WAY OF LIFE THEORY

THE UNDERLYING STRUCTURE OF WORLDVIEWS, SOCIAL RELATIONS AND LIFESTYLES

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A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy of the Australian National University

February 2009

Way of life theory: the underlying structure of worldviews, social relations and lifestyles

DECLARATION

I declare this thesis to be entirely my own work.

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ABSTRACT

What is the structure of society? Many thinkers have pondered the regularities. Way of life theory (WOLT) shows the relationship of every rational, social issue to every other rational, social issue.

From two dichotomised, theoretical dimensions called grid and group, Mary Douglas deduced four ways of life usually called individualism, hierarchy, egalitarianism, and fatalism. WOLT shows the same four ideal types may be deduced from any significant pair of social issues, including competition, cooperation, coercion, freedom, justice, self-identity, nature, human nature, and more. Since four types may be divided pair-wise in three ways, there are three, not two, dimensions or axes.

WOLT also deduces Douglas's fifth type (the hermit) and resolves the long-standing logical anomalies of grid-group theory.

In all, seven social theorists have independently deduced four types from various dimension pairs. Mistakes aside, they find the same four theoretical types. Evidently, the four types are natural kinds. Between them these theorists use three axes.

Numerous intuitive theorists from across social science have developed types without dimensions, and dimensions without types. Though incomplete, they show no significant disagreement.

It appears that every issue that must be taken into account to live socially fits the three axes. There is no flexibility: each issue fits the axes one way. Geometrically, three dichot-omised dimensions yield eight types, however four of them are not viable and do not arise. Given just four valid points, the number of dimensions is necessarily limited to three. The axes generate thousands of predictions.

Since deduction yields the same four types whatever issues are placed on the dimensions, the four types are, like objects of natural science, independent of any theorist. In turn, these four types control which issues fit and how they fit, delimiting the scope and refining the meaning of the issues—which places the issues, too, beyond any theorist's determination.

As in natural science, the sphere of application is set by the deductive theory, not by a theorist's pronouncement: what fits, fits. The domain appears to cover matters which people must take a position on to live socially. Emotional and internal personal issues will not fit.

WOLT sharpens meaning, formalises structure and extends connections in areas as diverse as equality, liberalism, game theory, corporate culture, national culture, political right and left, religion, and working-class health.

Like a natural science theory, WOLT is *relational*, not only taxonomic. As in natural science, no person, organisation, or social situation will conform exactly to its ideal types. It is falsifiable by deducing, or finding empirically, rival social types or a social phenomenon that will not fit. Empirical testing of the theory as a whole is awkward owing to its structure and to parochial effects. Three data sets failed to refute it.

WOLT reveals how every social issue relates to every other social issue, providing a tool for analysing worldview, social structure, and social behaviour.□

Way of life theory: the underlying structure of worldviews, social relations and lifestyles

ABBREVIATIONS AND GLOSSARY

(Brackets enclose alternative terms found in the grid-group literature)

- **1**, 1-ism: Individualist, -ism; (entrepreneur, market, competition); a social *type*
- 2, 2-ism: Hierarch(ist), hierarchy; (bureaucracy, oversight, positional); a social type
- **3**, 3-ism: Egalitarian, -ism; (sectarians, enclavists, critical activists, mutuality); a social *type*
- 4, 4-ism: Fatalist, -ism; (isolates, ineffectuals, randomness); a social type
- 5, 5-ism: Hermit, autonomy; the non-social type
- **Axis**: three axes, *X*, *Y*, *Z*, hold all *issues* necessarily underlying social relations. *Dimension* is almost synonymous but may imply a particular issue.

Bias = cultural bias = worldview

Cosmology = worldview

Cultural bias = *bias* = *worldview*; and see *way of life*

- Cultural Theory (CT) = GG theory
- Culture: shared beliefs, attitudes and behaviours, sometimes used for way of life
- **Dichotomise**: distinguishing absence v. presence (or No v. Yes) of an *issue*.
- **Dimension** = axis but *dimension* may imply a particular *issue* on the axis. *WOLT* shows there are 3 dimensions of social relations. They are called *X*, *Y*, *Z*, but it does no harm to think of them as length, height and width.
- **Grid**: extent to which the social environment is characterised by involuntary, coercive social interaction; degree of prescription; the social relations of the *Z* axis.
- **Group**: extent to which the social environment is characterised by voluntary, cooperative social interaction; degree of collectivism; the social relations of the *X* axis.

GG theory: Grid-group theory (Cultural Theory, neo-Durkheimian theory)

- **Issue** = relational issue: a concept, a social preference or policy or concern, on one of the *axes*, *X*, *Y*, *Z*. A pair of dichotomised issues form, or fit with, the four social *Types 1*, *2*, *3*, *4*.
- **Lifestyle**: behavioural preferences (or tastes) in dress, grooming, recreation, food, drink, house, garden, car, music, etc that match worldview and social relations. See *way of life*. Some expected descriptors of the types' lifestyles are:
 - 1: flamboyant, stylish, exotic, expensive, extravagant, selfconfident
 - 2: appropriate to station, compartmentalised, smooth weave, strait-laced, formal, dignified
 - 3: unstructured, 'natural', messy, coarse weave, thrifty, righteous, critical
 - 4: vulgar, over-priced, heedless, casual, unaffected
 - 5: serene, comfortable, detached, aloof, other-worldly
- **Nature**: the whole physical environment supporting living, not just the natural biological environment.
- **Objective** judgement: judgement from outside the social structure. Objective is not a synonym for unbiased.

Rational: that which is not emotional. Rational beings try to make sense of the social world and assume others do the same. The meaning is not confined to goal-oriented maximising of self-interest (the *Type 1 rationality*).

Rationality = way of life

Relational issue = *issue*

Social relations: structure of relations corresponding to *worldview*:

- 1: negotiate one on one, competitive, respect winners
- 2: ranking; the right person in the right job, respect higher rank
- 3: cooperative, harmonious, egalitarian
- 4: casual, isolated, uncertain, mistrustful, ape 1s, fear 2s
- 5: no social relations.

Solidarity = way of life

Subjective judgement: judgement by a participant in the social structure.

- **Type**: one of the four logical outcomes of two dichotomised *issues*, generally an ideology (ism). A fifth type is independent of *issues*. Type may mean *way of life* itself, or a person or a group adhering to a way of life. Common descriptions of the types are:
 - 1: independent, self-regarding, opportunist, competitive
 - 2: rule-respecting, cooperative, competitive and coercive
 - 3: norm-following, small group, cooperative, political left
 - 4: fragmented, coerced, authority-dodging
 - 5: socially detached, withdrawn, autonomous.
- **Way of life**: (type, solidarity, culture, rationality) may be divided into three aspects: *worldview*, *social relations* and *lifestyle*.
- **WOLT**: Way of life theory: all rational, social issues fit on three axes and form four social types.
- **Worldview** (bias, cultural bias, cosmology, orientation): one of the five subjective views of how the (social) world works or should work, including morality, beliefs, values, attitudes, political ideology and economic preferences.
 - 1: self reliant, compete within bad human nature to get ahead
 - 2: loyal to the properly authorised; people are trainable, tradition
 - 3: everyone should voluntarily cooperate as equals
 - 4: mistrustful, fatalistic, short-term, grab whatever is going
 - 5: autonomous, detached from the material 'rat-race'.
- X, Y, Z: Three dimensions or axes holding relational issues. The three dimensions are the three possible ways to pair-wise divide the four types. Dimensions are dichotomised as absence v. presence, of (views of) issues such as:
 - X: 1+4 v. 2+3; cooperation, (*group*), interdependence, social optimism, material pessimism, positive freedom, sincerity
 - Y: 3+4 v. 1+2; competition, self-reliance, social pessimism, material optimism, negative freedom, integrity
 - Z: 1+3 v. 2+4; coercion, (*grid*), rules, authority, rank inequality, clear categorisation, fidelity

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Thanks to my supervisors: John Uhr who, in the beginning, made it sound like a viable project; Val Braithwaite for her comments; Paul 't Hart for his blunt commentary and for his courage in accepting a student with an "adventurous" thesis. I thank my panel, Ian McAllister and David Adams, for their comments. David's friendly advice helped keep me sane through a couple of years of puzzlement. Thanks, too, to Ann Cowling, head of the ANU's statistical consulting unit, for her help and to Keith Dowding and Martin Lodge for reading and commenting on sections.

Thanks to my friends: to Linley Hill, who gathered a bundle of responses to the 15item Likert test; to Fran Chambers who read parts and offered advice from the earliest days; to Steve Wood who argued over innumerable details; to Jodie Houston who helped me gather Q-sort data; to Jacqui Homel, Peter Reddy, Natalie Mast and Melissa Lovell who read and commented on sections; to Kathryn Kelly for reading the whole thesis and making many useful suggestions; to Wayne Errington and Angus Algie for the genial evenings which turned into WOLT workshops, and for their comments on various written sections. To Angus especially I owe many insightful ideas.

Finally, thanks to the academics who have shared their time and knowledge over the numerous queries that have arisen in course of the thesis.

PREFACE

This PhD project did not set out to develop grand theory. It began with the intention of testing Mary Douglas's grid-group theory. Two things happened: standard social science testing approaches proved inappropriate and the theory evolved fundamentally.

I accepted, with Popper, that unless a test could potentially refute the theory, it was not a test. What survives of the plan to test the theory is presented as Chapter 7.

Douglas has two issues, grid and group, on two axes; other theorists also designate two issues on two axes. They are not the same issues yet they all find the same types. They are not the same axes: they need three axes between them. After finding that many pairs of issues deliver the same types, I accepted that all social relations issues fit on three axes and adopted the name *way of life theory*. It still astonishes me: there appears to be no rational social relations issue which does not fit. At the same time, issues of passion and personality cannot be made to fit.

A PhD thesis is supposed to add a brick to the edifice of knowledge, not rebuild its foundations. Writers have remarked, with varying degrees of irony, on grid-group theory's ambition to explain everything. Way of life theory is much worse. Strict methodological conservatism seemed appropriate: scrutiny of premises, methods of irreproachable precedent, plain language, everyday examples, falsifiable claims.

WOLT's applicability across the breadth of social science means this thesis often ventures outside my expertise. May the simplifications never undermine the argument.

MEP February, 2009

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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

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All things without, which round about we see, We seeke to knowe, and how therewith to doe; But that whereby we reason, live and be, Within our selves, we strangers are thereto...

We that acquaint our selves with every Zoane And passe both Tropikes and behold the Poles, When we come home, are to our selves unknown, And unacquainted still with our owne Soules.

—Sir John Davies, 1599.

1.1 A new theory

This thesis proposes a new theory of social interaction. Way of life theory (WOLT) is an extension of Mary Douglas's grid-group (GG) theory. WOLT finds the same five cultural types as GG theory but finds three dimensions of sociality, not two. Instead of deducing the four social types from two dimensions of grid and group, they can be deduced from numerous pairs of issues on two of the three dimensions. It appears that all rational social issues fit on the three axes, thereby relating every social thing to every other social thing.

This introductory chapter sets the context and formulates the question, considers the GG theory background, summarises the contents of the thesis, and then explains the methods and approaches, which are those of the natural sciences rather than social science.

1.2 The question

The question is the most basic in social science. How does society work? What parts is it made of? How do the parts interrelate? Physics has its relationships of matter and energy; chemistry has its reactions between the elements and compounds; biology has its systems of organs and its taxonomies of species. What are the interacting components of society?

There are various ways of expressing the problem...

The elderly Floyd Allport, a founder of social psychology, puzzled:

Some way must be found to describe in general terms that layout of conditions surrounding and involving individuals which we have called 'the group,' and to formulate, in the precise yet universal manner of science, what actually goes on in the situation we call 'collective' action. In this broader sense the problem of the individual and the group is really the 'master problem' of social psychology. (Allport 1962: 7)

Mary Douglas wanted to be able to compare cultures across African tribes but:

Culture is a blank space, a highly respected, empty pigeonhole... The intellectual gap that yawns is a reproach to anthropology, for ours is the only discipline that has any pretensions to be dealing with culture systematically. (Douglas 1982 [1978]: 183)

I have tried to compare the conditions for different kinds of witchcraft beliefs, or for matrilineal or pawnship institutions. Always the thing I have sought to understand has slid through my fingers like a hairy rope, each twist and pull bringing up a new segment to challenge the basis of classification. Without typologizing there can be no generalizing. (200)

C Wright Mills had said social arrangements need to be connected to ways of thinking:

Without a formulation of mind which permits social determinants a role in reflection, assertions on the larger historical level carry less intellectual weight. A theory of mind is needed which conceives social factors as intrinsic to mentality. (Mills 1963 [1939]: 424)

And that is what Douglas produced. In 1983 she told a conference:

I would argue that we should pay more attention to the social processes that influence moral structures and particularly to methodology and fundamental assumptions... Each particular type of social system can be assumed to engender its appropriate, formal commitments in the breasts of individuals... Working out a typology is the crux. (Douglas 1983: 43).

She had, by then, worked out her typology, a theory which connects social systems and the commitments that form in a person's breast. Her method was to set two theoretical *issues* of social relations she called *grid* and *group* as two dichotomised dimensions and from them deduce four kinds of theoretical social environments from which she then inferred four matching kinds of commitments—four *types*. The types are four basic ways people perceive social relations and four matching ways that society is structured—four *ways of life*.

A generation younger than Allport, the elderly Harry Eckstein, after a career pondering political culture, thought GG theory "especially promising" and speculated that "Together the four types may in fact exhaust all possible such systems of political orientations." (Eckstein 1997: 31) This hopeful-guarded comment reflects a common view of GG theory: its types work well but is it theoretically sound? He is far from content:

Conceivably, we may at some time in the future have a scheme for characterizing the elements of culture patterns (and also social structures) analogous to the periodic table, which is a powerful device for both descriptive and theoretical purposes. We have nothing of this kind yet, not even a primitive beginning. (Eckstein 1997: 29)

Grid-group theory is persuasive and heuristically useful. But it is incomplete. Theorists have recognised that there are social relations issues other than grid and group and some have tried to fit them onto the grid and group axes. This has been unsuccessful and grid and group have remained unique concepts peculiarly able to deliver the GG types. The relevant questions are: Why are these "grid" and "group" so special? Where does everything else fit? Are there other dimensions? Would other issues deliver other types?

These questions are thirty years old; this thesis answers them. WOLT shows there are three dimensions of social relations, not two. All social issues fit onto them; grid and group are just two issues among dozens. There are no further types.

This thesis tackles the "master problem of social psychology" and finds a solution, at least for the rational part of collective action. WOLT is analogous to the periodic table in its comprehensiveness and its inflexible, systematic, relational structure. It cannot match the table in precision—that would seem truly impossible—but it *is* a primitive beginning.

1.3 Background

Mary Douglas first published what became known as grid-group theory in 1970 but her best exposition is the 1978 paper, *Cultural Bias* (Douglas 1982 [1978]). She distinguished in the social world two dimensions she called *grid* and *group*, dichotomised each into *weak* and *strong* and from the resulting four combinations, deduced four types of cultures or "ways of life". Grid means prescription, the extent to which the social environment restricts people's options; group signifies the extent to which people belong to a collective.¹ The group dimension is familiar as *individualism* versus *collectivism*, as Tönnies's *Gesellschaft* versus *Gemeinschaft*, as Maine's *contract* versus *status*. By adding the second dimension, grid, Douglas created two kinds of individualism and two kinds of collectivism. The most popular names for the four GG types are:

- 1. Weak grid, weak group: individualism
- 2. Strong grid, strong group: hierarchy
- 3. Weak grid, strong group: egalitarianism
- 4. Strong grid, weak group: fatalism

To these Douglas added a fifth type who did not participate in social relations: autonomy, or the hermit.

The grid-group scheme allowed her to deduce worldview (cosmology, or cultural bias as she called it) from social structure. It tied individual beliefs to social arrangements.

It is a method of identifying cultural bias, of finding an array of beliefs locked together into relational patterns. The beliefs must be treated as part of the action and not separated from it as in so many theories of social action. (Douglas 1982 [1978]: 199)

I must... indicate the level at which I assume that these structures [grid and group] can be found... the operative level is that at which excuses are required from individuals and made by them and where moral judgments materialize into pressures from other persons to act in certain ways... This level may be conceived as the social accounting level, the level of justification and explanation. (201)

On the basis of this social accounting—individual judgements and justifications under social pressures—she systematically deduced the effects of each of the four combinations of social structure upon the people caught up in them. The upshot was four coherent patterns

¹ Three definitions of grid and group: Douglas (1982 [1978]): "*Group* means the outside boundary that people have erected between themselves and the outside world. *Grid* means all the other social distinctions and delegations of authority that they use to limit how people behave to one another." Thompson et al (1990: 5): "*Group* refers to the extent to which an individual is incorporated into bounded units... *Grid* denotes the degree to which an individual's life is circumscribed by externally imposed prescriptions." Grendstad (2003: 2): "The basic structure of grid-group theory is that two dimensions demarcate four types. The grid dimension measures restrictions on individual behavior. The group dimension measures the degree to which an individual is incorporated into a tightly knit group."

each consisting of logically connected values, institutions and actions: people who think in a certain way relate to each other in a certain way and adopt a certain lifestyle, there being four such ways. The fifth type she added, ad hoc, as someone whose thinking was not deducible from social arrangements.

In the years since, hundreds of studies have applied GG theory to topics across social science. The theory was clarified through usage and discussion and it was broadened, particularly with the publication of the textbook, *Cultural Theory*, by Thompson, Ellis and Wildavsky in 1990. Though critics have pointed out faults, the faults seem to be accepted and GG theory is now fairly established (Douglas 2007; 6 and Mars 2008; Thompson 2008).²

1.4 Way of life theory; thesis layout

This thesis first explicates WOLT then assesses it. The explication sets out its concurrence with GG theory, reviews comparable classificatory theories and explains WOLT's three dimensional structure. The thesis then presents illustrative applications, considers the theory's epistemological credentials, and attempts to test it empirically.

- Ch 1: Introduction.
- Ch 2: Basic types. Deduction of WOLT as Douglas deduced GG theory to show that its types, named 1 to 5, are the same, and to resolve long-standing logic problems.
- Ch 3: Other theories. Comparison of types and dimensions across social science shows pervasive accord; WOLT completes, rather than competes.
- Ch 4: Three dimensions, X, Y, Z. How they work, how everything fits, what they predict, how they are falsifiable.
- Ch 5: Corroborations. Cases from various fields demonstrate WOLT's power to reveal new connections, expose old mistakes, and guide inquiry.
- Ch 6: Scientific context. WOLT's scientific probity, its scope and its place in sociology.
- Ch 7: Testing. Three empirical surveys do not refute the theory.
- Ch 8: Conclusion. Reflections on history and meaning.

In **Chapter 2** the five types are deduced from the pair of relational issues, *competition* and *cooperation*. In addition to finding the same four types as Douglas deduces from grid and group, the autonomous hermit is also deduced and the chapter resolves GG theory's logical anomalies regarding competition, the views of nature, and the derivation of discrete

² Douglas (2007): "CT [GG theory] now claims a large band of practitioners, more than 700 published titles, and some real-world traction." GG theory's critics are relatively few (Jann 1986; Johnson 1987; Laitin 1988; Spickard 1989; Johnson 1991; Hindess 1991; Schwarz 1991; Schwartzman 1991; Selle 1991a, b; Friedman 1991, 1993; Welch 1993: 141-147; Boholm 1996; Sjöberg 1998; van Heffen and Klok 2003; Nowacki 2004; Sjöberg 2005).

types from continuous dimensions. The chapter offers strong evidence of a third dimension, explicates the nature of the deductive, ideal-type argument, examines its premises, considers inter-type relations, and briefly surveys the theory's explanatory and predictive possibilities at the type level. The domain of the theory appears to be *matters which people must deal with in order to live socially*.

Chapter 3 looks at relational classifications across the social sciences. Including Douglas, seven theorists have taken a pair of issues, set them as dimensions, dichotomised them and deduced four types. Mistakes aside, they all found the same types. Their dimensional issue pairs are idiosyncratic and apparently unrelated, so it follows that (a) the four types can be deduced from issues other than grid and group or competition and cooperation, (b) the four ways of life are the only social types there are, hence their existence is independent of any theorist, and (c) since four types can be arranged pair-wise in three ways and these theorists use, between them, all three, there are three dimensions of social relations.

Since Marx, about twenty theorists from various fields have developed relevant typologies without the aid of dimensions. All but one find two or three of the three pro-active types. Despite Marx's focus on the proletariat and the cataclysmic political events in its name, none of these intuitive typologists notice the Type 4. A larger number of investigators, in fields ranging from linguistics to primatology, have identified dimensions without types. Though the vocabulary varies, all note the X dimension (cooperation, Douglas's group) along with one or both of the other two dimensions.

Chapter 4 is the heart of the thesis. It explains how social relations fit on three axes. The interrelationships of three axes are more complicated than two but they cope with everything. Some GG theorists (e.g. Mars 1994 [1982]: 29; Ostrander 1982; Thompson 1996) attempted to set issues other than grid and group on the axes but with the Y axis missing this could not succeed. The axial positions of a few dozen social issues—mostly ordinary things, few as technical as grid and group—are listed in Table 4.2. Many of these issues may be used to deduce the five WOLT types ab initio. The 3-D structure has no flexibility so there is no freedom to define axial issues or the types: issues are fixed by their fit to the four types; the three axes are defined polythetically by the issues on them; and the four types are fixed polythetically by the issues on the three axes. This (apparently tautologous) relationship of types to issues to axes to types is theory-determined, not theorist-determined. Geometrically, three dichotomised dimensions yield eight positions but four of them are unviable and do not occur—which is why it suffices to specify issues on two axes to fix the type. The resulting strict rules lead to thousands of specific, non-intuitive predictions.

Chapter 5 sets out case studies to illustrate WOLT's power to illuminate topics across social science. It shows that equality under law is the only coherent simultaneous

realisation of equality of opportunity and equality of outcome; it shows that liberalism, the 200 year intellectual project, cannot succeed; it holds out the possibility of game theory and economics taking "tastes" into account; it can connect corporate culture and national culture and guide empirical research; it demonstrates that political right and left are types, not dimensions; it generates a comprehensive comparative anthropology of religion; it offers advice on working-class health. Where WOLT is applied it sharpens meaning, exposes structure, and broadens connections. Like a natural-science theory, it is relational rather than taxonomic, extending understanding in diverse areas and relating the areas to each other.

Chapter 6 puts WOLT in context: in science, sociology and psychology. The deduction from dichotomised, hypothetical extremes means that the types and the axial issues are, like theoretical objects of natural science, ideal types. Like lines and points, spheres and planes, they *represent* reality; in their perfect, extreme form they do not exist in reality and no person or organisation or social situation can conform exactly. The claim that the four ways of life are *all* the social ways that can exist is falsifiable by deducing, or showing empirically, rival social types. The claim that everything in the social world fits either on one of the dimensions or else falls under one of the four types may be falsified by finding a social phenomenon that will not fit.

The tactic of using two dimensions is examined to show that it can generate theoristfree types and dimensional issues. The dichotomisation of issues is defended as being the way people think and as being the only conceptually unambiguous measure. A comparison of WOLT and personality theory finds that the latter appears to deal with emotion and the personally internal, whereas WOLT deals with cognition and the socially relational. An attempt to locate WOLT in sociology finds it to be both Durkheimian and Weberian.

Chapter 7 considers the possibilities and difficulties of testing the theory and describes three empirical tests based on surveys: a 99-respondent questionnaire, a 1700-respondent questionnaire, and a Q-sort with 120 respondents. For structural reasons, the tests seek to refute types, not dimensions, through allocation to type and inspection of type consistency. The tests offer some confirmations of the theory (which shows as a better discriminator than materialism/post-materialism) and no significant refutation.

Chapter 8 concludes with some reflections on the antecedents of WOLT and on the social science problem of theorist-free meaning that was solved in its development.

1.5 Methods, approaches

1.5.1 Hypothetico-deductive science

Comte would approve the approach of this thesis. Referring to Montesquieu's *Spirit* of *Laws* of 1748 he says, "The great strength of this memorable work appears to me to be in its tendency to regard political phenomena as subject to invariable laws, like all other phenomena." (Comte 1896 [1853]: 166) That has been a social science goal ever since. There is much debate over the suitability of natural-science methods in the social sciences however in the present instance it is not a matter of choice: it is inherent to deduction from dimensions. The posited dichotomised dimensions are hypothetical, idealised concepts and WOLT and GG theory are hypothetico-deductive theories as are the six other two-dimension-al typologies discussed in Chapter 3. Some of these theorists' deductions are modified—weakened—by infusions of the interpretative and the empirical but WOLT carefully adheres to the natural-science approach. Its effects are alluded to where relevant, and in Chapter 6, after the theory itself has been established, its epistemological context is considered in relation not only to science but to sociology and personality theory.

Where Douglas (like the other dimensional typologists) deduces four social types from putatively objective social structure, WOLT deduces all five types from *subjective perceptions* of social arrangements. That is, WOLT deduces views from views. It may be said to apply scientific method to *Verstehen*, a combination some think contradictory (Scruton 1983: 419, 484). It is a non-normative theory of perceptions of the normative, an objective study of the subjective, a value-free theory of values. Deduction is necessarily value-free for its conclusions are inherent in its premises but the choice of premises, i.e. issues to place on the dimensions, may be a value judgement. However, if all issues deliver the same five types then choice and values become irrelevant.

Where in GG theory deduction of types depends upon the meanings attributed to grid and group, the three WOLT axes permit the types to be deduced from practically any significant pair of social relations issues. It seems there exist no relevant issues which cannot be placed on the axes and it seems there are no issues which can be placed on two axes to deduce anything other than the four types. That is, like reckoning with fractions, decimals or percentages, the answer is the same no matter how it is computed and, as in the natural sciences, the result does not depend on verbal definitions of basic concepts. Anyone can work it out. It is open to falsification both logical and empirical, theoretically in thousands of ways, practically in dozens.

WOLT finds there are just 3 sets of issues (concerns, policies) and just five possible ways of life (isms, worldviews). This allocation of everything in the social world—values,

preferences, organisational structures, modes of interaction—to three dimensions or five types, suggests that all the items within a type or a dimension are in some sense the same. That does not mean they are identical, any more than the elements on a particular row or column of the periodic table are identical. A convenient analogy is with the states of matter: solid, liquid, gas, etc. Concrete and steel are both solids but not identical. Analogously, *negative freedom* and *nature friendly* are on the same axis but not identical. Concrete and steel differ systematically from water and petrol in the arrangement of their atoms. Analogously, negative freedom and nature friendly differ systematically from *interdependence* and *equality of outcome* in their relationship to other social values.

The difference between *dimension* and *type* is not always clear in social science but in WOLT they are quite distinct. It is virtually impossible to incorrectly allocate items because meaning is bestowed by the structure—the interrelation of the three dimensions and the five types. Allocation is strictly logical and quite inflexible: *issues* fit on *dimensions* which form *types* which determine how the *issues* fit to the *dimensions*. To classify issues such as justice, equality, identity, religion, or epistemology does not require great erudition. There are, of course, vast literatures on these issues. There is a vast literature on molecular structure but it is not necessary to know the chemical nature of concrete and petrol to be able to classify them as solid and liquid. If reality contains issues or types that, like jelly, are indeterminate, the theory is not immediately concerned with them. WOLT specifies three dimensions and five types and like all scientific theory it is a *model* of reality, not reality itself. As in natural science, its categories are *ideal-types* so are *never* perfectly realised. Real individuals and organisations will deviate and will be hybrid—yet should be comprehensible in terms of the ideal categories.

1.5.2 The individual

The approach may be characterised as methodological individualism: from individual views social consequences are drawn.³ Thus it reverses Douglas's approach. Douglas was convinced deduction in that direction was not possible (\$2.3.6). It turns out, however, that directly deducing views from views works well. The deduced social consequences are also *views*: not "objective" social structures but views of them, which is appropriate because society is what the people who comprise it *think* it is; it is their thoughts which make it. Society, like gravity and many another scientific concept, is unobservable; only its effects may be observed. Unlike gravity, the effects of society are only interpretable through the meaning they have for the people who are affected. Alan Ryan puts it as follows:

³ Nothing turns on the term "methodological individualism". Here it is an explanatory approach, not an ontological claim. Hodgson (2007: 8) thinks the term a poor one, never genuinely applicable, but it would seem to accurately designate deduction from subjective views.

...the question is not whether the social scientist... has correctly described the causal antecedents of a phenomenon, but whether he has understood how the persons involved would have described their situation... we have to know what the agent thinks the situation is before it can begin to possess a logic for him, and therefore for us. (Ryan 1973: 6)

WOLT is a theory of what the agent thinks the social situation is.

A question comes up occasionally in the GG literature as to whether the type classification applies to individuals or to social units. It applies to both. This question arises in an etic context, i.e. where grid and group are objective properties of objective society. However GG theory was never essentially about objective society; it was always, and mainly, about beliefs (§2.3.6). Collectives pass resolutions and promote policies so may be held to have opinions but individuals *certainly* have opinions and are thus legitimate objects of study. Individual preference sets are in the foreground here as they are for Douglas. These individual preferences are *social* preferences, preferences which have social implications and which are shaped by the social arrangements people find themselves involved with. Conversely, an organisation's formal policies will be some kind of aggregate or average of the opinions of its members. Insofar as a whole society has opinions it, too, will reflect the opinions of its members, past and present, but this thesis is little concerned with whole society; its concern is the individual attitudes and their associated social structures, which are likely to be subsets of whole societies.

WOLT explicates the connections between the individual views and social structure and though cause is assumed, its direction is not. Whereas an empirical correlation says nothing about cause, showing only a statistical connection in the data (with some probability of its being due to chance), a deduced theoretical connectedness requires cause in order to perform the deduction (and chance is ruled out). However it does not say what causes what. Mostly we may assume a two-way street, i.e. that individual attitudes and social arrangements cause each other in a mutually reinforcing, or mutually correcting, way.

1.5.3 Theorist-free concepts through 2x2 typologising

Central to WOLT is the tactic of the forming of four types from two dichotomised dimensions. It is employed as a device to escape the subjectivity that plagues social science. The subjectivity problem arises because social objects are figments, are matters of agreement. A well-known treatment is John Searle's (1995) who points out that quite ordinary objects such as a ten-dollar note, or a vote, or a chess game, have no meaning outside of the meaning people socially agree upon. Those objects are fairly readily agreed but serious problems arise with concepts like cooperation, freedom, and justice because different scholars have different conceptions of them. This thesis shows a way that a 2x2 typology can obviate the theorist's conception, or at least most of it.

Creating a typology by dimensions is fairly common in social science and there is a modest literature on the subject. The minimal form is to note that some issue is pertinent and to designate it as a dimension ranging through the incidence of the issue. If only the issue's extremes are recognised it will be reduced to two "types". Such dichotomising is applied here (and by the other theorists) for clarity. In the natural sciences issues can be measured but social science knows no units of measure so concepts such as *high* and *low* are unclear and only the dichotomy, *presence* versus *absence*, is conceptually unambiguous.

If there is a second pertinent issue then there will be two types for each of the first issue's two, making four types in all. Every time a dichotomised dimension is added, the number of types doubles. Normally, every issue requires its own dimension; the possibility of having more than one issue per dimension is not considered in the literature. If it were, it would doubtless be assumed that if two issues can be put on one dimension, the issues must be synonyms. But this need not be the case. Chapter 3 discusses seven theorists who each use a unique pair of issues but who all derive Douglas's types. Table 4.2 lists a hundred issues which will give, or fit in with, the same four types. They are not synonyms for they encompass the whole range of rational social relations.

Since the four types are deduced from issues, the types are logically determined by the pair of issues used to deduce them. For a further specific issue to fit those same types, it must be framed just so, and then it can be set, just so, on the appropriate axis or axes. That is, the types logically determine the axial position(s) of the new issue. The theorist gets no choice; it is a matter of working it out. For example, *freedom* will fit nowhere. But framed as *negative freedom* and *positive freedom* it falls on the Y and X axes.⁴ In short, setting issues on dimensions to fit the types becomes a technique which creates social science objects—both issues and types—that are theorist-free.

1.5.4 Neutral vocabulary

To minimise distraction from idiosyncratic vocabulary, the WOLT axes are labelled X, Y and Z and the types are numbered 1 to 5. Since many issues fit on the axes, many words may be used to describe them; as a guide, not a definition, X, Y, Z may be thought of as cooperation, competition and coercion. (Grid and group are on the Z and X axes.) The terms *dimension* and *axis* are almost interchangeable, axis being entirely unspecified as to the issue on it whereas in common usage dimension tends to imply an issue. In the usual situation as in GG theory, there is only one issue per dimension which means the issue is the dimension.

⁴ For unusual matters framing can be puzzling but well-known issues are usually standard, e.g. justice must be framed as process and outcome to fit on Y and X; Hirschman's exit and voice fit on Y and X and predict a specific loyalty on Z; Linton's achieved and ascribed statuses fit on Y and Z (and require equal status on X). Important issues like freedom and justice not only fit but suffice to derive the WOLT types ab initio in the manner of Chapter 2 and of the seven theorists of Chapter 3.

The types are referred to by the numbers 1 to 5 to avoid labels that never quite capture the concept. Mamadouh (1999: 401), discussing the usual GG terms, says, "The labelling unfortunately also produces a lot of confusion because labels stimulate our imagination so readers tend to... fill up the quadrant [i.e. type] with the connotations of the labels..." Some of the type names used in GG theory (see Glossary) are so limiting as to be distorting but even the most acceptable confuse. No insistent admonition that "individualist" is a technical term ever entirely removes the difference between saying, "Individualists would do such-and-such," and saying, "Type 1s would do such-and-such." The temptation to slide mentally from technical term to colloquial meaning is seemingly inescapable as one wonders, "But what is individualist about that?" The answer may be "Nothing," and the appropriate, non-misleading question is: "What is 1-ist about that?" In this thesis, the neutral *worldview* is used in preference to *bias, cultural bias* or *cosmology. Type* may refer to way of life or to worldview, and it may refer to individuals or to social structure. *Culture* is not used where its meaning would be doubtful.⁵

The vocabulary used to describe types and issues is important and the distinction between subjective and objective⁶ is important. Not important are distinctions between beliefs, values, attitudes, opinions, tastes, preferences and commitments (and probably other terms). These words have their different meanings but WOLT is a theory about all of them. The is-ought distinction, sometimes said to be the difference between belief and value, is discussed in §2.4.1 and is not critical. WOLT does tend to be about the more enduring orientations—say, values more than opinions—but the differences are not of crucial consequence to the theory and very often terms could be interchanged.

1.5.5 Scope, examples, criticism

The scope of the theory seems best described as that which is unavoidable if social interaction is to occur. These are the things people who live together have to take a position on in order to get along, things which in principle they must negotiate with each other but in practice would mostly be given as cultural inheritance. That may be a slightly conservative description, since the theory includes things that do not look as if they are essential. However matters concerning emotions and the internal personal do not fit: WOLT seems to draw a line between the rational and the non-rational and between the relational and the non-relational. WOLT knows no restrictions on place or time.

⁵ "Culture" is very contested. Eckstein's (1997: 26) definition: "Cultures are the variable and cumulatively learned patterns of orientations to action in societies" captures WOLT's *ways of life* quite well.

⁶ This was a concern of Douglas's but little noted elsewhere in the GG literature. Thompson et al (1990) do not discuss it and shift back and forth between the objective and the subjective.

Like GG theory, WOLT can be conceptually partitioned, as in the thesis title, into worldviews, social structures and lifestyles. The first is subjective; the second partly subjective, partly objective, and the last is objective. This work concentrates on worldviews because WOLT is deduced from (idealised) views yet everything hinges on social relations, the worldviews being views concerning, and systematically affected by, social relations. Lifestyle seems less weighty and plays a lesser role in this thesis, with dress, decor, music, etc being mentioned in parochial terms (namely the modern West) to add colour to abstractions. It is treated herein as dependent upon views and social arrangements although, like social relations, lifestyle would have causal impact on views (see Appendix 10, §A10.3 for an example). There must be a logic of such causes—but it is not considered here.

One of the attractions of GG theory has been the way the types are readily perceived in ordinary situations and readily applied to prominent people or institutions. The theory is unique in this respect. Because WOLT's deductive base is so broad and not dependent upon the somewhat tenuously defined grid and group, the types are in sharper focus and it lends itself even more to practical examples. Illustrative examples are given throughout and to a great extent are mundane and readily disputable. The quite technical Chapter 4, which explains how the three dimensions are interrelated and how they relate to the four social types, is leavened with many examples, and Chapter 5 consists entirely of studies intended to show-case WOLT, particularly its relational aspects.

There is a concern that arises occasionally in the GG literature about type constancy: whether an individual's preference set stays the same or whether it fluctuates according to situation and over time. According to the theory, social arrangements influence beliefs, hence a person's beliefs might change if momentary social circumstances change. It is assuredly the case⁷ but it is not our concern. No one is a *totally* different psychological person in different circumstances and the aim is to understand something of that constancy. For example, after reaching maturity people vote the same way over long periods. WOLT offers insight into that. Any future micro-theory which predicts how people's attitudes fluctuate according to the momentary social situation will surely require a macro-theory of the constant as a comparative context.

Most criticisms of GG theory allege some inconsistency or gap and these are appropriate grounds for complaint (hopefully all resolved with WOLT). Occasionally, though, there is a different, inappropriate sort of criticism; it is the objection that the theory's propon-

⁷ For example, in simple experiments Vohs et al (2006; 2008: 210) show that randomly selected subjects exposed to small, incidental reminders of money (e.g. a wall poster) tend 1-ist compared with subjects exposed to neutral objects. They became less helpful and less requiring of help, sought more interpersonal space, preferred solo leisure and work activities, and preferred to take sole responsibility. This instance would indicate that WOLT may also help explain transient attitudes.

ents have contradicted themselves. This is applicable elsewhere in social science but not to GG theory or to WOLT. A scientific theory cannot depend on the consistency of a theorist's writings. The theory of gravity cannot be impugned by noting that Newton said one thing here and something else there. All it means is that Newton made a mistake. In science this is basic. On the other hand, if one wishes to understand Hobbes's argument, one consults his writings and if he contradicts himself, there is no independent way to settle the matter. If I have contradicted myself in this thesis then one of the statements is simply wrong and it should be possible to decide which (if any) is right. As a deductive theory, WOLT stands or falls on its logic, not on the clarity or confusion of any theorist.

In advancing a new theory, the intention is to persuade. WOLT's claims must engender scepticism. For GG theorists, grid and group have been the key to understanding worldview and social structure—can they really be discarded and replaced by any ordinary pair of relational issues? Can everything socially rational really be on three dimensions making up four types? In anticipation of such scepticism an effort has been made to use plain words in order to offer the maximum chance of detecting flaws. In working the theory out, countless puzzles have been solved so hopefully most objections are anticipated. As far as I know, the exposition contains no glossing-over of awkward points. Suggestions are made as to where WOLT might be vulnerable and falsification criteria are carefully set out (§6.2.8). A valid objection to the theory would satisfy one of those criteria or would assert some inconsistency, such as a mistake in the reasoning or a critical omission.

Way of life theory: the underlying structure of worldviews, social relations and lifestyles

CHAPTER 2 BASIC THEORY: DEDUCTION OF FIVE TYPES

2.1 Introduction
2.2 The nature of a priori deduction
2.3 Five ways of seeing the world, five ways of life
2.3.0 Premises
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2.3.2 Type 2, the ruler: hierarchy
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2.5 What WOLT explains and predicts
2.6 Competition—a clarification
2.7 Conclusion

Table 2.1	Competition and cooperation YX	. 22
Table 2.2	The grid-group "map" ZX	. 43

Agreement on political fundamentals cries for an explanation. Why, how, through which mechanisms do people come to think alike about political fundamentals?

-Charles E Lindblom (1981)

Every man, wherever he goes, is encompassed by a cloud of comforting convictions, which move with him like flies on a summer day.

-Bertrand Russell. Sceptical Essays

Human beings do not choose what they want, like ordering a la carte... Preference formation is much more like ordering prix fixe from a number of set dinners or voting a party ticket. Only those combinations that are socially viable, that can cohere because people are able to give them their allegiance, to share their meanings, may be lived.

—Aaron Wildavsky (1987a)

2.1 Introduction

This chapter establishes way of life theory (WOLT) from first principles. Mary Douglas deduced grid-group theory from two kinds of theoretical social arrangements she called *grid* and *group*. In this chapter WOLT is derived from *subjective views* of two theoretical social relations called *competition* and *cooperation*. The resulting five "types" are the same as the GG theory types. There are two big differences in approach: the types are derived from a significantly different pair of issues than GG theory, and they are derived from subjective perceptions of social relations, not objective social structure.

The chapter has several purposes:

- to establish a strict deductive theory in the manner of natural, rather than social, science;
- to demonstrate that there must be three dimensions, not two;
- to foreshadow the theory's independent deduction from many different issues and the fitting of every relevant issue to three axes;
- to show the types can be directly derived from subjective cosmology (worldview), an approach Douglas thought impossible;
- to illustrate the place of *competition*, a long-standing awkwardness in GG theory;
- to formalise the status of the *hermit*, an embarrassment in the GG literature;
- to show that the five types' concepts of *nature* follow from premises and do not need to be introduced from external sources.

Loose ends will be tied up in subsequent chapters. This chapter sets WOLT out in formal terms and leaves qualifications, justifications and implications till later. The plan is to state WOLT concisely where it covers the same ground as GG theory.

In the GG literature, the grid-group concept and the characteristics of the types are almost always set out in the form of assertions. This is so even where they are explained in detail. It is a sophisticated style which seems to *assume* that the characteristics of the types follow from the grid-group premises, that the reader can 'connect the dots' and perhaps, even, that it would be gauche to spell out the logic step by step. If one asks, of this or that asserted characteristic, "Now, precisely why would that be so?" doubt can arise. The doubt is usually unfounded but sometimes the assertion is incorrect.¹

The exception to this style is Douglas (1982 [1978]) which is deductive and in which sentences are actually numbered and referred to by number. Her careful deductive approach

¹ Suggested examples of errors include: Douglas (1996: 46) and Grendstad and Selle (1997: 159) on Type 1s and authority; Hampton (1982) on competition; Thompson (1996) on competition and equality; Mars (1994 [1982]) on the nature of egalitarians; Coughlin and Lockhart (1998: 41) on 3-ist rights and 1-ist stratification; Lockhart (2001c: 56) on 1s' and 3s' and (2001a) on 4s' perceptions of the social environment; Vaughan (2002: 420) on punitive 3s. People who write will make errors but some would have been avoided by being carefully deductive.

is followed here because: (i) if the logical steps are spelt out, there is less chance mistakes faulty reasoning—will occur and a greater chance they will be found, (ii) a scientific approach requires a logic (Chapter 6) and, (iii) such exposed reasoning is more convincing. Words are flexible and one can always argue but that is good reason to be as explicit as possible. Since the present deduction is covering the same ground as GG theory it is kept fairly brief.

The following sections consider the nature of a priori deduction, deduce the five types, discuss some features of the types in comparison with GG theory, summarise general social matters WOLT might explain and predict, and the chapter closes with a clarification of *competition*.

2.2 The nature of a priori deduction

Epistemological justification—the use of dimensions, their dichotomisation and other matters—is postponed to Chapter 6 but prior to the theory's explication it seems appropriate to explain something of the nature of a deductive theory.

Based upon explicit premises concerning views of *competition* and *cooperation*, five types are deduced via a sequential: "if... then..." logic whereby the "then" consequences commonly stand as premise for a further deduction. In this WOLT follows Douglas in Cultural Bias who numbers her sentences and premises and refers to them by number with words like, "consequent on 4 and 5..." to deduce her next point. This is the standard approach of natural science where theory is formed by taking idealised objects and working out the necessary relationship between them.² It is also the approach in economic theorising but it differs from most, though not all, theories of culture which are either intuitive categories developed by the theorist or else inferences from empirical findings (Chapter 3). The types to be derived here conform to Bailey's (1994: 4, 6) and to Tiryakian's (1968: 178) definitions of typology: mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories formed from explicit and salient dimensions. From the specification of five types resulting from two dichotomised dimensions, and relying on a few other premises, the characteristics of the five types are theoretically deduced. No causal direction is implied: *competition* and *cooperation* are just the starting points for the deduction of the types. They do not *cause* the types. The detective who examines a footprint and deduces that the burglar was a tall man, is not suggesting that the footprint *caused* the burglar's height and sex.

Thus WOLT dimensions and types do not make an *empirical description* of the world but a *conceptual model* of it. It is not a taxonomy based on observation but a relational typology based on theoretical premises. It is a rationalist, a priori, hypothetico-deductive,

 $^{^2}$ In social science this approach has a respectable heritage even if only sporadically used: "The abstract ideal type or model is the one the Weber used as an 'if... then' device." (Bailey 1994: 18) There is a striking ideal-type application in Kelsen's *Pure Theory of Law* (Posner 2001).

"conditional-genetic" (Lewin 1931: 149), scientific approach and it is very familiar. For example, *if* the shortest distance between two points is a straight line, *then* Euclidean geometry theorems follow. If... then... *If* the shortest distance is not a straight line *then* the geometry will be non-Euclidean. The approach is purely conceptual since (i) there is no such thing in the real world as a line, a straight line, or a point and (ii) the theorems which follow from the premise are unavoidable, being inherent in the premise itself.³ In other words, the premise is imaginary and the conclusions are arguably tautologous.⁴ Notwithstanding this conceptual remoteness from the phenomenal world, Euclidean geometry is indispensable for comprehending and manipulating that world.⁵

Familiar as this approach is, to the social theorist accustomed to verification based on the observation of frequency of empirical occurrence, it will be unusual, and since the approach itself is not discussed in the GG literature (although it generates that theory) it is well to make it quite clear: the argument proceeds from premises that are not real to inevitable (assuming no mistake in the reasoning) conclusions based on these premises, and these conclusions become new premises for further deduction. Conclusions are *not* interpretations. Unless otherwise indicated, a conclusion is the *only* outcome (or only set of outcomes) logically following from the given premises. Possibly unlike geometry, the deduction cannot be considered a certainty: the burglar is not *definitely* a tall man; she *might* be a dwarf with large feet; deduction yields the logical finding. At the same time, the conceptual results of the deduction are hardly imaginary: logical deduction is not flexible so its conclusions should be

⁵ WOLT does not require that this be the only approach to science but McKinney (1966: 16) says:

³ Economist Ludwig von Mises also uses geometry as an example, remarking:

Einstein raises the question: 'How can mathematics, a product of human reason that does not depend on any experience, so exquisitely fit the objects of reality? Is human reason able to discover, unaided by experience through pure reasoning the features of real things?' And his answer is: 'As far as the theorems of mathematics refer to reality, they are not certain, and as far as they are certain, they do not refer to reality'. (Mises 1960 [1933]: 39. He cites Einstein's *Geometrie und Erfahrung*, Berlin, 1923: 3)

⁴ Boholm (1996: 71-2) considers the grid-group typology marred by a "gruesome tautology": "...the concept is tautological: people of culture A habitually do X because they share this particular culture A that prescribes that they do X." Maybe. Elements which are metals are good conductors because they share the classification as metal which prescribes that they be good conductors.

No concept is ever a copy of anything real. This is most strikingly evident in the realm of physical science. No scientific concept deals directly with perceptual experience, but only with the limits as constructively formulated. In theory, for instance, a sphere and a plane can touch each other in only one place. In the empirical world, however, allowances have to be made for the roughness of surface and the pressure of a real sphere on a plane.

If "no scientific concept deals directly with perceptual experience" then to understand cyclones, chromosomes, fossils, or any other physical phenomenon, the procedure is to construct a *model* by postulating premises relating to the essential interacting parts, then deducing the consequences of their interaction. The deduction is theoretic; real objects are not thereby perfectly described; consequently, deduced outcomes are not perfect descriptions, or perfect predictions, of real world events. If the premises were not too far removed from reality (e.g. not an oversimplification) the deduced model will be usefully valid. Such validity will apply to individual events or circumstances and will be unrelated to the frequency of their occurrence (Taylor 1958: 110 and see Chapter 6).

unresponsive to imagination. Types are deduced from hypothetical premises but rather than hypothetical, it seems better to regard them as extreme or, as Weber put it, "ideal" or "pure": each type is an archetype. Where, rarely, strict deduction is not followed below, the deviation from logic is signalled by words like "presumably" or "perhaps".⁶

The intention is to build an unambiguous theoretic model of social cognition: to explicate logical inevitabilities, rather than argue for possibilities. Or, more precisely, the aim is to build five models of cognition since the reasoning deducing each type stands for itself without dependence on the other types. The extent to which real people and real social contexts conform to the types is another matter. They will deviate from the archetypes just as real physical objects deviate from theoretical geometric shapes. Weber was very insistent on this point: "The sharper and more unambiguously constructed the ideal types are, that is, the more *unreal* in this sense they are, the better they perform their terminological, classificatory and heuristic services." (Weber 1921: 561 [522], italics original) Much human activity is prompted by attachment, for which a more parsimonious explanation would be that applied to other social animals, namely reproductive probability, not coherent subjective attitudes.⁷ Also, meaning for real people is surely often rooted in emotions which, being non-logical, cannot be deduced. Each conclusion here is the *logical* consequence of preceding premises.⁸

Artificial as their origin is, the GG types have real world resonance and this resonance has been a significant factor in GG theory's appeal. The reaction of risk scholar John Adams (1995: x) would be a common one: "I now see the stereotypes of cultural theory—egalitarians, individualists, hierarchists, fatalists and hermits—everywhere I look." Though the types are ideal-types, or extremes, and no one fits perfectly, it is not hard to find persons and institutions that exemplify them and illustrative examples are given below to lend the theoretical deductions some immediacy.

The uncompromising ratiocination is utterly exposed to refutation. This is partly because it is explicit, but in principle because the occurrence of a single faulty link in the chain of deductive reasoning invalidates subsequent conclusions. Since a thinking mistake distorts subsequent deduction, the best chance of avoiding and exposing such mistakes is to

⁶ Some might say the approach is not deduction but "inference to the best explanation". Perhaps a deduction that is not a certainty should be referred to as an inference but if so "deduction" could hardly apply in social science. Here "if... then..." will be regarded as deduction and "inference" will be something weaker, something possible, rather than probable or logically inevitable. As in mathematics, deduction does not imply causal direction.

⁷ No doubt, coherent subjective attitudes operate alongside attachment and contribute to it. But the common practice, in sociology and cross-cultural psychology, of treating the family as just another group ignores genetic distance, thus confounding two distinct mechanisms.

⁸ Weber's (1968 [1922]: 6) position is comparable: "it is convenient to treat all irrational, affectually determined elements of behavior as factors of deviation from a conceptually pure type of rational action." At some point there may also be a problem with logic itself. Ultimately, the occurrence of life is not logical so logic may have limits.

set out a sequential logic. This sensitivity to a reasoning flaw should not be understood simplistically. A faulty link is prima facie grounds for declaring subsequent conclusions incorrect but it is not grounds to declare the theory a failure: the premise might be poorly expressed and the reasoning might be revised and the link repaired; or the premise may be wrong but of limited effect, impinging on only a subsidiary detail of the theory, in which case only that detail will need correction (minor errors are common in the GG literature). Realistically, WOLT is not going to fail through some incorrect premise or logic because (i) each of the five types is independently deduced, (ii) the same theory can be deduced from many different starting points (Chapters 3 and 4, Appendix 1), (iii) the worldview types formally deduced here have been noticed, one way or another, by sociologists for centuries (Chapter 3), (iv) the three pro-active worldviews are common currency in organisation theory and political science discussion of ideology (Chapter 3) and—perhaps most tellingly for a theory of how people think—(v) the five types fit with vulgar stereotypes (see page T4 of Appendix 3, and Appendix 10).⁹

If the theory, though exposed, is not likely to fail through faulty deduction, and if it is difficult, on account of confounding by other influences (such as attachment and emotion mentioned above), to falsify by comparing WOLT theoretical outcomes with the social-psychological manifestations in the real world, is the theory genuinely sensitive to testing? Some testable predictions are listed in §2.5 below; Chapter 4 identifies a large number of specific predictions which follow directly from the conceptual deduction; Chapter 7 is devoted to empirical testing.

2.3 Five ways of seeing the world, five ways of life

2.3.0 Premises

WOLT is derived below from preferences for *competition* and *cooperation*. These two *relational issues* are chosen because they are of broad social scope and their meaning is fairly plain. Nothing depends on them in particular: other dimensional typologists choose other issues and many different pairs of issues would suit our purpose: the same types always result (Chapter 3). Competition and cooperation are important to all social animals and a human would likely have some view of them. To live socially, a human would need to adopt some position regarding them. In dichotomised terms, one would either accept or reject where to accept means to consider desirable and necessary for social well-being and to reject would mean to consider undesirable and an impediment to optimal social living.

⁹ These are stereotypes of mindset and social behaviour such as politics, class, profession, lifestyle. Common stereotypes of race, ethnicity, and religion find no correspondence in WOLT (or GG theory).

It might be thought that competition and cooperation are mutually exclusive. Not so: though each may occur without the other, in human society they probably usually occur together. Sport, for example, is competition which could not take place without cooperation. Given these two dichotomised issues, there are four possibilities: 1: accept competition and reject cooperation; 2: accept both competition and cooperation; 3: embrace cooperation and reject competition; 4: reject both competition and cooperation. See Table 2.1.

Table 2.1 Competition and cooperation YX

Competition	Yes	1	2
Y	No	4	3
		No	Yes
		Cooperation X	

This typology could apply to social structure or to social interaction but here the four types are intended as *preferences* which means there are putative *persons* who may be called Type 1, Type 2, etc who think society should run, or does run,¹⁰ according to their preference. Most dimensional typologists regard the types as objective social contexts. That includes Douglas who begins with types as social context and from them derives types as individual preferences (§2.3.6, §3.2.3, §3.5).

Table 2.1 shows a theoretical world of preferences that is divided two ways: into those who like and those who dislike cooperation, which is to say it divides the 1s and 4s from the 2s and 3s; and into those who like and those who dislike competition, which is to say the 1s and 2s versus the 3s and 4s. The former division shall be known as the X *dimension*, or *axis*, and the latter as the Y dimension or axis. In Chapter 3 it will be shown that many issues fit on these X and Y axes and in Chapter 4 it is shown that most of the social universe fits on them. As we will see, Douglas's five types are the same and her *group* (which signifies a cooperative social environment) is the X dichotomy; however her *grid* (which signifies a a coercive social environment) is a different dimension, one which divides the world into the 1s and 3s versus the 2s and 4s. That division, the dimension Z, is not represented in Table 2.1— it cannot be for the table is on a flat page which can only show two dimensions. In sum, these three dimensions, which are all possible pair-wise divisions of four types, are:

¹⁰ The difference between *is* and *should* is immaterial as most people do not distinguish. See footnote 30.

	No		Yes	
X:	1,4	v.	2, 3	
Y :	3, 4	v.	1, 2	
Z :	1, 3	v.	2, 4 1	

Consideration of the appropriateness of such stark dichotomisation is suspended until Chapter 6 and discussion of its verisimilitude is deferred until Chapters 5 and 7. For the moment we note only that these four "ideal types" constitute a mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive classification of people who have views. This leaves a logical possibility of people who do not have a view. These shall be known as Type 5. Thus is created a typology that includes everyone and puts no one into more than one category.¹²

Definitions of *competition* and *cooperation* are not critical since we are concerned with people's own interpretations and because the two are so distinct near enough is good enough. A qualification is that the two words have slightly pejorative and distinctly affirmative connotations respectively and no such normative judgments are wanted here. Accordingly we may note that the concept of competition does not include any coercion; David and Goliath face each other willingly; if either is compelled, it is not a genuine competition. It may be thought that no reasonable person would say cooperation is bad and that may be so but we are constructing ideal types, rather than reasonable ones. Cooperation for present purposes may include not only nice conduct such as collaboration and teamwork but also collusion, complicity, connivance and conspiracy—any plan or plot whereby people willingly combine in some undertaking.

A deductive argument is only true to the extent its premises are true. The major premise is the five-fold typology. In addition to it and its implication that people think dichotomously, three further general premises appear to be needed:

- Humans have views on things which are important for living
- People think rationally, i.e. they try to make sense of the world
- People are moral, i.e. they wish to see what is right realised

¹² Technically, the Type 5 could be divided into three kinds: (a) those who have a no view of either competition or cooperation; (b) those with a view on competition only; (c) those with a view on cooperation only. This may be shown in a table:

Competition	View	5b	1,2,3,4
	No view	5a	5c
		No view	View
		Cooperation	

In this thesis Type 5 is 5a as the ideal type.

¹¹ This chapter applies the X and Y dimensions, mentioning Z as appropriate. The interrelationship of the three dimensions is studied in Chapter 4.

These premises are implicit in the GG literature but never discussed. They are considered below in §2.4.

If such people as these five types existed, what would they be thinking?

2.3.1 Type 1, the doer: individualism

To reject cooperation, this person would have to think people should compete without help from others. That is, everyone should be competing with everyone else. The rejection of cooperation indicates that Type 1s regard it with suspicion: a proposal to cooperate may be a crafty move in another's program to compete. This implies human beings are not to be trusted. In turn, this nasty human nature means that government is to be feared since the rulers are bound to selfishly exploit their powers of compulsion—so the less government the better. Compulsion stifles competition so liberty would have high priority to 1s who would insist on equality of opportunity to compete.

To achieve in such a world people must exploit the chances offered so 1s would keep an eye out for opportunities and they would likely be restless and dissatisfied with the status quo. A self-reliant, can-do, entrepreneurial outlook would be a matter of pride, and 1s would admire a successful, dashing hero. To form profitable relationships with others, they would feel a need to impress. In the interests of self-promotion they would tend to demonstrations of personal prowess and to glad-handedness. They might dress in prestige brands, perhaps flamboyantly to emphasise individual difference. They might make sacrifices to live in a large house in an up-market suburb and to drive an imposing car in order to demonstrate accomplishment and to appear generous. With interpersonal relations negotiated in a competitive atmosphere, good manners would be crucial in order for people to get along, and where recourse to law is deficient, the 1-ist need for recognition and respect might generate an "honour culture" of high sensitivity and extreme reaction to insult. Evidently 1s see a world that yields benefits if energy and skill are applied, which implies that nature—the physical world which supplies resources-must be basically friendly and if things go wrong one has only oneself to blame. Independent and inclined to view risk as opportunity, these libertarian 1s might be expected to constantly generate new ideas and create new things, to strive for individual recognition and to construct ego-centred personal networks-one-to-one reciprocal relationships-to explore and exploit the resource constituted by their social environment.

In the GG literature Type 1 and 1-ism are called individualist and individualism.¹³

¹³ In the real world nobody can completely reject cooperation. This is an ideal type. Moreover, cooperation is a positive word no one wants to deny outright—see footnote 41. Still, it is easy to find famous approximate 1s and theorists of 1-ism. Examples: Napoleon, Colette, Banjo Paterson, Margaret Thatcher, Dale Carnegie, Heinlein, Horatio Alger, Dirty Harry, James Bond, Scrooge, Superman, Protestantism, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, Tom Paine, Ayn Rand, Nozick, PJ O'Rourke, Adam Smith, Hayek, Milton Friedman.

2.3.2 Type 2, the ruler: hierarchy

The person who thinks both competition and cooperation are required will find it necessary to have rules setting out when to cooperate and when to compete. Rules have to be enforced so an authority structure will be needed: society will need to be a hierarchy. Evidently, to have both competition and cooperation simultaneously, coercion is needed as well. In crude terms, the individual in a hierarchy cooperates with superiors, competes against peers, and coerces inferiors. To command requires resources so resources will have to be distributed according to rank, which will mean that people are explicitly recognised as being of different worth. One resource is information; higher ranks will know more, control information dispersal, and keep secrets. High rank and the favour of authority will be attractive so people will strive to raise their station, competing within the rules for promotion. Indications of status (badges, uniforms, titles) will be needed; decorum, formality, dignity and ceremony will be expected; and to encourage cooperation an ethic of noblesse oblige may be cultivated. With a priority to demonstrate loyalty, dress would have to conform to standards, and personal possessions should keep up appearances but avoid an impression of "getting above oneself". The hierarchy with its rules and standards and appearances implies a mental world of strong categorisation, i.e. boundaries between actions and applications and artefacts: certain actions, foods, dress and decor go together and suit certain occasions.

Such a hierarchy would be a complicated structure and willing participants may feel they are involved in an enterprise (society, institution, organisation) that is worthy, even ennobling and grand. To preserve such valuable complexity 2s would honour tradition, be reluctant to tamper with the social status quo, and regard criticism of their institutions as pernicious. Institutions would be seen as more venerable and more valuable than any individual. Where the 1s value liberty, 2s would treasure fraternity, and briskly point out there can be no liberty without order. The necessity to have the right person doing the right job implies that if society did not have the right people applying the right rules, things would go wrong, which is to say nature would not provide adequate resources for living. Hence risk is to be approached in a measured way by the right people in the right manner. When things do go wrong 2s will be reluctant to find fault with their system and will blame the approach, i.e. deviance: some negligence or crime on the part of an individual who was not supportive or did not comply with the rules. Conversely, the self-sacrificing hero will be admired and decorated and promoted. Where the Type 1 hero is an intrinsically superior person who demonstrates cool individual ascendancy, the Type 2 hero makes a superior effort (bravery, dedication, self-sacrifice) to support the collective. Placing high value on propriety, Type 2s will tend to be rule-bound, traditional conservatives and may contribute to the operation of big, complex organisations that dwarf the lives of their human members.

A stable, complex hierarchy will be able to interact with other groups on the basis of division of responsibilities, cooperating on the largest scale, engaging in the deadliest competition, exercising the most pervasive coercion.

In the GG literature Type 2 and 2-ism are called hierarch(ist), hierarchy, and bureaucracy.¹⁴

2.3.3 Type 3, the carer/critic: egalitarianism

To view cooperation as desirable and competition as anathema, one must be objecting to the inequalities which competing creates. So the 3s want everyone equal in terms of access to resources. Extra resources provide power so they must want no one to be in a position to command anyone else. They want equality in terms of resources and power—equality of outcome. To expect cooperation without command and without the incentive of personal gain, 3s have to regard human nature as fundamentally good. Harmony will be possible and highly prized. If some individuals appear not to be good, it must be because they are corrupted by society and its (1-ist) greed and (2-ist) privilege. The 3s will agree with the 1s in rejecting the compulsion intrinsic to 2-ism, but where the 1s also see compulsion embedded in 3-ist cooperation, the 3s see compulsion embedded in the 1s' individualistic quest to compete successfully.

The prevalence of competitiveness and the presence of needy people indicates that resources are limited, so the 3s would prize frugality and approve programs to redistribute wealth from rich to poor. If resources are limited nature must be fragile, thus vigilance will be needed to keep it from collapsing and caution exercised to avoid taking risks. The 3s are carers and where 1s think human nature nasty and nature nice, the 3s think the reverse: people are nice and nature is unforgiving. They are likely to oppose slavery, fur coats and clear-felling and even technology. The 3s would abhor waste and favour thrift which will be reflected in dress and possessions.

The 3s' stance as critics implies that cooperative associations of 3s might feel under siege from the wider society, which would give them a sense of exclusive righteousness. Since, in such an association, individuals cannot officially tell other individuals what to do, the only physical sanction against members is expulsion which is generally too extreme to exercise, so the threat of it will be elaborated by exaggerating the benefits of membership and the terrors of non-membership. Thus groups of 3s would tend to be small, schism-prone, exclusive and inclined to millenarianism. Order will be maintained through group criticism

¹⁴ There are plenty of famous 2s, or at least there used to be. Fictional 2s are rare, theorists are relatively few, and there has been no 2-ist economics since 1890. Examples: Metternich, Schiller, Thomas Macaulay, Henry Newbolt, GK Chesterton, Baden-Powell, Sir Humphrey Appleby, Lee Kuan Yew, WF Buckley Jr, Colonel Blimp, Judge Dredd, royalty, Freemasons, Catholicism, Confucius, Plato, Aquinas, Edmund Burke, Baltzell, Oakeshott, Kirk, Scruton.
and group pressure to conform. If (under external pressure) a leader arises, the basis must be charisma. In some collectives egalitarianism may extend to the rejection of private property. Distinguishing between people on any basis, even objective ones, will be viewed as containing the seeds of inegalitarian discrimination and this reluctance to categorise would extend into the living environment and into the wider world. Where the 2s demarcate with strong, unambiguous boundaries the 3s will prefer none or weak, fuzzy ones and seek to "break down the barriers".

Like the 1s, the egalitarian 3s will be dissatisfied with the status quo and will also be prepared to personally defy it on principle, however the social and environmental problems that concern the 3s cannot be resolved by individuals or by one sect doing the right thing, and the better world 3s seek cannot be achieved without the cooperation of all. To have impact the whole society must act so 3s are likely to be vigorous social critics and when things go wrong they will blame "the system".

In the GG literature Type 3 and 3-ism are called egalitarian, sectist, enclavist, critical activist, egalitarianism, sectism, mutuality.¹⁵

2.3.4 Type 4, the battler: fatalism

If 4s are social, what is their social glue if they neither compete nor cooperate? It seems social relations will have to be coercive or random. The rejection (or failure) of cooperation must mean that people are not to be trusted. If coercion and lack of trust are pervasive, the 4s must see themselves as being at the mercy of capricious people or forces which push them around—and coercion will merely be the way things get done. If people are distrusted, words will be, too, and 4s will tend to regard people who speak well as pretentious; they will value unaffectedness, and admire people who seem down-to-earth. If life is an unpredictable lottery, it makes sense to buy a ticket so 4s may be gamblers, dreaming of escaping fourdom by a big win. With nature supplying resources erratically, cause and effect are unrelated so there is no point in planning and no point in studying. The concept of risk is muted or absent and when things go wrong, the imputed reason will be bad luck.

Thus it will be rational for 4s to incline to apathy and improvidence. Their low level of education will reinforce the apparent arbitrariness of rules and of government action so the authorities will be feared and distrusted, and the object of ingratiation where not avoided. Where spoken words are too unreliable to be of great significance, the written word, particularly rules, may have mystic power. Type 4s are likely to be society's foot soldiers,

¹⁵ 3-ism is very political and there are plenty of famous people of 3-ist cast, though fictional 3s are rare. Examples: St Francis, Charles Dickens, Sidney & Beatrice Webb, GB Shaw, Orwell, Henry Lawson, Dorothea in *Middlemarch*, Doonesbury cartoon, Leunig cartoon, Quakerism, Thomas More, Rousseau, Malthus, Marx, Kropotkin, Bakunin, Sorel, Proudhon, Veblen, Dewey, Trotsky, Gramsci, Arendt, Habermas, Foucault, Keynes, JK Galbraith, EF Schumacher, Krugman, Amartya Sen.

doing the work that requires less knowledge, somewhat heedless, possibly happy-go-lucky and proud of their toughness, grabbing short-term advantage, spending their money quickly before someone takes it from them, and not capable of acting in concert (hence politically impotent) unless led or beguiled by 1s, 2s, or 3s.

In the GG literature Type 4 and 4-ism are known as fatalist, ineffectual, isolate, "lowerarch", fatalism, randomness.¹⁶

2.3.5 Type 5, the loner: hermit autonomy

A Type 5 has no view of competition or cooperation. Is this possible? Usually, we have no view of matters that do not concern us. Most of us will have no view about, say, the politics of Alice Springs. How can anyone in society not have some opinion on competition and cooperation? It can only be that this Type 5 is outside society, is someone detached and autonomous enough to see no need to compete or to cooperate: at the extreme, a hermit. It follows that in order to live, a Type 5 must have resources which are independent of society so to a Type 5, nature must be an unconditional cornucopia. This does not imply wealth in the conventional sense; it may be that available resources are very modest by the standards of other types, as long as they are subjectively more than adequate. Since all 5s must formerly have been something else, they are likely to be older people. They would be bemused by the society from which they have withdrawn, disillusioned with the rat-race, uninterested in family and instead pursuing interests, such as studying or fishing, which involve little social intercourse.

In the GG literature the Type 5 and 5-ism are called hermit and autonomy.¹⁷

2.3.6 Discussion of the above derivations of the five types

Different issues but the same types

Evidently it is not a problem to derive GG theory's ways of life from competition and cooperation. The ways are identical with those derived from grid and group. Is it not remarkable? For thirty years, grid and group have been the key to deriving the ways of life; every paper that applies the theory discusses them and quite a few try to measure them (e.g. Hampton 1982; Mars 1994 [1982]; Caulkins and Peters 2002; Gross and Rayner 1985). How

¹⁶ The 4s are the putative constituents of the vague political position called "populism". Their basic survival strategy is to keep their heads down so renown would seem impossible, however some special ones—ideal types—have become famous and there are even some theorists or exponents: the Good Soldier Švejk, Barney Google & Snuffy Smith, Andy Capp, Li'l Abner, Steptoe and Son, Kath and Kim, Homer Simpson, Marx's proletariat, Banfield's (1958) southern Italian villagers, Kafka, Beckett, Steinbeck, R. Crumb, Schopenhauer.

