* as a charismatic leader who exists outside the realm of everyday routine and the profane sphere (Weber, 1973: 43-53). This charismatic authority is inseparable from *baraka* (blessing) and *karama* (divine distinction) recognised by Muslims in general and by

¹⁹ In Sura (Chapter) 58 (11) God says "...God will raise up, by many degrees, those of you who believe and those who have been given knowledge..." (Haleem, 2005: 363).

the *santri* and the *thariqat* followers in particular. *Karama* is the characteristic attributed to a holy man such as a *saint* or *kyai*, who can transfer God's blessing to the people who need it. With the *karama* he possesses, the holy man is bestowed by Allah with the ability to understand divine things or creatures hidden from human sight. The power he has received from God enables him to transcend the normal human situation (Turmudi, 2006: 73). Muslim folklore relates that a saint can perform Friday prayer in Mecca, and at the same time be seen praying in his local mosque. Some Muslims even believe that the *karama* will continue even after the saint's death (Bruinessen, 1995: 215). Because the *kyai* is close to God, he can get the *karama*; therefore, he can give *baraka* to the people who need it.

Baraka is a spiritual quality reflected through people, such as the saint, and the *kyai*, who are gifted with *karama*. *Baraka* can be transferred to ordinary people through the *kyai*'s prayers and through building a good relationship with the *kyai*. Therefore, the people always obey the *kyai*'s orders and avoid disappointing or opposing him, lest these actions impede *baraka*, and even attract *kuwalat* (a curse). Muslims visiting the *kyai* usually donate funds to him in return for counselling²⁰, religious alms tax (*zakat*),²¹ special presents and gifts (*syukuran*) and annual contribution at the *imtihan*.²² They also pay visits to the *kyai* in order to deliver presents and share joy when they have experienced good fortune. The visitors believe that submitting their gifts to the *kyai* will attract *baraka* and *restu* (approval)

²⁰ The visitors end their consultation with the *kyai* by shaking hands and usually submitting some amounts of cash. Hence the gift is popularly called *salam tempel* (shaking hand with money).

²¹ In this regard the *kyai* is one of eight *zakat* recipients. In the village, *zakat* is distributed by individuals; accordingly, it enhances the personal relationship between the *kyai* and the givers as well as attracting *barakah* of the *kyai*.

²² In *imtihan* (festivities at the end of educational session in the *pesantren*) the *kyai* followers, *santri*, graduate *santri* and colleagues pay homage to the *kyai* by making contributions of cash and in kind. The *imtihan* or other feasts held at the *pesantren* express the *ulama*'s concern about public religious and recreational interests; and show the level of popularity and public recognition of the *kyai* as *pesantren* owner.

(Mansurnoor, 1990: 257). People who get *baraka* in their life can lead a life where they make ends meet. A poor man who lives at subsistence level may lead an untroubled life if he has received *baraka*. In contrast, a rich man living with material sufficiency may suffer from spiritual trouble due to a lack of *baraka* (Turmudi, 2006: 74-75).

Despite the obvious charismatic elements of the *kyai*'s leadership, the *kyai* is in fact dependent upon his followers. To maintain his prestige among his followers, the *kyai* is morally obliged to provide help for the villagers in the form of various performances and services. These include religious services, advice, and education and sometimes even material benefits. If the *kyai* fails to fulfil the villagers' expectations and concerns he will become unpopular (Mansurnoor, 1990: 220-221). The main service the *kyai* provides is a counselling forum²³ in which visitors seek solutions to their problems or ask for blessings (*baraka*). Apart from religious advice, the *kyai* alleviates the problems of visitors by giving them formulas in the form of *doa* (prayer) and amulets taken from some verses of the Qur'an. Most first generation *kyai* such as in Madura have expertise in certain areas, such as medication and invincibility, in addition to their religious knowledge. This confirms the findings of Hirokoshi's study of the *ulama* in West Java that the *kyai* is not only a religious advisor for surrounding community but also a healer who cures illnesses. Many *kyai* have acquired both religious knowledge and traditional and spiritual health knowledge. The *kyai*'s motivation to master such knowledge is based on the belief

²³ This counseling not only adds to the *kyai*'s prestige but also brings in more detailed news and information from different parts of the regions. Furthermore, through radio, television, and newspapers, magazines, the *kyai* has better access to supralocal news and diverse up-to-date topics such as natural disasters, wars, and technological innovations. Indeed, because of their recurrent encounters with diverse visitors and *santri*, the *kyai* have a better picture of the society at large and become the centre of the news bank (Mansurnoor, 1990: 112).

that healing ability will attract many followers, and assist the *kyai* to maintain their position as society's guide (Hirokoshi, 1979: 126).

Because of his access to public contributions and his personal wealth, a *kyai* (such as the one in Madura) has the ability to support villages' projects such as the renovation of roads, canals, wells, religious centres and school buildings. Although such support is closely related to the idea of *kyai* patronage for the villagers, some funds accumulated by the *kyai* are rechannelled into projects of public interest. The *kyai*'s ability to mobilise funds for his projects and services marks his achievement. The support and contribution given by local people to the *kyai* constitutes repayment and reciprocity. The inability of most villagers and the *santri* to reciprocate the *kyai*'s contribution places them under constant pressure of indebtedness. The effective and legitimate means to alleviate such indebtedness is to respect the *kyai* and support his projects, including those in education (Mansurnoor, 1990: 327).

2.4. Conclusion

As a traditional Islamic institution, the *pesantren* has its basic elements--*kyai*, *pondok*, mosque, *santri*, and *kitab kuning* which distinguish it from other institutions. The interaction of these elements forms the *pesantren* subculture in which certain values are developed, and the relationship between the *kyai* and *santri* is built on charisma and hierarchy. Due to its ability to adapt itself to recent development and societal needs without deviating from the primary mission of a *tafaqquh fi al-din* institution, the *pesantren* endures today. Adjustments have ranged from the inclusion of the *madrasi* (classical) system and vocational training in *pesantren* education, to reformation of its leadership, diversification of educational institutions, and transformation from a primarily educational facility to a socio-economic

institution. This last role led to the *pesantren*'s involvement in participatory development programs stimulated by Indonesian NGOs.

As a rural institution, the *pesantren* builds close relationship with the villagers through the provision of religious and social services. The *kyai*, who is the core of the *pesantren*, joins the highest social and economic elite in the village. Moreover he has an important role in influencing and mobilizing his followers to participate in a range of activities and movements. In accordance with his popularity, he is morally obliged to provide the villagers with numerous services, such as religious education, counselling, advice, feasts, and even development projects. The villagers believe that the *kyai* inherits from the prophets and has a role in paving the way for them by virtue of his closer access to the Divine. For the villagers, getting the *kyai*'s *baraka* and *restu* is important and efficacious for their life. Therefore, it is not surprising that the villagers are very eager to respect the *kyai* and to obey his orders, and as a result become indebted to the *kyai*.

CHAPTER III
THE ORIGIN AND PARADIGM OF PARTICIPATORY DEVELOPMENT
IN *PESANTREN*

This chapter will discuss the origin and paradigm of participatory development in the *pesantren*. The first section explains the New Order modernisation and examines the emergence of LP3ES and P3M, exploring their role in the origin of participatory development in the *pesantren*. The second section deals with the paradigm developed by LP3ES and P3M in the implementation of participatory development in the *pesantren*.

Participatory development in the *pesantren* was initiated by Muslim activists who joined LP3ES and P3M in response to the excess of top-down modernisation (Developmentalism) of the New Order. Through these NGOs the activists strengthened the *pesantren* to become agents of participatory development at the grass root level. It is argued that despite the fact that LP3ES and P3M provided the *pesantren* with participatory methods and training absent from the top-down New Order development model, they share the modernisation paradigm with the New Order. This paradigm focuses more on service delivery and fails to offer an alternative for achieving macro social and political transformation.

3.1. The New Order Modernisation

When the military New Order regime under Soeharto came to power in 1967, replacing the Old Order regime of President Soekarno, the regime focused on modernisation to remedy many ills besetting the nation. These were perceived to be political instability, economic collapse, and misuse of state doctrines; the *Pancasila* and constitution of 1945 (Ramage, 1995: 23-25). The new regime then introduced the ideas

of pragmatism, de-ideologisation, depoliticisation and development (*pembangunan*). Economic development was needed to direct people's attention away from politics and towards the economy and to change the national slogan from 'politics as commander' as practised by the old regime to 'economy as commander' (Ali and Effendy, 1986: 94-95). Under the jargon of *pembangunan*, developmentalism became a new official orthodoxy signified by the establishment of Kabinet Pembangunan I (Development Cabinet I, June 1968-March 1973).

The dominant concept of developmentalism applied by the New Order reflects western paradigms of development, that is, a kind of stage-by-stage movement towards 'higher modernity' in the forms of technology and economic advance (idea of progress) (Hettne, 1995: 49-57). Modernisation advocates the process by which so-called traditional structures and societies are transformed into more modern types, along a developmental trajectory mirroring the earlier reforms of the European Industrial Revolution. Modernisation encompasses secularisation, commercialisation, industrialisation, increasing material standard of living, diffusion of literacy, education, mass media, national unification, and the expansion of popular involvement in participation.

With the assistance of 'Berkeley Mafia'¹, the New Order regime adopted the modernization theory introduced by WW Rostow in his book *The Stage of Economic Growth: a Non-Communist Manifesto* (Rostow, 1971). This theory uses the metaphor of growth in an organism to explain modernization. In this case, development is seen from an evolutionary perspective as a journey from 'traditional to modern'. The assumption

¹ Berkeley Mafia refers to a group of University of California Berkeley-trained neo-classical economists who became architects of the New Order modernisation in 1970s such as Emil Salim, Ali Wardhana, and Widjojo Nitisastro.

here is that all societies were once alike (traditional), and that the Third World will also pass through the same set of changes as experienced in the West to eventually become 'modern'. Rostow argues that development will flow almost automatically from capital accumulation. As savings are invested in productive activities, capital accumulates. This process leads to economic growth. The most intense activity, and hence the greatest contribution to economic growth, is generated by the industrial sector. This is obvious from the series of Indonesian five-year development plans (*Repelita*) in which industrialisation became the driving force (Booth, 1988).

Modernisation of the New Order was also based on the theories introduced by David McClelland and Inkeles and Smith. McClelland based his theory on Weber, arguing that if the Protestant Ethic caused economic growth in the West, then some analogous phenomenon must be sought in other places in order to achieve economic growth. What lay behind Weber's theory, McClelland argues, is a personality trait, 'the need for achievement' (N-Ach). The reason why people in the Third World countries, including Indonesia, are underdeveloped is because they have a low sense of this need for achievement (traditional mentality and belief in predetermination) (Fakih, 1995: 65).

Indonesia's economy grew at 8.0 percent annually in the period of 1965-1980 (World Bank, 1991: 180), and despite the global recession occurring in 1980-1988, it achieved 5.1 percent growth (Budiman, 1988: 127).² Apart from the industrial sector, which grew by 11.9 percent between 1965 and 1980 and by 5.1 percent in the 1980-1988 period, the upward surge of oil prices in the 1970s contributed to Indonesian economic development. In 1972, Indonesian crude sold for less than \$US 3 a barrel, but by 1980

²In 1982, 1985 and 1986 the growth rates were very low. They were 2.24%, 1.87% and 1.62% respectively.

the price increased to over \$US30. In the period 1970-81, export revenues from oil increased at a rate of 45.5 per cent. Oil and gas accounted for 37 per cent of total export revenue in 1970, and by 1981 this proportion had climbed to 82 per cent (Vatikiotis, 1994: 34-35).

Economic growth has improved people's well-being. People's life expectancy at birth rose from 41.2 years in 1960 to 61.5 years, the under five mortality rate dropped from 225 per 1,000 live births in 1960 to 100 in 1989, access to safe water increased from 11 percent of the population during 1975-1980 to 46 percent in 1988 and adult literacy increased from 54 percent in 1970 to 72 percent in 1985. This can be attributed to improvement in the combined primary and secondary enrolment ratio, which rose from 49 percent in 1970 to 84 percent in 1987. The real GDP per capita also increased from US\$490 in 1960 to US\$1,820 in 1988 (UNDP, 1991: 127).

However, this development denied equality by failing to share the process and the product of development, and by excluding politically meaningful participation in development (Santoso, 1992: 121-137). Inequality³ in development is an unavoidable situation, although there were some attempts to redistribute the fruit of development.⁴ There is no sign that inequality will end quickly, as Indonesia has implemented a

³ Budiman (1988: 125) noted that the Gini Coefficient of income distribution has been increasing since the New Order came to power. It was 0.22 in 1964 and increased to 0.46 in 1980. The increasing concentration of income distribution also indicates the decline in share of the lower 40% income-group of the national income. It took 25.5 percent of the national income in 1964. After the share slightly increased to 1.3 in 1971, it declined dramatically to 12.7 in 1976. The lower 40% income group received only 10.4 percent of national income in 1980.

⁴The state developed some policies for income distribution: 1. credit policies for economically weak and disadvantaged such as small-scale credits and capital investment loans; 2. policies for developing small-scale industries through promoting 'foster-company' relationships with big industries; establishment of small scale industry complexes and industrial villages to accommodate cottage industry and handicrafts and; 3. policies that encourage cooperatives (Salim 1983: 15).

structural adjustment program.⁵ This was done in response to the decline of oil and gas revenue in the early 1980s. As external debt increased liberalization of the economy, private big business groups were encouraged to gain more control of productive assets. In this context, Robison (1986) notes that economic development in the New Order has given rise to a number of very large and diversified domestic business groups. They are the only economic agents benefiting from the liberalisation measures which lead to conglomeration (Hill, 1990). Spatial inequality between Java and outside Java also became an economic development problem. Despite the fact that most of the economic activities are concentrated in Java, this region has had the highest proportion of the population living below the poverty line. In West Java, Central Java, Yogyakarta and East Java, the percentage of people living below the poverty line was 32.7%, 57.9%, 59.9%, 54.9% respectively (Hill and Weidemann, 1989: 42).

Although the People's Consultative Assembly of Indonesia has officially legitimised participation as essential to national development, its meaning has been distorted in the context of state-led development (top-down). Participation is not seen by the state as challenging its monopoly on decision making and is not in opposition to the state.⁶ Therefore, such participation discourages people from bargaining strongly for power *vis a vis* the state and, in turn, weakens Indonesian civil society. The development efforts are virtually out of the people's control and accordingly they are vulnerable to the

⁵Among measures taken in SAP are the elimination of subsidies and /or prices control, reduction of budget deficit and contraction of national and real government expenditure and austerity in government spending. On research of SAP in Indonesia see Hal and Hull (1990).

⁶ The New Order government saw itself as a big family which has to live in *keserasaian, keseimbangan, and keselarasan* (harmony). Because the harmony is determined culturally and ideologically, any opposition which leads to disharmony is rejected. Any conflict should be resolved through consultation (*musyawarah*) to achieve consensus (*mufakat*) (Hien 1990: vii).

abuse of the state power (Santoso, 1992: 134). This indicates that participation is trivial because without it top-down development progresses anyway (Mac Andrew, 1986: 9).

Williams (1980: 13-18) notes three types of participation-dominated decision-making process in rural development during the 1980s. The first was where the community has no role in decision making, and merely carries out the instruction of authorities such as government agencies or officials. Accordingly, program implementation may be a burden to the community and irrelevant to the special needs of the poor; the community was unaware of the potential benefits of the program, and subsequently became a passive spectator rather than an active participant. The second type of participation is that in which the villagers decided their priorities with little or no outside influence, and carried out communal activities using local resources. The village head, the board of *Lembaga Sosial Desa* (Village Social Committee) and the group of *Pamong Desa* (village officials) appointed by the village head were the main participants. This was paternalistic and semi-feudal participation. However decisions were made based on local initiative and were implemented in *swadaya* (self-help) and *gotong royong* (mutual aid and collective work). The villagers' contribution to the projects was restricted to providing cash, labour, building materials or percentage of harvests. The final type of participation was where the community and the government engaged in two way communication. The villagers attended the meetings, but their voices were rarely heard. The interests of the poor were not adequately represented by the *Lembaga Sosial Desa* because the poor had virtually no bargaining power.

To secure the success of development the New Order enforced political stability which gave a justification to the regime to crush everything considered as an obstacle to

modernization. With two magic formulae: ‘*pembangunan*’ (development) and ‘*stabilitas*’ (stability), the New Order recycled Dutch colonial slogans of *Kemadjoean* (progress) and the regime turned into a repressive-developmentalism regime. The government restructured the political system by forming only three major political parties: PPP (*Partai Persatuan Pembangunan*, United Development Party), *Golkar* (*Golongan Karya*), PDI (*Partai Demokrasi Indonesia*, Indonesia Democratic Party). The government imposed *Pancasila* as the sole basis of socio-political organisations, limiting political participation at grassroots level (floating mass policy) by denying political parties access at village level. The New Order also imposed political containment on Indonesian Muslims. The regime was very suspicious of the notion of an Islamic state and the ideology carried by political Islam. This triggered ideological conflict among Indonesian leaders from the early days of independence.⁷ Depoliticisation policy, in turn, resulted in the Muslim majority in Indonesia experiencing difficulty in striving for their own social and political aims (Effendy, 2001).

3.2. LP3ES P3M and Origin of the Participatory Development in the *Pesantren*

LP3ES (*Lembaga Penelitian, Pendidikan, dan Penerangan Ekonomi dan Sosial*, the Institute for Social and Economic Research, Education and Information) and other

⁷ The state political containment of Indonesian Muslims includes (i) the prohibition of *Masyumi* Party rehabilitation and other attempts to establish an Islamic political party (1966-1968); (ii) the eradication of *ex-Darul Islam* rebellion members by the security authority in an attempt to discredit Islam; (iii), the fusion of all Islamic political parties into PPP (the United Development Party) and the government intervention in its leadership (1973); (iv), an attempt to remove Islamic law from the domain of Muslim marriage and divorce by a bill of Marriage Law (1972-1973); (v), recognition of *Aliran Kepercayaan* (Javanese Mysticism) as alternative to Islamic religion (1978); (vi), military suppression of ‘Islamic extremists’ in incidents occurred in Tanjung Priok, Lampung, and Tasik Malaya (1982-1985); and (vii), the imposition of *Pancasila* as the sole basis of political parties and mass organisations replacing Islam (See Latif 2005: 462-96).

Indonesian NGOs emerged in the 1970s in the context of a critique of national development strategy. These were created in reaction to the government approach to development, which was considered inadequate, top-down and non-participative. The NGO⁸ LP3ES was established in 1971 by intellectual and student reformers of the 1966 generation⁹ with support from German *Friedrich Naumann Stiftung* (FNS) (LP3ES, 2001: xi-xii). The main concern of LP3ES was to counter the negative impact of development by offering alternatives. It also positioned itself as the state partner and as the mediating institution between the state and people. In advancing the development model with a more popular and human face, LP3ES first uses indigenous skills and resources; secondly, it focuses on redistribution and targeting towards meeting the basic needs of the masses; and thirdly, it develops strategies of popular participation for achieving these goals (Eldridge, 1999: 87).

The LP3ES socio-cultural background reflects part of a broad tradition of modernist Islam, with some patronage from technocrats associated with the former Socialist Party of Indonesia (PSI). Its network of members and associates has extensive links with major facets of Islamic life in Indonesia; hence, modernization and democratization of Islamic institutions have always formed part of its mission (Eldridge,

⁸In Indonesian context, NGO first refers to, *Lembaga Swadaya Masyarakat* (LSM, self-reliant community institution), namely, groups of poor people or local groups which work directly with them, and secondly, *Lembaga Pengembangan Swadaya Masyarakat* (LPSM, institutions for developing community self-reliance). These are larger, usually city-based groups that give support or assistance to the development of smaller groups (Eldridge, 1995: 13). The use of the term LSM/LPSM instead of NGO is designed to avoid “the anti-government” perception of NGO terminology that implicates them as rivals to the government in development process (Fakih, 1995: 110).

⁹Socialist Indonesian intellectuals such as, Prof. Soemitro Djojohadikusumo, Minister of Trade and later Research, Dr. Emil Salim, then deputy chairman of the National Development Planning Board (BAPPENAS), Dr. Ali Wardana and Prof. Selosoemardjan who were active in the Indonesian Association for the Promotion of Economic and Social Knowledge (BINEKSOS) have important roles in the establishment. LP3ES became the operating arm of BINEKSOS.

1995: 86-87). It was during the 1970s that the Muslim young generation involved in the Islamic renewal movement under the leadership of Nurcholish Madjid¹⁰ emerged to seek alternatives beyond the political arena in order to allow Islam to fulfil an important social role. They combined Islamic teachings, western social theories and the socio-political reality of Indonesian society. Therefore, the main agendas of this movement were re-actualisation of Islam in a modern context through renewal of Islamic thoughts, politics and bureaucracy¹¹ (Effendy, 2001). However, realising the negative impact of national development, some Muslim activists of this renewal movement moved their focus to grass roots empowerment in rural areas. They were compelled to address the more tangible or immediate problems confronted by Indonesian society at large, the majority of which is Muslim, such as the socio-economic and political impacts of the regime's policy which puts too heavy an emphasis on stability and growth at the expense of popular participation and distribution (Effendy, 1993: 86-87). These activists¹² viewed the New Order's development policies in light of the social transformative dimension of Islamic teachings¹³ and dependency theory.¹⁴ Their agenda was basically

¹⁰ Nurcholish Madjid was an Indonesian Muslim scholar (1939-2005) who led the Islamic renewal movement in the early 1970s, seeking to mediate the antagonistic relationship between Islam and the state in Indonesia.

¹¹This renewal movement was also known as 'cultural Islam' in contrast to 'political Islam'. Political Islam is a term referring to efforts that promote Indonesian Muslim aspirations and carry Islamic agendas into law and government policies through the electoral process and legislative institutions. These agendas range from the state's moral foundation to policies it produces, including incorporating *shari'ah* into the constitution and replacing ideology of *Pancasila* with Islamic ideology (Baswedan 2004: 670). In contrast, Cultural Islam revitalises Indonesian Islam through non-political activities including intellectual, education, and social transformation. Cultural Islam places "Islam, whose primary role in the life of the nation is to serve as a source of ethical and cultural guidance" (Hefner, 1993: 4). In other words, cultural Islam is not related to politics and power. This cultural movement is promulgated by Nurcholish Madjid and Abdurrahman Wahid who introduced the idea of "*Islam Yes Partai (Party) Islam No*" and "*Pribumisasi Islam*" (indigenisation of Islam) respectively.

¹²Among the activists supporting this stream were Dawam Rahardjo, Sudjoko Prasadjo, Adi Sasono, and Mansour Fakih.

¹³ There are some Islamic injunctions in the Qur'an advocating Muslims to establish social justice, and to eradicate exploitation of the poor people.

political--that is, the formation of a strong civil society *vis-à-vis* the state. Many activists, such as Dawam Rahardjo who joined LP3ES in the early 1970s, channeled such ideals through NGO (LSM) movements.

In the 1970s LP3ES used its links with the *pesantren* as an entry point for promoting more participatory approaches to social and economic development. Many urban activists had become aware of their lack of links with rural people, and saw this lack as weakening the support for, and legitimacy of, their struggles to effect change at higher levels of politics and decision making. Their *pesantren* program was basically intended to build capability and consciousness in the Muslim society at a grass roots level, leading towards the formation of an autonomous middle class as an important element in the development of a democratic political system. In other words, the long term goal of this program was to establish a cultural movement for democratization and social and political transformation at the national level (Eldridge, 1995: 92, 177; Fakhri, 1985: 153). Since the *pesantren* are largely identified as the educational institutions of traditionalist Islam, LP3ES¹⁵ was aware of the significance of cultivating co-operation with individuals associated with NU (*Nahdhatul Ulama*, lit. Resurgence of Islamic Scholars). This was considered the organisation *par excellence* of Indonesia's Islamic traditionalism.¹⁶ Some of its representatives who took part in this cause were Zamroni,

¹⁴ In the 1970s, theories of development such as dependency, development and underdevelopment introduced by Latin American theorists such as Andre Gunder Frank, Dos Santos, Cardoso, Freire, and Furtado influenced these young intellectual Muslims in analysing the contemporary political economic situation in Indonesia.

¹⁵ Dawam is the only activist of LP3ES who had knowledge of the *pesantren* due to his brief educational background in the *Pesantren Krapyak* of Yogyakarta. As a student activist involved in the 1966 movement, he knew people with strong affiliation to NU.

¹⁶ There are two reasons to link the *pesantren* with NU. First, in the early 1950s; the political role of the *pesantren* represented by the *kyai* at a national level was very strong. This political aspiration was channeled through NU, which became one of political parties under Sukarno's regime. The *pesantren* was often categorized as a social force, whereas the NU was associated with a political institution. Secondly,

former chairman of KAMI (Indonesian Student Action Front) in 1966, Nashihin Hasan and Abdurrahman Wahid.¹⁷ Wahid was regarded as the 'ideal bridge-builder' between the *pesantren* world and LP3ES. He helped identify a number of the *kyai* who were likely to cooperate, and he also introduced LP3ES activists to the *kyai* (Effendy, 2001: 90; Bruinessen, 1994: 237). The authority of Wahid enabled him to influence other *kyai* to become involved in the program (Santoso, 1989: 41-46).

The cooperation between LP3ES and the *pesantren* resulted in the establishment of a new NGO in 1983, P3M (*Perhimpunan Pengembangan Pesantren and Masyarakat*, the Indonesian Society for *Pesantren* and Community Development).¹⁸ The establishment of P3M was basically intended to channel the German FNS funds for at least the next ten years to continue the LP3ES *pesantren* program. The FNS did not fund particular projects for more than ten years (Bruinessen, 1994: 246-247). Both LP3ES and P3M continued to cooperate through training programs, forums and the distribution of each other's literature; therefore, P3M operationally inherited the ideology and methodology of participatory development applied by LP3ES in the *pesantren*

the NU has a social origin in the *pesantren* milieu. This organisation was established on 26 January 1926 by leading *kyai* such as KH. Hasyim Asy'ari (Tebuireng)--Wahid's grandfather--, KH. Bisri (Denanyar), KH. Ridwan (Semarang), KH. R Hambali (Kudus), K. Nahrowi (Malang), and KH. Doromuntaha (Madura).

¹⁷Abdurrahman Wahid is the protagonist of renewal movement in the traditionalist organisation of NU. Wahid is a grandson of NU founder, Hasjim Asy'ari. Shortly after returning from study in Egypt and Iraq in 1971, Wahid was teaching in some Javanese *pesantren*. By the mid 1970s, he was in regular contact with Nurcholish Madjid, Dawam Rahardjo, and Adi Sasono, joining them in a series of academic forums and study cells. From this contact, Wahid was familiar with the dominant themes of NGOs such as alternative development, democracy, and human rights. He was also invited to take part in community development projects designed by LP3ES (Latif, 2005: 557-558; Barton, 1995: 45-46).

¹⁸Dawam Rahardjo from LP3ES together with some leading Muslim figures such as Saleh Widodo from *Pesantren Darul Fallah* of Bogor, Abdurrahman Wahid and Yusuf Hasyim from NU established P3M. Most of the *pesantren* participation leaders became important figures in the P3M network.

(Eldridge, 1995: 180; Fakhri, 1985: 137). To expand the involvement of the *pesantren* in participatory development, P3M established the *pesantren* network.¹⁹ In addition, through this network the *pesantren* could take over NGO roles in rural areas (Fakhri, 1985: 152).

The inclusion of the *pesantren* into the LP3ES program signaled the starting point for *pesantren* involvement in institutionalised participatory development. This was signified by the installation of a new organisation in the *pesantren* known as BPPM (*Biro Pengembangan Pesantren dan Masyarakat*, Bureau for *Pesantren* and Community Development). This innovation did not mean that the *pesantren* had never been involved in providing social services for villagers. Rather, the establishment of BPPM only changed the nature of the *pesantren* activity from sporadic to continuing and organized. BPPM was intended to serve as a local NGO which had the ability to organize and mobilize society to solve their local problems. It was also intended to ensure the continuation of development programs in the *pesantren*²⁰ (Maryono, 1988: 34-41).

¹⁹ This network consists of four components (i) head office of P3M in Jakarta, (ii) five service *pesantren* (development and leadership, entrepreneurship and management, agricultural technology and agribusiness, documentation and information, and socio-religious research service), (iii) participating *pesantren*, (iv) target groups ---the *pesantren*'s surrounding society. This network is not hierarchical with subordinate relationships between the *pesantren* and P3M; rather, it is characterised by coordination (Santoso, 1989: 26-33).

