At My Mother’s Table

MIGRATION, (RE)PRODUCTION AND RETURN BETWEEN HADCHIT, NORTH LEBANON AND SYDNEY

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This thesis\(^1\) reflects my own original research

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\(^1\) The pictures on the front cover are of the village of Hadchit and of Sayde. Our Lady, as depicted on the door of the Sayde El Shiffe (Our Lady of the Cliff) Church in Hadchit, taken by Nelia Hyndman-Rizik, 2007.
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Abstract

In the era of globalisation, studies of migration focus on mobility, deterritorialised identities and diasporic forms of belonging across nation state boundaries. Indeed, uprootedness from the soil of home and place has resulted in a general condition of ‘homelessness’ in late modernity, referred to as the diasporic condition. The search for an ‘absolute home’ has become the Holy Grail for pilgrims in late modernity and forms the basis for this study, which explores the ‘migrant’s conundrum’: does home move where the migrant moves, or is it forever tied to the primordialism of place, soil and kinship? Through an examination of the construction of homeliness amongst an immigrant community of 500 households from the village of Hadchit, North Lebanon, who reside in Western Sydney, Australia it will be shown how their strategies of home-building depend upon the capacity to imagine themselves as being united by kinship, a shared village of origins and as part of the broader communal Maronite identity (Mwarne), which now transcends nation state boundaries. Patrilineage (bayt), village (day’aa) and sect (ta’eefa) have historically defined Lebanese sectarian identities and now, as this study shows, are deployed as a strategy of home-building and community construction in diaspora. However, capitalist social relations of production in Sydney have transformed bayt, day’aa and ta’eefa amongst the second generation through the gendered renegotiation of the marriage contract from relations of descent to relations of consent. Thus, the Hadchitis now face a crisis of (re)production and attribute this to the Australian state being hukum niswen, ruled by women, an inversion of the gendered order of power in Lebanon. Through pilgrimages to the ancestral village émigrés seek a spiritual resolution to the contradictions of migration through the restoration of their connection to place, but find they cannot seamlessly belong in Hadchit. Meanwhile, multicultural crisis and a milieu of anti-Lebanese racism limit their claims to national belonging in Australia. This study finds that the contradictions of the migration process are unresolvable through physical mobility, because the feeling of ‘home’ is ultimately an affective and social construction that transcends place. The elusive quality that defines home and provides a sense of unconditional
belonging is, in fact, socially constructed by women, through their daily practices of care within the home and the most important woman for the construction of homeliness is the matriarch, *sit el bayt* – the power of the house. Thus, the place where the immigrant can be at home is metaphorically at their ‘mother’s table’. The shifting and gendered construction of home amongst the Hadchitis in Sydney has also led to a transformation of cultural identity amongst them. Through the process of migration, (re)production and return the Hadchitis have become Lebanese-Australians.
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Then a ploughman said “speak to us of work”...

Often have I heard you say, as if speaking in sleep, “He who works in marble, and finds the shape of his own soul in the stone, is nobler than he who ploughs the soil”. “And he who seizes the rainbow to lay it on a cloth in the likeness of man, is more than he who makes the sandals for our feet”. But I say, not in sleep, but in the overwakfulness of the noontide, that the wind speaks not more sweetly to the giant oaks than to the least of all the blades of grass; And he alone is great who turns the voice of the wind into a song made sweeter by his own loving. Work is love made visible. And if you cannot work with love but only with distaste, it is better that you should leave your work and sit at the gate of the temple and take alms of those who work with joy. For if you bake bread with indifference, you bake a bitter bread that feeds but half man’s hunger And if you grudge the crushing of the grapes, your grudge distils a poison in the wine Excerpt from “The Prophet” (Gibran, 2005 (1923): 33-34)
1. Introduction

Movement plays a key role in the modern imagination with even the idea of home coming to refer to routine sets of practices, rather than fixed places... In ‘liquid modernity’...the domination of the unconditional superiority of sedentarism over nomadism and the domination of the settled over the mobile is grinding to a halt...modernity has given rise to the metaphorical figure of the pilgrim...the restless seeker for identity (Coleman and Eade 2004:5).

In the era of globalisation the migration process has uprooted people from the soil of the place of their birth and led to the primacy of mobility over situatedness. This has transformed the construction of primordial attachments, whereby culture and kinship transcend place and are reconstructed in different parts of the world in new configurations that generate contradictions of identity. Consequently, the search for an absolute home, where the immigrant can seamlessly belong has become the trope and Holy Grail for pilgrims in late modernity. Declining economic conditions under the latest phase of capital accumulation have also contributed to a culture of border disorder and fear in immigrant receiver nations (Hage 2003). None more so, than for Lebanese immigrants living in Australia in the aftermath of September 11th, such as immigrants from Hadchit, the subject of this study, who now suffer from an acute state of ambivalent belonging and racist exclusion. What force would lead immigrants from Hadchit to uproot themselves from the soil of home and the life of the ‘ploughman’ (Gibran 1923) to become wage labourers in Australia?

From peasant to wage-labourer

This thesis draws upon a political economy perspective to explain how the migration process is intimately connected to the development of capitalism as a mode of production and its requirement for labour. I propose that the migration process can be conceptualised as a negotiation between structures and agents, as a dance between capital and labour. At the macro level capital’s changing requirements for labour provides the pull factor for international migration. At the micro level, immigrants themselves negotiate migration pathways through the development of complex social networks across transnational borders and are
driven by a range of complex push factors. The most important, according to Werbner (1990), is the pursuit of success, through the accumulation of capital and status inter-generationally. Indeed, immigrant communities are marked by status differentiation as some become more established than others. Baldassar (2001), likewise, argues that finding success through attaining financial independence, or ‘sistemazione’, is central to the dynamics of migrant communities and the principal motivation for migration itself:

Migration is often intimately connected to marriage and sistemazione. To be able to achieve sistemazione an individual needs capital or at least a steady income. The desire for sistemazione is recognized as the most common incentive for migration. Historically, migration was an opportunity to make enough money to ‘set oneself up’ with house and family when the means to do so were not available at home. Migrating was…a way of attaining independence (Baldassar 2001:40).

Building on Baldassar and Werbner’s argument that migration is a process of building success, through accumulating capital and status intergenerationally, Hage (2005) theorises that migration can be understood as the search for a viable life, or what Bourdieu terms “illusio” (Bourdieu 1980:66), the sense of meaning and importance in one’s own life. Hage argues that a sense of meaning and purpose in life is linked to the feeling that one is ‘going somewhere’ in life and theorises this as a form of ‘symbolic movement’ (Hage 2005:8). The decision to move physically, through the process of migration, links symbolic and physical mobility:

We engage in the kind of physical mobility that defines us as migrants because we feel another geographical space is a better launching pad for our symbolic selves…migration cannot be understood without taking into account this relationship between symbolic and physical movement (Hage 2005:8).

However, he suggests, people only make the decision to migrate when there is no prospect for upward mobility in their home society (Hage 2005:8). Thus, Hage argues, it is better to migrate and have the possibility for a better life (read ‘higher status’) than to be condemned to the social position you were born into and become physically and symbolically stuck, metrahu in Arabic, where you started with your life potential unrealised (Hage 2005:9).
A central aspect to attaining a ‘higher status’ has been the process of peasant transformation into wage labourers under capitalism, as a mode of production. Marxist anthropology theorises that the expansion of capitalism is central to the European expansion and colonisation of the New World (Castles and Miller 2009; Marx and Engels 1848; Wolf 1982; Worsley 1984). As capitalism expanded it converted and incorporated various indigenous and feudal modes of production, referred to respectively as the kin-ordered and the tributary modes of production (Wolf 1982:76). Central to this project has been the dislocation of the peasantry from the land in order to convert them into wage labourers on the factory floor (Wolf 1982:77). Marx in *Capital* wrote the following:

The expropriation of the great mass of the people from the soil, from the means of subsistence, and from the means of labor, this fearful and painful expropriation of the mass of the people forms the prelude to the history of capital. It comprises a series of forcible methods, of which we have passed in review only those that have been epoch-making as methods of the primitive accumulation of capital (Marx 1867).

The “expropriation” of the peasantry has been achieved forcibly, such as through the enclosure movement in England, but also willingly. Humphrey (1998:30) argues that industrial capitalism actually recruits labour from the South on the basis that they are willing to become wage labourers:

The very recruitment of Labour is premised on the assumption that people are willing to become wage workers, to be proletarianised. Industrial Capitalism generated urban space to make people available as surplus labour. The constant evaluation of the worth of migrants as desirable or undesirable is invariably sheeted home to the question of their willingness to become productive wage workers.

I will refer to the willingness to become wage-labourers as a process of ‘voluntary expropriation’. Thus, migration can also be conceptualised as a form of symbolic mobility between modes of production through the process of proletarianisation.

Why would the peasantry willingly be proletarianised? The reason lies in the promise of upward mobility, the driving force behind capital accumulation and its ideological counter-part: the social ‘devaluation’ of the peasantry. Worsley (1984) suggests that the peasantry have been ideologically devalued
over centuries through their construction as being “little more than animals”, due to their link with agriculture:

For many people, peasant life still signifies what it did for Marx – ‘rural idiocy’: a nineteenth-century mental set established over centuries during which peasants were regarded as little more than animals…development is still simply equated with urban, industrial life; underdevelopment with an agricultural existence. Progress is therefore deemed to consist either in moving people out of agriculture altogether or in creating ‘factories in the field’ (Worsley 1984:70).

Why does the link with agriculture underpin the ideological construction of the peasantry as being ‘backward’? I propose that it is the association between agriculture, soil and the seasons and, thus, the link between agriculture and nature. The logic of ‘closeness to/distance from nature’ operates as the common duality against which hierarchies of class, gender and race are constructed. Ortner (1974) posits that women’s subordination can be understood by the formula that “female is to nature as male is to culture”, or that women are symbolically associated with nature, as opposed to men who are identified with culture (Ortner 1974:361). Building on De Beauvoir’s (1953:58-59) observation that women are caught in the endless repetition of reproducing the species and, thus, produce “perishables”, Ortner (1974::362) surmises that this allows men to accumulate culture, which is socially constructed and, thus, has greater status and meaning, because it demonstrates men’s transcendence over nature and women’s subjection to it.

Ortner argues that society constructs meaning through culture, which generates meaningful forms that allow the givens of human existence (the ultimate ‘given’ being death) to be transcended, because the life cycle of the society transcends the mortality of the individual (Ortner 1974:359). Culture allows humans to perceive themselves to transcend nature and, thus, to construct meaningfulness. However, access to the meaningful task of generating culture is distributed unevenly by gender and social class and, hence, meaning is monopolised by those higher up the social ladder and systematically denied to those below, through their construction as being closer to nature and, thus, more subjected to it. Developmental racism, or social Darwinism, constructed the hierarchy of the races within this framework. White Europeans were/are
represented as being more civilized (transcendent over nature) than indigenous and colonised peoples, who were/are represented as being ‘primitive’ and, hence, closer to nature (Hage 2003:53).

The logic of closeness to/transcendence over nature can also be applied to human class formation. Bourdieu (1984:40), following Ortner, links women’s subordination, like the working class, to their ‘closeness to nature’ and argues that the refusal of nature is, in fact, the starting point for class distinction (Bourdieu 1984:40). Bourdieu (1984:53-54) posits that class distinction is measured by accumulated cultural capital and the “distance from necessity”. The learning of legitimate culture is premised upon the suspension and removal of economic necessity and the distance from groups subjected to those determinisms (Bourdieu 1984:54). This produces the pure gaze of the aesthetic disposition, as measured by the objective distance from those trapped within necessity, while freedom exhibits the distance from necessity through the stylisation of life (Bourdieu 1984:55).

Marx (1844) reflected on the nature/culture/meaning problematic and proposed that the development of capitalism, as a mode of production, is the mechanism, par excellence, by which humanity achieved ‘transcendence’ through the subjection of nature and the victory of the machine. Under the feudal/tributary mode of production, being tied to a ‘piece of land’ as a peasant represented the bottom of the social order, but under capitalism the proletariat on the factory floor became the new starting point for class distinction. According to Marx (1976:165), the mastery over nature, or abstraction from nature, is central to capital accumulation and is achieved through the mystification of human social relations as the relation between things, which he referred to as “commodity fetishism”:

> It is nothing but the definite social relation between men themselves which assumes here, for them, the fantastic form of a relation between things…so it is in the world of commodities with the products of men’s hands. I call this the fetishism which attaches itself to the products of labour as soon as they are produced as commodities (Marx 1976: 165).

Abstraction in class relations, however, is differentially experienced under the capitalist and feudal modes of production: the former offers the ‘possibility’
for upward mobility, the capitalist carrot; while in the latter one’s station in life is determined through birth and heredity. The second difference between the two is that the capitalist mode of production defies the seasons and is, of itself, abstracted from nature through the Industrial Revolution, whereas the feudal/tributary mode of production is built upon accumulating surpluses generated by the agricultural cycle (Wolf 1982). The third difference between the two modes of production is the way in which subjection is experienced. Under the feudal mode of production the lords/aristocracy owned the land and the peasantry together in a direct form of domination/exploitation (Marx and Engels 1848). With the shattering of feudal ties, however, comes the ‘possibility’ for upward mobility, the cornerstone of capitalism, which mystifies the experience of subjugation through the acquisition of material gain through cash payment.

While capitalism offers the ‘possibility’ of upward mobility, it also suppresses the reality that social class mostly reproduces itself (Kuhn 2005:49). The myth of upward mobility is, therefore, the key to the success of capitalism, because:

The capacity to distribute hope in the midst of massive social inequality has been the secret of the nation-states enduring ability to sustain capitalist accumulation (Hage 2003:14).

But, the gap between fantasy and reality also leads to a crisis of meaning under capitalism, because meaning/hope itself is distributed unevenly on the basis of social class (read: meaning=the accumulation of transcendence). Alternately, society distributes meaning/hope, according to Hage, through providing/denying access to dignity and social inclusion through the notion of care, as a form of symbolic belonging (Hage 2003:3). In the latest phase of capital accumulation nation-states have been struggling to distribute hope to all of their citizens, especially immigrants (Hage 2003:16)

**Migration and the search for home**

Migration has been central to the expansion of capitalism, as a mode of production since the 19th Century and became the mechanism by which labour was recruited for the expansion of the Industrial Revolution, during the
mercantile and industrial phases of world migration up until the 1960’s. After the 1960’s world migration entered what is referred to as the post-industrial period (Castles and Miller 2009:2), which constituted a sharp break with the two previous phases, which were dominated by migration from Europe to a handful of former colonies (Castles and Miller 2009:2). In the post-industrial phase migration became truly global as the number of sending and receiving countries increased and the global supply of immigrants shifted from Europe to the developing countries of the Third World (Castles and Miller 2009:2). The other feature of this change was that migration now was between densely populated countries in the earliest phase of industrialisation to densely settled post-industrial societies, with increasingly segmented labour markets, which has implications for immigrant incorporation in the world’s global cities (Castles and Miller 2009:2-6).

Migration theorists link this transition to the shift in late capitalism from Fordism to Flexible Accumulation (Harvey 1989). Under Fordism companies were vertically integrated and labour organised itself around the factory floor. But, under post-Fordist Flexible Accumulation production lines are vertically disintegrated and production line requirements are met by the outsourcing of materials and labour. Now capitalism can transcend the nation-state as a site of permanent anchorage and is characterised by mobility and impermanence (Hage 2003:19). This has led to the break up of the so called liberal–democratic order in favour of new global entities which operate across national boundaries (Hodge 2006:203). Late capitalism has also made a shift in the gravity of economic activity from production to financial speculation (FIRE: Finance, Insurance, Real Estate), facilitated by computer technology, also referred to as the ‘financialisation’ of capitalism (Bellamy and Magdoff 2009:77). The triad of late capitalism, according to Bellamy and Magdoff (2009:77), is globalisation, neo-liberalism and the rise of finance capital. Neo-liberalism can be defined as the application of the principles of neo-classical economics to the realm of public policy (Stillwell 2006:204). Globalisation can be defined as the intensification of economic, social, cultural and technical relationships over distance (Kuhn 2005:43). Harvey (1989) argues that a feature of globalisation is that time has sped up to such an extent that it is experienced simultaneously across large
distances and terms this “time-space compression” (Harvey 1989:284). He links these changes in late modernity to the transition in capitalism from Fordism to Flexible Accumulation and the new mobility of capital over labour (Harvey 1989:284).

Consequently, capital can now relocate its resources to wherever labour is cheapest and this has led to the decline of manufacturing in the former centres of production, including Sydney (Harvey 1989:284). This change has had a significant impact on migrant communities internationally from the Turks in Germany to the Lebanese in Western Sydney. The main consequence has been the shifting of manufacturing to Third World locations, which has led to high unemployment rates, racism and uncertainty for migrants in the world’s global cities and strengthened the power of capital over labour in a new configuration. Late capitalism has also generated uncertainty and a loss of hope for the ‘refugees within’ due to the decline of the welfare state under neo-liberalism and the rise of what Hage terms “paranoid nationalism” (Hage 2003:20-21). A response to these changing nation-state and geo-political dynamics has been the decline in tolerance and the rise of Islamophobia in the aftermath of September 11th, multicultural crisis and the tightening of ‘border protection’ in Australia, the most notable examples being the Tampa Crisis in 2001 (Hodge 2006:23; Poynting et al 2004:25-25) and the Cronulla Riots of December 2005.

Migrants, therefore, increasingly find themselves faced with diminishing opportunities for advancement, which has led many to hedge their bets for success between two possible nations, referred to as transnationalism (Schiller and Bashch 1995:50). According to Schiller, transnationality is facilitated by technology, but produced by the inability of immigrants to find national belonging and inclusion in the face of declining economic circumstances during the latest phase of capitalist accumulation globally (Schiller and Bashch 1995:52). Transnationalism also examines micro level migrant agency to negotiate the macro level structures of the global economy and migration restrictions in receiver nations through the construction of transnational social fields which include social networks and flows of remittances, goods, emotions and labour between the home and host-nation (Brettell 2008:119-120).
Migration, globalisation and ambivalent belonging have led to a generalised condition of homelessness in late modernity, referred to as the diasporic condition, which is underpinned by the fragmentation and hybridisation of national identities:

National culture will never be unified in the old sense, because they are irrevocably the product of several interlocking histories and cultures, belong at one and the same time to several homes and to no one particular home. People belonging to such cultures of hybridity have had to renounce the dream or ambition of rediscovering any kind of lost cultural purity or ethnic absolutism. They are irrevocably translated (Hall 1992:310).

Translation implies a loss of cultural purity, which is generated by the process of deterritorialisation, whereby groups are no longer tightly territorially bounded, historically unselfconscious or culturally homogenous (Appadurai 1991:191).

Baldassar theorises, therefore, that migrants feel that home itself has a shifting centre that moves where the migrant moves and the search for home becomes an eternal quest “for an increasingly elusive identity” (Baldassar 2001:9). Strategies of migrant home-building (Abdelhady 2008; Hage 1997) are central to understanding the processes by which migrants feel at home within mobility. Hage (1997:102) differentiates homes from houses as physical structures and defines migrant home-building as the process of building the feeling of being at home and thus, proposes that home is principally an affective construct rather than a geographical one. If this is the case why is the return to the homeland so compelling for immigrant communities?

The concept of diaspora, the dispersal from an original location to one of more peripheral locations (Saffran 1991:83), originally referred to the Jewish, Greek and Armenian experience, but now has been extended to apply to immigrants, expatriates, refugees, guest workers, exile communities, overseas communities and ethnic communities (Tololyan 1996). For example, among Greeks internationally, a new type of Greekness is emerging that is not centred on the homeland territory but in the diaspora (Schiller and Bashch 1995:53). Tololyan (1996) argues that the use of the term has become too ubiquitous and questions why so many minority groups are claiming diaspora status now. Clifford (1994:311) suggests diaspora discourses break the binary subaltern
relationship between the migrant minority and the majority society by linking migrants to a multi-locale community beyond the borders of their host society. This offers the possibility for an ongoing transnational network that includes the homeland, not as something simply left behind, but as a place of continuing attachment (Clifford 1994: 311).

While the return to the homeland is compelling, it is often unrealisable, so the diaspora itself must become a home away from home (Clifford 1994). This leads to a paradox, according to Naficy (1993:129), as exiles find themselves caught between two seminal threats: the disappearance of the homeland (because it is constantly in crisis) and their absorption into the host-nation. Consequently, the exilic condition is inherently liminal and fetishised images of the homeland become a substitute for the homeland itself:

The exiles locate the illusory compensatory forms of pleasure and power not in gold or undergarment but in images of the homeland and of the past. As a fetishised substitute for the homeland, these images – like any other fetish, must encode unequal relations of power and be ahistorical, stereotyped and simplified (Naficy 1993:129).

The age of globalisation has, therefore, led to complex and shifting constructions of home and identity, which draw on geography, while simultaneously transcending it. Having examined the broader literature on home, place and migration, we will now examine the research problem, setting and fieldwork for this study.

The research problem

Another force of considerable importance was the strong tie between the peasant and his land, a tie which...cannot be explained in cold economic terms. Land was literally life to the villager, whose roots in a particular piece of ground often reached backward for generations (Kepler-Lewis 1968:17).

This quote, written over 40 years ago, explains the centrality of the connection to land, *ard*, as a source of life and livelihood for the people of Hadchit. Indeed, it alludes to a relationship of consubstantiation, whereby the people of Hadchit worked their land to bring it to life and, in turn, the land gave them life. The notion of being ‘rooted’ in the soil of a particular place is symbolic of the primordial relationship between culture, kinship and place and
underpins a construction of identity in which the three are united in a ‘Holy trinity’ of belonging and homeliness. What force could break this primordial connection between the people of Hadchit and their land? I propose that Marx’s concept of expropriation allows us to understand the force which detached the people of Hadchit from their land and drove their migration to Sydney to become wage-labourers. As will be shown in greater detail in the next chapter, I argue that their expropriation was achieved voluntarily, because it built upon the previous waves of migration from the village to the Americas which took place from the end of the 19th century. Like the previous waves of immigrants before them, the Hadchitis who migrated to Sydney conceptualised their migration as an opportunity to find najeh, or success, through becoming wage labourers and, thus, to achieve ‘upward mobility’, the foundational promise of capitalism itself.

This thesis explores how migration transforms the articulation between home, place, gender and identity. It addresses the central question: where is home, does it move where the migrant moves or is it tied to the primordialism of place. I term this ‘the migrant’s conundrum’ and investigate it through four key themes. The first theme examines migration as the search for najeh, success, as defined by material wealth. In the pursuit of najeh immigrants from Hadchit are caught in a paradox, whereby they can gain material wealth, but instead become ‘spiritually poor’. The second key theme examines the nexus between gender and social (re)production and shows how migration transforms gender relations. The third key theme examines the discourse of return to Hadchit. The last key theme examines the process of cultural transformation, which has led the Hadchitis to become Lebanese-Australians.

**The fieldwork**

The focus of this study is a 500 household migration cluster from Hadchit, North Lebanon (Maps 1, 2), located in the suburbs surrounding Parramatta in Sydney, Australia (see Map 3). The fieldwork was undertaken intensively for a 12 month period starting in December 2005 and involved field research in Sydney, the United States of America and Hadchit, North Lebanon. In Sydney I based myself in the suburb of Wentworthville, near Parramatta, where many immigrants from Hadchit live and a diverse range of other immigrants from
India, the South Pacific and S.E Asia. Wentworthville borders Westmead and is made up of a mixture of free standing houses and apartment blocks all within walking distance of the train station, which links the suburb to Parramatta and the central CBD of Sydney.

In the original fieldwork design (see Appendix 1) I was also to spend three months in Lebanon, based in the village of Hadchit, but the 2006 July War between Israel and Hezbollah intercepted and forced the cancellation of my fieldwork plans. Instead, I made a trip to the United States of America (USA) to follow up the descendants of the 1890’s wave of migration from the village of Hadchit and undertook fieldwork in St. Louis Missouri, Butte, Montana and Portland, Oregon (see Appendix 7 for a complete list of publications from this research project). Meanwhile, the Sydney based field research started with the Cronulla Riots in December 2005. This set the tone for the study, which began as a ‘village study’, but soon the broader politics of race relations, multicultural crisis in Australia and the impact of September 11th on Arabs living in the West came to bear on my research. This critical intervention forced me to situate this study amidst the most contested issues of our times: the limits of national belonging in Australia for immigrants of non-English speaking background, particularly Lebanese, and the impact of war and uncertainty in Lebanon on the lives of the Lebanese and on the Lebanese diaspora. This study also addresses the other enduring theme of our time: the journey, the pilgrimage, the search for roots, the quest to find home and the meaning of place in the era of globalisation and mass migration. This study is not just my story it is our story, the descendants of immigrants from Hadchit. In total this project reflects 4 ½ years research in Sydney, North America and Hadchit and online at various Lebanese websites. It is the synthesis of my own auto-ethnographic experiences with detailed participant observation field research, historical ethnography, genealogical research, family history and anthropological approaches to migration and diaspora studies. In the next section I locate myself in this study
through an auto-ethnographic account of return to Hadchit as a *Mahjar* Lebanese\(^2\)

**An auto-ethnographic account**

![Image of family](image)

**Figure 1:** My great grandparents, Sharifee Karem Kairouz born in Bcharre and her husband Salah Rizk born in Hadchit, taken in Butte Montana with their children who were born in America.

My great-grandparents on my mother’s side (see Figure 1) emigrated from Lebanon to the USA in the 1890’s during the first wave of Lebanese emigration. The paternal family village, Hadchit (the village of my mother’s father’s father see Figure 2 below), has remained our place of connection in Lebanon. From the earliest age when I first heard of the ancestral family village, Hadchit, located in North Lebanon and perched on the edge of a cliff in the high altitude *Wadi Qadisha*, or Holy Valley, it had a hold on my consciousness. It was always more of a mythical than a real place, seemingly inaccessible from the present due to the tyranny of distance, both in kilometres and generations. The ongoing instability of Lebanon, and the fact that for most of my childhood Lebanon had been at war, reinforced the perception that it was an inaccessible place and yet I had an overwhelming desire to see it once in my lifetime. Would it always remain a picture post-card or an image on a website or would I be able to go

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\(^2\) *Mahjar* is a term used for the 1\(^{st}\) wave of Lebanese emigration to North America in the 1890’s and their descendants.
there, see it and touch it? Why did this village have such a hold on my consciousness and, indeed, the consciousness of so many descendants in North America and Australia? It seems that the attachment to place can be passed from one generation to the next without any actual return taking place. But, with each generation the homeland becomes more remote and more of a fantasy than a reality and the connection to it more tenuous.

I have always been adventurous and as soon as I was old enough I set out on my first attempt to visit Hadchit when I was 23 in the mid 1990’s. The journey started in Sydney, where I met for the first time relatives from Lebanon who migrated to Australia in the 1960’s. This meeting would lay the foundations for this study a decade later. The first attempt to visit Hadchit never took place as I later got stuck in Turkey and couldn’t get a visa to travel through Syria to Lebanon. In 1996 I enrolled in a PhD in the School of Archaeology and Anthropology, at ANU, to start this study, but instead I got married and had three children and still Hadchit was on my mind. I began to regret that I didn’t visit in my twenties, when there was a period of peace in Lebanon. Then in 2005 I was awarded a Re-Entry Scholarship for Women to the ANU to complete this study. Perhaps I would now get another chance to visit Hadchit? As part of my fieldwork I attempted a second visit to Lebanon and Hadchit in July 2006. Five days before I was due to depart, Israel started a 34 day War against Lebanon, which closed the national airport and destroyed much of the county’s infrastructure. I got a taste for how precarious life in Lebanon can be. In May 2007 I made a third attempt to visit Lebanon for a conference at the Lebanese American University and to do some fieldwork in Hadchit. Like my previous attempt a war broke out in Lebanon, just when I was departing, only this time I was en route and it was too late to turn back.

**Day one:**

I arrived in Lebanon during the siege of the *Naher el Bared* Palestinian refugee camp in May 2007 and there was a random bomb campaign of café’s and restaurants in *Beirut*. On my first night in *Hamra*, in central Beirut, a bomb went off 1km from our hotel. I received a phone from the Australian Embassy the next morning telling me to leave the country, but I was determined to visit
Hadchit after the conference I was to attend on Lebanese emigration at the Lebanese American University. I hired a driver from the hotel to drive me to the Qadisha Valley in North Lebanon, 2 ½ hours away, where Hadchit is located. He drove through Jounieh and Jbeil and then at Batroun/Chekka we started to head up into the mountains, the views were spectacular. It is a steep winding road that does a series of hairpin turns as it climbs higher and higher until it reaches the high altitude Qadisha Valley, at 1300-2000m, and the villages of Bcharre, Hasroun, Bka Kafra, Hadchit at one end of the valley and Blouza, Bane, Kfarsghoub and Ehden at the other end of the valley. I stopped in Bcharre, the village where my great-grandmother Sharifee was born, and stayed at the Hotel Chabat. Upon arriving the afternoon mist rolled in off the sea and filled the valley.

![Figure 2: The first view of Hadchit as I approached from Bcharre. Source Nelia Hyndman-Rizik, 2007.](image)

The next morning I had breakfast and set out on foot for Hadchit, a 25 minute walk from Bcharre. As I walked around the bend I got my first view of Hadchit, a spectacular sight, as the old town is built on a promontory overlooking the valley (see Figure 2). There is a large section of terraced fields
as you approach the village, fed by a waterfall that comes down off the mountain and everywhere is the sound of water rushing. As I walked into the village, apart from the fruit trees, there weren’t many signs of intensive agriculture. Many of the fields were overgrown by grass and the stone walls collapsed and, instead, there were trucks driving around selling *el khudra* (vegetables). I didn’t get past the first house in the village before I was welcomed in for coffee. The average house had electricity, washing machines and a car. It is not a remote mountain village disconnected from the world anymore. They have mobile phones and satellite TV and work down the mountain in the cities. I was taken to a relative’s house where I ate a beautiful lunch and had a phone call from Sydney to check how it was all going. It was as if there is continuity between Sydney and Hadchit and the two spaces are contiguous and joined.

**Day two:**

It was important to see the Rizk family ruins (see Figure 3). I was very curious to see the house where my mother’s grandfather, who emigrated to America in the 1890’s, had been born. It took my cousins a while to remember which house it was and they showed us several other old stone houses that were no longer inhabitable that were associated with the Rizk clan before they found the house of my great-grandfather. Eventually, we came to the house of the Isber Rizk branch of the Rizk clan (see Appendix 3), who are the descendants of my great-grandfather’s brother, Youssef, who remained in Hadchit when the other four brothers emigrated. This, they told me, was the house where my great-grandfather was born. I was surprised to see it still standing and inhabited. It had another storey added to the original house, which was made of concrete. It was intriguing to me that I could walk into this village 110 years after my great-grandfather left and that they would still know who I was and be able to show me the house where my great-grandfather was born. I had a feeling of roots in this place. It was not like I felt that I fitted perfectly in Hadchit, but that this was a place of origin for me.
The next most important part of my return was to visit the St. Raymond’s Maronite Church, the place where my great-grandparents married before they emigrated to America (see Figure 3). It had white plastered ceilings, a chandelier and a large Icon of St. Raymond on the wall. I was accompanied by the Mayor, my mother and cousins in the village. The keeper of the Church brought out the finger bone of St. Raymond, a relic that was wrapped in cloth and kept behind the Alter, as a form of blessing for me. My mother then lit a candle on behalf of our family in America and paid tribute to my great-grandfather and my mother’s siblings and all the Rizk/Rask family. My return was the return of many and fulfilled the obligations to maintain a connection to place for the broader Rizk/Rask clan of North America.

I was then taken to see all of the religious shrines in the ancestral village, indeed the village itself is presented as shrine. The second church I visited was in honour of Sarkis and Bakhos (two Roman soldiers, see Figure 4), which the Rizk family has an association with as it is located in the old Rizk hara or precinct. The third Church in the village is Saydet Eschiffe, or Our Lady of the Cliff (see Figure 4), perched right on the edge of the cliff. The style is simple, almost austere and humble. Sarkis and Bakhos and Saydet Eschiffe have been
restored in recent years, as part of the contributions made by Hadchit’s immigrant communities overseas. St. Raymond’s Church is thought to be at least 200 years old and is built over a Phoenician temple base. Last century a Roman goddess (there are different versions of the origin myth for the statue) was excavated from the foundations of St. Raymond’s and today its decapitated body is placed in a cage outside the front of the Church (see Figure 6).

Figure 4: Religious sites around Hadchit. Source: Nelia Hyndman-Rizik, 2007

Day three

I was driven around the valley by a senior Rizk elder. The first village we passed was Blouza, the neighbouring village to Hadchit, also perched on the edge of the cliff and completely depopulated by migration, mostly to South America. It now has several large mansions and apartment blocks built by émigrés. I was then driven through Bane to Kfarsghoub and onto Ehden, the biggest town in the valley, it also appears to be the wealthiest. Ehden has a street entitled Rue Émigré. You can see the extent to which migration has brought wealth, through remittances, to these mountain villages by the amount of construction that is evident everywhere. Ehden’s patron saint is Sayde, Our Lady, and has the oldest Maronite church in the district, dating back to 749 AD.
Back in Hadchit I attended a funeral for a deceased émigré from Sydney in the afternoon whose body had been repatriated to Hadchit for burial at the cemetery and a service at Mar Romanos (St. Raymond’s). The body of the deceased was brought to Lebanon by her two sons. The villagers attend the funeral masses for émigrés held at St. Raymond’s out of a sense of duty, wejbet, as the people of the home town are the spiritual keepers of the diaspora. The women were all wearing black (See Figure 5) and attended to the body of the deceased for the final viewing and grieving, in an adjoining building to the church, while the men were outside with the Bishop, Saydna, and the priests. During all stages of the ceremony there was strict gender separation. Some of the older women wore black head scarves. There was a long period of call and response and ritualised wailing over the body before mass. We then moved to the church where there was also strict gender separation, with the women sitting in the back and the men at the front. The Bishop, Saydna, and three other priests presided over the mass. As I left the church I followed the coffin and filed past the bereaved. I looked up and I noticed the mist was wafting up from the Qadisha valley below and it started to rain a bit. I was struck by what an incredible location Hadchit is situated in, perched as it is, on the edge of a cliff over looking a 1km sheer drop to the valley floor below. The grandeur of the scenery was quite over-whelming.
In the morning I was accompanied to see some of the last remaining cedars in Lebanon, *Arz al Rab* (Cedars of the Lord), in a small glade above Bcharre. They are ancient, huge and aromatic. There are a lot of tourist shops there, none doing any business because of the crisis in Lebanon at the time. The tourist operator told me “they want to destroy Lebanon” (they being the Syrians). Lebanon is hopeless with 18 religious sects and Syria” (why he didn’t mention Israel I don’t know), us Lebanese live day to day, because we can’t count for anything”. Everyday I asked at the hotel, “*Keef el akhbar min Trablos wa Beirut?*”, how is the news from Tripoli and Beirut? “*Ma fi shi*” nothing they said. But, everyday I got warnings from DFAT (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade) telling me to leave the country, because the situation could deteriorate anytime and access to the airport could become a problem. So, life in Lebanon is precarious and the ability to enjoy it is the ability to ignore the situation. Nonetheless, there is an air of hopelessness about Lebanon’s future, people have
this listlessness about them. Yet, there is an extreme kind of hedonism in Lebanon too, a tendency to party to the extreme, to ‘live’ in the face of uncertainty. Thus, paranoia and hedonism exist alongside one another simultaneously.

I joined my cousins in a procession at 6pm for Mary, also my mother’s name, marking the last day of the month of Mary. The children were dressed in white and blue which are the colours of Mary. In the St. Raymond’s Church the statue of the Virgin Mary was placed in the centre of the church and held up high for all to see. The women sat in the back and there were a few men at the front of the church. Many of the women wore black. The sacred female aspect through Sayde, Mary, Hanni, mother of Mary, Shamouni and Saint Rafqa are strong in Maronitism.

Day four ended with the Rizk family reunion (see Figure 3). I was taken to the party, along with my mother, by our cousins in the village. I was surprised upon arriving to discover that the reunion only included the male clan heads from each sub-branch of bayt Rizk (The house of Rizk- the Rizk patrilineage, see Appendix 3 for the Rizk family tree) and the wives from the household who hosted. I felt like an anomaly as a woman at the reunion, that it was a strange inversion for all concerned. Instead of the return of the ‘prodigal son’, it was the return of the ‘prodigal daughter’. It highlighted to me the ambiguity of my group membership as a returning woman from the Rizk clan. Khouri Youssef, the Rizk priest, was there and this was a measure of respect I am sure. Tony Rizk, who designed the Hadchit website, was also there. He sent the American Rizks (Rasks – my mother’s maiden name is an anglicized version of Rizk) a copy of the Rizk family tree back in the year 2000. He had subsequently lost it and I gave it back to him again, as it was on my laptop. The information was sent from him to America, from America to me in Australia and then I returned it to him in person back in the home village. Connections were made between the different branches of the Rizk transnational family between Australia, Canada, America, St. Louis and the home village itself. Because they could locate me on the family tree, it was easy for them to weave me into the web of kinship. The
meeting was formal, everyone sat around the salon room and the women of the household served orange juice, tea and chocolates.

They asked me a lot of questions about the Rizks in the world, particularly in America. They asked me: “You have visited the Rizks on three continents what does distinguish them”? I said “They have strong women”!! Shock and silence was the response, distinction is not ordinarily associated with females. It was their view that the Rizk family is known as one of the most ordered and community minded families in the village, the family that comes together to organise things. They see themselves as effective at leadership, so it was no surprise to them that the returning anthropologist doing the study on the village was from Bayt Rizk.

**Day five:**

I was determined to walk below Hadchit, through the cemetery down the trail that leads to the wadi. I had read so much about this iconic trail, there was no way I was going to leave without walking it myself. It was one of the most spectacular walks I have done. The situation was tense, though, because of the crisis in Tripoli at the camps. Everywhere we went LBC news was on, and the army had decided to make a move on *Fatah el Islam* after a week of re-arming. I was worried maybe we should have left while we could. They were extremely paranoid in the villages around Hadchit about militants from *Fatah el Islam* making an escape through the *Qadisha* to Syria. Rumours start, circulate and get a life of their own. In neighbouring *Blouza* a child thought they saw three bearded men (they associate bearded men with Muslims) with guns wandering in the *Wadi*. The state of paranoia is such that the rumour spread like wildfire to the surrounding villages and in Hadchit the men were up all night guarding the village and searching for the dissidents. No one was found. Consequently, the next morning when I arrived to go on the walk to the *Wadi* the Mayor was concern that it was ‘dicey’ and that my security couldn’t be guaranteed. He sent “el shebab”, the boys, in front with guns to guard the trail for the walk into the gorge, while he accompanied me. It was ironic in such a scene of majestic beauty to be surrounded by such palpable fear. *Fatah el Islam*, which translates
as “Islamic Invasion”, of course feeds into the Maronites’ larger historical memory of conflict with Islam and their status as a besieged minority. Surviving through adversity is Hadchit’s motto.

Figure 6: Around Hadchit: St. Raymond's Square, Icons at Deir el Salib, Picture of St. Shamouni and the decapitated Goddess in front of St. Raymond’s Saydet Eschiffe. Source: Nelia Hyndman-Rizik, 2007.

Nonetheless, the walk into the gorge was stunning, it is all World Heritage listed and there are so many sights of historical significance (see Figure 7). It took about an hour and a half. The first place we stopped was the cave, Deir el Salib, Monastery of the Cross, which is a 12th - 13th century chapel (see Figures 4 & 6). We passed the remnants of an ancient water mill half way down the cliff and then walked around to the chapel of Adissi Shamouni (See Figure 7). The mayor told me that once a year the village priest celebrates mass there. There are many hundreds of grottos, caves, hermitages and monasteries built into the walls of the Wadi Qadisha, some dating back to the Roman period in the 3rd Millenium B.C. The most important Syro-Byzantine iconography found in the valley’s monasteries and caves, dates back to the medieval period during the 12th and 13th Century. Following the controversies in medieval Christianity over the nature of Christ, many generations of monks sought refuge in the hermitages of the Qadisha. There are three key monasteries of historical importance: Deir
Qannoubin, the former seat of the Maronite Patriarch, Deir Mar Antonios Qozhaya, site of the first printing press in the Middle East and continuously inhabited by Monks since the 12th Century and Deir Mar Elishah, the founding location for the Maronite Order of Monks, established in 1695 (Brochure 2003:6).

Figure 7: Sacred topography, the view from the Shrine of Adissi Shamouni out into the Wadi Qadisha, below Hadchit. Pictures also of the interior of the Shrine to St. (Adissi) Shamouni, a pilgrims collection. Source: Nelia Hyndman-Rizik 2007.

Today (see Figure 7), when you walk in the valley, the remnants of this history are there to be seen. Hadchit itself looks like a fortress, located on a cliff for self-defence. As you walk down the trail toward the bottom of the gorge the irrigation canal still flows with water from the top of the mountain. The terraces are still in use on the valley floor below Hadchit, some of the only operating fields remaining. It seems most households have made the transition away from farming but only some have reliable income from other sources, apart from remittances, such as construction. Everywhere we go in the village the original agricultural infrastructure is in disrepair; the irrigation channels, the fields, the
trees, the olives and the water mills, they have all been in disuse now for a period of roughly 50 years. This includes the Rizk family mill by the river at the bottom of the Wadi. It was hard to find it as the grass and bushes had grown up around it, but after asking some questions I found someone who knew where it was. I had to scramble my way into it, but was surprised to find the roof and walls still intact. It has two storeys with the mill stream arriving in the basement through three canals, which turn three stone disks, which turn wooden poles connected to the stone mills on the 2\textsuperscript{nd} floor.

It feels as if the village has abandoned tradition, but has only a tenuous connection to modernity and that war is never far away. Remittances free the villagers from the subsistence agricultural cycle and most of the young people don’t know much about the traditional aspects of it. The water irrigation technology throughout the village is pretty ingenious. It comes from springs fed by snow melt from the top of the mountain, which are guided by aqueducts and canals throughout the town and out to the terraces, everywhere one hears the sound of rushing water. These days, they say the water often runs out now by the end of the summer, as there is less snow on the mountains with global warming. On the last day the Mayor decided I should leave early because of the deteriorating political situation. I brought some typical items a ‘pilgrim’ might return with from Hadchit (see Figure 7). The departing comments they gave me were: “Your mother is Hadchiti but you are not”. I am constantly caught by my dual positioning as a ‘half-caste’.

\textbf{The insider/outsider Anthropologist}

While neither claimed the inherent superiority of insider views, they argued that “native” perspectives on both First and Third World societies must become an integral part of Anthropology if it is to be decolonized (Harrison 1991:88)

The debate over the role of the ‘native anthropologist’ has been well written about in anthropology (Altorki and Fawzi El-Solh 1988; Harrison 1991; Okely and Callaway 1992). In the post-colonial world it is inevitable that formerly colonised peoples will conduct research in their own societies. Furthermore, with the increasing trend toward anthropology at home (Jackson 1987) the native voice will gain greater currency within anthropology.
Nonetheless, native anthropology does not escape the dilemmas of objectivity and representation in research. Rather, it is still necessary to locate and to problematise one’s position within the nexus of class, race and gender which operates within any research situation (Harrison 1991:90). Indeed, claims to local status can be contested and, as Harrison suggests, multiple consciousness is a feature of the native Anthropologist:

I suggest that anthropologists with *multiple consciousness and vision* have a strategic role to play in the struggle for a decolonized science of humankind. Multiple consciousness and vision are rooted in some combination and interpenetration of national, racial, sexual, or class oppressions. This form of critical consciousness emerges from the tension between, on the one hand, membership in a Western society, a Western-dominated profession or a relatively privileged class or social category and, on the other hand, belonging to or having an organic relationship with an oppressed social category or people (Harrison 1991:90).

Altorki and Fawzi El Solh (1988) write that the position of insider/outsider is common for Arab female researchers and it often works to their advantage in societies typified by varying degrees of sex-segregation. She likens the insider/outsider position to that of a bicultural background:

…[some Arab female] researchers share a number of characteristics…and in addition have a bicultural background. This dimension surfaces in a number of ways in their work and has had some impact on aspects of their self-identity as researchers. However, the relationship between the bicultural experience and …being a blend of two cultures, this status permits a certain role flexibility (Altorki and Fawzi El-Solh 1988:9).

Joseph (1988), likewise, discusses her role as an insider/outsider in her writings on returning as a Lebanese American to do research in Lebanon. She found that the role of *mughtaribi*, or return immigrant, gave her a place in the community where she conducted her field research and accounted for her difference, thereby, allowing her to adopt a broader range of roles than women were normally permitted and to move across class barriers in Lebanese society (Joseph 1988).

The role of the insider/outsider in anthropology leads to a discussion of auto-ethnography and the role of personal experience in anthropological writing. In general, Okely and Callaway (1992) argue, autobiography has been relegated
to the literary genre and expunged from scientific writings, as it is regarded as subjective in a tradition that demanded scientific objectivism. However, the very nature of the anthropological tradition, which involves intensive fieldwork which submerges the self in another culture, leads to a paradox for anthropology. Fieldwork becomes a lived, embodied experience that anthropologists are expected to stand back from and write objectively about. In addition, the Great-White Man tradition has expected tales of the lone achiever, yet the anthropologist is expected to write in a purely objective style. Consequently, fieldwork narratives have tended to be relegated to diaries and novels, some written under pseudonyms. In particular women writing from the margins (often as the wives of anthropologists) have tended to adopt a writing style, which incorporated the ‘I’ as a subversion to scientism. Okely and Callaway (1992) propose, therefore, an integration of the subjective fieldwork experience with theory and methodology and terms this reflexivity (Okely and Callaway 1992:24).

Throughout my fieldwork experiences in all three locations I was inherently affected by my dual positioning as an insider/outsider anthropologist and by being female. I have linkages to the Hadchiti immigrant community in Sydney through my mother. On the other hand, I am half Anglo through my father and it was my bi-racial appearance, gender and lack of fluency in the Arabic language, which were the three most pivotal factors which affected the course of my field research. Additionally, my class position as a well educated, middle class researcher allowed me a greater flexibility and mobility than women are often permitted in the Hadchiti immigrant community in Sydney. Each of these factors also caused a degree of trauma for me personally as I found myself in the nexus between race, gender and class.

The most challenging issue for me was my bi-racial background. As a fourth generation descendant of immigrants from Hadchit I was uncomfortable and unfamiliar with many aspects of Lebanese society and, likewise, I found that Lebanese people were often uncomfortable with my bi-racial appearance, my lack of fluency in the Arabic language and my position as a married woman, with a child living away from my husband in order to undertake field research. I
found myself constantly confronted by comments which referred to my ‘White’ appearance, with the inference that I didn’t look Lebanese enough, as we saw in my auto-ethnographic account of return to Hadchit. I found this disorienting, but came to realise that it was an inherent part of the field work experience and it demonstrated to me the centrality of liminality for the second, third and fourth generation descendants of immigrants. Additionally, my role as a mother of a young child, who accompanied me on my fieldwork, gave me mobility in both the world of men and women and mitigated against my total categorisation as a ‘sharmoota’ or a prostitute (but I observe that this categorisation is generally attributed to any ‘mobile’ female who isn’t spatially contained within the domestic sphere and is unsupervised by father/brother/husband). Nonetheless, negotiating my role was at times difficult as my positioning was inherently ambivalent and because I didn’t behave like other married women in the Hadchit community and I lived alone in my own apartment away from my husband. All of these experiences contributed to the ethnography that follows through the chapters of this dissertation and have enriched my understanding of the complexities of the social fabric of the Hadchiti immigrant community in Sydney and their relationship with the home village.

**Thesis Outline**

Chapter Two provides a brief historical overview of the formation of Lebanon, the rise and fall of the Maronites and their role in the uneven development of capitalism in Lebanon by sect under the French. This discussion provides the background for the four waves of Lebanese emigration, which led to the formation of the Maronite diaspora. A detailed background on the village of Hadchit is then provided and an analysis of the two previous ethnographies, which were conducted in the village in the 1950’s. The chapter finishes with a series of narratives on migration from Hadchit to Sydney in the 1960’s which illustrate the experience of moving between the two worlds.

Chapter Three examines the social dynamics of the Hadchiti social village in Sydney. Three spheres of Lebanese identity: patrilineage (*bayt*), village (*day’aa*) and sect (*ta’eefa*) have historically defined sectarian identities in Lebanon and now, as this study shows, are deployed as a home-building strategy
in Sydney. The ethnography of ‘village life’ explores the dynamics of the Hadchit Association, the St. Raymond of Hadchit Hall and who is included/excluded in the Hadchit telephone directory. Ostentatious displays of success, *najeh* and status, *markaz*, will be examined through a case study of St. Raymond’s day at the Grand Westella, while discourses of spiritual poverty will be analysed through an exploration of Lent as a case study in religious practice. The intersection between the Hadchiti social village and the broader Maronite diasporic community is found at Our Lady of Lebanon Maronite Church, Harris Park, where the deterritorialised Maronite villages of North Lebanon are socially reconstructed in a constellation of belonging.

Chapter Four undertakes an intergenerational analysis of the transformation in the social relations of production amongst the Hadchitis in Sydney, which I will refer to as the (re)production nexus. The chapter starts by examining the gendered construction of domestic space and the centrality of women for the affective and spiritual dimensions of homeliness through their daily practices of care. Through a ‘spiritual division of labour’, women resolve the contradiction between the material and spiritual worlds, which allows their families to work in industrial time and space. The chapter then examines how the second generation are renegotiating gender-roles and the nature of the marriage contract from ‘relations of descent to relations of consent’. This transformation has destabilised gender roles and led to a crisis of (re)production for *bayt*, *day’aa*, and *ta’eefa* (patrilineage, village and sect) as overlapping spheres of affective attachment amongst the second generation.

How has this crisis been conceptualised? Chapter Five explores the representation of Australia as being *balad niswen-hukum niswen*: a land of women, ruled by women with a Queen as the Head of State. The chapter begins with an analysis of matriarchy versus patriarchy in the Lebanese village and explores how gender narratives and roles get turned upside down in the course of war and migration. I argue the migration process has been emasculating for the men in the Sydney Hadchiti community, because of their experience of subjugation in the host nation. Furthermore, migration has been a challenge to gender relations, due to the education of daughters and the participation of wives
in the cash-economy under capitalist social relations of production in Australia. Through four key binary opposition and inversion discourses Australia is depicted being ‘only for work’ and a land of opposites to Lebanon, where male dominance is imagined to be the natural social order.

Chapter Six builds on Chapter Five by examining pilgrimages of return to Hadchit in search of home. Anthropological approaches to pilgrimage (Baldassar 2001; Cannell 2006; Coleman and Eade 2004; Dubisch 1995; Eade and Sallnow 1991b; Turner and Turner 1978) frame the analysis of the return visit as a right of passage and journey. The representation of Hadchit as a sacred space contrasts with the representation of the host-nation as being profane and ‘spiritually empty’. Central to this construction is the very fragility of the homeland itself and the im/possibility of return to it (Naficy 1993). Consequently, the homeland has been fetishised (Hage 1989, Naficy 1993) and converted into a Holy land, which is other worldly and timeless. I theorise that pilgrimages are a form of penance, in which immigrants seek to restore their connection to place. However, narratives of return always contain elements of liminality and ambivalence, in which the immigrant cannot be completely at home in the ancestral village.

Chapter Seven returns to Sydney to consider the ambivalence of belonging for Hadchitis in Australia, with the Cronulla Riots of December 2005 as a backdrop. The chapter begins by mapping the history of anti-Lebanese racism in Australia and the creation of the Arab Other in the national discourse. It will then situate the Maronites within the Lebanese community in Australia. Having set the stage, the particularities of the Hadchiti experience will be analysed to demonstrate the pervasiveness of anti-Lebanese racism and the limits to translating their ‘success’ into national belonging. The experience of racism in the host-nation amplifies their feelings of homelessness, *el ghurba*, for they are not quite Australian or Lebanese. The chapter finishes by examining the transformation of the second generation into ‘Lebanese-Australians’.
2. Lebanese Emigration and the village of Hadchit

With wealth a foreign land becomes a homeland and with poverty a homeland becomes a foreign land. 

Arabic Proverb

The formation of Lebanon

Lebanon is located in the Eastern Mediterranean (see Map 1) and borders Syria and Israel. There are three main geographical regions: the coastal plain, the Lebanon Range and the Anti-Lebanon Range, with the Bekaa valley in between (see Map 1). The highest mountain, Jabal Lubnan, at 3500 meters, is part of the Lebanon Ranges and generates significant rainfall, approximately 82.5cm annually, providing a fertile agricultural climate in a region dominated by desert (Hitti 1965:11-12). The Lebanese mountains historically provided refuge for Lebanon’s diverse religious groupings, an historical feature of mountainous regions in pre-capitalist societies, according to Hage (1989:129). Lebanon has 18 religious sects and minorities, which comprise Sunni and Shiite Muslims, Druzes and Eastern rite Christians including: Maronite, Greek, Armenian and Syrian Catholics, Syrian (Jacobites) and Greek Orthodox, Coptics and Nestorians (Cobban 1985:15). Lebanon's proximity to the Fertile Crescent and its central location in the Eastern Mediterranean has placed it at the crossroads of a series of empires throughout history including: the Canaanite/Phoenician, Mesopotamian, Persian, Hellenistic, Roman, Christian/Byzantine, Islamic, Crusader, Mamluk, Ottoman and lastly, the colonial French (Cobban 1985:70). The Ottoman Empire had a long-term and significant presence in Lebanon from 1521-1918, which then was part of the province of Syria until the empire collapsed at the end of WWI (Batrouney 1985:12).

The modern state of Lebanon was created during the French Mandate in 1926. In 1943 Lebanon gained independence from the French and its constitution was formalised by the National Pact in 1943 (Cobban 1985:70; Humphrey 1998:65). Lebanon’s system of Confessional Democracy allocates

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3 The Druze are almost unique to Lebanon and are a sect within Shiite Islam, but their teachings also include reincarnation, which is thought to derive from connections to other Eastern religions and possibly to pre-date Islam and Christianity (Cobban 1985:22).
political power on the basis of religious sect, as determined by the 1932\(^4\) census. The Maronites were estimated to be 75% of the population at the time, but are now thought to be less than 40% of the population due to a century of emigration (Salibi 1971:84). Under the division of power determined by the National Pact the President is to be a Maronite, the Prime Minister, a Sunni Muslim and the Speaker of the House, a Shiite. Seats in parliament were divided on a 6-to-5 ratio of Christians to Muslims, however, the 1989 Taif Accord, which ended the Civil War, changed the ratio to half and half.

Efforts to alter or abolish the Confessional system have been at the center of Lebanese politics for decades. Those religious groups, namely the Maronites, most favoured by the National Pact sought to preserve it, while those who saw themselves at a disadvantage sought either to revise the power allocation by updating key demographic data or to abolish the National Pact entirely and this became the basis for the Lebanese Civil War of 1975-1990 (Russell 1985:17). The conflict centred on the distribution of political and economic power, which was entrenched in the hands of a few elite land owning and merchant families, “The Four Percent Class”, who controlled 32% of the country’s gross domestic product (Batrouney 1992:18; Russell 1985:18).

After the 1989 Taif Agreement resolved the Civil War, Lebanon formed a ‘second republic’ (Hage 2001). Despite reforms to the division of power, the unequal distribution of wealth and political office by sect continues. In the aftermath of the July 2006 War with Israel, there has been a political struggle between the Hezbollah led March 8\(^{th}\) coalition and the ruling March 14\(^{th}\) coalition, led by Saad Hariri, over the distribution of cabinet seats and ultimately the control of the Lebanese state. Lebanon almost returned again to Civil War in May 2008, but the conflict was ameliorated by the 2008 Doha Agreement, which allocated Hezbollah the veto power in the Lebanese cabinet. The 2009 elections were won by the March 14\(^{th}\) coalition, who subsequently took five months to form a national unity government. The problem was the division of power with the Hezbollah led opposition, who claim they won 55% of the vote, but were only allocated 45% of the seats in the cabinet (Al- Amin 2009). In the formation

\(^4\)There has been no census in Lebanon since 1932 as it would substantiate that the Maronites no longer are the majority sect in Lebanon (Humphrey, 1998)
of the national unity government on the 9th of November, 2009, the final division of power was based on a 15-10-5 structure, which grants the March 14th coalition 15 ministers, the March 8th opposition 10 and President Michel Sleiman five seats, which guarantees the president the tipping vote (Sakr and Qawas 2009).

