COMMUNITY FORESTRY:
PARADOXES AND PERSPECTIVES
IN DEVELOPMENT PRACTICE

by

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A thesis submitted for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
of the Australian National University

May 1996
DECLARATION

Except where otherwise acknowledged, this thesis is my own original work.

Juan M. Pulhin

Canberra, 30 May 1996
DEDICATION

To my wife Yay
for her love,
sacrifices,
and unwavering support
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The initial ideas in this thesis took shape during the first year of my PhD studies in the Department of Forestry of the Australian National University. I thank Dr. Neil Byron for stirring up my interest in the role of forestry in development, and for his able supervision during this period.

After fieldwork I transferred from the Department of Forestry to the Department of Human Geography, where I was exposed to various other approaches to the theory and practice of development, through my supervisor, Dr. Doug Porter. Doug inspired me to look beyond forestry and relate my work to the wider debate about sustainable development. Beyond this, his commitment to a high degree of scholarship, matched with conscientious supervision, was both a challenge and a constant source of encouragement. Special thanks are also due to Dr. Bryant Allen and Professor Benedict Tría Kerkvliet for their valuable advise and encouragement during the writing stage. Their insightful comments on the early drafts strengthened the arguments of the thesis. Bryant also provided vital assistance during the final stages of writing.

Many people of many different places and organisations provided assistance during my 15-month fieldwork in the Philippines. I wish to thank them all. The names are too numerous to mention, bar few. In the Central Visayas Regional Development Project, thanks go to John Dalton, Bel Navasquez, Pol Garma and Raul Samson. At the other three projects I thank the staff of the three NGOs — Pag-Bicol Foundation Incorporated, Philippine Association for Intercultural Communities, and the Soil and Water Conservation Foundation. At the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, I express my gratitude to Mayumi Quintos, Belen Sotalbo and Joel and Divine Malicsi, who went beyond their normal workload to facilitate my research. I also wish to acknowledge the warm reception,
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The prayers, encouragement and love extended by the members of the Graduate House Fellowship, the Saturday Bible Study Group, and the other Christian brethren is also deeply appreciated. I must mention the special support and encouragement Yay and I received from Roland, Jacob and Mary during the difficult times in my study. Our parents and loved ones in the Philippines also provided a continuous source of inspiration.

Finally, I give thanks, glory and honour to my Lord and Saviour, Jesus Christ. The blessings and grace we received from Him in the course of pursuing this study is indeed unfathomable.
ABSTRACT

This thesis deals with two related topics: core development objectives in community forestry in the Philippines, and the ‘instruments’ of development practice which have been used to address these objectives. The two topics have currency beyond forestry development and are at the centre of a debate about sustainable development. Community forestry aims to democratise resource access, alleviate poverty, and ensure the sustainability of forest resources. Development practice, however, has often led to contradictory outcomes. This paradox is examined from three perspectives: that of political economy, characteristics of practice, and the theory of rationalisation.

Four government-initiated community forestry projects in the Philippines are analysed. These projects provide an historical trend on the development and refinements of the different techniques from the early 1980s to the present. The relationship between the use of these techniques and improved outcomes in terms of the three core concerns is established. Empirical findings from the cases suggest that there is no necessary relationship between the employment of these instruments and better development outcomes. The attempt to democratise forest resource access through the use of access instruments has benefited the local elite and reinforced the government’s jurisdiction over these resources. Similarly, the use of appraisal and participatory planning techniques has homogenised views of the local community and advanced a centrally determined agenda in forest management that has worked against the alleviation of poverty. Forest degradation is likely to continue, even with the incorporation of social factors into the concept of sustained-yield forest management.

The political economy perspective suggests that contradictory effects can be explained by the country’s historical and political structure which has been shaped by
an economically-driven development model and dominated by a more privileged sector. Despite genuine efforts for reform, this perspective contends that community forestry projects and related development interventions will always be influenced by political forces, and their benefits will be captured by the privileged sector. On the other hand, a focus on the characteristics of practice leads to the conclusion that contradictory effects are results of the limitations of these techniques, including their poor application. This implies that the adverse effects may be addressed through the refinement of these techniques and improvements in their application. Finally, the rationalisation thesis reveals that paradoxical effects are inherent in the use of these techniques. This perspective posits that even with the apparent shift from a state-controlled to a more participatory and decentralised approach in forest management, such as community forestry, the instrumentalist nature associated with the application of these techniques reinforces the characteristics of homogeneity, technocracy, and centralism which are inclined to produced paradoxical outcomes.

Both the political economy and the rationalisation perspectives provide a gloomy prognosis for community forestry. However, the recognition of the dual problems of poverty and environmental degradation in the Philippine uplands, suggests that community forestry should not be abandoned. Through a responsive mode of practice, there is room to move to improve the outcomes of the three central objectives. But responsive practice is not a panacea for all development ills. The process is bound to be slow, strategies will vary from one place to another, and success will be patchy. But because responsive community forestry practice is not amenable to central programming and control, it is more likely to result in sustainable outcomes than the present approaches.
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<td>ACIPHIL</td>
<td>Associacion Ng Mga Consultants Na Independente (Philippines) Inc.</td>
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<td>ADB</td>
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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 The Problem

This thesis deals with three core development objectives of community forestry: _democratisation of resource access, poverty alleviation, and forest resource sustainability_. I argue that these objectives are paralleled in the political, economic, and resource sustainability intentions, which are manifested in the concept of Ecologically Sustainable Development (ESD). The thesis also deals with ‘instruments’ of development practice. Such instruments include a variety of techniques and approaches which are employed by development institutions to realise these objectives. These two topics — the core development concerns and instruments of practice — are at the heart of debates about sustainable development.

Community forestry projects provide a nexus that links them. Projects function as institutional frames within which instruments are used to articulate policies to achieve the three core objectives at the local level. Because realising the objectives appears to elude many community forestry projects, an in-depth inquiry into its theory and practice is of paramount importance.

Philippine forestry provides an excellent case for the exploration of some theoretical and practical issues pertaining to the above topics. From the early 1900s until the mid 1970s, Philippine forest policies were geared toward the industrialisation of the forestry sector. This confined forest benefits to the privileged few, and aggravated upland poverty and forest depletion. (DENR, 1990; Kummer, 1992; Broad and Cavanagh, 1993; Vitug, 1993). In the 1980s, the Philippine government introduced a new approach to forest management generally termed ‘people-oriented forestry’ or ‘community forestry’. Community forestry policy has since evolved to its
current form. It contains three central objectives: the democratisation of forest access, the alleviation of rural poverty, and the sustaining of the forest resource. The government considers community forestry a key approach with which to achieve the goals of the *Philippine Strategy for Sustainable Development* (DENR, 1989, 1990).

Some professional observers have claimed that the “Philippines has drafted some of the most progressive community-oriented resource management policies in Asia” (Walpole *et al*., 1993:viii). Others regard these policies as something to be acknowledged and learned from (Byron, 1992; Fox, 1993). Moreover, the Philippines has a vibrant and articulate civil society and Non Government Organisation (NGO) sector — particularly when compared to other developing countries (Racelis, 1994; Broad, 1994). Through its enlightened forest policies, the government provides democratic space to promote the active participation of these sectors in forest management. At the project level, innovative techniques (e.g., resource access instruments, Rapid Rural Appraisal (RRA), participatory planning techniques), and collaborative institutional arrangements (e.g., NGO-Government [GO] partnerships) are currently employed to achieve the policy objectives at the local level.

Despite such positive developments, recent experiences indicate that the three central objectives are far from being realised in practice. I develop this assertion based on evidence from professional judgements and practical experiences in community forestry. It is also reinforced by recent international reviews¹ on community forestry which concluded that “much more needs to be done” to increase its contribution in practice (Gregersen, Draper and Elz, 1989:231). This thesis provides me the opportunity to systematically examine whether there is substance to this assertion and be able to account for it.

My 15-month period of fieldwork on four community forestry projects in the Philippines allowed me to evaluate the practical outcomes of community forestry. At the conclusion of my fieldwork, I had not found distinct relationship between the current conventional practice of community forestry and improved outcomes towards
the desired aims. What I did discover were a number of paradoxical effects which had worked against the realisation of these objectives. Instead of enhancing the farmers’ control over forest lands and resources, the use of resource access instruments had reinforced the government’s jurisdiction over these resources. In the same manner, project appraisal and planning techniques — designed to better understand the needs of the local people — had contributed to the continuance of the deprived conditions of the upland poor. Moreover, forest degradation had continued despite the emphasis of community forestry on sustaining forest resources.

A substantial part of this thesis explains how these paradoxical effects came about. But my motivation goes beyond mere explanation; much of the impetus is derived from my previous research and consultancy experiences in community forestry. Thus, I also attempt to address a more practical question — ‘What is to be done to improve practice’?

My academic and practical interests address the explanatory and practical aspects of this study. The rest of this section elaborates on these aspects. First, I briefly outline three major perspectives in order to explain why effectively addressing the three core concerns with existing instruments of practice has proved elusive. These are: 1) the political, economic, and historical context; 2) the characteristics of practice; and 3) the ‘rationalization thesis’. I then turn to the question of what should be done.

The first perspective could be labeled the ‘political economy perspective’. It has a long intellectual tradition in political analysis of Philippine development problems. In the 1980s, political economy analysis gained prominence in the field of Philippine forestry and is now a popular argument used in this sector. The recent celebrated book by Robin Broad and John Cavanagh (1993), *Plundering Paradise: The Struggle for the Environment in the Philippines*, captures the central theme of this argument. The authors suggest that the inability to achieve the three core objectives is to be found in the country’s economically-driven development strategy. This is in turn rooted in the colonial economic history of the Philippines. The national development strategy has resulted in a near monopoly over
forest resources being granted to a few individuals and firms and has disadvantaged local people. The outcome has been the ‘plundering of the country’s forest paradise’ (Broad and Cavanagh, 1993).

The negative impacts of the national development strategy were felt keenly during the Marcos administration, particularly from the 1970s to the mid-1980s (Hawes, 1987). However, some political economy analysts suggest that the power structure which was created during this period continues to dominate and frustrate genuine efforts for reform. Development interventions — even those designed specifically to assist the poor — with the best of intentions, are seized by the elite for their own advantage. Proponents of the political economy perspective assert that the three core objectives can only be achieved within the context of an ‘alternative sustainable development model’. This model emphasises the institutions of civil society — a total departure from the traditional market-oriented or state-centred development approaches. Progressive thinkers, mostly from the NGO sector and big environmental coalitions such as the Green Forum, also advocate this development model.

However, the political economy perspective has certain limitations. First, it encourages a structurally or historically determined explanation. It explains local situation in terms of a global structural or historical interpretation. It does not account for the peculiarities of practice, nor for the diversity of local situations. Secondly, it tends to close off possible solutions. For example, it fails to give credit to recent progressive policies, and discounts the improvements of practice through a more conscientious use of the available instruments. Thirdly, it cannot account for local resistance or the possibility of drawing lessons from local resistance in order to improve development practice. In summary, while the political economy analysis is essential to an understanding of the context of practice, it neither offers a complete explanation for the paradoxical outcomes nor does it open up other ways of dealing with the problem of failure to address the core concerns.

The second perspective relates to characteristics of practice, that is, the degree to which practices are good or bad. The logic of this perspective is derived
from an idea of progress, which emerged during the Enlightenment. This idea was based on the belief that humans were capable of controlling and manipulating their social and physical environment to improve their material well-being. The systematic and progressive application of science and technology within the Western rationality tradition was seen as the vehicle for progress and a better life (Rich, 1994:201). The unparalleled technical and economic accomplishments during the industrial era, created a sense of optimism that contributed to the persistence of the earlier idea of development. This idea became associated with economic-managerialism, that is, the systematic allocation of scarce resources to satisfy human wants. When the same logic was applied to development practice, rural development came to be seen as the systematic manipulation of various factors of production (land, labour, technology and capital) within the institutional framework of the ‘project’ (Porter, Allen and Thompson, 1991:4-5). By association, community forestry has come to be seen as the application of various techniques and approaches of practice at the community level, to achieve the three core objectives.

The ‘characteristics of practice’ perspective — unlike that of political economy, account for the peculiarities of practice and the diversity of the local situation. It advances the idea that the failure to address the central concerns is due to poor application of particular techniques by the individuals or institutions. It argues that the appropriate application of more ‘refined’ techniques by responsible individuals or institutions has the potential to realise the objectives.

Still, the characteristic-of-practice perspective is incomplete by itself. It lacks the political, economic, and historical perspective, necessary to understand the broader context of practice. It also fails to account for certain ‘tendencies’ of the different techniques to produce negative, unforeseen or contradictory effects in practice. Thus, when it offers solutions, this approach is more inclined to argue for improved application, without an appreciation of the broader political-economic context that these applications tend to have in practice. A person coming from this perspective is likely to endorse a managerialist-technocratic approach in order to improve practice. Yet, this approach has been repeatedly shown not to work. An
understanding of the features associated with the application of the different instruments may enrich the perspectives provided by the political economy and the characteristics of practice.

The third perspective therefore concerns the rationalisation thesis. This too has a long and respectable heritage, with roots as far back as the Enlightenment. The ‘rationalisation thesis’ is attributed to the works of Weber in the early 1900s, and sustained through the 1930s and the 1940s by the critical theorists and more recently by the contemporary works of Rose and Miller. The theme of this thesis was summarised earlier in Weber’s (1948:182) ‘iron cage’ metaphor and more profoundly in the works of Rose and Miller examining British experiences of liberal democracy, along the lines of ‘governing the soul’ (Rose, 1989) and ‘governance at a distance’ (Rose and Miller, 1990; 1992; Rose, 1993). I will not elaborate on these works here, as Chapter Three provides more detail of the rationalisation thesis in relation to the present study. For the moment, I focus my discussion on the relevance of the rationalisation thesis in accounting for the difficulty of addressing the core concerns on the ground.

Rationalisation has been described as an historical process in which an increasing number of decisions are made using technical procedures to choose between alternative ways of achieving specific goals (Porter, 1985:8). In development practice, these technical procedures are embodied in the use of various techniques and approaches such as those applied in project planning and implementation. In community forestry, these techniques and approaches include resource access instruments, RRA, participatory planning techniques such as the use of Socio-Economic Development Plan (SEDP), and sustained-yield forest management and related technical procedures. Because they are designed to achieve specific goals which are set prior to their application, these techniques are not ethically or politically neutral. They favour homogeneity, efficiency, technical solutions and central control. The reason why the central goals are not realised is partly explained by these tendencies in practice. The analysis of the different
techniques and their propensity for producing paradoxical effects in practice is poorly covered by much of the development literature.

The analysis of the four case study projects indicates that these three perspectives do not necessarily contradict each other. Indeed, they could be combined into one analytical framework to broaden the compass of the sustainable development debate through a better awareness of local realities. As the three analytical Chapters Five, Six, and Seven demonstrate, this framework provides a better understanding on the difficulties of realising the three main objectives on the ground. Using this framework, it is possible to summarise the central proposition of this study:

*That the poor application of most common techniques used in community forestry in an unfavourable social and political contexts, exacerbates the inherent tendencies of these techniques to produce paradoxical development outcomes.*

### 1.2 What is to Be Done?

What is to be done? Here, I confine my answer to the frame of the project experience instead of providing a menu of policy recommendations. This does not mean that there is no room for policy recommendations. In theory, practice is improved through enlightened policy recommendations though this does not automatically apply in Philippine forestry. Dr. Adolfo V. Revilla, Jr., a respected policy analyst and former Dean of the College of Forestry, University of the Philippines, Los Banos, characterised Philippine forestry policy formulation as “a vicious cycle” of regulation (1986:4). He noted that “when a provision of a regulation is violated, another regulation is handed down to curb further violation of said provision instead of strengthening the implementation system”.

Analysis of the four cases suggests that there are alternatives outside the highly deterministic position offered by some political economists in terms of addressing the three central concerns. These alternatives can lie in what I describe as *responsive practice*. My idea of responsive practice goes beyond the
contemporary managerial approach currently applied in development practice. It will have the following five major attributes which are elaborated in Chapter Eight:

- First, responsive practice will begin with an acknowledgment of the mix of global interests and local circumstances and will harness this reality to move away from determinism, towards a more pragmatic and realistic search for better options.

- Second, responsive practice will put emphasis on the importance of diversity of approaches. It will reject standardised and well-rehearsed approaches to development intervention.

- Third, responsive practice will seize the opportunities offered by the current favourable political and institutional climate in the Philippines, and the more flexible ‘project frames’ that characterise recent development practice.

- Fourth, responsive practice will concentrate on improving outcomes through the ‘conscientised’ application of the different instruments of practice.

- Fifth and most importantly, responsive practice will acknowledge the central role of the human agency in the development process, and will capitalise on it to address the three core objectives of community forestry.

Under responsive practice, enlightened policy recommendations have the potential to regain their relevance. Yet more importantly, responsive practice will open possibilities to transform policy formulation from its current vicious cycle of regulation into a virtuous one.

1.3 Thesis Structure and Chapter Previews

Chapter Two explores the broader historical context of forestry in development, focusing on the evolution of community forestry. It examines the international and national contexts of development thinking in forestry and their influence in shaping the concept and policy of community forestry in the Philippines. The chapter also relates community forestry to the current development fashion on ESD. It argues that there
is a direct parallel between ESD’s political, economic, and resource sustainability intentions and community forestry’s core development objectives.

Chapter Three builds on the historical context provided in Chapter Two. It gives a brief theoretical background on the rationalisation thesis from Max Weber’s iron cage metaphor to its contemporary context as expressed in Rose and Miller’s governance from a distance. The discussion also focus on: the rationalisation thesis in the context of the evolving Philippine state; the different instruments of practice in community forestry; and the project as a institutional frame which provides the nexus that links the three core objectives and the instruments of practice. Moreover, the chapter elaborates on four research propositions being put forward in the study. These propositions have their foundation in the historical review of community forestry in Chapter Two and the theoretical background on the rationalisation theory.

Chapter Four provides an overview of the four case study projects as a general background for the three analytical chapters (Chapters Five, Six and Seven). It also discusses how the case studies were selected. In addition, the chapter reviews the different research methods used during fieldwork and the ethical issues observed by the author in gathering the case material.

Chapters Five, Six and Seven constitute the three analytical chapters. Using four community forestry projects as case studies, these chapters explore how the employment of various instruments promotes or hinders the achievement of the three central aims on the ground. As the empirical material from these cases points more to the unforeseen and contrary effects of the different instruments, the three perspectives discussed above are offered as explanations.

Specifically, Chapter Five deals with the central aim of democratising forest resource access using resource access instruments. The Central Visayas Regional Development Project, social forestry component (CVRP-1-SF), and the Presentacion Community Forestry Project are analysed to determine the effects of Community Timber Utilisation Permits (CTUP) and Community Forest Management Agreements (CFMA) in promoting the democratisation of forest resources. The chapter examines how the application of the resource access instruments have
produced paradoxical effects in the two project cases that worked against the goal of forest resource democratisation.

The last two decades had seen the emergence of a number of project appraisal and planning techniques including various institutional mechanisms which aim to better understand and address the situation of the poor. Chapter Six examines some of these techniques in the context of poverty alleviation. In particular, the chapter analyses RRA and participatory planning methods, as well as the NGOs involvement in the application of these techniques. The Claveria Community Forestry Project and the Low Income Upland Communities Project (LIUCP) serve as case studies. Analysis of the two projects shows that while the use of these techniques is an improvement over the traditional top-down approach to community appraisal and planning, improperly applied, they have the potential to reproduce poverty in these areas.

Chapter Seven deals with the central objective of sustaining the resource. As in Chapters Five and Six, the arguments in this chapter centre on techniques and approaches that are used to this end. The chapter focuses on sustained-yield forestry and related technical interventions such as Timber Stand Improvement (TSI), Assisted Natural Regeneration (ANR) and others. Using the Malicon Forest Stewardship Association (FOSA) of the CVRP-1-SF, and the Presentacion CFP, this chapter demonstrates that the use of the above techniques can promote a ‘tunnelling of vision’ which simplifies the complex local realities. These techniques and approaches tend to eclipse local diversity and to marginalise the socio-economic and political dimensions which are the very foundations of forest sustainability.

Chapter Eight provides the conclusion of the study. It summarises the major findings of the thesis, and then addresses more elaborately the practical question of what is to be done. As mentioned earlier, the answer to this question is confined to the framework of the project experience, particularly in what I described as responsive practice.

1 These include: Foley and Barnard (1984); Gregersen, Draper and Elz (1989); and Arnold (1991).
See for instance Abueva (1972).

Important contributions in the Philippine forestry literature with perspective of political economy include: Porter and Ganapin (1988); Kummer (1992); Contreras (1991); Broad and Cavanagh (1993); Vitug (1993); Broad (1995).

The succeeding discussion on the Broad and Cavanagh analysis is based on Chapter 3 (The Last Rainforests, pages 39 to 55) and Chapter 9 (From Plunder to Sustainability, pages 132 to 157) of Plundering Paradise.

This stems from Paulo Freire’s concept of ‘conscientization’, roughly translated in English as ‘consciousness-raising’ (Cf. Manzo, 1991).
CHAPTER TWO

THE EVOLUTION OF COMMUNITY FORESTRY

...what I would prefer to call ‘social forestry’ ... [is] primarily concerned with people whose needs are not able to express themselves as effective economic or political demands. In fact, history is replete with examples of conventional forestry extinguishing whatever rights such people might have had or subordinating them to the welfare of the forest. Forestry which is aimed at reversing these priorities is clearly different and certainly new, and to call it social forestry is not a bad way of making the distinction. The danger, of course, is that quite other practices can masquerade under the same slogan.

Alf J. Leslie

The Purpose of the Forests: Follies of Development, 1987:ix

2.1 Introduction

The inability of industrial forestry to benefit the rural poor or address the increasing rate of deforestation in the tropics contributed to a major shift in the direction of forest management in these areas in favour of a ‘people-oriented’ approach. Generally termed ‘community forestry’, this approach has lately been regarded as a new forestry paradigm (Gilmour and Fisher, 1991). The Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) of the United Nations defined community forestry “as any situation which intimately involves local people in forestry activities” (FAO 1978:1). It has been claimed to influence the nature of forestry activities more profoundly than any other development in the forestry profession (Arnold, 1991).

Community forestry, as currently practised in most developing countries, has been shaped by international development thinking and by the specific political and historical contexts in these areas. It has incorporated many of the ideas from mainstream development thinking; the most recent of which is the concept of sustainable development. In the Philippines, community forestry has been regarded
as a “new approach to forest management” (DENR, 1989a:172) with three avowed core objectives: democratising forest resource access; poverty alleviation; and the sustainability of the forest resources. These core objectives closely parallel the political, economic and resource sustainability intentions inherent in the concept of ESD.

In this Chapter, I explore the evolution of the concept and policy of community forestry in the Philippines. First, I examine major shifts in international development thinking and their influence in shaping the concept of community forestry. I then review the Philippines case historically, considering three major periods: the colonial period; the logging years from 1946 to the early 1970s; and the emergence of community forestry which began in the mid-1970s. Finally, I relate the central objectives of community forestry in the Philippines to the broader issues of ESD.

2.2 The International Context

The evolution of the concept of community forestry in Third World countries like the Philippines largely follows the major shifts in development thinking, particularly during the post-World War II period. Of direct relevance is the shift in emphasis from a top-down, pro-industrialisation approach to a basic needs approach and, more recently, to the concept of sustainable development.

2.2.1 Industrialisation of the Forestry Sector

In the early post-war period, the development process was almost exclusively perceived as an economic phenomenon. Economic growth was taken as a synonym for development while industrialisation was regarded as the major engine for growth (Arndt, 1981). The drive to industrialise in the Less Developed Countries was steered along the road of Western experience by the growth-oriented paradigm that
became popular after 1945 (Rostow, 1975). In this context, the industrialisation of the forestry sector was regarded as an effective catalyst for economic development.

Prior to the 1950s, debates in international forestry were mostly confined to ‘traditional’ forestry themes. A literature review, conducted by Kengen (1987), on the role of forestry in development showed that major themes in the first three World Forestry Congresses (WFC) — held in 1926, 1936, and 1949 — revolved around ‘traditional’ forestry issues. These included silviculture, forest surveys, forest policy, management and regeneration, and related issues. Scant attention was given to the role of forestry in economic development.

During the Fourth WFC, held in India in 1954, development debates of the post-war period penetrated the forestry sector. Concerns about the contribution of the forestry sector to the process of economic development were expressed. This was reflected in the Congress’ general theme: The Role and Place of Forested Areas in the General Land Economy and Economic Development of a Country. The ideas that emerged during this forum on the role of forestry in economic development were further developed in the three succeeding congresses held in 1960, 1966, and 1972. In general, these congresses reinforced positive thinking about the potential role of forest industries in promoting socio-economic development in the Less Developed Countries (LDCs) like the Philippines.

The blueprint for the industrialisation of the forestry sector was written in its most complete form by Jack Westoby’s The Role of Forest Industries in the Attack on Economic Underdevelopment (Westoby, 1962). Here, he elaborated how the forest could serve as the dynamo for economic development, particularly in the LDCs. Westoby (1962:168) summarised the central idea as follows:

Forests are a most important asset of a country’s wealth - an asset that every poor country possesses or could possess - for they provide a renewable raw material for a whole range of industries which have acquired great importance in many industrially advanced countries. This asset is very often neglected in less developed economies, or exploited only as raw material for export.

Westoby’s earlier advocacy of the industrialisation of the forestry sector was supported by a series of studies on timber trends and prospects: first, in Europe, and
later in Asia, Latin America and Africa. His major propositions were supported on technical and economic grounds (Westoby, 1962:168):

1) Forest industries provide a very wide range of products, both consumption goods and intermediate goods, flowing into many sectors of the economy. In other words, forest industries have strong forward and backward linkages with the rest of the economy.

2) The demand for these products is income elastic. In other words, demand rises sharply with economic growth.

3) The industries vary considerably in their raw material and other factor requirements, and in most of them alternative technologies can be successfully employed.

4) They are based on renewable resource and this resource is intimately linked to agriculture.

Seen in the broader context, Westoby’s blueprint for the industrialisation of the forestry sector was influenced by the prevailing development paradigm of the time. The theory was that Western countries set the pattern for development, and that developing countries have to pass through a number of stages of economic growth following the former’s development process (Rostow, 1960). Since the more ‘advanced’ countries attained their developed state through industrialisation, industrialisation was considered as both a necessary and a sufficient condition for development to take place.

The industrialisation model, which Westoby advocated for the forestry sector, was associated with the ‘top-down approach’ or ‘development from above’ (Stöhr and Fraser Tylor, 1981). Central to this approach was the assumption that economic benefits would diffuse through a society following capital investment in industrialisation. Westoby assumed that an increase in economic activity following the industrialisation of the forestry sector would readily diffuse and multiply to other sectors of the economy. This would, in turn, make everyone in the society better off, including the poor.

In the ‘top-down approach’, the emphasis was on large scale, capital intensive projects and the use of the most advanced technology available (Gilmour and Fisher, 1991). At the international level, ideas and technology had to travel from
the more advanced to the less developed countries. The approach therefore involved the use of large scale, private and public organisations to ‘transmit’ development. In forestry, this role was largely played by the FAO of the United Nations (UN), where Westoby was employed. FAO translated the international policies for the *First United Nations Development Decade* of the 1960s and the succeeding decades into forestry terms (Dargavel, Hobley and Kengen, 1985).³

Westoby’s blueprint for the industrialisation of the forestry sector established the important link between forestry and its associated forest industries to the national economy. It also opened new avenues for international cooperation in the forestry trade between the developed and the less developed countries. In the case of the latter, a new symbiotic relationship was expected between the two parties involved. The LDCs which abounded in forest resources during that time could mobilise these for development, assured of markets with their more advanced trade partners. On the other hand, the more developed countries would benefit from the relationship through the steady supply of forest products, particularly timber, to fuel and sustain their quest for further economic development.

By the late 1960s, however, the effectiveness of the ‘development from above’ approach was being questioned. The trickle-down effect had not materialised and poverty had not been alleviated in many developing countries (Bartelmus, 1994). A number of developing countries attained significant growth rates based on the UN target for the decade of six percent growth rate in terms of Gross National Product (Kengen, 1987).⁴ Yet economic growth was highly localised and often poorly related to people’s actual needs (Arnold, 1991). In general, the standard of living in most developing countries remained unchanged or even deteriorated. Only a small segment of society benefited in the process (Streeten and Burki, 1978).

A parallel lesson was being learned in the forestry sector. Industrialisation of the sector over almost two decades failed to address the socio-economic problems in many developing countries. This lesson was described by Westoby (1983:242):

Already, at the end of the sixties and the beginning of the seventies it was becoming apparent to me that the hoped-for benefits for forest-
based development were not being realised. More money was going into forestry; fortunes were being made; some forests were being ruthlessly exploited. But nearly all the developments were enclave developments; multiplier effects were absent; welfare was not being spread; the rural poor were getting poorer, and their numbers were increasing.

Critics of the industrial forestry model offered various explanations for its failure. For instance, Nautiyal (1967), contrary to Westoby’s first proposition as described earlier, demonstrated empirically that forestry and timber-based industries have quite weak backward linkages. Further, in *A Re-Appraisal of Forestry Development in Developing Countries*, Douglas (1983) argued that economic and social conditions in the LDCs were entirely different from developed countries and, therefore, predictions based on the latter’s experience were unreliable. For Dargavel, Hobley and Kengen (1985:16), the limitations of the industrial forestry model were to be found in the theory on which it was anchored:

> We argue that poor applications only exacerbated the ineffectiveness of policies that were theoretically inadequate. ... By recognising only the positive social and economic effects of industrialization, the diffusionist theory, on which industrial forestry rested, has proved to be theoretically inadequate to explain many negative realities.

As far as Westoby was concerned, the failure of the industrial forestry model was mainly due to political factors. He saw the issue as one of exploitation by the more developed countries and their allied development financial institutions of the forest resources of underdeveloped countries in their pursuit of economic advancement (Westoby, 1987:247-249). At the national level, he saw it as a small ruling elite reaping the benefits of the forest resources at the expense and deprivation of the disinherited masses. Westoby contended that addressing the socio-economic problems of the less developed countries transcends the economic and technical boundaries of forest development.

The failure of the forest industries development model to promote socio-economic development, together with the increasing rate of deforestation in most developing countries, contributed to the emergence of a new approach in forestry. However, many of the general ideas in Westoby’s earlier work are still being followed, particularly in resource-rich developing countries. This is despite the fact
that Westoby himself later forcefully challenged his original assumptions and, by extension, the industrial forestry model itself. 

### 2.2.2 Forestry for Local Community Development

In the 1970s, the emphasis in development thinking shifted to alternative approaches focusing on the needs of the poor. A 1974 report entitled *Redistribution with Growth* became the basis for international development strategy, particularly by lending institutions like the World Bank. The report advanced the idea that poverty problems in developing countries could be alleviated not by “abandonment of growth as an objective” but through the “redistribution of the benefits of growth” (Chenery *et al.*, 1974:xviii). This was to be attained by giving priority to the poorer groups in terms of development investments. In the rural sector, development projects had to focus on increasing the productivity of small farmers and the self-employed through better access to land, water, credit, markets, and other facilities.

In almost the same period, the Geneva-based International Labour Organisation (ILO) promoted the idea of ‘basic needs’ as a central approach to development (Ghai *et al.*, 1977). Basic needs were defined to include, “first, certain minimum requirements of a family for private consumption: adequate food, shelter and clothing, as well as certain household equipment and furniture; and second, essential services provided for and by the community at large, such as safe drinking water, sanitation, public transport and health, educational and cultural facilities” (Béguin, 1977:ii). It was claimed that as a development strategy, the basic needs approach would incorporate and expand on the ‘new development strategies’ in the 1970s, including the idea of redistribution with growth. An ILO team enumerated this expansion to include: 1) the broadening of the concept of development including so-called non-material needs; 2) the concrete specification of poverty in terms of some core basic needs (as defined above); 3) the overwhelming priority given to meeting the basic needs of all families in the shortest time possible; 4) the emphasis on redistribution of income and wealth and the creation of egalitarian societies; 5) the key role accorded to public service in combating poverty; and 6) at
least some rudimentary analysis of power structures in society (Ghai et al., 1977:3-4).

A parallel approach emerged in the forestry sector. The growing attention to rural development in the 1970s drew attention to the dependence of rural people on forests and trees. Apparent implications of this dependence were meeting basic requirements from the forest — food, fuelwood, fodder, grazing, building materials, raw materials and saleable products. It also involved maintaining tree cover to promote environmental stability (Arnold, 1991). The local people’s dependence on the forests for fuelwood and other forest amenities was highlighted by the worldwide energy crisis and the prolonged Sahelian drought in the early part of the decade. These incidents, together with the disastrous flooding in the plains of Southeast Asia in 1977, also underlined the impacts of deforestation and the degradation of forest cover (Arnold, 1991). Consequently, the new approach emphasised three major roles of forestry in rural development in addition to the industrial role.

1) The social equity role — to provide trees and other forest products to rural people who no longer had access to them (Gilmour and Fisher, 1991:6).

2) The poverty alleviation role — to find ways of increasing forest benefits to the local people who lived within or adjacent to the forests (Gilmour and Fisher, 1991:6).

3) The resource sustainability role — to address the perceived fuelwood crisis (Eckholm, 1975) and the increasing rate of deforestation and land degradation in developing countries (Myers, 1980).

As will be discussed later in this chapter, these three major roles paralleled the political, economic, and resource sustainability intentions of the ESD. They are also prototypical of the three central objectives of community forestry which emerged in the Philippines.

Since FAO, in its pioneering publication *Forestry for Local Community Development* (1978), defined the new approach to forestry development and dubbed it ‘community forestry’, a myriad of definitions has been published,
including related terms such as, social forestry, forestry for local community
development, and forestry for rural communities. As noted by Dargavel (1988:10),
a common thread in such schemes is the notion of ‘participation’ by villagers in
‘community’ decisions, work and benefits.

The legitimation of the concept of community forestry was boosted by the
adoption of *Forestry for People* as the theme for the Eighth World Forestry
Congress in Jakarta in 1978 (Gilmour and Fisher, 1991). It was also reinforced by
the release of the World Bank’s influential *Forestry Sector Policy Paper* in 1978,
which indicated its commitment to reformulating its lending program in favour of
environmental protection and people-oriented projects, as opposed to industry-
oriented forestry projects. A related initiative by the International Development
Research Center (IDRC) led to the creation of the International Center for Research
in Agroforestry, an international organisation to promote research in agroforestry
(Bene, Beall and Cote, 1977).

Similar to the industrial forestry model, the concept of community forestry
spread rapidly and gained easy acceptance. As mentioned above, this was partly
due to the realisation that policies promoting industrialisation were not effectively
attacking the problems of rural poverty and forest degradation (Kirchoffer and
Mercer, 1984). Thus, for policy makers, the community forestry model appeared to
be just the ‘right’ alternative to industrial forestry. Community forestry also fitted
with political considerations of the time. It matched almost perfectly with the political
rhetoric about redistributive justice and poverty alleviation being advanced by
development institutions like the World Bank. Moreover, community forestry
supported the people-centred or community-centred ideologies that became
fashionable in developing countries in the 1980s. Community forestry was,
therefore, seen not only as an operational strategy in forestry but also a development

The promising and significant potential of community forestry resulted in
considerable efforts and resources to support its implementation. Describing the
speed with which the idea of community forestry spread, as well as the World
Bank’s contribution to its implementation, Gregersen et al. (1989:8) wrote:
From the late 1970s until the early 1980s new programs were launched at an accelerated rate, accompanied by the tremendous growth in economic development activity related to farm and community forestry. Courses were developed, institutions were established or modified to deal with agroforestry research, significant programs were initiated and funded by multilateral and bilateral development organisations, and large sums of money were invested in community forestry projects in many countries. For example, during the decade 1977 to 1986, some 60 percent of the World Bank lending in forestry (US$1,300 million) was for social forestry and related fuelwood and watershed protection projects. This compares to a mere 5 percent in the previous decade.

The popularity of people-centred development contributed to further refinements of the community forestry approach. The notion was advanced of community forestry as an approach that “puts community at the centre” rather than forests (Gilmour and Fisher, 1991:68). Two key issues were clarified in the process: which people the forest should serve; and how the forest should serve these people. The first issue was addressed by Leslie (1987:ix) in his exposition of the social forestry concept. According to him, social forestry is “primarily, concerned with people whose needs are not able to express themselves as effective economic or political demands”. An FAO report published in 1983 clarified the second issue:

Community forestry departed radically from all previous conceptions of what forestry was about in that it centred on the idea of people’s participation — getting local populations to plan and execute their own projects on a self help basis. This meant providing them with the advice and inputs needed to grow seedlings, to plant, manage and protect their own forest resources, and to extract the maximum benefit from the resources. Community forestry is dedicated to the idea of increasing the direct benefits of the forest to the rural people (FAO, 1983:8).

Despite the refinements and considerable efforts in support, the good intentions of community forestry remain far from reality in many developing countries. This was revealed by the FAO’s review of the decade of experience in community forestry (Arnold, 1991). The verdict of the review was that many early community forestry projects were based on the wrong assumption that there was a strong, positive relationship between the perceived fuelwood shortage in the mid 1970s and the most urgent needs of local communities. As a result, a large portion of the initial investment in community forestry was allocated to afforestation projects to increase...
fuelwood supply at the expense of addressing the real needs of the local people. Apparently, despite the claim of people’s participation, these projects were designed on the basis of the perceptions of the ‘experts’ and the priorities of funding agencies, rather than on the felt needs of local communities. Part of the failure, as elaborated by Arnold (1991:5), was that:

...even projects which have sought to identify local needs, aspirations and possibilities have in practice done so more on the basis of the views of the planners and others from outside than on the local people themselves. Dialogue to achieve local participation has all too often started only after the project design has been finalised and is in place. Though the concept of participation took root quickly, in practice, it has been, and still is, more frequently preached than practised.

To rectify the situation, the FAO report reinforced the recommendations in the earlier assessments of community forestry — that the practice of community forestry should be improved (Foley and Barnard, 1984; FAO/SIDA, 1989). One major recommendation of the report was to promote the use of “participatory approaches to problem identification and project design” like RRA and other “applicable approaches and methods” (Arnold, 1991:26). Chapter Three discusses these approaches and methods (or techniques of practice as termed in this thesis) while Chapters Five, Six and Seven demonstrate through case studies their inherent tendencies to produce paradoxical effects.
2.2.3 Forestry in Sustainable Development

The most recent shift in development thinking that has influenced the forestry sector is the concept of ‘sustainable development’. The concern with sustainable development is a recent phenomenon, although most of the issues involved relate to earlier development debates. The “environmental doomsday literature” (Bartelmus, 1994:5) in the 1960s and the early 1970s, warned that some form of socio-economic collapse would result from the continuation of then current levels of economic growth. The much publicised and widely circulated report of the Club of Rome, *Limits to Growth* (Meadows *et al*., 1972) — in a slightly more optimistic view — provoked widespread attention to the physical limits of the world’s finite resources in sustaining exponential growth rates. However, it was believed that the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, in Stockholm in 1972, first brought the issue of sustainable development onto the agenda of international politics (Stokke, 1991:1). Since then, the term ‘sustainable development’ has come into widespread use (Tolba, 1987:97).

The publication of the influential report of the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED), *Our Common Future*, led to the emergence of sustainable development as a priority theme on the international agenda (Stokke, 1991:1). Referred to as the *Brundtland Report*, it defined sustainable development as a “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their needs” (WCED, 1987:43). “Implicit in this definition are three dimensions of development: social justice, economic efficiency, and environmental sustainability” (Rietbergen, 1993:4).

There are certain aspects of the above three dimensions of sustainable development that closely parallel, if not converge with, the three major roles of forestry in rural development as mentioned earlier:

1) Social justice: WCED’s concept of sustainable development also prioritises the smallholders in the allocation of resources: ‘Smallholders, including — indeed especially — women, must be given preference when allocating scarce
resources, staff and credit”. It also recommends “decentralising the management of resources upon which local communities depend, and giving these communities an effective say over the use of these resources” (WCED, 1987:65,143).

2) Economic efficiency: WCED’s concept of economic efficiency is linked to satisfying the basic needs of the poor which corresponds to community forestry’s concern on poverty alleviation. WCED (1991:87-88) notes: “A world in which poverty and inequity are endemic will always be prone to ecological and other crises”. It therefore advances “the concept of ‘needs’, in particular the essential needs of the world’s poor, to which overriding priority should be given”.

3) Environmental or resource sustainability: WCED, like the advocates of community forestry, recognises the physical limits associated with the use of the resource base and the need to conserve and enhance these resources. As emphasised: “The conservation of agricultural resources is an urgent task because in many parts of the world cultivation has already been extended to marginal lands, and fishery and forestry resources have been overexploited. These resources must be conserved and enhanced to meet the needs of the growing populations” (WCED, 1991:101).

The last dimension of resource sustainability brought forestry to the forefront of the sustainable development debate. Indeed, the Brundtland Report devoted considerable space to discussing forestry, including its alarming situation. The report also emphasised that while forest destruction has occurred worldwide, the greatest challenge is in the tropical forests of the developing countries. It also stressed the important role of community forestry in sustaining the forest resources:

Programmes to preserve the forest resources must start with the local people who are both victims and agents of destruction, and who will bear the burden of any new management scheme. They should be at the center of integrated forest management ... (WCED, 1991:180-181).
In development practice, sustainable development appears to be simply an addition of the environmental variable into the earlier development equation. The first two dimensions of economic efficiency and social justice are simply carried over from the first two decades of development promoted by the UN. Concerns about the ‘limits to growth’ (Meadows et al., 1972) in the early 1970s led to the incorporation of the sustainability variable in the late 1980s, making ESD a three-variable equation.

A parallel observation can be made in examining the role of forestry in development. The earlier growth-oriented forest industry model was geared towards promoting economic efficiency. The limitations of this approach in promoting socio-economic development in developing countries led to the emergence of community forestry. Aside from economic considerations (increasing local people’s direct benefits from forest resources), the equity variable (promoting access and equitable benefit to forest resources) is added to the community forestry equation. Lately, with the popularity of the concept of sustainability, sustaining forest resources through local people has become a major aim of community forestry projects. The case of the Philippines demonstrates this shift in development thinking in forestry and its influence in the evolution of the concept and policy of community forestry.

2.3 The Case of the Philippines

The evolution of the concept and policy of community forestry in the Philippines was shaped both by the international fashions in development thinking and the national economic, political, and environmental contexts. Three major periods in the history of forest management in the country are relevant: the colonial period; the logging years from 1946 to the early 1970s; and the emergence of community forestry, which began in the mid 1970s. In this section, I analyse the major policies and events and their implications within each period.
2.3.1 Forestry in the Colonial Period

Forest policy was influenced by the Philippines’ long history of colonisation. Prior to colonisation by Spain, land ownership was generally communal. Forests were accessible to all and ‘ownership’ was vested in whoever cleared and cultivated them first (Fernandez, 1976). Land was never owned in the same way as the present concept of land ownership implies. People possessed ‘access’ rights to occupy the land and to harvest the fruits of their labour while respecting their territorial boundary (Lynch, 1984).

