DELIBERATING ACROSS DIFFERENCE

BRINGING SOCIAL LEARNING INTO THE THEORY AND PRACTISE OF DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY IN THE CASE OF TURKEY

By

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DECLARATION

This thesis is the original work of the author, except where acknowledged in the text. It has never been submitted for degree or diploma in any university.

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ABSTRACT

This thesis will argue that one of the main challenges for deliberative democracy is the lack of attention paid to the different modes of deliberative practices. The theories of deliberative democracy often treat deliberation as a decision-making process. Yet, I would argue that this approach fails to appreciate the full benefits of deliberation because it ignores the fundamental role that the social learning phase of deliberation plays in reconciling differences. Hence I argue for a deliberative framework in which social learning and decision-making moments of deliberation are analytically differentiated so that the resources of social learning are freed from the pressures of decision-making procedures and are therefore no longer subordinated to the terms of decision-making.

This is particularly important for countries such as Turkey where divisions cut deep across society. A case study examines the discourses of the Turkish public sphere regarding Islam, democracy and secularism to identify the kinds of discourses present in relation to the topic in question. By analysing the types of discourses through Q methodology the study reveals points of convergence and divergence between discourses, hence provides significant insight into how deliberation oriented to social learning can play a substantive role in reconciling differences between sharply divided groups.
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INTRODUCTION

After more than a decade of intense debate, the normative idea of deliberative democracy has managed to establish itself as a viable basis for thinking about how to design democratic institutions. Yet, the debate continues and there is still ample room to be covered. It appears that the more diverse the social context, the more difficult it is to develop a sustainable framework for deliberative democracy. Some difficulties stem from the usual predicaments any democratic project faces, such as existing power relations and inequalities in various forms. On the other hand, some are generated by ambiguities in deliberative theory itself.

In order to develop the idea of deliberation as a practical program, the impact of the increasing diversity of modern societies needs further investigation. This is particularly true for those societies divided sharply by religious, ethic and cultural lines, which face unique challenges in establishing a democratic order. The question, from the point of divided societies, appears to be how to establish a properly functioning deliberative environment when those divisions represent a fundamental challenge for resolving differences in order to reach an agreement, or at the least a common understanding, over controversial issues. At the moment it seems that deliberative theory does not offer much more than arguing for a normative framework that is expected to be universally valid.
Deliberative theory presupposes that in order to guarantee proper rules of engagement during deliberation, basic individual rights, such as freedom of expression, are to be established as governing normative principles. This is so not only for the deliberative process itself but also for the society at large. In other words an established liberal culture is considered to be a prerequisite for the success of deliberative practice. Yet, this concept could be limiting in applying the deliberative idea to societies, which do not have a properly functioning democratic order. The limitation stems from the fact that if deliberation requires a well-established, mature liberal culture, then deliberative theory offers little to improve the conditions of those societies divided and trapped in a cycle of non-democratic rule. The question for deliberative theory then appears to be whether it can envisage a place for deliberation in those societies at all or not. If the answer to this question is yes, then the theory should revisit some of its main assumptions.

One of these assumptions is related to the insufficient level of attention paid to the internal differences of deliberative theories and the tension this insufficiency creates in the formulation of a deliberative framework, particularly for divided societies. The internal difference question can be associated with the different phases of deliberation as decision-making and social learning. A general trend among most deliberative theorists is to treat deliberation as a decision-making procedure. Yet, this tendency overlooks the fact that there is another important phase of deliberation, which is oriented to social learning and understanding rather than decision-making. Therefore the aim of this thesis is to point to the importance of recognising the social learning aspect of deliberation and to argue that for the development of democratic governance in divided societies this phase of deliberation is in fact as important as the phase of decision-making.

The first chapter of this thesis lays the theoretical foundation as to why deliberative theory has to defer to the social learning aspect of deliberation. The differences between social learning and decision-making stages of deliberation are established with an emphasis on how effectively to deal
with them in designing deliberative processes. In this respect, deliberative theory requires a revised framework in which an analytic distinction between social learning and decision-making aspects of deliberation is clearly established.

This section is followed by a comparison of the theories of Habermas and Rawls to show why a dialogical account of deliberation is essential to appreciate the concept of social learning within this context. A monological account of deliberation, as in Rawls, does not grasp the different dimensions of deliberation sufficiently because it neglects the fact that individual preferences could only be formed in relation to the preferences of others. Hence a monologic account of deliberation fails to conceive deliberation as an ongoing learning process.

In contrast to Rawls, Habermas' theory of communicative action provides important insights into the social learning aspect of deliberation. However, despite his emphasis on social learning Habermas does not sufficiently elaborate its role in deliberative practice. Instead he subordinates the social learning dimension of deliberation to an analysis of the formal role that decision-making procedures play in institutional settings. As will be examined, his strict rationality requirement in deliberative settings plays an important role in this shortcoming.

The first chapter also discusses other deliberative theorists, who despite their emphasis on the importance of alternative deliberative models still treat deliberation as part of decision-making processes. It is important that deliberation as social learning should be acknowledged in its own terms with its own claims in order to show how domination of decision-making terms in the theories of deliberative democracy constricts the social space in which a practical framework for deliberative action is applied. This section also expands on the hermeneutic character of deliberation through a brief analysis of Gadamer's framework.
The second chapter provides a background to the existing conditions of the Turkish political sphere where secular and Islamic ideas contest each other in relentless fashion. Turkey is one of those societies where ethical, religious and cultural divisions cut deep. This is not only because of its diverse social fabric, but also because it is one of the very rare examples in the Islamic world where Islam coexists with a secular system. Therefore, it is important that a background to the current conditions of Turkey is outlined. Here, particular attention is paid to the different stages of the development of Islamic discourse in Turkey in order to demonstrate that Islam has proven it has the capacity to adapt to the conditions of the day.

In Turkey, Islam sits at the background of the secular regime established by Mustafa Kemal in 1923, in which the paradigms of the Quran have no visible influence in the conduct of public affairs. Kemal’s dramatic steps towards secularisation transformed the circumstances in which religion and politics interacted in Turkey. Having lost its dominant position, for the first time, Islam had to play a defensive role against an unfriendly state. This required a different type of interaction between Islamic and Kemalist secular forces of the society, changing continuously according to the social and political circumstances of the time.

It is the dynamics of this interaction that makes Turkey a unique case study of the alternative ways in which deliberative processes can function. The divisions between secular and Islamic lines in Turkey have become increasingly antagonistic following the rise of the Islamic Welfare Party, known as the Refah Partisi (RP) in Turkey, into the ranks of government during the 90s. The tension between the army and the RP leadership resulted in the resignation of the RP from the government in 1998. Yet, instead of a decline, the Turkish political sphere witnessed a strong comeback of Islamic politics in the 2002 general elections due to the formation of a new party, Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (the AKP) founded by a group of elite RP members disenchanted by the orthodox Islamic politics of the RP. The AKP owes its election success to a paradigm shift in Islamic politics. This shift, apart from its fundamental role for democratic
development in Turkey, testifies to the importance of social learning in divided societies, such as Turkey. A healthy dialog oriented to social learning and mutual understanding between Islamic and secular forces of the Turkish public sphere could enhance the possibility that an adequate framework for reconciling differences can be established.

The third chapter provides a background for a Q study conducted in Turkey to analyse the discourses of the Turkish public sphere. Developed by William Stephenson from the 1930s onward, Q methodology is a useful tool to map out a typology of different perspectives pertinent to the area of research. Through this typology it becomes possible for the researcher to examine the relationship between different perspectives, thus to identify the points of convergence and/or divergence among them. This is in fact the main reason that Q methodology is chosen to analyse the varying relations between the perspectives of the Turkish public sphere. The chapter, hence, aims to emphasise the importance of Q methodology as a research tool through an introduction to its technique and method.

The fourth chapter presents how the Turkish Q study conducted in Turkey prior to the 2002 general elections was organised. The aim of the Q study was first to determine the kinds of discourses about democracy, Islam and secularism in the Turkish public sphere and then identify how they converged and/or diverged from each other. The critical moments of convergence and divergence, on how each discourse perceives and identifies a problem reveals important clues that can lead to the development of a new framework in which differences can be reconciled. This framework will then be used to map out the possible ways of developing an understanding between discourses.

In order to conduct the Q study in Turkey, firstly three discussion groups were formed. The first group consisted of only secular minded people. The second group was formed by only Islamic people. The third group was a mixed group attended by equal numbers of Islamic and secular people. Each group debated the relationship between Islam, democracy and
secularism. The statements to be used in the Q sorting sessions later on were drawn from these discussion groups.

The fifth chapter presents the interpretation of the findings of the Q study in Turkey. After factor analysis, the Q study indicated the existence of four main discourses present in the Turkish public sphere: Kemalist Discourse, Nationalist Discourse, Liberal Left Discourse and Islamic Discourse. The chapter analyses the findings about each discourse by thoroughly examining what each statement means for each discourse.

Before interpreting statements, a background section for each discourse in connection with the findings of the Q study will be provided. This will be a historical account aiming at tracing the roots and development of each discourse in the Turkish public sphere in order to display the complexity of the relationship between discourses. Hence, the link between past and present of each discourse will be explained in this section. Combining the historical origins of each discourse with their present position in relation to the topic at hand will provide important insights as to why social learning and understanding aspects of deliberation are crucial to relate each group to the common ground on which they belong. The discovery of potential moments of reconciliation is in fact closely tied to the development of a healthy dialog between opposing sides. The competitive disposition that decision-making procedures prompts between conflicting groups does not usually allow developing the kind of dialog that is necessary for establishing trust and/or empathy. Historical origins of each discourse will testify to the fact that there are indeed more commonalities between secular and Islamic discourses of Turkey than it is usually thought.

