The Quest for Indonesian Islam:  
Contestation and Consensus  
Concerning Veiling

By
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A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy  
at the Australian National University  

April 2007
I CERTIFY THAT THIS DISSERTATION IS ENTIRELY MY OWN ORIGINAL WORK

(SIGNED)
DENY HAMDANI
The Quest for Indonesian Islam: 
Contestation and Consensus Concerning Veiling

THESIS ABSTRACT

This study examines various transformations in the practice of veiling which have involved changes in its meaning for Indonesian Muslims. It concentrates on a forty-year period from the New Order to the Reform Era. In particular, it focuses on the interplay between the practice of wearing the veil and the changing social and political constellation in Indonesia, and relates these to the presence of both contestation and consensus regarding veiling among Indonesian Muslims.

After conducting one year’s fieldwork in some regions of Indonesia, I found significant changes in how Muslims negotiate their daily lives in connection with the idea of veiling. While a ‘relaxed’ form of veiling has long been practiced by santri (devout) Muslims, veiling has assumed an absolute meaning for other Muslims, especially since the increasing Islamisation of various social classes. The practice of veiling has become pervasive among Muslims: at the same time, it is intertwined with fashion trends, commercialisation and the expression of personal and religious identity.

Although some Modernist Muslims continue to contest the Islamist discourse regarding veiling, there is a growing trend to make veiling mandatory in certain parts of Indonesia. Veiling became oppressive rather than liberating in the areas where it has been imposed in the public domain. The appearance of the veil also changed: from a modest and traditional practice (kerudung), it was turned into the mandatory jilbab, which covers the head, neck and chest much more strictly. The veil transformed again in some parts of Indonesia, to become a fashion item: this made it a promising product for industry and marketing, due to the growing number of Muslim consumers. At the same time, in some places it has continued to be imposed by local Islam-oriented regimes which tend to want to control public behaviour according to their interpretation. In the light of these changes, I argue that the changing social and political conditions in contemporary Indonesia have impelled Muslims to search for an “Indonesian Islam”: what form that indigenous version of Islam will take is still being negotiated.
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Deny Hamdani
April, 2007
## Glossary

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<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
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<td><em>Abangan Muslims</em></td>
<td>Nominal or less strict Muslims, usually refers to Javanese Muslims</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>adat</em></td>
<td>Customary or traditional law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Aisyiyah</em></td>
<td>Women’s wing of the reformist organisation muhammadiyah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>akhwat</em></td>
<td>Literally means sister (Arabic)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>al-khimar</em></td>
<td>Head veil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Asbab al-nuzul</em></td>
<td>Circumstances and context for the revelation (of the Qur’an)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>aurat</em></td>
<td>Nakedness, pudenda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>baju koko</em></td>
<td>A long-sleeved plain coloured shirt without a collar that is usually worn by men to go to prayers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>baju kurung</em></td>
<td>Loose long-sleeved tunic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>bundo kanduang</em></td>
<td>Minangkabau honorific title for elder women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Bupati</em></td>
<td>Head of kabupaten (regency, district)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>busana muslim</em></td>
<td>An Islamic clothing ensemble: long loose clothing worn with a headscarf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>ciput</em></td>
<td>A simple, snug-fitting scarf to be worn over the head, under the headscarf to cover the hair. It looks like a snail shell – <em>ciput</em> – and is also called the <em>jilbab topi</em>, or <em>jilbab</em> hat; it is a stylish one-piece design</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>dakwah</em></td>
<td>‘The call’; preaching, proselysation, Islamic outreach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>dzalim</em></td>
<td>Tyranny</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>fatwa</em></td>
<td>Non-binding religious decisions in Islamic law</td>
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<tr>
<td><em>fiqh</em></td>
<td>Islamic jurisprudence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>fitnah</em></td>
<td>Chaos or discord, turmoil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>hadith</em></td>
<td>Report or account of the words and deeds of the Prophet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>hajj</em></td>
<td>Pilgrimage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>haram</em></td>
<td>Forbidden, unlawful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>hijab</em></td>
<td>Literally means ‘curtain, separation’. It segregates individuals or groups from society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>IAIN</em></td>
<td>Institut Agama Islam Negeri, State Institute for Islamic Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>ibadah</em></td>
<td>Worship, religious rituals and duties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>ITB</em></td>
<td>Institut Teknologi Bandung, Bandung Institute of Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>jihad</em></td>
<td>To strive or struggle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>JIL</em></td>
<td>Jaringan Islam Liberal, Liberal Islamic Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>jilbab</em></td>
<td>Women’s head-covering that leaves only the face exposed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>jilbabisasi</em></td>
<td>The growing prevalence of the <em>jilbab</em> among Indonesian women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>jubah</em></td>
<td>Long loose Arabic robe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>kaffah</em></td>
<td>Totality in practising Islam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>kain</em></td>
<td>A tightly-wrapped batik sarong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>kebaya</em></td>
<td>Close-fitting traditional blouse</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
kerpus internal headscarf
kerudung Loose headscarf; it was once known as kudung
khilafiyah A contentious legal matter on which the opinion of ulama is divided
khittah the spirit of the strategy of the NU founding fathers
kiai Noble, lofty; title of religious scholar or leader
kopiah black velvet fez or felt hat for men
kudung Muslim head shawl
kyai male religious leader or scholar who often owns a pesantren
Libasut taqwa Raiment of righteousness
Majelis Tarjih Majelis Tarjih dan Pengembangan Pemikiran Islam (Council on Law-making and the Development of Islamic Thought); founded by Muhammadiyah in 1927
maksiyat An immoral act, immorality
muallimat Religious teacher training for women
mufassir Scholar who specialises in Qur’anic commentary
Muhammadiyah Modernist Islamic organisation founded in 1912 by Ahamd Dahlan
muhrim close relative who is not a marrying partner
MUI Majelis Ulama Indonesia, Indonesia Ulama Council
Muslimat NU women’s wing organisation of NU
nagari traditional village in Minangkabau, West Sumatra
Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) “The Revival of Religious Scholars”, Indonesia’s largest Islamic organisation, established in 1926 by Hasyim Asy’ari and Wahab Hasbullah to promote traditionalist Islam
Nasyiatul Aisyiyah The young women’s section of Muhammadiyah
ninik mamak Minangkabau term used to refer to one’s mother’s eldest brother
nyai wife of a kiai (see above); a female ulama and teacher in Indonesia; particularly in Java
pengajian religious study group
perda peraturan daerah (a regional law)
perna peraturan nagari (a village law in West Sumatra)
pesantren “Place of the santri”, a traditional Islamic boarding-school
pitji felt hat
qath’i a definite or categorical principle in the Qur’an or Hadith whose meaning can not be negotiated or reinterpreted
rajam Death by stoning; the punishment for a married man who has unlawful sexual intercourse
ramadhan Ninth month of the Islamic calender during which fasting is required
santri A devout muslim
seragam uniform
shahabat A companion of the Prophet
shalat prayer conducted 5 times daily
<table>
<thead>
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<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>shalawat</td>
<td>praises or odes for the Prophet Muhammed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sharia</td>
<td>Islamic law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tabir</td>
<td>curtain used to segregate the sexes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>talakuang/telekung</td>
<td>headdress in the form of a veil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tangkuuluak/tengkuluk</td>
<td>folded or tied headdress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>taqwa</td>
<td>God-fearing; observing God’s commands; piety</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UIN</td>
<td>Universitas Islam Negeri, State Islamic University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ulama</td>
<td>religious leaders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>umat</td>
<td>the ruled; the religious community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ushul fiqh</td>
<td>The roots of jurisprudence; the principle and methods enabling the development of practical legal rules</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wali</td>
<td>chief, elder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zakat</td>
<td>‘purification’; the ‘wealth tax’, payment of which is one of the Five Pillars of Islam</td>
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

An intensification of religiosity in the Muslim public sphere was identified by Drewes (1955:286) and Djajadiningrat (1958:384) in the early 1950s. Similarly, Daniel S. Lev had a strong impression that many Indonesian people increasingly undertook Islamic obligations during the 1970s (1972:263). This stronger trend towards Islamisation in Indonesia was indicated by more and more people living up to the standards of Muslim orthodoxy. The number of santri Muslims – those who have knowledge of Islam and are living up to Islamic principles – was increasing. This inclination continued under the authoritarian New Order regime; it was manifested in the emergence of Islamic activism as a response to the depolitisation of the Islamic parties. As a result, religious activities including sermons which were filled with grievances, complaints and yearnings of an overtly political nature became pervasive in Indonesian mosques (Schwartz, 1999:164). This atmosphere encouraged Muslims to intensify their religious forums, and this made them more militant. Adopting ideas from this kind of forum, young participants strengthened their religiosity by taking up the veil and wearing it even in secular institutions.

In the 1980s the wearing of the veil in public schools started a period of conflict over veiling between certain Muslims and the bureaucracy; this was because the ruling regime affiliated itself to Christian and abangan bureaucrats rather than Muslim figures. During this period several female students in senior high school who took up the veil were stigmatised for being part of an Islamic radical movement, Jama'ah Imron, that was allegedly opposed to the legitimate state. Against this view, Amin Rais argued that the emergence of jilbabisasi in the Islamic World was a phenomenon linked to a movement ‘back to Islam’ and a searching for identity – or a kind of identity crisis – among Muslim youth at that time. Amin Rais endorsed this process. Therefore, the malice towards the jilbab shown by certain groups was obviously not addressed to the jilbab per se, but to the spirit behind it and the impulse to return to Islam (Amin Rais 1996:95). On the other hand, Abdurrahman Wahid contended that the emergence of the jilbab came from a generation who took every
aspect of life seriously, from acne to the ideal way of life. Wahid believed that jilbab isasi happened in a very simple way. It originated from the encouragement of a senior mentor who was regarded as one having full authority to interpret the truths of religion. The mentor suggested that his disciples cover their aurat in accordance with Islamic precepts, and the disciples obeyed. This was unusual clothing when girls wore it to secular schools where veiling was not encouraged (Tempo, January 29, 1983).

The acceptance of veiling in the public domain has changed the earlier stereotype, which related veiling to unfashionable clothing; it has become an attractive alternative. After the issuance of Regulation SK No.100/1991, political Islam was no longer forbidden by the state, while the ruling regime tried to accommodate Islamic forces within the power circle. For example the regime supported Islamic forces through its establishment of the ICMI (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia), a group of Muslim intellectuals who played significant roles in the bureaucracy. In the early 1990s a drama called Lautan Jilbab was staged. This drama represented the acceptance of veiling in public schools and more generally it represented the acceptance of Islamic symbols by the regime. During the same period a festival of Islamic arts, fashion, dancing and literature was held in Jakarta; it was called the Festival Istiqlal. While Lautan Jilbab signified the end of conflicts over the practice of veiling among Muslim women, the ‘Festival of Istiqlal’ was the beginning of the promotion of Islamic symbols, including Islamic attire. The involvement of middle-class Muslims who began to take up the veil also played a significant role in promoting the veil; this was concurrent with an intensifying knowledge of the religion and increasing involvement in religious activities. Moreover, the promotion of Islamic attire has been backed up by new Islamic media which have emerged with the growth of Muslim consumerism: magazines like Noor, Paras, Muslimah, Ummi, An-Nida and Alia target female Muslim readers. In the meantime, certain public schools have encouraged Muslim students to wear Islamic attire on certain days by allowing the headscarf for girls and a baju koko, a long-sleeved collarless shirt, for boys. At this stage, the wave of Islamisation began to
cross the boundaries between various social classes, by operating through commodification and formal education.

Due to the Islamisation of certain aspects of life, the aspiration of some Muslims to formalise veiling in the public domain became increasingly common in many regions of Indonesia although this desire has been contested by more liberal Muslims. Aceh initiated the imposition of veiling by issuing Regional Law No. 5 regarding the implementation of Islamic *syaria* law. One of the clauses states that “every Muslim man and woman is obliged to wear clothing that is in accordance with Islamic teachings, both in private or in public”.¹ To promote public endorsement of this law, a number of women involved in the PKK² group distributed free *jilbab* to people in the main square of the capital city of Aceh (*Koran Tempo*, March 19, 2002).

Addressing the formalisation of veiling, Musda Mulia, a progressive Muslim scholar, argued that the imposition of veiling is no longer Islamic. She believes that any kind of imposition contravenes the essence of Islamic teaching. For her, religious practice should be undertaken voluntarily, not by force. If a practice is regulated, it is an imposition (Mulia 2001 [http://islamlib.com](http://islamlib.com)). Similarly in Padang, West Sumatra, the Mayor imposed the wearing of Islamic attire on all students attending schools from the elementary to senior high school level as a part of his local policy (*Tempo*, May 22, 2005). According to this policy, students are obliged to wear Islamic attire – *baju kurung* (a long skirt with a matching long-sleeved loose tunic) for girls and long pants for boys.³ Although this policy was endorsed by local Muslim figures, criticism against it also emerged among Muslims. One of the critical voices came from Sudarto, Director of the Center for Inter-Community Studies (*Pusaka*) in Padang. He argued that the imposition of Islamic attire is irrational.

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¹ Article 5, Clause 3 of Regional Law No. 5/2000 regarding the implementation of Islamic *sharia* law.

² PKK stands for *Pendidikan Kesejahteraan Keluarga* (Guidance in Family Welfare). It is an association of women concerned with running home economics type programs for lower-class rural women. These efforts are usually backed up by state funding and the full force of the state apparatus (See Suryakusuma 2004:133).

Sudarto asked why the symbolic aspect of life should be regulated and standardised in public, whereas there are still many more serious problems in Padang that should be prioritised. He maintained that government regulation of attire is a nonsensical policy. Instead of imposing Islamic attire, Sudarto asked why the Mayor did not think about the education sector in the city, which is in much more urgent need of assistance (www.Islamlib.com, April 27, 2006). Apart from Aceh and West Sumatra, the Muslim aspiration to formalise Islamic attire has also emerged in other regions such as West Java: examples include instructional letters from the Bupati of Cianjur (Nos. 025/3643/Org & 061.2/2896/Org) discussing working hours and work uniforms for Muslims (Jam Kerja dan Anjuran Pemakaian Seragam Kerja [Muslim/Muslimah] pada Hari-hari Kerja); and an instructional letter written by the Bupati of Indramayu about the obligations to wear Islamic attire and to take lessons in reading the Qur’an (Wajib Busana Muslimah dan Pandai Baca Al Quran). Meanwhile, there are similar cases from South Sulawesi of the issuance of Regional Acts (perda), such as: a Regional Act from Kabupaten Bulukumba (No. 04/2003) about wearing Islamic attire (Berpakaian Muslim dan Muslimah); Regional Act No. 6/2005 from Kabupaten Enrekang regarding Islamic attire (Busana Muslim); and three Regional Acts from Kabupaten Maros (Nos. 15, 16, and 17/2005) about illiteracy in Arabic (and thus inability to read the Qur’an), Islamic attire and alms-giving (zakat) management (Buta Aksara Al Quran, Busana Muslim dan Pengelolaan Zakat).

All of the aforementioned developments signify both continuity and recent change in the accepted appearance and costume of committed Muslims: this new Islamic appearance is part of the quest of Muslims to find an appropriate identity for Indonesian Islam by connecting outward appearances with inner religiosity. This thesis investigates the transformation of religious identity by examining the movement from traditional veiling to new veiling which signifies a social transformation and profound change in the practice of veiling in Indonesia. It is very important to reveal the dynamics of this fundamental issue among Indonesian Muslims because it correlates closely with the social and political milieu. A good example of this linkage is provided by the experience of Iranian Muslims, who had to transform their appearance several times during their lives because of the changing
social and political situation. Muslim women who traditionally wore the veil were forcefully unveiled by government edict in 1936; and forced to reveil in 1983 after a regime change (Milani 1999:19). The 1936 edict banned the practice of veiling in public; veiling was re-imposed in 1983 after the Iranian revolution.

A chronological and ethnographic presentation requires serious academic attention to such transformations. Gender symbolism continues to generate signifiers for contesting ideas in the search for a representative embodiment of Indonesian Islam. Making an attempt to capture the transformation in the practice of veiling in Indonesia will be of significant utility in trying to understand the patterns of continuity and change in Islam from the centre (its Arab origin) to the periphery (Muslim countries outside the Arab world, including Indonesia).

Further, the transformation of veiling in the Muslim world has been influenced by situational factors that are much determined by the contexts of space and time. A number of scholars have analysed the significance of the recent veiling movement in Middle Eastern countries (e.g. Ahmed 1992; El Guindi 1981; Fernea and Gaunt 1982; Hoodfar 1991; MacLeod 1991; Moghadam 1993; Mule and Barthel 1992; Najmabadi 1991; Tohidi 1991; Zuhur 1992). Some other anthropological accounts have identified veiling with different contextual meanings. Sharma found that veiling constitutes ‘a symbol of separation’ (1978:251), while Abu Lughod found that veiling is ‘the most visible act of modest deference’ (1986:159). Anderson regarded veiling as comportment rather than chastity (1982:403). Makhlouf identified veiling as a signifier of the social condition of individuals (1979:32). Papanek considered that veiling created separate worlds and offered symbolic shelter (1973:290). While these studies raise useful findings for comparison with the Indonesian context, the differences between Indonesia and the centre of the Muslim world in the Middle East in terms of their contrasting forms of historical, political and cultural development will certainly reveal contrasting implications in certain ranges of space and time.

Bourdieu’s conceptual framework concerning ‘habitus’, field, cultural capital, symbolic capital and agents of consecration, offers an analytical framework to approach the practice and meanings of the veil. Those concepts relate to social structure of transforming practice of veiling as formulated by Bourdieau in the case
of Algeria, another Muslim country. Although Bourdieu’s theory is not easy to apply, his key concepts are profoundly inspiring to explain the complex system of veiling, which has social, political, cultural dimensions. The concept of habitus and field, which has been developed by Bourdieu, can explain how ‘habit-forming force’ or ‘mental habit’ in the case of veiling find various arenas (fields) of production, circulation, appropriation of goods, services, knowledge or status and the competitive positions held by actors. The pervasive practice of veiling in various classes of Muslims can be also linked to Bourdieu’s concept concerning ‘agents of consecration’. This emphasizes the role of important agents in promoting restricted production to foster producers of a certain type of cultural goods and consumers who will be influenced to consume them (Bourdieu 1993:121).

The wide diffusion of veiling within various groups of Indonesian Muslims after deep-seated transformations occurred in the social and political constellation indicates the existence of a mutual relationship which influences both continuity and change in Indonesian Islam. This evolution of the practice of veiling offers new insights into the significance of interconnectivity in transforming meanings and its effects on the consensus and contestation of veiling among Muslims. On the other hand, the strengthening of the Islamic movement and the changing of meanings and perspectives demonstrate the importance of considering a synchronic model within the diachronic development of veiling in Indonesia.4

This thesis explores contestation and consensus concerning the practice of veiling among Indonesian Muslims from the authoritarian era of the New Order regime to the contemporary era of regional autonomy. This effort will combine historical and ethnographical approaches to capture the transformation of meaning over four decades, and its effects on consensus and contestation regarding veiling among Muslims.

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4 The model employed here of exploring synchronic situations/conditions within a diachronic account of an historical development is inspired by Yudi Latif (2004).
**RESEARCH QUESTIONS**

This thesis seeks to answer several questions: How have Indonesian Muslims negotiated the practice and meanings of veiling in the changing social and political constellation during and post-Soeharto Indonesia? Under what circumstances and by what process, do the changing meanings of veiling proceed? To what extent did contestation and consensus concerning veiling take part in the efforts to search for and Indonesian form of Islam? These questions will guide this research project in order to reveal the scattered development of veiling within different social groups in Indonesia. Although this discussion does not focus on the development of Islamic veiling in terms of fashion and trends among consumers, it will nevertheless reveal aspects of this development when they are relevant to the main topic. Nor does this thesis emphasise Islamic veiling and enveloping attire in terms of their normative aspects, although discussing fundamental normative arguments (from the Qur’an and Hadith) is unavoidable in a discourse on this topic.

**THE COMPLEXITY OF VEILING**

There are two terms which mean ‘veil’ or ‘headscarf’ in Indonesian; these are kerudung and jilbab. While the kerudung (loose veil) refers only to a cover for the hair or head, the jilbab (tight veil) not only covers the head, but frequently also covers the whole upper body (like a cloak or shawl). The completely enveloping garment which covers the whole body is usually called busana muslim (Islamic attire). Andree Feillard discussed the replacement of the kerudung – which had been optional since the 1930s – by the recommended jilbab during the 1980s (1999:10). Because Feillard’s attention was still focused on the headscarf, the concept of veiling which requires covering the whole body remained a foreign concept in the Indonesian context. In this respect, Brenner found in the 1990s that the term jilbab is used ambiguously. She contended that some people use it to refer only to the head covering itself, while others intend it to designate the whole ensemble. Brenner agreed that the word jilbab is generally understood to refer to the newer style of Islamic clothing which became popular in the 1990s. It was imported from the Middle East and worn mostly by younger women instead of the more traditional...
sarong, kebaya and loose headscarf (kerudung) or caps made from woven fabric which were worn by older Indonesian women (1996:692).

Among Malay women – including those in West Sumatra – the practice of wearing a headdress was confined to the tudung (loose veil) which is commonly known as tengkuuluak among Minangkabau people. In contrast to the Islamist concept of veiling, the tengkuuluak refers to a hair cover or headdress that traditional Minangkabau women wear draped loosely over the head as a form of modesty. The term can refer to any cloth that is used to cover a woman’s hair. The traditional headscarf or tengkuuluak is usually worn with a baju kurung (a long, loose-fitting tunic), although the baju kurung is worn by both men and women. The difference lies in the style: long for women (either a single long-sleeved garment, or a long skirt worn with a knee-length over-blouse) and short (basically just a loose long-sleeved shirt) for men. Males wear the baju kurung with additional accessories such as a sarong (a piece of cloth worn wrapped around the waist like a skirt), trousers (seluar) and a head cloth (destar), while females complete their costume with a headscarf covering the head, neck and body if they are wearing a kain (similar to the male sarung, but longer, and wrapped more tightly) or a shawl or selendang (Siti Zainon Ismail 1993:380). Besides the loose veil, there is a tight veil worn by Minangkabau women that is called mudawarah. It is a modified version of the Arabic-style headscarf, which has been adjusted to suit the Minang sense of style: it is tied neatly, and covers the hair completely. During the 1920s Rahmah El-Yunusiyah introduced this kind of veil to female students at her institution, the Diniyah Putri Padang Panjang. El-Yunisiah claimed that the veil is designed to complement the baju kurung and the traditional batik kain, both of which cover the whole body except the face and hands. She claimed that this style of headscarf is based on Islamic teachings.\footnote{Ghalia, “Peringatan 55 Tahun Diniyah Putri Padang Panjang, Jakarta” Indonesia, p. 246.} Another type of tight veil is the telekung, known in Java as mukena, which is a garment which completely covers the head and body; it is worn for daily prayers.
Regarding differences in headdress and costume, el-Guindi identified two kinds of outfits worn by female Muslim activists in Egypt. The *al-khimar* is a headdress which covers all the hair to below the neck in back, and passes below the chin in front, leaving the entire face exposed (many observers see a resemblance to the veils of Catholic nuns). Women can also wear *al-jilbab*, a long loose robe with wide long sleeves. Both *al-khimar* and *al-jilbab* are dyed in austere, solid colours (such as navy blue, brown, beige or grey) and are made from thick, opaque material. Women choosing this costume do not put on any makeup, and they never wear prints, bright colours or fitted dresses that reveal any part of the body or its outline. Sometimes, this costume is worn with gloves; there is a lack of agreement as to whether or not covering the hands is prescribed for women in Islam, however (Guindi 1981:474-475).

It is clear that what is referred to as ‘the veil’ in English does not have any single name in Arabic. There are many Arabic words that could be translated as ‘veil’ in English. Aside from semantics, this is because the institution of veiling varies according to location. For example, there are several different kinds of head and face coverings for women (and for men) in the Islamic East, some of which are extensions of whole body covers. Correspondingly there are numerous Arabic terms which distinguish them (Fernea and Fernea 1979:68-77). Today female members of the Islamic movement in the Middle East wear what members call *al-ziyy al-Islami* (Islamic dress). *Ziyy* refers to female and male forms of dress which are meaningful and make sense according to local beliefs and rules. Modesty is defined in terms of cross-sex interaction and sexual identity (see Antoun 1968: Guindi 1981:474). In other words, the European term ‘veil’ (and its corollary assumption of seclusion) fail to capture the nuances of actual practice; they over-simplify a complex phenomenon. Furthermore, the word ‘veil’ as it is commonly used gives the illusion of having a single referent, whereas it is ambiguous: it refers at various times to a face cover for women, a transparent head cover, or to an elaborate headdress. Limiting its range of reference obscures historical developments, cultural differences based on social context, class, or special rank, and sociopolitical articulations (Guindi, 1995:110).
Veiling and seclusion are not the same thing. The former refers to the physical covering of the body, while the latter relates to restrictions on mingling with the opposite sex. Nevertheless, the two are complementary, because veiling, to some extent, is a kind of ‘portable seclusion’ which facilitates and preserves the idea of privacy and safety. Anderson argued that this relationship indicates that veiling and seclusion are facets of the same thing (1982:401). Discontent about the seclusion of women was expressed by the founding father of the Indonesian Republic, President Soekarno, who rejected the idea of separating men and women at social gatherings. In December 1938, Soekarno, accompanied by his wife, was invited to attend a Muhammadiyah meeting in Bengkulu. Soekarno decided to leave the meeting soon after they entered the hall. According to Antara (the Indonesian new agency) Soekarno said that he acted thus as a form of protest over the use of tabir (curtains) at the meeting. The tabir usually consists of a white curtain separating men and women at a meeting or in a prayer room. Soekarno argued that it was a symbol of slavery, and not an Islamic requirement but rather a custom promoted by the Muhammadiyah community (White 2004:120). Likewise, Haji Agus Salim, a prolific Muslim author, criticised the gender segregation practiced by JIB (Jong Islamiten Bund or ‘Islamic Youth Group’) during the 1920s. Salim demonstratively drew open the tabir (curtain) in the meeting forum of JIB. He was annoyed with the use of the tabir, arguing that women are able to move freely in public, mingle on public transportation without wearing the veil and watch films at the cinema without being secluded, yet they had to hide behind the curtain at JIB meetings. According to Agus Salim, the practice of segregation by using the tabir tends to imitate Arabic traditions rather than Islamic precepts. He asked why women should be secluded at social gatherings. Besides being a paradox in society, Salim argued that the practice of seclusion impeded the development of Islamic organisations. He believed that Arabic traditional practices would not gain public sympathy (Panitia 1996:312-317).
A REVIEW OF PREVIOUS STUDIES OF VEILING

Studies concerning veiling have been conducted by numerous scholars using a variety of approaches. Different contexts have led scholars to multiple explications which have linked the veil with pertinent social concepts. In the European social setting, most researchers tend to focus on the social conflicts which relate to the veil and the public discourse of citizenship, immigrant and legal studies. By contrast, in the Middle East context, veiling has been explained by other scholars with a major emphasis on symbolic, cultural and political aspects. Meanwhile, the growing practice of veiling in contemporary Indonesian Islam has brought Western scholars to conceptualise it as a complex trend which deals with modernity, identity and contested meanings of veiling among Muslims. By comparing such previous studies I intend to analyse the gaps which still remain and to make a contribution to filling those gaps, through this thesis.

One of important study is the investigation of veiling in France conducted by John R. Bowen (2007), an American anthropologist. His book entitled ‘Why the French Don't Like Headscarves’ explores the various disciplines of political philosophy, public policy and common sense in changing French daily life. Instead of making judgments on the rights and wrongs of French policy, Bowen has investigated how people think about an important social issue in context. He focuses on historical and social aspects to understand why the French government is concerned about a piece of cloth. By his ethnography of media coverage, Bowen found that the emergence of the veiling controversy is closely linked with three crucial problems: communalism, Islamism and sexism. He points out how Media portrayed such aspects as limiting the freedom and autonomy of women, and are related to other illegal practices like violence against women, excisions and polygamy. Bowen’s significant contribution is his comprehensive and objective analysis on the veiling controversy as a multicultural challenge of ambiguous France’s laicite (secularism).

Another study on the veiling controversy in France has been written by Pamela Nicolette Louise Jones (2004). In her dissertation, Jones presents a thorough account of the controversy of veiling (affaire du foulard) dealing with the principles and
practice of *laicité* (secularism). She has explored the *affaire* as a battleground for the soul and spirit of France which has been waged between competing social, cultural, legal and political principles. By focusing on the legal and administrative texts in the *affaire du foulard*, her thesis does not only capture the human drama of several veiling cases, but also the interrelation between legal and cultural issues to challenge the nature of secularism in France and the status of symbolism of the *foulard* for the Muslim schoolgirls. However, no interview materials were taken into account by Jones to explicate the controversy of veiling in the changing daily life of France.

A study on the controversy of veiling in the international context has been conducted by Sebastian Poulter (1997). While Jones only focuses on France’s experience, Poulter explores France and England. The two countries have been compared by examining the paradox of the regimes dealing with their policy on the headscarf issues. He found that while France, which draws a sharp distinction between Church and State, feels a compelling need to guarantee the exercise of religious freedom, England with its established Church, its lack of a written constitution and its failure to incorporate the European Convention, offers no legal guarantees of religious freedom or freedom from religious discrimination. Poulter also notes that despite the broad legal protection afforded by the Conseil d’Etat, a significant number of Muslim pupils have in fact found themselves excluded from school classes for wearing the *hijab*. By contrast, only a few brief incidents of exclusion appear to have occurred in England and schools seem generally willing to accommodate the *hijab* even though pupils have few legal rights in this regard. Poulter notes that Muslims pupils are able to wear the *hijab* more confidently and freely in English schools, even though their technical legal rights are better safeguarded by French law.

Sawitri Saharso (2007) also compares two cases on headscarves in European countries through case studies. While Poulter compared the situation in England and France, Saharso analyzed Germany and the Netherlands. Unlike Jones and Poulter, Saharso examines the headscarf issue through the different citizenship models which are adopted by the two countries. She found the peculiarity of the models relate to the governments’ treatment of immigrants’ cultural identity. In her study, Saharso notes
that the Netherlands, which represents a multicultural model of citizenship, tends to treat Islamic veiling issues with an accommodating policy. Meanwhile, Germany, with some eight federal states, has introduced legislation to ban the veil due to its ethno-cultural model of citizenship. As a study of public policy, Saharso reveals how public discourse in Germany and the Netherlands has played a significant role in shaping the official position. She depicts how veiling became a public issue in European people’s resistance to multicultural policies. Saharso’s standpoint presents the experience of liberal states in testing public neutrality on the one hand and the right to religious freedom of women on the other.

In the Middle East social setting, the study of veiling has been conducted with various approaches. One comprehensive study is Fadwa El-Guindi’s work in her book entitled: *Veil: modesty, privacy and resistance* (1999). In her study, she attempts to synthesise an ethnographic approach with historical and Qur’anic texts, *Hadith* (the reported sayings of the Prophet) and *Tafsir* (Qur’anic exegesis). Her investigation includes women who have made the decision to veil, those who have refused, some who have always been veiled, and others who have never veiled. Unlike some Western scholars who commonly use ideology of oppression to the practice of women’s veiling, El-Guindi’s has shown the complexity of veiling among Middle Eastern societies. She found that the dress code worn by male and female activists reflect certain cultural codes which differ from the traditional concept of modesty, shame and seclusion. The cultural codes, according to El-Guindi, incline to associate with the concept of privacy, sanctity, respect and restraint. Her impressive explanation concerning veiling among local communities is also exposed in her effort to compare veiling pattern among Tuareg men and women in North Africa, the Awlad Ali in Africa and Muslims in North India. She does not only insightfully underline similar pattern of veiling among such communities, but also identify the nature of veiling which is fluid and changing: it depends on diverse social and historical contexts.

The study of veiling has also been approached through a specific sub-groups rather than general coverage of the Middle East context. One insightful work is MacLeod’s study of new veiling practices among lower middle-class women in
Cairo, Egypt. MacLeod (1991) reveals the complexity of the phenomenon of modern middle class women paradoxically adopting a traditional symbol of female subordination. She argues that the emergence of such reactionary behaviour among women is an expression of their silent protest against the conflicting contemporary ideologies which encourage them to work outside the home on the one hand and confine them to the traditional roles of wife and mother on the other. MacLeod argues that the symbolism of the new veiling emerges from this intense sub-cultural dilemma, which involves both resistance and acquiescence. Based on a long period of ethnographic study, MacLeod’s work cogently describes a significant process of social change as it is occurring, and interprets it with discernment. In doing so, she depicts change among members of a particular social class in the capital city of a developing country. In addition, MacLeod discusses the potential of new veiling to accommodate protest for further reform and change in Egyptian society.

The experience of Turkey dealing with veiling is also dynamic. In the literature of the Turkish Islamic movement, Nilufer Gole depicts veiling as a multi-layered political issue in her work, *The Forbidden Modern* (1996). Gole found that veiling is related to social power-relations “between Islam and the West, modernity and tradition, secularism and religion, men and women, and women themselves”(1). During her fieldwork, Gole conducted in-depth interviews, predominantly by initiating group discussions. She asked probing questions, instigated discussions with invited lecturers and ‘intervened’ with the people researched. Gole focuses on agency and meaning: she attempted to listen, learn and understand how Islamism and women’s education coexist. Gole has shown the difference between Western and Turkish modernity in which the ideology of contemporary Islamist has been reconstructed in modern Turkish history. In contrast to the Western form of modernity, the principles of ‘secularism, equality, individualism and confessionalism’ are disputed in Islamic paradigm, particularly where gender and sexuality are concerned. Similar with El-Guindi’s finding fact that veiling does not have any correlation with passive and submissive inclination of women, Gole finds that young veiled students are the active and assertive agents who try to convey political message by their headscarves. They also gain another benefit such as access to
secular education, social recognition, and acquire a new class status. At the same time, Gole argues that they “also empower themselves through their claim on Islamic knowledge and politics” (Gole, 1996:22).

Just as the studies of veiling in the Middle East context have indicated a state of flux, researches concerning veiling in the context of Indonesian Islam have captured the changing pattern of its practice, although they have mainly been conducted in a Javanese social setting. One of the leading studies is by Suzanne Brenner (1996). She attempts to explore the significance of modern veiling among Muslims in Java by analysing young women’s experiences of conversion to veiling within the larger context of the Indonesian Islamic movement (ibid, p. 673). Brenner argues that the decision to wear Islamic-style clothing both effects and signifies a transformation of self for women in Java, and that this subjective transformation is informed by and in turn contributes to a larger process of social change in contemporary Indonesia. She speculates that in Java, the growing trend for women to wear Islamic clothing (veiling) challenges local tradition as well as Western models of modernity. Her analysis of Javanese women’s narratives of ‘conversion’ to veiling against the background of the contemporary Islamic movement reveals that veiling represents both a new historical consciousness and a process of subjective transformation that is tied to a larger process of social change in Indonesia. In presenting themselves as modern Muslims, Brenner points out that veiled women simultaneously produce a vision of a society that is distancing itself from the past as it embarks upon a new modernity. While she believes that veiling signifies a new historical consciousness and a new way of life, she also maintains that veiling practice should be seen as an active process of both self-and social production.

Brenner’s research has been extended by Washburn (2001), who engaged in similar research among Javanese Muslims. Washburn conducted research for one year in Yogyakarta, exploring women's personal experiences and jilbab-isation. She used a life history methodology, interviewing women with different experiences and backgrounds about their religious life. In this research, Washburn focuses on the meaning of Islamic teachings in relation to personal perceptions and the inner meaning of religious teachings. Interviewees were selected from the middle class,
and among scholars and Javanese community members, in order to reveal the complexity of religious interpretation, particularly in relation to wearing the jilbab. The question of whether wearing jilbab is a personal sign of modernity that is also an expression of a personal transformation has links to the patterns of social transformation urged by the Islamic movement. Washburn found that the jilbab is a personal symbol which embodies meaning in cultural and psychological terms. It can be a symbol of modernity or conversely of conservatism. It can also signal an acceptance of a gender role based on an Islamic perspective. Similarly, donning jilbab can represent a total personal transformation, from ignoring religious duties to living as a devout Muslim woman. According to Washburn, the perception of gender roles in Indonesia was influenced by the New Order regime’s construction of gender; the role assigned to women by the state was coincidentally parallel to that encouraged by Islamic thinkers. This gender ideology dictated that women should be under men’s control. She concludes that in any case, the jilbab is a complex symbol that can not be understood outside its personal, cultural and state contexts (Washburn, 2001:137).

Dwyer produced another piece of research on veiling in Java (2001). She was based in Yogyakarta, and explored how Muslims are negotiating modernity in the contemporary world. In her study, Dwyer treated the practice of veiling as a central aspect of modern Indonesian Islam: the jilbab (headscarf) has become imbued with contested meanings, and it is important to understand how women remake its significance in their travels through social space. Dwyer looked at gendered practices of piety. She found that Muslim women have become both potent symbols and active agents of Islamic identity. Dwyer explores how the cultural spaces created by Muslim women in Yogyakarta exist in dynamic tension with the religious and political landscape of contemporary Indonesia. She found links between gender, religion, power and space at a time when boundaries – including those of bodies, nation and religious community – are being debated in the name of ‘modernity’ (modernisasi) and ‘progress’/‘development’ (pembangunan). According to her, the body is not a stable signifier that remains fixed in its meaning within the boundaries of a shared and homogenous culture. Bodies move through cultural spaces, and these spaces
invest them with differing and contradictory meanings. In their turn, Dwyer notes that these embodied trajectories create political and religious cartographies that may redraw/reshape existing national, ethnic and/or religious categories and boundaries.

In a similar location of study to Dwyer, Nancy J. Smith-Hefner (2007) examines the practice and meanings of new veiling and of Islamization more generally for young Muslim Javanese women in the new middle class. From her fieldwork for about eight months in Yogyakarta, Smith-Hefner found that the new veiling is neither a traditionalist survival nor an antimodernist reaction but rather a complex and sometimes ambiguous effort by young Muslim women to reconcile the opportunities for autonomy and choice offered by modern education with a heightened commitment to the profession of Islam. By means of ethnographic and life-historical materials, she identifies the pervasive practice of veiling among Javanese Muslim women as an unpredictable development and paradox of modernity. Instead of framing the veiling practice as a settled entity, Smith-Hefner argues that veiling is an ostensible model of unfinished transformation. She concludes that veiling does not only serve as a uniform for the wearer, but also has political and sexual dimensions.

While some scholars related the veiling issue with modernism, Andree Feillard has juxtaposed the contemporary issue with growing conservatism. By framing the discourse of female leaders of Muslim organisations on women and Islam, she attempts to explicate veiling among both reformist and traditionalist Muslims. Feillard (1999) found that among the reformists, veiling has been regarded as a pledge of a virtuous life, while traditionalists view it as a new fashion accessory. Between these two inclinations of the Indonesian Muslim, she presents a third category of practicing Muslims who prefer not to wear the veil and reject the chador with a strong reaction. By interviewing NGO activists, Feillard argues that progressive Indonesian women do not intend to reject the practice of veiling for the shake of modernity, but they allow women not to don the veil in the name of freedom of choice although the social pressure is increasingly extensive in the Islamized public domain. As intense as the debate on polygamy among the intellectual middle class, Feillard points out that the discourse concerning the veil has been contested.
among progressive and conservative Muslims in their effort to gain recognition and influence when religious authority is scattered in an ambiguous trend of social life.

In line with Feillard’s identification of increasing conservatism among Indonesian Muslims, Eve Warburton (2006) confirms the strengthening of the religious regime in public institutions after the collapse of the New Order regime. In her thesis, Warburton examines the patterns of veiling which have been forged by changing social and political constellations. On the other hand, she believes that the changing meaning of veiling reflects broader social, cultural and political developments. By focusing on the experience of university students, she found a complicated interrelation between the socio-political realm and individual choices through a framework of ‘regimes’, emphasizing how veiling is a highly spatialised social practice that draws upon a range of influences and motivations. As Brenner and Smith-Hefner have found, Warburton argues that contemporary Muslim women’s choices to wear the veil respond to a complex system of social pressures and institutional structures which increasingly present the veil as being central to the cultivation of both a moral self, and society.

While many scholars have explored the social and political aspects of veiling, a gap still remains. This is particularly due to the fact that most previous studies are bound to a conceptualization of veiling within particular social settings or focused on a single perspective. Consequently, the scope of the problem is not wide enough. For example, veiling has been associated with the issue of public policy in European countries, but the examination of Muslims’ pros and cons in their internal circle has been less of less concern. Previous scholars’ exploration of the growing practice of new veiling has also focused on a certain social class. The object of research is usually the Middle class and well-educated Muslims. In the Indonesian context, most scholars have preferred researching Javanese Muslim practices over the development of religious practices of local Muslims in the outer islands. However, the pervasive practice of new veiling has not only been dominated by Javanese Muslims, but also adopted by people in other Muslim-based regions. These facts indicate that there is a significant void in the study of veiling.
The contribution of this thesis is to fill this gap concerning the complexity of veiling. It will balance the contestation and consensus trends within the discourse of veiling. It is also an effort to contribute to the enrichment of methodological and theoretical frameworks about the two evolving trends inherent in public discourse and religious-based issues. As mentioned above, a discussion concerning veiling cannot merely engage a single perspective. It should cover both sides, namely contestation and consensus, which are traced through historical investigation. In addition, this issue is explored with ethnographic data that is taken not only from Java but also from an outer island, West Sumatera. This thesis framework incorporates both social and political development variables to elucidate the dynamic transformation of the complexity of veiling in a comprehensive way.

**METHODOLOGY AND FIELDWORK**

This study combines historical and ethnographic approaches to explore the progressive strengthening of Islamisation movements in Indonesia and the changing significance of veiling among those who wear it. The chronological model is used to discuss changes in the meaning and practice of veiling which occurred in the space of a few decades in modern Indonesia. Since this project attempts to capture the development of veiling over a broad geographical area, it also employs synchronic ‘cross references’ to various groups and regions that are interconnected in terms of the development of veiling in Indonesia. During fieldwork, I visited Jakarta, Bandung, Surabaya, Yogyakarta and West Sumatra to collect data. The regions selected were intended to represent the wide diffusion of veiling among diverse Muslim groups who each play a significant role in relation to its changing meanings and the evolving perspectives on its practice. Since most prior studies have concentrated on using women as informants, this research project was based on interviews of both women and men; the intent was to describe the conceptualisation of veiling by both genders. This research is based on data provided by diverse informants: it involved both focus groups and individual interviews.
Since this thesis concerns itself with the living practice of veiling among santri Muslims, I use Nahdatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah women as representatives of gendered groups that can reveal fundamental ideas about veiling among santri Muslims. As a matter of fact, I originally planned to cover Persis (Persatuan Islam) – the Muslim Union – which is as concerned with religious practices and as devout as the other two groups. Due to the limited access to the Persis group available to me, however, I had to leave the Persis variant out of this study. To study the two chosen groups, I met with women affiliated structurally and/or culturally with the two Muslim organisations mentioned above; I also talked with females of various ages, to gain a sense of generational differences. I met NU women in East Java and Jakarta, and maintain contact by phone with some of them. Meanwhile, I met Muhammadiyah women mostly in Yogyakarta, although I did encounter a few of them in Jakarta. There is a distinction within this group between those who affiliate with Aisyiah and those who prefer Nasyiatul Aisyiah. I also remain in touch with informants from this group; I can reach them by phone to ask new questions or to confirm data.

In order to explore the Islamic movements, particularly in relation to veiling, I went to Bandung to meet former activists from the Salman Community. In addition, I examined archives concerning conflicts over the jilbab from the Salman Library and the records of its steering committee. I also collected data from the National Library in Jakarta and libraries in other cities I visited, such as Bandung and Surabaya. When I visited a high school in Bandung (SMAN 3), the veiled receptionist suspected me of being a Christian missionary. This was a personal experience that I have never forgotten. My expectation of a welcome in a religious community was shattered by the attitude of an apparently devout Muslim toward me, a fellow Muslim.

In addition to making observations in the cities that I visited, I interviewed some celebrities in Jakarta in connection with veiling. I did not rely on the interview data alone to derive a description of veiling among middle-class Indonesian women; but I also used newspaper and magazine clippings. In Jakarta I interviewed some NGO women, journalists from the Islamic media, Muslim intellectuals (both men and women), university students and young professionals.
The most challenging fieldwork location I visited was in West Sumatra. I had never visited this region before, and my visit took place when rumours were spreading threatening new earthquakes and tsunami-producing aftershocks. This was shortly after the devastating Aceh tsunami on Boxing Day 2004. Although my study had no connection to the earthquake, the situation – particularly in Padang – was not conducive to conducting fieldwork. Many stores were closed and the local library was open only on an irregular basis because of the recent disaster. The debate about formalising Islamic attire – which concerned veiling as a central issue – motivated me not to leave Padang before obtaining sufficient data. In addition, my visit to the countryside of West Sumatra opened my eyes to beautiful scenery with green nuances and coconut trees everywhere; the people still live in traditional ways there. Even so, Minangkabau people frequently own parabola satellite dishes; this possession is uncommon in Javanese villages. Due to the imposition of veiling down to the lowest level of the administration – e.g. the nagari (traditional village), I found the aspiration to formalise veiling to be as widespread as the aspiration for the implementation of syaria-based laws. In nagari Paninggahan (Solok Kabupaten, West Sumatra), I found a village that is trying to combine Islamic teachings with the requirements of adat (‘custom’; ‘tradition’; indigenous legal codes): even so, this effort has led to conflicting ideas about how to implement such a merger.

THESIS OUTLINE

This thesis consists of seven chapters. Chapter One presents the background of the research. It provides a general introduction to the subject, establishes research questions, discusses the complexity of veiling, summarises previous studies on the subject, reviews the research methodology, reports on fieldwork, and offers a thesis outline.

Chapter Two discusses veiling among devout Muslims (santri); the practice of veiling consistently represents this religious-social group. Two santri groups of women – from Nahdhatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah – reveal that their social class habitually practices veiling: this operates below the levels of consciousness and language and functions outside one’s own will; yet it determines one’s daily
comportment and activities. Among santri women, the issue of costume takes more than one question into account; santri women consider various aspects of clothing such as practicality, comfort, local standards of modesty, and aesthetics; all of these are significant for them. While the internalisation process continues by means of the explicit and implicit demands exerted within their own community, the practice of veiling among santri Muslims has not expanded to other social groups, despite the fact that the degree of disposition to wear the veil (kerudung) is relatively durable among them. Religious schools, like the Muallimat, habituated NU and Muhammadiyah women to wearing the veil in their early childhood, and female family members and relatives exemplified the regular practice of veiling. Due to the internalisation of veiling among santri Muslims, the practice remains relatively unchanged, although it is not strictly enforced.

Chapter Three explores the contestation of veiling during the New Order period. While the concept of wearing kerudung had been promoted among santri Muslims using a traditional approach, the ‘new veiling’ (jilbab) was advocated in a militant way. During this period of political repression, the social and political atmosphere encouraged veiled women to become symbols of resistance to the ruling state. There were certain tensions arising from the opposing positions of Islam vis-à-vis the state which made women’s decisions crucial: they became activists and victims at the same time. Since the bureaucracy’s attitude maintained its distance from Islamic groups, the issue of veiling became a symbol of protest against the ruling regime. The new style of dress (jilbab) included long-sleeved shirts, long socks and a big headscarf, while the old costume included only a loose veil or scarf (kerudung). Resistance to those who decided to wear jilbab emerged from fellow students, parents, and public school administrators representing the state bureaucracy. Because the state suspected that the growing popularity of veiling among young female students arose in response to a political movement, bureaucratic agents tried to restrain the wave of new veiling by imposing repressive and intimidating measures. Instead of withdrawing from the conflict, the new wearers of the veil stood by their views. As in other parts of the Islamic world during the 1980s, the
widespread global phenomenon of Islamisation and renewed commitment to the faith became an important social and political movement in Indonesia.

Chapter Four investigates social transformations after the contestation of veiling waned during the latter years of the New Order regime. The growing practice of veiling among middle-class Muslims was facilitated by state political support in the early 1990s, while the promotion of Islamic clothing has been sustained by religious institutions, celebrities and the Islamic print media. Although the practice of wearing Islamic clothing has become increasingly pervasive among members of various social classes in the Muslim community, the association between veiling and religious values has remained tenuous. Commercialisation has influenced the appearance of Islamic clothing, creating more fashionable products to suit the growing masses of Muslim consumers. Criticism of the new developments in veiling practice have emerged from those concerned with the *sharia* veiling criteria. Meanwhile those concerned with making Islamic clothing sell defended the new ‘fashionable’ veils. On the other hand, some Muslims have removed their veils, revealing their personal disillusionment with ‘Islamic veiling’ because the social and religious expectations it sets up are not in fact adhered to. Some have criticised the ‘anomalous behaviour’ of the veil wearers, while others have asked questions about the social construction of women’s identity and morality in relation to veiling. These facts reveal that Islamic clothing became increasingly popular due to the significant changes in its style which were made for the sake of ‘fashion’; at the same time, some Muslim women challenged the practice of veiling by removing their Islamic attire.

Chapter Five discusses the conflicting ideas about the institutionalisation of Islamic attire in West Sumatra. The experiences of Minangkabau people in Padang and Paninggahan shows that the implementation of mandatory Islamic attire is problematic, although it can be applied in a predominantly Muslim region. Instead of encouraging religious awareness, the imposition of veiling has resulted in purely formal obedience: it has lost its meaning and become oppressive for the wearer. In the process of institutionalisation, bureaucracy and religious groups collaborated to formalise Islamic attire. The headscarf and *baju kurung* have been stipulated to be the representative Islamic attire for women. Both bureaucrats and religious figures
used a common form of argumentation to justify the imposition of Islamic costume. They then defined the ‘correct’ and ‘incorrect’ forms of women’s attire in accordance with the criteria of Islamic veiling; this created coercion by imposing sanctions. All of these intertwining features reveal the traits of orthodoxy when they are manifested within a ruling religious regime.

Chapter Six explores the challenging and sometimes conflicting interpretations of veiling which have been offered by Indonesian Muslim scholars. In the search for a collective identity which embraces both Islam and local culture, these two elements must be incessantly negotiated in the changing social and political milieu. In addition, the trend toward orthodoxy is balanced by the emergence of heterodoxy as competing social groups struggle to define an appropriate identity that can represent their social aspirations. This chapter criticises the problematic of veiling in terms of religious doctrine and its social impact, which was recently deepened by the growing visibility of Islamic clothing and its recent entry into the world of fashion.

Chapter Seven presents the conclusion to the whole thesis. While the idea of veiling has been contested during its development, the idea of covering the aurat with a veil has been generally accepted among orthodox Muslims – both the old and the new santri. Nevertheless, the acceptance of veiling by many Muslims indicates that this increasingly pervasive practice is congruent with the intensifying Islamisation process. At the same time, veiling is continuously criticised by some other Muslims.

This research project shows that the development of veiling in Indonesia reflects the development of Indonesian Islam in response to the continuously changing and constantly re-negotiated social and political constellation. All the transformations of veiling, from the exclusive practice of veiling among santri (devout) Muslims to a popular practice among middle-class Muslims, and the issues surrounding the imposition of veiling by formalising Islamic attire, show how Indonesian Muslims have tried to construe Islamic precepts within the sphere of their local reality, employing both consensus and contestation against the backdrop of a changing social and political constellation. The quest for Indonesian Islam is continuously negotiated among Muslims in terms of the continuities and changes of daily life.
CHAPTER II
CONSENSUS ON VEILING
AMONG SANTRI MUSLIMS

Islam is the major religion in Indonesia, although other religions are also found there. Despite their common faith, religious observance is profoundly diverse among Indonesian Muslims, because they have been influenced by the cultural practices of earlier religions; there is also variation in the intensity of religious understanding. In Javanese society, the social fragmentation between santri (devout) and abangan (nominal, syncretic) Muslims arises at least in part from their different attitudes towards religious observance: these attitudes are indicated by their differing religious practices and diverse outward appearance (clothing). Santri are well known to be more pious than abangan: the wearing of a head covering by Muslim women generally symbolises the piety and modesty encouraged in most of the Muslim world (Abu-Lughod 1986:137). In addition, Clifford Geertz reported that santri women wear the Moslem head shawl (called kudung in Indonesia) while men wear a pitji (felt hat) (Geertz 1960:57). Clothing is one way santri express their piety and mark themselves as different from other social groups.

This chapter examines the living tradition of veiling among santri Muslims, who are the orthodox counterpart of the syncretic abangan according to the tripartite division of Javanese society into cultural streams established by Geertz (1964). I argue that while santri Muslims assert that covering the aurat is a necessary aspect of religious observance which has been internalised both consciously and unconsciously, their discourse about and practice of veiling tend to be confined to members of their own class, without having any significant impact on other social classes. Santri Muslims have a relatively durable and moderate practice of veiling based on local standards of modesty, practicality and aesthetic aspects, although a conservative element also exists among them. This chapter discusses the extent to which santri women (members of the social group generally considered the most pious in Indonesia) express consensus by wearing clothing designed to cover their
aurat as part of their expression of religious faith. Research for this part of the thesis was focused on women affiliated with NU (Nahdatul Ulama) and Muhammadiyah.

A. The Kerudung among Muhammadiyah Women

(1) Muhammadiyah Women

In general, Muhammadiyah women affiliate with one of two women’s organisations, Aisyiyah or Nasyiyatul Aisyiyah (NA). While the former is targeted at adult women, the latter is intended for younger women. The inception of Aisyiyah was assisted by Kyai Haji Ahmad Dahlan, the founder of Muhammadiyah, and his wife Siti Walidah (who was later known as Nyai Ahmad Dahlan), in the Kauman2 quarter of Yogyakarta (Syamsiyatun 2004:4). Historically, Aisyiyah was established in 1914 as a general association of Muslim women for learning religious texts, and called Sapa Tresna (‘Those Who Love’). It was named Aisyiyah under the leadership of Nyai Ahmad Dahlan and incorporated as the women’s section of Muhammadiyah in 1917 (Nizar 2002:81). The task of Aisyiyah within Muhammadiyah was to help women to fully understand what is meant by the injunction to practice Islam as a way of life. Women were to be educated to carry out such religious duties as performing the five daily prayers, fasting, paying the religious tax (zakat) and going on the pilgrimage. In addition, women must understand virtue and why they are not justified in committing adultery, cheating, telling lies and so forth. Muhammadiyah invited Aisyiyah to guide Muslim women to purify their faith in God, using the Holy Qur’an and the hadis (traditions of the Prophet) (Baried 1986:147).

Nasyiyatul Aisyiyah (NA) was founded in 1919, a few years later after Aisyiyah. The formation of a young women’s organisation was encouraged by Mr. Somodirdjo, then a school teacher, and a prominent member of the local branch of Muhammadiyah. It had previously been named Siswa Praja Wanita (SPW: Respectable Female Students), and was a simple group of a few Muslim girls in

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1 Muhammadiyah is a religious-cum-social organisation that was founded by Kyai Haji Ahmad Dahlan in 1912 as part of the Islamic reform movement in Indonesia.

2 Kampung Kauman is famed as a residence of the pious... only santri live there: Chinese and Christians are excluded (Peacock 1978:30).
Kauman (the Muslim district), Yogyakarta. Initially, the activities of SPW were conducted outside class hours, usually in the afternoons. It was intended to provide some space for pupils to put the theoretical knowledge they acquired in morning classes into practice, and to promote solidarity among them. Later, the afternoon activity was supplemented with instruction in the life and practical skills necessary for Muslim girls, such as home management, sewing, cooking, and *tabligh* (public speaking on religious matters) (cited in Syamsiyatun 2004:4; Setiawati 1985:34). In 1923, the SPW became a sub-group within Aisyiyah and in 1931, it was renamed *Nasyiatul Aisyiyah*, derived from Arabic, which means ‘the young/new generation of Aisyiyah’ (Syamsiyatun 2004:9).

While he encouraged the organisational emancipation of women, Kyai Haji Ahmad Dahlan also wanted them to wear the veil (Peacock 1978:38). Since the early inception of Muhammadiyah as a reformist organisation, women members had adopted both the tight veil and the loose veil. Feillard found evidence that the tight veil, referred to as “the Minang way”, appeared in Indonesia in limited reformist circles during the 1920s, including among Muhammadiyah women. Nevertheless, the tight veil was only worn by one ethnic group (the Minangkabau) in West Sumatra and was not found in Muhammadiyah circles in Java (Feillard 1999:9). On the other hand, the practice of wearing a loose veil (*kerudung*) could be found among
Muhammadiyah women from the 1950s, although it was still not obligatory. Feillard also demonstrated that one of the chairpersons of Aisyiyah wore the *kerudung* when she became a religious teacher, but she abandoned it for awhile in Solo, and later put it on again after marrying the son of a *penghulu* (palace religious authority) (Feillard 1999:10).

According to Ibu Mahsunah, until the 1970s the wearers of *kerudung* were a minority on the UGM campus (University of Gajah Mada, a secular university in Yogyakarta).³ Wearers included Prof. Dr. Baroroh Baried, Prof. Dr. Dawisah, Prof. Dr. Chamamah and Ibu Hadiroh Ahmad, all renowned Muhammadiyah figures who were referred to as “people from *Kauman*” or “the daughters of *Kauman*”.⁴ Although the *kerudung* was worn by members of the well-educated class, the practice did not attract other women because “…most people were still *abangan* [nominal Muslims] at that time”, a senior *santri* woman remarked. Also, efforts to promote the *kerudung* among younger Muhammadiyah activists were not successful. In the early 1970s, the *Ikatan Pelajar Muhammadiyah* (IPM: Association of Muhammadiyah Students),⁵ organised by Khalifah Sukri, staged an event called a ‘fashion show’ as part of a general meeting of Muhammadiyah members. Instead of receiving a warm welcome, the fashion show was criticised by Muhammadiyah elders because it advocated Western culture and was inappropriate for a mixed audience.⁶

Although a new style of veiling (*jilbab*) was mostly campaigned for by Islamists at secular educational institutions, some younger Muhammadiyah women also took part in promoting the newer style of veiling. One of them was Dina Khalifah Sukri (b. 1970), a grand-daughter of Kyai Haji A. R. Fachruddin.⁷ Dina had been involved in Islamic activism since entering a secular university. Although she

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³ Ibu Mahsunah is an activist in Aisyiyah.
⁵ The IPM later became the IRM, *Ikatan Remaja Muhammadiyah* (Association of Muhammadiyah Young People).
⁶ Interview with Khalifah Sukri in Yogyakarta, January 27, 2005.
⁷ Kyai Haji A. R. Fachrudin is a prominent Muhammadiyah leader. He was chairperson of the organisation between 1971 and 1985.
had been familiar with wearing the veil since secondary school, her veiling practices became more strict during her involvement with the Salman community, Bandung. After attending Studi Islam Intensive (SII: Intensive Islamic Study), Dina began to wear a longer veil and looser shirts, and sometimes also long socks. She was also asked to be a mentor in Salman activities and sent to Bontang, East Kalimantan on a *dakwah* mission in 1997. Similarly, Trias Setiawati (b. 1964), an activist in Nasyiatul Aisyiyah, took up the *jilbab* in the 1980s. When she began to wear the new veil, her mother wondered why she had suddenly decided to wear it, when she had not worn it before. Nevertheless, Trias admitted that initially she did not dare to wear it every day, because her teachers would think that she was a fanatic or a fundamentalist.

(2) Discourse and Practice

While the idea of covering the *aurat* with clothing remains dominant among Muhammadiyah women, other relevant details also played a significant role in determining how they veiled themselves, such as practicality, local standards of modesty, comfort, and aesthetics. According to Ibu Chamamah (b. 1941), her major criteria for choosing clothing are covering the *aurat*, comfort and looking good. She explained that because of her busy schedule as Chairperson of Aisyiyah, she prefers wearing trousers rather than skirts. Chamamah imagines that if she wore a skirt and climbed stairs she would surely trip over. Meanwhile, Mahsunah (b. 1949) argued that aesthetics are more important than the ideal of covering the body; considering only the *aurat* would require her to adopt a large, loose and austere veil as worn by Islamists. Moreover, the Islamist style of veiling is not appropriate for her because she is not as tall as most Middle Eastern women. For this reason, she prefers to create her own style of ‘Islamic clothing’: she takes her body size and the practical uses of clothing into account, and although she tries to comply with the *syar’ia* criteria, she still tries to look good. In terms of religious argument, Mahsunah speculated that the word *dijulurkan* (‘draw the veil’ in the *Qur’an*) does not indicate that the veil should be long and loose like a portable tent, but rather that it refers to the restriction of close-fitting clothes. According to Mahsunah, as long as clothing is not tied, it complies with the *syaria* criteria.
Local ideas of practicality, custom, comfort, and aesthetics are the main motivations for choosing clothing revealed by the two elite Aisyiyah members just discussed. Nevertheless, they claim that their practice is a reflection of Islamic standards as described in their official guidelines, *Adabul Mar’ah fil Islam* (Etiquette for Women in Islam). In this book about the gender constructions of Muhammadiyah people, the idea of veiling (wearing Islamic clothing) is formulated according to the interpretations of Muhammadiyah agents regarding Islamic clothing. These views about what constitutes Islamic clothing seem rather distant from Arab practice, while some interpretations remain ambiguous as to what Arabic culture is, and which aspects of it are relevant to the Indonesian Muslim context. For example, the idea of veiling presented in the Muhammadiyah guide does not emphasise wearing *jilbab* or *khimar* as Middle Eastern women commonly do (Majlis Tarjih, 1976:34). Although the guide discusses the traditional Middle Eastern form of Islamic clothing which is still based on the classical interpretation, the principle of *libasut taqwa* (‘the raiment of righteousness’) is emphasised as the most essential aspect of religiosity for the wearers of Islamic clothing (*ibid*, 31). The aforementioned principle constitutes a progressive idea of religiosity which focuses more on its social and spiritual aspects than on the symbolic aspect. The practice of wearing *kerudung* (a loose headscarf) among Muhammadiyah women and their concern about religious rituals (*ibadah*) are reflections of the context of their practice of veiling, which relates to religious piety. In an interview with Ibu Mahsunah about veiling practice, she claimed that “long before people wore the recent *busana*

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8 These guidelines were based on instructions agreed at the 17th Conference of the *Tarjih* Council in 1972. This was a collective decision by Muhammadiyah agents, including PP Aisyiyah, individuals, and Regional and Central *Tarjih*, the body charged with issuing *fatwa* for Muhammadiyah members. The term *tarjih* refers to legal reasoning or the “weighing” of different opinions; the idea is to examine a range of judgements, choosing the one which seems most suitable to the circumstances and closest to the sources of law (Kaptein 2004:121).

9 According to Guindi, the term *khimar* refers to a form of head-cover which covers all the hair down to below the neck in back, passing below the chin in front to expose the entire face. On the other hand, the *jilbab* is a long loose robe with wide long sleeves. Both the *khimar* and *jilbab* are in austere, solid colours (such as navy blue, brown, beige or grey) and made from thick, opaque material (Guindi 1981:474-475).
Muslimah fashions, Aisyiyah pioneered how to wear Islamic clothing in terms of theory and practice.\textsuperscript{10}

The ambiguity of Muhammadiyah’s stand on the Islamic criteria of veiling is also implied in their official guidelines. While the idea of aesthetics is present, on the other hand it is balanced by the concept of \textit{tabarruj} (‘immoderate excess’) which restrains Muslim women from going too far to create an innovative and fashionable appearance. According to this guideline, \textit{tabarruj} refers to the wanton display of women’s clothing and accessories (\textit{Majlis Tarjih}, 1976:35). The aesthetic aspect, according to this guideline, is important for women in choosing their clothing. Such an aesthetic should consider the potential social turmoil (\textit{fitnah}) which may be caused by clothing, however. To avoid \textit{fitnah}, women should not choose clothing, use perfume, or put on cosmetics to attract men. Instead of defining clear criteria for social turmoil (\textit{fitnah}), this guide only mentions normality and good intentions (\textit{ibid} 35). Due to this ambiguous stand on the principle of Islamic clothing, Ibu Mahsunah admitted that the Muhammadiyah guidelines need to be revised in accordance with recent social changes. (This construction of gender has been criticised by NU women within their own community. In order to revise the patriarchal ideas presented in religious texts, Sinta Nuriyah, a female member of the NU elite, conducted a study to criticise misogynistic ideas and update the \textit{Uqud al-Lujjayn}, a book about gender constructions which is taught in pesantren (Wahid 2001). NU is discussed in the next section.)

\textsuperscript{10} Interview with Ibu Mahsunah Sakir in Yogyakarta, 27 July, 2005.
Among members of the younger generation of Muhammadiyah women, the practice of covering the *aurat* is relatively strict compared to that of the older generation. Besides the fact that their youth enables them to accept new developments more easily, involvement in Islamic activism has played a significant role in their perspective. Trias Setiawati, who is involved in the *Pelajar Islam Indonesia* (PII: Indonesian Islamic Students) believed that from her first menstruation, a girl is obliged to wear the *jilbab*. In an interview, she argued that the veil is a declaration of intent to live a virtuous life as well as to improve oneself. Trias admitted that the Muslim community becomes very demanding of a woman after she has chosen to wear the veil. She is expected to be pious. Nevertheless, she made up her mind that although she could not be a good person in an ideal way, at least she could try to be one, by wearing the religious symbol. When she wears a veil, people consider that she should restrain herself from gazing longingly at males and receiving the same kind of looks from them.

In a similar vein to Trias, Dina Khalifah argues that as Muslims, women should ensure that they are wholehearted in their approach to wearing the veil. Dina wore a long robe and a long veil in austere colours after she became involved with the *Salman* community in Bandung, although she had previously worn the more
traditional, loose kerudung. In accordance with Islamist veiling practice, she kept her
distance from men and avoided mingling with them. At home, she also avoided
receiving any unexpected male guest. If one arrived, she immediately grabbed her
jilbab to cover her hair and retired from the room. Because of her attitude, her grand-
father, A. R. Fachruddin (a prominent Muhammadiyah leader) exhorted her: “Islam is
not as strict as you think. Islam is a wise religion. Please do not ignore your good
manners (akhlak) to a guest and do not offend people with your ways”.

(3) The Socialisation of Veiling

The socialisation of wearing kerudung begins in early childhood among
Muhammadiyah women. It is achieved through the intense application of example,
education and imposition, although these aspects are often intertwined in practice.
Ibu Chamamah Suratno (b. 1941) admitted that she was aware of the practice of
wearing kerudung from her childhood, because she grew up in a santri family. Her
father was a respected kyai (Muslim scholar) from Kauman (the Muslim district) in
Yogyakarta, who was educated in the Dutch educational system, and then studied at
Mecca for 15 years. Among her family and relatives, Chamamah saw women veiled
in a modest way.