¹⁷ Famous 5s, real, fictional and theorist, can be suggested: Buddha, Diogenes, Boethius, Steppenwolf, Howard Hughes, Burroughs, Ginsberg, Kerouac, Ignatius J Reilly, Kierkegaard, Camus, Nietsche, Spinoza, HL Mencken, Colin Wilson, Thoreau.

is it that two quite different dimensions deliver the same four social types? Is there some glibness in the deductions, some sort of vocabulary slippage, possibly unwitting, influenced by the knowledge of where it was headed? Could some subtle bending of meaning deliver different "types"? Unless such slippage can be shown, the only explanation is that the four types are in some sense real, that they actually do not depend on the dimensions.

At least, they do not depend very much. Perhaps we should not be too surprised for Douglas simply invented grid and group ("yes, I mean construct, fabricate, think up, invent" (Douglas 1982 [1978]: 190)) which would seem to leave the way open to inventing other issues.¹⁸ As the following chapter shows, six other theorists deduce social interaction from two dimensions and though they are from disparate fields and each uses a unique pair of dimensions they all find the same types. In Chapter 4 it is shown that dozens of dimensions (or, rather, dozens of *relational issues* placed upon just three dimensions) deliver or fit the four social types and it will be claimed that, of matters which must be taken into account to live socially, there are *no* issues that will deductively deliver any types other than these four, and there are none that do not fit on those three dimensions.¹⁹

Real people do not ratiocinate in the manner set out above and the five types were constructed from extreme premises. They are archetypes. Still, they are quite life-like. Types 1 and 3 are individualists and egalitarians and, if articulate (in our society), would be ideologues of the free-market libertarian right and of the critical socialist left. The Type 2 rule-respecting, propriety-loving hierarch is a recognisable bureaucratic stereotype, and the Type 4 as populist hoi polloi and in extreme form as "underclass" is equally recognisable.

Subjective versus objective derivation

It is also evidently not a problem to derive GG theory's five ways of life—cosmology, social structure and lifestyle—from *subjective views*. Douglas's Durkheimian approach typologising from objective reality and this Weberian approach typologising from subjective *Verstehen* give identical results for the four socially engaged types. In addition, Douglas's fifth type, the hermit, is derived naturally. The derivations above are briefer than Douglas's (and briefer than they would be if they did not appear, in some measure, in hundreds of papers) yet quite comprehensive.²⁰ They are also more sharply drawn for the premises, of

¹⁸ There have been some hints that other issues might work: Dake and Thompson (1993) almost deduce the four social types from needs and resources management (it is done here in Appendix 1) and Ostrander (1982) notes that Swanson and Marriott got the same types as GG theory—see §3.2.

¹⁹ On the other hand, emotional and personality matters cannot be made to fit on the dimensions (§6.5).

²⁰ They have a different emphasis: more political, less cultural. After Douglas has deduced the features of the four "cosmologies" (worldviews) logically consequent upon the four social contexts, she follows up with "inferential" consequences for the views of these four "types" about aspects of ordinary life. These include (Douglas 1982 [1978]: 208-226) views on nature (with sub-headings of culture, abroad, pre-culture, cultural processes, space, gardening, cookery, medicine), views on time (as a resource, old

subjective cooperation and competition, are clearer. An effort has been made to structure the above deductions so that the same issues are covered under the different type headings. Reference will be made to these issues later. The types' views of many other aspects of life may be looked up in Appendix 3.

Douglas derived the types from the "objective" social structures, grid and group; she thought that it was not possible to derive the types from subjective attitudes: "the movement of enquiry from that direction could never have elucidated structures of behaviour... This was Ruth Benedict's difficulty and Opler's and many other cultural anthropologists'." (Douglas 1982 [1978]: 231).²¹ We see above, though, that the derivation from "subjective" views of competition and cooperation is quite straightforward—more straightforward indeed, because competition and cooperation are plainer concepts than grid and group. Though Douglas discusses the distinction between the subjective and the objective—using those very words—and though emic v. etic is a basic theme elsewhere in sociology (Hofstede 1994; Burrell and Morgan 1979), in the years since she set out her theory, the distinction appears to have been ignored in the GG literature except for a mention by Spickard (1989) who agrees with her.

The attraction of objective derivation is plain enough: if social relations and worldview are related, and if the structure of social relations is a matter of objective assessment, here is potential to understand how people think without having to read people's minds,²² i.e. without asking them. Mary Douglas does it (e.g. 1982 [1978]: 186-8) as do Gross and Rayner (1985: 7-11), inspecting ethnographies to judge this tribe as individualist, that one as hierarchist and so on. But it has basic problems. Consider Gross and Rayner (1985: 9), talking about 4s:

Various occupations will place the constraints of a high-grid/low-group life-style on people including door-to-door salesmen and supermarket cashiers... The housebound disabled and elderly are other examples where strong social classifications and isolation create dependency on others.

age, youth, time past), views on human nature (sickness and health, death, abnormality and handicaps, personal relations), and views on social behaviour (distributive justice, punishment).

²¹ Douglas was quite convinced that social structure could not be derived from cosmology:

Douglas specifically warns against arguing: 'from people's expressed ideas about the world to the social organization without having any evidence for the latter. The trouble about arguing from the ideas is that they are infinitely numerous and the method is quite impossible to use. Nothing [is] to stop the enthusiastic application of grid/group analysis to a hand-picked selection of ideas, leaving out all the ones that disprove the case.' (letter, October 1983). (Spickard 1989: 159 fn 12)

Spickard lists some investigators (different from Douglas's) who "make this mistake." WOLT must make it too. But WOLT finds the "infinitely numerous" ideas fall into just three idea dichotomies (X, Y, Z) from which it argues to derive, inter alia, four types of social organisation.

²² This promise of objectivity is surely also part of the appeal of behaviourist psychology. And it was part of the appeal of functionalism in anthropology, sociology and political science: no need to investigate messy human motivations because the cause is in the effect: just observe closely and divine the feedback mechanisms.

Surely not all housebound and elderly? The difference between a contented stay-at-home Type 5 and a housebound Type 4 is in their thinking. What of the door-to-door salesman who plans to marry the boss's daughter and take over the business? Since the only person who knows his plans is the man himself, the only way to find out about them is to read his mind. In short, the elderly and the door-to-door salesmen might be 4s, or they might not. No doubt we would find more 4s among them than, say, among members of the stock exchange, but we will not know unless we can look into their minds. Type is not determined by social circumstances; it is determined by way of thinking. Statistically, low status workers such as road workers, fettlers, garbage collectors and cleaners are more likely to be in a high-grid situation but we would need to inquire further. The immigrant cleaner with no illusions about her lack of options but who intends her son to become a doctor is no Type 4. An extended family, middle class for generations-shopkeepers, teachers, clerics-will, over time, include numerous members who were broke and who did menial work but who stayed middle class. They retained their belief in self-efficacy and did not incline to 4-ist fatalism. Conversely there will be 4s who know prosperity when times are good but who never escape fourdom. Objective social circumstances is not an effective way to classify what is essentially a state of mind.

The above quotation is quite old. Since then, prominent GG authors have assumed a prior importance of subjectivity, even if it is seldom explicitly discussed. In the 1970s Douglas insisted on objective deduction but in 1997 she resiled from it: "In the theory a typology of cultures is derived from cultural biases... A cultural bias is a point of view... The basic discriminator is the attitude to power and authority" (128-9). She had come to see the basis of the theory in point of view and attitude, not in social structure. With this she left the typology with no explicit theoretic derivation to support it. WOLT supplies a derivation—or multiple derivations.

Subjective derivation is direct, deriving views from views, instead of via "objective" social structure. It deals with the real, not the imputed, for thoughts and views are objects in the real world—they do exist; those neurons do fire—whereas a "social structure", be it grid, group, or any other, is a figment, existing only through a kind of tacit agreement between the people who are in it (Searle 1995 and see Chapter 6). Greenfeld (2005: 114) points out that people's minds are "the smallest units of culture (analogous to cells in a biological organism)… Inevitably, therefore… one is led to the position of methodological individual-ism." The above deductions worked out what individual persons would think from their views of *social* relations of competition and cooperation. The persons' thinking was a consequence of, and almost entirely about, *social* matters. So it is a methodologically individualist deduction of that part of the inner life of the individual which concerns relations

with others. In this regard it may be worth noting that the theories of economics are built around individual preferences (of homo economicus, a Type 1), not around social structure.²³

The hermit

Douglas added the hermit ad hoc. She felt she had to do this because the hermit withdrew from society for subjective reasons, which is to say that, unlike the other four ways, the hermit's way of life was not deducible from any social structure (1982 [1978]: 204). Adding a type ad hoc undermines the rigour of a theory for if one further type can just be tacked on, what prevents adding others? The hermit's illegitimate status has been a nuisance to GG theory ever since.²⁴ Some analysts have made imaginative attempts to include the hermit within the grid-group table (see Mamadouh 1999 for an overview). No logic supports these and most researchers behave as if the hermit does not exist. Douglas knew (1982 [1978]: 204) that if the types could be deduced from their subjective views, the hermit would be logically accounted for but, as discussed, she considered derivation from the subjective to be impossible. The derivation above shows this is not the case and, as will be shown, ab initio derivation of the theory is possible from subjective views of many issues.

Discreteness

A logical problem with GG theory is that of discreteness of the types: how can discrete types be derived from issues of social context (grid and group) that are continuous? This has been pointed out in the GG literature (e.g. Coyle 1994: 220; Boholm 1996: 70; Thompson et al. 1999: 21) but left as an unresolved anomaly. With subjective derivation this may be resolved providing people hold dichotomous views, unequivocally *for* or *against* rather than views on a continuum from low to high. (This is not to assume dichotomous thinking *causes* discrete types—it could be the reverse.) In §6.4 dichotomisation is discussed in depth and shown to be plausible or even inevitable.

Nature

Another characteristic that arose logically in the WOLT derivations above was each type's attitude to nature. This means that "myths of nature" do not need to be imported from a parallel typology (Schwarz and Thompson 1990: 6; Grendstad and Selle 2000: 28). Says Marmadouh (1999: 402): "One of the most successful cases of incorporation has been the

²³ Derivation from subjectivity also obviates discussion of whether the types are (deterministically) *caused* by social structure (e.g. Friedman 1991: 350).

²⁴ For example, Thompson et al (1990: 17, n 26): "Mary Douglas has used this distinction [deliberate withdrawal] to take the hermit 'off the social map' [i.e. outside the 2x2 table of the four types], but we prefer to keep him on it. Indeed, we prefer to place him at the very center of our map, at the place where he will inevitably end up as he withdraws from each of the four corners that are occupied by the engaged social beings." But then, Thompson et al (1999: 21): "The hermit had to be taken 'off the map' because there was no place for autonomy in the grid/group scheme, even though its existence was recognised."

typology of myths of nature found by ecologists who studied institutions managing ecosystems such as forests, fisheries and grasslands." After describing the myths she says, "The two typologies fit so well into each other that the myths of nature have become an integral part of grid-group cultural theory." (403) If they fit that well it must mean they are theoretically connected.²⁵ The literature's unvarying reference to "myths" of nature is a pejorative way of saying "beliefs". In the subjective derivation of WOLT above, the dimensions of competition and cooperation are beliefs, as are all subjective consequences, including views of nature.

Competition

As will be shown, the WOLT derivation could have used many issues to derive the theory. *Competition* was selected above in part because it is a running sore in the GG literature. Essentially, GG theory cannot deal with competition because the dimension it is on is missing. Competition and cooperation are the dimensions Y and X but GG theory recognises only Z and X. As a consequence the only thing GG theorists did agree about it was that 2-ism was not competitive—which, as shown below in §2.6, is plain wrong.

Domain

Society is made of people and in striving to realise their individual preferences people will affect society. At the same time people are born and raised in a certain social environment and this will restrict which views are available to them, and which are acceptable, so that there will be a tendency for preferences to reinforce the prevailing social context. Given the premises specified, there are five underlying possible "ways of life" comprising five worldviews, five patterns of social relations, and five styles of behaviour. In Mary Douglas's original formulation she saw the ways of life, one at a time, in different tribes, but she and other writers during the 1980s, and now grid-group analysts generally, presume that in a

²⁵ Actually, in its "incorporation" of ecological myths, GG theory always did impose its logic on them. For ecologist Holling (1986) there are three views of nature he calls *stability* (characterised by a ball in a bowl—see Figure 3.1), *resilience* (a ball in a landscape of hills and valleys) and *evolutionary change* (1986: 294-6). For ecologist Timmerman (1986) there are myths of: *stability* (ball in a bowl), of instability (ball on an inverted bowl), of *cyclical renewal*, and of *resilience* which is neither stable nor unstable. Timmerman tentatively maps his myths onto GG theory's types but his allocations are not GG theory's, i.e. not in accord with Figure 3.1. Usually, too, GG theory's (and WOLT's) five views of "nature" may be applied not only to the biosphere but to the whole physical environment outside the context of social interaction.

It is not clear that "incorporation" from outside was necessary. In *Cultural Bias* (1982 [1978]: 209-21), Mary Douglas inferred the types' attitudes to nature from her grid and group premises in the following terms: **1**: "...nature is idealized as good and simple: 'Every prospect pleases and only man is vile'." (212); **2**: "Nature, especially in its symmetries and regularities is conceived to be on the side of the good society... an ideal undivided nature is part of the encircling ambience of culture, with God sustaining both." (210), "Going against nature means the threat of failure, unnatural vice is condemned." (211); **3**: "bias towards 'small is beautiful'" (209), "vulnerable, lovable, natural victims, and, on the other hand, menacing, predatory, ineducable nature." (210); **4**: "...people cannot be expected to show theoretical elaborations of the concept of nature in the cosmos."

modern pluralist society all of them would be present simultaneously and engaged in a perpetual contest for adherents. Some (e.g. Wildavsky 1987a: 7) assert that the different ways of life need each other and none is viable on its own.

As deduced above, WOLT is universal: subject to its premises, it contains no gaps requiring supplementary or alternative theory, and it admits of no exceptions. It is a logically watertight expression of the underlying rules and limits of sociality; its premises do not particularly specify *human* and the five ways of life should apply to the aliens from Alpha Centauri providing they are social and discuss things with each other.²⁶

Subject to its premises. The broad claim to theoretical comprehensiveness warrants careful scrutiny of the premises. To the extent they fail, the theory fails. They are considered in the next section. WOLT is not quite a theory of everything and some attempt to determine the boundaries of the theory's domain of application and to specify what it explains and predicts, is also warranted. This matter and the domain of WOLT is further examined in Chapter 6. The single word which best seems to characterise the theory is *relationality*, as in the title of Michael Thompson's book on GG theory, *Inherent Relationality* (1996). There is an emphasis on *views* of relationality. As with any scientific theory, what the theory covers is whatever the theory allows, not what a theorist declares. Still, a statement of domain is necessary, otherwise the unlimited freedom to declare anything awkward to be outside theory would undermine falsification. The best description of its domain seems to be:

WOLT concerns that which must be taken into account in order to live socially.

That is, any rational social relations issue which people must take a position on in order to be able to live together falls within the scope of the theory. Internal states such as emotions and trait personality do not seem to fall within the theory. This is discussed in §6.5.

²⁶ Said frustrated pioneer values researcher Milton Rokeach:

[&]quot;What seems to be required is a clearer, more systematic way of thinking about ideological variations—a frame of reference that, it is hoped, would enable us to make comparisons easily across historical time and cultural space, a frame of reference that would enable us to envision the kinds of ideological orientations that are theoretically possible in the future or even in some unknown social system on some other planet that spacemen may someday discover." (Rokeach 1973: 168)

WOLT grants his wish: a systematic frame of reference envisioning the theoretically possible ideological orientations. It may be a hidden assumption of WOLT that agents (individuals or institutions) must value self-survival above the survival of others in order to generate competition. Thus the theory may be restricted to individually-reproducing creatures. Eusociality (few breeders, many sterile workers) would seem to entail frictionless cooperation among clones or near-clones.

2.4 Premises and inter-type relations

2.4.1 Rational thinking; is and ought

It was stated in §2.3.0 that three general premises are needed:

- Humans have views on things which are important to life
- People think rationally, i.e. they try to make sense of the world
- People are moral, i.e. they want to see what is right realised

The first needs no discussion for the contrary is too implausible. *Rational* just means staying on this side of the looking glass; it is not confined to maximising utility. Its contrary would involve an Epimenides paradox, i.e. be impossible to assert logically. It could be supported in many ways and would seem conclusively demonstrated by small children who tend to regularise grammatical constructions (e.g. "runned" instead of "ran", Cole and Cole 1996: 299). A human tendency to think logically (and also to infer rules and follow them) is evidently innate. Humans may also be illogical and what is *not* a premise is that individuals think things through with the strict logic applied above to deduce the types.²⁷ All the model requires in this respect is that communities of people who live together would, over time, in their practices and conversations, tend to weed out inconsistencies and thus make their cultural practices and their implicit and explicit beliefs coherent.²⁸ As Douglas put it:

The underlying assumption is that a social unit of a particular pattern endures by the supporting commitments of its population and that this commitment will be manifest in the admonitions, excuses, and moral judgments by which the people mutually coerce one another into conformity. (Douglas, Introduction to Gross and Rayner 1985: xxiii)

Admonitions may be vitally important. Though largely overlooked in psychology's catalogues of human needs, we seem to have a need to teach each other. Whether in an academic seminar or in the pub, we want to instruct others. If I have to make excuses and put

²⁷ Ralph Linton's (1936: 363) opinion:

The rare individual who is genuinely consistent in thought and act is always a burden to his friends and, if he carries this tendency to its logical conclusion, is likely to end his days in an asylum... If [culture] can be said to exist at all, it consists of the elements which are shared by the personalities of the individuals who participate in it and which receive emotional reinforcement from this sharing.

 $^{^{28}}$ "An extensive experimental literature in social psychology established that attitude, belief, and value similarity lead to attraction and interaction." (McPherson et al. 2001: 428) "we would expect people to associate with similar others for ease of communication, shared cultural tastes... and other features that smooth the coordination of activity and communication." (435)

Much of the content of these the five worldviews is political. Political science universally accepts, at least since Converse's investigation in 1964, that the general public are poorly informed about political issues and do not reason abstractly over ideology. The puzzle there is to explain the coherence of popular political allegiance. Brady (1985) found good evidence that people attribute others' political attitudes from their own likes and dislikes. Zaller's (1992) model is of people accepting arguments that are consistent with predispositions. WOLT is more specific, setting out the available options on those likes and predispositions.

up with your admonitions as you make moral judgements of me, I will find it easier if you see the world according to me. If people who associate are incessantly telling each other what's what, inconsistent ideas will be brought to light—and there are just four coherent frameworks for agreement.

Although the above derivation of WOLT from subjective views is methodologically individual, and although there are individuals who exemplify the types, we would expect subsets of society to be more consistently, or clearly, of a type. For example, the individual members of a Greens party would be 3s of varying intensities and personal inconsistencies but the actions of the party as a whole should be consistently 3-ist. There would be much variation among individual members of a town chamber of commerce but the chamber's policies and actions should be clearly and consistently 1-ist. See also §6.4.2.

At a society level, the shared meanings that constitute the ongoing, rational part of a culture are inherited, not thought up (let alone deduced) individually. These meanings may be explicated by thinkers and expounded by leaders for the purpose of influencing the culture but single individuals seldom have great impact.²⁹ Cultures change only slowly and even under great pressure, such as conquest and colonisation, they can persist through the generations and through centuries. Culture transcends individuals and institutions; it is "in the air", a prospering set of memes, a Durkheimian collective consciousness shared by people who never meet directly or have teachers or other socialisers in common. People talk to each other and instruct their children and the culture persists.

Circumstances change and the shared meanings which are taken for granted as normal or right may become out of kilter with quotidian life, giving rise to conflict and corrections. As there is always some change occurring, there must always be some inconsistency in beliefs but a culture will presumably persist at least partly on the basis of its coherence in the eyes of its adherents. As derived above each of the five ways of life taken on its own terms is rational and coherent. It also seems that, from the point of view of any one of the ways, the other four ways will not make much sense.

The derivations of the ways of life show that the three pro-active types have the normative to the fore while the 4s are resigned to what they see as the real world. The 5s, with little inclination to convert others to their way of life, should have little concern for the normative. Among the three pro-active types, a psychological balance of "is" and "ought"

²⁹ Even the society-changing impact of exceptions such as the great religious leaders may be largely due to the promotions of followers acting in their names over an extended time.

could be imagined if each reflects along the lines of, "Mine is the correct view; if everyone thought about it properly they would join me because it is foolish to fight reality."³⁰

2.4.2 Inter-type relations; functionalist variety

Could a society consist of just one type? Do all five types coexist in society? How? Where do they come from? It is likely that the biophysical environment would influence the type make-up of a society³¹ but setting that aside, and ignoring the 4s (for ye have the 4s always with you), how would the types, qua types, cope? A purely 1-ist society cannot exist: as Hobbes pointed out, for 1s to live together at all some 2-ism will be essential to resolve disagreements and enforce agreements. A hypothetical 1-ist society with sufficient 2-ism would be open to invasion by 3-ism because there will be niches where a modicum of cooperation would deliver more prosperous outcomes. A hypothetical pure 3-ist societysay, an isolated tribe—would have a free-rider problem, i.e. it would be open to invasion by 1-ism. The early invasion would be camouflaged as 3-ism but the 1-ist competition will cause friction which would then require 2-ism to resolve. A hypothetical Type 2 society might survive while the 4s provided the wealth but presumably it would become rigid and oppressive and ripe for 1-ist or 3-ist invasion, in the extreme case through banditry or revolution respectively. It seems, then, that what Thompson et al (1990) call the "requisite variety condition" is confirmed: all types would be present in a viable society.³² If all the social types coexist, their proportions would depend on the physical environment, on the accidents of history, and on established customs. Some of the old men, and possibly old women, may be 5s; that may depend to some extent on the economic surplus.

In some sense, the types would be in competition with each other for adherents; if you have confidence in your way, you will probably try to persuade me to it. If we assume that 4s are the least attached to their own way of life and that the other three types do not easily

³⁰ The is-ought distinction has been an issue with philosophers ever since Hume pointed it out. Others are little concerned and, indeed, that unconcern is part of what agitates philosophers. Hofstede and Hofstede (2005: 45) confirm it, saying that their large scale surveys over thirty years show "that from one country to another there is a close relationship between the reality one perceives and the reality one desires." But they also note that "Pierre Bourdieu sees this as one of the key characteristics of a habitus. It represents necessity turned into virtue" (380). This inverts the suggestion here which, in effect, says that the virtue is necessarily the underlying reality. If people are confident they have the truth (or are dissatisfied with their reality): then not all "is" would be "ought", but all "ought" would be "is" providing appearances to the contrary (if noticed) are put down to misinterpretation or corruption.

³¹ For example, a harsh environment might require high mutual dependence for survival which should keep competitive 1-ism low; a high population density might fuel inter-tribal raiding and encourage a 1-ist warrior culture; settled agriculture and warring empires would be characterised by pervasive 2-ism.

 $^{^{32}}$ This would seem to have answered the occasional question (e.g. Laitin 1988: 590; Friedman 1991: 346) of where the types come from. This generation of the types from the social environment indicates that there is no need to postulate a genetic component, although that is quite likely (Alford et al. 2005).

change,³³ then such a competition will consist to a large extent of the three pro-active types competing to win over the 4s. If social viability depends on variety then beyond a certain level of success, it would seem any type would be sowing the seeds of its own downfall. Presumably, for a given set of societal and environmental circumstances there is an optimal distribution of types to make a stable society. If external circumstances are not stable, the proportions of the types of social arrangements and worldviews will have to change to meet the challenge or the society will go under. A common cause of instability might be invasion and war but if warfare is endemic then that will be the stable situation with consequences such as perennial raiding and truces and standing armies and walled cities. A significant cause of ongoing instability may be internal: the competition between the three pro-active types, each striving to spread its truth.

GG theorists sometimes see competition between ways of life as being the mechanism maintaining each one (Thompson et al. 1990: 96). Says Douglas (2005b: 12) "at the cultural level, each of the four cultures is self-defined by contrast with, in opposition to, the others." Hood (1996: 210) suggests that "mutual repulsion" pushes the ways toward extreme positions. The logic supporting these assertions is unclear. As discussed above, a sufficient explanation of a type is that it forms to provide a coherent way for individuals to get along with each other—a formulation Wildavsky (e.g. 1994) was fond of and which is often quoted—and there is little reason to say that a person or group would even notice the other types, as such, but would more likely just notice, vaguely, that some other people think differently. The 2s engage with everyone and will hardly make sense of other groups unless they are 2-ist; 3s compare themselves with an undifferentiated sinful non-3-ist world; 1s and 4s know that some people have illusions and pretensions; the 5s know that everyone is deluded.

GG theory's notion of mutual reinforcement through inter-type competition is a concession to functionalism at the whole-society level, something that GG theory otherwise eschews (Thompson et al. 1990: 106). Both GG theory and WOLT are functionalist at the *type* level (inasmuch as the type characteristics are mutually supportive of the coherent way of life which, in turn, reinforces the characteristics) but not at the *whole-society* level. Indeed, looking at whole society effects, one could argue that, given that *some* way of life must form in order for people to live together, a society that was very biased toward one type may open up opportunities for the other ways of life in niches or as reactions—in other words, fulfil GG theory's "requisite variety condition" and perversely *attract* competing types.

Certainly the types compete. In democratic societies political hegemony requires mass support. If conviction among adherents of the three pro-active ways tends to be stable,

³³ See Appendix 3, page T7, for a schedule of changes. It is from Thompson et al (1990: 69ff).

then a shift in support must come from a change of allegiance among 4s. Thus may we posit some whole-society functionalism: it is the "function" of the 4s in a stable polity to keep a balance among the three pro-active types.

2.5 What WOLT explains and predicts

As an a priori theory WOLT includes, like Euclidean geometry, whatever its logic will allow. The theorist's input does not affect it except in a discovery sense, namely to extend it with further deduction, to pinpoint exclusions, or to detect flawed logic.³⁴ Irrespective of how its sphere of application might be characterised in words, such as "the rational mind", or "that which must be taken into account for social living", the boundaries are set by the theory, the theory is not flexible, and its claim that there are just five fundamental coherent ways of life admits of no exceptions.

In Scope and Methods of Political Science Alan Isaak says of the scientist:

His first objective is to formulate useful *empirical concepts* that organise the phenomena that interest him. Then, starting with the assumption of determinism, he attempts to find relationships between these concepts. If successful, he discovers a scientific *law* or *generalisation*. Further systematisation of empirical knowledge is achieved by the construction of *theories*, which are collections of logically related generalisations. (Isaak 1985: 31, italics original)

The empirical concepts were competition, cooperation, views and people. The assumption of determinism was that people hold coherent, dichotomised views on competition and cooperation, thus creating an exhaustive, mutually exclusive, five-fold typology. Logically related generalisations from those five stances constructed a theory of five worldviews. Isaak continues:

Finally the scientist uses his laws and theories to *explain* events and situations that have occurred or exist and to *predict* future happenings. It can thus be said that the scientist's attempts to systematise are all leading to this ultimate objective, to explain and predict—to show *why* things were, are, or will be.³⁵

³⁴ A theme in the sociology literature is the problem of researcher bias (e.g. Gudykunst and Harris 1997: 149). This usually means ethnic bias but GG theory is no more distorted by the researcher's ethnicity than is geometry. Is it distorted by the researcher's own GG bias? Two of the most prominent authors, Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky, were strong, admitted adherents of the Type 2 and Type 1 ways of life, respectively, (Fardon 1999: 147; Douglas 2005a; Daniel Elazar in Wildavsky 1997: ix-xv) but this does not appear to have prejudiced their understanding of the theory per semthough it did affect Wildavsky's application of the theory (Adams 1995: 184; Wildavsky 1991b, a).

³⁵ An alternative, but compatible, view of science:

^{&#}x27;Scientific method' denotes a disputed idea, but usually involves the following four features: (i) the search for laws of cause and effect; (ii) the introduction of theory which may involve reference to entities not normally observed (e.g. the atomic theory); (iii) the derivation of predictions from theory; (iv) the division of reality into 'natural kinds'—i.e. fundamental classifications (such as those involved in (ii)) which reflect, not actual human interests, but

If explanations and predictions are what make a scientific theory useful, what might WOLT **explain**? Perhaps:

At the social level: *Item*: Why people disagree with each other (there are five equally valid fundamental points of view). Item: The basic pattern of human conflict (five rationalities are specified). Item: That culture is not dualist as most theories (e.g., left-right, Gesellschaft-Gemeinschaft, individualism-collectivism) have held, but is five-fold which means, inter alia, that an increase in adherence to one cultural type does not require or predict a decline in any particular other one. Item: The fundamental mechanism of social change (five ways of life struggle for pre-eminence), one of social science's most persistent and elementary riddles. Item: Why political positions are similar across the world (there are only five positions available). Item: The nature and extent of the 200 year-old occidental culture-war between liberty and equality, i.e. the free-market right versus the left, and why this war keeps intensifying (historic and ongoing decline of 2-ism). Item: Why personal ego-centred networks characterise innovation (incentive driven, risk happy). Item: That long-lasting organisations must be bureaucratic (for continuity and to engage with parallel and rival Item: Why leftist groups are disconnected and schism-prone (require organisations). consensus, lack leadership). Item: Why revolutions in the name of the working class have been led by the middle class (apathy, mistrust; revolutions are 3-ist).

At the <u>personal</u> level: *Item*: The human proclivity to dichotomous thinking (my way versus the meaningless others). *Item*: How it is that people are able to have a firm and coherent political view without knowing much about politics³⁶ (a very few concepts determine the rest). *Item*: Why people so often take a fixed position (no rational alternative). *Item*: Why apparently unrelated ideas so often go together (they are in fact related). *Item*: Why contrary evidence on an issue seldom changes a person's view (it would perturb their whole worldview). *Item*: The pattern of rationalisation of bias and selective interpretation of everything (there are five ways).

What might WOLT predict? Perhaps:

rather independent laws of nature (e.g. the classifications introduced by the periodic table of the elements). (Scruton 1983: 419)

WOLT makes science from human interests, two concepts usually considered incompatible. Scruton (1983: 484) again: "It is supposed that scientific explanation sees the human being as an organism motivated by physical causes; *Verstehen* sees him as a person, acting from reasons, and in accordance with fundamental values." WOLT sees *Verstehen* in scientific terms and has nothing to say about physical causes.

³⁶ A number of researchers have pondered this (eg Converse 1964; Zaller 1992; Strauss 1992; Tesser 1993; Alford et al. 2005) and see note 28.

Item: That there are five and only five basic ways of life.³⁷ *Item*: That everyone adopts a way of life. *Item*: That a person adheres to one way of life only. *Item*: That people will not make much sense of ways of life other than their own. *Item*: That change of type will be unusual and dramatic. *Item*: That there are just four ways for a person to change type and 20 stereotypes for change. *Item*: The whole of a person's worldview, lifestyle and social relations from a few clues. *Item*: That questions of value will never be resolved objectively because each way of life has different values and all are of equal objective validity. *Item*: That a liberal theory of justice, in as much as it seeks a formulation satisfactory to both the 1s and the 3s, can never be constructed. *Item*: That if all five ways of life have equal moral validity then a society must include them all if it is to avoid extremism. *Item*: That the Type 1, 2 and 3 ways of life compete for the support of the 4s. *Item*: That in a healthy society none of the three will succeed too well because: warlordism or gangsterism would be the result of overwhelming allegiance of 4s to 1s; fascism and war would be revolution.

Item: That there are fundamentally four (not two) major political groupings. *Item*: That just six fundamental pair-wise alliances (from four ways of life) can be formed. *Item*: The purpose and circumstances of such alliances and their benefits and internal tensions. *Item*: That people's work and leisure associations would be mostly among their own type and that this would tend to reinforce their views. *Item*: That where different types do interact relations may be difficult, viz: 1s will see 2s as inflexible, bureaucratic blunderers, 3s as softheaded meddlers, and 4s as a 3-ist fiction; 2s will see 1s as creative but foolhardy and selfcentred, 3s as perceptive but negative, and 4s as lower orders to be kept in line; 3s will see 1s as greedy and uncaring, 2s as power and privilege mongers and 4s as the victims of the 1s and 2s; 4s will perceive the others as pretentious, scheming, domineering and unpredictable.

The above items concern types, not dimensions. The explanations and predictions are not all exclusive to WOLT for other theories discussed in Chapter 3, especially GG theory, would do the same in a number of instances. However the explanatory and predictive potential would have no rival in social science (the only comparable theorising is in economics) and many of these predictions would be testable. Some would be refuted empirically. Consider the prediction that everyone adopts a way of life and that a person adheres to one way of life only. In reality surely everybody will be a hybrid at some level there is simply no such thing as a perfect sphere on a frictionless slope (Footnote 5). With some people the combination of ways of life may be indeterminate—the perfect sphere on the frictionless slope is very far from the real rock on the real hill. The theory—the underlying

³⁷ This is referred to in Thompson et al (1990: 3) and many a subsequent publication somewhat grandly as Cultural Theory's "impossibility theorem".

law—is untouched by these differences with reality. They indicate the theory just needs supplementing with other local influences. In the case of a rock on a hill it is easy to see the deviations from the model but with human culture the causes of deviation are not known.

The above explanations and predictions are general attributes applying to types. There are also predictions to be made at the issue level. For example, WOLT says there are four possible views of human nature and four on mother nature and that these views correspond, i.e. the view on one predicts the view on the other. Chapters 3 and 4 discuss the dimensions and the relationships of the types to each other and, as will be seen in Chapter 4, WOLT yields comparable predictions regarding opinions on a vast range of issues: freedom, justice, equality, self-identity, honesty, optimism, pessimism, personal style, the teaching of reading and many other concepts, exotic and mundane (Table 4.2). This involves tens of thousands of combinations of specific predictions. To predict individual behaviour is the basic objective of psychology. This has proved elusive and WOLT's power to predict views may make a contribution.

With its typology and issues applying at both individual and collective levels WOLT shows the underlying structure of worldviews and social interaction. Pages T4 and T5 of Appendix 3 offer many individual and collective real-life examples.

2.6 Competition—a clarification

Competition has been taken in this chapter as a dimension from which to derive WOLT. Along with *cooperation* it allowed GG theory's four social types to be straightforwardly deduced. There was no particular difficulty in its use and no apparent equivocation about its place in the social environment, and were it not such a GG bête-noir further discussion of it would not be needed. This note discusses the GG theory problem and the independent, or possibly prior, nature of *competition*.

Competition is so pervasive a feature of human interaction and so prominent a feature of the Type 1 way of life that GG writers have tried to place it upon the grid-group "map". Wildavsky (1987b: 284) simply used it as a synonym for Type 1 but Hampton (1982: 66) and Mars (1994 [1982]: 29) set it on the grid dimension (Table 2.2) which makes the 3s as competitive as the 1s—which is absurd—and the 2s as non-competitive as the 4s which is also incorrect. Douglas (1989: 174) in a note on the origins of the grid dimension, cites empirical research indicating some African tribes are low grid but not competitive, and says that "one way of dealing with the unintentionally imported notion of competition is to expel it from the grid dimension." Thompson (1996: 40), Dake and Thompson (1999: 419) and Mitleton-Kelly (2004: 300) take her advice and place competition on the group dimension which makes the 4s as competitive as the 1s, which is again absurd, and makes the 2s as non-

competitive as the 3s, which is also wrong. In short, the GG theorists have tried competition on both axes and neither works.³⁸ The 1990 textbook (Thompson et al. 1990) does not address the question. No one shows the 2s as competitive and the reason is simple: it is universally agreed that the 1s are competitive and with the dimensions of grid and group, it is geometrically impossible to show both the 2s and the 1s as being the same on any issue (Table 2.2). Yet, as Selle (1991a: 114) exasperatedly points out, the 2s *are* competitive.

Table 2.2 The grid-group "map" ZX

Grid (coercion) yes		4 fatalism	2 hierarchy	
Ζ	no	1 individualism	3 egalitarianism	
		no	yes	
		Group (coopera	ation) X	

It stands to reason that competition would not fit on either grid or group axes. Grid is a dimension of coercion, of whether people are free or controlled; there is no reason to assume this has anything to do with whether or not people strive against each other. Group is a dimension of individuality, of whether people act independently or in concert; this, too, does not predict any tendency to vie with one another. People might compete against one another whether free or controlled, they might compete alone or as a group. The everyday perception that competition as an opposite of cooperation is off the mark: group does *not* predict competition. Nor does grid. Competition cannot be accounted for in the grid-group diagram.

Whatever else it might do, a theory of social relations must accommodate competition if it is to be credible. In objective terms, competition, cooperation, and coercion pervade, possibly define, life. These three modes of interaction occur at the macro level of animals and plants, at the micro level of mites and bacteria, and at the molecular level within the complex factory that is a living cell. Moreover it is competition which is paramount, for whereas it is conceivable that there be organisms which neither coerce each other nor cooperate with each other, the members of every species, without exception, compete against each other. Competition made them and will make their descendants. That is to say: the ultimate purpose of any coercing or any cooperating will actually be for the purpose of gaining some competitive advantage; when germs invade a wound or a human points a pistol, when fish school or fishermen join a cooperative, they do it in order to *compete* more effectively. Evidently, the social interactions of coercing and cooperating serve and moderate competition; even though

³⁸ These misunderstandings about competition have led researchers astray. Hampton (1982) attempts to measure subjects' grid level by asking questions about competition on the assumption that high grid is low competition. Mars (1994 [1982]) categorises small independently working (and fiddling) delivery van operators as 3s but, as described by Mars, they have no typical Type 3 characteristics and would be well classified as 1s.

there is no overt competition in the coercing or in the cooperating, at a fundamental level their effect and their purpose is to better compete. The converse does not hold: competition may take place without coercion and without cooperation, and for most life-forms competition occurs without contact between the competitors; among humans this can also occur, such as when applying for a job or tendering for a contract.³⁹ It would seem competition is present wherever there is life and in social environments it is modified by coercion and cooperation.⁴⁰ Whereas coercion and cooperation are necessarily social, the essence of competition is non-social. Competition happens, whether social or not.⁴¹ Since competition can be present with or without coercion (high or low grid) and with or without cooperation (high or low group) then, objectively, competition is independent of—orthogonal to—both grid and group.

Subjectively, i.e., as far as *views* of competition are concerned, §2.3 specified that 1s think competition essential, 3s abhor it and Type 2s are competitive within the rules. From the point of view of the 4s, competition makes no sense, for in an arbitrary world that runs on luck not effort, competing would be pointless.

Though Type 2 competitiveness is denied by most of the GG literature which considers the question (e.g. Douglas 2005a: 98; Thompson 1996: 40; Thompson et al. 1999: 6), competition is intrinsic to hierarchy: individuals compete to rise in rank, whether through civil service promotion exam, sycophancy, court intrigue, or assassination. Regular applier of GG theory, Christopher Hood, describes the mundane kind of Type 2 competition:

...bureaucrats have traditionally been obliged to compete for appointment, reappointment, bonuses or merit pay raises, honours or medals, promotion to higher positions, even valued positions after retiring from or leaving the bureaucracy. And those who head government organizations likewise typically have to compete for good-quality recruits, budgetary allocations, valued office locations, major policy responsibilities, corporate awards or league-table

³⁹ Corporation law attempts to restrict contact between competitors for the very purpose of avoiding cooperation and coercion. As Adam Smith famously said, "People of the same trade seldom meet together even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public or some contrivance to raise prices." (*Wealth of Nations, Book 1, Chapter 10*). A conspiracy may be thought of as cooperation intended to coerce others.

⁴⁰ This is almost saying that the *purpose* of social interaction is to compete. From a biological standpoint the competitive advantages (to individual or gene) of group living must outweigh such disadvantages as disease contagion and concentrated stress on resources.

⁴¹ Enthusiasts for the free market (1s) maintain that market competition causes a wonderful worldwide cooperation that brings forth modern consumer goods each of which requires thousands, or even millions, of people to make. "Cooperation without coercion," renowned economist Milton Friedman calls it, commenting on Leonard Read's famous essay *I Pencil* http://www.econlib.org/library/Essays/rdPncl1.html. But it is a thin cooperation: negotiating price. "One might just as well claim that competitive markets are a particular scheme of cooperation, namely, the kind in which actors cooperate by acting non-cooperatively with one another." (Coleman 1987: 85) "Cooperation" is a success-word everyone would appropriate but it loses meaning if bees and blossoms cooperate, or if animals and plants cooperate by inhaling the other's exhalations. It might be more apposite to speak of a self-organising, spontaneous system as Hayek did http://www.mises.org/content/hayekbio.asp>.

rankings, reputation, prestige or position in the pecking order.⁴² (Hood et al. 2004: 8)

The 1s and 2s are competitive; the 3s and 4s are not. Hierarchy does to competition just what it does to coercion and cooperation: it redirects and orders. In doing so, it both inhibits and enhances. In a Type 2 structure, interpersonal coercion, cooperation and competition are confined to adjacent ranks for the purpose of enhancing inter-hierarchy coercion, cooperation and competition. It could be said that the very point of a hierarchical group is to relate, in one or more of these three ways, to other groups. As well as moderating individual competition, the Type 2 structure is the framework for collective competition. In bureaucratic environments it may take the form of "turf wars" between hierarchies but the ultimate Type 2 hierarchy is the military, which exists for the sole purpose of extreme collective competition. The military are matchless large-scale coercers and large-scale cooperators but the purpose of their elaborate coercing and cooperating is to win the ultimate, life or death, large-scale competition.⁴³

2.7 Conclusion

According to Douglas, Benedict and Opler couldn't do it and it couldn't be done, yet in this chapter a coherent, mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive typology of social attitudes has been derived from cosmology. Using the same strict approach as Mary Douglas, namely theoretical deduction from a pair of dichotomised issues set as dimensions, the same five ways of life as GG theory were deduced. If anything, the ways of life are a little more sharply delineated because their premises were sharper, being subjective views of competition and cooperation, not objective social structures of grid and group.

Prima facie, it seems very different: to try to understand behaviour not by judging from the objective social structure, but by looking at subjective motivations. But though grid and group seem to avoid motivation, they were just a starting point: Mary Douglas

⁴² This illustration of hierarchical competitiveness is presented for vividness and persuasiveness in the light of the GG literature's general denial of Type 2 competitiveness. Competitiveness was specified in §2.3.2 and the nature of Type 2 deduced from it. It was not, and is not, inferred empirically.

⁴³ "It cannot be proved but it is a safe assumption that the first time five thousand male human beings were ever gathered in one place, they belonged to armies that had come together for a battle." (Dyer 2005: 101). In the GG literature it is sometimes asserted that hierarchy "fetters" competition (e.g. Thompson 2003: 42). Not so. In the extreme hierarchy, although a soldier competes for promotion only with the same rank, his competitiveness, far from fettered, is enhanced to the point where he has the skills, resources, and authorisation to *kill* his competitor. This includes licensing the individual soldier to compete personally against another individual where the prize is not only the death of the competitor but typically the unfettered right to enslave his wives, massacre his children and sow his fields with salt. As Dyer (2005) shows, ten thousand years ago living in towns brought hierarchy and war and the extreme competitiveness of hierarchy is the central theme of any amount of history and fiction. Hierarchy and coercion are under-theorised in social science, probably because they are thought distasteful—see Chapter 7.

immediately derives cosmology—worldview—from grid and group, and most GG literature makes inferences about people's views. It always was about subjectivity:

...the operative level is that at which excuses are required from individuals and made by them and where moral judgments materialize into pressures from other persons to act in certain ways... (Douglas 1982 [1978]: 201)⁴⁴

The theory is about what people *think*. The directly subjective *Verstehen* approach of this chapter conforms to the ordinary way we seek to understand actions. "Why," we ask, "did he do that?" We expect he had a reason and expect he would explain and justify himself. If he had no reason or if an action was accidental, that is vital information. A communication from a social animal often conveys its intention with a view to influencing another's actions. "Read my mind," says a threat display, "and review your plans." We act on our understanding of others' minds. Human utterances may be interpreted as the invitation: "Read my mind." That is what this chapter has done: it began by postulating five possible states of mind and proceeded to read those minds.

The approach worked well. Compared with GG theory: the hermit is logically required, not added ad hoc; the "myths of nature" arise logically, requiring no other theory; providing people hold dichotomous views, discrete types arise logically from discrete dimensions; *competition*, which will not fit into GG theory, is intrinsic. Most important, we find a dimension that corresponds neither to grid nor to group. There are three possible ways to arrange pairs from four items, and competition (Y) is the other option after the division formed by grid (Z) and that formed by the group/cooperation (X) dimension. The approach works so well that, as will be shown in subsequent chapters, the types can be deduced from many pairs of issues, issues which are usually ordinary concepts or well-established ones. Evidently, *grid* and *group* were a means to an end and are not themselves crucially important.

WOLT provides a comprehensive, inflexible, a priori model of cognition setting out the underlying connections and constraints of relational life. The model, as a standard scientific deduction, is *theoretic*, which is to say the characteristics and relationships it describes are idealised. The types are archetypes. Since its deduction depends upon the objective ordering of logically connected subjective beliefs, to the extent non-logical beliefs and non-logical social relations obtain with a real person or a real association, the model will not apply. It applies to the extent people who live together work out ways of getting along with each other which are logically coherent. The model is heedless of nationality, ethnicity, modernity, and the nature-nurture division.

⁴⁴ This is Douglas's third attempt to set out her theory and by far the clearest; the previous two were in *Natural Symbols* in 1970 and its heavily revised 2nd edition in 1973.

It was shown in this chapter that WOLT potentially explains and predicts a range of social phenomena. In Chapter 4 a large number of more specific predictions will be made but before that WOLT will be set in the context of other theorists' conclusions about the types and dimensions of society.

Way of life theory: the underlying structure of worldviews, social relations and lifestyles

CHAPTER 3 THEORIES OF SOCIAL TYPES

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Figure 3.1 Personal interrelationships... and... the ball of life in the landscape of nature 77

In answering questions about change there has been a persistent effort, dating from the classical Greeks, to type societies. Among the better-known modern designations are Ferdinand Tönnies's Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft; Sir Henry Maine's status and contract; Herbert Spencer's militant and industrial; Charles H. Cooley's primary and (implicitly) secondary; Emile Durkheim's mechanical and organic; Robert Redfield's folk and urban; and Howard Becker's sacred and secular..."

-RW Wilson (1992: 1):

Sociologists, especially positivists, who are so hard to please in matters of empirical proof, are negligent, uncaring and incredibly lax when it comes to questions of epistemology.

—Bourdieu (1992)

3.1 Introduction

This chapter puts WOLT into the context of other theories that have tried to analyse society and to see how people act and think socially. Theorists may be divided into those who

- derive types from two dimensions like WOLT

- describe types without the mediation of dimensions, i.e. intuitively
- propose dimensions but do not develop types from them

I have found seven theorists who *derive types from dimensions*. Though they use various dimensions they find the same types and may all be regarded as subsets of WOLT, the disagreements being fairly minor and due to failures of reasoning. This consistency indicates that the four types are an insight into the fundamental nature of social interaction and attitudes.

About twenty *intuitive typologies* are discussed. These, invented without dimensions, identify two or three of the three pro-active types, hence do not contradict WOLT. Casual presumption of a division into Types 1, 2, and 3 is actually so common in economics and political science (e.g. market, bureaucracy and community; economic, political and social; liberty, fraternity and equality) that deviation from it would need justifying. A couple of typologies (Redfield, Inglehart) do deviate but are arguably irrelevant as their scope is confined to modern, industrial society. Type 4, a significant section of society and Marx's focus, is not noticed by any intuitive typologist post-Marx. (No Type 5s are noticed by anyone except Douglas unless they be Plato's guardians and perhaps Little's 'ensemble'.)

The practice of proposing *dimensions without types* appears even more popular than that of inventing types without dimensions. The concept of dimensions is more nebulous than the concept of types however the tendency to identify dimensions that correspond to X, Z, Y or, roughly, Types 3, 2, 1, is pervasive across disciplines.

The dimensional bases of WOLT and GG theory are compared and it is shown that subjective analogues of grid and group (i.e. issues on the Z and X axes) may also be used to deduce the five WOLT types. This confirms what the seven dimensional typologists indicate, namely that the theory can be derived ab initio from numerous different issue pairs.

The chapter concludes with a brief summary of the main features of the five ways of life preparatory to an examination of the 3-D axial relationship between them in the next chapter.

3.2 Theorists who construct types from dimensions

As far as I know, seven social theorists form types from two dimensions: Bowles, Marriott, Douglas, Ouchi, Merton, Triandis, and Swanson. They offer no major disagreement with WOLT. Short explanations of each of the seven are set out below, followed later (§3.5) by an extended comparison of WOLT and Douglas's GG theory.

3.2.1 Bowles's social interactions

Economist Samuel Bowles (1998: 86) draws on Max Weber to say human interactions may be *personal* or *impersonal*, and they may be *ephemeral* or *durable*. Thus interactions are: 1, impersonal and ephemeral which, Weber says, characterises the *ideal market*; 2, impersonal and durable, which characterises *bureaucracy*; 3, personal and durable, characterising *community*; and 4, personal and ephemeral, characterising *ascribed market*. These he sets out as in Table 3.1.

Table 3.1 Bowles's "social interactions" (impersonal / durable) YX

Y	impersonal personal	 ideal market ascribed market 	2 bureaucracy3 community	
		ephemeral	durable	
		X		

The type numbers are mine but all else is his. The terms for 2s and 3s he takes from Talcott Parsons. *Ascribed market* is his own term: "Racially segmented spot labor markets are an example, as they are personal (the racial identities of the participants matter) but the contact among participants is not on-going." (86) He could not have picked a better illustration of a Type 4 delivered up to fate and the caprice of powerful people.

The fit is perfect: from two kinds of social interaction (and two pioneer sociologists) Bowles deduces the same four types as WOLT. His types turn out to be ordered in same two dichotomies as applied in Chapter 2, namely Y (1+2 v. 3+4) and X (1+4 v. 2+3).¹

3.2.2 Marriott's transactional strategies

Anthropologist McKim Marriott draws on south Indian ethnographies to construct a model of castes and transactions which "leads to the finding that a culturally adapted twodimensional model, apparently simple and uniform, can nevertheless generate some of the Indian civilization's fabled diversity." (Marriott 1976: 109)

Advising that "Hindu thinking about social transactions viewed from the West may seem peculiar..." (109) he explains that in south India everything which can be the substance of social transaction, from food to wisdom, is imbued with "substance code", a sort of vital

¹ Bowles actually does little comparing of the types for his concern is not to elucidate them but to investigate the social consequences of markets, drawing on economics, game theory, sociology and anthropology literature to conclude (1998: 105) that the economic concept of "market failure" should be broadened to include the market's undesirable moral effects on people's preferences.

energy. Substance code varies between gross and subtle depending on the substance, and in general it is better to give than to receive because transference of substance code signals rank.

Marriott establishes two dimensions: low and high *giving*, and high and low *receiving*, which creates a typology of four kinds of "transactional strategies". Table 6 sets out his terms for the four situations so created and gives some examples from the many which he identifies from Indian ethnographies. The type numbers are mine and they indicate that he chose the Y and X axes.

Giving	high	1 maximal land-owner	2 optimal Brahman
Y	Iow	4 pessimal Sudra, leather w.	3 minimal artisans
		high <i>Receiving</i> X	low

Table 3.2 Marriott's "transactional strategies" (giving / receiving) YX

The maximal 1s are people who do a lot of transacting, and who balance the giving and receiving to keep the substance code transference in balance. The minimal 3s also keep a balance as guilds and sects with few transactions. Thus both 1s and 3s are neutral with respect to rank. The optimal 2s maximise rank through giving (subtle) substance code while the pessimal 4s (Sudra is the lowest caste) depend on receiving (gross) substance code.

Marriott has produced, from Hindu implications of giving and receiving, the same four types as Bowles found from a pair of characteristics of social interaction in the modern West. Both these theorists also divided the types into the same two dichotomies (1+2 v. 3+4 and 1+4 v. 2+3, i.e. Y and X), and these are the same divisions as applied in Chapter 2. This means that in some sense, *giving* is the same as *impersonal* is the same as *competition*, while *receiving* is the same as *durable* is the same as *cooperation*.

In his 1976 paper, Marriott acknowledges (138) Mary Douglas's comments on earlier drafts. There is no recognition there of any correspondence to her GG theory. This was, however, noticed by Ostrander (1982: 21) who finds Marriott's types to be the four GG types but is puzzled by the layout of the dimensions: "the correspondence between the two schemes remains illusory because the dimensions used are not congruent, even though the resulting types are." His perplexity arises from Marriott's use of issues that happen to be on the Y and X axes, whereas grid and group (which are iconic among GG theorists) are Z and X dimensions. There are three ways—three dimensions—that four things can be pair-wise compared and, as will be discussed in the next section, Douglas uses the Z division which §2.3, Bowles, and Marriott do not use.

Table 3.2 tabulates the effects of giving and receiving but where is rank shown? Rank is more or less the point of the giving and receiving. In order to indicate *rank difference*,

which does not appear in either row or column, Marriott turns to "diagonals" (the term is from Ostrander 1982: 26). He observes that the states of so-called optimal and pessimal transactions (the "diagonal" 2-4 in Table 3.2) are *asymmetric* with regard to rank, whereas the maximal and minimal arrangements (diagonal 1-3) are *symmetric* because the net substance code (quality and quantity) of giving and receiving balances in each. As one moves in the diagonal direction from Type 4 to Type 2, rank itself increases. Marriott's dimensions are continuums, not abrupt rows and columns, and his four types are at the corners of a square. The various castes and occupations are plotted in it so the diagonals appear more plausible there than they do when reduced to the bare dichotomous bones of Table 3.2.

In effect, Marriott has introduced the third dimension onto the two-dimensional page. He can do this because the issue on his third dimension happens to be a measure of difference. Normally this is not the case so in general it is not possible (unfortunately) to simplify the representation of the three dimensions by referring to "diagonals". This third, Z, dimension is perpendicular to the other two dimensions. That is, with respect to the two dimensional page, the 2s and 4s (rank asymmetry) would be above the page and the 1s and 3s (symmetry) would be below it and the Z axis is an axis of movement increasing in rank difference (not rank per se) from below to above.

3.2.3 Douglas's grid-group theory

Anthropologist Mary Douglas sought a way to compare the cultures of African and other tribes. She first published what was to become known as grid-group theory (also called Cultural Theory and neo-Durkheimian theory) in 1970. Her clearest version is from 1978, reprinted in Douglas (1982 [1978]). The following in part repeats material in Chapter 2; it is set out here for completeness in this context of social theories.

She divides the social world into dimensions of *grid* and *group*. Grid means the extent to which social arrangements restrict people's lives, i.e. are prescriptive. Group is the extent to which people engage with others.² She dichotomises each into weak and strong grid, and weak and strong group, yielding four social contexts she names as shown in Table 3.3 (type numbers are mine).

Table 3.3 Douglas's social contexts (grid / group) ZX

Grid	strong	4 fatalism	2 hierarchy
Ζ	weak	1 individualism	3 egalitarianism
		weak	strong
		Group	X

 $^{^{2}}$ For some definitions of grid and group see footnote 1 to \$1.3.

Notwithstanding the terms *weak* and *strong*, she continues as if her dimensions are discrete. The reasoning is straightforward; briefly: 1: where both social prescriptions and group obligations are weak, individuals negotiate life in an independent, entrepreneurial environment; 2: A hierarchy allows both prescription and group obligation to be strong; 3: Where prescription is weak no one has authority so if *group* is to be strong, people must be equal and human nature benign to allow people to cooperate without coercion; 4: People caught in a highly prescriptive environment without group support will be battlers whose lives are controlled by others. She also adds, ad hoc, a fifth type, the voluntarily withdrawing hermit, who is not included in her two dimensions. From her two dimensions, Douglas deduces a range of characteristics of the four social environments and from them infers, at some length, corresponding cosmologies or worldviews (Douglas 1982 [1978]: 205) corresponding to the types set out in Chapter 2. Note that whereas her *group* distinguishes 1+4 v. 2+3 and in this is the same as *cooperation, receiving* and *durable*, her *grid*, which sets 1+3 v. 2+4, is not represented in the derivations of Chapter 2, in Bowles, or in Marriott, and is therefore a different (the Z) dimension.

The same four types are independently generated by three theorists, Bowles, Marriott, and Douglas, from three very different pairs of issues for application to three very different cultures. Of the seven social scientists who construct types from dimensions, these three agree that there are four social ways of life and they agree what those ways are.

3.2.4 Ouchi's economic exchange conditions

In a much cited paper, organisation theorist William G Ouchi (1980) sees two dimensions of economic exchange conditions which he calls *goal incongruence* and *performance ambiguity*. The first is a situation where people seek different goals, where goals do not overlap and the actors have different agendas. The second prevails where it is difficult to assess the contributions of individuals such as where teams are involved in complex processes.

Different combinations of these causes distinguish three basic mechanisms of mediation or control: markets, which are efficient when performance ambiguity is low and goal incongruence is high; bureaucracies, which are efficient when both goal incongruence and performance ambiguity are moderately high; and clans, which are efficient when goal incongruence is low and performance ambiguity is high. (Ouchi 1980: 129)

Table 3.4 Ouchi's exchange (goal incongruence / performance ambiguity) YX

Y Goal	Yes	1 markets	2 bureaucracies
incongruence	No		3 clans
		No	Yes
		Performance a	ambiguity X

The numbers in Table 3.4 are mine. To clarify: 1: It is a basic property (and perceived merit) of the free market that no one is interested in what anyone's goals are. Performance contributions of all parties are unambiguously spelt out in the contract and rewarded in money (which reflects supply and demand). 2: A bureaucracy copes with people's different goals where joint effort means individual contributions cannot be costed; it remunerates according to rank or seniority. 3: The slogan *From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs!* encapsulates performance ambiguity where remuneration is unrelated. The intrinsic rewards of affinity and common purpose should trump monetary reward. Ouchi did not notice the Type 4 but we can easily fit it: for people who do not interact and who depend on fate, goals and performance are without meaning.

The descriptions of the 1s and 3s here suggest that for Ouchi's two issues a classic pair might be substituted: *Y* scarcity theory of value and *X* labour theory.

3.2.5 Merton, Triandis, Swanson

Sociologist Robert K Merton (1938) puts *cultural goals* and *institutional norms* as Y and X dimensions dichotomised as *accept* and *reject*, and derives—he is too discursive to be described as "deducing"—four types of which Types 1, 2 and 4 are clear. The Type 3 accepts norms and rejects goals but instead of Type 3 Merton finds "ritualism" which is "the psychosis of the bureaucrat" (673). Merton is interested in deviance and his discussion is distorted by his presumption that all the types except Type 2 (whom he describes quite accurately yet seems to think of as a kind of a nice free market (674, 677)) are social deviants. He has no conception of a Type 3 who accepts society's norms of proper behaviour while rejecting goals such as money and personal recognition, and who is not particularly ritualistic but works within social norms to show the goals are misguided.

Cross-cultural psychologist Harry Triandis sets Z and X dimensions of *sameness* and *interdependence* and identifies the 1s, 2s and 3s clearly but misses the 4s, finding instead a variation of Type 1. This occurs because "sameness" is too vague, because he fails to distinguish ascribed status from achieved status (Linton 1936; Foladare 1969, §4.7, §5.2.2), and because he forms his types as a pastiche of deduction and induction from empirical data (Triandis 1995: 44; Triandis 2001; Triandis and Gelfand 1998) instead of deducing strictly from his dimensions. Since Triandis is the doyen of cross-cultural psychology and his four part typology has some currency, Appendix 4 to this thesis offers a detailed explanation showing how, with its inconsistencies repaired, his scheme delivers the same four types as Douglas, Bowles and Marriott.

Anthropologist Guy Swanson's (1969) dimensions of culture are abstract and nebulous though his types are slightly clearer. Ostrander (1982) interprets them as the GG four and inasmuch as they are comprehensible, they seem to be.

3.2.6 Discussion of the seven dimensional typologists

Of the seven theorists I have found who form types from two dimensions—Bowles, Marriott, Douglas, Ouchi, Merton, Triandis, Swanson, (Table 3.5)—only Douglas became well-known outside her own field.

Bowles picked two very clear dimensions of interaction, found three types in the literature to fit, and himself deduced the Type 4. Bowles is apparently not interested in the wider implications of his elegantly constructed model of interaction. His concern is not to elucidate the types but to investigate the social consequences of markets, drawing on economics, game theory, sociology and anthropology literature to conclude (1998: 105) that the economic concept of "market failure" should be broadened to include the market's undesirable moral effects on people's preferences.

Marriott became a prominent indologist but his work is almost unknown outside Indian sociology (Gerow 2000). He used two highly particular but clear issues as dimensions and deduced the features of the four Hindu archetypes and within the square formed by them, he plotted empirical cases (castes, occupations) from the ethnographic literature. Marriott concludes that his "expansion of a Hindu ethnosociology of transactions... may suggest some potentialities for the development of diverse and productive ethnosociologies elsewhere, and for an expansion of the social sciences that have arisen in the West." (1976: 137) From the evidence presented here, it might have done so but it did not. In later years Marriott radically changed his scheme to an abstract three dimensional one that does not specify any of the eight types which would logically result therefrom (Marriott 1990). His 1976 model appears to have fallen by the wayside apart from its mention for illustrative type examples by grid-group writers (e.g. Ostrander 1982: 21ff; Gross and Rayner 1985: 8).

Douglas selected dimensions of social relations which were clear enough for her to deduce the characteristics of the resulting four types (and she added on a non-social hermit). In the 1980s she extended it to modern society and into political science with Aaron Wildav-sky and though it became lost to anthropology, GG theory has been widely applied in political science and sociology. A closer comparison of GG theory and WOLT will be found in §3.5 below.

Ouchi's dimensions are idiosyncratic but comprehensible and the types he derives are clear. It is curious that he misses Type 4 but his purpose is not primarily to set out a general theory of social relations; his object is to show which kind of organisation—market,

bureaucracy or clan—will be the efficient environment for which kinds of collective tasks. His tripartite division is standard among organisation theorists (Colebatch and Larmour 1993).

Merton's well-known scheme was cast as a theory of deviance, not a general theory of human social interaction—and he miscast the 3s. Swanson's (1969) scheme is included more in the interest of completeness than positive evidence for it is too abstract and vague to operationalise. Triandis's 1995 formulation is well known in psychology but the emphasis on national types and the absence of 4s prevents its general application. Triandis matches three of the four WOLT types and does not contradict WOLT—see Appendix 4.

Overall, of seven theorists with seven different pairs of dimensions, three are in full agreement as to their four theoretical types, one seems to be in agreement, and the other three deviate on only one type. This agreement on the basic structure of human interrelationships indicates that the relationships are *there*, that they are not artificial structures of theorists, but that these theorists have *discovered* four types. That is, the four types are not a convenient division of the social world into useful heuristic parts but are fundamental social structures, and fundamental mindsets, existing as independent of the social theorist as, say, the lungs and heart and liver are independent of the anatomist.

It is noteworthy that these theorists are not only from different disciplines and cultures but are talking about rather different things. For example, Marriott is classifying empirical exchange relations of everything material or psychological; Triandis's "culture" means shared preferences and values, empirically revealed; Bowles is talking about ways of economic interaction, theoretically constructed. Where Triandis is interpreting actual subjectivities, namely how people want society to be structured, Bowles is positing objective social structures within which people would act. The subjective-objective distinction is discussed in Chapter 6.

"Agreement" of types is, of course, a matter of judgement. But not very much. The types are very recognisable. There is a simple test: could the various theorists' types be interpreted such that they contradicted WOLT? Could they be switched around or given meaning opposite to the WOLT meaning? It seems to be out of the question. Even Swanson's types could only be disputed by exploiting his vagueness. We may also rule out collusion; it appears that the disciplinary boundaries between these seven theorists were too firm for them to know of the equivalencies in their various creations, even in the case of Marriott and Douglas who knew each other (Marriott 1976: 138).

Bowles's impersonal and durable interactions are conceptually very different from Marriott's Hindu giving and receiving, and they are both different from Ouchi's goal incongruence and performance ambiguity, and different yet again from the competition and cooperation of Chapter 2. Yet each of these pairs, when dichotomised, deductively yields the same types in the same pattern; these pairs of dimensions, or *relational issues*, are all the "same" pair. It turns out that numerous pairs of issues can be adopted as Y and X to derive the same four types (see Appendix 1) and the number of pairs of issues that will *fit* to the Y and X dimensions is dozens (Table 4.2).

Douglas's grid and group also deliver the same four types but in a different pattern; her group dimension is coincident with X but grid divides the types differently and is designated the Z dimension. It is the dimension Triandis notices and, as shown below (§3.4), it is widely noticed in social science. It is a dimension of prescription and as we will see, there are fewer issues on it than on X and Y.

3.3 Theorists who construct types without using dimensions

Table 3.5 includes the prominent theorists who fit reasonably well to the WOLT categories (Table 3.6 is more elastic). Of the modern³ non-dimensional typologies in Table 3.5 those of Elazar, Etzioni, Miller, and Colebatch & Larmour are fairly close to WOLT, Peirce's categories⁴ are comparable to WOLT as are the schemes of Maine, Tönnies, Spencer, Weber, Pareto,⁵ Linton, Becker (1942), Lipset, Rigby, Bakan, Maruyama and Fiske.

It is, of course, a matter of judgement what fits into Table 3.5 but nothing critically depends upon it. Not in Table 3.5 are Durkheim's and Little's schemes, which could be claimed as partly compatible with WOLT, and Robert Redfield's (1947) rural / urban division and Inglehart's materialism / post-materialism distinction. Durkheim's organic / mechanical distinction is equated to Types 1 and 2 in Table 3.6 but there are many discrepancies. For a discussion of Durkheim and comparison with GG theory, see Thompson et al (1990: 129-146). Little's (1985) division is also not in huge disagreement but is too idiosyncratic to fit into Table 3.5. He lumps the 1s and the 2s together, notes the 3s and identifies another group which is possibly Type 5. (He is quite abstract.) Robert Redfield's folk/urban distinction is somewhat related to Tönnies's Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft but it is developmental and generally irrelevant. Inglehart distinguishes "materialists" from the "post-materialists" who grew up in the affluent post-WW2 West so it, too, is developmental. Since WOLT knows no time or place, Inglehart also seems irrelevant, however WOLT is to an extent a materialist

³ For a comparison of GG theory with the categorisations of Montesquieu, Comte, Spencer, Durkheim, Marx, Weber, and Elazar see Thompson et al (1990: 109-193). For a comparison of GG theory and Inglehart's theory see Grendstad (1999). For comparison of GG theory with Swanson and Marriott see Ostrander (1982).

⁴ The comparative table at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Categories_%28Peirce%29 is a lot easier to read than Peirce's abstract and dense papers.

⁵ See <u>http://jkalb.freeshell.org/misc/pareto.html</u>, <u>http://cepa.newschool.edu/het/profiles/pareto.htm</u>, http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/it/pareto.htm

theory and inasmuch as there are overlaps, the two theories disagree. For a comparison of Inglehart's theory with GG theory see Grendstad (1997; 1999) and with WOLT see Chapter 7.

Table 3.5 Type equivalents (numbers)

Types from dimensions

Merton 1938 Swanson 1969 Douglas 1970 Marriott 1976 Ouchi 1980 Triandis 1995 Bowles 1998	1 1 1 1 1 1	2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2	3 3 3 3 3 3	4 4 4 4	5	X Y X Z X Y (Z) X Y X Z X Y	sociology sociology anthropology anthropology organisation theory psychology economics
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Types intuited without dimensions

Plato 400BC		2		4	5?	philosophy
Montesquieu 1752		2	3			law (society)
Comte 1840		2				sociology
Marx 1848	1	2	3	4		political economy
Maine 1861	1	2				law (society)
Peirce 1867	1	2	3			philosophy
Tönnies 1887	1	2	/3			sociology
Spencer 1896	1	2				sociology
Weber 1902	1	2				economics, sociology
Pareto 1916	1	2				economics, sociology
Linton 1936	1	2				anthropology
Becker 1942	1	2				anthropology
Elazar 1960	1	2	3			political science
Etzioni 1961	1	2	3			sociology
Lipset 1963	1		3			political science
Rigby 1964	1	2				political science
Bakan 1966	1		3			sociology
Miller 1975	1	2	3			law (justice)
Maruyama 1980	1	2	3			anthropology
Fiske 1991	1	2	3			anthropology
Colebatch 1993	1	2	3			organisation theory

Dates indicate chronology; for reference citations see text or Table 3.6. The types of Marx and earlier are inferred. Weber and Pareto describe 3s but include them in 1s.