The central issue in the confessional division of political power in Lebanon, despite the Taif and Doha agreements, is the real decline in the Maronite population due to their emigration over the course of the 20th Century and their conversion into a minority where they once were the majority. We will now examine the rise and fall of the Maronites more closely and their relationship with the French as an imperialist power.

The rise and fall of the Maronites

There is a great deal of dispute amongst scholars regarding the origins of the Maronites. Some argue that the Maronite rite was founded in 680 when the Maronites split from the Syrian Orthodox Church over a doctrinal schism that split the early Christian church (Moosa 1990:21). The conflict resulted from the Council of Chalcedon in 451, which created a new doctrinal understanding of the nature of Christ. The council argued that the incarnation of Christ had two natures in one person, but that they were separate and distinct after their union (Moosa 1990:87). The followers of Chalcedon became know as Malkites or Jacobites. The anti-Chalcedonians became known as Monophysites. The Monophysites followed the doctrine of the faith outlined in the Council of Nicea in the Fourth Century. The conflict in the church grew so great over this issue that the Byzantine emperor, Heraclius (610-641), created another doctrine which was an attempt to compromise and reunify his decaying empire (Moosa 1990:96). The new doctrine was called Monothelitism and stipulated that Christ had two energies but only one will. This doctrine took hold particularly in Syria Secunda, where the Maronites are thought to have originated. While the Maronites adopted the new doctrine, the rest of the Christian world would later classify it as a doctrinal heresy (Moosa 1990: 176).

Hitti (1965:91) traces the origins of the Maronite church to a fifth century ascetic who lived near Antioch in Syria and his followers became the Maronites
who later moved to the Orontes Valley. The more likely scenario, according to Moosa, is that the Maronites gained their name from a seventh century Monastery of Marun located between Hama and Shayzar in Syria near the Orontes River. This monastery gained notoriety for its adherence to Monothelitism and the Abbot, Yuhanna Marun, and his followers were called Maronites (Moosa 1990:36-7). Salibi proposes yet another origin for the Maronites. He argues they arrived in Syria's Orontes Valley from Southern Arabia as one of the last nomadic tribes to arrive before Islam, during the reign of the Byzantine emperor Maurice (582-602), and surmises that they fled the Orontes Valley for Mt. Lebanon around 900, because the Byzantines, under Basil II, persecuted them for their heterodox religious beliefs (Salibi 1988:88)

Figure 8: Schisms in the Christian Church. Source: Baer (1964:85).

Early Christianity was divided by the Great Schism in 1054 between the Latin West and the Greek East. The Eastern church is made up of Orthodox, Uniates and the independent Eastern churches, as shown in Figure 8. A number
of Orthodox churches united back to Rome, Latinised and recognised the Pope, these groupings became known as the Uniates, including the Maronites, who united back to Rome in 1182 following the Crusades of 1099. The Maronites gave the Crusaders assistance to reach Jerusalem and the Patriarch of the Maronite church, at the time, was the first to have contact with Rome (Salibi 1988:93). It wasn't until Pope Innocent III in the early 13th Century that the Latinisation of the Maronite church formally began. Until this time it was still essentially Monothelite in orientation. The first changes were made to the external features of church culture and Latin vestments and rings were adopted. After the Council of Qanubin the Latin Baptism was introduced and the Gregorian Calender was adopted in 1598. From this time onward the Maronites were poorly regarded by other Eastern churches for their association with Rome. This marks the beginning of the Maronites western orientation and outward association with Europe in contrast to the other religious groupings of the Middle East. The process of Latinisation continued after the Lebanese Council of Louisa in 1736 when the Maronite Patriarchs abdicated their authority to the Pope in Rome (Moosa 1990:267).

Maronite spirituality reflects their history as a Christian minority who found refuge in the mountainous hinterland of Lebanon and, thus, survived in a region dominated by Islamic empires for 1300 years. As a minority in the Islamic world, Christians, along with Jews and Zoroastrians, were categorised as Dhimmis (people of the book). While they were not forced to convert, their minority status was in some ways inferior, as they paid a special tax and could not wear certain colours or marry Muslim women, their houses of worship could not be ostentatious and they were excluded from certain positions of power (Hourani 1991:47). Rugged isolation and a long history of persecution under a succession of Islamic empires, especially the Mamluks (1250-1517) when the Maronite Patriarch had to be hidden and moved from village to village to avoid capture (Kepler-Lewis 1968:11), created a minority consciousness amongst the Maronites. The Lebanese mountains, especially the Wadi Qadisha, or Holy Valley, with its soaring cliffs and narrow passes provided a natural physical barrier and defence against invading armies and a source of refuge and defence (Kepler-Lewis 1968:11). Sunni Islam, by contrast, became the religion of power
and public office under the Ottomans (Batrouney 1985:3). Consequently, Lebanon’s coastal cities and ports were Sunni Muslim dominated, while the Maronite Christians lived in the mountainous hinterland and were regarded as alien outsiders:

Because of the ruggedness of the country, non-existent roads, and the deep winter snows, villages were often physically isolated from one another and from the larger coastal towns. There was also a sense of social isolation which Christian mountaineers felt in their dealings with the predominantly Muslim coastal towns which not only differed in religion but represented the foreign (Ottoman) rulers of the land (Kepler-Lewis 1968:16).

The isolation of the Maronites is reflected in their spiritual practice, which is characterised by its monastic character, referred to as an “Eremitical tradition” (Hourani and Habchi 2004:452). Monasticism evolved within the Maronite church as part of the Syriac hermit tradition, based on the life of saint Marun and rooted in the mountainous terrain of the Qadisha Valley, with its long history of hermitages and worldly repudiation. Monasticism emphasises poverty, chastity, obedience, severe asceticism and working the land as its practice (Hourani and Habchi 2004:454-455). The austere way of life was not only the preserve of the ecclesiastical hierarchy:

It was practiced by the believers; the common Maronite people...the people lived according to the liturgical calendar and shared austerity with the monks. They fasted a lot, abstained from many things and recited daily hymns and prayers...all Maronites led a daily eremitical life in work, prayer, obedience to the church and devotion to their spiritual authorities. This is why the Maronites are known to be a monastic people...everything takes place as if this community is a vast abbey having scattered branches headed by an abbot, who is a patriarch, surrounded by bishops who are assistants while the people form a kind of third order (Hourani and Habchi 2004:455-456).

If isolation and an austere way of life were historical features of the Maronites their fortunes changed from peripheral players in the order of power under the Ottomans, with the arrival of French imperialism in the region in the 19th Century. At the time, Mount Lebanon fell under the jurisdiction of the Pasha (Governor) of Saida. Below the Pasha was the Emir of the mountain, from the Shihab dynasty, who collected taxes on behalf of the Ottomans. The
most notable Shihab Emir was Bashir II (1788-1840) who consolidated control over the mountain (Salibi 1971:77). Below the Emir were the Druze lords, referred to as Muqata’jis/Shieks, who were large land owners in the system of feudal property relations referred to as Iqta. The peasantry were divided between Mutayers, landless serfs, who worked the land of the Muqata’jis/Shieks and what Salibi terms the ‘free peasantry’, who owned small plots and paid tribute, many of whom were Maronites (Hage 1989:136-137; Salibi 1971).

The European powers competed for the domination of trade in the region throughout the 19th Century, with the main rivals being the British and the French. Part of their strategy was to make alliances with local sectarian groupings and to become their ‘protectors’. The British were allied with the Druze, the Russians with the Orthodox Christians and the French with the Maronites (Russell 1985:17). Hage (1989:213) links the Maronite ascendancy to their alliance with the French and their subsequent domination of the silk trade, through the development of a Maronite bourgeoisie class. This led to four key historical features of Maronite self-identification: their intrinsic difference from their surroundings, their superiority over the ‘Muslim other’, fear and the need for protection. He links these key features of the Maronite identity to what he terms the ‘fetishism of identity’, whereby the Maronites experienced the change in their social practices generated by capitalist transformation as emanating from their identity itself in a causal link:

The Maronites did not simply experience their identity as a symbol of the new occupations, skills and tastes they acquired. Rather, they experienced it as their ultimate cause (Hage 1989:196).

Thus, the Maronites perceived their sectarian identity, as Christians, to be the source of their ‘superiority’ and difference from the Muslim other. Maronite difference also developed into a form of colonial Whiteness, a self-perception of being White like the French (Hage 2004b:188).

For the French their alliance with the Maronites was a means to achieve their colonial designs in the Middle East. A power struggle developed between the Druze, whose power derived from their position as Muqata’jis in the Iqta system of Feudalism, and the Maronites due to their alliance with the French.
Hage (1989:203) argues this led to the subsequent exclusion of the Druze from the silk industry. This culminated in the Civil War of 1860, in which a Maronite peasant revolt was suppressed by the Druze lords and thousands of Christians were slaughtered and their silk crops destroyed (Batrouney 1985:4).

Consequently, the Ottoman rulers, under pressure from the European powers to protect the ‘Christians’, were forced to administer Mount Lebanon as a semi-autonomous Mutesarrifate, or provincial governorship, after 1861 (Salibi 1971:78). The chief administrator was to be a Mutesarrif, or Governor, and was to be a non-Lebanese Ottoman subject of Catholic background. A local administrative council was to advise him and its membership was to be fixed with four Maronite members, three Druze, two Greek Orthodox and one each from the Greek Catholic, Sunni and Shiite communities. This was the early model for the modern Confessional State in Lebanon (Cobban 1985:51). However, the Mutasarrifate comprised a Maronite majority, many of whom saw it as a Maronite homeland and a prototype for future statehood (Salibi 1971:78-79).

Following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire after WWI, the French received a Mandate from the League of Nations over the territory of present day Lebanon and Syria. A push emerged amongst Christian nationalists for the formation of a ‘Maronite Nation’ and, according to Hage (1989:218): “For the Maronite subject, the nation had to be, if not an exclusively Christian nation, at least, a nation for the Christians”. This imagined Maronite Nation was not supported by all the Maronites, however, in particular the Beiruti/French capitalist class who saw it as too isolationist, as their trading interests and those of the French included both Mount Lebanon and the Muslim interior (Hage 1989:222). Furthermore, the boundaries of the Mutasarrifate were considered uneivable for a functioning state because:

The territorial limits of the Mutesarrifate...deprived the country of ports for its commerce and suitable land for its agriculture...Lebanon ...could not develop to its full potential unless its territory was enlarged to include the coastal cities of Tripoli, Beirut, Sidon, and Tyre, along with the Bqâ and the plain of Akkar, to the north of Tripoli (Salibi 1971:79).
Under the French Mandate on September 1st, 1920 Greater Lebanon was declared and on May 23rd, 1926 Lebanon became a Republic. The boundaries of the Mutesarrifate were expanded to include the Sunni Muslim dominated port cities of Tripoli, Beirut and Sidon and the Shiite dominated city of Tyre. The annexation of these additional territories changed the confessional balance and the Maronites “became the largest single community, and the Christian communities together formed only a small majority” (Salibi 1971:80). But, under the system of governance established by Michel Chiha, a prominent banker and intellectual, the Maronites were reserved the Presidency (Hage 1989:232). The system of Confessional Democracy that was formalised in the National Pact of 1943, when Lebanon gained independence from the French, enshrined Maronite power over a multi-religious state through their control of the Presidency. Consequently, according to Humphrey, the National Pact:

...was premised upon a radical inversion of the relationship between religion and power in Ottoman society. Sunni Islam was relegated from the religion of power and privilege to second rank in a multi-religious society (Humphrey 1998:76).

This inversion in the ‘order of power’ would provide the on-going basis for political instability in Lebanon and has contributed to extensive emigration from Lebanon throughout the 20th Century. The Maronites have been central to each phase of migration from Lebanon since the 1890’s. At first their access to the sites for emigration consolidated their class position within Lebanese society, as the owners of capital, through the development of international business networks and remittance flows. But, their displacement and exile from the Lebanese territory now undermines their claims to dominance within the Lebanese political system. This has led to a ‘discourse of Maronite decline’ amongst the Maronite diaspora and the perception they lost the Civil War and their pre-eminence in Lebanon. Now the future of the faith is in the diaspora, exiled from the Lebanese territory as a ‘detterritorialised Maronite nation’, united internationally by the Maronite Church.

**Four waves of Lebanese emigration**

Scholars (Abdelhady 2008:57; Humphrey 1998:24-25; Issawi 1992:5-6) have identified four waves of Lebanese emigration over a period of a century,
which were caused by a range of push-pull factors. The first wave was from 1880-WWI, the second from 1947-1966, the third from 1967-1975 and the fourth from 1975-1990. The first wave of emigration prior to WWI saw up to 100,000 people, or one quarter of the population, emigrate from Mount Lebanon between 1900 and 1914. Two thirds went to the USA and South America (Humphrey 1984:6; Issawi 1992:31). By 1914 it is estimated that emigration was running at an annual rate of 15,000-20,000 people. These migrations must be understood in terms of the mass migrations from Europe and the Mediterranean basin to the New World, which were taking place as part of the Industrial Revolution, which is referred to as the industrial period in world migration, as discussed in the Introduction (Castles and Miller 2009; Issawi 1992; Massey 1998). Between 1800 and 1925 more than 48 million people migrated from Europe and the Mediterranean basin to the former colonies of the New World including: Argentina, Australia, Canada New Zealand and the USA, with the latter receiving 60% of the total (Castles and Miller 2009:2). Migration in this period was characterised by the movement from densely populated regions to the sparsely populated New World colonies, which were rapidly industrialising and needed labour (Castles and Miller 2009:2).

There were also a range of domestic push factors for Lebanese emigration during this period. The first and most basic reason, according to Hourani, was population growth as there was insufficient land in the mountain villages of Lebanon to sustain the growing population (Hourani and Shehadi 1992:4). Additionally, as we saw in the section on the rise of the Maronites, Lebanon underwent many social upheavals during the capitalist transformation of Lebanon under French imperialism in the 19th Century. The traditional village base of Lebanese society was threatened by Lebanon’s incorporation into the world market, particularly through the silk trade (Batrouney 1985:5). The transport revolution in Europe facilitated the movement of trade goods all over the world and this was consolidated by the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869. Lebanon was flooded by European goods from the new factories, which competed against the products of Lebanon's cottage industries, such as silk, basket weaving and earthenware, demand dwindled, their production declined and Lebanon’s economy began to crumble (Batrouney 1985:8). The new
economic upheavals were followed by a massive wave of rural-urban migration from the villages of Mount Lebanon to the cities in search of jobs, as the system of barter and family reliance was breaking down. It is estimated that the city of Beirut grew from a small town of 5,000 people in 1800 to a city of 120,000 people by 1900. A new class of elite educated professionals and businessmen emerged, which polarised Lebanese society between the rich and the uneducated urban and rural poor (Batrouney 1985:8).

The majority of emigrants during the first wave of migration were Maronite and Orthodox Christians (Humphrey 1998:25). Linkages to the West developed first amongst them, through their contact with the colonial powers and participation in French and American schools, opened by Catholic and Protestant missions in Lebanon from the 1840’s. These institutions educated almost exclusively Lebanese Christians, Maronite and Orthodox, and led to a general intellectual awakening and Western orientation amongst them (Batrouney 1992:6). Reading and writing also became central to Maronite discourses of superiority and civilisational difference from their surroundings and the Muslim Other (Hage 2004b:197). The remittances sent home by the emigrants, estimated at around 800,000 pounds per year by 1910, contributed to the monetisation of the Lebanese economy, which was unique in the Middle East (Issawi 1992:26). Differential access to remittance flows, however, contributed to the uneven development of Lebanon as they were repatriated mostly by Christian emigrants to their villages and families networks. The successes of the early emigrants led others to follow until the outbreak of WWI.

The collapse of the Ottoman Empire would prove disastrous for Lebanon. From 1915-18 a massive famine occurred, which adversely effected the lowest class of society, and has been attributed to rising prices, the depreciated Turkish currency, a collapse in grain production, due to the replacement of subsistence crops with mulberries for silk production, but most importantly due to an Allied and Ottoman trade embargo (Batrouney 1992:11). It is estimated that death from starvation and related diseases in greater Syria surpassed 500,000, with most occurring in present-day Lebanon, particularly in urban areas (Issawi 1992: 27). World War I marked a drastic decline in Lebanese emigration, which remained
low between the two world wars due to the Great Depression and the tightening of immigration controls in the USA after the 1920’s (Abboud 2002; Abdelhady 2008; Castles and Miller 2009:2).

The second wave of Lebanese emigration started after WWII. The majority of this group were also northern Lebanese Christians who went to South America and to Australia, as part of the post WWII migration program, which selected Lebanese Christians as suitable migrants for settlement in Australia (Humphrey 1998:27). This was also the period when Shiite Lebanese migration started to West Africa. For the most part, the second wave of Lebanese migration was driven by the pursuit of economic opportunity, through gaining access to cash earnings, which has led Cohen (1997) to characterise the Lebanese as a trading diaspora. It has been surmised that the ‘poorest’ were not likely to migrate, as raising the money to migrate was often a broader family investment to establish remittance flows and pathways for subsequent chain migration (Wigle 1974).

The third wave of Lebanese migration started after the 1960’s and corresponds with the post-industrial period (Castles and Miller 2009:2) in world migration, which constituted a sharp break with the two previous phases that were dominated by migration from Europe to a handful of former colonies (Castles and Miller 2009:2). In the post-industrial phase, migration became truly global as the number of sending and receiving countries increased and the global supply of immigrants shifted from Europe to the developing countries of the Third World. Migration was now to post-industrial urban societies with increasingly segmented labour markets, as we saw in the Introduction (Castles and Miller 2009:2). In the case of Lebanon, there was also a general increase in tension in the Middle East after the Arab-Israeli Six Day War in 1967, which caused a new wave of Palestinian refugees to flee into Lebanon and contributed to a general climate of instability. The 200% increase in Lebanese emigration to Australia during this period was mainly due, however, to the diversification of the source countries for Australia’s migration scheme to seek sources of labour from Southern Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean, due to short falls in annual quotas from the United Kingdom (Humphrey 1998:27).
The fourth wave of emigration, during the Lebanese Civil War of 1975-1990, was significant and approximately 990,000 people, or 40% of the Lebanese population, migrated overseas (Abdelhady 2008:57). Half settled in the oil producing countries of the Persian Gulf and the other half settled in Europe, the Americas, Africa and Australia (Abdelhady 2008:57). By 1976 the Lebanese born population in Australia had increased to 33,424 (Batrouney 2002:428).

According to Humphrey (1998:80), the Civil War shattered the system of Lebanese Confessionalism and led to both the cantonisation and internationalisation of Lebanese society. The internationalisation of Lebanese society built upon linkages to family members abroad and through them to sites for chain migration and remittances flows. Humphrey (1998:62) refers to this as a mode of international subsistence:

Both rich and the poor in Lebanon developed their own internationalised worlds. The former through command over cultural capital which would ensure their privilege and the latter through remittances and possible emigration which lessened their dependencies on the patronage of the rich…the rich had the cultural and financial means to enter the ranks of the cosmopolitan world. The not so rich generally managed to acquire portable professional and technical qualifications to become labour migrants or emigrants, while the poor fell back on the family as a mode of international subsistence.

In the first phase of the Civil War, 1975-1982, the majority of emigrants were Christian, but after the 1982 Israeli invasion of Beirut this trend was reversed with the majority of emigrants being Muslim and Druze, many of whom migrated to Australia. However, the signing of the Taif Accord in 1989 led to an eruption of fighting between the Christian, Maronite factions (Lebanese Forces under Samir Geagea versus General Aoun and the Lebanese Army) and resulted in a final phase of large-scale Maronite emigration as they ‘gave up on Lebanon’. The ongoing instability of Lebanon transformed the Lebanese exiles and refugees into permanent settlers in their countries of settlement (Abdelhady 2008:58).

Since the 1990’s migration from Lebanon has run at an estimated 100,000 people per year and peaked in the aftermath of the 2006 July War with Israel (Abdelhady 2008:58; Hourani and Sensenig-Dabbous 2007). Contemporary migration from Lebanon is driven by chronic unemployment, under-development and the precarious post-colonial predicament of Lebanon (Abdelhady 2008:58;
Castles and Miller 2009). Indeed, Lebanon is said to be one of the most emigration prone countries with the population of the diaspora now exceeding that of the home country. The majority of emigrants today are educated youth and since the war the demographic profile of Lebanon reflects a decline in the sex ratio of the working population due to a higher male migration rate (Abdelhady 2008:58). The largest communities of emigrants and their descendants today are to be found in the United States of America, Canada, Mexico, the Caribbean islands, Brazil, Argentina and some other South American countries; Australia, Nigeria, Ghana, Senegal and some other West African countries and Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and other Gulf states (Hourani and Shehadi 1992:3-4). See Figure 9 for some approximations (likely to be exaggerations) of the numbers of Lebanese descendants in these countries.

Figure 9: The Lebanese Diaspora: Source: http://www.iloubnan.info/

**Lebanese Settlement in Australia**

Lebanese settlement in Australia followed the broader pattern of the four waves of emigration across the 20th Century. Australia received a small percentage, however, of the first wave with about 2000 Lebanese migrating to Australia before WWII (McKay 1980:33). Those that arrived from the 1880’s onward were referred to as Syrians, because Lebanon didn’t exist as a nation state at this time. Their loyalties were principally to their family/patrilineage, village and sect (*bayt, day’aa* and *ta’eefa*), because a national Lebanese
consciousness did not exist (McKay 1980:49). McKay argues, consequently, that internal differences between the Christian sects and between Christians and Muslims were transplanted to Australia with little intermarriage between them (McKay 1980:49). Lebanese migrants, at the turn of the 20th Century, generally worked as hawkers. They were supplied goods by Lebanese warehouseman of their own denomination (Melkite, Antiochian Orthodox or Maronite) based in Redfern (McKay 1980:32). Hawking typically involved selling Manchester door to door across rural Australia, either by horse and cart, or on foot with the goods carried in a backpack. As the hawker became financially established the pattern was usually to open a Manchester or Grocery store in country towns across Queensland, New South Wales and Victoria, see Figure 10 (ALHS 2002; McKay 1989; Monsour 2002).

![Figure 10: Wehby's Drapery in Braidwood operated for 90 years from the turn of the 20th Century. Source: Nelia Hyndman-Rizik, 2006.](image)

Through chain migration immigrants brought out their families and kin network from Lebanon. Due to opportunity and business acumen many Lebanese became established by the first generation and 25% of the second generation became tertiary educated (McKay 1980:61). The second generation moved to Sydney after the 1920’s into middle class neighbourhoods, such as North Sydney and the Eastern suburbs. The process of upward mobility continued into the third generation with 70% acquiring tertiary education,

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5 Cousin marriage occurs across all of Lebanon’s religious groupings (Cobban 1985:31)

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especially women, and settled throughout the Sydney metropolitan area. McKay argues that the Lebanese from the first wave of emigration experienced a strong process of assimilation into Australian society due to their absorption into various Australian Christian churches\(^6\) (McKay 1980:61). The adoption of Catholicism and Protestantism, according to McKay (1980:52), supplanted traditional affiliations and prevented the development of a pan-Lebanese identity amongst the early Lebanese in Australia.

Lebanese immigrants were excluded from citizenship under the White Australia Policy, between 1904 and 1920, because they were classified as Asiatic aliens under the Aliens Act (Monsour 2002:17). This led some Lebanese immigrants to conceal their actual place of birth and claim to be born in European Turkey or Greece (the other side of the Bosphorus Strait, which separates the continents of Asia and Europe), rather than on Mount Lebanon (Monsour 2002:22). Early Lebanese immigrants contested their racial classification as Asians and claimed to be Caucasian. In the context of the White Australia Policy, these claims to Whiteness were crucial to gaining citizenship, employment and acceptance in Australian society and often involved ‘passing as White’ through a conscious attempt to conceal their identity (Monsour 2002, 2006:124). One example is the Lebanese businessman in 1911 who wrote a letter to the Prime Minister claiming to be whiter than the Europeans themselves, only with superior “looks, habits, customs, religion and blood” (Hage 2004:187). Christianity was an important part of Lebanese claims to Whiteness at the turn of the century and continues to be (Ang 2001; Hage 1998; Hyndman-Rizik 2008; Monsour 2006:126), a topic we will return to in Chapter Seven.

As we saw in the previous section, Lebanese migration significantly increased in the late 1960’s when Mediterranean migrants were recruited for dirty work as unskilled labourers (Humphrey 1998:27). This pattern continued with the Lebanese Civil War, which led to a significant Lebanese presence in Australia. However, they entered a declining manufacturing economy. The global shift in capitalism to post-Fordism adversely affected migrant communities internationally due to the shifting out of production to sites of

\(^6\) Maronites joined the Australian Catholic Church, Orthodox tended to become Anglicans.
cheaper labour. Consequently, immigrants from Lebanon experienced severe unemployment rates of up to three times the national average due to their low levels of education, with one third having only primary school education (Humphrey 1984, 1998: 93).

During the Civil War the Lebanese did not receive formal refugee status, but the Australian government allowed family reunion on the basis of special humanitarian need, and, thus, paid little money toward their re-settlement in Australia, according to Humphrey (1998:23). Instead, the Australian government relied on the networks amongst Lebanese immigrants themselves and ‘self-help’ through the process of chain migration, which utilised family networks to facilitate their settlement (Humphrey 1998). The subsequent decline in the manufacturing sector forced Lebanese immigrant households into a combination of wage-labouring and social reciprocity, based on family dependence and the pooling of resources, or what Humphrey refers to as strategies of “urban subsistence” (Humphrey 1998:30).

The differing class position between the early wave and later wave migrants created questions of identity amongst established migrants and cleavages in the Lebanese community (Batrouney 1985:86). The Lebanese Christians built new Maronite, Melkite and Orthodox Churches, while Lebanese Muslims built new Mosques (Batrouney 1985:90). The centre for the post WWII Lebanese moved west from Redfern, the former Lebanese quarter at the turn of the century, with the opening of Our Lady of Lebanon Maronite Church at Harris Park in 1978 and the Lakemba Mosque in 1977. The established Lebanese organisations, such as the Australian Lebanese Association (ALA), were unable to cope with the scale of assistance required by the sizeable numbers of Lebanese that migrated during the Civil War. Furthermore, most of the political factions of the Lebanese Civil War developed counter-part organisations in Australia, such as the Kataeb Party, the Lebanese National Liberal Party, the Guardians of the Cedar and the Franji Marada on the right, and the Syrian National Socialist Party, the Syrian Front, the Socialist Progressive Party and the Ba’ath Party on the left. Consequently, the ALA came to be associated with the right and the old wealthy
settler families from the first wave and was unable to claim to represent all of the Lebanese in Australia anymore (Batrouney 1985:91).

Out of this breakdown in representation emerged the phenomenon of the village association as the major form of affiliation amongst Lebanese immigrants in Australia. Batrouney (1985:90) argues the rise of the village association was a response to the increased size of the Lebanese population in Australia and met their settlement needs on the basis of communal social ties based on village of origin and kinship. The village association also reflected the break down of Lebanese society across sectarian lines due to the Civil War and the reflection of these divisions in the organisations of the diaspora communities. By 1980 there were approximately 100 Lebanese village and regional associations in Australia with Kafarsghab, Bcharre, Zahle, Blouza, Hadchit, Barsa, Aches, Mencara, Sour, Menyeh, Meizh, Delieh, Denbou and Dansieh being the major associations (Batrouney 1992:91). In Granville, for example, there are various village association halls on the main road through the suburb. The Blouza association purchased a former movie theatre and has Blouza written on the ‘now showing’ board. The Bcharre association purchased a pub in Strathfield and holds its community functions upstairs and, as we will see in the next chapter, the Hadchit association purchased a former Masonic Hall in Granville for its community functions. These organisations mostly became charitable associations so they could repatriate funds to Lebanon legally, especially through the Civil War years. The popularity of the village association reflects the primordialism of the village, day’aa, as the primary affiliation for Lebanese immigrants in Australia, especially for the migrating generation.

Based on the 2006 Census, 72.8% of Australia’s Lebanese born population live in Sydney and 19.6% live in Melbourne (ABS 2008). The ABS (2008) estimates the total population of Lebanese born residing in Australia to be 74,850. The Lebanese make up 40% of Australia’s Middle Eastern born population, with the majority arriving in Australia in the 30 years up to 2005. The peak years for arrival were 1975 and 1987, with migration since 1992 averaging between 883 and 1,368 persons per year. Family stream constitutes 85.6% of migration from Lebanon to Australia and the ABS (2008) reports that
50.3% of Lebanese in Australia are Christians and 40.5% are Muslims and the remainder Druze. In terms of specific religious affiliation, the ABS reports that 30% of Lebanese in Australia are Maronite Catholics, 11% are Antiochian Orthodox and 34% are Sunni Muslim (ABS 2004), the rest are a mixture of Shiites, Druze and other Eastern Rite Christian denominations. The Lebanese comprise the majority of Arabic Speaking Background (ASB) immigrants in Australia, with the rest coming from the 22 Arabic speaking countries. We will now look in closer detail at migration from the village of Hadchit.

**The village of Hadchit**

The village of Hadchit is located in the *Kada’* (district) of Bcharre, North Lebanon, and is one of a group of ten key high altitude Maronite villages located in the iconic, World Heritage listed, *Wadi Qadisha* or Holy Valley (see Maps 1 and 2). Like other Maronite mountain villages, until the 1950’s Hadchit had a system of land tenure based upon small, terraced family holdings, which were carved into the mountain side and irrigated from snow melt, providing the basis for their annual subsistence with fruits, vegetables, grains for bread, olives for the table and oil and grapes for wine and arak. This system of small scale agriculture, based upon the ox driven plough (see Figure 11), had its roots in the *Iqta* system of Feudalism under the Ottomans, which combined tribute (an annual land tax) with small freehold land tenure (Hage 1989:136; Salibi 1971).

![Figure 11: A farmer and his wife from the Rizk clan using the Hadchit plough and oxen, taken in Hadchit after WWII and sent to the Hadchiti immigrant community in Butte, Montana. Source: Matt O’Dell, 2000.](image-url)
Hadchit has been the subject of two previous ethnographies, *Hadchite: A Study of Emigration* (Kepler-Lewis 1968) and *Some Aspects of Personality in A Lebanese Maronite Village* (Williams 1958), which were conducted in the village at the end of World War II. These provide us with historical ethnographic insight into the system of agriculture and kinship in the village, at the time and are revealing of the assumptions implicit in colonial-era anthropological writings. In both of these ethnographies it is obvious that the research audience was never intended to be the Hadchitis themselves. For example, the culture and personality study came to the following conclusion:

Some features of the Hadchite Personality: the most striking impression gained from the analysis…is the Hadchitis sense of defeat, their sense of being overwhelmed by their world, a world which most of them experience as harsh, cold, unrelenting, and un-giving. In this world they feel powerless and dwarfed. There is an almost universal lack of harmony between the individual and his setting: the individual is in constant struggle with this world from which he invariably emerges oppressed and defeated. His relationship to the environment is essentially that of victim (Williams 1958:238).

By contrast, Kepler-Lewis (1968:121) draws a different picture of the Hadchitis that highlights their cultural persistence and ingenuity living in a harsh environment and provides an in depth analysis of the annual agricultural cycle, which was built upon a gendered division of labour. While women were structurally contained with the home and village, conceptually the domestic sphere included the fields that the family owned, which were scattered individually-named small parcels. The men ploughed the fields and repaired the stone terraces, while the women and children were responsible for planting, maintaining, harvesting and processing the crops.

The reproduction of the patrilineage, *bayt*, embodied the system of social relations between the sexes and, in turn, ordered and reproduced the system of agriculture across the generations, establishing a relationship of consubstantiation between the people and the land. The regulation of women’s fertility was central to the reproduction of the patrilineage, the system of land tenure and, ultimately, their sectarian identity as Maronites. Land was passed from one generation to the next through a system of inheritance, whereby girls inherited a half-share of land and their brothers a full share, although girls in
practice gave their share of land to their brothers (Kepler-Lewis 1968:138). Kepler-Lewis (1968:77) estimated there were only 3000 individually demarcated plots available within the village limits of Hadchit. The marriage of daughters beyond the patrilineage and village might lead to the devolution of land holdings, already small and fragmented, which would be undesirable and unsustainable in a community dependant upon land for its subsistence. The age old problem for Hadchit, and the surrounding villages, was the dearth of available land for the expanding population. Indeed, Kepler-Lewis (1968:76-77) argued, a land/population balance had already been reached in the 19th Century. Thus, the paradox for the village was that the land was finite, while human fertility was not. This dilemma is captured in the Arabic proverb: “the women are more fertile than the land”.

The need to maintain a land/population balance was resolved through two mechanisms: regulation or emigration. Consequently, in-group endogamy within the lineage was the age old solution to overcome the devolution of land-holdings and there was almost total village endogamy in Hadchit in the 1950’s. Kepler-Lewis (1968) described the kinship system as a patrilineage system, which followed the rule of patrilineal descent and patrilocality, whereby the male descendants of a patrilineage and their families tended to congregate in the same part of the village, known as a hara:

The patrilocal residence rule...keeps married sons in the house of their father or in the general vicinity of their parents has had the effect of building up localized aggregates of kinfold in various parts of the village. These localized kin-groups are made up of several households with the same family name. These clusters are lineages or unilinear kin-groups made up of one or more patrilineages. Their localized quality is recognized by the villagers who call such localities “hara” (plural harat) (Kepler-Lewis 1968:144).

While hara refers to the physical locality of the patrilineage within the village, bayt is the Arabic term which refers to both the house and the lineage, and in the 19th Century, to women as the embodiment of the kinship system itself (Kepler-Lewis 1968:146). Kepler-Lewis found that 25% of marriages occurred within the lineage and referred to this as the Bint Am (daughter of paternal uncle) system of marriage or patrilateral parallel cousin marriage (Kepler-Lewis 1968:147-148). Hadchit has twelve bayts/patrilineages, which are: El Egha, Azar, Nazha,
Saaib, Chehade, Semaan, Saker, Rizk, Yunis, Bayssari, Chakti and Hounain (Kepler-Lewis 1968:147), which form 82 sub-branches (See Appendix 2) which, as a result of emigration, now transcend the village, as we will see in the next chapter.

The system of kinship and land inheritance in Hadchit, described by Kepler-Lewis (1968), shared much in common with other ethnographic descriptions of the Lebanese village in the mid 20th Century. Gulick (1953:371) in The Lebanese Village: An Introduction (Gulick 1953) describes the Lebanese kinship system as “an endogamous local group which is segmented into patrilineages, which are preferably endogamous but often exogamous in practice”. He suggests that the lineage itself is situated within a broader structure of village endogamy. Furthermore he identifies four defining features of the Lebanese village: devotion to land, religious orientation, predominance of kinship statuses and extreme localism (Gulick 1954:297).

In his description of the Lebanese kinship system Gulick theorises (1954) there is a gap between ‘theory and practice’. This is referred to as ‘anomie’ or a contradiction. While marriage within the lineage was preferred, marriage within the village, but outside the lineage, (village endogamy) was more common and sometimes between villages of the same sect across the Lebanese villages in the mid-20th century. Likewise, Tannous (1942), who also undertook his research in the mid-20th Century, identified the patrilineage as the focus of the individual’s broader sense of identification in the Lebanese village. Tannous cites the following Arabic proverb to demonstrate the shifting nature of allegiances in the Lebanese village: “Ana wa khayi ‘a ibn ‘ammi wa ana wa ibn ‘ammi ‘al gharib” -I am against my brother; my brother and I are against our cousin, my cousin and I are against the stranger (Tannous 1942:232).

7 This system of shifting alliances is typified by the Segmentary Lineage system of the Nuer (Evans-Pritchard, E. E. 1940. The Nuer: A Description of the Modes of Livelihood and Political Institutions of a Nilotic People. Oxford: Oxford University Press.)
Migration from Hadchit

Like many of the mountain villages of Northern Lebanon, for the better part of a century, Hadchit had a mixed economy, which combined the tributary mode of production (Worsley 1984) with the capitalist mode of production (Wolf 1982), referred to as a “peasant-worker” economy (Baldassar 2001:42; Humphrey 1998:30). In the 1950’s and 60’s Hadchit’s “peasant-worker” economy was built upon a long established pattern of seasonal movement between Hadchit and the suburb of Kubbi in Tripoli, where a large percentage of the village spent the winter months living and working in the cash economy and returned to the village in the summer to work in the fields. Kepler-Lewis (1968:24) referred to this pattern of seasonal movement as the “transhumant village”:

Another interesting type of internal movement found in the mountains of Northern Lebanon is the transhumant village. Many of the mountain hamlets and towns decrease by half or more in the winter when the people and livestock move down to the warmer coastal lands. Some of these exchanges are of long standing. Ehden, located high on the mountain between Tripoli and Bcharre, is a most populous town in the summer, but...in the winter the whole population moves to Zghorta...the people of the Bcharre region seem to prefer Tripoli (Kepler-Lewis 1968: 24-25).

Within the village there was variation in land ownership and the wealthiest families owned sufficient land to produce a surplus to barter and for food throughout the winter. Those who could stay in the village throughout the year, without having to do wage labouring in Tripoli, were referred to as the ‘Jourdiyye’, known for their resilience and toughness to withstand the winter on the mountain. Those that went to Kubbi in Tripoli, on the other hand, were the families that didn’t have enough land to grow their food for the year and, thus, had to supplement with urban cash income in order to survive.

An inversion happened over time as the ‘Jourdiyye’ were rich in land and food, but became poor in cash income relative to those that were working for part of the year in the city. The desire to access cash incomes and the promise of peasant transformation, ultimately led to the first migrations to Sydney in the

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8 Food was processed in numerous ways to be stored for winter including drying, pickling, and salting.
1960’s to work in the factories as wage labourers, but with the view that they would return to Lebanon transformed from the lowly social status they were born into. The following quote from the Kepler-Lewis study reflects the dreams for upward mobility and a ‘higher status’ imagined by young men in Hadchit if they were to migrate overseas in the 1960’s.

If I were rich I would buy a big car, build a building in Beirut, buy olive groves and gardens, hire a driver and be a ‘big shot’. I would get a gang of tough fellows to go with me wherever I went and I would make friends with all the beautiful girls and take a different one some place every day (Kepler-Lewis 1968:158).

In this quote he has captured the masculine fantasies for upward mobility, based upon the unattainable lifestyle of Lebanon’s powerful class of ‘Zaims’ (lord-politician-patron). Consequently, working the land was converted into a work of toil, as this quote on farming suggests:

The whole process of farming is considered hard and dirty work by most of those young men who have had some schooling outside the village or who have spent time in Tripoli loafing. Rebuilding terraces is seen as a back-breaking job. Hoeing and spading are hardly less easy. Even more unpleasant is the job of preparing and hauling manure to the fields. When I tried to take photographs of the process, several of the young asked not to be in the pictures. I don’t know one young man in this group who looks forward to owning a team of oxen and becoming a full-fledged farmer. Their attitude toward farming as a way of life is there must be an easier way to live. It is from this group that most of the recent emigrants have come (Kepler-Lewis 1968:89).

Working the soil, therefore, was regarded as lowly and degrading work and contributed to the desire to emigrate and Williams similarly linked the harshness of life in Hadchit to the desire to emigrate:

Their own immediate world is perceived as inimical and treacherous. The environment requires constant modification, structuring, and manipulating. But these Hadchitis see themselves only as taking from the environment, not as forcing it to produce and give. They live on their world but not as part of it, and never in harmony with it. Their life is a constant struggle with a setting that they experience as cold and harsh, full of pitfalls and dangers…Everyone hopes for a magical solution or a way out of his or her private dilemma. Yusef dreams of Australia, Simaan of a check from America, Victoria pleads with God to relieve her of her troubles (Williams 1958:236)
For the people of Hadchit the only way they could change their life trajectory and achieve a measure of ‘upward mobility’ was through the migration process itself. Indeed, Hadchit has been an immigrant sending village since the 1890’s. The first wave of migration went to the USA. It is estimated that 258 individuals emigrated from the village before 1950 (Kepler-Lewis 1968: 29). According to Kepler-Lewis, emigrants from Hadchit are to be found in at least 14 countries, with North and South America, Australia and Canada being the principal destinations (Kepler-Lewis 1968:30). From the beginning the emigrants sent back remittances, which contributed to the economic development of the village and its incorporation into the capitalist mode of production. However, the essential problem for the village of Hadchit, during the first wave of emigration, was that the second generation tended to discontinue repatriating money, as noted by Kepler-Lewis:

As older emigrants die abroad and are succeeded by a younger generation which has no first-hand knowledge of the village, all contact tends to disappear. However, whether American cousins, nephews and grandchildren have any real feeling of close kin ties or not, the people of Hadchite still consider them so and count them as part of the population of the village (Kepler-Lewis 1968:34).

It appears, therefore, that diminishing remittance flows inevitably led to the migration of a new generation from the village. Hence, another wave of migrants left Hadchit at the end of the 1950’s for Australia, about the time the remittance flows from North America dried up and Australia became the post WWII migration pathway. The second wave of migration went to Sydney and Melbourne from the late 1950’s and the third and fourth waves arrived in Sydney, from the 1960’s and during the Lebanese Civil War of 1975-1990. The final phase of migration from Hadchit to Sydney, and the remittance flows that it has generated, have contributed to the demise of the traditional subsistence agricultural life of Hadchit, which has now all but been abandoned. Migration to Sydney led to the proletarianisation of the emigrants in Sydney’s manufacturing sector and, thus, transformed both the emigrants and the village of Hadchit as it underwent a process of ‘long-distance’ industrialisation via remittance flows.
Kepler-Lewis’s conclusion regarding the impact of the 1890’s wave of migration on the village of Hadchit, was perceptive of what was to follow in the post WWII period:

Emigration has not destroyed family ties, because emigration is not considered permanent. As long as the family maintains the fiction that its members abroad remain within the bonds of kinship, the core value of the family remains unshaken as an ideal and the people in the village continue to think and act in terms of traditional relationships (Kepler-Lewis 1968:3).

This observation highlights the equally important role of kinship to land in the construction of home and identity amongst the Hadchitis. It is the mobility of kinship and the transcendental quality of the bayt that led to the development of transnationalism amongst them over the next 40 years of migration, in the era of globalisation, when Sydney became the principal transnational counterpart to Hadchit.

Today it is common to maintain spatially extended relationships between Hadchit and Sydney. These types of transnational linkages are aptly termed ‘translocal’ (Peleikas 2000:2), as they are both parochial, in that their social network is kinship and village based, and yet globalised, spatially extended and linked by electronic technologies and return visits. The process of deterritorialisation has resulted in a disjuncture between rural and urban space and between the global and the local, according to Peleikas:

In a small closely-knit country like Lebanon with its mere 4,000 square miles of densely populated urban and rural areas, the disjunctions between the rural and the urban, as well as the local and the global have become more tenuous (Peleikas 2000:3).

The pattern of village based affiliation is perpetuated because the Lebanese personal status law reinforces a strong link to the paternal family village (Peleikas 2000:3). All personal affairs are registered there, whether one is born there, lives in Beirut or overseas in one of the diaspora communities. The papers for births, deaths and marriages are held by the village Mukhtar (Headman/Mayor) and the right to vote in elections in Lebanon is based on registration in the paternal family village (Peleikas 2000:3). This system of bureaucratic organisation reflects the primordialism of the village in the national consciousness, as the basis for social attachments, and perpetuates translocal
connections between Lebanese diasporic communities and their home village, such as between Hadchit and Sydney.

**Uprooting: the experience of migrating from Hadchit to Sydney**

![Figure 12: Year of arrival in Australia. Source: Hadchit Household Survey, 2006.](image)

There are approximately 500 households of immigrants from Hadchit in Sydney and the majority arrived between 1960 and 1980 (see Figure 12). The Hadchit Household Survey shows several migration peaks with the years 1960-69 and 1970-79 being the peak years of arrival in Australia for fathers, mothers and children (see Figure 12). Chain migration over a 20 year period brought the majority of the Hadchit community to Australia. The inter-connection between the families links the entire community back to the first immigrant who arrived in Australia from Hadchit in the 1920s (see Appendix 5 and 6 for detailed chain migration maps of two families). Typically, the hosting family housed the family member they sponsored for a number of months or years and assisted in finding them work and eventually they moved out once they became established or married and purchased a house of their own. Often they didn’t move very far, preferring to stay in the same suburb, hence the clustering of the Hadchiti immigrant households in the suburbs of Auburn, Wentworthville, Merrylands,

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*Some of the earliest immigrants from Hadchit arrived in Melbourne in the 1920’s. There is still a community of immigrants from Hadchit living in Melbourne (see Eid 2006.), but for the purposes of this study the Sydney Hadchit community has been the focus of my research.*
Guildford, and Granville (see Map 3), a process that will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter.

We will now look at five narratives of migration to Australia from Hadchit that highlight the way the chain migration process occurred and provide an insight into the different ways in which the experience of migration process was conceptualised. The first is a tale of the lone adventurer.

**Narrative One: the lone adventurer**

**Why did you come to Australia?**

Before we start thank you for what you are doing and I hope that you will be the start and that you will encourage a lot of Hadchit young people to do what you are doing. You have our support from the Hadchit community here. I am one of the oldest members of the St. Raymond’s Committee and me and the boys have been working together for many years. We hope that many people will follow your footsteps. I was born in 1945 in Hadchit. It was a good year because the war finished. My father’s name was Romanus, named after St. Raymond. I came to Australia in 1966, I came by ship and it took 22 days. The ship was called the Angelina Laurel. I came direct from the Beirut wharf to Sydney. I was 20 years old, there was no one from Hadchit. I was on my own seeking adventure. We ran away from poverty, we came as the other Lebanese before us seeking adventure. I was working in Tripoli. Most Hadchit used to live in Tripoli (bil ibbi) – 9 months in Tripoli and 3 months in Hadchit. Most Hadchit people were well off because we worked. Hadchit people are hard working people and honest people. Hadchit people worked in construction all over Lebanon. We were well off, but it is in the Lebanese blood, like our grandparents we were seeking adventure and our fortune. My late uncle sponsored me and I lived in Redfern and I stayed with him for 3 years from 1966-69. My uncle was from Blouza. They looked after me like their own son. We lived behind the Redfern Cathedral and went to mass everyday.

**First job?**

My first job was in the factory at Meadowbank Hooversmatic. My cousin got me the job, I couldn’t speak English. I came from Lebanon with a high school certificate and a Tafe course in the building trade.

**Was it hard to learn English?**

It wasn’t hard because I could already speak French. I got my builders licence number early in 1970 and my licence number was 643. In 1969 I started to work for myself as a concrete form worker. At one stage I had nearly 30 men working for me. Now I am a full-time builder. Before, as a sub-contractor I had a lot of people working for me.

**Who is your community?**

My community is the Hadchit people. At church I am on the steward committee and I am the treasurer. I have been involved
with the Hadchit community since 1970 and served at the treasurer for 30 years.

**Narrative Two: The trauma and loss of leaving**

The following story tells of the trauma and unknown of setting out on the journey of migration to Australia by boat. It describes the moment of separation from friends and family as being like a ‘death’. On the boat she describes singing a mourning song to the woman above her in the dark on the boat. This narrative highlights her fear and trepidation of where she was going and of what she would encounter in Australia.

My husband can’t find work in Lebanon and my husband after very upset, have three children – say you sell the farm because we need for family and after coming to Australia and stay with my brother at Neutral Bay – he say you’re welcome. After we’re coming here we lived with my brother for 6 months. We came by boat from Beirut. After came all my family.

**What was it like on the boat with three young children, did they give you a cabin?**

I cry … I’m coming with my three children …and my mother scream!! like I am going to a funeral and three buses came with all my family and friends to Beirut I was leaving for Egypt- and I was dizzy with three young children and I can’t fit in, my baby’s small, I can’t fit in, too tight. They started cry. I put my kids bunks, after my son cry because the waves in Egypt were very bad. After me very upset I start to sing. There was a woman crying – I said what’s the matter you cry where are you from? – she was from el Wadi (below Hadchit) but her mum was from Hadchit.

**Where was she – through the wall?**

Three bunks she was up. Very upset cry. After start a wailing song.

**A mourning song?**

She sings it – the girl after cries and then my first cousin – she lives in Fairfield name Jamile and she was on her own coming to meet her husband here. Her husband was from Wadi Qanubine. They gave me 20kg of Olive Oil to eat with Kibbe in Australia. After Egypt she said “Zayt Zaytun (olive oil) eat it all”. My husband said why you brought that here - ? We’re coming here after, thank god for Australia beautiful country! Everything good. I go work for North Shore Hospital.

This family went on to sponsor four siblings and a nephew to move to Sydney where they lived in Auburn. Each sponsored family member stayed with them in their house for a number of years. Altogether they had people living with them for a period of five years. Spouses were arranged for several of them. Most members of this extended family now live in Wentworthville, Merrylands.
and Granville. They assisted each other in finding work either in the factory sector or, in the case of the women; they developed a long term association with the Royal North Shore Hospital. After hiring one woman from the Hadchit community the hospital encouraged them to bring other women to work there and so a large number of women from Hadchit worked at the Royal North Shore hospital for many years.

**Narrative Three: Moving between two worlds**

In the following migration story we hear about Sayde’s childhood in Hadchit before her migration to Australia, one in which the skills of peasant production were of value. She later contrasts this early part of her life with working at the Cottee’s Factory in Western Sydney. This narrative shows her attempts to make sense of her proletarianisation in Australia and shows how, in time, her family established themselves in Australia and found a sense of homeliness, through the availability of Lebanese cultural institutions and the ingredients to be able to cook the Lebanese cuisine.

**Part 1: Remembering Hadchit**

*Let’s start with where you were born in Lebanon?*

I was born in Hadchit, Lebanon after I marry I had three boys and two girls. I’m coming to Australia I’m working in Cottee’s factory for seven years, it was too much. We lived in Westmead.

*Let’s talk more about when you were in Lebanon when you were a child, what did you do everyday?*

When I was in Lebanon before I got married I worked “Bil ar’is” – in the garden terraces. After going to work with my father I carried rocks for him to repair the walls of the terraces. Before I got married I worked for my father everywhere – we planted wheat and grew vegetables.

*Was it women’s work to plant the seeds?*

yeh, the men dug the soil and the women put on the seeds –for the parsley and other vegetables and we put on the water in the summer time- we changed it from one bed to the next.

*We are looking at a photo of Hadchit– can we see a picture of any of your fields (see Figure 13)?*

Yes this is my village now that is my country Hadchit, that is Hasroun (across the valley) and that is Wadi Qadisha.

*Did each of your terraces have a personal name?*

Yes, yes;

*Can you remember their names?*
Said Kutly, the top field near Bcharre, then Sharona, Ahnur, Sharbime, Hard’shidiay, Banadura and Nizha in the Wadi.

So you had fields up high above the village and all the way down in the wadi too?

Yes, before I got married I worked too hard. There was 350 meters between the top and the bottom of the wadi.

After working in the fields up high and down low, I came back to the house, you know I wasn’t married those days. Later after I was married I still worked in the fields.

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Part 2: Working in the factories

After I came to Australia I worked at Cottee’s in the afternoon. I worked too much all the bosses loved me, because I could do what five men did packing the boxes. After a taxi brought me back to my house, Cottee’s got it for me, because I’m working alright. They loved me too much. After my kids say “no more working you old you come and sit down at home”. But I’m worrying because I loved my work, because they loved me because I’m working alright. After five men unload the boxes I packed them. After I said I wasn’t going to be working there anymore the boss was getting very worried.

So moving on then, why did you come to Australia?

There was a war between Israel and the Arabs, the 1967 Six day war. My husband had a cousin here and he said, why don’t you come to Australia—it is better for you. My husband he came to Australia before us for three months.
How was it coming – was it hard to say goodbye?

Yes it was hard, we cried and there weren’t hardly any Lebanese people. Now you would think you were in Lebanon because there are lots of Lebanese people, but when we came me and my husband there wasn’t. When I used to work I would always say to my boss “yes, yes, yes”. But one lady she said the boss wants to take me out and I said “yes, yes, yes”. They all started laughing at me and I start crying “What are you laughing at?” I said to them “Why you laugh, what you talking me?” – I did cry why I come to Australia – in Lebanon alright, I had garden, but after a while a girl comes to me and says “You know what they talking? They said the boss wants to take you out and you said “yes” – something funny you know. But when you people laugh I’m cry – “What you laughing about me, what you laughing about?” They knew I’m not understand English – that I just say “yes, yes, yes”.

Who looked after Fadi when you worked?

He went to a different friend every day. My daughter also stayed at home and helped looked after Fadi. Before when I left Fadi, not with my daughter, all day long at the factory I cry, cry, cry thinking about him, maybe he hungry. Worry about him. The boss say to me, why do you cry? I say “You don’t know what I have at home, my son every day with a different lady in a different house.

It was hard?

Yeh, yeh, now, thanks to God, it is easier and everything’s good.

Part 3: The challenges of getting established in Australia in the early years

How many years were you in Australia before it got easier?

Ten to fifteen years. Many years there weren’t many Lebanese people. We had to catch a train to see our cousins. We had to attend an Australian church, not a Lebanese church. Yeh, different life before, hard, hard. Thank You God now, because my kids good, they love God. On Sundays everything was closed before, not like now. Everything was cheap then. One whole sheep if you buy from Abattoir was $3.00. Yeh it was different life.

Did you make many Australian friends, considering there weren’t many Lebanese people in those days?

Yeh, yeh a little bit. I said yes to everyone. My husband does the banking for the church now every Monday. – We go to the church every evening and some days we stay at the church all day. My husband does everything for the church.

Are you in any kind of committee at the church?

Yeh I go to church every Sunday and every evening. Once a month the women and the men have a committee meeting.

So when you came there was no Lebanese shops?

Not much.

How did you make Lebanese cuisine?
Yes we grew lubia (green beans) in the garden. The first time we came to Australia we brought everything we need by boat with us.

You mean food supplies? What did you bring?

We brought the mortar and pestle for kibbe (jrn). I’m always cooking Lebanese food, my kids love it – what we had before– kibbe, lubia, mjaddra. Now it is easier because I can buy everything I need from the shop.

Do you make Laban (yoghurt)?

Yeh, Yeh I make it. Yesterday I made shanklish (a cheese made from yoghurt) for my daughter

What about zaytun (olives) do you do them yourself?

Yes I do them – I crush them and change the water twice a day. We buy a box of olives from the shop.

Do you make tomato puree?

Before yes, but not now – we buy it now.

Is there anything else you would like to add to your story before we finish?

Now nothing – I’m alright my kids are alright and they are always coming to help us.

And you still do a lot together?

Yes every Wednesday they come and we have a BBQ in the garage. Every night they come to visit too.

With Easter coming will you do anything special?

We will do a BBQ with tabouli and hommus. I make kibbi ar’s and my sister in law makes kofta, made from lamb. All the family stays together.

Sayde’s interview contrasts her childhood spent working the fields in Hadchit with her later life at the Cottee’s Factory, where she tells a narrative of being both an extremely strong and efficient worker, but also an account of her humiliation at being made fun of in the work place because she couldn’t speak good English. She tells of the hardship of having to leave her son while she worked and how she cried at work worrying about him being left with a ‘different lady everyday’. But, through home-building strategies she tells how it took 10-15 years before life in Australia became easier. The key aspects that made this transition possible was the establishment of Our Lady of Lebanon Maronite Church, Harris Park, where she is a regular and the increased availability of the key ingredients for cooking the Lebanese cuisine (in her oral history she tells how they originally brought all of the ingredients with them from Lebanon including a Jrn – a mortar and pestle for making kibbi). But, the factor which anchors her in Australia the most today is the success of her
children and the ongoing close social contact she has with them. Sayde has five children and eight grandchildren in Australia.

**Narrative Four: Australia as ‘Labour migration’**

In this migration narrative we hear Raymond’s account of Australia as ‘only work’, a common way in which immigrant’s from Hadchit conceptualised their lives in Australia at first.

*Let’s go back to the beginning and tell us about your childhood in Hadchit*

My village very good. Lebanon was very good when I was there, nice. When I was younger I was in school and everyday went to church. Everyday went to Mar Romanus. I studied to be a priest, but then followed friends to smoke and drink and then after learnt to work. They only paid me I pound (Lira) not enough for cigarettes.

*Did they make wine in Hadchit?*

Yeh they did. If I got money though, ten Pounds, I would spend it on alcohol and cigarettes

*Did your family have land in Hadchit?*

Yes they grew teffah (apple), mish mish, apricots, wheat. They looking after the land – my father. When I was a kid I would help with watering the fields – once a week. The water came from the main irrigation canal. Each farm got water in turns. But when I grew up and was 15 I went and never helped anymore, that was it.

