

AB INITIO DERIVATIONS OF WOLT

A1.1 Introduction	1
A1.2 Derivation from views of managing needs and resources	1
A1.3 Derivation from views of freedom to and freedom from	4
A1.4 Derivation from views of human nature	6
A1.5 Derivation from mixed-up issues	7
A1.6 Derivation from role identity and social identity	7
A1.7 Concluding remark to Appendix 1	11
References to Appendix 2	12
Table A1.1 Resource and needs manageability, YZ	2
Table A1.2 Negative and positive freedom, YX	5
Table A1.3 Human nature bad and good, YX	6
Table A1.4 Self-identity theory: role and group, YX	8

A1.1 Introduction

In this Appendix WOLT is deduced, *ab initio*, from several pairs of issues and the possibility of deduction from mixed-up issues discussed. In all cases subjective views are used. It is also possible, but less elegant, to use objective social structure. The premises discussed in Chapter 2 apply, *mutatis mutandis*. The first example, *managing needs and resources*, is an exigency faced by all life; the second, *freedom*, concerns animals; the third, *human nature*, is a particular case of a social animal concern. The last example, *self-identity theory*, is presumably an exclusively human matter.

In each example the type numbers—that which is to be proved—are inserted in anticipation of the deduced outcome; the numbers are only symbols and their use does not predetermine derivation of WOLT. In principle any theory at all could result so the question is: are the numbers correct? It is always quickly apparent that they are. This is the more significant in view of the fact that the deductions of the five types within each example are really five independent deductions. The advance knowledge of where the reasoning is required to lead does shape the argument. Does it distort it? If that can be shown a refutation may be recorded. These examples are set out to support WOLT but inasmuch as they exceed the evidence needed for persuasion, they serve to expose the theory to the would-be falsifier.

A1.2 Derivation from views of managing needs and resources

What Thompson et al (1990) refer to as “making ends meet” is an exigency faced by all organisms. The universe is divided into the living and the non-living and each living thing must match needs and resources or it will join the non-living. This appears unrelated to cooperation, competition or coercion and more fundamental than them because it is of unremitting importance to the individual organism and directly determines survival.

If human beings have views on managing needs and resources, four dichotomous positions are possible: 1. both needs and resources are manageable; 2. Only resources are manageable and needs are fixed; 3. Only needs are manageable while resources are fixed; 4. Neither is manageable.¹ These four positions are set out in Table A1.1. A fifth position

¹ Thompson and Wildavsky (1986: 168) and Dake and Thompson (1993) set out the four possibilities of managing needs and resources in just this way. The former article infers the five types of person

would be to have no view on managing needs and resources. Are these the familiar WOLT types?

Table A1.1 Resource and needs manageability, YZ

<i>Y Manage</i>	Yes	1	2
<i>resources</i>	No	3	4
		Yes	No
		<i>Manage needs -Z</i>	

There is no assumption that a person holding a viewpoint feels happy about it or that believing, say, resources are manageable means the person feels he or she is personally managing resources well. There is no assumption that people could offer an opinion on needs and resources if asked, or that they have thought much about them (though they may have). The claim is just that as people go about their daily lives making needs and resources match—as they must in order to stay alive—they likely have a basic belief or presumption which, from their point of view, amounts to being their “knowledge” or their “understanding” or simply that which they take for granted.

How are “needs” and “resources” defined? The short answer is that the subjectivity makes defining unnecessary: they are whatever people (who speak ordinary English) think they are. Maslow, a psychologist, famously postulated a somewhat arbitrary “hierarchy of needs” but needs are subjective, not objective. The discussion here may apply to psychic needs but it suffices to assume the needs are material ones: mundane products and services. A need is a perception and it is not necessarily modest. For example, does the chairman of the board really need his chauffeured Rolls-Royce? Certainly. Without it he would not be able to receive visiting dignitaries, the company would not win contracts, and ten thousand employees would lose their livelihoods. Evidently, he and his employees need his Rolls just as much as his teenage receptionist needs her nail-polish. A need is a perception. So are resources. In one common parlance “resources” means money. This meaning could apply here but it may be more general to imagine resources as the sort of goods that money buys or which can be turned into money. Resources could be something fundamental such as minerals in the ground, fish in the sea or available work-force, or they could be something derived, such as motor cars and nail-polish. Resources are anything perceived as being necessary to supply perceived needs.

Type 1s are defined as those who think both needs and resources can be managed. It would be necessary to know how. Given the skills there can be no particular limit for if there were a limit it would be a point where needs or resources cannot be managed, which would be contrary to the definition. Given no limit, this Type 1 cannot view manageability as dependent on other people, so Type 1s must be self-reliant and individualistic. This would mean that to 1s other people are a resource and to manage it each individual will have to develop relationships to other individuals. It is clear that this reasoning is indeed deducing the familiar WOLT Type 1.

Type 2s regard resources as manageable and needs as not manageable. If needs are somehow out of the range of action, resources must be managed to meet needs. The chairman has needs, the clerk has needs, the receptionist has needs. If different people have different needs receiving different resources, they must be of varying worth, so the Type 2 sees the world in terms of a hierarchy. Thus for 2s, individuals are defined in terms of their status relative to other people and an attitude of propriety—to each his due—will be important and society will need rules to ensure that resources are managed appropriate to station. This reasoning is clearly going down the path to defining the WOLT Type 2.

(entrepreneur, hierarchist, sectist, ineffectual, autonomist) with a kind of geometric analogy; the latter deduces four views of nature then infers individualism, hierarchy, egalitarianism and fatalism to fit.

Type 3s think that needs are manageable but resources are not manageable. It follows that it is our needs which can and must be managed in order to fit in with resources. If resources are fixed, frugality is imperative. Frugality in turn implies equality, since if one person were to receive more resources than others, that person would have more than necessary for minimal use. Thus the Type 3, like the Type 2, defines people in terms of their relation to other people, but insists that all are equal. If people are equal then no person can command another and saving resources will require people to cooperate with each other. So the 3s see, or want, a society that is cooperative and egalitarian. Plainly this Type 3 is also the familiar one.

Type 4s understand that neither needs nor resources are manageable. What they receive must therefore be in the hands of others and/or a matter of luck. If personal efforts do not influence what they receive, 4s will tend to apathy, improvidence and gambling. Because others influence what 4s get, 4s will see people as agents of power or luck, so that to improve one's lot one should seek the favour of whoever appears powerful. Mistrustfulness will be high, inhibiting the forming of effective alliances, and people's relations with each other will appear to be without pattern. Unmistakably the usual Type 4.

Type 5 is defined as having no view about the manageability of needs and resources. We are likely to have no view on matters that (we think) do not concern us. Managing needs and resources is of dire concern to every living organism so having no view could only arise if there is an excess of resources over needs. An example will illustrate this. Iodine is essential to our lives. Are iodine needs and iodine resources manageable? Most people will have no view and will never have given the matter the slightest thought—because their iodine supply exceeds their needs.² Health workers and people with a thyroid problem are likely to have quite distinct views on iodine manageability and will take active steps to match iodine needs and resources. Whereas for the four socially engaged types, resources are never plentiful—for 1s they are never enough; for 2s they are only enough if properly managed; for 3s they are only enough with frugality; and for 4s resources are only occasionally and temporarily enough—a Type 5 always has plenty. With resources in excess, the Type 5 is not under pressure and so is not engaged in the struggle as the other four ways of life are, and consequently will tend not to participate fully in society, just as most people are not engaged in the thyroid sufferer's struggle for iodine. This Type 5 is the familiar one: the autonomous outsider, or "hermit".

* * *

The typology formed from dimensions of views of managing resources and needs is the same typology that arises from views of competition and cooperation (Chapter 2). Unless there has been some glibness in the above deductions it should be considered to be an extraordinary result. Needs and resources do not, on the face of it, have anything to do with competition and cooperation yet the types, all five of them, turn out to be the same. Basic as matching needs and resources is, the division into manageable / not manageable is not one that is recognised in the sociology or political science texts; it has not come from any renowned theorist. Perhaps this is because needs and resources are in the YZ plane which excludes the X dimension, the dimension of sociality which all the theorists notice. Whatever the reason, it is one more black mark against intuitive theorising (Chapter 3).³ These commonsense attitudes to needs and resources are to be found in the GG literature, deduced

² <http://www.merck.com/mmpe/sec01/ch005/ch005e.html?qt=iodine&alt=sh#sec01-ch005-ch005e-572>

³ The fundamentally social nature of resource allocation is not *entirely* unrecognised:

We are familiar with the idea the people in some positions in the social structure have more access to resources, or access to different resources, than persons located in other positions. This is part of our view of the stratification system. However, what is not always recognized is that this is the nature of the social system: the allocation of rights and responsibilities for controlling resources. From this view, to repeat myself, social structure *is* the human organization of resource flows and transformations; social structure is the control of resources. (Burke 2004: 7-8, italics original)

or inferred from the types which, of course, were deduced from grid and group on the Z and X axes.

Each of the above paragraphs shows that a view of this elementary, material, apparently non-social concern has an immediate implication for social relations: the 1s' management confidence leads to self-reliance and individualism; the 2s' inability to meet needs leads to hierarchy; the 3s' inability to manage resources leads to equality; the 4s' inability leads to social atomisation; and the 5s' lack of interest leads to social detachment. Note that these are deductions, not a causal explanations, and causality will flow in both directions; i.e., social relations will have implications for views on managing needs and resources. The only assumption in the deduction appears to be that people, in holding their views of needs and resources, will take into account the fact that they associate with other people. These derivations show, as the derivations in the thesis show, that the individual-psychological and the social-psychological are tightly bound up with each other, yet in this case the derivation is from views concerning what seems to be (and for most life forms is) a purely individual matter. The connection between individual and society is considered a perennial sociological riddle and yet here, at life's most fundamental survival issue—managing needs and resources—the individual's view instantly implies a social view. The five views give five kinds of social relations—and these five kinds turn out to be precisely WOLT's five kinds of social connection.

Compared with the YZ plane in Table 4.1 the *yes* and *no* have been switched on the columns. This says that “manage needs—yes” is in the opposite direction on the Z axis to “coercion—yes”, which is to say that the issue on Z is *NOT manage needs*. The person (or society or social group) that accepts the need for coercion accepts also that needs are not manageable. The Y axis indicates that those who believe in competition necessarily believe that resources are manageable. The reverse also holds: to reject competition is to reject the prospect of managing resources. Whereas no politically aware person would be surprised to find that the sort of people who favour competition think that nature can be managed, it is probably not so widely realised that rejection of one logically requires rejection of the other. It is surely also not obvious that a felt necessity for social coercion is tightly bound to a conviction that human needs are not freely determined and, conversely, that the person or social group that thinks needs *can* be managed must logically *reject* coercion as a technique of social control. No doubt a substantial essay could be written on this.

A1.3 Derivation from views of freedom to and freedom from

Freedom, at its most elementary, is what distinguishes animals from plants. Freedom (“liberty”) was the reason for the European colonisation of north America, and it was the reason for the American revolution in 1776 which led to the establishment of the first national democracy of modern times. Freedom is of importance to everyone though in modern democracies it is perhaps consciously pondered only by a minority.

Let two kinds of freedom be distinguished: freedom *from* and freedom *to*. The first refers to freedom from imposition—say, to run from fire or from oppression—while the second refers to some kind of empowerment to influence one's environment. A lion and a lamb have much the same freedoms *from* the elements but a lion is free *to* influence its environment in ways a lamb is not. Hence the lion will be content to possess freedom-from. The political importance of this “negative” and “positive” freedom can hardly be overstated and it shows as the basic division in countries where there is a two-party polarisation. The Republican/Tory/Christian democrat party wants freedom *from* restrictions; its Democrat/Labour/social democrat opponent wants to empower the socially disadvantaged with freedom *to* influence society.

There are four combinations of dichotomised views of *freedom-from* and *freedom-to*, namely: *from* only, both, *to* only, and neither. That, along with no view, makes five archetypal positions. They are numbered in Table A1.2 in anticipation of the argument presented.

Table A1.2 Negative and positive freedom, YX

<i>Freedom</i>	Yes	1	2
<i>from Y</i>	No	4	3
		No	Yes
		<i>Freedom to X</i>	

If there are people with these views, what else would they believe?

1. Freedom-from. To believe only in freedom from restrictions is to think that this suffices to empower people and that no help *to* is necessary or desirable. This will be because people are, or should be, self-reliant (everyone can be a lion) and can achieve alone which in turn must mean that needs and resources can be managed and that cooperation and coercion are superfluous. Evidently this line of reasoning is deriving the Type 1 worldview.

2. Both freedom-from and freedom-to. If both are desired then people should be selectively relieved of restrictions they might otherwise suffer, i.e., they should be assisted to participate fully in life. Lions may get by with simple freedom from restrictions but the lambs need help to be free. Rules will be needed to decide who and what are self-reliant and who and what are communally empowered. Rules need rule-enforcers, hence hierarchy. Clearly, this is a Type 2 worldview.⁴

3. Freedom-to. If it is important to assist people to freedom, then the lambs must be assisted to be able to compete with the lions. Freedom from restrictions is presumably rejected because of a fear that a free hand would lead to coercion of, i.e. lack of freedom for, the less capable (or less ruthless). For freedom, no one may be in a position to coerce (lions should turn vegetarian), which implies that no one should have more resources and society will thus have to be purely cooperative. This is obviously the Type 3 worldview.

4. Neither freedom-from nor freedom-to. This is the view of someone who does not feel free. What happens must be a matter of fate: capricious lions sometimes bite, sometimes ignore, and sometimes share their kill.

5. No view. To have no view of freedom, implies freedom to excess, a freedom such that other people have no impact. This implies detachment from society.

