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Indonesia's East Timor Policy: 1998-2002

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I hereby declare that this thesis is my own work and has not been submitted for any other degree in the same or other form to any other university.

Kumiko Mizuno

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14 May 2003



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Abstract

This study is concerned with Indonesia's approach to East Timor in the post-authoritarian period. It examines Indonesia's rule over East Timor, the process of self-determination in East Timor, and its approach to residual issues after its hand-over to the United Nations (UN).

Indonesia's rule over East Timor was never recognised by the UN. During the Soeharto period, both its rule over East Timor and human rights violations in the territory had been constantly questioned by the international community; but little was changed in the government's approach. With the fall of Soeharto, however, the Indonesian government quickly moved to offer East Timor 'wide-ranging autonomy', and then, to the surprise of everybody, an opportunity to choose independence. This led to the holding of a UN-sponsored 'popular consultation' (essentially a referendum) on 30 August 1999. In the process of the referendum, however, massive violence took place. And, this violence left two serious human rights questions of concern to the international community: accountability of those accused of crimes on one hand and treatment and the repatriation of East Timorese left in West Timor on the other. Both problems are dragging on even today.

This study focuses essentially on three questions: the government decision to give an opportunity for independence to East Timor, the violence in the process of separation, and the government's approach to East Timor over the unresolved issues. It observes the interplay of international and domestic pressures that the Indonesian government faced, and identifies key factors influencing the government's behaviour. The relative impact of international and domestic pressures on the government's behaviour varied according to circumstances and the particular issues that were subjected to pressure. However, as far as the most critical event, namely independence of East Timor, is concerned, its materialisation was facilitated by an unusual confluence of circumstance and pressures.

Overall, this study argues that the explanatory power of domestic pressure was far stronger than conventional wisdom suggests; international pressure only works through domestic political players, and the interests of these political players had a substantial impact on the government's behaviour on East Timor. This study proves this by closely examining the interests and behaviour of key domestic players within the political elite over East Timor policy.

Glossary, Abbreviations & Acronyms

ABRI	<i>Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia</i> (the Indonesian armed forces)
AGO	Attorney General's Office
AIETD	All-Inclusive Intra-East Timorese Dialogue
Aitarak	'Thorn', Pro-integration militia based in Díli
AITI	<i>Associação para a Integração de Timor na Indonésia</i> (the Association for the Integration of Timor into Indonesia)
Apodeti	<i>Associação Popular Democrática Timorese</i> (the Timorese Popular Democratic Association)
ASDT	<i>Associação Social Democrata Timorese</i> (Timorese Social Democratic Association)
BAKIN	<i>Badan Kordinasi Intelijen Negara</i> (the State Intelligence Coordinating Agency)
BAIS	<i>Badan Intelijen Strategis</i> (Strategic Intelligence Agency)
BIA	<i>Badan Intelijen ABRI</i> (Armed Forces Intelligence Agency)
BMP	<i>Besi Merah Putih</i> (Red and White Iron), pro-integration militia based in Liquiça
BRTT	<i>Barisan Rakyat Timor Timur</i> (East Timor People's Front), pro-autonomy political group
CGI	Consultative Group on Indonesia (donor consortium for Indonesia)
CIDES	Centre for Information and Development Studies
Civpol	Civilian Police
CNRM	<i>Conselho Nacional da Resistência Maubere</i> (National Council of Maubere Resistance)
CNRT	<i>Conselho Nacional da Resistência Timorese</i> (National Council of Timorese Resistance)
CSIS	Centre for Strategic and International Studies
Danrem	<i>Korem</i> Military Commander
DFAT	(Australian) Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
Deplu	<i>Departemen Luar Negeri</i> (the Department of Foreign Affairs)
DKM	<i>Dewan Kehormatan Militer</i> (Military Honour Council)
Díli	the Capital of East Timor
DOM	<i>Daerah Operasi Militer</i> (Military Operations Region)
DPR	<i>Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat</i> (People's Representative Council, or the parliament)
ETAN	East Timor Action Network (US NGO)
Falintil	<i>Forças Armadas de Libertação Nacional de Timor-Leste</i> (Armed wing of Fretilin)
5 May Agreements	The Agreements on the ballot in East Timor between the UN, Indonesia, and Portugal
Fretilin	<i>Frente Revolucionária de Timor-Leste Independente</i> (the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor)
FPDK	<i>Forum Perdamaian, Demokrasi dan Keadilan</i> (Forum for Peace, Democracy, and Justice), pro-autonomy political group
Golkar	<i>Golongan Karya</i> (Functional Group, government party under the New Order)
GPK	<i>Gerombolan (or Gerakan) Pengacau Keamanan</i> (Peace Disturbance Movement)
HANKAM	Defence and Security
HAM	<i>Hak Asasi Manusia</i> (Human rights)
NTT	<i>Nusa Tenggara Timur</i> (East Nusa Tenggara province)
ICIET	International Commission of Inquiry on East Timor
ICMI	<i>Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia</i> (Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals)
IDP(s)	Internally Displaced Person(s)
IMET	US International Military Education and Training
Interfet	International Force East Timor
IGGI	Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia (donor consortium, disbanded in 1992)
(I)NGO	(International) Non-Governmental Organisation
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
Keppres	<i>Keputusan Presiden</i> (Presidential Decree)