*In Hadchit was there any work other than farming?*

No, not much. I started working in a building crew. They give me easy jobs to learn. Step by step I learnt.

What year did you come to Australia?

1967, I was 25 years of age. I had been working full time for 10 years before I came.

*How did you come to Australia and why did you come?*

I was sponsored by my cousins in Melbourne who had lived here for 15 years to come. He came after WWII. I went from Beirut to Athens and then around Africa because the Suez was closed it took 37 days to get to Australia. My mother paid for me to go to Australia. It cost fifteen hundred pounds; it was a lot of money in those days.

*After you arrived in Melbourne what happened?*

I couldn’t speak English when I came. I only lived for 3 months in Melbourne and then I came to Sydney. I came here to live with a cousin who said there was plenty of work.

*What work did you do in Sydney?*

Factories, I worked in factories everywhere for overtime rates. Once I could speak a bit of English I started changing factories every six months. In total I worked in ten factories.
Why did you change?

For the money, looking for over time. Some would give it, some wouldn’t. I was looking for extra hours, some factories would only give 40 hours/week, $39/week not enough. In 1969 some factories only paid $36.00 for the week. I was looking for more. I worked Ford, Dairy Farmers Milk, Yannora making gear box, James Hardy, I left four times and came back and worked for them for 30 years. I was a Machinist. I kept the machines operating 24 hours. I started 1970 I worked 16 hours/day and I worked Saturday and Sunday. I worked nearly 24 hours for the money. I worked 3 shifts and sometimes they gave me 16 hours overtime. I did the same job for 29 years as the leading hand, Machine Runner. I filled in other people’s jobs on the production line while they had a rest.

Were there other workers from Hadchit?

There were 5 or 6 workers from Hadchit on that production line. A lot of Lebanese worked in the factory, from North Lebanon.

These factories that you worked at, did many of them close down in time?

Yennora Gear Box closed, David Cotton closed. Only James Hardy and Dairy Farmers at Lidcombe stayed open. When James Hardy at Camellia closed – they were worried about Asbestos. Asbestos sheeting production cut off in 1980.

In this narrative we hear a contrast between Raymond’s childhood spent in Hadchit in the world of farming and his later rejection of it. His mother then pays for his ticket to Australia where he starts working very long hours in Sydney’s factory sector in an attempt to accumulate as much money as possible in order to ‘return’ to Lebanon having ‘made it’ in Australia. The transition to capital accumulation and the slippage between working machines and becoming like a machine, of working night and day, non-stop out of rhythm with nature are common ways in which Australian life is represented and understood. Proletarianisation is experienced as a process of abstraction from nature into the world of machines and Australian society is experienced as the ultimate ‘unnatural’ social order. This was viewed as tolerable if it were only a short term sacrifice and you could return to Lebanon.

Narrative Five: The Civil War and Exile

The Civil War in Lebanon began in 1975 and this transformed how many Lebanese immigrants understood their migration to Australia, as they realised it would be permanent – as the following narrative highlights:
The Civil War

You must understand that the war in Lebanon in 1975 changed everything – It is the case that all Lebanese ‘became more Aussie’ – because before that everyone was earning money to go back to Lebanon, but after the war became severe we all started building our lives and work here and had to forget Lebanon, we had to make Australia our home. Before Australia was just a place to make money and go back.

First impressions of Australia?

When I first came I thought this is a clean country and it has good government that looks after the people, the social welfare of the people but as you go deeper in the society and as you to start to understand more and speak the language Australia became just a big prison to me, it is a big jail I can’t get out of.

When did you start to think that?

It is when I started to speak English, make Australian friends and I discovered when I talk they think that I am old fashioned. As soon as I discovered the shallowness of the Australians I met. They focused on TV and what I need only and not others. An Arabic person is different, I don’t like to generalise but you can feel when you sit next to them that they feel with you from both ways. With the Australian people I met I couldn’t feel that connection.

This narrative highlights the transformative impact of the war in Lebanon in making the migration to Australia permanent and the realisation that they would have to ‘make Australia home’. However, it also highlights the ambivalence with which Australian society is seen and how life here is experienced as being shallow, lacking affect and like living in a “big jail”.

Through these different narratives on migration to Australia we get a complex picture of the multiple ways in which migration was experienced and conceptualised by the first generation of Hadchitis in Australia. In the first, we hear the tale of the young, male ‘adventurer’ seeking his fortune, to better himself and he draws on the long history of Lebanese migration to understand his own. The ability to tell his story and have it heard was a transformative experience, which acknowledged the ‘success’ of his migration to Australia. In the second, we hear of the trauma of departing Lebanon, where the act of leaving was likened to a funeral, only the death is a social death, the end of one life and the start of another. In Mariam’s account the boat trip to Australia was much like the ‘middle-passage’ of the slave trade, where no one knew where they were going or what awaited them. In the third, we hear of Sayde’s transition between two worlds; the first part of her life spent in Hadchit working the fields, each
with a name and living in connection with nature, and her later life working at the Cottee’s Factory doing the work of five men. In the fourth, Raymond describes working non-stop in the factory sector 16 hours a day – like a machine—as he saw Australia as only a site for labour migration. He provides a picture of the process of proletarianisation in Australia. In the last narrative we come to the realisation that the migration to Australia would be permanent, and now they must make Australia home, which ultimately unifies the multiple ways in which the migration process was experienced and imagined.

**Conclusion**

The location of Lebanon at the cross-roads of many empires has contributed, along with its topography, to the formation of 18 religious sects who found ‘refuge’ in Lebanon’s mountains, including the Maronites. This chapter showed how capitalist social relations developed unevenly by sect in Lebanon, with the Maronite alliance with the French facilitating their incorporation into capitalism through the silk trade. Migration became another mechanism of incorporation into capitalism, also unevenly by sect, through the conversion of immigrants into wage labourers in the countries of settlement. The 1975-1990 Lebanese Civil War was a major push factor driving Lebanese emigration and in its aftermath Sydney emerged as a significant hub for the Maronite diaspora, due to the scale of the emigration and the reconstruction of the northern Maronite villages in Sydney. The instability of Lebanon accounts for the absence of a ‘national Lebanese identity’ and the predominance of patrilineage, village and sect (*bayt, day’aa, ta’eefa*) as the primary forms of identification both within and beyond Lebanon’s national borders. This pattern has been brought to Australia, with the formation of Lebanese village associations, such as the Hadchit association, as the primary vehicle of identification for Lebanese immigrants in Australia. An examination of five migration narratives from Hadchit to Sydney illustrated how migrating to Australia was a traumatic experience that was reconciled initially as being only temporary, but became permanent. In the next chapter we will examine how immigrants from Hadchit have deployed *bayt, day’aa* and *ta’eefa* (patrilineage, village and sect) as a home-building strategy and reconstructed a social village in Western Sydney.
3. Constructing a social village in Sydney

Field Notes: March 26th, 2006

The funeral mass at Our Lady of Lebanon Maronite Church at Harris Park was in Arabic and Aramaic with a small amount of English and 1000 people attended, mostly from the Hadchiti immigrant community in Sydney. The deceased was the father of a prominent Hadchiti businessman and people attended to pay their respects. Everyone wore black, except for the Anthropologist who stupidly wore a hot pink shirt under a black jacket!! Frankincense was burnt; there was a choir and four priests including the Monsignor and the Bishop (Sayedna). After the funeral mass the family lined up outside the church and those who attended filed past the bereaved and gave their condolences. The wake (lemet rahme) was held afterwards at the St. Raymond of Hadchit Hall in Granville, where the food was catered by a local Hadchiti catering firm and was excellent Lebanese cuisine along with lasagna and ravioli. The scale on which community events occur is quite over-whelming…

As this excerpt from my field notes suggests, community events happen on a very large scale for Sydney’s Hadchiti immigrant cluster. The notion of a social village set within Sydney’s urban landscape and amidst the host-nation’s multicultural fabric will be the motif by which we can understand how this community of immigrants construct a sense of sociality and homeliness in Australia. The above excerpt also shows how the ethnographer is ‘out of place’, as exemplified when I wore the hot pink shirt to the Maronite funeral! I arrived in the field shortly after the Cronulla Riots of December 2005 with my daughter Amani, who was two and half years of age at the time, during what was a tense period of racial vilification for Australia’s Lebanese community. I found the fieldwork alienating and lonely at first as urban anthropology is disjointed and making social connections with immigrants from Hadchit required considerable effort on my part. Attending larger scale community events, such as the funeral in my field notes above, was how I started working my way into the social network of Sydney’s Hadchit community. At first my only contacts were relatives from the Rizk family whom I have been visiting since the mid 1990’s. However nobody knew what this ‘field work’ was going to involve, how much it would ask of my family and how a woman with a young child was going to undertake such a project. My insider/outsider standing amongst them contributed to the mutual disorientation of the ethnographer and the ‘subjects’ of
research. Thus, this ethnography represents a journey of discovery for both the ethnographer and reader, as we work our way through the terrain of Sydney’s Hadchiti social village.

This chapter will build on the migration narratives presented in Chapter Two. It first provides an overview and socio-economic profile of Sydney’s Hadchiti community, based on the Hadchit Household Survey conducted in July 2006, and examines a case study of ethnic entrepreneurialism and business networking as a strategy of community establishment in Australia. The chapter then shows how the Hadchitis have constructed a social village by examining the Hadchit Village Association, the Hadchit Telephone Directory and the St. Raymond’s of Hadchit Hall in Granville. A case study then explores the depth of community rivalry over competing claims to markaz, status, and najeh, success and shows how the Hadchit community has become socially stratified. Material success is contrasted with the pursuit of spiritual purity through an examination of how the Hadchitis fit into the broader Maronite diasporic community, at Our Lady of Lebanon Maronite Church in Harris Park. The Season of Lent is presented as a case study of religious practice and shows the gendered division of spiritual practice. It will be shown how the Hadchitis have drawn upon and reproduced bayt, day’aa and ta’eefa (patrilineage, village and sect) as overlapping spheres of sociality to construct a sense of homeliness in Australia.

A Socio-economic profile

While the Hadchitis participated in the factory work sector in their early phase of migration up to 1975, as we saw in the migration narratives in Chapter Two, they shifted significantly into the building and construction industry after this time, due to the decline in the availability of factory work. Figure 14 shows the dominance in 2006 of construction work in male incomes (60% of male workers) and it also accounts for 20% of female incomes. Factory work remains, however, the largest category of female employment, with Figure 14 showing it accounts for 30% of incomes for ‘mothers’, followed by professional employment at 15% and retail at 12%.
If we look at education there is a difference between the first and second generation in terms of educational attainment and between mothers and fathers. For the parental migrating generation 67% of fathers\textsuperscript{10} and 62% of mothers have no post secondary qualifications (see Figure 15). However, 41% of mothers are currently studying, as compared to only 3% of fathers. This alludes to the fact that Australia is providing opportunities for female education that weren’t available in Lebanon and that are made accessible to women with children (for example through Tafe colleges), this is a bone of contention in many households as will be seen in Chapter Five. Currently 40% of second generation are listed as still studying and 18% have a trade.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure14.png}
\caption{The dominance of construction for male occupations in the Hadchit community. Source: Hadchit Household Survey, 2006.}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{10} See Appendix 4: The Hadchit Household Survey – for a description of the household, which was defined as the household mother, father and children or other relatives that lived in the dwelling. The survey did not distinguish children by gender.
The Hadchit Household Survey did not specify the age of children listed as living at home.

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11 The Hadchit Household Survey did not specify the age of children listed as living at home.
Figure 16 from the Hadchit Household Survey provides an insight into the actual participation rate in the workforce of mothers, fathers and children. It also shows those who work unpaid in the family business and those with no job at all. The Hadchit Household Survey finds 24\%\textsuperscript{12} of fathers are unemployed. Additionally, the Hadchit Survey finds that 53\% of this group have been unemployed for more than 5 years. However, the sample included the over 50’s and Appendix 7\textsuperscript{13} shows there is a statistical correlation between age and unemployment and lack of English proficiency and unemployment in the Hadchit community. It is estimated that when the over 50’s are removed from the sample the percentage of unemployed men is 13.5\%, as compared to the national average of 5.2\% and the regional average of 4.7\% for Parramatta, according to the 2006 Australian Census (ABS 2006). The actual Hadchiti male participation rate in the workforce of 71\% was high, however, relative to the Australian average and relative to statistics available for migrants generally in Australia, as shown in Table 1.

Table 1: Selected Labour Force indicators of people aged 15 years and over November 2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Persons '000</th>
<th>Labour force participation rate(a) %</th>
<th>Unemployment rate(a) %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Born in Australia</td>
<td>11 402.6</td>
<td>67.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrants</td>
<td>1 362.6</td>
<td>62.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other overseas born</td>
<td>2 980.0</td>
<td>61.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total aged 15 years and over</strong></td>
<td><strong>15 745.2</strong></td>
<td><strong>64.8</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (ABS 2004)

Table 1 provides a point of comparison for the Hadchit Household Survey and reports the average labour force participation rate for migrants to be 62.3\% and their unemployment rate to be 6.2\%. The Hadchit community compares

\textsuperscript{12} The Statistical Consulting Unit has further refined this figure to be 25.2\% - see Appendix 7 on unemployment and age.

\textsuperscript{13} This is an analysis of the Hadchit Survey by the ANU Statistical Consulting Unit.
favourably, therefore, with migrants in general in terms of their labour force participation rate, but are almost twice as likely to be unemployed. This is true of the women in the Hadchit community, in particular, who are twice as likely as the men to be unemployed. The unemployment rate for women, if we exclude the over 50’s is 20.2%\textsuperscript{14}. This is consistent with the low participation rate of Lebanese women in the workforce in general (Humphrey 1998), with the Hadchit Household Survey showing their participation rate was 28% (see Figure 16). However, when we include those women that work unpaid in the family business the participation rate for women in the workforce comes up to 42%. This is low relative to both the Australian average and for the average amongst migrant women generally, according to the ABS (2004):

\begin{quote}
Migrant men had a similar age standardised labour force participation rate (74%) to Australian-born men (75%). Migrant women’s age standardised labour force participation (52%) was lower than Australian-born women (60%), and much lower than migrant men. The comparatively low levels of labour force participation among migrant women may in part reflect their lower levels of English proficiency and labour market experience prior to arrival in Australia.
\end{quote}

If we compare the Hadchit community with Lebanese in general in Australia there are some parallels and some contrasts. There are fewer households in chronic disadvantage and on welfare dependence as compared to Sunni Muslim households. Humphrey indicates that since the 1980’s unemployment has fallen disproportionately among the non-English speaking immigrants who suffered three to four times the national average levels of unemployment (Humphrey 1998:51). He estimates that amongst the Lebanese unemployment has remained chronically high and estimates it to be approximately 40% of the male population. This statistic, however, is variable across the Lebanese religious sects in Australia. According to Humphrey, the labour force participation rate was lowest amongst Sunni Muslim men and women, 43% and 14% respectively, and highest amongst Shiite Lebanese who had a labour force participation rate of 70%. Overall, he writes that the Lebanese sample showed that 65% of men and 28% of women were in paid employment (Humphrey 1998:51). He attributes the difficulties the Lebanese have experienced in the labour force to their low levels of education, lack of

\textsuperscript{14} As calculated by the ANU Statistical Consulting Unit in Appendix 7.
proficiency in English, their tendency to work in the low skilled sector and their large average family size (4.3 children on average), which makes it more difficult for women to participate in the workforce (Humphrey 1998).

Table 2: Labour Force Status, Selected countries of birth.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Lebanon</th>
<th>Iraq</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
<th>Iran</th>
<th>Israel</th>
<th>Syria</th>
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<tr>
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<td>%</td>
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<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Participation rate</strong> (i.e. the proportion of the population group who are either employed or unemployed)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
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<td>53.6</td>
<td>61.0</td>
<td>67.5</td>
<td>76.3</td>
<td>62.4</td>
<td>72.6</td>
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<td>26.7</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>34.3</td>
<td>50.1</td>
<td>60.5</td>
<td>28.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>44.2</td>
<td>39.7</td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td>59.2</td>
<td>69.2</td>
<td>44.7</td>
<td>66.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Proportion of the population group who are not in the labour force</strong> (i.e. neither employed or unemployed)</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td>49.4</td>
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<td>29.0</td>
<td>52.7</td>
<td>32.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Proportion of the population group in full-time employment</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>53.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>9.5</td>
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<td>18.2</td>
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<td>33.4</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>39.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unemployment rate</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Female</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>11.0</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (ABS 2008).
Note: the sum of the participation rate and the proportion not in the labour force does not total 100% due to 'not stated' responses

The most recent labour force statistics available on the Lebanese in Australia, based on the 2006 Census (ABS 2008), show that the labour force participation rate for Lebanese is 60.5% for men and 26.7% for women (see Table 2). The 2006 Census found the unemployment rate for Lebanese men was 11.8% and for women was 12.7% (ABS 2008). While the Hadchit Household Survey was consistent with Humphrey’s 1998 study, the labour force
participation rate for men is significantly higher than the ABS 2006 Census reports for Lebanese men generally in Australia. The labour force participation rate for Lebanese women, 26.7%, according to the 2006 Census (see Table 2), was close to the 28% labour force participation rate for women found in the Hadchit Household Survey and by Humphrey (1998). The unemployment rate for men, 13.5%, found by the Hadchit Household Survey, was slightly higher than reported in the 2006 Census, 11.8%, but the women’s unemployment rate, 20.2% was almost twice as high as found by the ABS in 2006, 12.7%. Thus, the Hadchit community compares favourably on the question of labour force participation, but women in the Hadchit community have a low labour force participation rate in the workforce and a high female unemployment rate relative to the Australian mainstream, migrants and Lebanese generally according to the ABS (2004, 2008), but consistent with the findings by Humphrey (1998). Despite appearances, however, the Hadchit Household Survey also demonstrates that women tend to work unpaid in family businesses and, with construction being the dominant ‘niche’ industry for the Hadchit community, there is a lot of ‘behind the scenes’ work that women do that goes unpaid and unrecognised.

Figure 17: Language spoken at home. Source: Hadchit Household Survey, 2006.

Humphrey describes Lebanese households in Sydney as surviving by strategies of “urban subsistence”, which includes the pooling of resources, welfare dependence, casual work and the black economy (Humphrey 1998:54).
Some of the households in the Hadchit community would share these strategies in order to survive in Sydney. The poorest households in the Hadchit community are indicated by those where the father is unemployed (given the low participation rate of women in the workforce in the Hadchit community). There is a correlation between age, lack of English proficiency and unemployment amongst fathers\textsuperscript{15}. Furthermore, the Hadchit Household Survey shows that 15\% of households speak only Arabic at home (see Figure 17), with most households, 69\%, being bilingual. While a portion of the Hadchit community struggles, as we have seen, we will now look at a case study of ethnic entrepreneurialship and business networking to explain the overall high participation rate of men in the workforce relative to the Lebanese in general. It will be shown how they have developed an economy within an economy as a strategy of community establishment in Australia.

\textbf{Case Study: Building business networks through Wasta}

Simply defined, wasta is favouritism, which attempts to use the influence of relatives or acquaintances to achieve certain objectives (Urban Dictionary 2007).

\textit{Wasta} [is] the ability to attract a client group and attain access to a power broker. The position of the \textit{Za\'im [Lord, Politician]} is frequently hereditary and politics is often treated like a family business (Nizar Hamzeh 2001:171)

While \textit{wasta} might imply favouritism based on kinship it can also mean networking and building business connections through returning favours, much like the concept of \textit{quid pro quo}. In business this might mean working together, supporting each other’s businesses and giving ‘mates rates’. Being able to provide a large range of services in-house has been central to the Hadchit communities’ ability to establish themselves through building businesses in Australia. It also fits into the model of patron-client relationships (Nizar Hamzeh 2001) from Lebanon, which has been an integral part of the process of chain migration. Through the patronage of more established families a client or relative is sponsored to come to Australia and is provided with housing, support and training in a business or trade. In return the sponsored relative might work in

\textsuperscript{15} See report by The ANU Statistical Consulting Unit in Appendix 7.
the family business for below award wages, or help support the household in other respects. Another aspect of these patron-client relationships is *wejbet* or the obligation or duty to sponsor and support relatives from Lebanon and to remit monies back to relatives in Lebanon. We will return to the concept of *wejbet* in the next chapter.

The Hadchitis have been able to improve their labour force participation rate through community networking and self-employment in family businesses, especially in the construction industry, which has emerged as an ethnic niche market for them as a group in Sydney. By having a large number of households who live in close proximity to one another, they have been able to pool resources and help build each other’s businesses. This was especially the case during their establishment phase in Australia in the 1970’s. In particular, they were able to train each other in trades through the network of construction companies operated within the community. Thus, Hadchit household networks have provided a ready pool of customers for businesses operated by fellow Hadchitis, similar to Werbner’s (1990) account of immigrant entrepreneurs amongst the Pakistanis of Northern England. This kind of business networking undoubtedly has provided a degree of independence from Sydney’s labour market and facilitated the Hadchitis to establish themselves in Australia, where otherwise they would have found themselves considerably disadvantaged as low skilled immigrants in a down-sizing manufacturing economy.

The Hadchit Telephone Directory, *Kitab el Hatif*, provides a forum for businesses owned primarily by immigrants from Hadchit, but also from other Lebanese towns and villages, to advertise their services. This raises money for the directory, but it also allows for business networking within the Hadchit community. Some examples of the types of businesses listed in the telephone directory include: printing presses, tiling, kitchens and joinery, food import, funeral direction, reception lounges, real estate, finance and money specialists, plumbing, hair studios, accountants, masonry, construction, land development, lighting and electrical, excavation, travel, painting and decoration, Lebanese bakeries, solicitors, bricklayers, concrete pumping, dentistry, security and catering. By patronising each other’s businesses and accessing in-house
financing the Hadchitis have been able to build businesses with large in-house client bases. Many also offer mates rates for Hadchiti clients and, thus, many Hadchiti households prefer to get someone from the community to do the job over an outsider. In this way the Hadchit community became partially self-sufficient in Sydney and can be seen as an economy within an economy. The following interview with a member of the Hadchit community illustrates how their business network operates:

If you have to call an electrician or a tradie would you be likely to call someone from the Hadchit community?

You’d network and you’d see who is related so they do a good deal for you. I had a shed done, so I called my cousin and I got a quote off of him and called another cousin and got a quote off of him then my cousin got someone else that he knew that I think was Portuguese, he did the job, but I got onto him through my cousin. But, when I had the house done I got some quotes for the electrical work and then I called someone from the Hadchit community – the rest were like $3000, but his was like $1800.

Is there an expectation with your cousins that you would use them?

The thing is you use them as a gauge of what is fair and what isn’t. But, with the one who charged me only $1800 why wouldn’t you go with him and he had to fit me in between commercial work and so he was doing me a favour you know. Also like he got it done in 1-2 days and someone else might have taken a week. So you use the Hadchit Tradies because they do it for the best price, they’re honest and you know they are going to do a good job for you- they’re not going to rip you off because they want to protect their reputation, they’re not going to do a shit job because it will get back to them. Otherwise everyone would say why did you screw so and so?

Do you think most people think the same way as you in the Hadchit community if they need something done?

There is this one guy who does fridges; I reckon 99% of the Hadchit community would use him, if your fridge breaks down you use him, because he’ll give you an honest opinion about your fridge. There is the trust also, but I know I can ring him up he’ll give you an honest appraisal.

This interview shows how finding a cousin is the first priority in doing business and finding someone from the Hadchit community is the second choice, but that both are considered more trustworthy than dealing with a community outsider.

While wasta emphasises the importance of connections based on family networks, an interesting consideration is whether the Lebanese concept of wasta in business is, in practice, very different from the way in which business more generally operates at the ‘top end’ in Australia. For example, there is a degree of
mutually beneficial networking that goes on between the Labor Party, local councils and business developers as was exemplified by the donations and planning scandal in the Wollongong City Council in early 2008. This scandal illustrated the extent to which it has become common practice for developers to make contributions to the Labor Party to facilitate the passage of their development applications through council and much the same process goes on in Western Sydney. In this sense *wasta* is alive and well in the broader Australian political system. Through networking with politicians, local members and the Labor Party, development applications are facilitated and business ventures are advanced. Likewise, the Labor Party (the Liberals to a lesser extent) relies on the ethnic vote and local, state and federal Labor politicians actively attend ethnic community functions in their electorates, particularly in Western Sydney, as part of building their voting base (Tabar, Noble and Poynting 2003:277).

The second generation, however, are starting to work in and to operate many of the family businesses that were started by the migrating generation within the Hadchit community and are beginning to resist *wasta* and *wejbet*. They say “mate’s rates are a pain and I can’t run the business like that anymore” and “I want things above board”. Others simply express the view that their businesses are too big to just trade with Hadchitis:

> Our customers are not just with Hadchit, we don’t do a lot of business with people from Hadchit. The majority are not. The building trade does. In our line of business we deal with restaurateurs and cafes. The bulk of our business is not Hadchit related. 90% of our customers are Arab-Australians.

This change in outlook also reflects that their businesses no longer need in-house networking, as they have grown beyond the Hadchit client base that built them. There is also a perception that there is a degree of inter-generational conflict when it comes to succession in family run businesses as the following interview excerpt illustrates:
What the problem is – if every family household realises who is heading the thrown next – everyone is going to have a difference of opinion – you got to agree to disagree. Everyone has to agree that there has to be a captain of the ship and that they will make decisions for the group. My father and I overlook it – you can’t have too many chiefs in there. Over the last few years we have heard of a lot of family break ups – say two brothers set up a business and then the children get to be 21 that is when the problems start...the children get to that age to take things over.

Indeed, quite a few of the businesses within the Hadchit community have grown into substantial enterprises in their own right. For example, the seventh largest construction and land development firm in Australia, DYLDAM, is owned by a Hadchit family. Additionally, Australia’s largest importer of Middle Eastern food supplies, Harkola, is owned by a family from the Hadchit immigrant community. There are also very large scale wholesale electrical, catering and entertainment venues owned by Hadchit businessmen. We will now look at two interviews with business leaders from the Hadchit community; the first discusses migrating to Australia and finding success through the development of a major construction company. The second interview provides a second generation\textsuperscript{16} perspective on how to carry forward the family business started by his parents.

Migration and the development of a construction company in Australia

**What exactly was your trade?**

I was a builder in construction and now my sons work in the trade. My company does the whole range of work – residential and commercial. Last year my company was the number seven construction company in Australia.

**Big time**

yeh

**But did you start small?**

Yeh – now we do extensions and driveways and one block of ten units per year. My son Fouad has been on the construction sites since he was four or five years of age.

**Did your sons all join the company?**

Yes and Ziad is the manager of the company, because when we came to Australia he studied English so he helped me while the others grew up and then they all joined in.

**How old were you when you retired from building?**

\\textsuperscript{16} See glossary at back for a definition of how I am defining first and second generation migrants.
About 4-5 years ago. In Lebanon I worked in Southern Lebanon and Beirut on the Refugee Camps with my father. Here it was similar work, however, in the old days in Lebanon it was hard work without the help of machines, such as diggers, everything was done by hand with a pick and shovel.

**So the building industry is the traditional trade for Hadchitis?**

Yeh, one way or another they all work in the building industry – brick work, tillers, roofers, concreter, stone masons– anything to do with building they’re involved with it. I went back to Lebanon seven years ago and built a new home there a holiday house.

**Is it on your traditional land there in the village?**

Yeh it is on the main road between Tripoli and Hadchit.

**How do you think it is that so many Hadchitis ended up in the building trade is it anything to do with the traditional work that people had to do in the village?**

The industry makes good money and the work is getting easier now, like for the stone masons the sandstone is pre-cut, before that it took 3-4 men to unload a piece of stone off the back of a truck.

**A second generation perspective on the development of a family import business**

I was born in Sydney. My parents migrated 30 odd years ago, I believe my father came first before 1975 and then he went back and married my mother and they came out together.

**Why did they come to Australia?**

Because of the unsteadiness at the time in Lebanon, that was the beginning of the Civil War in that period and that was the real driver to get the out of Lebanon…When I was growing up we lived at my grandparent’s house, dad’s mother and father, when I was a child. I have two brothers and two sisters and I have been married for 2 years and I moved out at that time. My sister married about 8 years ago and she moved out of home at that stage. We have always worked in the family business and we work with family all day long because everyone works in the business. I moved out to the outskirts of Auburn.

**So your parents learnt to speak English very well?**

Yes because of running the business and dealing with a wide variety of people and they learnt it quite quickly.

**What level of education did your parents have in Lebanon before they moved here?**

They had quite strong education before moving here, the equivalent of the Lebanese high school certificate. But, they didn’t go onto any higher education after that.

They have very fluent spoken French and can read and write Arabic.
Do you think their solid foundation in reading and writing Arabic was important for them in building the family business in Australia?

Yes, this business is more targeted at Arabic people and their being able to communicate with them and to make business dealings with Lebanon in order to source food supplies for migrants from Lebanon was part of their success. There wasn’t a wide range of Arabic foods available here 30 years ago. They started with a Delicatessen and that was retail, not wholesale. They then moved onto Flemington Markets where they established a shop front and we have been there for well over 25 years now. They don’t really trade under names there. That is where we met many of the clients that we deal with today, because that is where a lot of restaurants and cafes and delicatessens go to buy their fresh produce. The second stage was that we became wholesale suppliers to these businesses and started specializing in nuts, which is where we started. Then we branched into bringing products from Lebanon as the next stage and we have been doing that for around 20 years now.

You kids as you got old enough to work in the business did you diversify it?

We grew up in the business, our parents always provided a place for us, there was a play pen and there were desks, computers and white boards for doing homework after school. My sister still comes after school.

So your mum always worked in the business?

Yes and she has a kitchen here too, so she would often get her cooking done here and then take it home with her for our dinner.

What was your highest level of education?

I left school in year 10 and I joined the family business and I have only just come back to working in the family business in the last few years after spending three years working in a telecommunications company. I did that to get a better understanding of business and I learnt systems management and IT.

Have you been able to bring those skills back to the family business?

Absolutely. We didn’t really start using computers until me and my sister came into the business. My parents used to hand write every invoice that went out of here until about 7-8 years ago. It was definitely the experience that me and my sister gained working outside the family business that made a difference. My sister did the same thing as me. She started with the family business and worked outside the family business in an accounting firm and then came. My parents promoted us to go and work for other people. They said it would be a good idea to go out and see what the real world is about. You can become comfortable working or your parents. “Go and work for someone else and see what it is like and then come back” they said. My brothers will do the same thing.
These two interviews exemplify how family based businesses formed the prototype for the development of businesses more generally in the Hadchit community. While the interviewees tell how their businesses started by meeting the needs of an ethnic niche market, they moved beyond this in-house client base to form business empires that transcend the Hadchit community. While the first interviewee explained why construction is the dominant industry amongst the Hadchitis and attributed it to their experiences working as stone masons and concreters in Lebanon, the second interview exemplifies the business opportunities that were available in meeting the growing needs of Australia’s Lebanese community by providing the essential ingredients for Middle Eastern cuisine. We will now look specifically at the strategies of community building immigrants from Hadchit have deployed to create a sense of homeliness in Australia.

**Establishing a social village**

To what extent do the Hadchitis operate as a social village within Western Sydney? The social world of the first generation of immigrants from Hadchit is constructed between a network of known households, churches and shopping centres, separated physically and geographically from each other by unknown zones and people\(^\text{17}\). Thus, the Hadchiti social village is made up by discontinuous social spaces that are joined to each other by the act of visiting one another, community events in Sydney, telephone calls to Lebanon, watching satellite TV and visits to Lebanon, as we will see in Chapter Seven. Social relations in Sydney, therefore, are based on geographically extended, but physically disjointed spaces, which present a paradox for sociality and a degree of fantasy to sustain it. While the social mobility of Hadchitis in Sydney could be seen as pocketed and limited in one sense it is, conversely, a very large internalised social network characterised by extensive kinship relationships. For example, the average Hadchit wedding might have 350 guests and a funeral might be attended by 1,000 mourners. Where the physical village of Hadchit is geographically bounded, its counterpart in Sydney is defined conceptually by the

\(^{17}\text{Limited literacy for many in the migrating generation, especially the women, compounds the difficulties they face in navigating and moving geographically and socially around the city of Sydney.}\)
network of social relations which links this community of immigrants to each other and back to the home village.

We will start the ethnography by discussing the peak organisation which represents the Hadchitis in Sydney, the St. Raymond’s Charitable Association of Hadchit, Jameyet el Q’dis Romanus el Khayriye Hadchit, or the ‘Jameye’ for short. Like most Lebanese village associations it became a registered charity during the Lebanese Civil War. This enabled them to register with the Australian government and to receive government assistance, as well as to be able to legally transfer money back to the home village. The St. Raymond’s Charitable Association of Hadchit in Sydney is an incorporated association and is run by an executive committee, which includes a President, Secretary, Assistant Secretary, Treasurer and Assistant Treasurer and it reports to the government annually and is a proprietary limited association. The association also has the following sub-committees: The Hall and Grounds, Advertising, the Younger Set, Building, Representative, Printing, Fundraising and Funeral Committees. It has, till now, been an exclusively male organisation, led by a committee of 12 members from the patrilineages/bayts of Hadchit. In recent years the above sub-committees have taken over from bayt as the principal form of representation within the Jameye.

The Hadchiti social village in Sydney is defined conceptually by those listed in the Hadchit telephone directory, Kitab el Hatif, which is produced by the

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18 There is a split in the leadership of the Hadchit community in Sydney between the main St. Raymond’s Charitable Association of Hadchit Committee and a sub-organisation within the Hadchit community called the “St. Elias Association”, Jameyet Mar Elias el Khayriye. This division derives from the village of Hadchit itself, when a group of émigrés returned to Hadchit in the 1950’s from two villages in the upper Bekaa Valley, Dier el Ahmar and Baalbeck (hence the returnees and their descendants are sometimes referred to as the Bualbeckiyye). Their ancestors migrated to the Bkaa Valley from Hadchit in the mid-19th Century, but their descendants were pushed out during a sectarian conflict with the Shiites in the 1950’s. Many of the returnees have the surname “Hadchiti” and returned with only the clothing on their backs and the knowledge that their grandparents/great-grandparents came from Hadchit. Upon their return they found their re-integration into the village fraught with difficulties, principally surrounding the issue of land title and inheritance, as the plots which once belonged to their families had now been subsumed into the holdings of other families and it was nearly impossible, due to poor records, to trace the original land titles. This caused considerable tensions and the returnees maintained a separate identity and settled in the upper village. The division between the Bualbeckiyye and the rest of the Hadchit community has been transposed to Australia where they have maintained a separate association, which held a large function in 2006 of some 650 people to raise funds for a separate church in Hadchit in honour of “Mar Elias”, St. Elias, their Patron Saint (St. Raymond is the main Patron Saint for the village of Hadchit).
Jameye and updated every few years, the most recent edition was printed 2006 (see Figure 18). The telephone directory lists all the Hadchit families in Sydney (500 in total) by the name of the male ‘head of household’ and lists their address. The suburbs with the highest concentration of Hadchit households, according to the telephone directory, are Merrylands with 142 households, Auburn with 76, Guildford with 74 households, Wentworthville with 39 and Granville with 30. The rest of the households are scattered across a range of suburbs which surround Parramatta, such as Oatlands, Westmead, Northmead, Lidcombe, the Hills district and out to Windsor.

The directory lists 68 different family names, which derive from the 12 principal patrilineages/bayts of Hadchit, as we saw in Chapter Two. Through the process of sub-branch formation, whereby the son takes the father’s first name as his surname, these core patrilineages have segmented to become the 68 family groupings listed in the Hadchit telephone directory in Sydney today (and 82 sub-branches in total according to the Hadchit Family Tree, see Appendix 2). In Hadchit itself the families used to be concentrated into harat, or quarters within the village, as we saw in Chapter Two, but this had already started to break down by the 1950’s when Kepler-Lewis undertook his research in Hadchit. He
surmised that patrilineage break-down had been caused by population growth and emigration (Kepler-Lewis 1968:146). However, in Sydney the deterritorialised patrilineages of Hadchit have re-established themselves into *harat* within certain suburbs around Parramatta. This process happened via chain migration, as was shown in Chapter Two, whereby the first migrant household purchased a house in a suburb, and then sponsored several siblings who then settled in the same suburb or even on the same street. Their children then brought houses in the same area (see Appendixes 5 and 6 for migration chain maps). The Hadchit telephone directory shows, for example, that one family grouping, *bayt*, has 12 households in Auburn with six living on the same street.

A dilemma for the production of the Hadchit telephone directory has been the question of female out marriage from the community and whether they should still be listed in the directory. They now have a new section in the 2006 edition entitled: “The brother in law section”, which lists the husbands of women from the Hadchit community who have married out. The out-marriage of women is conceptually re-integrated back into the group, by listing their husbands as “brothers in law” to the community as a whole. The issue of female out marriage and whether they should still be listed in the directory has become a contested issue, as it goes to the core of whom their community should include or exclude. The inclusion of women who marry out threatens to expand the tight boundaries of their community by including women as signifiers of group identity, not just men (as the bearers of the family name). They have come to a point in Australia where to strictly uphold the rule of patrilineal descent and the male headed household as the signifier of Hadchit cultural membership may cause their community to exponentially shrink now that the second generation has grown to marriageable age and are marrying out. We will return to the question of marriage in the next chapter.
Figure 19: The St. Raymond of Hadchit Community Hall in Granville. Source: Nelia Hyndman-Rizik, 2006.

Where the Hadchit telephone directory provides the conceptual borders of the Hadchit social village, the St. Raymond of Hadchit Community Hall, Kaat Mar Romanus, in Granville provides a location where the Hadchiti social village comes together for a concrete moment of sociality. The Jameye purchased the former Masonic Hall (see Figure 19) in 2000 and converted it into a community hall named in honour of St. Raymond, the patron saint of Hadchit (see Figure 20 for the dedication plaque). They have renovated it and the upstairs is rented out to outside community groups for functions. The St. Raymond’s Hall in Granville is used for Jameye meetings, youth group meetings and private functions in the Hadchit community such as: kitchen teas (see next chapter), christenings, first communion celebrations and any other private function for which the Hadchitis in Sydney want to hire the venue. It fits a maximum of about 300-400 people. There is an industrial kitchen for catering purposes and a covered pergola behind the hall for large crowds. The Hadchitis also have a private funeral service.

19 There are grumblings amongst the Hadchitis that the rental price for the Hall is set so high that the poorer households can’t afford to hire it.
located close to the St. Raymond’s Hall, which is an example of horizontal integration in their business networking\textsuperscript{20}.

Figure 20: The Dedication Plaque as you enter the St. Raymond’s Hall. Source: Nelia Hyndman-Rizik, 2006.

Figure 21: Sacred sites in Hadchit, as depicted on the wall at the Saint Raymond of Hadchit Hall in Granville. Source: Nelia Hyndman-Rizik, 2007.

The walls of the hall feature a series of photographs (see Figure 21), which show sacred sites from the home village and the surrounding Wadi Qadisha, Holy Valley. These include pictures of the main village churches: St. Raymond’s, Mar Romanus, the shrine to saint Shamouni (otherwise known as the Mother of the Seven Martyrs) below Hadchit and the cave, Deir el Salib, Monastery of the Cross, in the Wadi Qadisha below Hadchit and the village of

\textsuperscript{20} It is a matter of some controversy whether this development represented a bit too much horizontal integration.
Hadchit itself perched on a promontory overlooking the Wadi Qadisha. Images from the home village create a sense of homeliness and continuity between the hall and the home village. The use of religious imagery also links the Hadchit identity to the broader Maronite identity and fetishises the Qadisha as the Maronite homeland, a topic we will return to in Chapter Seven.

**Case study: Displaying markaz and najeh**

Prior to the purchase of the St. Raymond’s Hall the Hadchit community owned a house in Merrylands called the Pink House. There is considerable nostalgia amongst them for the former house in Merrylands as it is seen as symbolising a time in the Hadchiti community’s evolution in Australia when things were simple and less driven by displays of markaz, status, and najeh, success, as the following interview excerpt reflects:

> Years ago they used to have the Pink House in Merrylands and they used to hire a band, the Guitar Boys, from the Westella and there’d be a BBQ, just like you had one at home and you invited some friends around – except it would be the whole community. It would be nice if they (the Jomeye) just remembered how hard it is when you are raising a family – how much a struggle it was for them at first. You have to remember where you came from and some people are still there now. There are still those of us trying to meet bills. My other mates are in the same situation as me and they don’t go to the events. In the past if you wanted to do a family thing and get the whole community involved it wasn’t such a fashion oriented event. It used to be more basic, but in the last ten years the community has ‘made it’ it has all become fancy.

While the majority of the community arrived within 10 years of each other, as we saw in Chapter Two, and started from humble beginnings working mostly in the factory sector, the success of those members of the community who transitioned into the construction industry during the building boom over the last 10 years has transformed the Hadchiti social village into a community of haves and have nots. Social events increasingly feature ostentatious displays of wealth that make all aspects of sociality ripe with competition between and within families, as is described in the following interview:
The problem starts where say, I go build a house. My sister in law sees and says “why can he build a house?” “Why can’t I?” There is inter-competition within the families. Knock on wood it won’t happen with me— you help your brother and sisters with their houses. I know with my brother’s renovation – I paid for things out of my own pocket – because at the end of the day if it is their house or yours, it doesn’t matter. I open up a lot of business ventures and put up my capital and put my brothers and sisters names in there. Because they don’t have a lot of rope like me as a freelancer as they are working hands on with dad and 10 years down the track I don’t want them to say that I am better off because I had the time to set up businesses.

Rivalry is worst amongst the women and the competition between sister-in-laws is emblematic of the rivalry between the families as a whole over the conspicuous consumption and display of the symbols of status, markaz, and success, najeh: houses, husbands, children, their jobs and relative status, cars and clothes. The Grand Westella at Lidcombe (see Figure 22) is an important venue for the performance of these rivalries as it is the iconic location for most weddings and large scale village association functions amongst the Lebanese in general in Western Sydney. The venue has several large halls, decorated ornately in the style of a lavish wedding reception centre with white draperies (see photos in section on weddings in Chapter Four). The Grand Westella offers a full Lebanese Mezza (appertif) menu and live Arabic music and dance. It evolved in response to the absence of such venues in Sydney catering to the Lebanese when the proprietor arrived from Hadchit in 1972 and is an example of immigrant entrepreneurialship and niche marketing to an ethnic audience. It first opened in 1982, as the following interview with the owner explains:
I was born in Hadchit in 1952, I lived in Tripoli which is the winter house of most of the Hadchit, as you know in the winter time Hadchit is too cold. It is very small the village, so many relocated to Tripoli, the 2nd biggest city for work. My father had a shoe shop. I have more memories of Tripoli, than Hadchit. I lived 9 months in Tripoli and 3 months in Hadchit in the summer. I finished my high school in Lebanon, I came to Australia, because my late mother wanted me to be a doctor. Unfortunately, I didn’t finish my education, but studied business management and catering. My father didn’t have much education; he could just sign his name, my mother also. There wasn’t the opportunity for education in Lebanon.

What year did you come to Australia?

I came here to study in 1972. My brother was here before me. At first I was going to America and it was expensive, so my other option was to come to Australia to work and study at the same time. My brother was sponsored and then me. I lived with my uncle in Ashfield when I first came. In the 1970’s America and Europe were the shine of the world and Australia was just at the beginning. Australia was just a humble country for workers and didn’t have ‘culture’. I would have gone back to Lebanon, but I stayed because I had to pay off my ticket. So I accepted the fact I would have to struggle so my father wouldn’t, so I thought I would stay for a year even though Australia was not my place.

So what kind of work did you do when you first came here?
When I first arrived my first aim was to finish my university degree and then I wanted to perform music. I used to be a hippy and play music. In Lebanon at the time everyone wanted to imitate the American way and the hippy life was the ‘simple life’ actually, like the peasant life and I didn’t really want to go back to that. When I first got off at the airport I thought they looked like Syrians – hard workers- my cousins. In Lebanon the Syrians used to be the workers and when I came to Australia I was expecting a better life. The first work I did was study at night and work in the factory during the day and then perform music at night. They didn’t accept me at first in the factory because I didn’t speak good English, but within 6 months I was fluent and then I became a foreman and had 160 people working under me and I did that for 5 years. The factory was called Norton’s; they used to make sticky tape and sand paper.

The development of the Grand Westella

I used to play guitar and at one stage I used to get paid 5 dollars a day. Then I saw that caterers used to get paid thousands of dollars and I thought bugger that. At that stage there were no Lebanese catering firms and I realised that the Lebanese needed their own so I left the factory and did a business management course at Tafe in 1980. At that stage I had two vans and I drove around and I performed the music too. I was the first Lebanese in the 1980’s who was a ‘thousanaire’ – not a millionaire –I used to earn big money when others earned hundreds a week; I earned thousands a week… I was distinguished from the rest when most of the community were just workers. I used to work at a venue called the Westella and I wondered if I could buy that name? Two years later I brought that venue and the name ‘Westella” and to Lebanese now it is the place for weddings, when you think about a wedding the Westella is the first thing to come to mind. At that time the village associations used to come to me as well for their functions. The Westella became the place – I had the venue, the music and the food. There are now 6 Westella lounges, but now I am building a new function centre in Lidcombe. Sixty percent of my client base is Lebanese. I do weddings and functions. But, when you become comfortable you start looking for other businesses that open up doors for you, so I looked at media and brought a Lebanese newspaper, An-Nahar and I got to know a lot of politicians in Australia that way.

The interviewee expresses a view that Australia was underdeveloped in many respects when he arrived here from Lebanon in the 1970’s and presented certain opportunities for business development. He describes his shock at being converted into a worker, where in Lebanon he viewed himself as coming from a sophisticated, linguistically diverse and fashionable background. The key transition point in his narrative was the recognition that the Lebanese needed cultural institutions if they were to build a sense of homeliness in Australia and so he provided the first venue, which catered Lebanese cuisine for weddings and village association functions. His ability to meet this demand established him as
the first “thousanaire” in an immigrant community which was predominantly working class at the time.

The annual St. Raymond’s Day Function held at the Grand Westella (see Figure 23) highlights how the village identity of the Hadchitis is mobilised as a mechanism for community construction in Australia and for the display of najeh, or success in migration. St. Raymond’s Day also shows the intersection between the Hadchit village identity (day’aa) and their broader sectarian identity as Mwarne, as the following interview highlights:

The Maronite faith is central to Hadchit identity. We have our patron saint Raymond. Every family has a ‘Raymond’ – our faith is very strong. We celebrate his saint day and the celebration goes on for weeks.

St. Raymond’s Day is held on or near the 4th of September\(^{21}\) (see Figure 23). It celebrates the patron saint of Hadchit, *Mar Romanus*, or St. Raymond (as shown on the front cover of the telephone directory). The occasion usually brings together between 600-700 people. The price to get in the door is usually $50-$70/head making it an expensive evening out for the whole family. Nonetheless it is generally well attended by all age groups in the Hadchit community, including teenagers and children. The Grand Westella is organised so that each extended family sits at its own table. The central table is usually reserved for dignitaries, including the President of the Association, the local Councilman and the State and Federal Members of Parliament. Typically, the evening starts with the serving of Lebanese *Mezza*, which consists of a beautifully presented series of small dishes, which people graze on for a couple of hours before the main course is served. *Mezza* usually consists of: *Hommus*, *Bzurat*, salted nuts, *Zaytoun*, olives, *Kibbe Nayi*, raw spiced mince meat with bulgur wheat, cold meats, *Tabouleh*, Parsley and Burghul Salad\(^{22}\), *Khibiz*, Lebanese bread, *Baba Ghanouj*, eggplant dip, *Ftayir* and *Sambusik*, small savoury pastries, *Kebekib*, meat balls, *Labni*, strained yoghurt, *Waraq Ineb*, stuffed vine leaves, and sometimes a mixed seafood platter (see photos in the section on weddings). There is almost always hard liquor on the table such as

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\(^{21}\) About 10 years ago it was still held in the basement of Our Lady of Lebanon Maronite Church at Harris Park.  
\(^{22}\) See recipes in the kitchen section in Chapter 4.
Rum, Whiskey, *Arak* (the Lebanese national drink, similar to but stronger than the Greek Ouzo) and soft drinks. The main meal is usually served later in the evening, perhaps as late as 10pm, and is ‘Aussie tucker’ – ‘steak and three veg’.

![Figure 23: St. Raymond's Day. Source: Nelia Hyndman-Rizik, 2005.](image)

Between *Mezza* and the main course there is live entertainment which usually consists of speeches and public raffles, which invariably become displays of status as the families compete with each other to spend the most money on raffle tickets as a form of ‘gift giving’. The larger purchases will be read from stage and an amount of $300-$1000 wouldn’t be unusual for one family to spend. Additionally, there is usually the auctioning of a range of donated items as a fund raising activity. The annual St. Raymond’s Day event could be read as a symbolic display of *najeh*, or success in migration; hence there is a distinctive sub-text of rivalry between the families. Fashion and dress become the key measures of *najeh* and high standards of attire are expected. Women have their hair done and wear their finest tailored clothes and are generally ‘well heeled’, while the men wear their best suits. Children also are dressed in their best clothes. The following interview excerpt reveals the cleavages in the Hadchit community regarding the excessive displays of *najeh* that have become common place at the annual St. Raymond’s Day function in recent years:
St. Raymond’s Day

Sometimes it is priced way too high for the average family and kids to go. $50 each and $35.00 a head for kids is too expensive – it would be more than $200 for us as a family to go. When we were younger it used to be $10. It has become like a prestige thing. They used to have something down the bottom of the Hall, just salad and BBQ and people could go and enjoy and be there as a community. But, now it is expensive and you feel like you have to buy a new suit to go and you have to outfit the whole family. It has become status oriented. Look half these people have become wealthy, congratulations but 30-40 years ago when they were my age trying to raise a family and it costs $200 to take everyone they would have found that expensive.

What do you think about the public auctioning of the raffle tickets?

The thing is it should be a donation…it should be on the quiet it is a donation. Good on them if you can do it, you can do it. Stuff like that shouldn’t be advertised. It’s like the donations plate at church – the bible says that the person who gives anonymously will get their reward. Ok they are trying to big name themselves, congratulations. It should be more to do with community and family and young people, like the Potato Night – the kids loved it and we loved it – it was relaxing it. At the Hadchit function there will be people who can’t afford to go, but they’ll go anyways. When they come I give them my donations. I just wish it would be more family oriented. Not just dinner and dance and you have to tell the kids to sit down the whole night.

This interview reveals the counter-side to najeh and markaz in the Hadchit community and expresses a view that community events have become out of reach for many families who are still struggling in Sydney. Furthermore, the interviewee makes the observation that “big noting” through the public auctioning of raffle tickets makes the gift unsavoury. He suggests the view that people will attend St. Raymond’s Day even if they can’t afford it, because the appearance of success is more important than success itself. These sentiments lie at the heart of the discourse of ‘spiritual poverty’ that haunts an immigrant community like the Hadchitis, as the pursuit of najeh is, after all, the whole purpose of migration. Yet, the projection of appearances also underpins the ‘spiritual poverty’ of the immigrant, as is reflected in this popular excerpt from the Bible:

“Man focuses on outward appearances, but the Lord focuses on the heart” 1 Samuel 16:7
The duality between material and spiritual success also become a play between distinction and communitas on the dance floor at St. Raymond’s Day. After the speeches the music starts, which is usually a 4-5 piece Arabic music group. The instruments might include the *drumbekki*, the Lebanese hand drum, the *uud*, a traditional string instrument, and an electric keyboard which substitutes for other traditional Arabic instruments. The singer, *motrib baladi* (male)/*motrbi baladieh* (female), takes centre stage and will perform songs throughout the evening. The singers that perform at the Grand Westella are very well known in the Lebanese community. The singer often starts by performing a *mawwal*, which is a slow form of Arabic lament, which features the classical Arabic ‘wail’. The *mawwal* will often be in honour of the ancestral village and captures the nostalgia the immigrant feels for their home town and for the land of their ancestors, *ard joudi*. Often the singers substitute the name of one village for the next, depending on which village association the function is for. In the case of St. Raymond’s Day the *mawwal* will be in honour of Hadchit and St. Raymond as the patron saint. The song builds pace slowly and then the drum beat picks up to that crucial point when the audience gets up and starts the Lebanese spiral dance, *Dabki* (see Figure 24).

![Dabki dancing accompanied by a Tabel drum at the Grand Westella. Source: Nelia Hyndman-Rizik, 2006.](image-url)
Dabki, the centrepiece of the evening, is a communal spectacle (Tabar 2005) for the measurement and display of markaz, status, and najeh, success in migration. The important high status men, but also those that are known to be the best dancers, will usually dance at the front of the Dabki line (sometimes women will dance at the front, but less often). The male dancers at the front perform the more elaborate dance steps (see Figure 24), while the women ‘put their best foot forward’, literally, displaying the most expensive brands of stiletto shoes in time to the Dabki beat. While the Dabki dance could be read as a dance of distinction, it is also a great equaliser. Through the act of dancing in unison in a circular motion to the beat of the large hand held Tabel drum, which is beaten at the centre of the Dabki spiral, the dancers come together in a moment of “communitas” (Tabar 2005; Turner and Turner 1978). In so doing, the Dabki dance suppresses ambivalence and rivalry and ultimately contains the ‘disunity’ of the Hadchit community. We return to the Dabki dance throughout the thesis, as it is a metaphor for home, none more so, than dancing Dabki during the St. Raymond’s festival in Hadchit, as we will see in Chapter Seven. The annual St. Raymond’s day function goes well into the night and usually finishes around 3am. In any year there will be some families that don’t attend as they have had a death in the family and are in mourning. In such a big community there is a sense of the fullness of life, as the community is big enough to capture all stages of the life cycle – infants, children, teenagers, newly weds, the middle aged, the elderly, the infirmed and those that are mourning for the loss of a loved one.

The Maronites in Sydney

I will now situate the Hadchitis within the broader community of Maronites in Sydney, which illustrates the intersection between their village identity and their sectarian identity as Mwarne. The Sydney Maronite community is part of the international Maronite diaspora, united by the Maronite Church (Al Kanisse al Marouniyye), which forms the body of the Maronites internationally (Hourani and Habchi 2004) and electronic media links the disparate arms of the diaspora, with Sydney being a significant hub. As we saw in Chapter Two, there is a discourse of Maronite decline, in the aftermath of the Lebanese Civil War, and given the scale of Christian emigration from Lebanon they now form the majority of the Lebanese diaspora. This leads the Maronite clergy to conclude
that the future of the faith is in the diaspora. Thus, an imagined deterritorialised Maronite Nation has emerged in response to their decline and exile from the Lebanese territory. As we saw in Chapter Two, where the Maronites were once 75% of the Lebanese population they are now thought to be less than 40% and some estimates suggest they are only 23% (Maronite Encyclopaedia, 2009). Globally the Maronite population is estimated by the Catholic Near East Welfare Association (CNEWA 2009) to be eight million, although the exact number is unknown, while the largest populations are in Brazil and the United States of America, as we saw in Chapter Two. The Maronite Church globally, as the regulating and unifying institution for the Maronites, is headed by the Maronite Patriarch, Mar Nasrallah Cardinal Butros Sfeir, who resides in Bkerke Lebanon and in Dimane in the Qadisha Valley in the summer months. The Maronite Church has 15 Eparchies outside of Lebanon including one in Australia (Eparchy of Australia 2009).

![Figure 25](image.png)

**Figure 25**: The assembly of Bishops under the Patriarch for the Pontifical mass at Parramatta Satudium during “Maronites 08”, July 2008. Source: Nelia Hyndman-Rizik, 2008.

In July 2008 the Maronite Church staged a major world gathering of Maronites in Sydney entitled “Maronites 08” (see Figure 25) as part of World
Youth Day celebrations in Sydney, led by the Pope. The main feature was a Pontifical mass (conducted in formal Arabic) held at Parramatta Stadium, which assembled 15 Maronite Bishops and 85 priests from around the world, led by the Maronite Patriarch and attended by 20,000 Maronites\(^\text{23}\). The event was promoted as an opportunity for spiritual renewal and as a major convergence for the Maronite diaspora internationally (an assembly of the deterritorialised Maronite nation). The mass was followed by a day of performances and exhibitions at the Parramatta Stadium.