* * *

Once again, all five types match the WOLT types and WOLT can be readily derived by dichotomising two subjective attitudes to freedom.

These brief derivations stemming from attitudes to freedom illustrate the usual distribution of normative feeling. The Type 1 and the Type 3 views are very ideological and diametrically opposed⁵ while the 2s take an each-way bet. The 2s' view of what "should" be is a view that simultaneously attempts to agree with both 1 and 3, a stance appropriate to coping with prickly 1s and 3s and to getting on with the day-to-day running of the world. The Type 1 and Type 3 positions are essentially irreconcilable but the pragmatic Type 2 resolution is to push the issues themselves into the background and to emphasise having the right person holding the right responsibilities adjudicating according to rules—and the more complicated the rules are, the less apparent will be the contradictions. The Type 4 view contains no normative component; it is the world as 4s know it, not as it ought to be, and the 4s see themselves as tough realists. In short: the three pro-active worldviews have the "should" well in the foreground with the 2s in a compromise stance between the 1s and 3s, while the fatalist

⁴ Objectively, freedom-from without order is Hobbes's mythical war of all against all. Sociality requires coercive authority and a warlord provides *some* order. Similarly freedom-to requires coercive order to enforce it. But these are not the subjective views.

⁵ In political science the yardstick discussion of the Type 1 and Type 3 views of freedom is Isaiah Berlin's *Two Concepts of Liberty*.

says the world is as it is and it is irrational to be wishing for something else. The 5s are merely bemused.

A1.4 Derivation from views of human nature

The nature of a social animal—affectionate, docile, suspicious, aggressive, etc—will determine the nature of its society. Human beings will have views on human nature. One’s views of human nature will affect one’s expectations of others’ behaviour and likely one’s behaviour toward others. Many observers, particularly American neo-liberals (i.e. 1s), think that attitude to human nature is *the* fundamental indicator of worldview, that it is the crucial difference between right and left, or what Americans call “(neo)conservative” and “liberal”.⁶

A negative, mistrustful perception of human nature drove both Hobbes and Locke and following them, misgivings about human nature shaped the US constitution and provides grounds for the “separation of powers” into legislative, executive and judicial branches. At a personal level one’s understanding of human nature will influence one’s dealings with people and, unlike needs/resources or freedom, most of us would have an explicit, conscious opinion about it. Is human nature bad or good? There are four dichotomised views: bad, both good and bad, good, neither good nor bad (Table A1.3) and in addition there is a fifth possibility of not having a view.

Table A1.3 Human nature bad and good, YX

<i>Hum. nat.</i>	Yes	1	2
<i>bad Y</i>	No	4	3
	No	Yes	
		<i>Hum. nat. good X</i>	

What further beliefs would these four perspectives on human nature lead to?

1. If human nature is bad then society, to exist at all, will need to be structured both to ensure that people see their interests in pro-social ways, and to inhibit people’s imposing on others. The requirement is for incentives and for security and dispute resolution. The government should curb invaders, protect property from criminals and enforce private contracts. But it is dangerous to put government power into human hands so government should be restricted to these essentials. If no one can coerce you or renege on agreements, all you will need is the same opportunity as everyone else and you will be able to achieve alone. This is evidently deriving the Type 1 worldview.

2. If human nature is both bad and good, society should ensure the goodness predominates. That will require strong government to inhibit the bad and to reinforce the good. Power should be in the hands of good people so society should be structured to recognise worth and encourage people to develop, and to suppress bad people and bad tendencies. A system of voluntary cooperation backed by coercive power is called for—in short, a Type 2 worldview.

3. If humans are basically good, with no basic badness, then there is no need to keep them in check as the 1s and 2s want. What is needed is for people’s natural goodness not be corrupted by miseducation or deprivation and for people not to be tempted from natural righteousness with wealth or privilege. Thus people should be equal in terms of power and money. Interventionist government is needed to ensure equality is maintained and to keep temptations at bay. This is the Type 3 worldview.

⁶ Prominent examples are Thomas Sowell, US political scientist and neoconservative media commentator, in his book *Vision of the Anointed* and Steven Pinker, Academic linguistics psychologist, in his book *The Blank Slate*. For more on them (and numerous others) see the amazon.com web site.

4. Someone who thinks human nature neither bad nor good, must think it capricious. Given such unreliability, one should stay out of the way of powerful people. That will also be the attitude to government. It is a Type 4 worldview.

5. If you have no view of human nature, you presumably do not mix with humans. You must be a hermit.

* * *

Evidently WOLT can be deduced from dichotomising two subjective views of human nature. The three pro-active types want to shape society to take human nature into account—each according to its particular view of human nature—while the 4s, having no ideal, reckon as usual to get by in an unpredictable environment.

A1.5 Derivation from mixed-up issues

The above deductions were carried out in each case using a matched pair of issues. Is the matching necessary? Does the deduction, and WOLT, somehow depend on selection of a matching pair? Or can we pluck, say, “manage resources” off the Y axis and “freedom-to” off the X axis and derive the types from: 1. can manage resources but is against freedom-to; 2 for both; 3 cannot manage resources but favours freedom-to; 4 for neither? Since a chain of logic connected them, it should be possible to find a route through the chain with the same results. But it might not be easy because deduction is not reversible: though all snow be white, not all white is snow. Instead of attempting to deduce the grand theory from any two random issues, it would be less demanding, and should suffice, to show that any two issues taken as a pair *fit* it and do not contradict the theory. This could be left as an exercise, however since there is no dearth of them:

1. If people can manage resources but do not need assistance to be free, they do not need empowering to find resources; they must be able to get these resources alone...
2. For people to receive assistance to be free implies a cooperative way of life. Resources should be managed cooperatively...
3. If resources are not manageable, a cooperative way of life will be a common defence against unforgiving nature...
4. If resources are not manageable and people do not need, or do not get, assistance, they must be delivered up to the whims of nature...

The above are not deductions of inevitabilities but merely a demonstration that these mixed-up issues conform to the theory. The same should apply to any other issue dyad, providing their meanings are preserved when they are detached from their usual partner. In the case of these two issues it looks as if the theory could also be deduced, *ab initio*, from them. It would require some pondering and it might be prolix because starting with two unrelated matters might open up logical digressions which would have to be chased down.

A1.6 Derivation from role identity and social identity

In sociology, there is a distinction between *doing* and *being* that has a long heritage. Albrow (1970: 21) says they are “two basic modes of sociological thinking: the analysis of action, and the analysis of groups.” Writing in 1957, sociologist Robert K Merton ponders some of the difficulties of sociological theorising and says:

However much they may differ in other respects, contemporary sociological theorists are largely at one in adopting the premise that social statuses and social roles comprise major building blocks of social structure. This has been the case, since the influential writings of Ralph Linton on the subject, a generation ago. By status... Linton meant a position in a social system involving designated rights and obligations; by role, the behaviour oriented to these patterned expectations of others. (Merton 1957: 110)

The distinction is between social position and social role: what you are compared with what you do. Today, three generations after Linton, and apparently unaware of the history, psychology has a perspective on this division called “self-identity theory”. The issues discussed above and in Chapters 3 and 4 disregard disciplinary boundaries between the social sciences and now the more impermeable barrier around psychology will also be breached.

Psychology knows two theories of self-identity: Social Identity (SI) theory, and Identity Theory or, as it is sometimes known, Role Identity (RI) theory. Both theories conceive of the self as socially defined (Terry et al. 1999: 228). Identity is “self-categorization or identification in terms of membership in particular *groups* or *roles*... individuals view themselves in terms of meanings imparted by a structured society.” (Stets and Burke 2000: 226, italics original.) That is a statement Mary Douglas could have made.

Linton and Merton saw social position and social role as matching up, going together in some systematic way. As self-identity, current psychology sees the two concepts as rival theories, however in what follows it will be assumed that either or both methods of forming identity may apply. The discussion concerns the “big picture” rather than identity formed as a teacher, mother, football fan, etc. Such particular identities, which apply only to some people, some of the time, must fit in as subsidiary instances. Consideration here is of the underlying conditions of sociality which everyone must deal with: how people see themselves in relation to others and how they justify themselves to each other; how people interact and the beliefs and attitudes that support their interactions.

In dichotomous terms, four kinds of people are defined: 1: those who construct identity according to role and reject the social; 2: those who construct identity through both role and social similarity; 3: those who construct it socially and reject role; and 4: those who do neither. These numbered options are summarised in Table A1.4.

Table A1.4 Self-identity theory: role and group, YX

<i>Y</i> Role	Yes	1	2
<i>identity (RI)</i>	No	4	3
		No	Yes
		<i>Social identity (SI) X</i>	

If these four types defined by RI and SI existed, what would they be like? Types 1 and 3 are discussed first, then the 2s and the 4s and in the process WOLT will be deduced. The basis for examining them will be statements from Stets and Burke (2000: 226):

RI (1s, 2s): “...having a particular role identity means acting to fulfil the expectations of the role, coordinating and negotiating interaction with role partners... ..the basis of role identity resides in the differences in perceptions and actions.”

SI (3s, 2s): “...social identity means... being like others in the group, and seeing things from the group’s perspective... the basis of social identity is in the uniformity of perception and action.”

The vocabulary from these quotations is adopted below. These descriptions are not comprehensive. On the contrary, they are the minimum to establish the two and distinguish them from one another. These are part of Stets and Burke’s definitions of the theories they would like to see “linked in fundamental ways” (224, §4.3). The link between them will be shown. In the process, many concomitants of RI and SI will be deduced—ultimately, of course, everything on the Y and X axes. These concomitants of the minimally defined RI and SI may then be compared with whatever further characteristics RI theorists and SI theorists attribute to the two methods of forming identity. If they differ, *they* have a logic problem.

From these two descriptions, can we name people who form their identity from *role*? Easily. Dirty Harry and James Bond would conform very well to the description of obtaining identity from their role. More prosaically, many people would see themselves in terms of their competence at “their” profession or trade. Who would have a *social* identity? The royal family would be an obvious case, and generally family status—youngest son, wife, grandmother—does not depend on any role though only a few people would see themselves as mainly defined thereby. The same goes for a member of a fan club, or of a congregation. Race or ethnicity might be defining for some but in a world where it is usual to be trained in some occupation and to live from that, we might expect role identity to be more prominent than social identity. Who would form identity both ways? Probably everyone to some extent, however that is not informative. Who from neither? Not so easy. Psychology wants to understand how people think and it would be useful to be able to identify archetypes but this is not done at all in the self-identity literature. Through WOLT it is readily done—but first the correspondence needs to be established.

If people saw themselves in terms of Table A1.4 and the above two Stets and Burke quotes, what else would they think?

Type 1s endorse the first, RI, statement and reject the second, SI, which is to say they want to negotiate interaction in their roles and reject being like others, reject any group perspective, reject uniformity of perceptions or action. Type 1s will thus be independent and in our society would be pleased to engage in a free market. 1s would expect a competitive environment and perhaps relish it. If competition to get ahead is rampant, human nature is not to be trusted. The reason 1s reject uniformity of perceptions and actions would be because it conflicts with negotiated interaction. 1s are negotiators and any uniformity, given untrustworthy human nature, would likely be disguised compulsion. Forming identity through role is evidently very action-oriented and 1s seeking competitive success will want to be free to act. Anything to do with a group will be suspect. This Type 1 is an individualist of Hayekian intensity.

Type 3s endorse the SI quote and reject the RI one. They find identity in being the same as others in their group and they reject different roles. No role expectations means no division of labour. That, and uniformity of perception, implies that there are no power differences, no authority. For the group to work people must be cooperative and agree with each other. For that, human nature must be trustworthy. A group functioning under those conditions is likely to be small, like a sect. Competition will be anathema for it would allow some to get ahead and introduce social differences. If there should be no structure in human relations there would be none in human activities or in the living environment, so 3s do not like boundaries or classification. Our Type 3 is an egalitarian of Rousseauian calibre.

* * *

These deductions of Types 1 and 3 are in line with Hogg et al (1995: 255):

[Role] Identity theory is principally a microsociological theory that sets out to explain individuals’ role-related behaviors, while social identity theory is a social psychological theory that sets out to explain group processes and intergroup relations.

Not so micro, though. And though the distinction between individual and social that Hogg et al draw is (as we know) quite right, there is no need for one theory to explain individuals and another to explain social processes. The Type 1 and Type 3 deductions above simply consider the individual view and neither actually “sets out to explain” anything. The resulting brief descriptions of Types 1 and 3 are far more specific than any descriptions in the identity literature although they stem only from Stets and Burke’s short definitions. How is that possible? The specificity arises from the presumption that each type *rejects* the other mode of identity formation. Identity theorists assume that both RI theory and SI theory must have a part of the truth, and that both will be operating with everyone. They are probably right but it tells us nothing. To understand the workings requires some teasing apart, some “reductionism”. The

speed of a motor car depends on both throttle and gear lever but to understand the workings each control must be considered on its own, excluding the other, even though in reality neither is ever on its own. No heart or lung ever worked on its own but to explain each we should ignore the other, at least at the elementary level of figuring out what it does. Taking RI and SI separately yields a “pure” picture of the worldview and social context of each theory and by doing that we see that the specified mutual rejection is quite logical: RI and SI—Types 1 and 3—contradict each other not just on identity but pervasively.

The **Type 2** is defined as a person using both role and social group for self-identity. Is this possible? The above-deduced antithetical positions of the 1s and 3s show that there are big incompatibilities to be resolved. How can people fulfil different role expectations and yet be like each other? How to coordinate and negotiate yet see the group’s perspective? How to form identity through difference and simultaneously form identity through uniformity? Do these 2s teeter on a tightrope of uncommitted compromise? Not generally. It *is* a sort of balancing act yet they stride confidently through a social world which they have soaked in the universal solvent of contradictions: rank. Hierarchical social interactions, simultaneously coercive and cooperative, not only allow but *require* both role and group identities to operate alongside each other.

