APPROACHES TO THE REGIONAL SECURITY ANALYSIS OF SOUTHEAST ASIA

BY

KHOO HOW SAN

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Approaches to the Regional Security Analysis of Southeast Asia

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Khoo How San

May 1999

A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy of The Australian National University
I, Khoo How San, hereby declare that except where acknowledged, this work is my own and has not been submitted for a higher degree at any other university or institution.
This thesis was embarked on in early 1993, when I was 42 years old. With its completion, I have learnt much about wisdom and love. My debt of learning goes to my supervisor, Professor Leszek Buszynski; mentors Dr Lau Teik Soon and Dr Ong Chit Chung; and colleague Mr Kwa Chong Guan. My debt of love goes to my ever-patient wife, Dr Angeline Khoo; my two daughters Liane and Lynn; and my brother How Tiong, all of whom kept my spirits high with love and prayers.
The purpose of this study is to critically evaluate three scholarly perspectives -- balance of power, institutional, and security complex -- to examine the evolving dynamics of security interdependence and inter-state relations among Southeast Asian states and external powers since 1945. This study is thus a comparative evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of the three methods in their empirical analysis of the regional security dynamics of Southeast Asia.

There is much merit in the balance of power approach. It tracked the consequences of the bipolar Cold War rivalry on Southeast Asia. Its logical construction led it to be concerned with alliances, coalitions and alignments. But it has not satisfactorily explained the relatively benign conditions after the Cold War. The institutional approach similarly emphasizes material explanatory factors (although, in its case, not exclusively so). It identifies the emergence of institutions when groups of countries find it in their mutual interest to cooperate through rules and norms. But the approach may prove to be incomplete in assessing ASEAN's post-Cold War behaviour. As an analytical device, the security complex is deployed to provide a corrective to the over-emphasis (of the other two approaches) on the systemic dynamics. By identifying regional and local dynamics interacting with systemic dynamics via patterns of amity and enmity, it offers explanatory accounts of the behaviour of regional states in situations where the other two approaches fail to do satisfactorily. Moreover, it provides a framework for the deployment of constructivism, which identifies the ideational process whereby interdependent regional states respond to changes in both the power and amity-enmity attributes.

This study concludes that security relations among Southeast Asian states and in their relations with external powers after the Cold War, are better examined using the three approaches in a complementary manner. In this way, the influence of local amity-enmity patterns is seen to impact on balance of power and institutional situations.
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CHAPTER 1

APPROACHES TO REGIONAL SECURITY ANALYSIS

1.1 Introduction: Purpose of this study

This study deploys three scholarly perspectives to identify and examine the evolving dynamics of security interdependence and inter-state relations among Southeast Asian states and external powers since 1945. Its purpose is to critically evaluate the three approaches -- balance of power, institutional, and security complex. This study is thus a comparative evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of the three approaches in their empirical analysis of the regional security dynamics of Southeast Asia. The historical landscape will be three time-periods: 1945-75; 1975-91; and 1991 to the present.

With regards to the subject of this study, the idea of “Southeast Asia” has undergone transformations since 1945 and in its present form is understood to comprise the 10 countries of ASEAN. The acronym ASEAN stands for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations which comprised five founding members on 8 August 1967 and which by April 1999 had become a 10-member regional grouping. Although ASEAN was created in 1967, for analytical simplicity, the study will apply the term “ASEAN’s regional security environment” throughout, even though the historical time-line begins in 1945. Moreover, this study examines the development of both ASEAN as a collective as well as the interactions of the 10 Southeast Asian countries with each other and with external actors. In terms of level of analysis, the primary focus is the regional level and its interactions with both the systemic and domestic levels.

As noted, above, the relevant “footprint” in this study is the 10 countries of what
is popularly accepted today as “Southeast Asia”: Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar (Burma), the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. To the extent that a useful examination of regional security interdependence may have to include the role of non-state actors as “security” referent objects, this non-state dimension will be incorporated. The starting point, however, will be an examination of the Southeast Asian states’ intramural and extramural relations and the effect of these state-centric relations on security interdependence.

Finally, the effect of the end of the Cold War is germane to this study. As a phenomenon, the Cold War was a major influence on policy-making and scholarly approaches to international conflict and cooperation. Undoubtedly, the end of the Cold War stimulated scholarly interest in whether mainstream international relations theory could adequately explain and predict events such as the dramatic collapse of the Soviet empire signalling the end of bipolarity. Realism came simultaneously to enjoy a revival as well as to come under severe assault. Nevertheless, both its adherents and critics at least agree on one point: that any study of international relations theory (IR theory) must acknowledge its strong influence on both scholars and practitioners. This study takes the position that realism continues to provide valuable insights into regional security thinking and practices in Southeast Asia but it also acknowledges that there are other approaches and idea which, by addressing realism’s shortcomings, contribute to a more robust regional security analysis.

The subsequent sections will, first of all, detail the conceptual framework used in this study. A review of the literature of scholarly approaches follows. It will be argued that realism -- which can broadly be labelled either as political realism or structural realism -- continues to guide the discourses and actions of security actors engaged in Southeast Asian security matters. In brief outline here, realism identifies the state as the highest form of political authority in an anarchic world, that is, one in which no world government is likely to arise. Moreover, internal security issues do not concern most realists. Modern political realism is usually
associated with scholars like Hans Morgenthau and it portrays the state as necessarily behaving as a power-seeking entity in the struggle to survive\textsuperscript{4}. Diplomacy and war are the typical instruments of state policy. Structural realism is usually associated with scholars like Kenneth Waltz and it portrays the state as a security-seeking entity in the anarchic world structure\textsuperscript{5}. Ever since the creation of the modern state system, this structure has either been bipolar or multipolar. Resort to war may occur when states attempt to prevent a preponderance of power in one state or a coalition of states.

Given this study’s attention to international security at the regional level, at least two other ideas – institutionalism and the security complex – may provide both complementary and corrective insights to those generated by realism. Briefly, institutionalism is derived from liberal and neoliberal approaches which accept realism’s premise of an anarchic world but insist that anarchy can be mitigated through rules which provide incentives for regularized cooperation among states. At the regional level, this idea may be described as regionalism. The security complex idea, as will be argued, is a useful analytical device for identifying regional and local security dynamics. It is not usually viewed as a predictive theory of state behaviour, unlike realism and liberalism.

While balance of power and institutionalism may be described as contending approaches laying claim to having predictive power, the security complex idea does not make such a claim and in this sense is not an approach to security. However, for the purpose of this study, when the collective expression “the three approaches” is used, it will be taken to mean the balance of power and institutional approaches as well as the security complex idea. As argued later in this chapter, the security complex can contribute to regional security analysis through its identification of the security dynamics among clusters of interdependent regional states and external powers. Several other approaches have also become prominent in IR theory: they will also be discussed in the literature review. However, they will not be deployed as such, since this study is not intended to be a comprehensive review of scholarly approaches to regional
security analysis. It is anticipated that a careful analysis of the validity and accuracy of the three approaches identified for the purpose of this study will lead to a better understanding of Southeast Asia’s regional security in the post-Cold War era.

1.2 The Conceptual Framework

The sections that follow will develop a conceptual structure of regional security, in which the idea of “security interdependence” serves as its characteristic feature. The argument is that, although states are the basic units in the international system, their autonomy is affected by the regional sub-systems they find themselves in. Relationships of interdependence in the sense of mutual concerns (whether mutual vulnerabilities or convergence of interests) exist among proximate states and powerful external states. States may find themselves located in more than one, as well as in overlapping, regional sub-systems. Also, as noted, powerful non-regional states are likely to be involved in regional sub-systems which attract their attention. Finally, regions may be usefully categorised into three types, depending on the extent of conflictual inter-state relations: regional conflict formations; security regimes, and pluralistic security communities. In regional conflict formations, states tend to display conflictual tendencies towards each other although some cooperation is possible. The security dilemma (mutual feelings of insecurity) among states is thus manifest, and interstate violence may occur as a result. Where security regimes have arisen, the involved regional states have been able to manage their relations such that conflict is usually avoided, and cooperation often possible. In pluralistic security communities, states retain their sovereignty but have acquired a regional identity and are meshed in institutions which foster cooperation; war becomes highly unlikely.

With such a framework (developed below) in place, that is, having provided a common lexicon, the three approaches – balance of power, institutional, and
security complex – can then be usefully deployed to study the regional security dynamics. Different “complementary” approaches have different purposes but may share certain core assumptions and disagree on others while “radical” approaches tend to reject many, if not all, of the core assumptions of mainstream approaches. To the extent that they do not claim to be general theories, scholarly approaches are useful “maps” to understanding issues, events and behaviour but should not be expected to “deliver” more than their stated purposes’ expectations. Also, rigid “compartmentalisation” need not always be the case. Realists, for example, emphasise material power in determining behaviour; some realists reject, while others downplay but do not totally reject, the role of ideas, identities, norms, principles and values in affecting outcomes.

1.3 Security, state-formation and the idea of the nation

The first three concepts that need to be addressed together are “the state”, “the nation”, and “security”. In modern usage, by “state” is usually meant a government ruling over territory within demarcated borders. Associated with this idea of the modern state is “sovereignty” – a legal concept that denotes the right to rule over designated territory. A more difficult concept is the idea of “nation” which carries, on one hand, the notion of a shared identity, which may or may not be based on the values of a dominant group. On the other hand, Benedict Anderson depicts the nation as an “imagined community”8 centred on a dominant group, its core values and organising ideology.

Yet another difficult concept is “security”, an abstract, contested idea and an “ambiguous symbol”.9 In the state-centric view, the basic assumption is that states are the primary actors in the international system and are also the legitimate providers of security. The state becomes the referent object of the highly desired value, security. But what is security? Generally, it is the absence of threat and the preservation of core values. Paradoxically, its pursuit may lead to the insecurity of other states, creating what has been called the “security dilemma”.10 This
condition arises when states perceive other states as threatening (or potentially threatening) and act to offset such “insecurity” by adding to their military power or co-opting the military power of other states. But, in the first place, offensive and defensive capabilities are often difficult to differentiate. Secondly, threat perception is based on both capability (the tangible component) and intention (the intangible component). Because intentions can change, sometimes very quickly, any buildup of military capability on one side provokes insecurity on the other side. The result is an action-reaction dynamic (an arms race) progressing to a spiral of insecurity.

There is also the question “Whose security?” For a large part of the developing world, security and insecurity within the domestic context may be just as important as the externally-directed, military security dimension of security. As noted above, while a state's sovereign jurisdiction can be defined by its physical boundaries, the idea of nation is more problematic. Colonial boundaries in much of the developing world resulted in many “nations” (especially ethnic and religion-based groups) becoming separated or forced to submit to the rule of other groups. In this often conflictual context, the desire for “national self-determination” became part of the anti-colonial drive and into the post-colonial situation. But, in most Third World regions after 1945, territorial sovereignty vested in the majority groups held greater sway over the national self-determination aspirations of smaller groups (which, however, continued to be a factor in domestic politics). The onset of the Cold War further reinforced the state-centric primacy, as the competing blocs vied not only to win over newly independent states but also to instigate the ascension into power of elites sympathetic to their cause.

The net result of this conflictual start to state-formation -- the establishment of political structures and a civil society -- is a tendency towards internal insecurity, both of the ruling elites and other groups. Indeed, communal, religious and even ideological tensions within the society may be difficult to reconcile. These tensions become inevitably violent when the challengers (such as other
nationalities) are unable to accept the existing state structures. In such “weak states”, either the ruling elite's core values or organising ideology (or both) are contested. Socio-political cohesion is low. Also, even if state structures have legitimacy, the society itself may be divided. In such circumstances, the state becomes both a threat to, and threatened by, the groups that challenge it. In contrast, in a “strong state”, the organising ideology (for example, liberal democracy) and core values are uncontested and civil society is well-established. Socio-political cohesion is therefore high.\textsuperscript{11}

The discussion above is relevant because of the linkage among internal security, national security and regional security when problems of state vis-à-vis nation arise. This study is primarily concerned with inter-state behaviour, and is necessarily state-centric, accepting the state as the central actor. Accordingly, inter-state relations take place according to the rules of the international system which emphasises the territorial sovereignty of states. But to the extent that the state is not the only actor which affects “national security”, this study recognizes that the political legitimacy of the ruling elites in many Third World countries is being continually challenged by groups seeking self-determination. Thus, because its subject is Southeast Asia, a region with still unresolved problems over the relationship between the state and nation, this study will be sensitive to the effect of other actors within the state which have the ability to affect national security. This may have internal security and regional security consequences. Because domestic politics and issues can have spill-over effects across sovereign borders (for example, insurgencies based on religion or ideology, and refugee flows), national security issues can become regional security issues.

1.4 The state and national security

The idea of “national security” is thus often problematic. When Kenneth Waltz declares that “in anarchy, security is the highest end”,\textsuperscript{12} the assumption is that the highest end of the state is “national security”. As already discussed above, such
an assertion implies that the referent object of national security -- the collectivity in question -- is the state, and that the ruling elite’s legitimacy is unchallenged within this political construct (or polity). But “whose security?” is not an internal issue within the state polity only when (1) national security threats are external ones; (2) the state's organising ideology is unchallenged; and (3) the state is able to keep contending groups from resorting to violence in pursuit of their goals. In the ideal “strong state” structure, state security is indeed synonymous with national security. But this is often not the case in the developing world: “whose security?” is especially pertinent in discussing the internal security dimension. In strong states, to the extent that domestic issues concern law and order, then these are usually handled by police forces and are not deemed internal security matters. Military forces are usually tasked for an external security role. But in weak states, military forces loyal to the ruling elites are often deployed – in an internal security role -- to combat both armed and unarmed resistance within the state boundaries. In the extreme, there is civil war, with or without foreign involvement (hence the external threat dimension becomes a factor as well).

Thus, in summary, to the extent that the relationship between state, nation, society and organising ideology is poor, the issue of “whose security?” within the territorial state clearly arises and will have to be considered. In a weak state, apart from external threats, violent threats may be posed by the “state” to other groups within the polity and, conversely, violent threats from disaffected groups may be posed to the state ruling elites and to other groups. Internal wars thus dog many weak states. For many such states, the distinction between external and internal security becomes blurred when external actors intervene overtly or covertly.

1.5 The state and comprehensive security

If the state, under ideal circumstances, takes on the role of providing national security against external military threats – that is, it acts as the central “securitizing” actor -- is it still accorded such status when the threats do not involve military force, as traditionally understood? In the first place, who decides
whether there is a case for a more comprehensive concept of security? Secondly, how is the state affected?

The advent of the nuclear age during the Cold War led some Western scholars and politicians, seeking to redefine security, to argue that states could no longer afford to engage in zero-sum security competition. This view led to the idea of common security, defined by the Palme Commission as the non-competitive pursuit of security “not against the adversary but together with him”.

Other threats like environmental and ecological dangers also came to be included under the rubric. Not unexpectedly, these ideas were resisted by policy-makers concerned with maintaining cohesion in the Western military alliance. In the West, then, the state continued to be the chief arbiter of what issues could be “securitized” and in the Cold War context, it emphasised the military dimension still.

Policy-makers in postwar Japan, however, who foreswore a military capability commensurate with that country’s resurgent economy, meanwhile also embarked on an exercise in redefining security, but in typically pragmatic Japanese fashion. Simon Dalby observed that “comprehensive security”, as it evolved in Japan, came to embrace more than the military aspect of state policy. The typical Japanese definition of the concept emphasises economic security but may also include vague references to “threats to a nation's well-being [which] may in reality take a variety of forms...”.

Similarly, in the late Sixties and early Seventies, ASEAN ruling elites began to define comprehensive security to accord with their domestic focus on national resilience, nation-building (as defined by the power elite in question) and political stability. At the intra-ASEAN and extra-ASEAN levels, the Indonesian-inspired idea of "regional resilience" emerged. According to Jusuf Wanandi, if each ASEAN member can accomplish an overall national development and overcome internal threats, regional resilience will automatically result much in the same way as a chain derives its overall strength from individual links. Thus, for
developing countries like ASEAN members, economic well-being is usually the overarching political objective of comprehensive security. It is claimed that comprehensive security allows this concern with economic well-being to be coupled to military formulations, and also allows the preoccupation with internal security to be included.  

The end of the Cold War has seen a resurgence of concern with environmental issues, both in the West and elsewhere including the developing world. Moreover, many scholars and policy-makers now share similar views. Dalby observes that environmental (including ecological) threats “require solutions that transcend boundaries in many cases, and yet many have locally based origins that are amenable to local interventions... [strengthening] the growing realisation that security cannot be generated by individual states alone”. Illegal population movements across international boundaries (or across water) also fall under this rubric of local and transnational efforts.

However, while there is a case to identify other dimensions of “security” besides the traditional military security aspect, most attempts to introduce a wider agenda fail to identify a clear unifying link among these several dimensions, especially the steps needed to transform a non-traditional issue into a security concern requiring, if necessary, military force undertaken by the state. Secondly, there is a case for making security “more comprehensive” in the sense that certain events may have cross-border consequences and that instability in whatever sector may affect regional security. But the argument for redefining security in terms of a shift away from both the central role of the state as well as the persistence of international boundaries has yet to be convincingly made. After all, in instances where economic, population or environmental issues result in inter-state tensions, military means (including coercion) remain a policy option of the states involved. This does not mean that non-state actors or the non-military aspects of security do not affect the international system, the regional level or the domestic level. It does mean that, when attaching the label “security” to an issue, state sovereignty and state power are still the primary means of affecting many outcomes. Indeed,
states’ security concerns are complex, involve external and internal linkages, and focus on relevant actors and issues.

Because of the primacy of the principles of territorial sovereignty and non-interference in internal matters, and the nature of state power, states are usually able to claim the right to “securitize” ideas and issues. The language of security is invariably defined by the state in such a manner as to give greater weight to the ruling elites’ perspective, for example, in the articulation of definitions of national security and comprehensive security. Any examination of regional security practices must at least be aware of this reality, while also looking out for other salient features.

1.6 Regional security

Having established that any conceptual framework which posits the state as the central actor in international politics must necessarily be sensitive to state elites’ articulation of their security interests, this section and the sections that follow will begin to link states’ interests in a regional context. If the international politics of one region are no different from another, everything being equal, then the balance of power should be equally valid across regions; institutions should create the same quality of incentives for cooperation across regions; and patterns of amity and enmity should influence actor behaviour uniformly. But the argument here is that regions are also shaped by their historical, geographical and cultural contexts. While it is possible, for example, to explain international politics using only the assumptions of balance of power behaviour among states, this may result in a high level of generality. But it is equally possible to include variations in history, geography and culture when examining regional security. The ideas of regional conflict formations, security regimes and pluralistic security communities are illustrative of such variations.

A region like Western Europe could be described as a pluralistic security
community, defined as a region in which member states do not expect to use force as a means of problem-solving.²² At the other extreme, a region like South Asia, in particular the Indo-Pakistani relationship, would be closer to what Raimo Väyrynen calls a regional conflict formation, in which conflictual patterns within and among regional states still dominate.²³ In Southeast Asia, the creation of ASEAN since 1967 has created, among its members, a security regime, defined as a group of states which cooperate to manage their disputes and to avoid war.²⁴ Admittedly, the process of change has never been adequately explained by international relations theory, but Western Europe was once a regional conflict formation and went through the stage of a security regime before becoming a security community. It could be argued that, under conditions of bipolarity, the destabilising effects of intramural power politics were strongly mitigated after World War II by the commitment of the United States to the region’s defence in the face of the Soviet threat, and by constraining West Germany by integrating it into the incipient European community. On the other hand, the development of institutions within the framework of integration created a Western European identity and entrenched norms of cooperation. Pointing to the Western European experience, some scholars argue that Southeast Asia could, over time, similarly attain a collective identity built around cooperative norms²⁵. The possibility arises that while material factors are still important considerations in regional security analysis, ideas and other social factors also need to be considered, especially when a region has moved from conflictual interstate relations towards cooperative ones.

Finally, to the extent that the developing world still comprises regional conflict formations and security regimes, certain salient features can be discerned. Leszek Buszynski has provided a good summation of the nature of Third World regional security:

In the developing world, notions of security reflect the overriding problem of establishing stable political structures and minimising potentially destructive communal or religious divisions. The term “security” includes those political and economic factors which may undermine existing
authority structures or contribute to the erosion of state legitimacy. In this sense, security is not just about relations between states upon the assumption that states are the major actors in international politics. It also embraces ethnic and religious communities, political organisations and other non-state actors whose actions may have similar consequences. States may not be at war with each other, and in a technical sense the region may be at “peace”, but divisive political and communal conflict stimulated by economic failure or misguided policies could still disrupt the region and have the same effect as war.26

One may surmise from the remarks above that any formulation of thinking about regional security needs to be contextual, both vertically and horizontally. Security at the regional level needs to be sufficiently differentiated from systemic considerations, without rejecting the impact of the higher on the lower level; however, the regional level is highly sensitive to individual states’ domestic politics. On the horizontal plane, the sense of intra-regional “interconnectedness” is palpable, and will be elaborated on in the next section.

1.7 Regional security and security interdependence

The idea of security interdependence conveys both positive and negative connotations, that is, mutual benefit or vulnerability may arise, and its intensity depends on factors like proximity and inter-state amity or enmity. National (that is, state) security concerns cannot be identified or assessed independently of other national security concerns in which cross-linkages may be identified. Thus, say, in a dyadic context, state A’s security policy can have meaning to state B if there is a linkage, such as a historic rivalry fuelling the security dilemma between them27. Usually, states with shared borders or which are in close proximity share such security interdependence. Conversely, zones of relative security indifference may exist among states. Often, these are states which (1) serve as buffers and (2) are not conduits for external or regional power contests. But other factors, such as growing economic interdependence in today’s globalizing context, may render the idea of security indifference less meaningful.
Regional security interdependence may be illustrated in three regions: Western Europe, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. As already noted, Western Europe is generally regarded as having remained conflict-free for more than 50 years and having evolved a collective identity since the Cold War. A region like Western Europe since 1945 has acquired a sense of community; indeed, one in which war among Western Europeans now seems highly unlikely. Inter-state conflicts of interests among these free-market democratic states do erupt but, it is argued, the discords do not become unmanageable. But even if post-Cold War Western Europe were now indeed a “zone of peace”, nearby are “hot spots” like Bosnia and Kosovo.

Thus, most Western European states continue to be deeply aware that the pluralistic security community they have created is only as “secure” in its external dimension as developments nearby permit. There is a sense of interdependence felt not only intramurally but also with regards to proximate states and regions, and with external actors like the United States. However, intramurally, and given the existence of a security community, the idea of interdependence is clearly imbued more with the possibilities of mutual benefits from cooperation than with vulnerabilities. The picture is mixed with regards to external actors. To most Western Europeans, the “presence” of the United States is a force for stability and cooperation; yet many Europeans worry about their vulnerability in the event the US becomes less visible especially in the security and economic realms. Alternatively, some Western Europeans fret about a US that may have become increasingly arrogant from its status as the sole post-Cold War superpower. The hot spots referred to earlier impose a sense of vulnerability – of a threat to certain cherished values -- even if felt in varying intensity by Western Europeans.

While the idea of security interdependence may be similarly applied to South Asia, the fact that it is still regarded as a regional conflict formation suggests that mutual vulnerability among the regional states is more palpable, and this vulnerability derives from insecurity fuelled by intense patterns of enmity. The central relationship in this region is that between India and Pakistan, and it is one
marked by a history of chronic mutual antagonism. During the Cold War, India developed security links with the Soviet Union while Pakistan did likewise with the United States and China. After the Cold War, the external powers have allowed the patron-client ties to weaken, with the exception of the Sino-Pakistani relationship. Meanwhile, the smaller regional states, those that are in close proximity to India – such as Nepal and Bhutan -- find little choice but to acquiesce in Indian hegemony. Others like Bangladesh and Sri Lanka resent and even contest India’s hegemony but do not seek Pakistani support.

Turning to a region like Southeast Asia, it cannot be said to have acquired the identity of a security community, even after the end of Vietnam’s occupation of Cambodia in 1989. This is simply because most inter-state security problems there have been shelved rather than resolved. Chapter 2 onwards will examine the emergence of a Southeast Asian regional security system. What is pertinent here is that relations of security interdependence (whether positively or negatively) are perceived to exist now among Southeast Asian states and with external actors which affect them. Its intensity likewise depends on factors like proximity and inter-state amity or enmity.

1.8 Regional security environment

The idea of “regional security environment” reinforces the notion of security interdependence by recognizing that national security concerns have also to be examined with respect to the role of external powers with interests in the region. An alternative descriptive label could be “regional security constellation”. Obviously, during the colonial period until the end of the Second World War, the regional security environment in Southeast Asia was dominated by the external powers. Apart from independent Thailand, national security concerns could not be said to exist. The postwar/Cold War period saw the emergence of the United States, the Soviet Union and China as key external powers and the division of the region into communist and non-communist states.
With these points in mind, it is suggested here that the relevant map of ASEAN's contemporary security environment comprises two components: (1) the 10 countries of Southeast Asia which are linked by security interdependence albeit, as will be argued later, in varying intensity; (2) external powers with security interests in the region, and also, with the ability to involve the regional states in their rivalries (or cooperative efforts). In the post-Cold War era, these powers are the United States, China, Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and perhaps Russia and India and even North Korea. It should be pointed out that neither component need be static. In an extreme situation, Cambodia might cease to exist as an actor, as Kuwait did (if temporarily) in the course of the 1990-91 Gulf War. New external powers might enter the scene, such as a “new” player in the form of a reunited Korea with an enhanced military capability.

1.9 Regional order and regional security

The final, and in fact integrative, element of this study’s conceptual framework is the idea of regional order. In its general sense, order conveys the notion of regularity, and hence predictability. Order may also suggest ranking. The international system is an anarchical structure in which large states and small states interact, that is, compete and cooperate over the distribution and management of scarce resources. Anarchy here is used in the sense of the absence of world government and in which the nation-state is the highest expression of sovereignty. In this setting, anarchy is the ordering principle and the distribution of material power is deemed to be fundamental. Thus, the Cold War bipolar global order described a situation where the two most powerful actors, the United States and the Soviet Union, maintained order, that is, preserved the system of states through various means, such as the balance of power, diplomacy and alliance-creation. The use of force is not proscribed.

Order may also be viewed as a condition. In this sense, it accommodates the idea
of a society of states as well. In this case, rules and institutions become significant, both for the creation of order as well as the content of that order which becomes “a condition governed by rules irrespective of what the rules say and not to be confused with peace”.29 As G.R. Berridge notes:

> It is a mistake to regard peace and order as synonymous since there appears to be nothing in principle to prevent states being at peace even in the absence of rules to govern their relations. If peace can be disorderly, order can be warlike. It all depends on the contents of the rules.30

Thus, whether seen as the preservation of a hierarchical system of states (in which the use of force is permitted) or as a condition (in which states learn to coexist through rules and institutions), international order – as Hedley Bull points out in his seminal work, *The Anarchical Society* – may be construed as a pattern in the relations between states which aims at and results in particular goals.31 It can therefore be maintained in both competitive and cooperative relations. Order need not be viewed simply as a linear movement from competitive to cooperative relations, but its maintenance could be effected through competition and even war.

A third possible meaning of order has to do with milieu goals. Here, ideational factors may be instrumental.32 Milieu goals “seek to shape the international environment in which a state operates to make it more peaceful or conducive to the pursuit of national goals”.33 Thus, the United States may pursue its milieu goal of an international order in which the majority of states share its democratic ideology, on the assumption that liberal democracies are less likely to make war on each other.34 Similarly, one Japanese observer suggests that one of Tokyo’s milieu (security) goals is “the management of fluidity in international relations and power transition” in the post-Cold War era.35

On the basis of the discussion above, regional order is (a) a reflection of the state-centric distribution of power capabilities at the sub-system level; (b) a pattern in the relations between regional states and interested external powers which aims at
and results in particular goals; and (c) a milieu in which ideational factors are
mobilised by certain states seeking to shape the regional security environment.
Regional order is thus maintained through cooperation as well as competition and
even war. Rules and institutions evolve; as do cooperative and conflictual
identities and goals. Implicit in this setting is tension between competing
prescribed regional orders (within the same regional system), involving both
regional and extra-regional states.

However, the efforts of the major powers to maintain systemic order may impact
differently on regions. Sometimes the major powers transfer their rivalries onto a
region, and regional states become their proxies. At other times, the major powers
seek to restrain local rivalries.

Southeast Asia has seen competing prescribed regional orders. It did not escape
the systemic impact of major power rivalry during the Cold War. Competing
interests and milieu goals further prevented the establishment of a pattern of
cooporative relations necessary to foster rules and institutions conducive to the
creation of a community (and its accompanying attitudinal shifts). The Cold War
Southeast Asian regional order was therefore largely conflictual. But after 1967, a
sub-regional order developed among the ASEAN members that fostered at least a
security regime. While the ASEAN members certainly continued to benefit from
the US security umbrella after 1975, they also became more accommodating
towards the other major powers with interests in the region. A regional order for
Southeast Asia must thus necessarily take cognizance of the existence of: (1)
external powers with interests in the region; and (2) both large and small regional
states, all of whose recent histories have tended to be more conflictual than
harmonious, with boundaries arbitrarily drawn by colonial masters.

Within the framework of this study, then, the territorial state (embodifying the
primacy of non-intervention, territorial integrity and sovereignty) is still a
meaningful coherent unit for investigating the regional security environment of
Southeast Asia. The state is the primary securitizing agent (but not the only one)
and its agenda may or may not encompass a more comprehensive notion of security; certainly, military security concerns remain a common feature of the region. The key concept is security interdependence which highlights both the mutual concerns of states which affect each other, and the salience of regional security analysis which, as argued above, emphasises the role not only of regional actors but also of extra-regional actors with interests in the region. Finally, the idea of regional order links all the other ideas together and acts as a barometer of interstate relations (in terms of conflict and cooperation, and also the influence of ideational factors) at the regional level.

This framework accommodates realist/neorealist notions of anarchy, balance of power, war as a sometimes necessary form of state activity, etc. It also accommodates the neoliberal belief in the importance of institutions, broadly defined, in mitigating anarchy; as well as variants like commercial liberalism. With these points in mind, this study will regard two scholarly approaches in IR theory -- balance of power and institutionalism -- as complementary perspectives and will proceed to deploy them in its investigation of Southeast Asian security dynamics. Finally, because this framework emphasises security interdependence, a third complementary idea which incorporates both material and ideational aspects will also be deployed. This third perspective uses the concept of security complexes. The rest of this chapter will review several approaches in IR theory and discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the three approaches to be deployed.

### 1.10 Realism and other approaches in IR theory

Although realism can be traced to classical Western thinkers like Thucydides and Machiavelli, its modern advocates include Thomas Hobbes, E.H. Carr and Hans Morgenthau. These latter advocates were interested in the international politics of the modern state system, and may be described as political realists. Broadly, their views of human nature ranged from pessimistic (humans are intrinsically selfish) to pragmatic, their common thread being their disapproval of advocates of
idealism, which emphasised the inherent goodness of man and the formulation of foreign policy on the basis of trust, and moral and ethical values\textsuperscript{39}. The philosophical underpinning of political realists led them to posit that states are the main units of the international system; that there is no higher form of authority above the state, and this results in “anarchy” which in this sense does not mean chaos per se but is the system’s basic feature; and that the main goal of states is to pursue their national interests. States, moreover, are unable to trust each other because of uncertainty over each other's intentions.

These basic premises led to other assertions: international politics is a zero-sum game, so states’ pursuit of national interests requires them to seek relative gains and to maximise their power; interest is defined as power (mainly military and economic strength) and powerful states may be tempted to achieve hegemony over other states; to prevent hegemony and hence to maintain international order, a balance of power is maintained; war may be necessary, and even inevitable, to maintain this balance; the interests of major states precede those of lesser states; and institutions only matter at the margin in regulating state behaviour. States prefer “self-help” and alliances are temporary.

Core features of political realism have been challenged, both by realists who dispute some key assumptions (neorealists), as well as other critics. Neorealists, led by Kenneth Waltz, disagree that states are power-maximising; instead, they seek to maximise security (while promoting a balance of power). Moreover, the neorealists view the international system in structural terms, with the distribution of material power as its defining feature (chief determinant of conflict and order).\textsuperscript{40} Unlike political realists, they therefore have little to say about human nature. In striving for an explanation of state behaviour, they also discount other factors like domestic politics. More recently, neorealists like Stephen Walt argue that perceptions of threat more than considerations of power per se motivate states, that is, it is the balance of threat rather than balance of power that is the system’s defining feature.\textsuperscript{41} Thus, one should monitor intentions (which can change very quickly) as much as capabilities (which take longer to change).
Finally, some neorealists are unwilling to accept that the distribution of power can be qualified in any way in the long term. Thus, John Mearsheimer, for example, strongly insists that institutions have marginal, if any, effects on state behaviour, and that with the lifting of superpower “overlay” over Europe following the end of the Cold War, European states will progressively return to balance of power politics.  

With reference to the earlier discussion, therefore, the Western European pluralistic security community built on institutions and norms will not endure over time. In the Asia-Pacific, Japan will become a more “normal” power and seek military rearmament and possibly nuclear power status. Other neorealists like Barry Buzan accommodate the influence of institutions and the effects of intersubjective social factors in shaping state behaviour. For example, patterns of historical enmity can be transformed into amity patterns – and vice versa – through, for example, ideas, rules and institutions, and the socialisation process.

Classical liberalism, which draws its inspiration from idealism, takes a benign view of human nature and is associated with classical thinkers like Immanuel Kant as well as modern-day politicians like Woodrow Wilson. Its normative stance is cooperation. Kant looked towards the eventual creation of a benign world government while Wilson envisioned the post-World War I League of Nations as an institution created by sovereign states willing to surrender their sovereignty to the League in matters of peace and security. More concretely, it has spawned several state-centric strands. These include: commercial liberalism, which posits that economic interdependence (especially free trade) reduces the danger of war among states; republican liberalism, which posits that liberal democracies are less likely to fight one another (the “democratic peace” argument); and liberal institutionalism, which posits that institutions (including international organisations) can manage inter-state conflict, encourage cooperation and thereby prevent war. To the extent that institutions suggest the effectiveness of norm-setting rules in an international society of states (as opposed to the Kantian tradition of a stateless world government), their
inspiration derives from the ideas of the 17th Century Dutch jurist, Hugo Grotius (the Grotian tradition).49

Just as neorealists seek to modify realism, neoliberals have attempted to modify liberalism while attempting to debate the neorealists. Neoliberal institutionalists like Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye acknowledge the realist premise of the primacy of states and material power in an anarchical system but strongly assert that institutions matter in affecting state behaviour. Institutions (sets of formal and informal rules that prescribe behaviour and shape expectations) can mitigate anarchy and constrain state behaviour such that states find it in their self-interest to cooperate, especially in the economic sector but also in the military sector, if less persistently.50

Post-classical approaches like neorealism and neoliberalism may be labelled “rational strategic interaction” approaches, that is, they assume that actors (states or other units) behave rationally (internally consistent with respect to goals and payoffs) in a structure of international anarchy. Post-modern “reflectivist” approaches such as critical theory, constructivism and feminist studies have arisen to challenge these “modern” approaches. However, among them, only constructivism will be reviewed here, since it is the only one that directly addresses the issue of states as securitizing agents.51

Constructivists can accept that the state is the primary actor in an anarchical world but argue that ideational (or social) factors such as ideas, culture and identity are as important as material factors (military and economic power) in shaping state behaviour and the institutions mutually created by states. In the first place, terms like anarchy, power politics, and the security dilemma are not objective conditions but are “socially constructed”, that is, these conditions are not necessarily immutable or “organic” features of world politics but exist because states mutually persist in subjectively interacting within these conditions. As Alexander Wendt puts it, anarchy is “what states make of it”.52 States therefore define their national interests through a subjective process of mutual
interactions. Through interaction and socialisation, states may develop a “collective identity” contrary to the expectations of power theorists. Postwar Japan is cited as a country which has acquired a pacifist culture and identity, and this in turn strongly influences its foreign and security policies.53 Clearly, this claim is a challenge to the expectation of some neorealists that Japan will eventually rearm and acquire nuclear weapons.54 The claims of constructivism -- a relatively new approach in International Relations theory -- will need to be assessed and tested empirically over a longer time frame, and this study will not deploy it as a comparative approach. However, because it alerts the scholar to the possible impact of ideational factors on state behaviour and institutions, this suggests that amity-enmity patterns may be transformed through intersubjective processes. This insight may be useful to the security complex idea, reviewed below.

The security complex is derived from neorealist state-centric thinking and takes as its starting point the idea that the security interdependence of proximate states within a regional system or sub-system varies in intensity. At least two factors cause this variation: the general and local distribution of power; and relations of amity and enmity. The analytical focus of the security complex is specifically the regional level of analysis and the identification of regional patterns of security relations as well as the pattern of outside interventions.

Barry Buzan in 1983 (and 1991) defined a security complex as “a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another”.55 While this definition is commonsensical, it does draw attention to the relational character of security among groups of regional states, and offers scope for some degree of differentiating state actor behaviour in the regional context (the relative autonomy of regional security relations). Realists and neorealists tend to view world politics from a “billiard balls” perspective – in which states of varying sizes are alike, or become alike, in their behaviour – thus privileging the major powers as they seek to draw other states into their blocs. As noted above, the security
complex does not dismiss the intervening major powers but locates their role as “penetrating powers” in local security complexes. Buzan and his associates have since expanded on the scope of this analytical device. In 1993, they provided a more nuanced definition of a security complex:

… a set of states whose major security perceptions and concerns are so inter-linked that their national security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one another.\(^{56}\)

Buzan, meanwhile, between 1991 and 1998, with the end of the Cold War in mind, began to address more closely the issues of a more decentralised and regionalised international system and how interstate relations within a security complex are transformed. Regional patterns of security relations, while durable, may be transformed. By 1998, Buzan and two associates had adopted a constructivist approach in seeking to widen the security agenda to incorporate, apart from the politico-military sectors, three other sectors: economic, societal and environmental. Since this study’s purpose is regional security analysis in the context of the traditional politico-military sectors, it will not pursue the debate over expanding the security agenda. However, Buzan by 1998 also notes that patterns of amity and enmity “entailed some constructivist deviation from objectivist, material realism – amity and enmity are generated by the actors and are not reflections of material conditions”.\(^{57}\) It is this linkage between constructivism and the security complex that will be pursued further, below.

To summarise the arguments above, if one’s starting point in the various IR debates since classical times is human nature, then the “clash” is between the idealists and the realists. Given their starkly opposing views of human nature, little accommodation is possible. If the disagreement centres on the system structure versus the nature of states, there is greater possibility for accommodation, and even the possibility that differing approaches in fact provide complementary insights into state behaviour.\(^{58}\) Hence, the contention between neorealists and neoliberals can be conducted in the same arena, over issues like self-help, relative gains versus absolute gains, and whether institutions really
matters in influencing actor behaviour. Sheldon Simon notes that:

… advocates of the [neorealist] school see international politics as a struggle for relative gains in which the power and status of states are determined hierarchically. The [neoliberal] school disagrees, insisting that all members of the system benefit when absolute gains are achieved across the system, virtually regardless of their distribution.\(^{59}\)

The theoretical implication of these contending mainstream state-centric approaches is that for neorealists (who accord security the highest value), international cooperation regimes will have a poor record because one state's gain is another's loss. For them, given anarchy, zero-sum outcomes result in most interactions. They insist that “immediate survival needs take precedence and require independent military and economic capabilities that attenuate cooperation”.\(^{60}\) The neoliberals accept that material conditions matter in anarchy but put their faith in the ability of a regime of states collaboratively to maintain rules and regulations to the benefit of all states. Neoliberals cite “strong empirical evidence of cooperation in international politics and the creation of institutions to facilitate cooperation [which] show that states do not necessarily concentrate on relative gains exclusively”.\(^{61}\)

Constructivists have also joined in this debate between neorealists and neoliberals. They have forced the mainstream approaches to at least consider the implications of ideational factors affecting outcomes, without rejecting the role of material factors.\(^{62}\) Put simply, the “power of ideas” needs to be considered alongside the “idea of power”.

Finally, the three approaches that will be deployed in this study’s regional security analysis will be labelled: balance of power, institutional and security complex. For realists and neorealists, the balance of power is an operating principle that seeks to preserve order by denying a preponderance of power to any state or coalition in the global system or in a regional system. States cooperate or enter into conflict primarily with this “security competitive” principle in mind. It should be emphasised at the outset that the focus of this study is the regional
system. A more detailed exposition of the balance of power approach will be made below.

Neoliberals emphasise cooperation under anarchy and attach great importance to institution-building. As noted earlier, institutions are connected sets of rules that promote norms of conduct, facilitate information-sharing, and reduce transaction costs. The institutional approach is summarised here simply as cooperation among states in a formal or informal arrangement for common purposes or shared interests. Institutions may thus have non-organisational form (as, for example, informal conventions and formal regimes like the Law of the Sea regime) and organisational form (whether intergovernmental or non-governmental organisations). Again, it should be emphasised that this study’s use of institutionalism is in the context of the regional system.

Finally, the third idea – security complex -- is tailored specifically for the regional level; it seeks to identify and describe the security dynamics within and among clusters of security-interdependent states within a regional security system. It “speaks” the language of the neorealists and neoliberals in its use of distribution of power and institutional cooperation. In addition, its concern with patterns of amity and enmity among security-interdependent states, and the possibility of transforming these patterns, allows it to draw from the contribution of constructivism with regards to the role of ideational factors.

1.11 The balance of power approach

Power, in the political sense, is influence over some other actor (or actors) or ability to act on some matter backed in both instances by force. John Stoessinger defines power in international relations as “the capacity of a nation to use its tangible and intangible resources in such a way as to affect the behaviour of other nations.” Realists and neorealists see both security and power as scarce resources central to the concerns of all states but which none can enjoy
completely, that is, an international hierarchy exists in which military might and economic capacity define the rank of any given state.65

Classical realists like Morgenthau tended to see international politics as a struggle for power, and hence to see national security as a derivative of such power.66 This logic prescribes that nations in an anarchy will resort to “balancing” behaviour. The balance of power is then defined as “a state of affairs such that no one power is in a position where it is preponderant and can lay down the law to others”.67 Classical realists, it should be added, argue that states attempt to maximize their power because human nature contains an innate drive for power. Trust, moreover, has no place in classical realism.

Structural realists (or neorealists) led by Waltz take the position that states seek to preserve their security (and maintain their position) rather than seek power per se when they resort to balancing behaviour.68 In the systemic sense, it is not human nature but the distribution of power which forces states seek to create a balance of power, an equilibrium among states that sometimes preserve peace and at least helps to preserve the independence of the great powers.69

What kinds of balance of power may be identified and what are the conditions for its maintenance? According to Hedley Bull, general and local balances of power may be identified. Together, they perform crucial roles in the system of states:

(1) the existence of a general balance of power throughout the international system as a whole has served to prevent the system from being transformed by conquest into a universal empire;

(2) the existence of local balances of power has served to protect the independence of states in particular areas from absorption or domination by a locally predominant power;

(3) both general and local balances of power, where they have existed, have
provided the conditions in which other institutions on which international order depends (diplomacy, war, international law, great power management) have been able to operate.⁷⁰

A careful reading of Bull shows that he dismisses the notion that there is an automatic balance of power mechanism. Neither, he argues, is the primary purpose of a balance of power to preserve peace:

The chief function of the balance of power... is to preserve the system of states itself. Preservation of the balance of power requires war, when this is the only means whereby the power of a potentially dominant state can be checked. It can be argued, however, that the preservation of peace is a subordinate objective of the contrivance of balances of power. Balances of power which are stable (that is, which have built-in features making for their persistence) may help remove the motive to resort to preventive war.⁷¹

G.R. Berridge, agreeing with Bull, adds that when a claim is made that the balance of power has broken down, this is often a result of a misunderstanding of the requirement for waging war to preserve the independence of states, especially the major powers. He argues that, for example, it was not the 19th Century balance of power that broke down with the outbreak of World War I, but diplomacy, which is but only one of the elements of the balance of power.⁷² Berridge expands on Bull’s observation that the balance of power is not an automatic mechanism. If a revisionist or revolutionary power emerges to threaten the status quo powers, the latter often resort to diplomacy first, even at the risk of seeming to “appease” the rising power. Diplomatic negotiations buy time for the status quo powers to look to their defences, and secondly, diplomacy helps to remove any doubt as to whether the rising power is indeed a revisionist power.⁷³ However, this is of little comfort to smaller powers which may have become the rising power’s victims in the meantime.

The end of the Cold War sparked a debate over whether bipolarity or multipolarity provided better conditions for a stable balance of power. Stephen Van Evera, for example, is among the scholars who argue that multipolarity –
once this current period of power transition passes -- may in fact provide a more stable order. Jack Snyder concurs with this view. Among those who disagree is John Mearsheimer; he argues that the “tight bipolarity” of the Cold War era fostered stability, at least at the superpower level, and that Europe will return to a more unstable multipolar balance of power. They concur with this view. Among those who disagree is John Mearsheimer; he argues that the “tight bipolarity” of the Cold War era fostered stability, at least at the superpower level, and that Europe will return to a more unstable multipolar balance of power. Aaron Friedberg and Richard Betts similarly argue that the Asia-Pacific is “ripe” for rivalry among the emerging regional powers.

Some who look to multipolarity as a guide to a stable balance cite the balance of power of the European states system in the 18th and 19th centuries. Power was diffused among five great powers: Britain, France, Russia, Prussia and Austria-Hungary, that is, the number of players were not too many nor too few to enable manoeuvring to take place and a rough equality of power to emerge. Moreover, Britain played the special role of a “balancer” willing to shift its power to the side of the status quo coalition. The great powers were also non-ideological in their outlook, that is, diplomatic mobility was enhanced and special relationships were not major influences on state behaviour. Finally, it has been claimed that the five European powers, sharing the same culture, were all gentlemen players of the Great Game.

Against these claims, those who look to the virtues of this century’s unique case of bipolarity argue that the “simplicity” of a two-power balance facilitates crisis-management, agreed rules of procedure, and reduces the fear, suspicion and miscalculation inherent in a multipolar balance.

Unfortunately, both sets of claims about polarity are difficult to verify with certainty. Undoubtedly, in a bipolar balance, there is no possibility for a “balancer”. But assuming a balancer is a necessary ingredient in a multipolar balance, will the United States (the only logical candidate) play this role in a future multipolar balance? The introduction of nuclear power may have created a “balance of terror” between two blocs, with nuclear stability enhanced by advances in technical intelligence gathering and arms control measures. But will a
future world of several nuclear major powers, smaller nuclear-capable powers and even nuclear “rogue states” prove destabilising, or will it provide the fillip for the major powers to act in concert and take preemptive actions to limit the nuclear club? Also, balance of power analysis tends to privilege the major powers, but the security dynamics in local balances may be more nuanced.

Obviously, the so-called conditions for a stable balance of power seem to be more prescriptive than empirical. Indeed, apart from seeing the concept in terms of systemic features or the conditions for its operation, it is often espoused as a policy justification by politicians. Critics tend to attack the concept of a balance of power as sacrificing complexity for superficially appealing explanations about power politics. These critics contend that international politics cannot be so narrowly explained, and that balances of power are inherently unstable.

The more sensitive of the critics of power balance agree with realists like Bull that the utility of force in international affairs has not declined but they question the perception that the oldest mechanism for preserving the peace has been the maintenance of a balance of power. They challenge its claim to be “the master institution in the practice of world politics, and the master concept in the study of international relations”. John Vasquez, a critic, notes that power balance advocates defend the viability of the concept by maintaining that wars occurred when the balance was disrupted. He suggests that this position concedes that a balance may be difficult to implement at the point at which it is needed most -- when war threatens. At the conceptual level, Vasquez attacks its imprecise meaning. Despite Bull's insistence to the contrary, some power balance advocates see an automatic mechanism at work: if one nation increases in power, one or more other nations will move to match and counter that power. Others, who seek an automatic mechanism, view power balancing as a conscious policy that decision makers must meticulously follow if it is to work. Still others use it as a popular symbol with which to marshall support and rationalize a position that has been taken for other reasons.
Nevertheless, despite its practical or conceptual limitations, and especially in the context of regional security analysis, a balance of power will prevent an “easy” victory by a belligerent regional state or coalition, as Vasquez himself admits. He comes closer to the nub of the issue when he asserts:

War may, and often does, occur among relative equals. This has led many scholars to argue that security can be attained not through a balance of power, but only through a preponderance of power. The other side will only be prevented from attacking if it knows it will lose the war. While this argument makes sense, what is to prevent the preponderant power from attacking [the other side]?\(^{30}\)

The balance of power approach, moreover, places great store on alliance formation centred usually on the military strength of a great power. A great power's interests or commitments may be unreliable, however, an issue which can be of immense concern to small states. Perceptions of US unreliability in Southeast Asia account for the continued concern over the effectiveness of its military presence. The former Soviet Union too, for example, stood aside when Chinese warships attacked Vietnamese naval vessels in the South China Sea over the Spratly Islands in 1988 despite the existence of a Soviet-Vietnamese treaty of friendship. Sheldon Simon makes the pertinent observation that:

Small states have found that ties to outside powers may be useless in dealing with local security challenges. Generally, great powers hesitate to become directly involved in a client's security actions against a neighbouring state that has no connection to a rival great power. Moreover, even if great power connections exist in a local rivalry, the outside powers may refrain from activating their commitments if the challenges to clients appear to be at so low a level that the guarantee seems unwarranted.\(^{81}\)

However, as Robyn Lim points out with regards to the alliance relationship between a great power and a smaller state concerned about potentially hostile neighbours, an alliance has to be kept mutually relevant. This is easier to achieve where the alliance partners share core strategic interests and are seen to share the burden. She argues, for example, that Australia shares with America a desire to see a balance of power preserved in the Asia-Pacific. Australia continues to offer
facilities, access and training to US forces. On the other hand, she concludes that the Philippines -- in its willingness to see the US remove its military bases from Clark and Subic in 1991-92 -- “failed to comprehend that alliances are a two-way street; they incur costs and risks for both parties”.82

Finally, given that the balance of power approach is rooted in realism, it brings forth an intense concern with security dilemmas, threat perceptions (and misperceptions) and arms buildups. Realists assume that man's instinctive will to dominate others issues from his drive for power over others while neorealists assume that the systemic distribution of power compel states to seek security. Thus, balancing behaviour in the anarchic system of states seeks to achieve/prevent domination or seeks to enhance one's security/position.

But because of what Robert Jervis calls the psychological dynamics -- in which one tends to assume that one's own balancing actions are justified but the other side's are provocative -- a security dilemma is created.83 This dilemma arises because of perceptions and misperceptions: the attempts of one or more states to achieve security provokes a feeling of insecurity in one or more other states. Jervis argues that all states tend to assume the worst of others and respond accordingly. Their collective actions unintentionally generate a spiral of insecurity. This security dilemma is further exacerbated by the inflexible images that it generates in the minds of decision makers -- both of their own intentions and of those of their opposite numbers.84

Such feelings of insecurity may set off an action-reaction arms race. A state may spark this off when it undertakes various means to achieve an edge in the military balance over a rival or merely to achieve a sense or feeling of security. But the technological and physical characteristics of these means, which contribute so much to this state's sense of security, also contribute to undermining the feeling of security in neighbouring states. Bruce Russett emphasises that “it is the element of competition, or interaction” that creates an arms race.85 Moreover, in a crisis situation, a high alert status may not be maintainable for an extended period so
the temptation to “use it or lose it” is there.

Following the logic of applying psychology to power politics, some realists/neorealists would argue that there is another side to the coin: balancing behaviour may actually deter would-be aggressors. Glen Snyder defines deterrence as “discouraging the enemy from taking military action by posing for him a prospect of cost and risk outweighing his prospective gain”. In the event that deterrence fails, then the state under threat would have been at least militarily prepared to meet the aggressor in battle, on its own or in a coalition. Deterrence is therefore an attempt to influence the behaviour of another in a desired direction. The counter-argument is that it is quite impossible to fine-tune the right “amount” of deterrence, given the operation of the security dilemma. Deterrence also rests on the assumptions of rational actors and a two-way flow of communication.

This problem with deterrence has led to the view that deterrence should be part of a process involving other instruments whose object is to enhance security. Thus, some see deterrence and diplomacy -- acting as behaviour modifiers -- as preventive measures against small incidents developing into crises. Deterrence signals a state of military preparedness against contingencies; diplomacy seeks to address the lack of communication, especially between neighbours, that feeds the security dilemma. Together, it is argued, these policy instruments complement each other and help to foster a climate for confidence-building. Goh Chok Tong, Singapore's prime minister, is one such advocate of the deterrence-diplomacy matrix:

A defence policy based only on deterrence will end up like two strangers “staring” at one another in the face. Each misreads the other's stare. Suspicious thoughts go through their minds, ending up often in punches. The “staring analogy” teaches us that the force of arms alone cannot keep the peace. While we must be prepared to “stare” back if necessary, it is more sensible for us to remove the reasons for staring at one another, that is, remove strangeness and promote openness and trust, and building linkages.

This position is essentially that of “preparing for the worst” (worst-case
situations) while seeking to ameliorate the security dilemma. Such advocates adhere to the realist underlying assumption of human nature: that intentions can quickly change from cooperative to conflictual. Hence, deterrence-cum-diplomacy advocates are comfortable with promoting measures such as military transparency but rule out such ideas as non-offensive defence whose underlying assumption is that the security dilemma can be overcome.\(^9\)

In short, the balance of power approach assumes that the consequences of anarchy cannot be satisfactorily mitigated. Self-help and security competition are the consequences of the security dilemma, given that the intentions of other states (including allies) within one’s regional security environment can change. Material (structural) factors determine the behaviour of states, and power remains a vital concept in understanding international politics and issues of regional conflict and cooperation. The balance of power approach highlights the structure and distribution of power in a hierarchical fashion. Hence, as reviewed earlier, one's security is determined by one’s autonomy in decision-making and by others’ intentions and capabilities. It is not that cooperation per se is ruled out, but the unceasing question asked is: “Why cooperate?”

Finally, for scholars interested in regional systems, balance of power has often been a useful yet inadequate approach. Using this perspective, local or regional balances of power may be identified but the attention on the great-power dynamic has inevitably overridden and obscured the sometimes more subtly embedded local balances. This is because the realist/neorealist “billiard ball” portrayal of world politics does not pay much attention to security interdependence below the systemic level; neither is it much interested in what are inside the hard shell of the billiard balls of varying sizes (states) as they interact and collide. In addition, the explicit focus on material power has obscured the often complicated relations of amity and enmity among regional states and external powers.

The balance of power approach also masks diversity between regions and within states, a consequence of the colonial division of the Third World. The subsequent
(often arbitrary) creation of new states regardless of natural clusters of communities, the construction of geographical zones such as Southeast Asia as well as the popular use of politically-derived labels such as the Far East, masked these diversities. Southeast Asia's involvement in the Cold War compounded this masking of the existence of sub-regions, each with its own security dynamic.

1.12 The institutional approach

Like the balance of power approach, institutionalism assumes actors are rational and utility-maximizing, that is, material factors affect actor behaviour. According to the institutionalists, states are rational egoists. Because states operate in a world in which agreements cannot be hierarchically enforced, institutionalists expect interstate cooperation to occur only if states have significant common interests. This criterion of common interests is viewed as a necessary ingredient in the success of international organizations. Neoliberal institutionalists accept that the negative effects of anarchy can be mitigated by international institutions. Moreover, institutions, in the view of neoliberals like Keohane, are “persistent and connected sets of rules (formal and informal) that prescribe behavioural roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations”.

Before continuing, the caveat should be inserted here that realists like Mearsheimer do not dispute the fact that states do operate through rules and institutions. However, he argues that:

… those rules [and institutions] reflect state calculations of self-interest based primarily on the international distribution of power. The most powerful states in the system create and shape institutions so that they can maintain their share of world power, if not increase it. In this view, institutions are essentially “arenas for acting out power relationships”. For realists, the causes of war and peace are mainly a function of the balance of power, and institutions largely mirror the distribution of power in the system.

Thus, as far as realists and neorealists are concerned, organisations should be
examined for their actual purpose. If the purpose is deterrence, this accords with balance of power thinking and not institutional thinking. The rationale for forming military alliances or coalitions is the imperative of counterbalancing some common military threat. Furthermore, if the organisational form is incapable of serving its purpose (in meeting the threat) or redefining its purpose (if the threat changes), such a coalition tends to wither. An explicitly security-driven formal organisation like the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) comes to mind here. (However, as will be elaborated, an institutionally-driven formal organisation like ASEAN certainly has security concerns too, and balance of power practices may be less explicit.)

On the other hand, for institutionalists, particularly neoliberal institutionalists, their attention is focussed on institutionalised cooperation among states “to enhance their well-being”. Thus, whereas realists and neorealists emphasise self-help and security competition and ask, “Why cooperate?” the question is recast by the neoliberal institutionalists to: “Why not cooperate?” They believe that anarchy can be mitigated and that power need not be the only determinant of interests. Their rallying theme is: institutions do matter, that is, institutions can positively affect state behaviour in an anarchical system. This mindset change is significant. Instead of focusing on themes like the security dilemma and a preference for self-help, the focus is shifted to creating – albeit in a still materially-driven but increasingly interdependent world – cooperative norms and rules. With reference to Keohane’s definition, above, Muthiah Alagappa points out that the claim of institutionalism is three-fold:

... first, institutions are constitutive (can help define interests); second, through rules and conventions they can regulate state behaviour by affecting incentives; and third, by altering conceptions of self-interest, reducing uncertainty, and stabilising expectations, they can facilitate peaceful change.

Institutions thus promote norms of conduct, facilitate information-sharing, and reduce transaction costs; in short, institutions have the common purpose of promoting mutual, iterative cooperation in a self-help world. For the purpose of
this study, the idea of “institutions” at the regional level may be seen as embodying three features: regionalism, regional organisations, and regimes. Regional institutions are arrangements (whether formal or informal) among at least three regional states to promote regional cooperation. Given this study’s security focus, “regional cooperation for security will depend on the ability of member governments to forge an integral view of the common purpose”.95 Expanding this into a broader purview, one may define *regionalism* as the “sustained cooperation, formal or informal, among governments, non-government organisations or the private sector in three or more contiguous countries for mutual gain”.96

The second feature is *regional organisation*, which for the purpose of this study will be defined as the institutional expression of (1) regional states’ attempt to create a regional order taking into account the existing structure and distribution of power; (2) their perceptions of mutual interests and interdependence; and (3) the rules of the game which govern their behaviour.97 Thus, regionalism may give rise to regional organisations.

The third feature is the concept of a *regime*, defined by Stephen Krasner as “a set of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations”.98 Regimes are thus single-issue oriented, for example, the Law of the Sea regime. More broadly, Raymond Cohen’s “rules of the game” will be used as a general concept to encompass the idea of regimes. These “rules” of conflict-management and cooperation-facilitation “include general norms of behaviour, aspects of international law, and rules which are created by formal and informal understanding” including gentlemen's agreements and tacit understandings.99

While regionalism and regimes/rules of the game, as defined above, are relevant to the scope of this study, the object is the regional organisation as a manifestation of regionalism (embodied regimes/rules) with the purpose -- whether openly stated or left unstated -- of promoting the participating states’
security and agreed regional order. Also, as noted above, regionalism will be taken to involve at least three state actors and is multilateral by definition. Multilateral institutional links, of course, may result from bilateral links which may or may not encourage multilateralism; conversely, bilateral problems may hinder corporate unity in a regional grouping, or, positively, a third party in a regional organisation may act to facilitate conflict-resolution of a crisis which has stalemated in the bilateral context.

Sukhumbhand Paribatra elaborates on the role of rules of the game in regional institutional development in developing countries. He does not dispute the realist/neorealist assumption that an anarchical international system prevails in which “insecurity” exists and only relative security is attainable. This interpretation of the institutional perspective allows for some degree of accommodation with regards to relative gains. The quest is thus for some sort of order (at all levels of analysis) in which conflict is confined “within tolerable limits” and “the risk of large-scale irreversible violence occurring in the relations among principal states” is minimised.  

Regional organisations must therefore establish rules of the game which “reflect the pattern of power distribution and the extent of mutuality of prevailing interests”. Such rules will perforce need to be adaptable in order to continue to reflect the prevailing power distribution and mutuality of interests. In addition, as in the case of the balance of power approach, the interests of the more powerful regional and outside powers (which are engaged in the region) will have to be catered for in any regional institutional arrangement. Just as a successful balance of power system ensures the independence of more than one major power, a successful security-oriented regional organisation ensures that more than one major power has an interest in its survival. As a corollary, in a successful balance of power system, the independence of the smaller states is protected. Similarly, the rules of the game in a successful regional organisation must provide for the needs and goals of the smaller states.
In this view, then, regional organisations -- as a means of enhancing security -- emerged as a necessary complement to self-help and to global approaches. Sukhmabhando lists four functions, which need not be mutually exclusive, performed by such regional organisations: (1) as a means of managing relations with non-member states, including deterring, restraining or eliminating threats from them; (2) as a means of managing or resolving conflicts and of promoting cooperation among members; (3) as a channel for articulating and promoting objectives (such as peace, prosperity and regional order) as norms of behaviour; and (4) as the common platform for promoting member states’ domestic stability.

Admittedly, against these possibilities are a number of limitations which may even lead to diminished rather than enhanced regional security: (1) regional organisations are often set up and promoted as responses to external threats, and may in fact accentuate conflicts with the sources of those threats; (2) where one or more of the objectives being promoted are not unanimously accepted intramurally, they can cause discord; (3) the desire for regional cooperation (for example, greater economic integration) as a means of promoting national security may appear to conflict with considerations of national interest (for example, regional economic integration may incur domestic political costs); and (4) the existence of centrifugal tendencies means that regional cooperation may be an inefficient and unwieldy means of organising and augmenting power, for example, while seeking to bring about a more favourable distribution of power between member and non-member states. One outcome may be “defection” from the common purpose in terms of a return to greater self-reliance or military alliance with external powers.102 This issue of concern over relative gains remains a serious obstacle to institutional cooperation.

Finally, academic interest in postwar regional organisations has usually focused on two broad and still evolving trends. One is intergovernmentalism, whose purpose is driven by a “minimalist” preference to adopt a flexible mix of formal and informal processes of cooperation. The other is supranationalism, in which organisational purpose is driven by a “maximalist” preference to create a tight
formal web of integrative regional structures in the cultural, economic, political, and security spheres. Each trend can be examined in its own right, but it is possible to depict a logical movement from intergovernmentalism to supranationalism. However, as discussed below, the former is not necessarily a sufficient condition for the latter.

Regionalism in the developing world – where a pluralistic security community has yet to emerge -- tends to evolve principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures which are relatively informal and unregulated, especially in their security-oriented role. In this context, there is a concomitant awareness of the potential of regionalism to promote synergistic economic development and to mitigate the developing countries’ disadvantaged position in the international system. This path of regionalism (1) emphasises incremental and even ad hoc cooperation (ranging from consultation and coordination to joint activities) rather than integration and regularised procedures; and (2) involves active involvement on the part of political leaders and senior government officials, especially in the security and economic dimensions. This aspect of regionalism will be referred to as intergovernmentalism, with ASEAN often cited as the model of an intergovernmental organisation.

Supranational organisations may have earlier beginnings in intergovernmentalism but they usually fairly quickly decided on movement towards some sort of integration. In the supranational approach, the eventual goal is economic integration and a high degree of political integration. This approach, which emphasises principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures which are formal and explicit, is usually associated with the developed West, the model cited being the European Union (EU). The EU, of course, went through evolutionary stages from its beginnings as the European Coal and Steel Community. Its Cold War purpose was to ensure that West Germany stayed integrated with the rest of Western Europe. As discussed earlier, Western Europe is generally regarded today as a pluralistic security community. It should be added here that while the EU does not have an overt military security role, many
of its members including the major European powers are members of a balance-of-power military alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). The United States, an extra-European power, is a NATO member. Throughout the Cold War, in non-communist Western Europe, a symbiotic relationship existed between a neoliberal institutional structure (the present EU) and a balance-of-power alliance system (NATO).

Intergovernmentalism (to the extent that it has not “evolved” towards supranationalism) appears at first glance to suggest an inferior model of regionalism. Hans Indorf’s cautionary caveat with regards to ASEAN that excessively nationalist policies can evolve which are contrary to the spirit of regionalism, echoes Sukhumbhand’s concerns about member states publicly asserting the primacy of their national interest. But there is still insufficient evidence to support the durability of either supranationalism or intergovernmentalism. Institutionalists have not convincingly refuted realist claims that post-Cold War Europe may yet slip into some future instability; by implication, the EU’s supranational model may still unravel along with a parallel regression from the pluralistic security community. From Indorf’s study of ASEAN, the intergovernmental model’s major weakness is its inherent organisational instability (centrifugal tendencies), dependent, as it were, on the existence of shared norms or convergences of outlook (which may not be durable) among political elites rather than durable, institutionalised norms complemented by the existence of a military alliance. Indeed, the evidence with regards to Third World regionalism suggests that bilateral contentious issues are still major impediments to organisational unity.

To conclude this section, an important gauge of institutions is whether they enable us to account for and predict state behaviour. On one hand, realists like Mearsheimer take the extreme position, arguing that institutions cannot surmount the inherent problem of relative gains concerns, and that it would even be foolish to promote institutions as policy. But other realists like Bull and most neorealists accept that rules and institutions help to promote an international society. On the
other hand, most institutionalists are now more cautious about their claims. They would not want to dispute Mearsheimer’s assertion that their approach “is of little relevance in situations where states’ interests are fundamentally conflictual and neither side has much interest in cooperation”\(^\text{107}\). Institutionalists are also more cautious now about assuming that interdependence necessarily creates incentives for lasting cooperation and peaceful change, since other factors like domestic politics and conflictual ideas need to be considered. But, having said that, institutionalists are unanimous that institutions do mitigate anarchy and positively affect state behaviour. To cite a vivid example, the fact that many small, highly vulnerable states continue to survive in an anarchic world suggests that principles such as sovereignty and non-intervention continue to be highly salient and that international organisations which promote such norms and principles have helped shaped states’ behaviour and expectations.