Maronites 08 was hosted by the Eparchy of St. Marouns, Sydney, which was formed in 1973 and is currently headed by Bishop Ad Abikaram, based at St. Marouns Cathedral, Redfern (Azize 2005:36). Australia’s Maronite population is estimated by the ABS to be 30% of the Lebanese population in Australia (ABS 2004) and to number roughly 92,000, although the exact number is unknown, with the majority being located in Sydney (Wikipedia 2009b). Thus, a reconstructed Maronite community has emerged in Sydney and is supported by a wide range of Maronite institutions including the following Maronite Parishes: St. Marouns Cathedral in Redfern (which was the first built in Australia at the turn of last century), St. Charbels Monastery in Punchbowl, St. George’s in Thornleigh, Beit Marouns in Strathfield, St. Joseph’s in Croydon and recently a new church has been built in Mt. Druitt. There are also a number of Maronite schools in Sydney including: St. Charbels College, Punchbowl and Our Lady of Lebanon College at Harris Park (Marounia 2005).

\(^{23}\) There were all sorts of rumours circulating that the two Christian camps, Aoun vs. Geagea, would have an altercation at the event. One rumour had it that the “Marada Militia” (of the Franjieh camp from Zgharta, who is allied with Aoun) had brought up 5000 tickets and weren’t going to attend so that the stadium would look empty. The Aoun camp have a view that the Maronite Patriarch is too allied with Samir Geagea and the March 14 Coalition.
The Parish of Our Lady of Lebanon (Saydet Lubnan) at Harris Park (see Figure 26), was the location for my field research and represents 23 Maronite villages of North Lebanon, including a number from the Wadi Qadisha, or Holy Valley, where Hadchit is located (see Map 2). When the congregation comes together at Saydet Lubnan there is a spatial continuity in the relationship between the villages and the people of North Lebanon, only relocated and reconstructed in Sydney. The image of spatial reconstruction is reinforced by the depiction of the patron saints from each village in the stained glass windows surrounding the church, which appear in the following order in an anti-clockwise direction: Our Lady of the Sea: Jieh, St. John the Baptist: Imar, Our Lady of Miziara, Sarkis and Bakhos: Harf Miziara, Our Lady of Tanourine, St. Mourat: Kfarzaina, St. Charbel: Bkaa Kafra, St. Assia: Kfarfou, St. Anthony of Padua: Barkalyun, St. Raymond: Hadchit, St. Saba: Blouza, St Leba-St. Jude: Hasroun, Our Lady of Zgharta, St. Saba: Bcharre, St. Joseph: Matrit, John the Baptist: Zaghartarine, St. Mourat Karmel: Mohr, St. Mourina: Wadi Kannoubine, St. Jacob: Asnoun, St Fadi: Bane, St Awtel: Kfarsghab, St. Challita: Knat and St. Maron: Bacheen.
Attending mass at Our Lady of Lebanon at Harris Park is one of the central features of Hadchiti social life. Many of the Hadchit families sit in the section of the church alongside the stained glass window dedicated to St. Raymond (see Figure 27). There are several masses at Our Lady of Lebanon on a Sunday: the 9am mass is usually in Arabic and Syriac/Aramaic and the 11am mass is usually a mixture of English, Arabic and Syriac/Aramaic, but everything is translated into English on a Power Point screen. Syriac/Aramaic\(^{24}\) and Arabic are also written up on the screen. Key parts of the Maronite liturgy retain the use of Aramaic, whether the mass is in English or in Arabic. The Maronite Church across the diaspora has attempted to standardise the Maronite Liturgy so that there are core features that don’t change whether you are in Lebanon, Australia, the USA or South America. There is a view amongst the youth, however, that the pace of life in Sydney demands an “express mass”:

I go to the local Catholic – express mass – 35 minutes. The Maronite mass – I went last Sunday to Our Lady and it went 1

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\(^{24}\) Aramaic is related to Syriac and Hebrew and is the core language of the Maronite Liturgy irrespective of whether the overall Mass is in English or Arabic.
hour and 15 minutes. That bored me. He was putting up pictures of the water, the forest. I could go to therapy for that – I feel they go a bit over board with that. I’m at work 7 days – so the last thing I want is to have to go more than an hour. I just go to the local Roman most of the time – 35 minutes – I have been to Our Lady several times this year, but I walked out after Holy Communion each time. I go to church to hear God’s teachings not the Priest’s – there is too much interpretation. I pray almost every night before bed – I feel better doing that than going to church.

There is a special youth mass at Our Lady of Lebanon at 7pm on a Sunday night, which is very well attended and conducted largely in English. The youth take their attendance seriously spiritually, but also socially. Youth mass is an opportunity to dress up in the latest fashions and there are always comments from the priests about the lack of ‘modesty’ amongst the young women in their fashion selections, which often feature stilettos heel, mini skirts and spaghetti strap shirts. The latest hair cuts and styles are very important markers of social success in Australia for both the young women and men. For the young people it is an opportunity to meet other young Maronite people and to experience some social solidarity during what has been a difficult period to be Lebanese in Australia, as this interview reflects:

Yeh – it is now every Sunday the churches are packed in Harris Park, Croydon – they are packed where 5 years ago they weren’t. It is to do with all of the problems we have had in the community. People are standing up – last Sunday at the youth mass it was packed. A lot of it is personal, at the same time it is about saying this is who we really are – we aren’t bad people…

The Maronite clergy work hard to maintain the connection of the Maronite Lebanese immigrant community to the church. One way this has been done in Australia is through the promotion of the three canonised Lebanese saints: Charbel, Rafqa and Nematallah (see Figure 28 for biography of saint Charbel). In 2006 a Saint’s Relics Tour came to Australia, which was promoted as an opportunity to experience spiritual renewal in Australia’s Maronite community. The visiting saint’s relics were represented as a spiritual link to the homeland for the diaspora and were depicted arriving in Australia by boat (see Figure 28). The relics toured each of the Maronite parishes in Australia and large crowds came to see them. Saint Charbel originally came from the village of Bkaa Kafra which, like Hadchit, is one of the villages of the Wadi Qadisha that is represented at Our
Lady of Lebanon, Harris Park. St. Charbel is known as the Hermit of Lebanon and he is valued as a saint because:

He makes us understand, in a world largely fascinated by wealth and comfort, the paramount value of poverty, penance, and asceticism, to liberate the soul in its ascent to God (Eparchy of Australia 2009).

This quote highlights the contrast between the life of the immigrant and Lebanon’s most esteemed saint. The first is characterised by their pursuit of najeḥ or material success and the second is exalted for his ascetic life of poverty. As we saw in Chapter Two, Maronitism is an Eremitic tradition, which emphasises monastic practice, indeed the Maronites are said to be a monastic people (Hourani and Habchi 2004). Thus, the sanctification of the soul, taher, and the attainment of material success, najeḥ, are diametrically opposed forces, which place the immigrant in a conundrum, as this interview suggests:

It is true that asceticism is a very strong element of the Maronites, this is because the Maronite Church is...essentially a hermitic or monastic church. The Maronites are a people who strove for collective solitude, reflection and prayer...when they came to Australia, they tried to keep this link to their traditions but it is very difficult, not because you can’t reflect and pray here, but because of the glitter of material wealth. So you’ll find that they yearn for the life their ancestors led in Lebanon, but they cannot continue that life because of their material wealth and their spiritual poverty.
Figure 28: The representation of the Maronite saints. From left to right St. Charbel, St. Nematallah and the boat that brought their relics to Australia and St. Rafqa and a biography of St. Charbel below. Source: www.maronite.org.au

SAINT CHARBEL Hermit of Lebanon

The Story of Charbel
On May 8, 1828 in a mountain village of Beka'kafra, the highest village in the near-east, Charbel was born to a poor Maronite family. From childhood his life revealed a calling to "bear fruit as a noble Cedar of Lebanon". Charbel "grew in age and wisdom before God and men". At 23 years old he entered the monastery of Our Lady of Mayfouk (north of Byblos) where he became a novice. After two years of novitiate, in 1853, he was sent to St. Maron monastery where he pronounced the monastic vows of poverty, chastity and obedience. Charbel was then transferred to the monastery of Kfeifan where he studied philosophy and theology. His ordination to the priesthood took place in 1859, after which he was sent back to St. Maron monastery.

His teachers provided him with good education and nurtured within him a deep love for monastic life. During his 19 years at St. Maron monastery, Charbel performed his priestly ministry and his monastic duties in an edifying way. He totally dedicated himself to Christ with undivided heart to live in silence before Nameless One. In 1875 Charbel was granted permission to live as a hermit nearby the monastery at St. Peter and Paul hermitage. His 23 years of solitary life were lived in a spirit of total abandonment to God. He died. Everyone forgot about him. Fifty years later, his body was discovered incorrupt and in short time he worked over 600 miracles. He is my new companion. My road has taken a new turning. It seems to me that I have been asleep for 9 ears---and before that I was dead."...a hermit of the Lebanese mountain is inscribed in the number of the blessed...a new eminent member of monastic sanctity is enriching, by his example and his intercession, the entire Christian people... May he make us understand, in a world largely fascinated by wealth and comfort, the paramount value of poverty, penance, and asceticism, to liberate the soul in its ascent to God..." On October 9, 1977 during the World Synod of Bishops, Pope Paul VI canonized Blessed Charbel among the ranks of the Saints.
The response to this conundrum is the intensification of religious practice in Australia amongst the Maronites and church attendance has increased over the last five years. However, the burden of ‘ascetic’ practice generally falls upon women, as mothers, to lead a daily ‘Eremitical life’ (Hourani and Habchi 2004) on behalf of the whole family. The following interview shows how this second generation interviewee sees the role of saints in his life and the spiritual division of labour within his family:

I try to practice the Maronite faith. I don’t go every week, I go once a fortnight – once a month. Dad goes once a week and mum everyday. St. Raymond is ours. Saints guide you through the different parts of life – through evil, if you are lost pray to that saint, so that is how I see all the saints. Michael is one of my saints that I sort of follow, I read his prayer – the saint of forgiveness. Women tend to have more of a connection with Mary.

This interview highlights how church attendance in his family ranges from once a month for him to once a week for his dad, while his mother goes everyday. This is very common in the Hadchit community. The interview also shows how saints are thought to form individual relationships with their subjects and to mediate between the believer and God. However, it is Mary who is the most significant saint for his mother and, indeed, Mary is said to be the most important saint in Maronite Catholicism (Salim 2002). Women, across the Hadchit community, maintain spiritual practice on behalf of their families through their faith in Mary. In Maronitism Marian devotion features strongly and at Our Lady of Lebanon Church Mary has her own altar behind the main altar and her statue stands on top of the church. In the Maronite tradition Mary is known as the “Mother of God”: “If Jesus the man is the divine Word, that is, God, then in a real sense Mary can be called Mother of God, insofar as Jesus is truly God” (Salim 2002:158). Mary is also known as the Symbol of the Incarnation, the Ever-virgin, the All-Holy, Jesus’s First Disciple, the First Sharer in the Resurrection, Mother of the Church, the Intercessor (Salim 2002:158-166) and as the Cedar of Our Faith:

Maronites have for centuries recognized the Mother of God under the title of Cedar of Lebanon. For us, she represents a strong and enduring faith, which does not break under adversity (Salim 2002:166).
If the Virgin Mary is the most important saint, her life of martyrdom, self-sacrifice and suffering serves as the archetypal role model of forbearance for women to emulate in order to withstand their ‘lot’ in a male dominated society. This Catholic gender ideology has been coined the “Machismo/Marianismo” division of spiritual labour (Stevens 1973:62). Its fundamental tenet is that women are spiritually stronger than men, because they are morally superior, while men are spiritually weak, morally inferior and sexually licentious. In fact, Marianismo constructs female saintliness out of their male inflicted suffering:

Taking its cue from the worship of Mary, marianismo pictures its subjects as semi-divine, morally superior and spiritually stronger than men. This constellation of attributes enables women to bear the indignities inflicted on them by men, and to forgive those who bring them pain. Like Mary, women are seen as mediatrixes without whose intercession men would have little chance of obtaining forgiveness for their transgressions. Conversely a female cannot hope to attain full spiritual stature until her forbearance and abnegation have been tested by male-inflicted suffering. Men’s wickedness is therefore the necessary precondition of women’s superior status (Stevens 1973:62).

The following Lent case study of religious practice shows how the paradox of material wealth and spiritual poverty, is resolved through a gendered division of spiritual labour, which converts women into the ‘ascetics’ of the home, leaving the men and children to work in industrial time and space.

**Case Study: Lent and spiritual purification**

The season of Lent, *Syem* in Arabic, is the most important religious cycle or complex within the Maronite calendar. It provides an annual cycle of spiritual purification and fasting is a key part of the process of ritual cleansing/sactification (*taher/tahra*) and renewal for the 40 days of Lent. The fast, *Sayem/Saymeh* (for male/female), is from mid-night (or the evening meal) until mid-day and prohibits all drinking, including water. Observance of the fast is variable and gendered. Some confine their fasting to Wednesdays, Fridays or to just Good Friday and Ash Monday. In general the first and last week of Lent, the week of the Passion (*Jome’at al Azimeh*), are the most important and people are most likely to observe the fast during these two weeks. Women are more observant than men in all aspects of religious practice and church attendance, including observance of the fast during Lent. Mothers are more likely to refrain
from eating meat, sweets, dairy and eggs for the entire period of Lent. This observation is supported by other literature on Marian devotion and religiosity in the Mediterranean region (Dubisch 1995:211) Men and children, on the other hand, are considered too busy working or too weak to be able to withstand the fast, as this young man explains:

I don’t eat meat and I fast for the first and last week of Lent. It is difficult to observe these days, we are all born sinners. It gets a bit hard for the younger generation because we work, it gets harder – it is not an excuse but it gets harder.

The obligation falls upon women, therefore, to fast for the spiritual well being of the family as a whole and to create spiritual space inside the home. It is common amongst the women to listen to prayer radio throughout the day as they cook and do household chores, as this interview shows:

Mum listens to the church radio prayer channel (The Voice of Charity) while she does the chores, cooking etc. It is mainly mothers that listen to that.

Additionally, women often perform extra recitals of the Rosary during Lent. For example, one informant explains she usually recites three rounds of the Rosary (each Rosary contains five decades) per day, but during Lent she recites 15 Rosaries per day, which usually takes 1 ½ hours. Pilgrimages within Sydney are also popular amongst the women during Lent and some youth also are taking part as this youth explains:

They [the women] walk from Westmead to Our Lady bare footed. Mum does it a few times a year. One time she walked from Westmead to Bankstown. At Easter they walk through the night. We walked from Granville to St. Mary’s in the city. 120 went this year, me and all my friends. We enjoy the walk. It was mostly Lebanese. It took us 8 hours, we started at midnight and got there at 8 am. You say a prayer along the way and there are the Rosary beads – so we say the Rosary as we walk. We felt Holy. Also popular is a picture of Mary in a frame with two doors and it goes from house to house in the Lebanese community, we had it for a week and every night Lebanese women come over and pray the Rosary.

The performance of pilgrimages within Sydney recreates rituals as they were practiced in Lebanon and in Hadchit during Lent and creates spiritual space within the profane space of Sydney. The emphasis is on bodily suffering to attain spiritual atonement, a kind of death and rebirth (Eade and Sallnow
According to Kepler-Lewis (1968) over 40 years ago in Hadchit the entire week preceding the entrance to Lent was celebrated as a Carnival, referred to as Marjaa. This celebration culminated in Khamis al Skora or Drunken Thursday (Kepler-Lewis 1968:218-219), when everyone got drunk before the start of the Lenten fast. Kepler-Lewis also observed the strict observance of the Lenten fast in Hadchit in 1950’s and wrote that throughout the Qadisha Valley the bells rang at midday to mark the break of the fast during Lent (Kepler-Lewis 1968:219). In Australia, however, the observance of Lent must take place within a broader society that largely ignores it. Thus, the Maronite Church becomes the marker of the feast days and important celebrations through the printing of newsletters and specialist Calenders and women, in particular, take on the burden of observing Lent and maintaining spiritual practice within the home in opposition to its absence in the host nation, a topic we will return to in Chapter Four.

As Lent is celebrated by Maronites in Australia, according to the religious Calender produced by Our Lady of Lebanon at Harris Park, it starts with Cana Sunday, Ahad Madkhal al Saoum, and is followed by Ash Monday, Tnayn al Rmad, but the entire first week of Lent is considered to be important. Palm Sunday or Ahad al Sha’aneen is the next key celebration of the Easter Cycle, occurring seven weeks after the first Sunday of Lent. These field notes from Our Lady of Lebanon at Harris Park give some feeling for how the ritual of Sha’aneeni is performed in Sydney (see Figure 29):

Palm Sunday field notes 2006: Palm Sunday, Sha’aneeni and Easter, Eid el Kbir, the Big Feast are the biggest celebrations of the year. Christmas, Eid el Milad, is of less significance. This is because Easter is the culmination of Lent – the season of self-sacrifice, fasting and eating Lenten dishes- meat free dishes, notably Mjaddra-green lentils and rice. The central feature of the celebration of Sha’aneeni is the procession around the car park of the church led by the Bishop (Sayyedna) and the parish priests (Al Qahani) carrying palm fronds followed by the congregation. The children are all dressed beautifully and carry special floral arrangements and candles. There were also olive branches. The atmosphere was very festive and people greeted each other with “Sha’aneeni mbarki” happy Palm Sunday.

The last week of Lent is celebrated as the Week of the Passion, which culminates in Good Friday, Jome’at Al Azimeh, which marks the crucifixion of Christ. These field notes from Good Friday 2006 (see Figure 30) give some
description for how Good Friday was marked in the Hadchit community in Sydney:

Fieldnotes: Good Friday: On Good Friday the women in most households make a particular dish from green lentils and burghul, which is meatless, called Kibbit ar-Rahib, The Monks Kibbi, (see Figure 30), which is sour to mark the sombreness of the occasion. The Friday service is at 3pm and it focuses on the re-enactment of the death of Christ and the cross is carried around the church.

In the evening the Hadchit Youth Set hold their annual “Potato Night” at the St. Raymond’s Hall, where grilled potato served with Toum (garlic sauce) is the highlight of the evening and marks the austerity of Good Friday. Potato Night usually attracts a large group of under 25’s who are often accompanied by their parents. About 200-300 people attended Potato Night in 2006. The young people were dressed in clothes of the latest fashion. The girls stood together and the boys stood separately in their own groups. The mothers sat on one side of the room and visited with each other and the fathers stood together on the other side of the hall. The occasion was casual and people seemed to enjoy seeing each other and to value the chance to catch up and have a break from the very busy pace of their lives in Sydney.

Good Friday (see Figure 30) is followed by the Vigil of Easter and Resurrection Sunday, Ahad al Qiama- or Eid al Kbeer (the Big Feast), which starts with midnight mass, Edass Noss Layl. Easter is usually a very festive occasion in most Maronite households. It is a release after the controls and sacrifices of Lent. Many families come together and have BBQ’s and eat a lot of meat, sweets and drink alcohol. Again it is the women that take on the burden of preparing the food for the Big Feast. The Maronites also celebrate Easter Monday or Tnayn Al Faseh, which traditionally in Hadchit was as widely celebrated as Easter Sunday, according to Kepler-Lewis, who concluded that the ritual cycle of Easter marks the greatest period of religious intensification in the year (Kepler-Lewis 1968:223).
Figure 29: Bishop Ad Abikaram leads the Palm Sunday procession at Our Lady of Lebanon Harris Park. Source: Nelia Hyndman-Rizik, 2008.

Figure 30: Good Friday lunch in the home of Hadchiti immigrants in Merrylands, served before attending mass at Our Lady of Lebanon, Harris Park. Source: Nelia Hyndman-Rizik, 2006.
Having looked at Lent as an annual cycle of religious intensification it is clear that women play a central role in creating ‘spiritual space’ through observing the fast, preparing Lenten dishes, performing pilgrimages and reciting prayers on behalf of their families. The maintenance of Maronite Catholicism, with its emphasis on monastic and ascetic practice, creates a duality between the material and the spiritual for the laity, which is generally resolved by the gendered division of spiritual labour within the family. Men tend to defer the observance of religious practice to their wives/mothers who carry the burden of faith for the whole family and construct the home as spiritual space in opposition to and as an inversion of the host-nation. However, following the Machismo/Marianismo analysis, it is also apparent that the spiritual division of labour is regulating the material world through regulating the relationships between the sexes. Through their role as the ‘ascetics’ of the home, female sexuality is self-regulated, which reinforces their structural containment within domestic space. At a deeper level, however, the spiritual division of labour reflects a patrilineal ideology, which regulates female sexuality for the reproduction of the three spheres of Lebanese identity.

**Conclusion: the reconstruction of bayt, day’aa and ta’eefa**

Through an examination of the home-building strategies of the Hadchit community in Australia it has been shown how the three spheres of Lebanese identity bayt, day’aa, ta’eefa, have been deployed as a strategy of community construction in Australia. These three spheres are sometimes divided and sometimes merge in a system of ‘unity within disunity’ (see Figure 31). The first sphere of identity, bayt, the patrilineage, transcends time and space. As we saw in Chapter Two each patrilineage is headed by a patriarch and includes a set of sons, their wives and their children (see the Rizk transnational family tree in Appendix 3). Women when they marry join another patrilineage, unless they marry within the lineage, which is known as ‘bint am’ (daughter of my paternal uncle) marriage or cousin marriage. Hadchit has 12 main patrilineages, which form 82 sub-branches (see the Hadchiti family tree in Appendix 2). As we have seen in this Chapter, through chain migration these now transcend the village itself and include those who reside in Sydney, where each patrilineage still forms the basis for community organisation. This has led to the reconstruction of
‘harat’ or family neighbourhoods through their settlement within particular streets and suburbs around Parramatta. The 12 patrilineages of Hadchit are united in Australia by the Hadchiti village association, the Jameye, which reconstructs the second sphere of Lebanese identity, day’aa, the village, in Australia. Through village association functions, the Hadchit telephone directory and the St. Raymond of Hadchit Hall, the village of Hadchit has been reconstructed through the network of social relationships amongst the deterritorialised patrilineages, thus, making it into a social village.

Figure 31: The intersection between Bayt, Day’aa, Ta’eefa in national and transnational borders.

The third layer of identity, ta’eefa, or sect, is reconstructed in Sydney through the Hadchitis’ identification with the broader Maronite communal
identity both within and beyond Lebanon’s national borders (see Figure 31). As was shown in this chapter, the Maronite villages are united through their patron saints, a common unifying symbol between local and national identities across the Mediterranean (Gilmore 1982), as illustrated by the re-configuration of the Maronite villages of Northern Lebanon at Our Lady of Lebanon Maronite Church, Harris Park, through the visual representation of their patron saints in a ‘constellation of belonging’. The villages of the Qadisha Valley, where Hadchit is located, are often referred to as the ‘Jibbat Bcharre’, referring to the monk’s habit as the symbol which unites them. Thus, the Maronite communal formation is made up of a series of inter-related villages linked within and beyond Lebanon’s national borders by the body of the Maronite Church (Al Kanisset al Marouniyye) (Hourani and Habchi 2004). In diaspora, therefore, the deterritorialised Maronite nation is united by the Maronite Church, as we saw during its convergence in Sydney during the “Maronites ’08” in July 2008.

However, the Maronite Church is ultimately contained within the body of Mary, Saydet Lubnan – Our Lady of Lebanon, the Mother of God and the Mother of the Church (Salim 2002). The womb of Mary is a common motif deployed to contain the Church across the Mediterranean (Dubisch 1995). In a paradox of gendered power, in an otherwise patriarchal and patrilineal tradition, Mary the Mother of God becomes the source of all creation and thus contains God as the ultimate ‘creator’ and, in so doing, contains the Maronite Church (Al Kanisse al Marouniyye) and the three spheres of identity (bayt, day’aa and ta’eefa) within her womb and this formation transcends the nation state. Thus, Saydet Lubnan is prominently displayed upon the roof of Our Lady of Lebanon Maronite Church in Harris Park and in Lebanon on the hills above Jounieh at Harissa.

Lebanon, as a nation state, can be conceptualised as a nation of 18 bounded sects, a Confessional Democracy, none of which can exact an absolute hegemony over the ‘nation’ (see Figure 31). However, through war, migration, exile and social reconstruction in Australia Lebanon’s sects are spatially reconstructed in Australia as a home-building strategy in diaspora. Unlike their boundedness within the Lebanese territory, in diaspora each of Lebanon’s sects are
transnational formations, which transcend both the home and host nation and look back to Lebanon as their point of origin. For the Sunni Muslim Lebanese their transnational formation is the ‘Umma’ (which comes from the Arabic word for mother – Umm) or the community of Muslims world wide. In the case of the Maronites (Mwarne), as we have seen in this chapter, the Maronites are contained ultimately within the body of Mary and, as will be developed in Chapter Seven, are united internationally through electronic media, satellite TV, phone cards and back to Lebanon through transnational flows and return visits. The formation of Lebanese village associations in Australia, such as the Hadchit Association, therefore, recreates the intersection between patrilineage, village and sect, but ultimately reproduces the division between the Lebanese sects in Australia, as this interview highlights:

**Do both sides of the Civil War mix in Australia?**

They won, not us. You don’t mix, your paths don’t cross. We don’t even mix with the Australians, why would we mix with them? The only contact we have is with the neighbours – outside our community. Our life – is our family, relatives and church – that is it. Our paths never cross – hello, how are you that is all I would say if I met a Muslim.
4. Being ‘at home’ and (re)producing the family

Until recently the images...immigration evoked were ones of rupture, uprooting, and loss of homeland...Migrancy is not simply about geographical movement but cultural continuity, discontinuity and transmutation (Baldassar 2001:7-10).

The notion of being transplanted is a common motif deployed to describe the immigrant and is a fitting symbol for an immigrant community united by a shared family tree\(^{25}\), such as the Hadchitis in Sydney. Like a tree that has been transplanted from Lebanon to Australia, the Hadchitis cannot be at home until they have grown roots (*shloush*) in the soil of the new land (*ard*). An integral part of growing roots is to raise a family in the new country, which instigates a process of cultural transformation. This chapter will examine the dis/articulation between feudal/tributary and capitalist social relations of production amongst the Hadchitis in Australia, which I term the reproduction/production nexus. This chapter shows how the (re)production of *bayt*, *day’a* and *ta’eefa* in Australia is threatened by the renegotiation of gender roles within the family, which transforms the domestic sphere into a field of struggle. The central premise of this struggle is the nature of the marriage contract itself, which is being renegotiated by the second generation from relations of descent to relations of consent (Sollors 1986). The chapter will start with an analysis of the gendered construction of domestic space and the centrality of women for the production of homeliness through their economies of nurturance and care within the family. It will then move on to examine the destabilisation of gender-roles through life cycle rituals and the contestation over changing marriage practices, with a case study on the Maronite wedding, *ors*, in Sydney.

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\(^{25}\) See Appendix Two: The Hadchit Family Tree
The gendered construction of homeliness in domestic space

**Speak to us of eating and drinking**
But since you must kill to eat, and rob the newly born of its mother’s milk to quench your thirst, let it then be an act of worship and let your board stand an altar on which the pure and the innocent of the forest and plain are sacrificed…for the law that delivered you into my hand shall deliver me into a mightier hand…your blood and my blood is naught but the sap that feeds the tree of heaven. (Gibran 2005 (original 1923):30)

**Speak to us of children:**
You may house their bodies, but not their souls for their souls dwell in the house of tomorrow, which you cannot visit, not even in your dreams (Gibran 2005:20).

Gibran’s notion that a house contains only a body, but that the soul transcends it, introduces us to the concept that homes do more than simply house and grow bodies, but are actually defined by their affective and spiritual dimension, which distinguishes a house as a physical structure from a home, which is said to have a heart. Hage (1997:102) has conceptualised the practice of migrant home-building as “the building of the feeling of being at home” and argues that the notion of home is an affective construct, which is made up of four components: security, familiarity, community and a sense of possibility. The most important relation, however, is between the home and food-production, which Hage (1997:101) argues, is a symbolic form of breast-feeding, the ultimate source of nurturing. The Arabic phrase, *lu’mit ‘umm*, meaning a mother’s mouthful, links the mother to the motherland, *baladna*, in reproducing within domestic space the familiarity of home (Hage 1997:101).

The Arabic phrase *umm el bayt* translates as mother of the house and implies the central place of women in the construction of homeliness inside domestic space, but the phrase *sit el bayt* translates as the power of the house, as the grandmother (*sit*) has seniority over her daughter-in-laws as the matriarch and, thus, rules over domestic space. Indeed, a house without a mother is said to be a house with no spirit, in which the family has four walls, but no soul. Hage (1997:117) relates the central experience of being at home to being a subject and, thus, distinguishes between feeders and eaters. In his theorisation, a patriarchal, communal home combines discourses of feeding and eating, in which both can experience themselves as subjects, not simply as objects (of nutrition or of being fed) and terms this the “culinary nurturing home” (Hage 1997:117). This
construction is fragile and dependent, he argues, on two variables: the presence of the father symbolising the law within the home, to protect the mother, and the second, the capacity of the mother to be converted into an object of nutrition and, thus, a domestic servant (Hage 1997:117). The home is always an ideal that is never fully realised, just as the mother is never mothering enough.

I consider the power of the ‘matriarch’, *sit el bayt*, to be a suppressed reality under whose authority the father and the children often experience themselves, not as subjects, but as dependent objects of her nurturing. The matriarch in her nurturing does more than just feed the body; however, she feeds the soul and, in so doing, constructs the affective and spiritual dimensions of homeliness within domestic space, not just for herself, but for the entire family. The concept of ‘spiritual eating’ is captured in the opening quote from Gibran and can be related to women’s role in the preparation of sacred food. Eating favourite dishes is a central part of feeling at home in Australia and can be likened to eating soul foods (Rouse and Hoskins 2004). The connection between spirituality and food (Beoku-Betts 1995:552) is reinforced, as we saw in Chapter Three, by spiritual dishes that are prepared and eaten for specific times on the Maronite religious calendar, especially Lenten dishes during Lent and on Fridays throughout the year, the most famous of which is *Mjaddra*, green lentil and rice potage.

In combining these constructions of gender roles we have a formulation similar to what Perrenas (2005:163) has found within the Filipino family transnationally, whereby the father is constructed as the “pillar of the home” (the one who makes the home stand) and the mother is constructed as the “light of the home” (the one who brings radiance). This relates to Hage’s (1997) theorisation that the father provides the law, while the mother provides the nurturance within domestic space. However, it is the father’s role, as head of the family, which is destabilised the most in migrant households and contributes to the experience of male emasculation, a topic I will develop further in the next chapter. Likewise, in diaspora and in the context of multicultural crisis, the feeling of homeliness and cultural identity is attached to the mother and exaggerated inside domestic space, because of the crisis of national belonging for Lebanese in the Australian...
public domain, which I will discuss further in Chapter Five and Seven. Consequently, the family experiences a dependence upon the mother for the feeling of ‘being at home’ and metonymically through her, to their cultural heritage, traditions and ultimately the homeland itself, *baladna*—‘our motherland’.

Abdelhady (2008:59) has also observed that the construction of homeliness in diaspora amongst Lebanese immigrants is gendered. She finds that men construct homeliness through relationships, while women engage in concrete physical practices inside domestic space to create home and recreate a connection with the homeland. She stresses that Lebanese immigrants are creating home within mobility and that home is not:

> A specific physical territory to be found in Lebanon, in their old houses or among old family and friends. Instead, home is something that is sought, imagined and recreated in new settings (Abdelhady 2008:63).

The important point here is that the feeling of home is constantly recreated through a gendered division of labour based on physical practices and relationships.

Amongst the Hadchitis in Sydney, I also observe a division of labour between the sexes which sees men for the most part dominating the external space of the home, often building the home for example and running the garden, while women control the internal domestic space, food production, the visual aesthetics of the home, the ethics of care and nurturance and the spiritual wellbeing of the family. The home has come to represent both a spiritual refuge from the host-nation, but also the success of the family within the host-nation, both symbolically and visually. The key measures of success are the home’s size and grandeur, its ornateness, the number of kitchens and bathrooms (which have increased dramatically in recent years) and the quality of the furnishings. The home is divided between the private and public spaces that the family presents to the world. As many Hadchitis work in the construction industry they have been able to add value to their own homes, and appearances and size are of great importance. The Parlour or Salon room, often found in homes in the Middle East, are also common in the homes of Hadchitis in Sydney. Guests are received
without bringing them into the heart of the home. The Salon is a formal room with the seating surrounding the walls of the room. This allows for the maximum number of people to be seated. The furniture will typically be of the formal ornate style, with carved wood and fabric cushions that are made in the Middle East and sold in specialty stores throughout Western Sydney. There is often a second living room for the family’s everyday private use and for guests who are more familiar. Bedrooms are typically separate, private zones within the home. Most households have two and sometimes three eating areas: formal, informal and one outside as part of the BBQ area.

Figure 32: A Jrn, traditionally used for pounding Kibbi, brought from Hadchit by a Hadchiti family in Merrylands. Source: Nelia Hyndman-Rizik, 2006.

The most important space within the house is the kitchen, el matbakh. Many Hadchiti homes in Sydney have two kitchens, one for everyday use and a second one outside attached to the BBQ and outdoor entertaining area. The outdoor kitchen is typically used for frying foods, such as onion, in order to keep food odours outdoors and for catering to larger parties. A Jrn (see Figure 32) or Mortar and Pestle, traditionally used for pounding Kibbi, will often be a prized family possession found in a Lebanese kitchen and often was brought by the family from Lebanon when they migrated to Australia. It is typical amongst the Hadchitis to buy ingredients for the kitchen in bulk when they are on special and to purchase fresh produce in bulk from Flemington Markets, as is told in this interview excerpt:

Growing up because there were so many people in our house – we had to buy things in bulk, but not so much anymore. Now
there is 5 of us in the home, we don’t need to anymore. We used to buy rice in 100kg bags. When cornflakes were on special at Coles then we would buy them in bulk. The strategy for low income was to buy things in bulk. You would have a whole heap of corn flakes, so when they finished there would be a special on rice bubbles and we would buy them. We used to buy from the markets and Auburn started getting fruit and vege and there was a lot of competition, so we started shopping there. Now with the smaller family we waste more food. We started taking things for granted. I am used to cooking for 12 people – it was hard to learn to cook for 4-5 – it was hard to do. That was something that me and mum struggled with.

Bulk purchasing is a cost saving measure, but also relates to buying patterns from Lebanon where uncertainty dictated buying ingredients in bulk in case of political strife (Abdelhady 2008:61). At another level, the pattern of bulk purchasing and storage of produce relates to deeper concepts of abundance, plenty and the preparedness to entertain, which are firmly rooted in the Lebanese rural, peasant culture, a tradition that is not built upon a half empty larder. The concept of plenty is central to peasant notions of wealth based upon the abundance of the harvest, which was the measure of the wealth of the family in the days of subsistence. It is well remembered by the older Hadchitis in Sydney that only those who had enough surplus in storage from their fields and fruit trees could stay in the village throughout the winter and survive, as we saw in Chapter Two.

Lebanese cookery is the central domain of women (see Figure 33 for some key recipes from the field). Being an accomplished cook is a matter of considerable pride and it is the measure of the skill of the woman in her home. Cookery also places women at the intersection of cultural production and cultural maintenance in diaspora, which relates to gendered constructions of purity, ethnicity and identity (Rouse and Hoskins 2004). It has been argued by Mintz and Du Bois (2002) that ethnicity is born of difference and works through contrast and that ethnic cuisine is associated with a geographically and/or historically defined eating community, which, like a nation, is ‘imagined’ and gender is central to its construction (Mintz and Du Bois 2002:109). In relating cookery to nurturing in the Lebanese family Humphrey writes that: “Food is another important part of cultural knowledge and consumption that is mainly produced at home” (Humphrey 1998:107).
### Habibe’s Kibbi mix

**Nayi**
- 1kg Hoggat – old lamb – from the leg
- ¼ small onion, quarter of red capsicum
- 2 tsp salt (goes on the meat) through mince machine
- 1 ½ cups of Burghul
- 1 tsp of baharat (on the Burghul), half tsp of cumin
- Mix together

**Cooked kibbe mihibbiye/ bis Sayniyyi**
- 1kg, hoggat/ any lamb
- 5 cups of Burghul-fine grade, wash, squeeze out water
- 1 big onion
- Red capsicum whole
- 4-5 leaves of mint
- 2 ½ tsp, salt, taste it
- Pinch of bicarbonate soda

### Tabouleh
- ¾ cup of Burghul
- 2 large bunches of parsley
- ½ bunch green onions finely chopped
- 1 cup of finely chopped mint
- 1-2 large tomatoes, finely copped
- 1/8 teaspoon cinnamon
- 2-3 tsp salt
- pepper to taste
- ½ cup of Olive oil
- ½ cup of lemon juice

**Method**
Rinse Burghul, drain, then squeeze excess water out. Place in large mixing bowl. First finely chop the parsley, then mint, then green onions and the tomatoes. Add seasonings and mix thoroughly by hand. Add lemon juice and toss with spoon and fork. Just before serving add oil and toss thoroughly.

### Mjadra
- 1 Cup of uncooked lentils
- 4 Cups of water
- 1 large onion, chopped
- ½ cup of olive oil
- Pinch of pepper
- Pinch of cumin, optional
- Salt to taste
- ½ cup uncooked rice

**Method**
Rinse lentils and place in a pan with water. Boil for 20 minutes. Meanwhile sauté chopped onion in oil until caramelized. Add onions and oil, seasonings and rice to the lentils. Cover and cook a further 20 minutes.

### Shahide’s Kanafı
- 1 packet of cornflake crumbs
- 300 gm cornflour
- 300ml thick cream
- 3 Tbsp of Orange Blossom Water (Mazaher)
- ½ cup of sugar
- 4 litres of milk
- 1 recipe of Itir (sugar syrup)

**Method**
Place milk, corn flour and sugar in pot and bring to boil, stirring constantly. Place crumbs and butter in the bottom of a large round pan/Sayniyye. Pour cooked custard into the pan and sprinkle remaining crumbs and dot with butter. Place in a 200 degree oven for 10 minutes, or until browned and boiling. Let sit for 5 minutes and serve

### Susanne and Warde’s Kishk
- Milk (10 litres)
- Boughul 1kg
- Plain flour
- Salt

**Method**
**Step 1**
Make 4 Litres of Laban (yoghurt). Boil 4ltr of milk on stove top. Allow to cool until you can place your little finger into the milk stirring for 8-10 seconds. Mix in 2 Tbsp of yoghurt. Cover for 6-8 hours with a blanket or place in the oven. Make remaining 6 litres of milk into laban and hang in a bag overnight to drain and make into labni (thickened drained yoghurt).

**Step 2**
Pour hot yoghurt over bourghul and allow to soak for 4 hours.

**Step 3**
Pass bourghul through a mince machine. Mix labni with soaked bourgul.

**Step 4**
Add 4 Tbsp of salt, mix everything and place in a pillow case to drain for 4-5 days and ferment.

**Step 5**
Spread a large single bed sheet on a clean concrete surface in the sun on a 30+ degree Celsius day. Throw flour over the sheet to cover. Squeeze out the laban onto the sheet in pellets, by rubbing it between your fingers. Then every 2 hours squeeze together the pellets to get moisture out. Will take 1 day to dry on a hot day and 2-3 days in cooler weather. Keep rubbing the mixture in the palms of your hands until it is as dry as a powder. Then sprinkle another 250 gm of flour over the mixture. Place onto a hot concrete floor and mix with hands every few hours. Store in glass jars for the winter.

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**Figure 33:** A selection of recipes collected during fieldwork. Source: Nelia Hyndman-Rizik, 2006.
The practice of Lebanese cookery is highly gendered and the act of eating and smelling the Lebanese cuisine forms the embodied and affective core of identity and homeliness in Australia, as expressed in the following interview:

**Is Australia home?**
Australia is home, because friends, work make us feel at home. This is where we grew up and made our daily routines. Mum’s cooking is one thing that you become accustomed to and you never enjoy anything other than your mum’s food at her table with her table cloth. Doesn’t matter where you go – even in Hadchit it is not the same as your mum’s table.

If the kitchen forms the heart of the house, this interview describes how the mother occupies the central position within the family for the construction and maintenance of homeliness through the act of cooking. Furthermore, the mother resolves the contradictions of belonging and identity that arise through the migration process at the ‘kitchen table’, as suggested by the view that this man is more at home at his mother’s table than in Hadchit. Thus, the ‘kitchen table’ forms the iconic image of home and homeliness, based on nurturance, which is intrinsically attached to the mother and children draw upon that iconic image of home when they form their own household as it metonymically links them to the ultimate ‘feeling of home’ to which they seek to return. Through this construction, the mother forms the centre for multiple households, sometimes transnationally, and becomes like the sun in the centre of the solar system with her children gravitating around her in a circular motion.

Hage (2003:28-29), similarly, theorises the mother’s care and nurturance is central for the construction of home. Drawing on psychoanalytic theory, he argues, a double movement of closure and openness allows for homeliness within mobility. Closure provides the sense of nurturance, but for mobility, homeliness must be built upon a secure attachment to the mother, which derives from a successful internalisation of the physical attachment to the mother, so that the child can transcend the parental home and develop an internal secure base. Thus, it is the idea of the mother and the family home, which sustains the feeling of homeliness into the future. Women’s daily practices of care in domestic space are foundational, therefore, for both the physical and psychological construction of home and for the possibility of constructing the feeling of homeliness into the future, as is highlighted in this interview about feeling at home in Australia:
What makes you feel at home?

Lebanese food, pictures of the Lebanese saints, Lebanese furniture – Lebanese coffee, Lebanese bread. My mum only cooks Lebanese food.

This interview relates the central feeling of homeliness to the female arrangement of domestic space and the experience of eating the Lebanese cuisine. Thus, the production and consumption of ethnic cuisine is an important strategy of migrant home-building (Hage 1997:101). The production of Lebanese cuisine is the domain of women. While women’s work in preparing the Lebanese cuisine might be seen as the perpetuation of traditional gender roles, it also can be seen as a source of empowerment and resistance to the dominant culture (Beoku-Betts 1995:536). In Lebanese society hospitality and preparedness for unannounced guests is a necessity. There is a distinction between everyday foods, such as stews, for example Lubyi bi Lahm (green bean and lamb stew), and festive foods, which might include: Hommus, garbanzo dip, Baba Ghanouj, eggplant dip, Tabouleh, the famous Lebanese parsley salad, Fattoush, Lebanese bread salad, Waraq Ineb, stuffed vine leaves, Sambusik, savoury meat pastries, Ftayir, small spinach pies, and Kibbi (see Figure 34). For daughter-in-laws cookery is a matter of much fear and trepidation due to the pressure of making the key Lebanese dishes to the standard of their mother-in-law, marta am. It is not unusual for a daughter-in-law to have a long apprenticeship to her mother-in-law, when it comes to mastering the preparation of the key Lebanese dishes, as this interview with a woman regarding her daughter-in-law illustrates:

What is difficult about mother-in-law/daughter-in-law relationships? Sometimes it is because the mother-in-law is possessive. Sometimes it is because the daughter in law needs to be taught. The mother-in-law thinks she is helping by guiding, but sometimes it is suffocating. You have your arguments, you don’t agree on everything. With my daughter in law there is a lot of things she doesn’t know how to cook. I watch her – if she asks I will tell her, but if she doesn’t I stay away. Finally my son says to her – “mum makes it like this” and she says to him – “well you can go and eat it over there then”. They had a little argument, they came over and I pretended I didn’t know anything about it, but pride plays a big part, instead of me telling her what to do – I asked her to come and help me. I said “come over help me” – I was standing and cooking for my family and in a round about way I was showing her. Whatever she needed to know she could see and learn, but not be told. She is 21, she is young, she was 18 when she got
married. She lived in Beirut. She was a child when she got married. She has pride. I show her the nicer way, you keep the friendship going that way.

This introduces the dualistic relationship between cookery and women’s status, it is both her source of pride and the key to her success within the family and within the broader community, but it can also be the cornerstone of her oppression in the home, particularly in the early years of her marriage (Humphrey 1998:107). Additionally, Lebanese cookery is more about the mastery of form rather than innovation, which sets a high standard for the novice to aspire. Consequently, many second generation daughters in the Hadchit community in Sydney are rebelling against the onerous aspects of food preparation associated with Lebanese cookery and some are refusing to learn the art of Lebanese cookery at all. This can be a source of conflict within the home and of ‘culture wars’ between the generations (Hyndman-Rizik forthcoming). Indeed, retaining and reproducing the Lebanese cuisine authentically becomes a contested issue, as this 19 year old young woman explains about her mother:

Whatever food she cooks, I can cook. If she makes basella ruz (peas and rice) – it takes her an hour to cook it, I can cook it – it takes me 2 hours – all afternoon. She thinks I don’t how. Everyone thinks I am incompetent. It is partly because I don’t show competency – I know how to do it – I get trial and error wrong. I found I’ve done the mistake – I cooked the meat before the onions and I did it wrong, but I find my way around it. Mum comes home she sees I am trying – it took me 1 ½ hrs and she jokes. I am struggling so much to see eye to eye – it cut me that she said I was incompetent. She says I do it wrong and then she’ll come and help me. You know what – we don’t have quantities – there is a specific pot mum cooks rice in so I use that one. I improvise – I know how the onions are supposed to look in the pot – I know how full or empty the pot is supposed to look – I take notice. I know how to do them I just choose not to. I don’t like people telling me I don’t know how.

Lebanese cookery is hands-on and sensory and the method of eye-balling, smell and taste are the typical ways in which the ingredients and the taste of the dishes are assembled and reproduced. It is an innovation to quantify Lebanese dishes in recipe books, which is another inter-generational issue between mothers and daughters when it comes to passing on the art of cooking the Lebanese cuisine. Daughters often complain that their mothers can’t tell them how much of a particular ingredient they put into a dish. This also relates to limited literacy amongst the migrating generation of mothers, who have had to deploy a range of
strategies to be able to negotiate life in Australia including shopping, as this
daughter tells us about her mother:

**What are your mum’s strategies when she can’t read and write?**

Yes she knows some of the letters of the alphabet. She knows
the first letters and she knows colours – if she wants to buy
Omo – she knows the first letter and the colour, so she can find
it. She also looks through catalogues; she knows her numbers
for prices. She drives – that was something we were really
proud of. She has been driving for 15 years now.

This interview excerpt shows the strategies of negotiation that mothers with
limited literacy deploy, with the assistance of their daughters, to do the shopping.

Lebanese cookery can also be time consuming and fastidious as cutting the
ingredients finely, particularly for dishes like *Tabouleh*, are considered the
measure of the cook. The presentation of the food and its taste are also key
aspects for consideration. The quality of *Waraq Ineb* (stuffed vine leaves), for
example, is measured by their size, they should be very thin, which adds to the
time consuming nature of preparing them in large quantities for parties (*hafli*).
Some women are so adept at making *Waraq Ineb*, they can roll them with one
hand. Likewise, the making of *Kibbi Mihshiyyi* and *Sambusik* (see Figure 34) are
female art forms. The measure of the quality of *Kibbi Mihshiyyi* is in the
thinness of the walls of the spheres and women use their hands to mould them
and stuff them with the filling (*Hushwit al Kibbi*). In Hadchit the production of
*Khibiz* (bread), *Waraq Ineb* and *Kibbi Mihshiyye* was undertaken collectively by
the women, who worked together in groups (Kepler-Lewis 1968:121). While
this does still happen amongst the Hadchitis in Sydney, it is in decline and this
style of cookery does not lend itself to the nuclear family and the demands of the
pace of life in Sydney. When it falls upon one woman to prepare these dishes for
a large party or function it can be a very demanding task. Nonetheless, it should
be pointed out that cookery is a matter of great pride for women, especially as
they get older. While cookery might be interpreted as the key to the daughter-in-
laws oppression, it is the central pillar of the mother-in-law’s pride and
accomplishment – consequently some daughters have rejected it altogether:

I really take off my hat for my mother – she has sacrificed her
whole life for us – I don’t think I would do that – I am selfish –
I am career oriented – there is more to life than just settling down, yes it would be nice – but being 28 there is still time – there is more for me to do – another trip to Vegas – Europe.

This interview shows how daughters see themselves as being more selfish than their mothers and unprepared to make the same sacrifices. This trend has also been accompanied by the tendency to hire Lebanese catering companies to prepare the food for large parties and festive occasions. This shift reflects the commoditisation of food and with it, an increase in symbolic rivalry between the families, which has increasingly displaced communal food preparation between the women for large family functions. The commoditisation of food is attributable to both the increased participation of women in the labour force; hence they no longer have the time for intensive food preparation, but also the shift from communal social relations of production to the competitive, atomised, nuclear household – under capitalist social relations of production in Sydney.

Figure 34: A selection of Lebanese dishes: Tabouleh, Sambusik and Kibbi.

If we move to the outside of the house, there is often a fusion between the kitchen and the backyard in terms of the use of space. The backyard of many homes owned by Hadchitis in Sydney reflects their peasant origins from the mountains of Northern Lebanon. There is commonly a grape arbour (the leaves are used for Waraq Ineb) and fruit trees, such as: persimmons, shajirit el kaki, plums, apricots (which are commonly eaten green) and olives zaytoun. The home curing of olives is common in many households, a skill brought with them
from Lebanon\textsuperscript{26}. Vegetable gardens are also common. The most important ingredients grown are lemons \textit{hamed}, parsley, \textit{ba’adunis}, mint, \textit{na’ana}, and tomato, \textit{banadura}, all of which are the essential ingredients for the Lebanese salad \textit{tabouleh}. It is also common to grow Lebanese or Hadchiti varieties of zucchini, \textit{kusa}, cucumbers, \textit{kihar}, and beans, \textit{lubyi}. Sometimes wild oregano or summer savoury is grown for making \textit{zatar}, the herb and sesame seed spice mix used for \textit{Manushi}, Lebanese pizza. Humphrey (1998) also noted the importance of the domestic production of these ingredients, as they are valued for their freshness in Lebanese cuisine.

It is not unusual to find chickens in the backyard and some households have a wood fired \textit{Soj} griddle (like a large upside down Wok with a fire underneath it) in the back yard for baking \textit{Soj} bread, the quintessential mountain bread of Lebanon. It is a large, thin, circular flat bread with no pocket and is a mixture of white and wholemeal flour (see Figures 35 and 36) and is usually folded over four times for storage purposes. It is a female art form and a matter of considerable pride for the women who still know how to bake this bread at home. It is thrown into the air like pizza dough and spun several times before being turned onto a cushion, which is used to place it upon the hot \textit{Soj} dome. Some households also use their backyards for making \textit{Kishk}, which is made from fermented yoghurt (\textit{Laban}) and burghul, which is salted and dried on concrete in the hot sun for several days until it turns into a powder before it is collected and stored for use later in various dishes (see recipe in Figure 36). The continuity of these various peasant art forms, which are highly gendered, amongst the Lebanese in Western Sydney links them to their subsistence roots in Lebanon. There is a sense of nostalgic loss for the lives left behind in the villages of Northern Lebanon and the gendered skills implicit in subsistence agriculture, which appear out of place in an urban landscape like Sydney. Through these physical practices home is recreated in Sydney and continuity between the two spaces is reinforced. These gendered art forms place women at the centre of the maintenance of culture and the construction of homeliness in diaspora.

\textsuperscript{26}The typical method for olive curing is by slicing them up the side and curing them in salt brine over many months.
Figure 35: The art of baking Soj in a back yard in Granville. First the dough is thrown in the air. Source: Nelia Hyndman-Rizik, 2006.

Soj dough
5 kg Flour – half white and half wholemeal
20 gm fresh yeast
1 ltr of warm water
1 Tbsp salt.

Method
Move the flour to one side of the bowl, pour half of the water and start mixing with flour until all the water is absorbed. Knead until the dough resists the hand. Allow to rise and then divide into balls, roll each one flat, throw in the air to make the bread thin and then place onto a cushion and then turn onto the Soj dome.

Figure 36: The dough is then placed on the hot Soj dome oven. Source: Nelia Hyndman-Rizik, 2006.
Another key aspect of the female arrangement of domestic space is their devotion to religious shrines within the home. There is very little secular art in the average Hadchit home, and most visual representations are of a religious nature. Perhaps the only secular item to be found on the wall of a Hadchit home in Sydney will be a picture of the village of Hadchit itself (which in itself transforms the village into a ‘shrine’) and it usually hangs in a central position on the wall in the main living room. The next most important picture in almost every home is a religious icon depicting saint Raymond (*Mar Romanus*), the patron saint of Hadchit, after whom the main church in the village is named. The other key saints represented in the homes of people from Hadchit are: *Sarkis* and *Bakhos*27, *El Sayde*28, *Our Lady*, *St. Shamouni*29, and *Mar Elias* (saint Elias). Additionally, the three canonised Maronite saints: *Mar Charbel*, *Adissi Rafqa* and *Mar Nematallah* also feature prominently on the wall in most homes (see Figure 37).

The most important religious representation in almost every home is the shrine, *mazar*, to Mary, Our Lady, which will typically be in the corner of the main living room, or sometimes in the front hallway (see Figure 37). Devotion to Mary or Sayde (Our Lady) is a key feature of female religiosity and, thus, attendance to this shrine is an exclusively female preserve within the home. Fresh flowers will often be placed at the shrine every day and candles might be lit. Marian devotion in the Maronite Church is linked to the experience of persecution in which the Maronites took refuge under Mary’s symbolic gaze (Sakr and Joseph 2005:31). Saint’s icons and medals are also an important part of the collections that might be found at Altars. Saint’s medals are also worn bodily around the neck and wrists of both men and women. They are typically cast in gold and one of the most common is the medal of Mary the Blessed

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27 The second village church in Hadchit is named after Sarkis and Bakhos, who were Roman soldiers and are depicted on horse back together in full armament. Additionally, bayt Rizk has a particular association with Sarkis and Bakhos, as this church is located in what was the Rizk Hara within the old town of Hadchit.

28 El Sayde Eshiffe – Our Lady of the Cliff is the third key church within Hadchit built on the edge of the cliff overlooking the Wadi Qadisha or Holy Valley. All of the key Churches of Hadchit are thought to be built on Roman and Phoenician temple bases.

29 The shrine to Saint Shamouni is located half way down the cliff on the way to the valley below Hadchit. Saint Shamouni is otherwise known as the mother of the seven martyrs as she is said to have sacrificed seven children rather than let them convert to Islam. Her image feeds into a long historical discourse and self-view amongst the Maronite villages of being besieged by Islam.
Virgin, which is often worn in accompaniment with the Maronite Cross and perhaps the Cedar of Lebanon (see Figure 38).

**Figure 37:** Shrine to Mary and the Maronite saints in a Hadchit immigrant household in Merrylands. Source: Nelia Hyndman-Rizik, 2006.

**Figure 38:** Common symbols worn along with saint’s medals: The Maronite Cross and the Cedar of Lebanon. Source: Nelia Hyndman-Rizik, 2006

The domestic shrine reflects the central role women play as the ‘spiritual keepers’ of the family, a topic I discussed in Chapter Three. Tending to the household shrine is an extension of their religious devotion at Church and unites the two domains. There is a tendency for these acts of religious devotion to
focus on the physical and spiritual well-being of the family. There is a sense in which the ‘men’ and children work and live by the rhythm of industrial capitalism in Sydney, while the mothers live and work in ‘spiritual’ time and space. They often listen to and watch the Maronite prayer channel on radio (Voice of Charity) or on Satellite (TV Lumiere) whilst they cook and do household chores. This interview with one woman explains how she sees Maronite spirituality:

There is a lot of female community – there is a lot of rituals that unite us together through our spirituality. Like on Good Friday we make Kiteb Rahib. The Hadchit have really taken it on. Hadchit saints are St. Raymond and St. Shamouni. There is strong devotion. St. Shamouni’s day we have a ritual – Harissi ceremony. Mum cooks it and sends it out to us. A lot of other families will do it. St. Raymond’s in September – 700 come together. That kind of stuff – religion and community is still tied together. The focus is draw people together and is centred around spirituality – I love that about my background and the two are integrated.

This interview highlights how women are united through their spirituality and emphasises how community and spirituality are integrated amongst the Hadchitis. Through the construction of the mother as the ‘spirit of the house’, the contradiction between the material and spiritual dimension is resolved, as we also saw in Chapter Three. The performance of religious obligation on behalf of the whole family, allows mothers to exert control over material domains beyond the home through their mastery of the spiritual domain. In this way the spiritual is regulating the material and mothers are purifying their loved ones’ spirits, which allows them to continue to work in industrial time and space – guilt free.