Kodam	<i>Komando Daerah Militer</i> (Regional Military Command)
Kodim	<i>Komando Distrik Militer</i> (District Military Command)
Kolakops	<i>Komando Pelaksana Operasi</i> (the Operations Implementation Command)
Komnas HAM	<i>Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia</i> (the Indonesian National Human Rights Commission)
Kopassus	<i>Komando Pasukan Khusus</i> (Special Forces Command)
Kopkamtib	<i>Komand Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban</i> (the Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order)
Korem	<i>Komando Resort Militer</i> (Military Resort Command)
Kostrad	<i>Komando Cadangan Strategis Angkatan Darat</i> (the Army's Strategic Reserve)
KPN	<i>Komisi Penyelidik Nasional</i> (National Commission of Inquiry)
KPP HAM Timtim	<i>Komisi Penyelidikan Pelanggaran Hak Asasi Manusia untuk Timor Timur</i> (National Commission of Inquiry on East Timor)
KPS	<i>Komisi Perdamaian dan Stabilitas</i> (the Commission of Peace and Stability)
KUHP	<i>Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Pidana</i> (Criminal Code)
LIPI	<i>Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia</i> (Indonesian Academy of Science)
Mahidi	<i>Mati Hidup Demi Integrasi</i> (Dead or Alive for Integration, pro-integration militia based in Ainaro)
Maubere	ordinary East Timorese people
Menko Pol(sos)kam	<i>Menteri Koordinator Bidang Politik (Sosial) dan Keamanan</i> [Coordinating Minister for Political (Social) and Security Affairs]
MPR	<i>Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat</i> (the People's Consultative Assembly)
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
New Order	Soeharto era
Opsus	<i>Operasi Khusus</i> (Special Operations)
PAN	<i>Partai Amanat Nasional</i> (the National Mandate Party)
Pam Swakarsa	<i>Pengamanan Swakarsa</i> (Volunteer Community Security)
Pangdam	<i>Panglima Daerah Militer</i> (Territorial Military Commander)
PDI-P	<i>Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan</i> (Indonesian Democratic Party for Struggle)
Perpu	<i>Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-undang</i> (Government regulation in lieu of law)
PKB	<i>Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa</i> (the National Awakening Party)
PKI	<i>Partai Komunis Indonesia</i> (the Indonesian Communist Party)
Polri	<i>Polisi Republik Indonesia</i> (Indonesian National Police)
PP	<i>Peraturan Pemerintah</i> (Government Regulation)
PPP	<i>Partai Persatuan Pembangunan</i> (United Development Party)
PPI	<i>Pasukan Pejuang Integrasi</i> (Warriors for Integration)
SARA	<i>Suku, Agama, Ras, Antara-golongan</i> (ethnicity, religion, race, and class)
Satgas P3TT	<i>Satuan Tugas Pelaksanaan Penentuan Pendapat di Timor Timur</i> (The Indonesian Task Force for the Implementation for the Popular Consultation)
SGI	<i>Satuan Gabungan Intelijen</i> (Kopassus Intelligence Joint Taskforce)
Solidamor	<i>Solidaritas untuk Penyelesaian Damai Timor Leste</i> (Solidarity for Timor Leste Peace Settlement)
Tim Advokasi HAM Perwira TNI/Polri	The Advocacy Team for Military and Police Officers' Human Rights
TNI	<i>Tentara Nasional Indonesia</i> (Indonesian National Army)
TPG	<i>Tim Penyidik Gabungan</i> (Joint Investigation Team)
UDT	<i>União Democrática Timorese</i> (the Timorese Democratic Union)
UNCHR	United Nations Commission of Human Rights
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNIF	United Front for East Timor, pro-autonomy political group
UNAMET	United Nations Mission in East Timor
UNMISSET	United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor
UNTAET	United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor
UNTAS	<i>Uni Timor Aswain</i> (United Heroes of Timor)
Wanra	<i>Perlawanan Rakyat</i> (People's Resistance)
Yayasan HAK	Díli -based human rights foundation
YLBHI	<i>Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Indonesia</i> (Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation)