With the arrival of the Spanish, land ownership was legalised through the institution of land titling, and the system of communal ownership and the traditional method of acquiring land through actual occupation and cultivation was superseded (Makil, 1982:6). From it evolved the myth of the Regalian Doctrine which vested the ownership of all land in the country in the Spanish crown (Lynch, 1984). A major implication of this was the marginalisation of the indigenous Filipinos. As far as the colonial power was concerned, the indigenous occupants of the unexplored archipelago became squatters on their own land (Lynch, 1986).

The creation of the Inspection General de Montes or Forest Service in 1863 placed the control, ownership and administration of forest resources under the colonial government. The Forest Service strictly regulated forest use and prohibited unauthorised encroachment into forest lands and illegal cutting of timber (Boado, 1985). A series of Royal Decrees were issued from Spain to this effect from 1866 to 1887, including a ban on kaingin making or shifting cultivation, which was the main source of livelihood of most indigenous people (Makil, 1982:7). This prohibition of their main source of livelihood was the second form of marginalisation of the indigenous people during this period.

The United States adopted the concept of Regalian Doctrine to maintain the state-controlled management of forest resources initiated by the Spanish. About three years after the American occupation, Inspection General de Montes was turned into a Forestry Bureau through General Order No. 50, dated 14 April 1900 (Makil, 1982). This was followed by the legislation of the Forest Act of 1904, and
later, the *Forest Law of 1917*. Under these laws, the Forestry Bureau retained the power to classify land into private and public domains and to issue forest licences for exploitation.

The United States’ “voracious demand for wood” became its prime motivation for formulating forest policies during its colonial administration (Bello, 1992:52). These policies benefited the privileged few and resulted in massive destruction of the country’s forest resources. As described by a respected forestry historian, Richard Tucker (1988:223):

> From the Forest law of 1904 onwards, U.S. colonial policy set about to modernise the logging industry as rapidly as possible, through close cooperation between the Bureau of Forestry and the large-scale timber corporations, both foreign and domestic. Philippine logging came to be dominated by a capital-intensive, technologically modern sector. Great profits accrued to the major investors, but the rainforests of the islands were depleted at an increasing rate by the allure of the international market.

The colonial effort to promote industrialisation in the Philippine forestry sector was designed to benefit the colonisers and their allied local elite. The American political agenda is aptly expressed in the Bureau of Forestry promotional booklet, which states that “When you buy Philippine lumber, you are helping not only the Filipinos, but also the American lumberman in the Philippines and the American machine manufacturers in the United States” (Quoted in Tucker 1988:228). Towards the end of the colonial period in 1940, American firms accounted for 41 percent of investment in the nation’s sawmill industry, while the Filipino elite accounted for 34 percent (de la Cruz, 1941:147). The Philippines had been transformed from a timber importer to Southeast Asia’s largest timber exporter (Tucker, 1988:223-228).

Americans also reinforced the introduction of ‘scientific forestry’ earlier started by the Spanish. American foresters were recruited to train local people in the Western concept of forest management (Roth, 1983).23 Research facilities were also established in 1910 with the colonial Bureau of Science and the new College of Agriculture at Los Banos, about 65 kilometres south of Manila. The research’s
primary emphasis then was to determine the properties and uses of selected tree species considered useful for the newborn wood industry (Tucker, 1992). The introduction of colonial ‘scientific forestry’ resulted in timber being perceived as the major forest resource. All the other forest benefits from which indigenous Filipinos subsisted for centuries, not to mention cultural values, were lumped together as ‘minor forest products’. In the process, indigenous people’s uses of the forests were relegated to the periphery of forest management (Tucker, 1992). The approach also co-opted indigenous forest management systems that were appreciated during this period. The American-appointed Philippine Secretary of Interior, Dean Worcester, impressed by what he saw in Bontoc Lepanto, wrote in 1914:

> When I first visited their country, I noted that all the trees in certain pine forests were carefully trimmed of their lower branches, and on inquiry found that the trees might not be felled until they reach a certain size although branches might be cut for firewood. The prevention of fires, which were very destructive in the pine forest, and the care of young trees were also adequately provided for (Worcester, 1914:860).

In general, however, there was a lack of appreciation and understanding of the indigenous forest management systems among both the Spanish and the Americans. This led them to blame the indigenous people and their method of shifting cultivation (kaingin) as the major culprit in forest destruction. The belief was perpetuated in the forestry sector and led to the formulation of forest policies which denied indigenous people access to and benefits from the forest resource.

### 2.3.2 From 1946 to the 1970s: Logging the Way to Underdevelopment

After World War II, the forestry sector supported the country’s macro-economic policy geared towards the enhancement of industrialisation to repair the war-ravaged economy. The sector started to liquidate the country’s forest resources into solid capital to spur economic development. Forest industries were rehabilitated within a few years and the exportation of logs and some processed products was resumed (Boado, 1985; Quintos, 1989).
State ownership and control of forest lands was perpetuated by the first Constitution of the Independent Philippine Republic on July 4, 1946. It stipulated in Section 1, article 13 that all timber lands “belong to the state”. This situation facilitated the massive timber exportation earlier established by the Americans. By the 1950s, logging had grown so profitable that timber licences proliferated. Towards the end of the decade (1959), the country was the major exporter of tropical timber accounting for almost one third of the world’s market in logs (Quintos, 1989).

Table 2.1  Licensees number and area, forest cover, and deforestation in the Philippines, 1959-1992

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>LICENSEES NUMBER</th>
<th>LICENSED AREA (000 HA.)</th>
<th>FOREST COVER (000 HA.)</th>
<th>AREA DEFORESTED (000 HA.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1959-60</td>
<td>4,485</td>
<td>13,000</td>
<td>225</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961-62</td>
<td>6,554</td>
<td>12,500</td>
<td>245</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963-64</td>
<td>7,928</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>265</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965-66</td>
<td>6,745</td>
<td>11,450</td>
<td>284</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967-68</td>
<td>8,302</td>
<td>10,850</td>
<td>296</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969-70</td>
<td>412</td>
<td>9,357</td>
<td>10,250</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971-72</td>
<td>461</td>
<td>10,598</td>
<td>9,650</td>
<td>298</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973-74</td>
<td>422</td>
<td>10,290</td>
<td>9,050</td>
<td>297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975-76</td>
<td>471</td>
<td>10,137</td>
<td>8,500</td>
<td>280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>376</td>
<td>10,211</td>
<td>8,100</td>
<td>264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>8,769</td>
<td>7,800</td>
<td>248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>8,310</td>
<td>7,600</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>261</td>
<td>7,939</td>
<td>7,400</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>7,754</td>
<td>7,200</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>7,539</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>5,779</td>
<td>6,900</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>6,347</td>
<td>6,800</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>6,594</td>
<td>6,600</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>5,847</td>
<td>6,500</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>5,579</td>
<td>6,400</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>4,737</td>
<td>6,300</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>4,634</td>
<td>6,200</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>3,760</td>
<td>6,100</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>2,917</td>
<td>6,015</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>2,311</td>
<td>5,900</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The timber boom which started in the late 1950s lasted for around twenty-five years (Boado, 1988). The desire to hasten industrialisation led to the licensing of more and more forest lands for exploitation during this period. From 4.48 million hectares in
1959, the licensed area more than doubled to 10.59 million hectares in 1971, constituting one third of the country’s total land area of 30 million hectares (Table 2.1). The timber licensees’ control of the one third of the country’s land area was sustained from 1971 to 1977, after which it gradually decreased to 2.31 million hectares in 1992 (Figure 2.1).

**Figure 2.1  Number of licensees and licenced area in the Philippines, 1959-1992.**  

Even before the publication of Westoby’s seminal article on the industrialisation of the forestry sector in 1962, the Philippines had already entered the industrialisation era. Initial efforts to build a forest products industry started as early as the mid-1950s through a directive issued by the Secretary of the then Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources (DANR), limiting the awarding of timber concessions to applicants capable of establishing appropriate and efficient sawmills and/or processing plants (Quintos, 1989). The initiative was given greater substance, more than a decade after, through a Presidential Directive issued in 1967 with the intention of boosting the local wood industry (Cortes, 1976). Under the directive, timber licensees were required to establish processing plants within four years from the issuance or renewal of their licences and to reduce their log exports by 10 per
cent every year until 1971. By then they would be required to process at least 60 per cent of their allowable cut and export only 40 per cent in logs.

Table 2.2  Average annual log production and export, value of export, and extent of underreported exports, 1955-1990.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Average Annual Production a (1,000 m³)</th>
<th>Average Annual Export a (1,000 m³)</th>
<th>Share of Export (%)</th>
<th>Average Value of Annual Export a (US$ FOB)</th>
<th>Rate of Under-reporting b (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1955-1960</td>
<td>5,105</td>
<td>2,393</td>
<td>46.9</td>
<td>84,446</td>
<td>38.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961-1965</td>
<td>6,749</td>
<td>3,892</td>
<td>57.7</td>
<td>181,254</td>
<td>65.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966-1970</td>
<td>9,918</td>
<td>7,392</td>
<td>74.5</td>
<td></td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971-1975</td>
<td>10,177</td>
<td>8,940</td>
<td>84.2</td>
<td>385,940</td>
<td>63.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976-1980</td>
<td>7,330</td>
<td>6,919</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>130,103</td>
<td>30.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981-1985</td>
<td>4,883</td>
<td>813</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>75,076</td>
<td>59.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986-1990</td>
<td>3,432</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>11,525</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources:  

a Based on FMB (1992).

b Based on the ratio of Philippine export volume of logs and Japanese import data. The latter was obtained from Ministry of Finance, *Annual Return of the Foreign Trade of Japan* as compiled by Bautista (1990).

However, the initial effort to boost the local industry, and thereby industrialise the forestry sector, never materialised. The policy resulted only in the establishment of uneconomic and poorly located mills. Many licensees were noted to have built processing plants simply to comply with the regulations, while concentrating continuously on log exportation (Boado, 1988). Official statistics show that from 1971 to 1975, an average of 68 per cent of the annual log production were exported, with only 22 per cent processed locally (Table 2.2). These statistics exclude the unreported logs exported to the Japanese market. Information on the actual log export gathered by Bautista (1990) reveals that the rate of underreporting during this period was as high as 63 per cent.29 With the attraction of lucrative foreign markets for high quality logs, only those of low quality were left for domestic processing. Minimum capital outlay and faster cash turnover made the exportation of logs more profitable for the licensees compared to wood processing, encouraging them to export more.
Even the later attempt to implement a wood rationalisation program, primarily through a log export ban, had a hard time taking off. The government policy to totally ban log exportation, scheduled for January 1976, was never pursued. Instead, a series of amendments of the earlier policies were undertaken, resulting in the implementation of partial and selective log exports. The government argued that the amendments were necessary to prevent the adverse effects of a ban on the country’s balance of payments, employment and the stability of the wood industry (Quintos, 1989). Some believed, however, that the amendments were designed to accommodate the strong opposition from timber licensees in the guise of protecting the general socio-economic welfare of the country. A complete log export ban was implemented only in 1989, three years after the famous EDSA Revolution which resulted in a change in the national leadership.

The effects of industrialisation in the Philippine forestry sector were, at best, economically limited and, at worst, socio-politically and environmentally damaging. Its only significant contribution was to generate foreign exchange earnings, but this was a short-lived gain, for log harvests began to decline from the mid-1970s (Figure 2.2). Because of the extremely low forest charges imposed by the government on forest exploitation, generated government revenues were not even sufficient to finance forest management and renewal. Low forest charges could have also promoted the alleged corruption and massive bribery in the forestry sector. Licensees were left with high profit margins which enabled them to bribe forest officers or meet the penalties for violations of forest rules and regulations (Revilla, 1990).

The industrialisation era facilitated the inequitable access to and benefits from the forest resources in favour of the local elite. In the guise of economic development, the issuance of timber licences was used as a mechanism to maintain political power and control. During the martial law period from 1972 to 1984, President Marcos centralised control over economic resources in the hands of the fraction of the traditional elite most closely aligned with him and his family (Porter and Ganapin, 1988). This period recorded the greatest number of licences issued in the history of Philippine forestry and the largest area made available for exploitation
(Table 2.1). The same period recorded the greatest decline in the country’s forest cover and the highest rate of forest destruction which ranged from 136,000 to 298,000 hectares per year.

![Graph showing average annual production, export, and earnings from 1955 to 1990.](image)

**Figure 2.2** Average annual log production and export, 1955-1990.
Source: Bautista (1990); FMB (1992)

Backed up with sufficient capital and the necessary political clout, timber licensees were easily able to enter into logging businesses and amass profits by concentrating on log exports. Minimal domestic processing limited the trickle-down of socio-economic benefits to other sectors of society, particularly the rural poor. At best, local communities were employed as labourers in logging operations, making them fully dependent on the latter, and hence their security rested on the fortunes of the usually short-lived logging companies. At worst, they were barred from entering forest lands to practise shifting cultivation to augment their meagre income. Occupants of public domains, including indigenous communities, were continuously...
treated as squatters and threatened with eviction or imprisonment if found engaging in the clearing of public land.

The logging concessions’ encroachment into ancestral lands had far more damaging effects (FDC, 1987). Not only were their productive resources exploited, but their burial grounds and sacred places were also desecrated. Moreover, with the opening of logging roads came the penetration of the lowland Westernised culture into the remotest parts of the countryside, resulting in the cultural disintegration of the tribal minorities.\(^\text{32}\) These negative effects generated pockets of both armed and non-violent forms of resistance in the countryside which contributed to the country’s political instability (Contreras, 1991; Porter and Ganapin, 1988:30-31; Bagadion, 1990).

Due to the fact that most licensees simply wanted to cut and get out, forests were likewise ruthlessly exploited beyond their sustainable limits. From 11 million hectares of old growth forests in 1934, the country is currently left with less than 1 million hectares, a large portion of which was cut during the timber boom period (Agaloos, 1990; cf. Map 2.1). Loggers, however, would always point to the forest occupants as the culprits in forest destruction.

The physical manifestations of the adverse effects of poorly managed industrialisation in the Philippine forestry sector are apparent. The once booming (from the 1960s to the 1970s) logging towns in Negros province and many parts of Mindanao are now close to becoming ghost towns due to the cancellation of timber licences and the depletion of the forest resources. Formerly lush mountains stocked with high volume, prime timber species, which were once controlled by logging operators, are now mostly abandoned and denuded. Catastrophic floods, the siltation of rivers and lakes, prolonged droughts, the destruction of biodiversity, and related environmental consequences not evident 30 years ago, have likewise become common phenomena.\(^\text{33}\) Meanwhile, forest occupants, currently estimated at about 10-11 million, struggle to eke out a living in the increasingly fragile forest environment.
Map 2.1: Changing Forest Cover of the Philippines (Source: Walpole et al., 1993)

1 Derived from data in Salita et al. (1966) and UN Ecafe (1978).
2 Derived from Namria 1987 SPOT map.
It should be mentioned, however, that the Philippines had sufficient policies to promote the sustainable use of the country’s forest resources. As early as 1954, Forestry Administrative Order No. 23 prescribed that logging operations in all areas declared as permanent forest should be under sustained-yield management (Uebelhör, Lagundino and Abalus, 1990). This was to be implemented through the application of a selective logging system to the Philippine dipterocarp forest. Since then, a series of administrative orders, directives, memoranda, and circulars, has been issued to support the implementation of selective logging and promote sustainable forestry (DENR, 1989). A *Handbook on Selective Logging* was also published by the BFD in 1965 (Siapno, 1970). Referred to as the ‘bible of Philippine forestry’, the handbook contained the rules and regulations for the implementation of selective logging as well as other related memoranda and circulars.

Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 331 (entitled *Sustained Yield*) issued on 8 November 1973, explicitly prescribed sustained-yield as the basis for sound forestry principles and practices in the country. Sustained-yield was reiterated as the appropriate forest management approach in P.D. No. 705 (*Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines*), and its amending decree P.D. No. 1559, issued in 1975 and 1978, respectively (Republic of the Philippines, 1975, 1978). Similar to the earlier directives, both decrees prescribed selective logging as the silvicultural and harvesting systems for the dipterocarp forest to promote sustained-yield.

Most of the evaluations conducted by local specialists on the Philippine Selective Logging System or PSLS (Utleg, 1973; Revilla, 1978; Tomboc, 1978,1987; and Reyes, 1983) arrived at an almost similar conclusion. They generally pointed out that the primary deficiency of the system was the apparent failure in its implementation. Maintaining that PSLS has some technical merits, Tomboc (1978) claimed that it is still the best until a better alternative can be developed. On the other hand, a recent comprehensive appraisal conducted by the RP-German Dipterocarp Forest Management Project on PSLS claimed that the problem was not simply technical. The appraisal emphasised that even if a more appropriate silvicultural system had been developed, the sustainable management of the dipterocarp forest was still bound to fail. This was considering the prevailing
political situation and the economic orientation of the concessionaires from early 1960 to the 1980s when the system was widely promoted. Uebelhör, Lagundino and Abalos (1990:36) elaborate:

During the time (1960-1980s) which saw the largest conversion of virgin into logged-over forest (approximately 4 million ha) the legal and political climate was not conducive to sustainable resource management. The government lacked the political will and the administration did not show the necessary determination to control and to enforce the rules and regulations which they had given themselves. Concessionaires entrusted with the management of the country’s forest were not induced to comply with the existing rules and regulations because of the doubtful security of tenure of their operations, the absence or unlikeliness of control and the easiness with which an increasing number of indifferent officials could be “convinced” to ignore violations (emphasis original).

It should be noted that the Philippine case typifies the experience of most tropical countries in pursuing the seemingly elusive goal of sustained-yield forestry. A 1988 study on tropical forestry carried out for the International Tropical Timber Organisation (ITTO) concluded that “the extent of tropical moist forest which is being deliberately managed at an operational scale for the sustainable production of timber is, on a world scale, negligible” (Poore, 1989:207). The study found that less than one-eighth of 1 per cent of tropical forests, where timber extraction is occurring on a commercial basis, were being logged sustainably. Similar to the Philippine case, the study also established that the success of sustainable natural-forest management goes beyond the technical aspect. Although technical constraints exist, they “are much less important than those that are political, economic and social” (Poore, 1989:8).

2.3.3 The Emergence of Community Forestry

By the 1970s, two major problems had become apparent in the forestry sector: massive forest denudation and increasing poverty among the upland occupants. During this period, there was also a growing acceptance that the punitive stance adopted by the government for almost a century was ineffective in containing the upland communities. The issuance of Presidential Decree 705 in 1975, otherwise
known as the *Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines*, led to the formulation of various government programs relating to forest land occupancy (Pulhin, 1987:12). The most popular of these programs were Forest Occupancy and Management (FOM) in 1975, Communal Tree Farming (CTF) in 1978, and Family Approach to Reforestation (FAR) in 1979.

In 1982, the above programs were consolidated through Letter of Instruction No. 1260 which launched the Integrated Social Forestry Program (ISFP). Its launching signalled the official adoption of social forestry as a forest management and development strategy in the Philippine uplands (Payuan, 1983). The program has three major aims: to stem the tide of forest destruction by shifting cultivation; to help fight poverty among the forest occupants; and to help rehabilitate the degraded forest environment (Agaloos, 1990:6).

The growing local and international concern towards ‘people-oriented forestry’ provided the momentum for the establishment of related programs and projects in the country under the banner of social or community forestry. A few months before the ISFP was launched, an inventory conducted by Bernales and de la Vega (1982) showed that there were already 255 upland projects in the country which may be generally categorised as ‘social forestry projects’. These projects were implemented by the government and the private sectors including Non-Government Organisations (NGOs).

However, the emergence of community forestry as a development intervention should be understood within the Philippines’ broader political context during the 1970s and 1980s. Community forestry emerged not solely in response to the worsening poverty and forest degradation in the Philippine uplands, although these were major contributory factors (Pulhin, 1985a; Pulhin, 1985b; FDC, 1987). Neither was its emergence merely an international import, although this was also instrumental (Aquino, del Castillo and Payuan, 1987:10). Community forestry also arose primarily as a state strategy to control and stabilise the intense political unrest in the countryside in the 1970s and the 1980s. In other words, social forestry was part of the overall rural development counterinsurgency strategy during this period of the Marcos administration (Bello, Kinley and Elinson).
At least two important observations support the counterinsurgency explanation. First, early social forestry projects were concentrated in parts of the country with high insurgency problems. In the Southern Tagalog (Region 4), for instance, early social forestry projects were located in the insurgent areas of Mindoro and Quezon provinces. In the same manner, the 1984 World Bank-supported social forestry project under the Central Visayas Regional Project (CVRP-1) was established in Negros Oriental where the New People’s Army (NPA) and the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) were most prominent in the mid 1980s (Kerkvliet, 1995:25). Secondly, it was quite ironic that the idea of social forestry emerged at the time Marcos himself was allowing his cronies to plunder the country’s forest resources through indiscriminate issuance of timber permits (Vitug, 1993a).

As mentioned earlier, from 1972 to 1984 the martial law regime recorded the greatest number of timber licences issued in the history of Philippine forestry; the largest area made available for exploitation; and the highest rate of forest destruction. The logic behind using social forestry for counterinsurgency is obvious. If people are mobilised in government development projects they are less available for revolution (Bryant and White, 1982). Indeed, by 1980, it was claimed that the NPA had created 26 battle fronts in the countryside and operated in 41 of the country’s 71 provinces (Bello, Kinley and Bielski, 1982:92). A National Democratic Front (NDF) spokesman described this situation as approaching that which existed in Vietnam in the early 1960s (NDF, n.d:203). Social forestry, together with other rural development projects, therefore constituted a force to pacify the then highly explosive political situation in most upland communities. Yet there appeared to be another logic in using social forestry for counterinsurgency. This was to deviate the attention of the general public — especially the upland communities — from the rapid “onslaught of the forests” (Potter, 1993:103) by the Marcos cronies.

Despite the emphasis on people’s involvement in forestry activities, the first generation of government social forestry did not depart from conventional practice sufficiently. These projects mostly aimed to “get trees in the ground rather than to get the household economies of the rural poor off the ground” (Peluso, 1992:242). The primary rationale was forest resource creation and protection to support the
national agenda in forest management. Any benefits to local people were just a bonus and intended mainly to win their support and involvement in forestry activities.

For instance, a study by the Forestry Development Center (FDC) in 1985 revealed the limited economic contribution of ISFP and its precursors to the income and livelihood of upland communities. In 1984, the BFD reported that ISFP participants had already generated considerable economic benefits through their harvested trees and agricultural crops. BFD claimed that the total income generated by more than 44,000 farmer participants was already close to 121 million pesos in just one and a half years of operation. This conclusion, however, was challenged by the FDC study which deduced that ISFP participants had only an average net income of 465 pesos in its one and a half years of operation. According to the study this was very low, considering the fact that some ISFP projects actually started in 1975 under FOM, in 1978 under CTF, and in 1979 under FAR and therefore should have already attained or be approaching their economic maturity by that time (FDC, 1985).

Even the intention behind the issuance of 25-year stewardship certificates was met with suspicion or rejection by some upland farmers. They believed that it was simply a means of getting them to plant trees and that the BFD would reclaim the land once the trees had grown (Porter and Ganapin, 1988:29). In Cordillera, the Tinggian tribe, invoking ancestral claims to forest lands, rejected the concept of a stewardship certificate asserting that the land belonged to them and, therefore, should not be ‘lent’ to them by the government.38

The limited coverage of social forestry projects also reduced their impact. The projects were mostly confined to occupied public lands devoid of forest vegetation and excluded timber licence areas, national parks and other forest reservations (Rebugio et al., 1987).39 Commercial extraction of timber was not included under the ISFP and therefore the benefits of logging remained solely in the hands of the favoured timber licensees.

There were also indications that social forestry temporarily strengthened the hegemony and control of the Marcos administration (Contreras, 1991:65). In 1984, the ruling party, Kilusang Bagong Lipunan or New Society Movement counted
social forestry as one of its major accomplishments and used it as a campaign promise during the Batasan parliamentary election. The then Minister of Natural Resources was also said to distribute stewardship agreements to upland cultivators in his home province in Palawan as part of his campaign to get votes. These were in addition to the role of social forestry in promoting political stability in insurgent upland areas.

The restoration of the Philippine democratic government, starting in 1986, placed the issue of social equity at the centre of the country’s forest policy agenda (DENR Policy Advisory Group, 1987). To guard against the inequities of the past monopolistic allocation, the New Constitution contains provisions mandating equitable access and distribution of benefits from the country’s natural resources. Policy reforms were installed to bring about radical transformation in the forestry sector (Ramos, 1993). These policies envisioned dismantling of the quasi-monopolistic forest industry controlled by a select few, and installation of a community-based forest management system. Policies were also said to be based on the pragmatic realisation that the ultimate survival of the Philippine forests lies in the hands of millions of smallholders (Ramos, 1993:121).

The Philippine Master Plan for Forestry Development (DENR, 1990a) provides the blueprint to operationalise the concept of social equity through democratising forest resource access. The plan stipulates that 1.5 million hectares or 54 per cent of the remaining 2 million hectares of secondary growth forest below 50 per cent in slope will be placed under community forest management in the next 15 years. Moreover, large scale operations like Timber License Agreements (TLAs) and Timber Production Sharing Agreements (TPSAs) will be confined to 682,000 hectares or 23 percent of the country’s total commercial forest (Figure 2.3).
The renewed focus on community forestry after 1986 also reinforced the poverty alleviation objective of the earlier projects. The scope of community forestry projects also expanded to include supplementary livelihood activities, farm-to-market roads, access to credit, and provision of water supply. These are in addition to the provision of tenure or resource access instruments like the Certificate of Stewardship Contract (Agaloos, 1993). More significantly, with the expansion of community forestry coverage to the natural forest, the sustainability variable was added to the equity and poverty aims of community forestry. The recent DENR administrative policies refer to community forestry as “a new approach to forest resource management” ... “which is geared towards developing organised communities that have the capability to sustainably manage natural resources” (DENR, 1989a:172; 1993:2). Based on these official documents, community forestry has three avowed core objectives:

1) to promote social equity by democratising forest resource access;

2) to alleviate poverty by providing forest-based and other alternative sources of livelihood; and
3) to promote the sustainability of the forest resources for the present and future
generations.

As discussed earlier, these central aims have their direct parallel in the three broader
issues of ESD. It has political intentions (democratising resource access); it has
socio-economic intentions (poverty alleviation); and resource sustainability intentions
(the sustainability of the forest resource).

2.4 Community Forestry and Sustainable Development

In 1987, the same year that WCED published its influential report, *Our Common
Future*, DENR initiated the process of formulating a *Philippine Strategy for
Sustainable Development (PSSD)*. The PSSD provides the Philippines’
framework and action program for environment and development issues. It was
formally approved on 29 November 1989 through Cabinet Resolution No. 37 and has, since then, been treated as an integral part of the country’s national development plan (DENR, 1990b). It aims to “achieve, maintain and disperse economic growth
without depleting the stock of the natural resources and degrading environmental
quality” (DENR, 1991:xi).

The PSSD built on WCED’s central idea of sustainable development and
applied it in the Philippine situation. It’s ten operational principles (DENR, 1990b:5)
can be categorised under the three general intentions of ecologically sustainable
development as advanced by WCED:

1) Under political or social justice and equity intention: a) a concern for meeting the
needs of future generations, otherwise termed as inter-generational equity; b) a
concern for equity of people’s access to natural resources; and c) promotion of
citizen’s participation and decentralisation in implementing programs.

2) Under economic efficiency or poverty alleviation intention: a) a recognition that
poverty is both a cause and consequence of environmental degradation.
3) Under resource sustainability intention: a) a concern not to exceed the carrying capacity of ecosystems; b) living on the interest rather than on the capital or stock of natural resources; c) a concern on resource use efficiency; and d) promotion of research substitutes, recycling, exploration, etc. from revenues derived from the utilisation of non-renewable resources.

The concept of community forestry, and specifically its three core objectives, was founded on the PSSD. These central aims directly advanced three of the ten PSSD general strategies. These include:

1) the reform of property rights as advanced by democratising resource access;

2) the induction of growth in rural areas, by poverty alleviation; and

3) the rehabilitation of the ecosystem, by sustainable forestry.

Community forestry was the forestry sector’s major strategy for promoting sustainable development as contained in the 1989 DENR Action Plan (for sustainable development) and in the country report presented during the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.43

It should also be noted that there seems to be convergence between the central concerns of community forestry and some of the principles for an alternative vision of sustainable development currently being promoted by a growing number of NGOs and people’s organisations (POs) in the country. These groups advocate that “the goals of development should be rec centred on four principles: ecological sustainability, equity, participation, and improvements in the lives of the poor majority” (Broad and Cavanagh, 1993:144). These principles are at the very heart of the concept of community forestry.

Some professional observers have claimed that the Philippines has some of the most progressive community forestry policies in Asia which can be learned from by other countries experiencing similar conditions (Walpole et al., 1993). Support for community forestry is also growing and is no longer confined to the government sector. Political critiques of the old logging system, such as Marites Vitug of the National Center for Investigative Journalism, and Maximo Kalaw, President of the
Haribon Society, placed high hopes in the concept of community forest management. Influential environmental coalitions, like the Green Forum, have also recommended community forestry to be the central thrust of the USAID Natural Resource Management Program (Green Forum, 1991). Indeed, there is now an agreement that community forestry is a potential vehicle to help promote the goals of PSSD.

However, whether the core objectives of community forestry can, in fact, be realised on the ground remains to be demonstrated. This may be determined by examining some theoretical and practical issues concerning the implementation of different community forestry projects. The remainder of the thesis is devoted to this task.

2.5 Summary

The evolution of the concept and policy of community forestry in the Philippines has been influenced both by the international trends in development thinking and the national socio-economic, political and environmental contexts. From the early 1900s until the mid 1970s, Philippine forest policies were geared towards the industrialisation of the forestry sector. The benefits of industrialisation were confined to the privileged few and were later seen as having contributed to upland poverty and forest depletion. By the 1980s, the government had introduced a new approach in forest management generally termed ‘people-oriented forestry’ or ‘community forestry’. Regarded by the government as a development strategy for the Philippine uplands, community forestry currently has the avowed central objectives of democratising forest resource access, alleviating rural poverty, and the sustainable use of forest resources. These objectives have their direct parallel in the broader issues of ecologically sustainable development.

Despite the high expectations of the potential benefits of community forestry on the part of both the government and non-government sectors, its practicability on the ground is unclear. This will be the focus of discussion from Chapters Five to
Seven. Before beginning this discussion, the next chapter examines the theoretical issues relating to the instruments of practice in community forestry, and discusses the research propositions which are being put forward in this study.

1 For details about these congresses, please refer to: Proceedings of the 5th World Forestry Congress held in USA in 1960; Proceedings of the 6th World Forestry Congress held in Spain in 1966, and proceedings of the 7th World Forestry Congress held in Argentina in 1972.

2 For a short description of the major implications of the 5th, 6th and 7th World Forestry Congresses in promoting the role of forest industry in economic development, please refer to Kengen (1987:10-17).

3 Aside from Westoby’s seminal paper itself, an example of this translation was a background document presented by FAO during the 6th World Forestry Congress held in Spain in 1966. The document, Wood: World Trends and Prospects, described the potential of the large tracts of forest resources in the underdeveloped countries in supporting the expanding timber industries in all regions of the world. The document also emphasised the role of the developed countries and the international agencies in facilitating the exploitation of the forest resources in the less developed countries to promote economic growth in these areas and, consequently, development.

4 The UN General Assembly declared the decade of 1960-1970 to be the “First Development Decade”. The Assembly established that underdeveloped countries should formulate policies aimed at attaining a 6 per cent or more growth rate measured through Gross National Product. This would have to be achieved through massive industrialisation. The assumption was that those countries that reached this target would be well on their way to development, and economic growth would trickle-down to the entire population.

5 For an exposition of this critique, please refer to Douglas (1983): A Reappraisal of Forestry Development in Developing Countries.

6 Westoby’s shift in perspective on the role of forestry in development is best conveyed in his excellent article, Forest Industries for Socio-economic Development, delivered during the Eighth World Forestry Congress in Jakarta in 1978.

7 This report — written by Hollis Chenery, Montek S. Ahluwalia, C.L.G. Bell, John H. Doloy and Richard Dolly — is based on a joint study conducted by the World Bank’s Development Research Center and the Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex.

8 The basic needs approach was taken up and widely publicised by the Program of Action of the 1976 World Employment Conference (Bartelmus, 1994:6). The clarification of basic needs issues and formulation action program was done by ILO which led to several publications the more popular ones of which are The Basic Needs Approach to Development (Gai et al., 1977); and Growth and Basic Needs: A One-World Problem, both published in 1977.

9 Discussion of these new development strategies is outside the scope of this study. For some discussion about these strategies and the basic needs approach, please refer to: Ghai et al. (1987); ILO (1977); Srinivasan (1977); Streeten and Burki (1978); Streeten (1979).

10 For detailed discussion on the factors contributing to the emergence of community forestry, please refer to: FAO (1978); Gregersen and McGaughey (1987); Foley and Barnard (1984);
Eckholm (1979); Gregersen, Draper and Elz (1989); Gilmour and Fisher (1991); Rebugio et al. (1987); Kirchofer and Mercer (1986); and Arnold (1991).

11 For a collection of definitions of community forestry and related concepts refer to DSF (1985).

12 Some of the more prominent advocates of these ideologies are David Korten of the People-Centered Development Forum and Robert Chambers of the University of Sussex, Brighton, England.

13 For discussion on the potentials of community forestry, please refer to: FAO (1978, 1983 and 1984); Proceedings of the Eighth World Forestry Congress (1978); Eckholm (1979); Kirchofer and Mercer (1984); Wiersum (n.d.); Pulhin (1985a,b); Griffin (1988); Ohlsson and Byron (1988); Gregersen and McGaughey (1987); Gregersen et al. (1989); Gilmour and Fisher (1991); and Foley and Barnard (1984).

14 The most influential contributions in this regard include: Korten (1981); Chambers (1983); Korten and Alfonso (1983); Korten and Klauss (1984); Korten (1986); and Cernea (1991a).

15 Gilmour and Fisher (1991) termed this approach the ‘community forestry paradigm’. Similar approaches seem to be advocated by a number of authors: Leslie (1987); Poffenberger (1990); Cernea (1991a, 1992); and Colchester (1994).

16 For a detailed exposition by Leslie, please refer to the introductory quotation of this Chapter.

17 For detailed discussion on the relationship of fuelwood shortage and the potential of community forestry to meet this shortage, please refer to the influential works of Eckholm (1975, 1979); and the relevant works of Arnold and Jongma (1978) and FAO (1978).

18 Some of this literature includes: Carson, 1965); (Lorraine, 1972); and (Mesarovic and Pestel, 1974).

19 After the first presentation of the book at a Smithsonian Institute press gathering in 1972, 9 million copies have been published in 29 languages, hundreds of reviews and a decade of citations (Porter, 1993). The use of a seemingly objective computerised global model by Meadows and colleagues must have provoked the widespread attention to their report compared to the other relevant literature during the period. The report posed a challenge towards a socially equitable, economically stable, and ecologically sustainable future through technocratic envisioning and management (Porter, 1993). Management of the global future was to be done through “global equilibrium” policies (Meadows et al., 1972:24) — stabilising population and industry, increasing resource efficiency, controlling population growth, diverting capital to food production and allocating agricultural capital to make soil enrichment and preservation a high priority, and increasing the average lifetime of industrial capital through better design and less obsolescence. For an excellent review of Limits to Growth (Meadows et al. 1972) and its sequel, Beyond the Limits (Meadows et al. 1992) please refer to Porter (1993).

20 I am aware that WCED’s concept of economic efficiency also relates to a “new era of economic growth” (WCED, 1987:xiii) which has been widely criticised as purely “conventional developmentalism” (Ekins, 1992:81). This aspect of economic efficiency has been the subject of other investigation (see for instance de la Court, 1990; and Ekins, 1992) and is outside the boundaries of this study.

21 Regalian Doctrine is a legal myth which had its colonial roots when Ferdinand Magellan “discovered” the Philippines in 1521 and planted the Spanish flag in Mactan Island. It presumed that all land belong to the Spanish Crown unless a royal grant described in official documentation recognised contrary property rights. Through the Regalian Doctrine, the indigenous occupants of the unexplored archipelago were converted into squatters. Despite the
Philippine independence from the Spaniards and the Americans, it remained the ‘theoretical bedrock’ upon which the Philippine national laws were based. For detailed exposition of the Regalian Doctrine, please refer to the pathbreaking works of Lynch, (1984, 1986).

22 *Kaingin* making is a traditional form of upland farming system which involves the clearing of forests area through slashing and burning, then cultivating it for one to three cropping terms. The soil is then left to rest, for several years, which is called the fallow period. During this time, the farmer shift to another area repeating the process. The old farm is again cultivated after the fallow period. However, with reduced are available, for cultivation along with population growth, there is a corresponding deduction in the length of the fallow period rendering *kaingin* making less sustainable.

23 According to Tucker (1983), this recruitment of American foresters to train the local people was done despite the fact that the former had virtually no knowledge or experience of tropical forest management.

24 In an insightful analysis on the effects of scientific forestry, Tucker (1992: 105) noted:

> Under the colonial “scientific” forestry, non-timber forest products were usually relegated to the periphery management systems. Most products of tropical and subtropical forests, which had been harvested and consumed for centuries before the advent of colonial forestry, came to be called “minor forest products” from the time colonial forestry began to evolve in Asia in the mid-nineteenth century. But they were minor only in reference to timber markets and monetisation of the forest. They were vitally important to both the biological character of the forest ecosystems and the cultures of the forest peoples. Indeed, the forests and their cultures were inseparable; their inexorable disruption was a single, double-faceted phenomenon.

25 Worcester (1914:860) himself believed that the practice of indigenous systems was confined only to the Igorots of Lipanto and Bontocs.

26 A useful historical perspective on this issue is provided by Pflueger, (1930) and Tucker, (1992).

27 For a complete list of these policies starting with the Spanish time to mid 1970s, please refer to Aquino, del Castillo and Payuan (1987:7-9).

28 For detailed discussion on the link between the forestry sector and the macro-economic policy of the Philippines, please refer to Quintos (1989).

29 Please refer to the last column of table 2.2 for detailed information about the rate of under-reporting.

30 This policy was stipulated in Section 32 of Presidential Decree No. 705 otherwise known as the *Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines* which states that “the entire production of logs by all timber licensees shall, beginning January 1, 1976, be processed locally. PD 705 was issued on 19 May 1975


32 An example of this cultural disintegration is the increasing materialistic tendency of the tribal groups upon exposure to the life of the lowlanders. In some parts of Mindoro Island, for instance, some members of the Mangyan tribes worked for illegal loggers to earn money for drinking and gambling, something which was alien to the Mangyan culture.
For instance, Porter and Ganapin (1988:24) cited a study of watershed management by UN organisations in 1982 which reported that flooding in the typhoon belt (from Northern Luzon to Southern Samar) had “increased greatly” due to watershed degradation.

The study was conducted by the International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) for the International Tropical Timber Organisation, the purpose of which was to examine the management of natural forest for the sustainable production of timber within the producer countries of ITTO. The study resulted in the publication of the book, No Timber Without Trees: Sustainability in the Tropical Forest authored by Poore et al. (1989).

For detailed description of ISFP and the three major programs it consolidated, please refer to: FDC (1985); and Pulhin (1987); Agaloos (1990); and Payuan (1983). Please also refer to Makil (1982) and Aquino, del Castillo and Payuan (1987); for comprehensive and excellent historical analyses on the evolution of ISFP starting the Spanish period.

Chapters 2 and 3 of Development Debacle by Bello, Kinley and Bielski (1982:12-39; 67-99) and the concluding chapter of David Wurfel’s Filipino Politics: Development and Decay (1988: 325-346) provides an excellent background and analysis about the Philippines rural development as a counterinsurgency strategy during the Marcos administration. Kerkvliet (1995) also provides an interesting discussion on the highly volatile political condition in the Philippine countryside from 1970s to the 1980s.

In 1978, when I conducted fieldwork for my Master’s thesis on social forestry in Mindoro and Quezon, I had to request clearance from the local military officials before I could enter the project sites since most of these areas were ‘NPA infested’. Some of the project areas were also abandoned by the local residents because of insurgency problems.

Personal interview with Father Balweg in 1986 in Cordillera, Philippines.

An exemption of these are those tribal areas issued with Community Forest Stewardship Agreement (CFSA) which could include a considerable portion of forest vegetation. However, CFSA prohibit timber extraction in these areas.

Based on personal interview with Palawan upland communities in 1987.

These administrative policies are: Department of Environment and Natural Resources Administrative Order No. 123, Series of 1989; and No. 22, Series of 1993.

One of the ten principles — a systems-oriented and integrated approach in the analysis and solution of development problems — can be categorised under all the three intentions, hence is not included in the list.


See for instance, Vitug (1993a).
CHAPTER THREE
COMMUNITY FORESTRY IN THE CONTEXT OF RATIONALITY

The Western concept of community forestry arose in the 1970s from a background of commercial forestry and a widespread sense of environmental crisis. As part of the “solution” to this crisis, community forestry, like commercial forestry, has tended to reduce the political dimension of environmental degradation to a technical problem.

Sabine Häusler
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3.1 Introduction

Chapter One asserts that the achievement (or non-achievement) of the three core objectives of the Philippines’ community forestry can be analysed in terms of three perspectives: the political economy, the characteristics of practice, and the rationalisation thesis. Chapter Two focuses on the genealogy of community forestry but also alludes to the first two perspectives. The counterinsurgency motive behind early community forestry projects illustrates one aspect of political economy. The poor contribution these projects have made to the economic welfare of the upland communities implies poor practice. This chapter provides a theoretical background for the third perspective: the rationalisation thesis. It also discusses relevant issues concerning the practice of community forestry and the four related propositions being put forward in this study.

The practice of community forestry in the Philippines conforms with the country’s evolving political system, that is, the movement from the pre-1986 dictatorial period to an emerging democratic and decentralised state. As noted in Chapter Two, the direction of forest management in the country has shifted from ‘state-controlled’ forestry, prior to 1986, towards a more decentralised community
forest management. The implications of this in addressing the three central concerns of community forestry can be analysed in terms of the rationalisation thesis.

Over the years there has been a similar shift in the rationalisation thinking, from Max Weber’s emphasis on direct bureaucratisation of life and centralising control to Rose and Miller’s (1992) argument about governance from a distance. Weber’s view of rationalisation coincides with the top-down, centralist and technocratic approach to development, while that of Rose and Miller can be associated to a certain degree, with the bottom-up, decentralised and participatory approach. The rationalisation thesis suggests that even with the apparent shift to a bottom-up, decentralised and participatory approach, there are certain tendencies within the instruments that are being applied, which are apt to reinforce the old character of technocracy and centralism. This contributes to some paradoxical effects in practice.

Following this introduction, the next section covers the background of the rationalisation thesis and briefly relates it to community forestry considering the changing structure of governance in the Philippines. Section three discusses the different techniques and approaches in the practise of community forestry and the various institutional mechanisms that employ them. Section four analyses development projects as institutional frames within which the several instruments of practice are used to articulate policies to achieve the three central objectives at the local level. Section five discusses four related research propositions in this study which are drawn from the genealogy of community forestry presented in Chapter Two and the background of the rationalisation thesis. Section six provides the chapter summary.