The non-dimensional schemes of Table 3.5 are approximate subsets of WOLT. Organisation theorists Streeck and Smitter (1985: 1) remark on the widespread identification of 3-ism, 1-ism, and 2-ism:

Three [models] seem to have virtually dominated philosophical speculation and social science thought. They tend to be identified by the central institution which embodies (and enforces) their respective and distinctive guiding principles: the *community*, the *market*, and the *state* (or the *bureaucracy*)—although it might be more accurate to label them according to the principles themselves: *spontaneous solidarity, dispersed competition* and *hierarchical control*. (italics original)

Of the non-dimensional post-Marx theorists listed in Table 3.5, six agree with this tripartite division while ten see a binary division. Since the theorists come from a range of fields and mostly conjure their types out of independent argument, the general agreement is some assurance that they are on the right track and a theory which contradicted such a cluster

of concurring opinion should be viewed with reservation. It says something for the power of learned intuition that it should show such consistency and that there should be such agreement with the types deduced from dimensions.⁶

	Туре 1	Туре 2	Туре 3	Туре 4	Туре 5	
Colloquial	middle class / entrepreneurial	middle class / bureaucratic	middle class / US "liberal"	working class/ blue collar		
Left/right	new right (free market)	old right (traditional)	(new) left (professional)	old left (unionised)		
US Colloquial	'(neo-)conservative'		'liberal'	(blue collar)		
US Intnl rel.	realism	realism	idealism			
Polit. science	individualism	conservatism	egalitarianism	populism	existentialism	
Rat. choice	individualism					
Plato 400BC		guardians		hoi polloi	?guardians?	
Montesquieu	1752	monarchy	republic	?despotism		
Comte 1840		hierarchy				
Marx 1848	capitalist	aristocracy	communist	proletariat		
Maine 1861	contract	status			*1	
Peirce 1867	secondness; fact	thirdness; thought	firstness; quality		*2	
Tönnies 1887	Gesellschaft	Gemeinschaft	Gemeinschaft		*3	
Durkheim 1893	'organic'	'mechanical'			*4	
Spencer 1896	individualism	hierarchy			*5	
Weber1902	market	bureaucracy	sects (seen as Type 1)		*6	
Weber 1902	individualist, capitalism adventurer	,traditional society	convent, monastery, bishopric	peasants	*7	
Pareto 1916	Class I (foxes)	Class II (lions)	Class I (foxes)		*8	
Linton 1936	achieved status	ascribed status			*9	
Merton 1938	innovation	conformism		retreatism	*10	
Becker 1942	secular	sacred			*11	
Elazar 1960	individualist	traditionalist	moralist		*12	
Etzioni 1961	remunerative, economic, utilitarian	coercive (force) + normative-esteem	normative-acceptance		*13	
Lipset 1963	achievement		equality		*14	
Rigby 1964	contract	command, custom	custom?		*15	
Bakan 1966	agency (individual)	communion	communion		*16	
Swanson 1969	heterarchy	centralism	commensalism	heteronomy	*17	
Douglas 1970	individualist	hierarchist	egalitarian	fatalist	hermit	
Inglehart 71	materialist?	security materialist	post materialist?	materialist	*18	
Miller 1976	rights/ Spencer/market	deserts/ Hume/ hierarchical	needs/ Kropotkin/ primitive		*19	
Marriott 1976	Hindu merchant	Brahman	accountant / weaver / potter	leatherworkr /barber	*20	
Maruyama 80	individualist	hierarchist	mutualist		*21	
Ouchi 1980	markets	bureaucracies	clans		*22	
Little 1985	'structure'	'structure'	'group'	*23	'ensemble'	
Fiske 1991	Market Pricing	Authority Ranking	Equality Matching		*24	
Colebatch 1993	market	bureaucracy	community		*25	
Triandis 1995	vertical individual	vertical collective	horizontal collective	*26	hor. individ?	
Bowles 1998	ideal markets	bureaucracies	communities	ascriptive markets	*27	

Table 3.6 Approximate type equivalents (names)

Dates above give chronology, not reference citations.

*1 (Macfarlane 1991) *2 <u>http://www.helsinki.fl/science/commens/terms/categories.html</u> *3 (Tönnies 1974 [1887]) *4 (Durkheim 1984 [1893]) *5 (Bolender 2004) *6 (Thompson et al. 1990: 162ff) *7 Inferences by Douglas (1996 [1979]: 24) *8 (New School; Thornton 1997) *9 (Linton 1936) *10 (Merton 1938) *11 (Becker and Myers 1942) *12 (Elazar 1972; Miller et al. 2006) *13 (Etzioni 1975) *14 (Lipset 1963) *15 (Rigby 1964) *16 (Bakan 1966) *17 (Swanson 1969) *18 (Inglehart 1971) *19 (Miller 1976) *20 (Marriott 1976) *21 (Maruyama 1974) *22 (Ouchi 1980) *23 (Little 1985) *24 (Fiske 1991; 1992) *25 Colebatch and Larmour (1993) is a short textbook setting out the standard organisation theory *26 (Triandis 1995: 44; 2001; Triandis and Gelfand 1998) *27 (Bowles 1998: 86)

⁶ The theorists listed in Table 3.6 are all the ones I considered relevant, with a tendency to err toward inclusion. There are others, for example, Presthus (1958; 1978) and Downs (1957) but their typologies are quite restricted in scope (and do not conflict with anything here).

On the other hand, comparison of the two sections of Table 3.5 reflects poorly on the intuitive approach. There are two problems: blindness and insignificance. The first problem is the overlooking of Type 4. Five of the seven dimensional schemes include Type 4 whereas not one of the 16 non-dimensional theorists since Marx notice the 4s.⁷ Construction of two dimensions and hence four types is itself no guarantee the four exist but the systematic approach draws attention to the logical possibility and if Type 4 does not exist, then that ought to be shown. No one does so: the non-dimensional theorists are simply oblivious to the 4s. The strange thing is that they were perfectly well aware of them: (i) Marx, far the most widely known of all social scientists, focused on the proletariat, and epoch-making revolutions took place in their name in the lifetimes of most of those theorists; (ii) The practice of social science is allied to social work and social work is targeted at the 4s. Do the guests on the Jerry Springer show and the callers to talkback radio not exist? Li'l Abner and Homer Simpson are recognised by hundreds of millions of people—but not by the professionals.⁸ That the most prominent thinkers in the field should fail so comprehensively is an indictment of the intuitive approach to social theory.⁹

The second problem is to detect the contribution of this intuitive typologising. Knowledge is supposed to accumulate but as a rule each of the listed theories argues for its own universe of types and does not recognise any other. Is not the justification for a new theory its superiority over extant theory? Not only do they not build on, or critique, each other but all of them can be seen as individual ruminations on something that is almost a commonplace. Streeck and Smitter (1985: 1), quoted above, say the perception of three models has dominated social science. Herbert Kitschelt (1994: 9) says it, too:

The universe of possible political demands and programs in the modern age is captured in the slogan of the French Revolution, 'liberty, equality, fraternity.' This slogan identifies three ultimate values endorsed by most citizens, but which are difficult to combine in a single viable social institution... In many ways, the programmatic content of political competition in contemporary democracies constitutes nothing but the perpetual struggle to cope with the trade-off among these three ultimate values...

A hundred years ago American philosopher Charles Peirce said it:

⁷ There is a sort of exception. AO Hirschmann published *Exit, Voice and Loyalty* in 1970 which were Y, X and 4-ism in his terms (but should be Y, X, and Z—see §4.5).

⁸ The scholarly obliviousness testifies to the effectiveness of the Type 4 life-strategy of keeping one's head down. Organisation theorists could claim that 4-ism is not a kind of organisation (debatable—see Hood 1998) however none do so.

⁹ Hindess (1991: 391), criticising GG theory, asks, "Why is an unexplained two by two typology better than an *ad hoc* typology that does without the pretence?" The answer should now be clear.

It rather annoys me to be told that there is anything novel in my three categories; for if they have not, however confusedly, been recognized by men since men began to think, that condemns them at once.¹⁰

An almost casual assumption of the three pro-active types can be found in all sorts of places. Comte's motto: "Love as principle and order as basis; progress as goal"¹¹ is 3, 2, 1. C Wright Mills takes for granted that the political world consists of 2s, 1s and 3s in the opening words of a 1960 essay: "It is no exaggeration to say that since the end of World War II in Britain and the United States smug conservatives, tired liberals and disillusioned radicals have carried on…" (Mills 1972 [1960]: 247). In his textbook on ideology, Macridis unselfconsciously titles three successive Chapters: Liberalism, Socialism and Conservatism. And then: "There are three elements within liberalism. One is *moral*, the second is *political*, the third is *economic*." (Macridis 1982: 23, italics original).¹²

In these examples the three types are each nowhere near as detailed and specific as WOLT (or GG theory) has them but the division into three is fairly clear. Whatever their differences and confusions, they are all talking about much the same thing and, most significant, no one puts up any really different rival categorisation. Because they are so pervasive, it is hard to put them into a comparative perspective. For example, no one divides social interactions into surly, jolly and circumspect; no one does a division of ways of life into difficult, thorough and condescending. It seems that in broad terms there simply is no other way to divide up the pro-active social world than into Types 1, 2, and 3.

Rick Wicks, a postgraduate student at Gothenburg, observes that "social scientists including economists—as well as journalists, advertisers, and others, often refer to 'the economic, political, and social conditions'" (Wicks 2008: 2) and he has collected examples, some of the most illustrative of which, with his references as footnotes, follow. It is curious that in most of these examples the WOLT numerical order obtains: Types 1, 2, 3.

Kenneth Boulding:¹³ "economic, political, and social" spheres; three modes of resource transfer: trade with you, take from you and give to you.

Mackey:¹⁴ "economic, political, and social problems"; "the new political, social, and economic paradigm"; "political, economic, and... cultural control."

¹⁰ Peirce 1903 <u>http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/terms/categories.html</u>

¹¹ L'amour pour principe et l'ordre pour base; le progrès pour but.

 $^{^{12}}$ Note the fractal property that *within* liberalism (1-ism) Macridis finds the three types again. Could all the types be divided up according to the same scheme? See §3.6.

¹³ Boulding, Kenneth (1978), Ecodynamics, A New Theory of Societal Evolution, Sage Publications, Beverly Hills. Boulding, Kenneth (1985), The World as a Total System, Sage Publications, Beverly Hills. Boulding, Kenneth, Elise Boulding, and Guy M. Burgess (1980), The Social System of the Planet Earth, Addison-Wesley: Reading, MA.

¹⁴ Mackey, Sandra (2002), The Reckoning: Iraq and the Legacy of Saddam Hussein, W.W. Norton: New York, (384, 217).

Thomas Friedman:¹⁵ "corporate-led coalitions to create commercial value...; government-led coalitions to create geopolitical value...; activist-led coalitions to create, or preserve, human values."

Friedland and Alford:¹⁶ "logics of action": in the marketplace, individual utility and efficiency; in the polity, democracy and justice; and in the family, mutual support.

Irene van Staveren:¹⁷ "three values appear time and again in economic analysis: liberty, justice, and care. Markets tend to express freedom, states to express justice, and unpaid labor to express care among human beings." She notes (p. 213) that C. E. Ayres¹⁸ asserted a similar set of core human values: "freedom, equality, and security". Van Staveren distinguishes: *forms*: exchange, redistribution, and giving; *locations*: market, state, and the care-economy; *virtues*: prudence, propriety, and benevolence; *development aid*: self-reliance, rights, or emergency aid; *symbols*: Lady Liberty, Joan of Arc, and Mother Teresa.

Waterman:¹⁹ "three freedoms: economic, political, and religious (conscience)."

Hobson:²⁰ "the democratic triad of liberty, equality, fraternity."

Bowles:²¹ "states, communities, and markets..."

Wright:²² "governance, moral codes, and markets."

Steedman:²³ "potatoes, politics, and prayer". Steedman quotes Philip H. Wicksteed's 1885 "business, politics, and the pulpit" in his book of sermons *Is Christianity Practical*?

Minowitz's²⁴ book title: *Profits, Priests, and Princes: Adam Smith's Emancipation of Economics from Politics and Religion.* Minowitz quotes Trotsky:²⁵ "God, kings, and capital."

¹⁵ Friedman, Thomas L. (1999/2000), The Lexus and the Olive Tree, Harper Collins, London, (202).

¹⁶ Friedland, Roger, and Robert Alford (1991), "Bringing Society Back In: Symbols, practices, and institutional contradictions", in The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis, Powell & DiMaggio (eds.), (39), cited in DiMaggio (1994).

¹⁷ van Staveren, Irene (2001), The Values of Economics: An Aristotelian Perspective, Routledge: London, (24).

¹⁸ Ayres, C. E. (1961), Toward a Reasonable Society: The Values of Industrial Civilization, University of Texas Press: Austin, (170).

¹⁹ Waterman, A.M.C. (1986), "Christian Political Economy: Malthus to Margaret Thatcher", pp. 99-124 in Block & Hexham (eds.), (123).

²⁰ Hobson, J. A. (1938/1976), Confessions of an Economic Heretic: Autobiography, Harvester Press: Brighton, (52).

²¹ Bowles, Samuel (1998), "Endogenous Preferences: The cultural consequences of markets and other economic institutions", *Journal of Economic Literature* 36:1 (March):75-111, (105).

²² Wright, Robert (2000), Nonzero: The logic of human destiny, Pantheon Books, New York, (99).

²³ Steedman, Ian (1994), "Wicksteed: Economist and prophet", in Brennan & Waterman (eds.) (211).

²⁴ Minowitz, Peter (1993), Profits, Priests, and Princes: Adam Smith's Emancipation of Economics from Politics and Religion, Stanford University Press, (240).

²⁵ Trotsky, Leon (1957), Literature and Revolution, Russell & Russell: New York, (255).
Wicks gives a number of other examples that employ variable vocabulary and which are less clear though readily defendable. His examples include only one overlap with the theorists mentioned in Table 3.6 (Bowles).

The broad recognition of the three pro-active ways of life is beyond doubt. The types perceived by the non-dimensional theorists listed in Table 3.5 vary in myriad details but the general position is overwhelmingly supportive of WOLT. WOLT encompasses them all and identifies the underlying structure they are groping for.

3.4 Theorists who specify dimensions but not types

The theories discussed above are those which develop a typology from multiple dimensions (§3.2) and those which set out types intuitively (§3.3). Many other researchers have worked out dimensions of human interaction but have not dichotomised their dimensions to deduce "types". Two classic instances discussed by Thompson, Ellis and Wildavsky (1990: 138, 247) are found in Durkheim's *Suicide* (1968 [1897]) and in Almond and Verba's *Civic Culture* (1963). In a classification apparently unrelated to his organic and mechanical solidarities (§3.3), Durkheim postulated that the cause of suicide was over- or under*regulation*, or over- or under*- integration*. These are plainly the Z and X dimensions. Almond and Verba suggested that political culture might be *deferential* or *allegiant*, again being Z and X.

Whereas there is some hope of completeness in the typologies discussed in the above sections, there is no such hope with this collection of dimensions. The examples below try to give an impression of the extent and variety of scholarly attempts to specify dimensions of social relations. The concept of a "dimension" is not as clear as "type" and some examples could be regarded as typologies.

3.4.1 Psychology—empirical findings Social psychology

In psychology (where scholarship scarcely intersects with other social sciences) there has been an empirical effort towards constructing psychometric "scales" to measure purported *values* (for a literature overview see Robinson et al. 1999). The values are intuited or taken from earlier psychology literature and empirical data are collected and examined for structure. Apart from investigations of culture (such as by Triandis (§3.2.5)), there have been empirical attempts to construct dimensions of values. The recognised pioneer, Milton Rokeach (1973: 170), proposed two dimensions of *equality* and *freedom* but in tests the model failed to hold up and *freedom* proved too vague (Mueller 1974; Cochrane et al. 1979). Freedom has been discussed for two centuries as coming in two varieties, usually known as *negative* and *positive*

and the difference between the two, like the difference in the two kinds of equality (*opportunity* and *outcome*), is of defining significance.²⁶

Where dimensions are found, they are predominantly Z and X. For instance, Braithwaite (1998), conducts tests using scales of political values called *security* and *harmony*. The four items which measure security (247) are a combination of Type 1 and 2 preferences so *security* is partly individualist, partly collective; harmony is mainly Type 3. She finds that these dimensions correlate well with right and left (measured using political policy/voting responses) and that "left and right values are relatively independent of each other."²⁷ (244) There are occasional exceptions to the Z v. X, e.g. Rasinski (1987) who finds Y and X: he expects and finds, with scales developed for the purpose, two "distinct values... proportionality, representing societal concerns about equity and need." His two value concepts, *proportionality* and *egalitarianism*, correspond to Types 1 and 3 (effectively Y and X—see §4.6) and there is no hint of the coercive Z. Empirical work in psychology studying attitudes and values has been very extensive with little internal agreement but also little contradicting WOLT.

Hexagon of vocational interests

Psychologist John Holland's commercial RIASEC typology specifies six personalities of occupational preference and six corresponding work environments. Four of the occupation groups fit well with WOLT's social types (e.g. store manager, bookkeeper, counsellor, carpenter—Holland 1996: 399).²⁸ Specified personal values are limited to those related to work and the relevant four roughly fit with WOLT (e.g. material accomplishment and social status, power in business or politics, social service, material reward for work). In a review paper Lubinski (2000: 421), says RIASEC is the most popular model of occupational interests and he cites research showing it holds up for large samples and cross-culturally.

Originally Holland depicted the interrelationship of the six types by placing them on a circumplex, i.e., arranging them at the corners of a hexagon (Holland 1973). According to Gurtman (2003: 410), "studies have not always yielded consistent support for the assumed circular structure of the traditional RIASEC", but Prediger (1982) inferred two dimensions from it which he called *people-things* and *ideas-data*. He and others have tested the types and

²⁶ WOLT readily includes freedom and equality; see Chapters 4 and 5 and Table 4.2.

²⁷ This is as WOLT and any politically aware observer would predict; see discussion of political left and right at §5.7.

²⁸ The other two might be called a boffin (backroom scientist) and a bohemian (unstructured artist). RIASEC stands for Realistic, Investigative, Artistic, Social, Enterprising, Conventional vocational interest scales, corresponding roughly to Types 4, boffin, bohemian, 3, 1, 2.

these two dimensions empirically and compared them with the Big Five personality typology. Lippa found that

Big Five Openness was related to Ideas–Data but not to People–Things. Gender was strongly related to People–Things but not to Ideas–Data.... M, F, and Big Five measures other than Openness tended not to correlate strongly with RIASEC scales or dimensions. (Lippa 1998: 996)

If the *ideas-data* dimension is correlated only with trait personality it is probably not in the WOLT universe (§6.5). *People-things* is an important distinction WOLT makes but separates, placing them on the X and Y dimensions respectively. (It is a mistake to put two different items on one dimension—see §4.10.) People and things line up with general tendencies set out in Table 4.4 (and see also §5.6.1, Table 5.4).

RIASEC is a theory of occupational interests, not a theory of society, but inasmuch as it overlaps, it is supportive of WOLT. Holland's other two types, which might be called the boffin and the bohemian, could be any of the three pro-active types. Perhaps they are being classified separately because boffins would often tend to 5-ism and the arty bohemian's emotional side (which is outside the WOLT domain) may be swamping other characteristics.

Hofstede

The best known researcher into national culture would be Geert Hofstede who in the early 1970s analysed a data set of 100 000 questionnaires from IBM employees around the world (Hofstede 2006). He finds four primary dimensions he calls: individualism v collectivism; power distance; uncertainty avoidance; and masculinity v. femininity. Recently he added a fifth, long term v. short term orientation, to account for Chinese culture.²⁹ The first is the X dimension every theorist recognises; his collectivism does not distinguish 2-ist collective from 3-ist collective (Hofstede and Hofstede 2005: 74). The second is a measure of hierarchy, which WOLT says is a type, not a dimension. The third, uncertainty avoidance, which is "related to the level of stress in a society in the face of an unknown future" is an emotional condition of nervous energy. Masculinity is "related to the division of emotional roles between women and men"; and the fifth dimension is "related to the choice of focus for people's efforts: the future or the present and past" and is thrift and perseverance v. respect for tradition and protecting one's 'face'.³⁰ Hofstede calls them dimensions of culture³¹ though emotion is probably more of a personality matter, however he and prominent personality researcher Robert McCrae found that "mean personality scores from 33 countries were

²⁹ <u>http://www.geert-hofstede.com/geert_hofstede_resources.shtml</u> (accessed September 2008) briefly describes all the dimensions.

³⁰ <<u>http://www.geert-hofstede.com/</u>> accessed April 2008.

³¹ Hofstede's operating definition of culture: "The collective programming of the mind that distinguishes one group or category of people from another." (Hofstede and McCrae 2004: 58)

significantly and substantially correlated with culture dimension scores." (Hofstede and McCrae 2004: 52. "Trait" personality is meant, specifically the "Big Five".) WOLT and the theories discussed in this chapter do not seem to have anything to do with trait personality—see Chapter 6.

There are other world-wide studies and Hofstede claims significant confirmation from them (2005: 80). But measures of the incidence of putative phenomena on a country-bycountry basis are not explanations; in effect they say that the English are the way they are because they are English, and the Chinese are like that because they are Chinese. Such empirical research describes, sorts and averages and is useful for administrative purposes (Hofstede's focus is international business) but it does not lead to understanding (Hayek 1994 [1967]; Lewin 1931). This is further discussed in Chapters 6 and 7.

Apart from his first two dimensions (which correspond to the X dimension and to 2-ism) the Hofstede national cultures have little in common with WOLT. Hofstede is also interested in *corporate* culture where he finds an entirely new set of six dimensions unrelated to his dimensions of national culture (Hofstede and Hofstede 2005: 291). In §5.6.2 one of his studies is examined through the WOLT lens and it is shown how the first two of his corporate dimensions can be resolved into 1-ism and 3-ism, in effect his international individualism v. collectivism dimension.

Cross-cultural psychology

Cross-cultural psychologists, who sometimes refer to Hofstede but seem to occupy a different scholarship space, investigate differences between countries (or ethnicities or similar, *culture* being effectively synonymous with *nation*) and the X dimension is universally perceived as individualism v. collectivism. A whole issue of the *Psychological Bulletin* (vol. 128, No. 1, 2002) was devoted to the IND-COL distinction and the keynote paper by Oyserman et al cites about 300 references and carries appendices tabulating a similar number of post-1980 studies using IND-COL. The general failure (except for Triandis, see §3.2.6 above) to distinguish between hierarchical collectivism (2-ism) and the egalitarian kind (3-ism) is a perennial source of confusion. But it is not the only confusion:

The core element of collectivism is the assumption that groups bind and mutually obligate individuals. From this core, theorists discern a number of plausible consequences or implications of collectivism. (Oyserman et al. 2002: 5)

This cannot possibly be "the core of collectivism" since individualists (1s) also bind and obligate individuals. No distinction has been drawn. Indeed, the 1s tend to be *more* engaged in such arrangements than the collective types, drawing up contracts and keeping track of favours owed. (If they are assuming that individualists are not social that is a severe misapprehension.) Oyserman et al's massive review paper finds that "European Americans were

not... less collectivistic than Japanese or Koreans" (3) which is a straightforward admission of failure to distinguish.³² They also say:

...the greatest strength of the IND-COL framework is its theoretical parsimony... However the value of this approach is contingent on the concepts of IND and COL being defined clearly, allowing them to be operationalized, assessed, and manipulated. Only under this condition will social scientists be able to evaluate the usefulness of the IND-COL framework. (Oyserman et al. 2002: 44)

It is over a hundred years since Tönnies (whom the authors cite) made this distinction yet a veritable army of researchers is still seeking to define it.³³ They are unable to evaluate its usefulness although, since it cannot distinguish Japanese from Americans, that at least would seem clear. AP Fiske (2002: 80) in the same journal is quite scathing. Apparently, the cross-cultural psychology project is taking place in a world remote from WOLT's.

Neurology

A very different psychology approach is direct neurological observation. "You can't do a CT scan to show where humans' rights are, you can't cut someone open and show us their human rights," says cognition expert Edward Slingerland.³⁴ He may have to eat his words. You can do an fMRI scan³⁵ and show where cooperation and competition are:

In this fMRI study individuals played a specially designed computer game, according to a set of predefined rules, either in cooperation with or in competition against another person. The hemodynamic response during these conditions was contrasted to that of the same subjects playing the game independently... distinct regions were found to be selectively associated with cooperation and competition, notably the orbitofrontal cortex in the former and the inferior parietal and medial prefrontal cortices in the latter. This pattern reflects the different mental frameworks implicated in being cooperative versus competitive with another person. (Decety et al. 2004: 744)

Does that mean that preferences for X axis issues, Bowles's *durable*, Marriott's *receiving*, Douglas's *group*, and Ouchi's *performance ambiguity* will be found at the same physical brain site as *cooperation*? Table 4.2 lists dozens of issues that are on the X axis and dozens on the Y axis. Many are quite plain concepts so their locations should be very testable.

A recent review paper endorses the finding that attitudes are physiologically distinct:

These studies use paradigms such as the ultimatum game, the prisoner's dilemma, and the trust game in order to examine the neural responses associated with cooperation, competition, fairness, and trust. Across these studies,

³² See Lockhart (2001c) for an American view of Japan through the lens of GG theory.

³³ Oyserman et al's desire for clear definition is common but forlorn. Definitions are not responsible for progress in natural science where quite basic objects remain undefined. See Chapter 6.

³⁴ New Scientist, 10 November 2007 page 7.

³⁵ Of fMRI, cognitive psychologist Steven Pinker said in 2005: "Five years from now, every psychology department will have a scanner in the basement." <u>http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/06/</u>magazine/06darwin.html?pagewanted=all accessed June 2008.

cooperation, trust, and fair play typically activate VMPFC, MPFC, and MPAC, whereas unfair and untrustworthy responses activate insula, caudate in the basal ganglia, or DMPFC. The finding that cooperation, relative to competition, promotes MPFC rather than DMPFC activity is consistent with previously described work... (Lieberman 2007: 275, citations omitted)

These researchers' concepts of fairness and trust are quite fuzzy; they would need a theory of worldview to refine them. Having found the X and Y axes in the brain, what of Z? Decety et al (2004: 744) predict that there would also be mechanisms for "coercion, deception, and manipulation of conspecifics." Presumably, they are trying to work out an ethical way to test for them. The analysis of Chapter 4 would suggest that, depending on who is coercing or being coerced, when this putative Z area of the brain lights up either *both* X and Y areas of the brain will also fire or else *neither* of them will.

3.4.2 Kemper and Collins: Z and X across the disciplines

In what appears to be a uniquely cross-disciplinary paper, sociologists Kemper and Collins (K&C) find that two "dimensions of microinteraction", corresponding to grid and group, describe social interaction in very disparate social science areas, including children and other primates. It is evident that detecting dimensions without types is even more popular than intuiting types without dimensions; K&C do not mention types at all. They designate their dimensions of "microinteraction" *power* and *status*.

Power in a social relationship entails conduct by which actors have (or try to gain) the ability to compel other actors... Force, threat... are the tools... *Status*... in a social relationship is conduct by which actors give voluntary compliance to other actors... The ultimate form of status accord is love. (Kemper and Collins 1990: 34, italics original)

So their *power* is an environment of coercion (Z axis) and their *status* is an environment of cooperation (X axis)—and they identify Mary Douglas's *grid* and *group* as conforming directly (47).³⁶ In a sweeping survey they see their two dimensions reported by many studies, most of which would be unaware of the others. They also often find a third dimension which they always rule out, usually on the grounds of being "task behavior" but which can be fairly readily seen as the Y dimension, or as 1-ism.³⁷

K&C's purpose is to identify underlying dimensions, however the issues making up dimensions may be very diverse and K&C have no firm way to detect equivalences. For example, it was established in §3.2 above that Bowles's *durable relations*, Hindu *receiving*, Douglas's *group*, and Ouchi's *performance ambiguity* are all the same dimension. It is hard

³⁶ The odd word *status* is not inconsistent with Sir Henry Maine's usage (Macfarlane 1991).

³⁷ Say K&C: "...we know of no 'theoretical principle'... that would establish that two (and only two) dimensions are sufficient to describe the social relations of microinteractions and that the necessary and sufficient ones are power and status." Evidence that *three* dimensions are necessary and sufficient is presented in Chapters 2 and 4.

to imagine these issues would ever have been judged equivalent had they not each been part of *a pair that generated the same types*. K&C are attempting to see the commonalities across the vocabulary of a dozen disciplines and their judgements of equivalence on the basis of theorists' descriptions are fluid and hence easy to criticise. Yet their paper is a tour de force and a rich source of ideas. The summary of it below shows (i) that the literature tends to confirm WOLT's three dimensions and, (ii) that forming dimensions without types is just as inadequate as describing types without dimensions.³⁸

Summary of Kemper and Collins's findings

Carter (1954) found three factors from factor analysis of coded interactions of small groups. K&C see two of them fitting power and status (Z and X) and the third as irrelevant because it is "task oriented", meaning that it is not directly social: "Although task behavior is a crucial aspect of social life, we maintain it is analytically distinct from relational conduct." (35) [But this "task oriented" would fit the competitive Y dimension.] They cite a number of other researchers of behaviour in small groups who found two factors similar to Carter. "Where additional factors were found, they can be understood as reflecting technical activity or as nonrelational in some other sense." (36) [Again, pure competition requires no relationship between competitors.] Bales and Cohen (1979) found, using factor analysis, the same three dimensions as Carter. Willer (1987), also using factor analysis, modelled three types of dyadic relations: *coercion* involving one party's (threat of) punishment; *social exchange* involving positive sanctions; and *conflict* where both parties sanction each other. K&C (37) equate coercion with their *power*, social exchange with *status*, and subsume conflict also under power. [If we declare conflict equivalent to *competition*, Willer would have the three WOLT dimensions.]

Triandis (1972) found, via factor analysis of cross-cultural data, three "fundamental dimensions of human social behavior": superordination-subordination, association-dissociation, and intimacy. K&C (38) equate the first to power and the second and third both to status. (This K&C paper antedates the Triandis work discussed above; his later *vertical* and *horizontal* dimensions would also fit K&C's *power* and *status*.) White (1980) found similar to Triandis in Melanesian and Indian data. Lutz (1982) found that emotion words of Ifaluk of Southwest Pacific fall into two scales: *strong position—weak position*, and *pleasant affects*—*unpleasant affects* which K&C say reflect their *power* and *status*.

Whiting and Whiting (1975) found, via multidimensional scaling, three dimensions of children's behaviour: *peer v. adult* orientation, *friendly v. hostile*, and *altruistic v. egoistic*.

 $^{^{38}}$ The slack in the vocabulary means that sometimes what they call "dimension" might be better called "type". The coincidence and distinction of *type* and *dimension* are discussed in §4.6.

The first two K&C see as power and status respectively; the last they rule out on the grounds that it is task oriented. (39) [Egoism is a feature of the competitive Y axis.]

Osgood et al's (1957) semantic differential method postulated three fundamental dimensions of *evaluation, potency, and activity*. K&C see status and power in the first two while they suggest that *activity* is either task oriented or else an individual, not social, descriptor and "is not in the same social plane as the other dimensions." (40) [Quite so. Activity, or action rather than words, is a feature of that competitive Y dimension.] They say this activity dimension is found by other linguistic researchers but the evidence suggests it "is an add-on of the Western tradition." (41) [Competitive activity is a strong feature of the modern West.]

In psychology K&C perceive a congruence between their power and status and learning theory's concepts of *punishment* and *reward* and also with Freud's drives of *Thanatos* and *Eros*, which they relate to Empedocles's *strife* and *love*. In sociology they see power and status in Etzioni's (1975) *coercive* and *remunerative* control methods, and in Bakan's (1966) *agency* and *communion* modalities of existence (42).³⁹ In parent-child relations K&C find their power and status in the work of numerous investigators as dimensions frequently called *control* and *affection*. In personality theory, they see support for their dimensions in the traits theorised by Leary (1957) and several other researchers. (43)

In primate behaviour they find a correspondence to Chance's (1984) *agonic* and *hedonic* distinction which applies to a number of primate societies. (44) They refer to de Waal's (1982) descriptions of chimpanzee politics which they say fall into two patterns conforming to power and status. They argue that "since primate and child groups are not task oriented... they exhibit the power and status dimensions in relatively pure form." (45)

K&C then turn to macro-interaction. Economist A O Hirschman (1970) proposed that discontented groups adopt three strategies: *exit, voice*, and *loyalty* of which the last two correspond to power and status. (47) They say *Voice* is action to advance their wishes and *loyalty* is a strategy to find support by giving support. *Exit*, meaning withdrawal, is irrelevant, say K&C, as it is not a descriptor of interaction. [Exit is exactly what disillusioned Type 1s, who are high on Y, do. K&C have misunderstood voice and loyalty—see Table 4.2, §4.5 and §5.5.1.] Anthropologist Mary Douglas's (1982) *grid* and *group* stand for power and status, and K&C mention her theory's applications in characterising education systems, commitment to Kuhnian "normal science", accountancy styles, and even geological orientations, which show that the two dimensions can be applied to classes and to occupational groups. (48)

³⁹ Etzioni's and Bakan's categorisations are more like types than dimensions. The interpretations of them set out in Table 3.6 disagree somewhat with K&C, however since both theorists fit into WOLT quite well this refines, rather than contradicts, K&C's basic thrust.

They find of Parsons's (1951) AGIL (Adaptation, Goal attainment, Integration, Latency), that A is a task dimension, G is power, I is status, and L is a stage of no interaction. (49) They say that, aside from L, Parsons's scheme is a version of Carter (1954) and Osgood et al (1957). K&C have an extensive discussion of Weber (1946) and his dimensions of *class*, *status group* and *party*. They find his class to be a task orientation, while status groups fit their *status*, and parties manifest *power*. (53)

Assessment of Kemper and Collins's findings

K&C make a moderately plausible case over a very broad compass and this summary scarcely does it justice. Their case is actually weakened by their lack of discussion of any classification that does *not* fit their thesis: one would think that someone, somewhere, would have published some division that conflicted their hypothesis and since none is mentioned one is left suspecting that their structure is flexible enough to make anything fit. In effect, they are suggesting, like GG theory, that *power* and *status* (*grid* and *group*, Z and X) are the universal dimensions of social interaction. Yet at the same time they find themselves having to deal with a persistently recurring third dimension. To support their two dimensional thesis they rule out this third dimension in each case, mostly on grounds of its being task oriented and hence "nonrelational". Their observation that "task behaviour is a crucial aspect of social life" (Kemper and Collins 1990: 35) indicates some ambivalence on this point⁴⁰ but if this third dimension does exist they say it "is not in the same plane as the other two dimensions so it is not difficult to allocate their third dimension to the Y of Bowles, Marriott, and Ouchi (who are not cited by K&C) and of WOLT.

The significant virtue of deriving "types" from dimensions is that it shows unambiguously which dimensions are equivalent to which or, better expressed, which *issues* or *concepts* belong together on a particular dimension. If it is true that there are only two or three dimensions then every issue of social interaction is to be allocated onto those two or three dimensions. This will include a big range of concepts—equality, freedom, apathy, crime, obligations, privacy, blame, property, trust, unity, and many more—and fitting them all into two or three categories must result in some strange-looking associations. This is an uncertainty K&C struggle with: "Indeed, power and status may each be thought of as (probably) small 'families' of variant forms," and they think that discovering them will

⁴⁰ They are in good company: "Durkheim vacillated between the everyday view of individualism as antisocial and his theories that told him that even individualism must be a social product," say Thompson et al (1990: 131) who go on to agree with Robert Nisbet's opinion that "it is the second view that is more consistently Durkheimian."

require "the widest survey of settings and roles."⁴¹ (38) K&C are creative in seeing families of variant forms and their equivalences are inevitably contestable. But when dimensions deliver the same *types* contestability evaporates. Of course, that relies on the Types 1,2,3,4 always signifying the same thing. Types are themselves open to interpretation, however as Chapter 2 and the various examples in §3.2 above indicate, the types are relatively precise concepts, and rather distinct from one another, so there is less room to juggle.

In Table 3.5 the typologists since Marx all see Type 1 opposed to Type 2 and/or Type 3 which implies the X dimension of individualism versus collectivism. The dimensions Kemper and Collins declare universal are Z and X (which they equate to Douglas's grid and group). From a WOLT perspective, the theorists they review all see the X dimension (*everyone* sees the X dimension) and for most of their examples the second dimension which K&C choose is Z except for the occasional inclusion of a Y issue. Yet most of their theorists also found a third dimension which K&C always rule out. Their grounds for excluding it are that it is "task oriented" and "nonrelational". But, as pointed out, task oriented and non-relational both suit the Y dimension of action and competition.

While it might be said that K&C's examples were selected to make a point, there are nevertheless a lot of them. Nothing in their paper so much as hints at a refutation of WOLT.⁴² Their examples provide evidence for three dimensions, rather than the two they conclude, and the overall finding from these dimensional theorists is that there are dimensions X and Z or else X, Y and Z or perhaps, because the distinction is not always clear, they are identifying Types 3 and 2, or else 3, 1 and 2. All of this supports WOLT. At the same time, as far as we can tell from K&C's meta-analysis, these non-typologising dimensioneers, like the non-dimensional typologists of Table 3.5, have no awareness of Type 4. Or Type 5.

3.5 WOLT and GG theory from subjective Z and X dimensions

The evidence of the theorists set out above generally supports WOLT. The majority can be seen as subsets of WOLT, varying idiosyncratically but not actually contradicting the postulate of three dimensions and five types. The list of theories reviewed above can never be exhaustive but §3.2, §3.3, §3.4 cover a lot of ground and it is unlikely there exists a comparable overview.

Of all the schemes considered above, far the most relevant for WOLT is GG theory. In Chapter 2 the four social types were derived from subjective views, which Douglas thought

⁴¹ This is the opposite of the WOLT approach. Instead of "the widest survey of settings and roles" WOLT ignores reality and deduces theoretical "(probably) small 'families' of variant forms"—yet the families are large enough to include everything social.

⁴² K&C is a source of concepts with which to probe WOLT. A nice one is *reward & punishment*. *Reward* is on Y and *punishment* is on Z if a penalty, but would be on Y if it is vengeance.

not possible. She, like most of the seven dimensional typologists of §3.2, used "objective" dimensions to derive their types, i.e., putatively objective social arrangements or relations of one sort or another. These pairs of dimensions consist of various issues yet they yield the same four types, however they do not all give the same *pattern* of types. There are three possible ways that four types can be compared in pairs and all three occur among the seven theorists. For example, Douglas's grid and group are Z and X but Bowles and Marriott used Y and X. Grid and group (the Z and X dimensions) have become reified in the GG literature as something *needed* to derive the four types but it should now be evident that other things will serve and that for objective derivation any pair of axes will do. In Chapter 2 *subjective* views of competition and cooperation set as the Y and X dimensions, were shown to yield the four types. Can we make a subjective derivation of the types using the Z axis?

If Douglas had attempted derivation from the subjective she would not have been able to use *grid* and *group* as dimensions because in general people would not have an opinion on them. Perhaps she might have chosen, as reasonable analogues, *coercion* and *cooperation*. Dichotomised, these would yield four views. They are shown in Table 3.7 which is Table 3.3 —her table—with the two new issues in place of grid and group. Instead of *weak* and *strong* the words *no* and *yes* have been substituted to emphasise that the derivation is of theoretical extremes of "pure" or "ideal" types.

Table 3.7 Social views (coercion / cooperation) mimicking Douglas ZX

Coercion	yes	4 fatalism	2 hierarchy
Ζ	no	1 individualism	3 egalitarianism
		no	yes
		Cooperatio	on X

Is Table 3.7 correct? Do coercion and cooperation really give the same result as grid and group? What would these alleged types 1, 2, 3, 4, be thinking?

Type 1. To reject both coercion and cooperation as a way of organising society, a Type 1 must be a person who believes we do not need to depend on anyone else, someone who says, "I can achieve alone—and so can/should everyone." These individualistic 1s would be objecting to coercion and cooperation because they would get in the way of persons doing what they want to do. This must mean the 1s think that people who appear to be cooperative are either pretending and will cheat, or else will actually exploit the cover of cooperation to coerce. So 1s must think human nature is basically self-interested. If people are to do what they want and human nature is bad then life is personal competitive striving.

It is not necessary to go on: this is clearly the individualist cosmology Douglas found from grid and group, and which was derived using competition and cooperation in §2.3.1.

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Type 2. The person who prefers both coercion and cooperation would be saying, "I willingly obey." Or rather, "*We* willingly obey," for this implies a social arrangement where some people give orders and others carry them out: a hierarchy. Why do 2s want cooperation when coercion is available? Presumably they see coercion as a short-cut or as a last resort to be used on those who don't cooperate, this not only to get things done but also so that the efforts of those who do cooperate are not undermined by others not pulling their weight. Evidently, 2s see a human capacity to do both the wrong thing and the right thing. For a hierarchy to perform properly, it will not only be necessary for the appropriately qualified (through learning, experience or bloodline) to occupy positions of authority, but people will need to know what their duties are and where everyone fits in, so rules will be vital.

This Type 2 is obviously the familiar one.

Type 3. People who believe in cooperation and reject coercion must want a cooperative community in which no individual may tell anyone else what to do. That implies that no person may have more resources than anyone else because extra resources—money, guns, blue blood—would allow some people to dominate. Competition would be anathema since its purpose is to allow some to get ahead of others. To cooperate without coercion, 3s have to think human nature is fundamentally good and if some people appear not to be, it must be because individuals are corrupted by society and its greed, ambition and privilege.

This is the expected Type 3 result.

Type 4. Apparently, the 4s, who see only coercion, think, like the 1s, that cooperation does not work. But if coercion is pervasive the 4s must see themselves as being at the mercy of people or forces which push them around. They will therefore tend to keep their heads down or to seek the favour of powerful people and act to encourage the fates to be kind to them. The reason cooperation does not work must be either because it is a disguise for coercion or else because people cannot be relied on to do what they say they'll do. If people's behaviour is so unpredictable then coercion is the necessary way to get things done.

This Type 4 is also the same one.

Type 5. Mary Douglas did not deduce the hermit. It is readily done, and indeed necessary because something must be done to cover the logical possibility of the person with no opinion. Not to have a view of coercion and cooperation means one is not affected by them which must mean one is outside society...

* * *

Deduction of the GG types from subjective views of *coercion* and *cooperation* (axes Z, X) is evidently straightforward. In other words, WOLT could have been deduced in Chapter 2 from these dimensions instead of *competition* and *cooperation* (axes Y, X). It is

readily shown that WOLT may just as easily be deduced from *competition* and *coercion* (axes Y, Z) too.⁴³ Subjectively or objectively, any two of the three dimensions can be used. In all the examples so far the pair of dimensions has yielded the same four social "types". The claim is that every relevant thing will either fit on those three dimensions or else be one of the four types. "Relevant" are relational issues—any questions that we have to answer to live socially. For reasons briefly canvassed in §2.3.6 it is preferable to derive from the subjective however this does not seem to be a vital matter.

Subjective versus objective is further considered in §6.5 in relation to Burrell and Morgan's (1979) discussion of sociological paradigms but a paradoxical aspect may be considered here. An example of *objective* is a sociologist saying, "I assess that society as hierarchical." *Subjective* refers to how the people in the society regard their society: "I live in/prefer hierarchy." A hierarchical society can only be such if the people in it think and act in a certain way so the sociologist is making an objective assessment of the outcomes of people's combined thoughts and acts, i.e., an objective assessment of something that does not objectively exist. On the other hand, the subjective, which is people's thoughts, is, as Searle (2004; 1995) points out, itself objectively real. Even if deluded, those thoughts objective-ly exist. That is to say, the sociologist's objective social structure does not objectively exist but a member's subjective view of the social structure does objectively exist. *Subjective views* are themselves real, observer-independent, *objective objects*. They are as real as "heat" or "gravity" or "+" and "–" and are thus appropriate objects of natural science investigation.

Three dichotomised dimensions logically yield eight types but the other four never turn up; they are places where objectively life is not viable and subjectively there is no coherent preference set. The effect of the "blank" points is further discussed in Chapter 4.

3.6 Five ways of life: worldview and social relations

The overwhelming concurrence of the seven dimensional typologists, the intuitive typologists, and the dimensioneers, constitutes considerable support for WOLT. Given that the relationship between the five types is explained, and given that there appears nothing relevant that does not fit, WOLT seems very sound.

The ways of life may be divided into three aspects: worldview, social relations and behaviour. Primary seems to be worldview (cosmology, bias, mindset), a set of preferences apparently concerning everything personal and social that is relational and subject to reason. The 1s are concerned about what is right, the 2s about what is proper, the 3s about what is

⁴³ An ab initio derivation of WOLT from Y and Z axes is given in Appendix 1 using issues concerning the manageability of needs and resources

essential, and the 4s about what is inevitable. The 5s are not concerned. Each way of life has its preferred means of social control and its unique presumption of resource supply and distribution.

The division of social relations into just 5 kinds is a rudimentary one. It might be compared with dividing the physical world into solids, liquids and gases, or the biological world into plants and animals. Still, given the five, it may be possible to investigate sub-types, analogous to distinguishing wood from gold, or giraffes from wrens, and determining the relationship between them. There is no attempt to do that in this thesis but a possible approach is the fractal one of dividing each of the types into four sub-types in the same systematic way, as Hood (1998: 51-70) does (using GG theory) in the context of public management.

In Chapter 2 the types were derived in formal manner and in this chapter other theorists' classification systems have been examined and compared. The emphasis of this thesis will now shift toward the specifics of the relationship between types, rather than their descriptions and manifestations.

Below are synoptic descriptions of the types and relations within each type. Figure 3.1 illustrates the five views of nature (i.e. the material environment), much as they are usually presented in the GG literature (e.g. Thompson et al. 1990: 27) and five patterns of personal relationships.

The network patterns hint at the robustness of the social structure and the sensitivity to perturbation. A structure-less 4-ist environment will not be perturbed; a Type 1 structure will be minimally affected by impact on, or of, one of its nodes as other nodes are only connected once and remaining connections stay in place; the 3-ist environment where everything is interconnected may suffer reverberations that rebound back and forth through the system; the disturbance in a 2-ist environment will depend upon rank—destructive at the top, minimal at the bottom, which, like many things to be shown in coming chapters, goes to show it is a sort of combination of the Type 1 and Type 3 positions.

Type 1s are individualistic doers, creative, innovative, entrepreneurial, risk-happy, opportunist, competitive, flamboyant, free-spending believers in personal freedom. Social relationships are one-to-one reciprocal, each individual building an ego-centred network. Type 1s like the competitive free market and see social control maintained through incentives. Government and society should be separate with people free to seek fame and fortune. Nature is friendly, human nature is bad and when things go wrong it is a person's own fault.

Type 1s interact but don't flock. A hundred 1s in a paddock would form a hundred personal networks. A Type 1 will deal with anyone if opportunity beckons. A Type 1 organisation (business, crime ring) could be expected to last a generation.

Figure 3.1 Personal interrelationships... and... the ball of life in the landscape of nature

Type 1 network







nature stable with care

 \bigcirc



Type 3 bounded group



nature unstable

 \bigcirc

Type 4 isolated

.

Type 5 autonomy

nature unpredictable



nature resilient



nature stable

Type 2s are rulers, traditional conservatives relating to each other in rank hierarchies characterised by division of responsibility and rules. They value propriety, loyalty, dignity, measured behaviour and noblesse oblige. Rules and roles structure cooperation and competition, as well as command which seems to take the foundational role in social coordination: a rule is not a request. The arrangement suits situations such as armies and bureaucracies where large numbers of people must work together. Nature can be friendly if approached properly and if risks are properly assessed; human nature is both bad and good, and when things go wrong, individual deviance will be to blame.

Where 1s and 3s are ideological and concerned for their different concepts of personal empowerment, the secretive 2s are pragmatically interested in control. A stratified Type 2 group (firm, army, nation), simultaneously cooperative, competitive and coercive, can be very large and endure for centuries. The role differentiation that characterises relations within hierarchies will also obtain between hierarchies, justifying their different existences and allowing them to divide responsibilities and collaborate.

Type 3s are carers and critics, leftist seekers of a harmonious, righteous world where people are equal. They value frugality and a modest lifestyle. Their didactic proclivities and concern for the underdogs (4s) and for the natural environment make them most comfortable in teaching and helping professions. Social control is best achieved via norms that everyone agrees with. Nature is unforgiving, human nature is fundamentally good, risk should be avoided and when things go wrong, "the system" is to blame.

To cope with free-riding without personal competition and structured hierarchy, 3s tend to sectism, i.e. membership of an exclusive, uncompromising, egalitarian, schism-prone, millenarian, bounded group with a charismatic leader. Its need for internal consensus leads to its demonising of the outside world which makes it in principle incapable of recognising or negotiating with other groups.

Type 4s are battlers, fatalists unclear about cause and effect, improvident, tough snatchers of short term advantage, less well educated, probably working in manual occupations. Social relations are patternless, mistrustful and ineffectual. Social control is through fate and arbitrary coercion which leads to a preference for keeping a low profile and a tendency to ingratiation. Nature and human nature are capricious, cause and effect are not salient, risk is an unclear concept, and when things go wrong no one is to blame for the bad luck.

The 4s do not proselytise and act in concert only when led by a member of one of the three pro-active ways of life. The 1s, 2s, and 3s, each convinced their way is the Truth, compete for the support of the 4s.

Type 5s are loners: detached, autonomous outsiders who used to follow some other way of life but have withdrawn from active society. They are likely to be older men, perhaps disillusioned with their fellow-humans, self-sufficient, possibly stoic, who prefer to live and work alone. Their resources exceed their (probably modest) needs so they are not interested in the rat-race and are sceptical of material ambition.

3.7 Conclusion

When the casual observer looks at the politics of the democratic world it is apparent that there are common features: a restricted pattern of parties, comparable across countries, different yet recognisably similar. A corresponding simple conclusion arises from this chapter's overview of the findings of social theorists. Theorists have their differences but also their similarities. Though the labels vary greatly, across countries and cultures, millions of people adopt only a very few basic social-political positions. As Aaron Wildavsky says, people's preferences are like choosing from a prix fixe menu; they cannot be mixed and matched à la carte. "Only those combinations that are socially viable, that can cohere because people are able to give them their allegiance, to share their meanings, may be lived." (Wildavsky 1987a: 4)

This chapter has reviewed social theorists' attempts to understand these orientations. Theorists have been divided into those who deduce types from dimensions, those who construct types without any dimensions, and those who infer dimensions without types. It has shown that, with qualifications, the few social theorists who deduce types from two dimensions all derive the same four types. Since they come from different fields and their dimensions are very different from each other this cannot be coincidence. To find seven theorists in such agreement, and no one with an alternative scheme, indicates that the four types exist *independent* of theorists' perceptions. The conclusion is unavoidable: there is a natural law that says there are four social types, no more, no less.

Devising types without dimensions, i.e. intuiting types, has been more common than deducing them from dimensions; a couple of dozen schemes have become known during the last century and a half. Almost all identify two or three of the three pro-active types, hence do not contradict WOLT. Type 4, which was Marx's focus, is noticed by none of them. Even more popular than types without dimensions is the practice of proposing dimensions without types. The concept of dimension is more nebulous than the concept of type but the universal tendency is to identify dimensions that correspond to X, Z, and Y in that order of frequency.

In short, literature across the social sciences overwhelmingly supports WOLT.⁴⁴ The myriad theories discussed in this chapter all explicate society in terms of its putative components. Apart from the seven dimensional typologists, who are hypothetico-deductive (at least in principle), these theories and categorisations are all empirical-intuitive, meaning that they are constructed by analysing society as it appears to the theorist. It is hard to see any grounds for offering a theory except that it be superior to other theories, however these theorists do not demonstrate this. WOLT shows that they capture part of the story, each with its own idiosyncrasies, and by and large they might be said to be incomplete rather than in error, so WOLT could be seen as an integration, or a sorting-out, of the relevant social science insights of recent centuries. It does this, not by generalising with umbrella concepts whose meaning seems to encompass the literature (as K&C and Wicks do), but by ignoring real phenomena and developing a hypothetico-deductive model from abstract conceptions. This standard natural-science approach delivers an ideal-type social world which turns out to include, exemplify, and extend the intuitive models these theorists have inferred from the real world around them. In the following chapters this quality of WOLT incorporating past social science insights will occur repeatedly, and in far more specific terms than in these sweeping social theories.

If there are four types then there are *three* ways they can be divided in pairs. What grounds could there be to say one of those three divisions does not exist? Implicitly, that is what each of the seven dimensional typologists discussed in the opening section of this chapter is saying: each deduces four types from *two* dimensions thereby dividing them in two ways and ignoring a third possibility (Marriott (1976) being a partial exception). Between them, however, the seven theorists utilise all three dimensions. Another conclusion is unavoidable: there is a natural law that says there are three dimensions of sociality, no less. It is shown in the following chapter that there are no more (§4.8).

The position at the end of Chapter 2 was that GG theory's five types were confirmed and its logical problems resolved. The position now is that the conceptions of typologists from the length and breadth of social science fit as incomplete subsets of WOLT, with barely a contradictory word.

Given two dichotomised dimensions there may be four types and it is clear that four do exist. Given four types there may be three, not two, dimensions; their existence also seems to be settled. Given three dichotomised dimensions there may be eight types—but we have

⁴⁴ The typology that does not support WOLT is perhaps the best known extant theory: Inglehart's "materialists" versus "post-materialists". Being time and place bound, it appears irrelevant to WOLT but there are overlaps. WOLT and Inglehart are compared empirically in Chapter 7. For a comparison of Inglehart with GG theory see Grendstad (1999).

seen only four. It appears there are only four, an attribute which will be examined in the next chapter which explores the relationships between the dimensions and the types. \Box

Way of life theory: the underlying structure of worldviews, social relations and lifestyles

CHAPTER 4 THREE DIMENSIONS

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Expatiate free o'er all this scene of man; A mighty maze! but not without a plan. —Alexander Pope. Essay on Man. Epistle i. Line 1

If we don't allow free thought in mathematics, why on earth should we allow it in morals and politics? —Auguste Comte. Système de Politique Positive

Bengel once told friends of a cherished plan of his. He hoped, he said, to arrange and sum up all the knowledge of his time, symmetrically and synoptically, around a central idea... But what Bengel meant was not just a juxtaposition of the fields of knowledge and research, but an interrelationship, an organic denominator.

-Hermann Hesse. The Glass Bead Game

4.1 Introduction

This chapter, the core of this PhD thesis, is a technical guided tour of the three dimensional structure of social relations, an explication of the interrelationships and complications. It is uncharted territory so where appropriate WOLT with its X, Y, Z dimensions, is compared to GG theory with its X, Z dimensions and examples are given to illustrate the relationships that WOLT reveals and the meanings it imposes. The purpose is to explain the theory prior to the next chapter's look at practical applications. This chapter is as tautologous as Chapter 2. Though not as syllogistic, nothing about the tri-axial relations is invented or presumed; everything follows as a logical consequence of having three axes and four types.

It is shown that each of the three dimensions holds many *relational issues* and the axial locations of several dozen are listed. It is asserted, and possibly proved, that there are no relevant issues which do not fit. Issues are *views* and the issues on an axis belong together: believe one, believe them all; reject one, reject them all. The three dimensions are polythetically defined by the issues on them; which issues go where is determined by the way they fit to the four types; the types are defined by the issues on the dimensions. The circularity is addressed in Chapter 6.

How issues fit to the dimensions, and how the dimensions affect issues, is explained using *freedom* as an illustrative example where it is shown that negative and positive freedom fit on the Y and X axes. WOLT often affirms the time-honoured, social science understanding, extending and contextualising it. Crucial is the availability of the Y dimension which allows numerous important issues such as justice, equality, nature, human nature, and resource management, to be located.

The power of WOLT to specify relationships is partly a consequence of four "blank" points. Two dichotomised dimensions form four geometric points but three form eight. At four of them nothing exists: they are not cognitively coherent, not rational. That is: four combinations of axial positions are viable; four are not. The four blank points appear at the three dimensional antipodes of the four types, which means that to *completely* oppose any type is not rational.

Because of the blank points, specifying *two* dimensions defines a type: given the positions on two, the type is defined and the position on the third axis is fixed. Thus WOLT specifies the conditions for coherence of different issues, for example the only way *cooperation* (+X) and *competition* (+Y) may obtain simultaneously is through *coercion* because +X and +Y are only coherent with +Z, not with -Z which is blank at +X,+Y. This predicted coherence—that given two dimensions the third is thereby fixed—is not restricted to "matched" issues but in principle applies to any mix of issues across the dimensions. For

example, the person who holds *human nature good* (+X) and rejects *self-reliance* (-Y) must also reject *rules* (-Z), a result that is by no means intuitive. The theory expresses thousands of such relationships.

Where conventional theory recognises three positions, such as *equality of opportunity*, *equality of outcome*, and *equality under law*, or AO Hirschman's *exit, voice* and *loyalty*, a redundancy exists. If the conventional theory is not in error, one of the three must be a combination of the other two. In these two examples, by putting the first two on the Y and X axes the third is revealed to be the logical result of combining the other two.

Axial *issues* are usually, though not always, also *type* characteristics but type characteristics are not axial issues. For example the issue *competition* on the Y dimension is also a Type 1 characteristic; *individualism* is a Type 1 characteristic but is not on any dimension. The difference between axis and type is surveyed and the nature of confusions, such as treating types like political left and right as "dimensions", is illuminated.

The +Z dimension allows X and Y to have the same sign. The 2s' balancing act is to combine the +X and +Y axes through +Z. Their method of ruling includes violence and threat of violence but their rule of the 1s, 2s, and 3s is also through moral suasion which is awkward because the 2-ist position is one of compromise, of reconciling the irreconcilable X and Y dimensions. This makes the 2-ist position difficult to defend logically, with the result that debate vitiates power so 2-ist discussion tends to the formulaic and to insisting that the rules be followed rather than talked about.

Each type has one axis in common with every other type and two axes in conflict. The 1s and 3s oppose each other on X and Y and agree only on the thinly populated coercive Z dimension. Even this meagre agreement is superficial because the grounds for their anti-Z stance differ, making the 1s and 3s very comprehensively opposed to each other. This is the basis of the culture war of our time.

The evidence is that no matter what social issues are employed to deduce the theory, the same four types result. In the natural sciences it is taken for granted that the same theory is deduced no matter what the approach but it is an oddity in social science. Is there some structural property of the $2x^2$ approach that effects this, that somehow leads from many different dimensions to just four types and three dimensions? It is shown that any number of dimensions could arise from the approach; that they do not is an intrinsic property of social relations, not of the theoretical approach. In answer to a common query, it is also shown that there must be three dimensions, no more and no fewer.

Finally, some guidelines to the process and pitfalls of discovering issues are presented and the strictness of the WOLT structure emphasised. The theorist is not free to define the meaning of words. It is up to the theorist to think of the problem and to discover the solution. Failure to find one would ultimately be a refutation of the theory.

4.2 Basic 3-D structure

The 2x2 tables dealt with so far are of two kinds: showing Y and X or showing Z and X. One can also draw up a table showing Y and Z (which adds no information) though in practice theorists do not¹ since, as shown in the previous chapter, everyone sees the X dimension (called cooperation, group, performance ambiguity, IND-COL, and other things). Table 4.1 shows all three possibilities—the YX plane, the ZX plane and the YZ plane—for reference purposes. The axes are labelled cooperation, competition and coercion as an aidememoire; their real names are X, Y and Z. As will be shown, the first table, the YX plane, is the most useful one for thinking about the structure.

Table 4.1 The three two-dimensional projections, YX, ZX, YZ

Comp.	Yes	1	2	Coerc.	Yes	4	2	Comp.	Yes	1	2
Y	No	4	3	Ζ	No	1	3	Y	No	3	4
		No	Yes			No	Yes			No	Yes
		Coc	ор. Х			Coc	ор. Х			Coe	erc. Z

Figures 4.1 and 4.2 illustrate simultaneously the three dimensions of Table 4.1.² The positive (i.e., usually *Yes*) end of each axis is the end marked with the axis label. If, in two dimensions, the four types may be regarded as forming the corners of a square, then in three dimensions they would be at the corners of a cube as in Figure 4.2. The positions of Types 1 and 3 are visible at the rear corners. Note that the cube is only an aid to visualisation; the types are represented by the corners of the cube; there exists no cube—the figure is just trying to present a picture of a 2x2x2 table using three axes with four points in space. The surface to the front, showing Types 2 and 4, is parallel to the YX plane of Table 4.1. That is, the YX view is the view looking along the Z axis. The ZX plane is the view from underneath, so to

¹ An instance of the YZ plane is given in Appendix 1 where WOLT is derived, ab initio, from Y *resources manageable* and Z *needs not manageable*.

² There have been previous suggestions of a three dimensional structure (Thompson 1982b, a; Thompson et al. 1990: 16) but since they have provided no additional insight they have not found acceptance. Mamadouh (1999: 399) says, "The third dimension is concomitant of the other two: no new combinations emerge. Therefore it can be ignored in a parsimonious model..." Here, too, no new combinations, i.e. new types, emerge but none of these three dimensions is a concomitant of the other two; each is different and there are three ways, YX, ZX and YZ, of setting out dimensions two at a time.

As discussed in §3.2.2 and §3.2.6, there is also Marriott's (1976) analysis of Hindu culture. He set two issues in the YX plane and did not realise that his issue on what the Ostrander (1982) called "diagonals" constituted the Z dimension.

speak, i.e. looking up the Y axis. Finally the YZ view is from the left along the X axis.³ The directions of the + and - are nominally arbitrary however they mostly correspond to yes and no of the dichotomisation, i.e. the natural direction of positive and negative. The exceptions are mainly on the Z axis, where it turns out that about half the known issues have positive meaning in the minus direction. Geometrically, the spatial relationships between the four positions are quite symmetric; it makes no difference which way up the cube of Figure 4.2 might be drawn to the relations between the types.

The three dimensions are perhaps most conveniently envisaged using the first image in Table 4.1, the YX plane, by imagining that the numbers are not on the surface of the page but that Types 2 and 4 hover above the page (positive Z, or *Yes*) and Types 1 and 3 are sunk below it (negative Z, or *No*). YX is convenient because it shows Types 1 and 3 as having nothing in common which reflects the basic political division in modern democratic countries—the free market 1s versus the egalitarian 3s—and because the YX plane is the most lively arena, i.e. it carries the most issues. An impression of this may be gained from Table 4.2 which shows the X and Y columns to be more heavily populated than the Z column.



Figure 4.1

Figure 4.2

Three-dimensional representation of the four social types. Positive is at the end with the label X, Y or Z. The corners of the cube represent the types. The antipodes of each type is blank: no type utterly opposes any other. Geometric symmetry obtains: each type agrees with each other type about the issues that fall on their common axis and opposes each other type on the issues of the other two axes. Hence a given type sees each other type is an ally on one set of issues and an opponent on two sets of issues. Since the blank antipodes are not coherent, to change type takes a reversal of views on two axes, i.e. two sets of issues.

Any *issue* has two types against it and two for it. With respect to any particular issue a given type has one friend and two enemies. From the perspective of each type, all *issues* are meaningful but the three other *types* are not meaningful; the other three types are composed of an incomprehensible (mistaken, foolish or wicked) combination of comprehensible issues.

When Mary Douglas invented grid and group she tried "to get a full array of possible social structures" (Douglas 1982 [1978]: 190). She never did claim completeness and her

 $^{^{3}}$ To the reader used to viewing plans and sections this description will be obvious. Other readers may need to look closely to confirm that Figure 4.2 does follow from the three sections of Table 4.1.

reason for having only two dimensions was that two was all she could mentally cope with (Douglas 1982a: 11). She, and everyone, would have assumed that if another dimension were added, the number of structures (types) must double to eight. However, it turns out the other four positions are empty. In effect, she pin-pointed all the social structures yet missed part of the array. With the wisdom of hindsight, there have been hints. The persistent problem about where to place competition (§2.6) was one, and another was the introduction of the notion of "diagonals" by Ostrander in 1982 which are actually the third, Y, dimension (§3.2.2). The three-dimensional relationship was camouflaged by the fact that although a dimension was missing, no types were. All social types may be shown by using two dimensions because there are only four of them. It is their interrelationship that requires 3-D. What is at the other four points? Nothing; they are incoherent and so not viable for life. These four blank, or impossible, positions are discussed below in §4.4.

That there would be three dimensions is perhaps not so surprising. Social animals appear conscious of cooperation, competition and coercion, and humans are keenly aware of them and talk about them explicitly. That they are mutually independent need not surprise us too much for although they are often seen as being mutually antagonistic, a little reflection allows us to see that each can operate alone. The names of the three dimensions, labelled X, Y, Z here, are not particularly *cooperation, competition* and *coercion* for, as shown by the dimensional typologies discussed in the previous chapter, other issues fit on the three axes and there is no single word which captures the meaning of any of the axes. Coercion with its implication of rank, loyalty and order is the most straightforward, but X is a dimension of social optimism and material pessimism whereas Y is the reverse and these are conceptually rather more complex ideas than cooperation and competition. However, cooperation, competition and coercion seem to be as good as names can get and as long as it is appreciated that they are *not defining* the axes they are handy, being descriptors of fundamental aspects of social relations and easier to bear in mind than X, Y, and Z.

4.3 Defining the dimensions

What, then, does define the three dimensions? All the *issues* that fit on them. What determines which issues fit? The four types. What defines the types? The dimensions: the types are deduced from dimensions. The circularity is discussed in Chapter $6.^4$ This can be said clearly: a pair of issues fits on two axes if, dichotomised, they are in accord with the four types. The pair might not suffice to *deduce* the types from first principles as per Chapter 2 and as per the seven theorists of Chapter 3, because the issues may be too limited in scope but if they *fit* the types then they belong on those two axes and contribute to the definition of those

⁴ The circularity is also completeness, i.e. no other theory (e.g. evolutionary psychology) is needed.

axes. Thus there is no single, linguistic definition of the axes; they are just X, Y and Z. What of issues that do not fit on any of the three dimensions? Apparently, there are none. This is WOLT's great claim. Any issue that appears not to fit is either not within the WOLT domain or the issue needs rethinking. This may be best appreciated with an illustration.

Consider freedom. Firstly, is it within the domain? Of course it is. No theory of social interaction could exclude it. Because WOLT's domain is fairly clear and comprehensive, rescuing the theory by declaring that an awkward issue is not within it is hardly feasible.⁵ Where will freedom fit? As an initial attempt we might simply dichotomise it and place it on negative Z making the 2s and 4s unfree. That will suit the 4s for they know they are not free but it will not suit the 2s. The 2s say there is no freedom without order and since social order is their bailiwick, that makes 2-ism pro-freedom. (We are concerned for subjective views; the "objective" sociologist has no say.) So this initial attempt is not working. Besides, to put freedom on -Z would make the 1s and 3s equally free which is also unsatisfactory because while both claim freedom, each maintains the other is unfree (§2.3) which indicates they have different understandings of the word and if we are to accommodate subjective views we must respect them both.⁶ To further complicate things, the 1s will agree with the 2s about the need for order to ensure freedom (just ask arch-1 Thomas Hobbes) which means that 1s and 2s will want to be at the same end of a dimension. On the other hand, any Type 3 would say that order is a smokescreen for domination and that for there to be real freedom the disadvantaged must be assisted—and that in turn would appeal to the 2s' sense of noblesse oblige which means the 2s and 3s also need to be at the same end of a dimension. How to sort out the confusion?

It is not news that *free* has multiple meanings: in political philosophy it is standard to distinguish negative freedom from positive freedom. If these two concepts are placed on the Y and X axes (Table 4.1), everything falls into place:

the 1s want negative and no positive (for positive destroys incentive);

the 2s will have both;

the 3s want positive and no negative (for negative allows competition); and

the 4s know there is no freedom.

(The 5s see nothing they need have a view of.)

Thus 2-ism, which we began by placing contra freedom and which in an extreme hierarchy most would agree is contra, turns out to be the way to promote both kinds of freedom. Moreover it is the only way to have both at once, for coercion is unavoidable both to keep

⁵ Ultimately issues which do not fit delineate the boundaries of WOLT's domain. These seem to be matters which are of an emotional and non-social, rather than rational, social kind. See Chapter 6.

⁶ This is a nice illustration of the virtue of working with subjective views. We could not begin to set out such reasoning if we had to define freedom in an objective sense.

order (by curbing the unruly) and to assist the unfree (by curbing the oppressor). WOLT thus refines the established view of two kinds of liberty: they are two *dimensions* of liberty and there are five concepts of liberty,⁷ just as there are five concepts of everything social.

This incorporation of *freedom* elaborates, hence helps define, the Y and X axes: negative freedom is in some sense the same as the issues on the Y axis which were considered in Chapter 3; positive freedom is the same as the X issues discussed there. In what sense "the same"? In the sense that the individual or the association that favours *negative freedom* must favour *competition* and Bowles's *impersonal interaction*, and must see society in terms of Ouchi's *goal incongruence*. That is the logic of the theory. Table 4.2 lists these and several dozen other issues on the three axes. If the table is correct this is a powerful logic for it means that all the issues within a column belong together: believe one, believe them all; reject one, reject them all; if you observe one characteristic in a person or in a social organisation, you may expect to observe the others. All the issues listed on a given axis are, in some socialcognitive sense, the *same*.

The definitions of the types, too, have been elaborated; their attitudes to freedom were deduced in §2.3 but now we see that the different types are directly tied by negative and positive freedom—as well as by competition and cooperation which were used as premises in Chapter 2. It turns out that these two notions of freedom not only *fit* on the axes but may be specified as premises in place of competition and cooperation, to *derive* WOLT and this is set out in Appendix 1. Scholarly treatises on freedom fill many shelves but Table 4.2 indicates that the WOLT structure brings out concomitants of freedom far more extensive-both broader and more specific-than intuitive theorising ever could. For two centuries negative and positive freedom have been philosophers' abstractions; WOLT gives them psychological and social location. It does it in a few lines of reasoning and essentially without arguing: given the four social types, freedom has to fit in with them. There is no choice about how it fits; the theory dictates this just as any scientific theory determines how its parts fit together. The political philosopher may explore subtleties of freedom at a depth WOLT does not plumb yet WOLT is comprehensive, precise and inflexible, and were we to examine Berlin and find aspects of his two concepts that disagree with the WOLT, Berlin must yield on the grounds of faulty logic.

