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Indonesia's East Timor Policy: 1998-2002

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CANBERRA

May 2003
I hereby declare that this thesis is my own work and has not been submitted for any other degree in the same or other form to any other university.

[Signature]

Kumiko Mizuno

14 May 2003
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Abstract

This study is concerned with Indonesia's approach to East Timor in the post-authoritarian period. It examines Indonesia's rule over East Timor, the process of self-determination in East Timor, and its approach to residual issues after its hand-over to the United Nations (UN).

Indonesia's rule over East Timor was never recognised by the UN. During the Soeharto period, both its rule over East Timor and human rights violations in the territory had been constantly questioned by the international community; but little was changed in the government's approach. With the fall of Soeharto, however, the Indonesian government quickly moved to offer East Timor 'wide-ranging autonomy', and then, to the surprise of everybody, an opportunity to choose independence. This led to the holding of a UN-sponsored 'popular consultation' (essentially a referendum) on 30 August 1999. In the process of the referendum, however, massive violence took place. And, this violence left two serious human rights questions of concern to the international community: accountability of those accused of crimes on one hand and treatment and the repatriation of East Timorese left in West Timor on the other. Both problems are dragging on even today.

This study focuses essentially on three questions: the government decision to give an opportunity for independence to East Timor, the violence in the process of separation, and the government's approach to East Timor over the unresolved issues. It observes the interplay of international and domestic pressures that the Indonesian government faced, and identifies key factors influencing the government's behaviour. The relative impact of international and domestic pressures on the government's behaviour varied according to circumstances and the particular issues that were subjected to pressure. However, as far as the most critical event, namely independence of East Timor, is concerned, its materialisation was facilitated by an unusual confluence of circumstance and pressures.