1.13 The security complex as an analytical device

An earlier section noted that the balance of power approach often masks the security dynamics of sub-regions. For example, with the Cold War in mind, Muthiah Alagappa observes that:

The closest the countries in the [Southeast Asian] region came to sharing a common security dynamic was during the height of the ideological confrontation in the 1950s and 1960s.... In retrospect it is clear that the Vietnam War principally only affected the security of North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and Thailand. Similarly the Cambodian conflict affected the security of these same countries. The Indonesian confrontation against Malaysia and Singapore did not affect the security of the continental Southeast Asian states.\(^\text{108}\)

In an attempt to act as a corrective, that is, to identify different sets of security dynamics in regional security analysis, the idea of the security complex was introduced by Barry Buzan. As noted earlier, a security complex may be defined as:
… a set of states whose major security perceptions and concerns are so inter-linked that their national security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one another.  

A security complex describes a relatively self-contained pattern of security relationships, typically among a geographically proximate group of states. A security complex is identified (1) by the distribution of power; and (2) by the patterns of amity, trust and cooperation and patterns of enmity, fear and rivalry generated by the local states. Buzan identifies five security complexes in the developing world: Latin (South) American, Middle East, Southern African, South Asian and Southeast Asian.  

The distribution-of-power aspect is clearly a material factor, and follows the logic of neorealism’s structural features, but obviously emphasising the regional dynamic. Hence, balance of power and geopolitical concerns are relevant to the security complex idea. For example, threats which are geographically closer will likely merit greater attention. The amity-enmity patterns aspect has both material and ideational relevance. How are these patterns shaped, how are they sustained, and can they be transformed? In the material sense, to the extent that the balance of power dynamic creates the security dilemma, mutual mistrust, etc, it reinforces patterns of enmity. Patterns of amity and enmity are also compatible with the neoliberal institutional approach, since regional institutions promote (or hinder) the development of norms, rules and principles, as well as shape behaviour for the purpose of regional cooperation. But, from this perspective, cooperative outcomes (or uncooperative outcomes such as defections and cheating) derive from some fear of the consequences of non-cooperation or otherwise, that is, material incentives or disincentives are germane.  

However, because patterns of amity/enmity are generated by the actors and are not just reflections of material conditions, once such patterns (and the security dynamics that flow from them) are identified, it is possible to deploy the constructivist idea of the mutual construction of social practices and identities conducive to peaceful change (movement from enmity to amity). Norms and
institutions seen from this ideational perspective contribute to the process of identity-formation. With all these points in mind, the distribution of power and amity-enmity aspects will now be discussed.

The first aspect, that of distribution of power, is based on the logic of anarchy (which confronts all states with security competition) and the effects of geographical proximity. Arising from this combined effect of the security dilemma and geography, security interdependence between states which belong in a given security complex is more intense than it is between states inside the complex and those outside it. The logic of anarchy further suggests that security complexes will be “penetrated” by major powers (assuming such powers are not “members” of the complexes). As will be further discussed, there are higher level and lower level complexes.

The second aspect, that of relationships shaped by positive and negative attitudes, originate in a variety of issues which cannot be reduced solely to the consequences of the distribution of power. Indeed, the key factors shaping patterns and amity and enmity are historical experiences and social factors -- cultural, political and social interactions. It was earlier noted that regions could be categorised on a conflict-cooperation continuum. The degree of amity/enmity may now be inserted: chaos (nearly all relations are defined by enmity); regional conflict formations (conflictual relations dominate but amity is also possible); security regimes (cooperative relations dominate but enmity persists if usually managed); and security communities (nearly all relations are defined by amity). Patterns of amity and enmity are durable but may be transformed, if usually slowly and with some difficulty.

The regional security complex framework is designed to highlight the relative autonomy of regional security relations, and to set them in the context of the state and system levels. While security complexes are relatively autonomous, they are nevertheless nodes in a global web of security interdependence. As already described, the regional-global linkage is provided in the concepts of distribution
of power and amity-enmity patterns.\textsuperscript{111} One of the purposes of the security complex framework “is to offset the tendency of power theorists to underplay the importance of the regional level in international security affairs”.\textsuperscript{112} Buzan argues that, too often, the states of the North define security issues in the developing world in terms of their own security priorities. He uses the example of the United States in the 1950s identifying Pakistan as a “Southwest Asian state”, that is, tying that country into the defence of the Middle East when in fact the real focus of Pakistan's security interests was in South Asia. American supply of arms to Pakistan thus fuelled “the obsessive insecurity of India and Pakistan in relation to each other, and opened the way for Soviet influence in the dominant power in the region”.\textsuperscript{113}

The five Third World security complexes identified by Buzan, including the Southeast Asian security complex, may be said to be “lower level” complexes, in which the power of the local states does not extend much, if at all, beyond the range of their immediate neighbours.\textsuperscript{114} This feature is a key element in the existence of relatively self-contained local security dynamics among sets of neighbouring states. Secondly, while major powers may impact on the lower level complex, no major power is involved as a regional power (if it does, the complex is transformed). But it should be emphasised that the concept's corrective effort does not swing to the other extreme of dismissing the impact of outside actors. Indeed, as nodes in the international system, security complexes not only define intense and relatively durable patterns of interactions among local actors, but also serve to guide and shape the impact of larger external actors on these local patterns.\textsuperscript{115} These nodes thus provide the entry for penetration of Third World politics by the great powers.

A complex is deemed a “higher level” complex if it contains major powers whose power extends far beyond their immediate environment or whose power is sufficient to impinge on several regions.\textsuperscript{116} The Northeast Asian security complex continues to be a higher level complex despite the end of the Cold War because it includes Russia, China, Japan and the United States.
External actors can impact on -- that is, “penetrate” -- the local lower-level complex in many ways. They can supply military assistance to clients and allies or even involve their own armed forces directly. More indirectly, they can supply economic aid to clients and allies. External actors can even switch sides -- without changing the local pattern of hostility. Indeed, while external powers may attempt to mediate in local disputes, their attempts to go against the grain of local alignments have a poor record.\textsuperscript{117} This is not to suggest that their influence has been minor; it simply means that “the experience of intrusive powers has been that it is easier to impose conflict than cooperation upon members of a subordinate system”.\textsuperscript{118}

In the extreme, as occurred during the Cold War, the superpowers “overlaid” the local power dynamic completely by imposing their own direct presence on the entire complex.\textsuperscript{119} Such overlay by the US and the Soviet Union occurred over much of Europe during the Cold War. Overlay is quite distinct from the process of penetration by great powers into the affairs of local security complexes because, unlike the former, it invariably suppresses the local dynamic. Past imperial overarching conquests resulted in overlay but the most recent was the Cold War superpower overlay.

How are adjoining security complexes demarcated? They are separated by zones, or boundaries, of relative security indifference. Such a boundary is usually one or more buffer states. Zones of relative security indifference separate adjoining complexes. Apart from the earlier reference to the Southwest Asian (Middle East) complex, Buzan also refers to the example of South Asia and Southeast Asia, both of which contain patterns of local rivalry intense enough to have generated several large wars. But despite the physical proximity of the two complexes, these wars have had virtually no impact across the boundary between them.\textsuperscript{120} Myanmar in security complex terms can be described, during the Cold War, as a buffer state between these two complexes.\textsuperscript{121} Politically and militarily weak, it was relatively peripheral to the security dynamics on either side of it.
Consequently, the local dynamics in South Asia and Southeast Asia were almost completely separated from each other during the Cold War.\textsuperscript{122}

Security complexes, then, are durable features of the international system. They provide a useful benchmark against which to identify and assess changes in the patterns of regional security.\textsuperscript{123} As noted earlier, once patterns of amity or enmity which are the result of history, culture and other social interactions, have been shaped, they become durable. Nevertheless, they can be transformed. The “essential structure” (distribution of power among the principal states within the complex) can also be transformed. A brief outline of what causes a transformation of the material structure of security complexes will first be made\textsuperscript{124} before proceeding to the non-material transformation of amity-enmity relations.

First, internal transformation may occur as a result of decisive shifts in the power relations among states. Thus, the complex's essential structure changes within the context of its existing outer boundary. Internal transformation took place in Indochina as a result of decisive shifts in power relations in 1975; it resulted in a reunited Vietnam becoming the dominant power.

Secondly, external transformation occurs when the essential structure is altered by either expansion or contraction of the complex's existing boundary. The addition or deletion of major states would constitute such a change. The breakup of the Soviet empire between 1989 and 1991 resulted in several former Eastern European states looking towards reintegration with Western Europe.

Turning to transformation of amity-enmity relations within a security complex, although what follows below discusses peaceful change, no deterministic trend towards amity is suggested. Indeed, it is reemphasised that patterns of enmity, fear, mistrust and rivalry may be extremely durable since they are conditioned largely by historical experiences and cultural, political and social interactions. But it is suggested that change towards amity (or, for that matter, enmity) is possible but difficult, and that the insights from constructivism regarding the
intersubjective constitution of state and collective identities is invaluable. An outline of constructivism’s understanding of world politics, especially of the patterned relationship among state identities and interests, follows.

Neorealism portrays states as like-minded, egotistic, self-interested actors constrained in their behaviours and actions by the anarchic structure of the international system. It assumes \textit{a priori} that only material interests shape states’ identities, behaviours and actions. Constructivism questions this narrow and “static” assumption about actors and structures. It accepts that states may indeed be constrained by material incentives and disincentives such as a balance of power. But it argues also that actors and structures are -- in a dynamic sense -- mutually constituted by social practice: meaningful behaviour (or action) is possible only within an intersubjective social context. Actors develop their relations with (and understandings of) others through the ongoing media of norms, identities and practices. Ted Hopf uses the example of the United States’ identity as a “great power” during the Vietnam War:

… to the extent that US appeasement in Vietnam was unimaginable because of US identity as a great power, military intervention constituted the United States as a great power. Appeasement was an unimaginable act. By engaging in the “enabled” action of intervention, the United States reproduced its identity of great power, as well as the structure that gave meaning to its action. So, US intervention in Vietnam perpetuated the international intersubjective understanding of great powers as those states that use military power against others.\textsuperscript{125}

Thus, an action may reproduce both the actor and the structure. But because social practice has a dynamic quality, change is possible, if difficult. As the Vietnam War progressed, the constitutive norms shifted in such a manner that while the identity of the US as a great power remained intact, the conflict was increasingly seen by all concerned as a war of national liberation rather than an ideological one. Similarly, as will be discussed in a later chapter, Vietnam and the ASEAN countries progressively came to mutually revise the former’s image as a regional hegemon. This intersubjective process of practice and identity-transformation in turn paved the way for the transformation of enmity towards
amity. To reiterate the earlier point, this statement does not imply either an inevitably smooth or complete process of peaceful transformation. Also, given its dynamic quality, this intersubjective process among states and groups within states may work in the opposite direction, from amity towards enmity.

Finally, state identity and its relationship to interests warrants some comment in the context of institutions as a vehicle for regional cooperation. Durable expectations between states require intersubjective identities that are sufficiently stable to ensure predictable patterns of behaviour.\textsuperscript{126} (Identities in this sense are needed to reduce complexity to some manageable level.) The identity of a state implies its preferences and interests, and thereby its consequent actions. It may be argued that the shaping of convergent preferences and actions among the founding ASEAN states helped create a mutually-constituted collective identity sometimes dubbed the “ASEAN way”. From this perspective, multilateral institutions are “an exercise in identity-building”.\textsuperscript{127} Subsequent chapters will examine ASEAN in this context.

Returning to the security complex idea, two of its limitations may be noted. First, unlike the balance of power and institutional approaches, it cannot be said to be a theory in that it is not “generative”. It is very useful in identifying security dynamics at the regional level but it cannot claim to have predictive powers. However, it can provide ex post facto explanations. In situations where the balance of power or institutionalist explanations do not seem to be satisfactory, the security complex framework can first identify the local dynamics (that is, distinguishing these from broader global-level dynamics) so that these approaches can then be usefully deployed. It is therefore very important to understand that the purpose of this study is a comparative evaluation of the three approaches in their empirical analysis of the regional security dynamics of Southeast Asia.

A second limitation is the security complex’s tendency to emphasise conflictual relations. Patterns of enmity are easier to identify than patterns of amity. Like the balance of power approach, it appears to explain the sources of competitive
insecurity better than the conditions for cooperative security. In this sense, the security complex is relatively insensitive to change. However, as discussed above, the “co-optation” of constructivism to examine the socially constitutive process of transformation of patterns of amity and enmity in this study promises to be fruitful, especially in assessing post-Cold War security thinking in the ASEAN region. The caveat is that -- as noted in this chapter’s literature review -- constructivism itself is still a relatively new approach in IR theory, albeit a promising one.

This section's discussion of the security complex suggests that it can be usefully deployed to mitigate the weaknesses of the balance of power and institutional approaches. The debate between advocates of these two major state-centric approaches has already been covered in the literature review. Briefly, both take the view that states are materially-driven rational actors albeit with different capabilities. As such, they expect actor behaviour to be predictable and actors’ strategies to accord with the imperative to advance their material interests. Importantly, both approaches treat domestic politics as issues within the state, since what matters are inter-state issues.

Two important aspects of this debate revolved around conflict versus cooperation, and around the related issue of absolute versus relative gains. Balance of power advocates expect states under the security dilemma to be “competitors” and to be continually wary of each other. In any set of relationships, conflict and even war may erupt because actual or potential relative gains of one side have become unacceptable to the other side or other sides. Force is therefore an option for policy-makers. Cooperation is possible -- including the creation of institutions -- but the cobbled of a common interest is possible only because of the need to balance an actual or potential threat. Time is not the issue in the sense that a rivalry may persist for some time, as was the case with the Cold War. Even with the end of the Cold War, an alliance like NATO may still survive if a new enemy is identified. In short, balance of power theorists are not concerned with “walking softly” or otherwise but are concerned with “carrying a big stick”.
Institutionalists argue that cooperation is not only possible but also could be made iterative and mutually beneficial because states are concerned with absolute, not relative gains inspite of the security dilemma. Institutions are therefore created and maintained to define interests in a transparent manner, to regulate state behaviour by affecting incentives, and by altering conceptions of self-interest. Moreover, while balance of power advocates are sceptical of peaceful change, institutionalists argue that the resultant reduction of uncertainty and stabilisation of expectations may create the material conditions for such change.

These major points of contention between the balance of power and institutional approaches arise because of the way they have been logically constructed. As general approaches, they have much merit, and on some points in fact complement each other. For example, institutionalists now accept the realist view that under conditions where states’ interests are chronically conflictual, the incentive to foster institutions is unlikely to exist or may be only weakly pursued. The focus of this study, however, is inter-state relations among Southeast Asian states and external powers within the context of the dynamics of security interdependence. When deployed to examine regional security in detail, these two general approaches may either miss the more subtle dynamics that exist among groups of regional states or offer logical conclusions that emphasise material factors which may not necessarily reflect the reality of Southeast Asian states’ security thinking and practices. Moreover, while the exclusion of the effects of domestic politics enable these two approaches to construct states as autonomous actors (“billiard balls”), it may lead to the discounting of such factors as differing strategic perceptions among a particular group of states and the underlying reasons for such variations.

As will be elaborated in subsequent chapters and summarised in the concluding chapter, the logical construction of the security complex idea allows it to at least attempt to correct the above weaknesses, broadly outlined, of the other two approaches. Specifically, first of all, the security complex builds upon the balance
of power approach's concern with patterns of power relations, the continued role of force, and the strategies which regional states (and their patrons) pursue in their self-interest. It does this by providing coherence to their motives and actions by identifying locally generated patterns of amity and enmity, missed out by power considerations alone. Briefly, these regional states tend to act on the basis of durable local dynamics (even if they are not always conscious of these dynamics) regardless of great power interventions. A clear example would be the discredited Domino Theory of the 1950s and early 1960s (at the height of the Cold War in Southeast Asia). Balance of power thinking constructed a scenario where the fall of one regional state to communist forces would lead to the collapse, one after another, of other regional non-communist states. One erroneous assumption of this idea was that the communist powers were strongly bound by common strategic interests. The idea again surfaced after 1975 (although now not given the Domino Theory label), when some fears were expressed that a reunited Vietnam could successfully emerge as a regional hegemon. A balance of power response by the ASEAN states would be to form a countervailing military alliance, but this did not occur. In both examples, the security complex framework identifies local dynamics, including the legacy of historical rivalries, which mitigate balancing behaviour.

Secondly, like the institutional approach, the security complex is also concerned with institutional cooperation. But the former posits that states cooperate on the basis of identified common material interests (including the fear of the future consequences of not cooperating). The latter, by identifying patterns of amity and enmity, goes further, to suggest – through the deployment of constructivist ideas - - that norms and identities can be intersubjectively shaped to encourage cooperative behaviour even in the absence of material incentives to do so. A clear example here would be the display of cohesion by the ASEAN states in support of Singapore over the so-called ICAP issue. In 1979, Australia embarked on a protectionist international civil aviation policy (ICAP), which principally affected Singapore Airlines. The negative impact on the other ASEAN airlines was very much less. The result of this ASEAN solidarity during negotiations forced
Australia to modify ICAP to accommodate Singapore's concerns.\footnote{128}

Finally, the security complex, by identifying security concerns along the lines of regional security interdependence, takes into account the subtle balancing that may occur within an institutional arrangement like ASEAN. Moreover, the disaggregation of the core complexes into sub-complexes facilitates the inclusion of the impact of domestic politics on relations among sets of security-interdependent states. An example would be the manner in which three of Singapore's neighbours -- Brunei, Indonesia, and Malaysia -- reacted when Singapore invited then Israeli President Chaim Herzog to pay it a state visit in November 1986. In the event, even Brunei -- a country with close ties to Singapore -- felt compelled to temporarily withdraw its High Commissioner because of the sensitivities of domestic politics. This issue will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3.

As argued above, the security complex idea can therefore contribute to regional security analysis through its examination of the security dynamics among clusters of security-interdependent regional states and external powers. It short, it is tailored specifically for the regional level.

1.14 Conclusion

This chapter examined the idea of security interdependence, and developed a conceptual framework centred on this theme. With regional security interdependence in mind, it then identified three analytical methods which have been used by observers to examine international politics. Their assumptions about global and regional politics during and after the Cold War shape their perceptual lenses about regional security dynamics.

The balance of power approach is derived from realist approaches. Its bias is towards the “high politics” of military security; it emphasises power politics in
international relations. To its adherents, the balance of power approach provides practical policy guides, resulting in options ranging from deterrence to bandwagoning. This approach, however, overemphasises the autonomy of states and suffers from insensitivity to regional and sub-regional balances and interdependent security dynamics. Its overriding attention to great-power interests results in an overemphasis upon conflictual relations and power politics, and an inadequate ability to take into account non-material factors. The institutional approach is derived from liberal approaches which accept realism’s premise of an anarchic world but which insist that anarchy can be mitigated through rules providing incentives for regularised cooperation among states. At the regional level, this idea may be described as regionalism. This approach may be applied to examine “low politics” issues such as the global political economy. As developed in this study, this approach emphasises intergovernmentalism among regional states seeking to enhance their well-being. Like the balance of power approach, it overemphasises states’ material interests. Moreover, it fails to recognize the subtle balancing that may occur among states within an institutional arrangement. Finally, the security complex framework is derived from neorealist state-centric thinking and takes as its starting point the idea that the security interdependence of proximate states within a regional system or sub-system varies in intensity. It thus maps out clusters of sometimes overlapping states whose security concerns are closely linked, on the basis of power distribution as well as amity/enmity patterns. Nevertheless, although focussed on the regional level, it recognizes the important role of penetrating external powers in the regional dynamics. Its identification of local dynamics and the possibility of change in the patterns of amity/enmity provides for the deployment of constructivist elements with reference to socially constructed norms and identities. The study will now attempt to use the three approaches comparatively to examine the security dynamics of Southeast Asia.

ENDNOTES
In this study, the idea of security interdependence is embodied in the argument that individual national securities can only be fully understood when considered in relation to each other and to larger patterns of relations in the international system as a whole. See, for example, Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear*, 2nd ed. (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), p. 22; and James W. Morley, ed., *Security Interdependence in the Asia Pacific Region* (Lexington: DC Heath and Co., 1986).

Cambodia became ASEAN’s 10th member on 30 April 1999. *Straits Times*, 30 April 1999. The other nine Southeast Asian countries, already ASEAN members, are: Brunei, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar (formerly Burma), the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.

See, for example, Michael W. Doyle and G. John Ikenberry, eds., *New Thinking in International Relations Theory* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997).


For a discussion of strong and weak states, as opposed to strong and weak powers, see Buzan, *op. cit.*, pp 96-107.


Pauline Kerr, Andrew Mack, and Paul Evans, "The Evolving Security Discourse in the


18Dalby, op. cit., p.21.


20A valiant attempt to widen the agenda along this line is Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, 1998).


22Deutsch et. al., op. cit., pp. 5-6.

23Vayrynen, op. cit., p. 345.

24Jervis, op. cit., p. 357.


30ibid., p. 166.
31 Bull, op. cit., p. 4 and p. 8.

32 Many IR scholars today argue that both material and ideational factors influence state behaviour. Alagappa, for example, asserts that ideas can influence the state’s interpretation of the world, shape policy agendas, and affect outcomes. See his “Introduction” in Muthiah Alagappa, ed., Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), p. 21.

33 ibid., pp 702-703.

34 This is the so-called “democratic peace theory”. Michael W. Doyle, “Liberalism and World Politics,” American Political Science Review, 80 (4), 1986, pp 1151-1169; and Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).


37 For an excellent review, see Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, Explaining and Understanding International Relations (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1990), ch. 2.


40 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, op. cit.


Doyle, “Liberalism and World Politics,” *op. cit*.


Waltz, “The Emerging Structure of International Politics,” *op. cit*.


In this vein, for example, two scholars collaborated to present realism, liberalism and socialism as perspectives on the international system as a whole. R.D. McKinlay and R. Little, *Global Problems and World Order* (London: Pinter, 1986).


*ibid*.

*ibid*.

See, for example, Hopf, *op. cit*.

Anarchy needs to be clarified. To the layman, it is a value-laden term, suggesting a state of chaos and, in a societal context, an absence of government. In international politics, however,
anarchy simply means that government resides in the units of the international system. Many practitioners and theorists therefore argue that anarchy is a preferred form of international political order, representing diversity, independence and self-reliance. Similarly, international anarchy does not mean that cooperation among actors in the system is unlikely or impossible. See the introduction in Buzan, *People, States and Fear*, 2nd ed., *op. cit.*, esp. pp 20-23. See also *World Politics*, 38 (1), 1985, whose theme is cooperation under anarchy.


65Introduction, in *ibid.*, pp. 4-6.

66Morgenthau, *op. cit.*

67This is Vattel's famous definition, quoted by Buzan, *People, States and Fear*, *op. cit.*, p. 165.


72Berridge, *op. cit.*, p. 171.

73*ibid.*, pp 171-172.


77*ibid.*, p. 175.


80*ibid.*

81Sheldon W. Simon, "Davids and Goliaths: Small Power-Great Power Security Relations in


83 Robert Jervis, "The Spiral of International Insecurity", in Little and Smith, eds., *op. cit.*, pp. 94-100.


88 *Straits Times*, 2 December 1988.

89 Other labels include non-provocative defence, defensive defence, defensive deterrence, structural defensivity and mutual defensive superiority. For a good discussion, see Andrew Mack, "The Strategy of Non- Provocative Defence: The European Debate," in Desmond Ball and Cathy Downes, eds., *Security and Defence: Pacific and Global Perspectives* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin Australia, 1990), pp. 163-190.


97 This definition is the author's, based on M.R. Sukhumbhand Paribatra, "ASEAN and the Kampuchean Conflict: A Study of a Regional Organization's Responses to External Security Challenges," in Robert A. Scalapino and Masataka Kosaka, eds., *Peace, Politics and


101ibid., p. 147.

102ibid., pp 148-150.


104ASEAN officials invariably emphasize that they do not envisage the grouping adopting the European Union's integrationist model. It is therefore somewhat intriguing that the introduction to ASEAN's 10th anniversary commemorative publication made the comment that "regional integration is the most appropriate mechanism for creating a strong resilient Southeast Asia". 10 Years ASEAN (Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 1977), p. 10.


106ibid.


110Buzan, People, States and Fear, op. cit., pp. 209-216.


112Buzan, People, States and Fear, op. cit., p. 186.


114Buzan, People, States and Fear, op. cit., p. 195.

115Brian L. Job, 'Introduction' in Brian L. Job, ed., The Insecurity Dilemma: National

116 Buzan, People, States and Fear, op. cit., p. 195.

117 ibid., pp. 213-4.


119 Buzan, People, States and Fear, op. cit., p. 213.

120 Barry Buzan, "The Southeast Asian Security Complex," Contemporary Southeast Asia, 10 (1), June 1988, p. 3.

121 ibid., p. 4.

122 ibid., p. 6.

123 Buzan, People, States and Fear, op. cit., p. 209.

124 ibid., pp. 216-221.

125 Hopf, op. cit., pp 172-173.

126 ibid., p. 174.


2.1 Introduction

This chapter analyzes the dynamics of regional security interdependence in Southeast Asia since 1945. The balance of power and institutional approaches will be deployed here while the security complex will be used in Chapter 3. The focus of this chapter is the post-1945 regional security environment in Southeast Asia before and after ASEAN's formation in 1967 and the grouping's formative years until 1975, when the three Indochinese states came under communist rule. Given the intensity of external power rivalries throughout the period under review, this chapter will first examine the adequacy of the balance of power approach in assessing Southeast Asian security concerns. The power rivalries involving external and regional actors in, and over, Southeast Asia, suggest that the balance of power approach provides one useful assessment of its security landscape.

The institutional approach lends itself readily to an examination of institutional “under-development” in postwar Southeast Asia, and to ASEAN's formation and consolidation, using the idea of learning “rules of the game” in conflict-management and cooperation-facilitation. This approach is expected to identify certain common bases conducive to the ASEAN model of regionalism. How the founding ASEAN members accommodated each other's security preferences was critical to ASEAN's formative years.

2.2 Southeast Asia: The historical and Cold War settings
The diverse region now known as Southeast Asia constituted a natural geostrategic entity in the sense that it was bounded by the major Asian powers of China to the north and India to the northwest while it was insulated from other powers by the Western Pacific. Thus, Southeast Asia was a pre-colonial locale for Sino-Indian influence. But while China cast its shadow over the region prior to European colonization, the first empire in Southeast Asia was a Hindu one -- Funan (1-6 A.D.) which encompassed what is today Cambodia and the southern tip of Vietnam. Indian (Hindu and Buddhist) influence also penetrated maritime Southeast Asia. But it was the proximity of China to the region that has proved to be the more durable in terms of a geo-political role. India since the Western colonial period ceased to be a major player but might conceivably play a renewed post-Cold War role in the future.

European colonization opened up the region, ended its maritime insulation from the West and wrought changes to historical patterns of security relations which continue to be felt -- and intensified -- by the creation of modern Southeast Asian territorially-based “nation-states”. The colonization of Southeast Asia by various European powers led to the imposition of (often arbitrary) territorial boundaries and the influx of large numbers of immigrants especially from China and India. These boundaries nevertheless served as the bases for local elites to establish the post-Second World War states of Southeast Asia. The Japanese interregnum provided these elites with the anti-colonial momentum even as it also ensured a lingering suspicion of Japan. The Cold War in Asia coincided with the various independence movements and struggles for statehood, and eventually saw the United States-Soviet Union superpower rivalry brought into Southeast Asia. Unlike the tight bipolar rivalry in Europe, the Asian contest was more fluid, as it involved the “China factor” as well.

Southeast Asia is rich in resources (and human energy), and these were what first attracted people from surrounding regions and, subsequently, the Western colonial powers -- Spain, Portugal, Holland, France and Great Britain. Secondly, taken together as well as individually, the regional entities are undoubtedly of strategic value to contending great powers, as both the Second World War and the Cold War amply testify. Moreover, the region's waterways, choke points and straits -- and in
modern times, its lines of supply and communication -- are of strategic and economic importance to Southeast Asian countries and the external powers. Japan, as an energy importer and manufactured goods exporter, had been aware of Southeast Asia's strategic and economic value since its emergence as a 20th century Asian power. But it took the Second World War for Japan to stake its territorial ambition on the region. Since then, Japan has remained a key player in the region's strategic and economic calculus. The Second World War and the Cold War that followed saw the United States emerge as a truly global superpower; it expanded its power and presence in the Asia-Pacific, including Southeast Asia. On the other hand, the former Soviet Union in its contest with the United States may be aptly described as the “incomplete” superpower; moreover, the Soviet Union was only a feature of Southeast Asia's security calculus for the relatively short period between 1978 and 1989.

Immediate postwar Southeast Asia did not have the luxury of gradually evolving a regional order shaped by mutually agreed norms and rules acceptable to the external powers. Instead, it was dragged into the global Cold War while the colonial legacy was still leaving behind a mosaic of large and small regional entities in uneven stages of state-formation and often in antagonistic relationships with each other. Southeast Asian leaders were thus subjected to internal stresses and interest group demands as well as external impositions and inducements. Muthiah Alagappa notes that “[a] major consequence of this recent origin of states in Southeast Asia has been the domestic and international challenges to their legitimacy.”

Since the colonial period, then, given the domestic and external constraints, if the diverse states of Southeast Asia have had little opportunity to determine their own regional order, it also meant a sense of regional identity eluded them. Equally, given their historical experiences, divergent perceptions of the external powers early became part of their strategic cultures. The interests and rivalries of powerful external powers interacted with the interests and rivalries of weak regional powers. In spite of this, the advent of the Cold War in Asia consequent on increasing American engagement grafted some coherence into the regional complexity, that is,
the superpower rivalry did result in an overarching communist versus non-communist divide in Southeast Asia.\textsuperscript{6}

However, while a “high politics” Cold War rivalry (the strategic calculus) was clearly discernable in East Asia, including Southeast Asia\textsuperscript{7}, a less obvious but equally crucial “low politics” contest (the political economy calculus) was taking place at the same time. By the time ASEAN was formed in 1967, non-communist Southeast Asia other than Burma (Myanmar) had chosen (if in varying degrees of endorsement) the capital-seeking market-based approach to economic and industrial development. In Northeast Asia, Japan (and Hongkong) provided the economic model for Taiwan and South Korea. Except for Hongkong and the Philippines, government involvement in the economic sector was palpable. By the early 1970s, communist China had come to be viewed by the West less as an ideologically-motivated actor and more as a balance-of-power actor. By the late 1970s, post-Mao China under Deng Xiaoping had also embarked on economic reforms with increasing tenacity. The not inconsequential results of this Cold War economic rivalry -- the “Western” capitalist economic grid versus the socialist/communist command economy grid -- in Southeast Asia will be examined in later chapters.

2.3 The legacy of US Containment policy 1945-75

In terms of the strategic calculus, in the immediate postwar period, the energies of United States foreign and security policy-makers were directed at resisting Soviet Communism in Europe. Until the communist victory in China in 1949, East Asia was not a major US concern. The creation of the People's Republic of China (PRC) changed that. American strategic concerns about the emergence of China as a Soviet ally brought the Cold War first into Northeast Asia (Korean War, 1950-53) and then into Southeast Asia (the Second Indochina War, 1954-75). China's decision in November 1950 to join the Korean War on the side of North Korea reinforced American suspicions of a Sino-Soviet communist alliance throughout East Asia. The emergence of a Cold War rivalry in the Asia-Pacific which drew in Southeast Asia
may be said to date from 1949.

The Cold War changed the strategic landscape of modern-day Southeast Asia. Fears of a Sino-Soviet bloc were raised among the Western powers following the February 1950 mutual defence treaty between the two communist giants and the outbreak of the June 1950 Korean War. From the early 1950s, China became involved again in the region's affairs. Apart from direct support towards North Vietnam's efforts to expel first the French and then the Americans from Indochina, China actively supported communist-oriented political parties and armed insurgencies in the rest of Southeast Asia. As indicated above, after 1949, American postwar Containment policy in Europe was extended fitfully to the so-called Far East (that is, East Asia). The fear then was a communist Sino-Soviet axis stretching across the Eurasian landmass. This fear led to the promotion of occupied Japan as a US ally, and with the onset of the Korean War (1950-53), to South Korea's inclusion within the US defence perimeter. By the early 1950s, the US had concluded separate mutual defence treaties with Japan, South Korea and the Philippines (establishing bases in all three), and jointly with Australia and New Zealand (ANZUS). By 1954, the US had become involved in mainland Southeast Asia. American involvement reached its peak during the latter part of the Second Indochinese War (1954-75). The chequered history of American involvement in Southeast Asia, especially Indochina, has been well documented and will not be discussed in detail here.

Undeniably, however, American involvement in a Southeast Asia struggling to deal with its various insecurities serves as a useful entrée into examining issues centred on the region’s postwar security interdependence. As noted above, the US role expanded in tandem with its Cold War balance-of-power concerns about Soviet and Chinese communism. It led to a buildup of American forces in a military network in the Asia-Pacific that comprised overseas bases and bilateral alliances. These bilateral efforts tended to be successful. But American-led collective defence efforts failed. America's concern about communist ascendancy in Indochina led to its promotion in
September 1954 of the Southeast Asia Collective Defence Treaty, otherwise referred to as the Manila Pact. This treaty saw institutionalized expression in February 1955 as the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). Thailand and the Philippines were the only two Southeast Asian countries willing to join SEATO. Apart from the US, the other members were Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand and Pakistan. This American-led attempt at a multilateral anti-communist alliance system proved to be a failure almost from the start because of the divergent agendas of its members. In July 1975, three months after the fall of South Vietnam and Cambodia to communist forces, SEATO members Thailand and the Philippines delivered the coup de grace by informally initiating moves to dissolve the organization. SEATO was formally dissolved in June 1977. Nevertheless, most Southeast Asian elites recognized that any precipitate move to withdraw the American military presence would amplify regional uncertainties. For example, the Manila Pact has never been revoked, and it continues to provide formal defence links for Thailand with the US. These various developments suggest that both external factors and regional dynamics have to be carefully assessed in discussing Southeast Asian regional security issues.

2.4 Regional states and the balance of power

The balance of power approach is state-centric, and it assumes states pursue self-help as autonomous actors. Hence, the history of colonial Southeast Asia reveals little about regional states’ balancing behaviour. Only Thailand remained free of colonial control. The regional security environment was benign, if simply because the status quo colonial powers held unchallenged dominance. Thus, it is from the period after the Pacific War and its aftermath, the Cold War in the Asia-Pacific, that the approach can be usefully deployed in the regional security analysis of Southeast Asia. Even then, mainland Southeast Asia was for much of that time an arena of superpower proxy war. For the purpose of this study, the Cold War in the Asia-Pacific will be divided into two periods: from 1949 to 1975; and from 1976-1991. The earlier period, covered in this chapter, was the more intense in terms of state-creation (and state-destruction). By 1975, only Brunei remained as a British protectorate; on the
other hand, South Vietnam had effectively ceased to exist as a state. A potentially new state, East Timor, was preemptively invaded by Indonesia.

The starting point for this analysis would be the Japanese occupation period (1941-1945), which played no small role in the various nationalist movements. The Japanese occupation gave a fillip to the notions of statehood, nationalism and anti-colonialism which increasingly came to be self-consciously promoted within the colonial territories. The local elites in Southeast Asia were already caught up in the anti-colonial/anti-Western fervour that was sweeping Asia prior to the Pacific War, but a sense of national destiny was yet to prevail.

This outwardly benign security environment in Southeast Asia came to be disturbed by Japan, which had already joined the Western powers in carving up China. Acting in accordance with its aspirations as a rising power in the Asia Pacific, yet denied such recognition by the status quo powers, it struck at Pearl Harbour in December 1941 and proceeded to carve out its own Southeast Asian empire. The balance of power mechanism in the Asia-Pacific was at work in the sense that the instrument of diplomacy had failed to keep the peace there. Japan behaved as a balance of power actor; it perceived that it could alter the distribution of power in its favour and went to war to effect such an outcome. The Japanese interregnum was followed by a brief “power vacuum” in Southeast Asia after August 1945; the returning colonial powers were militarily weak and now encountered local elites bent on the creation of independent states. The United States emerged as the preponderant Asia-Pacific power but eschewed hegemonic ambitions. Indeed, the US indicated that -- apart from the Philippines -- it did not regard Southeast Asia as a strategic concern. This attitude of benign neglect could be compared with imperial China’s. But ironically, this initial lack of American interest and the inability of the weakened colonial powers to sustain their military presence in the region was to set the stage for Cold War power rivalries and the accompanying proxy wars in mainland Southeast Asia.

On this point, Mohammed Ayoob asserts that

the workings of the post-World War II international system and the global
balance of power permitted -- indeed, encouraged -- conflict in the Third World at the same time violent interstate conflict was ruled out in the core strategic and economic areas, namely the industrial heartland comprising Europe, North America, and Japan.13

The international system that developed in the postwar Asia-Pacific showed distinct differences from that in postwar Europe. In both regions, America provided a security umbrella for its allies. In Europe, a bipolar superpower military balance emerged, manifested in opposing alliance systems and a political and ideological East-West divide. But in the Asia-Pacific, the start of the Cold War saw the emergence of an American network of bilateral military alliances to ostensibly meet a monolithic communist threat. However, in Southeast Asia in particular, no direct balancing emerged initially. Instead, in an environment of uncertainty and amidst the painful process of state-formation in Southeast Asia, the Western powers were preoccupied with pulling out their military presence. In 1954, the Western presence had already been “undermined” by the French withdrawal from Indochina. Then came the British decisions in 1967 and 1968 to withdraw their forces East of Suez.

As noted earlier, the proxy war that took place in Indochina after 1954 resulted from American perception of a global communist challenge (manifested in regional theatres) and the decision to include mainland Southeast Asia into Washington’s strategic sphere on the basis of the so-called Domino Theory. But by the mid-1960s, a more realistic strategic net assessment had become evident, paving the way for the enunciation of US President Nixon's 1969 Guam Doctrine which led to US troop withdrawal from mainland Southeast Asia. This less ideological, and more realpolitik-influenced, assessment flowed from balance of power factors: the Sino-Soviet split in 1960, the unchallenged preponderance of American maritime power vested in the Seventh Fleet, US-Chinese rapprochement in 1972, and the limits of Soviet power projection capabilities in the region. Politically, this realpolitik assessment enabled the US to discount its patron-client military relationship with South Vietnam and to countenance the demise of the latter in April 1975. Indeed, while North Vietnam’s military hand was strengthened, no “power vacuum” had occurred in the region in the aftermath of US troop withdrawal from South Vietnam.
a year earlier.

Viewed solely from the balance of power perspective, the reactions of regional states to these several major events between 1945 and 1975 would seem to exhibit both expected and unexpected results. For example, on the one hand, while non-communist Southeast Asia greeted the communist victories in Indochina in 1975 with some wariness, there was no rush to form countervailing military alliance structures, as balance of power advocates might have expected. On the other hand, some measure of bandwagoning was evident: following the 1969 Guam Doctrine and the 1973 Paris Peace Agreement, non-communist Southeast Asian states like Thailand and Malaysia began to seek rapprochement with communist China, recognized as the long-term beneficiary of the changed regional distribution of power. In fact, regional states faced with such diffuse external threats (in contrast to the more focussed domestic insurgency threats), chose a mixture of coping strategies, or “strategies of survival”. As observed by Morrison and Suhrke, these “strategies of survival” (which were not necessarily mutually exclusive) included accommodation, alliances (formal and informal) and alignments involving great powers, equidistance, and attempts to secure neutrality guaranteed by the external powers.14 The sections below will discuss these regional states’ strategies between 1945 and 1975.

2.5 Isolationist Southeast Asia: Burma, 1945-75

The balance of power approach fails to explain why postwar Burma (Myanmar) was able to maintain a strategy of isolationism in the face of Cold War rivalries in mainland Southeast Asia. After all, Burma was, and is, strategically sandwiched between China and India and is blessed with deep-water access to the Indian Ocean. Alone among the postwar mainland Southeast Asia states, Burma was able to carry out a policy of strategic isolationism -- its version of equidistance -- despite an unpromising start to independence from British rule in January 1948, when it was plunged into a civil war. At the same time, Burma was careful not to challenge the strategic interests of China, despite the presence of K uomintang remnants in the
Not unexpectedly, the intervention of major powers in Indochina created a balance of power situation there. For China, one consideration was a fear of American encirclement. For example, the Sino-North Vietnamese relationship reveals an interesting dynamic which conforms with the approach’s expectation that self-interest is paramount. North Vietnam, which proclaimed its independence from France in September 1945, set about to expel the French and to achieve unification with South Vietnam under communist leadership. The Chinese preference, however, was guided more by regional balancing behaviour, that is, a desire to ensure that the United States not establish itself in Indochina and thereby further “encircle” China. On this basis, it pushed North Vietnam to accept the 1954 Geneva Accord, which kept the two Vietnams separated. North Vietnam, a recipient of Chinese military and economic aid, felt compelled at this stage to accommodate Chinese interests. As Stanley Karnow notes:

[Chinese prime minister] Zhou's primary aim at Geneva was to carve out an agreement that would deny the United States a pretext to intervene in Indochina and again threaten China. Thus he sought a settlement that would keep the French in their former possession, to the exclusion of the Americans. Such an accommodation inevitably required a sacrifice of the Vietminh's objectives. But Zhou put China's priorities first. Besides, Chinese foreign policy throughout the centuries had been to fragment Southeast Asia in order to influence its states, and Zhou subscribed to that tradition.

Washington, however, found it politically unpalatable to acquiesce in the establishment of a new communist state. To the extent this rationale was more ideological than based on material interests, the US was not strictly a balancing actor. But direct American involvement in mainland Southeast Asia led to a Thai policy of seeking American countervailing power, that is, accepting US protection and its
concomitant alliance obligations. Thailand at this stage feared both Vietnamese ascendency and Chinese support of its own insurgents in the northeastern provinces.

Laos and Cambodia,\textsuperscript{18} the two most vulnerable new states by virtue of chronic domestic instability, small size and strategic value, found their attempts to secure neutrality or equidistance brushed aside by both sides of the Thai-Vietnamese rivalry and the wider rivalry over Indochina. For both Laos and Cambodia, balance of power politics seemed to apply. In Laos, the American-backed but weak royalist government was unable to prevent the leftwing Pathet Lao, with help from Vietnamese forces, from overrunning half of the country by mid-1953. Laos quickly became part of the so-called Ho Chi Minh Trail, the vital supply route for North Vietnam's war efforts in the south. As the Second Indochinese War intensified, US warplanes began bombing North Vietnamese-held territory in Laos. Cambodia initially seemed to escape from the balance of power rivalries that surrounded it. It benefited from the 1954 Geneva Accords. French and Vietnamese forces pulled out of the country and the communist-led Khmer Issarak gave up their struggle. In January 1955, Cambodia proclaimed neutrality and received aid from the United States, the Soviet Union and China. But its attempt to accommodate Vietnam proved its undoing. As the Second Indochinese War intensified through the 1960s and early 1970s, Cambodia, like Laos, became part of the Ho Chi Minh Trail and, not unexpectedly, American forces began violating its territory.

By the end of a dramatic year in 1975, Indochina had become (briefly) freed of external power involvement. Reunified Vietnam had become the regional ascendant power. Laos had come under a communist regime which acquiesced in Vietnamese influence. Cambodia had fallen to Pol Pot's radical, and increasingly anti-Vietnamese, Khmer Rouge forces.

2.7 Non-communist Southeast Asia, 1945-75

For the purpose of this section, it is noted at the outset that although SEATO was
ostensibly an American attempt to create an anti-communist alliance bloc covering Southeast Asia, it did not play an active military role. This was in contrast to NATO which played a major part in the operation of the European balance of power. Thus, for the period reviewed, an examination of the behaviour of Thailand and the Philippines, the only two Southeast Asian SEATO members, must look to more tangible aspects of their security links to the US.

Secondly, the historical background was an important determinant of Thai and Philippine Cold War behaviour. For example, the end of World War II made Thailand vulnerable to British and French demands to have it punished for its wartime pro-Japanese stance. Thailand was therefore eager to cultivate American support to deflect such pressures. Similarly, the Philippines had suffered both at the hands of the Japanese invaders and as a battleground during the Second World War. Thus, Manila retained scarred memories of its wartime experience and saw itself as vulnerable to postwar revolutionary communism's design. But the balance of power approach tends to examine actor behaviour in an 

With these caveats in mind, from the balance of power perspective, Thailand adopted a pro-American stance in the latter's communist containment policy in Asia because it saw the growing communist strength in the region with alarm. Thailand saw North Vietnam and communist China as its major enemies and sought American protection. Moreover, the Thais wanted to ensure that Laos and Cambodia remained as buffers against their historic enemies, the Vietnamese. The Manila Pact (the Southeast Asia Collective Defence Treaty) of September 1954 extended, for the first time, America's Containment policy to mainland Southeast Asia and created SEATO (the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization). SEATO headquarters were located in Bangkok and Thailand played host to an American military presence.

After 1969, following the enunciation of the Guam Doctrine (signalling a declining American interest in Southeast Asia), Bangkok -- despite resistance by hardliners in the military -- began a process of accommodation with erstwhile adversary China. Throughout this period (1945-75) Thailand's use of countervailing power has been primarily directed against North Vietnam's preeminence. Even before 1975, when
Beijing and Hanoi began to fall out, astute Thai diplomacy had already paved the way for de facto Sino-Thai cooperation against Vietnamese designs on the rest of Indochina.

At independence in July 1946, the Philippines kept its special relationship with the United States and allowed the latter to retain its sprawling air and naval bases. Indeed, Morrison and Suhrke observed that:

> Philippine involvement in the large power confrontation in Asia in the 1950s and the 1960s was primarily a function of its alliance with the United States. The islands provided forward military bases in support of the American presence in Asia, and Philippine governments contributed manpower and moral support to the larger ally in the Korean and Vietnam wars. The Philippines remained securely fastened in the American sphere of influence, partly because military, economic, and political aspects of the relationship benefited both governments, partly because there was no important external challenge to the "special relationship".  

Thus, both balance of power concerns as well as historical memories help to explain the Philippines' interest in mainland Southeast Asia during the period reviewed. In 1947, Manila and Washington signed a Military Base Agreement which allowed the US to maintain 23 bases in the Philippines for a 99-year period. Continued Philippine anxiety led to the 1951 US-Philippine Mutual Defence Treaty. The Philippines also became a SEATO founding member. For the US, the Philippine bases became part of its global security network throughout the Cold War period.

But postwar Philippines, a multi-island archipelago, was sufficiently remote from mainland Southeast Asia and, until the Sabah dispute with the new Malaysian federation flared up in the early 1960s, it was relatively unconcerned with maritime Southeast Asian affairs.

Apart from the Philippines, discussed above, maritime Southeast Asia in the period of the Cold War from 1949-1975 was not affected to the same extent by great power rivalry as did the primary arena, mainland Southeast Asia. The lack of interest by the United States in the sub-region -- until Indonesia's President Sukarno began to woo the Soviet Union and China in the early Sixties -- helped insulate the sub-region, as
did the relatively smooth post-1945 return of the British colonial rulers who promised eventual independence to Malaya and Singapore.

Again, the caveat about the important influence of domestic politics in Southeast Asian security concerns applies to maritime Southeast Asia, although it should be noted that historical rivalries were not a major influence there. Briefly, the British colonies had a smooth, albeit long, path to independence: Malaya on 31 August 1957; and Singapore, Sarawak and British Borneo (Sabah) on 16 September 1963 when they combined with Malaya to form Malaysia. Only in postwar Indonesia was there a violent struggle for independence. In the Indonesian archipelago, nationalist forces (albeit dominated by the Javanese) proclaimed independence on 17 August 1945 but this was achieved in fact only on 27 December 1949 after a bitter struggle with the returning Dutch forces. This struggle imprinted an anti-Western legacy on Indonesia, which Sukarno subsequently exploited in the direction of a hegemonic regional ambition.

This post-independence Indonesian sense of "regional entitlement"23 coupled with the country's self-conscious tilt towards the Soviet Union and China generated sub-regional mutual insecurities. By the early 1960s, Indonesia was not unexpectedly regarded by its two nearest neighbours (Malaya and self-governing Singapore) as a spoiler with hegemonic ambitions. Its animosity towards the Western powers led to its disdain of Malaya's independence gained peacefully in 1957 from the British. The fact that Malaya under Tunku Abdul Rahman's Western-oriented leadership produced economic progress did little to endear it to the Jakarta leadership. Thus, when the Tunku, in May 1961, proposed the creation of Malaysia -- a federation expected to comprise Malaya and the British colonial territories of Singapore, North Borneo (renamed Sabah) and Sarawak as well as Brunei -- Sukarno strongly opposed it to the extent of launching a military confrontation to "Crush Malaysia" in January 1963.

In response, Kuala Lumpur sought security guarantees from Britain. The 1957 Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement (AMDA)24 became the Anglo-Malaysian
Defence Agreement (still known as AMDA) when Malaysia was formed in 1963. Jakarta's insecurity stemmed from its perception that AMDA was an element in the West's network of security alliances. Moscow and Beijing encouraged Sukarno's perception that Malaysia was a Western stooge.

Unlike the situation in Indochina, and fortunately for the newly formed Malaysia, military assistance from the British-led Commonwealth Strategic Reserve forces helped to defeat Confrontation. The failed coup in Indonesia in October 1965 provided an opportunity for reconciliation between Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur and Confrontation was officially pronounced over in the following year. Indonesia also shook off its pro-communist foreign policy orientation. These events set the stage for the formation of ASEAN in 1967.

To review this discussion of the balance of power approach, from the postwar years till the mid-Sixties, Southeast Asia remained a region of conflict involving a test of strength and endurance among external powers, and communist and non-communist forces. South Vietnam was to pay the sacrificial price of being the focal point of this test of endurance in the Indochina vortex. Cambodia and, to a lesser extent, Laos, were equally vulnerable to state extinction but were fortunate to survive their unstable domestic and external challenges. Only Burma on the mainland was spared external intervention or the need to seek external sources of protection. Although coalition-building into two balance-of-power blocs did not occur as it did in Cold War Europe, a more subtle form of balancing behaviour did take place: Sukarno’s Indonesia excepted, the US security umbrella covered the rest of non-communist Southeast Asia, whether formally affiliated to the US or otherwise. Indeed, American intervention in Indochina and British Commonwealth protection of the entities that combined to become Malaysia in 1963, at the very least enabled a number of non-communist Southeast Asian states to consolidate their state-formation process and acquire a modicum of sub-regional identity. Following the 1965 coup attempt, Indonesia was steered away from further domestic instability and foreign policy adventurism by the conservative army-led forces headed by General Suharto.

Between 1965 and 1975, conflict in mainland Southeast Asia worked itself to a
political settlement that enabled the US to pull its forces out. The military turning point was the Tet Offensive of January 1968, in which a series of coordinated attacks on urban centres by communist forces, while repulsed, convinced Washington that a military solution was unachievable. Thereafter, events led to communist victory in 1975: President Johnson initiated Hanoi-Washington peace talks in Paris in January 1969; his successor Nixon introduced the Guam Doctrine (July 1969) and initiated rapprochement with China; and in January 1973 the Paris Peace Agreements were signed, in which the US agreed to withdraw all its forces from Vietnam.\textsuperscript{25} By 1975, then, a new regional balance had emerged in mainland Southeast Asia. It was one where Vietnamese military power was no longer restrained by the US, where Bangkok once again felt vulnerable with regards to Hanoi, and where -- for the first time -- the states in maritime Southeast Asia felt their security calculus must now factor in the implications of a communist Indochina and a militarily self-confident Vietnam.

Events between 1965 and 1975 were no less dramatic in maritime Southeast Asia. Singapore came to be the sub-region's balance of power advocate as a result of its post-1965 history. Separated by mutual agreement from Malaysia in August 1965 while Indonesia's Confrontation was still going on, Singapore (with a Chinese component that comprised 71 percent of its population) felt itself a Chinese island in a Malay sea. Singapore leaders themselves were unsure if the island-state, cut off from its Malaysian hinterland and still bedevilled by the twin threats of communism and communalism, could survive politically and economically over the long term. Even its early attempts to seek several non-aligned countries' help to build up its defence forces proved a wrenching exercise. Only Israel agreed to help train Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) personnel. The formation of ASEAN in 1967 helped Singapore to avert potential isolation.

From the analysis above, it may be argued that the balance of power perspective -- which emphasizes realist/neorealist notions of autonomous power-seeking or security-seeking states -- does highlight the effects of changes in the distribution of power. Thus, China has consistently calculated its actions on strategic interests, the
US had corrected its ideological tendency by the time of the 1969 Nixon Doctrine, and small states may have to suffer extinction (South Vietnam) because of the overriding interests of the major powers. But where factors other than material power and interests -- such as the relative "immaturity" of the regional system, local and regional dynamics, domestic politics, and historical memories -- impact on possibly balance of power situations, the results may be mixed. Certainly, the lack of an overriding threat perception in Southeast Asia and even in Northeast Asia, led to an American security umbrella located in bilateral alliances with key allies and not in a bloc alliance against the communist powers.

The balance of power approach is not without merit in its analysis of the behaviour and interests of the major powers engaged in Southeast Asia in the period 1945-75. But the approach appears to be insensitive to the more nuanced behaviour and interests of the regional states in Southeast Asia. Because the balance of power approach tends to focus on existing state-centric structures, it fails to give sufficient weight to the historical origins of rivalry in Southeast Asia prior to the formation of the modern state. In essence, mainland (or continental) Southeast Asia has had a more conflictual history than maritime Southeast Asia. The roots of the conflicts and tensions among present-day Thailand, Myanmar and the three former Indochinese states go back to pre-colonial times, when continental political entities waxed and waned. Rival ethnically-based empires or communities threatened each other's "space" and even existence. The colonial powers imposed their hegemony and created arbitrary boundaries. In modern times, the continental states also bore the brunt of great power rivalry (and in the case of Vietnam, an enduring contest with China).

In maritime Southeast Asia, the empires and communities that arose were separated by water, and until the mass arrival of indentured Chinese (and Indian) labourers by the colonial powers, were ethnically more homogeneous. The colonial powers, on the other hand, found it easier to divide up maritime Southeast Asia among themselves. While issues of contention also arose among the post-colonial maritime states, these have generally been less rooted in historical antagonism than those among the continental states.
Admittedly, the ideological division of Southeast Asia up till 1975 was fuelled by Cold War superpower rivalry as well as China's role. The Indochina sub-region of mainland Southeast Asia became a contested arena between external powers (and their regional proxies). In contrast, in postwar maritime Southeast Asia, although the new Republic of Indonesia became increasingly anti-Western and a source of concern (and, subsequently, conflict) vis-a-vis its maritime Southeast Asian neighbours, the Americans did not see the sub-region as within its alliance obligations. But the germane issue for the non-communist regional states was not the ideological faultline; it was their vulnerability to political and socio-economic destabilization. As former Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew observed, US involvement in Vietnam over a prolonged period bought time for the other countries in Southeast Asia "to get their acts together". He felt that if the North Vietnamese had swept down to the south earlier, there could have been a momentum that would have destabilized the rest of the region at a very crucial time in its economic development.\(^27\) In this sense, the balance of power that held in mainland Southeast Asia up to 1975 -- while it saw the extinction of South Vietnam as an entity -- helped both to preserve the independence of the maritime states and to insulate them sufficiently for the purpose of consolidating their state-formation process.

2.8 **Southeast Asia 1945-75: The institutional approach**

As outlined in Chapter 1, the theoretical contributions of the institutional approach may be summarized as: institutions matter in facilitating cooperation among states. Institutions – rules that prescribe behaviour, constrain activity and shape expectations – do matter because they often mitigate international anarchy by facilitating cooperation (for example, reducing transaction costs) among self-help states. Accordingly, absolute gains prevail over relative-gain considerations. However, institutionalists agree that states will only create institutions if certain material conditions exist. These include: an environment in which states are not in endemic conflict; the benefits must outweigh the costs, otherwise there is the risk of
defection and institutional failure or irrelevance; some mechanism (or leadership role) is in place to reassure states with extant relative-gain concerns and to enforce the rules of the game (to prevent cheating).

When applied to the regional context, especially in developing regions like Southeast Asia, institutions in the form of regional organizations may be seen as playing an important role: they have the potential to suppress destructive behaviour and to encourage cooperation among states. As will be argued below, where full political and economic integration is an infeasible goal, mainly because of "non-negotiable" sovereignty and non-interference concerns, a limited form of regionalism would seem to be the realistic model.

With the outline above in mind, it is noted that there was little attempt to promote regionalism in mainland Southeast Asia during the period 1945-75 because of the endemic conflictual situation there. On the other hand, maritime Southeast Asia, together with Thailand and the Philippines, fared better after 1967, when ASEAN was created.

It will be argued below, that in the case of ASEAN, there was an effort to foster a common institutional purpose: the enhancement of national security through the management of intramural conflicts and tensions. The norms of sovereignty and non-interference by third parties were therefore upheld as cherished values. The evidence will suggest that such a common purpose, prior to ASEAN's formation, proved elusive to the earlier attempts at security-oriented regionalism. As observed earlier in this chapter, the balance of power approach portrayed an externally-imposed regional structure increasingly dependent on the US military presence, especially as the other Western powers withdrew militarily. The “two Southeast Asias” that resulted informed the various coping strategies of postwar Southeast Asian actors. The institutional approach's investigations must begin with the idea of Southeast Asia itself in order to determine if a common purpose (“Why not cooperate?”), at least among some key regional actors, was being forged.
Historians agree that prior to World War II, the idea of Southeast Asia was not widespread. The setting up of the wartime South-East Asia Command (SEAC) by the Allies is regarded as providing the first sense of coherence, if still somewhat imprecise, to the term. In the early postwar period, there was little by way of indigenous attempts at an institutional regional or sub-regional identity focused on security issues in Southeast Asia. SEATO, discussed earlier in this chapter, served extra-regional, not regional, purposes. Between 1945 and 1961, no serious effort at regional institution-building was attempted. First of all, the states which had already acquired independence were still in the process of self-absorbed state-formation or in civil war. Secondly, there existed strong mutual suspicion among these states. Thirdly, the remaining entities -- Singapore, British Borneo (the future Sabah and Sarawak) and Brunei -- were still under colonial patronage.

If institution-creation requires the creation of rules, then a learning process was required for these mutually suspicious regional states to identify and define their common interests, regulate their behaviour, and facilitate peaceful change. This section will focus on the process of forging the political will among key Southeast Asian leaders to cooperate on an intergovernmental basis as the initial premise of regional cooperation. In turn, the “rules of the game” -- “rules” of conflict-management and cooperation-facilitation including “general norms of behaviour, aspects of international law, and rules which are created by formal and informal understanding” including gentlemen's agreements and tacit understandings -- were developed.

The starting point for this exploration of the learning process was the proposal by the prime minister of Malaya, Tunku Abdul Rahman, on 27 May 1961, to create a new state, Malaysia, out of five entities. It was a strategically astute proposal because four of these entities -- Brunei, Sabah, Sarawak, and Singapore -- would have had to become vulnerable mini-states if granted separate independence. The idea of a Malaysian federation could be seen to enhance the security of neighbouring Indonesia and the Philippines. It could have been argued that Malaysia -- and the prospects were even that it would be a viable enterprise -- would have, with goodwill
from Indonesia and the Philippines, served as a security buffer for them. This would have left these two stretched archipelagic states free to deal with their own internal security and political legitimacy problems which included separatist threats.

The idea of Malaysia therefore represented a bold attempt at creating a political arrangement that would contribute to regional security. All the proposed component members expected Britain (and Australia and New Zealand) to provide much of the external security guarantee. Indeed, their primary attention was centred on containing communism and communalism (internal security issues) and attempting political accommodation among the various domestic groups.

But while Malaysia survived (albeit minus Singapore after August 1965) its proposal triggered Indonesia's Confrontation and Philippine objection to the inclusion of Sabah in the new federation. This clash of purpose, in turn, sealed the fate of an early indigenous attempt at regionalism, the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA), and exposed the impracticality of Maphilindo, a hurriedly unveiled proposal to loosely link Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia.

The contexts in which ASA (July 1961) was established and Maphilindo (August 1963) was proposed provide the clues to ASA's ultimate demise and Maphilindo's non-starter fate. First, in terms of the inter-state dimension, they were severely limited in membership (to the point of being exclusionary) and based on certain fears. ASA was ostensibly an economically-oriented grouping. But it comprised Thailand, Malaya and the Philippines, three pro-Western anti-communist countries, two of whom were members of the US-led SEATO. The third, Malaya, maintained close security ties with Britain, which was also a SEATO member. These ties were to later become formalised as the Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement. Given the prevailing situation, the interests of Indonesia and the regional states it regarded as colonial lackeys were conflictual. For Jakarta, relative gains overrode absolute gains and it had scant regard for an institution it regarded with suspicion. Indonesia felt it was the target of a pro-Western “ganging up” and labelled ASA as merely a front for SEATO.\textsuperscript{31}
Maphilindo, on the other hand, with its strong overtones of Malay-stock racial affinity, included Indonesia but excluded Thailand and if realized would have caused division within Malaysia (with its large Chinese minority). The circumstances for its proposed creation were bizarre compared with those for ASA, for it was in fact based on a fear of each other even if this was left unstated.

ASA at least claimed overtly to be an economic cooperation grouping. Thailand and Malaya had a history of bilateral cooperative endeavours along their land border while the Philippines under President Garcia was seeking a more Southeast Asian identity but remained distrustful of ideologically radical countries like Indonesia. Maphilindo, on the other hand, was a product of the discord engendered by the proposed creation of Malaysia. Its flimsy common denominator was the affinity of the majority Malay-stock peoples in all three countries. In reality, Indonesia under Sukarno saw Maphilindo as an expression of its concept of a “greater Indonesia”. It feared an economically more successful Malaysia as an alternative centre of Malay leadership. Moreover, it had separatists in Aceh who looked towards Kuala Lumpur. The Philippines under Marcos similarly feared that Muslim rebels in its southern provinces would draw inspiration from fellow Muslims in North Borneo (Sabah).

Tunku Abdul Rahman reluctantly agreed, initially, to the Maphilindo concept in the hope that it would render both Indonesia's hostility and the Philippines' Sabah claim more amenable to resolution. The Tunku's fear was that Sukarno and Marcos would otherwise find common cause in seeking to wreck Malaysia.

As it turned out, the idea of Maphilindo simply died. In institutional terms, all the players were looking only for relative gains. The mutual suspicions among Indonesia, the Philippines and Malaya/Malaysia were simply too evident. By way of illustration, Manila’s fear of Jakarta's ultimate designs was cleverly exploited by Kuala Lumpur's delegation during tripartite reconciliation talks, when it was suggested to Manila that it would be the next victim of Jakarta's irredentist ambitions. These mutual suspicions were fuelled by personality clashes. The relationships among Sukarno, Macapagal (Marcos after 1965), and the Tunku, were
uneasy and even hostile. Their foreign ministers too projected strong and often unaccommodating personalities. In contrast, the key mediating personality was Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman, who worked tirelessly in a vain attempt to keep ASA going. Thus, a key ideational (non-material) ingredient in ASEAN's success -- political will translated in practical terms into intergovernmental consultation and consensus-building -- was missing in ASA and Maphilindo. On the other hand, a key material factor, the need to reflect the distribution of power in a regional grouping -- that is, to include all the key players -- was also missing.

The lessons learnt from the failures of ASA and Maphilindo were: (1) there had to be open recognition of the existence of deep-seated mutual suspicions among subsets of Southeast Asian countries; (2) Indonesia had to be a key, and constructive, player. Peter Lyon argues that “[t]he most striking and important thing about the launching of ASEAN was Indonesia's active membership in it from the start, symbolising an end to Indonesia's Confrontation campaign and to her previous indifference to practical regionalism in Southeast Asia”; (3) the issue of regional order in the immediate and longer terms had to be addressed, that is, common denominators had to be developed towards the Indochinese countries and to the external powers. The October 1965 coup attempt in Indonesia led to the new leadership under Suharto, which provided the entry point for Indonesia into Southeast Asian regional cooperation. It also led to the ending of Confrontation and to reconciliation with Malaysia. But it remained a delicate matter for finding a mutually satisfactory way to ease Indonesia into the “club”.

2.9 ASEAN: Formative years\textsuperscript{34} and formative “rules of the game”

At first blush, it would seem that ASA (moribund but not technically dead, unlike Maphilindo) could simply be expanded to include Indonesia, and this was Malaysian PM Tunku Abdul Rahman's position. But Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik made it clear that a new organization, even if in name, was needed. Jakarta, aware of the necessity for its active participation, preferred to be a founder-member of an
altogether new body. Thai foreign minister Thanat Khoman, having successfully played mediator in the disputes among the former Maphilindo members, continued to play an active role in this regard. An initial proposal for a South-East Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (SEAARC) was rejected. Malik pressed for the new body to be named ASEAN, and it was accepted. He also approached Burma and Cambodia to join the proposed organization but was rebuffed by them.

An intriguing aspect of this lead-up to ASEAN's formation was the apparent oversight in bringing "on board" Singapore, whose relations with Malaysia were still strained in the aftermath of separation in August 1965. As Thanat Khoman, who prepared the draft charter for the proposed new body, recalled in 1992: "Within a few months, everything was ready. I therefore invited the two former ASA members, Malaysia and the Philippines, and Indonesia, a key member, to a meeting in Bangkok. In addition, Singapore sent S. Rajaratnam, then foreign minister, to see me about joining the new set-up. Although the new organization was planned to comprise only the former ASA members plus Indonesia, Singapore's request was favourably considered." For Singapore, it would have been imperative to seek membership in the new organization, for failure to be accepted would have meant being isolated. As Leifer noted: "Singapore was wedged physically between two tense bilateral relationships. Its interposing location seemed even more precarious when during early 1966 the diplomacy of reconciliation was conducted exclusively between Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur."

Two observations are pertinent at this point. First, as earlier indicated by the balance of power perspective, this critical start-up phase for ASEAN was taking shape in a relatively benign regional security environment for non-communist Southeast Asia. Maritime Southeast Asia was relatively insulated from the security dynamic in Indochina, and Thailand’s security relationship with the US was stable. Secondly, on hindsight, it was fortunate for the new grouping that neither Burma nor Cambodia elected to join it then. Clearly, membership criteria had not been carefully formulated. The political situations in Burma and Cambodia then would have proven divisive to the new grouping. On the other hand, again in hindsight it was fortunate
that Singapore recognized the danger of being isolated and thereby reintroducing instability and potential external power intervention. This initial exclusion of Singapore highlights the durability of inter-state tensions in Southeast Asia and serves as a reminder of ASEAN’s shaky start.