The role of women as the religious keepers and protectors of the family, is also highlighted by Bottomley (1992) in her study of the Greek family and is a general observation in the literature on women in Eastern Christianity (Dubisch 1995). However, I will argue that the role of the mother as the spiritual keeper and ‘ascetic’ of the home also provides a powerful ideology of spatial containment consistent with the rules of patrilineal descent. Female sexuality is regulated through spiritual practices, which ultimately sublimate their sexuality to a ‘higher purpose’, the perpetuation of the patrilineal family, while constructing female chastity and abstinence/regulation as the core of female virtue, based on the life of the Virgin Mary. Thus, through the gender ideology
of Machismo/Marianismo the pattern of male mobility/virility and female containment/abstinence is produced and reproduced from one generation to the next (Stevens 1973:62). Indeed, the Mater Dolorosa, the sorrowful mother, based on the life of the Virgin Mary and her sorrow for her son, provides a parable of suffering motherhood for all women to aspire to, in order to withstand hardship and endure their ‘lot’ in life. But, Mariology also provides a powerful lay instrument for the sanctification of all women as the reward for their endurance. But, apotheosis is only attainable in later life once their childbearing years are past:

For men, unmarried females are moral and intellectual imbeciles, in need of constant supervision. How is it possible that from such unpromising material each generation produces its own quota of saintly mothers who reign supreme over the extended family? For the women, the early years of marriage are seen as an apprenticeship, a “trial by fire”, in anticipation of a state of blessedness which can be attained only after middle life, when the childbearing period is past and after a woman has supposedly been divested of her specific sexuality. Menopause becomes a sign of divine grace (Stevens 1973:62).

Thus, saintliness and female sexual abstinence/regulation are inextricably linked to each other and release from these measures of control only come later in life. In the meantime, religion is a powerful tool, which allows women to withstand their trials and tribulations. Many women in the Hadchit community will say they “must learn to carry their cross”, which likens women’s lives to the Passion of Christ, enabling them to carry their burden in life and endure their suffering through the strength of Mary. Women also call upon the power of saints to regulate their fertility and to protect their children. Female saints, such as Adissi Shamouni, are specifically prayed to for conception. Interaction with saints typically occurs through dreams, where women typically see symbols; such as the fig sliced open to show its seeds, to indicate their fertility. Mernissi (1977) argues that women use their religious devotion to saints as a form of symbolic resistance to the predominant patriarchal spiritual, social and political order. She concludes that the regulation of fertility and sexuality is central to the devotion of women to saints:

Women in an unflinchingly patriarchal society seek through the saint’s mediation a bigger share of power, of control. One area in which they seek almost total control is reproduction and
sexuality, the central notions of any patriarchal system’s definition of women (Mernissi 1977:107).

This section has examined the construction of the domestic sphere as ‘spiritual space’ and has shown how the role of women as the ‘ascetics’ of the home underpins patrilineality and is intimately linked to the reproduction of group identity based on bayt, day’aa and ta’eefa (patrilineage, village and sect). However, this construction is now being de-stabilised by a clash of ideology with the prevailing capitalist social practices of the host-nation, which are built upon gender equality, individualism and choice. Consequently, daughters are now rejecting suffering motherhood, the Mater Dolorosa, and are making claims for greater personal choice and agency. This has transformed life-cycle rituals into a field of struggle, none more so than negotiations around the question of marriage.

**Life cycle rituals and the destabilisation of gender-roles**

Young people feel that there isn’t enough independence – in terms of decision making. The other issue is the roles of the sexes – it has changed so much in one generation. It is really confusing. Some of the men in our community want to be ‘mothered’ – if the wife has been educated she doesn’t want to ‘mother him’ and do all that work. There is still a bit of that in the younger generation. There still needs to be some growth emotionally. A lot of women are starting to develop a lot of anxiety – they don’t know what they want with all of the expectations of the community – what is their role? How much do they extend themselves to their family and how much do they do their own thing – it needs to be negotiated and some girls are having anxiety attacks.

This interview highlights the tension that has developed between the generations when it comes to the question of gender roles. I have termed this clash the reproduction/production nexus, which can be read as a clash between modes of production. Where the ideology of patrilineal descent requires the regulation of female sexuality to reproduce bayt, day’aa and ta’eefa (patrilineage, village and sect), capitalist social relations of production require the regulation of female sexuality for the reproduction of capital and wage-labour:

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30 See the Glossary for the definition of first and second generation migrants I am using in this study.
Capitalist production, therefore, under its aspect of a continuous connected process of reproduction, produces not only commodities, not only surplus-value, but it also produces and reproduces the capitalist relation; on the one side the capitalist, on the other the wage-labourer (Marx 1867).

Marxist feminism (Lorber 1997) theorises that women’s unpaid work reproducing the family, reproduces wage-labour and, in turn, reproduces capitalism. However, in late modernity capital now utilizes women’s paid work in the labour market and, hence, changing gender-roles are a feature of late capitalism. Consequently, migration has transformed the Hadchiti family into a field of struggle between the generations over gender roles and life cycle rituals have now become the subject of contestation, renegotiation and invention. A transformation in the process of life cycle rituals can lead to a change in the construction of the group as a whole and the most contested domain is the selection of marriage partners. The core of this struggle is the question of group identity and its relationship to the dominant mode of production. Which group identity is being reproduced through the process of life-cycle rituals amongst the Hadchitis in Australia: bayt, day’aa and ta’eefa or a cosmopolitan Australian identity unified by citizenship?

In his examination of Hadchit during the 1950’s, Kepler-Lewis (1968:210) conceptualised life cycle rituals as performing an integrating and centripetal role, which recreated the cohesion of the group as a whole:

Most of the events of the life cycle are centripetal and integrating. The nucleated quality of Hadchite provides a high intensity of daily face to face relationships for inhabitants. The events which occur to one are known to and sometimes participated in by nearly everyone. Children are usually born at home and spend their lives in close association with siblings, parents, relatives and surrounded by traditional beliefs and practices. The close network relationships and interdependence is supported by common experience in growing up. All of this serves to make the individual strongly aware of his privileges and responsibilities as a member of a household, a lineage and village. The sum of these influences probably counters the impulse to emigrate and if the individual does decide to leave the village, it probably strengthens the feeling in the village and on the part of the emigrant that the departure is a temporary measure.

Contrary to Kepler-Lewis’s prediction, however, migration became a significant factor in Hadchiti society and life-cycle rituals in Sydney, rather than performing the integrating role they once played, have now become a source of
renegotiation and transformation. One of the key cultural values, which underpins life cycle rituals is the concept *wejbet*, or duty in Arabic, which is associated with family ties and the obligation to attend the significant life cycle events of family members. It derives from a kinship based value system in which blood ties are given greater importance than friendship. In the context of Sydney, *wejbet* has been re-cast by the second generation into a form of compulsory obligation to kin, which is in opposition to the dominant culture’s emphasis on personal choice, agency and friendship over kinship, as this interview excerpt highlights:

From a personal point of view, I tend to give friendship a way more consistent importance in my life, whereas I deal with brotherhood as a kind of obligation "*wejbet*”. I have my own philosophy on the issue which says “Friendship is the result of a personal choice, where you choose whom to hang out with, whereas brotherhood is "parachuted" on you, and you are forced to accept it as is, you are forced to accept your brother you can’t change him. A friend is a person you choose to take, he is a "customised" brother.

As this quote highlights *wejbet* is seen as taking choice away, while important life decisions and relationships are “parachuted” upon you. Thus, reflections on *wejbet* in Australia tend to be discussed in terms of the modernity versus tradition divide and the second generation often subject it to criticism as they seek greater agency and control over the significant life decisions which affect their lives, the most important being marriage. The following interview demonstrates the process of reflection that *wejbet* has been subjected to and highlights the centrality of choice and friendship over family in criticisms of it:

**Some perspectives on *wejbet***:

*Wejbet* is duty. I don’t just follow *Wejbet*. Our relationships are all based on *wejbet*, but I don’t believe in it. I don’t go and visit someone if I don’t feel anything in common or if I don’t feel close to that person. It is very unusual, I am very proud that I came to that point.

**What made you do it?**

I will tell you what made me do it. Because, when people go and do *wejbet* – visiting or going and see them if they had a new born baby, sick at hospital, funeral – *wejbet* drives everything. I don’t let *wejbet* drive me– I do it because I want to, because I like them not *wejbet*. I say to my cousins my relationship to them is not because of *wejbet* I have come here because we are friends because I like you. Because otherwise they go and do *wejbet* and come back and have no time… then they drag their feet, because they are sick of it and that puts me
off wejbet. The family is what drives everything. Everyone has to be placed within the web of wejbet, if they can’t place you than they don’t want you. If you think different then you are dumped- then you don’t belong anywhere. I will tell you something about wejbet: when my son died I had so many people my house was full of people for 2 days, 3-4 days – then the funeral and the church was packed and the next day nobody was here, the house was empty. Then again that was wejbet. That is when I hated wejbet because I had lost my son, we had the funeral and then the house was empty. No one was here the next 2 days, no cousins came. This is negative side of wejbet they all go when everyone is there, so they are ‘seen’ to do their wejbet, but the next week when I really needed it, when I was alone suffocating in grief – no body was here I didn’t see anyone. It is appearances – they just want to be ‘seen’ doing their wejbet.

In this interview we hear how wejbet is driven by appearances and that relationships which are based on duty alone lack genuine depth of feeling, especially the obligations and ties between cousins. This criticism follows the trend amongst the second generation to elevate choice, personal agency and friendship over kinship ties and highlights the tension between what Sollors (1986:6) refers to as relations of ‘consent versus descent’.

If wejbet, or obligation, underpins life cycle rituals, the Maronite Church provides a regulating over-arching influence for each phase of the life cycle of the individual and, thus, the community as a whole. It is difficult to separate the reproduction of the Hadchiti village identity (day’aa) from the reproduction of their sectarian identity (ta’eefa) as Mwarne, which in turn reproduces the Maronite Church (Al Kanisse al Marouniyye) as a whole. Indeed, the people/congregation are seen as a ‘third order’ in the Maronite Church, as we saw in Chapters Two and Three (Hourani and Habchi 2004). However, like wejbet, the inter-twined relationship between the people and the Church is constantly threatened by disarticulation in Sydney, through the influence of feminism, Australian youth culture, secularism and, ultimately, by out-marriage. Thus, the central project for the Maronite Church is to provide a regulating function for Lebanese of Maronite background in Australia to counter the effect of cultural slippage. Hence, I argue there is a kind of symbiotic relationship between the people (the congregation) and the Maronite Church as an institution, whereby the Church produces the congregation through the role of religious rituals in the life cycle of the individual. In turn, the people reproduce the Church through adhering to its beliefs and rituals, but most importantly through
endogamous marriage within the Maronite community and the raising of Maronite children, through the rituals of Baptism, the institution of God Parenthood, First Communion and the Maronite wedding. We will now look at these life cycle rituals more closely and I will show how each phase of the life-cycle has become a field of struggle over gender-relations, which threatens to unravel the reproduction of bayt, day’aa and ta’eefa (patrilineage, village, sect).

Infancy

A birth is the start of the life-cycle and establishes a woman as a mother through the pain of childbirth. The birth is followed, usually within six months, by the Baptism, Amedi. The child is usually given two names, their birth name and a religious name, usually after a saint, which is given during the Baptism. The child’s Baptismal Gown, Tayeb Emaydi, often is a heirloom handed down in the family. The tradition of God-Parents, Errabeen, is common and they have a prominent role during the Baptism. This relationship usually forms alliances between families who often are already related, but God-Parents are sometimes friends of the parents too. In the Maronite rite the child is confirmed at the time of their Baptism. The Baptism is usually followed by a feast, hafli, sometimes at the saint Raymond of Hadchit Hall, or commonly back at the parents’ house. The party is often large as most family members will be invited; it is not unusual for there to be 70-100 guests. The priest is usually invited to attend also. Women will commonly work together for many days in advance to prepare the food for a Baptism. Alternately the feast is prepared by a catering company, which has become more common in recent years but adds to the cycle of increasing expense attached to life cycle rituals in the Hadchit community, especially through the boom of the last 10 years.

The Evil Eye complex (Gilmore 1982), the belief that the envious gaze has the capacity to harm, circulates to varying degrees amongst families from Hadchit in Sydney. Specifically it relates to the belief that the Evil Eye causes dryness in infants and nursing mothers, barrenness in livestock and a lack of potency in orchards and fields (Yronwode 2005:1). While this belief is in decline, it is still common practice amongst the Hadchitis that if you praise an infant you must also use the expression “Mashallah” or “Ism al Salib”, in the
name of the cross, to dispel the power of the Evil Eye. Another expression of the
belief in the Evil Eye is the practice of pinning blue beads (which are thought to
repel the Evil Eye) and saint’s Medals upon an infant’s shirt. Both are still
can today in Sydney’s Hadchit community. In the past in Hadchit, and in
much of rural Lebanon, male infants were thought to be more coveted and
susceptible to the effects of the Evil Eye and sometimes were dressed as girls and
even left unclean so as not to attract compliments. It could be argued that the
roots of the belief in the Evil Eye relate to a time pre-dating access to reliable
health care when infant mortality rates were high. Kepler-Lewis (1968:188-189)
noted during his time in Hadchit that typhoid was a common childhood ailment
that killed infants and access to doctors was limited. Consequently many
superstitions surrounded infant fevers. The spirit masrufi or karini was
commonly believed to choke children and the usual protection was to place a
religious amulet from the Mar Antonius Qozhayya Monastery around the child’s
neck (Kepler-Lewis 1968:189).

Childbirth and raising an infant can be an overwhelming experience for
new mothers in the Hadchit community in Australia and contributes to the
hardships of the migration experience. A lack of knowledge of the Australian
health care system can exacerbate matters. There was a case of an infant death
soon after one family migrated to Australia from Hadchit in the late 1960’s, due
to a high fever that was left untreated. The child was swaddled and left in a dark
room to ward off the fever, but unfortunately the child died and this caused much
trauma for the mother in subsequent years, as one of her daughter’s reflects:

I had some siblings that died here. The little girl died after they
had been here for two weeks, she contracted measles. They
were living in a large house with other families. Somehow my
sister got a really high fever. At that time in Lebanon they used
to wrap the child up and put them in a dark room, they had
different ways of dealing with fevers there and so that is what
mum did with her, but she passed out, but there wasn’t much
they could do for her. To think you could die of measles, she
was only two and mum was devastated. It was the start of
many sad things that happened to her here in Australia.

This narrative describes how hard raising an infant in a new country can be and
how the trauma of losing a child haunts women for the rest of their lives. But,
for the second generation they hope to have easier lives than their mothers.
Raising infants is a challenging task, nonetheless, and maternal depression continues to be an issue for many young mothers in the Hadchit community.

**Late childhood and adolescence**

Late childhood amongst the Sydney Hadchitis is marked by the ritual of First Communion, *Awal Urbani*, when the child is 8-9 years of age, which marks their transition to become a full and functioning member of the congregation and to puberty. It is usually followed by a family party and feast which, like the Baptism, can be quite large. As girls move towards adolescence they are subject to increasing supervision and surveillance, which will last until the time of their marriage. Williams (1958:31) observed the following pattern during the adolescent period in Hadchit in the 1950’s:

> ...Adolescence for boys means greater freedom while for girls the period marks…the onset of increased restrictions. Both boys and girls begin working seriously at about this time. Girls from about the age of twelve on are very constantly under the eye of older members of their family. They learn what is involved in being a Hadchite wife and, as they learn, do a great deal of closely supervised work. Their social behaviour, too, is closely watched, and they are taught to be careful of their reputations. Girls and boys learn that virginity and a spotless name in the community are nearly absolute requirements for female success. Brothers are taught that they are the guardians of the virtue of their sisters and, along with that, the honour of the family.

These values are still the underlying set of assumptions which drive the socialisation of young women in the Sydney Hadchit community today and, likewise, are a source of conflict and contestation within the family, as these ideals are extremely difficult to uphold in contemporary Australian society and are even an inversion of the prevailing post-feminist social contract. As we saw in Chapter Two the ideology of patrilineal descent requires the regulation of female sexuality to reproduce it. In Sydney the close supervision of daughters involves restricting the mobility of young women through the strategy of spatial containment. This is sometimes accomplished by passing the responsibility to brothers to supervise their sisters in the public domain, beyond the gaze of the father. The supervision of sisters extends to selecting their choice of clothes outside the house, as this brother notes regarding his sister:
She never shows her mid drift, she doesn’t wear short skirts with heels, she doesn’t wear singlet tops. If I tell my mother I disagree with what she’s wearing mum might defend her until dad gets home and then it is up to him. I am like my father in the sense of what is acceptable and what isn’t. My taste and my father’s taste is exactly the same my father was out there and I am out there and we know what is out there and we don’t want to be looked upon as bad people.

Brothers view it as their duty to defend their sister’s honour in public and to know their whereabouts at all times. Chaperoning is one strategy to maintain a sister’s virtue and cousins assist each other in supervising their sisters. Through the teenage years some households will not allow daughters to stay the night at friend’s houses or even to attend school camps, especially if they are attending a public school. As they move towards the late teenage years most girls in the Sydney Hadchit community are not permitted to go out to night clubs in the city. This brother explains why:

If I didn’t know where she was it would be a problem if something happened. If it is Parramatta I can get someone down there quickly, but in the city – it would be a problem I don’t know people there. My sister has the upstanding to say listen I’m not interested, until I walk over and say what are you doing to my sister – guys are more scared of guys. Every male has the responsibility to look after their sister.

The following interview excerpt describes the course of action young men will take to defend their sister’s honour in the public domain if problems arise:

One of my cousins – his two sisters are older than him. He was 15-16 and they were 18-20 and every time they went out he would ask “where are you going and who with”. I remember one time one of the sisters got in a situation and he came down with 10 of his mates and took care of the situation. As much as a female upholds herself, there are situations where males have to get involved. They sent an sos and help came.

Consequently, sometimes church, family and village association functions are the only permissible activities for daughters during this period. This strategy restricts their mobility and increases the chance that they will marry within the community.

**Early adulthood**

Finishing school is marked by the year 12 Formal. After this time the period of early adulthood starts and the expectation is that sons and daughters will remain at home until they marry. The view is that no upstanding woman
will date a male that doesn’t live with his parents, but also that no upstanding female could risk going back to a boyfriend’s unsupervised apartment. Likewise, no respectable female can live on her own in an apartment or a share house without being seen as a *sharmoota*, prostitute. Generally, a couple can date, but the daughter must always sleep at her parents’ house until she is married, even if the couple are engaged. Thus, the moral standard within the Hadchit community is an inversion of what they perceive to be the socially permissive norms of Sydney and places the community at odds with the prevailing youth culture in contemporary Australian society. This causes a tremendous amount of resentment amongst the young women as this interview with a 19 year old woman describes:

I wasn’t allowed to go shopping with my friends, I had bed times, I wasn’t allowed to wear short skirts. Everything that was trivial was hard for me I had to ask if it was alright with my parents. I wasn’t allowed to put gel in my hair for school. “It is a fashion show for what”? I wasn’t allowed to wear makeup, do my eye brows, no anklets, no toe rings. I don’t think just because your daughter wears an anklet she has broken the rules and boundaries – in my parents’ eyes it wasn’t acceptable for a Lebanese, Christian, Maronite girl to wear an anklet and toe rings with a tattoo. In our community, especially Hadchit – we are very talkative town – if a girl is seen talking to guys – they’re from the village at the same place they will talk about you. Look at her she is talking to so and so– he is doing drugs and the talk comes out. All of the sudden you are the little whore who is taking drugs. The gossip comes out of nothing.

In this interview the ‘village gaze’ acts as a disciplining structure for young women and reputation is still a strong determinant for marriage prospects.

While the maintenance of ‘chastity’ underpins the close supervision of women, there is also a financial logic for young adults to live at home until they marry. Working sons and daughters are encouraged to buy a property that they rent out whilst they live at home with their parents rent free. This allows them to save money and make a head start on the purchase of a property before they marry. This facilitates the second generation to become established in Australia, but also relates to Lebanese notions that wealth and home ownership are pre-requisites for marriage. Sydney’s real estate boom (and then crash) over the last decade enabled some young people to purchase several houses and rent them out whilst they still lived at home. This pattern was reinforced by their participation
in the construction and real estate industries\textsuperscript{31}. The concept that one could spoil a child with love, affection and financial support is not a common viewpoint in Lebanese families and this will often be raised as a point of difference with the perceived child rearing practices of Anglo Australia. This interview shows how this 28 year old female real estate agent understands living at home in her late twenties:

\begin{quote}
We stay at home until we get married; it is looked upon as breaking a tradition. Even if I would love to spread my wings and do that it wouldn’t be encouraged. I look at it as a 28 year old, but then when you are surrounded by great families, without them I wouldn’t be the person I am today. We’re not forced to just get married. I don’t have anyone in my life right now. My parents encourage us to study, travel, but they do want us to end up with the right person, not just anyone. There is no match making either, but as I said we are encouraged to study, to look at our goals and live our dream. We don’t pay any board, all the money we save goes to us. We look at financial things like an investment, male and female. I got my own investment property. I am very well established. You look at everyone else and you look at your identity, I look at moving out – I am so spoiled and lucky – I come home food is ready, grocery shopping – I spend my money on me – I do retail – make up, clothes and shoes. I don’t pay for electricity and rent or groceries.
\end{quote}

In this interview she explains how she wants to move out, but it is unacceptable for women to live away from home before they get married, because it is ‘breaking a tradition’. How are female demands for greater agency and choice changing the process of negotiating marriages in the Hadchit community in Sydney?

\textbf{Agency and contested marriage practices}

I will begin the analysis of marriage by looking back to Hadchit in the 1950’s as a point of comparison. According to Williams (1958:33), the average age of marriage for women was between 15-18 years, while for men it was 20 years of age, and he described married life as follows:

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{31}The recent downturn in the housing market has pinched many households in the Hadchit community. The combination of record high prices and low interest rates created an environment of easy credit access. When the prices of houses collapsed in Western Sydney the rent no longer equalled the mortgage repayments and when they were forced to sell some lost as much as $100,000 dollars on the purchasing price. Western Sydney has had the highest number of "fire sales" since the 1930’s. The land developers at the top end of the Hadchit community have also had great difficulty selling the apartment blocks they have built.
\end{quote}
Following marriage, a man and wife are faced with a life of heavy toil and inexorable demands. For the woman, only childbirth and illness afford a change from the exacting routine. There is the unending daily round of managing and providing for the household: the family and animals must be fed; clothes must be washed and mended; roofs must be maintained; one day a week is given over to bread making. Women range over the slopes too difficult for cultivation in search of greens, women help in the fields during planting and harvest times. For the men there are periods of idleness every year when farm work is minimal. The poorer two-thirds of Hadchite men hope for extra wage labor...The work on the land, though, is intensive and demanding. For the average Hadchite couple there are almost no alternatives to this life of heavy toil. Some seek to escape in drunkenness. All dream of emigration as a release from their plight and their life-long round of unremitting labor, but for only some does this become a reality (Williams 1958:34).

Through migration to Sydney the Hadchit families sought ‘a better life’ and have worked hard to educate their children in Australia. Consequently, education has delayed the age of marriage by approximately a decade, or even longer in many cases. The process of social change is not a linear process, however, but is characterised by contradiction and renegotiation, especially over the institution of marriage, the role of the sexes within it and the nature of the marriage contract. The central issue young women in the Hadchit community in Sydney critique is the role of marriage as a patriarchal institution, whereby the supervision of women is passed from the father to the husband, as this young woman explains:

If I go somewhere I know I am not allowed to go out to the front of the house. If we go to a party I am not allowed to go outside. In my family, my cousins – if you are a girl you get treated like a child. Your father yells at you, I am 19 – they yell at me. You get told what to do. They tell me when I can go out. It doesn’t matter how old you are they make you stay home. Everyone thinks when you are 18 it doesn’t matter what your family thinks anymore. It doesn’t make a difference, not in our family. With marriage the power swaps from your father to your husband.

The reaction to this process of renegotiation has been the intensification of the social mechanisms of supervision and control over daughters by fathers and brothers, a process I term “paranoid patriarchy” (Hyndman-Rizik 2008). The strict supervision of women can be understood as a strategy of marriage selection, in which parents seek to reproduce the patrilineage (bayt) the Hadchit village identity (day’aa) and the broader Maronite communal identity (ta’eefa) in
Sydney. The regulation of female sexuality, through spatial containment and in-group endogamy, can be read as strategies to maintain group cohesion and identity in Australia. Women become the boundary markers of group identity and ethnicity (Chavez 2007, Friedl 1967, Goldstein 2006). I will show, however, that it is an uphill battle and, despite attempts to restrict female mobility, out-marriage is an inevitable outcome of the demands for greater choice and agency amongst the second generation, male and female.

The under thirties have made it very clear that they are seeking to renegotiate a marriage contract in which they have greater agency and choice over the selection of partners and in their sex roles, as this observation from a 28 year old woman highlights:

**How do you see marriage and career?**

If I was to get married I probably would change my surname. I don’t know who I would end up meeting. I would like to work and to keep some independence and combining back accounts. I would like to keep my career and my independence. My mother had five kids, I think I will be lucky to have the one kid. I don’t think I would go to three. When you meet that right person things change. I do want to keep working so I can be independent not relying on someone else. Personally I would like to be around when I have the baby – I don’t want to go straight back to work. I would like to have the 12 months off. Personally I am not that keen on a childcare centre. Who do you trust? – just my mum.

This interview shows how daughters are demanding degrees of freedom that they don’t perceive their mothers to have had. The key issue second generation women are seeking to renegotiate is the question of control, they are completely rejecting the idea that the man is the head of the household and has the right to control the wife, or that their father has the right to control them, as this 19 year old woman states clearly:

I will have control because I won’t stand for it when I get married. I’ve seen how he [dad] controls my mum and my dad has an old mentality and he has a sexist way of thinking and I don’t like it. I will say to my fiancé and when I am picking the one I am going to be with that I won’t live like that. I choose my own – no arranged marriages here. I don’t want my husband to think just because I have a child – that I can’t work and I will then stay at home and clean the house and I can’t see friends. I don’t want him thinking I am going to do everything – I want him to share. I am not going to let him have that much control over me – it is good to have a balance.
From the perspectives of young men, many also want their partners to be educated and to work, so that they contribute money to the household and they can have a better standard of living in Sydney, as this 25 year old banker explains:

You need two incomes now to live comfortably in Sydney. I don’t have a problem with women working. Personally I am happy for my wife to work and I would stay at home and do house duties – I want us to share those things. I haven’t got a problem with house work I didn’t have sisters we were all boys so we had to do it and I live by myself now – so if I don’t do it, it doesn’t get done. I am house trained unlike my mates. We go on holidays and they’ll eat something and get up and leave the food at the table and wait for it to be picked up. Then I say to them – who is going to pick it up? Mum’s not here, there are no sisters here. I’ve never had that – even though my mother does washing and ironing, but she never cleaned our room – if we didn’t do it – it didn’t get done. I’d rather my wife works than stay at home and do housework – unless we can afford it and it is her choice. When we have kids it will be a different story – as it is with everyone. At first – when they are small – I don’t mind her going back to work if we can get a carer. Women working isn’t a problem for me – it is her choice.

In this interview we hear how women’s participation in the work force is now considered essential for economic success amongst young men in the community and, I would argue, emblematic of the prevailing capitalist social practices in Australia, whereby both men and women are now becoming wage-labourers.

When it comes to the question of marriage this 18 year old woman explains that her father would love her to marry a Maronite from the village, but that her happiness is more important. She sets out what she describes as the “new marriage” contract that she aspires to:

I don’t think it could be any better for my dad – If I married a Lebanese, Christian, Maronite from the village – but if I was unhappy – my dad wouldn’t be happy. They don’t want me with anyone who is not Lebanese, Christian, Maronite –but if I don’t marry Lebanese – I would go for Maltese, Italian in the wog area, because at least they still have culture. Sometimes it is hard combining a Lebanese and Maltese together. My cousins married out of the culture and they seem to be ok. But, my cousin married a Christian, Maronite –and it is like the new generation marriage. They go out with their friends, they have their own lives, they both work, they go out together and sometimes they don’t. She hangs out at my house. I classify them as the new marriage, cause my aunts who don’t know say ‘why is she out without her husband. She should be home – why is she out with boys for coffee’ – they talk about her. She goes without her husband and the older generation ask
“where is your husband” – “I’ve never met a person who is married going out without their husband”. It is good to be together, but you also need your own life.

The central features of what she describes as the ‘new generation marriage’ are choice, equality between the sexes, female employment, agency, independence and mobility. Most importantly, she describes how a married woman should be able to go out ‘without her husband’.

Sollors (1986:112) theorises that modernity is underpinned by a renegotiation of gender-roles in marriage towards love marriage. He argues that ‘consent over descent’ forms the basis for American citizenship and identity and is central to the process of ‘becoming American’. Descent he describes as “those relations defined by relations of substance, by blood or nature”, while consent relations describe those of law or marriage (Sollors 1986:6). Descent language, he argues, emphasises heirs, hereditary qualities and entitlements, whilst consent language stresses free agency to become the “architects of our fate” and choose our own spouses, destiny and political system (Sollors 1986:6). Most importantly, he theorises that consent relations underpin the construction of consensus in a country whose citizens derive from immigrants of heterogeneous descent (Sollors 1986:6).

I propose that a similar transition from descent to consent occurs for immigrants in Australia as part of their incorporation into capitalist social practices and the Australian identity as citizens, because the ‘nation’ ultimately contains the plurality of its subjects. The search for agency and choice are central to the second generation’s rejection of *wejbet* or duty, their parent’s role in their choice of partners and their attempts to negotiate a marriage contract that is defined by choice, love, non-relatedness and equality between genders. However, the ‘new generation marriage’ also underpins the transformation of both genders into ‘wage labourers’ under capitalist social relations of production, a process which emphasises individualism and the dis-embedding of communal kinship ties. What about the role of consent in cousin marriages in the Sydney Hadchit community?
**Cousin marriage and consent**

Kepler-Lewis (1968:148) estimated that 25% of marriages in Hadchit were within the patrilineage. While the Maronite Church explicitly bans 1st cousin marriage, he surmised that marriage within the patrilineage was due to the small number of marriageable women at any time within a small village. He estimated 99% of marriages in Hadchit were within the village, as we saw in Chapter Two, and this ultimately regulated the system of land tenure. Today, studies of consanguineous marriage in Lebanese society, such as a survey of marriage in Beirut, found cousin marriage to be 25% of all marriages (Khlat 1988:190). However, first cousin marriage was found to be higher amongst Muslims than Christians, while patrilateral parallel-cousin (bint am) marriage is the most common form of first cousin marriage for both groups.

According to the Hadchit Household Survey, 35% of all marriages within the Hadchit community in Sydney are between cousins (see Figure 39). It also showed that 25.5% (see Appendix 7) of marriages amongst the ‘children of householders’ were between cousins (see Appendix 4 to see how the household was defined). This shows both a pattern of social reproduction and transformation between the generations. Despite, the renegotiation of marriage, cousin marriage continues to be preferred in 25% of all marriages amongst those born or raised in Australia. Additionally, the Hadchit Household Survey found that 36.6% of marriages amongst the ‘children of householders’ were with someone of Lebanese background, while 38.4% were with non-Lebanese. In the latter case, it can be deduced that, despite tight social controls, almost 40% of the second generation expressed their preference for love marriage amongst non-relatives and, thus, married outside the community altogether. This highlights the absorbing tendency of the host-nation, which challenges the tight mechanisms of social control within the family. Out marriage is also a source of intergenerational disputes in Hadchiti immigrant households.
This interview describes the process, which led this second generation woman, who is approximately 45 years of age, to agree to an arranged marriage with her cousin:

I came to Australia when I was eight years old. I did year 12 and went to uni for a couple of months, I studied accounting. I took over the paperwork for my husband’s business. I was 17,18 when I got married. I married my cousin, it was more of an arranged marriage. My father came up to me when I was 16 and a half and said he wanted to bring his nephew out, I said if I liked him I would marry him. We had our ups and down, but he was raised in Lebanon, so he was different to me, but we have five beautiful sons. At first it was a struggle to speak Arabic with him, we tended to speak English at home.

The question of choice is central to debates around consent and cousin marriage. Most interviewees who married their cousin expressed that it was their choice, but it also made their family happy. Many described refusing to marry their cousin at first, either during a visit to the home village or when their cousin came to Australia, but eventually ‘falling in love’ with them and agreeing to the marriage.

The other common narrative is the rejection of proposals for cousin marriage. Many second generation interviewees, male and female, are opposed to the institution and insist on their right to choose their spouse. This interview describes why this second generation female rejected cousin marriage:

What do you think about cousin marriage?
That is a big issue for me – I have had three proposals from my first cousin. I would differentiate between cousins I lived with and those I didn’t. Growing up I realised that we did things differently to non-Lebanese families – I realised that there were good things and some not so good things – there was the respect for family, but the cousin marriage is something I just can’t accept for myself. I’d rather no relatives – from Hadchit everyone is going to be 3rd and 4th, I could maybe tolerate 3rd and 4th maybe but definitely 1st and second no way. The other thing that struck me – I worked in child disability service and there were a lot of Lebanese and there was a genetic component to it. There was a link with 1st and second cousin marriage. I would rather be single than to go down that path.

The central issue for this interview subject is the relationship between cousin marriage and poor genetic outcomes, as she sees it. I have not investigated the accuracy of these claims as it is not the focus of my research. The focus of my analysis is how important the discourse of choice and agency and consent over descent, in marriage relationships, has become for the second generation.

**Case study: Ors-A Lebanese Maronite Wedding in Sydney**

We will now look at a case study of one marriage in the Hadchit community between a second generation daughter and a non-Hadchiti Lebanese man, which illustrates the process of negotiation between the generations and the genders that has become a common feature of the wedding cycle. From my observation the Lebanese Maronite wedding, *Ors*, as it is celebrated amongst the Hadchitis in Sydney, typically has 10 phases and can be characterised as a series of transformative rituals rather than as a singular event. In the context of the community becoming successful and established in Australia, the entire wedding cycle has become inflated and transformed into a prominent display of wealth and each phase of it has become more opulent over the last 10 years.

The first phase of the cycle starts with dating, *Msahabi*. Typically couples who are dating are expected to announce an engagement within a year. Like others in the second generation, Leila turned away from cousin marriage in favour of ‘love’ marriage. Leila also deferred her age of marriage to 30 years of age, but remained living at home and worked until this time. Once she met her partner she was permitted to see him on dates, but she had to be home by 11pm. She dated him for several months, but it was important that the family met him
sooner than later, so that it would be quickly established whether he would be an acceptable suitor:

My husband and I were older than the average – we were 28 years old. I had started working when I met him. I told my father a few weeks after I met him. He wasn’t too happy at first, as he knew I had worked so hard to get my university degree and he thought I would have to give it up. My dad wanted to meet his parents early. I told dad I wanted to meet his parents first. He wanted a cross between me choosing and him having a say. He thought it was lowering myself meeting his parents first without him. It was hard, I knew I wasn’t doing anything wrong.

The second phase is the first family meeting, Ta’aruf al Ahel, the potential groom was invited to Leila’s family home, where he met her father, mother, siblings and all of Leila’s paternal uncles (a meeting with the patrilineage). He had to establish that he was serious about Leila. His education, employment history and Catholicism were all important considerations in establishing his acceptability to the family. Once it was recognised that he was acceptable and prepared to make a solid commitment, the relationship became more serious:

My father met my parents-in-law after 8-9 months. We had to establish a serious commitment first. They didn’t want things to go on too long without me getting engaged, they wanted a demonstration of commitment. They had the perception that guys are after one thing and you have to protect yourself, by getting engaged sooner than later you are establishing that he is serious about you and is prepared to make a serious commitment.

The third phase, the engagement, El Khotbi, was announced after approximately 18 months. The engagement was negotiated through a formal meeting between the families and Leila’s paternal uncles were present. The groom’s father asked the bride’s father formally for her hand in marriage. It is still a formal process and the approval of the family is important and it is the view that the whole families are marrying not just the individuals. Once the engagement is accepted the fiancé becomes a nominal family member, but the Wedding is expected within 6-8 months. Bride Price, Naqd, was not formally exchanged as part of the wedding. In Australia Bride Price is usually a token piece of jewellery or has been transformed into assistance with the purchase of the couple’s first house. The following describes the process of announcing the engagement:
After 8-9 months he came to meet my parents and we got engaged after 18 months. His parents came to our house and asked for my hand in marriage and asked on behalf of their son. His brothers and sisters came as well. My uncles were there too and my brothers and sisters. My father in law said to my father – “I would like to ask for your daughter’s hand in marriage” and my father listened and my dad said yes. It felt like my parents had the final say and that night the parents did all the talking. We then had an engagement luncheon at his parents when he gave me a ring. There was no bride’s wealth. That night we had a meal together. It is always a bit hard, because you think you have satisfied them – because we are negotiating. We were engaged for 8 months.

This interview highlights how important the process of negotiation between tradition and change has become for the second generation, but that she felt her parents, in particular her father, had the final say about the selection of her marriage partner.

Phase four, the kitchen tea, is an example of a hybrid ritual that combines aspects of Lebanese tradition with new trends in Australian society, in particular the commercialisation of weddings. The kitchen tea for Leila’s wedding was held about six weeks before the wedding. It involved about 90 women from the extended family of the bride and the groom as well as female friends. It was held at the St. Raymond’s Hall in Granville. It went for several hours and included speeches, party games and a buffet, which was mostly Lebanese cuisine (see Figure 40). The aim of the kitchen tea was to provide a set of gifts that were specifically for the kitchen and, hence, for the establishment of the home. Where in the past the women used to cook for a week to cater for an event like a kitchen tea, these days it is common for it to be done professionally by a Lebanese catering company. The effect has been to drive up the standards for these events. Leila chose to have a kitchen tea in lieu of a layleyee, but many weddings celebrate both.
Phase five, the pre-wedding party, *layleyee*, occurs the night before the wedding. It is usually held at the bride’s house and includes the immediate family of the bride and groom; hence it is supposed to be smaller than the wedding. Nonetheless, many families include 100 close relatives if you include uncles, aunts and 1st cousins. The *layleyee* will typically go well past midnight. Where the *layleyee* was once viewed as a more intimate and festive occasion than the main wedding, some now view it as another onerous burden on families as the *layleyee* has grown into a large event in its own right.

Phase six, the wedding, *ors*, typically has between 300-600 guests and is a very ornate and costly affair. Leila’s wedding had two parts. It started with a Maronite Catholic wedding mass held at St. Charbel’s in Punchbowl, mostly in English, but with key parts of the liturgy in Aramaic and in Arabic. The bride was escorted to the Alter by her father, where she was symbolically given to the groom. The mass went for 1½ hours. The groom, bride, best man and the bride’s maids were crowned, *Tej*, during the ceremony. The bride and groom sat to the side and the mass was completed with a celebration of the Eucharist. Everyone congratulated the newly weds outside the church afterwards. Leila describes her wedding:
Figure 41: The Wedding reception at the Grand Westella. Source: Nelia Hyndman-Rizik, 2007.

Figure 42: The presentation of *Mezza* at the Grand Westella. Source: Nelia Hyndman-Rizik, 2007.
We had a traditional wedding. We had a Maronite Ceremony at St. Charbel’s. We had a full wedding mass. We had more than 600 people at the reception at the Westella. I had to accept the fact that I was going to have a big wedding, because my dad knows a lot of people. My parents decided who would be there. We had Dabki and belly dancing, speeches. I wore a white wedding dress. I was 30 when I got married. I know a lot of girls now that are getting married at that age.

Phase seven, the Reception party, *haflı*, was held at the Grand Westella. The upstairs reception room was hired for the occasion and was decorated sumptuously with flowers, draped curtains and there were approximately 600 guests (see Figure 41). Every table had a bottle of 12 year old Chrivas Regal whiskey, various wines and soft drink plus an extensive assortment of Lebanese *mezza* (see Figure 42). The bridal party sat at a long table up on a stage, separate from the rest of the guests. The entrance of each member of the bridal party into the reception centre was announced by the MC and marked with a drum roll. The Groom’s grandparents entered first, than his parents, the Bride’s parents, the Bride’s Maids and the Best Man and then, lastly, the Newly Weds. The spiral *Dabki* dance was the central pillar of the evening and it went for many hours. Two basic dance steps were performed and there were several different singers and a live Arabic music band. The *Tabel* drum was pounded in the middle of the circle, which added to the uplifting and cathartic character of the dance and the bride and groom stood in the centre of the spiral.

Following the reception couples usually go on a honeymoon, *Shaher al ‘Asel*. After returning from the honeymoon the couple makes their first public appearance at Sunday mass followed by a family party, *Radit el Ejir*. Following mass the Bride and Groom’s family return to the Bride’s parent’s house for lunch. The highlight of the day is when the bride places sweet dough above her mother’s door into which is pressed lollies, sweet almonds and coins in the shape of a cross. Sometimes families also celebrate a 40 day mass, *Jinnez al-Areb’een*, following the wedding and have a small get together and the parents and immediate relatives of the bride and groom have a meal and look at the wedding albums and honeymoon photos. The marriage cycle is completed with the birth of the couple’s first child, which brings us back to the beginning the life-cycle.
The wedding cycle has become increasingly expensive during Australia’s boom over the last decade, reflecting the increasing levels of wealth within the Hadchit community in Sydney. It is now common for families to spend $50,000-$80,000 dollars on a wedding, which are typically $80.00/head at the Grand Westella, but can be as high as $220/head at other reception centres, but it is argued most families break even as the ‘gifts’ will typically be cash and $200.00/head is the norm. Costly weddings, as a display of wealth, raise the bar for the community as a whole and households who can’t afford it feel compelled to project the ‘appearance’, mazaher, of success. This is part of the performance of status between the families in order to prove their najeh or success in migration, as we saw in chapter three. The wedding gift is another form of symbolic competition between the families, as it reveals their relative wealth and status. The conspicuous consumption displayed through all the stages of the wedding cycle might be read as a symbolic display of the process of capital accumulation amongst the Hadchitis in Australia. Like all booms one wonders whether there will be a ‘bust’.

**Conclusion: The transformation of bayt, day’aa and ta’eefa**

Humphrey argues that Australian society represents a threat in every respect to the reproduction of the Sunni Muslim Lebanese family (Humphrey 1998:85). I contend that this is the case for both Lebanese Muslims and Christians. This crisis of (re)production can be explained by what Hylland-Eriksen (1995:119-120) has referred to as the disarticulation between kin-based social relations of production, which underpin the feudal/tributary mode of production, and the process of bureaucratisation that has occurred in modern capitalist societies. Weber (in Hylland-Eriksen: 119-120) systemically theorised the differences between the two with respect to the industrialisation of Europe. In general bureaucratic organisation replaced kinship bonds with a set of anonymous principles based on equal treatment and individual choice. Thus, the transition to individualism has been central to the production of wage-labourer under capitalist social relations of production. The shift to personal choice and agency is also the basis for Sollors’ (1986) theorisation that modernity is characterised by the transition from relations of ‘descent to consent’. However, the incorporation of women into the labour force has now led to greater female
mobility and agency in late capitalism. Indeed, Marx (1867) theorised that capitalism would eventually lead to the break down of the patriarchal family as women’s labour replaced men’s (the feminisation of labour).

Consequently, the ideology of consent over descent and the demands for choice in marriage have led to the destabilisation of gender roles and a crisis of (re)production in the Sydney Hadchit community, as we have seen throughout this chapter. Female choice and agency threatens the reproduction of the patrilineage and out-marriage outside the ‘village’ destabilises the reproduction of the Hadchit village identification. However, the Maronite church in Australia is also struggling with the transformation of their congregation through the process of out-marriage. Kepler-Lewis (1968) argued that religion played an integrating role for the Hadchitis by providing a broader in-group within Lebanon’s multi-confessional ethno-religious patchwork.

Religion is an integrating factor…which acts as a very strong social cement. The people of Hadchit are deeply attached to the Maronite church. This colours their relationships with other religious communities of the country and makes them a part of a broadly based in-group in reference to other confessions in Lebanon (Kepler-Lewis 1968:211).

For Maronites living in Australia there is a similar dynamic as the church defines the boundary of the in-group of Maronites against a backdrop of differing ethno/religious confessions (Australian multiculturalism), but in the context of state secularism. The Maronites in Australia, as an exiled ‘Maronite Nation’ have developed, therefore, an interesting inversion to the modern secular state. Where in Lebanon confessional democracy failed to enshrine their ability to rule themselves, in the deterritorialised nation the Maronite Church assumes renewed power as an integrating and regulating institution in opposition to the host nation and in resistance to the ‘decline’ of the Maronites in the homeland. Unlike the modern state, however, the deterritorialised ‘Maronite Nation’ has no division between church and state and, yet, it is a kind of imagined community (Anderson 1983) that exists only to the extent that Australia’s laws and institutions and can be suppressed. Thus, there is a contradiction between the deterritorialised ‘Maronite Nation’ and the host society when it comes to the question of sovereignty.
One of the representations that the Maronites have about themselves is that, unlike Sunni Muslim Lebanese, they are Christians and, therefore, share the same core values as the Christian, Western civilisational polity. However, in practice, the dominant culture of the Australian host-nation, with its emphasis on female mobility and consent, is perceived to be a profound threat to the reproduction of the central feature of Maronite society, the patrilineage. The response by the Maronite Church to this crisis of (re)production has been to re-define Maronitism into a spiritual identity and to detach it from the Lebanese ethnicity:

The Maronites migration from Lebanon has brought Maronite spirituality to the world. The true Maronite strives diligently for spiritual and cultural authenticity...However, there is one other important aspect to acknowledge...what defines a Maronite is not primarily being Lebanese; rather, being Maronite is a spiritual reality that roots well beyond Lebanese culture. In other words one does not have to be of Lebanese descent to be a Maronite (Sakr and Joseph 2005:31).

Humphrey (1998) discusses a similar set of conflicts in Australia for Sunni Muslim Lebanese and links the system of patrilineal descent and the honour code to the system of Sharia Law in Islam (Humphrey 1998:91-93): “In Islam patrilineality became sanctified and codified in religious law” (Humphrey 1998:91). Thus, the secular law of the Australian host-nation is seen to undermine the cultural integrity (read patrilineality) of both Christian and Muslim Lebanese immigrants in Australia. We have seen throughout this chapter the struggles within domestic space over marriage practices. I have shown how daughters are rebelling and seeking to over-turn the authority of fathers, brothers and husbands through claims for greater agency and choice over all the key phases of the life cycle, the most important being their marriage. As a counter-play to this mutiny amongst the women, the Lebanese immigrant community, both Muslim and Christian, looks beyond the host-nation for law and sovereignty – to God’s divine law – as it is articulated through the Sunni Muslim or Maronite tradition (where God’s laws are at their core patriarchal and patrilineal) to uphold the social order against the threat of fitna, the social chaos derived from unregulated female sexuality in the context of Australia. This is an example of how diasporas are drawing upon regulating institutions, such as religion, which operate across the borders of the modern nation-state.
5. Gender Inversions between Lebanon and Australia

In an attempt to understand the destabilisation of gender roles in Australia, the Hadchit men have come to imagine the Australian state as a matriarchal state, which is *balad niswen-hukum niswen*, a land of women, ruled by women, as symbolised by the Queen of England as the Head of State. Australia is represented as an ‘upside down land’, a land of opposites to Lebanon, where male dominance is depicted as the ‘natural social order’. While the previous chapter analysed the construction of Lebanese Marianismo, or suffering motherhood and its destabilisation, this chapter examines the role of the ‘patrilineal virilocal complex’ in the construction of Lebanese Machismo and shows how the cycle of patrilineality and war reinforce male supremacy in a vicious cycle. The chapter shifts between Australia and Lebanon and examines how gender narratives and roles get turned upside down in the course of war and migration. Even more worrying, through the analysis of four binary opposition and inversion discourses between Lebanon and Australia, it will be shown how female demands for greater equality might actually displace the man from the position of ‘head of the household’.

**Matriarchy versus patriarchy**

All married people in Hadchit want children, and they want boys in particular. To have sons makes a woman a real woman. Prestige, respect, power, and success are linked with being the parents of sons. A marriage is not fulfilled until at least one male heir has been forthcoming. The onus is on the mother: it is she who is blamed for a barren union or one in which there are only daughters (Williams 1958:24).

This quote captures the core set of values which underpin the Lebanese system of patrilineal descent. The link between the system of patrilineal descent and the second class status of women has long been a debate in anthropology. Indeed, Ortner (1974) suggests that women’s subjugation and second class status is a human universal. Cranny-Francis et al (2003:2) assert that the binary opposition between male and female is almost universally structured with the male being the positive and dominant side of the equation, while the female is positioned in the weaker and inferior position.
Is this always the case? Feminist anthropologists and gender theorists have asked whether systems of matrilineal descent, by contrast, offer women a higher social status (Mernissi 1977; Sanday 1973, 1981; Webster 1975). Starting with Engels and Bachoffen (1861) in the nineteenth century, social theorists proposed that matriarchy pre-dated patriarchy in human social organization and linked it to matrilineal descent, matrilocality and goddess worship (Seymour-Smith 1986, Webster 1975). The consensus in anthropology is, however, that matrilineal societies are associated with, but don’t automatically equate to a higher social status for women. They are likely to have a higher social status if they play a strong role in the agricultural cycle or in commerce, as was the case with Iroquois women in North America (Harris 1975:343; Keesing and Strathern 1998: 194-195; Kottak 1994: 244-246), but matrilineal systems do not immediately equate to matriarchal power as men still retain key positions of power and regulation within the kinship corporation (Harris 1975:195). This has been referred to as the ‘matrilineal puzzle’, whereby the system of matrilineal descent actually reproduces the male line through the sister. The essence of the “matrilineal puzzle”, therefore, is that the “woman’s ties to her husband are potentially at odds to her ties to her brother” (Keesing and Strathern 1998:195). Patrilineal systems of descent and residence patterns (virilocality), on the other hand, dominate human social organization, with Harris estimating they account for 71% of human societies globally (Harris 1975:343). While the patrilineage depends upon women to reproduce it, as we have seen in Chapters, Two, Three and Four, do women really belong to the patrilineage? I suggest that the inherent ambiguity of women’s group membership in patrilineal descent systems could be termed the “patrilineal puzzle”. Oppenheimer (1980), in his analysis of the ‘patrilineal ideology’ amongst the Druze, similarly noted that women embody society’s contradiction through the ambiguity of their status:

Women, always dependent upon their attachments to particular groups through men, are thus never fully incorporated but never really free. They are often blamed, by men, for causing intrigue and dividing allies through gossip, but they also link men through affinal alliances and provide their husbands with sons (Oppenheimer 1980:628).
Furthermore, Keesing and Strathern (1998:246) and Kottak (1994:246) argue that gender stratification is increased in patrilineal-virilocal societies and male supremacy is enshrined by the “patrilineal, virilocal complex”, or what Harris has referred to as the “male centred warfare complex” (Harris 1975:267-343), wherein the system of patrilineal descent, virilocality, war and male supremacy are reinforced in a vicious cycle:

…the decline of matriliny and the spread of the patrilineal-virilocal complex is [linked to] pressures on resources…faced with scarce resources, patrilineal-virilocal cultivators such as the Yanomami often wage warfare against other villages. This favours virilocality and patriliney…such societies tend to have sharp domestic-public dichotomy, and men tend to dominate the prestige hierarchy. Men may use their public roles in warfare and trade and their greater prestige to symbolize and reinforce the devaluation or oppression of women (Keesing and Strathern 1998:246).

In the case of Lebanon it can be argued that the system of patrilineal descent goes hand in hand with a system of patriarchal control in society, but not without some contradictions, particularly in the Maronite villages. Harris (1975:348) has argued, for example, that there can be a contradiction between the residence pattern and the system of reckoning descent. Gulick (1953) noted a contradiction in Lebanese kinship and highlighted the tendency to maintain close relations with one’s matrilateral kin and even to marry matrilateral cross and parallel cousins despite the pre-dominance of the patrilineal system of reckoning descent and kinship ties, particularly among the Lebanese Christians. He surmised that:

This indicates an apparent conflict with the two firmly established patterns in Arab culture; the dominance of patriliney and the preferential marriage of the closest possible relatives outside of the nuclear family…the problem involves the Christian Arabs, and…reflects a sort of compromise growing out of the cultural conflicts which arose when the pagan Arabs were Christianized (Gulick 1953:369).

Tannous (1942:232), emphasises the tendency for relationships to be maintained with one’s mother’s kin, despite the prevalence of patriliney and patrilocality in Lebanese kinship systems. Mernissi theorises this contradiction, or “anomie”, within the Arab kinship system derives from the pre-Islamic period known as the “Jahaliya” (Mernissi 1987: 62-65). She argues that Islam actually institutionalised the transition from marriage patterns based on matrilineal
descent and uxorilocality (residence with the mother’s kin) during the Jahaliya to the system of patrilineal descent, which would guarantee and enshrine male paternity:

The new social structure of Islam, which constituted a revolution in the mores of pre-Islamic Arabia, was based on male dominance. Polygamy, repudiation, the prohibition of zina, and the guarantees of paternity were all designed to foster the transition from a family based on some degree of female self-determination to a family based on male control (Mernissi 1987:64).

Mernissi suggests, therefore, that paternity is ultimately a social construction that depends upon the regulation of female sexuality through the segregation of the sexes and the spatial containment of women within the domestic sphere (Mernissi 1987:46-64). I take this argument a step further: paternity is socially constructed through the system of patrilineal descent, which converts female reproductive power into male power through their ability to regulate it (Humphrey 1998:101-102). This is the fundamental project of Arab patriarchy, Muslim and Christian, (and, indeed, all patriarchies). Joseph (1999:117) theorises that Arab patriarchy is reproduced through the brother-sister relationship, which is an extension of the father-daughter relationship, whereby the honour of the patrilineage depends upon the modesty of ‘daughters’, a pattern we have seen through the chapters of this thesis. Through the connectivity in the brother-sister relationship women learn that to be loved by a man is to be controlled by a man and the brother, conversely, learns that it is his role to control and regulate the sexuality of the women he loves (Joseph 1999:139-140).

The ‘mother-in-law’, mart ‘am (translation: wife of paternal uncle, assumes patrilateral parallel cousin marriage as the norm, whether or not it is in practice) also plays an important role in the reproduction of patrilineality and patriarchy. The power of mart ‘am, first and foremost, only accrues to the mother of sons, not daughters, which links us back to the opening quote for this section, which highlighted the centrality of sons for the prestige of women. This is because mart ‘am rules vicariously over the women within domestic space on behalf of her son and the patrilineage. Mothers-in-law are the deputy sheriffs for the interests of the patrilineage. Daughters-in-law speak often of being ‘broken in’ by their mother in laws and of living under the inescapable gaze of mart ‘am, as
we saw in Chapter Four. Thus, the power of *mart ‘am* ultimately derives from successfully ruling over her daughter in law and is based upon seniority, as every *mart ‘am* was once a daughter-in-law herself. Mernisi (1987), likewise, theorises the mother-in-law’s power is pervasive in domestic space and is a more significant source of oppression for the daughter-in-law than her relationship with her husband. Through the rule of *mart ‘am* within domestic space, patriarchy is actually being reproduced by matriarchy.

I would add that one consequence of virilocality in transnational marriages is that the power of *mart ‘am* becomes concentrated as the bride sometimes lacks access to her matrilateral kin. It can be seen, therefore, that female power exists in the Lebanese kinship system as a contradiction to the predominant system of patrilineal and patriarchal power relations which contain it. It can also be both enhanced and de-stabilised by war and migration, as we have seen in Chapters Three and Four, which has led to the perception that Australia is a direct inversion of the order of gendered power in Lebanon. We will now examine this representation of Australia more closely.

**Australia: the upside down land**

I came to Australia in 1972. At that time in Lebanon from 1967 was the peak period; Lebanon was top of the world. People had a house in the village and a house in the city. At that time Lebanon was called the Paris of the Middle East. Everything that was in Europe was in Lebanon. When I came to Australia, really I was shocked, because I was expecting it to be something like Lebanon or better and it was worse. Australia was not a fashionable country it was a hard working country. I arrived at Sydney airport from Lebanon wearing a beautiful suit, with perfume/cologne...thinking that I was arriving somewhere like Europe and I was disappointed.