According to Chamamah, although the obligation to wear a headscarf was
never explicitly conveyed to her during her early education, she automatically
absorbed the understanding about the need to cover the aurat within the religious
atmosphere created in her family; further, she had already read about it in the
classical texts of Islamic literature. In other words, although veiling was never
explicitly discussed in the household, she drew her own conclusions regarding veiling
practice from her interpretation of classical texts. Chamamah remarks: “There were
no restrictions imposed by our parents, because we already knew what we were
permitted and not permitted to do from our reading of the classical texts. For
example, in the book of Taqrib,\textsuperscript{11} there are certain restrictions regarding certain

\textsuperscript{11} The book (kitab) of Taqrib is a fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) book that is commonly taught
in pesantren at the middle level of education. The book was written by a Muslim scholar, Ibn
Qasim al-Ghazzi, (d. 918 AH; 1512 AD) (See Bruinessen 1990: 226-269).
issues.” This subtle socialisation made Chamamah feel comfortable with wearing “Islamic clothing” and caused her to accept it as a given social construction.

It was different in the case of Khalifah Sukri’s attempts to socialise veiling for her daughter, Dina (b. 1970). According to Dina, she has been ‘accustomed’ to veiling since her mother forced her to wear one during her studies at junior high school. As a teenager, Dina objected to wearing the veil: “Why should I wear the veil, when other girls can look funky without veiling?” she protested. “In the Qur’an, females are obliged to wear the veil, especially when alone, and you have grown up now”, her mother replied. Dina could not reject her mother’s arguments. Furthermore, wearing the veil was an absolute condition if she wanted to enter a public school, rather than attending a Muhammadiyah school. Dina agreed to the veiling requirement so that she could go to a public school. She continued to wear the veil throughout SMP, SMA, and University; and she has kept wearing it up to the present, when I interviewed her.

The introduction of veiling practice to Muhammadiyah families was also undertaken through religious activities at home and at religious schools. Muhammadiyah families strongly encouraged their children to attend religious, rather than secular, schools. As Ibu Mahsunah said, her husband gave religious guidance to the children after the jama’ah (collective) prayer at home. According to Ibu Mahsunah, the principle of covering the aurat was sometimes taught in that forum amongst other principles, although it was not discussed in depth. She also directed her children to go to a Muhammadiyah school which requires female students to wear the veil. Muhammadiyah has a cadre school for girls, the well known Muallimat, where the curriculum is dominated by Islamic principles and disciplines. At this school, students are obliged to wear the headscarf as part of the uniform. According to Ibu Mahsanah, when she studied at Muallimat in the 1960s, she wore a kebaya (blouse), kain (sarong) and headscarf à la Minangkabau which is called kerudung lilit. The baju kurung (long-sleeved tunic) later replaced the kebaya in the school uniform. “When I studied at Muallimat, I wore a headscarf to identify myself as a religious school student,” she recounted. According to Ibu Mahsanah, the dominance of Islamic disciplines at the cadre school was intended to produce ulama intelek
(scholar-intellectuals) and intelek ulama (intellectual scholars) as planned by K. H. Ahmad Dahlan.

At the organisational level, Muhammadiyah women do not restrict membership to those who wear the veil when recruiting new members. When members are promoted to a higher level in the organisation’s hierarchy based on their achievements in Aisyiyah, however, they are strongly encouraged to wear the veil. This encouragement can be regarded as a strategic form of dakwah. According to Ibu Mahsunah, Aisyiyah’s priority in recruiting new members is their willingness to join the organisation. As long as a woman wants to join Aisyiyah, she will not initially ask her to don Islamic clothing. “At the lower levels of the organisation, the most important thing is recruitment,” she said. “As long as a woman is a Muslim and wants to apply Islamic teachings, we can accept her as a member. But, we do not require her to wear Islamic clothing”.

Ibu Mahsunah realises that not everyone at the grass roots level wants to wear kerudung. But she is sure that after becoming a member of Aisyiyah, a woman will slowly adjust her appearance to conform with what is commonly worn by other members. According to Mahsunah, by becoming involved in many religious forums (pengajian), new members will become aware of the significance of covering the aurat and will take up the headscarf. It is different at the upper levels of Aisyiyah. The requirements for membership at this level are based on a greater degree of accomplishment: the member should be able to read the Qur’an and she should wear Islamic clothing. These requirements are applied to members at the regional level (wilayah) because, according to Mahsunah, the members of Aisyiyah become public figures who should set an example for other members. These accomplishments are routinely achieved by Aisyiyah members at educational institutions, teachers, and other leaders at the regional (wilayah) and central (pusat) levels of Aisyiyah.
B. The Kerudung & Nahdhatul Ulama (NU) Women

(1) NU Women

As with male members of Nahdhatul Ulama (NU), female members of NU do not only include those involved in the structure of the organisation, but also women who are culturally and emotionally affiliated with the organisation. There are no exact records of the number of NU women, let alone the exact number of NU members in total. The estimated number of NU members is about 35 million (Fealy 1996:xix). Women who are involved in the organisational structure become members of the women’s-wing organisations within NU, such as Muslimat, Fatayat and IPPNU. Other NU women are characterised by their devotion to ritual, their high morality (akhlak), and their adoption of the ideology inscribed in the NU constitution: ahlus sunnah wal jama’ah.

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12 Nahdhatul Ulama (NU) is the largest Indonesian Islamic organisation. It was founded in 1926 by eminent ulama (religious scholars), most of whom were leaders of pesantren (Islamic boarding schools). Their aim was to provide an organised voice to defend the interests of traditional Islam, particularly the pesantren system (Fealy 1996:xix).

13 Muslimat is a religious organisation that represents Nahdhatul Ulama (NU) women above the age of 40. This organisation was set up to ‘improve the well-being and status of Muslim women’. It is organised at national, provincial, district, sub-district and local levels. It has local leaders in more than 14,000 villages. Muslimat NU leaders often regard their connection to thousands of villages and millions of women through the concentric structure of the Nahdlatul Ulama as one of their greatest strengths (Canland and Nurjanah 2004:3).

14 Fatayat is an organisation for young women within the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). It focuses on leadership training, Islamic principles of organisational management, and the principles of the NU. It was established in 1950, for Nahdlatul Ulama women between the ages of 20 and 40. Many of the women in Muslimat NU and Fatayat NU are graduates from Nadhaladul Ulama boarding schools. Fatayat NU is structured in the same way as Muslimat NU: both have five structural levels, beginning in thousands of villages and moving up through sub-district, district, and provincial levels of leadership, and finally reaching a national leadership based in Jakarta (Canland and Nurjanah 2004:3).

15 IPPNU stands for Ikatan Puteri Puteri Nahdlatul Ulama (Association of Daughters of the NU). This organisation was previously called IPNU – or Puteri – and was a female student organisation within NU founded in 1955. During the New Order period it changed its name to the one used today (Machrusah 2005:x).

16 It is inscribed in the NU Constitution that NU adheres to the creed (aqidah): ahlus sunnah wal jama’ah. See also http://www.nu.or.id about ‘paham keagamaan’ (the religious stream).

17 Ahlus sunnah wal jama’ah or aswaja (the short form) means ‘the followers of the Prophet’s tradition and their community’.
During the early development of NU, several of its fatwa concerning women’s role were very conservative; but fatwa are getting more progressive in response to the rising demands from Indonesian Feminists, and the growing number of intellectuals among NU members. According to the Eighth NU Congress in 1933, women were not allowed (haram, unlawful) to go outside the home for fear of fitnah (chaos or discord). At the same congress, it was also agreed that women were forbidden (haram) to work outside with their face and hands exposed (Masyhuri 1997:187). Until the early 1940s, NU fatwa suggested that the proper place for women was in their home (Machrusah 2005: 51). In the post-war period, however, NU issued a fatwa (in 1954) permitting women to become members of Parliament. In November 1997, NU issued a fatwa that women could take part in the national leadership if they fulfilled certain qualifications such as quality, capability, capacity and acceptability (cited in Machrusah 2005:69; Sekjen PBNU 1998:59).

In terms of ritual, NU women are concerned with traditions that have been built up among their members, particularly among the elite, which have their origins in the spiritual exercises commonly performed by Sufi practitioners. One woman who was very diligent in performing the traditional rituals was Ibu Solichah Wahid Hasyim, who was involved in the Muslimat organisation from 1952 until the end of her life. She incessantly recited the shalawat to the Prophet Muhammad and read the Qur’an from the first to the last chapter (khatam) every three days during the last few years of her life. Ibu Solichah always carried a mini-sized Qur’an in her car so that she could read it when travelling. She also admired people who completely memorised the Qur’an (huffadz) (Pucuk Pimpinan, 1996:125-126). Likewise, Ibu Chasanah Mansur, another member of the female NU elite, is keen on reading the Qur’an, performing zikr,18 (remembering the name of Allah in one’s heart, and speaking it aloud), and pronouncing the tasbih (subhanallah) (Pucuk Pimpinan 1996:136).

18 In Arabic, the term is dhikr. Dhikr is the act of remembering the name of God, and then saying it aloud; it refers especially to the tireless repetition of an ejaculatory litany, and to the technique employed (See Raudvere 2002:71; Gardet 1965:223). In regard to the element of Sufism: Sufi ideas and practices have been prominent sources of inspiration in more intellectual Indonesian Muslim circles (See Arberry 1969; Tringham 1971; Andrea 1987; Baldick 1989; Popovic and Veinstein 1996; Knysh 2000).
Unlike the practice of veiling in the Middle East, where it symbolises the relegation of women to the private sphere and their invisibility and nonparticipation in public life (Ahmed, 1975:119); the practice of wearing the kerudung does not hinder NU women from participating in the public sphere, particularly in politics. In the 1955 election, five Muslimat activists became Members of Parliament: Mahmudah Mawardi, Maryam Kantasumpena, Maryamah Junaiedi, Hadiniyah Hadi, and Asmah Sjachruni (Zuhri et al. 1979:66; Machrusah 2005:49). They played a role in the rejection of the draft marriage law initiated by the government in 1957. They did not agree with the concept of secular marriage because it contravened Islamic law (Machrusah 2005:50). In addition, there were seven women appointed as members of the Gotong Royong House of Representatives (DPR-GR: Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Gotong Royong) in 1960 (gotong-royong is a Javanese expression meaning ‘to work together co-operatively’). Five of the appointees were the women previously elected to Parliament, and the other two members were new: Solichah Wahid Hasyim and Mrs. Munir Munawar. Moreover, two Muslimat women were appointed as members of the Provisional People’s Consultative Assembly (MPRS: Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Sementara) in 1966: they were Chasanah Mansyur and Aisyah Dachlan (Zuhri et al. 1979:66).

The period from the 1950s to the 1960s was the peak of Muslimat NU’s role in politics; in the subsequent period, the organisation experienced deflation and stagnation. Due to the amalgamation of the political parties in the early 1970s, the
representation of Muslimat NU in Parliament decreased compared to that obtained in the previous election, when NU was still an independent political party. In 1973, NU was forced to merge with the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, or United Development Party (PPP), a new entity designed to meld the Islam-based parties into a single political body. Fealy and Barton identified NU as the political victim of the New Order’s de-Islamisation policy in the early 1970s (Fealy 1996:xx). As a result, NU’s seats in Parliament were shared with other Islamic elements which had been fused into the PPP. Due to this changed situation, the allocation of seats to representatives from Muslimat NU decreased. There were four Muslimat NU figures who were elected to the House of Representatives (DPR-RI) in the 1971 election, including Machmudah Mawardi, Solichah Wahid Hasyim, Maryam Taha, and Asmah Sjachruni. Two other NU women became members of the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR-RI), Musjrifah Ali Masyhar and Malichah Agus (Zuhri et.al. 1979:67). The number of Muslimat NU figures elected to Parliament in the 1977 election was the same as after the previous election (ibid).

When NU decided to dissociate itself from political organisations in 1984, the Muslimat NU faced a dilemma: should the women’s organisation withdraw their cadres from ‘practical politics’ or allow them to cross over to an affiliated party? (Ma’shum and Zawawi 1996:141) Either Muslimat NU would have no cadres to represent NU women in Parliament, or it would lose potential cadres who would disengage from the Muslimat NU to join another, more political organisation. This dilemma was the political consequence of the 27th NU Congress decision to restrict serving NU officials from holding structural positions in a political party at the same time (Nakamura 1996:106). Nevertheless, Muslimat NU politicians preferred to become involved in the PPP, although their affiliation with the Muslimat NU was thereby formally ended after the ‘Return to Khittah’ (‘fundamental commitment’) policy came into effect.

The infiltration of Muslimat NU politicians into other parties started in the early 1990s when Aisyah Hamid Baidhowi joined the Golkar party. She was then elected to the National Parliament in 1997 (Machrusah 2005:119). As a result of the 1997 elections there were six members of Muslimat NU in the DPR, five from PPP and one
from Golkar. Nine other Muslimat NU members were appointed to the MPR, seven women from PPP, one woman from Golkar and another woman from The Regional Representative Council (Utusan Daerah) (cited in Machrusah 2005:69; PP Muslimat NU 1998:5).

Although a *fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence) orientation has long been characteristic of the classical NU way of thinking, recent challenges from NU youth have shifted this orientation towards a more progressive position. It is well known that in matters of law and doctrine, traditionalist NU Muslims follow the great *ulama* of the past rather than deriving their own conclusions directly from the Qur’an and hadis. In other words, they adhere to one of the orthodox *mazhab* or schools of law and practise *taqlid*, i.e. following the rulings of the founding father and other major scholars of this school as they are found in standard *fiqh* works (Bruinessen 1996:167). In a recent comparison of NU with the Muhammadiyah reformists, Van Doorn-Harder found that NU interpretations concerning women have become more progressive than those of the reformists. The two divergent models traditionally followed by NU and Muhammadiyah have come closer to one another; they borrow each other’s methods. Traditionalist scholars now include references to secular sources, particularly in the fields of philosophy, sociology and economics; while reformists are returning to a deeper study of the *fiqh* sources (Van Doorn-Harder 2006:11).

Since veiling and seclusion are aspects of the same thing (Anderson 1982:401), discontent about seclusion has also been expressed from time to time. During the 1950s, Ibu Asmah Sjachruni, a Muslimat NU activist from South Kalimantan who later served as Chairperson of Muslimat NU, rejected the practice of using a *tabir* (curtain) to separate men and women attending a forum. This incident occurred when Ibu Asmah was invited to attend a regional NU Conference in South Kalimantan. Renowned for her strong leadership qualities as Chairperson of Muslimat NU South Kalimantan, she was asked to present her organisation’s political strategies for winning the 1955 election after NU seceded from Masyumi and became a separate
She agreed to convey her ideas to the forum on one condition: there would be no *tabir* during her presentation, even though the curtain was generally used in mixed gatherings within the Muslim community. After the steering committee agreed to her demand, she presented her ideas before the forum, accompanied by her secretary. She commented further: “When women prove that they have the necessary [leadership] qualities, the *tabir* is abandoned” (Machrusah 2005:21). Ibu Asmah was also asked why Muslimat did not oblige its members to wear the headscarf (*jilbab*). She replied that the decision to wear the headscarf or not is a personal choice. She maintained that as long as the criteria (*syarat* and *rukun*) of covering the *aurat* have been fulfilled, the woman is considered to have a modest appearance. According to Ibu Asmah, covering the *aurat* does not refer only to wearing the headscarf (Helmy 2002:80).

(2) Discourse and Practice

As with the common practice of wearing a head-covering in most of the Muslim world (Abu-Lughod 1986:137), the practice of covering the head followed by NU women cannot be separated from their concern with Islamic affairs. The main reason for wearing the headscarf is the religious prescriptions which inspire their way of life. Although some people do not really remember the exact verse referring to veiling in the *Qur’an*, they think that women should comply with the practice of covering up the female body. Ibu Siti Anirah, one of the Muslimat activists, said in an interview that NU women are taught in *pesantren* about the concept of the female *aurat* and correct morality (*akhlak*) for women during their Islamic jurisprudence (*fiqh*) lessons. To realise the concepts they have been taught in action, young *santri* women wear a long piece of cloth wrapped around the waist like a skirt (*kain panjang*

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19 *Masyumi* was a modernist-dominated Islamic political party of the late 1940s and 1950s, from which NU seceded in 1952. Masyumi was banned by the Sukarno regime in 1960 (Barton and Fealy 1996:vii).

20 Ibu Siti Anirah was born into an NU family. While her father was an NU activist, her mother was involved in Muslimat. Before becoming involved in the central administration of Muslimat, Anirah joined IPPNU as a teenager and was involved in the PMII as an undergraduate (S1). When I interviewed her, she was one of the secretaries of the Muslimat NU.
or batik sarong) as commonly worn by their mothers. In addition, they wear a kebaya (close-fitting long-sleeved blouse) as typically worn by Javanese women – this garment is relatively tight (body-hugging); there is no kebaya that is cut loose like a tunic. The kerudung (loose headscarf) is worn for outdoor activities. The combination of kain and kebaya was commonly worn by NU women, as exemplified by Ibu Asmah Sjahruni, who has worn this combination from her teenage years until the present (Helmy 2002:90). The kain was also worn by Ibu Chasanah Mansur to play tennis, despite its impracticality (Pucuk Pimpinan, 1996:136).

Wearing kain limits the ability of the wearer to take large steps. Nevertheless, Anirah remarks that there are no more women who consider the kebaya to be Islamic clothing. Nowadays, most Muslims wear a long-sleeved tunic that usually extends to the knees and is combined with a long skirt or sometimes trousers.

Picture 2.4 Senior Muslimat NU Figures in 2003

The practice of wearing the kerudung has long been a visible mark of santri women: it was formerly regarded to be an unfashionable item of clothing, and sometimes wearers were talked about by others behind their backs. Anirah

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21 Interview Ibu Siti Anirah in Jakarta, March 12, 2005.
22 Ibu Asmah Sjahruni led the Muslimat NU as Chairperson for three consecutive terms, from 1979 to 1995 (Helmy 2002).
23 Ibu Chasanah Mansur has been an activist in Muslimat NU Jakarta since the 1950s. She was the Chairperson of Muslimat NU in the DKI Jakarta in 1958; she was appointed to become Secretary of the Central Committee of Muslimat NU in 1967 (Ma’shum 1996:134).
24 Interview Ibu Siti Anirah in Jakarta, March 12, 2005.
commented that the *kerudung* marks the identity of a *santri* Muslim. If there is a girl wearing the *kerudung*, the inevitable remark of passers-by is: “Look at her wearing the *kerudung*, she must be a *santri*” (*Lha itu sudah santri tuh sudah pakai kerudung*).

A similar experience was recounted by Farida Salahuddin Wahid who has worn the *kerudung* since she joined the Muslimat NU. In an interview, Farida admitted that when the wearers of *kerudung* were still in a minority (1970s-1980s), women who wore it were usually mocked or insulted with the epithet ‘daughter of a *kyai*’ (traditional devout Muslim leader/scholar). Although women who spoke thus were merely speculating that Farida was the daughter of a *kyai*, she actually is. Fortunately, she was confident when someone mocked her. “I can look pretty even though I wear a headscarf”; that is what she usually said. According to Farida, one needed confidence to wear the headscarf at that time. If she lacked confidence, a veiled girl would discard her headscarf as soon as someone mocked her.

Likewise, Rosa Safira Machrusah was treated inconsiderately by people in the early 1990s for wearing a headscarf in a shoe store. Machrusah browsed for shoes in the store to select which ones were appropriate for her. But every time she examined and replaced them, the shop assistant repeated her actions to check if there was something wrong with the shoes. As a result of this unfriendly treatment, Machrusah remarked: “What’s the difference between a veiled and an unveiled girl? Do you think that I cannot afford to buy the shoes? I have some money, but if you treat me like that, I will not buy them”.

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25 Farida Shalahuddin Wahid is a daughter of Saefuddin Zuhri, a prominent NU leader, who became the Minister for Religious Affairs during the Sukarno regime. Farida married Shalahuddin Wahid, the current NU leader, who is the grandson of the NU’s founding father, Hasyim Asy’ari.

26 Rosa Safira Machrusah comes from an NU family. Her father and mother are prominent leaders in the NU community. The interview on which this discussion is based was conducted in her office, after she became a member of the House of Representatives (DPR) from the PKB (*Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa*, National Awakening Party). Before becoming involved in the political sphere, Machrusah used to be an activist in both IPPNU and KNPI.

Before the practice of veiling became pervasive among Muslims, NU women tended to make their Islamic clothing by themselves because the stock of headscarves and their accompanying outfits were not available in stores or at the market. In addition, NU women wanted to popularise wearing the headscarf among other Muslims. Farida recounted that she often made her kerudung and clothes herself; sometimes she asked a tailor to make her an Islamic outfit, including the headscarf. Farida bought cloth and matched it with the headscarf that would be worn. “It is simply a square like a table cloth (taplak meja). The cloth is folded into two and becomes a triangle. The edge of the cloth is finished”. Similarly, Machrusah made her Islamic clothing by herself. She not only designed it for herself; she also participated in a competition for Islamic clothing design in her town in the early 1990s. Machrusah’s aim was to promote and popularise Islamic clothing, which had an unfashionable image at that time. In order to increase her designing skills, Machrusah attended a course on fashion and design. For her efforts in designing Islamic clothing, she won an Islamic clothing competition at the regional level.

In spite of the fact that the practice of wearing the kerudung is regarded as ‘imperfect’, NU women do not choose the Arabic style of veiling – which covers the whole body – or the Islamist style. According to Anirah, Muslimat NU women do not wear a long loose veil that covers the entire body (except the face) down to below the hips. Anirah maintains that the most dominant style of veil worn by Muslimat women is also the simplest. This style of veil, commonly called kerudung, covers the head including the hair. It is held tight under the chin with a pin, but sometimes it is also pulled tight behind the neck, albeit the shape of the body is thus sometimes revealed. Anirah believes that the expression kerudung Ibu Nyai (the style of headscarf worn by the wives of kyai) could refer to the style worn by the senior elite of Muslimat, such as Ibu Wahid Hasyim28 and Ibu Asmah Sjahruni.29 This kind of kerudung is worn by simply draping it on the head (diselendangin) without any cloth

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28 Ibu Wahid Hasyim has been an activist of Muslimat NU since the 1950s. She represented Muslimat as a Member of Parliament (DPRGR) in 1960. Her husband, Wahid Hasyim, was the Minister of Religious Affairs during the Sukarno regime (Ma’shum 1996:125-6).

29 Ibu Asmah Sjahruni is also an activist in Muslimat NU. She was Chairperson of Muslimat NU three times, serving from 1979 to 1995.
worn underneath to cover the hair. Anirah admits that the Ibu Nyai kerudung style still exposes the neck and some of the hair because its position is not secure. It is “just placed on the head.” If a woman wears a kerpus (a kind of cap), it only covers the head from the forehead to the nape of the neck. The kerudung is draped under the chin, with one end falling over the chest and the other over the shoulder in back. Depending on how loosely or tightly the scarf is draped, the neck may or may not be visible. Usually it can be seen only when the kerudung is worn loose and has slipped out of position. The wearer usually adjusts the kerudung into the correct position, however. Also, if there is a wind, Anirah puts her headscarf into a secure position; she can do this very quickly. Likewise, Farida argues that the practice of veiling according to akhwat (that preferred by Islamists) is very complicated (ribet) and impractical (tidak praktis), particularly as she is very active. Moreover, the long-loose-large veil is not comfortable (gerah) for her. Farida does feel that the ‘strict’ veil is more Islamic than the style of veil she wears, but she denies that you can measure a person’s piety according to whether they wear jilbab or not. She believes that wearing a jilbab that matches her costume looks better than wearing more conservative and impractical clothing in order to conform to an ideal Islamic style.

The discourse about the aurat among NU women reflects a conservative outlook which retains the classic interpretation of aurat and veiling, although there have been recent signs of a more progressive inclination. The classic fiqh opinions (Islamic jurisprudence), maintain that a woman’s aurat includes her whole body except the face and the hands. Machrusah believes in this principle: therefore, she never takes her veil off outside her home, even though during outdoor activities she feels hot. Nevertheless, she has long been accustomed to the practice and no longer feels uncomfortable. Instead, she would be ashamed if she went out unveiled.

Farida defines Islamic clothing as attire that covers the aurat, but the way women cover the aurat includes various styles. It might be with a long shirt and a long skirt, and a headscarf. According to Farida, this is one criteria of Islamic clothing. She contends that the most important criterion in veiling is covering the hair. She believes that a woman’s hair is her aurat. Anirah speculates that the standard definition of the aurat has been set out in Islamic precepts, and that it
includes the whole body except the face and hands. But, she argued, this standard should be adjusted to the tropical climate of Indonesia and the historical background of a society which has not emerged from Islamic origins. Anirah asserts that those who came from the keraton (‘palace’) tradition used to wear kemben – a piece of cloth wrapped around the body from the chest to the waist – which revealed the arms, shoulders, and cleavage. According to Anirah, as Javanese women have changed their traditional costume to wear kebaya instead of kemben, this represents progress in terms of covering the aurat, although some women persist in wearing kemben and kebaya. Anirah claims that when Ratu Hemas replaced the kemben with the kebaya at court, this indicated that the keraton had been Islamised.

Now that veiling has become increasingly pervasive among Indonesian Muslims, most NU women have gained advantages from its popularity and innovation. The way NU women wear the headscarf has also changed to reflect the new trends in Islamic clothing. Farida admits that “we are advantaged by the growing vogue for Islamic attire because we have a lot of alternatives to consider in choosing the style that matches our taste.” She continues, “I am glad about the recent developments in veiling. The head cover is no longer odd. It seems to me that contemporary women have become aware that they are Muslims and should wear the veil. This development reveals a stronger impulse to learn about Islam.”

According to Farida, in recent years Muslimat activists have given up wearing the classic kerudung. If a woman continues to wear it, she usually wears a tight-fitting cloth under the veil which covers the scalp and part of the forehead. This cloth is called a ciput, and also comes in various and fashionable styles. Further, Anirah admits that most NU women have changed slowly in terms of their appearance, moving from the kerudung to the jilbab, although their mode of wearing the jilbab is not as strict as the practice urged by Islamists. She argues that these changes in acceptable appearance are intended to adjust to the current fashion in Islamic attire (busana muslim). This is not only because the jilbab is more practical; it is also more

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30 Ratu Hemas was a queen of Yogyakarta who adopted the practice of wearing kebaya rather than kemben.
comfortable (enak dipakai). “In case we are in a hurry, we do not need to manage our hair neatly; we just cover it with the kerpus (internal headscarf) and then the jilbab (external headscarf). It is all done. But even if this is still too complicated, putting on the jilbab without any internal veil is just fine.”

(3) The Socialisation of Veiling

The wearing of kerudung by NU women as part of the santri community exemplifies a modesty code, gender symbolism and religious identity. Because the socialisation of the kerudung tends to operate beneath the level of consciousness, the idea of covering the aurat becomes a habit that is derived from predominantly unconscious internalisation, particularly during early childhood. Farida said that she has always been familiar with the practice of wearing the kerudung, because it was commonly worn by her mother, her mother’s family, and her mother’s friends. Since childhood, Farida found that the kerudung was invariably worn by women in her community. Similarly, Anirah said that she became accustomed to the kerudung from childhood, when she entered the Muallimat school, although her parents had never instructed her to wear it. According to Anirah, “I did not wear the kerudung only at elementary school”. This means that she has covered her body since adolescence. Anirah wears a kain panjang, sarong, or long dress, an angkin or benting (waistband), a loose tunic top, and a kerudung; she will continue to wear that style when she studies at university. A member of the young generation of NU women, Safira Machrusah, has worn the kerudung since high school. Her parents did not force her to wear the headscarf, but they did enrol her in a religious school. She has always been accustomed to wearing kerudung because her mother and her mother’s family wear the traditional headscarf. Because of this habit, she feels uncomfortable and ashamed if a man finds her unveiled, and she immediately covers her body to inhibit the male gaze. Using Bourdieu’s term, this practice became a habit-forming force which he called habitus. Habitus is a system of lasting,

31 Muallimat is a religious teacher-training school which segregates girls and boys in class. This school produces religious teachers after six years of study. Since the changes made in the educational system, the six-year study period has been divided into two levels: a junior and a senior high school.
transposable dispositions which integrates past experiences; it functions at every moment as a matrix of perceptions, recognitions, and actions which makes the achievement of infinitely diversified tasks possible (1977:83).

The unconscious internalisation of veiling does not take place only in the family circle; it also occurs at the organisational level. According to Farida, in the Muslimat NU organisation, if there is a woman not wearing a headscarf no one will admonish her; she will merely be different from other members. “I saw a new member of Muslimat who initially did not wear a headscarf. But, knowing that most people wear the kerudung, she then adjusted her appearance by adopting it, even though no one had asked her to wear it,” Farida remarked. According to Farida, although Muslimat NU has no clear guidelines regarding dress like the Aisyiyah Muhammadiyah organisation does, members automatically wear the kerudung; there are no Muslimat activists who go unveiled.

In addition, the internalisation of wearing kerudung was accomplished through advocacy; it passed from one individual to another, although this took time, and was not done in a direct way. Although Farida was accustomed to wearing kerudung during her studies at the Muallimat School, she continued her education at a secular school where veiling was not required. Like other students, she did not wear the veil during her time at university. Her father32 once exhorted her, “You’d better cover your aurat.” Her father had directed her to wear the headscarf since she was an adolescent. “The most important thing I have told you as a father is about covering the aurat. It depends on you whether you want to cover it up or not, but my duty as a father has been accomplished. Anyway, it is your own responsibility before God.” This exhortation made Farida anxious, especially because her father had mentioned the name of God. Her father also asked her seriously to keep her distance from men, particularly at parties where men and women mixed. Farida’s father did not allow her to attend a party if she was not accompanied by her brother. Like her father, Farida’s mother sometimes gave her advice when she put on a short skirt like those popular

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32 Farida’s father is Saefudin Zuhri, Minister of Religious Affairs during Sukarno’s regime.
among young girls: “Why don’t you put on a long skirt? It will cover your *aurat.*” Farida finally began to comply with such exhortations when she joined the Muslimat NU. Similarly, Anirah stated that she does not force her daughter to wear the *kerudung.* She did persuade her to wear it because she studies in a secular senior high school, however. Anirah told her daughter: “I wear the veil daily, why don’t you wear it too?” According to Anirah, this insistence encourages her to wear the veil at secular school. Anirah claims that she only encouraged her daughter; the awareness comes from the girl herself: Anirah labels her daughter’s awareness as ‘religious’.

C. Conclusion

In contrast to the Middle Eastern practice of veiling, the concept of the *kerudung* as understood among *santri* Muslims does not hinder women from participating in the public sphere. At the same time, its meaning and how it is worn are not as strict as they are for Islamists, although religious observance is still a dominant motive. The involvement of *santri* women in the fields of politics, education and *dakwah* movements shows how they can deal with daily life in a male-dominated system without encountering any problems in accessing the public domain, even though the segregation of men and women is still relatively prevalent. *Santri* clothing practice does not take only a single aspect into account: *santri* women consider various features in selecting their clothing; such as practicality, comfort, local standards of modesty and aesthetics. As indicated by Ibu Farida from Muslimat and Ibu Chamamah from Aisyiyah, both of whom have busy schedules and have become mobile individuals, they prefer wearing practical and comfortable clothing to the complicated attire required by Islamists. Nevertheless, *santri* women claim that their clothing and style of veiling are in line with the *syaria* criteria as outlined by Ibu Anirah and Ibu Mahsunah. They also agreed that veiling practice should relate to local standards of modesty and that it should consider the aesthetic aspect of clothing.

While the internalisation process continues by means of both explicit and implicit demands made within their own community, the practice of veiling among *santri* Muslims does not expand to other social organisations, despite the fact that the
degree of disposition to wear the veil (kerudung) among them is relatively durable. Religious schools like Muallimat habituated NU and Muhammadiyah women in their early childhood to wearing a veil, while female family members and friends exemplified the practice. Internal socialisation operates beneath the level of consciousness and language, but it functions outside one’s own will to determine one’s manner of life. Meanwhile, parental encouragement to take up the veil consolidated the idea of veiling in santri circles. The exhortations from Farida’s father regarding the veil exemplify parental attitudes in the NU community, while Dina’s mother’s imposition of the veil on her daughter is a strong indication of how the Muhammadiyah group regards veiling. Given these two demonstrations of the internalisation of veiling among santri Muslims, it is evident that the practice of wearing a veil is relatively unchanged, even though it is not strictly enforced.

While veiling is considered to be a form of religious expression among santri Muslims, it is not a central issue in their collective agenda as it is for Islamists. Even so, members of the younger generation of santri Muslims have been influenced by the Islamist movements and/or have taken part in campaigning for the so-called “new veiling”. As pointed out above by Farida Salahuddin Wahid, there is no compulsion to wear the veil in the Muslimat NU community. Those who join the women’s wing of the organisation automatically adjust themselves to the style of dress of other members, even if they previously went unveiled.

At the same time, both in the dakwah movement and regarding the recruitment of members to Aisyiyah, encouraging women to take up the veil is not a crucial priority, considering the long-term strategy of their mission and their strategy for achieving the gradual implementation of Islamic precepts. According to Ibu Mahsunah, she prioritises an individual’s being a Muslim, her willingness to join the Muhammadiyah community and her mastery of Islamic teachings above suggesting that she take up the veil. Ibu Mahsunah believes that inviting people to undertake living according to Islamic principles is an effective and reliable strategy.

Nevertheless, members of the younger generation of santri Muslims have faced different developments than the older generation did. Some young Muhammadiyah
members, for example, began to wear the tight veil (*jilbab*) after they became involved in Islamic activism, joining groups such as the *Pelajar Islam Indonesia* (PII) and the Salman Community. The new practice of veiling was diffused through a wider segment of society through the activities of Islamic movements on secular campuses and in the network of Indonesian mosques. This new campaign was conducted in a militant fashion, and will be explored in the subsequent chapter.

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CHAPTER III
CONTESTED VEILING
UNDER THE NEW ORDER

According to the analysis of the late Clifford Geertz, the social structure of the Javanese people is divided into *santri* (orthodox, strict Muslims) *abangan* (nominal, syncretic Muslims) and *priyayi* (aristocratic civil servants) (Geertz 1960). Of these, *santri* Muslims are the social agents most concerned about “Islamic doctrine and most especially the moral and social interpretation of it” (1960:127). Unlike *abangan*, *santri* have a tradition of wearing a head cover: women wear head shawls called *kudung* (*kerudung*), while the men wear *pitji* (a felt hat) (1960:57). This practice was traditionally socialised among children at home, through formal education, and/or by mothers who wore loose headscarves, whether or not their appearance reflected a *santri* Muslim interpretation of religious texts. The practice remained exclusive to a certain religious-based class, however; most Javanese women remained unveiled until the late 1990s.

The practice of wearing *kerudung* (a loose veil over the head) among *santri* women before the 1980s did not attract other women, since proselytisation for the practice was not conducted in a militant way. By contrast, Islamists have vigorously promoted veiling as central to the revival of Muslim identity and the reconstruction of the Islamic moral and social order (Moghadam 1993:2450). During the 1980s, a worldwide Islamist movement encouraged Muslim women to take up the veil through religious sermons and *fatwa* (Daomato 1995:19). Zehra Rahnavard, an outspoken and militant Islamist woman from Iran, once declared that “hijab is the greatest thing the Islamic revolution did for women. It took them away from being mere sex objects and made them intellectually and spiritually valued people” (Moghadam 1993:248). These doctrines have not only convinced many women to take up the veil; they have also created certain norms for veiling. Due to the wide dissemination of the principles of the Islamist movement in the Muslim world, particularly in Turkey, the
wearing of this ‘new’ Islamic dress has emerged as something completely different from the headscarf traditionally worn in rural areas (Gole 1996).

This chapter aims to examine the controversy over veiling during the New Order period, particularly when the Islamic movement emerged in response to the authoritarian regime on one hand, and to increasing secularisation within the Muslim community on the other. I argue that during the 1980s the Islamic movement, by setting up *dakwah* networks among young people, fostered a ‘new veiling’, which was different from traditional forms of head covering in terms of its appearance and meaning. Unlike the conventional *dakwah* movement conducted by the NU and Muhammadiyah organisations, these new *dakwah* networks were promoted by the Islamist movement. Participants came from urban educated groups which mostly relied on campus and mosque networks. At the same time, the emergence of new veiling was challenged by the state – which entertained suspicions of the movement – and by certain Muslim intellectuals.

A. The Practice of ‘New Veiling’

(1) The Islamic Movement and New Veiling

During the 1970s, the Islamic movement in the Muslim world saw dress assume a pivotal symbolic, ritual and political role (Guindi 1999:129), although the movement was not simply about a dress code. In Egypt, the Islamic dress women wore after the mid-1970s replaced modern secular clothes; it was part of a grass-roots activist movement to strengthen moral and behavioural codes (Guindi 1999:129). Likewise, in Turkey there was an effort to create indigenous dress styles for Muslim women on the one hand, and to accommodate traditional Islamic dress on the other (Norton 1997:165). A similar movement emerged in Indonesia when Islamic groups, based both in mosques and on secular campuses, intensified religious instruction and sermons: these inspired unveiled girls to take up the veil (See Aziz et.all.). As it developed, the new practice of veiling among Islamic activists was believed to have political motivations: the ruling regime suspected that ‘new veiling’ was an expression of Islamic revivalism, in both the national and international arenas (Effendi 1998:295).
The most seminal and prominent group in Indonesia was the university-based Salman community, from which other *dakwah* groups gained inspiration; before long, this produced a militant *dakwah* movement. Unlike the conventional *dakwah* groups affiliated with Nahdhatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah, the Salman – which was based at the mosque of the Bandung Institute of Technology (ITB) – focused on university students, and later on school students. The central Salman figure in the training of militant cadres was Imaduddin Abdulrahim, a charismatic engineer who developed a special training called *Lembaga Mujahid Dakwah* (LMD: ‘Training for the Defenders of *Dakwah*’) in 1974.¹ By means of a kind of ‘brainwashing’, this intensive training produced many militant *dakwah* cadres who strictly followed and defended Islamic doctrine. Since participants in the training came from various regions of Java, alumni then spread both the ideas and the training model within their own networks (Aziz 273). Although there was no structural link between alumni, the aim of the movement was everywhere the same: to Islamise youth (*Tempo*, May 13, 1989:80).

Although the content of the *dakwah* disseminated by the Salman community was not new, the techniques and spirit of the religious training and sermons were formulated in very innovative and challenging ways. Imaduddin – well known as Bang Imad – was an orator and charismatic figure who cleverly presented Islamic doctrines in order to motivate people to become militant Muslims. In the hands of Bang Imad, *aqidah* (creed), *jihad* (struggle), *tauhid* (oneness) and *risalah Islam* (Islamic mission) became powerful concepts that encouraged Muslims to put Islamic teachings into practice. A new feature of the movement was its non-compromising method, which is an approach typically embraced by Islamists. Bang Imad developed the notion of *risalah Islam*, ‘the totality of Islam’ in other words; the system of belief that should be realised in an Islamic society. To implement *risalah Islam*, Muslims should conduct *jihad*, or ‘sacred struggle’: the aim is to transform the non-Islamic system into an Islamic one. The content of the Qur’anic chapter entitled *Al-fath* (‘The Triumph’) established a fundamental belief in sacred struggle, because in *Al-

¹ See Masjid Salman ITB, 1988, p. 42.
fath, God promises the victory of Islam over other religions. This chapter motivated people, and encouraged their spirit and enthusiasm for jihad. In addition, the uncompromising method adopted by the Islamist movement is founded on a chapter in the Qur’an which rejects compromise with any kind of criticism or resistance (Aziz 1989:238).

In addition to the innovative and challenging method of dakwah, the atmosphere of the Islamic movement during the New Order was profoundly conducive to the growth of religious-based militancy as a form of resistance to the corrupt and authoritarian ruling regime. As Oliver Roy points out (1994:56), the work of re-socialisation (to Islamic doctrines) occurred in a spirit of puritanism that highlighted the alleged corruption of the ruling classes. The emergence of new veiling reflected a trend: Islamic dress was not only a sign of this puritanism, but also of the anxiety of a newly urbanised population faced with the sudden and apparent degradation of values in the city. The New Order regime repressed its two main rival political powers: communism and political Islam (Karim 2002:2). Moreover, from its inception until the early 1990s, the New Order regime was repressive, particularly in relation to religious activities and Islamic activists. Bang Imad’s activism was always monitored by the state apparatus: wherever he went, he was followed by intel (intelligence officers). Once he delivered a sermon: “Those who build their own graves are exactly like fir’auln (pharaoh).” At that time, Soeharto had constructed his tomb in the Istana Giri Bangun, Solo, Central Java. Soon after Imaduddin’s speech, the state apparatus charged him with humiliating Soeharto, although Imad had never mentioned a specific name or place in his speech (Asshiddiqie 2002:39).

Given the social and political atmosphere of the time, militant dakwah groups saw themselves as a force of resistance against the ruling regime. Meanwhile, their

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2 Indeed Allah shall fulfil the true vision which He showed to His Messenger in very truth. Certainly, you shall enter Al-Masjid Al-Haram, if Allah wills, secure (some) having your head hair cut short, having no fear. He knew what you knew not, and He granted besides that a near victory (Al-Hilali, 1996:929).

3 The symbol of pharaoh (fir’aun) is often used by preachers to criticise an authoritarian regime. The fir’aun were the kings of Egypt who built their graves before their death, producing the pyramids.
preoccupation with female appearance and women’s bodies assigned a central responsibility to women in the Islamist restructuring of power, culture and society. In this respect, “women were made the carriers of cultural values and indigenous norms as defined by the ruling elites” (Moghadam 1993:246). As the experience of women in Algeria showed, “the veil helped Algerian women to meet the new problems created by the struggle” (Fanon 1967:63). When the French colonial government tried to undermine Algerian culture by adopting a ‘deveiling approach’ as a way to gallicise Algerian women, the reaction of local women was the opposite to that intended by the French. Instead of being subjugated by the colonial policy, women emphasised their practice of veiling as a national and cultural symbol adopted by patriotic Algerian women (Fanon 1967). In a similar manner, the growing practice of veiling among Indonesian students during the 1980s tended to strengthen Muslim religious awareness on the one hand and to constitute a symbol of resistance on the other. Most new wearers of the veil were the products of Islamic training (Aziz 1989:278); the ideology of struggle (jihad) against the ruling regime also came from Islamic activism. In other words, the increasing commitment to religiosity among militant Muslims was a response to the authoritarian regime.

Another significant feature of the Islamic movement in Indonesia has been the involvement of young students and intellectuals from secular institutions in urban areas: this is a reflection of an element of ‘searching’ in Indonesian Islam. This is similar to what happened in Turkey, where the Islamist movement gained most of its support from socially integrated urban groups, such as students, doctors, engineers and civil servants (Gole 1996:59). A large number of Indonesian girls studying in secular schools were involved in dakwah communities, either in their leisure time or during school hours. According to Abdurrahman Wahid (1983), these young Muslim girls were the generation who took things so seriously that they were easily influenced by an ‘authoritative mentor’. When the mentor encouraged them to cover their aurat (nakedness), they immediately obeyed the instruction.
Wahid respected the younger generation, because they were trying to find Islam in a comprehensive way. Their actions were part of a serious effort to search for an appropriate formulation of Islam: this would be used to overcome social problems, but it also fostered discontent towards fellow Muslims who adopted secular ideas (Tempo, January 29, 1983:16).

(2) Social Reactions to Veiling

Since veiling among Islamists is different from traditional forms of covering the head, the new style of head-covering, later known as jilbab, became a provocative symbol which triggered opposition from some authority figures. Such opposition to veiling is evident in the cases of six female students at SMAN 3 Bandung during the late 1970s, when the practice was not common among female students in secular schools. After reading the extensive press reports, I was able to interview some of

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4 Wahid was a Vice Secretary on the Central Board of Nahdhatul Ulama (NU) when he wrote his article entitled: *Kerudung dan Kesadaran Beragama*. 

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the women involved: Eliza, Santi, Rahayu Kuswendiarti, Ariani Budi, Arif B. Yulianti and Aryuni B. Pantjawati. They started to wear the veil in 1978 after they became involved in Islamic activism. Because the social and political environment at the time was not conducive to the public display of Islamic symbols, their veiling practice was not welcomed by those in their social circle, e.g. their friends, families, teachers and the school Principal. Some other adolescent students, including Triwulandari, Wiwik Rumindari, Ratu Nasratur Nisa, and Aai Rusmiyani, most of whom were at senior high school, encountered similar resistance from their school management when they took up the veil. Unwelcome reactions were also experienced by Tiena Gustinar Amran and other students (Adinda Kustini, Irma Zuhati, and Anisah) at the Bandung Institute of Technology (ITB), who initiated veil wearing at a secular university (Salman 1988:51). In a similar case, when Ida Nurul Hasanah (a newly-employed lecturer) chose to wear the veil, her superior at Airlangga University (in Surabaya) discriminated against her.

The experiences of the six students at SMAN 3 Bandung revealed how the new veiling practice attracted opposition from various social groups, resulting in discrimination against the wearer. One of the most severe forms of opposition stemmed from the school management, involving teachers and the school Principal. According to Aryuni, the Principal often summoned students who wore jilbab to chide them for not conforming to the school dress code. During their interrogation, they were asked their reasons for wearing the veil, and the Principal directed them to remove it on the grounds that they were breaking school rules. Although this pressure frequently disturbed them, they kept wearing the enveloping garments for the sake of their religious beliefs. Similarly, the sports teacher often asked veiled students to wear shorts during physical education classes, a practice that was anathema to them due to their strict interpretation of the concept of female aurat. To force them to comply, the teacher threatened to bar them from the class unless they wore the sports uniform. Despite this pressure, they refused to remove their veils.

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during the sports lesson; they were prepared to face any disciplinary consequences. As a result, their scores for physical education class were three or four, less than the six points required to pass.6

Their parents did not support their adoption of the veil, and their friends were also critical of their behaviour. Ariani admitted that her parents were not very religious; they did not really care about their daughter’s belief that the veil was a religious precept. Her father was actually reluctant to see the Principal about the conflict over his three daughters’ dress. He worried that they would be expelled from the highly regarded school they attended, at which it was not easy to gain a place. Once her father said: “Studying is more important than doing something controversial”.7 But Ariani and her two sisters did not share their father’s opinion. Nor did they change their minds when their friends mocked them, asking them in pejorative language whether they had just returned from a pilgrimage. Other students threw balls of paper at their heads, exclaiming: Haji wekdut! (‘Pilgrim women’).8 Someone said derisively, “SMA 3 will become a pesantren!” A male student remarked to one of the three sisters: “Hi, I used to really like you, but after you started wearing the veil, I do not like you anymore. What can I see of you? A female friend said: “I think it’s more important to work on having a good attitude toward morality rather than covering the body even if one’s attitude is still bad.”9

Although these veiled girls faced opposition in Bandung, subsequent aggressive reactions to veil wearers were more extreme elsewhere. One devastating experience was recalled by Triwulandari, a student of SMAN I in Jember, East Java. She was not only condemned by the Principal and her Islamic teacher (guru agama) for her new style of dress at school (i.e. a long-sleeved shirt, long socks and a headscarf); she

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6 Interviews with Aryuni March 17, 2005; Ariani March 19, 2005; and Arif March 28, 2005. The three girls are sisters. Their father, Abdul Kadir Naloleh, is a Muslim from Sulawesi, though not formally affiliated with any religious organisations. He has an emotional and informal attachment to Persis, Persatuan Islam (The Union of Islam).
7 Ibid.
8 Haji Wekdut is a pejorative Sundanese expression used to refer to women who dress in shrouding attire like female hajj, although they have not completed the pilgrimage.
9 See Note 4 above.
was also interrogated by an officer of the Military District Command (KODIM). While the school management insisted that she remove her veil, the Military office went further: they suspected that she was involved in Islam Jama’ah, even though she claimed that she was only familiar with the name from the newspapers. Wiwik Rumindari, a student at SMP Negeri 4, Jember, East Java, also experienced severe treatment (Panji Masyarakat, No. 389, p. 61). She had previously worn the veil only outside school for outdoor activities, such as shopping in traditional markets and visiting her friends. When she wore it to school, she was warned by the Principal and sent home to change into school uniform. She remained firm in her stand not to take the veil off, however. Finally, the school Principal expelled her, and she moved to another school.

While secondary schools require uniforms, institutions at the tertiary level of education do not. Even so, the practice of veiling at a secular university was still a foreign concept, and people avoided veiled women. When Tiena Gustinar Amran – one of the pioneers of veiling at Bandung Institute Technology (ITB) – took up the veil in 1979, everybody stared at her, and kept their distance. When I interviewed her, she said that people looked at her as if she were a leper. People clapped their hands, not in support of her, but to taunt her instead. “They thought that I was sick or crazy”, Tiena said. After encountering this reaction to her veiling debut, she lost her confidence. This avoidance by peers was also experienced by Ida Nurul Hasanah, a student at the University of Airlangga in Surabaya. Ida obtained a letter of appointment (ikatan dinas) as a member of the teaching staff in one of faculties due

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10 Islam Jama’ah was a religious-based militant group which tried to undermine the Soeharto regime. The group was led by Imron whose idea was to create an Islamic state in Indonesia (See Ani 1982). The rumour that there was a necessary connection between veiling and Islam Jama’ah was also accepted by many people.

11 Interview conducted on March 3, 2005. See also Panji Masyarakat.

12 She was warned to wear a uniform in a letter dated November 5, 1982.

13 In Jakarta, many cases occurred at state schools. A female student at SMAN 68, Ratu Nasiratun Nisa wore kudung from December 1982. According to the Principal’s instructions, she was not allowed to attend classes because of the veil. Aai Rusmiyani, a student at SPG 3, Pasar Minggu, South Jakarta experienced similar things.

14 Interview held in Jakarta, on March 2, 2005.
to her high level of academic achievement. When she went to the Dean’s office to confirm her appointment, the Dean looked surprised that she wore the veil. Ida assumed that the Dean might not have realised that the person who had been appointed was a woman who had chosen to wear the veil. In fact, the Dean did see Ida when she received an award at the annual graduation ceremony for being the best student in her faculty; but he had not realised that the job offer had been made to this veiled woman, whose mode of dress was not favoured. In addition, at this time there was tension at the university between Muslims and Christians. The Dean, who is Christian, expressed his objection by asking the question: “Is it OK if you wear a uniform?” (In Indonesia, uniforms are referred to with the acronym PSH, or Pakaian Seragam Harian [Staff Uniform].) Ida answered that she did not object to wearing the PSH as long as it covered the *aurat*, for example allowing her to wear a long dress. When I interviewed her, however, she said that the Dean did not respect her as a veiled woman.

3) The Diffusion of New Veiling

During the first two decades of the New Order regime, militant *dakwah* groups played a significant role in the process of Islamisation in Indonesia: many *abangan* Muslims became *santri* Muslims. Liddle reported in 1996 that “many abangan, or the children and grandchildren of 1950s and 1960s abangan, are becoming santri” (p. 623). One example was the ‘conversion from *abangan* to *santri*’ project of Jamaah Shalahuddin, a militant *dakwah* group based at Gadjah Mada University in Yogyakarta. Karim (2000:32) found that since the group was founded by *santri* students in the late 1970s, the *santri*-isation of the secular campus had affected both students and lecturers, whose background tended to be *abangan*. Through *dakwah* activities, *abangan* people became interested in learning about Islam. They took part in the Shalahuddin movement\(^{15}\) and were actively involved in *dakwah* programs. Another significant group which Islamised a secular university (as mentioned above)

\(^{15}\) The name *Shalahuddin* was taken from a well-known hero of the Crusades, Shalahuddin al-Ayyubi, who was regarded as a person who could communicate with everyone on every side of the conflict (Karim 2002).
was Jama’ah Salman, a mosque-based group at the Bandung Institute of Technology (ITB). As an inspiring Islamic cultural movement, the Salman community later “adopted a relaxed, democratic form of dress, amusement and interaction, while encouraging strict adherence to Muslim devotional acts (ibadah), including the daily prayers, the fast, and payment of alms (zakat) to the poor” (Hefner 1993:13).

The wave of Islamisation and renewed commitment to the faith become a widespread global phenomena in the 1980s; as a contemporary Islamic movement, it inevitably promoted religious symbols in its agenda. Daomato identified a renewed encouragement of Islamic dress (hijab) in the sermons and fatwa of conservative preachers and theologians in many parts of the Muslim world (1995:19). In Egypt, activists in the Islamic movement began to wear what they called al-ziyy al-Islami (‘Islamic dress’): this is worn by both women and men to conform to a code of modesty. While men wear sandals, baggy trousers and loose shirts in off-white, lihya (a full beard trimmed short) and sometimes a moustache and shoulder-length hair, women wear a combination of al-jilbab (a long gown) and al-khimar (a veil for the head) (Guindi 1981:474). Nagata found that Islamic activists adopted a similar appearance during the 1980s ‘dakwah movement’ in Malaysia. The practice of wearing Islamic dress has become a hallmark of dakwah followers, characterised by the use of a short head veil (telekung) and the covering of all parts of the body except for the face and hands. Some women also wear socks and gloves, while a small minority have even adopted the face veil. Men did not necessarily modify their dress at all, although some have taken to wearing the green or white ‘Arab’ flowing robe (jubah) and a skullcap (serban) or turban (Nagata 1980:414-415).

Under the repressive New Order regime,16 dakwah groups – purposely or inadvertently – diffused a new concept of veiling that was considerably different from the traditional Indonesian practice of wearing a headscarf (kerudung). There were at least two significant pioneering dakwah groups that were strongly involved in the

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16 The New Order regime strictly controlled any kind of social or political activity during the 1970s and 1980s, including religious activities. The period was a time “when even the walls had ears” (ketika dinding pun bertelinga). This expression describes how the regime seriously monitored any social-political movement using military personnel (Asshiddiqie 2002:38).
campaign to encourage the new practice of veiling. One was the previously mentioned *Jama’ah Salman* affiliated to the campus Salman mosque at the Bandung Institute of Technology (ITB); the other was *Jama’ah Istiqomah*, which was based at the independent Istiqomah mosque in a suburb of Bandung.\(^{17}\) Both these *Jama’ah* were founded by Salman activists, however (Rosyad, 1995:58): the former community was exclusively dominated by university students (at least during its initial development);\(^{18}\) while the latter expanded to include members of the wider Muslim community. While *Istiqomah* focused their activities on religious sermons, Islamic training for school students, Islamic courses for women, and preaching courses; *Jama’ah Salman* concentrated on ‘Sunday morning mentoring’, *Lembaga Mujahid Dakwah* (LMD: ‘Training for Dakwah Cadres’) and *Studi Islam Intensive* (SII: ‘the Intensive Study of Islam’). A number of these activities inspired girls to take up the veil, including the six students at SMAN 3 Bandung, Triwulandari and Tiena.

The significant influence of *Salman* and *Istiqomah* is evident from the earliest cases of *jilbab* at both secondary and tertiary educational institutions. Before deciding to wear the *jilbab*, Ariani – and the other five students of SMA 3 Bandung – took part in Islamic training for school students organised by the Istiqomah community during the school holidays. Ariani recounted that she learned about the mandatory nature of Islamic dress from a tutor during this intensive Islamic training. Meanwhile, Tiena decided to wear the veil after her participation in LMD cadre training; this was organised by Salman when Imaduddin was still actively involved in Salman’s activities. Likewise Triwulandari was inspired to don the *jilbab* by her involvement in the SII intensive training organised by Salman. While the training attended by Tiena targeted university students, the course that Triwulandari enrolled

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\(^{17}\) The *Istiqomah* mosque was built in 1969 by the *Istiqomah* Foundation and was completed and opened for use in 1971 (Rosyad 1995: 64).

\(^{18}\) In 1985, Salman established Karisma, which accommodates children and school students.
in was designed for school students; the latter training program was not as militant as the former.\footnote{After the LMD was banned by the state in 1983, the Salman activists introduced SII B which targeted university students, as a counterpart of SII A which catered for secondary school students. In fact, SII A was founded in 1978 (see Masjid Salman ITB 1988:67).}

The girls had not previously been familiar with the idea of the Islamic veil, but during the intensive Islamic training program, the tutors encouraged veiling. When Ariani asked why most people do not wear the veil despite the encouragement of veiling inscribed in the Qur’an, the tutor answered:

You do not need to pay attention to the majority of people who practice Islam. But you have to see what the Qur’an said about veiling. If it is clearly stated that veiling is mandatory for female Muslims, just do it and do not care about other people’s practice.

This provocative statement confused Ariani and put her in a conflicted position before she finally decided to take up the jilbab. She and her five friends went against general practice in the Muslim community at that time.

Unlike Ariani, Tiena and Triwulandari claimed that they were never explicitly instructed about the doctrine of jilbab by any tutor during the training. Both of them perceived that the whole doctrine taught in the training – e.g. tauhid (‘oneness’),\footnote{Tauhid not only means believing in one God; it also includes obeying God’s will in total subservience (Abdulrahim 2002: 22).} sunatullah,\footnote{Sunatullah means the rules of God. Imaduddin (Bang Imad) explains that sunatullah is a set of rules that has been stipulated by Allah for the sake of order, the maintenance and harmony of the universe and the life of mankind (Abdulrahim 2002:15).} and the social aspects in Islam – made them feel subservient and obedient to God. Moreover, the sequence of ritual prayers – particularly the program of tahajjud prayer\footnote{Tahajjud prayer every night – created a spiritual atmosphere and raised emotional drive. All of these religious elements tacitly encouraged the participants to practise Islam in a comprehensive way, including adopting Muslim dress (which was indeed exemplified by the female tutors, who consistently wore the veil).} every night – created a spiritual atmosphere and raised emotional drive. All of these religious elements tacitly encouraged the participants to practise Islam in a comprehensive way, including adopting Muslim dress (which was indeed exemplified by the female tutors, who consistently wore the veil).

Nevertheless, both the explicit and unspoken approaches created the same sense of militancy among the alumni of the intensive training programs: this was the key to
disseminating the new practice of Islamic veiling. It supported new wearers of the veil, so that opposition from teachers, peers and family did not stop them from adopting it. Ariani and her five friends did not give up their belief, even though they were strongly pressured by their parents, friends and teachers. Likewise, Triwulandari (who was avoided by her friends and interrogated by the Military office) maintained her strong conviction, although she had to move to another school to avoid worse treatment. Further, Tiena, who had been harassed by her secular university community, persisted in maintaining her new appearance, although she lost confidence at her veiling debut. She could not look at other people because of this. According to Tiena, the power of veiling is perceived when we have a strong belief (haqqu...yiqin) that God’s will mandates veiling for women. Denying God’s signs is syirik, the greatest sin for a Muslim. Rather than being syirik, Tiena preferred to obey God’s will, even though people avoided her. She firmly maintained her conviction and never abandoned the veil.23

The militancy of the pioneer jilbab – wearers contributed to the continuity of the movement. In addition, the agents of new veiling were individuals with potential. The six students who experienced conflicts in their social environment finally finished their studies at the well-known school – SMAN 3 Bandung – and continued on to enrol in several prominent universities, despite the pressure from the school management during their term of study. The three sisters – Arif Budi Yulianti, Ariani Budi S and Aryuni B. Pantjawatari – went on to enter the Bandung Institute of Technology (ITB) where they joined the activists in the Salman community and strengthened the campaign for the new veiling.24 Likewise, Triwulandari went to ITB after completing high school at another institution after being forced out of her previous school in Jember, East Java. Her older colleague Tiena GA also played a

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22 Tahajjud is an optional prayer (sunnah) that should be performed at night after the Isha prayer and a short period of sleep.

23 Interview with Tiena Gustinar Amran in Jakarta, March 2, 2005.

24 After they graduated from their school, the number of students wearing the jilbab multiplied and the conflict between veiled students and school management became so severe that Ariani and others supported their juniors by endorsing jilbabisasi in the school. (Salman Archive, pp. 60-62).
significant role within the Salman group, providing support for students victimised for wearing the jilbab. The number of cases multiplied during the 1980s. In other words, these graduates of Islamic training were outstanding individuals who played a significant leadership role in campaigning for and advocating new veiling among the young.

B. Contested Veiling among Social Groups

(1) Islam vis-à-vis the State

From the inception of the New Order regime until the mid-1980s, the state took a much harsher attitude towards Islamic groups and their demands (Crouch 1981): political Islam was labelled the ‘extreme right’, and became Public Enemy Number Two after the ‘extreme left’, the Communists (Liddle, 1996:615). The fusion of the Islamic parties in the 1970s and the imposition of a government policy in 1983 that required all social and political organisations to accept the state ideology of Pancasila as the ‘sole foundation’ (asas tunggal) for social and political life, encouraged people to adopt alternative strategies to express their social and political aspirations. As a result, an alternative cultural strategy was taken up more intensely by Indonesian Muslims, rather than continuing to rely on a political strategy.25 This cultural strategy took the form of religious activities such as sermons, religious speeches, seminars, and intensive courses on Islamic doctrines, which were all known as cultural-based Islamic movements or dakwah movements. Schwartz explored dakwah movements among youth in mosques, where sermons were filled with grievances, complaints and yearnings which were overtly political in nature. In addition, other contentious topics such as land issues, inequalities of wealth, government corruption and perceived official favouritism towards Christians (especially Chinese Christians) became familiar topics at religious gatherings (1999:164).

25 While the structural strategy focused on the transformation of the political structure (legislative and executive), the cultural strategy emphasised the changing of social behaviour (people’s way of thinking) (Kuntowijoyo 2001:118)
The unproductive relationship between Islam and the New Order regime precipitated mutual suspicion. The government suspected that the Islamic movement was a political effort to undermine the state’s power. This suspicion is revealed in a diary entry by a student which connected veiling to a subversive political movement. She reports her teacher saying: “If you wear the jilbab for Allah, I cannot ban it, but if you wear it because of political motives, I will let the school management handle you”. Another example of this alleged link comes from a school publication which states:

The trend of militancy has been used by a certain group against the state, particularly by urging female students in certain schools to wear unlawful attire according to school uniform rules, despite the fact that the old style of uniform does not contravene Islamic teaching. Besides, the ‘aksi jilbab’ (campaign for veiling) designed by a certain group is not a religious movement, but a political movement (Alatas and Desliyanti, 2001:32; see also Wartasiswa, No. 3/I.).

At the bureaucratic level, the treatment of students who wore the veil in school looked very repressive, although there were no guidelines for punishment in the government regulations about school uniforms. After the early cases of new veiling which occurred in Bandung, the Department of Education and Culture prepared regulation SK No. 052/1982 governing school uniforms for students at all educational levels. This provision half-heartedly accommodated the headscarf, but in practical terms, school administrations tended to reject students who wore headscarves during school hours. Several punishments were applied to veiled students: exclusion from class, ostracism of those who did attend classes wearing jilbab, and encouragement to move to another school. An archive from the Salman community shows that after Ariani and her friends graduated,
the school administration expelled an increasing number of veiled students from classes. Students reported that teachers ordered: “anyone who is wearing the veil, please leave!”26 Six veiled students at SMAN 1 Bogor were not acknowledged by school staff members, even when they were present. They could attend class, but neither their presence nor anything they did was acknowledged. Their attendance and performance in daily lessons and examinations were ignored. In addition, they were often investigated by the Principal on a daily basis (Alatas, 2001:51).27 At the same time, as noted above, Triwulandari had to move to another school after she was investigated by the local military office (KODIM) (Panji Masyarakat, 1982).

While bureaucrats rejected the idea of veiling, the military apparatus arrested people who criticised the government for its repressive policies. One victim of

26 *Salman Archive*, p. 66.

27 In the case of Lisa, a student at SMAN 2 Cirebon, the school sent her an official letter saying she was not allowed to attend class because she was breaking school rules (*Salman Archive*, p. 26).
political arrest was Tonny Ardie, a militant Muslim activist who was charged for his severe criticism of the New Order regime. Ardie was arrested for his speech in August 1983 at the Masjid Agung Al-Azhar in Kebayoran Baru. At the time he argued that the point of contention with the government was the school uniform and head-dress required of school girls. Ardie stated that “women who dress offensively, who wear a bikini, or who sin are no problem […but…] Islamic girls wearing an Islamic head shawl […] are terrorised and severely threatened [so that they must] remove their old-fashioned costume or leave school!” After Ardie finished speaking, it is recorded in the transcript that the audience shouted *Allahu Akbar!* and clapped their hands (Ardhie 1984:25).

Although religious agencies suggested alternative proposals or criticised various school administrations by sending memoranda through a range of bureaucratic channels, most agents of the latter tended to defend the schools’ rejection of the *jilbab*. In February 1984, the Indonesian Council of *Ulama* (MUI) proposed an appropriate design for a jilbab to be worn by school students. A delegation from the MUI had a meeting with the office of the Department of Education and Culture. At this meeting, the delegation from the MUI proposed two things: their first point was that they agreed with compulsory school uniforms; but their second statement was that the MUI supported the veiled students. The delegation argued that students who wore the veil were basically still fulfilling the criteria of the school uniform in terms of colour and badge. In addition, they were following a religious requirement and practice: this is a guaranteed human right (*Panji Masyarakat* July 11, 1994). Similar points were made by Z. E. Muttaqin, a MUI chairperson from West Java. He argued that most veiled girls are good girls who achieve high academic standards. “They tend to avoid any kind of immoral conduct and are inclined to study hard”, he remarked. Muttaqin thus contended that allowing girls to wear the veil would actually assist teachers to fulfil their duty to maintain high moral standards among students. Therefore, Muttaqin wondered why teachers banned the headscarf in schools: “It is intolerable conduct (*dzalim*). Indeed, such repressive conduct no longer reflects the mission of education”, he said (*ibid*).
Such criticism was seemingly ignored by most bureaucratic agents, however: they countered it with various arguments. For example, an officer in the Department of Education and Culture initially appeared to welcome the MUI’s suggestion. He told the MUI delegation: “Basically, MUI’s proposal does not contravene our principles. Instead, the proposal is congruent with official guidelines”. He then presented other principles governing school uniforms that had nothing to do with the MUI’s proposal. Instead of responding directly to those proposals, the officer merely said that school uniforms should not contradict moral standards, Indonesianess and local tradition. Another bureaucrat defended the ban on the headscarf. The Minister of Education, Nugroho Notosusanto, argued that the question of veiling is debatable [in Islam] and should not be made into an issue (Merdeka August 12, 1983). Amir Machmud, the Chairperson of the House of Representatives, refuted the argument about human rights. He said that the issue of the jilbab is a matter for regulation within an organisation, not a human rights matter. Based on this somewhat weak and illogical argument, he supported Notosusanto’s view on the banning of headscarves in public schools (Merdeka, August 16, 1983).

The contestation between students and school administrations on the one hand, and between religious groups and elements of the bureaucracy on the other, provides significant evidence that Islamic elements were represented by state agencies as being opposed to the policies of the government. Instead of resolving the conflict, the state tended to keep the problem in an ongoing state of tension and controversy. The Minister of Religion, Munawir Syadzali, who represented the state’s interests, regarded wearing the veil to be non-compulsory. He stated that many wives of kiai do not wear the veil, including his own wife. By contrast, K. H. Hasan Basri believed that covering the female body (aurat) is obligatory for Muslims, stating, “There is no argument about this issue”. He insisted that the government discuss the case and resolve it immediately (Tempo, January 13, 1990). Concerning these conflicting ideas, the Chairperson of the Indonesian Council of Ulama (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, or MUI), E. Z. Muttaqien, admitted that he had failed to convince the state of the value of compulsory wearing of the veil for women: this was because of an ‘x-
factor’; this was the common assumption about wearing the veil represented a political action (*Tempo*, October 20, 1984).