Fortunately, despite the intra-mural tensions and mistrust, the formative years of ASEAN -- from August 1967 till mid-1975 (when communist forces achieved military victory in Indochina) -- while eventful, led to a learning process in which rules governing behaviour and norms (elaborated below) were formulated. As summed up by Leifer, ASEAN's main attainment in this period was “institutional survival”.38

The rules that emerged were: (1) the primacy of political and economic stability in promoting national and regional security; (2) the display of political will by the governing elite especially in resolving issues (or in not resolving them, in order to avoid conflicts or disagreements); (3) adherence to the norm of territorial sovereignty, given the many bilateral disputes and lingering suspicions about aggrandisement; (4) the primacy of diplomacy in reconciling differing external threat perceptions and accommodation of links to external powers; (5) the preference for bilateral mechanisms in dealing with internal security threats; and (6) finally, the creation of a political formula (political culture), the “ASEAN way”, to serve as the conceptual basis for the association's existence and purpose.

Primacy of political and economic stability

The late K.S. Sandhu succinctly observed that ASEAN “was not founded to promote economic cooperation or political integration a la the European Economic Community, or any other similar organization, but rather to promote stability and security.”39 The qualifying reference to the then EEC's goal of supranational regionalism was crucial. The individual members' stability and security were the cherished overriding values and political integration was rejected outright as an
unnecessarily divisive concept. Economic cooperation was to be achieved cautiously, for if badly handled, was foreseen to be divisive too if perceptions of unequal benefits to the involved parties developed. In other words, the foremost economic goal was the promotion of individual member states' economic development and modernization which were also seen as the means to counter the threat of internal instability fuelled by communist, communal or religious instigations. Security was multi-faceted precisely because issues like employment and educational opportunities, poverty and corruption could be easily exploited. Stability was required both for regime maintenance and to attract foreign investments.

**Political will**

ASEAN's attempt to develop a sense of identity and common purpose was severely tested in its early years by intramural issues. In addition to territorial and economic issues affecting bilateral relations, “the communal and religious dimensions have added a publicly subdued emotional undercurrent”.40 Two examples will be highlighted: the so-called Corregedor incident to illustrate the failure of political will; and the hanging of two Indonesian marines by Singapore to illustrate how leadership restraint averted a major crisis.

In March 1968, barely eight months after Philippine-Malaysian relations were reestablished at the ambassadorial level, the Corregedor incident erupted. Manila newspapers carried reports that a secret army recruited from Filipino Muslims was undergoing training on Corregedor island with Sabah as the invasion target. Congressional investigations did not establish government involvement but, following an exchange of notes between Kuala Lumpur and Manila, it became clear that the Marcos government was keen to keep its Sabah claim alive.41 The two countries' relations progressively deteriorated. ASEAN meetings were disrupted because Philippine representatives were instructed to introduce a reservation on the Sabah claim each time, in effect forcing Malaysian representatives to stay away.
Relations between the two sides were resumed only in December 1969, after much diplomatic cajoling by the other ASEAN members. Neither side benefited from the episode and ASEAN's cohesion was severely tested.

In contrast, President Suharto played a critical role in defusing a potential crisis when Singapore hanged two captured Indonesian marines in October 1968. The two men had been convicted earlier of terrorist bombings during Confrontation and had exhausted further appeals under due processes of law. President Suharto then made a personal appeal for clemency, and was supported by Malaysian Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman. But Singapore, in existence as a sovereign state for only three years, felt that the rule of its law had to stand. The executions led to the sacking of the Singapore embassy in Jakarta by angry Indonesians. There were demands for economic sanctions and other retaliatory measures and even punitive military action. The Chinese community in Jakarta was not spared the wrath of angry mobs, revealing an early sign that actions taken by Chinese-majority Singapore for non-racial reasons could always be exploited by extremists in neighbouring countries.

President Suharto, despite a deeply felt sense of being slighted, played the restrained statesman. Through his foreign minister Adam Malik, he made it known that the issue would not stand in the way of the two countries' improving bilateral relationship. In May 1973, when Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew went on his first official visit to Jakarta, he made a personal gesture of visiting the two marines' graves in the Kalibata heroes' cemetery. Leifer sums up the positive spillover of the events till May 1973 thus:

It was only by that time that the government of Singapore had come to appreciate fully the seriousness of President Suharto's personal commitment to ASEAN and regional co-operation. That commitment has since been recognized as of fundamental importance to the security of the island-state. As a consequence, Lee Kuan Yew has taken great pains to cultivate a close personal relationship with President Suharto.

*Territorial sovereignty*
The two examples above also illustrate the emotional element in issues involving territorial sovereignty. Both the Philippines and Malaysia were prepared in 1967 to put at risk their intra-ASEAN relationship because the Sabah territorial issue was enmeshed in domestic politics which in turn could threaten the political survival of the respective ruling elites. Singapore, at the time of the 1968 affair, was still uncertain about Indonesian goodwill towards it. Singapore decided to carry out the hanging of the marines to symbolize its jurisdiction over its sovereign territory, and it has continued to uphold zealously its sovereignty as a hallmark. In this sense, these two “tests” illustrate that ASEAN regional cooperation then was still at the beginning of the learning curve, with all the attendant fits and starts.

*External threat perceptions and external powers*

The distinctively bipolar situation in Cold War Europe was conceptually easier for the balance of power and institutional approaches to handle. There was sufficient convergence within blocs about the overall threat perception (at least among the ruling elites) and the two competing socio-economic systems reinforced bloc differences. However, the five founding members of ASEAN found they had to develop “agree to disagree” rules on their differentiated and nuanced external threat perceptions and foreign policy orientations -- in an agreeable manner, if they were to preserve a cohesive international image. The discussion below highlights the differentiated perspectives, and helps explain ASEAN’s particular approach to the process of institution-creation, embedded as it were, with balance of power concerns.

ASEAN political leaders recognized early on -- and no doubt profiting from the experiences of ASA, Maphilindo and the period of Confrontation which saw Malaysia's reliance on external military support vindicated -- that they did not have a common strategic perspective vis-a-vis external powers or the Indochinese states. This led to a disavowal of an intra-mural military alliance and an emphasis instead on security cooperation centred on intelligence exchanges and border security
matters, and framed within a bilateral and non-ASEAN basis. (However, apart from Indonesia, the other four founding ASEAN members had security arrangements with external powers.) In any case, until the dramatic events of 1975 in Indochina, the sense of urgency of any external threat to ASEAN members other than to Thailand was lacking. Indeed, even Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia in 1978-79 caused some intra-mural strains as ASEAN attempted to forge a united front in support of Thailand.

**INDONESIA:** Indonesia was highly critical of ASA when the grouping was set up in July 1961 because by then Jakarta's external orientation under Sukarno had been decidedly anti-Western. The three ASA members -- Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines -- had defence arrangements with either the United States or Britain. By the time ASEAN was realized, the Indonesian external orientation had changed. It should be emphasised, however, that it would be incorrect to depict this as pro-Western. Suharto, like Sukarno but without the penchant for grandstanding, felt that Indonesia's external interests were best served by nonalignment. But he was pragmatic and accommodated his ASEAN partners' desire to have a continued Western military presence in the region. He was also shrewd and knew that such a presence contributed to regional stability and hence to the region's ability to attract Western and Japanese investment capital.

Because of the 1965 coup attempt, the Suharto administration began to identify China as the main external threat and the local Chinese population as potential fifth columnists for Beijing. As for Vietnam, Indonesian leaders have always felt a special affinity with it on account of their revolutionary backgrounds. Without the background of a historic rivalry or the salience of proximity, Vietnam was not regarded as a major external threat.

**MALAYSIA:** Peninsular Malaysia's experiences also shaped the Malay-majority ruling elite's external threat perceptions in the period up to 1975. Three years after the Japanese surrender in 1945, the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) went into the Malayan jungles and launched a guerilla campaign -- referred to as the Emergency --
against the British administration. The party was largely Chinese-based and was backed (but with no great enthusiasm) by communist China. The CPM ultimately failed to win support among the majority of the local Chinese (about 33 per cent of the population) and the Emergency was declared over in 1960, three years after Malaya gained its independence. Remnants of the CPM guerillas were chased north to languish along the Thai border.

As in post-1965 Indonesia, communist China was viewed as a source of support for the local communists, and hence a threat to both internal and external security. With the formation of Malaysia in 1963, Kuala Lumpur sought a continued British military presence. This British commitment was to prove useful when a regional power, Indonesia, launched its Confrontation campaign in January 1963.

The British announcement in January 1968 of an accelerated timetable for military disengagement "east of Suez" (first announced in 1967) followed by US President Nixon's Guam Doctrine of July 1969 provoked a reassessment of the regional security environment among all the ASEAN members. For Malaysia, it led the Tunku to revive an earlier idea and invite Britain, Australia, New Zealand and Singapore to a conference to discuss regional security. After a series of meetings over the next three years, the Five Power Defence Arrangements was formalised on 1 November 1971. A shift in Malaysia's external orientation, however, became apparent after Tun Abdul Razak took over the leadership helm from the Tunku in the aftermath of the May 1969 Malay-Chinese racial riots. Tun Razak began to explore the idea of the neutralisation of Southeast Asia.

Although in 1971, the Malaysian proposal for a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) was endorsed by the other four ASEAN members, the behind-the-scenes negotiations resulted in a document that was imprecise. On the one hand, the continuation of the presence of "temporary" foreign bases was left unchallenged, satisfying the Philippines (and Singapore, which actively sought a continued American military presence); on the other hand, Indonesian fears that the Malaysian initiative would give legitimacy to Chinese entry into the region were assuaged by
ZOPFAN's emphasis on neutrality, and not neutralisation (Tun Razak's original idea) which would have required external power guarantees. Nevertheless, ZOPFAN symbolized Malaysia's higher profile in the region as well as a more "equidistant" foreign policy while remaining wary of communist regimes.

SINGAPORE: Until Brunei joined ASEAN in January 1984, Singapore was the sole mini-state in the grouping. Separated from Malaysia in August 1965 and with hardly any defence forces, it quite understandably was preoccupied with ensuring its survival. Its economic outlook in 1965 was bleak.

On one hand, an attitude developed among its leaders that it was always potentially vulnerable to external threats. Bilveer Singh suggests that at least five elements influenced this leadership perception, viz. geography, demography, economy (near total dependence on world trade), strategic environment and leadership experience. Moreover, its early attempt to solicit help from "friendly" countries like India and Egypt to build up its defence forces from scratch was rebuffed because they did not want to offend Malaysia. This imprinted in the leadership's mindset a strongly realist outlook. Malaysian tardiness in vacating its military camps in Singapore and Kuala Lumpur's apparent expectation that Singapore would, in short time, find it necessary (because of anticipated economic problems) to seek a political reunion on Malaysia's terms, reinforced this outlook.

On the other hand, this unfavourable start to nationhood imbued a "can-do, must-do-or-die" attitude in defining vital interests. Israel's offer of help in building up the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) was welcomed, and diplomatic isolation in the run-up to ASEAN's formation was averted by literally demanding a role as a founder-member. Economic vulnerability was tackled by a combination of economic and foreign policies that encouraged Western multinational corporations (MNCs) to invest in Singapore. It began to devise a deterrent-oriented defence doctrine and espoused a balance of power among the external powers, to act as a restraint on any over-ambitious regional state. In sum, from the start, the economic dimension of national survival was understood and Singapore's solution was to embark on making
itself relevant to investors and markets outside its own region. The immediate military threat perception was the sense of being a Chinese-majority island in a Malay sea and the solution was to develop a deterrent posture while encouraging a balance of power favourable to Singapore's interests. In practice, this became a policy of cautious support (in the period under review) for an American military presence as Britain embarked on its military withdrawal.

**THAILAND:** Alone among the ASEAN members, Thailand has never been colonized by the Western powers. But its history of rivalries with Burma and the empires of pre-French Indochina, as well as an acute sensitivity to China's shadow, have imbued it with an ability to respond with alacrity to changes in its regional security environment. Thailand's strategic perspective was that of a balance of power and it was prepared to align itself with a preponderant friendly power. This inclination, and a fear of communism, led Thailand to seek the protection of the United States and to join in Washington's efforts to contain communism. Thailand dispatched troops to fight the communist north in the Korean War (1950-53), joined the Manila Pact (September 1954), and concluded the Rusk-Thanat Agreement (1962), which affirmed that the US would defend Thailand with or without the concurrence of the other SEATO signatories. By 1967, assessing that the security buffers on its northern and eastern borders provided by Laos and Cambodia respectively were being increasingly threatened by North Vietnam, which was backed by the Soviet Union and China, Thailand dispatched troops to fight alongside US troops in South Vietnam and the border areas. Still, throughout this period, Thai leaders were confident that the Indochina conflicts did not seriously threaten Thai national security.

However, from 1969, a series of developments -- the Guam Doctrine, the winding down of the Vietnam war as American troop withdrawals speeded up, Sino-American rapprochement amid Sino-Soviet estrangement, and finally the communist victories in South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos in 1975 -- once again led Thailand to put emphasis on the Vietnamese threat above all else. Thailand became ASEAN's "frontline state", deriving diplomatic support from its fellow members and somewhat
desultory military support from the United States. China came to play an increasing role as Thailand's anti-Vietnamese coalition partner and as arms supplier to the Thai military forces, raising disquiet among ASEAN members wary of China's long-term threat to the region.50

THE PHILIPPINES: Maritime insulation and the protection against external threats ensured by the 1951 US-Philippine Mutual Defence Treaty as well as the 1954 Manila Pact (which resulted in SEATO), meant that the postwar Philippines could afford to deal primarily with its internal security threat. This comprised a Luzon-centred Maoist communist insurgency (which, however, drew no support from the relatively small ethnic-Chinese community) and a Muslim separatist movement in the southern islands. Thus, pre-1975 Philippines shared little of the strategic concerns about either North Vietnam or China displayed by its ASEAN partners. Nevertheless, as noted earlier, Philippine political leaders saw communism as a global threat which had to be resisted at the regional level. In this vein, Manila in 1966 committed a 2,000-man civic action group in support of the US war effort in Vietnam. Like Thailand, however, the realization of impending American retreat from Indochina after 1969 prompted the Philippines to gradually adopt a more realpolitik foreign policy towards the US and towards communist China. Sino-Philippine diplomatic links were established in June 1975.51

Internal threats and border security cooperation

While ASEAN members developed a particular approach to external security concerns that did not necessarily accord with institutional assumptions, they paid special attention to their internal security needs which accords with institutional expectations. The norm of non-interference meant that ASEAN members did not challenge the legitimacy of their counterpart governing elites’ right to define internal security issues, especially with regards to separatist issues. At the same time, the norm of reciprocity was more pro-actively invoked: ASEAN members were obliged to cooperate bilaterally on issues like border security. ASEAN member governments
were in effect “institutionalising” each other’s internal legitimacy.

Thus, during the early years of ASEAN, the setting for expanded bilateral security cooperation against internal threats was being gingerly laid. The underlying basis for this endeavour was re-assurance, that is, an ASEAN member will not allow its territory to be used as sanctuary by another's insurgents, dissidents and communalist elements. Border security cooperation against communist guerillas bore the most fruit, provided that territorial sovereignty was respected, in letter if not always in spirit.

Why did ASEAN evolve this internal security practice? Seen in context, a major concern of maritime Southeast Asia -- Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore -- remained one of “intramural” confidence-building in overcoming mutual suspicions of each other. Just as salient for the ASEAN members was that they were still facing internal threats: four of the five states (Singapore excepted) still faced communist insurgents. In Singapore, the PAP government's tough internal security laws sought to isolate both pro-communist and communalist elements.\(^{52}\)

In addition, three ASEAN members faced the threat of secession in varying intensity. Indonesia faced secessionist threats in Aceh and the Moluccas; Thailand in its four southern provinces as a consequence of its unassimilated Malay community on the Thai-Malaysian border; the Philippines had its Moro Muslim problem. The Malaysian federal government did not face an overt threat of secession from Sabah and Sarawak but federal-state tensions existed. In addition, bilateral intra-ASEAN border tensions periodically surfaced. For example, Thailand was suspicious of sympathy shown by some Malaysian elites (especially in the northern states of Kedah and Kelantan) towards Muslim separatists in southern Thailand. Aceh irredentists in Indonesia still looked to Malaysia for inspiration.

As part of the intramural confidence building process, border security cooperation has also been institutionalized. Indeed, even before ASEAN was established, there has been a history of border cooperation between Thailand and Malaya (Malaysia
after 1963). The early recognition of internal security problems arising from porous borders led the Thai government and the British colonial government in Malaya to conclude their first border agreement in 1951, within three years of the Emergency. The delicate issue of territorial sovereignty was resolved by mutual agreement not to permit hot pursuit. Upon independence in 1957, the Malayan government continued with this practice. In 1965, the Malaysian and Thai governments set up a high-level General Border Committee (GBC) with the two defence ministers as co-chairmen. This GBC has since served as the model for bilateral ASEAN border security cooperation, reflecting a consensus that there was a common threat to national security and regime maintenance from the individual members' insurgency problems. The continuing important role of the GBC in Thai-Malaysian security cooperation, as well as in Indonesian-Malaysian security cooperation, was recently reiterated by a senior Malaysian Defence Ministry official.

Following the formation of ASEAN, and despite the obstacles to greater collaboration arising from past and current suspicions, a number of other bilateral border or maritime cooperation pacts were signed between ASEAN members. A 1972 agreement between Kuala Lumpur and Jakarta created a joint border committee tasked to primarily eliminate the communist insurgents on their common land and sea borders in the Sarawak-Kalimantan area. Again, neither side was allowed border-crossing privileges. On at least two counts, the Malaysian-Indonesian pact was less politically sensitive than the Malaysian-Thailand accord: the military-led Suharto government was as eager as Kuala Lumpur was to crack down on communist insurgents and their supporters; secondly, the small number of terrorists on the Sarawak-Kalimantan border was more a nuisance than a threat. Singapore and Indonesia agreed in 1974 to patrol jointly their littoral waters to curb smuggling activities; a year later, the Philippines and Indonesia also signed a joint sea patrol agreement denying sanctuary to smugglers.

*ASEAN's political formula*
If, as the foregoing sections have shown, ASEAN's viability was fragile from the beginning, cohesion-building had to begin as an immediate task. But the Sabah dispute emerged soon after ASEAN's formation and especially took its toll on Philippine-Malaysian relations. Moreover, the memory of Indonesia's Confrontation lingered. Yet ASEAN survived. With the benefit of hindsight, the “operating” basis that emerged eventually for cohesion-building was what Estrella Solidum calls "ASEAN's political formula". From the institutional perspective, this can be regarded as a set of principles which serves to:

(i) provide the reasons for ASEAN's existence;
(ii) define the nature of relationships not only among the member states but also with other states and with other international organizations; and
(iii) provide directions for various types of action which members may take on issues and situations.

This political formula connects the other elements of the ASEAN character -- primacy of stability, political will, territorial integrity and threat perceptions -- discussed above. The institutional foundation is reflected in generally accepted principles derived especially from the UN Charter, the Bandung Declaration and the ASA Declaration. These were, inter alia, respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, peaceful settlement of disputes, and non-interference in the affairs of other states. Institutional flexibility is reflected in some more protean principles such as the "temporary status" of foreign military bases first enunciated in the Manila Agreements of 1963 establishing the short-lived Maphilindo.

ASA and Maphilindo were regional initiatives which attempted but failed miserably to foster "good neighbourliness, active cooperation, friendly consultations and mutual assistance, Asian solutions for Asian problems, primary responsibility for the stability and security of the region, and musyawarah or regular consultations for consensus-making". ASEAN itself did not always measure up to these attributes cited by Solidum. But one difference was, as noted earlier, Indonesia's embrace of
regionalism. The 1965 failed PKI coup coupled with the emergence of the reform-oriented New Order government led by General Suharto and its decision to end Confrontation provided one of the necessary (if not sufficient) ingredients which enabled ASEAN to have a fair chance of succeeding where ASA had failed. Prior to ASEAN’s formation, Indonesia and the Philippines had joined in opposition to the idea of Malaysia. In contrast, soon after ASEAN was formed, the Philippines was in effect isolated when it attempted to pursue again its divisive Sabah claim. This time, Indonesia played the "good ASEAN citizen".

Finally, as part of the process of shaping its rules of the game, ASEAN began developing codewords designed to encapsulate common values (or at least non-contentious values) as well as to accommodate differences. Codewords among members of a grouping are indicative of "the language of their empathy and rapport". Antolik notes that the Indonesian concept of "national resilience" is perhaps the best-known ASEAN codeword. The sum of the parts becomes "regional resilience". By 1972, ASEAN foreign ministers were ready to endorse these two concepts in their joint communique which highlighted the necessity "for member countries to develop national resilience which would enable them to face present changes and challenges of the future with greater confidence". National resilience becomes the building block for regional resilience. According to this reasoning, if each ASEAN member can accomplish an overall national development and overcome internal threats, regional resilience will automatically result. This idea -- rather than a defined external threat -- is used to explain the ASEAN states' bilateral cooperation on a number of matters, including defence and security. Thus these two concepts' ready appeal derives from their emphasis on non-interference by ASEAN members in each other's affairs while at the same time the idea of interdependence is reinforced.

Thus, the five founding ASEAN members in the period reviewed went through a learning curve in their quest to live together and, more importantly, to get into the "habit of working together". To the extent that regional cooperation during the period reviewed was seen as a strategy compatible with regime security goals, then it
met at least the minimum expectations of the parties concerned. These goals included internal security, political stability, the primacy of state sovereignty (a concern especially of the smaller states) and some notion of regional influence and/or leadership among some of the states.

But the limitations of Southeast Asian regionalism were also evident, at least in the period under review. It would not be incorrect to suggest that all the attempts at regional groupings among Southeast Asian states since 1945 involved certain realist fears, even if left unstated. These fears were of inter-state spillover of domestic conflicts; of foreign subversion through local proxies; and of the consequences of changes in the regional and global environment. Former Singapore foreign minister, S. Rajaratnam, one of the only two surviving signatories of the 1967 ASEAN Declaration, wrote in 1992 that:

As a student of history, I believe that it is not common ideals but common fears that generally hold groups and nations together. The moment the common fears disappear, the brotherhood becomes an arena for dissension, conflict and even bloodshed.

More positively, but still in a cautionary vein, Hans Indorf points out that ASEAN's interest is a compound of national interests and that:

member states project and preserve their national interests regardless of common bonds stipulated under the umbrella of a regional organization. Although not consciously admitted, the emphasis is upon intergovernmentalism in which national interests converge only coincidentally, and felicitously, with regional objectives.

2.10 Conclusion

This chapter’s purpose was to highlight the useful and complementary insights of both the balance of power and institutional approaches in examining the dynamics of security in postwar Southeast Asia between 1945 and 1975. Certainly, the Cold War balance of power and its effects on the region were a major preoccupation of both regional and external powers. Where it was in their interests to do so, both the major
powers and the regional states resorted to balancing behaviour. Survival was highly salient in the interaction of major power and regional power rivalries. But, clearly, threat perceptions were sufficiently varied to affect the degree of security interdependence between mainland and maritime Southeast Asia.

For the institutional approach, too, where it was in their interests to do so, regional states created institutions to foster iterative cooperation. This was not an easy task in a post-colonial developing region like Southeast Asia, as evidenced by the failure of ASA. But the rules of the game that ASEAN developed in this formative period maintained, over time, a momentum that generated a balance of benefits over costs. In this respect, ASEAN in this period held the promise that institutions do matter where the political will exists to harness them for the intended purposes: to identify and define mutual interests, to shape behaviour and norms, and to facilitate peaceful change. However, the limitations of intergovernmental regionalism were also evident. For example, cooperation was limited to the lowest common denominator basis. There was thus hardly any meaningful economic cooperation on an ASEAN basis during this period.

ENDNOTES


2 Paul Dibb, A New Balance of Power in Asia, public lecture at the Australian National University, 3 November 1994.

3 See, for example, “Japan may trade power for profit... an enlarged ASEAN will force a new balance between Japan and South-East Asia,” Straits Times, 1 July 1996.


This theme is explored by various contributors in Donald E. Weatherbee, ed., *Southeast Asia Divided: The ASEAN-Indochina Crisis* (Boulder, CO.: Westview Press, 1985).

East Asia is usually understood to comprise Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia. Some writers treat Northeast Asia and East Asia as identical, but this merely creates confusion.


The First Indochina War, involving principally France as the external power and North Vietnam as the local power, lasted from 1946-54, when French forces fell at Dien Bien Phu. The Second Indochina War, from 1954-1975, saw the pullout of French forces (after the 1954 Geneva Accords) and their replacement by the Americans, whose troop numbers rose to a peak of half a million in 1965. In this war, Laos and Cambodia became hapless participants. The Third Indochina War (1978-89) began with Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia and ended with the pullout of its occupation troops.


See, for example, Charles E. Morrison and Astri Suhrke, *Strategies of Survival: The Foreign Policy Dilemmas of Smaller Asian States* (St Lucia, Queensland: University of Queensland Press, 1978).


They were both given Associated State status within the French Union in 1949. In 1953, the Royal Kingdom of Cambodia gained independence. It became the Khmer Republic after the pro-American General Lon Nol staged a military coup and deposed Prince Norodom Sihanouk in 1970. In 1975, the new Chinese-backed Khmer Rouge regime renamed it Democratic Kampuchea; four years later, the Vietnamese-installed Heng Samrin regime
called it the People's Republic of Kampuchea. Since 1989, it reverted to the name Cambodia.


Laos became independent in 1953. But leftwing nationalists, who had earlier refused to recognize the country's status as a constitutional monarchy within the French Union, formed the Pathet Lao to fight the French and Royal government. Laos emerged from the 1954 Geneva conference with a coalition government comprising the pro-Thai Royalists, the pro-Vietnamese Pathet Lao, and a weak neutralist faction. A brief period of neutralization by international guarantee resulted from the 1962 Geneva accord. But factional fighting resumed until the Pathet Lao victory in 1975 established the Lao People's Democratic Republic. Yong Mun Cheong, “The Political Structures of the Independent States,” in *ibid.*, pp 402-406.


20For a succinct account of Thailand's initial enthusiasm for SEATO as an expression of the American security connection, and Bangkok's subsequent disillusionment, see Morrison and Suhrke, *op. cit.*, pp 113-118.

21*ibid.*, p. 233.

22*ibid.*, p. 239.


26For the purpose of this study, mainland Southeast Asia refers to Burma (Myanmar), Thailand, Vietnam (North and South Vietnam before 1975), Laos and Cambodia. Maritime Southeast Asia refers to Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei and the Philippines.


28See, for example, Donald K. Emmerson, “‘Southeast Asia’: What's in a Name?” *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, XV (1), March 1984, pp 1-21.


32 ibid., p. 73.


34 An extensive literature on ASEAN has been built up. Among the text cited in this study are: K.S. Sandhu *et al.*, compilers, *The ASEAN Reader* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1992); Alison Broinowski, ed., *Understanding ASEAN* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982); Arnfinn Jorgensen-Dahl, *Regional Organization and Order in Southeast Asia* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982); and Michael Leifer, *ASEAN and the Security of South-East Asia* (London: Routledge, 1989).


38 ibid., p. 52.


42 The issue was in effect “a legacy of Confrontation”. Leifer, *ASEAN and the Security of South-East Asia, op. cit.*, p. 39.


44 For a summarized account of former ambassador Lee Khoon Choy's role in the behind-the-scenes developments leading to Mr Lee Kuan Yew's first state visit to Indonesia, see the "Introduction" to his *Diplomacy of a Tiny State, 2nd ed.* (Singapore: World Scientific, 1993), pp. 1-30.


48 See, for example, Lee Khoon Choy, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

49 Leifer, *ASEAN and the Security of South-East Asia, op. cit.*, p. 78.
For more details of the points covered in this sub-section, see Morrison and Suhrke, *op. cit.*, pp 113-41.


For a discussion of Thai-Malaysian border cooperation based on the General Border Committee (GBC), see B.A. Hamzah, “ASEAN Military Cooperation Without Pact or Threat”, *Asia Pacific Community*, No. 22, Fall 1983, pp 33-47.

Interview in Kuala Lumpur, 16 December 1994.


*ibid.*


*ibid.*, p.126.

*ibid.*, p.134.


*ibid.*, p. 98.

Other codewords include *mufakat* (consensus) and *musyawarah* (consultation).

Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew’s address to the 15th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Singapore, 14 June, 1982.

Thanat Khoman, Thai Foreign Minister when ASEAN was established in August 1967, is the other surviving signatory of the ASEAN Declaration.


Hans H. Indorf, *op. cit.*, p. 82.
CHAPTER 3

THE SOUTHEAST ASIAN SECURITY COMPLEX

3.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter, the balance of power approach depicted the Cold War rivalry among the major powers engaged in a divided Southeast Asia. In this view, the material fact of great power rivalry led to US commitment of troops into mainland Southeast Asia. The regional dynamic, however, was not always consistent with systemic-level balance of power expectations. This raises the question of whether a highly segregated region like Southeast Asia could be viewed with the degree of coherence assumed by the balance of power approach. Also, given the approach’s structural bias, changes in institutional interests and inter-subjective understandings were not adequately explored. The institutional approach, by arguing that states can benefit from cooperation through mutually agreed rules, examined institutional developments and the conditions which enabled non-communist ASEAN to meet its members’ minimum expectations and to thereby survive institutionally. But the approach, like balance of power, also takes a structural view and similarly treats states as behaving alike. It too fails to address situations where the intense dynamic at sub-regional levels prevails.

In this chapter, the security complex framework is deployed as a corrective complementary device. While it is not generative in the sense of having predictive value, it may provide ex post facto accounts and explanations of state behaviour in circumstances where local dynamics impact on balance of power and institutional situations. In the first part, the security complex will address the question of the coherence of the region, between 1945 and 1975, for analytical purposes. As proposed in Chapter 1, the idea of the security complex is useful to identify and highlight the security dynamics at the regional and local levels and the changes that have transpired. It will seek to link the structural distribution of power (and its
effects) to local patterns of amity and enmity generated at the regional and sub-regional levels. The security complex emphasizes security interdependence among sets of regional states without ignoring the importance of the major powers’ role in shaping regional security dynamics. It is further argued below that “disaggregating” the Southeast Asian security complex into smaller, overlapping, clusters will draw out important aspects of security interdependence which even the aggregate complex may miss.\(^1\) It should be made clear here that both the ideas of security complexes and security sub-complexes are the scholar’s tools for theoretically identifying grids within which clusters of security-interdependent countries are linked for purposes of analysis.

Following this exercise, the second part of the chapter will deploy the security complex to conduct, as a case study of intra-ASEAN security concerns, a detailed examination of the maritime sub-complex over an extended period of time.

3.2 Southeast Asia 1945-75: The security complex’s analysis

As outlined in Chapter 1, a security complex is identified by (1) the distribution of power among regional states and external powers; and (2) the patterns of amity, trust and cooperation and patterns of enmity, fear and rivalry, among regional states. These local states form clusters of security interdependence. It should be reiterated here that both power distributions and amity/enmity patterns interact to produce perceptions of security and insecurity. Hence, two mutually hostile regional states may seek recourse to various material means to prevent each other’s military preponderance. Having said that, the underlying bases for their actions and behaviour usually stem from the extant amity/enmity patterns shaped especially by history and culture.

In the case of Southeast Asia, these historical and cultural legacies have resulted in a number of enduring rivalries, especially in mainland Southeast Asia. For example, Thailand has had a precolonial history of conflictual relations with the Indochinese
states and Burma. Ethnic and cultural differences were embedded in these disputes. In precolonial maritime Southeast Asia, conflicts were usually between rival empires. The colonial period in Southeast Asia altered the demographic landscape and imposed administrative boundaries that, in the postwar years, created border (land and maritime) disputes, transborder ethnic communities and communal politics. Because of the chequered history of the region, historical rivalries and mutual suspicions remained relevant upon independence and the process of state-formation.

The sections that follow will first outline Southeast Asia's division into two components during the Cold War; a regional security complex is then sketched. Finally, with the view to further refining the approach, the aggregate (overall) complex will be disaggregated to draw out smaller sets of security dynamics not readily apparent in the overall complex.

Like the balance of power approach, the security complex depicts postwar Southeast Asia between 1945 and 1975 as increasingly divided -- as the Cold War intensified -- into two components. In mainland Southeast Asia, a conflict formation (a region in which conflictual inter-state relations dominate) developed from the start, centred on North Vietnam's regional ambitions. Strong patterns of enmity, a consequence of geopolitics, history and culture, existed among all the mainland states but the most intense rivalries were those between communist North Vietnam and South Vietnam; and between North Vietnam and Thailand (with Laos and Cambodia as their battleground). The rivalries of the three key external powers -- the US, the Soviet Union, and China -- complemented the rivalries of the regional states. In maritime Southeast Asia, a conflict formation developed between 1963 and 1966, the period when Indonesia launched Confrontation against the new Federation of Malaysia. Importantly, external power rivalry was less intense in this sub-region; instead, Britain (and its allies Australia and New Zealand) played the major external power role. By 1967, with the creation of ASEAN, Southeast Asia may be said to have been clearly divided into a communist component and a non-communist component, each suspicious of the other. Both components were backed by external powers. More
accurately, members of both components forged (in varying degrees of formality) security arrangements with external powers.

Thus, in sketching the Southeast Asian security complex, apart from structural distribution of power concerns, it is possible to identify a subtler dynamic resulting from durable patterns of amity and enmity generated by inter-state relations. These amity/enmity patterns also affect the possibility for institution-building. In the case of mainland Southeast Asia, strong patterns of enmity and survival concerns precluded the emergence of institutions. In contrast, early attempts at institution-creation had occurred among several of the region’s non-communist countries, including Thailand. Moreover, once Confrontation had ended, ASEAN emerged as a new institution with the aim of managing intramural relations more peacefully. Such a process of transforming patterns of enmity towards amity will be discussed in a later section. For now, the purpose is to point out the contrasting developments in the two components.

Mainland Southeast Asia remained mired in conflict whereas, after 1967, the five countries which founded ASEAN recognized the existence of intramural security concerns and sought to mitigate them. For example, member states adopted the norm of not identifying neighbouring states as threats but used the institutional setting to simultaneously engage in discreet balancing and confidence-building. The fledgling ASEAN provided its members with a sense of group purpose (which its predecessor ASA failed to achieve), and they developed intra-mural patterns of amity, or at least patterns of incipient amity where enmity and suspicion previously existed. At the formative stage, a durable ASEAN political identity had not been forged yet, but the incipient sense of purpose was a positive development which stood out in contrast to the experience of the non-ASEAN states of Southeast Asia.

Nevertheless, the existence of two ostensibly Cold War ideological components within the Southeast Asian security complex did not override state-to-state insecurities within each component; neither were there uniform threat perceptions with regards to regional and external powers. Illustratively, to go somewhat beyond
the period reviewed in this chapter, if a simple balance of power were the *overriding* concern of ASEAN members after the communist victories in Indochina in 1975, it would have been reflected in a convergence of threat perceptions and renewed efforts to seek countervailing power. It took the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in late 1978 to persuade the ASEAN members which saw Vietnam as a buffer against China to "harden" their stance towards Hanoi. On the other hand, the real extent of their individual military weakness was also revealed. As B.A. Hamzah put it eloquently:

> All the excuses that the ASEAN countries needed could be found in the [Cambodian] conflict and yet ASEAN could not agree on a pact. Why? Because under closer analysis, despite all [the] rhetoric, there are real differences in threat perceptions and ASEAN knew all along that it could not confront Vietnam militarily.²

To conclude this section, it should be said that the situation in intra-ASEAN relations represented a sometimes uneasy compact of sorts. Post-Confrontation Indonesia played a low-keyed reassurance role in the early years when mutual suspicions (vis-a-vis Malaysia and Singapore) were still strong. But at least non-communist Southeast Asia had moved away from being a conflict formation. In contrast, the non-ASEAN component of the Southeast Asian security complex remained a conflict formation from 1946, when French troops sought to reassert colonial control, till 1989, when reunited Vietnam finally pulled its troops out of Cambodia. The security dynamic among the Indochinese states was especially complicated.³ Since 1945, North Vietnam had dominated Indochinese security relations but was strenuously resisted by South Vietnam, Cambodia and, if less strenuously, by Laos. By 1975, South Vietnam ceased to exist; Laos after 1975 had no choice but to acquiesce in a client relationship with Vietnam⁴ -- until the Soviet Union began in the late 1980s, under Mikhail Gorbachev, to cut back on its financial assistance to Vietnam and Laos, and hence diminishing its influence in Indochina.⁵ Cambodia was in even less control of its destiny throughout the Cold War.⁶ Perhaps more so than in the case of Laos, Cambodia deeply feared Vietnam's hegemonic and territorial ambitions. Thus, the end of the Second Indochinese War in 1975 led the Khmer Rouge to rebuff Vietnamese overtures.
3.3 Towards a more complex Southeast Asia (1945-75)

The preceding section's outline of the Southeast Asian security complex during the Cold War provides a broad picture of the region's security environment. But its aggregate sweep only gives glimpses of the mixed patterns of amity and enmity generated within and across communist and non-communist Southeast Asia. Thailand, for example, has more intense security relations with the Indochinese states than with most of its ASEAN partners despite its crucial role as ASEAN's so-called “frontline” state. Moreover, in terms of the overall complex, Burma (Myanmar) during the Cold War was merely a buffer state between the Southeast Asian and South Asian complexes; such a depiction fails to capture that state's enduring security interdependence with Thailand. The Philippines' colonial history had insulated it from much of the rest of Southeast Asia but it felt, from the postwar years, that it could no longer afford to be isolated.7

The basic approach of defining a Southeast Asian security complex is sound but its description of the region's security dynamics can be improved by what Muthiah Alagappa calls “disaggregation” into sub-complexes. As originally developed by Barry Buzan, the Southeast Asian security complex was driven by postwar/Cold War security concerns. However, smaller aggregations that cut across the Cold War divide, with some degree of overlap, are identifiable.

Alagappa has suggested that the Cold War tendency to ascribe greater coherence than justified to Southeast Asia could be due to: (1) the proxy use of the region by the major powers to carry out their rivalries and conflicts, thus diverting away attention from the dynamics of Southeast Asia's many intra-regional conflicts; (2) the chronic Indochina wars which similarly focused greater attention on the mainland's security dynamic; (3) the ready acceptance of Southeast Asia as a coherent unit for analysis and policy. The result of these several factors was “to further mask the fact that Southeast Asia is composed of a number of sub-regions, each with its own
3.4 The core and non-core sub-regions

Michael Antolik, in his analysis of the ASEAN phenomenon, divided what he calls the grouping’s “security interconnections” into three components: a core comprising Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore; a western flank comprising Thailand and its bilateral links with Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore respectively; and an eastern flank comprising Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines and Brunei. Finally, Antolik observes a shared security concern of the two smallest ASEAN states, Singapore and Brunei, since 1984 (when newly-independent Brunei joined ASEAN) but does not flesh this out adequately. His categorization establishes two ideas which will be used in this study: the notion of overlap, that is, a regional state may find itself in different sets of security interconnections; and the identification of a core ASEAN membership.

Alagappa identifies a similar core “insular ASEAN” security sub-complex which however includes Brunei; and a core Indochinese sub-complex which includes Thailand. He identifies three other sub-complexes, two of which are essentially bilateral in nature: Thai-Burmese, Thai-Malaysian and Philippine-Malaysia-Indonesian. He also identifies a maritime security complex centred on the security of the South China Sea waterways. It is, however, doubtful whether South China Sea security issues can be usefully examined in security complex terms.

Following the categorizations by Antolik and Alagappa, the notion of core sub-complexes of security interdependence requires closer examination. Until the formation of ASEAN, the Cold War Southeast Asian security complex was highly conflictual, with no meaningful centripetal cores even though a distinction between maritime and mainland Southeast Asia could be (and has been) made. ASEAN's formation in 1967 created, over time, a core “activist” membership usually recognized to comprise Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. This, in turn,
makes it analytically possible -- when disaggregating the Cold War Southeast Asian security complex -- to identify two core sub-complexes. One is a maritime core sub-complex whose “members” during the period under review shared a convergence of political outlook. This core sub-complex comprises Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore (and Brunei, as will be argued). The other core sub-complex is the continental (or mainland) core in which a convergence of political outlook among regional states did not exist during the period under review. Thailand as the sole ASEAN “member” of this sub-complex, was able to draw on its political solidarity with the other ASEAN members.

With the several points above in mind, Alagappa's five security complexes -- alternatively called sub-complexes (or clusters) with no difference in meaning -- will be used for this study:  

(1) the maritime core (Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Brunei)  
(2) the continental (or mainland) core (Thailand, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia)  
(3) the Thai-Burmese (Thai-Myanmarese) complex  
(4) the Thai-Malaysian complex  
(5) the Malaysia-Philippine-Indonesian complex

Finally, disaggregation of the security complex after 1967 is important because it will help identify the varying intensity of patterns of conflict and cooperation across different issue areas.

3.5 The maritime core

This sub-complex comprising Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore (and, after 1984, Brunei) exhibits patterns of security interdependence which are primarily the result of recent history, geography and political economy. Within this sub-complex, there is a triangular relationship among Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore; and a bilateral relationship between Malaysia and Singapore due to their common colonial ties and
Singapore's dependence on Malaysian-supplied water. In addition, after 1984, Brunei's proximity and history vis-a-vis its two larger neighbours (Indonesia and Malaysia) locate it within this sub-complex. Also, Brunei and Singapore within this sub-complex have developed a special relationship based in large measure on their identity as small, vulnerable states.

Indonesia was, and still is, the “centre of gravity” of the security dynamic in this sub-complex. Indonesia's Confrontation against Malaysia (which included Singapore as a component member from 1963-65) and support of the Azahari rebellion in Brunei (1962) represented the peak of its strident anti-colonial, anti-Western foreign policy. It was significant therefore that Jakarta became a founder member of ASEAN in August 1967. This was symbolic of the Suharto “New Order” administration's desire to implement a foreign policy of reassurance towards its maritime Southeast Asian neighbours.

Nevertheless, the sheer territorial and demographic size of Indonesia meant that its domestic political situation was closely monitored by its neighbours. Moreover, these attributes make it a regional power (or at least a potential one) and a key player in the management of regional order. But because of Indonesia's suspicions of the potential for subversive and “disloyal” activities of its ethnic Chinese minority, relations with Chinese-majority Singapore were often tense. However, cautious diplomatic overtures to each other in the early 1970s led to a better understanding of each other, and to mutual respect between President Suharto and Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew. In contrast, once Confrontation was over, leaders in Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur found it easier to establish a working relationship based on their Muslim, and to a lesser extent, Malay heritage. But both sides periodically sought to play down this uneasy affinity and to prevent it from being portrayed as one akin to abang-adek (elder brother-younger brother).

It should be pointed out here that although Confrontation exposed Indonesia's weakness as a military power, it also exposed Malaysia's vulnerability as a geographically divided nation compounded by its having territorial disputes with all
the other ASEAN states. Thus, the security linkages of peninsular Malaysia are located in the “western flank”, that is, involving Indonesia, Singapore and Thailand. As for the “eastern flank” -- Sabah and Sarawak -- the linkages involve the Philippines and Indonesia. Sarawak was a major security concern for the new Malaysian federation in 1963 but the end of Confrontation allowed Malaysia to all but eliminate communist insurgent activity along the border with Indonesia's Kalimantan province. Problems however remained along the maritime interface between Sabah and the southern Philippines. The above discussion highlights the feelings of vulnerability that Kuala Lumpur displays about its Sabah/Sarawak component.

Within the maritime core, the Singapore-Malaysia security relationship has been one of the most visibly interdependent; it is also one that is often buffeted by political storms. Both sides still carry the historical baggage of Singapore's separation from Malaysia on 9 August 1965; Malaysian leaders periodically refer to the event as a “secession” while Singapore leaders sometimes remind the younger generation that the vulnerable island was “expelled” to sink or swim. There still exists what Alagappa calls the “structural character of mutual suspicion and antagonism [which perpetuates] a certain caution and uneasiness, and periodic turbulence [which] will continue to characterize bilateral relations”. Certainly, between 1967 and 1975, this chapter’s period of review, this “bitterness and animosity... informed their threat perceptions of each other”. Still, wisdom prevailed in the mutual recognition that Malaysia supplied most of Singapore's potable water needs while the island city-state remained the major import-export hub for its former hinterland.

Both sides were also careful to periodically declare that their defence was indivisible, and their enthusiasm for the Five Power Defence Arrangements was promoted as evidence of the FPDA as a confidence-building measure in terms of their defence relationship. The FPDA, set up in November 1971 as a set of consultative arrangements and a vehicle for multilateral military exercises among three friendly external powers -- Britain, Australia and New Zealand -- and the two regional neighbours, Malaysia and Singapore, provided reassurance on several counts. First,
while admittedly not an alliance structure, it had the undeclared purpose of reassuring the two regional members of allied support in case of future Indonesian hegemonism. Secondly, as noted above, it provided a vehicle for the two regional members to engage in multilateral military cooperation, given their discomfort after their 1965 separation with engaging in bilateral exercises. Thirdly, the FPDA symbolized (in tangible terms) the indivisible defence of the two regional members through its integrated air defence command located in Butterworth, Malaysia. Throughout the period reviewed in this chapter, both countries ensured that their commitment to the FDPA was not affected during tensions in their bilateral relations.

Finally, throughout this difficult post-separation period between the two countries, Suharto's Indonesia maintained a careful policy of non-interference, earning the acknowledgement from both neighbours that Jakarta was sincere in its reassurance role.

Given the background of mutual suspicions in this sub-complex, these several developments indicate a shift -- that is, movement -- from patterns of enmity towards patterns of amity in the relations among Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. In material terms, the mutual accommodations should have been unstable, and self-help and self-interest should have driven at least the two smaller regional states to seek overt military countervailing power from external sources. Yet what did occur can only be partially explained in power terms. The FPDA was unveiled as a consultative set of arrangements, and avoided identifying regional threats. This served to reassure Indonesia. On the other hand, it did deploy real assets and a command structure in the form of the joint air defence umbrella located at Butterworth. Finally, having an Australian as commander of the Butterworth headquarters and investing the FPDA with regular air and maritime (but excluding land) exercises served to enable Singaporean and Malaysian air and naval forces to exercise together in a politically acceptable fashion. It also fostered bilateral military ties. The FPDA therefore accommodated realist concerns all-round -- Indonesia being a clearly interested “non-party” -- in a novel manner.
Viewed from the institutional perspective, the FPDA could be said to fulfil the functions of helping to define interests, regulating behaviour and reducing transaction costs, that is, mitigating uncertainty between Singapore and Malaysia while serving as a confidence-building measure. To the extent that the FPDA serves to alter conceptions of self-interest, and again bearing in mind that Indonesia was part of the “equation”, constructivists would argue that, in ideational terms, the FPDA acquired an intersubjectively constructed identity that at minimum made it acceptable to Indonesia.

More broadly, in ideational terms, the security relations in the maritime core came to be nested within the evolving ASEAN identity which sought to articulate constitutive and regulative norms and to reproduce convergent preferences and interests. In other words, as argued in Chapter 1, the reproduction of convergent preferences among at least the three maritime core countries helped to create a mutually constituted regional identity nowadays referred to as the “ASEAN way”.

To be sure, this process of identity-building was painfully slow and risked reversal, as when Singapore executed two Indonesian marines in October 1968. Nevertheless, the constructivist idea of intersubjective understanding seems to provide a plausible account of the peaceful transformation from enmity to amity, over time, in the maritime core. To the extent that strong political leadership -- backed by able diplomats and senior officials -- was crucial in achieving this transformation in the period reviewed, a reversal towards renewed enmity cannot be ruled out if leaders with divergent interests were to emerge, or if the region continues to be faced with major economic crises.

The other small state in the maritime core, Brunei is wedged between East Malaysia's Sarawak and Indonesia's Kalimantan, even if it has a land border only with Sarawak. Although Brunei's majority population is Muslim-Malay, no such special relationship developed between the Sultanate and Indonesian or Malaysian leaders. On the contrary, Brunei, diminutive yet blessed with oil resources, retained British security guarantees in the form of a continued military presence after independence in 1984. It rejected membership in the new Malaysian federation
(1963) and only eventually joined ASEAN in 1984 after Britain prodded it to gain independence in the same year.\textsuperscript{23} Brunei's anxiety about the intentions of Indonesia and Malaysia stemmed from its fear of being a coveted prize, either as part of a “greater Indonesia” or Kuala Lumpur's ill-concealed desire (in the run-up to Malaysia's formation) to have Brunei join the new federation on account of its oil revenue.\textsuperscript{24} This insecurity is linked to the Bruneian monarchy's own concerns about radical Islam's influence on domestic politics. The final component of this complex is the special relationship between Brunei and Singapore. This relationship, which began after Brunei's independence in 1984, will be further discussed in a later section, below.

Seen through the security complex lens, the maritime core complex discussed above exhibited intense security interdependence. The colonial dominance of the Dutch in Indonesia and the British in the rest of the maritime core suppressed much of the local dynamics. But patterns of enmity within this sub-complex began to emerge in the post-colonial, state-formation years right up to the end of Indonesia’s Confrontation. The separation of Singapore from Malaysia created a legacy of bitterness in this bilateral relationship. The formation of ASEAN in 1967 provided the opportunity for three members of this complex -- Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore -- to begin to address the bases of their tensions and insecurities, as discussed above. Both material and ideational factors may be said to have been instrumental in the shifts in amity/enmity patterns that resulted.

Seen in this light, and again going a little beyond the period under review in this chapter, the 1976 ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation was less a conflict-management mechanism and more an endorsement of an evolving Southeast Asian sub-regional security identity in which constitutive and regulative norms were enshrined. While the treaty was signed by all five members, it was particularly relevant for the maritime core members as symbolic of an Indonesian pledge of non-aggression. The treaty's provision for the inclusion of additional Southeast Asian signatories (Brunei then being the obvious candidate) signalled to them that their security concerns would be accommodated.
3.6 The Indochina continental core

If the states of the maritime core eventually achieved a working understanding of each other's security concerns by 1976, this was not the case in the continental core complex until perhaps 1988 when Thailand and Vietnam began their process of rapprochement. In other words, there was little indication of a shift towards patterns of amity in the continental core. In material terms, the structural condition of regional and great power rivalries continued to stoke the continental core as a conflict formation. In ideational terms, the mutually constructed understandings of the several actors were negative ones, reinforced through practice. Just as it required the central actor in the maritime core, Indonesia, to initiate the process of reassurance for confidence-building to occur, similarly it required the continental core's two primary actors, Thailand and Vietnam, to first acknowledge their overriding security interdependence.  

The disaggregated security complex framework correctly locates and emphasizes Thailand's primary security dynamic within the Indochina sub-complex during the Cold War. Thailand was the maritime core's buffer in the ASEAN-Indochina nexus. But the “imported” Cold War division and Thailand's membership in ASEAN sometimes suppressed the fact that, above all else, Thailand's national security could not be analyzed apart from those of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. This has been the case historically; Thailand has always considered itself a regional power in Indochina. Diplomatically, successive Thai governments have exploited balance of power opportunities in the continental core to its advantage since the French colonial era. During the First Indochinese War, a watchful Thailand was able to keep aloof because that conflict was largely self-contained. But by the time of the Second Indochinese War, great power rivalry had become a feature of the sub-region. Moreover, Thailand by then faced internal and external communist threats. 

Thus, as discussed in Chapter 2, a strongly anti-communist Thai leadership agreed to
join the US-led SEATO alliance and the 1954 Manila Pact became the primary instrument for Thailand's security. A decade later, with an intensifying war close to Thai border areas, the Rusk-Thanat Agreement of March 1962 confirmed American commitment to Thailand's defence. But America's subsequent decision to disengage its land forces from Indochina presaged an eventual communist victory, which occurred in 1975 in all three Indochinese states.

By the Third Indochina War, the Americans had arrested somewhat their neglect of Thai security concerns and agreed to substantially increase deliveries of war material. Nevertheless, Thailand remained uncertain of united Vietnam's intentions and began, from mid-1975 when Sino-Thai diplomatic relations were established, a process of aligning with China against Vietnam. The basic Thai strategy remained the same: to prevent Vietnam from consolidating itself in the rest of Indochina. From the above discussion, by introducing the idea of patterns of amity/enmity among the rivals in the continental core sub-complex as well as their relations with external powers, Thailand’s balance of power behaviour is placed in a sharper context, that is, when viewed from the disaggregated security complex perspective.

3.7 The Thai-Burmese sub-complex

As noted above, Thailand’s intense security interdependence with its regional neighbours and external powers can be identified when examined in the context of the continental core sub-complex. As discussed below, patterns of amity and enmity exist between Thailand and Burma (now Myanmar) in their bilateral sub-complex. But because during the Cold War, both Thailand and Burma were relatively unconcerned about the impact of each other’s orientation towards external powers, the external dimension of this sub-complex is less complicated. This less intense situation for Burma allowed it to become a buffer between the aggregate Southeast Asian security complex and an adjacent cluster, the South Asian complex. Apart from Thailand, India (the key player in the South Asian complex) was also prepared to leave Burma alone to pursue its policy of neutralism and isolation.
In terms of both the aggregate complex and the bilateral sub-complex, then, Burma (unlike Thailand) was under no pressure to engage in balancing behaviour vis-à-vis its larger neighbours, China and India. In practice, its policy of neutralism and isolation incorporated a measure of alignment with China. After all, a primary Burmese concern was relations with China, viewed as a powerful neighbour exerting influence on the pro-Chinese Burmese Communist Party. This nuanced behaviour of Burma in the period reviewed would not have been readily accounted for by the balance of power approach, which would have depicted Burma as a strategically located regional state interposed between two major rival powers, China and India.

Furthermore, in ideational terms, the Burmese ruling elite’s experimentation with socialist ideas predisposed them to develop relations of amity with communist China, in spite of concerns over Beijing’s possible hegemony. This helps explain why Burma studiously avoided association with the American-led SEATO, and also why it declined an invitation to join the proposed pro-western ASEAN grouping. From the institutional perspective, Burma should have wanted to join ASEAN on the basis of deriving material benefits from membership.

As for the local patterns generated in the Thai-Burmese sub-complex, this has been a result of the historical legacy, that is, the local security dynamic focussed to a large extent on border problems during the period reviewed. Just as Thailand and Vietnam have a long history of rivalry and mutual animosity, so do Thailand and Burma. Periodic tensions and cross-border firefights occurred between Thai and Burmese forces. This was because of Burmese allegations that Thailand provided arms and safe havens inside Thai territory for Burma’s various ethnic insurgent movements as well as ethnic Burman political dissidents. Thai military officers also profited from the illegal trade in gems, drugs and commodities along the border.

As in the case of similar bilateral problems in Southeast Asia, both countries recognized a shared security vulnerability along an insurgent-occupied border made porous by the hilly and jungle terrain. In 1959, Rangoon asked Bangkok to allow
“hot pursuit” rights across their border in the wake of revolts by ethnic minorities. Bangkok was unenthusiastic but a bilateral security cooperation agreement was signed in 1963. A nadir was reached in Thai-Burmese relations when Bangkok allowed former Burmese prime minister U Nu to form a united front of Burmese dissidents and to launch a military campaign against the Rangoon government from bases in Thai territory.\(^{30}\)

3.8 The Thai-Malaysian sub-complex

Border security problems were also a major element of the Thai-Malaysian sub-complex. In this case, it was Thailand that was suspicious of Malaysia's apparent unwillingness to crack down on Malaysian Muslim elements sympathetic to the armed struggle waged by Thai Muslim separatists in southern Thailand. The historical backdrop, elaborated below, has been a major factor in the uneasy border security since 1957, when Malaya gained independence from Britain.

Until 1909, the four northern Malay states of Kedah, Kelantan, Terengganu and Perlis were client states of the Thai king, together with the seven Thai provinces of what was once the Muslim trading state of Pattani. In that year, Siam (the kingdom changed its name to Thailand in 1939) surrendered its rights to the four Malay states to Britain. This area has thus been a vortex of Thai and Malay nationalisms, with Pattani Muslim separatist groups securing sympathy from Malay elements in the four northern Malayan (Malaysian after 1963) states.

Because of this political dynamic, the Malaysian government led by the moderate UMNO (United Malays National Organization) has found it politically unwise to crack down too hard on irredentist Muslim groups which look to the other major Malay Muslim party, PAS (Partai Islam). The Malaysian government took the official position that the separatist groups within Thailand (but which also operated on the border) were an internal matter and that it had provided no assistance to them.
But ironically, the success of the Emergency campaign (1948-60) -- in which the Malayan Communist Party's insurgency was ultimately crushed -- forced communist terrorist remnants to flee north to the Thai-Malaysian border. Until then, as noted above, there were only Thai Muslim separatists who operated there. With the entry of communists into this porous jungle region, the newly independent Malayan government had an incentive to cooperate with the Thai government on their respective border problems but Bangkok was never assured that Kuala Lumpur fully reciprocated its efforts. Bangkok sought a quid pro quo arrangement in which its cooperation against the MCP would be matched by Kuala Lumpur's commitment to cut off the support Malaysian elements were alleged to be giving to the Thai Muslim separatists.

Despite such Thai dissatisfactions, there has been a long-established habit of border security cooperation which predated Malayan independence, for the colonial British authorities also understood its necessity and signed a border agreement with Thailand in 1951. This document was revised in 1965 by Kuala Lumpur and Bangkok, and a high-level General Border Committee was set up. In 1970, a key revision was made: the right of “hot pursuit” by either side into three miles of the other's territory subject to troop withdrawal within 72 hours. As noted by Hans Indorf, however, since most of the action took place on Thai soil, Thai politicians and military leaders resented such intrusion and cited instances of the Malaysian armed forces' abuse of the agreement's terms.31 (A new agreement in 1982 eliminated hot pursuit altogether.)

Thus, for the period under review, Thai and Malaysian border security cooperation persisted albeit uneasily. Going beyond this period, by 1989, the remnant 1,100-strong CPM members -- from a peak strength of 8,000 in 1951 -- had become a spent force and they surrendered to Thai and Malaysian authorities.32 This has not eliminated problems on the border, since Thai Muslim separatists continue to operate there. The Thais have now begun to feel that, with the quid pro quo element in their mutual border security cooperation removed, the Malaysians will be even less keen to provide assistance to them.
Finally, the security importance of this peninsular complex during the Cold War was well understood by Indonesia and Singapore as well. Alagappa calls it the “bridge” between the continental core and the maritime core. Antolik observes that:

The bilateral relationships between Thailand and ASEAN members to the south bind the western flank together. Thailand and Malaysia, who have long understood their security interconnection, are central to this collaboration; their cooperation predates ASEAN. Furthermore, this relationship, besides being the oldest in the region, underlies relations between Thailand and Singapore and Indonesia; both value Thailand's contributions to the well-being of Malaysia, their buffer zone.34

3.9 The Malaysia-Philippine-Indonesian sub-complex

The maritime sub-complex discussed earlier had three key players (Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore) and a fourth member (Brunei) which, by virtue of strong patterns of security interactions with the others, was a legitimate member of that complex. Similarly, in the Malaysia-Philippine-Indonesia complex, the more intense interaction within it was that occurring between Malaysia and the Philippines, as a result of their long-standing feud over Sabah and a more recent dispute (since the late 1970s) over parts of the Spratly islands.

For the period under review, only the Sabah dispute will be discussed. The dispute flared up in the early 1960s when the then Malaya and Britain agreed that the British colony of North Borneo (later renamed Sabah) should join the proposed Federation of Malaysia. The Philippines objected to the colony's inclusion, arguing that North Borneo had merely been leased to the British by the Sultan of Sulu. Since Sulu was part of contemporary Philippines, North Borneo was Philippine territory. Kuala Lumpur and London rejected this claim, arguing that North Borneo had been ceded in perpetuity to Britain.

During the Cold War, the Philippines was arguably the most “insulated” of the founding ASEAN members. Apart from its relative sense of external security derived from the American military facilities, its domestic communist insurgency problem
(centred on Luzon in the north) has no trans-border linkage. It is in its southern islands especially Mindanao, close to Sabah, where Muslim separatists operate. Its regional security interface was thus primarily with Sabah. But because of Manila's dispute with Kuala Lumpur over Sabah, there was no security cooperation between these two ASEAN members over border security. This situation also created the problem of a sizeable influx of illegal Filipino immigrants into Sabah.

As regards Philippine-Indonesian relations, this has had a chequered record. The majority of Filipinos are of ethnic Malay or mixed-Malay origin; most are Christians but Muslims form the majority in the southern provinces. Manila, especially during the Sukarno era, harboured suspicions about Jakarta's aspirations in the region. Yet the two collaborated, if covertly and opportunistically, during Confrontation. On balance, however, ever since the formation of ASEAN, Philippine-Indonesian security cooperation, centred in the seas between Mindanao and Sulawesi islands, has improved somewhat, if not dramatically.

While the Sabah claim issue was the stumbling block in Philippine-Malaysian relations in the early years of ASEAN, both Indonesia and Malaysia came to appreciate the need to prevent Manila's further isolation and to help it, at least in the diplomatic arena, deal with its increasingly radicalized Muslim separatists. A destabilized Philippines, one sparked by Muslim insurgency, would likely have had spill-over effects on them.

First, the Philippines played a vital role in ASEAN's sense of external security during the Cold War: it became the sole host to US forces in Southeast Asia after the Americans withdrew their forces from Thai bases in the aftermath of the Vietnam War. Even post-Sukarno Indonesia -- ostensibly the most non-aligned of the ASEAN states -- acquiesced in a continued US military presence in Southeast Asia. Thus a Philippines embroiled in domestic turmoil might have found it harder to gather domestic consensus on retaining the foreign military bases.

Secondly, in the 1970s, the Mindanao insurgency threatened to escalate and there
was a possibility of the rebels securing aid from the international Muslim
community. Indonesia and Malaysia intervened at the 1977 Islamic Conference to
block this aid. The two countries also helped persuade Nur Misuari, the separatist
Moro National Liberation Front's leader, to drop his demand for total
independence. These diplomatic initiatives took cognizance of the danger that
Indonesia's and Malaysia's own radical Muslims or MNLF sympathizers might
foment trouble. Alagappa's alternative description of this sub-complex as the
"Islamic-Christian interface complex" aptly captures the embedded religious
feature of its security dynamic.

In conclusion, the security complex framework was deployed above to identify broad
patterns of amity and enmity between communist and non-communist Southeast
Asia in the period 1945-75. Secondly, disaggregating this Cold War security
complex into five sub-complexes showed up subsets of local dynamics, mostly
shaped by history, culture or more recent political events.

3.10 Issues of insecurity and amity/enmity shifts in the maritime core sub-
complex

The deployment of the security complex idea fleshed out a Cold War Southeast
Asian security complex, which upon disaggregation, yielded at least five sub-
complexes. Of these, it is argued here, the maritime core sub-complex is the most
interesting in terms of a more detailed investigation because it underwent dramatic
changes in terms of a general transformation from a conflictual set of relationships to
more amicable relations. Nevertheless, because patterns of amity and enmity are
durable, their transformation is difficult and may even be reversible. The existence of
distinctive sets of relationship embedded within this sub-complex, in particular, the
Indonesia-Malaysia-Singapore relationship and the Singapore-Malaysia relationship,
gives the sub-complex a particularly dynamic quality. This second part of the chapter
will therefore deploy the security complex approach to conduct, as a case study of
intra-ASEAN security concerns, a detailed examination of the maritime sub-
complex over an extended period of time. As such, the time-frame will necessarily go beyond the period reviewed in the first part of this chapter. Finally, a much less detailed review of the Thai-Malaysian and Malaysia-Philippine-Indonesia sub-complexes will be conducted.

In broad terms, the issues of insecurity in the maritime core sub-complex result from: (i) the recent history of inter-state mutual suspicions, with Indonesia playing a particularly aggressive role until 1965 and with post-separation tensions between Singapore and Malaysia continuing; (ii) the ethnic element which cuts across borders in all four countries but is often focussed on the policies of Chinese-majority Singapore whose actions are subject to intense scrutiny; (iii) feelings of vulnerability: Singapore and Brunei because of their miniscule size, Malaysia because it is geographically divided and because of its racial politics, and Indonesia because of its archipelagic spread; and (iv) the presence of foreign powers.

These issue areas overlap and intersect. For example, suspicions have periodically been raised in Kuala Lumpur and Jakarta about alleged hidden agendas in Singapore's economic policies, such as its espousal of an economic growth triangle linking it with Johor state in Malaysia and Batam/Bintan islands in Indonesia's Riau province, or its aggressive economic investments in China. Singapore has been especially sensitive to allegations that its enthusiasm for business opportunities in Riau and China carried ulterior motives of exploitation and seeking favour respectively. Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong, jointly officiating at a multi-million dollar Bintan resort project in 1996 with then President Suharto, emphasised its mutual stakeholding benefits and its contribution to bilateral ties. Deputy Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong made a point to highlight, at a conference on investment opportunities in India, Singapore's policy of forging “omni-directional” business links with China, India and Southeast Asia. He said this approach was better than a narrow focus on China, adding that

[i]the more we pursue opportunities elsewhere in the region, the more clearly both our own people and our neighbours will see us clearly for what we really are: a multi-racial society rooted in several Asian cultures, and not just
a predominantly Chinese society in the middle of non-Chinese Southeast Asia.  

3.11 The Indonesia-Malaysia-Singapore relationship

The analysis in this section captures the particularly intense security interdependence of the three key countries that comprise the maritime core sub-complex. It is suggested here that the security complex approach – as an analytical tool tailored for regional-level analysis – complements the broader canvass strokes provided by the balance of power and institutional approaches. Moreover, while not ignoring the distribution of power, it caters for an observable shift from patterns of enmity to patterns of amity especially in Indonesia-Singapore relations, and suggests that non-material “intersubjective” factors (the power of ideas and norms such as mutually constituted belief in “win-win” cooperation) were at work in such transformation. It bears repeating too that the reverse may occur, that both material and ideational factors may transform cooperative patterns into conflictual ones.

Disaggregating the overall security complex helps to identify sub-regional sources of insecurity through the locally generated patterns of amity and enmity among states, which may arise, for example, from history and feelings of vulnerability. In the case of the Indonesia-Malaysia-Singapore relationship, the recent history of mutual suspicions has been an important backdrop. Until Sukarno was replaced by the pragmatic Suharto, one major dynamic of the maritime core complex centred on the insecurities of Malaysia and Singapore vis-a-vis Indonesia. As one Indonesian observer summed it, these two countries “were in the past targets of Indonesia's aggressive policy of confrontation, which they saw, understandably, as an expression of Indonesia's expansionist ambition”. Suspicions about post-Sukarno Indonesia continued to linger. An early occasion was the Indonesian decision to dispatch troops into Portuguese-held East Timor in December 1975 and incorporate it into Indonesia. Jakarta's professed reason for its military action was that the situation in East Timor, which was due to become independent, had become chaotic and that the Fretilin guerilla group poised to take over was Marxist. East Timor would become a haven
for secessionists and communists, it was feared.