### 3.2 Rationalisation and Community Forestry

Scant attention has been given to the rationalisation theory as an analytical tool with which to explore recent debates on sustainable development, particularly in forestry.\(^1\) This is despite Weber’s (1948:26) claim that rationalisation have “existed in various
departments of life and in all areas of culture”. It has inexorable influence in the
development of the society and individuals from the administration of the state to the
‘government of the soul’ (Rose, 1989). In this section I provide a brief overview of
the rationalisation theory. My discussion is confined to those features that provide
explanations to contemporary practice with regard to community forestry in the
Philippines. Of particular relevance is the shift in rationalisation thinking from
Weber’s direct bureaucratisation of life and centralising control to the recent works
of Rose and Miller (1992) on governance from a distance.² I then relate the idea of
rationalisation to the changing structure of governance in the Philippines and its
implications for the management of the country’s forest resources.

3.2.1 Overview of the Rationalisation Theory

The idea of rationality can be traced as far back as the early seventeenth century.
Rationality is embedded in the works of Francis Bacon and René Descartes,
concerning a grand vision to dominate nature as well as human affairs through the
role of instrumental reason (Rich, 1994:207). The Enlightenment thinkers of the
eighteenth century such as Voltaire, Montesquieu, Diderot and Kant also wrote
about the embodiment of reason in social institutions and practices — particularly the
rationality of the modern Western social order. They argued that the “force of
reason would promote freedom and liberate humanity from the ‘yoke of traditional
authority’” (Porter, 1985:53). What makes Weber’s work more relevant today than
that of the earlier thinkers is his ambivalence over the idea of ‘progress’ — the
lodestar of Western rationality. As elaborated by Brubaker (1984:3):

Today, however, we are inclined to regard pre-Weberian discussions
of the rationality of modern society as empirically oversimplified or
morally overoptimistic — as implausible descriptions or naïve
celebrations of ‘progress’ in which we no longer believe. Weber’s
conception of rationality and rationalisation on the other hand, speak
directly to our experience — and our anxieties — in ‘a world
increasingly shaped by scientists, industrialists and bureaucrats
(Levine, 1981:5).
If we find Weber’s discussion of rationality challenging and evocative today, more than sixty years after his death, this is above all because of the marked ambivalence of his attitude toward western rationalism. Weber breaks decisively with the ‘optimistic faith [of the Enlightenment] in the theoretical and practical rationalisability of reality (Weber, 1949:85).

3.2.1.1 Weber and Onward: Early Rationalisation Thesis

Rationalisation constitutes the substance of Weber’s work. Of central importance was his distinction between two types of rationality: formal and substantive. Formal rationality “refers primarily to the calculability of means and procedures” (Brubaker, 1984:36ff; emphasis original) to achieve given ends regardless of their value or significance. A purely formal rationality allows for the maximum calculability of action, that can be oriented to an infinite variety of substantive ends, such as economics, science and technology, and the modern legal and administrative system. In bureaucratic administration the emphasis on impersonality, efficiency, and specialised technical expertise evinces this type of rationality. Bureaucracy, therefore, represents the ‘purest’ institutional embodiment of formal rationality. On the other hand, substantive rationality refers “primarily (from some explicitly defined standpoint) to the value of ends or results” or “rationality from the point of view of some particular substantive end, belief or value commitment” (Brubaker, 1984:36; emphasis original). As a value-rational action, substantive rationality refers to “traditional forms of authority, like social status, ethical absolutes or politics in the classical sense” (Porter, 1985:56).

Weber argued that modern industrial capitalism, formal law, and bureaucratic administration increasingly supplanted the traditional forms of life basic to substantive rationality. Thus, there is an irreconcilable tension between formal and substantive rationality. This tension can be interpreted in terms of conflicting values. Formal rationality infers calculability, efficiency, and impersonality; while substantive rationality, fraternity, equality and charity or brotherly love (Brubaker, 1984:42ff). The tension can also be construed as a social tension between competing interests.
and the groups that bear these interests. For instance, in a capitalist society, maximum formal rationality favours economically powerful groups with monopolistic price-setting powers. Similarly, in development practice, such as in community or agroforestry projects, maximum formal rationality is likely to favour land owners who have the resources to respond well to project intervention.

Specifically, the tension between the two forms of rationality is implicit in Weber’s comprehensive analyses of the different dimensions of modern life: industrial capitalism, formal law, bureaucratic administration, and asceticism and ethics. While each has unique features of rationalisation (and, by implication, unique forms of tension), certain unifying themes can be identified in his analyses of these dimensions that illustrate this tension. Three of these themes relate to the present study: 1) knowledge, 2) impersonality, and 3) centralising control (Brubaker, 1984).

The first theme is that of knowledge, particularly scientific knowledge. The rise of systematic empirical science and of scientific technology in the Western society engenders scientific knowledge as the universal basis for rational action. This has led to the displacement of the magical and religious views by the scientific view — a process referred to by Weber as the ‘disenchantment of the world’ (Weber, 1948). The scientific view advances the belief that humans and nature can be manipulated and controlled towards desired ends through technical means and calculations. As humans are reduced to calculating machines, disenchantment erodes the belief that the world has discoverable meaning. In the process, this destroys the “more congenial, spontaneous, egalitarian, and intrinsically meaningful aspects of human association” (Dryzek, 1990:4) with fellow human beings and nature.

The calculating man who produces scientific knowledge has to engage in the ‘simplification’ of complex reality to promote predictability and control. This requires the ‘tunnelling of vision’ (Scott, 1993:1), that is, only those aspects of reality which are quantifiable are given major importance and entered into the scientist’s calculus. Reality is reduced to a few ‘variables’ which promote prediction, and a sense of certainty towards a desired outcome. In the same manner, the values of nature, for example forests, are reduced to those which are measurable and would
serve the interests of the calculating man. The implication of this in development practice is obvious. Human and natural diversity is stripped and homogenised to allow its manipulation towards a pre-determined outcome. Consequently, the homogenised situation favoured an interventionist approach to efficiently produce the desired result.

The second theme on impersonality relates to the concept of reification — an important legacy of the German intellectual tradition to modern social thought (Mitzman, 1970:4). Contemporary expressions of this concept are ‘objectification’ and ‘depersonalisation’. Berger and Pullberg (1965:200) defined reification as “the moment in the process of alienation in which the characteristic of thing-hood becomes the standard of objective reality”. In Weber’s portrayal of bureaucratic administration, reification is reflected in formal and abstract rules and the emphasis placed on “impersonal and functional purposes” (Weber, 1978:225). Bureaucratic officials act in a “spirit of formalistic impersonality ... without hatred or fashion and, hence, without affection and enthusiasm” (Weber, 1978:959). Purely personal and emotional elements, such as love and hatred, are treated as ‘irrational’ and require complete elimination from the official business. The more rational a bureaucratic organisation becomes, the more the individual bureaucrat is reduced to a “small cog in a ceaselessly moving mechanism which prescribes to him an essentially fixed route of march” (Weber, 1978:988). Bureaucratic organisation approximates a technically efficient machine while individual freedom and creativity are curtailed.

The third unifying theme is control — over material objects and other human beings. Rational control over social and natural processes allows for the improvement in material well-being. Yet it also makes possible the development of increasingly sophisticated techniques that have tendencies towards “political, social, educational, and propagandistic manipulation and domination” (Weber, 1949:35). In the political domain, for instance, “forms of state” can be treated as “techniques like any other machinery” (Mayer, 1956:76). This legitimises the state’s exercise of power as a technical instrument for the attainment of its goal. For instance, Weber (1949:47) argued that
... it is possible to defend quite meaningfully the view that the power of the state should be increased in order to strengthen its power to eliminate obstacles, while maintaining that the state itself has no intrinsic value, that it is purely a technical instrument for the realisation of its value (emphasis added).

The use of different techniques and approaches promotes calculability and, hence, a sense of certainty towards a desired outcome. Calculability of outcome, in turn, requires the centralisation of control. In economic activity, performance of factors of production is assured through the monopolisation of control by the entrepreneurs, that is, individual workers are ‘expropriated’ from the ownership of the means of production (Weber, 1978:137). Weber saw this not in the context of Marx’s capitalism, but as part of a much broader process of rationalisation that he subsumed under the notion of bureaucratisation. Centralisation of control is “conditioned partly by the nature of modern technology, which was typically too large, expensive, or sophisticated to be controlled by the individual worker, and partly by the greater efficiency of centrally organised activity” (Brubaker, 1984:13).

Bureaucratisation of life and centralisation of control are two allied concepts central to Weber’s work on rationalisation. For Weber, rationalisation is a powerful engine that propels modern society towards technocracy and centralism. A purely formal type of rationality conjures up a clean and orderly society where modern science, technology and economics — centrally controlled by the state — can flourish (Dryzek, 1990:4). Still, it also increases man’s chances to be “imprisoned in an iron cage of his own making” (Coser, 1971:233). This dilemma, popularly known as the ‘iron cage metaphor’, summarises the essence of Weber’s rationalisation thesis. It continues to be the subject of analysis among scholars interested in determining the meaning of the modern ‘rational’ world to humanity.4

Interest in the subject of rationalisation was sustained from Weber onwards through the critical theorists in the 1930s and the 1940s. These theorists — the more prominent of whom were Herbert Marcuse and Jürgen Habermas — expanded Weber’s work to other aspects of human life.5 In general, the dehumanising effects of the continued invasion of instrumental reason into human affairs persisted as a challenge for these theorists. Weber’s idea of centralising
control, especially the expanding role of the State, was also further developed — particularly in Habermas’ work.

Habermas, in his first major translated work, *Towards a Rational Society* (1970), documented the increasing interdependence of science, technology, and industry, and the State and society in the nineteenth century. Social and political stability were to be maintained in order to address economic crises and promote economic advancement. Expansion and increasing intervention of the State were required through the greater involvement of technicians and administrators in social and economic affairs (Porter, 1985:59-60). As a result, actions of the State were no longer publicly seen as political interventions but necessary technical reactions to efficiently manage an orderly economy and to sustain economic growth. In other words, the State’s function was depoliticised — its centralising control became purely a technical issue — resulting in impoverishment of substantive debate. Purely formal values, such as calculability, efficiency and impersonality, came to dominate in the decision making process concerning the State’s affairs. By implication, the state’s centralising control was not only legitimised but also expanded and reinforced.

3.2.1.2 Rose and Miller: Rationalisation in the Contemporary Context

A recent shift in rationalisation thinking is manifested in the work of Rose and Miller in the area of governance. Drawing from the work of Michel Foucault (e.g. 1991:87-104) on ‘governmentality’ and Bruno Latour’s concept of ‘action at a distance’ (Latour, 1987), they advance a new conception of rationality by analysing primarily British society in the 1960s and 1970s. Contrary to the earlier rationalisation thesis, Rose and Miller argue that rationality (whether in the realm of politics or economics) is exercised not by centralising control — as in Weber’s bureaucracy — but through a diversity of regulatory mechanisms that facilitate governance from a distance (Rose and Miller, 1990, 1992).

Rose and Miller’s new conception of rationality is linked to their modern interpretation of the State and political power in advanced liberal democratic
societies. They reject the notion of the modern nation-state as a “centralised set of institutions and personnel wielding authoritative power over a nation” (Rose and Miller, 1992:176). Similarly, they dispute the contention of other analysts who treat states as “unified actors that rule domestically” (Rose and Miller, 1992:178). To the extent that the modern government ‘rules’, they argue that it does so “through a multitude of agencies and techniques some of which are only loosely connected with the executives and bureaucracies of the formal organs of the state” (Rose and Miller, 1990:1). They elaborate:

To understand modern forms of rule, we suggest, requires an investigation not merely of grand political schema, or economic ambitions, nor even of general slogans such as ‘state control’, nationalisation, the market and the like, but of apparently humble and mundane mechanisms which appear to make it possible to govern: techniques of notation, computation and calculation; procedures of examination and assessment; the invention of devices such as surveys and presentational forms such as tables; the standardisation of systems for training and the inculcation for habits; the inauguration of professional specialisms and vocabularies; building design and architectural forms - the list is heterogeneous and is, in principle, unlimited (Rose and Miller, 1990:8; emphasis added).

Rose and Miller (1990, 1992) refer to the above humble and mundane mechanisms (regulatory mechanisms) as governmental technologies. Through these technologies, political rationalities and the government programmes they articulate become capable of deployment. The idea of ‘deployment’ in this case does not connote a direct extension of control from the seat of power to the subjects of these programmes. Neither does it imply a ‘totally administered’ programming of the State. Governmental technologies enable the authorities to “act upon, and enrol those distant from them in space and time in the pursuit of social, political or economic objectives without encroaching on their ‘freedom’ or ‘autonomy’” (Rose and Miller, 1992:187). In other words, these technologies operate by enabling and shaping the self-regulating capacities of the subjects so that they will be aligned with the objectives of the authorities (Martin, 1995: in press).

Unlike the earlier conception of rationality, domination is not an issue in Rose and Miller’s modern conception of political rationality. On the contrary, this type of
rationality provides a sense of ‘regulated freedom’ that encourages the ‘participation’ of its subjects in their own governance. Similar to Weber’s concept, however, the roles of knowledge and expertise remain significant, except that they operate differently in the contemporary context. Whereas previously, knowledge and expertise were centralised for the purpose of bureaucratic efficiency, they are now part of the mundane mechanisms that facilitate the shaping and utilisation of the self-regulating capacities of the subjects (Rose, 1993:295-296). Consequently, far from providing full autonomy to its subjects, this new form of political rationality increases the potential to ‘rule’.

However, governing the subjects from a distance with the aid of different ‘technologies’ is difficult to put into operation. Unexpected problems associated with these technologies, unplanned outcomes, unruly reality, and other related problems, render governance unprogrammable in the manner prescribed. As Rose and Miller (1992:11) concluded: “The ‘will to govern’ needs to be understood less in terms of its success than in terms of the difficulties of operationalising it”.

3.2.2 Rationalisation, Philippine Governance and Community Forestry

The institutions of governance in the Philippines followed a consistent pattern of centralisation and expansion from the colonial period to the pre-1986 Marcos dictatorship. This was reversed starting from the Aquino period and culminated with the enactment of the 1991 Local Government Code (LGC). LGC is considered a “significant turning point” in the decentralisation and devolution of government powers (Magno, A., 1993:14) and has been described as ‘one of the most radical piece of legislation passed in recent years’ (Brillantes, 1994:575). It promises to enhance the autonomy of local government units (LGUs), institutionalise participation of popular organisations in local governance, and to diminish the role of the national executive office in governance (Magno A.,1993:15).

The centralisation and control of political power during the Marcos martial law period is commonly seen as a political move to perpetuate his political dominance (Wurfel, 1988:114-153; Hutchcroft, 1991; Rivera, 1994). Yet it can
also be justified as a Weberian approach to address the political and economic crises that prevailed during the period (Bello, Kinley and Elinson, 1982:39; Hawes, 1987:13-40). For Marcos, martial law was ‘morally and politically necessary’ — a legal tool to ‘totally administer’ and order the country’s chaotic socio-economic and political situation, through the centralisation of political power. Marcos wrote in 1973:

I believe that we in the Philippines have developed a new idea of a reform government under martial law. We are using martial law not only to restore civil order. We are using it as a legal means to bring about badly needed and drastic reforms in our country. I believe that other democracies — especially in the poor countries — can use martial law in the same way (Cf. National Media Production Center, 1980:297).

Marcos’ thesis was based on the argument that substantive values such as freedom, had to be traded off against order and economic prosperity. The country must choose one or the other. Having chosen the latter, the centralisation of power was seen as a prerequisite for implementing political and economic reform. Centralisation, it was hoped, would make the administration of the society — including the different development strategies — more efficient and effective. Based on this perspective, centralisation was a rational approach to make the state more responsive to the political and economic needs of its citizenry.

The emerging democratic and decentralised form of governance in the Philippines, on the other hand, can be interpreted along Rose and Miller’s concept of governance from a distance. Decentralisation can be seen as a rational approach of the state to involve local people in their own governance through the different instruments of ‘ruling’. These ‘instruments’ may range from the government administrative machinery that allows the transfer of authority, responsibilities and rights to LGUs to mundane planning techniques that enable the local barangays to prepare their own development plans. For instance, as the barangay people develop the capability to plan through certain planning techniques, there is the tendency for their aspirations to be shaped and aligned to the priorities of the government which retains the decision as to what project to fund. Thus, far from
facilitating full local autonomy, decentralisation may increase the potential for the
political rationalities of the state authorities to be incorporated into the daily lives of
the people.

The management of the country’s forest resources conforms with the
emerging democratic and decentralised structure of governance in the Philippines. In
the area of resource democratisation, the traditional ‘state-controlled’ or centrally
managed forestry has shifted to a decentralised approach of ‘returning the forest to
the people’ through the issuance of resource access instruments. Similarly,
‘participatory’ techniques and approaches have gained widespread application and
are now acknowledged as more responsive to the ‘needs’ of the upland communities
compared to the typical technocratic and centralist approach of conventional forestry
projects. Moreover, technical knowledge such as sustained-yield forestry — an
expertise once exclusive to foresters — is now being imparted to the upland people
to promote the sustainability of the local forest resources. In summary, community
forestry is seen as a rational approach to employing the different \textit{instruments of
practice} in a given project — through the local people’s involvement — to address
the three core concerns.

3.3 Instruments of Practice in Community Forestry

Over the last decade, there has been increasing interest in the development,
refinement, and application of the different instruments of practice in community
forestry. In this study, instruments of practice are loosely defined as a combination
of various techniques and approaches and institutional mechanisms, that have the
potential to promote the three core policy objectives of community forestry. The
techniques and approaches include democratising techniques (i.e. resource access
instruments); rural appraisal and planning techniques or approaches (i.e. RRA, and
SEDP) and forest management approaches (i.e. sustained-yield forestry). On the
other hand, the institutional mechanisms cover a vast domain of institutions or
organisations extending from international agencies to a panoply of small NGOs and
POs at the local level. While these instruments are the focus of discussion in Chapters Five to Seven, I present a brief survey here. My intention is not to identify all the different instruments of practice in community forestry, only those which are salient in the promotion of the three core aims.

### 3.3.1 Techniques and Approaches of Practice

Since the colonial period, forest policies in the Philippines — as in most developing countries — have been implemented using the techniques of scientific forestry. Scientific forestry had its origins largely in Prussia and Saxony from about 1765 to 1800 (Lowood, 1990). Its emergence was associated with the state’s primary concern to ensure a continuous supply of wood to generate revenue and, later, to include ecological purposes. The idea of scientific forestry, however, had deeper philosophical roots. It was anchored in the European rationality that nature, including forests, could be manipulated and controlled to promote the advancement of human welfare (Lowood, 1990:341). Using the tools of mathematics — and in the favourable atmosphere of the ‘quantifying spirit in the 18th century’ (Frängsmyr, Heilbron, and Rider, 1990) — forestry evolved as a science primarily concerned with the measurement, manipulation, and regulation, of selected tree species. From Germany, the idea travelled to the United States and later was transmitted to developing countries including the Philippines (Clawson and Sedjo, 1984:3).

Two characteristics associated with scientific forestry are relevant to the present discussion. First, scientific forestry instituted the ‘simplification’ of the otherwise complex natural forests into ‘commercial wood’ (Scott, 1993:1-2). This involved the manipulation and regulation of the forest to allow management of the few favoured commercial trees on a sustainable basis so as to ensure future timber supplies. This approach, widely known as ‘sustained-yield forestry’, is the concrete embodiment of scientific forestry. Through sustained-yield forestry, the natural forest, with its vast number of uses, was simplified into ‘abstract’ trees representing cubic metres of saleable timber and so many cords of firewood fetching a certain
price. Other forest products — equally, if not more beneficial to the local people — were set aside since they did not feature in market transactions and therefore did not contribute revenue to the state (Repetto, 1988:12). Also left out were the diverse flora and fauna that characterised the tropical forests. The cultural values attributed to the forests by indigenous inhabitants were also overlooked in the simplification process.

Second, scientific forestry vested forest management in technically trained foresters, and the task of forest protection in state-appointed forest wardens and officers. With the state’s legitimising role to promote the welfare of society through the wise use of its forest resources, it was rational from a management point of view to place the forests under its control. The scientific credo of forest conservation, “to promote the greatest good for the greatest number of people for the longest possible time” (Dana and Fairfax, 1980:72), provided the ethical justification and legitimacy for the state-controlled, or centralised forest management (Peluso, 1992:7-8). Embedded in this conservation credo was the notion that local people posed a threat to forests and were culprits in forest destruction. Thus they were excluded from legal access to the forests — and hence their benefits — by the boundaries of forest laws.

Under the present Philippine community forestry model, the government hands over the responsibilities of forest management and protection to upland communities in exchange for certain access rights. The recent community forestry slogan of ‘returning the forests to the people’ is symbolic of the government’s recognition of these rights that were seized by the state from indigenous communities during the Spanish period. These access rights to forest benefits are now being ‘returned’ to upland communities (both indigenous and migrants) using resource access instruments. Resource access instruments are legal agreements between the government and the upland communities (individuals or groups) regarding the management of a given forest land. They entitle their recipients to enjoy certain forest benefits in exchange for compliance with government-defined responsibilities in forest management and protection. In Chapter Five, my focus is on the use of
resource access instruments as a technique for promoting the core policy concern of democratising access to forest benefits. Appendix 1 provides a description of these instruments.

However, the emergence of community forestry did not seem to displace but rather to perpetuate the simplified ‘commercial wood-orientation’ characteristic of scientific forest management. From the point of view of the Philippine government, the central concern of community forestry remains the promotion of sustained-yield of selected commercial trees in the name of ensuring the country’s timber supply. (DENR, 1990a). If ever other forest products such as rattan, are considered, it is because they have a market value, hence generating government revenue in the form of forest charges and taxes.

The handing over of forest management and protection responsibilities to upland communities (under community forestry) is tied to technical knowledge. This is done through social preparation techniques such as community organising; an expertise said to be the special competence of NGOs. Under the present community forestry, NGOs are contracted by the government to build the capability of local people in forest management. Through community organising, NGOs ‘prepare’ the local people technically and socially to manage a given forest land on a sustainable basis. Central to this is the application of the principles of sustained-yield forestry in a given forest area. Chapter Seven explores how sustained-yield forestry — a technical instrument applied to promote the policy concern with forest sustainability — has the tendency to produce a paradoxical effect.

The policy on poverty alleviation also involves the use of various techniques to facilitate implementation. These include appraisal and planning techniques which are characteristic of project practices and have become part of the rituals of project design and implementation (Porter, Allen, and Thompson, 1991). Among the appraisal techniques, RRA has, for the last decade, gained prominence in community forestry projects. Similarly, ‘participatory’ planning methods, like the SEDP, are increasingly being applied to promote the participation of the local people in project planning and implementation. Together with project-initiated livelihood strategies,
these techniques and methods serve as instruments to alleviate poverty in community forestry projects and are the focus of Chapter Six.

3.3.2 Institutional Instruments

The production and application of the above techniques are facilitated by different institutional mechanisms. Three levels of institutions — international, national and local — are directly involved in the design and application of the different instruments to achieve the three central aims of community forestry.

3.3.2.1 International Institutions

The international institutions include academic, research and development agencies. As indicated above, sustained-yield forestry — a popular approach in forest management — was developed in forestry schools in Germany before it spread to the United States and eventually to developing countries such as the Philippines. Similarly, the pioneering work on RRA started in the late 1970s in academic institutions such as the Institute of Development Studies at the University of Sussex and, in the 1980s, the University of Khon Kaen in Thailand (Chambers, 1994a). On the other hand, the refinement of RRA for the specific application to community forestry projects — including its worldwide dissemination — has been undertaken by the FAO.\textsuperscript{11}

Development agencies such as, the World Bank, institutionalise these techniques and approaches in development practice. A good example of this is the widely used economic technique called Cost-Benefit Analysis or CBA.\textsuperscript{12} Multilateral banks do not fund development projects unless they pass through the ritual of conducting a CBA. RRA and various ‘participatory’ planning methodologies have similarly been institutionalised in most international lending and development assistance organisations.
The use of such techniques provides these institutions with a sense of control over the outcomes of development investments (Porter, Allen, and Thompson, 1991:91-134). These techniques also aid the transformation of political issues into technically rational decisions that may provide legitimacy to project investments, even though such investments may be contestable. International development institutions such as the World Bank, have been accused of coopting these techniques and methods (e.g. participatory methods like Participatory Rural Appraisal) to advance politically motivated agenda and imperatives (Rahnema, 1992).

3.3.2.2 National Institutions

The Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) is the key national institution responsible for addressing the core concerns of community forestry. It is appointed by law to implement the policy of the state to “ensure the sustainable use, development, management, renewal, and conservation of the country’s forest” and “the equitable sharing of the benefits derived therefrom” (Republic of the Philippines, 1987a:2). Specifically, it has a mandate to formulate, implement, and supervise government policies, plans, and programs in forestry, of which community forestry plays an important part. To perform its institutional mandate, DENR is given the authority to ‘exercise supervision and control’ over all forest lands which by virtue of the Philippine Constitution are ‘owned by the State’ (Republic of the Philippines, 1987a:3; 1987b).

The DENR’s community forestry policy of ‘returning the forest to the people’ contradicts its institutional mandate of supervision and control. One way of addressing this contradiction is through the development and issuance of resource access instruments. The issuance of resource access instruments is meant to provide the local people with tenurial security to the lands they occupy or claim without relinquishing state-ownership over these lands. Since the launching of the first nationwide community forestry program in 1982, one of the main objectives of
DENR has been the development, issuance, and refinement of different resource access or tenure instruments.

The DENR through its field personnel, and in collaboration with NGOs and POs, also facilitates the application of other techniques and approaches in community forestry. Through the use of various ‘participatory’ techniques under the general rubric of ‘community organising’, upland dwellers are involved ‘in their own development’ by joining community forestry projects (Upland Development Program, 1989:1). In some instances, these techniques may be used to improve the antagonistic relationship between local communities and the DENR caused by its early punitive approach to forest management and non-recognition of ancestral rights. Viewed more optimistically, these techniques could perhaps enable local people to demand necessary reforms and support from the government and to hold it accountable for its action or non-action. This possibility is discussed in the last chapter.

Limited personnel and financial resources together with poor logistic support continue to constrain DENR field offices in effectively advancing the central aims of community forestry. This is despite the fact that under the Philippine Master Plan for Forestry Development, about 1.5 million ha of second growth forests are to be ‘handed over’ to the local communities for their management. The situation is exacerbated by the fact that in some upland areas DENR has an antagonistic relationship with the local people for various historical reasons. Some of these include: 1) the previous punitive approach of DENR in forest management that has led to the imprisonment, ejection or resettlement of upland people from the forest land they occupy; 2) non-recognition of ancestral land rights (FDC, 1987); and 3) the practice of graft and corruption by some DENR field personnel, especially during the logging years from the 1960s to the 1980s. Though these reasons are not fully documented in the literature, they are common knowledge in most upland areas. To facilitate the achievement of the central objectives, DENR solicits the support of other institutions such as the funding agencies, LGUs, NGOs and POs. This is in line with the spirit of decentralisation currently pursued by the national government.
Supportive of the government decentralisation thrust, the DENR central office has transferred some of its authority and responsibilities to more than 200 regional, provincial and community offices (Ramos, 1993:125). These include the issuance of resource access instruments to local communities covering forest areas up to 1,000 ha. Similarly, the DENR has devolved to the LGUs most of its ISF projects (DENR, 1992a). Moreover, it has encouraged the involvement of NGOs and POs in the implementation of its projects.

3.3.2.3 Local Level Institutions

Three kinds of institutions are involved in the application of the different techniques and approaches at the local level: NGOs, POs and LGUs.

a) Non-Government Organisations (NGOs):

NGOs have recently emerged as a key development institution in implementing community forestry. Limited human resources, a tarnished public image, and new opportunities for collaboration, are some of the reasons that have led DENR to tap the expertise of NGOs (Ganapin, 1989; del Castillo, 1992; Teves and Lewis, 1993). In a broader context, this initiative also supports the 1987 Constitutional mandate that ‘the state shall encourage non-government organisations, community-based or sectoral organisations that promote the welfare of the nation’ (Republic of the Philippines, 1987b: Article II, Section 23). It also matches perfectly with the recent priorities of international funding agencies to support NGOs activities in forestry.

International and local recognition of the contribution of NGOs in the forestry sector has led to the growing number of DENR’s programs and projects involving NGO participation (Ganapin, 1989; Korten, 1992; Taylor, 1992; Cabarle and Heiner, 1994). There is hardly any DENR people-oriented forestry program or project that does not include the participation of NGOs. The situation has induced the mushrooming of NGOs specialising in upland development issues over the past few years, including those whose main agenda is solely to make money (Upland
NGO Assistance Committee, 1991). Towards the end of 1991, close to 600 NGOs were accredited and included in the master list of the DENR’s NGO desk in Manila (del Castillo, 1992).

In the context of DENR’s programs, NGOs ‘refer to private, non-profit voluntary organisations committed to the task of socio-economic development and established primarily for service’ (DENR, 1992b:2). Included in this definition are cooperatives and POs organised for these purposes. As DENR has managed to involve NGOs in its programs and projects, so it has managed to prescribe the type of role it wishes NGOs to play. In community forestry, this role may yet be largely confined to assisting DENR in project implementation. For instance, under the *Revised Guidelines for Community Forestry Program*, NGOs are referred to simply as ‘assisting organisations’. They are ‘contracted by DENR to assist in training and organising local communities during the preparatory phase’ of program implementation’ (DENR, 1993:1). Similarly, NGOs in other community forestry projects function as contract organisations whose operations are bounded by the Terms of Reference defined by the DENR and funding agencies. In this case, the role of NGOs may be viewed as an extension arm of DENR. They become part of the institutional mechanisms that allow the DENR to govern at a distance.

Viewed positively, the role of NGOs as assisting organisations provides them with the ‘democratic space’ to enable local communities to control the management of forest resources for their own benefit. It also offers them a unique opportunity to significantly influence the current decentralisation efforts of the DENR towards forging a delivery system that is more responsive to the needs of the people. In summary, while the DENR-NGO collaboration provides possibilities for the cooption of NGOs, it also renders the DENR ‘penetrable’ as it opens up new opportunities for partnership, beneficial for local communities.

*b) People’s Organisations (POs):*

The 1987 Philippine Constitution defines POs as ‘bona fide associations of citizens with demonstrated capacity to promote the public interest and with identifiable
leadership, membership, and structure’ (Republic of the Philippines, 1987b:Article 13, Section 15). POs can be distinguished from NGOs in terms of their functions and composition. POs tend to represent ‘their members direct interests, have member-accountable leadership, and are substantially self-reliant’ (Korten, 1990:2) while ‘NGOs are usually called ‘intermediary’ or support groups normally composed mainly of professionals’ (Goertzen, 1991:20, Cf. Tigno, 1993:63).

The organisation of POs is generally one of the ‘prescribed’ outputs under the DENR community forestry projects. POs have to be officially registered before they can be issued with resource access instruments. Because their organisation is usually induced by certain official project requirements rather than a spontaneous response to certain issues, there is a tendency for them to disintegrate once the project terminates. Ganapin (1989:89) observed:

In all of the government’s social forestry programs it should be noted that no totally self-reliant upland community organisation has yet been developed. This is partly due to the difficulty of trying to meet the long-term social processes required to develop a solid community organisation while at the same time also initiating efforts to meet critical and immediate economic needs. The situation is also substantially due to the fact that many government forestry workers, though technically competent, are untrained in community organising. The problem is exacerbated by project designs that do not have strong community organising components and insist on inappropriate approaches or technologies.

The POs are in a unique position compared to other institutions. They serve as both employers and subjects of the different techniques and approaches in community forestry. However, their involvement in the application of these techniques and approaches places them in a more vulnerable position since they have to bear the consequences. As POs are involved in participatory planning, for instance, there is the possibility that their aspirations and interests will be shaped and aligned by the national agenda in forest management. Potentially, they may become instruments that primarily advances the forest management interests of the national government instead of articulating and promoting local interests.

On the other hand, the POs are also in a privileged position. As subjects, they are best able to judge which techniques can fully serve their cause. POs are
also in a position to resist in situation where the use of these instruments constricts rather than enables them to benefit from the local forest resources.

c) Local Government Units (LGUs):
The LGUs emerged as a key actor in community forest management with the enactment of the 1991 Philippine Local Government Code. Under this Code, the LGUs share with the DENR responsibility for the sustainable management and development of the country’s forest resources within their territorial jurisdiction. As indicated above, most of the of the DENR’s ISF projects are devolved to the LGUs. However, DENR retained all projects and activities wholly or partially funded from foreign sources (DENR, 1992a).

An emerging concern among some LGU officials is that the “devolved functions and responsibilities are not accompanied by adequate powers and authority” (Brillantes, 1993:18). In a 1993 study conducted by Brilliantes, a number of local officials argued that their responsibilities for planting trees and apprehending violators were not accompanied by the authority to issue permits to cut and transport forest products, nor to prosecute offenders. In cases of forest violations, LGUs can do the apprehending, but they have to leave the prosecution process to the DENR. Indeed, through the LGC, it appears that the DENR’s authority over the management of the country’s forest resources was retained if not reinforced. The Code states the devolved environment and natural resources services and facilities should be “pursuant to the national policies and subject to supervision, control and review of the DENR” (DENR, 1992a:1). Similarly, the DENR’s guidelines for its devolved functions indicate that it may “conduct investigation, and when necessary, cause the prosecution of erring parties in the implementation/enforcement of its devolved functions” (DENR, 1992a:9).

On the other hand, there is a concern among the municipal and provincial officers of the DENR about the general capabilities and absorptive capacities of the LGUs to adequately carry out the devolved functions. This is primarily due to the perceived lack of technical capabilities of LGUs in forest management (Brillantes,
1993:19). In conclusion, the current involvement of the LGUs in forest management may yet be seen as a conservative push in the devolution of management and control over forest resources.

### 3.4 Projects as Institutional Frames

Despite their known weaknesses\(^{16}\), projects are widely used, and are likely to remain as the main vehicle in development practice (Cernea, 1991a). For many observers, projects have become synonymous with development itself (Porter, Allen, and Thompson, 1991:95). In community forestry, projects are the basic means of translating the core policy objectives of democratising forest access, poverty alleviation, and forest sustainability, into action programs. They function as institutional frames within which the different instruments of practice are used to articulate policies and potentially achieve the three central aims at the local level.

In practice, implementing community forestry projects is described by Gilmour and Fisher, (1991:113ff) as a “perplexing task of dealing with a complex of biophysical and sociological systems”. They likened community forestry implementation to an amoeba which bulges out somewhere else every time it is poked, “but where, how or even if it will react is unclear”. Contrasting it with the ‘moderately’ predictable paradigm of technical forestry that allows for the control of some ‘extraneous elements’, they contend that in community forestry, “everything seems to be an extraneous element with unknown boundaries and effects” (Gilmour and Fisher, 1991:13).

The usual approach to managing the messy and turbulent world of community forestry practice is through institutional framing. This involves the identification and delineation of the ‘boundaries’ of the forest (geographic space) and the local communities (social space). Geographically, a given forest land is identified through field reconnaissance, delineated on the map, and designated as the project area. Correspondingly, the boundary of the social space is defined by identifying the upland communities who are to be the project participants and intended
beneficiaries. Thus, community forestry projects are represented in terms of the location and hectarage of forest land where intervention is to occur, as well as the number of intended beneficiaries, either individuals or families. For large-scale, foreign-assisted community forestry projects, boundary delineation and project representation are usually done by technical ‘experts’ in ‘consultation’ with the local people concerned.

Once identified and delineated, the geographic and social space become the subjects of detailed investigation. Physical, socio-economic and related information is gathered and, where possible, measured, quantified, and assessed, to serve as inputs to project formulation. Recently, the use of appraisal techniques, such as RRA, in community forestry allows for a quick and cost-effective generation of information with varying degrees of involvement from the local people. The use of these techniques is justified not only in terms of generating reliable information but of adding legitimacy to the project at the local level.

Collected information is analysed and serves as a major basis for formulating specific project objectives. Unlike the policy objectives, which are general in scope, project objectives are more defined and are directed towards specific activities and outcomes. As explained by Craig and Porter (forthcoming):

....specific objectives of the projects are generally observable, objectively defined ends which are to be realised by means of specific mechanisms within the project. The objectives include the target populations and areas (beneficiaries) and are logically linked to the supply of resources or inputs, a limited number of desired outputs, and a list of specific project activities.

The link between the project objectives and the desired outputs is facilitated through the setting of physical targets. In the context of the Philippines community forestry projects, biophysical and social targets are the ‘simplified’ expressions of the core objectives themselves. For instance, the central concern to democratise resource access is usually expressed in terms of the number of resource access instruments to be issued to a specified number of participants (social target) covering a certain hectarage of forest land (biophysical target). In the same way, poverty alleviation is expressed in terms of the number of project participants (social target) who are to
benefit from their involvement in community forestry activities through additional income. Similarly, the core concern of forest sustainability is expressed in terms of hectarage to be reforested, protected, or placed under sustained-yield management (physical target).

Quantification of the biophysical and social targets allows for the efficient allocation of project resources or inputs, both financial and human. Resources are allocated proportionate to the magnitude of these targets and the specific intervention activities required to attain them. These involve the application of different techniques and approaches through the institutional mechanisms within the geographic and social frames of the project.

Setting of rigid targets in community forestry projects, however, transcends the issue of efficient resource allocation. In the Philippines case — and probably elsewhere — rigid targets are part of the institutional mechanisms (in this case, by the DENR and concerned funding agencies) which ensure control over the project outcome by focusing on the quantifiable, measurable and, hence, verifiable indicators of the success of the project. Targets dictate the project activities and determine the extent of people’s involvement in these activities — who is to be involved to achieve the desired output, and when they are to be involved. The more substantive issues, such as building the capability of the local people to plan and implement their own plans, access of the poor to project benefits, scheduling of the project activities to fit the seasonal calendar of the poor, and others, are relegated to the background. Moreover, in a highly political terrain of development assistance, physical targets provide the technical justification and legitimacy for funding community forestry projects. With conventional project techniques such as CBA, physical targets can be manipulated and adjusted to yield high financial and economic returns, thereby providing legitimacy to projects. Therefore it is not surprising that despite the known negative impacts of setting rigid physical targets, community forestry projects continue to be target-driven in their orientation (Poffenberger, 1990b:281; Gilmour and Fisher, 1991).
The employment of the different instruments of practice via some project mechanisms (such as objectives, resources and targets) is not only framed geographically and socially. It is also framed temporally through the project cycle (Craig and Porter, forthcoming). Through this cycle, the messy world of community forestry practice is stabilised by temporal sequencing of activities. These segmented activities normally include identification, preparation, appraisal, negotiation, implementation and supervision, and completion and evaluation. As practised by ADB (Figure 3.1) and other international funding agencies, evaluation leads again to the preparation of new projects (Curtis, 1985).

Each segment of the project cycle involves certain activities, inputs and outputs, which should be accomplished within a predetermined period of time. The outputs of each segment serve as inputs to the succeeding ones and are expected to contribute towards the attainment of the overall target. Each succeeding segment is considered therefore a rational progression of the previous one, geared towards project completion, when all the desired project outcomes are expected to be accomplished.

The spatial, social, and temporal frames of community forestry projects presume to create order and stability so as to allow the efficient and effective employment of the different techniques and methods. These frames also reinforce the notion that community forestry projects (and other rural development projects) can work in a controlled, stage-by-stage and rational context, that travels linearly from specific objectives to expected outcomes (Pottier, 1993). This does not hold true in practice, as I will demonstrate in Chapters Five to Seven. The ‘unruly’ political context of these projects, and the poor application of the different instruments of practice, exacerbates the inherent tendencies of these instruments to produce unintended results.
Figure 3.1: ADB's Project Cycle
(Source: ADB 1981)
3.5 Propositions for Analysis

Considering the above discussions and the historical review of community forestry in Chapter Two, I put forward four related propositions in this study. First, the practice of community forestry produces paradoxical effects which work against the realisation of its avowed central policy objectives: the democratisation of resource access, poverty alleviation and resource sustainability. Second, these contrary tendencies can be analysed in terms of three perspectives: a) the historical and political context or the ‘political economy’; b) the characteristics of practice; and c) the rationalisation thesis. Third, the idea of ‘regulated freedom’, drawn from the modern form of rationalisation theory, helps to explain the contrary effects of various instruments of practice in community forestry. Fourth, these contrary effects are not so great that the practice of community forestry should be totally abandoned — there is room for a more responsive practice to improve outcomes.

These propositions are examined using experience from four government-initiated community forestry projects. Since the propositions are closely related, I make no attempt to match a specific proposition to a particular case. I examine the first three propositions using the four project cases in the three analytical chapters that follow (Chapters Five, Six and Seven). I explore the last proposition on responsive practice in the concluding chapter (Chapter Eight).

Proposition 1: Community forestry tends to produce paradoxical effects.

My conception of this proposition is based on a decade of professional and practical experiences in community forestry in the Philippines. In 1985, I started to question whether the early projects of the ISFP would succeed (Pulhin, 1985a) and pointed out the “profits and perils” (Pulhin, 1985b) likely to arise in their implementation. My involvement in a series of project preparations and evaluations of community forestry projects in the Philippines from 1988 to 1990 reinforced my earlier assessment that these projects have a propensity to produce paradoxical effects, which work against the realisation of the three core objectives. Rather than enhancing a farmer’s control
over forest land and resources, in many instances the reverse occurs. Similarly, project interventions designed to alleviate poverty either benefit the elite, or sustain if not reproduce the deprived condition of the upland poor. Moreover, forest degradation remains unabated even though the emphasis of community forestry projects is to sustain the resource.

This proposition, however, is not based purely on personal experiences and biases. It is supported by a large body of community forestry literature dealing with practice, not only in the Philippines but also internationally. As indicated in Chapter Two, the recent FAO review on a decade of experience in community forestry revealed that, despite some initial gains, it remains far from attaining its goals in many developing countries (Arnold, 1991). This review echoed earlier assessments that called for the improvement of community forestry practice (for instance, Foley and Barnard, 1985; Gregersen, Draper, and Elz 1989).

Proposition 2: The contrary tendencies of community forestry practice can be analysed in terms of three perspectives.

The first perspective is derived from a traditional political economy or historical materialist perspective. Community forestry — like any other rural development project — cannot be analysed independent of its historical and political context. The association of the early community forestry projects with the state’s counterinsurgency strategy illustrates one aspect of the political economy perspective (Bello, Kinley, and Bielski, 1982). Consistent with the early observations of Bello, Kinley, and Bielski, a more recent literature along the lines of political economy has traced the problems in Philippine forestry to the structure of the society (Porter and Ganapin, 1989; Contreras, 1991; Broad and Cavanagh, 1993). In general, this literature suggests that the contrary tendencies of community forestry are endemic to the country’s economically-driven strategy which is rooted in the colonial period. The negative impacts of this strategy were most evident during the Marcos administration from the 1970s to 1980s, but the power structure this strategy has wielded continues to exert its influence in the present. Community forestry projects
are susceptible to being seized by the elite for its own advantage, contributing to the reproduction of the problems.