Given the rejection of the aspiration of some Muslims to wear the veil in public schools, particularly at SMAN 68 Jakarta, some parents of veiled students took the case into the courts. This effort was supported by a legal aid organisation (LBH: or the *Lembaga Bantuan Hukum*) in Jakarta. There were several stages in LBH’s efforts to resolve this case. First, LBH sent a letter to the local office of the Department of Education and Culture (*Kakanwil Depdikbud*) in Jakarta, asking about the policy of the school. According to LBH, the restriction of veiled students from attending classes and sitting for examinations was against the law. This argument was not considered by the local authorities, however. LBH then sent a second letter to the Minister of Education and Culture, Prof. Dr. Fuad Hasan, asking for clarification of the state policy on school uniforms. Finally, LBH took the case to the State Court in central Jakarta. Although court sessions on the veil conflict had been undertaken several times (seven), the judge decided to reject the lawsuit (Alatas and Desliyanti 2001:60-61). These disputes over the veil exemplify Thaba’s identification of the 1980s as a period characterised by antagonism and conflict between Islam and the state (Thaba, 1996).

At the same time, there were several cases of veiled women who were suspected of spreading ‘poisoned food’ in traditional markets. Prior to this there had been rumours of ‘poisoned biscuits’ which contained sodium nitrite, resulting in a death in 1989. The women were accused of being responsible for the spreading of poisons which caused a ‘moral panic’ in society. The rumours mentioned that the veiled women used a small hose hidden under their *jilbab* to pour poisons into products such as frying oil, *tofu, tempe*, cigarettes and *bakso*. People who believed the rumour reacted strongly: they suspected all veiled women; they mocked, stoned, caught, frisked, and generally maltreated them. One of the victims was Mrs. Fadilah Mutafiah, a veiled teacher at SMPN 3 Serang, West Java. When Fadilah went shopping in a traditional market, some people suspected her of spreading poisons. Two security guards restrained her hands and dragged her to a security office close to the market, with many people following. Before she arrived at the office, the crowd
of people mistreated her, while her hands were held by the two guards (*Suara Masjid*, December 1989:27). In fact, Fadilah was later proven innocent: she did not commit the crime of which she was accused by the hysterical crowd. The extreme behaviour surrounding the poisoning cases is indicative of several characteristics of social behaviour which have been identified by Goode & Ben-Yehuda as exemplifying ‘moral panics’ (1994:33-41), such as concerned behaviour, increasing hostility, widespread agreement or consensus, disproportionality, and volatility.

Since the spreading of the rumour that the ones poisoning foodstuffs were veiled women, concern over the behaviour of veiled women was heightened in society. According to Lukman Harun, a Vice Chairperson of Muhammadiyah, he often received reports from veiled women who had been harassed by people (e.g. being mocked, frisked, stoned and generally abused) because of suspicions that they were poisoning food (*Tempo* November 4, 1989:22). Consequently, many assumed that veiled women were linked with those who were spreading poison. In addition, hostility toward veiled women had increased; it led to a consensus of opinion that there was a connection between veiled women and the cases of poisoned food. Most people assumed that the threat was real, serious, and perpetrated by members of Islamic groups. As a result, many people assumed two things: (1) that many more individuals were engaged in the behaviour in question than actually were; and (2) the threat, danger, or damage imagined to be so imminent was out of proportion to the nature of the threat; the imagined danger was in fact considerably greater than what a sober empirical evaluation could support. The issue was volatile and relatively short-lived, however, which is a common trait of moral panics. They erupt fairly suddenly, and nearly as suddenly, they subside. As soon as the authorities delivered a press release explaining the chronology of events and their own actions, the rumours involving veiled women slowly abated (*Tempo*, November 4, 1989:22).
(2) Polemics on Veiling

The conflict over the wearing of the headscarf (jilbab) during the 1980s, and the rivalry between Islamists and moderate Muslims, sparked polemics as to what extent there are convincing references to the practice of wearing jilbab in the Islamic tradition. Some people maintain that the wearing of Islamic dress by a growing number of Muslim girls has strong justification from the Qur’an and Hadith, while some others doubt that Islam provides definite criteria about correct dress. What is at stake is not just a true understanding of Islamic doctrine in relation to Islamic attire; the debate also represents a search for the true embodiment of Indonesian Islam.

While a number of Muslim intellectuals have tried to explore the issue of veiling in Islam by adopting a contextual approach, many Muslims strongly embrace conservative and textual interpretations of the issue. Since Muslim life is guided by the Qur’an and Hadith, arguments about veiling always refer to both these sources, although people often interpret them differently. There are two relevant verses in the Qur’an that pertain to the issue of veiling, in the chapters entitled Al-Ahzab (‘Confederate’) 33:59 and Al-Nur (‘Light’) 24:31. The former verse reads: “O Prophet! Tell your wives and your daughters and the women of the believers to draw their cloaks (jilbab) over their bodies (i.e. to screen themselves completely except for the eyes or one eye in order to see the way). That will be better, that they should be known (as free respectable women) so as not to be annoyed. And Allah is Ever Oft-Forgiving, Most Merciful”. The latter verse is: “And tell the believing women to lower their gaze (from looking at forbidden things), and to protect their private parts (from illegal sexual acts) and not to show off their adornment except only that which is apparent and to draw their veils (khumur) all over juyubihinna [i.e. over their bodies, faces, necks and bosoms]…”28

Some argued that most verses in the Qur’an were formed in the light of history and against a particular social-historical background; thus they represent a response

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to these conditions (Rahman 1982:5). The available information about the circumstances surrounding the veiling verses does not provide a precise and consistent view of the reasons for their revelation, however. Consequently, efforts to understand the concepts contained in Islamic traditions have produced various opinions and pronouncements. As religious figures, Munawir Syadzali, Ibrahim Hoesein and Abudin Nata recognised the same reasons (asbab al-nuzul) for the handing down of the veiling verses; nevertheless, their ways of understanding and explaining how the history behind the verses should be contextualised in Indonesia were different.

These three Muslim scholars agreed that Verse 33:59 was handed down to distinguish between free Muslim women and slaves in a slave-owning pre-Islamic (Jahili) society. Abudin Nata argued that although the verse was directed at the Prophet’s wives, the message was also intended for other Muslim women. For Nata, the instruction can be also applied to other believers, because God’s words are universal. Therefore, the verse encourages believers to cover their aurat with the jilbab (PM, No. 450:25). Like Nata, Ibrahim Hoesein agreed that 33:59 indicates that covering the aurat is mandatory for women. Hoesein believed that this is not because of the traits of femaleness; rather, it is intended to protect women and to guard them from fitnah (‘chaos’ or ‘discord’). While the instruction is mandatory, Hoesein believed that this characteristic is complementary (tathniyah) not primary. This means that although it is mandatory, the realisation of this directive can depend on the situation. In other words, veiling is mandatory, but this does not mean that an unveiled woman is an infidel (kafir) (PM, No. 450:22).

In contrast to Nata and Hoesein, Syadzali argued that Verse 33:59 can not be understood as a strong prescription for Islamic dress, because the subject of the verse is the Prophet’s wives; it is very contextual. Instead of relying on Verse 33:59, Syadzali asserted that Verse 24:31 offers a more appropriate designation of Islamic dress, despite the fact that it relates only to ritual prayer (shalat). He doubted that the criteria applied to the Islamic dress worn for prayer could be extended to clothing worn in public (PM, No. 450:18).
In addition to the different opinions and pronouncements regarding the status of the veiling verses, the two concepts of veiling – jilbab (cloak) and khimar (shawl) – mentioned in the verses have been understood differently by various Indonesian Muslim scholars. Instead of distinguishing between the jilbab and the khimar, Abudin Nata combined the two concepts into a single definition of jilbab, that is, “a kind of long, loose blouse covering the face and chest because these are part of the female aurat” (PM, No. 450:25). Unlike Nata, Munawir Syadzali argued that in Arabic the word jilbab refers to a long gown that is usually worn by Arabs, or those who have taken a formal vow. Hence, Syadzali contended that kerudung (‘headscarf’) is a more appropriate term than jilbab for discussing the issue of veiling in Indonesia (PM, No. 450:18). Meanwhile, Nurcholish Madjid argued that the term jilbab does not refer to a headscarf (kerudung); rather it is a mantle, since he was sure that the issue of veiling in the Qur’an relates to covering the bosom, not the hair (1998:136). Therefore, Madjid interpreted the text about veiling as follows: “wear your mantle to cover your bosom, not to cover your hair” (Madjid, 1998:134-136). Daud Rasyid criticised Madjid’s definition of jilbab by combining two opinions: he stated that jilbab refers to attire that is larger than a khimar (headscarf), and to clothing that covers the whole female body (2002:48).

The differences of opinion among scholars do not stop at such basic issues; they also occur in discussions about the relationship between the concept of aurat and

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29 Nata based his definition on the translation of the Qur’an published by the Department of Religion. This definition was seemingly perplexing to the majority of Muslims in Indonesia, where the Syafi’i school of thought (madzhab) is dominant. In this Qur’an translation, the female face is included as a part of the body that should be covered, whereas Syafi’i madzhab does not recognise this strict definition of aurat (Tempo, December 11, 1982).

30 A similar interpretation can be found in Dr. Ibrahim Anis’s definition of jilbab as an under-garment (gamis) or shawl (khimar), or clothing to be worn beneath the external female garment that covers the whole body like a mantle (Al-Mu’jam al-Wasith, Mathba’ah Mishr Syarikah Musahamah, Egypt, 1960, Chapter 1, p. 128).

31 The former definition is quoted from Lisan al-Arabi and the latter is taken from Tafsir Jalalain. According to Mernissi, the term jilbab is a rather vague concept in Lisan al-Arabi. It can designate numerous pieces of clothing, ranging from a simple chemise to a cloak. One of the definitions in this dictionary describes the jilbab as a very large piece of cloth worn by a woman; another describes it as a piece of cloth that a woman uses to cover her head and bosom (Mernissi 1991:180-181).
veiling. A religious figure, Syafi’i Hazami, argued that the female *aurat* encompasses the whole body except the face and the palms. He also maintained that there is no distinction between the *aurat* as understood for the purposes of ritual prayer (*shalat*) and the concept of *aurat* in non-religious activities. In other words, Hazami applied the same standard for women’s modesty in public as was usual for praying: he expected women to cover their bodies both during *shalat* and in public. He argued that the material used to cover the body need not always be a *kerudung*, however: women could use a long piece of cloth, a *sarong*, or other materials. Such garments should be worn outside the house, but they can be taken off at home (PM, No. 450, p. 22). Ibrahim Hoesein agreed with Hazami’s strict criteria regarding *aurat*: there should be no differentiation in terms of location. But he made an exception for practical reasons regarding the *aurat* of female workers, explaining that they are not forbidden to display their forearms during work. Unlike Hazami and Hoesein, Nurcholish Madjid did not discuss the concept of *aurat* during prayer, since this is relatively definite compared to the definition of the *aurat* in public places. As Madjid believed that the concern expressed in the *Qur’an* about veiling is focused on covering the bosom, he excluded female hair as being part of the *aurat* in public (Madjid, 1998:136). His statement was supported by Harun Nasution, the Rector of the Institute for Islamic Studies (IAIN) in Jakarta, who remarked controversially that “there is no strict definition of *aurat* in Islam” (*Prioritas*, 1987).

While *aurat* relates to the concept of modesty, the standard of female modesty is certainly different from one culture to another, although the idea of covering certain parts of the body might be universal. Syadzali agreed with Hamka’s comment regarding Islamic dress in his work, *Tafsir Al-Azhar* (1965). As an expert in Qur’anic exegesis, Hamka remarked that people have the freedom to dress in various ways and styles in accordance with the time and place. The most important things for Muslims are heart-felt faith and an attitude that is based on Islam. Hamka believed that style of dress is an area of culture which should be determined by place, time and also intelligence. That is why Islam will never interfere if Indonesian women change their *kebaya*, batiks and Western gowns, according to Hamka. Meanwhile, Nurcholish Madjid believed that there are different standards of modesty in Arabic countries and
that Indonesia should recognise the differences between itself and the Middle East in terms of its own natural evolution. For Madjid, Arabic culture produced the idea that for Muslim women the *aurat* includes the whole body – except the face and the palms – which is not suitable to the Indonesia context. Madjid believed that applying the same standards world-wide ignores the historical roots of the way people dress (*Mimbar Ulama*, 1986). In a similar vein, Harun Nasution believes that *jilbab* is not an authentic Islamic tradition and represents an element of Arabic rather than of Islamic culture (*Prioritas*, 1987). On the other hand, Abudin Nata suggested that because *jilbab* is a facet of human culture, it can be adjusted in accordance with the situation and conditions, and the taste of the wearer. If one accepts this view, various cultures will produce their own style of *jilbab* such as *jilbab à la* Indonesia, *à la* Arab, and *à la* Iran. Moreover, the Prophet gave mankind freedom to manage worldly matters in accordance with cultural parameters. For Abudin, a religious figure, the argument that *jilbab* is not appropriate for tropical countries like Indonesia does not make any sense. He asked why there are other tropical countries where women still wear the *jilbab*. He was sure that Allah knows that Indonesia has a tropical climate, and that He is aware that a woman can wear the *jilbab* wherever she is. In other words, the issue lies between convenience to the wearer versus appropriateness (*Panji Masyarakat*, No. 450, November 21, 1984:25-26).

(3) Jilbab: A Symbol of Protest

The adoption of new forms of veiling can be seen as “a form of rebellion and a rebuff to a parental generation whose efforts have not improved the social conditions”; the new garb carries a political message: it is a dramatic, non-violent protest against the establishment and its policies, as well as against the West (Fernea 1993:120). The symbol of protest represented by the new veiling in Indonesia has been similar to the experience of women in other parts of the Muslim world since the veiling movement (*jilbabisasi*) emerged from the repressive atmosphere of the New Order regime. The contentious issues discussed in Mosques such as the corrupt bureaucracy, the authoritarian regime and the immoral conduct of individuals become the centre of the movement for reform.
Veils became dramatic visual symbols (Ferne 1993:119) which expressed opposition to the authoritarian regime of the New Order, although most wearers were unaware of the scale of the impact of their new practice. After the government issued Regulation SK 052/1982 about school uniforms, school administrators pressured veiled students more severely, although the regulation was merely a guideline, not an order. In response, students continued wearing the veil, despite the sanctions from schools for alleged abuses of the school uniform regulations. But, since the national bureaucracy has long been dominated by military elements, a military approach was used by the bureaucracy at the level of the school system. Instead of fulfilling the schools’ demands, many veiled students protested the policy in several ways. Students at SMAN 3 Bandung collected signatures from many other students to rally support for the practice of veiling in public schools.32 Ariani and her friends met officials in the office of the Department of Education and Culture to complain about their treatment by the school management.

In reaction to the repressive treatment by the bureaucracy, Islamic activists staged many protests against the ban on headscarves in schools. For example, Islamic activists organised students to stage demonstrations in the central office of the Minister for Education and Culture. Students were organised into a forum named *Kesatuan Solidaritas Umat Islam Indonesia* (KSUII: ‘The Union of Solidarity for Indonesian Muslims’). This union was intended to defend and advocate for students who had become victims in *jilbab* cases. This forum accommodated students concerned with this issue, both those from senior high school and university. Yoyoh Yusroh, a militant activist from PII (‘Indonesian Islamic Students’), led the organisation.33 She organised a peaceful demonstration34 with 400 female participants on 11 August 1983 to meet with Nugroho Notosusanto, the Minister for Education and Culture. A similar action was staged by thirty young Muslims calling themselves ‘*Pemuda dan Mahasiswa Islam Bandung*’ (PMIB: ‘Islamic Youths and

32 Salman Archive, pp. 70-75.
33 Interview in Jakarta, May 31, 2005.
34 The demonstration was also supported by male activists such as Toni Ardi, Egi Sudjana, Zaenal Muttaqin, etc.
Students of Bandung) on 26 November 1990. They held a demonstration in front of the Ministry of Education and Culture to protest against the ban on wearing the *jilbab* in junior and senior high schools and in the photographs taken for student identity cards. They read a petition supported by 194 university and school student organisations, several *pesantren* and the MUI chapter of Bogor. The same group had previously held demonstrations on the campus of the *Institut Teknologi Bandung* (ITB: Bandung Institute of Technology) and at Padjajaran University in Bandung (INIS, 1989:70).

Given the repressive atmosphere under the New Order regime, the *jilbab* movement among young Muslims reflects resistance by oppressed subjects; most wearers of the *jilbab* were not politically aware, however, and did not understand the impact of politics. Under the New Order Islam was politically marginalised by the state, and the emergence of Islamic symbols was assumed to be a political movement designed to undermine the legitimacy of the regime. According to Emha Ainun Nadjib, a prominent Muslim poet, the emergence of *jilbab* and the revival of Islam on secular campuses expressed political antagonism to the contemporary circumstances. Cak Nun, as Emha is commonly called, believes that new veiling was motivated by political interests and cultural understanding, although the wearers do not really understand the ontology of the *jilbab* and are unable to differentiate among the various sources which became their inspiration. Cak Nun explained his position through an analogy. According to Cak Nun, in terms of political sovereignty the wearers of *jilbab* are like poor people who do not understand how they became poor. They are also like people who have been rained upon and yet are unable to explain the rain, its origin, or its strategic aim; yet they are rained upon and get wet. The simplest way to deal with rain is to use an umbrella (Najib 1989:252-253): thus, women do not need to understand the ontology in order to follow the practice.
C. CONCLUSION

The idea of covering the female body has become the basis of a dramatic social movement. The campaign for new veiling among Islamists distinguished their ideas from the traditional Indonesian concept of veiling, which is not advocated in a militant way. In spite of referring to the same religious texts, Muslim scholars differed considerably in their interpretations. The *dakwah* groups, particularly the Salman community, played a significant role in promoting ‘Islamic dress’ in innovative and confronting ways. Intensive Islamic training produced militant cadres who used the kinds of uncompromising approaches typically embraced by Islamists. The involvement of young secular students and intellectuals from urban areas ensured the political character of this Islamic movement against the ruling regime.

The New Veiling was a foreign concept and a provocative symbol which triggered resistance within society. This was not only because of the difference between the new and old practices of veiling; it was also due to the derivative values of the new veil, which challenged the social order. While the new dress-style included long-sleeved shirts, long socks and a large headscarf, the old costume featured a loose style of veiling. Resistance to the new veiling practice emerged from fellow students, parents and school administrations which represented the state bureaucracy. Since the state suspected the growing popularity of veiling among young female students to be a political movement, bureaucratic agents sought to restrain the wave of new veiling by means of repressive and intimidating measures. Instead of withdrawing from the conflict, the new wearers of the veil stood by their views.

Due to the militancy of the Islamists in promoting their beliefs, the diffusion of new veiling continued through *dakwah* groups in both campus-based and independent mosques. *Jama’ah Salman* and *Jama’ah Istiqomah* were representative groups which campaigned for the new veiling. Meanwhile, the bravery and achievements of veiled students also made a significant contribution to guaranteeing the continuity of the veiling campaign. The infusion of new veiling into secular public institutions through student and teacher cadres brought the Islamic movement to the attention of
educated middle-class groups which later continued the campaign for the veil. As a result, in certain places, nominal Muslims (abangan) became santri Muslims who supported and were involved in the dakwah movements. As in other parts of the Islamic world during the 1980s, the widespread global phenomenon of Islamisation and renewed commitment to the faith became an important social and political movement in Indonesia.

Since the veil is “an outward sign of a complex reality” (Fernea 1993:120), the expression of resistance by certain Muslim groups in campaigning for new veiling has been both a religious and a political movement. For example, Muslim figures made religious arguments supporting the practice of veiling, although some other Muslims were against it. The decision to take up the veil has been accepted by wearers as the performance of a religious obligation. The militant pronouncement of religious doctrine ignored the complexity of religious interpretations, however. The debates regarding veiling among Muslim scholars produced an interpretation that covering the aurat does not absolutely require wearing a jilbab; the same purpose can be achieved with other styles of clothing, such as the kerudung, which has local familiarity. Moreover, according to Nurcholish Madjid, the concept of veiling refers to covering the bosom, not the hair; this contradicts the arguments offered by proponents of the jilbab.

The political dimension of the veiling movement in Indonesia can be traced to efforts by some Muslim groups to influence ordinary Muslims. The Islamic movement associated the concept of veiling with religious precepts and pressured the government to accept the veil in public schools. In the 1980s, the government rejected the aspiration for veiling by banning the veil in schools. Muslim groups appealed against the ban, insisting that the issue was a matter of religious expression and human rights. Their protests took the form of collective actions involving Islamic organisations. The movement for the right of female students to wear the veil became a visible symbol of a moral and politico-religious movement, which took the form of repeated protests against the prevailing forms of social and political power.

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CHAPTER IV
THE CHANGING APPEARANCE OF
INDONESIAN MUSLIM WOMEN

A young female rock climber from Indonesia was reported in the *Sydney Morning Herald* as “the number one Asian climber” for her achievements at several world championships. Under the headline ‘The Headscarf Reaches New Heights’, this article remarked on the unusual appearance of a climber who wears long loose pants and tucks the ends of her headscarf inside her loose top rather than adopting the more usual skimpy tops and brief athletic shorts. The 28-year-old climber is Etty Herawati, a Muslim woman who has been climbing since she was 15, when she lived on a cliff-lined part of the coast of Java with her mother, who could climb coconut palms. Since Etty believes that wearing hijab (jilbab) is obligatory for Muslims, she stated that the headscarf did not hinder her activities, including her participation in this boutique sport. According to this report, whether she is in the gym practising on the climbing wall or taking her daily runs, the jilbab is always in place (*Sydney Morning Herald*, January 31, 2004).

A report like this one reflects two important contemporary developments: (1) Indonesian Muslim women now appear in public without attracting any social stigma (as happened frequently in the 1980s; and (2) there is an ongoing social and cultural transformation taking place, which is the fruit of increasing Islamisation among various classes of Muslims. Although the growing use of the veil among Muslim women does not represent the peak of the Indonesian Muslim search to discover the correct context of religious precepts, the pervasive practice of veiling does indicate the increasing Islamisation of various social classes. Islamisation cannot be achieved

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1 Excerpt from a poem that has been set to music. It is sung by the Bimbo Orchestra (See Sayuti, *Taufiq Ismail: Karya dan Dunianya*, Grasindo, Jakarta, 2005, p. 114).
without passing through a period of conflicting polemics and severe contestation among diverse social agencies.

The contestation of veiling in secular institutions, particularly at state or public schools during the 1980s, displayed how Islamic forces tried to struggle against an authoritarian state. This struggle was largely symbolic: Muslims adopted Islamic dress to express both their piety and their resistance, while the ruling elite rejected those same symbols because it suspected Muslims of trying to undermine state power. The atmosphere later became more conducive, however, as Soeharto’s political affiliation shifted from pro-abangan-Catholic to pro-santri-Muslim. These unpredictable changes influenced public policy regarding Muslim girls’ aspiration to wear the veil in public schools; this same aspiration had previously brought teenagers to court or caused them to be expelled from school. In the early 1990s the Department of Education issued a decree allowing girls to wear the veil in public schools; this was a sign of the reconciliation of the state and Islam at the political level, and represented the beginning of the process of legalising veiling in the public domain.

The emergence of celebrities who wear the veil also played a significant role as an ‘agent of consecration’ in encouraging the massive wave of new veiling. There were two common motives for this new promotion of veiling: some public personalities were concerned with religious injunctions; others concentrated on Islam in relation to female beauty. Celebrities opened Islamic clothing stores, published books, organised seminars about Islamic clothing, staged fashion-shows, set up contests for veiled models, and even established a modelling school for veiled women. A similar role has been played by several Islamic magazines, such as Paras, Muslimah, Noor, Alia, Umni and Al-Nida. It is these publications that have mostly created the public construction of veiled women during the last few years. In the meantime, the role of the state in supporting Islamic cultural assets (after Soeharto moved his political affiliation closer to Islam) provided an easy way to disseminate the popularity of the veil among new santri Muslims. The state-sponsored Istiqlal Festival, where Islamic clothing came into the spotlight, was the beginning of a new episode for Indonesian Muslims: Islamic agents could now promote their symbolic
capital in public. Other cultural events added colour to the dynamics of Indonesian veiling: a verse drama called Lautan Jilbab (‘The Ocean of the Veil’) was staged just before the boom in Islamic clothing occurred.

This chapter explores the changing appearance of Indonesian Muslim women: it investigates current veiling practices, which are clearly fostered by social, political and personal transformations. I argue that while Muslim agents promote ‘Islamic veiling’ as a primarily religious concern, when significant agents in society endorse cultural and economic efforts, the resulting social interactions and eventual social transformation will also influence the practice of veiling. Changes in the appearance of Indonesian Muslim women not only reflect the evolution of clothing styles; they also indicate transformations in perspectives on veiling and religiosity. This chapter discusses the extent to which Muslim women wear the veil to express their religiosity as well as their personal preferences in terms of fashion, comfort and beauty. In doing so, they have made a visible contribution to ‘Islamising’ Indonesian Muslims.

A. THE PUBLIC PROMOTION OF ISLAMIC ATTIRE
(1) A Conducive Atmosphere for Veiling

One piece of evidence for a new reconciliation between Islam and the state late in the New Order period was the issuance of SK 100/1991 which allowed veiling as part of the public school uniform (see Picture 4.1 below). This was not the only sign of the new centrality of Islam in Indonesian public life, however. According to Liddle (1996:625), ‘there had been a palpable relaxation of tensions, and... the reason for the new policies was a more sophisticated government attitude toward Islamic demands.’ In the words of a former Department of Religion official during Soeharto’s regime, “What has changed is the Islamic community, and the government just adjusted itself” (Forum Keadilan, February 26, 1996, 18). Jimly Asshiddiqie, a senior lawyer, states that Soeharto’s attitude to Islam became more accommodating in the 1990s (Asshiddiqie 2002:54). Most notable is the change in the appearance of Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana, the eldest daughter of Soeharto, who wore the kerudung (headscarf) in public as soon as she returned from the pilgrimage to Mecca in 1989 (Tempo, October 1989:46). In addition, the legal conflict about veiling between
students and school administrations was won by a veiled plaintiff in 1995 after the defendants’ plea was rejected by the judge at their first trial and again at the appeal (Gatra, 22 April 1995, 44).

The decree allowing veiling, SK 100/1991, became a ‘green light’ for young Muslims to wear the veil in public schools; their right to do so had previously been hampered by the SK 052/1982 regulation about school uniforms (see Chapter III above). Although both decrees use the term pakaian khas (‘special clothing’) to describe the headscarf and additional Islamic outfit in terms of the school uniform, the former decree considered an ‘ideal’ model of the veil (i.e. covering the head, neck and chest), while the latter regulation merely refers to a cover for the head (destar), and does not mention covering the neck or chest. In the new decree, the headscarf is referred to as kerudung rather than jilbab, while the old decree mentioned the ikat kepala (headdress) which looked like a destar (men’s headdress) or blangkon (traditional Javanese batik headdress for men). Instead of using the definite concept of substitution in the old decree about school uniforms, the new regulation used the word “penyempurnaan”(supplement) in its title, which makes the status of the regulation less clear.

Picture 4.1. The Veil is Included in School Uniforms
The use of “penyempurnaan” (supplement) in SK 100/1991 instead of “perubahan” (substitution) in the old regulation has not been fully discussed in public discourse. However, the new regulation replaced rather than completed or supplemented the old one. This is made clear in the last article of the decree (penutup), which says that by the stipulation of the decree, other regulations which contravene the new regulation are is void. The idea of substitution was discussed by Islamic media, although the word “penyempurnaan” was attached to the formal concept of substitution. In this case, the word “penyempurnaan” was seen as synonymous with “pengubahan” and “penghapusan”. Media Dakwah magazine was one area of media which used the word “pengubahan aturan” (revision of the regulation) and “penghapusan SK penangkal jilbab” (repeal of the decree of headscarf ban) to describe the replacement of school uniforms policy (Media Dakwah, No. 201, March 1991, p. 9).

In addition to the problematic use of the concept “penyempurnaan”, the new decree seems less comprehensive (kurang sempurna) than the old one. At the level of coverage, for example, the new decree only covers state schools, whereas the old decree did not only regulate the state schools, whereas but also private schools. On this point, therefore old decree is more comprehensive than the new decree. In addition, the new decree does not regulate the uniform of kindergarten students as the old decree did. This incomplete coverage of educational level has become a reason to say it is a less comprehensive policy. On the other hand, the new style of head cover for female uniforms (see picture 4.1) might be considered as a more perfect outfit (lebih sempurna) than the old uniform, which did not accommodate the headscarf, since Islamists argue that a headscarf which covers the chest is more perfect than wearing a female headdress which only covers the head.

One can also consider the usage of the word “penyempurnaan” as an example of euphemism or doublespeak, a common practice of the terminology used by New Order bureaucrats. The concept of “penyempurnaan” may be deliberately ambiguous as is the case with phrases such as “downsizing” or “rightsizing” for “firing of many employees”. Since the word “penggantian” (substitution) of a policy was stereotypically considered impolite, the word “penyempurnaan” became a more
polite choice. The impoliteness lies in the subjective assumption among people that substitution of policy tends to disrespect to the previous policy which might be produced with hard work and serious effort. It may also have been deliberately constructed to disguise or distort its actual meaning, such as “penertiban” (readjustment) has been used instead of “penggusuran” (eviction) in the terminology of urban development management. During the New Order regime, Sundhaussen found that bureaucrats tended to use euphemistic phrases which were considered “necessary” from the government’s point of view. For example, the term “normalization of campus life” (Normalisasi Kehidupan Kampus/NKK) was designed to keep the students off the streets and politically compliant (Sundhaussen, 1981:825)

The ambiguous position of the decree goes beyond terminology to the legal status of the regulation. Since a decree of ‘Dirjen Dikdasmen’ was not included in the legal hierarchy, the status of the regulation about school uniforms could not be legally binding. The lowest level of regulation which was recognised by the law were Ministerial Regulations (Peraturan Menteri) and Ministerial Instructions (Instruksi Menteri). In other words, no regulations under ministerial level could legally bind people as citizens. However, this an ambiguous legal status was not questioned by Islamist groups involved in veiling cases. Despite the fact that it reflected a half-hearted policy in terms of validity of the regulation, it was perceived by Islamists as the culmination of the conflict. Commenting on the new decree, the Chairperson of the Indonesian Ulama Council (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, MUI) said: “From now on, we have decided that the case of wearing jilbab in the schools is settled” (Media Dakwah, February, 1991).

The aspiration to replace the regulation on school uniforms lasted throughout the New Order regime, but its realisation took a long time. While Islamists

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2 According to the Decree of Provisional People’s Consultative Assembly No.XX/MPRS/1966, the legal hierarchy were: the Constitution (UU 1945), Decree of People’s Consultative Assembly (Tap MPR), Laws or Governmental regulations enacted to substitute for the law (Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-Undang, Perpu), Governmental Regulations (PP, Peraturan Pemerintah), Presidential Decree (Ketetapan Presiden), other regulations such as Ministerial Regulations (Peraturan Menteri) and Ministerial Instructions (Instruksi Menteri) etc.
sporadically staged mass demonstrations to repeal the old decree, the government had been buying time for uncertain reasons. Some Muslim figures also negotiated with government elites to achieve their goals. One serious effort was conducted by the Indonesian Ulama Council (*Majelis Ulama Indonesia, MUI*), which frequently met with bureaucrats from the Ministry of Education and Culture, General Attorney and the Ministry of Empowerment of Bureaucrats (*Menpan*). In this respect, MUI played a significant role in pressuring government to meet Muslim aspirations. By working with the religious institution which represents various Islamic organisations in Indonesia, the government assumed that the process and product of the policy was legitimate. As Walinono said, “The replacement (of the regulation) was decided not because of the incessant protests about the headscarf’s ban in public schools. We have issued a new regulation after long consultations with MUI for about a year. We did not want the public to have the impression that the regulation was issued because of protests. That’s all” (*Tempo*, 19 January 1991:76).

By denying that the new policy was a reaction to public pressure, the government was avoiding shame. The office wanted to give the impression in public that the replacement of school uniforms was initiated by the Ministry of Education and Culture. Admitting that the new policy was an accommodation of Muslim aspirations had no place in the bureaucratic system of the New Order. “No pressure at all! Trust me, this policy has been initiated by the Ministry of Education and Culture. Please, do not get this wrong and assume this policy was issued by government due to external pressure!” the office argued. No wonder, the office preferred using the word “*penyempurnaan*” to “*perubahan*”. Moreover, there was no objection from Muslim groups about the use of the concept of ‘*penyempurnaan*’, which sounded more moderate, albeit ambiguous.

However, the new policy on school uniforms was basically a compromise following long conflict between Muslim students and school management. It was a combination of both interests and reflects various ideas offered in the negotiation process. For example, the technical term used in the new decree was different from the popular term for veiling, namely “*jilbab*”. The new decree used the concept “*pakaian khas*” instead of “*jilbab*” to neutralise the concept of uniform which was
specifically designed to respond the Muslim aspirations. Since this policy was a compromise, this changing attitude of government to accommodate Muslim aspirations was considered sufficient by Muslims. There was no idea of mandating the practice of veiling for Muslim students as a result of Islamisation in the post-New Order regime. At this stage, veiling was acknowledged by the government in the new policy. In other words, veiling was allowed or voluntary, not obligatory.

Although the new regulation reflected the ambiguity in bureaucratic procedure, most Muslims welcomed the political decision. Instead of being signed by the Minister for Culture and Education, Fuad Hassan, the regulation was signed only by Prof. Dr. Hasan Walinono, General Director of the Elementary and Secondary School System (Dirjen Dikdasmen), in front of the Minister for Religious Affairs, H. Munawir Syadzali MA and the Chairperson of the Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI), K. H. Hasan Basri. This indicated that the veiling matter was a secondary issue which could be handled by the Minister’s staff. According to Professor Walinono, the decree was not signed by the Minister because of the opinion of the government on the issue of jilbab. For Walinono, the jilbab case was merely a question of proper school uniform; therefore, such a trivial matter could be handled by the ministerial staff. “The minister makes recommendations only on matters that relate to principles,” Walinono remarked (Kompas, 01/02/1991).

Meanwhile, Muslims held a thanksgiving gathering – syukuran jilbab – at the Masjid Agung (Great Mosque) of Al-Azhar in South Jakarta, to express their gratitude for the enactment of the jilbab decree; others undertook sujud syukur (Islamic worship expressing thanksgiving) at the Masjid Arif Rahman Hakim in Salemba, Central Jakarta (Media Dakwah, No. 202, April 1991:56-57). Reporting the new regulation, an Islamic journal printed an article under the headline: Jilbab Kini Benar-benar Bebas Merdeka (‘The Jilbab is Really Free Now’) (Media Dakwah, February 1991). At the same time, a Surakarta mosque network organised a seminar about the jilbab as an expression of Muslim identity; its purpose was to campaign against the images of fanaticism and right extremism associated with wearing jilbab, and to counter other stereotypes about it (Media Dakwah, May 1991:55-56).
Another reflection of Thanksgiving (syukuran) was expressed by a verse drama entitled *Lautan Jilbab* (‘The Ocean of Jilbab’),³ which was welcomed by Muslim communities in many cities. A Muslim poet and mystic, Emha Ainun Nadjib, created a poetic narrative which reflected the cultural, political and religious dimensions of the 1980s in an artistic performance (Nadjib 1989a:255). His poetry says: “The ocean of jilbab, the wave of struggle, a suffered adventure. It is not possible to stop. Silence begins to speak!” (Nadjib 1989b:39). According to Aswab Mahasin, a Muslim intellectual, *Lautan Jilbab* was a play that tried to present the self-image of the populous, egalitarian *santri* Muslims, and to express their criticism to the status quo. The new play was reflective and peaceful: it delivered a harmony of limited motion (*Tempo*, 8 February 1992:99). After its inception, the poem was performed in several cities, including Jakarta (Panji Masyarakat, No. 631, 1-10 December 1989:83); later it was performed in Yogyakarta, Ujungpandang, Malang, Madiun and Surabaya (*Tempo*, 24 August, 1991:68).

By this time the state no longer maintained a distance from Islam: it accommodated Muslim figures within the bureaucracy, and permitted the promotion of Islamic symbols to intensify at cultural events supported by state officials. The Festival of Istiqlal (FI) indicated that the bureaucracy was willing to support Islamic aspirations, and to foster the integration of Islam with the state. The festival not only presented exhibitions of Islamic fine arts, calligraphy, and books; and performances of Islamic dances, drama and music; it also staged fashion shows and seminars about Islamic dress (*busana muslim*).⁴ The first Festival of Istiqlal was held in 1991, and the second in 1995. Both festivals were held in the Istiqlal Mosque;⁵ an historic

³ According to Emha, *Lautan Jilbab* was an incidental poem, written in response to a performance at the Ramadhan Art Festival organized by the Shaalahuddin Community (*Jama’ah Shaalahuddin*) at the University of Gadjah Mada, Yogyakarta, in 1986. This Muslim community was founded by Muslim students to promote *dakwah* on this secular campus. The poem was later revised and modified to suit performances in theatres (Nadjib 1989). Originally, however, *Lautan Jilbab* was written in reaction to the restrictions against wearing the *jilbab* at public schools during the 1980s.


⁵ Istiqlal (Arabic) means ‘independence’. The mosque was established during the Soekarno regime in 1964, but completed by President Soeharto.
mosque in Jakarta. Adopting the motto: *Pesta Budaya Rakyat Bernafaskan Islam* (‘A Celebration of the Culture of the People, Made Congruent with the Spirit of Islam’), the festival organisers invited President Soeharto to open the cultural event by reading *basmallah*,\(^6\) and striking a *bedug* (a large drum used to summon the faithful to prayer) (*Editor*, No. 6, 26 October 1991:26-27). According to Taufiq Abdullah, a prominent Indonesian historian, the victory of Islam was symbolically displayed by the FI. He contended that the festival exemplified a new form of integrative Islam, which brought the state (*umara*) and religion (*ulama*) closer to one another, and thus expressed a new Indonesian Islam (*Ummat*, No. 8, Thn. I, 1995:39). Abdullah argued that the FI was a ‘peace agreement’ with history (Abdullah 1996:60). Meanwhile, Affan Gaffar, a political observer, maintained that FI revealed the state’s inclination to accommodate Muslim aspirations to further its own interests. On the other hand, Gaffar argued, the new perception, attitude and political orientation of Islamic groups developed during the last five years worked to render Muslims more accommodating to the state. He pointed out that earlier Muslim struggles expressed an antagonistic opposition to the state (*Editor*, No. 6, 26 October 1991:30).

The FI not only signified the political accommodation of Islamic aspirations; it also sparked a growing veiling trend among Indonesian Muslims. During the festival, the cultural discussion about Islamic clothing and the Muslim fashion show emphasised the practice of wearing *jilbab* – usually defined as a headscarf covering the head including the ears and hair – but also expanded the term to encompass a complete ensemble covering the whole female body except the face and palms (*Tempo*, 9 November 1991:43). During the discussion, Ahmad Mansur Suryanegara, an historian, argued that the essence of Islamic clothing is *libasut taqwa* (obedience to God). That is why, he argued, the *kimono* worn by Japanese fulfilled the criteria of Islamic clothing (Suryanegara 1993:392). According to a prominent designer of Islamic attire, Anne Rufaedah, the influence of the FI, which promoted *busana muslim* (Islamic attire), was significant in fostering the adoption of this new fashion

\(^6\) *Basmallah* refers to the Qur’anic words *‘bismillahirrahmanirrahim’*. It is a religious spell or short prayer, used to begin any kind of good activity. It means: “In the name of Allah, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful.”
by Indonesian Muslims. Rufaedah contended that the popularity of busana muslim became increasingly intense during FII in 1995. She found that almost 50% of the clothing offered for sale in popular urban markets like Tanah Abang (Central Jakarta) was busana muslim. The average turnover of the clothing trade in the market was approximately five million rupiah per day. Approaching the Lebaran holiday celebrating the end of the Ramadhan fasting period, the turnover in the Tanah Abang Market could reach billions of rupiah (Kompas, 1 December, 2002). In late 2002, Anne herself negotiated for the opportunity to open a stall in a high-class market, Sogo Plaza Senayan, where she regularly sold busana muslimah.7

Religious activities also intensified in secular public schools where the Islamisation movement established during the New Order regime continued; at the same time, encouragement for veiling was increasingly strengthened through Islamic institutions. At SMAN 3 Bandung, religious activities intensified: ta'lim (learning about Islam) began to be conducted in class rooms. Religious instruction was also offered on weekends as an extra-curricular activity, and the sessions were attended by many students. In addition, religious activities were organised at the class level by Rohis Ihwan (male students) and Rohis Akhwat (female students). Other institutions such as Forum Studi Islam (FSI: the Islamic Studies Forum) and Dewan Kemakmuran Masjid (DKM: Mosque Administrative Council) were responsible for similar activities. While a guideline published for students established Friday as ‘Muslim-uniform Day’ (Buku Panduan [guideline] 2003/2004:45), tutors also encouraged female students to wear the veil on days other than Friday because of the daily schedule of religious activities.8 Religious activities also intensified at SMAN 2 in Padang, West Sumatra. Students gathered every morning before class to listen to a short religious discourse called KULTUM (Kuliah Tujuh Menit, or ‘Seven Minute Sermon’). At this school, an internal student institution called Bina Remaja Muslim (BRM: ‘Guidance for Muslim Teen-agers’) organises many religious activities, such as pengajian (‘recitation of Al-Quran’) and religious commemorations. During

7 Interview with Anne Rufaedah in Jakarta, 14 October 2004.
8 Interview with a member of the teaching staff for Islamic subjects, in Bandung, March, 2005.
Ramadhan, students should also attend wirid remaja (teenage recitation clubs) and pesantren kilat (short courses about Islam) as part of the school curriculum. The current school rules for SMAN 2 Padang state that female students must wear a uniform consisting of a long blouse and skirt (baju kurung), and a headscarf (jilbab) on Fridays, while male students should wear baju koko. 9

The period of tension between Muslim groups and government elites has changed with the increasingly conducive atmosphere for Muslims which has greatly strengthened their position. This significant change does not only deal with the opportunity for Muslims to express their cultural aspirations, but also relates to their freedom to use religious symbols in public institutions. Although the changing attitude of government has tended to be a result of political compromise due to social pressure, people have accepted the change with a positive response. People welcomed the change with thanks giving celebrations in many places without considering the ambiguous position of the new product of decree. As I have discussed above, the changes in policy on school uniforms involved ambiguous concepts of substitution and legal status. However, why the policy was not designed to be more legally binding or it was not definitely issued as a substitution of the old decree was never really questioned. It was politically sufficient to guarantee that the practice of veiling was no longer a problem. The new decree was a milestone in the conducive atmosphere for veiling since female students in public schools were no longer prevented by school management from wearing the headscarf. In this respect, veiling become acceptable and voluntary for the wearer.

(2) Veiling among Celebrities

There was an unprecedented incident at a national beauty contest in 2004, when one contestant did not wear the type of clothing commonly chosen by other contestants. While the other contestants revealed the shape of their bodies, she covered her body, limbs and head in a shrouding garment known as busana Muslim

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9 Pedoman Peraturan Tata Tertib (‘School Guidelines’) for SMAN 2 Padang, July 2003. These were signed by the Principal, Drs. Basni; a representative from the school parents’ association, Drs. Herly Patris; and a student representative, Afifah Amatullah.
(Muslim attire). The competition was organised by a secular cosmetic company, PT. Mustika Ratu. The beautiful shrouded young girl was Andina Agustina (b. 1986), who not only became a finalist, but also won a prize in the category of ‘Favourite Princess’. Her victory was broadcast on TV and published in the print media. “I am proud that I can win while wearing the jilbab (headscarf). I want to show the world that wearing the jilbab is not an obstacle to achieving success and participating in all kinds of social life,” she remarked (Republika, 10 August, 2004). Besides expressing her pride in her own public achievement, Agustina also paid homage to her idol, a popular veiled actress. According to Agustina, one of her reasons for taking up the veil was her admiration for Inneke Koershawati, a movie actress who changed her appearance in recent years by taking up the veil. A survey revealed that Inneke Koershawati is an inspirational figure who has influenced women to take up the veil.10 Such admiration for celebrity dress-styles encourages the practice of veiling to become increasingly pervasive: it also signifies that veiling is no longer only an expression of religious conviction.

In spite of the fact that celebrities are often regarded to be ‘the epitome of the inauthenticity or constructedness of mass-mediated popular culture’ (Franklin 1999 cited in Turner 2004:4), the practice and experience of female celebrities who wear the veil differs in complex ways from one generation to another. Former generations of celebrities who took up the veil were individuals: their practice was unpopular, but they persisted anyway. Under the New Order stereotype of veiling, Ida Royani (b. 1953), who was a singer, model and movie star during the 1970s, took up the veil in 1978, at a time when her career was still vibrant. During this period, she turned her career away from the world of celebrity to the unpopular business of promoting Islamic clothing, because she no longer wished to accept entertainment contracts which required her to discard her veil. Ida opened an Islamic clothing boutique in her house. Instead of selling her products to the general public, she

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10 This survey was conducted by a shampoo company, to find out which public figure was most influential in encouraging Indonesian women to wear the headscarf. According to the company manager, the survey was intended to find a model to use in shampoo advertisements that targeted veiled women. (Launching of a new shampoo product in Jakarta, 1 October 2004).
tended to offer her collection of Islamic clothing to elite consumers. This was indicated by the price of the clothes and the luxury cars of visitors parked around her boutique. At the second Festival of Istiqlal, Ida organised an Islamic fashion show with Ida Leman, Anne Rufaeh and Nani Wijaya (Gatra, February 4, 1995). Ida not only participated in a pengajian (religious study) group with fellow artists such as Benyamin S and Kenan Nasution; she also strongly implemented strict criteria regarding Islamic clothing – which according to her is different from ordinary clothing. Ida argued that Islamic clothing must not only cover the whole female body – except the face and palms – it must also avoid the use of thin fabrics, and may not be cut to fit the body tightly. She referred to an incident in the life of the Prophet, when he avoided looking at a woman who was wearing revealing clothes (Ummat, No. 9, 1995:90-92).

Similarly, Neno Warisman (b. 1964), a singer and movie star, took up the veil in 1991, at a time when the social and cultural milieu was not conducive to veil-wearers. Like Ida Royani, Neno became a pioneer among female artists in wearing the veil. In addition, Neno's style of veiling is unique; people refer to it as the jilbab or kerudung à la Neno.11 When she took up the veil, Neno intended to withdraw from the entertainment world, although she could not totally leave it. Unlike Ida Royani, Neno did not market her distinctive style of veiling, but this style has been sold in many stores and taken up by many Muslims. According to Neno, she took up the veil after her role in a sinetron (electronic film), Sayekti dan Hanafi (1988), which was produced by the state-owned TV station (TVRI). Although her career would begin to wane after taking up the veil, Neno stood by her decision. “At that time, I made up my mind to wear the veil once and forever. This decision was the result of passing through a long process of contemplation and many nights in tears”, Neno remarked.12 Her persistent stance led her to reject any kind of offer which involved her performing without wearing the veil. Consequently, her popularity as a singer

11 The Jilbab à la Neno comprises two layers of cloth which are worn on the head, but the style of draping them makes them look like one cloth. Neno said that she developed her style when she performed the pilgrimage to Mecca.

12 Interview with Neno Warisman in Canberra, September 14, 2006.
and movie star decreased significantly. Her image as a veiled artist made her into an icon of religious artists; this in turn shifted her profession to that of a speaker and presenter on TV shows addressing family, childhood development, and religious issues. In addition, she prefers singing and acting in movies that convey religious messages.

While Ida Royani initiated the commodification of Islamic clothing among elite Muslims, Neno Warisman campaigned for the veil among the Muslim masses. Both celebrities dedicated their lives to promoting the veil in their own way. In relation to Bourdieu’s concept, both celebrities play significant roles as ‘agents of consecration’ in the field of restricted production to foster producers of a ‘determinate type of cultural goods’ and consumers capable of consuming them (Bourdieu 1993:121). Although Neno does not market her style of veiling, her invention has encouraged manufactures to create the same product as a ‘cultural good’ that can be purchased by other Muslim consumers. On many occasions, Neno said, women have asked her how to create her style of veiling and she has happily shared her secret with them.13 Meanwhile, Ida Royani produces and provides ‘cultural goods’ at her store for consumption by elite Muslims. Due to the limited market at home, she has often gone abroad to expand her customer base. Noor, a leading Islamic magazine, gave awards to Neno and Ida because of their impact as important agents in promoting the veil in Indonesia. Neno was awarded for being the pioneer wearer of the veil, while Ida received recognition as the first designer of Islamic clothing.

Although the campaign for veiling is based on a religious stance, it has also gone hand in hand with material prosperity. Since Ida Royani changed her career to become a designer of Islamic clothing, she has sold her products at high prices: her ensembles commonly sell for around Rp. 500,000 (AUS$71) to Rp. 1,500,000 (AUS$214) (Ummat, 30 October 1995: 92); some outfits cost as much as four million rupiah (Bisnis Jakarta, 19 November 2002). Ida’s clothes are mostly purchased by wealthy members of the elite. In order to expand her business, Ida not only markets her products in her own boutique; she also puts her designs in high-class department

13 Ibid.
stores, such as Sogo, Sarinah, and Pasar Raya Jakarta (Ummat, 30 October 1995:92). Likewise, after deciding to wear the veil Neno Warisman changed her profession to become a successful preacher and presenter, although she still acts in certain movies. Neno not only obtained economic advantages: she also gained a new image as a veiled celebrity. She mentioned that her honorarium as a presenter or speaker could reach around Rp. 7,500,000: this is higher than the fee for acting in a sinetron, although the latter activity is usually more demanding.\(^{14}\) When Neno became the presenter on the program Renungan Ramadhan (‘Contemplating Ramadhan’) for a private TV station, she received an award sponsored by the Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI: Majelis Ulama Indonesia) for being the best presenter on Indonesian television (Suara Merdeka, 21 December 2005). In 2006, she also received the Insan Peduli (Humanitarian) Award from the Ministry of National Education: this was granted in recognition of her concern for childhood development issues.\(^{15}\) Inneke Koeshershawati also received a Best Presenter Award from the MUI for her performance on TV (Gatra, 14 January 2002). She was also chosen to advertise a new shampoo product aimed at veiled women (Gatra, 1 October, 2004). Inneke represents the new generation of celebrities who have prospered financially since taking up the veil.

Religious and economic motives for taking up the veil are intertwined among the new generation of celebrities, challenging the common stereotype of veiled women. Ratih Sanggarwati, formerly a prominent model, donned the veil in 2000: she stated that her motivation to do so was strengthened by an enticing offer to work as a veiled model. Ratih said that she became aware of the injunction to cover the female body (aurat) when she attended a pengajian (religious forum) for her friend's birthday. The preacher’s religious exhortations moved her emotionally and encouraged her to wear the veil. Ratih still had doubts about wearing the veil, however; she feared that her new appearance would disadvantage her in some circumstances. She was afraid that she would become estranged from her husband

\(^{14}\) Interview with Neno Warisman in Canberra, 14 September 2006.

\(^{15}\) Ibid.
and family, and worried about the loss of her popularity, her visibility in the mass media, financial support (money) and the reaction of members of the elite community. In the midst of her personal struggle over the veil, a cosmetic company (Az-Zahra) offered her work as a veiled model, provided she was willing to take up the veil fulltime. Ratih accepted the offer, signing a contract in front of journalists. When a journalist asked her: “When will you take up the veil?”, Ratih looked at the contract, which stated that she agreed to cover her body from the first day of publicity for the advertisement. She then asked her client (the Az-Zahra representative): “When will the advertisement be published?” The representative replied, “it will be published in the next two months”. Ratih immediately said, “I will take up the veil in the next two months, as stated in the contract”.

In several recent cases, celebrity veil-wearing has tended to be market-driven: their performances can make money and they can help media entrepreneurs to attract a new audience (Turner 2004:34). Berliana Febrianti, a sinetron star, admitted that she was not accustomed to wearing the veil, but she had to don it because she became a presenter on a TV program aired during Ramadhan (the fasting month); the program featured religious sermons, called Pasaur, and was broadcast by a commercial TV station (Tempo 19-25 January 1999). Berliana also worked for a prominent Islamic clothing company, Shafira, as a veiled model (Serambi Indonesia 11 April 2006) and thus became a representative veiled women for diverse Muslim groups (Bisnis Indonesia 5 September 2006). Similarly, Peggy Melati Sukma, a sinetron star, said that she wore the veil during the month of Ramadhan. “I became a presenter on Mozaik Ramadhan (‘Ramadhan Mosaic’). It was not possible for me to wear sexy clothes for a Ramadhan TV program. I would have been condemned by the Muslim public”, Peggy explained. She remarked that she was asked to wear Islamic clothing by the producer, and she agreed (Suara Merdeka 11 December 2001). In fact, Peggy was also involved in non-religious TV programs which required her to remain

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unveiled, such as *Putri Malam* (RCTI)\(^{17}\) and *Pat-Pat Gulipat* (TPI)\(^{18}\) (*Kompas* 14 December 2001).

![Picture 4.2. Inneke’s Kerudung in a Shampoo Advertisement](image)

Nevertheless, the remarks of certain celebrities reflect how they promote the veil to their audience by referring to their own personal experiences; at the same time, the media offer images with which viewers can identify. Although Inneke Koeshawati’s past experiences were at odds with a religious life, she admitted that after beginning to wear the veil, she felt more calm in dealing with her problems. She is no longer afraid to be gossiped about in the mass media. “I will surrender to God Almighty. Because everything happens with His permission, doesn’t it?”, Inneke remarked (*Paras* No. 6, October 2004). Inneke also said: “Do not hesitate to wear the veil!” (*Gatra* 14 January 2002). Similarly, Ratih Sanggarwati stimulated Muslims to wear the veil as a fundamental aspect of the Muslim image of morality (*akhlak*). “We have to improve the negative image of Islam [by wearing] appropriate clothing”, she remarked (*Suara Merdeka* 7 November 2003). Ratih also expects Muslim women to learn from her experience; that is, that she has worn the veil as a

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\(^{17}\) RCTI stands for *Rajawali Citra Televisi Indonesia*, a private TV station based in Jakarta.

\(^{18}\) TPI stands for *Televisi Pendidikan Indonesia*, a private TV station based in Jakarta.
celebrity and taken risks. “Why don’t ordinary people do the same thing?”, she challenged.\textsuperscript{19} Astri Ivo, a former movie star, invites Muslim women to wear the veil, but urges them to continue to look beautiful. Astri argues that a woman who wears the veil need not to look ugly. On the other hand, Astri suggests that women should maintain their beauty and healthy skin as a form of noble conduct (\textit{ibadah}) to please their husbands (\textit{Suara Karya} 8 October 2005).

Echoing Boorstin’s critique of celebrity as ‘the epitome of all that is trivial, superficial, meretricious and deplorable about contemporary popular culture’ (cited in Turner, 2004:23), the practice of veiling by certain celebrities is relatively artificial, tawdry and inconsistent. Trie Utami (b. 1968), a talented female singer, began to wear the veil after marrying a Muslim preacher, Andi Analta Baso. She argued that her decision to take up the veil was based on her own will, not because of her husband. Iie (her nick-name) went on the pilgrimage with her husband; soon after returning home she donned the veil (\textit{Paras} December 2003:47). When she divorced, however, she discarded the veil and went back to her previous appearance. Moreover, Iie denied that she had ever worn the veil (\textit{jilbab}): instead, she claimed that she wore a special head-dress which people later called ‘\textit{kerudung à la Trie Utami}'.\textsuperscript{20} A similar case concerned Tya Subiakto, a talented young composer who used to wear the veil; she performed at many religious musical events. She changed her appearance as soon as she divorced her husband, Rudi Saputra Hamid. Tya denied that her reason for deveiling was because of her divorce, however. She explained that she had become bored with her style, and had tried to start a new life by focusing on a career in jazz music. Tya argued that as a result of her veiled performances since 1998, she had become known as a Muslim musician who mostly performed with Islamic orchestras. By deveiling, she said, she wanted to free herself to express her ideas more fully (\textit{Tabloid Nurani}, Edition 216, Year IV, 10-16 February 2005:40). Tya feared that her having worn \textit{jilbab} for six years would disadvantage her new music career, although she had previously been happy and

\textsuperscript{19} Interview with Ratih Sanggarwati in Jakarta; 21 September 2004.

\textsuperscript{20} Interview in Jakarta, 31 March 2005. According to Iie, she has been told by a friend that her style of \textit{kerudung} has been sold at Tanah Abang market, Central Jakarta.
tranquil with the practice. According to Tya, wearing the jilbab also confined her to a ‘segmented market’. At a recent appearance, she stated, “I want to be myself” (Cek & Ricek, No. 338, Year VII, 21, 21-27 February 2005, p. 31).21

Although veiling practices among celebrities are relatively unstable both in style and meaning, celebrities who wear the veil have played a role – whether intended or accidental – in setting trends for various kinds of veiling among Muslim consumers. In his study of celebrity and consumer society (1989), McCracken examined the process by which celebrities acquire symbolic meanings in a culture and then transfer those meanings to products. McCracken identified three stages in a ‘Meaning Transfer Model’: (1) the appearance of the celebrity in the mass media; (2) the attribution of celebrity to the product; and (3) the stage of consumption. When Ratih Sanggarwati was hired by a cosmetic corporation (Az-Zahra) or an Islamic clothing boutique (Al-Fath), her familiar appearance in the mass media had a significant effect on Muslim consumers. Her style of draping the kerudung immediately inspired the sale of ‘kerudung à la Ratih Sang’ in the market. Muslim consumers strongly attribute a new and unique veiling style, which combines the Javanese kebaya and the Malay baju panjang (long blouse) to Ratih Sanggarwati’s influence.22 The connection thus made between veiling style and celebrity signifies the transfer of meaning from Ratih’s appearance to a specific style of veil. When consumers find the images projected by a celebrity desirable and resonant, they may aspire to be like that celebrity. Then, celebrity emulation may take the form of purchasing and using the style of veiling (product) worn by the celebrity. The consumer, in turn, will acquire the celebrity-conveyed meanings and thus be able to construct a satisfying self-concept (McCracken 1989:317). At this stage of consumption, celebrities have introduced new trends in veiling which have fashioned cultural meanings into practicable forms.

21 Following Iie and Tya, other celebrities who changed their appearance after a divorce are Dewi Hughes and Ulfah Dwiyanti.

22 Besides this example of Ratih Sanggarwati’s style of kerudung, there are many styles of veiling which are attributed to celebrities. There are kerudung à la Inneke Koesherawati, Krisdayanti, Marissa Haque, Gita KDI, and Marshanda.
Although celebrities function as trendsetters in relation to veiling, their economic interests and limited access to religious discourses represent fundamental weaknesses in popular forms of Indonesian Islam, and the related process of Islamisation in Indonesia. Nevertheless, their activities have negotiated between two spheres of religious identity: between ‘theoretical’ and ‘popular’, ‘official’ and ‘folk’ Islam. The result is that Islam has developed specific local features across large historically- and culturally-shaped regions of the Muslim world. Instead of referring to the traditional veil worn by Arabs at the original centre of Islam, Indonesian Muslims, living in a peripheral region, produce new and creative styles of veiling which maintain a distance from Arab practice. “There are many types of headscarf in Indonesia but they're not like Arabian clothes. We're creating our own Indonesian Muslim style”, says Keke Z. Sugitahari, owner of a modern Muslim clothing boutique (The Jakarta Post 19 March 2007). Gradeva and Ivanova (2001:329) characterise such developments as the emergence of regional forms of Islam incorporating large-scale adaptations of local cultural and religious usage.

B. The Changing Meaning of Veiling

(1) Veiling among Middle Class Muslims

Since the waning of political Islam in the early 1970s, most of the energy of Indonesian Muslims has turned to a ‘cultural Islam’ movement embodied in cultural activities such as majelis ta’lim or pengajian (Islamic study groups), seminars, workshops etc. Hefner (1993:13) identified this ‘cultural’ form of Islam, which influenced university communities, and also expanded to urban middle-class Muslims. This movement intensified religious life among middle class Muslims; this is shown, to a certain extent, by the ‘conversion’ from unveiled to veiled fashions. As Fernea found in Egypt (1993:120), the current trend towards veiling is a middle- and even upper-class phenomenon. One example of this kind of ‘conversion’ concerns Helvy Tiana Rosa (b. 1970), who took up the veil after attending a pengajian. According to Helvy, she had previously been an unreligious person, but

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23 According to Anwar, the percentage of middle-class people in Indonesia reached only 9.28% in 1994, whereas in Jakarta it has reached 46.68% (Anwar 1998:34-37).
then she found out something that she had never known before about her religion. Helvy recounted that she had attended an impressive Islamic forum when she was in senior high school. She was enchanted with the messages conveyed, and by the way the preacher delivered them. Although the religious forum did not specifically concern veiling from the Islamic perspective, she was encouraged to decide to wear the veil immediately.

It was a new thing and the first time in my life. In the forum, I had learned that there is an Indonesian translation of the Qur’an. I was so touched by the way the preacher spoke, which was unlike what I had commonly seen on TV. I felt that I received a hidayah (‘divine guidance’), enlightening at that time. I promised the people in the forum, “I am going to wear jilbab”, even though the decision was so sudden.24

The growing popularity of pengajian in urban areas encouraged middle-class women to become actively involved in religious study groups. These religious activities encouraged Muslims to undertake religious rituals and then to engage with religious symbols, including veiling. Siti Khairiyah (b. 1931), a senior teacher, said that she had observed the growth in the number of religious forums since the early 1990s. Khairiyah became involved in pengajian and then decided to go on the pilgrimage to Mecca. After she returned from the hajj, she participated in more pengajian in her community. “In the pengajian, I learned that covering the aurat is mandatory for Muslims,” she remarked. Although wearing the veil can be uncomfortable, Khairiah felt that she had to take it up because she had studied religious teachings and undertaken the pilgrimage. She then began wearing the veil every time she went out. Khairiah also observed that many women in her community wear the veil because the image of veiling is no longer negative.25

While pengajian became a trigger for veiling, Islamic institutions – which were widespread in the public schools – also played a significant role among the younger generation by fostering religious activities; these were (and are) especially intensive during the Ramadhan month. Vika (b. 1982), a university student, said that during

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24 Interview with Helvy Tiana Rosa in Jakarta; May 5, 2005.
25 Interview with Siti Khairiyah in Jakarta; 7 June 2005.
Ramadhan she has a strong will to learn more deeply and more seriously about Islam. “I am a Muslim, but I do not know much about my religion. Therefore, the sacred month of Ramadhan is a good time for me to learn more about Islam,” she remarked. According to Vika, friends who were active in the Islamic Section (SKI: Seksi Kerohanian Islam [Rohis]) campaigned for a ‘culture of shyness’ (budaya malu). This means that Muslims should be shy about doing bad things and shy about ignoring God’s will. Since covering the female body was part of the realisation of the budaya malu, Vika was encouraged to take up the veil. She assumed that women were not allowed to show their bodies, except for the face and palms. It would be a sin if women showed their bodies (aurat). Vika said:

If I do sinful deeds from puberty until I die, and I do not wear jilbab, and I commit sinful acts continuously, I can not imagine how much sin I would produce everyday. Moreover, I know that I would not be doing anything to earn rewards (pahala). Instead of producing sin everyday, better I decrease it.26

Although wearing the veil mostly concerns outward appearance, in practical terms changing one’s appearance by donning the veil is a hard decision which involves an inward struggle followed by a gradual transformation. Ine Nova Ayu (b. 1969), a former model, said that it took her several years to decide before she took up the veil. When Ine accepted that it is mandatory for Muslim women to wear the veil, she did not abruptly change her appearance. Ine was anxious about whether to wear the veil or not, because she had to consider her career as a model. Changing her appearance by veiling meant she would have to dissociate herself from her career. Meanwhile, she slowly changed her style of dress to what she called ‘oriental clothes’, by lengthening her costumes and making them loose.27

I was anxious for about two years while I was considering whether to wear the veil. I did not want to change my appearance abruptly, because I prefer to change my way of life gradually. That’s why during my preparations for wearing the veil, I bought items of Muslim dress step by step. Instead of wearing jilbab, I started wearing kerudung (loose headscarf) and long sleeves. Deep in my heart I made up my mind that I

26 Interview with Vika in Surabaya; 15 June 2005.
27 Interview with Ine Nova Ayu in Surabaya; 21 June 2005.
was going to wear the veil someday. I just waited for a good moment to do that. Before the momentum built up, I wanted to improve my knowledge of Islam and to try to behave according to Islamic teachings.28

Upon returning from Mecca where she had performed the umrah (little pilgrimage), Ine began to wear the veil, and she quit her job as a model. She turned to being a housewife; her daily life is fulfilled by holding pengajian sessions with her friends in her own home.

In the fragile social and economic situation during and after the 1997 crisis, which disillusioned the Indonesian middle-class, many Muslims leaned heavily on their religion, which increasingly became an identity signifier among members of the new middle-class (Heryanto 1999:173-176). The growth of pengajian among middle-class Muslims channelled their disillusionment on the one hand, and created a new market driven by Muslim consumers on the other. Iit Sugiharto (b. 1960) quit her job at an automotive company and took up the veil. Iit admitted that she was disappointed with the performance of the corporation. She then involved herself in many pengajian, at the same time selling Islamic clothing to the participants. Realising that pengajian sessions are a good place to offer her products, Iit has participated in many forums which are mostly attended by middle-class women in Surabaya.29 She claims that in attending pengajian she not only obtains ukhrawi (‘divine or spiritual gifts’); she also secures profane [economic] advantages. Moreover, it was at a forum that she found the inspiration to change her appearance and her career. According to Iit, the pengajian forum encouraged her to perform hijrah (‘a transformation’) 30 from a bad life to a better life.