The invasion of East Timor illustrates the tensions between actions based on self-help and the mutually constructed constraints carefully cultivated in the “ASEAN way” identity. What may be observed is that, only on few occasions, have such self-help actions been vigorously pursued in the face of possible corporate discord. Singapore’s execution of the convicted Indonesian marines in 1968 was one, when it wanted to signal its sovereignty; Indonesia’s 1975 action was another, when it wanted to signal its fear of regional flashpoints. Nevertheless, Indonesia's action represented a breach of the ASEAN way, particularly the norms of non-interference and non-use of force. ASEAN solidarity was tested at the United Nations when Singapore (with barely 10 years of independence as a sovereign mini-state) initially abstained on a resolution which condemned the annexation, while the other ASEAN members -- including Malaysia -- cast their vote for Indonesia. Thus, policies and actions of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, taken for national reasons have, often without warning, led to adverse reactions (whether official or non-official) within this cluster of states.

The dynamics of this trilateral relationship may be further illustrated. While in the early post-Confrontation, post-separation years, Indonesia and Malaysia began in earnest their process of reconciliation, the efforts between Singapore and Indonesia were more low-keyed. During the initial period, there was little open display of Malaysian discomfort over signs of closer Indonesia-Singapore ties. However, following Lee Kuan Yew's ground-breaking trip to Indonesia in May 1973, ties between Indonesia and Singapore began to firm up. Moreover, early agreement on demarcating their maritime territorial boundaries had ensured that disputes of this nature no longer existed between Jakarta and Singapore. It followed that domestic elements were never given any opportunity to exploit this as an issue in times of bilateral tensions.

What is intriguing is that, as Singapore-Indonesian relations were consolidated in the 1980s, especially in their defence relations, Malaysian political leaders and senior military officials began to express signs of disquiet. Jakarta spokesmen felt obliged
to address them, for example, the Indonesian ambassador to Malaysia said in a newspaper interview in 1990 that Indonesia-Singapore defence cooperation had been able to move forward because Singapore was not seen as a potential threat. Given that the 1980s was a period of intensive buildup of the Singapore Armed Forces' capabilities, the ambassador's remark may be taken as indicative of a consolidation of military confidence-building and reassurance between Indonesian and Singaporean defence personnel. Thus, at least at the senior levels, patterns of amity were now palpable, the fruit of defence relations forged since the early 1970s. Importantly, the ambassador alluded to Malaysian suggestions that Singapore was seeking to use Indonesia as a counterweight by asserting that Indonesia's stand "on this matter is different from Malaysia." Nevertheless, Indonesian leaders remain sensitive to the need not to overplay the country's cordial relations with Singapore, especially with regards to their domestic constituents. Just as Kuala Lumpur has to act with restraint in curbing Malaysian politicians who engage in Singapore-bashing, especially when the "provocation" has a racial flavour, similarly Jakarta has to be careful in not appearing to defend Singapore too vigorously when Indonesian politicians also indulge in Singapore-bashing. Many Indonesians see Singapore as a well-armed Chinese-dominated city-state which acquired its wealth from exploiting its economically backward neighbours. Many too are not happy to see its close ties with Israel. On its part, Singapore remains watchful of joint Indonesia-Malaysian activities. Singapore showed its unhappiness by openly mobilizing its troops when Indonesia and Malaysia held a joint military exercise in August 1991 in southern Johor, just 18 km from its border, on the eve of the island republic's National Day. All this suggests that the dynamics of this trilateral relationship have been shaped, as Muthiah Alagappa has noted, first, by the sheer physical size of Indonesia and its proximity to its two neighbours; secondly, by differences as well as commonality in ethnicity and religion. There is a third factor: the element of uncertainty surrounding leadership succession.

The first factor is manifested in an Indonesian sense of regional preeminence which
its two smaller neighbours have always been uneasy with and have, in reaction, often made a point to not acquiesce in. To the extent that Indonesia under Sukarno felt slighted that it was not consulted by Britain and Malaya in the proposal to create the Malaysian Federation, Sukarno's sense of outrage was egged on by the self-serving communist faction (including air force officers) and fuelled by his need to distract the populace from his disastrous economic policies. On the other hand, the conservative army group of generals was unenthusiastic when Sukarno launched Confrontation against Malaysia, with one retired general admitting later that the army obstructed the campaign and keep the best battalions out of the conflict. Suharto too was not above being miffed when regional neighbours undertook initiatives without consulting Indonesia. The Malaysian prime minister's enthusiastic hawking of his East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC) proposal elicited a lukewarm response from Suharto partly because Mahathir had failed to first broach the matter within ASEAN circles.

With regard to the second factor, Confrontation had left a powerful and enduring legacy -- not so much of suspicions by Malaysia and Singapore about Indonesia's territorial designs but more of a lesson learnt about the interplay between enduring geographical proximity and the "realities" arising from differences as well as commonalities in ethnicity and religion. These "realities" were the majority Malay-Muslim populations of Indonesia and Malaysia and the majority Chinese population of Singapore. They serve as the conduit through which events and policies in one country involving ethnicity or religion impinge on either one other or both other countries.

The leadership succession factor is the most difficult to assess with any confidence, and is the most complex because it also encompasses the uncertainties arising from generational change. It has been fortuitous for the maritime sub-complex that three key leaders -- Suharto, Mahathir and Lee Kuan Yew -- were strong, pragmatic personalities who, in pursuit of their national interests, also understood the dangers posed by the other two factors, discussed above. Moreover, they had capable lieutenants (ministers, diplomats and senior officials) who shared their vision and
who were either problem-solvers or politically skilled personalities able to keep their leaders in touch with the ground. This combination ensured that, when needed, unpopular measures could be implemented and popular sentiments resisted in times of inter-state tensions.

Among the three leaders, only Lee Kuan Yew in 1990 actually handed over the formal reins of government to his successor, Goh Chok Tong who in turn has established good relationships with Indonesian and Malaysian leaders. Both Lee and Goh have set themselves the task of grooming the next generation of leaders. But events in Indonesia and Malaysia in 1998 underscored the fragility of uninstitutionalized leadership succession. In the wake of social unrest in Indonesia sparked by the Asian financial crisis, Suharto stepped down in May 1998. The new president, Jusuf Habibie, lacked legitimacy and a power base but was installed and maintained in power only because of the backing of armed forces chief General Wiranto. A new presidential election is expected in November 1999 but a future leadership scramble cannot be ruled out if social unrest in the country persists. In Malaysia, Mahathir began the process of addressing the leadership succession question with the appointment in late 1993 of Anwar Ibrahim as his deputy and presumed heir apparent. But in September 1998, Mahathir had Anwar arrested on charges of corruption and sexual misconduct. Observers saw the prime minister's action as a pre-emptive reaction to alleged moves by Anwar and his supporters to oust the former for alleged corruption and nepotism. Although Mahathir subsequently, under pressure, appointed then foreign minister Datuk Abdullah Badawi as his deputy prime minister, the prospect of political and economic uncertainty aggravated by the effects of the Asian financial crisis cannot be ruled out in Malaysia.

Thus, the events of 1998 in at least Indonesia and Malaysia seemed to confirm the phenomenon described as the "performance paradox" whose argument is that successful developing countries with authoritarian regimes may find that although their position is strengthened by increased prosperity, it is at the same time undermined by the demands of the middle class and other interest groups. Certain
aggrieved segments, such as religious/chauvinist radicals or even ultranationalists, might also challenge the legitimacy of the successor ruling elites. Of the two countries, Indonesia is the more vulnerable to instability, given its comparatively weaker institutions. While Singapore seems the most politically and economically stable in this regard, this is of little comfort if either of its bigger neighbours succumbs to the negative effects of the performance paradox. The historian Mary Turnbull suggests that even the oil-rich Bruneian monarchy may not escape "another Azahari-type problem." This uncertainty about the long term in the maritime subcomplex is its fundamental vulnerability.

For Singapore, the sense of vulnerability derived from these three factors appears to be embedded. At the publicly declared level, it is argued that there is no identified threat, that is, a friendly and stable Malaysia and Indonesia pose no threat. But the "lesson" from World War II is, first, that a threatening power will use the neighbouring states to launch an attack. A land threat, therefore, will come from the direction of the peninsula. Cutting off Singapore's water supply by an enemy becomes an obvious follow-on move. Secondly, the regional security environment can change rapidly; hence the need for a strong military deterrent, which in turn has created tensions with Malaysia. Singapore has sought to address this, with deputy prime minister Lee Hsien Loong himself publicly declaring that the defence of Singapore and Malaysia was indivisible and that it made no sense to launch an "invasion" of peninsula Malaysia.

Yet the pragmatic Singapore leadership now realizes that its insecurity dilemma can be mitigated. Deterrence (ostensibly directed at no country in particular) is now augmented by reassurance, or "defence diplomacy" among defence ministries, directed in particular at Indonesia and Malaysia. In this sense, the ideational notion of defence diplomacy was deployed to effect shifts from enmity to amity relations. Bilveer Singh notes that:

With defence diplomacy in mind, since 1988 Singapore has enhanced its military cooperation with the neighbouring countries in ASEAN, especially Malaysia and Indonesia. The first ever joint exercise between the land forces of Singapore and Malaysia, codenamed Semangat Bersatu (Unity in Spirit), was held in May 1989. Similarly,
Singapore has upgraded its defence cooperation with Indonesia as seen in the opening of the Siabu Air [Weapons] Range in March 1989 and the Memorandum of Understanding signed... on 23 March 1989. By this agreement, Singapore was provided with training grounds for its troops in Indonesia. 55

Following from their successful joint development of the Siabu Air Weapons Range (in eastern Sumatra), Singapore and Indonesia proceeded, in 1991, to develop an electronic Air Combat Manoeuvring Range (ACMR) at Pekan Baru, near Siabu. Its completion in 1994 has seen the entire area providing the full spectrum of pilot training, air-to-air, air-to-ground and navigational training. The joint statement released by the two armed forces at the signing of the ACMR agreement said:

The joint development of the ACMR reflects the ties that exist between the two air forces and highlights the enhanced bilateral defence cooperation between Indonesia and Singapore. 56

For Malaysia, an ambivalence towards its neighbours resulted from its experiences. Indonesia's Confrontation of 1963-66 began just after Malaysia had essentially broken the back of its communist insurgency threat in the peninsula. By the mid-1960s, a period of tentative rapprochement with Indonesia amidst still stormy relations with post-separation Singapore and tense domestic politics (culminating in the 1969 racial riots) prevailed. The 1970s saw a consolidation of relative domestic stability and a more non-aligned foreign policy outlook. Dr Mahathir Mohamad became Prime Minister in July 1981. His leadership has led to improved relations with Singapore and continued cordial relations with Indonesia. Ironically, his brash style sometimes led to differences with Suharto whereas in contrast Lee Kuan Yew had struck a better rapport with Suharto.

For Indonesia, its experiences also conditioned its attitudes towards Malaysia and Singapore. Jakarta's suspicions of Chinese-predominated Singapore as a potential fifth column for China was progressively ameliorated as their leaders maintained contact after rapprochement had taken place in the 1970s. Trade links were initially a sensitive issue, with Jakarta accusing Singapore of encouraging illegal smuggling activities which bypassed revenue incomes. 57 Many Indonesians continue to project
their feelings of resentment, at the relative wealth of their Chinese population, onto Singapore. Post-Confrontation relations with Malaysia got off well but a number of irritants have developed, centred on a more active Malaysian foreign policy geared to boost its Third World image. In perspective, however, Indonesia under Suharto did not feel any threat to its sovereignty originating from either a Malaysia or a Singapore which was internally stable. Its primary immediate security concern is the integrity of its far-flung archipelago.

3.12 The Singapore-Malaysia relationship

This section specifically examines the Singapore-Malaysia dynamic, in which patterns of amity and shared destiny were consciously fostered, and mutually reproduced, despite sometimes unfavourable domestic politics. It will depict the Singapore-Malaysia relationship as one that has often erupted into acrimony. Until separation in 1965, both Singapore and Malaysian leaders could not contemplate a viable independent existence for the island. It was (and still is) dependent on Johor state for more than half of its water supply, and its entrepot business was predicated on peninsula Malaysia as its hinterland. Yet the two years of its inclusion in the Malaysian federation were fraught with tensions because of the politics of race-demography and the differing “visions” of the federal leaders and the Singapore leaders. These two tensions mutually fed on each other.

The Chinese are in the clear majority in Singapore (77 per cent) while the Malays comprise only 15 per cent there. On the other hand, the Malays form a slim majority of 53 per cent (the Chinese form 36 per cent in peninsula Malaysia with the Indians accounting for the balance of 11 per cent). As elsewhere in Southeast Asia, the Chinese dominate economic activities while the indigenous ethnic group dominate the political sphere. Singapore is the exception insofar as the Chinese also dominate politics there. Thus, prior to separation, Lee Kuan Yew's call for a “Malaysian Malaysia” was seen by Federal Malay politicians as a challenge to the political status quo and an attempt to exploit the “unstable” racial balance, given also that the Chinese population in the East Malaysian states of Sabah and Sarawak made up a
sizeable minority of 25 per cent there. The Federal leaders decided that they could not work with the PAP and that therefore Singapore -- in spite of the mutual belief that its viability as a mini-state was uncertain -- could not stay in Malaysia. Tun Ismail, the then Home Minister of Malaysia, later gave this account:

Personal jealousies and ambitions were so strong and the political approaches to communal problems were so divergent that either of two things was bound to happen. First, if Singapore continued to be a part of Malaysia, communal clashes of such magnitude as to destroy Malaysia as an identity were bound to occur; second, if Singapore was separated by mutual agreement, the chances of co-operation and eventual union of the two countries were better. As it turned out, the latter alternative happened.\(^6\)

Separation, and mutual membership in ASEAN in 1967, did not see an early reconciliation. Michael Leifer's observation is worth recounting:

Politicians from both [countries] appeared incapable of refraining from commenting publicly on matters within one another's domestic domain. In August 1970 the first official visit to Malaysia since separation by Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew had to be called off at the last moment. Over-zealous immigration officers in Singapore had ordered that the lengthy hair of two visiting Malay youths be cut in keeping with the prevailing social ethic in the Republic that long hair was a sign of moral degeneracy. That action provoked a furore across the causeway in a symptomatic expression of resentment. It required a two-year cooling-off period for Mr Lee's visit to be reinstated.\(^6\)

This, then, was the background to the post-1965 tensions, some of which still exist today. On the one hand, despite the fact of strained relations immediately and even after separation, leaders on both sides ensured that vital interests were not compromised. The issue of water supply to Singapore was one. Another was the acceptance at the highest level that the defence of Singapore and Malaysia remained indivisible.

On the other hand, this is not to suggest that these vital interests were not buffeted by the squalls of bilateral tensions or domestic political provocations. The more radical Malaysian media and politicians, in particular, have a record of bringing up these issues whenever bilateral tensions occur while the previously restrained Singapore
press have, in recent years, encouraged public reactions to various Malaysian allegations.

The year 1986 marked the start of an especially tense period in Singapore-Malaysian relations which, while seeming to have brought suppressed communal issues to the surface, had the net result of eventually firming up their bilateral ties. The trigger was what appeared to the Singapore leaders to be a normal practice: an invitation to a friendly country's head of state to pay an official visit to the republic. But Israeli President Chaim Herzog's visit, from 18-20 November, provoked Malaysian protests and extremist demands that the water supply to Singapore be cut off, as well as a domestic furore during which the loyalty of Malay Singaporeans to the country was raised. On the official level, Malaysia recalled its High Commissioner (ambassador) during the Herzog visit.62

Eventually leaders in both Kuala Lumpur and Singapore acted to cool the issue. Post-mortems by both sides -- including an analysis by Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew -- agreed that Singapore could have at least postponed the visit because it occurred too soon after Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad had made several speeches attacking Zionism. Just as indicative of the pragmatic approach taken by the ruling elites of both sides, the Malaysian government rejected domestic demands that the bilateral water agreement be reviewed. Nor did it allow a recently concluded water and natural gas package deal to be affected by the controversy. Under the deal, Singapore was to be allowed to draw more water from Johor and in return was to invest in tapping the natural gas-fields off Terengganu as well as in a gas processing plant. Singapore also committed itself to be a purchaser of the gas when it came onstream.

However, the issue of the loyalty of Singapore Malays to Singapore did not die down and once again provoked Malaysian reactions. A speech on 22 February 1987 by Singapore's then Second Minister of Defence (Services), Brigadier-General Lee Hsien Loong, in which he defended the limited recruitment of Malays to sensitive positions in the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF), was the catalyst. General Lee said:
We live in Southeast Asia. If there is a conflict, if the SAF is called to defend the homeland, we don't want to put any of our soldiers in a difficult position, where his emotions for the nation may be in conflict with his emotions for his religion.\(^{63}\)

In reaction, Malaysian Foreign Minister Rais Yatim pointed out that General Lee's reference to the racial factor in the SAF could only suggest that Singapore regarded Malaysia as an enemy.\(^{64}\) Then, in April, four Singapore soldiers deployed on a boat on the Singapore side of the Johor Straits, crossed over to the Malaysian side to buy crabs. The Malaysian media led accusations that the four were on a spying mission. Quick action by Singapore to discipline the soldiers involved failed to defuse the tensions and, once again, the Malaysian media and politicians indulged in “Singapore-bashing”.\(^{65}\)

There were other irritants, for example, Singapore's refusal to accept truckloads of Malaysian vegetables because they were found to have been contaminated by pesticides; the marked appreciation of the Singapore dollar against the Malaysian currency (both were at par in the early post-separation years); and charges that Singapore fishermen were using Malaysian-registered boats to fish in Johor waters. All these examples reinforced a Malaysian public perception of a Singapore that was arrogant and exploitative.

Senior leaders in Singapore and Malaysian came away from this series of spats more aware that, at least at the levels below them (including their general publics) there had been a drift in relations for a variety of reasons. These included a perception that Singapore's economic success owed much to Malaysian magnanimity (without it being acknowledged); resentment that during a period of drought in Johor the water supply to Singapore was nevertheless kept uninterrupted,\(^{66}\) and disquiet at Singapore's defence buildup. These were potentially emotive issues which self-serving politicians could exploit. For example, Malaysia politicians were reported to have used the Herzog controversy to accuse Singapore of being a “Zionist agent” in Southeast Asia and a threat to the interests of Muslims in the region.\(^{67}\)
In terms of crisis-management, two aspects of this relationship is now clear. First, incidents or tensions will crop up unexpectedly even if due care had been taken with regards to sensitivities. For example, Lee Kuan Yew's well-intentioned call on Singaporeans to make more trips to Malaysia during 1990 in support of that country's Visit Malaysia Year campaign elicited charges of insincerity from Kuala Lumpur's tourism minister. Secondly, very often it takes the top leaders to resolve issues that defy resolution including at the senior officials' level. This has been the case with recent water agreements. The 1987 revision was only made possible after a four-year standoff. The breakthrough followed a meeting between Mahathir and Lee in September 1986.

The personal chemistry between Mahathir and Lee Kuan Yew had contributed to firmer ties. Lee could say, without taking umbrage, that he had “taken note” after Mahathir had told him in October 1987 that Singapore should be more circumspect and take the feelings of Malay Malaysians into consideration when dealing with Singaporean issues. Both men are also pragmatists, as witnessed in their no-nonsense approach to the water agreements. Also, while there are a number of vernacular newspapers in Malaysia (and Indonesia) that regularly indulge in Singapore-bashing, Lee, while in New York in 1988, said allusively: “You write in the Singapore papers like you write in the American papers, and, I tell you, you are at war.”

One final incident is worth noting. In late 1989, several Malaysian civilian and military officers were arrested for spying for a foreign country, later identified as Singapore. Both prime ministers went into public damage-control, while emphasising that Malaysian national security had not been compromised. Nevertheless, Malaysia cancelled planned bilateral land, sea and air exercises. Agreement to resume them was made only in May 1991, following Malaysian Defence Minister Najib Abdul Razak's visit to Singapore.

After Lee Kuan Yew stepped down as Prime Minister in November 1990, an immediate item on new Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong's agenda was an official
visit to Kuala Lumpur from 11-13 January 1991. This signalled no interruption in the “business as usual” bilateral ties. Singapore-Johor ties were also on the agenda, and Goh’s official state visit to Johor in the same year was a first by a Singapore Prime Minister. A high-powered delegation accompanied Goh for fresh talks on the water agreement. Goh himself began to get the Young PAP leaders to be better acquainted with their counterparts across the causeway. In December 1993, Second Minister for Foreign Affairs, Brigadier-General George Yeo, a potential future Prime Minister, led a 35-member team on a four-day visit which included a meeting with newly appointed Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim as well as UMNO Youth counterparts.

Thus, despite the problems over the issues of water supply and the defence of Singapore and Malaysia, the leaders on both sides of the Causeway have ultimately acted in good sense. To be sure, both the Malaysian and Singaporean mindsets have changed since the early post-separation years. Remarks by Tunku Abdul Rahman before leaving Kuala Lumpur for the 1969 Commonwealth Conference in London indicated his belief that Singapore was, militarily, a liability still. Asked if Singapore could become a base for any projected five-nation mobile force for regional defence, he told the reporters, “Singapore will provide no effective defence against any attack.”

By 1991, Dr Mahathir had pinpointed the crux of the two countries' *symbiotic relationship across all issues* when he commented that “an unstable Malaysia is not good for Singapore as much as an unstable Singapore is not good for Malaysia”. To underscore the close security interdependence of the two countries, Singapore Foreign Minister S. Dhanabalan declared in the aftermath of the Herzog affair: “We will not allow Singapore to be used to undermine the security and stability of Malaysia or any other ASEAN neighbour.” Clearly, this close interdependence has to be examined in both the material and ideational senses, as was done in this section.
3.13 Brunei's place in the maritime core sub-complex

The security complex perspective takes into account the historical legacy which shaped Brunei’s suspicions towards Indonesia and Malaysia. Like Singapore, Brunei is tiny and its security concerns centre on its survival. Its past experience has also made it wary of Indonesia and Malaysia. Like Indonesia and Malaysia, however, its majority population is Muslim-Malay (60 percent of the population of 270,000). While Singapore's strategic asset is its location as a communications crossroads, Brunei's is its rich oilfields. Like Malaysia and Singapore, it has to take cognizance of the physical presence of Indonesia. It had the unhappy experience of being an object of attention in the events preceding Sukarno's Confrontation and the formation of Malaysia. In the August 1962 Brunei legislative council elections, the left-leaning Parti Rakyat Brunei led by Indonesian-trained A.M. Azahari won all the contested seats. Egged on by both Indonesia and the Philippines, Azahari then led a revolt to prevent Brunei as well as Sabah and Sarawak from joining Malaysia. British forces quelled the insurrection.

Azahari fled to Indonesia while some of his fellow rebels found sanctuary in adjacent Limbang in Sarawak. The then Sultan, shocked by the vulnerability of Brunei's geographical division into two parts and aware of the attention on it as an oil-rich prize, especially after he declined to join Malaysia, did two things. First, he revived Brunei's claim to Limbang which had been annexed by the British in 1890. Secondly, he reaffirmed a need for British protection. But, as Antolik observed, this only put off the inevitable: “...ultimate British withdrawal and the challenge of co-existence with Malaysia and Indonesia”.

Thus, while the other three maritime core countries were seeking accommodation with each other from the mid-Sixties, and progressively shaping patterns of amity, Brunei remained wary of Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur. In turn, Malaysia and Indonesia continued to regard Brunei as potentially unstable, in the same manner they had regarded Singapore soon after the 1965 separation. In Singapore's case, it quickly established its legitimacy and international credentials. But in Brunei's case, Malaysia and Indonesia remained concerned that a radical regime might replace the
Sultan. Lim Joo-Jock has suggested that a 1975 Malaysian combined-arms seaborne landing exercise near Mersing on peninsula Malaysia's east coast, where the terrain is similar to Brunei's, tested its capability to project anti-insurgency forces into Brunei if need be.\textsuperscript{78} According to Leifer, Malaysia under Tun Abdul Razak had also conducted covert activities to foster political unrest within the Sultanate.\textsuperscript{79}

Nevertheless, after Datuk Hussein Onn became Malaysian Prime Minister in January 1976 on Razak's death, he discontinued the covert activities against Brunei and made efforts to heal relations with the sultanate.\textsuperscript{80} At the same time, Indonesia too was signalling that it sought better ties with Brunei and that its invasion of East Timor in December 1975 (and subsequent annexation of the territory in 1976) should not be a cause for alarm. To add to these complementary series of “pulls” was the “push” from the British, who now insisted that Brunei would have to be independent by the early 1980s.

Strictly viewed from the realist perspective, Brunei’s security dilemma would have been heightened and would have prompted it to try and seek alternative countervailing power. But, the attempts by Indonesia and Malaysia to forge amity met a positive response from Brunei, if with some caution. Furthermore, from the constructivist view, it may be argued that by the early 1980s, the regional identity of ASEAN was a positive one, and mutually reproduced among its members as the “ASEAN way”. Thus, upon independence from Britain in January 1984, Brunei immediately joined ASEAN. Like Singapore, it became a member as part of its survival strategy, that is, in order not to be isolated within the maritime core and the region. Beyond just this material factor, however, for Indonesia and Malaysia, Singapore's survival since 1965 as a politically stable small state had persuaded them to accept the idea that their security interests with regards to Brunei were better served with the tiny sultanate within the folds of ASEAN. In this respect, Brunei and Singapore have cultivated a shared identity, and its related norms, as small states whose interdependence transcended ethnic or cultural affinities.

Nevertheless, small states remain acutely conscious of the security dilemma. In foreign and defence policies, Brunei since independence has been cautiously
adopting a robust, realist outlook. It had clung to its dependency on British protection right till independence in 1984. Since then, however, Brunei has developed a close defence relationship with Singapore and allowed the latter to use its training facilities. In effect, this meant that at all times there would be elements of Singapore's armed forces (about 500 troops and some helicopters) deployed in Brunei.

More recent events have seen a Bruneian orientation towards wider defence ties within and without the maritime sub-complex. It agreed to work out a Memorandum of Understanding with the United States in July 1991 allowing visits by American warships.\(^8\) There has also been an annual *Kingfisher* series of exercises with the US armed forces.\(^9\) Unlike Singapore, however, Brunei's defence links with the United States remain tenuous but may yet expand. Brunei has begun sending observers to Five Power Defence Arrangements exercises but remains wary of joining the FPDA. Still, Brunei has started developing security cooperation with Malaysia. Apart from an intermittent series of bilateral naval exercises (*Hornbill*), the two countries in July 1993 conducted their first bilateral land exercise (*Malbru Setia*).\(^3\) In early 1994, Malaysia announced that it would station a squadron of its new Hawk jet trainers in Labuan (in Sarawak) and that Bruneian pilots -- who will also be getting Hawks -- will be invited to train jointly with its pilots.\(^4\)

Finally, Brunei -- like Indonesia and to a lesser degree Malaysia and Singapore -- suffers from the leadership succession problem, as noted earlier. Much depends on the present Sultan's ability to synthesize his vision of a status quo Malay Muslim Monarchy (Melayu Islam Beraja, or MIB) with the stresses and strains of modernization in a wealthy but societally weak state.\(^5\)

3.14 **The Thai-Malaysian and the Malaysia-Philippine-Indonesian sub-complexes**

This section's purpose is to draw out the main features of the security dynamics in the other two intra-ASEAN sub-complexes during the Cold War. In particular,
The Thai-Malaysian sub-complex: As discussed in Chapter 2, security cooperation in the Thai-Malaysian sub-complex (manifested in their General Border Committee) represents the “prototype” model which other ASEAN members have adopted. Yet there are problems. In brief, the peninsula Malaysia-Thai border has seen a chequered history of bilateral tensions and joint military action against Malayan Communist Party (MCP) guerillas. On the Thai side, an anti-communist sentiment and the recognition that an unstable porous border undermines bilateral ties are mixed with suspicions that Kuala Lumpur, while having benefited from their joint anti-communist actions, has not sufficiently reciprocated in helping Bangkok suppress its Muslim separatists. On the Malaysian side, just as the leaders in Kuala Lumpur are publicly constrained during dips in Singapore-Malaysia relations to curb “Singapore-bashing” because of the nature of Malaysian communal politics, similarly they cannot be publicly seen to crack down too hard on radical Muslim Malaysians (especially in Kelantan state) who campaign in support of the Thai Muslim separatists. Kuala Lumpur also wants “proof” that Thai Muslim fugitives who cross the border into Kelantan engage in terrorist activities.\[^{86}\]

The public surrender of the MCP guerillas in 1989 has removed part of the glue in Thai-Malaysian border cooperation. Thai political and military leaders have become more vocal in their allegations that Malaysian leaders at best dismiss the grievances and at worst covertly assist the Muslim irredentists. In the aftermath of a Muslim separatist ambush on a Thai army convoy in August 1993, Thai air force chief Gun Pimarnthip, a former military attache in Kuala Lumpur, alluded to support for the rebels from Kelantan state, where an Islamic party is in power. He said “it could probably be provided by a state near the border” adding that while Thailand trusted Malaysia, “we cannot overlook all possibilities concerning the issue”.\[^{87}\] In April 1994, following attacks on some Israelis in Bangkok, Permanent Interior Secretary Ari Wong-araya alleged that an unspecified neighbouring country was harbouring the “separatist” terrorists who committed the attacks. He added that security on the border with Malaysia had been tightened.\[^{88}\]
Thailand's major security concerns are focused on the Indochinese states and the protection of its EEZs. Nevertheless, increasing tensions between Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur over their land border cannot be ruled out. This might then spill over into their maritime boundaries. In this respect, both countries are beginning to watch each other's maritime buildup with some concern.

The Malaysia-Philippine-Indonesian sub-complex: Within this sub-complex, the security dynamics became progressively less conflictual after ASEAN was formed, that is, feelings of mutual suspicion became less intense, and a gradual shift towards feelings of amity was discernible. As discussed below, patterns of amity and enmity were thus transformed in an institutional situation.

Thus, in this sub-complex, in contrast to the signs of increasing (but carefully managed) tensions in the Thai-Malaysian sub-complex, there has been improved relations between Kuala Lumpur and Manila. The breakthrough began with President Ramos' visit to Kuala Lumpur in January 1993 and Prime Minister Mahathir's return visit to Manila in February 1994. Nevertheless, until their disputes over Sabah and fishery zones around the Sulu Sea are resolved, there will be periodic tensions over these issues.

Both Indonesia's and Malaysia's major security concerns are focused on the maritime core sub-complex. For Malaysia, however, within the Malaysia-Philippine-Indonesia sub-complex, it has to ensure that it has the capability to project its forces towards the defence of Sabah and Sarawak. There is currently no direct threat to these two states but their fractious domestic politicking, turbulent past and the experience of Confrontation are reminders of their vulnerability.

For Indonesia, its security concern in this sub-complex is a situation which destabilizes the Philippines' southern provinces. It is concerned that a radicalized Muslim insurgency in Mindanao will in turn provide moral and even material support to its radical Muslims in Kalimantan. If this were to happen, Indonesian security planners might well direct more attention to this sub-complex. Moreover,
Manila has not been able to eliminate the communist insurgency threat which has migrated from Luzon to Mindanao.

There is a certain ambivalence in Jakarta's and Manila's approaches towards each other. Indonesia and Malaysia had their interests in mind in their active lobbying on the Philippines' behalf in the Organization of the Islamic Conference in the late 1970s when the Moro insurrection was at its height, amplified by fears of Libyan involvement. Between October 1993 and November 1995, Jakarta hosted reconciliation talks between Manila and the Moro National Liberation Front. On the other hand, Indonesian leaders appear to be sometimes insensitive to Philippine politics. This was illustrated recently in the furore over the hosting of an international conference on East Timor at the University of the Philippines campus in May/June 1994. Foreign Minister Ali Alatas publicly demanded that Manila stop the conference, which had no official support or involvement. Manila, on the other hand, did not take early action to nip the issue in the bud, something Singapore or Malaysia would have done "in the ASEAN spirit". By seeming to prevaricate, Manila angered Jakarta, which proceeded to: (i) arrest Philippine fishermen for allegedly entering Indonesian waters; (ii) pull out some 200 Indonesian businessmen from a key regional conference in Davao City; (iii) threaten to pull out of a proposed East Kalimantan-Philippine economic arrangement; and (iv) hint that Indonesia would stop its mediation efforts over the Moro issue.

In the final analysis, the Philippines had declined in relative influence in ASEAN between the grouping's formative years and the end of the Cold War. One turning point was Indonesia taking the side of Malaysia when the Philippines raised the Sabah issue again in 1968. Moreover, in terms of security cooperation, it became the least active of the ASEAN members, highlighted especially by the American pullout from Clark Air Base and Subic Bay Naval Base in 1991-92, and the departure of the Singapore air force detachment in 1991 after the Mount Pinatubo eruption. Still, there is a joint border agreement with Indonesia to curb sea smuggling and piracy. Also, there are bilateral military exercises with other ASEAN members but these are currently not extensive because of the parlous state of the Philippine armed forces.
Nevertheless, in the aftermath of the American military pullout, the Philippines has been reintegrating into the ASEAN “security network” starting with its active participation in the ASEAN think tanks' review, in the early 1990s, of post-Cold War regional security trends. Bilaterally, its improved relations with Malaysia has resulted in an agreement in July 1993 which set up a joint commission. The commission's tasks include looking into: (i) a joint border patrol agreement similar to the Philippine-Indonesian one; (ii) possible cooperation in exploiting the maritime mineral resources in their disputed waters; (iii) forming a “growth triangle” covering the southern Philippines, Indonesian Kalimantan and east Malaysia (and Brunei); and (iv) resolving the issue of thousands of illegal Filipino workers in Sabah. Further bilateral defence cooperation may result.

3.15 Conclusion

The security complex was deployed in this chapter as a corrective complementary device. Furthermore, insights from constructivism could be utilized upon the identification of the local dynamics. In the period reviewed here (1945-75), the other two approaches, with their systemic, state-centric bias, could not satisfactorily account for state behaviour when local patterns of amity and enmity impacted on balance of power or institutional situations. For example, Burma’s foreign policy of neutralism was driven by material reasons (accommodation of China) as well as ideational reasons (amity based on the socialist identity). Similarly, although Burma was invited to join the pro-western ASEAN, its neutralist identity led it to reject the overture. Thus, while the structural features of the region generated intense security concerns, regional states did not always act on the basis of self-help or through the available interest-constituting institutions. As outlined in this chapter, the overall Southeast Asian security complex framework, by depicting both distribution of power concerns and patterns of amity/enmity, demarcated an arena wherein changing patterns of security relations could be better discerned. It was then found that, by disaggregating the overall security complex, smaller sets of sometimes
overlapping sub-regional dynamics could be identified and examined. With this in mind, the intramural dynamics among three maritime core countries – Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore – were examined in some detail. By carefully identifying the changing patterns of amity and enmity in this sub-complex, the security complex drew insights into enduring tensions and security concerns as well as efforts to manage disputes and to foster cooperation through mutually constructed understanding, including institutional norms. The analysis also highlighted the uncertainties of leadership succession in the maritime core. In sum, the security complex’s framework, while not generative, is a useful analytical tool, particularly in its analysis of security interdependence in both the material and ideational senses.

ENDNOTES


8Alagappa, op. cit., pp 11-12.


10Alagappa, op. cit., pp 11-25.


14 For a first-hand account by Singapore’s first ambassador to Indonesia, see Lee Khoon Choy, *Diplomacy of a Tiny State*, 2nd ed. (Singapore: World Scientific, 1993).


17 This dubious distinction needs to be qualified after July 1995, when Vietnam joined ASEAN; and July 1997, when Myanmar (Burma) and Laos joined the grouping. Vietnam and Malaysia do not have adjoining land or maritime borders but both are among multi-party claimants in the South China Sea disputes. Myanmar and landlocked Laos do not border Malaysia.


20 *ibid.*


Alagappa, op. cit., p. 10


Alagappa, op. cit., p. 13.

Antolik, op. cit., p. 51.

Ibid., p. 77

Ibid., pp 78-9.

Ibid., p. 79.

Due to intramural disagreements, Misuari could not keep the MNLF united. In 1978, a breakaway group formed the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). More recently, a radical splinter group from the MILF, Abu Sayyaf, was formed. “Mindanao’s Chance,” Asiaweek, 5 March 1999.

Alagappa, op. cit., p. 13.

With the Cold War context in mind, by “intra-ASEAN” for the rest of this chapter is meant the five founding ASEAN members plus Brunei.

Straits Times, 19 June 1996.

Straits Times, 20 June 1996.


Michael Leifer, ASEAN and the Security of South-East Asia, op. cit., p. 65.

Utusan Malaysia, 9 February 1990.


Utusan Malaysia, 9 February 1990.

The Straits Times newspaper gave prominent coverage to the issue, encouraged readers to write in and interviewed public figures and academics. Typical of the response from informed observers was political scientist Seah Chee Meow's: “Friendship should not lead to failure to appreciate each other's sensitivities. The exercise in Johor was inappropriate as it was meant to be a border exercise between Malaysia and Indonesia. It was also timed to cause unnecessary apprehension. Why should the climax of the exercise be on Aug 9 [Singapore's National Day]?” Straits Times, 10 August 1991.
The EAEC was first promoted by Mahathir in December 1990 as the pan-Asian East Asian Economic Group (EAEG), to be led by Japan as a counterweight to the European and North American trade blocs. The idea was adopted as the very much more modest EAEC by ASEAN at its fourth summit in Singapore in January 1992. Linda Y.C. Lim, “ASEAN: New Modes of Economic Cooperation,” in David Wurfel and Bruce Burton, eds., *Southeast Asia in the New World Order: The Political Economy of a Dynamic Region* (London: Macmillan, 1996), p. 21.


In his speech in July 1988 in Kuala Lumpur, before the Harvard Business School Alumni Club of Malaysia, Lee Hsien Loong said: “Suppose... by an accidental turn of events, Singapore found herself in charge of the southern parts of West Malaysia. How could 2.6 million Singaporeans occupy a vast territory many times the size of Singapore? How could we control the large, diverse and spread out population, several times larger than Singapore's? How would we handle sensitive and delicate religious and communal issues, in which we have no experience whatsoever, without violent reactions? Immediately Singapore would discover that she had simply added to her problems, both internally and internationally, and would wish a return to status quo ante. So any Singapore government would be crazy to try it.” *Straits Times*, 21 July 1988.


*Straits Times*, 3 August 1991.

One aim of Indonesia's Confrontation was to impose economic sanctions on Singapore on the assumption that the two-way smuggling activities would be hit. Needless to say, Indonesia's economy suffered as badly, if not more, during this period.

The emotional context of the August 9, 1965, separation can be gauged from the way leaders on both sides label the event. Singapore leaders use the terms “expelled” or “separated” while many Malaysian leaders choose the term “seceded”. The unpublished memoirs of the late Tun Dr Ismail Abdul Rahman, the then Malaysian Home Minister involved in the talks on Singapore's merger with Malaysia and subsequent separation from it, reveal that separation was by mutual agreement. His memoirs were obtained by the *Sunday Times* (Singapore) and published in its Sunday Review section of 20 September 1992.

The May 1969 racial riots in peninsula Malaysia illustrate the potential for a powder-keg situation to develop quickly where the racial balance is “unstable”, that is, where the main minority group -- the Chinese in this case -- is sizeable. The riots erupted in the aftermath of a general election which had polarised racial feelings. In contrast, in Indonesia, where the
Chinese comprise a very small minority, racial “riots” often occur in the aftermath of some socio-economic or political issue subsequently vented at the Chinese because of their perceived involvement, as was the case in post-September 1965 events, when large numbers of Chinese were killed because of the links between the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and the Chinese Communist Party.


62 Indonesia and Brunei also recalled their envoys. While Indonesian leaders were unhappy about the visit, they did not express it in the same intensity as Malaysian leaders did. But the Indonesia media did indulge in “Singapore-bashing”. Brunei has close relations with Singapore but felt it had to go along with the other two Muslim countries in expressing formal disapproval. The Herzog affair vividly exemplifies the security interdependence among the four countries.


64 *Foreign Broadcast Monitor* (Singapore), 25 March 1987.

65 *Berita Harian* (Malaysia), 9 October 1987.


70 *New Straits Times* (Malaysia), 7 December 1989 and 8 December 1989.


72 *Sunday Times* (Singapore), 12 December 1993.

73 Quoted in Alex Josey, *Lee Kuan Yew and the Commonwealth* (Singapore: Donald Moore Press, 1969), p. 79. The Tunku added that: “In time of war, Singapore should be declared a free area. If you drop ten bombs on Singapore, the whole island would be destroyed.”.


76 For most of its history, however, the Sultanate of Brunei included Sabah and Sarawak, and
at its zenith in the 16th century included the Sulu archipelago and much of the southern Philippines.

77 Antolik, op. cit., p. 84.


79 Leifer, ASEAN and the Security of South-East Asia, op. cit., p. 46.

80 ibid.


87 Sunday Times (Singapore), 22 August 1993.


91 Asiaweek, 5 March 1999.


93 ASEAN compilation, Asian Defence Journal, August 1993, p. 94.

94 See, for example, Straits Times, 7 March 1994.
CHAPTER 4

ASEAN'S COLD WAR EXTERNAL SECURITY CONCERN, 1975-91

The three Indochinese countries must constitute a single entity which cannot be distinguished.
-- Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach, in a speech in May 1980.1

There can... be no solution to the Kampuchean [Cambodian] problem if the legitimate security interests of ASEAN and Vietnam are not safeguarded. A solution must, therefore, incorporate a guarantee that Kampuchea will not pose a threat to its neighbours as well as the external powers who are indirect parties to the present conflict.
-- Singapore Foreign Minister S. Dhanabalan, addressing the June 1981 ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Manila.2

4.1 Introduction

The period between 1975 and 1991 saw several dramatic events taking place in Southeast Asia. In 1975, the communist forces triumphed militarily in Indochina but by 1989 Vietnam had been compelled to pull out of Cambodia. By 1991, however, the effects of major adjustments at the regional and great power levels were creating new regional uncertainties. The focus of this chapter is on ASEAN’s management of external security issues – the “Cambodian problem” in particular -- and will therefore incorporate its members’ concerns and behaviour with respect to the Indochinese countries and external powers.

The three approaches will be deployed in this chapter to examine two salient aspects of security interdependence in this period: (1) developments in ASEAN's strategic environment, with special attention to the "Cambodian problem"; and (2) the emergence of an economic dimension that impinged on ASEAN members' external security and which led to attempts to establish economic linkages within the
grouping and with external partners. As discussed in Chapter 3, the earlier period (1945-75) had been marked by the volatile processes of state-formation, identity-creation, and incipient institution-building. Self-help was evident; relations of amity, however, were retarded across the ideological divide. Significantly, the US decision to withdraw militarily from mainland Southeast Asia led to initial efforts by the ASEAN states to forge a new regional order which accommodated the resultant changes in power distribution. But, as discussed below, while China seized the opportunity to “open up” both diplomatically and in the economic arena, mutual suspicions emerged between ASEAN and reunited Vietnam. In this later period (1975-91), apart from the regional contest over politico-security order, a contest over economic order had also emerged.

4.2 The regional balance of power, 1975-78

In this section, the balance of power approach is deployed to assess its ability to explain actor behaviour in a period when two historical rivalries -- the Thai-Vietnamese and the Sino-Vietnamese -- began to intensify. It was noted in Chapter 2 that Cold War superpower rivalry introduced the effects of the global balance of power into Southeast Asia. The large-scale introduction of American troops into mainland Southeast Asia to engage directly in the local conflicts – and hence to internationalize them – was ideologically motivated, since America’s own survival was not at stake. In this context, the Guam Doctrine (1969) and the completion of US troop withdrawal (1973) saw Washington reverting to balance of power behaviour. But, contrary to the approach’s expectation, Washington subsequently failed to take advantage of Vietnam’s diplomatic overtures, as the latter sought to avoid over-reliance on its patron, the Soviet Union.

Although the Soviet Union continued to accord higher priority to the global contest, the rivalry between Moscow and Beijing over Indochina intensified. Regional states found after 1973 that they now had to pay greater attention to both China and the
Soviet Union. How the regional balance and the global (great power) balance evolved between 1975 and 1991 will now be discussed. An important aspect of this examination would be the interactions between the global and the ASEAN-Indochina balances as events began to build up towards the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, and thereafter, from December 1978 until the collapse of the Soviet Union in late 1991.

By the end of 1975, with all of Indochina under communist control, united Vietnam's emergence as a potential regional hegemon changed the regional situation in such a manner that two historical rivalries -- the Thai-Vietnamese and the Sino-Vietnamese -- began to intensify again. These two rivalries gained prominence at the same time as American strategic interest in Southeast Asia (shaped by domestic politics) was at a low point while, in contrast, Soviet interest was intensifying which impinged on China's interest. Also, instead of acquiescing in Vietnam’s hegemony, Cambodia began to assert its autonomy and to seek countervailing power.

Between April 1975 and December 1978, the ASEAN states lacked a consensus on a “clear and present” danger from Vietnam. In any case, they lacked the military capability or common purpose to organize militarily against a sudden direct threat. But Thailand was concerned about the likelihood of Vietnamese military preponderance in mainland Southeast Asia and, as will be described below, did undertake balance of power responses to the communist victories in Indochina. Vietnam, on its part, although flushed with victory, was still preoccupied with devising an Indochina strategy. This provoked a local balance of power response from Cambodia. This situation of flux potentially worked to the advantage of interested major powers prepared to ally, or consolidate existing alliances, with regional states.

But ASEAN members, while wary of Vietnam and uncertain about the future actions of the US, the Soviet Union and China, did not undertake any overt balancing initiatives. Instead, ASEAN members individually took a more indirect route to create a “favourable” regional balance: accommodation with China. In short, a
regional “balance” gradually developed between Vietnam and ASEAN after 1975 in the sense that mutual wariness developed between the grouping and Vietnam over each other's intentions. This mutual wariness came to be translated into “two very different and clearly conflictual conceptions of the preferred regional order or framework for the conduct of the region's international relations”. Only Vietnam's conception -- that “Indochina is a single strategic unit” -- can be usefully analyzed in balance of power terms, as it created a series of balancing moves among the three key actors: Vietnam, Thailand and Cambodia. In the ASEAN conception, coordinated balance of power actions were not undertaken. ASEAN members’ corporate efforts to achieve accommodation with Vietnam will be discussed in the institutional section, below. Briefly, these mainly diplomatic efforts undertaken between 1975 and 1978 failed to produce accommodation between the two sides, especially with regards to Thailand’s concerns about Vietnamese intentions.

Indeed, Vietnam – disregarding Thai concerns -- began to pressure Laos and Cambodia to sign so-called “friendship” treaties with it, effectively insisting that Indochina should come under its hegemony. Vietnam's pursuit of its preferred regional order came to be expressed in its attempt to dominate Laos and Cambodia, justified on the premise that Vietnam's national interest should be paramount in this special relationship. Laos acquiesced in this demand that it become a satellite state and in July 1977 signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Vietnam which interlocked the two countries' economic and security systems. Cambodia, even more strategic than Laos, was especially coveted by Vietnam as a satellite. Phnom Penh, however, resisted Hanoi's pressure. Border tensions built up, aggravating Thailand's security dilemma and setting the stage for China and the Soviet Union to become even more engaged, this time as opposing patron powers.

The issues facing, and actions taken by, Vietnam and Cambodia and their respective external backers over the 1975 events and the subsequent “Cambodian problem” have been well-covered by Indochina watchers. The momentum of Sino-Vietnamese and Thai-Vietnamese rivalries was incrementally stepped up after 1975. This may be observed in the individual actions taken by both regional and extra-
regional actors.

Phnom Penh’s behaviour was undoubtedly informed by balance of power concerns. Cambodia's fear of both Vietnam and Thailand had seen its incumbent strongman from Sihanouk to Lon Nol to Pol Pot attempt to involve external powers in its survival. Similarly, China’s behaviour as an external power, even before the post-1975 developments, was strongly informed by balance of power considerations.

Hanoi was to discover that even before unification, Beijing had considered the strategic implications of a united Vietnam: for example, in January 1974 it moved preemptively to seize the South Vietnamese-held Paracel Islands, claimed by China and the two Vietnams. More intriguingly,

... [if] an alleged South Vietnamese Foreign Ministry document made public by Hanoi in 1981 is genuine, US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, “look[ed] upon the conflict on the subject of the Hoang Sa [Paracel] Islands as a marginal problem, even an inconvenience, within the framework of the joint efforts with Communist China to contain North Vietnam”.7

If Hanoi felt aggrieved by Beijing's dismissive attitude towards their erstwhile “teeth and lips” relationship, the latter felt betrayed by the former's “ingratitude” in its revived territorial claims and in its perceived tilt towards Moscow after 1973 (when the Americans completed their military pullout from Indochina). China, despite its own needs, had provided North Vietnam with billions of dollars in aid during the Second Indochinese War. By 1978, the Sino-Vietnamese quarrel erupted into the open, triggered by Hanoi's expulsion of some 200,000 ethnic Chinese into China.

As for the Cambodian-Vietnamese relationship, almost immediately after their respective victories, tensions arose and border skirmishes erupted in early May 1975.8 Despite follow-on negotiations, these cross-border attacks persisted. Of greater concern for Hanoi was Phnom Penh's open tilt towards Beijing. The tit-for-tat game had begun. On 18 August, China pledged massive economic aid to a visiting Cambodian delegation; on 30 October, the Soviet Union pledged long-term economic aid to Vietnamese leader Le Duan during a state visit. By early 1976 (6
February), China had signed a secret military aid agreement with Cambodia; a year later, on 24 February 1977, Beijing curtly informed Hanoi it was not getting any new aid. Vietnam, meanwhile, scrambled to seek a resumption of diplomatic ties with the US (it failed to do so), but in a major diplomatic coup which underlined great power interests at work, China and the US announced on 15 December 1978 their normalization of ties. Earlier, on 28 June 1978, Vietnam had joined the Soviet economic bloc, COMECON. On 3 November, a 25-year Soviet-Vietnamese Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was signed, and on 25 December, Vietnam launched its invasion of Cambodia. In this series of events, the only actor which did not behave in balance of power terms was the United States, which did not take advantage of the Vietnamese overtures. In this case, domestic US politics was the overriding constraint on US foreign policy. However, the balance of power approach does not account for domestic politics and is unable to explain the US behaviour.

As for the ASEAN members, they had already individually adjusted to the earlier withdrawal of American ground forces from mainland Southeast Asia. For example, Malaysia, despite its wariness of China, had taken the initiative in 1974 to establish diplomatic relations with it, thus recognizing for the first time Beijing's legitimate role in regional affairs. Thailand, always alert to changing balances, had by 1972 sent out feelers to China that it sought diplomatic relations as soon as was practicable. In July 1975, three months after the fall of Saigon (now known as Ho Chi Minh City) and Phnom Penh, Thailand established diplomatic relations with China and quickly moved to reconcile with the Khmer Rouge regime.

With regards to relations between Vietnam and ASEAN members, the former between 1976 (that is, following formal unification) and 1978 did actively engage in regional diplomacy although this did not include relations with ASEAN as an organization. As already noted, in the immediate aftermath of the 1975 events, the Thai-Vietnamese relationship was an uneasy one, as seen in Vietnamese deputy foreign minister Phan Hien's visit to ASEAN and other Southeast Asian capitals in July 1976. Bangkok was omitted from his itinerary. But by mid-1978, Hanoi had
opened or resumed diplomatic and/or trade relations with all five ASEAN members. In July 1978, Phan Hien visited ASEAN capitals again, declared that Vietnam now accepted ASEAN and announced support for ZOPFAN. To cap this “peace offensive”, Prime Minister Pham Van Dong himself visited ASEAN capitals in September-October and offered to sign bilateral treaties of friendship and non-aggression. But ASEAN members co-ordinated their responses and declined the offer. This united front proved diplomatically astute, for two months later Vietnam invaded Cambodia -- after securing the friendship treaty with the Soviet Union.

In summary, the discussion above suggests that the use of the term “local balance” or “regional balance” from the period 1975-78 may be justified in the sense that an incipient balance was shaping up, centred on Thai-Vietnamese rivalry. This balance became more palpable when Cambodia after December 1978 became the vortex for regional and external power rivalries (the subject of the next section). However, from the discussion above, one key player, the United States, failed to act according to balance of power expectations.

4.3 Balance of power, 1978-91: The regional-global intersection

This section examines the intensification of the global and regional rivalries over Cambodia, with the US eventually using its diplomatic and economic power to help consolidate the alignment against the Soviet-Vietnamese coalition. By 1973, all US ground forces had been withdrawn from Indochina, and the 1969 Guam Doctrine was taking effect after nearly a decade of direct US engagement. The period 1975 to 1991 saw the US concentrating on its rivalry with the Soviet Union on strategic issues elsewhere, and as a consequence, it played a rather passive (if still important) role in Southeast Asia. In contrast, the Soviet Union was presented with the opportunity of securing strategic gains through closer ties with Vietnam at China's expense; by the mid-1980s, however, Moscow -- overextended globally -- was disengaging from the region. China, meanwhile, was steadily consolidating its
position as a major factor in ASEAN security thinking. These shifts in power among the key external actors, which fuelled continued uncertainty in ASEAN's regional security environment, will now be discussed.

From the balance of power perspective, the Cold War strategic *leitmotif* was the fluid US-led global balance against the Soviet Union (and its allies including Vietnam) until 1989-91. As Chapter 2 demonstrated, the global balance was initially driven by the postwar American Containment policy which portrayed an attempt at global and regional domination by a Sino-Soviet communist axis. To the US, North Vietnam was the two communist powers' proxy in Southeast Asia. The Sino-Soviet split in the early 1960s gradually modified this US-led global balance and permitted the US and China to draw closer but until 1975, North Vietnam continued to derive benefit from this global rivalry. After 1975, united Vietnam increasingly depended on the Soviet Union for diplomatic, economic and military support in tandem with its deteriorating relations with China.

Within ASEAN, Bangkok's balance of power tendency led it to both seek countervailing power against, as well as accommodation towards, Hanoi. With regards to the US, Thailand sought continued military assistance while also asking that the highly visible American military facilities be removed. However, Thai attempts at conciliatory overtures to Vietnam met with an initial rebuff. When Vietnam launched its December 1978 invasion of Cambodia, Thailand and China -- in a secret meeting on 14 January 1979 -- agreed to support the Khmer Rouge's guerilla war against the Vietnamese invaders and the Heng Samrin regime installed by Hanoi. For Thailand, the prospect of Cambodia's removal as a buffer against Vietnam posed a security threat. To the Thais, China had become “a friend who was the enemy of my enemy”. For China, the invasion was seen as “part of a Soviet scheme of encirclement with Vietnam in the role of an oriental Cuba”. On 17 February, China launched a 16-day border war against Vietnam to ostensibly teach it “a lesson”.

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From the balance of power perspective, the increasing involvement of the Soviet Union over Cambodia began to attract Chinese and American countervailing involvement which led to a stalemate, as discussed below. For the Soviet Union, the November 1978 Soviet-Vietnamese treaty marked a new active phase of interest in Southeast Asia, after the setback in Sukarno's Indonesia some 15 years earlier. Again, as in the earlier period, the calculus of this Soviet opportunistic entree was the major power-level rivalry. As Geoffrey Jukes notes:

... the United States and most of its allies chose to locate the [Vietnamese] invasion on the larger international chessboard of superpower relations, as did China, and the Soviets themselves reinforced this pattern of thought by exploiting the Chinese invasion of Vietnam in the following year to secure basing rights for warships at Cam Ranh Bay and aircraft at Da Nang.16

Once again in Indochina, events between 1978-79 (and 1985-86, as discussed below) on the Indochina chessboard moved towards a military stalemate. For the next 10 years (1979-89), ASEAN was engaged in a diplomatic drive to force Vietnam to abandon its occupation of Cambodia. It will be shown, below, that there were limits to Vietnam's use of military power (despite Soviet military and economic aid) as well as China's use of countervailing power in support of Thailand, resulting in a military stalemate at the regional level.

Vietnam, from the balance of power perspective, was to find that its diplomatic isolation and military “overreach” would eventually force it to give up its strategic goal of a Hanoi-dominated Indochina when the major powers began to disengage from the Cambodian issue. On the other hand, as discussed below, China was to gain strategically from the issue.

By February 1979, Vietnam had achieved its political objective of a special relationship within Indochina by concluding a friendship treaty with Cambodia (similar to the one with Laos). The preservation of a friendly puppet government in Phnom Penh was deemed a major foreign policy goal and the situation in Cambodia was deemed “irreversible”. Ironically, Vietnam committed the error of overextending
itself militarily in Cambodia despite having won the earlier war by trapping the Americans in this manner. In essence, it forgot that its commitment of large numbers of troops and external support in the form of Soviet economic and military aid were not a sufficient condition for victory if the anti-Vietnamese forces, also generously supplied externally and provided with sanctuaries in Thailand (now backed by China), could force a long-drawn war of attrition. Increasing Vietnamese frustration on the battlefield was evidenced by Hanoi’s use of chemical weapons during 1981-82 against the Khmer Rouge (and civilians under its protection). Assessing the situation in early 1985, Chang Pao-min provides the kernel of the stalemate:

As neither China nor Vietnam is prepared to make any concessions, the outcome of the Sino-Vietnamese conflict over [Cambodia] depends to a large extent upon the ability of the [Cambodian] resistance forces to withstand Vietnam’s growing military pressure and to continue to expand their base of popular support. It also depends upon the successful cooperation of all anti-Vietnamese forces, which is crucial to retaining at least the international diplomatic support the resistance movement has been enjoying. So far the Khmer Rouge has repeatedly thwarted Vietnam's dry-season offensives, including the most recent and hitherto most intensive onslaught by the Vietnamese forces, thereby demonstrating its political resilience and military credibility. It is also remarkable that the otherwise intense mistrust between Sihanouk, Son Sann, and the Khmer Rouge has proven to be much less than their common hatred of the Vietnamese, in spite of the recurrent signs of strains between the three strange bedfellows.

The Chinese, moreover, had correctly assessed the limits of Soviet influence in Southeast Asia and elsewhere. In December 1980, Deng Xiaoping had said: “It is wise for China to force the Vietnamese to stay in [Cambodia], because that way they will suffer more and more.” What was left unstated was that Vietnam's patron, the Soviet Union, would begin to suffer as well. Soviet economic assistance to Vietnam came to US$1 billion annually while military assistance averaged US$1.5 billion annually between 1982 and 1986. The Soviet Union had also become bogged down in its own “Vietnam” having invaded Afghanistan in December 1979. At the superpower level, the advent of the Reagan administration in 1981 saw an accelerated US-Soviet arms race and increased American sponsorship of Cambodian and Afghan anti-Soviet resistance forces. On the other hand, the Reagan
administration also provoked the Chinese by calling into question a basic premise of Sino-American rapprochement: Taiwan's future. A resurgent America behaving in balance of power terms and able to capitalize on Sino-Soviet rivalry was not necessarily advantageous to the Soviet Union or China in the global balance.

*The intersection of the global and regional balances at the Cambodian issue from this point was critical.* The evidence is that, by 1985, Vietnam -- still counting on Soviet support -- was contemplating a phased, but eventually complete, withdrawal of its forces from Cambodia. There was a mood prevailing in Hanoi that the Vietnamese-installed regime in Phnom Penh was capable of assuming its own defence. Meanwhile, new Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, who became general secretary of the Soviet communist party in March 1985, now began to give primacy to economic reforms and improving relations with China. This was made public in a speech he made in Vladivostok on 28 July 1986; Beijing's response was positive. Indeed, the 1984-85 Vietnamese dry season offensive in Cambodia did not provoke a Chinese show of support for the Khmer Rouge or the ever-watching Thais. According to Leszek Buszynski, this was because, among other reasons

the Chinese apparently had no desire to confront the new Soviet leader with a crisis which would set back Sino-Soviet relations.... China had moved away from the strategy of confronting Vietnam militarily, which had characterized its policy over the Cambodian issue in the early 1980s. The Chinese, like the Russians, now began to disentangle a complex issue by resort to incentives for compromise, in recognition that a confrontative posture would simply strengthen the Soviet-Vietnamese alliance.

One final entanglement remained. This was the long-standing Chinese demand -- reiterated by Deng Xiaoping in September 1986 -- that Sino-Soviet rapprochement required removal of the “three obstacles”: Soviet troops in Afghanistan, the concentration of forces along the Sino-Soviet border, and Soviet support for the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia. The Soviet pledge to begin the process of removing these obstacles satisfied the Chinese. Following these key accommodations, other developments fell into place. Foremost was Hanoi's commitment to continue its phased withdrawal from Cambodia, this time with Soviet
encouragement. Vietnam announced, despite initial scepticism by ASEAN members, that it had completely pulled out of Cambodia in September 1989.

Meanwhile, the diplomatic initiatives to secure a political solution among the Cambodian factions, begun by ASEAN using the Jakarta Informal Meetings (JIM) format, developed into the United Nations-supervised peace process brokered by the external powers. Thus, by the end of 1989, “the Cambodian conflict had become detached from global considerations as a consequence of detente and even more striking global changes”. In effect, the great powers had removed Cambodia from their global rivalry and ASEAN could do little to restrain the factional fighting in the country. Thereafter it was the United Nations, with great power support, which arranged a ceasefire in 1991.

By focussing on the structural effects of the changing distribution of power, and by emphasizing “interest defined as power”, the balance of power approach provided a broad canvas of the changes in ASEAN’s strategic environment over the Cambodia issue between 1975 and 1991. From its perspective, with the exception of the United States, the key actors engaged in the issue certainly acted on the basis of self-help. In this view, within ASEAN, Thailand appeared to be the only member with a direct self-interest to contest Vietnam’s military position in Cambodia and to seek the help of a more powerful ally in this engagement. Finally, while the approach may have been criticized for emphasizing the interests of the major powers in regional affairs, with respect to this period of Southeast Asia’s history, such a view has not been entirely inaccurate.

4.4 Balance of power and the international political economy

This section advances the argument that in the global and regional rivalries over the Cambodia issue between 1978 and 1991, military power was only part of the “contest” involving material capabilities. The other part was the power of the so-
called global economy led by the United States. Although militarily weak, ASEAN members (separately, and in varying degrees) integrated into the global economy and was therefore able – together with the US and China -- to leverage on that power to effectively balance against the Soviet-Vietnamese coalition. In a nutshell, ASEAN held the economic edge in the “contest” involving both strategic and economic relative gains.

Neoliberals link economics and security on the premise that cooperation promotes states’ national interests when “positive-sum” outcomes are possible. In contrast, realists/neorealists traditionally emphasize competition and “zero-sum” outcomes. Furthermore, the economic dimension of security is usually understood by realists/neorealists to mean the economic capabilities that, together with military capabilities, enhances a state’s power in the international system. Realism makes no conscious effort to explore this dimension other than to note that a state’s material power is derived especially from its military and economic capacity. In this section, however, it will now be argued that balance of power’s assumption of the primacy of power or security renders it useful in identifying the competitive aspect of the economic dimension. In other words, this section will now relate balance of power behaviour to self-help “competition” in the international political economy. There was an economic contest in that the so-called free market system was associated with the West while the planned economies were associated with communist and socialist countries. As it turned out, the free market system became the “global economy”.

In applying this argument in this section, Vietnamese military power may be said to be constrained by Chinese military power and international diplomacy; on the other hand, the ASEAN members became increasingly economically secure through their links with the global economy. As will be argued, by the end of the Cold War, Vietnam and its patron, the Soviet Union, lost in both the military and economic senses taken together. In short, by the end of the 1980s, the imperative of having to integrate into the dynamic global economy was no longer a choice, military power notwithstanding. This economic reality had been masked so long as strategic rivalry
occupied centre-stage. The economic dimension was not salient in Chapter 2, covering the period 1945-75, because the focus was on the dynamics of state formation and early regionalism (in the case of ASEAN) in terms of confidence building among still mutually suspicious entities. It is from the period reviewed in this chapter that the emergence of this competitive economic dimension is noticeable.

It may now be argued that, with hindsight, during the earlier period of the Cold War, the direct US military role in Indochina “bought time” for the non-communist states to build up their economies. China, moreover, was a comparatively closed economy as were the wartorn Indochinese states. Thus, during the 1945-75 period, the five countries that became the founding ASEAN member-states were in the early stages of integrating into the global economy underpinned by the US security umbrella and, in the Asia-Pacific, by Japan's emerging economic power.

Given this wider contest -- that is, in the arena of the international political economy -- between the communist and non-communist states of Southeast Asia especially after 1975, the following observations may be made. First and foremost, regardless of regional concerns over the American commitment to maintain a military presence, the US retained an extensive security network which China by the middle to late 1970s began to quietly encourage as part of its anti-Soviet posture and as part of its market opening to the West. Secondly, regional economies from China to tiny Singapore -- with the exception of the Indochinese countries -- came to share a common dependence on access to Western, especially the US, markets and knowledge base for their consumer exports and economic infrastructures.

Thus, a military situation existed which was uncertain at worst, but not necessarily unfavourable to the militarily weak ASEAN states; and an economic situation existed which was initially favourable to ASEAN and thereafter consolidated upon by ASEAN (slowed down only for a few years during the world recession of the mid-1980s). In turn, ASEAN's growing economic dynamism enabled its members,
with the exception of the economically-lagging Philippines, to improve the quality of their armed forces and re-equip them with modern weapon systems. Indeed, ASEAN members embarked on separate force modernization programmes after Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia in 1978. To reiterate, the ASEAN side of this economic security/military security equation was underwritten by Western and Japanese interests and the institutions supporting the global economy, while the Soviet Union and its economic bloc, COMECON, attempted to play that role for Vietnam and Laos. Vietnam itself attempted to impose its military and economic hegemony over Laos and Cambodia.