Overall, this study argues that the explanatory power of domestic pressure was far stronger than conventional wisdom suggests; international pressure only works through domestic political players, and the interests of these political players had a substantial impact on the government's behaviour on East Timor. This study proves this by closely examining the interests and behaviour of key domestic players within the political elite over East Timor policy.
### Glossary, Abbreviations & Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABRI</td>
<td>Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (the Indonesian armed forces)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGO</td>
<td>Attorney General's Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AiETD</td>
<td>All-Inclusive Intra-East Timorese Dialogue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aitarak</td>
<td>'Thorn', Pro-integration militia based in Dili</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATTI</td>
<td>Associação para a Integração de Timor na Indonésia (the Association for the Integration of Timor into Indonesia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apodeti</td>
<td>Associação Popular Democrática Timorense (the Timorese Popular Democratic Association)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASDT</td>
<td>Associação Social Democrata Timorense (Timorese Social Democratic Association)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAKIN</td>
<td>Badan Kordinasi Intelijen Negara (the State Intelligence Coordinating Agency)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAIS</td>
<td>Badan Intelijen Strategis (Strategic Intelligence Agency)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIA</td>
<td>Badan Intelijen ABRI (Armed Forces Intelligence Agency)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BMP</td>
<td>Besi Merah Putih (Red and White Iron), pro-integration militia based in Liquiçá</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRTT</td>
<td>Barisan Rakyat Timor Timur (East Timor People's Front), pro-autonomy political group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGI</td>
<td>Consultative Group on Indonesia (donor consortium for Indonesia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIDES</td>
<td>Centre for Information and Development Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civpol</td>
<td>Civilian Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNRM</td>
<td>Conselho Nacional da Resistência Maubere (National Council of Maubere Resistance)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNRT</td>
<td>Conselho Nacional da Resistência Timorense (National Council of Timorese Resistance)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSIS</td>
<td>Centre for Strategic and International Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>Danrem</td>
<td>Korem Military Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFAT</td>
<td>(Australian) Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deplu</td>
<td>Departemen Luar Negeri (the Department of Foreign Affairs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DKM</td>
<td>Dewan Kehormatan Militer (Military Honour Council)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dili</td>
<td>the Capital of East Timor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOM</td>
<td>Daerah Operasi Militer (Military Operations Region)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPR</td>
<td>Dewan Perwakilan Pakyat (People’s Representative Council, or the parliament)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ETAN</td>
<td>East Timor Action Network (US NGO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Falintil</td>
<td>Forcas Armadas de Libertação Nacional de Timor-Leste (Armed wing of Falintil)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 May Agreement</td>
<td>The Agreements on the ballot in East Timor between the UN, Indonesia, and Portugal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fretlin</td>
<td>Frente Revolucionária de Timor-Leste Independente (the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPDK</td>
<td>Forum Perdamaian, Demokrasi dan Keadilan (Forum for Peace, Democracy, and Justice), pro-autonomy political group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Golkar</td>
<td>Golongan Karya (Functional Group, government party under the New Order)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GPK</td>
<td>Gerombolan (or Gerakan) Pengacau Keamanan (Peace Disturbance Movement)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HANKAM</td>
<td>Defence and Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAM</td>
<td>Hak Asasi Manusia (Human rights)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NTT</td>
<td>Nusa Tenggara Timur (East Nusa Tenggara province)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICIEET</td>
<td>International Commission of Inquiry on East Timor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICMI</td>
<td>Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia (Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP(s)</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMET</td>
<td>US International Military Education and Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interdet</td>
<td>International Force East Timor</td>
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<tr>
<td>IGGI</td>
<td>Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia (donor consortium, disbanded in 1992)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(I)NGO</td>
<td>(International) Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organisation for Migration</td>
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<tr>
<td>Keppres</td>
<td>Keputusan Presiden (Presidential Decree)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Kodam      Komando Daerah Militer (Regional Military Command)
Kodim      Komando Distrik Militer (District Military Command)
Kolakops   Komando Pelaksana Operasi (the Operations Implementation Command)
Komnas HAM Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia (the Indonesian National Human
            Rights Commission)
Kopassus   Komando Pasukan Khusus (Special Forces Command)
Kopkamtib  Komand Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban (the Operational Command for
            the Restoration of Security and Order)
Korem      Komando Resort Militer (Military Resort Command)
Kostrad    Komando Cadangan Strategis Angkatan Darat (the Army's Strategic
            Reserve)
KPN        Komisi Penyelidikan Nasional (National Commission of Inquiry)
KPP HAM Timtim Komisi Penyelidikan Perlanggaran Hak Asasi Manusia untuk Timor Timur
            (National Commission of Inquiry on East Timor)
KPS        Komisi Perdamaian dan Stabilitas (the Commission of Peace and Stability)
KUHP       Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Pidana (Criminal Code)
LIPI       Lembaga ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia (Indonesian Academy of Science)
Mahidi     Mati Hidup Demi Integrasi (Dead or Alive for Integration, pro-integration militia
            based in Ainaro)
Maubere    ordinary East Timorese people
Menko Pol(sos)kam Menteri Koordinator Bidang Politik (Sosial) dan Keamanan [Coordinating
            Minister for Political (Social) and Security Affairs]
MPR        Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (the People's Consultative Assembly)
NAM        Non-Aligned Movement
New Order   Soeharto era
Opsus      Operasi Khusus (Special Operations)
PAN        Partai Amanat Nasional (the National Mandate Party)
Pam Swakarsa Pengamanan Swakarsa (Volunteer Community Security)
Pangdam    Panglima Daerah Militer (Territorial Military Commander)
PDI-P      Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan (Indonesian Democratic Party for
            Struggle)
Perpu       Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-undang (Government regulation in
            lieu of law)
PKB        Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (the National Awakening Party)
PKI        Partai Komunis Indonesia (the Indonesian Communist Party)
Polri      Polisi Republik Indonesia (Indonesian National Police)
PP         Peraturan Pemerintah (Government Regulation)
PPP        Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United Development Party)
PPi        Pasukan Pejuang Integrasi (Warriors for Integration)
SARA       Suku, Agama, Ras, Antara-golongan (ethnicity, religion, race, and class)
Satgas P3TT Satuan Tugas Pelaksanaan Penentuan Pendaftar di Timor Timur (The
            Indonesian Task Force for the Implementation of the Popular Consultation)
SGI        Satuan Gabungan Intelijen (Kopassus Intelligence Joint Taskforce)
Solidamor  Solidaritas untuk Penyelesaian Damai Timor Leste (Solidarity for Timor Leste
            Peace Settlement)
Tim Advokasi HAM The Advocacy Team for Military and Police Officers' Human Rights
Perwira TNI/Polri
TNI        Tentera Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Army)
TPG        Tim Penyidik Gabungan (Joint Investigation Team)
UDT        União Democrática Timorense (the Timorese Democratic Union)
UNCHR      United Nations Commission of Human Rights
UNHCR      United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNIF       United Front for East Timor, pro-autonomy political group
UNAMET     United Nations Mission in East Timor
UNMISET    United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor
UNTAET     United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor
UNTAS      Uni Timor Aswain (United Heroes of Timor)
Wanra      Perlawanan Rakyat (People's Resistance)
Yayasan HAK Dili -based human rights foundation
YLBH1      Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Indonesia (Indonesian Legal Aid
            Foundation)