28 Ibid.
29 Iit said that she is a loyal participant in 12 religious gatherings (pengajian) in Surabaya: these include Al-Maghfiroh (‘Mercy’), As-Salam (‘Salvation’), At-tawadhu’, Ma’had Tibi/Keluarga Sakinah, Raudhatul Jihad (‘Garden of Struggle’), Khairun Nisa (‘The Righteous Women’), YPJHI: Yayasan Pengajian Jama’ah Haji Indonesia, Majelis Ta’lim RT, Pengawas (Pengajian Wantia Surabaya), Ummul Nazirah, Latifatul Qalbi, and Gema Nusa (Gerakan Membangun Nurani Bangsa).
30 Hijrah means ‘to migrate from one place to another to find a better place to disseminate Islamic teachings’ (dakwah). This term originally stems from the migration of the prophet Muhammad from Mecca to Medina in order to further his dakwah mission.
The assumption that there is a personal transformation associated with veiling, which Brenner conceptualises as ‘reconstructing the self’ (1996:673), can be verified among middle-class Indonesian Muslims. Their wearing of the veil indicates their willingness to be devout Muslims who try to change their appearance and live by the values which derive from that of new appearance. A young professional woman named Lily (b. 1975) admits that she wanted to become a devout Muslim by wearing the veil (jilbab). According to her, there was no need for her to become a devout Muslim first and only then to don the veil, as in the case of santri women who wear the kerudung (loose headscarf); instead, she wanted to initiate a new religious practice by adopting something symbolic, and then trying to perform religious rituals consistently and to study Islamic teachings continuously. Lily stated that by wearing the veil, her attitude shifted: it was no longer ‘weird’ (aneh-aneh). Therefore, some people believed her to be more pious (alim). Previously she had been known as an anak gaul (‘social person’) who mingled with people having various interests and backgrounds. Instead of gathering with her friends, Lily now prefers listening to religious sermons on the radio and reading religious books. By wearing the veil, she keeps her distance with her friends and from her boyfriend as well. She tries to leave her bad habits behind, such as swearing and ignoring prayer times. “For me, wearing the jilbab is like a reminder of my religiosity”, Lily remarked.

Likewise, Helvy Tiana Rosa changed her appearance from unveiled to veiled to signify her deepening religiosity. She believes that wearing the jilbab is God’s order. “This piece of cloth is an identity for Muslims. If you want to be a Muslim, show your identity by wearing the jilbab,” she remarked. According to Helvy, the identity of a female Muslim who does not wear the jilbab is questionable. “I understand the wearing of jilbab as a practice of worship. It is an embodiment of the faith,” she attests. Helvy said that she admires one of the Prophet’s companions, Umar bin Khatab (d. 644 AD) who embraced Islam totally and dramatically. “I try to refer my own practice to the characteristics of Umar; I mean, believing without question. If God orders Muslims to wear the jilbab, I will wear it right away. Even if God orders me to wear a sack to cover my body, I will wear it as well,” she said. Helvy lamented the idea [Cak Nur’s idea] that wearing the jilbab is not as important as the concept of
dignifying high morality (akhlak) or libasut taqwa (‘the dress of piety’). According to Helvy, both the concept of libasut taqwa and wearing the jilbab are important, because they should complement one another.

The association between veiling and religiosity has lately become tenuous, however, since Muslim women wear the veil for complex and different reasons. While religiosity became the central motive for veiling during the last years of the New Order (Feillard 1996:9-10; Brenner 1996), the growing vogue for Islamic dress offered a new lifestyle to middle class Muslims after the end of the New Order regime (Champagne 2004:19; Heryanto 1999:175-6). Recent developments in veiling include the introduction of a new style which leaves the neck exposed or visible, called the jilbab gaul (‘hip jilbab’) (Champagne 2004:16). This kind of veiling sees female Muslims wearing a T-shirt or a long-sleeved tight-collared shirt and tight jeans instead of wearing the loose style of clothing which is considered ‘more Islamic’. In addition, the practice of wearing the veil for practical reasons and the general disfavour for traditional clothing do not indicate an Islamic dress style (busana muslim) which has a religious dimension (Juliastuti 2003). Non-religious reasons for veiling current among its wearers include beautifying themselves and gaining respect from other people (http://hestirahayu.blogspot.com). At Islamised institutions, the decision to wear the veil tends to be motivated by ‘a desire to be part of the majority’ (ikut-ikutan) (Warburton 2006:59).

Currently, veiling is a social and cultural trend among younger middle-class Muslims who are increasingly loosening their practice from the normative criteria of ‘Islamic clothing’. This shifting trend has led to arguments about whether the fashionable veil is eligible for acceptance as fulfilling ‘Islamic dress criteria’. According to Anne Rufaedah, a Muslim clothing designer, the growing popularity of the ‘fashionable veil’ (kerudung gaul) is a response to the absence of Islamic clothing for young people on the market. As a result, young Muslims modify their practice of veiling according to what is popular among the young, irrespective of the traditional

31 The expression libasut taqwa stems from the Qur’an: “the raiment of righteousness, that is better” (7:26).

32 Interview with Helvy Tiana Rosa in Jakarta; 5 May 2005.
veiling criteria. Nevertheless, Rufaedah argues that such a trend is still tolerable as long as young women are keen on wearing the veil. In other words, Muslim youth have a double target in veiling: displaying their Muslim identity on the one hand and keeping up with current fashion trends on the other (Warburton 2006:55). Even so, some Muslims often criticise the kerudung gaul as an un-Islamic and non-sharia-based form of veiling. An Islamist writer, Abu Al-Ghifari, criticised such veiling in two popular works: Kudung Gaul: Berjilbab Tapi Telanjang (‘The Hip Veil: Veiled but Naked’) (2001) and Jilbab Seksi (‘The Sexy Jilbab’) (2005). Both works discouraged following the current fashion in veiling: it was an abuse of Islamic teaching. While the earlier essay condemned the wearing of kudung gaul as fahishah (‘an immoral sin’); the latter censured wearing the fashionable veil as a form of modern jahiliya (‘ignorance’). Some other Muslims are happy to see the pervasive veiling among Indonesian women, although they criticise the fashionable veil, which they call the jilbab funky. This expression refers to the kind of veiling noted above, which is widely considered to be an abuse of Islamic sharia law because it does not comply with Islamic clothing conventions such as covering the entire body, the use of opaque materials, looseness of cut, and dissimilarity to men’s clothes in cut and style (i.e. no jeans) (http://www.hidayatullah.com).

The changing significance of the veil among Muslim women is perceived by Aryuni (b. 1964), who experienced the early development of veiling in Bandung. Aryuni admitted that wearing the jilbab during the early years of its developing popularity was not as easy as it is today. She still remembers how hard she found it to cope with her circumstances and the social pressure, while her fellow students remained unveiled. Nowadays, Aryuni observes that the process of deciding to wear jilbab is not as ‘autonomous’ as when she donned it in the early 1980s. According to her, most women who wear the jilbab tend to ignore its religious meaning and the

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33 Interview with Anne Rufaedah in Jakarta; 14 October 2004.
34 The expressions jilbab gaul, jilbab seksi and jilbab funky refer to the ‘fashionable’ veil. This is usually worn by young women, who choose colourful materials and a good-looking style for their jilbab, and sometimes wear it with closed-fitting and/or short clothes.
35 See Chapter 3, which discusses the involvement of Aryuni and her friends and sisters in promoting Islamist veiling at public school.
proper criteria of Islamic veiling. Instead of considering its functional aspect, current wearers tend to take the situation and context in which it is worn into account, and they make their decisions about clothing for the sake of fashion. Aryuni believes that the proper function of the veil is to cover the female body (aurat), rather than to beautify the wearer, as it is written in the Qur’an. In addition, many wearers of the veil ignore the concept of mahram (‘people one is forbidden to marry’, i.e. close relatives); Islamic precepts say that women should never reveal their bodies (aurat) to non-muhrim, males who are not close relatives.36

While the practice of veiling has become pervasive among middle-class Muslims, the normative criteria for Islamic veiling still concern some people: they consider the various ‘fashionable’ veiling styles anomalous. According to Aryuni, the current kerudung gaul fashion, which is tight at the neck and made of more colourful material, does not comply with the essential intent of covering the body (menutup aurat) and avoiding male attention. Although she likes various styles of veil, Aryuni argues that her practice is in accord with the Islamic dress criteria. Moreover, Aryuni asserted that wearing the kerudung gaul does not always cover the neck; furthermore, the clothes worn with the kerudung tend to be body-hugging. Aryuni analogised those who wear kerudung gaul to people who consume ‘vegetarian’ synthetic meat, when real meat is still available and consumable. These people assume that synthetic meat is real food that should be consumed. In other words, Aryuni argues that a woman who wears the kerudung gaul actually appears not to be wearing the veil as prescribed by the Qur’an; instead, she is most concerned with appearing in fashionable clothes. According to Aryuni, this ‘pretend practice’ reveals a lack of personal autonomy, because women tend to follow the current trends.37 Iit (b. 1960) also expressed criticism of the kerudung gaul: she lamented the current practice of wearing the veil, but ignoring the ‘Islamic syari’‘da’. Although the image of veiling is no longer negative in Indonesia, Iit said that wearing body-hugging, see-through clothes, applying too much colour and choosing mannish styles,

36 Interview with Aryuni in Bandung; 17 March 2005.
37 Ibid.
are indications of the widespread abuse of the Islamic criteria. Unfortunately, she said, people tend to imitate this kind of clothing. It is happy with the growing acceptance of veiling by celebrities, but she pointed out that the way celebrities wear the veil is often not according to what is proscribed in the Qur’an. She expected that those celebrities would eventually improve their appearance, however, by learning more about the Islamic criteria for choosing proper clothing.\footnote{38 Interview with Iit in Surabaya; 21 June 2005.}

While the Islamic clothing criteria are in dispute, the changing appearance of many Muslims continues. This relates to both personal and social transformations which have influenced Muslims’ perspectives on the world. For example, Helvy Tiana Rosa, formerly an Islamist activist, asked why the Islamic criteria for women’s clothing should not resemble those for men. She argued that the traditional Arabic jubah or gamis (a long loose robe) is worn by both men and women; and wondered why some people in Indonesia criticise female Muslims for wearing pants because they are a male style, whereas in fact that item of clothing can be worn by both sexes. Helvy admitted that her style of Islamic clothing has changed from an Islamist to a moderate style of veiling. “I no longer wear the long loose robe and long headscarf since I deal with many people who have many different perspectives,” she remarked. Helvy asserted that her way of veiling has evolved in line with the changing appearance and vision of An-Nida and Ummi, two Islamic magazines which she used to manage.\footnote{39 Interview with Helvy Tiana Rosa in Jakarta; 5 May 2005.} Likewise, Vika, a university student, argues that the old klombor-klombor style (loose, long garments in austere colours)\footnote{40 In Javanese, klombor-klombor means ‘loose clothes’.} has evolved into fashionable Islamic clothing now that various kinds of veils are available on the market. Many designers and celebrities have played a significant role in promoting the veil. Nevertheless, Vika found that many people do not understand how to wear the veil correctly in terms of the Islamic criteria. She often sees her friends wearing a veil with short-sleeved clothes, a visible navel, or the hair revealed. Although she has not mastered Islamic teachings completely, she acknowledges that covering the body (menutup aurat) means covering it from head to toe. Vika tends to wear a moderate
style of veiling herself, which is inclined neither to the Islamist style nor to the jilbab gaul (body-hugging and colourful style).  

(2) Veiling in the Islamic Media

The Islamic media underwent significant changes during and after the New Order regime as Islamisation intensified in the public sphere. In the early 1990s, only 12 of the 275 print-based media in Indonesia (which published 13,964,846 copies on a daily basis), were Islamic in focus (Media Dakwah January 1992:58). In contrast, Islamic-based media emerged increasingly after the New Order regime ended, because the government relaxed its strict control of the mass media. Apart from Sabili and Ummi, Agus Muhammad – a media observer – identified other Islamic newspapers and journals such as Jurnal Islam, Lasykar Jihad, Saksi, Nur Islam, Tarbawi, Al-Izzah, and Darul Islam (http://islamlib.com/id). In addition, Islamic book publishers increased significantly (up to 30% of all books published) from early 2000 (Republika 3 October 2004). Such changes demonstrate how the Islamic media grew and developed and gained a wide readership during the reform era.

The growing influence of Muslim social styles in the public sphere encouraged the media to promote the Islamic clothing styles which had become pervasive among the middle-class. Some magazines espoused Islamic clothing as a new lifestyle among female Muslims, although some others maintained that the veil is linked to religious identity and thus subject to normative criteria. The former position is represented by the Paras and Muslimah magazines, while the latter is expressed in the Ummi and An-Nida magazines. Although they appeal to different markets, the spirit of the magazines reflect Eickelman’s finding about the increase throughout the Muslim world in vocal debates about what it means to be a Muslim and how to live a Muslim life (Eickelman 1999:7). The proliferation of the new print media exemplifies the emergence of a new public sphere in which religious norms, practices and values play significant and sustained roles (Hefner 1997:110-16). These magazines played a

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41 Interview with Vika in Surabaya; 15 June 2005.
significant public role for Muslims by idealising and promoting various forms of Islamic clothing in accordance with each magazine’s vision.

Initiated by Islamist activists, the *Ummi* and *An-Nida* magazines cannot be separated from the dynamic of Islamic activism. *Ummi* has been published since 1989 by an Islamist network called *Lembaga Dakwah Kampus* (LDK: The Campus Dakwah League). For its early issues, *Ummi* only printed a thousand copies which were circulated among lower middle-class women. One of the initial aims of this periodical was to advocate for female students who had conflicts with school administrations over wearing the veil during the New Order regime. *An-Nida* emerged two years after *Ummi*. Nevertheless, both *Ummi* and *An-Nida* existed under the same over-arching network of Islamic activism, although each has its own management. In 1993, *Ummi*’s management acquired *An-Nida* in order to revive it. Among Islamic periodicals, *An-Nida* was the first magazine to offer its readers short stories or serials imbued with the spirit of *dakwah*. Likewise, *Ummi* later became an Islamic family magazine; its mission is to foster three gender constructions: *mar’atun shalihah* (‘devout women’), *ummu madrasah* (‘mothers as agents of education’), and *zaujah muti’ah* (‘obedient wives’).

Unlike *Ummi* and *An-Nida*, the origins of *Paras* and *Muslimah* had nothing to do with Islamic activism. Both magazines emerged because of commercial imperatives. While *Paras* was first published in late 2003, *Muslimah* first appeared in late 2002. Both magazines belong to one management, however: this is the PT. Variapop Group which also produces a mystery magazine, *Hidayah*. While *Paras* targets adult women, *Muslimah* is intended for a teenage audience. Both magazines are owned by H. Mustafa bin Haji Ton, a Malaysian entrepreneur, who has a successful media business in Malaysia. Although *Paras* and *Muslimah* are commercial magazines, their Editor-in-Chief asserts that their publication is an aspect of *dakwah*. In an additional bid for legitimacy, *Paras* added a fictitious religious consultant, Prof. Dr, Buya Sidi Ibrahim, to the list of editorial staff.

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42 There is a rumour in circulation that the PT Variapop Group also owns *Tabloid Pop*, a porn magazine.
Although these magazines appeal to different markets, their production depends on the current situation and marketing strategy. Muslim consumers have become increasingly diverse and changeable since Islamisation has permeated various social classes. In 2000, although Indonesia had not yet recovered from the economic crisis, Umni’s circulation reached 104,000, Paras was selling 70,000 copies of each issue (up from its initial 50,000 copies) by its second year of publication (2005). According to the Chief Editor, the increase in circulation was caused by the growing veiling trend among female Muslims who wanted to beautify their appearance. Meanwhile, the large circulation achieved by Umni in 2000 was assumed to be in response to the existing social and political constellation. According to Umni’s Editor, the market is situational and very unstable. Therefore, Umni’s customers leave over time. Similarly, An-Nida’s circulation reached its peak in 2000 (50,000 copies, up from 15,000). According to the present Editor, a significant factor in the magazine’s high production quality was the short stories by Helvy Tiana Rosa, which were published during her tenure as Editor-in-Chief of the magazine. At that time, Muslim teenagers were keen on Helvy’s style of writing. Unlike An-Nida, Muslimah
reached its peak production (60,000 copies) in 2002 because teenage Muslims were curious about the newcomer; later its circulation slowly declined to 30,000 copies.

Since *Ummi/An-Nida* and *Paras/Muslimah* target different markets, they also project different perspectives on how Muslim women should wear the veil. According to *Ummi*’s Chief Editor, A. Mabruri, his magazine does not promote the *jilbab gaul*, a style in which the headscarf is tied around the neck. He argues that that kind of headscarf style merely reflects a frustrated woman, because she has failed to comply with Islamic *sharia* law. He called the *jilbab gaul* the *jilbab cekek*, a headscarf that strangles the neck (*mencekik leher*). By contrast, *Paras* promotes the wearing of *jilbab gaul* which is assumed to be more fashionable. According to *Paras*’s Chief Editor, Eva Deswenti, wearing the *jilbab gaul* is still in line with *sharia* criteria as long as it covers the body (*aurat*). According to Irra Fachriyanti, Chief Editor of *Muslimah*, it was her magazine that introduced veiling for teenage Muslims; before that time, the veil was typically worn by married or adult women. In fact, the existing Islamic journals did not suit the taste of teenagers, who are physically and psychologically different from adults. According to Irra, *Muslimah* has tried to show that teenagers can wear the veil and be proper and cute at the same time. The combination of jeans and a long-sleeved T-shirt is no longer considered taboo by *Ummi* and *An-Nida*. ‘Funky and fashionable’ is the image promoted by these representatives of the Islamic media.

In addition, *Paras* and *Muslimah* do not adopt the style of Islamic clothing (*busana muslim*) that incorporates a smock and a veil covering the breasts as typically worn by Islamist activists. Most of the Islamic clothing portrayed in these magazines follows the *jilbab gaul* style, combining the veil with colourful and fashionable clothes. Nevertheless, *Muslimah* claims that its endorsement of fashionable and funky veiling styles also promotes Islam by associating it with more beautiful fashions and styles.

We still dignify the concept of *aurat* (covering the whole body) for women (excluding the face and palms) by referring to the *Qur’an*, verses 33:58 and 24:30-31. At the same time, however, we provide the space to develop many kinds of veiling styles in more creative ways. Sometimes, we combine jeans and long-sleeved T-shirts, as long as they are not body-hugging. This is
undertaken in line with the general mission of *Muslimah* – that is, introducing Islam with beautiful styles and promoting Islamic teachings through popular writing; thereby allowing it to be funky and not really a pressure/burden. In other words, *Muslimah* wants to convey religious doctrines in easier ways, in order to prevent Muslim teenagers from being trapped into a negative way of life.\(^{43}\)

Moreover, *Muslimah* realises that some of its readers do not yet wear the veil, while others may already wear the veil, but are still learning about Islam. In other words, most readers are beginners in the study of Islam.

*Muslimah* is concerned with teenagers changing their lives in a gradual way, including encouraging them to wear the veil. If they prefer wearing jeans and pants, let them. We also try to offer a variety of veils, fashionable, but still in accord with Islamic principles (*shari’a*). For us, the learning process will guide them to obtain information from many sources, such as *pengajian* or reading books, and to choose which style of veil is appropriate for them. In this respect, our approach to inviting teenagers to wear the veil is based on compromise: we do not pressure them to conform to the strict criteria of the veil.\(^{44}\)

In response to the changing social and cultural environment, *Ummi* and *An-Nida* changed their perspective on veiling. Whereas during the first three years after its inception *Ummi* still promoted austere colours and a big veil, Mabruri admitted that most *dakwah* activists had moved away from the old style of veiling; nevertheless, they still complied with *shari’a* criteria such as covering the body (*aurat*) and breasts; opaqueness; looseness; and definite differences between women’s and men’s clothing styles. After the 15th edition of October 2005, *An-Nida* also changed: it altered its cover to showcase more colourful veiling styles. Previously, this magazine featured drawings on the cover rather than models, to avoid using photographs of women. According to Helvy, formerly Chief Editor of *An-Nida*, the perspective on veiling initially changed among the activists of *An-Nida*. At a time when most activists wore the *gamis* (big loose Arab robe), Helvy slowly changed to wearing a blouse and long pants. She said that wearing the *gamis* was not

\(^{43}\) *Ibid.*  
\(^{44}\) *Ibid.*
practical for her. On one occasion when she had an appointment with an Islamist activist, Helvy was not recognised by the activist because of her altered style of dress. These magazines claimed that their publication mission had succeeded, encouraging Muslim women to take up the veil. From its inception, Ummi was concerned with advocating for many female students who had problems at school. According to Mabruri, Ummi’s Chief Editor, the practice of veiling is an aspect of Islamic identity that has been promoted for a long time. “That is why the enactment of the 1991 SK 100 Regulation allowing female students to wear the jilbab at school is our victory,” he remarked. Mabruri asserted: “Look at the current situation; out of every 10 women, maybe 5 or 6 people are wearing the jilbab.” Similarly, Helvy asserted that publishing a short story in An-Nida was very influential in promoting dakwah and ibadah. From the Reader’s Section of her magazine, Helvy knew that many people started to wear the jilbab after reading a story in An-Nida, particularly the ‘Mas Gagah’ story (Ketika Mas Gagah Pergi – ‘When Mas Gagah Left’). This is revealed in the letters of readers, even a few years later after publication (Rosa 2000:x). According to Helvy, promoting dakwah by means of the print media is more effective than doing it orally, although ideally a preacher should master both writing and speaking skills. “Unlike the oral media that are listened to once, written media can be read many times by an individual, and then it can be read by another person, and so forth. [A written work] can be eternal, even after the writer has passed away,” she remarked.45

(3) Removing the Veil

While wearing Islamic dress increased among Javanese Muslim women (Brenner 1996; Dwyer 2001; Washburn 2001; Warburton 2006), among middle-class Muslim women the practice of veiling has relaxed in terms of its religious and social meaning in contemporary Indonesia. Warbuton has identified an inconsistent attitude towards the jilbab among wearers, which mostly reflects ‘the regime of peer influence’ (Warburton 2006:55-6). In addition, the decision of some celebrities to

remove their veils is an indicator that at the popular level veiling is no longer assumed to be an important part of religious practice and social appearance.\footnote{46 See the section on veiling among celebrities.} Another indicator of the declining significance of veiling is revealed by the personal experiences of four young women who used to wear the veil. The practice of veiling differs in complex ways from one person to another (Fernea 1993:122). Further, the decisions of some Muslim women to remove their veils have various dimensions and multiple meanings. The personal experiences of Dhea (an academic) Ana (an NGO activist), Naya (a lecturer) and Herlina (a university student) reveal how the removal of the veil challenges prevailing assumptions about veiling.\footnote{47 The first three names are pseudonyms, while the last one is a real name.}

Dhea (b. 1975), an academic at a state university in Java, wore the veil from the time she became a student at the university where she now works. She explained that her family comes from an abangan (nominal Muslim) background, and did not consistently follow Islamic teachings. Her mother used to be a Catholic who converted to Islam before marrying her father. As traditional Javanese, Dhea’s family maintains a good relationship with other relatives, although some of them come from different ethnic and religious backgrounds. Dhea admitted that she has many Catholic relatives who love her as much as her Muslim relatives do. Her parents did not provide her with religious instruction, but Dhea obtained religious knowledge from her teachers at school. From elementary to junior high-school, she studied at a public school, while her senior high-school was Catholic. Instead of being taught about religious variety and the need for tolerance, Dhea was taught to hate Christianity by an Islamic teacher at her junior high-school. At the Catholic high-school, she received a spirit of hatred towards Muslims from a Catholic teacher, although she tried to be a good Muslim.

She took up the veil shortly before commencing her studies at university, to overcome her anger at religious prejudice. In the early 1990s, she joined an exclusively Muslim community on her campus which is known as halaqah (‘small circle group’). While she had previously worn a simple headscarf, she changed her
veil to the Islamist style after joining the community. Dhea admitted that she became aware of the oppressive regime of Soeharto because of her interaction with this group. On the other hand, this community taught ‘strange doctrines’ regarding gender relations. For example, she was forbidden to shake the hand of any man not considered to be *muhrim* (a close relative whom one cannot marry). As a result, she refused to shake hands with her uncles at a family gathering. Her father was saddened by her attitude, but she remained stubborn. Her attitude slowly altered due to her growing distance from the religious community, however; she also changed her veiling style to a less Islamic, more ordinary fashion. After graduating from university, Dhea mingled with many people who were relatively moderate in their outlook. She also became involved in many activities with NGOs, and this required her to be very mobile. Moreover, Dhea read many books about Islam and feminism, issues which attract widespread discussion among scholars. After passing her first year as a university academic, she decided to remove her veil.

Like Dhea, Ana (b. 1973), an NGO activist, also experienced personal transformation in connection with veiling. She started to wear the veil in the 1990s, when the New Order regime still banned it in public schools. Like Dhea’s, Ana’s family was not religious. The then teenage Ana became curious about Islam after her sister joined *Darul Islam* (The House of Islam), an organisation forbidden under the New Order regime. Ana often discussed religious issues with her sister, referring to the *Quran* and *hadith* (Sayings of the Prophet) for guidance. She experienced something new and interesting that she had never felt before in studying religious teachings. Ana then studied Islam intensely as a member of a religious association at her school (*Rohis*: *Kerohanian Islam*, or ‘Islamic Spirituality’) and took up the veil at that time. Although she admitted that wearing the veil was uncomfortable, Ana kept wearing it to fulfil God’s command. She donned a long loose robe (*gamis*) like that typically worn by Islamic activists. Her curiosity to learn more deeply about Islam

48 According to Dhea, she had previously worn a small headscarf combined with jeans; she changed to wearing *jubbah* while attending the *halaqah*, although she did not assume the *chadar* (face veil), as most of the other community members did.

49 Interview with Ana in Jakarta; 2 June 2005.
led her to an underground religious community, *Negara Islam Indonesia* (NII: ‘The Islamic State of Indonesia’), an organisation that was banned by the New Order regime. Ana joined NII because of the challenging doctrines propounded introduced by its members. She took a vow (*bai’at*) and recited a proclamation before being formally accepted as a member.

After she became involved in NII activities, Ana dedicated her time and energy to the organisation, recruiting many new members. She changed her veil – which had previously been large and loose – to a more practical style to accord with her increasing activities. “I no longer wear a big *jilbab and gamis* (the long Arab robe), because I often ride a motorbike to organisational activities. I wore a shoulder-length headscarf on those occasions. It is handier for getting around,” she remarked. After two years as an active member of the organisation, Ana was promoted to *panglima* (commander), an office which made her responsible for a certain territory (*wilayah*). Nevertheless, the title was a mere formality: it carried no real authority, because the organisation harboured a fundamental gender bias. After five years, Ana came to feel that the organisation did not respect her fairly because of her gender. She perceived that her femaleness excluded her from equality with her male counterparts. Ana felt discriminated against in this regard and her awareness rose to become an impulsive force. She challenged the NII leaders over this unfair treatment. After a long and tough battle with the NII leaders, Ana decided to leave the organisation. Her disappointment and disillusion led to her decision to remove her veil.

While Ana discarded her veil in rebellion against an exploitative regime (the NII), Naya (b. 1971) removed her veil to gain wider access to social life. While she wore the veil, she felt that there was a distance between her and other people, even though one reason (besides the religious one) Muslims take up the veil is to increase their access to the public sphere. Naya admitted that her style of veiling was influenced by a small community (*halaqah*) on campus in which she immersed herself during her undergraduate studies. In that exclusive group, people called male activists *ikhwan* (Arabic for ‘brother’) and female activists *akhwat* (Arabic: ‘sister’); men and women were strictly segregated in the community. *Ikhwan* and *akhwat* never communicated face-to-face, as communication was not allowed between people
of different sexes. Cross-gender communication could only occur if there was a hijab (barrier) between the interlocutors. In other words, communication was entirely confined to the voice, because the two parties could not see one another. Furthermore, in the community people were not allowed to shake hands with the opposite sex (except for those categorised as muhrim), or to use perfume, cosmetics or lipstick.

Although Naya had been happy with her life in the community, after she moved to another town she no longer wore her veil in the Islamist style. Moreover, her new friends were not as strict as her old friends in the previous town. She exchanged her previous veiling style for ordinary Islamic attire which was no longer excessive in size or made in a monotonous colour. When Naya was hired as a university lecturer, she became involved in many research activities and began to deal with many people. From her experience, Naya learned that being a religious person means being a humanist. She argued that the core of humanity present in every religion should be understood seriously, rather than using outward symbols to declare one’s religiosity. She came to the conclusion that if a Muslim woman wears the veil, this does not guarantee that she understands the essence of religion, which dignifies human beings. She also questioned herself about the nature of veiling, which she had previously believed to symbolise piety and righteousness. When she increasingly noticed the conflict between the ideal and the practice, she began to doubt the efficacy of this religious symbol, even though she did not have the courage to challenge it. Therefore, when she accepted a scholarship to pursue her studies abroad, she adopted a new appearance by removing her veil. She admitted that removing her veil in her own country would be a problem since ‘permanent and consistent-standards’ regarding veiling have become an ideal norm in Indonesia’s ‘Islamised culture’.

Unlike the three former Islamist activists discussed above, Herlina (b. 1980), a talented young writer, removed her veil after wearing it for several years because she felt it was no longer appropriate for her to wear the veil with its attendant social expectations.

50 Interview with Naya in Sydney; 20 August, 2005.
I do not want people judging me to be *berjilbab tapi telanjang* (‘wearing the veil but naked’) since I no longer adhere to the criteria for ideal Islamic clothing. I often wear a short headscarf and body-hugging clothes with short or rolled-up sleeves. Besides, I do not want to stigmatise veiling any longer by my own activities: I often go to entertainment places such as discotheques and pubs to seek inspiration for my writing, and these are inappropriate places to wear the veil. For the above reasons, I feel that the belief in wearing the veil is not firmly planted in my heart. Also, my practice of Muslim worship is currently no longer stable, as is suitable for a devout Muslim who wears the veil.51

Herlina started to wear the veil in her last two years at public school in Yogyakarta. She unwittingly obeyed the rule that obliged female Muslim students to wear the veil, although she wore it half-heartedly. Basically, she wondered why a vocational training student studying Hotel Management should wear clothes that are unfamiliar in the hotel industry. Nevertheless, she consistently wore the veil until the end of her school years, and when she continued at university. After Herlina began intensely writing novels, however, she had to read a lot of books dealing with science, philosophy, religion, odd studies, gender and feminism, etc. At the same time, she was mingling with a lot of people of various sexes and from different groups. In her need to seek inspiration, she often visited ‘unusual places’ such as nightclubs entertainment places, places for contemplation, etc. During this time, she felt that her religiosity had slowly declined even though she still wore the veil. At this point, however, she came to regard her veiling as no longer meaningful. After long consideration, Herlina removed her veil after her *Garis Tepi Seorang Lesbian* (‘The Margins of Lesbianism’, 2002), was published. On the back of the book, Herlina’s picture still portrayed her wearing a veil and glasses.

These four young women all indicated that their experiences of transformation in connection with veiling passed through three stages in terms of their appearance. They originally went unveiled, then they took up the veil; finally they removed the veil at a certain point in their lives. While Brenner argued that veiling among Muslim women represents ‘personal awareness’ and offers a new form of modernity (1996:673), a woman’s removal of her veil is also a sign of ‘personal consciousness’:

51 Interview with Herlina in Surabaya; 23 June, 2005.
to take off the veil questions its nature in terms of fundamental tenets of Islamic doctrine dealing with morality, religious identity and personal piety. Critical awareness of the symbolic and superficial aspects of religious practice among veil-wearers expressed ‘increasing scepticism’ towards ‘traditional orthodoxies’; a trait which Ahmed identified as a postmodern inclination (1992:10). The four young women discussed above come from various backgrounds within the urban middle-class; yet all of them consciously repudiated the ‘new Islamic look’ after first adopting it.

Although their reasons for removing the veil were not only based on their personal disillusionment with ‘Islamic veiling’, the practice of veiling was related to gender-based interpretations of Islamic teachings which were instituted by a religious regime. This regime introduced religious doctrines with the idea of maintaining gender-based segregation, male superiority and the seclusion of women, all typically campaigned for by Islamist movements. These ideas conflicted with indigenous Indonesian standards of etiquette, equality between the sexes and free social intercourse. After Dhea joined a *halaqah* (small religious community) which forbade women to shake hands with men, she implemented the doctrine within the circle of her relatives. Her father advised her: “I do not expect you to be an ‘Arab’; I just want you to be a righteous Muslim woman.” Dhea’s father deplored her stand because it conflicted with traditional manners which usually encourage shaking hands when greeting someone. Although Dhea did not go along with her father’s request, she later felt that her attitude had dissociated her from her immediate family and close relatives. Her attitude changed after she took up the veil. She resolved that veiling was no longer that important to her. “I do not want to lose the beauty of togetherness (*silaturrahmi*) with my extended family only because of wearing something that I have not fully investigated yet,” she remarked.

Meanwhile, the NII religious regime introduced Ana to the concept of male superiority based on gender inequality. Although Ana had long been involved in the organisation, she was not promoted to a leadership position (*mas'ul*) in the organisational structure. She asserted that there was a new male member of just one month’s standing, yet he was chosen to be a leader (*mas'ul*). At that time, Ana had
been active for five years and she knew more about the organisation’s doctrines. In
addition, she could drive, ride a motorbike, work hard and for long hours and then go
out at night. Ana found out later that a woman in the organisation would always only
be umat (the ruled) because only men could be leaders. If she menstruated during the
holy month of Ramadhan, she would be fined for not fasting, while there is no fine
for men at all. This misogynistic perspective encouraged Ana to question many
aspects of religious doctrine. Ana’s criticism not only pointed to the unjust system of
the religious regime, but also to the personal practice of veiling. She felt that her
religiosity was not fulfilling her spiritual needs. Since veiling inflicts a religious
burden on women before they can achieve spiritual experience, Ana discarded it.

Another conflict between the ideas campaigned for by the Islamic religious
regime and the personal aspirations of those who wear the veil relates to the ideas of
seclusion and segregation and the female aspiration to gain greater access to society.
This conflict was experienced by Naya and Herlina, who felt the need for greater
access to social life, but wore the veil, which greatly limited their freedom of
movement. They developed this aspiration after they distanced themselves from the
strict religious regime which had encouraged them to take up the veil in the first
place. While Naya experienced this change after she moved to another town, Herlina
underwent it after she started to study at university. Naya recounted that after
removing the veil, she could mingle with anybody from any background. The barrier
she had faced no longer existed. Similarly, Herlina found that her movements and
activities were no longer restricted after she took off her veil. Furthermore, she had
had no choice but to wear the veil at high school, and she could not visit cafes or
nightclubs to seek inspiration for her novels without facing condemnation for wearing
the veil to such places. According to Herlina, veiling segregated her from the free
public access which she needs as a writer. When she wore the veil to night clubs,
many people regarded her conduct as inappropriate because a veiled girl should not
go to such places. Unlike Herlina, Naya used to wear the veil voluntarily, although
later she became aware of the disadvantage of seclusion arising from veiling. She
admitted that sexual segregation had confined her to a limited social circle which
restrained her activities and career.
Apart from personal reasons for discarding the veil, criticism of veiling practice has been based on concern that the social expectations attached to the veil are not congruent with the empirical practice of those who wear it. While some people criticise wearing the veil as an ‘anomaly’, others question the social construction of female identity and morality which is expressed through veiling. Since Herlina understood veiling to be a symbol of religious identity and personal piety, she was annoyed with people who wore the veil but paid no attention to ‘religious rules’. She discovered that many of those who wear the veil do not conduct ritual worship (shalat) and cannot read the Qur’an. Moreover, she lamented the abuses perpetrated by veil-wearers who become criminals or drink alcohol, when such conduct is condemned by religious teachings. Like Herlina, Naya criticises veil-wearers who do not perform the required worship (shalat and fasting) and continue to do bad things (maksiat). Further, she idealises those veil wearers who understand that the essence of religious existence is to dignify humanity. Therefore, Naya criticises wearers of the veil who do not care; who even hurt other people. According to her, claiming a religious identity is meaningless for those who ignore humanity. “It is better that Muslims do not wear the veil but care for and are kind to people, than it is to wear the veil but not to care for other people”, she remarked.

These social constructions have been criticised by other former wearers of the veil. Ana was disturbed by the social construction of women’s morality which is behind veiling. She asked why women should be controlled regarding to ‘dos’ and ‘don’ts’ of correct veiling, while men’s behaviour is never discussed. In addition, Ana criticised the stereotype that veiled women make a ‘positive impression’, while unveiled women produce a ‘negative impression’. Instead of focusing on female morality, Ana suggests a balanced standard of morality which is enjoined on men as well. “If men have no problem whether or not they wear a hat, jubah (long loose Arabic robe) or grow a beard, why must women’s clothing, preferences and habits be examined according to a male standard of morality?” she asked. In this respect, Dhea believes that veiling is not immune from human subjectivity, because it is a ‘semiotic practice’ linked to who signifies whom, and what is being signified. In other words, patriarchal standards play a significant role in measuring female morality and piety.
According to Dhea, instead of remaining trapped in this ‘semiotic practice’ which reduced her motivation to wear the veil, she chose to remove it.

C. CONCLUSION

The increasing adoption of Islamic clothing by Indonesian Muslim women represented a social transformation which took place after the New Order regime’s opposition to veiling abated. This transformation was encouraged by political support from the state on the one hand, and a cultural movement among Muslim groups on the other. Permitting female Muslims to wear the veil in public schools resolved the bureaucratic problems surrounding Islamic clothing, while the *Istiqlal* Festival paved the way for the promotion of Islamic clothing in a wider social space. Both these important developments would have been impossible without the cooperation of the state. At the same time, the promotion of Islamic clothing among Muslims was sustained and furthered by celebrities who modified veiling from a religious practice into a fashionable cultural product. As a result, veiling has become increasingly pervasive among various classes of Muslims, although the current association between veiling and religious conviction is more tenuous than it used to be.

While the number of Muslim consumers grew in line with increasing Islamisation, Islamic clothing also became a popular commodity which could be marketed with religious nuances. Some celebrities took up the veil because wearing Islamic clothing promised economic gain. Some of them have been awarded by the MUI (religious council) for being inspiring veiled celebrities, while some others have delivered religious sermons (*dakwah*). The new Islamic print media also popularised fashionable Islamic clothing for Muslims of various ages by suggesting that the veil could be adopted as a lifestyle or fashion choice. The Islamic magazines which promote Islamic clothing have circulation figures that match those of the secular media. This current development of ‘fashionable’ veiling has been criticised by the Muslim public, however. The criticism arises from the debate over whether the *kerudung gaul* complies with the *shari’a* criteria or not. While magazines which are associated with commercialising Islamic clothing defend the new fashionable veils,
those more concerned with the shari’a criteria censure this fashion trend. Among the Islamic media, Paras and Muslimah are magazines which defend the new veiling styles, while the journals which condemn it are represented by the Umni and An-Nida magazines.

On the other hand, some Muslims have abandoned veiling because the social and religious expectations associated with it were not there in actual practice. Personal disillusionment with ‘Islamic veiling’ encouraged some women to remove their veils. Religious regimes played a significant role in changing the world view and appearance of many women. Some women were originally unveiled, then took up the veil, then finally removed it at a certain period of their lives. While some former veil-wearers criticise the ‘anomalous behaviour’ of those who continue to wear it, others ask questions about the social construction of female identity and morality in relation to veiling. Given these conditions, the established meanings of veiling have been challenged by some former wearers; at the same time, the number of women choosing to wear the veil is still growing, although the religious nuances associated with adopting this shrouding attire have slowly declined. The practice of veiling remains popular. This is indicated by the song lyric by the Bimbo Music Orchestra which was cited at the beginning of this chapter: “There are millions of Aisyah [Muslim women] donning Islamic attire”.

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CHAPTER V

THE FORMALISATION OF ISLAMIC ATTIRE IN
THE PUBLIC DOMAIN

The increasing popularity of veiling during the last two decades still seems inadequate to those Indonesian Muslims who want to infuse all of society with Islamic precepts. After Islamic aspirations were accommodated by the state in the 1990s, Muslims have slowly gained confidence from the new visibility of Islamic symbols. The 1991 enactment of a regulation allowing Islamic veils in public schools was significant evidence of the acceptance of Islamic symbols in the public domain. Meanwhile, a ‘cultural strategy’ undertaken to campaign for the practice of Islamic veiling was intensively promoted by Muslims through their networks of cultural reproduction, such as mosques and other Islamic-based institutions. This cultural strategy, according to Kuntowijoyo, is more appropriate than a collective approach when it is applied to the promotion of Islamic veiling, because the result will be more durable in changing Muslims’ way of thinking (2001:120). Due to changing social and political conditions, some Indonesian Muslims no longer rely on the ‘cultural strategy’ alone in managing the regulation of dress; they also emphasise a ‘structural strategy’ which involves introducing regulations enforcing the obligation to wear Islamic attire (busana muslim).

The growing trend in many regions to formalise Islamic veiling has become the nexus of what Boland identified as a “partial realisation of Islamic law” (1971:164) or ‘positivi shari’a’ in different social settings (Bowen 2003). Instead of campaigning for an Islamic state, certain groups of Indonesian Muslims have recently instituted elements of Islamic law, in accordance with the Djakarta Charter that had been proposed in 1945. In this charter, the aspiration of Muslims to undertake their religious obligations was constitutionally guaranteed. The current Islamic movement has utilised the opportunities presented by regional autonomy since 2001, and depends on the situation and the ‘tactics’ to be followed. In terms of the promotion of Islamic veiling, its formalisation in various regional acts (perda) has resulted in a
significant enhancement of its status from a living practice among Muslims to part of a legalised framework. In Kuntowijoyo’s view, this social and political transformation has inevitably ignored the old approach based on individual awareness, which became the core of ‘the cultural strategy’ employed by the Islamic movement in Indonesia during the New Order (2001:120).

This chapter explores how some Minangkabau people in West Sumatra have negotiated the imposition of Islamic attire in the public domain. I argue that the formalisation of Islamic attire has been unproductive in terms of promoting Islamic precepts because veiling is an idea that is incessantly contested within the complex Muslim social structure. The imposition of this ‘contested concept’ has led to veiling becoming an ‘imposed choice’ that has assumed a formal meaning as proper religious attire for the wearer. Instead of enhancing religious awareness, the imposition of Islamic attire on students in public schools has failed to encourage a personal awareness of religious and cultural identity in them. In addition, the implementation of compulsory Islamic attire has faced many problems due to the amalgamation of modern and traditional mechanisms in the changing social structure. The enforcement of the laws requiring Islamic attire has been ambiguous and half-hearted because of the uncertain conceptualisation of Islamic veiling. Moreover, the idea of obligatory veiling is not fully supported by women because the idea came from patriarchal men and elite women rather than from the grassroots. Instead of accepting it, women have tended to resist compulsory veiling on the grounds of discomfort, impracticality and their freedom of expression. This chapter discusses the problematic conceptualisation and enforcement of Islamic attire in West Sumatra, where Islam and adat (local custom) are negotiated to express a collective identity in the changing conditions of everyday Minangkabau life.
A. The Formalisation of Islamic Attire in Padang

(1) The Regulation of Islamic Attire

Following the collapse of the New Order regime, the social and political constellation in Indonesia changed from a centralised to a decentralised system.¹ Decentralisation took the form of a massive distribution of extensive powers and authority to the regional administrations, who were now expected to manage their own internal affairs according to local aspirations rather than central policy. Six administrative areas were excepted from this arrangement, including foreign affairs, defence, the judiciary, the monetary and fiscal departments, and religion.² Local elites have used this opportunity to strengthen local identity on the one hand, and to revive old traditions on the other. The aspiration of Minangkabau people to maintain their customary practices is reflected in a local saying: kembali ke nagari (‘return to the traditional Minangkabau village’) and kembali ke surau (‘return to the local house of prayer’).³ The realisation of these local aspirations seems to have had a significant impact, not only on the development of traditional institutions, but also on the complex relationship between Islam and adat (local custom) in the matrilineal Minangkabau society. Since the inception of regional autonomy, Islamic attire has been considered one of the crucial aspects – where veiling is the central issue – of dress code, religious practice and local identity; it is therefore enjoined on Muslims by certain kinds of regulations.

Historically, the pattern of regulations on veiling during the New Order to the Reform Era passed through three stages. For about three decades, veiling was banned,

¹ Decentralisation was realised by the issuance of Law No. 22/1999 regarding Regional Administration, and Law No. 25/1999 establishing a fiscal balance between the Centre and the Regions.

² See Regional Administration Law No. 32/2004, Article 10, Clause 3.

³ This is embodied in a regional act: Perda No. 9/2000 regarding the guidelines for village administration (Ketentuan Pokok Pemerintahan Nagari). Based on this regulation, the lowest administration unit – the nagari or village – is considered very effective in preserving the religious teachings and cultural identities of the Minangkabau people (Perda Sumbar 2000:1).
then it was allowed and then became obligatory in certain regions of Indonesia. This rapid change does not only relate to the Islamization at the level of bureaucracy, but also to the strengthening ideas of the formalization of Islamic sharia as the concept of the Jakarta Charter weakened. As Hefner argued, the reappearance of Islamic symbols was blatant in many sectors of government bureaucracy after the long suppressed situation during New Order regime (Hefner, 2000:143). At the same time, Muslim intellectuals turned their concern from how to revive the idea of an ‘Islamic state’ to how to manifest an ‘Islamic society’ in the frame of Pancasila (Liddle, 2001:104). However, the imposition of Islamic sharia on Indonesian Muslims has still become the core of Islamization, although the agenda for an ‘Islamic state’ has been transformed into ‘Islamic society’. In other words, the spirit of the Jakarta Charter has seemingly never perished, only transformed into another form of movement which is more subtle and more probable. As one Indonesian commentator wrote, “Failing to have the sharia re-inserted into the constitution, they may continue to imbue legislation with the spirit of the sharia, if without once making mention of the ‘sharia’ itself.” (cited in Abuza, 2007: 30-31).

This strengthening of the formalization of Islamic sharia has also contributed greatly to regulating Islamic attire in democraticizing Indonesia. Although the idea of imposing Islamic attire contravenes the principle of human rights, regional elites have produced discriminative regulations by obliging female Muslims to wear Islamic dress. The Muslim activist, Musda Mufia, has examined this gender-bias in sharia. She argues that a woman is the most susceptible agent and the easiest target to control. According to her, this is the reason why policy makers tend to regulate women rather than focusing on how to increase social welfare and the economic income of people (http://www.rahima.or.id/SR/02-01/Opini.htm). With a similar tone, an intellectual Muslim, Moslem Abdurrahman, criticizes the effect of practice of Islamic sharia on women’s position. Abdurrahman has found that the implementation of Islamic sharia in Indonesia, Sudan, Pakistan and Iran tends to restrict women in many aspects of life. He concludes that a woman is the first victim of the project of Islamic sharia in many Islamic countries (http://islamlib.com/id/artikel).
Another aspect of the rapid transformation of Muslim political aspirations has been strengthening support for conservative Muslim groups after the collapse of the Soeharto regime. Such conservative groups have not just infiltrated religious organizations but have also found their way into political parties, particularly Islamic parties (The Jakarta Post, January 2, 2008). According to Abuza, the Islamist political parties now appear to be focusing on advancing *sharia* through public policy, issue by issue. He found that Islamists tend to focus on issues specifically pertaining to women and family law, but have been less forceful about implementing the Islamic criminal code. Abuza therefore argues that they are working through legally democratic processes rather than espousing a top-down cultural revolution (Abuza, 2007:85). This conservative trend in Indonesian Islam has also been identified by Greag Fealy who tends to “blame” liberal Muslim groups for this current development. Fealy argues that liberal groups have alienated many mainstream Muslims and thus provided opportunities for conservatives to mobilize against them (Fealy, 2006: 23).

The enforcement of the wearing of Islamic attire (*busana muslim*) has been inscribed in the articles of various regulations in West Sumatra.\(^4\) Kabupaten Solok (Perda No. 6/2002), Kota Sawahlunto (Perda No.2/2003), Kabupaten Lima Puluh Kota (Perda No. 5/2003), Kabupaten Pasaman (Perda No. 22/2003), Kabupaten Pesisir Selatan (Perda No 4/2005) and Kabupaten Agam (Perda No.6/2005) have all formalised Islamic attire in regional acts (*perda*). Some regional bureaucracies prefer

\(^4\) Beyond West Sumatra, other regions have also institutionalised Islamic veiling. For example, West Java issued Letter No. 551/2717/ASSDA.1 in September 2001 concerning the Civil Service Movement initiated by the Bupati of Cianjur to implement good behaviour (*Gerakan Aparatur Berakhlakul Karimah dan Masyarakat Marhamah*); letters from the Bupati of Cianjur (No. 025/3643/Org and No. 061.2/2896/Org), about working hours and work uniforms for Muslims (*Jam Kerja dan Anjuran Pemakaian Seragam Kerja [Muslim/Muslimah] pada Hari-hari Kerja*); and a letter from the Bupati of Indramayu about the obligation to wear Islamic attire and undertake training in the *Qur’an* (*Wajib Busana Muslimah dan Pandai Baca Al Qur’an*). In South Sulawesi the following regional acts (*perda*) were issued: Regional Act No. 04/2003 in Kabupaten Bulukumba about wearing Islamic attire (*Berpakaian Muslim dan Muslimah*); Regional Act No. 6/2005 in Kabupaten Enrekang about Islamic attire (*Busana Muslim*); and Regional Act No. 15,16,17/2005 in Kabupaten Maros about people’s inability to read the *Qur’an*, Islamic attire and the management of alms-giving (*zakat*) (*Buta Aksara Al Qur’an, Busana Muslim dan Pengelolaan Zakat*).
to issue a ‘call to action’ (surat himbauan) rather than a perda, although the former, unlike a perda, is not binding. Local veiling policies that rely on bureaucratic authority can be found in Kabupaten Padang Panjang (No. 800/2993/BKD-PP/2003), Kabupaten Tanah Datar (No. 430/228/Kesra-2004) and Kota Padang (No. 451.422/Binsos-iii/2005).

Unlike other ‘calls to action’, the local policy in Padang has attracted public attention for several reasons. First, the media pay more attention to Padang as a provincial capital than to other regions. In several Jakarta-based journals, the Padang Mayor’s policy of formalising Islamic attire by Decree (No. 451.422/2005) has sparked controversy on the national stage, despite policies regarding Islamic attire being widespread in West Sumatra. The reason is that the Mayor’s policy is problematic and ambiguous. It is ambiguous because it includes a recommendation

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5 Article 7 of the Law regarding Legal Enactments (Pembentukan Peraturan Perundang-undangan – No. 10/2004 – stipulates five levels in the legal hierarchy: the Constitution (Undang-undang Dasar); Laws (Undang-undang) or Governmental Regulations enacted to substitute for the Law (Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-undang, Perpu); Governmental Regulations (PP, Peraturan Pemerintah); and Regional Acts (Peraturan Daerah). Letters from regional leaders (kepala daerah) are not included in this list. Nevertheless, in terms of administrative law, as the executive agent of local government, a regional leader has an inherent authority called Freies Ermessen, under which he/she can make regulations about matters not yet covered by law, or to implement an existing rule. This authority is also called ‘discretionary power’. A government is not allowed to act beyond its authority (detournement de pouvoir), however, or against the law (onrechtmatige overheidsdaad) (Marbun and Mahfud MD 1987:46-7). Such rules (those set out in official letters) cannot be binding regulations for the people.

6 The Kabupaten (regency) and kota (city) are local administrations which have similar levels of authority under the provincial government. While the kabupaten tends to include villages characterised by farming and agricultural affairs, kota are usually urban settlements which rely on economic support from non-agricultural sources.

7 Padang is located about halfway down the West Sumatran coast. This city extends from Padang Pariaman in the north to Pesisir Selatan in the south and stretches from Solok in the east to the Indian Ocean in the west. Padang’s territory covers 695 km² of the total area of West Sumatra, which is 42,297.021 km². Annual population growth averaged 1.27% between 1990 and 2000. The current population is 756,014, that is, sixteen percent of the total population of the province, which is 4.46 million (BPS Sumbar, 2003:41). Padang’s weather is tropical and wet. Temperatures range between 28.5 °C and 31.5 °C during the day, and 24 °C and 25.5 °C at night (Safwan, 1987:62).

8 A private TV channel broadcasted a talk-show program presenting the Mayor of Padang, Fauzi Bahar, and a panel of local politicians. In addition, Tempo magazine questioned the policy of the Mayor in an article entitled: Kerudung Bersendi Pak Wali and Ihwal Kerudung Wajib di Padang (May 22, 2005).
that compliance be voluntary, but its articles clearly use the words ‘oblige’ (mewajibkan) and ‘obliged’ (diwajibkan) as if Islamic dress were legally mandated for women. This differs from a local policy in Tasikmalaya, West Java, where the ‘call to action’ (surat edaran) urging women to don Islamic attire uses the word dianjurkan (‘encouraged’ or ‘recommended’) in accordance with the nuanced approach of the moral movement. The policy of the Padang administration is problematic because it has challenged the complex social structure of Padang: the Minangkabau people are not the only social group in the urban area, where many non-Muslim people also live.

Instead of enforcing Islamic attire by a specific regulation, the Mayor’s policy has been implemented through programs for students offered at various educational levels. These programs include wirid remaja (‘teenage gatherings for ritual activities’), an intensive program of didikan subuh (a dawn religious class), the anti-Togel (a campaign against illegal gambling), anti-drug (narkoba) movement,11 and encouraging Islamic attire (busana muslim). The wirid remaja are aimed at junior and senior high-school students (SLTP and SLTA)12, while the didikan subuh is aimed at elementary schools (SD: Sekolah Dasar). The other two programs target all levels of education, encompassing elementary school (SD/MI)13, junior high-school (SLTP/MTS)14 and senior high-school (SLTA/SMK/MA)15 students. While

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9 This ‘call to action’ is inscribed in letter No. 451/SE/04/Sos/2001 concerning efforts to enhance religiosity and piety (Upaya Peningkatan Kualitas Keimanan dan Ketaqwaan). This policy is part of a campaign to improve people’s skill in reading the Qur’an; it involves attendance at religious school after formal school hours.

10 Togel stands for Toto Gelap, literally a ‘dark’, or illegal lottery.

11 Narkoba stands for Narkotika dan obat-obat terlarang (‘narcotics and illegal drugs’).

12 SLTP stands for Sekolah Lanjutan Tingkat Pertama, while SLTA stands for Sekolah Lanjutan Tingkat Atas.

13 SD and MI are at the same level of elementary education. SDs tend to be secular, while MIs are denominational institutions belonging to the Islamic community which are usually managed by private organisations. Although MI stands for Madrasah Ibtidaiyah (Arabic), which means ‘elementary school’, the curriculum at MI contains more Islamic subjects than that used at SD.

14 SLTP and MTS both refer to junior high-schools. While the SLTP is a secular institution, MTS, which stands for Madrasah Tsanawiyah (Arabic), is an Islamic institution which offers more Islamic subjects than an SLTP.
the anti-Togel (illegal gambling) and anti-drugs (narkoba) movements do not consider religious affiliation, the obligation to wear Islamic attire (busana muslim) is directed only at Muslims. Even so, the final regulation states that non-Muslim students should ‘adjust’ (menyesuaikan diri) to Muslim dress by wearing baju kurung\textsuperscript{16} for girls and long pants for boys.\textsuperscript{17}

The distinctions made between the school uniforms worn by Muslim and non-Muslim students and favored by the Mayor’s policy have not been backed up by specific regulations at particular schools. I found that senior high-school uniform regulations still refer to the existing national regulation for school uniforms (SK100/1991),\textsuperscript{18} which already accommodates both Islamic and ‘secular attire’. The standard Islamic costume for girls as described in the regulation is a headscarf, a long-sleeved shirt and a long skirt.\textsuperscript{19} Since the Mayor’s policy does not specify a new standard for uniforms, Muslim students continue to follow the existing national regulation, while non-Muslim students modify the national model, leaving out the headscarf. The wearing of headscarves by Muslims has become common in many educational institutions, although veiling and the baju kurung are only compulsory on Fridays.\textsuperscript{20} In order to display local identity, non-Muslim students are also obliged to

\textsuperscript{15} SLTA, SMK, and MA are acronyms referring to the same level of senior high-school, but each institution has special characteristics. The SLTA is usually called SMA, Sekolah Menengah Atas, or SMU, Sekolah Menengah Umum; these institutions are general senior high-schools offering no specialisation. In contrast, the SMK, which stands for Sekolah Menengah Kejuruan (Vocational School), offers specialisations, for example engineering, or tourism. While all three types of school are secular, MA, which stands for Madrasah Aliyah (Arabic), or senior high-school, provides an Islamic-oriented education. Although the MA are not professional religious schools for clerics, these institutions offer many more Islamic subjects than do the other two kinds of high-school.

\textsuperscript{16} Baju kurung refers to the traditional Minangkabau long-sleeved, loosely fitting women’s tunic that reaches to slightly above or below the knees (See Whalley 1993:309).

\textsuperscript{17} As inscribed in the letter of instruction (surat instruksi) No. 451.422/Binsos-iii/2005.

\textsuperscript{18} The complete reference to the regulation is SK No. 100 /C/Kep/D/1991. This regulates school uniforms, and complements SK No. 052/C/Kep/D 82, which concerns the guidelines for school uniforms from kindergarten to senior high-school. Both regulations were produced by the Ministry of Education and Culture.

\textsuperscript{19} See SK 100/1991.

\textsuperscript{20} The rules of SMAN 2 Padang stipulate that female students should wear the jilbab and the baju kurung every Friday. The regulation has been in force since 2003.
wear long-sleeved shirts and long skirts on Fridays, but without the headscarf. Nevertheless, the regulations on veiling and *baju kurung* are only set out in the guidelines for school policy, and there is no detailed explanation about the uniform.\(^{21}\)

Since regulations about Islamic attire remain unclear, the efficacy of a given policy relies quite heavily on the charisma of individual bureaucrats. Because the Mayor’s policy had no constitutional or binding power over the people,\(^{22}\) the Mayor employed ‘a set of techniques and devices to transcend the use of rationality in his political action[s]’: Bensman identified this as ‘modern charisma’ (1986:52). When the Mayor launched his policy, he used the classical technique of persuading people through plausible arguments. He speculated that the imposition of Islamic attire would prevent sexual harassment. Instead of investigating the complex origins of criminal conduct, he concluded that sexual harassment occurs because the *aurat* is flaunted: this invites harassment (*Haluan* 02/11/2005).\(^{23}\) In public, the Mayor stated that he was committed to improving the personal behaviour and morality of students as prescribed by Islamic teachings (Munir 2005:131). To further his purpose, the Mayor summoned the school principals of Padang to a meeting to discuss his policy of making Islamic attire compulsory in schools.\(^{24}\)

Unlike the veiling conflicts (*kasus jilbab*) that occurred in Java during the New Order regime,\(^{25}\) wearing the Islamic head-covering at public school seems to have been unproblematic in West Sumatra; it had become a daily practice for many students before the Mayor issued his policy. School administrations played a significant role in supporting or rejecting this practice. In Padang, teachers and

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\(^{21}\) In a guideline included in the school rules of SMA 2 Padang, it is written that female students should wear *baju kurung* and *jilbab* (the headscarf) on Fridays, while male students should wear *baju koko*. This item appears in the section on clothing, Chapter 5, Clause 27.

\(^{22}\) According to the new legal hierarchy, Perda is the ‘lowest’ law that binds the people. The Mayor’s policy (SK Walikota) is not even a Perda law, however.

\(^{23}\) *Haluan* is the local Padang newspaper.

\(^{24}\) My informant told me that there was a meeting of all the school principals in Padang and the Mayor, where they discussed the imposition of Islamic attire.

\(^{25}\) Conflicts over veiling occurred in certain regions of Java. They arose in response to the restrictions imposed by the state *vis-à-vis* the growing desire to wear the *jilbab* (headscarf) among female students at public schools (Alatas and Desliyanti 2001).
principals generally welcomed the enforcement of Islamic attire after the announcement of the Mayor’s local policy. At SMAN 2 Padang, for example, the new approach to Islamic attire was announced at the distribution of final reports to students’ parents at the end of the semester in 2000. The school administration distributed uniform guidelines for the following semester which were in line with the Mayor’s new policy. The Mayor’s programme was also endorsed by the school administration at SMAN 3 Padang, which organised the students to make a declaration supporting the Mayor’s policy at the Islamic New Year celebrations (Hijriah). In addition, the school staged a competition for Islamic attire to which the Mayor was invited. In recognition of this effort, the Mayor announced that SMAN 3 Padang was the ‘laboratory’ for Islamic attire in Padang (Haluan 03/21/2005).

Another instance of support on the part of school administrations at the junior high-school level can be found at SMPN 20 Padang. At this school, serious attention is paid to Islamic attire, and it is part of the school guidelines. The policy inscribed in big letters on the wall of the school states that “those who wear tight shirts or short skirts [hemmed above the knees] will have their grades reduced by fifty points (-50) from a maximum of 100 points”.

In practice, this mechanism of reducing points was not applied. Several students that I interviewed admitted that they never tried to wear tight shirts or short skirts in the class room. Claudia, a third grade student, told me she had no courage to wear something different from other students. It would be embarrassing, she said. Instead of attracting public attention, she prefers to adapt to the practices of other students. Therefore, her points have never been reduced because of her uniform. In other words, teachers and school management never applied the mechanism due to the absence of infringement because students did not challenge the inscribed regulation.26

Initially, students in year One (kelas satu) were targeted because their uniform package included a headscarf, which is more costly than both the unveiled and

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26 However, later monitoring of this school revealed that the inscribed regulation no longer exists. It has been removed by the school management. One of teachers, Nurliana, admitted that the policy was not applied. She speculated that it might not be effective to impose the uniform standard by reducing points. That’s why, she agreed to remove the policy because it was useless (This observation and interview took place in August 2008).
enveloping modes of dress. At that time, wearing the scarf was optional for years Two and Three, although teachers ‘encouraged’ students to wear it. After the Mayor’s policy was issued in 2005, however, all students were obliged to wear Islamic attire. At elementary school, teachers tell pupils that wearing Islamic attire is compulsory, and they pass this message on to their parents. At SD Alang Lawas Padang, the six-to-twelve year-old students wear Islamic attire; this consists of long pants for boys and the headscarf for girls.

Since the enforcement of Islamic attire in the public domain was already widespread throughout West Sumatra, the local policy of the Padang educational administration seemingly reinforced and strengthened the aspirations of Minangkabau people to express the unity of Islam and adat (local custom) as their collective identity. As in other parts of West Sumatra, the examples of ‘billboard politics’ evident in certain parts of Padang show how Minangkabau people campaign to realise their aspirations. At a bus stop on a main road in Padang, I saw a slogan that read: “Cover your aurat (nakedness) so that God may bless you” (Tutuplah auratmu semoga Allah meredhaimu: see picture 5.1 on the following page). Although it does not mention the source of the message it conveys, this sign embodies Minangkabau aspirations.

![Picture 5.1: Billboard Politics in the City of Padang.27](image)

27 Most billboards – including this one – are installed by the Regional Administration (PEMDA).
These aspirations are also expressed on another billboard set up at the eastern corner of the central square in Padang:

I congratulate the students at Padang junior and senior high-schools, and admire their statements regarding [the following]: the eradication of Togel (illegal gambling) and the fight against drugs (narkoba); the intensive programs of didikan subuh (dawn religious classes) and wirid remaja (teenage groups for ritual activities) and the wearing of Islamic attire (busana muslim)...28

As the Mayor remarked in his ‘Motherhood Statement’, “The pride [for this achievement] does not belong to the government; it is the fruit of the aspirations and the awareness of the people, [which have impelled them] to support the policy of the City Administration” (Padangekspres 4/22/2006). Nevertheless, he took some credit, claiming that other regions had learned from his successful efforts to promote Islamic attire.

2) Islamic Attire for Students

Shifts in political power have played a decisive role in changing educational regulations and the style of school uniform accepted in public schools. As already noted in Chapter 3, the adjustment made to SK 052/198229 – the previous national regulation regarding school uniforms – by adding a supplement known as SK 100/199130 – reflected the changing attitude and policy of the central government. Both regulations were issued by Dirjen Dikdasmen (the division of the Ministry of

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28 The billboard’s message came from Din Syamsudin, Chairperson of the Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI). It remained in place from February 2005 to February 2006.

29 This regulation stipulated the requirements for all school uniforms, from kindergarten (TK) through elementary school (SD), junior high-school (SMP) and senior high-school (SMA), not only in public schools, but also in private schools. This regulation accommodated a form of ‘headgear’ for female students that resembles a cap or destar/blankon, as a special uniform option (pakaian khas).

30 This regulation constitutes a supplement (penyempurnaan) to the SK052/1982 regulation, that accepted the idea of the veil (kerudung) as an element of female costume in public schools. For certain Muslims, this regulation was a more legitimate government response to the widespread aspiration to wear the Islamic veil at public school.
Education and Culture which is responsible for elementary and secondary education). The new regulation accepted the Islamic veil as an alternative uniform for female students. In a similar way, the Padang Mayor's policy (No. 451.422/Binsos-iii/2005) was an attempt to exert his power at the local level by standardising the school uniform in terms of Islamic veiling practices.

Instead of imposing Islamic attire on all the people in Padang, the Mayor focused on people working or studying in government settings. He began with his policy on school uniforms, targeting students at all levels from elementary to senior high-school (SD to SMA), who numbered 156,627 young people in 2004. This means that the policy targeted 19% of the total population of Padang (756,014 people, 96% of whom were registered as Muslim). The Mayor also intended to recommend that civil servants in the local administration – particularly female staff – wear Islamic attire (Haluan 02/11/2005), although this intention has not yet been realised. Nevertheless, the institutionalisation of Islamic attire in the bureaucracy has not been followed by a Regional Act (perda) which would exert coercive power in terms of the constitutional and legal hierarchy.

One important difference between the new local Padang regulation about school uniforms and the existing national regulation is that the latter provides acceptable alternatives as part of the school uniform. The Mayor’s policy recommends one single school uniform for all students, that is, Islamic attire (busana muslim), which prescribes the baju kurung and headscarf for girls. Non-Muslim students are thus pressured to wear this costume in order to comply with the clause relating to ‘adjusting’ (Article 10). This clause recommends that non-Muslim students adjust their style of dress to conform to Muslim standards. In contrast, the existing national regulation provides details of two choices of uniform for girls, the ordinary and ‘special’ (seragam sekolah khas) versions. The former requires a short-sleeved

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31 Official data from the Padang Administration for 2004 indicate that there were 96,426 students enrolled in 354 state-owned elementary schools and 60 private ones. This number is much higher than the total junior high-school enrolments, which were 35,492 students studying at 35 public and 39 private schools. Meanwhile, senior high-school enrolment reached 24,709 students in 14 public and 31 private institutions (See Padang Dalam Angka 2004:73).
blouse and a short skirt falling to below the knee, while the latter consists of a long-sleeved blouse, a long skirt and a headscarf. Students may choose which of the two alternative styles of uniform to wear at school in accordance with their own preferences and beliefs. The Mayor’s policy omitted the unveiled alternative, however. In other words, the policy of the Padang Administration stipulates one standardised school uniform, while the existing national regulation is open to a choice of uniforms as long as they conform to the general specifications (Chapter I, Article 1, Clause E).

Since the implementation of the policy, all Padang students from elementary to senior high-school have changed their uniform into an Islamic costume. This consists of the *baju kurung* and headscarf for girls and long pants for boys (see Picture 5.2 below).