With regard to Stets and Burke’s two statements above describing RI and SI, if you are a Type 2, your *role identity* is explicit; in the military you will actually wear badges declaring your rank and your competencies. You fulfil role expectations by performing duties assigned in accord with your role identity, working with others performing different duties according to their role identities. At the same time your *group identity* is also explicit; in the military everyone even wears the same costume which is actually known as a “uniform”. You are by definition like those of your own rank and though the very meaning of rank hierarchy is social difference, you have things in common with the ranks from which you have risen, and see much in common with the next rank you are competing to win. In short, your identity is through both difference and uniformity. If it is your role to coordinate and negotiate you do it on behalf of the group to promote its perspective. The 2s are conservative hierarchs upholding rule-bound propriety and tradition.⁷

The **Type 4** is defined as using neither role nor group to form identity. Thus the 4s do not manipulate the environment to control resources, do not fulfil a responsible role, have no group self-identity, engage in no group action. Such individuals would have an uncertain existence, and lack role presumably because of meagre motivation, training and skills. Lack of group perception and action would indicate social isolation and distrust and imply poor interpersonal skills. 4s might find identity through others: vicarious identity with sporting or military heroes, which would tend to remind them of their own lack of role and place. The 4s would likely be of low socio-economic status and would have a view that human nature is untrustworthy and unpredictable yet given their lack of competence they would be dependent upon others for a livelihood. Hence what comes to the Type 4 lies in the hands of powerful people who are unpredictable. Options are restricted; life is a matter of luck and fate; cause and effect are only weakly connected. Long-term thinking would not be possible so the Type 4 would tend to grab whatever is going while it is going, and to spend available funds promptly before someone snatches them away. If life is a lottery it will make sense to buy a

⁷ Students of bureaucracy know this. Read *action* for “institutional”; *group* for “associational”:

In more recent jargon, the concept of bureaucracy has comprised both institutional and associational aspects. On this simple, but vital, distinction depend two basic modes of sociological thinking: the analysis of action, and the analysis of groups. If this distinction had always been recognized much of the confusion in the literature on bureaucracy could have been avoided. (Albrow 1970: 20-21)

Albrow explains that the two aspects of bureaucracy are (i) rule by officials and (ii) officialdom. The former is an *action* comparable with democracy which is a kind of rule, and the latter is a *group* comparable with aristocracy.

ticket so 4s will tend to be gamblers. For the 4s, a basic survival strategy will be to keep one's head down. The 4s are the proletariat.

* * *

Based upon Stets and Burke's brief descriptions of role identity theory and social identity theory, WOLT's four ways of life have been deduced. From their definitions, a Type 5 could be inferred as someone who does not associate with others, which would exclude the possibility of a role to play or a group to be similar to.

Are there other definitions of RI and SI in the literature which, if adopted, would produce different types? Probably not, given that the deduced Types 1 and 3 are in accord with Hogg et al (1995) and the cited authors are widely published and are here summarising decades of research in a venerable journal. To sum up, in terms of idealised types, you form your identity:

- 1 through the role you play in relation to others
- 2 through both your role (task) and your similarity (rank) to others
- 3 through your similarity to others of your group
- 4 through neither role nor group but vicariously, through heroes
- 5 through nothing: you dissolve your identity

Regarding RI and SI, Hogg et al (255) think "there is almost no systematic communication between these two perspectives; they occupy parallel but separate universes" but Stets and Burke (2000) speculated that there must be a way to link the two theories and that, in combination, they "can move us toward a general theory of the self." (224) WOLT shows the link, provides detailed, polythetic definitions of the theories which are far more precise than those found in the self-identity literature, and shows how self-identity fits into the rational social universe. When a general theory of the self is constructed, WOLT will be part of it.

A1.7 Concluding remark to Appendix 1

Different pairs of issues have been used above to derive WOLT from first principles. In each case the same types resulted. *All* the types were the same, even though, within the discussion of each particular pair of issues, there are five independent deductions so that in principle some types could have been the same and some not. The issues considered above were managing needs and resources, freedom, human nature, and self-identity. Apart from the various dimensional issues adopted by Douglas and other theorists (Chapter 3), other issues shown to serve to derive WOLT were: competition, cooperation (§2.3), coercion (§3.5), and equality (§5.2.1).

There are further issues that can be used to deduce WOLT (e.g. justice, nature) and though it is likely that there will be issues which are not important enough to actually derive the theory, the whole of rational social subjectivity appears to fit with the types. If a pair of relevant issues can be found which yields different types, WOLT will be refuted.

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RESOLVING *INQUIRY* INTO AXES

This appendix inquires into *inquiry*, particularly forensic inquiry. In §4.9.3 a criminal trial was defined as society's way to attribute blame and it was found that *confession*, *adversarial*, and *inquisitorial* processes resolve onto the X, Y, and Z axes. An inquiry such as an inquest or the investigation into the causes of a disaster is very different from a criminal trial: where a trial locates blame; an inquiry locates the truth.

Discovering issues can be an untidy process and their presentation in this thesis, after the fact and with solution to hand, gives a false impression. The following discussion may give some idea of its trial-and-error nature as well as showing (again) that it can lead to discoveries we would not otherwise think of.

In §4.9.3, the trial started out with *adversarial*, and *inquisitorial* processes. Let us first switch *inquisitorial* to *investigative* to remove the coercion. An inquiry into a serious event might have coercive aspects (e.g. subpoenas) but coercion is not of the essence as it is in a criminal trial, so let us assume coercion to be absent in an ideal-type inquiry. That would probably mean we are not going to use the Z axis. An inquiry might, like a trial, locate blame but no party (at least formally) is specifically arraigned and the essential purpose is to discover the truth. How would *investigative* and *adversarial* fit into WOLT? Consider the types' preferences. We would expect the 1s' competitiveness would incline them to the *adversarial* and we can envisage interested parties' lawyers making competing representations. 1s' patience with *investigative* is questionable since 1-ism is more oriented to future possibilities rather than past mistakes, but since there is no coercion they might tolerate it with a view to building skill from experience. The 2s will prefer to avoid the adversarial disruption because they cannot well control it. In the case of a criminal trial that is not important but in an inquiry into a disaster, 2-ism itself—the regulatory system—is to some extent on trial so 2s will want the truth to be uncovered (or buried) by a reliable official whose proper qualifications will ensure the investigation and conclusions are credible, so an adversarial free-for-all is anathema. The 3s will join the 2s against the disharmony of adversarial argument but what is the 3s' attitude to investigation? We can well imagine political 3s demanding inquiries into this or that. The 4s do not participate in public inquiries but among themselves any inquiry will be adversarial; lacking the belief in cause and effect presupposed by dispassionate investigation, arguments proceed by hurling the dishes.

On the above reasoning the positions of the 2s and 4s are fully fixed and entirely opposed. Hence the YX pattern of Table 4.1 would apply—it seems that removing coercion from *investigative* has indeed put Z out of the picture. If we write down the pattern of the four types of the YX plane and then try to fit investigation and adversarial on to it, after some experimentation we might arrive at the situation shown in Table A2.1.

Table A2.1 Official inquiry and NOT adversarial YX

Y	Yes	1	2
<i>Investigative</i>	No	4	3
		Yes	No
		<i>Adversarial -X</i>	

The table has the 2s and the 4s placed as per the reasoning above and it suits the 1s who are pro-adversarial, and the 3s who are con. It also says the 1s are happy with investigation and the 3s are not. Would this be right? It is all right for 1s whose competence-based attitude will, in appropriate circumstances (egos and reputations not in jeopardy), be content to see careful investigation and discovery of causes so that the problem can be fixed and future disasters avoided.

But is it true that the 3s do not investigate? That is not what was surmised above. Is Table A2.1 wrong or can we rationalise the 3s' position in this layout? We can. The 3s are the millenarians; the end of the world is revealed truth and one does not investigate it. For 3s the concept of objective truth is dubious—postmodernism is quite frank about this—and less important than the sincerity of the teller. It's not what you say; it's how you say it: repent and ye shall be saved. The spirit is everything; the flesh is nothing. To come down to earth, consider the representations of activists John Pilger and Noam Chomsky: their in-depth investigations argue a case rather than inquire; they do not so much seek the truth as prove the truth. In short, the 3s do not inquire into the truth for they already know it. Whether it concern slavery, whaling, global warming or the second coming, the answer is known in advance. An inquiry, unless it will promote the revealed truth, can only be a nuisance.

So the rationalisation of Table A2.1's depiction of the 3s allowed WOLT to tell us something new. It is an illustration of the power of the WOLT dimensions to distinguish meaning, to strip the *ideal type* of intuitive sloppiness. It depended upon the switch from inquisition to investigation (i.e. the removal of coercion) without which the situation would be as for the criminal trial. The theorist has had little choice in this process: the WOLT structure constrained the relational issues which required a distinction between criminal trial and inquiry, which led to the exclusion of coercion from investigation—and then it forced refinement of the concept of the Type 3.

What the 3s want—and the 1s

If the 3s want neither adversarial nor investigation then, as with the trial, we might take a closer look at their position. With the theory having forced us to pinpoint the 3-ist position, if we accept that the 3s know the truth through revelation,¹ then revelation has to fit somewhere, too. What axis is it on? Z is available. That will have to be minus Z, of course, to suit the 3s. This would suit the 2s and 4s on +Z who are presumably not interested in revelation but it would mean that the 1s accept revelation. Can we rationalise that? Do 1s sometimes rely on revelation?

For 1s, the self-improvement literature lets us make up a good story. Arguably the most 1-ist book ever written, Norman Vincent Peale's 1952 *The Power of Positive Thinking*, opens with the words "Believe in Yourself! Have faith in your abilities! ...with sound self-confidence you can succeed... self-confidence leads to self-realization and successful achievement... this book will help you believe in yourself and release your inner powers." Faith? Belief? Inner powers? Prentiss (2001: 251) says, "Peale's concept of divinity was of a profoundly immanent God, conceived as a source of energy who dwells in the mind and waits to be tapped."² Obviously there is no way to demonstrate the truth of such a proposition. It is knowledge by revelation. Much of the voluminous self-improvement hype finds, like Peale, the source of the mental power in God but God is not essential to the concept and the same sort of 1-ist revelation can stem from merely an inordinate self-assurance—positive thinking.

On the Z axis we have now set *NOT revelation* and shown this to suit the four types' notion of the truth. Z is the axis of coercion. This means that revelation is opposed to coercion? Does that make sense? It does. The revealed truth of the Christian martyrs was impervious to the most horrific coercion by civil and religious forces. Today's martyrs—suicide bombers—are not coerced by vastly superior military forces. The marchers in 1960s civil rights movement in southern US knew they were right and state brutality could not coerce them. The same goes for the campaigns against British colonial rule in India and

¹ *Revelation* has a religious connotation excrecent here but there seems to be no better word. The meaning here is simply what WOLT requires: a truth known and to be propagated, not to be sought or questioned.

² That the Christian God could be so interpreted testifies to the psychological needs of 1-ism and is a tribute to its ability to utilize the available resources. Whereas religion offers spiritual support to the 3s, now and in the hereafter, it has to supply earthly, material support to the 1s. See §5.9, in particular the second-last paragraph.

Pinochet in Chile. Those are 3-ist manifestations. 1-ist revelation is essentially fantasy, well manifested as the standard film hero who, as confident of his intrinsic superiority as the movie-goers who are watching him, single-handedly eliminates the criminals who have been coercing the town. Another example is the prosperity gospel movement, where one overcomes all life's pressures by belief in a muscular (literally) Jesus and with donations which are an investment which will be returned many times over (e.g. Coleman 2006).

So the structure worked out for *inquiry* is this: the 2s rely on formal investigation, the 3s rely on revelation, the 4s delight in adversarial. The 1s will apply all three methods: sober inquiry, assured truth, or competitive argument, as suits the situation. What is the truth? For 2s the truth is what the properly authorised official pronounces; for 3s the truth is already known and a proper inquiry must discover it; for 4s the truth is held by the winner of the argument; and for 1s the truth is whatever suits the opportunistic purpose.

The sceptical reader, who is wondering if we can rationalise anything, could undermine the above analysis by demonstrating, theoretically or empirically, that 2s and 4s also rely on revelation. Assuming that is not possible, we have seen some connections we would not otherwise see and the matter is all neatly wrapped up. Except for one thing. It is all neat and tidy except that we have *adversarial* on the -X axis whereas for the criminal trial it went onto the Y. The same thing cannot be on two different axes. Perhaps there is some crucial difference between the competitive prosecution and defence of an accused person and competitive investigation of an event. There does not seem to be much doubt that Y is adversarial for a *trial*, yet if 1s and 4s are both to be adversarial for *inquiry* then that puts it on -X. Perhaps the latter is a sort of non-cooperative obstructionism whereas at the trial it is a form of attack to gain advantage. Somewhere in the above tidy story there is a *Denkfehler*—a thought-error—and the matter requires more pondering. There are plenty of unsolved problems in mathematics, too.

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TRIANDIS'S FOUR TYPES

A field of research that has been thriving in recent years is cross-cultural psychology. Its most prominent figure, and a founder of the field, Greek-American Harry Triandis, appears to be the only writer in the field to derive types from two dimensions. Like the non-dimensional typologists (Chapter 3), he identifies the 1s, 2s and 3s but he misnames and misplaces the 1s and consequently overlooks the 4s. Basically it is because he does not strictly deduce from his dimensions but simultaneously seeks to fit his extensive empirical data, to create a theoretical-empirical pastiche. With its inconsistencies eliminated, Triandis's scheme turns into the same four types that Douglas, Bowles and Marriott derive.