²⁰ There are five functions of BPPM: (i) as a special class for senior *santri* to understand the actual social problems outside their campus, and to provide a training place to organize and plan useful social development activities; (ii) as an instrument for the *kyai* to actualize his teachings about *da'wah bi al-hal* (practical religious propagation); (iii) as an instrument for the *pesantren* to respond to recent social development; (iv) as a 'modern' mediating institution between the *pesantren* and outside organizations such as NGOs and funding agencies that are concerned with development programs and ; (v) as an information centre for development programs for the surrounding community (Billah, 1988: 15).

3.3. Paradigm of Participatory Development in *Pesantren*

In achieving the long term purpose of participatory development in the *pesantren* LP3ES did not always oppose policies initiated by the state. Instead, LP3ES preferred to work closely with the state, that is, relevant bureaucratic agencies, to implement programs (Effendy, 2001: 88-89), seeking to cooperate and create dialogue with institutions in order to try and influence their policy (inside-in strategy). They argued that that the only way to transform government is to work with the government and slowly produce change through education and negotiation (Whitelum, 2003: 174-177). In this regard, Mahasin former LP3ES director argued:

The strategy is not to organise people to wage a frontal attack on the state, for capturing the state per se does not mean establishing an alternative hegemony in Gramscian sense. Frontal assault on the state is not only suicidal given the present situation, but also incorrect from the standpoint of strategy, for it will leave a void in society once the state is taken over. Thus, the proper role of NGDS (Non-governmental development organisations) is to build counter-hegemony through education and conscientisation of the people, to create an alternative hegemony that after a certain period might lead to social change. This may in the end open up the way to a new society. (cited in Whitelum, 2003: 176)

While working with grass roots people to provide direct services and basic resources, some CD NGOs also presented a fundamental challenge to political, economic, and patriarchal structure. This strategy is very different from the 'outside-in' strategy, which proposed change by putting pressure on institutions and people without actually engaging the particular target in dialogue. This strategy is employed by advocacy NGOs that foster a more radical approach to empowerment, and seek structural change that impacts upon power relations to produce collective empowerment at regional, national, and international levels. They avoid direct engagement with the government, preferring to challenge and confront the state. They have been involved in

the pro-democracy movement, and anti-corruption and anti-debt campaigns, such as LBH, WALHI and INFID (Whitelum, 2003:174).²¹

Whitelum (2003: 155) argues that the increased political repression of the New Order regime, especially in the mid 1970s, influenced NGOs such as LP3ES to adopt their paradigm. The New Order only tolerated NGOs that endorsed charitable causes or the New Order Development agenda. With the decrease in oil revenues, the regime found that its development programs relied upon the efforts of NGOs to fund national development. Endorsing NGOs to achieve development objectives helped the New Order to maintain political stability, and attract foreign investment. In this context Emil Salim former environment minister during the New Order, notes:

It is inappropriate to suggest that government and NGOs are confronting each other. As long as the differences concern problems of implementation, then the NGOs' right to exist is guaranteed. But if the differences concern more 'philosophical' differences in ideology or differences in national aims, then clearly any NGO with those sorts of differences with the government will not have the right to exist. (1983: 71)

This political climate allowed NGOs delivering various services such as health, education and small scale economic development to survive, increase in number and hamper the overtly political oriented NGOs.

However, the 'inside-in strategy' was vulnerable to being co-opted by the New Order government and caused structural problems. Such problems were faced also by donors when trying to engage the government in poverty alleviation work. The

²¹Arief Budiman (1994) classified Indonesian NGOs into two types: community development (CD) NGOs and advocacy NGOs. However, such division sometimes overlaps because many NGOs promoting grass roots services also advocate political consciousness of people at the grass roots level, and build counter-hegemony in order that resistance from below may grow, organise, and eventually take power from the elites. Therefore, empowerment became the term adopted by both the CD NGO and the Advocacy NGO. The difference lies in terms of strategy: 'inside-in' or 'outside-in'.

government's political, economic and social structures were considered to be the core of the problems disempowering the people. Involving the state in this work might serve to sustain the process of disempowerment (Holcombe, 1995: 18). Hulme and Edwards (1994: 13-27) warn that NGO programs will be co-opted by the process of engagement, that they will cease being advocates for the people and instead become development contractors or implementers of donor or government programs. The fear is that they will become tools of a development paradigm (top-down) they do not support (Whitelum, 2003: 193-194).

This is apparent in the case of LP3ES. Despite the fact that LP3ES promoted participatory development in the *pesantren* as an alternative to the top-down development model and as a means for social transformation, it was largely parallel to the government development paradigm (modernisation). Like other CD NGOs involved in development activities in the late 1970s, LP3ES did not introduce a radical alternative paradigm of development, but merely tried to 'reform'²² and reacted to the methodology and practices of the government development model, without questioning its basic assumption. They tended to neglect the problems of class exploitation, political oppression, gender bias, and the state's cultural and ideological hegemony of development (Fakih, 1995: 113-118, 173). They regarded the theory of development supported by the government with the growth model translated in *Repelita* (five-year

²² In examining the Indonesian NGOs, Fakih (1995) classifies them into conformist, reformist, and transformative NGOs. This classification is based on the Gramscian notion of hegemony in building civil society and on their attachment to the ideology of modernisation. LP3ES is classified as a reformist NGO whose objective does not include the radical transformation of power relations, or the rejection of the ideology of development as defined by the New Order. This NGO in the Gramscian civil society concept was regarded as supportive of hegemonic ideas and status quo power relations. LP3ES, through its cooperation with Suharto and their participation in the technical application of development ideology, consented to existing power relations and the ideology of development that Suharto advocated (Whitelum, 2003: 185).

development plan) as good. What they found problematic was the approach and methodology: a top-down and non-participative approach to development. Therefore, the NGO's task was to guide the people in generating knowledge, skills and attitudes with a view to becoming 'modern', and capable of 'participation' in development.

To begin with, LP3ES interest in the *pesantren* was based on the assumption that the *pesantren* was an effective instrument to disseminate development ideas and programs, and to mobilise local resources and rural society for national development purposes (Billah, 1988: 12-13; Kuntowijoyo, 1991). Based on the seminar on Social Participation held by LP3ES and TEMPO weekly in Bogor in September 1971, LP3ES conducted a feasibility study to explore the possibility of utilising *pesantren* to stimulate social participation in national development (Maryono, 1988: 30-31). In this study²³ the *pesantren*'s position in the village was examined and linked to village development, vocational training, and the creation of employment opportunities in agriculture, handicrafts and production units. The study concluded that the *pesantren* had the potential to induce social participation in rural society, and increase the success of national development (Prasodjo, 1974). As an institution growing from and within society, the *pesantren* had significant influence on rural society. This was palpable in its role in offering services such as traditional education to the villagers when modern education could not be accessed in rural areas. The *pesantren* also became the symbol of social and political countervailing to the oppressor, at times such as the Dutch colonial

²³ This study was conducted by researchers from LP3ES (*Lembaga Penelitian, Pendidikan dan Penerangan Ekonomi dan Sosial*, Institute for Economic and Social Research, Education, and Information). Researchers included Dawam Rahardjo, Sudjoko Prasodjo, and Madjid, and the study was undertaken from December 1971 to January 1972 in some *pesantren* of Bogor, namely, *Al-Falak*, *Ciapus*, *K. Harun*, *Hidayatul Athfal Sadeng*, *Muta'alimin*, *Sinager*, *Darul Fallah* and *Bakom*. The results of the study are published by LP3ES: Sudjoko Prasodjo et. al. *Profil Pesantren: Laporan Hasil Penelitian Pesantren Al-Fallah dan Delapan Lainnya di Bogor*, Jakarta: LP3ES, 1974.

period. This was achieved by practising politics of isolation when villages were still free from the touch of political forces (Billah, 1985: 290). In short, the *pesantren* was the main social, cultural, and religious dynamic of traditional Muslim society.

The paradigm of participatory development in the *pesantren* was intended to transform the *pesantren* from a traditional to a modern institution, and was based on modernisation theory. It assumed that the backward mentality, behaviour and culture of people, such as the low level of their 'need for achievement' and other traditional values, prevented them from developing and growing. This backward mentality and values were considered to be the main cause of their lack of participation in development. Involving the *pesantren* in the LP3ES program constituted the 'salvation movement' from the negative impact of the New Order modernisation, which proceeded quickly and demanded radical changes in both way of life and institutions, from traditional to modern (Rahardjo, 1985: xiii). At that time, the *pesantren* was regarded as a traditional and rural institution which symbolised backwardness, resistance to the outside world, and a traditional lifestyle. The *pesantren* only focused on religious education (*tafaqquh fi al-din*) and produced graduates who did not have a great social impact within society: they could not respond appropriately to complex social problems beyond the religious sphere (Billah, 1988: 294). These internal shortages resulted in failure of the *pesantren* to support national development. The LP3ES program encouraged the *pesantren* to adjust itself to modernization and the villagers' demands, and helped the *pesantren* become a catalyst for rural development. The *pesantren*'s role would become greater, and its contribution to socio-cultural transformation would be more meaningful, once the *pesantren* could respond appropriately to society's problems. This could be achieved by

alleviating poverty, eradicating social and economic gaps, and disseminating new relevant knowledge and technology. With these changes, the *pesantren* functioned not only as a traditional educational institution but also as (i) the centre for village training in development of knowledge, logical thinking, skills, and personal guidance for rural society, and (ii) a village-based, rural institution enhancing self-help belief with the aim of developing its environment economically, physically and spiritually (Ziemek, 1986: 213-215).

LP3ES programs in the *pesantren* almost replicated those that targeted small entrepreneurs, also developed by LP3ES. These development programs had focused on three major components: development of entrepreneurial skills and attitudes (AMT), transfer of appropriate technology and income generating activities. The latter activity replicated the Department of Religious Affairs' *pesantren* program in the early 1970s (Bruinessen, 1994: 245). These projects were intended to motivate people to participate in small-scale economic development as a means of increasing the welfare of the target group. LP3ES believed that the development process would work if capital was given to the right people: those highly motivated to achieve outcomes, with skills in the micro technology of business, such as marketing, accounting and financial management. These entrepreneurs would become the drivers of the growth process, and the rest of the community would benefit from the trickle down effect (Fakih, 1995: 117). A program coordinator staff of P3M Jakarta notes:

People are poor because they don't have proper education and they don't have capital to do business...it is more than this, it is depending on mentality, creativity and work ethos or spirit of life. This is a very basic requirement for people to develop. After that they can be trained in doing business such as marketing, financial management, leadership and so on. (Quoted in Fakih, 1995: 176)

During the cooperation between LP3ES/P3M and the *pesantren*, the latter only focused on the implementation of the development programs and neglected the underlying objective of such programs. In fact, none of the development programs in the *pesantren*, such as cooperatives, savings and loans, appropriate technologies, small scale industries and income generating activities, were the main objectives of participatory development. Rather, they were entry points to achieve the long term objective, namely, a cultural movement for democratisation and social transformation of the *pesantren* and rural society (Fakih, 1985: 153). The NGO activists were reluctant to express to the *kyai* their true aims of the democratisation of the *pesantren* and of the village. LP3ES and P3M did not want the *kyai* to reject their programs, and they wanted to maintain good relationships with the *kyai* to ensure the sustainability of their projects in the *pesantren*. That is why technical and methodological issues were always raised in needs assessment discussions. Such issues included the need of the *pesantren* to participate in national development, but excluded discussion of the need for democratisation in the village (Fakih, 1985: 153). In this context, Johnston (1990: 82) regards such NGOs as LP3ES as '*pengrajin social*' (social craftsmen) implying that their work demanded great effort and a high level of concentration to achieve even minimal changes in a very confined area. Their preference to work in a limited number of small communities to improve their standard of life and dignity resulted in difficulties in promoting change at the national level.

3.4. Training Program for *Pesantren* Facilitators

To help the *pesantren* to effectively stimulate the local people to participate in development, LP3ES held *LTPM* (*Latihan Tenaga Pengembangan Masyarakat*, Training for Community Development Workers). This was a one-year training program which included six stages: recruitment, in class training, fieldwork/research, a planning workshop, action program and evaluation. There were two purposes to this training. First, it was intended to educate facilitators in understanding society's needs and problems, identifying potential and stimulating social participation in rural development. Secondly the training was also designed to generate grass roots social transformation through the organisation and education of groups within the village. Increasing capability of groups within the village alleviated unfavourable socio-economic situations, systems, and structures that created and sustained impoverishment at the community level (Dilts,1999: 36-37).

Participatory training and institution building in rural areas became the main transforming tools of modernity. LP3ES mixed the Freireian conscientisation and PAR with Achievement Motivation Training (AMT). In this regard, Eldridge (1988) notes that there has been tremendous contradiction and ambiguity among the Indonesian NGOs--including LP3ES--in responding to the growth model of development. Many NGO activists are motivated by a mixture of political and service ideals, and it is quite unclear how their development programs are supposed to lead to transformation of the political macro structure. Enormous ideological confusion is evident in relation to basic objectives such as the promotion of self-help, with dependency analysis being mixed with entrepreneurship training along the lines advanced by McClelland which assumes

that the underdeveloped condition of people is caused by values and traditions that are incompatible with development (cf. Edwards and Hulme, 1994: 25). For Freire, however, participation and empowerment refers to the transformed state where the oppressor and the oppressed meet each other on new and equal ground. Others, such as dependency theorists, argue that poverty is more than a psychological state and is rooted in economic and social structures. There can be no poverty alleviation without fundamental structural changes in the internal politics and economy of countries and in the world economy. Conscientisation, *andragogy*, and PAR are utilised to analyse and confront the ‘structure of oppression’ within existing forms of economic development, state formation, political rule and social differentiation. Hence, participation represents a citizen’s right to challenge subordination and marginalisation (Hickey and Mohan, 2004: 6-7).

There are some differences between LTPM I held in 1977/1978²⁴ and those that were held after 1983.²⁵ In the *first stage* of participant recruitment for LTPM in 1977/1978, LP3ES required the participants to be senior *santri* or young teachers (*ustadz*) coming from the *kyai*’s family, or individuals with private and close relationships with the *kyai*. LP3ES argued that closeness to the *kyai* was important not only for continuing development programs in the *pesantren*, but also in easing the communication process with the *kyai*. In contrast, at the 1983 LTPM II held by LP3ES

²⁴LTPM I was held by LP3ES in the *Pesantren Pabelan* of Magelang, Central Java. In the first term, training was held from October 1977 to April 1978 in which the participants explored theoretical subjects followed by practice in villages surrounding sub-district of Mungkid. Having attended the training, the participants returned to their *pesantren* to conduct action programs for the next six months. This implementation was then reported to and evaluated by LP3ES. This training was attended by representatives from eight *pesantren* from Java and Madura, namely, *Pesantren Pabelan* of Magelang, *Maslakul Huda* of Pati, *Annuqayah* of Madura, Cipasung of Tasik Malaya, *Darul Fallah* of Bogor, *Darun Najah* of Jakarta, *Tebu Ireng* of Jombang, and *KH Ghalib* of Lampung.

²⁵The second training (LTPM II) was held by LP3ES and the *Pesantren Maslakul Huda* of Central Java in 1983/1984 to prepare the facilitators for 13 villages in the Margoyoso sub-district.

and the *Pesantren Maslakul Huda* of Pati, Central Java, participation was not limited to *pesantren* teachers (*ustadz* not young *kyai*), but was extended to female and male village youths from 13 villages in Margoyoso sub-district. According to Fowler (1997: 84-85), such cadres constitute a change agent or catalyst for development action. They need a deep insight into the community in question, and trust and acceptance from the people. Gaining the community's trust is essential for successful fulfilment of two roles: facilitation of group awareness and providing advice or consultation on the changes people want for themselves. Fowler argues that an insider catalyst has good local insight but may struggle to achieve local credibility in a new role, especially if it is linked to external resources where personal commitment to the common good may be overridden by personal rewards. Furthermore, because insiders remain within their group, their communication of the NGO vision, mission and identity is likely to be weaker. However, in spite of the fact that they necessarily undertake a lengthy process to gain community acceptance and trust (which may be hampered by cultural prejudices), Fowler asserts that they will be the best choice for becoming the catalyst. However, Fowler (1997: 84) acknowledges that any community member could potentially become the change agent cadre. Bearing in mind the long social relationship between the *pesantren* and its surrounding villagers, it was not difficult for the change agent from the *pesantren* to gain social trust. Moreover, the hierarchical structure of the *pesantren* in which the *kyai* was a charismatic leader assisted the change agent from the *pesantren* to carry out new tasks and potentially accelerated social change in rural areas. LP3ES strategy in choosing the catalysts from the *pesantren* illustrated what Billah called 'betting on the strong' (1988: 17), meaning that a renewal effort or social change will be

more effective and easily spread in a certain society when it starts by inducing responsive elites towards this change.

In the *second stage* of in-class training the participants studied four main strategic elements, the first of which was orientation to participatory development and the role of *pesantren* and other community institutions. This was intended to broaden participants' awareness and knowledge of social economic structures, and root causes of village problems. The participants were also infused with the concept of achievement motivation training (AMT). This training unit also included analysis of Islamic injunctions for action in social and economic development. This was apparent in the inclusion of discussion on Islamic perspectives on development. It included subjects such as Islamic concepts of entrepreneurship, work ethos for life improvement and rational (progressive) theology replacing 'fatalistic' theology (as commonly embraced by ordinary Muslims, including *pesantren* society). In this context, LP3ES interpreted Islamic teachings in ways that supported the ethos of modernisation. This was similar to the way modernist Muslim scholars created the discourse on the role of religion in development, secularisation and rationalisation (modernist theology). Therefore, this process created a new religious interpretation which was appropriate only to modernisation (Fakih, 1995: 108). According to Islamic modernism, the failure of Muslim worlds to achieve the social changes observed in Western countries is due to inherent faults in the internal aspect of Muslim society. These include the fatalistic theology embraced by Muslims that is incompatible with achieving modernisation, low levels of entrepreneurship and work ethos, and inflexible adherence to traditional values and Islamic interpretations. Islamic modernism regards Western countries that achieve a

high stage of modernity as the best example for the developing world. Therefore, it would be beneficial for Muslim worlds to emulate their development strategies and thoughts (Munawar-Rahman, 1995: 22).

LP3ES and P3M adopted such modern theology, but failed to formulate transformative theology for the *pesantren* program. Transformative theology regards the underdevelopment of Muslim societies as not due to traditional culture and mentality but rather to an imperialistic relationship between the first and the third world at the global level, and to exploitative relationships between the powerful and the powerless at the local level. Therefore, according to transformative Islam, poverty alleviation should be conducted first by transforming unjust existing social structures. Proponents of this notion developed ideological critiques of modernisation and critiques of Islamic modernism through *Qur'anic* exegesis. From this, transformative *Qur'anic* exegesis emerged, and was applied to theological practice in social action. In fact, social change within Muslim society goes hand in hand with change in its theology. The creation of transformative theology to replace modern theology enabled participatory development in the *pesantren*. The theology became an inherent characteristic of the *pesantren* and allowed the *pesantren* to function as something other than a mere instrument of NGO sponsored development programs. However, transformative theology is only solidly constructed with the implementation of participatory development.²⁶

The *second* element of in-class training was a research component to generate village data. In LTPM I the facilitators were taught social research methods, statistics,

²⁶ Ashghar Ali Engineer, an Iranian Muslim scholar, proposed the transformative *Qur'anic* exegesis. He interprets the term *kafir* (infidel) as not only the people who do not perform Islamic obligations such as prayers, or pilgrimage for the richest, but also extends the term to people who do not support efforts to establish just social order in Muslim society (Engineer, 1992).

and scientific problem solving techniques (LP3ES, 1977: 5), whereas in LTPM II they were taught participatory action research (PAR). This was defined as “research structured by the democratic interaction of the researcher and the oppressed classes of people and takes the form of a dialectical unification of theory and practice reciprocally between the researcher and the oppressed classes” (Kassam, 1982: 4). PAR replaced the scientific research given during LTPM I in 1977. The *third* element was an introduction to program planning. Group planning techniques for socio-economic programs at the grass roots level were taught with the emphasis on situation analysis and group discussion. Finally, the facilitators examined the appropriateness of the programs to basic problems encountered by village groups. They also analysed the existing government and local programs activities and identified ways of re-activating existing social and governmental structures at village level.

The *third stage* was field work (research) in surrounding society, the results of which informed the *fourth stage*: program planning. In LTPM I, village data was gathered based on conventional research techniques such as questionnaires, observation, and interviews with villagers and village authorities. The facilitators tabulated and analysed data and presented problem solving alternatives in the form of a research report. As noted by Fasih (1995: 190), most of the facilitators recognized that in this research the villagers were not involved in identifying the problems and analysing the results of the research. Participation in village forums such as RT (*Rukun Tetangga*, Household Association) was used to demonstrate that the program plan was proposed in consultation with village figures, and efforts were made to motivate the people to participate in program implementation. In contrast, in LTPM II the facilitators used PAR

which promised to create non-violent and democratic models for economic, political and cultural transformation, and assumed that human beings had the ability to create knowledge. Therefore, this research placed the oppressed in a powerful position: they were creators of knowledge in the process of transformation of their own educational and political process. Furthermore, *andragogy*, coined by Malcolm Knowles, and the Freirian model of people conscientisation (consciousness building) were central in PAR. *Andragogy* refers to a method of training that treats the participants as adults who have sufficient knowledge and experience to create learning sources for themselves, and of themselves. This method uses structured experience, two-way communication and multidirectional techniques; therefore, the research direction is determined by the participants, and the researcher's role is restricted to facilitation, and creation of an environment that enables the people to learn from their own experience. In this research, the facilitators work closely with village figures, and most importantly the poor villagers, to generate local knowledge of socio-economic and political situations, problems, potentials, and proposed program alternatives. In developing the program plan, they held a workshop in the village involving most community members, to discuss and review the action research findings, and to develop action plans. The facilitators of this forum gave villagers the opportunity to express their opinions and suggestions, thereby developing a plan that reflected real aspirations.

Stage five of the training was an action program intended to implement the programs approved during the village workshop. The action program was conducted over an eight-month period. To implement the programs, the facilitators and the villagers formed KSM (*Kelompok Swadaya Masyarakat*, self-help groups) within which

the villagers would be free to realise their potential, have access to natural resources to solve their own problems, and ultimately fulfil their own needs through self-reliance. Dependency of the villagers upon external agencies, as well as the *pesantren*, was intended to decrease gradually under this plan. During the LTPM I planning was implemented for villages in Mungkid District in cooperation with UDKP (Unit for Coordinating Development).²⁷ After LTPM I, the facilitators were required to implement development projects in their *pesantren* based on local society needs for the following six months. The results of this were then evaluated by the *pesantren* facilitators and reported to LP3ES. The *final stage* of the training was an evaluation workshop, held after one year to assess the effectiveness of overall program implementation in the villages. This evaluation was also designed to identify further training needs, not only for the village cadres but also for the existing KSM.

3.5. Conclusion

Participatory development in the *pesantren* was initiated by Muslim activists who joined LP3ES and P3M. Having been inspired by the social transformative dimension of Islamic teachings and dependency theory, these activists sought to empower grass root society who was facing the socio-economic and political negative impacts of the New Order development policy. This policy stressed stability and growth at the expense of people participation and even distribution. LP3ES and P3M efforts to use the *pesantren* as the entry point for promoting participatory approaches to social and economic development were intended not only to create people participation,

²⁷ UDKP (*Unit Daerah Kerja Pembangunan*) was set up in every sub-district (*kecamatan*) based on the Presidential Instruction No. 13/1972 to coordinate sub-district development activities and take responsibility for the head of district (MacAndrew, 1986: 25).

but also to build capability and consciousness of Muslim society at grass roots level. This led to the formation of an autonomous middle class--an important instrument of democratization and social and political transformation. In other words, their agenda was basically political, that is, the formation of a strong civil society *vis-à-vis* the state.

LP3ES and P3M provided *pesantren* facilitators with knowledge of participatory methods, and training such as needs assessment, consciousness raising amongst the people, and Participatory Action Research (PAR). These were important parts of a broader strategy to stimulate people participation at the local level. However, there was inconsistency between the LP3ES paradigm and the long term objective of participatory development. While LP3ES intended to create social and political transformation through the *pesantren*, its 'inside-in strategy' and paradigm were strongly influenced by the modernisation assumption advocated by the New Order. Its intention to transform the *pesantren* life from traditional to 'modern' and to utilise the *pesantren* as an instrument to support the national development was reflected in its programs. Moreover, *pesantren* development programs were mainly concerned with service delivery (such as saving and loans, cooperatives and income generating) rather than advocacy activities. In addition, Participatory Action Research and 'radical' Freirean conscientisation were mixed with modern Islamic theology and McClelland's N-Ach training to become transforming tools for modernity. The participatory development in the *pesantren*--as will be discussed in Chapters 4 and 5-- stimulated people's participation. However, the focus of LP3ES on service delivery, and its preference for working in a limited number of small communities to improve their living standard resulted in LP3ES becoming

'pengrajin sosial' (social craftsmen), which limited its capacity to promote social and political transformation beyond the local context.

Annex 1

Comparisons between LTPM I and LTPM II

Elements	LTPM I	LTPM II
Duration	One year training (in class and in society)	One year training (in class and in society)
Subjects of Training	<p>1. Overviews of <i>Pesantren</i> and Village Development (village matters, Islam and the ethos of development, participatory development through the <i>pesantren</i>, Achievement Motivation Training, TPM matters)</p> <p>2. Scientific Research and Problem Solving (concepts and methods)</p> <p>3. Program Planning</p> <p>4. Examples of development programs as problem solving alternatives</p> <p>5. Project Implementation</p>	<p>1. Overviews of <i>Pesantren</i> and Village Development (village matters, Islam and the ethos of development, participatory development through the <i>pesantren</i>, Achievement Motivation Training, TPM matters).</p> <p>2. Participatory Action Research (concepts and methods)</p> <p>3. Program Planning</p> <p>4. Examples of development programs as problem solving alternatives</p> <p>5. Project Implementation</p>
Participants	Young <i>kyai</i> , <i>ustadz</i> , and senior <i>santri</i> from <i>pesantren</i> . All male.	<i>Ustadz</i> and mostly male and female village youths

Sources: LP3ES and BPPM PMH (1983) and LP3ES (1977)

CHAPTER IV
PARTICIPATORY DEVELOPMENT
IN *PESANTREN ANNUQAYAH* OF GULUK-GULUK MADURA

This chapter will examine the way the *Pesantren Annuqayah* of Madura, East Java stimulates its surrounding society to participate in development programs. The first part of the chapter gives a brief description of the *Pesantren Annuqayah* and Guluk-Guluk society. The second part discusses the implementation of participatory development in the *Pesantren Annuqayah*.

It is argued that first, despite the fact that participatory development in the *Pesantren Annuqayah* does not follow formulaic participatory development, and gives a dominant role to the *kyai*, it succeeds in increasing people's participation and leads to sustainability and self-reliance. Secondly, notwithstanding such achievement, the *pesantren* uses participatory development to maintain its domination in society.

4.1. A Brief Description of *Pesantren Annuqayah* and Guluk-Guluk Society

The *Pesantren Annuqayah* is situated in the village and sub-district of Guluk-Guluk, Sumenep District, Madura Island, East Java and is one of the largest *pesantren* on the island. This *pesantren* was established in 1887 by KH Muhammad Syarqawi, an *ulama* (Muslim scholar) from Kudus, Central Java, after completing his study in Mecca. In later development, KH Muhammad Syarqawi's descendants enlarged the *Pesantren Annuqayah* by establishing branches within Guluk-Guluk village; therefore, it thus became a kind of federation of the *Pesantren Annuqayah*. This enlargement was intended to effectively manage and supervise the increasing number of *santri*. In 1923

KH Abdullah Sajjad set up a branch of the *Pesantren Annuqayah* in Latee (100 meters away from the main *pesantren*), followed by KH Ahmad Basyir who established another branch in Nirmala in 1963. The last branch of the *Pesantren Annuqayah* was established by KH Ishamuddin in 1972 in South Lubangsa. As a federation, the *Pesantren Annuqayah* is led by the collective *kyai* leadership of 14 *kyai* and 17 *nyai* (*kyai*'s wives). They all belong to the KH Muhammad Syarqawi family.