⁷ The benchmark discussion of negative and positive freedom is Isaiah Berlin's 1958 essay *Two Concepts of Liberty*. The following quote sets out the vocabulary and the Type 1 view: "It is this—the 'positive' conception of liberty; not freedom from, but freedom to—which the adherents of the 'negative' notion represent as being, at times, no better than a specious disguise for brutal tyranny." (127) The site <u>http://berlin.wolf.ox.ac.uk/information/a-z.html#liberty</u> (accessed September 2008) lists numerous users of the positive-negative distinction dating to Bentham in 1776, Kant in 1788 and Schiller in 1793. These theorists are distinguishing 1s from 3s though Berlin also mentions the freedom of the hermit. WOLT is derived ab initio from Berlin's "two concepts" in Appendix 1.

Table 4.2 Some issues on the X, Y, Z dimensions

	X (+X: Types 3,2)	Y (+Y: Types 1,2)	Z (+Z: Types 4,2)
Social relations	cooperative	competitive	coercive
social prospect	social optimism	social pessimism	realism
social aim	harmony (Rousseau)	security (Hobbes)	ordered conformity
justify social action by:	end justifies means (optim.)	correct process (pessimistic)	authority
	altruism	carrot	stick
	interdependent	self-reliant	
social action	outcome justifies	process justifies	
	human nature good	human nature bad	
justify social norms	instrumentally	via natural law	by authority
	trust others	mistrust others	by authority
the time to at one to a	invite social risk	avoid social risk	to a she big also also and the
Justice is given by:	a just outcome, needs	a just process, rights	to each his due, deserts "7
social problems	solve—reactive	prevent-pro-active	accribed status *2
		achieved status	ascribed status 2
evaluate society on:	and collective morality	idual social contributions	commitment
international relations	'idealist'	'realist'	communent
criminal—social	rebabilitate lost soul	must pay in proportion	remove punish to deter
personal offence	turn other cheek	vengeance as warning	ignore or crush for dignity
	excuse expressive words	iustify instrumental actions	
transgression	fear didn't mean it sorry	anger, necessary, provoked	ritual cleansing
	norms blurred, implicit	norms definite. explicit	official rules
value people for:	good thoughts	good acts	who and what they are
criminal trial	repentance	adversarial	inquisitorial
civil inquiry	NOT adversarial	inquiry	NOT revelation
responsible for:	failure to act - omissions	actions - commissions	
re people's relations	results oriented (optimistic)	process oriented (pess'tic)	
leader			
	positive freedom-to	negative freedom-from	
distinguish between:	groups	individuals	*3
kinship	social construction	biological construction	
	stress obligations	stress rights	NOT
self categorisation of identity	social Identity: what you are	role Identity: what you do	indicates issue is *4
caught-out face	self-criticism	criticise others	on the negative
caught-out feeling	guilt (for omission)	shame (for commission)	end of the axis.
	turn the other cheek	an eye for an eye	
	curb power differences	Increase power differences	*5
and strategy		tit for tot	5
game strategy	cooperate	แเ-าอา-เลเ	
Material relations			
material distribution	(should be) equal	(should be) unequal	
material prospect	material pessimism	material optimism	pragmatism
justify environmntl action by	correct process (pessimistic)	end justifies means (optim.)	F 9
material action	process justifies	outcome justifies	
	nature unforgiving	nature friendly	
	environment is fragile	environment is robust	
	technophobe	technophile	
justify consumption regulatn	via nature's laws	instrumentally	by authority
	avoid material risk	invite material risk	
material problems	prevent – pro-active	solve – reactive	
resource distribution	equality / outcome criteria	equity / deserts criteria	*6
re material things	process oriented (pessi'tic)	results oriented (optimistic)	
Social & material relations			
Social & material relations	aquality of outcome	aquality of apportunity	aguality under the low
equality for mishan blamo:	equality of outcome	equality of opportunity	
honesty / prohity is:	encerity	internal une person	fidelity
nersonal style	modest	flambovant	according to occasion
necessity mother of invention	indicates desperation	stimulates inspiration	
economic value theory	labour value	scarcity value	
theory of science	Kuhnian paradiom shift	Popperian falsification	
	adapt self to environment	adapt environment to self	*7
(Marriott 1976, see §3.2.2)	NOT Hindu 'receiving'	Hindu 'giving'	social rank difference
	NOT bride-price	dowry	

Table 4.2	(continued)	Some issues on	the X, Y,	Z dimensions
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Χ Υ Ζ	
Hirschman: org. decline 'voice' 'exit' 'loyalty'	*8
Kant's ends dignity (has no equivalent) price (has equivalents)	*9
(Bowles '98 see §3.2.1) durable social contact impersonal goods allocation	*10
Kissinger upheaval §5.3.2 'prophet' 'conqueror'	*11
philosopher consequentialist (outcome) deontologist (duty)	
Schutz's philosoph motives 'Weil' (past circumstances) 'Um-zu' (future achievement)	*12
attend to language form (context, grace) substance (content)	*13
Ouchi org. framewk §3.2.4 performance ambiguity goal incongruence	*14
non-nepotistic altruism indirect reciprocity direct reciprocity	*15
'authority transmission' 'relevant connections' 'science'	*16
knowledge masters determine corpus agreed knowledge corpus	*16
ditto scholasticism (the masters) reality testing (the facts)	*16
ditto NOT can be shown wrong can be shown right	*16
Sowell social vision §5.6.1 'unconstrained' 'constrained'	*17
teach reading whole language phonics	
book learning / study who how	*18
healing holistic scientific	
jury decisions via NOT 'verdict' – prior opinion 'evidence' – inquiry	*19
Some XZ issues	
Douglas GG theory §3.2.3 'group' (cooperative) *20 'grid' (prescr	iptive)
oppose apathy favour apathy	/
objective social relations 'status' *21 'power'	
focus of interaction with whom one interacts *22 how one inter	racts
theory of society NOT conflict (non-violent) *23 order	
info on org's core problem costly to keep info private *24 explicit, unam	nbiguous info
Some YZ issues	
boundaries of categories firm, unambiguous NOT permeal	ble, fuzzv
resources manageable NOT needs n	nanageable
formal NOT informal	
NOT politically alienated *25 deferential	
support leader NOT challend	ge leader
conformist NOT non-con	formist

*1 (Miller 1976) *2 (Linton 1936; Foladare 1969) *3 (Triandis 2001: 914) *4 (Stets and Burke 2000) *5 (Dawkins 2006 [1976]) 6 (Triandis 2001: 916) *7 (Triandis 2001: 914) *8 (Hirschman 1970) *9 (Bowles 1998: 90) *10 (Bowles 1998: 86) *11 (Kissinger 1999: 1075) *12 (Gross 1965: 336) *13 (Triandis 2001: 916) *14 (Ouchi 1980) *15 (Alexander 2006) *16 (Boyer 2003) *17 (Sowell 2002) *18 (Douglas 1988: 172) *19 (Hastie et al. 1983) *20 (Douglas 1982 [1978]) *21 (Kemper and Collins 1990) *22 (Ostrander 1982: 15) *23 (Burrell and Morgan 1979: 13) *24 (Peck and 6 2006: 150) *25 (Thompson et al. 1990: 247)

There are a number of issues like negative and positive freedom: recognised distinctions that WOLT affirms, which enrich its axes and become themselves enriched (a) by the addition of the other types (often, but not always, 2, 4, 5) which were overlooked by the traditional theorising and (b) by revealing the relationship to numerous other axial issues—to everything in the rational social universe. Examples of such issues are nature, human nature, justice, and equality (see Table 4.2). *Equality* is a case where WOLT shows something else that is new. The equality wishes of the three pro-active types are well known: the 1s want equality of opportunity, the 3s equality of outcome, and the 2s equality under the law or (same thing) equal treatment of equal people. But it is only by putting the first two on the Y and X axes that we recognise the Type 2 position as a combination of the other two. Is this true? Could such a simple thing be overlooked in the vast literature on equality? It seems so. This aspect of equality is explicated in §5.2.

There are also cases where WOLT reveals distinctions that are not well recognised, for example, in *social identity* theory and *role identity* theory WOLT shows how two apparently self-contained theories connect to each other and to the world of social interaction. The literatures on the two theories mostly ignore each other though there is an occasional comparison (e.g. Hogg et al. 1995; Terry et al. 1999: 228).

In contrast to Hogg and his colleagues (Hogg, Terry, and White 1995), we see substantial similarities and overlap between social identity theory and [role] identity theory. We think that this overlap ultimately will cause these theories to be linked in fundamental ways, though we do not think that time has come. (Stets and Burke 2000: 224)

That time has now come: WOLT specifies that overlap and links the theories in fundamental ways. It does it by placing *social identity* and *role identity* on the X and Y axes. This makes social identity 3-ist, role identity 1-ist and introduces to identity theory the 2s, 4s and 5s—and it expands the concomitants of self-identity by the whole contents of Table 4.2. In Appendix 1 WOLT is *deduced* from these two kinds of identity.

Another instance is a proposal of anthropologist Pascal Boyer (2003, Table 4.2 fn 16) who thinks the traditional "Two Cultures" distinction (or quarrel) between science and the humanities is too crude so he divides the latter to make three kinds of knowledge he calls "science", "erudition", and "relevant connections". As a typology of kinds of knowledge (ranging from "hard" to "soft") it is a shrewd interpretation of the academic world but it offers no explanation, no theory, no wider context. Boyer's knowledge types can be integrated into the whole social world by putting science on Y and relevant connections on X. This makes erudition a combination of the other two rather than a half-way point and, of course, it also shows us the fourth type (no knowledge) and all the other concomitant issues.

Because it lacks the Y axis, GG theory cannot deal with these social issues. What it can do is deduce, from grid and group, the types' positions with regard to equality, freedom, justice, etc, but the direct relationship between these issues is not brought out since types are only interconnected by the logic chains going back to grid and group.⁸ Those chains stem from two somewhat flexible concepts and by the time the types' attitudes to, say, equality, are deduced, they are possibly located as much by knowledge of the conventional division as by the deduction. By locating equality directly on the axes as WOLT does, the logic is immediate and whereas the conventional division keeps GG theory on the straight and narrow, WOLT sharpens the conventional theory.

We see that the three dimensions, which defy single word encapsulation, and defy comprehensive definition, are nevertheless very rigid. They will accept concepts strictly on

⁸ Some definitions of grid and group are given in footnote 1 to §1.3

their terms, jerking concepts into place to fit the structure and to fit the types and thereby refining the concepts and expanding their context.

4.4 The four blank positions, mixing issues

To expand the dimensions from two to three is a fifty per cent numerical increase and a thousand per cent increase in complexity. The viable configurations of dichotomised issues are summarised in Table 4.3. The four blank positions are at the antipodes of the locations of the four types as can be seen in Figure 4.2. The blank positions are where there are two axes positive with the third negative; and where all three axes are negative.

Table 4.3 The four viable axial combinations

	Х	Υ	Ζ
Гуре 1	_	+	_
Гуре 2	+	+	+
Гуре З	+	-	_
Гуре 4	_	-	+

The four antipodes, +-+, ---, -++, ++-, are blank, i.e. not viable.

There seems no way to show that the blank points must always be blank. Deductively, for each issue, they always turn out that way so the conclusion that they are always blank is an inductive one. Nothing in the process of deriving the types excluded the four blank positions; they just do not arise. For all known issues (Table 4.2) only the four known types occur. Evidently the blank positions are not viable for life or, rather, there is no coherent mental state which can exist there. This non-viability might be imagined directly at the point (-X,-Y,-Z) where to reject all three of coercion, cooperation and competition would surely be to reject social life entirely.⁹ The non-viability of the other three blank points (+-+, +++, ++-) is not quite so apparent but it is possible to show it.

Consider, for example, cooperation, competition and coercion. WOLT says that coercion (+Z) is the only way to have the first two (+X, +Y) because competition and cooperation are in conflict and rules will be needed to decide where they are to apply. This was part of the logic that derived Type 2 (§2.3.2). We know coercion can exist on its own (i.e. 4-ism) but why can't we have coercion (+Z) operating with cooperation and without competition (+Z,+X,-Y) or vice versa (+Z,-X,+Y)? Could people cooperate in a coercive environment without competing? No. Coercion implies a hierarchy of coercers and coerced—how could people ascend the hierarchy without competing? It is not coherent.

⁹ No coercion, no cooperation, no competition (in practice "low" rather than "no") would be the *objective* place the Type 5 inhabits—but the dimensions are subjective viewpoints not objective descriptions. The 5s do not repudiate cooperation, competition or coercion: they have no view of them.

Could people compete in a hierarchy without cooperation? This would be a coercive jungle where everyone competes alone for promotion and no one ever colludes with another to do in a common enemy. It too, seems socially incoherent. Thus for this particular example, the blank points check out as the table has it.¹⁰ It would similarly check out for all known relational issues. However there appears to be no way to rule out the possibility that somewhere, somehow, issues might be found which did not fit in with the four types. None are known. So far, by the philosopher's classic analogy, all swans are white.

The lists of issues in Table 4.2 say much more. In ruling out those four positions, the theory is making a huge number of predictions about the compatibility of views. The three axes constitute three meta-issues and *the compatibility rules of Table 4.3 apply to the whole axes, not just singly to each row in Table 4.2*. In principle we may take *any* three issues from the three columns and put them together. It is a commonplace to say everything is related but WOLT specifies how each social thing is related to each other social thing. For example (referring to the first few lines of Table 4.2) the theory says you may hold human nature good (+X) and at the same time believe in self reliance (+Y) but if you do, it is then logically impossible for you to reject coercion and authority. This is not well-known. The person who holds human nature good (+X) and rejects self-reliance (-Y) *must* reject coercion and authority (-Z). Who would have thought it?

In practice, mixing issues may cause problems of meaning because the basic purpose in putting a matched pair on a single line of Table 4.2 is that together they help define each other as they are fitted to the types. However providing the meanings can be preserved any issue can be mixed with any other.¹¹ For example, the first three lines of Table 4.2 tell us that *social harmony* and *social pessimism* can be combined only through *coercion*. This would be daunting to deduce directly (though it should be possible), and to be able to read it off that table is a demonstration of the power of the theory. Thousands of such statements of strict compatibility of social relations can be read off Table 4.2, most of them unknown and some startling. They should all be falsifiable. This example could be theoretically falsified by

¹⁰ Economics recognises that the competition and cooperation that make up the free market require the coercion of contracts and courts. But the general rule is not recognised. The theoretical minimum society would be three people, one of whom wears insignia and carries a big stick. Game theory experiments which set two individuals to cooperate and compete would be impossible without the third player in the white coat who makes and administers the rules, and who rewards and punishes. The influence of the experimenter is often discussed as an extraneous nuisance. But in the real world outside the laboratory there is always an equivalent; social exchange cannot occur without it. (There is also a fourth person who comes in the night to clean the experimenter's rooms. Are the 4s necessary to social exchange? Is a fifth, reminding us of the possibility of a different reality, also necessary?)

¹¹ Appendix 1 gives an example of fitting mixed issues. The ability to preserve meaning across different topics will vary. The meanings of some issues are plain and will be robust across different topics, whereas others, especially terms from particular authors, only have their meaning by the comparison with the matching concept on the same line. Because we are dealing with language, the reductionism depends upon the context.

demonstrating that *social harmony* and *social pessimism* can logically be combined without coercion, or by showing that social pessimism and coercion do not necessarily imply social harmony (and so on). Such testing is not easy. It requires taking two parts and deducing the third from them. It tends to be a long-winded undertaking and requires following logic chains to some common issue. These propositions are, of course, also open to *empirical* testing.

All four social types are rational perspectives and since the antipodes of the four types are occupied by the four incoherent blank points, to be utterly opposed to *any* type is not possible (or, at any rate, not rational). No type is utterly opposed to any other. Each type opposes two other types on two axes and agrees with one type on the other axis. Each type agrees with each other type on one axis, a different axis for each. Each axis has two types agreeing with it and two opposing it. Geometric symmetry obtains. Thus is set out precisely which issues any two types might agree on and what they will disagree on.

4.5 Two axes determine; three are redundant

The case of *equality* discussed above illustrates another feature of the structure of the social world. Because there are four blank positions, only two axes are needed to determine a type. Hence if there are *three* established positions, as in the case of equality, and if all three are correct (as would be likely if they are renowned), one of them *must* be a combination of the other two. Among the examples of issues listed in Table 4.2, several lines show all three axis columns filled in which is to say that in these lines the table is presenting a redundancy. Any two of the three axes suffices to specify the four types and with that, the position on the third axis is already fixed. Consider the YX plane in Table 4.1: Type 1 is *fully* specified by +Y -X. Its Z is *necessarily* negative for the +Z there does not exist. Similar applies to all the types and the situation is summarised in Table 4.3. Thus any labelling of *three* axes is an over-specification. Type 2 is peculiar in being positive with respect to all axes. Whereas Types 1, 3, and 4, are specified as positive on one axis and negative on the other two axes, Type 2 is defined as positive on all three axes. (This can be seen in Figure 4.2.) In Table 4.1 the YX plane shows the Type 1 is +Y, Type 3 is +X, Type 4 is neither and Type 2 is both. Type 2 is "both" in all three planes shown in Table 4.1. Type 2 is a kind of compromise; where the 1s, 3s and 4s are "pure", the 2s combine all three axes.¹² Type 2 is not a combination of the other three types but is a combination of the basic building blocks of those types. It could be said that it combines the basic building blocks of 1-ism and 3-ism—the Y and X axes—by means of the basic building block of 4-ism, the coercive +Z.¹³

¹² As an image of society, the YX plane may be seen as a boxing ring: the 1s and 3s are in the fighting corners; the 2s and 4s are in the neutral corners. The 4s perform maintenance under the baleful eye of the 2s who referee, trying to ensure the fighters keep to the rules (and never land a knock-out blow).

 $^{^{13}}$ Classic liberalism would combine +Y and +X without coercion. It is incoherent. See §5.4.

The claim that any combination of two axes immediately specifies the third, has falsifiable repercussions. For instance +Y with -X *requires* -Z, e.g., pure competition without cooperation *requires* that there also be no coercion. That is quite a simple statement and it may be found diverting to try to imagine situations of social interaction where this would not be the case. As discussed, the 2s achieve +Y and +X simultaneously by using coercion, and also the 4s achieve, if that is the word, -Y and -X simultaneously via coercion.

The situation is that there are just four positive options: (1) +Y, or (2) +X+Y+Z, or (3) +X, or (4) +Z, and there are no others. That is: available is the positive on any *one* of the three axes or on *all three*—and not two of them. Any one is logical alone but any two of them require the third, as oil and water may only be together with an emulsifier. It is more complicated than that because the third axis is always a redundant combination of the other two—though which axis is the one dependent on the other two, seems to vary depending what the issues are.¹⁴

This puts us in a position to ponder the redundancies entered into Table 4.2. Some are almost trivial: it is hardly a great insight that *realism* would be the way to combine optimism and *pessimism*, positively in the case of the pragmatic 2s, and negatively for the 4s who know that in their fate-driven world optimism and pessimism are irrelevant and foolish. If X is harmony and Y is security then 2s might achieve both at once through ordered conformity, which might also hold society together in the absence of both, i.e. 4-ism. Those examples border on the obvious yet they contribute to the definition of the axes and relations of the types. Is it less obvious that if norms are justified on X instrumentally and on Y via natural *law* then to do both at once 2s might impose rules to decide which applies when, and justify by authority? Perhaps all the blank spaces in the Z column could be filled in with rank authority for this is the 2s' universal solution to contradictions and the basic social glue of 4-ism. Are *sincerity* and *integrity* to be simultaneously achieved through *fidelity*? It sounds plausible and insightful though it is still on the edge of being right by definition. Do the 4s really display fidelity? If they lack sincerity and integrity, it is all they've got. It is like saying that *liberty* and *equality* are achieved together, or not at all, through *fraternity*. Without fraternity the 4s are drifting isolates;¹⁵ it is the 4s' big worry and to the extent they fail, it must be enforced.

If the preferred forms of criminal trial for 3s and 1s are repentance and adversarial inquiry, then it stands to reason that the only chance of them being brought together would be

¹⁴ How is it possible for axes to be orthogonal and simultaneously to be interdependent? This circumstance arises because some combinations are not viable ("blank") but it is an odd situation.

¹⁵ The Australian notion of mateship, cultivated in a lonely settler society in a harsh environment, may be seen as a fatalistic, misery-loves-company kind of brotherhood.

in a coercive inquisition. This is discussed further below in §4.9.3 and the preferences listed for the more complicated civil inquiry are discussed in Appendix 2.

Let us pass over Marriott's division, which was discussed in §3.2.2 and §3.2.6, and consider AO Hirschman's three responses to organisational decline: *exit*, *voice* and *loyalty*. Do they fit onto Y, X and Z as claimed in Table 4.2?

Hirschman is most interested in:

the two contrasting, though not mutually exclusive, categories of exit and voice... [which] ...faithfully reflect a more fundamental schism: that between economics and politics. Exit belongs to the former realm, voice to the latter. (Hirschman 1970: 15)

If exit and voice fit economics and politics then their fit to Y and X seems fairly plain. Is loyalty a way to deal with them simultaneously? That is not how Hirschman sees it. He sees loyalty essentially as passive toleration: the loyal "suffer in silence" (30). That is the kind of loyalty that sees no option; it is the 4-ist way: exercise neither exit nor voice. But loyalty might also include them both: to deal with deteriorating conditions one might abandon some activities (exit) and campaign to fix others (voice) and surely that is exactly what loyal 2s trying to save their employer would do. So Hirschman is somewhat incomplete. He does say exit and voice are not mutually exclusive; WOLT shows that is true but that the way they can be together—the only way—is via loyalty. That is a considerable restriction which not only illuminates the relationship but also defines loyalty: loyalty is the presence of both exit and voice, or the absence of both.

"Loyalty is the most criticized concept in Hirschman's framework..." say Dowding et al (2000: 476) and because a polarisation of exit versus voice (Y versus X or simply 1s versus 3s) is so noticeable, some will have them mutually exclusive, e.g., Farrell and Rusbult (1992) who see that voice and loyalty go together (because like Hirschman they see loyalty alone as passive) and add a fourth type, *neglect*.¹⁶ Barry (1974), who has an extended discussion of loyalty, sees that "voice... is already built in to loyalty" (98) and Graham and Keeley (1992) agree (195) and compare conceptions of it in a journal issue with several discussions of loyalty. So the confusion blooms and buzzes. Much of the discussion, like that of Kemper and Collins (1990, §3.4.2), is about conceptualisations which turn on the meaning of words. The WOLT axes, with the 2s combining exit and voice, sort out these various interpretations

¹⁶ This EVLN (exit, voice, loyalty, neglect) scheme (which very roughly corresponds to 1,3,2,4) and which has gained some empirical support (Dowding et al. 2000: 481), is created from two dimensions of *passive-active* and *destructive-constructive* (e.g. Farrell and Rusbult 1992: 203). Apart from their erroneous effects of making loyalty passive and exit and voice mutually exclusive, these dimensions are normative. Dividing the world into good and evil then conducting empirical research to support the division is not scientific.

and apart from unequivocally allowing exit to be combined with loyalty (which most authors shy away from) it does not hugely disagree with any of them.

In tying Hirschman's theory into the wider social world, WOLT is more unambiguous and more eclectic than merely conceptions of responses to pending organisational failure. Still, on the first page of his 1970 book Hirschman says that his theory provided him with his "own unifying way of looking at issues as diverse as competition and the two-party system, divorce and the American character, black power and the failure of 'unhappy' top officials to resign over Vietnam..." Having invented it, he saw applications everywhere. So have many others (Barry 1974: 83) and the scheme has been applied to client relations, employee attitudes, citizen satisfaction, political allegiance, even romantic alliances (Rusbult et al. 1986; Goodwin 1991).

With the modification that loyalty is broader than Hirschman defined it, his popular framework fits directly into WOLT. What if it had not fitted? It would have been easy not to mention it. What well-known triples (or dualisms) have been omitted here and in Table 4.2 which do not fit into WOLT?

4.6 Distinguishing types from axes

How to read types from the axes (i.e., from the columns of Table 4.2)

The axial issues, exit, voice and loyalty, *seem* to be Types 1, 3 and 2. Would it matter if we simply declared them to be so instead of insisting that they belong on the Y, X and Z axes? It would. It is acceptable to see exit and voice as Types 1 and 3 but loyalty is on the Z axis, which is the 4s' specialisation, and Type 2 is made of all three axes.¹⁷ Still, considering Table 4.2, when one peruses the X and Y columns, it does seem that those two lists of issues are characteristics of Types 3 and 1 respectively. Apart from the complicated geometry, just what is the distinction between *axis* and *type*?¹⁸

As a kind of mental shorthand we may say, mostly but not always, that an X issue is a Type 3 characteristic, that Y is Type 1 and, too, that Z is Type 4. We may do this because Type 3 is defined as "yes" on the X axis and "no" on both the other axes so an issue on the X axis generally suffices to specify a Type 3 characteristic. Similar reasoning applies to Types 1 and 4 (see Table 4.3). This is not reversible: X is Type 3 but Type 3 is not X for Type 3 is much more. Moreover this shorthand does not always work. The reason is that Type 3 (say) is *negative* on the other two axes; it actively *rejects* them; it is not indifferent. So if the issues

 $^{^{17}}$ Z is not 2-ism. This mental trap arises because Z is the 2s' specialty for contriving compromise, and because those who think about coercion are anti-Z 1s or 3s. The 2s are all three axes.

¹⁸ A rough and ready distinction between type and dimension is to regard type as ideology or "ism", and to see dimension as issue or policy or program. This is only rough: e.g., monotheism and polytheism are axial issues (XY), not types—see §5.9.
on the other two axes are *positive*, which is most of the time, then they can be ignored—because they are rejected. But if one of them is *itself* a negative then rejecting a negative makes a positive and so the other axis has to be taken into account.

For example, the Y axis includes *competitive* and we may directly say *competitive* is a characteristic of Type 1, since Type 1 rejects the X and Z issues of *cooperative* and *coercive*. That is all right. However, toward the bottom of the Y column we find *conformist*. This is *not* Type 1. And Table 4.2 is not telling us it is Type 1; the table is only telling us that it is on the Y axis. The definition of Type 1 is positive on the Y axis *and* negative on X and Z. The Type 1 rejects Z which in this case means rejecting *NOT non-conformist*, which is to say the Type 1 accepts *non-conformist*.¹⁹ So the table is telling us that Type 1 is both conformist and non-conformist which is precisely the opportunist position we would expect of Type 1. To read issues in the Y column as Type 1 characteristics is correct *unless* there is a negative in one of the other columns. Another instance: under Y is *investigative*. Next to it under X is *NOT adversarial* and under Z is *NOT revelation*. Since Type 1 rejects X and Z, the table is telling us that Type 1 gets to the truth through all three: investigative, adversarial and revelatory approaches.²⁰

Perusing the issues listed in Table 4.2—there is no claim that Table 4.2 is exhaustive—shows that it is safe to take the X column as a list of Type 3 characteristics and the Z as Type 4 except for *order* and *conflict* as conceived by Burrell and Morgan (1979: 13) where we see that 4-ism sees both at once (fate deciding which prevails when). It is not safe to take Y issues as Type 1 characteristics without looking to see if the other axes contain reversed issues. Type 2 characteristics cannot be read off any column because Type 2 is defined as positive on all three axes—although, where all three columns are filled in, the Z entry does tell us how the 2s (and the 4s) cope with the issue.

It might bear repeating that although the issues on X, Y and Z are, with the above exceptions, direct characteristics of Types 3, 1 and 4, these characteristics do not *define* these types. Type 1 is perhaps most accurately characterised as "individualist" but there is no axis with individualism on it. The individualism is the product of positions on all three axes (or any two of them). Similarly there are no axes of egalitarianism or fatalism. Types 1, 3 and 4 *include*, respectively, the Y, X and Z issues listed in Table 4.2 but the types are defined by *combinations* of axial positions—as is, of course, Type 2 hierarchy. Those combinations are visible in Figure 4.2 and listed in Table 4.3.

¹⁹ The double negatives here are unavoidable; "non-conformist" is linguistically a negative but in meaning is a positive thing, i.e. it is not merely the absence of conformity. There seems to be no plainer synonym.

²⁰ For discussion of investigation, adversarial, and revelation see Appendix 2.

The importance of the distinction between axis and type

In social science it would be normal, almost instinctive, practice to make a *dimension* out of individualism and out of hierarchy, egalitarianism and fatalism. It is a mistake. WOLT shows they are not dimensions; they are states, i.e. types. The commonest example of this is the "dimension" from political left to right. Left is Type 3 and right is Type 1 or Type 2 (depending whether "dry" neo-liberal is meant, or "wet" traditional conservative) and no dimension directly connects them. Figure 4.2 shows each type related to the other three types across the diagonals of the three adjacent faces of the cube. The diagonal is not a dimension. There exists no cube; there are no faces; there are no diagonals. There are only three axes and the difference from one type to another is via two of them. (Two because the third they have in common.) Adherence to a type is a variable quantity and can be measured empirically. For an individual or a collective one might measure the degree of left or right, i.e. the degree of adherence to a type (as is done with individuals in the examples in Chapter 7) and one might measure the incidence of a type in a population. Such measurements will surely show that left and right are inversely related but that does not imply a dimension between them. In economics, supply and demand tend to be inversely related but they do not define the ends of a dimension; they are related through two dimensions of price and quantity. Imputing a "dimension" from one type to another is an attempt to measure along a diagonal across a face of the cube and it is incoherent. If political right be "dry" it is Type 1 and the relationship between left and right is via the two dimensions of Y and X—i.e. via the issues upon Y and X; if right means "wet" it is Type 2 and it is related to the left via the dimensions Z and X.²¹

Given that there exists no cube, no faces, no diagonals, there is no logical position "halfway" between types. Each type is deduced for itself and the resulting preference sets (Chapter 2, Appendix 3), are irreconcilable with each other: the types derived from discrete dimensions are discrete. Theoretically, a rational person cannot be more than one type. That real people will always be a mixture does not mean they will be halfway between types. The sports fan who supports two rival teams cannot be placed on a scale halfway between them for there is no continuum between the teams. Perhaps the fan will support one team here, the other team there, the one strongly, the other weakly and on occasion might be unable to support either. Chalk and cheese could be mixed but the result will not be halfway between them. It would be something that behaves as chalk sometimes and as cheese sometimes and, perhaps, sometimes like neither. The assumption of a continuum between positions such as political left and right is not logical. The space between the types is logical no-man's land.

²¹ Presumably, a person's, or an institution's, adherence to type would be the sum (or vector sum) of the strengths of beliefs in all the axial issues.

Unless it can somehow be shown that there is a *theoretic* "halfway" (hence falsifying WOLT), empirical testing that *looks* for a halfway is without theoretical basis and is likely to mislead.

We have seen that types and axes can be confused and we can appreciate why the leftright "dimension" is so widespread. Social science has been barking up that tree for two hundred years. Yet the wet and dry distinction is also well known and, as shown in Chapter 3, many theorists have spotted the three pro-active types. At the same time it is not known that the wet, conservative right is a combination of the two dimensions that are the defining basis of the dry neo-liberal and of the left.

4.7 The X and Y axes, the Z axis and the irreconcilable 1s and 3s

GG theory implicitly claims that the whole social universe fits on two axes and Kemper and Collins (Chapter 3) agree with this although they, too, are not saying it explicitly. WOLT says unequivocally that there are three axes: three kinds of social issues. It says that every issue which must be taken into account to live socially fits on one or more of the three axes. The three axes have been named X, Y, and Z and some of their features and interrelationships have been described. The collection of issues on the three axes in Table 4.2 seems to be a longish list yet if that list covers most of the rational social universe—if that is all there is—it actually seems rather modest; perhaps human sociality is not too complicated after all. It is clear that the X and Y axes are much more variegated than the socially constrained Z axis and in the following some general features of the X and Y axes are considered with some reflections on the corresponding Z and the relative natures of the Types 1 and 3 in the light of the Z axis, Z being all the 1s and 3s have in common.

General tendencies of the X and Y dimensions

Table 4.4 sets out some general tendencies of X, the axis of interdependence and cooperation, and Y the axis of independence and competition. They are not specific, self-defining issues as in Table 4.2 but looser, more arguable tendencies. They are assertions, inferred from the gamut of specific issues (though there is overlap with Table 4.2). To say that X is female and Y is male, or that X concerns people and Y concerns things,²² is like saying that men are taller than women, or the temperature is colder at higher altitudes: it is a tendency that might have many exceptions.

The Type 2 balancing act: using +Z *to mediate* +X *and* +Y

The corresponding Z for each item of Table 4.4 must be a way to achieve both X and Y simultaneously (2-ism) and also deny both simultaneously (4-ism). To give a feel for the Z

²² "While the sexes do not appear to differ appreciably on data versus ideas, they routinely differ by a full standard deviation on people versus things (females tend to gravitate toward the former, males toward the latter)." (Lubinski 2000: 421) Grendstad (2000a: 236) thinks it "implausible that women concur with egalitarianism because they are born female"—but that is consistent with his data.

let us look at the first few. The Z for the first item, *being* and *doing*, could be labelled *appropriate/expected behaviour* since for 2s, to do the noble deed is to demonstrate the inner light, and for 4s, the expected unobtrusiveness, or short-term acquisitiveness, should ensure both inner worth and external deeds stay negative. The *reward* for 2s would be promotion which is both a display of acceptance (X) and an increase in resources (Y).²³ For 4s, the reward for being negative on both X and Y would be punishment. Combining social construction and objective world leads to what Boyer (2003) terms "erudition" which is knowledge in social areas such as history, archaeology, public administration, where objective knowledge is applied but experience and learning are important and the word of the master carries weight—and which is a very 2-ist sort of knowledge. There seems to be no word to label +Z which would designate both "erudition" and ignorance (unless it be "official pronouncement").

Table 4.4 General tendencies of X and Y axes

X being	Y doing
being: value inner worth ²⁴	doing: value external deeds
reward is love from others,	reward is recognition, expressed as
expressed as social acceptance	goods and services from others
social construction, postmodernism, word of the master; scholasticism	objective world, science, undisputed facts and relations; reality testing
ontology, holism, technophobe words	epistemology, reductionism, technophile actions
legitimacy	sovereignty
normative analysis	positivism
goodness; Jerusalem	lawfulness; Athens
monotheism, spirit*	polytheism, flesh*
social optimism, material pessimism	social pessimism, material optimism
apology, forgiveness	anger, compensation
politics	economics
reduce demand	increase supply
right brain	left brain
yin, female, empathic	yang, male, systematic
people	things

* "It is the spirit that gives life; the flesh is useless." (John 6:63)

²³ Salaries in bureaucracies are usually lower than in the 1-ist private enterprise environment because acceptance—job security—is higher.

²⁴ The difference between *being* and *doing* is nicely illustrated by John 8:7, "He that is without sin among you, let him first cast a stone at her." The woman had been caught in the *act* of adultery but the Type 3 is only concerned with what is in people's *hearts*. A Type 1 would see no relevance in the sinfulness (*being*) of the accusers to the woman's sin (*doing*); a Type 2 would declare no relevance for the witnesses but require the judge to be personally above sin. The Type 3, believing in innate goodness and preferring norms to coercive rules, says, "Go and sin no more." (John 8:11)

The 2s, or 2-ist principles, run practically everything—every undertaking of any size and complexity—and at bottom their way to combine the principles of the X and Y axes is by coercion, a framework of rules deciding between X-like and Y-like options and defining why, when and how punishment will be levied and by whom. If people are rational, the *threat* of explicit, predictable, rule-governed violence should encourage them to behave. Rationality might not stop there and the 1s, 2s and 3s would not obey solely in response to threat; they would also obey either because they agree with the rules or else because they think it proper socially facilitating—to obey even when they do not agree. Threat weighs heavier with the 4s and if they think no one is looking, obedience may become optional. General social facilitation is a meaningless abstraction in the 4s' disconnected, untrusting, capricious, fate-driven world.²⁵ With the disobedient, 2-ist coercion becomes overt violence and if excessive may excite opposition from 1s and 3s who, perceiving a common enemy, might join forces. Until about 200 years ago, the 1-3 distinction, nowadays so noticeable in the West, was not noticed because 2-ism was more powerful and blatantly violent.

The inherently difficult nature of the Type 2 balancing act can be seen in the stiffness of bureaucracy, the hierarchical tendency to ritualism and reluctance to relinquish outdated practices, and in psychological repression which may be reflected in bizarre sexual proclivities. The management of mating behaviour would have to be the 2-ism's most intractable regulatory problem.²⁶ Because 2-ism is an ongoing attempt to reconcile pragmatically two irreconcilable visions, it is philosophically difficult to defend in debate against 1-ism or 3-ism, each of which is supported by a coherent, more or less straightforward logic. Hence talk vitiates authority; power is to be wielded with a word and a nod, not nattered about, and its verbal justification will be restricted to the formulaic and ceremonial. 2s are uncomfortable with freedom of expression and there are very few 2-ist philosophers or theorists (exceedingly few living ones) while 2-ist economic theory is non-existent, having evaporated with the *Methodenstreit* of the late nineteenth century.²⁷ In social science coercive social relations appear to be under-theorised which is unfortunate since 2-ism, though it reaches an extreme exemplification in fascism and the military, made civilisation possible over the last ten thousand years.²⁸

²⁵ In a way, the 4s' life-problem is social facilitation. The advent of the mobile phone, which provides ongoing short-term facilitation through agreement, confirmation and re-confirmation of social arrangements, must have had a special impact on the 4s.

²⁶ Reproductive competition is probably at the root of all behaviour. See Ch 2, footnote 26.

²⁷ One can argue that Keynesianism is 2-ist—or that it is 3-ism looking to state power.

²⁸ Occasionally someone notices: "In spite of the claims of some exchange theorists, exchange is not the only kind of social relationship. Of at least equal importance are relationships of coercion and conflict." (Willer 1987: xv). An indication of how times have changed is political philosopher Matt Matravers' (2000) book *Justice and punishment: the rationale of coercion*, which does not notice 2-ism. He sees 1s desiring *process* on objective, non-moral grounds, and 3s as seeking ways to justify a certain

It is probably the case that any compromise will do if necessary to hold power, however the 2s' strategy is quite subtle. They use hierarchy pragmatically to agree with elements of the two overt ideologies which allows the 2s to claim (if they were to talk about it, which they generally do not) that 2-ism fulfils the shouted principles of the 1s and 3s better than either of those ideologies would if applied full-bloodedly. The modern 2-ist position will be that since the rules are agreed they must be respected, however 2-ism is more complex than merely resolving contradictions by fiat and it is understandable if bureaucracies are contradictory, unwieldy and reticent, given the way 2-ism is put together and given that there is little principled philosophy it can call its own.

The 4s, sharing the Z axis with the 2s, do not have a balancing act but we might expect them to have a justification problem for there is surely no logical argument which can explain how it is *good* to be positive on Z and negative on X and Y. Small wonder the 4s find the world runs on fate and luck. That justifies anything.

The role of the Z dimension

Z is the dimension of coercion, threat, intimidation, punishment, prescription, conscription, compulsion, restriction, order, regulation, rules, ritualism, disincentive, control, command, authority, rank inequality, division of labour, unity of purpose, loyalty and fidelity. Or something like that. These issues are +Z, i.e., with respect to the YX plane shown in Table 4.1, these issues are sitting up above the surface of the page. The 2s and 4s agree with them while the 1s and 3s reject them. The last lines of Table 4.2 show that the Z dimension contains several issues which are linguistically or psychologically positive in its negative direction. The direction of the positive and negative of an axis is mathematical convention and arbitrary in principle, however as arranged here almost all of the prolific X and Y issues are positive.²⁹ The total number of issues that fit on Z are apparently far fewer than those on X and Y and several of them point in the Z's nominally negative direction. Examples are: manage needs, challenge the leader, be non-conformist. With respect to the YX plane, these issues are below the surface of the page; 2s and 4s are opposed to them and Types 1 and 3 subscribe to them.

This restricted and restrictive Z dimension allows positive positions to be adopted on both the X and Y axes and defines Type 2, giving rise to such 2-ist characteristics and concepts as hierarchy, propriety, ceremony, pride in rank, elitism, tradition, conservatism,

outcome. He sees the rationale for punishment in "constructivism" yet does not see the 2s at all, let alone that they are the ones who want both process and outcome. Moral philosophers must find 2-ism awkward to cope with since it is arrived at pragmatically rather than morally.

 $^{^{29}}$ An exception is Hindu *receiving* (Table 6), which is negative on the X dimension, i.e. the *high* and *low* are switched but even here, since in Hindu terms it is better to receive less, the psychological positive actually agrees with the axis positive. Precisely the same applies to *Conflict (non violent)* which is similarly negative on the X axis.

noblesse oblige, measured judgement, problem forestalling and management, moderation, decorum, dignity, reticence, seemliness, prudery, duty, scapegoating, and clear categorisation. These may be contrasted with the 4s who share the Z with the 2s but are negative on both X and Y which leads to fatalism, limited appreciation of cause and effect, ineffectuality, improvidence, apathy, short-termism, populism, truculence and unpretentiousness. We would expect 4s to fear 2s, and 2s to be contemptuous of, and wary of, the 4s.

The 1s and 3s have Z in common. They oppose each other on the issues on the X and Y axes but agree in repudiating Z. Since the Z issues are of limited scope this 1-3 agreement on anti-Z sentiment is meagre. However it is even less than the few issues might indicate because the 1s' and 3s' grounds for objecting to Z differ. They are both against coercion and authority but the 1s dislike restrictions on their personal freedom whereas the 3s dislike material and power inequality. As 1s and 3s both know, the point of freedom from restrictions is in order to compete to achieve material (and hence power) inequality—and consequently 3s reject negative freedom. While the 1s and 3s both dislike rank (ascribed status) the purpose of the 1s' competing and negotiating is to acquire *achieved* status (Linton 1936, see §5.2.2). The 3s find this just as objectionable as rank because they see the competition for achieved status generating a devil-take-the-hindmost society with the weakest going under—to which the 1s' view is that achieved status is a matter of just reward for effort which confers no power to compel anyone.³⁰ On the negative Z, while the 1s and 3s agree that human needs are manageable, the 1s see it as optional and a matter of skill, whereas the 3s see managing needs as a necessity because resources are finite and unequally distributed, and the environment is suffering. While both would challenge a leader, the conqueror Type 1 does it to become the leader; the prophet 3s³¹ do it to build Jerusalem. While both are non-conformist, the 1s want to innovate; the 3s want reform. In short the 1-3 agreement resting on their common position on the Z axis is superficial and only likely to be felt where 2-ism is a powerful enough common enemy for it to swamp these 1-3 differences. In today's industrial West this is far from the case. The 1-3 culture war is perhaps most obvious in the blogosphere where for the most part the two sides do not talk to each other (Adamic and Glance 2005) and where they do, when it is not merely ad hominem, the differences outlined here are easy to see.

³⁰ Wildavsky (1982: 47) discussing 1s and 3s (GG theory):

There is a world of difference between those who wish to reduce authority so as to promote individual differences, and those who reject authority so as to reduce individual differences. While individualism encourages all transactions that maintain competition, sectarianism [i.e. 3-ism] rejects all bargains that increase disparities among people.

³¹ For further discussion of Kissinger's (1999: 1075) conqueror and prophet, see §5.3.2.

4.8 Further dimensions? Further issues?

4.8.1 Why 2x2? Methodological slickness?

In Chapter 3 it was shown that seven theorists deduce the same types from various dichotomised dimensions and these are the same as deduced from yet other dimensions in Chapter 2. In Appendix 1 the same five worldviews are derived from several very different sets of important social issues. No matter what the starting point for deduction, the same theory arises.

This sort of equivalence is taken for granted in physics and mathematics. Calculation with decimals, with fractions, or with percentages will all yield the same answer. If they do not, there is a mistake. Accountancy depends on it. The equations of motion may be deduced separately or from each other, by algebra or by calculus but they will always be the same equations. Launching and retrieving spaceships depends on this. There are hundreds of geometric and algebraic ways to deduce Pythagoras's theorem and no matter which is adopted, always the square on the hypotenuse equals the sum of the squares on the other two sides. Land surveying depends on this. In each case the theoretic edifice may be built from a few selected abstractions, then from them the other abstractions may be deduced, always yielding the same edifice of knowledge. No matter from which side the edifice is approached, it is the same edifice. In the natural sciences this situation is fundamental. The various theoretical, deductive abstractions lead to the same theoretical result-and from there to practical applications. This is the approach taken with WOLT in Chapter 2 and it was the approach, even if not explicitly recognised or always rigorously adhered to, of those seven dimensional typologists considered in Chapter 3. But it is not the usual approach in social science. In the social sciences, if there is a different approach there will be a different theory. This is actually expected. The new theory is expected to rival rather than reinforce existing theories. With the signal exception of economics, it is not common in social science to state theoretical premises and deduce straightforward conclusions. In stating numerous different sets of premises which, as in the natural sciences, all lead to the same theory, WOLT must be unique. And it would also be unique in including, rather than rivalling, extant theories.

To what extent does this consistency and generality depend on the way the problem was set up? Is it really the case that every rational, social issue fits on three axes and deduction from them always yields just four social worldviews? Or is there some trickery? Given two items, with dichotomised views of each, four types must ensue and if people without views are added, that will make five types. So much is inevitable. Does this mean the number of types was actually predestined by the approach? No. There must indeed be five types each time but nothing compels them to be always the same five. Pairing competition and cooperation (§2.3) gave WOLT's four interacting types but that in itself did not mean that pairing coercion and cooperation (§3.5) would give the same four. There is no apparent a priori reason that Bowles's types and Ouchi's types should correspond. There is no apparent a priori reason the five types derived from pairing views of managing needs and resources would be the same as those from views of freedom and as those of self-identity (Appendix 1)—and that these would also be WOLT's five. This approach would allow dozens of types to be deduced if they were there. They are not there; always the result is the same five. Not only does this give WOLT a unique robustness, but it offers an obvious theoretic falsification: find a pair of relevant items and show that they do *not* lead to WOLT's four types. Table 4.2 is offering many suggestions for the would-be falsifier to experiment with; perusal of the social science literature would yield more.

Why take items two at a time? Because it is convenient to compare two variables at a time; science and mathematics do it everywhere. It does not set a limit to what is compared. Why restrict the table to 2x2? To what extent does this predetermine the outcome? Not at all. One "2" is inevitable if Yes/No dichotomising is accepted. Dichotomisation is discussed further in Chapter 6 but its main quality is to count decisively: the sort of things being measured have no units so the only measure we can be clear about are the mutually exclusive extremes like exist versus not-exist. This dichotomisation puts no limit on the number of potential dimensions: there could have been a new one for every issue dichotomised. This may be appreciated by considering an issue not within the compass of the theory. Take "happy": one might see the world as a *happy* place or not. Constructing two dimensions with, say, *coercion*, yields four results: happy-coercive, nonhappy-coercive, happy-noncoercive, nonhappy-noncoercive. Thus are created four brand-new "types" which are not the WOLT types. It would be possible to draw some kind of inferences about the sorts of persons or environments corresponding to each of these categories; as types they are not so much false as trivial. Why don't they have significance? For two reasons. One is because happy appears to be irrelevant here, in that it is not an issue people must take a position on in order to live together. The other reason is that these "types" have no connection with anything else. Were we to discover that dimensions formed from, say, happy, intelligent, nonchalant and diligent all gave the same four "types" then they would be of interest. Such a miracle will not occur and instead "types" will proliferate as each dichotomisation creates a new "dimension". Yet with the issues chosen for deducing WOLT the miracle does occur: only four social types and three dimensions ever arise. If relevant issues can be found which generate other types, WOLT will be refuted.

Given that Table 4.1 covers all possible two dimensional sections, how could the other four, blank, positions show up if they were there? It is true that taking dimensions two

at a time can yield only four types, i.e., only four of the eight possible geometric positions can appear in any particular 2x2 table. But there is no structural slant toward the valid four. The blank positions would show if there were types different from the WOLT four—yet the same four types are found for every 2x2 deduction. If types inconsistent with the WOLT types were ever derived, they might be in those blank places and it might be the beginning of a rival theory. There appear to exist no relevant issues from which such deductions could be made and all indications are that the four blanks are logically impossible, i.e., cognitively incoherent. Either there is nothing at those four points, or else they form a space which holds something outside WOLT's domain, in which case it is hard to see why it would not stand alone, rather than meshed with WOLT's structure.

In the derivations of types, does knowing the conclusion in advance influence the logic? In the deduction of each type in §2.3 and their deduction again from coercion and cooperation at §3.5, it was always known in advance where it was headed, where the deduction was required to go. This same situation obtains with a Euclidean theorem. Foreknow-ledge presumably facilitates brief, targeted deduction but honest argument requires the possibilities to be tracked down and the sceptic's question is: has any significant logical alternative been overlooked? §2.3 is plainly written and open to critical examination. Alternatively, has some vocabulary slippage occurred whereby words subtly change meaning from one sentence to the next? It seems unlikely that such oversight or misinterpretation could be maintained over the spread of issues that have been considered. If any have and if their rectification leads to different conclusions as to how theoretical rational persons would see the world, WOLT would be undermined.

Might there be further dimensions? Only three were found but can further ones be ruled out? Yes. Provided there are four blank positions, there are only four valid points and four geometric points can define three dimensions at most. One point in space has zero dimensions, two points is the minimum to define a single dimension (a line); three points is the minimum to define two dimensions (a plane), and four is the minimum to define three dimensions (a solid). So there is nothing with which a fourth dimension could be defined. That niggling question: Why two dimensions? (e.g. Selle 1991a: 100), which is only ever treated evasively in the GG literature (Douglas 1982a: 11; Wildavsky 1984: 5) is settled: three dimensions, no more and no fewer, are needed to describe social relations.³²

 $^{^{32}}$ In an odd foreshadowing of the 3-D structure, Thompson et al (1990: 84, 99) point out that a tetrahedron is the simplest three dimensional geometric form. In Figure 4.2, lines connecting the four occupied corners (slicing off the four blank corners) form a tetrahedron as per the stereoscopic image below (from <u>http://www.mathematische-basteleien.de/tetrahedron.htm</u>). An animated image of a tetrahedron may be found at <u>http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Tetrahedron.gif</u>.

4.8.2 A sort of proof

We have seen that many issues will deductively yield the four social types and that, apparently, every rational and social thing can be paired with something else and placed on two axes to fit in with the four types. There must be an explanation for such order. Here is an attempt to divine it.

If, from some premises, we deduce a string of results, then (a) it should be possible to select some of those results and deduce the original premises (and hence the rest of the results) and, (b) it will not be possible from any of the deduced results to deduce anything to contradict the premises or other results. This would seem to be in the nature of deduction and necessary for a field of study to be internally consistent. If, (c) some new premises yield contradictions of the original results and there are no mistakes in the deduction, the new premises are in a different domain, i.e. irrelevant.

Some premises

P1. People have preferences concerning two social *issues*, A_1 and A_2 . (These might be, as in §2.3, *cooperation* and *competition*.)

P2. Peoples' preferences are dichotomous, either accepting or rejecting A_1 and A_2 .

P3. People think logically.

P4. The issues A_1 , A_2 matter to some domain, D, of social life. So $D = f(A_1, A_2)$. At least people who have views of A_1 and A_2 *perceive* that they matter in domain D.

Some deductions

D1. From P1 and P2, it follows that there are four possible viewpoints: 1: accept A_1 and reject A_2 ; 2: accept both A_1 and A_2 ; 3: reject A_1 and accept A_2 ; 4: reject both A_1 and A_2 .

D2. From D1 and P3, all people hold one, and only one, of these four views. Thus there are four "types" of people.

D3. From P3, P4 and D2, each of these four logical types participating in domain D must hold a view on a characteristic, C_1 . Each type's view of C_1 may lead to a view of some C_2 and from their respective views of C_2 each might have a view C_3 —and so on, each building a coherent set of views on characteristics C_1 , C_2 , C_3 , ... C_n . Thus four sets of views are deduced by a chain of logic stemming from the four A_1/A_2 preferences. In the example of cooperation and competition, these would include the four views of freedom, justice, equality, nature, human nature, coercion, etc, set out in §2.3.



Some conclusions

From D1 and D3, domain D consists of just four sets of views and no more. The number of characteristics, C, is indefinite but there can be no further coherent preference sets because D1 is exhaustive.

Could we not take, say, C_3 and C_6 , dichotomise them, and set them on two axes and deduce four new types? This must be logically impossible. Only the *same* types can arise for there is no information to derive anything else. By way of illustration: to dichotomise the issues of negative freedom and coercion and put them on two axes will deduce the same four types and it will be seen that the issues fall on the Y and Z axes.

That illustration indicates the possibility of inferring new axial issues from some of the characteristics C (perhaps not from all C because some may be too unimportant). These new issues will then serve to deduce the same characteristics, C_1 , C_2 , C_3 , etc, i.e. the same four types. It will not be possible to deduce any different types.

No new types are possible because it is a closed system, one big tautology. Everything has to fit as long as there are no mistakes in the deductions. It stemmed from the original A_1 , A_2 but is not particularly dependent on them since other axial issues can be put in their stead.

If another two issues, unrelated to any previous deductions, be found to conform to the four types then these new issues are within domain D—and will actually be deducible from other issues and characteristics. If some pair of issues R_1 , R_2 , be found that can *not* be placed on two axes to logically fit with the four types, then one or both of those issues is not within D.

D must contain *all* matters that are logically affected by the issues, A, and characteristics, C. If these issues and characteristics are significant, then domain D will be significant. The social domain systematically affected by views of cooperation and competition (and freedom, coercion, etc, etc) would be very significant.

QED—perhaps.

4.9 Discovering issues

4.9.1 Inventing issues

Where do these relational "issues" come from? *Types* are not such a puzzle: they are derived from issues and there are only five of them. The *type characteristics*, although seemingly endless (Chapter 2, Appendix 3), are also fairly plain: they are arrived at mainly by deduction and this deduction is mostly from previously deduced characteristics rather than direct from axial issues. Discovering and describing the axial issues is less straightforward.

And whereas type characteristics are fairly plainly related, the issues on a particular axis (Table 4.2) mostly do not look as though they would have any connection with each other; the thing that holds them together is that they fit with the same four types. Where do they come from? What made Bowles (1998 §3.2.1) think of *impersonal* and *durable*? How did Ouchi (1980 §3.2.4) dream up *goal incongruence* and *performance ambiguity*? Ouchi's paper is well known and Douglas's *grid* and *group* have iconic status, being seen in the GG literature as the key to unlocking social relations. The respect for the Ouchi and Douglas analyses and the comparative rarity of theorists who derive types from dimensions—seven are all I can find—indicate that it cannot be very easy to discover issues.

The many issues of Table 4.2 are to some extent the product of confidence that WOLT is correct. This is to take the attitude that a failure to fit some social phenomena into WOLT will be because they have not been properly thought through. Such an attitude seems necessary: it would be an impediment to solving a mathematical problem to assume the fundamental rules of mathematics might fail with the particular numbers under consideration. The thesis is that everything in the universe of social relations fits the structure either as issue or as type. But how do we set about placing issues (or items that might be issues) on the WOLT dimensions? If we get it wrong, what happens to the theory? What happens to the issues? Nothing happens: the theory keeps us on the straight and narrow.

Any relevant duality or dichotomy, such as Kant's *price* v. *dignity*, or *monotheism* v. *polytheism*, must fit somehow; and there must be a way that any relevant non-duality, such as *justice*, or *leadership*, can somehow be made dual so it will fit onto two axes. Once spotted, the fitting may be straightforward but sometimes it is quite difficult to sort out and when it is, it seems the root of the problem is some inadvertent conflation of concepts. For example, puzzling contradictions arise if one simply tries to fit *optimism* and *pessimism* into WOLT. These are basic social notions and social relations will be affected by them yet trying to look at them alone leads in circles of contradiction. Everything falls into place when we distinguish the social from the material, i.e., when it is realised that the X axis tilts toward *people-optimism* and *things-pessimism* whereas the Y has *people-pessimism* and *things-optimism* (Table 5.4). The axial placements in Table 4.2 (and in Tables 5.4 and 5.8) are totally exposed to disputation. If it appears that some item is mistaken it may be my blunder but it is more likely some elusive difference is being overlooked. And if two conflicting analyses can be logically supported—each probably bolstered by real-world examples—the cause will likely be a failure to locate some fundamental distinction.

In §4.3 the distribution of *freedom* to dimensions was discussed. If there is to be a concept called "freedom" (to be worried about and argued over) then WOLT seems to be decreeing that it must come in two variations, in order that we can somehow distribute them

onto two axes and hence derive four types. Either it comes in two variations or else we need some related issue to match it to. In the case of freedom a well-known distinction turned out to fit on X and Y. This freedom duality was spotted by Kant, Bentham, Schiller and Berlin, so it was available if we knew where to look.³³ But how do we cope if such a convenient pair of concepts is not to hand? The short answer is: by trial and error, and the following sections attempt to show by anecdote how the axial issues which support the types can be determined. The illustrations concern *categorisation*, and *inquisitorial v. adversarial* trial.³⁴

4.9.2 Categorisation

Consider the matter of *categorisation*, which is not a famous social science theme but seems to be fundamental to understanding how the world works.³⁵ As a giveaway signal, voicing an objection to dividing the world up ("reductionism")³⁶ seems to be as reliable an indicator of 3-ism as an expressed concern for "consumerism" or "social justice". Our problem is to figure out how it fits onto the axes. Let us reasonably infer that:

- the 2s love to categorise and classify,
- the 3s detest it,³⁷
- the 1s will categorise, or not, to suit their passing purpose,
- if the world runs on fate, analysis in terms of categories would be pointless.

Those seem to be plausible descriptions of the four social types' stances toward categorisation. What is an appropriate pair of issues and which axes do they fit on? They have to fit somehow. If we can't make them fit then either "categorising" is not an essential social matter or else the theory fails. If we take it that the 2s and 3s are completely mutually opposed it would mean that the YZ plane of Table 4.1 applies, since in the other planes 2s and 3s have something in common. On YZ the 1s and 4s also have nothing in common, a situation which fits our inferred 1s "both" and some kind of "neither" for the 4s. But both and

³³ As psychologists apparently do not (Rokeach 1973, §3.4.1, §5.7.2).

³⁴ For comparison with the trial, in Appendix 2 *investigation* v. *adversarial* inquiry is considered.

³⁵ Categorisation was the distinction impressed on Mary Douglas by Basil Bernstein which first prompted her to develop GG theory. "Therefore, the next task ahead was to attempt a typology of cultures based on a people's need for classification." (Douglas n.d.: 2) She had previously assumed (in her 1966 *Purity and Danger*) that everyone did classify things in their world. Oddly, the distinction between those who classify versus those who don't does not seem to be mentioned in the countless descriptions of the types found in the GG literature.

³⁶ Closely related is the insistence that there is no such thing as *objectivity*, that everything is relative.

³⁷ Arch-2 GK Chesterton, expresses his impatience with arch-3, HG Wells:

Then there is the opposite attack on thought: that urged by Mr. H.G. Wells when he insists that every separate thing is 'unique,' and there are no categories at all... Thus when Mr. Wells says (as he did somewhere), 'All chairs are quite different,' he utters not merely a misstatement, but a contradiction in terms. If all chairs were quite different, you could not call them 'all chairs.' <u>http://www.gutenberg.org/files/16769/16769-h/16769-h.htm#CHAPTER</u> <u>III The Suicide of Thought</u> accessed August 2008.

neither of what? What issues lie on the Y and Z axes that give rise to these four positions? To get the four types we must think up two issues.

If we write down the four types as the YZ plane in Table 4.1 prescribes (Table 4.5), we know the 2s like categories and the 3s loathe them so we must be able to write *like categorisation* and *loathe categorisation* on the two dimensions. We will have to write *like* on Y and *loathe* on Z and it will be necessary to switch the *yes* and *no* to make Z correct. We could leave it at that but *like* and *loathe* are very generic and, on the assumption that everyone has to put up with some categorisation, in Table 4.5 the two issues have been put as *sharp conceptual categorisation* and *blurred conceptual categorisation* which looks more informative. (The two forms of Table 4.5 are the same. Both have *NOT blurred* on the Z axis but the right one, showing the negative of the axis with yes and no switched, may be easier to read.) Thus the puzzle is solved: the two entries to the Y and Z columns of Table 4.2 would be *sharp categories* and *NOT blurred categories* and the positions of all four types are clear.

Table 4.5 Sharp and blurred categorisation

Y	Yes	1	2	Y	Yes	1	2
Sharp	No	3	4	Sharp	No	3	4
		No	Yes			Yes	No
	NC	DT B	lurred Z			Blurre	d -Z

The general problem is to accommodate some concept on the 2-D structure, i.e., find a matched pair of axial issues fitting to the four types. This example of categorisation indicates that the process is something like: (i) notice some label or concept applying to social relations; (ii) infer or speculate on the attitudes of the four social types to the item; (iii) from those attitudes, pick one of the three possible layouts of Table 4.1; (iv) label the axes with a pair of issues and then revise and re-think until it makes sense.³⁸

The other axis, X, is not used and in Table 4.2 has been left vacant. As is often the case, there seems to be no corresponding concept, i.e., no particular word expressing attitudes to categorisation which could go onto it, i.e., nothing relevant that both 2s and 3s would like and 1s and 4s would reject.

4.9.3 Criminal trial

Consider the duality, *inquisitorial* versus *adversarial*. These are the two recognised legal processes for attributing blame. Blame seems socially fundamental so the two should fit with other relational issues and WOLT should find a place for them. It seems straightforward:

³⁸ This seems to be the process Peirce called abduction or retroduction. As Blaikie (1993: 164) says, it is a process akin to finding the right key for a lock.

the adversarial form is competitive so put it on Y; the inquisitorial is a compulsory process so put it on Z then fill in the numbers as per the YZ plane of Table 4.1 to give the situation in Table 4.6.

Ζ

Table 4.6 Criminal trial, adversarial or inquisitorial YZ

Y	Yes	1	2
Adversarial	No	3	4
		No	Yes
		Inquisitorial	

Do the numbers add up? 1s who are accused will want to demonstrate innocence and in accord with their pejorative view of human nature 1s will expect the guilty to claim innocence.³⁹ They would reject the inquisitorial which might entail subtleties for they want a clear verdict of guilty or not guilty in order to hold individuals responsible for their actions and for compensation to be assessed. Are 2s happy with either process? They may tend to prefer the inquisitorial where the properly qualified pronounce on deviants but an adversarial process which identifies them within an impartial 2-ist court will be satisfactory. The 3s want neither process. For them, adversarial is upsetting and inquisitorial is oppressive. The sinner is a victim of an unjust society so punishment is inappropriate.⁴⁰ The 4s, like Kafka's Josef K, will be in the dock and will find the process inquisitorial and coercive, like the rest of the world, whatever its form. In sum, Table 4.6 encapsulates the situation.

What the 3s want

We have the satisfaction of seeing the issues fit neatly to the theory but we can also learn something new. The 3s reject both processes so what is it that they do want? They seek a harmonious, egalitarian, coercion-free community so when confronted with an erring soul the 3s require repentance—a sincere confession—for re-admission to the community. The 2s, who regard humans as flawed but improvable, will also be pleased with confession. This agreement between the 2s and 3s suggests putting repentance onto the X axis (which in Table 4.6 would stick up out of the page). The 1s and 4s are negative on X, which also fits since 1s will expect confession to be a ploy and repentance to be deceit, while 4s would only confess under duress or for some immediate advantage such as a reduced sentence—which is

³⁹ "Laws politick, ordained for external order and regiment amongst Men, are never framed as they should be... unless presuming Man to be in regard of his depraved Mind, little better than a wild Beast..." (John Locke, *Second Treatise on Government §135*)

⁴⁰ It follows from this that sinners would not sin were it not for the exploitation and oppression. People would behave well if treated well, so rather than laws, 3s want norms that encourage the best by expecting people to behave well. It is the exact opposite of Locke's view in the previous footnote.

not repentance (and 3s, such as those in Figure A10.1 in Appendix 10, will be disappointed when 4s re-offend).

This exercise of finding the fit of the trial procedures of English and Roman law into WOLT has shown where a third approach to culpability fits in. We do not normally think of repentance in the context of adversarial and inquisitorial but it is widely used. It is applied in "restorative justice"⁴¹ shaming mediations between victims and offenders, available in many jurisdictions as an alternative or preliminary to the usual court hearing, particularly for young offenders. Confession has the formidable heritage of the Inquisition, the Salem witch trials, the self-criticism practices under Calvin and Mao,⁴² and in the Communist show trials in the USSR, Czechoslovakia and Rumania where the leading figures of the regime offered abject, gushing confessions of treason before being shot. The 2-ist state needed confessions to make the trials of the state's most prominent leaders believable. The accused knew they were going to die and as 3-ist believers in socialism's new dawn, all they had left was their membership in the community.⁴³

⁴¹ <u>http://www.aic.gov.au/rjustice/</u> accessed September 2008. This whole discussion is in dire contradiction to criminologist Barry Vaughan's (2002: 420ff) discussion of the GG types.

⁴² "Ritual self-criticism is the precondition for reintegration into the community. As Mao points out, 'so long as a person who has made mistakes... honestly and sincerely wishes to be cured and to mend his ways, we should welcome him and cure his sickness so that he can become a good comrade'." (Young and Ford 1977: 94, elision original). It is conceivable that Mao was introduced to self-criticism as a youth by protestant missionaries.

⁴³ An extraordinary insight into 3-ism is provided by the most prominent of the accused, Nikolai Bukharin, Politburo member, editor of Pravda and theorist of Bolshevism. In early March 1938 he and twenty others of the top Soviet leadership were tried for treason. In his final plea he reflected upon confession:

For three months I refused to say anything. Then I began to testify. Why? Because while in prison I made a revaluation of my entire past. For when you ask yourself: "If you must die, what are you dying for?"—an absolutely black vacuity suddenly rises before you with startling vividness. There was nothing to die for, if one wanted to die unrepented. And, on the contrary, everything positive that glistens in the Soviet Union acquires new dimensions in a man's mind. This in the end disarmed me completely and led me to bend my knees before the Party and the country. (USSR 1938: 777)

^{...}we repent our frightful crimes. The point, of course, is not this repentance, or my personal repentance in particular. The Court can pass its verdict without it. The confession of the accused is not essential. The confession of the accused is a medieval principle of jurisprudence. (778)

The monstrousness of my crimes is immeasurable especially in the new stage of the struggle of the U.S.S.R... What matters is not the personal feelings of a repentant enemy, but the flourishing progress of the U.S.S.R. and its international importance. (779)

It looks as if confession was as essential as it was in Medieval heresy trials. Bukharin believed in the glorious new Soviet Union and that even his own death was appropriate (see his letter to Stalin at http://www.yale.edu/annals/Reviews/review_texts/Walden_on_Getty_Ass_Newspapers_10.22.99.html accessed September 2008). Confessing restored him to the cause and community he had devoted his life to. He was executed three days later.

Compare the show trials of Germany's *Volksgerichtshof* where from 1942 to 1945 Nazi court president Roland Freisler averaged three death sentences per day. Confessions were of little public interest and not voluntary. <u>http://www.zeit.de/2005/06/A-Freisler?page=4</u> accessed September 2008.

We see that there are three ways society can determine blame: X, voluntary acceptance; Y, winner of a tussle between prosecutor and accused; Z, authoritative pronouncement. Preferences of persons and organisations will be one of the four permitted combinations of these: 1: -X+Y-Z; 2: +X+Y+Z; 3: +X-Y-Z; 4: -X-Y+Z.

The process of fitting known issues seems to be: (i) notice some duality concerning social relations; (ii) set the pair on two axes; (iii) infer which types would be high and low on each of them, write them in and label the axes. Note that this procedure means the theory is in control. Given distinct, dichotomised issues, there is little room for the theorist to define anything or to decide, on the basis of intuitive reasoning or debatable definitions of words, what counts or where it goes. The theorist's job is to notice the problem and to discover the solution. Nothing can be put in the "wrong place"; the attempt will merely fail. What fits, fits. If a different pattern of the issues in different positions could be fitted, the theory would not be in control. By the same token, if the concepts are not clear, the parts will not fall into place, which is to say that WOLT is preventing the perpetration of vagueness.⁴⁴

The above examples indicate that placing issues is not a trivial task. If it were there would be more than seven theorists who had done it—though they were all handicapped by having only two dimensions available. Where a pair of issues is on X and Y, as the majority seem to be, then usually (see §4.6 for qualifications) they will form Types 3 and 1 respectively; both together will fit Type 2; and "neither" will fit with Type 4. Most of the concepts listed in the X and Y columns in Table 4.2, Table 4.4, and Tables 5.4 and 5.8 require but a little pondering to drop them onto WOLT dimensions. The ease or difficulty is probably best appreciated with examples, so the lines for *leader* in Table 4.2 and for *service provided* in Table 5.8 have been left blank, inviting the reader to fill them in.

4.10 Dichotomise what?

Dichotomise how?