Triandis early on divided cultures horizontally into the usual individual versus collective then later, like Douglas, he applied a second dimension to split each into two parts. He calls this second dimension *vertical*. "There are four kinds of self: independent or interdependent and same or different," he says (1995: 44) naming the resulting four types as shown in Table A4.1.

Table A4.1 Triandis's cultures

<i>Different (unequal)</i>	VI vert. individualism	VC vert. collectivism
<i>Same (equal)</i>	HI hor. individualism	HC hor. collectivism
	<i>Individualist</i>	<i>Collectivist</i>

"In collectivist cultures, horizontal [HC] includes a sense of social cohesion and of oneness with members of the ingroup. Vertical [VC] includes a sense of serving the ingroup and sacrificing for the benefit of the ingroup and doing one's duty." (44) This is an excellent description of the WOLT collective Types 3 and 2. He continues: "In both individualist and collectivist cultures, the vertical dimension accepts inequality, and rank has its privileges. This is reflective of the 'different self.' In contrast, the horizontal dimension emphasizes that people should be similar on most attributes, especially status. This reflects a 'same self' that does not want to stand out."

What, actually, are VI and HI? A picture emerges from other Triandis writings. "One dimension that is especially important is the horizontal-vertical aspect. Some cultures emphasise equality (e.g., Australians, Swedes, kibbutzim), and others emphasise hierarchy (e.g., India, highly competitive Americans who want to be 'the best')." (Triandis 2001: 909) From a WOLT perspective an "especially important" dimension which places competitive Americans in the same box as hierarchical Indians is untenable. "HI... are highly self-reliant, but they are not especially interested in becoming distinguished or in having high status. In VI, people often want to become distinguished and acquire status, and they do this in individual competitions with others." (Triandis and Gelfand 1998: 119)

So VI are competitive individualists who seek status, whereas HI are more relaxed individualists, illustrative examples being Americans and Swedes respectively. This is quite different from WOLT and GG theory. Triandis's individualism/collectivism dimension is synonymous with WOLT *cooperation* and GG *group* but his *vertical* is apparently not *coercion* or *grid*. Yet his *vertical* does identify the collective 2s and 3s as per WOLT, so why doesn't it replicate Types 1 and 4 in the individualism column? The explanation lies with the vocabulary: *same* and *different* are imprecise and *vertical* is serving two masters: status and rank. Rank means recognition by unequals; status includes recognition by equals. Rank is authorisation to coerce; status may mean respect and bargaining power. The difference is

usually distinguished as *ascribed* versus *achieved* status (Linton 1936: 115).¹ The practical difference is enormous. Rank is anathema to the American myth (Lipset 1991) whereas the striving for status, in the sense of seeking to be recognised and to “stand out”, is arguably America’s most significant cultural feature.² Does *vertical* mean status or does it mean rank? If VC is to mean Type 2—and it clearly does—then vertical has to be *rank difference*. If vertical means rank difference then Americans cannot be VI; they must be put into the HI. And then HI will have to be designated as competitive, not relaxed.

Americans, Triandis tells us, want to stand out and are not perturbed (relative to Swedes) by social inequalities. (1995: 46) The way to “stand out” is to successfully compete; it is competition which leads to inequality, a matter discussed in §2.6 and §5.2.1. “VI... stresses competition narrowly,” he says (1998: 123) The whole point of competing is to determine who is superior and this inequality Triandis would have as a vertical difference. It is a misunderstanding. The inequality is not social rank; it is status difference due to inequality of outcome, leading to recognition of some superior capability. By contrast, ranks do not compete: the higher rank simply commands the lower. For a society to be competitive people have to be of *equal* rank. That is, for the unequal outcomes caused by competition, it is a requirement that there be *no* verticality and that people be, in this sense, the *same*. A narrow stressing of competition implies a stressing of equality of opportunity.³ Competition can only be between equals. If, in some particular instance it appears otherwise, it is not a genuine competition; it may be a coercion or possibly a practice exercise. In a real competition with voluntary participants we cannot know who is superior until the contest is over. If we know in advance who will win, it is sham competition. If participation is involuntary, it is not competition but coercion. If David faces Goliath, is it unequal? There is only one way to find out and if we do not know who will win then, at least in principle, we must presume the competition is between equals and await the outcome.

If the competitive Americans are HI then HI fits Type 1. In that case who, in WOLT terms, are the people Triandis is calling HI? They would be 3s if the Swedish example is a guide, assuming the world’s model welfare state reflects its citizens’ attitudes. Alternatively, horizontal individualists, “highly self-reliant but... not... interested... in status” (1998: 119), describes Type 5 hermits, which is not what Triandis is thinking of. With Type 1 Americans relocated to HI, who would be VI where vertical means rank difference? (Note that *vertical* is not rank per se: Triandis’s vertical is a culture of low or high *difference* or *rank asymmetry*.) The VI are people who do not group but who recognise unequal ranking. Type 4s, who recognise their own low rank vis-à-vis the rest of society will fit. The 4s will probably not notice the difference between Type 1 authority based on superior ability and Type 2 authority based on seniority, so whether they mill at the base of a Type 2 hierarchy or drift on the periphery of a Type 1 network, they will be delivered up to powers beyond their control.

The effect of these deliberations is to convert the Table A4.1 layout to the standard pattern—GG or WOLT—with the Z and X axes. The overlooked distinctions between ascribed status and achieved status, and between equality of outcome and equality of opportunity, have to be recognised to make sense of social interaction.

The moral of the story.

Triandis has two errors. He failed to note that competition requires equal ranking and he failed to observe the difference between achieved and ascribed status. The former, that competition presupposes equal opportunity, is not only the essence of the American entrepreneurial ethos but is an old philosophical discussion. The latter is a distinction which

¹ The *authorised* individual’s orders are obeyed because they are seen as legitimate, being in accord with rules backed by coercive powers. The *respected* individual’s instructions are obeyed by people for their own reasons, such as personal esteem, or as a favour, or for a reward.

² Triandis’s conflation is common; even Adam Smith does not distinguish (Smith 1975 [1759]: 59-62).

³ This is widely recognised: e.g. Feldman (1999: 161): “Equality of opportunity is typically cited as the companion belief to economic individualism.” And see §2.6 and §5.2.1.

formally dates from 1936. Both concepts are widely recognised. Had Triandis taken either into account he could not have produced the categorisation he did. It might be objected that the writer who took every theory into account would not produce anything. If so, it merely illustrates the non-cumulative nature of social science. But it is not necessarily that bad. Recognised theories—ones that have stood the test of time and felt to make sense—ought to be recognised. The new theory that flies in the face of established theory should be welcome for saying something new, but it must engage the established theory, not ignore it.

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Appendix 5 Data and scores for 15-item Likert test

99-respondent Likert data, rows reordered in sequence Type 1, 2, sceptics, neutrals, 3s. 1 = agree; 5 = disagree
 Shaded are putative "inconsistent" responses or "wrong" adherence. Dashes = no opinion. C = contradiction. c = weak contradiction.

TYPE 1 (5) (5) (5) (1) (5)	TYPE 2 (1) (5) (1) (1) (1)	TYPE 3 (5) (5) (1) (5) (1) (5)	Contra	Raw scores			Net adherence			Subj	Age	Sex							
				1 Y	2 n	3 Y	1	2	3										
5 5 5 1 5	5 5 5 5 5	5 5 5 5 5		5	0	1	4	2	2	5	0	0	0	65	25	m	Type 1 >2		
5 5 5 1 5	5 5 1 5	5 5 5 5 5		5	0	0	4	2	1	5	0	0	-4	1	0	29		47	m
5 5 5 1 5	5 5 1 5	5 5 5 5 5		4	0	1	2	2	3	4	0	0	-1	0	-1	45		35	m
5 5 5 1 5	5 5 1 5	5 5 5 5 5		4	0	1	4	2	1	4	0	0	-3	1	0	2		53	m
5 5 5 5 5	5 5 5 5 5	5 5 5 5 5		4	1	2	2	2	2	3	0	0	0	0	0	14		33	m
5 5 5 1 5	5 5 5 5 5	5 5 5 5 5		4	1	2	3	3	2	3	0	0	-1	1	0	46		60	f
5 5 1 1 5	5 5 5 5 5	5 5 5 5 5		4	1	1	4	3	2	3	0	0	-3	1	0	87		21	f
5 5 5 5 5	5 5 5 5 5	5 5 5 5 5		3	0	3	2	1	1	3	0	1	0	0	0	12		45	m
5 5 5 5 5	5 5 5 5 5	5 5 5 5 5	C	4	1	4	1	2	2	3	0	3	0	0	0	78		19	f
5 5 5 1 5	5 5 1 5	5 5 5 5 5	C	4	1	4	0	2	2	3	0	4	0	0	0	76		21	m
5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	C	3	1	5	0	0	5	2	0	5	0	-5	20	47	m	Type 2 >2	
5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	c	0	3	5	0	3	1	0	-3	5	0	2	0	21	49		m
5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	c	2	2	4	0	1	3	0	0	4	0	-2	6	30	m		
5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	c	1	3	4	0	2	2	0	-2	4	0	0	0	85	27		m
5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	c	3	1	4	0	2	1	2	0	4	0	0	0	52	41		f
5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	c	0	3	4	1	0	5	0	-3	3	0	-5	63	80	f		
5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	c	1	4	4	1	2	3	0	-3	3	0	-1	22	49	m		
5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	c	1	4	4	1	2	3	0	-3	3	0	0	-1	33	26		m
5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	c	0	4	4	1	2	2	0	-4	3	0	0	0	62	80		m
5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	c	1	3	4	1	1	4	0	-2	3	0	-3	66	27	f		
5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	c	2	3	3	0	1	3	0	-1	3	0	-2	71	20	f		
5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	c	1	3	4	1	2	2	0	-2	3	0	0	0	94	35		m
5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	c	2	2	4	1	2	3	0	0	3	0	-1	35	28	f		
5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	c	1	4	4	1	3	2	0	-3	3	0	1	0	93	29		f
5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	c	1	3	4	1	2	1	0	-2	3	0	1	0	4	45		f
5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	c	0	2	4	1	3	2	0	-2	3	0	1	0	64	25	f	
5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	c	2	3	4	1	3	2	0	-1	3	0	1	0	30	31	m	
5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	c	2	3	4	1	3	2	0	-1	3	0	1	0	34	26	m	
5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	c	2	1	4	1	2	1	0	1	3	0	1	0	92	32	m	
5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	c	3	1	4	1	3	2	0	0	3	0	1	0	9	24	f	
5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	c	2	3	4	1	3	1	0	-1	3	0	2	0	19	47	f	
5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	c	1	2	4	1	3	1	0	-1	3	0	2	0	53	28	m	
5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	c	0	5	3	2	3	2	0	-5	1	0	1	0	42	32	f	
5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	c	0	4	3	1	0	4	0	-4	2	0	-4	0	96	27	f	
5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	c	0	4	1	2	2	3	0	-4	0	-1	0	-1	10	59	f	
5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	c	0	4	1	4	3	1	0	-4	0	-3	2	0	18	48	m	
5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	c	1	4	3	2	3	2	0	-3	1	0	1	0	59	21	f	
5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	c	0	3	3	2	3	1	0	-3	1	0	2	0	36	29	f	
5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	c	1	4	1	4	2	1	0	-3	0	-3	1	0	38	33	f	
5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	c	1	4	1	4	3	1	0	-3	0	-3	2	0	32	54	f	
5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	c	0	3	1	2	3	1	0	-3	0	-1	2	0	69	21	f	
5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	c	2	0	0	3	2	2	0	0	0	-3	0	0	89	39	f	
5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	c	2	2	0	4	2	2	0	0	0	-4	0	0	3	42	m	
5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	c	1	3	0	5	3	1	0	-2	0	-5	2	0	48	30	f	
5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	c	1	3	0	5	3	1	0	-2	0	-5	2	0	75	20	f	
5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	c	3	2	0	5	1	3	0	1	0	-5	0	-2	5	40	m	
5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	c	3	2	0	5	3	2	0	1	0	-5	1	0	25	49	m	
5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	c	2	2	0	5	3	1	0	0	0	-5	2	0	47	19	f	
5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	c	3	1	1	3	2	1	0	2	0	-2	1	0	37	52	f	Neutral <-3, >-3
5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	c	2	0	1	2	1	1	0	2	0	-1	0	0	60	40	m	
5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	c	3	1	3	2	1	2	0	1	0	0	-1	0	41	87	m	
5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	c	2	1	3	2	2	2	0	1	0	0	0	0	44	34	f	
5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	c	3	2	3	1	2	3	0	1	0	0	-1	0	24	48	m	
5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	c	3	2	3	1	1	3	0	1	0	0	-2	0	72	32	m	
5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	c	2	1	3	1	2	2	0	1	0	0	0	0	91	34	f	
5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	c	2	1	2	0	2	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	57	19	m	
5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	c	1	3	3	1	3	2	0	-2	2	0	1	0	55	20	f	
5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	c	1	2	3	1	0	1	0	-1	2	0	-1	0	74	24	f	
5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	c	1	0	1	0	2	2	0	1	0	0	0	0	90	38	m	
5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	c	1	2	3	2	2	3	0	-1	1	0	-1	0	43	31	f	
5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	c	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	0	1	0	0	0	51	37	m	
5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	c	2	2	3	2	1	2	0	0	1	0	-1	0	70	20	f	
5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	c	2	3	2	3	2	2	0	-1	0	-1	0	0	54	20	m	
5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	c	1	2	1	2	1	2	0	-1	0	-1	0	-1	56	19	f	
5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	c	2	2	1	3	2	1	0	0	0	-2	1	0	50	35	m	
5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	c	1	3	2	3	2	2	0	-2	0	-1	1	0	82	55	f	
5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	c	1	3	2	2	0	0	0	-2	1	0	2	0	73	25	f	
5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	c	2	3	2	3	3	1	0	-1	0	-1	2	0	26	28	f	
5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	c	2	0	1	4	3	0	2	0	0	-3	3	0	67	23	f	Type 3 >2
5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	c	2	1	2	1	4	1	0	1	0	0	3	0	79	20	m	
5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	c	3	2	1	3	4	1	0	1	0	-2	3	0	58	19	m	
5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	c	3	2	0	4	4	1	0	1	0	-4	3	0	11	27	f	
5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	c	0	5	3	2	4	1	0	-5	1	0	3	0	31	89	m	
5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	c	2	3	3	2	4	1	0	-1	1	0	3	0	49	33	f	
5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	c	2	3	1	4	4	1	0	-1	0	-3	3	0	13	36	m	
5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	c	1	3	1	4	4	1	0	-2	0	-3	3	0	23	45	m	
5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	c	0	5	1	3	3	0	0	-5	0	-2	3	0	8	32	f	
5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	c	1	3	0	5	4	1	0	-2	0	-5	3	0	61	46	f	
5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	c	0	5	0	5	4	1	0	-5	0	-5	3	0	98	48	f	
5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	c	3	1	2	3	4	0	0	2	0	-1	4	0	16	31	f	
5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	c	2	1	2	2	4	0	0	1	0	0	4	0	27	33	f	
5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	c	2	1	0	3	4	0	0	1	0	-3	4	0	28	22	f	
5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	5 5 1 1 5	c	0	4	3	2	4	0	0	-4	1	0	4	0	86	27	f	