Vietnam's road to its disastrous economic situation between 1975 and the end of the Cold War may be traced to the initial push and pull factors. Ralph Smith notes that:

In principle, it would have been possible, in the years immediately following reunification, for Vietnam to develop its economy on the basis of a continuing balance between Soviet and Chinese aid and a limited measure of non-communist trade and investment -- underwritten by Hanoi's membership of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Asian Development Bank. But Soviet insistence on playing the dominant role, and China's unwillingness to take second place, forced Vietnam to choose between its two powerful allies. The failure of the Vietnamese prime minister, Pham Van Dong, to secure a major commitment from France in the spring of 1977, combined with the breakdown of talks with the United States and a congressional resolution (4 May 1977) which prohibited any grant of economic aid to Vietnam, made it easier for [party leader] Le Duan to respond favourably to Soviet offers (or pressure). As a result Vietnam sought a special relationship with the CMEA [COMECON] in July 1977 and joined as full member one year later.29

In contrast, ASEAN as a grouping continued to do well economically, despite the recession of the mid-1980s. ASEAN members were also relatively free of dependence on foreign aid. Finally, ASEAN members' free market orientation enabled them to hunch together in their economic diplomacy as well, resulting in the creation of dialogue partner status for ASEAN's key trading partners, especially the United States, Japan and the European Community. Japan, in particular, became a major trade and investment partner to the ASEAN members. China's opening up to
Western trade and investments from the late 1970s, and the quest for international markets for its exports, meant also that Beijing -- like Japan -- began to have an economic interest in ASEAN's economic well-being.

Thus, by the time the Cold War was coming to an end, this regional contest could not be sustained by the Soviet Union and Vietnam (China was now “on the other side”). When Gorbachev became Soviet leader in 1985, he emphasized economic reforms over great power rivalry. The economically progressive ASEAN states were now seen as potential trading partners, to be wooed. Soviet signals that it was disengaging from the Cambodian issue were in effect signals that, in Southeast Asia, it had “lost” in the economic contest as well. In tangible terms, it led to Soviet acquiescence in Chinese demands over the “three obstacles”, noted earlier. Indeed, the accelerating abandonment of Hanoi by Moscow was a factor which induced the Vietnamese leaders to pull out the bulk of Hanoi's troops from Cambodia by September 1989. Hanoi still hoped to sustain a pro-Vietnamese regime in Cambodia even as it realized its hoped-for Indochinese federation had all but vanished. Its continued isolation, as the Soviet Union collapsed, led to a reassessment. Hanoi had to strike a deal with China, and secret talks held at Chengdu in 1990 were the first step. For China, the decline of the Soviet Union lessened Beijing's anxiety about Moscow's use of Vietnam and Cambodia as part of an encirclement of China.30

But Hanoi's fear of isolation persisted, both in the military-security and economic-security sense. The withdrawal of Soviet patronage exposed Vietnam's vulnerability on several levels. The American embargo was hurting not only in bilateral terms. American influence over allies like Japan and international agencies like the World Bank made them less than forthcoming in providing economic assistance. It became necessary therefore to renew efforts to woo the Americans. Then there was Vietnam's relationship with China. The Vietnamese leadership was split on the extent Hanoi should “kowtow” to China. Finally, accommodation with ASEAN was now also deemed necessary and increasingly mutually attractive. First, at least two ASEAN members, Indonesia and Malaysia, were openly apprehensive about China's
long-term objectives in the region and therefore inclined to see Vietnam as a potential buffer. Secondly, reformers among the Vietnamese leadership saw ASEAN's economic dynamism and expertise as assets which could be tapped by Hanoi. As early as November 1990, Vietnamese Prime Minister Do Muoi had declared: “We wish to join ASEAN very much. Joining ASEAN would be helpful. We need more friends to build our country.”

Thirdly, even hardline ASEAN states like Singapore saw Vietnam as a trade and investment partner, and a potential security partner.

In sum, then, ASEAN’s sense of regional security after 1979 became progressively more self-confident. The US military presence continued to be accepted as legitimate even though nationalist pressure against its location in the Philippines was mounting in Manila. Economically, ASEAN was integrated into the global market. In contrast, on all these counts, Vietnam fared poorly. It acquired pariah status even as it was being drawn increasingly into the Soviet orbit. Already suffering under the American economic embargo, it found that economic dogma and membership of COMECON made it a supplier of cheap labour and goods to Eastern Europe while its own people were being denied consumer goods. Militarily, it faced Chinese pressure on its northern borders and became increasingly bogged down in Cambodia. The Soviet military presence in Vietnam increased in the early 1980s, preventing sympathetic ASEAN countries like Indonesia from being more vocal in seeking dialogue with Vietnam.

4.5 Balance of power approach, 1975-91: A summary

To summarize this review of the period 1975-91, the main strength of the balance of power approach lies in its identification of power rivalries at both the global and regional levels. These were of such intensity that there was no prospect of a convergence of interests among the Southeast Asian states and the involved external powers as to the preferred order for the region. By default (and contrary to balance of
power expectations), the US chose to be a passive player as Sino-Soviet rivalry intensified and subsumed the regional rivalries under the global rivalry. To the extent that both China and the US provided adequate security guarantees to Thailand, the ASEAN member most affected by the Cambodian problem, Bangkok was willing to bear the cost of aligning with China and providing sanctuaries to the anti-Vietnamese resistance forces.

Apart from the strategic dimension, in this period under review, it was found that the balance of power approach could be linked to the economic dimension of the ASEAN-Vietnamese contest if viewed in the context of rivalry in the international political economy. The mutually reinforcing tendencies of security and economics kept the ASEAN members individually integrated into the Western-led global network while the communist Southeast Asian countries remained backward and isolated. At this stage, however, the demands on ASEAN cohesion imposed by these links to external actors and organizations were minimal.

4.6 The institutional approach: ASEAN's tenuous cohesion

The victory of communist forces in Indochina in 1975 jolted ASEAN to move from its formative, intramural-centred phase to a more externally-oriented phase, in the course of which the grouping’s cohesion was tested over the Cambodian issue. Nevertheless, the event may be said to have accelerated ASEAN’s institutional development. In this section, the institutional approach will be assessed in terms of its ability to explain ASEAN members’ behaviour in the institutional setting during the period reviewed.

The question of payoffs and the risk of defections from the coalition are relevant here. In a balance of power context, all payoffs are in relative gain terms, that is, self-interest and concerns about relative gains determine state behaviour. In the institutional context, however, an institution is constitutive yet reflects calculations of
self-interest. Thus, defections may not occur because the relative gain benefits from
doing are outweighed by the absolute gain benefits the institution is supposed to
provide, even if some perceived interests may have to be constrained. In the case of
ASEAN, in the period reviewed, under what circumstances did one (or more)
member find its interests constrained by corporate actions or inactions, and what
took place subsequently?

Since ASEAN's inception in 1967, member-states had held differing strategic
perceptions about other regional states and the external powers (for that matter,
among the national policy-making elites, perceptions differed). Until the events of
December 1978 and February 1979, however, ASEAN never had to consider the
prospect of a defection over an external issue.

ASEAN convened its first summit in Bali in February 1976 “as a direct response to
the communist domination of Indochina”. 32 Carlyle Thayer has suggested that, until
1975, ASEAN as an organization could do little but to adopt a “wait and see” attitude
towards Indochina. 33 The communist victories in Indochina in 1975 “served to
awaken ASEAN from years of torpor”. 34 At this stage, the potential for Vietnam to
become a regional hegemon and therefore a threat to Thailand was still
indeterminate. In this sense, ASEAN's corporate actions such as the Bali summit
were still in the nature of symbolic support for Thailand. Michael Leifer notes that:

Not even Thailand's government had expectations of an imminent military
threat. Defence expenditure did not rise markedly as a direct consequence of
revolutionary political change in Indochina. Under the circumstances, it was
deemed appropriate to convene the first meeting of ASEAN's heads of
government not as an expression of collective panic but to invest the
Association formally with a political identity. 35

Thus, on the diplomatic front, ASEAN attempted without too much insistence soon
after April 1975 to engage the victory-flushed Hanoi leadership in a dialogue.
Vietnam's response was to accuse ASEAN of being a military bloc aligned with the
West.
The period between April 1975 and December 1978 was one of uncertainty and adjustments. The US sought no active role but the Soviet Union and China had become more actively engaged. Laos had settled into being a satellite of Vietnam (and an acceptable buffer in Thailand's eyes) but Cambodia had become increasingly embroiled in border clashes with Vietnam. It was Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia on 25 December 1978 which once again removed Cambodia's buffer role between Vietnam and Thailand; and once again re-introduced great power intervention. It also finally unleashed a frenzy of ASEAN diplomatic initiatives on behalf of its mainland member, beginning with the ASEAN foreign ministers' swift condemnation (on 13 January 1979) of the attack.

ASEAN's diplomatic support for Thailand, however, proved inadequate. As noted earlier, Thailand and China entered into a de facto alignment, which was followed by the Chinese attack on Vietnam in February 1979. Despite the concerns that Indonesia and Malaysia had about China as a long-term threat to the region, failure on the part of ASEAN to collectively support Thailand (and implicitly, the Sino-Thai alignment) would have weakened the grouping and might even have prompted Bangkok to question the usefulness of ASEAN. The result was intramural tensions throughout the long-drawn Cambodian issue.

Thus, over this important issue of Cambodia between 1979 and 1989, ASEAN members were faced with the question of the degree to which they were prepared to surrender their foreign policy agendas in deference to Thailand's. Conversely, having secured the other members' general support, how much flexibility did Thailand have in adapting to changing situations in pursuit of its own interests? To the extent that ASEAN members perceived that absolute gain benefits from the institutional setting could outweigh the relative gain benefits from pursuing self-interests outside it, intramural compromise was possible. In other words, the culture of cooperation that ASEAN members had fostered among themselves since 1967 was regarded as an absolute gain benefit acquired within the institutional setting. One expression of this
culture of cooperation was the development of the norms of consensus and consultation which, until 1975, centred on intramural issues.

The development of a culture of consensus and consultation on external issues only became more urgent after 1975. Leszek Buszynski notes that Vietnam's reunification... was the first stage in this development when ASEAN members feared the emergence of a major communist threat. The Bali summit of ASEAN leaders, held in February 1976 and convened as a direct response to the communist domination of Indochina, was a landmark in ASEAN's history. Decisions were made at this first ASEAN Summit as part of an effort towards institutionalization of the organization; as a consequence the ASEAN secretariat was established in Jakarta in 1981. Vietnam's invasion of [Cambodia] in December 1978 was a second stage in ASEAN's development when an immediate consensus was formed in opposition to the Vietnamese action.36

In retrospect, while the 1967-78 period tested ASEAN's intramural capabilities, the period 1978-91 tested ASEAN's ability to create the abovementioned “immediate consensus” and to generally sustain it throughout the 10-year Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia. The existence of this consensus did not mean that conflicts of interest would not arise. But it did mean, as discussed below, that such tests of cohesion need not be fatal to the institution.

Consensus was easily, and unanimously, achieved on the simple fact of Vietnam's illegal occupation of Cambodia. After all, ASEAN's institutional creed enshrined national sovereignty and territorial integrity as cherished values. Indeed, the ASEAN foreign ministers acted quickly and met in Bangkok on 12 and 13 January 1979, to condemn the attack37. ASEAN solidarity was also in evidence at the United Nations. ASEAN collectively began working hard to get the West and Japan to impose economic sanctions and to punish Vietnam at the United Nations as well as to unseat the Vietnamese-installed Heng Samrin regime. These tasks required tight solidarity and effort because of the international antipathy towards the ousted Khmer Rouge's reign of terror from 1975-78. A resolution introduced in the UN Security Council calling for the withdrawal of “all foreign forces” from Cambodia was, predictably,
vetoed by the Soviet Union. But in September 1979, the UN General Assembly (UNGA) voted, by 71 to 35, not to unseat the ousted Democratic Kampuchea (DK) government in favour of the Heng Samrin regime. ASEAN was ready to sponsor its own UNGA resolution on 14 November 1979. Calling for the cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Cambodia, it was carried by 91 votes to 21.38

Towards these efforts to ensure Vietnam did not profit from its invasion, ASEAN came up with several other initiatives, the most important being the UN-sponsored International Conference on Kampuchea (ICK) held in July 1981, which served as the basis for subsequent efforts to end the conflict. The ICK called for a ceasefire and the withdrawal of all foreign forces; appropriate arrangements to ensure that armed Cambodian factions would not be able to prevent or disrupt the holding of free elections (to be held under UN supervision); respect for Cambodian neutrality; and a programme of international aid.40

Furthermore, whereas in 1976 Vietnam was able to get ASEAN's ZOPFAN formula struck off the final resolution of the Non-Aligned Movement's summit in Colombo, by the 1979 summit in Havana, ASEAN was able to mobilize a number of NAM member states to condemn Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia. At the United Nations General Assembly, from 1979 to 1989, ASEAN prevailed in preventing the Vietnamese-installed People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) government of Heng Samrin (and later, Hun Sen) from assuming Cambodia's seat at the UNGA. ASEAN diplomacy also bore fruit in persuading European states and Australia to terminate their aid programmes to Vietnam.

Thus, in general, where absolute gains were attainable without constraining interests, ASEAN unity was not tested. ASEAN’s achievement as a diplomatic community acting on behalf of Thailand should be seen in this light.

However, over the 10 years from 1979 to 1989, ASEAN’s unity was tested whenever
conflicts of state interests or changing interests could not be easily accommodated intramurally. Generally, breaks in ASEAN solidarity surfaced because of Thailand's insecurity and the persistent problem of uncoordinated initiatives by ASEAN members pursuing their agendas. The most notable instance of the former was Thailand's 1979 alignment with China. The 1980 Indonesia-Malaysian initiative, dubbed the Kuantan Principle; and the so-called Thai “turnaround” on Indochina in 1988, are illustrative of the latter issue. These three issues will now be discussed.

*Thailand’s Alignment with China:* On the first issue, to the extent that Thailand and China had engaged in a de facto alliance against Vietnam, what kind of support was ASEAN to give to them without being seen to be an anti-Vietnamese bloc, especially after China's (albeit brief) invasion of Vietnam's border regions?

The intramural point of contention was Thailand's alignment with China, given expression in the de facto alliance concluded between Thai premier Kriangsak Chomanan and Chinese politburo member Geng Biao and vice-foreign minister Han Nianlong in Utapao on 14 January 1979. Their collaboration, which made both parties allies of the Khmer Rouge, included the use of Thai territory to supply the Chinese-backed Khmer Rouge, provide transport and transit facilities for Cambodian personnel and materiel, and help Khmer Rouge leaders make foreign trips through Thailand. Nayan Chanda judged that this collusion “proved to be the beginning of the most significant strategic relationship developed by Beijing in post-Vietnam [War] Southeast Asia”. The Chinese, in a *quid pro quo* gesture, cut off support for the Communist Party of Thailand. Prime minister Kriangsak also secured a public reiteration of the US security guarantee. Leifer notes that “ASEAN constituted only a lesser complementary resource which Thailand's regional partners felt obliged to place at its service”.

Within ASEAN, this joint Sino-Thai argument that a Soviet-backed Vietnam was a *direct threat* to ASEAN members was only supported by Singapore. The others, particularly Indonesia and Malaysia, expressed anxieties about changes in the
regional balance of power amid renewed great power competition. If Thailand represented the hardline position on Vietnam, Indonesia represented the voice of caution. Jakarta felt a certain affinity with Hanoi, in terms of their respective revolutionary struggles against colonial powers. It sympathized with Hanoi's need to create security buffers against Beijing. Indonesia held the belief that China was potentially the longer-term hegemonic threat and that Vietnam could become the buffer for the ASEAN members.

These fundamental, if purposely kept low-profile, conflictual interests were already evidenced in the five foreign ministers' statement of 13 January 1979 which condemned “foreign aggression” rather than identified Vietnam by name. As noted by Thayer, this muted ASEAN collective response was partly attributed to Indonesia, then chairman of the grouping's standing committee. Thus, the tensions within ASEAN over a major external issue, the Cambodian problem and Thailand’s resultant alignment with China, can be explained by the institutional approach as resulting from divergent strategic perceptions and interests. But an institution is weakened only if the payoffs from membership are low. In this instance, the relative gains from independent action over the Sino-Thai alignment clearly did not outweigh the absolute gains already achieved, symbolized in ASEAN’s institutional capacity to manage a broad range of issues.

The Kuantan Principle: Moving next to the Kuantan Declaration, it was a statement issued (during a bilateral summit in March 1980 in the peninsula Malaysian town of Kuantan) by Indonesian President Suharto and Malaysian Prime Minister Hussein Onn which one observer described as calling for the “neutralization of [Cambodia] from all big powers and was therefore close to a de facto acceptance of a Vietnam-dominated [Cambodia]”. The statement reflected a growing Indonesian and Malaysian concern that the requirement of ASEAN solidarity on Cambodia was conceding too much to Thailand's security preferences, especially its hard line which did not encourage Vietnam to compromise and which required recognition of the ousted Khmer Rouge regime. Indonesia and Malaysia preferred
more room to manoeuvre. Thailand, in response, rejected the Kuantan initiative. Once again, rather than risk an intramural division, especially when Vietnamese troops had persistently made incursions into Thai territory, Indonesia and Malaysia backed down publicly.

What is interesting, from the institutional perspective, is that the events that followed provided further evidence of intramural management of problematic issues. In the wake of the Kuantan initiative, Indonesia and Malaysia signalled they would assume a more independent role over Indochina while at the same time ensuring that other ASEAN members were kept updated. In June 1982, ASEAN's problem with the Khmer Rouge's legitimacy was ameliorated when, at a Khmer resistance summit meeting held in Kuala Lumpur, the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) with Prince Sihanouk as head of state was established. The Khmer Rouge was now just one of the coalition partners albeit the strongest. In an effort to maintain ASEAN solidarity, Indonesia was designated ASEAN's interlocutor with Vietnam. In August 1987, the Indonesian and Vietnamese foreign ministers agreed on a formula of informal “cocktail party” meetings of the various Cambodian sides. This led to the so-called Jakarta Informal Meetings (JIM) which took place in July 1988 and February 1989. The diplomatic impasse, however, remained, indicating the limits of regional initiatives which did not involve the external powers or safeguard their interests.

The September 1989 Vietnamese decision to withdraw the bulk of its troops from Cambodia was due to a number of reasons, including Hanoi's own assessment that the regime in Phnom Penh had an even chance of survival. More importantly, Hanoi was now more concerned about its own deteriorating economic situation than maintaining its special relationship with Cambodia and Laos. For Vietnam, its strategic and economic isolation had made it a “toothless tiger” on the verge of acute economic crisis, and forced it to seek accommodation with ASEAN and China. ASEAN, through its tenuous solidarity on the issue, had played a key role in keeping Cambodia in the diplomatic spotlight and thereby in preventing Vietnam from
keeping its spoils. As noted earlier, by 1989, however, the great powers had removed Cambodia from their global rivalry and a United Nations-brokered ceasefire was put in place in 1991.

The end-game in Cambodia was thus outside ASEAN's diplomatic capability and was for all intents imposed on the Cambodian factions. On 23 October 1991, the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) was established with the signing in Paris of the Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodian Conflict. One observer described it as “the most ambitious peacekeeping effort ever attempted by the United Nations... brokered by outside powers and accepted only with deep reservations by the Cambodian parties themselves”. The UN-supervised elections were held in May 1993.

Thailand’s “turnaround” on Indochina: In 1988, Thailand quite unexpectedly began to reverse its “bleed Vietnam” policy. From the institutional perspective, this unilateral decision was clearly a defection from the ASEAN position by Thailand, and was based on its assessment that, this time, its “unilateral” relative gains outweighed the “institutional” absolute gains. By way of introducing this issue, Donald Weatherbee observes that “ASEAN's consensual diplomacy [was thrown] into disarray” after General Chatichai Choonhavan became prime minister in August 1988. Without consulting his ASEAN counterparts, Chatichai announced a new policy of turning Indochina from a battlefield to a marketplace. In public statements and secret diplomacy, Chatichai “sought to entice Hanoi, Phnom Penh, and Vientiane into a new relationship defined by mutual interest in peaceful frontiers and commercial contact”. Then, in an unexpected move, Chatichai invited People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) premier Hun Sen to visit Bangkok in January 1989. It was ill-timed, because JIM II (the second round of Jakarta Informal Meetings) was to take place in February. According to Weatherbee,

ASEAN reaction to Chatichai's initiative varied from surprise and consternation to anger. Singapore, for example, saw the visit as Thailand's unilateral undermining of ten years of ASEAN solidarity....
There is no doubt that, if the issue was institutional cohesion, Thailand had acted in unseemly haste. But, for Thailand, its “turnaround” in 1988 arose from a mutually reinforcing combination of a change in power distribution (the push factor) and a change in Thailand’s economic interests (the pull factors). First, it would be instructive to go back to key events that occurred after Mikhail Gorbachev became the Soviet leader in March 1985, in particular, events in the first half of 1988. Driven by the overarching ideas of glasnost (political openness) and perestroika (economic and governmental reforms) actively promoted by Gorbachev, Soviet diplomacy in Southeast Asia began to progressively emphasise contacts with the ASEAN states. In March 1987, eight months after Gorbachev’s speech seeking the normalization of Sino-Soviet ties, foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze visited not only Hanoi and Phnom Penh, but also Bangkok and Jakarta (as well as Canberra). It was the first time a Soviet foreign minister had visited any ASEAN capital, and Shevardnadze had taken care to visit the two most important ASEAN states on the Cambodian issue, which was a top-agenda item on these stops.

When Vietnam announced in May 1988 that it would complete a withdrawal of 50,000 troops from Cambodia by December, "the international perception of a direct Soviet role in that decision crystallized". Two months earlier, on 14 March 1988, the Soviet Union had stood apart from the Sino-Vietnamese naval clashes which took place in the disputed Spratly Islands archipelago. In contrast, the Soviet Union had moved warships into Cam Ranh Bay and rushed arms deliveries to Vietnam soon after the Chinese attack on northern Vietnam in February 1979.

The degree of Soviet influence on Vietnam’s decision to speed up its troop withdrawal is moot here. What impressed the Thai leadership, however, was the
clear Soviet signal that it was disengaging from the Cambodian problem. On one hand, it was no longer prepared to act as Vietnam's external backer; on the other hand, Soviet accommodation with China would also help to reduce Beijing's influential role. In the same month that Vietnam announced its planned troop withdrawal (May 1988), Thai prime minister Prem Tinsulanonda visited Moscow and reaffirmed the Thai leadership's impressions. Thereafter, the change of leadership when Chatichai Choonhavan assumed the premiership in August provided the occasion to carry out Bangkok's so-called “turnaround” policy changes in favour of business opportunities. These changes reflected both the practised, and astute, strategic assessment the Thais were renowned for, and the emergence of economic interests as the new driving force. As summarized by Buszynski,

... Thailand's attention turned away from the security problem of Cambodia and became focused upon the business opportunities that Indochina represented. The Vietnamese withdrawal [of the bulk of their troops in September 1989] from Cambodia... removed a major threat to Thailand and correspondingly eliminated any need to allow the Soviet Union a role in Thai foreign policy. After the termination of the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia the Soviet Union no longer figured as a significant actor for Thailand.55

Thailand’s 1988 policy change may be construed as evidence that Bangkok clearly understood that, provided the vital interests of the other ASEAN members were not undermined in particular situations, it could seek to maximize its interests in Indochina. It acted swiftly in January 1979 by agreeing to a de facto alliance with China; and it acted equally swiftly in August 1988 to seek economic ascendancy in Indochina once an economically weak Vietnam (with the removal of Soviet backing) was no longer a threat56. On both occasions, it took a chance on possible strains on ASEAN cohesion, and, on both occasions, it prevailed.

Finally, could it argued then that ASEAN’s cohesion on external issues remained fundamentally weak, that ASEAN solidarity was based on Cambodia as a single overriding issue? This “single-issue” argument asserted that so long as Vietnam, with Soviet backing, occupied Cambodia, the “glue” of a common fear of ASEAN
members' own vulnerability to regional instability held. ASEAN solidarity on Cambodia was therefore said to be based upon a temporary consensus. On this argument, the Cambodian issue might be seen as foreshadowing future external issues that may be potentially divisive. On the other hand, ASEAN from 1967 to the period reviewed had managed intramural issues well. From the perspective of the institutional approach, the key criterion really is: Do institutions matter? From the evidence in Chapter 2 and in this chapter, ASEAN did make a difference to intramural relations and, if more tenuously, on external issues too. As noted in Chapter 2, institutions do matter where the political will exists to harness them for the intended purposes: to identify and define mutual interests, to shape behaviour and norms, and to facilitate peaceful change. Nevertheless, in material terms, political will cannot be taken as a given. To conclude this section on a cautionary note, one Indonesian observer argues:

If there should be a lesson to be learned from the [Cambodian] issue that might be of great relevance to ASEAN regionalism, perhaps it would be that ASEAN should be sustained by something more lasting without undue dependence on, and too much sensitivity to, external challenges, particularly in the form of crises. ASEAN cooperation is to be fostered not only because of, but also in spite of, such external challenges. 

4.7 The security complex perspective, 1975-91

This section will use the security complex framework to explain variations in state behaviour not anticipated by the other two approaches. It will do this by examining the major Cold War extramural issue ASEAN members faced: the Cambodian problem. Many of the details pertinent to this issue have been covered in the earlier sections; the purpose of this section is to complement the analyses of the two approaches deployed above.

The security complex does not ignore power relations. However, the interplay between great power and regional rivalries are in this case put in the context of local
patterns of amity and enmity, found both within the aggregate Southeast Asian security complex and the disaggregated sub-complexes. The use of the security complex acknowledges that material concerns centred on the distribution of power and amity/enmity patterns influence the security behaviour of the ASEAN members. But it also seeks to identify non-material factors such as identity and changes in norms and values (and to deploy constructivist ideas where relevant). The security complex framework is also cognizant of the nexus between intensity of security concerns and proximity to threat. Taken together, these points suggest that there will be variations in the behaviour of ASEAN members on the Cambodian issue. For example, it is asserted here that the Philippines and Brunei were the two ASEAN members whose security interests were least affected by the Cambodian problem, and they will be examined first.

As discussed in Chapter 2, the Philippines initially viewed the Vietnam War in balance of power terms; it also identified with the anti-communist Containment policy of the US. But great power changes like the Sino-Soviet split of the early 1960s, the 1972 Sino-American rapprochement and the process of US disengagement from mainland Southeast Asia made Manila realize that its geographical location largely insulated it from the security dynamic in mainland Southeast Asia. Philippine membership in a regional institution, ASEAN, also ameliorated the country's sense of isolation and increasingly gave it a more regionally-oriented identity.

Seen through the perspective of the security complex idea, Philippine security concerns in the period reviewed underwent palpable changes. Indeed, it is in the task of “drawing out” the Philippines from the aggregate Southeast Asian security complex and examining it in its disaggregated sub-complex that the relevant dynamics can be more easily identified. Thus, Manila was largely unaffected by the consequences of the communist victories in 1975. Its primary security preoccupation was not external threats but its Muslim rebellion in the south and a renewed communist insurgency in Luzon. There was little concern that its own insurgencies
would draw inspiration or material support from the Indochinese communists. Secondly, the Philippines' maritime insulation, its small ethnic Chinese community, and the protection of the mutual security treaty with the US gave it a security perspective that could even be seen as indifferent to the concerns of the other ASEAN members. For example, President Marcos publicly declared a year after the fall of Saigon that Manila did not envisage external aggression against any ASEAN state in the next decade.\textsuperscript{58} Finally, as detailed in Chapter 3, the Philippines retained a strong security interdependence within the Malaysia-Philippine-Indonesia sub-complex. Within this sub-complex, the Sabah claim was the most contentious issue but even this issue, during the period 1975-91, had been put aside.

Brunei's security interdependence, too, was primarily located within its sub-complex, the maritime core. Its local patterns of amity and enmity were shaped by its relations with Indonesia and Malaysia. While oil-rich Brunei was wary of the intentions of its two bigger neighbours, its strong defence relationship with Britain (and, subsequently, with Singapore) helped ameliorate its security dilemma. Like the Philippines, it was also largely unaffected by the 1975 communist victories in Indochina. After Brunei joined ASEAN in 1984, it kept a low profile on foreign policy issues. The Cambodian conflict was not its major concern, and unlike Singapore (the other mini-state within ASEAN), it did not actively canvass a US military presence in the region, since it retained security ties with Britain throughout 1975-1991.

This “detachment” from mainland Southeast Asia's security dynamic, evidenced in the Philippines and Brunei, was not the case for the other ASEAN members -- Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore -- all of whom developed nuanced positions on the Cambodian problem, and behaved accordingly. As informed by the security complex's analysis, the balance of power concerns of these four countries will have to be qualified by non-material factors.

For Thailand, located within the vortex, its profound concern with events in
Indochina was obvious. In balance of power terms, this would simply be viewed as a concern about the distribution of power. A Soviet-backed Vietnam in pursuit of regional hegemony and the loss of Cambodia as a buffer threatened Thailand's security. The security complex's treatment complements this picture. Historically intense patterns of enmity existed in the continental core sub-complex, and Thai-Vietnamese rivalry rooted in these historical patterns and the more recent anti-communist orientation of Thai leaders dominated the sub-complex. Heavy penetration by the external powers (China, the US and the Soviet Union) fuelled the mutual antagonisms within this sub-complex, and prevented movement towards convergence of mutually constituted interests -- a necessary condition for movement towards patterns of amity.

Thus, strategic and regional rivalries strongly influenced Thailand's security orientation in the continental core sub-complex. In addition to the perceived threat of a united Indochina under Vietnamese domination, Thai fears about a possible resupply of arms to Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) insurgents arose immediately after 1975 because of Hanoi's capture of large stocks of American weapons. Thailand also bore the brunt of refugee flows from Laos and Cambodia. But Vietnam's attempts after 1975 to co-opt Laos and Cambodia into its sphere of influence met only partial success. Laos, a landlocked state dependent on Vietnam after 1975, allowed Vietnamese troops to be stationed on its territory following their conclusion of a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in July 1977. But the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia chose to assert their independence. Tensions soon erupted in the border areas, and the Khmer Rouge turned even more towards China for support and countervailing power. China, in turn, saw an opportunity to penetrate the sub-complex even further through securing Thailand as an ally against Vietnam, and offered Bangkok the incentive of a cut-off in aid to the CPT.

Nevertheless, patterns of amity and enmity, while durable, can be transformed by perceptions of convergent (or divergent) interests or ideational shifts. These patterns are, after all, generated by the actors themselves. The dramatic changes in the
strategic and regional distribution of power that began with Soviet disengagement from the continental core sub-complex ameliorated Thailand's security concerns. In turn, economic interests promoted by the business-oriented elites within Thai administrations since 1988 led to the emergence of convergent interests within the sub-complex, that is, between Thailand and the Indochina countries. This shift in amity-enmity patterns – albeit cautious and gradual -- has acted to reduce mutual hostilities between Thailand and the Indochinese states, including arch-rival Vietnam. Thus, Thailand’s “turnaround” policy on Indochina, discussed earlier using the institutional approach, may also be examined in security complex terms. In accordance with this argument of the security complex perspective, Thailand moved quickly to reverse its hardline approach once it felt the dynamics among the external powers had clearly shifted in a manner that sharply reduced the Vietnamese threat. The alacrity with which Thailand reversed its “hardline” policy can therefore also be explained by an ideational shift in perceptions about Indochina from one of a “battlefield” to that of a “marketplace”.

If Thailand, following Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia in 1978, took a hardline position on the issue because its vital interests as a player within the continental core sub-complex were involved, why did Singapore -- which was outside the continental core -- also adopt a hardline policy? (After all, it will be argued subsequently that Indonesia and Malaysia, both outside the continental core too, were more accommodating towards Vietnam.) It is important, in this present discussion, to reiterate two points: first, that disaggregation into sub-complexes helps identify core security concerns but this is not to suggest that a country's core concerns are located only within its sub-complex (or overlapping sub-complexes). The Philippines and Brunei were examples of ASEAN members whose primary concerns were indeed located within their sub-complexes. So was the case with Thailand: it was just that during much of the Cold War, the continental core was the dominant sub-complex within the aggregate Southeast Asian security complex. Thailand was the so-called "frontline" state because all its ASEAN partners recognized that its fall or defection would affect the entire aggregate complex.
Secondly, Singapore was the one ASEAN member whose core security concerns during the Cold War encompassed both the aggregate complex and the sub-complex it was located in, the maritime core. In other words, Singapore's ruling elites linked the global and regional rivalries, and the mini-state's intense security interdependence with Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei, to the elites' conviction that Singapore's survival could be promoted by ensuring its economic relevance and by the prevention of any form of regional hegemony. This meant the continued need for the US military presence as the only available balancer. Thus, Singapore had a strategic interest in the rivalries over Cambodia, and it took the threat of a Soviet-backed Vietnam very seriously. A consistent thread in Singapore's security thinking was the prospect of further American retrenchment from the region, which -- if it occurred -- would eventually create a vacuum which China or even Japan would fill. Over Cambodia, Singapore believed that a Soviet-backed Vietnam could: (1) permit the Soviet Union to increase its presence in the region, triggering a Chinese response; (2) exploit ASEAN vulnerabilities and engender a crisis of confidence if US commitment to the region wavered; and (3) weaken Thailand's will to act as ASEAN's buffer against Vietnam if the ASEAN-US-China coalition was not vigorously maintained. Finally, a deterioration of the security conditions in the continental core would create instability in the maritime core as well, since Thailand and Malaysia were the bridge linking the two cores.

Chapter 3 has argued that Indonesia was relatively secure in the maritime core complex. On the other hand, its long-term perception of China as a future regional threat influenced its behaviour over Cambodia. For Indonesia, its interest in the continental core was as much the result of institutional solidarity with fellow ASEAN member Thailand as a strategic appreciation of Vietnam's buffer role against further Chinese encroachment. Writing in 1987, Robert Tilman observed that within ASEAN, Indonesia was often regarded as the opposite extreme from Thailand and Singapore in its perceptions of Vietnamese goals and strategies, and that this position was not new. He suggested that it was Indonesia's historical memory of the
Indonesian Revolution, a much-cherished national symbol, and its perceived similarities with the Vietnamese independence struggle, that made Indonesia the most sympathetic to Vietnam's circumstances. Tilman noted, in contrast, that Indonesian officials still described China as the most serious external threat facing Indonesia. Again, the historical memory of Beijing's role in the 30 September coup in Jakarta and uncertainty about the loyalty of the local Chinese community, fuelled this perception.

In the context of the period reviewed, these Indonesian perceptions of the two communist countries helped explain Jakarta's tendency to challenge Thailand's approach towards Vietnam. Thus, secure in its own security sub-complex and far removed from the contest in Indochina, Indonesia could afford to argue that ASEAN should view Vietnam as a future buffer against China and to adopt a more conciliatory corporate policy towards Hanoi.

Finally, Malaysia shared Indonesia's strategic assessment of a future China threat, although this perception was held with much less intensity by Kuala Lumpur. Vietnam was thus perceived as a buffer. But Malaysia had a history of security cooperation with Thailand, the "frontline" state whose fall could bring Vietnamese forces to its border. Malaysia therefore shared Singapore's concern that ASEAN solidarity in support of Thailand was essential. Moreover, within its maritime core sub-complex, Malaysia's historical memory included the image of Sukarno's Indonesia as a threat and this resulted in residual suspicions about Jakarta's long-term intentions. This made it difficult, from the security complex perspective, to identify a consistent thread in its position on the Cambodian issue. But its general position was in harmony with Indonesia's. Perhaps one reasonable (and non-material) explanation for Malaysia's stance during the period reviewed is that Kuala Lumpur's foreign policy-makers were still distancing themselves from the pro-Western policy of Tunku Abdul Rahman, who had stepped down in September 1970 in favour of Tun Abdul Razak. Tun Razak's successors, Tun Hussein Onn and the present incumbent, Dr Mahathir Mohamad, continued with his ostensibly non-aligned, high-profiled
foreign policy which combined equidistance towards major powers and championship of Third World interests with pragmatic but discreet security cooperation with the Western powers.

4.8 Conclusion

In this chapter, the balance of power approach identified the development of alignments and alliances on the basis of power or security. This fuelled the security dilemma and it was found that the global and regional balances intersected over Cambodia in the period reviewed. The behaviour of China and the Soviet Union in the region largely accorded with the assumptions of the balance of power approach: both powers sought to deny the other advantage and both cultivated allies. The regional balance itself saw the revival of Thai-Vietnamese and Sino-Vietnamese rivalries, and both balances intersected over the Cambodian problem. Thus, the strength of the balance of power approach continued to be in its depiction of the external dynamics. Moreover, it also identified the emergence of an economic contest which saw Vietnam “bled” while ASEAN members benefited from their linkage to the global economic system. But the approach is weak in identifying the historical and cultural bases of regional dynamics. Also, it could not explain the behaviour of the US which, because of domestic politics and preoccupation with the US-Soviet rivalry elsewhere, played a relatively low-key role in Southeast Asia after 1975.

The institutional approach identifies the development of cooperative arrangements (whether formal or informal) on the basis of prospective mutual gains. Such institutions are strengthened or weakened according to members’ expectations. In this chapter, it was found that ASEAN unity was often tenuous but no member was prepared to risk cohesion when put to the test, that is, interests were constituted and constrained. The approach provided the logic (benefits of institutional cooperation) and unity of purpose of ASEAN regionalism on Cambodia despite intramural
strategic divergences. Hypothetically, if ASEAN had not existed as a framework to marshal diplomatic support for Thailand on this issue, the Soviet Union and Vietnam would most probably have been able to divide the non-communist Southeast Asian states, and further fuelled the various rivalries. ASEAN's diplomatic successes were also due to its cohesion. Thus, ASEAN as an institution mattered. The institutional approach shares the balance of power approach’s weakness in the sense that it emphasizes material interests. Importantly, however, it allows for changing interests, as illustrated in its account of Thailand’s “turnaround” on Indochina in 1988.

While the two approaches above tend to downplay the effect of regional (and intramural) dynamics on state behaviour, the security complex framework, by purposively identifying both power relations and patterns of amity/enmity, is logically constructed to highlight these dynamics. As a corrective, the security complex, as used in this chapter, explained variations in state behaviour that the other two approaches did not anticipate. In particular, patterns of amity and enmity varied in intensity in different sub-complexes, a result of differing historical and cultural bases. Thus, on the Cambodian problem, Thailand’s primary security interdependence was located in the still conflictual mainland core sub-complex while Indonesia (in the maritime core sub-complex) could afford a longer-term strategic assessment of the role of the major powers and of Vietnam. Furthermore, because patterns of amity/enmity are generated by the local actors, and could be transformed, by deploying constructivist ideas, it was shown – in the example of Thailand’s Indochina “turnaround” – that economic interests could be mutually promoted once threat perceptions were considerably ameliorated.

ENDNOTES

1*Bangkok Post,* 24 May 1980.


Illustratively, Chang Pao-min cites the 21 April 1978 issue of the *Far Eastern Economic Review* which quoted a Vietnamese official thus: "We insist on a special relationship, because there is not another example in history of such a relationship where the two peoples shared each grain of rice, every bullet, suffering and victory." *Kampuchea between China and Vietnam* (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1985), p. 159.


COMECON is the more familiar Western label for the CMEA, or Council for Mutual Economic Assistance.


The Chinese invasion has been dubbed the "pedagogical war". For a brief account, see Chanda, *op. cit.*, pp 356-8.


19 Chang Pao-min, op. cit., p. 177.


21 Buszynski, Gorbachev and Southeast Asia, op. cit., p. 90.


23 One notable exception was foreign minister Nguyen Co Thach, reputed to be a hard-liner over the Cambodian issue. Buszynski, op. cit., p. 81.


26 Wich, op. cit., p. 112.

27 Leifer, "Cambodia in Conflict," op. cit., p. 79.

28 Burma (Myanmar) is, of course, excluded from the discussion here as it kept to its isolationist policy throughout much of this period.


33 Thayer, "ASEAN and Indochina," op. cit., p. 140.

34 ibid., p. 139.


37 Bangkok Post, 14 January 1979.

38 Case Study: The Third Indo-China War, Conflict Management Studies in Contemporary International Politics (Geelong, Australia: Deakin University, 1988), pp 44-5.
Cambodia was called Kampuchea during the period of Khmer Rouge rule, and under the Vietnamese-installed People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) government.


Thayer, op. cit., p. 146.


Chang Pao-Min, op. cit., p. 150.


ibid.

ibid., pp. 8-9.


Although Singapore was to join the other ASEAN members in criticising Thailand's "turnaround", it was all too aware of the critical Soviet role in having prolonged the Cambodian issue. In a speech in March 1987 (when Shevardnadze was visiting the region), Singapore's foreign minister S. Dhanabalan said the Soviet Union could only play a positive role by helping to resolve the Cambodian issue, and that so far it had played a negative role by assisting Vietnam to continue its occupation. Without Soviet aid, Vietnam would not be able to last a week in Cambodia, he added. *Foreign Broadcast Monitor*, no. 53/87, 6 March
1987.


59 In his study of Singapore's foreign policy, Narayanan Ganesan cites one 'practitioner' (presumably a foreign ministry official) he interviewed as asserting that 'the Thais had to be propped up to face a united Indochina'. *Singapore's Foreign Policy in ASEAN: Major Domestic and Bilateral Political Constraints*, PhD dissertation, Northern Illinois University (Ann Arbor: UMI Dissertation Services, 1993), p. 140.


61 Ibid., pp 87-8.
CHAPTER 5

POST-COLD WAR SOUTHEAST ASIA: THE INSTITUTIONAL
AND BALANCE OF POWER PERSPECTIVES

5.1 Introduction

This chapter deploys the balance of power and institutional approaches to examine Southeast Asian states’ responses to their security environment after the Cold War. Chapter 6 will deploy the security complex for this task. For consistency with the chronological sequencing of the previous chapters, the starting point is nominally 1991 but this will not be rigidly adhered to, as several issues to be discussed had emerged earlier.

For balance of power theorists and institutionalists, the post-Cold War era has revived their debate, especially about whether the transition to, and emergence of, a multipolar world will see more conflict or more cooperation. To the extent that the ending of the Cold War signalled a new uncertain period of transition, from a bipolar to a still evolving multipolar structure – a new balance of power -- states' interests will be vigorously pursued or shaped according to expectations, either by the distribution of power or because of institutional rules and norms, or even ideas and identities. With these issues in mind, this chapter will assess whether the expanded ASEAN and the other existing and new institutions can account for conditions in the Asia-Pacific since 1991, or whether post-Cold War behaviour in the region would be better explained in balance of power terms. Accordingly, this chapter will deploy the institutional approach first, in an examination of post-Cold War ASEAN.

5.2 The institutional approach and post-Cold War ASEAN
The end of the Cold War saw ASEAN embarking on membership expansion and the creation of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA). ASEAN members participate in two new Asia-Pacific multilateral institutions, the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). From the analysis in Chapters 2 and 4, ASEAN during the Cold War was careful to promote a limited form of regionalism, admitted only one new member, Brunei, and eschewed institutional links with Northeast Asia (other than creating a bilateral Dialogue Partner process). From the institutional perspective, are the conditions conducive for both deeper and broader institution-building involving ASEAN members? To what extent have the conditions changed, without affecting the premise that cooperation can produce absolute gain payoffs?

It is worth recalling that when the idea of ASEAN was being promoted in the mid-1960s, membership invitations were sent to Burma (now Myanmar), Cambodia and Sri Lanka. All three were non-communist but they declined to join the new grouping. Any notion of sending invitations to the regional communist countries was out of the question. ASEAN during the Cold War thus came to be identified as an anti-communist grouping, despite its formal denial of such an image. Moreover, after ASEAN-5 (August 1967), it was only sixteen and a half years later (January 1984), that Brunei’s inclusion led to ASEAN-6.

But, with the end of the Cold War, communist Vietnam joined ASEAN in July 1995 (ASEAN-7) and in July 1997, Laos and Myanmar joined the grouping (ASEAN-9). Cambodia failed to be included in 1997 only because of an internal coup but in April 1999 its formal induction at a special ceremony in Hanoi led to ASEAN-10.1 This expansion (“broadening”) of ASEAN membership is thus remarkable because of its speed. In addition to this “broadening” process, it also initiated what has been called a “deepening” process in the area of intramural economic cooperation. Moreover, ASEAN began to link up with, or push for, new multilateral institutions with both security and economic features. These efforts, which initially centred on the Asia-Pacific, have broadened to include links with Europe and other regions.
On the economic side, the expanded ASEAN created AFTA. ASEAN members also joined APEC and took the initiative to create the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) process. On the security side, they were instrumental in creating the ARF.

5.3 From ASEAN-6 to ASEAN-10

States engage in institution-building (and, by extension, institution-expansion) because they normally expect that cooperation will produce absolute gain benefits, that is, distributional concerns about relative gains are not sufficient to warrant staying on the outside (including free-riding and defections) or engaging in balancing behaviour (if national interests are perceived to be threatened). Indeed, Keohane and Martin suggest that institutions can (1) mitigate fears of cheating and so allow cooperation to emerge; and (2) alleviate fears of unequal gains from cooperation. Successful institutions do this by providing information which becomes instrumental in producing cooperative outcomes, that is, institutions "can facilitate cooperation by helping to settle distributional conflicts and by assuring states that gains are evenly divided over time". Reciprocity is, of course, a necessary condition in ensuring that institutions stay cohesive.

From this brief reiteration of Chapter 1’s survey of the institutional approach, it is suggested here that post-Cold War ASEAN has attempted to take on the role of a coordinating mechanism to ensure the attainment of cooperative outcomes, whether in the context of its own expansion or in new institution-building. In this exercise, it has drawn on its post-Confrontation experience in reconciliation and identity-building; and in affirming limited regionalism through intergovernmentalism.

The de facto ending of Confrontation in 1965 and Suharto’s emergence and espousal of his economic development-oriented “New Order” removed the threat of a hegemonic Indonesia. These developments facilitated a convergence of outlook and interests among Indonesia, the ASA members (Malaysia, the Philippine and Thailand) and the new city-state of Singapore. Briefly, all five founding members of
ASEAN felt that reconciliation, accommodation of differences and conflict avoidance through an institutional framework enhanced, rather than weakened, their self-interests. The emphasis was on political issues since economic issues were less salient then. On external issues, the strategic setting was the great power rivalry in Indochina.

Similarly, with the end of the Cold War, a convergence of outlook and interests developed between the ASEAN members and their regional adversary, Vietnam. In this case, it was the strategic setting that provided the impetus for reconciliation. The dramatic realignment of power, both global and regional, meant that there was now no reason to diplomatically isolate Vietnam which, in an expanded ASEAN, was no longer seen as a military threat but as an economic partner. Like Indonesia, its regional aspirations could now be located within ASEAN.

Members of the ASEAN academic community and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) with close contacts to their governments began to play an active role in sketching out this incipient convergence. In 1991, a group of them had initiated a project, Interaction for Progress, which brought together officials (in their personal capacities) and academics and NGO representatives from ASEAN and Vietnam “with the broad aim of contributing to the overcoming of past antagonisms and to the definition of a new partnership between [ASEAN] and Vietnam”. Under this rubric, two symposia were held: one in Hanoi (August 1991) and one in Kuala Lumpur (May 1992). The Hanoi meeting also led to the formation of an ASEAN-Vietnam Study Group. This study group produced a report, Shared Destiny: Southeast Asia in the 21st Century. At this stage, ASEAN policy-makers were content to let the non-policy-making community take the lead in exploring potential Vietnamese membership.

The Shared Destiny report placed emphasis on the benefits of integrating Vietnam without insisting on a similar ideological outlook, that is, the Vietnamese ruling elite's communist ideology was now deemed not to be an obstacle to potential membership. Given this mood within ASEAN, 1992 marked the initiation of official
promotion of “broadening and deepening” the grouping.

Broadening was taken to mean membership expansion while deepening was taken to mean redefining ASEAN’s economic purpose, discussed in the section below, on AFTA. However, to the extent that deepening was taken to mean greater ASEAN economic cooperation based both on the existing ASEAN-6 as well as a potentially bigger market (encompassing Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar), it was linked to broadening. Thus, economic deepening dovetailed with political broadening to encompass all 10 Southeast Asian countries.

To ASEAN officials, in-principle acceptance of Vietnam as an ASEAN member meant a review of whether the other three non-ASEAN states (Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar) were acceptable/willing to become members as well. Official and non-official (academic) positions within ASEAN at this stage, on the issue of membership, have been summarized by Noordin Sopiee. He suggests that there were two schools, one which favoured an expansion of ASEAN into ASEAN-10, and another which felt ASEAN-6 should be kept intact but a new regional construct, which he christened the “Council of Southeast Asia” and dubbed by the media as SEA-10, be allowed to evolve. Both schools had in common the belief that, with the end of the Cold War, there would be sufficient common purpose among the 10 Southeast Asian states to build a foundation of security and economic interdependence. They diverged over whether ASEAN’s established rules and practices, such as those that evolved over border dispute management, could be readily adopted by the new members.

By the December 1995 ASEAN Summit in Bangkok, the issue of an ASEAN-10 or SEA-10 seemed to have been settled in favour of the former. As a policy, the issue of broadening was now settled. Vietnam had been officially accepted as ASEAN's seventh member at the July 1995 ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM). In December, apart from Vietnam taking its place at the summit, “special guest” status was conferred on Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar. All 10 states of Southeast Asia were therefore represented in Bangkok. On the eve of the 1995 summit, Philippine
foreign affairs under-secretary Rudolfo Severino announced that ASEAN heads of government had decided to meet every year, that is, formally during summit years and informally during non-summit years. Given the precedent set in 1995, these yearly meetings of government heads were expected to continue to comprise all 10 countries, and to allow the ASEAN leaders to engage the candidate members. An intramural concern was Myanmar’s pariah status with ASEAN’s traditional backers, the US and the European Union, largely due to its political and human rights record.

In any case, at their 1996 annual ministerial meeting (AMM) in Jakarta, ASEAN foreign ministers in a show of unity forcefully reiterated their policy of engaging Myanmar without necessarily approving of its domestic policies. At the 1996 AMM, ASEAN ministers also managed to get the US and European Union, during both the ARF and Post-Ministerial Conference (PMC) sessions, to at least tacitly await the results of ASEAN-Myanmar interactions. Myanmar (together with Laos) was admitted into ASEAN at the 1997 AMM in Kuala Lumpur, despite US and EU disapproval. Cambodia would have been admitted then if not for strongman Hun Sen's coup in early July 1997 against his rival and co-prime minister, Prince Norodom Ranariddh. But, following UN-monitored elections in early 1999 which led to Hun Sen's installation as sole prime minister, ASEAN approved Cambodia's entry, which took place on 30 April 1999.

The institutional approach does not seem to provide a satisfactory rationale for the manner in which ASEAN went ahead with membership expansion. During the Cold War, ASEAN went through the crucible of a painful learning process which helped to explain ASEAN's cohesion over the Cambodian issue. Moreover, ASEAN's diplomatic unity with regards to the major external issue, Cambodia, carried the support of two key external actors, the United States and China. Even so, it may be argued that ASEAN-6 had yet to develop into a strong institution.

With the end of the Cold War, it may be argued that Vietnam's membership of ASEAN was relatively unproblematic because of a mutual convergence of outlook and interests. Laos posed little problem but only because of its low international
profile since 1975. But the same could not be said with regards to Myanmar, or even to Cambodia. ASEAN's decision to back Thailand's constructive engagement of Myanmar lacked any strong institutional logic. It was based on the belief that the Western-imposed sanctions on Myanmar would be counter-productive and leave Myanmar vulnerable to irredentist pressures or strategic and economic dependence on a rising major power, China. It was further argued that Myanmar's involvement in ASEAN would allow it to learn the rules of cooperative behaviour by participating in the ASEAN-wide AFTA and ASEAN-linked groupings like APEC and the ARF. On the other hand, there has been increasingly some international cost to ASEAN for accepting Myanmar into its fold. Bloc-to-bloc ASEAN-EU relations as well as ASEAN-US relations have been held hostage to Western disapproval (driven largely by domestic politics) of Myanmar's military-led ruling elite's human rights record. It is as yet uncertain whether the West will continue to accommodate ASEAN's policies, or seek to exclude Myanmar (or Cambodia, if it reverts to instability and repression) from certain activities. Neither is it certain whether Myanmar itself will be a constructive member of ASEAN. Vietnam and Laos, in contrast, are clearly reform-minded, and are motivated by the benefits of institutional cooperation.

There is also the risk of a two-tiered “rich-poor” ASEAN emerging, given the relatively insulated nature of the economies of not only Myanmar but also Laos and Cambodia, as well as their leaders' lack of regular political interactions with the ASEAN-6 leaders. Myanmar had hoped to ride on the regional investment boom by joining ASEAN, but the 1997 Asian economic crisis hit just when Yangon joined the grouping. Myanmar's economy, already at a standstill, failed to attract investments from within an economically weakened ASEAN and from external sources. Vietnam's experience in integrating into ASEAN will provide lessons for the so-called CLM states. Nevertheless, despite the political and economic obstacles, ASEAN leaders have so far put up a united front in arguing that an ASEAN-10 would provide the critical mass in dealing with external powers and in coping with external events.
Apart from the political issue of expanding ASEAN's membership (broadening), there was also a felt need to redefine ASEAN's economic purpose (deepening) as a response to post-Cold War economic conditions. ASEAN's institutional rationale during the Cold War was primarily in the political arena and economic issues like preferential trading arrangements or even a free trade area were effectively marginalized. A great deal of effort was marshalled into creating an ASEAN identity of intramural good neighbourliness (while a great deal of the “real work” of issue management was handled bilaterally). ASEAN’s external image was that of a diplomatic and economic lobby (while bilateral diplomatic and economic links with external actors were strongly promoted). There was little incentive for collective efforts in the economic arena, given the unimpressive figure of 20 percent for intra-ASEAN trade. Moreover, although the political legitimacy of the ruling elites within ASEAN throughout the Cold War was always strongly conditioned by their ability to deliver the economic goods, this task was accomplished largely through a heavy reliance by individual members on external markets.

Throughout the Cold War, then, ASEAN economic cooperation was uneven, given the low level of intra-ASEAN trade in contrast to trade with external partners. But by 1991-92, ASEAN leaders began to realize that: (1) their domestic economies were rapidly involved in market-driven processes requiring regional and international economic integration. Their ability to coordinate economic policies would help them win market shares and attract investment inflows in the face of competition from big emerging economies like China and India; (2) their economies remained vulnerable to external activities such as protectionist and trade bloc tendencies elsewhere, speculative capital flows, and to the health of the global economy; and (3) the combined effects of these two factors had persuaded ASEAN leaders to review their long-established reluctance to push for regional economic integration, and indeed to now push for new forms of regional cooperation such as the “growth triangle” concept.¹⁹ In the 1980s, especially after the 1985 Plaza Accord which saw new flows
of Japanese investment capital abroad, these external events had already compelled individual ASEAN economies to begin adopting outward-oriented investment-attracting strategies and unilateral liberalization.

Thus, post-Cold War ASEAN now faced these economic-oriented pressures, regionally and globally. The track record of ASEAN economic cooperation was unimpressive. Examples of dismal past ASEAN economic institutional initiatives include the 1976 ASEAN Industrial Project (AIP), the 1977 Preferential Trading Arrangement (PTA), and the 1983 ASEAN Industrial Joint Ventures (AIJV). Hadi Soesastro notes that this was “a big embarrassment” but adds that these attempts nevertheless “may have contributed to creating the habit of cooperation, which is essential to the success of ASEAN”. What is important, from the institutional perspective, was ASEAN members’ willingness -- despite unresolved political concerns about expansion -- to rethink their approach to economic interests, when the economic circumstances changed.

During the Cold War boom years, the ASEAN economies on their own were small players internationally; their economic performance had resulted more from outside trade and investment links; and except for Singapore, most retained high tariff walls in so-called sensitive products. With the end of the Cold War, the entire Asia-Pacific (with the exception of North Korea) began to compete for market and investment capital shares. This was because the global economy had now created conditions in which (1) market competition had rendered self-sufficiency or inefficiencies intolerable; (2) individual efforts to maintain external market shares or investment inflows were inadequate, since multinational corporations' production was being spread around a number of countries; and (3) capital was highly mobile while markets had to be competitively secured, given the entry of a number of low labour-cost countries into the global economy.

Thus, despite the awareness within ASEAN that political issues would continue to pose problems, the economic challenges led to an intramural momentum to inject an economic imperative into ASEAN’s post-Cold War institutional rationale.
Furthermore, such an “economic glue” would help better bond new and old members.

To the extent that limited regionalism was still its milieu goal, ASEAN's response to the economic challenges excluded highly integrative measures that promote absolute gains. The initiative that emerged, AFTA, had two modest objectives: it was intended to be “primarily aimed at enhancing ASEAN's attractiveness as an investment location and market. It can also be seen as a training ground for the ASEAN members in their efforts to integrate more fully into the world economy”.

From the institutional perspective, AFTA is representative of how ASEAN, in its efforts to be a coordinating mechanism in pursuit of cooperative outcomes, nevertheless has to alleviate the chronic fears among its members of unequal gains. AFTA was initiated at the ASEAN economic meeting in October 1991. A follow-up framework agreement was signed at the 1992 leaders' summit, to be made operational on 1 January 1993. The summit also agreed that the instrument for implementing AFTA tariff reductions would be the Common Effective Preferential Trade (CEPT) scheme. The target was a phased movement towards a free trade area.

But intramural contentions over items for inclusion or exclusion delayed AFTA’s launch to 1 January 1994. Rice, for example, is a commodity an exporting country like Thailand would like to see “liberalized” but is regarded as a “sensitive item” by Indonesia and the Philippines. AFTA's prospects will also depend on how relative gain concerns are alleviated. For example, AFTA has to balance interests between the more advanced economies (like Singapore) and the less advanced economies (like Indonesia).

Examples such as the above, of intramural sensitivities over payoffs and domestic considerations which may subvert long-term gains, have plagued past intramural efforts at economic cooperation. AFTA faces similar obstacles but a valid material reason for guarded optimism this time is the greater awareness of the possible political consequence of failure to corporately manage the effects of globalization,
discussed above. Paul Bowles suggests that political legitimacy may be affected in
failure this time to augment domestic economic strategies with regional coordination:

...between 1985 and 1991, the whole rationale for a regional trading area [within ASEAN] had changed; the primary economic purpose was no longer trade creation but the avoidance of investment diversion to other parts of the world economy and in this the [ASEAN] leaders... were united not least because the legitimacy of governments in the region had increasingly relied on their ability to “modernize” their economies.\(^{25}\)

This sense of urgent purpose was confirmed by remarks by Singapore prime minister Goh Chok Tong that investments in the ASEAN region would flow away “unless ASEAN can match the other regions in attractiveness both as a base for investments and as a market for their products...”\(^{26}\). The formation of AFTA, unlike the earlier attempts, was thus strongly driven by “the changing external environment, and in particular [by] the fear of investment diversion”\(^{27}\).

Seen in this material context, the issue of promoting intra-ASEAN trade becomes less critical, at least for AFTA's early development. Nevertheless, the prospect for such trade has improved. Intra-regional two-way trade expanded from US$79 billion in 1993 to US$111 billion in 1994, an increase of 41 percent. Intra-regional trade of products covered by the CEPT scheme grew even faster at 44 percent during the same period. This development increased intra-regional trade in 1994 to more than 20 percent of total ASEAN trade of US$505 billion -- higher in share compared with other major trading partners such as Japan (19 percent), the US (17 percent) and the European Union (15 percent).\(^{28}\)

AFTA, therefore, has the potential to create absolute gain benefits through its commitment to free trade and a coordinated effort to attract direct foreign investments. The decision taken at the 1995 summit to accelerate the implementation of the AFTA process was an overriding political signal that ASEAN was cognizant of other regions challenging its attractiveness as a market and a place for investment capital. In a follow up, ASEAN leaders issued a "Statement of Bold Measures" at their sixth summit in Hanoi in December 1998, in which they pledged, among other
things, to advance the implementation of AFTA from 2003 to 2002 for the original
signatories, that is, ASEAN-6. They also affirmed that under the October 1998
Framework Agreement on the ASEAN Investment Area (AIA), national treatment
would be made available within six months of the signing of the AIA.  

In summary, ASEAN's post-Cold War ability to take on the role of a coordinating
mechanism (to ensure the attainment of cooperative outcomes) has seen a mixed
record. While AFTA faces problems of managing intramural fears of relative gain
advantages, its rationale of preparing ASEAN for the post-Cold War economic
challenges is sound. Its political purpose is also clear: ASEAN members cannot
afford not to successfully integrate into the global economy. However, the rapid
expansion of ASEAN's membership has a less forceful logic in the case of Myanmar,
and possibly Cambodia. While an argument can be made for a convergence of
outlook and interests between Vietnam and the ASEAN-6 members, the grouping's
decision to include -- as speedily as possible -- the CLM countries remains
problematic. The original ASEAN-6 had the “privilege”, during the Cold War, of
concentrating their efforts on political matters. ASEAN-6's cultivation of a culture of
intramural cooperation based more on informal processes than on institutionalized
norms gave it institutional strength, but the CLM countries may not easily adapt to
this culture. Finally, ASEAN's rush to become ASEAN-10 risks alienating the
external support that had proven invaluable thus far.

5.5  ASEAN and post-Cold War Asia-Pacific multilateralism

Apart from the issue of intramural expansion and the decision to create AFTA, why
did the changing economic and strategic environments also influence ASEAN’s
active participation in post-Cold War Asia-Pacific multilateralism? Will an expanded
ASEAN benefit from this effort to expand the grouping’s institutional links, or will
cohesion be seriously affected?

ASEAN, as noted above, has sought in the post-Cold War era to act as a coordinating
mechanism to ensure the attainment of cooperative outcomes, both intramurally and extramurally. In the context of the discussion in this section, ASEAN has attempted to become a key player on post-Cold War multilateral security and economic issues. However, as discussed below, ASEAN was initially not a key player, and was in fact unsure about the consequences of promoting multilateral institutions, despite what it perceived to be changing conditions in the Asia-Pacific.

To be sure, during the Cold War, the US security umbrella in the Asia-Pacific discouraged multilateral institution-building. The Asia-Pacific differed from Europe during the Cold War in that a multilateral security structure based on an ideological divide did not take root. Instead, the wars that erupted in the Asia-Pacific -- while initially provoking a US fear of a Soviet-led expansion of communism -- fairly quickly led to a bilateral alliance system among the non-communist states, centred on the US military presence. Even China in the aftermath of its 1972 rapprochement with the US tacitly accepted the utility of US military forces acting as a curb on Soviet opportunism and as a buffer in the Korean peninsula. In this sense, there was little incentive to introduce security-oriented proposals of a multilateral nature. As far as the US was concerned, multilateral initiatives were more likely than not to constrain its security and economic leadership in the Asia-Pacific. In general, its allies did not challenge this view. Unsurprisingly, Soviet attempts to introduce a security dialogue process along the lines of the Council for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) failed for lack of support.

However, the end of the Cold War meant the US itself would begin to question, over time, the nature if not the need for its military presence in the Asia-Pacific. In anticipation of this, ASEAN members, as well as other Asia-Pacific powers, began to consider the creation of an institutional framework that would eventually replace this Cold War balance-of-power security structure (or umbrella) centred on the US military presence. This umbrella played a not unimportant role in enabling ASEAN to keep discussions on security matters out of its public agenda, and to pursue security cooperation intramurally and extramurally outside of the ASEAN rubric.
ASEAN's decision, made at its 1992 leaders' summit in Singapore, to put security on the agenda of its annual foreign ministers' meetings and dialogue sessions with its “like-minded” partners from the West, Japan and South Korea, may be seen as complementary to its economic initiative, AFTA. It was also indicative of ASEAN’s sensitivity to trends in the Asia-Pacific. One such trend was a momentum to create post-Cold War multilateral structures in the Asia-Pacific. ASEAN wanted to ensure that it had a voice in these new structures. But it took an initiative by non-ASEAN states (led by Australia) to create the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum in 1989 which persuaded ASEAN to embark on multilateral activism in the economic arena and, eventually, in the security arena. To the extent that an APEC dominated by the major powers might leave ASEAN-6 without a strong voice, ASEAN's efforts to expand its membership could be seen as an attempt to ensure that it had an adequate and credible influence in such fora. An ASEAN-10 would give the grouping a combined population of over 500 million, and a Gross Domestic Product of over US$400 billion. But, as already noted above, the potential gain from such a critical mass has to be weighed against the obstacles posed by the newer members' backward economies and from Myanmar's pariah image.

In the security arena, ASEAN members began exploring the creation of a security dialogue structure in which the grouping could (through the structure's modalities) at least influence, if not set, the key agendas. As will be discussed below, ASEAN came to be regarded by the external powers as the most suitable agent to bring about this structure, which became the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). ASEAN saw its expanded membership as providing Southeast Asia with a unified voice in dealing with the other engaged powers in the Asia-Pacific. Again, this expectation remains largely unfulfilled.

5.6 The ARF: ASEAN's initiative on a security dialogue

In July 1990, during the Jakarta ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) and its follow-on Post-Ministerial Conference (PMC), Australia proposed a forum to "build
confidence and patterns of cooperation" between old friends and old enemies.\textsuperscript{33} At the July 1991 Kuala Lumpur PMC, Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama suggested that the PMC be used as a "forum for political dialogue" on security as well as economic cooperation and diplomacy.\textsuperscript{34} His call was similar to a suggestion made also in 1991 by the ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS), a grouping of regional think-tanks (established in 1988) with access to their respective governments.\textsuperscript{35} One analyst suggested that, by the January 1992 Singapore Summit, ASEAN members had "decided to claim the process in the hope that they could channel rather than resist the momentum".\textsuperscript{36} The Singapore Summit created an ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting (SOM) on Regional Security which first met in June 1992, one month before the AMM. The ASEAN SOM meeting in May 1993 led to the announcement of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), which held its first meeting in Bangkok in July 1994.