Must the dichotomisation really be yes-no? What if, instead of yes-no dichotomising of a single issue, we put two complementary issues, for example, friendly-unfriendly? Would that not be a reasonable single dimension? No. It is not so important whether the dichotomy is yes-no, high-low, or weak-strong but it is vital that the dichotomy be of a *single* issue. *Friendly* is one issue; *unfriendly* is another. A moment's thought suffices to realise that *not-friendly* is different from *unfriendly*. It is very common in social science to construct a single dimension from two different things, in the assumption that they are natural opposites. It is a

⁴⁴ For example, if one assumes that a trial is a way to find the *truth* (rather than attribute *blame*) the attempt to locate axes will go round in circles. The axial positions for an *inquiry* into the truth are discussed in Appendix 2 and there, as with the trial above, new connections are revealed when the third axis is pondered.

mistake. To pre-emptively exclude other possibilities (namely *both* and *neither*) is to introduce a bias and incur logical error before any reasoning has even begun. Superficially, the dichotomy friendly-unfriendly sounds exhaustive and if asserted in a psychology or sociology paper probably no one would take exception. So easily does social science go astray. This is the menace of relying on intuition. Totally avoiding intuition may be impossible but surely it should be avoided where it is possible. In the case of *friendly* and *unfriendly* we already know that in reference to mother nature or human nature, the 2s are both and the 4s are neither. To place unfriendly-friendly on a single dimension would be to rule out the 2s and 4s, to rule out the possibility of ever discovering them.⁴⁵

Two dimensions from one?

In Chapter 3 Bowles's (1998) dimension of *ephemeral-durable* contact was discussed. In view of the previous paragraph, should these not be split into two dimensions? If we accept that *ephemeral* is identical with *not-durable* then they form a single dimension. That seems to be what is meant and is the interpretation necessary for strict, all-inclusive, mutually exclusive dichotomisation. But what if we did put two words on two axes when they are mutually exclusive and belong on one axis? What will happen? Nothing. Being all-inclusive means it is logically impossible to put anything for *neither* and being mutually exclusive means it is logically impossible to put anything for *both*. All that can result is the sort of triviality shown in Table 4.7.

Table 4.7 Trying to make two dimensions from one

X	Yes	1,4	
ephemeral	No		2,3
		No	Yes
		Dural	ble X

The outcome is similarly trivial if two different issues that lie on the same axis are put on separate axes. For example, if *coercion* and *rules* are put on two different dimensions, the 2x2 matrix will have 1,3 in one position saying no-no and 2,4 saying yes-yes and the other two positions will be empty—and it is obvious the two issues belong on the same axis. The only way the other two positions could be filled is if one can show there can be rules without

⁴⁵ For example S Fiske (2007) puts *friend* and *foe* as a single dimension. This imputes universality to the saw: "If you are not with us then you are against us". Another example is Prediger's (1982) dimensions of *people-things* and *ideas-data* imputed from Holland's (1973; 1992) hexagon of vocational interests (§3.4.1). Of course, if each of people, things, ideas and data is declared a dimension for itself, the complexity skyrockets—but that does not make it right to impose polar dimensions. A further example is the division into "social identity" and "role identity" which are not put on any dimension but are apparently assumed by a large field of psychology research to be mutually exclusive (Hogg et al. 1995; Terry et al. 1999) thus pre-empting any chance of noticing *both* and *neither*. See Appendix 1. Personality theories, too, are riddled with such false dichotomies—see §6.5.2.

coercion or coercion without rules. Rules without coercion is a social impossibility if the rules are real; coercion without rules is a state of arbitrary violence which is a condition of social breakdown and WOLT does not apply.

Evidently we cannot get into trouble by attempting to place things on *different* axes if they are too many, it will sort itself out. It is the converse that is the danger. We will be misled if we put things that belong on separate axes onto one axis—such as *friendlyunfriendly*. Science depends on the meaning of words. Meanings are flexible and there is no agreed way to quantify levels of the issues WOLT deals with. Just one clear logical quantitative measure is available: mutual exclusivity, the difference between presence and absence, the difference between F and not-F. It may be that in *practice* it is difficult to detect this difference but that is nothing exceptional for there is measurement error in all applied science. In *principle* the difference is perfectly clear. To sloppily impute mutual exclusivity to words that are not mutually exclusive is to disdain the only conceptually clear mensuration there is. The safe approach would be to err on the side of splitting things; overdoing it will be quickly apparent.

No flexibility, the theory decides

At the risk of labouring the point, another example. Could we not put the dichotomy *captive-free* on a single dimension if we wish? No. The theorist is not free to make such a decision. The scientist does not get to choose the components of a theory. The components are to be *discovered*. But surely this dichotomy *captive-free* is exhaustive and clear? If *captive* and *free* are physical states then perhaps they are mutually exclusive, but that is outside the realm of WOLT which is about mental-social states.⁴⁶ If freedom is a mental state then, as we know (§4.3), it becomes necessary to clarify the meaning, namely to ask which is meant: freedom-from or freedom-to. That is what WOLT will accept, what WOLT insists on. This restriction—in truth a clarification—of the shape of the issues is precisely what makes the theory theorist-independent. The three axes are there; *they* decide. As in natural science, it is the theory, not the theorist, that determines what its domain is, which matters it deals with, and where they fit in.

If WOLT dictates what it will accept, the theory itself is determining its compass, hence any part is determined—predetermined—from other parts, so is not the whole theory one great tautology? In principle, it seems so. That is science and it troubles some philosophers (e.g. AJ Ayer in Edwards and Pap 1965: 655-7; Poincaré 1905: Part 1, Ch I). It does not appear to trouble the scientists since new scientific discoveries keep being made and new (tautologous) connections and consequences keep being perceived.

⁴⁶ And 5s can be free in prison. Boethius is the classic example.

If an *issue* is not acceptable to WOLT unless expressed just so, what is to be done with issues that cannot be so phrased? The existence of any such issue contradicts WOLT. It is a prima facie refutation. It appears, though, that all preferences which must be dealt with in order to live socially can be so phrased. Moreover, it would appear that this phrasing is seldom new but usually consists of recognised distinctions such as freedom from and to, and procedural and redistributive justice, which are standard concepts widely considered necessary to understanding.

4.11 Conclusion

This chapter explored the three dimensional structure of social interaction.

It appears that all relevant issues fit onto three axes; several dozen such issues, apparently covering the gamut of social relations, were listed. Numerous important issues, such as freedom, equality and justice (which cannot fit onto the grid-group scheme) define the axes. In so doing, the issues themselves become highly specified as do their connections to the rest of the social world; relationships unnoticed in centuries of intuitive theorising, become visible.

Geometrically, three dichotomised axes yield eight types but four of the eight never occur: they are incoherent. These "blank" points are at the antipodes of the four WOLT types in the 3-D space; consequently it is impossible to hold a coherent set of preferences comprehensively opposed to any type. The 3-D structure is entirely symmetrical: each of the four social types agrees with each other type on one axis, and disagrees with each on two axes; each axial issue has two types agreeing with it and two opposing it.

Evidently, no matter what issues are employed to deduce the theory, the same four types result. As is taken for granted in the natural sciences, the same theory is deduced no matter what the approach, no matter what the theoretical starting point. It was shown that the 2x2 methodology does not predetermine the number of dimensions or number of types and because there are just four valid points the number of dimensions can be no more than three.

In specifying where issues fall on the three axes, the relationship of every issue to every other issue is stated specifically. The theorist is not free to define the meaning of words or to intuit relationships. The structure specifies thousands of falsifiable relationships. Several issues: freedom, equality, Hirschman's exit, voice and loyalty, political left and right, were discussed to illustrate the interactions of the axes and the pragmatic role of 2-ism in reconciling the irreconcilable positions of the 1s and 3s.

It was shown that the great variety of social activity is on the X and Y axes and relatively little variety on the Z. As well as specific issues, to X v. Y can be attributed some general tendencies: being v. doing, love v. recognition, spirit v. flesh, social optimism and

material pessimism v. social pessimism and material optimism, people v. things, female v. male.

A rough distinction between *type* and *dimension* is to regard type as ideology or "ism", and to see dimensional issue as policy or program. The characteristics of *types* tend to be stable attributes of people or organisations, such as individualism or hierarchy, whereas the *issues* which go on the *dimensions* are specific concerns about which a person or an organisation might have an opinion or a policy, such as coercion or cooperation. A type's characteristics are logically coherent and can be deduced from each other. The issues on a dimension are not readily deduced from each other and their coherence is shown by taking them two at a time and demonstrating that they fit the four types. Issues, in pairs from two different axes, both fit to, and construct, the types.

The structure itself is exposed to falsification in making the claim that every relevant issue can be placed on the three axes. Kemper and Collins (1990: 59) remark, with reference to their two dimensions, that there are conceivable dimensions that would not fit.⁴⁷ For WOLT, any such dimensions may only be matters outside its domain. WOLT would be falsified (i) if relevant issues can be found that are not resolvable onto the three axes, or (ii) if relevant issues can be formed into dimensions which yield a different theory (different types), or (iii) if one or more of the four "impossible" positions can be shown to be viable for any issue, or (iv) by showing that there is some interdependence, i.e. non-orthogonality, between the types which would allow logical positions "halfway" between types.

In 1991 Per Selle complained of the grid and group dimensions:

Not only do the dimensions remain unclear, *but we are not really told very much about them*... The truth is that most of what is written within the tradition starts out from the four (or five) cultures and not from the dimensions as such... most of the literature is mainly about cultures, but decoupled from the dimensions as such." (Selle 1991b: 362, italics original)

This criticism cannot be made of WOLT. To give credit where it is due, Mary Douglas (1982 [1978]) did start with the dimensions and carefully deduced the four cultures from them. Still, we never could be told much about the dimensions because, as concepts, "grid" and "group" are blurry and, notwithstanding Douglas's lengthy discussion of them (190-200), somewhat meagre. There were attempts to flesh them out: apart from the various efforts to fit competition on these two axes, there were attempts to fit equality (e.g. Mitleton-Kelly 2004: 301), while Mars (1994 [1982]: 29) tried to locate several objective designations

⁴⁷ Kemper and Collins see as excluded: "material-ideal, pragmatic-affective, instrumental-expressive." Curiously, all three look not like three dimensions, but like three pairs of dimensions that would fit directly on the Y and X axes. K&C more or less systematically excluded Y (§3.4.2).

of social relations on them.⁴⁸ With hindsight we see it was not possible to say very much about the dimensions because: (i) they were intrinsically unclear; (ii) grid—the Z axis—has relatively few issues on it so there is not a lot to be said about it and, most important, (iii) one dimension was entirely missing. Thus, in order to see the types it was unavoidable that they be, as Selle puts it, "decoupled". A certain mental leap was needed to comprehend the four cultures but for those who made the leap, the cultures were plain and they were so readily applied heuristically, their persuasiveness transcended their flawed foundation. They were persuasive not only because the GG types could be perceived "out there" in the "real world" (exemplified, caricatured, challenged) but also because of their internal coherence. As the deductions in Chapters 2 and 3 demonstrate, the nominated dimensions-competition, cooperation, coercion, Bowles's interactions, Ouchi's idiosyncratic constructs-are starting points. Once started, whether from grid and group or from any other pair, the shape of a type is then deduced from its own sequential logic. This is demonstrated for several other starting positions in Appendix 1, and the first page or two of Appendix 3, which tabulates some characteristics of the five ways of life, may be read as a logical sequence whereby rows depend upon previous rows.⁴⁹ Once started—once off and running on the right track—no cognisance of dimensions is required: the types stand for themselves.

But Selle would like to know what it is they are standing on. The answer is three dimensions which, with the four social types themselves, appear to contain everything in the rational, social world. Apparently, things fit because it is a closed, deductive system. The dimensions are defined by the issues that are on them; the types determine what and how issues fit on the dimensions; and the types are derived from the dimensions. This circularity—this self-contained completeness—is in accord with usual scientific theorising and is discussed further in Chapter 6.

WOLT makes the structure of social relations explicit enough to show the relationship, at the dichotomous level of presence versus absence, of every rational social thing to every other rational social thing. It says what goes with what, and what does not. Real social relations are not dichotomous and real people are not pure types, so the next chapter will give some indication of how effective WOLT can be for analysing theoretical and practical social relations.

⁴⁸ Mars's items were: *grid*: autonomy, insulation, reciprocity, competition; *group*: frequency, mutuality, scope, boundary.

⁴⁹ See Appendix 1, §A1.2 for assistance.

Way of life theory: the underlying structure of worldviews, social relations and lifestyles

CHAPTER 5 REAL WORLD CORROBORATIONS

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A legitimate scientific theory should also be fruitful. A good theory makes new predictions; it anticipates, pursues, and corroborates future facts. More than just accounting for previously encountered facts of nature, science makes bold claims about previously unknown phenomena and then goes looking for them.

—Asma (2001: 163)

5.1 Introduction

This chapter presents applications intended to display WOLT to best advantage, i.e. instances that corroborate or what George and Bennett (2005: 75) call "plausibility probes" or "preliminary studies on relatively untested theories and hypotheses to determine whether more intensive and laborious testing is warranted." This chapter attempts to show that WOLT applies in every sphere of social relations, from philosophers' speculations to psychologists' notions of politics to the fundamentals of religion. It is shown that the theory can be usefully applied to analyse social relations, ordinary and academic, and that its application can lead to new insights.

Confirmatory instances are likely to stimulate ad hoc scepticism: "That is all very well but what about Fred? Fred does not fit the theory."¹ WOLT is a theory of *ideal types*. There are situations that do not fit but WOLT (which admits of no exceptions) is *not* refuted by noting some person or social group appears not to conform to it. WOLT is falsifiable to an extent unique in social science but *ad hoc intuitive exceptions do not falsify*. However, this misunderstanding has occurred often enough over the years that it seems worthwhile attempting to get in first and immunise the theory against it.

Consider a theory claiming that Earth's gravity is an acceleration of 9.8 metres per second per second and imagine testing it by dropping a pillow from the Tower of Pisa. The theory would appear to be seriously in error. The pillow test fits poorly because other influences are significant. A test which dropped a cannon-ball would show good agreement with the gravity theory. A test with thistledown might show that gravity theory has no detectable relevance. Yet gravity operates without exception. We must expect analogous effects when comparing reality with any theory. It seems that:

- confirmations, as with the cannon-ball, would indicate possible usefulness of the theory;
- the theory should not be actually contradicted: thistledown offers no alternative;
- there must be an explanation, analogous to air resistance, for failure to confirm.

As this chapter demonstrates there are many cannon-ball type confirmations of WOLT. This is fortunate. It could have been otherwise. Newton's First Law says a moving body continues, forever, in a straight line at constant velocity. There are *no* confirming examples: those bodies moving forever are in curved paths and those which go straight are very short-lived. If there are comparable social laws they will surely be hard to detect.

If we find people or institutions which do not appear to conform to WOLT, we may simply say there are other influences operating and we do not know what they are.

¹ Occasionally it turns out that Fred does fit and some lines of Appendix 3 arose from such challenges.

Comparisons of places where WOLT fails, or where it is weak, have potential to identify these other influences. A premise of WOLT is rationality, so irrationality would be one such influence; others might be local social or environmental peculiarities or pathologies. A naïve exception challenges the theory but it does not falsify. Extensive falsification criteria are set out in this thesis (§4.4, Table 4.2, §6.2.8).

The examples in this chapter are chosen for variety and for their display of interrelationships. Description of single types is limited, the intention being to reveal new connections rather than show instances of the real world fitting the theory. It is easy to present a colourful collection of academic and informal perceptions of the types for there are plenty of confirming real, theoretical, and fictional instances. Such confirmatory perceptions are persuasive and can be insightful but they are descriptive, rather than explanatory. Also, this aspect is not new, being common to GG theory. For the same reason there are no essays in this thesis on each type's characteristics. It is not that an extended discussion would be of no value—type characteristics are not always obvious or easy to work out and the type descriptions in §2.3 and §3.6 are fairly terse²—but the aim of this thesis is not so much to present a typology as to understand the relationships between types and between issues.

The chapter includes both scholarly and everyday applications. It shows what philosophers have overlooked about equality, improves on Kant and Kissinger, explains why liberalism can never succeed, suggests modifications to game theory experimentation, demonstrates the role of optimism and pessimism in organisational data gathering, exposes the incoherence of left-right political psychology scaling, sets out a general anthropology of religion, and advises on anti-smoking and anti-obesity campaigning. This chapter will not be accused of excessive humility but a broad range of particular and unqualified applications maximises opportunities for refutation.

5.2 Equality and status

5.2.1 Equality

Perhaps the most political word in the political lexicon is *equality*. Social animals understand it in their way and it is at the core of our perspective on the social world. In political science and law (e.g. Feldman 1999: 161; Miller 1976; Scruton 1983: 152; Verba and Orren 1985: 6) equality is seen as coming in three kinds: 1: equality of opportunity; 2: equality under the law and, what amounts to the same thing, equal treatment of equal people; 3: equality of outcome. Are those numbers correct for the WOLT types? There is really no choice: if the political science consensus is right, then that will be the only reasonable

² Appendix 10 has some type-allocation, exploring the theory's intersection with poetry, country and western music and proverbs, and showing off WOLT's deconstructive muscle in film and fiction.

allocation of the types. What of the 4s (who have, as usual, been overlooked)? The answer is easy for they know there is no equality (though they might have a pipe-dream of equal power). We now have all four social types allocated—as, indeed, they are allocated in the GG literature. If they are correct the question is: what would be the *issues* that give rise to these four types? We seek two issues placed on two of the three axes. A suggested placing is set out in Table 5.1.

Table 5.1 Equality YX

Y Equality of	Yes	1	В
opportunity	No	4	3
		No	Yes
		X Equ. of	outcome

In WOLT terms, let the Type 1 and 3 positions be designated as issues on the Y and X axes as per Table 5.1 (in accord with the relation between type and dimension discussed in §4.6) and let the Types 1, 3, and 4 be put in their appropriate places along with a "B" for "both". Before considering whether B = 2, note that putting the putative types 1 and 3 as axes is saying that 1-ism *rejects* equality of outcome and that 3-ism *rejects* equality of opportunity. These are indeed their positions, for 1s know that the former would mean there was no opportunity to get ahead, and the 3s know that equal opportunity can only lead to unequal outcomes (§2.3). The axes of Table 5.1 fit the 1s, 3s, and 4s well.

In Table 5.1, "Type B" is some social arrangement which simultaneously espouses, or some person who simultaneously believes in, both equality of opportunity *and* equality of outcome. Is this possible? If it is, can this Type B be Type 2? The literature on bureaucracy appears to make no such claim. Yet if it is not, it will be necessary to create another dimension (or two) to accommodate "equality of opportunity" and "equality of outcome" and Type B will have to be declared as a sixth type. This would be a disaster for the theory since equality, or its lack, is such a basic feature of social living.

The resolution of these two contradictory goals is by the 2s' patent method: ranking. All members of a given rank must receive the *same benefits* (that being very nearly what "rank" means) while at the same time they all have, in principle, the *same opportunity* to compete to rise in the hierarchy. Inequality is inherent to hierarchy (that being very nearly what hierarchy means) and the higher the rank the greater the opportunities and the outcomes, but within each rank equality of both outcome and opportunity obtains. So B = 2, equality of opportunity and of outcome fall on the Y and X axes, and the simultaneous realising of those

two kinds of equality may be achieved through equality under the rules, rules which stipulate equal treatment for equal people.³

Marvellous irony: hierarchy, the epitome of inequality, explicitly signals and recognises equality. Moreover, it is evident the two forms of equality are actually needed in order to form, or define, hierarchy. (And the 2s could argue, were they so inclined, that their pragmatism better realises both kinds of equality than the all-or-nothing Type 1 and Type 3 extremes: the 1s' equality of opportunity would lead to dog-eat-dog competition and unstable inequalities in outcome; on the other hand, the 3s' equality of outcome would destroy ambition.) Now this *equality under law* has been here proposed as a *type* but, like the other two equalities, it may be put on the +Z axis as an *issue*. By doing that, the 2s remain as the realisers of all three kinds of equality and the 4s join the 2s as equal under law. This accurately locates the 4s where Anatole France famously put them: "The law, in a majestic concern for equality, forbids both the rich and the poor to sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets and to steal bread."⁴ That quote shows why the 3s are -Z; the 1s are against equality under the law because it entrenches privilege and undermines competition.

The philosophy literature on equality is vast. Opportunity and outcome are seen as being in opposition and in attempts to have them both at once (without coercion, naturally) they are divided into sub-types and referenced to theories and academic opinions of justice and fairness, and red-herrings about class and race are dragged across the trail of argument.⁵ Discussion is invariably normative which would be the main reason no one knows that equality under law is a combination of the two; the notion that the only way both can obtain simultaneously is in a measured, regimented, ranked, hierarchical social structure does not fit

³ This discussion did not *deduce* 2-ism from equality; it just showed that it fits. Hierarchy may be deduced as follows. Premise: equal opportunity, when grasped, leads to unequal outcomes which provide unequal opportunities to the winners. Conclusion: to preserve equal opportunity, winners must withdraw from the social environment. For equality of outcome, all winners must win the same prize. After withdrawal, if both equalities are to continue for the winners, they would need to join a new set of equals for an equal chance at another common prize. To achieve all this will require obedience to rules which will require rule makers and rule enforcers—i.e. hierarchy. Thus hierarchy is the only way to achieve both equalities simultaneously showing, once again, that if X and Y are to be positive, Z has to be positive too. The common prize will be promotion in rank.

⁴ "La loi, dans un grand souci d'égalité, interdit aux riches comme aux pauvres de coucher sous les ponts, de mendier dans les rues et de voler du pain." Anatole France, *The Red Lily*, 1894. More recently, Gong Xiantian of Beijing University Law School said a new Chinese property rights law offered equal protection to "a rich man's car and a beggar man's stick."

<u>http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/12/international/asia/12china.html?r=1&th& emc=th&oref=slogin</u>. Adam Smith (who was no Type 3) was blunt in 1776: "Civil government, so far as it is instituted for the security of property, is in reality instituted for the defence of the rich against the poor, or of those who have some property against those who have none at all." (*Wealth of Nations*, Part II)

⁵ Joseph (1980) distinguishes the opportunity to acquire status from opportunity to develop one's talents, asserting that the latter does not rule out equality of outcome. He errs. Schaar (1981 [1967]: 198-9) had discussed this "talent opportunity" and concluded: "When the fat boy who finishes last in the footrace gets the prize for 'best try,' he has lost more than he has won." The equal opportunity to develop one's own talents would guarantee unequal outcomes.

into the normative environment. Equality under the law does not seem to be a philosophy topic (it is a politics and law topic) and it appears there exists no dispassionate academic research into, or discussion of, hierarchy. With the notable exception of GG theorists, it seems the only academics who notice hierarchy are those who object to it.⁶

This parsing of equality is another notch in WOLT's barrel. Every relational issue has to fit and if an issue of that importance did not fit then the theory would be seriously damaged. A theory must explain all its domain. A theory which fits some of the time and sometimes does not, is crippled since it is not possible to say, in a given circumstance, whether it applies.⁷ WOLT is a strict framework and the availability of respected older knowledge, such as this consensus on equality, means that the older knowledge either fits WOLT or it is in error—or else WOLT is in error.

Finding correspondence confirms WOLT and also confirms the conventional perspective. With any scientific theory, the more the evidence mounts that supports it, the more legitimate it will be to claim that any other analysis or categorisation—any other "knowledge"—which does not conform to it, is incorrect. In this case the standard three-way political categorisation—equality of opportunity, equality under the law, and equality of outcome—fell into place and an eminent observer's sardonic observation fitted too. WOLT confirmed the accepted political distinctions and added to them by revealing their interdependence and putting them into the context of myriad social concomitants on the three axes. The political philosophers have been talking about equality for a couple of hundred years but are not aware that equality under law is combination of the other two equalities.⁸ Nor is it known that any one of them, or all three, are socially viable, yet two of them without the third, are not. WOLT provides an incisive, all-inclusive umbrella theory of perceptions of equality.

⁶ Hierarchy literature may be sparse but literature on bureaucracy, the most familiar manifestation of hierarchy, is extensive and dates back to the invention of the word two and a half centuries ago (Albrow 1970: 16). Of course this literature (e.g. Beetham 1996: 69) recognises that welfare—equality—programs need bureaucracy to administer, but although much of the literature is overtly normative (e.g. Goodsell 1994; and see Albrow 1970 for an overview) it does not refer to the vast theorising on equality. Nor does it refer to the similarly vast theorising on justice and freedom—beyond the basic Hobbesian affirmation that the prerequisite for justice and freedom is order.

⁷ Examples of theories that fit sometimes are "realism" in international relations, and "rational choice" in political science and economics. WOLT tells us when they apply: both are Y axis issues.

⁸ Gunnar Grendstad (2000b: 218) lists all four types' attitudes to equality and considers equality to be "the central feature of grid-group theory's cultural biases... Each notion of equality is used to justify an issue (i.e., position, goal or policy)." Central feature? How does Grendstad know what the four types' positions are? By deduction from the types' *other* characteristics. With just grid and group (Z and X) dimensions, this "central feature" cannot be directly derived. That requires the Y dimension.

5.2.2 Status

A social concept related to equality is *status*, which is a term applied to individuals and to social structure. Status is not as clear as political science's triple conception of equality (Foladare 1969) but the distinction between *achieved* and *ascribed* status has been a touchstone in sociology since Linton pointed it out in 1936. Achieved status is the sort which one earns through work or study; ascribed status is assigned, e.g. by birth, and takes no note of innate differences.

Let us add a third kind: *equal* status and then let us put *achieved* and *equal* on the Y and X axes in the pattern of Table 5.1. The 4s have no status so they fall into place readily. Is "Type B" ("both") actually *ascribed* status? In a manner analogous to equality, 2-ist ranking performs the compromise: it combines achieved and equal status by ascribing status: individuals *achieve* a rank *ascribed* as *equal* to others of that rank. This ascribed *type* may also be placed as an *issue* on the Z axis where it will ascribe (low) status to the 4s who reject both achieved and equal status.

Linton's *achieved* and *ascribed* are normally seen as an opposition but this is evidently not accurate; ascribed status is a compromise combining equal with achieved, and though the importance of status is recognised it is not realised that the kinds of status systematically correspond to whole ways of life. WOLT also says that any one of the three kinds of status is viable alone but if two of them are present, then the third must also be present.

5.3 Kant's ends and Kissinger's upheavals

In *equality* and *status*, renowned dichotomies were shown above to fit into, and to be elaborated by, WOLT. Here are two more pairs of issues, Kant's *ends*, and Kissinger's *upheavals*, that fit the types when they are dichotomised and put onto the dimensions. We will see that an eighteenth century philosopher's observation on ends and a statesmanhistorian's perspective on violent upheaval are fundamentally connected. It may be that WOLT's ways of life could be *deduced* from these pairs, however here it is only shown that they *fit*, or perhaps merely that they *can* fit, as another demonstration of WOLT's effective-ness in exposing the order within the social world.

5.3.1 Kant's ends

A famous assertion:

In the realm of ends everything has either a price or dignity. Whatever has a price can be replaced by something else which is equivalent; whatever is above all price, and therefore has no equivalent, has dignity. (Kant 1949 [1785]: 182)

Let there be four preferences for *price* and *dignity*: 1: prefer price and reject dignity; 2: prefer both; 3: prefer dignity and reject price; 4: reject both. They are summarised in Table 5.2.

Table 5.2 Kant's ends (price / dignity) YX

Price	Yes	1	2
Y	No	4	3
		No	Yes
		Dignity	/ X

Do the types match as numbered? Surely. 1: In an ideal competitive market everything has a price and there is nothing that cannot be replaced by an equivalent. Constraints in the name of dignity will mask compulsion and privilege. 2: Rank and honour cannot be bought with money—that is corruption—but money or its equivalent is essential as the measure of rank. 3: Love of money is the root of all evil; putting a price on everything destroys relationships, wrecks social cohesion and gives some people power over others. 4: Such pretentious distinctions are irrelevant in a capricious world where you have to take what you can get when it's going.

So Kant's ends can deliver the WOLT types and the fit is quite neat. It confirms Kant and extends him. Are these just clever words? Would there be other ways of reasoning? Words are flexible and the test would be whether reasonable argument can be made to *contradict* this fit. The concurrence shown in Chapter 3 among dimensional typologists indicates the match is no coincidence. The sceptic should begin by seeking a relevant dichotomy which does *not* fall into place.

This brief analysis of Kant's ends demonstrates both the irreconcilable nature of the basic ethical positions and the slickness of the reconciling mechanism. Does *all* ethics boil down, in the end, to two opposed positions?

5.3.2 Kissinger's upheavals

According to Henry Kissinger (1999: 1075), "change is the law of life" and upheaval is symbolised by the *conqueror* and the *prophet*:

But the more abrupt the upheaval, the less reliance there can be on consensus. Force must replace a sense of obligation. Victory is prized over continuity; opponents are eradicated, not persuaded. The great symbols of this attitude are the conqueror and the prophet. The conqueror makes no secret of his design; his mission is to impose his will, though if his conquests last, he must sooner or later transform dominance into a sense of obligation. This is how empires achieve legitimacy.

The prophet's role is more subtle. Though his cause is based on proclaimed values, his claims are for this reason even more universal and insistent. Right-

eousness is the parent of fanaticism and intolerance. Opponents are extirpated often, it is alleged, for their own good. Reigns of terror become necessities, not aberrations. The symbol of such a period is the commissar who kills millions without love and without hatred in the pursuit of abstract duty. This is why crusades have often created as much havoc and suffering as conquest.

Let us assume four different attitudes to upheaval and change: 1: conqueror, reject prophet; 2: both; 3: prophet, reject conqueror; 4: neither. See Table 5.3.

Table 5.3 Kissinger's upheavals (conqueror / prophet) YX

Conqueror	Yes	1	2
Y	No	4	3
		No	Yes
		Prop	het X

Does it pan out as Table 5.3 asserts? 1: The conqueror is the quintessence of the competition winner. The prophet's values would only get in the way. (Free marketeers would not shy from *conquer* to describe a market *victory*.) 2: If the conquest is to endure, obligation has to replace dominance.⁹ Obligation relies on values. The replacement is partial as conqueror strength must be retained for occasions when devotion to prophet values wavers. 3: Values are eternal and the might-is-right conqueror is proof of the menace of power differentials. 4: Attempts to conquer or to espouse values are foolish and pointless but ingratiation with the powerful is always sensible. This especially applies in dangerous times of upheaval, for with the conqueror there will be booty; with the prophet the revolution will bring a perfect society (as long as the politically unsound are extirpated).

So Kissinger's terms will fit on the Y and X axes and we see that his conqueror who transforms dominance into obligation is a separate type who is combining some aspects of both his types—and of course, WOLT adds the fourth type Kissinger is unaware of.

From the remarks to this fourth type we might infer that society is an ongoing struggle between the 1s, 2s and 3s for the allegiance of the 4s. If the three pro-active types are competing for the 4s, what do the 2s offer them that the 1s and 3s do not? Answer: love. At least the bottom of the 2-ist hierarchy offers the 4s acceptance and some comfort of belonging, of extended family, of secure social connectedness, and of predictability. The 1s appeal to the 4s' self-interest and the 3s try to awaken their consciousness, both of them insisting that the 4s relinquish fourdom. The 2s accept the 4s as 4s.

* * *

⁹ Kissinger's transformation of Type 1 conquest into Type 2 legitimacy is widely known in political science as Mancur Olson's (1993: 567) image of a shift from a 'roving bandit' of indiscriminate theft to "a 'stationary bandit' who rationalizes theft in the form of taxes."

It is doubtful that without the WOLT structure any connection between these two observers' perceptions would ever be noticed. With WOLT, it is a matter of saying, "If K is right then his dichotomy should fit into WOLT," and then of figuring out how—or else of showing he is wrong. In addition to the commonalities, the fitting to the types provides insights into each perspective and it also connects them to all those other issues, such as an economist's notion of ephemeral and personal interactions (Bowles, §3.2.1), a management theorist's analysis of economic exchange (Ouchi, §3.2.4), an anthropologist's conception of Indian sociology (Marriott, §3.2.2) and, of course, another anthropologist's conception of how people, from tribal Africa to urban America, structure their cosmologies (Douglas, §3.2.3). Unawares, these disparate theorists are complying with an underlying law. Although they are not by any means talking about the same thing, their propositions fall within a common cognitive framework. Given the range of matters considered in the previous chapters and the list of issues in Table 4.2, it would seem we are in a position to suspect that a theory which conflicts with WOLT, is misguided. For example, liberalism.

5.4 Liberalism is incoherent

Perhaps liberalism had its beginnings in Jewish monotheism in the second millennium BC, Judaism being less dependent upon hierarchy's compulsion for maintaining social order and cohesion than the polytheisms around them, and more reliant on 3-ist moral suasion. Then two thousand years ago, the story goes, the charismatic leader of a small group of 3s strode into the temple of the 2s and threw over the trading tables of the 1s. The 4s, he declared, shall inherit the earth. It is a tableau of antagonism which became familiar in the West during the last 150 years: the 1s and 2s in cahoots and the 3s outraged at their exploitation of the 4s. In Europe, for one and half millennia, the 1s and 3s were only a muted presence; there was trade and there were institutions concerned with poverty and alms, but 2-ism was dominant, with the church paying lip-service to Christian 3-ism while priesthood and nobility took some income from commerce, supported some charity, and exercised life and death sway over common people.

Liberalism as we know it began in the seventeenth century as a 1-ist (freedom and rights) reaction to stifling 2-ism. In 1690, when God and king ruled a hierarchical world, John Locke published his *Second Treatise on Government* (power should be divided; government should ensure citizens' liberty and property) which became an instruction manual for the US founding fathers a century later. After Adam Smith's very 1-ist *Wealth of Nations* (the government should not interfere in the free market) in 1776, liberals began to perceive wealth

inequality, and poverty, as a lack of freedom and a lack of rights. The tension political theorists refer to today as between *freedom* and *equality* had come to the notice of thinkers.¹⁰

Liberals would have individuals free but not at the cost of others' freedom or rights, so they try to build a just bridge from 1-ist liberty to 3-ist fairness. They would do it without going near 2-ism, for 2-ism (hierarchy and rules) is precisely what liberals object to. The liberal intellectual project can never succeed since it is an attempt to be positive on the X and Y axes and negative on Z, which is incoherent. There is an impressive record of failure. An ancient precursor which appears in many cultures was "Do unto others as you would have them do unto you." Immanuel Kant expressed his *categorical imperative* (your action is appropriate if it could become a universal rule) around 1785, and Jeremy Bentham promoted *utilitarianism* (the greatest good for the greatest number) around 1800. JS Mill's *harm principle* (do as you wish as long as you don't harm others) of the mid 19th century was another. They have intractable logical and practical problems. John Rawls made a new attempt with his somewhat 3-ist *Theory of Justice* in 1971 (do as you wish as long as the worst-off get some benefit) and in 1974 Robert Nozick published his quite 1-ist *Anarchy, State and Utopia* (no one's rights may be interfered with) trying to drag the concept back towards Locke.¹¹

The above analysis is simplistic, and an overstatement. Of course liberal philosophers are aware of the coercive nature of the state and, though they see it as a necessity whose role is to be minimised, the liberal's explicit project is to design rules to effect some compromise between X and Y. The problem is that there exists no logical compromise other than Type 2 hierarchy—and hierarchy is liberal anathema.¹² The liberal philosopher is essentially a Type 1 or Type 3 who sees some principle as good (such as those in parenthesis

¹⁰ That is, between *negative* freedom and equality of *outcome*.

¹¹ The USA can be regarded as a practical social experiment attempting X and Y without Z:

The widespread belief among those who theorized about Jacksonian democracy in his time... was that equality of opportunity, meticulously followed would lead to an approximation of equality of result... everything artificial and unnatural, everything government imposed on man in his free state, such as charters, franchises, banks, and other monopolies, became anathema. It is this belief—not in equality undefined nor in just one kind of equality but in *mutual reinforcement of opportunity and result*—that I think made the United States truly exceptional. Another way to describe U.S. exceptionalism is to say that liberty (i.e., individualism) is held to be compatible with equality (egalitarianism). (Wildavsky 1987a: 19, italics original. Individualism and egalitarianism refer to GG theory Types 1 and 3.)

So Jacksonian democracy attempted to reconcile equality of opportunity (Y) with equality of result (X) by deliberately *avoiding* government (Z).

Wildavsky is enthusiastic about GG theory yet his own political discernment transcends it. Here his equality of result is a *group* (X) preoccupation and his government imposition is a *grid* (Z) concern but whence comes his "equality of opportunity"? Not from GG theory, which has no place for it.

¹² Georg Simmel for example: "Only through the voluntary act of renunciation expressed in [the concept of *fraternité*]... would it be possible to prevent *liberté* from being accompanied by the total opposite of *egalité*." (Quoted by J Friedman 1993: 151) In WOLT terms Simmel is saying, "Only voluntary 2-ism can prevent 1-ism from destroying 3-ism." But 2-ism is not voluntary.

in the previous paragraph) and reluctantly recognises a need for a state to enforce rules needed to give effect to the principle. For example, the liberal plan may include an explicit proposal to reconcile equality of outcome and equality of opportunity; few liberals would concede that this can only be effected with hierarchy.

The debate shows how tenacious the beliefs in 1-ism and 3-ism are and how irreconcilable these two worldviews are. Though no one will ever have fire in the belly over liberalism, its attempt to maximise human potential is esteemed and liberal theorising is an academic industry generating millions of words. In practice, though, it is the 2s, positive on all three axes and more or less theory-free,¹³ who mediate between the 1s and the 3s—and run the world.

The decline of 2-ism over the last two centuries has made the confrontation between 1-ism and 3-ism into the grand struggle within Western society. It is the culture war which has become prominent in recent years, and is possibly still coming to a head. There will be no winner. The only way to win is to keep a balance. Which is liberalism. Which does not make logical sense. So the balance must be kept by the 2s. Which is illiberal.¹⁴

5.5 Economics and game theory

5.5.1 Preferences

Economics takes preferences as given. People will strive to realise their preferences but what those preferences—often called 'tastes'—are is no business of economics. In economics and in game theory people are treated, basic demographics aside, as if they are all the same: "homo anonymous" as Boone (1999: 343) terms it. If that is also homo economicus, as it seems it usually is, then it is an assumption that all people are 1s. Many have pointed out the inadequacies of self interest as an explanation. Thomas Macaulay was

¹³ There is hardly any 2-ist theorising. 2-ism is about power and because the 2-ist position is not easy to defend logically, talk undermines power. Thus 2s eschew theorising. There are only a few Type 2 theorists, e.g., Edmund Burke, G K Chesterton, Michael Oakeshott, Russell Kirk, E Digby Baltzell, Roger Scruton. They tend to avoid discussing access to material resources, which is of vital concern to liberalism. Resource access is the central concern of economics. Economists are all liberals and can be readily classified according to their 1-ist (e.g., Smith, Hayek, Friedman) or 3-ist (e.g., Marx, Keynes, Galbraith) leaning. Unless Keynes be judged a Type 2 (as is arguable) there have been no Type 2 economists since the *Methodenstreit* of the 1890s.

¹⁴ Protestant theologian, Reinhold Niebuhr:

All social co-operation on a larger scale than the most intimate social group requires a measure of coercion. While no state can maintain its unity purely by coercion neither can it preserve itself without coercion... Divergence of interest, based upon geographic and functional differences within a society, is bound to create different social philosophies and political attitudes which goodwill and intelligence may partly, but never completely, harmonise. Ultimately, unity within an organised social group, or within a federation of such groups, is created by the ability of a dominant group to impose its will. (Niebuhr 2002 [1932]: 3-4)

dissatisfied with it in 1852 (Lockhart 2001b: 11). Economists are aware that tastes guide preferences but this is vacuous as long as it is not stated which taste guides which preference:

For economists to rest a large part of their theory of choice on differences in tastes is disturbing since they admittedly have no useful theory of the formation of tastes, nor can they rely on a well-developed theory of tastes from any other discipline in the social sciences, since none exists. (Becker 1976: 133)

So the problem is to have a theory of tastes. In 1977 a famous economics paper by Stigler and Becker argued that there is no accounting for tastes because they involve "endless degrees of freedom," are ad hoc, and explain everything and nothing. Overlooked then and now in this "tastes" debate are Hirschmann's (1970) *exit, voice* and *loyalty* which are three tastes explicitly placed in an economic context. Viewed as personal predilections, they are respectively Y, X and 4-ism (see §4.5) and at that time were already well-known.

Becker said in his 1992 Nobel lecture that "The rational choice model provides the most promising basis presently available for a unified approach to the analysis of the social world by scholars from the social sciences."¹⁵ The essential idea of "rational" is the same as WOLT's: choices will be coherent, i.e. fit together in a rational manner. But where rational choice assumes rationality and the maximising of "utility", WOLT assumes rationality and sociality. As game theorist Yanis Varoufakis (2008: 1271) says, "The explanatory traffic is singularly one-way: from individual action to social and organizational structure." Rational choice is methodologically individual, as WOLT is, but it is all Y axis with no X or Z. Thus it is also individualistic in that "maximising utility" is about individual returns (often of money) which is the first priority only for 1s. On this basis rational choice models an unrealistic society saturated with the 1-ist view of human nature:

It is best not to think of rational choice theory as explanatory theory... The predictions generally involve disorder; underprovision of public goods, universal nonvoting, manipulation of legislative processes, arbitrariness and instability in collective choice, domination of policy making by well-organized minorities, rent-seeking by office-holders, Pareto suboptimality in public policy, and so forth... (Dryzek 2003: 17)

Apparently, a rational society will be a grasping, Hobbesian free-for-all. To the extent society is not like this, it will be because there are three other rationalities competing with 1-ism. Hobbes's solution was a strong Z axis; as a hard-headed Type 1 he could not imagine the cooperative X but WOLT says they will both be needed. Taking rational choice's same approach of rationality but allowing these X and Z axes a role—i.e. allowing people to make social choices other than maximising personal utility—logically yields three other hypothetical societies quite different from the "rational choice" one. They are just as rational

¹⁵ <u>http://home.uchicago.edu/~gbecker/Nobel/nobellecture.pdf</u> accessed July 2008.
(and just as unrealistic). WOLT logically depends on individuals' having views about community. It depends, in its methodological individualism, on individuals having a view of relations to other individuals, on their talking to each other (§2.4, §6.4.2), on their seeking, in their attitudes and behaviours, to make sense to others, and on their assuming that others' attitudes and conduct also generally make sense. 1-ism *is* a way of making sense of social relations—but there are three other ways too.

Kanazawa (2001: 1131) takes on Stigler and Becker (1977) directly, asking:

Why do so many players in Prisoner's Dilemma games make the irrational choice to cooperate? Why do people participate in collective action? Why do people sometimes behave "irrationally" by acting on their emotions? Why does rational choice theory appear to be more applicable to men than to women?

And:

A theory of revealed preferences, which is often used in microeconomics, only measures individuals' preferences empirically but does not explain where they come from or why the actors have them. (1133)

Kanazawa suggests that evolutionary psychology (EP) will help and offers some answers to the questions he poses. They are not trivial answers but ultimately EP is unsatisfying. Evolution, i.e. natural selection through differential reproduction, may explain why rational choice would apply more to men than women but that is not explaining why responses should vary between men. Sex accounts for a little of tastes but only a little.¹⁶ WOLT would say that there will be five predictable fundamental patterns of experimental response and that Type 1s will conform better to rational choice expectations than other types (which, among other things, will mean that more men than women will conform—see Table 4.4). People come in various types and as long as game theorists go on effectively assuming that everyone is a Type 1 making a personal benefit calculation, they will be as mystified as doctors who attempted blood transfusion before blood types were understood. Irrespective of that, the usefulness of EP as a theory of tastes is limited for it is not immediately germane. It is too deep an explanation; for example, WOLT is not affected by the extent to which the causes of its three dimensions and five types are genetic or social.¹⁷ If, say, a stable society is achieved through some optimal proportions of the five types then whether the forces tending to maintain this optimum are social or genetic is a separate question.

Contra Stigler and Becker (1977), WOLT says tastes are not ad hoc; it says there are three, not endless, degrees of freedom which yield just five preference sets. WOLT would

¹⁶ One thing evolutionary psychology can explain but WOLT cannot: emotions including romantic love.

¹⁷ It seems political attitudes are about 50% inherited (Alford et al. 2005; Bouchard and McGue 2003).

explain some of the "irrationality" found in experiments as deviations from the standard homo economicus (Type 1) model. Wildavsky (1994: 148), referring to GG theory, says of preferences that for 1s it is more of whatever is going; for 2s, respect and respect for their institution, for 3s, "excoriating the established cultures of individualism and hierarchy" which is jaundiced; and for 4s: keeping out of the way. We could improve on that: 1s commit to material things and self-promotion; 2s commit to their organisation and its aims (self-effacing); 3s commit to people and utopian human relations (self-denying); 4s to keeping their heads down (self-preservation); and 5s to the infinite nothingness (self-transcendence). In short, WOLT provides a theory which amounts to a theory of tastes which would give some predictive power.

Varoufakis (2008: 1271) says game theory has three spheres of success: evolutionary theory, the design of large-scale auctions, and some laboratory experiments. The first two are distinctly competitive, 1-ist environments, and the third usually is as well. Here are a few specific suggestions for extending economics and game theory into the environments of the other types. *Item:* WOLT would predict Type 1 clients will be more litigious which opens up possibilities for differential pricing and premiums. Item: The 4s' concern for social integration should mean that they particularly find the mobile telephone a boon. The 4-ist preference pattern should be of interest to phone service providers (as it presumably is to purveyors of cigarettes and hamburgers). *Item:* Game theorists (who are likely personally to be of 1-ist orientation) expect that in one-shot anonymous (double-blind) dictator and ultimatum games where reputation building is not possible, subjects will be less generous. WOLT would say that Type 3s' generosity will be less affected by anonymity. *Item:* In the anonymous ultimatum game WOLT would predict: that 1s would tend to make small offers and accept relatively small offers ("rational choice"); that 3s would tend to offer equal shares and decline small offers as a form of "voice"; and that 4s, if they can be lured into the experimenter's orbit, would accept low offers. 2s' behaviour should be rank dependent hence predictable where the subject feels a need to preserve status and/or knows the other's status.

5.5.2 Personality and taste

Times may be changing. Some economists seem to be seeking ways to fill the gap in their explanation. One prospect for a theory of tastes is personality research.

Swope et al (2008: 998) ran tests with "a dictator game, an ultimatum game, a trust game, or a prisoner's dilemma game. We find limited support for the importance of personality type for explaining subjects' decisions."

Caplan (2003: 398) is more optimistic. "An enormous literature within economics examines the determinants of labor earnings, but almost never considers personality as a

possible independent variable." He argues that personality types are systematic and stable and correspond empirically to tastes, therefore tastes vary systematically, therefore they, via personality, would be helpful for explaining behaviour. Unfortunately he has only one solid example: "conscientiousness invariably predicts better job performance" (398). *Conscientiousness* is one of the "Big Five" personality types. But then he casts doubt on its usefulness by suggesting that education is a proxy for it—which, of course, employers already take note of. He mentions four other specific trait suggestions (399) but his cited authorities are all commercial Myers Briggs¹⁸ publications.

In 1991 Barrick and Mount published a meta-analysis of 117 studies of personality for career and occupation purposes. The studies included 162 samples ranging in size from 13 to 1401, yielding a total sample of 23,994. Where necessary the various personality measures were converted to Big Five measures by an expert panel. Their findings were:

Conscientiousness predicts performance in all their occupational groups (professionals, police, managers, sales, and skilled or semi-skilled), and in three areas: job proficiency, training proficiency, and personnel data (salary, turnover, status change, tenure). *Extraversion* was a valid predictor for 2 occupations, managers and sales, in all three areas. *Openness to Experience* and *Extraversion* were predictors of training proficiency. Correlations were around 0.2 for conscientiousness and rather less for the others. The authors think it "not surprising that the overall validity of personality measures has been found to be relatively low." (22) If personality types are systematic and stable, they would perhaps help explain preferences, however after quite a lot of research it does not look as if trait personality will ever be a significant practical predictor of occupational behaviour. A root problem is that personality is entirely empirical; there is no theoretical basis for it (§6.5) and no one knows why (alleged) personality types exist.

Game theory experimentation in effect assumes subjects are Type 1 by setting up individualistic relations and incentives. WOLT says different people relate in different ways: only the 1s engage with individuals in reciprocal negotiations, issue by issue as per the usual game experiment; 2s cooperate with their superiors and others in their organisation; 3s cooperate with the select few who seek the great goal; 4s with whomever they must; and 5s with no one. Game theory in effect does not recognise the 2s, 3s, 4s, or 5s. This is like testing gravity by dropping objects from the Tower of Pisa and not noting whether they are cannon-balls, pillows or thistledown. The game theorist will recognise a subject's sex, age, income, education and race but beyond those perceived differences, all people are the same. If one only takes black and white portraits one will never imagine eyes of blue, brown and green. To load colour film, the experimental approach would need to classify subjects

¹⁸ The Myers Briggs Type Indicator is widely used in personnel management (§6.5.2).

according to WOLT type (using a test such as in Chapter 7) and so predict and note behaviour in the experimental game. Even then, however, an experiment restricted to what is an essentially non-relational Type 1 environment of individual dealing for personal monetary reward would not be as informative as an experiment which offered rewards of comradeship, or which promoted harmony, or helped protect the environment, or strengthened status, or granted superior insight. Strange as it may seem to game theorists, some *rational* subjects would find these more attractive than money. How an experimental game could offer such rewards is another question.

In a wide-ranging paper Boone et al (1999) seek a theory of tastes via a certain concept of personality. They note arguments that economic agents (i.e. people) differ as to their inclination toward *cooperation* and with WOLT as our datum we can watch them grope in the dark as they

investigate the effect of personality on competitive versus cooperative behavior in five Prisoner's Dilemma games. Specifically, the paper deals with four personality traits: locus of control, self-monitoring, type-A behavior and sensation seeking. (1999: 346)

Their "locus of control" refers to contrasting types they call "externals" and "internals". Their description of them fits WOLT 4s and non-4s quite well:¹⁹

Those who believe in external control (i.e., externals) see themselves as relatively passive agents and believe that the events in their lives are due to uncontrollable forces. Externals consider what they want to achieve as dependent upon luck, chance and powerful persons or institutions. They think that the probability of being able to control their lives by their own actions and efforts is low. Conversely, those who believe in internal control (i.e., internals) see themselves as active agents, feel that they are masters of their fates and trust in their capacity to influence their environment. Internals believe that they control the events in their lives by effort and skill...

Internals, who believe in their own control over events, are prepared to adopt a more aggressive style of play if they think that aggressiveness or competitiveness will pay off. (Boone et al. 1999: 348)

They cite other research showing the externals (4s) to be more "cooperative" but their own testing found the opposite. They quote research showing that the internals (i.e. non-4s) are both more cooperative *and* more competitive. Since these include 1s, 2s, and 3s, that seems correct. They do not notice that since the 4s do not have control, competition and cooperation are logically irrelevant and that 4s will cooperate if compelled, otherwise they will take up the mistrustful, short term advantage, which in a prisoner's dilemma is likely to be "defect".

¹⁹ Their other three personality traits, like much of personality theory, do not seem to be relational issues hence not within the WOLT domain—see §6.5.

They speculate that the internals may be more astute than 4s (362) and they find internals do more "sensation-seeking" which is supposed to lead to a greater readiness (than 4s) to take risks. But WOLT says that will depend on whether these non-4s happen to be 1s or 3s and whether the risk is material or social. They note that the internals will tend to trust verbal or written words and promises. They are right: WOLT says the 1s will want to see the contract (and review obligations in the light of future dealing, i.e., standard rational choice behaviour); the 2s will want to assess their interlocutor for standing and rectitude; and the 3s already know people are basically trustworthy.

Boone et al's reflective theory-free method—inventing concepts, taking meanings from English words, making up hypotheses from the literature—yield empirical findings contradicting Stigler and Becker's 1977 "endless degrees of freedom" and essentially agree-ing with WOLT: a clear difference in behaviour between their externals (4s) and the rest.

Taken together, our findings clearly show that individuals behave strikingly differently although confronted with exactly the same (market) situation. It follows that economic (game) theory, which starts from the untenable assumption of the homo anonymous, misses an important part of the picture. (Boone et al. 1999: 367)

In general terms they are insisting that people come in different kinds; they happen to have hit upon the 4s as a distinct type and find some confirmation. It seems so basic: people do have different blood groups; there are blondes, brunettes and redheads. The fruitless thrashing around with personality theories demonstrates that at least some game theorists recognise that a theory of tastes has to be built on a "type" approach. Normally, personality is internal and non-social but Boone et al saw a *relational* type and it was fruitful. That is what WOLT does: it classifies persons in terms of their eye for their relations with others, persons who are grounded in values and social context. For experimentation with *cooperation* or *competition* WOLT can supply specific lists of values and social contexts. Game theory would be enriched if these were taken advantage of.

5.6 Optimism and pessimism; a corporate culture example

5.6.1 Optimism-pessimism reflection

The WOLT Y axis contains a view of *mother nature benign (optimistic)* and its X axis has *mother nature fragile (pessimistic)*. Views of human nature are reversed: Y sees *human nature bad (pessimistic)* and X sees *human nature good (optimistic)* (§2.3, Table 4.2). Several issues which may apply both to the material and social worlds, i.e., to things and to people, are reflected in this optimistic-pessimistic mirror. On the Y axis, the 1s will want precautionary measures taken in areas where human interaction is involved; they will want to restrict state power and have legal contracts spelling out people's obligations; they are not too

worried about the physical environment outside of matters concerning freedom to negotiate their own lives. The 3s, who are not worried about human nature, will tend to trust people, including the state, to do the right thing socially but will want precautionary measures taken to protect the defenceless, finite, fragile material world.

American political scientist and conservative columnist Thomas Sowell has written much on social optimism and pessimism. In the following his *constrained* and *unconstrained* may be taken as Y and X (or Types 1 and 3 though his *constrained* includes some 2-ism):

While believers in the unconstrained [i.e. X, 3-ist] vision seek the special causes of war, poverty, and crime, believers in the constrained [Y, 1-ist] vision seek the special causes of peace, wealth, or a law-abiding society. In the unconstrained vision, there are no intractable reasons for social evils and therefore no reason why they cannot be solved, with sufficient moral commitment. But in the constrained vision, whatever artifices or strategies restrain or ameliorate inherent human evils will themselves have costs, some in the form of other social ills created by these civilizing institutions, so that all that is possible is a prudent trade-off. (Sowell 2002: 24)

Some issues reflecting the materially optimistic and socially pessimistic Y axis and the socially optimistic and materially pessimistic X axis are listed in Table 5.4. Clearly, it is not just the environment where the 1s tend to be risk-happy. The 3s are similarly inclined to adventurism but in the social area. This material-relational opposition does not seem to have been noticed in the risk literature. Risk is probably the biggest single application of GG theory but there too, since the Y axis is lacking, this distinction is unrecognised. The last item of Table 5.4, *being* and *becoming*, is perhaps whimsical. *Distrust* and *trust* could also be entered into the table except that the material world is not usually thought of as trustworthy or untrustworthy.

Table 5.4	Pessimism	and optimism	: material XY	, social YX
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Pessimism X (3) Y (1)	$\leftarrow \text{ Nature / things / ideas} \rightarrow \\\leftarrow \text{ Hum nat / people / society} \rightarrow$	Optimism Y (1) X (3)	
pro-active, prevent problems		reactive, solve problems	
avoid risk, pre	cautionary	invite risk, seek opportunity	
seek stability		seek change	
seek just process		seek just outcome	
justify by proper process		end justifies means	
non-instrumentalist		instrumentalist	
procedural rati	onality	substantive rationality	
becoming (Parmenides)		being (Heraclitus)	

WOLT is telling us that the question, "Do you believe the end justifies the means?" cannot be meaningfully asked or answered unless the context—things or people—is clear.

(And then, perhaps, this very blunt question need not be asked directly if the belief would be better inferred from answers concerning other issues.) What makes these particular issues subject to this "reflection"? Presumably it applies only to XY issues²⁰ and presumably it applies to all issues on XY which *can* refer to both material and social realms.

Perhaps the most central of these overlapping items is the distinction between just process and just outcome. It is not that either the 1s or the 3s would openly deny the other, but rather that they see the other necessarily achieved through their own axis.

In the **social world** of rewards and punishments the 1s, who prefer just process, will verbally agree that a just outcome is very important but insist the only way for an outcome to be just is if people are rewarded according to their efforts. If effort (and skill) is not the basis of resource distribution the outcome—whatever it might be—cannot possibly be a just one. Hence 1s favour equal opportunity: if the game is rigged in someone's favour, the outcome will be, ipso facto, unjust. The 3s, on the other hand, would verbally agree that just processes of social reward are very important but insist that the only way to judge whether the process was just is to consider the outcomes. They would point to systemic wealth inequalities as indicating unjust process, along with systemic biases in crime and incarceration figures as showing that some people do not get a fair chance.

If either party dominates the argument the consequences can be grim. When social process is merely instrumental, 3-ist attention to goal turns to zealotry and the utopianism may lead to the prophet's extirpation that Kissinger talks about above (§5.3.2). Examples are the Jacobin terror, "breaking the back of the peasants" in 1932, Jonestown, the Cambodian killing fields. The alternative extreme, where 1-ist bias causes social goals to be lost sight of, may lead to Kissinger's conqueror, to banditry and warlordism, and a Hobbesian war of all against all, examples being the Warring States, some former Soviet countries in the 1990s and present-day Congo and Somalia. Some GG theorists (e.g., Wildavsky 1987a: 7) insist that a balance of types is needed for a healthy society; evidently they are right—though the reasons for this only become clear because WOLT adds the Y axis. As we know, the balance between 1s and 3s is maintained through 2-ism but if the 2s take things to extremes (in effect using coercion to aggrandise both process and outcome), 1-ism and 3-ism will be suppressed and fascism will ensue.²¹

In the sphere of the **material world** the reverse picture of process and outcome obtains. Historically it has not been as dramatic but is now of ever-escalating salience. The

 $^{^{20}}$ For example, no such reflection applies to attitudes toward categorisation (§4.9.2): the 2s like, and the 3s abhor, categorisation in both material *and* social realms.

²¹ Wildavsky (1987b: 293): "The solution to the hierarchy problem [of 'rigidity and exploitation'] therefore, is to surround it with sufficient force of other cultures to mitigate its excesses without depriving it of the ability to maintain order."

3s want proper process in environmental matters and the 1s agree in principle but point out that results are what count and that rising living standards are brought about by economic development. This disagreement was the central theme of Douglas and Wildavsky's 1982 *Risk and Culture* which was one of the earliest applications of GG theory and perhaps the first time the 1-3 division on environmental issues had been academically recognised. The notion that views on risk are politically motivated has since become widely appreciated. In particular, the environment argument has sharpened in recent years and Jacques et al (2008) report that English language books disputing global warming are 92% from "conservative think tanks" and that 90% of conservative think tanks "espouse environmental scepticism." The general polarisation may be appreciated by an internet search of the Club of Rome's 1972 *Limits to Growth*. This old report is probably more stridently debated today than when it was printed, the disparity in the two sides' assessments (it is obviously wrong; it is obviously right) remarkable in view of its numerical and scientific content and the absence of overtly political material.

The notion of rationality, a word almost appropriated by public choice theory, is related. The two kinds in Table 5.4 are from Herbert Simon (1985: 294). He distinguishes "procedural" and "substantive" rationalities, asserting that "we can judge a person to be rational who uses a reasonable process for choosing; or, alternatively, we can judge a person to be rational who arrives at a reasonable choice." He thinks the procedural rationality characterises cognitive psychology, and that substantive rationality (i.e. outcome) comes from economics (293). This is an assessment which would have to be with respect to the material world only. Simon is famous for pointing out that rationality is bounded, i.e. limited by the actor's capacities and knowledge:

...the key premises in any theory that purports to explain the real phenomena of politics... [includes] the ways in which people characterize the choice situations that face them. These goals and characterizations do not rest on immutable first principles but are functions of time and place that can only be ascertained by empirical inquiry. (Simon 1985: 301)

WOLT certainly concurs with the first sentence but the last one is completely wrong: firstly because empirical inquiry needs to be guided by theory²² and secondly because WOLT offers immutable principles. They are so immutable they do not depend on time or place, or even specifically upon being human. The "principles" by which "people characterize the choice situations that face them" are readily enunciated. Socially, 3s want a rational *outcome* (egalitarian)—but 1s say there is no such thing and that attempting it will involve oppressive

²² As philosophers from Comte (1896 [1853]: Vol 1: 29) to Popper (1983 [1956]: xxxiii) remind us, it is actually not possible to make observations without theory, their point being that implicit, unrecognised theory is influencing the collection of data in unknown ways.

process. 1s want a rational social *process* to make the fight for fame and fortune fair—but 3s say this will lead to irrational outcomes of disharmony and inequity. Materially, 3s want rational *process* of treating the material world properly to preserve the environment—but 1s say this will lead to the irrational outcome of loss of wealth. 1s want a rational material *outcome* (maximum wealth)—but 3s say this leads to irrational process of environmental destruction.

As an aside, these considerations, and the issues listed in Table 5.4, show the advantage, or necessity, of reasoning in terms of subjective views, rather than objective social structure. The objective sociologist might be able to work up some criteria to assess a society or organisation as, say, cooperative or hierarchical, but what observer would have the courage to judge a subset of society as one that promotes just process and discounts just outcome in the material sphere yet holds the reverse positions with respect to social arrangements? What would there be to judge by? What are objective criteria for rationality? Surely, contra Simon, there are none. Nor would there be objective criteria which could reveal in the social structure a partiality to stability or change in either of the material or social realms. From subjectivity (and WOLT) these distinctions follow naturally.

5.6.2 Corporate culture: employee attitudes

The optimism-pessimism manifest in individuals' views, and reflected on the X and Y axes, has practical potential to guide data gathering and observation. Consider a study of employee attitudes in ten corporations in Denmark and Holland by Hofstede and Hofstede (2005: 292) where factor analysis of the data showed six factors, the first two of which the authors called:

Factor 1. Process oriented versus results oriented

Factor 2. Employee oriented versus job oriented

Assuming that "oriented" means something like "prefer" or "attach higher priority to," each of these may be split into two dimensions and allocated to WOLT axes and types.

Dealing first with the simpler **Factor 2**, employee versus job, the plausible pattern of WOLT type preferences is as shown in Table 5.5. It has the 1s oriented to the job, the 2s oriented to both job and employee, doing their usual pragmatic balancing act, the 3s oriented to the employee, and the 4s, who have better things to worry about, to neither. These allocations are reasonable, given what we know of the types.

Table 5.5 Job oriented and employee oriented YX

Job oriented	Yes	1	2	
Y	No	4	3	
		No	Yes	
	Empl	oyee	oriented	X

Although the meaning of the factor is not absolutely clear (the authors' labels reflect their judgement of the nature of the empirical factors that came out of their computer analysis), simply constructing the two dimensional Table 5.5 adds subtlety and complexity. The authors do discuss the question of whether to apply one dimension or two in relation to other matters (e.g. 82, 125), saying that it concerns the level of analysis, that whereas an individual could hold both views or neither (as the 2s and 4s do in this matter) if, overall for the group, one is high and the other is low, they put it into one dimension because generally they find a given corporation will tend to be either employee or job oriented. This itself is reasonable since their purpose is not to find fine distinctions but rather the contrary: to discover integrating and simplifying classifications. Parsimony is desirable and the value of WOLT does not lie in the complication of doubling the number of types; the value lies in the *context* in which it places the factored people, i.e., in the vast range of concomitant attitudes WOLT predicts. Type 1s are not just some people who happen to be "job-oriented"; they are much, much more. Saving some people are "employee oriented" is merely a fact; identifying them as Type 3s yields understanding of it. By applying WOLT, the results are not just isolated *findings*; instead empirical facts become located in an overarching theoretic structure predicting other empirical phenomena-which may then be looked for.

The Hofstedes' **Factor 1**, process versus results, is more complex because it depends on whether the issue concerns *things* or *people*. In this corporate context an example of *things* might be the production of widgets, and an example of *people*, the operation of a pension scheme. The two sets of attitudes to these, both in the XY plane, are the reverse of each other from the point of view of the 1s and 3s, as shown in Table 5.6.

Table 5.6 Results-oriented or process-oriented: things YX, people XY

(a) <u>Things</u>				(b)	People	<u>e</u>		
Results	Yes	1	2	Process	Yes	1	2	
oriented Y	No	4	3	oriented Y	No	4	3	
		No	Yes			No	Yes	
	Pro	ocess	oriented X		F	Results	oriented	X b

For the widgets, the 1s want to judge on quality and quantity of *output*—ultimately they will judge on profit—whereas the 3s will want to know about waste disposal and noise

levels which are *process* concerns. Table 5.6(a) applies. For the pension scheme, the 1s will want payouts to reflect employee contributions which is a *process* concern, whereas the 3s will be concerned about the *results*, namely whether the payouts are adequate for everyone. Table 5.6(b) applies. Which do the Hofstedes mean when they find a single dimension, "results" versus "process"? Unless their data collection respected the things/people distinction, they will not be able to say, and in repeat surveys their factors for results and process will either be mysteriously erratic or be biased.

If this Factor 1 were to distinguish people from things, it would give dimensions that would *predict* Factor 2 for, as the Tables above show, they are the same dimensions. Even if a single dimension from 1s to 3s is assumed this should still show up as the same for both factors, since the 2s' and 4s' positions never shift.

The two tables, 5.6(a) and 5.6(b), show that the problem with the supposed dimension *results v. process* is that it ignores the division between 1-ism and 3-ism. This division is what the Hofstedes know as their individualism-collectivism dimension, the most significant dimension found among national cultures from the IBM studies (§3.4.1). However, they see no connection; they distinguish "*national* cultures" from "*people's perceptions of practices in their work unit*." (Hofstede and Hofstede 2005: 291, italics original) "They [the corporation studies] produced six entirely new dimensions: of practices, not of values." (292) Six entirely new dimensions! This comes from attempting observations without theory. Practices and perceptions must relate to values, unless people are schizophrenics or hypocrites. What they call "practices" are, anyway, *verbal* survey responses, just as the IBM surveys were. WOLT integrates them seamlessly and if the Hofstedes distinguished things from people they, too, would integrate them. Even if they kept individualism-collectivism (1-3) as a single dimension, they should find it all comes together as:

Job-oriented = results-oriented (things) = process-oriented (people) = individualism = 1. Employee-oriented = process-oriented (things) = results-oriented (people) = collectivism = 3.

5.7 Political left and right

5.7.1 The general correspondence of left-right to the WOLT types

Left-right, the long-standing colloquial political classification, allows two categories whereas WOLT (along with most theory—see §3.3) insists on three politically pro-active types. Though many have protested the inadequacy of the left-right distinction it remains in daily use, not only in the media but in opinion surveys and even among academics who perceive academic departments divided into what they call left and right. Many have attempted to improve on it, a popular method being to draw a north-south libertarian-authoritarian

axis and a west-east left-right axis.²³ However left and right are types, not dimensions and regarding them as dimensions, or ends of dimensions, is incoherent, as was discussed in §4.6. How does the left-right division compare with WOLT's types?

Left is readily matched to Type 3 (see, e.g., Scruton 1983: 260). Right fits either Type 1 or Type 2 depending whether "dry" (Robert Nozick, libertarian) or "wet" (Edmund Burke, conservative) is meant. Scruton (408) notes that beliefs attributed to the political right are not all mutually compatible and he sets out a bullet-point list which may be neatly divided as 1-ist or 2-ist. Up to a generation ago the right was thought of as an ideology of *tradition* and *authority*, its extreme manifestation being a military regime, but nowadays the right is more often thought of as neo-conservatism or neo-liberalism (i.e., free market) which is *innovative* and *anti-authority*. So the meaning of the concept "right" has shifted from 2-ism to 1-ism, though both senses are still applied²⁴ and the two are often confused when the distinction between achieved and ascribed status is not recognised (Linton 1936, §5.2 and see Appendix 4). In the industrialised countries, democratic political parties of "the right" are usually a combination of 1-ist and 2-ist sentiment and there is commonly tension between the two factions.

What of the 4s? Where are the 4s in the left-right scheme? Mostly ignored (which suits them) and to the extent they are not ignored, their political classification, like much else, is decided by others. In a Marxist or a trade union context they are *left* and Grendstad (2003) found them there in the Nordic countries. But under the disparaging term "populist", they are thought of as *right*. In Switzerland, where each of the four WOLT types is represented by a separate party, the press assumes the 4s (Swiss People's Party) to be part of the right. The 4s go where they are led, probably where the short-term gains look biggest.

WOLT pinpoints the oft-remarked inadequacies of the left-right distinction: left is Type 3, right has two distinct and conflicting meanings,²⁵ and the proletariat form a category on their own. As do the hermits, of course.

²³ See <u>http://www.lp.org/lpn/9908-Nolan.html</u> and <u>http://politicalcompass.org/</u>. Political geographers, Hermann and Leuthold (<u>http://sotomo.geo.unizh.ch/research/</u>) have developed some elaborate, partly animated, cartography around a form with liberal-conservative in place of libertarian-authoritarian.