Scores for 60-card Q-sort

Appendix 6

Subj	T1	T2	T3	T4	Sex	L-R	Age
1	16	0	19	-35 c	f	5	60
2	-7	-4	-6	17	m	5	30
3	-7	-6	38	-25	m	3	50
4	-1	-18	29	-10	f	3	50
5	2	-12	33	-23	f	3	50
6	10	2	19	-31	f	7	20
7	11	-14	36	-33	m	5	30
8	11	-11	26	-26	f	4	30
9	2	10	15	-27	m	3	30
10	-15	-6	22	-1	m	3	30
11	-13	12	27	-26	m	3	30
12	-10	-23	49	-16	m	3	30
13	21	-11	-2	-8	m	5	30
14	16	-10	26	-32 c	f	7	70
15	-20	-1	40	-19	f	1	30
16	6	-11	36	-31	f	3	40
17	-28	0	34	-6	f	3	30
18	-3	1	21	-19	f	4	30
19	-2	-3	33	-28	m	4	30
20	32	-10	7	-29	f	7	30
21	6	-19	25	-12	m	3	30
22	-15	-8	38	-15	f	2	30
23	-20	-7	45	-18	m	3	40
24	16	-5	4	-15	f	5	30
25	19	-11	6	-14	m	6	30
26	-5	8	28	-31	f	6	40
27	28	-11	8	-25	m	4	50
28	-8	-21	44	-15	m	3	50
29	18	-4	21	-35 c	m	4	60
30	4	-11	28	-21	m	4	60
31	5	-1	28	-32	m	3	50
32	29	13	-13	-29	m	5	30
33	4	2	22	-28	m	4	20
34	2	-4	11	-9	m	4	30
35	-5	-16	42	-21	m	4	20
36	-2	-12	42	-28	m	2	50
37	-1	-14	40	-25	m	2	50
38	6	-16	18	-8	m	6	30
39	7	-3	11	-15	f	5	40
40	1	-9	39	-31	m	3	60
41	-9	-4	36	-23	f	5	30
42	11	12	10	-33	m	6	40
43	26	-10	23	-39 C	m	5	50
44	13	-12	20	-21	m	4	30
45	27	-11	18	-34 c	f	4	30
46	3	-22	30	-11	f	4	20
47	6	31	1	-38	f	6	40
48	-3	-11	28	-14	f	3	30
49	0	-9	22	-13	m	3	60
50	16	-8	18	-26 c	f	3	40
51	-1	-2	39	-36	m	2	70
52	15	13	9	-37	m	7	30
53	-8	2	21	-15	f	6	30
54	46	-2	-10	-34	m	5	40
55	11	-10	20	-21	f	6	30
56	35	-8	-4	-23	f	5	30
57	2	2	30	-34	f	3	60
58	-12	8	28	-24	f	3	40
59	-7	-10	41	-24	f	2	30
60	29	1	5	-35	m	6	20
61	16	-25	29	-20 c	f	3	30
63	-2	-14	36	-20	f	3	30
64	-20	-9	44	-15	f	3	40
65	0	1	3	-4	f		30
66	7	22	5	-34	m	4	30
67	25	-10	23	-38 C	m	6	30

(Numbers 62, 84 and 117 not used)

Subj	T1	T2	T3	T4	Sex	L-R	Age
68	19	9	9	-37	f	3	40
69	11	0	9	-20	f	3	16
70	-10	-8	39	-21	f	2	30
71	-7	-13	42	-22	m	3	30
72	13	-4	9	-18	m		60
73	10	-1	8	-17	f	4	20
74	2	3	-5	0	f		50
75	18	-9	23	-32 c	m	7	20
76	-11	0	4	7	m	1	20
77	-9	-17	24	2	m	7	30
78	3	11	23	-37	f	6	30
79	17	10	5	-32	m	6	40
80	-19	-12	42	-11	m	3	40
81	-16	-3	37	-18	f	3	40
82	14	-4	26	-36	m	6	20
83	-12	-9	33	-12	m	3	20
85	0	17	26	-43	f	5	20
86	25	-3	15	-37 c	f	6	30
87	-14	-14	42	-14	m	3	30
88	-13	-14	35	-8	f	2	20
89	24	-18	23	-29 C	m	7	70
90	21	13	2	-36	m	3	50
91	8	14	-10	-12	f	7	70
92	-10	-27	39	-2	m	1	20
93	36	-1	-3	-32	m	5	50
94	24	4	6	-34	m	3	40
95	25	-25	22	-22 C	m	3	16
96	12	-17	17	-12	m	5	16
97	25	-1	18	-42 c	f	6	20
98	15	2	16	-33 c	m	6	20
99	-28	-6	48	-14	m	1	40
100	-2	-21	43	-20	m	3	50
101	-9	8	34	-33	f	5	20
102	-14	-7	31	-10	f	2	20
103	-15	1	44	-30	f	3	20
104	-2	-26	47	-19	m	2	30
105	8	-11	34	-31	f	2	20
106	42	2	-1	-43	f	8	30
107	-19	-11	23	7	f	3	20
108	-14	-19	42	-9	m	3	60
109	-7	14	10	-17	m	3	30
110	20	-7	8	-21	f	4	60
111	12	0	11	-23	m	5	60
112	-9	-12	30	-9	f		40
113	23	6	11	-40	f	8	40
114	-13	-3	10	6	f	5	50
115	12	-9	34	-37	f	5	60
116	1	-21	32	-12	f	2	40
118	-20	-6	45	-19	m	3	20
119	-11	-19	26	4	f	2	20
120	-17	-2	27	-8	m	4	60
121	-3	8	10	-15	m	5	60
122	-12	15	30	-33	f		30
123	11	13	12	-36	m		30

Average 3.9 -4.8 22.8 -21.9 63 m
 Maxim. 46 31 49 17 57 f

C = contradictions (20+ & 20+)
 c = partial contradictions (15+ & 15+)

	T1	T2	T3	T4	Chance
10+	45	14	92	1	38
15+	32	4	84	1	19
20+	20	2	74	0	5
25+	14	1	58	0	1
30+	5	1	43	0	0
40+	2	0	18	0	0

Q-sort for



← TEND TO DISAGREE

POLITICAL PERSONALITY

TEND TO AGREE →



44-CARD VERSION

-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3	4	5

Place the 44 cards in the 44 squares according to how much you agree or disagree with them.
 One card per square.
 Later they will be scored from -5 to +5 depending on the column. (The row does not play a role.)
 The scoring will reveal which of the four political types — *doer*, *ruler*, *carer/stirrer* or *battler* — best describes you.
Tip: First, put the cards roughly into three groups before refining them into your preferred order.
 Take as long as you like.

Case No

44-CARD Q CONCOURSE

<p>Everyone should have an equal chance to succeed and fail without government interference</p> <p>s37</p>	<p>One of the problems with people today is that they challenge authority too often</p> <p>s38</p>	<p>The world would be more peaceful if its wealth were divided more equally among nations</p> <p>s39</p>	<p>Voting is pointless since whoever you vote for things go on pretty much the same</p> <p>s40</p>	<p>In our society most people don't have much chance to be a success in life</p> <p>s92</p>
<p>The best way to provide for the future generations is to preserve the customs of our past</p> <p>s42</p>	<p>Our country needs a fairness revolution to make the distribution of goods more equal</p> <p>s43</p>	<p>Cooperation with other people rarely works</p> <p>s44</p>	<p>People who are successful in business have a right to enjoy their wealth as they see fit</p> <p>s45</p>	<p>Society works best when people obey all rules and regulations</p> <p>s46</p>
<p>I support a tax shift so the burden falls more on corporations & people with large incomes</p> <p>s47</p>	<p>The future is too uncertain for a person to make serious plans</p> <p>s48</p>	<p>The free market is the best way to supply people with things they need</p> <p>s49</p>	<p>Respect for authority is one of the most important things that children should learn</p> <p>s50</p>	
<p>Most people make friends only because friends are useful for them</p> <p>s52</p>	<p>In a fair system, people with more ability should earn more</p> <p>s53</p>	<p>Decisions in business and government should rely more heavily on public participation</p> <p>s55</p>	<p>Success in life is pretty much a lottery</p> <p>s56</p>	<p>Democracy – the essence of democracy is individual freedom</p> <p>s61</p>
<p>Democracy is not the point; the vital thing is to have qualified people in control</p> <p>s62</p>	<p>Democracy is fairness; people are equal and should have equal access to society's benefits</p> <p>s63</p>	<p>In criminal justice, punishment is as important as rehabilitation</p> <p>s93</p>	<p>Careless use of technology is the root cause of most of our environmental problems</p> <p>s95</p>	<p>There is little people can do to change the course of their lives</p> <p>s96</p>
<p>Democracy is largely wishful thinking; those in charge disregard the rest</p> <p>s64</p>	<p>Democracy depends basically on free business enterprise</p> <p>s65</p>	<p>When things go wrong it is usually because someone didn't pull their weight</p> <p>s66</p>	<p>Conflict could be much reduced by a more equal distribution of this country's resources</p> <p>s67</p>	<p>We are only insignificant cogs in the machinery of life</p> <p>s68</p>
<p>Welfare payments tend to destroy individual initiative</p> <p>s69</p>	<p>It is more important to respect the law than to question authority</p> <p>s70</p>	<p>Competitive-ness in our society is too high and causes too much discord</p> <p>s71</p>	<p>People will rip you off if you aren't careful – even among friends</p> <p>s72</p>	<p>One of our society's problems is that it has lost respect for established customs</p> <p>s74</p>
<p>Doing night courses for career advancement is more trouble than it's worth</p> <p>s76</p>	<p>Taking everything into account the world is getting better</p> <p>s77</p>	<p>Our technical society takes too many risks without regard to the consequences</p> <p>s79</p>	<p>Taxes in the higher income brackets should be reduced</p> <p>s81</p>	<p>Mostly, people who attend political demonstrations are socially irresponsible types</p> <p>s82</p>
<p>In this country employees do not have enough protection from employer exploitation</p> <p>s83</p>	<p>We have too much government interference in our lives</p> <p>s85</p>	<p>Publicly burning the national flag should be a punishable offence</p> <p>s86</p>	<p>It is wrong for parents to bring children to political demonstrations</p> <p>s90</p>	<p>Our technological society is using resources at an unsustainable rate</p> <p>s91</p>

44-CARD Q CONCOURSE

There are 44 cards numbered from 37 to 96 with 16 numbers missing. The numbering is a hangover from the earlier 60-card set. The remainder after dividing the number by 4 indicates which *type* the card is intended to detect.

Sixteen cards have been removed from the 60 card concourse (Table 9.4). They were statements 5, 21, 37, 53, 18, 22, 42, 58, 15, 23, 39, 51, 24, 44, 48, 52. (Corresponding to new numbers: 41, 57, 73, 89, 54, 58, 78, 94, 51, 59, 75, 87, 60, 80, 84, 88.) There were also some small changes to the wording.

Such testing as has been done (20 subjects) with this shorter 44 card set seems to indicate that it is at least as good a detector for types as the 60 cards and, of course, it is easier for subjects to carry out. It appears to be a better detector of Type 4 but detecting 4s remains a problem; apart from the difficulty of finding subjects, there is some doubt that statements S40 and S52 (formerly 4 and 16) are really tests of fatalism. The former could be regarded as simple realism and be agreed to by any type, while the latter has been interpreted as a Type 1 statement.

The random odds for the 60 card set were determined by running a large number of simulations and counting the scores. Corresponding values for the 44 card set were found by rescoring the 60 card data (120 respondents) with the sixteen statements excluded. The maximum possible score for a type is 35 (50 with the 60 card set) and a score of 14 may be taken as a clear indication of Type, equivalent to the score of 20 with the larger set.

It might be an improvement to mark the columns with scores from 1 to 11 instead of from -5 to +5. This matter is much discussed among Q users; there is no doubt that many subjects want the zero column to be where they feel neutral and find it discomforting to put things they like under a negative and vice-versa.