Until 1917 the *Pesantren Annuqayah* limited its activity to religious teachings for its *santri* in the form of *sorogan* and *bandongan*. A change in the educational system occurred under the leadership of KH M Ilyas Syarqawi (1917-1959) who established the *Madrasah Ibtidaiyyah Annuqayah* (MIA) for male *santri* under the classical (*madrasi*) system. The *madrakah* eventually introduced non-religious subjects in 1935, enabling the *santri* to broaden their knowledge beyond religious studies. This educational system and curriculum was introduced by his son (KH Chozin Ilyas) who had been exposed to non-religious subjects such as Malay language, Maths, and History when he attended the *madrasi* system in the *Pesantren Tebu Ireng* of Jombang. In accordance with the establishment of the *madrakah* by the Department of Religious Affairs, and to enhance the educational level of the *santri*, the *Pesantren Annuqayah* also established *Madrasah Tsanawiyah* and *Madrasah Aliyah* (secondary level) in 1952 and 1967 respectively. *Santri* who wished to acquire an *ijazah negeri* (state educational certificate) were encouraged to sit a national examination coordinated by the Department of Religious Affairs. Since 1981, the *Pesantren Annuqayah* has been approved by this Department as the official venue for the national examination for the *santri* of *madrakah* in Sumenep District (Basyuni, 1985: 227).

Compared to male education, female education in Guluk-Guluk is far less advanced. This is due to the widespread Madura tradition of early marriage for girls at age 15-20, accompanied by a belief that female education is unimportant. The *Pesantren Annuqayah* instituted for female students *Ibtidaiyah* (primary level) education in 1950, *Tsanawiyah* in 1981 and *Aliyah* in 1984. It also increased social awareness of the importance of female education by highlighting religious injunctions that decreed acquiring knowledge was a religious obligation for both male and female Muslims. In 1984, the *Pesantren Annuqayah* also became a provider of tertiary education (Institute of Islamic Studies) with establishment of the Faculty of Islamic Law and Faculty of Islamic Education.

As local religious institution, the *Pesantren Annuqayah* is morally obliged to assist local people. When KH Syarqawi established this *pesantren*, he brought spiritual order to Guluk-Guluk society by offering religious services through *pengajian*, through which villagers could show their attachment to Islam. Towards the 1930s, this *pengajian* was attended not only by local people, but also by many social figures from other parts of Madura such as Sumenep and Pamekasan District. Through this *pengajian* the Islamic mysticism values such as *ikhlah* (sincerity), *sabar* (patience), *tawadhu'* (modesty) and *shidq* (trust) that underlie every activity of the *kyai* and the *santri*, were disseminated to the surrounding society. Such a world-view regarded all aspects of life as *ibadat* (worship) which must be conducted for the sake of God's blessing. This view was perpetuated further by the successors of *Kyai Syarqawi*¹, by offering not only the *pengajian* but also formal religious education to Guluk-Guluk society.

¹ For genealogy of the *kyai* of the *Pesantren Annuqayah* of Madura see annex 2

One of the most striking characteristics of Madurese society (including Guluk-Guluk) is their great obedience and respect towards the *kyai* as religious and informal leaders (LP3ES, 1979). For the villagers, great respect must be shown when encountering the *kyai*. Any villager riding a bicycle who encounters the *kyai* will stop and lower his or her gaze as a mark of respect. Similarly, when the *kyai* drives a car through the village, the villagers will step to one side of the road and look at the ground to show respect. Noting such phenomena, the *kyai* restricts his contact with the villagers, arguing that this “avoids embarrassing fellow villagers” (Mansurnoor, 1990: 353). However, the *kyai*'s relationship with his immediate assistants, close friends and clients (visitors) is more direct and personal, in contrast to his more impersonal relations with the villagers at large.

The *kyai*'s position surpasses that of government officials according to a Madurese proverb. This maxim states that there are four people in this life to whom the Madurese afford great respect and obedience: *Bapa, Babuh, Guruh, and Ratoh* (father, mother, religious teacher, and king) respectively. Obedience of the teacher (*ulama* or *kyai*) is thus placed after the father and mother, but is given priority over obedience of the *ratoh* (king). In the Madurese context, the *ratoh* is not a government official, but can be king, a descendant of a king or one of his aristocrats. Betraying any of these people will attract divine punishment in this life. As noted in Chapter 2, the *kyai*'s possession of religious knowledge, economic strength and charisma becomes an important feature of the *kyai*ship both in Java and Madura. However, in the case of Madura, the villagers' respect to the *kyai* is also influenced by historical factors. Mansurnoor (1990: 35-38) argues that during the nineteenth century, the *ratoh* was still popular among the people

of Madura as an independent, exemplary, and powerful leader. Nevertheless, the increasing subordination of the *ratoh* to the infidel (*kafir*) Dutch colonialism disillusioned local people and religious leaders. The people lost faith in the *ratoh*'s ability to provide protection against outside powers, including colonialism. Although the villagers embraced the positive aspects of Dutch colonialism, such as improved living conditions resulting from cultivation, production and land-ownership, they could not accept the subordination of their leader. In this legitimacy crisis, the people looked to the alternative authority figure, the *kyai*, to help in their idealistic struggle against colonialism. In fact, many *kyai* in Madura led the armed struggle against the Dutch such as KH Abdullah Sajjad from the *Pesantren Annuqayah* was killed in the conflict in 1948 (Basyuni, 1985: 225). It should be noted, however, that the popularity of the *kyai* dates from the early Islamisation period in the region and the *ratoh*' legitimacy crisis simply strengthened the *kyai*'s perceived position as an independent and powerful leader in Madurese society.

The *kyai*'s prominent position makes him a patron for society, and Madurese people are encouraged to consult him in the face of both religious and non-religious problems. Visitors from different parts of the region bring news to the *kyai* that affords him great social insight, and consolidates his position as a source of diverse and important information. The people accept new inventions or programs only after the *kyai* has issued *fatwa* or religious justification for them. Accordingly, government officials in Madura always engage the *kyai* to ensure the success of development programs, including family planning, transmigration, and agriculture. Moreover, the *kyai*'s crucial

role is apparent in the case of *carok*² resolution. It is usual for a humiliated person to seek revenge on the individual responsible for their humiliation, but an influential *kyai* can prevent *carok* for some villagers (Mansurnoor, 1990: 221, 358-360).

When the *Pesantren Annuqayah* started its involvement in participatory development in 1980s, Guluk-Guluk society was not economically prosperous. Guluk-Guluk is situated in hilly terrain in an unfertile limestone landscape. Agriculture is challenging in this environment, and farmers rely on rainy season deluges to water their crops. Nonetheless, the agricultural sector (tobacco cultivation and *polowijo*, or short term plants such as peanut and corn) provides the main livelihood of 63% of villagers. Cultivating tobacco is financially hazardous for farmers—they are attracted by the chance to become rich when prices are high, but they risk ruin if tobacco prices drop drastically. The price of tobacco responds to market prices, fluctuating between Rp.40,000 and 150,000 per quintal. The farmers are not able to sell their tobacco directly to the market; rather they must sell it to *tengkulak* (brokers) who resell it to the cigarette factories in Java. The *tengkulak* tend to seek substantial gains from these transactions at the expense of farmers' profit margins.

Despite such fluctuations in profitability, villagers persist in cultivating tobacco because it generates the main source of income for many families. This activity requires significant injection of cash capital at the start of the cultivation season for buying seeds and fertilizers. Given the financially vulnerable position of tobacco farmers, it is not surprising that in Guluk-Guluk there are money-lenders providing loans at exorbitant

² *Carok* is a culturally sanctioned form of violence to settle accounts that could involve the entire core of kinsmen. When a man's honor (especially related to family, women, and public reputation) is transgressed, he will kill the transgressor, either alone or with his kinsmen. In return, the relatives of the victims may take revenge against the killers. For further elaboration about *carok* see Wiyata (2002).

interest rates--sometimes more than 30% monthly. The practice of *gadai tanah* (agricultural land pawning) is also attested, resulting in social conditions that allow the economically strong, such as landholders, to dominate and exploit the weak and the poor. According to the 1985 village census, most people living in Guluk-Guluk were surviving under the poverty line with annual incomes between Rp.75,000 and Rp.105,000. Their agricultural land holdings amounted to an average 0.2 hectare per family.³

The *Pesantren Annuqayah* consider that their conventional *dakwah* (*dakwah bil maqal*) is to strengthen Muslims' belief by giving them religious advice, and performing prayers. However, this is restricted to the spiritual sphere, and is not considered to be an effective solution to villagers' problems that are derived from ill-fated social and economic situations. The *pesantren* sought an effective solution to such problems by concentrating its efforts on social activities within its religious framework. In this context, participatory development was strategically ideal.

4.2. Participatory Development as *Dakwah Bil Hal*

Participatory development has become an important conduit for provision of organised social services to the constituents of the *Pesantren Annuqayah*. Unlike other local organisations, which conduct participatory development programs without modification, the *Pesantren Annuqayah* has to translate it into Islamic terms, namely, *dakwah bil hal and fakku raqabah* or *'Itqu raqabah*. The *dakwah bil hal* refers to the

³ Guluk-Guluk is 1,667 hectares wide, and inhabited by 10,150 people. Of the population, more than 55% have never attended school, 8% have not finished primary school, more than 35% finished primary school and less than 2% completed secondary and tertiary schools. Most of the villagers (64%) are farmers owning 0.2 hectare of land. Civil servants, traders, and others comprise 2%, and the remainder is unemployed (see *Pesantren Annuqayah, Satu Abad Pesantren Annuqayah*, PPAN Press, 1997).

transformation of Islamic teachings from religious sermons into social activities, whereas *fakku raqabah* or *'Itqu raqabah* refers to freedom of Muslims from slavery. It is mentioned in one verse of the *Qur'an*⁴ that the greatest social activity a Muslim can undertake is to free someone from slavery, as the Prophet Muhammad did many times throughout his life. Slaves are freed by paying a specific sum of money to their owners. The *pesantren* equated the notion of 'freeing people from slavery' with 'freeing people from the poverty trap', thus contextualising the social issue within Islamic religious teaching. In short, participatory development is employed by the *Pesantren Annuqayah* to translate Islamic teachings into social activities that assist villagers to solve their own problems (Basyuni, 1985: 234). Accordingly, implementing participatory development becomes a part of the *ibadat* (worship) that can attract rewards in the hereafter. This process characterises the *kyai* as a 'cultural broker' (as coined by Geertz 1960): the *kyai* translates the values of modernisation into Islamic terms to make them comprehensible for the *pesantren* and surrounding society, whilst maintaining existing values.

The integration of participatory development is signified by the establishment of BPM PPA (*Biro Pengabdian Masyarakat Pondok Pesantren Annuqayah*, Society Service Bureau) in April 1979 under the leadership of *Kyai* A Basith and *Ustadz* (the *pesantren* teacher) Syafi'i Anshary. According to *Ustadz* Panji Taufiq (former chief of BPM in 1993), the name of BPM had a different meaning from BPPM in other *pesantren*. *Pengabdian Masyarakat* (society service) in this context means that the *pesantren* as an institution was founded and grew in the village environment, and was

⁴*Sura* (chapter) *Al-Balad* (90: 11-18) "Yet he has not attempted the steep path. What will explain to you what the steep path is? It is to free a slave, to feed at a time of hunger an orphaned relative or a poor in distress, and to be one of those who believe and urge one another to steadfastness and compassion" (Haleem, 2005: 422).

morally obliged to assist the villagers in solving their problems. It should be noted, however, that in the BPM the role of the *kyai* is important. Many *kyai* that became chiefs of BPM, such as KH Tsabit Khazin and KH A Hamidi Hasan, were also of the *pesantren* family. Moreover, the senior *kyai* became advisers in the BPM. In later developments, although BPM was led by senior *santri* (*ustadz*) such as Panji Taufiq, programs had to be approved by the *kyai* before being implemented. In this institution, staff, with approval from the senior *kyai* in the *pesantren*, had authority to manage participatory development in Guluk-Guluk. This authority extended to the establishment of cooperative relationships with external NGOs (funding agencies).

Despite some criticisms from the *kyai* outside the *Pesantren Annuqayah*, BPM considered cooperation with NGOs such LP3ES to be compatible with the purpose of *dakwah bil hal*. Some *kyai* in Madura argued that LP3ES and many NGOs were not simply linked to the secular ideas of participation, egalitarianism and democracy, but that they had connections to foreign funding agencies. Therefore, cooperation of BPM *Annuqayah* with NGOs would make them complicit in soliciting funding from perceived 'anti-Muslim' Western countries. However, BPM staff such as *kyai* A. Basith and *Ustadz* Syafi'i Anshary believed acceptance of such funding could be justified on religious grounds, as long as it was granted for humanitarian, rather than political, reasons. They supported their stance with a *hadith* (the Prophet tradition) stating that the Prophet had eaten foods sent by faithless people (*Majusi*). The Prophet said "Look at this *halal* (lawful) food and do not ask from whom it came" (Effendy, 1990: 71-73). For the BPM staff, the social benefits of funding outweighed any concerns about its origins. Moreover, the *Pesantren Annuqayah* and LP3ES were mutually cooperative in working

towards a shared vision: a commitment to develop rural society through a participatory model which also became the purpose of *dakwah bil hal* of the *pesantren*. For their part, LP3ES could use its conceptual and technical skills to formulate development concepts, offer consultation, and source funding. As a complement, the *pesantren*'s influence on rural society could facilitate implementation of such development programs.

The justifications offered for participatory development show that *pesantren* society and the *kyai* are concerned with the pragmatism of development theories, and can direct them to achieve their own purposes. For the *kyai*, as long as the concept of participatory development is justified by *pesantren* values (Islamic teachings), and is useful in assisting the villagers to solve their problems, it will be accepted. The *pesantren* then uses participatory development to enhance its social role and build its prestige.

4.3. Pengajian and the Kyai's Authority in Participatory Development

Rather than building a new institution to organise the villagers, Basith and Anshary viewed the *kelompok pengajian*⁵ (religious congregation) as an appropriate forum to stimulate people participation in development. The *pengajian* are existing social groups with deep roots in Guluk-Guluk village that date from the 1920s, when the founder of the *pesantren* instituted the first of such congregations. *Pengajian* are held weekly, fortnightly, or monthly and are attended by most members of the village, especially men and adults. Participants are drawn from all social levels: from religious and village figures to ordinary people. Every member takes a turn to host the *pengajian*. Usually there is one *pengajian* in every *dukuh* (hamlet); however, some *dukuh*, such as

⁵ *Pengajian* are informally organised religious courses that are usually held on a regular basis (weekly) in mosques, or in private houses after evening prayers. In Guluk-Guluk, most *kyai* have their own *kelompok pengajian* in their *dukuh* (sub-village).

dukuh Daleman and Central Guluk-Guluk, have two or three groups in response to increased participant numbers. At the end of 1979, there were 15 *pengajian* comprised of 60 members each (Effendy, 1990: 91-92). When participatory development was being promoted in Guluk-Guluk, some *kyai* (such *Kyai* Tsabit Khazin in *dukuh* Daleman) established new *pengajian* for youth. One of these, *Remaja Talang Putra* (*Talang* Male Youth Group), comprised around 100 members who convened religious gatherings to promote people participation.

Such *pengajian* provide participants with religious knowledge, spiritual satisfaction, meaning, hope and security (*keselamatan*). As *pengajian* are primarily religious forums, the villagers always participate in chants (*tahlil*⁶ and Qur'anic verses) that are performed under the leadership of the *kyai* or *ustadz* (the *pesantren* teacher) from the *Pesantren Annuqayah*. These forums are followed by religious sermons delivered by the *kyai*; however, he may authorise senior *santri* or the *ustadz* to lead on his behalf, if they have sufficient Islamic knowledge. In their capacity as proxies of the *kyai*, they serve as religious teachers who are authorised to offer spiritual guidance to the local people. Given the religious authority of the *kyai* in such forums, the villagers follow what they say, and believe that the *kyai* will not mislead them.

The benefits of the *pengajian* extend to increased communication and greater solidarity among the villagers. As noted by Mansurnoor (1990: 183-184), the main attraction of the *pengajian* is not simply gaining divine rewards by reciting the *Qur'an* and other chanting, as these are activities that could easily be undertaken at home. Rather, the opportunities for involvement in social cooperation, communication and recreation are also recognised and valued by participants.

⁶ *La Ilaaha Illa Allah* (There is no god but Allah)

To support the promotion of participatory development, the *Pesantren Annuqayah* capitalised on the authority and influence of non-formal leaders of every *dukuh* by establishing the *pengajian kader* (cadre *pengajian*). This weekly *pengajian* is held in the *pesantren* complex on Friday nights, and is intended for specific groups: leaders of *dukuh pengajian*, non-formal figures from the *dukuh*, and some senior *santri*. These individuals are motivated to promote participatory development in their groups in the *dukuh*. Membership of this *pengajian* is a source of pride--their presence at the *pesantren* is subject to invitation from the *kyai*, and they feel that they were more important in their *dukuh*. The *pesantren* then utilises these individuals for promotion of participatory development. Like the usual *pengajian*, this forum also employs Islamic injunctions to raise members' awareness of particular social problems.

Bearing in mind that participatory development is considered as *ibadat*, it is not surprising that the *kyai* in the *Pesantren Annuqayah* are deeply involved in promoting it to their followers. At the outset, Basith made use of the *kyai*'s authority in disseminating participatory development through the *pengajian*. He realised that in a paternalistic society like Madura, it is uncommon for young *kyai* to deliver messages with a radical social change agenda. Traditionally, only senior *kyai* with many years' experience in interacting with villagers would introduce new ideas.⁷ The younger *kyai* in the *pesantren* Basith would simply assist senior *kyai* in explaining these ideas, and only add limited additional information related to participatory development.⁸

⁷ Participatory development is considered to be a new concept despite the long-established tradition of the *pesantren* providing social services to its community. However, the method of planning, implementation and evaluation, and cooperation with NGOs and foreign funding agencies had not previously been a part of *pesantren* society. Therefore, dissemination of the program to the villagers using religious justification had to be initiated by senior *kyai*.

⁸ Among the *kyai* who actively disseminated participatory development were *Kyai Waqiq Chazin* of Central Guluk-Guluk, *Kyai Noor Sidqy* of *dukuh Klabaan*, and *Kyai Tsabit Chazin* of East Guluk-

To motivate villagers to participate in development, and to increase their work ethic, the *kyai* employ Islamic teachings in the *pengajian*. Through *ceramah* (one-way religious sermons, rather than dialogue) the *kyai* raise local people's awareness of their socio-economic situation. Factors besetting their life, such as low income, lack of education, and lack of motivation to increase social prosperity, are highlighted through religious doctrine. For example, the *kyai* motivate people to participate in development programs by interpreting religious principles, such as the concept of *takdir* (destiny, fate), in the framework of *Ahlu Sunnah wal Jama'ah* ideology. Guluk-Guluk villagers interpret the *takdir* as the fixed and unchangeable stipulation of God about their fate in this life and in the hereafter, and they are obliged to work as hard as they can. Such a stipulation cannot be changed by human beings. Thus it is commonplace for them to acknowledge hardships or failure with the utterance, "I am poor and others are rich due to God's *takdir*, I am jobless due to the *takdir*, and that I will be in the hell is also destined by God." This fatalistic understanding of the *takdir* leads to a weak work ethic in this life. A Madurese proverb articulates this resignation to fate: "*Mon Pangeran aberri' sagentang, ta' kerah alle du gentang*" (If God gives us one thing, it will not change to two things) (Hasan, 1994: 235).

BPM staff and the *kyai* of the *Pesantren Annuqayah* have attempted to remedy this situation by introducing the 'right' interpretation of *takdir*, transforming it from passive and fatalistic to active and characterised by free will. They find support for this change in *Qur'anic* verses, such as "...God does not change the condition of the people

Guluk. These *kyai* had hundreds of *pengajian* members in their *dukuh*. Their authority increased the ease of dissemination and implementation of participatory development programs.

[for the worse] unless they change what is in themselves...”.⁹ The *kyai* emphasise that *takdir* is determined by people’s efforts; if the people work hard, employing good methods, technologies and prayers, they may achieve favourable results (Hasan, 1994: 237).

The *kyai* also promote learning *kitab kuning*¹⁰ in the *pengajian* to encourage participation. This is achieved by linking the contents of the *kitab kuning* to principles of development programs. For example, when the *pengajian* are studying the types of pure water used for pre-prayer ablutions in the *kitab kuning*, the *kyai* relate this to the importance of providing villagers with a good water supply¹¹. He then explains that the Prophet tradition outlines six activities that attract rewards for their doers in both this life and in the life after death. These are: (i) imparting useful knowledge to humanity; (ii) providing clean water for the public interest; (iii) digging a well for the public interest; (iv) planting trees for the benefit of other people; (v) giving charity in the form of Al-Qur’an for readers; and (vi) offering of pious prayers by children for their deceased parents. *Ustadz* Anshary notes that if this religious precept is read by the *kyai* to the villagers, they are obliged to participate in water supply programs. There is no answer from the villagers but *sam’an wa tha’atan, sami’na wa atha’na* (we listen, and we obey).

BPM *Annuqayah* also uses the *pengajian* to educate villagers about ‘modern’ agricultural technologies. A guide from the Department of Agriculture is invited to the

⁹ *Sura* (chapter) *Al-Ra’du* (13: 11). See Haleem (2005: 154).

¹⁰Such as *Kifayatul Akhyar and Adzkiya’* (Islamic Jurisprudence books). For an explanation of the *kitab kuning* see Chapter 2.

¹¹ At that time, water supply was one of development programs conducted by the *Pesantren Annuqayah*.

pengajian to explain ‘modern’ techniques for improving farmers’ crops.¹² Local farmers are encouraged to attend at the *kyai*’s invitation, and come willingly to listen, and learn how to implement agricultural guidance from the officials. The same farmers are usually reluctant to accept invitations to agricultural forums organised by officials outside the *pengajian*. A Department of Agriculture guide who was in charge in Guluk-Guluk stated that “Before the establishment of BPM *Annuqayah*, the agricultural guidance we gave to the farmers was absurd, because people were in despair about the condition of the land in this region. They believed more strongly in traditional methods, inherited from past experiences, than what the officials said” (quoted in Hasan, 1994: 240).

Having raised the people’s awareness, the BPM *Annuqayah* intensified *bhek-rembhek* --deliberative discussions held after the religious sermon sessions in the *pengajian* to solve social problems. Members of this *bhek-rembhek* participate in identifying and planning development programs; therefore, the *pengajian* group provides opportunities for people participation above its religious function. Before the adoption of participatory development in the *Pesantren Annuqayah*, the *bhek-rembhek* was incidental activity which was held by the villagers to respond to specific problems. However, since the *pesantren Annuqayah* integrated participatory development, the *bhek-rembhek* has become a regular activity after every religious sermon.

The *bhek-rembhek* session commences with a cup of coffee or tea, and snacks provided by the host of the *pengajian*. This marks the end of the religious aspect of the *pengajian* to which the rituals and sermons belong. The *bhek-rembhek* session is

¹²For example, the farmers were advised to vary the plants they grow according to three patterns: pattern 1 (corn-nuts-tobacco), pattern 2 (corn-nuts-nuts), and pattern 3 (*gogo* paddy-cassava). They were also advised to use chemical fertilizer. This was very different from their established custom of planting tobacco in one season and corn in the next.

followed by an address by the *pengajian* leader, who invites BPM staff to present alternative solutions to the social and economic problems of the village. The BPM staff and the *dukuh* figures have previously discussed such problems in the cadre *pengajian* held in the *pesantren*. Here, the *dukuh* figures present problems they have identified, and discuss alternative solutions with the BPM staff. The *bhek-rembhek* in the *pengajian dukuh* is intended to socialise the villagers, and encourage their suggestions and criticism. If the villagers agree with the proposed programs, the session is continued to plan implementation activities.

As a social institution, the *bhek-rembhek*, in principle, accommodates all village members' aspirations; it gives all villagers an equal opportunity to express their willingness, ideas, thoughts, criticism and suggestions. However, the *bhek-rembhek* tends to be dominated by a small group of people comprising important figures in the village, such as *pengajian* leaders, and educated and wealthy people. Their participation in this forum, as noted by *Ustadz* Anshary, is considered to be 'creative participation.' This term alludes to involvement of local people in the *bhek-rembhek* forum, and program implementation that is based on both the awareness of the meaning of the program, and on the willingness to sustain the programs. In this regard, *Ustadz* Anshary noted that "what we want is the growth of creative participation from all members of society; therefore, they can become independent. Unfortunately, the number of such groups is very limited".¹³

In the *bhek-rembhek*, involvement of ordinary people (*wong cilik*) who do not have a good education, social position or economic prosperity can be characterised as passive participation. These people comprise the majority of *pengajian* members. In

¹³ Interview with *Ustadz* Syafi'i Anshari 17 December 2007

forums in which the *kyai* attends, they are reluctant to express what they want, to give ideas, advice or expression, and they tend to obey and help implement decisions made at those times. They are regarded as ‘little people’ who are unable to speak in public forums such the *pengajian*. They do not have the bravery to look directly at the face of the *kyai*, let alone to criticise him, or other leading figures. *Kyai* Tsabit Chozin recognised that this is an expression of the hierarchical social structure of the Madurese people. In social interactions with respected people such as the *kyai*, *ustadz*, and officials, ordinary people (*wong cilik*, *oring kenek*) must show great respect. This custom extends into the *pengajian* and the *bhek-rembhek* forum; accordingly, they tend to say “yes” to what the *kyai* says (Effendy, 1990: 104).

Figure 1. The Relations among the BPM *Annuqayah*, *Pengajian Kader* and *Pengajian Dukuh*




Figure 1 shows that the importance of the senior *kyai* position is based on their sole authority to approve programs. The BPM, in which many *junior kyai*, *ustadz* and senior *santri* may become prominent staff, is always subordinate to the senior *kyai*. The BPM also ask the senior *kyai* to motivate the people in the *pengajian kader* and the *pengajian dukuh*.

From the above explanation, it is clear that the *kyai* and BPM staff dominate the process of facilitation, from problem identification to program planning based on the village data they have. To get the village data, however, the *kyai* and BPM staff (as facilitators) do not undertake ‘scientific research’ as required by LP3ES.¹⁴ Despite the fact that they do not undertake such research, the data they have, to some extent, is more accurate than that obtained through such research. As informal leader of the village, the *kyai* constitutes a bank of village data: he has the most detailed picture of the village and of the villagers’ character and personality. He understands the problems faced by villagers better than anyone else, because he receives people from all levels of society in the daily counselling sessions he provides. The local people seek advice from the *kyai* on a range of problems, from religious matters, to the most private problems affecting all aspects of their life. In return, the *kyai* offers suggestions, and prescribes treatments as alternative solutions to their problems. The *kyai*’s advice is drawn from a large information base: he obtains news and information from outside the village when visitors from other parts of Madura Island consult him about their problems. Moreover, the *kyai* is familiar with political and social development at national and regional levels through the *pesantren* network and *Nahdhatul Ulama* (NU). Therefore, it is not

¹⁴ LP3ES (through LTPM I) requires *pesantren* facilitators to conduct ‘scientific’ research to understand village data.

surprising that Horikoshi (1976: 8) labels the *kyai* as a better anthropologist than the professionals that observe him and his village.

In such circumstances, the *kyai* in Madura enable accurate mapping of the problems faced by villagers, and can propose a range of possible solutions. In accordance with the idea of participatory development, however, the *kyai* of Madura discuss such village problems with the informal leaders of every *dukuh* to cross check the accuracy of data, and discuss alternative solutions with them. This ensures that the proposed programs correctly address society's real problems. This proposal is also disseminated to local people through existing social institutions (*pengajian/bhek-rembhek*) to let the people provide input, to finalise plans and to arrange the implementation of development programs.

4.5. Some Development Programs in the *Pesantren Annuqayah*

During intense cooperation between the BPM and LP3ES, there was a number of development programs conducted in Guluk-Guluk.¹⁵ One of these was *simpan pinjam* (saving and loan) developed to fulfill farmers' needs for fertilizer. However, the concerns of the BPM *Annuqayah* quickly extended beyond this to the tradition of borrowing money with high interest rate from the moneylenders, and did this without sparking a conflict of interest between the moneylenders, the *pesantren* and society. However, although the savings and loans largely succeeded in eradicating the practice of money lending in Guluk-Guluk, the people participation is limited in the program implementation. The program initiation, planning and evaluation are still in the hand of the BPM and non-formal figures.