From its inception, the ARF has been "ASEAN-centred". The 18 founder-members comprised: the ASEAN-6; Vietnam, Laos and Papua New Guinea (all ASEAN observers at the time); Russia and China (both invited to the first meeting as ASEAN's "guests" and subsequently to be elevated to dialogue-partner status); and the US, Canada, the European Community, Australia, New Zealand, Japan and South Korea (all dialogue partners). The highest-level ARF meetings, those of the foreign ministers held annually, take place only in ASEAN capitals, and only after the ASEAN foreign ministers themselves have met under their AMM. The PMC meeting completes this three-stage procedure. As implemented in 1994, the ARF session is interposed between the established AMM and PMC. Before the ARF was created, the PMC represented the annual dialogue between ASEAN and its “like-minded” external well-wishers. Today, the 10 dialogue partners are Australia, Canada, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, Russia, South Korea, the United States and the European Community.\textsuperscript{37} In 1992, when ASEAN began the process to use the PMC to eventually create the ARF, the dialogue partners did not include China, India or Russia. The external powers have also conceded to ASEAN much of the agenda-setting as well as the route to ARF membership. Newly accepted ASEAN members automatically become ARF members while others have to seek admission.
From the institutional perspective, it is usually the case that formal institutions which involve the major powers are initiated by these powers themselves. Yet the opposite has occurred with respect to the ARF. Moreover, as discussed above, ASEAN assumes the “driver’s seat” of the ARF. In other words, on one hand, the ARF may be depicted as a serious attempt by ASEAN to act as the Asia-Pacific's coordinating mechanism in the security realm. On the other hand, the external powers appear to be satisfied that the ARF is largely a dialogue structure (a "talk shop" in the eyes of its critics).

The ARF is nevertheless an unstable institution because of the characteristics highlighted above. ASEAN's proprietary control over membership criterion is one thorn. The Western powers were not particularly happy with Myanmar’s membership of the ARF, which currently has 22 members. It was noted above that ASEAN had insisted that members of the grouping are automatically ARF members, although even within ASEAN concerns continue to be raised about Myanmar's human rights record. More broadly, membership eligibility and the associated notion of “geographical footprint”, is somewhat haphazard. One ARF member, the European Community, is not a country. On the other hand, Taiwan and North Korea are still non-members although they have expressed their interest. Closer scrutiny, however, indicates that China, for one, has been able to exercise some veto on membership. It has so far insisted that Taiwan be excluded from the ARF process.

ASEAN's cautious management of the agenda has also upset the Western powers. The three potential Asia-Pacific flash points – the China-Taiwan issue, tensions on the Korean peninsula, and the Spratlys multiparty dispute -- are usually discussed only in general terms. Clearly, ASEAN's claim to “leadership” in the ARF process is dependent on its own unity and in the willingness of other members to subscribe to this self-proclaimed role. One senior Malaysian Foreign Ministry official suggested that a Malaysian concern is whether, with the creation of the ARF, fellow ASEAN members will continue to use the ASEAN rubric to manage their bilateral ties. On the other hand, ASEAN unity on the Spratly Islands multiparty disputes, coupled
with the grouping's careful management of the ARF's agenda to keep the issue low-keyed, has led to Beijing agreeing, since 1995, to hold regular ASEAN-China talks on the issue at senior officials' level.\(^{41}\)

China apart, other non-ASEAN members of the ARF have not always been impressed with ASEAN's helmsmanship of the ARF process. All the ARF members are in broad agreement with the concept paper which ASEAN tabled as a roadmap at the Forum's second meeting in Brunei in 1995. As outlined, the ARF was to proceed in three stages, but allowing for some overlap: confidence building, preventive diplomacy and, finally, "approaches to conflict" (the original term for this third stage was "conflict resolution" but it was substituted on China's insistence). However, as Michael Leifer observed, some of the non-ASEAN members of the ARF are unhappy with ASEAN's control of its agenda and pace. He cites a "heated exchange" during a May 1995 senior officials' meeting in which some non-ASEAN members felt they were being treated as "second-class citizens".\(^{42}\) In a newspaper interview in 1996, Ali Alatas, the Indonesian foreign minister, insisted that "[at] this stage, ARF is a forum to share views and to progress towards a greater comprehension".\(^{43}\) In other words, Alatas was arguing that even as a "talk shop", the ARF enabled its members' officials -- over time, and through regular face-to-face contacts -- to appreciate each other's positions. But such assertions irk those who either want to impose greater formality on the ARF process or to put regional crises on the agenda. Although Alatas did not identify the Forum's critics, his remarks above came in the wake of comments by US officials who had felt the ARF was putting aside issues like the China-Taiwan standoff, tensions in Korea, and the political situation in Myanmar.

These several contentious matters -- encapsulated in the issue of the provision of leadership within the ARF -- may therefore prove divisive to the ARF if conflicts of interests build up, despite general consensus on the ARF's core purpose. Its continued relevance in the emergent Asia-Pacific multilateral process, and the effect on ASEAN's voice in the process, will need to be assessed in conjunction with the discussion on APEC, below.
Although APEC was created earlier than the ARF, an institutional framework has now emerged whose purpose is to address the linked economic and security concerns of Asia-Pacific countries and interested external actors. From the institutional perspective, APEC is -- like the ARF -- illustrative of how the interests and expectations of various actors, including the ASEAN members, are articulated and resolved (or left unresolved).

The impetus that led to APEC's creation in 1989 arose from the fear of a failure of the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which might then trigger trade wars among regional blocs centred on the major economic powers. The original Australian initiative excluded the United States but it soon became clear that APEC would otherwise be dominated by Japan. Thus, although APEC was conceived as a trade liberalizing multilateral regime, only the participation of the US would assuage Asia-Pacific states which feared the creation of a Japan-led yen-bloc. ASEAN members were among those which insisted that the US be included (1) to “balance” the economic power of Japan; and (2) just as important, if not more, to provide a setting whereby the US can seek beneficial economic integration. ASEAN members and other Asia-Pacific states insisted that an important purpose of APEC was to keep the US engaged economically -- and thereby provide it with an important plank to retain its security interests in the region. A United States that stays economically engaged in the Asia-Pacific would be less inclined to turn isolationist.

It also became apparent that APEC had the potential to serve as an instrument for managing the relations among the major Asia-Pacific economic powers and to enable them to discuss security concerns in the background. Moreover, to the extent that US and Japanese economic integration in the Asia-Pacific would also serve to help the transition of the emergent economies (especially China and Vietnam) into the
regional free market, then APEC could serve as an instrument for such economic “warming-up”. As one Japanese analyst observed, political rapprochement is often preceded by economic warming-up.\(^{45}\)

However desirable these objectives are, leadership (whether provided by one or several) is a necessary condition for institutional success. APEC languished in its first three years and was only invigorated when US President Bill Clinton, seeking fresh impetus for his Asia-Pacific foreign policy, took the initiative to host an APEC leaders' summit. This took place in Seattle in November 1993. But while APEC summits have since become an annual event, the US has since adopted a lower profile again. The problem of leadership within APEC still exists, despite a rotating chair system. Moreover, APEC is potentially divisive because some members sought to expand its membership\(^{46}\) while others wanted more formalized structures or wanted to set benchmarks for movement towards lower tariffs.

Some assessments, from the institutional perspective, about the dynamics of ASEAN's links with APEC and the ARF may now be made. First, in terms of APEC as the prospective economic leg of the Asia-Pacific's multilateral architecture, the problem of a lack of institutionalized leadership is evident, as observed above. Economic leadership clearly has to come either from an economic power or from some leadership arrangement managed by the major economic powers. This is because compliance with agreed economic goals have to be enforced. ASEAN is constrained from attempting a leadership role in the Asia-Pacific, given its limited economic influence. On the other hand, in terms of the ARF as the prospective security dialogue leg of the Asia-Pacific's multilateral architecture (that is, as distinct from a military alliance structure), the very presence of several major powers constrain their eligibility to provide leadership. ASEAN, as the most viable Asia-Pacific regional institution and also on account of its model of consultation and consensus, was therefore acceptable as the "driver" of the ARF.

Secondly, common interests are less easily forged over economic issues in a multilateral setting. Differences within ASEAN over APEC have emerged. One
example became evident at the Indonesian-hosted Bogor summit of APEC leaders in November 1994. Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir, who had boycotted the first (1993) summit, refused to go along with the consensus-building “compromise” dual-track plan for trade liberalization which President Suharto had painstakingly promoted.\(^{47}\) On the other hand, while differences between ASEAN and non-ASEAN ARF members have surfaced, ASEAN unity in the ARF setting has generally held. Moreover, in the case of the ARF, it allows the involved external powers to reassure regional states like ASEAN members vis-a-vis their intentions. Both China and Japan, for example, are very aware of suspicions about them among Asia-Pacific states.

Thirdly, however, for both APEC and the ARF, there is broad consensus among their members that their core objectives should be: (1) to help keep the United States engaged in the region; and (2) to serve as a mechanism for the engaged great and middle powers and other actors (such as the EC) to meet regularly in an Asia-Pacific setting. If this consensus holds, it is argued, accommodation over difficult issues -- whether in APEC or the ARF -- becomes possible.\(^ {48}\)

In institutional terms, then, ASEAN unity when relating to APEC or the ARF is more easily obtained when common interests outweigh divergent interests. One related argument is that precisely because APEC and the ARF have to accommodate different players with different agendas, ASEAN unity -- “one for all, and all for one” -- would help achieve individual expectations. But it could also be argued that a successful APEC (less so with the ARF) which proscribes discriminatory trade practices across the board could undermine the need for ASEAN collective effort. Seen in this light, ASEAN's future is intertwined with the ability of APEC and the ARF to underpin the continued economic dynamism and peaceful conditions in the Asia-Pacific. APEC and the ARF together have the potential to serve as the institutional avenues for leaders and senior officials of the Asia-Pacific major powers and regional states to meet and to work on problems and issues. But APEC has yet to show that it can assume a trade-dispute management role while the ARF is still at the confidence-building stage. Ultimately, however, APEC and the ARF will be
diminished if any of the major powers becomes dissatisfied with them.

A final observation, in this section on multilateral initiatives in the Asia-Pacific, needs to be made regarding ASEAN. First, in terms of security institution-building, it was noted above that the ARF’s continued relevance depends to a large extent on ensuring that the major powers find it useful to their interests. ASEAN’s task here is therefore manageable, even if a new security institution were to be created for Northeast Asia, where the critical flash points are located. In other words, the ARF can be refocused to deal with Southeast Asian security issues, with ASEAN still in the driver’s seat.

Secondly, in terms of Asia-Pacific economic institution-building, ASEAN's initial concerns were “inward”, centred on whether its voice could be heard in a large forum like APEC. Another example was Malaysia’s attempt to initiate an East Asian Economic Grouping (EAEG) in December 1990, without consulting its ASEAN partners and without ascertaining if regional countries were ready for such an idea, which excluded the United States and would de facto have given economic leadership to Japan. In the event, ASEAN foreign ministers – displaying diplomatic finesse – “reformatted” EAEG in July 1993 into the East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC), a harmless caucus within APEC. But ASEAN learnt its lessons from all this and, since then, has become a proponent of multilateral links that complement, rather than compete with, APEC. With this in mind, the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) process was convened in March 1996, to ensure that Europe too had a stake in the Asia-Pacific’s (and ASEAN’s) economic well-being. The careful manner in which ASEM was created made it acceptable to the US while it was also effectively a forum involving key East Asian economic powers (Japan, China, South Korea and ASEAN) and the EU countries. In institutional terms, these complementary links are more likely than not to promote convergent interests among both large and small states.

To conclude this section, from the institutional perspective, ASEAN may be examined in light of its attempt to act as a coordinating mechanism to attain
cooperative outcomes, both in the context of its own expansion and in new institution-building. In the new conditions after the Cold War, ASEAN-6 and Vietnam found they could identify convergent interests, and therefore ASEAN-7 proved to be relatively painless. But ASEAN's "rush" to become ASEAN-10 seemed to defy institutional logic, given the problems associated with the other Southeast Asian countries, especially Myanmar. AFTA's economic and political purpose was found to be a response to the new conditions; yet it was still in harmony with ASEAN's idea of limited regionalism. Finally, ASEAN's roles in APEC and the ARF reflected the different economic and security dynamics, as well as the common factors, in the Asia-Pacific's multilateral developments.

5.8 ASEAN's balance of power concerns

As discussed above, institutions like the ARF emerged after the Cold War under conditions which enabled ASEAN to broker a convergence of interests among key players in the Asia-Pacific, including itself. In this view, the ARF symbolizes the idea of cooperative security. The next few sections examine these conditions under the lenses of the balance of power approach. This concern with the distribution of power and state's behaviour in a time of transition to multipolar world politics logically focuses on the US security umbrella and the emergence of China as a rising power.

It was found in Chapter 4 that even before the end of the Cold War, there had been a general recognition among the ASEAN states that the distribution of power from the global level to the regional level had been undergoing change for some time, with uncertain consequences. Since then, the concern has been raised by balance of power advocates about the future of American involvement in Asia-Pacific security issues and the emergence of China as a regional military and global political and economic power. On the other hand, three of the world's biggest economies -- the US, Japan and China -- are in the Asia-Pacific and, despite their trade disputes and the effects of the 1997 Asian economic crisis, have been engaged in reviving the region's
economic momentum. Moreover, despite the existence of potential flash points in the Asia-Pacific, the region is comparatively benign.

The behaviour of various actors in the Asia-Pacific region just prior to, and in the aftermath of, the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 illustrates the complex security landscape that has emerged. This mixed picture is exemplified in the events which led to the withdrawal of American forces from the Philippines in 1992; and in regional states’ behaviour in preventing rapid power shifts. This latter position was articulated, for example, by former Japanese foreign minister Shintaro Abe who asserted that regional states "must strive constantly to avoid any rapid shifts in the balance of power, while at the same time continuing diplomatic efforts to reduce that power to the lowest possible level".49

ASEAN members seem to agree with this view, and by the time of their 1992 summit, were prepared to put security issues on their agenda. Singapore's offer to host some American military facilities in 1989 (discussed below) was the precursor of a general acknowledgement among ASEAN members that the grouping needed to take a more active role in shaping the new balance of power among the major powers engaged in the Asia-Pacific.50

5.9  Balance of power and the post-Cold War US role

In the Asia-Pacific, the “self-help” balance of power perspective identifies an overriding concern with the consequences of power politics in Northeast Asia. The demise of the Soviet Union left the US as the sole superpower. By the US Pentagon's own estimate, it will have no "peer competitor" at least until 2015.51 On the other hand, even before the end of the Cold War, US grand strategy and military capability have been adjusting to a future multipolar strategic environment in the Asia-Pacific. While, for the US, balance of power concerns are still acute in Northeast Asia, such concerns have become more relaxed with regards to Southeast Asia. Indeed, as will be shown, the result has been a greater convergence of outlook within ASEAN and
with other Asia-Pacific countries on the US security role in the region. Quite discreetly, ASEAN members have enhanced their security cooperation in an informal web underpinned by the US military presence.

Although the recent Asian economic crisis has refocused Southeast Asian leaders’ concerns on their region’s political and social stability, any inter-state “spill-over” is likely to be localized. On the other hand, a major post-Cold War concern of ASEAN members is the critical Northeast Asian balance, the assumption being that instability and crisis in the latter region will affect the former. The security dynamic among the US, China and Japan is especially crucial in this regard. ASEAN is of course not a Northeast Asian player and it is incapable of affecting the balance of power there. (Instead, ASEAN has promoted multilateral dialogue and other efforts aimed at Northeast Asia through structures like the ARF.) Singapore promotes the consistent theme that a strong US-Japan security partnership is crucial to the future Asia-Pacific order. No ASEAN leader has contradicted this position, which may be summed up in the following assessment by Singapore's elder statesman Lee Kuan Yew:

It's crucial that the US and Japan should be on the same side of [the] balance. In less than 50 years, no combination of forces will be able to balance China.

Within Southeast Asia, the former Indochinese states have joined ASEAN and there is now no longer an ideological perspective on the external powers. Indeed, nearly all the ASEAN members are likely to share a similar position in not wishing to see a diminished US military presence. The possible exception would be Myanmar, which has close security ties with China and depends on it for much of its military equipment. But a counter argument could be made that, precisely for this reason, a fiercely independent-minded Myanmar would want to encourage a countervailing US presence.

The process within ASEAN of linking up with the US military presence began to take shape as the Cold War was winding down. It was not surprising that the grouping's most consistent advocate of a visible US presence, Singapore, was among
the first to be concerned that US-Philippine bases negotiations (which began in the late 1980s) might lead to a worst-case situation of a precipitate American withdrawal from Southeast Asia. Before discussing the "trigger" events -- the Philippine bases negotiations and the Singapore offer of expanded facilities to US air and naval forces -- that led to the ASEAN-6's post-Cold War re-assessments of the balance of power, it would be useful to briefly review their positions on the US presence. Vietnam will also be included although it joined ASEAN in July 1995.

Malaysia: Only Malaysian prime minister Mahathir Mohamad, among ASEAN heads of government, had publicly suggested that the US military presence may be unnecessary. But he has also qualified his remarks by saying that any reduction in US forces should be gradual. On the other hand, in January 1995, his then defence minister, Najib Tun Razak, made it a point to reiterate that Malaysia had no problem with the US military role in the region and that the two sides were involved in regular training exercises. Following Singapore's offer of expanded facilities to US forces, Malaysia had offered to service US warships at its dockyard in Lumut. As indicated above, it also has an MOU on military exercises with US forces.

Singapore: The island republic remains consistent in its stance that the US is as ever needed to maintain a "balance of power to avoid undue dominance by any single player". Deputy Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong recently reiterated his view that "[t]alking is useful and important, but it is never a substitute for a secure, stable balance" based on military power. For example, the regular port visits to Singapore by US aircraft carrier groups are usually given coverage by the local press (and are therefore a highly visible presence) as are US-Singapore military exercises and American endorsements of the US-Singapore "partnership". In January 1998, during the visit to Singapore of US Defence Secretary William Cohen, it was announced that the new naval base being developed at Changi would include a specially built berth to accommodate the US carriers.

Thailand: Bangkok has become somewhat ambivalent towards the US presence, a trend that began with the Chatichai government before the end of the Cold War. In
part, this was in reaction to the US’ own ambivalence and in part it was a result of Thailand's closer relationship with China. One recent example was the attempt by the US to position Equipment Afloat Ships (EAS) in the Gulf of Thailand, which Bangkok eventually rejected. However, Thailand continues to value the various military exercises involving Thai and US forces each year, conducted under their bilateral alliance. In particular, the annual US-Thai Cobra Gold exercise involves more than 20,000 troops from both sides.

Indonesia: Jakarta, which values its image as an active and respected non-aligned country (even if the movement has become anachronistic), has nevertheless begun to show a greater inclination to engage in greater security cooperation with the US and to join in the network of military activities linked to the US, such as the Australian-hosted Kakadu (naval) and Kangaroo (combined arms) series. Indonesia began participating in these two exercises from 1995. The US-Indonesian military relationship is, however, often beset by political problems such as when the US Congress insists on attaching human rights conditions onto training grants or weapon sales.

Brunei: The sultanate traditionally preferred to look to Britain for its external security links. But in the wake of the Singapore offer of facilities to US forces, Brunei offered to host US warship visits on a regular basis. Unlike Singapore, however, Brunei does not espouse an activist foreign policy within ASEAN and has not made clear how it views the US role in terms of its security interests.

The Philippines: A combination of nationalist domestic politics and natural disaster (the 1991 volcanic eruption on Mount Pinatubo which spewed huge amounts of ash onto Clark Airfield) led to American withdrawal from the Philippines in 1991-92. Moreover, security cooperation suffered. Although the Mutual Defence Treaty (MDT) remained operative, the alliance relationship was in danger of becoming a paper pact. On the part of Manila, the MDT was increasingly seen to be useful only if the US were prepared to come to the aid of the Philippines in any regional conflict, and, in particular, in the Spratlys dispute. This initial post-Cold War mood of
essentially asking “What's in it for me?” has also provoked Manila to rebuff Washington's initiative on an Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA) on the grounds that any stockpiling of US equipment and weapons would compromise the Philippines’ constitutional requirement.\textsuperscript{66} On the part of Washington, it publicly asserts that it can do without access to the Philippine bases. However, the ACSA issue -- described by one commentator as “US bases by another name” -- is still being discussed by both sides.\textsuperscript{67}

The US and the Philippines are, however, interested in resuming regular military exercises and signed a Visiting Forces Agreement in 1998, which was expected to be ratified by the Philippine Senate in May 1999.\textsuperscript{68} Very soon after the Philippine navy discovered Chinese concrete structures put up on Mischief Reef (claimed by both sides and other claimants) in February 1995, the Philippines and the US renewed ad hoc joint military training including one in July 1995 in which US Navy SEALs and Philippine commandos participated\textsuperscript{69}.

Vietnam: Post-Cold War Vietnam waited patiently for full normal relations with the US to be established. One reason for Vietnam's vigorous pursuit of entry into ASEAN was its belief that the US would be more agreeable to speed up full recognition to it once it became an ASEAN member. Security cooperation with the US will remain minimal until Vietnam modernizes its armed forces to achieve some level of interoperability, and until the US fully sheds its Vietnam War Syndrome. However, as an ASEAN member, Vietnam offers an excellent military infrastructure especially Danang air base and Cam Ranh Bay air and naval base, assets it can use to host military exercises with its fellow ASEAN members and “friendly” external powers. On a visit to Vietnam in November 1994, the US Navy's most senior officer in the Pacific, Admiral Richard Macke, refused to rule out future use of Vietnam's military facilities.\textsuperscript{70}

5.10 The Philippine bases and the “Singapore offer”
Even before the end of the Cold War, the prospect of a US withdrawal from its bases in the Philippines had arisen. Although the US became an offshore power in Southeast Asia after 1973-75 (that is, it no longer deployed ground troops in Southeast Asia), its comprehensive air and naval facilities in the Philippines had remained a source of visible reassurance of American interest in the ASEAN region. However, the business-like approach of US negotiators during US-Philippine talks in the late 1980s on renewal of the base leases alerted ASEAN members to a change in US attitude towards forward-deployed basing. By 1991-92, within four years of US-Philippine talks which began in July 1988, the Americans had withdrawn from their Clark and Subic bases after 100 years of “special relations”.

The US Philippines bases issue is illustrative of the changed, more complex, regional dynamics which followed from major power realignment from the mid-1980s. On the one hand, no power vacuum really existed, since US forces were still present and, at least in Southeast Asia, no other major powers could project their forces yet. On the other hand, such a power vacuum might indeed arise if, for various reasons (such as domestic pressures in host countries and in the US itself), American forces were to begin a process of withdrawal. As will be shown, overt balancing was not in evidence. But importantly, while the US Philippines bases issue tested ASEAN solidarity, the net result was a greater intramural convergence of outlook on the US security role. The issue arose from the increasingly acrimonious negotiations between Manila and Washington in talks on extending the lease on the American military facilities in the Philippines beyond the lease's expiry in 1991.71

Two events -- which tested intramural solidarity -- arose out of the bases negotiations: (1) starting with Foreign Secretary Raul Manglapus' trip to ASEAN states ahead of the 1987 summit in Manila, the Philippines began urging its fellow ASEAN members to share in the burden of hosting the US bases; (2) failure to achieve an ASEAN position led to Singapore offering to host what it called limited facilities to rotating American air and naval units.
In the first event, following the overthrow of the Marcos government in February 1986 and the inauguration of the Corazon Aquino administration, nationalist elements within the Philippines citing the need for a “new relationship” began to clamour for either increased “rent” or the outright removal of the American air and naval bases in the country. The issue became an ASEAN affair when Philippine foreign minister Manglapus began to call for unspecified burden-sharing by fellow ASEAN members of the American military presence. This raised once again within ASEAN circles the question of foreign bases and ZOPFAN, at a critical juncture.

The second event resulted from the first. Singapore announced in August 1989 that it was willing to host, on a modest scale, American air and naval facilities. This was followed up in November 1990 by the signing in Washington of a Memorandum of Understanding. Singapore's official reason for its action was that it was in fact responding to the Philippine call for burden-sharing of the American military presence within ASEAN. But Singapore, a strong advocate of a continuation of the US military presence, assessed (1) that erstwhile fellow hardliner Thailand, now freed from dependence on ASEAN for solidarity over Indochina, was no longer willing to be as vocal in its support of the US bases as before; and (2) that the new mood in the US was that the Philippine bases were useful but not vital for its global security objectives given Soviet military decline. As early as 1988, a study by the New York-based Council of Foreign Relations had concluded that the Philippine bases were not crucial, and that relocation costs were bearable.\(^{72}\)

A certain naivety in the new Corazon Aquino administration in the Philippines started the process which led to the American withdrawal in 1992. At the start of her administration early in 1986, Mrs Aquino sought to have the bases removed. Only much later did she seek the retention of the bases upon realization that there was also a pro-bases lobby of business and military groups. In a sense, the Philippine political elite who encouraged the popular sentiments could not envisage the Americans being prepared to leave their Philippine bases in the event talks on lease renewal broke down.
The other key actor, Singapore, was concerned that (1) the Aquino government would cave in to the anti-bases pressures; (2) isolationist elements within the US would add to such pressures on the Bush administration; and (3) the other ASEAN countries were being constrained by domestic politics which prevented them from publicly urging the Americans not to pull out from the Philippines. Singapore's action was consistent with its declared position: that a continued -- and visible -- American presence was necessary for its own security, and for regional security.

Thus, from the above account, intra-ASEAN dynamics had made it impossible for all ASEAN members to openly endorse the Philippines' call for burden-sharing of the US military presence. The balance of power approach is mainly concerned with reasons of self-interest for actions taken, and looks at states' capabilities and declared intentions, not at the domestic constraints or milieu goals like ZOPFAN which drove those intra-ASEAN dynamics. Even Singapore, which was the ASEAN member which acted least ambiguously in implementing its endorsement of the US presence, did not seek a formal bases agreement with the US. Indeed, while Singapore came out to openly support the collective ASEAN statement which the Philippines lobbied for, it did not force the issue. Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew later backed down and even conceded that “we should not be seen to take a position” on what was a bilateral issue. This occurred after he had held discussions with Indonesia's President Suharto in late November 1987. With Jakarta now setting the tone, the issue came to a dead end. It was not put on the agenda at the Manila summit and suffered a similar fate at the 1988 ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Bangkok. Manila failed to understand that it was challenging the carefully nurtured ASEAN understanding on ZOPFAN and the issue of foreign bases. To the extent that the bases existed before ASEAN was formed, Indonesia could accept their existence. It was another matter to openly declare that ASEAN now needed the bases as part of its security needs.

The Singapore offer, on the other hand, sought to advance the island republic's material interests and declared balance of power outlook without undermining the sensitivities of Indonesia and Malaysia, both of whom continued to openly espouse ZOPFAN. The offer was announced as an extension of existing Singapore-US
arrangements and hence was not deemed a contravention of the ZOPFAN principle. Thus, at the official level, ASEAN could accept that the arrangement was a bilateral matter. Official (as opposed to media) reactions from Indonesia and Malaysia, and the other ASEAN states, illustrate the complicated dynamics at work in their declaratory as well as privately espoused positions.

The official Indonesian reaction was guarded, with foreign minister Ali Alatas making the point that the offer had not affected ASEAN solidarity. The cue seemed to have come from President Suharto who -- in a meeting with Lee Kuan Yew in Brunei -- said his concern was whether the Singapore offer was tantamount to the setting up of a new foreign base, that is, whether it was a challenge to the ASEAN position on ZOPFAN. He concluded that Singapore had merely extended existing facilities to the Americans. This official position has to be distinguished from the media reaction, which ranged from those echoing Jakarta's line to strident attacks on the Singapore offer.

In Malaysia, Prime Minister Dr Mahathir did not make an early comment, leaving this to his defence and foreign ministers. Like the official Indonesian commentators, they emphasized the sanctity of ZOPFAN. Foreign Minister Hassan went further and called for the convening of an ASEAN meeting to discuss the issue.

It was at this point that the reaction of one other key ASEAN member is notable. Thailand's support for the Singapore offer had been low-keyed but now Foreign Minister Siddhi made a statement to reject any ASEAN forum on an issue that might expose intramural divisions. Brunei understandably supported Singapore's position but had no wish to upset Malaysia or Indonesia by being overly vocal on the issue. Finally, the Philippines, ostensibly the benefactor of Singapore's effort to share some of the burden of hosting the American presence, again found to its dismay that there was to be no official ASEAN position on the US presence in the region.

The Singapore offer, like the Philippine bases issue, is a useful example of how a balance of power situation may be complicated by local dynamics. Arising from
these dynamics, one observation would be that four ASEAN states -- Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand -- are the key regional security "nodes". The relative isolation of the Philippines then can be gauged from the speed with which ASEAN as a whole adjusted to the pullout of US forces from Clark in 1991 and from Subic in 1992. A second observation is that ASEAN security practice is highly nuanced, that is, official statements may not reflect the leaderships' actual sentiments. The Singapore offer of military facilities -- subsequently accepted by Washington -- helped to promote a less ambiguous ASEAN discourse on regional security issues, especially with regards to the US presence and ZOPFAN. It forced, as it were, a more pragmatic approach among Indonesian and Malaysian policy-makers. As former Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew noted in the aftermath of the debate over the offer: “[Their] private position is unstated, but can be perceived by reading between the lines.” Indeed, both Indonesia and Malaysia were to subsequently feel more “comfortable” about admitting the origin and extent of their own security cooperation with the US, which in Kuala Lumpur's case goes back to the 1970s.

Following the collapse of the bases talks, Singapore moved to back up the 1990 Singapore-US Memorandum of Understanding by agreeing to locate a key command, the Command Logistics Western Pacific (Comlog Westpac) in Singapore. Comlog Westpac, headed by a rear admiral, functions both to coordinate the US Navy's logistics activities as well as its military exercises with regional navies. The significance of this relocation was that the discreet US involvement with ASEAN security cooperation was kept uninterrupted and in fact was later enhanced.

Singapore's action on access facilities forced the other ASEAN members to become more open about their position. Indonesian Foreign Minister Alatas voiced his fears about a “security disequilibrium” and even argued that the US was “geopolitically part of the region”. In 1990, it had been revealed that US and Indonesian military forces cooperated on maritime training and anti-submarine warfare activities. Although Malaysian prime minister Mahathir continued to dismiss the usefulness of the US presence, defence minister Najib revealed that Malaysia and the US had held joint military training long before the formalisation of their cooperation in 1984.
Furthermore, such cooperation was now being enhanced.\textsuperscript{82} Brunei began to take tentative steps to mesh into this network of military activities with the US, in effect an overdue recognition that its security links with Britain would diminish. Brunei agreed to provide access arrangements for US warships and to embark on joint military training with the US; in November 1994 the two countries signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) for bilateral defence cooperation.\textsuperscript{83}

The Philippines was caught off guard by the apparent willingness of the United States to abandon their “special relationship” with the end of the Cold War. The timing for Manila was unfortunate, because Washington's strategic reassessment at the time envisaged a drawdown of US forces worldwide. For Singapore, its balance of power considerations kept it alert to such nuances and it moved decisively to ensure that the US kept a \textit{visible} military presence in the mini-state's regional security environment. Moreover, Singapore handled its offer of facilities to the US quite adroitly. It preserved its options while allowing the other ASEAN members room to manoeuvre. It was careful not to challenge the ZOPFAN ideal. Finally, Thailand was more concerned about its bilateral security relations with the US than with American bases in the Philippines which served the global interests of the US. In this sense, initiatives on the bases issue were mainly left to the maritime ASEAN states, vulnerable to sea lane disruptions. In fact, as noted above, Singapore subsequently agreed to the relocation of the Seventh Fleet's Command Logistic Western Pacific (Comlog Westpac) to Singapore,\textsuperscript{84} while Brunei, Malaysia and Indonesia made their own access arrangements for US forces.

5.11  \textbf{The new US outlook: “Places, not bases”}

In the orthodox balance of power thinking, once the US decided to pull out from the Philippines, it would logically be expected to secure alternative bases if it wanted to maintain a visible presence in the Southeast Asian and Australasian regions. In fact, the approach taken by the US reflects, like that taken by the ASEAN countries, a more subtle agenda sensitive to its own and to regional countries’ domestic politics.
In other words, while the US continues to emphasize the balance of power approach, it is no longer cast in the Cold War ideological mould.

To the extent that isolationist tendencies in the US can be managed, US military forces in the Asia-Pacific remain capable and willing to complement ASEAN members' expansion of security provisions in a variety of ways. Conversely, the evidence since 1992 is that ASEAN members now openly seek a continued and visible US military presence. An extensive web of military exercises in which US forces and high technology assets are involved – to a degree and at the pace comfortable to the host country -- is being put in place.

The US security network in East Asia is a balance of power structure. It continues to be characterized by its web of bilateral military links. In both parts of East Asia -- Northeast and Southeast Asia -- no central balance existed. Indeed, in Northeast Asia, while Japan and South Korea saw themselves as US allies, they were less enamoured of each other, given their enduring historical animosity. The US has yet to determine if the rise of China (to be discussed in detail in the next section) poses a future threat to its vital interests. Certainly, it would appear that for now, all the major powers involved in Northeast Asia have the common objective of preventing a war on the Korean peninsula.

For Southeast Asia, with the end of the Cold War and since the closure of the Clark and Subic bases, the US has embarked on a new policy of “Places, not bases”. The US military does not now have a superpower rival at the global level, and it can now focus on potential regional threats. This regional threat approach emphasizes US participation in ad hoc arrangements underpinned by a convergence of security interests. US participation thus provides valuable familiarization of doctrines and training, and leverage in such critical areas as real-time information and logistics resupply. Also, only the US has the independent ability to assemble from its global assets what is called the “reconnaissance strike force” for use in crisis situations requiring the military strike option.85
In policy terms, the new post-Cold War US outlook began -- under the Bush administration -- with the 1990 US Defence Department publication titled the *East Asia Security Initiative (EASI)*. Its purpose was to reduce, albeit gradually, US forces in East Asia. The new Clinton administration found itself having to ward off allegations of foreign policy drift and in the Defence Department's February 1995 report, the *United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region*, it pledged to retain about 100,000 forward-deployed military personnel and other military assets "for the foreseeable future". This figure of about 100,000 personnel was recently re-confirmed at least for the four-year period from 1997-2000 in the 1997 Defence Department's *Quadriennial Defence Review*.  

As a global power, the US must fit its Southeast Asia policy into its overall plan. With the end of the Cold War (global Soviet competition), the US felt it now had in effect two “non-NATO” regional contingencies to deal with (the Middle East and North Korea). As early as 1990, it seemed that the US had decided that its large, fixed bases in one single Southeast Asian country were no longer critically needed. Instead, as Donald Emmerson notes (in the context of ASEAN-6),

under EASI all six ASEAN states would be to varying degrees involved in a very different US military profile -- small, fluid and contingent upon access. Under EASI, low-profile bilateral arrangements were worked out in memoranda of understanding with various ASEAN member countries. Typically, these accords afforded US military ships or planes rights of access to particular ports or airfields for repair, provisioning or training exercises. Singapore went furthest by agreeing to host a small complement of American military personnel.

In this respect, ASEAN members' nuanced regional security concerns had to be sensitively handled. In particular, regional states' often unstated concerns about China since the end of the Cold War have influenced their actions, both in the sense of engaging Beijing and in monitoring its behaviour. A US proposal to pre-position logistics ships (Equipment Aboard Ships, or EAS) offshore in Southeast Asian waters was badly handled politically, forcing Thailand to publicly reject it as it could be seen by China to be part of a new American encirclement strategy. Even Singapore in its public pronouncements did not offer itself as a location. The EAS
scheme is, however, fundamental to the "Places, not bases" policy and the US is expected to seek an eventual location for such ships in Southeast Asia.\footnote{88}

As noted above, the ASEAN countries are unwilling to publicly identify any future preponderant power in their region. This constrains their willingness to host a greater American military presence since the US has made it clear its forces will be tasked primarily for regional conflicts outside Southeast Asia. ASEAN members remain acutely concerned about their sovereignty, territorial integrity, national identity and political legitimacy. Yet these concerns are not expressed in unambiguous balance of power terms or behaviour. In this sense, the ASEAN states see the American military presence in Southeast Asia under the "Places, not bases" policy as representing an \textit{extant} commitment to the region's political stability. This post-Cold War US policy is couched in the politically accepted language of fostering military ties and the expansion of bilateral (and limited multilateral) security links with the ASEAN countries.\footnote{89} It is a "peacetime and contingency" presence with the limited objectives of (a) projecting a visible US presence in Southeast Asia so as to reduce the likelihood of conflict; and (b) enhancing interoperability among forces friendly to the United States so as to bring to bear effective military forces in conjunction with local forces to deal with any aggressor.\footnote{90} Insofar as US or regional domestic politics does not force an about-turn, there is no ideological content to this policy.

Despite regional concerns about the steadfastness of this US commitment, senior US military officials regularly take pains to insist that while political decisions are "beyond their pay scales", tangible evidence of long-term US involvement exists.\footnote{91} In 1995, the US Pacific Fleet began to schedule large-scale exercises with regional navies. Under this initiative called Cooperation Afloat, Readiness and Training (CARAT), a US carrier task force including destroyers, frigates, submarines and amphibious landing vessels would be assigned to the Western Pacific for three months to a year to conduct bilateral exercises with navies in the area. Previous naval exercises only involved US warships seconded briefly from battle groups which happened to be sailing in the region.\footnote{92}
5.12 ASEAN and post-Cold War China

The post-Cold War Asia-Pacific could have been "ripe" for the emergence of a balance of power situation, given the presence of a status quo great power, the US, and a rising power, China. Yet this has not been the case, contrary to balance of power logic. One important reason has been the general acceptance of the US military presence in the region, as already discussed above. Another reason is the situation regarding China, discussed in this section.

Although strategic perceptions differed within ASEAN during the Cold War, China's regional role was increasingly accepted. ASEAN leaders do not seem to share the "containment versus engagement" debate over post-Cold War China being argued in Western circles. ASEAN members share at least one view: China casts its shadow but it need not be a menacing one, that is, it need not be a military threat. Optimism about China is premised on three key assumptions: (1) that nothing goes wrong within China and that China is not threatened externally; (2) that China's political and economic stakes in ASEAN shapes its behaviour positively towards the grouping; and (3) that none of the 10 states of Southeast Asia (the ASEAN-10) is left isolated or becomes vulnerable to Chinese, or other major power, pressure.

China, moreover, does not currently have a military presence in maritime Southeast Asia. While it shares extensive land borders with Myanmar, Vietnam, and Laos, it does not have any forces stationed abroad, unlike the US. Most ASEAN states do not regard a post-Cold War China that is economically integrated into the region as an expansionist threat. However, apart from the still unlikely risk of a destabilized China, they are concerned that China may be provoked or frustrated by a variety of circumstances ranging from Western, especially American, disregard for its "non-negotiable" issues (Taiwan and Tibet) to perceived Western economic or military containment.

In terms of Sino-ASEAN political relations, regular dialogues on regional peace,
stability, conflict prevention and economic ties were agreed upon in January 1995, with the first meeting of senior officials taking place in Hangzhou, China in April.\textsuperscript{95} However, unlike the increasing sense of comfort which regional states have in engaging in defence and security cooperation with the United States, ASEAN members still treat the possibility of such cooperation with China as a sensitive issue.\textsuperscript{96}

In terms of military security, ASEAN members are faced with the prospect of uncertainty over whether China will become a status quo or an anti-status quo political and military power. The major obstacle, in military security terms, is China's all-encompassing claims to the Spratly islands which make it a maritime neighbour to all the littoral ASEAN states (although Indonesia, Singapore and Thailand are not claimants in the islands' disputes). Specifically, how will China's increasing assertiveness in its Spratlys claim affect ASEAN members (including Vietnam) who may have to decide whether to band together or bandwagon with China, or to invite support from one or more external players? The Spratlys issue may thus be examined from the balance of power perspective, below.

5.13 Balance of power and the South China Sea

From the balance of power perspective, only the US has the ability to "police" the South China Sea, given the military assets at the disposal of its Pacific Command. However, the US has been careful to assert that it takes no side in the multiparty claims in the South China Sea, and that its interest is to ensure the sea lines of communications (SLOCs) are kept open. China is the most powerful claimant state but it does not have the power projection capability to take and hold the entire South China Sea, which it claims. However, as will be discussed, China has used and may continue to use the South China Sea issue to either exert pressure on certain regional countries or to link it to changes in the regional environment which affect the Sino-US relationship.
For the ASEAN countries, the South China Sea issue is potentially divisive since not all of its members are claimants in the dispute. Support for an ASEAN claimant may incur the displeasure of China, with no certainty of US support for ASEAN.

During the Cold War, China directed its forays into the South China Sea against only South Vietnam in January 1974 (Paracels) following Sino-American rapprochement, and against reunited Vietnam in March 1988 (Spratlys) following Sino-Soviet rapprochement, while Hanoi was an international pariah, and while Sino-US relations were stable. Force was used by both sides on the two occasions. In those instances, China was careful not to provoke the ASEAN claimants to the Spratlys (Malaysia, the Philippines and Brunei). Japan, moreover, felt assured that its vital oil supply lines from the Middle East passing through the South China Sea were being protected by the US Navy even though the United States consistently declared that it took no sides in the disputes.

Since the end of the Cold War, however, China and the other claimants have raised their profile over the Spratlys especially since the departure of the US forces from the Philippines in 1992. China seems to have both elevated the Spratly issue to come under its broader maritime claims in East Asia, as well as intensified its probing actions in the Spratlys to cover not only Vietnam's but Philippine claims as well. In February 1992, China's parliament passed the Territorial Waters Act which applied not only to the South China Sea islands (including the Spratlys) but also, for the first time, to the Diaoyu (Senkaku) islands in the East China Sea, claimed also by Japan. The new territorial sea law implied that China would use force to ensure its rights in the territorial waters around its claimed islands. This law and China’s actions with respect to its maritime claims cast it, in balance of power terms, as a revisionist maritime power. As will be discussed, how this “more aggressive” Chinese posture invites reactions from the US and non-ASEAN regional powers ultimately depends on these powers’ vital interests.

To Vietnam (which became ASEAN’s seventh member in 1995) China's February 1992 sea law was provocative, coming as it did on the heels of Sino-Vietnamese
normalization of relations in November 1991. As if to confirm Hanoi's suspicions, in May 1992, China signed a contract with a small US exploration firm, Crestone, in an area of seabed in the south-west of the Spratlys group. Although China by early 1992 had signed 66 contracts with foreign oil companies for offshore oil and gas development, this was its first in the Spratlys. Moreover, the Crestone zone overlapped with Vietnam's “Tu Chinh” bank, located on its continental shelf. According to one Vietnamese observer, Vietnam initially kept its protest low-keyed but

> [w]hen Chinese troops planted a sovereignty marker on July 4 on a tiny reef in the Spratlys, Vietnam accused China of having “seriously violated Vietnam's territorial sovereignty”. On September 5, Vietnam hinted it would use force to repulse two Chinese vessels exploring for oil in the Gulf of Tonkin.

In the course of 1993 and 1994, Chinese and Vietnamese sabre-rattling over the Crestone/Tu Chinh area continued. Vietnam, however, had little choice but to tone down its rhetoric thereafter. In February 1995, it was the Philippines’ turn to protest at Chinese actions in the Spratlys. Manila released photographs of several Chinese structures around Mischief Reef, just 135 nautical miles from the Philippine island of Palawan. Apart from guard-posts and a satellite antenna, the structures included a helipad as well. Chinese foreign minister Qian Qichen's claim in March that the structures were shelters for fishermen was undermined by President Jiang Zemin's subsequent remark that a strong People's Liberation Army (PLA) was a necessity to safeguard China's territory, airspace and “oceanic rights and interests”. Like Hanoi, Manila's initial public protests were low-keyed but in the midst of negotiations, the Philippine navy destroyed Chinese survey markers on eight reefs and, on 25 March, detained four Chinese fishing vessels with 62 fishermen near Alicia Annie Reef. But subsequent official Philippine statements and actions -- like Vietnam's -- became conciliatory towards China.

The more accommodative Philippine stance as well as a unified ASEAN position at the first Sino-ASEAN political dialogue in Hangzhou in April 1995 persuaded Beijing to enter into bilateral talks with Manila on the South China Sea in August 1995. The outcome was a bilateral “code of conduct” which stipulated that the two
sides would refrain from any destabilizing activities in the area. In April 1997, however, Manila protested at the discovery of four Chinese warships in an area of the Spratlys claimed by the Philippines. The Mischief Reef issue raised bilateral tensions again in 1999 upon Philippine charges that China had reinforced the structures there. Beijing dismissed Manila’s call for United Nations involvement, insisting the issue was a bilateral matter.

Thus, Chinese actions in the Spratlys appear to target the two claimants most vulnerable to its pressure. Vietnam – still militarily weak -- is historically aware that China can apply pressure at various points: any attempt to seek countervailing power against China in the South China Sea will merely shift Chinese pressure to other issue-areas, such as border trade. The Philippines, even militarily weaker than Vietnam, nevertheless is less constrained in seeking the countervailing power of US forces. How the US respond might then be taken by the Chinese as indicative of the prevailing American position on the issue.

The above examples illustrate, for the ASEAN claimants, a complicated situation in the Spratlys, because of several broad aspects:

(i) With the end of Sino-US and Sino-ASEAN cooperation over Cambodia, Chinese behaviour towards the other Spratly claimants appear to have become more complex. On one hand, it still seeks the goodwill of ASEAN and until recently was careful not to push ASEAN into collective action against it; on the other hand, China has been unhappy with the recent boldness of some of the other claimants. Moreover, China's perceived strategic requirements in the widely-scattered archipelago and its future oil needs compel it to position itself to assert a visible presence and to stand ready to reap the benefits of oil discoveries. The beginnings of a less cautious action-reaction spiral may therefore have begun to replace the creeping annexations undertaken by the various claimants during the Cold War.

(ii) ASEAN members are caught in a dilemma, with the grouping's collective image at stake. One course of action is reassurance towards China, but this is unsatisfactory
to the claimant members who feel that China could use divide-and-coerce tactics on individual claimants. Moreover, Indonesia, although not a claimant, was unhappy that recent Chinese maps showed boundary overlaps into the waters of Indonesia's Natuna islands. Vietnam's entry into ASEAN carried a calculated risk for the grouping in terms of conflict-management over the Spratlys. China's reaction might conceivably have been to harden its approach if it perceived an ASEAN united front on the Spratlys which included Vietnam, the only rival claimant (other than Taiwan) with a total claim on the Spratlys.

(iii) Japan has not indicated that it has become less confident of US ability to protect its vital oil supply routes. Nevertheless, recent Japanese defence allocations have been towards maritime force projection. It is unlikely that Japan will be a major direct player in the Spratlys in the immediate future but a failure of US resolve to intervene in the event of a major Spratlys incident would call into question the value of the US-Japanese alliance in protecting Japan's vital interests.

(iv) The US is unwilling to be more assertive on the Spratlys other than to warn all claimants that it is likely to act militarily if the sea and air lanes through the Spratlys are ever impeded. In fact, it may even be argued that so long as Beijing is careful not to challenge this freedom of passage, it would not necessarily be disadvantageous for Washington to see the Spratly islands dominated by China rather than have them parcelled out to individual states. Beijing has obliged by regularly pledging not to disrupt the sea lanes. The US, however, is also aware that regional concerns about the Spratlys works well with its “Places, not bases” strategy. The US, rebuffed in 1994 over its quest for a location for its Equipment Afloat Ships (EAS), is prepared for a more opportune timing to gauge ASEAN members' reaction to this request again. Philippine concerns about the Spratlys have led to a resumption of US-Philippine military training involving marine and maritime assets.

From the balance of power perspective, then, these potential factors for an action-reaction dynamic, taken together, have contributed to the chances of the Spratly disputes becoming a post-Cold War flash point. Until 1992, when ASEAN moved to
put regional security openly on its agenda, there was no common ASEAN position on the disputed islands. In July of that year, at the Manila ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, ASEAN issued its first formal statement on regional security, the Declaration on the South China Sea, which held that no claimant should use force in pursuit of its claim. It was a calculated gambit: Vietnam readily endorsed it while China noted it as an ASEAN initiative.

The other course of action for ASEAN members is to band together in a show of diplomatic deterrence, so to speak. Now, with Vietnam a member of ASEAN, China faces an ostensibly united grouping willing -- if episodically -- to provide diplomatic support to its claimant members. As discussed earlier, Beijing has since 1995 agreed to hold annual ASEAN-China political dialogues which include security issues like the Spratlys claims. These have, at best, been "agree to disagree" forums.

Some observers have suggested that because the Spratlys issue affects the ASEAN members, it might -- with the Cold War Cambodian issue already settled -- become the grouping's new "glue". Taking the balance of power perspective, however, Michael Leifer suggests that the multiparty Spratlys issue highlights ASEAN's lack of countervailing power on an issue involving a major power and in which the vital interests of other major powers might not be challenged. He compares the post-Cold War Spratlys issue with the 1980s Cold War Cambodian issue and contrasts their different contexts. Over Cambodia, ASEAN was able to successfully pursue its diplomatic campaign to isolate Vietnam politically and economically because it could draw on the countervailing military power of China. Although Vietnam was supported by the Soviet Union, the latter did not see Vietnam as so vital a client that it would risk a confrontation with China. On this calculation, China “punished” Vietnam in 1979 over the latter's invasion of Cambodia, and engaged in a naval battle with Vietnam in the Spratlys in 1988. On both occasions, too, the US stood on the sidelines. Japan, of course, was a passive player.

The primary interest of the US and Japan in the Spratlys issue is their unimpeded access to the SLOCs across the archipelago. China has been careful so far in not
raising international concern that its actions in the Spratlys would undermine the SLOCs. Indeed, China itself will want to ensure that the SLOCs are kept accessible, since it will increasingly be dependent on Middle East oil. Moreover, the argument could be made that it is not in the interest of the US and Japan to see a resolution of the multiparty claim in such a manner as to have a patchwork ownership situation. This poses a dilemma for the US and Japan. A future China in de facto possession of the Spratlys but which is a status quo power and fully integrated into the global community is likely to ensure that the archipelago is no longer a flash point. But a future China which has not been integrated into the global community (either because of external or internal causes) and which has become ultra-nationalistic, will seek to make the archipelago its own internal lake.

For now, the ASEAN members make much about intramural solidarity. But, over the Spratlys issue over the longer term, there is no certainty about this. Myanmar and Thailand have close relations with China and they are not claimants in the Spratlys. Singapore, Laos and Cambodia -- the other non-claimants -- will also likely prefer to be neutral. External trade-dependent Singapore, however, has a vital interest in unimpeded access to the archipelago's SLOCs. While Brunei is deemed a claimant, in reality, its claim is the consequence of its proclaimed 200 nautical mile EEZ. Indonesia is wary of China, especially since (as noted earlier) recent Chinese maps show boundary overlaps into the waters of Indonesia's Natuna islands. China has, however, acted to somewhat reassure Indonesia on this matter. Thus, within ASEAN, only Vietnam, the Philippines and Malaysia have promoted their claims in such a nationalistic manner that any backtracking is liable to provoke domestic outrage. For these three states, the strategy would be to “internationalize” the issue either by keeping it constantly in the international spotlight or to acquire the countervailing power of the US or a US-Japanese coalition. For lack of a choice, the first “option” is being vigorously pursued by these three ASEAN states.

Two possible “wild cards” may complicate the issue further. One is a breakdown in the united front approach of China and Taiwan in their respective claims. So far, neither China nor Taiwan has contradicted each other's (similar) claim. Only a
Taiwan declaring its independent status will provoke such a breakdown. The other wild card is the discovery of large deposits of undersea oil and gas. But even if such discoveries are made, the technological capability to tap these resources currently still rests with the Western oil companies and consortiums, which will have to be brought in under some sort of cooperative regime, which in turn might provide the incentives to achieve a comprehensive (non-military) solution.\textsuperscript{115}

Given this overall situation, the advantage of time lies with China, which can even afford to be accommodating towards ASEAN. Indeed, China appears to have made two important concessions to ASEAN at the 1995 ARF meeting. The first is its acceptance of the Law of the Sea as a basis for future negotiations; the second is the dropping of its rigid position that it would only engage in bilateral talks with fellow claimants. China has therefore indicated its in-principle acceptance of multilateral negotiations.

However, China continues to increase its maritime force projection capability while ASEAN members -- despite their own maritime-oriented force modernization programmes -- continue to lack a credible countervailing military force mechanism in support of the grouping's diplomatic position. Ironically, over Cambodia during the latter phase of the Cold War, it was China that provided the military muscles to ASEAN's diplomatic efforts. Given this context, the Spratlys remain an area of regional tension and one reason for ASEAN members' accelerated force modernization. To summarize, on this issue of the Spratlys multiparty claims, the balance of power perspective has, on the whole, provided useful insights into the interests and behaviour of the various actors.

5.14 ASEAN and post-Cold War Japan

In balance of power terms, Japan is an “incomplete” major power in the Asia-Pacific: it is an influential actor on the basis of its economic power, not its military power. Japan is also not a “normal” major power in the sense that it has assigned its defence
to the US-Japan alliance, with itself as the junior partner. Hence, as pointed out in
Chapter 1, some realists argue that this abnormal situation held only during the Cold
War; that in the post-Cold War era, Japan will eventually rearm on the basis of self-
help. The US-Japan alliance might then have to be revised or, in the extreme,
dispensed with. Just as China’s emergence as a rising power becomes a regional
threat only as a result of worst-case situations, any reversal of the current positive
perception of Japan’s security role in the Asia-Pacific will occur only if the US-Japan
alliance is abandoned or it becomes a source of concern to other powers.

It is in this light that Asia-Pacific states from China to the ASEAN members view
the issue of revisions to the guidelines covering the US-Japan Defence Treaty. The
revisions will enable Japan to participate more actively in regional crises that
threaten its security. Nevertheless, as American commentator Douglas Paal of the
Asia Pacific Policy Center noted, the real issue will be how the guidelines will
operate in a crisis. He agreed that the revamped alliance was now directed primarily
towards the Korean peninsula but added that the “bottom line” would be China's
behaviour “if Korea becomes a source of peace rather than tension”.116 Ironically,
therefore, the very strengthening of the US-Japan alliance may either help or hinder
the peaceful post-Cold War transition to a new balance of power in the Asia-Pacific.
The revamped US-Japan alliance may have to be revised again in the event of a
peaceful process of Korean reunification. Its re-invention will have to be kept in
tandem with a revamped US security relationship with a reunified Korea. The logical
role for the US following Korean reunification would be one of assisting Japan and
Korea to come to terms with each other -- a role not catered for in balance of power
thinking.

Thus, the ASEAN states are concerned about the security dynamic among the three
“critical” major players in the Asia-Pacific -- the US, China and Japan -- and in
events on the Korean peninsula. Their concern with the US is its potential
unwillingness to shoulder the leadership role, at least until a new Asia-Pacific order
is put in place. With China, the problem is whether external and internal factors will
shape its behaviour positively or negatively. With Japan, the concern is uncertainty
over the changing nature of its security and economic partnership with the US.

Japan, especially since the 1985 Plaza Accord of the Group of Five, has become a major investor in Southeast Asia (apart from its traditional exporter role). The Plaza Accord aligned major currencies which resulted in a revalued yen. One effect was that Japan was compelled by comparative advantage pressures to locate a number of manufacturing plant overseas, including Southeast Asia. Japanese firms have therefore substantially increased their investments in the region. Coupled with this trend was the uncertainty in the late 1980s about the liberal global trade system underpinned by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The fear of regional trade wars breaking out should GATT fail raised the possibility of a Japan-led yen bloc among some Asian-Pacific countries. In the event, concerted efforts to rescue GATT paid off and led in turn to the creation of the successor World Trade Organization (WTO), which has a better prospect of shaping the post-Cold War liberal global trading system.

This brief background above is necessary to put into relief Japan's basic problem as an economic powerhouse: damned if it does, damned if it doesn't. Japan's image as an economic exploiter counterpoised with the reality of its major role in the economies of Northeast and Southeast Asia complicates a potential economic leadership role in the region. Japan’s image was further dented during the Asian economic crisis which began in July 1997: it was perceived to be unwilling to further open up its market to imports from the badly hit economies. In fact, not only has Japan contributed to the economic prosperity of the ASEAN members\textsuperscript{117} but its pragmatic approach to aid and investments during the Cold War facilitated China's open door policy and integration into the global economy. Since the late 1970s, Japan has been quietly investing in and offering aid to Burma (now Myanmar). Japan has been injecting much-needed investment capital into Vietnam. More recently, it took a leading role in the international rescue package for Thailand when the latter triggered off a severe regional currency crisis after the baht collapsed in early July 1997\textsuperscript{118}. In other words, in the Asia-Pacific, both during and after the Cold War, Japan played (and continues to play) a not inconsequential role in underpinning
economic security while the US played the primary role in underpinning military security.

This economic partnership has been overshadowed by the security partnership manifested in the US-Japan security alliance. Yet, put simply, it is a package deal. But even before the end of the Cold War, both dimensions have come under strain. The unravelling of one will unravel the other dimension. The challenge facing both countries is to find a rationale for this economic and security partnership in a post-Cold War context. For the US, the common Soviet threat during the Cold War justified its security umbrella over Japan and the rising trade gap in the latter's favour. For Japan, it accepted the lesser partner role and generally followed the US lead on foreign policy positions. It also justified its passive foreign policy based on its pacifist Constitution.

The ASEAN members during the Cold War period found this low-profile Japanese posture agreeable, even as Japan increasingly became one of their major trading and investment partners. Reassuringly, the Fukuda Doctrine of August 1977 pledged that Japan would be a peaceful economic power working closely with ASEAN. But there were persistent reminders within ASEAN of suspicion towards Japan. Tokyo was surprised by the anti-Japanese protests and rioting that occurred during prime minister Tanaka's visit to the ASEAN region in 1974. A suggestion in May 1990 by the then Thai prime minister, Chatichai Choonhavan, that Thailand and Japan should conduct joint naval exercises in the event that the US withdrew from the Philippines drew sharp criticisms from Malaysia and Indonesia.

The conventional wisdom within ASEAN, during and after the Cold War, is that Japan should remain anchored to the US-Japan security alliance. The general argument is that the status quo in Northeast Asia still needs to be maintained to deter war on the Korean peninsular, to pre-empt an arms race, and to prevent nuclear proliferation. This presumes, however, a condition whereby Japan has little incentive to re-arm combined with the assured trip-wire presence of US forces in Japan and South Korea. This presumption is tenuous simply because of the complex mutual
suspicions among the Northeast Asian actors. The US does not fully appreciate this tension and has been urging Japan to bear more of the security burden, both in regional and extra-regional terms (protection of vital SLOCs). In the US view, this burden-sharing can be met through Japanese commitments on logistics and weapons resupply, limited maritime activities and access to facilities. Once committed, however, Japan might have to increase its military capability, in effect, to re-arm.

A second argument within ASEAN, voiced in varying degrees of directness, is the fear that a re-armed Japan, coupled to its economic power, will once again destabilize Southeast Asia. This is tantamount to admitting a basic distrust of Japanese intentions. As with fears expressed about China, this perception has less to do with Japan as a hegemon of its own making but more with that of its becoming one, if pushed to the wall. A variation is the argument that a re-armed Japan will, via the mutual insecurity spiral, engage in an intense rivalry with China, eventually extending this contest into Southeast Asia. In both variations, the US-Japan security alliance -- the restraining factor on Japan -- would have collapsed at some point.

Japan itself is acutely aware that its post-Cold War security situation has become much more complex. The clearly defined Soviet threat has dissolved. Spillover from war in the Korean peninsula remains a threat including that from North Korean missiles armed with nuclear, biological or chemical warheads. The 1991 Gulf War exposed Japan's vulnerability in protecting its access to Middle East oil. Other threats -- also felt by other regional states -- arise from the post-Cold War uncertainties: ancient rivalries coming to the fore, and complicated by territorial and other disputes. Thus, the end of the Cold War has created domestic pressures for Japan to be a “more normal” nation: to balance its economic power with greater reliance on self-defence and even a more activist international profile. In coping with a rising power like China, as discussed earlier, the regional response has been to seek to integrate it into the international system and to urge the US to help in this task while maintaining a strong military presence. But Japan is an enigma. Other than invoking the mantra that the US-Japan security alliance must not be severed, other Asia-Pacific states have yet to come to terms with the prospect of a more militarily powerful Japan.
Several ASEAN states, for example, have yet to decide whether to welcome a more visible Japanese naval presence in their region.

For ASEAN members, what has to be closely watched is any change in Japan's attitude towards the US-Japan security alliance. On one hand, they accept that the alliance has to evolve -- to enable Japan to assist the US in regional conflicts -- to stay relevant to the two partners. The 23 September 1997 release of new guidelines for US-Japan military cooperation, following the April 1996 Clinton-Hashimoto declaration to strengthen the bilateral treaty, aims to satisfy both signatories. For the US, burden-sharing by Japan is deemed vital to enhance treaty effectiveness and to bolster domestic support. For pro-treaty Japanese, the country's expanded responsibility is welcome as an acknowledgement that it cannot continue to leave the main burden of the defence of its vital interests to the US. On the other hand, there is also some concern among ASEAN members that the revamped treaty will be perceived by China as a renewed attempt to contain it. Both Japan and the US have made efforts to reassure Beijing that the treaty is not aimed at China. What has been left unsaid, at least publicly, is that China's behaviour is being monitored. The visit by Japanese prime minister Ryutaro Hashimoto to the ASEAN region in January 1997 was probably an opportunity for him to assure regional leaders as well.

Finally, from the balance of power perspective, even if the US-Japan alliance stays in place, it seems unlikely that Japan will remain a passive partner. By seeking a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council and engaging in more UN peacekeeping operations, it is signalling that it intends to be a “more normal” state. While Japan's high-tech military forces have so far been pictured as defence-oriented and linked to the US, the restructuring of its military assets points increasingly towards more independent capabilities. Moreover, the Japanese defence ministry now plans to build up an independent intelligence network, that is, one less reliant on the US. In short, ASEAN analysts detect a trend towards Japanese rearmament in tandem with Tokyo's political push towards becoming a more normal country. Japanese rearmament is likely to upset the wary relationship between Beijing and
Tokyo, as well as with the two Koreas. In sum, Japanese interests and behaviour are still based on the status quo but domestic and external events may transform it into a military power in a still uncertain strategic environment.

5.15 ASEAN and the Asia-Pacific regional powers

A number of Asia-Pacific regional powers have since the end of the Cold War acted in an interposing diplomatic role to create institutions like APEC and the ARF to, among other purposes, provide multilateral fora to engage the three major powers. These Asia-Pacific regional powers (that is, other than the US, China and Japan) may be identified by their pro-active foreign and defence policies and by their middle-sized economic, diplomatic and military power, and are sometimes referred to as middle powers or middle-sized powers.\textsuperscript{125}

This section will use the balance of power approach to examine the defence and security-oriented interposing roles of four Asia-Pacific regional middle powers -- Australia, Taiwan, South Korea, and India -- and their relations with ASEAN. The assumption is that these middle powers share with ASEAN the self-interested goal of working towards a relatively stable transition to a multipolar Asia-Pacific. It is also assumed that these powers share ASEAN’s concerns about the consequences to regional security of mismanagement in the triangular relationship among the US, China and Japan, as well as the separate bilateral US-China, US-Japan, and Sino-Japanese relationships. One usually unstated concern is the possibility that these three major powers (and possibly others) might create a concert of power. In its benign form, a concert would merely be an informal arrangement for ad hoc consultations among the cooperating powers but it could also lead to the dangerous situation in which one or more power is isolated.\textsuperscript{126} Moreover, states other than the concert powers may be forced to bid for attention in securing their interests.

Although these four powers (together with ASEAN) have been advocates of the multilateral dialogue process, discussed earlier, this institutional approach has its
limitations. For example, Taiwan’s participation is constrained by China’s insistence that the former cannot be formally represented in security forums like the ARF. Also, the focus on the middle powers’ security-oriented roles here allows this section to factor in these actors in their own right, instead of being subjects within larger issues. For example, the Taiwan and Korean issues are potential flash points. Yet, from the balance of power view, the post-Cold War Asia-Pacific has seen the rise of Taiwan and South Korea as emerging regional powers. North Korea -- despite its military power -- is not regarded as a regional middle power in this sense because it lacks the attributes of economic and diplomatic power, and remains a reclusive state. Unlike the other actors deemed to be middle powers, its focus is survival rather than seeking an active moderating role in the emerging post-Cold War order. On the other hand, Canada has the attributes of an Asia-Pacific regional middle power but is excluded from this discussion on the argument that Ottawa, despite its active diplomacy in the region, remains very much a North American and Atlantic power in terms of military security orientation. India may not, on the basis of geography, be strictly an Asia-Pacific state but since the end of the Cold War it has come to be accepted as a regional security player. Moreover, India’s strong security interdependence with China links it to the Asia-Pacific region. Russia will only be briefly discussed because while it is expected to eventually re-emerge as an Asia-Pacific major power in its own right, its current attention is focussed on its European security dynamics.

Australia and ASEAN: Nearly all the current ASEAN members have, in the post-Cold War years, established closer security contacts with Australia. Like Singapore, Australia sees a visible US military presence as vital to its regional security. It is also prepared to participate in the evolving defence community centred on US military forces and assets. The Australian armed forces, although modest in size, is well-equipped and highly trained. Regular training exercises with US forces ensures their interoperability with each other.

For the immediate future, Australia's regional security role will be critical. First, its willingness to strengthen its defence relationship with the US has led to its offer of greater access and training facilities to the latter. Indeed, China has expressed some
unease that taken together, the revisions to the US treaties with Japan and Australia will act as northern and southern pincers, respectively, aimed at containing China.

Secondly, Australia -- as a US-aligned regional neighbour to ASEAN members -- has since the end of the Cold War moved towards a more regionally oriented security policy. One writer even describes this (albeit) long-term process as the “ASEANization” of Australia. Canberra is able to offer its ASEAN neighbours security cooperation activities at a higher profile level than the US, given regional sensitivities to being seen to be too cosy with the US. The Indonesia-Australian Agreement on Maintaining Security, signed in December 1995, openly endorsed an incremental and discreet buildup in security cooperation between two countries with often difficult political relations. It also signalled a mutual concern about the future Asia-Pacific balance of power. Although purely consultative, the agreement refers to “adverse challenges to either party or to their common security interests”. Australia has formalized defence activities with Indonesia and Malaysia and stepped up security cooperation with Singapore.

Thirdly, Australia is actively involved in the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA), whose other parties are Britain, New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore. This set of non-binding arrangements, set up in 1971, is still operational and has become a vehicle for Australia's regional engagement. Its original dual purpose of serving as a deterrent to Indonesian hegemonism and as a vehicle for Malaysian-Singapore confidence-building is nowadays downplayed. The showpiece of the FPDA, the Integrated Air Defence System (IADS), with an Australian as the IADS commander, provides joint radar coverage for the two Southeast Asian neighbours.