STATISTICAL ANALYSIS AND THEORISING

A9.1 Introduction	1
A9.2 Likert testing for <i>dimensions</i>	1
A9.3 Likert testing for <i>types</i>	2
A9.4 Q-sort testing for types	3
A9.5 Principled objections	5
A9.6 Conclusion.....	6
References to Appendix 9	6

A9.1 Introduction

Chapter 7 discussed ways to test WOLT and argued that it must be tested, as in natural science, by examining the efficacy of its predictions, not by factor analysing data sets.

In recognition of the ubiquity of factor analysis in social science, this appendix considers the possibilities for statistical analysis of data such as the 15-item, 99-respondent Likert test and the 60-card, 120 respondent Q-sort considered in Chapter 7.

As discussed in Chapter 7, we could conduct surveys probing:

- the consistency of issues on the three *dimensions*,
- the consistency of characteristics of the *types*, and
- the restriction that only four of the possible 8 geometric positions are viable.

This appendix considers the application of factor analysis to simulated data for these. It shows that factor analysis is not effective in revealing the WOLT structure even where the data are extremely clear confirmations of the theory and that regression of data will not develop theory.

A9.2 Likert testing for *dimensions*

Testing of dimensions by correlations among issues within a dimension will not be a direct test for types because the preference on any axis applies to *two* types. Everything on the X column of Table 4.2, for example, applies to both the 2s and the 3s. A single type requires two axes to be uniquely determined.

The theory asserts (with allowance for the esoteric items) that agreement with one issue in the X column implies agreement with them all. This has potential to show up as correlations. Consider a Likert test like the one described in Chapter 7 except that it is for dimension issues, not type characteristics. Let there be 15 statements, five each of the form *I like x, I like y, I like z* where x, y, z, are issues on the three axes. Then a respondent who is a perfect Type 1 would record antipathy to the five x issues, agreement with the y issues and antipathy to the z items. This is in accord with the theory which says that types are formed from agreement and disagreement with the axial issues. A respondent who is a perfect Type 1 (who agrees only with the Y axis) would answer the 15 issue statements with disagree (-1) and agree (1) as follows:

Respondent R1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 1 1 1 1 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1

A perfect Type 2 (who agrees with all three axes) would respond:

Respondent R2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

and similarly, the other types:

Respondent R3 1 1 1 1 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1

Respondent R4 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 1 1 1 1 1

Let simulated data on this pattern be generated with ten of each of the above four types. With these 40 perfect respondents, 10 of each type, factor analysis shows the correlations as perfect, that is, within each group of five the correlation between statements is 1 and correlation between statements across dimensions is zero. This is as it should be since the dimensions are orthogonal to each other. If, however, the data altered to 31 respondents, being ten each of the first three types and a single Type 4, the correlation matrix again shows 1 for the correlations within each of the three groups but it shows a cross-correlation of 0.4 between statements from different groups. Since both data sets are perfect instantiations of the theory, the sole cause of these changed correlations is the change in the number of Type 4 respondents. Obviously, the procedure cannot see data that are not there yet WOLT says nothing about frequency of occurrence. It no more says how often each type arises than the periodic table of elements says what proportion of the planet is made of gold. The statistical approach is not testing the dimensions or anything else about the theory; it is making a statement about a data set. The factors extracted, too, are affected by frequency of occurrence. There are three components (not four) for the data set of 40 and they account for 100% of the variance, 33.33% each. For 31 respondents *two* components account for 94% of the variance (though the data contain 10 items for each of *three* types), the third only 6%. The factor analysis is not reflecting the theory. Nothing pertaining to the theory is taken into account by the factor process and nothing can be: if the theory were an entirely different one, this factor analysis process would be exactly the same.

A9.3 Likert testing for types

Chapter 7 discusses a 15-item Likert test (Figure 7.1). There are five statements each of the general form *I like Type 1, I like Type 2, I like Type 3* (Types 4 and 5 being ignored). The ideal Type 1 respondent would record agreement to the five Type 1 items. WOLT has no prediction to make concerning this respondent’s view of the other 10 items except that generally they should not appeal—so “disagree” theoretically does not apply. If we suppose that the Type 1 has no opinion for the other ten statements and we record 1 for “agree” and 0 for “no opinion”, the perfect Type 1 respondent’s answers to the 15 statements would be:

Type 1 resp. 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

and perfect Types 2 and 3 would answer:

Type 2 resp. 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0

Type 3 resp. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1

A perfect score for any type is 5 and of the fifteen statements, ten are always irrelevant. This contrasts with the previous example of testing dimension issues, where all statements are relevant to each respondent. In practice people will have their opinions but, as discussed in Chapter 7, these are not predictable (with WOLT). This is quite different from the above pattern of opinions about dimensional issues.

If we form 20 each of the above three answer sets, making 60 in all, then factor analyse them, the correlations within types are exactly 1 (obviously, since they are identical), and correlations between types are 0.5. If we take out 19 respondents such that there are 20 each of Types 1 and 2 and a single Type 3 (total 41 respondents) the within-type correlation is 1 and the between-type correlation varies between 0.15 and 0.95. That the correlation between Types 1 and 2 should depend on the number of Type 3s measured makes no sense. It is an indication of the effect of substituting a mathematical statistical model which makes inferences from a data set, for the a priori WOLT model. In both these instances the data reduction shows two factors (not three) account for 100% of the variance but with 60 respondents they are 50% each; with 41 respondents they are 65% and 35%. Again, this has nothing to do with the theory and everything to do with the frequency of the occurrence of the different types.

WOLT says there is *no* correlation between types. The correlations here arise from the rows of zeroes. If, instead of the “no opinion” zeroes we simulate data such that the answers to the other ten statements are randomised, a perfect Type 1 answer might look like:

1 1 1 1 1 -1 1 -1 1 -1 1 -1 -1 1 1

assuming there are no “no opinions”.

If 30 of such answers are generated for each type, making 90 answers in all, the correlations between any two statements within a type (i.e. within statements 1 to 5, and in 6 to 10, and in 11 to 15) come out around .3 and are mostly significant at $p < .05$. Those are low numbers for data that perfectly instantiate the theory. Correlation between statements of different types is mostly insignificant. Two factors account for 21% and 19% of the variance with the rest declining steadily from 9%.

If the number of respondents choosing Type 3 is reduced to 5, making 65 cases in all, the correlations within the Types 1 and 2 are now about .4 but within the third type now insignificant. The correlation between Types 1 and 3 now shows around -.3 correlation. There is one factor accounting for 27% of the variance with the others dropping away from 12%. These differences to the 90 respondent data set are due purely to reducing the number of respondents—which is nothing to do with WOLT.

In both these examples the data constitute *perfect* instantiations of the three types: there is no missing information and all simulated respondents were utter adherents. Yet the correlations are quite unimpressive. These simulated data are so constructed that the theory, WOLT, accounts for them 100%; it is simply not possible to construct answers that would better exemplify WOLT. They require no additional theory to account for them and they *perfectly* confirm the theory yet factor analysis gives virtually no indication of it. The reason is plain: in the data set the majority of answers to any statement are irrelevant to the theory. But that is the nature of the theory and any testing must take that into account. Testing by substituting a statistical model for the theoretical model is no test.

The above-described simulated tests of Likert data are exemplary of dozens of tests conducted with simulated data in order to see what factor analysis could bring. Other tests included data sets of various sizes, sets that used graduated responses rather than simple 1 or -1, sets which included “no opinion” and sets which were constructed to reflect less than fanatical adherence adjusted to various levels of rejection. Also varied were the kinds of rotation, the constraints on number of factors, and whether it was principle components or factor analysis. In no instance—no instance at all—was it possible to interpret the factors as reflecting the WOLT types.

A9.4 Q-sort testing for types

Because factor analysis is virtually always used with a Q-sort, some effort was put into testing simulated Q-sort data. The results were as disappointing as the above testing of the Likert data. Every conceivable parameter was varied within the WOLT theory but

correlations depended on frequency of occurrence and, except for one peculiar situation, never did the number of factors reflect the WOLT types.

A typical example would have 100 simulated respondents divided into four groups of 25. The extreme “perfect” case is to have 25 simulated responses put cards 1-15 hard against the right hand end (the 15 being randomly distributed there), and the other 45 cards randomly distributed in the rest of the sort. 25 responses would have cards 16-30 to the right (and the rest random), a further 25 would put 31-45 to the right, and the last 25 would have cards 46-60 achieving the maximum score. These data are unambiguous: 25 fanatical 1s, 25 fanatical 2s, 25 fanatical 3s and 25 fanatical 4s, each scoring the maximum with their appropriate 15 cards and each utterly disdainful of the other types with their other 45 cards distributed randomly over the rest of the Q-grid. A more perfect representation of WOLT is not possible. Factor analysis yields three factors each allegedly accounting for around 20% with the rest 2% each.

Every conceivable parameter, including size of data set and strength of type-adherence, was varied consistent with WOLT but it made no material difference. Factor analysis or principle components, various rotations and restrictions were tried but none yielded a recognisable reflection of WOLT.

What has the literature to say about this? Almost nothing. There is some questioning from the early days when factor analysis first became available using computers but there seems to be no literature using simple simulated data.¹ I could find no one who tested simulated data which was constructed in accord with an a priori theory.

Whatever the explanation, the bottom line was clear: if the technique could not demonstrate the theory when the data were perfect, it was not useful to examine real data.

“Balanced” statements

The peculiar exception mentioned above obtained if the statements were constructed to be disagreed with equally as much as agreed with. Thus if there were 14 statements to detect a type then the perfect type would place seven of them to the far right of the sort and place the other seven to the far left. I was unable to find any reference which mentioned this ploy of “balancing” statements, let alone advocated it. I was also unable to obtain a mathematical explanation as to why this process yields a different number of factors from using purely positive statements—the psychology of the sorter has not changed. Repeated trials with simulated data using 56 statements (4x14) confirmed that it reliably delivered the correct four factors and the individual respondents were correctly allocated to them.

It is, however, of no practical use here because suitable statements cannot be constructed. WOLT says what a type favours, rather than what a type opposes. It is very difficult to infer from WOLT what a particular type, and only that type, is against. There are only a few of the statements in the 60-card sort that can be inverted. Statements may be expressed in the negative however that requires the subject to think in terms of double

¹ Overall (1964) measured books (height, width, thickness), analysed the measurements and concluded: “In all of this, there is no need to assume that simple structure factors will correspond to any particular set of fundamental dimensions of the objects nor, for that matter, to assume that such fundamental dimensions exist in nature.” (276) Armstrong set up a simulated situation in 1967 and found: “The actual underlying model is simple and it provides a perfect explanation of the data. While the factor analysis ‘explains’ a large proportion of the total variance, it fails to identify the known factors in the model” (17) which is what I found. There was a belated, and complicated, reply to this by Preacher in 2003 who said that “unambiguous and meaningful results” can be obtained with “proper use” (13). In a lengthy article Widaman (1993) considers contested claims of the meaning of common factor analysis and principle components analysis (and the difference between them) and says: “The results suggest that principal component analysis should not be used if a researcher wishes to obtain parameters reflecting latent constructs or factors” (263) which, presumably, are what I wished to reveal. Fabrigar et al (1999) discuss the use of exploratory factor analysis in psychological research and present “a survey of 2 prominent journals that suggests that researchers routinely conduct analyses using... questionable methods.” (272)

negatives i.e., they have to place the item towards the left end to relative signal degrees of disagreement with a negative. It is too confusing.

The “balanced” technique gives the correct number of factors but the point is not to get the right factors—that is a prerequisite!—the point is to register strength of adherence. In the extreme “perfect” case of data balanced positive and negative, the percentage variance accounted for by the first six factors were: 17.4 16.8 16.5 15.9 1.8 1.6 so the four factors are clear enough. Yet the four only account for 66% of the variance, not 100%. With “imperfect” data which sets every respondent scoring 30 (which is a very high score), the percentages of the first six factors were: 7.2 6.7 6.1 6.0 4.3 3.6. Here the top four factors are not so clear and account for just 26% of the variance which is modest considering the strength of the data is far greater than any real data could be. (A trial with 1000 random 56-card sorts indicated there was a 1 in 250 random chance of scoring 30 or more—which is equal to never in a 100 sort sample.) Evidently, even if this procedure could be put into effect, it could show, at best, only a very weak effect.

A9.5 Principled objections

Attempts to answer these questions, and to resolve the puzzles turned up by the simulated data testing outlined above, led to a few articles which object to the approach in principle, which say that to use a regression program is to replace the social theorist with a statistician, which means that instead of checking a social theory, one accepts whatever the data show. Moreover, even if this shows *what* is related, it does not show *why* data are related.

People who have made this point include Lewin (1931), Hayek (1994 [1967]), Taagepera (2007a) and JG Taylor (1958). They insist that statistical analysis can never lead to theory. One could measure the pedals and other controls of a car under all sorts of conditions and compare with the speedometer needle but no amount of statistics will reveal how those controls affect the speedometer and there is no prospect of insight into how a car works. The statistical analysis of a million inputs and outputs of a million computers will never show how a computer works. This is so whether we take the letters typed and the printed results, or we take some analysis of the meanings written, or we take some technical measurement data and the computer-calculated results. Unless we have a *theory* of how the computer works, comparison of inputs and outputs will lead nowhere. No statistical analysis of Tycho Brahe’s observations, or their finest modern equivalent, will show that orbits are elliptical. Though we would learn much about the number, size, brightness, distribution, etc of heavenly objects, we will never discover the inverse square law.