¹⁵ See annex 1

In Guluk-Guluk society, the practice of borrowing sums of money from moneylenders was very common. This money was often borrowed to cover the costs of mortuary rituals (*selamatan*) for family members, or of daughters' wedding ceremonies. Money was also used to meet costs of tobacco cultivation, such as buying seeds and fertilizers annually. These costs were incurred by Guluk-Guluk farmers, who each have on average only 0.2 hectare of agricultural land. Although the government provided KMKP (Permanent Small Capital Credit) with a 1.5 % interest rate monthly to the farmers, the complex application procedure meant it was rarely utilised. As noted by Mansurnoor (1990: 166), to receive this financial assistance, the farmers were required to submit a proposal to the village head, who then handed it to the sub-district head. This process took a long time, and the farmers were required to pay administration fees to the village head. The loan was often granted to farmers after the cultivation had begun. Moreover, the farmers had difficulty in repaying the loan according to the determined schedule due to their high dependency on rainfall. Therefore, the farmers preferred loans from local moneylenders, who were mostly village figures in Guluk-Guluk. These provided loans at short notice and without complex application procedures, but with exorbitant monthly interest rates of 20-30%. The moneylenders also monopolised supplies of fertilizer when they knew it was required for tobacco cultivation. Many farmers were forced to pawn their gold and cows to get cash and fertilizers, which would be paid for at massively inflated rates after the crop was harvested. For example, if the farmers took fertilizer on credit at Rp15, 000/quintal from the money lenders, they had to repay Rp.60,000 /quintal within 4 months.

In an effort to eradicate such practices, the BPM *Annuqayah* proposed the savings and loans program to six *pengajian* groups in *dukuh* Minuwih, Congaban, Guluk-Guluk Tengah, Daleman Barat, Daleman Timur and cadre *pengajian*. According to *Ustadz* Anshary, this program was initially intended to guarantee the *pengajian* members money for a death fund (*dana kematian*); hence increasing solidarity among the villagers. To avoid undesirable confrontations with the moneylenders, the BPM recruited them as members of the *pengajian* in their *dukuh*, and gave them important roles. This effectively increased the prestige of moneylenders: to those who were wealthy people and figures within the *dukuh*, recruitment to the *pengajian*, with potential to become its leader, was an honour bestowed by the *kyai* and the *pesantren*.

The BPM educated these non-formal leaders about the *dana kematian* saving program; however, *Ustadz* Anshary never informed them that eventually the program would provide for farmers' fertilizer needs leading up to the tobacco season. Therefore, the moneylenders in the *pengajian* did not realise that such a program would eventually reduce their financial gains from fertilizer credits and money lending. The savings and loans program was then socialised to the members of the *pengajian* through the *bhek-rembhek* to get approval, and seek suggestions from the members on issues such as the amount of money the members should lend and borrow. The BPM also explained that such a program would ease the people's burden in getting financial support to fund the death ceremony. Having understood the benefit of the program as it was proposed by the BPM, and in light of its support from the *kyai*, members of the *pengajian* easily accepted it, and agreed to gather a specific sum of money every month. In the program initiated in 1978, each member of the *pengajian* was required to pay a Rp100 registration fee, and

an additional voluntary donation depending on their financial capacity. The members who did not have a great deal of money usually contributed around Rp10 and Rp30. In contrast, the wealthy villagers' monthly voluntary donations could reach Rp200.

Towards tobacco cultivation season of 1978, the *pengajian* had accumulated a huge sum of money, but nobody had drawn on it as a death fund, because at that time there had been no deaths in the village. *Ustadz* Anshary describes how he discussed with the *pengajian* leaders the use of the money to buy fertilizer to fulfil farmers' needs. Because the size of the *pengajian* death fund was still insufficient to buy fertilizer for all members, the *Pesantren Annuqayah* lent some money to the *pengajian* groups—totalling approximately half of the required money. At that time, there were 1.2 tonnes of available fertilizer which were given to six *pengajian* groups whose members were tobacco farmers. Unlike the charitable death fund, the fertilizer credit had to be repaid after the crop at a rate of Rp8,500/quintal--Rp.2500/quintal higher than market price. However, this premium was much lower than that demanded by money lenders, who charged more than 50% above market price for fertilizer credit. In accordance with the agreement among the *pengajian* members, the margin of fertilizer profit was shared between three parties: 5% for the supplier, 45% for the *pengajian* to fund fertilizer purchase for the next season, and 50% for the death fund. In 1979, the amount of fertilizer lent to the farmers increased to 8.5 tonnes, which was distributed to the same *pengajian* groups. In this year, the *pengajian* groups' contribution was Rp.105,000, and the *BPM Annuqayah* was Rp.245,000 (Effendy, 1990: 78). The increase in demand for fertilizer from other *pengajian* groups caused *BPM* to increase the availability of fertilizer to 10 tonnes in the cultivation season of 1980. However, from mid-1981, the

BPM *Annuqayah* appointed some *pengajian* groups to be co-operatives, offering fertilizer credits for their members. This was because some *pengajian* had enough savings to get fertilizer credit without financial assistance from the *pesantren*. According to *Ustadz* Anshary, in 1984 many *pengajian* groups achieved self-reliance in fulfilling their members' fertilizers needs.

The BPM launched a successful program to overcome a persistent water problem in Guluk-Guluk and its surrounding villages. In 1979, the *pesantren* drilled a well in its complex to fulfil its own water needs, and the needs of its society. Due to a surplus of water from this well, and demand for water elsewhere, the *pesantren* distributed the excess to Daleman *dukuh* with financial support from UNICEF in 1983. The water supply project was also extended to villages outside Guluk-Guluk District, including Rembang *dukuh*, four kilometres away from the *pesantren*. To get clean water, the villagers had to walk to a spring in a small hill two kilometres away. They were also required to allocate time early in the morning to get the water. It is not surprising that this process resulted in frequent conflict among the villagers. An effort to find a closer source of clean water was made by the villagers, who dug their own well, around 17 meters deep. However, this well failed to yield a single drop of water, creating a sense of hopelessness among the villagers. Knowing that the BPM had successfully implemented a water supply project, village non-formal leaders, who were also *pesantren* graduates and leaders of the *pengajian* groups, asked the BPM to assist them in developing a water supply project. Based on the calculations of BPM and non-formal figures, the spring located in the hill could be tanked and distributed to villagers' houses. However, this

project could not be implemented without the villagers' support—an issue that was discussed in the *bhek-rembhek* forum held within the *pengajian*.

With the cooperation of LP3ES and the Canadian Embassy in Jakarta, the BPM could source funding to buy water pipes, but this was insufficient to finance construction, and BPM had to bear the additional costs. To meet this shortfall, every household agreed to contribute between Rp.20,000 and Rp.50,000 (repayable within six months), and to provide manpower and equipment. In the construction phase the BPM utilised technological skills acquired from LP3ES training, such as the ability to make water tanks from Ferro cement. Together with the villagers, the *pesantren* built pipes to transport clean water to the village. Once this supply network was established, the villagers set up HIPAM (Association for Water Users) to ensure good distribution of water was maintained. The water supply program was also implemented in other villages with the same problems, such as Pekamban Daya, Pekamban Laut, Pragaan daya, Pekambangan Barat, Moncek Timur, and Sera Timur.

Another development program initiated by the BPM *Annuqayah* was the eradication of *tanah gadai* (agricultural land pawning). In Guluk-Guluk, the practice of *gadai* was very common among poor tobacco farmers. Like the money lending scheme, the *gadai* was also intended to cover the cost of death ceremonies (*selamatan*), wedding ceremonies and tobacco cultivation. The *gadai* tradition was initiated by agreement between the landowner (the farmer) and the moneylender. In this agreement the landowners were given around Rp800,000 to Rp1,000,000 per hectare in return for pawning their land to the moneylender until the landowners were in a position to redeem their land. There was no interest on this transaction; however, the right of land use and

crop yields belonged to the moneylender during the pawning period. As there was no fixed timetable for the end of the *gadai*, the farmers were free to redeem their land whenever they were able to repay the money. However, small farmers whose sole source of income was the pawned land were unlikely to possess the means to repay their debt and redeem their land. To make matters worse, they were often forced to ask for additional money from the same moneylender to fulfil their daily needs. This significantly increased the amount of money needed to redeem their land. According to the BPM *Annuqayah*, until mid-July 1985, there were at least 60 lots of pawned agricultural land in Guluk-Guluk.

To eradicate the *gadai* tradition, in 1982 the BPM *Annuqayah* redeemed four pieces of agricultural land from the moneylenders and gave them back to two farmers. However, this type of program was a kind of charity intended to lighten the people's burden. With financial assistance from LP3ES, the BPM redeemed the agricultural lands of eight farmers in 1984. Unlike the moneylenders, who took the right of land and its crop, the BPM gave the right of land cultivation and its crop back to the farmers in a sharing system. The crop yield of land was shared: 50% for the farmers, and 50% for BPM as repayment for the land. It was hoped that after a couple of years, agricultural land ownership would be in the hands of farmers. However, the program failed and only one farmer successfully repaid the money and re-owned his land. The rest of the farmers were unable to repay 50% of the crop, and some exacerbated their problems by re-pawning their land to moneylenders outside Guluk-Guluk village. They pawned their land secretly to avoid the attention of the *Pesantren Annuqayah*. According to *Ustadz*

Anshary, the failure of this program was due to incurrence of unpredictable expenses such as school fees for their children.

4.6. Participatory Development and Social Position of the *Pesantren Annuqayah*

The implementation of development programs in the village such savings and loans, water supply, and abolition of the *gadai* system have made the villagers indebted to the *Pesantren Annuqayah*. They recognise that the *pesantren* has assisted them by relieving their burdens and solving their problems. In return, the villagers are willing and ready to support and help relieve the *pesantren* of its own burdens. This is demonstrated in the building of the *pesantren* facilities. The *Pesantren Annuqayah* calls upon *pengajian* leaders and wealthy villagers to assist in construction and enlargement of *pesantren* facilities, such as *madrasah* (schools), dormitories, and offices. *Pengajian* leaders ask the members to help the construction process by making certain contributions, ranging from material contribution of sand, bricks, stones, and wood; to manpower supply, including carpenters and bricklayers; to providing food for workers. The wealthiest villagers contribute a huge sum of money to these construction efforts. They have also formed a committee which is responsible for the accomplishment of the projects. Construction work is also supported by such *pengajian* groups outside Guluk-Guluk as those from Rembang village in Pragaan Daya District. Their willingness to be involved in such projects is stimulated by the villagers' indebtedness to the *Pesantren Annuqayah* for solving the water supply problem in their village. Voluntary participation in constructing *pesantren* facilities is regarded as the manifestation of the great gratitude of the villagers towards the *pesantren*.

Regarding such a phenomenon, one of the *kyai* explained that from 1980, the *pesantren* has had one building annually erected by village volunteers; the *pesantren* simply received the key upon completion and started to use the building facilities. In 1979, the *pesantren* only had 2 hectares to accommodate around 982 *santri*. After the *pesantren*'s initial involvement in development programs, its facilities increased gradually. In 1989, the *pesantren* comprised around 2,501 *santri*, and had an area of 5 hectares. Its facilities included 461 rooms for the *santri* dormitories, 45 school rooms, 2 mosques, 6 *mushalla* (small mosques), 1 hall, several offices and sport facility.

Observing such phenomena it is obvious that the *Pesantren Annuqayah* has utilised the villagers' resources for its own benefit, in return for initiating and conducting development programs. However, in the perspective of both wealthy and ordinary local villagers, assisting the *pesantren* is considered to increase the chance of receiving spiritual rewards, that is, *shadaqah jariyah* (never ending rewards) in the hereafter. Helping the *pesantren* will also attract the *kyai*'s blessing (*baraka*), which is very important in a villager's lifetime. In this context, the villagers also have their own leverage, not only in terms of material gains but also spiritual ones.

Apart from getting the *baraka*, the wealthy people who became the main supporters of the project have other motives in aligning themselves with the *kyai*; namely, to lower their materialistic profile among the villagers and to protect themselves from their neighbours' 'attacks'. In the village, the wealthy sometimes are considered as being less concerned with poor people needs and some of them are involved in the practice of money-lending to local people. These were vulnerable to hatred and criticism of their fellow villagers. To shield against such attacks, wealthy villagers offer gifts,

such as cash and material project contributions, to the *kyai* and share the benefits with him in preference to donating the funds to the poor. In this way they try to obfuscate their blatant pursuit of material rewards and self-enrichment. This process additionally offers a second layer of protection: any overtly negative attitude towards the *kyai's* wealthy followers could indirectly be understood to challenge the *kyai's* interests (cf. Mansurnoor, 1990: 225-332).

Participatory development has enhanced the reputation of the *Pesantren Annuqayah*: in 1981 the *pesantren* won the *Kalapataru Award* for its reforestation program conducted in Guluk-Guluk. This activity was carried out by the *pesantren* through employing its *santri* and other youth *pengajian* groups to plant one thousand trees in hilly areas. This effort was then extended by the local people through planting fruit trees in their yards. The *Kalpataru Award* is granted by the Indonesian government to individuals or groups who contribute to saving the environment within national development programs. Moreover, the numerous development programs conducted by this *pesantren* have increased the rank of Guluk-Guluk village from *Desa Swadaya* in 1978, to *Desa Swakarsa* in 1979 and to *Desa Swasembada* in 1982 (Basyuni, 1985: 235, 239). The *desa* classification system was created in 1972 by the Indonesian government to stimulate successful national development. At the first level is *Desa Swadaya* (traditional village), referring to a village in which people are strongly tied to local customs (traditionalism), economic conditions are only adequate to fulfil basic needs, productivity is low and its per capita income is below Rp12,000. At this level less than 30% of villagers have graduated from primary school. Furthermore, village infrastructure is very limited, impeding external communication. The second level is

Desa Swakarsa (Transitional village), in which traditional customs are in transition because of outside influences affecting the way villagers think. The village is introduced to technology and the average per capita income is Rp12,000. Between 30% and 60% of villagers have graduated from primary school at this level. The highest level is *Desa Swasembada* (developed village), and refers to villages where the traditional custom have little influence, the relationship among the people is rational and new agricultural technology is utilised to increase productivity. The per capita income of the villagers is Rp.17,000 and the percentage of people graduating from primary school exceeds 60%. In addition, improvements to village infrastructure increase the ease of external communication (Widodo, 2000: 103).

4.7. Conclusion

The integration of participatory development into the *pesantren* enabled it to pave the way towards delivery of social services to villagers in more organised way. This is achieved through applying religious justification to participatory development as *dakwah bilhal* (implementation of Islamic teachings in the social sphere), and as *ibadat* (worship) in which people conducting the programs will receive rewards in the hereafter.

It is clear that the role of *pesantren* figures such as *kyai*, the staff of BPM *Annuqayah*, and other non-formal leaders in the *dukuh* (sub-hamlet) was dominant in promoting participatory development. These figures identified local problems and potentials, and used the *bhek-rembhek* forum held within the *pengajian* to motivate people's participation and to plan development programs. They are also deeply involved in mobilizing local people to participate in the implementation process, which is the villagers' area of greatest contribution, despite their involvement in *bhek-rembhek*

forum. The domination of these figures is inseparable from characteristic Guluk-Guluk society, in which the *kyai* has a prominent position in patron-client relationships.

Although this domination is a matter of culture, however, it creates local people's indebtedness to the *pesantren*. The *pesantren*'s successful implementation of projects to address social and economic problems of the villagers, *Kalpataru* award it received, and the resultant enhanced status of Guluk-Guluk from *desa swadaya* to *desa swasembada* are testimony to the success of *Pesantren Annuqayah* in implementing development programs. The people's indebtedness to the *pesantren* as a result of these successes is exploited by the *pesantren*. The *pesantren* asked them to make contributions (materials, cash and manpower) towards the construction of *pesantren* facilities. For the villagers, such contributions are not considered a burden; rather, they represent a valuable opportunity to get the *kyai*'s *baraka*, and to attract eternal rewards in the hereafter (*al-shadaqah al-jariyah*). In this context, while participatory development gives the *pesantren* and local people an opportunity to develop their own participation process and to achieve sustainability, both the *pesantren* and the people also utilise it to address their own interests.


**Annex 1. Some Development Programs conducted by BPM *Annuqayah* of Madura
In Cooperation with LP3ES**

NO	ACTIVITY	YEAR	EXPLANATION
1	Fertilizer Supply	1978-1984	In 1984 most of groups were self reliant in fertilizer supply.
2	Mat Crafting	1978-1979	Failed due to inability to repay loans given by BPM, and absence of women facilitators.
3	Making fan palm sugar home industry	1982	Difficulties experienced in gaining raw material.
4	Roof Making Crafting	1983-1988	Succeeded in increasing the income of the craftsmen.
5	Reforestation	1979-1980	Succeeded in reforesting the barren hilly areas and local people's yards, leading to BPM being recognised with the <i>Kalpataru</i> Award.
6	Water supply	1979-1983	Expanding this program to three sub-districts outside Guluk-Guluk and supported by LP3ES, CIDA, IDEX, and UNICEF.
7	Appropriate Technology (Water pump, rope pump, hydrant pump, Ferro cement, energy saving stove)	1980	LP3ES initiatives and water pumps were utilized to support water supply programs.
8	Skills Training for <i>santri</i> (Library, printing, photography, typing, entrepreneurship)	1980-1986	Attended by <i>santri</i> from the <i>Pesantren Annuqayah</i> and from the surrounding <i>pesantren</i> . These activities were supported by LP3ES, The Asia Foundation, JIEC of Japan.

9	Community Health Program (Public well and toilet making)	1978-1980	BPM succeeded in changing defecation customs in the fields of the local people and encouraged them to utilise public toilets, and build their own at home.
10	Redemption of Pawned agricultural land	1982-1985	Failed. The farmers re-pawned their land to meet daily needs without BPM knowledge.
11	Literacy training for local people	1979-1981	Assisted the villagers to achieve a basic level of literacy.
12	Agricultural training in cooperation with Department of Agriculture	1985	Introduced agricultural technology to enhance crops.

Sources: BPM *Annuqayah* Document 1990

Annex 2. Genealogy of the *kyai* of the *Pesantren Annuqayah* of Madura



1. KH Muhammad Syarqawi
 - a. *Nyai Sabina* (KH Muhammad Syarqawi's first wife)
 - b. *Nyai Hirzin* (KH Muhammad Syarqawi's second wife)
 - c. *Nyai Khadijah* (KH Muhammad Syarqawi's third wife)
 - d. *Nyai Mariyah* (KH Muhammad Syarqawi's fourth wife)
 - e. *Nyai Sarbati* (KH Muhammad Syarqawi's fifth wife)
 - f. *Nyai Nurani* (KH Muhammad Syarqawi's sixth wife)

- c1. Shalihah
- c2. Zainal Abidin
- c3. Sa'duddin
- c4. Zubaidah
- c5. Rahmah
- c6. Jawahir
- c7. Yahya
- c8. Jauhar
- c9. Bukhari
- c10. M. Idris
- c11. As'ad
- c12. Qamariyah

- d1. M Yasin
- d2. M Ilyas
- d3. Abdullah Siradj
- d4. Abdullah Sajjad
- d5. Abdul Malik
- d6. Aisyah
- d7. Na'imah

g. *Nyai Arfiyah* (M Ilyas's wife)

- | | |
|----------------------|--------------------|
| d2g1. M Khazin Ilyas | d2g8. Hisyam |
| d2g2. Mahfuzhah | d2g9. Abdul Warits |
| d2g3. Shiddiqah | d2g10. Syifa |
| d2g4. Mamduhah | |
| d2g5. M Amir Ilyas | |
| d2g6. M Ashim Ilyas | |
| d2g7. Badi'ah | |

h. *Nyai Shafiyah*
(KH Abdullah Sajjad's first wife)

- d4h1. Maimunah
- d4h2. Mu'azhah
- d4h3. Ahmad Basyir
- d4h4. M Ishamuddin
- d4h5. Abdul Hafizh
- d4h6. Arifah
- d4h7. Abdullah Mujahid

i. *Nyai Aminah Azzahra'*
(KH Abdullah Sajjad's second wife)

- d4i1. Maftuhah
- d4i2. Abdul Basith
- d4i3. Zainab Khabirah

CHAPTER V
PARTICIPATORY DEVELOPMENT
IN *PESANTREN MASLAKUL HUDA* OF KAJEN PATI CENTRAL JAVA

This chapter will discuss the implementation of participatory development in the *Pesantren Maslakul Huda* of Kajen, Pati, Central Java. The first section will provide a brief description of the village of Kajen and the *Pesantren Maslakul Huda*. The second part deals with issues surrounding the implementation of participatory development in this *pesantren*, such as Islamic justification of the program, participatory action research and the KSM (*Kelompok Sawadaya Masyarakat*, self-help group) and development programs conducted by the *pesantren*.

It is argued that participatory development in the *Pesantren Maslakul Huda* has led to the creation of genuine participation in which local people are able to identify their own problems, potentials, and create alternative solutions. The role of the *kyai* in the *Pesantren Maslakul Huda* is limited to giving Islamic justification to the acceptance of participatory development, and program implementation is in the hands of senior *santri* and village facilitators. The use of participatory action research and the creation of KSM (the self-help group) as a people's forum enables them to express their own perspective on their problems without the *kyai's* interference. However, it is also argued that the *pesantren* utilises participatory development to enhance its economic position among the local people.

5.1. A Brief Description of Kajen Village and the *Pesantren Maslakul Huda*

The village of Kajen, one of 22 villages in Margoyoso sub-district, is situated around 18 km north of Pati District, Central Java. It extends over 63.460 hectares and has around 3,292 inhabitants. Unlike surrounding villages, Kajen does not have wet field cultivation (*sawah*) (Mudatsir, 1985: 197), which has led the villagers to pursue non-agricultural livelihoods such as trades and transportation services. Villagers working as farmhands and manual labourers in factories must work outside Kajen. Some of the villagers work in providing for the everyday and educational needs of *santri*, such as food and study equipment. To work as farmers, the villagers must rent farmland in surrounding villages. Burger (quoted in Dirdjosanjoto, 1999: 87) noted that the rental of farmland is commonplace for Kajen villagers. The richer villagers even purchase some farmlands as rental properties in neighbouring villages. The development of the tapioca industry in the neighbouring village of Ngemplak Kidul in the 1970s, however, led some villagers to establish tapioca crisp (*kerupuk*) home-industry. The product of this home-industry is sold both in local markets and to brokers who resell it outside Kajen.

Since the end of the 17th century Kajen¹ has been associated with the story of *Syaikh Ahmad Mutamakkin*, the founder of the village. He became a saint who had an important role in the development of Islam in this village and surrounding cities of the

¹As *perdikan* village, Kajen was not imposed with the obligation of paying tax to the government from the Dutch colonial period to 1958. In return, villagers were asked to maintain the mosque and the grave located in the village. They were also required to send four people to the district office for night watch, and provide eight people to carry water to the district head's (*bupati*) house. Furthermore, as *perdikan* village, the succession of the village head was not determined by village election but by inheritance, which had lasted until 1958 (Dirdjosanjoto, 1999: 66-67; Mufid, 2006: 93-94). Unlike other villages, which have *tanah bengkok* (village agricultural land given to the village head), in Kajen the village head does not get *tanah bengkok* due to the lack of *sawah*. As a result, village revenue is very limited. Only once a year, the village gets additional income from tax of trading, art performances, and other related activities during the *haul* of Mutamakkin celebration. Although there was a monthly salary for village administrators, it was insufficient to meet daily expenses.

north coast of Java.² He is said to be buried in a grave next to his mosque, situated in the west side of the village. This grave is highly respected by local people and almost every day there are visitors who come to seek *baraka*, or to offer prayers to God. In commemorating Mutamakkin, the villagers hold *haul*³ for him, the annual event on the 10th day of *Muharram* or *Syura* (the first Islamic month). This lasts for seven days and nights, and attracts thousands of visitors from different villages and cities on the north coast of Java. These visitors to Mutamakkin's grave and *haul* create economic opportunities for the villagers. *Santri* who have graduated from the *pesantren* also utilise the *haul* as an opportunity for reunion with fellow students, and to visit their *kyai*, in order to exchange information and to strengthen the teacher-disciple relationship.

In Kajen, the *kyai*,⁴ together with village administrators and wealthy people, are considered as *wong gedhe* (respected people), in contrast to *wong awam* (ordinary people). Even though the *kyai* is considered to be the most influential informal leader, the degree of their authority is determined by the strength of their relationship with

² The story of Mutamakkin is alive among the villagers. It was written in classical Javanese literature entitled *Serat Cebilek* (Kuntowijoyo, 1991). Mutamakkin who lived in the mid 18th century when the Mataram kingdom of Yogyakarta ruled the village was also a great *ulama* who was an expert in Islamic jurisprudence. His followers called him a saint (*waliyullah*).

³ *Haul* basically means the celebration to commemorate the day of someone's death. For respected people such as *kyai* and *wali* (saint), the celebration is conducted vigorously, and is characterised by the reading of *doa* (prayers), *khataman* (reciting a whole chapter of the *Qur'an*), and conveying religious sermons. The visitors believe that reading special chanting at Mutamakkin's grave can attract *baraka* (blessing), and ensure their prayers to God are answered. This belief is influenced by the teachings of *tasawwuf* (Islamic mysticism) that are embraced by the local people. To hold the *haul*, a village committee is formed to collect funds (cash, or foods) from the villagers. This is not a difficult activity, as the villagers believe that their contribution to such events will attract *baraka* and also symbolise the relationship between them and Mutamakkin (Dirdjosanjoto, 1999: 88-89).

⁴ One of villagers said that "the *kyai* has spiritual force and Islamic knowledge exceeding ordinary people. Mastering religious knowledge is not an easy matter. Many people become mad due to their inability to digest it. A *kyai*, he must be an extraordinary person because no single *kyai* is mad. He must have spiritual force above other people." (Dirdjosanjoto, 1999: 155-156)

Ahmad Mutamakkin.⁵ The *kyai* who have the closest relationship with Mutamakkin are at the top of the *wong gedhe* layer, and are respected by other *kyai*, wealthy people and bureaucrats. This phenomenon is inseparable from the influence of *thariqat* teachings embraced by Kajen villagers, who believe in the *karama* of Mutamakkin. For the *thariqah* followers, a saint such as Mutamakkin is still alive in another world even though he has died in this world. Therefore, in solving the problems of life, they always come to Mutamakkin's grave and ask for *baraka*. For example, a young educated *kyai* in Kajen whose son suffered from a severe illness which required surgery, visited Mutamakkin's grave to request *baraka* from him for his son.

Kajen is also known as *desa pesantren* (*pesantren* village) because there are fourteen *pesantren*⁶ in the village. Apart from the *pesantren*, Kajen also has other Islamic educational institutions: five *Madrasah Aliyah* (Senior High School), five *Madrasah Tsanawiyah* (Secondary School), six *Madrasah Ibtidaiyah* (Primary School), and two kindergartens. These educational institutions accommodate around 2345 male and female *santri* and employ 120 teachers, 22 of whom are *kyai* (Mudatsir, 1985: 197). The large number of *pesantren* can be attributed to three important factors. First, like other *kyai* in Java, the *kyai* in Kajen⁷ (i.e. the Mutamakkin family) pay great attention to their children's Islamic education so that they can assume *pesantren* leadership after their fathers. All the *kyai* in Kajen claim descent from Mutamakkin. KH Sahal Mahfudh,

⁵ Among *kyai* of Kajen there is a kinship system based on the descendants (*Bani*), namely *Bani Salam*, *Bani Nawawi*, and *Bani Sirat*. Each member of *Bani* is obliged to preserve his family identity, to maintain good relationships, and to help other members in all situations. These obligations are especially strong in respect to continuing their grandfather's mission to maintain and to develop Islamic values and education (Mufid, 2006: 113).

⁶ These *pesantren* are *Kulon Banon (TPH)*, *Taman Pendidikan Tamrinul Huda (TPH)*, *Mathali'ul Huda*, *Maslakul Huda*, *Pesantren Putri Al-Badi'iyah*, *Pesarean*, *Kauman Kretek*, *Asrama Pelajar Islam Kajen (APIK)*, *Permata*, *Raudhatul Ulum*, *Manbaul Ulum*, *Pesantren Putri Al-Inayah*, *Buludono* and *Polgarut Selatan*.