A political economy perspective has also been used to explain the contrary tendencies of community forestry outside the Philippines. Dargavel, Hobley, and Kengen (1985:22) had the tone of political economy when they argued that:

Social forestry is being implemented through governments and their forest services, which have retained their colonial organisation and style. They are very much part of the social structures that reproduce poverty. We hold that the failure of social forestry to confront the social structures that cause the conditions it nominally hopes to alleviate, constitutes a theoretical inadequacy so debilitating that its policies will be ineffective.

However, the poor outcomes of community forestry projects cannot be fully explained by the political structures in which they are embodied. I argue that ‘poor practice’ in terms of poor application of the different instruments also contributes to the paradoxical effects. The fact that the huge literature in community forestry is replete with exhortations that project design and implementation should be improved, points to the limitations of current practice (Foley and Barnard, 1984; Gregersen, Draper, and Elz, 1989; Arnold, 1991; Guggenheim and Spears, 1991). The recent preoccupation with refining the different techniques and mechanisms of practice, as well as the trend towards institution building, also supports the perspective on the need to improve practice (Cernea, 1992; Fisher, 1993; Rao, Hoskins, Vergara, and Castro, n.d.; Gronow, 1995; Hafner, 1995).

It is ironic that despite more than a decade of committing resources and refining the instruments of practice, the goals of many community forestry projects appear to remain elusive. This suggests a need for other analytic tools to better explain the contrary tendencies of community forestry practice. I propose that a third perspective derived from the rationalisation thesis offers powerful insights on the complex and contradictory nature of practice.

The rationalisation thesis suggests that the contrary tendencies of community forestry are inherent in the techniques and approaches of conventional practice. On the one hand, techniques and approaches are necessary to implement community
forestry projects. These techniques and approaches, however, are not value-neutral. They represent a mode of thinking that advances a purely formal or instrumental type of rationality. The use of these techniques tends to reinforce certain characteristics of practice, such as homogeneity, technocracy and centralism, that are inclined to promote paradoxical effects.

Proposition 3: Community forestry is a form of regulated freedom.

Community forestry projects are implemented in the context of a ‘bottom-up’, ‘participatory’, and decentralised approach to forest management. It is a popular belief that through the application of various techniques and approaches, the control and management of forest resources will be passed to the local people. The modern form of rationalisation thesis suggests that this may not be the case. The application of these techniques and approaches with the local people’s participation offer them regulated freedom that increases the possibility of their governance from a distance. These instruments align the socio-economic and forest-related activities of the upland communities, who are normally beyond the reach of the state, with the centrally determined agenda and imperatives in forest management.

The experience of practice, however, suggests that governing local communities from a distance through the application of the different instruments is difficult to operationalise. Poor application of these instruments, turbulent local situations, unexpected outcomes, and other related problems, render governance unprogrammable in the manner prescribed and so contribute to the paradoxical effects of community forestry.

Proposition 4: There is room for a more responsive practice to improve outcomes of community forestry.

The political economy and the rationalisation perspectives offer a pessimistic view as regards improving the outcomes of community forestry so as to realise the three central objectives. The political economy perspective suggests that improved outcomes can only be realised within the context of an alternative sustainable
development model. On the other hand, the iron cage metaphor of the rationalisation thesis highlighted that the differing techniques and approaches are always inclined to produce paradoxical effects. This does not mean however, that the idea of community forestry should be totally abandoned. There is room to improve the outcomes of community forestry efforts through a more responsive practice.

### 3.6 Summary

In this chapter I have presented a background of the rationalisation thesis and argued that it provides a useful theoretical framework by which the performance of the three central aims of community forestry can be analysed. I have also discussed different techniques and approaches in practice as well as the institutional mechanisms that employ them within the frames of community forestry projects. I explained that community forestry projects function as the institutional frames within which the different instruments of practice are used to articulate policies and possibly achieve the three core objectives at the local level. Based on these discussions, I have also put forward four related propositions: 1) community forestry tends to produce paradoxical effects; 2) the contrary tendency of community forestry can be analysed in terms of three perspectives; 3) community forestry is a form of regulated freedom; and 4) there is room for a more responsive practice to improve the outcomes of the three core objectives.

In the succeeding chapters, I will investigate the adequacy of these propositions using four community forestry projects. Before starting this investigation, the next chapter presents an overview of the four cases and the research methodology.

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1 A recent attempt along these lines is the excellent work of Bruce Rich, *Mortgaging the Earth* (1994). Rich’s work, however, focuses on the rationalisation thesis of Weber and does not include the contemporary expressions of rationalisation such as those of Rose and Miller.
I am aware of the works of other rationalisation theorists including that of the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory in the 1930s and 1940s, of which Herbert Marcuse was a member, and the recent work of Jürgen Habermas. These works, although with some degree of relevance, are outside the main concern of this study. However, I mention briefly the work of Habermas in this overview.

There is no consistency in the literature on the distinction between Weber’s counterposing types of rationality. Brubaker (1984) uses formal vs. substantive rationality while Porter (1985) uses technical vs. substantive rationality. On the other hand, Sadri (1982:622-623) identifies three distinctions: theoretical vs. practical; formal vs. substantive; and instrumental vs. value rationality. For the purpose of this thesis, I follow Brubaker’s distinction between formal and value rationality. Formal rationality as referred to here includes the features of technical rationality as used by Porter.

See for instance the much celebrated work of Marshall Berman (1982).


Political rationalities like governmental technologies are a key concept. Rose and Miller referred to political rationalities as ‘the changing discursive fields within which the exercise of power is conceptualised, the moral justifications for particular ways of exercising power by diverse authorities, notions of the appropriate forms, objects and limits of politics, and conceptions of the proper distribution of such tasks among secular, spiritual, military and familial sectors’ (Rose and Miller, 1992:175).

This phenomenon is termed by Rose (1993:296) as “‘degovernmentalisation of the state’ — a detaching of the centre from the various regulatory technologies … and the adoption instead of a form of government through shaping the powers and wills of autonomous entities.”

A barangay is the smallest political unit in the Philippines, normally constituting around 200 to 500 households.

For a detailed analysis about the state’s simplification of the forest, please refer to Scott’s (1993:1-8) excellent seminar paper, State Simplifications, Nature, Space and People, presented at the Australian National University, Canberra, Australia.

A few exceptions to this are community forestry projects established in national parks and old growth forests which do not allow the utilisation of timber resources but only the ‘minor forest products’.

See for instance, FAO’s community forestry notes and field manuals on RRA and related topics.

CBA is probably the most authoritative economic technique institutionalised in development organisations such as the World Bank. For an excellent analysis of CBA as a ‘technology of control’ in a rural development project in Kenya, refer to Porter, Allen, and Thompson (1991:90-134).

A typical example of this is the issue of constructing big dams for hydro electric and irrigation purposes that involves resettlement of thousands of tribal communities. This highly political issue can be transformed into a technical one through the use of CBA, that is, in terms of justifying the project as financially and economically viable.

An example of this is the case of the Low Income Upland Communities Project being implemented in Mindoro Oriental. During my fieldwork in the area, an NGO member said that
they have to do a lot of ‘community organising to improve the tarnished image of the DENR in the Mangyan tribal communities’. Accordingly, some Mangyan groups don’t want to be involved with any project associated with DENR.

15 Major DENR programs and projects which involve NGO participation include: The Integrated Social Forestry Program, The National Forestation Program, The Forest Land Management Agreement; The Community Forestry Program; and, more recently, The Regional Resource Management Project. For a concise discussion of these programs, refer to del Castillo (1992:34-36).

16 Some of these weaknesses, as enumerated by Cernea (1991a:6-7), include: 1) they are only segmented units of intervention; 2) they tend to create enclaves and to siphon resources from non-project activities while sustained development at the same pace beyond their limited time frame may be doubtful; and 3) the flow of project allocation is prone to diversionary pressures that often channel resources away from the intended beneficiaries.
CHAPTER FOUR

CASE OVERVIEW AND RESEARCH METHODS

It is true that development interventions do not take place through projects alone, but projects are the most widely used vehicle. Their underlying model contains a greater potential for case by case fine-tuning than planners typically use.

Michael M. Cernea

_Putting People First: Sociological Variables in Rural Development_, 1991a:6

...there can be no ethical justification of research solely as an intellectual or career-oriented exercise. Moreover, the subject of research should benefit not only from the results of research, but also from the process of research itself.

M. Hamnett, D. Porter, A. Singh, and K. Kumar

_Ethics, Politics, and International Social Science Research: From Critique to Practice_, 1984:103

4.1 Introduction

In Chapter Three I noted that community forestry projects are the basic means of translating the three core policy objectives: democratising resource access, poverty alleviation, and sustaining forest resources, into action programs. Specifically, projects function as institutional frames within which the different instruments of practice are used to articulate policies with the potential to achieve these three central objectives on the ground. Indeed, the mushrooming of community forestry projects from the 1980s until the present has been accompanied by the development, refinement and application of various techniques and approaches of practice. Consistent with the government’s decentralisation program, this period has also been characterised by an increasing involvement of local actors — NGOs, POs and, more recently, LGUs, in forest management. Such institutions, together
with the DENR and funding agencies, facilitate the application of these techniques and approaches in community forestry projects.

The development of different techniques and approaches in community forestry, and in development practice in general, has been paralleled in the field of social research. Over the last two decades, the use of conventional research techniques, such as the survey method, has been increasingly criticised on the grounds ‘that it misrepresents social reality, can provide only a partial and distorted view, and that it is alienative and oppressive by its character’ (Hamnett et al., 1984:97). These criticisms have led to the development of alternative techniques and methods under the general rubric of ‘participatory research’ or ‘participatory action-research’.

The main departure of participatory research techniques from the conventional survey method relates to political and ethical issues (Hamnett et al., 1984:95-109; Fals-Borda, 1991:3-11; and Chambers, 1994a:954). Politically, participatory techniques aim to liberate or empower their subjects through their ownership and appropriate use of the knowledge generated through research. Ethically, these techniques are not designed to be elicitive or extractive. Their correct use should benefit the subjects of such research not only by its results but through their participation in the process. Unlike the survey method, the subjects are not exploited as objects for data-mining nor “simply as grist for the academic career mill” (Hamnett et al., 1984:107). They are active participants in the discovery of things about themselves and their environment, are able to see the relevance of the research in their own terms and situations, and able to give it meaning towards improving their own situation.

This chapter covers two major themes. Section two focuses on the selection and overview of the four community forestry projects under study. These projects were purposely chosen to provide a view of the history, differing techniques, and approaches, used in the practice of community forestry, their development and refinements. Section three deals with research methods and ethics. My intention — in putting the two themes together, is — to demonstrate a parallel trend in development practice (in this case the practice of community forestry) and social science research, that is, the application of ‘subject-oriented’
techniques and approaches in their respective practices. This has some relevance in
addressing the practical objective of this study particularly the question ‘What is to
be done?’ which is the focus of chapter 8.

4.2 Case Selection and Overview

This section provides a brief description of the social, economic, political and
environmental context of the four case study projects. It also discusses how these
projects were selected and which among them will be examined analytically. A
more in-depth analysis of these cases as they relate to the three core objectives is
reserved for the three analytical chapters that follow. Map 4.1 shows the location
of the four case study projects, while Table 4.1 presents a general profile of these
projects.

4.2.1 The Central Visayas Regional Project, Social Forestry
Component (CVRP-1, SF)

The Central Visayas Regional Project I or CVRP-1 was the first major foreign-
assisted multi-sectoral regional development project in the Philippines. It was
financed by a World Bank loan of US$25.65 million and a counterpart fund from
the Philippine Government of US$9.8 million. The beginning of the project can be
traced back to 1977 when the Philippine Government and the World Bank agreed
to plan for a regional development project using Central Visayas (Region VII) as the
pilot region (CVRPO, 1986:1). Actual implementation did not start until July 1984
after much detailed planning, bank negotiations, creation of a Regional Project
Office, and training of core staff. Table 4.2 presents briefly an historical account of
the project from its conception through implementation to termination.

The final choice of Central Visayas as a pilot site was mainly in response to
the 1980 World Bank poverty study that showed it was the second poorest among
the 13 regions of the country (World Bank, 1980).
Map 4.1: Philippines - The Location of the Projects Studied
Table 4.1  Profile of Four Case Study Projects

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<tr>
<th>CHARACTERISTICS</th>
<th>CVRP-I (Social Forestry)</th>
<th>LIUCP*</th>
<th>Presentacion CFP</th>
<th>Claveria CFP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1. General Description</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Location</td>
<td>Ayungon and Bindoy, Negros Oriental (Region 7)</td>
<td>Mindoro Oriental and Occidental (Region 4)</td>
<td>Presentacion, Camarines Sur (Region 5)</td>
<td>Claveria, Misamis Oriental (Region 10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Total project area</td>
<td>17,363 ha</td>
<td>9,000 ha</td>
<td>1,282 ha</td>
<td>1,500 ha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Total project cost</td>
<td>55 million pesos (Actual cost)</td>
<td>15.14 million pesos</td>
<td>2.33 million pesos</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Year established</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g. Major project intervention</td>
<td>Provision of resource access, community based reforestation, forest utilisation, agroforestry, infrastructure, and institutional strengthening</td>
<td>Community organising and co-operative development, resource access and resource management, agroforestry, livelihood and reforestation, infrastructure and social services, and project mgmt. and institution building</td>
<td>Community organising, timber stand improvement, assisted natural regeneration, contract reforestation and agroforestry</td>
<td>Community organising, agroforestry, inland fishpond, animal dispersal, forest protection</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **2. Bio-physical** | | | | |
| a. Vegetative cover | About 40% logged-over area, 25% reforested area, and the remaining 35% open and cultivated areas and patches of old growth | About 90% grassland, cultivated and fallow area, and 10%, second growth forest | About 60% logged-over area, 20% brushland and cogonal land, and 20% cultivated area | About 60% logged over area, 15% mossy forest, 15% cultivated and open areas and 10% burned area |
| b. Slope category/elevation | Moderate to steep slope with dominant slope ranging from 18-40% (6,000 ha) and 40% and above 12,300 ha) | 75% sloping to rolling (8-30%) and the rest mostly level to gently sloping (0-8%) | About 70% undulating to rolling (20-40%) and the rest hilly to mountainous (50% and above). 300 to 1500 m a.s.l. | Elevation ranges from 1,100 to 2,200 m a.s.l. |

Continued on next page...
Table 4.1 continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Clastic type</th>
<th>Type 3, relatively dry from November to April and wet during the rest of the month</th>
<th>Type 1, two pronounced seasons: dry season from November to April, wet during the rest of the year.</th>
<th>Type 2, no pronounced dry season with maximum rainfall from November to February</th>
<th>Type 4, rainfall more or less evenly distributed with low rainfall in February and March</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>d. Average annual rainfall</td>
<td>1,645 mm. at sea level and 2,140 in the mountains</td>
<td>2,000 mm. at sea level and 2,250 in the mountains</td>
<td></td>
<td>Varies from sandy to clay loam with an average of 6 ph.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Soil</td>
<td>Generally formed from volcanic ejecta mostly clay to clay loam and 4.6-6.2 ph.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-economic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Number of participants</td>
<td>1421</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>262</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Average family size</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Major source of livelihood</td>
<td>farming (hillside and flat land), hired labour, forest products gathering</td>
<td>kaingin making, forest products gathering</td>
<td>upland farming/kaingin making, forest product gathering, fishing and hired labour</td>
<td>upland farming/kaingin making, forest product gathering, tomato production</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Farm size per household</td>
<td>Generally ranges from less than 1 to 9 ha, average 3 ha.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Generally ranges from 1 to 8 ha, average 2 ha.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Extent of land claims in project site</td>
<td>Roughly 50% claimed through tax declaration, inheritance, certificate of stewardship contract, and personal stake through occupancy</td>
<td>Roughly 60 to 70% of the whole project area are claimed Mangyan tribe as their ancestral lands.</td>
<td>About 70% claimed through tax declaration, inheritance, and personal stake through occupancy</td>
<td>About 15% claimed through tax declaration, inheritance and personal stake through occupancy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Type of ethnic groupings</td>
<td>Generally Visayans, native to the area.</td>
<td>Mangyans (Indigenous Cultural Community or ICC)</td>
<td>Generally Bicolanos (migrants)</td>
<td>Higaonons (ICC) and Visayan migrants</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Except for project location, all other descriptions refer to Kabilyan Watershed, Bulalacao Mindoro Oriental, since this is the focus of the case study.

Sources: Various Project Documents
CVRP was seen by its proponents as a pioneering attempt to address the twin problems of rural poverty and environmental degradation on a regional scale. The project aimed to: a) raise the income and living standards of poor, small-scale producers in project areas, particularly upland farmers and artisanal fishermen; and b) improve the management of the forest, upland, and nearshore habitats in these areas, both by arresting the rapid degradation of the environment and by augmenting the resource base. In addition, the project supported the government’s regionalisation program (World Bank, 1983). This latter objective was implemented primarily through the establishment of the Central Visayas Regional Project Office (CVRPO) with an autonomous administrative and fiscal system. Funds were allocated directly from the Department of Budget and Management to the CVRPO which, in turn, sub-allocated the funds to the implementing Site Management Units or SMUs (Mangahas, Valera and Taylor, 1988:12).

Social Forestry (CVRP-1-SF) was one of the three major technical components of the CVRP-1. The two others components included upland agriculture and nearshore fisheries. The social forestry component was implemented in 12 barangays within the municipalities of Ayungon and Bindoy, Negros Oriental (Map 4.2). Farming, both irrigated and rainfed (hillside farming), is the main occupation in the project area. Other occupations include hired labour, working on other farms in exchange for a certain per cent of harvest (kinahon system), and forest products gathering.

Typical of most upland areas, government support services hardly reach the project barangays. Before CVRP constructed a perimeter road in the project area, barangay roads were hardly passable, especially during the rainy months from May to October. There is no electricity; water supply is mostly from springs or wells, while medical services are only available in those areas near the municipalities of Bindoy and Ayungon. Schools are only provided up to the elementary level and normally lack sufficient number of teachers.
Map 4.2: The Central Visayas Regional Project - 1, Social Forestry
(Sources: Project Documents)
Table 4.2 Central Visayas Regional Project-I (Rural): A brief historical account.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>The Philippine Government and the World Bank agreed to formulate a regional development program with the Central Visayas (Region VII) as the pilot region.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>Formulation of Regional Investment Development Program for Region VII adopting an integrated area development strategy through World Bank support.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1981</td>
<td>Executive Order No. 694 created the Central Visayas Urban and Rural Project Office to prepare a package of RDIP projects in the areas not covered by the existing programs and regular budgets of line agencies and local government units.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid 1981 to August 1983</td>
<td>Preparation of detailed feasibility study for CVRP-I with the assistance of FAO/IBRD Cooperative Program missions, submission, and bank negotiations and approval</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 1983 to June 1984</td>
<td>Pre-implementation of the CVRP-I which included: 1) creation of the CVRPO through Executive Order No. 907 under the supervision of the Office of the Prime Minister; 2) signing of loan of agreement with the World Bank; and 3) five-month training of site management unit (SMU) core staff.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1984</td>
<td>Start of project implementation with the deployment of 35 core staff to nine sites: four upland, four near shore, and one social forestry site.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>CVRPO placed under the Office of the Vice President with the abolition of the Office of the Prime Minister after the famous February 1986 Revolution (EDSA Revolution).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January to June 1987</td>
<td>Extension of CVRP-I for six months from June to December 1987. CVRPO placed under the caretaker arrangement of the Office of the President.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1987</td>
<td>CVRP supervision transferred from the Office of the Vice President to the National Economic Development Authority through Executive Order No. 230.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1988</td>
<td>Start of the provincialisation process through the creation of the Provincial Resource Management Committee in the provinces of Cebu, Bohol, Negros Oriental, and Seiquior.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1988</td>
<td>CVRP supervision transferred from NEDA to Regional Development Council of Region VII through Board Resolution No. 51.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 28, 1989</td>
<td>Two-year extension of CVRP-I until December 31, 1991 through Presidential Executive Order No. 262 to foster high level integration of project activities with those of line agencies and local government units.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 1991</td>
<td>Twelve-month extension until December 1992 to wind up project activities and facilitate smooth transfer of project activities to local government units.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Winding up of SMU activities, completion of project documentation and planning for CVRP phase II</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CVRP Project Documents.
The project area was among the few sites in the region that still contain patches of virgin forest. It covered a total of 17,363 ha of timberland, formerly licensed to the Philippine American Timber Company Incorporated (PATIC). PATIC was one of the major log exporters in the province of Negros Oriental until the cancellation of its permit in 1979. Four other logging permits in the province were simultaneously cancelled through a directive signed by the then Director of BFD, Edmundo Cortez, upon orders of President Marcos (Negros Chronicle, 1979:1). The reason for cancellation was apparently to maintain a proper ecological balance in the province. About three years after the PATIC cancellation, a timber evaluation study conducted by BFD in the first six months of 1982 recorded the following vegetative cover in the project area:

- Virgin forests 746 ha
- Logged-over forests 8,080 ha
- Open/cogonial areas 7,153 ha
- Brushland 615 ha
- Active kaingins 416 ha
- Cultivated areas 353 ha

The CVRP-1-SF aimed to: a) improve the living conditions of the rural poor families occupying government timber land by creating employment and increasing income; b) conserve forest by stopping further destruction of logged-over areas; c) increase wood supplies and arrest soil erosion by reforestation; and d) develop through ‘hands-on’ experience a forest management approach based on labour-intensive, smallholder operations, that would be replicable nation-wide (ACIPHIL, 1986:1). In addition to these official objectives, it may also be assumed that the project was part of the counterinsurgency program of the Marcos administration with the support of the World Bank. The project sites — particularly the mountainous areas adjacent to Negros Occidental — were among the main sites of operation of the CPP/NPA (Aldecoa-Rodriguez, 1989:198). It was also in-between the ‘guerilla base’ of CPP/NPA located in the municipalities of Pamplona, Negros Oriental, and Isabela, Negros Occidental. On the other hand, the 57 Infantry Battalion of the Philippine Army was located in a neighbouring municipality, Mabinay.
My choice of CVRP-1, SF as a case study relates to its timber utilisation and its forest management techniques. As an experiment in local resource management, the proponents of CVRP-1-SF innovated the CTUP to provide timber access to forest occupants. CTUP was the first resource access instrument developed in the history of Philippine forestry that granted commercial utilisation of timber to upland communities. Its issuance was also the first example in Philippine forestry of the authority of forest resource allocation being handed over by the central forestry bureau to its Regional Director. In Chapter Five I demonstrate that poor application of CTUP in an unfavourable historical, and political context reproduced the problem of inequity in forest access.

CVRP-1-SF’s strategy of forest rehabilitation and utilisation was based on the principle of sustained-yield forestry. The remaining 8,000 ha of logged over forests were to be utilised on a sustainable basis to maintain the supply of timber. Open areas were to be reforested to augment the forest capital, while the remaining virgin forest was to be preserved through forest protection with the participation of the local communities. While these approaches were technically sound, they tended to homogenise the local situation and to promote a singular approach to forest management. In Chapter Seven I discuss how this tendency can obscure the social and political dimensions of forest management which are the very foundation of resource sustainability.

4.2.2 The Low Income Upland Communities Project (LIUCP)

From April to July 1989, I was one of a four-member team hired by the Asian Development Bank to conduct a Feasibility Study for the proposed Low-Income Upland Communities Project (LIUCP). The project was to be established in selected watersheds on Mindoro island. Our main tasks were to identify the watershed sites and prepare project interventions that would satisfy two major development priorities of the government (LIUCP, 1989:2):

1) To improve the income and living standards of upland communities, particularly the tribals, through improved security of tenure, improved agroforestry technologies, easier access to markets and
improved delivery of basic services (education, health, water supply) and infrastructure; and

2) To accelerate the reforestation of critical watersheds with and through the cooperation of the upland communities, particularly the tribals, who inhabit these watersheds.

These objectives also matched ADB’s priority in environmental lending. In 1987, ADB established its environmental unit — an indication of its commitment to environmentally oriented projects. This was upgraded in 1990 into an Office of the Environment (Korten, 1994:937). During the period when we were preparing the LIUCP feasibility study, ADB approved another forestry project in the Philippines: The Forestry Sector Program Loan. ADB funded 50 per cent of this US$240 million project while the other half was financed through the Japanese Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF).

Mindoro Island was a suitable location for the project. The seventh largest island in the Philippines, it comprises the two provinces of Mindoro Oriental and Occidental with a total land area of over 1 million ha (Map 4.3). It lies just off the southwest corner of Luzon, about 130 km south of Manila. Approximately 600,000 ha of the uplands of Mindoro (or 60 percent of the total land area of the island) are home to about 474,000 people (World Bank, 1989a). About 35 percent (167,000) of these people belong to the Mangyan tribe (Contreras, 1991). The rest are migrants, mostly from the nearby provinces of Batangas, Cavite, Quezon and Rizal.

The Mangyans are the original inhabitants of the Mindoro Island. They are commonly known as the ‘meekest and most peace-loving’ of the more than 50 cultural communities scattered all over the Philippines. ‘Mangyan’ is a generic term for seven major ethno-linguistic groups who inhabit the foothills and mountains of Mindoro Oriental and Occidental. These include the Alangan, Buhid, Batangan (sometimes called Taobuhid), Hanunoo, Iraya and Tadyawan. Of the seven tribes, Hanunoos have their own literature and are noted for their indigenous conservation-oriented kaingin system (Conklin, 1957). Accordingly, the Mangyans used to occupy the flat lands near the coast. The arrival of migrants — especially after World War II — pushed them to the higher slopes
of the watersheds where they now eke out a living. Their major source of livelihood rests on these lands where they do kaingin making and gather forest products. In general, the Mangyan economy is of the subsistence type. They normally market a small portion of their produce from kaingins just to be able to purchase basic necessities which include salt, kerosene, rice and, occasionally, clothing. A common practice to earn small cash — especially while awaiting the harvest from their kaingins — is to serve as hired labourers to the relatively better off migrants.

Migrants occupy the lower portions of the watersheds which are more accessible from the town centres. Most of these areas were either bought from the Mangyans or acquired through economic deceit, threats or, in few cases, outright violence (Dalton et al., 1989). In general, government support services, such as better roads, health, education, water supplies and electricity, are concentrated in these areas. With higher educational attainment and better opportunities, migrants in general have higher standards of living than the Mangyans. They are also full participants in the cash economy and have a more sophisticated lifestyle.

Mindoro Oriental and Occidental were regarded by the military authorities as NPA expansion areas. The World Bank-funded Mindoro Integrated Area Development Project which began in 1975 was associated with the military counterinsurgency scheme to contain the explosive expansion of NPA in the two provinces (Bello, Kinley and Bielski, 1982:93-96). Military ambushes and bombings in the mountains frequently occupied the front pages of national newspapers in the 1970s and early 1980s. The peace and order situation had improved in 1988, although NPA continued to operate openly in some areas.

Forest cover of the two provinces was at a critical level. At the time of project preparation, forest cover in Mindoro Oriental was estimated at about 150,000 hectares or 35 per cent of the province’s total land area. Almost half of this, however, (about 70,000 ha) was second growth forests — mostly of poor quality (ADB, 1989). On the other hand, Mindoro Occidental was left with barely 11 per cent forest cover or about 64,000 hectares. There was hardly any trace of old growth forest in the area. The remaining second growth forests occurred in patches located in valley bottoms and on sedentary hills. Forest destruction continued at an alarming rate as pressure from settlers and illegal loggers mounted.
In Mindoro Oriental alone, more than 50,000 hectares of old growth forest were reported lost between 1984 and 1988 (Dalton et al., 1989:16).

To pursue the above objectives, we selected eight major watersheds as project sites comprising a total of 225,000 ha. Five of the watersheds are located in Oriental Mindoro and three in Occidental. About 7,500 families living in 14 settlements or sitios were estimated to benefit directly from agroforestry and reforestation. Of these, 4,500 are Mangyan families, and 3,000 are lowland immigrants. The project aimed to increase agroforestry productivity on about 15,000 ha and reforest another 15,000 ha in the targeted watersheds.

LIUCP officially commenced on March 1990 and is expected to be completed by December 1997. The project is implemented through DENR in coordination with the Provincial Governments of Mindoro Oriental and Mindoro Occidental. Provincial Project Management Offices (PPMOs), managed by DENR personnel, were established in both of the provinces (Map 4.3). Six Watershed Management Units (WMUs) were also established in six key municipalities where the different watersheds are located. Six contracted NGOs manage these WMUs and coordinate the implementation of project activities in the watersheds. The PPMOs, on the other hand, supervise and coordinate the WMUs and the NGOs working in the project areas. A Manila-based National Project Coordinating Office (NPCO) was also established to coordinate the operations of both PPMOs, to facilitate the flow of funds, and to assist in the procurement and selection of the consultants (ADB, 1989:25-26).

My choice of LIUCP as a case study has little to do with my previous involvement in its feasibility study, although project familiarity was part of my consideration. I was interested in studying the project after having been informed during my fieldwork that it was not working as intended, and that the NGOs had plans to terminate their project contracts. LIUCP was meant to incorporate the lessons from similar completed and on-going projects in the Philippines. Specifically, it built on the CVRP’s approach of involving the people in forest management. Under the CVRP-1-SF, local people were involved in pre-determined project activities. Their ‘participation’ therefore was confined to project implementation. In contrast, LIUCP’s approach to participation started at the
planning stage. Through the assistance of the NGOs, local people were to be trained to prepare their own SEDPs which they themselves would implement.

The use of SEDPs to promote participation of project beneficiaries in planning their own socio-economic development, and the NGO involvement as a project catalyst are among the latest approaches in development practice adopted by LIUCP. In Chapter Six, I will demonstrate through the LIUCP case that these approaches have a tendency to promote centrally determined interests and imperatives, undermining the local socio-economic and cultural context of the project. I will also argue that a planning technique, such as SEDP, has a propensity to simplify the otherwise diverse and rich community life of project beneficiaries, such as the Mangyans, only to fit them into the project time frame where they could easily be manipulated and controlled. This contributes to the reproduction of problems of upland poverty.

4.2.3 The Presentacion Community Forestry Project

In 1989, the DENR started to facilitate the establishment of nine pilot sites under the CFP. To be established in different regions of the country, the pilot sites were to generate lessons and insights towards a wider implementation of “a new approach to forest management” involving “community participation” (DENR, 1989a.:172ff). As indicated in the CFP Manual of Operations, the new approach represents the ‘first phase in the comprehensive restructuring of the forest industry’. This is to be done partly by granting forest product utilisation to the resident upland communities — a privilege enjoyed in the past solely by the few timber licence operators.

The Presentacion Community Forestry Project was the first of the nine CFP pilot sites to be established. It officially commenced in June 1990 with a Memorandum of Agreement between the DENR Secretary and the Executive Director of the Pag-asang Bicolnon Foundation Incorporated (Pag-Bicol). Pag-Bicol is a local NGO formed in 1989 by 27 young professionals, the majority of whom are members of the Christian Life Community, a formative school organisation based at the Ateneo de Naga University run by Jesuit Fathers. Its mission is to promote the development of POs that are actively involved in rural
development, community-based health programs, environmental objectives, women’s issues, appropriate technology and the appreciation of local cultures. The foundation believes in the primacy of people’s participation in development, the liberating process of education, self-reliance, collaboration with groups and agencies of similar orientations, and works towards peace that is based on social justice (Pag-Bicol, n.d.). Pag-Bicol is based in Naga City and operates in the province of Camarines Sur. It was contracted by DENR to socially and technically prepare the CFP participants to sustainably manage the local forest resources.

Nestled between Lagunoy Gulf and Caramoan Peninsula, the project area is located in four coastal barangays: Buenavista, Bagong Sirang, Maangas, and Patrocinio, all of Presentacion, Camarines Sur (Map 4.4). It is approximately 70 km away from Naga City, one of the few centres of commerce and trade in the Bicol Region. From Naga City, the area can be reached by a concrete road as far as the municipality of Goa, then a dirt road that connects it to the four barangays. This dirt road becomes unpassable during the rainy season. For an easier mode of transportation, one has to follow the same concrete road from Naga to another municipality, Sabang, then take a motorised boat to the project site.

Except for the poor road conditions, government support services are present in the four project barangays. Three government agencies (Department of Agriculture, Department of Social Welfare and Development, and DENR) have their continuing projects in the barangays, while other agencies can be tapped for specific services upon request by the local people. The range of
government support includes electricity, water supply, barangay hall, day care centre, medicines, calamity relief, sorting out land conflicts, training on livelihood, extension of farming, fishing and forestry technologies, and other services. Except for Barangay Patrocinio, the three other barangays have elementary schools while Barangay Maangas has a high-school. Despite these services the local people remain poor, primarily due to limited land available for cultivation and the absence of other alternative sources of livelihood.

The four project barangays have a total population of 4,743 as of 1993 (Pag-Bicol and BREDCI, 1993). Based on the 1990 socio-economic survey conducted by Pag-Bicol, about 90 per cent of the households fall below the poverty line set by the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA) at P2,148.00 per month (Pag-Bicol, 1990). The same percentage of households depend primarily on forest land for making a living. Upland farming (mainly done through kaingin making) and fishing are the two major sources of livelihood (Pag-Bicol, 1990). Illegal timber cutting and trade was also an important source of income especially before the project started. Local people shift from one livelihood source to another depending on the season of the year. Fishing is usually done from March to June when the sea is normally calm and fish are available in large quantities. People normally prepare their land for kaingin anytime from February to April. Some people engage in illegal timber cutting during the lean months of May to August. During this period people have not harvested from their kaingins, and fishing may not be possible due to strong winds and typhoons.

The project covers a total area of 1,863 ha. of which about 55 per is under forest cover: 48 per cent residual forest and 7 per cent mossy forest (Map 4.4). The remaining 45 per cent comprises brushland, grassland and cultivated areas. Five logging concessions operated in the area from 1976 to 1984. The local people observed an increase in the number of claimants of forest land and an upsurge in illegal cutting activities after the last logging operator ceased operations. This was due primarily to the absence of alternative sources of livelihood in the area. A local leader estimated that close to 100 households were engaged in illegal cutting and timber business before the implementation of the project.
Both kaingin making and illegal timber harvesting contributed to forest destruction. To address the problem, Pag-Bicol targeted the kaingineros and illegal timber cutters and/or buyers/financiers as potential project participants. To identify these groups and assess the local situation, Pag-Bicol conducted a socio-economic survey during its first month of operation in the area. People were then recruited into the project through a series of seven-day orientation training sessions organised by Pag-Bicol from June to August 1990. In a casual discussion with some participants most of them noted that the prospect of a bright future through timber utilisation was their major motivation for joining the project.

Funded by ADB, the three-year project aimed to enable the participating communities to sustainably manage the forest resources within the area. This was to be achieved through the assistance of Pag-Bicol in community organisation, and training in technical forest management so that within three years a Community Forest Management Agreement (CFMA) can be issued to the community. CFMA is a legal instrument which permits upland communities to commercially utilise timber and other forest products in second growth forests. In return, the recipients will have to devote about 30 per cent of their income from this source to reforestation activities, and also pursue other means of livelihood. Holders of this agreement have an initial tenure of 25 years renewable for a further 25 years.

In August 1990, Pag-Bicol facilitated the formation of the first forestry cooperative in the country named Barangay Resources Environment and Development Cooperative Incorporated (BREDCI). In preparation for the CFMA and, ultimately, timber utilisation, the participants engaged in different ‘pump-priming’ activities. These included contract reforestation, agroforestry, assisted natural regeneration, timber stand improvement, and rattan plantation development. Pump-priming activities served two purposes: as alternative sources of livelihood to stop illegal cutting and kaingin making; and to train the local people in the principles of sustained-yield forest management. After the termination of Pag-Bicol’s contract with DENR as assisting organisation, BREDCI will take over the forest management within the project site.

‘Returning The Forest To The People’, was the avowed theme of the Covenant of Catalysts for Community-Based Forest Resource Management
signed by 91 NGOs, DENR staff, and resource persons during the orientation workshops on community-based natural resource management held in Davao City and Los Banos on May 7 and July 31, 1993 (NRMP, 1992:5). Some basic strategies for achieving this are through the provision of CFMA to CFP participants and their hands-on training on the principles of sustained-yield forest management. My use of Presentacion CFP as a case study relates to these two strategies. Like LIUCP, CFP builds on the experiences and lessons of CVRP in community-based forest management (DENR, 1990a). Specifically, CFP expanded the concept of CTUP to include the utilisation of live trees from second growth forest instead of only the standing and fallen dead trees. The resource tenure was also expanded to 25 years with possible renewal for another 25 years instead of the CTUP’s two-year permit. In a similar way, CFP provides the opportunity to train the local community in the concept of sustained-yield forest management through the assistance of contracted NGOs — a strategy that was never systematically implemented under CVRP-1-SF.

The use of CFMA and sustained-yield approaches to promote sustainable community forestry is no doubt an improvement on the earlier forestry projects. CFMA offers the potential for a more equitable distribution of forest benefits, while sustained-yield emphasises continuous supply of forest resources. However, CFMA advances a type of formal legalism that has a tendency to reinforce government control over the forest resources instead of returning it to the people. Because of the instrumentalist values inherent in CFMA, it also has the potential to perpetuate the technocratic and centralist approach of the conventional forest management. This aspect is explored in Chapter Five. On the other hand, sustained-yield forestry promotes a highly deterministic strategy for forest management. It can confine the concept of sustainability to purely physical limits of the resource and, in the process, marginalise the two other core objectives of equity and poverty alleviation. How this threatens forest resource sustainability is the major focus of Chapter Seven.

4.2.4 The Claveria Community Forestry Project
Following the initial implementation of the nine CFP pilot projects, an additional 24 sites were established in 1991, similarly funded by the ADB. In 1992, USAID also funded a further 17 CFP sites under its Natural Resource Management Program (NRMP), bringing the total number of project sites to 50 (Dolom, 1993). The yearly increase in the number of CFP projects is partly due to compliance with the tranche requirement of NRMP which stipulates that DENR must have signed and awarded a total of 50 NGO service contracts before the end of 1992 (Winrock, 1992).

The Claveria Community Forestry Project is one of the 17 CFP sites funded by USAID. It is designed in basically the same way as the Presentacion CFP (and all other CFP sites) except for the absence of massive ‘pump-priming’ activities which characterise all ADB-funded projects. Instead, minimal funds for small-scale, income-generating activities are allocated. A certain amount is also earmarked for training in technical and related forest management skills. Similar to other USAID-funded sites, the focus is on ‘community organising’, developing schemes for capital formation, and training in forestry techniques and financial management.

The project is located in Barangay Mat-i, one of the 24 barangays in the municipality of Claveria, Misamis Oriental. It is 65 kilometres south of the city of Cagayan de Oro, the hub of commercial activities in Region 10 (Map 4.5). It is accessible from Cagayan de Oro via a 50 km cemented road to the municipality of Claveria which joins a 15 km all-weather road to the project barangay. From the Mat-i barangay proper, the most accessible part of the project site could be reached by traversing a 2-kilometre abandoned logging road. About 52 per cent of the 1,500 ha covered by the project is second growth forest, 9 percent mossy forest, 14 per cent brushland and grassland, 22 per cent cliff, and 3 per cent cultivated land (Map 4.5). The elevation ranges
from 1,100 to 2,200 m a.s.l. which make a considerable portion of the project site prone to soil erosion.

The project site was subject to massive militarisation during the early 1980s. Most of the residents had evacuated to other neighbouring barangays and municipalities between 1983 to 1985 (SWCF, 1993:11). Only those families who had nowhere to go were left in the area. Military activities peaked in 1985 when the assigned military officer was said to have issued a ‘search and destroy’ order because the whole Barangay Mat-i was considered to be supportive of the NPA. Peace and order started to return only in 1988 — the same year that the majority of the local people returned. A military detachment is still maintained in the barangay proper, though its operation is now limited to occasional patrols in the mountains.

The project site is home to about 600 families, roughly 35 percent of whom belong to the Higaonon tribe (SWCF, 1993). One of the ethno-linguistic groups in southern Philippines, Higaonons claimed to be the first inhabitants of the area. In 1952, migrants — mostly from Bohol province — started to arrive and settle in the area. Some Higaonons intermarried with these migrants while others retreated into the heart of the mountains beyond the reach of the ‘outsiders’. Currently, Boholanos and Cebuanos constitute the majority (about 60 per cent) of the population in the area.

Farming is the major source of livelihood, and the type of crops varies greatly. Tomatoes and Baguio beans are commonly planted by the migrants — mainly for commercial purposes. Other crops include corn, rice, sweet potatoes, green pepper, banana, eggplant, and various root crops and vegetables. Higaonons, on the other hand, plant corn and root crops for home consumption. They also cut timber and gather rattan for additional income. Migrants are generally economically better off compared to the Higaonons.

Project implementation started in July 1992. The Soil and Water Conservation Foundation (SWCF) was chosen by the DENR and community representatives from among five competing NGOs to assist in project implementation. SWCF has a total contract budget of P2,337,500 over the three-year project period. Its major task is to initiate livelihood activities in the area and help build the capability of the local community to sustainably manage the existing
forest resources. The NGO is based in Cebu City (Central Philippines) and has eight years of rich experience in upland development.

The project was only in its 15th month of operation when I conducted my fieldwork in the area. My choice of the project as a case study has nothing to do therefore with its major accomplishments, but relates to a key issue applicable to all CFP sites. It exemplifies the use of RRA as a technique for assessment and planning to help define the constitution of the ‘community’. The prominence of RRA as a technique in rural development projects over the last two decades led to its adoption in community forestry. The adoption of RRA under the USAID-funded community forestry projects was an improvement on the approach under the first nine CFP pilot sites. In these early projects, community appraisal was generally done through the conventional socio-economic survey. As in Presentacion CFP, the survey results were then used to determine the target groups, or those who should constitute the ‘community’.

In compliance with its terms of reference, SWCF conducted RRA as its first major activity when it commenced project implementation in July 1992. The tool enabled the NGO staff to assess the socio-economic and bio-physical situations, farming and cropping patterns, marketing systems, and forest products utilisation in the area. The exercise also enabled them to explain the project to the local people as well as the NGO’s role in its implementation. Based on the ‘network analysis’ conducted, they were also able to identify immediate solutions to local problems (such as the use of soil testing kits instead of indiscriminately applying large amount of fertilisers) which became part of the project’s ‘entry point’.

Despite the usefulness of RRA as far as the NGO is concerned, Chapter Six shows that SWCF staff, and the hired local people, lacked the required specialised skills and experience to generate high quality RRA results. Still, the problem goes deeper than simply poor application of the technique. The chapter demonstrates that the use of RRA tends to facilitate the reification of the local people. Local people are counted and represented as percentages which allows their lumping together into a single category, for example, ‘people with low income’. The implication of this in terms of perpetuating the myth of a ‘homogeneous’
community and the potential for reproducing the problem of poverty is examined in Chapter Six.

4.3 Research Methods and Ethics

Having selected the four projects, I embarked on fieldwork in October 1992. The research methods I used can be categorised under the family of participatory research techniques, rather than the conventional extractive survey method. Nevertheless I do not pretend to have conducted participatory research. Given my research agenda as a PhD student and considering my time schedule and limited resources during fieldwork, my approach was still close to being extractive. However, conscious of the political and ethical implications of traditional social science research, I tried to minimise the negative consequences of this type of research during my fieldwork.