Those examples are from Lewin, Hayek and Taylor. Their point is that in the case of human beings, as with cars, computers, and stars, statistical analysis of inputs and outputs will not yield understanding. Colomer (2007: 138) is more technical but just as unequivocal:

In order to show the drawbacks of the linear additive regression model, he [(McGregor 1993)] took random data that fit perfectly three well-established laws in physics (Galileo’s law of falling objects, Boyle’s ideal gas law and Newton’s law of gravitational attraction) and analysed those data by regression. He concluded that ‘none of the regression equations comes even close to capturing the real form of the underlying relationship’. McGregor rightly inferred that political scientists using such a technique might be blind to underlying relationships between political variables. Two types of error are possible as a consequence of focusing on regression analysis with the unquestioned assumption that the relationship to be revealed should be linear and additive. First, true relationships may be overlooked because, not being linear and additive, they cannot be revealed by the regression model (as in the case of physical laws just mentioned). Second, certain conclusions can be accepted as true (e.g. because a high R is found) when they are not, as one may suspect happens rather frequently in certain kinds of empirical political studies.

The words “political scientists using such a technique might be blind to underlying relationships between political variables” should ring loud alarm bells.

A9.6 Conclusion

Gordon, in the second edition of his *Classification* thinks that:

“...the results of classification studies could enable investigators to formulate general hypotheses to account for the observed data. Probably the most famous example of such classifications are the Linnean system in biology and the periodic table of chemical elements—both of which were constructed without recourse to modern automated methods of classification!” (Gordon 1999: 6)

Would factor analysis of Mendeleev’s elements really have yielded the periodic table? Would it from today’s knowledge of the elements? No one seems to have tried it. Taagepera is certainly of the contrary opinion. Referring to what he calls “theory-free postdictive regression” he says that “The profuse regression and correlation coefficients published in political science are mostly dead on arrival—once printed, no one uses them again for any purpose...” (Taagepera 2007b: 112)

My investigation indicates that even if the data were perfect, statistical data processing would neither lead to theory nor test a theory.

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POETRY, SONG, FILM, FICTION, PROVERBS

A10.1 Introduction	1
A10.2 Poetry.....	2
A10.3 Celebrating 4-ism.	2
A10.4 Film and fiction	4
A10.5 Proverbs.....	8
References to Appendix 10	9

A10.1 Introduction

Chapter 5 consisted of illustrations of WOLT applied to philosophy, politics and sociology. This appendix is intended to demonstrate WOLT's insights into popular culture. If "psychology" and "sociology", are meaningful concepts, then they must be epitomised and crystallised in the characters and moral lessons of literature. Shakespeare, for example, would be a rich source for academic psychology to draw upon. He is ignored, as is all fiction. Our time-honoured proverbs and mottos would surely form a concentrated distillation of how we think. What has social science to say? It is oblivious. Music and song? Anthropologists record exotic forms but mainstream psychology and sociology do not recognise their existence let alone offer theories to integrate and compare them. Very occasionally one sees a high-brow reference but it is vanishingly rare for the social sciences to seek illustrative examples from fiction or other popular culture. If we set aside postmodernist "theory", it would probably be just as rare for social science theories to be applied to analyse fictional interaction. The social sciences disdain the ordinary, everyday culture of song and story but in fact they stand helpless and confused before it. A century of ivory-tower theorising has brought it no ability to analyse them.

WOLT is not helpless. As a theory of how people see the world it ought to be applicable to stories and folk sayings and the examples in this appendix show that at least some of the time it is. The exercise also highlights WOLT's limitations: Shakespeare, for example. Though we might see Lady MacBeth as a Type 1 and Brutus as Type 2, we are at a loss to discuss grieving Mark Antony and have nothing to say about that most referred-to character, hesitating Hamlet. WOLT may be better than any other theory but the passions seem to be outside its domain.

Given the absence of reference to fiction in social science it is hard to find a comparative context. An exception is provided by game theorist Yannis Varoufakis who, in offering some examples of prisoner's dilemma, includes *Tosca*:

In Puccini's *Tosca* the heroine's lover is arrested and sentenced to die. Scarpia, the police chief, promises Tosca that he will substitute blanks for the bullets in the firing squad's rifles if she agrees to submit to his advances. She agrees, but as they embrace she stabs and kills him with a hidden dagger. However, in the same way she had 'defected' from the agreement, so had Scarpia. Real bullets were fired at Tosca's lover, culminating in the tragic death of all three protagonists (predictably, the devastated Tosca leaps to her death). (Varoufakis 2008: 1273)

And so Puccini's protagonists locate the Nash equilibrium. Varoufakis shows how game theory connects themes in *Tosca*, *Oedipus Rex*, *The Prince*, *Leviathan*, the *invisible hand*, the *tragedy of the commons*, and *Das Kapital*. He regards this as a broad range and suggests (1259) that their common feature would not be noticed without the concept of the prisoner's

dilemma. WOLT notices them: they are all Type 1 and as a range of situations they are considerably narrower than those below and in Chapter 5. WOLT locates them in relation to other types, which game theory cannot do because it sees the whole world as Type 1 (§5.5). However what game theory can do, which WOLT cannot, is explain why these protagonists, in seeking to be competition winners, become losers, caught in the so-called race-to-zero. Perhaps there should be four other game theories developed for the types other than Type 1.

In the examples presented below WOLT is applied to poetry, to country and western music, to film and fiction, and to proverbs.

A10.2 Poetry

Most poetry exists in another universe from WOLT. This would be because it is commonly about romantic love and about emotions—pride and pulchritude, passion and piety—rather than values or social principles. Poets who are WOLT-analysable tend to be those with a social/political agenda. As it happens, that includes Australia's two best-known poets: Type 1 Banjo Paterson with his lone hero horsemen, and Type 3 Henry Lawson with his labourers, alcoholics and bush wives. Type 1 poets are rare (Goethe?) but nineteenth century 2-ist poets from the glory days of imperialism are plentiful, unobtrusive 2-ism being the main characteristic of Henry Newbolt's ("The river of death has brimmed its banks/ and England's far and honour a name/ But the voice of a schoolboy rallies the ranks:/ 'Play up! Play up and play the game!'") and Thomas Macaulay's works ("And how can man die better than facing fearful odds/ For the ashes of his fathers and the temples of his gods?") with their now quaint, self-sacrificing, imperial militarism, and of Schiller's lengthy ballads of self-effacing, noble, communal deeds. Because 2-ism is hard to justify with logic, patriotism is handy for legitimation, however love of homeland should not be confused with 2-ism. Patriotism is a refuge of all types: the GI single-handedly annihilating a regiment of German troops; the sans-culottes and communards crying vive la France, and the 4s, less satisfied with verbal affirmations,¹ expressing their patriotism by volunteering as cannon-fodder at the bottom of the 2-ist hierarchy.

Type 3 poets are quite hard to find—perhaps George Eliot (Mary Anne Evans) and AE Housman and, of course, Blake ("I will not cease from mental fight,/ Nor shall my sword sleep in my hand,/ Till we have built Jerusalem/ In England's green and pleasant land."), though there are more 3s if the concept is relaxed to admit the romantics who honour nature. Not all romanticism is 3-ist (Banjo Paterson is a romantic) but the romantics seem to fit more as 3s than as anything else. (The nature-adoring *Wandervogel* movement was 3-ist.) There is a little Type 4 poetry in some of HL Mencken and Louis MacNiece ("It's no go my honey love, it's no go my poppet;/ Work your hands from day to day, the winds will blow the profit,/ The glass is falling by the hour, the glass will fall forever./ But if you break the bloody glass you won't hold up the weather.") As for 5-ism, there is a rare example from Richard Lovelace ("Stone walls do not a prison make,/ Nor iron bars a cage;/ Minds innocent and quiet take/ That for an hermitage.") though Lovelace was no hermit.

When poetry reflects WOLT it tends to do it quite vividly, and though it is only a tiny proportion of the overall volume of poetry, it is rather more than the poetic echoes of the theories of Chapter 3, or of any of the personality theories. See pages T9, T10 of Appendix 3 for some WOLT-relevant quotations including some poetry.

A10.3 Celebrating 4-ism.

In 1971 the British group, The Kinks, recorded *Uncle Son* celebrating "a working man,/ Simple rules and simple plans." The intuitions of the academic theorists (Chapter 3)

¹ Mary Douglas (1973), discussing the 4s as she invents GG theory, rails against Vatican II. One of her points is that whereas the middle classes can show their faith through prayer, words don't count with the 4s. By lifting the official proscription on eating meat on Friday the Church destroyed the ability of the "bog Irish" living in London's outer suburbs to express their faith.

may fail but, like Geoff Pryor at the booths (§5.8), the intuition of the artist hits the mark. The second stanza gives the four social types in four lines:

Liberals dream of equal rights,
 Conservatives live in a world gone by,
 Socialists preach of a promised land,
 But old Uncle Son was an ordinary man.

If the 4s had an anthem it might look like the third stanza:

Unions tell you when to strike,
 Generals tell you when to fight,
 Preachers teach you wrong from right,
 Feed you when you're born; use you all your life.

But *Uncle Son* does not quite celebrate 4-ism. It is essentially a slightly ironic protest song, and perhaps a 3-ist perception of a Type 4. (The chorus: "Bless you Uncle Son,/ They won't forget you, when the revolution comes.")

America is the place for commemorating 4-ism and country and western music is the medium. Negro spiritual, gospel, ragtime, blues, jazz, rock 'n' roll and, recently, hip-hop all come out of fourdom.² There are films made of 4s and sociological studies of them but the makers are never 4s. American music is to a great extent the 4s' own work. It has been taken up by the middle classes except for the country and western genre which remains the 4s' exclusive territory. If national proclivities for songs of hopelessness, drunkenness, joblessness, and crime were compared, the US would surely be the winner. A few examples:

Sixteen Tons—and what do you get? Another day older and deeper in debt.
I Got Stripes—around my shoulders because I am in jail.
Tom Dooley—who is to hang for stabbing a woman to death.
Don't Take Your Guns to Town—but he does and gets killed in a bar.
Ruby, Don't Take Your Love to Town—but she does leaving her dying man alone.
The House of the Rising Sun—a New Orleans house of dissolution.
King of the Road—two hours of pushing broom buys an 8 by 12 four-bit room.
Gentle On My Mind—reminiscences of a hobo in the junkyard and the train-yard.
D-I-V-O-R-C-E—messing up the family life.
It Wasn't God Who Made Honky Tonk Angels—a fallen woman's feminist theory.

Even songs with a glimmer of hope (*Tie a Yellow Ribbon, Stand By Your Man*) are fatalistic.³ The futility of the 4-ist dream of the good life is well conveyed by the Harry McClintock parody:

...In the Big Rock Candy Mountains, you never change your socks
 And little streams of alcohol come a-trickling down the rocks
 The brakemen have to tip their hats and the railroad bulls are blind
 There's a lake of stew and of whiskey too...

I'm a-goin' to stay where you sleep all day
 Where they hung the jerk that invented work
 In the Big Rock Candy Mountains...

² The other music is folk. It is supposed to come from the common people. In modern times it tends to 3-ism but it seems to reflect all the types. Folk is opposed to classical which is supposed to be upper class but which also seems to reflect all the types.

³ What happens if you play a country and western song backwards? You get your girl back, you get your truck back, and you get your dog back.

That this is a fantasy only underlines the hopelessness. The 2004 Ig Nobel prize in Medicine was won for the finding that high suicide rates are correlated with listening to country and western music:

Further research, including analysis of country music lyrics, showed that the major themes—including the travails of love, drinking alcohol as a way to deal with life's problems, and a sense of hopelessness about work and finances—have all been linked to increased suicide risk.⁴

We probably should not blame the music. Music expresses feelings that resonate with the listener, and country and western expresses lonely entrapment. The American 1-ist mainstream insistence on optimism, on a try, try-again stance, and the universal disdain for hierarchy, provide no social-psychological space for failure or even ordinariness. Country and western music appears to be a grope for comfort where an overwhelming ethos of competitive equality of opportunity creates many “losers.” If American 4s seek social integration in the lower echelons of hierarchy (as they might in a more 2-ist society such as Europe or Japan), they will be looked down on for failing to stand tall and independent. The self-respecting alternative is a cabin in the woods stocked with tinned food and ammunition.

A10.4 Film and fiction

We might expect fictional characters and situations to tend to be “ideal types” because they have to be recognised quickly and unmistakably. Fiction is often analysable with WOLT⁵ and the following consists of some “deconstructions” using it.

The standard American film consists of a Type 1 hero who fights evil 2s (the vast criminal conspiracy; the bureaucrats who took his badge from him) in order to execute, always successfully, a Type 3 agenda of making the world safe for ordinary people. Along the way a few 4s may graduate to 1-ism. James Bond is the same Type 1 hero but has a Type 2 agenda of making the world safe for the government, presumably because the British are nervous about a super man acting for ordinary people.

The Type 1 hero is an intrinsically superior individual who has (more or less unexplained) special talents and who is above all rules. Type 2 heroes also exist and are more complex—more three dimensional, so to speak. Their superiority is due to blue blood, or diligence, or bravery, and propriety is their watchword. The dashing, rascal Type 1 hero does not perspire or show a furrowed brow; the solid, reliable Type 2 hero is stressed but of stout character. The self-aggrandising Type 1 hero single-handedly makes the world a better place; the self-effacing Type 2 barely manages to keep the collective viable. 2-ist film heroes are not common and are seldom American where bureaucracy is more likely to be the object of disdain.⁶

The *Harry Potter* stories (again, British) are very 2-ist with their emphasis on training, on respect for elders, and the problem of coping with flawed people, however the outstanding example of a Type 2 hero is *Judge Dredd* who helps maintain order in 22nd century Mega-City One, a seething conurbation of 400 million (all 1s and 4s) stretching from Boston to North Carolina, wherein democracy has been relinquished in favour of judge-rule. Good management is what is needed to control problems caused by opportunist 1s or foolish 4s. Notwithstanding its setting, this comic book is British; it has been published weekly for thirty years. Judge Dredd literally epitomises the law (“I am the law” he says as he takes the villain

⁴ <http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A4476-2004Oct3?language=printer>. Accessed June 2008. Article by Rick Weiss, staff writer.