⁷ For genealogy of *kyai* in Kajen see annex 2

the *Pesantren Maslakul Huda* leader, is of the youngest or eighth generation. The second factor is that a newly established *pesantren* is regarded as the embodiment of the *amanah* (important message) of the *kyai* to his *santri* to continue the tradition of knowledge transmission. By observing this, the existence of the *pesantren* will always be maintained; therefore, if an old *pesantren* collapses, a new one will replace it. The third and final factor influencing the increase of *pesantren* in Kajen is a *pesantren* regulation requiring *santri* who come from places five kilometres outside the complex to live in dormitories, either inside or outside the *pesantren*. The increasing number of *santri* living outside has led to the transformation of their dormitories into new *pesantren* (Mudtasir, 1985: 204-205).

The *Pesantren Maslakul Huda*, one of a number of *pesantren* participating in the LP3ES program, was established by KH Abdussalam and his son KH Mahfudz in 1910. This *pesantren* initially focused on *kitab kuning*. Two years later, KH Abdussalam and his brother KH Nawawi established *Madrasah Mathali'ul Falah* (PIM, *Perguruan Islam Mathali'ul Falah*)⁸ in the classical (*madrasi*) system. The establishment of the *madrasah* addressed their concerns about the inadequacies of the *pesantren* educational system, which only relied on *bandongan* and *sorogan* systems. Like other *pesantren* such as *Tebu Ireng* of Jombang, this change was influenced both by KH Abdussalam's educational experience with the *madrasi* system in Mecca and Medina, and by the *kyai*'s response to Dutch colonials introducing a modern educational system. In 1951, the *madrasah* equipped its *santri* with non-religious subjects, such as English, Indonesian and Sociology, in compliance with a regulation issued by Ministry of Religious Affairs (Yunus, 1979; Faiqoh, 2003: 182-187). However, when the government offered the

⁸ The name of PIM was proposed by KH Mahfudh Salam in 1922

graduates of this *madrasah* the ‘state educational certificate’ based on a national exam, it declined. The *madrasah* felt that acceptance of such an offer led to dependency of educational institutions on the state and resulted in the loss of the *madrasah*’s control over determining the best curriculum for its *santri*.⁹

Under the leadership of KH Sahal Mahfudz since 1963, the *Pesantren Maslakul Huda* has changed gradually. In 1976, the *kyai*’s wife established the female *Pesantren Al-Badi’iyah* to expand educational opportunities for female *santri* (Alwie, 2004: 20-21). In 1979, the *pesantren* established BPPM (Bureau of Community and *Pesantren* Development) to institutionalise the expansion of its role in social services. It also established BUMP (*pesantren* owned-enterprise bodies) such as banks and co-operatives in the 1990s. All of the above institutions are coordinated under *Nurussalam* foundation with KH Sahal Mahfudh as the leader. The establishment of the foundation signified the changing of the *kyai*’s leadership in the *Pesantren Maslakul Huda* from sole leader to part of a collective leadership. Every institution under the foundation has the delegated authority to manage itself, including financial matters, and report its institutional development to the *kyai*. The *santri* also have the right to manage their own activities and to choose their leaders through presidium elections, in which three *santri* are elected and proposed to the *kyai* for approval. This process is different from that of other traditional *pesantren*, in which the *santri* leader is appointed by the *kyai*.

⁹ Despite this rejection, many PIM graduates have enrolled at leading universities such UGM (*Gadjah Mada* University) of Yogyakarta.

5.2. Participatory Development and the *Pesantren*'s Social Service

The *Pesantren Maslakul Huda* used religious justification to effectively enhance its social role through participatory development. In addition to religious service, the *pesantren* is morally obliged to offer social services to its surrounding society. The integration of participatory development into the *pesantren*'s life represents one of the ways in which the *pesantren* fulfils this need. According to Sahal Mahfudh, the poor social and economic situation of villagers around the *pesantren* is of great concern. Most of the villagers do not have agricultural land or sufficient income to fulfil daily needs. In the past, his father KH Mahfudh Salam always offered charity to them, both sporadically and at times of special need, such as towards the end of the fasting month. However, there was concern that this tradition could lead to people's dependency on donations. Sahal Mahfudh accordingly developed an interest in enhancing the *pesantren*'s role from mere religious institution to social service provider.¹⁰

On one hand, participatory development creates opportunities for the *pesantren* to get involved in social services in a more organised way. On the other hand, it advocates democratisation, and tends to reduce the *pesantren*'s domination over its community. Participatory development is metaphorically regarded as a big stream entering the *pesantren* life. *Kyai* Sahal Mahfudh applied the strategy of canalisation (*kanalisasi*) in adopting participatory development. The *pesantren* has the ability to direct changes to suit its own purposes by distributing this 'stream' into canals. The *pesantren* can also direct new streams into the canals to help achieve its own purposes,

¹⁰ In the early 1970s, Mahfudh discussed this idea with Abdurrahman Wahid and shortly after that meeting, Wahid, who joined LP3ES, invited Mahfudh to send his *santri* to attend the LTPM training held in the *Pesantren Pabelan* in 1978.

such as enhancing its role in social activity. While the *pesantren* conducts participatory development, it does not relinquish its domination within the society.

Kyai Sahal Mahfudh justified participatory development as social *ibadah*¹¹ (worship), whose advantages extend not only to the individuals directing it, but also to the public. Furthermore, Mahfudh believed that adoption of participatory development fulfilled one of a Muslim leader's obligations towards his followers. He quoted the prophet tradition, stating that "anyone who does not take care of Islamic community affairs is not of my followers (*ummah*)" (Mahfudh, 1994: 362). He also quoted Umar ibn al-Khattab, the Prophet *Khalifah* (successor), to stress the importance of paying attention to the poor. Al-Khattab wrote "You should beware, do not stay distant from your community, approach the poorest people among them and give them opportunities to convey their opinion..." (Mahfudh, 1994: 362). *Kyai Sahal Mahfudh's* argument reveals not only his role as cultural broker, as defined by Geertz (1960), but also his creativity in making adjustments and innovations to assist his followers in understanding and accepting new social changes (Horikoshi, 1976). This phenomenon is deeply rooted in *pesantren* tradition which was based on the Islamic jurisprudence principle '*al-muhafazah 'ala al-qadimi al-shalih wa al-akhdzu bi al-jadidi al-ashlah*' (maintaining good old values and adopting better new values). This principle represented a survival mechanism for the *pesantren*—they could promote social changes without uprooting traditional values. In this context, the use of the Islamic injunction to justify

¹¹ In this context, *ibadah* is understood not in terms of performing prayers but of every good activity conducted for the sake of God that is also useful for human beings. This is similar to the concept of *dakwah bi al-hal* proposed by *Kyai A Basith* from the *Pesantren Annuqayah*.

participatory development, such as at the *Pesantren Annuqayah* of Madura, is understandable.

Bearing in mind that there are fourteen *pesantren* in Kajen, the task of building the same world-view among them is considered essential to sustaining participatory development. As well as using Islamic justification, *Kyai* Sahal Mahfudh took advantage of the authority of the most respected *kyai* in Kajen, KH Abdullah Salam (sixth generation descendant of Mutamakkin), to support his efforts in disseminating participatory development. The support from this *thariqah* leader enabled Sahal Mahfudh to convince other *pesantren* leaders to accept the new program. Most of the *kyai* in Kajen were suspicious of participatory development because they had bad memories of an initiative introduced before LP3ES launched the current program. Between 1972 and 1976, the Minister of Religious Affairs, Professor Mukti Ali, oversaw a vocational skills development program for the *santri*. This program focused on vocational training, such as animal husbandry, printing, tailoring and crafting, and was intended to equip the *santri* with useful skills for building enterprise after graduating from the *pesantren*. However, many *kyai* considered such training to be a distraction from educational activity in the *pesantren*. They argued that such programs changed the *pesantren*'s mission, from institutions for *tafaqquh fi al-din* to centres of animal husbandry and technical skills—new foci which drew the *santri*'s attention away from educational activities. Therefore, this program was not well developed, and was ultimately rejected by many *kyai* in Kajen and other areas (Bruinessen, 1994: 243-244).

Like the *Pesantren Annuqayah*, *Maslakul Huda* integrated participatory development into its structure by establishing BPPM PMH (Bureau of Society and

Pesantren Development of the *Pesantren Maslakul Huda*) in 1979¹². The establishment of BPPM demonstrates that the role of the *pesantren* is not merely to provide the surrounding society with religious knowledge, but with social services as well. In 1986 BPPM was rated amongst the top five NGOs in Indonesia by winning WWW (What's Working in the World), following nomination by the UN (Santoso, 1988: 82-83). BPPM also has an important role in supervising the quality of the facilitation process, assisting local people with technical and financial support and connecting them with external institutions such as banks, government bodies, and private organisations.

5.3. The *Rukun Tetangga* and Participatory Action Research

The suspicion they encountered within village government encouraged BPPM to build structural cooperation with 13 heads of Kajen household associations (*RT, Rukun Tetangga*).¹³ In Javanese villages, RT (*rukun tetangga*) includes all households in the village, and its members regard their fellows as one big family. Despite the fact that people differ in social rank on the basis of wealth, education and prestige, they are expected to show respect to each other. Adherence to the principle of equality is demanded by the members; all should attend the community meetings, take equal part in the projects, and contribute the same amount of money and materials. This constitutes the basic level of community participation, in which equality is demanded. Although RT heads should be respected by all the members, village residents insist that no man has

¹² To gain legal recognition, BPPM PMH was registered at the law office on the 1st of October 1980. On the explanation of BPPM see chapter 3.

¹³ RT is the smallest unit in the village structure, which consists of a number of households. The number of RTs varies depending on the size of the village. Each village is headed by *kepala desa* (village headman) who establishes a special committee, LKMD (Village Resilience Institution), to plan development programs in the village. Below the headman, the village is divided into a neighborhood, association *Rukun Keluarga* (RK) or *Rukun Warga* (RW), which in turn is divided into RT, the smallest units.

the right to consider himself superior to any other residents by virtue of his senior position. Therefore, it is not surprising that members of community often ignore rank in criticising the failure of RT elites to fulfil their obligations in respect to broader social needs.

RT heads usually invite their members to monthly meetings to participate in discussion of important community issues. Even though the RT head offers advice about the issues under consideration, he never uses his authority to force its solution. Usually, project plans are developed in consultation with members of society and consensus building is considered to be extremely important. Some RT heads reject the procedure of holding structured meetings, arguing that they are an unnecessary formality; instead they canvass their neighbours' opinions through informal discussions during the afternoon and evening, when residents generally gather on ward pathways.

It should be noted that despite professed egalitarian principles, the gap between those of high and low rank in the community is frequently obvious in RT meetings, and is borne out in decisions related to the RT village facilities. RT staff members often discuss project execution with the community elites, who are active in community affairs, before presenting the plan to the members to mobilise *kerja bakti* (community working bees). The RT elites, such as government staff and wealthy people, agree to contribute larger amounts of money. They present the cost of projects to the RT meeting to reach consensus on raising required funds, and to determine the work roster. However, a lack of consensus decreases the residents' support for the project, and in turn leads to failure. This RT situation in Kajen is similar to that in kampung in Yogyakarta,

(Guinness 1986: 178-181). Guinness also gives examples of projects that have failed due to a lack of support from RT members (1986: 154-156).

Before the introduction of participatory action research and the formation of KSM (self-help group), BPPM utilised the monthly RT meeting to stimulate people's participation. BPPM staff offered participatory development to 13 heads of RT and convinced them of its potential to improve their living conditions. It was recognised that at this stage the role of BPPM staff was pivotal, especially in conducting research to identify village problems. In every RT meeting, BPPM staff asked for time to discuss the negative impact of social and economic problems identified through their own research in the village. They also identified potential solutions that could be put in place to resolve the problems. BPPM staff, for example, explained to the villagers that village advancement was hampered by deficiencies in the local economy, such as the increase in unemployment, limited job opportunities, and difficulty in finding initial capital to fund new enterprise. In addition, many farm labourers could not afford to meet their fundamental needs such as food, health and basic education.

On such occasions, BPPM staff enlisted the *kyai* to motivate people to participate by giving religious justification to certain development programs. The *kyai*'s involvement ensured the development program was in line with Islamic doctrine. For example, when the *kyai* explained a health program such as the nutritional improvement, he cited the *Qur'anic* verses and the Prophet traditions related to this topic.¹⁴ However,

¹⁴ *Kyai* Sahal Mahfudh quoted *Sura* (chapter 23:51): "Messengers, eat good things and do good deeds: I am well aware of what you do" (Haleem, 2005: 217). He explained that in this verse God ordered Muslims to eat good, nutritious foods before ordering them to conduct good deeds. He goes on to say that nutrition is important not only to fulfill the physical needs of human beings, but also to fulfill required spiritual activity. Without sufficient nutrition, Muslims will not be healthy and strong; therefore, it hampers them from performing perfect worship (Mahfudz, 1991: 3).

unlike in Madura where the *kyai* was used to promote participatory development on an operational level, in the *Pesantren Maslakul Huda*, the *kyai*'s role was limited to convincing both leaders of the *pesantren* and members of society about the quality of such development programs. *Kyai* Mahfudz, for example, provided religious justification for development programs through training sessions, seminars and workshops. In this context, the charisma of the *kyai* was utilised as the entry point to generate acceptance of development programs, and was not used to facilitate the process of planning specific development programs with the people.

Changes occurred in 1983, when LP3ES introduced Participatory Action Research (PAR) into village facilitator training held by BPPM. This training (LTPM)¹⁵ was undertaken to prepare new facilitators for 13 villages¹⁶ in Margoyoso sub-district. Unlike the first LTPM held by LP3ES in 1978, this training, which included PAR, lasted for one year, from recruitment to evaluation stages. Moreover, this LTPM was not intended exclusively for senior *santri* and *ustadz* from the *pesantren*; rather, it recruited 28 male and 28 female village youths from 13 villages who had been recommended by formal (village head) and informal (religious leader/*kyai*) figures. The expansion of training program was intended to accelerate the implementation of participatory development in all villages in the sub-district of Margoyoso (Hadimulyo, 1983: 9-15).

Regarding this training, one of the participants, Murthadi (aged 44,) a village farmer, said that the training program he attended six years ago had deeply influenced the way he promoted participatory development in his village. He noted:

¹⁵BPPM-PMH also held the same training for 30 *pesantren* in Central, West, East Java and West Kalimantan between 1985 and 1986.

¹⁶ These villages are Ngemplak Kidul, Tegalharum, Pangkalan, Pohijo, Purwodadi, Waturoyo, Purworejo, Soneyan, Semerak, Langgen Harjo, Cebolek, Sodomukti and Bulumanis Kidul.

The training subjects, like work ethics from an Islamic perspective, managerial and cooperation skills, adult education methodology, learning to listen to other people, and program planning, increased my self-confidence to facilitate and motivate other people. It also helped me adjust to new environments and enhance social sensitivity to other people's needs. So, I am always ready to learn from guests from my village visiting my house. (quoted in P3M, 1990: 35)

Having attended one-month's in-class training¹⁷, the new facilitators undertook four months of action research in their village to get specific information about village situations. The data included economic and social conditions of villagers, existing communication and influence networks, social and inter-group conflicts, non-functioning government programs, farmer difficulties with loan sharks/credit system, family income utilization, land title disputes, perceptions concerning formal education, belief systems, pressure on landless people, labour/and ownership patterns, and attitudes toward development programs. The data were obtained through personal observation, and by holding interviews with informal and formal figures to problematise the village situations. Most importantly, the facilitators also held informal interviews with groups of ordinary people in villages using participatory methods. They also employed adult education, inspired by Freire, that used structured experience (*kaji urai*). Local people were encouraged to analyse their daily life experiences and to relate them to broader village problems. The following quotation describes how the facilitators build people's awareness, and to encourage them to analyse their situation.

Early morning in the village of Kajen, a young woman wearing a *kerudung* (Islamic head covering) sits with a group of illiterate peasant, women. They are drawing squares or circles, the size of which indicates their perception of their own understanding relative to other villagers in terms of landholding, wealth, welfare, education or happiness. The conversation is lively as they dig deeper into their circumstances and their problems. 'Why are we unable to send our children to school? Why are some people poor and others rich? Is it because the

¹⁷ For the explanation of in-class training see Chapter 3

poor are lazy? Is it fate? What does our religion say about this?' These women from the culture of silence are asked another question by the young woman after they have listed 'important' people in their community, again using graphic representation: 'If the size of this square represents the influence of the opinions of this particular person, draw a square representing the influence of your own opinions in the community...' The session ends with the peasant women asking the young woman personal questions about herself, her family, and her background. The session had begun in this manner, with the young woman inviting questions: 'You know my name, but why do you think I want to talk with you? What reasons do you have for not trusting persons like myself? What are differences between us?' At the end of their meeting, they decide when they will meet again, what they will discuss and who else they will invite to join them. In subsequent sessions, folk sayings, Quranic passages, and development slogans will be used as discussion starters... Groups will analyse the meaning and the relevance of the content of these 'messages' in terms of their own life experiences. Using projective techniques with questions such as 'what do your neighbours complain about most?' And by the use of drawings and posters, a picture of social interaction patterns and family activities will be developed and discussed.(Dilts, 1999: 35-36)

The data gathered by the facilitators was systematised and classified in consultation with the staff of BPPM *Maslakul Huda*, then checked for accuracy through consultation with the villagers. In such discussions, they also proposed problem-solving alternatives, based on the skills and resources of the villagers. This type of research was conducted in 13 villages around Kajen, each with its own problems and assets; therefore, the solutions offered were diverse. In Kajen, for example, the pollution of tapioca waste, health care (building public wells and toilets), and enhancement of the prosperity of workers in the tapioca home industry became major concerns of the village. In contrast, concerns in Sidomukti extended beyond fixing health problems to increasing livestock raising activity, such as beef cattle farming. Proposed alternative solutions to identified problems were then prioritised on a scale from the most urgent to the least urgent, and prepared for presentation at a village seminar.

At the end of fourth month of action research, the facilitators held a village seminar at the village office that was attended by the *pamong desa* (village officials), the local *kyai* and the villagers, including those who participated in the research. In this seminar, the facilitators presented their research findings, and the attendees were invited to criticise and offer further suggestions. The seminar was then followed by the action plan, and the formation of KSM to conduct specific development activities.

Interestingly, during the seminar, the village officials often rejected the findings, especially those related to problem identification, because these were related directly to their responsibilities in conducting development programs. For example, a problem identified by the facilitators and the interviewed villagers was annual flooding. Villagers claimed that officials did not take sufficient measures to ‘prevent’ the flood, and insisted that the harm it caused could be abated by building people awareness and mobilising local resources. In reply, the village officials refused to acknowledge that the flood was a problem, arguing that such flooding was a regular event, and the villagers should simply get used to the situation; if flooding occurred, its impact could be overcome. There was a marked difference in the way the recurring flood was viewed by officials and villagers. The officials accepted the flood as part of their life, and as a natural disaster that could not be prevented, but villagers recognised a problem that could be solved.

The implementation of PAR increased the reputation of the *pesantren* and facilitators among the government officials. The *camat* (sub-district head) of Margoyoso asked BPPM to train the village heads in the sub-district, noting that “the cadres (village facilitators) seem to be better than the village heads at facilitating and planning

community activities” (Dilts, 1999: 41). Moreover, some of the village facilitators trained by the *pesantren* were promoted to positions within village institutions that channeled society’s aspirations, such as the Deliberative Institution (LKMD and LSD).¹⁸ The government’s effort to include the *pesantren* cadres and other informal leaders in LKMD and LSD was intended to increase grass roots support. The village head fulfils dual roles as implementer of central government policies, and as representative of the people who elect him. A conflict of interest arises when he is directed from above to implement a development program that may contradict with the needs of his constituents, the villagers.

To counter this, the inclusion of village facilitators in such institutions as LKMD and LSD enables them to influence the decision making process that affects village development programs, as shown in action research and village seminars. This situation is very different from the initial stages of participatory development, when the village officials of Kajen and sub-district government of Margoyoso were suspicious of these initiatives. They regarded such programs as PPP (United Development Party) political campaigns intended to win villagers’ votes in the general election. In the late 1970s, when participatory development was first promoted, the *pesantren* and *Nahdhatul Ulama* (NU) were considered to be affiliated to the Islamic party (PPP), whereas the village and sub-district heads were government officials, and were affiliated to other political party, *Golongan Karya*. Furthermore, many PPP activists also claimed that the

¹⁸ LKMD (*Lembaga Ketahanan Masyarakat Desa*, Village Resilience Body) was set up by the presidential instruction no. 28/1980 with the specific aim of getting the village community involved in all aspects of planning village development activities. Its function also extends to coordination of all government activities at the village level, and to improve overall government services. The LKMD consists of the village head, village officials and other representatives from the village (MacAndrew, 1986: 39).

Pesantren Maslakul Huda was co-opted as a political instrument by *Golongan Karya* to conduct certain development programs in Kajen. It was unusual at that time for religious institutions such as the *pesantren* to conduct development programs.

5.4. The *Kelompok Swadaya Masyarakat* and Development Programs

Having being trained in PAR and BPPM, village facilitators did not hold RT meetings; rather, they encouraged the local people to form new social groups, namely, *Kelompok Swadaya Masyarakat* (KSM, self-help group). The formation of KSM in Kajen and in other villages in Margoyoso began after the TPM held a village workshop during the action research process of 1983. The establishment of KSM, which consisted of 20 to 30 people, enabled its members to identify the economic and social problems they faced, analyse their strengths and weaknesses, and determine the most effective solutions to their problems. KSM fostered equal and non-paternalistic relationships among their members, which enabled people to express their own interests and opinions, and ensured that programs were not conducted without awareness of the real issues.

According to a P3M report, around 62 KSM groups were built in cooperation with BPPM *Maslakul Huda* and P3M. These comprised 2495 members in 1990, not only from the village of Kajen and sub-district of Margoyoso, but also from three other districts in central Java (P3M, 1990: 10). Most of the KSM groups were located in agricultural regions, and most of their members were educated to either primary or secondary school level. Their income levels were typically low—ranging from Rp30,000 to Rp90,000 per month.

The evaluation held six months after program implementation revealed that awareness building and people participation in the KSM became important aspects of

the groups' existence. Twenty-three out of sixty two existing KSM groups coordinated by BPPM were inactive. The groups were not well prepared to become self-help groups in the sense that their formation was not based on a proper assessment of the real problems, potentials, opportunities and challenges surrounding them. In other words, awareness building was neglected in the formation of groups. They were spontaneously formed to obtain funds from BPPM, which were basically intended to assist in developing group potential. As a result, the solidarity among the members was fragile, and the groups became inactive when the fund was exhausted. The members were not equipped with technical skills to manage specific enterprises, and as a result, the type of group enterprise pursued was determined by dominant group members who possessed certain skills. This hampered participation for all members. In contrast, for active KSM groups, the most important goal was building group capacity, rather than relying on loans. These groups analysed their situation and gauged their potential through needs assessments conducted with the support of village facilitators, and then they sought start-up capital for a new enterprise.

To fulfil the capital needs, the KSM conducted income-generating activities such as group savings and loans, or UBSP (*Usaha Bersama Simpan Pinjam*). The *simpan pinjam* is a common activity of KSM in which the members commit themselves to depositing a certain amount of money each month, which can be lent out to any one of them at a moderate interest rate. Subsequent profit on loans is then divided among members annually. The *simpan pinjam* helped free members from the lack of capital which could lead to their dependency on moneylenders, and to the practice of *gadai* (pawning). In savings and loans, there are three kinds of savings, with the amount of

money determined by the member agreement. The first is *simpanan pokok* (main saving), each member contributing the same amount of money, usually between Rp5,000 and 10,000, which can be paid in instalments over several months. The second type is *simpanan wajib* (obligatory saving), paid by the members weekly. The third type of saving is *simpanan manasuka* or *sukarela* (private saving), with the amount dependent on the members' financial capability. The amount of money that can be borrowed by the members is determined by the appropriateness of the enterprise conducted by member or group. If the enterprise is profitable and needs lots of capital, the members are eligible for big loans. When this program commenced in 1983, a member usually could borrow up to Rp.25, 000. Increases in group savings stimulated the motivation of members to increase production, or to create new enterprises.

In this saving and loan group, late payments are always discussed by the members during their monthly meeting. The group organisers and some members try to find the cause of the lateness, and remind the members of their payments. If the cause of inability to repay a loan is misfortune, the members will contribute *tenggang renteng*¹⁹ to cover the outstanding debt. Until complete repayment has been made, other members are not able to take a loan because the outstanding sum is unavailable for loan. When the assisted member is finally able to repay the debt, the amount deposited is returned to the members. This *tenggang renteng* system creates cooperation and mutual assistance within the group. It also provides a forum in which all members can contribute something towards the welfare of this group; hence, to safeguard group capital.

¹⁹ This refers to collective contributions made to repay the member's loan due to his/her inability to repay according to the schedule. Failure of one member to make timely payments causes delays for subsequent borrowers.


For established KSM groups--the groups that undertake certain enterprises--BPPM provide certain loans (revolving funds) to inject additional capital into their existing enterprises. In other words, the KSM group must have its own capital before receiving funds from BPPM. In this context, building group capacity has become the highest priority, and the external loans are treated as additional support for the group's enterprises. The sum lent to the group is up to five times the value of the available group capital. This stimulates members to increase the group's savings. Furthermore, BPPM enhances the group's abilities by offering consultation, training, and supervision. BPPM also helps establish certain connections between established KSM and institutions such as banks, government departments, and business companies, in order to build further cooperation and to get wider market access.

This loan system has been utilised to develop the *krupuk* industry in Kajen. In this major home industry, tapioca flour is used for making tapioca crisps (*kerupuk*). The rise of such an industry is encouraged by the availability of raw materials, that is, tapioca flour, which is easily sourced from the neighbouring village. Raw material is purchased from Ngemplak Kidul village, then processed with the assistance of family members, and the *krupuk* is finally sold in the local market of Kajen, and in public gatherings such as public *pengajian* and *thariqah* meetings. It is also sold to brokers, who resell it in markets outside Kajen (Mufid, 2006). However, due to the small amount of capital they own, many *krupuk* producers cannot increase their production and their profits only fulfil their daily needs.

BPPM also provides loans of Rp10,000 for every household, with the requirement that they must pay administration costs of Rp500. So far BPPM has

provided loans of Rp650, 000 distributed among 65 households. From the *krupuk* industry, the villagers could potentially realise profits of Rp750 to Rp1500 per day. The villagers also contribute the amount of their *tabungan sukarela*, which within three years reached Rp750, 000. It is worthwhile to add this amount to their loan to increase the production capacity of the *krupuk* industry. Apart from providing loans to the *krupuk* industry, BPPM also supports the industry with management skills, ranging from processing to marketing. To assist with this, BPPM invited a *pesantren* alumnus who successfully managed a *krupuk* industry in Sidoarjo²⁰ to give the training. With the improvement of product quality, and wider access to the market, this effort increased the development of the *krupuk* industry in Kajen. Some home industries even managed to employ 10 to 15 people.

Figure 2. The Relationship of BPPM, Village Facilitators and KSM



Apart from savings and loans for the *krupuk* industry, there were a number of development programs conducted by BPPM-PMH during their cooperation with LP3ES,

²⁰ Sidoarjo is the largest *krupuk* industry centre in East Java, and possibly Indonesia.

P3M and external institutions such as government departments and banks.²¹ Another example of an important development program related to beef cattle (*ternak sapi*). In this program, local people participated based on their identified problems, potentials and available village resources. The roles of facilitator and BPPM were important in building awareness and providing support in the form of technical skills, and financial assistance through additional loans.

The initial livestock enterprise was held by KSM in Sidomukti village, and was then developed in other villages such as Ngemplak. This enterprise was developed in recognition of the fact that many villagers in Sidomukti have livestock for their own livelihoods, unrelated to their work in the agricultural sector (LP3ES, 1983: 28). Their livestock are extremely important to the villagers because of the vulnerability of their agricultural crop to failure, through insect attacks, or increased fertiliser prices. In agricultural regions such as Sidomukti, there is very strong support for developing such enterprises, because pasture to feed livestock is readily available. Moreover, the tapioca waste (cassava peel, and waste), produced by home-industry in Kajen and Ngemplak Kidul, can be utilised as organic food for the livestock after processing. Kajen and Ngemplak Kidul are famous centres for the production of tapioca flour, which is the basic ingredient of the tapioca crisps produced in the villagers' home industry. However, the waste treatment is not properly managed, and has resulted in a bad smell pervading the surrounding environment. In Ngemplak, Kajen's neighbouring village, there are many tapioca flour home-industries that produce more than five tonnes per day. These industries can employ at least 2,000 villagers from Ngemplak village and surrounding villages.