The Q study findings provide important clues why in a divided society, such as Turkey, deliberation oriented to social learning and understanding could play a vital role. The findings show that divisions between secular and Islamic discourses in Turkey are not necessarily insurmountable, against a common perception. Yet, achieving an understanding of commonalities between discourses requires an emphasis on the implementation of the
right deliberative framework; deliberation oriented to social learning and understanding. Hence, the analysis of the findings demonstrates why divisions of the Turkish public sphere can better be reconciled within the social learning phase of deliberation rather than decision-making oriented processes.

The sixth chapter will analyse each discourse from a different perspective. This time similarities and differences across discourses will be looked at in comparison to their attitudes towards some themes that commonly appeared in the statements such as dialog for mutual understanding, the scarf, Kemalism and secularism, the state and the army, the media, democracy and Islam. Through this topic-based analysis, the points of convergence and divergence across all discourses will be further clarified.

The seventh chapter will elaborate on the prospects of democratic development in Turkey on the basis of an important finding of the Q study. As will be revealed in the fourth chapter, the Q findings detect some similarities between liberal left and some Islamic groups. These two groups show signs of converging in their conceptualisation of a democratic order based on the protection of individual rights. The basis of this proximity between Islamic and liberal left groups is a paradigm shift that occurred first within the left and then among Islamic groups. During the post 1980 coup period some sections of the left, trying to recover from the relentless onslaught of the army, switched from their traditional class based politics to a new paradigm based on the acknowledgment of basic individual rights. A similar shift occurred in the late 1990s within the ranks of Islamic politics, ironically caused again by the army. In 1998, following an ultimatum by the army indicating that the political manifestation of Islam reached an intolerable level of threat to the secular system, some groups within the mainstream Islamic politics decided not to use Islam as the basis of their political discourse. Instead they redefined the vision of their politics on the basis of individual rights, as in the case of liberal left groups. The paradigm shift by both groups represented a vital turning point for the future of democratic polity in Turkey. The fact that two different sections of Turkish
society, traditionally hostile to one another, are now able to develop a similar view of democratic politics is of fundamental importance for the future forms of democracy in Turkey. The reflections of this move in the public sphere, in the form of broad alliances, are not commonplace yet. However, the genesis of an alliance between these groups is already at work. It is therefore the purpose of this chapter that this crucial development within the ranks of the left and Islamic politics is analysed. To this end, firstly an historical account on how the concept of individual rights is evolved both in Islamic and leftist ranks will be presented. The findings of this section then will be tested in the case of Women’s Platform for Peace (WPFP), an anti-war alliance formed with the participation of a very diverse political and cultural representation of groups, ranging from Muslim women and Kemalists to leftists and homosexuals. The case of the WPFP will provide a real life experience of how social learning aspect of deliberation can bring about a better understanding between conflicting perspectives by establishing trust and enhancing the overall acceptance of democratic principles.

Finally the eighth chapter will revisit some of the theoretical issues on social learning raised previously. The first section will evaluate social learning one more time in the light of Seyla Benhabib’s latest book *The Claims of Culture* (2002). The second section will revisit Islam and democracy relationship and discuss how a Habermasian framework can offer some remedy for reconciling the principles of a democratic polity with some Islamic concepts.
1. DELIBERATION AS SOCIAL LEARNING

1.1 Social learning vs. decision-making

Deliberation, in the theories of deliberative democracy, is often treated as part of a formal decision-making process. I would like to contest this approach by arguing that it fails to appreciate the full benefits of the deliberative process. It fails to see that deliberation also runs as an opinion formation process oriented to learning, which substantially differs from the decision-making process in terms of its structural and cognitive elements.

The scope of deliberation covers a vast area of human activity, yet its primary carrier, in an operational sense, is limited to the cognitive activities of individuals. Participants in deliberation apply different logics to the different stages of deliberation according to the aim and the orientation of their deliberative activity. In this sense, deliberative practice covers two main stages: social learning and decision-making.

Deliberation as social learning is oriented to participants developing an understanding of other claims reflecting various world-views. It is the first stage that individuals subject themselves to within a genuine deliberative environment. Once participants acknowledge that they are interacting with representatives of other traditions, the purpose of deliberation becomes one of appropriation and evaluation of other perspectives by mastering the skills of putting oneself into other’s shoes. In other words, the interpretation of differences becomes the focus of the deliberative practice. The social learning stage of deliberation is, therefore, a hermeneutic practice primarily oriented to understanding in the sense that reaching agreement does not assume a priority during deliberation.
The orientation towards learning and understanding indicates that social learning processes operate at a distinctively different dimension in terms of their logic as well as institutional design. During the social learning stage of deliberation, participants are oriented to a hermeneutic practice in order to reach an understanding of different positions. Gadamer (1975) defines this hermeneutic exercise as “the fusion of horizons”, in which the traditional and the new converge to form a new perspective on the issue at hand. In the fusion of horizons, nobody is fully detached from their subjective views, yet then arrive at a new juncture through learning without specifically striving for a rational agreement.

Deliberation oriented to social learning presumes no time and space constraints to make a final decision; hence it is an informal, open-ended process, which could last as long as participants want it to. Since it is oriented to broaden the scope of understanding it functions horizontally, in a Gadamerian sense, in that both the flow of information and the impact of deliberation make a horizontal move among participants.

The main difference between social learning and decision-making then is their orientation to understanding and agreement respectively. Yet, if participants do not converge on a solution, then what is the merit of discussion? Warnke answers this as “in the first place, we come to understand perspectives other than our own; in the second place, we often learn from them” (2001: 313, also see 314). Fearon (1998) also analyses deliberation as discussion and highlights several reasons why deliberation, even only for the sake of exchanging ideas, has a value. Fearon’s argument does not deal directly with the social learning aspect of deliberation, yet reinforces the idea that when deliberation works with an orientation to learning it could yield more positive outcomes, which in return can “improve the likely implementation of the decision” (1998; 45). He contends that discussing issues lessen or overcome the impact of bounded rationality by revealing different possibilities for solving a problem. Fearon also argues that the quality of discussion helps to gain the final decision legitimacy in the eyes of the group, contributing to group solidarity. In a similar vein, Bohman
(1998, 1996) maintains that unrestricted public discussion increases the democratic quality of the decisions because it takes into account all existing positions. Deveaux, on the other hand, reflects the benefits of locating the source of democratic legitimacy outside formal political deliberation since “democratic activity is not exhausted by formal political processes; it is also reflected in acts of cultural dissent, subversion, and reinvention in a range of social settings” (2003; 782).

Fennema and Maussen also underline the importance of public discussion “as more dispersed and less institutionalised forms of public debate” distinct from the regulated arena of public deliberation that is linked to decision-making (2000; 380-381). They conceive public discussion as learning process and argue that public discussion should be as unrestricted as possible so that different positions become visible in public eye. This broad inclusiveness Fennema and Maussen suggest could not only contribute to the overall quality of decisions in the long run, but could also counter the sceptical arguments about deliberation that it favours those who can articulate themselves well, hence disadvantages those who speak less well (Sanders, 1997; Fraser 1992; Mansbridge, 1980).

In contrast to the social learning stage of deliberation, deliberation as decision-making aims at specific decision. This is usually a formal process oriented to making decisions under some limited time and space conditions. Due to these limitations the process usually ends in decision, be it through voting, consensus, or some other kind of agreement. Here the flow of information follows a vertical pattern towards the achievement of a final outcome in contrast to the horizontal move in social learning oriented deliberative practices. Similarly, as a result of spatial and temporal constraints the impact of deliberation also functions vertically in that the horizontal development of understanding and learning among participants is subordinated to the pressure of reaching agreement. In other words, the urgency of reaching a decision overwhelms the attitude towards opinion-formation, thus preventing a broadening of the scope of learning.
In this sense, the hermeneutic function of social learning ceases its operation and retreats to the background since the deliberation moves into a different stage. With this, the logic and the internal dynamics of deliberation also change. Considering this change as a paradigm shift from understanding to decision-making will not be too far fetched. From the point of view of my argument what is at stake here is the fact that the orientation towards making a final verdict pressures the whole process. I have already mentioned time and space limitations. A highly precious element of deliberation, the time, gets only a limited chance in decision-making procedures, thus also ending up delimiting the amount of information to share.

Yet, probably the most important consequence of the shift from social learning to reaching agreement (or from understanding to decision-making) occurs at the level of personal engagement between participants. Orientation towards decision-making undermines the role of cooperative interaction by triggering an inclination towards protecting the existing configuration of interests, thus leading to a strategic power struggle among participants. Dryzek (2003), for instance, maintains that decision-making processes exacerbate the possibility that deliberation could turn to an identity contest. Clashes between identities rather than constructive engagement would surely have a detrimental impact on the quality of whole process. Fung, on the other hand, raises the point that in decision-making oriented procedures participants only take deliberation seriously if they believe it will influence decision (2003). Fung also suggests that these processes are mostly front-loaded in the sense that they aim to influence rather than learning (2003; 346).