The FPDA's relevance depends very much on the interests of the three core partners: Australia, Malaysia and Singapore. It is possible that as Australia increases its engagement in the region as an ASEAN partner, the FPDA will become outmoded. A popular Indonesian view is that greater security cooperation among maritime Southeast Asia, and with Australia, would render the FPDA irrelevant. But given the long time frame required for other regional countries like Indonesia to recover
from the Asian crisis, the FPDA framework is still useful for exercising and training among three basically interoperable forces. Still, in August 1998, Malaysia withdrew from a major FPDA maritime exercise at the last moment, forcing the other partners – including Britain which had dispatched a carrier group – to reschedule the planned activities. That this was the first time a major FPDA exercise had been disrupted and coming in the wake of strained Singapore-Malaysia relations, provoked concerns by some commentators that Kuala Lumpur was already rethinking its commitment to the pact.\textsuperscript{132}

\textit{Taiwan and ASEAN:} Taiwan's declared policy remains that of “One China”. But under President Lee Teng-hui, Taiwan has sought to create diplomatic space, that is, to prevent its isolation. Taiwan has been progressively building up its military forces, especially to meet any blockade attempt by China. Lee Teng-hui's aim, it seems, is either to enable Taiwan to reunite with China from a position of strength sometime in the future, or to choose the radical route, that is, abrogate the One-China policy once international support is assured, making Taiwan's independence chances more viable. US policy on this issue is thus a critical factor. Thus, American military equipment sales to Taiwan continue to upset China. For example, China has warned the US against including Taiwan in the proposed Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) system under discussion with Japan\textsuperscript{133}. US policy on Taiwan, however, is often dictated by domestic politics, which the Taiwan lobby skillfully takes advantage of.

ASEAN members have been careful to avoid being dragged into the China-Taiwan-US tangle. ASEAN statesmen like Lee Kuan Yew have insisted that the US would find it difficult to mobilize ASEAN members' support behind it in the event Washington chose sides in a Beijing-Taipei crisis\textsuperscript{134}. But Taiwan is also a major investor in a number of ASEAN countries. Moreover, Taiwan is one of the multiparty claimants in the Spratly Islands dispute.

Thus, a Taiwan that behaves in balance of power terms is, in the Chinese view, provocative. From the ASEAN perspective, Taiwan should be encouraged to be an active player in the “inclusive” multilateral efforts to create a new Asia-Pacific order. However, China's future potential as a military great power seems to have given it
the bully's leverage in preventing Taiwan from participating in its own right in the ARF and the ARF-linked think tank, the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), although Taiwanese delegates now attend CSCAP working sessions in their personal capacities. Moreover, except for the low-keyed Singapore-Taiwan security relationship\(^{135}\), ASEAN countries have fought shy of forging defence and security links with Taipei. But Taiwan's role as a future balance of power player cannot be dismissed, especially if its economic power enables it to emerge as an active diplomatic and military power. The risk exists that it may become the spoiler, provoking Chinese reactions.

**South Korea:** Like Taiwan, South Korea has become a major trade and investment partner of the ASEAN countries. Unlike Taiwan, South Korea does not need to fight for diplomatic space and is a member of APEC and the ARF as well as CSCAP. South Korea has also begun to develop security relations with ASEAN countries, and with Australia. In balance of power terms, South Korea -- and in future, a reunified Korea -- will become a major player in Northeast Asia but is unlikely to seek to extend its military influence into Southeast Asia. But for ASEAN, because of the growing economic links between South Korea and ASEAN members, it has become important for regional stability that Seoul, like Tokyo, work out a new security relationship with Washington once their bilateral alliances with the US become no longer appropriate. This will happen when Korea becomes one nation again as a result of peaceful reunification. Given the historical tensions between Korea and Japan, and the possible unwillingness of the US to hold the ring, this is the daunting challenge ahead for these three actors.

**India:** Unlike the other three middle powers discussed above, India -- an “outsider” during the Cold War -- has been careful to project only a trade and diplomatic profile in the Asia-Pacific. Some analysts have suggested that India, as it begins to take the same economic reform path that China took in 1978, and as it becomes more engaged with the Asia-Pacific, will want to insert a maritime presence as well\(^{136}\). Already, following an initiative by the Indian Chief of Naval Staff in October 1992, Indian naval units have bilaterally exercised with ASEAN navies\(^{137}\). India has also
secured a place at the ARF. The restrained welcome to India by some regional states contrasts with the concerns expressed, during the Cold War, of an assertive “out-of-area” India that was also friendly to Vietnam. At least two ASEAN members, Thailand and Indonesia, remain wary of greater Indian involvement in Southeast Asian security matters. For now, India -- unlike Australia -- is not expected to play a major cooperative security role in Southeast Asia. However, Indo-ASEAN economic relations are expanding, and security ties with ASEAN members are slowly growing. For now, India's involvement in Southeast Asia's regional security will continue to be limited by its primary area of concern, South Asia, and by its continued rapprochement with China. But India aspires to be a maritime power and is watchful of China’s naval growth.

5.16 ASEAN and Russia

The Russia that emerged from the post-Soviet empire still considers itself a Pacific power but is unlikely to have a significant economic or military presence in Southeast Asia for some time. Russia continues to seek a political influence through its membership of the ARF and is becoming a major seller of weapon systems to the Asia-Pacific, including China and the ASEAN countries.

From the balance of power perspective, there is also the possibility of strategic convergence between Russia and China. Most analysts suggest that any security partnership which emerges between them would be a tenuous one, given the lack of a “glue” to bind such a partnership. In any case, Russia seeks integration with the West while Sino-US relations may be difficult but have yet to become mutually hostile. A renewed Sino-Russian strategic alliance would only result from a worst-case situation in which both powers find a common anti-American cause. Such a situation appears unlikely. The more likely situation is the use by Beijing and Moscow of each other as a “card” vis-a-vis their bilateral relations with the US and Japan. By the same token, the recent warming relations between Russia and Japan led to a bilateral pledge to sign a peace treaty by the year 2000 but indications point to this as a public
relations exercise aimed at the other major powers, given the deep suspicions still between the two countries. 

5.17 Conclusion

The institutional and balance of power approaches were deployed in this chapter to examine Southeast Asian states’ responses to their security environment after the Cold War. The former emphasizes institution-building and the cultivation of cooperative rules; the latter emphasizes power distributions as an explanation of state behaviour. Both approaches seek to explain the behaviour of the various state actors, and the ASEAN members in particular.

From the institutional approach’s perspective, ASEAN members sought to position the grouping as a coordinating mechanism to secure cooperative outcomes, both intramurally and extramurally. This raises both problems and possibilities. Problems of divergent interests and failure to adhere to the rules of the game are more likely the larger the number of actors. Hence, while Vietnam’s entry into ASEAN after the Cold War was comparatively smooth because of its gradual induction and its basically convergent interests with the ASEAN-6, the entry of Myanmar was more problematic. Myanmar’s domestic politics especially its human rights record, and alignment with China, has affected ASEAN’s links with other actors and institutions. To the extent that such costs lead to ASEAN members strengthening their links to external actors outside the ASEAN rubric, group cohesion suffers. ASEAN’s role in new institution-building also carries risks to its cohesion. ASEAN’s managerial role in the ARF has thus far only been weakly challenged by some non-ASEAN members. In contrast, ASEAN members have a weaker voice in APEC and the risk to ASEAN solidarity over economic issues are ever present. Nevertheless, both new and old ASEAN members recognize the absolute gain possibilities that can be achieved from a cohesive institution, especially given the uncertain external environment. AFTA, whose purpose is to prevent investment-diversion, is illustrative of a successful modest effort at institution-building. But even AFTA may
suffer from efforts to protect relative gains. In reality, at this point in the post-Cold War transition, institutions have not really been severely tested. Put another way, ASEAN members and other players engaged in the Asia-Pacific’s multilateral initiatives have so far been “good institutional citizens” because the benefits of membership still outweigh the costs.

Where the issues are clearly reflective of military security concerns in an inter-state context, the strength of the balance of power approach is evident. Thus, the dynamics of the South China Sea issue suggest that it is a potential flashpoint for skirmishes and that diplomacy holds little prospect of success. ASEAN members are unlikely to produce any countervailing force against China, the most powerful claimant in the Spratlys. Still, major conflicts need not arise there. Ironically, the lack of US interest there may help to prevent action-reaction responses. Where the regional conditions are more complicated, such as the regional security environment in Southeast Asia, the balance of power approach is weaker in explaining states’ behaviour. Thus, there is little overt balancing behaviour in Southeast Asia, despite concerns about a retrenching US, an emergent China and problems in the triangular relationship among these two major powers and Japan. Still, the more nuanced behaviour of the ASEAN states show evidence of a consolidation of the US-led cooperative security web under the rubric, “Places, not bases”. Moreover, some middle powers have identified convergent or converging interests with ASEAN members. Again, as is the situation regarding the institutional approach, ASEAN members and other Asia-Pacific players have good reason still to behave cooperatively. But there is no certainty that conditions will not change to induce more overt balancing behaviour.

Thus, in examining the prospect for the emergence of a new security system in the post-Cold War Asia-Pacific, the balance of power perspective finds that the avoidance of rapid power shifts is the primary goal and that military power is still necessary. Future unconstrained major power (and even middle power) behaviour -- that is, unconstrained by institutional norms -- poses the risk of setting back the various multilateral institution-building efforts.
ENDNOTES

1*Straits Times*, 30 April 1999.


3*ibid.*, pp 390-391.

4The report was dated February 1993, and was published by Singapore's Information and Resource Centre.

5In this chapter, and the remaining chapters, ASEAN-6 refers to the six members before 1995; ASEAN-7 includes Vietnam, which joined in 1995; ASEAN-9 includes Laos and Myanmar, both of whom joined in 1997. ASEAN-10 refers to the period after April 1999, that is, after Cambodia joined the grouping.


8*Straits Times*, 29 July 1995.


12Singapore's major English-language daily editorialised that “in terms of regional security, ASEAN is bound to be interested in any extraneous presence in a Myanmar whose long Bay of Bengal coastline and island possessions in the Andaman Sea give it a strategic advantage in relation to the Straits of Malacca, the vital lifeline between the Indian and Pacific oceans”. *Straits Times*, 24 July 1996.

13Interviews with several ASEAN officials between December 1994 and February 1995.


In the early post-Cold War discussions about expanding ASEAN to include the “non-like-minded” Southeast Asian countries, the short-hand term “CLV” was used by ASEAN officials and academics to denote Cambodia-Laos-Vietnam. This was to reinforce the point that the idea of Indochina was no longer relevant. After Vietnam joined ASEAN in 1995, and with Myanmar (Burma) by then a prospective member, the term “CLM” came to be used, denoting Cambodia-Laos-Myanmar.


Soesastro, op. cit., pp 1-40.

For example, Singapore prime minister Goh Chok Tong has articulated this view. Straits Times, 28 January 1992.

Soesastro, op. cit., p. 2.

In political terms, ASEAN serves to discreetly constrain the largest and most populous member, Indonesia, from behaving “selfishly”. In economic terms, Singapore is often portrayed as the ASEAN member most geared towards the global economy, and there is thus an implicit intramural perception that AFTA will benefit it most. AFTA, it should be added, was strongly promoted by Singapore although it originated as a Thai initiative.


Bowles, op. cit.


With the end of the Cold War, the CSCE has become further institutionalized as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

The fact that APEC was billed as an Australian (that is, Western) initiative did not escape ASEAN members' attention.


36 Michael Antolik, “The ASEAN Regional Forum: The Spirit of Constructive Engagement,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, 16 (2), September 1994, p. 120.

37 India, China and Russia became dialogue partners during the July 1996 PMC. China and Russia were previously consultative partners. Straits Times, 16 July 1996.

38 In a newspaper interview, Singapore's Foreign Minister at the time the ARF was proposed in 1993, Mr Wong Kan Seng, gave an account of the “delicate stage-setting” required to get the forum started:

In the early 1990s, the key dialogue partners, such as the US and the European Community, would have baulked at having to sit around the table with countries such as Russia and China to discuss security. So in 1991, China and the then USSR were invited to the ASEAN Ministers' Meeting as guests of the host country, Malaysia. The following year, they became guests of ASEAN at the Manila meeting, and it was decided that Vietnam and Laos would be invited to future meetings as observers. Last year [1993], when Singapore chaired the ASEAN Standing Committee, [Mr Wong] decided that an informal dinner would be a suitable environment for the protagonists to meet. This would get around objections that the stage had been set too soon, and in too structured a manner. We got all ministers, including the European Community ministers, around the table. We talked about certain key political and security issues of the region, and we settled on this idea of an ASEAN Regional Forum to be held the following year, that is, 1994, in Bangkok. If we didn't set the stage for these events to take place, get the timing right, and seize the opportunity presented, the ARF would not have been formed.

Sunday Times (Singapore), 20 November 1994.

39 Myanmar and India became ARF members in July 1996. In July 1997, Laos and Myanmar formally joined ASEAN; Laos automatically became an ARF member. Mongolia’s membership was accepted in July 1998. The 22 ARF members may thus be grouped into: the ASEAN-10, the 10 PMC dialogue partners, Papua New Guinea, and Mongolia.


41 In February 1995, the Philippine navy discovered Chinese structures on some rocks in the Spratly Islands near the Philippines, called Mischief Reef. These structures were apparently put in place since October 1994. Manila demanded that Beijing remove the structures and ASEAN members subsequently stood united with the Philippines. Although China insisted that the structures were shelters for fishermen, it went into damage-control in its diplomatic relations with ASEAN and agreed to the first ASEAN-China meeting on the Spratly Islands issue, in the city of Hangzhou in April 1995. Straits Times, 6 April 1995 and 31 July 1995.

43*Straits Times*, 30 May 1996.


46The 18 founder-members were: the ASEAN-6; five Northeast Asian economies (Japan, China, Taiwan, Hongkong and South Korea); four American economies (the United States, Canada, Mexico and Chile), and three South Pacific economies (Australia, New Zealand and Papua New Guinea).


48Singapore foreign ministry's permanent secretary Kishore Mahbubani is confident that while APEC and the ARF are likely to experience difficulties -- chiefly the tension between Western institution-building impulses and Eastern consensus-building impulses -- “the interest of all participants in sustaining economic dynamism, peace and stability leads to a pragmatic spirit of accommodation and consensus”. Mahbubani, “The Pacific Way,” *Foreign Affairs*, 74 (1), January/February 1995, p. 110.


50Singapore Foreign Ministry Deputy Secretary, Peter Ho, noted that with the end of the Cold War, ASEAN “conservatives” like Indonesia and Malaysia became more receptive to the role of external powers in the region. Interview, 27 January 1995.

51*Straits Times*, 21 May 1997.

52Analysts like the University of Malaya's Professor Lee Poh Ping does not rule out the possibility of a future alliance between China and Japan, resulting in a highly unstable power balance compounded by frictions from the growing economic interdependence in the Asia-Pacific region. Interview, 17 December 1994. Similarly, then Singapore Institute of International Affairs chairman Dr Lau Teik Soon argues that Japan would not necessarily fear a more powerful China; that is, this factor may not be a sufficient condition for Japan to retain its security alliance with the US. Interview, 28 December 1994. In contrast, Henry Kissinger (and other Western analysts) contend that in the absence of a credible and substantial American military presence in Northeast Asia, “Japan and China would be increasingly tempted to pursue national courses of action which, in the end, could well be directed against each other and all the buffer states in between”. *Diplomacy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), p. 828. Samuel Huntington takes the view that Japan will be deeply divided as to whether to bandwagon, balance or equilibrate. *Straits Times*, 4 November 1994.

54 Business Times (Singapore), 21 August 1989.


57 ibid.


59 Straits Times, 23 October 1997.

60 Straits Times, 16 January 1998.

61 The US wants to “pre-position” up to six such ships laden with weapons and supplies in Asia to augment its eight-ship flotilla in Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean and in Guam in the Western Pacific. Interview with Rear Admiral Peter Long, Commanding Logistic Group Western Pacific (COMLOG WESTPAC), 30 December 1994.

62 Straits Times, 1 November 1994; Sunday Times (Singapore), 13 November 1994.

63 Straits Times, 16 May 1999.

64 Admiral William Owens, the then vice-chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, urged Congress in March 1995 to re-establish military training aid to Indonesia, cut in 1992 after Indonesian troops killed anti-government demonstrators in East Timor. Such training aid and other military ties fostered a spirit of cooperation and friendship in the region, he argued. “US military wants Indonesia's training aid resumed,” Straits Times, 17 March 1995. For a recent Indonesian perspective of this difficult relationship, see Aleksius Jemadu, “Seeking a new format in RI-US ties,” Jakarta Post, 26 June 1997.


68 Straits Times, 21 May 1999.


70 Admiral Macke was quoted as saying: “I'm a naval officer and naval officers are always looking for good ports.” Straits Times, 25 November 1994.

71 The Mount Pinatubo eruption in 1991 weakened the Philippine negotiating position, because the volcanic ash mudflow made Clark Airfield unusable. Shortly thereafter, the US Air Force closed the Airfield and its adjacent Crow Valley electronic warfare range, and pulled out.

72 Straits Times, 7 June 1988.
Given past Indonesian sensitivity, Alatas’ remarks signalled a shift in Jakarta's public stance. See, for example, his interview in Business Times (Singapore), 29 October 1992.

Sydney Morning Herald, 16 July 1990.


Straits Times, 21 May 1997.


Straits Times, 12 December 1994.

Admiral William Owens, the then vice-chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, told the US Congress in March 1995 that after the US forces withdrew from Subic and Clarke, the US armed forces discovered it was easier than previously thought to get along without the need for large bases. Modern military equipment, such as ships, could be maintained at commercial facilities and it was “politically better” to spread the funds around by calling at such facilities rather than to have a single large base, he said. “US military wants Indonesia's training aid resumed,” Straits Times, 17 March 1995.

Vice-Admiral Archie Clemins, Commander, US Navy Seventh Fleet, said in a newspaper interview that despite the loss in the Philippine bases, the US Navy and Air Force enjoy relative freedom of transit and security cooperation throughout Southeast Asia. He noted that apart from its defence agreements with Thailand and the Philippines and the location of a logistics command in Singapore, the US has agreements with Malaysia and Indonesia which allow the US Air Force to mount surveillance flights and to make use of their air bases in the event of a crisis. In addition, port visits and repair arrangements project the US presence. *New Sunday Times* (Malaysia), 18 December 1994.

Interview with Rear Admiral Peter Long, Commander, Logistic Group Western Pacific (COMLOG WESTPAC), 30 December 1994. See also *Straits Times*, 9 March 1994.

Singapore's Senior Minister, Lee Kuan Yew, and Malaysia's Prime Minister, Mahathir Mohamad, are among the most vocal advocates of this view. Interestingly, one senior Malaysian Foreign Ministry official suggested that unlike the early European colonizers, the famous Chinese adventurer of the 15th Century, Admiral Cheng Ho, made no attempts to claim territory for China. Interview, 15 December 1994. Dewi Fortuna Anwar makes the counterpoint that the general Indonesian antipathy towards China should not be underestimated, and that in fact “a modernized China was regarded as of an even greater threat to Indonesia than a less-developed one.” *Indonesia in ASEAN: Foreign Policy and Regionalism* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1994), pp 189-90.

Professor Yan Xuetong, the director of the Chinese Centre for Foreign Policy Research, a think-tank close to the Chinese foreign ministry, provides a Chinese finding that showed its external environment was not as favourable as Beijing would like it to be, largely because of problems in the Sino-US relationship. First, on the security factor, the trend of American arms sales to Taiwan reduced the prospect of peaceful reunification. Secondly, on the political factor, China needed to identify common strategic interests with the US and Russia, but was able to establish a "strategic partnership" only with Russia in April 1996. Thirdly, on the economic factor, China needed good relations with the US as the latter was still the largest single market in the world. Ching Cheong, “Talks Crucial to China's Goal of Becoming Major Global Power,” *Straits Times*, 28 October 1997.


See, for example, John G. Roos, “Interview: Dr Yeo Ning Hong,” *Armed Forces Journal International*, 12 May 1992, pp. 38-41.

For Vietnam and China, their South China Sea claims are part of their historic rivalry. Vietnam's claim cover not only most of the Spratlys but also the Paracel Islands, making it the major ASEAN claimant. It also occupies the largest number of islands (between 21 and 24). The Philippines, until Vietnam's entry into the grouping in 1995, had been the major ASEAN claimant but enjoying the protection of the US military facilities until these were removed between 1991-92. Manila's wide-area claim encompassed nearly 60 isets, rocks and atolls in the Spratlys (it occupies eight islands). By comparison, Malaysia's Spratlys claim is minor, covering several cays and reefs (it occupies three). Brunei does not even describe itself as a claimant and its involvement results from the outward projection from its narrow coastline of its assertion of a 200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Khoo How San, “ASEAN and the South China Sea Problem,” in Chandran Jeshurun, ed., *China India, Japan and the Security of Southeast Asia* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1993), pp 181-207.


100 Lu Ning, Flashpoint Spratlys! (Singapore: Dolphin Books, 1995), p. 64.


104 ibid., quoting South China Morning Post, 15 March 1995.

105 ibid.


107 Straits Times, 22 March 1999.


109 In December 1994, seven months before Vietnam formally joined ASEAN and two months before the Mischief Reef fracas with the Philippines, Li Guoxing, director of the Asia-Pacific Department at the Shanghai Institute for International Affairs, warned ASEAN against backing Hanoi in its dispute with Beijing over the Spratlys. “If the situation is not well controlled, the possibility of an outbreak of localised armed clashes is not to be excluded,” Li warned. Straits Times, 14 December 1994.

110 In an interview with the Malaysian newspaper, the New Sunday Times, Vice-Admiral Archie Clemins, commander US Navy Seventh Fleet, repeated the litany that the US might intervene militarily in Southeast Asia if the region’s sea lines of communication were threatened, jeopardising oil supplies to the US and the international market. New Sunday Times, 18 December 1994.

111 See, for example, “Beijing: Feel free to cross S. China Sea,” Straits Times, 18 May 1999.

112 ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea (Manila: Joint Communique of the 25th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, 22 July 1992).

113 See, for example, the Tokyo-based Research Institute for Peace and Security's review, Asian Security 1993-94 (London: Brassey's, 1994), p. 166.

See, for example, Mark J. Valencia and Jon M. Van Dyke, “Comprehensive Solutions to the South China Sea Disputes: Some Options,” in Sam Bateman and Stephen Bates, eds., The Seas Unite: Maritime Cooperation in the Asia Pacific Region (Canberra: The Australian National University, 1996), pp 223-62.

International Herald Tribune, 7-8 June 1997.

See, for example, Kwan Weng Kin, “Japan praised for helping South-east Asia,” Straits Times, 25 May 1999.


Kwan Weng Kin, “Japan will re-arm, but 'unlikely to become aggressor,'” Straits Times, 28 September 1995.


See, for example, Douglas T. Stuart, “Toward Concert in Asia,” Asian Survey, XXXVII (3), March 1997, pp 229-44.


Desmond Ball and Pauline Kerr, Presumptive Engagement: Australia’s Asia-Pacific Policy in the 1990s (St Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin Australia, 1996), p. 94. The authors provide the text of the treaty as an appendix, pp 143-4.

ibid., p. 70.

ibid., p. 68 and p. 70.

See, for example, Mochtar Kusuma-atmadja, “Some Thoughts on ASEAN Security Co-operation: An Indonesian Perspective,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, 12 (3), December


133 See, for example, Melinda Liu, “Defending Taiwan,” *Newsweek*, 17 May 1999.


139 *Straits Times*, 4 November 1997.
CHAPTER 6

POST-COLD WAR SOUTHEAST ASIA: THE SECURITY COMPLEX PERSPECTIVE

6.1 Introduction

ASEAN's expansion is expected to lead to a less cohesive grouping, when viewed from the balance of power and institutional perspectives. Given China's rise, balance of power thinking logically constructs a situation of renewed great power rivalry or even a concert of powers, and possibly centrifugal pulls exerted on ASEAN members. Institutional thinking leads to scepticism about the rationale of expansion when doubts exist about ASEAN's post-Cold War purpose and about the newer members' capacity to absorb the grouping's rules and norms. In both cases, the forecast about regional resilience is guarded, if not pessimistic. However, expectations about both the post-Cold War ASEAN framework and Southeast Asian states’ “coping strategies” can be differently framed, when patterns of amity and enmity among groups of security-interdependent states and external actors are closely examined. These locally generated dynamics are important considerations which the security complex framework takes into account. Accordingly, the security complex will now be deployed to examine the more complicated situation which the ASEAN members face in the post-Cold War era.

6.2 The security complex perspective and post-Cold War interdependence

In Chapter 5, it was found that force is still an option for policy-makers with some regional states expanding security links with the United States; at the same time, policy-makers appear to invest effort in new institutions like AFTA, APEC and the ARF. Nevertheless, there has been no region-wide trend towards balancing
behaviour while the conditions for institutional cooperation do not seem to be always evident. Indeed, with the end of the Cold War, ASEAN members felt a need to invest the grouping with a renewed economic purpose amidst catchphrases like “prosper-with-thy-neighbour” (as opposed to a “beggar-thy-neighbour” mindset). It bears observation, however, that the logic of this cooperation-centred premise was not altruism but self-interest.

As argued in this chapter, the security complex may be able to correct or compensate for these general weaknesses of the other two approaches. Local patterns of amity and enmity, while durable, may be transformed. As already illustrated in Chapter 3, these local dynamics may impact on balance of power and institutional situations, and affect regional states' behaviour accordingly.

The regional security complex framework highlights the relative autonomy of regional security relations, and sets them in the context of the state and system levels. During the Cold War, the interaction of intense great power rivalry and intense local enmity sustained the conflict formation in the communist component of the Southeast Asian security complex. In contrast, the less intense conditions in the non-communist component eventually fostered a security regime and the creation of ASEAN-6. Its members came to share the view that “[t]he more divided the security relations within the local complex, the easier it will be for great power rivalries to penetrate the region”.

With the end of the Cold War, the Southeast Asian security complex (in common with other regional complexes) was freed from superpower rivalry, albeit accompanied by strategic uncertainty. This uncertainty – a consequence of the changes in power distribution – led to an opportunity to reappraise local rivalries. While in some other regions, local enmities were now unconstrained, in Southeast Asia, the former Indochinese states led by Vietnam were now attracted to the ASEAN model of economic and political cooperation. Vietnam, in particular – by disavowing hegemony over mainland Southeast Asia -- now acknowledged that security and economic interdependence had become part of an integral process.
Economic reform in the former Indochinese states – the transformation of their command economies towards market economies – had become necessary.

In other words, with the end of the Cold War, the former Indochinese states found themselves drawn to the logic of economic imperative and incentive, or what George Quester calls the “power of economics”\(^4\). By *economic imperative* here is meant a situation in which integration into the increasingly globalized economic system was no longer a matter of choice; *economic incentive* here means the idea that “the prospect of a continuing mutually profitable trade relationship discourages war, or even threats of making war”\(^5\). Not only was economic success now recognized as a vital national requirement, along with military security, there was now an incentive to transform enmity into amity patterns within the continental core sub-complex. As explored below, Thailand was to play a catalytic role in this process.

6.3 The post-Cold War continental core: Vietnam sets the stage

In Chapter 3, the continental core was found to be heavily penetrated by external powers throughout much of the Cold War. China was both an external power and a regional power. The Chinese played a major role in sustaining strategic rivalry in the continental core after the Americans had pulled out their military forces from South Vietnam in 1973. While changes in the distribution of power have a catalytic effect on security interdependence, patterns of amity and enmity within a complex or sub-complex may have a more sustained effect. Amity/enmity patterns, while durable, may be altered and result in changes in security relationships.

Such alterations may be encouraged by a number of stimuli. One is, of course, balance of power considerations. Soviet rapprochement with China from the mid-1980s signalled the start of great power realignment in the Asia-Pacific. With regards to the continental core sub-complex, an increasingly vulnerable Vietnam began to seek accommodation with China and by September 1989 had pulled its troops out of Cambodia. It also began to make overtures to the US with the hope of establishing
diplomatic and economic relations. By June 1990, the US Congress had forced the Bush administration to withdraw its support of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK), which included the Chinese-backed Khmer Rouge. Only the so-called US demand for a “road map” benchmarking steps to normalization prevented an early resumption of US-Vietnam ties. By the time the Soviet Union actually collapsed in 1991, China stood to gain leverage over the three Indochinese states and Myanmar. Vietnam understood this and soon after it pulled its troops out of Cambodia in 1989, it began to seek rapprochement with the ASEAN states. Thus, Vietnam’s initial motivation for links with ASEAN was a strategic one. Although there was some scepticism, ASEAN members responded positively to Hanoi's overtures.

In this situation, above, China continued to be viewed with suspicion by Vietnam, that is, strategic considerations led Hanoi to seek political rapprochement with Beijing but little effort was made to cultivate convergent interests. To the extent that balance of power considerations continued to strongly influence the Sino-Vietnamese security relationship, shifts in the patterns of amity/enmity in this relationship were difficult to achieve. In contrast, in the period 1989 to 1995, Vietnam's security interdependence with the other continental core countries and with the ASEAN members underwent fundamental change.

More generally, while mutual suspicions, especially between Thailand and each of the Indochinese states, have not been eradicated, the Cold War context no longer sustained them. In effect, the “Indochinese question” became moot insofar as it had involved a political contest for regional order among regional states. Regional order now was being stimulated by a strong economic dimension which encouraged mutual “opening up” and created opportunities for diplomacy and non-governmental (mostly academic and business-initiated) overtures. These “confidence-building” activities became the catalyst for the transformation of the continental core from a conflictual sub-complex to a more cooperative one.
6.4 The continental core's transformation: Thailand as catalyst

As noted above, ASEAN -- led by Thailand -- responded favourably to Vietnam’s overtures, albeit with some initial caution. The fact that Thailand, always sensitive to great power changes, was under the business-oriented premiership of Chatichai Choonhavan (from August 1988 till his ouster in a coup in February 1991), was a factor in Bangkok's dramatic foreign and economic policy changes towards Indochina.

Initially, Chatichai's August 1988 policy of turning Indochina from a “battlefield to a marketplace” irked both his own foreign policy establishment and the other ASEAN members (especially Indonesia), as it amounted to normalization of relations with Vietnam and was announced without intramural consultation. Then, in January 1989, Cambodian leader Hun Sen's visit to Bangkok provoked an intra-ASEAN diplomatic storm. These and other Thai initiatives were especially controversial as they came at a time when questions were being asked about ASEAN's cohesion once a political settlement had been arranged for Cambodia. From the institutional perspective, this was indeed an important issue. From the security complex perspective, however, Thailand's actions merely recognized that power relations were changing quite rapidly and that economic interests could now complement political and security interests. In fact, Thailand's economic push into Indochina and also Myanmar was to provide the ice-breaker for other ASEAN members to review their Cold War approach, and thereafter, to establish more open economic and political links with the former Indochinese countries (and Myanmar).

In sum, a process initiated by Thailand altered the security dynamic between ASEAN-6 and the former Indochinese countries such that the general pattern of enmity dividing Southeast Asia began to break down. Writing on the eve of ASEAN's expansion, Carlyle Thayer made the following assessment:

The Indochinese states no longer equate national security predominantly with military strength. Their security policies are now more multi-dimensional, and are overwhelmingly domestic in focus. While all three have external
security concerns, they no longer share the perception that they are threatened militarily by a common enemy. ASEAN no longer views a Soviet-backed Indochinese bloc as a direct threat to its security. This shift in national-security perspectives has made possible new forms of cooperation between Indochina and ASEAN.  

6.5 Post-Cold War Vietnam and ASEAN

Neither the institutional nor the balance of power approaches would have satisfactorily accounted for Vietnam's fairly quick transition to its new-found identity as a status quo Southeast Asian actor. Vietnam had institutional links with the Soviet bloc and shared fellow communist China's concern about the West's triumphalism when the Soviet bloc and the Soviet Union itself collapsed between 1989 and 1991. With such a mindset, Vietnam could have remained defiant and isolationist, or acquiesce in China's demands. Its willingness to forsake its Cold War conviction that its ideological control over Laos and Cambodia was a security imperative, also cannot be explained in institutional terms. The balance of power approach fails to explain why both China and the United States rejected Vietnam's separate overtures to them. After all, a recovered Vietnam would have the economic and military potential to be a future medium-sized power and, therefore, would be a useful ally to be cultivated.

The use of the security complex as an analytical device for identifying local dynamics, however, allows for the critical examination of both the material and ideational factors that account for Vietnam’s transition to status quo ASEAN member, despite its adherence to the communist ideology. Moreover, ideational influences in the amity-enmity patterns within a complex or sub-complex can be explained through the deployment of constructivism. Thus, the enmity between Vietnam and China is deep-seated, and embedded in historical and cultural memories and images despite efforts towards realpolitik rapprochement; on the other hand, Vietnam’s animosity towards ASEAN during the Cold War had no historical or cultural backdrop. In ideational terms, Vietnam and China have not shifted from their mutually constituted negative images of each other; the Vietnam War merely
introduced the United States as a more salient “other” which both could identify as a common enemy.

As for the mutually constituted images which ASEAN members and Vietnam had of each other during the Cold War, the pattern is more diffuse. Nevertheless, especially after 1979, ASEAN in its corporate identity was seen by Vietnam (and self-admitted by hard-liners in the grouping) as being part of the anti-Vietnam/anti-Soviet coalition led by the West and China. Importantly, Vietnam distinguished between its criticisms of ASEAN as a group and its friendship with at least two ASEAN members, Indonesia and Malaysia. This feeling of amity was often reciprocated by those two countries. In this sense, Indonesian and Malaysian efforts during the Cold War kept ASEAN-Vietnam relations from being completely antagonistic. Thus, with the end of the Cold War, and given Vietnam’s greater fear of isolation and pressure from China, little reason remained for Vietnam to sustain its image of an “enemy” ASEAN. Once ASEAN members’ initial wariness was overcome, it became possible to begin a process of fostering amity between Vietnam and the ASEAN members.

In material terms, a convergence of interests also began to develop between Vietnam and ASEAN members after the Cold War. In fact, in terms of economic interests, individual ASEAN members during the Cold War had been trading with Vietnam. Such business contacts proved useful to starting up ASEAN private sector investments after the Cold War, once the official approval was given. With the benefit of hindsight, it is unsurprising that ASEAN members and Vietnam (before it formally joined ASEAN) fairly quickly achieved mutual rapprochement.

Moreover, the situation of uncertainty over the interplay of the external powers began to create strategic convergence of interests between ASEAN members and Vietnam. Thus, the end of the Cold War had a direct impact on Vietnam which resulted in Hanoi’s accommodation with ASEAN. Vietnam indicated early that it was keen to join ASEAN; a key policy implication of this stance was that it sought to address the issues of Chinese proximate power and Thai-Vietnamese rivalry. There is much irony about Vietnam's fairly quick entry into ASEAN. It was the focus of
much of ASEAN's Cold War security concerns and indeed, Thailand still harbours suspicions of Vietnam. Yet Vietnam was to become the model for the other aspirants into ASEAN membership. Vietnam's political elite, not having to face the problems arising from domestic challenges or instability, actively sought to transform the Cold War patterns of enmity with its neighbours, with other regional states and with external powers like the US. Vietnam is especially eager to secure investments from the United States and Japan, as well as ASEAN members apart from Thailand. ASEAN as a group agreed to support Vietnam's entry into APEC with the ending of a three-year moratorium on membership in 1996. Vietnam's priority is economic development but it is also cautiously developing security cooperation links with other regional states. Vietnam's strategy is thus to widen its options in the economic and security spheres.

It should be emphasized at this point that while transformation from enmity to amity is possible, it is a gradual process which is reversible. Moreover, even within ASEAN-6, the perception that it is still a security regime and not a pluralistic security community, implies that enmity patterns still exist, if less intense than those found in a conflict formation. With this caveat in mind, the very strategic and economic weight that a revitalized Vietnam will usefully carry as an ASEAN member can, however, be a renewed future source of concern to its traditional rival Thailand and to its smaller neighbours Laos and Cambodia. Having learnt the painful lesson that its economic weakness had reduced it to supplicant status vis-a-vis China and ASEAN, post-Cold War Vietnam seems determined to catch up in the economic arena. This goal will not be easy, given the widespread corruption and resistance within the ruling elite towards reform for fear of losing political control. Finally, Vietnam seems quite clear about its strategic objectives as a member of ASEAN. This includes easing the pressure of its strategic situation: the degree of accommodation and resistance to Chinese power.

6.6 Post-Cold War Laos and ASEAN
The security complex highlights the dynamics among large and small states within a complex or sub-complex, and with the engaged external powers. The issue of the vulnerability of the smaller states is one of the important indicators of relative stability within a complex. Different circumstances may affect small states’ vulnerability but, clearly, in the maritime core sub-complex, both Singapore and Brunei have actively worked to entrench the norms of equality of states, sovereignty and non-interference. During the Cold War, the two small states of the continental core, Laos and Cambodia, remained hapless victims of the global and regional rivalries. But the post-Cold War transformation of relations among Thailand, Vietnam and China have now created a window of opportunity for the continental core to reduce the vulnerability of the smaller states. As discussed below, this window has to be seized.

Laos took advantage of the more favourable conditions emerging in its sub-complex even before the Cold War ended. Domestic stability was restored fairly quickly after the communist faction's victory in 1975. Vientiane and Hanoi signed a 25-year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in July 1977. But by the time Vietnamese troops were withdrawn from Laos in the late 1980s, the landlocked country had been quietly reforming its economy and foreign relations.

Without fanfare, Laos became the first Indochinese state to embark on market reforms. As early as 1979, Laos had begun cautious market-oriented reforms. In 1985, it introduced a "one market, one price" system and stopped agricultural subsidisation. By March 1991, Laos had completely privatised state-owned enterprises and begun the process of market-based industrialization. In recent years, Laos has been keen to market its hydroelectric power supply to neighbouring states. Indeed, Laos -- traditionally suspicious of its neighbours -- has become one of the more eager proponents of sub-regional economic integration.

In foreign relations, post-Cold War Laos has also been successful in establishing balanced relations with its neighbours -- Vietnam, China, Thailand, Cambodia and Myanmar. This has not been easy. While Lao-Vietnamese relations are no longer
ideology-based and have become more market-based, Laos' economics-driven opening to Thailand and China carries an underlying fear of exploitation by these two bigger neighbours. Laos, which fought a border skirmish with Thailand in 1987, continues to view the latter with some suspicion. One recent example has been the problems associated with the Australian-built Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge across the Mekong River. Thailand was eager to wean Laos from its traditional client-patron relationship with Vietnam. To a certain extent, Bangkok has succeeded through the offer of economic incentives. But Laos has shown itself to be a skilful balancing player; for example, in August 1994, Laotian President Nouhak Phoumsavanh paid a visit to Hanoi to "renew" the bilateral friendship. In addition, Thailand is concerned about Chinese inroads into Laos. Like Myanmar, therefore, Laos is at the stage where outreach to other countries beyond its traditional links will serve as a counterweight to the attention of its immediate neighbours.

On the surface, the change in Laos' fortunes has been remarkable. One key domestic factor has been the change in the political leadership's ideational outlook from one that was inward-looking to a more reform-minded and outward-engaging one. One key external factor has been the willingness of external powers in the post-Cold War era to keep out of Laotian affairs. Although Laos effectively remains a one-party state, and the Lao People's Revolutionary Party (LPRP) faces problems of political succession, it has been able to exercise political cohesion and to govern effectively. But the reality of Laos' landlocked geography and porous borders, relative backwardness, vulnerability to market opening and poor investment potential, forces it to accommodate the interests of China, Thailand and Vietnam. Laos, a member of ASEAN since July 1997, will also require great efforts to fulfil the obligations of membership in the grouping.

6.7 Post-Cold War Cambodia and ASEAN

In security complex terms, Cambodia has begun to benefit from the general pattern of amity being fostered in its regional environment. Cambodia formally joined
ASEAN in April 1999. Hun Sen, who became prime minister following the July 1998 election monitored by international observers, seemed to have acquired sufficient political control to avert domestic instability, at least while he remains the country’s strongman. Yet it was Hun Sen who plunged Cambodia into renewed crisis in July 1997, when as Second Prime Minister and leader of the Cambodian People's Party (CPP), he staged a coup and forced First Prime Minister Prince Ranariddh to flee the country (the prince returned to contest the election). The 1997 event seemed to confirm pessimistic forecasts that Cambodia continued to be at risk from internal instability. During the Cold War, such incidents would have triggered a crisis within Cambodia and would have brought about the risk of external power involvement.

Yet, as pointed out above, the two key regional actors in the continental core (Vietnam and Thailand) and the key external power (China) have, in the post-Cold War era, rejected involvement in Cambodia's domestic politics. Their primary (and mutual) concern now is a stable region conducive to trade expansion and foreign investments. Thailand had also made efforts to distance itself from the Khmer Rouge, which in any case is no longer active with the death, surrender and capture of its top leaders. Bangkok also hopes to project itself as the hub of an economically vibrant continental Southeast Asia. It therefore has a stake in the stability and effective governance of its neighbours.

Vietnam, on its part, played an active role in seeking early ASEAN membership for Cambodia. During the July 1997 ASEAN foreign ministers' deliberation on the Cambodian crisis, Vietnam tried to get Cambodia admitted as originally agreed, that is, together with Myanmar and Laos on July 23 in Kuala Lumpur, when the ASEAN foreign ministers were scheduled to hold their Annual Ministerial Meeting.

Nevertheless, Cambodia's porous borders and chronic domestic politics continue to pose problems for its neighbours. Although Vietnam has sought improved ties with Cambodia, border problems persist. Also, Cambodian authorities admitted in November 1995 that they were unable to locate four Vietnamese-Americans who
slipped into the country allegedly to take part in a plot to topple the Hanoi government. More troubling, foreign diplomats and Cambodian government officials estimated that anti-communist groups, with an estimated strength of 400 to 500, had been operating out of Cambodia for “a long time” in an attempt to overthrow the Hanoi government.\textsuperscript{22} The July 1997 crisis may be seen as the culmination of the buildup of political tensions prior to the general election scheduled for May 1998 and aborted after Hun Sen’s coup. In that buildup of political manoeuvrings, two relatives of Prince Ranariddh were expelled to France for allegedly plotting coups, as was popular former finance minister Sam Rainsy\textsuperscript{23}.

Cambodia presents ASEAN with a challenge to the grouping's notion of national and regional resilience which implicitly expects the incumbent ruling group to maintain (or create) its own political legitimacy. Cambodia's economic problems have also to be addressed. ASEAN cannot afford to have chronically unstable and economically laggard members.\textsuperscript{24} Until the coup in July 1997, ASEAN's support for Cambodia's coalition government had been predicated on the continued decline of the Khmer Rouge and on the ability of the Ranarridh-Hun Sen government to moderate their rivalry. Ironically, the recent consolidation of power by Hun Sen who controls the internal security apparatus may now offer prospect of a more stable political regime\textsuperscript{25}.

Finally, the era when King Sihanouk attracted international attention and played a critical unifying role in Cambodian affairs seems to have passed. Hun Sen has shown himself to be a master at penetrating Cambodian society, showing the iron fist when necessary. Sihanouk, who has prostate cancer, is more often than not in Beijing for medical treatment. Hun Sen, moreover, has learned, at the very least, to project an international image of a victor in an internal power struggle. He has also sought to project a willingness to accommodate ASEAN and international concerns so as to get on with rebuilding Cambodia.\textsuperscript{26}

Thus, even with membership in ASEAN, Cambodia is the weakest and most highly unstable link in the continental core, a sub-complex that during the Cold War saw
two rival regional powers, Thailand and Vietnam, and an external power China, involved in protracted conflict. The region’s external security-driven Cold War dynamic has changed to one more driven by economic issues. Today, an unstable Cambodia will still see these three powers holding a “watching brief” over it to protect their interests vis-a-vis each other. But China and Thailand are unlikely now to openly support anti-Hun Sen groups; the Ranariddh group will be an embarrassment given its inherent weakness. Vietnam, with its “Cambodian quagmire” still a recent memory, has set its priorities on economic progress and regional integration. It may take some time for Cambodia to get its act together, but that possibility at least appears now to be in prospect.

6.8 Post-Cold War Thai-Myanmar dynamics

From the security complex perspective, Myanmar is likely to integrate into the continental core, through the process of building and consolidating economic links which then become the foundation for building subsequent security links. A Myanmar that has become well-integrated into the Southeast Asian security complex has also the potential to act as a bridge between Southeast Asia and South Asia, instead of the buffer role it played between the two complexes during the Cold War.

Myanmar benefited from the winding down of Cold War strategic competition in mainland Southeast Asia. For reasons already discussed in Chapter 3, Myanmar became a buffer between the South Asian and Southeast Asian security complexes during the Cold War. Until 1988, Myanmar kept a low international profile and the domestic challenges by opposition politicians and ethnic separatists to the rule of strongman General Ne Win did not attract much external attention. Since the 1960s, Myanmar was also able to stay clear of the dynamics of Sino-Indian rivalry. Of the ASEAN states, only Thailand shared an intense security relationship with Myanmar. The Thai-Myanmar sub-complex was characterized by mutual suspicion and a tense border. Their uneasy Cold War relationship saw Thailand allowing Myanmarese
separatist and dissident groups to set up sanctuaries inside its borders to serve as a security buffer.

Thus, from the security complex’s perspective, an interesting feature is Thailand’s complicated but separate security relations with two Cold War rivals, Vietnam and Myanmar. How the Thai-Myanmar dynamic has developed since the end of the Cold War will now be examined.

Just as Thailand took the initiative – for both strategic and economic reasons -- to turn Indochina from “a battlefield to a market place”, it began to reassess its relations with Myanmar as a result of developments which saw Yangon forging closer relations with Beijing. International condemnation of Myanmar after the ruling military-led regime had brutally cracked down on pro-democracy demonstrators in September 1988 led to cutbacks of Western and Japanese aid and investments. The newly-created State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC)

27, which then declared martial law, turned to China for help. China began to provide security and economic assistance. Beijing's help included about US$1.5 billion in military sales and construction of infrastructure such as roads. There were also reports that Myanmar had agreed to provide China with access to its naval facilities facing the Bay of Bengal, triggering security concerns from India and Thailand. After 1989, border trade increased. This Sino-Myanmarese border trade is now conservatively estimated at US$1 billion annually. The growing integration of the economy of northern Myanmar into the economy of China's Yunnan province has evinced some domestic disquiet.

28 One expatriate Myanmarese observer even asserts that Myanmar has virtually become an economic satellite of China.

29 Meanwhile, in the aftermath of the 1988 events in Yangon, Thailand sensed a new willingness by Myanmar to open up its economy. Thai cabinet minister General Chavalit Yongchaiyut visited Myanmar to negotiate logging and fishing deals for Thai businesses. For the first time in decades, officially-approved bilateral border trade was established and the Thai army granted its Myanmarese counterpart permission to use Thai territory to attack ethnic minority camps from the rear.
Despite the resurgence of political opposition and separatist activities, SLORC carried out its promised general election in 1990 which gave the mandate to the National League for Democracy (NLD), headed by Aung San Suu Kyi, daughter of wartime hero General Aung San. Stung by this outcome, SLORC (which had already placed Aung San Suu Kyi under house arrest), rejected the election results. SLORC later convened a National Convention in February 1993 ostensibly to draft a new constitution but in fact to ensure the perpetuation of the military's dominance in government. SLORC, newly armed by Chinese weapon supplies, also started a renewed military campaign against the two strongest separatist groups along the Thai border, the Karen National Union (KNU) and the New Mon State Party (NMSP). At the same time, SLORC began to woo the other minority groups and by May 1996, 17 of the 20 largest armed opposition groups (with over 50,000 men under arms) had signed “standfast” (ceasefire) agreements with Rangoon.  

These various developments in Myanmar provoked further Western condemnations. But Thailand began to develop a policy towards Myanmar that sought to prevent its further isolation. Beginning with the pro-business administration of Thai Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan, the Thais have been willing to look the other way when SLORC forces crossed the border in hot pursuit of the Karen and Mon rebels. Apart from the granting of licences to Thai businesses to exploit Myanmar's timber, fishery and gem resources, the two governments and three oil companies signed a US$1 billion deal in February 1995 to build a 400-km natural gas pipeline from the Gulf of Martaban (across Karen and Mon territory) to Thailand. Thai-Myanmarese relations continue to be marked by tensions and are a product of a history of conflict and of current contentious issues. But, as seen above, there has been a remarkable convergence of Thai and Myanmarese economic interests, at least at the political, military and business elite levels.

This convergence of mutual interests resulted in a major foreign policy outcome: Thailand's “constructive engagement” policy towards Myanmar. The security complex approach identifies the rationale for this policy: Thailand saw itself as the
commercial hub of post-Cold War mainland Southeast Asia. For this hub concept to work, Thailand needed to have friendly relations with its immediate neighbours.

In other words, with regards to Myanmar, suspicion and enmity had kept Thai-Myanmarese elite relations conflictual, and the anti-Rangoon groups at the border could retain their sanctuaries. But, after August 1988, the economic process sparked by the Chatichai government's overtures to the Myanmarese elites led to a policy decision in Bangkok to seek political and economic links with Rangoon. It was now argued by Thai leaders that “constructive engagement” of Myanmar would result in less tensions at the border, even if this meant a diminution for Thailand of its influence over the anti-Rangoon groups at the border. It was further argued that the economic benefits would outweigh this political “loss”.

Furthermore, Thailand was concerned that the renewed Western-led sanctions and diplomatic campaign against Myanmar after 1990 were driving the SLORC regime even closer to Beijing. A long-term Thai concern was that a Myanmar allied to a powerful patron (China) could turn out to be a troublesome neighbour. “Constructive engagement” was thus also a plank in Thai policy to provide Myanmar with a way out of its economic and diplomatic isolation, and to reduce its reliance on China. Despite some initial Malaysian and Indonesian unhappiness, Thailand scored a diplomatic victory when it secured ASEAN and Japanese support for its Myanmar policy.  

Meanwhile, assured they would not be isolated within the region, the generals in Myanmar, even as they took a firmer approach with both the domestic opposition and armed separatists, began to liberalize the economy and attempted to overcome the Western-led economic sanctions by promulgating generous foreign investment laws. In one sense, the results of these economic reforms have been incremental, given the continued scepticism of international investors (with the exception of foreign oil companies). In another sense, however, trade and investment with China and Thailand, and more recently, with other ASEAN and several other countries especially India, have seen steep increases. Japan, which initially followed the
Western powers’ lead in imposing economic sanctions after the 1988 events, came around to ASEAN's position of not isolating Myanmar.\textsuperscript{34}

Evidence of an increasingly self-confident Myanmar regime include the establishment of the 1993 National Convention to restore constitutional rule but with the military rulers in key roles, and a mixture of accommodation and confrontation with the ethnic insurgents (one payoff of closer ties with China was the demise of the Beijing-backed Communist Party of Burma). More recent signs of SLORC's self-confidence were the release of the opposition's political symbol, Aung San Suu Kyi in July 1995\textsuperscript{35} and Myanmar's preparations to join ASEAN, which occurred in July 1997.

Thus, the end of the Cold War has begun a process of bringing about greater interactions between Myanmar and its neighbours. Not unexpectedly, the centre of this dynamic is the Thai-Myanmar sub-complex where new security and economic interactions have been established amidst continuing tensions over bilateral issues. China, as a neighbouring major power, is an active external player in this sub-complex.

The foregoing indicates that at the regional level, one bilateral security dynamic, the Thai-Myanmar sub-complex, is still a complicated one. Nevertheless, while Myanmar has yet to clearly articulate its security relationship with Thailand (despite the latter's many attempts at reassurance and confidence-building), their economic relationship has improved. Despite Western criticisms of SLORC, Myanmar has benefited from its security relationship with China, and from its economic relations with Japan and ASEAN.

In contrast to the security complex's assessment above, the assumptions of the balance of power and institutional perspectives do not permit a sanguine view of Myanmar's post-Cold War situation. The power balance perspective would yield the conclusion that an insecure Myanmar will likely end up as a Chinese satellite. The institutional perspective would yield the conclusion that a Myanmar defiant towards
international criticisms, would strain ASEAN’s cohesion, or compromise the grouping’s established external links, as happened in March 1999 when annual EU-ASEAN foreign ministers' talks were cancelled. But, as argued above, the security complex's deployment does allow for a measure of optimism about Myanmar's security relations with its fellow ASEAN members, particularly Thailand.

6.9 Networking and the security complex

Before proceeding to an examination of the post-Cold War maritime core, it would be useful to introduce the practice of networking among ASEAN members. Given that Thailand was the continental core’s only ASEAN member before 1995, networking, as defined below, was insignificant in that sub-complex, and only cautiously being built up there now, with the expansion of ASEAN. However, networking is very well developed among the ASEAN-6, and will be discussed in this section. It will then be applied to the maritime core.

Networking among ASEAN-6 leaders and their senior officials is an important element in the grouping's management of conflict and cooperation. Such cooperative attitudes for mutual gains require, at the least, effective political communication. In the more complicated post-Cold War economics-driven regional security environment, ASEAN has responded by paying greater emphasis to the connection between security and economics. In meeting this challenge, ASEAN members' individual and corporate initiatives rely heavily on networking. This process of networking facilitates the transformation of patterns of mutual suspicions and enmity to patterns of trust and amity. Networking can also be examined from the institutional perspective, but this approach does not examine the imperatives for doing so beyond facilitating cooperation for mutual material interests. The security complex idea builds on this argument: it suggests that given the nature of security interdependence, networking is most active among the proximate states in a complex or sub-complex, where relations are most intense. Moreover, through social practice
(that is, drawing from constructivist insights), networking facilitates shifts in amity/enmity patterns and fosters a culture of cooperation.

A working definition of networking between two or more actors would be: to improve the channels of information gathering and sharing; policy consultation and coordination; consensus building; facilitating bilateral and multilateral agreements; and identifying and, to the extent feasible, preventing problems arising from unilateral actions and decisions (including preventing misperceptions about intentions and capabilities)\textsuperscript{37}. Networking exists in any form of communication. Political and security networking is a feature of international relations, and indeed it has always been an important process within ASEAN. Within the ASEAN culture, the emphasis, in the first instance, is on “getting to know you” or, in the words of Malaysian prime minister Mahathir Mohamad, “\textit{Tak kenal maka tak cinta}”, a Malay idiom meaning “we need to know one another before we can like each other”\textsuperscript{38}. This foundation helps to inculcate habits of dialogue to build consensus and to foster cooperation and problem-solving. Its form may be formalized, as in the ASEAN post-ministerial dialogues (which began in 1974 and involve external partners as well) or informal, as in the ad hoc “four eyes” meetings between ASEAN heads of government. The logic of ASEAN-style networking has been summarized by two regional observers:

Familiarization tours, formal and informal contacts amongst counterparts, the constitution of ad hoc problem-solving committees, and visits by ministerial delegations, all emphasize the establishment of interpersonal relationships at all levels of the national bureaucracies of ASEAN members, and, clearly, at the sub-regional... level as well. Networking is particularly important in the ASEAN context because of the necessity of settling outstanding matters informally, behind the scenes, and before issues are made public\textsuperscript{39}.

In terms of security networking, activities covered under this rubric also include military visits and exchanges, defence sales, port calls and other contacts. Such contacts create informal channels of communication and, as noted by one observer, the use of the armed forces “to establish bilateral ties... reinforce economic and
political bonds while lessening the risk of military tension. A senior Singapore defence ministry official adds that

As we build up our capability we don't want people to get the wrong idea. This sort of “defence diplomacy” is very important for us.

During the Cold War, the attention to ASEAN's outward concern with national sovereignty and territorial integrity together with strategic concerns led to this networking process being underplayed by analysts. The end of the Cold War has seen non-traditional security issues like economic competition and economic cooperation becoming more prominent. Military security concerns remain high on the agenda but as one observer argues, the “security framework is inappropriate for dealing with relationships when vital national interests are not directly challenged and the primary policy instruments do not involve threats and coercion... national interests are increasingly defined in terms of managing competition within the context of cooperative processes”. As Chapter 5 showed, from the institutional perspective, ASEAN's expansion and the creation of the APEC and ARF multilateral processes sought to deal with the transnational implications of security and economic interdependence. From the balance of power perspective, such multilateral cooperative processes would be subject to problems imposed by strategic uncertainty and threats to national sovereignty and territorial integrity.

But, with regards to ASEAN and its institutional and other links to other actors, these two approaches fail to provide insights into the important bilateral and multilateral networking process that results from these links. Institutions can be identified when they are established because they are formally promulgated. The operation of the balance of power can be seen to be at work through the formation of alignments and alliances.

Relations of amity and enmity, and their shifts, however, cannot be understood in terms of these two approaches yet they may be important for security. To illustrate, the institutional approach emphasizes payoffs and the management of interests to achieve cooperation. Yet, as Chapter 4 illustrated, this is inadequate to explain the
great difficulties ASEAN experienced in its effort to cobble a corporate position on the Cambodian issue. In Chapter 3, however, the process of networking was found to facilitate shifts in the patterns of amity and enmity in the sub-complexes, especially in the maritime core sub-complex. In other words, seen from the security complex perspective, the purpose of networking within an institutional situation is to seek to modify and shift values towards patterns of amity to facilitate cooperation.

6.10 Networking in the maritime core

As discussed in Chapter 3, a culture of cooperation has already been fostered in the maritime core, comprising Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Brunei. But how durable is this culture? The question is whether it can be sustained when new leaders take the helm. And, just as in the continental core, it will be argued below that the maritime core is being enlarged, in this case with the integration of the Philippines. How will this addition affect this sub-complex's culture of cooperation?

If there is one overriding factor that distinguishes the maritime core, despite its turbulent past, it is its effective use of networking, starting from the political leadership and senior officials. This process is combined with the continuity of leadership (shaped by the memory of Sukarno's destructive foreign policy) which developed a convergence of core values committed to political stability, social cohesion and economic well-being. This leadership culture is also acutely aware of the maritime core's mutual interdependence in economic and security terms. However, this strength is also potentially a weakness in the post-Cold War period because this leadership culture also depends on personal chemistry and therefore lacks institutionalization. For example, the sudden resignation of President Suharto in Indonesia in May 1998 saw Jusuf Habibie succeed him. While it is likely that President Habibie will be a transition head, pending presidential elections in November 1999, he has not got on well with Singapore’s leaders. The leadership issue in Indonesia remains a contentious one within the domestic polity. Also, there has been a resurgence of political Islam in Indonesia and Malaysia. For the leaders of
the two mini-states in the maritime core, Singapore and Brunei, while networking is highly valued, their long-term perspective has always been that the regional “strategic and security situation can change very quickly”.\textsuperscript{43}

The positive spin-off from this leadership penchant for networking and cooperation is the confidence with which senior officials tackle contentious issues. These officials continue to be innovative in dealing with logjams that arise. In this sense, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore may be described as the three activist maritime core states. An example of this penchant among the officials of these three states for innovations is the joint agreement by Singapore and Malaysia to submit their dispute over the island of Pedra Branca (also known as Pulau Batu Putih) to arbitration by the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Indonesia and Malaysia are also seeking a solution to their dispute over Sipadan and Ligitan islands.

Another example, the original growth triangle within ASEAN, now called SIJORI (Singapore-Johor-Riau) and first mooted by Singapore prime minister Goh Chok Tong (when he was deputy premier) in December 1989, enjoys the attention of senior officials familiar with each other. The growth triangle's primary rationale is sub-regional economic cooperation designed to increase economies of scale, exploit complementarities in production, and enlarge the size of markets. Its security implication comes from the functionalist view that cooperation in one functional area will have positive spillover into other areas such as security. Singapore, in particular, may be said to see SIJORI as meeting its need to diversify its water supply sources and to ensure a captive industrial investment location.\textsuperscript{44} SIJORI continues to be a public sector-driven project although private sector involvement is vital. The commitment of the involved states affirms the priority of cooperation and an inclination to resolve problems amicably. SIJORI's success -- after some hiccups -- sets it as the model and benchmark for other “growth geometries”.

Nevertheless, all things being equal, cooperation and accommodation within the maritime core have mostly been bilateral in nature. Even the tripartite SIJORI was able to get started fairly quickly because it was initially more a twin-track
development with a Riau province-Singapore component and a Johor state-
Singapore component. Similarly, the much publicised anti-piracy patrols begun in
1992 by the Indonesian, Malaysian and Singapore navies are coordinated patrols
rather than joint trilateral patrols.\footnote{45}

6.11 Post-Cold War security cooperation in the maritime core

Security and defence networking among the three activist maritime core states, and
with Thailand, developed during the Cold War, remains in place, and has even
expanded. All four countries have also expanded their security cooperation activities
with the United States and Australia. They continue to ensure that all such activities
are bilateral when only ASEAN members are involved; and they eschew formally
institutionalized defence arrangements, in recognition of both intramural and
extramural sensitivities. Yet, while a formal defence community has not been
created, an increasing emphasis on joint training, exercises, doctrine development
and interoperability has emerged.

Although Thai-Malaysian border security cooperation may be said to be the
precursor to subsequent intra-ASEAN security cooperation, nevertheless, it is in the
maritime core where such cooperation has developed more fully, in terms of
frequency and range of activities. Accordingly, the security complex idea is deployed
here to examine the post-Cold War security networking and cooperation in the
maritime core.

Security networking facilitates security cooperation, since networking seeks to
modify and shift values towards patterns of amity to facilitate cooperation. Clearly,
where patterns of enmity predominate, security networking is highly restricted and
cooperation is minimal, if any. Thus, in security complexes where the security
dilemma is still acute, such as is the case with the South Asian cluster, the
antagonists are likely in fact to be engaged in an arms race. As observed earlier,
security cooperation in the post-Cold War continental core has yet to bear fruit.
Security networking there is only slowly developing; mutual suspicions have to be addressed. Even then, without the requisite political will, joint border committees or joint commissions there -- ASEAN's basic conflict-management mechanism -- cannot be very effective.

In contrast to the continental core, the states in the maritime core have had a longer history of security networking and cooperation. Following Indonesia’s Confrontation and Singapore’s separation from Malaysia, there was still mutual suspicion among the former antagonists. Thus, the development and consolidation of patterns of amity among the three activist maritime states (with Brunei included after 1984) went through a chequered but persistent process. These efforts have since paid off, evidenced by the increasing regularity of joint military training and exercises, joint surveillance and patrol, and exchange of intelligence, in the maritime core. The scope and frequency of these activities are currently limited only by (1) political sensitivities and periodic “hiccups” over bilateral issues; and (2) interoperability problems with regard to armed forces' doctrines, command and control links, force structures, equipment and logistics infrastructure, etc.

Security cooperation in the maritime core has moved beyond the spectrum of military activities cited above to even more concrete commitment. One example is joint utilization of facilities. The Singapore-Indonesian joint air weapons range (AWR) has been in operation since 1989 while the joint air combat manoeuvring range (ACMR) was completed in 1994. Indonesia has also begun to provide Singapore's air force with air space in waters off southern Sumatra and near the Natuna Islands in the South China Sea. Malaysia and Singapore established a bilateral Defence Forum in January 1995 to promote joint training and cooperation in defence equipment matters.

This section has contrasted the low level of security cooperation in the continental core with the high level of such activities in the maritime core. Nevertheless, it is useful to reiterate that fundamental vulnerabilities and security concerns exist in both core sub-complexes. The difference, as argued in the next section, is that the
maritime core countries (together with Thailand and the Philippines, that is, the ASEAN-6) have developed reassurance measures to prevent misperceptions arising from these security concerns. For example, almost all intra-ASEAN joint military training and exercises are organized along bilateral lines, outside the ASEAN rubric, so as never to give the impression that another ASEAN partner is the putative enemy. The security complex highlights the underlying tensions between security-interdependent states and recognizes their mutual vulnerabilities; it leads the careful observer to note the need for continual reassurance measures among the maritime core states. Both the institutional and balance of power approaches fail to pay adequate attention to these nuanced security activities in the maritime core. One Indonesian analyst notes, for example, that for Singapore:

> the major consideration in military cooperation with Indonesia and Malaysia is not to build up joint defence postures against outside threats. It is primarily meant to reduce the military threats from Indonesia and Malaysia. Through the [various] agreements with its two closest neighbours, Singapore has developed its diplomatic and military relations, thus improving its bilateral relations, and has obtained training facilities which it urgently needed.\(^\text{48}\)

6.12 **The maritime core: Avoiding tests of vulnerability**

In the continental core, the security complex framework has highlighted the continued wariness Laos and Cambodia display towards their bigger neighbours. In turn, Thailand, Vietnam and China watch carefully for signs of either of the smaller states moving closer to a rival power. In contrast, within the maritime core, its smallest member Singapore (area: 645 sq km) has faced up to this problem and vigorously worked at pursuing a discreet balance of power policy and to acquire a credible military force. On the other hand, Singapore has put a premium on networking, evolved its own brand of “defence diplomacy” and sought to handle security-focussed issues through the several high-level bilateral committees/working groups it has established with Indonesia and Malaysia. In short, Singapore has sought to address the problem of a small state’s inherent vulnerability *within its sub-complex* by making itself both less vulnerable and yet reassuring; the less vulnerable
it is, the less likely the inherent problems will arise. The net result is that while Malaysian and Indonesian politicians and media commentators continue to portray Singapore as a regional “Israel”, the Singapore-Malaysia and Singapore-Indonesia defence relationships – cultivated outside the glare of public attention -- have now acquired a pragmatic and durable basis. In this sense, these defence relationships are a stabilising factor and underpin cooperative efforts in the political and economic spheres.

The other small member of the maritime core, Brunei, has also sought to face up to its potential vulnerability. Its close and visible security relationship with Singapore signals that within the maritime core, small states need to forge a convergence of interests. Brunei's security relationships with Malaysia and Indonesia have also improved. By the end of the Cold War, Brunei had accepted the inevitability of declining British interest in its external security and began seeking closer contacts with the US. The above discussion suggests that the maritime core countries have, at the regional level, consolidated the process of security and defence networking (that is, sub-regional security and defence cooperation).