²¹ See annex 1

The Sidomukti KSM had 20 members who maintain beef cattle. In late 1985, this KSM had initial capital from the group savings and loan program of around Rp1 million. BPPM-PMH then provided an additional loan of Rp1 million to the KSM. This sum was designated to buy four cattle, which were distributed to the chosen members based on the group agreement, and were put in the breeders' ownership. The maintenance process took between four and five months, and the costs related to the maintenance were borne by the maintainers. After four months of maintenance, the cattle were ready to sell at around Rp2.8 million. This meant that the group realised a profit of Rp800,000 for four cattle. Each owner then received Rp200,000 and the remaining sum of Rp400,000 was returned to the KSM savings, and used for buying new cattle to be bred by other members. Therefore, within one year the KSM was able to increase their cattle numbers to seven.

By 1988, the beef cattle program had developed, and received significant financial and technical support—not only from BPPM-PMH, but also from government institutions such as the Department of Agriculture of Pati District. In managing such development, the KSM worked in a more organised and efficient way. In discussions with BPPM-PMH about their plan, they reached an agreement to manage the implementation of the program. They not only provided some facilities including pens, food processing, and cattle but also formed the committee coordinating the program. With the financial support from BPPM, P3M and Central Java government, the KSM bought 20 cattle, which were put in a 400 metre square pen was located in the outskirts of Sidomukti village. The pen was built by the members of KSM on land they rented from local villagers. To enhance the quality of breeding process, the KSM did not rely

on the grass and other agricultural products available in the village, but utilised the tapioca waste produced in surrounding villages. To support the use of this waste BPPM-PMH, in cooperation with the Department of Agriculture of Pati District, provided the KSM with a livestock food processor that was obtained from the Institute of Technology of Bandung (ITB).²² In addition, the KSM members also received training on the use of machine, and the process of making the livestock food. The use of tapioca waste was intended to decrease the problem of waste pollution besetting Kajen and surrounding villages, and to enhance the quality of the cattle. Within four months the cattle were ready to sell. The benefit of cattle selling was shared among three parties: BPPM-PMH (40%), KSM saving (10%), and the maintainers (50%). In the first stage of the maintenance process, there were 9 members of the KSM who were responsible for maintaining the cattle, and who received the benefit. Having realised profits from selling the cattle within 4 months, the rest of the KSM members have the same opportunity to manage the livestock, depending on their agreement (Gufon, 2006: 76).

5.5. Participatory Development and Social Position of the *Pesantren Maslakul Huda*

The creation of KSM, as advocated by participatory development in the *Pesantren Maslakul Huda*, benefits both local people and the *pesantren*. The KSM groups are utilised by the villagers as a means of building awareness, identifying problems and potentials and mobilising available resources for the sake of self-reliance. It is also apparent that the *pesantren* enjoys great advantages from the development

²² ITB was one institution which built cooperation with LP3ES in the *pesantren* program in early 1980s by offering appropriate technology for rural areas. However, this appropriate technology program was not entirely successful because it was top-down and the implementation often did not consider its suitability to local people's needs and local cultural dimension (Marzali, 2005).

activities they conduct. Through its cooperation with a number of KSM in Kajen and other villages, the *pesantren* usually receives between 20% and 40% of the profit generated by certain programs. The remaining 60% to 80% is given back to the members of the KSM. The existence of the KSM attracts external institutions to build cooperative relationships, and provides the *pesantren* with considerable financial benefits. The profits accumulated as a result of such relationships have enabled the *Pesantren Maslakul Huda* to establish financial institutions such as BPR *Artha Huda Abadi* (People Credit Bank),²³ *Shari'a* Saving and Loan Bank, as well as cooperatives, public telephones and a workshop.²⁴

There is a range of underlying reasons behind the establishment of such institutions. First, as an educational institution, the *pesantren* should be able to provide considerable sums to finance its own operational costs, including construction of educational facilities. In the earliest days of the *pesantren* many *kyai* were landowners in addition to being religious leaders, and the *pesantren* was thus able to finance itself. In addition, the villagers and the *santri's* parents contributed cash or other donations to support the operation of the *pesantren*. Nowadays, with decreased *santri* enrolment, and cessation of *kyai* land ownership (particularly in Kajen, which lacks agricultural land), a

²³BPR initially was founded by BPPM in 1995 with initial capital of Rp150,000,000,-. Share ownership was divided among three parties: BPPM (29%), LP3ES (51%), and *pesantren* families and graduates (20%). However, five years later BPPM changed the distribution of share ownership to BPPM (51%), LP3ES (29%), and *pesantren* families and *pesantren* colleagues (20%), arguing that BPPM and the *pesantren* proposed the establishment of BPR and subsequently managed it, whereas LP3ES only provided initial capital.

²⁴ The workshop enterprise resulted from utilisation of equipment provided by the Department of Religious Affairs in 1973. The workshop initially was intended to be a laboratory in which *santri* could develop workshop skills. In later development, this facility was utilised by the *pesantren* for business purposes, employing KSM who were interested in the field. The enterprise attracts profit sharing both for the *pesantren* and KSM (Alwie, 2004: 185).

lack of financial resources has resulted in difficulties in the *pesantren* running a sustainable educational mission.

Secondly, the establishment of profitable institutions was also intended to eradicate the financial dependency of the *pesantren* and the KSM on external funding sources, such as NGOs and the government, in conducting development programs. Before the establishment of BPR, the amount of revolving funds distributed to the KSM was limited, and was derived partly from external funding agencies; therefore it limited program acceleration. Moreover, the government contribution was usually followed by political consequences, such as influencing the *pesantren* and the *kyai* to support government programs, and at worst, supporting the *status quo*. Likewise, NGOs had their own agendas in giving financial support.

Apart from these reasons behind the establishment of profitable institutions owned by the *pesantren*, it is clear that the *pesantren* was strategic in building external cooperation (with organisations such as LP3ES and P3M) that benefited its institution. With the establishment of BPR owned by the *pesantren*, financial assistance could be offered to the KSM which were under its guidance. The more money KSM borrowed towards the costs of running certain programs, the more wealth the *pesantren* could accumulate through profit sharing. When the BPPM facilitated certain development activities and equipped the KSM with technical skills to ensure the success of the programs, it also ensured a smooth flow of cash from the KSM to the *pesantren*. Therefore, the BPPM was a kind of bank with additional facilitation functions. It effectively allowed a handing over of KSM financial dependency from NGOs, donors and outside financial institutions, to the *Pesantren Maslakul Huda*. It has also resulted in

a shift in the status of the *kyai*--in the past they were economic and social elites by virtue of their religious knowledge and land ownership. Today, although this status has not diminished, the *kyai* and the *Pesantren Maslakul Huda* are recognised as economic and social elites on the basis of financial resources, rather than landowning.

5.6. Conclusion

Participatory development in the *Pesantren Maslakul Huda* has led to the creation of genuine participation among local people. This is especially palpable after the introduction of participatory action research (PAR) in facilitator training held by the *pesantren* and LP3ES. This training recruits male and female youth representatives to become facilitators in their own village, and is intended not only to expand the dissemination of participatory development, but also to ensure that the participatory process is conducted by local people. The creation of KSM (self-help groups) as new people forums in the village enables them to identify their own problems, potentials, and to propose alternative solutions. Furthermore, unlike the *pengajian* in which the *kyai*'s authority influences the forum, in KSM the *kyai* is excluded. This means the members have a more equal relationship, and avoid being pressured by the *kyai*'s influence in the decision making process. The *kyai*'s role in the *Pesantren Maslakul Huda* is limited to justifying participatory development and the suitability of certain development programs through Islamic doctrine. The facilitation process is in the hands of BPPM staff and village facilitators who are not *kyai* or *ustadz*.


It is undeniable that participatory development has assisted the *Pesantren Maslakul Huda* in establishing its role in social services in a more organised way,

without uprooting it from its mission. This is achieved by giving Islamic justification for participatory development, labelling it as *ibadat sosial* (social worship), and describing it as the fulfilment of Muslim leaders' obligations to their constituents. Furthermore, the intensive cooperation between the *pesantren*, KSM and NGOs enables the *pesantren* to enjoy financial benefits. These benefits extend to establishment of financial institutions, such as banks, to help avoid financial dependency on external funding sources. Such institutions enable the *pesantren* to become self-financing, and allow them to offer loans to the KSM. By offering loans to the KSM, the *pesantren* can accumulate greater financial resources, and shift KSM dependency on external funding, from NGOs on to themselves. Therefore, while participatory development offers a chance to local people to have their own voice, and develop the ability to negotiate with local government (transformative at the local level between local people and local government), it also gives the *pesantren* the means to sustain its domination over the surrounding society.

Annex 1**Examples of Development Program Conducted by BPPM *Maslakul Huda*
In Cooperation with LP3ES and P3M**

NO	ACTIVITY	YEAR
1	Beef cattle farm	1985-now
2	Skills training (embroidery, animal husbandry such as fish and prawns)	1983, 1989
3	Savings and loans, revolving fund for improving enterprises	1979-now
4	Mediating peanut industry and tapioca home industry in supplying tapioca flour	1979-1983
5	Leadership and management training for KSM leaders	1989
6	Water supply	1987
7	Appropriate technology (water pumps, rope pumps, hydrant pumps, Ferro cement, energy saving stoves)	1980
8	Animal husbandry training (fish and prawns)	1989
9	Community health program (health fund and health cadres, tapioca waste drainage construction)	1979-1987
10	Redemption of pawned agricultural land	1983-1985
11	Village facilitator training for 30 <i>pesantren</i> in East, Central and West Java	1983-1986
12	Agricultural training and farmers cooperative	1985

Annex 2. Genealogy of Kyai of Kajen



CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

I have examined the effectiveness of the *Pesantren Annuqayah* of Madura and the *Pesantren Maslakul Huda* of Kajen Central Java in implementing participatory development during their intense cooperation with LP3ES and P3M between 1977 and 1993. It is clear that participatory development in both *pesantren* created local people participation, despite the fact that there were some differences in procedure and level of participation. However, the effectiveness of the *pesantren* to stimulate people's participation in development cannot be explained solely by formulaic participatory development procedure--rather it needs to be examined in the specific cultural context of each *pesantren*. It is also obvious that the *pesantren* utilised participatory development to sustain their domination over society. Before further exploring such issues, this concluding chapter will summarise the implementation of participatory development in both *pesantren*.

The *Pesantren Annuqayah* of Madura did not follow formal procedures of participatory development, but made adjustments to reflect the Madurese cultural context. These changes were intended to create people participation. In this *pesantren* participatory development was characterised by:

1. Dominant role of the *kyai*, BPM staff (facilitators) and informal leaders of *dukuh* (hamlet). The *kyai* and BPM staff had a greater part in program planning and problems and potentials identification, but did not follow research procedures as outlined by LP3ES during LTPM I (including activities such as holding interviews, distributing questionnaires, data tabulation and analysis). The *kyai*

were also deeply involved in building people's awareness and motivation to take part in development programs. They related such programs to religious obligations by using Islamic injunctions from the Qur'an and the *hadith* (the Prophet tradition).

2. Local people's involvement was mainly at the implementation level of development programs. Despite the fact that the *kyai* and BPM staff expressed an intention to discuss problems and program planning with the local people, the use of existing social forums, namely, *pengajian* (religious congregations) and *bhek-rembhek* (deliberative forums) was not conducive to building people participation. These forums put the elites (especially the *kyai*) in unchallenged positions of prestige. The *kyai* is a charismatic leader who holds religious authority in the forum, and is consulted by local people for advice on religious and non-religious problems. The local people believe that the *kyai* will never mislead them. Therefore, when the *kyai* proposed certain development programs and explained their benefits for the people (using religious motivation), the people did not question him. The passiveness of the local people was also strengthened by the concept of *baraka* (blessing), achieved by obeying the *kyai*'s orders, and not opposing his commands.
3. Despite the domination of the *kyai* and BPM staff in problem identification and decision making processes, most development programs they conducted (such as savings and loans and water supply) addressed local needs and, after a period of time, led to self-reliance and sustainability in local communities. Participatory development at the *Pesantren Annuqayah* led to receipt of a *Kalapataru Award*

in 1981. This was awarded to recognise the *pesantren*'s efforts in establishing a reforestation program in Guluk-Guluk (see annex 1 of chapter 4). A number of development programs conducted by this *pesantren* also led to enhancement of the rank of Guluk-Guluk village from *Desa Swadaya* (traditional village) in 1978, to *Desa Swakarsa* (transitional village) in 1979, and to *Desa Swasembada* (developed/self-help village) in 1982.

4. In Madura, women were less involved in the participatory development process. The only development program in which women took part was one providing financial assistance for mat crafting, which lasted only ten months (see annex chapter 4). Among the suggested reasons for such failure is the lack of women program facilitators.

In contrast, the *Pesantren Maslakul Huda* of Kajen, Central Java, followed formulaic participatory development procedure throughout implementation, and seems not to have faced cultural constraints. The implementation process was significantly different from that conducted by the *Pesantren Annuqayah* of Madura.

1. Unlike in Madura, where the *kyai* were deeply involved in the facilitation process, the *kyai*'s involvement in Central Java was limited to giving Islamic religious justification for the suitability of participatory development and specific projects. The facilitation process is handed to his senior *santri* (the *pesantren* students), who become BPPM staff.
2. Unlike in Madura, where *pengajian/bhek-rembhek* was utilised for local people organisation, in Kajen local people preferred RT (household organisation) meetings. After the introduction of Participatory Action Research (PAR),

Kelompok Swadaya Masyarakat (KSM, self-help groups) were used to identify problems and to plan solutions. The use of PAR and KSM enabled the local people to express their own opinions and propose development programs without intervention from the *kyai*'s authority. This, in turn, led to the creation of people participation, not only in implementation, but also in problem and potential identification and program planning. In this respect participation was more broad-based in Kajen than in Madura.

3. In Madura, women had little involvement in the public domain, but the cultural context of Kajen actively endorsed the involvement of women in participatory development. Women in Kajen were not only involved as members of self-help groups (KSM), but also as village facilitators. This is especially true after 1983, when the *Pesantren Maslakul Huda* held LTPM II, where women and men both undertook facilitator training.
4. Development programs in the *Pesantren Maslakul Huda*, such as savings and loans, cattle beef maintenance and other programs (see annex chapter 5) were well suited to local needs. These enabled villagers to use their own resources, including initial capital, for setting up enterprises. Moreover, the use of PAR in mapping village problems and potentials and planning programs enabled local people to create their own development programs; leading to self-reliance and sustainability. Furthermore, this situation not only enabled them to negotiate with village government officials on the prioritisation of development activities, but also encouraged *camat* (sub-district governmental heads) to invite some *pesantren* facilitators to take up positions in LKMD (*Lembaga Ketahanan*

Masyarakat Desa, Village Resilience Institution). This inclusion allowed LKMD to absorb local knowledge related to development planning.

6.1. Participatory Development and Cultural Context

The importance of cultural context in the practice of participatory development is emphasised by Cooke and Kothari. They note that “participatory approaches are presented as flexible and continuously evolving in the light of problems of application and adapting to specific context. This, it is claimed, has led to significant methodological adjustments being made to the approach, encouraged by the continual need for introspection” (Cooke and Kothari: 2001: 6).

In Madura, the practice of participatory development is characterised foremost by the dominant involvement of the *kyai*. This, however, is considered necessary, and is justified by Madurese culture, in which the relationship between the *kyai* and society can be strongly characterised as patron-client or paternalistic. The role of the *kyai* in implementing participatory development extends beyond facilitation (as advocated by participatory development); more importantly, they are leaders with important decision-making responsibilities. As explained in Chapters 2 and 4, in Java (especially in Madura) the *kyai* is the most respected member of the social elite in the village, and his influence and authority surpasses that of the local government and the king (*ratoh*). The *kyai* is a charismatic leader and is regarded as being close to God; therefore, he can achieve *karama* and bestow *baraka* (blessing) on the people who need it. *Baraka* is obtained through the *kyai*'s prayers, and building good relationships with the *kyai*. Accordingly, the people always obey the *kyai*'s orders, and seek to avoid disappointing

and opposing him; these actions may impede the *baraka* and even attract *kuwalat* (a curse). Such is the prominence of the *kyai*'s position that Madurese people are encouraged always to consult him when they face both religious and non-religious problems. People will accept new inventions or programs only if the *kyai* has given *fatwa* or religious justification for it. Accordingly, the *kyai*'s involvement or approval is essential to the sustainability of development programs.

The evidence from Madura suggests that government programs encountered difficulties when implementation was attempted without the *kyai*'s support. As noted in Chapter 4, agricultural guidance offered by the government officials to Guluk-Guluk villagers was often neglected. The officials could not convince the people of the importance of meetings and new agricultural methods for crop improvement. However, such advice was accepted and implemented after the *kyai* invited a government official to outline agricultural techniques in the *pengajian/bhek-rembhek* forum.

The importance of the *kyai* in this matter is also suggested by Niehof (1987b: 117-136), who studied the family planning program of Madura. Due to the sensitivity of the issue, the government uses the *kyai* to provide moral and religious justification for the program, thus ensuring its smooth implementation. Madurese customs increase the difficulty of implementing such a program: women are the targets of family planning, but it is considered inappropriate for them to act in the public domain. The public domain is dominated by men, who set the religious and moral standards for action. Madurese men are expected to decide on the moral acceptability of innovations, with guidance from the *kyai*. Moreover, approaching women directly to accept family planning is not considered appropriate. Women will become receptive to information

about family planning only once it has been made acceptable through religious justification. To overcome such barriers, the family planning fieldworkers have to build contacts with the important *kyai* in the village (Niehof, 1987b: 130-131). This situation shows that the people's involvement in certain development programs cannot be separated from the *kyai*'s intervention. Accordingly, the government officials always embrace the *kyai* to ensure success of their development programs in Madura. It is unlikely that participatory development programs such as water supply, fertiliser credits and toilet building and usage will induce people's participation, or be sustainable, if they are introduced directly by the government or NGOs without the involvement of the *kyai*.

Although the *Pesantren Annuqayah* did not collect village data according to formulaic participatory research (PAR and PRA), the accuracy of data was not compromised. Indeed, the research conducted by the *pesantren* may be more accurate than that undertaken by PRA. As explained in chapter 3, in order to understand the social and economic problems of the village, the *pesantren* facilitators were required by LP3ES to conduct research. However, the *kyai*, who is also a facilitator for local people in Madura, did not need to follow this research procedure. As informal leader of the village, the *kyai* is akin to a village data bank; of all the villagers, he has the most detailed picture of the local character and personality, and the problems villagers face. This is because the *kyai* receives people from all levels of society in his counselling role. The local people consult the *kyai* about their personal issues, ranging from religious questions to the most private problems. The *kyai* assists through offering solutions in the form of suggestions and treatments.

The *kyai* can also easily obtain news and information from beyond the village, as outsiders coming from other parts of Madura Island also seek consultations with him to talk about their problems. Moreover, the *kyai* is familiar with political and social development at national and regional levels through the *pesantrèn* network and *Nahdhatul Ulama* (NU). Therefore, it is not surprising that Horikoshi (1976: 8) labels the *kyai* as a better anthropologist than those that surround him.

In such circumstances, the *kyai* in Madura did not need to conduct formal research, or hold what Cornwall labels ‘invited space’ (2004: 75-76), such as PRA, to gather data from the people. The *kyai* can therefore accurately map the problems the villagers face, and propose possible solutions. In accordance with the idea of participatory development, however, the *kyai* of Madura discussed these village problems with the informal leaders of every *dukuh* to cross check the accuracy of data and canvass alternative solutions. This process ensured that the proposed programs effectively addressed real social problems. Proposals were also disseminated to local people through existing social institutions (*pengajian/bhek-rembhek*) to enable them to provide input, to finalise plans and to arrange the implementation of development programs. Moreover, to ensure the people’s understanding of the programs, the *kyai* raised awareness of the programs’ importance, and related them to religious obligation by using Islamic injunctions (the *Qur’an* and the Prophet tradition). This religious connection was perceived to be positive, and had a good impact on implementation. The strategy was particularly effective in the religious community of Madura, where people typically used religious norms to guide their lives. Religious motivation combined with

the appropriateness of development programs to local needs to ensure the long-term sustainability of the programs.

It is clear that the charismatic leader in the *Pesantren Annuqayah* of Madura had an important role in development. The character of his leadership is similar to that of South Asian NGOs, as suggested by Hailey, who notes:

...key decision makers interact and operate on a very personal level. They invest considerable time in building personal contacts and developing relationships of trust. They work alongside farmers, care for families, walk and talk with villagers, listen and learn. They place great emphasis on informal contacts, unstructured dialogue and mutual learning. Their relationships, although highly personalised and even paternalistic are rooted in a genuine commitment to helping the poor and disadvantaged. But above all their success depends on their understanding of, and responsiveness to, the needs of the local communities with which they work (2001: 95).

Collectivism is the most striking characteristic of South Asian culture. This entails the integration of people from birth into strong and cohesive social groups in which hereditary social differentials are easily accepted. South Asian culture values the importance of ascription, whereby position and power are ascribed by virtue of birth, kinship ties, personal relationships and connections (Smillie and Hailey, 2001: 137). In terms of leadership, South Asian society has high 'power distance' scores in which "the less powerful members of institutions and organisations within a country accept that power is distributed unequally" (Hofstede, 1997: 28). In this cultural context, in which cohesive group relations are palpable, "to achieve success and survival it is essential to put the importance of strong personal relationships between the leadership and the communities with whom they work" (Smillie and Hailey, 2001: 137), and "the ideal boss is a benevolent autocrat or good father" (Hofstede: 1997: 37). Such characteristics are regarded as alien to Western European and North American cultures, which are

highly individualistic, low 'power distance' achievement-oriented meritocracies. Accordingly, many successful NGOs in South Asia were distinguished by working closely with local communities in a highly collaborative, but personal, way. Their interaction was based not on formulaic, structured processes, but more on common sense, shared beliefs, and mutual dialogue. Likewise, informal and highly personal relationships are important in the decision making and planning processes (Smillie and Hailey, 2001: 96).

This process is vulnerable to criticism that such practice constitutes paternalism and is easily manipulated by elites. Bardhan (2000), for example, argues that elite domination can discourage local people involvement in participation. The elites are regarded as the only people who can communicate with external agencies, propose certain development projects and effectively oversee project implementation. This domination is in contradiction with broad-based democratic participation as required by participatory development principles. In a similar vein, Mosse also criticises elite domination of the participatory process. He argues that because participatory activity is often a public event in which authorities and outsiders are present, it becomes politicised, and local knowledge produced from it is "strongly shaped by local relations of power, authority and gender and conceals differences in terms of who produces and of ways of knowing" (2001: 19). Moreover, project facilitators direct participatory activity; therefore, identification of villager needs is often shaped by perceptions of what the project can deliver, and does not represent local knowledge.

Such criticisms are based on analysis of the way organisations should operate or make decisions; however, these are founded on Western perceptions of good practices,

and fail to account for the dynamics of the local cultural context (Hailey, 2001: 96). In this regard, Hofstede (1997: 26-27, 37) suggests that the collectivist, 'high power distance' cultures, commonly associated with the developing world, have a very different perspective of participation to the individualistic, 'low power distance' cultures of the West. As a result, the process of participation is not universally the same but is dependent on different cultural norms or assumptions. Such characteristics of South Asian leadership are also found in Madurese society.¹ Therefore, the dominant role of the charismatic leader of the *Pesantren Annuqayah* of Madura, who has produced commitment and ability to mobilise people to participate in rural development, should not be judged according to Western conceptions of what constitutes a good decision making process. Such conceptions are based on individualistic and 'low power distance' culture. Rather, the role should be viewed in the cultural context of collectivism and high power distance that is appropriate to Madurese society.

Another feature of the implementation of participatory development in the *Pesantren Annuqayah* of Madura is limited involvement of women. From a certain perspective, reduced female involvement implies ineffectiveness, as one purpose of participatory development is to remedy the exclusion of women from the development process. However, equal inclusion of women in participatory development entails equivalent presence of women with their male counterparts in the public domain, and is culturally undesirable. Madurese culture is characterised by sharp division of the sexes, and the relationship between men and women is explicitly defined. Madurese culture

¹Hofstede (1997: 26) outlines power distance index (PDI) values for 50 countries and 3 regions. Indonesia, India and Pakistan score 78, 77 and 32 respectively. It means that Indonesia is higher than the last two countries in terms of power distance, and Madura is an example of such a high power distance society.

endorses only same-sex friendships among children, and enforces this social rule through the separation of male and female students in *madrasah* educational facilities, such as the *Pesantren Annuqayah*. Although their place is stereotypically confined to the household as wives and mothers (Niehof, 1987a: 167-180), women can organise themselves in women's organisations. As the *kyai* applies sexual division rigorously, male and female visitors who seek consultation with the *kyai* are strictly separated: men consult with the *kyai* and women with the *kyai*'s wife (*nyai*). This sexual division does not, however, exclude women from assisting their husbands in the field. However, to display close contact with males in the public domain is considered taboo, and could spark envy, which can lead to *carok* (taking revenge to restore self-dignity following humiliation).

According to White's levels of participation (as outlined in Chapter 1), the practice of participatory development in the *Pesantren Annuqayah* of Madura can be classified as representative participation, although the *pesantren* did not follow formulaic participatory methods. Through personal consultation with local people and informal discussions in *pengajian/bhek-rembhek*, the *kyai* learns people's expectations for improvement in their lives. This is implemented into program action, and most of the programs lead to self-reliance and sustainability. The *kyai* is always obliged to maintain strong representation of the local people; otherwise they will withdraw their support and respect. Turmudi (2006: 73), in his research on the *Pesantren Darul Ulum* of Jombang, East Java, found that in the 1970s, the *kyai* of this *pesantren* was widely condemned by the local people because he joined the government party: an action regarded as taboo, and showing a failure to struggle for *ummah* (Muslim Community). Accordingly, some

parents of children studying in the *Pesantren Darul Ulum* withdrew their children and sent them to another *pesantren*. Likewise, as discussed in Chapter 4, the image of the Madura *rato* (king) as a powerful leader declined when he neglected the local people's expectations of non-cooperation with the Dutch government. This became an important lesson for the *kyai* in Madura to maintain their representation of the local people.

6.2. Continued *Pesantren* Domination over Society

Turning to the impact of participatory development on *pesantren* domination over surrounding society, it is interesting to present Hailey's intriguing questions. He notes:

It appears that key individuals mediate an informal consultation process and facilitate a shared decision making process with local communities. This not only enables them to maintain their networks and contacts, but also enhances their profile in the community and reinforces their power and authority...Does such informal mediation reflect genuine belief in the value of collaboration and participation, or is it merely a way to reinforce their power base? Does such personalised interaction mean that NGOs manipulate and hijack decision making process? Do local people have any real power to shape decision making and to prioritise activities? (Hailey, 2001: 96-97)

As demonstrated in Chapters 4 and 5, participatory development bolsters the standing of *pesantren* over their societies. In the *Pesantren Annuqayah* of Madura, the dominant role of the *kyai* and BPM staff in participatory development inevitably leads to people's indebtedness to the *pesantren*. The people believe the *pesantren* has assisted them in solving social and economic problems they encounter. The *pesantren*'s broader achievements through development programs are also testified by its success in the 1981 *Kalapataru Awards*. These awards recognised the *pesantren*'s Guluk-Guluk village reforestation program, which transformed a barren hill to a green environment (see annex of chapter 4). Additionally, a number of development programs implemented by

the *pesantren* resulted in enhancement of the rank of Guluk-Guluk village from *Desa Swadaya* (traditional village) in 1978, to *Desa Swakarsa* (transitional village) in 1979 and to *Desa Swasembada* (developed/self-help village) in 1982. The people's indebtedness for these achievements is exploited by the *pesantren*, which asks them to make contributions of materials, cash or manpower towards the construction of new *pesantren* facilities. This could be regarded as utilization of the people's potential for the benefit of the *pesantren*. From the local people's perspective, however, such contributions are not considered to be burdens; rather, they provide great opportunities for the local people to receive the *kyai's baraka* and to attract never-ending rewards in the hereafter (*al-shadaqah al-jariyah*). In this context, participatory development allows the *pesantren* and the villagers to use each other in their own interests.