The strategic use of deliberation within decision-making processes is also highlighted by Sunstein (2002), who argues that under the pressures of decision-making, members of a deliberating group would actually polarise their pre deliberation tendencies towards a more extreme point, instead of moving towards agreement. He points to research that the more participants attend to deliberation as a like-minded group emphasising their group
identity, the less chance there will be that their original position will be affected by deliberation. When this occurs there is clearly less chance that deliberation could display the kind of interaction favoured by an attitude towards understanding. This point is also indicative of the fact that the more members of a group are subject to peer pressure and group expectations the less they interact with an attitude towards understanding others. As Mackie (2002) observes, people, acting as part of an interest group, rarely admit to change their mind during a deliberative practice, yet admitting becomes relatively easy in a subsequent forum with different participants.

Sunstein, on the other hand, observes that his findings are at odds with Fishkin’s (1991, 1995) Deliberative Opinion Polling (DOP) conducted in several countries. DOP, in which small groups of participants from highly diverse backgrounds are asked to deliberate about various issues, has found no systematic tendency toward polarisation, even though it was identifiable in some cases. After analysing the differences between his cases and the DOP’s Sunstein (2002) has concluded that the difference stems from the institutional design of the deliberative procedures. In DOP cases, a large pool of information, including participants from various backgrounds, were available. The most important, though, is that there was no pressure for decision making at the end of deliberation. Those factors, according to Sunstein, have considerably reduced the possibility of group polarisation in DOP cases.

The implications of the difference between social learning and decision-making aspects of deliberation are of fundamental importance from the point of deliberative theory. The literature on deliberative politics usually conceptualises deliberation as a decision-making process and confines it into the formal structures of the various governing bodies oriented to reaching decisions. Even though there are some exceptions, such as in the theories of Dryzek, Benhabib, Young and McCarthy, an insufficient appropriation of the social learning aspect of deliberation is common practice. As I have argued, deliberative practice is a two-sided coin. An ambiguous treatment of this fact certainly leads to a dilemma marring the
integrity of deliberative framework developed by most deliberative theorists. I will discuss this problem in due course; for the time being it suffices to indicate that it leads to confusion since the questions of deliberation related to social learning are investigated through the terms of decision-making. Subordinating the social learning phase of deliberation to the terms of decision-making has even been the case for most of the theorists mentioned above. Even though they offer useful insights into the appreciation of social learning, hence broaden the scope of deliberation, the influence of their fruitful initiatives are marred by the fact that their arguments are usually constructed via the terms of decision-making, with the exception of Dryzek.

Therefore, it is essential that deliberative theory moves towards a point where the internal differences of deliberative practices are analytically distinguished and systematically treated. This step does not only require identifying in what sense deliberation as social learning differ from deliberation as decision-making, but also formally allocating social learning its own sphere equipped with its own resources and operated under its own terms. This, I believe, will not only fix the confusion mentioned above, but will also enable revitalisation of the subordinated thus under-utilised capabilities of deliberation oriented to social learning and understanding. This does not suggest positioning social learning and decision-making as opposites, but rather to help in developing a dialectic unity between these two different phases of deliberation in a more theoretically sound way.

The importance of this step becomes immediately visible when societies, such as in Turkey, are considered, where social, religious and cultural divisions cut deep across society in that the ethical self-understanding of a community clashes with others on matters related to living together. If societal divisions are linked to ethical disagreements in general, then the solution to the problems of divided societies have to be conceptualised first at the level of social learning phase of deliberation oriented to understanding. Indeed, as the Q study in Turkey will show later on, the desire of Islamic groups to engage in dialog with seculars could only make
sense under the auspices of deliberation as a social learning process. That is, in order to settle conflicts and ensure peaceful social cooperation, egocentric perceptions of “what is good for us” should move towards discovering the potential connections with others through the question of “what is good for all of us”. It is more important at this stage that an understanding of the arguments and the needs of others primarily drive deliberation rather than that an agreement is reached at the end. The issues, related to ethical and cultural differences that constitute the background for any potential disagreement at the decision-making level are not expected to be resolved within a certain time frame. These issues would be dealt with after due consideration within informally structured, broad, inclusive and ongoing practices of deliberation oriented to social learning. What is needed is to allocate a formally recognized sphere to the social learning phase of deliberation in order to maximise the potential towards mutual understanding inherent in all deliberative activities.

1.2 Establishing The Dialogic Necessity

The deliberative framework based on the distinction of different phases of deliberation, as discussed above, envisages that the members of collective bodies develop an understanding of their differences on the issues common to them. Defining social learning as perspective taking immediately highlights the intersubjective nature of deliberation, that is, individuals learn how to tackle the fragmented nature of the social world in reciprocal relations with others. This reciprocal relationship invokes a certain mode of interaction in which participants accept the fact that their action carries a dialogic substance. In other words, when they sincerely attempt to understand each other they operate on an intersubjective basis. Analysing this action mode is, therefore, important in order to highlight the dynamics of deliberation oriented to social learning. As Elster asserts (1998), the idea of deliberative democracy simply rests on argumentation, not only because it proceeds by argument, but also because it can only be justified by argumentation. Thus, any theory, which
puts deliberation at the centre of its framework, logically needs to establish its foundation thorough an analysis of argumentative speech.

Habermas’ theory of communicative action in this sense is ground breaking since it specifically focuses on the intersubjective nature of human communication, which can then be used to derive conclusions for a democratic polity. Establishing deliberation as a dialogical process helps Habermas to construct his framework on the basis of presuppositions of dialog, which he inherently links to human speech. The framework that Habermas draws provides important insights on the social learning aspect of deliberation, more specifically on the kind of role that social learning plays in human communication. The analysis of the dialogic conditions of deliberation is also important to distinguish it from other deliberative frameworks, which are monologically constructed. In the next section, based on a critique of Rawlsian framework I will argue that any democratic theory that does not appreciate the dialogic character of deliberation consequently fails to appreciate the social learning capacity of deliberation. Therefore, it is essential that an understanding of the difference between a dialogic and monologic account be established.

In *The Theory of Communicative Action* (1987), Habermas investigates the construction of a common social world through an analysis of different stages of socialisation. Drawing from Mead’s theory of socialisation Habermas argues that the fundamental ideas of morality, such as equality of respect and common good, are digested into the moral consciousness of individuals through a social learning process achieved through each individual’s dialog with others. Habermas’ emphasis on the intersubjective and dialogic conditions of moral development provides a resourceful basis for the social learning capacity of deliberative processes. The fact that the development of moral consciousness goes hand in hand with the recognition of other worldviews; that in order to reach this stage one has to be able to look at the world from others’ point of view; and all this constitutes a constructive learning process, paves the way to the formulation of a framework in which the social learning aspect of deliberation could be
rescued from its neglected position. Failing to do so results, one way or another, with a monological account of deliberation, as in Rawls, whose Kantian model of the individual is capable of making rational decisions in her solitude. Yet a critique of Rawls is not only important for distinguishing a dialogic account of deliberation from a monologic one, but also for showing why establishing deliberation as social learning as an analytic category is essential.

1.3 Why a Monological Account of Deliberative Democracy is Insufficient: Rawls

The importance of Habermas's emphasis on the dialogic conditions of moral development stem from the fact that his move represents a shift from a subject oriented paradigm to an intersubjective paradigm, advocating the communicative action of individuals as the main premise for testing the legitimacy of rules. The engagement between Rawls and Habermas provides an excellent account to show the importance of this paradigm shift. My intention here, though, is not to provide a full analysis of Rawls' theory, but briefly to underline the benefits of deliberation as social learning by showing why a monological account of deliberation is insufficient to capture the full meaning of deliberative process. I would like to argue that Rawls's treatment of the subject, which hardly moves away from Kant's transcendental interpretation, plays an important role in explaining why a monological account restricts itself by the rules of decision-making procedure, thus is not capable of expanding the scope of deliberation to the sphere of social learning.

The reason the role of the subject is central is because its characteristics determine the nature of the deliberative process. If the subject is not captured within its continuously evolving interactive environment with others, that is, that individuals come upon themselves in an ever expanding fashion in their communicative interaction with others; that the identity of individuals could only be formed in relation to other identities and in this
sense it is an ongoing learning and justification process, then it is less likely that the deliberation will be conceived as a learning process. Rawls’ subjects, in this sense, are fully matured in that they have the ability of being both reasonable and rational, while empowered with a capacity for a sense of justice and a conception of the good (1993; 19). Their interaction with the outside world occurs usually in an experimental manner. They come upon themselves mainly through the mediation of objects around them. In this sense, their reciprocal relationship with others is driven by “the idea of mutual advantage understood as everyone’s being advantaged with respect to each person’s present or expected future situation as things are” (1993:16-17).

The function of reciprocity in Rawls’s account, then, is a pragmatic task to understand others position and to choose the best alternative to serve individual advantage (1993:49-52). Rawls ties this pragmatism mainly to what he perceives as “the practical impossibility of reaching agreement on the truth of comprehensive doctrines” (1993:63). Hence, Rawls’ individuals in deliberation hardly move away from their existing frame of reference. Deliberation in this sense is a matter of mainly checking the compatibility of others’ views with theirs, and accepting them in an overlapping fashion if they are suitable. In this framework, Rawls does not leave too much room for the moral development of his individuals’ ego. His reference to the social learning aspect of deliberation is limited to a monological learning process as the accumulation of knowledge about the practical world.