![Picture 5.2: Veiled Junior High-school Students in Padang](image)

During my fieldwork, I found that both male and female students at various education levels ‘obeyed’ the directive to wear Islamic attire. The policy is not applied in non-Muslim denominational institutions, although the bureaucracy recommends that girls wear the *baju kurung*. At SMAN 2 Padang, rumors that
Islamic attire would be enforced were widespread several months before the Mayor issued his policy. As a result of this rumor, the proportion of students wearing Islamic attire rose from 20% to 100%, including a few non-Muslim students. Similarly, at SMAN 3 Padang, Islamic attire is worn by all the students. As this style of dress for girls was welcomed by both the school administration and the parents of students, the school claims to have been the first institution to implement the new policy on Islamic attire (Haluan 03/21/2005). At SMPN 2 Padang and SD Alang Lawas the combination of baju kurung and headscarf for girls and long pants for boys is also the common uniform.

Although the shift to Muslim attire occurs only once, the expense is very high, particularly for the female uniform. According to a female senior high-school student in Padang, the new uniform is more expensive because of the extra cloth required for the longer clothes and the additional cost of the headscarves. In addition, up to three versions of the school uniform may be mandated: a daily (harian), scout (pramuka), and traditional (pakaian adat) uniform, each with its own complementary headscarf. As her father’s monthly income was only one million rupiah, replacing her school uniform cost more than sixty percent of the household income. Similar complaints were made by parents, particularly those with children in Third Year (kelas tiga). Not only was making the change in uniform costly: the new uniform would only be worn for a short time, because the remaining period of study at the lower elementary level was less than one year. This meant that parents would have to replace the old uniform with the new one, which would be discarded not long afterwards.

Female students reacted to the imposition of Islamic attire in a range of different ways. At SMAN 2 Padang, I found four main responses among female students. First, some girls feel comfortable with the practice because they have been accustomed to covering the whole body so as not to expose the female aurat.

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32 The daily uniform consists of a long-sleeved white blouse and a long grey skirt, while the scout uniform comprises a long-sleeved light brown blouse and a long dark-brown skirt. Meanwhile, the ‘traditional’ baju kurung encompasses a green long-sleeved blouse and a long black skirt that is completed with a lining. Each uniform is complemented by a matching headscarf. Friday’s uniform is baju kurung. Saturday’s is the scout outfit, while for all the other days the daily uniform is worn.
Members of this group have no problem with the Mayor’s policy; indeed they support it because it enforces a religious obligation. Afifah (16) has worn the headscarf since junior high-school, and said that she is happy with the imposition of Islamic attire at her school. Although in this case it was implemented by force, she feels that requiring Muslims to visibly express their religious identity has a positive impact, particularly on teenage girls who should cover their *aurat*. As is commonly claimed by defenders of the headscarf, Afifah believes that Islamic veiling not only protects her skin from the burning sun, but also from sexual harassment by trouble-making men. Afifah argues that even though covering the body is only compulsory during school hours, it still has a good effect in terms of religious practice. As flaunting the *aurat* is sinful and covering it is rewarding, she maintains that those who wear the veil at school still get some benefit from the daily practice even if they remove it after school. Even some observance, she says, is better than passing the whole day in sinful behaviour.

Second, there are some who objected to the imposition of veiling at first but have since become accustomed to wearing Islamic attire. Most of the members of this group have chosen to wear Islamic attire for activities outside school since their school formalised Islamic dress during school hours. Although these girls were initially forced to choose Islamic dress, some of them stated that they are now *ikhlas* (‘sincerely accepting’) about wearing the veil either in or out of school, for example during private lessons, sightseeing trips and social gatherings. Nurul (19), reveals an ambiguous attitude: she essentially disagrees with the formalisation of Islamic attire because she believes that veiling should not be adopted under compulsion. On the other hand, she admitted that although she initially felt uncomfortable wearing the veil, she became used to it after several months. Moreover, she only became aware of the obligation to cover up after her teachers and friends explained the reasoning behind veiling. For these reasons, she has made up her mind to keep wearing the veil, not only at school but also for other activities outside her home. Nurul argues that she has gained a lot of advantages from changing her style of dress. For example, she is no longer bitten by mosquitoes since her body is covered by Islamic
attire. Although the percentage of girls at her school who wear Islamic attire full-time is only 30%, Nurul has made the commitment to remain veiled.

Third, quite a number of students disagreed with wearing the veil but felt unwilling to reject the imposition openly. They wear Islamic attire in class, but remove it as soon as they step outside the school. They treat their Islamic attire as a school uniform that is worn only for formal education and religious activities, ignoring its religious significance. Members of this group also reveal an ambiguous attitude: they know that wearing the veil is a religious obligation, but they do not yet feel ready to don it. Olvini (17) argues that before a person decides to wear the jilbab, she should be both physically and mentally ready. She feels that she is not yet ready to don the religious costume because for her it is impractical (ribet). She not only unveils for outdoor activities, but also dyes her hair bright colours as a fashion statement. She remarked that her school teachers do not know that she dyes her hair because she wears the veil in class. If there were a choice, she would reject the obligation to wear Islamic attire in school, because it restricts her freedom of expression. For these reasons, she wonders why the Padang Administration decided to impose Islamic attire; other regions that have a Muslim majority among their citizens have not enacted similar policies.

Fourth, several students objected to wearing Islamic attire because they are not Muslim; despite this, they have ‘adjusted’ their costume to fit in with the other students. Although the Mayor’s policy allows non-Muslim students not to wear the headscarf, these students cannot rely fully on this exemption. Social pressure at school forces them to wear Islamic attire. A Catholic student, Nastika (16), admits that it is inconvenient for her to be different from other students in terms of her clothing; furthermore non-Muslim students are in a minority at the school. Therefore, she and other Christian students have decided to wear Islamic attire. Nastika said that it is no use challenging the regulation, although she has profound objections to it. Instead of solving the problem, mounting a challenge would only get her into trouble.

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33 At the junior high-school level, wearing Islamic attire is required of non-Muslim students at SMPN 20 Padang. According to one teacher, the students do not object to wearing the religious costume, even though they are not Muslims.
Nastika realises that wearing the veil requires commitment and determination, even on the part of those who wish to wear it because they are Muslim; adopting the practice is even harder for non-Muslims. Therefore, compulsory veiling should be unwelcome to everybody.

Given the views expressed above by students at Padang schools, Islamic veiling seems to have been narrowed to ‘an imposed choice’ rather than remaining a ‘personal choice’ made as the result of a new ‘awareness’ (kesadaran) as described by Brenner (1996). Nurul’s experience shows that her will to wear the veil was triggered by the uniform regulations rather than by her own decision. This was in contrast to Afifah who already practiced veiling before the regulation came into force. Although both girls now wear the Islamic veil full-time, Nurul remains somewhat ambiguous about the practice, while the latter feels more certain. Nevertheless, Nurul’s attitude is less ambiguous than Olvini’s: Olvini feels uncomfortable wearing the all-enveloping costume, putting it on under compulsion. Consequently, Olvini equates Islamic attire with a school uniform, and discards it as soon as she leaves the school grounds. As more students seem to share this view than either Nurul’s and Afifah’s, the formalisation of veiling may not lead to a long-term change in women’s acceptance of Islamic attire. The reactions of Nurul and Olvini to the ‘improper choice’ forced upon them show how norms and ideas are continuously negotiated in social spaces.

In addition, Islamic veiling has become an oppressive tool used by Muslims against non-Muslim students as a minority group. Nastika’s experience shows how she became powerless vis-à-vis the powerful pressure applied by bureaucratic agents. For example, when she walked along a corridor at her school, a teacher reminded her to wear the veil as other students did. At that time, she just put the headscarf on her shoulders without tightening it around her head. Nastika told the teacher that she is not a Muslim. Nevertheless the teacher kept insisting that she wear the headscarf by demonstrating how to put it on correctly. The teacher told her that although she is not a Muslim, she would do better to ‘adjust’ to the practices and dress styles of the other students. “This is so [you can] look neat”, the teacher added. This teacher also pointed out that “Catholic nuns wear the veil too, don’t they?” Such examples of the
application of personal pressure show how power works as “the capacity of social agent(s) to impose his/their desire against the defiance of others” (Weber 1978:926). Another example is provided by a statement made by the Padang Mayor on a TV program dealing with Islamic attire. On this talk-show, Nastika witnessed how the Mayor ‘encouraged’ people in Padang to wear Islamic attire by saying, “It is not nice to see a black sheep in a mob of white sheep”. This clearly indicated to Nastika that political pressure was being exerted by the Mayor, who wants to standardise the way people dress by repudiating diversity and rejecting individual differences in personal appearance.

(3) A Contested Discourse

Since the widespread institutionalisation of Islamic precepts throughout West Sumatra by means of regional regulations (perda), the Mayor’s policy enforcing Islamic attire in Padang has been welcomed by powerful elements in local society. The efficacy of the policy represents an alliance between a ‘ruling political apparatus’ and Islamic-based groups that have long campaigned to impose Islamic attire in the public domain. The Mayor’s policy amounts to a bureaucratic endorsement of these Islam-oriented groups; at the same time, the Mayor needs their support to pave the way for public acceptance of policy platforms. Nevertheless, some powerful groups have questioned the policy and criticised the imposition of Islamic veiling in a plural society. In the following section, I will first outline the main arguments made by the Mayor’s supporters; then I will discuss the dissenting views.

An Aisyiah activist, Maeliana Rusli, pointed out that the Mayor’s policy regarding Islamic veiling reflects a political endorsement of an Islamic society. She believes that the regulation is an effective way for local government to accommodate and facilitate the spread and practice of the Islamic teachings followed by

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34 *Aisyiah* is the organisation for the women’s wing of *Muhammadiyah*. It is the second largest Islamic organisation in Indonesia. According to Rusli, *Aisyiah* has 14 branches in Padang whose members total about 1400 women. Aisyiah has a special uniform that is usually worn by members during their meetings and other activities. It consists of a sarong, a long-sleeved shirt (*baju kurung*), and a headscarf.
Minangkabau people. For her, the Mayor’s position is in line with the *hadith* (sayings of the Prophet):

*Man ra’a minkum munkaran, fal yughayyir biyadihi, wa in lam yastati’ fa bilisanihi, wa in lam yastati’ fa biqalbihi, dzalika adh’afal iman.*

He who sees among you an abomination, let him change it with his hand [power], and he who cannot, let him change it with his tongue, and he who cannot, let him change it with his heart, though this be the weakest faith.

According to Rusli, the Mayor has a duty to take action, using the power that he has. Given the fact that many girls do not cover their *aurat*, Rusli argued that this is *kemungkaran* (‘an abomination’): the Mayor should lift his hand (i.e. use his power) to overcome it. Moreover, Rusli speculated that the uncovered bodies of women make them susceptible to sexual harassment. She has found that cases of sexual harassment on buses are mostly triggered by women who flaunt their bodies.

Similar endorsement comes from a Muslim cleric, Buya Masoed Abidin, who argued that the political decision to impose the veil in schools reflects the expectations of most people in Padang, particularly the Minangkabau, who are the dominant ethnic group. He claimed that 60% of female Muslims in Padang were already wearing the veil before the local government issued its ‘call to action’; furthermore, the majority of Minangkabau women have always worn a traditional head-covering with a sarong and a long-sleeved shirt. Therefore, Abidin believes that what the Mayor has done regarding Islami c veiling reflects common social practice. The Mayor’s policy is a good strategy for encouraging the remaining 40% of Muslim women in Padang to wear the veil, he added. According to Abidin, the Mayor is very clever at meeting people’s needs. Because he graduated from teacher-training college and has a family background in teaching, Abidin believes that the Mayor assumed that a standard school uniform would help enforce discipline among students. Since Minangkabau people have traditionally relied on three legal ‘pillars’ or authorities

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35 Buya Masoed Abidin is a member of the board of the Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI) in Padang. He is also an elite member of DDII, *Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia*, or ‘The Indonesian Council for the Propagation of Islam’. 
known as the Tali Tigo Sapilin, Abidin argues that the local government policy represents a significant and legal pillar which has a credible historical basis.36

Rather than presenting religious arguments for the Mayor’s policy, Shafwan Karim37 defended it because it amounted to an effort to enforce noble conduct (akhlakul karimah) and etiquette in terms of clothing standards. Karim is pleased about the Mayor’s concern for religious activities in Padang: he gives him credit for promoting religious fora (pengajian), Islamic short-courses (pesantren kilat) and special Ramadhan activities. Karim regards the policy on school uniform as no more than a natural decision to make in Muslim-dominant Padang; he does not consider it to be an extraordinary case of Islamic law enforcement. As he is concerned about moral degradation, Karim regards formalising Islamic veiling as a necessary measure to take in order to overcome the ‘social ills’ (penyakit masyarakat) alleged to be rampant in Padang.38 According to Karim, wearing Islamic attire is not a burden, because it is merely a uniform. Making male students wear baju koko – a long-sleeved collarless plain-coloured shirt that is usually worn to go to prayers39 – is like obliging factory-workers to wear a uniform. In his opinion, the issue has nothing to do with Islamic teachings. Finally, he pointed out that wearing body-covering attire protects both male and female students from mosquito bites.

Hasna Wirda40 also welcomes the Mayor’s policy because it is in accord with the aspiration to return to the Minangkabau philosophy: adat basandi syara, syara basandi kitabullah (“Local custom draws on syara, syara draws on the Qur’an”). In

36 These three legal pillars are: adat istiadat (‘local custom’), undang-undang Negara/pemerintah (the acts and laws of the national and/or regional governments) and religious principles (Sihombing 1983:48). This concept underpins the social philosophy of traditional Minangkabau society.

37 Shafwan Karim is the Muhammadiyah Chairperson in Padang. He is also a Rector of Bung Hatta University. After he chose to teach at the university, he gave up his political involvement with the Golkar Party.

38 The penyakit masyarakat or ‘social ills’ refer to various activities such as gambling, prostitution, theft, etc.

39 The baju koko is a long-sleeved shirt without a collar. It is made in a plain colour – although this may be bright. Men usually wear it to the mosque, and for prayer.

40 Hasna Wirda is a former Aisyiyah activist. She is now a lecturer at IAIN Imam Bonjol, Padang.
addition, Wirda explained that this philosophy is in accordance with the Minangkabau character: Minangkabau are ‘faithful’ (*beriman-bertakwa*) and ‘possess a special culture’ (*berkebudayaan khas*). For this reason, she argues, wearing the Islamic veil will come to characterise the Minangkabau people, because ‘Minang culture’\(^{41}\) is ‘Islamic culture’. In this respect, Wirda speculates that the essence of people’s aspirations is to return to the Minang identity (*jati diri*). Wirda laments that due to globalisation, the tradition of wearing modest Islamic clothing had been abandoned by many people. Therefore, she is happy with the current re-education of students to wear Islamic attire at their schools. Accustomed to wearing the headscarf from adolescence, Wirda supports the style of Islamic veiling practiced by female students (*Diniyah Putri*) in Padang Pandjang; this style is called *mudawarah*.\(^{42}\) This is a special style of headscarf worn at *Rahmah El-Yunisiah*, an educational institution for women.\(^{43}\)

In addition to religious figures, Paljariati Yusral, an activist in the Islamic Party (PKS),\(^{44}\) supported formalising Islamic attire. Although he admitted that his political affiliation differs from that of the Mayor, he conceded that the policy does indeed support Minangkabau aspirations. Like Hasnawirda, Yusral claimed that enforcing veiling promotes the modern realisation of the identity (*jati diri*) of the Minangkabau people as it was formulated by their ancestors: *adat basandi syara, syara basandi*

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\(^{41}\) The word *Minangkabau* is often shortened to *Minang*. Minangkabau people are commonly referred to as *orang Minang*.

\(^{42}\) According to Fauziah Fauzan, a fourth-generation Manager at *Diniyah Putri*, the *mudawarah* is a style of headscarf which was modified from the original Arabic style into a style that suited Minang women. It can be tightened neatly.

\(^{43}\) This institution focuses on instruction for women, and is based on the boarding-school system. Its curriculum not only deals with pedagogic and Islamic subjects; it also addresses gender equality and women’s issues. According to its motto: “preparing woman to educate the next generation”, this institution teaches traditional skills such as cooking, sewing, weaving and technology-based skills (See Afrianty 2006:31). The unique veil students wear was first worn by Rahmah El-Yunisiah, the founder of this institution. She stated that this veil is designed to be worn with *baju kurung* and a batik sarong, a costume which covers the whole body except the face and hands. She claimed that this model accords with the criteria of Islam teachings (*Peringatan 55 Tahun Diniyah Putri Padang Panjang*, Jakarta, Ghalia Indonesia, p. 246).

\(^{44}\) Paljariati Yusral is Secretary of the *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera* (PKS: ‘the Welfare and Justice Party’), in Padang.
Yusral regards imposing religious standards to be inevitable: it is a necessary practice intended to re-educate people about the importance of living by Islamic precepts. Yusral argues that without any enforcement from leaders, Islamic teachings are often forgotten or ignored, because that is the character of human beings. Yusral lamented that the Mayor’s decree was not legally binding, however, because it is instruksi, not perda – “an instruction, not a law.” As a Member of the House of Representatives, Yusral would welcome a proposal for a bill requiring Islamic attire if it was proposed by the Executive. Thus, he exemplifies the aspirations of some members of the House of Representatives – particularly those from Islamic parties – to institutionalise Islamic attire in Regional Acts (perda) passed by the Legislature.

The support of Muslim leaders for the Mayor’s policy reflects the Minang people’s strong endorsement of enforcing Islamic attire. Rather than being influenced by the ruling apparatus, Islamic figures are personally motivated to institutionalise Islamic attire in public. The impetus for their argument arises not only from their belief that veiling is part of local community tradition;\(^{45}\) it is also impelled by their monolithic understanding of religious doctrine.\(^{46}\) In this respect, their endorsement does not reflect Gramsci’s concept of consent as resulting from “the effort of the leading class to entice other social groups to agree to its perspective of the natural” (1975:80). On the contrary, in this instance the ‘consent’ stems from the strong impulse of the Muslim population of West Sumatra as predicted by Dobbin, who wrote that Islam is the potential means for Minangkabau people “to reach their goal to control their own destiny” (Dobbin 1983:244).

\(^{45}\) Veiling is part of the traditions of Aisyiah, Muhammadiyah and the DDII.

\(^{46}\) The common inclination of Muslims in Padang is to reject liberal thinking in relation to religious doctrine. Several Muslim leaders have insisted on following and enforcing the MUI edict which forbade liberalism, pluralism and secularism (*Media Indonesia*, 20 Agustus 2005). Further, public choices of which books to read show that the general population of Padang prefers normative to discursive books. Popular choices are *fiqh ibadah* and classical texts (*kitab kuning*) (See Mulia 2000:54-60).
On the other hand, since the imposition of Islamic attire in Padang has no strong basis in terms of the Indonesian hierarchy of binding laws, dissenting groups question the validity of the Mayor’s policy. Miko Kamal, a former LBH activist, argues that the ‘call to action’ is a one-sided policy that involves only the Executive and ignores the existence of the Legislature, the Regional House of Representatives (DPRD); it also contravenes several regulations with higher legal status, including Law No. 10/2004. Therefore, the policy is basically ad hoc. Kamal speculates that the Mayor tends to produce policies as the need arises. In the absence of military force, Kamal contends that the policy merely represents a bureaucratic regulation which conceals a political interest. If the Mayor is serious about regulating Islamic attire, Kamal argues, he needs to propose a bill concerning it to the Regional House of Representatives.

Sudarto, an NGO activist, criticises the policy for being an unproductive strategy which is characteristic of the Padang administration. Sudarto argues that instead of producing a ‘call to action’, the Mayor should concentrate on crucial social programs, such as education and public welfare. In Sudarto’s view, enforcing Islamic veiling in schools will not be effective, because it is being implemented by applying social and political pressure. Veiling is only practiced at school; outside school hours, most female students discard their headscarves. He believes that the policy will be abandoned as soon as the Mayor’s term of office ends. Since the policy ‘pressures’ non-Muslim students to wear the Islamic veil, Sudarto condemns it as a form of ‘moralist-based fascism’ (Indopos, 06/05/2005:4; www.islib.com). He speculates that there is almost no resistance to the policy in Padang because it does not capture the public’s interest; it does not deal directly with people’s main

47 See Footnote 3 above, which summarises the five kinds of laws that are recognised as legally binding.
48 LBH stands for Lembaga Bantuan Hukum (the Legal Aid Institute).
49 Although Fauzi Bahar was not a cadre of any political party at the time, in early June 2006 he was elected to become Chairperson of the National Mandate Party (PAN) of Kota Padang. He put himself forward as a candidate at the party’s Third Regional Congress, and won 102 votes out of a total of 191. The other contenders, Irdamsyah Nazar and Ahmad Amin, won 45 and 40 votes respectively (Haluan June 12, 2006).
50 Sudarto is Director of the Center for Inter-Community Studies (Pusaka).
concerns, particularly about the state of the economy. Sudarto contends that it would be different if the policy directly disadvantaged people economically. In addition to these reasons, he argued that government intervention in religious practices, particularly regarding the enforcement of Islamic veiling, should not be tolerated. The policy merely diverts attention from more crucial issues that should be prioritised in local government programs (Indopos May 27, 2005; www.islib.com). As noted above, however, the compulsory uniform change has caused hardships for many students.

Lusi Herlina, another NGO activist, questions the relationship between enforcing Islamic veiling and moral improvement. She suggests that wearing Islamic dress will not automatically improve female morality: this is because moral values are not built in the short term; they are developed gradually over the long term. Herlina also rejects the argument that enforcing Islamic veiling can solve rampant ‘social ills’ (penyakit masyarakat), because particular social problems have particular solutions. Instead of improving student morality, Lisa speculates that enforcing Islamic veiling will lead to intolerance among them, because they will become unaccustomed to differences, particularly in personal appearance. Since the Mayor’s policy targets elementary school students, Herlina is concerned that these children will grow up unfamiliar with diversity; this is not a good thing, because diversity (kebhinekaan) is very important for children who are still seeking their identities during their formative years.

Amidst the general discussion about the pros and cons of Islamic veiling, the imposition of veiling on non-Muslim students has drawn particular criticism, which has been rejected by the relevant agencies in Padang. In a dialogue held in 2005 between President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and elite bureaucrats from throughout West Sumatra, the Padang Mayor denied that his policy compels non-Muslim students to wear the Islamic veil. According to the Mayor, the policy works at the level of a ‘call to action’ (himbauan) encouraging elementary and secondary school students to wear the Minang costume of a baju kurung and a headscarf. The Mayor stressed that the imposition of Islamic attire was merely intended for Muslims, however (Media Indonesia, 08/26/2005). Similarly, in response to a Jakarta-based
magazine report that a public school in Padang had imposed Islamic veiling on non-Muslim students (Tempo, 05/22/2005), the Principal of the school denied that the school management had ever forced non-Muslim students to wear the Islamic veil. According to the Principal, he had only encouraged non-Muslim students to ‘adjust’ their clothing in accordance with the Mayor’s policy (Padang Ekspress 05/21/2005).

Instead of justifying and accommodating Muslim aspirations, the Mayor’s policy has been widely regarded as a populist political move, made to rally support for his election to a further term of office. Kamal stated that if one looks at the Mayor’s actions in relation to Islamic-based issues, one can see that the Mayor wants to make a good impression on Islamic voters. According to Kamal, the Mayor’s decision to impose Islamic attire cannot be separated from his intention to gain the sympathy of the Muslim majority, despite the fact that he is not himself a devout Muslim. In addition, Kamal contended that the election of the Mayor as Chairperson of the National Mandate Party (PAN) in Kota Padang during his tenure as Mayor clearly indicated his ambition to gather support from political parties before the next Mayoral election. According to Kamal, once the Mayor has control of one significant political party, he will expand his power to gain control of others. Paljariati Yusral rejects such a cynical assumption, however, and encourages people to freely judge the Mayor’s motives. Yusral regards the Mayor’s policy as an aspect of a strategic effort to make Padang a religious society. Yusral argues that everyone has the right to participate in the next direct election (pilkada) for the position of Mayor, and people can assess the success of his performance in office.

Because the discourse about the enforcement of Islamic dress – including the head-covering – has been contested among the Minangkabau, this narrow focus has sidelined fundamental issues: What are the standards for covering the female body? The precise concept remains obscure. Although Padang is an urban plural society, people’s perspectives on correct dress tend to conflict. Some women criticise ‘impolite dress’ styles that flaunt the aurat, without generalising this to include all the forms of Western-style clothing that are worn by some women in Padang. Rosita, an NGO activist, argues that scanty dress is symptomatic of moral decadence, and tends to accompany bad attitudes. She laments that many Minangkabau women are happy
to display their bodies (aurat), while serious efforts to bring back traditional norms have been regarded as denials of human rights. She believes that bad attitudes stem from a ‘dangerous social virus’. She also argues that the efforts she makes against immoral dress are a concrete step towards enhancing the dignity (harkat and martabat) of Minangkabau women (Gatra 11/05/2001). Similarly, on a pilgrimage flight to the holy cities in Saudi Arabia, a male passenger complained that the uniform worn by stewardesses was improper. He was annoyed when he saw the woman’s navel and back when she bent down to serve people. He also complained that she wore her headscarf incorrectly because it was not held securely in place. He felt that this was embarrassing to the group, who were travelling to holy places. He protested to the management and urged the office of Religious Affairs to remedy the problem (Padang Ekspres 01/29/2005).

B. Islamic Clothing in Nagari Paninggahan

On a sunny Thursday morning, the sound of voices breaks the usual week-day silence. From my vantage point in front of an ornamental rumah bagonjong (a miniature model of a traditional house), I can hear the faint sound of talking in irregular tones within the village, which is located on the western edge of Lake Singkarak. Approaching the source, the sounds of a bustle become clearer. The noise is coming from a big gathering of people who are trading in the traditional market. Lots of men and women are gathering to make transactions under colorful awnings shading them from the sun. The crowd is centered around this row of sellers, who are set up opposite a row of buildings across a narrow asphalt road. Although the buildings are old and dirty, there is a parabola antenna installed on almost every roof, unwittingly reflecting the paradox of modernity coupled with tradition. The noise of the crowd mixes with the sound of the motorcycles that come and go from this place where people spend the whole day trading.

Market day has been a special day since the end of the nineteenth century, when every nagari (traditional Minangkabau village) held its own market once or twice a week. On market day, the village served as an economic center for the surrounding area. This rotating market system was repeated at the district level, so that each
district administrative center became a focal point where people from several neighbouring villages conducted their business once a week (Abdullah 1972:9). This market in Nagari Paninggahan is always crowded with a variety of traders and buyers, and the stalls extend to the shoulder of the main road. Although there are men looking around the market, women are more dominant, purchasing their daily needs (see Picture 5.3). At a fish vendor’s stall, a woman wearing a *baju kurung* (loose, long-sleeved tunic) combined with a *sarong* (a piece of cloth wrapped around the body like a skirt) and a veil is making a sale to a woman wearing a woven hat with a casual T-shirt. The former woman hands over a wrapped parcel containing fresh *Ikan Bilih* (a local variety of fish)\(^{51}\), while the latter offers cash as payment. Meanwhile, an unveiled trader watches as if she is anticipating someone’s arrival. She looks nervous. In order to calm her anxiety, she asks her fellow traders to warn her if *nagari* officials come to execute a sudden ‘sweep’ or raid on unveiled women. On that day, she had forgotten to wear the veil – compulsory for female villagers since the settlement became a *nagari* (‘village republic’).\(^{52}\)

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\(^{51}\) Local people believe that this exotic fish, called *Mystacoleuscus Padangensis* in Latin, is the only fish in the world that lives only in Singkarak Lake (*Kompas*, July 16, 2004). The catch has decreased significantly in recent years, however, and there is concern that the fish – and these fish sellers – may become extinct (*Kompas* November 16, 2002).

\(^{52}\) A *nagari* is a ‘village republic’, possessing its own definite territory, an administration and the *adat* (autonomous local customs) that control the village social order (Manan 2003:3)
While traditional markets in West Sumatra function as local centres of economic activity and cultural interaction (Delly 1989), the weekly market in Paninggahan has also become a ‘cultural experiment’ where women are required to wear Islamic attire in accordance with religious regulations and local custom (adat). From the loudspeaker of a mosque located approximately fifty meters away from the market, the voice of the village chief can be heard, reminding people in the market about women’s obligation to wear Islamic attire. Soon after the announcement, several officials, including the manti,53 panito,54 and dubalang adat,55 led by a coordinator called a tantrib (Ketenteraman dan Ketertiban, an official in charge of maintaining public order), sweep every block of the market in search of unveiled

53 Manti stems from the word mananti, meaning people who are trusted to assist the penghulu in his duties (Article 1, Clause k of the Perna)

54 A Panito is a knowledgeable Muslim scholar (ulama) who specialises in determining lawful and unlawful interpretations of Islamic teachings. The clan position of the panito is then assumed by a trusted person (Article 1, Clause i of the Perna).

55 Dubalang adat, better known as hulubalang, is a clan-ranking in the adat system. The position is elected and responsible to the penghulu. The Dubalang has the duty to protect the penghulu and his assistants, and to provide security for his clan or within the nagari (Article 1, the nagari, Clause m of the Perna).
women. A woman who is caught unveiled is sent home to get it if she lives in the village, while women who reside outside it are reminded to obey the regulation in the weeks to come. The officials tell the people that women should wear the veil or they will be fined. On this day, the raids are conducted only until the call from the mosque for the mid-day prayer (dzuhr), rather than continuing until the market closes.

(1) The Regulation of Islamic Attire

Paninggahan is one of two nagari administered by the Sub-district of Kecamatan Junjung Siriah. With eighteen other Kecamatan, Junjung Siriah belongs to the Regional Administration of Kabupaten Solok (regency).\(^{56}\) The name ‘Paninggahan’ might come from the phrase *tempat singgah* (‘sojourning place’) or *tempat yang ditinggalkan* (‘the abandoned place’), because people from the upland hills came down to the valley to find a better place to settle.\(^{57}\) Although this nagari is part of Kabupaten Solok, its traditional customs stem from the adat of Tanah Datar, from whence the people of Paninggahan originate.\(^{58}\) Like other nagari around the upland valleys, Paninggahan has a natural panorama that stretches from the eastern periphery of Lake Singkarak\(^{59}\) a thousand hectares inland to embrace the interior highlands of Padang. At its southern periphery, Paninggahan borders on Nagari Muaro Pingai, while Kabupaten Tanah Datar is the border on the northern side. The whole area of Paninggahan covers 10,250 hectares. The distance by road between Paninggahan and Kabupaten Solok is approximately 43 kilometers; while the village is 81 kilometers from Padang. Among its population of 11,553 people\(^{60}\), farming is

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\(^{56}\) This information is based on *Solok Regency in Figures* (2003:19). Kabupaten Solok has 19 sub-districts (*kecamatan*), encompassing 82 nagari.

\(^{57}\) According to Datuk Panjang (a member of the adat Council), there is no agreement yet about the origin of the word *Paninggahan*.

\(^{58}\) This information is based on a story told by Datuk Panjang: the Paninggahan customs are different to Solok customs in terms of marriages and funerals, because the adat of Paninggahan stems from the adat of Pariyangan Tanah Datar.

\(^{59}\) Singkarak Lake was formed by a volcano, *Gunung Singkarak* (‘Mount Singkarak’). As a result of ongoing eruptions, the mountain became a crater filled with water.

\(^{60}\) This number is based on the population of nagari in 2004 as written on the white board of the nagari office. For public information, this board was installed on the wall of the office.
the most popular occupation; this is followed by trading, fishing and jobs in the service sector. During the restructuring of the administrative units, this nagari was divided into six villages in accordance with the number of jorong (sub-villages) in its territory.

Since the ‘rebirth’ of the village republic\(^{61}\) in 2001, the nagari is the lowest administrative level which possesses the autonomous authority to manage its own internal affairs. Based on West Sumatran Regional Act No. 9/2000, the Wali Nagari, the head of the local administration, can enact laws, as long as he obtains the agreement of the local Legislative Council. In other words, a nagari can produce its own regulations (Peraturan Nagari, Perna) as long as they cover matters not yet regulated at a higher administrative level.\(^{62}\) However, this autonomy is quite limited. These regulations (Perna) actually remain under the control of the level of government above the nagari, the Kabupaten. The Regency administration (Pemerintah Kabupaten), can monitor and control the actions taken at lower levels: it has the authority to abrogate Perna enactments, or a Wali Nagari’s policies. If a conflict occurs, however, the nagari leader can express his objections to the provincial administration.\(^{63}\)

Exercising its formal authority, the local administration of Paninggahan drafted its first law aimed at the management of social order, namely: *Paninggahan Yang Beragama dan Beradat* (‘A Paninggahan that is Inspired by Religious Teachings and Traditional Customs’) (Perna No. 1/2002). Rather than attempting to amalgamate

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\(^{61}\) Changes to the form of the lowest level of the administration – from the nagari to the desa (village) and back to the nagari – occurred in three different phases: before, during, and after the New Order regime. In 1983, the nagari was replaced by the desa. However, after the Regional Autonomy Act was issued (UU No. 22, 1999), the desa was replaced by the old nagari system, which had been in abeyance for 17 years (see Mulyani 2001:75). The return to the nagari was not only made to unify the administration; it was also enacted to unify local society, which is based on adat (Fauzi 2003:96).

\(^{62}\) Regional Act No. 9/2000 of West Sumatra delineates the position of the Nagari administration within the State Administration. Regional Act No. 22/1999, which re-organised the local administration, has been replaced by Regional Act No. 32/2004. The new law continues to recognise the village’s autonomy in the management of its own internal affairs (See Clause 12 of Regional Law No. 32/2004).

\(^{63}\) Clauses 1 and 2 in Article 17 of Perda No. 9/2000.
Islam and adat in a balanced way, however, the Perna seems to allow Islam to exert a more dominant influence. One indication of this is the juxtaposition of the words beragama and beradat in the regulation. Beragama means ‘to have a religion’ or more specifically an ‘Islamic way of life’ based on the Qur’an and Sunnah (traditions regarding the Prophet); beradat, which means ‘to possess local customs or traditions’ or to live a ‘tradition-based life’, also refers to these two sources of Islamic teachings rather than to ancient pre-Islamic traditions.  

As Abdullah has pointed out (1978), the dominant position of Islamic teachings implies that a ‘pure’ form of adat is no longer believed to be ‘an all-encompassing system sustaining the foundation of the Minangkabau society’; this transformation has accelerated since the 19th century Padri movement in West Sumatra. In addition, due to the strengthening position of religious teachers and an expanding network of religious schools during the 1970’s and beyond (Abdullah 1978), the ‘hegemony of religious groups’ has successfully wrested control from the old adat-based groups. Even so, the absorption of Islam into the Minangkabau belief system and social structure has not replaced adat: rather, it has enriched the nature of Minangkabau culture (Abdullah 1978:4). Therefore, the long-standing efforts made to combine Islam and adat have been a significant factor in making the Minang one of the most thoroughly Islamised ethnic groups in the Malay world (Abdullah 1985:141).

One of the crucial issues in the Perna which reflects the effort to amalgamate Islam and adat is the obligation to wear Islamic attire. Although there is no specific law enjoining Islamic attire, the Perna covers a wide range of social activities. The three main areas of life mentioned in the regulation are educational institutions, wedding venue (baralek) and outdoor spaces. According to the Perna, all students from kindergarten to senior high-school are obliged to wear Islamic clothing. Since

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64 See the General Definition set out in Article One, Chapter One of the Perna. 

65 Other nagari in Kabupaten Solok have specific regulations on Islamic attire, such as Saok Laweh (Perna No. 5/2002), Taruang-Taruang (Perna No. 2/2003) and Kinari (Perna No. 2/2004). Still other nagari plan to follow this trend.

66 Article 11 of the Perna: “Students in every school in Panningahan from Kindergarten through Elementary, Junior and Senior High-School are obliged to wear Islamic attire.”
students at the 19 schools in the nagari numbered 3,443 in 2004\textsuperscript{67}, they comprised 29% of the population of nagari Paninggahan at that time. The Perna also provides that everyone involved in traditional wedding ceremonies (baralek), both men and women, are obliged to wear Islamic attire. Following traditional practice, the bride should wear Islamic attire and the suntiang (bridal headdress), while the groom wears entirely traditional clothing: this includes the deta bagonjong (horned headdress), baju gadang (an oversized collarless black shirt) and celana balapak (trousers woven of gold thread). In addition, the bridesmaids should wear baju kurung (long loose tunics) and headscarves, while the groomsmen should wear sarongs and kopiah (felt hats). Finally, the Perna requires adult men and female Muslims who are out in public to wear Islamic dress. The last two areas overlap somewhat, since outdoor activities include wedding ceremonies (baralek). As it is difficult to regulate the activities of people outside their homes, the Thursday market has become an easy place to enforce the clothing obligation, and officials often conduct random sweeping operations there.

Since Minangkabau people are well-known for tenacity in their Islamness, non-Muslims are rarely found around the nagari, let alone in the country of Paninggahan. It is almost impossible for a Minang person to be a non-Muslim, although he/she may only be a nominal Muslim. According to Junus, Minangkabau people scarcely recognise another system of belief beyond Islam. (1997:261). Therefore, the question of whether non-Muslims should be subject to local regulations has never been considered. This could be a weakness of the Perna if pluralism needs to be dealt with in the future. But it could also be a strength for not regulating on an unnecessary issue. Official data of nagari population does not categorize citizens based on their religion. According to the Wali Nagari, there is no need to categorize people in terms of religion because everyone in the nagari of Paninggahan is a Muslim. This homogenous population might be a determining factor explaining the absence of discrimination based on religion as happened in Padang.

\textsuperscript{67} This data is taken from the same source as detailed in footnote no. 59.
Because the Perna of Paninggahan was drafted at almost the same time as the Perda about Islamic attire in Kabupaten Solok,68 the relationship between the two appears uncoordinated,69 and there are significant differences between them. For example, the two regulations employ different technical descriptions of Islamic attire (busana muslim). The Perna defines it as clothing that covers the aurat, is loose, polite and dignified (berwibawa), and in accordance with the Qur’an and Sunnah;70 while the Perda definition refers only to clothing that is in the Islamic style (bercirikan Islami).71 Neither of these definitions gives a clear description of Islamic attire. These ambiguous and uncertain definitions thus lead to equally ambiguous standards of enforcement. The Perna not only refers to a debatable and religion-based concept of the aurat; it also makes a very general and vague reference to the Qur’an and the Sunnah. In the field of Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh), the degree to which male and female bodies (aurat) should be covered is the subject of never-ending debate. Also, public discussion of the aurat, particularly in regard to the female body, is focussed on how a woman should cover herself for the ritual prayer. The concept of aurat outside the prayer situation warrants almost no discussion. Therefore, the use of such a concept as the basis of a legal stipulation which requires a strict definition is problematic. In addition, the religious values expressed in the two sacred texts still require contextual interpretation, because the principles set out in the Qur’an and the Sunnah are universal. The stipulation of pakaian bercirikan Islami in the Perda is confusing. It gives rise to multiple interpretations, and is not clear in its conceptualisation. Instead of defining an ‘Islamic’ form of dress, the term merely refers to the Arabic tradition without taking local practices into consideration.

68 According to Datuk Palindih, a member of the adat Council, the legal drafting of the Perna was commenced in 2000. It was enacted in 2002, when the Perda on Islamic attire was issued.

69 In the Paninggahan Perna, there is no reference to the Perda of Kabupaten Solok (No. 6/2002) regarding Islamic attire; other nagari that have produced similar Perna (such as Taruang-Taruang and Saok Laweh) have referred to the Perda, however.

70 The definition of busana muslim given in the Perna can be found in Clause f, Article One, Chapter One.

71 The definition of busana muslim provided in the Perda is in Clause 4, Article One, Chapter One.
Fortunately, the Perda goes on to explicate the criteria of Islamic attire in more detail: for example, it distinguishes between male and female attire. It implies that men should wear long pants and long- or short-sleeved shirts, while women are obliged to wear long-sleeved shirts and skirts with a kerudung (headscarf).

Since Islam focuses on female attire, the criteria for female Islamic attire are more complicated than for the male version. There are two general criteria that apply to female Islamic attire, however: it should be opaque and it must not be tight or cling to the body. The Perda gives more details: the long-sleeved shirt should cover the hips and torso, while the long skirt should cover the ankles. Unlike the regulation in the ‘Paninggahan Perna’, which does not mention the kerudung (headscarf), the Perda requires a kerudung that covers the hair, ears, neck, nape of the neck and the chest.

Although the definition of Islamic clothing is complicated as well as problematic, the nagari officials (tantrib) and ninik mamak do not seemingly only rely on the conceptualisation of Islamic attire in the Perna and Perda. They tend to use a “subjective definition” of Islamic clothing based on their knowledge. In some cases, the tantrib tended to simplify the Islamic attire to a headscarf. For example, when a woman attended a wedding party without wearing a headscarf, the tantrib admonished her, although she was wearing Malay-style clothing with a long-sleeved shirt and polite long pants. Her mistake, according to the tantrib, was attending the baralek without wearing a headscarf. Meanwhile, the tantrib did not take action against a veiled woman who wore tight clothing which did not meet the criteria of Islamic attire. These facts illustrate the biased standard practiced by nagari officials. In addition, the tantrib rarely warned a man for not wearing a kopiah (felt hat) in baralek, eventhough some young men from rantau (anywhere but still have connection with the village) often did not wear the kopiah (felt hat) in wedding parties.

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72 These two criteria are in Clause 2, Article 7; and Clause 2, Article 8.
73 The criteria are in Article 7, Clause 1B; and Article 8, Clause 1B.
74 Interview with Delfiana, 4 October 2006.
75 Interview with Mina, 4 October 2006.
Comparing the scope of the two regulations, the Perna is targeted at all segments of the public sphere, while the Perda emphasises certain social groups. As mentioned previously, the three targets for compulsory Islamic attire in Paninggahan are: educational institutions, wedding venues (baralek) and outdoor spaces. In contrast, the Kabupaten Solok regulation is selective, although it does impinge on most people. Kabupaten Solok focuses on two levels of formal education, junior and senior high-school (SMP and SMA), although Islamic attire is also compulsory for students in non-formal education. In terms of Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh), it is more sensible to restrict the regulation to baligh (puberty) or adolescent students, rather than including pre-pubescent students at kindergartens (TK) and elementary schools (SD). The Perda also confines the obligation to wear Islamic attire to male and female staff in public and private institutions; the regulation cannot realistically control people beyond this. Therefore, it does not oblige people to wear Islamic attire outside these institutions, although it does strongly recommend that they do so.

(2) The Law Enforcement Mechanism

Because the legal drafting of nagari regulations involves local representatives, the resulting Perna reflects democratic mechanisms; at the same time the regulations inculcate the ideas behind their enactment. According to the wali nagari (village chief), drafting a Perna is discussed within the Representative Council of the Nagari (BPN: Badan Perwakilan Nagari), although the village chief proposes the idea initially. The Village Council comprises the leaders of the jorong (smaller hamlets within the nagari), ninik mamak (mother’s eldest brothers), alim ulama (Muslim clerics), pemuda (youths), and bundo kanduang (senior mothers). It is easy for the people of Paninggahan to become aware of a new Perna because of the number of representatives present at the consultation forum. Public awareness of a Perna is also promoted by the Tim Safari Ramadhan (‘Ramadhan Road-show Team’), composed of the wali nagari (village chief), Kerapatan Adat Nagari (Village Adat Assembly), members of the Badan Perwakilan Nagari (House of Representatives) and the Majelis Ulama Nagari (Village Council of Clerics), Bundo Kanduang (senior mothers) and pemuda (young people). This team conveys information about the
Perna and its contents by means of religious sermons delivered on a daily basis during the Ramadhan month. Also, the \textit{wali nagari} often delivers his own messages (about the Perna and its enforcement) at wedding ceremonies (\textit{baralek}).

Schools in Paninggahan have started to make Islamic attire compulsory in school uniforms, but their regulations are based on the Perda rather than the Perna. This is not only because the Perda was issued before the Perna;\textsuperscript{76} the Perda Regulation is also preferred because it is more comprehensive. In the clause governing Islamic attire for students, the Perda explains the Islamic criteria for proper clothing in more detail, and sets out the sanctions imposed for infractions more clearly, than the Perna does. Furthermore, there are no conflicting clauses in the Perda, especially in the sections regarding the compulsory nature of Islamic attire. I observed male students at several schools in Paninggahan wearing long-sleeved shirts and pants; and female students wearing long-sleeved shirts, long skirts and headscarves. According to the Vice Principal of SMU 1 Junjung Sirih, Paninggahan, one hundred percent of the students at the school have been wearing Islamic attire since 2002. The effectiveness of the Islamic attire policy in the schools may be due to efficient enforcement of school regulations governing student behaviour on the part of school administrations.

In contrast to the effectiveness of institutional control in the schools, controlling and monitoring people in the \textit{nagari}, particularly when they are engaged in outdoor activities, is more complicated. As an aspect of his law enforcement efforts, the \textit{wali nagari} has designed a strategy of staging \textit{razia} (‘raids’), although these are not provided for in the Perna. \textit{Razia} are conducted at random rather than according to a regular schedule; they target the Thursday market and wedding ceremonies (\textit{baralek}). As noted previously, \textit{razia} are undertaken by several types of officials, led by the \textit{tantrib} as coordinator. According to the \textit{tantrib}, the Adat Council (KAN: \textit{Kerapatan Adat Nagari}) conducts a coordination meeting before each \textit{razia}, both those launched on market day and those which target scheduled \textit{baralek}. Every clan (\textit{suku}) is usually represented at such meetings by \textit{manti} and \textit{dubalang} (see footnotes 49 and 51). At

\textsuperscript{76} Interview with the Vice Principal of SMU 1 Junjung Sirih, Paninggahan; May, 5, 2005.
the meeting, they discuss how the razia will be conducted and agree on the procedure that will be followed

If a razia is staged on market day, the tantrib installs desks at certain crossroads in the nagari. Each suku (clan) has a safeguard in that members are represented at a certain desk manned by their clan’s manti and panito. After the wali nagari makes an announcement from a mosque loudspeaker reminding everyone of their obligation to wear Islamic attire, the tantrib and other officials scour every single block in the traditional market area, looking for people not wearing Islamic attire. Rather than targeting both males and females, the officials focus on searching out unveiled women. When they find an unveiled woman, they counsel her to wear a headscarf rather than fining her as the Perna directs. The officials make a note of her name and report the infraction to her ninik mamak (mother’s eldest brother), who is the senior male traditionally regarded to be responsible for her. Later, in the rumah gadang, her ninik mamak will advise the woman to wear Islamic attire in public; not only to obey the Perna, but also to fulfil her obligation to live according to religion and adat.

Similar mechanisms prevail in the razia launched at wedding ceremonies (baralek) and other social occasions. The officials will make a ‘sweep’, gathering the unveiled women from among the participants at the baralek, which usually lasts several days. On the first day (usually a Monday), a baralek starts with menjemput bako, in which the groom’s relatives fetch the bride and take her to their house in a procession accompanied by talempong, the traditional musical ensemble of the Minangkabau. As soon as the bride arrives at the groom’s house, his bako (the men of her father’s lineage) give the groom various kinds of living things such as a chicken, bananas (a whole hand of bananas from one tree), sugar cane, and a coconut

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77 Rumah gadang literally means ‘big house’; it is the traditional communal house of the Minangkabau.

78 The music is performed by a talempong ensemble, which consists of several gong/percussion instruments played in an interlocking fashion by three or more performers. The ensemble may include a double-headed drum (gandang), a framed drum (rabano) and a multiple-reed instrument made from coconut leaves (pupuik batang padi) (See Abdullah, Summerfield, Summerfield 1999:65).
(a whole coconut that has grown a shoot). The bride returns to her father’s house in the same procession, after delivering all of the gifts. The second and third days of baralek are usually held on Tuesday and Wednesday. On those days, the bride and groom invite their ninik mamak to gather together. This forum is not only intended to allow the couple to ask the elders permission for their union, but also to enable them to get advice from the elders about managing a household in accordance with adat.

The main events of the baralek cycle are usually conducted on the fourth and fifth days. While the wedding ceremony for the groom’s side is conducted on Thursday, the bride’s side celebrates it on Friday. For brides and grooms who are students, civil servants or people engaged in merantau [this is the traditional Minang practice of going away from the home nagari to earn money], the main baralek events are usually held on a Sunday.

Minangkabau are well known for maintaining their traditions, and cultural ceremonies are social gatherings that involve a lot of people. Based on my own observations, the majority of those who wear Islamic attire at baralek ceremonies tend to be elderly rather than young people. I saw a veiled bride and a groom dressed in Islamic attire, but some of the people who accompanied them were not wearing it, particularly the young people. Since officials conduct raids at random and fairly rarely, most young people tend to follow their everyday dress practice. Those who wear the veil are those who are already accustomed to it, while those who leave it off are those who do not wear it consistently anyway.

Because implementing the regulations on Islamic attire is problematic, the enforcement of the Perna has precipitated resistance from women who reject wearing the veil. According to Abu-Lughod (1990), such instances of resistance can be used to ‘diagnose how power relations transform’ conflicting social structures. One form of resistance is illustrated by a woman who has been accustomed to going without the veil. Although she grew up in Paninggahan, her long period of socialisation in the rantau (living outside the core Minang area) means that she prefers wearing casual rather than Islamic-style clothing. When she once attended a baralek without a headscarf, she was intercepted by nagari officials (tantrib); they chided her for not wearing Islamic attire, and advised her always to wear the veil in public. Instead of
listening quietly to this advice, the woman argued back emotionally: “How can you advise me to wear the veil, when your own daughter has done worse than I? Could you please stay out of my business, and take care of your own daughter?” Such defiance indicates that although power is exercised through representative symbols, by imposing a range of prohibitions and restrictions on clothing; another agent may not only reject the advice, but also resist it by countering with critical argument.

Similar resistance was displayed by an unveiled female trader at a traditional market when a _bundo kanduang_ (senior women) reminded her of her obligation to wear Islamic attire. The _bundo kanduang_ used her position within the _nagari_ social hierarchy to take action against a woman who had broken the Perna law. Although the trader knew that the woman addressing her was the Chairperson of the _bundo kanduang_ group in Paninggahan, she rejected caution and challenged her critic. “In all my experience trading in other markets in Kabupaten Solok, I have never been admonished like this, although I know that there are similar regulations in other _nagari_ in the region.” Her emotional tone heightened as she complained about the _bundo kanduang_’s order. The _bundo kanduang_ replied to this show of resistance as follows: “This is not Solok, you know; this is Paninggahan. When you are in this _nagari_, you have to obey the local rules.” Angry interchanges like these reflect Foucault’s assertion that “where there is power, there is resistance” (1978:95-96). When power is applied to the subaltern, resistance arises.

The mechanisms used to enforce Perna involve a combination of modern mechanisms on the one hand and a traditional approach on the other. Paninggahan Perna stipulates two kinds of administrative sanction. Those who violate the rule are fined one hundred and fifty thousand rupiah (Rp. 150,000) and will not be granted the

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79 Interview with Neli, the Head of the Administration Section of Paninggahan, May, 4, 2005.
80 _Bundo Kanduang_ literally means ‘mother of the womb’, or one’s own mother; but first and foremost it is the name of a wise and fair queen-mother who features in the well known Minangkabau legendary tale _Kaba Cindua Mato_. The expression is used as an honorific title for senior women (Van Reenen 1996:2; see also Biezeveld 2002:70).
81 Ibu Rosni, the Chief of the _bundo kanduang_, told me this story on May 5, 2005.
rights of ordinary citizens in the office of the nagari. While the Perna requires administrative sanctions to follow any infringements of the law, local enforcers tend to use traditional means, drawing on the institution of the ninik mamak. Because of this discrepancy, administrative sanctions for infringements of the Islamic dress code have never been applied since the introduction of the Perna. As the wali nagari remarked, “Until now, no one has been affected by the administrative sanctions, because we actually only stipulate the sanctions in order to make people afraid to break the law.” While the administrative sanctions have therefore not been effective, traditional mechanisms have become an alternative for enforcement of the law. By this approach, any law breaker will be verbally reported to the ninik mamak. This report will be followed up by the ninik mamak, who later advises his nephew. Therefore, verbal warnings played a more significant role than administrative sanctions, which are a new mechanism. According to the chief of nagari, the fine has been stipulated mainly to make people think twice before breaking the law.

The position of the ninik mamak, who have been powerful traditional agents in the Minangkabau social structure, has significantly declined, however. There are several reasons for this. This decline is not necessarily caused by the reluctance of an individual datuk or penghulu (chietain) to undertake his duties; in many cases, he is incompetent to act as the traditional voice of authority, for example. Also, many people who have been installed as penghulu live far from their kemenakan (‘nieces and nephews’); the same people who chose them to revive the old traditions as holders of this important traditional office (membangkit batang tarandam). Also, the traditional ceremony required to make an individual into a penghulu is very costly. Thus, the physical distance between penghulu and their kemenakan has created a psychological and social distance. All of these factors mean that the titles of datuk or penghulu have become merely symbolic; they have lost the authority associated with the traditional function (Asril 1983:28). “Nowadays, a ninik mamak is no longer the ruler of his kemenakan. He can no longer control what should be done by his

82 Article 10, Chapter 4 specifies the sanctions regarding breaches of custom (adat) and manners; while Article 47, Chapter 16 details the fine.
83 Interview with Abu Bakar Bulek, wali nagari (Chief) of Paninggahan; May 4, 2005.
kemenakan. No wonder the supervision of veiling practice is not effective at the level of the rumah gadang, where the ninik mamak traditionally take control.”

The enforcement mechanisms of Perna seem unrealistic and unsystematic compared to the enforcement of Perda. The sanctions imposed for not following Perda are rational and well-ordered since they utilise the prevailing sanctions in each formal institution. For example, a breach of the dress regulation by public and private staff will be punished in accordance with existing sanctions in their disciplinary code. The essence of the Perda is to make infringement of the official uniform equal to other disciplinary matters. The Perda thus tends to be a rational choice. It does not create new sanctions for a non-criminal deed. The detailed package of sanctions in educational institutions is additional evidence of the systematic enforcement of the Perda. Unlike the Perna which does not specify different level of sanctions, the Perda varies the sanctions in accordance with the level of infringement. There are five stages of punishment, namely an initial verbal warning, a written warning (by letter), a report to the parents, exclusion from class activities (suspension), and finally expulsion from the school. These various sanctions are also used to punish other misdeeds which prevail in schools.

Nevertheless, the Perda has no strong enforcement mechanisms in outdoor spaces. The Perda specifies that those who break the rule at social events like weddings should be warned verbally and reported to a committee to ensure they wear Islamic attire in the future. Such a sanction is both the fundamental weakness and the strength of the rule. Considering the loose nature and large size of a community, oral admonition might not be as effective as in schools and offices, which can more easily control their members. In addition, the verbal warning in outdoor spaces is not followed up with further sanctions or any serious monitoring of the offender. In practice, a verbal warning becomes a formality in many social events. However, issuing a verbal warning as a mechanism to encourage people to wear Islamic attire is appropriate since any harsher punishment for a matter of clothing would be

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84 Interview with Rudi Hartono, a member of the administrative staff of the nagari, on May 4, 2005.
85 These sanctions are listed in Article 11, Chapter Four.
unproductive. Therefore, delivering a verbal warning through authoritative agents is a moral appeal to people to follow the local regulation. It does not rely on coercive measures, but it operates through persuasion.

Since both male and female Minangkabau have traditionally worn headgear, the imposition of Islamic attire seems to maintain old practices while simultaneously strengthening Islamic influence. According to Datuk Panjang, a senior penghulu in Paninggahan, in the 1950s there was an agreement among penghulu kaum and elite figures that adult men should wear the kopiah (felt hat) for activities outside the home. At that time, a man who did not wear the kopiah would be slapped by anyone who dared to do it. “Wait until 4 pm, there must be someone who has the guts to slap him, especially ninik mamak, manti and dubalang, who are brave people. No one can dispute the punishment or resist the traditional authorities if he is slapped”, Datuk Panjang said. At that time, adult women also wore a headdress called tengkuluk (scarf), although the punishment for not wearing this was not a slap. Women were given a verbal warning by the ninik mamak to wear the headgear. That traditional veiling practice had nothing to do with religious piety, however: it was related to cultural identity and local custom. The headdress could be made of any kind of cloth. As long as it covered the head, it was called a tengkuluk. If a woman went out in a hurry without putting on the scarf, her ninik mamak would say: “Don’t hurry! Are you a Dutch lady (nyonya belando) going outside buka tenda (lit. ‘with the tent open’)?” After the new style of headscarf arrived, reminders from ninik mamak changed from “Please wear a tengkuluk!” to “Please put on a kerudung if you want to go outside.” Some people say that the female headdress changed from tengkuluk to kerudung in Paninggahan because the former style does not cover what they call the aurat perfectly. As noted above, in the Perna the religious term aurat (parts of body that should be covered) is used as a significant criterion in defining busana muslim.

While Islamic law does not specify a particular punishment for unveiled women, the strengthening conservatism among Minangkabau people led to a stricter rule of social habits long before the modern social structure was established. However, there were no reports of breaches of Islamic veiling regulations by Minangkabau people during the revivalism of Islam in West Sumatera. In the 19th
century Padri movement, severe penalties were inflicted on women who consumed tobacco, which was forbidden according to the beliefs of this community. Due to the violation of this ban by his mother’s sister (mandeh), Tuanku Nan Renceh, an elite Padri figure, killed his aunt with his own hands. According to Dobbin, although veiling and beards for men were also required by regulation at that time, there was no information about the punishment for unveiled women as evidence of the extreme Puritanism of the Padris (Dobbin 1983:132). A specific strict rule for unveiled women can possibly be found in the old history of Assyria. Based on some accounts, unveiled women were considered to have committed a crime. At that time, the severe penalties that could be inflicted on women who broke the law on veiling could be included “flogging, having pitch poured over their heads and having their ears cut off” (Driver and Miles 1935:409; Ahmed 1992:14; Guindi 1999:15).

(3) The Formal Significance of Islamic Veiling

Although married women in Paninggahan have traditionally worn the tengkuluk, the practice of covering the head is now conditional and in a state of flux. The tengkuluk was usually worn by adult women to attend wedding parties and social gatherings, while the lilik was worn to religious activities such as mengaji (reciting the holy Qur’an), going to surau and the like. The Tengkuluk is a shawl worn around the head to cover the hair, but it does not cover the neck and bosom, although young women sometimes drape the ends of the shawl over their shoulders. Unlike the tengkuluk, which is loose and insecurely fastened, the lilik is neater and secure, and is rather formal in style. It comprises a shawl that is bound around the head under the chin which covers the neck and chest as well as the hair. This headgear is sometimes called mudawarah, the typical headscarf worn at the religious school called Diniah Puteri Padang Panjang. Feillard (1999) discusses the transformation of the headscarf from kerudung to jilbab in Java. In a similar way, in Paninggahan the dominant headdress fashion has shifted from the tengkuluk to the kerudung; a few people refer to both these styles interchangeably as jilbab. Most people regard the transformation as an expression of growing concern about covering the body (aurat) as more important than maintaining traditional Minang practice. From the kerudung
style, women have further transformed their outfits into a body-covering fashion, the *busana muslim*, which has now been formalised in a binding regulation.

Recent developments in Paninggahan have transformed veiling from an optional to a compulsory practice mandated by the dress code formalised in the Perna. The justification for making this change has been stated by the *wali nagari* as follows: “Since being Minang means being Muslim, the obligations enjoined by Islamic teachings (*syara*) for Muslims should be undertaken by Minang.” According to him, the whole female body except the face and the palms of the hands is clearly included in *aurat* (‘nakedness’): it should be covered up in Islam. So, if a woman is really committed to her religion, she must cover her *aurat* using the type of clothing prevalent in Minangkabau: *baju kurung* and *kerudung*. Minang believe that the practice of veiling reflects *syara*, and they have formulated this idea in a local aphorism: *adat basandi syarak, syarak basandi kitabullah* (“Local custom draws on *syara*, *syara* draws on the *Qur’an*”).

Nevertheless, due to the declining role of the *ninik mamak* and the inconsistent enforcement of the regulations about Islamic attire, veiling practice among the women of Paninggahan is inconsistent and uncertain. On the grounds of ‘discomfort’ (*panas*: ‘feeling hot’) and ‘reluctance’ (*malas*: ‘lazy’), Delfiana⁸⁷ (27) admitted that she prefers not to wear the headscarf for outdoor activities, although she still respects her *ninik mamak*. In anticipation of meeting her *ninik mamak*, she has prepared a piece of towel to cover her hair. In fact, however, her *ninik mamak* is not as strict as she had thought, because he is also uncertain about what is correct. The *ninik mamak* sometimes prompts Delfiana when he finds her out without a veil, but not on other occasions. Therefore, while the young women is half-hearted, the uncle is uncertain. Mina (aged 21) has also experienced this ambiguity.⁸⁸ She admitted that often she does not cover her hair in public because she does not regularly see village officials monitoring veiling. Since sweeping operations are rarely conducted, Mina takes the risk of going to the market unveiled, although she sometimes dons the veil. Rather

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⁸⁶ Interview with Abu Bakar Bulek, the *wali nagari* of Paninggahan; 4 May 2005.
⁸⁷ Interview with Delfiana at her house; 4 October 2006.
⁸⁸ Interview with Mina at the traditional market in Paninggahan in October 4, 2006.

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than being aware of its religious significance, Mina admitted that her decisions to wear the veil or not are very dependent on her mood and the situation. If she thinks that her clothes match the headscarf and she feels in the mood, she will wear it, despite not being very confident about adopting this style of dress. In addition, whether or not her friends wore the headscarf was a very large determining factor for Mina as a teenager. If they wore the veil, she would wear it; if they did not, she would not either.

While women are usually aware of religious precepts about Islamic veiling and the existence of Perna, these two factors are often over-ridden by the desire to make their own decisions. For example, Fitri (19) said that she does not want to wear the veil, although she is obliged to do so in the village.\textsuperscript{89} She has made up her mind to take up veiling when she marries, but she is not ready yet \textit{(belum ikhlas)}. Although her \textit{ninik mamak} often reminded her about veiling when the Perna first came into force, she usually ignored him. Fitri argued that Islamic veiling should not be formalised in the legal framework. She believes that people already know what is good and what is bad about covering their bodies. Instead of imposing standards and monitoring people’s attire, she thinks people should be allowed to choose what kind of clothing they wear. This view is also shared by Rita\textsuperscript{90} (24) who refuses to change her mode of attire because it has been her habit and style not to veil. After a long stay in the \textit{rantau} (outside the Minang heartland), she is more comfortable with her current style of clothing. Rita tends to ask people to understand the way she dresses, rather than following their standards: she does not accept having to adjust her clothing to other people’s ideas by wearing the veil as inscribed in the local rules.

The trend towards veiling in Paninggahan seems to be a formal practice: women wear the veil in certain places because they are afraid of their \textit{ninik mamak} and the village authorities rather than because of the ‘historical awareness’ and ‘personal transformation’ that Brenner found in Java (1996:673). The formal meaning of veiling is recognised by woman like Dewi (20) who wears the headscarf

\textsuperscript{89} Interview with Fitri at the cross-roads in Paninggahan in October 5, 2006.
\textsuperscript{90} Interview with Rita at her home; 4 October 2006.
for shopping in the traditional market and also for wedding ceremonies (baralek) because she is forced to. She admitted that like many other women in Paninggahan, she tends not to wear the veil for activities outside her home, other than those two. Her friends often remind her: “If you want to go to the market or to a baralek, wear your headscarf, unless you want to be caught by the village authorities.” Because of these reminders, she follows her friends’ suggestions, although sometimes she feels uncomfortable. Other women like Yarneli (34) say that the sweeping operations conducted by village officials are like being trapped into formality, because they focus on the headscarf no matter what else the women are wearing. According to Yarneli, if Islamic teachings are to be followed properly, the strict criteria for correct Islamic attire – which are more complicated than just wearing a headscarf – should be consistently enforced. She is not sure whether Islamic attire is relevant in the context of Paninggahan or not.

C. Conclusion

The experience of Minangkabau people in West Sumatra in negotiating their conflicting ideas regarding veiling reflects the unproductive outcome of promoting Islamic attire in a complex Muslim society which is not structured along traditional Arab lines. The regulation requiring Islamic attire in Padang has constitutional problems; thus it is profoundly ambivalent in terms of both its implementation and the arguments used to explain and defend it. Moreover, the regulation has been implemented in line with the growing trend towards Islamic attire in Muslim regions in Indonesia. Instead of encouraging religious awareness, however, the imposition of veiling has made the veil into a purely formal obligation: it has lost its profound inner meaning for those who wear it. According to Padang students, veiling is part of a school uniform that must be worn in the school grounds; for adult Paninggahan women, veiling has become part of a formal costume that must be worn for baralek and shopping at the traditional market. To some extent, the imposition of Islamic

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91 Interview with Yarneli at the traditional market of Paninggahan; 4 October 2006.
92 Parker found a similar situation in Bukittinggi (Inside Indonesia, Jul-Sept, 2005).
dress has made the veil into a tool of oppression – particularly for non-Muslim students who were forced to adopt this symbol of Islamic identity – rather than a liberating personal choice. Due to the declining role of traditional agents in Paninggahan, particularly the ninik mamak, the enforcement of Islamic veiling has been inconsistent and uncertain, whereas the modern mechanism – imposing administrative sanctions – has never been applied.

The enforcement of Islamic veiling in both Padang and Paninggahan rests on a flawed religious conceptualisation. Consequently, the justification for the imposition of Islamic veiling leads to a ‘fallacy’ rather than encouraging a logical way of thinking. The attempts made by certain religious figures to indoctrinate the population with the idea of veiling as an obligation has culminated in a monolithic interpretation, whereas Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) and Qur’anic exegesis (tafsir) provide various complex interpretations about veiling and the female body. Due to this complexity, efforts to impose compulsory Islamic veiling are as difficult as convincing everyone to have a single taste and style in how they dress. The attempt to compel veiling in Paninggahan has precipitated resistance from Minangkabau women rather than sincere obedience. Breaching the Islamic veiling regulation is certainly not regarded as a serious crime, since women see it as merely a question of clothing. In addition, the rationale for veiling as a preventative measure against sexual harassment, the sun, and mosquito bites is a superficial attempt to hide the lack of serious government effort to address the roots of social problems and law enforcement on the one hand, and the management of community health to eradicate disease-carrying mosquitoes on the other.

From the time that the regulation on Islamic veiling was imposed on the subaltern, the characteristics of orthodoxy have been reflected in both social interactions and discourse. Orthodoxy is characterised by the features identified by Bernirblau, such as collaboration among social groups; control of the means of material, intellectual and symbolic production; constructing correct and incorrect forms of belief and praxis; and the engagement of coercive mechanisms (Bernirblau 2001:340). In enacting regulations about acceptable dress, the local government bureaucracy and religious groups have collaborated to formalise Islamic attire on the
grounds of their common interest. While the Mayor as village leader needs only a superficial and popular program, other groups require political support from their constituents. In order to realise the goal of following Islam, the headscarf and *baju kurung* have been stipulated to be the correct and representative Islamic attire for women. Both government and religious figures have promoted the advantages of Islamic veiling as a 'panacea' for sexual harassment, criminal conduct and mosquito bites to justify their support for regulations that impose Islamic veiling in public. Meanwhile, groups which support this policy define correct and incorrect forms of women’s attire in accordance with Islamic criteria for proper dress, such as: long and loose clothing that covers the hair, neck and chest, and is made of opaque materials and not body-hugging. With such criteria institutionalised in the regulations, enforcement inevitably creates coercion by means of imposing sanctions.