4.3.1 Study Methods

I collected a combination of primary and secondary information during my fifteen-month period of fieldwork in the Philippines from October 1992 to December 1993. Where appropriate, I used multiple sources of evidence to validate gathered information. I was always conscious of the biases and defects associated with “rural development tourism”. To overcome these biases and better understand the local situation, I spent about eight weeks per project on data gathering. In addition, I returned to every project site for about a week each to wrap-up my fieldwork. The purpose of this final visit was to keep track of developments and to further validate the information I had gathered earlier. Table 4.3 summarises my fieldwork activities from October 1992 to December 1993. Where appropriate, I used multiple sources of evidence to validate gathered information. I was always conscious of the biases and defects associated with “rural development tourism”. To overcome these biases and better understand the local situation, I spent about eight weeks per project on data gathering. In addition, I returned to every project
Table 4.3 Summary of fieldwork activities by quarter, 1992-1993

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1) Gather secondary information about community forestry and other relevant information at the national level.

2) Make final arrangements with the concerned individuals and institutions regarding the conduct of the case studies.

3) Conduct case studies: CVRP, Presentacion CF? (CFP1), LIUCP and Claveria CFP (CFP2).

4) Report writing/initial writing of the cases.

5) Final visit to the case study sites.
site for about a week each to wrap-up my fieldwork. The purpose of this final visit was to keep track of developments and to further validate the information I had gathered earlier.

I used a combination of study methods in conducting the case studies. Their use in each of the projects studied is summarised in Table 4.4 and then discussed in some detail.

Table 4.4 Research methods and affiliation of informants

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<tr>
<th>Research Methods</th>
<th>Central Visayas Regional Project</th>
<th>Low Income Upland Communities Project</th>
<th>Presentacion Community Forestry Project</th>
<th>Claveria Community Forestry Project</th>
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<tr>
<td>Analysis of Project Reports and Other Document Direct Conversation and Wandering Around Interviews Participation in Project Activities Field Reflection and Partial Analysis</td>
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Affiliation of Informants

- PO/Local Officers 15 8 8 5
- Project Participant 36 8 14 29
- Non-Participant 9 2 17 6
- Project Staff 12 4 —
- NGO Staff — 10 8 6
- Barangay Council 6 4 10 2
- Local Government 2 2 1 —
- DENR Field Offices 6 2 6 2
- DENR Central Office — 3 1 1
- Private Consultant 2 2 — —
- ADB 1 — — —
- Business Sector 1 — — —

I classified the degree of relevance of the research methods in the analyses of the four cases as “highly relevant” and “less relevant”.

The numbers under each project site are the number of informants with different affiliations. Some informants may belong to more than one category: for example, a project participant may also be a PO leader or a member of the Barangay Council.
a) Analysis of project reports and related documents.
In asking permission to conduct the different case studies, I always included access to project documents in my formal requests to those individuals and agencies concerned. Despite these requests, internal documents and correspondence concerning two projects were not easy to obtain. Only after establishing rapport with the persons in charge, and assuring them that the information would be treated as confidential, was I able to access to internal project documents. Normally, I spent the first few days researching at the project offices to gather relevant documents. I then read and digested these documents before immersing myself in the community concerned. After completing my research at the community level, I returned to the project office to gather additional information and interview the key persons involved in the project.

b) Direct conversation and wandering around.
I acquainted myself with the local socio-political context through wandering around the project area and engaging in conversation with the local people. This also served as an avenue for explaining my purpose and establishing rapport with prospective informants. In the process, I was particularly keen to discover the existing factions and the various interests represented in the community. This helped me to select a wide range of informants so as to get a balanced view of the different research issues to be addressed. The same goals influenced me in choosing the appropriate venue for an interview and a credible field guide — both of which proved to be requisites for obtaining reliable information.

c) Individual and group interviews.
In gathering case materials about the different projects, I combined individual and group interviews. Owing to the range of issues I wanted to address, the affiliation of my informants was very diverse. They comprised project participants and non-participants at the local community level, as well as DENR officials and consultants at the national level (Table 4.4). While the results of these interviews are not all reflected in the three analytical chapters that follow, they were extremely useful for my understanding of the different projects.
In general, I selected the informants on the basis of their knowledge, influence, or involvement in the different projects — giving priority to those who seemed likely to be most affected by these projects. Interviews conducted at the community level ranged from highly informal casual discussions, to relatively more formal semi-structured interviews. They took place at very diverse places and times — at quick meetings along the road or trail, while trekking to and from the reforestation sites, while observing people at work on their farms, before and after community assemblies, while back-riding on a motor bike, during meals or rest times at the project site, or at a specified venue most convenient to the informants. Outside the community, interviews were mostly of the semi-structured type, and conducted in offices or in the houses of the informants. They ranged from purely casual talks to semi-structured interviews with the aid of checklists. Checklists differed in each project. I constructed them following two to three weeks of stay in the project areas, after I had gained familiarity with the key project issues at the local level. During the interviews, the informants had considerable control over the direction of the discussions, which allowed them to unveil relevant issues not necessarily included in the checklists. I also assured them of anonymity and confidentiality in case of sensitive information.

In general, the interviews revolved around the socio-political and environmental context of the projects, the involvement of the different actors in planning and implementation, the perceptions of those affected or likely to be affected, and the benefits and problems associated with project implementation. In all cases, the bottom line was to establish a relationship between the practice of community forestry and improved outcomes in terms of the three central objectives. Depending on the preferences of the respondents, some interviews were tape-recorded, while others were written in my fieldnotes during the course of the interviews. Informal interviews were usually noted after actual meetings.

d) Participation in project activities.
Where possible, I also made a point of participating in the different project activities relevant to my research. This enabled me to meet and talk with the key project actors and participants, and capture the key issues involved in project
implementation. The degree of my participation varied depending on the type of involvement required of me by the person or agency concerned. For instance, in attending the LIUCP Mid-Term Review with the ADB Mission, I was earlier warned by the Project Manager not to participate in any formal discussion. I was then simply a passive observer. On the other hand, in Presentacion CFP, I was requested to be an active participant in a Cooperative Development Training by serving as resource person.

e) Field reflections and partial analysis.
My type of research fits well with what Chambers (1992:14) called “progressive learning”. In this case, my initial findings determined the next research step, and research progressed as I accumulated more information and, initially, processed it through reflection and partial analysis. My research program did not follow a rigid blueprint. It was highly flexible to respond to the local situation, to probe deeper into locally identified issues, and to cross-check information from various sources, thereby allowing progressive learning to take place.

Interaction with people is a requisite for progressive research. Early in the research process, I developed the habit of discussing my initial findings with almost anybody who was willing to listen and make comments. My captive audience — in almost all cases — were my research assistants and the NGO or project staff who resided at the project sites. More often than not, my sharing of insights stirred up reactions and impressions which generated additional ideas and perspectives, or encouraged further probing of relevant issues. Usually this led to identification, through referral, of key informants, more knowledgeable on the subject of interest. Bits and pieces of information and insights gleaned from these discussions were recorded in my field notes.

4.3.2 Research Ethics

My fourteen months of field work provided me with enough time to innovate ethical ways of gathering reliable information at the community level. The key here was building rapport. Culturally, most Filipinos who live in the countryside are
suspicious of ‘new faces’ or outsiders.\textsuperscript{13} In the absence of rapport, people feel reluctant and uneasy about requests to be interviewed. Even if they agree — as a gesture of hospitality — they are likely to withhold information, especially when dealing with the more sensitive issues.

Trust is an essential ingredient in building rapport. In order to gain trust, I had to be honest about my purpose so as to avoid creating false hopes and expectations. During my initial visit, I always informed potential informants that my main objective in conducting this research was to satisfy the requirements for my degree. I emphasised that my primary intention was to learn about their experiences and perceptions of a project and other related issues. I also informed them that my research might not directly improve their situation but could possibly contribute towards a more responsive practice of community forestry in the future.

A partner of honesty is a caring attitude. While I did not create false hopes, I tried my best to extend some assistance to my informants during the course of my research in whatever ways possible. These varied in different situations but generally included: 1) providing them with additional information about the project and answering some of their queries; 2) giving them some solicited advice on project-related issues; 3) serving as a resource person during seminars and workshops; 4) sharing with them the highlights of my research findings before leaving the study site; and 5) bringing their problems to the attention of the persons or agencies concerned who were not normally within their reach. The following comments from some of my informants encapsulate the various roles I performed while conducting research.

We are fed up of doing forest protection because those we apprehend just made fool of us ... We appreciate your concern of informing the DENR about our problem. (President of a Forest Stewardship Association, CVRP-1-SF).

It's good you're here. Nobody else could have clearly explained the historical perspective of development practice and the principles on GO-NGO-PO collaboration. (Project Staff, Low Income Upland Communities Project).

We are pleased you also talked with us and listened to our side. It's a relief to know that there are people who are also willing to listen and understand our situation. (Resigned PO Member, Presentacion CFP)

Many researchers have conducted studies in our different projects but all of them ran away with the information and nothing has been heard about them
since then. I would suppose their outputs just gathered dust in the shelves. Discussing important observations during informal times and the major research findings before leaving the study site (like what you are doing), make the research relevant and not extractive. But how many researchers will find time and have the commitment to do it? (Project Manager, Soil and Water Conservation Foundation)

Indeed my role shifted from a researcher/learner, to a confidant, an extensionist, a lecturer, a consultant and, as one project participant described it, a community organiser — a luxury which most researchers and development tourists could not afford. Instead of being a passive observer and extractor of information, my varied role made my research more interesting and challenging. I also felt a sense of fulfilment in realising that I was there not simply to mine information and treat the local people as guinea pigs to be studied, but to offer a little act of good will or, at times, simply a sympathetic ear.

4.4 Summary

The practice of community forestry in the Philippines over the last decade has been characterised by the development and refinement of different techniques and approaches that supposedly facilitate project implementation. It is also characterised by an increasing number of actors involved in the application of these techniques and approaches. I considered these developments in the selection of the four case study projects. As I describe in the overview, these cases show an historical trend in the development and refinement of these techniques and approaches. Thus, they are representative of the current and evolving practice of community forestry and rural development in general — not only in the Philippines but also in most developing countries.

A parallel development in social research is the use of participatory techniques in place of the traditional extractive type of research typified by the survey method. Participatory research techniques are subject-oriented: they are meant to benefit the local people not only from the research output but also from the research process. Showing a parallel trend in social research and the practice of community forestry, I argue, provides some insights into the issue of ethics in
practice. This I will discuss briefly in Chapter Eight. In the next three analytical chapters, I will examine how the application of the different instruments of practice contributes to the achievement or non-achievement of the three central objectives of community forestry.

1 Techniques of participatory research include: collective research through meetings and sociodrama, critical recovery of history, valuing and applying folk culture, and production and diffusion of new knowledge through written, oral and visual forms. They also include a flexible use of methods from sociological and anthropological traditions, such as the open interview (avoiding any excessive rigid structure), census or simple survey, direct systematic observation (with personal participation and selective experimentation), field diaries, data filing, photography, cartography, statistics, sound recording, primary and secondary source materials, notarial, regional, and national archives, and related methods (Fals-Borda and Rahman, 1991:9-10).

2 The Philippines regionalisation program can be traced as far back as 1954 with the establishment of the Government Survey and Reorganisation Commission (GSRC). However, it was only with the creation of 11 regions in the country in 1972 that regionalisation started to take place. The National Economic Development Authority (NEDA) regionalised as soon as it was formed in 1973. Through its Regional Development Staff, NEDA organised the Regional Development Councils (RDCs) in each of the regions. RDCs were established to facilitate regional planning and representation in the lawmaking bodies, and to coordinate all planning and programming activities at the regional level. On the other hand, government ministries established regional offices to act over administrative matters to improve public services (World Bank, 1983:1-4). Though part of the CVRP objective, regionalisation is outside the main concern of the present study, hence it will not be elaborated here.

3 CVRP-1 refers to the rural component of the Central Visayas Regional Project.

4 This program was meant to contain insurgency in the countryside, to maintain political stability in the city and protect American investments in the Philippines (Bello, Kinley and Elison, 1982).

5 For an insightful analysis of the implications of these loans and related environmental loans in the Philippines, please refer to the excellent articles of Frances Korten (1993; 1994).

6 Kaingin making is a traditional form of upland farming system which involves the clearing of forest area through slashing and burning, then cultivating it for one to three cropping terms. The soil is then ‘left to rest’ for several years which is called the ‘fallow period’. During this time, the farmer shifts to another area repeating the process. The old farm is cultivated again after the fallow period. However, with reduced area available for cultivation along with population growth, there is corresponding reduction in length of fallow period, rendering kaingin making less sustainable. In some parts of the country such as in the Southern Tagalog area, people who do kaingin making do not shift from one place to another. They still do slashing and burning as well as maintaining fallow period but they rotate their cultivation within their own farm instead of shifting from one place to another.

7 On our way to a Mangyan settlement in Pola Watershed during project preparation, a lady NPA and her male escort stopped us for questioning. After having taken our names and being questioned for about 20 minutes, we were told that we could push ahead with the project since it is pro-poor. They warned us though that it should not affect their operations in the area. Upon arrival on our destination, we were surprised that the Mangyans had been notified of our
coming and were already gathered to listen to the proposed project without any prior arrangement.

8 In July 1993, while finalising arrangements with DENR to conduct a study in the LIUCP, I was advised by a friend from an NGO that I should consider other projects for study because ‘there are major problems in the area’. Accordingly, the implementing NGOs were to terminate their contracts because of unsolvable problems in project implementation. I became more interested about what was happening in the field and managed to join the LIUCP Mid-Term Evaluation in Mindoro Oriental held on 16-22 August 1993, as participant observer.

9 Literature on social research called this triangulation method. This simply means checking the validity of the data using at least three sources of evidence, eg., secondary sources, direct observation, and interview. An example of this is the validation of reported project accomplishments on-site through field observation and interviews with the local people.

10 For a complete discussion on rural development tourism including its biases and defects, refer to Chambers (1983: 13-23); Chambers (1991: 518-519); Chambers (1992: 14, 21).

11 I should point out here that I spent 60 to 80 per cent of my fieldwork time, in each case study project, living and learning on-site with the local people. The rest of the time was spent with NGOs, DENR field personnel (from regional down to the municipal level or CENRO level), local government units, and other project actors.

12 “Wandering around” involves going around the community particularly in areas where most people converge like in sari-sari store, observing their activities, and listening to their conversations.

12a Discovering the value of understanding the local political structure, I wrote in my field notes dated 11 January 1993: “It is very important to understand the local political structure in the community even before the researcher starts collecting information. Choosing the interview venue and the local field guide can be very crucial in obtaining reliable information. Where there are opposing factions, neutral ground should be identified if interviews will be conducted other than the house of the informants. Persons identified with existing factions should not be chosen as field guide. Likewise, researchers should always show a neutral posture in order to win the support of all factions and get a reliable information. Cross checking of information with the different factions is very crucial in this respect.”

12b In this study, “formal semi-structured interview” refers to the type of interview that uses a set of guide questions but provides flexibility to probe deeper into certain interesting issues mentioned by the respondent. The purpose of the study is explained to the respondents before the interview and their permission to serve as respondent is sought. The answers are written down during the course of the interview or recorded using a cassette tape.

13 This type of learning is one of the principles shared by Rapid Rural Appraisal and Participatory Rural Appraisal and is characterised by Chambers (1992: 14) as: ‘conscious exploration, flexible use of methods, opportunism, improvisation, iteration and crosschecking, not following a blueprint program but being adaptable in a learning process.’

14 This statement is even more true among tribal communities. In Mindoro we observed that some parents called their playing children to come inside their house, the first time they saw us wandering around the community. The reason for this, I later discovered, was fear of outsiders.
CHAPTER FIVE

DEMOCRATISING RESOURCE ACCESS

We have to reverse the errors of the past. Recognising that poverty and social inequality are the root of environmental destruction, this administration boldly removed illegal logging and shifted access and rights over forest resources to upland and tribal communities with Programs such as Community Forestry Program, Forest Land Management Agreement, and the revitalised Integrated Social Forestry Program.

President Corazon C. Aquino
State of the Nation Address, 1991

Without adequate controls, access to utilise forest resources can become a license to destroy these resources.

Department of Environment and Natural Resources

5.1 Introduction

Recent socio-political and environmental changes in the Philippines have led to a new approach in forest management that emphasises the democratisation of resource access. This approach is implemented mainly through the government’s issuance of resource access agreements or permits to upland communities involved in community-based forestry programs and projects. The idea behind democratising forest resource access tends to support the major arguments of the growing number of environmental groups in the Philippines. For most of these groups, the country’s environmental crisis is “more than anything else, an equity issue” (Magno, F., 1993:8). Some advocates of the people-centred development agenda in the country also assert that “democrat-isng control of resources is the key to sustainable development” (Broad and Cavanagh, 1993:138).
In this Chapter, I focus on the use of resource access instruments as a technique for promoting access to forest resources. Resource access instruments are legal agreements between the government and the upland communities (individual or groups) regarding the management and development of a given forest land. They entitle their recipient communities to certain forest benefits, in exchange for compliance with government-defined forest management and protection responsibilities (Chapter Three). Using two government-initiated community forestry projects, I examine how the use of these instruments has produced unintended effects that prevent this policy concern from being effectively addressed.

Before examining the two cases, an overview is provided on the imperatives of forest resource democratisation drawn from the current literature. This is followed by a brief discussion of some of the resource access instruments used in community forestry projects. I then present the experiences of CVRP-1-SF and Presentacion CFP that used CTUP and CFMA, respectively, in attempts to democratise access to forest resources.

5.2 The Democratisation Imperative

Benefits flowing from the Philippines’ forest resources have been the monopoly of the few who have had access to them. Historically, they have constituted the wealthier, more politically or militarily influential sectors — the elite in the nation’s socio-economic strata. Consequently, the uneducated and the less privileged majority — particularly most of the upland communities — have been barred from enjoying the benefits of the utilisation of the nation’s patrimony.

Recently, there has been a growing consensus among the various sectors of Philippine society on the imperatives of democratising access to forest resources. For instance, a Policy Advisory Group, organised by the DENR in 1987, endorsed the constitutional principle of equity and social justice in the management and development of the country’s forest resources. The Advisory Group — with membership from the country’s leading academic and private organisations — argued that “this principle should have primacy over all other considerations including
those of economic efficiency and ecological sustainability” (DENR Policy Advisory Group, 1987:6). They contended that equity in natural resource access is the key to the country’s political stability and the sustainability of these resources.

Along the direction proposed by the Policy Advisory Group, environmental groups throughout the country link their fight for environmental protection with the effort to democratise natural resource access. These groups assert that the environmental problems in the country are primarily an equity issue (Magno, F., 1993). They consider that democratisation process is a major step in the implementation of a people-centred development agenda that emphasises community-based models for resource management. For some environmental leaders, democratising access to resources is the very key to sustainable development (Broad and Cavanagh, 1993).

On the part of the government, particularly the DENR, democratising access to forest resources is seen not only as a means of promoting equity but also of advancing its institutional mandate to sustain the productivity of these resources. Property rights reform, therefore, constitutes one of the core strategies under the PSSD. As explained in the PSSD document (DENR, 1990b:8):

Self-regulation in the exploitation of natural resources can be achieved by assigning secure access rights, perhaps even private ownership over these resources, to responsible individual and communities. Through secure access rights, the individual or community establishes a lasting tie with the resource and a long-term stake in its protection for sustained productivity.

A voluminous literature on land tenure supports DENR’s proposition that secure access rights are essential to the sustainability of forest resources. The central argument of this literature is that they represent an important incentive to individuals and communities to use resources more efficiently and to invest privately in the use of the land (Intal, 1991; Cf. Beder, 1993:168). It has been claimed that secure property rights ensure the people’s commitment to the development, management, protection, and sustainable utilisation of forest resources (Ganguli, 1993). Conversely, adverse effects are observed where property rights are insecure (Lynch, 1992:2):
The tenurial instability of forest dwellers frequently undermines short- and long-term customary incentives to conserve and sustainably manage natural resources and to make long-term improvements. It prevents many small-scale users from legally benefiting from their local natural resource bases. It generates animosity between small-scale users and the natural resource officials and bureaucracies.

In the Philippines, two major solutions have been proposed for democratising forest resource access; these relate to property rights (Lynch, 1992). The more radical approach is through official recognition and delineation of the perimeters of existing community-based tenure systems (Lynch and Talbott, 1988). This will involve the recognition of well-defined ancestral land claims in many parts of the country. Some NGOs and individual defenders of indigenous rights advocate this approach. However, the idea has not yet gained enough support from the DENR leadership — presumably due to its adverse implications for this department. The second approach is to grant property rights and issue resource access agreements/permits to upland communities. This procedure is the one widely implemented by DENR under its community forestry programs and projects.

Lynch (1992) has made an important distinction between community-based tenure systems and resource access instruments, in terms of their prime sources of legitimacy. According to him, community-based tenure systems draw their basic legitimacy from the community within which they operate. Under these systems, "local participants are the primary allocators and enforcers of local rights to forest resources" (Lynch, 1992:3). Resource access instruments, in contrast, draw their main legitimacy from the nation-state which institutes them. Under this approach, the paramount allocator and enforcer of rights to forest resources is the national government. The present study focuses on resource access techniques, since sufficient project experiences are now available to document and critically analyse this approach.

5.3 Resource Access Instruments in Community Forestry

DENR is the primary government agency responsible for the sustainable development of the country’s forest resources (Chapter Three). It has a legal
mandate to exercise supervision and control over all forest lands. Since its reorganisation in 1987, DENR has embraced a new institutional mission of promoting social justice and equity by democratising forest resource access in favour of upland communities. The issuance of resource access instruments enables the DENR to legitimately pursue its new mission on forest resource democratisation while, at the same time, maintaining supervision and control over these resources. Resource access instruments offer its recipient upland communities economic and other benefits from having access rights to forest resources. On the other hand, as a form of legal contract, resource access instruments draw their prime legitimacy from the nation state, thereby providing the government with a sense of control over these resources.

Starting in 1982, DENR has developed and issued several resource access instruments under its major community forestry programs and projects. These programs include the Integrated Social Forestry Program, the Community Forestry Program, and the Forest Land Management Agreement. Under the ISF Program, participants are issued a Certificate of Stewardship Contracts (CSC) or a Community Forest Stewardship Agreement (CFSA) in the case of group beneficiaries. These instruments legitimise their occupancy within forest lands and entitle them to enjoy the benefits that can be generated from proper management of the land for 25 years. They may be renewed for another 25 years provided the stewards have properly developed their areas and complied with their responsibilities stipulated in the contracts.

Under the CFP, the right to manage and utilise existing forest resources is extended to organised upland communities. Qualified communities can be issued a Community Forestry Management Agreement (CFMA) over existing natural forests — initially up to a maximum of 1,000 ha. A CFMA is also valid for 25 years and renewable for another 25 years. It allows organised communities to harvest timber from second growth forest on the condition that the area will be protected and managed according to the principles of sustained-yield forest management. The community must also use a portion of the income derived from harvesting to renew and improve the forest resource and to engage in alternative sources of livelihood.
The FLMA, on the other hand, is basically a joint venture agreement between the government and a family, community, or selected corporation, for the protection and sound management of forest plantations (DENR, 1990c; 1991b). These plantations include those developed under the contract reforestation projects of the DENR and those established by DENR itself. Under the FLMA, the Forest Land Manager is engaged by the government to provide maintenance, protection and management of the forest plantation covered by the contract. In return, the FLMA holder is entitled to harvest, process, utilise or sell, the wood and other commodities produced from the plantation, with a pre-determined share being paid to DENR to recoup the costs of the initial reforestation contract.

In addition to the above, the CVRP-1-SF in coordination with the DENR developed its own resource access instrument, called CTUP. It was a privilege granted by the DENR to organised forest communities, allowing them to commercially utilise the standing and fallen dead trees within the CVRP social forestry site. In return, the organisations were to allocate part of the proceeds from timber extraction for the protection and management of the remaining forest and for the rehabilitation of open and grassland areas.

In general, the type of resource access instrument varies depending on the condition of the forest land. Over the last decade, the application of resource access instruments has expanded from occupied areas (CSC) to plantation forests (FLMA) and to second-growth, and limited areas of old-growth, forests (both through CFMA). These instruments are continually being refined based on the experiences gained from their application.

5.4 Cases of Democratising Forest Resource Access

Limited studies have been conducted about CTUP and CFMA. My research therefore focuses on two government-initiated community forestry projects that use
these instruments. The first case of CVRP-1-SF, focuses on the effects of CTUP issuance on the distribution of forest benefits. The second case on Presentacion Community Forestry Project centres on the claimant issue in forest lands and its implications on the future issuance of CFMA.

5.4.1 Community Timber Utilisation Permit (CTUP): CVRP-1-SF

The aim of CVRP-1-SF was to provide local communities with access to and benefits from the available forest resources as an incentive to sustainable forest management. This was to be pursued through the application of Forest Stand Improvement (FSI) in the available 8,000 ha of logged-over areas within the 17,000 ha project site.\(^8\) FSI involves the cutting of overcrowded young trees, and defective and deformed trees, along with the removal of undesirable brush and vines in logged-over forests. It was traditionally seen as a silvicultural rather than an economic activity; hence, trees cut down during this operation were normally left in the forest to decompose. However, despite the generally inferior wood quality from FSI compared with trees cut during normal harvesting operations, this wood is still of commercial value. It is a useful material for lumber, posts, fuelwood and other wood products.

Proponents of the CVRP-1-SF modified the traditional FSI practice by advocating the commercial utilisation of timber from FSI operations. As noted in the project design, this strategy was expected to achieve two objectives simultaneously (CVRP, n.d.a:37):

1) to promote the growth of the healthy residual trees by removing competing vegetation; and

2) to increase rural income through the sale of hand-sawn lumber, firewood and other forest products.

To pursue the above objectives, detailed activities, estimated timber yield from FSI, and expected financial returns, were all neatly calculated by the project proponents. The project document elaborates (ACIPHIL, 1986:3):

Forest Stewardship Associations (FOSAs) comprised of reforestation participants would be organised to implement FSI under the BFD and
CVRP-I control and guidance. The FOSAs would be allocated areas to FSI operations based on an estimated per capita rate of 8 ha. per member family to be worked in stages (roughly 1.6 ha/family each year). Each 1.6 ha. segment would yield an estimated average 2,200 bd. ft. of wood and 80 poles. Participants would derive an estimated annual income of P2,750 per family for about five years. In all activities, labor intensive methods would be emphasized. Patches of low grade forests and/or open lands in the FSI areas would be upgraded via enrichment planting. After several years, government would grant long-term permits for selective cutting of healthy, mature residuals provided FOSAs demonstrated commitment to (and capability for) rational, conservation-oriented forest management during FSI operations.

FSI was seen by the project designers as an initial step towards pioneering a new approach to smallholder commercial utilisation of timber which could be applied nationwide. As indicated above, it was envisioned that after several years of implementing FSI, long-term permits would be sought from the then BFD to implement a community-based type of timber concession. Unlike recent attempts to restructure the timber industry in favour of community-based forestry, CVRP-I-SF’s approach was seen by its designers as being complementary to the activities of the corporate sector in the timber industry (Dugan, 1985). It was calculated that small-scale producers would extract raw materials from the mountains and deliver them for processing to the corporate sector more cheaply than could be done by using heavy equipment. This made sense because the remaining commercial forests were already patchy and located in less accessible areas where the use of heavy equipment was economically unviable. Such a mutually supportive arrangement between the corporate sector and the smallholder timber producers had never been tried in most developing countries.

5.4.1.1 Stabilising the Project Environment

Project staff found that achieving FSI objectives was not as straightforward as it had appeared to be in project documents. In reality, implementing a community forestry project was a complex business. Many things were uncertain and beyond the control of implementing agencies. For instance, recruitment of participants was a
difficult task. In Barangay Bamban, members initially rejected the project due to frustration experienced with the previous government-initiated schemes (cf. Box 5.1). Peace and order problems in the area also led others to think that the project was supported by the communists.\(^\text{10}\)

External forces also added to the complexity of pursuing the project objectives. During the interim period between project design (mid 1981) and on-site implementation (mid 1984), two major complications occurred. First, the collapse of the country’s sugar industry in the early 1980s threw thousands of rural people out of work — particularly in the provinces of Negros Oriental and Occidental. ACIPHIL Consultants Incorporated (the consulting firm for project implementation) estimated that approximately 1,300 of these jobless families entered the social forestry area to do \textit{kaingin} for a living (ACIPHIL, 1986). As a result, the number of occupant families was believed to have doubled from roughly 1,200 to about 2,500, creating much pressure in the remaining forested areas. Secondly, the nationwide drought during the period 1982-83 resulted in big forest fires in the project area. The combined effects of these two events reduced the 8,000 ha logged-over area to around 5,000 ha (ACIPHIL, 1986). These events necessitated alterations in the project strategy. As explained by the first CVRP-1-SF Project Manager, Gerry Mascariñas:

\begin{center}
\textbf{Box 5.1 Barangay Leader: “Government Projects Stink”}
\end{center}

Government projects already stunk in this place when CVRP was introduced. Under the government education program, teachers are not good models to emulate. They arrive in the area on Tuesdays and go home on Thursdays instead of teaching from Monday to Friday. The irrigation project of the National Irrigation Administration benefited only the outside contractors and labourers from the neighbouring municipalities. The construction of the structure was also sub-standard so it didn’t last for a year. DENR’s reforestation project in the neighbouring towns was also frustrating. The forest occupants were hired as labourers in the project and were promised that the trees planted in their farms would be theirs in the future. However, as the trees grew, they were forced by DENR officials to vacate their farms claiming that these were government land and part of its reforestation project. Since CVRP was introduced as government project, people shied away from it (Interview with Barangay Leader, Ayungon, Negros Occidental, 16/11/92).
The original plan was to consolidate in one or two pilot areas then to radiate from there. By consolidation, we mean that the local people are the ones implementing the project, their organisation is already strong, and there is already a semblance of sustainability in their activities. We presumed this would take two years or more from project initiation. But we had to change our plan to immediately cover all the 12 barangays because of rampant illegal cutting and rapidly spreading kaingin areas. We were afraid that by the time we were ready to radiate, there would be no more forest to manage (Interview, 27/11/92, Dumaguete City).

The promise of timber utilisation through FSI served as an incentive for local people to participate in the protection of forest resources. It was supported by local barangay officials who, in turn, convinced their constituency to join the project. In essence, timber utilisation became the project’s ‘entry point’. To gain the support of local people in forest protection, and in anticipation of the early approval of the timber utilisation permit, project staff facilitated the formation of Forest Stewardship Associations (FOSAs) in the 12 project barangays. The first FOSA, Yasoma, was formed in August 1984, barely two months after the project commenced. By the end of the 1985, the project claimed to have ‘organised’ 10 FOSAs, an additional 14 FOSAs by 1986, and the last two by 1987 (CVRP-1, 1992a).

However, the idea of community timber utilisation was still very new — especially in the forestry bureaucracy. It had never been tested on the ground. Neither had it been investigated local researchers and by academics. The prevailing practice during the period was the issuance of timber cutting permits to capital-intensive TLAs. The government also granted short-term licences for various types of ‘salvage operations’, but none of these included a permit that was consistent with a community-based approach (Dugan, 1985). In late 1984, BFD central authorities disallowed timber utilisation through FSI, but approved the agroforestry and reforestation components of the project (CVRP-1, n.d.b).

To maintain legitimacy and stabilise the relationship with the local people, CVRP staff proposed an alternative to FSI. This involved using the standing and fallen dead trees which abounded in the project area as a result of the 1983 forest fires and the severe tropical typhoon that hit the area in 1984. CVRP staff initiated an inventory of these trees, then facilitated the FOSAs’ request to be issued with
timber utilisation permit. The request was favourably endorsed by BFD District in Ayungon and the Regional Office in Cebu, to the BFD Central Office in Manila. In March 1985, the BFD Central Office refused the request, on the grounds that Marcos had banned all forms of logging in Negros Oriental. The CVRPO asked for an exemption from this ban, but the relevant documents were said to be lost in the Office of the President, in Manila, during the February 1986 EDSA Revolution (CVRP-1, n.d.b).

By this time, the political temperature had risen in the project area. Various FOSAs became cynical about project staff — the former felt betrayed and became suspicious that the scheme was just no different from previous ones. CVRP-1-SF field staff perceived threats of bodily harm from local people; they threatened resignation if timber utilisation permits were not immediately awarded to the different FOSAs.

Changes in the leadership of the Ministry of Natural Resources (MNR now DENR) after the EDSA Revolution favoured the issuance of CTUP. The newly appointed Minister, Ernesto Maceda, was a former boss of the BFD Regional Director for the Central Visayas, Jose Gapas. Gapas had served as a consultant under the project. Similarly, the appointed Deputy Minister, Sarraga, was a good friend of another consultant in forestry, Patrick Dugan. One of MNR Assistant Ministers, Benjamin Leong, was also a close friend of the CVRP Executive Director, Rey Crystal. These connections assisted the issuance of MNR Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1986, delegating authority to the BFD Regional Director to issue CTUP. This was the first instance of such delegation in the history of Philippine forestry. In May 1986, the first seven CTUPs were awarded to seven FOSAs. Another 11 CTUPs were awarded in October 1986 by Minister Maceda himself during his visit to the project site. Limited to the utilisation of available standing and fallen dead trees in the project area, CTUPs had a maximum tenure of two years.

5.4.1.2 Promises Unfulfilled: Realities of Project Implementation
CTUPs offered some prospects of promoting equity in access to forest resources and improving the lot of the local forest occupants. It was the first permit issued by the Philippine government which gave forest occupants the opportunity to legally derive income from the utilisation of forest trees. Although timber utilisation was limited to dead trees, wood extracted from the operation was still of commercial value. Moreover, CTUPs were seen by CVRP staff and consultants as a potential vehicle for forest protection and rehabilitation. Part of the proceeds from timber extraction were to be allocated by the different FOSAs to protect and manage the remaining forest and to rehabilitate the open and grassland areas within their respective boundaries (Yao, 1992.).

When CTUPs were issued, most of the FOSAs were not equipped to undertake labour-intensive timber utilisation. Few FOSA members were interested in handsawing timber, since most of them were farmers by occupation. In order to facilitate timber exploitation, outside sawyers had to be hired to train FOSA members. The situation led to a proliferation of outside sawyers who ended up pocketing more money than FOSA members who were unfamiliar with the job. In the case of Yasoma FOSA for instance, only 25 pairs of the estimated 100 pairs of sawyers were FOSA members. Ten pairs were non-members, but lived in the same locality, while the remaining 65 pairs came from other municipalities.

Most of the sawyers suffered a ‘hand-to-mouth existence’. They needed cash to provide for their families while they were working in the mountains. However, FOSAs did not have the initial capital to support the cash requirements of the sawyers. To meet their needs, FOSA Presidents usually came to an arrangement with buyers or businessmen who advanced some money for a specified volume of lumber. As a result, the buyers were able to control the prices of lumber.

Within the FOSAs, benefits from timber extraction mostly accrued to the officials who controlled CTUP operations and marketing. Some FOSA officials received P0.20 for every bd ft of lumber sawn from outside sawyers. This served as a payment to enable them to work in the FOSA. In addition, some Presidents who handled the marketing also received as much as P0.50 per bd ft of lumber as a bribe for selling (including ‘fresh lumber’ cut from live trees) to a favoured buyer. On top
of these bribes, all FOSA officers received an honorarium for every bd ft of lumber sold (Figure 5.1).

Due to the fact that most FOSA Presidents controlled the marketing of lumber, the Presidency became a much coveted position. Businessmen supported their own candidates to ensure that they would have a monopoly in purchasing lumber produced by the FOSA. During an interview, some officials and members from Yasoma FOSA, said that vote buying had became so rampant that certain businessmen paid as much as P150 per vote in support of their candidates. “The ‘cost’ per vote was three times higher compared to the 1985 national Presidential election where people received only P50 per vote”, a FOSA member recalled. Pocketing of the FOSA’s share (P1.00 per bd ft) by officials was also common in the project area. Still none could equal that of the Yasoma FOSA. Its members filed suit against their President for failing to account for P1.3 million which was missing (Yao, 1992).

The high demand for quality lumber led to the cutting of live trees. In Yasoma FOSA,¹² for instance, a barangay official estimated that more than 50 percent of the more than 5,000 m³ lumber extracted from the area came from live trees. In group discussions conducted with FOSA members, it was revealed that in order to circumvent CTUP policy, which allowed only the utilisation of dead trees, live trees were treated with chemicals to destroy their root systems. Two investigations conducted by the BFD Regional Office in July and September 1987 confirmed the cutting of live trees (Yao, 1992). The second investigation also revealed that some BFD and CVRP field personnel had tolerated illegal cuttings and facilitated the shipment of fresh lumber. In January
Figure 5.1 Sharing of benefits from one bd ft of lumber sold at P6.60, CVRP-I, CTUP operation, 1986-88
(Source: Interview with FOSA members and officers, lumber buyer/businessman, and lumber dealers, CVPR fieldwork, 1993)
1988, the DENR Secretary sent an inter-agency team to assess the project. Their report confirmed the illegal activities in the area and served as the basis for the cancellation of all CTUPs on August of the same year.

The cancellation of the CTUPs left some FOSA members in a sudden economic depression — especially the hillside farmers who had abandoned their farms to concentrate on timber utilisation (CVRP, n.d.b:19). Most of them had to continue with the activity, this time illegally, to eke out a living. In the absence of other livelihood sources, the local people continued to encroach on the forested areas to make *kaingins*. The combined effects of illegal cutting and *kaingin* making continue to contribute to forest depletion in the area —especially since CVRP’s termination in December 1992.13

Overall, the businessmen/buyers benefited most. A simple computation made for one bd ft of timber sold at the conservative price of P6.50 revealed the following sharing of benefits: P2.00 for hauler and sawyers; P1.00 for FOSA share; P1.50-P2.00 for transporting costs; and P1.50-P2.00 as the buyer’s profit (Figure 5.1). This means that of the estimated total value of timber harvested by all 18 FOSAs, amounting to P34.6 million14, about 28 per cent (P9.3 million) went to around 20 businessmen, while only P13.4 million or 39 per cent was earned by roughly 500 sawyers and haulers.

Even the plan to use a part of the proceeds from timber utilisation to finance reforestation activities was hardly realised. Few FOSAs allotted part of their share for reforestation, while only Malicon FOSA continued to undertake forest protection and maintenance of planted seedlings. Group discussion with the Malicon members revealed that this is primarily to the watershed value of the adjacent forest. About 300 ha of irrigated farms rely on the Malicon watershed for water supply. Chapter Seven elaborates more on the Malicon case as it relates to the issue of forest sustainability.

5.4.1.3 What Went Wrong With CTUP?
Official evaluations, project reports, World Bank Aide Memoires, and personal assessments by project implementors, FOSA members, and observers, offered varied answers to the question of why CTUP had failed to achieve the socio-economic and environmental objectives of its designers. These answers, however, generally can be categorised under poor practice, that is, CTUP was applied at the wrong time in an appropriate manner.

An inter-agency evaluation team commissioned by the DENR Secretary in January 1988 pointed out that one of the reasons for failure was the inappropriate use of CTUP as the ‘project’s entry point’ (Inter-agency Evaluation Team, 1988:8). The team concluded that FOSA members were unprepared for CTUP operations since they did not receive any training on forest conservation from either the CVRP or BFD. This conclusion was supported by some local DENR personnel and former CVRP staff whom I interviewed on the CTUP issue. For a number of them, agroforestry would have been a more appropriate entry point for the project. They believed that CTUP should have been set up only after the local people had been fully trained so as to understand the importance of forest conservation. They also argued that better results could have been achieved had CTUP operations been piloted first in a few FOSAs.

Generally, the consensus among project evaluators, implementors, and FOSA members was that CTUP’s failure was primarily one of mismanagement. Problems commonly cited include: 1) the absence of clear guidelines and policies on CTUP implementation; 2) no clear-cut definitions of duties and responsibilities of the implementing agencies; and 3) lack of close monitoring and field supervision by the CVRP and BFD personnel.

Convinced that the failure of CTUP could be turned around by improving practices, in 1991 an inter-sectoral group with representation from CVRP-1-SF field personnel, local DENR, LGU and FOSA Officials proposed detailed guidelines governing the issuance and operation of CTUP in the project site. These guidelines in the form of a regional administrative order were to be signed by the DENR Regional Executive Director in the hope that CTUPs could be reissued. This administrative order contained the basic concepts and objectives of CTUP, the terms
and conditions of issuance, the duties and obligations of the recipient FOSAs, the duties and responsibilities of a CTUP management committee whose role was to oversee the CTUP operations, and the penalties for violations of the CTUP terms and conditions. With the termination of CVRP-1-SF in 1992, the proposed guidelines were never implemented.

In addition to poor practice, however, the historical and political context in which the CTUP was applied also contributed to its paradoxical effects. The most obvious expression of this was the involvement of some BFD and CVRP personnel in facilitating a shipment of fresh lumber (Yao, 1992). A number of BFD personnel formerly assigned to the project site were said to be included in the monthly payroll of some businessmen in exchange for a variety of illicit favours including underscaling of timber and allowing the transport of fresh lumber. Such behaviour has an historical precedence. During the logging years of the 1960s and 1970s, it was common knowledge that BFD personnel made huge amounts of money from colluding with TLA holders. As a result of the cancellation of all TLAs in Negros Oriental in 1979 they lost this additional source of income. CTUP operations allowed them to regain this additional source of income although at a reduced amount.

A less overt expression of politics was the attempt of some CVRP staff to influence the then Barangay Captain of Bamban in the formation of five FOSAs. As attested by the Barangay Captain himself, the CVRP staff requested him to form the FOSAs having failed to ‘recruit’ barangay members to join the project because of the latter’s bad experiences with previous government projects. As a consequence, the CVRP staff failed to check the illicit activities of the Barangay Captain during the CTUP operations because they ‘already owed him a favour’. At the FOSA level, politics took the form of FOSA leaders controlling the operations, colluding with buyers or outside sawyers, or running away with the CTUP money. As one FOSA member commented: ‘It is always the more educated leaders who benefit most from development activities like CTUP’.

An interplay of politics and poor practice was evident in the involvement of two mayors of Bindoy and Ayungon in hiring CVRP labourers. CVRPO hired all
the technical staff, but most of the project labourers were hired on the recommendation of the two mayors. There were about 60 labourers who supervised the nursery activities, assisted in reforestation and forest protection, and supported the CTUP staff in supervising operations. Most of these labourers, according to a former CVRP staffer whom I interviewed, were either family members, close relatives, or friends, of the sawyers, and because of this, they failed to check reported violations in the project sites. When I asked why CVRP staff had failed to check these violations he said it was partly due to the 21 motorcycles provided by the project. I found his explanation interesting:

We, as the project’s Resource Management Specialists, went only up to the nursery sites. We went as far as the motorcycle brought us, that is, where there is road. The 21 service motorcycles provided by the project were not good for development. When I still did not have my service motorcycle, I went to the inner parts of the forest. But after I had my service, I could only go as far as the road side. The motorcycles transformed us into technocrats. We did not really know what was happening in the forest. We mainly relied on the report of the labourers (Interview, Davao City, 18/09/93).