Yet, Rawls makes an attempt to capture the dialogic significance of moral development and ironically he uses Piaget and Kohlberg, as Habermas does. In the light of Piaget’s work, he maintains that acquiring a moral point of view “rests upon the development of intellectual skills required to regard things from a variety of points of view and to think of these together as aspects of one system of cooperation” (1973; 468) It is true that for Piaget, as Rawls conceives, the essence of moral development is to acquire the multiplicity of world views available within the social context individuals belong to. Yet, equally important for Piaget is the acceptance of this process
as an ever-evolving cognitive development, as he asserts, “every reciprocal action between individual subjects mutually modifies them. Every social relation is thus a totality of transforming the individual in his mental structure” (quoted in Habermas; 1984: 69). In this sense, cognitive development is not only the understanding and construction of an external world, but also decentering ego through its reflective conceptualization of the social world by discursively negotiating moral norms. Thus, only through an intersubjectively structured justification of norms can ego evolve to be an autonomous identity. However Rawls grasps Piaget’s work only from his pragmatic angle as “the art of perceiving the person of others, that is, the art of discerning their beliefs, intentions and feelings” (1973: 469), thus he fails again to fully appreciate the dialogic role of learning in deliberation.

Rawls’s analysis could satisfy the requirements of decision-making oriented deliberative practices in which subjects aim to choose the best option available among the alternatives, yet remains certainly inadequate for the broader needs of deliberation oriented to social learning in which the self not only understands others, but also internalises their perspectives, including comprehensive doctrines, in order to define herself in relation to others. The intersubjective core of a socially produced self, thus, appears to be the key to do justice to the analysis of deliberative procedures. Habermas elaborates this moment lucidly:

The self of an ethical self-understanding is dependent upon recognition by addressees because it generates itself as a response to the demands of an other in the first place. Because others attribute accountability to me, I gradually make myself into the one who I have become in living together with others. The ego which seems to me to be given in my self-consciousness as what is purely my own, cannot be maintained by me solely through my own power, as it were for me alone –it does not belong to me. Rather, this ego always retains an intersubjective core because the process of individuation from it emerges runs through the network of linguistically mediated interactions (1995-II; 170)

Perhaps, the source of the problem for Rawls is the fact that his framework is constructed on the basis of a Hobbesian distrust, which conceives individuals as “warring factions” rather than capable of cooperatively acting
towards a mutual understanding. That is why he aims to construct a platform on which “contingencies which sets men at odds and allows them to be guided by their prejudices” can be excluded (1973; 19). Yet it is precisely this mistrust that renders his theory as a monological one based on a contract, the rules of which are preestablished before any argument takes place between the concerned parties. He maintains, “the aim of the contract approach is to establish that taken together they impose significant bounds on acceptable principles of justice” (1973; 18).

In order to achieve this, he formulates the idea of “the veil of ignorance”, which blocks out participants’ knowledge about their existing social conditions, their role and place within the social system, as well as their specific goals, desires and interests to ensure that these contingencies do not interfere with the process of decision-making. With the veil of ignorance Rawls believes that

> “the differences among the parties are unknown to them, and everyone equally rational and similarly situated, each is convinced by the same arguments, therefore we can view the choice in the original position from the standpoint of one person selected at random”, and secondly “no one knows his situation in society nor his natural assets, and therefore no one is in a position to tailor principles to his advantage” (1973; 139).

The whole purpose of this exercise for Rawls is that people arrive at a consensus under a fair and impartial framework. Yet, the very nature of this framework leads to a certain kind of consensus, where ideas overlap (overlapping consensus) without necessarily going through a justification process since in the original position participants are not given the opportunity to evaluate, argue about the differences between themselves and then reach a consensus.

Habermas, in his critique of Rawls (1995-II), points to this logical flaw in Rawls’ framework. Habermas argues that the constraints through which the original position is designed limits participants as moral persons “who posses a sense of justice and the capacity for their own conception of the
good, as well as an interest in cultivating these dispositions in a rational manner” (1995-II; 12). On the other hand, according to the idea of overlapping consensus the same participants are supposed to understand “the highest-order interests”, such as all citizens are free and equal as well as reasonable and rational, in order to realise social unity. Therefore, the participants find themselves in a peculiar dilemma in which they “are supposed both to understand and to take seriously the implications and consequences of an autonomy that they themselves are denied” (1995-II; 12).

What is crucial here from the point of my argument is that the way Rawls justifies his deliberative framework overlooks the social learning aspect of deliberation simply because he ignores the dialogic unity of social learning and decision-making in favour of a strict decision-making regime among the formal bodies of “public reason”, such as parliamentary debates, judicial decisions, elections, administrative acts and pronouncements (1993; 215-216). With this, Rawls undermines the actual potential of informal deliberative practices oriented to understanding and social learning more than decision-making. Rawls’ public reason, therefore, is deprived of the benefits of a more reflexive and discursive deliberative practice, which continuously reconstructs itself through an open-ended, ongoing communication process. Habermas warns that even though Rawls intends to establish an intersubjectively applied procedure through his original position, the potential gains of his attempt are scattered because of the constraints he sets on the amount of information participants can exchange. Thus, his attempt remains inadequate since he imposes “a common perspective on the parties in the original position through informational constraints and thereby neutralizes the multiplicity of particular interpretive perspectives from the outset” (1995-II; 117). Imposing a perspective in a rather monological fashion could also jeopardize the impartiality of judgment for they do not “withstand revision in light of morally significant future experiences and learning process” (1995-II; 118).
Habermas’ emphasis here on the importance of learning process takes us back to the main point of my argument that the social learning aspect of deliberation is corollary to a dialogically formulated deliberative framework. Rawls’ individuals are not adequately equipped to conceive deliberation as a learning process since their autonomy is monologically constructed, that is, it does not grow out of the intersubjective relationship with others. Even in the midst of collective action with others, what motivates Rawls’ individuals is mainly to choose the best alternative to their advantage. What goes down with this is the fact that deliberation is an intersubjectively structured, dialogic act in which the autonomy of individuals is shaped through a continuously evolving mutual understanding and learning process between parties. Failure to capture this moment results also in failure to distinguish the fundamental distinction between social learning and decision-making aspects of deliberation.

1.4 Habermas and the Presuppositions of Speech

The critique of Rawls’s monological account has shown that a proper appreciation of deliberation requires a clear analysis of the type of action that individuals enter during their dialog. The importance of this analysis stems not only from the need for a better understanding of the whole process in terms of its inner dynamics, but also from the fact that the integrity of any deliberative framework is dependent upon an explanation about what makes the actual procedure a legitimate one. In this sense, Rawls was mistaken in choosing monologically imposed devices to secure the legitimacy of a dialogic practice; a kind of methodological mishap. On the contrary, Habermas grounds his whole argument on the basis of a paradigm shift from subjective cogitation to intersubjective dialog. He puts the burden of judgement on the actual communication process, thus the legitimacy of the deliberative procedure depends entirely on individuals’ communicative action. In order to do this, though, he had to prove that the communicative action of individuals carries a normative content, which ensures the legitimacy of the process. Habermas finds the point of appraisal
in the presuppositions of human speech. He sets his task out with the following statement:

If we assume that the human species maintains itself through the socially coordinated activities of its members and that this coordination has to be established through communication – and in certain central spheres through communication aimed at reaching agreement – then the reproduction of the species also requires satisfying the conditions of a rationality that is inherent in communicative action (1984; 397)

Habermas posits two main points here. Firstly, communication is the main medium to establish coordination of social activity. Secondly, communication aimed at coming to agreement has to satisfy a certain level of rationality, which is already embedded within the structures of language. Indeed, without referring to a model of speech, Habermas asserts, the process of understanding remains unresolved. Thus, he adds, understanding can be fully appreciated “only if we specify what it means to use sentences with a communicative intent” (1984; 287).

It is through this communicative intent that language takes over the role of coordinating the actions of individuals. Habermas argues that the structure of language is in fact oriented to reaching understanding, which is mutually presupposed by participants in their dialog. In other words, when individuals get together with a communicative intent their action is driven by some pragmatic rules of language. Habermas calls these rules “universal pragmatics” and asserts that they are unavoidable as long as the focus of communication is maintained towards reaching a shared agreement. If one wants to participate in a dialog with a sincere intention for reaching agreement, she cannot avoid raising some validity claims corresponding to different speech acts. So, when she claims that whatever she wants to communicate has a true content, her speech corresponds to constative speech acts (verbs such as assert, describe). Meanwhile, she claims that her speech is right with respect to prevailing norms and values, corresponding to regulative speech acts (verbs such as order, prohibit). She also would want to express herself truthfully so that the others can trust her
by referring to her intentions and feelings, which correspond to representative speech acts (such as admit, conceal). And finally, her speech should claim that whatever she raises is intelligible, that is, comprehensible to others. Those four claims to different validities (truth, rightness, truthfulness and comprehensibility) and corresponding categories of speech acts constitute the basis for what Habermas calls an “ideal speech situation” in which there would be no need for any type of constraints, provided “if and only if, for all possible participants, there is a symmetrical distribution of chances to choose and apply speech-acts” (quoted in Thompson, 1982; 123). All this is turned into three presuppositions of argumentative speech by Habermas as follows:

“1. Every subject with the competence to speak and act is allowed to take part in a discourse.

2.a. Everyone is allowed to question any assertion whatever.

b. Everyone is allowed to introduce any assertion whatever into the discourse.

c. Everyone is allowed to express his attitudes, desires and needs.