The *Pesantren Maslakul Huda* has also successfully facilitated involvement of local people in participatory development. The use of PAR by local people to identify village problems, potentials and to propose solutions has enabled them not only to create their own development programs, which have led to self-reliance and sustainability, but also allowed them to negotiate with the local government. According to White's levels of participation (as discussed in Chapter 1), it can be argued that such programs engender a kind of transformative participation at local level, especially in terms of the relationship between the local people and the local government.

However, this raises an important question: when the local people have the ability to define their own problems, use their own resources and negotiate with the local government, does the *Pesantren Maslakul Huda* phase out its role as facilitator for the local people and let the people achieve economic and political independence from the

pesantren? Or, does the *Pesantren Maslakul Huda* want to maintain the people's dependence on it, and sustain its domination over the people? As explained in Chapter 5, the *Pesantren Maslakul Huda* of Kajen Central Java utilises participatory development in a more subtle way to maintain its domination over the society. While the local people become decision makers in their dealings with local government, the *pesantren* still maintains the local people's dependence on it. This is initiated by the establishment of *Bank Perkreditan Rakyat* (BPR, People Credit Bank) *Artha Huda Abadi*, which becomes a part of the *pesantren*'s organisational structure. This BPR is established by the *pesantren*, in which the *pesantren*, its colleagues and LP3ES all have shares in the BPR. Intensive cooperation among the *pesantren*, LP3ES/P3M and KSM from 1978 to 1993 enabled the *pesantren* to realise financial benefits and establish such financial institutions. The establishment of BPR had a dual benefit: it freed the *pesantren* and KSM from financial dependency on external funding agencies such as NGOs and the state, and enabled the *pesantren* to become self-financing and to offer loans to the KSM it had established. Offering loans to the KSM allowed the *pesantren* to accumulate more financial benefits (through interest payments) and, at the same time, the *pesantren* shifted the KSM dependency on external funding sources such as NGOs on to itself. When participatory development became a seed of transformation at the local level, where there was negotiation between the local people and the local government to self-determine development, the *Pesantren Maslakul Huda* did not extend their efforts beyond the local level to achieve broader transformation. Instead, it maintained the people's financial dependence, through the KSM, on the *pesantren*.

In this context, the establishment of BPR also signifies a changing focus of the *pesantren*, from conscientisation to service delivery, that stresses economic or financial matters. The changing role from facilitation or animation to service delivery is common in South Asia, as suggested by Tilakaratna (1991: 247). He notes:

There are many EAs [external agents] who de-emphasize conscientisation as an instrument of action and tend to switch over to softer economic approaches to promoting projects using external deliveries. However, such deliveries carry the possibility of creating a new dependency: from moneylenders and traders, to animators and the service delivery agency. The new relationship may be a less exploitative one, but it is also liable to abuse. The animator becomes a delivery agent, a role which tends to alter his relationship with the people into an unequal one. He becomes the benefactor who can bring resources to the people, without the latter having to acquire them through their own efforts. He will also be heavily involved in delivery disbursement--accounting, supervision, and loan recovery--which diverts his attention from his fundamental role as animator... being tied to a delivery system, an animator would find it difficult to phase out either. Delivery tends to perpetuate the need for animator's services.

In fact, continuation of people participation may lead to broader social and political transformation. Wickremaarachchi (1991: 277) observed that the practice of participatory research by South Sri Lankan farmers led to social and political transformation after undergoing a lengthy process. He noted that when the people's organisation became stronger, and they became confident of their capacity to solve problems in their environment, they were provided with a new drive to air their views on issues affecting the larger community. The people tended to move into new social terrain that was beyond their individual power to change, and began to exert pressure on other social institutions, officials, politicians and other groups. They began to assert their rights against injustice, marking the beginning of countervailing power against those in the establishment that stood in their way. The local people began to develop an awareness of the erosion of their surplus, and recognised the malpractice of officials in different government organisations that was occurring in the name of development.

Both *Pesantren Annuqayah* and *Pesantren Maslakul Huda* have justified participatory development with Islamic teachings to enhance their social service to society. In Madura participatory development is considered as *dakwah bilhal*, (implementation of Islamic teachings in social sphere), and as *ibadat* (worship) whereby people conducting this program will get rewards in the hereafter. Likewise, in Kajen, Central Java, participatory development is regarded as *ibadah sosial* (social worship). Therefore, the integration of a new idea like participatory development into *pesantren* life enhances *the pesantren's* role in society without deviating from their traditional values. From one perspective, this religious justification represents a survival mechanism. It allows the *pesantren* to evolve through social change by ensuring such change is deeply rooted in *pesantren* tradition, which is based on the Islamic jurisprudence principle '*al-muhafazah 'ala al-qadimi al-shalih wa al-akhdzu bi al-jadidi al-ashlah*' (maintaining good old values and adopting better new values). In this context, the use of Islamic injunction to justify participatory development by the *Pesantren Annuqayah* of Madura and the *Pesantren Maslakul Huda* of Kajen is understandable.

Participatory development is also used by the *pesantren* to facilitate more organised delivery of social services to local communities. As explained in Chapter 2, in addition to religious service, the *pesantren* is morally obliged to offer social service to its surrounding society. Without this, it cannot maintain its position in society. Integration of participatory development into the *pesantren's* activities constitutes one aspect of their obligations towards their constituents. In the *Pesantren Annuqayah* of Madura, when participatory development was about to be introduced, it reconsidered its conventional *dakwah (dakwah bil maqal)*, which was limited to the spiritual sphere, and

intended to strengthen Muslim belief through religious advice, and prayer. Such functions were reassessed as non-viable solutions to villagers' problems that derived from ill-fated social and economic situations. However, the *pesantren* continued to augment its efforts to assist local people with religious advice, by conducting social activities within a religious framework. In this context, participatory development became the right thing to do. Similarly, in the *Pesantren Maslakul Huda*, the unfavourable social and economic conditions of the surrounding society increased its desire to assist. Furthermore, Mahfudh believed that adoption of participatory development fulfilled one of a Muslim leader's obligations towards their followers. In this case the *kyai* is the leader of society. The justification of participatory development shows that the *pesantren* is concerned with the pragmatism of development theories, and can direct them to their own purposes.

The inclination of the *pesantren* and the *kyai* to sustain domination over society is built on past experiences. Horikoshi (1976), who conducted research on the *kyai* and *ulama* of West Java, suggests that in dealing with social change they attempt to maintain the local socio-cultural system within which they gained their privilege positions. As traditional leaders, their position is institutionalised and imbedded in community structure and their leadership is contingent upon social recognition. Therefore, the *kyai* must demonstrate their ability to meet the religious, economic and social expectations of their society. To achieve this, traditional leaders introduced modern educational systems and new agricultural technologies to the society, and assisted the villagers in financial matters and business operation. In this context Horikoshi sees the *kyai* as a cultural broker who introduces system elements from outside and generates changes in the

community—as long as such changes benefit the *kyai*'s position as leader. However, Horikoshi notes that the *kyai* also blocks channels of communication and withholds information in order to protect their position, especially at times of leadership crisis. In one case a leadership crisis resulted from government efforts to depoliticise peasantry leadership in the village and improve security after eradication of the threat from the Indonesian communist revolts of 1965, and the Darul Islam movement. Such circumstances result in the *kyai*'s inability to lead collective social action.

To overcome such a crisis, a charismatic *kyai* who has gained a good understanding of his followers' minds and needs through lengthy interaction could manipulate meaningful cultural symbols and the spiritual needs of his followers. The *kyai* might speak to the local people of dangerous situations, such as the possibility of World War III, floods and natural disasters, even though he has no source of information on these matters outside media reports. By raising the possibility of unstable situations and creating a mood of crisis among his followers, the *kyai* can capture the attention of the villagers and lay the groundwork for performance of charismatic acts. The *kyai* also utilises the people's feeling of oppression that stems from economic shortages, and alleviates it by linking such earthly hardship to happiness in the hereafter. In the *pengajian* in which the *kyai* perform their services, people gather to increase religious merit, to stabilise unstable situations, to understand religious inscriptions and seek knowledge about *tasawwuf* (Islamic mysticism), and to receive reassurance from the *kyai* to help them manage their lives, fears and anxieties. The *kyai* also provides spiritual services such as formulas from the Qur'anic verses. When such predictions do not happen, the *kyai*'s authority does not decrease, because it is attributed to the capacity of

his followers' prayers to gain God's mercy. Hirokoshi's explanation shows how the traditional leader is always interested in maintaining their dominant position in the society, even through manipulation at times of crisis.

In Madura, the desire of the *kyai* to sustain his domination over its society is inseparable from New Order government penetration in the region (Mansurnoor, 1990). From post-independence, the government failed to accelerate development programs; therefore, the *kyai* emerged as an important, genuine local leader who was obliged to fulfil popular expectations, not only in the spiritual sphere but also in worldly matters. The latter became important when the *kyai* took over government roles (i.e. development programs). However, when the government penetrated Madura by introducing development projects, providing subsidies and promoting non-religious education, the positive results for the people resulted in the government's positioning as a serious competitor to the *kyai*'s activities, influence and patronage.

The *kyai* manages the appropriateness of religious symbols and moral views for the villagers and religious sanctions remain important in the justification or rejection of certain changes. In some cases the *kyai* use their position and collective representation to ask their followers not to endorse certain development programs. Therefore, the *kyai*'s good will and support is essential to the success of development programs. Moreover, due to the top-down government approach in such development, the *kyai*'s personal knowledge of the local situation and his hold on the people is indispensable in project and program implementation. Participatory development, with its strength in bottom-up strategy, is therefore an effective tool to bolster the positions of the *kyai* and the *pesantren*, both in society and *vis a vis* the government.

6.3. *Pesantren* and Macro Social Political Transformation

The failure of participatory development in the *pesantren* to bring about macro social and political changes beyond the local level results from inadequacies of the paradigm and strategy promoted by LP3ES. As discussed in Chapter 3, the objective of LP3ES and P3M in promoting participatory development is not only to create people participation in development programs, but also to build capability and consciousness of Muslim society at a grass roots level. This leads to the formation of an autonomous middle class, which becomes an important element for democratisation and social and political transformation at a national level. In other words, their long-term agenda is basically political: the formation of a strong civil society *vis-à-vis* the state. To achieve such objectives, however, LP3ES applied an ‘inside-in strategy’, which focuses more on service delivery programs such as savings and loans, cooperatives and income generation rather than advocacy activities. Moreover, the LP3ES paradigm is strongly influenced by the very New Order modernisation assumptions that it criticised. This is reflected in LP3ES’s intention to transform *pesantren* life from traditional to “modern”, and to utilise the *pesantren* as an instrument to support national development. Despite the fact that LP3ES introduced participatory action research and “radical” Freirean conscientisation which is important in stimulating people participation, such radical methods were mixed with modern Islamic theology and McClelland’s N-Ach training, and became transforming tools for modernity. The focus of LP3ES on service delivery, and its preference to work in a limited number of small communities to improve local living standards resulted in difficulties in promoting social and political transformation beyond the local context; therefore, LP3ES and the *pesantren* in its networks only act as

'pengrajin sosial' (social craftsmen) (Johnston, 1990: 82; Edwards and Hulme, 1992: 25).

In order for participatory development to achieve social and political transformation beyond the local level, it needs to meet three requirements (Hickey and Mohan, 2004: 168-169) which are not fulfilled by LP3ES. First, it should be part of a politically radical project, in the sense that participation should seek “directly to challenge existing power relations rather than simply work around them for more technically efficient service delivery” (Hickey and Mohan, 2004: 168). Moreover, NGOs should transform the policy process and development discourse through advocacy work. In other words, participation should be directed to wider power relations and macro political issues. Secondly, to achieve institutional and structural transformation, participation should engage with the underlying process of development, rather than remaining constrained within specific policy and intervention processes. Finally, participation should be implemented in the broader political community beyond the project level, and connect populist methods of participation with more politicised understanding of social change. Accordingly, participation will bring the people into the political process, and transform and democratise the political process at a national level.

It should be noted here, however, that challenging political structure does not mean removing the state's role to govern; rather, as argued by Williams (2003), social and political transformation does not necessarily invoke reversal of power relations. Local patrons in this context are portrayed as being of great utility to the 'lower' level, with the people preferring to work through them, rather than take their place. In the same vein, Palmer and Rossiter argue that the NGO strategy in dealing with government

structure is to influence the direction of its policy, because "NGOs cannot seek to replace the state, for they have no legitimacy, authority, or sovereignty, and, crucially, are self-selected and thus not accountable" (quoted in Edwards and Hulme, 1994: 17).

The importance of addressing political issues stems from the highly localised and often transitory nature of many small scale successful NGO programs, but at the same time, government programs which are large scale have limited impact on society. More importantly, the government system and structures that determine the distribution of power and resources within and between societies remain largely unchanged. If NGO programs cannot touch this political realm many effective projects will remain grouped as an "island of successes in an all-too-hostile ocean" (Edwards and Hulme 1994: 13). NGO projects with limited scope will not be able to generate continuous improvement in the lives of the poor. In this context, Edwards and Hulme (1994: 13) reiterate what Korten said: "If you see a baby drowning you jump in to save it; if you see a second and a third, you do the same. Soon you are so busy saving drowning babies that you never look up to see that there is someone there throwing these babies in the river".

However, achieving such transformation also requires building networks among groups of people at a national level. Such linkage, both horizontal and vertical, will enable the people to take collective action outside local group associations. Horizontal linkage will enable local people to exchange information and organise collective action, and vertical linkage in the form of national federation will allow people to have a more powerful voice. The Voluntary Health Association of India succeeded in influencing government policy because this organisation extended its advocacy work (lobbying in the media and parliament) throughout its broad network of thousands of voluntary health

workers and organisations around the country. In such a way, the strengthening of individuals at the grass roots level and organisations on a large scale allows combined lobbying to change government policy, and becomes more powerful in effecting transformation (Edwards and Hulme, 1994: 23, 25).

So far, participatory development in the *pesantren* of *Maslakul Huda* of Kajen Central Java and *Annuqayah* of Madura has created people participation with different procedures and at varied levels. In *Maslakul Huda*, using formulaic participatory development, local people are involved in the process from problem identification to program planning. In contrast, in *Annuqayah*, participatory development is modified for the local context and does not necessarily follow formulaic participatory development. Despite this form of participatory development, programs conducted by the *Pesantren Annuqayah* are mostly well-suited to local needs, and lead to sustainability and self-reliance. Moreover, the *pesantren* elites who have a dominant role in the process maintain their representation of the people, and are obliged to address local people's needs, lest *pesantren* domination erodes.

While it is worthy to structure participatory development in Madura around the local cultural context, it is also evident that such practice results in people's indebtedness to the *pesantren*. It emphasises that participatory development programs are initiated and dominated by the *pesantren* rather than the people. In the initial stages it may be beneficial to rely on the *pesantren* to solve the village problems; however, it is likely that such practice will result in villagers' long-term dependence on the *Pesantren Annuqayah* to solve their problems. As Madurese society undergoes change, however, the *Pesantren Annuqayah* also needs to reduce its involvement from facilitation, to

provision of religious legitimation for certain development programs. It will encourage the people to be more independent in solving their own problems.

Evidence from this study suggests that the *pesantren* elites, both in *Maslakul Huda* of Kajen and *Annuqayah* of Madura, have the potential to become the critical middle class that can strengthen civil society and temper government action. In Madura, for example, the *kyai* are in competition with the government to win influence over society, and utilise participatory development to strengthen their position. Likewise, in Kajen, the *pesantren* elites have the ability to negotiate with the government in determining their development programs. However, it is unlikely such effort could be sustained at the national level. First, LP3ES and P3M did not provide the *pesantren* with a paradigm that focuses on advocacy. Moreover, to create broader transformation, construction of a national network among the *pesantren* and political lobby is needed. **Secondly** as a traditional institution, the *pesantren* always consolidates its identity and maintains traditional patterns of hierarchical solidarity. Although the *pesantren* manages to stimulate local people to participate in development programs, it also maintains its domination over society. In the past, people have relied on the *pesantren* to provide Islamic knowledge, but today they also rely on it for economic assistance. Finally, the *pesantren*, as argued by Wahid, stands at a crossroads, where it must choose whether to be on the side of the government or that of the people. If the *kyai* “consider their *pesantren* to be in danger, [they] will choose to defend its survival rather than oppose the government” (Eldridge, 1995: 181). In addition, the ideology embraced by the *pesantren*, and also *Nahdhatul Ulama* (the *pesantren* affiliated organisations), is highly

influenced by the theology of *Ahl Sunnah wal Jama'ah*, which tends to comply with the ruling government rather than seek confrontation.

This study has focused on the period of 1977 to 1993, when participatory development was introduced into the *pesantren* by LP3ES and P3M. During this period, the New Order regime was characterised by repression and intolerance of the democratisation process. To understand the capacity of the *pesantren* to inspire broader transformation through advocacy work, and to build an information-sharing network between all Indonesian *pesantren*, more extensive research is required that extends beyond the two case-studies examined here.

GLOSSARY OF INDONESIAN TERMS

- Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jama'ah* (Ar. the follower of the Prophet tradition and Muslim society): ideology embraced by the *pesantren* and NU
- Al-muhafazah 'ala al-qadimi al-shalih wa al-akhdzu bi al-jadidi al-ashlah*: maintaining good old values and adopting better new value
- Amanah*: important message
- Andragogy*: a method of training that treats the participants as adult who have sufficient knowledge and experience to create learning sources for themselves, and of themselves
- Ashar*: afternoon
- Asy'ariyah*: Islamic theology embraced by the *pesantren* society
- Bandongan*: method of learning in the *pesantren* in which a group of *santri* listens to the *kyai* who reads, translates (using Javanese language) and comments on certain Arabic religious texts.
- Bapa, Babuh, Guruh, and Ratoh*: father, mother, religious teacher, and king
- BAPPENAS**: National Development Planning Board
- Berkeley Mafia*: a group of University of California Berkeley-trained neo-classical economists who became architects of the New Order modernisation in 1970s
- Baraka*: blessing
- Bhek-rembhek*: deliberative discussion (in Madura) held after the religious sermon session in the *pengajian* for solving social problems
- BPM PPA** (*Biro Pengabdian Masyarakat Pondok Pesantren Annuqayah*): Society Service Bureau of the *Pesantren Annuqayah* of Madura
- BPPM** (*Biro Pengembangan Pesantren dan Masyarakat, Bureau for Pesantren and Community Development*): a new body established in the *pesantren* to manage participatory development
- BPPM PMH**: Bureau of Society and *Pesantren* Development of the *Pesantren Maslakul Huda*
- BPR** (*Bank Perkreditan Rakyat*): People Credit Bank
- BUMP** (*Badan Usaha Milik Pesantren*): the *pesantren* owned-enterprise bodies
- Bupati*: district head
- Camat*: sub-district head
- Carok* : a culturally sanctioned form of violence to settle accounts that could involve the entire core of kinsmen. When someone's honor especially related to family, women, and public reputation is transgressed he himself or together with his kinsmen will kill the transgressor. In return, the relatives of the victims may take revenge against the killers.
- Ceramah*: religious sermons
- Dakwah*: Islamic propagation
- Dakwah bil hal*: transformation of Islamic teachings from religious sermons into social activities
- Dana kematian*: death fund
- Desa Swadaya* : traditional village
- Desa Swakarsa* : transitional village
- Desa Swasembada*:developed village

- Dinamisasi*: dynamisation
- Doa*: prayers
- Dukuh*: hamlet
- Fiqh*: Islamic jurisprudence
- Gadai tanah*: agricultural land pawning
- Golkar (Golongan Karya)*: the New Order party
- Gotong royong*: mutual aid and collective work
- Hadith*: the Prophet tradition
- Halal-haram*: lawful and unlawful
- Halaqah*: a group of *santri* discusses the content of certain *kitab* in an uncritical way with the *kyai* to deepen their understanding
- Ibadah*: worship; also every good activity conducted for the sake of God and is useful for human beings.
- Ibadat sosial* : social worship
- Ikhlas*: sincerity
- Ilmu laduni*: knowledge acquired without learning
- Imtihan*: festivity at the end of educational session in the *pesantren*
- Isya'*: night
- Kafir*: infidel
- Kaji urai*: structured experience
- Kalpataru Award*: Award granted by the Indonesian government to individuals or groups who contribute to saving the environment within national development programs
- Kanalisis*: canalisation
- Karama*: the characteristic attributed to a holy man such as *saint* and *kyai*, who can transfer God's blessing to the people who need it.
- Kelompok pengajian*: religious congregation
- Kepala desa* : village head
- Kerja bakti*: community working bees
- Kerudung*: Islamic head scarf
- Kerupuk*: tapioca crisp
- Keselamatan*: security
- Khataman*: reciting the whole chapters of the *Qur'an*
- Kitab kuning*: *kitab* (Ar): book: the materials ---usually classical Islamic books--- offered in the *pesantren* and generally referred to the "yellow books". The term "yellow" denotes the condition of the books that are very old, and were usually improperly preserved. However, nowadays many new similar books deliberately re-printed on the yellow papers
- KMKP (Kredit Modal Kecil Permanen)**: Permanent Small Capital Credit
- KSM (Kelompok Swadaya Masyarakat)**: self-help groups
- Kuwalat*: a curse
- Kyai*: *pesantren*'s leader
- Kyai langgar*: *kyai* of mosque who leads the religious activities for the surrounding society
- Kyai pesantren*: *kyai* of the *pesantren* who leads the *pesantren*
- La ilaaha Illa Allah*: there is no god but Allah

Lembaga Pengembangan Swadaya Masyarakat (LPSM): an institution for developing community self-reliance which is larger, usually city-based group that gives support or assistance to the development of smaller groups

Lembaga Sosial Desa: Village Social Committee

Lembaga Swadaya Masyarakat (LSM): a self-reliant community institution, a group of poor people or local groups which work directly with them

LKMD: Village Resilience Institution

LP3ES (Lembaga Penelitian, Pendidikan, dan Penerangan Ekonomi dan Sosial, the Institute for Social and Economic Research, Education and Information): NGO sponsoring participatory development in the *pesantren*

LTPM (Latihan Tenaga Pengembangan Masyarakat, Training for Community Development Workers): Training held by LP3ES for the *pesantren* and village facilitators.

Madrasah: religious school which combines its own and the Ministry of Religious Affairs' curriculum in which both religious and non-religious subjects are taught.

Madrasa system: classical system

Madrasah 'Aliyah: religious high school

Madrasah Ibtida'iyah: religious primary school

Madrasah Mathali'ul Falah (PIM): *Perguruan Islam Mathali'ul Falah*

Madrasah Salafiyah: *Salafiyah* School

Madrasah Tsanawiyah: religious secondary school

Madzhab: Islamic school of law

Maghrib: sunset

Majusi : faithless people

Makruh-mubah: inappropriate-neutral

Modernisasi: modernisation

Muhammadiyah: an Indonesian reformist Muslim organisation

Muharram or *Syura*: the first month of Islamic year

Murid: spiritual student

Mursyid: spiritual teacher

Naqshabandiyah: a branch of *sufi* orders

Nahdhatul Ulama (NU lit. Resurgence of Islamic Scholars): main organisation of Indonesia's traditional Muslims

Nyai: *kyai*'s wife

P3M (Perhimpunan Pengembangan Pesantren and Masyarakat, the Indonesian Society for Pesantren and Community Development): NGO sponsoring participatory development in the *pesantren*

Pamong Desa: village officials

Pancasila: Indonesian state ideology that consists of five principles

PDI (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia): Indonesia Democratic Party

Pembangunan: development

Pengajian: religious courses, though informally organised, held mostly on regular basis (weekly) in mosques or private houses after evening prayers

Perdikan: village which was not imposed with the obligation of paying tax to Dutch colonial government

- Persis (Persatuan Islam, Islamic Union)*: an Islamic reformist Muslim organisation
- Pesantren Khalafi*: Type of *pesantren* that not only teaches religious studies but also includes non-religious curriculum or sets up schools.
- Pesantren Salafi*: type of the *pesantren* that only teaches religious studies, usually from *kitab kuning* as its core educational activity
- Pesantren*: Islam boarding school
- Polowijo*: short term plants such as peanut and corn
- Pondok*: students' dormitory in *pesantren* complex
- PPIM (*Pusat Pengkajian Islam dan Masyarakat*): Centre for the Study of Islam and Society of State Islamic University of Jakarta
- PPP (*Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, United Development Party*): Islamic party
- Repelita*: Indonesian five-year development plan
- Restu*: approval
- RT (*Rukun Tetangga*): household Association)
- Rukun Warga (RW)*: hamlet organisation coordinating household organisations.
- Salafiyah*: the early generation of Muslims that is, companions of the Prophet and their followers who had applied Islam directly from the Prophet.
- Salam temple*: shaking hand with money
- Sami'na wa atha'na*: we listen to and obey (the order)
- Santri*: *pesantren* students
- Sawah*: wet field cultivation
- Selamatan* : mortuary ritual, ritual meal
- Shadaqah jariyah*: never ending rewards granted by God in hereafter
- Simpan pinjam*: savings and loans
- Simpanan manasuka* or *sukarela*: private saving
- Simpanan pokok* : main saving paid once-for-all by members of the cooperative
- Simpanan wajib*: obligatory saving paid by members of cooperative weekly
- SD (*Sekolah Dasar*): non-religious primary school
- SLTP (*Sekolah Lanjutan Tingkat Pertama*): non-religious secondary school
- SLTA (*Sekolah Lanjutan Tingkat Atas*): non-religious high school
- Sorogan*: a method of learning in the *pesantren* in which individual *santri* studies religious text in front of the *kyai*.
- Stabilitas*: stability
- Subuh*: dawn
- Sufism*: Islamic mysticism
- Swadaya*: self-help
- Syukuran*: gift
- Tafaqquh fi al-din*: deepening Islamic knowledge
- Takdir*: destiny, fate
- Tanah bengkok*: village agricultural land utilised by the village head
- Tenggang renteng*: collective contribution to repay the member's loan due to his/her inability to repay in schedule.
- Tengkulak*: broker and usually tends to seek substantial gain from trading transactions at the expense of farmers' profit margin
- Ternak sapi*: beef cattle farm
- Thariqah*: the *sufi* orders

UBSP (*Usaha Bersama Simpan Pinjam*): Savings and Loans Pre-cooperatives
UDKP (*Unit Daerah Kerja Pembangunan* Unit for Coordinating Development): Local institution set up in every sub-district (*kecamatan*) based on the Presidential Instruction No. 13/1972 to coordinate development activities in sub-district and is responsible for the head of district

Ulama: Muslim scholars

Universitas: University

Ustadz: religious teacher

Wajib-sunnah: compulsory-strongly encouraged

Waliyullah: saint

Waqf: endowment

Watak mandiri: self-reliance

Wong cilik, wong awam oring kenek: ordinary people

Wong gedhe: respected people who have higher social status

Yayasan Pendidikan: educational foundation

Zakat: Islamic alms tax

Zhuhur: noon

Appendix 1**Currency Exchange Rate from US\$ 1 to *Rupiah* (Rp)**

Year	Rp
1977	415
1978	446
1979	631
1980	632
1981	637
1982	666
1983	919
1984	1,030
1985	1,115
1986	1,283
1987	1,643
1988	1,717
1989	1,787
1990	1,882
1991	1,982
1992	2,051
1993	2,095

Source: World Bank (2003)

Appendix 2

List of Interviewees

1. KH Syafi'i Anshary (*Pesantren Annuqayah* of Madura/21 and 22/12/2006)
2. KH Abdul Basith AS (*Pesantren Annuqayah* of Madura/23/12/2006)
3. Ustadz Pandji Taufiq (*Pesantren Annuqayah* of Madura/24 and 25/12/2006)
4. Muzammil Al Muttaqin (*Pesantren Annuqayah* of Madura/ 26/12/2006)
5. Qusyairy (*Pengajian of Guluk-Guluk* Madura/ 23/12/2006)
6. Abdul Wahib (*Pesantren Maslakul Huda* of Kajen/ 7/01/2007)
7. Sukardi (*Pesantren Maslakul Huda* of Kajen/ 8/01/2007)
8. Dr. Purwo Santoso (Gadjah Mada University, Yogyakarta/09/01/2007)
9. Isyon Basyuni (LP3ES, Jakarta/ 22/01/2007)
10. Dr. Abdul A'la (Institute of Islamic Studies, Surabaya/27/12/2006)
11. Sunardji (P3M, Jakarta/ 14/12/2006)

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Abdurrahman. 2002. *The Pesantren Architects and Their Socio-Religious Teaching (1850-1950)*. PhD Dissertation. Ann Arbour: UMI Dissertation Services.
- Ali, Fachri., and Effendy, Bahtiar. 1986. *Merambah Jalan Baru Islam: Rekonstruksi Pemikiran Islam Indonesia Masa Orde Baru*. Bandung: Mizan.
- Alwie, Alfoe Ni'am. 2004. *Pesantren Maslakul Huda: Membentuk Insan Mandiri*. Yogyakarta: Wisma KMF Papingan.
- Arief, Sritua and Sasono, Adi. 1981. *Indonesia: Ketergantungan dan Keterbelakangan*. Jakarta: Lembaga Studi Pembangunan.
- Azra, Azyumardi. 1997. "Pesantren: Kontinuitas dan Perubahan", in Nurcholish Madjid. *Bilik-Bilik Pesantren: Sebuah Potret Perjalanan*, Jakarta: Paramadina. pp.ix-xxvii.
- Bardhan. Pranab. 2000. "Irrigation and Cooperation: An Empirical Analysis of 48 48 Irrigation Communities in South India". *Economic Development and Cultural Change*. 48(4): 847-865.
- Barton, Greg. 1995."Neo-Modernism: A Vital Synthesis of Traditionalist and Modernist Islamic Thought in Indonesia". *Studia Islamika*. 2(3): 1-75.
- Baswedan, Anis Rasyid. 2004. "Political Islam in Indonesia: Present and Future Trajectory". *Asian Survey*. 44 (55): 670.
- Basyuni, Ison. 1985. "Da'wah Bil Hal Gaya Pesantren". In M Dawam Rahardjo (ed.). *Pergulatan Dunia Pesantren: Membangun dari Bawah*. Jakarta: P3M. pp. 219-244.
- Billah, MM. 1985. "Pemikiran Awal Pengembangan Pesantren". In M Dawam Rahardjo (ed.). *Pergulatan Dunia Pesantren: Membangun dari Bawah*. Jakarta: P3M. pp. 289-198.
- _____. 1988. "Dari Paradigma Instrumentalist ke Paradigma Alternatif", *Pesantren*, 4(4): 10-29.
- Booth, Anne. 1988. *Agricultural Development in Indonesia*. Sydney: Allen and Unwin.
- Bruinessen, Martin van. 1994. *NU: Tradisi, Relasi-Relasi Kuasa dan Pencarian Makna Baru*. Yogyakarta: LKiS.