In a broader political context, CTUP issuance had its counterinsurgency dimension. The influx of migrants to the project site during the collapse of the sugar industry in the early 1980s was an indication of the fragility of the socio-economic and political situation on the whole Negros island. The failure of the sugar industry is related to the broader Philippine political economy — a subject not covered in this study. Suffice it to say that the collapse, coupled with the highly skewed land distribution in Negros island, called for major government intervention to prevent the CPP/NPA takeover in the area. This implies that as far as the Marcos administration and the World Bank were concerned, the immediate objective of the project was to stabilise the political situation in the area. If in the process of project implementation, the official objectives could be attained, so much the better.

The failure of CTUP, however, is not only associated with politics and poor practice. In the next Section, I examine the case of Presentacion CFP to show that the tendency to produce paradoxical effects is inherent in the use of resource access instruments such as CTUP.
5.4.2 Community Forest Management Agreement (CFMA): Presentacion CFP

During a field assessment of the 70 ha contract reforestation within the Presentacion CFP on 15 February 1992, we discovered to our great disappointment — that the reforestation bunk house had been destroyed. The wooden slab floor had been almost completely removed. More than half the roof, constructed from the local *nipa* (a type of palm commonly used for roofing) material, had been dismantled as well. We found some of the materials, tied in bundles, ready for hauling away. A few minutes after we had found the wrecked bunk house, an old man who had been hauling the materials arrived — very much surprised by our presence. Obviously, he was the person responsible for the wreck. Throughout our stay in the bunk house, which lasted for almost half an hour, the old man remained silent. He did not even respond to the proposal of a Pag-Bicol (the project assisting NGO) staff member that he haul back all the materials and reconstruct the bunk house. This was despite the offer of assistance by some members of the local CFP Cooperative (BREDCI), and payment for his labour.

To some of us who witnessed the incident, the old man’s behaviour was an expression of his lack of support for the project. To others, it was an act of outright stupidity. To the DENR Regional CFP Coordinator, it was indicative of the NGO’s poor performance in community organisation. A deeper inquiry into the old man’s behaviour, however, showed its substantive logic. His dismantling of the bunk house, and unwillingness to reconstruct it, can be read as a form of resistance to what appeared to him as contradictions in the CFP. The CFP had promised to democratise resource access through the issuance of CFMAs to organised upland communities. Yet, so far, it had deprived him and his family from making a living from their nine hectares of land which happened to be within the ‘forest zone’. It was on this land that reforestation bunk house and an adjacent project nursery had been constructed by some members of BREDCI — the local forestry cooperative organised by Pag-Bicol staff. My interview with the old man (known to the local residents as Pay Belo) and his two sons, a month after the incident, gave me a better
understanding of his personal circumstances as well as broader issues concerning CFMAs (Box 5.2).

**Box 5.2  The Personal Circumstances of Pay Belo**

Pay Belo owned 10 ha land which he bought in 1946. He considers this land as the only gift he can give to his 11 children. As far as his family is concerned, education is a privilege of the rich. Before the CFP implementation, he and his five sons cultivated their land and planted rice, root crops, abaca (Manila hemp), and tiger grass. When CFP was introduced in the area in 1990, two of his sons joined the project. The prospects of a better life through CFMA and other livelihood opportunities were their primary motivations for joining.

When the 70 ha contract reforestation was established, 6 of his 10 hectares were planted with forest species by the BREDCI members. Part of the area where he used to plant rice was also converted by BREDCI members to a nursery. He was promised that the place would be given back to him as soon as the seedlings had been planted in the reforestation area. However, the delayed release of funds for outplanting resulted in overgrown seedlings that were no longer suited for planting. As a result, he had not used the area for almost three years because he was afraid to remove the overgrown seedlings.

It was also in this area where the reforestation bunk house was constructed. According to Pay Belo, he was made to understand that the bunk house would be given to him after three years. Since nearly three years had elapsed since its construction, he decided to use its materials for his own purposes. After all, the bunk house was promised to be given to him and the land where it was erected also belongs to him.

Pay Belo’s two sons have resigned from the project since their incomes from pump-priming activities were not sufficient to support their own families. The brothers now live as tenants. Their own land is now planted with forest trees under the project because it falls within the forest zone.

(Interview, Presentacion Camarines Sur, 10/03/93).

5.4.2.1  Democratising Claimed Areas

Technically, the DENR through CFP, intends to ‘place a system of institutional ownership or stewardship’ over fragmented residual forests that are located mostly in former logging areas (Guiang, 1991:41). In Presentacion CFP, this involves a 1,863 ha logged over area to be placed under the management of BREDCI through the issuance of CFMAs. Advocates of community forestry believed that CFMAs facilitate the ‘returning of the forest to the people’ and help to arrest poverty and forest depletion in CFP areas such as Presentacion (Dugan, 1989; Guiang, 1991).

DENR’s objective ignores the fact that most of these areas are claimed or occupied by upland cultivators. Based on a nationwide comprehensive study
conducted by Cruz, Zosa-Feranil, and Goze (1986), it was estimated that there are now around 11 million people occupying forest lands (Cruz et al., 1992). The majority of these people are farming in these areas (World Bank, 1989a). In Presentacion, and probably in most upland areas, addressing the claimant issue with regard to forest lands is crucial to the implementation of community forestry projects. The complexity of this issue is expressed in the 1991 Accomplishment Report of Pag-Bicol:

The project has identified a total of 98 families with claims within the CFP site. When their claims were laid out in the CFP project map, one can say that the whole area looks like a subdivision... They [claimants] refused the inclusion of their claimed lots in the areas to be developed as contract reforestation, timber stand improvement, assisted natural regeneration, and agroforestry. This led to project implementation delays and strained community relations between BREDCI members and the claimants. In many instances, threats of physical harm and heated confrontations occurred between the regular members and the claimants (Pag-Bicol, 1991; clarification added in parentheses).

A more recent census of the claimants done in 1993 showed that there are a total of 105 families with claims within 268 ha ‘old project contracts’ signed by Pag-Bicol in 1990. Of these families, only 33 (31 per cent) are BREDCI members, while 72 (69 per cent) are non-members (Table 5.1). In addition, an undetermined number of families claimed a significant part of the new 1,000 ha CFP contract signed on 13 December 1991. An interview with some BREDCI officials revealed that only about 400 ha of the 1,000 ha ‘new contract’ are not claimed. However, a recent project document (Pag-Bicol and BREDCI, 1993) shows that there are a total of 140 families claiming 840 ha within the 1,863 ha project area. This represents 13 per cent of the 805 families in the four project barangays. A short account of the increased occupancy in the project area and the transformation of the local forest resources is presented in Box 5.3, based on an interview with a local resident.

Different groups view the claimant issue from various perspectives. Local DENR officials maintain that the lands being claimed are ‘public lands’, hence ‘cannot be subject to individual ownership and titling’ (Pag-Bicol, 1991:6). This implies that the claimants have no right to resist the various pump-priming activities on their lots. On the other hand, the claimants, especially the non-BREDCI
members, believe they have ownership rights to their claimed lands. They argue they have already invested much time, money and effort in buying and/or developing their lots, decades before the entry of CFP (Pag-Bicol, 1991). In an interview with a group of claimants, one of them proudly showed a ‘Deed of Absolute Sale’. The document is properly notarised by a lawyer involving a 10 hectare claimed area which he purchased in 1974.

Table 5.1 Number of claimants within the 268 ha ‘old project contracts’, Presentacion CFP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE OF PUMP-PRIMING ACTIVITIES</th>
<th>AREA UNDER CONTRACT (ha)</th>
<th>NUMBER OF CLAIMANTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BREDCI MEMBERS</td>
<td>NON-MEMBERS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contract Reforestation (^a)</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contract Reforestation (^a)</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assisted Natural Regeneration</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timber Stand Improvement</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rattan Plantation</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agroforestry</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\) There are two reforestation contracts within the 268 ha covered under the old contracts.

Source: Presentacion CFP project documents and interview with BREDCI officials.

The views of some Pag-Bicol staff and BREDCI officials and members regarding the claimant issue seem to support the DENR’s ‘public land’ argument.\(^{21}\) Part of the reason appears to relate to their commitment to get the different pump-priming activities done on the project site — including the claimed areas. Pag-Bicol is a main signatory with DENR and BREDCI in the two project contracts involving the different pump-priming activities. Both Pag-Bicol and BREDCI are accountable to DENR in ensuring that these activities are implemented and the physical targets for them are being met. On the other hand, most BREDCI members earn additional income from the various pump-priming activities. They are also the future recipients of the CFMA.
Box 5.3 History of Forest Occupancy in the Project Site: An Oral Account by Pay Garing

“In 1935, the forest edge was still adjacent to Lagunoy Gulf,” recalled Oligario Aleno, an oral historian from Barangay Maangas, one of the four barangays covered by CFP. Fondly called Pay Garing, Mr. Aleno, now in his late sixties, clearly remembered the transformation of the local forest resources and the increase occupancy on the project area.

Pay Garing recalled that they used to have a big wooden house a few metres from the shore line in Barangay Maangas. The forest edge was then only about 200 metres from the shore line. Their house posts were round timber, mostly molave species (Vitex parviflora), cut not very far from the place. Now, the species can hardly be found, if not totally extinct from the area.

The major source of livelihood during that period was fishing, although kaingin was also important. Some migrants interested to do kaingin making, bought claimed areas from local kaingineros. Having sold their claims, these kaingineros cleared additional forest lands for their own cultivation. However, people's practice of kaingin making was not very destructive during the period. They fallowed the land for a period to allow it to regain its fertility.

According to Pay Garing, cultivation significantly increased in the area during World War II. The Japanese army’s occupation of the near-shore areas drove the people to the mountain — where they sought refuge. The only means of survival then was to clear the forest and engage in kaingin making. It became their main source of livelihood for five years until liberation in 1945. After the liberation, most people left the mountain — to search for a better livelihood and to have their children educated in the lowlands. However, most of them maintained their claimed areas. They continued to plant root crops and perennial crops in their kaingins to augment their income from other livelihood sources such as fishing.

Pay Garing recalled that the second wave of claimants started to flow into the area during the first logging operation in 1965. Local residents and migrants working on the logging operations staked their claims in logged over areas and converted them to kaingins. Buying and selling of claimed lots also increased during this period. After the fifth, and last, TLA holder left the place in 1984, most of the displaced workers stayed in the area and continued working in their kaingins. In addition, migrants from nearby barangays and municipalities either bought existing claims or staked their own claims in the logged over areas. As a result, claimed areas which were dispersed before became numerous and adjacent to each other.

The series of five logging operations from 1965 to 1984, followed by kaingin making, contributed much to the depletion of forest resources in the project area. Pay Garing estimated that one has to walk now for more than five kilometres from the barangay proper before reaching the nearest forest edge, which was only 200 metres away half a century ago.

(Interview, Presentacion, Camarines Sur, 12/01/93).

The issuance of CFMA to BREDCI can have serious negative repercussions in the absence of a more acceptable and beneficial arrangement with the claimants — especially since most of them derive their main source of living from their claimed areas. BREDCI’s bias towards planting forest trees in these areas to satisfy DENR’s requirements clashes with the claimants’ need to plant food crops for their subsistence. The current technology of intercropping trees with food crops
(agroforestry) does not appear promising under the local circumstances, partly because of the prescribed close spacing of forest trees (2-3m by 3m) under contract reforestation. The main reason, however, is the prohibition of the prevailing practice of burning *kaingin* areas during site preparation since it might also destroy the planted tree. More than the land’s present economic value, however, some of the claimants, such as Pay Belo, regard their claimed areas as the only inheritance they can leave to their children. Others have also established some form of emotional attachment to their lands, since these have sustained both them and their parents and will continue to provide for their children and grandchildren.

Important questions also arise with the transition from individual claims to a cooperative type of land stewardship, once CFMA is awarded to BREDCI. First, is who will decide the long-term development of the claimed area — will it be BREDCI, the individual claimant, or both? Resolving this question is very important due to the long gestation period involved in forest production. Second is the matter of benefit distribution. What is the most appropriate sharing arrangement between the claimants and BREDCI of the benefits derived from the claimants’ lands? These are crucial issues that need to be settled by the different parties involved.

5.4.2.2 *Regulated Freedom, Paradoxical Effects and Resistance*

Prior to the introduction of the project in 1990, people had control over their claimed areas and the crops that they produced. Claimants within the forest zone could freely undertake *kaingin* making and plant whatever crops they required without any interference from the government. Some of them even paid tax to the municipal government, adding legitimacy to their claims. Individual claims were also recognised and respected by their neighbours and the whole community — even in the absence of supporting papers as evidence of ‘ownership’. Claimants had the ‘right’ to exclude others from encroaching onto their ‘possession’. This right drew its legitimacy from local tradition rather than from the government legal system: that all lands of public domain are owned by the State.
The local people’s ‘free access’ to the remaining forest resources also provided them a sense of ‘control’ over these resources. As mentioned in Chapter Four, almost 100 households were engaged in illegal timber cutting and timber business before the project started in 1990. Some of them were full time, while others engaged in these activities only during lean months when food was scarce. For some of the local people, timber resources served, according to Chambers, Saxena, and Shah (1990:19), as “savings banks and cashable assets” — particularly to the poorer sector of the community. Timber cutting was an important source of cash, especially in times of emergency such as sickness or death in the family, or even in meeting social obligations such as weddings and barangay fiestas. While legal control over forest resources rested with the DENR, the local people were also in control in a practical sense, since they could access these resources whenever they were in need. This form of access was, of course, illegal as far as DENR’s regulations were concerned. According to one BREDCI officer, local people also managed to ‘control’ the DENR officials — who occasionally visited the area — by feeding them good food and giving them some cash.

The use of CFMA as a resource access instrument assists the government’s ‘territorial reach’ into the claimed areas of the project. It also regulates the local people’s ‘free access’ to timber resources in the remaining second-growth forest. CFMA is a legal contract to be entered between the DENR and BREDCI concerning the management and development of the 1,863 ha project area. It entitles the BREDCI members to certain forest benefits in exchange for their compliance with regard to government-defined forest management and development responsibilities. CFMA is therefore a form of instrumental contract aimed at a specific performance or result. It does not change the classification of the project area — the land remains legally owned by the State. Instead, the contract formalises the role of the local people and holds them accountable for the management and development of the area in exchange for the right to commercially utilise existing forest resources following the principles of sustained-yield management. Thus, CFMA offers the local people in Presentacion CFP a form of regulated freedom in their access to forest land and the resources therein.
Contrary to the common belief that CFMA would promote the ‘returning of the forest to the people’, local people found that it had reinforced the DENR’s jurisdiction over forest land and resources in the area. With the implementation of the project, most of the claimed areas — including Pay Belo’s 6 hectares — were subject to the project’s pump-priming activities. These areas are now planted to trees and no longer suitable for kaingin. It should be made clear, however, that CFMA does not nullify the claimants’ ‘rights’ to their lands. Instead, the claimants were forced to forfeit their control over the type of crops they planted in these areas because planted trees had started to close their canopies which meant that cash crops could no longer be grown.

In the same manner, the local people’s free access to forest resources was curtailed if not totally controlled. One of the conditions for the issuance of CFMA is that BREDICI must demonstrate that it is capable of protecting the remaining forest resources in the project area. Thus, BREDICI and Pag-Bicol, with some assistance from DENR, jointly conduct forest protection activities. Their efforts have significantly minimised illegal activities in the area. Pag-Bicol noted in its 1991 Annual Report that the incidence of illegal activities in the project area was reduced by 80 per cent during the first year of implementation. Similarly, kaingin making was minimised.

The above does not imply that the DENR’s offer of a regulated freedom through CFMA has inherently by sinister control motives. On the contrary, CFMA’s objective is to legalise and organise the local people’s access to forest benefits in order to promote the sustainable management of forest resources. The claimed areas that have been planted to trees are meant to augment the remaining second-growth forest so as to have sufficient area for sustainable forest management. On the other hand, DENR’s contracting of Pag-Bicol to prepare the community socially and technically for the CTUP issuance attests to DENR’s commitment to resource democratisation and sustainable forest management. Moreover, the fact that most illegal cutters — and some claimants, including the two sons of Pay Belo — voluntarily joined the project implies that they perceived DENR’s proposal to be well intentioned. That this proposal was later met with resistance was due to a
number of factors — some of which have been mentioned above. Others include: the inability of the project to provide viable livelihood alternatives; and a host of administrative factors. These two points need further elaboration.

During the seven-day series of program orientation, organised by Pag-Bicol, regarding the CFP, local people were told of the prospective benefits of the project. They were to be organised into a forestry association, undergo training in forest management, and engage in pump-priming activities while waiting for the CFMA to be issued. As mentioned in Chapter Four, pump-priming activities served two purposes: as an alternative source of livelihood to stop illegal cutting and *kaingin* making; and to train the local people in the principles of sustained-yield forest management. The prospects for improved living situations encouraged the local people (including the illegal cutters and some claimants) to join the project. Promises of the ‘good life’ that goes with CTUP issuance has, to some extent, inspired them to become aligned with the national agenda in forest management.

During its first year of operation the project went smoothly despite some resistance from a number of claimants. However, the delay in releasing funds to sustain the various pump-priming activities discouraged the participants — most of whom relied on the project for their cash requirements. Bureaucratic red tape was partly responsible for the delay but more especially, the cash flow problem of the Philippine Government.\(^{23}\) From 1991 to the end of 1992, the project operated for only six months due to the limited release of funds. This period also coincided with the Philippine Presidential election and contributed to the holding back of reforestation funds for a time. Pag-Bicol, in an effort to keep the project going, incurred a total debt of P700,000 from other NGOs. The total interest and service charges for this amount was P58,000, presumably to be shoulders by Pag-Bicol. In addition, there was the cost of delayed salary payments to Pag-Bicol staff and the burden of shouldering some project expenses to enable staff to continue work on the project site.

At the community level, delayed budget releases could mean curtailing a number of basic needs of some project participants — particularly the timber cutters and *kaingineros* who gave up their former sources of livelihood to become involved
in the project. There were instances, where it had also resulted in further indebtedness since by the time they received their wages these were not even sufficient to cover their debts. It took three months before people could be paid their wages in the pump-priming activities. This was one reason why a number of BREDCI members resigned. Most of them mentioned during interviews that their family would not have been able to survive given limited employment provided by the project and the delay payment of wages. Others returned to illegal cutting. Even those who remained as BREDCI members complained. As an old man emotionally told us during an interview:

What will the government do to us? We are prohibited from timber sawing. We are also prohibited from kaingin making. We are waiting for work under the project but it only comes in a trickle. Even the wages are delayed. If we did not work as hired labourers on other people’s farm, our families would not survive (Interview, Presentacion, Camarines Sur, 19/03/93).

As tension increases in the project area so do varying forms of resistance, for example, the visible type such as claimants directly confronting the BREDCI and Pag-Bicol’s attempt to incorporate their farm lands in the several pump-priming activities, and the actions of Pay Belo in dismantling a bunk house for his own use. However, there are also hidden forms of resistance. In January 1993, about 2,000 saplings and pole size Acacia mangium were mysteriously cut in the reforestation site. Some cut saplings were even hauled to near a foot trail — allegedly to draw attention to what had been done. Most of the community believed it had been done by the family of an illegal timber cutter whose squared lumber had been confiscated by BREDCI officers a month earlier. In an interview with the BREDCI President, however, he disclosed that it had probably been done by some claimants who did not want their land planted with forest trees.

5.5 Summary

In recent years, the intention to democratise forest resource access has occupied a central agenda in Philippine forest management. The idea has gained support from
different sectors of society, and is regarded by some environmental groups as the key to sustainable development. The basic mechanism by which the government advances the democratisation of forest resources is the issuing of resource access agreements or permits. These instruments promise their recipient communities benefits from the forest resources. On the other hand, they provide the government with a sense of assurance that these communities will sustainably manage forest resources by regulating them from a distance.

Resource access instruments draw their main legitimacy from the central government. Contrary to the claim that their issuance assists the ‘returning of the forests to the people’, in fact they tend to reinforce the government’s jurisdiction over a given forest area through a form of regulated freedom. This form of freedom encourages the involvement of local people in community forestry projects. It also helps to encourage the upland communities to become aligned with the objectives of the central government. The fact that regulated freedom did not work in both CVRP-1-SF and CFP Presentacion — for a variety of reasons — reveals the complexity of attempting to govern communities from a distance by the use of resource access instruments.

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1 For a detailed account on how the elite and more influential sectors of the Philippines have benefited from the country’s forest resources, please refer to the works of Vitug (1993a, 1993b); Porter and Ganapin, (1988); (Broad and Cavanagh, 1993); Robles (1990); Batario (1990); Villadiego (1991); and Bagadion (1990).

2 For an important contribution on this subject with some relevance to the Philippines, please refer to: Cornist, Javier and Escueta (1986); Intal (1991); Sajise and Ganapin (1990); Lynch (1992); Durner and Thiessehussen (1992); Cornista (1993); de Guzman (1993); Ganguli (1993); Gasgonia (1992); Salazar (1993); and Sajise (1994).

3 Key national NGOs advocating recognition of community-based tenure systems are the Legal Rights and Natural Resources Center, Inc., the Legal Assistance Center for Indigenous Filipinos (PANLIPI); and the Philippine Association for Intercultural Development Incorporated (PAFID).

4 There is a prevailing belief in the DENR that once community based tenure systems have been officially recognised and delineated, DENR will lose an estimated 25 to 59 per cent of its jurisdiction and control over Philippine land-based resources (Lynch and Talbott, 1988).

5 Owen Lynch has conducted many important legal and land tenure-related studies in the Philippine ancestral lands. Some of his more important articles are: Lynch (1984, 1986 and 1992) and Lynch and Talbott (1988).
6 This limit can be increased later, if the community can demonstrate that it is capable of managing forest resources on a sustainable basis.

7 Despite the fact that CTUP was one of the important bases in the development of other resource access instruments, particularly the CFMA, no formal field research has been conducted regarding this instrument. Similarly, I am not aware of any field research that has been conducted on CFMA since it has not yet been formally issued in any of the existing 50 CFP projects nationwide. However, a policy study on CFMA and other resource access instruments has been conducted by Salazar (1993) under the USAID Natural Resources Management Program Policy Studies.

8 The project participants were also expected to benefit in terms of additional income from the other two subcomponents of the project which included the reforestation of 5,000 ha of grassland and brushland and agroforestry intervention on 3,200 ha of cultivated areas. Since the democratisation issue centred on the FSI operation, the present chapter focuses on this subcomponent. The other subcomponents will be discussed in Chapter Seven.

9 BFD was formerly a line Bureau under the then Ministry of Natural Resources, now DENR. Under the 1987 DENR reorganisation, BFD was changed to Forest Management Bureau (FMB) and became a staff bureau of DENR.

10 In my interviews with some FOSA members, I was informed that local people were initially suspicious about the project because the field staff informed them that they were to be ‘organised’ into associations. Accordingly, the word ‘organised’ scared them because it was associated with the NPA’s mobilisation strategy.

11 A study conducted by N. Sanchez (CVRP-1, 1992b) at the project site from July 1986 to March 1987 showed that of the 325 abandoned logs that were sampled, recovery was 33 per cent while soundness was 28 per cent. However, the 309 standing dead trees that were sampled had 62 per cent recovery and 56 per cent soundness. The 634 sampled logs were either cut by the former logging concession, burned by forest fires or kaingin making or felled by typhoons between the period of 1979 and 1984. However, the exact year the sampled trees died was unknown.

12 The names of the FOSAs are usually combined from the names of those sitios (sub-zones within a barangay) which participate. Thus we have Yasoma (Yamot, Sook and Mapinoon sitios) and Malicon (Maliwbaliw and Mancopa sitios), among other FOSAs.

13 During my final visit to the project site nine months after the project termination, I observed from the road side the continuous encroachment of kaingins into the forested areas particularly in the area covered by the Yasoma FOSA. I also learned from the local residents that illegal cutting continued—particularly in the areas near Mabinay municipality.

14 Based on CVRP’s recorded volume in 1988 of 15,691 m$^3$ for construction materials. This excludes the volume of fuelwood, log ends and slabs. Since manually sawn lumbers produced from FOSA operations were in rough form, buyers usually had them resawn. The value of P34.4 million is based on the assumption of 80 per cent recovery from resaw operation and a conservative price of P6.50/bd ft (80% of 15,691 * P6.50 = P34.4 million).

15 The different sources for these perspectives include the external evaluation, project reports, World Bank Aide Memoire, interviews with former CVRP staff and consultants, BFD personnel at the district and provincial level, FOSA and barangay leaders, and FOSA participants and non-participants. The external evaluation and project reports include: (ACIPHIL, 1986); DENR Region 7 (1988); Inter-agency Evaluation Report (1988); IAST (1992); CVRP-1 (1992a); CVRP-1 (n.d.b); Yao (1992); and World Bank (1986-1991).
16 Among the DENR personnel who supported this assessment are the former Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Officer of Negros Occidental and the Chief of the DENR team that assisted the CVRP staff during CTUP implementation.

17 For detailed discussion about this issue, please refer to Hawes (1987:83-101).

18 This field assessment was conducted by representatives from DENR field offices and NGOs implementing community forestry projects in Region 5. I served as a participant observer during the occasion.

19 The same problem exists in other forestry projects. In an insightful article by Fegan (1995), he cites the case of a 14,000 ha plantation in Bukidnon, Mindanao which had “bewildering layers of claims to the same land”. This has posed problems in the implementation of the project.

20 This project document, *Plano Para sa Pagpauswag Asin Pagmanehar Kan Mga Rekursus sa Komunidad Kan CFP Presentacion* was sent to me at ANU by Pag-Bicol a year after my field work. The document indicates that the project area has expanded in its coverage from the original 263 ha “old contract” and 1,000 ha “new contract” to a total area of 1,863 ha. Figures based on this document will be used in discussing the issue of forest sustainability in chapter 7.

21 The view of some Pag-Bicol staff can be gleaned from the Pag-Bicol’s 1991 Accomplishment Report. Under the section on ‘Absence of Policies and Procedures Addressing the Claimant Issue’, Pag-Bicol states: ‘In the first place, one can say that the claimants are squatting on government property’. The same report mentioned the strained relationship between the BREDCl members and the claimants due to the latter’s refusal to include their claims under the different pump-priming activities.

22 The local people gave three reasons for practising burning in their *kaingins*: 1) it saves them a lot of time in the preparation and maintenance of their *kaingins* which they channel into other sources of livelihood; 2) the ash from burning fertilises the soil, hence gives them a higher yield; and 3) it kills insects and other elements which are potential sources of pests and diseases.

23 Government projects such as reforestation, are the last priority in the allocation of government funds. The Department of Budget and Management normally waits for the monies from the April tax collection before it finalises the allocation of funds to these projects. Even in some foreign-assisted projects, such as the ADB-funded CFP, the local counterpart money is normally the bottleneck during project implementation.


CHAPTER SIX
POVERTY ALLEVIATION AND
COMMUNITY FORESTRY

I was hungry and you formed a committee to investigate my hunger; I was homeless and you filed a report on my plight; I was sick and you held a seminar on the situation of the underprivileged; you investigated all aspects of my plight and yet I am still hungry, homeless and sick.

T.L.V. Ulbricht

6.1 Introduction

The relationship between poverty and the environment has been the subject of recent studies and is at the heart of the modern field of environment and development (Broad, 1994). In the case of the Philippines, local scholars argue that unless poverty is alleviated, environmental problems — particularly forest degradation — will continue to worsen (FDC, 1985b; Bautista, 1990; Revilla, 1990, 1991; Cruz et al., 1992). The country’s policy makers and planners, as well as the international funding institutions such as the World Bank, ADB and USAID, support this argument by their inclusion of poverty alleviation strategies in forest management.

In this chapter, I posit that an analysis of the different project techniques, and the institutional mechanisms that use them, is central to understanding the outcomes of community forestry projects in relation to their socio-economic objectives. I have selected two community forestry projects to demonstrate the effectiveness of these techniques as mechanisms for alleviating poverty. In the first case, that of the Claveria CFP, I focus on the issue of identifying the ‘community’ using RRA and its implications for the distribution of future project benefits. In the second case, that of
the LIUCP, I analyse the use of SEDP as a tool for ‘participatory’ planning and its effectiveness in improving the socio-economic welfare of the participants. I also examine the institutional mechanisms by which SEDP is employed in relation to poverty alleviation. Before examining the two cases, the next section presents a brief outline of the current poverty situation in the Philippine uplands. The chapter ends with a short note on the relevance of the study to the broader debate on the relationship between poverty and the environment.

6.2 The Dimensions of Upland Poverty

The Philippines ranks 50th among the world’s poorest countries, with a 1990 per capita GNP of $730 (World Bank, 1992). In a confidential version of a 1988 World Bank report on Philippine poverty, it is described as the only Southeast Asian country ‘where the average living standard is declining and the number of people in poverty is increasing’ (Cf. Broad and Cavanagh, 1993:5). Depending on the type of measurement employed, between 44 and 59 per cent of all families in 1985 are defined as poor (NEDA, 1987:33; 1993:1; and World Bank, 1988a). Income distribution remains highly skewed in favour of the rich. More than half of the country’s total income flows to the wealthiest 20 per cent of the population (NEDA, 1993:1).

Poverty in the Philippines is predominantly a rural phenomenon. Of the estimated 15.54 million people living below the ‘subsistence level’ in 1985, 11.66 million come from rural areas (World Bank, 1988a).1 It is not possible however, to calculate accurately the number of the upland poor because it is very difficult to determine the monetary value of the output of subsistence farmers (Wolters, 1991:71). This is compounded by the fact that, in the uplands, food is not only stored in the house but also in nature — ‘on the cob, on the hook, on the pod, or in the ground’ (Fernandez, 1984:25). However, some researchers agree that upland inhabitants are among the ‘poorest of the poor’ (Sajise, 1985:1; Porter and Ganapin, 1988:7).
The 1989 national census of forest occupants conducted by the DENR provided a sketchy picture of the extent of poverty among the forest occupants based on several welfare indicators. The survey claimed to have covered 52 per cent of the identified 7,255 barangays within the forest land. About 13 per cent of the 1.6 million adults surveyed had no formal education. Of the 377,179 households who relied on farming as the main occupation (80 per cent of the total households surveyed), 57 per cent had a meager annual cash income of P5,000 (US$192) or less. This was barely 20 per cent of the income which marked the poverty line as determined by NEDA — government planning office.² About 66 per cent lived in houses constructed of light materials; 62 per cent were without water supplies; while 47 per cent had no toilet facilities.

The same census indicated that land holdings among forest occupants were relatively small, with an average farm area of 2.67 ha per household. This was lower than the 3 ha agrarian reform limit set for agricultural land. While 45 per cent considered themselves ‘owners’ of the land they cultivated, tenure was insecure. Only about 8 per cent of the 408,309 tiller operators interviewed had a legal basis for their claims to government-issued Certificate of Stewardship Contracts (CSC) or Community Forest Stewardship Agreements (CFSA). Moreover, of the reported 1.26 million ha occupied by the respondents, 31 per cent are under the timber licence agreement (TLA). About 11 per cent considered themselves as squatters on the land they occupied while 8 per cent were tenants.

It has been argued that poverty among upland communities is associated with several inter-related factors. Among these are: the small size of farms and low productivity, insecurity of land tenure; inadequate marketing experience and poor distribution systems, lack of alternative income-generating opportunities, absence of education and health facilities, poor nutrition, weak community organisation, and their remoteness from and inaccessibility to town centres (Aguilar, 1982; Cadelina, 1983; Elevera-Lamberte, 1983; Fernandez, 1984; Sevilla, 1984). Recent analysts, however, contend that upland poverty is due to the concentration of natural resources in the hands of a privileged few (Broad and Cavanagh, 1993; David,
1991; Wolters, 1991). This is particularly glaring in the forestry sector, where exploitation has been the privilege of logging concessionaires. As President Maximo Kalaw of Haribon Foundation explains in an interview with the Berkeley California-based Philippine Resource Centre (Quoted in Broad and Cavanagh, 1993:46):

In the past 15 years, we have had only 470 logging concessionaires [in the Philippines] who [have been given the right to exploit] all the resources of the forests. ...The average profit on logging is 100,000 pesos per hectare after you’ve paid all expenses. When you total this, it would amount to about $42 billion, more than our foreign debt, that came from the forest and this money went to 470 people. The process created poverty for 17 million people around the forest areas (original brackets).

Kalaw’s political economy perspective, while interesting, does not explain the contemporary problems of upland poverty — particularly in areas where community forestry projects exist. It fails to take into account the recent DENR efforts to democratise forest benefits by ‘returning the forest to the people’, and the contradictory effects of this in practice (Chapter Five). Similarly, it fails to recognise the tendencies to produce paradoxical effects which are inherent in the use of different ‘poverty alleviation techniques’, which are inclined to reproduce poverty in these areas. The next section focuses on the second factor.

6.3 Techniques and Institutional Mechanisms for Alleviating Poverty: Experiences from Two Cases

Over the last two decades, the international will to alleviate poverty has greatly influenced the field of development practice. This has played a part in the emergence of various project-appraisal and planning techniques, as well as institutional arrangements which aim to better understand and address the situation of the poor. Proponents of community forestry projects in the Philippines have been quick to adopt these innovations as part of attempts to alleviate upland poverty. Of the project appraisal and planning techniques, RRA and participatory planning respectively have recently gained prominence. These techniques are normally
employed through the contracted NGOs in most government-initiated community forestry projects.

6.3.1 Identifying the Community: RRA and the Claveria CFP

Determining which people or group(s) of people constitute the ‘community’ is central to any strategy for the alleviation of poverty, as well as addressing the other core concerns of community forestry. Yet the word ‘community’ — a basic concept in community forestry — remains ‘mythical’ and is ‘used very loosely’ in the literature (Gilmour and Fisher, 1991:68; Cernea, 1992:310). It has various connotations\(^3\), and has been claimed to have little value in implementing community forestry projects (Gilmour and Fisher, 1991).

Under the Philippine Community Forestry Program, the task of identifying the ‘community’ in a given project area is generally left to the assisting NGOs. In some areas, the NGOs take a political/administrative approach by considering the whole barangay as the community. Elsewhere, NGOs take a target-group approach by limiting the community to forest occupants and nearby residents who are dependent on the forest for their livelihood (Hermann et al., 1992). Whichever approach is taken, however, the conduct of Rapid Rural Appraisal (or other assessments such as a socio-economic survey), is usually instrumental in determining the constitution of the community and, by extension, the likely beneficiaries of the project.

6.3.1.1 The Community As Viewed Through RRA

One of the major tasks of the Soil and Water Conservation Foundation (SWCF) as the assisting NGO for the Claveria CFP is to conduct RRAs. As specified in its terms of reference, the SWCF is to analyse the socio-economic and biophysical situation in the project area as a basis for initiating specific project intervention activities. The RRA results will complement forest resource data and are intended to
provide the basis for the preparation of a Community Resource Management and Development Plan or CRMDP (DENR, 1993). 4

As mentioned in Chapter Four, RRA was the first major activity conducted by SWCF field staff — two months after it commenced project operations in July 1992. The RRA was conducted in the project barangay — Barangay Mat-i — which constitutes about 600 households. The SWCF’s Community Organiser, who had undergone a 12-day RRA training, coordinated the activity. 5 Three other project staff and five local residents assisted in the actual work. None of them had received training in RRA except for a one-day briefing on the subject conducted by the Community Organiser. A manual entitled Rapid Rural Systems Appraisal (RRSA): Diagnostic and Design Tool for Upland Development (Sajise et. al., n.d.), designed by Filipino researchers, served as a major reference in conducting the activity. 6

A critical analysis of the RRA report indicates that the SWCF staff fell prey to what Chambers (1994c:1441-1442) termed as the ‘RRA dangers’. Two of the four cited dangers associated with RRA apply to the Claveria CFP. First is that of ‘instant fashion’. The rapid international promotion and adoption of RRA induced its instantaneous institutionalisation as an appraisal technique for the Philippine Community Forestry Program. However, RRA demands special-ised skills (Arnold, 1991) which may not be instantly acquired from a one-off training seminar such as that conducted by the DENR. These skills are gained through much practice and learning experiences in the field (Chambers, 1994c).

The limited experience and skills of the SWCF staff in conducting RRAs resulted in their heavy reliance on structured interviews — the very method which RRA had sought to avoid and improve on. 7 The 39-page RRA report has 37 tables, 36 of which were drawn from structured interviews. Except for two tables on forest-product collection and utilisation, and two on land use and tenure, the tables mostly contain the standard demographic and socio-economic information typical of socio-economic surveys. Some of this information appears to be of little use in the formulation of CRMDP. 8 Ironically, the more relevant information for planning
purposes was left out during the RRA. This included information on the different groups dependent on the forest for livelihood, the claimants and illegal cutters in the area, those who had access rights and control over the local forest resources, and other information.

The second danger is associated with standardisation. The standardisation of RRA is associated with its codification in the form of a manual. While manuals are useful guides, they also tend to be taken as blueprints, thereby stifling the creativity and flexibility of their users. A good example of this is the selection of respondents for the structured interview. The RRA manual stipulates that the “respondents should represent a cross section of the target population” with a sample size of 15-20 per cent (Sajise et al., n.d.:17). SWCF staff followed this instruction by randomly choosing 120 respondents (20 per cent sample) from a total of 600 households in the entire Barangay Mat-i. While the approach itself is statistically sound, its usefulness in community forestry, particularly in the Mat-i case, is questionable. The result was the 36 tables mentioned above which aggregated the local people into the typical researcher’s categories (e.g. sex, civil status, religion, etc.) expressed in terms of frequencies and percentages. This aggregation simplified the otherwise complex social realities within the project site, and obscured the existence of different groups and interests in relation to local forest resources. As will be elaborated later, recognition of these groups and interests is crucial in advancing the poverty alleviation objective.

The combined effects of the two RRA dangers are better appreciated by considering the results of the network analysis of problems within the project area (Figure 6.1). This analysis is considered as one of the most important outputs from RRA and the major basis for determining specific poverty alleviation strategies to be introduced by the project. As shown in Figure 6.1, the major problem in the area is low family income. Five primary causes are identified: improper farming practices, high production costs, no reliable market outlets, inadequate capital and poor farming systems. These are the result of alleged secondary causes (such as lack of technical assistance in the case of poor farming systems).
At least two observations could be made on the structure of the network analysis. First, the difference between ‘poor farming systems’ and ‘improper farming practices’ as primary causes of low family income is unclear as these terms are not defined in the RRA report. Secondly, it is perplexing how the ‘selling of forest products’ contributes to ‘inadequate capital’. Even more confusing is how the ‘illegal extraction of forest products’ causes ‘improper farming practices’. Since the causal relationships of the identified problems are poorly established, the very purpose of constructing the network analysis is defeated.

More significant however, is the difficulty of coming up with a network analysis which represents the entire barangay of 600 households. The use of structured interviews, the random selection of 120 respondents, and the type of analysis (aggregation through frequency counts and percentages), have all contributed to the homogenisation of the entire Barangay Mat-i into people with ‘low family income’. Essentially, the use of the RRA technique, and the method by which it was employed, had indirectly shaped the constitution of the ‘community’. In the case of Mat-i CFP, the ‘community’ was shaped to constitute all the 600 households of the entire barangay rather than groups of people with diverse interests.

6.3.1.2 The ‘Real’ Heterogeneous Community

As a community, Barangay Mat-i is much more complex and heterogeneous compared to the simplified picture presented in the RRA result. It constitutes different individuals and groups whose interests are linked to the local forest resources. I was able to identify at least six of such groups whose members directly benefit from the local forest resources. As shown in Table 6.1, they derived assorted benefits from, and had varying degrees of dependence on, these resources. A brief survey of these individuals and groups will help one to appreciate the heterogeneity of people within the Claveria CFP site.

The first group is composed of 15 occupant-cultivators. They reside in a small settlement area called Aligodon, about three kilometres away from the centre of Barangay Mat-i. All of them belong to the Higaonon tribe. They subsist on corn,
rice, and root crops which they grow in their *kaingins*. Some of them also hunt wild animals for food and gather rattan and other forest products. They sell the rattan for their cash needs. Of the six groups, they are the most dependent on the forest as a source of livelihood.

Table 6.1 Direct beneficiaries, major benefits and degree of dependence on the local forest resources, Claveria CFP, Misamis Oriental.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIRECT BENEFICIARIES</th>
<th>MAJOR BENEFITS</th>
<th>DEGREE OF DEPENDENCE ON THE FOREST</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) 15 occupant cultivators</td>
<td><em>kaingin</em> areas, forest products for food and other basic needs</td>
<td>fully dependent on the forest as source of livelihood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) 28 non-occupant claimants</td>
<td>farm lands/ <em>kaingin</em> areas</td>
<td>main source of livelihood to some, particularly the members of Higaonon tribe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) undetermined number of illegal timber cutters and rattan gatherers</td>
<td>income from forest product extraction</td>
<td>major source of income to some Higaonons, but supplementary source to others especially during lean months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) 2 local buyers of illegally cut timber</td>
<td>income from business operation</td>
<td>source of additional income but have other alternative sources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) rattan concessionaire and his local representative</td>
<td>income from the rattan concession</td>
<td>source of additional income but have other alternative sources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) 11 local small-scale rattan manufacturers, only three are full time</td>
<td>raw materials</td>
<td>dependent for raw materials, but have alternative sources of livelihood</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Fieldwork, September to October 1993, Mat-i CFP, Claveria, Misamis Oriental.

The second group comprises 28 non-occupant claimants most of whom reside in Mat-i *barangay* proper. They are a mixture of the native Higaonons and migrant Boholanos. Similar to the first group, most of them have *kaingins* within the project area. In general, the Boholano sub-group is in economic terms, relatively well off compared to their Higaonon counterparts. Most of them have other sources of livelihood such as tomato growing — the main source of income of most Boholanos in Mat-i and its neighbouring *barangays*. Higaonons are more dependent on their *kaingins* compared than the Boholanos.

The third group consists of an indeterminate number of illegal timber cutters and rattan gatherers. Like the second group, they are also a mixture of Higaonons
and Boholanos. The Higaonons are generally more involved with rattan gathering, although they also engaged in timber cutting. The Boholanos, on the other hand, do little rattan gathering, but more timber cutting.

Higaonons and Boholanos also vary as to the degree of their economic dependence on the local forest resources. For most Higaonons, rattan gathering and timber cutting are their main sources of cash income, so these activities are pursued almost year round. Most Boholanos, however, do timber cutting only during dry months when food and other means of livelihood are scarce.

The fourth group is associated with the illegal timber cutters in the third group because it contains the two local buyers of illegally cut logs. Both are women with local political connections. One is the wife of a soldier, the other is the daughter of a datu, a recognised tribal leader of the Higaonons. While theirs is a ‘part time business’ they probably derive a greater cash benefit from local forest resources than the first three groups. For instance, it is common knowledge in the whole barangay that the wife of the soldier was able to have their house constructed out of her income from illegally cut logs.