3. No speaker may be prevented by internal or external coercion from exercising his rights as laid down in (1) and (2)” (1990: 89)

The first rule establishes the principle of openness, that is, a practical discourse should be open to all subjects as long as they are competent enough to take part in argumentation. The second rule refers to the right to equal participation, which allows all relevant information to be included in discourse. More importantly (c) ensures that participants’ particular needs and desires are taken into account during the process of reaching agreement. And under the third rule participants are guaranteed that the rules can be enjoyed equally by all of them, excluding the use of force from discourses.

What is important in this formulation is that participants envisage argumentation as free from repression and inequalities if they are sincere in their attempt to reconcile their differences. Thus, as opposed to the constraints Rawls suggests, Habermas relies on the procedure itself to ensure a legitimate outcome. All that is needed is a symmetrical distribution
of chances to raise and challenge the validity of claims (to take a yes or no position in Habermas' terms). Therefore, whoever wants to engage in discourse with a serious intention makes some normative presuppositions, which regulate action towards the creation of legitimate outcomes.

In this sense, deliberative procedures can operate on the basis of internal rules that are implicit in the structure of language. It does not need to be reinforced externally. In other words, since agreement only arises as a common conviction it presupposes the voluntary and equal participation of subjects. In this sense, “it cannot be imposed by either party, whether instrumentally through intervention in the situation directly or strategically through influencing the decisions of opponents” (1984: 287) Thus, the premise for a communicatively achieved agreement is the acceptance of its legitimacy by the participants. With this, Habermas’ framework lays the ground for developing a deliberative environment oriented to learning and understanding, that is, the process of understanding could indeed be as legitimate as a decision-making process since both ultimately rely on the same premise; the rules of argumentative speech. Deliberation in either form can produce fair results in the eyes of participants as long as they act sincerely.

1.5 McCarthy's Challenge to Habermas

As I have shown, in Habermas' scheme orientation towards consensus is one of the main presuppositions of argumentative discourse. He is concerned that if the presupposition of reaching consensus were dropped from dialog, then the deliberative process would lose its rational sense and become something else other than rational argumentation, thus eradicating the main alternative against coercion and manipulation. Hence Habermas’ establishes a strong link between rationality and the purpose of deliberation. This is the point where Habermas’ moves away from the informal circles of opinion formation oriented to social learning and turns towards the formal, institutional bodies of deliberation, manifested mainly in the forms of decision-making procedures.
His statement “discourses do not govern” (1992: 452) demonstrates clearly what concerns him. Habermas does not believe that without the support of some institutional arrangements discourses alone can bring about social change. They can surely influence the administration “in a siege like manner”, yet “communicative power cannot supply a substitute for the systematic inner logic of public bureaucracies” (1992: 452). In this sense, the public sphere is thought of as “a sounding board for problems that must be processed by the political system” (1996:359). Yet, this is not enough for Habermas since even though

“Social movements, citizen initiatives and forums, political and other associations, in short, the groupings of civil society, are indeed sensitive to problems, but the signals they send out and the impulses they give are generally too weak to initiate learning processes or redirect decision-making in the political system in the short run” (1996: 373)

Hence, Habermas shifts his attention to formal procedures within the administration where a practice of rational debate is assumed as the rule. With this move Habermas leaves a vast terrain of deliberative activity behind, which operates mainly on the basis of social learning and understanding instead of decision-making. The issue here is not so much whether he is still interested in the informal discursive activities in the public sphere, but this shift in his orientation is not sufficient enough to utilise the rich, but untapped sources of deliberative activity.

This shortcoming of Habermas' theory has been brought to attention by some democratic theorists, who have also made some inroads into the idea of less formal forms of deliberation. The aim of this chapter is, thus, to present the ideas of Thomas McCarthy, Seyla Benhabib, Iris Young and John Dryzek with a specific emphasis on their conceptualisation of deliberative democracy. As will be seen, these theorists expand the understanding of deliberation through their emphasis on the less restricted, more inclusive, informal phases of deliberation. On the other hand their
contribution is usually impaired by a lack of emphasis on social learning aspect of deliberation in their methodological design. Deliberation, in this sense, is still tied to the terms of decision-making procedures, disallowing a full appreciation of social learning phase of deliberative activity.

McCarthy, if not the first, was one of the first political theorists who highlighted the tension in Habermas’ thought caused by the strict rationality requirement in communicative settings (1978). With his critique of the strict rationality requirement of the Habermasian framework McCarthy provides a very valuable tool to envisage an alternative approach, which could lead to the establishment of a framework based on the differentiation of deliberative process as social learning and decision-making.

McCarthy disagrees with Habermas by arguing that rationally motivated agreement should not be conceived within such a narrow perspective that Habermas presents. He maintains that Habermas’ insistence upon rational agreement is tied to his elaboration of communicative action in the sense that practical reason always acts towards reaching a consensus in dialog (1991: 195). He suggests that there is room available for some alternatives between a strategically arrived compromise and a rationally achieved consensus (1991: 196), allowing for different frameworks alternative to consensus oriented decision-making procedures. McCarthy’s suggestion opens up a possibility for moving towards a reconstruction of deliberative theory along the lines of deliberation as social learning. Yet, McCarthy still thinks of deliberation under the terms of decision-making processes, undermining the potential of his critique.

According to McCarthy (1998), in order for Habermas’ discourse ethics to serve as a realistic normative ideal for democratic theory in pluralistic societies, his emphasis on the scope of rational, moral consensus should be fine tuned by looking at the potential disagreements in the matters of ethical concern more carefully. McCarthy’s argument departs from the point where Habermas (1993) identifies three analytically distinguishable discourses in decision-making procedures as pragmatic, ethical, and moral. These
discourses are all related to the question of “What should I do” but taking a different meaning depending on the kind of problem.

Pragmatic discourses, according to Habermas, are related to practical, empirical matters, such as policy issues. They are oriented to reaching preestablished goals by weighing out the efficiency of various strategies. In this sense their validity is gained from the degree of their applicability.

Ethical discourses, on the other hand, are related to norms and values grown out of a specific life story, which take the question of “What should I do” from the point of “Who I am “, “Who I want to be” and “What kind of life I want to pursue”. In ethical discourses, reason and will condition each other reciprocally since “justifications become rational motives for changes of attitude” (1993: 11).

In moral discourses, finally, the orientation to self-understanding in ethical questions shifts to an interpersonal level where the justification and application of norms stipulating reciprocal rights and duties becomes the main motive in answering the question “What should I do”. In this sense, contrary to ethical discourses, moral discourses “require a break with all of the unquestioned truths of an established, concrete ethical life, in addition to distancing oneself from the contexts of life with which one’s identity is inextricably interwoven” (1993: 12). In Habermas’ framework, the question of justice or rights is allocated to moral discourses since they need to undergo through a universal test to be able to claim validity. They are not related to a specific form of life because they try to answer the question of “what should I do” with reference to “what is equally good for all”. This reference to “all” requires that moral questions should be debated under the strict condition of universalisability.

McCarthy raises his objection at this point and argues that, due to his strict universalisability requirement, Habermas’ separation of discourses inadequately deals with the fact that discourses are indeed part of the concrete stories of different traditions and self-perceptions. McCarthy also maintains that Habermas is indeed aware of the predicament his analysis
causes. Speaking of abortion for instance, Habermas readily acknowledges that “descriptions of the problem of abortion are always inextricably interwoven with individual self-descriptions of persons and groups, and thus with their identities and life projects. Where an internal connection of this sort exists, the question must be formulated differently, specifically, in ethical terms.” (1993; 59). Yet, if this is true for abortion, it is the fact of pluralist societies that they are continuously challenged by similar type of problems. Indeed, the most important societal problems causing deep divisions belong to the same category. For instance, in the case of Turkey, as will be shown, the division between Muslims and seculars cuts through the layers of ethical and moral disputes concurrently. As McCarthy asserts these disputes “could not be resolved consensually at the level at which they arose” (1998:127). Then, it is hardly a feasible proposal that the democratic practice weighs heavily towards rational consensus trying to realise a universal justification of norms through one right answer. Hence, McCarthy argues that what is needed is “to go beyond this either/or and try to capture the dialectical interdependence in practice of these analytically distinguishable aspects” (1998:127). Along this line he suggests that if something has to be decided from the standpoint of justice, the scope of “all” should be limited to the particular members of the society in question, to a particular time and place, yet should be inclusive of the whole range of interpretive and evaluative perspectives related to the topic in question. Being able to deal with persistent ethical and political differences then requires the utilisation of “cultural resources and institutional arrangements different from those suited to domains in which there is only one right answer to every well-formulated question” (1998:152).

The key concept here for McCarthy is mutual accommodation as an alternative way of dealing with persistent ethical and political differences, operating on the basis of mutual respect and consideration of the humanity of others. Through mutual accommodation differences in value orientations can become part of a cooperative, harmonious and mutually supportive sphere of relations. This is a procedural framework in which rational acceptance does not come from “the force of the better argument” alone,
but more from the acceptance that they abide by the rules of engagement, which they conceive as fair “even when things do not go their way”. In this sense, McCarthy suggests a two-track version of justification of outcomes: direct and indirect justification. Habermas’ formulation of rational consensus can apply in direct justification, that is, directly justified outcomes are accepted by all, possibility of one single answer. On the other hand, indirectly justified outcomes “are accepted by different parties for the same procedural reasons, but different substantive ones” (1998:146), hence the disagreements of a reasonable nature can coexist. McCarthy concludes with a strong note:

It seems best, then, to acknowledge and analyse independently a type of ethical-political dialogue aimed at not negotiated compromise, not at substantive agreement, and not at ethical-political consensus, but at forms of mutual accommodation that leave space for reasonable disagreements. We can imagine cultures that nourish the corresponding values and virtues, and practices that are predicated not on the assumption of one right answer but on respect for, and a desire to accommodate, ineliminable difference. We can imagine them because we already rely upon them in areas of our lives where it is important for us to maintain harmonious, cooperative, and mutually supportive relations with people with whom we do not always agree, whom we cannot always convince or be convinced by, and whom we do not simply to outsmart. In multicultural democracies, they will inevitably play a larger role in political life as well. (1998:153).