Like two sides of the same coin, the emergence of orthodoxy brings heretical challenges because both are aspects of the same social process within which belief systems are defined in different ways (Zito 1983:1111). In other words, when orthodoxy emerges, heterodoxy also arises. Although the proclivity to orthodoxy expressed by the imposition of Islamic veiling has been challenged by local agencies among the Minangkabau people, their voices are relatively weak. On a larger scale, such orthodoxy has also been challenged by intellectual dissenters whose perspectives offer freedom of thought to Indonesian Muslims. How orthodoxy has been challenged by such intellectual heretics will be discussed in the next chapter.
CHAPTER VI
CRITICISM OF VEILING AFTER THE FALL OF THE NEW ORDER REGIME

Because Indonesia is a predominantly Muslim country, the development of social and political life has been much influenced by Muslim agents. Their roles have tended to become more dominant since they have gained wider access to the social and political domain after the collapse of the New Order regime. The rise in the number of Islamic political parties within the Indonesian democratic system is a reflection of the increasing Muslim role in politics. In regard to physical appearance, Muslims have played a significant role in campaigning for Islamic clothing, a practice which is increasingly found among members of various social classes. In addition, Muslim efforts to incorporate ‘Islamic principles’ into the legal system have become increasingly common. Although these developments have led to a conservative trend, Muslim reformers have also contributed to the dialogue on Indonesian Islam. As Fealy argued, reform groups have had a large role in strengthening the pluralistic character of Indonesian Islam (Fealy 2006:23): these progressive groups balance the trend towards conservatism.

This chapter examines the religious and social criticism of the veiling practice among Indonesian Muslims since the fall of the New Order. I argue that while wearing the veil has been pervasive among various classes of Muslims, criticism of both doctrine and practice has challenged the living perspective on veiling which relates to religious concerns and social costs. Moderate Muslim scholars have not only shifted from the idea of mandatory jilbab to optional veiling; they also disagree with the absolutist outlook and social pressure associated with the veil. Although most critics do not regard the jilbab issue to be an important aspect of religious life, they are still concerned with local standards of modesty, and the promotion of kerudung rather than jilbab. This chapter discusses the criticisms directed at veiling,
dealing with various religious interpretations as well as the social impact of veiling from the perspective of Muslim intellectuals.

A. Religious Criticism

(1) Arguments Based on Sacred Texts

Islamic reformers have openly criticised the practice of veiling, citing examples from Indonesian Islam which are closely related to the wearing of Islamic clothing. A recent example of this was Ulil Absar Abdalla’s article entitled *Menyegarkan Kembali Pemahaman Islam* (‘Refreshing Islamic Understanding’) in *Kompas* (18 November 2002).\(^1\) Ulil Absar Abdalla, who is well known as Ulil, argued that the wearing of *jilbab* (headscarf) is a reflection of Arab culture, like other Islamic doctrines such as *qishas* (‘equal punishment’), *rajam* (‘death penalty’), wearing *jubah* (the long loose robe of Arabia) and growing a beard. Ulil discouraged Muslims from practicing such customs. Similarly, Ulil’s predecessor, Nurcholish Madjid, questioned the relationship between veiling and Islamic teachings in *Matra* magazine (December 1992:18). According to Madjid, the question of clothing should be culture-specific, although the universal idea behind Islamic clothing is covering the *aurat* (nakedness). Although Ulil and Madjid did not formulate their ideas within a particular study, they both tended to distinguish between Islamic principles and Arabic practices.

Islamic reformers claim that the absolutist approach to doctrine must become more complex and relaxed. While orthodox Muslims believe that veiling is mandatory, Muslim reformers contend that wearing the veil should be optional. In an interview, Ulil said that Islamic clothing does not merely refer to the *jilbab*; it includes any garments which fulfil the criterion of covering the *aurat*. According to Ulil, other forms of ethnic clothing can be regarded as ‘Islamic’, as long as they are accepted as culturally linked and appropriate, such as Chinese or Indian dress.\(^2\)

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1 Ulil Absar Abdalla is coordinator of *Jaringan Islam Liberal* (JIL: the Liberal Islamic Network), which is based in Jakarta.

2 Interview with Ulil Absar Abdalla in Jakarta; 13 January 2005. All further references to Ulil derive from this source.
Likewise, Nong Darul Mahmada, a JIL (Jaringan Islam Liberal, or Liberal Islamic Network) activist, argued that wearing the *jilbab* should not be obligatory, although she is not firmly for or against wearing religious attire. From a historical account, she found that the tradition of wearing the *jilbab* amongst the *sahabat* (Prophet's companions) and amongst their followers was more of a cultural obligation than a religious one ([http://islamlib.com/en](http://islamlib.com/en)). In other words, the idea of veiling as optional has been promoted by some Muslim intellectuals. This inclination has been identified by Berger as a ‘heretical ethos’ which brought ‘a movement from fate to choice’ (1979:11).

The intellectual ‘heresy’ which inclines to question and deconstruct the established doctrine is also reflected in the criticisms directed at the concept of *aurat* (nakedness), that requires that certain parts of the body be covered. Ulil disagreed with the concept of the female *aurat* that is mostly understood by orthodox Muslims to include the whole body except the face and hands. He argued that discussion of the *aurat* should not be focused merely on the female body, but on its male counterpart as well. Ulil was of the view that it does not make any sense for the concept of *aurat* to distinguish between men and women, as both creatures have equal rights. Nevertheless, he recognises that distinctions regarding the *aurat* of men and women are valid for ritual prayer. He does not attempt to debate this matter, regarding it as a given aspect of the Muslim religion. Beyond the ritual prayer (*shalat*), however, Ulil argued that the concept of *aurat* is not valid. Ulil believes that the concept of covering the *aurat* in the public sphere, that specifies that the whole body of women should be covered, derived from Arabic culture. Moreover, the practice belongs to the elite class of Arab society which harbours remnants of the old feudalism.\(^3\)

Similarly, Quraih Shihab, a prominent Indonesian *mufassir* (commentator on the *Qur'ān*) questioned the proposition that the *jilbab* is based on the *Qur'ān*. He argues that the legal definition (in Islamic law) of the female *aurat* or body is indeterminate (*dzanni*), not definitive (*qathʿi*); since there were different

\(^3\) *Ibid.*
interpretations among the classic ulama. Besides, interpretations of the Qur’an were
diverse, and neither their understanding nor their reading of the hadith enabled the
ulama to convince each other. Therefore, Shihab maintained that if there were a
definitive direction in the Qur’an and hadith, the ulama would not differ in their
opinions and use logical reasoning to define the extent of the female aurat. According to Shihab, the different interpretations among the ulama are based on
personal opinions: these were derived from their social context, that is their position
in society and their logical reasoning; rather than from a definitive, clear and firm
indication of a divine ruling. Given these facts, Shihab concludes that the female aurat is a debatable issue (khilafiyah) among Muslims (Shihab 2001:165-7). He also
argued that as the Qur’an does not give a clear definition of the aurat, the ulama are
entitled to have different opinions about it (Shihab 2000:179).4

While Shihab doubted that there was a mandate for veiling on the basis of Qur’anic exegesis (tafsir), Moqsith Gazali, a young liberal Muslim, questioned the
reasoning behind veiling in terms of the methodology of Islamic jurisprudence (ushul
fiqh). Gazali did not assume that wearing the veil is mandatory; he treated it as a
medium for promoting women’s protection. Therefore, he did not see the veil as
being the purpose in itself. Moqsith argues that the reason for the syaria (maqasid al-
syari’at) regarding dress is not the question of wearing the veil itself, but the
promotion of social order by enjoining a particular outward appearance on women.
In other words, veiling works to facilitate social control and public order. Gazali
asserted that if the social order (as the principle aim of the practice) is actually
disturbed by it, however, the means (veiling) should be abolished; it is not achieving

4 Shihab’s opinion has been criticised by several Islamic activists. According to the critics, Shihab’s opinion is ambiguous, whereas it is clear that the jilbab is mandatory. According to Muchlis Hanafi, an NU activist in Egypt, although the jilbab does not have a definite status (qath’i) in the Qur’an and hadith, the indication that it is mandatory is based on strong evidence (dalil) and clues (qarinah). Hanafi based his arguments on three factors: first, the practice of the companions (shahabat), which was not forbidden by the Prophet; second, the understanding of the companions (shahabat); and the acceptance of the practice by Muslims in general from generation to generation. All of these lead to the conclusion that women should cover their whole body except the face and hands. In addition, there is sometimes permission to display a portion of the hands and legs (when necessary for work). Hanafi maintained that no credible ulama would allow women to display certain parts of their bodies such as the hair, neck and calves (www.hidayatullah.com).
its aim. If the practice of wearing the veil is mandatory, but it creates social disorder, the wearing of the veil would be made unlawful (haram). Gazali also argued that veiling is not part of the *rukun Islam* (‘five pillars of Islam’) or the *rukun Iman* (‘six pillars of faith’) – both important aspects of Islam – because wearing the veil is a pre-Islamic practice. He maintained that the encouragement of veiling within Islam is not an obligation but a regulation. The essential aspect of veiling, according to Gazali, is covering the *aurat*, and the Muslim scholars (ulama) disagreed about what the concept of *aurat* actually included. Gazali maintained that the diverse conceptions of the *aurat* resulted from multiple interpretations of the texts and different perspectives on changing social traditions.\(^5\)

While some Muslims believe veiling to be part of the embodiment of the concept of *kaffah* (totality in practicing Islam),\(^6\) other Muslims criticise this concept. While Jadul Maula,\(^7\) a young Muslim intellectual, argued that *kaffah* is a myth, Ulil further questioned the extent to which Muslims should adopt Islamic teachings in a comprehensive way. Maula rejected the concept of *kaffah*, for Islam is not a fixed package-deal attached to a monolithic interpretation. According to Abdalla, at the level of theology Islam should be comprehensive, while at the social level, it could be different, allowing local variation. Ulil asserted that the social aspect cannot be equated with the theological aspect. Both Maula and Ulil rejected the concept of *kaffah* in a similar tone. According to Maula, the concept of *kaffah* lies in the realm of the heart (i.e. it is spiritual); it does not depend on submission of the self in terms of dogma (i.e. outward costume, practice, ritual). He lamented that those veiled women who hold themselves in high esteem for having accepted the concept of *Islam kaffah* regard unveiled Muslim women as not being truly *kaffah* like them. Maula also observed that *Islam kaffah* has been subordinated: both to the market system through the media and fashion industries; and to the political system through the

\(^5\) Transcript of a discussion on veiling and human rights in Jakarta; held on 3 March, 2004.

\(^6\) The term *kaffah* comes from a passage in the *Qur’an*, 2:208: *udhkulu fis silmi kaffah* (“Enter perfectly into Islam by obeying all the rules and regulations of the Islamic religion”).

\(^7\) Interview with M. Jadul Maula in Yogyakarta; 26 July 2005. He is a coordinator of LKIS (*Lembaga Kajian Islam dan Sosial*, ‘The Institute for Research on Islam and Society’), in Yogyakarta. Further references to Maula are from this source.
bureaucracy and its promulgation of regional acts (perda) requiring Islamic clothing in public.

Meanwhile, Ulil suggested that if a Muslim wants to accept the concept of *kaffah*, being totally committed to practicing Islam does not mean one must be trapped into wearing a particular label or donning a particular symbol. According to him, living according to the literal meaning of *Islam kaffah* (totality in practicing Islam) can confine Muslims to a narrow world. On the other hand, Fatimah Az-Zahra, an activist in an Islamic NGO, argued that *kaffah* is a social construction. She has had experience with the daily life of female students at an Islamic boarding school (*pesantren*). She found a *pesantren* community that tried to implement *Islam kaffah* by insisting that female students wear socks. This practice is based on the assumption that the whole female body should be covered, including the feet. Due to the unhealthy effect on the feet, however, the practice has been abandoned by female students at the *pesantren*. They concentrate on other Islamic principles that are more relevant to their daily lives, such as: ‘Cleanliness is next to godliness’ (*an-nadzafatu minal iman*). In this regard, Fatimah believes that the concept of *kaffah* will change in accordance with the evolving local context.

While orthodox Muslims tend to adhere more strictly to the established methodology of religious reasoning with its literal interpretation of the sacred texts, intellectual reformists are inclined to understand sacred texts in a less literal way. In his interpretation of the proposition of veiling as it appears in religious texts such as the *Qur’an* and *hadith* (sayings of the Prophet), Amin Abdullah, Rector of UIN Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta, avoids being trapped by certain verses of the *Qur’an* and *hadith* which are assumed to be relevant to the veiling issue. According to him, following the prescriptions (*ayat*) on veiling in the *Qur’an* amounts to an atomistic way of thinking. Opinions on the issue of veiling should take the complexity of current social conditions and social structures into account. Without understanding

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8 Interview with Fatimah Az-Zahra (a pseudonym) in Jakarta; 26 October, 2004. Further references to Az-Zahra are from this source.

9 UIN stands for *Universitas Islam Negeri* (the State Islamic University) which was previously called IAIN, the State Institute for Islamic Studies.
both of these aspects, Abdullah asserted that Islam will continue to be interpreted as it was in the era of the Prophet, when the Qur’an was written down. As a result, this narrow understanding of Islam will be as small as an atom in relation to the whole entity of Islam.¹⁰

In terms of the treatment of the sacred texts, Husein Muhammad, a kiai who is concerned about gender issues, also thinks that requiring women to veil themselves cannot be the main concern; even though some people assume the directives gleaned from the sacred texts are a certitude (qath’i). According to Husein Muhammad, any text dealing with human relations, except those giving instructions for ritual worship (ibadah), can be changed in accordance with the contemporary social and cultural context. “The main point for Muslims is moral values, not the literal meaning,” he remarked. According to him, the literal meaning of the texts is an example of how universal ideas of morality can be embodied in a particular way in a certain space and time. He claimed that the prescription of veiling is not a crucial issue in Islam in comparison to other humanitarian issues, such as helping people and being kind to everyone.¹¹ Turning to the sacred texts, Ulil also does not treat the veiling proposition (ayat) as a definite stipulation. According to him, every single verse in the Qur’an does not have the same status. One verse might have a constitutional character which Muslims regard as mandatory, while another one may be regarded as optional. In a similar vein to Muhammad, Ulil asserted that Islam should be interpreted contextually; that is, in accordance with the values of Malay or Southeast Asian culture. His arguments are based on his concern that the essence of Islam be delineated clearly, distinguishing between the Arabic cultural creation and the fundamental truths embodied in its doctrines.

Another criticism of ‘Islamic veiling’ is based on the idea that a liberating strategy should be linked to the practice of veiling. In the spirit of Islam as a liberation theology, Lies Marcoes, an NGO activist, believes that the veiling encouraged in Islam liberates women from an inhuman way of life. Marcoes asserted

¹¹ Interview with Kyai Husein Muhammad in Cirebon; 18 November, 2004.
that veiling absorbed the idea of the covered body. According to her, the history of the practice of veiling reveals that it was originally confined to the elite class, who used to display their bosoms to show off their finery. Marcoes claimed that such a practice is proscribed in the Qur’an (24:31). Therefore, the prescriptions of the Qur’an on veiling were connected with eliminating social classes. She said that veiling provided freedom for people from the lower social class, because they were no longer slaves; while for the upper class, veiling was intended to cover the bosom in public. Marcoes speculates that encouraging women to wear the veil ameliorated two problems. It liberated women from unequal treatment on the one hand and from worldly lust on the other.¹²

(2) Conceptualising Indonesian Islam

There has been much criticism about the relevance of ‘Islamic veiling’ (jilbab) in the Indonesian context, since it is a relatively new phenomenon among Muslim women. One criticism is based on whether Indonesian culture is similar to the Arabic culture where Islam originated. As with a previous reformer, Nurcholish Madjid, Ulil Absar Abdalla argued that the jilbab is characteristic of Arab culture like wearing jeans belongs to American culture, the pashmina belongs to Indian culture, and the abaya to Saudi culture. He pointed out that the appearances of Arabic culture need not necessarily be followed by Indonesian Muslims. Moreover, Maula maintained that veiling has no traditional reference to the archipelago’s indigenous customs. Therefore, he believed that it does not have strong roots. Maula showed that throughout the archipelago traditional clothing is not worn with a veil, although some garments, such as those worn by Minangkabau and Aceh women, resemble the veil in their style.

Nevertheless, the loose headscarf (kerudung) has long been a traditional item of clothing among a certain group of Muslim women who are well known as santri, or by those who have gone to Mecca for the pilgrimage (haji). Amin Abdullah recounted that his mother wore a loose headscarf (kerudung) as a reflection of the

¹² Interview with Lies Marcoes in Jakarta; 17 September 2004. Further references to Marcoes are from this interview.
indigenous practice (khas keindonesiaan) of Muslim women. Similarly, Lies Marcoes argued that the concept of the jilbab was not popular among female Muslims. She praised Mrs. Wahid Hasyim’s practice of wearing a loose veil (kerudung) in public (she was the wife of the Minister of Religion during Soekarno’s regime), and that of Ibu Fatmawati (Soekarno’s wife); she argued that their individual decision tended to symbolise maturity. Ulil contended that the criteria of Islamic clothing are those which comply with the standards of public decency and which dignify people’s honour as human beings. Moreover, Islamic teachings do not recognise only a single type of clothing. As Ulil believes that not a single society recognises nudity as decent in public, he is not worried as long as ‘public decency’ becomes the standard for the way people dress. Similarly, Marcoes is opposed to the assumption that the righteous embodiment of Islam is wearing the veil (jilbab), and that there are no other alternatives available for producing an Islamic appearance. She believes that the practice of veiling will strengthen the social strata and encourage people to attach more significance to differences. “The pluralistic perspective has perished and been replaced by a monolithic point of view, because Islamic identity has become embodied in a single symbol,” she remarked.

Among moderate Muslims, veiling is not regarded as a compulsory practice. Ulil asserted that he is not against the wearing of the jilbab. However, he does oppose the viewpoint that the jilbab is the only form of Islamic clothing. He maintains that he defends people’s right to wear the jilbab, as he does the right of the French to ban wearing the veil in public schools. Nevertheless, he is against the imposition of the jilbab in the public sphere. Another view based on a looser standard of female modesty has been delivered by Quraish Shihab, a prominent Indonesian mufassir. Shihab argued that the crucial criterion for female clothing is that women who wear it appear respectable. He referred to the practice of NU and Muhammadiyah women who did not wear the jilbab, particularly a few years ago. According to Shihab, most ulama in NU and Muhammadiyah tend to allow their wives and daughters not to wear the jilbab. He speculated that it is impossible that these ulama did not know about the verse on veiling. Shihab sensed that for certain reasons those ulama did not regard wearing the jilbab as an important practice.
Maula argued that it would be impossible for him to campaign against the practice of veiling despite its anomalistic inclination. According to him, wearing the veil should be a secondary issue among Muslims because it is not a substantial aspect of Islam. Maula maintained that it is as ridiculous for Muslims to struggle against wearing the *jilbab* as it is to regard veiling (*jilbab*) as not being part of Islam. It is profoundly problematic.

The modernist Muslim project of conceptualising Islamic clothing hit a dead-end, since they were aware of the indefinite nature of veiling practice in the Islamic tradition. Some of them could not find a clear definition of Islamic clothing for women. For example, Musdah Mulia failed to find a single definition of Islamic clothing. According to her, there are no appropriate criteria for Islamic clothing. “As long as clothing does not entice people and arouse their sexual desire, it fulfils Islamic criteria,” she remarked. Therefore, Mulia argued, it is very open to interpretation. In the Islamic tradition there are various interpretations of Islamic clothing, she said. Some scholars refer to *busana muslim* as the costume commonly worn by most Indonesian Muslims; some others say it must cover the whole body, except the eyes. But some other scholars argue that Islamic clothing refers to garments which cover the parts of the body which are commonly covered in the culture concerned.

At this point, it is possible to approach the idea of conceptualising Indonesian Islam in terms of outward appearance. According to Mulia, If wearing a skirt is considered modest in a given culture, this fulfils the Islamic criteria, because it is in keeping with the principle criterion of modesty. 13 The lack of clarity in the criteria determining ‘proper’ Islamic clothing was also felt by the late Harun Nasution, a prominent Muslim reformer: “The opinion saying that wearing the *hijab* is mandatory could be right; and those who have the opinion that it is not mandatory could be correct as well. A clear definition of the *hijab* is not stated in the *Qur’ān* and reliable *hadith* (*mutawatir*)” (Nasution 1995:332).

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Dealing with exclusive and oppressive ways of thinking in relation to the practice of veiling, Lies Marcoes perceived that currently there is a sort of pressure coming from veiled women towards the unveiled: they are stigmatised as imperfect Muslims or not good Muslims. As a Muslim feminist, Marcoes admitted that she will don the veil as long as there is no pressure to wear it. Also, she will voluntarily wear the veil in order not to become alienated from the community. In this regard, she would like to be a Muslim without having to wear the veil. Musda Mulia, who conducts research on Islam and pluralism, is concerned with the practice of veiling in a different way. She has found that some people who wear the veil consider unveiled women unfaithful Muslims; whereas Mulia believes that one’s being a faithful Muslim should be based on one’s morality in dealing with human relationships and humanity in general. Mulia rejected the view that the quality of a Muslim’s faith can be measured by the symbol of the veil, and outward forms of ritual worship such as prayer, fasting or pilgrimage. Similarly, Ulil speculated that the more religious people are, the more exclusive they become. Ideologically-committed, veiled Muslims tend to exclude other groups in the community and are suspicious of non-Islamic life-styles. Given these facts, Ulil maintained that in Indonesia religiosity has been trapped into a ‘banal immediacy’. This means that Muslims tend to engage the symbolic aspects of their religion for artificial purposes.

B. Social Criticism

(1) The Current Practice of Islamic Dress

The practice of veiling in Indonesia grew in a dynamic way. It was once a marginal expression of Muslim identity worn by certain groups (for instance, santri); now it is common practice. Since the end of the New Order, veiling has been promoted in various ways and by various agents. On one hand, it has become a promising commodity which has fostered industry and commerce; conversely it has itself been pervaded by those forces. Capitalism has played a significant role in promoting fashionable Islamic clothing, while Muslim consumers have increased in numbers in response to the widespread promotion of Islamic clothing. On the other hand, veiling has slowly declined as a religious symbol. The veil has complex
meanings for those who wear it, not only in regard to religious identity, but also in relation to fashion trends, lifestyle and new products for consumers.

Muslims have differing views about the growing number of women who wear the veil. Maula believes that the current pervasiveness of veiling was triggered by industrial trends and then backed up by cultural agents. According to him, the availability of veils in different styles and colours at the market has encouraged Muslim women to wear it as a fashion item. Moreover, he observed that wearing the veil has been supported by the *dakwah*-based ideas disseminated by modern media such as the *sinetron* (electronic cinema), short-stories in Islamic publications, newspaper articles and so forth, all of which campaign for it. Meanwhile, Fatimah Az-Zahra has argued that the increasing variety of veiling practices is associated with the phenomenon of globalisation. She asserts that external influences have penetrated local cultures: not only western commercial innovations like McDonalds, but also Iranian-style Islam came to Indonesia in the 1980s. Az-Zahra believes that in its global interactions, capitalism has played a significant role in social changes, including the transformation of veiling practice. The variety and availability of veils on the market display how capitalism has successfully embraced this religious symbol to advance commercial interests. On one hand, Az-Zahra argues that there are many people who are advantaged by the ‘selling of Islam’. On the other, Marcoes claims that the phenomenon is the result of a combination of fashion trends (capitalism), popular frustration with Indonesia’s never-ending socio-political problems, and the general inclination of Muslims to be pious (*saleh*). People want to be more secure, to live clean lives, and to avoid dealing with anything that goes against morality. In this regard, she believes that the more corrupted people are, the more veiled Moslems there will be.\(^{14}\)

Criticism of current veiling practice encompasses various social dimensions. According to Maula, a growing number of Muslim women who wear the veil have been trapped into a commodification and politicisation of their religion that employs religious symbols as part of a camouflaging process rather than encouraging an

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\(^{14}\) Interview with Lies Marcoes in Jakarta; September 17, 2004. See also her article at [www.gusdurnet.id](http://www.gusdurnet.id); March 12, 2004.
internalisation of religious values that will bring about a deeper understanding of Islam. There has been a trend among those who wear the veil to imitate the veiling styles of people from higher classes. In this regard, Maula argued that those lower-class Muslims who imitate the veiling styles of middle-class Muslims tend to view Islam on a surface level. Maula maintained that the imitation occurred because the oppressed agents wanted to imitate their oppressors, but there was also something ambivalent in their mimicry. Maula pointed to a similar ambivalence among those nominal Muslims who do not perform the daily prayers, but nonetheless wear the veil in public. For Maula, this kind of veiling practice is artificial: it might be motivated by the need to adapt socially, the hope of economic gain, the desire to ingratiate oneself with the boss and so forth, rather than by religious conviction. He believes that a greater number of veil-wearing women are influenced by social and economic factors rather than by religious ones, or because veiling is associated with religious awareness.\textsuperscript{15}

Since the association between veiling and religion has become tenuous, the assumption that increased veiling is linked to Islamic revivalism might be misleading. Zuly Qodir, a coordinator of the Islamic Network of Muhammadiyah Youth (JIMM), argued that the increase in veiling does not necessarily indicate the presence of an Islamic revival in Indonesia, since it plays out on an artificial level, not a substantial one. Moreover, he found that veiling tends to be related to fashion rather than to religious awakening as happened in the 1980s. Similarly, the positive image attached to veiling might have a contradictory significance for those who wear it. According to Marcoses, certain groups which have been advantaged by the jilbab campaign have an interest in using Islamic symbols, particularly purification symbols. Marcoses maintained that these people want to use positive symbols to balance their wrongdoings and abuses. She posited that the more widespread the trend to wear the jilbab (as an Islamic symbol) became, the more social abuses occurred. Marcoses argued that the institutionalisation of Islamic clothing is intended to wipe out corrupt practices among the people. In this regard, Qodir argued that the ritualistic,

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid.
formalistic and symbolic aspects of religion are problematic: therefore, he suggested the need for a promotion of religious values that is more substantial than symbolic.

(2) The Imposition of Islamic Clothing

While the practice of veiling has been popular among Muslims, the idea of formalising Islamic criteria and imposing them on clothing worn in public has emerged with increasing frequency in certain institutions and regions. There are many agendas behind the formalisation of Islamic clothing, including controlling public morality, aspirations for reform and a sense of collective identity. These agendas have not only shifted the significance of the veil among its wearers; they have also fostered a form of social and political oppression. The experience of Muslims in West Sumatra (see Chapter 5) showed that veiling tended to take on a purely formal meaning for those who wore it after Islamic clothing was imposed in public. In addition, the imposition of Islamic clothing on all social groups led to ideological violence. This current development in veiling practice precipitates criticism, and draws attention to the problematic of institutionalising Islamic clothing by decree.

The formalisation of veil-wearing by means of political agents and instruments has devastated social order and disadvantaged many people in various regions. According to Maula, the imposition of veiling has massively increased the number of veil-wearers in some regions; nevertheless, it will also be a turning-point, because a practice that should be undertaken voluntarily and naturally has been turned into an imposition and an obligation. He believes that this political endeavour will collide with the principle of human freedom. Moreover, such regulations have been imposed with a ‘sweeping’ attitude: no allowance has been made for the feelings and practices of non-Muslims. In a syaria-based region, Maula found that some people had reacted against the regulation by establishing a de-veiling movement. At this point, Maula felt, veiled women had become political victims; furthermore, they completely ignored the right to freedom of expression possessed by unveiled women. This is in contrast to the situation in the 1980s, when the veiling movement was an expression of religious identity, and protagonistic in nature. The formalisation of veiling,
according to Maula, has created alienation between religious people and their religious teachings. The quality of the people who currently wear the veil has altered, because of the intervention of political agents in the field of the private: this represents a radical departure from the early veiling movement, when women were proud to wear the veil voluntarily as an expression of their religious awareness.

The implementation of Islamic sharia law, which imposes Islamic veiling in public, is a reflection of the ignorance of the political elite: they have their priorities wrong in choosing the legislation they wish to implement. Lies Marcoes asked why hijabisasi was lumped into one package with the Islamic sharia implementation, whereas Islamic law should place more emphasis on good governance and anti-corruption policies. According to Marcoes, the so-called defenders of sharia who have pushed this trend towards imposing ‘Islamic’ standards actually have no well-formulated concept of what sharia is. For example, “they do not have any obvious concept of justice,” Marcoes remarked. Instead of promoting the complicated concept of universal values enshrined in the Qur’an, they have been trapped into a ‘banalisation’ of sharia by their presentation of the jilbab as an absolute symbol.

Meanwhile, Musdah Mulia asked why women should wear busana muslimah in the form of the jilbab. “How can that be?” Although she agrees that Muslim women should wear the jilbab, she disagrees with the legal enforcement of such a standard. Mulia believes that to do so contravenes Islamic principles: this is because to force someone to do something contradicts the essence of Islamic teachings. According to Mulia, religion and its obligations should be undertaken voluntarily, without any enforcement. If a practice has been regulated by law, this means that it is enforced. Mulia argued that Indonesia has a secular, state-based law: it is not an Islamic state, and this is inscribed in the Constitution (http://islamlib.com/id). In addition, Mulia claimed that when the sharia was formulated, those responsible did not involve representatives from as wide a cross-section of society as possible in their deliberations: in particular, they ignored women as agents. Likewise, Mulia lamented the over-riding Muslim concern with promoting symbolic and ritual forms of worship (ibadah mahdhah). She argued that the Islamic movement should be concerned with female labour (TKW), defending women against domestic violence, and female-
child-trafficking, rather than giving priority to questions of ritual worship and the wearing of religious symbols.\(^\text{16}\)

The implementation of regional laws formalising Islamic clothing made women the victims of male power. Fatimah Az-Zahra questioned why the Islamic movement tends to promote religious identity by positioning women in the front line. Why don’t regional laws treat men and women equally, rather than discriminating against women in their implementation. Similarly, Gadis Arivia, a female NGO activist has criticised the gender inequality embedded in the regional law. According to Arivia, formalising Islamic clothing means that the state believes that it must control how women behave and the clothes they wear. From this point of view, she asserted, the state is still dominated by men; it is, after all, only women who are targeted by this policy. Arivia speculated that the legal formalisation of Islamic clothing in the public sphere has disadvantaged women, and that women’s voices are ignored. Speaking from a woman’s perspective, she said that the regional laws are not credible.

The control of the state by non-professional officials, and the illogical rationale employed by agents in the executive branch of government to implement the formalisation of Islamic clothing, resulted in a parody of democracy. According to Arivia, the legislation of compulsory veiling was an attempt to control female morality. This exertion of external control certainly contravenes the aspirations of women’s groups. She questioned why state policy does not prioritise women’s rights, providing more work opportunities, and affording protection to victims of conflict and abuse. According to Arivia, the function of the state is not to control morality, but to facilitate programs to promote women’s rights. The overt reason offered for making veiling compulsory is to prevent cases of rape and sexual harassment; this does not make any sense to her. The simple assumption is that ‘women are raped by men because their clothing is improper’. “People are not allowed to rape women just because they are wearing mini-skirts, hot pants or seductive clothing,” she remarked. According to Arivia, the campaign for human rights and democracy should focus on

\(^{16}\) Interview with Siti Musdah Mulia in Jakarta; 12 September 2004. Further references to Mulia are from this source.
the principle that women should not be raped for any reason, no matter how seductive their clothing is. In this context, people have been deceived by their local governments, and the rationale offered to justify the regional acts imposing clothing regulations.

The politics of identity lurking behind the imposition of Islamic clothing violates the ideal principles of multiculturalism and pluralism. Gadis Arivia argued that the politics of identity contradicts the politics of difference which has been enshrined in the national motto: Bhineka Tunggal Ika (‘Unity in Diversity’). As a feminist activist, Arivia opposes any politics of identity that ignores a gendered perspective. Similarly, Amin Abdullah said that the politics of identity is the politics of defeat of the Muslim ummat by Western superiority. Amin argued that the politics of identity mostly presented by groups who advocate the imposition of Islamic sharia law is rhetorical and emotional; at the same time, modern ideas and scientific developments are almost completely neglected among Muslims. According to him, due to the inability of Muslims to compete successfully against ‘the other’, the discourse on wearing jilbab has been used as a form of escapism which becomes a cultural subconsciousness. Lies Marcoes also wonders whether engaging in the politics of identity will widen social gaps and magnify ostensible distinctions. According to Marcoes, the pluralistic perspective will perish, to be replaced by a monolithic point of view, because Islamic symbols are currently being presented in a single embodiment, and given a unitary significance.
C. CONCLUSION

There has been much criticism of the growing practice of veiling among Indonesian Muslims in the post New Order period. Instead of working towards overcoming current social problems, contemporary religious practice has promoted outward appearances: this has created new problems related to religious discourse and the social costs of imposing veiling. Religious criticism from moderate Muslims revealed the problematic issues associated with veiling; while social criticism explored the paradoxes in the current practice of veiling. While veiling is commonly considered mandatory by most Muslims, some Muslim intellectuals have challenged established doctrine by calling for consideration of the cultural setting of veiling. Since Ulil Absar Abdalla believed that the jilbab is a part of Arab culture, he discouraged Indonesian Muslims from wearing it. He then deconstructed the mandate of the jilbab, and found it to be optional. As Berger has argued, the inclination to change ‘from fate to choice’ is characteristic of intellectual heresies.

Nevertheless, the wish of some Muslim intellectuals to promote the kerudung (loose style of headscarf) expressed a counter discourse to that of the mandatory jilbab. According to the critics, the kerudung possesses historical and cultural significance in Indonesia but the jilbab does not. Therefore, the kerudung can be regarded as an example of Indonesian-style clothing (khas keindonesiaan), which can be worn without calling up any association with an absolutist outlook or external social pressure. In addition, most critics do not regard Islamic clothing to be an important issue: this is because clothing is a cultural element, not a religious one. Nevertheless, these critics do not campaign for the removal of the veil; nor do they gauge a person’s moral standing by whether or not she wears the veil.

According to the critics, both the veil and its wearers are peculiar. Although commodification, globalisation and Islamisation have all influenced veil-wearers, their initial will to purify themselves became camouflaged. They were trapped into practices associated with mimicry: lower-class women imitated higher-class women, and everyone copied celebrities and public figures. As a result, wearing the veil is no longer based on genuine personal religious awareness; rather, it arises from motives
of social adaptation, economic tactics, fashion, and other short-term aims. Instead of reflecting a new revival of Indonesian Islam, the growing popularity of wearing Islamic clothing conceals a religious movement towards the banal; furthermore, the veil now embodies contradictory meanings for those who wear it.

As a result of the imposition of Islamic clothing, social criticism revealed a paradox associated with the formalisation of religious identity. According to the critics, the imposition of Islamic clothing led to disadvantages rather than advantages in and for social life. At the level of their legal implementation, veiling laws not only worked against human freedom, but also encouraged people to resist by removing their veils. Under a religious regime, people become political victims and are alienated from the essential principles of religion. Finally, due to the ignorance of the political elite, the ideals of multiculturalism and pluralism are in slow decline.

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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION

The history of veiling in Indonesia reflects the development of Indonesian Islam in response to the changing social and political constellations produced by the continuous negotiations taking place among various social agencies. Although Muslims did not invent the concept of veiling, in Indonesia the practice of veiling represents a form of ‘cultural capital’ that is both accepted and contested among Muslims. The acceptance of veiling by many Muslims indicates that this increasingly pervasive practice is congruent with the intensifying Islamisation process currently taking place in Indonesia; nonetheless, veiling is continuously contested by some other Indonesian Muslims. The veil has acquired changing meanings among those who wear it. This evolution has not been as dramatic as it was for Iranian women. In Iran, women who had traditionally always worn the veil were forcibly unveiled by government edict in 1936; then in 1983 they were forced to put the veil back on when the regime changed (Milani 1999:19). The recent experience of Indonesia demonstrates that veiling, formerly found almost exclusively among santri (devout) Muslims, has been transformed into a popular practice among middle-class Muslims. This has occurred in the context of a decade-long conflict between Islam and the state. This trend culminated in the formalisation of Islamic attire in local government regulations in certain parts of Indonesia.

The exclusive practice of veiling by santri Muslims signified a level of orthodoxy and religious commitment which distinguished them from the abangan (nominal Muslims) in the Javanese social structure. The santri practice of wearing the kerudung (loose veil) was socialised as a modesty code and an expression of gender symbolism through various social institutions, including the family, Islamic schools, and religious organisations. Among Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) women, wearing the kerudung fulfils the Islamic injunction to cover the aurat: nevertheless, older NU women are not as strict about the practice as members of the younger generation.
Likewise, senior Muhammadiyah women are less strict about wearing the *kerudung* than their younger relatives and colleagues. The younger generation of Muhammadiyah women is involved in campaigning for veiling among young Muslims. According to women from both NU and Muhammadiyah, the growing trend for a wider assortment of Muslims from different backgrounds and classes to adopt the veil has advantaged them in their campaigning for stricter adherence to religious precepts. This is despite the fact that a style of attire once linked to being religious has now become fashionable. Beyond this social and political transformation, however, the practice of veiling among devout Muslims has penetrated the sphere of what Bourdieu calls *habitus*, which operates beneath the levels of both consciousness and language. *Habitus* functions outside one's own will; yet it determines one's manner of life.

In the hands of the promoters of Islamist ideology, the concept of the headscarf was renewed to become a symbol of militant and uncompromising protest and resistance against the state. During the New Order regime, a ‘new’ form of veiling which covered the whole female body and required the *jilbab* (tight veil) replaced the optional *kerudung* (loose veil) that had traditionally been worn by female Muslims in Indonesia. The social and cultural transformation of veiling was linked to a long period of contestation and controversy: between Islamic groups and the state on one hand, and Islamist groups *vis-à-vis* moderate Muslims on the other. The decision of girls influenced by Islamist ideas to wear *jilbab* at public schools was opposed by the state bureaucracy, both in national regulations and through the development and administration of local policies. As a result, a formerly religious motivation became linked to a political movement which involved power and resistance: the negotiations about what it was appropriate to wear in public went far beyond a simple question of fashion. The ruling regime suspected that the growing practice of veiling masked a political movement designed to undermine the legitimacy of the state; those who wore the veil expressed their resistance to a regime which not only marginalised Islamic groups politically, but also allegedly endorsed a corrupt system. These social and political tensions eased after the ruling regime turned its affiliation away from *abangan* and Christian circles toward Islamic groups, however. This ‘change of
heart’ at the top was congruent with accommodating religious symbols in public, including tolerating veil-wearing at public schools.

In the meantime, the issue of veiling has also fuelled an unending debate between Islamist groups and moderate Muslims. Some people argue that veiling is based on convincing references in Islamic texts; others reject the notion that Islam provides any definite criteria for Islamic dress. Differing interpretations of the Qur’anic verses (ayat) regarding veiling (33:59; 24:31) have led Muslims to make various pronouncements on the subject. Although both groups agree with the idea of covering the aurat and with the reason for the revelation of the veiling verses (asbab al-nuzul), they have complex differences of opinion about certain aspects of the question. While Islamists believe that the practice of veiling is mandatory, and is the realisation of the injunction to cover the aurat, moderate Muslims argue that the obligation to wear the veil was confined to the Prophet’s wives. Syadzali proposed distinguishing two versions of the female aurat: one for the purpose of ordinary social practice in public places, and the other for ritual prayer (shalat) (Panji Masyarakat, No. 450, 1984:18). Madjid believes that the mention of veiling in the Qur’an relates to covering the bosom, not the hair; hence he concludes that the hair is not part of the female aurat (Matra, December 1992:18). Although these polemics never achieved any agreement about veiling in Islam, younger Muslims have continued the search for an Indonesian form of Islam which allows for indigenous standards regarding personal appearance in varying social settings.

Although the ‘new veiling’ practice was a source of controversy between an absolutist state and moderate Muslims during the 1980s, since then veiling has become increasingly pervasive among middle-class Muslims. This is due to the wave of Islamisation that has permeated various social classes. After the ruling regime accommodated veiling within its political policy, wearing the veil at public schools was no longer a problem. The management at certain schools even encouraged Muslim students to wear the veil on certain days because Islamisation had occurred by then in public schools. A similar phenomenon of intensifying veiling was seen among university students after campus mosques established strong networks during the Islamic movement in the 1980s. Meanwhile, the transformed appearance of some
celebrities also played a significant role in promoting the veil and Islamic clothing (busana Muslim). Some celebrities took up the veil as a symbol of their intensified religiosity. Some of them, such as Ratih Sanggarwati and Inneke Koestersawati, have commodified the veil in various ways, promoting it in commercial advertisements and fashion shows. In addition, the emergence of an Islamic media encouraged Muslims to take up the veil. Veiling is no longer merely a religious garment; it is also a fashion trend which offers many alternative styles.

When Islamisation strengthens to a certain level in a given Muslim community, the practice of veiling is no longer encouraged by moral and religious appeals alone; it is further enacted in the civil law. This trend is exemplified in the growing number of perda (regional laws) based on syaria which have been enacted in certain regions of Indonesia. The experience of Minangkabau people in West Sumatra shows that the idea of implementing Islamic precepts can sometimes be amalgamated with local adat to become a widely-accepted aspiration. The concept of veiling was claimed as an aspect of local identity, and formulated into a dress code supported by strong religious arguments. The imposition of veiling created social and constitutional problems, however. Instead of encouraging religious awareness, the public regulation of veiling fostered the opposite effect: the veil took on a purely formal meaning for those required to wear it. For students at urban public schools, the veil is merely part of a uniform that must be worn within the school complex; while for Minangkabau women in rural areas it has become a type of formal garment that is worn for baralek (wedding ceremonies) and going to market. To some extent the imposition of veiling has become a tool of oppression, particularly for non-Muslim students forced to adopt an (outward) Islamic identity: this is in stark contrast to its earlier significance as a medium of personal liberation.

The formalisation of Islamic attire in parts of Indonesia exhibits some of the characteristics of orthodoxy identified by Bernirblau (2001). His analysis refers to collaboration among social groups; control of the means of material, intellectual and symbolic production; constructing correct and incorrect forms of belief and praxis; and the engagement of a coercive mechanism. Meanwhile, since the widespread formalisation of Islamic attire enacted in regional laws in parts of West Sumatra,
some local Muslims have criticised this as an unproductive practice: nevertheless, the supporters of formalisation outnumber the critics. At the national level, moderate Muslim scholars have expressed criticism of the practice of veiling and its development. Although their arguments against compulsory veiling reflect the continuity of opinion among members of the older generations of moderate Muslims, current public discussion of the veil has expanded to address wider issues. The question of veiling has become more complex: it is linked to ideas of piety, modesty, identity, and religious principles; and also to fashion, commerce, and celebrity. While the discourse about veiling has continued, its practice among Muslims has changed. Some cases of individuals deciding to remove their veils show that the decision to wear or not to wear the veil is part of a search for personal identity and for a distinctive way of practicing Islam.

All the transformations in Indonesian veiling practices over the last few decades indicate that there is an intertwined relationship between social, political and cultural developments. On the other hand, the changing social and political conditions in contemporary Indonesia have forced Muslims to negotiate their perspectives on Islam in accordance with their interests. While veiling was once used by Muslims to protest against the authoritarian New Order regime, in some parts of Indonesia it is now linked to bureaucratic efforts to insert a religious regime into the political structure; this is accomplished by means of regional laws which strengthen the public power of orthodoxy. In post-New Order Indonesian society, veiling has been promoted with religious nuances that are intertwined with commercial interests. Some middle-class women obtained a positive image of piety, modesty and religious identity by taking up the veil; others have challenged the practice because it disadvantaged them by limiting their social access and interactions. When the conflict between their modern careers and pastimes and wearing Islamic dress became too great, some women decided to remove their veils. At the level of religious discourse, some Muslims have campaigned for a single Islamic interpretation of veiling to maintain the established legitimacy of religious authority. Some other Muslims have stood out against accepting a single interpretation of religious texts: their priorities are to guarantee freedom of religious reasoning and to
campaign for the cultural contextualisation of religious doctrine. These social agents in the Indonesian Muslim community compete against each other in their mutual search for an Indonesian form of Islam in the changing context of daily life.

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APPENDICES

TEXT OF INDONESIAN NATIONAL AND REGIONAL LAWS REGARDING PROPER DRESS IN PUBLIC
APPENDIX 1

Keputusan
Direktur Jenderal Pendidikan Dasar dan Menengah
Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan
No. 052/C/Kep/D 82

Tentang

PEDOMAN PAKAIAN SERAGAM SEKOLAH
BAGI SISWA TAMAN KANAK-KANAK, SEKOLAH DASAR, SEKOLAH
MENENGAH TINGKAT PERTAMA DAN SEKOLAH MENENGAH
TINGKAT ATAS DALAM LINGKUNGAN PEMBINAAN DIREKTORAT
JENDERAL PENDIDIKAN DASAR DAN MENENGAH

DIREKTUR JENDERAL PENDIDIKAN DASAR DAN MENENGAH

Menimbang:

a. Bahwa pembinaan dan pengembangan kesiswaan sangat perlu
   untuk menciptakan suasana dan tata kehidupan sekolah yang baik
   dan sehat, sehingga akan menjamin terselenggaranya proses
   belajar mengajar dalam rangka membangun manusia Indonesia
   seutuhnya;

b. bahwa menciptakan suasana dan tata kehidupan sekolah yang baik
   merupakan modal dasar dari usaha meningkatkan Ketahanan
   Sekolah dalam rangka mewujudkan sekolah sebagai Pusat
   Kebudayaan;

c. Bahwa usaha meningkatkan Ketahanan Sekolah dapat dicapai bila
   para siswa memiliki rasa bangga yang wajar dan tidak berlebihan
   terhadap sekolahnya, serta setiap siswa merasa bahwa seorang
   siswa adalah saudara bagi siswa lainnya;

d. Bahwa agar usaha tersebut di atas dapat dilaksanakan sebaik-
   baiknya, maka perlu adanya pakaian seragam sekolah yang akan
   meninggikan citra siswa dan menumbuhkan rasa persatuan dan
   kesatuan serta jiwa korsa antar siswa;

e. Bahwa untuk itu dipandang perlu menetapkan Pedoman Pakaian
   Seragam Sekolah bagi Siswa Taman kanak-kanak, Sekolah Dasar,
   Sekolah Menengah Tingkat Pertama dan Sekolah Menengah
   Tingkat Atas dalam Lingkungan Pembinaan Direktorat Jenderal
   Pendidikan Dasar dan Menengah;

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Mengingat:

a. Keputusan Presiden Republik Indonesia:
   1. No. 44 tahun 1974;
   2. No. 45 tahun 1974 sebagaimana telah diubah/ditambah terakhir dengan Keputusan Presiden Republik Indonesia No. 27 tahun 1981;

b. Keputusan Menteri Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan:

c. Keputusan Direktur Jenderal Pendidikan Dasar dan Menengah:
   1. Tanggal 9 Juni 1980, No. 091/C/Kep/ O 80;
   2. Tanggal 8 Agustus 1981, No. 129/C/Kep/N 81;


MEMUTUSKAN:

BAB I
UMUM

Pasal 1

(1) Yang dimaksud dalam keputusan ini dengan Sekolah adalah:
   a). Taman kanak-kanak (TK), TK Pembina Negeri dan/atau TK Swasta;
   b). Sekolah Dasar (SD) Negeri dan Swasta;
   c). Sekolah Menengah Tingkat Pertama (SMTP), Umum, Kejuruan, baik Negeri maupun Swasta;
   d). Sekolah Menengah Tingkat Atas (SMTA), Umum, Kejuruan dan Keguruan, baik Negeri ataupun Swasta;
      dalam lingkungan pembinaan Direktorat Jenderal Pendidikan Dasar dan Menengah, termasuk Sekolah Indonesia di luar negeri.

(2). Yang dimaksud dengan Pakaian Seragam Sekolah adalah:
   a. Pakaian untuk digunakan saat belajar di sekolah, yang disatu ragamkan,
   b. Pakaian yang diatur bentuk/modal, warna, tambahan atribut dan cara penggunaannya.

(3). Pakaian Siswa disaturagamkan dimaksudkan agar:
   a). Menumbuhkan rasa persatuan dan kesatu an antar siswa, memperkuat jiwa korsa (esprit decorps), jiwa satu persaudaraan di antara mereka,
   b). Memperkecil rasa kebanggaan yang berlebih-lebihan dan mengembalikan ke rasa bangga yang wajar terhadap sekolahnya masing-masing.
   c). Memperkecil perbedaan status sosial keluarga dari mana murid/siswa berasal.

Bab II
PERLAKUAN TERHADAP PAKAIAN SERAGAM SEKOLAH
Pasal 2

(1) Pakaian seragam sekolah bila dikenakan sebaik-baiknya akan meninggikan citra siswa pada umumnya dan nama baik sekolah masing-masing pada khususnya.
Untuk mencapai itu, maka perlakuan terhadap pakaian seragam sekolah hendaknya:
   a). Bersih, lebih baik lagi bila diseterika,
   b). Rapih, baju/blus dimasukkan celana/rok, kancing-kancing digunakan, memakai ikat pinggang, tidak menambah atribut selain yang ditentukan,
c). Tidak lusuh warnanya,
d). Tidak membiarkan yang robek dan lepas jahitannya, supaya ditisik dan dijahit kembali,
e). Digunakan lengkap (sedapat mungkin) sesuai yang ditentukan,
f). Digunakan sesuai fungsinya, untuk upacara berbeda dengan untuk tidak upacara (harian).

(2) Pakaian Seragam Sekolah yang dikenakan seenaknya sendiri akan menurunkan citra siswa dan merusak nama baik sekolahnya, yaitu bila pakaian seragam tersbut: kotor, kumal, lusuh, robek/lepas jahitannya, baju dikenakan di luar celana, kemeja terbuka terlihat dada, atribut lain terpasang di sana sini, sepatu tidak mengenal semir atau dicuci dan sebagainya.

**BAB III**
**DISIPLIN DAN TANGGUNG JAWAB**

**Pasal 3**

(1) Berpakaian seragam sekolah memerlukan tertib dan disiplin, yaitu sikap menaati peraturan cara berpakaian dan mematuhi ketentuan yang telah disepakatkan. Sikap mental untuk taat dan patuh terhadap peraturan serta tata tertib akan menumbuhkan kesadaran peraturan serta tata tertib akan menumbuhkan kesadaran hukum dan disiplin diri, disiplin yang tumbuh dari dalam, tanpa paksaan dan tekanan orang lain. Disiplin diri akan membentuk disiplin kelompok, yang ada pada akhirnya memperkuat disiplin nasional.

(2) Setiap siswa selama berpakain sekolah bertanggung jawab untuk bersikap tingkah laku yang baik dalam menjaga citra siswa dan nama baik sekolahnya. Tanggung jawab moral tersebut akan dirasakan lebih berat dari pada pelanggaran terhadap peraturan dan tata tertib yang mengeluarkan sanksi.

**Pasal 4**

(1) Disiplin dan tanggung jawab siswa terhadap ketentuan Pakaian Seragam Sekolah dan terhadap cara berpakaian seragam sekolah dan terhadap cara berpakaian seragam, secara pribadi dapat dijadikan dasar bagi pemilihan siswa teladan dan secara kelompok dapat dijadikan dasar bagi lomba sekolah teladan.

(2) Agar supaya rasa disiplin dan tanggung jawab terhadap peraturan dan cara berpakaian seragam dapat tertanam baik, maka perhatian dan pengawasan guru, terutama orang tua, mutlak perlu.
BAB IV
JENIS, MACAM DAN BENTUK

Pasal 5

(1) Dilihat dari jenisnya, maka ada dua jenis pakaian seragam sekolah, yaitu pakaian untuk puteri dan untuk putera. Corak yang berbeda ini disesuaikan dengan sifat-sifat keputrian dan keputraan yang memang berbeda.

(2) Dilihat dari macamnya, maka ada pakaian seragam yang digunakan untuk upacara dan ada yang digunakan harian saat belajar di sekolah. Oleh karena prinsip satu ragam (seragam) maka perbedaan pakaian seragam upacara dengan pakaian seragam harian, adalah berupa tambahan-tambahan kecil yang dikenakan pada pakaian seragam harian dan dapat ditanggalkan kembali setelah upacara selesai dilaksanakan. Benda-benda tambahan dibawa dari rumah dan baru dikenakan saat upacara akan berlangsung dan ditanggalkan saat upacara selesai berakhir.

(3) Dilihat dari bentuknya, maka model dan warna pakaian seragam untuk TK, SD, SMP dan SMTA berbeda satu sama lain. Jenis, macam dna bentuk pakaian seragam untuk sekolah yang sejenjang harus sama, kecuali warna untuk pakaian seragam TK (sesuai dengan sifat-sifat masa usia TK) dibolehkan tidak sama agar meriah. Pilihan kombinasi warna untuk pakaian seragam TK diserahkan kepada para pengasuh TK.

(4) Bagi sekolah-sekolah (SD, SMTP, SMTA) yang berhubung pertimbangan agama dan adat istiadat setempat menghendaki macam dan bentuk berbeda terutama untuk jenis pakaian seragam puteri, maka dapat mengenakan pakaian seragam khas untuk seluruh siswa dalam satu sekolah.

Perbedaan itu terletak pada:
   a). Tutup kepala khas
   b). Ukuran panjang lengan blus
   c). Ukuran panjang rok

Pasal 6

Ragam pakaian lain yang selama ini dikenakan di sekolah, seperti:

1). Tekstil bermotif batik untuk baju dan blus, digunakan oleh kontingen sekolah bila akan mengikuti kegiatan-kegiatan kesiswaan misalnya: paduan suara (lomba seni siswa), gerak jalan, temu karya siswa, misi kebudayaan, wisata siswa, porseni dsb.

2). Seragam putih-putih, digunakan untuk kelompok pengibar dan petugas tata upacara bendera (lihat bab IX).

3). Seragam pramuka, digunakan oleh pelajar/siswa anggota pramuka, selama mereka berlatih rutin (120 menit), latihan khusus (menyesuaikan) atau sehari penuh (pada hari pramuka). Latihan rutin pramuka diadakan Sabtu petang,
Minggu pagi atau Minggu petang, di luar jam efektif belajar bagi gugus depan pramuka yang berpangkalan di lingkungan sekolah.

BAB V
MASA BERLAKU DAN PERALIHAN
Pasal 7


(2). Berlakunya pakaian seragam sekolah yang diatur dalam pedoman ini tidak serentak untuk seluruh siswa dari satu sekolah, melainkan hanya dikenakan kepada siswa kelas I dan II SMTP/SMTA sedangkan siswa kelas III hanya diwajibkan mengganti atribut. Untuk pakaian seragam sekolah siswa SD pelaksanaannya diatur sedemikian rupa sehingga dalam masa dua tahun, seluruh siswa d apat berpakaian seragam yang baru.

(3). Dengan demikian maka masa peralihan penggantian seragam dari yang lama ke yang baru, berlangsung selama dua tahun. Artinya setelah dua tahun (pada saat memasuki tahun ajaran 1984/1985) semua siswa telah mengenakan pakaian seragam sekolah yang diatur oleh pedoman ini.

(4). Masa peralihan ini perlu diadakan untuk tidak meresahkan dan menyulitkan orang tua/wali murid, juga perlu untuk memberi kesempatan kepada para pengusaha industri tekstil untuk menyediakan bahan yang diperlukan (kain dengan warna tertentu) di pasaran.

BAB IV
PENGADAAN
Pasal 8

(1). Pengadaan bahan pakaian seragam sekolah diusahakan oleh masing-masing sekolah dan tidak diusahakan terpusat oleh suatu badan yang semata-mata mencari keuntungan.

(2). Kalau mungkin pengadaan bahan pakaian seragam sekolah diusahakan melalui usaha Koperasi Sekolah, yang didukung oleh BP 3 dan guru-guru, untuk membangkitkan semangat berkooperasi di kalangan siswa.

(3). Orang tua/wali siswa dimungkinkan untuk mencari sendiri bahan pakaian seragam sekolah di pasaran, asalkan ketentuan mengenai bahan, warna dan bentuk/model sesuai dengan pedoman ini.
BAB VII
PENGUNAAN
Pasal 9

(1). Sesuai dengan bunyi ketentuan Bab I Pasal 1 ayat (2), maka pakaian seraga sekolah dikenakan setiap hari belajar di sekolah, kecuali hari Jum’at yang dianggap hari pendek, para siswa diizinkan untuk tidak mengenakan pakaian seragam sekolah. Para siswa hari itu mengenakan pakaian bebas yang rapih, sopan, sederhana, tidak menonjolkan perbedaan status sosial orang tua/keluarga dari mana siswa berasal.

(2). Mengenakan pakaian bebas (bukan seragam) pada hari Jumat itu dimaksudkan agar siswa tidak merasa jenuh, bosan dan tertekan, sebagai akibat dari penggunaan pakaian seragam setia hari.

(3). Apabila orang tua/wali siswa oleh karena keadaan ekonominya benar-benar tidak mampu untuk melengkapi pakaian seragam yang sesuai dengan ketentuan pedoman ini, maka diperbolehkan putera atau puterinya menggunakan sebagian dari ketentuan; tidak dibenarkan pihak manapun memaksakan, malah harus dibantu untuk dapat melengkapinya.

Perlu dicegah agar tidak dicemoohkan oleh kawan-kawan mereka yang mampu melengkap.

BAB VIII
PAKAIAN SERAGAM SEKOLAH
DENGAN KELENGKAPANNYA
Pasal 10

Pakaian seragam siswa Taman Kanak-kanak:

1. Seragam Harian Puteri, mengenakan:
   - Blus, bentuk biasa, kerah bulat lengan pendek tanpa saku, dikenakan di dalam rok.
   - Rok, bentuk terusan, tanpa lengan, lubang leher lebar (everhoier), dua saku tempel di sebelah depan panjang rok 3 cm di atas lutut,
   - Kaus kaki, pendek model puteri, warna sama dalam satu sekolah,
   - Sepatu, model puteri, bentuk rendah, tertutup dengan tali sepatu warna sama dalam satu sekolah.

2. Seragam Upacara Puteri, perbedaan dan/atau tambahan mengenakan:
   - Tutup kepala, model puteri,
   - Blus bentuk biasa, kerah bulat, lengan panjang, tanpa saku,
- Dasi

3. Seragam Harian Putera, mengenakan:
   - Baju, kemeja biasa, kerah model sport, lengan panjang tanpa saku,
   - Rompi, berkancing tiga di depan warna sama dengan celana,
   - Dasi

4. Seragam Upacara putera, perbedaan dan/atau tambahan mengenakan:
   - Tutup kepala model putera
   - Baju, kemeja biasa, kerah model sport, lengan panjang tanpa saku,
   - Rompi, berkancing tiga di depan warna sama dengan celana,
   - Dasi

5. Tanda-tanda, siswa puteri atau putera mengenakan:
   - badge Taman Kanak-kanak, dikemukakan pada “tali” rok sebelah kiri setinggi dada atau pada rompi sebelah kiri setinggi dada, bahan kain.
   - Tanda lokasi, tertulis nama sekolah, dikenakan di lengan blus/kemeja sebelah kanan dekat jahitan bahu, tulisan hitam, bahan kain.
   - Tanda nama, dikenakan pada tali rok sebelah kanan setinggi dada atau rompi sebelah kiri dada, warna dasar hitam, tulisan putih, bahan kain.
   - Tanda topi, dikenakan pada tutup kepala sebelah depan.


**Pasal 11**

Pakaian seragam siswa Sekolah Dasar.

1. Seragam Harian Puteri Sekolah Dasar:
   - Blus, bentuk biasa, memakai kancing kerah bentuk shiller, lengan pendek memakai satu saku tanpa tutup sebelah kiri, warna putih, blus dipakai di dalam rok.
   - Rok, bentuk plooirok, minimal jumlah lipatan 15, tanpa saku panjang rok 5 cm di atas lutut, warna merah.
   - Kaus kaki, pendek model puteri, warna:putih.
   - Sepatu, model puteri, bentuk rendah, tertutup (dengan atau tanpa tali sepatu), tumit rendah, warna: hitam, bahan dari kain atau kulit.

2. Seragam Upacara Puteri, tambahan, mengenakan:
   - Tutup kepala, warna: merah hati dan putih.
- Dasi, warna: merah hati.

3. Seragam Harian Putera, mengenakan:

- Baju, kemeja biasa, kerah model sport, lengan pendek memakai satu saku tanpa tutup sebelah kiri, warna: putih, kemeja dipakai di dalam celana.
- Celana pendek, model biasa, panjang celana 10 cm di atas lutut bagian pinggang disediakan untuk ikat pinggang, saku biasa di sebelah kiri dan kanan, warna: merah hati.
- Ikat pinggang, lebar 2 cm; warna: hitam.
- Kaus kaki, pendek, warna: putih.
- Sepatu, model putera, bentuk rendah, tertutup dengan tali sepatu; warna: hitam, bahan dari kain atau kulit.

4. Seragam Upacara putera, tambahan mengenakan:

- Tutup kepala, warna: merah hati dan putih.
- Dasi, warna: merah hati.

5. Tanda-tanda, siswa puteri atau putera mengenakan:

- Badge sekolah dasar, dikenakan pada saku blus/kemeja; bahan kain,
- Tanda lokasi, tertulis nama sekolah, nomor dan kabupaten/Kotamadya; dikenakan di lengan blus/kemeja kanan dekat jahitan bahu; tulisan hitam; bahan kain.
- Tanda nama, dikenakan pada blus/kemeja sebelah kanan setinggi dada; warna dasar: hitam, tulisan putih, bahan kain.
- Tanda topi, dikenakan pada tutup kepala sekolah depan.

Pasal 12

Pakaian seragam siswa sekolah Menengah Tingkat Pertama

1. Seragam harian puteri, mengenakan:

1. Blus, bentuk biasa, memakai kancing, kerah bentuk schiller; lengan pendek; memakai satu saku tanpa tutup sebelah kiri dada; warna: putih; blus dipakai di dalam rok.
2. Rok, dengan dua stolplooi di sebelah depan; ritsleting di belakang; satu suku tersembunyi di samping kiri; di pinggang disediakan tempat ikat pinggang, panjang rok 5 cm di bawah lutut, warna: biru hitam (blue black),
3. Ikat pinggang lebar 5 cm, warna hitam.
5. Sepatu, model puteri, bentuk rendah, tertutup (dengan atau tanpa tali sepatu), tumit rendah; warna: hitam; bahan dari kain atau kulit.
2. Seragam Upacara Puteri, tambahan, mengenakan:
   - Tutup kepala, warna: biru hitam dan putih.
   - Dasi, warna: biru hitam.

3. Seragam Harian Putera, mengenakan:
   - Baju, kemeja biasa; kerah model sport; lengan pendek; memakai satu saku tanpa penutup sebelah kiri dada, warna: putih, kemeja di dalam celana.
   - Celana pendek, model biasa, panjang celana 10 cm di atas lutut; bagian pinggang disediakan untuk ikat pinggang; satu saku biasa di samping kiri kanan dan satu di belakang kanan pakai tutup; warna: biru hitam.
   - Ikat pinggang, lebar 2cm; warna: hitam.
   - Kaus kaki, ukuran bawah betis, warna: putih.
   - Sepatu, model putera, bentuk rendah, tertutup dengan tali sepatu, warna: hitam bahan dari kain atau kulit.

4. Seragam Upacara Putera, tambahan mengenakan:
   - Tutup kepala, warna: biru hitam dan putih
   - Dasi, warna: biru hitam.

5. Tanda-tanda, siswa puteri atau putera mengenakan:
   - Badge OSIS SMTP, dikenakan pada saku blus/kemeja; bahan kain,
   - Tanda lokasi, tertulis nama sekolah, nomor dan kabupaten/kotamadya dikenakan pada lengan blus/kemeja kanan dekat jahitan bahu; tulisan hitam; bahan kain.
   - Tanda nama, dikenakan pada blus/kemeja sebelah kanan setinggi dada; warna dasar:hitam, tulisan putih; bahan kain.
   - Tanda topi, dikenakan pada tutup kepala sebelah depan.

Pasal 13
Pakaian seragam siswa Sekolah Menengah Tingkat Atas:
1. Seragam harian puteri, mengenakan:
   - Blus, bentuk biasa, memakai kancing; kerah bentuk Schiller; lengan pendek, memakai satu saku tanpa tutup sebelah kiri dada; warna putih blus dipakai di dalam rok.
   - Rok, dengan satu stolplooi di sebelah depan, ritsleting di belakang satu saku tersembunyi di samping kiri; di pinggang disediakan tempat ikat pinggang; panjang rok 5 cm di bawah lutut; warna: abu-abu.
   - Ikat pinggang, lebar 1,5 cm; warna: hitam.
   - Kaus kaki, pendek, warna: putih.
2. Seragam Upacara Puteri, tambahan, mengenakan:
   - Tutup kepala, warna: abu-abu dan putih.
   - Dasi, warna: abu-abu

3. Seragam Harian Putera, mengenakan:
   - Baju, kemeja biasa; kerah model sport; lengan pendek; memakai satu saku tanpa tutup sebelah kiri dada, warna: putih; kemeja dipakai di dalam celana.
   - Celana panjang, model biasa tanpa lipatan; panjang celana sampai mata kaki; lebar bawah maksimum 25 cm; bagian pinggang disediakan untuk ikat pinggang; saku biasa di samping kiri kanan satu dan satu di belakang kanan dengan tutup; warna: abu-abu.
   - Ikat pinggang, lebar 3 cm; warna: hitam,
   - Kaus kaki, pendek, warna: hitam.
   - Sepatu, model putera, bentuk rendah, tertutup dengan tali sepatu; warna: hitam; bahan dari kain atau kulit.

4. Seragam Upacara Putera, tambahan mengenakan:
   - Tutup kepala, warna: abu-abu dan putih,
   - Dasi, warna: abu-abu.

5. Tanda-tanda, siswa puteri dan putera mengenakan:
   - Badge OSIS SMTA, dikenakan pada saku blus/kemeja; bahan kain,
   - Tanda lokasi, tertulis nama sekolah, nomor dan kabupaten/kotamadya dikenakan pada lengan blus/kemeja kanan dekat jahitan bahu; tulisan hitam; bahan kain.
   - Tanda nama, dikenakan pada blus/kemeja sebelah kanan setinggi dada; warna dasar: hitam, tulisan putih; bahan kain.
   - Tanda topi, dikenakan pada tutup kepala sebelah depan.