The fifth group is composed of the rattan concessionaire and his local representative. Both belong to the Higaonon tribe. Amongst all the direct beneficiaries of the local forest resources, the concessionaire is the only one who is not a resident of Barangay Mat-i. His local representative is the datu mentioned above, whose daughter is the local timber buyer in the fourth group. The concessionaire’s representative serves as the local middleman. He makes an arrangement as to the gatherers on the quantity of rattan he will purchase, the specific time it is to be available, and the exact buying price. He then sells the rattan to the concessionaire at a higher price who, in turn, ‘passes’ it to businessmen or other buyers at a certain profit. The DENR records show that the concessionaire’s rattan permit comprises a total area of 4,260 ha covering the whole CFP site. The permit was issued on 20 August 1990 and expires on 20 August 2000.

The sixth and final group constitutes 11 local, small-scale rattan manufacturers who rely on the forest for their source of raw materials. Of the 11
manufacturers, only three are full-time in business. The rest operate on a part-time basis to supplement their farming activities. The three full-time manufacturers employed 8 workers, while the 9 part-time manufacturers employed 25, most of whom were family members. All the manufacturers purchase their raw materials from the local rattan gatherers.

Two characteristics of the above groups are worth mentioning here. First, they interact in a dynamic manner. Some groups, such as the illegal timber cutters and local buyers, have a mutually beneficial relationship. No one other than local timber buyers will purchase illegally cut logs. However, the local timber buyers will only thrive as long as there are people brave enough to cut logs illegally. Other groups, however, such as the local rattan manufacturers and the concessionaire and his local representative, act as competitors. They compete in buying rattan from the local gatherers.

Secondly, the groups are not mutually exclusive. One person could belong to two or more groups depending on his or her personal situation or interest in the local forest resources. For instance, most of the occupant-cultivators in the first group are also the rattan gatherers in the third group. In the same manner, some of the non-occupant claimants in the second group are also the timber cutters and rattan gatherers in the third group. These two characteristics point to the varied socio-economic interests of the local population and the complex dynamics of the groups in their attempts to benefit from local forest resources.

It should also be mentioned that the six groups discussed may not be the only ones directly benefiting from local forest resources. There are likely to be other groups of a similar nature existing in the area. The objective here is not to identify all such groups but to demonstrate the importance of recognising their existence and dynamics. Failure to do so is likely to reproduce poverty in the project area, even with the best of intentions and strategies to alleviate it.

6.3.1.3 The RRA/Poverty Alleviation Connection
As mentioned earlier, the RRA’s result — particularly the network analysis — has portrayed the local people as a homogeneous community and obscured the existence of the different groups discussed above. Consequently, it failed to capture the dynamics of these groups, the kind of benefits they derived from the local forest resources, and their varying degree of dependence on these resources. This information is crucial to the formulation of CRMDP and the targeting of the poor as the primary project beneficiaries. For instance, the inability to take into account the heterogeneity of groupings and the diverse needs is likely to perpetuate the timber bias in forest management — that is, it is likely to serve the interests of better-off groups such as the businessmen. Moreover, questions of who should be involved in formulating the CRMDP, whose needs should be given priority, which group should be responsible for implementation, and how the benefits are to be shared equitably, are better addressed in possession of the above information.

Poor households, like the majority of Higaonons, are much more dependent on products from the forests (and other types of common) than better-off households (Jodha, 1986). With the homogenisation of the whole Barangay Mat-i into one category (i.e., people of low income), the full dependence of most Higaonons on local forest resources was de-emphasised. Consequently, the importance of targeting them to become the main resource managers as well as the main project beneficiaries has not been fully appreciated by the SWCF staff. This is evidenced by the formation of Mat-i Agroforestry Development Association Incorporated (MAGADAI) through the influence of the SWCF staff.

MAGADAI was formed to serve as the legal organisation which was to be issued with the CFMA. The organisation was created with representation from 28 existing local associations and groups in the entire barangay. These associations and groups have extremely heterogeneous interests: sports, irrigation, tree farming, waterworks, marketing cooperative, parent-teachers associations, mother’s association, and others. They also include five barangay zone leaders (Purok leaders) and the leaders of six work groups (alayon) established under the CFP project. MAGADAI’s broad community representation may be seen as both a
strength and a weakness. On one hand, there is the potential for greater awareness and involvement of the local people in responsible forest management. On the other, the project is vulnerable to manipulation by powerful individuals who have the knowledge and the means to trap the benefits from forest management and utilisation. Indeed, with only 7 Higaonons among the 28 voting members of the association, the die has already been cast in favour of the migrants. Moreover, there is no assurance that the 7 Higaonon representatives will not put their own interests first since 5 of them are from the Higaonon elite. In summary, the formation of MAGADAI has, inadvertently, marginalised the forest-related interests of the Higaonon poor, and there are serious implications regarding future distribution of forest benefits — at the expense of the poor Higaonons.

Fortunately, some Higaonons — including a number of the 15 cultivator-occupants, are among the more responsive project participants. As a result, they have received technical and material support under the project’s ‘community development services’ (SWCF, Various Project documents). They have been assisted by the NGO staff in the construction of their own small-scale fish ponds, given tilapia fingerlings for their fish ponds, and taught about agroforestry techniques. Others were also able to buy farm tools through the project’s revolving funds and earn cash through their involvement in the perimeter survey and forest resource inventory conducted by the project. A few are also current recipients of the SWCF-financed animal dispersal project.

While not discounting the impressive performance of the SWCF staff, it should be noted, there are problems arising from the categorisation of the whole Mat-i as comprising families with low incomes. This means that the different livelihood activities are available for anyone who wishes to benefit from the project. Whether they are the poorest Higaonon fully dependent on the forest or a relatively well off Boholano, does not matter at present, all 50 project participants including those who are better off, can enjoy the same project benefits.

Would more training and field experience on RRA result in proper identification of the different groups and, therefore, more efforts to address the needs
of the poorer groups? The existing literature on RRA says ‘yes’. This literature suggests that the two dangers associated with RRA mentioned above — instant fashion and standardisation — could have been minimised, if not avoided, had the RRA team been better trained and more experienced in the use of this technique. It should be recalled that only one of the nine-member RRA team had undergone training. The rest had to rely on a one-day ‘briefing’ on the subject conducted by the ‘trained’ individual. However, RRA demands specialised skills which are gained through much practice and learning experience in the field. Indeed, a review by Van Steijn (1991) of RRA conducted by NGOs in the Philippines points to a ‘quite widespread practice of low quality’ (Cf. Chambers, 1994c:1441).

The representation of the local people as a homogeneous community, however, goes deeper than merely being a ‘widespread practice of low quality’. The tendency to homogenise is inherently associated with the use of RRA — although poor practice can reinforce this disposition. For instance, interview results from the 120 ‘randomly chosen respondents’ had to be tabulated and analysed if they were to serve as a basis for the project ‘entry point’ and inputs in the formulation of CRMDP. Consequently, people were represented as mathematical categories which allowed their lumping together into a single category, e.g. people of ‘low family income’. In the process, the heterogeneity of local groups and the diversity of their forest-related needs were generalised.

The tendency of RRA techniques towards homogenisation was also reflected during the validation of RRA results. Such validation was conducted separately in 6 Puroks to ensure that the majority of those interviewed would be present and could participate in the process. Part of the objective was also to determine the varying problems, needs and opportunities in the different Puroks as a basis for planning. Indeed, 91 out of the 120 persons interviewed were present during the scheduled validation in their respective Puroks. After the validation, the NGO had to summarise the problems and their causes into a single network analysis (Figure 6.1). This analysis was an important part of the RRA report to be submitted to DENR and the USAID representative organisation to satisfy the requirements for the release of
funds for the next project activities. As the messy problems and causes were summarised and ordered into a neat network analysis, the peculiarity of each Purok situation was lost in the process. The tendency towards homogenisation appears to be inescapable.
Figure 6.1  Network analysis of problems in Barangay Mat-i, Claveria, Misamis Oriental
(Source: Soil and Water Conservation Foundation, 1993)
Relevant here is the deeper implication of the use of network analysis. As shown in Figure 6.1, this analysis transforms the ‘community’ into a network of problems, and their causes, in a hierarchical form (primary, secondary and tertiary, etc.). Based on these problems and causes, suggested solutions were jointly identified by the SWCF staff and the 91 respondents during the RRA validation. These solutions were to serve as input in defining the different project interventions. However, the network analysis does not identify the people affected by these problems nor those who are part of the causes. Thus, the beneficiaries of the suggested solutions remained the homogeneous community which, in this case, is anybody from among the 600 households in Barangay Mat-i. An important observation by Nancy Peluso (1992:242) directly applies to the Claveria CFP and the rest of community forestry projects in the Philippines:

The real issue in social forestry, after all, is not whether the people are involved — people will always be involved — the issue is which people are involved, how, and why.

6.3.2 Planning with the People? The LIUCP

The atmosphere was very tense during the 1993 Mid-Term Review of the LIUCP conducted in Mindoro Oriental. A week before the occasion, five of the six implementing NGOs had indicated their intention to terminate their service contract in a ‘Joint Statement’ addressed to the DENR Secretary. Highlighted in the statement were ‘problems in the project implementation which interfere in the successful attainment of LIUCP’s goals’ (LIUCP NGOs, 1993:1). During the Mid-Term Review’s wrap-up session, the remark made by one NGO representative was shattering to some of us:

In our experience, the project has increased the burden of the Mangyans instead of improving their livelihood. It takes a year before the scheduled project activities like infrastructure and reforestation are implemented. As a result, people who have been waiting for these activities failed to work in their kaingins which is their only source of livelihood.
On the other hand, the Team Leader of the Review Mission from the ADB expressed his dissatisfaction with the low project accomplishment against the overall physical target. He emphasised that even the physical targets set in the SEDPs, supposedly developed with the participation of the local people, were not being met. He also encouraged the NGOs to “convince and motivate more” the Mangyan beneficiaries to give support to the project. Finally, he reminded the NGOs that their work should be carried out in accordance with their terms of reference.

The notion of participation and NGO involvement as a catalyst in project implementation was among the recent trend in development practice adopted by LIUCP. In this section, I examine how ‘participatory’ planning techniques through SEDP and the institutional mechanisms, assist or hinder the accomplishment of that core objective of community forestry, poverty alleviation.

6.3.2.1 Participatory Planning and the SEDP

LIUCP is quite typical of rural development projects in the 1980s. Its proponents support the idea that the participation of local people is fundamental to ensure the project’s success and sustainability. This is explicit in the project appraisal document:

Upland community participation in planning its own socio-economic development, and in the adoption of environment-conserving agroforestry techniques and watershed rehabilitation, is considered absolutely essential for sustainable achievement of the Project’s objectives. (ADB, 1989:25)

The preparation of SEDPs is central to local people’s participation. As stipulated in the ADB Appraisal Report, SEDPs are to be developed in the targeted communities within six months after the fielding of the NGOs’ Community Organisers (ADB, 1989). The report also specifies that no project interventions shall be initiated in a project area until an SEDP has been completed. SEDP preparation is to be facilitated by the contracted NGOs with the assistance from the concerned Provincial Project Management Office (PPMO).
Theoretically, the preparation of SEDPs was meant to support the ‘learning process approach’ to development which the LIUCP management\textsuperscript{11} claimed to adopt (LIUCP, 1991). Under the approach, the intended beneficiaries themselves were to analyse their local situation, prepare their own SEDPs, implement and evaluate the outcome of these plans, and learn in the process. Starting initially from one Site Management Unit (SMU) in each of the six watershed areas, project implementation would be gradually expanded to other sites as more experience and knowledge were gained from the initial site. The expansion sites would undergo the same learning cycle by drawing on the experiences and information gained from the initial sites. The whole learning process was to be catalysed by the contracted NGOs with assistance from PPMO staff. During the eight-year life span of the project, a total of four SMUs in each of the six watershed project areas were targeted to participate in the learning process.

It was assumed by the project designers that the exercise would bring tangible benefits to the local people. Since local people had to prepare their own SEDPs, it was anticipated that these would reflect their common aspirations and needs (LIUCP, 1991) which would then, hopefully, be addressed with support from the project resources. The learning process was also seen by the project proponents to be transformative (Dalton \textit{et al}, 1989). As local people learned to analyse their own situation, to plan and do something to improve it, it was expected that they would become increasingly in charge of their own development process.

For funding agencies such as the ADB, participatory planning is an instrument for greater effectiveness as well as a new source of investment. As Rahnema (1992:119) points out, ‘participatory processes bring to development projects what they need most in order to avoid the pitfalls and failures of the past’. These include: 1) a close knowledge of the “field reality” which foreign technicians and government bureaucrats do not have; 2) networks of relations, essential both to the success of on-going projects and long-term investments in rural areas; and 3) the cooperation, on the local scene, of organisations able to carry out development activities. These ‘investible’ organisations (referring to the third item), as observed
by Rahnema, ‘also increase the economy’s capacity to absorb poverty-oriented investments’ (Rahnema, 1992:119). The relevance of this observation on the LIUCP case will be discussed later.

Participatory planning was also an appealing proposition to the contracted NGOs. It supported their general ideals to empower the local people and build their capability for self-determination. The LIUCP’s claim to promote participatory planning was one of the main reasons why the NGOs joined the project (LIUCP NGOs, 1993). Indeed, the approach is an improvement on the traditional top-down and purely technocratic planning strategy of earlier forestry projects which has, in the past, resulted in the ejection or resettlement of upland communities residing within reforestation sites. After more than three years of project involvement, however, the paradoxical effects of ‘participatory’ planning techniques turned out to be one of the major reasons for the NGOs’ disengagement from the LIUCP. A closer look at these planning techniques in practice sheds more light on their nature.

6.3.2.2 Fitting Community Needs to Project Components

In practice, the idea of participatory planning through the putting together of a SEDP is a form of ‘bounded participation’ (Porter, Allen, and Thompson, 1991:131). As cited in the 1990 Annual Report, the planning exercise was conducted ‘within the framework of LIUCP’ (LIUCP, 1991:1). In other words, SEDPs had to conform to the pre-defined components of the LIUCP if they were to be implemented using the project’s resources. With the project components intact and officially agreed to, one could only hope that these would fit the needs of the local people. The facilitating NGOs therefore were left with the task of trying to match these needs with the pre-defined project components in order to determine which activities could beneficially be carried out under the project. The experience of the PAFID, the contracted NGO for the Kabilyan Watershed in Mindoro Oriental, illustrates this.

In 1990, PAFID assisted a local-situation analysis in the Kabilyan Watershed area as part of the SEDP preparation. The participating Hanunoo Mangyans identified six major problems that they wanted to be addressed in the
SEDP preparation. PAFID matched these needs to the existing LIUCP’s components to determine which could be addressed under the project, and possibly, using PAFID’s own resources. The identified solutions under the LIUCP components served as the major basis in preparing the SEDP (Table 6.2).

Table 6.2 Identified community needs and proposed solutions based on the officially defined LIUCP components, Kabilyan Watershed, Bulalacao, Mindoro Oriental.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IDENTIFIED COMMUNITY PROBLEMS/NEEDS</th>
<th>PROPOSED SOLUTIONS AND THE CORRESPONDING LIUCP COMPONENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) land tenure problems posed by existing pasture lease agreements (PLAs)</td>
<td>1) PLA cancellation and issuance of resource access agreements to the Mangyans under the resource access and resource management components</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) absence of government services</td>
<td>2) establishment of linkages with the government agencies under the project management components</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) unstable peace and order situation</td>
<td>3) partly to be addressed under the community organising component and through coordination with both the military and the NPAs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) long dry season and abrupt climatic changes that imperils food production</td>
<td>4) to be addressed through the agroforestry, livelihood and reforestation component</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) health problems</td>
<td>5) to be solved through social services, linkage with health agencies and the livelihood component</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) lack of facilities to transport products to the market</td>
<td>6) to be addressed through the infrastructure component</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As experienced by PAFID and the local people, bounded participatory planning — particularly the use of SEDP — has locked them into an agenda determined by the LIUCP. The pre-defined project components led PAFID and the local people to prepare SEDP within the boundaries of these components. Alternative solutions to community problems outside the project concerns were simply ruled out, while SEDP strategies were narrowed down to those officially endorsed by the project. For instance, it should be noted that, strictly speaking, reforestation does not directly address any of the six identified problems in Table 6.2. Yet because reforestation is a major LIUCP component, PAFID had to adopt it as one of the project strategies.
to be implemented through the SEDPs. This experience was not unique to Kabilyan watershed. The LIUCP National Project Office (NPO) itself admitted in its response to the NGO Joint Statement that some of the SEDPs ‘were even tailor-made to the Project’ (LIUCP, 1993a:11).

The NPO argued that the relevance of SEDP to local people’s needs largely depended on the quality of NGO assistance at the community level (LIUCP, 1993a:2). It asserted that was, since the important decisions in the SEDPs (i.e., on which activities to undertake, and where, when, how and by whom) were made by the people themselves, the people had the flexibility to ‘push their own agenda’ (LIUCP, 1993a:11). In essence, the NGOs and their perceived lack of support were to blame for the SEDPs that were not responsive to the local people’s needs.

It is possible that the quality of assistance of some NGOs may truly be poor. However, this is not the main reason why SEDPs are ‘tailor-made to the project’. Two related explanations are more plausible. First is the enclosures set by the officially approved project components and their pre-set targets. This has been partly discussed earlier, but the issue of pre-set targets needs more elaboration.

LIUCP’s general targets for each component, and its corresponding budget, had been finalised as early as at the appraisal stage in the ADB’s project cycle (Figure 3.1). These targets were officially approved during project negotiations and served as ADB’s basis for monitoring and evaluation. To ensure their attainment, they have to be reflected in the SEDPs through the assistance of the contracted NGOs. Indeed, one of the required outputs in the SEDP preparation was to come up with a ‘more realistic’ target which could be implemented within the time frame of the project. Consequently, the project came up with two types of physical targets. One was the pre-set target under the officially approved projects components or the ‘target based on design’; the other was the SEDP-target developed in each of the watershed areas. Basically the two types of targets were the same except for the normally low values in the SEDPs. In reality, genuine participatory planning through SEDP formulation was not feasible within the project framework. The local people
would not have been able to push for their agenda when a pre-set target for each component had been officially affirmed and was being pursued through the SEDP.

The second explanation relates to the legitimising role of SEDP as a tool for participatory planning. Despite the project enclosures, SEDP preparation provides the local people with a sense of freedom to plan for their socio-economic development. This sense of freedom subdues the urge for local resistance and provides legitimacy to the officially sanctioned project components. As the NGOs and the local people accept these as legitimate, alternative solutions to identified local problems are obscured. Consequently, the options for solving these problems are narrowed down to those offered within the framework of the project. Indeed, the NGOs and the local communities adopted the project components during the initial project implementation hoping they could address the local needs. It was only after having experienced some problems associated with their implementation that they saw the limitations of these components.

The two explanations suggest that SEDP, like most planning tools, is not politically neutral. It promotes an instrumental approach to project intervention. It tends to legitimise centrally determined agendas and imperatives — in this case, pushing for the implementation of officially identified project components. This does not mean that the use of SEDP was responsible for all the major problems in the LIUCP implementation. As indicated above, the use of participatory techniques such as SEDP, is an improvement on the conventional top-down approach to development. In some cases, as in Kabilyan Watershed, it has some positive results.

During preparation of the SEDP, the Mangyans in Kabilyan Watershed pointed out that their greatest problem was the presence of pasture leases on their ancestral lands. Since addressing land tenure was part of the LIUCP, PAFID gave precedence to this during the SEDP implementation. By mobilising the Mangyans and lobbying at the DENR Central Office in Manila, five pasture leases were cancelled within the first three years of project implementation. These areas covering a total of about 3,000 ha were awarded to five Mangyan Associations through the issuance of CFSAs.
The ‘type’ of participation advanced by SEDP, however, was confined to the time, space and intentions allocated by the DENR and ADB. Thus, despite the positive outcomes, the use of SEDP had generally contributed to paradoxical effects which appeared to have significantly outweighed the positive results. The next section explores this in relation to the poverty alleviation objective of LIUCP.

6.3.2.3 Alleviating Poverty Through Bounded Participation

LIUCP offers the potential to alleviate poverty in the uplands of Mindoro while simultaneously addressing the environmental concerns of the government. Two of the five major project components directly address the problem of poverty: 1) agroforestry, reforestation and livelihood\(^2\); and 2) infrastructure and social services.\(^3\) The expected benefits in terms of employment and income were impressive. The 15,000 ha agroforestry intensification was expected to create about 17,000 man-days per annum of “additional employment on a sustainable basis” (ADB, 1989:32). It was also anticipated that farm income of farmers would increase from 200 to 289 per cent over a 5-to 7-year period. On the other hand, the reforestation target of 15,000 ha was predicted to create 1.7 million man-days of employment. An additional 800,000 man-days per annum were also expected from labour-based infrastructure development. Also project estimates showed that each family beneficiary would earn an average of P3,000 or P1,500 per year through their involvement in the contract reforestation and infrastructure development, respectively.

Realisation of the above economic benefits depends on the attainment of the pre-set targets under each component. This, in turn, depends on four unwritten assumptions: 1) that the different project components would perfectly fit the needs of the local communities; 2) that the SEDPs could be formulated to match exactly the pre-set targets, 3) that all the project inputs would be available in the right quantity and quality at the appropriate time and place they were needed; and 4) that the ‘troublesome knob’, (Porter, Allen, and Thompson, 1991:131) in project
implementation, namely, the human factor, could be successfully managed to produce the desired outcomes.

Initial experience in project implementation indicates that none of the above assumptions is likely to be valid. As discussed earlier, some project components are not relevant to the community’s needs. In most areas in Mindoro Oriental, for instance, Mangyans are more interested in financial assistance for livelihood activities and medical support, than in reforestation and agroforestry. The lack of fit between the official project components and priorities and the community’s needs is reflected in the following brief comments:

The project is not really for poverty alleviation. It is purely an environmental project. It is not after livelihood but mainly for contract reforestation. (Mangyan from Pola Watershed)

Most Mangyans are in need of medical support and working animals but the project’s budget is primarily on reforestation. The project bought the latest model of Canon camera worth P32,000 to document its activities. But it cannot answer the farmer’s request for carabao dispersal. (US Peace Corps Volunteer, Kabilyan Watershed)

SEDP targets are also extremely low compared to official ones. In Mindoro Oriental, SEDP targets for reforestation and agroforestry constitute only 20 per cent of the official figure. Roughly 70 per cent of the projected total project contribution in income and employment is expected from reforestation and agroforestry. With the extremely low SEDP target that could be realistically attained under the project, the potential economic contribution of the LIUCP has been significantly reduced.

The assumption that project inputs would be available at the right time and place is similarly unrealistic, considering that bureaucratic red tape and delayed release of funds are perennial problems in practically all government development projects in the Philippines. Indeed, two of the eight ‘implementation defects’ raised in the NGOs’ Joint Statement relate to these problems. As noted in the Joint Statement (LIUCP NGOs, 1993:2-3):

Activities in response to people’s priority needs included in their SEDPs were either very much delayed or not undertaken at all. In some cases, technical designs for infrastructure from the engineering unit were inappropriate or materials delivered were substandard. Thus, people’s expectations were not met. ...Throughout the
implementation process, funds for NGO services have never been released on time. The advance release of quarterly funds as per Terms of Reference was also not followed. Compounding the problem of fund releases for NGO services is the slow release of funds for developmental activities of the communities causing the NGOs to lose credibility in the communities.

The possibility of managing the human factor in project implementation to attain the desired physical targets is an even more unrealistic assumption — especially considering that most of the beneficiaries are Mangyans who are distinct socio-culturally from their migrant counterparts. For instance, while a typical migrant will ordinarily welcome the contract reforestation component as an additional source of income, a Mangyan may question its relevance in relation to his ownership of the land. The statement of a Mangyan leader in Pola Watershed during an interview illustrates this:

If the government really recognised that this is our land, why does it have to contract us to do reforestation? We can reforest our own land at our own initiative without the government paying us to do the job. But we have to do it at our own pace, not at the pace the government wants it done (Interview, Mindoro Oriental, 18/08/93).

PAFID staff who have lived with the Mangyans in Kabilyan watershed for almost three years also observed that Mangyans have a very uncomplicated lifestyle. Their daily routine consists of not much more than pounding rice and gathering firewood just before cooking. While this is laziness to outsiders, it is simply the way of life for a people who are not pressured by time. Accordingly, for this group of Mangyans in Kabilyan, two weeks is much too far ahead to plan for activities that are not part of their daily lives. The concept of SEDP’s physical target to be attained months or years ahead is, therefore, completely incomprehensible to them.

For the ADB and the DENR, the contracting of NGOs is an attempt to overcome such socio-cultural ‘obstructions’ and to assist successful project implementation, by building on the comparative advantage of the NGOs in ‘organising’ upland communities and the high credibility they enjoy among the locals (ADB, 1989:28). Essentially, NGOs are to ‘organise’ the target beneficiaries using ‘participatory’ techniques to implement the different project components and to
attain the pre-set physical targets. In this case, NGOs serve, in Rahnema’s term, (1992:119) as ‘investible organisations’. They increase the capacity of the local area to absorb poverty-oriented investments by socially preparing the local people to implement these investments.

During their later involvement in project implementation, however, some NGOs have seriously considered the socio-cultural context of the project. In most situations, this means modifying the existing project components or working outside their boundaries to best serve the needs of the Mangyans. Some NGOs provided extra time for social preparation by allocating more than the six months requirement of the project for SEDP preparation. Community woodlots using local resources were established in two watershed areas to resist the money-oriented concept of contract reforestation and to reinforce the Mangyan’s ownership of their ancestral land. In the Kabilyan watershed, PAFID initiated an alternative approach to agroforestry by reviving the traditional farming practice that integrates forest trees, fruit trees, and agricultural crops into one area. However, because these initiatives were small-scale and done in the later part of the NGOs’ involvement in the project, they did not create enough visible impact to be considered as alternative strategies by the DENR and ADB.

In their Joint Statement, the NGOs noted that LIUCP is not responding to the basic needs of the Mangyans. They asserted that limited funds are available for livelihood activities, that delayed project activities disrupted the traditional phase of the Mangyan lifestyle to the detriment of their livelihood, and that ‘pre-set targets unduly influenced the articulation of the people’s needs to be embodied in the Socio-Economic Development Plans’ (LIUCP NGOs, 1993:2). They also contended that the target-orientation characteristic of the project smothered the indigenous decision-making and the farming techniques of the Mangyans.

The assertions made by the NGOs in the Joint Statement, which they also raised during the Mid-Term Review, were not addressed in the report of the ADB Mission Team (LIUCP, 1993b). The focus of the report was the slow progress in project implementation, particularly in accomplishing the project’s physical target for
reforestation. The report noted that at the time of review, the project has achieved only about 37 per cent of its physical targets in just under half (45 per cent) its planned total life time (Table 6.3). Interestingly, the Mission Team used the official physical target in their evaluation as if SEDP targets did not exist. This reinforces the earlier argument that bounded participation associated with the use of SEDP is a tool for legitimating centrally-determined agenda and imperatives.

The Mission noted three main reasons for the slow progress in project implementation. Two of these involved the lack of technical skills of the NGOs and their reluctance to be monitored by the DENR. One of the Mission’s recommendations is for the DENR to ‘terminate the inefficient NGOs and replace them with better ones and/or undertake implementation directly in specific areas’ (LIUCP, 1993b:11). The Mission also pushed for the development of a 14-month Action Plan ‘to expedite progress and recover time loss’ in project implementation (LIUCP, 1993b:13). The Plan was very ambitious when compared to the project’s physical accomplishments for the first three years of implementation. It centred on catching up with the physical accomplishments. Another outcome of the Mission was the change in project scope by the reduction of the physical targets — especially in reforestation and agroforestry. However, the same strategy of ‘participatory’ planning is to be used to accomplish these targets.

By November 1993, the five NGOs had begun to terminate their contracts with the DENR. On the other hand, the LIUCP staff from the national and provincial offices had started work according to the new scope of the project. Yet the Mangyans’ livelihood appears to be more uncertain than
Table 6.3 Physical progress of LIUCP as of 20 August 1993.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROJECT COMPONENT</th>
<th>PHYSICAL TARGET</th>
<th>WEIGHT</th>
<th>PHYSICAL COMPLETION</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Expected up to 30/6/93 (%)</td>
<td>Actual Physical %</td>
<td>Wtd.. Acmp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Community Organising and Cooperative Development</td>
<td></td>
<td>8.20</td>
<td></td>
<td>59</td>
<td>4.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) Site Management Units</td>
<td>24 nos</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>12 nos</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Sitio Service Centers</td>
<td>60 nos</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>48 nos</td>
<td>80</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Multipurpose Buildings</td>
<td>24 nos</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>11 nos</td>
<td>46</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Resource Access and Resource Management</td>
<td>8.40</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>7.60</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) Land tenurial instruments</td>
<td>6,773 nos</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>6,639 nos</td>
<td>98</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Watershed Management Units</td>
<td>6 units</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>6 units</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Training</td>
<td>42,000 TD</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>31,076 TD</td>
<td>75</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Agroforestry, Reforestation and Livelihood</td>
<td>49.40</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4.40</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) Community Nursery</td>
<td>60 nos</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>50 nos</td>
<td>83</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Nursery Operations</td>
<td>210 units</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>42 units</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Agroforestry</td>
<td>15,000 ha</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>1,185 ha</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) Reforestation</td>
<td>15,000 ha</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>375 ha</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Infrastructure and Social Services</td>
<td>15.70</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) Water systems</td>
<td>135 units</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>108 un.</td>
<td>80</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Schools</td>
<td>20 nos</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>2 nos</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i. Primary</td>
<td>17 nos</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>60 km</td>
<td>75</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii. Secondary</td>
<td>3 nos</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>40 km</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Market Roads</td>
<td>119 km</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>57 km</td>
<td>48</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i. Construction</td>
<td>80 km</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>2 nos</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii. Rehabilitation</td>
<td>80 km</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iii Graded Trails</td>
<td>32 nos</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iv. Bridge/culverts</td>
<td>5 nos</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v. Spillways</td>
<td>1,100 ha</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>30 ha</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) Irrigation Systems</td>
<td>583 units</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>30 ha</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Project Management</td>
<td>18.30</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>14.60</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) NGOs</td>
<td>6 nos</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>6 nos</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Consultancy</td>
<td>240 mm</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>108 mm</td>
<td>45</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Vehicles/M’cycles</td>
<td>583 units</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>554 un.</td>
<td>95</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>37.40</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ever. This uncertainty is reflected in a quote from PAFID’s (1993:5-6) termination letter to the DENR Secretary:

Enhancing the livelihood on a long-term basis requires more time and in-depth involvement and planning than is allowed under the LIUCP Program. This is much more important than the short-term employment on road construction and reforestation project.

Nonetheless, the concern of PAFID and the other NGOs for the livelihood of the Mangyans transcends the economic opportunities being offered by the project. It relates to the whole lifestyle of the Mangyans, of which livelihood is only a part. As learned by the NGOs, endorsing the financially-driven LIUCP components through the SEDP may increase the Mangyans’ income but it will have deleterious effect on their lifestyle. Again, this is partly captured in PAFID’s (1993:5) termination letter:

We generally observe that the project is now creating an adverse effect on the value systems of the Mangyans. Most of the local people who are interested in the continuation of the LIUCP are more interested in personal financial benefit than in permanent improvement of resources. With this change in values, the goals of the project are compromised. Worse, the egalitarian social structures are being adversely affected.

6.4 Summary

Poverty studies in the Philippines indicate that people in the uplands are among the poorest of the poor. Some scholars argue that unless upland poverty is alleviated, environmental problems — particularly forest degradation — will continue to worsen. Community forestry interventions are seen by the government and the funding institutions as an important strategy in alleviating upland poverty.

Concerns regarding poverty have contributed to the emergence of various project appraisal and planning techniques which aim to better understand and address the situation of the poor. Of the different appraisal and participatory planning techniques, RRA and techniques, such as the use of SEDP, have recently gained more prominence. These techniques are normally employed through the
assistance of contracted NGOs in most government-initiated community forestry projects.

An analysis of two government-initiated community forestry projects demonstrated how the use of these techniques tends to perpetuate the problem of upland poverty. The case of Mat-i CFP showed how RRA has reinforced the ‘romantic myth of homogeneous community’, thereby marginalising the forest-related needs of the poorest in the community. The second case of the LIUCP demonstrates that even with the involvement of NGOs, bounded participatory planning using SEDP is not easily translated into a tangible attack on the problem of poverty. The two cases highlight the importance of looking at the different project techniques, and the institutional mechanisms, that use them to understand the outcomes of community forestry projects in terms of their poverty alleviation objectives. They point to the need to consider the indirect mechanisms which may perpetuate poverty, instead of looking only to the ‘powerful forces’ as advanced by the analysts of political economy. These indirect mechanisms are normally left out in the current literature, not only in community forestry but also in the broader debate on the poverty-environment relationship. By including them as part of the analytical framework, the debate on poverty-environment will be enriched.

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1 The subsistence level is defined as the minimum food threshold. The official subsistence line per capita in 1985 was 2,904 pesos for urban areas and 2,414 pesos for rural areas (Cruz et al., 1992).

2 The National Economic Development Authority (NEDA) defined the poverty line in its Medium Term Philippine Development Plan, 1987-92, as ‘the monthly income required to satisfy almost 100 per cent of the nutritional requirements and basic needs of a family of six’. The NEDA sets this minimum monthly income for a family of six at P2,382 ($113) for the entire Philippines. The figure is higher for Metro Manila (P3,282 or $156) and lower for provincial urban and rural areas (P2,912 or $138 and P1,006 or $98 respectively).

3 According to Gilmour and Fisher (1991), community suggests a group of people with common interests such as residence, kinship, religious affiliation. This implies that members of communities may act jointly in respect of these common interests. However, individuals may belong to a number of communities depending on the set of interests relevant to each in a given situation. Therefore, a community of residence does not necessarily share a common interest in relation to the local forest resources. Because of these various connotations of community forestry, Gilmour and Fisher suggest that the word ‘community is of little use in implementing community forestry’ (Gilmour and Fisher, 1991:69).
DENR Administrative Order No. 22, Series of 1993 described the Community Resource Management and Development Plan (CRMDP) as a comprehensive plan to be prepared jointly by the community and the assisting NGO with help from DENR. Accordingly, the plan shall specify how the forest resources shall be managed and developed to meet the identified needs and problems of the community while ensuring the sustainability of these resources. The plan had not been formulated during my field work in 1993, hence is not covered in the present study.

The 12-day training was not only in RRA but also in Perimeter Survey and Mapping of the CFP sites. It can be assumed then that at most no more than 60 per cent of time (about seven days) was devoted to RRA.

The authors of the manual described Rapid Rural Systems Appraisal or RRSA as a ‘rapid, flexible, iterative, systems-oriented, cost effective, participatory, and interdisciplinary method of site assessment to provide better understanding of the rural situation’ (Sajise et al., n.d.). RRSA combined some of the early features of RRA (such as its rapidity, flexibility, cost-effectiveness, and multidisciplinary approach) with Gordon Conway’s agroecosystems analysis which draws on systems and ecological thinking (Conway, 1985, 1986, and 1987). In recent western literature, the incorporation of the agroecosystems analysis into RRA has been traced as part of the international development on RRA methodology (Chambers, 1994a,b,c). For the purposes of this study, the word RRA will be used instead of RRSA.

The reliance on structured interviews waters down the claimed strengths of RRA over a formal survey (Chambers, 1992:5), for example, 1) RRA allows for progressive learning which is flexible, exploratory, interactive and inventive; 2) it allows learning from and with the rural people, eliciting and using their criteria and categories, and finding, understanding and appreciating indigenous technical knowledge; 3) it allows finding out only what is needed and measuring only that which needs to be measured; and 4) it allows for information to be collected by different methods, sources, and disciplines and a range of informants in a range of places, and cross-checking to get closer to the truth through successive approximations.

An example of these are the radio and television station preferences of the respondents, their type of house, source of news and/or entertainment, respondent’s religion, etc.

Network analysis of problems is based on the site assessment conducted by the RRA team, primarily through structured interviews. This is done by identifying the major problems of the people in the area from which the primary, secondary, tertiary, etc., causes are traced. This network of problems is then represented in a diagram such as the one in figure 6.1.

Identifying these groups was one of the major tasks during my stay in the project area for more than a month as part of my field work.

The LIUCP management is composed of the National Project Office or NPO based in Manila and two Provincial Project Management Offices (PPMO) based in the provinces of Mindoro Oriental and Mindoro Occidental.

The agroforestry, reforestation and livelihood component consists of: 1) the establishment and operation of about 60 community nurseries (approximately eight per watershed) to facilitate the adoption of soil conserving agroforestry technologies by about 7,500 farming families over an approximate area of 15,000 ha in the targeted watersheds, 2) the reforestation on a contract basis by the beneficiaries, of another 15,000 ha in targeted watersheds; and 3) credit and technical assistance for income diversification. The agroforestry subcomponent is supported by a US$620,000 ADB-financed technical assistance for agroforestry research and development. The major aim of the technical assistance is to test the application and promote the localised adoption of agroforestry technologies developed by the Mindanao Baptist Rural Life Center in Bansalan, Davao del Sur. One of the strategies under this technical assistance is the
development of an agroforestry demonstration farm in the different watershed areas for potential adoption by the beneficiary communities. Reforestation subcomponent on the other hand involves straightforward contract reforestation (CR) offered to individual families and community-based contract reforestation (CBCR) generally preferred by the Mangyans. Income diversification focuses on supporting primary income-generating activities such as livestock and poultry raising, intensive homelot gardening—particularly for high-value vegetables, and handicrafts. Financial support for this component is to be sought under the Land Bank Integrated Rural Finance Program which is a non-contributory agricultural micro-credit scheme.

The infrastructure and social services component supports the construction of basic social infrastructure in the project sites, such as simple road networks in the sitio, water supply, school, and setting up of health clinic facilities. It also involves labour-intensive construction and rehabilitation of farm-to-market roads including foot bridges and spillway crossings, and the construction of labour-intensive, simple irrigation systems.

Cumulative official targets in Mindoro Oriental for reforestation and agroforestry are 8,275 ha and 8,850 ha, respectively. SEDP targets for the same components are only 1,562 ha and 1,787 ha, respectively.

One could speculate that this is due to a combination of reasons: 1) the negative publicity about LIUCP in the national dailies quoting some negative remarks about the project from an “NGO spokesman” (Evora, 1993); 2) the heated and confrontational approach that prevailed during the course of the project evaluation (NGOs and POs vs. DENR and ADB); 3) the NGOs hinting that they would terminate their contract before the end of 1993; and 4) the POs request in some areas as in Pola watershed that the project should be stopped because it destroyed the culture of the Mangyans.

These reasons include: 1) lack of availability of labour within the upland communities, especially the Mangyan communities; 2) some NGOs lack technical skills and experience in playing the role as an implementing organisation and they do not have qualified technical staff to carry out/facilitate development activities; and 3) inadequate supervision and monitoring of NGOs by DENR and reluctance of some NGOs to be monitored by the DENR.

For instance, total physical targets for reforestation and agroforestry were 1,475 ha and 2,800 ha respectively, to be accomplished within a 14-month period. These were almost two times higher than the accomplishment during the first three years of project implementation, i.e., 725 ha for reforestation and 1,185 ha for agroforestry.
CHAPTER SEVEN
SUSTAINING THE FOREST RESOURCES

The reductionism of the scientific forestry paradigm created by commercial industrial interests violates both the integrity of the forests and the integrity of the forest cultures who need the forests in its diversity to satisfy their needs for food, fibre and shelter.

Vandana Shiva
Monocultures of the Mind: Perspectives on Biodiversity and Biotechnology, 1993:18

7.1 Introduction

The previous two chapters have dealt with two of the core concerns of community forestry: democratising resource access, and poverty alleviation. As noted in Chapter Two, these concerns have their direct parallel in the broader issues of ‘environmentally sustainable development’. Democratising forest resource access parallels the political intentions of ESD, and poverty alleviation its economic intentions. In this chapter, I focus on the third aim of community forestry: to achieve forest sustainability which corresponds with ESD’s resource sustainability intentions.

The concept of forest sustainability, however, is multidimensional. It has close links with the political and economic core concerns of community forestry, described in the last two chapters. Indeed, a growing body of literature on community forestry and on sustainable development has established that addressing these political and economic concerns is central to resource sustainability. Thus, while the focus of this chapter is on forest sustainability, it would be unrealistic to completely detach the discussion from the social dimensions of forest management.

Consistent with the two previous chapters, this chapter focuses on approaches that are used to address the third core concern: forest sustainability. I put forward two associated arguments concerning the application of sustained-yield
forestry principles and related approaches in community forestry projects. First, I assert that such an application tends to advance a ‘simplified’ approach to forest management that dismisses local alternatives to forest sustainability. Secondly, even with the recent attempt to incorporate the ‘social factor’, I contend that the application of these principles and approaches tends to marginalise the two core concerns of resource democratisation and poverty alleviation, and so works against the realisation of forest sustainability.

I present my arguments, first, by providing a brief outline on the emerging practice of sustained-yield forestry as it is applied in community forestry in the Philippines. I then use the Malicon FOSA of CVRP-1-SF and the Presentacion CFP to demonstrate the substance of the two arguments. Finally, I propose that a pluralist approach to forest sustainability which recognises local diversity (human and natural) and allows for local alternatives is potentially more promising than the conventional sustained-yield forestry techniques.

### 7.2 The Emerging Practice of Sustained-Yield Forestry

Sustainability of forest resources is the very essence of forest management. A central concept in forestry science, sustained-yield forestry deals with the management of forest resources in perpetuity. It involves the application of “scientifically-based rules for balancing harvest with growth” (Lee, 1984: 93) to provide a continuous supply of forest resources through time. The concept of sustained-yield forestry was originally developed to maintain stable timber supplies. It was later broadened to include other outputs from the forests (Clawson and Sedjo 1984). In practice, however, the application of the concept has been criticised for being confined to ‘logging prescriptions’ on commercial timber, rather than the management of a whole range of forest products and services (Colchester, 1993:191-192).

The criticism that sustained-yield forestry is basically logging prescriptions holds true for the Philippines at least in the period from the 1950s to the 1980s. An early attempt, in 1953, to put this concept into practice was part of the first forestry management plan in the country. Its objective was to regulate timber cutting “on a
sustained-yield basis, to reduce logging damage, and to provide sufficient areas to meet the logging demands of the operators within the working circle” (Uebelhör, Lagundino and Abalos, 1990:6). That sustained-yield was about ‘sustainable logging’ was also reflected in Logging System Under Sustained Yield, the title of the first forestry administrative order issued in 1954. The administrative order prescribed the nationwide application of sustained-yield management in all areas declared as permanent forest (or likely to be declared as such) through the employment of a selective logging system (Uebelhör, Lagundino and Abalos, 1990). The Philippine Selective Logging System (PSLS), as it is known today, remains the official silvicultural system for the Philippine dipterocarp forest and the main practical expression of sustained-yield forest management.