The above first arrival narrative by a Hadchiti male immigrant provides the over-riding impression of Australia as a backward and unsophisticated country. It is also an inversion discourse, which describes the subject being converted into a social inferior in the context of Australia. Not only is he dressed better than the Australians, but in his view they did not appreciate his superior dress sense and quite possibly he was perceived to be effeminate for being ‘over dressed’ and wearing perfume or cologne. It is just the first step in what becomes a whole series of experiences, where Australia is seen as an upside down land, a land of
opposites. There are parallels to this in European perceptions of Australia as the antipodes, a sunburnt, “bright and savage land” and disappointment was a common first impression (Martin 1993:vii). For many Hadchiti men Australia was a land of opportunity that Lebanon didn’t offer them, but Australia demeaned them, while in their eyes it was utterly inferior to them and to Lebanon in many respects. This has led to the construction of four key inversion discourses between Lebanon and Australia which places the two in binary opposition to each other (see Table 3).

Table 3: Binary opposition and inversion between Lebanon and Australia.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Australia</th>
<th>Lebanon</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Only work: land of industrial capitalism/secular</td>
<td>Lebanon is life: spirit of resistance/confessionalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Balad niswen: land of women, Queen/matriarchal state/rule of law</td>
<td>Balad rijel: land of men, patriarchal/failed state and lawless</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Hukum niswen: women rule inside and outside of domestic space/hen pecked husbands=fitna social chaos</td>
<td>Hukum rijel: men control women and the social order inside and outside of domestic space</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Land of peace/state monopolises the means to violence/male impotence</td>
<td>Land of war/rule of the gun and hyper-masculinity/male virility</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The first of these inversion discourses constructs ‘Australia as only work and Lebanon as life’. This discourse represents Australia as being life sapping. What is it about Australia that makes life so dull and tasteless? Arriving from Lebanon as an immigrant sub-class into a rule based society, such as Australia, could be read as a pacifying experience. There are rules and fines for everything: speed limits, traffic lights, traffic infringements, littering, J-walking and even the rubbish bins have to be placed in a straight line at the same time every week. People form queues. The legal system runs every aspect of society and orders everyone’s life. Everything works like clock work, including the trains. The rhythm of life in Australia is the rhythm of industrial capitalism, not the seasons, as was the case in the village. For there to be order there must be submission, the population must comply and migrants, in particular, must learn to live within the law. Some have described this process as a “suffocating experience”, like being stripped of your free-will (read masculinity). Bottomley (1992:85-86) has made a similar observation about Greek immigrants, who make frequent comparisons between the countries where they emigrate to work and Greece where they can “live” and find the capacity for enjoyment. A central aspect of being able to “live” is what she has described as the “spirit of resistance”, which is
encapsulated in the circle dance, the dance of life. I, likewise, have made a similar observation about the performance of the Lebanese Dabki dance during return visits to Hadchit (Hyndman-Rizik 2008), as we will see in the next chapter.

Australia, on the other hand, must tame the unruly immigrant and colonise them, but in the process it robs them of their vitality, which for men can also translate as their potency. Migration is so emasculating, according to Hage (2006b), that some Lebanese men have even experienced it bodily as sexual impotency. Likewise, Mahler has written that the experience of emasculation amongst male immigrants is a common account in the broader literature on migration (Mahler 2006). What brings about this loss of status? Much has been written internationally about the subjugation and marginalisation of immigrants as an underclass in the developed world, their experience of racial and religious difference and the way in which post-Fordist capitalism has left them behind as the chronically unemployed (Chavez 2007; Harvey 1989; Kivisto 2003; Ong 1999; Schiller and Bashch 1995). In the Australian context the experience of chronic disadvantage amongst Vietnamese and Lebanese immigrants has been the focus of most of this literature (Bottomley 1992; Collins et al. 2000; Hage 1998; McKenzie 1999; Noble and Tabar 2002; Poynting 2004). However, there is a particular way in which the experience of racism and economic marginalization combines with changing gender roles in migration to displace the male immigrant’s sense of manliness, which is central to understanding how migration and emasculation articulate with each other (Abulrahim 1993; Hirsch 2003; Mahler 2006). Migration can both accentuate and unravel traditional gender roles. This is largely because migration challenges traditional gender relations in a number of ways. Firstly for immigrants like the Hadchitis, migration marked their transformation from rural peasants, filaheen, into urban wage-labourers in Sydney. It also marked the entry of many women into the workforce and education, an issue I return to in the last section of this chapter. However, the Lebanese on the whole, as we saw in Chapters Two and Three, experienced a crisis of migration because of the collapse of the manufacturing sector in Australia after the mid-1970’s, which has led to high male unemployment rates (Humphrey 1984). How do immigrants, such as the
Hadchitis, make sense of their experience of marginalisation and how do they imagine Australia as the host nation?

In the dominant discourse of the nation, the rule of the Queen as the Sovereign Head of State brings order to Australia as a colonial dominion (Martin 1993; Millar 1978). As a former penal colony the project of pacifying an unruly criminal class in a wild colonial frontier established Australia as an intensely rule based society with a militaristic ethos (Hughes 1987). Additionally, the stereotyped representation of Australian men as beer-swilling tends to support a masculinist view of the Australian character (Bennett 1988:4). These aspects of Australian life, along with the mateship tradition forged through Australia’s participation in the Great War and WWII are supposed to reveal the male focused, militaristic history of Australia (Millar 1978). Likewise, the law and legal system in general has in the past been conceptualised as an extension of patriarchal power.

Hage (2003:32-38) has theorised that the nation state is alternately imagined as a motherland or fatherland. In the motherland conception, he argues, the state, for those in the interior, is typically imagined to be a nurturing feminine state that supports the populace through their attachment to its breast. Thus, milk is the symbol of the motherland. The fatherland, on the other hand, is imagined to rule the borders of the country in order to protect the interior. It is the hard face of the state and the one that imposes order and regiment upon the populace, or defends the nation. Blood is the symbol of fatherlands (Cohen 1997:105). Hage goes on to argue that the neo-liberal state in Australia has brought about a crisis of attachment to the nation state, because of the absence of nurturing or hope, which he refers to as “paranoid nationalism”, as mentioned in the introduction (Hage 2003:42). However, immigrants, as a subaltern class, commonly don’t experience a nurturing or feminine attachment to the host nation. In fact Cohen theorises that diasporic subjects typically imagine their country of origin to be their motherland, in an idealised form (Cohen 1997:106). Thus, the relationship of the immigrant to the host nation is inherently ambivalent, with the immigrant typically experiencing it as a harsh and unloving fatherland.
My research with Hadchiti male immigrants in Australia, however, suggests that they have developed a particular conceptualisation of their oppression under the Australian state, in which the Australian state is imagined, not as a competing patriarchy, but as a competing matriarchy, which fails to offer them sustenance. Hadchiti male immigrants have turned the dominant representation of the Australian nation on its head, in a subaltern inversion (Guha 1987), and instead, they have conceptualised the Australian state as a feminising force which actually robs them of their masculinity. At the highest level they have conceptualised the Queen of England as a symbolic representation of the Australian nation as a matriarchal state, which disproportionately bestows privileges upon its female populace. What could be worse than oppression under a competing patriarchy than oppression under a ruthless matriarch who has robbed the men in general and migrant men in particular of their power and masculinity and converted them into hen-pecked husbands? Perhaps, their impression of Australia relates to deeper fears of the civilisational demise that befalls a society where the traditional order of power has been inverted and, thus, in the Australian case, the women now are feared to have grown so powerful that they actually rule over the men.

Thus, the second inversion discourse between Lebanon and Australia constructs Australia as a balad niswen, a land of women, and more importantly, it is actually hukum niswen under the rule of women. To what extent is this perception amongst Hadchiti male immigrants shared more generally by male immigrants from Lebanon? The following interview with a Maronite Lebanese male immigrant from Beirut suggests that this is a broader perception in the Lebanese community in Australia:

Q. Why do Lebanese men talk about Australia as a “balad niswen”?
A. Because the women here got the right like the men and because of the Queen...

Q. What gives them this impression? How is it perceived to be different to Lebanon in this respect?
A. Because in Lebanon and the Arab countries the men are everything and the women cannot do what they can do here in Australia...But not every one is like that who is coming from Lebanon, mainly the Muslims and the Christians who are coming from outside the cities.
In this interview it is clear that women are perceived to have a higher social status in Australian society than in Lebanon and that this is most commonly a view held by rural male immigrants. What is it about Australia that gives them this impression? I would argue it is the sexual desegregation of the public domain, the emergence of educated women that occupy high status public positions (we now have a female Deputy Prime Minister, Governor General and State Premier) and, worse still, the education of their own women. The most important influence, however, is the dominant role of the Australian state, which has appropriated the role of the provider and displaced the male as the head of the family. This is particularly important in the context of high male unemployment rates in the Lebanese community (Humphrey 1984, 1998). Mernissi (1987:172) came to a similar conclusion in her analysis of why modernisation is such a threat to male supremacy in Morocco and argues that it is ultimately “castrating” because:

The state constitutes a threat and a mighty rival to the male as both father and husband. The state is taking over the traditional functions of the male head of the family, such as education and the provision of economic security for members of the household…The increasingly pre-eminent role of the state has stripped the traditionally powerful family head of his privileges and placed him in a subordinate position (Mernissi 1987:172).

This brings us to the third inversion discourse between Lebanon and Australia, that of the failed patriarch or the ‘hen-pecked husband’. The expression hukum niswen, as well as meaning the rule of women in Arabic can also refer to a hen-pecked husband, which is a matter of great shame and stigma in Lebanese society. A failed patriarch, or a man that is ruled over by his wife, is seen as the ultimate failure, stripped of his virility and masculinity. That is, masculinity itself is defined by the capacity to “rule over women” and in its absence a man, by default, cannot really be a man.

Humphrey (1998:93) argues that the regulation of women is central to the construction of manliness in Lebanon:

In honour men’s regulation of women is a measure of their social standing. According to men, social order requires them to assume responsibility for women to prevent social chaos.
Thus, the Lebanese family has become an institution of resistance against the Australian state, according to Humphrey (1998), because it is perceived as an imminent threat to the power of the man as the head of the household. Meanwhile, the power of the man has actually become exaggerated both within and beyond the family within the Lebanese immigrant community:

In migration the cultural sensitivity of male-female relations becomes particularly acute as social ties contract around the nuclear household...gender is recast as a confrontation between the inside/outside, the familiar/foreign and the safe/dangerous...In the absence of a strong Muslim cultural and institutional environment, the family assumes the burden of cultural reproduction...Australian law and society are unfamiliar, avoided or resisted...The enhanced authority of men in domestic space in the immigrant community is paralleled by their pre-eminent role in settlement and community formation (Humphrey 1998:91-92).

What happens, then, when a man is seen to be a failed patriarch and cannot regulate his women, or even worse is ruled over by the women in his house? The hen-pecked husband is a suppressed reality that is not supposed to occur in a patrilineal and patriarchal society, such as Lebanese society, but in truth it is a common aberration. Hence, there is a gap between appearance and reality (Friedl 1967), or what has been referred to as Mediterranean dualism (Gilmore 1982). In the Hadchiti immigrant community in Sydney the emasculating experiences of migration itself have contributed to the inability of husbands to unequivocally rule the roost and it has become a matter of common banter and gossip, as the following comment made by a Hadchiti female immigrant in Sydney, referring to a marriage between an Australian born Lebanese wife and a husband who was born in Hadchit illustrates:

It is bad enough that she rules over him inside the house, but can’t they keep it inside the house, does everybody else have to know about it?

This was said with a great deal of ridicule for the husband’s inability to run his wife. This exchange captures, firstly, how important the appearance of control over women is for a viable masculinity. Conversely, it reveals how emasculating it is for the husband who is ruled over by his wife, as captured by the following derisive insult used to describe a hen-pecked husband in Arabic: ‘houwe cuss’, which likens him to the female sexual organ as the ultimate source
of sublimation and, thus, symbolically castrates him. It also shows how women can be complicit in their own subjugation through their promulgation of the very gender ideology that oppresses them. Women discipline each other into line through shaming and gossip.

Therefore, when the expression *hukum niswen*, ruled by women, is used to describe the Australian state, by Lebanese male immigrants, it converts the Australian state into a feminising and emasculating presence, which robs them of their capacity to rule over their women. Thus, there is a perception that the men have lost their right in Australia to rule over their family inside domestic space. Australian society is represented as a threat in every respect to the reproduction of the patrilineal and patriarchal Lebanese family. In relation to Sunni Muslim Lebanese in Australia, Humphrey (1998:89) argues that the system of independent family law is perceived to be a direct threat to male power within the family. The areas of encroachment include: the custody of children, the provision of the sole parent’s pension, female entitlement to property, in the case of divorce, and the provision of women’s refuges (Humphrey 1998). These, in addition to the state endorsed campaign condemning domestic violence against women, are all perceived to intrude upon the rights of the man as the head of household. These are all contrasted with the ‘order of things’ in Lebanon, where the state is largely absent in matters of family law, marriage and divorce, which are relegated to the jurisdiction of the religious confessions and the rights of men over property and children in the event of divorce are upheld (Humphrey 1998:93).

If the state in Australia has undermined aspects of male patriarchal control within the family, it has also pacified male violence through monopolising the means to violence, which has led to an absence of war within its borders. This brings us to the fourth pivotal inversion discourse between Lebanon and Australia: in Lebanon there is war and chaos and in Australia there is peace. What is it about war that leads to the construction of Lebanon as a space of naturalised male dominance? The warring mentality itself plays upon binary oppositions between ‘us and them’, ‘good and bad’ and between ‘men and women’ (Cooke 1994-95; Elshtain 1987: 3). Elshtain (1987:4) in *Women and*
War typifies women as “the life bearers and men as the life takers” and that men are the “Just Warriors and women the Beautiful Souls”. What effect does the polarisation of war have upon gender relations and the perpetuation of male dominance? Harris argues that war intensifies the cultural devaluation of women:

Thus, war may be responsible for creating or intensifying the widespread cultural devaluation of women, certainly this devaluation cannot be regarded as natural (Harris 1975: 267).

As discussed earlier, the “patrilineal, virilocal complex”, or the “male-centred warfare complex” in anthropological theory posits that incessant warfare, the system of patrilineal descent and male supremacy reinforce each other in a vicious cycle. War zones create a type of machismo where virile masculinity itself becomes inextricably linked to acts of violence and the rule of the gun. Peteet (1994) examines this phenomenon in the Palestinian case, where she argues violence has become central to acts of resistance against the Israeli state but also in the construction of masculinity for Palestinian men. She writes:

While femininity is no more natural than masculinity, physical violence is not as central to its construction. It does not reproduce or affirm aspects of female identity, nor does it constitute a rite of passage into adult female status (Peteet 1994:44)

There is a Lebanese expression for this type of machismo, mitil antar or abaday, meaning macho and strong. In Lebanon’s Civil War (1975-1990) participation in militias became central to the lives of many men and a key way in which they were able to perform their masculinity, accumulate status or even contest and subvert their social position. Humphrey has argued that the collapse of the Lebanese state during the Civil War led to a world of terror and rumour that seem to target civilians more than combatants (Humphrey 2001:123). In this context masculinity became defined by fearlessness in the face of adversity, defending your family, village or sect and by the unfettered access to ammunition and military hardware. Humphrey writes this about gender relations during the war:
Throughout the course of the war, men were regarded as politically active and as representatives of families and communities. Women, by contrast, were generally seen as politically passive and retained their cultural position as hareem, under the protection of men...the exception being in the case of massacres (Humphrey 2001:124)

It is true that women also received training in Lebanon’s militias and there are accounts of how the war allowed women to break out of traditional roles, because of the general dissolution of Lebanese society itself in the course of the war (Cooke 1987). Some women became female heads of household in the absence of their husbands and others were able to defer the age of marriage through their participation in the war. There were also cases where women had greater physical mobility in Lebanon than their husbands, brothers or fathers in navigating military check points controlled by opposing militias (Sabbagh 2003b:102). Cooke discusses how “mothering” became the dominant form of female resistance to the Lebanese Civil War (Cooke 1987, 1994-95). It became a way of countering the tendency for war to become an arena for the display of manliness and heroism (Cooke 1994-95:10). In particular, mothering became “staying and looking after Lebanon”, while the men either fought futile battles or emigrated to the “mahjar”, the lands of emigration (Abu Nassr 2003:96). Thus, the migration of Lebanese men, in the mothering discourse of the women who stayed in Lebanon throughout the Civil War, according to Cooke became associated with manly cowardice and vacillation (Cooke 1987:56). Cooke writes:

Men had always been the dominant class, to whom obedience had been an unquestioned duty, had proven themselves weak and unworthy. As the patriarchal structure was falling apart, as the country was collapsing, women were finding a voice (Cooke 1987:56).

But, for all of these narratives of how war can liberate women, there is plenty of evidence to suggest the opposite (Abu Nassr 2003, Maksoud 2003). In fact, the men that fought in Lebanon’s Civil War are sometimes referred to as the “jeil el harb”, or the war generation, a term that carries with it an implication of the damage done by the culture of uncontrolled violence that dominated Lebanon for a decade and half. We should consider how this culture could actually have perpetuated male dominance and the spatial containment of women. Women were often forced to withdraw into the tiny social worlds of their neighbourhood
or village and the fear of harm itself became the main leverage men held over women to contain them there (Abu Nassr 2003:96). Fear can be a very Machiavellian tool of social control. Of course, the spatial containment of women is not a new pattern for Lebanese society, but was reinforced and perpetuated by the social chaos of war.

Olujic (1998) has discussed how violence against women in war should be seen as an extension of pre-existing patterns that predominate during peace time. She argues that acts of sexual violence that occurred against women in war-torn Bosnia-Herzegovina were an extension of the honour and shame complex that were enacted upon women’s bodies (Olujic 1998:31-32). In war the rape of women can become an act of war between men because “men suffer the shame of their failure to protect their property that includes women, family, bloodlines, and soil” (Olujic 1998:39). But, even worse, rape can become a method of ethnic cleansing, according to Olujic:

through forced pregnancy resulting from rape, aggressors can purify the blood of the attacked group by creating ethnically cleansed babies belonging to the group of the invading fathers (Olujic 1998:39).

Thus war zones can accentuate the dichotomy between “good and the bad woman” and the fear of sexual dishonour becomes the central reason to restrict the movement of women in war situations. Thus, the social worlds of women can immeasurably shrink as society collapses through war. Furthermore, Maksoud (2003:93) has argued that the breakdown in state services in Lebanon, such as water and electricity, and the rise in fundamentalism forced women back into traditional roles and put the feminist movement on the defensive:

It has often been argued that because of the deconstruction of society as a result of war women can construct new roles. What happened in Lebanon, however, was exactly the opposite. The deconstruction of society led to the arrest of progress, the stifling of creativity, and to the reduction of concern to the basic needs. Women, instead of being free to construct new roles, were in fact consumed with old traditional roles and domestic duties (Maksoud 2003:94).

The pattern of living in the pocketed and tiny social world of war has also followed Lebanese women into migration and exile in Australia. There are many cases of women in the Hadchit community in Sydney who had never left their
village before migration to Australia, especially if they grew up during the Civil War years. They married and migrated to Australia while still young and living with racism in a migrant sub-culture has perpetuated their spatial containment within the home. But, the opposite can be said of young men from Hadchit who grew up in Sydney. Hadchit men continued to visit Lebanon throughout the Civil War, mostly to arrange marriages, but also because participation in the militias became a right of passage for the construction of masculinity for young Hadchit men in Sydney.

Field notes: Sydney June 2007
Fouad returned to Hadchit in the late 80’s during the Civil War and hung out with his cousins who were in the militias. He wore military attire and handled Kalashnikovs. He described the excitement of going to see “The Green Line” in Beirut. He then showed me the photo albums where I saw the war chest, the militia photos, the army fatigues and the photos posing with military hardware.

It is here that we can get a picture of how participation in violence during return visits to Lebanon has become a way to resurrect Lebanese migrant masculinity. It is interesting to consider this male right of passage as a tradition, because it is possible that war tourism provided a counter-balance to the emasculating experiences of migration itself, where young men were able to regain their lost masculinity through the gun as the ultimate phallic symbol.

The culture of violence I have described in Lebanon can also provide an insight into why Australia might be perceived by some Lebanese men as a balad niswen, a land of women, because it is a pacified land where the state has monopolised the means to violence and there are strict gun controls. Cooke (1994-95) has discussed how war zones create a binary opposition between “war as the domain of men” and “peace as the domain of women”. The absence of war in Australia, according to this logic, by default, defines it as the “domain of women”, which perhaps explains the conceptualisation of Australia as a balad niswen by some Lebanese men, particularly the jeil el harb, or the war generation. The experience of migration can be a double disempowerment for them. Not only do they experience subjugation under the Australian state, but migration also pacified and disarmed them.
Changing gender relations between Sydney and Hadchit

Whilst I was in Hadchit doing fieldwork in May-June 2007 I came to see the Sydney Hadchiti immigrant community from the perspective of the home village. While the Sydney Hadchitis lament constantly the corrosive effects of Australian society in undermining the moral standing of their women, it seems that the same process of renegotiation we saw in Chapter Four has been occurring to gender relations in Hadchit, as this interview with a 37 year old, unmarried, educated woman about the status of women in the village reveals:

My mother went to school, but stopped when she was 14, but not all got to go. The women used to work in the fields. So the women who went to school were lucky. My generation is lucky because most of them had a chance to get to school and some to university and get jobs. I finished my university in 1995 and got a job in 1997. Most of my class got married and went to Australia. In Sydney the Hadchit community lives like they are in the Hadchit of twenty years ago and they have maintained the old fashion language and ideas more than we have here.

In this account we hear that the Hadchitis in Sydney are actually behind Lebanon and the home village, caught in a migration lag. Perhaps the Hadchit men in Sydney are nostalgic for an idealised male dominated social order in Lebanon? This is why you often hear how disappointed they are with the moral standing of the women when they return to Lebanon. In the following interview extract the same woman explains how she sees the role of the man and woman in a modern marriage in Lebanon:

I had a dream when I was young that I would study, get a job and when I married my husband would share the work, I watched American movies, and you see the guy help his wife. But, in Lebanon you do not live alone and if you get married the man has to buy the house. I like a man older than me – 7-10 years, but when I get married I want to stay in work.

Meanwhile, in Sydney the migration process has placed tremendous strains on gender relations in the Hadchit community, because it offers opportunities for women to renegotiate their status through access to paid employment and education. This section extends the analysis of changing gender relations we saw in Chapter Four by examining debates over female education. While women are becoming educated, there is still an expectation among some of the men that they will stay at home after they get married and that the priority is for the man to get
an education and advance their career, as this interview with a young second generation man reveals:

It still lingers in the background that men are the bread winners and women stay at home. There is more emphasis on the male to mature and advance the career, because the women are going to stay at home. You see a lot of girls go to uni, but then after they get married they see it as something to fall back on. I have only met one Lebanese girl who has gone to uni and graduated. In my first cousin generation there isn’t many who have gone to uni. On my dad’s side in Sydney I will be the first to go to uni and on mum’s side I am the first to go to uni.

This interview shows that the woman staying at home after marriage is still his ideal; however reality often falls short of it. Another dimension to the problems of emasculation the Hadchit men face in Sydney is that while some men have experienced unemployment the women sometimes are more employable than the men. This has been the case in some of the transnational marriages between Australian born Hadchit wives and their husbands who were born in Hadchit and often served for considerable periods in the militias during the Lebanese Civil War (1975-1990). Many of these men arrived in Australia poorly equipped for civilian life and sometimes found themselves in the position of the house husband, while their educated wife earned the family income. This interview explains how limited education amongst the men creates competition between the families:

There is a competition between the families. Some people are still struggling because the men didn’t have high education. If they got a trade they did better than those who didn’t get a trade. My father isn’t an educated man – but he has provided the basics.

These contradictions underpin the discourse amongst the men that Australia is balad niswen, a land of women, because it reflects their experience of emasculation in the host nation and the fear of losing control over their women in the context of the liberties of Australian life. As I argued in the previous chapter, however, female education and participation in paid employment fits into the broader pattern of capitalist transformation and conversion into ‘wage-labourers’ that we have seen for the community as a whole, only now the women, especially the second generation, are systematically moving into the workforce. This heightens male fears of ‘loss’, which manifests as an inversion discourse, where
Australia is depicted as being the ultimate un-natural social order. However, it is important to consider that gender inversion is actually produced by capitalism itself, as Marx argued:

The less the skill and exertion of strength implied in manual labor, in other words, the more modern industry becomes developed, the more is the labor of men superseded by that of women. Differences of age and sex have no longer any distinctive social validity for the working class. All are instruments of labor, more or less expensive to use, according to their age and sex (Marx and Engels 1848).

Given Marx’s argument that capitalism, over time, produces a gender-inversion with the women ‘on top’, representations of Australia as being headed by a ‘matriarch’ are very fitting.

Consequently, much of the gender conflict in the Sydney Hadchit community concerns access to female education and the fear of the transformative potential of it. There is now a broad movement amongst the women in the 35-45 year age group who married early and missed the chance for an education to attempt to acquire it now that their children are school age or grown up. They do so through the system of Tafe Colleges, which offer courses tailored to women who wish to return to education and work after a lengthy period raising children. There is tremendous resistance from husbands to these initiatives amongst the women to improve themselves, get an education and find a life beyond the home. The men want their wives to remain absolutely dependant and contained within the domestic sphere, the only problem is that they simply can’t afford to keep them there, with the record costs of living in Australia’s largest city demanding two incomes to keep the household afloat (single income households are another reason why Lebanese Australian households are in a disadvantaged position socio-economically in Sydney). In this interview extract with a woman who migrated at age 18 to Sydney she reflects on the tensions generated by female education:

**Q. Did women have access to education when you grew up?**
**A:** No, no, no. Most of the families didn’t want to spend for female education they just wanted them to get married. I am starting to see that husbands don’t want an educated girl they just want to marry a simple girl. Most of the men don’t want an educated woman, they are stronger you can’t manipulate them they can’t do whatever they want with them. They seek just simple girls; they can keep them under control.
The central dilemma is that the participation of women in work outside the home provides challenges of supervision for migrant men, which has been broadly cited in the migration literature (Bourgois 2002; Humphrey 1998; Salzinger 2002). It is a double edged sword as the family needs the income, but husbands fear losing control over their wives. This has resulted in the development of what I term “paranoid patriarchy” (Hyndman-Rizik 2008) amongst the men who seek to enforce the spatial containment of their daughters and wives, in reaction to the pressures of Australian society, a process we looked at in Chapter Four. However, the broader context of multicultural crisis and anti-Lebanese racism in Australia, as we will examine in Chapter Seven, creates a “double burden of oppression” for Lebanese women (King 1988). In practice, the men, who themselves feel restricted in the context of racism in Australia, severely restrict the mobility of ‘their women’ in the name of protecting them from racism and moral corruption. This interview extract from an 18 year old teenager describes her reaction to living under constant surveillance:

Me and my cousins we’re not allowed out…towards the end of my schooling I didn’t do well because I had nothing else to look forward to. I went crappy in my HSC for the fact that it was all about HSC and I was never allowed out and I was sick of it. If they would have just given me a bit of what I wanted and let me out a bit throughout high school. Now all I want to do is go out, party, spend money, have a phone – kill it –you know, and I can’t do it. Because, I didn’t have it. They tell me I’ll get over it. But you’re over it, I’m not – I haven’t even started to experience it – I’m a very emotional person because I was never allowed to do stuff and I’m resentful for those times I wasn’t allowed out and nobody understood it.

There is an Arabic saying for young women to keep them mindful of appearances ‘You have two eyes, but there is 1000 eyes watching you’. In the Hadchit community in Western Sydney it is 6000 eyes, because they have around 3000 people living in four suburbs, so surveillance is paramount. Young men have become the moral police for their fathers and mobile phone surveillance is the method of choice to keep track of their sisters. The community of brothers also extend their surveillance to other female relatives. Thus if they are out and meet one of their female friends/cousins they will ring her brother on the spot and ask “where is your sister?” It is a mark of the male’s honour to know their sister’s location at any given moment, as this interview extract with a young man illustrates:
If I am out and see some friends, if they are girls, the first thing I do is ring their brothers and say – do you know your sister is out here? Last time my sister was in Parramatta a friend of mine didn’t see that our cousin was with her and the first thing he did was ring me and say “do you know where your sister is” and I said “Yeh – I think she is in Parramatta”. He asked me “Who is she with”? and I said “With one of my cousins” and he replied “Oh I just wanted to let you know where she is” – it is just a male thing.

This quote shows how men in the second generation have taken over the burden of female supervision from their fathers. As I have argued in both this and Chapter Four the pattern of social change and the process of renegotiation in gender relations is not a linear process across the generations and is even subject to contradiction and regression. Through the process of negotiation, however, some women are able to attain greater social freedoms than others and, likewise, some men are less subject to the dictates of female supervision prescribed by the rules of patrilineal descent and even reject it. An important variant determining the degree of female mobility is the level of education of both the men and women within the family and their labour force participation.

Deconstructing gender relations within the Hadchit community also has to be understood within the context of the broader political climate in Australia, in which the status of Lebanese women is seen as indicating their lack of integration into Australian society. Thus, critiques of gender relations within Lebanese society can be construed as justifying the dominant representations of Arab men as ‘backward’. Other Arab feminists have written of this dilemma (Hussein 2006; Sabbagh 2003a). The effect is to silence the debate. I have

32 See the following articles:
Following the Cronulla riots in Sydney in 2005, John Howard rejected the idea that there was underlying racism in Australia. http://www.theguardian.com.au/story/0,25197,22447255-25072,00.html | similar pages
... warned the Fraser government in 1976 it was accepting too many Lebanese Muslim refugees without ‘the required qualities’ for successful integration. http://www.thesun.co.uk/story/0,20867,20996448-601,00.html
shown in this chapter how migration heightens gender conflict by contributing to male experiences of emasculation and loss.

**Conclusion**

This chapter examined a discourse that Australia is *balad niswen-hukum niswen*, a land of women, ruled by women, an inversion of the gendered social order in Lebanon. It was shown how Hadchiti men in Sydney experience their migration as being emasculating due to the education of their wives and daughters and through their participation in the labour force. But, most importantly, the central role of the Australian state, with its monopoly on violence and independent system of family law, has played a pivotal role in displacing the man as ‘head of the household’. By making a transnational comparison to Lebanon and the home village, it was shown that gender roles are, likewise, the subject of contestation and renegotiation in the context of modernisation. Thus, migrant communities can become locked in a time-capsule and even fall behind the home village in social attitudes. In the next chapter we will return to the ancestral village, Hadchit, and examine the liminal experience of home and identity for returnees.
6. Return to Hadchit

The idea of the journey remains basic to pilgrimage and sets it apart from other visits to sacred places...where the everyday world comes close to, even touches, the spiritual world, and where the everyday world is altered by such an encounter. In addition to centering around a different sort of place, pilgrimage generally involves a different sort of time, time that is removed from ordinary life and that may re-enact events associated with gods, saints, martyrs, and other sacred beings (Dubisch 1995:36-37).

Anthropological approaches to pilgrimage (Baldassar 2001; Cannell 2006; Coleman and Eade 2004; Dubisch 1995; Eade and Sallnow 1991b; Turner and Turner 1978) will frame the analysis of the return visit to Hadchit, as a right of passage and personal journey, imbued with religious and symbolic meaning. This chapter shows how Hadchit has been primarily constituted as a sacred space by the diaspora, which contrasts with the depiction of the host-nation as a profane ‘upside down land’, as we saw in Chapter Five. Central to this construction is the very fragility of the homeland itself and the im/possibility of return to it (Naficy 1993). Consequently, the homeland has been fetishised (Hage 1989; Naficy 1993) and converted into a Holy Land, which is other worldly and timeless. It is in this context that return visits, whether actual or virtual, are experienced and imagined as a pilgrimage through time and space to the object of spiritual renewal, the home village, the place of roots, ancestry and soil. The conceptualisation of Hadchit as the unchanging ancestral village, perched in the dramatic landscape of the Holy Valley, the Wadi Qadisha, is central to the construction of it as a lost homeland.

The chapter starts with an examination of the construction of pilgrimage and rituals of return to the homeland. The specificities of Maronite discourses on and representations of Lebanon as a lost Christian Holy Land are then analysed. The Hadchiti experience is situated within the broader Maronite discourse on the Holy Valley, the Wadi Qadisha, as the place of origins for the Maronite identity. The chapter then explores two ethnographic accounts of return to Hadchit and shows how the Hadchiti diaspora participates in and constructs the discourse on
the Holy Valley as a lost and sacred homeland. The first case study examines the ‘virtual return visit’ to Hadchit. The second case study examines transnational interaction between Sydney and Hadchit and the liminal experience of second generation returnees. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the inherent ambivalence in the relationship between Hadchit and its peripheries and between Lebanon and the Lebanese diaspora.

**The construction of pilgrimages to the homeland**

In the Catholic tradition, pilgrimage has always been seen as a form of penance, and indeed was imposed as a punishment for secular offences in the Middle Ages. The hardships and dangers of the journey and the bodily privations which pilgrims were obliged to undergo were thought to win the penitential pilgrim God’s forgiveness and grace. Yet, while a similar orientation towards a sacrificial discourse cannot be discounted amongst the older-day flagellants…their dominant motives tend to be material rather than spiritual. By voluntarily undergoing pain, the devotee hopes that his or her request for a material favour…will be granted by the shrine divinity (Eade and Sallnow 1991a:21).

The relationship between bodily privation, punishment and pilgrimage links the body with the soul and the journey of pilgrimage to the attainment of bodily wholeness and restoration. Within the framework of pilgrimage (Baldassar 2001, Cannell 2006; Dubisch 1995; Eade and Sallnow 1991b; Turner 1979, Turner and Turner 1978) the immigrant’s return can be conceptualised as the pursuit of spiritual redemption and a restoration of bodily wholeness from the shattering experiences of ‘el ghurba’, exile, spiritual poverty and subjugation in the host-nation. Indeed, the nexus between bodily and spiritual redemption is a central element of Catholic pilgrimage as Eade and Sallnow suggest:

This eschatological transformation of the body was foreshadowed, in a highly telescoped fashion, by Christ’s death, resurrection, and ascension to heaven. His tortured body, however, bore not his own sins but those of all mankind. Since then, numerous saints and would be saints have been held to have emulated this process of anticipatory restoration and redemption…their frail or suffering bodies in life allegedly remaining incorrupt after deaths…given this tight nexus between spiritual salvation and corporeal wholeness in Christian belief, self-inflicted suffering and divine healing in the context of pilgrimage cults come to possess a sacred significance…(Eade and Sallnow 1991a:22)

The suffering immigrant moves through time and space and the journey of return becomes the bridge which brings the pilgrim to the object of spiritual
renewal, the notion of home or homeland. Dubisch (1995: 38), following Gennup (1960) and Turner (1979, Turner and Turner 1978), has defined pilgrimage as a rite of passage with three phases: the first phase is the separation of the pilgrim from ordinary life, the second phase is the liminal period of the pilgrimage or journey between worlds (which might be the travel through space in an aircraft today – the new ‘middle passage’) and lastly, the return to ordinary life. Central to Turner’s conception of pilgrimage is that it is an experience in anti-structure, which is defined by liminality, or inbetweeness, and which culminates in an experience of comunitas or the catharsis of oneness (Turner and Turner 1978:9-10). According to Dubisch, the physical journey of pilgrimage is also a metaphor for an inward journey to find out who we are outside of the ‘structures’ which define and confine us (Dubisch 1995:42).

Pilgrimage is also a type of ritual performance and through the repetition of ritual, Turner (1979) argues, it is possible to suspend the passage of time. In the context of migration, therefore, where the immigrant is removed in time, space and generations from the home village, the pilgrimage home offers a way to overcome the tyranny of distance. This construction reinforces the binary opposition between the host nation as a land of work and industrial capitalism, as we saw in Chapter Five, and the homeland/motherland as the source of life. In the absence of being able to ‘live’ in the homeland and sometimes even to visit, as is often the case with Lebanon, the homeland is transformed into a place for the after-life, a mythical and sacred space (Durkheim 1961) beyond the everyday, a land of saints, Churches and Monasteries, a Holy Land. This conceptualisation of Lebanon is exaggerated with every political crisis and war, which further undermines the viability of the Lebanese nation state.

Baldassar applied the framework of pilgrimage to understand how the diaspora and the home town are unified by the return visit in the case of San Fiorese immigrants living in Perth (Baldassar 2001). She draws on the Christian pilgrimage tradition to understand return visits to San Fior in Italy and argues that the pilgrim seeks, through an eternal quest, to maintain connection to and relationships with loved ones in the home town. Baldassar likens the home town to a ‘shrine’ and the return to it becomes a form of spiritual renewal. However,
she argues, the immigrant’s pursuit of both *sistemazione*, economic success, and *campanalismo*, a sense of place, compete and set up a hierarchical relationship between the town’s people and the émigré’s. The town’s people claim cultural capital over the émigrés due to their greater claims to *campanalismo*, or attachment to place, while the returning immigrant attempts to prove their superior *sistemazione*, acquired through migration (Baldassar 2001:209-210). This creates competing discourses that are, in some ways, unresolvable.

The complex inter-relationship between homelands and diasporas have, alternately, been conceptualised as a politics of “desire and disdain” (Winland 2002). Writing about post-communist Croatia, Winland (2002) discusses how the object of desire, a free Croatia, actually brought into relief the tensions between diasporic and homeland Croatians, because of the involvement of the diasporic Croatian community in the formation of the independent state of Croatia. She suggests that the challenge for transnational theory is to go beyond the opposition between “where you’re at and where you’re from” (Ang 2001:13; Gilroy 1991-92) and to look at the politics of representation and recognition (Winland 2002:693). Winland describes the inter-relationship between diaspora and homeland peoples as characterised by “entangled tensions” (Winland 2002:694), because:

> Diasporas construct notions of homeland in ways that are often very different to homeland peoples and this can lead to ambivalence and tensions between them (Winland 2002:695).

While both Winland (2002) and Baldassar (2001) have posited that ambivalence is an inherent component of the diaspora-homeland relationship, I would suggest that it is also underpinned by mutual dependence. The homeland is often dependant upon the diaspora for remittance flows, international representation and to facilitate migration and labour flows out of the country of origins. The diaspora, conversely, is dependant upon the homeland for its very definition of itself, for a sense of meaning and origins. In the absence of being able to “live” in the homeland, those that remain behind must “live” for the diaspora, with their help and support, and fulfil the obligations of those that are absent on their behalf, which include the care of loved ones left behind. In the case of Hadchit this includes the maintenance of property, attending funerals,
daffin, memorial services and 40 day masses, Jness Ara’b’e’en, for the deceased in the diaspora at the St. Raymond’s Church in Hadchit\textsuperscript{33}. These sets of obligations to the dead and the deceased in the after life place those that ‘stay’ behind in the role of “spiritual keepers” (Peleikas 2000) for the diaspora, an issue I return to later in this chapter.

Given that there is ambivalence and tension between homeland and diaspora communities, Naficy (1993) as noted earlier, theorises that exile consciousness is constituted between two pivotal threats: “the threat of the disappearance of the homeland and the threat of themselves [the exile community] disappearing into the host society” (Naficy 1993:129). He argues that diasporic communities live in a state of liminality and, in turn, fetishise the homeland as an iconic image and circulate it. Nostalgia becomes the currency of life for exile communities and it is based upon the unrealisable trope of return. He goes on to argue that fragmentation and deterritorialisation have led immigrants to experience time diachronically (I will refer to this as ‘diachronic suspension’) and to see the present as an unreality (Naficy 1993:147-148). If ‘return’ is often unrealisable it is not surprising that the homeland itself becomes fetishised, and in the case of the Hadchiti diaspora and the Maronites more generally, the homeland has been transformed into a ‘religious shrine’.

With no prospect of return, the impossibility of life in the homeland and the disappearance of the homeland itself, ‘statelessness’ has become central to the Palestinian experience of dispersal and exile (Cox and Connell 2003). Indeed, Said has argued that the current age is the era of the refugee, the displaced person and exile (Said 1990). Cox and Connell argue that location, place and identity have existed in a symbiotic relationship and that for many diaspora communities the reference back to a ‘stable’ nation-state or homeland defines them in diaspora. However, for the Palestinians:

\textsuperscript{33} Memorial services and 40 Masses are also held in Sydney for those that have died in Hadchit, reinforcing the sense of mutual obligation.
Exile is experienced without recourse to a functioning nation-state…that might offer a stable centre for identity…consequently, they have suffered a constant struggle to assert their own sense of identity in opposition to other people’s often diverse discourse of Palestinian identity (Cox and Connell 2003:331).

Two central states of being are said to define the Palestinian condition in diaspora: *al ghurbah*, the eternal stranger separated from home and the dream of *awda*, the desire to return to their homeland. But in the absence of return they must make themselves at home where they are (Cox and Connell 2003:338).

I would argue that the Lebanese situation has much in common with the Palestinian case where the homeland is constantly in crisis or disappearing. Given its state of political, social, economic and sectarian division, situated in the shadow of Israel and Syria, the Lebanese nation state is precarious. In the aftermath of the Civil War of 1975-1990, the Lebanese diaspora has been largely transformed from a “trading diaspora”, as it was once conceived (Cohen 1997), into an exile community. As we saw earlier in the thesis, there is a discourse of decline amongst the Maronite diaspora, in which they lost the Civil War and cannot ‘return’ and now Lebanon is a ‘lost Holy Land’.

**Lebanon: The Lost Holy Land**

A biblical land, Lebanon possesses an abundance of religious sites where Christians of many denominations find peace, serenity and contemplation. These Christian sites – basiliicas, cathedrals, churches, chapels, sanctuaries, convents, monasteries and even hermits’ caves- are found throughout Lebanon, a land celebrated in the Song of Solomon for its fragrance and beauty. Set in the eastern Mediterranean, cradle of the great monotheistic religions, spiritual and mystical life in Lebanon has flourished over the centuries. (Brochure 2002:2).

In this mode of relating to Lebanon the Maronite diaspora constructs Lebanon as the land of the Bible, with a multitude of Christian sites, a land of peace, serenity and the ‘mystical life’. Indeed, images of war, religious difference and conflict are suppressed and replaced with sanitised, glossy images of Lebanon, which are primarily Christian, as the above quote reflects. This sanitised version of Lebanon is reinforced by movies such as: “Lebanon a land of Milk and Honey” (Movie 2008), as promoted by the Ministry of Tourism, in
which Lebanon is represented by its bucolic landscape. The prologue for the
film reads:

Let our film guide you on a unique journey through the heart of
this historic land. Then you will know what the Lebanese joie
de vivre, magic and generosity are all about (Movie 2008).

The reality of war, chaos and suffering is suppressed in favour of landscape
images, which focus on the visual beauty of Lebanon. More importantly, the
landscape is depicted by its Christian character, indeed Lebanon is said to have a
sacred topography. The Ministry of Tourism in Lebanon is partly responsible for
the distribution of these images, given that tourism is the life-blood of the
Lebanese economy. But the distribution of these fetishised, glossy images of
Lebanon, such as those in theBeauty of Lebanon.html, which circulates widely
in Lebanese email networks, reflects a disjunction between fantasy and reality, or
even the suppression of reality in favour of fantasy.

These images seem to circulate with greater frequency the more
(im)possible the dream of Lebanon becomes. In this construction Lebanon is a
dream, it is not realisable, therefore its representation is not of this world, but
removed in time and space, thus making it other worldly and spiritual. There are
multiple versions of Lebanon and hence it is as much a discourse as it is a reality.
Gibran’s (1962) famous piece, Your Lebanon and Mine, highlights the contested
nature of representations of Lebanon. However, the Christian version is innately
linked to the iconic landscape of the mountains:

You have your Lebanon and I have mine. Yours is political
Lebanon and her problems, mine is natural Lebanon in all her
beauty, you have your Lebanon with programs and conflicts, I
have mine with her dreams and hopes. Be satisfied with your
Lebanon, as I am content with the free Lebanon of my vision.
Your Lebanon is a snarled political knot which Time
endeavours to untie; My Lebanon is a chain of knolls and
mountains rising reverently and majestically toward the blue
skies. Your Lebanon is an international problem yet to be
solved; My Lebanon is calm, enchanted valleys murmurous
with church bells and whispering brooks (Gibran 1962:79).

Central to the disjunction between fantasy and reality in representations
of Lebanon is the detachment of the landscape from the social and political relations
it gave rise to. Hage (1989:118-125) theorises that the fetishism of identity is a
process by which the Maronite identity is detached from the class relations that
produced it (mystification) and inverted so that it becomes causal in generating their superior class position. Furthermore, he writes:

One of the important features of the fetishism of identity is that it ends up conceiving of identity as a transhistorical essence (Hage 1989:125)

In the Christian version of Lebanon, therefore, the unique Christian heritage is rooted in the Lebanese mountains in a timeless link that transcends the social relations to which the landscape gave rise. But, in the aftermath of the Civil War of 1975-1990, there is a Christian perception that the future of the Maronite faith itself is to be deterritorialised and exiled out of the Lebanese territory, as we saw in Chapters Two and Three. Hence, in Christian representations, Lebanon has now become a lost Holy Land and ‘return’ to it has become increasingly tenuous. Not only have the Maronites fetishised their identity, but now the homeland itself has become fetishised (Naficy 1993) and detached from its origins and representations of it circulate in the diaspora as a set of deterritorialised images and discourses.

Figure 43: Map of the Holy sights in the Qadisha Valley. Source: Ministry of Tourism (Brochure 2002).

If Christian representations of Lebanon depict it as a ‘lost Holy Land’, the return to it is constructed as a form of religious pilgrimage, built upon a ‘Christian’ Holy map of Lebanon (see Figure 43). Bowman (1991) discusses the
contested versions of the sacred as they play out during pilgrimages to the Holy city of Jerusalem. Jerusalem is not one Holy city, but a multitude of Holy cities existing alongside each other, “as many as are the religious communities which worship at the site – built over the same spot, operating at the same moment, and contending for hegemony” (Bowman 1991:98). Thus, the Jewish, Christian and Muslim versions of Jerusalem exist alongside one another and are constructed by the interaction of the pilgrim with the site:

The various Jerusalems function as signs in the diverse discourses on religion, power, and identity of the visiting groups. Just as those discourses are created by the pilgrims’ home cultures, so too do these signs render meaning from and direct it back towards, the cultures which mobilize them (Bowman 1991:99).

Likewise, Lebanon has a multiplicity of religious communities which construct it as a Holy Land. The Christian map of Lebanon exists alongside and in contradiction to competing versions of Lebanon’s religious identity and meaning, as symbolised by its religious sites and rooted in its ‘sacred topography’. Of all the Christian sites in Lebanon the Holy Valley, or Wadi Qadisha, is fetishised the most and said to be central to the Maronite religion and identity itself. The Patriarch of the Maronite Church has his summer residence in Dimane, and for several centuries before that the Patriarch was based in Wadi Qanubine, both in the Holy Valley. This quote on the Holy Valley, from the Ministry of Tourism, reflects its spiritual significance:

In the high majestic mountains of the north, Christianity’s long presence is marked by countless sanctuaries and places of devotion. The word “Qadisha” comes from a Semitic root meaning “holy”, a fitting name for this gorge whose depths lie at the bottom of sheer cliffs and which is rich in water from melting snow (Brochure 2002:4).

The notion that the Holy Valley, Qadisha, is removed in time and space is central to the construction of it as a sacred space, which is other worldly: “Qadisha, one of the deepest and most beautiful valleys in Lebanon, is indeed a world apart” (Salameh Sarkis 2002). The village of Hadchit sits in the heart of the Holy Valley, high on a promontory (see Figure 2 in the Introduction) and the discourse of pilgrimage has come to dominate the Hadchiti diasporas’ perception of itself, its origins and the im/possibility of return to Hadchit.
Hadchit as a shrine and the virtual return to it

Cadmus, Ulysses, they showed me the way
To seek the world’s end wherever it lay,
To greet all my kin as the wanderer must,
To the land of my birth, then, I’ll come back, I trust.
Yet Destiny ungrateful, that hard heart of Fate,
Broke down the Human, gave evil its spate
In Lebanon, -ah Hope return! Stem the fray,
That gay smiles and bright cheer my land’s face may display.
The home of my grandfather takes me in hand,
To mother, dear Sara, so tender, so grand,
That symbol of virtues as old as the land.
The nest of the eagle, Hadchit on high,
In command of the Holy Valley it lies,
Which guides and directs its children’s steps to Paradise.
(El Chidiac Younis 1976).

In this poem Hadchit is situated centrally in command of the Holy Valley and return to it is deemed necessary to achieve ascension to heaven. The eternal desire to return dominates discourses on Hadchit amongst the diaspora in both Australia and America, whether or not an actual return is made. Through the Internet and video productions the return of one, becomes the return of many. As shown in Chapter Two, emigration from the village of Hadchit spans a period of 120 years, with the first wave going to North America in the 1890’s and the second, third and fourth waves arriving in Australia since the 1950’s. Kepler-Lewis (1968) noted that the first wave of migration from the village had led to a process of deterritorialisation:

As long as the village maintains the fiction that St. Louis is a kind of extension of Hadchite, the emigrant remains within the bond of kin-ship only with more attenuated ties. The core value of the family remains unshaken…the villager can say with conviction that the population of the village is 3500 – 500 here, 1000 in the Kubbe in Tripoli and 2000 in St. Louis Missouri (Kepler-Lewis 1968: 247-249).

This process has been extended by mass migration to Australia. Where the St. Louis and North American connections with Hadchit have become attenuated over time, ethnic reconnection has been facilitated by the Internet when the village of Hadchit went online in 2000.
Figure 44: Internet traffic in 2005 to the Hadchit village website: Source: http://hadchit.8m.com/

Figure 44 shows the Internet traffic to the village website in August 2005. The website guest book captures some of the diasporic notions held about Hadchit amongst the North American descendants. These two comments from members of my family welcomed the village online back in April 2000, they are left like footprints in the sand of cyberspace:

Welcome; Hadchit to the World Wide Web! Best wishes Toni Rizk and good luck to you. I'm your visitor #62. Sala'am A Happy and Holy Easter to all ! April 21, 2000 07:07:40 (GMT Time)

Congratulations on an interesting Web Site. I still have relatives in Hadchit and it is nice to see the village as it is today. April 2000

The following comment made by a descendant in St. Louis, Missouri regarding ancestry and genealogical links to Hadchit was how I was able to link up with the Hadchitis in St. Louis and visit them in order to do ethnographic fieldwork for this study (See Appendix 3 on the transnational Rizk family tree):

My great-grandparents emigrated from Hadchit around the turn of the century. My cousin Brian already told that story. Our family names are Rizk and Wehiby-Saar. Our names were Americanized to Wahby and Risk. Tony Rizk is probably a cousin as are all the Rasks in the country. My great Uncle Charlie spelled his name Rask. My great-grandfather Risk and several of my great-uncles Reask. I hope to someday come to visit my “hometown.” We have an annual Hadchit Homecoming here in St. Louis. This will be the 3rd Annual and all of our cousins are invited to attend.
For many of the North American Hadchit descendants, myself included, the photos on this website were the first they had seen of the ancestral village. Until that time Hadchit was a mythical homeland, but not a reality in the here and now. The Internet site put Hadchit on the map for the descendants all over the world and brought the village into virtual connection with the diaspora, particularly in North America. Prior to its launch the sense of detachment in time and space was the dominant mode of relating to Lebanon and the home village. Nonetheless, it is striking that in the above comment from the village guest book this 3rd generation descendant still claimed Hadchit as his ‘hometown’. It shows the degree to which the North American descendants retained the fantasy of connection to Hadchit as a place of origins and even still claim it to be their ‘hometown’.

The ‘diachronic suspension’ of the American Hadchit was accentuated by the fact that America closed its borders in the 1920’s to large-scale immigration (Daniels 2006), which meant that until the post WWII period there was no significant additional migration into America from Lebanon or Hadchit. Thus, for many of what are referred to as the mahjar or the North American Lebanese from the first wave of emigration, Lebanon became a distant homeland, removed in time and space from them and not accessible from the present. The instability of Lebanon reinforced this perception, as did the time frame in which the migration took place, which pre-dated mass transport and the communication revolution.

Consequently, nostalgia has become the principal way in which relatedness to Lebanon has been enacted and maintained by many of the mahjar Lebanese. Lebanon became a matter of heritage, ancestry and blood lines, but no actual connection to place was maintained. Books such as Remember me to Lebanon (Shakir 2007) and Food for Grandmothers: Writings by Arab-American and Arab-Canadian Feminists (Kadi 1994) fit into this genre and form part of the literature which many of the mahjar Lebanese of North America access to remember their Lebaneseness. Rowe (2007) discusses how 3rd and 4th generation Lebanese Americans attempt to access their Lebaneseness through genealogical and archival research, but not through actually visiting Lebanon.
They feel that their Lebaneseness is caught in the past and they only can access it through tapping into their bloodlines and by tracing their genealogies, not through cultural renewal and contact with Lebanon in the here and now. Rowe (2007) argues that they are using the tools of modernity to perpetuate and access an identity that they fear they are losing, but which is increasingly stigmatised in post-September 11th America (Rowe 2007). This has also been the case with the North American Hadchitis amongst whom it has become popular to undertake extensive archival and genealogical research through for example, http://www.EllisIsland.org and by using Family Tree Maker and Master Genealogist software. As a researcher I was able to draw upon this research in order to undertake this project. It allowed me to make linkages with different branches of the Hadchiti diaspora and to demonstrate my own relatedness to them (see Appendix 1 and 2 for full details of the Hadchit and Rizk transnational family trees).

![Figure 45: The Movie “Hadchit: The Journey Home”](image-url)

The Maronite Church of North America has produced a range of DVD’s and Video productions, which represent return visits to Lebanon as a form of pilgrimage. In this genre the homeland is represented as a shrine and a Holy
Land, removed in time and space from the ‘here and now’ of North America. The first of these is entitled: “Kfar Sama: The Village of Heaven” (Movie 2005). The second and more important one for consideration in this study is the movie entitled: “The Journey Home: Hadchit, Lebanon” (Movie 2004) (see Figure 45). The caption for the video reads:

The Journey Home is the story of a pilgrimage to Lebanon. Pilgrims from St Louis, Missouri travel to their hometown of Hadchit in the Shadows of the Holy Valley. Explore, through this story, the love the St Louis Maronite Catholic Community shows for their ancestors in Lebanon as well as the love they share for their faith and family in the United States. Experience the beauty of St Raymond’s Church in Hadchit, Lebanon and the saint Raymond’s Cathedral in saint Louis, Missouri.

This movie starts in St. Louis and is introduced by Bishop Shaheen, the Maronite Rite Bishop for the Western United States. He comments that the immigrants from Hadchit who settled in St. Louis might have been “materially poor, but they were spiritually rich”. He also wonders at how someone, such as himself whose grandparents were from Lebanon, could visit Lebanon and feel at home in the land of their ancestors. For the Simons (Semaan) family, whose return is the focus of the production, their journey home is the return for many. The two St. Raymond’s Churches, one in Hadchit and the other in St. Louis (see Figures 46 and Figure 3) are said to form a united spiritual entity, with the St. Raymond’s Maronite Church in Hadchit depicted as the ‘sacred heart’ of the Hadchitis globally. The spectacular landscape of the Holy Valley, with its soaring cliffs, mountain peaks and valleys are said to add to the sacredness of place, which transforms Hadchit into a ‘shrine’ and the return visit into a quest for spiritual renewal.
The movie features the interior of St. Raymond’s Maronite Church in Hadchit (Figure 3 in the Introduction). The sound of the church bells ringing in the Holy Valley is depicted as a timeless, audible link to Hadchit for the viewer. Indeed, the description by the Simon family of their return visit describes the return as undoing time and that through the pilgrimage journey “the years fell away”. Hadchit is depicted as timeless and unchanged, beyond the ravages of modernity and thus sacred. The last section of the video production captures a recital by the village poet in Arabic, an Ode to the Emigrant, which translates as follows:

**Ibn Hadchit**
And to you son of Hadchit
You emigrated seeking riches in a new world
What ever happens to you, you will return to Hadchit
When you come back you will feel the happiness that you remember
And outside Hadchit no matter how much money you have or materials you possess
They are nothing compared to when you sit and eat and drink in your home town
The experience is worth the whole world (Movie 2004).

This poem captures the eternal desire of the emigrant to return to Hadchit. Through the journey of return the emigrant is said to find spiritual renewal. Indeed, the village poet posits that the spiritual riches of Hadchit, the power of the connection to land, *ard*, out weigh whatever material wealth can be gained.
through emigration and, thus, he condemns the emigrant to ‘spiritual poverty’. The Ode to The Emigrant, therefore, captures the paradox of migration: the ‘spiritual wealth’ with which the émigré departed is converted and lost through the pursuit of material gain and, instead, they return ‘spiritually poor’. This contradiction relates to the central binary opposition of this study, as developed in Chapter Five, which constructs the lands of emigration as being ‘only for work’ and ‘spiritually empty’, while Hadchit is the ultimate source of life, through the reproductive properties of its sacred land, ard, the symbolic mother of all the people of Hadchit.