²⁴ That this reflects popular perceptions of "right" is confirmed by Grendstad (2003) who carried out a large empirical study comparing GG theory and self perceptions of left-right in the Nordic countries. Says conservative American political theorist, Russell Kirk: "For a century and half, conservatives have yielded ground in a manner which, except for occasionally successful rearguard actions, must be described as a rout." (Kirk 2001 [1953]: 5)

²⁵ <u>http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Left-Right_politics</u> and its associated discussion page well illustrate the confusion stemming from trying to fit 3 worldviews (1, 2, 3) into two ideological categories. That objective difficulty is aggravated by the dichotomous assumption of "My view versus the rest," i.e., the pervasive difficulty of discerning distinctions among views which differ from one's own.

5.7.2 Empirical left and right in psychology

Social surveys with political content usually ask about the respondent's position on a left-right dimension. The distinction and the terms are so common that people are used to them and presumably they have some relative validity from one survey to the next.

As political shorthand, these terms have their uses. But for purposes of political analysis, they obfuscate more than they clarify... The left-right distinction is beset with contradictions... Efforts to read back the left-right distinction into U.S. history, for instance, succeed only in making a hash of it. (Wildavsky 1987a: 11-12)

Conover and Feldman (1984: 168) find a variety of issues that do not fit left-right and want to split beliefs into economic and social dimensions; Wildavsky (1987a), GG theory's energetic salesman, calls this "ad hoc category massage" (13), saying that using cultural concepts makes it unnecessary. He discusses several surveys to conclude that GG theory gives a better explanation than left-right (15).

Who is listening? A vast effort has gone into constructing "scales" of left and right. Since, as discussed, left and right are types, not a dimension or dimensions, such scales are incoherent. They merely find where the intuition of the test subjects roughly matches the intuition of the researcher.

The 1999 edition of *Measures of Political Attitudes* by Robinson, Shaver and Wrightsman (eds), is an 800-page compendium which "provides political and social scientists with the necessary information to best measure political attitudes and data"²⁶ and of which the editors say, "Our focus in this volume is on political attitude and behavior *scales* (i.e., series of items with homogenous content), scales that are useful in survey research settings as well as in laboratory situations." (2, italics original).

A psychological "scale" is a standard set of questions intended to test for some putative phenomenon, here *liberalism* and *conservatism*. In developing a scale, questions are tested on sample subjects and factor analysed. Those questions which did not contribute to the dominant factors are deleted in order to make the scale more sensitive and homogeneous. There is necessarily always some doubt as to whether the resulting question set is measuring the phenomenon claimed for it.²⁷

Chapter 3, "Liberalism and Conservatism," by Kathleen Knight, provides an opportunity to show practical differences between the intuitive and the deductive approach, to

²⁶ Editorial review at http://www.amazon.com/Measures-Political-Attitudes-Social-Psychological/dp/ 012590245X/sr=8-1/qid=1157781679/ref=pd_bbs_1/102-0278764-1367301?ie=UTF8&s=books

²⁷ It is possible that this process of whittling away non-contributing items destroys a scale's sensitivity to the polythetic variety that makes up human nature and the attempt to distil the essence whittles away meaning itself. Perhaps this is the root of the IND-COL problem briefly discussed in §3.4.1.

highlight the particular differences between (the US version of) left-right and WOLT, and to demonstrate WOLT's power to analyse and correct. Knight discusses the problems of definition and then, before presenting a variety of scales, she suggests (1999: 69) that "most scholars would probably find much to agree with in the following comprehensive definitions offered by Kerlinger":²⁸

Liberalism is a set of political, economic, religious, educational, and other social beliefs that emphasize:

freedom of the individual, constitutional participatory government and democracy, the rule of law, free negotiation, discussion and tolerance of different views, constructive social progress and change, egalitarianism and rights of minorities, secular rationality and rational approaches to social problems, and positive government action to remedy social deficiencies and to improve human welfare.

Conservatism is a set of political, economic, religious, educational, and other social beliefs characterized by emphasis on:

the status quo and social stability, religion and morality, liberty and freedom, the natural inequality of men, the uncertainty of progress, and the weakness of human reason. It is further characterized by distrust of popular democracy and majority rule and by support for individualism and individual initiative, the sanctity of private property, and the central importance of business and industry in society.

However different facets of these definitions have been emphasised by different scholars. (Knight 1999: 69)

Resolution with WOLT is impossible. Some examples of the conflict: *Item:* These liberals believe in "the rule of law," but the conservatives do not. WOLT says precisely the reverse, that the rule of law is meat and drink to conservatives, and less important to liberal 3s who prefer norms. Apparently, these conservatives want the "status quo" without rules. *Item:* Where liberals want "freedom of the individual", the conservatives want "liberty and freedom". These are identical, not orthogonal. WOLT says freedom-to is orthogonal to freedom-from, in accord with a distinction of 200 years' standing, and in this context liberals want the former and conservatives the latter. *Item:* The determination of "morality" as exclusively conservative conflicts with WOLT which says a claim to superior morality underlies everyone's viewpoint. It also contradicts Daniel Elazar's (1972) American political subcultures which assigns this cachet to the 3s (Table 3.6). *Item:* Similar applies to liberalism's "rational approaches to social problems". WOLT says all views are rational which implies that a social science finding that liberals are more rational than conservatives, is biased.

²⁸ Kerlinger, Fred N, 1984, *Liberalism and conservatism: the nature and structure of social attitudes*. Hillsdale NJ, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

"Liberalism"		T / A = type or axis item is on.		
Туре 1	Туре 2	Туре 3	T/A	
freedom of the individual,			1	
	the rule of law,		2	
free negotiation,			1	
		discussion,	3	
tolerance of different views,			1	
	constructive social progress	constructive social progress	X	
change,		change,	-Z	
		egalitarianism,	3	
rights of minorities,		rights of minorities,	-Z	
secular rationality,	secular rationality,	secular rationality,		
rational approaches to social problems,	rational approaches to social problems,	rational approaches to social problems,		
	positive government action to remedy social deficiencies and improve human welfare	positive government action to remedy social deficiencies and improve human welfare	X	

Table 5.7 Kerlinger's liberalism and conservatism compared with Types 1, 2, 3

"Conservatism"

Туре 1	Type 2 the status quo and social stability,	Туре 3	T/A 2
religion and morality, liberty and freedom,	religion and morality,	religion and morality,	1
	the natural inequality of men, the uncertainty of progress, and the weakness of human reason,		Z Z Z
distrust of popular democracy and majority rule,	distrust of popular democracy and majority rule,	distrust of popular democracy and majority rule,	Z
individualism and individual initiative, the sanctity of private property, the central importance of business and industry in society			1

A summary of WOLT's disagreements is given by Table 5.7, where the contents of the two definitions have been arranged to accord with the opinions of the three pro-active WOLT types. One group of characteristics, "constitutional participatory government and democracy," which, allegedly, liberals, but not conservatives, believe in, has been omitted as none of the three types has a predictable attitude to it. Quibbles over placings in Table 5.7 are possible but would not alter the overall situation, which is that the two interpretations, Kerlinger's empirical distinction and WOLT's theoretical deduction, are wildly at odds. Says Knight (1999: 83), "Theoretically, the liberal scale is expected to be nearly orthogonal to (independent of) the conservative one…" Which theory, she does not say but she says some studies support this and some do not. In the Axis column, the allocations to +Z and -Z do make sense as does the absence of Type 3 from conservatism but beyond that, if Kerlinger is right then Table 5.7, where the columns are logically derived, would show that people do not think logically.

Robinson, Shaver and Wrightsman's Measures of Political Attitudes is a well-known resource. The topic of the chapter, "Liberalism and Conservatism," is one Kerlinger apparently devoted much of his career to and he is the most prominent researcher mentioned. Though Knight introduces other researchers' scales, saying, "Wide-ranging philosophical and theoretical differences in the definitions of liberalism and conservatism complicate any decision about the choice of scales to measure ideological predispositions" (81), she does not present any other definitions. Table 5.7 shows the 1s to be equally distributed to these "liberalism" and "conservatism" categories which means the 1s are not being identified at all. This is a huge omission in describing the nature and structure of political attitudes in the USA, it being the home of 1-ism if ever there was one. The table indicates some tendency for liberals to be 3s and conservatives to be 2s, with which WOLT agrees, and which may explain occasional orthogonality, but these definitions will never explain the structure of social attitudes in a country where the big political division is between the private property, freemarket 1s, and the welfare- and environment-promoting 3s (and both are suspicious of the bureaucratic, government 2s). In short, the definitions substantiate Wildavsky's complaint that left and right make a hash of it; they are another demonstration of the perils of intuitive theorising; and the painstakingly developed scales that purport to measure them can yield no useful insight.

5.8 At the Booths: Figure 5.1

"Booths" refers to voting places on election day. This Geoff Pryor cartoon was published in Lovell et al (1995: 400) which credits the *Canberra Times* newspaper. Judging by the clothing fashions, the drawing must date from around 1980. The six images have been reordered in the WOLT sequence but nothing else has been changed.

The political caricaturist has a few strokes to deliver a recognisable image and as such is a perceiver of ideal types. The correspondence of these images to the WOLT types is remarkable. They are the product of intuition and experience—Pryor spent a career as political cartoonist for the Canberra Times—but if he had picked two or three of them correctly it would have been an achievement to match the theorists of Chapter 3; to get all five is astonishing. Of course, he has six not five but, as he says, the sixth stands for nothing. In terms of accuracy, the Type 1 is a rather down-market example, the Types 2, 3 and 4 are perfect, and the Type 5 is a little more misanthropic than the ideal. Pryor's Democrat refers to the party of that name (now defunct). If the Democrat be taken as a small-d democrat then it, too, is accurate as democracy is aligned with none of the five types.

Figure 5.1 "At the Booths" (Geoff Pryor, Canberra Times)

THE SWINGER



... A salesman from Giralang, Barry hasn't read the front half of a newspaper in ten years. He owes his political education to the Mike Willesee Show and to the campaign jingles which infest the screen at this particular time. The politicians take careful note of voters like Barry — they know that his rhinoceros hide has one small spot of paper-thinness the Hip Pocket. To touch the nerve at this spot is to take possession of his heart and soul — for this election at any rate ... THE TRUE-BLUE LIB.



... Over the years, Bunty has consistently been a pillar in the bastion of Free Enterprise, Good Breeding and Taste. In her eyes, the nation must at all costs be protected from the socialist forces of darkness which (according to her husband, Doctor Armitage) are bent on depriving her of the lifestyle to which she has long been accustomed. Besides, the Labor rabble are rowdy, don't wash too often and consort with union types...



... Doug and Rowena are both high school teachers (Doug teaches Mathematics and Rowena a course in Social Awareness). They own a nice house in Farrer with a couple of cars in the carport. Patio intellectuals, they deeply believe in the need for social justice and a compassionate welfare system which will relieve the burdens imposed on The Little Man by a meanminded autocratic regime, guiced by selfish vested interests. They are firmly committed to a program of wealth redistribution (as long as it is not their own of course)...



.... Jack finds the compulsory exercise of his democratic rights an unwarranted intrusion into his leisure time (and much less fun than filling in a Pools coupon). When confronted with a Senate ballot form with its thirty-odd candidates, Jack doesn't stuff around — he fills the damn thing in as quick as he can and heads off to the pub to catch the first at Moonee Valley ...

. . . A middle-ranking public servant who has access to certain sensitive policy-making areas, and who has written speeches for yovernment ministers of both colo urs, Les has often earned the gratinude of his political masters for his incisive judgment and his tirekessness. They would not be so grateful if they knew that Les, a clostetanarchist, secretly regards all p oliticians as self-seeking, vain, prevaricating buffoons who do the nation more harm than good. In fact, Les says exactly this on exich ballot form he neatly folds and slips into the box. . .

THE AUST. DEM.



An architect whose work is as middle-of-the-road as his politics, Adrian rejects the insensitive, bigcorporate, Ayn Randish approach of the Right on the one hand, and the big-government, fiscally erratic policies of the Left on the other. Now that we know what Adrian rejects, what then does he accept? Adrian is not quite sure but as soon as he finds out he'll let us know — but don't hold your breath . .

5.9 An anthropology of religion¹

Religion was Mary Douglas's life-long interest and her writings on religious proscriptions would be more famous than her grid-group theory. She did not apply GG theory to religion. She was prevented from doing so by the lack of the Y axis.

This thesis has made it clear that most of the action is on X and Y (Table 4.2), with the issues on these two axes giving rise to a pervasive conflict between the proponents of those axes, the 3s and the 1s. The Z axis is less varied, and it looks as if the "function" of the coercive Z axis is to resolve the contradictions of X and Y, to compromise and to curb. This view implies that the contradiction between X and Y, manifest as conflict between 3-ism and 1-ism, is the central driver of social interaction. Compared with modern industrial society, in the civilisations of the last ten thousand years X and Y have been swamped by Z and overbearing 2-ism yet it seems that underneath the autocracy and aggression a low but tenacious level of X and Y (beliefs and social patterns) struggles on, driving social existence, providing dominant 2-ism with principles to enforce and wealth to live off. Support for this interpretation comes from what may be an unexpected source: religion.

It turns out that a straightforward anthropology of religion can be developed by putting practically any religious issue on the Y and X axes and seeing how the 2s cope with the problem, for cope they do. As we know, the 1s are pro Y and the 3s are pro X. That leaves the 2s to be in favour of both and the 4s to reject both. The facilitator, or enabler, of the 2s' acceptance and of the 4s' rejection is their adherence to the coercive Z axis.

As discussed in §4.9 and elsewhere, relational issues need to have two components so we can put them onto two axes and see how they might fit with the four types. And everything relational has to fit: if the theory is right then anything that does not fit just has not been properly worked out. What might we choose as pairs of relational issues in religion? *Polytheism* versus *monotheism*? *Material* versus *immaterial* god(s)? *Local* versus *universal* god(s)? Any of these will do and they all go onto the Y and X axes. Consider the first pair. How would it suit the 1s (yes-no) and 3s (no-yes)? Multiple gods will have different competencies. This would allow 1s to worship the god appropriate to the particular requirement at a particular time and place, and if the god did not perform, or if an enemy's gods proved to be stronger, it would allow a switch of allegiance. This sounds decidedly 1-ist.² For 3s, a single god is essential because 3s don't tolerate categorisation; they would

¹ The fit of religious characteristics to the WOLT X and Y axes was pointed out to me by Angus Algie who also originally worked out many of the correspondences listed in Table 5.8.

² Polytheism and 1s in early 20th century China:

^{...}vulgarized Taoism and Buddhism... provided the individual in distress symbolic and magical devices to communicate with and bribe a variety of deities and spirits. Just as their

object to the inequalities, factionalism and disharmony implied by more than one god. So the distribution of Y: polytheism and X: monotheism suits the 1s and 3s well.

The 2s are supposed to agree with both axes. Are not *polytheism* and *monotheism* mutually exclusive? They are, but religious 2s do not apply social science's high standards of logic.³ Hinduism, which is extremely 2-ist, has countless gods and simply insists that each is a manifestation of the single Supreme Being—problem solved. Christianity, in its very 2-ist Catholic form, asserts a single God but provides saints. Saints are not called gods, however they are supernatural specialists providing material benefits according to their expertise—which is what the can-do 1-ist approach to religion (and life) requires.

The 4s reject both multiple gods and a single god. Are they atheists? 4s can hardly be atheists for they know that just around the corner uncontrollable forces are waiting to thump them. But inquiring as to how many of them there are would be inane.

So polytheism and monotheism fit the Y and X axes. *Material* versus *immaterial*? *Local* versus *universal*? Put these on the Y and X axes and it is readily seen that they fit the 1s and 3s. The Y axis gods are material beings, enhanced humans (or other creatures) with human prejudices and appetites, living in particular places (grotto, mountain) who demand sacrifices of valuable property as a form of payment and in return offer material benefits from the harvest, weather, battle, etc. If they fail, it may be because the sacrifice was cheap. To anticipate this, the sacrifice must be public so everyone knows that it was properly made (and so the prestige of the sacrificer is sustained). Their localised, limited power suggests the gods are born of the earth and their quasi-human nature implies that an outstanding human can rival them and become a demigod or even a god. On the other hand the God of the X axis is immaterial, does not live on earth, has little interest in property sacrifice but instead is concerned for what His people have in their hearts—and the heart is revealed through words and it is private. To the pure, God offers forgiveness and, being all-powerful, eternal life. He created a perfect earth which is sullied by humans, who cannot approach His status, it being blasphemous even to think such a thing.

The fit of those properties to the 1s and 3s is plain but the 2s have to achieve both *material* and *immaterial* at once, both *local* and *universal* at once. A 2-ist social system will have a hierarchy of priests. God may be immaterial but the priests, the intermediaries between worshippers and God, are not. In Christianity the immaterial God actually appeared as a material man. If the god lives in a material object the priests can explain the immaterial spirit

deities were separate according to specific functions, folk believers were individualistic in their religious conduct and pragmatic in their attitude toward the supernatural. (Young and Ford 1977: 90)

³ Indeed, if the 2s did not practice being simultaneously monotheist and polytheist (if they just plumped for one or the other) we could place both options on a single axis as mutually exclusive.

within it (with whom, presumably, only the priests can communicate). The priests will explain that the god(s) demand(s) immaterial pure hearts and noble deeds as well as material contributions. Around the ninth century the Christian church owned half the productive land in Europe (Lal 2001: 85) but the 2s' immaterial-material balancing act got out of balance and the scandal of "indulgences"—God's grace for a monetary payment—was one of the triggers of the Protestant Reformation in the sixteenth century. How to compromise between expensive sacrifice and sincere words? The 2s' device is ritual—words are spoken in a holy language, in an exact sequence, by the authorised person, with the sanctioned intonations, and

Table 5.8 Religion issues on X and Y axes and Type 2 resolution in monotheism

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	X being: inner worth	Y doing: external deeds	Monotheist Type 2
use, purpose knowledge of God nature of God residence temper leadership	monotheism immaterial God (holy spirit) universal presence and power God created earth unconditional love, eternal life total, revealed, eternal Word perfect being: rival is blasphemy live beyond sky—unreal estate God quick to forgive (sad if bad) God leads by example	polytheism material god (takes material form) local presence and powers gods born of earth contract for services hypothesis, subject to correction enhanced mortal: hero can rival in special places—best real estate gods quick to anger over bad act god as agent leader	God + saints and angels God + saints, Hindu avatars God + saints and angels icons, statues of virgin and saints Covenant prom. land, eternal life rites change but Book constant saints [prophets not relevant] church, Ark of covenant, shrine penance, Hail Marys priests both agent and example
service provided			
reliability worship through: worship by: sin is: sin by human nature result of sin sinner suffers till multiple sins	God constant words, whole behaviour private thanks for God's love mortal: failure to live a good life omission—act to be a non-sinner people good but flawed till saved absolute: wages of sin is death forgiveness granted one sin or many – equally deadly. forgiveness is total	gods fickle actions, specific deals public sacrifice for material request venial: offence of broken contract commission—must act to sin people bad but innocent till guilty proportional penalty (e.g. crop fails) penalty exacted sins cumulative forgive piecewise: 1 sin = 1 penalty	constant but with a hot temper material contributn, ritual prayer pray together but in private 3: bad living; 1: break church rules both people can be good if guided venial and mortal sins venial penalty; mortal forgiveness venials add up; mortal sins don't venial and mortal sins
sinner's access	lose access until submission	retain access to god city of man: Athens, law	still got His ear if venial Eternal city: Rome management
mother nature miracles	primal order—man spoils epiphany; bad spirit cast out	primal chaos—man cannot affect material (competition won)	priests ensure order 3: exorcism; 1: saints intervene

The third column is not Z. A Z column would probably just read "authority" (priestly decree, holy writ) on every line. This third column identifies the 2-ist resolution of simultaneous X and Y in a monotheism such as Christianity. X and Y may be read as Type 3 and Type 1. They amount to distilled social images of leadership and service, offence and incentive, place and meaning—in short, as God(s) created in the images of man.

accompanied by appropriate bodily movements. Ritual is a way to turn words into actions and pageantry can be costly. God simultaneously local and universal? Again, 2-ism has no problem resolving the contradiction: it simply provides for Him to be more present in some places than others, e.g. a temple. And within a temple there is an inner sanctum which is even more holy, and within that, the Ark of the Covenant will be most sacred of all. The monotheist religions say God is everywhere and yet have their holy cities and shrines. What is the 4s' position on all this? It is no concern of the 4s whether God is material or not, or where the gods live. (The gods will find them, whatever the case.)

Table 5.8 provides a list of religious issues that fit the Y and X axes, along with an indication of the Type 2 resolutions under monotheism. It is the skeleton of a theological anthropology of unprecedented generality. The third column is Type 2, not Z because a Z column would be uninteresting: it would mostly contain only *authority* or similar. The Type 2 resolution under monotheism is the pertinent matter for us since it is the official position of the "great" religions⁴ and in much of the industrialised world.⁵ The WOLT prospectus of the divine sums up roughly as follows: for 1s: wheeler-dealer, super-humans with various material specialisations; for 2s, an all-powerful king and subordinate saints; for 3s, a perfect, friendly father providing psychic harmony and eternal life; and for the 4s, an unpredictable bully. Table 5.8 would indicate that 1-ism cannot really be comfortable under an official monotheism, whatever compromises or concessions are made in the Y direction. In the case of Christianity this discomfort would be aggravated by the unrelieved 3-ism of its teachings⁶—turning the other cheek is just not the 1-ist way—and we might expect strongly 1-ist societies, such as the USA and Melanesia, to bend Christianity, perhaps bizarrely, in an attempt to mould it into competitive incentive terms more consistent with 1-ism.⁷

Religion is a human universal but is it something that has to be taken into account in order to live together? Millions nowadays disdain it and in most industrial societies it appears to be of little practical effect which indicates that it is not socially essential. In that case it would have been possible (had that been convenient) to argue that religion is irrelevant to WOLT, that it is outside the WOLT domain. Yet as we have seen, the fundamental attributes of religion fit directly onto the X and Y axes and WOLT sorts out religion just as efficaciously as it sorts out other, more self-evidently essential, social phenomena. It would seem to follow that religion, surplus though it may be to modern requirements, serves some social purpose, or reflects some psychological need, which is at the core of social life. If religion is redundant to modern society then this core need, whatever it is, must be being satisfied in some other way.

 ⁴ "Great" is a sort of category-mistake meaning monotheism. Having a large number of believers is seen as "great" but probably only a single, non-corporeal god is viable over a large geographical area.
 ⁵ Presumably 2-ism copes as well when the system is officially polytheist, offering some sort of fudge

to mollify 3s. Polytheist 2-ism would have been the norm in the BC Middle East, except for Judaism.

⁶ We can see the 3-ism also in the seven deadly sins of the Catholic Catechism: pride, avarice, envy, wrath, lust, gluttony, and sloth. The first six constitute one big sin: 1-ism. Sloth is the sin of 4-ism.

⁷ The Pentecostal movement, where words become things through hype, and a gift is a personal investment for material return (Coleman 2006; Rutherford 2006), is doing well in both the US and Melanesia.

5.10 Type 4 health

The health warnings in anti-smoking campaigns will be effective for the 1s, 2s, and 3s but not for the 4s for whom the consequences will be too long-term. Besides, it is not believable: Granddad smoked fifty a day and lived till he was ninety. In countries where in recent decades the health damage has been publicised we would expect smokers to be disproportionately 4s. A New York Times op-ed confirms this:

Americans who make between \$24,000 and \$36,000 a year smoke at twice the rate of those earning \$90,000 or more. The same applies to Americans with a high-school education rather than a college degree. Rural Americans smoke more than city-dwellers. (Horwitz 2008)

The author, a reformed smoker, advises Barrack Obama to smoke in order to bolster his blue-collar support.⁸ WOLT says Type 4s are perennially anxious about their social integration and Horwitz's whimsical piece shows that in this, as in many another matter, WOLT is merely pointing out what is plainly before our noses. "But I do miss the companionship of a shared smoke. Indulging in a vice stigmatized by most Americans is an easy way to bond with people with whom you otherwise have nothing in common." Appropriate propaganda to reduce 4s' smoking would need to prove it *reduces* sociality. That would be difficult but if it can be done it should be effective whereas campaigning on longterm health damage will not be.

Tackling obesity among 4s would be even trickier.⁹ A social relations approach does not look promising since, unlike smoking, fat is not seen as a social positive and emphasising this may merely increase depression. As with smoking, a healthiness campaign will be ineffective: better would be to demonstrate the short term advantages of slimness, rather than the long-term disadvantages of obesity but, unfortunately, slimness is not very short term; the short-term result of dieting is discomfort. The implication is that one-on-one direct positive feedback would be needed. Monetary incentive or disincentive may help but the Horwitz quote above indicates that price is not very effective in discouraging smoking.

An alternative would be to abandon the Type 1 incentive approach and invest in 3-ist consciousness-raising, i.e., provide better education which would amount to an anti-fourdom campaign since it teaches to delay gratification—see box. This approach may be running into

⁸ There was unusually explicit recognition of the 4s as voters during the 2008 competition between Obama and Clinton for the Democratic nomination. New York Times columnist David Brooks calls the 4s the "lottery class" http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/10/opinion/10brooks.html?th&emc=th for their high gambling rate. He points out that high middle class education has divided the country, "In this election, persuasion isn't important. Social identity is everything." ">http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/29/opinion/29brooks.html?em&ex=1209614400&en=91a7356b897e1b82&ei=5087%0A>">http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/29/opinion/29brooks.html?em&ex=1209614400&en=91a7356b897e1b82&ei=5087%0A>">http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/29/opinion/29brooks.html?em&ex=1209614400&en=91a7356b897e1b82&ei=5087%0A>">http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/29/opinion/29brooks.html?em&ex=1209614400&en=91a7356b897e1b82&ei=5087%0A>">http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/29/opinion/29brooks.html?em&ex=1209614400&en=91a7356b897e1b82&ei=5087%0A>">http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/29/opinion/29brooks.html?em&ex=1209614400&en=91a7356b897e1b82&ei=5087%0A>">http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/29/opinion/29brooks.html?em&ex=1209614400&en=91a7356b897e1b82&ei=5087%0A>">http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/29/opinion/29brooks.html?em&ex=1209614400&en=91a7356b897e1b82&ei=5087%0A>">http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/29/opinion/208/04/29/opinion/208/04/29/opinion/208/04/29/opinion/208/04/29/opinion/208/04/29/opinion/208/04/29/opinion/208/04/29/opinion/208/04/29/opinion/208/04/29/opinion/208/04/29/opinion/208/04/29/opinion/208/04/29/opinion/208/04/29/opinion/208/04/29/opinion/208/04/29/opinion/208/04/29/opinion/208/04/208/04/29/opinion/208/04/208/0

⁹ Obesity decreases with socio-economic status <u>http://content.nejm.org/cgi/content/short/329/14/1036</u> <u>http://www.mja.com.au/public/issues/178 09 050503/cam10689 fm.html</u> http://epirev.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/29/1/29 accessed July 2008.

the law of diminishing returns for two reasons: (1) the barriers to education have long been quite low which has presumably enabled many 4s to enter the middle classes over recent generations, hence remaining 4s may be more hard core, reducing the efficacy of education and affirmative action, and (2) simply being at the bottom of the pecking order is, irrespective of diet, itself conducive to heart disease and other ailments. (Wilkinson 1999, 2005)

A Surprising Secret to a Long Life: Stay in School

By Gina Kolata¹⁰

...A few extra years of school is associated with extra years of life and vastly improved health decades later, in old age.

It is not the only factor, of course.

There is smoking, which sharply curtails life span. There is a connection between having a network of friends and family and living a long and healthy life. And there is evidence that people with more powerful jobs and, presumably, with more control over their work lives, are healthier and longer lived ...

In every country, compelling children to spend a longer time in school led to better health ...

Dr. Lleras-Muney and others point to one plausible explanation—as a group, less educated people are less able to plan for the future and to delay gratification. If true, that may, for example, explain the differences in smoking rates between more educated people and less educated ones.

Smokers are at least twice as likely to die at any age as people who never smoked, says Samuel Preston, a demographer at the University of Pennsylvania. And not only are poorly educated people more likely to smoke but, he says, "everybody knows that smoking can be deadly," and that includes the poorly educated.

But education, Dr. Smith at RAND finds, may somehow teach people to delay gratification. For example, he reported that in one large federal study of middle-aged people, those with less education were less able to think ahead.

"Most of adherence is unpleasant," Dr. Smith says. "You have to be willing to do something that is not pleasant now and you have to stay with it and think about the future."

5.11 Conclusion

The intent of this chapter was to demonstrate WOLT's power to bring to light hidden connections and examples were given from philosophy, politics, economics, religion, and sociology.¹¹ The emphasis was on interrelationships, rather than taxonomic description. It was shown, for example, how the three standard kinds of equality relate to each other, how Kant's ends interrelate, that liberalism is incoherent because of the axial configuration, and so on. The WOLT structure usually leads to additional insights and information.

That is not the end of the inter-relationships. Because every relational issue fits onto just three axes, the interrelationship of these disparate topics is also given. Equality is related to Kant's ends, is related to liberalism; political left and right are related to the particulars of religion, are related to corporate culture—and so on.

¹⁰ <u>http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/03/health/03aging.html?th&emc=th</u> Accessed June 2008

¹¹ In Appendix 10 WOLT is applied to poetry, song, film, fiction and proverbs.

An omitted discussion concerns the implications of casually inferring WOLT types. The five types are so distinctive that brief acquaintance with the theory allows the informal classifying of organisations, governments, and prominent people, as well as friends and colleagues. The normative implications of this also apply to GG theory but the WOLT types tend to be more sharply drawn and casual typing is easier. This matter often comes up in conversation about the theory as does the related, speculative question of the effect of the theory's wide dissemination. As an ideal-type, hypothetico-deductive theory, WOLT is not normative so perhaps these aspects are beyond the scope of this thesis.

This chapter has concentrated on applications of the theory that emphasise the relational aspects. Ignored are the myriad applications of the GG literature. Grid-group theory has been applied to analyse many situations, from Douglas and Wildavsky's 1982 monograph on risk to the recent application of the types to analyse control by and of government (Hood 1998; Lodge and Wegrich 2005a, b; Thompson 2008). A recent thousand-page compendium asserts that GG theory "now rivals the rational choice, Weberian and postmodern outlooks in influence across the social sciences" (6 and Mars 2008) and offers sections titled Business, Work and Organizations, Politics, History, Environment, Technology and Risk, Crime, Consumption. Since GG theory shows connections between institutions and attitudes it is more than a taxonomy, however much of the analysis in this chapter is not possible using GG theory.

To this point this thesis has explicated way of life theory, specifically:

- deduced the five types from relational issues, showing them to be mutually exclusive, collectively exhaustive, and derivable from numerous directions. The implication is that if other types can be deduced, from any relevant issues, WOLT would be falsified.

- shown that no social-psychological theories of the last two centuries refute WOLT, that theorists who deduced types from dimensions found the same types, and that the numerous intuitive creations of types without dimensions, and of dimensions without types, also support WOLT.

- shown that social relations have a three dimensional structure into which everything relational should fit, and shown, for dozens of issues, specifically how each issue is related to each other issue.

- presented a smorgasbord of demonstrations of WOLT's analytic breadth, depth and precision.

The remainder of the thesis attempts to put the theory under pressure. Attempts to refute WOLT empirically are presented in Chapter 7 but first Chapter 6 will try to place the theory in context in science, psychology and sociology. \Box

Way of life theory: the underlying structure of worldviews, social relations and lifestyles

CHAPTER 6 SCIENTIFIC CONTEXT

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In prose the worst thing one can do with words is to surrender to them. When you think of a concrete object, you think wordlessly, and then, if you want to describe the thing you have been visualising you probably hunt about till you find the exact words that seem to fit. When you think of something abstract you are more inclined to use words from the start, and unless you make a conscious effort to prevent it, the existing dialect will come rushing in and do the job for you, at the expense of blurring or even changing your meaning.

—George Orwell. *Politics and the English language*

Outside our heads there is freestanding reality. Only madmen and a scattering of constructivist philosophers doubt its existence. Inside our heads is a reconstitution of reality based on sensory input and the self-assembly of concepts.

—Edward O Wilson. Consilience

Without Contraries is no progression. Attraction and Repulsion, Reason and Energy, Love and Hate, are necessary to Human existence.

—William Blake. *Marriage of Heaven and Hell*

6.1 Introduction

This chapter seeks to place WOLT in context—in science, psychology and sociology. It sets out a short catalogue of science theory characteristics and:

- justifies the application of natural-science approaches to on pragmatic grounds and shows how WOLT adopts them.

- shows the need for theorist-free objects of study and theory components.

- explicates the use of the 2x2 table to find theorist-free objects. This appears to be an original invention or discovery.

- justifies the uncompromising dichotomisation of dimensional issues (which was required for the deduction of the theory) on grounds of subjectivity and structural inevitability.

- attempts to delineate the WOLT domain, in particular to distinguish it from personality theory.

- places WOLT in the context of social science theories, showing it to be both objective and subjective, both Durkheimian and Weberian.

6.2 Approaches for science theorising

As has been made clear, WOLT was developed using the approaches of natural science. This implies both licence and constraint. If natural science adopts a certain tactic then it is allowed. The "ideal type" is such a practice. If natural science must satisfy a certain stricture then so should WOLT. "Falsifiability" is such a standard.

In the following the science theory characteristics which have been respected or relied upon in the construction of WOLT are summarised and their use explained and justified. They are approaches that natural science uses.¹ It is not necessary to claim that they are essential to scientific theorising (though some may be), or that they are complete; it suffices that they are normal attributes of the scientific approach. Social science may not always be amenable to such methods but the efficacy of natural science is so clear, it might be expected that theorising which did respect its normal practices would be regarded as conservative. This

¹ It is difficult to infer, from the writings of philosophers of science, "how-to" rules for the would-be scientist (Chalmers 1982 is a partial exception). For example, the question of what constitutes a scientific "law" is a philosophical quagmire. Also, it seems that arguing over the way science is done is a *social* science specialty. Blaikie (1993) provides an overview of the many positions which amount to claims that social science is somehow different (e.g. that there do not exist general social laws and such laws cannot exist (46)). It all smacks of special pleading. Every science is different but others are not engaged in a century-long argument expatiating on their differences and explaining why they should, or should not, use the same methods.

is not the case; on the contrary, these approaches are not generally respected in social science and it is adhering to them which is exceptional, hence these justifications.²

6.2.1 Ideal types

Science theory often applies to objects that are *idealised*, not real. Galileo's sphere and plane are geometrically perfect and frictionless. They do not exist. Newton's first law says a body will move in a straight line at a constant velocity unless disturbed. There are no examples. Some think idealisation is universal:

Many modern philosophers of science... have discussed the meaning and stressed the significance of idealization in physical laws. Ernst Mach, for example, writes, 'All universal physical concepts and laws... the concepts of rays, the dioptric laws, the law of Mariotte [Boyle's law], etc., are arrived at by idealization. They thereby assume that simple and also general, little determined form which makes it possible to reconstruct any facts, however complicated, by synthetic combination of these concepts and laws, thus making it possible to understand them'. (Kaufmann 1944: 86-7 quoting Mach's (1906) *Erkenntnis und Irrtum*)

An example of this "synthetic combination" of laws would be Newton's first law. It never applies on its own: it must be supplemented with a theory of the disturbing force, such as friction or gravity. The motion of billiard balls and comets can be understood by combining the theories. The separate ideal-type theories are necessary since observation of actual moving bodies without the separate ideal theories would not even indicate that the balls and comets obey the same law.

Carl Hempel notes the same phenomenon:

It is a remarkable fact... that the greatest advances in scientific systematization have not been accomplished by means of laws referring explicitly to *observables*, i.e., to things and events which are ascertainable by direct observation, but rather by means of laws that speak of various *hypothetical*, or *theoretical*, *entities*, i.e., presumptive objects, events, and attributes which cannot be perceived or otherwise directly observed by us. (Hempel 1965 [1958]: 177 italics original)

It is, then, a standard scientific procedure to construct theories from ideal types—pure products of the imagination—and then put them together to explain or predict the real world. It would be unthinkable to attempt to understand how the weather works without using the fundamental theories of chemistry and physics. Should we not take the same approach if we wish to understand how society works? The social science application of ideal types is

 $^{^{2}}$ Not everyone will agree that social science does not respect natural science practice. Greenfeld (2005: 108) complains that, "Unlike biology and physics, both of which have left the conclusions of 1901 light-years behind, the social sciences have not progressed." The cause? "The social sciences have modeled themselves on physics." (101) This thesis asserts the contrary: a failure to so model. The approaches herein, usual in science (including physics) are seldom applied in social science.

universally known from Max Weber's advocacy but little used.³ Outside of Weber's own work, the only well-known instance would be *homo economicus*:

most economists... find Economic Man useful... [A]bstraction, strategic simplification, is the only way we can impose some intellectual order on the complexity of economic life. And the assumption of rational behavior has been a particularly fruitful simplification. (Krugman 2007)

Concepts such as *perfect competition*, *complete information*, *market clearing* (and others) are also ideal types and Schutz (1973: 218) observes that "...the two most advanced 'theoretical' social sciences—pure economics and jurisprudence—make use of ideal-typical constructs... in order to delimit their subject areas and establish an objective context of meaning..."

Evidently, theorising in terms of ideal types is normal, perfectly proper, and useful where applied in social science. It was adopted in the derivation of the five WOLT types in Chapter 2 from two idealised conceptions of competition and cooperation and applies to every other pair of axial relational issues. Given that they are idealised, refutation does not follow from finding natural cases which do not conform: nature contains few spheres rolling on planes, let alone perfect markets. Experimental sociologist David Willer does expect the theoretic ideal to have some correspondence with reality:

It is also evident that the scientific model makes no reference to causes in the phenomenal world, but circumvents the problem of such unobservable connections by drawing a theoretic world in which theoretic objects and events are considered—a world which is similar to and thus stands for the empirical case. (Willer 1987: 2)

It was shown in Chapters 2 and 4 and especially in Chapter 5, that the WOLT ideal types reflect many empirical cases and that the theoretical relationships between the types and between the ideal issues resemble a range of real instances. A feature of ideal types in natural science is their partial or reductionist character in the sense that not only does theory set aside observed phenomena but an ideal type represents only a part of reality. Instead of Galileo's sphere rolling on a plane, nature offers us avalanches.⁴ Yet an avalanche obeys the same laws and avalanche research would be impossible without those laws. Aerodynamic theory concerns airflow over foils of specified shapes but in nature wings vary their shape—and yet obey the rules worked out for the simplified, partial model. WOLT is a partial model of psychology and we might expect that some natural cases will, like the wing of an albatross, be

³ Friedman (Anonymous 2004) says that in social science Weber is "merely gestured at respectfully." An internet search shows occasional papers explicitly applying ideal types. An example renowned in legal theory is Kelsen's *Pure Theory of Law* first published in 1934. His non-normative, ideal-type analysis is stark 2-ism: "…law is the property of being a *normative* system backed by a *credible* threat of using *physical force* against a violator of the norms." (Posner 2001: 6, italics original)

⁴ The sphere on a plane analogy is used by Lewin (1931: 161) who apparently got it from Mach.

recognisable exemplifications of the theory and that other cases will be as remote from it as a fluttering autumn leaf. High-fidelity wings and spheres can be artificially constructed to check theories, an option not available for a theory of the mind.

Ideal types in science have another special aspect: they are theorist-free. Weber's ideal types were as he perceived them; he invented them. His types proliferate without limit and understandings of them are disputable, which results in scholastic attempts to divine what Weber truly meant rather than trying to learn how society is truly put together. In natural science ideal types are determined by nature and are discovered, not invented. Phlogiston was not science; it was fiction. Crystal spheres and "downwards tendency" were never going to explain or predict—gravity had to be discovered. And in describing gravity Newton had *no choice* in expressing it in terms of mass and distance, and had he somewhere erred, there would be no concern to try to interpret his meaning; the mistake would simply be shown and physicists would move on. The reduction to the idealised component parts must "carve nature at the joints"; scientists may not chop her up as they think fit. WOLT *discovers* ideal types via dichotomised dimensions—see below §6.3.

6.2.2 Relationships, not intrinsic properties

Scientific theory elucidates *relationships* of objects, not objects' intrinsic properties. It is the distinction Kurt Lewin (1931) makes between Galilean and Aristotelian science (see note 27). Galileo's sphere does not possess an internal downward tendency; it relates to the plane via gravity. The properties of Newton's inertial body are of no relevance; what matters are relations of distance, direction and time. The periodic table is not a list of properties of elements but an explication of the relationships between them. Thus a description of ideal types' characteristics is not a theory. Most of the typologies described in Chapter 3 are not scientific because they neither show a relationship between their (alleged) types nor explain why they should exist at all. The same applies to personality "theories" (§6.5).

A relationship between ideal types will necessarily be an ideal relationship. The relationship between the WOLT types is via ideal-type issues on three mutually orthogonal axes. This predicts attitudes of the types toward each other and shows what is required to switch types. Within the axial structure, the numerous relational issues determine the four social types and the types determine where relational issues fit on the axes, which is to say how issues relate to each other. The structure is specific but not precise: it specifies the issues and shows how each relates to each, but denoting interrelationships by placing them on "axes in three dimensions" is a far cry from mathematical formulae.

6.2.3 Not frequency

Lewin (1931: 153) tells us science is not about *frequency* of occurrence of objects or of relationships. The law of gravity does not indicate how often apples fall or how many moons will be orbiting. The periodic table does not predict how frequently or in what proportions the various elements occur. In some fields (e.g. natural selection) frequency is central but Lewin's point is taken up by Willer (1996: 322) who sees in academic sociology, "a fundamental confusion between statistical procedures of empirical generalization on the one hand and the methods of theoretical science on the other," and says that some researchers "conflated empirical generalizations, which are always specific to time and place... with scientific laws... which are universal." That which often occurs is most noticed and importance gets attached to it but empirical research which identifies characteristics which occur relatively regularly does not constitute theory; it only produces findings applying to that data set. Such findings may be valuable for administrative purposes but they do not explain. WOLT has nothing to say about how often each of its types will be found. This is further discussed in Chapter 7 in the context of testing WOLT.

6.2.4 Measure what?

WOLT may be viewed as measurement at the most primitive level, the level Stevens (1946: 678), calls the "nominal scale", which is deciding which category objects belong in i.e., assigning a name. Primitive but clear and thorough: WOLT shows how to assign everything in its domain of rational social relations either to one of three "dimensions" called X, Y, Z, or else to one of five "ways of life" called 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. Despite its minimal nature, this "measurement" (allocation) is not simple and not intuitive.

Measurement remains at this primitive level because there are no units to measure with. Cooperation and coercion, preference and rejection, do not come in litres or parts per million. Lacking units of measure, the objects of interest to social science cannot, in principle, be quantified save for one binary measure: presence versus absence. WOLT relies on that dichotomy.

In the natural sciences measurement of quantifiable objects is universal and of central importance. There is great emphasis on measurement in social science; however, lacking units, practical measurement is largely confined to the ordinal. Rankings are subjective and cross-comparison—what Stevens (679) calls "interval measurement"—is woolly. Frequency of occurrence can be counted to any desired accuracy but, as discussed above, frequency generally does not explain. Practical aspects of this are considered in Chapter 7 in the context of the Likert questionnaire and the Q-sort used to test WOLT, and in Appendix 9.

Measurement may suggest what is interesting and is presumably indispensible for testing theoretical predictions, however measurements and data processing are not themselves science (McGregor 1993: 803) and results will be of doubtful scientific value if the basic objects of study are not nature's objects—see below §6.3.

6.2.5 No intuition

As Matthews (1993: 368) points out, in general, a theory which "makes sense" is not a scientific theory. What makes sense is a flat earth, sorcery causing disease and women's subjection to men. These made sense for ten thousand years and still do in non-scientific societies. A round, spinning, orbiting earth and Darwinian evolution are counter-intuitive. To cross-cultural psychologists it makes sense to distinguish people on the basis of nationality or ethnicity (§3.4.1). Chapter 3 found twenty intuitive typologists (since Marx) who made sense of the social world (Table 3.6). They contradict each other in myriad detail and *all of them* got it wrong in a fundamental way: they overlooked the 4s. Of seven theorists who used a theoretical approach and ideal types, only two missed the 4s (§3.3, Table 3.5). That is an indictment of intuition. Scientists probably have useful intuitions but they need testing. In social science, as in ordinary life, the evidence is that intuitive theorising is the road to misconception. Science may ultimately make sense of the world but making sense is not science.

Because WOLT is deduced, not intuited, it is open to dispute in the same way as a geometry theorem. A mistake can be logically demonstrated for, unlike the typologies of those twenty intuitive typologists, the theorist's opinion does not count: it is a matter of working things out.

6.2.6 Universality

A scientific theory knows no unpredictable exceptions. It applies at all times and in every single instance. Galileo's sphere filled with helium and floating away still obeys gravity. Exceptions test a theory: crystal spheres explain thousands of stars but a handful, the planets, cripple that theory. Scientific theories are valid for specified conditions and a theory where the conditions cannot be specified, and which fails unpredictably, is of little use as we cannot know when to apply it. "All theories must be universal because they claim to apply to all cases within their scope without specific exceptions. This bold claim is necessary, for without it theory has no utility, being limited, like findings, to particular times and places." (Willer 1996: 328) WOLT logically includes everyone rational and (apparently) includes every issue that must be coped with for people to be social. So specified, its (apparent) exception of emotion and trait personality can be predicted, or explained, as non-rational and non-social.

6.2.7 Deduction

Science may profitably involve strict *deduction* (Ayer 1965 [1936]: 656). Euclidean geometry, deduced tautologically from a very few axioms concerning imaginary points, straight lines, a circle, and parallel lines, yields results indispensable to our world. It troubles some (e.g. Poincaré 1905) that science's hypothetico-deductive method takes theoretical premises about objects which do not exist and obtains new knowledge via a sequence of tautologies. Whatever the reservations, deduction is normal and fruitful. The five equations of motion, for example, are deduced from the definitions of velocity and acceleration. They are found not by sitting back and thinking deeply, not by flash of insight, not by factor analysis of empirical data, but by utterly tautologous, unavoidable deduction from the fundamental defining relationships.⁵ In science, deduction from theoretical constructs is normal and effective. In social science it is unusual, the exception being in economics—which is the most successful of the social sciences. The five WOLT types are strictly deduced from ideal issues (Chapter 2) and, as this thesis has shown, it has broad practical application.

It appears the usual social science practice is to look at reality: "Models in the social sciences are simplified representations of social processes and institutions." says Keith Dowding (2001: 91).

The simplified representations of the world are designed to abstract (some) important features so we may examine some of the causal effects in theory and try to examine them more closely in reality... When formalizing models we face hard choices. We cannot include all the complexity of non-formal models, nor the complexity of the full descriptions of reality, let alone the complexity of the world itself. We are forced to simplify and even to assume that relationships between aspects of the world are not as we know them really to be. (Dowding 2001: 91)

When Newton connected the tides with a falling apple and a pendulum, he did not choose important features to simplify processes. His result—the inverse square law—was a grand simplification but as a consequence of a theoretical relationship concerning ideal concepts called mass and distance. WOLT does not rely on simplifying abstractions; its premises are theoretical. Deduction from them leads where it leads: to a relational theory that simplifies over the gamut of social relations.

(1) a = (v - u) / t where: a = acceleration, v = velocity, u = initial velocity, t = elapsed time. Equation (1) may be rearranged as: (1a) v = u + at, (1b) t = (v - u) / a, (1c) u = v - at. The definition of velocity at any instant is the rate of change of distance, s. That is: v = ds/dt. To find

the distance travelled integrate velocity through time t, i.e. integrate (1a) to give: (2) $s = ut + \frac{1}{2} at^2$ Substituting (1), (1b), (1c) for a, t, and u into (2) in turn gives three further equations:

(3) s = (u + v)t/2 (4) $v^2 = u^2 + 2as$ (5) $s = vt - \frac{1}{2}at^2$

⁵ Constant acceleration in a straight line is defined as the change in velocity per unit time, i.e.:

These equations may be found in any elementary text. They hold for constant acceleration in a straight line, conditions which never exist, and they are essential to understand and predict moving bodies.

6.2.8 Falsification

A scientific theory prompts *predictions* which, if refuted, qualify, modify or destroy the theory (Popper 2001 [1972]; Kuhn 1962; Lakatos 1970). Even postulating that the earth was flat or that heavenly bodies circle the earth, led to deducible consequences which could be refuted. Theories which make potentially falsifiable predictions can be improved and thus are likeliest to contribute to improvement in knowledge. It is, apparently, a severe requirement: "...if social scientists followed the advice of Karl Popper and considered falsification as the decisive criterion of demarcation there would be remarkably few, if any, theories in social science." (Welch 1995: 87) This may be too pessimistic a view (Dowding 2008), however the models of the theorists of Chapter 3 are evidence for it. They are riddled with contradictory differences yet none disproves another and none says, or even could say, "This theory would be disproved if the following were shown..." Falsifiability is little discussed in social science.⁶

WOLT offers thousands of falsification criteria. They have been stated at various points and may be summarised as follows:

- If some issue pertaining to social relations can be identified which does not fit on the three axes the theory would be undermined as it would not be universal.⁷ Dozens of issues fit; only one is needed to refute.

- If a pair of relational issues can be found from which types can be deduced other than the WOLT types, the theory would be undermined (as it would not be universal). Many pairs have been shown to conform; only one pair is needed to refute.

- If the four social types could be deduced from contradictory issues, for example issues contradicting those listed in Table 4.2, the meaning of the types and axes would become ambiguous and the theory would disintegrate. The only known example of an unresolved contradiction occurs in Appendix 2.

- If some types other than WOLT's five can be identified, either by theoretical deduction or empirical investigation, that would require fundamental modification of the theory. A viable rival typology would presumably destroy the theory. Of the theorists who use two dimensions, three deviate. But the deviations consist of only a single type in each case

⁶ Social science might seldom discuss falsification (and rather offer reasons why it should *not* apply) but it *practises* falsification with gusto when the rare opportunity arises. The 1990s debate over the thesis "democracies never war against each other" consisted almost entirely of attempts to falsify it and of counter-attempts to falsify the falsifiers.

⁷ A claim of universality is implicit in Maine, Tönnies, Durkheim, Elazar, Inglehart and other intuitive typologisers (Table 3.5), however their categories depend on *their* definitions so one can never prove them wrong. Grid-group theory would come nearest to an explicit claim but is unable to produce a list of confirming challenges along the lines of Tables 4.2 and 5.8 (mainly because it knows only the Z and X axes). Mars (1994 [1982]: 29) made the most extensive attempt in the grid-group literature, listing half a dozen somewhat nebulous dimensional issues.

and are readily shown to be in error (§3.2, Appendix 4). The only significant empirical (partial) rival is Inglehart's post-materialism theory which in Chapter 7 is shown to be weaker discriminator than WOLT—using data collected to favour Inglehart.

- Where it can be shown empirically that any of the numerous disparate issues that theoretically fit on each axis do not go together with the other issues on that axis (believe one, believe them all; reject one reject them all), the theory is refuted. From Table 4.2 and elsewhere, falsifying combinations number in the tens of thousands. Empirical refutation needs explaining, presumably in terms of local circumstances. If refutations were numerous or persistent over a broad range of environments the theory would be failing. There is little evidence of refutation in the testing outlined in Chapter 7.

- Similarly, issues across axes may only go together according to the four viable types; combinations which form the four "blank" points are inadmissible. This, too, implies tens of thousands of falsifying combinations.

- Any theoretical procedure which showed that the axes are not orthogonal (i.e. not independent), or that the types are not discrete and there is some kind of continuum or "halfway" between them, would be a falsification.

6.3 Discovering nature's ideal types

6.3.1 Intersubjectivity through relationships, not definition

There is another vital requirement for successful science theory: intersubjectivity. The ideal types and their corresponding objects of study in the phenomenal world must be agreed. When the physicist writes F = ma, there is no dispute about the meaning of force, mass and acceleration and no one who uses them has doubts about what they refer to. This confidence does not obtain in social science. John Searle (1995) says it is because the objects of study are socially constructed. He points out that a dollar bill, a theatre ticket, a certificate of competency, are just pieces of paper unless we ascribe their "real" meaning to them socially. A university, a game of chess, and a corporation only exist if people agree they exist; otherwise they are, respectively, ordered piles of bricks, some funny shapes, and—nothing at all. The social world is made of up of socially constructed objects. Things like a ticket or a university will not be subject to much dispute but more abstract concepts find no agreement. As senior anthropologist Roy D'Andrade puts it:

The basic problem revolves around the issue of *identification*; that is, *the development of a method by which an ethnographer can reliably identify cultural ideas, beliefs, or values.* (D'Andrade 2000: 16, italics original).

After a century of intensive activity, anthropology cannot identify what it is supposed to be studying. Mary Douglas shared his frustration—and invented GG theory:

...if anthropologists want to compare two types of ancestor worship, for example, or two kinds of belief in witchcraft, the cultural differences will often be so vast as to render vain any effort of comparison. Cultural Theory is a kind of solution to this problem. (Douglas 2005b: 2)

Dowding (2001: 91), quoted above, wants "simplified representations of social processes and institutions" but Searle, D'Andrade and Douglas are complaining that there is no way to reliably say what a "process" or an "institution" is. The problem arises with quite simple events, for example the person who raises a hand. Is it a vote? A bid? An attempt to catch attention? The actual raised hand is not of interest; what matters is the socially imputed meaning and its "thick description" may be contested. One would like to conduct empirical testing of purported social phenomena but what is to be measured? We do not want to know how high the hand is raised, how quickly, or how long it is held aloft; we want to measure its social meaning. If three observers have three views as to the meaning of the raised hand, how shall we know which is correct?⁸

Meaning, by its nature, is a matter of opinion and opinion also applies to force, mass and acceleration. Do these exist only because everyone agrees? Some say so (e.g. Trigg 1985: 21ff) though it is an extreme view. They seem to exist as real objects independently of human agreement whereas social objects depend utterly on agreement. It suffices to say that the people who use natural science objects are agreed on them and agreed on what real objects these concepts apply to, and on their idealised interrelationship (F = ma). They are agreed because they see the theory works and they can take advantage of it to design seat belts, compute freight costs and launch artificial satellites. Every such application is a confirmatory test of the theory and reinforces the intersubjective consensus. It would seem impossible for a science to progress where the objects of study were not agreed by the scientists—yet that is the basic situation in social science.

Intersubjectivity does not mean agreement on definitions. Indeed, *mass* defies definition.⁹ Intersubjectivity means that everyone agrees sufficiently on what mass is, to be able to apply it and to learn new things. The problem of social science is often thought to be a question of agreeing on definitions, for example, Elinor Ostrom refers to John Searle and says:

The basic difference between the social world and the biophysical world is that the biophysical world exists whether or not humans reflect on it, but the social

⁸ The president of the Royal Anthropological Institute said it in 1940:

[&]quot;...one of the characteristics of a science as soon as it has passed the first formative period is the existence of technical terms which are used in the same precise meaning by all students of that science. By this test, I regret to say, social anthropology reveals itself as not yet a formed science. (Radcliffe-Brown 1968: 191)

Anthropology has since then given up the quest for universal technical terms.

⁹ In physics the definition of *mass* is not agreed, *time* is not at all understood, and what *is* agreed is that it is *not possible* to define *matter* (Jammer 1997: 1-5; Woodward 2000).
world is constituted by human thought, language, and action. Given the importance of language, a more serious threat to the future of our discipline than the lack of universal laws is our lack of common definitions for key terms we use including power, norms, and institutions. (Ostrom 2006: 4)

She sees the problem but her remedy must be mistaken: our understanding of the biophysical world does not depend on definitions. This principle applies to quite simple things: we all know what a chair is but can we all agree on the definition of a chair? That is quite awkward. A chair is multi-faceted; a definition has to be polythetic, meaning that it consists of many components, not all of which are necessary in every instance—which seems to mean that the definition is not definitive. Agreeing what an object is and agreeing on its definition are two different matters. The proof of the pudding is in the eating: natural science does not—cannot—agree on definitions and social science's wish for agreed definitions remains unfulfilled.¹⁰

How do scientists so readily agree upon their objects of study without defining them? How can everyone have the same thing in mind yet be unable to agree, verbally, on what it is? Does natural science depend on rough basic concepts being near enough and no one asking too many questions? Hardly. The answer must be that agreeing on *what* something is, depends on knowing *how it fits* with everything else. If each part of F = ma is agreed but attempts to define those parts yields disagreement, then the agreement must be resting on the acceptance of the relationship, F = ma. The relationship between the parts serves to allow understanding of the parts. In turn, the intersubjective acceptance of that relationship must rest upon its ability to deliver reliable results, on its imperviousness to refutation.¹¹

So not only does science not depend upon intrinsic properties of objects as discussed in §6.2.2, it does not depend on definitions of the objects. To know what an object is, is to know its relationship to other objects. This even applies to the chair: if we think of it as something to sit on we are describing its relationship to other objects. If we add that it has a back to lean on and it is too narrow to accommodate more than one person we add to the relationships. Apparently, in order to know what we are talking about, we have to know the interrelations. If we see the interrelations, we will see the objects. Ostrom, above, is exactly wrong: the universal laws are needed before the definition. To seek definitions of such social science objects as *cooperation, human nature*, or *just process* is to chase a phantom; these things are no more definable than natural science objects are. We should seek to know how they interrelate and how they relate to everything else in social science. The better we understand that interrelationship, the more thorough the intersubjectivity.

¹⁰ Newton himself said, "I do not define time, space, place, and motion, as being well known to all." (Rynasiewicz 2008)

¹¹ According to Einstein, mass itself is not a property but a relation. It depends upon the physical object's velocity with respect to a frame of reference.

We might note that although the biophysical world exists, as Ostrom says, independent of human reflection, the ideal types employed to understand it are not quite independent. Since the ideal types which are effective, and probably necessary, in understanding the real world do not actually exist in the real world, they must be products of reflection—and yet (contra Weber) there is no freedom to *invent* those ideal types; they have to be *found*. They do not exist yet they have to be found. Ideal types may be mystic Forms embodying Platonic essence but it appears that as long as everyone agrees on them, knowledge can advance, and everyone can agree on the meaning of ideal types only when they know how the ideal types interrelate.

If definitions are a dead-end, science can obviously not depend on a theorist's definition. People will agree on types if ideal types' interrelationships are open to checking, theoretically and empirically, by anyone and without reference to a particular theorist.

6.3.2 Theorist-free types from dichotomised dimensions

WOLT's tactic is to form ideal types from two dichotomised dimensions of idealised *social issues*. It is the approach adopted in Chapter 2 (and in §3.5 and Appendix 1) and also by the seven dimensional typologists discussed in Chapter 3. The process, which is by now familiar, is set out briefly in abstract form below before considering its implications.

Let a minimalist 2x2 table of types be constructed from dichotomised *positions* concerning two social science *issues*. From the two issues four *types* are formed whereby: Type 1 is entirely issue Y and excludes issue X; Type 2 includes both issues; Type 3 is entirely X and excludes Y; and Type 4 excludes both. See Table 6.1.

Table 6.1 General 2x2 form YX

lssue	Yes	1	2
Y	No	4	3
		No	Yes
		Issue X	

The issues Y and X will be matters important to the social science domain under investigation; let them be sufficiently clear, and sufficiently different, that for each of the four positions we can logically infer a list of properties. That is, we deduce four types each consisting of a list of logically coherent characteristics.

In this thesis this has been done with issues pertaining to social relations and all told there are about a dozen illustrations. In the case of WOLT, the issues are subjective social preferences and in the case of most other theorists they are objective social relations. The four resulting types are ideologies, social structures and patterns of behaviour. The present discussion is intended to be more general: not necessarily rational social relations, not necessarily subjective, just some matters outside the natural sciences. The issues are *dichotomised*, rather than more finely divided because in social science the only conceptually clear measure is presence versus absence. It seems that in social science dichotomisation is necessary if we wish to discriminate truly *ideal* types.

Now let two different, apparently unrelated, social issues be substituted for Y and X and suppose that when four types (i.e. four lists of characteristics) are deduced from these new (dichotomised) issues they turn out to be the *same* four types as before. We might imagine that this second pair of issues was shrewdly chosen. Suppose then that deduction from a *third* pair of apparently unrelated issues also yields the same types. If these deductions were scrupulous, not fudged with an eye to the outcome, and if the issues were genuinely different, this concurrence would indicate that these four types had some sort of natural reality, a reality transcending the issues from which they were formed. That would be confirmed if *numerous* dichotomised issues placed on the Y and X axes yield the same four types.

Evidently, the apparently unrelated pairs of social issues are actually related. The selection of the issues to place on the two axes is in the hands of the theorist, however if *no* issues can be found, within the relevant domain of inquiry, which will logically yield anything other than these same four types then the selection is independent of the theorist. Finally, if *all* relevant issues, even ones too specialised, or too unimportant, to serve as a basis for *deducing* types, always *conform* to the four types, it would mean that the four types were actually independent of the social issues themselves, i.e. independent of the very issues from which they were (thought to be) derived. It would mean that those four types were real ("ontologically fundamental") in the sense that *gravity* and *mass* and *distance* are real, i.e. they are set by nature, not by a theorist or a theorist's choices.

Thus a technique for discovering social science ideal types which are independent of a theorist is a theoretical possibility. It would be implausible, were it not applied herein to the domain of social relations. This thesis finds that among matters that rational people have to take into account in order to live together, the same four types always occur and there are apparently no issues which do not deliver or conform to the four types. WOLT uses preferences and the resulting four patterns of preferences were called Types 1, 2, 3, 4 with a Type 5 added to account for ideal-type persons who have no preferences.

George and Bennett (2005: 239) point out that a typology is not a theory, that a typology must be controlled by a theory to be reliable. They are concerned for the merit of the issues used to form the axes of the typology: Why construct a typology from *those* particular items? WOLT obviates this doubt. The first X and Y had no special merit: they merely produced the same types as all the other issues inserted for X and Y. George and Bennett state that a typology can be inductive or deductive and that they are mostly a combination. Of the seven dimensional typologists of Chapter 3 Bowles and Douglas may be considered purely deductive and Ouchi nearly so. All are partly deductive and, as Appendix 4 shows, it is the departure from the deductive where Triandis falls into error. This would confirm that, as set out above, the procedure has to be strictly deductive—the types are to be deduced from the dimensions and induction has no place.

How is the domain, the relevant sphere of inquiry, determined? Might we choose a domain so vague that all meaningful objections can be avoided, or a domain so narrow it contains no novelty? We can choose nothing except the first pair of issues. They generate the four types and the domain is fixed. For example, in §2.3 dichotomised preferences for *cooperation* and *competition* sufficed to deduce the four social types. That settled the matter: everything further had to fit. The domain is limited and delimited by whatever further dichotomised issues will fit onto the two dimensions, i.e. those issues which will deductively yield, or at least conform to, the four fixed types; they are the things that are logically related to the types and to the first and all pairs of issues. Thus not only are the types out of the theorist's hands, but so are the issues. Once the types are fixed *they* determine what issues will fit and how and where. Apparently the whole structure is a tautology (§4.8.2) and the issues and the types define and fix each other just as the parts of F = ma define and fix each other and, as in natural science, the only choice the theorist has is to try to discover further applications (i.e., further relational issues), and it will be the *theory* which then decides, via deductive logic, whether they belong and how they fit in.

There is a complication. Each issue divides the world into two mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive sets called yes and no, or present and absent. As Table 6.1 shows, the Y issue divides the world between Types 1+2 and 3+4. X divides the world between 1+4 and 2+3. A complication of this dual division is that its consequent four types can be arranged in a *third* dichotomous division: that between the Types 1+3 and Types 2+4 which cannot be shown in Table 6.1. Let issues which divide the world this way be called Z issues.¹² As we know, in social relations this Z dimension does occur, showing up with issue pairs that yield the four types but which do not fit on the same X and Y axes; they show on X and Z or else on Y and Z as per Table 6.2.

¹² This aspect of dimensions appears not to be discussed in the typology literature which says that if there are n dichotomised dimensions, they yield 2^n types. Here we began with two dimensions, X and Y, which yield 2^2 , i.e. four, types. The fact that four types then suggest (or invite, or require) another dimension seems nowhere recognised. If one began with, say, four dimensions to give 16 types (which is not unusual in dimensional typologies (George and Bennett 2005; Bailey 1994)), there is an astronomical number of further possible dimensions among those 16. Normally, each dimension carries just one "variable" (unlike WOLT, where three dimensions carry a hundred variables, i.e. issues) and when facing, say, 64 types from six variables, the types are usually reduced by arguing that some combinations of the variables would be unreasonable (George and Bennett 2005: 246-8).

Table 6.2 General 2x2 forms ZX and YZ

lssue	Yes	4	2	Issue	Yes	1	2
Ζ	No	1	3	Y	No	3	4
		No	Yes			No	Yes
		Iss	ue X			lss	ue Z

That the issues to make or conform to the four types actually fall on three dimensions gives rise to a further complication: three dichotomised dimensions generate eight, not four, positions and there appears to be no reason in principle why all eight types should not exist.¹³ It is a remarkable, not to say fortunate, circumstance that with social relations only four of the eight ever show up (§4.8) and the other four are blank. If this dimensional technique could be applied to some other field, and if all eight points turned out to be valid, how many dimensions does that imply? Where four points created from two dimensions can support three dimensions, there are no less than 70 ways to dichotomise eight objects into two equal parts¹⁴ (and there is no rule that says the parts they should be divided into must be equal). As long as there are only four points, three is the maximum number of dimensions (§4.8).¹⁵

In Chapter 2 WOLT was deduced from the issues *cooperation* and *competition*. Would social scientists ever agree on definitions of these words? They would not. When they were used in §2.3 to deduce the four social types scant definitions of them were given. Apart from a few remarks intended to strip them of their normative content, they were allowed to be whatever people would think of them. As was pointed out, their definitions could be so minimal because it was the subjective which was under investigation and the two concepts were mutually different enough that they would not be confused—particularly when restricted to dichotomised extremes. Those definitions, minimal as they are, may now be discarded. For present purposes, they *should* be discarded for cooperation and competition (and all the other issues) are what the WOLT structure allows them to be, no more and no less. They can be described with other English words but, as with the basic objects of natural science, attempting to define them raises points of disputation and while this may be interesting and possibly even insightful, we should leave definitions alone if we seek agreement and the

¹³ The literature on dimensional typologising does not consider these complications. The dimensions are the variables which are presumed to be important in the field under study and the possible combinations of them form the types which are then assessed for practicality. The relationship of the dimensions to each other is assumed to be orthogonal, that each additional variable (i.e., issue), doubles the number of types. Bailey (1994) and George and Bennett (2005) discuss the daunting number of types that are generated by four or more variables but it may be vastly worse than they think. They assume that adding one more variable adds only one more dimension. But as we know, whereas one issue can only be one dimension, two issues imply *three* dimensions.

¹⁴ n!/(r!(n-r)!) = 8!/(4!(8-4))! = 70.

¹⁵ The four points do not have to be divided equally. We can make four more divisions: 1 versus 2,3,4; 2 v. 3,4,1; etc. But the "issues" on these "dimensions" are simply the characteristics of the types themselves: individualism, hierarchy, etc.

application of the theory. They are what the WOLT structure permits and if there is some aspect of them to be checked, it is to be done by seeing how that aspect fits with the structure, not by looking up a definition. The meanings of the issues in Table 4.2 mostly conform to everyday meanings but precise meaning is fixed by axial location. Where the issues are terms employed by a particular theorist, as some in Table 4.2 are, their meaning is what WOLT says it is and if that should depart from the view of the theorist who invented it, the theorist's perspective is enhanced. Relevant examples are Hirschmann (§4.5), Linton (§5.2.2), and Triandis (Appendix 4), not to mention all the intuitive typologists of Chapter 3.

The general importance of the subjective—the emic—does not seem to be overwhelming. In the case of WOLT, the subjective is logically cleaner, makes things plainer, and allows some analysis the objective would not. Yet overall the same result follows if the social contexts are considered objective phenomena rather than preferences, which is what most of the seven dimensional typologists discussed in Chapter 3 did. (In that formulation, the Type 5 would account for those who are outside of all social structure.) Whether this dimensional technique for discovering ideal types can be applied in areas other than rational social relations (e.g. in personality or emotions) is beyond the present remit.

6.3.3 Theorist-independent relational issues

The fitting of a pair of dichotomised issues onto two axes permits no choice or flexibility. They have to be so placed that they fit with the four types and they have to be expressed in a way that fits. This will usually mean that their meanings are clarified. As shown in §4.3 freedom will not do; there is no such social issue; acceptable are positive freedom and negative freedom and these will fit onto X and Y and nowhere else. Similarly, *equality* will not do; it has no satisfactory social meaning; if equality of outcome and equality of opportunity are specified they will fit on X and Y (§5.2). If equality of opportunity and equality under law are specified they will fit on Y and Z-and nowhere else. The act of working out these correspondences not only forces the issues to be cast in a way to fit onto two axes such that they conform to the four types (or perhaps deliver them deductively as freedom and equality will), but the mere setting of a matching pair (such as positive and negative freedom) side by side reduces confusion between them and is defining in itself. The four yes/no combinations stipulate unequivocal acceptance or rejection, which brings their differences out into the open so the meanings of each of the pair are sharpened by the comparison. They are made pure, or extreme, just as Weber said they should be. Long-established distinctions like the two kinds of freedom possibly do not need refining but in the case of less settled topics listed in Table 4.2 such as managing needs and resources (Appendix 1: §A1.2), or self-identity theory (Appendix 1: §A1.6), or Hirschmann's exit, voice and loyalty (§4.5), or the predilection for categorising (\$4.9.1), the necessity to fit onto two axes and fit the types is defining: meanings are sharpened by the theory. The effect is to reduce, if not remove, reliance on the meaning of English words; there is no latitude for speculating on the ins and outs. Once sorted onto axes, the options, implications and associations are all fixed.