The merits of McCarthy’s framework are obvious from the point of the argument that this thesis defends. A sphere of dialog based on mutual understanding, distinct from strategic use of decision-making procedures, is established as the focus of his argument. He indeed becomes very close to suggesting a framework based on a distinction between opinion formation and decision-making dimensions of deliberation. Yet, McCarthy moves no further and stops evaluating what the independent type of ethical-political dialogue he suggests entails in terms of its analytic features. He makes it clear the need for the practices of an open-ended, mutual accommodation based processes with no ultimate consensus orientation, however, he elaborates neither the dynamics nor the logic of these practices in terms of
what clearly makes them different from, or how they can be related to, the practices of decision-making processes.

In fact McCarthy’s scheme carries an ambiguity towards his treatment of decision-making since it leaves the fundamental question of how to make democratically legitimate decisions open. It is indeed this ambiguity that leaves him susceptible to the kind of charge that Habermas lays. In his reply to McCarthy, Habermas asserts, “given McCarthy’s premises, he cannot explain how democratic legitimacy is even possible” (1998; 395). Habermas refers to the fact that if democracy is accepted as a solution to fair decision-making, then reaching agreement ultimately becomes the apex of this practice. In this sense, Habermas’ insistence upon rational agreement is a methodological requirement not only for the integrity of his theory, but also for any theory that defines fair decision making procedure as fundamental to achieve a genuine democratic polity. In this sense Habermas is consistent in his line of argument. Therefore, the dilemma does not so much stem from seeking rational agreement, but more from imposing this requirement into all dimensions of deliberative practice, hence not allowing for a proper development of a different domain in which different kind of communicative activities orient themselves towards mutual understanding more than rational agreement.

In terms of deliberative theory, this domain corresponds to deliberation as social learning where opinion formative, interpretive actions of participants, distinct from decision-making, become the main paradigm, thorough which the open-ended, inclusive features of deliberation oriented to understanding free themselves from the specific rules of engagement in decision-making practices. In other words, the resources of social learning are allocated to where they belong in order to achieve mutual understanding rather than functioning in the service of decision-making procedures only. Hence, any attempt to broaden the framework of deliberation would be bogged down unless this shift in the orientation of deliberative practice is made clear, that is, a specific argument for it decoupled from the references of decision-making is developed.
A specific argument for social learning in this sense requires an elaboration of how its interpretive, hermeneutic character can actually coordinate the process of deliberation. For this, Gadamer’s hermeneutics and Habermas’ engagement with it offer valuable insights. Habermas acknowledges that in building his communicative model of action he has taken all the functions of language equally into account, including Gadamer’s hermeneutics (1984:95). His extensive engagement with Gadamer in the early stages of the development of his theory was critical to establish his framework. However, particularly in his more recent work, the role of Gadamer’s hermeneutic approach has gradually retreated to the background, with no clearly specified function. Hence, in order to revitalise the role of the interpretive, as well as inclusive and open-ended characteristics of learning processes, Gadamer’s hermeneutics should be revisited.

1.6 Hermeneutics Reconsidered: Gadamer’s Fusion of Horizons

So far, I have argued that the demanding level of rational attitude towards dialog in Habermas’ framework creates a tension in the appreciation of the social learning aspect of deliberation. Surely, any dialog oriented to achieving a common account should be driven by the fact that participants’ behaviour should aim at a certain level of rationality. However, what is not seen clearly in Habermas’ account is to what degree the level of rationality can vary during the informal discursive endeavours of individuals.

This brings us back to the importance of acknowledging differences in the logic of different deliberative processes. It is normal to expect a competent level of rational attentiveness during a decision-making process, yet it could equally be limiting, as well as misleading, if this level is expected to govern deliberation oriented to social learning. In those settings where the initial aim is to develop an understanding of other parties, it is participants’ interpretations of various life stories that play a more functional role. In their
dialogic engagements, when participants seek to understand each other they have to open themselves up in order to explain their positions and to understand what the other stories are. Under the conditions of social learning that I have argued for this does not necessitate an agreement, but an interpretive, hermeneutical sensitivity towards others, aiming at what Gadamer calls a “fusion of horizons” (1975: 273-274).

In the fusion of horizons participants make themselves understandable to each other without relinquishing their original position, trying to find a common point rather than converting to an alternative position. Understanding then is conceived by Gadamer as “part of the process of the coming into being of meaning” (1975:147) in which nothing appears to be perfect rather than a continuous adaptation of different views. In their hermeneutical endeavour individuals try to situate themselves within the broader horizon of the context they are in. Their primary aim is to understand what is given to them and what constitutes the meaning and the importance of it. For that, they do not have to disregard their original hermeneutic position, yet they need to open themselves to the opposite claims and allow them to enter into a dialogic conversation (1975:289). This is the gist of Gadamer’s appropriation of Aristotle’s *phronesis* in which understanding always operates with a practical aim in mind. In this sense, the fusion of horizons work as a test of the claims of each horizon. It is only by this process that individuals come to an understanding of themselves and situate themselves correctly within “one great horizon”.

When our historical consciousness places itself within historical horizons, this does not entail passing into alien worlds unconnected in any way with our own, but together they constitute the one great horizon that moves from within and, beyond the frontiers of present, embraces the historical depths of our self-consciousness. (1975: 271)

In this framework, Gadamer drops away the dichotomised relationship between understanding and misunderstanding in a way that no communication process is seen to be perfect and complete. Yet they are inclusive of all features that are part of the identity structures of individuals.
Here, Gadamer introduces one of his fundamental contributions to hermeneutic theory. He asserts that prejudices are also part of individuals’ identities. They are constitutive of the meaning of each horizon to the extent that they effectively shape the existing boundaries of horizons. Thus, he maintains that no process of understanding can be conceived properly without acknowledging the role of prejudices. In his words:

A consciousness formed by the authentic attitude will be receptive to the origins and entirely foreign features of that which comes to it from outside its own horizons. Yet this receptivity is not acquired with an objectivist “neutrality”: it is neither possible, necessary, nor desirable that we put ourselves within brackets. The hermeneutical attitude supposes only that we self-consciously designate our opinions and prejudices and qualify them as such, and in so doing strip them of their extreme character. In keeping to this attitude we grant the text the opportunity to appear as an authentically different being and to manifest its own truth, over and against our own preconceived notions” (1979:151-152.)

What is at issue here for Gadamer is that one interprets and understands what is given from a selective perspective bound by personal social and cultural circumstances, which are situated at some point in history. Thus, understanding operates under the auspices of a certain frame of reference and the gap between different reference points could only narrow down through the dialogic practices of a community. In this sense, the immediate interest behind hermeneutics is not to develop a critique of existing circumstances, but rather coming to an understanding through dialog about the issues of common interest.

However, this is exactly where Habermas feels uneasy about the hermeneutic tradition.

Predictably, Habermas’ concern here is related to mobilising the rationality potential residing within the communicative action of individuals. He asserts “reaching an understanding functions as a mechanism for coordinating actions only through the participants in interaction coming to an agreement” (1984: 99). In other words, if the dialog is not oriented to reaching agreement in a way that the rational assets of communication are
overlooked as in hermeneutic practice, then it would fail to capitalise on its own critical potential.

Habermas’ concern here sounds a legitimate one given that hermeneutics with no orientation to creating a common ground would not have a critical edge. Yet, it also seems that Habermas is struggling with a dilemma, which is supposed to be fixed by his theory. That is, if the universal pragmatics of speech presupposes a rational attitude towards differences among participants, as Habermas indicates, then a dialog oriented towards understanding should ultimately be able to develop a rational and critical attitude during deliberation. In fact, Habermas himself acknowledges this:

“Participants, however diverse their backgrounds, can at least intuitively meet in their efforts to reach an understanding. In all languages and in every language community, such concepts as truth, rationality, justification, and consensus, even if interpreted differently and applied according to different criteria, play the same grammatical role.” (1996: 311)

This role is being able to take a reflexive, rational attitude toward their own cultural traditions by the members of different cultural groups. Habermas also asserts that under the conditions of modern societies, in which a positive law and secularised politics are achieved, even religious or metaphysical worldviews would lose their fundamentalist character, simply because they have to compete with other world views “within the same universe of validity claims”, assuming the presuppositions of secularised thought (1996; 551, note 59). The underlining assumption here for Habermas is that the rational and critical thinking are embedded within the pragmatics of daily communication to the degree that all traditions are capable of developing a self-reflective, critical discourse in that they can distinguish between what is true and what they hold to be true as long as they subject themselves to the presuppositions of argumentative speech (1995-I: 138-139). Yet, if this is the case, then it becomes difficult to justify Habermas’ critique of Gadamer that hermeneutic interpretation is prone to lose the critical edge required for making universally valid justifications.
The difficulty here does not seem so much to stem from the difference in what they say, but more from where Habermas’ analysis is focused. Under Habermas’ scheme, the critical potential that the hermeneutic action carries is mostly elaborated from, thus subordinated to, the conditions of formal deliberative practices. If the difference between understanding and agreement in his framework was clear enough, that is, if he distinguished the deliberative sphere of understanding oriented to social learning from the formal decision-making oriented deliberative procedures, then Gadamer’s hermeneutic could have found its proper place within the informally structured practices of deliberation.