Historically, the practice of sustained-yield forestry in the Philippines, and probably elsewhere, has been associated with large-scale commercial timber exploitation. The concept is inherently biased towards commercial timber (Chapter Two). The meaning of timber is limited to its ‘merchantability’, that is, a specific diameter and height that a tree must reach before it “can be logged and marketed for profit” (Sanvictores, 1993:3). Even if their existence is acknowledged on paper, other forest products and amenities are generally relegated to the periphery of forest management. For instance, Presidential Decree No. 705 — otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines (1975:4) — defines forest products as “timber, pulpwood, firewood, bark, tree top, resin, gum, wood, oil, honey, beeswax, nipa, rattan, or other forest growth such as grass, shrub and flowering plant, the associated water, fish, game, scenic, historical, recreational and geologic resources in forest lands”. The same Code states that the concept of sustained-yield management is not limited to commercial timber but also applies to the water, grass, wildlife, and other renewable resources of the forest. In practice, however, the concept has yet to be applied beyond a few commercial tree species.

The commercial orientation of sustained-yield forestry tends to promote a capitalist mode of production. It caters primarily for large-scale, capital intensive, and highly mechanised timber production that depends on a continuous timber supply to sustain operation and profit. Thus, it is inclined to serve the interests of the elite who have the capital and other means to venture into the timber business. The
sophistication of sustained-yield forestry also requires the specialised knowledge to be able to predict timber yield and to regulate the forest so as to produce a constant yield over time. Logically, it places forest management in the hands of the experts. It also leads to a centralised approach to forest management, where large production investments are matched with specialised knowledge to ensure a continuous timber supply.

The recent priority given by the Philippine government to community forestry has led to a new strategy that incorporates the social factor into the sustained-yield equation. An emerging strategy for forest sustainability can be gleaned in the following statement from the Philippine Master Plan for Forestry Development (DENR, 1990a:94):

A system of managing the forest resources that would favour the upland communities, provide them with a continued source of livelihood, that is compatible with the principles of sustainable management, and at the same time serve as a tool for forest protection has to be developed.

Four related observations can be deduced from this formulation when compared to the early practice of sustained-yield forestry. First there is the change in the intended beneficiaries. Under the emerging strategy, the benefits of sustainability shift from the elite sector to the local communities. Secondly, there is the nature of the production system. The emerging strategy hopes to replace the capitalist mode of production with one that centres on community needs, i.e. it should at the same time, provide a continuous source of livelihood for rural people. Thirdly, there is the ownership of knowledge about sustained-yield forestry. By implication, there is a sharing of technical knowledge about sustained-yield between technical experts and the local communities who are expected to serve as the prime movers of forest sustainability. Finally, there is the issue of forest protection. Under the emerging strategy, the participation of the local communities in forest protection activities is a vital component in achieving sustainability of forest resources.

The principles of sustainable management contained in the Forestry Master Plan also indicate a broadening of the scope of the early practice of sustained-yield. While previous practice was generally applied to old-growth natural forest, the new strategy integrates the natural forest and plantations into one management unit. It
also claims to include the management of other forest products in addition to timber. A whole range of activities using various forestry techniques, such as reforestation, enrichment planting, TSI, ANR, and others, also forms part of the sustainability strategy. This is elaborated in the other section of the Forestry Mater Plan (DENR, 1990a:94):

Under the harvesting aspect of the management plan, the community is allowed to cut a volume equivalent to what the forest can sustain on a periodic basis taking into account the yield of both the natural forest and the plantations that will be established as part of the program. The allowable cut will also include the volume removed under TSI, as well as forest products other than timber. On the aspect of forest renewal, the community will be encouraged to undertake enrichment planting and assisted natural regeneration to hasten the rehabilitation of the forest. Likewise, reforestation of open and denuded areas will be part of the management contract. The minimum area to be reforested will depend on the extent of area needed to insure sustainable operation.

It should be emphasised, however, that this ‘broadened’ scope does not change the principles of sustained-yield forestry. The main objective of applying the principles of sustained-yield in community forestry is still the systematic application of technical forestry knowledge in order to ensure the continuous supply of forest resources over time. What has changed, however, is the incorporation of the social factor. Nonetheless, there is apprehension, about whether this new strategy can be realised in practice as suggested by the title of an important 1991 DENR seminar (1991c), *Sustainable Management of Natural Forests in the Philippines: Possibility or Illusion?* The misgivings are based mainly on two grounds. The first concerns the technical and institutional feasibility of applying the concept. A DENR Adviser on Silviculture and Social Forestry, Konrad Uebelhör (1991:222) elaborates on this:

Little is known, on the other hand, on how to introduce sustainable forest management practices into an upland community considering that type of ownership, management objectives and capacities, decision-making processes, etc. are quite different from those for which the traditional forest management concepts were developed. From an extension point of view a stepwise introduction and gradual refinement of management practices in relation to training and special skills development is desirable. The community, however, might view an overburdening of their forest activities with bureaucratic red tape, diverse control measures and technical prescriptions as a lack of sincerity from the government side and as a possibility to open doors for a diversity of well-known and costly “facilitation” practices.
The second ground for disquiet relates to the historical and socio-political forces that are likely to frustrate the successful employment of the concept. Uebelhör (1991:224) states:

In case of a concerted action of local elites and government officials (so-called unholy alliances) undermining the sustainable development efforts, the project and the community will rather be helpless, unless external control mechanisms are established at the highest level.

A number of authors and organisations have expressed reservations about the potential of sustained-yield forestry even in its ‘traditional form’, that is, without incorporating the social factor. Their reasons match the two concerns regarding technical and institutional feasibility and the unfavourable historical and political context in which sustained-yield forestry has usually been normally applied. Of the two sets of reasons, a 1988 study conducted for the International Timber Trade Organisation concluded, that the historical and political constraints were more important than the technical aspects (Poore, 1989:8). This conclusion supports the recent appraisal of the earlier practice of sustained-yield (1960-1980s) in the Philippines through the PSLS (Uebelhör, Lagundino and Abalos, 1990). As mentioned in Chapter Two, the appraisal asserts that even if a more sophisticated silvicultural systems could had been implemented, forest sustainability would not have improved because of the political situation at that time and the economic orientation of the concessionaires.

In summary, the earlier practice of sustained-yield forestry in the Philippines, through PSLS was constrained by the limitations of the approach and poor implementation. Moreover, it was further constrained by the unfavourable historical and political context in which it was applied. Even with the recent incorporation of the social factor to broaden the concept of sustained-yield forestry, the same sets of constraints are likely to limit its realisation on the ground. This analysis is supported by the existing literature on sustained-yield forestry. However, while this is interesting and of some importance, it focuses only on the political and technical aspects of sustainability. A less-explored aspect among existing studies is the nature of sustained-yield as a forest management tool, and its tendency to produce
contradictory effects. This is the subject of analysis in the following two project cases.

### 7.3 Sustaining the Forest Resources: Experiences from Two Cases

**Table 7.1 Characteristics of the community forestry case study projects.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHARACTERISTICS</th>
<th>MALICON FOSA (CVRP)ᵃ</th>
<th>PRESENTACION CFPᵇ</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Status of forest cover</td>
<td>Of the 1,300 ha project area, approximately 10% are mossy forest, 60% logged over area, and 30% grassland and cultivated areas.</td>
<td>Of the 1,863 ha project area, 7% are mossy forest, 48% logged over area, and 45% brushland, grassland, and cultivated areas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Major use of the forest</td>
<td>irrigation water, <em>kaingin</em>, local construction materials, fuelwood.</td>
<td><em>kaingin</em>, local construction materials, commercial timber, rattan, and fuelwood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Pressure on the remaining forest resources</td>
<td>pressure come from 58 hillside farmers and undetermined number of illegal cutters from nearby barangays and municipality.</td>
<td>under intense pressure from 140 forest land claimants and undetermined number of illegal cutters from within the project barangays and neighbouring areas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Forestry techniques and approaches employed or to be employed</td>
<td>agroforestry, assisted natural regeneration, community timber utilisation, forest protection.</td>
<td>agroforestry, reforestation, assisted natural regeneration, timber stand improvement, rattan plantation establishment, community timber utilisation, forest protection.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: ᵃACIPHIL (1986) and CVRP field notes; ᵇPag-Bicol and BREDCI (1993)

The following sections discuss the different approaches applied in the two project cases to promote the sustainability of forest resources. Excluded from the discussion is the provision of resource access instruments which has been dealt with in Chapter Five. Table 7.1 presents some characteristics of the two cases that relate to the present discussion.

### 7.3.1 The Case of Malicon FOSA

Malicon FOSA is one of 28 FOSAs organised by the CVRP staff in 1985 under the CVRP-1 Social Forestry Project (CVRP-1-SF). It is the largest of the five FOSAs in Barangay Banban, Ayungon, Negros Occidental, and has the third largest area of
the 28 FOSAs. Compared to most of the FOSAs, Malicon has abundant forest resources. As of 1993, approximately 70 per cent of the 1,313 ha FOSA area was chiefly with second-growth forest. The Malicon forest is also under relatively less pressure from upland farmers and illegal cutters. Both *kaingin* and illegal cutting activities are controlled by FOSA members who conduct regular forest patrols.

Local people, including those from the neighbouring municipality, benefit from the Malicon forest. Upland farmers plant corn and root crops in open areas for commercial purposes as well as home consumption. Lowland farmers use the numerous forest creeks to irrigate their ricefields. Local residents also harvest timber or utilise dead trees from the second-growth forest for house construction and repair, and gather fuelwood from the forest for cooking. In addition, some people from the neighbouring *barangays* and the municipality of Mabinay benefit from the second-growth forest through illegal timber cutting.

The Malicon forest was part of CVRP-1-SF’s 17,363 ha forest land targeted for sustainable management. Its grasslands and cultivated areas constituted part of the project’s physical target for reforestation and agroforestry, respectively. Its second-growth forest was to be sustainably managed as part of the 8,800 ha production forest through the development of a forest management approach based on labour-intensive, smallholder operations that would be replicable nationwide. In addition, the remaining mossy forest (roughly 10 per cent of the total area) was to be preserved as part of a 730 ha protection forest.

By the time CVRP-1-SF terminated in 1992, however, the Assistant Project Manager estimated that around 1,200 ha of second-growth forest in the project area had lost its forest cover during the eight years of project implementation. The first Project Manager estimated that the depletion of forest cover could have been around 1,000 ha during the same period. This means an average annual loss of 125 to 150 ha. Forest fires, illegal timber cutting and *kaingin* making were among the major reasons cited for forest depletion. Of the different FOSAs, however, Malicon still had one of the highest percentages of forest cover. Forest protection activities within the FOSA boundary have continued even after the project termination. These are the main reasons for choosing Malicon FOSA as a case study in this chapter.
7.3.1.1 Reforestation and Agroforestry

Under the original CVRP-1-SF implementation plan, 5,000 ha of grassland and brushland areas and 3,200 ha of cultivated and claimed areas were to be developed for reforestation and agroforestry purposes. These tasks were to be accomplished through the involvement of an estimated number of 1,200 households residing within the project site (ACIPHIL, 1986). The use of timber utilisation as the project’s entry point, however, diverted the activities of the CVRP staff and the local people from reforestation and agroforestry. From the start of the project in July 1984 until the first seven CTUPs were issued in May 1986, only 205 ha of the first two-year target of 3,800 ha were reforested. No agroforestry farms were established during this period (ACIPHIL, 1986). Forty hectares of the total reforested area at this time were within the Malicon FOSA. However, forest fires ravaged the area for three consecutive years; hence planted seedlings either died or were stunted in growth.

There were also limited physical accomplishments in reforestation and agroforestry during the CTUP operation from May 1986 to July 1988. As observed by a World Bank Mission Team in 1988:

...attention was initially focused only on the CTUPs and the cutting and processing of dead timber; all other activities has lagged behind for one reason or another - reforestation and agroforestry mainly from insufficient staff emphasis aggravated by late budget releases (World Bank, 1988b:5).

It was only after the CTUP cancellation in August 1988 that CVRP staff were able to give full attention to reforestation and agroforestry. However, physical accomplishment continued to lag behind schedule. In February 1989, a World Bank Mission Team reported that only 25 per cent (1,295 ha) of the five-year physical target in reforestation had been achieved almost five years after project implementation (World Bank, 1989b). Part of the reason, in addition to the emphasis on CTUP, was delayed budget releases and the unwillingness of some claimants to allow reforestation in their areas (CVRP, 1992a). Except for a 2 ha area reforested using part of the proceeds from timber utilisation, no reforestation took place in Malicon between 1988 and 1989. Agroforestry development also lagged behind schedule; a total of only 170 ha was planted with fruit trees in 1988.
against a target of 700 ha for five years. Delays were due mostly to the complexity of issuing CSCs which were part of the conditions for implementing agroforestry interventions (CVRP, 1992a).

From 1990 until its termination in 1992, CVRP implemented three strategies to boost its reforestation goals: straight reforestation, ANR, and on-farm reforestation. Straight reforestation involved the regeneration of open areas and grasslands within the forest land by contracting FOSAs to conduct specific reforestation activities. The three-year contract meant the planting of forest trees at 2m by 3m spacing as well as their maintenance and protection (CVRP, 1992a). Average contract cost for one year establishment and two years maintenance was P12,000 per ha.

ANR involved encouraging the growth of pioneer shrubs and trees already existing in the area by the removal of unwanted vegetation and the establishment of firebreaks (CVRP, 1992b). Unlike straight reforestation which focuses on the planting of seedlings raised from the nursery, assisted natural regeneration is concerned with the existing broadleaved species regardless of their commercial values. It offered a cheaper way of reforesting a given area where abundant regeneration already existed. Average cost per ha for a one-year contract was only P1,790 (CVRP, 1992a).

Finally, on-farm reforestation entailed planting fruit and forest trees on the vacant areas owned by the upland farmers, especially those covered by CSC. Under this strategy, farm owners were provided with free seedlings or were paid P1.50 for each seedling planted (CVRP, 1992a). The strategy was developed in response to resistance from land owners or claimants unwilling to give their area for straight reforestation because they feared that the government would take them away once reforested.

The rich regenerations at the edge of Malicon second-growth forest made them suitable for ANR. In 1991 alone, Malicon FOSA completed a 265 ha ANR contract with CVRP. Similarly, it completed a three-hectare straight reforestation contract and a 16 ha on-farm reforestation during the last two years of the project implementation. What made Malicon different from the rest of the FOSAs was not its physical accomplishments — although these were important — it was the
motivation of its members to protect the remaining Malicon forest from further forest degradation.

7.3.1.2 Timber Utilisation and Forest Protection

CVRP-1-SF proponents considered community timber utilisation as a primary vehicle for sustainable forest management. The main assumption was that if local people benefited economically from timber utilisation, they would be motivated to participate in activities which assisted sustainable forest management. This was the primary reason for choosing timber utilisation as a main project component. As elaborated in Chapter Five, the commercial utilisation of standing and fallen dead trees was realised through the DENR’s issuance of CTUP to 18 FOSAs including Malicon.

It was envisioned that the various project activities would promote the principle of sustained-yield forestry. The commercial utilisation of standing and fallen dead trees was to be augmented through reforestation to perpetuate timber production. Forest was also protected in order to prevent illegal cutting and forest fires that could deplete the remaining timber stock. Similar to other FOSAs, Malicon allocated part of the proceeds from timber extraction to sustain timber resource with the assistance of CVRP staff. For every bd ft of lumber extracted and sold, Malicon FOSA allotted ₱0.05 for forest protection and ₱0.10 for reforestation. The forest protection fund was used to hire two, full-time local forest guards to conduct daily patrols in the forested area. On the other hand, 2 ha of grassland were planted with Gmelina arborea using the reforestation fund from the CTUP operation. Of those FOSAs that conducted reforestation, only Malicon did the maintenance for planted seedlings; the remainder their reforested areas unattended, and these were subsequently either burned or overgrown by grasses.

Unlike the others, members of Malicon FOSA continued with forest protection activities after the CTUP cancellation — this time, most of the male FOSA members worked on a voluntary basis. Their main reason was to sustain the major benefit they derived from this activity: water. As one FOSA member briefly explained:
Our irrigated lands depend on the forest for water supply. If we do not protect the forest, then we allow the destruction of our very source of life (Group Discussion with Malicon members, Barangay Banban, Negros Oriental, 26/10/92).

Starting in the 1980s, owners of irrigated lands have observed the declining water yield from the various tributaries of the Malicon watershed. During the summer of 1991, a significant area of rice land could no longer be supported by the available water supply. Local people began to fight over water to irrigate their farms. Some guarded their waterways to prevent others from rechannelling irrigation water to their own farms. Members of the Malicon FOSA perceived that the declining water yield was due to the depletion of the forest resources. This tends to support the claim in the literature that the removal of forest cover can result in decreased stream flow during the dry season.\(^5\)

Interviews with local residents revealed that Malicon watershed supported about 300 ha of the total 400 ha of irrigated rice farms in the whole of Barangay Banban. The remaining 100 ha were irrigated through the watersheds of the other three FOSAs: Ama, Saba and Alta FOSA. About 60 per cent of the 400 ha was owned by people from the lowlands — including those from the neighbouring municipalities like Tayasan. The rest were owned by the local barangay residents including the Malicon members.

Malicon FOSA had 78 members as of 1993. Of these, 40 had upland farms, 20 owned lowland irrigated farms, and 18 had both lowland and upland farms. Average farm size per family was 3 ha for combined lowland and upland farms (IAST, 1992). While only 38 members owned irrigated farms — totalling about 50 ha — the majority of FOSA members, including the upland farmers, benefited from the 300 ha irrigated area. This was made possible by an arrangement (termed as *kinahon*) entered into by a ricefield owner and an interested farm worker. Under this system, a person works for a ricefield owner, in exchange for a fraction of the harvested rice. For instance, a worker may get one-sixth of the total grain harvested for doing the planting and harvesting for the ricefield owner, but only one-seventh for doing just the harvesting. Almost all the upland farmers rely on *kinahon* to meet their rice requirements. This motivates them to become actively involved in forest protection.
7.3.1.3 Beyond Politics and Poor Practice

Chapter Five demonstrated that the combination of an unfavourable political context and the poor application of CTUP contributed to the CVRP-1-SF’s failure to promote equitable distribution of forest benefits and the sustainability of the local forest resources. These factors, however, were not the only reasons for the failure. A less overt explanation relates to the application of the principle of sustained-yield forestry during project implementation. This had bred a form of ‘tunnel vision’ (Scott, 1993) in the management of local forest resources. Tunnel vision has its advantages as

it brings into very sharp focus certain limited aspects of an otherwise complex and unwieldy reality. This very simplification, in turn, makes the phenomenon at the center of the field of vision far more legible and, hence, far more susceptible to careful measurement, calculation, and manipulation (Scott, 1993:1).

As a ‘simplified’ approach, sustained-yield forestry brings into sharp focus only the commercial value of the forest resources. This enables the proponents of sustained-yield forestry to concentrate on a few commercial tree species, and to work towards the idea of predictability of timber yield in a given period. When applied in community forestry projects, however, sustained-yield forestry also breeds a simplified approach to forest management that fails to capture the complexity and unwieldiness of local reality. In the case of the CVRP-1-SF, the application of sustained-yield principles engendered simplified assumptions about the otherwise complex realities and these assumptions were inconsistent with the project objectives. Two assumptions are relevant to the present discussion: that of homogeneity; and that of the singularity of approach.

The commercial orientation inherent in sustained-yield forestry led the project proponents to assume that the majority of FOSA members would be interested in timber utilisation (homogeneity assumption). As the first Project Manager, Gerry Mascariñas, briefly explained:

We treated the community as homogeneous. We thought everyone would be interested in timber utilisation. But we found out later that
few were inclined to engage in timber sawing. Most were interested only in farming (Interview, Dumaguete City, 27/11/92).

The situation led to a proliferation of sawyers outside the project area who were not interested in forest conservation. This was to be expected since, unlike the members of the Malicon FOSA, they had no stake in conservation of the local forest resources. On the contrary, outside sawyers were said to start forest fires so that they could continue their operations of utilising dead trees.

The ‘singularity approach assumption’ also relates to the commercial orientation of sustained-yield forestry. The application of sustained-yield principles led the project’s proponents and staff to assume that the only possible way to solicit community assistance with forest protection was through the direct economic incentive of timber extraction. This is not necessarily so as demonstrated by the Malicon FOSA. After the CTUP cancellation, followed by CVRP termination, the Malicon FOSA continued with forest protection activities, unlike the other 18 FOSAs issued with a CTUP. They did this to preserve the watershed value of the forest that supports their irrigated farms. The Malicon case illustrates that local people value the forest — not necessarily for the direct benefits it offers from timber extraction — but as integral part of their farming systems, and probably also for other related purposes.

It should be noted that the main issue here is not simply a matter of two poor assumptions carelessly made by the project proponents in the rush to implement the project. This suggests that the problem cannot be easily addressed through overnight managerial fixing. The issue is deeper than poor practice and has a philosophical dimension. The employment of ‘scientific’ forestry techniques — of which the principles of sustained-yield forestry are the complete embodiment — has been associated with what an Indian environmental activist, Vandana Shiva, termed as ‘monocultures of the mind’. She develops this concept in the context of the need to recognise diversity:

Monocultures of the mind make diversity disappear from perception, and consequently from the world. The disappearance of diversity is also the disappearance of alternatives - and gives rise to the TINA (there is no alternative) syndrome. How often in contemporary times total uprooting of nature, technology, communities, and entire civilisation is justified on the grounds that ‘there is no alternative’. 
Alternatives exist, but are excluded. Their inclusion requires a context of diversity. Shifting to diversity as a mode of thought, a context of action, allows multiple choices to emerge (Shiva, 1993:5).

Thus viewed, the homogeneity and singularity of approach assumptions are products of a ‘monocultured mind’ brought about by the application of sustained-yield forestry. Such principles contributed to the homogenisation of the local people’s diverse livelihood interests so as to fit the commercial timber orientation of sustained-yield. Upland people came to be seen, more as timber sawyers than farmers. Similarly, only the economic value of the forest in terms of its timber resource was given emphasis. The diversity of forest benefits — including its watershed value — disappeared from the perception of the CVRP-I-SF proponents and field personnel. Consequently, local alternatives to forest sustainability such as voluntary forest protection being done by Malicon FOSA, escaped the tunnel vision of both the technocrats and field implementors. In essence, the application of the principles of sustained-yield had advanced the ‘no alternative syndrome’. The disappearance of other alternatives (particularly local ones) to forest sustainability reinforced the traditional technocratic and centralist approach to forest management which failed to address the core concern of forest sustainability.

### 7.3.2 The Presentacion CFP

Statistics on the Presentacion CFP’s forest cover, number of claimants, and estimated number of illegal cutters, collectively reflect the status of its forest resources. Some of the information presented in Chapters Four and Five are worth recalling here. Only 55 per cent (1,030 ha) of the total 1,863 ha project area has good forest cover. The remaining 45 per cent (833 ha) is brushland, grassland, and cultivated areas. A total of 140 cultivators and claimants have a stake in 46 per cent (850 ha) of the total project area (Pag-Bicol and BREDCI, 1993). Before the implementation of the project in 1990, BREDCI Officers estimated that close to 100 households (roughly 10 per cent of the four project barangays) were engaged in illegal cutting and/or timber business within the project site. Indeed, these figures indicate that the forest resources are under intense exploitation pressure.
The local people use the forest for multiple purposes. Claimed areas are normally converted to *kaingins* and planted with agricultural crops. Common agricultural crops include rice, corn, sweet potato, yam and other root crops. Coconut, hemp, banana, and tiger grass (for manufacturing brooms) are also important products and major sources of cash income. The second-growth forest is the source of timber, both for commercial purposes and local domestic needs such as house construction and repair. Rattan and vines are also harvested from secondary forests. In the 1992 forest inventory conducted in the area, the local people identified seven species of rattan which are of commercial value. Fuelwood, the only energy source for cooking in the project site, is also collected from the second-growth forest and *kaingin* areas.

Qualitative indicators exist on the diminishing value of the local forest. As may be recalled from Chapter Five, forest cover has receded by about 5 kilometres from the shoreline since World War II. Valuable timber species, such as *molave* (*Vitex parviflora*), and animals such as wild pigs and deer, which used to abound in the area are now rarely found. Similarly, timber resources have dwindled. An illegal timber cutter from Barangay Maangas complained during an interview that now had to hike for three hours before reaching a cutting site. A decade ago, cutting sites for timber were less than one hour walk from the settlement.

To sustain local forest resources, several different project interventions have been pursued: agroforestry, reforestation, assisted natural regeneration, timber stand improvement, rattan plantation, and forest protection. In addition, community timber utilisation is to be undertaken after the DENR’s issuance of CFMA and once the Community Resources Management and Development Plan has been approved. Accordingly, the plan shall “specify how the (forest) resources shall be managed and developed to meet the identified needs and problems of the community while ensuring the sustainability of these resources” (DENR, 1993:10). In other words, the ‘social factor’ is claimed to be built-in in the idea of sustainability.

Implementation of the different schemes was to be carried out by the local forestry cooperative, BREDCI, with assistance from Pag-Bicol. During the course of the project implementation, BREDCI officers and members were to be prepared organisationally and technically for their eventual management of the local forest.
resources. Table 7.2 presents the different project interventions and their physical targets under the existing land uses. They can be classified into two major categories: forest renewal, and sustainable timber utilisation.

**Table 7.2 Project interventions under different vegetative cover, Presentacion CFP.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VEGETATIVE COVER AND PROJECT INTERVENTION</th>
<th>AREA (HA)</th>
<th>Existing Land Use</th>
<th>Project Intervention</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Mossy forest</td>
<td>142</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Residual forest</td>
<td>888</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) Timber stand improvement (TSI)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td></td>
<td>39</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td></td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Assisted natural regeneration (ANR)</td>
<td>120</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Rattan plantation development</td>
<td>42</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Brushland, grassland and cultivated areas</td>
<td>833</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) Reforestation</td>
<td></td>
<td>102</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
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<td>1992</td>
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<td>25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td></td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Agroforestry</td>
<td>35</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Assisted natural regeneration (ANR)</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td></td>
<td>60</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total** 1,863

Note: Preparatory activities for timber harvesting in 532 ha residual forest and forest protection of the entire project sites are parts of the different project interventions.

Source: Pag-Bicol and BREDICI (1994).

### 7.3.2.1 Forest Renewal

An important work by Kummer (1992) on the Philippine postwar deforestation analysed deforestation as a process with two main elements: “First, the primary forest is converted to secondary forest through logging, and second, human settlements primarily composed of poor farmers, then encroached upon the secondary forest” (Kummer, 1992:147). Kummer’s analysis of the deforestation
process matches — to some extent — the history of deforestation in Presentacion CFP. Logging operations from 1965 to 1985 converted a significant portion of the area from primary to secondary forest. The influx of claimants during and after this period, resulted in the conversion of part of the secondary forest into *kaingin* or agricultural plots. Some of these people, however, such as Pay Belo (Box 5.2 of Chapter Five) had bought their area or staked their claim before logging started in the area. Whether old or recent claimants, their prime motivation for *kaingin* making is first to survive, and secondly, to improve their economic well-being. This should be kept in mind in analysing the likely outcome of forest renewal activities in the project area.

As far as the government is concerned, the whole Presentacion CFP site is classified as public land. The prescribed forest renewal activities were therefore based on biophysical characteristics, such as the nature of existing vegetation and slope, rather than on socio-economic criteria such as the presence or absence of claimants. Thus, timber stand improvement, assisted natural regeneration, and rattan plantation establishment, were the prescribed interventions for the second-growth forest. On the other hand, reforestation, agroforestry, and natural regeneration, are for brushlands and grasslands. All of these intervention activities were meant to improve the productivity of the forest or rehabilitate the denuded areas. They were part of the approach to sustain the forest resources in the area by augmenting the remaining second-growth forest.

From a purely technical forestry point of view, the different project interventions appeared to suit the biophysical characteristics of the project area. The different physical interventions were designed to match the existing vegetative cover. What was problematic though was the appropriateness of these interventions in promoting forest sustainability in the light of conflicting interests about the use of the land. As mentioned above, a significant portion of the area especially within the brushland and grassland category had been claimed and converted to *kaingins*. The same area was subjected to reforestation and assisted natural regeneration. Similarly, some portions of the claimed residual forest were also subjected to other project interventions.
Of the various interventions, agroforestry is probably the most appropriate for the greater part of the 850 ha which have been claimed. Agroforestry allows local people to combine agricultural crops with forest trees — so they don’t have to be displaced from working on their farms. Ironically, only 35 ha or 3.7 per cent of the total physical target was allocated for this purpose. Obviously, the project was biased towards timber production. Of the total physical target of 948 ha, about 81 per cent (771 ha) was for timber production; only the 142 ha (15 per cent) rattan plantation and 35 ha (about 4 per cent) agroforestry plots were not allocated to this purpose.

Considering the dwindling timber resources of the Philippines, one is inclined to favour the timber bias of the project on the grounds that the site is a logged over area. However, since land claims in the project area “look like “subdivisions” when laid out on a map (Pag-Bicol, 1991:4), the argument may be socially unsound and likely to work against the sustainability objective. The local people, particularly the claimants, viewed sustainability apart from the issue of timber production. They were more concerned about the sustainability of their farms that were threatened by the introduction of various forest renewal activities. Some claimants who were interviewed, foresaw that life would be a lot harder if their areas were planted to trees.

Pag-Bicol facilitated a series of discussions with the claimants in the different project barangays to gain their support for the project. The local DENR officials and BREDCI members were also present on these occasions. In these dialogues, some claimants requested that DENR officials exclude their areas from the project site. They proposed an adjustment of the project boundary on the upper slopes of the mountain so that only a few kaingins would be covered by the project. Others also requested that DENR reclassify their areas as agricultural land so that they could apply for land titles.

In the five dialogues conducted, DENR officials maintained that claimed areas were officially classified as public lands, and therefore could not be subject to individual ownership and titling. However, recognising the complexity of the issue, they suggested that Pag-Bicol staff and BREDCI officers might resolve the conflict through a continuing process of “peaceful dialogue” (Pag-Bicol, 1991:6) with the
claimants. Since claimed areas are ‘legally public’ the claimants have little alternative except to negotiate for the use of these lands. On the other hand, since Pag-Bicol and BREDCI had contracts with the DENR to implement various technical interventions, they had to assert the public status of these lands so as to be able to demand them for their use.

Claimants responded in various ways to the situation. Some, like the two sons of Pay Belo, joined the project so that they could take part in the various activities to earn some cash. However, this meant that they had to allow at least part of their lands to be subjected to project interventions. Few claimants managed to confront BREDCI members directly and to resist the incorporation of their area into the project. Others however, submitted their lands for the project purposes for fear that the DENR might put them in prison if they resisted. As one claimant explained briefly during an interview:

Most of us are afraid to talk during the dialogue because we are illiterate. We might talk about the wrong thing and be imprisoned for doing so (Interview, Presentacion, Camarines Sur, 19/03/93).

In some instances, BREDCI officials and the claimants attempted to settle the land conflict by negotiating arrangements for sharing of future produce from the land. In Barangay Maangas, claimants requested a 30 per cent share from the produce of their land which had been developed under the project. This sharing arrangement was accepted by BREDCI to placate the claimants in the hope that they would allow immediate reforestation in the area since the seedlings had already reached their planting stage (Pag-Bicol, 1991). In some instances, however, because of lack of space to implement the different activities, the President of BREDCI admitted that they had had to reforest claimed areas without the prior knowledge of the claimants.

Most of the claimants interviewed generally complained that they were worse off now compared with before the project had been introduced. Common reasons cited were: the absence or limited planting space, the project’s prohibition of kaingin, and the limited alternative sources of livelihood available. As the canopy of the planted trees closed, the sustainability of the claimants’ farms — their main source of livelihood — became increasingly threatened. This, in turn, posed a threat to forest sustainability, since the local people resisted the different project
interventions that threatened their livelihood. As mentioned in Chapter Five, the cutting of 2,000 saplings and pole size *Acacia mangium* was interpreted by some as a form of resistance by some claimants whose lands were planted to forest trees. Moreover, there is no assurance that cultivated areas planted to forest trees will not be converted back to *kaingin* after these trees have been harvested. Considering the high demand for farm lands and the limited alternative sources of livelihood, *kaingin* areas are likely to expand and encroach heavily into the remaining second-growth forest.

7.3.2.2 *Sustaining the Timber Harvest*

Forest renewal is just one of the project approaches to promote the sustainability of local forest resources. Another strategy is to promote sustainable harvesting of the existing timber resource and the plantation forest established through reforestation. This strategy is the main objective of CFP. It is to be pursued following the principles of sustained-yield forest management.

In Presentacion, the present method of timber harvesting by the illegal cutters is not sustainable. They extract timber from the forest in a very unregulated way with little regard for conservation. Primarily, this is because the forest became an open access resource after the last logging operator left the place in 1985. Some claimants also wanted to get rid of trees so that they could convert these areas to *kaingins*. Under the proposed sustainable approach to timber harvesting, annual harvest is to be regulated through an annual allowable cut (AAC). Wallace explains the concept of AAC in a clear and concise manner:

> AACs are calculated from the residual forest area and tree sizes. They are based on 35-year cutting cycles, and designed to provide for sustained production of trees greater than 60 cm diameter. Each year, all of the volume of 70 cm diameter trees and half of the volume of 60 cm trees are allowed to be cut (Wallace, 1993:2).

In the resource inventory conducted by BREDCI and Pag-Bicol, 532 ha of the 888 ha residual forest have been determined as 'operable area' (i.e., area available for timber production). The rest either lacked sufficient timber stock or were within the 50 per cent slope logging restriction set by DENR. The DENR-developed, AAC
formula prescribed a 35-year cutting cycle for second-growth dipterocarp forests all over the country. Using this formula, only a total of 15.2 ha of the 532 ha operable area can be subjected to annual harvesting.

Based on AAC computations made by Pag-Bicol and BREDCI, the annual harvest from the 15.2 ha cutting areas ranges from 408 m$^3$ in year one to 714.4 m$^3$ at the end of the 25-year planning period. This is equivalent to an average harvestable volume of 27 m$^3$/ha in the first year to 47 m$^3$/ha in the 25th year. Judging from these figures, the productivity of the forest appears to be relatively low considering that some parts of the area had been logged more than 20 years ago. Normally, a second-growth forest of the same age in other parts of the country can easily produce a harvestable volume of 60 m$^3$/ha (DENR, 1992c). One possible explanation for the low productivity is the continuous timber extraction by the local illegal cutters after the last logging operation finished. In other words, it is highly probable that the same area has been repeatedly logged, contributing to its poor timber stock. Table 7.3 shows the computed annual allowable cut for the residual forest for the 25-year planning period.

Table 7.3  Annual allowable cut (AAC) from second-growth forest, Presentacion CFP.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>DIPTEROCARP (m$^3$)</th>
<th>NON-DIPTEROCARP (m$^3$)</th>
<th>TOTAL AAC (m$^3$)</th>
<th>HARVESTABLE VOLUME (m$^3$/ha)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>365</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>484</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>364</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>483</td>
<td>32</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>364</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>483</td>
<td>32</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>364</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>483</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>482</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-10</td>
<td>1,803</td>
<td>591</td>
<td>2,394</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-15</td>
<td>2,091</td>
<td>696</td>
<td>2,787</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
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<td>16-20</td>
<td>2,550</td>
<td>970</td>
<td>3,550</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-25</td>
<td>3,572</td>
<td>1,012</td>
<td>3,572</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Pag-Bicol and BREDCI (1994).

Theoretically, forest growth can be simulated to determine its sustainable yield under a given cutting cycle. This may have been a useful exercise except that
the limited information available about the Presentacion second-growth forest has constrained the carrying out of a meaningful simulation analysis. However, findings from a simulation study — conducted in a somewhat similar second-growth forest of the Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines (PICOP) — provides some insights for the Presentacion CFP (PICOP, 1989). The study showed that harvested volume from second-growth forest could be attained in the third growth within 30 to 40 years. However, this is only possible through intensive silvicultural treatments, such as TSI, and supplementary planting of dipterocarp species (PICOP, 1989). In the absence of intensive silvicultural treatment, sustainable yield from the same area could only be attained after 60 years.

It should be noted, that the PICOP study was conducted in a well-managed second-growth forest. PICOP uses a modified selective logging system, known as the PICOP Residual Forest Silvicultural System, in harvesting its second-growth forest (PICOP, 1989). The system aims to provide sustainable harvest by specifying a desired residual stocking level which would be expected to produce the required volume for the third management cut. It is also guided by a long-term, sustainable forest management plan that is continuously revised to improve the development and management of the residual forest. In contrast, the second-growth forest of Presentacion has low productivity. It is also likely to receive comparatively low-quality management from local people due to the technical sophistication of forest management. Thus, it can be anticipated that even the relatively low harvest during the second cut will not be sustained in the third cut using a 35 year cutting cycle.

There is also the possibility of loss of the second-growth forest, considering its small operable area and the strong pressure to convert it to agricultural land. At the start of the third cyclic cut (36th year), the population in the four project barangays would have doubled to about 9,550 assuming the current rate of increase of 2 per cent. Even if only 30 per cent of the projected 1,155 additional families will need farm lands, and assuming that the present average farm size of 2.85 ha is sufficient to support a family of four, further 987 ha will be necessary to support these families. This is almost twice the size of the current operable area, and more than the entire size of the second-growth forest (888 ha). Most of the lands outside the second-growth and mossy forest have been privatised or claimed. In the
absence of a viable alternative means of livelihood, it is, therefore, highly probable that a significant part, if not the whole, of the operable area could be converted to agricultural farms even before the third cyclic cut started.

7.3.2.3 Marginalising the Social Dimension

The various technical interventions in Presentacion CFP have attempted to address the physical limits of the forest resources in the area in order to achieve their sustainability. Forest renewal activities were conducted to augment the existing forest resources, either through improving their productivity or renewing what had been depleted. On the other hand, the use of AAC was meant to apply the principles of sustained-yield by regulating the annual timber harvest to a certain volume which the natural capital could sustain. The use of these scientific techniques and approaches, however, has promoted a tunnelling of vision. It has brought about a focus on the physical or timber production aspect of sustainability while marginalising the social dimension.

Goodland et al. (1991:492) noted that forest sustainability has several components apart from timber production. These include the sustainability of forest-dwelling peoples and others dependent on the forest for their source of livelihood. The use of forestry approaches in Presentacion CFP emphasised the timber production component of forest sustainability. However, it has also obscured the social component by marginalising the interests of the claimants whose main source of livelihood has been threatened by these interventions.

The application of the different approaches also contributed to the ruling out of local alternatives. DENR rejected the proposal to move the project boundary upward, not only because claimed areas are classified as public lands but also because there are no other places to apply these techniques. It should be noted, however, that while the proposal seemed to be unpopular, it could well be a more realistic approach to manage the situation. Granting the request of the claimants would mean the permanent conversion of the claimed areas into agricultural lands. Still, it could have been used by DENR and BREDCI as a condition for the
claimants to no longer expand their claimed areas into the second-growth forest. This may have had more long-term positive implications for forest sustainability.

Similarly, the use of the different forestry techniques has narrowed the options of the claimants in negotiating the use of the claimed areas. Their options were confined to those that allow for the application of these techniques. This meant that they either permitted BREDCI to use part of or their entire land for purposes of the project, or negotiated for a share in the future produce of the land. They could of course resist the inclusion of their area in the project but had to face the risk of being confronted by the BREDCI members and the DENR officials.

The use of the different forestry techniques has also limited the flexibility of the Pag-Bicol as facilitator in the peaceful dialogue between BREDCI and the claimants. Instead of serving as a neutral party, Pag-Bicol was forced to take the side of BREDCI and, by extension, the government, to advocate for the application of the officially-sanctioned approaches in the claimed areas. That Pag-Bicol’s contract with DENR was to assist in the application of these techniques left the NGO no alternative but to encourage claimants to support the project by allowing the inclusion of their areas.

On the other hand, the application of sustained-yield principles has equity implications. As mentioned earlier, sustained-yield forestry is associated with commercial orientation in forest management. Indeed a draft CRMDP, formulated by Pag-Bicol and BREDCI, projected that the average annual revenue from the second-growth forest is about P1.8 million for a 25-year planning period. However, as the AAC and projected revenue take centre stage in forest management, the interests of Pay Belo and the rest of the claimants — especially those who are not members of BREDCI — are likely to be forgotten. Moreover, as the timber becomes highly commercialised, the domestic-wood needs of the poorer sector are also threatened. BREDCI set the market price of lumber at P18/bd ft — this is hardly affordable for the poor. As the poor are deprived from access to forest benefits, they are likely to carry out illegal cutting which, in turn, is likely to work against the realisation of forest sustainability.
7.4 Summary

Sustainability of forest resources is the major goal in forest management. Conventionally, this is pursued through the application of the principles of sustained-yield and related forestry approaches. These are normally viewed by their proponents and users as value-free instruments which automatically assist the sustainability of forest resources. Experiences from the Malicon FOSA of the CVRP-1-SF, and the Presentacion CFP, indicate that this is not the case. The Malicon FOSA reveals that the application of sustained-yield principles in community forestry projects has homogenised the local community and advanced a singular approach to forest management. This rules out any room for local alternatives regarding forest sustainability. On the other hand, the Presentacion CFP demonstrates that, even with the recent attempt to incorporate the social factor, the application of various sustained-yield principles and techniques has tended to marginalise the core concerns of equity and poverty alleviation that is likely to work against the sustainability of forest resources.

The two cases demonstrate that the application of sustained-yield principles and related forestry approaches leads to the ‘tunnelling of vision’ in forest management. Such application brings into focus only the timber production component of forest sustainability at the expense of the social components. It helps to narrow sustainability choices to only the technical aspect of forest management. The equity and livelihood components of sustainability are marginalised and this tends to work against the timber production component. Good development practice or resource management practice, is “about widening, not narrowing of choices” (Porter et al., 1991:204). This suggests that approaches to forest sustainability should recognise the local human and natural diversity and should provide space for local alternatives. This definitely goes beyond the conventional application of sustained-yield forestry principles and techniques.
For related definition and discussion about sustained-yield forestry, refer to: Ramsdall (1937); Chapman (1950); Loucks (1964); Davis (1966); Society of American Foresters (1968); Revilla (1976).

Presidential Decree No. 705 was amended in 1978 by Presidential Decree No. 1559. However, this amendment retained the definition of forest products.

See for instance: Lamprecht (1989); Palmer (1989); Poore (1989); Reithergen (1989); Keto et al., (1990); Talbot (1990); Anderson (1989); Rainforest Information Centre (1990); World Rainforest Movement (1990).

Agroforestry target under the original project document was 3,200 ha. Apparently this was reduced to 700 ha during the course of project implementation. The reason for the reduction was not cited in any of the project documents.

See for instance: Aiken and Moss (1975); Dasman et al. (1979); Gomez-Pompa et al. (1972); Lewis and Coffey (1985); Sioli (1985).

This constitutes 142 ha (7 per cent) of mossy forest and 888 ha of residual forest (47 per cent).

See the oral account of Pay Garing in Box 5.2 of Chapter 5.

At present, however, even some portions of the forested areas have been claimed, and hence are no longer under open access.

During my field visit in 1993, I observed newly cut trees in some parts of the forest. I was informed by my guide that these areas were claimed by the local people and being prepared for kaingin making.

An exception to this is Palawan province where the prescribed cutting cycle is 45 years (DENR, 1992).

Time series data on timber yield and regenerations of a given forest stand are needed to do this exercise. Except in rare cases where the forest area is being closely monitored for research purposes such as in PICOP, information of this kind is not available even in well managed TLAs.

The current population of the four project barangays is 4,743.