**Transnational flows between Sydney and Hadchit**

While the North American Hadchitis, who are now in their third and fourth generation in the USA, primarily relate to Hadchit virtually, the Sydney based Hadchitis claim a translocal (Peleikas 2000:3) and synchronic connection with the home village. Time compressing technologies and constant movement back and forth between the two hubs facilitates the flows of people, money, goods and emotions, while kinship ties are the conduits for these flows. Thus, the village of Hadchit is no longer geographically bounded and Sydney is even perceived to be an extension of the home village. This is a fantasy construction which suppresses the effect of distance and the presence of the host-nation and is sustained by air travel, telephone calls and electronic technologies such as the Internet and Satellite TV.

About five years ago Satellite TV from Lebanon became available in Australia, such as the Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation (LBC), Al Jazeera, Future TV and other Arabic language programming. It appears in real time and many households watch it all day and well into the night. Before the advent of Satellite Television, only Arabic language newspapers and radio provided news about the ‘old country’. However, accessing newspapers is dependent on literacy in the Arabic language. With Satellite TV all speakers of Arabic, regardless of their level of literacy, can engage with news and other programs straight from
Lebanon. The Hadchit Household Survey found that 78% of Hadchit households in Sydney watch LBC Satellite TV broadcast from Lebanon.34

The preference for LBC Satellite Television situates the Hadchitis as members of the Maronite diasporic ‘viewing public’, which is spatially disconnected from Lebanon and yet synchronically connected in time to each other. LBC projects a Christian image of Lebanon and is broadcast from Jounieh, a Christian district to the north of Beirut (each of the Lebanese political/religious factions have their own TV station – for example: Hezbollah has Al Manar, Saad Hariri’s Future Party has Future TV and Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement has OTV (Orange TV broadcast on Arabsat-BADR3). In terms of political style LBC is considered to be conservative and to interpret events in Lebanon from a Christian vantage point. Consequently, it provides a representation of Lebanon that fits with a “Maronite” world view and the Hadchitis are able to situate themselves in a community of like minded Lebanese. In many households LBC runs all day and when there is a political crisis in Lebanon it runs all night (because of the time delay). This has contributed to the perception amongst the Sydney Hadchitis that they are not removed from events in Lebanon, but are a part of them. Perhaps they can even imagine their household is situated in a suburb of Beirut, or in Hadchit, not Sydney.

The experiential element of being able to watch events in Lebanon as they unfold is transformative in changing how events are perceived and in collapsing distance (Aksoy 2006). It also can bring the trauma of war in Lebanon into the living rooms of the diaspora. The July 2006 war in Lebanon highlighted the ability of Satellite TV to transform opinion in the Lebanese community and to pull many members of the diaspora out of their attitudinal ‘migration lag’, especially the Maronites, towards a set of viewpoints which are closer to the prevailing opinion in Lebanon. Satellite TV can also operate as a counter-hegemonic influence against the host-nation’s media, which demonstrates the contested nature of news and its representation. In the case of the July 2006 War

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34 There is a black market industry in Sydney for the installation of illegal satellite dishes for receiving transmissions for free. Otherwise the fees are quite high per month for most Satellite TV stations.
in Lebanon, Satellite TV enabled Lebanese immigrants to receive news about the war in Lebanon through Arab media sources instead of the mainstream Australian press, which tended to present the war from an Israeli perspective.

Satellite TV is also utilised for accessing Maronite religious services, one example is TV Lumiere (TV of light) ([http://www.telelumiere.com/eng/index.html](http://www.telelumiere.com/eng/index.html)). This station is supported by the Assembly of Catholic Patriarchs in Lebanon. It is very popular with housewives who watch it all day whilst they prepare food and perform their households tasks, particularly during Lent. Consuming TV Lumiere reinforces the diasporic imaginary of a Maronite viewing public linked to each other across time and space through Satellite Television. It also reinforces the position of the home as a sacred refuge against the profanities of the host-nation and the role of women as the spiritual keepers of the family, as we saw in Chapters Three and Four.

The Internet is the next most important electronic media after Satellite TV, which facilitates the flow of news and information from Lebanon and around the Lebanese diaspora. In Australia the premier online Lebanese forum is [http://www.daleelaustralia.com/](http://www.daleelaustralia.com/) - it has the latest news from Lebanon, it advertises social events in the Australian Lebanese community across the various sects, provides information on Lebanese entertainers internationally and has a social networking function. Other Internet sites which are popular with the Lebanese diaspora include: [WorldLebaneseCulturalUnion:http://www.wlcu.com/](http://www.wlcu.com/) and [http://www.leb.org/](http://www.leb.org/). Popular online news sources include: [http://www.dailystar.com.lb/](http://www.dailystar.com.lb/), [http://english.aljazeera.net](http://english.aljazeera.net), [http://web.naharnet.com/default.asp](http://web.naharnet.com/default.asp). The use of these websites is highest amongst the under 50’s. Websites also proliferate for all of the major political factions in Lebanon. The Hadchit community in Sydney is strongly allied with Samir Geagea’s Lebanese Forces, which is a former Christian militia and now political party with the following website: [http://www.lebanese-forces.org/](http://www.lebanese-forces.org/). The Hadchitis have their own branch of the Lebanese Forces with the following website: [http://www.samirgeagea.s5.com/](http://www.samirgeagea.s5.com/).
Online and virtual contact via the Internet and Satellite TV with Lebanon is supplemented by phone calls and email. According to the Hadchit Household Survey, telephone calls are the most common means to stay in touch with relatives in Lebanon from Sydney, with 50% of respondents claiming to ring Hadchit weekly, followed by 15% of respondents keeping in touch via email (see Figure 47). Telephone cards have brought down the price of phone calls between Lebanon and Australia and have greatly increased the access to cheap phone call rates. There are a range of companies that provide cheap call rates to Lebanon such as: [http://www.aussiephonecards.com.au](http://www.aussiephonecards.com.au). In my interviews most households estimate they spend $10-$15 AUD/month on keeping in touch with family in Hadchit by phone. The power of the voice is central to the maintenance of close kin relationships across distance.

**Figure 47: Contact with Hadchit. Source: Hadchit Household Survey, 2006.**
Remittance flows from the Sydney Hadchiti immigrant community, even after 40 years in Australia, continue to be significant (see Figure 48). The Hadchit Household Survey showed that 80% of households send remittances to relatives in Hadchit and 61% send money regularly. Face to face interviews in the Sydney Hadchit community found that the average amount sent per household was roughly $5000 AUD per annum, which amounts to approximately $2.5 million AUD worth of remittances from the Sydney Hadchit community to the home village annually. In addition to these funds the St. Raymond’s Charities of Hadchit raises funds for public works in the village. In 2006, $100,000 AUD was donated for projects in Hadchit by the St Raymond’s Charities of Hadchit Committee in Sydney. These resources significantly support household income in the village and have facilitated the move away from subsistence agriculture. During the Civil War years the Sydney Hadchitis funded a grocery store in the home village, which also facilitated the move away from agriculture.

**The second generation**

Return visits are an important part of the transnational flows between Sydney and Hadchit and have increased in number since the end of the Civil War in 1990. There has been a renewed engagement with broader Lebanese culture amongst the second generation many of whom have returned to Lebanon on a
regular basis. They have been looking for a way to feel proud of their Lebanese background in the context of the multicultural crisis in Australia, as we saw in Chapter Six. The Hadchit Household Survey shows that 31% of respondents have returned frequently to Lebanon with a further 30% having returned once in the last 5 years (see Figure 49).

![Figure 49: Return visits in the last five years. Source: Hadchit Household Survey, 2006.](image)

Through return visits to Lebanon kinship ties are maintained over time and across generations and marriages and alliances are made. It is not surprising, considering the lack of acceptance and belonging that many Lebanese people now confront in Australia that the second generation are also attempting to strengthen their links back to Lebanon. When asked why they like to visit Hadchit interviewees often say, “Australia is only work, but Lebanon is life”. Returnees are drawn to the unique ability of the Lebanese in Lebanon to live life to the fullest, despite war and uncertainty and it is this quality about life in Lebanon that draws them back. This excerpt from a poem about Beirut illustrates what the diaspora loves about it: ‘I love Beirut because Beirutis live as if they are going to die tomorrow and party as if they will live forever’ (source: I Love Beirut on [www.daleelaustralia.com](http://www.daleelaustralia.com)).

A common inversion discourse is the view that, despite war and uncertainty, they don’t worry in Lebanon, live for the moment and have nerves of steel, as this second generation returnee reflects:
They don’t have worries, they are happier than here. Even with bombs they don’t care – my uncle and my cousin said when we rang [during the 2006 summer war] “we’re just having coffee on the balcony, couldn’t be happier – the bombs are two hours away. No one is hurt, everyone is fine – come join us for a coffee” – that is their view.

By contrast, it is a common view that there is no ‘life’ in Australia, there is only work and, consequently, people live only for the future not in the here and now. They lament that in Australia you have to save your money and pay off your mortgage and everything is “work, work, work”. It is common to complain that work is taking an ever increasing proportion of time, even weekends, as if capitalism is eating them alive. Thus, Lebanon and Australian life are compared in the following way:

Here we plan a year ahead, where in Lebanon they live day by day and they make the most of everyday. They live in uncertainty they don’t know if they will wake up and the village will be rubble. They don’t live for the future. They live day by day and see what happens.

While, it is common for the diaspora to represent Lebanon and the Lebanese as being ‘care free’ and living for the moment, in general narratives of return to Lebanon and Hadchit depict the journey as a pilgrimage in search of religious identity, as this second generation returnee highlights:

It is fascinating to see the old churches in Lebanon. Everytime I have been I have visited the Churches – St. Charbels, St. Raymond’s I have said a prayer. Every time I go to Hadchit I go St. Raymond’s – I go before mass – they go for 1½ and it is in Arabic. But when I am in Hadchit if I am there for a week I go twice. There rest is social.

Additionally, narratives of return to Hadchit, focus on becoming reconnected to family and to place:

How would you describe the experience of going back to Hadchit?

You can’t imagine what it is going to be like, I found it more entwined, you feel your relatives, it was more getting connected to your relatives, because they were just names before, you knew em, but didn’t know em, and you were meeting them and getting to know them and the place – getting connected to the place.

Thus, the ‘return’ is conceptualised as a journey of re-connection and it is a common account to feel adjusted and adapted to the mountainous landscape of the Qadisha and Hadchit, as if it is a natural fit:
What did you think of the landscape?
Yeh I love it, I felt I was adapted for there, my skin cleared up – it was healthier. I was meant to live in this landscape. It climatically suited me. Here ...I can handle the snow. I found that health wise and physically I can see we were evolved for there and it was beautiful and the open space.

But, the most important re-connection returnees seek is with the land, ard, of Hadchit and it is a common narrative of return to describe touching and kissing the ground and to feel a love of the soil of Hadchit as if it is sacred and Holy. But even the intensity of this connection is experienced simultaneously with being ‘out of place’ and an ‘Australian’ in the village, as this second generation returnee describes:

I felt more Australian there, but on a spiritual level I felt connected and the ground was Holy – sacred and I wanted to take a piece of that land home and I felt an appreciation of Aboriginal people. I felt the soil was speaking to me – and then I understood what the Aboriginal people were talking about. When I went there I felt more Australian. They spoke too much in the village about everyone else’s life – they would tell you every detail about everyone’s life and the girls. When I got up and walked outside everyone knew I had got up and had breakfast. The gossiping got to me. Also – their spirituality – they are surrounded by saints and churches and they didn’t go to church on Sunday and I was shocked by that.

This interview highlights the construction of the village and its land, ard, as sacred and the interviewee describes coming to an appreciation of Aboriginal Australians and their spiritual connection to country after their return visit. Yet, the spiritual construction of the home village (in contrast to the profanity of the host-nation) is ‘undone’ by the lack of interest in religiosity and church attendance amongst the villagers themselves. Perhaps they don’t have to work so hard at being ‘spiritual’ in the home village as they live in the ‘centre’ and are connected to place? These narratives of connection/disconnection, and of the sacred and the secular, highlight both the liminality and the fragility of the construction of the homeland as being intrinsically sacred.
According to the Hadchit Household Survey, 28% of returnees strategically time their return visits for the St. Raymond’s Day Festival (see Figure 50), the patron saint of Hadchit, which is held in Hadchit every September. When asked why, they say they go there to dance ‘Dabki in the village square of their forefathers (see Figure 51). Many returnees tell me of an intensely emotional experience of belonging whilst they danced, but no sooner did it finish they once again felt like an ‘outsider’ in their parent’s village. In fact, for the second generation, finding identity and belonging in the home village of their parents has turned out to be fraught with contradictions. Often return migrants, especially the second generation, find themselves positioned as ‘Australians’ or at best ‘Mughtarib’ (return immigrant), but certainly not ‘locals’, as this interviewee tells us:

**Did they accept you in Hadchit?**

Yes and no. When you go there you sort of feel you are ‘in-between’, when you go there you feel like you are part of Hadchit and you are Lebanese and when you go there they call you the “Australian” – the “Australi” – it is like you are caught in two worlds because here you are still a ‘new Australian’ or a ‘wog’ and you feel that Hadchit is where you belong and then you go there and it is as if there is no where you belong – I don’t belong anywhere – where do I belong? – It is psychological.
To make matters worse, the second generation discover that their Arabic is indelibly tainted with the regional accent of their parents’, which contemporary Hadchitis now associate with the backward and unsophisticated ‘village identity’ that they strive to lose. Hence, many returnees find themselves caught in-between competing versions of modernity between Lebanon and Australia as this interview with a second generation returnee emphasises:

Your relatives accept you and then you got people there who will make fun of how you speak, because you have old fashioned Arabic. We speak like their forefathers used to. “Oh where’d you learn to speak Hadchiti?“ – “we learnt to speak it at home that is all we speak with our parents”. But, they go to Beirut and are more educated now and have city attitudes and they don’t want to be associated with the village and the mountains…they want to crawl up the hierarchy, they don’t want to be associated as country bumpkins, they want to be more ‘cosmopolitan’. But that is how I speak, but it takes a while. Like I had this argument with this one guy, I said to him- “you are making fun of me now, but you come to Australia ad see how you will survive. You will have to learn a new language and people will be telling you off, let’s see how you will survive – you’ll be lost there”. He felt a bit embarrassed.

Baldassar (2001) describes a similar disorientation for the second generation during ‘return visits’ to Italy, amongst the San Fiorese in Perth, who feel ‘out of place in both their old and new home (Baldassar 2001:339) and argues that the feeling of homelessness is a quintessential feature of the diasporic condition and an inherent feature of the migration process (Baldassar 2001). She argues that the movement back and forth of the return visit itself becomes ‘home’ for the deterritorialised migrant (Baldassar 2001; 338). I would argue, however, that the return visit for the Hadchitis actually allows them to unify the two competing conceptions of home, one that moves with the migrant and the other which is tied to the primordialism of place and ancestry. Dancing ‘Dabki’ in the village square of their forefathers achieves just this through an intense moment of ‘communitas’ (Tabar 2005; Turner and Turner 1978), wherein all obstacles are overcome…if only for that moment, as this description of dancing Dabki in St. Raymond’s square describes:
Dancing Dabki on St. Raymond’s day in Hadchit
I go for 18 days to Lebanon – I spend 7 days doing Beirut. The clubs in Beirut are English music. Where as the St. Raymon d’s Festival in Hadchit that is Arabic music and the Dabki dancing. I am really into it. I really love Dabki. It gives you a big high – I get emotional – you get sort of – you are with your family you don’t see them – but then you get really high and you feel like you belong, that this is where you should be for that moment. Then you come back to reality the next day and think that you work tomorrow and how are you going to make the next dollar.

The Dabki dance is the peak ritual of the return visit as it involves embodied repetition (Turner 1979). The dance steps are performed in unison, to the drum beat of the Tabel in the centre of the spiral dance. Rhythmic unity is central to the ability of Dabki to suppress time and to create the experience of ‘communitas’ (Turner and Turner 1978). Bottomley (1992) has, likewise, conceptualized the Greek circle dance, “the dance of life”, as a form of embodied resistance for the Greeks (Bottomley 1992:86-87). During return visits to Greece, she argues, the circle dance allows the immigrant to liberate themself from the “iron cage” of industrial capitalism, through the wild free spirit of dance (Bottomley 1992:84). Additionally, the circle dance moves in an anti-clockwise direction which is pivotal to its ability to suppress time and to create ritual space that is beyond time. Hence, Bottomley writes
There is in Greece a more general notion of a ‘dance of life’ which moves like circle dances, in an anti-clockwise direction (Bottomley 1992:86).

I would argue the Dabki dance for the Hadchitis serves much the same purpose. The embodied circular movement of the dance is the antidote to the experience of alienation and subjection in the host-nation, because the dance itself contains the experience of liminality - of connection, disconnection and rivalry simultaneously.

Many interviewees described a period of 10-15 years without making return visits through the 1970’s and 80’s and then a resumption of transnational interaction in the 1990’s after the end of the Civil War. The feelings of liminality were greatest during the first return visit, but over a period of five years and several visits second generation returnees described being able to accumulate belonging, as this interview illustrates:

The first trip I was a painting on the wall, the second trip it got a bit better. I went with Dad. It was better when he was there. It embedded me more when he was there. But then the third time, there was no troubles. I was with my brother. We were part of it, we were family and they got used to us, before that they hadn’t seen us for 15 years. The third trip was all about partying and I was there for four weeks. It was the life style, they are so relaxed, they don’t care about anything. They live in the minute, they don’t worry about work.

This interview also demonstrates the trend amongst the second generation to diversify the return visit to include visiting major tourism sites in Lebanon and to spend time in Beirut. Due to their imperfect fit in the ancestral village, the second generation are attracted irresistibly to the night life of Beirut. Here they strived to do what their parents or grandparents could never do, as ‘illiterate mountain peasants’ or ‘Jabaliye’ (mountain people), they wanted to join the fashionable, cosmopolitan expatriates and the educated elite of Lebanon on the dance floors and in the cafes of Rue Monot. This interview describes the common search for cosmopolitan modernity and belonging in Beirut, especially amongst young men:
In Beirut I didn’t speak much Arabic, mostly English. The night clubs are all English. I didn’t feel Lebanese in the night clubs. It feels like you are outside of Lebanon – they are underground. You could be anywhere in those spaces. No Dabki dancing in Beirut – it is all popular, latest English music and women in cages. They are regular night clubs like anywhere else. We’d go to the Argile bars late afternoon – late lunch/dinner. The Beirut clubs open at 10pm and go till dawn. The people are from all over the world. I like meeting Lebanese from everywhere. Seventy percent speak English. The night clubs in Beirut is like being at home in Sydney. But the St. Raymond’s I feel like a true Lebanese and Hadchit person – outside with the Arabic music. In Beirut you just feel like a tourist. You don’t know that you are even in Lebanon (cosmopolitan space). You get a good feeling from going to Beirut now unlike 10 years ago with the civil war, it has been re-built and the people are beautiful looking. You get in the centre of Beirut and everything is colourful. It was important to go there and to see what our heritage is and what our real family is like, whereas here there is always a negative connotation with Lebanese. They never focus on our family values. Whereas in Lebanon it is always about that.

In this interview excerpt the subject describes looking for a cosmopolitan place amongst the ‘beautiful people’, a space that could be anywhere, not even in Lebanon and he contrasts this with the home village, which is ‘Arabic’. Second generation returnees seek access to a cosmopolitan modernity, which they feel excluded from in Australia due to the “negative connotation with Lebanese”. Hence, the lack of ability for the second generation of Hadchitis in Sydney to translate their acquisition of Australian cultural capital into national belonging in Australia has given impetus to switch strategies and attempt to acquire transnational cultural capital and national belonging back in Lebanon in a way that their forefathers never could as rural peasants or ‘Fillahin’.

What happens, however, to the feelings of attachment to Australia when returnees are in Hadchit? It is common to feel homesick for Australia even as they are feeling ‘at home’ in Lebanon and Hadchit, as this returnee describes:

**Did you feel connected to Hadchit?**
Yes and no, it is sort of like when you are there you miss where you are from, you get homesick for Australia because that is where you are from, but you still felt the connection there, even though you weren’t brought up there, you still felt you were part of it.

This state of ambiguous belonging undoes the claim to an ‘absolute homeland’ where the immigrant can seamlessly belong. Indeed, the contradiction between
the two places is signified by the rivalry and competition between the Sydney and Lebanon based Hadchitis.

One of the most intense forms of rivalry is over competing claims to and displays of *najeh* or success. The returning immigrants feel compelled to prove their *najeh* or success through displaying symbols of their acquired material wealth in a visual performance before their home town, but often it is just a ‘show’, as this returnee describes:

**Do you think Hadchit people have a misconception about how wealthy people are in Australia?**

> It’s because people go there and bullshit. They say I have this, I have this, I own that. When I got there I tried to say it isn’t that easy in Australia. There are gas bills, electricity and explain what a mortgage is. But, there are people who go there and people don’t know em, say they say I have this and I have that. They come back here, they probably have nothing. They want to be ‘seen’ to be successful.

These competing discourses of ‘success’, *najeh*, are important to the immigrants – after all what was the purpose of migration if it wasn’t to find material success? The retort of the villagers is to elevate connection to place, culture and religion over the material success of the émigré, as we saw in the “Ode to the Immigrant” in the previous section. This leaves the émigré caught in the migrant’s conundrum: they can gain material wealth through migration, but instead become ‘spiritually poor’ and ‘culturally backward’.

Marriage is another form of intense rivalry between the Sydney and Lebanon based Hadchitis. It is a common view that the women and men who return to the village have access to all the best ‘stock’ when it comes to selecting partners to marry. This turns on its head the discourse of superiority the town’s people assert over the diaspora and leads to tension and ‘attitude’ as this second generation woman reflects:

Some of the girls were intimidated by me – they thought we had come there to ‘steal’ the men. I was walking in and I was getting all this ‘attitude’ – then I realised what the issue was – because most of the guys would like to come to Australia – so the Australian girls have the option of the best guys and the local girls think they are left with slim pickings. There was a lot of ‘attitude’ – “I am not here to get married – they are all yours” – somehow they didn’t get the message.
The contradictions and rivalries between the emigrants and the villagers are in some ways unresolvable and enduring. However, in practice immigrants live with and have perfected the art of ‘dual belonging’ in both Lebanon and Australia. Dual belonging is achieved through making a division between one’s ‘everyday home’ in Australia and the conversion of the ancestral village into a ‘spiritual homeland’, as this second generation returnee explains:

What is your relationship to Hadchit?
Australia is home, I love Australia, this is where I belong, this is where I am connected, this is my base. Lebanon is my spiritual home – Australia is my other home.

This interview excerpt sums up beautifully how the contradictions of belonging and place are resolved by converting the home village into an ancestral and spiritual motherland, which is the ultimate source of life through its land, ard, even if you can’t live there or seamlessly belong there anymore.

**Liminality and ambivalence**

The two accounts of return to Hadchit examined in this chapter each dealt with the duality of connection and disconnection. Indeed, the return visit is the ultimate liminal experience. My own auto-ethnographic account of return to Hadchit, as presented in the Introduction, likewise highlighted the ambivalent construction of belonging in the ancestral village. Why is this so? The relationship between homeland and diaspora peoples in the broader literature on migration has been conceptualised as inherently ambivalent. Winland has discussed it as a relationship of ‘desire and disdain’ (Winland 2002), while Baldassar has conceptualised it as a competition between the search for sistemazione, economic success, and campanalismo, or attachment to place (Baldassar 2001). Hage has characterised the experience of return visits to Lebanon amongst the Lebanese diaspora as: “khallas”, the end - “I am never coming back to this country” (Hage 2007). Liechtman similarly has written of the ambivalence in group membership encountered by “Afro-Libinais”, or Lebanese from Senegal, when they return to Lebanon, as they are not African, nor are they Lebanese, she argues, but could more accurately be described as a distinctive ethnic group in their own right – as “Afro-Libinais” (Leichtman 2005).
The contested emotions between homeland and diaspora peoples flow in both directions. Those in the homeland also resent the diaspora. Labaki indicates that many Lebanese in Lebanon resent the control the diaspora has over the country because they control the purse strings through remittance flows, the control of business and the banking sector (Labaki 2003). Indeed, the homeland could be said to be ‘dependant’ upon the diaspora. However, I would argue it is actually a relationship of mutual dependence, as the diaspora is dependant upon relationships with those in the ‘homeland’ for the symbolic construction of meaning and attachment to place.

What is at stake in these emotional flows are the contested versions of authenticity, situatedness and culture, which are not just constructed within the confines of the homeland territory (where these notions certainly are not agreed upon in any case), but also from a distance via transnational flows between the diaspora and the homeland. Peleikas (2000), drawing on Appadurai (1996) has discussed how locality is constructed by players not just situated within the ‘home village’, but often from a distance, through the flows of emotion, people, remittances and gifts, or by watching Satellite TV. The representation of the homeland itself, via visual imagery, such as the Maronite discourse on Lebanon as a lost Holy Land, illustrates how the Lebanese diaspora constructs Lebanon as a locality. Not only is Lebanon constructed from a multiplicity of positions, so too are the Lebanese people. Just as there are multiple versions of Lebanon, that exist alongside one another, there are multiple and contested versions of who the Lebanese people are. This dynamic lies at the heart of the difficulties and disorientation encountered by émigrés during the return visit, as the multiple versions and discourses on what Lebanon is and who the Lebanese people are come face to face and clash.

Through the journey of return, the pilgrim seeks to overcome that which separates them from home and homeland, to overcome the ravages of time and distance and to experience spiritual renewal through ‘communitas’ and regain bodily wholeness through the Dabki dance (Turner 1979). However the irony, according to Bowman, is that the pilgrim actually reproduces the contested
contradictions they seek to overcome. The sacred does not, therefore, transcend the cultural:

Pilgrimages are journeys to the sacred, but the sacred is not something which stands beyond the domain of the cultural, it is imagined, defined, and articulated within cultural practice (Bowman 1991:120).

Through the Maronite construction of Lebanon as a lost Holy Land, the Christian version of Lebanon is reproduced and the pilgrim both produces and perpetuates the multiple versions of Lebanon. The fragility of Christian Lebanon is revealed when reality intrudes upon the fantasy construction and can even unravel it. The pilgrim must arrive at the airport, travel through “non-Christian” parts of Lebanon, deal with the realities of war and conflict and the precariousness of daily life. The binary opposition between the ‘sacred and the profane’, as it has been constructed by the diaspora, can even be turned on its head through the return visit and rupture their dream of Lebanon.

Hence, many returnees express disappointment that the home village has changed, that it was not timeless, that they have satellite dishes and don’t go to church that much anymore, or that the women have more freedom in Lebanon than in Sydney. There are so many contradictions and the longer the returnee has been away the worse they become. In fact, the return visit can unravel the version of ‘Lebanon’ that those in the diaspora hold to be true. It can even invert relations and many returnees report that, despite war and uncertainty, life is actually ‘better’ in Lebanon, because the Lebanese know how to “live”. This particular discourse can result in an even worse crisis for the immigrant, after all what was the purpose of migration if it wasn’t to have a better life than those we left behind? Hage (2005) has discussed this as a “crisis of migration”, when the immigrant realises that their desires for upward mobility might be unrealisable in the host nation, but even worse untranslatable back in the home country or that life might be better for those that did not migrate at all. One reaction to this conundrum, which is emerging amongst second and subsequent generations, is to move away from Lebaneseness and to aspire to a more cosmopolitan global identity.
Abdelhady has examined diasporic notions amongst elite Lebanese expatriate professionals in Paris, New York and Montreal (Abdelhady 2008). Amongst this group of Lebanese expatriates, she argues, cosmopolitan notions of belonging predominate over ethnicity as a form of identification and the relationship with the homeland is not dominated by the myth of return. Rather, it is argued that they find multiple sites of belonging and are able to recreate home without a discourse of return. The ability to claim “multiple homes and no return” seems to operate as a class signifier in exile and diasporic communities (Abdelhady 2008:65). That is, the more ‘cosmopolitan’ cultural capital one can claim, the less one needs the ‘homeland’, or the desire to return to it, for the construction of identity.

**Conclusion**

This chapter showed how contested ‘being at home’ in Hadchit is for émigré’s, their children and grandchildren. I conclude that the detachment from place, as a result of migration, leads to a constant state of ambivalent belonging in both the home and host-nation (*el ghurba*). How is this conundrum resolved? This study finds that immigrants from Hadchit have developed ‘dual belonging’, which makes a division between two kinds of home. Sydney is designated the centre of ‘home’, while Hadchit is converted into a ‘spiritual homeland’ and shrine, where émigrés can visit to accumulate a symbolic connection to place, but no longer can live or seamlessly belong. In the next chapter we return to Australia to examine the process of becoming ‘Lebanese-Australian’.
Field notes: July 29th 2006
The satellite TV was on in every house I went to – LBC and Al Jazeera, for most families it is the focus right now, often well into the night, we were up till 2am last night because of the time gap. I’ve been drinking 5-6 cups of Lebanese coffee a day and I’m a bit strung out. Many can’t sleep and are distressed by the situation and are crying every night. Every time a town is bombed we look at a map of Lebanon to see where it is located. Everyone seems to feel powerless and dubious of the representation of the conflict by the Australian press and ‘sold out’ by Howard in terms of how their interests are being represented at the national level. The scenes of Lebanese in Beirut pleading to be evacuated because ‘they were Aussies too’ were very telling. There was a perceived link between the Cronulla Riots and the racism against Lebanese Australians and their treatment in Lebanon once the war started.

The Cronulla Riots of December 2005 and the July 2006 Summer War in Lebanon occurred within six months of each other and together were the dominant influences of the period in which I conducted my fieldwork. The above excerpt from my fieldnotes, at the time, captures the intensive period of anti-Lebanese racism in Australia that was generated by the convergence of the two events. This chapter examines how the experience of racism amplifies the liminality of the second generation and examines their struggles to find their cultural identity and to belong in Australia.

Migration and Whiteness

Australia has had four major immigration policies throughout the 20th Century: the White Australia Policy, 1901-1945, the Assimilation Policy, 1945-1965, the Integration Policy, 1965-1972 and the Multiculturalism Policy in 1973 (Hodge 2006:15-16). Whiteness was the basis for immigrant inclusion/exclusion and citizenship during the White Australia Policy. The White Australia Policy was driven by the fear of Australia’s proximity to Asia and the ‘yellow peril’ and privileged migration from the United Kingdom, as the means to expand Australia’s population, while Asian migration was excluded by the Immigration Restriction Acts of 1901, 1908 and 1910 (Hodge 2006:16).
The shift to the Assimilation Policy in 1945 reflected changes in Australia’s migration scheme in the Post WWII era. The ideology of ‘assimilation’ expected immigrants of non-English speaking background to become absorbed into the Australian mainstream. Indeed, assimilation provided the dominant policy framework for immigrant incorporation in both Australia and the USA until the 1960’s. Assimilation was also the dominant theoretical framework, led by the Chicago School of Sociology (Wirth 1946), to conceptualise the process by which immigrants became absorbed into the American Melting Pot and generally dominated the study of migration elsewhere until the 1960’s (Schmitter Heisler 2008:83).

Hage (2003) argues, however, the shift in Australia to the Integration Policy in 1965 reflected the change in the migration program to seek new sources of labour from Southern Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean and the fact that these new immigrants simply didn’t assimilate (Hage 2003:57). The Integration Policy still demanded immigrant absorption, but accepted that it would take longer. The expansion of Australia’s migration program in the 1960’s was principally driven by the need for labour to expand Australia’s manufacturing sector, which could not be recruited in sufficient numbers from Britain (Hage 2003:54; Humphrey 1998:27). The increasing racial plurality of Australia ultimately led to the formation of the Multicultural Policy under the Labor government in 1973. It has been argued that multiculturalism simply reflected the unavoidable reality of Australian life after the 1960’s:

Descriptively…multiculturalism was not a government choice, ‘multiculturalism’ merely described the inescapable fact that Australia’s immigration program, which had become diversified throughout the 1960’s, had created a society with more than a hundred different minority ethnic cultures that existed with but also transformed – and were in turn transformed by-Australia’s Anglo-Celtic culture (Hage 2003:58).

What were the implications of racial pluralism in Australia for the maintenance of a White conception of Australia, as founded under the White Australia policy? Hage (1998: 20) in White Nation argues that the shift to multiculturalism was a policy of immigrant incorporation and containment aimed at the maintenance of White rule in the context of an increasingly pluralistic
society. Indeed, he highlights the superficiality of tolerance and postulates that “White Multiculturalism” actually grew out of a White supremacy fantasy regarding the decline in the centrality of Whiteness for the Australian identity:

White multiculturalism cannot admit to itself that migrants and Aboriginal people are actually eroding the centrality of White people in Australia. This is because the very viability of White multiculturalism as a government ideology resides precisely in its capacity to suppress such a reality (Hage 1998: 22).

Out of this ‘discourse of Anglo-decline’ emerged Australia’s own form of neo-fascism, as epitomised by the rise of Pauline Hanson’s One Nation Party (Hage 1998:232). The Howard conservative government, which was elected in 1996, absorbed and popularised Hanson’s anti-immigrant sentiment and this led to the resurrection of colonial xenophobia and overt forms of public racism in Australia (Griffiths 2005:160). Indeed, Hodge (2006:18) argues, the election of the Howard government marked a return to more ‘regressive’ migration policies and an end to multiculturalism. The return to the politics of immigrant exclusion was ultimately symbolised by the decision of the Howard government to change the Department of Immigration, Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (DIMIA) to the Department of Immigration and Citizenship (DIAC) on the 23rd of January 2007.

The Cronulla Riots of December 2005, in a beachfront suburb of Sydney, became the ultimate expression of Australia’s multicultural crisis, but specifically focused on the ‘lack of integration’ of Lebanese immigrants. The riots built up over a number of days starting on December 4th 2005 when a verbal exchange took place after three lifesavers approached a group of Lebanese men on Cronulla beach. On December 6th the Daily Telegraph ran the story: “Fight for Cronulla: We want our beach back”, which was considered a ‘call to arms’. Indeed, the mass media has been criticized by Lattas and Poynting for stirring up the moral panic (Lattas 2007; Poynting 2006). In particular, 2GB talk back radio broadcaster Alan Jones played a prominent role in inciting the riot by fuelling anti-Middle Eastern sentiments over the airwaves. The final galvanizing force was a series of text messages, which circulated widely calling for attacks against Lebs, one read: “This Sunday every Aussie in the Shire get down to North
Cronulla to support the Leb and Wog bashing day, bring your mates, lets show them that this is our beach and they’re never welcome” (Lattas 2007:301). On the 11th of December 2005 approximately 5000 people gathered on Cronulla beach to protest against recently reported incidents of assaults. Violence broke out after a large segment of the mostly Caucasian crowd chased a man of ‘Middle Eastern appearance’ into a hotel and two other youths were assaulted on a train. The following nights saw several retaliatory violent assaults in the communities near Cronulla and Maroubra, large gatherings of protesters around south western Sydney and an unprecedented police lock-down of Sydney beaches and surrounding areas between Wollongong and Newcastle (Wikipedia 2009a).

**The construction of the Arab Other**

Anti-Lebanese racism is not new for Australian society; in fact it can be dated back to the first arrival of Lebanese immigrants in Australia in the 1880’s. As we saw in Chapter Two, until the 1920’s the Lebanese, who were then called Syrians or Turks, were classified as Asiatic Aliens and denied citizenship under the White Australia Policy (Monsour 2002). During WWI the Lebanese were also regarded as Aliens as they were classified as Turks, as former subjects of the Ottoman Empire, and, thus, were considered potential enemies within (Monsour 2002:35). Due to the pressure to assimilate into Australian society, in this early period, many Lebanese anglicised their names and, due to the lack of access to their own religious institutions, became absorbed into Australian Catholic and Protestant churches (Batrouney 1985). While the Cronulla Riots are the most intense outward expression of anti-Lebanese racism this country has seen to date, in truth, it has never been easy for the Lebanese to find acceptance in Australian society.

Over the last 15 years anti-Lebanese racism has accelerated. It has been generally linked to Lebanese difference, Islamic disadvantage and the rise of international Islamophobia, especially since September 11 (Hage 2006, 2002; Collins 2000; Poynting et al 2004). Indeed, many authors have been tracing the cycle of the intensification and merging of anti-Muslim, anti-Lebanese and anti-Arab sentiment since the first Gulf War in 1991 (Hage 1998, Hage 2002, Hage
In *Bin Laden In The Suburbs* Poynting et al (2004:11) argue that the Arab Other has now emerged as the conglomerate of these fears and has been converted into the ‘Folk Devil’ of our times as the result of successive waves of moral panics especially since the late 1990’s. In particular, they note the convergence of a series of international and local events such as: ethnic crime gangs, race rapes, asylum seekers, September 11 and the 2002 bomb blasts in Bali in creating this dynamic (Hage 2004a:11). Politicians and the media have fed the development of this moral panic, which has come to focus the public gaze upon the Arab Other and, thus, conflated a range of peoples, communities and cultures into a single category.

However, what is more interesting to me is the intersection between the current moral panic against the Arab Other and the broader crisis in Australian multiculturalism, which seems to have found its ultimate expression in the Cronulla Riots. Why do the two appear as if they are converging? Or, more specifically, why has the fear of the Arab other come to epitomise the end of Australia’s ‘tolerance’ towards ethnic difference? It appears that Australian society is experiencing a ‘crisis of Whiteness’ (Kincheloe and Steinberg 1991:11), which finds a parallel in the American case (Goldstein 2006; Kaufman 2004; Root 1996; Steinberg 1981). The ‘crisis of Whiteness’, Kincheloe and Steinberg (1991) argue, is the inevitable outcome of pre–World War II migrants and their descendants accumulating Whiteness and, ultimately, challenging the status of White Anglo-Saxon Protestants (WASPS) in American society. Moreover, as Ang (2001) argues, the fact that immigrants like the Jews and the Irish were able to accumulate Whiteness revealed that ‘Whiteness’ itself is not an innate biological truth, but a social construction:

> Whiteness is not a biological category but a political one: to be ‘white’ signifies a position of power and respectability, of belonging and entitlement, but who is admitted to this position of global privilege is historically variable. Some people have become white over time as their status and power have risen, such as the Irish and Jews in the US (Ang 2001:188).

In the Australian case, Hage (1998) analyses the ‘crisis of Whiteness’ (Kincheloe and Steinberg 1991, 11) as a ‘discourse of Anglo-decline’ (Hage 1998:79) and draws on similar arguments to the American case. However, Hage
goes further to suggest that migrants who refuse to integrate present an even greater challenge to ‘Whiteness’ than those who attempt to accumulate it through the process of assimilation, because they possess an independent ‘will’, which competes with the national will. Or, worse still, migrants who refuse to integrate challenge the ‘centrality of Whiteness’ to the Australian identity (Hage 1998:22).

It would seem that, in the spectrum of Australian ethnic groups, the Arab Other has become the ultimate unassimilable immigrant. Where do Maronite Catholic Lebanese find themselves situated when the Arab Other is mostly assumed to be Muslim and predominates as the ‘folk devil’ of our times?

**Christian versus Muslim**

Historically, Lebanese Christians have sought to find acceptance in Australian society through their shared Christianity (Batrouney 1992). Hage argues that some Lebanese Christians actually deploy their Christianity as a means to accumulate Whiteness and, hence, greater belonging in Australian society (Hage 1998:60). The Maronites have a long tradition of White self-racialisation, as we saw in Chapter Two, which pre-dates Lebanese emigration to Australia, which derives from the early engagement of the Lebanese Maronites with the French during the development of capitalism in Lebanon in the 19th Century. According to Hage:

> Christian Lebanese identity was experienced by those identifying with it as European and white, and as intrinsically endowed with a causal power to generate the very capitalist social practices that produced it (Hage 2004b:118).

No doubt the Maronites brought this pattern of colonial Whiteness with them when they came to Australia. Through my ethnographic research with Hadchiti immigrants I have noticed many Lebanese Maronites have developed a discourse of denial in relation to the state of anti-Lebanese racism in Australia. Many of the Christian Lebanese I interviewed identified Muslims of all backgrounds, not just Lebanese, as destroying the good name of the Lebanese in Australia; a reputation they claim was forged by the early Christian Lebanese immigrants. When asked about the Cronulla Riots, many of the Christian Lebanese that I interviewed blamed the riots on the bad behaviour of the Muslim Lebanese and they rarely identified anti-Lebanese racism as the source of the
difficulties facing the Lebanese community in Australia. Indeed, many claimed to have never experienced racism, that the trouble was not in their neighbourhood and there was even sympathy expressed for dominant Anglo-Australian attitudes towards Lebanese Australians as depicted in the media. The following interview highlights the strategy of differentiation and distancing from Muslims commonly deployed by Hadchit immigrants:

What do you think about Cronulla?
It is all the media, if they know you it won’t change their opinion. But, we have copped a battering in the press. The Italians went through it, the Chinese went through it, but we have just never been able to get over it. We have been in the media for a while now.

Does it affect your daily life and the youth?
It affects the youth more because they work outside the community, they have more exposure so they see a lot more people, in the city and they cop it — they get stereotyped. Sometimes they get asked three times what are you — where are you from ie Australia — no your family —Lebanon — are you Christian or Muslim? The fact that the media is differentiating between Christian and Muslim is making it worse because they are saying it is becoming religious.

This interview expresses the view that the Lebanese have “never been able to get over it”, unlike the Chinese and the Italians. The current fashion, amongst Lebanese Christians, of wearing large and prominent crosses attests to their need to differentiate themselves from Lebanese Muslims. As the above interview subject describes, it is common to be asked three times “What are you?” Thus, crosses are deployed as a strategy to gain acceptance, through appeals to Christianity as a form of Whiteness. When asked whether they are effective in diffusing the effects of anti-Lebanese racism, interviewees will generally answer yes. However, when asked about personal experiences of racism, an apparent contradiction between their discourse and experience on the ground emerges. On the one hand, they claim that their Christianity diffuses anti-Lebanese racism and that wearing symbols of their Christianity assists in this, yet on the other hand many are actually experiencing racism on a daily basis. In truth then, many Christian Lebanese find that there are limits to their ability to convert their Christianity into belonging in Australian society, because ultimately they can only aim to be like White Australians, but will always fall short (Hage 1998:61).
A growing minority amongst the Maronites, however, are starting to see the limitations of their Christianity to protect them from anti-Lebanese rejection. This is because the Cronulla Riots were actually an event that targeted Lebanese Australians without differentiating between Lebanese Christians and Muslims. Consequently, it has prompted a growing minority within the Lebanese Christians, especially the youth, to see beyond their sectarian consciousness to their shared plight with Lebanese Muslims. The following response to the Cronulla Riots from an 18 year old Christian teenager illustrates the changing consciousness that is starting to develop amongst the Maronites:

When it was the Cronulla Riots I was crying because I’m Christian and I’m Lebanese and there was a picture that it was the Lebanese and it was the Muslims, but whether it was the Christians or Muslims it doesn’t matter because it was Lebanese people in general who were being targeted… and you know you wanted to go and fight…if we’re being targeted that much….

The Cronulla Riots also galvanised alliances between Muslim and Christian Lebanese to defend the Lakemba Mosque. In the aftermath of the riot there was a rumour, spread by text message, that the Lakemba Mosque would be attacked in retaliation. The following interview with a young Muslim Lebanese man who participated in the defence of the Mosque, describes the atmosphere of cooperation between Christian and Muslim Lebanese during the intensive siege:

The stakes were so high for us during the aftermath of the Cronulla Riot that threats were made to burn down the Lakemba Mosque – it was bad enough that they beat us on the beaches, but to have the heart of our community threatened meant that we felt our very existence in Sydney was precarious at that point. [Due to the gravity of the situation, he went on to say] The crescent and the cross stood together that night to defend the Mosque.

Thus, the Cronulla Riots cannot simply be conceptualised as an issue of Christian versus Muslim or Anglo versus Lebanese; but go beyond these dichotomies to the question of who has the right to call themselves Australian and to share in the benefits of the Australian identity itself. The riots might be interpreted, therefore, as White Australians asserting and delineating their right to monopolise the category ‘Australian’ and to assert their hegemony over the archetypal symbol of Australian leisure: the beach. Thus, the struggle on the
beach that day might be seen as a metonym for the national hegemonic struggle over the Australian identity. Is Australia, at its core, a White country with a dominant Anglo Saxon culture, or is Australia, at its core, a multicultural society?

Lattas (2007) theorises that ‘the beach’ symbolises the relaxed civility, which underpins the construction of national belonging in Australia, while Lebanese immigrants are depicted by their disordered subjectivity, disrespect and lack of peace and harmony. Indeed, he argues, the rioters sought to reclaim Australia’s “direction, its true existential project and being” from the disorder generated by the unwelcome presence of the Arab Other (Lattas 2007:303).

Thus, for the 5000 rioters on Cronulla beach that day, the category Lebanese simply represented all ethnic Australians in that it was an intense moment of fear and rejection of the ethnic other. This collapsing of ethnic Australia into the label Lebanese was typified by the T-shirts and body painting which read: “You flew here we grew here”.

But, more telling was the actual lynching mobbing of people for their apparent Middle Eastern Appearance. As it turned out a couple of the individuals were actually of Greek and Bangladeshi background (Hage 2006a). Here we see the disjuncture between what was said, “No Lebs here” and what was done, i.e. any Australian who happened to have an ethnic appearance was victimised. In this way the category Leb merged with ethnic and was opened up, in that moment, to include anyone of non-Anglo appearance. In some ways, then, the Cronulla Riots were more than simply another episode in the unfolding story of anti-Lebanese racism in Australia. In fact, the riots clearly represented a merging of anti-Lebanese racism with a crisis of Whiteness. Thus, the plight of Lebanese Australians and the plight of multiculturalism in Australia have come to be intimately interwoven.

**Living with racism**

When one speaks to the older migrating generation within the Hadchit community they will tell you stories of their early experiences of racism in Australia 40 years ago, it usually involved their denigration as being ‘wogs’. An

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35 The Lebanese response to this is “you came in chains we came in planes.”
example of this kind of encounter is encapsulated by the story of a group of Hadchit men at the local club in Auburn getting into a brawl with a local Anglo-Australian who demanded they “speak English” and they responded: “Sure we will speak English, but not in our own families and with our cousins you cannot deny us the right to speak our own language within our own community”.

When considering these early experiences of racism confronted by the Hadchitis in Australian society, it can be deduced that the Hadchitis had a lowly social status as newly arrived immigrants of non-English speaking background—the men worked in the factories and the women cleaned the hospitals. The Hadchit experience of racism in those days could be explained by their poor acquisition of the symbols of Australian cultural capital. However, it is ironic that the second generation in the Hadchit community, some 40 years later, seems to experience racism even more acutely than their parents a generation ago. This is despite having been born in Australia, speaking English with an Australian accent, most having completed year 12 and many having tertiary qualifications, almost all working and earning good salaries, but, most importantly, identifying as being Australian. Indeed, many members of the Hadchit community have attained the symbols associated with success, but still they find themselves locked out of the Australian identity. For example, it was a common account amongst interviewees, particularly the youth, that the six weeks following the Cronulla Riot were experienced as an intensive period of anti-Lebanese rejection. One young man told me how he was too frightened to eat his lunch outside of his work place in the suburb of Miranda during that time.

But, the experience of daily racism also manifests in a more subtle way. This quote from a 21 year old male who works in retail illustrates the lengths he will go to be seen as a good ethnic and not Lebanese:

I dress to where I’m going to be working, if I am working in the city it is business suits and pinstripes. I use different language if I am working in the city it is Ma’am and sir…in the city they are more corporate…people say to me are you Italian or Greek. Because I present myself well and I have proper English and I am actually respectful and courteous. I uphold myself to a degree to where people respect me and people who don’t see Lebanese people as respectful see a stereotype. I never tell people I’m Lebanese when I’m working I say my parents were born in Lebanon—I’m born here I’m Australian.
From this quote it can be seen how the subject tries to pass for White by being courteous and respectful, values not normally attributed to the Lebanese, so he says. In fact, passing for White, in his case, actually means aspiring to be mistaken as Italian or Greek, because it is closer to Whiteness in the pecking order of good and bad ethnics which makes up Australian society today.

Living with racism has also led to a siege mentality amongst members of the Hadchit community, who limit their physical mobility around the city of Sydney. This quote from a Real Estate agent in the Parramatta describes how Sydney has become a divided city:

The North Shore was a bit funny – I worked there for over a year. One time the police pulled me over on the highway and they were looking at my license and they saw that I was from out west, which is a 45 minute drive away, they said “what are you doing here”, like over the bridge is a different country and then asked to see my business card – when they saw it they were sort of alright, but it makes us want to stay in this area because we’re not wanted. We are stuck in a shoe box…you know you can go to S/W but you got to stop at Hurstville because after that it is Cronulla and if you go North you got to stop before you cross the Harbour Bridge because we’re not wanted there. So we’re sort of stuck between the city and out West.

The imperative to stay in their “shoe box,” as the subject in the quote describes, is a process that disciplines the Lebanese to stay in their designated suburbs and, in practice, is a strategy of spatial containment often enforced by police harassment. However, the Cronulla Riots were also an example of the punishment metered out to Lebanese who step out of their box and dare to transgress into the recreational zones of the city, such as the beach, which some Australians would like to imagine as White only space, if it weren’t for all those migrants (especially Lebanese) who keep showing up.

What does the Hadchit experience of racism tell us about the broader experience of racism in Australia’s Lebanese community? Anti-Lebanese racism is usually conceptualised as relating to the marginality of the Lebanese in terms of their high unemployment rate, their poverty and their difference, particularly Lebanese Muslims (Poynting 2004:12-13). But why can’t this group of young, trendy, affluent second generation Lebanese Christians feel a sense of belonging in Australia? Although they now have accumulated the symbols of success they
simply are not converting into national belonging, instead, they have hit a glass ceiling, which now blocks their ability to convert their cultural capital into national belonging.

Ong’s (1999) analysis of the limits of accumulation for wealthy Hong Kong immigrants in San Francisco is relevant to understanding the Hadchiti predicament. Ong (1999) argues that despite their wealth and acquisition of the symbols of success in American society, such as university degrees, million dollar homes and Rolex watches, the Hong Kong immigrants have hit a glass ceiling which ultimately limits their ability to belong in America (Ong 1999:108). Ong describes this barrier as the White business establishment which upholds the centrality of Whiteness to economic power and belonging in the upper echelons of American society:

They soon discover that just as there are limits to flexible accumulation in business, so are there limits to cultural accumulation for gaining prestige...Chinese immigrants...cannot easily covert such symbolic capital into high social standing in Anglo circles (Ong 1999:108)

Hage (1998) similarly argues that the limits to accumulation are reached when faced with those who do not have to accumulate symbolic capital or Whiteness but actually embody it naturally as what Bourdieu calls the ‘aristocracy of the field’ (Hage 1998: 61-62). In the Australian case this is the Anglo elite, who innately embody Australianness and Whiteness. Thus, for the Hadchitis, there is only so much Whiteness they can accumulate and as long as ‘Anglo-ness’ remains the core of the Australian identity, they will always find themselves on the outside looking in. To make matters worse, however, it appears the current crisis in multiculturalism and the moral panic against the Arab Other has actually caused the second generation of Hadchitis to suffer a social devaluation as Lebanese Australians, which has actually led to a loss of their accumulated cultural capital and instead they are going backwards. Tabar (2007) has also observed the devalorisation of the symbolic value of Lebanese ethnic cultural capital in Australia due to attacks on Lebanese youth ethnicity (Tabar 2007:158).
**Lost in translation**

The convergence of the Cronulla Riots with the July 2006 Summer War in Lebanon, highlighted the tenuous position of Lebanese-Australian dual nationals:

**Field notes: July 30th 2006, Sydney**
The whole discussion of Lebanese-Australian dual nationals seemed to smack of double standards. The Lebanese were depicted as wingers and ungrateful for all that had been done for them. A prominent newspaper columnist was saying that their citizenship should have run out after living back in Lebanon for more than five years. No one would ever say that about Aussies living in London. But dual nationals seem to be increasingly represented as having divided loyalties – and only putting their hands up when they’re needy. So the Lebanese seem to be getting pinched from both ends at the moment…

The media representation of the evacuation process from war torn Lebanon, as discussed in my field notes above, represented Lebanese-Australian dual nationals as epitomising the immigrant with divided loyalties. This episode of intensive media scrutiny accentuated the tensions between dual nationality, citizenship and cultural identity amongst the Lebanese in Australia. This section will examine how cultural identity, especially amongst the second generation, is defined between competing claims to national belonging/exclusion and ethnicity between the home and host nation.

Baldassar (2001:338) suggests that second generation immigrants possess a migrant habitus that is different to their parents, who more readily accepted the status of guest. Their children, on the other hand, often identify as being Australian and have acquired components of White cultural capital such as language, accent and education and, therefore, feel more affronted by the experience of racism in the host society. Hence, the experience of being caught in-between is a quintessential experience of second generation migrants (Baldassar 2001). In the case of the Hadchiti community, the second generation experience of being caught in-between is made more acute because of the stigmatisation of Lebanese ethnicity in Australia.

The Hadchit Youth Set provide an interesting set of second generation opinions and dilemmas about the limits to reproducing the Hadchiti identity in Australia and the process of becoming Lebanese-Australian. They meet regularly at the St. Raymond’s Hall. The Youth Set committee is mixed in
gender, where the adult committee is not, and represent themselves as being more technologically savvy than their adult counterparts in the main committee. They see their mission as the perpetuation of the Hadchiti cultural identity amongst the younger generation in Sydney. The following interview with a committee member highlights the contradictions of reproducing the Hadchiti identity in Australia:

**Do you have to live in Hadchit to be Hadchiti?**
No – there are more exciting parts of Lebanon than Hadchit.

**Is Australia home?**
Definitely I was born here.

**Are Hadchit organizations and the Hadchit centre important to you?**
That is the long term viability that is for the next generation so they know where they come from. Hadchit is the place where my ancestors came from.

It is common amongst the Youth Set to feel that the village social networks are their strongest allegiances in Australia, as this interview shows:

I socialise with Hadchit boys for the most part, but not necessarily cousins. My social network is based around my village. I socialise with other Lebanese not from Hadchit, but the main association is with Hadchit.

One of the Youth Set’s initiatives in 2006 was a series of State of Origin events at the St. Raymond’s Hall, specifically designed to attract the under 25’s. The Youth Set supplied pizza and coca cola and a large projector screen was pulled down for the viewing of the State of Origin Series live. Football is hugely popular with the Hadchitis (particularly the men) and they tend to split their loyalties between three of Sydney’s football clubs: the Parramatta Eels, the Canterbury Bulldogs and St. George Illawarra. It is ironic that, in order to attract the under 25’s, the Youth Set frame the event as an “Aussie” cultural spectacle, with a twist, as it serves the purpose of perpetuating the Hadchiti group identity amongst the youth in Australia. It is an example of hybridisation and cultural inventiveness amongst the second generation.
Hot rod cars are common in the rear car park behind the St. Raymond’s Hall. Masculine bravado, or protest masculinity, is a common feature of the young men in the Hadchit community, particularly the second generation, who were raised in the context of Sydney and hyper-masculinity might be seen as a way of living with racism in Sydney. The latest male fashions feature Nike and Fila sports wear and baseball caps (see Figure 52), along the lines of American gang fashions. The revival of smoking the Argile, the Lebanese water pipe, has become a popular symbol of Lebanese cultural pride and resistance to the stigma of being Lebanese in Sydney amongst the second generation, especially the young men. Women smoke the Argile as well, but more commonly at home in domestic space. One of the most popular flavoured tobaccos used in the Argile is Teffiah, or apple flavour. It is popular to eat salted nuts while smoking the Argile. Lebanese sweet houses, such as those in Merrylands, Granville and Harris Park, also provide Argiles for customers to smoke, while they eat Lebanese sweets. Resistance to racism through the celebration of culture and heritage has been a common reaction to living with Australia’s multicultural crisis in Lebanese communities like the Hadchit community in Sydney. This interview excerpt provides one young man’s perspective on Argile smoking:
Argille is more of a guy thing, but there are girls who smoke, it depends if you are a smoker or not. A lot of people smoke argile in Lebanon, here it is more of a guy thing. Argiles in cafes started about 3-4 years ago. It started with the sweet houses – heart to heart. Here it is sweets, coffee and tobacco. I have Greek and an Aussie friend who have them, it is expanding around to cultural diversity. Strawberry, Teffah – that is what I like.