⁵ Romantic love is the major area where WOLT has nothing to say. It is not in WOLT's domain, presumably because courtship (and other procreative behaviour) is non-social, being practised by quite primitive animals. WOLT seems to have nothing to say about comedy, per se, either.

⁶ Is Errol Flynn in *Dodge City* a Type 2 hero? As sheriff he brings the law and resists mob rule but he also wins the girl and goes off at the end to rescue another lawless town. It seems he is a superior individual showing that 2-ism works providing there is Type 1 directing it.

by the collar) and he is literally self-effacing, the top half of his face being always covered. There are no 3s though there was a 3-ist episode which concerned cruelty to animals; for humans there is no sympathy and judges themselves are, like Catholic priests, not permitted romantic attachment. Figure A10.1 is from an exceptional story which features a Type 3 who has sympathy for a “perp” (perpetrator). Nearly every word in those panels manifests 2-ism as deduced in Chapter 2—including the fancy that a Type 3 would actually see the error of her ways. Just as Dredd has no time for 3-ist compassion for criminals, he also has no time for 1-ist concern for the perps’ victims: neither the 3-ist view of society failing its members, nor the 1-ist desire for compensation or revenge, has any purchase: the judges recognise only the state as law-enforcer and the criminal as law-breaker. As model 2s the heavily armed judges take no satisfaction from performing their policing and sentencing duties but tend to be jaded and slightly cynical, so that rather than being fascist they display some 5-ist Platonic guardianship. The situation in Mega-City One keeps deteriorating—as it must because glory is in the past for 2s, and 5s tend to the misanthropic. Judges are also human and those who go bad observe best 2-ist practice by taking the “long walk,” an effectively suicidal descent into the squalor and violence of the “Undercity”.

Figure A10.1 Judge Dredd



Judge Dredd: The Exo-Men, Part 2. Script: J Howard; Art: R Smith; Lettering: T Frame. Published by Rebellion Developments.

The official Judge Dredd site⁷ attributes the success of the comic to its action and humour. There is no recognition there, or in any other internet discussion, of its coherent socio-dynamics. In other words, the coherence is subconscious: the different writers over the

⁷ <http://www.2000adonline.com/?zone=info&page=history> accessed July 2008.

years, who would probably be quite young and neither politically sophisticated nor learned in literature, have unknowingly understood the dynamics as have the readers.

There are many real Type 3 heroes and their exploits have often been celebrated in film, e.g. *Schindler's List* (1993), *Hotel Rwanda* (2004), *Amazing Grace* (2006) each about a Type 3 who saves others from rapaciousness. Fictional Type 3 heroes are less common and the concept of "hero" must be relaxed to find examples. Cinderella might be a Type 3 hero compared with her Type 1 step-sisters (and presumably Type 2 father). Dorothea in George Eliot's *Middlemarch* is another. One might argue that Dr Fane in *The Painted Veil* (Somerset Maugham novel and 1934 and 2006 films) is a Type 3 (or is he a vengeful Type 1?) who converts his self-centred wife into a Type 3. Lisa of *The Simpsons* is a Type 3. Is the success of that long-running TV animation due in part to its coherence? Homer epitomises Type 4; Bart, the schemer, is a (somewhat anarchic) Type 1; Marge, the voice of moderation, gathering the family around the table at mealtimes, is a Type 2. We only have to convince ourselves that Maggie, the non-communicating baby, is fulfilling the Type 5 role.

A distinct fictional Type 3 (and sort of Cinderella) is Andrea, the main character in the 2006 film *The Devil Wears Prada*, a tale which derives its integrity partly from its attention to detail but essentially from its depiction of 1-ism versus 3-ism. Andrea is an unpretentious, even dowdy, journalism graduate who lands a job in the ruthless, egotistical world of New York fashion publishing. At first disoriented, she is seduced by the glamour, and the film explores the ambiguities of her superficially successful integration into a 1-ist world. The tensions of any female being an extreme Type 1 are most thoroughly displayed in the character of the formidable Miranda, Andrea's career-driven boss. The types are exemplified by their clothes (costly and stylish v. thrifty and practical) and manner (bitchy and dismissive v. agreeable and considerate). It is a parable which teaches that self-regarding 1-ism is seductive but the best things in life are Type 3 and the two worlds do not mix.

The 4s' place in fiction is not edifying. But it is entertaining. The standard US movie usually includes some (they are the ones wearing baseball caps) perhaps as a foil to the hero's superiority, or perhaps as apprentice 1s, or possibly just because 1s do not explicitly recognise the existence of 4s. The 4s slip on banana skins and the world laughs at their incompetence. By definition real 4s are not likely to achieve prominence but cartoon caricatures do—no doubt because they are ideal types. Hillbilly Li'l Abner was very famous. As the official website says, cartoonist Al Capp's "hapless Dogpatchers hit a nerve in Depression-era America"⁸ by presenting characters who were worse off than the reader. Type 1 life revolves around esteem and recognition, and Capp even provided the no-hopers of Dogpatch with the wretched inhabitants of frozen Lower Slobbovia to look down on.

A fine image of the 4-ist way of life is offered by Patrick O'Brian (2002 [1971]: 90-91) in *Post Captain*. It is 1803, an interval of peace in the Napoleonic wars. English naval physician, Stephen Maturin, and his French counterpart, Dr Ramis, are chatting about "the subject of humanity at large—man's general unfitness for life as it is lived."

'This is particularly the case with sailors,' said Stephen. 'I have watched them attentively... the sailor, at sea (his proper element), lives in the present. There is nothing he can do about the past at all; and, having regard to the uncertainty of the omnipotent ocean and the weather, very little about the future. This, I may say in passing, accounts for the common tar's improvidence. The officers spend their lives fighting against this attitude on the part of the men... Sailors will provide against a storm tomorrow, or even in a fortnight's time; but for them the remoter possibilities are academic, unreal. They live in the present, I say...

'Now let us turn our honest tar ashore... no slops [clothing] provided by the purser, no food perpetually served out at stated intervals. And what do we find?'

⁸ <http://www.lil-abner.com/cappbio.html> accessed December 2008.

‘Pox, drunkenness, a bestial dissolution of all moral principle, gross over-eating: the liver ruined in ten days’ time.’

‘Certainly, certainly; but more than that, we find, not indeed false pregnancies, but everything short of them. Anxiety, hypochondria, displacency, melancholia, costive, delicate stomachs... a retention of urine; black, compact, meagre stools; an obstinate eczema.’

‘And for you all this is the effect of solid earth beneath the subject’s feet? No more?’

Stephen held up his hands. ‘It is the foetus of a thought; but I cherish it.’

A Type 5 hero? The whimsical, time-travelling Dr Who in the 20th Century series might qualify as a Platonic guardian. His pretty offsideer tended to be something of a Type 4, perennially disregarding the Doctor’s advice and getting captured by the Daleks who were extreme 2s (“Exterminate! Exterminate!”) as were their occasional substitutes, the Cybermen and the Vogans. There is something of a tendency to cast aliens as compassion-free 2s. Those other Vogons whose task it was to vaporise Earth to make way for a hyperspatial express route in Douglas Adams’s *Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy* were also archetypal. John Adams (1995: 172), discussing GG theory, quotes the head of the Vogon Constructor Fleet:

...all the planning charts and demolition orders have been on display in your local planning department in Alpha Centauri for fifty of your Earth years, so you’ve had plenty of time to lodge any formal complaint and it’s too late to start making a fuss about it now.

We see that fictional stories and characters are often amenable to WOLT analysis but in the 2004 satire *Team America: World Police* the characters actually spell out the theory as a part of the story. This movie, by the creators of the animated TV series *South Park*, parodies US foreign policy, film culture, and politics of all colours. The eponymous, swaggering anti-terrorist squad, which shoots up people and blows up places in the course of “saving” them, has a mission to prevent North Korean dictator Kim Jong-II from demolishing the whole planet. Team America’s blundering tactics are opposed by the left-leaning Film Actors Guild (FAG). The essential theory, as manifested by the standard American movie, is explained twice, first briefly in a scene in a bar and then in the film’s final scene when the Team leader delivers a public speech explaining, without irony, that he must be allowed to deal with Kim because the world works as a conflict between gung-ho 1s, malevolent 2s and effeminate 3s. Paraphrased, the speech runs as follows:

We’re reckless, arrogant, stupid 1s and the Film Actors Guild are 3s.

Kim Jong Il is a 2.

3s don’t like 1s because 3s get messed up by 1s but 1s also mess up 2s—2s who just want to wreck everything.

3s may think they can deal with 2s their way but the only thing that can mess up a 2 is a 1 with some audacity.

The problem with 1s is that sometimes they mess up too much, or mess up when it isn’t appropriate, and it takes a 3 to show them that.

But sometimes 3s are so full of nonsense that they become 2s themselves because 3s are too close to 2s.

I don’t know much in this crazy, crazy world but I do know that if you don’t let us mess up this 2 our 1s and 3s will all be wrecked.

There is plenty of internet comment on this film but little on this speech though one reviewer called it “...one of the most coherent, concise positions I’ve yet heard on the War on Terror.”⁹ It is a coherent, concise analysis of the motivation behind the standard US movie’s

⁹ <http://flakmag.com/film/teamamerica.html> accessed July 2008.

worldview, and a perceptive appreciation of the interactions of the three pro-active types. It also displays a bias which the authors, clever as they are, did not escape. This is the American 1-ist prejudice that 2s are evil and that the 3s are too close to them. WOLT says that the claim that 2s are more evil than 1s or 3s will not stand up to examination and since the political right, in the US and around the world, consists of 1s plus 2s in the same party (in coalition to combat the 3s) a strong case could be made that it is the 1s who are closer to the 2s. The attribution of effeminacy to Type 3 is an exaggeration, though WOLT suggests a tendency in this direction and there is empirical support in voting (Washington 2006; Oswald and Powdthavee 2005a, b), game-theory (Kanazawa 2001: 1131), and systematising and empathising (Clots-Figueras 2005; Baron-Cohen et al. 2003) research.

A10.5 Proverbs

It would be a weak theory of social arrangements and social interaction that could not cope with the mottos and maxims of everyday living. Most proverbs seem to be classifiable and a few words on them will round off this Appendix's demonstration of WOLT's versatility. They are classifiable variously as types or as axial issues.

Those oft remarked oppositions, Look before you leap v. He who hesitates is lost; Haste makes waste v. It's the early bird that gets the worm; Once bitten twice shy v. If at first you don't succeed try, try again; Many hands make light work v. Too many cooks spoil the broth; The pen is mightier than the sword v. Actions speak louder than words; and many more, are all X v. Y.

It is hard to find Z proverbs (Better safe than sorry; Fools rush in where angels fear to tread) but there are plenty of Type 2 sayings: A chain is as strong as its weakest link; A jack of all trades is master of none; A little knowledge is a dangerous thing; A man is known by the company he keeps; An old dog will learn no tricks; Ask no questions, hear no lies; As you make your bed, so you must lie in it; Cut your coat according to your cloth; Early to bed and early to rise, makes a man healthy, wealthy and wise; If it ain't broke, don't fix it; Spare the rod, spoil the child—and on and on.

A few of a similarly large supply of Type 1 proverbs: The grass is greener on the other side; Don't cry over spilt milk; A bad workman blames his tools; Faint heart ne'er won fair lady; He who laughs last laughs best; Money makes the world go around; Necessity is the mother of invention; Nothing ventured, nothing gained; Variety is the spice of life; You can't make an omelette without breaking eggs; Smile, and the world smiles with you; cry, and you cry alone; An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth; A big tree attracts the woodsman's axe—and many more.

The 1s and 2s appear to have more sayings than the other types. It is as if the 1s are full of exuberant go-getter sentiments and the 2s are soberly warning them to take care.

It must be significant, somehow, that there are not nearly so many Type 3 sayings: It is better to give than to receive; Let him who is without sin cast the first stone; There's no such thing as a free lunch; and three to oppose the last three from the 1s' list: A pleasure shared is doubled, grief shared is halved; Turn the other cheek; All that glitters is not gold.

The 4s have a moderate stock of proverbs: A bird in the hand is worth two in the bush; All good things must come to an end; Beggars can't be choosers; Don't look a gift horse in the mouth; It never rains, but it pours; Shit happens; Jam tomorrow and jam yesterday, but never jam today; Make hay while the sun shines; When ignorance is bliss, 'tis folly to be wise.

Give the 5s their due: Live and let live; Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof; That which does not kill you, makes you stronger; The best things in life are free; This, too, shall pass; To each his own.

There are a few proverbs which do not express the types' opinions but describe them. About 1s: Sow the wind and reap the whirlwind; Who lives by the sword dies by the sword. About 2s: Can't see the forest for the trees; The more things change, the more they stay the same; There's many a slip 'twixt cup and lip. About 3s: A friend to all is a friend to none; It's

easy to be wise after the event. About 4s: You can lead a horse to water but you can't make it drink; A fool and his money are soon parted.

Some proverbs seem general: If wishes were horses, beggars would ride; A stitch in time saves nine; Honey catches more flies than vinegar; Knowledge is power; The squeaky wheel gets the grease; Those who live in glass houses shouldn't throw stones; Two wrongs don't make a right.

Finally, there are some that can be debated: how to classify the golden rule, Do unto others as you would have them do unto you? And is: All for one and one for all, an expression of 2-ist solidarity or a reciprocal 1-ist deal?

Even where the classification is arguable, WOLT provides a basis for arguing.

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