- _____. 1995. *Kitab Kuning, Pesantren dan Tarikat: Tradisi-Tradisi Islam di Indonesia*. Bandung: Mizan
- Budiman, Arief. 1988. "The Emergence of the Bureaucratic Capitalist State in Indonesia", in Tech Ghee Lim.(ed.). *Reflections on Development in Southeast Asia*. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. pp. 110-129.
- _____. 1994. "Reply in Session 3". In Rustam Ibrahim (ed.). *The Indonesian NGO Agenda toward the Year 2000*. Jakarta: CESDA-LP3ES. pp. 112-116.
- Castles, Lance. 1966. "Notes on the Islamic School at Gontor". In *Indonesia* 1(1): 30-45.
- Chambers, Robert. 1994. 'The Origin and Practice of Participatory Rural Appraisal', *World Development*, 22:7. pp. 953-969.
- Cleaver, Frances. 2001. "Institutions, Agency and the Limitations of Participatory Approaches to Development". In Bill Cooke and Uma Kothari. *Participation: the New Tyranny*. London: Zed Books. pp. 36-55.
- Cooke, Bill and Kothari, Umma. "The Case for Participation as Tyranny". In Bill Cooke and Uma Kothari (eds.). *Participation: the New Tyranny*. London: Zed Books. pp. 1-15.
- Cornwall, Andrea. 2004. "Spaces for Transformation? Reflections on Issues of Power and Difference in Participation in Development". In In Samuel Hickey and Giles Mohan (eds.). *Participation: From Tyranny to Transformation?: Exploring New Approaches to Participation in Development*. London: Zed Books. pp. 75-91.
- Craig, Gary and Mayo, Marjorie (eds.). 1995. *Community Empowerment: A reader in Participation and Development*. London: Zed Books.
- Dhofier, Zamakhsyari. 1980. *The Pesantren Tradition: A Study of the Roles of the Kyai in the Maintenance of the Tradition of Ideology of Islam in Java*. Ph.D Thesis. Canberra: Australian National University.
- _____. 1982. *Tradisi Pesantren: Studi tentang Pandangan Hidup Kyai*. Jakarta: LP3ES.
- _____. 1995. "The Role of Traditional Islamic Educational Institutions in the Universalization of Basic Education in Indonesia". In AG Muhaimin (ed.). *Tradition and Change in Indonesian Islamic Education*. Jakarta: Office of Religious Research and Development, Ministry of Religious Affairs. pp. 36-60.
- _____. 1995. "Pesantren and the Development of Islam in the New Order" In AG Muhaimin (ed.). *Tradition and Change in Indonesian Islamic*

- Education*. Jakarta: Office of Religious Research and Development, Ministry of Religious Affairs. pp. 87-104.
- Dilts, Russ (et.al). 1999. "Researchers from the Village: An Indonesian Non-Government Ryal Action and Community Development Program. *Innotech Journal*. 1 (January-June): 34-42.
- Dirdjosanjoto, Pradjarta. 1999. *Memelihara Umat: Kiai Pesantren and Kiai Langgar*. Yogyakarta: LKiS.
- Direktorat Jenderal Pembinaan Kelembagaan Agama Islam. 1997. *Data Potensi Pondok Pesantren Seluruh Indonesia Tahun 1997*. Jakarta: Depag RI.
- Dudley, E. 1993. *The Critical Villager: Beyond Community Participation*. London: Cornell University Press.
- Edwards, Michael and Hulme, David. 1994. "Scaling-Up the Developmental Impact of NGOs: Concepts and Experiences" in Michael Edwards and David Hulme (eds.). *Making a Difference: NGOs and Development in a Changing World*. London: Earthscan. pp. 13-27.
- Effendy, Bahtiar. 2001. *Islam and the State: The Transformation of Islamic Political Ideas and Practices in Indonesia*. Singapore: ISEAS.
- Effendy, Bisri. 1990. *An-Nuqayah: Gerakan Transformasi Sosial di Madura*. Jakarta: P3M.
- Eldridge, Philip J. 1988. "Non-Governmental Organisation and the Role of State in Indonesia". Paper presented to conference on *The State and Civil Society in Contemporary Indonesia*. November 1988.
- _____. 1995. *Non-Government Organizations and Democratic Participation in Indonesia*. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press.
- Engineer, Ashghar Ali. 1992. *Islam dan Pembebasan*. Bandung: Mizan.
- Esteva, Gustavo. 1992. "Development." In Wolfgang Sachs (ed.), *The Development Dictionary: A Guide to Knowledge and Power*. London: Zed Books. pp. 6-25.
- Fadjar, A Malik. 1997. "Sintesa Antara Perguruan Tinggi dan Pesantren". In Madjid, Nurcholish. 1997. *Bilik-Bilik Pesantren: Sebuah Potret Perjalanan*, Jakarta: Paramadina. pp. 111-120.
- Faiqoh. 2003. *Nyai: Agen Perubahan di Pesantren*. Jakarta: Kucica.

- Fakih, Mansour. 1985. "Pengembangan Masyarakat di Pesantren: Hambatan dan Permasalahan". In Manfred Oepen and Wolfgang Karcher. *The Impact of Pesantren in Education and Community Development in Indonesia*. Jakarta: P3M. pp. 148-160.
- _____. 1995. *The Role of Non Governmental Organizations in Social Transformation: A Participatory Inquiry in Indonesia*. Ph.D Dissertation. Ann Arbour: UMI Dissertation Service.
- Federspiel, Howard M. 1991. "Muslim Intellectuals and Indonesia's National Development", *Asian Survey*, 31(3): 232-245.
- Fowler, Alan. 1997. *Striking a Balance: A Guide to Enhancing the Effectiveness of Non-Governmental Organisations in International Development*. London: Earthscan.
- Freire, Paulo. 1970. *The Pedagogy of the Oppressed*. New York: The Seabury Press.
- Geertz, Clifford. 1960. "The Javanese Kijaji: The Changing Role of A Cultural Broker", *Comparative Studies in Society and History*. 2 (2): 228-249.
- Gufron. 2006. *Peran Pesantren Maslakul Huda dalam Pengembangan Masyarakat Bidang Peternakan di Desa Sidomukti Kecamatan Margoyoso Kabupaten Pati Jawa Tengah*. Honour Thesis. Yogyakarta: Fakultas Ushuluddin, Universitas Islam Negeri
- Guijt, I and Shah, M. 1998. *The Myth of Community: Gender Issues in Participatory Development*. London: IT Publication.
- Guinness, Patrick. 1986. *Harmony and Hierarchy in a Javanese Kampung*. Singapore: Oxford University Press.
- Hadimulyo. 1985. "Dua Pesantren, Dua Wajah Budaya". In Rahardjo, M Dawam. (ed.). *Pergulatan Dunia Pesantren: Membangun dari Bawah*. Jakarta: P3M. pp. 98-113.
- _____. 1983. "Latihan di Mana-Mana". *Pesan*. (November-December): 9-15
- Hailey, John. 2001. "Beyond the Formulaic: Process and Practice in South Asian NGOs. In Bill Cooke and Uma Kothari (eds.). *Participation: the New Tyranny*. London: Zed Books. pp. 88-101
- Haleem, MAS Abdel. 2005. *The Qur'an*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hasan, M Afif. 1994. *Pelaksanaan Pola Pembangunan Masyarakat Deswa oleh Pondok Pesantren Annuqayah: Studi Diskriptif tentang Biro Pengabdian Masyarakat Pondok Pesantren Annuqayah Guluk-Guluk Sumenep*. Master

- Thesis. Malang, Indonesia: Program Pendidikan Luar Sekolah Program Pascasarjana IKIP.
- Hasan, M Nashihin. 1995. "Karakter dan Fungsi Pesantren". In Manfred Oepen and Wolfgang Karcher. *The Impact of Pesantren in Education and Community Development in Indonesia*. Jakarta: P3M. pp. 108-109.
- Hefner, Robert W. 1993. "Islam, State, and Civil Society: ICMI and the Struggle for the Indonesian Middle Class." *Indonesia*. 56: 1-35.
- Hettne, Bjorn. 1995. *Development Theory and the Three Worlds: Towards an International Political Economy of Development*. New York: Longman Scientific and Technical.
- Hickey, Samuel and Mohan, Giles. 2004. "Towards Participation as Transformation: Critical Themes and Challenges". In Samuel Hickey and Giles Mohan (eds.). *Participation: From Tyranny to Transformation?: Exploring New Approaches to Participation in Development*. London: Zed Books. pp. 3-24.
-
- _____. 2004. "Relocating Participation within a Radical Politics of Development: Insights from Political Action and practice". In Samuel Hickey and Giles Mohan (eds.). *Participation: From Tyranny to Transformation?: Exploring New Approaches to Participation in Development*. London: Zed Books. pp. 168-169.
- Hien, Yap Thiap. 1990. "Law, State and Civil Society". In Arif Budiman (ed.). *State and Civil Society in Indonesia*. Monash Papers on Southeast Asia No. 22 Victoria: Monash University. pp. vi-x.
- Hill, Hal. 1990. "Ownership in Indonesia: Who Owns What and Does It Matter?". In Hal Hill and Terry Hull (eds.). *Indonesia Assessment 1990*. Canberra: Department of Political and Social Change, Research School of Asia Pacific and Asian Studies, the Australian National University. pp. 56-65.
- Hill, Hal and Weidemann, Anna. 1989. "Regional Development in Indonesia: Pattern and Issues. In Hal Hill (ed.). *Unity and Diversity: Regional Economic Development in Indonesia since 1970*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 3-54.
- Hofstede, Geert. 1997. *Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Holcombe, Susan Higinbotham. 1995. *Managing to Empower: The Grameen Bank's Experience of Poverty Alleviation*. London: Zed Book.

- Horikoshi, Hiroko. 1976. *A Traditional Leader in a Time of Change*. Ph.D Thesis, Urbana: University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
- _____. 1979. "Mental Illness as a Cultural Phenomenon: Public Tolerance and Therapeutic Process among the Moslem Sundanese in West Java". *Indonesia*. 28(October): 121-138.
- Jabali, Fuad and Jamhari (eds.). 2003. *The Modernization of Islam in Indonesia: An Impact Study on the Cooperation between the IAIN and McGill University*. Montreal and Jakarta: Indonesia-Canada Islamic Higher Education Project.
- Jay, Robert R. 1969. *Javanese Villagers: Social Relation in Rural Modjokuto*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Johnston, Marry. 1990. "Non-Government Organisations at the Crossroads in Indonesia". In RC Rice (ed.). *Indonesian Economic Development: Approaches, Technology, Small-Scale Textiles, Urban Infrastructure and NGOs*. Clayton, Victoria: Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University. pp. 77-92.
- Jones, Sydney. 1996. "The Javanese Pesantren: Between Elite and Peasantry". In *Reshaping Local Worlds: Formal Education and Cultural Change in Rural South East Asia*. New Haven, Conn: Yale Centre for International and Area Studies. pp. 19-41.
- Kabeer, Naila. 1999. "Resources, Agency, Achievements: Reflections on the Measurement of Women's Empowerment". *Development and Change*. 30(3): 435-464.
- _____. 2005. "Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment: A Critical Analysis of the Third Millennium Development Goal". *Gender and Development*. 13(1): 13-24
- Kartodirdjo, Sartono. 1973. *Protest Movement in Rural Java: A Study of Agrarian Unrest in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries*. Singapore: Oxford University Press.
- Korten, David. 1990. *Getting to the 21st Century: Voluntary Action and the Global Agenda*. Connecticut: Kumarian Press.
- Korten, David., and Carbner, George. 1984. "Planning Framework for People Centered Development", in Korten, David, and Klauss, Rudi. *People Centered Development*. Connecticut: Kumarian Press. pp. 201-209.
- Korten, Frances. 1983. "Community participation: A Management Perspective on Obstacles and Options." In David C. Korten and Felipe B. Alfonso (eds.)

Bureaucracy and the Poor: Closing the Gap. Singapore: McGraw-Hill International Book Company. pp. 181-200.

- Kothari, Umma. 2001. "Power, Knowledge and Social Control in Participatory Development". In Bill Cooke and Uma Kothari. *Participation: the New Tyranny*. London: Zed Books. pp. 139-152.
- Krishna, Anirudh, Norman Uphoff and Milton J Esman (eds.) 1997. *Reason for Hope: Instructive Experiences in Rural Development*. West Hartford, Conn: Kumarian Press.
- Kuntowijoyo. 1991. *Paradigma Islam: Interpretasi untuk Aksi*. Bandung: Mizan.
- Latif, Yudi. 2005. *Inteligensia Muslim dan Kuasa: Genealogi Intelegensia Muslim Indonesia Abad ke-20*. Bandung: Mizan.
- LP3ES. 1974. *Laporan Penelitian Partisipasi Masyarakat Pulau Madura dalam Pembangunan* [Microform]. Washington DC: Photoduplication Service, Library of Congress.
- _____. 1977. *Program Latihan Pengembangan Masyarakat Desa Melalui Lembaga Tradisionil Pedesaan: Pesantren*, Unpublished Paper, Jakarta: LP3ES.
- _____ and BPPM PMH. 1983. *Laporan Latihan Tenaga Pengembangan Masyarakat(LTPM) Untuk 13 Desa Kecamatan Margoyoso Kabupaten Pati II (Putri)*, Kajen: BPPM PMH
- _____. 2001. *Profil & Pendapat Kenangan 30 Tahun LP3ES (1971-2001)*. Jakarta: LP3ES.
- LP3ES Research and Reporting Team. 1981. "Cooperatives Search for Self-Reliance: A Field Report". *Prisma: the Indonesian Indicator*. 23 (December): 27-63.
- MacAndrew, Colin.1986. "Central Government and Local Development in Indonesia: An Overview". In Colin Mac Andrew (ed.). *Central Government and Local Development in Indonesia*. Singapore: Oxford University Press. pp. 6-19.
- Madjid, Norcholish. 1997. *Bilik-Bilik Pesantren: Sebuah Potret Perjalanan*, Jakarta: Paramadina.
- Mahfudh, MA Sahal. 1991. "Pembinaan Gizi dan Kesejahteraan Keluarga (Dari Sudut Pranata Agama dan Tokoh Agama)". Paper presented to National Discussion on *Gizi*. 14-19 Oktober.
- _____. 1994. *Nuansa Fikih Sosial*. Yogyakarta: LKiS

- Makdisi, George. 1981. *The Rise of Colleges*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Mansurnoor, Iik Arifin. *Islam in an Indonesian World: Ulama of Madura*. Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University Press, 1990.
- Maryono, Erfan. 1988. "Aktualisasi Peran Kemasyarakatan Pesantren: Refleksi Pengalaman LPSM". In *Pesantren*, 4(4): 30-42.
- Marzali, Amri. 2005. *Anthropologi dan Pembangunan Indonesia*. Jakarta: Prenada Media.
- Mastuhu. 1994. *Dinamika Sistem Pendidikan Pesantren*. Jakarta: INIS.
- Mohan, Giles. 2002. "Participatory Development". In Vandana Desai and Robert B Potter (eds.). *The Companion to Development Studies*. London: Hodder Arnold. pp. 49-53.
- Moser, CON. 1989. *Community Participation in Urban Projects in the Third World*. Oxford: Pergamon Press.
- Mosse, David. 2001. "People's Knowledge, Participation and Patronage: Operations and Representations in Rural Development." In Bill Cooke and Uma Kothari. *Participation: the New Tyranny*. London: Zed Books. pp. 16-35.
- Mudatsir, Arief. 1985. "Kajen Desa Pesantren" in M. Dawam Rahardjo (ed.). *Pergulatan Dunia Pesantren: Membangun dari Bawah*. Jakarta: P3M. pp. 197-218.
- Mufid, Ahmad Syafi'i. 2006. *Tangklukan, Abangan dan Tarekat: Kebangkitan Agama di Jawa*. Jakarta: Yayasan Obor Indonesia.
- Muhaimin, AG. 1995. "Prelude". In AG Muhaimin (ed.). *Tradition and Change in Indonesian Islamic Education*. Jakarta: Office of Religious Research and Development, Ministry of Religious Affairs. pp. 1-18.
- Kassam, Y and Kemal, M (eds.). 1982. *Participatory Research: An Emerging Alternative Methodology in Social Science Research*. New Delhi: Society for Participatory Research in Asia.
- Munawar-Rahman, Budi. 1995. "Dari Tahapan Moral ke Periode Sejarah: Pemikiran Neo-Modernisme Islam di Indonesia". *Ulumul Qur'an*. 3(v): 4-29.
- Niehof, Anke. 1987a. "Madurese Women as Brides and Wives". In Elsbeth Locher-Scholten and Anke Niehof (eds.). *Indonesian Women in Focus: Past and Present*. Dordrecht, Holland: KITLV. pp. 166-180.

- _____. 1987b. "Family Planning in Rural Madura". In Phillip Quarles van Ufford (ed.). *Local Leadership and Programme Implementation in Indonesia*. Amsterdam: Free University. pp. 117-136.
- Noer, Deliar. 1973. *The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia 1900-1942*. Singapore: Oxford University Press.
- Parfitt, Trevor. 2004. "The Ambiguity of Participation: A Qualified Defence of Participatory Development." *Third World Quarterly*. 25(3):537-556
- Parpart, Jane L. 2004. "Rethinking Participatory Empowerment, Gender and Development: the PRA Approach". In Jane L Parpart, Shirin M, and Staudt, Kathleen (eds). *Rethinking Empowerment: Gender and Development in a Global/Local World*. London: Routledge. pp. 165-181.
- Pesantren Annuqayah. 1990. *Laporan Pelaksanaan Program Kerja BPM Annuqayah Document*. Unpublished Report. Sumenep: PPAN
- _____.1997. *Satu Abad Pesantren Annuqayah*, Sumenep: PPAN Press.
- Prasodjo, Soedjoko (ed.). 1982. *Profil Pesantren: Laporan Hasil Penelitian Pesantren Al-Fallah dan Delapan Lainnya di Bogor*. Jakarta: LP3ES.
- P3M. 1990. *Laporan Hasil Penelitian untuk Pengembangan Program BPPM Maslakul Huda Kajen Margoyoso Pati*. Jakarta: P3M.
- Rahardjo, M. Dawam.1974. "Pesantren dan Pembaharuan". In Rahardjo, M. Dawam (ed.). *Pesantren dan Pembaharuan*. Jakarta: LP3ES. pp. 1-38.
- _____.1975. "The Kyai, the Pesantren and the Village: A Preliminary Sketch". *Prisma: The Indonesian Indicator*. 1(1): 32-43.
- _____.1985. *Pergulatan Dunia Pesantren: Membangun dari Bawah*. Jakarta: P3M
- _____.1985. "Perkembangan Masyarakat dalam Perspektif Pesantren". In M Dawam Rahardjo (ed.). *Pergulatan Dunia Pesantren: Membangun dari Bawah*. Jakarta: P3M. pp. vii-xxii.
- Rahman, MD Anisur. 1993. *People's Self-Development: Perspective on Participatory Action Research: A Journey Through Experience*. London: Zed Books.
- Ramage, Douglas. 1995. *Politics in Indonesia: Democracy, Islam and the Ideology of Tolerance*, London: Routledge.
- Robison, Richard. 1986. *Indonesia: The Rise of Capital*, Sydney: Allen and Unwin.

- Rostow, WW. 1971. *The Stage of Economic Growth: a Non-Communist Manifesto*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Salim, Emil. 1983. "Development with Equity: Indonesia's Future Challenge". *Prisma: The Indonesian Indicator*. 27(March): 3-18.
- _____. 1983. "Common Aims, Different Approaches". *Prisma: The Indonesian Indicator*. 28(March): 70-72.
- Santoso, Purwo. 1988. "Kiprah Pesantren dalam Transformasi: Catatan dari Maslakul Huda". *Pesantren*. 4(4): 80-87.
- _____. 1989. *Politik Kultural Pesantren: Interaksi LSM/LPSM-Pesantren dengan Pemerintah dalam Pengembangan Masyarakat*. Laporan Penelitian. Yogyakarta: Fakultas Ilmu Sosial dan Politik Universitas Gadjah Mada.
- _____. 1992. *Political Challenges to Sustainable Development in Indonesia*. MA Thesis. Ann Arbor: UMI Dissertation Services.
- Sasono, Adi. 1987. "Rentang Peran Serta LPSM". In *Alternatif*. 4 (February-March): 23-8.
- Schneider, Hartmut. 1995. "Concept, Issues and Experiences for Building up Participation". In Schneider, Hartmut and Libercier, Marie-Helene. *Participatory Development from Advocacy to Action*. France: OECD. pp. 29-64.
- Schuurman, Frans J (ed.). 1993. *Beyond the Impasse: New Directions in Development Theory*. London: Zed Books.
- Sen, Amartya Kumar. 1999. *Development as Freedom*. Oxford: Oxford University Press
- Slamet-Velsink, Ina. 1994. "Traditional Leadership in Rural Java". In Hans Atlov and Sven Cederroth (eds.). *Leadership on Java: Gentle Hints, Authoritarian Rule*. Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press. pp. 33-56.
- Smillie, Ian and Hailey, John. 2001. *Managing for Change: Leadership, Strategy and Mangement in South Asian NGOs*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Steenbrink, Karel A. 1986. *Pesantren, Madrasah, Sekolah: Pendidikan Islam dalam Kurun Modern*. Jakarta: LP3ES.
- Sulaiman, Irhamni. 1985. "Pesantren Mengembangkan Teknologi Tepat Guna ke Desa", in Rahardjo, M Dawam. (ed.). *Pergulatan Dunia Pesantren: Membangun dari Bawah*. Jakarta: P3M. pp. 245-263.

- Tebba, Soedirman. 1985. "Dilema Pesantren: Belenggu Politik dan Pembaruan Sosial" in Rahardjo, M Dawam. (ed.). *Pergulatan Dunia Pesantren: Membangun dari Bawah*. Jakarta: P3M. pp. 267-288.
- Tiliakratna, SP. 1991. "The Role of Animator". In Ponna Wignaraja, Akmal Hussain, Harsh Sethi and Ganeshan Wignaraja (eds.). *Participatory Development: Learning from South Asia*. Karachi: Oxford University Press. pp. 223-252.
- Tim Kompas. 1997. "Pesantren: Dari Pendidikan Hingga Politik" in Nurcholish Madjid. 1997. *Bilik-Bilik Pesantren: Sebuah Potret Perjalanan*, Jakarta: Paramadina. pp. 121-131.
- Turmudi, Endang. 2006. *Struggling for the Umma: Changing Leadership Roles of Kiai in Jombang, East Java*. Canberra: ANU E-Press.
- United Nation Development Program (UNDP). 1991. *Human Development Report 1991*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Vatikiotis, Michael J. 1994. *Indonesian Politics under Suharto: Order, Development, and Pressure for Change*. London: Routledge.
- Wahid, Abdurrahman. 2001. *Menggerakkan Tradisi: Esai-Esai Pesantren*. Yogyakarta: LKiS.
- Weber, Max. 1973. "The Routinization of Charisma" in Eva Etzioni Havely and Amitai Etzioni (eds.). *Social Change*. New York: Basic Book. pp. 43-53.
- Whitelum, Bernadette. 2003. *Rhetoric and Reality in the World Bank's Relations with NGOs: an Indonesian Case Study*. Ph D Thesis. Canberra: The Australian National University.
- White, Sarah. 1996. "Depoliticising Development: the Uses and Abuses of Participation". *Development in Practice*. 6 (1): 6-15
- Wickremaarachchi, SP. 1991. "Keeping People's Surplus in People's Hand". In Ponna Wignaraja, Akmal Hussain, Harsh Sethi and Ganeshan Wignaraja (eds.). *Participatory Development: Learning from South Asia*. Karachi: Oxford University Press. pp. 259-281.
- Widodo, Saleh. 2000. "Kembali Ke Desa". In Taufiq Ismail. *Membangun Kemandirian Umat di Pedesaan: Ikhtiar dan Peran Pesantren Darul Fallah 1960-2000*. Bogor: PP Darul Fallah. pp. 101-106.
- Wignaraja, Ponna. "Towards Praxis and Participatory Development" in Ponna Wignaraja, Akmal Hussain, Harsh Sethi and Ganeshan Wignaraja (eds.).

Participatory Development: Learning from South Asia. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1991. pp. 195-205

- Williams, Glynn, Manoj Srivastava, Stuart Corbridge and Rene Veron. 2003. "Enhancing Pro-Poor Governance in Eastern India: Participation, Politics and Action Research". *Progress in Development Studies*. 3 (2): 159-178.
- Williams, Glynn. 2004. "Evaluating Participatory Development: Tyranny, Power and (Re)politicisation". *Third World Quarterly*. 25 (3): 557-578.
- Williams, Glenn. 1980. "Community Participation and the Role of Voluntary Agencies in Indonesia". *Prisma: The Indonesian Indicator*. 16(March): 11-31.
- Wiyata, A Latief. 2002. *Carok: Konflik Kekerasan dan Harga diri Orang Madura*. Yogyakarta: LKiS.
- World Bank. 1991. *World Development Report 1991: Poverty*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- _____. 1994. *Internal Implementation Review*. Washington DC: World Bank.
- World Bank. 2003. "Exchange Rate of Rupiah to US \$".
[http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/eap/eap.nsf/2c4ea74c4d42fe8d852568b60074a864/04d6c170a7579a4b472569180032bfaa/\\$FILE/Rp-us\\$.pdf](http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/eap/eap.nsf/2c4ea74c4d42fe8d852568b60074a864/04d6c170a7579a4b472569180032bfaa/$FILE/Rp-us$.pdf). Accessed: 27/06/2007
- Yacub, Muhammad. 1985. *Pondok Pesantren dan Pembangunan Masyarakat Desa*. Bandung: Angkasa
- Yunus, Mahmud. 1979. *Sejarah Pendidikan Islam di Indonesia*. Yakarta: Mutiara.
- Ziemek, Manfred. 1985. *Pesantren dalam Perubahan Sosial*. Jakarta: P3M.