BAB IX
PAKAIAN SERAGAM KELOMPOK PENGIBAR DAN PETUGAS TATA UPACARA BENDERA
Pasal 14
(1). Sesuai dengan bunyi ketentuan Bab IV, Pasal 6, butir 2, pakaian seragam putih-putih digunakan untuk para anggota kelompok pengibar dan petugas tata upacaa bendera.
(2). Kelompok pengibar dan petugas tata upacara bendera berjumlah 11 (sebelas) orang siswa putera/puteri, yang terdiri dari: seorang pembaca acara, seorang
pemimpin upacara, seorang pembaca Pembukaan UUD 1945, tiga orang pengibar, seorang dirigen lagu/paduan suara, tiga orang pemimpin kelompok barisan (SM, kelas I, II dan III, serta SD pasukan I, II dan III) dan seorang pendamping pembina upacara. Bila perlu ditambah tiga orang cadangan.

(3). Pakaian seragam putih-putih ini hanya dikenakan pada saat berlangsungnya upacara dan tidak digunakan sebagai pakaian seragam sekolah harian, artinya setelah upacara selesai para pengibar dan petugas menanggalkan seragam itu dan kemudian mengenakan pakaian seragam sekolah harian.

(4). Seragam putih-putih memiliki kekhasan pada: kemeja lengan panjang, seraf (setengah leher) berwarna merah, tutup kepala berupa peci hitam, sarung tangan dan lencana.

BAB X
PENUTUP

Pasal 15

Pedoman pakaian seragam sekolah ini dalam pelaksanaannya memerlukan peranan aktif dan bantuan dari para orang tua/wali siswa, para pendidik dan berbagai unsur masyarakat serta disiplin para siswa sendiri yang bila dilaksanakan dengan baik akan menumbuhkan citra siswa dan nama baik sekolah, jiwa persaudaraan; rasa persatuan dan kesatuan, rasa tanggung jawab terhadap peraturan; semua itu sangat diperlukan sebagai modal dasar dari usaha meningkatkan Ketahanan Sekolah yang menunjang terwujudnya sekolah sebagai Pusat Kebudayaan dalam rangka membangun manusia Indonesia seutuhnya.

Pasal 16

(1). Hal-hal lain yang belum diatur dalam pedoman ini akan diatur lebih lanjut dalam ketentuan tersendiri.

(2). Pedoman ini mulai berlaku pada tanggal ditetapkan

Ditetapkan di Jakarta
Pada tanggal 17 Maret 1982
Direktur Jenderal Pendidikan Dasar dan Menengah

t.t.d

Prof. Darji Darmodihardjo, S.H.

NIP: 130 676 351
ENGLISH VERSION

Decree of the Director General of Primary and Secondary Department of Education and Culture
No. 052/C/Kep/D 82

Concerning

SCHOOL UNIFORM CODES FOR KINDERGARTEN, ELEMENTARY, JUNIOR AND SENIOR HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF THE DIRECTORATE GENERAL OF PRIMARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION

DIRECTOR GENERAL OF PRIMARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION

Considering:

a. That the education and development of school students is extremely important in creating a friendly and healthy school environment and to ensure the success of the learning and teaching process in order to establish a better quality of Indonesian people.
b. That the creation of a friendly and healthy school environment is an important element in the efforts to increase the role of the school in order to implement the idea of the school as a cultural centre.
c. That these efforts to maximize the role of the school are achievable if students’ possesses a certain – not exaggerated – sense of pride in the school and a sense of brotherhood.
d. That for these objectives to be implemented well, it is important to regulate school uniform to increase the good image of the students, the sense of integrity and unity [for the country] and sense of esprit de corps.
e. That it is viewed as important to regulate codes for school uniform for students of kindergarten, elementary, junior high, and high schools under the supervision of the Directorate General of Primary and Secondary School.

Recalling:

a. Presidential Decrees:
   1. Number 44 Year 1974;
   2. Number 45 Year 1974 as amended/revised by the presidential Decree No. 27 Year 1981.
   3. Number 71/M Year 1979.
b. Minister of Education and Culture Decrees:
   1. Number 0323/U/1978, 28 October 1978;
c. Director General Primary and Secondary Education Decrees:
   1. Number 091/C/Kep/ O 80, 9 June 1980;
2. Number 129/C/Kep/N 81, 8 August 1981;

Giving appreciation to: The result of the “Small Seminar on Drafting the Rules and Guidance for the implementation of School Uniform”, which was attended by officials from central and regional governments, on 5 - 6 February 1982, in Wisata International Hotel Jakarta.

DECIDED:

To stipulate: The Codes for School Uniform for Students of Kindergarten, Elementary, Junior High, and High School under the supervision of the Directorate General of Primary and Secondary Education.

CHAPTER I
GENERAL
Article 1

(1) Definition of School in this Decree includes:
   a) Kindergarten, State-supervised Kindergarten and Private Kindergarten;
   b) Elementary School, State-owned or Private;
   c) Junior High School, Regular or Vocational, State-owned or Private;
   d) High School, Regular or vocational, or vocational teacher training schools, State-owned or Private; under the supervision of the Directorate General of Primary and Secondary Education, including Indonesian schools overseas.

(2). Definition of School Uniform covers:
   a) Set of clothes worn during learning at school, which is unified,
   b) Set of clothes, which is unified in its design, colour, and other attributes and the way it is worn.

(3). Aims of school uniform for students are:
   a) To encourage a sense of unity and integrity among students and to strengthen the esprit de corps, or sense of brotherhood among them,
   b) To decrease excessive pride in a school and to transform it into a sufficient level of pride of a school.
   c) To minimize social disparities among students concerning their social class.
CHAPTER II
CODES IN REGARDS TO SCHOOL UNIFORM

Article 2

(1) School Uniform, if worn properly, will add to a better image of students and school in general and a better description of their own school in more specific contexts. For that reason, school regulations should require the uniform to be:
   a) Clean, it is better if ironed.
   b) Neat, shirt/blouse is to be tucked into pants or skirt, buttons are to be done up, wear belt, and do not add other accessories except regulated ones.
   c) The colour of the uniform is still good, not worn out.
   d) Not torn, if it is, it is to be re-stitched,
   e) Worn completely as regulated.
   f) Worn according to its function, the uniform for the National Flag Ceremony is different to that for regular school days.

(2) School Uniform, if not worn properly, will downgrade the good image of students and their school, for example if the uniform is dirty, worn out, untidy, torn/poorly maintained, not tucked into the pants, short-unbuttoned so the chest of a student is apparent, other accessories tucked into here and there, unpolished or unwashed shoes, etcetera.

CHAPTER III
DISCIPLINE AND RESPONSIBILITY

Article 3

(1) Wearing school uniform implies certain rules and types of discipline, which relate to the attitude to obey dress codes and agreed rules. This mentality to follow and comply with rules and codes will increase the level of legal awareness of self-discipline; discipline that comes from the inner self, not by force from outer elements. Self-discipline will encourage the bigger collective discipline, which in the end will strengthen the discipline at national level.

(2) Every student wearing school uniform bears the responsibility to behave well for the sake of his own good and to maintain the good reputation of his school. This responsibility should be viewed as more challenging than the violation of rules and disciplines which impose sanctions.

Article 4

(1) The discipline and responsibility of students in complying with School Uniform Codes and the way they wear them can [in fact] be measured in contests for the favourite or best student, or in a collective sense, for the best school.

(2) To successfully inculcate this discipline and responsibility of students in complying with these rules and ways of wearing School Uniform, the control and supervision from teachers and particularly parents is extremely important.
CHAPTER IV
CATEGORIES, TYPES AND STYLES

Article 5

(1) Categories: School uniform is divided into two: School Uniform for females and for males. The types of School Uniform are determined by different characteristics between female and males.

(2) Types: School uniform is divided into two: the uniform for the National Flag Ceremony and uniform for regular school days. As this is a unified school dress, the difference between the uniform for the National Flag Ceremony and that of regular school days only consist of small additional articles which are attached to the regular school days uniform and can be detached after the Ceremony finishes. These additional articles are brought from home and only worn when the Ceremony commences and detached when it finishes.

(3) Styles: the styles and colours of school uniform for kindergarten, elementary, junior high, and high school students are different from one to another. The characteristic, types and styles for the same level schools must be unified, except for kindergarten school uniform (which in nature, should adopt younger age characteristics of kindergarten students), which is allowed not to follow the unified uniform for the sake of liveliness. The combination of colours for kindergarten school uniform is to be decided by kindergarten administrators.

(4) For schools (elementary, junior high, and high schools) that have certain religious and cultural elements and wish to have different types and styles, particularly for female uniforms, a special uniform is allowed for all the students at the school.

The difference should be:
   a) A special head scarf
   b) The length of blouse sleeves
   c) The length of skirt

Article 6

Other sets of school uniforms which have been used, such as:

1). Uniform with batik motifs for both shirt and blouse, is to be used by school groups for particular students activities like a choir (art competitions for students), group marching (gerak jalan), students talent day (temu karya siswa), cultural, tourism, or sport events.

2). White and a white Uniform is used by team for displaying the national flag and by other officials in the national flag Ceremony (see CHAPTER IX).

3). Scout uniform is used by scout members when they perform regular exercise (120 minutes), special exercise (time to be adjusted) or for one whole day (on scout day). Regular scout exercises are to be conducted on Saturday evening, Sunday
morning, Sunday evening, outside regular learning hours for scout groups which have their base around school.

CHAPTER V
IMPLEMENTATION AND TRANSITION

Article 7
(1). School Uniform as mentioned in this Decree is to be implemented commencing in learning year 1982/1983. New students (grade I) who have just entered kindergarten/elementary schools commencing July 1982 are subject to this Decree.

(2). The implementation of this School Uniform Decree does not apply at once for all students from a school, but is [firstly] for students of grade I and II junior high and high school students, while students of grade III are subject to adjustment of their uniform. For elementary school students, implementation is applied so that in two years, all students will have to wear the newly designed uniform.

(3). Thus the transition period from the old uniform to the new one is two years. This means that after two years (by learning year 1984/1985) all students will wear the newly designed uniform regulated by this Decree.

(4). This implementation period is necessary to avoid trouble for parents/persons responsible for students, and also to textile industries the chance to produce all the necessary materials (textiles of certain colour) for the market.

CHAPTER IV
SUPPLY

Article 8
(1). It is the responsibility of every school to make school uniform available and not supplied by certain centralized profit-oriented institutions.

(2). If possible, school uniform should be supplied by a small enterprise run by the school (Koperasi), assisted by parents’ organization for the school and teachers, to maximize the use of Koperasi at school.

(3). Parents/persons responsible for students are also allowed to obtain the uniform by themselves in the market, as long as it follows the codes regarding type of textile, colour and design/style as regulated in this Decree.

CHAPTER VII
USE

Article 9
(1). AS mentioned in CHAPTER I Article 1 point (2) school uniform is worn on school days, except Friday, which is a shorter day for learning, when students are allowed not to wear school uniform. Students can wear any type of clothes as
long as they are respectful, simple, and do not show the different social background of the parents or families of students.

(2). This application of non-uniform on Friday is aimed to present students feeling bored and depressed by wearing school uniform everyday.

(3). In the case that parents/persons responsible for students, for economic reason, cannot afford complete uniform for their children as regulated in this Decree, then their children can wear any regulated school uniform; it is not acceptable that any party would force the use of school uniform for those who cannot afford it, but they are to be helped to be able to acquire it. It is important to avoid students being mocked by their fellow students for not able to afford school uniform.

CHAPTER VIII
SCHOOL UNIFORM AND ITS ATTRIBUTES

Article 10
School uniform for kindergarten students
1. School uniform for females comprises:
   - Regular blouse with a round collar, short sleeves, no pockets, and worn tucked into a skirt.
   - Long dress, no sleeves, wide round (everhoier), two affixed pockets at the front of the dress, the length of the dress is 3 cm above the knees.
   - Socks, short, female design, the same colour for all school students.
   - Shoes, female style, flat and closed at the front, same shoe laces for the entire school.
2. School Uniform for the National Flag Ceremony for females, with additions or particular design of:
   - Hat, female design,
   - Regular blouse, round collar, long sleeves and with no pocket.
   - Tie
3. School uniform for male students comprises:
   - Regular shirt, sports designed collar, long sleeves, no pockets.
   - Vest, three buttons at the front, same colour as pants,
   - Tie.
4. School Uniform for the National Flag Ceremony for male students, with additions or particular design of:
   - Hat, male design.
   - Regular shirt, sport design collar, long sleeves, no pocket,
   - Vest, with three buttons at the front, same colour pants,
   - Tie
5. Badges, for female and male students:
   - Textile-badge for kindergarten, put on the left side of the skirt “strap” or on the left side of the vest, at about chest level.
   - Location badge, in textile, with name of the school, affixed on the right sleeve, next to the shoulder seam of the shirt/blouse, in black print.
- Textile-name label, put on the right side of the skirt strap or on the left side of the vest, at about chest level, background: black, writing: white.
- Hat badge, put at the front.
6. Colour composition of the uniform, which comprises of skirt/pants/vest, socks, shoes, hat and tie, is to be decided by kindergarten administration.
Note: this should apply for every kindergarten student at a school.

**Article 11**

School uniform for elementary school.

1. Daily uniform for elementary school female students:
   - Regular white blouse, with buttons, *shirller* shaped collar, short sleeves, one pocket without flap on the left side, worn tucked into skirt.
   - Pleated dark red skirt, with at least 15 folds, no pocket, length 5 cm above the knees.
   - Short white socks, female design.
   - Shoes, female design, flat and closed (with or without laces).
2. Additions to the elementary school uniform for the National flag Ceremony for females include:
   - Hat, colour: dark red and white.
   - Tie, colour: dark red.
3. Daily uniform for elementary school male students:
   - Regular white shirt, sports like designed collar, short sleeves, one pocket without flap on the left side and to be worn tucked into pants.
   - Short dark red pants, regular, length 10 cm above the knees, with loops for a belt, regular pockets on the right and left.
   - Black belt, 2 cm wide.
   - Short white socks.
   - Black Shoes, male design, flat, closed with laces, made from textile or leather.
4. Additions to elementary school uniform for the National flag Ceremony for male students include:
   - Hat, colour: dark red and white.
   - Tie, colour: dark red.
5. Badges, for both male and female:
   - Elementary school badge, in textile, affixed on the blouse/shirt pocket;
   - Badge Location, in textile, with name, [code] number of the school, and municipality/city, affixed to the right sleeve, next to the shoulder seam of shirt/blouse, with black print.
   - Student name label, on right side of the shirt/blouse, at about chest level, background: black, writing: white.
   - Hat Badge, put at the front.

**Article 12**

School uniform for junior high school students.

1. Daily uniform for junior high school female students:
- Regular white blouse, with buttons, *shriller* shaped collar, short sleeves, one pocket without flap on the left side, worn tucked into skirt.
- Dark blue skirt, with 2 pleats at the front, zip at the back, one hidden pocket on the left side, loops for belt, length 5 cm below the knee.
- Black belt, 5 cm wide.
- Short white socks.
- Black Shoes, female design, flat and closed (with or without laces), made from textile or leather.

2. Additions to junior high school female uniform for the National flag Ceremony, include:
- Hat, colour: dark blue and white.
- Tie, colour: dark blue.

3. Daily uniform for junior high school male students
- Regular white shirt, sport designed collar, short sleeves, one pocket without flap on the left side, worn tucked into pants.
- Short dark blue pants, regular fit, length 10 cm above the knee, loops for belt, regular pockets on the right and left side, and one pocket with flap at the back.
- Black belt, 2 cm wide.
- White socks, medium length.
- Black shoes, male design, flat and closed, (with laces), made from textile or leather.

4. Additions to junior high school male uniform for the National flag Ceremony, include:
- Hat, colour: dark blue and white.
- Tie, colour: dark blue.

5. Badges for male and female students:
- Junior High School OSIS badge, made from textile, affixed to the blouse/shirt pocket;
- Badge Location, also made from textile, with name, [code] number of the school, and municipality/city, affixed to right sleeve, next to the shoulder seam of shirt/blouse, with black print.
- Students’ name label, background: black, writing: white, made of textile.
- Hat badge, at the front.

**Article 13**

School uniform for high school students.

1. Daily uniform for high school female students:
- Regular white blouse, with buttons, *shriller* shaped collar, short sleeves, one pocket without flap on the left side, worn tucked into skirt.
- Grey skirt, with 1 pleat at the front centre, zip at the back, one hidden pocket on the left side, loops for belt, length 5 cm below the knee.
- Black belt, 1.5 cm wide.
- Short white socks.
- Black shoes, female design, flat and closed (with or without laces), made from textile or leather.
2. Additions to high school female uniform for the National flag Ceremony, include:
   - Hat, colour: Grey and white.
   - Tie, colour: Grey.

3. Daily uniform for high school male students
   - Regular white shirt, sport designed collar, short sleeves, one pocket without flap on the left side at about chest level, worn tucked into pants.
   - Long Grey pants, regular fit without crease, length until the ankles, width of bottom part a maximum of 25 cm, loops for belt, regular pockets on the right and left side, and one pocket with flap at the back.
   - Black belt, 3 cm wide.
   - Black short socks.
   - Black shoes, male design, flat and closed, with laces, made from textile or leather.

4. Additions to high school male uniform for the National flag Ceremony, include:
   - Hat, colour: Grey and white.
   - Tie, colour: Grey.

5. Badges for male and female students:
   - High School OSIS badge, made from textile, affixed to the blouse/shirt pocket;
   - Badge Location, also made from textile, with name, [code] number of the school, and municipality/city, affixed to right sleeve, next to the shoulder seam of the shirt/blouse, with black print.
   - Students’ name label, background: black, writing: white, made from textile.
   - Hat badge, at the front.

CHAPTER IX
UNIFORM FOR NATIONAL FLAG DISPLAY TEAM AND OTHER OFFICIALS

Article 14

(1). As mentioned in CHAPTER IV, Article 6, verse 2, white and a white uniform is to be used for members of teams displaying the National Flag and for other officials in the national flag Ceremony.

(2). The team for displaying the national flag and other officials comprise 11 personnel, males or females, which are: one Master of Ceremony, one Instructor of ceremony, one 1945 Constitution Reader, three personnel to flag the national flag, one choir conductor, three section leaders (for example, Grade I, II and III for junior/senior high school students, Group I, II, and III for elementary students), and one Assistant Senior Instructor for the Ceremony (Pembina Upacara). If deemed necessary, three back-up officials can also be prepared.
(3). This white and white uniform is to be used only during the ceremony and should not be used as daily uniform, which means that after the Ceremony finished, the team for the national flag ceremony and other officials must take off the white-white uniform and are allowed to change to their daily school uniform.

(4). The white and white uniform has long sleeves with a touch of red at the collar area (seraph), while the hat, which is the peci, and gloves have a special badge.

CHAPTER X
CONCLUSION

Article 15

The implementation of these school uniform codes requires active participation from parents or others responsible for students, educators and other elements of society as well as the disciplining of students, which if implemented can well result in a better quality of students and good reputation of school, encourages brotherhood, unity and integrity, sense of responsibility to rules and regulations; all these are needed as basic elements to increase the schools’ role as a Cultural centre in order to create better people in Indonesia.

Article 16

(1). Other matters which have not been included in this Decree are to be arranged in separate regulations.

(2). This Decree is valid from the date it is enacted

Enacted in Jakarta
On 17 March 1982
Director General of Elementary and Secondary Education
Signed,

Prof. Darji Darmodihardjo, S.H.
NIP: 130 676 351
Appendix: Decree of the Director-General of Primary and Secondary Education, Department of Education and Culture.

Dated 17 March 1982 No. 052/C/Kep/D 82

CHAPTER VIII (School Uniform with all its attributes), Article 13 (for high school).

School Uniform for Female High School Students
APPENDIX 2

PEDOMAN PAKAIAN SERAGAM SEKOLAH


KEPUTUSAN
DIREKTUR JENDERAL PENDIDIKAN DASAR DAN MENENGAH
DEPARTEMEN PENDIDIKAN DAN KEBUDAYAAN
No. 100/C/Kep/D/1991
tentang
PENYEMPURNAAN KEPUTUSAN DIREKTORAT JENDRAL PENDIDIKAN DASAR DAN MENENGAH No. 052/C/Kep/D. 82

DIREKTUR JENDERAL PENDIDIKAN DASAR DAN MENENGAH

Menimbang:

a. bahwa pembinaan dan pengembangan kesiswaan sangat perlu untuk menciptakan suasana dan tata kehidupan sekolah yang baik dan sehat, sehingga akan menjamin kelancaran terselenggaranya proses belajar mengajar;

b. bahwa menciptakan suasana dan tata kehidupan sekolah yang baik merupakan modal dasar untuk menumbuhkan rasa bangga yang wajar terhadap sekolahnya, serta setiap siswa merasa saudara bagi siswa lainnya;

c. bahwa agar usaha tersebut di atas dapat dilaksanakan dengan baik-baiknya, maka perlu digunakannya Pakaian Seragam Sekolah guna meningkatkan citra siswa serta meningkatkan citra siswa serta meningkatkan persatuan dan kesatuan.

d. bahwa hasil pertemuan silaturahmi antara Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan dengan Majelis Ulama Indonesia tanggal 19 Agustus 1983, Majelis Ulama Indonesia setuju adanya Pakaian Seragam Sekolah.

e. bahwa untuk itu dipandang perlu menyempurnakan Keputusan Direktur Jenderal Pendidikan Dasar dan Menengah Nomor 052/C/Kep/D.82 tentang Pedoman Pakaian Seragam Sekolah.
Mengingat:

1. Undang-undang Nomor 2 Tahun 1989
2. Peraturan Pemerintah Nomor 28 Tahun 1990
3. Peraturan Pemerintah Nomor 29 Tahun 1990
4. Keputusan Presiden Republik Indonesia:
   a. Nomor 44 tahun 1974;
   b. Nomor 15 tahun 1984, sebagaimana telah diubah/ditambah dengan Keputusan Presiden Republik Indonesia No. 25 tahun 1990;
5. Keputusan Menteri Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan
   a. Tanggal 1 Mei 1974, No. 14/U/1974;
   e. Tanggal 18 Oktober 1984, No. 0461/U/1984
6. Keputusan Direktorat Jenderal Pendidikan dan Menengah
   b. Tanggal 17 Maret 1982, No. 052/C/Kep/D.82;
   c. Tanggal 7 Mei 1986, No. 201/C/Kep/0.86;
   d. Tanggal 31 Januari 1987, No. 015/C/Kep/I/87
Memperhatikan:

MEMUTUSKAN

Menetapkan:

Penyempurnaan Keputusan Direktur Jenderal Pendidikan Dasar dan Menengah
No. 052/C/Kep/D.82

Bab I
Ketentuan Umum
Pasal 1

Dalam Keputusan ini yang dimaksud dengan:

a. Pakaian Seragam Sekolah adalah pakaian yang dikenakan oleh siswa pada hari belajar yang di satu ragamkan jenis, rancangan dan warnanya.


c. Kepala Sekolah adalah Kepala Sekolah dari sekolah yang bersangkutan.

d. Siswa adalah Peserta didik yang mengikuti pendidikan di sekolah.

e. Pakaian seragam sekolah khas adalah pakaian seragam sekolah yang dipakai siswa puteri karena keyakinan pribadinya sesuai dengan rancangan dan warna yang telah ditentukan.

Bab II
MAKSUD, TUJUAN DAN SASARAN
Pasal 2

Maksud ditetapkannya pakaian seragam sekolah adalah untuk menghindari adanya keanekaragaman jenis, rancangan dan warna pakaian seragam sekolah yang dapat menimbulkan kesan kurangnya keteraturan dan ketertiban serta menonjolnya perbedaan tingkat kemampuan ekonomi orang tua/wali siswa.

Pasal 3

Tujuan ditetapkan Pakaian Seragam Sekolah adalah:

a. Menumbuhkan rasa kebersamaan, memperkuat jiwa persaudaraan sehingga dapat menumbuhkan rasa dan kesatuan di kalangan siswa;

b. Memperkecil perbedaan tingkah laku siswa yang disebabkan oleh adanya perbedaan tingkat kemampuan ekonomi orang tuanya;
c. Menanamkan dan mengembangkan kesadaran bermasyarakat serta patuh terhadap peraturan yang telah ditetapkan;
d. Menumbuhkan kesadaran disiplin diri yang pada gilirannya memperkuat disiplin sosial dan nasional.

**Pasal 4**

Pakaian seragam sekolah berlaku bagi seluruh siswa pada setiap jenis dan jenjang sekolah

**Bab III**

**PERLAKUAN TERHADAP PAKAIAN SERAGAM SEKOLAH**

**Pasal 5**

Perlakuan terhadap Pakaian Seragam Sekolah hendaknya:

a. Bersih,
b. Rapih, (blus/kemeja dipakai dan dimasukkan ke dalam rok/celana, kancing blus/kemeja dipasang).
c. Lengkap dengan atribut sekolah.

**Bab IV**

**DISIPLIN DAN TANGGUNG JAWAB**

**Pasal 6**

Berpakaian seragam sekolah didasarkan pada tata tertib dan disiplin, sesuai dengan peraturan tata cara berpakaian yang telah ditetapkan.

**Pasal 7**

Siswa berpakaian seragam sekolah bertanggung jawab untuk bersikap dan bertingkah laku yang baik demi menjaga citra siswa dan nama baik sekolahnya.

**Bab V**

**JENIS, MACAM DAN RANCANGAN**

**Pasal 8**

Pakaian seragam sekolah ada 2 (dua) jenis, yaitu Pakaian Seragam Sekolah untuk siswa puteri dan Pakaian Seragam Sekolah untuk siswa putera.

**Pasal 9**

(1) Pakaian Seragam Sekolah terdiri atas 2 (dua) macam, yaitu Pakaian Seragam Sekolah yang digunakan untuk Upacara Bendera dan Pakaian Seragam Sekolah yang digunakan harian pada hari belajar.
(2) Pakaian Seragam Sekolah untuk Upacara Bendera, berupa Pakaian Seragam Harian ditambah mengenakan topi pet.

(3) Kelengkapan dan warna Pakaian Seragam Sekolah tercantum pada lampiran I Keputusan ini.

**Pasal 10**

(1) Rancangan Pakaian Seragam Sekolah disesuaikan dengan jenjang sekolah, yaitu untuk siswa SD, SLTP dan SLTA sesuai dengan lampiran II, III dan IV.

(2) Siswa puteri yang karena keyakinan pribadinya menghendaki penggunaan Pakaian Seragam Khas yang warna dan rancangannya sesuai dengan lampiran III dan IV.

(3) Bagi siswa puteri yang menggunakan pakaian seragam sekolah yang khas sebagaimana dimaksud pada ayat (2) harus mendapat persetujuan orang tua atau wali siswa.

**BAB VI
PENGADAAN DAN PENGGUNAAN**

**Pasal 11**

(1) Pengadaan Pakaian Seragam Sekolah pada prinsipnya diusahakan sendiri oleh orang tua atau wali siswa.

(2) Pengadaan Pakaian Seragam Sekolah dapat pula diusahakan sekolah melalui Koperasi Sekolah.

(3) Pengadaan Pakaian Seragam Sekolah untuk siswa Kelas I tidak boleh dikaitkan dengan pelaksanaan penerimaan siswa baru.

(4) Apabila orang tua atau wali siswa tidak mampu menyediakan Pakaian Seragam Sekolah diharapkan agar sekolah memberikan kemudahan untuk memperoleh bagi anak-nya/asuhannya.

**Pasal 12**

(1) Pakaian Seragam Sekolah dikenakan setiap hari belajar kecuali hari Jumat.

(2) Pada hari Jumat siswa mengenakan pakaian bebas rapih, sopan dan sederhana.

**Bab VII
PENANGGUNG JAWAB**

**Pasal 13**

Penanggung jawab pelaksanaan Keputusan ini adalah Kepala Sekolah.
Bab VIII
PENUTUP
Pasal 14

(1) Dengan ditetapkannya Keputusan ini, maka ketentuan lain yang bertentangan dengan Keputusan ini dinyatakan tidak berlaku.

(2) Keputusan ini berlaku untuk sekolah negeri.

Pasal 15

(1) Hal-hal lain yang belum diatur dalam Keputusan ini akan diatur lebih lanjut dalam ketentuan tersendiri.

(2) Keputusan ini mulai berlaku pada tanggal ditetapkan, dan penerapannya dimulai tahun pelajaran 1991/1992

Ditetapkan di Jakarta
Pada tanggal 16 Februari 1991

Direktur Jenderal
Pendidikan Dasar dan Menengah

Prof. Dr. Hasan Walinono
Nip. 130 162 839
KELENGKAPAN DAN WARNA PAKAIAN SERAGAM SEKOLAH

I. PAKAIAN SERAGAM SEKOLAH UNTUK SISWA SEKOLAH DASAR

A. Pakaian Seragam Harian:
   1. Pakaian Seragam Harian Puteri
      - blus bentuk biasa, lengan pendek memakai satu saku tanpa tutup di sebelah kiri warna putih, dipakai dan dimasukkan ke dalam rok;
      - rok bentuk ploioirok, minimal jumlah lipatan 15 tanpa saku, panjang rok 5 cm di atas lutut, warna merah hati;
      - kaus kaki pendek, warna putih;
      - sepatu hitam.
   2. Pakaian Seragam Harian Putera:
      - kemeja bentuk biasa, lengan pendek memakai satu saku tanpa tutup di sebelah kiri, warna putih, dipakai dan dimasukkan ke dalam celana;
      - celana pendek model biasa panjang celana 10 cm di atas lutut, bagian pinggang disediakan untuk ikat pinggang ukuran 2 cm warna hitam;
      - kaus kaki pendek, warna putih;
      - sepatu hitam.

B. Pakaian Seragam Upacara
   Pakaian Seragam Harian ditambah dengan mengenakan topi pet warna merah hati.

C. Tanda-tanda/Atribut
   - badge Sekolah Dasar, dikenakan pada saku/blus/kemeja bahan kain;
   - tanda lokasi, tertulis nama dan nomor sekolah, serta nama kabupaten/Kotamadya dikenakan di lengan blus/kemeja kanan dekat jahitan bahu, tulisan hitam, bahan kain.

Lampiran I: Keputusan Direktur Jenderal Pendidikan Dasar dan Menengah

Nomor: 100/C/Kep/D/1991
Tanggal: 16 Februari 1991
II. PAKAIAN SERAGAM SEKOLAH UNTUK SISWA SEKOLAH LANJUTAN TINGKAT PERTAMA (SLTP)

A. Pakaian Seragam Harian

1. Pakaian Seragam Harian Puteri:
   - blus bentuk biasa, lengan pendek memakai satu saku tanpa tutup di sebelah kiri, warna putih, dipakai dan dimasukkan ke dalam rok;
   - rok dengan dua stoplooi di kiri-kanan, ritsleting di belakang, satu saku tersembunyi di samping kiri, di pinggang disediakan untuk tempat ikat pinggang, panjang rok 5 cm di bawah lutut. Warna biru tua;
   - ikat pinggang ukuran 3 cm warna hitam;
   - kaus kaki pendek, warna putih;
   - sepatu hitam.

2. Pakaian Seragam Harian Puteri Khas
   - blus bentuk biasa, lengan panjang sampai pergelangan tangan, memakai satu saku tanpa tutup di sebelah kiri, warna putih dipakai dan dimasukkan ke dalam rok.
   - Kerudung seperti diperagakan dalam gambar di lampiran III;
   - Rok panjang sampai pergelangan kaki dengan dua stoplooi di kiri-kanan, ritsleting di belakang, satu saku tersembunyi di samping kiri, di pinggang disediakan untuk tempat ikat pinggang, warna biru tua;
   - Ikat pinggang ukuran 3 cm, warna hitam;
   - Kaus kaki pendek warna putih;
   - Sepatu hitam

3. Pakaian Seragam Harian Putera
   - kemeja bentuk biasa, lengan pendek, memakai satu saku tanpa tutup di sebelah kiri, warna putih, dipakai dan dimasukkan ke dalam celana;
   - celana pendek model biasa, panjang celana 10 cm di atas lutut, bagian pinggang disediakan untuk tempat ikat pinggang, satu biasa di samping kiri-kanan dan satu di belakang kanan (bukan saku tempel) pakai tutup, warna biru tua.
   - Ikat pinggang ukuran 3 cm warna hitam;
   - Kaus kaki pendek, warna putih;
   - Sepatu hitam
B. Pakaian Seragam Upacara
   Pakaian Seragam Harian ditambah dengan mengenakan topi pet, warna biru tua.

C. Tanda-tanda/Atribut
   - badge OSIS SLTP dikenakan pada saku blus/kemeja, bahan kain.
   - Tanda lokasi, tertulis nama dan nomor sekolah, serta nama Kabupaten/Kotamadya, dikenakan pada lengan blus/kemeja kanan dekat jahitan bahu, tulisan hitam, bahan kain.

III. PAKAIAN SERAGAM SEKOLAH UNTUK SISWA SEKOLAH LANJUTAN TINGKAT ATAS (SLTA).

A. Pakaian Seragam Harian

1. Pakaian Seragam Harian Puteri:
   - blus, bentuk biasa, lengan pendek, memakai satu saku tanpa tutup, di sebelah kiri, warna putih dipakai dan dimasukkan ke dalam rok;
   - rok dengan satu stoplooi di depan tengah, ritsleting di belakang, satu saku tersembunyi di samping kiri, di pinggang disediakan tempat ikat pinggang, panjang rok 5 cm di bawah lutut, warna abu-abu.
   - Ikat pinggang ukuran 3 cm, warna hitam;
   - Kaus kaki pendek, warna putih;
   - Sepatu hitam.

2. Pakaian Seragam harian Puteri Khas
   - blus, bentuk biasa, lengan panjang sampai pergelangan tangan, memakai satu saku tanpa tutup, di sebelah kiri, warna putih dipakai dan dimasukkan ke dalam rok;
   - kerudung seperti diperagakan dalam gambar di lampiran IV;
   - rok panjang sampai pergelangan kaki dengan dua stoplooi di kiri-kanan, ritsleting di belakang, satu saku tersembunyi di samping kiri, di pinggang disediakan untuk tempat ikat pinggang, warna abu-abu;
   - Ikat pinggang ukuran 3 cm, warna hitam;
   - Kaus kaki pendek, warna putih;
   - Sepatu hitam
3. Pakaian Seragam Harian Putera
- Kemeja bentuk biasa, lengan pendek, memakai satu saku tanpa tutup di sebelah kiri, warna putih, dipakai dan dimasukkan ke dalam celana;
- Celana pendek model biasa, tanpa lipatan, panjang celana sampai mata kaki, lebar bawah antara 20-25 cm, bagian pinggang disediakan untuk ikat pinggang, saku biasa di samping kiri-kanan dan satu di belakang kanan (bukan satu tempel) dengan tutup, warna abu-abu.
- Ikat pinggang ukuran 3 cm, warna hitam
- Kaus kaki pendek, warna putih;
- Sepatu hitam.

B. Pakaian Seragam Upacara
Pakaian Seragam Harian ditambah dengan mengenakan topi pet warna abu-abu.

C. Tanda-tanda/Atribut
- Badge OSIS SLTA dikenakan pada saku blus/kemeja, bahan kain.
- Tanda lokasi, tertulis nama dan nomor sekolah, serta nama Kabupaten/Kotamadya, di kanan pada lengan blus/kemeja kanan dekat jahitan bahu, tulisan hitam, bahan kain.

Ditetapkan di Jakarta
Pada tanggal 16 Februari 1991
Direktur Jenderal
Pendidikan Dasar dan Menengah

Prof. Dr. Hasan Walinono
NIP. 130 162 839
PEDOMAN PAKAIAN SERAGAM SEKOLAH


Pakaian Seragam Sekolah diperlukan dalam rangka pembinaan dan pengembangan kesiswaan, yaitu untuk menciptakan suasana dan tata kehidupan sekolah yang baik dan sehat, sehingga menjamin kelancaran terselenggaranya proses belajar mengajar. Kehidupan sekolah yang baik merupakan modal dasar untuk menumbuhkan rasa bangga yang wajar terhadap sekolahnya serta setiap siswa merasa saudara bagi siswa lainnya.

Penggunaan Pakaian Seragam Sekolah dimaksudkan pula untuk meningkatkan citra siswa serta meningkatkan persatuan dan kesatuan; patuh terhadap peraturan dan menumbuhkan kesadaran disiplin diri yang selanjutnya memperkuat disiplin sosial dan nasional.

Pakaian seragam sekolah dikenakan siswa pada hari belajar yang disaturagamkan, jenis, rancangan dan warnanya.


Khusus dengan Pimpinan Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI) telah diadakan pertemuan silaturahmi yaitu tanggal 4 Desember 1990 untuk bersama-sama melihat konsep penyempurnaan peraturan pakaian seragam sekolah dan menyepakati siswi SLTP/SLTA memakai tutup kepala seperti rancangan dalam konsep lampiran III dan IV serta siswi SLTP memakai rok midi dan pakai kaus kaki panjang sedangkan siswi SLTA memakai rok panjang sampai pergelangan tangan.

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Setelah dilaporkan kepada Bapak Menteri Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan, maka beliau menyarankan sebaiknya rancangan rok siswi SLTP dipanjangkan sampai pergelangan kaki seperti rancangan rok siswi SLTA.

Selanjutnya dalam pertemuan yang kedua pada tanggal 28 Desember 1990 menghasilkan bahwa Pimpinan MUI menyetujui konsep penyempurnaan itu menjadi Konsep final setiap lembar konsep final itu diparaf oleh 3 (tiga) orang Pimpinan MUI yang hadir dan Direktur Jenderal Pendidikan Dasar dan Menengah; terakhir tanggal 29 Januari 1991 Ketua MUI KH. Hasan Basri dalam rapat Pimpinan MUI di Mesjid Istiqlal Jakarta telah membubuhkan paraf beliau pada setiap konsep final tersebut.

Dengan demikian kosep final telah disetujui secara resmi oleh pimpinan Majelis Ulama Indonesia.

Pada tanggal 31 Januari 1991 konsep final ini telah disampaikan pada rapat Kordinasi Menko Kesra.

4. Persamaan dan perbedaan antara SK lama dan baru.

Persamaannya adalah jenisnya tetap yaitu Pakaian Seragam Sekolah untuk siswi putri dan siswi putera; macamnya juga tetap yaitu Pakaian Seragam Sekolah yang digunakan harian pada hari belajar dan untuk Upacara Bendera berupa pakaian seragam harian ditambah dengan mengenakan topi pet, dan warna celana/rok tetap yaitu untuk SD warna merah hati, SLTP warna biru tua dan SLTA warna abu-abu.

Perbedaan antara lain:

4. 1. Alasan Penggunaan Seragam Khas

SK baru: (asal 10 ayat (2) dan (3)

- siswi puteri karena keyakinan pribadinya menghendaki penggunaan Pakaian Seragam sekolah yang Khas, dapat mengenakan Pakaian Seragam Khas yang warna dan macam-macamnya sesuai dengan lampiran III (untuk SLTP) dan IV (untuk SLTA).

- Bagi siswi putri yang menggunakan pakaian seragam sekolah yang khas, harus mendapat persetujuan orang tua atau wali siswa.

SK lama (Pasal 5 ayat (4)

- bagi sekolah-sekolah (SD, SMTP, SMTA) yang berhubung pertimbangan-pertimbangan agama dan adat istiadat setempat menghendaki macam dan bentuk, berbeda, terutama untuk jenis pakaian seragam puteri, maka dapat menggunakan pakaian seragam khas untuk seluruh siswa dalam satu sekolah.
4.2. Tutup Kepala

SK baru (lampiran III dan IV)

- kerudung warna putih seperti diperagakan dalam gambar di lampiran III dan IV.

SK lama

- ikat kepala seperti destar/blangkon, warna tidak ditetapkan.

4.3. Blus

SK baru

- blus bentuk biasa, lengan panjang sampai pergelangan tangan, memakai satu saku tutup di sebelah kiri, warna putih, dipakai dan dimasukkan ke dalam rok (SLTP/SLTA).

SK lama

- blus berbentuk jas, lengan panjang, dipakai tidak dimasukkan ke dalam rok, warna putih (SMTP/SMTA).

4.4. Rok

SK baru

- rok panjang sampai pergelangan kaki, untuk siswi SLTP warna biru tua dan SLTA warna abu-abu.

SK lama

- rok biasa sampai lutut SMTP warna biru hitam dan rok panjang sampai ke mata kaki untuk SMTA warna abu-abu.

4.5. Untuk Upacara Bendera

SK baru (pasal 9 ayat (2))

- Pakaian seragam sekolah untuk upacara bendera, berupa pakaian seragam harian ditambah dengan mengenakan topi pet (warna sesuai dengan celana/rok).

SK lama

- Seragam Harian, tambahan mengenakan:
  - tutup kepala, warna: SD (merah hati dan putih) SMTP (biru dan putih) SMTA (abu-abu dan putih)
  - dasi, warna sesuai celana/rok.
4.6. Berlakunya keputusan
   SK baru
   Untuk sekolah negeri
   SK lama
   Untuk sekolah negeri dan swasta

4.7. Taman Kanak-kanak
   SK baru
   Tidak mengatur pakaian seragam TK
   SK lama (pasal 10 ayat (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), dan (6) mengatur secara sangat
   rinci Pakaian Seragam Siswa TK mulai diatur dari seragam harian, seragam
   upacara, tanda-tanda yang harus dipakai (atribut-atribut) sampai ke
   pemilihan/komposisi warna.

4.8. Penanggung jawab
   - SK baru (pasal 13)
     Penanggung jawab pelaksanaan keputusan ini adalah kepala sekolah.
   - SK lama
     Tidak menetapkan penanggung jawab.

Jakarta, 16 Februari 1991
Direktur Jenderal
Pendidikan Dasar dan Menengah

Prof. Dr. Hasan Walinono
NIP. 130 162 839
ENGLISH VERSION
SCHOOL UNIFORM CODES

Decree of the Director General of Primary and Secondary Education 16 February 1991 No. 100/C/Kep/D/1991 on the revision of the Decree of the Directorate General of Primary and Secondary Education No. 052/C/Kep/D 82

DECREE
OF DIRECTOR GENERAL OF PRIMARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION
DEPARTEMENT OF EDUCATION AND CULTURE
No. 100/C/Kep/D/1991
ON
THE REVISION OF THE DECREE OF THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF PRIMARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION NO. 052/C/KEP/D 82

DIRECTOR GENERAL OF PRIMARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION

Considering:

a. That the education and development of school students is extremely important in creating a friendly and healthy school environment, and to ensure the success of the learning and teaching process.

b. That the creation of friendly and healthy school environment is an important element to encourage some sense of pride in the school and the sense of brotherhood among students.

c. That for these objectives to be achievable, it is important to regulate school uniform to increase the good image of the students and also the sense of integrity and unity [for the country].

d. That a meeting between the Department of Education and Culture with the Ulama Council of Indonesia (Majelis Ulama Indonesia) on 19 August 1983 has agreed to the application of school uniform.

e. That for the above reasons, it is necessary to revise the Decree of the Directorate General of Primary and Secondary Education No 052/C/Kep/D.82 on the Codes of School Uniform.

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Recalling:

1. Regulation Number 2, Year 1989;
4. Presidential Decrees:
   a. Number 44 Year 1974;
   b. Number 15 year 1984, as amended by the President in Decree Number 25, year 1990;
5. Minister of Education and Culture Decrees:
   a. Number 14/U/1974, 1 May 1974;
   e. Number 0461/U/1984, dated 18 October 1984;
6. Directorate General of Primary and Secondary Education Decrees
   b. Number 052/C/Kep/D.82, dated 17 March 1982;
   c. Number 201/C/Kep/0.86, dated 7 May 1986;

Giving appreciation to:

2. The result of the meeting organized by the Coordinating Ministry of People’s Welfare on 31 January 1991

IT IS DECIDED

To Stipulate: The revision of the Decree of the Directorate General of Primary and Secondary Education Number 052/C/Kep/D.82.
Chapter I
GENERAL
Article I

In this Decree, the meaning of:

a. School Uniform is a set of clothes worn by students during school days, which is unified in its type, design and colour.

b. School is elementary, junior high, and high schools under the supervision of the Directorate General of Primary and Secondary Education, the Department of Education and Culture.

c. Principal is the principal of a school.

d. Student is a participant who receives education at school.

e. Special school uniform is the uniform to be worn by female students for their personal beliefs in accordance to the determined design and colour.

Chapter II
PURPOSES, AIMS AND TARGETS
Article 2

The purpose of the application of school uniform is to avoid the variety of types, designs, and colour of school uniform which can create the impression of less discipline and less management, also [to avoid] the occurrence of sense of the economic gap between parents of students.

Article 3

The aim of the application of School Uniform is:

a. To encourage togetherness and brotherhood so it can increase the sense of integrity and unity among students.

b. To minimize the disparities of attitudes of student caused by different levels of economic states of their parents.

c. To educate and develop the social consciousness [of students] and to educate them to obey rules and regulations.

d. To encourage self discipline, which later will help to strengthen the social and national discipline.

Article 4

School uniform is applied to all students at all types and level of education.
Chapter III
CODES IN REGARDS TO SCHOOL UNIFORM

Article 5

School uniform should include the following criteria:

a. Be clean,
b. Neat, (blouse/shirt is to be tucked into skirt/pants, and be buttoned.
c. School emblems to be attached.

Chapter IV
DICIPLINE AND RESPONSIBILITY

Article 6

The implementation of school uniform is based on the regulated school codes of conduct and discipline.

Article 7

A student wearing school uniform bears the responsibility to behave well for his own good and to maintain the good reputation of his school.

Chapter V
CATEGORIES, TYPES, AND STYLES

Article 8

School uniform is divided into two categories: school uniform for females and school uniform for boys.

Article 9

(1) School uniform is divided of two types: School Uniform for National Flag Ceremony and Regular School Uniform.
(2) School Uniform for the National Flag Ceremony is the Regular School Uniform with an addition, which is school hat.
(3) Full details of the attributes/badges and colour of School Uniform are attached in Appendix I of this Decree.

Article 10

(1) The styles of School Uniform should be in accordance with the level of schools, whether primary, junior high or high school, as described in Appendixes II, III, IV.
(2) Female students who for their own belief wish to wear a Special School Uniform, are allowed to and should adjust its colour and design with [what is described in] Appendix III and IV.
(3) Female students wishing to wear a Special School Uniform as mentioned in point (2) must obtain approval from their parents or their student’s parent.
CHAPTER VI
SUPPLY AND USE

Article 11

(1) School Uniform in principle is the responsibility of parents or the persons responsible for students (wali) to provide for their children.
(2) A school can provide School Uniform through School owned business Koperasi.
(3) A school is not allowed to provide School Uniform for First grade primary students and organise it as part of new students’ admission package.
(4) In case a parent cannot afford to provide School Uniform for their children, the school is to give concessions to its students.

Article 12

(1) School Uniform is to be used every school-day except Friday.
(2) On Friday, a student is allowed to wear any outfit provided it is neat, polite and simple.

Chapter VII
Persons in Charge

Article 13

The persons in charge for this Decree are school principals.

Chapter VIII
CLOSURE

Article 14

(1) The issuance of this Decree terminates any other contradicting regulations to this Decree.
(2) This Decree is applied for state-owned schools [only].

Article 15

(1) Other matters not included in this Decree are to be arranged in separate regulations.
(2) This Decree is valid from the date it is decided, and will be implemented in learning year 1992/1992.

Enacted in Jakarta
On 16 February 1991
Director General
Primary and Secondary Education

Prof. Dr. Hasan Walinono
Nip. 130 162 839
Appendix I: Decree of Director General of Primary and Secondary Education

Number: 100/C/Kep/D/1991
Date: 16 February 1991

ATTRIBUTES AND COLOURS OF SCHOOL UNIFORM

I. SCHOOL UNIFORM FOR PRIMARY SCHOOL

A. Daily School Uniform:
1. Daily School Uniform for Female Students
   - Regular white blouse with short sleeves and one pocket without flap on the left side, and tucked into skirt;
   - Dark red skirt with pleats, at least 15 pleats without pockets, with length 5 cm above the knee.
   - Short white socks.
   - Black shoes.

2. Daily School Uniform for Male Students:
   - Regular white shirt with short sleeves and one pocket without flap on the left side, and tucked into pants;
   - Regular pants, with length no less than 10 cm above the knee, with 2 cm loops for a black belt;
   - Short white socks.
   - Black shoes.

B. School Uniform for the National Flag Ceremony
   Daily School Uniform plus dark red hat.

C. Badges
   - Primary school badge, in textile, affixed to the blouse/shirt pocket;
   - Location Badge, in textile, with name, [code] number of the school, and municipality/city, affixed to on the right sleeve, next to the shoulder seam of the shirt/blouse, with black print.

II. SCHOOL UNIFORM FOR JUNIOR HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS

A. Daily School Uniform

1. Daily School Uniform for Female Students
   - Regular white blouse with short sleeves and one pocket without flap on the left side, and tucked into skirt;
   - Dark blue skirt with two pleats on the left and right sides, zip at the back, one hidden pocket on the left side, bands for belt, with length of about 5 cm below the knee.

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- Black belt, 3 cm wide.
- Short white socks.
- Black shoes.

2. Special Daily School Uniform for Female Students
- Regular white blouse, with long sleeves to the wrist, one pocket without flap, and tucked into skirt;
- Headscarf as described in the picture in Appendix III.
- Long dark blue skirt to the ankles with two pleats on the left and right sides, zip at the back, one hidden pocket on the left side, loops for belt;
- Black belt, 3 cm wide.
- Short white socks.
- Black shoes.

- Regular white shirt with short sleeves and one pocket without flap on the left side, and tucked into pants;
- Regular dark blue short pants, with length no less that 10 cm above the knee, with 2 cm loops for black belt, regular pants pockets on the left, right, and right-back with flap (not attached pocket types);
- 3 cm black belt.
- Short white socks.
- Black shoes.

B. School Uniform for the National Flag Ceremony
   Daily School Uniform plus dark blue hat.

C. Badges
- Junior High School OSIS badge, made from textile, affixed to the blouse/shirt pocket;
- Location badge, also made from textile, with name, [code] number of the school, and municipality/city, affixed to the right sleeve, next to the shoulder seam of the shirt/blouse, with black print.

III. SCHOOL UNIFORM FOR HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS

A. Daily School Uniform

1. Daily School Uniform for Female Students
- Regular white blouse with short sleeves and one pocket without flap on the left side, and tucked into skirt;
- Grey skirt with one pleat at front centre of skirt, zip at the back, one hidden pocket on the left side, loops for belt, length of about 5 cm below the knee.
- Black belt, 3 cm wide.
- Short white socks.
2. Special Daily School Uniform for Female Students
- Regular white blouse, with long sleeves up to the wrist, one pocket without flap on the left side, and tucked into skirt;
- Headscarf as described in the picture in Appendix IV.
- Long Grey skirt with two pleats on the left and right sides, zip at the back, one hidden pocket on the left side, loops for belt.
- Black belt, 3 cm wide.
- Short white socks.
- Black shoes.

- Regular white shirt with short sleeves and one pocket without flap on the left side, and tucked into pants;
- Regular Grey pants, with length to the ankles, no crease, the width of the bottom part is about 20-25 cm, loops for black belt, regular pants pockets on the left, right, and right-back with flap (not attached pocket types);
- 3 cm black belt.
- Short white socks.
- Black shoes.

4. School Uniform for the National Flag Ceremony
Daily School Uniform plus Grey hat.

5. Badges
- High School OSIS badge, made from textile, affixed to the blouse/shirt pocket;
- Location badge, also made from textile, with name, [code] number of the school, and municipality/city, affixed to the right sleeve, next to the shoulder seam of the shirt/blouse, with black print.

Enacted in Jakarta 16 February 1991
Director General of Primary & Secondary Education
Prof. Dr. Hasan Walinono
(NIP. 130 162 839)
Press Release:

School Uniform Codes

1. The new Decree of the Director General of Primary and Secondary Education Number 100/C/Kep/D/1991 is the revision of the older Decree number 052/C/Kep/D.82.

School uniform is necessary, particularly to educate and develop students, and to establish a good and healthy environment for schools so it will guarantee the success of the learning-teaching process. The creation of a nice and good environment at school is an important element to encourage the sense of pride in the school and the sense of brotherhood among the students.

The purpose of the application of school uniform is to avoid the variety of types, designs, and colour of school uniform which can create the impression of less discipline and less management, also [to avoid] the occurrence of a sense of economic gap between parents of students.

School uniform is also aimed to increase the good image of the students and the sense of integrity and unity [for the country]; so students are submitted to rules and possess good self-discipline which will expectedly lead to discipline for them as members of society and as citizens of the country.

School uniform, which means unified in type, design and colour, is to be worn by students on school days.

This Decree is valid for primary, junior high and high schools under the supervision of the Directorate General of Primary and Secondary Education and will be implemented by learning year 1991/1992.

2. The process of the revision of this school uniform regulation began since two years ago, when the Director General of Primary and Secondary Education instructed the Directorate of Students’ Education (Direktorat Pembinaan Kesiswaan) to take the necessary measures to study regulations regarding “school uniform”, and to structure “the new concept of revision” of the regulations.

In late February 1989, the Director General of Primary and Secondary Education reported to the Minister of Education on school uniform. The Minister has given his direction to revise the school uniform regulation.

3. For about two years, the Directorate General of Primary and Secondary Education has conducted consultations with many institutions and has accepted views and suggestions from various institutions included the prominent Ulama, society, mass media, also governmental institutions such as: Attorney General and the State Ministry of Civil Servants. A meeting conducted with the Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI) leaders on 4 December 1990 to discuss the proposal of revising school uniform regulations and also agreed that junior high and high schools’ students are allowed to wear a long headscarf as described in Appendix III and IV with a short skirt for junior high school and a long skirt to the ankles for high school students.
After this was reported to the Minister of Education and culture, he suggested that the length of the skirt for junior high school students [who wear the headscarf] be lengthened to the ankles as it is for high school female students.

On 28 December 1990, a meeting between the Ministry of Education and Culture and the *Ulama* Council of Indonesia resulted in an agreement that the proposal for revision of school uniform regulation be the final draft. Every page of the final draft was signed by 3 representative *Ulama* of the Council who attended the meeting and the Director General of Primary and Secondary Education; Finally, on 29 January 1991, the Chairman of the Council, K.H. Hasan Basri, in the high level official Council meeting which took place in Istiqlal Mosque Jakarta, signed [and approved] the final draft. On January, 31 1991 this final draft was presented at a coordinated meeting at the Ministry of People’s Welfare.

4. The similarities and differences between the old Decree and the new Decree.

The similarities between the two decrees lay in the same categories and same types, which are school uniform for female and boy students, and school uniform for both regular school days and the National Flag Ceremony which adds a hat to the uniform with the same colours: dark red for primary school, dark blue for junior high school, and Grey for high school.

The differences lay in:

4.1. Reasons for the use of special uniform

The new Degree (article 10 section (2) and (3))

- Female students, who for their own belief, wish to wear a Special School Uniform are allowed to wear it, [but] to adjust it to the colours and style of the Uniform as described in Appendix III (for junior high school) and Appendix IV (for high school).
- Female students wishing to wear Special School Uniform as mentioned in section (2) must obtain approval from their parents or their *wali siswa*.

The Old Degree (Article 5 verse (4))

- Schools (primary, junior high, or high schools) which for religious and cultural reasons wish to apply different styles, particularly uniform for female students are allowed to apply special uniform for all students at the school.

4.2. Headscarf

New Decree (Appendix III and IV)
- A white headscarf as described in the picture in Appendix III and IV.

Old Decree
- A bandana/scarf like *destar* or *blangkon*, no particular colour regulated.
4.3. Blouse  
New Decree  
- Regular blouse, long sleeves, one pocket on the left side, white, worn tucked into skirt.  
(Junior high/high school)  

Old Decree  
- Blouse like a coat, long sleeves, not tucked into skirt, white (for junior high and high school).

4.4. Skirt  
New Decree  
- long skirt to the ankles, for junior high school the colour is dark blue and for high school is grey.  

Old Decree  
- Regular skirt to knees for junior high school, the colour is dark blue; and for high school a grey long skirt.

4.5. For the National Flag Ceremony  
New Decree (Article 9 verse (2))  
- School uniform for the National Flag Ceremony is the daily school uniform plus hat (colour to match pants/skirt colour).  

Old Decree  
- Daily Uniform plus:  
  - hat, color: for elementary (dark red and white), junior high (dark blue and white), high school (grey and white)  
  - tie, colour to match pants/skirt.

4.6. Implementation of the Decrees  
New Decree  
Only for state owned schools  

Old Decree  
For both state owned and private schools

4.7. Kindergarten  
New Decree  
Does not regulate a particular uniform for kindergarten students.  
Old Decree (Article 10 section (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), and (6) regulates in detail the school uniform for kindergarten students in relation to daily uniform, national Flag Ceremony Uniform, and all attributes and colours.
4.8. One who is responsible
   - New Decree (Article 13)
     The one who is responsible for this Decree is the school principal.
   - Old Decree
     Does not stipulate anyone to be responsible for this decree.

Jakarta, 16 February 1991
Director General of
Primary and Secondary Education
Prof. Dr. Hasan Walinono
NIP. 130 162 839

***
APPENDIX 3

WALIKOTA PADANG
INSTRUKSI
Nomor: 451.422/Binsos-iii/2005

TENTANG

PELAKSANAAN WIRID REMAJA DIDIKAN SUBUH DAN ANTI
TOGEL/NARKOBA SERTA BERPAKAIAN MUSLIM/MUSLIMAH BAGI
MURID/SISWA SD/MI, SLTP/MTS DAN SLTA/SMK/MA DI KOTA PADANG

WALIKOTA PADANG

Menimbang:

a. bahwa sebagai tindak lanjut pelaksanaan Pesantren Ramadhan tahun 1425 H/2004 M bagi murid/siswa SD/MI, SLTP/MTS, SLTA/SMK/MA yang beragama Islam

b. bahwa untuk meningkatkan keimanan dan ketaqwaan kepada Allah swt, bagi warga Kota Padang terutama pelajar SD/MI, SLTP/MTS, SLTA/SMK/MA di kota Padang diperlukan penanaman Aqidah melalui wirid remaja dan didikan subuh.

c. bahwa untuk memenuhi maksud poin a dan b tersebut di atas, dipandang perlu ditetapkan dengan isntruksi Wali Kota Padang.

Mengingat:


Menginstruksikan:

Kepada:
1. Kepada Dinas Pendidikan Kota Padang
2. Kepala Kantor Departemen Agama Kota Padang
3. Ketua DMI (Dewan Masjid Indonesia) Kota Padang
4. Camat se-kota Padang
5. Lurah se-kota Padang

Untuk:

PERTAMA: Mewajibkan bagi seluruh siswa SLTP/MTS dan SLTA/SMK/MA yang beragama Islam untuk mengikuti kegiatan wirid remaja di mesjid/Mushalla setiap hari kamis malam (minggu I dan III) setiap bulan, pukul 19.30 WIB s/d selesai di lingkungan siswa berdomisili dan diharapkan kepada orang tua siswa/Murid supaya memberikan dorongan serta memotivasi/mengawasinya.

KEDUA: Mewajibkan didikan subuh/sholat subuh berjama‘ah bagi seluruh siswa murid SD/MI yang beragama Islam kelas 1 (satu) s/d kelas VI (enam) di masjid/musholla setiap hari minggu pagi, pukul 04.30 WIB s/d selesai di lingkungan siswa berdomisili dan kepada orangtua murid diharapkan supaya ikut mendampinginya selama pelaksanaan didikan subuh berlangsung.


KEEMPAT: Materi/kurikulum yang akan diajarkan berupa keimanan, ibadah dan akhlak yang disusun oleh pemerintah kodya Padang dan Kantor Departemen Agama Kota Padang.


KEENAM: Pengawasan pelaksanaan wirid remaja dan didikan subuh, dilakukan oleh instruktur dan guru SD/MI, SLTP/MTS dan SLTA/SMK/MA se-kota Padang dengan mengisi daftar hadir (absen) bagi peserta wirid remaja dan didikan subuh sesuai dengan lokasi masjid/mushalla dan tempat tinggal (domisili) murid/pelajar tersebut.
KETUJUH: Penilaian prestasi murid/siswa dalam pelaksanaan wirid remaja dan didikan subuh dilakukan oleh instruktur/pengajar bersama pengurus masjid/mushalla secara objektif pada tempat kegiatan berlangsung.

KEDELAPAN: Hasil penilaian/prestasi murid/siswa pada angka ketujuh di atas dalam kegiatan wirid remaja dan didikan subuh ini agar dievaluasi oleh para guru (beragama Islam) dan hasil penilaianannya diintegrasikan dalam nilai mata pelajaran bidang studi agama murid/siswa (teori dan praktik).

KESEMBILAN: Biaya pelaksanaan kegiatan wirid remaja dan didikan subuh sepenuhnya dibebankan kepada swadaya masyarakat di lingkungan masjid/mushalla dan bantuan pihak lain yang tidak mengikat.

KESEPULUH: Bagi murid/siswa SD/MI, SLTP/MTS, SLTA/SMK/MA sekota Padang diwajibkan berpakaian muslim/muslimah yang beragama Islam dan bagi non-muslim dianjurkan menyesuaikan pakaian (memakai baju kurung bagi perempuan dan memakai celana panjang bagi laki-laki).

KESEBELAS: Bagi murid/siswa SD/MI, SLTP/MTS, SLTA/SMK/MA sekota Padang diwajibkan mengkampanyekan Ani Togel, Judi, Narkoba dan Miras serta penyakit masyarakat lainnya.

KEDUABELAS: Pelaksanaan instruksi ini mulai berlaku sejak awal semester II (genap) tahun ajaran 2004/2005, dan hal-hal yang bersifat teknis akan diatur oleh Dinas/instansi terkait dengan suatu ketentuan lebih lanjut.

Dengan instruksi ini dibuat, agar dapat ditindaklanjuti dan dilaksanakan sebagaimana mestinya, terima kasih.

Disalin sesuai dengan aslinya oleh:

Staf Sub Umum Dinas Pendidikan Kota Padang

A M R I
NIP. 130910924

Ditetapkan di Padang Pada Tanggal: 7 Maret 2005

Cap/Dto

F A U Z I   B A H A R

Tembusan kepada Yth:
1. Sdr. Ketua DPRD Kota Padang
2. Sdr. Muspida Kota Padang
3. Sdr. Ketua MUI Kota Padang
4. Sdr. Ketua LKAAM Kota Padang
5. Arsip

268
ENGLISH VERSION

The Padang Mayor’s Instruction
No.451/422/Binsos-iii/2005

on
The Implementation of Youth Wirid and Subuh Teaching, Anti-Drug Campaign and Moslem Clothing Uniform for SD/MI, SLTP/MTS and SLTA/SMK/MA Students in Padang

The Padang Mayor

Considering:

a. that this follows the implementation of Pesantren Ramadhan in 1425H/ 2004 M for SD/MI, SLTP/MTS and SLTA/SMK/MA Moslem Students
b. that there is a need to improve the belief and faith in God for Padang people particularly for SD/MI, SLTP/MTS, and SLTA/MA students in Padang by establishing youth group for ritual activities and dawn class as about religious teaching

c. that in relation to the above points a and b, it is necessary to enact a Law regulated by the Padang mayor instruction.

Recalling:

1. Regulation no.22/2004 on regional regulations
2. The joint agreement between the Minister of Internal Affairs and the Minister of religious affairs no.128/82 and no.44A/1982 on the improvement of the ability to recite and write the Qur’an for Moslems in their daily life
3. Regulation of the Minister of Internal Affairs no.130-67/2003 on the acknowledgment of regency and city authority and list of divisions in the department/LPND
4. Regional regulation no.6/2005 on the obligation to recite the Qur’an for SD/MI
5. Padang regional regulation no.19/2004 on the middle development plan (RPJM) in 2004-2008

Instructing:

To 1. The head office of Padang educational bureau
    2. The head office of Padang department of religious affairs
    3. The head of Padang DMI
    4. All Padang sub districts heads
    5. All Padang village heads

That:

ONE: It is compulsory for all SLTP/MTS and SLTA/SMK/MA Muslim students to participate in youth ritual activities at the mosque/prayer room at the closest venue to their home each Thursday evening (in the first and third week) each month from 19.39pm
local Jakarta time until the venue closes. It is expected that the parents of the student will encourage, motivate and supervise this.

TWO: Compulsory dawn religious teaching/communal prayer for all SD/MI Muslim students in class 1 to class 6 at the mosque/prayer room at the closest venue to their home each Sunday morning, from 4.30am local Jakarta time until the end of the activity. It is expected that the parents will accompany the students for the duration of the class.

THREE: Relating to the first and second points above, teachers should not burden students with homework. For implementation, teachers in each location should coordinate with the manager of the local mosque/prayer room.

FOUR: Material/curriculum that is taught relates to religion, worship and morality and is produced by the Padang municipal government and the Padang City Department of Religion.

FIVE: The instructor/Teacher of the religious ritual activities and dawn religious teaching will be appointed by the manager of the relevant mosque/prayer room, based on consensus among MDA/TPA/TPSA teachers and religious teachers from SLTP/MTS and SLTA/SMK/MA who live in the area surrounding the mosque/prayer room.

SIX: Supervision of the youth ritual and dawn religious teaching class will be conducted by SD/MI, SLTP/MTS and SLTA/SMK/MA teachers in Padang by completing an attendance sheet of the class participants at the relevant mosque.

SEVEN: The evaluation of students in each youth ritual class and dawn religious class will be carried out by the instructor/teacher together with the manager of the mosque/prayer room objectively at the place the activities are conducted.

EIGHT: The results of the students (as referred to in point seven above) in the youth ritual activity and dawn religious teaching will be evaluated by (Muslim) teachers and the results will be integrated in the overall score for the student’s religious studies (theory and practice).

NINE: Operational costs for the youth ritual activity and dawn religious teaching will entirely be covered by donations from the local mosque/prayer room community and other non-binding sources.

TEN: For SD/MI, SLTP/MTS, SLTA/SMK/MA students in Padang it is compulsory to wear Islamic clothing, non-Muslims are recommended to adjust their clothing accordingly (baju kurung for girls and trousers for boys).

ELEVEN: For SD/MI, SLTP/MTS, SLTA/SMK/MA students in Padang it is compulsory to campaign against illegal gambling, gambling, narcotics and alcohol and other social ills.
TWELVE: The implementation of this instruction will be enforced commencing from semester II, 2004/2005 teaching year, and technical issues will be regulated by the relevant agency/institution in further regulations. It is hoped that this instruction is followed up and implemented as intended, thank you.