In contrast to the continental core, the maritime core comprised countries which became ASEAN members in 1967 (Brunei joined ASEAN in 1984). Led by their top leaders, the countries of the maritime core pursued reconciliation fairly early -- soon after the end of Indonesia's Confrontation against Malaysia. Rapport established among the maritime core's leaders has been a vital confidence-building factor. This early fostering of confidence-building flowing from the highest leadership level down helps explain the palpable mood of mutual accommodation in the defence buildup and modernization efforts of Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia. Singapore, in particular, from its independence in 1965 began to design its force structure to thwart external threats, that is, it adopted a deterrent posture. Under the circumstances, possible threats could only come “from or through” peninsular Malaysia or from an Indonesia which had reverted to Sukarno-type (ultranationalistic) circumstances. Malaysia, immediately after Confrontation, felt less insecure about external threats as it was re-assured by the trip-wire role of Australian
Mirage fighters at the Butterworth air base. It kept its primary security focus on counter-insurgency operations but began to shift towards conventional warfighting after Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia in December 1978. Since the end of the Cold War, it has speeded up its conventional force structure buildup, in tandem with other force modernizations in its region. Despite early Singapore-Indonesia tensions, President Suharto came to appreciate the small island-state's vulnerability. Indonesia also recognized that its environment was relatively benign and, just as important, that it had a role to play in strengthening this benign environment. Not surprisingly, in accordance with its defence doctrine, Indonesia kept its defence buildup gradual with primary emphasis on internal security and territorial defence.

This is the key historical difference in the security dynamics of the two core sub-complexes: throughout the Cold War, vulnerability in the continental core meant the likelihood of being drawn into other states' conflicts; vulnerability in the maritime core came to be accommodated rather than tested. With this understanding in place, security cooperation among ASEAN members and with external powers could then subscribe to the Indonesian-inspired concept of a “spider's web” of security linkages. In this concept, individual ASEAN countries developed their own security links. Because these links threatened no fellow members, the whole was implicitly protected by the individual webs.

6.13 **Singapore as the economic hub of the maritime core**

Apart from vulnerability to the use of force which most small states face within their security complex (or sub-complex), they also face another imperative: economic survival. Again, in the maritime core, Singapore has adopted the same basic philosophy towards overcoming economic vulnerability as it did towards overcoming military vulnerability. Unable to rely on its hinterland after 1965, it sought to avoid becoming an economic competitor within its sub-complex. Instead, it complemented its comparative advantage in oil refining, entrepot trade and services by wooing multinational firms to build up an export industry. This economic strategy
was carefully managed by Singapore leaders soon after separation from Malaysia in August 1965. Its efforts to industrialize and eventually to specialize in high value-added niche industries like computer hard-disks and wafer fabrication, to become a major oil refining and petro-chemical centre, and to become a world class financial and communications hub, plugged it firmly into the global economy. In adopting this economic strategy, Singapore has thus avoided competing for the same markets and niche areas as its neighbours. Singapore has also become a major investor in Indonesia and Malaysia, and in developing this so-called “external wing”, is becoming a major investor in the rest of Southeast Asia as well. Moreover, apart from Singapore’s planned approach, a greater degree of economic complementarity has developed among the four maritime states, compared to the greater degree of economic competition in the continental core.

The result for Singapore, as the economic hub of the maritime core, has been generally positive when accepted by Indonesia and Malaysia in the spirit of “prosper-with-thy-neighbour”. From time to time, economic nationalism from Indonesia and Malaysia, and even from Thailand, have led to strained relations. For example, the SIJORI growth triangle has been largely successful because of the synergistic combination of Singapore's value-added assets and Riau and Johor's resources and labour inputs. But problems have arisen within SIJORI because of the perceived disparity in economic benefits enjoyed by Singapore compared to Riau and Johor. Thailand has also been wary of Singapore's growing economic presence in the former Indochinese states and Myanmar. More recently, the Asian economic crisis which began in mid-1997 has re-ignited regional economic nationalism. On balance, however, despite the problems stirred usually by economic nationalism that recur in the maritime core's economic relations, the degree of interdependence -- driven by self-interest -- among the four states is clearly manifested.

6.14 Philippine integration into the maritime core
In the continental core, the end of the Cold War broke Myanmar's isolation and is leading to its integration into the sub-complex. Thailand's “constructive engagement” of Myanmar played a catalytic role in this process. The end of the Cold War is similarly leading to the integration of the Philippines into the maritime core. Just as Myanmar is ASEAN's western flank, the Philippines is the grouping's eastern flank.

This comparison needs to be qualified. The Philippines is a founder-member of ASEAN and has never been isolationist. But as earlier chapters have shown, all three approaches used in this study depict the Philippines as somewhat of an “outsider” in its relations with the other ASEAN members. However, the combination of the departure of US forces from the Philippines in 1991-92 amidst strategic uncertainty; the economic imperatives and incentives of further integration into the regional and global economies; and the personal drive of Fidel Ramos, who succeeded the lackluster Corazon Aquino on 1 July 1992, has created the impetus for a more ASEAN-oriented outlook. In this process, integration into the maritime core owes much to the initial efforts of Ramos, whose personality predisposed him to network with the leaders of the three activist maritime states. Indeed, Ramos quickly struck a rapport with Malaysian prime minister Mahathir Mohamad, when he paid his ice-breaking visit to Kuala Lumpur in January 1993. \(^{51}\) Mahathir's return visit to Manila in February 1994\(^ {52}\) consolidated the Malaysian-Philippine relationship at the highest level, opened up contacts down the line and led to bilateral economic and security links. Still, the Sabah issue is merely dormant and subject to future turns in Philippine domestic politics.

Similarly, the Philippine-Indonesian nexus has consolidated, again with the personal rapport between Ramos and Suharto setting the pace. Indonesia has been taking a special interest in the resolution of the Muslim separatist insurgency in the southern Philippines. Jakarta brokered talks between Manila and the main insurgent group, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). A major breakthrough came with the meeting between rebel chief Nur Misuari and Ramos on 19 August 1996\(^ {53}\) and the election of Misuari as the governor of Mindanao province in September that year. \(^ {54}\)
Finally, the Singapore-Philippines relationship has also improved greatly, in spite of the 1995 furore over the hanging of a Filipino maid in Singapore for murder. Relations were restored fairly quickly and the two armed forces’ joint training programme, disrupted by the furore, was also quickly resumed by 1996. For example, in June 1996, the first in a new series of bilateral naval exercises (codenamed “Sea Tiger”) was launched.

The impetus for these various initiatives comes from the general post-Cold War trend: in economic terms, there has been a revival of the Philippine economy and the war-weary, resource-rich and underdeveloped south does not want to lag behind. The transformation of Mindanao from a conflictual zone to an economic zone is critical to the take-off of the East ASEAN Growth Area (EAGA) involving Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines. In strategic terms, the removal of the US security umbrella created a sense of vulnerability in the Philippines, a feeling that was amplified by China's increasing assertiveness in the widely scattered Spratly Islands chain, of which Manila is also a claimant (of part of the Spratlys).

Thus, to the extent that ASEAN's policy of engaging Myanmar represents the grouping's desire to prevent a situation of an unstable or vulnerable state sitting on its continental flank, push and pull factors also began to focus ASEAN attention on the potential for instability in the Philippines, ASEAN's eastern maritime flank. As noted, one push factor in the Philippines' integration into the maritime core has been the 1992 withdrawal of the US forces from the Philippines, and the resultant sense of a security vacuum felt by Manila. China's higher profile over the Spratlys, of which the poorly-armed Philippines is a rival claimant and maritime neighbour, is another push factor. The pull factors have been the imperatives and incentives for closer economic integration with the maritime core and increased security-related interactions with the maritime core members. For example, Jakarta became quite active in mediating Manila's dialogue with the Muslim forces in the southern Philippines. Manila has also begun establishing defence link-ups with Malaysia and renewing those with Singapore.
6.15 The post-Cold War bridge sub-complex

From the security complex perspective, Thailand occupies a strategic position in the aggregate Southeast Asian security complex. As Muthiah Alagappa notes, Thailand and Malaysia form the “bridge” sub-complex (or Thai-Malaysian sub-complex) between continental and maritime Southeast Asia. Bangkok's energies since the end of the Cold War are increasingly directed towards economic opportunities and political influence in the continental core. It has thus consolidated its powerful security interactions within the continental core. But Thailand has also strong security links with the maritime core.

This section briefly reviews the state of the security dynamic between Thailand and Malaysia amidst the transformations of the continental and maritime core sub-complexes. A long history of political and security cooperation has characterized this bridge sub-complex but in the post-Cold War era, old and new irritants dog the Thai-Malaysian security relationship. On the other hand, bilateral economic cooperation, never pursued with any zeal during the Cold War, may yet become the new stimulus in preserving the patterns of amity in this sub-complex.

The issues that provoke concern include the land border problems and fishery disputes. The ending of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) insurgency along the Thai-Malaysian border in December 1989 had removed the incentive for security cooperation there between the two armed forces. Instead, the old problem of the apparent lack of enthusiasm shown by Kuala Lumpur in helping Bangkok curb the activities of Thai Muslim separatists along the border continues to serve as a bilateral irritant. A new problem is the flow of illegal refugees from Myanmar and Bangladesh into Malaysia through the porous Thai-Malaysian border. The increasing frequency of encroachments by Thai fishermen into Malaysian waters have also strained bilateral relations. Finally, some Malaysian defence analysts have expressed disquiet at the recent Thai naval buildup, inferring that these naval assets might be used to protect Thailand's wide-ranging fishing fleet (the world's third...
largest) poaching in neighbouring waters or become a threatening force if bilateral relations worsened\textsuperscript{62}.

On the positive side, while Thai-Malaysian border security cooperation has had a chequered history, it has also been institutionalized. The Thai-Malaysian General Border Committee (GBC) system is the oldest mutual security-building mechanism in ASEAN. Also, unlike the situation in the Thai-Myanmaese sub-complex, the Thai and Malaysian defence establishments have built up a durable network among their senior officials and officers.

So far, too, the two countries' long-standing conflict-management mechanisms continue to be used to defuse fisheries-dispute tensions. Thai-Malaysian cooperation in exploiting their Joint Development Area (JDA) in the Gulf of Thailand despite a long-standing dispute over the maritime border, underscores their propensity for conflict-resolution.\textsuperscript{63}

6.16 Security concerns and defence modernization

From the analysis thus far, in broad terms, the countries in the maritime core have made progress on several indicators of a cooperative culture: networking, promoting amity, avoiding tests of vulnerability, and strengthening security cooperation. In contrast, the continental core countries have lagged behind, understandably, given that mainland Southeast Asia was until recently a conflict formation. It was only with the end of the Cold War that economic conditions pushed the continental core countries to pursue greater cooperation within their cluster.

However, the recent Asian economic crisis has complicated the positive trends in both core sub-complexes. Briefly, in the maritime core, the crisis set back economic and milieu goals and created tensions among Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. Specifically, future developments in the maritime core will depend very much on how the transition in Indonesia turns out. In the continental core, Thailand's goal of
becoming the economic powerhouse there may similarly be set back. In both sub-complexes, the crisis has taken a toll on the momentum of defence and security cooperation, as well as set back defence modernization targets in the countries most badly hit.

6.17 Contingency planning in the maritime core

The security complex analysis does not dismiss balance of power concerns (with regards to regional states and external powers) but locates these concerns in the context of security interdependence within complexes or sub-complexes. As already noted in Chapter 3 and earlier in this chapter, the security dynamic among Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia was a unique one during the Cold War era. It had “stabilized” in the sense that a sub-regional balance was achieved in which tiny Singapore continued to progressively build up a highly modernized and offensively-oriented conventional military force whose paradoxical role was both that of a powerful deterrent and that of an agent of reassurance (deterrence and defence diplomacy). With the end of the Cold War, Singapore's armed forces have also been structured to deal with contingencies, having acquired a rapid deployment capability.

During the Cold War, contrary to balance of power expectations, neither Indonesia nor Malaysia reacted to Singapore's military buildup, that is, an arms spiral did not occur. An important factor here was that great power rivalry had not been keenly felt in the maritime core. Consequent on this, neither Indonesia nor Malaysia felt any clear and present danger from an external power link to Singapore’s military buildup. Indonesia in particular took visible steps to reassure Malaysia and Singapore by keeping its external defence expenditures low. This reassurance posture led to tangible security and defence cooperation between Singapore and Indonesia, and between Malaysia and Indonesia. However, the Singapore-Malaysian political relationship still carried the “baggage” of their 1965 separation and defence cooperation was consequently subject to the prevailing political climate. The
triangular dynamic was more complicated, with Malaysia and Singapore watchful over the state of the other's relations with Indonesia.

The era of the Cold War did result in the focusing of the security concerns of the two larger maritime core states on managing intramural issues within the sub-complex rather than on external issues or on contingency threats. In sum, the argument here is that during the Cold War, the issue of the buildup of conventional defence forces was not felt to be an urgent need in the maritime core except by Singapore. Furthermore, neither Indonesia nor Malaysia sought to match Singapore's military buildup. Since the end of the Cold War, however, the maritime core is witnessing both a step-up in the pace of defence modernization as well as a reorientation towards conventional forces. Moreover, the three activist maritime states’ armed forces now address contingency situations that may arise in their security environment.

6.18 Issues of insecurity in the post-Cold War maritime core

The security dynamic in the maritime core is a complicated but not necessarily volatile one. During the Cold War, Singapore's unambiguous endorsement of the US security umbrella made it easier for Indonesia and Malaysia to adopt more ambiguous declaratory postures on the issue, despite a common minimal position that any sudden US pullout might create a strategic vacuum. The US decision to withdraw from its Philippine bases between 1991 and 1992 created disquiet in the maritime core. But only Singapore had acted, even before that event, to offer the Americans access to its military facilities. Thus, there was a general feeling that a reduced US military presence in a time of great power transition would create pressures for greater self-reliance among regional states. For Indonesia and Malaysia, China's rise posed a long-term security concern. Indonesia's armed forces were focussed on territorial defence whereas Malaysia's were only just beginning to adopt a conventional focus. While it would not be possible to counter a large-scale conventional attack from a major power without assistance, both Indonesia and Malaysia now felt that the creation of a more conventionally-oriented military force
would be needed in case of attempts by such a major power to coerce them through lower-level military actions.

The maritime core states were also concerned over whether China was escalating its pressure on the ASEAN claimants to the Spratly Islands. China had previously applied pressure on Vietnam over the Spratly Islands in a naval skirmish in 1988. Since early 1995, Beijing seemed to be testing Manila's resolve by building large structures over Mischief Reef. Indonesia's concern was over its Natuna Islands abutting the disputed Spratly Islands while Malaysia's concern was over its claims to several islands in the Spratlys. Thus, converging with their Cold War long-term concern about China's potential as a regional hegemon was their more immediate, post-Cold War concern that China was now ready to follow up on its pressure on Vietnam and the Philippines over the Spratlys with pressure on them. Both Indonesia and Malaysia have therefore in the post-Cold War era begun to prepare for contingencies in which their maritime stakes are challenged.

In terms of intramural insecurity, Indonesia remains supremely self-confident that neither Malaysia nor Singapore has the intention to pose security threats to it. Also, no other Southeast Asian state is perceived as a potential threat to Indonesia. Malaysia, however, has increasingly shown disquiet at the buildup of offensive capability of two neighbours: Singapore and Thailand. With regards to Thailand, it will only be briefly noted here that Kuala Lumpur watches carefully Bangkok's naval expansion programme. The two countries are occasionally involved in naval incidents involving illegal fishing by Thai trawlers. But these incidents are usually resolved at the political level. The Malaysian concern is a long-term one in the event that Thai-Malaysian relations are less cordial. This section will, however, exclude discussion of the Thai-Malaysian dynamic. Its focus is on whether Malaysia in the post-Cold War era has redefined its threat perceptions such that it must prepare for a number of contingencies around the maritime core. As indicated above, one concern is that -- in the event of a downturn in Sino-Malaysian relations -- China will pressure Malaysia at a weak point, the islands it occupies in the Spratlys. A second contingency is the possibility of political unrest in Sabah or Sarawak, or in
Indonesia's Kalimantan province which spill over, requiring the dispatch of rapid deployment forces from West Malaysia to restore order in East Malaysia.

Is there a third contingency: conflict with Singapore? Put another way, does Malaysia now feel that it is uncomfortable with Singapore's unmatched offensive capability? A Malaysian decision to restructure and re-equip its armed forces could then achieve both the purposes of blunting Singapore's offensive power as well as meeting the other national security threats discussed above. It would appear that Malaysia's post-Cold War defence modernization programme does have these various purposes in mind.

Finally, within the maritime core, Singapore has since its defence force buildup (beginning in 1967) always assumed that regional threats to its survival could develop suddenly. Its progress from a modest “poisoned shrimp” defence doctrine to an all-purpose deterrent designed to secure swift victory, in the absence of commensurate reassurance measures, could have triggered an arms race with Indonesia and Malaysia. As noted above, mutual reassurance between Indonesia and Singapore has been successful, in large part because political relations have been good. On the other hand, tensions and mutual suspicions in the Singapore-Malaysian political relation have often affected the two countries’ defence relationship. The Joint Defence Forum, an initiative launched by then Malaysian defence minister Najib Tun Razak in early 1995\textsuperscript{64}, has made cautious headway. The forum was set up as a joint committee to explore and discuss defence projects and bilateral problems. By its second meeting in March 1996, only one joint venture project to produce 12.7mm general purpose machine gun ammunition had been approved, as well as the exchange of flight simulator training between the air forces of the two countries\textsuperscript{65}. It should be noted, however, that Malaysia's recent drive to become more self-reliant in defence and to meet various contingencies carries a dynamic of its own, subject to budgetary constraints.

To summarize the foregoing discussion, the arms buildup/defence modernization in the ASEAN maritime core sub-complex has not been destabilizing. It could have
been destabilizing and even heightened intramural insecurity if there were no political understanding and accommodation at the elite level. But this necessary “ingredient” is currently well understood by the respective political leaders and their senior defence officials and military staffs, who as a consequence value the role that networking plays in their security calculus. The balance of power perspective would have merely attempted to assess whether a sub-regional arms race existed in the maritime core. The security complex identifies the more subtle dynamics that explain why this has not been the case, and why reassurance has played an important role in the maritime core. The security complex accounts for the importance of patterns of amity that are being shaped by the incremental networks of regular bilateral military exercises, contacts among senior defence officials and senior officers, and other forms of security and defence cooperation among the three activist maritime core countries. Indonesia, hostile to the formation of Malaysia in the 1960s, has been a force for stability since. Malaysia and Singapore, while watchful of each other’s defence and economic developments, are keenly aware of their intertwined security interdependence in these areas of vital interests. Brunei gradually blended into this maritime core network after it joined ASEAN in 1984. More recently, the Philippines has begun to join in this maritime core network.

These features of the maritime core's (and the bridge sub-complex's) approach to security cooperation have borne fruit in the management of their respective arms buildup and in their handling of tensions that arise. Good political and defence relations among the maritime core states and Thailand have resulted in sustained bilateral security links, which in turn have ameliorated (but not eliminated) mutual concerns about each other’s defence spending and force structuring.

This section has so far focussed on the three activist maritime core countries. To complete the analysis, Brunei and the Philippines will now be discussed. Brunei's post-Cold War security preoccupation continues to be contingencies involving Indonesia or Malaysia. Brunei has found itself involved as a claimant in the multi-party Spratly dispute, and the direction of its post-Cold War defence modernization has been towards protection of its offshore oil installations. The Sultanate cannot rule
out clashes at sea with either a more antagonistic post-Suharto Indonesia or with Malaysia over these installations. Having noted this, however, the point should be made that after 1984, new ASEAN member Brunei’s security dilemma was attenuated by Indonesian and Malaysian reassurance postures and by its close defence relationship with Singapore. In other words, there is movement towards reinforcing patterns of amity in the Brunei-Indonesia and Brunei-Malaysia dynamics. Also, in common with the other ASEAN countries, Brunei began to re-assess its security situation when American withdrawal from the Philippines was in prospect. As noted earlier, by 1991 it had indicated it would allow American warship visits to its port, by 1994 the two sides had signed an MOU on bilateral defence cooperation, and by 1995, ships of the US Seventh Fleet and the Royal Brunei Navy had conducted a training exercise in the vicinity of Brunei.

In the case of the Philippines, it has begun to modernize all the three services of its armed forces. Their relative state of backwardness, compared with the other maritime core states, has been a result of geography, history and budgetary constraints. With American forces based in the Philippines until 1991-92, the focus of the armed forces has been on internal security, viz. the communist insurgency and Muslim separatist groups. Tensions with fellow ASEAN member Malaysia over Sabah brought out the painful contrast between their armed forces’ external defence capabilities. Nevertheless, the relative insulation of the Philippines from the security dynamics of Southeast Asia was obvious.

But developments even before the end of the Cold War, and heightened by it, have forced a reassessment by the Philippines. The Americans had withdrawn their forces by 1992. The Philippines has been a claimant to islands in the Spratlys since the mid-1950s. All the claimants have become more assertive, with China seen to be especially so. For the Philippines, China has become a maritime neighbour and a strategic long-term concern. The several Mischief Reef incidents since early 1995 brought this point home and provided the impetus for the Ramos administration to push a multi-billion dollar shopping bill for the armed forces through the legislature. This defence modernization programme is constrained by a lack of available funds
but the long-awaited economic recovery is expected to provide a more sizeable portion allocated to defence expenditure. With maritime concerns now a priority, the Philippine navy received a US$2 billion five-year modernization programme in December 1996.\(^{69}\)

The Philippines has therefore joined, at a late stage, its ASEAN partners in the ongoing process of contingency-oriented force modernization. Unlike most of the other ASEAN countries, however, its external defence needs are more specific and amenable to a long lead-time. The Philippines has begun to participate in the ASEAN security and defence cooperation network. As suggested by the security complex approach, such networking reinforces patterns of amity among the participants and helps facilitate a more benign intramural security situation. The willingness of Malaysia and the Philippines to put aside the Sabah issue and to forge closer links, including economic and security links, reinforces this sentiment. In a complementary move, the Philippines and the US are once again reviving their security cooperation, including US weapons sales under Foreign Military Sales (FMS) terms. In the wake of the 1995 Mischief Reef incident, US Navy SEALs and Philippine commandos conducted joint exercises in July 1995.\(^{70}\) The Philippines has also begun to develop security contacts with other external powers, including Britain which has been keen to expand its arms sales to Southeast Asia.

6.19 Issues of insecurity in the post-Cold War continental core

The countries in the continental core are still watchful about each other, having only recently emerged from Cold War enmity. Not unexpectedly, security cooperation there is minimal, if any. Thailand, the most economically developed of the continental core countries, has initiated what is, in effect, a reverse sequence of what has been occurring in the maritime core (where networking fosters amity and political and security cooperation, and paves the way for economic cooperation). It hopes to be the leader in creating prosperity there by being mainland Southeast Asia's economic hub. Conditions are then created for networking, and for greater
political stability and political cooperation. A culture of comprehensive and cooperative security could then be nurtured. This "start-up" strategy makes sense because the former Indochinese countries and Myanmar are eager to promote economic reform and development. There is therefore, in a sense, a common economic agenda prevailing across the continental core, dampened only (if measurably) by the Asian crisis.

Thus, despite the still palpable history of insecurity among the continental core countries, conditions in post-Indochina, post-Cold War mainland Southeast Asia, have not been ripe for rivalry. Only Thailand and Myanmar have implemented sustained force modernization programmes, while Vietnam is beginning to do just that. It does not go unnoticed that these are the three countries that will dominate the continental core. Even then, analysts have noted that Thailand's post-Cold War buildup, as in the past, still lacks a coherent match of acquisitions with threat perceptions. Myanmar's military buildup has been focussed on the expansion of its army, with assistance from China. This rapid buildup appears to be directed at maintaining military rule and border pacification. The potential regional hegemon of the Cold War period, Vietnam, has downsized its armed forces and only recently begun a modest military purchase and refitting programme. The balance of power perspective is unable to provide an adequate explanation for this situation. It would have correctly noted a situation of mutual suspicion among all five states in the post-Cold War continental core, yet it would not have been able to explain the apparent lack of defence preparedness with respect to each other.

It is tempting to speculate that it would only be a matter of time before the conditions of economic revival and deteriorating relations provoked an arms race in the continental core, and that Cambodia and Laos would once again be the pawns in the bigger states' rivalries. Being an analytical device, the security complex is not generative; it can only provide an ex post facto assessment, based on the dynamics of security interdependence in the continental core. On this basis, it provides a logical account that is less pessimistic than the balance of power account. Its argument is that the continental core has begun to experience a peaceful transformation: the
resulting complicated dynamic is increasingly economics-driven. Undeniably, the continental core's history of chronic conflict and mutual suspicion has inhibited security cooperation and networking among the component states. Thailand and Vietnam were historical rivals and both are uneasy about Myanmar's military links with China. Laos, a reluctant Vietnamese client in the recent past, remains xenophobic as far as security links are concerned. Cambodia is still a step behind, as it struggles to overcome political instability.

But, in contrast to the Cold War conditions, the incentives for hegemonic ambition and territorial conquest, at least at the regional level, no longer obtain. All five states in the post-Cold War continental core now have the opportunity to develop their economies individually, as a sub-region, and within the wider ASEAN rubric. The "power of economics" -- in which integration into the increasingly globalized economic system is no longer a matter of choice and where the prospect of a continuing mutually profitable trade relationship discourages war -- is compelling. The ideational mindset of "prosper-with-thy-neighbour" cannot be said to have been embedded in the continental core yet, but it is at least now a policy option. Thailand is the most advanced economy in the continental core, and is the most well-networked with the rest of ASEAN and beyond. Skilfully managed, these advantages possessed by Thailand may help it to act as the economic prime mover in the continental core. However, its self-image as the natural economic leader of this sub-complex has yet to be endorsed by the other states.

Three other observations on security concerns in the post-Cold War continental core may be noted. First, the rising neighbouring power China is in closer proximity in this sub-complex than in the maritime core and therefore is a major factor in the five countries' security calculus. Secondly, Vietnam also provides another key to the future security dynamic of the continental core. As its economy improves, it may rearm. In particular, modern-day Vietnam had always sought countervailing external security links vis-a-vis China. Thirdly, observers agree that Myanmar has become a key strategic player in the sub-complex but disagree about whether it is able to avoid
over-reliance on China for its security needs, especially if Western sympathy for the military regime's political foes and ethnic separatists escalate.

6.20 Conclusion

The security complex framework, as deployed in this chapter, identifies the more complicated security dynamics that exist, or have arisen, within the expanded ASEAN membership. These sub-regional patterns of amity and enmity affect security relations, as do the distributions of power and institutional arrangements identified in Chapter 5. The balance of power approach focuses on the responses of Southeast Asian and other affected states to the still fluid distribution of power among the major powers in the Asia-Pacific, and reiterated the logic of self-help. The major institutional concern is whether ASEAN cohesion -- deemed necessary for the grouping to remain an influential player -- can weather the strains of expanded membership and engagement in the emergent Asia-Pacific multilateralism. However, they provide an incomplete picture of the expanded ASEAN’s future direction.

Disaggregation of the post-Cold War Southeast Asian security complex identifies a maritime core sub-complex that continues to consolidate on the patterns of amity and cooperative norms progressively fostered since the end of Confrontation. Moreover, there is a convergence of interests among the maritime core states on security cooperation, including with a key external power, the United States. Mutually constitutive and converging interests, especially economic ones, have led to the integration of the Philippines into this sub-complex. But economic nationalism also tested political relations, and the mid-1997 currency crisis and its aftermath clearly reinforced the maritime core’s economic and security interdependence. However, the maritime core cannot be said to be a security community yet, and the problems of leadership succession and economic nationalism may yet create future instability within this core sub-complex.
The end of the Cold War opened up remarkable opportunities in the other key sub-complex, the expanded continental core which now included Myanmar. The push factor came from the imperative imposed on Myanmar and the three former Indochinese countries to implement market reforms to cope with the post-Cold War globalized economy. The pull factor came from the recognition that the potential wealth of the sub-region remained to be peacefully and cooperatively tapped. This economics-driven milieu has compelled the continental core countries to reassess their assumptions about security. The result is mixed: convergence of interests has fostered cooperative norms such as those driving Thai-Myanmarese joint ventures; geopolitical concerns have however intensified, and China’s “next-door” presence as an external penetrating power weighs heavily on the five states’ security and economic calculus. In this context of intertwined destinies, a Cambodia that reverts to chaos may set back the sub-region's economic progress and undermine the cooperative “prosper-with-thy-neighbour” norms being shaped.

ENDNOTES

1Hadi Soesastro argues that ASEAN's poor performance in intra-mural economic cooperation was the result of a lack of common focus. He suggests that ASEAN's first major post-Cold War economic initiative, the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA, launched on 1 January 1994) should aim at projecting ASEAN's attractiveness as an investment location to global players. See his "ASEAN Economic Cooperation: The Long Journey to AFTA," Indonesian Quarterly, 23 (1), 1st Quarter 1995, pp. 25-37.

2This assumption was succinctly summed up by Lee Kuan Yew: "Rich neighbours will become better neighbours and good customers". Straits Times, 8 February 1990.


5Ibid.


7An early Track Two initiative was the setting up of the ASEAN-Vietnam Study Group comprising experts (including officials in their personal capacities) which between 1992 and


10*Straits Times*, 13 and 15 March 1993.

11*Straits Times*, 1 July 1996.


13*Straits Times*, 3 October 1995.


16*Straits Times*, 30 April 1999.


20*Straits Times*, 15 and 18 July 1997.

21*Straits Times*, 2 June 1996.

22*Reuter News Service*, 14 November 1995. In the report, a Vietnamese diplomat named two of the groups as Chinh Phu Vietnam Tu Do (Free Vietnam Government) and Chinh Phu Vietnam Phuc Quoc (Government for Vietnamese Restoration) and said Hanoi had told top U.S. and Cambodian officials of its concern.


24See *Beyond UNTAC: ASEAN's Role in Cambodia*, ASEAN-ISIS Memorandum No. 4, October 1993; and the more recent *Cambodia in ASEAN: Partnership for Peace and National Reconciliation*, Report of the IKD Study Mission to Cambodia, May 1997. This latter report was compiled by a group of ASEAN academics who visited Cambodia in May 1997 under the auspices of the Malaysian think-tank, the Institute for Policy Research (Institut Kajian Dasar-IKD).


27 SLORC was renamed the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) in November 1997, but analysts did not foresee any change in policy as a result. For the purpose of this study, SLORC will still be used. *Sunday Times* (Singapore), 16 Nov 97; and *Straits Times*, 22 Nov 97.


32 Two of the oil companies are foreign majors: Unocal (US) and Total (France). The third is PTT Exploration and Production of Thailand, a private subsidiary of Thailand's Petroleum Authority. Mary P. Callahan, "Looking Beyond the Release of Aung San Suu Kyi," *Asian Survey*, XXXVI (2), February 1996, p. 161.


34 *Straits Times*, 2 March 1995.


37 This definition is adapted from Stuart Harris' observation of the dialogue process on issues of economic cooperation in the Asia-Pacific. See his *Policy Networks and Economic Cooperation: Policy Coordination in the Asia-Pacific Region*, Working Paper 1994/4, Department of International Relations, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies (Canberra: Australian National University, 1994), p. 1.


Mrs Chua Siew San, the ministry's deputy secretary for policy. Quoted in *ibid*.


While Bruneian leaders invariably avoid publicly stating their external security concerns, Singapore leaders often make it a point to do so. In this respect, analogies are often drawn; for example, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 was cited to show the dangers of unpreparedness by a small state. More recently, the 1995-96 Taiwan Straits crisis was used to remind Singaporeans that while hoping for the best, they must also prepare for the worst. See, for example, highlights of Singapore Defence Minister Tony Tan's speech to the Singapore Armed Forces' military institute (SAFTI-MI) in June 1996. *Sunday Times* (Singapore), 2 June 1996.

Sree Kumar and Sharon Siddique, *op. cit.*, p. 53.


*Straits Times*, 18 January 1995.


*Straits Times*, 12 September 1996.


*Straits Times*, 8 June 1996.
58 EAGA is sometimes also referred to as EAGA-BIMP, to indicate the four participating ASEAN countries. See the three chapters devoted to analyses of EAGA in Imran Lim, ed., *Growth Triangles in Southeast Asia* (Kuala Lumpur: ISIS Malaysia, 1996).


61 Malaysian authorities reported in 1993 that, on average, 2,000 Thai trawlers had been sighted annually fishing illegally in Malaysian waters since 1985. However, less than 10 percent of the incidents led to arrests. *FBIS/East Asia*, 7 July 1993, p. 35.


63 *Straits Times*, 11 February 1995.

64 *Straits Times*, 18 January 1995.


68 *ibid.*


70 *Straits Times*, 25 July 1995.

71 For a similar view, see John Funston, "Thai Foreign Policy: Seeking Influence," *Southeast Asian Affairs 1998* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1998), p. 294. Funston also comments on the exploitative behaviour of Thai companies. *ibid*.


75 Quester, "The United States and Asia After the Cold War," *op. cit.*, p. 42.
7.1 Introduction

This study hopes to make a modest contribution towards the analysis of Southeast Asian regional security since 1945. Its purpose is to evaluate two contending approaches useful towards such analysis, as well as an analytical device which identifies local security dynamics. The conceptual framework centres on the idea of security interdependence. In accordance with the stated purpose, the study examined the evolving regional security dynamics and the consequent actions and behaviour of the various regional states (the ASEAN-10) and involved external powers. In this task, it took into account material factors like power and interests as well as ideational factors like norms, values and identities.

The two scholarly approaches were chosen for their insights into how states interact and seek to promote their material interests; accordingly, the study examined in detail their strengths and weaknesses. The balance of power approach, derived from realist/neorealist theories, set the tone with its compelling argument that, in an anarchic world order, states remain wary of each other and cooperate only because they have to. The institutional approach, derived from neoliberal theories, provided its equally compelling counterpoint argument that cooperation requires rules, and in creating institutions to facilitate these rules, states find that they could cooperate iteratively. Together, these two approaches provide insights into the tensions between conflict and cooperation under anarchy, whether at the systemic or subsystemic (regional) level. Nevertheless, as summarized below, there are inherent limitations in both approaches in their logical constructions of regional security, especially since the end of the Cold War.
A third idea specifically focussed on regional security analysis was therefore introduced: the security complex, an analytical device which identifies the often complicated local dynamics and networking relations in regional systems (and subsystems) and provides explanatory accounts in situations where the weaknesses of the balance of power and institutional approaches are clear. Although the security complex is not an approach as such, for the purpose of this study, the collective expression “the three approaches” has been taken to mean the two approaches deployed, as well as the third idea, the security complex. The security complex, apart from its own merits, can be seen as a corrective to the other two. Taken together, all three approaches help to make our understanding of regional security more complete.

7.2 Balancing, institution-building and the security complex corrective

The debate between balance of power theorists and institutionalists has already been discussed in Chapter 1, and the sections below will summarize the observations arising from the deployment of these two approaches in this study. The purpose of this section is to review the particular contribution of the security complex in its corrective role vis-à-vis the weaknesses of the other two approaches in regional security analysis.

First, to what extent do the states in a region like Southeast Asia conform to the underlying assumption that they have the attributes (both at a point in time and over time) to either balance each other or to create the rules as usually understood in the institutional literature. The idea of a balance of power implies that certain material conditions exist to create a powerful dynamic that shapes state behaviour. Thus, under Cold War bipolar conditions, a region like Europe basically conformed to balance of power expectations. Two blocs emerged, with at least the US-led bloc imbued with a common perception of the Soviet threat. This threat perception was palpable because the belief was that war could engulf the entire region. Even in Northeast Asia during the Cold War, although an unambiguous bipolar condition did not obtain for long, the threat of war engulfing the entire region (comprising only a
few states) continued to induce balancing behaviour. But Southeast Asia during the Cold War never conformed to a single dynamic. The mix of large and small post-1945 states which emerged, developed complicated external and internal security concerns that prevented the superpowers from creating blocs aligned to them. No common threat perception prevailed and while local conflicts erupted, the general threat of war was not palpable. In this light, SEATO was doomed to fail.

The balance of power approach, as such, is unable to explain this phenomenon. However, the security complex offers an ex post facto account. The effects of great power rivalry are not dismissed at the regional level. However, in identifying the various regional security complexes through the distribution of power and amity/enmity patterns, the security complex device also evaluates the interaction of the regional and sub-regional dynamics with the systemic ones. It thus identifies the Cold War European security complex as having been “overlain” by the superpower dynamic; as a consequence, regional dynamics were largely suppressed (and, it may be argued, transformed over time). The effect of superpower rivalry on Cold War Southeast Asia was less intense, although a security complex emerged there that was divided along communist and non-communist lines. Meanwhile, historical rivalries coalesced with contemporary insecurities to shape the extant regional and sub-regional dynamics. Under those conditions, overt balancing behaviour was not uniformly observed (although, as observed by this study, subtler balancing behaviour took place in the institutional context).

As for the institutional approach, it challenges the realist/neorealist view that cooperation under anarchy is always driven by selfish interests. Thus, in its view, whilst the Soviet threat was salient, cooperation among the Western allies in Cold War Europe led to rules and norms which made cooperative behaviour iterative. Similarly, in Cold War non-communist Southeast Asia, the absence of an overriding threat did not prevent the emergence of rules and norms (among the ruling elites) that accommodated various intergovernmental interests -- only that these rules emerged after a period of learning. Nevertheless, although the literature review in Chapter 1 noted that the process of intergovernmentalism need not lead to supranationalism,
the institutional approach’s assumptions of building on common interests and the benefits of formal rule-creation emphasize progression towards some degree of integration. As such, the ASEAN intergovernmental approach to regionalism has not been adequately investigated, although the attributes of the ASEAN Way of non-interference, consultation and consensus, and conflict-avoidance rather than conflict-resolution, were identified. However, looking through the lenses of the security complex, it is possible to discern the intramural dynamics that led to the grouping’s chequered record of cooperation and apparently modest achievements (by the institutionalists’ standards). In particular, differing intramural Cold War strategic perceptions of China and Vietnam were often difficult to gloss over. Moreover, the security complex, by identifying security concerns along the lines of regional security interdependence, takes into account the subtle balancing that occurred within ASEAN. Put differently, having identified the security dynamics within a complex, the balance of power can be deployed more insightfully.

Secondly, the state-centric balance of power and institutional approaches are not overly concerned with regional states’ domestic politics or internal security issues. On the other hand, the security complex’s attention to local patterns of amity/enmity, which result from historical and social factors, permits concern with the spillover effects of domestic and internal security issues to be properly examined. For example, disaggregation of the core security complexes into sub-complexes facilitates and focuses the inclusion of the impact of domestic politics on relations among sets of security-interdependent states.

Just as the balance of power approach can be deployed in a more nuanced manner within the security complex, the institutional approach's view that states cooperate largely on the basis of identified common material interests (including the fear of the future consequences of not cooperating) can be nuanced or qualified both by the identification of amity/enmity patterns within a complex and by the constructivist argument that change in these patterns is possible through social practice. Thus, norms and identities can be intersubjectively constituted to encourage cooperative behaviour, even in the absence of material incentives to do so. It may be difficult in
this ongoing transition period to assess if the collective identity of an expanded ASEAN will turn out to be as highly resilient as that of ASEAN during the Cold War, but the security complex seems to be a suitable research platform for such an enterprise.

The contribution, to the security complex idea, of constructivism, with its emphasis on identity-building and identity-transformation, suggests that it may be necessary to re-examine the framework for analysing Southeast Asia conflict and cooperation so that both material conditions and ideational perceptions, values, norms and identities are given proper weigh in understanding both the ideals and behaviour of regional states with respect to such fundamental concepts as security, sovereignty, alignments, and war and diplomacy as instruments of state policy.

Using the three approaches, above, the sections that follow will review the development of the region: (1) from the end of the Second World War in 1945 to Vietnam’s reunification in 1975; (2) from 1975 to 1991, when the Americans began their post-Cold War military withdrawal from the Philippines; and (3) since 1991, a period of still ongoing transition in world politics and regional order.

7.3 The balance of power approach, 1945-75

To recall the arguments made in Chapter 1, this approach is underpinned by realist/neorealist assumptions about the material world. These assumptions are that: states, regardless of size, are selfish units in the anarchic international system, that they either seek to maximize their power or security, and that “great powers do as they will, small powers do as they must”. Implied in these assumptions is a less explicit one: that hegemony is instinctively unwelcome but states will act in their own interests. Therefore, states will either resist any hegemonic attempt or bandwagon with the rising power. Balancing behaviour does not preclude war: states may attempt war-prevention policies or form war-fighting coalitions to maintain this anti-hegemonic structure. But balancing behaviour is often not an automatic reaction,
that is, it may fail to occur when it is most needed. Other critics argue the opposite, that balancing behaviour is dangerous when it constrains a rising power seeking a “place at the table”. Finally, institutions and local dynamics, while not dismissed, seldom matter.

One further assumption is that states, including small states concerned with survival amongst larger states, have enough autonomy to act in their self-interest. To the extent that external powers have all but completely colonized a region of previously autonomous states, the only balancing that can result, in such a situation, is that among the external powers over the region, and any regional entity that has not been colonized. In the context of postwar Southeast Asia, a regional system of states only gradually re-emerged. No regional system of states could be said to have existed in Southeast Asia when the Second World War ended in Asia in August 1945. In this state-centric perspective, Thailand was the only sovereign “unit”, and therefore the only one capable of pursuing “national interest”, as defined within the category. But the Japanese interregnum ensured that the returning colonial powers were less than enthusiastically welcomed. The forces of change in Southeast Asia were building in momentum: the process of state-creation had begun, whether carried out violently or through mutual consent between the colonial power and the dominant local elites, and whether these elites’ legitimacy came to be contested. As new states emerged, a very immature regional system began to take shape. The introduction of the Cold War into Asia, and Southeast Asia, saw an increasing American (great power) military presence in the region, as well as the advent of a proxy war in combination with a local war in Indochina. The Sino-Soviet split complicated the big power rivalry. But even if the interests of the big powers took precedence, power had its limits, and the US “lost” the war over Indochina. Victory for the Soviet-backed North Vietnamese was consummated when South Vietnam “fell” in April 1975.

The balance of power approach thus provides a highly focussed perspective on world politics. It is useful as a reminder that the very idea of Southeast Asia was an imposed (wartime) external power construct, and that the region’s Cold War strategic value lay in it being an object of external power contests. Regional
institutions and local dynamics (except for the powerful nationalism in North Vietnam and Indonesia) were weak and underdeveloped when the Cold War in Southeast Asia began. Admittedly, for Hanoi, the first two Indochinese wars were wars of national liberation. But all three Indochinese wars were also proxy wars, and external powers were instrumental in their outcomes. ASEAN emerged as an institution with the modest objective of sub-regional reconciliation among the maritime Southeast Asian states. Although the grouping included Thailand as a member, in this period it was unable to function as a diplomatic community in support of Thailand. Understandably, Bangkok behaved in the manner balance of power advocates expected, that is, it relied on the United States for its security needs. Even in maritime Southeast Asia, it was the British and Commonwealth forces’ countervailing power that constrained Indonesia’s hegemonic ambitions during the Sukarno period.

The main strength of the balance of power approach is its reminder that the use or threat of military force is still operative among states. But paradoxically, this strength is also its weakness: its logical construction of the imperative of states’ constant preoccupation with balancing to prevent or preempt a preponderance of power is not always borne out by the evidence. The balance of power approach is thus not the vehicle to explore the beginnings of Southeast Asian regionalism. Its assumption that states seek either power or military security (against external threats or to fulfil hegemonic ambitions) “oversells” the like-minded independent actions of regional states, whether large or small, and “undersells” their interdependence and self-identities. The balance of power approach fails to take into account the more nuanced security needs and longer-term threat perceptions of some regional states, as well as political leadership and domestic politics.

Furthermore, as depicted above, although there was indeed “self-help” balancing behaviour and actions during the Cold War, no central balance of power existed in the Asia-Pacific. If such a balance had existed, it might have drawn Southeast Asia into a wider arena. Instead, the wars in Indochina quickly developed a dynamic
separate from that in Northeast Asia, although US-Soviet rivalry was a major factor in both situations.

7.4 The Institutional approach, 1945-75

The period 1945 to 1975 saw both the emergence and failure of Southeast Asian initiatives to promote regionalism, with only ASEAN having survived. Generally, the institutional approach has been able to identify the material conditions for this situation. One critical condition was the lack of peaceful relations among the new states which emerged after 1945, which made it difficult for such states to cooperate and to forge common interests. This was the case with mainland Southeast Asia in the period up to 1975. Secondly, apart from North Vietnam, the other Indochinese entities were weak states, lacking both legitimacy and control over their territory. Strong political leadership could also be said to be a necessary condition, but this could prove divisive if such leaders held differing or even unrealistic visions of regional order. In this light, the abortive Maphilindo was ill-conceived, as its institutional purpose was racially-inspired. The inclusion of key regional states was also critical, but this too was not a sufficient condition. The short-lived Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) was limited in membership to only three pro-Western countries; including Indonesia under Sukarno in ASA would have led to its earlier demise. While an important reason for ASEAN’s endurance was the role of Indonesia as a founder member, the fact that Suharto was keen to promote regionalism attests to the salience of the leadership factor.

Between 1945 and 1975, then, institutions in the form of formal organizations did emerge, ostensibly to promote rules and norms of cooperation, facilitate information-sharing and reduce transaction costs. As part of this process, institutions constitute interests, constrain behaviour and shape expectations. Of course, balance of power advocates do not deny that states in their self-interest create institutions. As noted in Chapter 1, Mearsheimer insists that “[the] most powerful states in the system create and shape institutions so that they can maintain their share of world power, if not
increase it. In this view, institutions are essentially arenas for acting out power relationships”. Following this argument, the creation of the US-led Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) could be explained as a failed attempt to serve American purposes.

The emergence of ASEAN as a regional organization can indeed be explained from the institutional perspective as a cooperative effort to promote common interests. But this explanation is incomplete since ASEAN deliberately made no attempt to endorse a future vision of supranationalism. ASEAN eschewed supranationalism because, in its case, regionalism was meant to reinforce sovereignty, non-interference, bilateralism and all the other attributes that became known as the ASEAN Way. On close examination, these attributes reflected mutual insecurities among sets of states in a security complex, that is, linked by security interdependence. Also, while Mearsheimer’s assertion, above, that institutions exist as arenas for acting out power relationships does not apply to ASEAN as such, the intramural dynamics suggest the development of discreet rules of the game that take into account members’ security concerns, including towards each other. One example would be the intramural understanding that Indonesia’s membership in the grouping served to constrain Indonesia’s regional ambitions. To avert misunderstandings, ASEAN members restricted their military exercises with each other to the bilateral context. Also, although no overt military alliance organization was created by the ASEAN states, bilateral security links with external powers were accepted intramurally.

In the case of the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA), its inception in 1971 could be regarded as a subtle form of balancing by Malaysia and Singapore against Indonesia. As a consultative set of arrangements involving external powers (Britain, Australia and New Zealand), it indirectly deterred any revival of hegemonic ambitions by Indonesia. But, to be sure, within the institutional structure, there was the reminder to Singapore and Malaysia that their joint defence was in their interest.

Thus, while the institutional approach offers useful insights into Southeast Asian regionalism between 1945 and 1975, there is a need to consider the more
complicated security concerns at the regional and sub-regional levels. In this respect, the intramural dynamics within ASEAN affected the grouping’s development in such a manner that the institutional approach could not satisfactorily explain its members’ preferences and actions, as summarized in this section.

7.5 The Southeast Asian security complex, 1945-75

The security complex is a useful analytical device for regional security analysis: its focus is on the regional/local level of analysis; and it combines state-centric distribution of power concerns with the identification of historically and socially derived local patterns of amity and enmity to “map out” clusters of security-interdependent regional states. These clusters are referred to as “security complexes”. As a further refinement, a security complex of several states may be usefully “disaggregated” into sub-complexes, to identify sub-regional security links that the aggregate complex does not closely address. States may be located in overlapping sub-complexes. For example, Malaysia is located within both a “bridge” sub-complex (together with Thailand) and a “maritime core” sub-complex (together with Indonesia, Brunei and Singapore).

In terms of regional security analysis, the security complex can be deployed as a useful corrective to the state-actor bias of the other two approaches, whose logical constructions often obscure the complicated relations of amity and enmity attributable not just to the local actors and external powers, but which resulted also from historical and social factors. As pointed out in the sections above, balance of power behaviour is most evident only under such conditions as a developed system of states, clear and openly identified threats, the reliability of putative allies, and a preference for the military option in dealing with the problem of the security dilemma. As for the institutional approach, while ASEAN members subscribed to its logic of creating rules and norms on the basis of common interests, they were not prepared to endorse its inclination towards highly formalized and integrated structures which required the surrender of some measure of sovereignty. In other
words, ASEAN members defined those interests in terms of limited regionalism which, in turn, reflected the extant patterns of amity/enmity.

With regards to the Southeast Asia security complex between 1945 and 1975, this was a period of state-formation, but patterns of local amity and enmity were more complicated, cutting across territorial boundaries and shaped largely by historical and social factors. These more complicated relations among the new regional states and involved external powers impacted upon the balance of power and institutional situations which arose as state-formation proceeded in postwar Southeast Asia. It is in this sense that the security complex idea -- by highlighting these regional and local patterns of amity and enmity -- serves as a corrective to the problems faced by the two approaches, above.

Thus, the relations of amity which postwar Burma and Indonesia under Sukarno developed towards communist China influenced their behaviour, and disposed them to be at least wary of the Western Cold War presence in Asia. A less obvious example would be Brunei in this period: the balance of power approach will tend to pay little attention to it. Brunei was strictly not a “unit”, or state actor, since it was a British protectorate. Similarly, the institutional approach is concerned with how states seek to cooperate with each other. But, by deploying the security complex idea, an event in Brunei such as the Azahari rebellion of 1962 would have been more clearly linked to other developments such as Indonesia’s hegemonic ambitions at the time and Malaysia’s intentions towards the oil-rich entity. The rebellion was quelled by British troops, but some rebel leaders sought refuge in Indonesia and Malaysia. The suspicions engendered within the Brunei ruling elite towards Indonesia and Malaysia remained for a long time, and affected its attitude towards whether to join Malaysia in 1963. Thus, the security complex's depiction of post-independence Brunei particularly includes the historical and cultural make-up of its amity/enmity outlook towards its much larger neighbouring states.

The examples above are illustrative of the painful postwar state-creation process in Southeast Asia which engendered affinities, suspicions and divergent threat
perceptions among regional states. Certainly, the small states which emerged faced survival concerns almost immediately, while porous borders posed threats to territorial integrity. Political and even armed contests among communist, communalist, nationalist, irredentist and other groups -- and their spillover into neighbouring states -- further stymied state-building efforts, let alone efforts to create a sense of regional community. This did not mean that Southeast Asian regionalism was doomed, but the obstacles to it came to be understood by the ruling elites and led the founding leaders of ASEAN to strive for only a limited form of regionalism.

Finally, patterns of amity and enmity can be transformed, if slowly and often through a difficult process of identity-building. As explained in Chapter 1, the security complex provides a framework for such ideational factors to be examined through the deployment of the constructivist approach.

Thus, the identification of an emergent Southeast Asian security complex and a number of sub-complexes during the 1945-75 period on the basis of both power relations and amity-enmity lines distinguished the Cold War security dynamic from the regional and sub-regional ones. The Cold War dynamic undoubtedly created durable patterns of enmity between the communist and non-communist countries of Southeast Asia. Moreover, among the non-communist states, patterns of amity were gradually strengthened after ASEAN was formed in 1967. This “divided Southeast Asia” went through various phases during the Cold War. At this stage, that is, until 1975, the socially constructed identities of ASEAN as “Western-backed” and the Indochinese states as “Soviet and Chinese-backed” prevented any shift in the regional amity-enmity patterns.

7.6 The balance of power approach, 1975-91

Important systemic changes occurred during this period, and the (by now) more mature Southeast Asian regional system, closely linked to the global system, was consequently affected. Balance of power considerations were highly salient: the
withdrawal of American forces from mainland Southeast Asia and the victory of communist forces there raised the possibility of Soviet-backed Vietnamese domination over Indochina. This was linked to aggressive Soviet policies elsewhere including the overall US-Soviet rivalry and other regional contests. In Southeast Asia, the resurgent Sino-Soviet rivalry replaced the earlier US-Soviet rivalry. Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia triggered a de facto alliance between China and Thailand, and prompted even closer Vietnamese-Soviet collaboration. The Soviet prize was its use of Cam Ranh Bay and Danang. This balance of power account seemed verified when the stalemated “Cambodian problem” was eventually resolved after the major powers began the process of disentangling the global balance from the regional balance. ASEAN, in this view, did not greatly matter in the Cambodian end-game.

For realists and neorealists, the period 1975-91 in Southeast Asia’s history seemed to be a confirmation of the balance of power’s continuing explanatory power. In this view, regional events were dominated by big power politics. By the late 1980s, it was argued, both the Soviet Union and Vietnam had over-stretched themselves materially, and by 1991 the Americans could dispense with their century-old policy of forward-basing in Southeast Asia.

7.7 The institutional approach, 1975-91

If self-help was evident in this period, as depicted above, was there evidence of it being mitigated? Institutions can fulfil this role, and one would expect this to be the case at least among the ASEAN countries, where a security regime had emerged, and cooperation could be made iterative. The institutional approach continues to offer a complementary perspective on events in Southeast Asia in this period. However, as seen from the institutional perspective, now that regionalism was no longer in its initial phase, consolidation and/or further institution-building would have to be more evident. The result is in fact ambiguous.
On one hand, ASEAN stayed cohesive despite the eruption of several intramural crises; and it emerged as a diplomatic community, proving it could constitute interests on behalf of its “frontline” member, Thailand. The institutional success of ASEAN in this period cannot be overemphasized. Generally, ASEAN’s goals on the Cambodian issue were limited to diplomatic initiatives, that is, they conformed to the grouping’s model of limited regionalism. On the other hand, the requirement of ASEAN members keeping in line with Thailand’s foreign policy constrained the preferences of Indonesia and Malaysia, which were wary of forging an anti-Vietnamese coalition with China. These two ASEAN members’ 1980 “Kuantan initiative” was an example of their venting their frustration. In institutional terms, too, Thailand’s “turnaround” in 1988 on ASEAN’s Indochina policy was a blow to the grouping's solidarity. And, as realists would argue, institutions mattered only at the margin in the Cambodian end-game, when the major powers decided among themselves that it was in their interests to disengage from the regional conflict.

7.8 The Southeast Asian security complex, 1975-91

In this period, the exercise of examining in detail the disaggregated security complex yielded insights into a more complicated Southeast Asia than either the balance of power or institutional approach could have done. This disaggregation is useful in identifying the variations in intensity of patterns of Southeast Asian conflict and cooperation across different issue areas during the Cold War. Just as the wars in Indochina developed a separate dynamic from the rivalry in Northeast Asia, separate dynamics existed in continental and maritime Southeast Asia.

For example, Thailand’s historic rivalry with Vietnam consistently informed its behaviour which was focussed primarily in the continental core sub-complex. Thailand's identity as a key player in the continental core made it highly interdependent with Vietnam, its historic enemy. It was also acutely sensitive to any change in its security environment. As its unilateral actions in 1979 (de facto alliance
with China) and 1988 (turnaround on Indochina) showed, Bangkok was prepared to risk ASEAN unity in pursuit of its interests.

Indonesia and Malaysia's location in the maritime core informed their perception that China was a longer-term threat and that Vietnam could fulfil the role of a buffer against the former. Singapore, however, because of its own historical experiences and its deeply-held conviction that hegemonic ambitions in the overall Southeast Asian security complex had to be countered, canvassed for a continued American military presence in the region, even if this presence was now offshore.

7.9 The balance of power approach since 1991

From the balance of power perspective, the post-Cold War Asia-Pacific is evolving into a multipolar arena. Southeast Asia -- no longer insulated -- will become increasingly interdependent, in this multipolar situation, with the rest of the Asia-Pacific (in the security and economic spheres). However, while in the earlier bipolar period, the approach has been able to satisfactorily account for the interests and behaviour of the major powers, and identified the linkage between the global rivalry and inter-state regional conflicts, the current situation of uncertainty is less clearly explained.

Certainly, the utility of force has not been disproved. Realists even argue that the multilateral security dialogue institutions that have emerged are at best supplementary to countervailing power. But the rise of China as a future Asia-Pacific military and economic power has not led to any overt pattern of balancing behaviour by the US or the other major regional powers. One complication clearly is the high degree of economic interdependence that now exists. There is also the question, in the case of Southeast Asia, of whether the Cold War period was an aberration in terms of great power-regional states' interactions. It was unusual for a great power, as the US did during the Vietnam War, to directly commit itself to the defence of countries in a region in which vital interests were not at stake. The US security umbrella transformed the security dynamic and political economy of Southeast Asia.
Balance of power thinking may have exaggerated the notion of power vacuums. In fact, the US military presence, even after the American withdrawal from the Philippines in 1991-92, remains visible (and welcomed by regional states) following implementation of the "places, not bases" policy. Also, the balance of power approach identifies states’ behaviour in terms of alliances and coalition-building. But the preference of Southeast Asian states since the end of the Cold War has been to build up a network of informal bilateral arrangements with the US and middle powers like Australia. This is sensible because no other external power is in a position to be a rival power to the US. Although China is a rising power, it is in no position to exert a military presence throughout Southeast Asia for some time. Japan is already an economic power but it too is as yet unable to exert a military presence in the region. India, the third Asian power with a past influence on Southeast Asia, will remain preoccupied with South Asian security issues. The US-centred "places, not bases" network is likelier to be expanded than curtailed.

In sum, during this transition to a more multipolar Asia-Pacific, of which Southeast Asia is now clearly linked to the other constituent parts, balancing behaviour has not been strongly manifested, some 10 years after the Cold War’s end. Both intra-regional and extra-regional relations have changed such that they have affected the operation of the balance of power. Clearly, the continued military and economic interests of the US in the Asia-Pacific will be a major factor in averting resort to such behaviour. But this is not to say that it will not occur. A return to overt balance of power behaviour could result from:

(1) great power rivalry or conflict breaking out in Northeast Asia (Taiwan or Korean peninsula) and spilling over into Southeast Asia (interdiction of sea lanes);
(2) the regional arms buildup developing into an arms race; and
(3) economic interdependence, instead of creating positive payoffs (mutually beneficial outcomes) creates negative payoffs (zero-sum outcomes).
As noted in Chapter 1, neoliberals argue that the creation of institutions facilitate cooperation, that is, when states can jointly benefit from cooperation, they create institutions, the "persistent and connected sets of rules (formal and informal) that prescribe behavioural roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations". With the end of the Cold War, ASEAN has expanded. Moreover, the Asia-Pacific has seen a resurgence of formal institution-creation in both the security and economic arenas. Some prominent examples include the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) for the former; and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum for the latter. ASEAN members have been active in promoting these institutions.

Obviously, a region still in conflict, especially one where civil war, interstate war, and proxy war coalesce, will have weak institutions and difficulty creating new institutions. The evidence from postwar Southeast Asia confirms this observation of the institutional approach. Newly independent regional states had little in common and therefore had great difficulty cooperating on security issues on the basis of a common regional order. The much troubled process of state-creation in postwar Southeast Asia was thus not conducive to institution-creation. Since 1967, however, ASEAN has emerged as a durable example of limited regionalism centred on intergovernmentalism. With this caveat in mind, regional developments have provided the indicators of the institutional approach's strengths and weaknesses.

In the context of ASEAN-6, the strength of the institutional approach was its ability to explain both the grouping's consolidation of intramural accommodation and its cohesion when faced with external challenges during the Cold War. In other words, the approach examines the conditions which fostered ASEAN members' cooperative behaviour and identifies the commitment to common organizational interests.

But, with the end of the Cold War, as seen from the institutional perspective, an ASEAN-10 would be increasingly beset with problems of cohesion if, first of all,
divergent political interests result. Myanmar, for example, is still a pariah in Western eyes, and ASEAN members may once again find themselves subordinating their own foreign policies to maintain solidarity with Yangon. Secondly, a two-tiered ASEAN -- a rich tier comprising the original ASEAN-6 and a poor one comprising the former Indochinese states and Myanmar -- may yet emerge. If a two-tiered grouping were to emerge, it would invalidate the economic plank on which ASEAN embarked on expansion. An explanation about state behaviour based on institutional assumptions would lead to the conclusion that ASEAN should have put a temporary cap on membership after Vietnam's entry in July 1995. It would have suggested that a separate Southeast Asian construct (a so-called SEA-10)) would be preferable to help Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar (the so-called CLM countries) learn the rules of the game deemed to be necessary for the ASEAN process to work.

One other major institutional concern is the issue of maintaining economic cooperation as a "glue" to ensure ASEAN cohesion. Yet, maintaining the expanded ASEAN’s economic relevance in a globalizing world economy and in the face of competition from China and other emerging economies for trade and investments is proving a challenge. Responding to this challenge may require invigorating both ASEAN-wide cooperative frameworks like AFTA, and more flexible arrangements like the “growth triangle” idea. Institutional thinking will tend to favour the former, when the latter may actually be complementary to it (and will be discussed in the next section on post-Cold War security complexes).

AFTA, as noted in Chapter 5, is important as ASEAN's response to the new economic conditions, that is, as a vehicle to promote norms of regional economic cooperation to strengthen institutional cohesion. With the end of the Cold War, ready access to foreign markets and investment flows could no longer be taken for granted by ASEAN members. Western markets had become less accessible, amidst the danger of a breakdown in the liberal global economy and the rise of regional economic blocs. Moreover, the collapse of communism and the emergence of China's and India's economies had created other rival centres which attracted capital, investments and markets. At stake now was ASEAN members’ economic viability.
which provided the basis for their political stability. The new post-Cold War purpose of avoiding investment diversion outside ASEAN now carried a sense of urgency, and led to AFTA's creation. It was also a “training ground” for ASEAN members to integrate more fully into the global economy. But, as discussed in the next section, ASEAN-wide frameworks like AFTA may be inadequate to deal with the new economic conditions.

7.11 The Southeast Asian security complex since 1991

As argued in Chapter 6, the security complex remains useful in identifying regional dynamics which saw the interplay of two post-Cold War trends -- changing regional amity-enmity patterns; and emergent trans-border economic interdependence -- and which are not readily identified by the balance of power and institutional approaches. The security complex maps out the geographical arenas where these trends at the sub-system, that is, regional, level, are taking place. Briefly, on one hand, in areas where patterns of enmity are still intense, negative outcomes are produced. Such outcomes do not facilitate economic interdependence (with its emphasis on trans-border processes). Thai-Myanmar relations during the Cold War fit this description. On the other hand, where a convergence of interests has begun to develop, both security and economic interdependence becomes more evident and positive outcomes may occur, including the emergence of patterns of amity. It may be argued that Thai-Myanmar relations have begun to move in this direction.

With the end of the Cold War, balance of power thinking expects renewed great power rivalry yet this has not happened. Institutional thinking expects ASEAN-10 to face problems of cohesion unless its political and economic leverage can generate absolute gain payoffs for all members. Such an outcome is still uncertain. However, from the security complex perspective, the end of the Cold War has enabled the overall Southeast Asian security complex, which now includes Myanmar, to continue the earlier momentum of amity-building among former Cold War foes. Thus, the lifting of the Cold War great power rivalry has meant -- in Southeast Asia’s
case -- greater regional autonomy. Two countries, Thailand and Vietnam played the catalytic role in creating a “prosper-with-thy-neighbour” economic mindset.

With regards to security issues, by examining the different conditions between the two core sub-complexes, the security complex identifies both balancing behaviour within the institutional setting as well as close networking as factors in mitigating the security dilemma. The result is that security cooperation among the maritime core states has consolidated in the post-Cold War era. In contrast, the continental core is only now beginning to start on the learning curve of security networking and eventually cooperation.

7.12 Conclusion: Regional security analysis after the Cold War

The purpose of this study is to critically evaluate three approaches in the regional security analysis of Southeast Asia since 1945. From the observations of this study, there is still much merit in the balance of power approach. From its systemic “perch”, it tracked the consequences of the bipolar Cold War rivalry on Southeast Asia. But its logical construction led it to be concerned with alliances, coalitions and alignments, and to be dismissive of institutions as well as the more complicated security dynamics at the regional and sub-regional levels. Although it has not satisfactorily explained the relatively benign conditions after the Cold War, this does not mean that balancing behaviour among the major powers will not return. The Asia-Pacific, in particular, may yet be ripe for rivalry.

The institutional approach similarly emphasizes material explanatory factors (although, in its case, not exclusively so). It identifies the emergence of institutions when groups of countries find it in their mutual interest to cooperate through rules and norms. Institutions hardly matter in a regional conflict formation; they begin to emerge when a security regime emerges. ASEAN from 1967 till the end of the Cold War was usefully examined on this basis. But even during the Cold War, ASEAN’s cohesion was often tenuous. The institutional approach does not satisfactorily
explain why this was so. With the end of the Cold War, from the institutional perspective, ASEAN should have gone into a period of consolidation of its collective purpose and identity before embarking on expansion. Yet expansion was precisely what ASEAN did, contrary to institutionalists’ expectations.

The idea of the security complex cannot be said to merit its being described as a theory; it is not generative and therefore is not expected to offer predictions vis-a-vis the other two approaches. As deployed, its task is to provide a corrective to the over-emphasis (of the other two approaches) on the systemic dynamics. By identifying regional and local dynamics interacting with systemic dynamics via patterns of amity-enmity, it offers explanatory accounts of the behaviour of regional states in situations where the other two approaches fail to do satisfactorily. Moreover, it provides a framework for the deployment of constructivism, which identifies the ideational process whereby interdependent regional states respond to changes in both the power and amity-enmity attributes. Because patterns of amity and enmity are generated by the actors themselves through social practice, inter-subjective change is possible, and may be mutually constituted. Ideational factors are therefore relevant to the security complex perspective.

Security relations among Southeast Asian states and in their relations with external powers after the Cold War, are therefore better examined using the three approaches in a complementary manner. In this way, the influence of local amity/enmity patterns is seen to impact on balance of power and institutional situations. Moreover, the security complex identifies networking relationships among state actors in terms of amity patterns. Potentially balance-of-power outcomes are thus often mitigated by regional states' understandings of their security interdependence. The nature and intensity of such relations are captured in the ideas of the security complex and sub-complex. Similarly, ASEAN evolved from the regional states' understandings of their security interdependence, rather than an unmitigated subscription to the idea of progress in the direction of political and economic integration. Finally, the inclusion of ideational factors allows for the identification of the intersubjective process of transforming patterns of amity and enmity relations.
ENDNOTES

1 For example, Michael Leifer points to ASEAN’s unique institutional experience, which may not be an appropriate model for other regions. See his “The ASEAN Peace Process: A Category Mistake,” *The Pacific Review*, 12 (1), 1999, pp 25-38.


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