In fact, in relation to the interaction between understanding and agreement, Gadamer is as close to Habermas as he can be. He too argues that understanding involves primarily coming to an agreement. It is a dialogically reached agreement in the sense that it involves a process, which takes others’ claims seriously, defines and tests them against one’s own prejudices and reaches to a new understanding of the issue at hand. As Warnke points out, Gadamer perceives understanding as an appropriation process, through which participants reach to a “better” position by becoming able to see strands of agreement and disagreement at the end (1987; 103). That is why Gadamer defines hermeneutic understanding as a learning experience broadening the horizons of participants. The result of this process goes beyond the original positions of participants, reflecting a transformation to a new view and a new stage of the tradition (1987:104). In other words, the critical dimension that Habermas is concerned with is embedded within the dialog between traditions in Gadamer. Each tradition carries its own kind of critical reflection into the dialog that they engage. Yet unlike Habermas, Gadamer does not emphasise a strong orientation towards agreement, instead he substantially relaxes the dose of rational behaviour in favour of a more informal exchange between parties.

From the social learning point of view I argue for, Gadamer’s framework provides an essential ingredient. His hermeneutic emphasis on the dialogic
character of understanding complements the role of social learning in deliberative processes. Yet, the challenge for deliberative theory here is to converge the essentials of Gadamerian and Habermasian frameworks in favour of a dialectical relationship between them. The features of Gadamer’s hermeneutics serve well the requirements of deliberation as social learning. But, there is no need to position Gadamer against Habermas in order to achieve those requirements. Habermas has enough under the belt of his theory to accommodate a hermeneutic approach, particularly in his early works. His own words testifies to the interaction between his critical theory and hermeneutics:

For those acting in the first person singular or plural with an orientation to mutual understanding, each lifeworld constitutes a totality of meaning relations and referential connections with a zero point in the coordinate system shaped by historical time, social space and semantic field. Moreover, the different lifeworlds that collide with one another do not stand next to each other without any mutual understanding. As totalities, they follow the pull of their claims to universality and work out their differences until their horizons of understanding “fuse” with one another, as Gadamer puts it (In Outwhaite, 1994: 358)

Indeed, as Axel Honneth indicates, Habermas reaches the fundamental premise of his theory, that is, human subjects are united with one another through the medium of linguistic understanding, via a study of hermeneutic philosophy (1995: 86) However, his concentration in his later works on the formal deliberative procedures oriented to decision-making impedes him from benefiting from this early insight. Thomas McCarthy in *The Critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas* (1978) has rightly pinpointed this tendency and stated that the critical theory of Habermas is becoming more formal and universal and less hermeneutical and situational.

In a similar vein, Richard Bernstein highlights the difference between Habermas and Gadamer by pointing to an inherent tension in Habermas’ thought (1983, 1985). Bernstein argues that the way Habermas structures his argument leaves no other option beyond only two alternatives: either universal criteria will be established as a rational basis for evaluating the
plausibility of competing interpretations of different world views (horizons in Gadamer) or there will be no escape from relativism. Habermas’ answer to this dilemma was to develop a communicative ethics grounded in the intersubjective structures of social production with a strong emphasis on a rational basis required for testing competing claims. However, Bernstein maintains that Gadamer’s hermeneutic theory avoids this dilemma thanks to his different emphasis on the process of understanding, which shows that making comparative judgements is possible without necessarily appealing to such strong universal criteria.

Bernstein in this sense perceives Habermas and Gadamer as complementary rather than competing. He claims that Gadamer’s hermeneutic can be employed to get a better grasp of what Habermas is doing, yet on the other hand Habermas provides a more comprehensive and plausible interpretation of current historical circumstances than does Gadamer. (1983:182-196)

The importance of Gadamer from the point of my argument lies in his assertion that traditions are not self-contained and completely isolated from others. Hence, there is always a possibility to find different ways of surpassing the boundaries of each tradition so long as a sincere dialog in order to comprehend the claims of other traditions is maintained. For that, what is required is no more than a deliberative environment oriented to learning in which the primary role of dialog is hermeneutic understanding. This becomes particularly important in countries like Turkey where the orientation in dialog, given the existence of sharp divisions in the community, is expected to be primarily understanding rather than agreement. The key point here is the fact that when divided traditions meet each other their first task is to develop an understanding of one another to overcome different interpretations of the issues at hand. This is clearly a hermeneutic task, which does require establishment of its own deliberative sphere freed from the pressures of decision-making procedures, open to reasonable disagreements without converging on one answer.
1.7 Expanding the Scope of Deliberative Practice: Benhabib

The role of hermeneutics in deliberative practices has been echoed also in the theory of Seyla Benhabib. Benhabib maintains that the emphasis on rationality in democratic theory is a consequence of the universalist tendencies that appeared in moral theory as a response to the challenges of modernity. Following the dawn of modernity, Benhabib argues, moral theory underwent a differentiation process between moral and ethical issues for the defence of the autonomy of the self, leading to a differentiation between "the generalised" and "the concrete" other (1987). This move was mainly motivated by the desire of the emerging bourgeoisie to find a universally applicable norm system. This was essential in order to overcome the problems of men living under the purely egoistic conditions of "the state of nature", hence morality was emancipated from ethical worldviews and justice alone became the center of moral theory.

A consequence of this move was that while the issues of justice were dealt with extensively within the moral domain of the public sphere, an entire domain of human activity related to ethical self-understanding of men was confined to the limits of the private sphere and put beyond the light of justice. The generalised other, born as a result of this dichotomy, required viewing each individual as a rational being abstracted from the concrete identity of the other. Its moral dignity was constituted not by the acknowledgment of differences from others, but rather by the comprehension of what was overlapping in common. Its interaction with others was regulated primarily by formal public and institutional rules.

Yet, Benhabib argues that by only focusing on what is common, the generalised other reflects only one side of the self and ignores paying attention to the individual needs of the others. The "concrete" other, then, expands the boundaries of the generalised other by dealing with each individual's personal histories constitutive of their concrete identities, including their emotional state of affairs. In contrast to the "generalised" other, the "concrete" other abstracts itself from the question of what is
common and focuses on comprehending the needs of others, their motivations, desires and background stories. Within this model, procedures are geared to bridging the gap between formal and informal politics by focusing on ordinary people’s everyday deliberations. In Benhabib’s words:

The procedural specifications of this model privilege a plurality of modes of association in which all affected can have the right to articulate their point of view. These can range from political parties, to citizens’ initiatives, to social movements, to voluntary associations, to consciousness-raising groups, and the like. It is through the interlocking net of these multiple forms of associations, networks, and organizations that an anonymous “public conversation” results. It is central to the model of deliberative democracy that it privileges such a public sphere of mutually interlocking and overlapping networks and associations of deliberation, contestation, and argumentation…today our guiding model has to be that of a medium of loosely associated, multiple foci of opinion formation and dissemination which affect one another in free and spontaneous processes of communication (1987:74)

Benhabib’s formulation points to a direction where certain characteristics of deliberation as social learning become clearly visible. Deliberation is seen as an ongoing process of argumentation oriented to understanding with others occurring at different levels of public sphere. She further qualifies her model as a “non coercive and non final processes of opinion formation in an unrestricted public sphere” (1987:76).

Here, it is not difficult to discern that with her differentiation of the “generalised” other from the “concrete” other, Benhabib moves towards a hermeneutic elaboration of the interaction between individuals based on mutual understanding. The universalist tendencies in contemporary moral theory, Benhabib argues, recapitulate the old Kantian dilemma by depriving noumenal selves from being properly individuated, which results in a monological model of moral reasoning. For instance, under conditions of Rawls’ veil of ignorance, “the other as different from the self disappears” and differences become irrelevant (1987:165). Instead, she argues for an interactive universalism, advocating a model of communicative need interpretation and acknowledging the dialectic unity of the generalised and
the concrete other. The underlying premise for this framework is the fact that members of individual communities develop their self-consciousness in reference to the contingent life histories of others in that the discourses of need interpretations reveal a historical dimension in which the history of the self and the history of collective are intertwined.

However, Benhabib also warns that their dialectic unity is not only confined to the past and the present since they carry a practical intent related to future. As she asserts “what such discourses can generate are not only universalistically prescribable norms, but also intimations of otherness in the present that can lead to the future” (1987:169). Benhabib calls this process “historically self-conscious universalism” in which the principles of deliberative polity, universal respect and egalitarian reciprocity are arrived “from within the normative hermeneutic horizon of modernity” (1992: 30). It would be quite normal to assume that, this horizon, similar to Gadamer’s, involves all presuppositions and assumptions of discourses reflecting the background stories of every community. However, Benhabib distances herself from Gadamer’s hermeneutic through a critique similar to Habermas’. She maintains that Gadamer’s interpretation of *phronesis* does not provide a clear account of what constitutes the validity of moral judgement, making Gadamer vulnerable to the charge that his theory lacks a critical yardstick to distinguish between traditions in terms of their worthiness (1992:135).