Meanings become deducible rather than disputable, something that in social science does not normally occur outside of economics. As in economics, clear terms should allow a more precise discussion not only reducing disputes of terminology but leading away from the normative. For example, one might analyse some person or social relationship or historic event in terms of *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*, or in terms of *mechanical* and *organic*, or in terms of *lions* and *foxes*. These analyses might well be illuminating and in broad terms they are likely to be similar to each other and similar to a discussion using WOLT as the analytical tool. However to go into details will require more precise meanings of the terms and those precise meanings can only be found in the writings of Tönnies, Durkheim and Pareto (who will surely disagree, and may well be self-contradictory). But the meanings and implications of the types and issues WOLT applies have no guru; anyone can work them out. Meanings that have passed through the WOLT sieve are no more authority-dependent than the meanings of cone, or electron or acceleration or crystal, or hormone, or blood-pressure.

In principle, a matched pair of relational issues can be split apart and issues can be mixed. Provided the meaning of half can be retained, then it may be matched with half of a different pair. For example, *positive freedom* and *equality of opportunity* placed on X and Y respectively fit the four types. They *must* fit—see §4.4 and Appendix 1: §A1.5. These two items would probably also deductively deliver the four types though it might be quite lengthy.

It is hardly to be expected that WOLT can eliminate all vocabulary disputes but if everything social goes onto dimensions which always deliver the same four types, it should cut a swathe through the cross-purposes and imprecision. In organisation theory, for instance, three arrangements corresponding to Types 1, 2 and 3 are widely accepted. They are called *market / dispersed competition*, and *state / bureaucracy / hierarchical control*, and *clan / community / spontaneous solidarity* (§3.3, Streeck and Smitter 1985; Ouchi 1980; Colebatch and Larmour 1993) But some want to add a fourth category to cope with perceived real-world deviations (e.g. Streeck and Smitter 1985; Hollingsworth and Lindberg 1985). Their basic problem is that they have no way of knowing whether or not the three accepted types are all the types there are. A related problem is their dependence on the English meaning of the three terms. WOLT resolves both problems by calling them Types 1, 2, 3, which instantly specifies the inter-relation between them for dozens of issues and, of course, extends the types with the real fourth type which no one in organisation theory notices (except Hood (1998) who applies GG theory).

6.3.4 When to find types by dichotomised dimensions

The above discussion and that of Chapter 3 comparing social theorists, and that of Chapter 4 describing WOLT's three dimensional structure, offer extensive evidence that tactic of using dimensions can be effective and fruitful. Some brief justification was offered in §4.8 to show that no deception was involved but what is its scientific status? The practice is as old as modern social science but in the natural sciences it seems to be unknown. What is the standing of creating a 2x2 table of four types by taking issues and using them to form dimensions?

The "how to typologise" literature is thin.¹⁶ In science, as in daily life, it is necessary to identify things and group them into categories and form typologies but it is not usual to do it via pairs of dichotomised dimensions. The Linnean system, for example, has no such tactic associated with its hierarchical classification. The periodic table has rows and columns showing relationships between elements but they are not composed of dichotomies. Mathematics distinguishes many dichotomies about numbers—odd and even, prime and non-prime, positive and negative, rational and irrational, real and imaginary—but there is no practice of forming pairs of dimensions from them. No one suggests, for example, that the four types yielded by dimensions of rational/irrational and real/imaginary would have any significance. It could be done but it is apparently pointless, not analytically fruitful. An equation shows the relationship of mass, distance and gravity¹⁷ but an elementary understanding might be to note that close objects are more strongly attracted than distance are dichotomised, that would lead to four types of strength of attraction as per Table 6.3.

Table 6.3 Gravitational attraction dichotomised

Total	big	strong	medium	
mass	small	medium	weak	
		close	distant	
		Distance apart		

Table 6.3 contains little information compared with the formula which allows exact values to be inserted to give exact results. Still, it does carry some information and there is nothing wrong with creating it. In social science there is no choice for it would seem to be the only way to form ideal types. In the case of WOLT it is somewhat less crude than the image of gravitational force in Table 6.3 because the types are naturally discrete (§6.4) whereas

¹⁶ At least the typology literature is thin now. Hempel and Oppenheim (1936) give the impression that there may have been more early in the twentieth century, in French and German.

 $^{^{17}}$ F = Gm₁m₂/d² where F is gravitational force, G is a constant, m are the two masses and d is their distance apart. To graph total mass, d and F simultaneously takes three dimensions.

gravity, mass and distance are continuums, which means the divisions of strong, medium and weak are arbitrary.

It is a common and informative scientific procedure to graph two quantities against each other on two orthogonal axes. In empirical social science the ubiquitous correlation coefficient is a number representing the pair-wise orthogonal graphing of two measured variables. To dichotomise an issue into *yes/no* or *present/absent* and tabulate it against a second dichotomised issue is a kind of minimal form of this except that it is three variables: the two dichotomised ones and the result—which entails three dimensions.

Since, unlike mass, distance and gravity, there are no units of measure for the social issues, the dichotomous presence and absence are the only conceptually unambiguous measures. In practice presence or absence of such things as cooperation, positive freedom, hierarchy, and so forth will often be unclear but *conceptually* the division is clear which allows clear theory to be built. (In practice in science lack of clarity is normal for there are always measurement errors and observational ambiguities.) Four types from two dichotomised issues supplies such unambiguous conceptual clarity as is achievable and however crude it may be, the Chapter 3 comparison of the dimensional typologists with the intuitive typologists and intuitive dimensioneers shows that it is very much better than doing without it.

6.4 The origins of discreteness

The discussion above assumes issues are dichotomised discretely. In Chapter 2 the WOLT types were derived from discrete, dichotomised issues and it was remarked in §2.3.6 that GG theory has a logical problem with discreteness: how can discrete types be derived from issues of social context (grid and group) that are continuous, ranging from weak to strong? This has been pondered in the literature (e.g. Boholm 1996: 70; Thompson et al. 1999: 21) but remains unresolved. With derivation from the subjective (as WOLT applies), logical consistency is given by declaring the deduction is from discrete issues. This is plausible providing people hold dichotomous views, i.e. views which are unequivocal, binary *for* or *against*, not views on a continuum from weak to strong. Because this proposition strikes resistance, evidence for a human proclivity to such "dualism" is presented below. The resistance is pervasive yet there appears to be no scholarly counter-argument. To repeat a caution that has been expressed a few times in this thesis, dichotomous thinking is not asserted as the *cause* of discrete types; in the subsequent section it is shown how dualism may just as well be a consequence of the four types, as the cause.

6.4.1 The case for dichotomous thinking

As far as the Type 5 is concerned, the question of discreteness is settled automatically because Type 5 is defined as someone who does not have views; there is no logical continuum

—no "halfway"—between having a view and not having one. In logical terms the 5s are thus necessarily discretely different from the other types. Real world 5-ism, like all the types, is a matter of degree for even serious hermits are not actually hermetically sealed off from society. Conceptually however, one either has a view of things or one does not.

For the four social ways, discreteness necessarily arose in the derivation of the types in Chapter 2 because each dimension was defined discretely: cooperation or not, competition or not. With discreteness specified for the issues, discreteness of types must follow. WOLT is a theory describing how people think. Do people actually think in dichotomies? Is it our subjective inclination to dichotomise the perceived world? Do we privately make up our minds (or just have the feeling, take for granted) that, say, we inhabit a competitive social environment *or not*? Or do we think of our environment as being somewhere on a continuous scale between not-competitive and competitive? The extent to which dichotomous thinking prevails affects the realism and legitimacy of the derivation of discrete types.

A case might be made that life is fundamentally dichotomous: the program is on two strands written with bases which occur as a pair of pairs, chromosomes form in pairs, cells divide into two, there are two sexes, most organisms are left-right symmetric, and nerves are binary, firing or not firing. But do we think in binary terms? We do seem to need some kind of relational devices to make sense of the world:

Reality presents itself as an absolute infinity (*absolute Unendlichkeit*), as Weber calls it.¹⁸ To acquire knowledge, we need dichotomies, metaphors, analogies, and parables. Their epistemological function is to indicate similarities and differences: similarities between different phenomena and vice versa. It is only by means of demarcation or framing that the human minds can isolate phenomena and acquire knowledge about them (Rutgers 2001: 5)

That dichotomous thinking is a common reproach is itself an indicator of prevalence though this may refer to extreme manifestations. Our vocabulary often (mostly? always?) dichotomises continuums—tall and short, good and bad, rough and smooth, happy and sad—even though we must well know that the majority of instances are not described by these extremes; to describe most instances we must resort to phrases: "of medium height" and the like. The vast number of adjectives whose opposites are formed with the prefixes un-, in-, etc also supports the thesis of a tendency to dichotomise. Although we are never explicitly enjoined to think dichotomously, we are told not to mess with Mr Inbetween: it is no compliment to declare something neither fish nor fowl, and a person who does not decide between two options¹⁹ is likely to be regarded as vacillating or dithering. The thesaurus is rich

¹⁸ Weber, Max. (1985 [1904]). "Die 'Objektivität' sozialwissenschaftlicher und sozialpolitischer Erkenntniss," p. 171, in M. Weber (Ed.), *Wissenschaftslehre* (6th ed.). Tübingen: Mohr/Siebeck.

¹⁹ The limitations of language are here revealing. The clumsy "does not decide" is needed for neutrality. To write "cannot decide" would be to put a negative slant on not deciding, making it out to

in such pejoratives and poor (pardon the dichotomy) in affirmatives such as "cautious" or "measured". Though we know the objective world to be a continuum, and though we presumably also have other ways of thinking about it, our vocabulary, at least in English, does seem to demonstrate a proclivity for dichotomising it.

Sociologists agree. Says Bourdieu (1992: 39):

There is a celebrated article, one of the finest texts of the sociological literature, by Durkheim and Mauss, 'The Primitive Forms of Classification'... where they show that, in the thinking of archaic societies, one finds dualisms and oppositions—hot/cold, east/west, dry/wet—and that these oppositions, these basic dichotomies organize every thought and all practice. These oppositions are applied to everything... Our own intellectual apparatus, believing itself free from all constraint, is full of oppositions of this type, neither more nor less deep. When you say 'quantitative sociology/qualitative sociology', you are not far from masculine/feminine.

Bourdieu says we are "full of oppositions" and yet dichotomous thinking is commonly frowned upon. It is considered simplistic and serious theorists might have been expected to eschew it. However, as Table 3.5 indicates, many theorists have seen dichotomies. The three pro-active WOLT types were noticed but often only two at a time.

Evidence for the dichotomous thinking of ordinary people is everywhere. Injunctions such as food taboos (including modern vegetarianism) say what may and may not be eaten; they do not say what may be eaten a little. The ten commandments do not equivocate: thou shalt not and there is no question of sinning in moderation. Conceptual dichotomies that are not continuums abound: true and false, subjective and objective, to and fro, them and us, profit and loss, the quick and the dead, body and soul, nature and nurture. The in-group versus outgroup dichotomy has justified slaughter for millions of years. The male-female dichotomy is arguably the most obvious, pervasive, interesting and important feature of our social existence. Chinese Taoist philosophy has the whole universe running on a single principle of opposites, yin and yang. Child psychologist Paul Bloom (2004) sets out evidence that Cartesian dualism—dichotomously distinguishing body from mind—is an innate human predisposition, a product of biological evolution, and that experiments show it is practised by babies.

There appears to be no question of a tendency to dichotomous thinking. For Claude Lévi-Strauss thinking about the world in terms of binary opposites was a human trait. Rodney Needham agreed though he argued with Lévi-Strauss on the details. Needham, discussing Hertz's 1909 investigation into "polarity", says:

be a failing. Writing "will not decide" would imply that not deciding is a wilful refusal. Thus the language itself, presumably reflecting normal thinking, condemns as incapable or obstinate the person who *does* not decide between options.

Hertz thus contributed... to the recognition of dualism—i.e. the classification by binary opposition—as an elementary and universal mode of classification. Over the next sixty years and more, increasing attention was paid to this feature by anthropologists and by scholars in other disciplines... Ethnographically, it is very remarkable that civilizations most distant from each other in time and space should have constructed practically identical dual classifications, composed of such standard oppositions as right/left, male/female, strong/weak, superior/ inferior, light/dark, and so on.

We have already seen, when we surveyed certain forms of classification, that this simple relation of opposition can be transcended in more elaborate systems, but it remains a basic resource in the articulation of symbolic categories. (Needham 1979: 31-2)

Needham's topic is symbolic classification of which dualism is just one aspect. He has some cautionary words:

The universal incidence of dual symbolic classification, whether in integral systems (China, Miwok) or as partially expressed in more complex settings, suggests the possibility that to classify by binary opposition is a natural proclivity of the human mind. This is a radical but so far intractable problem. (Needham 1979: 57)

Ethnographer McKim Marriott (1976) who in effect worked out WOLT/grid-group theory independently (Ostrander 1982, §3.2.2), asserts that Hindus are monist, not dualist. However this seems to be a case where, as Needham puts it in the quote above, "this simple relation of opposition can be transcended in more elaborate systems." The paper by Marriott discussed in §3.2.2 is titled Hindu transactions: diversity without dualism and he finds, empirically, that Hindu society has four social relations patterns-and thus escapes from dualism. On that basis WOLT similarly escapes from dualism. But like WOLT his thesis depends on it and his discussion is thick with dualist conceptions: Hindu "substance code" is gross v. subtle, hot v. cold, internal mixture v. external mixture, and he sees catalysis v. stability, optimal transactors v. pessimal transactors, maximal v. minimal, not-giving v. giving, status symmetry v. asymmetry, and receiving v. not receiving (Marriott 1976: 136).²⁰ He escapes dualism only in the sense that he ends up with four, not two, types. GG theorist Michael Thompson expresses a similar ambition in a monograph titled *Inherent relationality:* an anti-dualist approach to institutions but then he sets out the GG map and places more dichotomised issues on its axes. Escaping this dualism was a major motivation for Douglas too.²¹ However all, WOLT included, are based on dualities.

²⁰ The last three correspond to low-high Y, Z and X (§3.2.2 and Ostrander 1982: 23). Being objective, empirical, researchers' assessments, Marriott's terms designate ranges and the data (castes, occupations, in effect WOLT or GG types) fall within the ranges.

²¹ (Douglas 1982b: 191):

Following Maine, most anthropologists (and others) have assumed that the shift from status to contract goes in step with the breakdown of the corporate groups, as if the increase of

The evidence for a general human tendency to dichotomise in interpreting the phenomenal world is overwhelming and there appears to be no systematic argument to the contrary.²² Perhaps the tendency is the quotidian version of the scientist's need to know relationships between objects discussed in §6.3.1 above. Perhaps we do not understand anything unless we can relate it to something else and the simplest form of that would be the relationship to an opposite. For present purposes something slightly weaker than the dichotomies discussed above is required, namely that we merely dichotomise *is* against *is not*, i.e. existence against non-existence. For example, we need to distinguish cooperative from not cooperative,²³ which is a milder opposition than cooperative versus uncooperative. (The logical need for this minimal form of opposition is discussed in §4.10.) So the question is: do we think or presume in our daily, take-it-for-granted way, that we work or play *either* in a cooperative environment *or else* in one that is not cooperative? If we do, and if we generally tend to see things in such dichotomies, then the problem of the logical derivation of discreteness is resolved.

6.4.2 No need for dichotomous thinking?

The premise that humans think dichotomously was set in order to deliver, logically, Douglas's five discrete types. It does not follow that dichotomous thinking *causes* the five worldviews. Dualism was a position from which to argue and it is possible that the reverse holds: that dichotomous thinking is caused by the clustering of worldviews into discrete types. A logical difficulty was resolved but if dichotomous thinking does not cause the clustering, what would?

It has already been pointed out that people do not reason things through individually. The deductions of the five types in Chapter 2 were made from a basis of logical thought but such individual ratiocination is not plausible and it was suggested (§2.4) that social interactions would be the mechanism which would weed out inconsistencies. There is actually much evidence for such mechanisms.

individual freedom could only be traded against decrease in group strength. I am trying to present a less impoverished view of social change.

²² In a book of essays on dualism in cultures around the world, Needham (1973: xviii) notes that "from common report" there are some social anthropologists who "are very suspicious of attempts to establish instances of dual symbolic classification." Though he endorses this wariness he says the grounds for the objections are unclear: "Whereas there are many dualistic analyses of symbolism, which are open to inspection in printed sources, it is generally hard indeed to discover anything more than isolated allusions that can be set against them." I, too, have found much informal antipathy to dualism. In view of the total lack of evidence this presumably stems from a 3-ist antipathy to categorising.

²³ It is common to distinguish this "complementarity" from contradictory opposites, i.e. big/not-big is distinct from big/small (Lyons 1971: 463). Some philosophers also distinguish not-big from non-big (Rutgers 2001: 7). Probably non- would be required here in order for all cases to be included, however the distinction should not be very important since the concern is with a *tendency*, the tendency for people to dichotomise (to polarise, to see opposites) and how they do it is sure to vary.

One would be the psychology theory of "cognitive dissonance" which states that people bring their beliefs into line with their behaviour in order to reduce internal discomfort. If there is social pressure to behave in a certain way—and there always is—relieving cognitive dissonance should tend to maintain a common mind. This has been investigated in political contexts, for example in a discussion of structural factors influencing voting behaviour in the 2002 Bundestag election, Saalfeld, referring to Lazarsfeld et al (1948), says:

According to Lazarsfeld and his collaborators, 'voting is essentially a group experience'. Partly pre-empting Leon Festinger's psychological theory of cognitive dissonance, Lazarsfeld and his collaborators argue that individual voters seek to avoid conflicts with the groups they belong to, essentially by adapting to relevant group 'predispositions'... The high predictive power of this index of predispositions in empirical studies of US presidential elections led Lazarsfeld and his collaborators to the famous conclusion: 'A person thinks politically as he is socially. Social characteristics determine political preference.' (Saalfeld 2004: 173)

The simplest and plainest evidence would be the literature on group conformity stemming from Sherif's 1930s research into the "autokinetic" effect, an illusion whereby subjects perceive a stationary light in a darkened room to be moving. When they estimate the movement individually, the distances are idiosyncratic but when in a group, subjects agree on the amount of movement. Norms form when people talk. There have been numerous follow-up experiments of various degrees of complexity and difficulty, sometimes with experiment-er's confederates (stooges) distorting the evolving norms. Arrow and Burns (2004: 186) summarise some of these experiments and conclude that:

They show that group norms (a) emerge among people with initially divergent views, (b) are internalized by group members, (c) differ across groups and (d) are transmitted to new members across multiple generations of the group. They demonstrate that problematic norms (e) change over time to either match the preferences of members more closely or match the structure of the environment more effectively.

Here is a general social mechanism which would unify views by mitigating extremes and culling inconsistencies. As a thought-experiment, consider a state-of-nature where nondichotomous asocial people are distributed over the mental competition-cooperation landscape. Those in extreme positions would be unambiguous "types" but most, not given to philosophical reflection, will have inconsistent attitudes. Now let them be social. Their divergent views will converge for they will seek to agree about the way the world works and about the nature of their social relations. But the agreement will not be arbitrary, as it might with the autokinetic light. The derivations of the five types (§2.3) show that attitudes to competition and cooperation have very extensive implications, implications that apparently range over every aspect of living. In order to live together in some sort of amity there are many general questions to be resolved and there are just four internally consistent ways to do it. People who agree with each other will have to settle on one of them. The effect will be for worldviews to cluster around the four "pure" types.²⁴ Though there will be distortions from local peculiarities such as available resources or strong leaders, the assertion by Thompson et al (1990: 16) that each way of life will "clump" in its quadrant is very plausible.

If people will tend to cluster in the quadrants, would this not also apply to the landscape mentioned in §5.7.1 which crosses a north-south libertarian-authoritarian axis and a west-east left-right axis?²⁵ No, for there are no inconsistencies or incoherencies implied by being in the centre (or anywhere else) in that landscape. People may clump for sociability anywhere in a logically undifferentiated mental landscape²⁶ whereas the competition-cooperation landscape consists of four logical islands in a void.

Thus the premise of dichotomous thinking may be superfluous: if group-think is pervasive, there is nowhere else for people to be. Although, in light of the evidence, a human proclivity for dichotomous thinking is hardly in doubt, it may well be an outcome, not a cause, of the four types of social intercourse. Like many questions of causal direction, it is probably best to see the two tendencies as mutually reinforcing.²⁷

6.5 WOLT's domain, personality

Some things are within the WOLT domain, some are not. Read Schiller and be tempted to think he wrote it to provide evidence for a theory two centuries in the future. Read parts of the Bible for the same but other parts do not seem to have anything to do with the theory. Read Shakespeare and find the theory of little use for analysis. It looks as if politics is in and the passions are out. If the WOLT domain is to be described in a single word then "relationality" might be the best one. *Inherent Relationality*, the title of Michael Thompson's 1996 GG monograph, seems to capture something central. Then again, Shakespeare is about

²⁴ This does not require conscious reflection: if there are four viable ways of living together then biological selection could evolve a tendency to prefer one of the ways or stable proportions of the ways. Twin studies do indicate that political attitude is significantly genetically driven (Alford et al. 2005).

²⁵ e.g. <u>http://www.lp.org/lpn/9908-Nolan.html</u> and <u>http://politicalcompass.org/</u>.

²⁶ Clump they will. Latané and L'Herrou (1996) show experimentally that where people communicate on arbitrary matters, large stable clumps of agreement form, including stable minority clumps.

²⁷ An appealing feature of the reverse explanation (i.e. that the four social types cause dualism) is that it is modern scientific, what Kurt Lewin (1931) terms "Galilean". That is, instead of seeing, as Aristotle would, the object of study (here the person) as possessed of internal properties (dualism) which explain its behaviour, Galilean science explains the behaviour of the object in terms of its dynamic relation with its environment (here people living together). Anthropologist Rodney Needham (1973: xxxi), the dualism expert, admits that "ultimately there is still an uncertainty about the intrinsic significance of the dual schemes and their constituent principles. A general implication is that they refer to constant tendencies of the human mind…" He is much exercised by the puzzle of significance and by epistemological difficulties with "fact" and "theory". The fading of anthropological interest in "oppositions" in recent decades perhaps vindicates his concern: it has not led anywhere. WOLT offers a solution by spelling out those "constant tendencies of the human mind" whereby dualism is a concomitant of the necessity to construct social ways of life in one of four discrete configurations.

relations. The best description seems to be: those rational matters which people must take into account in order to live together. It is a conservative description for WOLT also includes things that do not appear to be absolutely necessary. As has been pointed out, as a deductive theory, the domain is fixed by the theory itself: what fits, fits, and no verbal definition is determining. Apparently impossible to fit are: emotions, attachment, mating behaviour and, for the most part, trait personality.

6.5.1 Personality and grid-group theory

"Personality" hangs around like a wraith. Lay people usually assume WOLT or GG theory to be about personality.²⁸ Triandis (2001: 913), a prominent cross-cultural psychologist, actually uses the word to describe the tendency to individualism or collectivism but he is an exception and the other theorists considered in Chapter 3 do not mention it.

Only occasionally do GG authors bring up personality and then with a presumption that it is a separate concept, although the GG literature appears to contain no discussion of the difference. Hampton (1982: 76) speculates that personality rather than cosmology might influence a person's choice of social context though he does not offer any particulars. If he is right—if, say, introverts are likely to prefer a Type 1 context, extraverts Type 2, neurotics Type 3, and so forth—it would be extremely important. However nothing in the derivations (§2.3) of the five types points to any such association. Boholm (1996: 72), criticising GG theory, compares its potential political exploitation with that of personality but makes no substantive comparison. If WOLT is confined to the rational, as it seems it has to be, there appears to be no possibility of intersection with notions like extraversion or neuroticism.

Personality seems to occupy a different space from the GG / WOLT concerns of ideology, values, morals, preferences, beliefs, attitudes and so on. Yet a person's social relations must surely be influenced by their personality. Saucier (2000: 367) says that "personality is more concerned with consistencies in patterns of behavior, whereas social attitudes and beliefs are more concerned with consistencies in patterns of cognition..." The following sections attempt to express the distinction. Firstly, the vocabulary of the four most popular personality theories²⁹ is examined through the WOLT lens, some of the literature dealing with culture and personality is reviewed, authoritarianism is discussed, some order is found in Winter's subdivisions of personality, and a few other connections are pondered.

²⁸ In part this would be because there is no other generic way to refer to it. The presumption of "personality" turned out to be so common that the public data collection via the Q-sort (Chapter 7) was promoted as a test of "political personality".

²⁹ Descriptions of the personality systems discussed here may be found in any introductory psychology text and on numerous web sites. The California Psychological Inventory has been omitted mainly because it is more complex. Though it is broader than personality (and deals with morality), it still contains only a few items that appear to relate to GG theory.

6.5.2 Personality vocabulary

The most widespread system in personnel management is probably the Myers Briggs Type Indicator which dates from the 1920s. It classifies into 16 types generated by four scales: extraversion–introversion, sensing–intuition, thinking–feeling, and judgement–perception. These distinctions seem to concern purely internal states and none finds a place among the WOLT types or axes.

The personality scales of US psychologist Raymond Cattell are famous in academe: reserved–outgoing, unintelligent–intelligent, emotional–unemotional, humble–assertive, taciturn–gay, expedient–conscientious, shy–bold, self-reliant–clinging, trusting–suspicious, practical–imaginative, artless–shrewd, self-assured–apprehensive, conservative–experiment-ing, follower–self-sufficient, undisciplined–controlled, relaxed–tense. Of these 16 traits some are interactional. Perhaps self-reliant–clinging, trusting–suspicious would find a place in WOLT as relational issue comparisons Y-X and X-Y respectively, while conservative–experimenting would be Types 2-1 if experimenting with things in the environment or 2-3 if experimenting with people politically (§5.6.1). (Whether types or relational issues, these are all false dichotomies—see §4.10.)

The best known clinical scheme would be the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory dating from the 1940s. The scales of the current version are called hypochondriasis, depression, hysteria, psychopathic deviate, masculinity-femininity, paranoia, psychasthenia, schizophrenia, mania, and social introversion, of which the only one with a weak correspondence to anything in WOLT is masculinity-femininity as Y-X.

The dominant academic personality scheme is now the "Big Five" or the "Five Factor Model" and indications of research with it are that personality is mainly genetic (McCrae et al. 2001: 528). Under the name NEO PI-R, the five main traits have each been subdivided into six parts: *Neuroticism*: anxiety, hostility, depression, self-consciousness, impulsiveness, vulnerability to stress; *Extraversion*: warmth, gregariousness, assertiveness, activity, excitement seeking, positive emotion; *Openness*: fantasy, aesthetics, feelings, actions, ideas, values; *Agreeableness*: trust, straightforwardness, altruism, compliance, modesty, tendermindedness; *Conscientiousness*: competence, order, dutifulness, achievement-striving, self-discipline, deliberation. Among the interactional items there are possible correspondences with WOLT: trust, altruism, tender-mindedness are associated with X; order, dutifulness with Type 2; and achievement-striving with Type 1. Perhaps there is a tendency for assertiveness and excitement-seeking to be 1-ist.

What is personality? Why those particular items? The items are empirically determined, generally the distilled vocabulary from questionnaire and other data. These trait personality schemes are the product of an enormous amount of empirical research and they

sustain vast academic and commercial activity. As descriptions and distinctions of contestable objects no discrimination is made between matters that are internal (e.g. anxiety, self-discipline) and matters that are relational (e.g. altruism, dutifulness) and it may be that the relational do not properly belong. There is no actual theory of personality for there is no explanation for the "traits" or of their interdependence and though "longitudinal studies have shown that traits are stable over long periods despite intervening life events," (McCrae 2001: 820) and though the traits are known to be between 40 and 80 per cent genetically inherited (DeYoung 2006: 1149), these are empirical findings and there does not appear to be any explanation of their social or biological/evolutionary functions. Whatever personality in this trait sense may be, the vocabulary comparison would indicate it has little in common with WOLT.

6.5.3 Comparing culture with personality

Psychologists in recent years seem to have taken increasing interest in culture and some fairly weak connections to personality have turned up, though they do not well match the vocabulary correspondences suggested above. Triandis (2001) offers a review of the relationship between the "cultural syndromes" (907) of individualism and collectivism and personality. He finds little, mentioning one study that "found a negative correlation between Openness and allocentrism [a preference for collectivism] and positive correlations between Agreeableness and Conscientiousness and allocentrism," (917) which in WOLT terms means Openness is –X, and Agreeableness and Conscientiousness are +X. Another study "found some evidence of greater tendencies toward deception among collectivist samples" (917). Deception is not included the above four personality theories. Many studies show a negative correlation between the Openness trait and conservatism (Van Hiel et al. 2007: 131). We would expect an item called "Openness" would be inimical to the secretive 2s, though the six sub-headings of Openness seem hardly relevant. For other connections, studies show mixed results (Van Hiel et al. 2007: 132).

In an earlier study, Van Hiel and Mervielde (2004: 659), posit a distinction between "conservatism" and "economic conservatism" (i.e. between 2-ism and 1-ism, or wet and dry) and, indeed, find Openness negatively correlated only with 2-ism. Most such studies have used the NEO PI-R, however Van Hiel and Mervielde use a very different scale called Hartmann's "boundary questionnaire" (BQ) designed to detect boundaries in the mind. The BQ seeks to measure how sharply, or how rigidly or impermeably, people mentally divide up the world. The detection by BQ of thin, permeable boundaries (putatively category-reviling 3-ism) has been shown to be highly correlated with Openness although the BQ test items are quite different from the Openness items (McCrae 1994; Van Hiel and Mervielde 2004: 660). The flipside of their isolation of 2-ism, is their finding of "heightened levels of openness and

greater permeability of boundaries at the left-wing side of the political spectrum" (672) which is 3-ism. This discovery that boundaries are important to the 2s and not to the 3s, is something Mary Douglas, using GG theory, had been saying for thirty years. Say Van Hiel and Mervielde (681), "There is no clear reason why conservative ideology would lead one to appreciate, for example, solid frames for pictures or particular clothing styles." There certainly is clear reason: it is an integral component of a coherent worldview (see e.g. Douglas 2007 and §2.3.2).³⁰

6.5.4 Authoritarianism

The negative correlation of 2-ism to Openness seems to be the extent of confident empirical correspondence of culture and trait psychology. Authoritarianism is a special case. It is not among the items of the four personality schemes set out above. Yet it is thought of as a personality trait in its own literature. Duckitt et al (2002: 76) review this literature and conclude that the right wing authoritarianism scale (RWA, which goes back to Adorno and measures authoritarian aggression and submission), is measuring not a personality characteristic but rather ideological beliefs—in short, 2-ism.

What one includes under the term "personality" is arguable but Saucier, (2000) who went through the dictionary and factor analysed all the "isms", agrees. He would have "conservatism or authoritarianism" as social attitudes rather than as personality:

Both draw on affective response tendencies, but personality is more concerned with consistencies in patterns of behavior, whereas social attitudes and beliefs are more concerned with consistencies in patterns of cognition (that might, of course, influence affect and motivate behavior). (Saucier 2000: 367)

Duckitt et al (2002: 78) distinguish two "social worldviews" which they call belief in a "competitive-jungle world", and belief in a "dangerous world" which fit reasonably well as somewhat extreme expressions of Types 1/4 and Types 2/3 respectively, which is to say the time-honoured division of individualism versus collectivism, i.e. the X axis. They find, empirically, that "dangerous" (high X, collectivism) is correlated with RWA which is what we

³⁰ One reason that Douglas noticed this is because she was raised in a strongly 2-ist environment (Douglas 2005a; Fardon 1999; White 1978 [1933]). Her self-aware predilection for order and structure also goes some way toward explaining her development of GG theory.

Using the BQ scale (developed for people troubled by nightmares!) Van Hiel and Mervielde stumble upon an aspect of human thought and lack a theory to interpret it. They wonder as their empirical investigations reveal that

the belief in the indispensability of clear structures and distinctions is typical for the conservative direction, whereas the lack of it goes together with progressive ideology. Thus, the present results suggest that conservatives should like democratic forms of cooperation just as much as progressives, at least insofar as work tasks are precise and clearly delineated. (Van Hiel and Mervielde 2004: 680)

Quite—assuming it is possible for hierarchy to be democratic.

would expect, while "competitive jungle" (low X) correlates with "social dominance orientation" (SDO), which is a more recent scale designed to measure the desire to dominate (Duckitt et al. 2002: 75; Van Hiel et al. 2007: 133). This we would also expect since low X includes 1s whose aim in life is to compete and get ahead. They also find that "dangerous" is weakly correlated with "social conformity" while the "jungle" is weakly negatively correlated with it, which is in accord with the X axis, and jungle also has a strong correlation with tough-mindedness while "dangerous" has none which is to say low X is more tough-minded than high X which would make sense if the individualistic competitive environment demands toughness—as seems plausible. In short, collectivism correlates with conformity and authoritarianism, while individualism correlates with tough-mindedness and dominance orientation.

It would appear that SDO measures 1-ism and RWA measures 2-ism, i.e. people who believe in hierarchy. It does not follow that because hierarchy is called "authoritarian", those who agree with it are of authoritarian personality, unless they be so defined, in which case Edmund Burke and Michael Oakeshott are authoritarians, in which case "authoritarian personality" has no prospect whatever of explaining World War II fascism, which was the original point of the concept.

Both of these names, right wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation, are pejorative, bestowed by people who disapprove of them. It appears that what they are measuring is, in neutral terms, a preference for a hierarchical authority structure (as obtains in most sizable organisations), and a striving for self-advancement (as everyone is encouraged to do). That is, they are 2s and 1s. The original thesis was that "an individual is most receptive to those ideologies which afford the fullest expression to his over-all personality structure" (Horkheimer, quoted in Todosijevic and Enyedi 2008: 767), and "…the core of the authoritarian disposition is composed by authoritarian aggressiveness, conventionalism, and authoritarian submissiveness" (770). In ordinary parlance we would label as authoritarian a person who insisted on getting his or her own way, who put personal authority ahead of substantive outcomes. That would be a personality property and there seems no logic which can associate such attitudes with any of the WOLT types. Empirically we might say that at the collective level, political history shows that authoritarian outrages by extreme 3-ist regimes have been as great as those of 2-ist regimes. It all seems to indicate that research using a loaded vocabulary leads to confusion.

6.5.5 Some order

Evidently, distinguishing personality from worldview is not easy and if we were to declare all the psychology of the individual to be part of "personality" then we would include the WOLT types as personality types. Some order among the concepts is given by David Winter (2005), a senior political personality researcher, who sees four domains of personality:

cognitions, traits, motives and *social context* which he derives from the two dichotomies, *public-subjective v. private-objective* and *trans-situational v. situation-dependent* as set out in Table 6.4. WOLT belongs in his cognitions category. We can see some things that belong to WOLT in the situation-dependent row, both private motives and public context. WOLT in effect says these things are actually to a large extent trans-situational. His scheme has no place for the intimate connection between cognitions and social contexts so central to WOLT.

Table 6.4 Types of personality theories

	Private, subjective	Public, objective
Trans- situational	COGNITIONS beliefs, attitudes, values, self-concept, identity	TRAITS Big Five etc. (extraversion, neuroticism, openness)
Situation- dependent	MOTIVES motives, goals, eg achievement, affiliation, power	SOCIAL CONTEXT (i) immediate situation (ii) gender, class, wealth, culture, social identity

Winter's (2005: 572) classification of personality theories. WOLT readily fits under 'cognitions' but WOLT says that both of the situation-dependent 'Motives' and some of 'Social context' are related to cognitions (i.e., worldview) although social context in WOLT terms is more about how people inter-relate, rather than gender, class, etc. 'Traits', on the other hand, seem to have no connection to the other three categories. Thus the world is divided between trait personality and the three rational conditions: cognitions, motives and social context.

If there were no overlap of the top right hand personality traits with the other three categories then Winter's personality could be divided into two aspects which might be called the rational-relational (WOLT) and the emotional-internal ("personality").³¹ Winter remarks that motives cannot easily be mapped onto traits (566) and since the overlap of all three—cognitions, social context and motives—with traits is so small, and since WOLT is so inflexible and its boundaries are comparatively firm, it looks as if the potential is for the concept of traits to be refined to eliminate the overlap. That would mean that it is mainly Openness which would be refined.³² Perhaps, too, it would be fruitful to explicitly distinguish

³¹ There is a tradition of separating the cognitive and the affective in psychology. Fabrigar et al (1999: 28), cite references dating to the 1940s and say, "According to the tripartite model... attitudes have affective, cognitive, and behavioral components... Numerous studies have investigated the hypothesised tripartite nature of attitudes... in particular, the affective and cognitive components have received a great deal of attention as separable aspects of attitude structure... Therefore, there are compelling theoretical and empirical rationales for separating affect and cognition in attitude structure."

³² Winter's classification throws some light. However much related to trait personality is murky. One significant trans-situational objective trait is *intelligence* which occurs only in Cattell's list. Intelligence is not emotion, and if emotion is trait personality's main concern, the emotions themselves—anger, joy, disgust, fear, rage, grief, and so on—are nowhere mentioned. Do, then, personality traits refer to *predispositions* to certain emotions? In the case of the ancient four humour division into sanguine,

the internal personal from the interactional relational, instead of (or as well as) subjectiveobjective distinction.

6.5.6 Some connections

The emotions, whatever they are, do seem to intersect with culture. There is presumably nothing more emotional than love and there is empirical evidence that the individualism-collectivism dichotomy is related to how people love. Le and Levenson (2005) found collectivism correlated with "self-transcendence" in a study of 90 immigrants to the US and a study of 164 undergraduate students. They review other research and conclude that, "At the psychological level, the internalization of these cultural syndromes can result in differences of perceptions of self and others... which may differentially affect the development of self-transcendence and love." Perhaps WOLT does have something to say about love. At least we might expect that if romance is facilitated by harmony then unlike WOLT types would tend not to be mutually attracted.

Adherents of the five ways of life are necessarily emotionally attached to their position; they will often be passionate about it and it would be usual for attitudes to important issues, and towards other types, to be visceral. However, conceptually, such emotion is separate from the pattern of rational preferences.³³ For example, consider material risk; this is a rational matter to which WOLT gives its five rational answers (yes, maybe, no, don't understand, uninterested), yet taking a risk, even thinking about taking a risk, is emotionally stirring. Are there five corresponding emotional responses? There seems no reason to think so: an individual will prefer one approach to risk because he or she "likes" it and another will prefer different approach also on the basis of liking. WOLT explains which people will like which approach but the *strength* of liking (or nervousness or whatever) is a separate issue and will be, presumably, an expression of the individual's personality. Or perhaps it is just the strength of their type adherence. WOLT is constructed on an assumption of rationality behind the liking and when it comes to empirically testing the validity of the theory, to the extent this involves asking people, it involves asking them what they like. Predilections will show idiosyncratic vatriations: this Type 1 is a creative original thinker; that one is fascinated by celebrity and fame. This Type 2 wants to promote unity and common purpose; that one prizes loyalty and self-effacement. This Type 3 feels strongly about the school curriculum; that one is concerned for the preservation of wilderness. This Type 4's pride is a car; that one loves a

phlegmatic, melancholic and choleric, they certainly do (as do star signs and the enneagram) however, since the emotions themselves are subjective and situation dependent, they would have to fit under "motives" in Winter's classification—and Winter tells us motives do not map onto traits.

³³ Though it is a hoary question. "Socrates and the Stoics argued that only cognitive states were necessary for virtue, whereas Plato and Aristotle argued that both cognitive and affective states were necessary." (Homiak 2003)

football team. Recluses, too: self-reliant, or devoted to meditation, or fond of nature... WOLT achieves some order but the detail of emotional attachments is never-ending, so empirically there may be problems of distinguishing personality and emotion.

Notwithstanding the meagre overlap with academic personality theory, there seem to be direct links with what we would ordinarily think of as personality. For example Wildavsky (1989: 109) points out that charisma in a leader is personality and the 3s, to whom leadership per se is inequality and thus undesirable, resort to charismatic leadership when under pressure. Bloor and Bloor (1982) looked at scientists in their work environment and suggest that their findings of Types 1, 2, 3, and 4 cosmologies could be distorted by personalities they label "ambitious", "authoritarian", "paranoiac" and "passive". Disentangling seems impossible, at least for the restricted area they describe. It is also possible to see quite a few characteristics we would ordinarily think of as personality-related within WOLT itself. Dress and lifestyle for example, and we might reasonably infer the five types' tendencies to a distinct demeanour (brash, dignified, righteous, abject, aloof), and to a particular manner (bonhomie, formal, considerate, casual?, detached), and to sex (lusty, prudish, practical, furtive, bemused?). All of these things we would ordinarily think of as personality. Also in our colloquial personality catalogue are the types' distinct concepts of honesty (integrity, fidelity, sincerity, unaffectedness, disinterest), and perhaps even piety (talk to God, talk through priest, talk in tongues, talk to priest, commune with nature). The extent to which real people might actually display these characteristics is unknown but it does seem that many characteristics we usually think of as personality-related, plausibly correspond to the WOLT types.

6.6 WOLT's location in sociology

In Chapter 3 WOLT was located among theorists of typologies and dimensions. It was a pragmatic comparison of classifications of components of society. This section attempts to locate the theory at a more abstract level within the structure set out by Burrell and Morgan in their 1979 classificatory tour de force of sociological theories and theorists. They divide theories into alternatives they call *objectivist* and *subjectivist*. The objectivist they describe as follows:

If one subscribes to the view... which treats the social world as if it were a hard, external, objective reality, then the scientific endeavour is likely to focus upon an analysis of relationships and regularities... The concern, therefore, is with the identification and definition of these elements and with the discovery of ways in which these relationships can be expressed. The methodological issues of importance are thus the concepts themselves, their measurement and the identification of underlying themes. This perspective expresses itself most forcefully in a search for universal laws which explain and govern the reality which is being observed. (Burrell and Morgan 1979: 3)

This description of objectivist theory is a fine description of GG theory and by extension of WOLT. The dimensions *grid* and *group* designate "external, objective reality" and the focus is indeed upon the analysis of relationships, their regularities being deduced. Identification and definition of themes were prominent subjects in Chapter 2 and universal laws were the purpose. An important methodological issue was indeed the concepts themselves, namely to specify them in falsifiable form.

On the other hand, Burrell and Morgan describe the *subjectivist* approach as follows:

If one subscribes to the alternative view of social reality, which stresses the importance of the subjective experience of individuals in the creation of the social world, then... the principal concern is with an understanding of the way in which the individual creates, modifies and interprets the world in which he or she finds himself.

This subjectivist view is supposed to be "the alternative view of social reality" yet it is also an excellent description of WOLT. The subjective experience in the creation of the social world was at the heart of the Chapter 2 deductions. The principal concern of WOLT is indeed with the way the individual interprets the world, above all the social world.

This distinction between objectivist and subjectivist is something that concerns WOLT but WOLT falls into both categories. WOLT objectively studies the subjective. However contradictory it may sound, it is objective subjectivism (with the subjectivism constrained to five possibilities). It is not quite as contradictory to call it objective Verstehen, for Weber's approach is not dissimilar and, in fact, Burrell and Morgan are able to map all their many theorists onto their scheme except him. "Weber insists that objectivity in the social sciences is only made possible through the use of ideal types, which allow for the ordering of elements of reality," (Burrell and Morgan 1979: 231) and Weber also insists that constructing the ideal types requires Verstehen. Thompson et al (1990: 161) also see significant similarities of GG theory with Weber. On the other hand, it is widely assumed (e.g., 6 2003: 398; Fardon 1999: 212; Lockhart 1999: 864; Peck and 6 2006: 26) that grid and group are Mary Douglas's words for the "regulation" and "integration" of Durkheim's Suicide. Peck and 6 (2006) do not see GG theory as Weberian at all but call it neo-Durkheimian. This is a remarkable labelling flexibility considering that these two sociologists are normally regarded as being somewhat at odds and it may be taken as a confirmation of the simultaneous objective-subjective nature of the theory.³⁴ Durkheim attributed suicide to over- or under-

³⁴ Harry Eckstein (1996):

Weber himself was a resolute methodological individualist, in that he considered all social phenomena to be 'reducible' to individualistic atoms. If there is one crucial difference between Weber and Durkheim it is that Weber was an action-theorist and Durkheim was an interaction-theorist. For Durkheim a minimum of two actors is required to constitute a 'social fact', whereas for Weber the basic unit is always a single actor. Weber therefore avoids

regulation or over- or under-integration, terms which correspond to strong or weak grid and group (Z and X) though he did not set them as orthogonal dimensions and did not deduce any social types from them.

Although the subjective-objective distinction (and the concomitant distinction between objectivism's social approach, and subjectivism's methodological individualism) may affect the way meta-theorists would classify WOLT, the distinction is not as fundamental as it may seem since the types turn out the same either way. Douglas assumed the existence of an external social reality but the various other ways to derive the types demonstrated in §2.3, §3.5 and Appendix 1 show that grid and group were no more than a place from which to start the deduction. Douglas derives cosmology from an image of social reality; WOLT's subjective derivation derives cosmology from cosmology. The two approaches give the same types but starting from the subjective views avoids the assumption of any social reality. That is, with regard to the existence of external social reality, WOLT is agnostic; if reality exists, the theory describes it as existing in five kinds alongside the five subjective worlds; if not, the theory is content to describe the subjective worlds. Presumably the question will never be decided and we will go about our daily lives, and conduct scientific investigations, assuming the existence of a real social world. WOLT is not affected. The empirical researcher seeking the real social world ought to be able to detect the five (if they are not too heavily overlaid with local cultural effects) but may in practice be so beset with the operational problems of objective measurement (Caulkins and Peters 2002; Bloor and Bloor 1982) that convincing escape from observer-bias is impossible. On the other hand, the empirical researcher seeking the subjective types merely has to read people's minds (Chapter 7).

So WOLT exempts itself from Burrell and Morgan's meta-theory of sociological theory construction and bridges the supposed gulf between Durkheimian objectivity and Weberian subjectivity. It could almost be said that WOLT does not try to be a sociological theory, that it merely inquires into the vernacular "theories" that people (not social scientists) might hold about living in society, and finds that, for rational people, there are just five "theories" which archetypal social beings may adopt. These five are the result of holding coherent attitudes to the issues they need to address in order to live together, issues which are ordered into just three sets of dichotomous alternatives.

collective categories like consensus or collective consciousness as postulates for theory. (Eckstein 1996: 485)

So WOLT is both an action and an interaction theory. The basic unit is a single actor yet it seems a 'social fact' (whatever that may be) would require four actors.

6.7 Conclusion

This chapter discussed the normal approaches of natural science and showed that, however unusual in social science, they are respectable and were properly observed in the construction of WOLT. Natural science has proved very effective over recent centuries. The content of previous chapters indicates that its methods may also be effective for understanding worldview and social relations. With respect to traditional science WOLT may described as follows:

- It is *deduced* a priori, what some would call tautologous.
- It is *reductionist* in that it explains via constituting components.
- The components are *ideal types*, not observed objects or observed relations.
- The types and issues are theorist-independent; they are *nature*'s objects.
- It specifies *relationships* between its ideal types and issues; it is not just a taxonomy.
- As a taxonomy its types are *mutually exclusive*; there is no overlap.
- The types are *collectively exhaustive*; it leaves no gaps for further types.
- It is *consistent*, yielding the same results no matter how deduced.
- It makes *falsifiable predictions* of which many are empirically testable.

It was shown that the tactic of the 2x2 table formed from dichotomised dimensions, which is not uncommon in social science, has potential to deliver theorist-free ideal objects if multiple dimensional issues always yield the same types.

The dichotomisation of issues into present and absent, which is the only conceptually unambiguous measure of social science objects, was justified on the grounds (a) that people think in dichotomies or (b) that if there are just four coherent sets of beliefs for social beings who talk to each other, this will compel dichotomous positions on issues.

In §6.3.1 it was shown that science does not depend on defining basic objects definitions being elusive or impossible—and that scientists agree on the objects by agreeing on the objects' interrelationships. If dichotomisation is an inevitable companion of language it would have evolved with language which would make it a deep cognitive need, however science does not dichotomise. Science takes measurements and discovers subtle, complex, multi-object relationships. Scientists resort to this method of relational understanding out of necessity, rather than as a cognitive proclivity, for objects such as *matter* and *mass* and *time* can only be comprehended in terms of their interrelations. Is reality itself relative? It looks as if ideal types, at least, only exist in relation to other ideal types.

The distinction between WOLT and trait personality is blurred. Formal personality classifications lack theoretical explanation, lack internal coherence, and lack falsification criteria. Apart from a negative correlation between Big Five Openness and Type 2, there is little overlap between academic personality and WOLT, though there seem to be some

colloquial connections. Roughly, the boundary seems to be emotion and the personally internal as distinct from cognition and the socially relational.

It was shown that WOLT connects Durkheimian objectivity and Weberian subjectivity, and that it does not fit (or fits too well) into Burrell and Morgan's (1979) analytical scheme for twentieth century sociological paradigms.

Burrell and Morgan cover a large number of theories and at the end of it they sum up in a paragraph that speaks volumes on the nature of social science theorising:

Each of the paradigms has been treated on its own terms... Using our analytical scheme, destructive critique would have been a simple task. By assuming a posture in a rival paradigm, it would have been possible to demolish the contribution of any individual text or theoretical perspective, by providing a comprehensive critique in terms of its underlying assumptions... The task of academic demolition is simply all too easy. We have consciously sought to adopt a constructive stance, to build rather than to demolish. (395)

"Academic demolition" of WOLT is invited. This is the proper stance for a scientific model. Rather than "underlying assumptions" WOLT has explicit premises and their status is clear: to the extent the premises are not fulfilled, the theory does not hold. Rather than ask a "constructive stance" of critics, attack from a "rival paradigm" is sought. Realistically, "destructive critique" will not be possible, let alone simple, however it would be appropriate for scientific integrity *requires* that a theory be exposed to examination of its structure and conclusions with a view to falsification, i.e. destruction. The concept of falsification is absent from the paradigms treated by Burrell and Morgan, and falsification criteria would be difficult to infer (with the possible exception of Weber). By contrast, WOLT's large number of explanations and predictions offer countless opportunities for partial or total falsification.

The following chapter describes three attempts to falsify WOLT empirically. They fail.□

Way of life theory: the underlying structure of worldviews, social relations and lifestyles

CHAPTER 7 TESTING WAY OF LIFE THEORY

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Belief systems have never surrendered easily to empirical study or quantification. Indeed, they have often served as primary exhibits for the doctrine that what is important to study cannot be measured and that what can be measured is not important to study.

-Philip E Converse (1964: 206)

All we can do is to search for the falsity content of our best theory. We do so by trying to refute our theory; that is, by trying to test it severely in the light of all our objective knowledge and all our ingenuity. It is, of course, always possible that the theory may be false even if it passes all these tests; that is allowed for by our search for verisimilitude. But if it passes all these tests then we may have good reason to conjecture that our theory, which (we know) has a greater truth content than its predecessor, may have no greater falsity content. And if we fail to refute the new theory, especially in fields in which its predecessor has been refuted, then we can claim this as one of the objective reasons for the conjecture that the new theory is a better approximation to truth than the old theory.

-Carl Popper. Objective Knowledge

7.1 Introduction

This chapter considers the possibilities for quantitative testing of WOLT and describes three attempts to do so.

The heuristic corroboration of the theory presented in Chapter 5 consists of examples offering confirmations of it. This chapter seeks to *test* the theory, to put it under pressure to see how it might be *refuted*. In social science quantitative testing is usually via factor analysis computing correlations among selected data, an approach which not only seeks to *confirm* but which also substitutes a statistical model for the theory's model. It is thus inappropriate here (see Appendix 9).

To find WOLT's faults we would need to see where its predictions fail, that is, we would have to adopt the standard scientific method of comparing theoretical predictions with empirical observations. Conceivable approaches to testing WOLT are discussed and some are rejected for reasons of difficulty or ambiguity; the three tests described use surveys and seek to refute or confirm the WOLT *types*, not the axes.

It is apparently impossible to design a survey to exclude ephemeral and parochial effects, irrelevant to WOLT, which confound and dominate simple correlations. Moreover the mutually exclusive structure of the types means that for any type most survey statements will be theoretically irrelevant and so simple correlations are swamped by irrelevant responses. Given some information about an individual, WOLT predicts other information about *that individual*. Hence testing for confirmation or refutation requires allocation to Type—1, 2, 3, or 4—in order to then see if WOLT predictions are refuted.

Three tests were conducted:

- a 15-statement, 99-respondent Likert test for the three pro-active types
- analysis of the 1996 Australian post-election survey (1700 respondents)
- a 60-statement, 120-respondent Q-sort test for the four social types.

This testing should be regarded as exploratory. Large surveys tend to lack items which would detect 2s or 4s and possible reasons for this are discussed. Though a Q-sort is more enjoyable for the respondents than a questionnaire (and probably a more accurate means of comparing across people), difficulties with gathering Type 4 data indicate that individual interviewing would be needed to survey persons of 4-ist conviction.

The tests do not refute the theory and instead offer various confirmations. The 1996 data shows the division between the 1s and 3s to be a considerably better reflection of social attitudes than that between Inglehart's materialists and post-materialists.

7.2 Testing approaches

7.2.1 Confirmation versus refutation

Much social science testing seems intended to demonstrate the *correctness* of hypotheses through the gathering of systematic data and factor-analysis. This approach is not so interesting with WOLT for there is plenty of evidence of the theory's correctness (Chapters 4 and 5). It is a theory that seems to have no gaps or inconsistencies, which can illuminate the most disparate areas of social science and quotidian experience, and which can embrace and correct most recognised social typologists' classifications (Chapter 3). It is a theory easily grasped in broad terms and readily applied to categorise and compare countless well-known real or fictional people and their attitudes and behaviour; the WOLT types are readily recognised in politics, media, and daily life. In short, the theory has heuristic potential broader than any other social science theory and given this face-value plausibility, and the consistency with other theorists, seeking to demonstrate correctness through factor analysis will not yield new insights.

There is a further reason for eschewing approaches aimed at confirming the correctness. Its wide applicability is genial but caution is appropriate when seeing a theory confirmed:

...once your eyes were opened, you could see verifying instances everywhere. A Marxist could not look at a newspaper without finding verifying evidence of the class struggle on every page... And a psychoanalyst, whether Freudian or Adlerian, assuredly would tell you that he finds his theories daily, even hourly, verified by his clinical observations. But were these theories testable? Were these analyses really better tested than, say, the frequently 'verified' horoscopes of the astrologers? What conceivable event would falsify them in the eyes of their adherents? (Popper 1983 [1956]: 162)

It is human to see confirmations of our theories: people notoriously see their "theories" of race, astrology and divine intervention confirmed. Our intuitions and suppositions are not to be trusted¹ and this has encouraged the search for more objective approaches. One odd effect is the academic development of theories or hypotheses for which statistical support may be found but which do *not* seem to relate to the daily news, or to our histories, religions, proverbs, literatures, films, etc.²

¹ The problem of seeing what we want to see is not confined to social science; for example, a century ago it was considered as a fact there were canals on Mars; it was nonsense. <<u>http://www.umich.edu/~</u><u>lowbrows/reflections/2001/dsnyder.7.html</u>> accessed June 2007.

² The last academic social science theory that was popularly applied would be Harris's treatment of transactional analysis, "I'm OK—You're OK" over thirty years ago. In recent years Goleman's "Emotional Intelligence" has gained some limited popular currency.

7.2.2 A priori prediction, not post hoc regression

WOLT's power to interpret plain-language events and relationships, however persuasive, does not test the theory. The eclectic examples of Chapter 5 exemplify the theory. To *test* a theory we must actually *test* it, not set out to show how good it is. We must apply some process which has potential to show the theory to be incorrect.

The standard test procedure in science is to compare the prediction of a theory with reality. If the prediction fails the theory is modified or discarded. If it does not fail, the theory's credibility improves. This is the approach taken here. Newton's theory predicted a new planet in a certain position and when astronomers looked, it was there. Had it not been, his theory would have been in doubt. Darwin stated bluntly that if any structural part of one species could be shown to be for the exclusive good of a different species, it would "annihilate" his theory. So far this has not been shown. The epistemological underpinnings of this "falsification" approach were given formal expression in Karl Popper's 1934 *Logik der Forschung* and were extensively explored by philosophers during the twentieth century. Comparison of the prediction with the empirical phenomena is the standard approach to science theory testing.

However, it is not the standard procedure in social science. In social science the usual approach is not to test a theory's predictions with a view to falsifying it but to compile a data set thought to be relevant and then to apply multivariate linear regression to see whether it turns up a statistical pattern of types (factors or components) which resembles the theory's. The process does not test any theory; instead the data (collected with the theory in mind) are sorted to see if they might correspond to the theory's divisions. The epistemological status of this approach is unclear but it is a sort of automated induction. By this approach, "the social scientist abandons to the statistician the choice of the model" (Taagepera 2007: 115) and the derived "factors" statistically describe the data but do not explain them:

A major goal of science is to explain in a way that can lead to prediction. Such an explanation consists of 'This *should* be so, because, logically...'. In contrast, there is no explanation in 'This is so, and that's it'. (Taagepera 2007: 115)

WOLT is precisely this logical "should be so". The other problem with the statistical ordering of empirical data is that what is not in the data cannot be in the factors. Factors depend on correlations in the data, which depends on how *often* phenomena occur. Phenomena that appear rarely in the data are treated as anomalous. But WOLT no more says how often any of its five types occur than the theory of blood types says what proportion of the population is type A, or the theory of cloud formation predicts the frequency of cumulous, or the theory of gravity says how many moons a planet will have. A law of nature is not... a classification of the parts according to the frequency of their occurrence, but an explanation of how the parts hang together in the system. (Taylor 1958: 110)

How the parts hang together. A scientific theory sets out the *relationship* among the parts. It does not say how often the parts (or their relationship) will be seen but says—must say—that it *always* applies, that it applies to *every single instance*. Gravity applies every time, to thistledown just as to cannon-balls (§5.1). Mathematical data reduction techniques which depend upon frequency of occurrence are a sort of averaging process, which assumes that rare, non-conforming phenomena are of no concern. A scientific theory is not an average; on the contrary it is an extreme, it is the idealised relationship between idealised components (Chapter 6). Hence, though a theory must apply in every instance, no empirical instance ever precisely realises the theory.

Respected observers have long railed against statistical modelling in social science (e.g. Lewin 1931; Hayek 1994 [1967]) but as long as social science models are descriptive, rather than explaining through logical, causal relationships, it seems statistical analysis of empirical data is the default. In view of its universal use in social science, Appendix 9 discusses factor analysis and related techniques and shows that in the case of WOLT the technique will not yield the correct number of types *even when the types are equally present*.

All that is by way of justifying the present application of the classic scientific, not social scientific, approach, namely to test the theory by examining the efficacy of its predictions.

In §2.5 a large number of social and individual predictions were listed. The prospects of their empirical testing would vary from straightforward to impossible. For example, there would seem to be no way to falsify the claim that the Type 1, 2 and 3 ways of life are in a competition for the support of the 4s. The only systematic way to disprove the prediction that a liberal theory of justice which seeks a formulation satisfactory to both the 1s and the 3s can never be constructed (§2.5, §5.4) would be by constructing such a theory. Other claims, such as the prediction that people's work and leisure associations would mostly be among their own type and that this would tend to reinforce their views, seem testable, as does the prediction that everyone belongs to one and only one way of life. But even the testable ones would not easily lend themselves to a survey approach but would mostly require ethnographic investigation. This implies qualitative interpretation not greatly different from the applications discussed in Chapter 5.

Is it possible to stand back from the interpretive testing and probe the theory in a more objective way? The possibility of a quantitative approach is offered by the axial *issues* and by the characteristics of the *types*. The *issues* on the X, Y, and Z dimensions in Table 4.2

are very specific matters of preference and since many of them are everyday things, they should be well suited to a questionnaire survey. In §2.3 characteristics of each of the *types* were deduced and Appendix 3 has more. These, also, are mostly ordinary matters and suited to plain language phrasing and so to a mass survey. With regard to *issues* and *types* the predictions are of three general kinds:

- the characteristics of a *type* go together (§2.3);

- the issues on an *axis* go together (Table 4.2);
- only four combinations of (eight geometrical) axial positions can occur;

and these three approaches are considered in the next section.

7.3 Overview of WOLT's testable aspects

WOLT finds three axes, labelled X, Y, Z, upon which *issues* of attitude or social arrangement such as cooperation, competition, coercion, may be found. Three dichotomised axes give rise to eight logical positions of which four are occupied (as Types 1,2,3,4) and four are vacant as explained in Chapter 4. Allowing each axis a + and a -, the pattern is set out in Table 7.1 (which is a repeat of Table 4.3).

Table 7.1 The four viable axial positions

	Х	Υ	Z
Type 1	_	+	_
Type 2	+	+	+
Туре З	+	—	_
Type 4	_	_	+

The four antipodes, +-+, ---, -++, ++-, are blank, i.e. not viable (§4.4).

WOLT's fifth type, the non-social hermit to whom these social axes are irrelevant, might be tested as a type for consistency (correlations) of predicted characteristics. There is no attempt here to test for the Type 5 for an elementary ontological reason: by definition Type 5s have no view. There also appears to be no testing for 5s in the GG literature.

There is quite a large number of issues that go onto the X and Y axes and rather fewer that fit on Z (Table 4.2). Empirical testing for *dimensions* could investigate correlations among issues on each axis. For example, are the preferences in the X column of Table 4.2 for cooperation, social optimism, material pessimism, equal status and equality of outcome correlated? The four *types* which the dichotomised dimensions form have many specific characteristics (§2.3, §3.6, Appendix 3) so, similarly, testing for *types* would ask whether Type 1 characteristics such as: human nature is bad, liberty has a high priority, self-reliance is better than interdependence, material risk is opportunity, and so on, are correlated.

What is the practical difference between testing dimensions and testing types?³ The detailed answer is fairly complicated (see Appendix 9) but a test for axes must cope with the fact that any position on an axis is held by *two* types. Who is in favour of coercion? Both 2s and 4s. Who dislikes competition? Both 3s and 4s. There is therefore an inherent ambiguity in asking survey questions about attitudes to dimensional issues.⁴ Though an issue, taken alone, is type-ambiguous, the examples of Chapter 5 demonstrate that it is the 3-D structure of issues which permits analysis of various social matters and which is needed in order to specify what it is that the types share and what it is that each has which makes it unique. Since *types* are, in theory, unambiguous, it is *types* which have been investigated here. This testing must be considered tentative but, as will be seen, it does not show any significant refutation of the theory.

A test for the four social types might look at individual and collective subjective attitudes, or it might look at observable "objective" social structures. Those who have tried objective judging with GG theory are unconvincing, either making judgements of social structure that are open to question (e.g. Altman and Baruch 1998) or taking their subjects' verbal opinions as their guide to categorising the structure (e.g. Hampton 1982). WOLT was derived from subjective views, for reasons of logic and clarity, and its emphasis is the subjective. Where social structure is discussed, the focus is on subjective views of the structure rather than a sociologist's objective judgement. Thus testing is more straightforward if it tests subjective views. Testing the theory via objective assessment of social arrangements is not further considered.

7.4 Theoretical possibilities for testing the types

7.4.1 Irrelevant correlations between types

In testing for *types*, a special difficulty arises in that the four social types are in theory not correlated with each other, but in practice will be correlated.

³ The question of testing *dimensions* did not arise with GG theory for it knows only the Z and X dimensions and grid and group are the only issues upon them so the prospect that WOLT offers of testing correlations of issues does not exist. Mars (1994 [1982]: 29) and Thompson (1996) attempt to put a few other issues onto the grid and group axes. Inasmuch as they are specific they disagree with the WOLT distribution of issues (Chapter 4). Gross and Rayner (1985) set out a program for measureing grid and group. Caulkins and Peters (2002) could not operationalise it but Mamadouh (1999: 398) recommends it "to grasp the complexity of the grid and group dimensions". To take grid and group as a measure of culture is to take one item from each of the Z and X columns of Table 4.2.

⁴ An example of the ambiguity occurs with the testing for "belief in a just world" (BJW) for which there is a substantial literature (for an extensive list see Bègue and Bastounis 2003). It is thought to occur in two forms: BJW-O and BJW-S which turn out to be, in effect, the Y and X axes. Although research finds the two beliefs are distinct, there is a considerable correlation between them (ca 0.5 according to Bègue and Bastounis 2003: 455). We can see why: the correlation will depend on how many 2s (or 4s) happened to be among the tested subjects. If they were only perfect 1s or 3s, there would be no correlation.

The types are derived from common axes, but it is a logical and linguistic derivation and once derived, the types' characteristics bear no relation to each other except for being mutually exclusive. It seems this must be so by definition since if two types have something in common then that something cannot be an exclusive *type characteristic* but would have to be an *issue* on their common axis.⁵ Axial issues and type characteristics may sometimes be conceptually hard to keep apart but if we are to test for *types* then the testing has to be for the exclusive properties of the types. For example, who is in favour of entrepreneurship? Only Type 1. The attitudes of the other types to this are not predictable beyond the general, weak inference that they would tend not to be interested, that entrepreneurship is not their priority. WOLT makes no prediction of any differential attitudes to Type 1 concerns among the other types—they will all reject entrepreneurship equally as far as the theory is concerned. Thus, in principle, data that represented the types would show no correlations between types aside from weak non-discriminating negative ones.

In practice this ideal will be massively disturbed. In advanced societies, particularly the Anglo-sphere, a survey is likely to include respondents (3s) who have enough political awareness to appreciate the ramifications of entrepreneurialism and thus to be explicitly, even emphatically, opposed to it. Hence although, in principle, adherents of the other ways of life do not have a predictable position to Type 1 characteristics, in practice there will be connections. These specific oppositions of pairs of types will occur with different respondents to varying amounts and overall they are big effects, as will be shown. However since they are not specifically predictable it seems we can only proceed as if they are absent.

Who believes in the division of labour with the right person in the right job? Only Type 2. The only predictable attitude of the other types would be a lack of interest or some discomfort and a tendency to give it a low priority. Who thinks the primary purpose of education is to cultivate a critical attitude? Only Type 3. Respondents of other adherences have nothing to say. Would they object to it? Perhaps not; all WOLT can predict is that they would tend not to find it of primary interest. If they were simultaneously confronted with the rival assertions that education is primarily to develop skills to competitively utilise resources,

⁵ This is set out in §4.6. Here is a partial recapitulation. In Table 4.2 the three columns, X, Y, Z are issues which apply to Types 3, 1, 4, respectively and, with exceptions discussed in §4.6, may be taken as type characteristics. For example *cooperation* is on the X axis and is also a Type 3 characteristic because Type 3 rejects *competition* and *coercion*. So (with exceptions) we have a sort of shorthand where we can say everything in the X column is Type 3. But the reverse does not hold. (Nearly) all X is Type 3 but not all Type 3 is X. For example, *cooperation* in combination with the rejection of the other axes (*competition, coercion*) leads to further characteristics of the Type 3 as deduced in §2.3.3. Those type characteristics are not on any axis. So (most of) X is Type 3 but not all Type 3 is X. The same goes for Y and Type 1, and for Z and Type 4.

The rule on exceptions is explained in §4.6 and it boils down to this: an issue in the column X, Y, or Z is also a characteristic of Type 3, 1, or 4 respectively, *except when there is a negative in the adjacent column*. As it happens, most of the examples of this exception in Table 4.2 are Y issues.

and that education is primarily to build character and make a strong society, they might have a sharper negative view. That sort of situation should apply to many issues which, seen alone, would not get non-adherents particularly excited but seen compared with rival possibilities might stimulate a more discriminating response. (A Q-sort is a good medium for presenting such comparisons.) The essential point of these considerations is that if a survey is designed to detect four types, then for any particular respondent three-quarters of the statements will have no significance.

The derivation of the types from dichotomised issues on axes means that the types are mutually exclusive. That will not necessarily be apparent from the characteristics of the types themselves. For example WOLT says *entrepreneurship* and formal *division of labour* are incompatible which is by no means self-evident (the point of having a theory is to tell us the non-obvious), so examining this empirically would be a test of the theory. In other cases some mutual incompatibility might be intuitively apparent; for example, if those varieties of the primary purpose of education (discussed in the previous paragraph) are offered as side-by-side options the respondent has the opportunity to contrast them and hence some encouragement to express differing preferences, even where (as in a Q-sort) the respondent is free to rank all options the same.