Cultural pride and resistance are common amongst the youth, however, this is often in the context of having to constantly assert their right to be Australian and to call Australia home when working/socialising in the broader Australian community, as the following interview reveals:

Yeh there was a guy who came into my shop once – he goes “What are ya”, I said “Australian”. He said “no you’re not”. I said “Mate I am born here and i’m not producing my passport for you, but it says my nationality is Australian and I have every right to be here as much as you. There is one difference I work and pay my taxes to support someone like you who doesn’t work.

This interview shows the stark limitations the Hadchit youth actually face in calling themselves Australian. In this case, the subject claims to be Australian because he works and he has a passport! This demonstrates the disjuncture between feeling and looking Australian, because he’s not White enough. In fact, Australian citizenship and a passport are not enough to claim national belonging and the greatest struggle for the second generation is actually to be Australian. Some members of the second generation perceive the depth of the problem and suggest that it doesn’t really matter how much they try to assimilate, because “they’re never going to get there”, as the following interview highlights:

They are difficult times, but …the ones that are doing well will assimilate – everyone will eventually. But they will have to get back to previous levels of acceptance before recent events. We have to go out of our way to say we are not like that, bending backwards to show we are not like that – assimilate more quickly to prove we’re not like that. A good example is the Canterbury supporters- how much more can you assimilate – they support the team passionately. What ever you do you will never get accepted. Those Canterbury supporters are ocker but they look Middle East, but they are passionate about football.

**Do you think Australia is more racist now than 10 years ago?**
Yeh – it has, but it always has been, but it was underlying and now it has come to the surface.

**Which one is worst – hidden or in the open?**
Whatever Pauline Hanson said 10 years ago, that is what the Liberal Government is doing now, they just appropriated her views. But, ten years ago they were going to arrest her for
what she was saying, but now? So what is better before or after?

The crisis of belonging the Lebanese face, according to this interview subject, derives from the fact that Australia has actually become a more racist country in the last 10 years, which has shifted the goal post so that the second generation feel like they can never get there (ie. be Australian) and, instead, they are lost in translation.

Linguistic ambiguity captures the dual and shifting cultural worlds that the second generation inhabit. It is common to mix Arabic and English or to strategically shift between them. In general most of the second generation find that they speak Arabic with their parents and English with their siblings, or use Arabic to express very particular emotions or feelings that are lost in translation into English as this interview excerpt highlights:

I spoke Arabic first until I went to school. My mum’s English was broken – as I went to school we started speaking English more – me and my sister and now we have swapped mostly to English. With my uncles and aunts we speak Arabic, but with the younger generation we speak English. But, you know, there are some things that you really just want to say in Arabic that have no translation, or are just lost in translation. If am speaking to my sister and I want to say something positive – I would say “Habibte” – affectionate terms have more meaning and depth – “khalili surtek” – leave me that beautiful face, it makes no sense in English, but in Arabic it is beautiful. So I try to have the best of both worlds…it is good to be around others who are bilingual, understand the culture and know what I mean.

This interview reveals the subject’s desire to combine and draw on the best of both worlds through bilingualism, but there is also an element in which meaning and depth is lost in translation or has no equivalent in English. What is the resolution of the dual positioning of the second generation? This second generation woman describes how she tries to combine both worlds and take the best from both:

I have tried to get the best of both worlds – As an adolescent it was stressful – am I Lebanese or Australian? Then I got percentages – 60:40 – then as I got older I don’t have to be this or that, but take the best of both worlds – there is a big part of me that is Lebanese – I can appreciate my background more now than before – I like where I am sitting with both now, I use it to my own advantage.
The central problematic, however, for many in the second generation is that their sense of cultural identity actually shifts and “depends where you go”, as the following interview demonstrates:

**How would you describe your cultural identity?**
I am Australian. It depends where you go – in Australia I am Lebanese, but when you go to Lebanon I am Australian. It is a tricky one for us.

Thus, they are neither Lebanese nor Australian. The word *el ghurba* in Arabic means homelessness or exile and derives from the word *gharb* meaning West, thus, exile and homelessness is inherently associated with migration to the West. The state of homelessness is made worse by the experience of everyday misrecognition. While most second generation interview subjects claim that Australia is absolutely home, they are constantly confronted with a lack of recognition of their ‘Australian-ness’, referred to in critical race theory as “racial interpellation” (Hall 1997:368; Shin Huey Chong 2008:32), or the identification and misrecognition of the subject’s group membership based on their racial appearance. This second generation man describes the complexity of racial interpellation beautifully:

I am Australian. I felt like an Australian in Hadchit – they would say “here comes the Australian” I am proud to say I am Hadchiti, but I don’t think like them or act like them. As an immigrant, we haven’t a homeland. Here in Australia we are immigrants and back in Lebanon you’ve left it – you’re nowhere you’re a nomad. Understand? If I go to Lebanon and say I am Lebanese they are going to say “no you’re not you’re from Australia”. Here if I say “I am Australian” they say “no you’re not, you got a beak like an Arab, you behave like an Arab you are an Arab”. So there is nowhere to rest that wicked head of ours on a pillow and say I am Lebanese or Australian.

This narrative describes the core of the migrants’ conundrum, as I have termed it, for the immigrant there is no pillow to rest your head on – they are nowhere, neither Lebanese nor Australian. Furthermore, this interview subject identified his Arab appearance, especially his hook nose, as being a significant component to his lack of belonging in Australia. This captures how the experience of racism is embodied as a lack of bodily wholeness, or a deep sense of being flawed or wrong (Fanon 1967). How do immigrants from Hadchit and their children seek to overcome this sense of bodily contradiction? In popular
American slang this condition is often referred to as being an Oreo, defined in the Urban Dictionary as a:

Racist slur and schoolyard name based on racist stereotypes wrongly assuming that intelligence, articulateness, dapperness, and manners are traits of whites and not blacks. Therefore, a black who possesses these traits is an oreo, white on the inside and black on the outside. A corollary slur is banana, yellow (Asian) on the outside and white on the inside (http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=oreo).

The disjunction between bodily appearance and cultural identification is a feature of being ‘out of place’ and intrinsic to the diasporic condition (Hall 1992), but is amplified by the experience of racism. Given that it is common for cultural identification amongst immigrants from Hadchit to be shifting and situational, how do they define their cultural identity?

**Conclusion: the hyphenated identity**

The Hadchit Household Survey (see Figure 53) provides some insights into the question of cultural identity between the first and second generation of Sydney’s Hadchit community. While 28% of fathers and 22% of mothers identified as being Lebanese, only 5% of children identified as being Lebanese. Conversely, only 3% of mothers and fathers identified as being Australian, while 20% of their children identified as being Australian. I find this a small percentage for the second generation and take it as symptomatic of the lack of national belonging amongst the Lebanese in Australia, especially the second generation. Identification with the village of origin, Hadchit, was intriguingly low for both parents and children, with only 7% of fathers, 8% of mothers and 7% of children identifying with being Hadchiti. The most common form of cultural identification, for both parents and children, was the hyphenated identity, Lebanese-Australian, with 46% of fathers, 54% of mothers and 57% of children identifying as such. The next largest category of identification was Hadchit-Australian with 16% of fathers, 13% of mothers and 10% of children identifying in this way.
Baldassar, in her study on Italian migration to Australia, has examined the transformation of identity amongst a group of immigrants from San Fior and the changing construction of *campanalismo*, a system of “unity within disunity”, which forms the basis for the many Italies and translates as bell towerism (Baldassar 2001:80-84). Local identities in Italy were based on the village or *paese* and each *paese* had its own dialect and the *paese*’s boundary was defined by the audibility of its bell tower (hence *campanalismo*). These identities shift together and apart and depend upon regional and familial rivalries for their construction (Baldassar 2001:81-84). Indeed, the *paese* was said to be the *paesani*’s (villagers) world. Through migration it is no longer the case that one’s village is one’s world and *campanalismo* became a strategy of settlement and was consequently transformed:

Campanalismo has been redefined in Australia. Campanalismo in Australia is not so much attachment to place as identification with particular groups of people (Baldassar 2001:202).

Thus, for the second generation, the village and regional identities become muted in Australia and ultimately eclipsed by the broader category Italian-Australian (Baldassar 2001: 326).

In Arabic a similar linguistic ambiguity exists between the word *baladi* for my nation and its alternate meaning being my town, as a synonym for *day’aa,*
village, reflecting the view that, for an eternity, the village was the villager’s whole world. As we saw in Chapter Three, the three spheres of identity, patrilineage, village, sect (bayt, day’aa and ta’eefa), were deployed by the first generation as a home-building strategy in Australia. Their reproduction in Australia, however, poses certain challenges and contradictions, especially through the renegotiation of gender roles, as we saw in Chapters Four and Five, which has led to their transformation in Australia. In this chapter we saw how living with racism amplifies the experience of being caught ‘in-between’. The second generation, consequently, are situated between a series of contradictory forces and objectives: the desire to maintain cultural identity and linkages to Lebanon and to Hadchit, as the ancestral village, and to be part of the broader Maronite community as Mwarne, but most of all to be Australian. These contradictory identity pressures are generally resolved by the adoption of the hyphenated identity, Lebanese-Australian, which has now emerged as the majority form of cultural identification amongst the Hadchitis in Australia (see Figure 53).

The predominance of the category, Lebanese-Australian, as the primary form of identification suggests that it has supplanted the regional, Hadchit village based identification over time in Australia. I find it symptomatic that neither parents nor children significantly identified as being just Australian. Anti-Lebanese racism and multicultural crisis in Australia has clearly made it more difficult for immigrants from Hadchit, and the Lebanese more generally, of both the first and second generation, to find national belonging in Australia. Neither do they identify strongly as being just Hadchiti or Lebanese. For both generations the hyphenated category, Lebanese-Australian, best captures their dual positioning as being both Australian and Lebanese and, yet, distinctively different from both. Thus, the parochialism of the village identity has faded for both generations in the context of migration to Australia.

Noble and Tabar (2002), likewise, show that the Lebanese-Australian hyphenated identity is common amongst second generation Lebanese. However, they suggest that hybridity goes beyond simply the process of hyphenation to imply multiple, shifting identities which combine different elements to create
something new (Noble and Tabar 2002:131). I would agree with this observation and have found that multiple and shifting identities are common second generation self-perceptions. The experience of racism in Australia amplifies the contradictions of migration for the second generation of Hadchitis and this is experienced as liminality. The Hadchit household survey also shows that the overwhelming majority of Hadchitis have taken up Australian citizenship (see Figure 54), but only a small percentage of both parents and children actually identify as being Australian. Thus, there is a disjuncture between citizenship and national belonging. As we have seen throughout this chapter, the second generation have accumulated the symbols of success in Australia society, but find it difficult to translate them into national belonging.

Figure 54: Australian citizenship. Source: Hadchit Household Survey, 2006.

The emergence of the Lebanese-Australian identification encapsulates the dilemmas of being Lebanese in Australia today. In a positive reading one might say that being Lebanese-Australian is the embodiment of the best of both categories. Alternately, the hyphenated identity can be a conundrum, leaving the subject overwhelmed by contradiction, as they are not really ‘Australian’ nor are they ‘Lebanese’, but shift between both. But, if the hyphenated identity generates contradiction, it also contains the dual positioning of the second generation. Thus, through the process of migration, (re)production and return, bayt, day’aa and ta’eefa (patrilineage, village and sect) have undergone a process
of destabilisation, renegotiation and transformation in Australia, which has ultimately led the second generation of Hadchitis to transcend the three spheres and to become Lebanese-Australians.
8. Conclusion: At My Mother's Table

Australia is home, this is where I belong, but a part of me longs for Lebanon – I want to and need to go back.

This quote highlights the shifting construction of home, or the ‘migrant’s conundrum’ as I have termed it, the central research question addressed by this dissertation. Through examining migration from the village of Hadchit to Sydney, where a transnational immigrant community of 500 households has formed, I examined the transformation in the articulation between home, identity, place and gender as a result of the migration process. While the centre of home has shifted to Australia, the experience of racism in the host nation amplifies the experience of liminal belonging, especially amongst the second generation of Hadchitis in Australia. Thus, the iconic image of the ‘ancestral village’, perched on the edge of a cliff, overlooking the Qadisha valley continues to have a hold on the consciousness of the diaspora. In the context of living in an urban metropolis such as Sydney, leading lives dominated by the rhythm of industrial capitalism, the fantasy of an absolute sacred homeland, where culture and place are unified (and women know their place!!) is compelling. Indeed, Hadchit has become a ‘shrine’ for pilgrims who long to return, as the opening quote describes, to the land of their ancestry and roots, the original motherland, baladi, and source of life.

As we saw in Chapter Two, the village of Hadchit has a long history of migration, with the first wave going to the United States of America in the 1890’s. Like those that went before them, the immigrants from Hadchit who settled in Sydney, Australia from the late 1950’s underwent a process of transformation as a result of the migration process. The most important transformation was from peasant to wage-labourer, with Sydney as the site of their incorporation into capitalist social relations of production. What force drives the migration process? In Chapter One I showed how migration flows, at the macro level, are inextricably linked to the expansion of capitalism as a mode of production, through providing new sources of labour for the expansion of industry, particularly in the industrial phase of world migration up until the
1960’s. I utilised the concept of ‘voluntary expropriation’ to understand how immigrants willingly become wage-labourers. But, micro level migration narratives are complex and contain a plurality of push and pull factors and one of the most important push factors for Lebanese migration has been war and displacement. In Chapter Two I discussed the particularities of the Lebanese migration experience, by examining the four waves of Lebanese emigration over a period of 120 years and the multiple ways in which the migration process was understood by immigrants from Hadchit themselves.

Almost invariably discourses of migration are linked with the pursuit of ‘success’, najeh, through the accumulation of capital, but more importantly status, markaz, as the most important form of symbolic capital. Capitalism promises the possibility for upward mobility, while migration unifies symbolic and physical mobility in the pursuit of a more ‘meaningful life’ (read: the attainment of a higher status) (Hage 2005). Throughout the thesis I conceptualised migration as a form of mobility between modes of production and showed how the Hadchitis strove to transform themselves from filaheen, peasants, into wage-labourers in Australia. In this sense, migration offers the possibility to overturn fate and hereditary birth status to become the architect of one’s own destiny and pursue the dream of a new life in a new country. Thus, migration and the pursuit of upward mobility are inextricably linked, while ostentatious displays of status and success become important features of migrant communities, as we saw in Chapter Three. What was the purpose of migrating if it was not to find success? Dreams of upward mobility can be shattered when immigrants discover the limits of upward mobility and the rigidity of class and race in the host-nation. As we saw in Chapters One and Two the shift in late capitalism from Fordism to Flexible Accumulation and the movement of manufacturing offshore to Third World locations has left many immigrant communities, such as the Lebanese in Sydney, marginalised in increasingly segmented labour markets.

How do immigrants from Hadchit understand the complexity of their migration narratives and the limits of accumulation in the context of Australia? Throughout the thesis I discussed what I termed the ‘paradox of migration’,
whereby immigrants from Hadchit accumulate material capital, but struggle not to become spiritually poor. The duality between the material and spiritual worlds underpins Maronitism, an Eremitical tradition as we saw in Chapter Two, which venerates ascetic practice through the idealisation of the Maronite saints, such as saint Charbel the hermit who undertook a vow of poverty. But the asceticism of the Maronite saints contrasts with the pursuit of material ‘glitter’ amongst the immigrants themselves. Consequently, immigrants from Hadchit pay penance for their migration and the pursuit of the material, through the intensification of religious practice and the counter pursuit of *taher/tahra* – spiritual purification.

The demands of ‘spiritual life’ are generally incompatible, however, with the pace of industrial time and space and this contradiction is generally resolved through a spiritual division of labour between men and women. As we saw in Chapters Three and Four women are the ‘ascetics of the home’ and perform religious obligations on behalf of the whole family. Through the Machismo/Marianismo (Stevens 1973) duality women are constructed as being physically weaker, but spiritually stronger than men for their forbearance to withstand the male inflicted suffering that is their ‘lot’ in life. While, Machismo, as a gender ideology, is built upon hostility to women as the measure of manliness:

> The male feels obliged to express hostility towards women, including his wife…he is expected to show a regal disdain for their feelings, a lack of concern for the effect his actions may have on their physical or emotional welfare; in fact, ostentatious cruelty toward women can be expected to elicit respectful admiration from male companions and friends (Stevens 1973:60)

Female suffering starts early, from the beginning of puberty with the intensification of supervision through to the pain of childbirth itself, as we saw in Chapter Four. Like the passion of Christ carrying his cross, so too women must carry their cross, but through the strength of Mary they can attain saintliness, *adese/adissi*, through the austerity of their religious practice. The *Mater Delorosa*, the Suffering Mother, is the ultimate model of female saintliness, which transforms female weakness into strength. Women become the spiritual intercessors for male indiscretion and weakness. But their apotheosis is in becoming the matriarch, *sit el bayt*, the power of the house. For Machismo, as an
ideology, is underpinned by the male fear of female domination, but also the idealisation of the mother.

At a deeper level the Catholic Machismo/Marianismo gender ideology can be understood as a patrilineal ideology, whereby the spiritual dimension is regulating the material world through regulating the relations between the sexes. The spiritual division of labour underpins the reproduction of *bayt*, *day’aa* and *ta’eefa*, as we saw in Chapter Threes and Four, and requires the male regulation of female sexuality for the reproduction of the social order against the threat of *fitna* – unregulated female sexuality. Thus, women can’t really be free until they reach menopause, when they no longer need to be ‘regulated’, but can themselves become the ‘regulators’ of their daughter-in-laws on behalf of their son. Thus, motherhood is the basis for female matriarchal power, which itself serves to reproduce patriarchy. But, ironically, patriarchy is built upon the centrality of female fertility and nurturance as the core of social relations.

How is this gender ideology influenced by migration to Australia? This thesis examined the re-construction of the Hadchiti social village in Sydney, defined by the network of social relationships amongst the deterritorialisied patrilineages, which are united by kinship, a shared village of origins and as part of the broader communal Maronite identity (*Mwarne*), which now transcends nation state boundaries. However, Chapter Four examined the transformation of *bayt*, *day’aa* and *ta’eefa*, amongst the second generation, through the renegotiation of gender-roles. Central to this process of cultural transformation has been the renegotiation of the marriage contract from ‘relations of descent to consent’. Consent relations, according to Weber (in Hylland-Eriksen 2005) and Sollors (1986), have become a pervasive feature of modernity, whereby agency, choice, equality and individualism are asserted over descent relations, as defined by kinship, obligation and arranged marriage. Sollors (1986:259) argues, in the American case, that consent relations unify a heterogeneous population brought together through the migration process.

However, I propose that female agency and choice does not merely unite a heterogeneous population, but actually produces it. This is because women are the markers of the borders between ethnic groups (Goldstein 2006) and choice
leads to out-marriage. But, as we have seen in this thesis, the shift to consent relations also marks a transition in women’s roles from being the (re)producers of bayt, day’aa and ta’eefa (patrilineage, village and sect) to becoming the (re)producers of ethnically diverse, Australian wage-labourers, united by secular citizenship. How do the Hadchitis understand this crisis of (re)production?

Chapter Five examined a discourse amongst the men that Australia is balad niswen-hukum niswen, a land of women, ruled by women, an inversion of the gendered order of power in Lebanon. The chapter showed how gender narratives and roles get turned upside down in the course of war and migration. It was shown how migration is emasculating for the men, because of the education of their wives and daughters through their participation in the cash-economy under capitalist social relations of production in Australia. In their attempt to understand their experience of emasculation in Australia the Hadchit men have come to imagine the Australian state as a matriarchal state, which is hukum niswen, ruled by women, as symbolised by the Queen of England as the Head of State.

Through four key binary opposition and inversion discourses Australia is represented as a land of opposites to Lebanon, where male dominance is presented as the natural social order. Movement back and forth between Lebanon and Australia bring face to face the changing articulations between home, place, identity and gender between Hadchit and Sydney. Lebanon is imagined as a ‘natural’ social order, where relations of descent are built upon ethnic absolutisms, which are tied to particular territories and absolute constructions of home. The reproduction of Lebanon’s confessional identities (read: sectarian divisions) relies upon a male dominated, confessional social order, which is built upon the rules of patrilineal descent and the male regulation of female fertility. As we saw in Chapter Five, the enhanced power of men is underpinned by a weak state, lawlessness and war, which forms the basis for the reproduction of hyper-masculinity/mobility and female suffering/containment. Australia, on the other hand, is built upon a different national imaginary. Australia is depicted by Hadchiti male immigrants as the ultimate ‘un-natural’ social order, because the women are ‘on top’. Australia has a strong centralised
state, which monopolises the means to violence and, hence, is *hukum niswen* – ruled by women. This leads to male feelings of loss and ‘emasculating’/displacement in the face of active, unregulated female sexuality (*fitna*).

How do immigrants from Hadchit resolve these gendered articulations between modes of production? Chapter Seven explored the search for home in Hadchit and examined Maronite representations of Lebanon as a lost Holy Land. Anthropological approaches to pilgrimage (Baldassar 2001, Cannell 2006; Coleman and Eade 2004; Dubisch 1995; Eade and Sallnow 1991b; Turner and Turner 1978) framed the analysis of the return to Hadchit as a right of passage and journey, imbued with religious and symbolic meaning. It was shown how pilgrimages to Hadchit are a form of penance, in which immigrants seek to overcome the contradictions generated by the migration process. But, narratives of return always contain elements of disjunction and liminality, in which the immigrant cannot be completely ‘at home’ in the ancestral village.

Meanwhile in Sydney, the second generation find they cannot translate their accumulated Australian cultural capital into national belonging and often feel locked out of the Australian identity, which amplifies their experience of *el ghurba*, homelessness. This study finds, therefore, that the search for an ‘absolute home’ is a trope or Holy Grail, which is unresolvable through physical mobility, because the feeling of home is shifting and moves where the migrant moves. As shown through the chapters of this thesis, immigrants from Hadchit feel out of place in both Australia and Hadchit - there is “no pillow to rest your head on”, as one interviewee explained in Chapter Seven.

If home is mobile and shifting then how does the immigrant construct a sense of homeliness? Baldassar (2001:338-339) likens immigrants to pilgrims who journey searching for home in a world that transcends territorial boundaries. Ang, on the other hand, argues that the idealised ‘homeland’ is the common unifier for diasporas and deterritorialised peoples (Ang 2001:5). In counter point, Baldassar (2001:383) suggests that mobility itself provides the resolution to the migrant’s conundrum through the restless movement back and forth between San Fior and Perth. This study finds, however, that the feeling of home
ultimately transcends place and is defined by its affective and spiritual dimensions. I propose that the resolution to the migrant’s conundrum hinges upon women’s everyday practices of care and nurturance. While home might be shifting, for immigrants from Hadchit, the core of home is highly gendered. Where is home? A common reply was “At my mother’s table” - as explained in this interview excerpt from Chapter Four:

**Is Australia home?**
Absolutely, friends, work make us feel at home. This is where we grew up and made our daily routines. Mum’s cooking is one thing that you become accustomed to and you never enjoy anything other than your mum’s food at her table with her table cloth. Doesn’t matter where you go – even in Hadchit it is not the same as your mum’s table.

In this formulation, ‘home’ transcends place and is defined, not by geography, but by sitting at “mum’s table”. It is here that the immigrant can ‘be at home’ and experience unconditional love. Eating mum’s food, at mum’s table provides the ultimate feeling of nurturance that forms the core of home, identity and belonging. I propose, therefore, that the feeling of homeliness is constructed by women and the most important woman for the construction of home is the matriarch, *sit el bayt*. As demonstrated through the chapters of this thesis, women perform a mediating role between the sacred and profane, and resolve contradiction through a ‘spiritual division of labour’ within the home, whereby they nurture both body and soul and construct home itself. Women define the centre of home, across space, and pass the centre to their daughters, while men experience their dependence upon the women in their life to define home for them. The centrality of women for the construction of home is amplified by the contradictions of the migration process.

Thus, the search for the centre of home ultimately leads us to the matriarch, but even the matriarch herself, the most potent symbol of home, is an ideal. As we saw in Chapter Four, it is the successful internalisation of the mother, or the ‘ideal of the nurturing mother’, as symbolised by the iconic image of the ‘kitchen table’, which underpins the capacity to reconstruct home within mobility and to attain successful adulthood and independence. I wrote this poem about the archetypal Lebanese matriarch whilst in the field:
Sit el Bayt – The Lebanese Matriarch

Short and lovingly round
Leans forward, while preparing dinner
Loves to serve Kibbi Nayi
Saints Medals
Always in the Kitchen
Heavy, hobbling gait and shortness of breath
Commanding presence
The archetypal Lebanese Matriarch
Always wears black
Never disagree with her
In the kitchen – she holds court
Sings Arabic songs whilst she cooks
And they say she only speaks with broken English…

If motherhood is an ideal that women cannot live up to than El Sayde, Our Lady, is the ultimate mother whom all women can aspire to be and whose presence is omnipotent. From the statue of Mary at Harissa, over-looking Jounieh in Lebanon, to Our Lady of the Cliff in Hadchit and across the oceans to Our Lady of Lebanon Church at Harris Park, the gaze of Mary is pervasive. Within domestic space the mazar, or shrine, to Mary is the core of the home, under whose gaze the family can be ‘at home’. The transcendental quality of Mary’s gaze unifies the diaspora and the motherland.

The ‘spiritual’ representation of Lebanon as a lost motherland has taken on more significance in the aftermath of the Lebanese Civil War (1975-1990), which has led to a discourse of decline amongst the Maronite diaspora and a perception that the future of the faith is in exile outside of the Lebanese territory. This has led to the construction of the Holy Valley, Wadi Qadisha, and Hadchit’s central location in it, as a sacred, lost motherland, which feeds into a larger set of historical discourses amongst the Maronites that they are and always will be a persecuted minority besieged by Islam. But, through mass migration and information technologies they can keep the faith alive and reconstruct the deterritorialised Maronite Nation in exile, united by the Maronite Church. But, in an inversion of gendered power, the most potent unifying symbol of the Maronite Church is Saydet Lubnan, Our Lady of Lebanon, whose body gave birth to Christ and, ultimately, contains the Maronite Church and the
congregation (the third order), composed of the deterritorialised patrilineages (bayt) and villages (day’a) of north Lebanon, within her womb.

This study of emigration from the village of Hadchit has found that a general resolution to the migrant’s conundrum, for the Sydney based Hadchitis, is to imagine two kinds of home. As I have argued, the centre of home moves with the immigrant and is constructed by women’s practices of care. Through the chapters of this thesis, I have shown how the ancestral village has remained the central component of an origins discourse amongst the Australian Hadchitis, despite the centre of home shifting to Australia. With the shifting of home to Australia, the construction of cultural identity has transformed amongst the second generation, who have transcended the three spheres, bayt, day’aa, ta’eefa (patrilineage, village sect) to become Lebanese-Australians. Meanwhile, the village of Hadchit has been converted into a ‘spiritual motherland’ for the Australian based Hadchitis and the physical connection to place has been replaced by a spiritual and symbolic one. But, the spirit of the ‘motherland’ is transmitted to her children, the diaspora, through the omnipotent gaze of Mary, the mother of God and all of the Maronite people.
**Glossary**

**First and second generation migrants:**
The first generation in standard migration studies refers to the migrants. The second generation is generally defined as those born to the first generation in the host country, and it also usually includes individuals who migrated as a young child (Baldassar 2001:3).

**Globalisation:**
Increasing interconnection through trade, capital flows, human migration, and other kinds of transnational movements (Nonini 2002:11).

**Transnationalism:**
The process by which immigrants forge and sustain simultaneous multi-stranded social relations and link together their societies of origin and settlement (Schiller et al 1995:48).

**Deterritorialisation:**
The process by which groups are no longer tightly territorially bounded, historically unselfconscious or culturally homogenous (Appadurai 1991:191).

**Time Space Compression:**
A process by which time has sped up to such an extent that it is experienced simultaneously across large distances (Harvey 1989:284).

**Diaspora:**
Dispersal from an original location to one of more peripheral locations (Saffran 1991:83).

**Imagined Community:**
A concept which defines the nation as a socially constructed community, which is to say imagined by the people who perceive themselves as part of that group (Anderson 1983:6-7).

**Cultural Capital:**
Is based on Bourdieu’s four types of capital: social, economic, cultural and symbolic. Each is convertible with the most powerful being symbolic capital. Each will now be defined. Social capital is defined as power gained by the sheer number of family members, retainers or network of supporters. Symbolic capital is defined as reputation or honour, including intellectual honesty. Cultural capital is defined as distinction within the autonomous fields of art and science; intellectual or educational qualifications. Economic capital is defined as ownership of stocks and shares, or, more generally of monetary awards (Fowler 1997:31).

**Field:**
Is based on Bourdieu’s theory of the field defined as: “A partially autonomous field of forces, but also a field of struggle for positions within it. These struggles are seen to transform or conserve the field of forces. Positions are determined by the allocation of specific capital to actors who are thus located in the field. Positions once attained can interact with habitus to produce different postures which have an independent effect on the economics of position taking within the field” (Mahar, Harker, and Wilkes 1990:8).

**Habitus:**
A system of durable, transposable dispositions which functions as the generative basis of structured, objectively unified practices (Bourdieu in Mahar, Harker, and Wilkes 1990:10).
**Arabic Terms**

Abaday\(^{36}\): Strong/macho

Addisi: Female saint

Adese: Saintliness

Ahad al Madkhal al Saum: Cana Sunday

Ahad al Qiama: Easter; Resurrection Sunday

Ahad al Sha’aneen: Palm Sunday

Akhed al Khater: Condolences for the family of the deceased

Al Qahani: Parish priests

Al-Kanisse al Marouniyye: Maronite Church

Amedi: Baptism

Aрак: Aniseed-flavoured liqueur

Ard Jdoudi: Land of my ancestors

Ard: Land

Argile: Lebanese water pipe

Arz al Rab: Cedars of the Lord

Awal Urbani: First Communion

Awda: Desire to return to homeland

Ayb: Shame

Ayle: Family

Ba’ adunis: Parsley

Baba Ghanouj: Eggplant dip

Balad Niswen: Land of women

Baladi: My Motherland

Baladna: Our motherland

Banadura: Tomato

Bayt: House/patrilineage

Bekaa: Valley between Lebanon and anti-Lebanon mountain range

Bint ‘Am: Wife, but also daughter of paternal uncle

Bint: Girl

Bzurat: Salted nuts

Dabki: Lebanese spiral dance

Daffin: Funeral

Day’aa: Village

Deir al Salib: Monastery of the Cross

Dhimmi: People of the book

Drumbekki: Hand drum

Edass al ahad: Sunday mass

Edass Noss Layl: Midnight mass

Eid al Kbeer: The great feast, Easter

Eid al Milad: Christmas

Eid al Kbeer: The great feast, Easter

Eid al Milad: Christmas

El Ghurba: Exile, homelessness

El Khobz: The betrothal

El Matbakh: Kitchen

El Shebab: The boys

El Shiff: Cliff

Errabeen: God-parents

Fatah el Islam: Islamic invasion

Fattoush: Bread salad

Filahene: Peasantry

Fittou: Socialism

Ftayir: Spinach triangle

Genaz al Sini: One year memorial mass for the deceased

Gharb: West

Habibti: My love (feminine)

Hafli: Reception/party

Hakim: Medical doctor

Hamed: Lemon

Hamra: Central Beirut suburb

Hanni: Mother of Mary

Hara: Patriarchal village cluster

Harreem: Under the protection of men

Harissa: A festive pulse stew

Hedad: Wearing black in mourning

Hommus: Garbanzo bean dip

Houwe cus: An insulting reference to a man, likening him to the female sexual organ

Hukum Niswen: Under the rule of women

Hushwit al Kibbi: Kibbi stuffing

Iqta: System of Feudalism that operated on Mount Lebanon in the 19th Century

Ism al Salib: In the name of the Cross

Jabal Lubnan: Highest mountain in Lebanon or the territory referred to as Mount Lebanon

Jabaliye: Mountain people

Jahaliya: Pre-Islamic matrilineal descent

Jame ‘yet el Q’dis Romanus el Khayriye: Hadchit: St. Raymond’s Charitable Association of Hadchit

Jameye: Hadchit Committee in Sydney

Jeil el harb: War generation

Jibbat Bcharre: Villages of the Bcharre district

Jinnez al-Areb’een: Forty day memorial mass

Jome’at al Azima: Good Friday

Jome’at al Azimeh: Week of the passion

Jourdiyye: rugged villagers who stay in the mountains throughout the winter

Jrn: Mortar and pestle

Kaat Mar Romanus: St. Raymond of Hadchit Community Hall

Kada’: District

Kanafi: Custard desert with rose syrup

Karini: Evil eye spirit

Khebek: Meat balls

Khallil Surtuk: Term of endearment (feminine) meaning I miss your face

Khallas: The end

Khamis al Skora: Drunken Thursday

Khiar: Cucumbers

Khibiz: Bread

Kibbi: Lebanese national dish made of pounded mince and burghal

Kibbi bis-Sayniyye: Baked meatloaf

Kibbi Mihshiyye: Kibbi spheres

Kibbi Nayi: Raw kibbi

Kibbit ar-Rahib: Monk’s kibbi

Kishk: Fermented yoghurt powder

Kitab el Hatif: Hadchit telephone directory

Khudra: Vegetables

Khoury: Priest

Laban: Yoghurt

Labni: Strained yoghurt

Le’met Rahme: Wake

Lu ‘mit ‘umm: Mother’s mouthful

---

\(^{36}\) All Arabic terms used are transliterations from the spoken Lebanese language and may differ from modern standard Arabic.
Lubnan: Lebanon
Lubyi bi Lahm: Green bean and lamb stew
Lubyi: Beans
Mahjar: Diasporic Lebanese, especially from the North American 1890’s emigration
Manushi: Lebanese pizza
Mar: Saint
Mara: Married woman
Marfaa: The week before lent
Markaz: Status
Marti ‘Am: Mother in law, wife of paternal uncle
Masebha: Rosary
Mashallah: In the name of God
Masrufi: Evil eye spirit
Mawwal: A form of lyrical lament
Mazaher: Appearance
Mazar: Shrine
Mbarki: Blessed
Metrahu: Stuck in the place of your birth
Mezza: Entrée
Mitil Antar: Macho
Mjadra: Lentil and rice stew
Motribi baladieh: Female singer
Motrib baladi: Male singer
Msahabi: Dating
Mughtaribi: Return immigrant (feminine)
Mukhtar: Headman, mayor
Muqata’ji: Lord
Mutayer: Landless peasants
Mutesarrif: Governor
Mutesarrifate: Provincial governorship
Mwarne: Maronites
Na ‘ana: Mint
Naheer el Bared: Palestinian refugee camp in Tripoli
Najeh: Success
Naqd: Brideprice
Ors: Wedding
Pasha: Governor
Qadisha: Holy (Syriac)
Radit el Ejir: Sunday mass followed by a party that the parents of newlyweds have after their return from the honeymoon
Sajirit el kaki: Persimmons
Sambusik: Savoury meat pastry
Sayde: Our Lady
Saydet Eschiffe: Our Lady of the cliff
Saydet Lubnan: Our Lady of Lebanon
Sayedna: Bishop
Sayem/Saymeh: Masculine/Feminine for fasting
Sha’aneeni: Palm Sunday
Shaher al Asel: Honeymoon
Sharaf: Honour
Sharmoota: Prostitute
Shloush: Roots
Sit el bayt: Power of the house, matriarch
Sit: Grandmother
Syem: Lent
Ta’arof al ahel: First meeting with the family during courtship
Ta’eefa: Sect
Tabel: Hand-held drum
Tabouleh: Parsley Salad
Taheer/Tahra: Spiritual sanctification
Tayeb Emaydi: Baptismal gown
Teffah: Apples
Tnayn al Feseh: Easter Monday
Tnayn al Rmad: Ash Monday
Toum: Garlic sauce
Umm el bayt: Mother of the house
Umm: Mother
Umma: Sunni Muslim Lebanese transnational formation
Uud: String instrument
Wadi: Valley
Waraq Ineb: Stuffed vine leaves
Wasta: Connections, favours, networks, nepotism
Watan: Motherland, homeland
Wejbet: Duty
Zaim: Lord, Patron, Politician
Zatar: Sesame, herb spice mix
Zayt: Olive oil
Zaytoun: Olives
Zina: Sexual prohibition
Appendix 1: The Research Design

Research Methodologies

Figure 55: Research methodologies

The research design had nine components: participant observation, the Hadchit Household Survey, 50 structured interviews, a youth focus group discussion, six oral histories, multi-sited field research, cyber-ethnography, continuity model of field work and auto-ethnography (see Figure 55). I undertook a methodologies course as part of my first year preparation in the School of Archaeology and Anthropology before I undertook fieldwork. In addition, I felt that I needed extra training so I attended an inter-disciplinary 3 day training program in February 2006 run by The University of Canberra, the Australian National University and the Australian Catholic University on research methodologies. This training program included instruction in how to undertake structured and unstructured interviews, life histories and focus groups. What follows is some detail on each of the nine research methodologies I deployed:
1. Participant Observation:

This involved ‘hanging out’ with the Hadchitis in Sydney in several centres across the Western United States and in the home village in North Lebanon. This included visiting them in their homes, joining in community events, going to Church and attending special community events, such as St. Raymond’s day, Weddings, Funerals and other functions. I was given a great deal of assistance by the Jameye or the Hadchit Committee in Sydney. They facilitated a lot of my contacts in the community and assisted in finding willing interviewees. My status as a married woman and a mother of three children accompanied by my then two and half year old daughter, enabled me to move with a great deal of freedom in the community as my status wasn’t ambiguous. I was also able to participate in very male dominated social settings such as committee meetings and political meetings where I was often the only woman in the room. With my daughter present for most of my interviews it also made it more comfortable for women to receive me in their homes when I went to visit them.

2. The Hadchit Household Survey

This survey was sent by mail to 500 households in the Sydney Hadchit community using the addresses from their telephone directory. It was carried out in August 2006 with the assistance of the St. Raymond’s Charities of Hadchit Committee, who funded, distributed and collected the survey form. The survey (see Appendix 4) was modelled on the Australian census, which was carried out in the same month, August 2006. The survey received a 30% response rate and, thus, constitutes a representative sample. For the purposes of the survey the household included resident parents, grandparents and children and the questions covered a range of topics from the place of birth, year of migration to Australia, number of children, proficiency in English and Arabic, work history, remittances, return visits to Lebanon, communication with Lebanon, Satellite TV and cultural identity. It has been a very useful overview for the fieldwork data to give more detail to some of the observations gained through ethnography.
3. Structured Interviews

I undertook 50 structured interviews in the Sydney Hadchit community – 25 male and 25 female. I had ethics approval for verbal consent from my participants and I have used research pseudonyms to guarantee the anonymity of my informants. The interviews on average took one hour and I used a digital recorder and uploaded the interview as a digital audio file on my laptop. I was able to listen to the interviews and transcribe what I needed into Microsoft Word. The use of digital technology has been vital for being able to access interview data with ease and has meant that it has not been essential to transcribe the entire interview to be able to utilise it for my research.

4. Youth focus group discussion

I undertook one youth focus group with 25 participants who were over 18 and under 30 years of age at the St. Raymond’s Hall in Granville. The discussion was digitally recorded and focused on youth issues and the second generation experience. Given that my field research was undertaken in the six months following the Cronulla Riots most of the discussion was on the experience of racism and social exclusion in the context of Sydney and the crisis in Australian Multiculturalism. Most participants reported that the six weeks following the Cronulla Riot were experienced as an intensive period of anti-Lebanese rejection. It was common to experience hostility in the workplace and to hide one’s Lebanese background or even to attempt to ‘pass’ as Greek or Italian. As a result of undertaking this Youth Focus Group discussion I came to a deeper understanding of the predicament of the second generation and how they experience racism more acutely than their parents a generation ago, despite identifying as being Australian.

5. Oral histories

I undertook six oral histories in Sydney and five in the United States of America. I modelled my oral histories on a prototype developed by the Australian Lebanese Historical Society. The Australian Lebanese Historical Society also provided me with guidelines for undertaking effective oral histories.
I used verbal consent consistent with my ethics approval and sought consent for the oral histories included in this thesis. In Australia the subjects for the oral histories were over all 60 and the discussion focused on their childhoods in Lebanon and their migration story to Australia. For the American oral histories I also interviewed subjects who were over 60 and each recounted their life history and recollections of their grandparents who migrated from Lebanon.

I have transcribed several of the oral histories using the language of the interviewee as closely as possible, to capture the intonation of their English. If they needed to speak Arabic a family member translated during the interview and then I transcribed the English. It was often the case that the one to one oral history turned into a family round table discussion, which reflected the Lebanese extended family. I returned the transcribed oral histories to the families to be edited and to get their final approval. It is intended that the oral histories will be something I can give back to the communities where I have undertaken research.

6. Multi-sited fieldwork

The foundation for this study was one year of participant observation field research in Sydney, where I was based in Wentworthville in the Parramatta region of Sydney for six months full time and I travelled back and forth between Canberra and Sydney for a further six months. I originally planned to spend three months in Hadchit, but the July 2006 War with Israel intervened and I re-submitted my ethics documentation for approval to undertake two months field research in the United States of America with descendants of Hadchitis in St. Louis, Missouri, Butte, Montana and Portland, Oregon. In May 2007 I was able to undertake a short field work trip to Hadchit and received ethics approval for this, but the security situation precluded an extended field trip. This was in conjunction with a conference at the Lebanese American University.

7. Continuity model of fieldwork

This means that I have completed 4.5 years of fieldwork on and off with the Hadchit community in Sydney and had ongoing contact with research subjects in Hadchit and in the United States Online via the Internet. In the first year of this project I visited Sydney a few times to set up the study and to meet key
community members. The second year was the most intensive phase of my fieldwork, but I have returned to Sydney throughout the 3rd, 4th and 5th years of this research project. As I came to understand the community better and people became used to me my field work became more directed and during the writing up phase I have been able to verify my research conclusions.

8. Cyber-ethnography

This basically means examining Internet sites, forums and blogs as well as establishing networks using email. In the case of this research project I have used the Internet extensively. Much of the information I had on Hadchit before I started this research all came from the Internet, in particular via emails from my family in the United States, amongst whom were several avid amateur historians and family genealogists. Additionally, the village of Hadchit itself launched its own website, Hadchit - hadchit.8m.com - Lebanon in 2000. Through this website I made contact with Hadchit descendants in St. Louis Missouri via the guest book. Email communication was established and then I received an invitation to visit them and I went there in October 2006. I have also used email communication to establish research relationships in Lebanon and to maintain connections in Sydney. I have been able to verify my data with research subjects in Sydney via email communication.

9. Auto-ethnography

This acknowledges the autobiographical component of this research project. As my Great-grandfather was from Hadchit there will always be an element in which the project answers my own questions about what my Lebanese heritage means to me. When I went to Lebanon to do fieldwork in Hadchit it was also my own first “return visit” to the ancestral village of my family. While I intend to acknowledge the autobiographical as a sub-text in this project I do not intend it to dominate the study overall. Additionally, my dual positioning as an insider-outsider amongst the Hadchitis, and indeed amongst the Lebanese in general, was an integral dynamic throughout the fieldwork phase and during the writing up of this ethnography (and probably always will be).
Appendix 2: The 12 Patrilineages (Bayts) and 82 sub-branches of Hadchit. Source: The St. Raymond's Charities of Hadchit, Sydney.

Four sons moved to Butte, Montana in the 1890’s including: Salah, Sarkis, Butros and Hanna and their surname was changed to Rask. Their brother Yusuf stayed in Hadchit and his descendants are in Hadchit, Portland, Oregon and in Sydney. The descendants of the four brothers in the USA are in Portland, Oregon, Butte, Montana, Spokane, Missoula and scattered across Montana, Washington and Oregon and in Australia.

Moved to Butte Montana and married into Zahouk/Younis (Johns in America) line and the surname was changed to Joseph

Migrated to St. Louis Missouri

Descendants in Hadchit, Sydney and Portland, Oregon and their Surnames are: Rizk, Jabour and Rask

Descendants are in Hadchit, including Tony Rizk and in St. Louis, Missouri including the descendants of Simon Reask and Webby families

Descendants in Hadchit and in Sydney
### ABOUT YOUR HOUSEHOLD AND FAMILY

1. **How many persons live at this address?**
   - **Householders:** Father and/or mother
   - **Children:** living at home
   - **Relatives:** grandparents, brothers, sisters, cousins etc.
   - **Other:** non-relatives, i.e. friends, tenants

2. **What age are the persons living in your household?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tick box</th>
<th>Under 10 years</th>
<th>10 to 16 years</th>
<th>16 to 20 years</th>
<th>20-30 years</th>
<th>30 to 50 years</th>
<th>Over 50 years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Father</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mother</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child 2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child 3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child 4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. **Please indicate place of birth for each person**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place of birth - Tick box</th>
<th>Australia</th>
<th>Lebanon</th>
<th>Other country</th>
<th>Hadchit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Father</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mother</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. **If born in Lebanon, in which year did you come to Australia?**

   - **Show year e.g. 1993**
     - Father
     - Mother
     - Children

---

Marriage and religion

5 In which country did you marry?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Australia</th>
<th>Lebanon</th>
<th>Other country</th>
<th>Hadchit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6 Are you married to a first degree relative i.e. cousin?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tick box</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7 Do you have married children?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tick box</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8 Have your children married a non-Lebanese person?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tick box</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9 Have your children married a first degree relative i.e. cousin?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tick box</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

10 What is your religious denomination?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tick box</th>
<th>Tick box</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maronite</td>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>No religion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Training and education

11. Have you completed a trade certificate or other educational qualification since leaving school?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>NO</th>
<th>NO</th>
<th>YES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Householder: father</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Householder: mother</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

12. What is the highest level of education completed since leaving school?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Trade certificate</th>
<th>University degree or diploma</th>
<th>Post-graduate degree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Householder: father</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Householder: mother</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

13. In which country did you complete your highest qualification?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Australia</th>
<th>Lebanon</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Householder: father</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Householder: mother</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

End of page 3
### Employment

14 Do people in your household have full time or part time jobs?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YES</th>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Work for pay / profit</td>
<td>Unpaid in family business</td>
<td>Do not have job</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Householders: father</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Householder: mother</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adult children over 16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

15 What is your occupation or job?

- Factory / industry
- Clearing - hospital / general
- Construction / building
- Office work - clerical, secretarial
- Real estate
- Professional
- Sales - retail / wholesale
- Other

16 If currently unemployed, how long so?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tick box</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than 1 year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Householder: father</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Householder: mother</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adult children</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

End of page 4
### Identity and belonging

17 Are you an Australian citizen?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Tick box</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Father</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mother</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

18 What language is mostly spoken at home?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Tick box</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English &amp; Arabic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

19 How well do you speak English?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Tick box</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Well</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not well</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not at all</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Householder: father |          |
| Householder: mother |          |
| Children            |          |

20 How do you culturally identify yourself?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identify as a person who is:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Householder: father |          |
| Householder: mother |          |
| Children            |          |

21 Have you visited Hadchlit and how often?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>In the last 5 years have you visited Hadchlit:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Father</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mother</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

End of page
Identity and belonging

22. What was the purpose of your visit to Hadchit?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Visit</th>
<th>Family</th>
<th>Business</th>
<th>St. Raymond's Day Festival</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Householder: father</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>❌</td>
<td>❌</td>
<td>❌</td>
<td>❌</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Householder: mother</td>
<td>❌</td>
<td>❌</td>
<td>❌</td>
<td>❌</td>
<td>❌</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children</td>
<td>❌</td>
<td>❌</td>
<td>❌</td>
<td>❌</td>
<td>❌</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

23. Do you financially support family members in Hadchit?

Tick box

- No - do not send money to Hadchit
- Sometimes - not every year
- Yes - regularly send money every year

24. How often do you keep in touch with relatives in Hadchit?

Tick box

Do you contact your relatives at least:

- Telephone: Never, Weekly, Monthly, Yearly
- E-mail: Never, Weekly, Monthly, Yearly
- Write letters: Never, Weekly, Monthly, Yearly

25. Do you watch Lebanese Broadcasting Corp (LBC) television?

Tick box

- YES
- NO

- **1926** Simon Zahouk → Melbourne
  - **1928** wife Sarah (nee) Koury + 4 children and left 2 in Lebanon

- **1950** Butros and Sonya Younan - 5 children → Sydney
  - **1960** Wadiha → Sydney
    - Sister Nadia = Joe Toubji from (Blouza)

- **1966** Amira and Bashir Merhi +5 children (Tony, Nabil, Antoinette, Jack and Simon) → Croydon, Ashfield, Burwood
  - **1968** nephew Ray Merhi
  - **1971** George and Sade Jidias + 5 daughters and 1 son
  - **1970** Georgette and Bulos Daher

- **1967** Ray Khatter → 1970 Pierre, 1972 Tony, Robert, Joseph, Michael (father), Fay and Maweheb (all from the Khatter family)

Employment

One of the major questions of interest in the survey conducted in the Hadchit Community was the effect of age and English language proficiency on the level of unemployment. The data to address this question can be summarized in a table of counts. The data is presented separately for mothers and fathers. These tables are presented below. Note that some of the categories for the factors have been combined. The levels for the factor Age are 4 (20 to 30), 5 (30 to 50) and 6 (over 50). For English proficiency level 1 refers to good English and level 2 refers to poor or no English. For unemployment 0 is employed and 1 is unemployed for either short or long terms.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fathers age</th>
<th>fEngProf</th>
<th>fUnemp</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mothers age</th>
<th>mEngProf</th>
<th>mUnemp</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A two way table of counts relating two quantitative variables (usually referred to as factors) is referred to as a contingency table. The natural question that arises is whether there is any association between the two factors, or do they act independently of each other. This is usually assessed by calculating the Pearson chi-squared value.

When we have a table of counts where we have three or more quantitative variables (as we have here) we need to use a more general method of analysis. Such tables are analysed by fitting a Generalized Linear Model (GLM) where we assume Poisson errors and a log link function (this is the usual approach for count data). The main interest is whether there are significant interactions between unemployment and age or unemployment and English proficiency.

The table we have is a special form of contingency table in that our principal factor of interest has only two levels (employed or unemployed). Hence we can explore the question of whether the proportion of people in employment is dependent on either age or English proficiency. In this case the GLM being fitted assumes Binomial errors and has a logit link function.

The results of the GLM analyses and the significance (or otherwise) of the factors of interest, can be assessed using an analysis of deviance table. This is analogous to the analysis of variance table that arises when the data are normally distributed. Note that the degrees of freedom (d.f.) for the residual terms are rather small in these tables. The first table is for the fathers and the second table for the mothers. The order of fitting the two terms (Age or English proficiency) can be important with this type of analysis, however for the data we have here for both fathers and mothers it makes no real difference.
Accumulated analysis of deviance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Change</th>
<th>d.f.</th>
<th>deviance</th>
<th>mean deviance</th>
<th>approx deviance</th>
<th>ratio</th>
<th>F pr.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>+ Age</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11.600</td>
<td>5.800</td>
<td>5.02</td>
<td>0.166</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+ fEngProfnew</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4.589</td>
<td>4.589</td>
<td>3.97</td>
<td>0.184</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residual</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.310</td>
<td>1.155</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>18.499</td>
<td>3.700</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table of predicted mean proportions for the Age factor are given in the following table together with their standard error (s.e.). There is a trend in employment with Age, although this is not significant.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prediction</th>
<th>s.e.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.00047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.05481</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.06488</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table of predicted mean proportions for the English proficiency factor are given in the following table together with their standard error. There is no significant difference between the two levels although the proportions reflect our expectations regarding employment levels and English language ability.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prediction</th>
<th>s.e.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>fEngProfnew</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.04324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.08546</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For the mothers we have the following analysis of deviance table.

Accumulated analysis of deviance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Change</th>
<th>d.f.</th>
<th>deviance</th>
<th>mean deviance</th>
<th>approx deviance</th>
<th>ratio</th>
<th>F pr.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>+ Age</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13.220</td>
<td>6.610</td>
<td>2.54</td>
<td>0.283</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+ mEngProfnew</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7.704</td>
<td>7.704</td>
<td>2.96</td>
<td>0.228</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residual</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5.207</td>
<td>2.603</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>26.132</td>
<td>5.226</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table of predicted mean proportions for the Age factor are given in the following table together with their standard error. As expected the employment level for older women appears less than for younger women, although the difference is not statistically significant.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prediction</th>
<th>s.e.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.1652</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.0803</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.1291</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table of predicted mean proportions for the English proficiency factor are given in the following table together with their standard error. There is no significant difference between the two levels although the proportions reflect our expectations regarding employment levels and English language ability.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prediction</th>
<th>s.e.</th>
<th>mEngProfnew</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.7607</td>
<td>0.068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.4678</td>
<td>0.164</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Employment and age**

157  **TABULATE** [PRINT=nobs; CLASSIFICATION=fAge,fUnempnew; MARGINS=yes] SurveyID

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Nobservd</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>Nobserved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>fUnempnew</strong></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>fAge</strong></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nobserved</strong></td>
<td>102</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Unknown cell

Nobservd 12

160  **TABULATE** [PRINT=nobs; CLASSIFICATION=mAge,mUnempnew; MARGINS=yes] SurveyID

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Nobservd</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>Nobserved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>mUnempnew</strong></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>mAge</strong></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nobserved</strong></td>
<td>99</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Unknown cell

Nobservd 4

174  **TABULATE** [PRINT=nobs; CLASSIFICATION=fAge,fUnempnew; MARGINS=yes] SurveyID

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Nobservd</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>Nobserved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>fUnempnew</strong></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>fAge</strong></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nobserved</strong></td>
<td>64</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Unknown cell

Nobservd 12

187  **TABULATE** [PRINT=nobs; CLASSIFICATION=mAge,mUnempnew; MARGINS=yes] SurveyID

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Nobservd</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>Nobserved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>mUnempnew</strong></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The above tables unemployment and age give totals regarding the unemployment data including the totals for fathers and mothers. The first two tables include the over 50s and the last two tables exclude them. For fathers the percentages are 31/92 = 25.2% for all the data and 10/74 = 13.5% excluding the over 50s. For mothers the corresponding values are 42/141 = 29.9% and 20/99 = 20.2%.

Marriage

The data relating to the question of out-marriage can be summarised in the following table. Marplace is marriage place and the levels for this factor are 1 (Australia), 2 (Lebanon), 3 (Other) and 4 (Hadchit). The factor 1stDeg denotes cousin marriage of parents, the factor ChNonLe refers to whether the children married non-Lebanese or Lebanese, and the factor C1stDeg refers to whether the children married a cousin or not.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MarPlace</th>
<th>1stDeg</th>
<th>ChNonLe</th>
<th>C1stDeg</th>
<th>n</th>
<th>y</th>
<th>Nobserved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>n</td>
<td>n</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>y</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>y</td>
<td>n</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>y</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>n</td>
<td>n</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>y</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>y</td>
<td>n</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>y</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>n</td>
<td>n</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>y</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>y</td>
<td>n</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>y</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>n</td>
<td>n</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>y</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>y</td>
<td>n</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>y</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If we combine the information over the 4 levels of the marriage place factor we obtain the table below. Note that this table also gives totals for each combination of the factors, and these totals are denoted by Nobserved.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1stDeg</th>
<th>ChNonLe</th>
<th>C1stDeg</th>
<th>n</th>
<th>y</th>
<th>Nobserved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td>n</td>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>y</td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nobserved</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>23</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>y</td>
<td>n</td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>y</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
From this table we can deduce that for parents with married children, the percentage of parents with cousin marriages was $\frac{16}{47} = 34.0\%$. The overall cousin marriage rate for children is $\frac{12}{47} = 25.5\%$. The number in this table that seems a little surprising is $6$ – children of parents who did not marry cousins, who married Lebanese cousins. This seems a bit higher than expected with a rate of $\frac{6}{20} = 30.0\%$.

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(21/08/08)
Appendix 8: List of publications from the thesis


http://www.counterpunch.org/amin06122009.html


*Anthropological Quarterly* 40:97-183.


I love Beirut, 2006. www.daleelaustralia.com


Maps http://www.iloubnan.info/


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Sakr, E., and N. Qawas. 2009. "Intensive Lebanese efforts give birth to


Village of Hadchit Website: [http://hadchit.8m.com/](http://hadchit.8m.com/)


**Movies**