Copied from the original record by:
General Staff of the Education Agency
Padang City

A M R I
NIP. 130910924
Enacted in Padang
On: 7 March 2005

F A U Z I  B A H A R
Copied to:
1. Head of Regional Legislative Assembly Padang
2. Leader of the Regional Council for Padang City
3. Indonesian Ulama Council Padang City
4. LKAAM Padang City
5. Archive
APPENDIX 4

PERATURAN DAERAH KABUPATEN SOLOK
NOMOR 6 TAHUN 2002
TENTANG
BERPAKAIAN MUSLIM DAN MUSLIMAH
DI KABUPATEN SOLOK
DENGAN RAHMAT ALLAH SUBHANU WATA’ALA
BUPATI SOLOK

Menimbang:

a. bahwa sesuai dengan ketentuan pasal 29 ayat (2) Undang-undang dasar 1945. Negara menjamin kebebasan tiap-tiap Penduduk untuk beribadah menurut agama dan kepercayaannya masing-masing;

b. bahwa sebagai salah satu perwujudan dari pelaksanaan ajaran agama Islam adalah tercermin dari pakaiannya dalam kehidupan sehari-hari;

c. bahwa menutup aurat di dalam Islam hukumnya adalah wajib, baik di dalam ibadah yang bersifat mahdah maupun yang bersifat ammah;

d. bahwa untuk terwujudnya suasana kehidupan masyarakat yang mencerminkan kepribadian muslim dan muslimah serta dalam upaya mewujudkan masyarakat Kabupaten Solo yang beriman dan bertaqwa, maka dipandang perlu menetapkan Peraturan Daerah tentang Berpakaian Muslim dan Muslimah.

Mengingat:


2. Undang-undang Nomor 2 Tahun 1989 tentang Sistim Pendidikan Nasional (lembaran Negara tahun 1989 Nomor 6 tambahan lembaran Negara nomor 3390); 


4. Keputusan Presiden Nomor 44 tahun 1999 tentang teknik Penyusunan Peraturan Perundang-undangan dan Bentuk Rancangan Undang-undang , Rancangan Peraturan Pemerintah dan Rancangan Keputusan Presiden (Lembaran Negara tahun 1999 Nomor 70);

Dengan persetujuan
DEWAN PERWAKILAN RAKYAT DAERAH KABUPATEN SOLOK

Menetapkan: PERATURAN DAERAH KABUPATEN SOLOK TENTANG BERPAKAIAN MUSLIM DAN MUSLIMAH DI KABUPATEN SOLOK

BAB I
KETENTUAN UMUM
Pasal 1

Dalam Peraturan Daerah ini yang dimaksud dengan
1. Daerah adalah Kabupaten Solok.
2. Pemerintahan Daerah adalah Pemerintahan Kabupaten Solok.
4. Pakaian Muslim dan Muslimah adalah pakaian yang bercirikan islami;
5. Masyarakat Kabupaten Solok adalah orang yang berdomisili dan bekerja di Kabupaten Solok;

BAB II
Maksud, Tujuan dan Fungsi
Bagian Pertama
Maksud
Pasal 2

Maksud Berpakaian Muslim dan Muslimah bagi masyarakat adalah untuk menggambarkan seseorang atau masyarakat yang beriman dan bertaqwa kepada Allah subhanahu wa ta’ala serta taat mengamalkan Agama Islam sekaligus melestarikan pakaian adat.

Bagian Kedua
Tujuan
Pasal 3

Tujuan berpakaian Muslim dan Muslimah adalah:
1. Membentuk sikap sebagai seorang Muslim dan Muslimah yang baik dan berakhlak mulia;
2. Membiasakan diri berpakaian Muslim dan Muslimah dalam kehidupan berkeluarga maupun dihadapkan masyarakat umum;
3. Menciptakan masyarakat yang mencintai budaya Islam dan budaya Minangkabau;
4. Melestarikan fungsi adapt sesuai dengan pituah”syara mangato adat mamakai”
Fungsi berpakaian Muslim dan Muslimah adalah untuk menjaga kehormatan dan harga diri, sebagai identitas Muslim dan Muslimah, serta untuk menghindari kemungkinan terjadinya ancaman dan gangguan dari pihak lain.

Bab III

Kewajiban dan Pelaksanaan

Bagian Pertama
Kewajiban
Pasal 5

Setiap karyawan/karyawan, mahasiswa/mahasiswi dan siswa/siswi Sekolah Lanjutan Tingkat Atas (SLTA) atau Madrasah Aliyah (MA) serta pelajar Sekolah Lanjutan Tingkat Pertama (SLTP) atau Madrasah Tsanawiyah (MTs) diwajibkan berbusana Muslim dan Muslimah, sedangkan bagi warga masyarakat umum adalah bersifat himbauan.

Bagian Kedua
Pelaksanaan
Pasal 6

(1) Berpakaian Muslim dan Muslimah sebagaimana dimaksud pada pasal 5 dilaksanakan pada:
   a. Kantor-kantor Pemerintah dan swasta;
   b. Sekolah Negeri dan Swasta, mulai dari sekolah lanjutan tingkat pertama (SLTP) / Madrasah Tsanawiyah (MTs), sekolah lanjutan tingkat atas (SLTA)/ Madrasah Aliyah (MA) sampai perguruan tinggi.
   c. Lembaga-lembaga pendidikan sekolah dan luar sekolah;
   d. Acara-acara resmi

(2) Bagi masyarakat umum dihimbau untuk berpakaian muslim dan muslimah dalam kehidupan sehari-hari termasuk pada acara hiburan umum.

Pasal 7

(1) Ketentuan mengenai pakaian muslim dan muslimah bagi karyawan/ti pada kantor pemerintah dan swasta sebagaimana tersebut dalam pasal 6 ayat (1) huruf a adalah sebagai berikut:
A. KARYAWAN

1). Memakai celana panjang
2). Memakai baju lengan panjang / pendek

B. KARYAWATI

1) Memakai Baju lengan panjang yang menutupi pinggul
2) Memakai rok atau celana panjang menutup sampai mata kaki;
3) Memakai kerudung yang menutupi rambut, telinga, leher, tengkuk dan dada.

(2) Pakaian sebagaimana dimaksud pada ayat (1) tidak tembus pandang, dan tidak memperlihatkan lekuk-lekuk (tidak ketat).
(3) Ketentuan mengenai model pakaian muslim dan muslimah diatur lebih lanjut dengan keputusan bupati.

Pasal 8

(1) Ketentuan memakai pakaian muslim dan muslimah bagi siswa dan mahasiswa sebagaimana dimaksud pada pasal 6 ayat (1) huruf b adalah sebagai berikut:

A. LAKI-LAKI

1). Memakai celana panjang
2). Memakai baju lengan panjang / pendek

B. PEREMPUAN

1) Memakai Baju lengan panjang yang menutupi pinggul dan dada yang di dalamnya sampai lutut;
2) Memakai rok atau celana panjang menutup sampai mata kaki;
3) Memakai kerudung yang menutupi rambut, telinga, leher, tengkuk dan dada.

(2) Pakaian sebagaimana dimaksud pada ayat (1) tidak tembus pandang dan tidak memperlihatkan lekuk-lekuk tubuh (tidak ketat).
(3) Ketentuan mengenai model pakaian diatur lebih lanjut dengan keputusan bupati.

Pasal 9

Ketentuan memakai pakaian muslim dan muslimah pada lembaga pendidikan sekolah dan luar sekolah sebagaimana dimaksud pada pasal 6 ayat (1) huruf c, menyesuaikan dengan ketentuan yang berlaku pada karyawan/karyawati.
Pasal 10
Ketentuan memakai pakaian busana muslim dan muslimah pada acara resmi sebagaimana dimaksud pada pasal 6 ayat (1) huruf d menyesuaikan dengan jenis acara dan ketentuan yang berlaku setempat.

Bab IV
SANKSI

Pasal 11
Setiap pelanggaran terhadap ketentuan Peraturan Daerah ini dikenakan sanksi sebagai berikut:

a. Bagi Karyawan/Karyawan/Dosen/Guru-guru/ dan lain-lain dikenakan sanksi sesuai dengan ketentuan Disiplin pegawai;

b. Bagi siswa dan mahasiswa dikenakan sanksi secara bertingkat sebagai berikut:
   1) Ditegur secara lisan;
   2) Ditegur secara tertulis;
   3) Diberitahukan kepada orang tua;
   4) Tidak dibolehkan mengikuti pelajaran sekolah;
   5) Dikeluarkan / dipindahkan dari sekolah

c. Bagi panitia yang menyelenggarakan acara resmi, dikenakan sanksi berupa teguran secara lisan agar panitia menertibkan undangan.

Bab V
Pembiayaan

Pasal 12
Pembiayaan untuk pelaksanaan peraturan daerah ini dibebankan pada anggaran pendapatan dan belanja daerah kepada orang tua murid/siswa, masyarakat dan bantuan lainnya yang sah sesuai dengan ketentuan yang berlaku.

Bab VI
Pengawasan

Pasal 13
Pengawasan terhadap pelaksanaan peraturan daerah ini dilakukan oleh bupati dan atau pejabat lain yang ditunjuk serta tokoh masyarakat.

Bab VII
Ketentuan Lain

Pasal 14
(1) Peraturan Daerah ini hanya berlaku bagi masyarakat yang beragama Islam dan berdomisili dan atau bekerja di daerah.

(2) Bagi karyawan / karyawan, mahasiswa/mahasiswi, siswa/siswi dan pelajar serta masyarakat yang tidak beragama Islam busananya menyesuaikan dengan ketentuan yang berlaku bagi agama masing-masing.
Bab VIII
Ketentuan Penutup

Pasal 15

(1) Hal-hal yang belum diatur dalam peraturan daerah ini sepanjang mengenai pelaksanaannya akan diatur lebih lanjut oleh bupati;

(2) Peraturan daerah ini berlaku efektif 1 tahun sejak tanggal diundangkan.

Agar setiap orang dapat mengetahuinya memerintahkan pengundangan Peraturan Daerah ini dengan penempatannya dalam lembaran daerah kabupaten Solok.

Ditetapkan di Solok
Pada tanggal 11 Maret 2002
Bupati Solok,

DTO
GAMAWAN FAUZI

Diundangkan di Solok
Pada tanggal 11 Mei 2002
Sekretaris Daerah

Drs. H. Syafrul Chatib
NIP. 410002432

Lemda Kabupaten Solok tahun 2002 Nomor 17 Seri E-12
ENGLISH VERSION
REGIONAL LAW OF KABUPATEN SOLOK
NUMBER 6 YEAR 2002

RELATING TO

MUSLIM CLOTHING AND MUSLIM WOMEN
IN KABUPATEN SOLOK

WITH THE BLESSING OF GOD THE ALMIGHTY
BUPATI SOLOK

Considering:

a. that according to the stipulation of article 29 point (2) of the 1945 Constitution.
The state guarantees the freedom of each Citizen to practice religious rites
according to individual religion and beliefs;

b. that a form of the implementation of Islamic teachings is reflected by everyday
clothing;

c. that to cover the aurat is compulsory under Islamic law, both in worship which is
mahdah and ammah;

d. that for the realisation of community life that reflects the character of Muslim
men and women and to make Kabupaten Solok a religious and God-fearing
(bertaqwa), thus it is considered necessary to instate the Regional Law on Muslim
clothing for men and women.

Remembering:

1. Law Number 12, Year 1956 relating to the Formation of Regional Autonomy for
Kapupaten in Central Sumatera Province State Paper Year 1956 Number 25.

2. Law Number 2, Year 1989 on the National Education System (State Paper Year
1989 Number 6, Additional State Paper Number 3390);

3. Law Number 22, Year 1999 on Regional Administration (National Paper Year
1999 Number 60, Additional State Paper Number 3839);

4. Presidential Decree Number 44, year 1999, on the technique of legal drafting and
form of Bills, Draft Government Law and Draft Government Decrees (National
Paper year 1999 Number 70);

5. Kabupaten Solok Regional Law Number 4, year 2001, on Nagari Administration
(Regional Paper year 2001 Number 4, additional Regional Paper Number 4)
With agreement from
REGIONAL PARLIAMENT
KABUPATEN SOLOK

Stipulates: KABUPATEN SOLOK REGIONAL LAW ON CLOTHING FOR MUSLIM MEN AND WOMEN IN KABUPATEN SOLOK

CHAPTER I
GENERAL CONDITIONS

Article 1
The terms used in this Regional Law should be understood as follows:
1. Region is Kabupaten Solok.
2. Regional Administration is Kabupaten Solok Administration.
3. Bupati is Bupati Solok.
4. Men and Women Muslim Clothing is that which is Islamic;
5. The Kabupaten Solok community is the people who are domiciled and work in Kabupaten Solok;

Chapter II
Meaning, Aim and Function

First Section
Meaning

Article 2
The meaning of wearing Men and Women’s Muslim Clothing for the community is to demonstrate that someone or the community is faithful and fears God and practices Islam and maintains traditional clothing.

Second Section
Aim

Article 3
The aim of Men and Women wearing Muslim Clothing is:
1. To form a good attitude (berakhlaq mulia) as a Muslim Man or Woman;
2. To accustom oneself to wearing Islamic clothing in the household and in public;
3. To create a community that respects Islamic and Minangkabau cultures;
4. To protect the function of traditional culture according to the proverb "syara mangato adat mamakai".
Third Section
Function

Article 4
The function of men and women wearing Islamic clothing is to ensure an appreciation of, and respect for, Muslim identity and to prevent external threats or disturbances.

Chapter III
Responsibility and Implementation

First Section
Responsibility

Article 5
All employees, students at university, and students at senior high schools or Islamic senior high schools (Madrasah Aliyah (MA)) and junior high schools or Islamic senior high schools (Madrasah Tsanawiyah (MTs)) must wear Islamic clothing, whereas the wider community are advised to wear this clothing.

Second Section
Implementation

Article 6
(1) The wearing of Muslim clothing as referred to in article 5 should be followed out by:
   a) Government and private company office staff;
   b) State and Private schools, including students at junior high schools / Islamic junior high schools (Madrasah Tsanawiyah (MTs)), senior high schools/ Islamic senior high schools (Madrasah Aliyah (MA)) and tertiary institutions.
   c) Educational institutions including schools and extra-curricular institutions;
   d) Formal occasions

(2) The general public is advised to wear Islamic clothing on a daily basis, including at public entertainment events.

Article 7
(1) The stipulation for wearing Islamic clothing by employees at government and private offices as referred to in article 6 point (1) a is as follows:
A. MALE EMPLOYEES

1). Wear trousers
2). Wear long/short sleeved shirt

B. FEMALE EMPLOYEES

1) Wear long sleeved shirt that covers the waist;
2) Wear a long skirt or trousers that cover the ankles;
3) Wear a veil that covers their hair, ears, neck and chest.

(2) The clothing that is referred to in point (1) should not be transparent nor reveal the human form (not tight)
(3) The stipulation on the mode of clothing should be later regulated by a bupati decree

Article 8
(1) The stipulation to wear Islamic clothing for university students as referred to in article 6 point (1) b, is as follows:

A. MALES

1). Wear trousers
2). Wear long/short sleeved shirt

B. FEMALES

1. Wear long sleeved shirt that covers the waist and chest until the knee;
2. Wear a skirt or trousers that cover the ankles;
3. Wear a veil that covers the hair, ears, neck, nape of the neck and chest.

(2) Clothing as referred to point (1) should not be transparent and not reveal the human form (not tight).
(3) The stipulation on the mode of clothing is regulated later in a bupati decree.

Article 9
The stipulation on wearing Islamic clothing at educational institutions including schools and extra-curricular institutions as referred to in article 6 point (1) c follows the stipulations set out for male and female employees.

Article 10
The stipulation to wear Islamic clothing at formal occasions as referred to article 6 point 1 d is determined by the type of event and local stipulations.
Chapter IV
SANCTIONS

Article 11

Each evasion of the stipulations set out in the Regional Law will incur the following sanctions:

a. For Male and Female Employees/Lecturers/Teachers and others the sanction that will be applied is according to the stipulations of employee disciplinary codes;

b. University students will incur the following range of sanctions;
   1) Warned verbally;
   2) Warned in writing;
   3) Parents informed;
   4) Forbidden from attending classes;
   5) Expelled or moved from the school

c. Committees that organise formal occasions will incur the following verbal sanctions to the participants about the obligation to wear the Islamic clothing in that occasion.

Chapter V
Funding

Article 12

Funding for the implementation of this regional law is sourced from the regional budget to ensure that parents of students, the community and other legitimate assistance is in accordance with the existing stipulations.

Chapter VI
Monitoring

Article 13

Monitoring of the implementation of this regional law is carried out by the bupati and other appointed officials and community leaders.

Chapter VII
Other Stipulations

Article 14

1) This Regional Law only applies to the community who are Muslim and domiciled and or work in the area.

2) For employees, university and high school students and the community who are not Muslim clothing should be appropriate to the existing stipulations for their religion.
Chapter VIII
Closure of Stipulation

Article 15

1. The matters that have not been regulated in this regional law as long as it relates to the implementation will be regulated later by bupati;
2. This regional law is effective for one year from its date of enactment.

This Regional Law should be recorded in the Kabupaten Solok regional paper so that the public are informed.

Stipulated in Solok
On this day 11 March 2002
Bupati Solok,

GAMAWAN FAUZI

Enacted in Solok
On this day 11 May 2002
Regional Secretary

Drs. H. Syafrul Chatib
Government Employee Number. 410002432

Regional Paper Kabupaten Solok year 2002 Number 17 Series E-12
APPENDIX 5

PEMERINTAH KABUPATEN SOLOK
KECAMATAN JUNJUNG SIRIH
WALINAGARI PANINGGAHAN

PERATURAN NAGARI

TENTANG

PANINGGAHAN YANG BERAGAMA DAN BERADAT

TAHUN 2002
PERATURAN NAGARI PANINGGAHAN
NOMOR 1 Tahun 2002

TENTANG

PANINGGAHAN YANG BERAGAMA DAN BERADAT
DENGAN RAHMAT ALLAH SUBHANAHU WATA’ALA

WALINAGARI PANINGGAHAN

Menimbang:


b. Bahwa dalam rangka berusaha memperbaiki dan menyempurnakan akhlak serta budi pekerti masyarakat Nagari Paninggahan.

c. Bahwa dalam rangka meningkatkan peranan dan fungsi Kerapatan Adat Nagari (KAN) dalam menerapkan kebijakan yang serasi, seragam serta ikut mensukseskan pelaksanaan nagari lebih lanjut peningkatan peranan Kerapatan Adat Nagari (KAN) dalam kenagarian Paninggahan.


e. Bahwa untuk mewujudkan cita-cita sebagaimana dimaksud di atas perlu ditetapkan Peraturan Nagari tentang “Paninggahan yang beragama dan beradat”.

Mengingat:

1. Undang-undang nomor 1 tahun 1974 tentang Perkawinan.

2. Undang-undang nomor 12 tahun 1965 tentang pembentukan otonomi kabupaten dalam lingkungan Sumatera Tengah.


Dengan persetujuan
BADAN PERWAKILAN NAGARI PANINGGAHAN

MEMUTUSKAN

Menetapkan: PERATURAN NAGARI PANINGGAHAN TENTANG PANINGGAHAN YANG BERAGAMA DAN BERADAT

BAB I

KETENTUAN UMUM

Pasal 1

Dalam peraturan Nagari ini yang dimaksud dengan:

a. Nagari adalah kesatuan masyarakat hukum adat dalam Nagari Paninggahan yang terdiri dari himpunan beberapa suku yang mempunyai harta kekayaan sendiri.
b. Paninggahan yang beragama adalah masyarakat Paninggahan yang paham akan nilai-nilai agama dan sesuai dengan Al-Qur’an dan Sunnah serta pelaksaanaannya sesuai dengan Al-Qur’an dan Sunnah.
c. Paninggahan yang beradat adalah masyarakat Paninggahan yang paham dan melaksanakan adat Nagari Paninggahan yang berdasarkan kepada Al-Qur’an dan Sunnah.
d. Generasi adalah mereka yang berumur tahun sampai meraka yang sudah tua.
e. Sertifikat baca tulis Al-Qur’an adalah surat keterangan atau tanda bukti bahwa yang bersangkutan telah bisa baca Al-Qur’an.
f. Busana muslim adalah pakaian yang menutup aurat, longgar, sopan dan berwibawa sesuai dengan ajaran Al-Qur’an dan Sunnah.
g. Kerapatan adat adalah Kerapatan Adat Nagari Paninggahan sebagai wadah tertinggi dalam masyarakat hukum adat nagari.

h. Pelaksanaan kegiatan adat adalah serangkaian pelaksanaan kegiatan baik yang sudah dilaksanakan maupun yang akan dilaksanakan yaitu berupa pola tingkah dan perbuatan masyarakat hukum adat di nagari.

i. Masyarakat hukum adat Paninggahan adalah masyarakat dengan berbagai lapisan sosialnya yang ada di nagari dengan pepatah “Adat Salingka Nagari, Pusako salingka kaum”.

j. Penghulu atau datuk adalah pimpinan dalam suatu kaum yang diangkat atau diambil sumpahnya dalam perhelatan panghulu.

k. Manti adalah asal katanya dari manati yaitu orang yang dipercaya membantu penghulu dalam kaumnya sebagai ulasan jari, sambung lidah dari penghulu.

l. Panito adalah orang yang alim (ulama) orang yang tahu syah dengan haram hak dengan batil dan merupakan jabatan fungsional dalam suku yang dipercaya dalam kaum atau sukunya.

m. Dubalang adat adalah disebut orang hulubalang merupakan jabatan fungsional adat dalam kaum yang dipilih dalam suku dan bertanggungjawab kepada penghulu. Dubalang bertugas mengawal pemimpin dan pembantu penghulu, menjaga keamanan dalam suatu kaum atau nagari, kata dubalang, kata mandareh kareh ditakiak, lunak disudu berdiri dan bertindak di atas kebenaran.


o. Sidang Kerapatan Adat Nagari khusus adalah persidangan yang dihadiri hanya oleh Penghulu saja.

p. Sidang KAN lengkap adalah persidangan yang dihadiri oleh penghulu, Manti, Panito dan Dubalang Adat.

q. Sidang Nagari atau Ampek Jinih adalah atau yang lazim disebut sidang Nagari yang unsurnya adalah para Ninik Mamak, Alim Ulama, Cadiak Pandai, Bundo Kanduang dan Pemuda.

r. Orang Ampek Jinih adalah Ninik Mamak, Alim Ulama, Cadiak Pandai/Pemuda dan Bundo Kanduang.

s. Ninik Mamak adalah Penghulu, Manti, Panito dan Dubalang Adat.

t. Perangkat adat dalam nagari adalah Manti, Panito dan Dubalang Adat.
BAB II
SASARAN

Pasal 2

Pasal 3
Seluruh lapisan masyarakat Paninggahan harus memahami dan mematuhi adat yang berlaku di Nagari Paninggahan.

BAB III
BELAJAR AL-QUR’AN

Pasal 4

Pasal 5
Kepada semua orang tua wajib menyerahkan anak-anaknya untuk belajar Al-Qur’an ke surau atau tempat pendidikan Al-Qur’an.

Pasal 6
Setiap orang tua / wali murid bersama guru surau harus mengadakan pertemuan koordinasi minimal sekali dalam sebulan.

Pasal 7
1. Setiap calon penganten yang akan melangsungkan pernikahan harus bisa membaca Al-Qur’an yang ditandai dengan sertifikat yang dikeluarkan oleh instansi terkait serta mengamalkan syariat Islam.
2. Calon penganten perempuan dibolehkan minta mahar kepada calon penganten pria sesuai kesepakatan kemampuan pihak laki-laki.
BAB IV
ADAT DAN ADAB

Pasal 8
2. Setiap pemangku adat (penghulu, manti, Panito, Tonganai, Acik) wajib mengajarkan adat kepada kaumnya masing-masing.
3. Setiap surau menyediakan 1 (satu) hari dalam seminggu untuk tempat belajar adat dan kesenian tradisional.
4. Setiap pemuda/remaja dalam jorong diwajibkan mengikuti kegiatan pemuda dan kesenian tradisional yang ada dalam jorong tersebut.

Pasal 9
Kepada orang tua diwajibkan mengajarkan kepada anak-anak mereka tentang sopan santun dan budi pekerti untuk terciptanya silaturahmi yang baik serta terciptanya umat yang berakhilak sesuai Al-Qur’an dan hadits.

Pasal 10
1. Setiap muslim dan muslimah yang baligh dan berakal (dewasa) apabila keluar rumah atau meninggalkan rumah diwajibkan berbusana muslim.
2. Di setiap acara resepsi pernikahan atau acara lainnya setiap wanita diharuskan memakai busana muslimah.

Pasal 11
Setiap sekolah yang ada di Nagari Paninggahan mulai dari TK, SD, SLTP dan SLTA diharuskan berbusana muslim.

Pasal 12
1. Kaum laki-laki yang datang berkunjung ke rumah perempuan atau sebaliknya tidak diizinkan lewat dari jam 21.00 WIB.
2. Wanita baligh yang keluar rumah pada malam hari harus ditemani oleh orang tua/muhrim.
3. Di rumah yang ada wanita baligh atau janda tidak dibolehkan menerima tamu untuk bermalam di rumah tersebut.
4. Tuan rumah wajib melapor kepada Kepala Jorong bila ada tamu dan harus bertanggung jawab penuh terhadap tamunya.
Pasal 13
Apabila azan diumandangkan seluruh kegiatan-kegiatan adat atau acara rapat-rapat yang sedang berlangsung dalam nagari harus dihentikan.

Pasal 14
Dilarang keras dalam acara perkawinan pada malam hari mengadakan semacam hiburan atau permainan yang diduga keras dapat memancing perbuatan yang mengandung makniat.

BAB V
SURAU DAN MASJID
Pasal 15
1. Setiap masjid dan surau diharapkan mempunyai garim supaya setiap waktu dapat dikumandangkan suara azan tanda masuknya waktu shalat.
2. Setiap masjid dan surau harus disediakan tempat belajar mengaji bagi generasi yang akan belajar.
3. Sehubungan dengan ayat 2 pasal ini maka setiap surau atau masjid diharuskan mempunyai guru mengaji yang tetap.
4. Setiap masjid dan surau harus dikelola dengan memakai managemen yang baik.

BAB VI
KETERTIBAN UMUM
Pasal 16
1. Seluruh masyarakat nagari Paninggahan tidak dibenarkan atau dilarang keras melakukan perbuatan maknian seperti:
   a. Mengkonsumsi, menjual, mengedarkan atau memproduksi minuman keras dan narkoba dan sejenisnya, baik secara terang-terangan atau sembunyi.
   b. Perzinaan dan hal pornografi lainnya seperti memutar, menjual, menyewakan VCD porno, memajang gambar porno, serta membaca, menjual atau menyewakan buku-buku forno.
   c. Melakukan perjudian seperti Togel dan sejenisnya.
   d. Segala bentuk perkelahan atau tawuran.
   e. Melakukan pencurian, perampokan dan tindakan kriminal lainnya.
2. Seluruh Masyarakat Nagari Paninggahan tidak dibenarkan atau dilarang menangkap ikan dengan memakai bahan peledak, setrum, bahan racun serta jenis jala dan jaring dengan ukuran di bawah 1 inche.
3. Setiap warga masyarakat Nagari Paninggahan tidak dibenarkan atau dilarang merusak fasilitas umum nagari.
PASAL 17
1. Bagi warga masyarakat Nagari Paninggahan yang mempunyai televisi dianjurkan mematikannya pada saat jam shalat dan pada waktu anak-anak mengaji serta saat wirid atau kegiatan agama lainnya yang dilakukan pada malam hari.
2. Pada saat azan dikumandangkan atau saat kegiatan agama sedang berlangsung di surau/masjid/lokasi tertentu maka masyarakat yang berdomisili di sekitar lokasi kegiatan dianjurkan untuk melakukan kegiatan permainan seperti domino, kartu kuning atau sejenisnya.

PASAL 18
Dilarang keras mengadakan keramaian di malam hari yang diduga keras dapat mengganggu ketertiban umum dan kesusilaan serta agama yang berlaku, seperti: band, orgen, layar tancap, karaoke.

BAB VII
MAJLIS TAKLIM

Pasal 19
1. Setiap masjid dan surau diharuskan membentuk majelis baik untuk kaum tua maupun kaum muda.
2. Dalam pelaksanaan acara majlis taklim wajib mengawali kegiatan dengan membaca Al-Qur’an yang ayatnya berkelanjutan di setiap kali pertemuan (dimulai dari surat pertama).

BAB VIII
DAKWAH

Pasal 20
Ceramah agama yang disampaikan oleh pemerintah harus membatasi diri dari hal-hal yang menyebabkan perpecahan seperti:
a. Antara ulama dengan ulama
b. Antara jama’ah yang satu dengan jama’ah lainnya.

Pasal 21
Penceramah diharuskan memberikan contoh atau tindakan yang baik bagi umat sesuai dengan Al-Qur’an dan hadis dalam kehidupan sehari-hari.
BAB IX
KESENIAN
Pasal 22
1. Setiap kesenian yang ditampilkan di dalam nagari Paninggahan diharuskan tidak bertentangan dengan agama dan adat yang berlaku di Nagari Paninggahan.
2. Dilarang menampilkan kesenian band dan sejenisnya yang menampilkan nyanyian dan tarian yang tidak sesuai dengan agama Islam dan adat yang berlaku di Nagari Paninggahan.

Pasal 23
Para seniman yang menampilkan acara kesenian diharuskan berpenampilan sopan dan bertata krama yang baik sesuai dengan Agama Islam dan adat yang berlaku di Nagari Paninggahan.

Pasal 24
Batas waktu dalam menampilkan acara kesenian adalah siang sampai jam 18.00 WIB sedangkan malam sampai jam 2.00 WIB

BAB X
KERAPATAN ADAT NAGARI (KAN)
Pasal 25
Jenis-jenis persidangan di Kerapatan Adat Nagari Paninggahan adalah:
a. Sidang Khusus Kerapatan Adat Nagari (KAN)
b. Sidang KAN lengkap
c. Sidang Nagari Ampek Jinih

Pasal 26
Kewajiban Penghulu atau Pemangku Adat
1. Setiap Penghulu atau pemangku adat wajib menghadiri sidang-sidang khusus KAN, sidang lengkap KAN, dan sidang Nagari/Ampek Jinih.
2. Bagi penghulu yang tidak berdomisili di kampung atau merantau diwajibkan menghadiri sidang tahunan KAN satu kali setahun yang diadakan pada bulan Syawal.

Pasal 27
1. Setiap *suduik* diwajibkan ada satu Manti, Dubalang Adat dan Panito.
2. Kepada Penghulu, Manti, Panito dan Dubalang Adat wajib memenuhi panggilan atau undangan jika diperlukan untuk membicarakan masalah kepentingan Nagari.
BAB XI
LARANGAN DALAM ADAT

Pasal 28
1. Dilarang kawin sepersukuan dalam Nagari
2. Dilarang nikah lari atau nikah keluar Nagari.
3. Dilarang melakukan perbuatan *taikek lakabak, takaja, takurung* di bilik dalam.
4. Dilarang melakukan perbuatan yang menurunkan wibawa dan kehormatan Ninik Mamak di dalam Nagari.
5. Dilarang memulangkan “Tando Batunangan” oleh pihak laki-laki maupun perempuan tanpa alasan yang dapat diterima secara adat.

BAB XII
ADAT BARALEK NIKAH KAWIN

Pasal 29
Pelaksanaan adat menjelang nikah kawin

1. *Baropek* mencari urang sumando di rumah tangga bagi kaum perempuan.
2. Membuat dan mengantar *bubua ketek bubua panikek janjang panapik badua*.
3. Membuat dan mengantarkan bubua gadang (*Bubua panakok hari kabaralek*).
4. Minta izin kepada orang tua dan para ninik mamak dalam kaum dan sukunya.
5. Pelaksanaan adat lainnya seperti mana yang biasa.

Pasal 30
Mendudukkan Ninik Mamak

1. Bagi anak kemenakan yang akan melaksanakan baralek harus terlebih dahulu mengadakan “mendudukkan Ninik Mamak” kedua belah pihak pada hari selasa dan rabu (siang atau malam).
2. Pada acara mendudukkan ninik mamak apabila yang bersangkutan berhalangan maka diwakilkan kepada penghulu dalam suku dan jika tidak ada juga harus diwakilkan kepada manti, Dubalang adat atau perangkat lainnya.

Pasal 31
1. *Baropok* mencari urang sumando di rumah kaum perempuan sebagaimana pasal 29 ayat 1 harus dilaksanakan.
2. Membuat dan mengantarkan bubua ketek sebagaimana pasal 29 ayat 2 di atas adalah hukumnya wajib, bubua yang diantar cukup bubua sacambang dengan ukuran 3-4 liter berasnya diantar paling banyak 12 (dua belas) orang dinanti dirumah laki-laki dengan makanan ringan (depek, bugih, garulak, agar-agar dan yang sejenisnya serta tidak dengan nasi).

3. Membuat mengantarkan bubua gadang (bubua panakok hari kabaralek) sebagaimana pasal 29 ayat 3 di atas tidak merupakan keharusan, bubua diantar atau diketahui orang banyak.

4. Bagi calon penganten harus meminta izin langsung kepada ninik mamaknya sebelum nikah tanpa diwakilkan kecuali sakit.

5. *Manuruik urang* (mengundang) secara adat adalah dengan *manikek janjang manapik bandua* serta membawa *sirih nan sakapua rokok nan sabatang*.

**Pasal 32**

*Adat mengantar anak daro jo marapulai*

1. Bagi kaum perempuan pakaian untuk mengantar *anak daro jo marapulai* adalah berpakaian “muslimah” Babajua kurung longgar dan dalam, serta pakai kerudung.

2. Bagi kaum laki-laki pada saat mengantarkan marapulai harus berpakaian sopan, pakai sarung dan pakai peci atau kupiah (tidak boleh pakai kaos oblong).

**Pasal 33**

Bagi kaum perempuan dan laki-laki pada saat melakukan kegiatan sebagaimana pasal 32 di atas harus berjalan atau bepergian pakai Nan Tuo nantau dengan adat.

**Pasal 34**

*Adat Bawaan Ke Rumah Penganten*

1. Bagi *pasamandan* atau *dusunak* terdekat dengan pihak yang *baralek* bawalah sesuai dengan kemampuannya seperti: salimuik, kain sarung, baju, anduk dll dibawa dengan jamba atau berupa kado.

2. Bagi teman atau undangan yang dekat dengan penganten (laki atau perempuan) berikanlah bawaannya berbentuk amplop (uang).

Pasal 35
Adat Malie-liek
1. Jumlah orang yang akan dikunjungi maksimal sebanyak 7 orang (penghulu kedua belah pihak, mamak tertua kedua belah pihak, kakak tertua kedua belah pihak, bapak tertua dari penganten perempuan).
2. Bawaan yang dibawa sewaktu malie-liek adalah sebuah rantang yang isinya lapek bugih, garubik dan sejenisnya.

Pasal 36
Pakaian Anak Daro Jo Marapulai
Pakaian anak daro jo marapulai dikembalikan kepada pakaian adat lama pusako usang yaitu penganten laki-laki pakai deta bagonjong, baju gadang, celana balapak dan anak daro pakai sunting berbusana muslimah dan lain sebagainya disesuaikan dengan adat kita.

Bab III
UANG ADAT
Pasal 37
Macam-macam uang adat
1. a. Uang adat kawin
   b. Uang adat tekanan surat
   c. Uang Adat penyelesaian perkara
2. a. Mintak pith atau uang hilang tidak dibenarkan lagi kepada kaum perempuan
   b. Uang hilang namanya diganti dengan uang adat.

Pasal 38
Uang Adat Kawin
1. Minta uang kepada perempuan adalah bertentangan dengan adat dan agama Islam.
2. Uang adat sebagaimana pasal 37 ayat 2 di atas adalah wajib yang besarnya maksimal 2 (dua) emas untuk semua golongan atau statusnya.
3. Uang adat maksimal 2 (dua) emas akan ditambah uang adatnya 1 (satu) emas kalau marapulai berstatus ninik mamaknya (penghulu).
Pasal 39
Besarnya uang sebagaimana pasal 38 di atas harus disebutkan besarnya pada saat mendudukkan Ninik Mamak ada hari Selasa, agar dapat diketahui oleh orang banyak.

Pasal 40
Uang Adat Tekanan Surat

1. Uang Adat mendudukkan Ninik Mamak 1/10 emas.
2. Uang adat tekanan surat sando panggang (2,5% dari nilai barang, untuk penghulu dan KAN tidak perlu menandatangani surat tersebut.
3. Uang adat tekanan surat jual beli tanah 10% dari nilai jual atau harga tanah untuk penghulu.
4. Uang Adat tekanan surat permohonan setifikat ke penghulu 2.5% dari nilai barang.
5. Uang adat tekanan surat izin kemenakan untuk menikah
   a. Penghulu Rp. 10.000
   b. Manti dan atau dubalang adat Rp.5.000
   c. Panito Rp. 5.000
6. Uang adat sebagaimana tersebut pada ayat 2, 3 dan 4 dalam pasal ini adalah batas maksimum dan dapat disesuaikan atas kesepakatan kedua belah pihak.

Pasal 41
Uang Adat Penyelesaian Perkara

Uang adat penyelesaian perkara/sengketa:

1. Di tingkat kaum uang konsumsi anggota sidang perdata harus dipikul oleh kedua belah pihak.
2. Di tingkat *suduik* uang konsumsi anggota sidang harus dipikul oleh kedua belah pihak yang bersangkutan.
3. Di tingkat suku uang konsumsi anggota sidang harus dipikul oleh kedua belah pihak dan yang penandatanganan surat keputusan kepada Ninik Mamak Kerapatan Suku sebesar:
   - Rp. 20.000/ orang untuk penghulu
   - Rp. 10.000/ orang untuk manti, panito dan dubalang.
4. Di tingkat KAN maksimal 5% dari nilai objek yang diperkarakan.
Pasal 42
Uang Adat Pengangkatan Penghulu

1. Uang pengangkatan penghulu adalah sebesar:
   a. Adat membuat surat \(\frac{1}{2}\) emas
   b. Adat untuk Penghulu Suduik 2 \(\frac{1}{2}\) emas
   c. Adat untuk Penghulu Suku 3 \(\frac{1}{2}\) emas
   d. Adat tekanan surat ke masing-masing penghulu 1/10 emas
   e. Adat diateh rumah untuk Penghulu Andiko 6 emas
   f. Adat diateh rumah penghulu pucuak 9 emas
   g. Adat penyumpahan 1/10 emas
   h. Adat Kepala Manti/Dubalang 1 \(\frac{1}{2}\) emas
   i. Adat tekanan Ketua KAN \(\frac{1}{2}\) emas
   j. Adat untuk panito \(\frac{1}{2}\) emas
   k. Uang tamu \(\frac{1}{2}\) emas
   l. Untuk kas KAN 3 emas

2. Uang adat untuk penghulu suku sebagaimana pasal 43 ayat 1 poin E dan F harus dibagi anggota penghulu orang hadir tanpa memandang persuku.

Bab XIV
ADAT BARALEK PENGHULU
Pasal 43
Sumpah Penghulu

1. Setiap penghulu harus disumpah sebagaimana biasa (yang lazim)
2. Sumpah penghulu harus terkonsep (Ada teks).

Pasal 44
Pidato Adat Baralek Penghulu

1. Pidato adat dalam baralek penghulu adalah:
   a. Pasambahan Sirih.
b. Pasambahan Bubua

c. Pasambahan Adat

2. Ketiga pasambahan tersebut pada ayat 4 pasal ini harus dilaksanakan oleh penghulu.

Bab XV

Kedudukan Pusaka Tinggi

Pasal 45

Harta pusaka tinggi boleh dihibahkan dan boleh juga tidak:

A. Hal yang membolehkan:
   a. Ahli waris kanduang sudah tidak ada lagi.
   b. Kemauan si penghibah sendiri melalui musyawarah kaum.
   c. Harta yang dihibahkan hanya 1/3 dari harta.

B. Hal yang melarang:
   a. Kalau sekiranya ada di pundaknya terpikul suatu kewajiban baginya.
   b. Ahli waris yang patut buliah

C. Harta pusaka tinggi boleh dihibahkan kepada:
   a. Kepada anak sendiri atau orang lain yang jadi tanggungan si penghibah.
   b. Kepada lembaga Sosial Kemasyarakatan.
   c. Kepada orang lain yang terlunta-lunta atau perlu bantuan.

Bab XVI

SANKSI

Pasal 46

1. Barang siapa dengan sengaja tidak melaksanakan peraturan sebagaimana yang tercantum dalam pasal 4 maka yang bersangkutan tidak diberikan surat tanda tamat belajar atau ijazah.

2. Barang siapa dengan sengaja tidak melaksanakan sebagaimana yang dimaksud pasal 5,6, maka kepada orang tuanya dikenakan aksi gotong royong selama satu minggu atau denda Rp. 150.000

3. Bagi yang melanggar pasal 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23 dan 24 dikenakan sanksi administrasi di mana setiap akan mengurus sesuatu hal melalui kantor walimagari Paninggahan tidak akan dilayani dan denda sebanyak-banyaknya Rp. 150.000.
4. Bagi anak kemenakan yang kawin sepasukan, sesuai dengan adat yang berlaku, adat Salingka Nagari, Pusako Salingko kaum, maka perbuatan tersebut sebagaimana pasal 28 ayat 1 harus dibuang dari kaum suku dan nagari.

5. Bagi anak kemenakan yang melaksanakan nikah lari dari Paninggahan yang tidak memenuhi persyaratan adat harus ditindak tegas, kemudian mendudukkan Ninik Mamak kedua belak pihak, Mamatiang kesalahan dengan membayar denda masing-masing 1 emas untuk keperluan kerapatan suku yang bersangkutan.


7. Penghulu yang tidak dapat memenuhi pasal 26 ayat 2, dua kali berturut-turut maka penghulu tersebut dikembalikan pada kaunya dan dapat diterima kembali sebagai anggota KAN dengan syarat harus mengisi adat kembali ke Nagari. Setengah dari adat pengisian ke nagari 3 emas bagi penghulu handiko 4,5 emas bagi penghulu pucuk.

8. Bagi penghulu, Manti, Panito, Dubalang Adat yang melanggar pasal 28 diberikan sanksi 2 kali lipat dari sanksi yang diberikan pada masyarakat dan kalau dipecat dari keanggotaan KAN Paninggahan.

9. Bagi penghulu, Manti, Panito dan Dubalang adat yang melanggar ketentuan pasal 26 ayat 1, 3 kali tanpa alasan yang jelas maka terpaksa jabatannya dipulangkan kepada asalnya atau sukunya oleh KAN.

Bab XVII
Ketentuan Peralihan

Pasal 47
Sebelum ditetapkannya peraturan nagari ini maka seluruh instruksi, petunjuk, atau pedoman yang diadakan pemerintah, pemerintah daerah dan pemerintah nagari jika tidak bertentangan dengan Peraturan Nagari ini dinyatakan tetap berlaku.

Bab XVIII
KETENTUAN PENUTUP

Pasal 48
Hal-hal yang belum diatur dalam peraturan nagari ini sepanjang mengenai peraturan pelaksanaannya akan diatur lebih lanjut oleh Wali Nagari.

Pasal 49
Peraturan Nagari ini mulai berlaku pada tanggal diundangkan dan berlaku efektif mulai tanggal 1 September 2002.
Agar setiap orang dapat mengetahuinya memerintahkan pengundangan Peraturan Nagari ini penempatannya dalam Lembaran Negara Paninggahan.

Ditetapkan di Paninggahan
Pada Tanggal 30 Juni 2002
Wali nagari Paninggahan

(Ir. H. Abu Bakar Bulek)

Diundangkan di Paninggahan
Pada tanggal 30 Juni 2002
Sekretaris Nagari

(Djasman S.Ag)
Lembaran Negara Paninggahan Tahun 2002 Nomor 1.
ENGLISH VERSION

KABUPATEN SOLOK ADMINISTRATION
KECAMATAN JUNJUNG SIRIH
WALINAGARI PANINGGAHAN

NAGARI LAW

ON

PANINGGAHAN THAT IS INSPIRED BY RELIGIOUS TEACHINGS AND TRADITIONAL CUSTOMS

YEAR 2002
NAGARI PANINGGAHAN LAW
NUMBER 1 YEAR 2002

ON

PANINGGAHAN THAT IS INSPIRED BY RELIGIOUS TEACHINGS AND
TRADITIONAL CUSTOMS

WITH THE BLESSING OF GOD THE GLORIOUS AND EXALTED
WALINAGARI PANINGGAHAN

Considering:

a. That according to Law No. 4 year 2001 of the Nagari Government, the Nagari
Government should determine nagari law to regulate and look after the
interests of the Nagari community based on local clan and customary
traditions and the Qur’an and Islamic tradition.

b. To increase the role and function of the Nagari Traditional Council
(Kerapatan Adat Nagari, KAN) and to implement appropriate and uniform
laws and realise the implementation of Nagari laws for the increased role of
the Nagari Traditional Council in the Paninggahan nagari.

c. That the Paninggahan Nagari community is the part of the community’s
traditional law that is based on “Adat Basandi Syarak, Syarak Basandi
Kitabullah” (local custom draws on syara, syara draws on the Qur’an), “Syara
Mangato, Adat Mamakai” (Syara says, adat implements), “Adat Istiadat
Minangkabau tidak lapuk di hujan, tidak lakang di paneh” (the character of
adat which is not moldy by the rain and not cracked by the heat). This saying
is becoming increasingly forgotten because of the influence of foreign
cultures and the change of times and needs to return to its roots and origins
that it is the Qur’an and Islamic tradition. That to realise the above Nagari
Law on “Paninggahan that is inspired by religious teachings and traditional
customs” needs to be enacted.

Recalling:

1. Law number 1 year 1974 on Marriage.
2. Law number 12 year 1965 on the regional autonomy for kabupaten in Central
Sumatra.
3. Law number 22 year 1999 on Regional Government State Paper year 1999
number 60, additional paper number 38.
4. Presidential Decree Number 44 year 1999 on legal drafting techniques and the
form of bills, and draft presidential decrees (state paper year 1999 number
70).
5. Regional Law of Kabupaten Solok number 7 year 2000 on the vision and
mission of kabupaten Solok.

7. Regional Law of Kabupaten Solok number 10 year 2001 on competence in reading the Qur’an for SD, SLTP, SLTA students and brides.

With agreement from
NAGARI PANINGGAHAN REPRESENTATION OFFICE

AGREE

To enact: NAGARI PANINGGAHAN LAW ON TENTANG PANINGGAHAN THAT IS INSPIRED BY RELIGIOUS TEACHINGS AND TRADITIONAL CUSTOMS

CHAPTER I
GENERAL CONDITIONS

Article 1

The terms used in this Nagari law should be understood as following:

a. Nagari is the traditional law community unit of Nagari Paninggahan comprised of a collection of several clans that have individual wealth.

b. Religious Paninggahan is the community of Paninggahan that understands religious values in accordance with the Qur’an and Islamic tradition.

c. Paninggahan that observes traditional customs is the community that understands and implements Nagari Paninggahan tradition that draws on the Qur’an and Islamic tradition.

d. Generation is those who are aged 6 years and above.

e. A certificate in writing and reading the Qur’an is a declaration or proof that the party involved can read the Qur’an.

f. Islamic clothing is clothing that covers the aurat, is loose, conservative and dignified according to the teachings of the Qur’an and Islamic tradition.

g. Traditional council is the Nagari Paninggahan Traditional Council which is highest body in the Nagari traditional law.

h. The implementation of traditional activities is a range of activities implemented in both past and future that relates to the attitude and the actions of the traditional law community in Nagari.

i. The traditional law community of Paninggahan is a community with various social layers in nagari with the saying “Adat Salingka Nagari” (Adat that prevails in the Nagari), “Pusako Salingka Kaum” (Inheritance that prevails in the clan).
j. *Penghulu* is the elder who leads a social group and is fostered or sworn in as a ceremonial leader.

k. *Manti* (assistant elder) originates from the word *manati* that is someone who is entrusted as the assistant of an elder in his social group to assist and act as spokesperson for the elder.

l. *Panito* is a knowledgeable Muslim scholar (*ulama*) who specialises in lawful and unlawful Islamic teachings. The clan ranking of panito is assumed by a trusted person

m. *Dubalang Adat*, better known as *hulubalang*, is a clan ranking in the adat system that is elected and responsible to the *penghulu*. *Dubalang* has the duty to protect the leader of the penghulu and his assistants and provide security in his clan or nagari (article 1, *nagari point m* of the *Perna*).

n. *Bundo Kanduang* is a senior female agent in a great house (*limpapeh rumah nan gadang*). It is a term for the position of a very important woman. *Limpapeh* means ‘*Tonggak Tuo*’ (Old Pillar) from the great house. This is reflected in the control of wealth, property, rice fields, land and forest and others which are in the hand of the mother, thus the mother is caretaker.

o. A special meeting of the Nagari Traditional Council (KAN) is a meeting attended only by the *penghulu*.

p. A general meeting of the KAN is a meeting that is attended by *penghulu*, Manti, Panito and *Dubalang Adat*.

q. A meeting of the Nagari or *Ampek Jinih* is commonly referred to as a meeting of the Nagari whose elements are *Ninik Mamak*, *Alim Ulama*, *Cadiak Pandai*, *Bunda Kanduang* and youth.

r. *Ampek Jinih* are *Ninik Mamak*, *Alim Ulama*, *Cadiak Pandai/youth* and *Bundo Kanduang*.

s. *Ninik Mamak* are *Penghulu*, Manti, Panito and *Dubaang Adat*.

t. Traditional apparatus in the Nagari are Manti, Panito and *Dubalang Adat*.

**CHAPTER II**

**TARGET**

**Article 2**

1. The entire Paninggahan community must be able to read, write and comprehend the Qur’an.

2. To foster a moral and noble community according to the Qur’an and Islamic tradition.

**Article 3**

All layers of the Paninggahan community must comprehend and obey the traditions of Nagari Paninggahan.
CHAPTER III
LEARNING THE QUR’AN

Article 4
1. All primary school to junior high school aged students must attend Qur’an studies at a prayer room or place of Qur’an studies and obtain a certificate of completion of Qur’an studies from the relevant institution.
2. Teenage to adult Paninggahan community members must comprehend and implement the messages of the Qur’an.

Article 5
All parents must permit their children to study the Qur’an at a prayer room or place of Qur’an studies.

Article 6
All parents/guardians and Qur’an studies teachers must hold a coordination meeting at least once a month.

Article 7
1. All brides who are about to be married must be able to read the Qur’an and have a signed certificate from the relevant institution and observe sharia law.
2. All brides are permitted to request a dowry from the groom according to the affluence of the groom.

CHAPTER IV
TRADITION AND MANNERS

Article 8
1. The community (young, old and children) must learn the traditions and arts from ninik mamak (mother’s eldest brother), candik pandai (intellectuals) and teachers in Nagari Paninggahan and be active in Jorong (sub-Nagari) and Nagari activities.
2. All guardians of tradition (penghulu, manti, Panito, Tonganai, Acik) must teach traditions to their relevant community.
3. All prayer rooms must provide a place to study tradition and arts, one day a week.
4. All youth in the jorong must take part in youth activities and traditional arts in their jorong.

Article 9
All parents must teach their children the manners and attitudes to foster good social interaction and noble umat according to the Qur’an and prophet’s sayings.

Article 10
1. All pubescent Muslims must wear Muslim clothing when they leave their house.
2. Women must wear Muslim attire at all wedding receptions or other formal occasions.
3. Men must wear modest clothing and kopiah (Felt hats) at wedding receptions or other formal occasions according to the Nagari Paninggahan tradition.

**Article 11**

All schools in Nagari Paninggahan from TK, SD, SLTP and SLTA must wear Muslim clothing.

**Article 12**

1. Men must not visit women or vice-versa beyond 21.00 Western Indonesia time.
2. Pubescent girls who leave the house in the evening must be accompanied by their parents/muhrim.
3. Men are not permitted as overnight guests in households where there is a pubescent girl.
4. Hosts must report their guests to the jorong head and must be responsible for their guests.

**Article 13**

If the call to prayer has sounded all traditional activities or meetings that are being conducted in the nagari must be stopped.

**Article 14**

It is strongly prohibited for evening wedding ceremonies to conduct entertainment or games that are strongly suspected to incite immoral acts.

**CHAPTER V**

**PRAYER ROOMS AND THE MOSQUE**

**Article 15**

1. All mosques and prayer rooms should have a mosque caretaker so that the call to prayer is pronounced as a sign of prayer time.
2. All mosques and prayer rooms must provide a place for the studying generation to learn prayer reading.
3. In accordance with point 2 in this article, all prayer rooms or mosques must have a permanent Qur’an studies teacher.
4. All mosques and prayer rooms must be managed according to good practice.
CHAPTER VI
PUBLIC ORDER

Article 16

1. The nagari Paninggahan community is not justified or is strongly prohibited for conducting immoral acts such as:
   a. Consuming, selling, dealing in or producing alcohol or narcotics and the like, either openly or covertly.
   b. Fornication and forms of pornography like screening, selling or renting porno VCDs, displaying pornographic pictures, or reading, selling or leasing pornographic books.
   c. Gambling such as illegal gambling and the like.
   d. All forms of fighting or beatings.
   e. Theft, burglary and other criminal activities.

2. The Nagari Paninggahan community is not justified or is strongly prohibited from using bombs, electric shock, poison fishing or fishing using webs or nets under 1 inch.

3. The nagari Paninggahan community is not justified or is prohibited from damaging public facilities of the nagari.

Article 17

1. All Nagari Paninggahan citizens who have a television are requested to turn it off during prayer times and when children are studying the Qur’an or conducting religious rituals or other religious activities in the evening.

2. When the call for prayer is sounded or when religious activities are being conducted at the prayer room/mosque or other location the surrounding community is requested to stop activities such as playing dominos, card games and the like.

Article 18

It is strongly prohibited to create unnecessary noise in the evening that is likely to disturb the peace and morality and religion of the community such as: bands, organ, outdoor movies and karaoke.

CHAPTER VII
RELIGIOUS FORUM (MAJELIS TA’LIM)

Article 19

1. All mosques and prayer rooms must form a committee of young and old members.
2. In the implementation of the forum, the committee must commence activities with a reading of the Qur’an from the beginning of the text (commencing from the first letter).

CHAPTER VIII
MISSIONARY SERMON

Article 20

Religious sermons delivered by the government must avoid topics that potentially trigger conflicts, such as:

a. Between ulama and another ulama
b. Between the people to other people

Article 21

The preacher must give the people examples of good behaviour based on the Qur’an and prophet’s sayings from day-to-day life.

CHAPTER IX
THE ARTS

Article 22

1. All arts performances that are performed in Nagari Paninggahan must not clash with the existing traditions in Nagari Paninggahan.
2. It is prohibited for bands to perform songs or dances that are not in accordance with Islam and the local traditions of Nagari Paninggahan.

Article 23

Artists who perform must appear modest and be of polite behaviour according to Islam and the local traditions of Nagari Paninggahan.

Article 24

The time limit for performing artistic events for matinee performances is until 18.00 Western Indonesian time and for evening performances until 2.00 Western Indonesian time.

CHAPTER X
NAGARI TRADITIONAL COUNCIL (KAN)

Article 25

Forms of meetings of the KAN include:
a. Special meeting of the Nagari Traditional Council  
b. General KAN meeting  
c. Meeting of Four Elements of Nagari (Ampek Jinih)

**Article 26**

The responsibilities of the Penghulu or Pemangku Adat are:

1. All Penghulu or pemangku adat must attend special KAN meetings, general KAN meetings, and meetings of Nagari/Ampek Jinih.
2. Penghulu who do not live in the village or have moved away from their village must attend KAN meetings once a year at the start of the Syawal month (lunar month).

**Article 27**

1. All units must have one Manti, Dubalang Adat and Panito.
2. The Penghulu, Manti, Panito and Dubalang Adat must fulfil a request or invitation if they are required to speak on matters relating to the Nagari.

**CHAPTER XI**

**PROHIBITION UNDER CUSTOMS**

**Article 28**

1. It is forbidden to marry within one’s own clan in the Nagari
2. It is forbidden to elope or get married outside the Nagari.
3. It is forbidden to carry out immoral deeds or gather in closed rooms.
4. It is forbidden to carry out conduct that defames the legitimacy and respect of the Ninik Mamak in the Nagari.
5. It is forbidden for men or women to return an engagement ring (Tando Batunangan) without a reason that is justified by custom.

**CHAPTER XII**

**MARRIAGE CUSTOM**

**Article 29**

Implementation of custom prior to marriage

1. A meeting at the house of the bride's family to find a suitable groom.
2. Make and arrange the “porridge of small portion” or “porridge of ties”, which is flanked by two people.
3. Make and escort the porridge of gadang (the porridge which is served on the day of wedding party).
4. Ask the parents and ninik mamak in the community and the clan for their blessing for the marriage.

5. The implementation of other customs is as per usual.

**Article 30**  
**Uniting the Ninik Mamak**

1. A nephew or niece who will be married must carry out the “Mendudukkan Ninik Mamak” (uniting them) ceremony for both sides of the family on a Tuesday or Wednesday (day or night).

2. If a party has other commitments and cannot attend the mendudukkan ninik mamak ceremony, the relevant party can then be represented by a penghulu in the clan or by the manti, Dubalang adat or other apparatus.

**Article 31**

1. A special meeting looks for a candidate for the bride at the home of the female as obliged in article 29 point 1.

2. Making and arranging the porridge of small portion as outlined in article 29 point 2 above is compulsory. The porridge may be accompanied by another kind of porridge (bubua sacambang) of 3-4 litres of rice carried by a maximum of 12 (twelve) people at the home of the male with snacks (depêk, bugih, garulak, jelly and other dishes not served with rice).

3. Making and accompanying the porridge of gadang (the porridge which is served on the day of the wedding party) according to article 29 point 3 above is not compulsory. In this ceremony, the bubua is delivered by a courier or well known by many people.

4. The bride/groom must directly request the blessings of their ninik mamak before their wedding except unless they are ill.

5. The Manuruik urang (invite), according to custom, is delivered with honour (manikek janjang manapik bandua) and by taking the betel and tobacco.

**Article 32**  
**The Custom of Escorting the Bride and Groom**

1. Clothing of the females escorting the bride and groom is Muslim clothing. Babajua kurung is loose and long, worn with a veil.

2. Clothing of the males for the mengantarkan marapulai must be modest, with sarung and peci or kupiah (t-shirts are not permitted).
Article 33

Females and males at the activity outlined in article 32 above must walk or travel wearing ‘Nan Tuo nantau’ (recommended clothing) according to custom.

Article 34

Custom of Giftgiving at the Bride’s Home

1. The Pasamandan or dusanak (relatives) closest to the wedding party (baralek) bring gifts according to their affluence such as: salimuik (blanket), kain sarung (sarong), clothing, towels etc which are carried with the jamba or in the form of a gift.
2. Friends or invitees who are close to the bride/groom will bring gifts in the form of an envelope (money).
3. Women invitees in the nagari bring gifts in the form of small containers containing rice or envelopes which include a voucher for glasses, plates etcetera.

Article 35

The Ceremony of Introduction (Maliek-liek)

1. The total number of people visited should not exceed 7 (penghulu from both sides, the eldest mamak of both parties, the eldest brother/sister of both parties and the eldest father of the bride).
2. Gifts that are brought at the introduction ceremony are small containers filled with traditional food such as lapek bugih, garubik and the like.

Article 36

The Clothing of Bride and Groom

The clothing of ‘anak daro jo marapulai’ (bride and groom) is returned to the old custom of ‘pusako usang’ (antique heirloom). Men wear ‘deta bagonjong’ (horned headdress), ‘baju gadang’ (an oversized collarless black shirt), ‘celana balapak’ (trousers woven of gold thread) and the ‘anak daro’ (bride) wears ‘suntiang’ (bridal headdress) with Islamic attire which is adjusted to suit local custom.

CHAPTER III

FEE OF CUSTOM

Article 37

A variety of Adat’s fee

1. a. Fee of Marriage based on custom
   b. Fee of administration
   c. Fee of settlement for cases
2. a. Mintak Pitih or fee paid by the bride’s family to the groom’s family.
   b. Fee of compensation is replaced with fee of adat.
Article 38
Fee of Marriage based on Adat

1. Asking money for women contravenes adat and Islamic teachings.
2. Fee of adat which is mentioned in article 37 point 2 above is a must. It is maximally two grams of gold for all groups or status.
3. Fee of adat maximally 2 grams of gold will increase to 1 gram of gold if the bride and groom are close relations (ninik mamak/penghulu).

Article 39

The amount of money as mentioned in article 38 above should be declared at the ceremony of ‘mendudukkan ninik mamak’, which is recommended to be held on a Tuesday.

Article 40
Fee of Adat for Administration

1. Fee of adat for ceremonial ‘Mendudukkan Ninik Mamak’ is 1/10 grams of gold.
2. Fee of adat for a pawn ticket is 2.5% of the value of the item for the penghulu, and the KAN no longer needs to sign the letter.
3. Fee of adat for administration of land transaction is 10% of the value of the land or the land’s price for the penghulu.
4. Fee of adat for administration of a certificate’s proposal to the penghulu is 2.5% of the item’s value.
5. Fee of adat for a permission letter for niece/nephew to get married
   a. The Penghulu is Rp. 10,000
   b. The Manti and Dubalang Adat is Rp.5,000
   c. The Panito is Rp. 5,000
6. Fees of adat as mentioned in points 2, 3 and 4 in this article are the maximum and can be adjusted with the agreement of both sides.

Article 41
Fee of adat for the cases settlement

It is ruled as follows:

1. At the level of kaum, the payment of consumption which is used to serve the member of session of civil cases should be paid by both sides.
2. At the level of ‘suduik’ (clan unit), the payment of consumption which is used to serve the member of session should be paid by both sides.
3. At the level of *suku*, the payment of consumption which is used to serve the member of session should be paid by both sides and they should sign a letter of decree to the *ninik mamak* of Kerapatan Suku (Council of Clan), as follows:

Rp. 20,000/ person to the *Penghulu*
Rp. 10,000/ person to the *Manti, Panito dan Dubalang*.

4. At the level of KAN, the maximum fee is 5% of the object’s value of the case.

**Article 42**  
Fee of *adat* for the appointment of *Penghulu*

1. It is regulated as follows:

   a. *Adat* to make a letter  \( \frac{1}{2} \) gram of gold
   b. *Adat* to the *Penghulu Suduik*  \( 2 \frac{1}{2} \) grams of gold
   c. *Adat* to the *Penghulu Suku*  \( 3 \frac{1}{2} \) grams of gold
   d. *Adat* of administration for each *penghulu*  \( 1/10 \) gram of gold
   e. *Adat* in the house of the *Penghulu Andiko*  6 grams of gold
   f. *Adat* in the house of the *Penghulu Pucuak*  9 grams of gold
   g. *Adat* of oath  \( 1/10 \) gram of gold
   h. *Adat* of the *Manti Chief/Dubalang*  \( 1 \frac{1}{2} \) grams of gold
   i. *Adat* of administration of Chief of KAN  \( \frac{1}{2} \) gram of gold
   j. *Adat* to the *Panito*  \( \frac{1}{2} \) gram of gold
   k. Fee to serve guest  \( \frac{1}{2} \) gram of gold
   l. Fee for the KAN’s treasure  3 grams of gold

2. Fee of *adat* for the *Penghulu* as mentioned in article 43 point 1E and F should be shared among the members of the *Penghulu* without differentiating the *suku*.

**CHAPTER XIV**  
The *Adat* of *Baralek Penghulu*

**Article 43**  
The *Oath of Penghulu*

1. Every *Penghulu* must take an oath.
2. The oath of *Penghulu* must be in a written text.
3. The oath is taken before the *adat* is accepted at the main house (*rumah gadang*).
**Article 44**

Speech of adat of Baralek Penghulu

1. It comprises:
   a. Bestowing the betel.
   b. Bestowing the fruits
   c. Bestowing the adat

2. The three gifts in point 4 of this article should be the responsibility of the Penghulu.

**CHAPTER XV**

The Rank of Inheritance (*Pusaka Tinggi*)

**Article 45**

The inheritance (*Harta Pusaka Tinggi*) may be transferred or not:

A. Some requirements to transfer the inheritance:
   a. The siblings have no more heirs.
   b. It is transferred based on the willingness of the giver after consultation with *kaum*.
   c. The proportion of the bequest is only 1/3 of the total inheritance.

B. Some ineligible conditions are:
   a. If the giver has the main obligation to support his/her family as breadwinner.
   b. There are still heirs who deserve the property

C. The inheritance (*Harta Pusaka Tinggi*) may be bequeathed to:
   a. A son or daughter or someone else who is under his/her responsibility.
   b. Social Institutions.
   c. Other people who need immediate help.

**CHAPTER XVI**

SANCTIONS

**Article 46**

1. Those who purposely break the regulation as mentioned in article 4, will not obtain a certificate of graduation.

2. Those who purposely break the regulation as mentioned in article 4, will be punished with social work (gotong royong) through his/her parents for a week or fined Rp. 150,000.
3. Those who break article 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23 and 24 will receive an administrative sanction. The office of Nagari will not serve him/her and he/she should pay Rp. 150,000.

4. A niece or nephew who gets married with in the same clan, must leave the Nagari as mentioned in article 28 point 1. This punishment is based on the prevailing local custom (Adat Salingka Nagari or Pusako Salingko kaum).

5. A niece or nephew who chooses a runaway marriage from the Paninggahan, must be firmly punished by paying a fine of 1 gram of gold for the expense of the negotiation process. This punishment is undertaken after the ninik mamak of both sides at one forum.

6. A person of nagari who has been found guilty of committing adultery as mentioned in article 28 point 3, should be firmly punished by a parade to embarrass them in the village with a traditional orchestra (talempong sayak, deta upih and bungo sikamunyuik). In this parade, there will be an announcement to the public about the sinner. More details about this sanction will be ruled on later.

7. If the Penghulu can not fulfil article 26 point 2, and has two consecutive absences, he will be returned to his clan and can be re-accepted as a member of KAN on condition he situates himself in the adat system. Half of the payment to nagari is 3 gram of gold for the Penghulu Handiko and 4.5 grams of gold for the Penghulu Pucuk.

8. The Penghulu, Manti, Panito, or Dubalang Adat who break article 28, will receive twice the normal sanction. He will also be dismissed for being member of the KAN of Paninggahan.

9. For the Penghulu, Manti, Panito or Dubalang Adat who break article 26 point 1 three times without any sensible reasons, his mandate as an officer will be withdrawn and returned to his original clan by the KAN.

CHAPTER XVII
Stipulation Concerning Transition

Article 47

Before this Perna is enacted, all existing government regulations still prevail as long as they do not contravene the Perna.

CHAPTER XVIII
CLOSING

Article 48

Any aspect which is not regulated yet in this Perna will be regulated later by the Wali Nagari.
Article 49

This Perna will be effective once it is enacted on 1 September 2002.

This Perna should be filed in the administration files of Paninggahan in order that people can be aware of this enactment.

Stipulated in Paninggahan
30 Juni 2002
The Wali Nagari of Paninggahan

(Ir. H. Abu Bakar Bulek)

Enacted in Paninggahan
30 Juni 2002
Sekretary of Nagari

(Djasman S.Ag)
Administration File of Paninggahan 2002 Number 1.