In the two surveys I carried out, the intention was to devise statements that were unique type detectors, i.e. propositions that only one type would agree with (or disagree with) and which the other types would merely mildly repudiate to the extent they were meaningful to them. If this intention could be realised, WOLT predicts only a faint, non-discriminating, negative correlation between the types. It was not realised. As discussed above, this is no surprise, since the left-right division that is widespread in Western politics would lead to an expectation of a negative correlation between Type 1 and Type 3 attitudes and between the 2s and 3s, and a positive correlation between Type 1 and Type 2 characteristics because they constitute the political right (see discussion of left-right in §5.7.1). The left-right division is well recognised in our society so these characteristics would probably be internalised even by people who are not politically engaged. Traditionally, concern for the 4s is the 3s' raison d'être which should make them correlated but recently 3-ism has drifted into other things such as environmentalism and post-modernism. The two surveys bear out these reflections. In the Q-sort each respondent was given a score for each of the four types and when the four sets of scores from the 120 respondents (Appendix 6) are compared they correlate as shown in Table 7.2.
	Type 2	Туре 3	Type 4
Type 1	0.09	-0.65	-0.56
Type 2		-0.49	-0.40
Туре 3			0.05

Table 7.2 Type correlations among 120 Q-sort respondents

From Table 7.2 it is very clear that statements of the Q concourse did not only detect the types they were aimed at. People of 1-ist and 2-ist orientation did recognise and reject Type 3 detectors and the 3s similarly reacted to the Type 1 and 2 statements. And though the 3s did not much favour the 4-ist position, they did not reject it as the 1s and 2s did. There were comparable strong correlations among the three types of the 99-respondent Likert questionnaire. All these correlations have nothing to with WOLT. WOLT can explain them, as it must explain everything social, but the correlations reflect the particular society being examined. Note that a factor analysis carried out on such data would yield a dominant "underlying dimension" essentially with the 1-ist and 3-ist positions at its ends. This alleged dimension will be said to "account for" the data. There is no such dimension; these correlations reflect the 1-3 polarisation in current Western culture and indicate that (some of) the people surveyed did have some awareness of the connections behind the scenes. For perspective, imagine a survey conducted in the 2-ist Europe of two hundred years ago when liberalism was new. This could be expected to show little correlation between Type 1 and Type 3 statements (whatever they would be) and for both of them to be negatively correlated with Type 2.

It is apparently impossible to design a survey consisting of statements which detect pure single types. When a statement is reacted to by both the 1s and 3s (in opposite ways) it becomes a sort of half-baked test for the Y or the X *dimension* rather than a test for *type*. For example, if a statement concerned with entrepreneurship is systematically endorsed by the 1s and rejected by the 3s, it is performing the same function as a statement about a Y axis issue—competition, say—as far as the 1s and 3s are concerned. However it is only a partial Y issue because the 2s should be neutral towards entrepreneurship, whereas their view on Y issues, such as competition, aligns with the 1s. Hence correlations between types do not expose the WOLT dimensions; they expose time- and place-bound type polarisations.

If we accept, as we must, that many statements are going to stimulate systematic responses from two (or more) types, not one, then any data analysis which merely measures how the responses are correlated will be a mess. Its pattern of correlations will not reflect WOLT but will reflect the cultural concomitances that happen to be in the data set. *We are not interested in what the data contain; we are interested in testing the theory.* There will be other excresscent correlations caused by statements that inadvertently speak to more than one

type and which reflect systematic effects of fashion, current issues, and parochial customs (and there will be the random effects of mood and personal quirks). In any particular questionnaire the systematic effects will show up as correlations across types which reflect polarisations driven by way of life but not reflecting the essential WOLT relationships. In the case of the Q-sort, when the 60 x 60 matrix of correlation coefficients is computed, it shows numerous inter-type correlations, the greatest being between the 1s and the 3s as Table 7.2 effectively summarises.

7.4.2 Correlations within types

Correlation within each type is a different matter. The aim is to test WOLT's predictions of attitudes. The statements of a set designed to detect a type obviously should be positively correlated with each other. Any negatives would constitute a refutation (or a mistake in statement design). However a complication arises from the awkward fact that a statement is only significant to the person who adheres to the relevant way of life. Suppose, for example, that 20% of the respondents happen to be perfect Type 1s. Given a perfectly designed test, they will respond unequivocally to the statements designed to detect them while the other 80% of subjects will respond unpredictably to these statements. If we simply look for correlations among the Type 1 statements, the responses of the 80% will tend to overwhelm the preferences of the Type 1s. If the 80% are indeed random then the correlations between the Type 1 statements will be weak but conform to the predicted direction because the 20% will have a deciding influence on the calculation. But if there are non-random elements among the 80%, as there often will be, the 20% will be swamped and the calculated correlation coefficient will not reflect WOLT (per se) but other systematic effects. As it turns out, intra-type correlations in both surveys, though weak, are remarkably conforming. In the case of the 120-respondent Q-sort, the 60 x 60 correlation matrix shows all the significant (p < 0.05) correlations among the 15 statements within the four types to be positive except one: the correlation between statements 36 and 44 is -0.19, p = 0.04. In the 99-respondent Likert test, too, all significant correlations of the five statements within each of the three types conforms except one: the correlation between statements 6 and 7 being contrary to predicted direction at 0.18, p = 0.04.

7.4.3 Individual case testing

Evidently a sweeping, general, mass approach to analysing data using a statistical model will not work to test the theory. We are not at liberty to regard the subjects as an amorphous mass; we must look to the individual persons. WOLT is a deductive theory specifying how people see the social world and specifying how the social world is structured. If empirically measuring the putatively objective structures of the social world is too fraught,

to check the theory we must ask individuals how they subjectively see the world and we must look whether individuals confirm or refute the theory.

...the universal laws of the mind, when they are discovered... ...will be formulated in such a way that, given certain facts about an individual, including facts that are not themselves mental phenomena, we shall be able to calculate other properties of the system. (Taylor 1958: 110)

This is quite precisely what WOLT does. Given a positive or a negative answer to a statement characterising a particular type, WOLT predicts positive or negative answers respectively to the other statements characterising *that* type by *that* individual. More realistically, given a *couple* of consistent answers designating a type, further responses can be predicted. To be of value, WOLT must perform this feat more reliably than any other theory. (As discussed above, WOLT makes *no* predictions about the individual's responses to statements characterising *other* types.) Similarly, given a positive or a negative preference concerning a couple of issues on a particular axis, WOLT predicts positive or negative answers to issues on *two* dimensions, WOLT predicts the answers, *by that individual*, to the statements about issues on the third dimension according to the prescriptions of Table 7.1.

Although it is not social science custom, this approach to testing a scientific theory by considering *individual cases* is normal. A theory that says light has mass can be checked by finding a case of it, to see if light is bent when it passes a large body. Famously, a single case was celebrated as "proof" of that theory (Crelinsten 2006). Is gravity always 9.8 ms⁻²? To check we might climb the Tower of Pisa and drop cannon-balls, pillows and thistledown and time their descent (§5.1). The investigation will not prove the theory, only confirm or refute, and if we fail to refute, the theory gains credibility. Individual responses must be compared with the predicted responses. A refutation of WOLT would be given by a person who shows a worldview pattern which WOLT says is non-viable, for example being two types at once, or having *issue* preferences positive on two dimensions and negative on the other one (contrary to Table 7.1). A confirmation would be to show multiple characteristics for a single type or an issue pattern conforming to Table 7.1. Confirmation and refutation are not simple things; they depend on observations and on interpretations of those observations.⁶ To test for confirmation or refutation we will have to detect the 1s, 2s, 3s and 4s and then look to see whether they conform to the WOLT predictions. The process here adopted is to score each individual case in order to allocate a type (if possible) and then compare that score with the likelihood of achieving it by chance. If there are refuting instances, we will have to consider

⁶ It took a century and a half before Copernicus's sun-centred universe displaced the earth-centred one because of effective refutations (Chalmers 1982: 68).

whether they are significant which will be a matter for judgement, here as in all empirical science.

7.5 Likert testing for types: 15 item questionnaire

Chapter 2 set out some characteristics of the five types and Appendix 3 provides a classified overview. It is not too difficult to construct colloquial statements reflecting these characteristics. Figure 7.1 shows a questionnaire of 15 statements consisting of 5 statements intended to reflect each of the three pro-active types.⁷

Each statement is an operationalisation of the general form *I like Type 1*, *I like Type 2*, *I like Type 3*, for agreement, or *I dislike Type 1*, etc for disagreement. That is, each is intended to detect a single type. Thus the ideal Type 1 respondent would record five predicted responses to the Type 1 items. The theory will come under genuine stress to the extent that these five items are genuinely different from each other and to the extent that all 15 items are different (Sunderland 1962). If (say) the Type 1 items were just rewordings of the same notion, or if items of another type were linguistic negatives of the Type 1 items, then a theory-supporting outcome would be built in. If the 15 items are all on different subjects, neither synonyms nor antonyms can occur.

The statements of the test shown in Figure 7.1 came from sources such as the Australian post election surveys, as modified by considerations of the responses to two previous, shorter, questionnaires administered to adult education evening classes and to colleagues, and by discussions with respondents. The explicit intention was to make each statement apply exclusively to just one type though it turned out, as explained above, that the responses to many statements are correlated across types.⁸ The 15-statement test was completed by 99 respondents, subjects being friends and colleagues and their friends and colleagues. A stipulation was Australian residency, on account of the Australian references in the questionnaire. Respondents were predominantly though by no means entirely from the university environment. There was no expectation of any Type 4 adherence. The average age was 37 and the range was 19 to 89. There were 51 women and 48 men. The complete data set and the scores are attached as Appendix 5.

As discussed above, WOLT has no prediction to make concerning a Type 1 respondent's view of the 10 items testing for the other types, except that generally they should not appeal. The theory predicts that people see preferences other than their own as not making sense, so will not perceive subdivisions among those other 10 preferences. The result

⁷ The column of numbers under "Office use" reveals type. If the number is staggered left then the type should agree. If to the right, disagree. Statements were intended to be neutral to other types.

⁸ Question 2 is now out of date. Educated Type 3s have changed their minds on tariff protection.

Figure 7.1 15-item Likert test for three types (99 respondents)

WORLDVIEW TEST

Answer **SA** strongly agree, **A** agree, **N** no opinion, **D** disagree, **SD** strongly disagree. (Don't ponder too long – just react as you basically feel.)

(Don't ponder too long Just react as you basicany reel.)	Answer	Office use
AGE SEX	4	√ ×
TV coverage of environmental issues is too biased towards the greens	1	3
Australia requires more protectionist economic measures	2	1
Flag-raising and singing the anthem should be compulsory at school assemblies	3	2
The showing of nudity and sex in films and popular magazines has gone too far	4	3
The smoking of marijuana should NOT be a criminal offence	5	2
Employees do not have enough protection from employer exploitation	6	3
Australia needs a stronger military capability	7	3
The fusion of information and entertainment is a worrying trend	8	1
Young people today need more organised guidance and discipline	9	2
Gambling (casinos, poker machines, etc) has gone too far in Australia	10	1
Too many people nowadays have too little sense of duty or respect for tradition	11	2
"To each according to contribution" is preferable to: "to each according to need"	12	3
Taxes in the higher income brackets should be reduced	13	1
It is more important to respect the law than to question authority	14	2
Too many people live by manipulating money, not really contributing	15	11

Key: small numbers under Office use. Staggered left means Agree is type.

WORLDVIEW TEST CALCULATED EXAMPLE

Answer **SA** strongly agree, **A** agree, **N** no opinion, **D** disagree, **SD** strongly disagree. (Don't ponder too long – just react as you basically feel.)

	Answer	Of	fice	use
AGE SEX	\mathbf{A}	\checkmark		×
TV coverage of environmental issues is too biased towards the greens	1. <u>N</u>		3	
Australia requires more protectionist economic measures	2. <u>A</u>		1	1
Flag-raising and singing the anthem should be compulsory at school assemblies	3. <u> </u>	2	2	
The showing of nudity and sex in films and popular magazines has gone too far	4. <u> </u>		3	3
The smoking of marijuana should NOT be a criminal offence	5. <u> </u>		2	2
Employees do not have enough protection from employer exploitation	6. <u> </u>	3	3	
Australia needs a stronger military capability	7. <u>SA</u>		3	3
The fusion of information and entertainment is a worrying trend	8. <u> </u>		1	1
Young people today need more organised guidance and discipline	9. <u> </u>	2	2	
Gambling (casinos, poker machines, etc) has gone too far in Australia	10. <u>A</u>		1	1
Too many people nowadays have too little sense of duty or respect for tradition	11. <u>A</u>	2	2	
"To each according to contribution" is preferable to: "to each according to need"	12. <u>D</u>	3	3	
Taxes in the higher income brackets should be reduced	13. <u>A</u>	1	1	
It is more important to respect the law than to question authority	14. <u>A</u>	2	2	
Too many people live by manipulating money, not really contributing	15. <u>D</u>	<u> </u>	1	
		2 x 1		3 x 1
Net scores: Type 1: -1, Type 2: 3, Type 3: 0	·	4 x 2		1 x 2
Respondent is scored as Type 2		2 x 3		2 x 3

must be that each type sees the other types as scattered, disjointed and vaguely unattractive. The practical qualification to this is that the Types 1 and 3 are so diametrically opposed on so many issues and political right and left are such common parlance (in contemporary Western industrial society) that this opposition can be conscious so politically aware people may explicitly recognise what they are against. That is, a politically aware person of Type 1 or Type 2 inclination might single out Type 3 sentiments as opposition and vice-versa. A few politically aware persons may even have a concept of three pro-active types: the dries, the wets and the left. As discussed in §3.3, no one notices the 4s in this social-analysis context.

There are five statements per type. Individual scores are computed by allocating +1 for adherence, zero for no opinion and -1 for rejection. Each respondent thus receives three scores, one for each type (see example in Figure 7.1). If we allow a score of 3 to count as the qualifying score, there will be four ways of demonstrating type adherence: score 5 by agreeing with all five statements; score 4 by agreeing with four and expressing one 0; score 3 by agreeing with four and disagreeing with one, or else by agreeing with three along with two zeros. On that basis, each respondent can be characterised from their 1,2,3 triad as a confirmation, a refutation or neither. There are no structural restrictions which would prevent a respondent scoring 5 for all three types, or zero for all three, or -5 for all three. Of the 99 subjects, if the number of confirmations or refutations is greater than chance then the theory is, respectively, confirmed or disproved.

In the illustration of scoring in Figure 7.1 the *strongly* has been ignored. A number of variations for scoring were tried but they made almost no difference to allocations to types so discussion below refers to simple allocations whereby *strongly* plays no role.¹ Where a "type" is defined as a score of 3 or greater, the results were:

See Appendix 5 for all scores. The only suggestion of a refutation were the two "contradictions", both of them being simultaneously Type 1 and Type 2. One scored 3 and 3, the other 3 and 4. They were both quite young—a man of 21 and a woman of 19—perhaps

⁸ x Type 1
22 x Type 2
31 x Type 3
= 61 clear allocations to type (8+22+31)
2 x "contradictions" being a score of 3 or more for two types simultaneously
20 x "neutrals" scoring between +2 and -2, none of whom scored 2 for more than one type 16 x "sceptics" scoring negative -3 or more, one of whom scored as a sceptic on two types
= 38 not allocated to type (2+20+16)

⁸ x "weak contradictions" being a score of 2 for two types simultaneously

¹ There is no useful definition of "strongly". It seems its main advantage was to give the respondent some feeling of subtlety and hopefully to reduce the incidence of *N: no opinion*. People were told their score and given some information on its meaning.

too young to have settled into a coherent worldview.² If the bar were lowered to allow a score of 2 to be classed as a type then of the 99 there would be eight further "weak contradictions", three of them Types 1+2, two of them 1+3 and three 2+3. All eight scored 3 or more for one type and 2 for another. If 8 in 99 is a low number it implies that a score of 2 does indicate a type tendency. This is reinforced by the fact that of 36 "sceptics" and "neutrals" who scored an absolute value of 2 or less, none had 2 for more than one type. (If a score of 2 were to qualify as a type a further 20 respondents would then be allocated making 81 in all.)

Are these results low or high? Is 61 out of 99 a high value? Are 2 in 99 and 8 in 99 low values? The only benchmark seems to be chance. To compare, twelve sets of random responses were generated—twelve sets of 99 x 15.³ In the real data 14% of answers were "no opinion" so six sets were generated with 14% "no opinion" (randomly scattered) and six sets without any "no opinion". The average numbers of the types are given below.

Six random runs each of 99 cases with 14% "no opinion" yielded on average:

```
9 x Type 1 (range 7-12 over the six runs)
12 x Type 2 (range 6-16)
10 x Type 3 (range 4-14)
30 clear allocations to type (range 22-37)
6 x contradictions (range 3-8, one instance being a double contradiction)
41 x neutral (range 39-45)
21 x sceptics (range 16-27)
69 not allocated to type (range 62-77)
10 x "weak contradictions" (range 5-17)
```

Six random runs each of 99 cases without any "no opinion" yielded on average:

```
12 x Type 1 (range 5-18 over the six runs)
11 x Type 2 (range 4-15)
14 x Type 3 (range 10-19)
= 37 clear allocations to type (range 31-46)
9 x contradictions (range 7-11, eight instances being double contradictions)
27 x neutral (range 23-30)
26 x sceptics (range 16-30)
= 62 not allocated to type (range 53-68)
no "weak contradictions" as a score of 2 (or any even number) is impossible
```

When these figures are compared with the real data, the theory is not refuted. The real data's 61 allocations is high; its 2 contradictions and 6 weak contradictions are both low. So those figures are confirmatory. The real 61 unambiguous allocations to type compared with the random 30 or 37 indicate that the test was detecting a systematic phenomenon.

There is something else: the questionnaire seems to get the right answer. Many of the subjects are known to me and to colleagues. Some people wear their type on their sleeve,

² The intention was to avoid undergraduates but a few slipped in. No data have been omitted.

³ The random responses were created using the Microsoft Excel random number generator.

others reveal themselves after longer acquaintance (and yet others remain a mystery) so in some circumstances one can guess types. In the course of collecting the 99 cases there were no major surprises and only a few minor ones. There is no reason to think the questionnaire is not a reasonably reliable classifier of adult worldview.

7.6 Likert testing for types: large scale survey

Around the industrialised world many surveys are conducted asking hundreds of questions in order to find out what people are thinking.⁴ Should not WOLT, as a theory of everything, be applicable to these massive and essentially free data? Social science researchers who conduct their own surveys tailor the questions to suit the theory.⁵ In that sense, using a general survey might be a more demanding test of the generality of a theory. On the other hand not all items of a large scale general survey will be relevant so there has to be a selection from among them and some aspects of the theory will not be tested if there are no relevant items.

The code books of a number of surveys, including all ISSP surveys from 1986 to 2004, were examined with the WOLT categories in mind.⁶ It turns out that these surveys tend to include numerous statements to detect 1-ist and 3-ist attitudes but questions which would reveal the 2s are rare and survey designers are as oblivious to the 4s as the theorists discussed in §3.3. (Moreover, I have come to doubt that many people of Type 4 persuasion respond to such surveys—see Q-sort discussion below.) One explanation for the omission of Type 2 detectors is that the major marker of the Z axis and a big marker of 2-ism, is *coercion*. It is intrinsically difficult to construct useful statements of the general pattern: *I like coercion* or *Coercion is a good thing*. Everyone will profess to favour *cooperation* and they may see positive aspects of *competition* but no one openly espouses coercion.⁷ Of course, there are

⁴ There is a large number of surveys by public agencies. Major ones include the International Social Survey Program's theme-based surveys <u>http://www.issp.org/</u>, the World Values Survey, http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/ the European Values Study <u>http://www.europeanvalues.nl/</u>, the Eurobarometer run by the European Commission, <u>http://ec.europa.eu/public opinion/index en.htm</u>. Many countries run comprehensive post-election surveys.

⁵ It seems to be universal philosophical opinion that it is impossible to observe anything without some kind of theory (Comte 1896 [1853]: 29; Popper 1983 [1956]: xxxiii; Chalmers 1982: 32ff), however large-scale surveys usually have several researchers involved in their design and so would embody multiple implicit (or explicit) theories.

⁶ The ISSP 2000 survey included eight statements designed to detect the four social types (GG theory).

⁷ Rhodes (2000: 117) points out that there exists no non-judgemental, purely descriptive word for coercion in the sense that "kill" is non-judgemental vis-à-vis "murder". The evaluative nature of the word (and its various near-synonyms such as compulsion, prescription, intimidation and duress) confounds its neutral exploration and pre-empts dispassionate consideration of its morality. Its pejorative tone makes it impossible to advocate even as we daily coerce our children and routinely advocate laws requiring active compliance on pain of coercive penalties. It never has been considered quite proper to discuss the regrettable-but-necessary nature of compulsion and rule with analytical candour (Machiavelli 1984 [1513]).

markers of 2-ism other than coercion and their absence requires a different explanation. If such surveys had been conducted two or three generations ago statements concerning respect, respectability, seemliness, decorum, manners, pride, dignity, prestige, duty, truth, truthfulness, fidelity, loyalty, ritual and honour might have been included but these notions are no longer fashionable. Perhaps the public is no longer interested in them but at any rate the survey designers certainly are not.

One data set, the 1996 Australian Election Study Survey, was explored in detail to see what might be learnt. The survey asked 1780 people 151 questions on attitudes to issues and policies along with 114 questions on political opinions and 38 questions on demographics. The survey items include a considerable number that could be called "type detectors", where it is possible to say whether WOLT types would agree or disagree. Categorising them is a matter of judgement but for the most part not difficult, though there are items that can be argued over. As mentioned, nearly all relevant items relate to Types 1 and 3. This survey also included Inglehart's (1971) four goals⁸ providing the opportunity to compare WOLT with the materialism / post-materialism distinction.

The data were first explored to establish benchmarks for levels of correlation that may be considered large or small. The strongest correlation to be found among environmental questions⁹ is E7Pollut (*Pollution is an urgent environmental concern*) x E7Waste (*Waste disposal is an urgent environmental concern*) at 0.52, followed by E6Pollut (*Stronger measures should be taken to protect the environment against pollution*) x E6Spend (*Increase government spending to protect environment*) at 0.49. E7Pollut x E6Pollut correlates at 0.43

Correlations are higher concerning trade union questions: D9Strict (*There should be stricter laws to regulate trade unions*) x D9TuPow (*Trade unions in this country have too much power*) correlates at 0.75. D9NoTu (*Australia would be better off without trade unions*) x D9Strict is 0.61 and D9NoTu x D9TuPow is 0.59.

- 2. giving people more say in government decisions,
- 3. fighting rising prices,
- 4. protecting freedom of speech.

⁸ In 1971, Ronald Inglehart postulated a 'silent revolution', a movement from material concerns of food, shelter and security to a 'postmaterial' concern for belonging, self-expression and quality of life values. He asked respondents to prioritise four goals:

^{1.} the maintenance of order in the nation,

From the answers he classified people as materialist (priorities to 1 and 3), postmaterialist (2 and 4) or mixed. There is a huge literature on Inglehart's theory.

⁹ The environment is an issue which epitomises post-materialism and is a strong marker of modern Type 3. Grendstad (1997: 158) has a discussion of Inglehart's incorporation of environmentalism and of its inclusion in GG theory.

Table 7.3	Selected Correlations,	Australian	Election	Survey
-----------	------------------------	------------	----------	--------

	Materialist	Type1a	Type 1b	Туре 3
Equality	00	anti-union	free market	00
E2ADLand (rights too far)	.28	.43	.48	23
E2Abor (govt. nelp too far)	.26	.42	.39	25
E2Equop (women too far)	.26	.19	.24	16
E1 (cut tax & soc serv)	.20	.31	.52	28
Environment				
E12 (trade off tax/envir)	23	14	20	
E7Waste (not urgent)	.13 (.001)			19
E7Pollut (not urgent)	.12			17
E6Bias (TV bias to green)	.24	.39	.36	24
E6Uran (should mine U)	.23	.33	.41	36
Trade unions				
D9TuPow (TUs too powerful)	.26	na	.65	49
D9NoTu (better if no TUs)	.29	na	.54	37
E5Succes (all can succeed)	.10 (.012)	.22	.41	21
E2NudSex (gone too far)	.11 ໌	.29	.17 (.007)	10 (.061)
G5 (elect Aust pres)		.28	.31 ໌	,
D4 (I have health insur)	.11 (.006)		.05 (.04)	17
J12 (my income)	,			22
Authority				
E5DeathP (for murder)	.26	.40	.44	
E5LawBrk (higher sentences)	.21	.40	.37	18
Defence				
D2Def (defence important)		13	20	- 08 (07)
F1 (incr. defence spend)	10 (017)	17	26	- 14 (002)
C_2 (Queen important)	12 (002)	20	0	
G3 (Queen important)	.12 (.002)	.20	.30	25
Probity				
C2p1 (politicians corrupt)		.31	.30	.12 (.05)
C5 (politicians self serving)		.16	.13 (.025)	.12 (.014)
C2p4 (politicians are liars)		.12 (.003)	.17 (.003)	
C2p5 (pol recent moral decl)		.30	.33	11 (.02)
C7p2 (vote has no effect)	09 (.031)			.10 (.026)
B8Own (L-R self place)	26	51	42	.51
Education (hi – low)		14 (.008)	20 (.042)	
Age (low – high)				.14 (.006)
Materialist	na	.41	.40	19 (.006)
Type 1a	.41	na	.79	51
Туре 3	19 (.006)	51	na	na
Cases 1:	329	384	274	314
2:	316	299	51	246

p < .001 unless shown. na = not applicable because of common item. Dash: no significance (p>0.1).

E2AbLand: Aboriginal land rights have gone too far; E2Abor: Government help for Aborigines has gone too far; E2Equop: Equal opportunities for women have gone too far; E1: reduce taxes and reduce social services; E12: trade off low tax against the environment; E7Waste: Waste disposal is not an urgent environmental concern; E7Pollut: Pollution is not an urgent environmental concern; E6Bias: TV coverage of environmental issues is biased in favour of the greens; E6Uran: Australia should mine its uranium; D9TuPow: The trade unions in this country have too much power; D9NoTu: Australia would be better off without trade unions; E5Succes: In Australian society anyone prepared to make the effort can succeed; E2NudSex Nudity and sex in films and magazines has gone too far; G5: Australian president should be popularly elected; D4: I have private health insurance; J12: increasing income (Type 3 tends to low income); E5DeathP: The death penalty should be introduced for murder; E5LawBrk: Lawbreakers should get stiffer sentences; D2Def: Defence is important; F1: Spend more on defence; G3: The Queen is important to Australia; C2p1: Most federal politicians make a lot of money by using their office improperly; C5: People in government look out for themselves; C2p4: Most federal politicians care more about special interests than about the general public; C2p5: Ethical and moral standards of federal politicians have declined in recent years; C7p2: It makes no difference who you vote for; B8Own: personal left - right placement; Education: (recode) decreasing levels; Age: (recode) in increasing years.

Two other examples where a high correlation would be expected because the questions were closely related are: E2Abor (*Government help for Aborigines has not gone far enough*) x E2AbLand (*Aboriginal land rights have not gone far enough*) at 0.75, and E5DeathP (*The death penalty should be introduced for murder*) x E5LawBrk (*Lawbreakers should get stiffer sentences*) at 0.45.

All told, some 300 cross-tabulations were tested. The above are the highest pair-wise correlations found among the answers and they are all pairs which appear to have related meanings (i.e. near-synonyms and hence independent of any theory). They are all significant at the 0.001 level. (Correlations discussed below are significant p < .001 unless otherwise indicated.)

Related meanings do not necessarily mean high correlations. E8Envir (*I approve of environmental groups campaigning*) x E7Waste (*Waste disposal is an urgent environmental concern*) is only 0.23. E5Pref (*Women should get preferential treatment applying for jobs*) x E2Equop (*Equal opportunities for women have not gone far enough*) is only 0.18. On that basis it seems a correlation of 0.20 is worth noting in this context of trying to isolate mindsets.

In view of this, the correlations between D9Strict (*There should be stricter laws to regulate trade unions*) x E2AbLand (*Aboriginal land rights have not gone far enough*) of -0.34, and of E2AbLand x E2Equop (*Equal opportunities for women have not gone far enough*) of 0.34 are striking. People who are in favour of unions tend to be in favour of Aboriginal land rights and people who are in favour of land rights are in favour of equal opportunity for women. Prima facie, these matters are unrelated. WOLT would predict a correlation as would any politically aware observer since these are long-standing issues in Australia and the main parties of the left and right are fairly distinctly identified with them.

As discussed above, the correlations between two single opinions will be heavily influenced by systemic local effects and by random effects and some tested turned out to be quite weak though almost always in the direction predicted by WOLT. To test the theory, individual response patterns have to be examined. How to score and identify types? The approach taken was to designate as a type persons who affirm two or three predicted items (i.e. a rough equivalent to achieving a score of 3 in the 99-respondent test) and then to see if these individuals' attitudes toward further items conform to predictions. Everything that seemed pertinent to WOLT was tested and all interesting correlations are listed in Table 7.3.

To isolate **Type 1**, those who 'agreed' or 'strongly agreed' with the statements D9Strict (*There should be stricter laws to regulate trade unions*) and D9NoTu (*Australia would be better off without trade unions*) were made part of a dichotomy with those who 'disagreed' or 'strongly disagreed'. It is called **Type 1a** in Table 7.3. Suspecting that this might be an anti-union subset of Type 1, **Type 1b** was formed from those who 'agreed' or

'strongly agreed' with: D9Tax (*High income tax makes people less willing to work hard*) and D9EmpCon (*Individual employment contracts are better for workers than enterprise agreements*) and D9EcGrow (*It is more important to promote faster economic growth than to ensure that income is distributed more fairly*). As a subset these would be adherents of pure economic individualism. As a glance down the two columns in Table 7.3 shows, Type 1a and Type 1b are strikingly similar in their attitudes to other issues and the correlation between them is 0.79. These apparent economic libertarians, however, do not seem to distinguish themselves from Type 2 for they not only favour law and order and stronger defence (which *might* be interpreted in Hobbesian terms as modern 1-ist) but they think the Queen is important. And though they prefer, as libertarians probably should, popular election of an Australian president, they barely carry private health insurance and from E2NudSex they want to clamp down on pornography which is most illiberal. This was the only refutation of WOLT that turned up. Otherwise Type 1 coherence confirms WOLT.

Type 3 was defined from those who 'agreed' or 'strongly agreed' with D9Equal (*Income and wealth should be redistributed towards ordinary working people*) and 'disagreed' or 'strongly disagreed' with D9EcGrow (*It is more important to promote faster economic growth than to ensure that income is distributed more fairly*) into a dichotomy with their opposites. The correlations are as WOLT would predict, the only qualification being that as environmentalists (E12) they are, like Doug and Rowena Russett of §5.8, not prepared to put their money where their mouths are. The signs of the columns of Table 7.3 show that the correlations of Type 3 are almost a mirror of those of Types 1a and 1b, which is a distinct confirmation of WOLT.¹⁰

Materialists were coded from Inglehart's four goals (footnote 8) with 'mixed' being omitted, thus forming a dichotomy of unambiguous materialists and post-materialists. Its column of correlations show it to be a pallid Type 1. This is as WOLT would predict (see §3.3 and Table 3.6).¹¹ The correlations do show an attitude difference between materialists and the Type 1 individualists which seems to concern probity whereby the individualists are more cynical. This is in accord with WOLT predictions of the 1-ist world-view (human nature bad). It is interesting that the materialists who actually *stated* that defence was a high priority are less concerned for authority and security than the anti-union and free-market Type 1s.

¹⁰ Sjöberg (2003: 196, 202) finds similar mirror images of 1-ism v. 3-ism. He tests GG theory's efficacy as a predictor of risk and finds it wanting but the lists of correlations for 1s and 3s are startlingly symmetrical; even low, insignificant correlations are almost without exception mirrored in sign across the two types, a phenomenon that does not occur for the other theories he tests. He does not mention this and in an altercation with Tansey (2004; Sjöberg 2005) it is also not remarked.

¹¹ It is also not conflicting with Grendstad (1999) who compares Inglehart with GG theory for European data finding the materialists to be 4s and post-materialists 3s. He has a large data set but only two items each for grid and for group. He finds that Europe, country by country, tends to be divided between 4-ism and 3-ism (469).

These results are the more striking considering that Inglehart's theory is actually tailored to the time and culture and questions to detect it were tailored to the theory, whereas WOLT is a general theory and the questions used were those that happened to be available.¹²

The limitations of the approach are evident, the main one being the absence of data relating to 2-ism and 4-ism and a secondary one relating to the subjectivity of the selections for cross-tabbing (though that would apply to any tailor-made questions too). Overall, the results do not refute WOLT and comprehensively confirm the division between the 1s and 3s. It would appear that the distinction between 1s and 3s is a considerably better reflection of social attitudes than that between the materialist and post-materialists.

7.7 Q-sort testing

In an attempt to deal with the limitations of the mass surveys and the 99-respondent test for three types, a 60 item Q-sort "concourse" was constructed. Q methodology was developed by William Stephenson over a career beginning in the 1930s. It is a quantitative way to examine subjectivity with an emphasis on the views of individual respondents (Thomas and Watson 2002: 141; Watts and Stenner 2005: 88; McKeown and Thomas 1988). The respondent sorts statements into a preference ranking within the set framework (Figure 7.2). This delivers a holistic picture of the respondent's subjectivity and, because preferences are relative, it is a picture which may be compared with other respondents' pictures. (With a Likert test one never knows whether one respondent's "strongly" is actually stronger than another's "weakly" but in the Q grid, if one item is preferred some other item must yield.) A practical virtue is that a Q-sort is more fun than filling in a Likert questionnaire and it should be easier to find volunteer respondents, especially Type 4s. It may be, too, that the physical grasping of the cards facilitates the mental grasping of their content. The grid illustrated in Figure 7.2 was actually used at A3 size.

¹² Grendstad (1997) analyses the 1993 Norwegian ISSP survey which included eight questions designed to detect the four GG social types. He finds that "Cultural Theory does surprisingly well in accounting for environmental attitudes, particularly in comparison to the theory of postmaterialism, which accounts for next to nothing in environmental values and beliefs." (166) Grendstad (1999) with two items each for grid and group finds that for a large survey in Europe, "The postmaterialist index turned out to be a better statistical predictor of environmental concern than either the grid or group components." (473) This is perhaps not surprising: grid and group are Z and X; Z has no predictable relation to environmental concerns, and X would be pro-environment to the extent it is measuring 3-ism.





60-card Q-sort grid. In practice it was A3 size

The 60 statements came from various sources,¹³ and consisted of four sets of 15 statements designed to detect the four types (Table 7.4). Watts and Stenner (2005: 89-90) say the process "is not *theory-driven* as is customary in the design of a questionnaire, but is instead carried out as a 'sampling' task." (italics original) The WOLT Q concourse was, of course, entirely theory-driven. Watts and Stenner's purpose is the usual one of discovering empirical patterns of subjectivity: "The procedure is quite straightforward: participants are first required to complete a card-sorting task and the results of that task are then subjected to factor analysis." (88) Factor analysis of Q-sorts is virtually universal (Conover and Feldman 1984: 102; Brown 1970: 181; Thomas and Watson 2002: 143). The present aim is different: it is to determine whether WOLT is a predictor of individual attitudes; factors in the data set are not of interest; patterns within persons are, patterns that confirm or refute WOLT.

¹³ The biggest single source was Grendstad (2001: 13) who had 20 statements. Others were taken from GG literature and from survey questionnaires. A major aim was to avoid repetition. The emphasis in the four groups of 15 varies: statements to detect Types 1 and 3 concentrated on government and economics, Type 2 on government and morality, and Type 4 statements a mix of government, economics, morality and astrology (see Figure 7.3). The astrology was a mistake but otherwise there is little to be done about the asymmetry of emphasis; it is the nature of the beast.

Table 7.4 60-statement	Q concourse	(120 respondents) 8.6.05
------------------------	-------------	------------------	----------

1	Everyone should have an equal chance to succeed and fail without government interference
5*	If people have the vision and ability to acquire property, they ought to be allowed to enjoy it
9	People who are successful in business have a right to enjoy their wealth as they see fit
13	Competitive markets are the best way to supply people with things they need
17	In a fair system, people with more ability should earn more
21*	The very first purpose of government is to guarantee personal safety and freedom
25	Democracy – the essence of democracy is individual freedom
29	Democracy depends fundamentally on the existence of free business enterprise
33	The welfare state tends to destroy individual initiative
37	To coverage of environmental issues is too blased towards the greens
41	Taking everything into account the world is getting better
43	Ve have tee much government interference in our lives
43 53*	In this country anyone can succeed if they are prepared to work
57	In criminal justice, punishment is as important as rehabilitation
•	
2	One of the problems with people today is that they challenge authority too often
6	The best way to provide for future generations is to preserve the customs and practices of our past
10	Society works best when people obey all rules and regulations
14	Respect for authority is one of the most important things that children should learn
10	The reimany purpose of government is to keep order and ergenics infrastructure
22	The primary purpose of government is to keep order and organise infrastructure
20	When things go wrong it usually because someone didn't pull their weight
34	It is more important to respect the law than to question authority
38	One of our society's problems is that it has lost respect for established customs
42*	It is more important for politicians and public officials to obey the rules than to be sincere
46	Generally, the sort of people who attend political demonstrations are socially irresponsible types
50	Publicly burning the national flag should be a punishable offence
54	It is wrong for parents to bring children to political demonstrations
58*	Government should encourage the nobler aspects of the human spirit
3	The world would be a more peaceful place if its wealth were divided more equally among nations
7	Our country needs a fairness revolution to make the distribution of goods more equal
11	I support a tax shift so that the burden falls more heavily on corporations and people with large incomes
15*	We need to dramatically reduce inequalities between men and women in the world
19	Decisions in business and government should rely more heavily on popular participation
23*	The main purpose of government is to look after people, especially the less privileged
27	Democracy means fairness; people are equal and should have equal access to society's benefits
31	Conflict could be much reduced by a more equal distribution of this country's resources
35	Competitiveness in our society is too high and causes too much discord
39^	I support government attempts to eliminate poverty
43	Our technical society takes too many fisks without sufficient thought to the consequences
47 51*	Gambling on poker machines and in casinos is socially destructive
55	Our technological society is using resources at an unsustainable rate
59	Careless use of technology is the root cause of most of our environmental problems
4	Veting is pointless since where you yets for things go on pretty much the same
4	Cooperation with other people rarely works
12	The future is too uncertain for a person to make serious plans
16	Most people make friends only because friends are useful for them
20	Success in life is pretty much a lottery
24*	The real purpose of government is to control the people
28	Democracy is largely wishful thinking; those in charge disregard the rest
32	We are just so many cogs in the machinery of life
36	People will rip you off if you aren't careful – even among friends
40	Doing night courses for career advancement is more trouble than it's worth
44*	A person's star sign is a good indicator of personality
48 *	A horoscope often accurately tells what the future holds
52*	The many sightings of UFOs is good evidence that they exist
56	In our society most people don't have much chance to be a success in life
60	I here is little people can do to change the course of their lives

* These 16 cards removed for 44-card concourse.





The statements were printed on cards which the subject placed on the grid in order of preference from least preferred on the left to most preferred on the right. Statements are scored according to the value, from -5 to +5, shown at the top of each grid column (Figure 7.2). An initial version was tested with 29 people, predominantly academics, a big concern being for clarity and simple language. It was modified slightly after discussions. Subsequently, respondents solicited in two pedestrian malls on two Saturdays along with friends and academic colleagues added to 120 subjects in total. Scoring was straightforward: the scores for each set of 15 detectors were summed. The theoretical maximum score for a

type—i.e. the score if all its 15 cards were placed as far to the right side as possible—was 50. The minimum possible score was, of course, -50. All scores are listed in Appendix 6.

The 60-card sort took around half an hour to complete. 60 cards is on the large side for a Q-sort and subjects were advised, as is the usual practice in Q-sorting, that it would be easier if they began by forming three rough piles of *probably agree*, *probably disagree* and don't know. Some personal information was recorded: left-right self placement, preferred political party, age group, birth position (eldest, youngest, etc), education level, kind of occupation, place brought up, postcode, marital status, whether spouse had done the Q-sort. For privacy reasons these were answered by numbers from multiple options. As with the 99respondent Likert questionnaire, undergraduates per se were not solicited. Undergraduates are very common subjects of psychology testing but they are young people in transition to adult lives and are famously politically volatile; settled types are more likely to be found among older people. The data include three 16 year-olds, 22 people between 18 and 24, and 46 between 25 and 34; there are 63 men and 57 women. No data were excluded. After the subject had completed the Q-sort it was photographed and then the card numbers were entered into a spreadsheet programmed to calculate the scores for the four types. It is possible to add up the scores by hand but it is tedious and mistake-prone. Participants were told their personal scores (learning their "political personality" was an incentive to participate) and issued a handout on the theory. Respondent's age and sex are not correlated with Type scores or with political left-right self-placement. Left to right self-placement is distinctly correlated with the type scores as WOLT would predict: 1: .57, 2: .32, 3: -.54, 4: -.36.

How to decide what score qualified a respondent as a "type"? With the 99-respondent Likert test there were only five items per type and so a score of 3 out of a possible 5 presents itself as the reasonable mark. The Q-sort has 15 items per type and their scores can range from -50 to +50. For a null hypothesis random Q-sorts were generated to see what the chance scores would be. Seven sets of 100 random sorts of the 60-statement worldview concourse were generated in an Excel file. The 700 sorts indicate that simple chance says one will achieve a score of:

- 10+ for one or more types in 32% of sorts,
- 15+ in 16% of sorts,
- 20+ in 4.5% of sorts,
- 25+ in 1% of sorts and
- 30+ will only in occur 0.2% of cases, ie once every 500 Q-sorts.

These are positive scores; chance has an equal number of negative scores but they do not count (in theory) for measuring WOLT. From this we might say that a score of 10 for a type says practically nothing - with a 32% chance of being zero, it might as well be zero. A

score of 20 may be taken as an indication of type. Only 4.5% of such could occur randomly. A score of 25, with a 1% chance appearance, might be considered unequivocal.

Score	Chance	Type 1	Type 2	Туре 3	Type 4
10+	32	38	12	77	1
15+	16	27	3	70	1
20+	4.5	17	2	62	0
25+	1	12	1	48	0
30+	0	4	1	36	0
40+	0	2	0	15	0

Table 7.5	Percentages	of scores in t	he 120-respon	dent Q-sort.

As Table 7.5 shows, the real numbers are far greater than those predicted by chance. If we take 20 as the minimum score to categorise someone as a "type" there are nominally 81% of respondents qualifying. Chance has 4.5%. If we take 25 as the minimum there are 61% of respondents who qualify whereas only 1% do so by chance. Chance says no one should score 30 or more but 41% actually did so.

It is clear that people see very extensive consistencies within the types. WOLT is not refuted and appears confirmed. Might these consistencies be otherwise explained? The main explanatory possibility is synonyms. For example statements 44 and 48 are effectively synonymous (Table 7.4).¹⁴ In other cases there may be a commonsense consistency of meaning for which WOLT's predictions would not be needed. The line is difficult to draw because the very derivation of WOLT types is based on logic and meaning.

There is little evidence that synonyms had a disturbing effect. If items are commonsense synonyms (or near-synonyms) they should inflate the scores (positive or negative) for that type since persons of all persuasions will answer them consistently. Ignoring Type 4, among the other 45 cards, the clearest cases of near-synonyms would be statements 10, 14 and 34, or statements 6 and 38, which are all Type 2 detectors. Yet if we take 20 as a type cut-off only 2% qualify as Type 2 and if we take -20 as a sort of negative cut-off there are only 8% (9 people) who are anti-2s. This seems fairly small given that chance predicts 4.5%. For comparison purposes there are 5% who scored -20 or less for Type 1, zero anti-3s, and no less than 59% who scored -20 or less as anti-4. The WOLT-conforming consistency of the responses is not explained by synonyms.

There is bias in the set of statements. Apart from the bias against 4s, the fact that no one at all placed Type 3 statements as far negative as they placed the 1s and 2s shows that the

¹⁴ Statements 44 and 48 arose partly from misjudgement and partly from the difficulty of inventing Type 4 detectors.

Type 3 statements had more general appeal. Even if the cut-off is dropped to -15, there are still no anti-3s. (Of other negatives at -15, there are 11% anti-1s, 15% anti-2s and 73% anti-4s.) This will be partly because most of the subjects were 3s so there are simply fewer candidates to be anti-3 and partly it may be indicating that the Type 3 statements were less objectionable to the 1s and 2s than the Type 1 and Type 2 statements were to the 3s. This latter accords with the nature of the 3-ist view: whereas the 1s, 2s and 4s are each likely to think the other types are mistaken, the 3s tend to think the 1s and 2s are evil (§2.3.3, §5.3.2).

Contradictions: there are four instances of people scoring 20 or more for two types (all four are Types 1+3, see Appendix 6). These are refutations of WOLT which says a person can only (logically) adhere to one type. There are 74 people scoring 20+ as a Type 3—if four of them also choose Type 1, is that a significant refutation? There seems no standard to compare it with. Contradictions cannot be compared with chance in the manner of the 99-respondent Likert test. If the random chance of scoring 20+ is 4.5% then the random chance of scoring it twice in one result might be the square of that which is about 1 in 500 but in fact it will be far less because when one type scores 20+ it occupies part of the positive part of the Q grid so the chance of another type achieving 20+ will be far lower than 4.5%. (There are no instances in the 700 random cases.) In short, the choice in favour of both Type 1 and Type 3 preferences is a very unambiguous choice. One of these four is 16 years old but the others are around 30, 50 and 70 and their self-placed L-R position ranges from moderate left to moderate right. They are all men. Two of their wives did the Q-sort, neither scoring 20 for any type.

Is 4 in 120 a lot or a little? Perhaps the question does not make very much sense. The 120 respondents to this test were an opportunity sample. It could easily have happened that none of these four had sat down and done it. If they did not exist in the data, the support for the theory would have appeared stronger. On the other hand, another four like them might well have been included, making 8 in 120. We have no idea of what the chances are. If they had been 40 instead of 4 it would have made the theory appear useless. If we perceived no material difference between cannon balls and thistledown and we picked items at random to drop to test gravity, does it affect gravity how many of each we use? It does not. Yet if we used a lot of thistledown we would surely conclude that the gravity theory was useless. The theory of gravity can be rescued by introducing an additional theory of air resistance. What is the equivalent of air resistance for our four respondents? Is it personal like something in their childhood or from last week's movie? Or is it to do with their social milieu? Is it in their genes? Organisms differ; for example people respond to drugs very variously, so we should expect variations with mental phenomena. But there is one thing that can be said: WOLT provides a basis from which to investigate those four cases. Without it, we have nothing; with

it we have the first step toward identifying the "air resistance" (or overthrowing the theory) and that can only be enlightening.

Some impression of the sample bias can be gained from the average scores for the four types over the 120 respondents: 1: 4, 2: -5, 3: 23, 4: -22. Thus the "average respondent" was of Type 3 persuasion with a slight Type 1 tendency. The large negative score for Type 4 is caused not only by lack of representation in the sample but also, it seems, by faulty Type 4 statements. In particular, it was common for people to glance at the horoscope ones and instantly set them to the extreme left of the sort.

It may be that a better cross-section is achieved by approaching friends than by soliciting strangers in a public place where the volunteers are overwhelmingly 3s. That would be what the make-up of the 99 respondent survey indicates. But that does not solve the problem of collecting data on 4s for 4s are not friends with the middle classes. Almost every colleague with whom I discussed the problem of Type 4 participation declared they knew someone or had a family member who "is a perfect Type 4" but whom they rarely see and to whom they are not close. On the second public occasion we set up outside a TAB betting shop¹⁵ and failed to get a volunteer from the dozens of men who wandered in and out of the TAB on a Saturday afternoon. Since many other shoppers stopped to do the Q-sort, it was a sobering lesson. The 4s don't trust. It would appear that the way to survey 4s is by interview and that in any sample of a population which involves self-selection they will be severely under-represented.

With regard to comprehension of the statements, there is no indication that middleclass people had any problem, however the main topic, which is politics, is not subjectively salient to a large proportion of the population. The matters covered do affect them but they have not necessarily thought about them. For Type 4s both the language and the topics dealt with may be too difficult for many but this is only a suspicion based on conversation and observation; no firm evidence is available.

Overall, the Q-sort results are a confirmation of WOLT. Apart from the lack of Type 4 response, the concept of the Q-sort seems to be a good one and on the basis of a detailed examination of the 120 scores the sort has since been reduced to 44 cards (the statements deleted from the concourse are marked by asterisks in Table 7.4). The 44-card sort is easier to carry out, will be more accurate for the 4s, and should be at least as good a discriminator as the 60 card set—see Appendices 7 and 8.

¹⁵ The TAB (Totalizator Agency Board) is an Australia-wide network of shops taking bets on horse and dog races.

7.8 Conclusion

This chapter considered the possibilities for quantitative testing of WOLT and described three exploratory attempts to do so.

Supportive interpretive evidence for WOLT can be readily found and Chapters 3 and 5 offer examples. But those examples were selected. How can a more objective quantitative assessment be made? In social science it is common to apply factor analysis to seek correlations among selected data but it, too, is an approach which seeks to confirm. Moreover it imposes a statistical model, ignoring the theoretical model. WOLT is not a statistical theory.

To fault the theory we would need to see where its predictions fail, which would require the standard scientific approach of comparing theoretical predictions with empirical observation. WOLT makes many distinct predictions (§2.5) but the prospect of testing them in quantitative terms varies from difficult to impossible. Possibilities for quantitative testing lie with the concomitances of the issues within each axis, with the concomitances of the characteristics within each type, and with the restriction to four of the eight geometric combinations among the dichotomised axes.

Testing within an axis is ambiguous in that any position on an axis applies to two types. Since the practically applicable aspect of WOLT (and GG theory) is its classification into types, it also seems more interesting to test for them directly and that was the approach here. Testing can be of subjectivity or objective social arrangements. The former—people's opinions—was tested here in view of the problems of some grid-group testing for social structure and in the light of WOLT's derivation from subjectivity. Testing was restricted to the four social types, the Type 5 being ignored.

In principle, the four types are mutually exclusive but otherwise uncorrelated with each other. In practice, however, they will be strongly correlated: for example, characteristics of the 1s and 2s will be negatively correlated with those of the 3s, owing to standard left-right political divisions. This has nothing to do with WOLT per se and it disturbs testing. If some type characteristic is systematically responded to by a second type it gives the appearance of being an issue on their common axis—yet it is not since the third and fourth types have no systematic relation to it. The systematic response stems from ephemeral or local circumstances, which are not accounted for by WOLT.

Such circumstances are pervasive and it seems impossible to design a survey consisting of statements that pertain to one type only. As a result, any form of data analysis that measures correlation among responses will reflect these irrelevant correspondences; it will not reflect WOLT. In the tests outlined here, these correlations were extensive.

Correlation *within* a type faces a different problem. A survey item designed to detect Type 1s is in principle of no interest to the other types. If, say, 20% of respondents are Type 1 then 80% of responses to Type 1 detectors will be irrelevant. Thus simple correlations between items will be swamped by irrelevant data. Given some information about an individual, WOLT predicts other answers by *that individual*; it does not predict responses from other types. Hence to test for confirmation or refutation requires detection of 1s, 2, 3s, and 4s in order to see whether they conform to WOLT predictions.

A 15-item, 99-respondent Likert test for the three pro-active types failed to refute the theory and offered some confirmatory indicators. Large scale surveys lack items which would serve to detect 2s or 4s. A test using the extensive data from the 1996 Australian Election Study Survey comprehensively confirmed the division between the 1s and 3s and showed it to be a considerably better reflection of social attitudes than that between Inglehart's materialist and post-materialists. The third test, a 60-statement, 120-respondent Q-sort, was intended to detect the four social types. When compared with chance scores it strongly supported the validity of WOLT's division. It failed to find any Type 4s, not because there are none but because the 4s don't do surveys—a behaviour WOLT itself predicts.

This testing should be regarded as exploratory. Though a Q-sort is more enjoyable for the respondents than a standard questionnaire and more flexible, it still depends upon the printed word and is ill-suited to capturing data on 4s. For them it seems that individual interviewing would be needed or even the ethnographic approach exemplified by Whyte's *Street Corner Society* or Liebow's *Tally's Corner*—which would be to retreat from the quantitative subjective and to revert to the qualitative "objective" social arrangements that the testing described in this chapter was trying to get away from.

Way of life theory: the underlying structure of worldviews, social relations and lifestyles

CHAPTER 8 CONCLUSION

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The principal theoretical difficulties of the social sciences are two in number. First, in the study of culture there are no "natural kinds," basic atomic units equivalent to genes, cells, and organisms that can form the base of permutational operations in analysis. The lack of natural kinds guarantees the second difficulty, "nomic isolation." Each major discipline—anthropology, sociology, political science, and so forth—has been required to develop its own conceptual base and language.

The discovery of natural kinds in culture would represent a key theoretical advance in the social sciences. Most scholars appear to believe that such units either do not exist or, if they do exist, cannot be derived by any means currently available.

-Edward O Wilson (1996 [1989]: 111)

The most serious question which the methodology of the social sciences has to answer is: How is it possible to form objective concepts and objectively verifiable theory of subjective meaning-structures?

—Alfred Schütz (1963: 246)

8.1 A new theory

This thesis has proposed a new theory in answer to social science's biggest question: How does society work? Way of life theory (WOLT) provides a method of identifying society's component parts and showing their interrelationships. Its scope takes in those matters which must be attended to for people to get along with each other. The theory shows how every rational, social thing is related to every other rational, social thing.

This concluding chapter reflects on some history and on the problem of meaning that was solved to arrive at WOLT.

8.2 Trying to identify the components of society

Cumulative science

Montesquieu imputed rules to social relations (§1.5.1), for example, he suggested that Protestantism, with no visible head and a spirit of liberty, is suited to a republic whereas hierarchical Catholicism would suit a monarchy (Montesquieu 1914 [1752]: Book XXIV, 5). His general point is that flexibility is limited: certain values and social arrangements match and there is order in society's complexity. A century later Comte saw social structure fulfilling "the two great ends of human existence" namely to *regulate* and *combine* people (Thompson et al. 1990: 115). These are WOLT's Z and X axes. Comte did not see them as dimensions which might be weak or might be strong but thought both had to be strong. Fifty years on, Durkheim saw them as two dimensions, *regulation* and *integration*, but he did not combine them to form types. (He saw their individual weak/strong extremes as being causes of suicide.) Seventy years later Mary Douglas, French-speaking and steeped in Durkheim, again postulated Z and X dimensions of social structure but dichotomised them as weak and strong, presumed them orthogonal, and deduced four coherent worldviews usually called individualism, hierarchy, egalitarianism and fatalism which are WOLT Types 1, 2, 3, 4.

These theorists were all connecting social arrangements to individual beliefs. Douglas's grid-group theory was a significant advance and its types were persuasive but it had awkward aspects: it was dependent upon its peculiar dimensions, *grid* and *group*, whose meanings were not quite clear; there was no way to tell if the theory was complete; and attempts to fit other social issues failed.

Way of life theory also dichotomises dimensions to deduce four types, but instead of grid and group almost any significant pair of social issues will do, using two of three dimensions. All relevant issues fit on these dimensions.

Coincidental science

Seven theorists, unconnected with each other, have used the approach of using a pair of dichotomised dimensions to form four types. Despite the variety of their dimensions and of their purposes they all found the same types. Anthropologist Douglas's four types were intended to compare African tribal cultures; economist Bowles derived his to describe modern social interaction; Indologist Marriott (who indirectly introduced a third dimension), explained social transactions in the south Indian caste system; organisation theorist Ouchi classified economic exchange conditions but missed the 4s; sociologist Merton developed the types as a theory of social deviance but missed the 3s; cross-cultural psychologist Triandis constructed them as a theory of subjective culture but missed the 4s; and anthropologist Swanson's four kinds of tribal politics seem to be the same though his dimensions are bafflingly abstract. The pairs of issues these theorists dichotomise to form their dimensions are as various as their disciplines yet, save for those few mistakes, the types they derive from them turn out to be the same. Between them they employ all three possible ways of dividing four types into pairs, i.e. three dimensions. Some conclusions are unavoidable: there are four, and only four, types of social structure and corresponding worldview; there are three dimensions; many pairs of issues may be set upon those dimensions. Among dimensional typologists there is no contradiction of WOLT.

There are also social science typologists who do not use dimensions, and there are dimensioneers who do not derive types. As Chapter 3 showed, among several dozen theories, very little contradicts WOLT, these intuitive theorists being incomplete rather than in error.

Way of life theory

WOLT assumes, with Douglas and others, that beliefs and social structure are connected, that they are mutually confirming and correcting: people obtain their beliefs from society and society reflects people's beliefs. Thus its minimum domain is those matters which people must address in order to live together. WOLT reveals the interrelationships of specific beliefs, or *issues*, showing how they make up five *types* or *ways of life*. The main difference from GG theory is that WOLT has three axes, not two, and that all relational issues, not just grid and group, find their places on the three axes.

The numerous *issues* which fit on the axes are the matters to be addressed while the five *types* are the possible ways of addressing them. Where Douglas deduced the four social types from the issues of grid and group, WOLT shows many pairs of issues can be used—they yield the same types and they also yield all five of Douglas's types. This thesis sets out ab

initio deductions of the types from about a dozen different pairs. It contains many demonstrations of finding and placing issues on axes.¹

Table 4.2 (page 90) lists the axial positions of a hundred or more issues from across social science, every pair of which interrelates the types. Thus the types are tied to each other directly by a dense web of ordinary social issues, rather than connected via a logic chain going back to grid and group. The issues on the three axes may be viewed as dynamic relational possibilities and types as the feasible static configurations of them. If the axes are the problems of living together, the types are the solutions; if the axes contain single concerns or particular policies, the types are integrated ideologies or social arrangements.

8.3 Meaning through interrelationship revealed by typology

The problem of meaning

This thesis began with quotations from thinkers wanting to understand the individualsocial nexus. Their problem can be seen as a problem of the meaning of words. One of the many theorists who struggled to relate ways of thinking to social context was Karl Mannheim. He saw ideal types similar to those of Weber and others but realised they were the ones he felt were there and that there was a problem with objectivity of analysis. Says Clifford Geertz:

In Mannheim's case, this problem was the animus of his entire work—the construction, as he put it, of a 'non-evaluative conception of ideology.' But... he ended, as is well known, in an ethical and epistemological relativism that he himself found uncomfortable. (Geertz 1964: 47)

Mannheim knew, with Weber, that he had to think in terms of ideal types but he had the problem of meaning, the great bugbear of social science. As Geertz diagnoses it:

...the social sciences have not yet developed a genuinely nonevaluative conception of ideology... [the solution lies] in the perfection of a conceptual apparatus capable of dealing more adroitly with meaning. Bluntly, we need a more exact apprehension of our object of study... (Geertz 1964: 49)

The problem is the exact apprehension of our object of study and the answer does not lie with definitions. If physics cannot define "mass" there is no prospect of defining "social structure". Physicists who work with mass agree on its meaning without difficulty; social scientists who discuss social structure do not. How do physicists agree without definitions? John Searle (1995) says the natural sciences have the advantage of dealing with objects that exist in reality whereas the social sciences deal with objects that are figments of agreement. No doubt real existence makes agreement easier but if that difference were decisive, social science would be a lost cause. As shown in §6.2.1 natural science theories deal with ideal

¹ For ab initio deductions of types see \$2.3, \$3.2, \$3.5, \$5.2.1, Appendix 1. For placing of issues on axes see \$4.3, \$4.9, \$5.2, \$5.6, \$5.6, \$5.9, Appendix 2.

objects rather than real objects and as shown in §6.3.1, the lesson from the natural sciences is that apprehension of concepts comes from knowing their interrelationships. The parts of F = ma cannot be defined but one understands them by understanding the equation. One understands the pendulum, the tides and a falling apple by knowing the interrelationship which connects them—or connects ideal abstractions of them. Perhaps physical things are inherently undefinable, perhaps their actual existence depends on their interrelationships, but it seems clear that our *understanding* of them depends upon our perceiving their interrelationships. In short, if we wish to agree on objects of study, it behoves us to discover how named objects relate to each other. If we can sort that out then we will know what the names mean.

The 2x2 typology where different ideal-type issues all yield the same four types is a "conceptual apparatus" which makes both issues and types (which are ideologies) nonevaluative as Geertz wants, and it does it by showing how they interrelate—thus providing a more exact apprehension.

2x2 Typologising

Forming 2x2 typologies is not a recognised scientific technique. It is a tactic which in the present application generates ideal types and reveals their interrelationships thereby enabling intersubjective understanding. Dichotomising is appropriate because it reflects the only conceptually clear measure—the only ideal-type measure—there is: presence versus absence. Lacking a thermometer that measures degrees of cooperation, or a barometer that registers the pressure of hierarchy, ideal types are limited to present and absent. Where physics graphs two idealised variables against each other, all social science can do is plot two idealised dichotomies to yield four types.

The trick, it seems, is to do it more than once. A single instance of forming four types from a pair of dichotomised issues creates a mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive typology. This can be very useful, as the case of grid-group theory shows, however the significance of the four types depends utterly on the significance of the chosen pair of issues. The setting of *further* issues on the axes such that they fit with the types reduces the significance of any particular pair. If *all* issues fit then none have any particular significance and the interrelationships of all are known. Instead of science's usual plot of one pair of incrementally changing variables, this substitutes the repeated fit of many pairs of crudely dichotomised issues. It serves Mannheim's purpose of delivering nonevaluative conceptions and it does it by revealing the interrelationships.

The 2x2 technique and the three dimensional structure overcome the perennial social science problem of meaning. The concepts represented as types and issues thus acquire the existential reality of "force", "point", or "gravity". This has never been done in social science (or even thought to be possible). Relating things via three dichotomised dimensions is no

mathematical formula yet appears to be quite as rigid. It is open to anyone to add issues to the dimensions, since the logic of the axes and the types will compel them to conform. With low flexibility of meaning and no weight on the authority of the theorist, anyone may deduce, or dispute, the details of the axial issues and of the four social types, as anyone may deduce or dispute geometry theorems. The dense contents of Table 4.2, Table 4.5, Table 5.6, Table 5.8, and Appendix 3 are, in effect, countless theorems open to argument on theoretical, logical grounds. They are not open to argument from authority. Authority can contribute suggestions for what is important, and if it conflicts with a deduced result it may make us suspect a reasoning error, but ultimately the logic decides.

As a dimensional theory, WOLT is relatively parsimonious: 2x2x2. Moreover, where this ought to yield eight types, only four of them exist, yielding more parsimony (§4.8.1). There are four types in three dimensions and a clear result: every rational social issue fits on one of the three axes and there are five basic ways of life, namely: five worldviews, four ways to structure social relations plus one non-social way, and five ways of behaving.

As a typology, distinguishing five types is less crude than dividing everyone into left and right, or into individualist and collectivist, yet it is still very broad and basic. It may be compared with the division into matter and energy, or into solids, liquids and gases, or into animal, mineral and vegetable. The three axes are somewhat more detailed: about a hundred issues which are as inflexibly located on their respective axes as the chemical elements are located in the periodic table. But social issues are nowhere near as finely specified as the elements and within each axis there is overlap between them. It is as if the rows of the periodic table were clearly distinguished but not the columns. What does it really mean to be "on three axes"? This is a construction for purposes of comprehension, much as the rows and columns of the periodic table are.² Essentially, the axes represent orthogonality: relational issues come in three sets and the three are mutually independent.

8.4 A few potential WOLT applications

From game theory to liberalism, Kant's ends to criminal trials, cigarette smoking to employee attitudes, this thesis has offered a large number of illustrative examples yet it is a new theory and (like a baby) it may be too early to see its potential. Still, some things can be said. There are hundreds of papers which apply grid-group theory to a large range of topics, all of which should be suited to WOLT analysis.

Chapter 5 demonstrated WOLT's effectiveness in several social science fields and there are further topics that would be fairly clearly suited. One would be the rise of right-wing populism in the established democracies over the last generation. For example it could be

² There are many alternative representations of the periodic table including spiral, cube, and pyramid.

treated in terms of the pro-active types competing for the allegiance of the 4s. Another is climate change, popularly seen as a contest between the "denialists" and the left (i.e. 1s and 3s). This is an old topic for GG theory, dating from Douglas and Wildavsky's *Risk and Culture* in 1982, and like other risk topics, it is open to more subtle analysis recognising the distinction between social risk and material risk (§5.6.1). Yet another area is literature and popular culture. Though heavily concerned with the passions, plenty of literature carries a message and would seem to offer inexhaustible potential for WOLT analysis (see Appendix 10). For example, it would be a fine essay to show in WOLT terms why feminists (and other 3s) should be outraged at how *My Fair Lady* spoils the ending of Shaw's *Pygmalion*.

A field so far not emphasised is history. WOLT's explanatory potential seems huge. The decline of 2-ism and the rise of 1-ism and 3-ism over the last two centuries has been mentioned a couple of times in this thesis and an exploration of this zero-sum power game through the WOLT lens would surely be illuminating. Closer to our time, there is the prospect of viewing peace in post WW2 Europe as due to the rise of 1-ism and a balance of types—which is hardly what Schuman and Monnet were thinking with the 1951 Coal and Steel agreement.

On a broader canvass, it would take a hefty volume to examine the rise of Protestantism through the WOLT lens. In §2.3.1, footnote 13 listed Protestantism as an example of 1-ism and in view of *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* that is unremarkable. Yet Protestantism's repudiation of Catholic hierarchy and its personal, vernacular access to God are as 3-ist as they are 1-ist, and the discussion of religion at §5.9, shows that Protestant monotheism is ill-suited to 1-ism. Calvin, too, was the self-selected, permanent, charismatic, all-powerful, 3-ist principal, not the other-selected, temporary, specialised executive that characterises 1-ist management.

8.5 The effectiveness of traditional science

Researchers in the biophysical sciences get on with their job without ruminating on the philosophy of science. They do not, for example, consciously apply the principle of falsification and are probably unaware of it, however they expose themselves to it with every publication. Institutional falsification weeds the natural sciences automatically, pressuring in the direction of truth. This does not happen in social studies. The social scientist would need to be consciously scientific, to explicitly state falsification criteria. To give a pertinent example, no one ever said, "Grid-group theory would be falsified if two other relevant dimensions yielded four types different from those derived from grid and group." Why not? If GG theory is correct and there really are four social types, then surely it follows that everything social must fit?³ Of course, the theory, and social science generally, does not have that sort of confidence. Yet how fruitful it might have been!

WOLT does say it (§6.2.8) and future testing should be directed not toward confirmation but toward refutation. In principle, this would be by showing there are other types or other dimensions, however the material presented in this thesis would indicate that such a major falsification is unlikely and the three dimensions and five types will prove impervious. The potential would be to refine: to modify details, determine limits. A significant refinement would be to find subdivisions of ideal types through hypothetico-deductive reasoning. This might be to subdivide each of the ways of life using the same 2x2 approach, after the manner of Hood (1998), or it might be to further classify issues, i.e. to find natural subdivisions within the axes.

Theoretical refinement may be supplemented with empirical probing. The examples of WOLT applications in Chapters 4 and 5 gave an impression of its breadth, and in academic theory and experimentation, in corporate and national culture, in marketing and policy and in other areas, it makes the theoretical connections that lead to testable predictions. So researchers presently using the theories of Chapter 3, or inventing their own, should find WOLT more productive.

The epigraph on page 2 observes that the search for knowledge has allowed us to understand much of the outside world but that to the world within our selves—that whereby we reason, live and be—we are strangers. Today, that asymmetry would be even greater and some areas of our ignorance have been thrown into relief in this thesis. For example, hierarchy and coercion are crying out for dispassionate, non-normative investigation. They would be relatively tractable, unlike the problems of emotion and personality. WOLT's apparent confinement to cognition confirms the long-mooted (and disputed) distinction from affect. Of affect we have only hazy perceptions. We have no scientific understanding of love and lust and rage and the commitment people feel to tribe, homeland and children. And whereas we think even our pets have personalities, despite our intense interest and a fabulous research investment, we barely discern trait-personality's existence, and we have no theory of it, not even a sociobiological one. It would seem that until the relevant ideal types, and their ideal-type interrelationships, are discovered, emotion and personality will remain puzzles.

³ Researchers who asked, "Why these 'grid' and 'group'?" were starting to think in this direction and some GG theorists took it further. There were attempts (Hampton 1982; Mars 1994 [1982]; Thompson 1996) to attach other issues to the grid and group axes but, with a partial exception regarding needs and resources (Thompson and Wildavsky 1986: 168; Dake and Thompson 1993, 1999), no deductions were pursued. Their issues do not fit, the basic problem being the missing Y axis. Ostrander (1982: 21), the only person to compare GG theory with other dimensional typologies, noted Marriott's (1976) derivation of the same four types as Douglas (see §3.2.2) but considered it "illusory". So instead of a program of testing GG theory with a view to refuting it, there was a program of promotion and grid and group became magic concepts and the 2x2 table of the four types became reified as the "map" or "diagram".

It is centuries since hypothetico-deductive, ideal-type science began to reveal the biophysical world as orderly and the interactions of its components as lawful relations of comprehensible cause and predictable effect. In GG theory, the scientific approach yielded a clearer insight into an orderliness in social relations that had long been hazily perceived. WOLT's persistent application of the method reveals a profound order in social structure which specifies the relation of every rational, social preference to every other rational, social preference.

Way of life theory: the underlying structure of worldviews, social relations and lifestyles

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