Benhabib’s understanding of Gadamer appears to be affected by an ambiguity in her treatment of the internal differences of deliberation as in the case of McCarthy. Benhabib with her account of deliberative democracy certainly provides a more inclusive alternative since she clearly focuses on the importance of informal ways of deliberating within the public sphere. However, she falls short of acknowledging why most of the time the logic of these informal interactions differs from the formal ones. Instead, in her model, the process of understanding, or the hermeneutic circle, appears to be subordinated to decision-making process, that is, she identifies the social
This becomes quite apparent in her criticism of Iris Young. Benhabib opposes Young’s formal identification of different aspects of deliberation. In Benhabib’s view Young’s attempt to formally include various other modes of communication, such as greeting, story telling and rhetoric, as well as rational argumentation, is both unnecessary and implausible. Benhabib maintains that these modes of communication may have their place within the informally structured daily communicative practices, yet she claims that insisting on their formal recognition results in building an undesired opposition between the modes of communication and critical argumentation. (1996: 82-83). This is quite a puzzling conclusion by Benhabib in the sense that it renders her previous affirmation of an “anonymous public conservation”, based on “free and spontaneous processes of communication”, indeterminate in terms of its critical potential. The ambiguity increases even more when she states that the kinds of communicative modes that Young defends do not suit the public language of institutions and legislatures, which appeals to public reasons, consonant with the specific rhetorical structure of law (1996: 83). Here, Benhabib clearly prefers to allocate the defining role in deliberation to the formal bodies of deliberative institutions rather than spheres of informal communication. She ties her understanding of anonymous public conversation to the terms of decision-making bodies.

This shift towards defining deliberation mainly in decision-making terms undermines Benhabib’s attempt to overcome the strict universalisability requirement of discourse ethics. The main dilemma here appears to be stemming from the fact that a consistent way of arguing for the informal circles of deliberation requires a clear division of work between understanding and agreement oriented phases of deliberation. Therefore, so long as the emphasis in deliberative processes remains within the confines of the terms of decision making process there seems methodologically no consistent way out of this dilemma. This is perhaps the
main reason that Habermas does not change his position in relation to the role that rational agreement plays in his theory. Therefore, he manages to maintain the consistency of his argument.

Yet for Benhabib the solution she offers to relax the conditions of rational agreement makes a loop and ends up being tied to the same terms again, that is, the terms of decision-making process aimed to be surpassed at the first place. From a social learning perspective, Benhabib surely takes the right step to relax the universalisability requirement in order to initiate “an anonymous public conversation”, yet failing to clearly demarcate what differentiates “multiple foci of opinion formation and dissemination” from decision-making processes withers the impact of her emphasis on “non final processes of opinion formation” away.

The way out of this dilemma is to formally acknowledge the different modes of communication and then situate the kinds of rationality within each communicative sphere they belong to. It is only through this way that the benefits of Young’s “greeting, rhetoric and storytelling”, or any other informal way of communication for this matter, can be fully utilised.

1.8 Outside the Boundaries of Formal Deliberation: Young

Ironically, though, Young’s attempt to broaden the boundaries of deliberation through more inclusive features of her communicative democracy falls victim to the same dilemma. In her account of deliberative democracy Young displays a clear awareness of the role of different modes of communication in deliberative practices and tries to broaden the scope of inclusion. She states that

A theory of democratic inclusion requires an expanded conception of political communication, both in order to identify modes of internal inclusion and to provide an account of more inclusive possibilities of attending to one another in order to reach understanding (2000: 56)
To achieve the desired level of expansion, Young introduces three categories of greeting, rhetoric and narrative in addition to formal argument. She indicates that these additional categories are also important to counter balance some exclusionary characteristics in formal argumentative speech. For instance, the lack of competence in the articulation of the argument, being too emotional or passionate, or lack of orderly conduct could result with some contributions to the argument to be excluded from serious consideration “not because of what is said, but how it is said”.

The inclusion of different possibilities of communication surely will help to broaden the scope of deliberative practices for two main reasons. First of all, through a more personal expression of participants’ needs and desires, deliberative process would become more context sensitive since the gap between public and private reasoning will narrow down, prompting a more emphatic climate among participants towards understanding one another’s meanings and intentions, consequently fostering the conditions of social learning. Secondly, it would relax the strict conditions of universality, and thus rationality, by taking into account understanding more than agreement. The move towards understanding here designates a step into the domain of hermeneutic action, raising the possibility of demarcating a distinction between two different levels of deliberation as social learning and decision-making.

Yet, Young fails to appreciate this opportunity. Her analysis does not develop any further to fully articulate those differences. Her acknowledgement of different modes of communicative styles does not show how those different styles correspond to different modes of deliberation. Instead, as in Benhabib, Young makes her reference to those alternative modes of communication via the terms of decision-making process, thus remains inadequate in freeing the benefits of her argument from the limits of what currently governs the theories of deliberation.

Because of this problem, Young’s theory becomes vulnerable to the kind of critique that Benhabib raises. Benhabib is right in the sense that under the
terms of decision-making process, it is hard to envisage a deliberative process sustaining Young’s type of communicative styles. The restrictions of decision-making process, as outlined before, would eventually squeeze these alternative modes of communication out of deliberation process. This is a natural result of the fact that these alternative modes belong to a different deliberative sphere oriented more to the hermeneutic cycles of understanding and learning rather than decision making. Young’s attempt to broaden the scope of deliberation, therefore, remains not fully developed until she acknowledges the need that the differentiation of deliberation between social learning and decision-making modes should be properly established in order to adequately utilise the role that her alternative communication styles play.

1.9 Decoupling Social Learning From Decision-Making: Dryzek

An important contribution to deliberative theory as a social learning experience comes from John Dryzek (2003, 2000, 1990). The importance of Dryzek’s framework is twofold. Firstly, he recognises the social learning aspect of deliberation as distinct from decision-making by pointing to the different ways in which the deliberative process functions. Secondly, and more importantly, he suggests that decoupling these two phases of democratic process is a viable alternative for reconciling different views particularly when tough identity issues are at stake. This is certainly what is needed in order to maintain the methodological consistency that I have discussed above.

Under his scheme, which he calls discursive democracy, Dryzek posits democracy as a dynamic, open-ended project in which discourses engage each other in a timeless and spaceless fashion. Envisaging democratic process as contestation of discourses enables Dryzek to devise a framework based on the dialogic qualities of deliberation. Resembling
Habermas’ “the subjectless form of communication”, Dryzek’s discourses do not possess agency in that they cannot be reduced to a well-defined, individualistic set of values, instead they reflect different dimensions of individuals depending on the discursive circumstances. In his words:

A discourse is a shared means of making sense of the world embedded in language. Any discourse will always be grounded in assumptions, judgements, contentions, dispositions, and capabilities. These shared terms of reference enable those who subscribe to a particular discourse to perceive and compile bits of sensory information into coherent stories or accounts that can be communicated in intersubjectively meaningful ways. Thus a discourse will generally revolve around a central story line, containing opinions about both facts and values. (2000:18)

Defining discourses over the boundaries of individual identities, that is, on the basis of what constitutes their identity instead of what they want, enhances the possibility that individuals can get out of their binding group identities and express themselves freely and reflexively. Hence, Dryzek’s discursive model is broadly inclusive in the sense that the contestation of discourses is not restricted only to reasoned argument. Instead many other kinds of communication, including gossips, jokes and rhetoric, are allowed to take place in the process as long as they are reflective, non coercive and capable of linking the particular experiences with some more general point or principle. Discursive democracy in this sense is the sum of intersubjective communication across discourses within the public sphere and not limited to decision-making procedures only.

Indeed, for Dryzek, the idea of reciprocity grows out of not the decision moments of democratic practice, but of public deliberation construed as social learning (2003). He asserts that under the pressure of decision-making, especially when a decision is reached by voting, the democratic process turns into a contestation of identities, hence particularly in divided societies “the game becomes one of ensuring that the state is defined to make sure that one’s favoured identity will always and inevitably win key votes” (2003:7) In other words, contestation of identities, instead of
contestation of discourses, rules the process of deliberation in the form of “a raw clash of identities”, rendering a reflective attitude less possible.

Here Dryzek posits his solution. He suggests focusing on deliberation to function mainly within the boundaries of the public sphere, and decoupling deliberation and decision moments of the democratic process. He maintains that “reflection is a diffuse process, taking effect in the relative weight of competing discourses over time”, hence locating contestation of discourses in the public sphere as a social learning experience would enhance the possibility that individuals would be able to reflect on their preferences. This situation, Dryzek asserts, “is less fraught than that in hot deliberation, where reflection can only take effect in the choices of individuals under the gaze of both opponents and those with a shared identity” (2003:9). Dryzek refers here to Mackie’s observation (2002) that people resist admitting that they change their minds in deliberative forums, yet at another time and place with different participants admission becomes easier and more likely. Thus, for Dryzek, decoupling decision from deliberation goes hand in hand with decoupling the public sphere from the state apparatus and the formal bodies of decision-making in order to maintain the authenticity of deliberation. He seeks a semi-detached, loose connection with the state, yet he warns that the emphasis on the public sphere “as the appropriate venue for discursive contestation does not have to mean completely shunning the state”.

With his emphasis on decoupling social learning phase of deliberation from decision-making phase, Dryzek takes an important step towards the analytical treatment of internal differences in deliberative practices. Even though in this initial stage his theory does not fully elaborate how he envisages a workable arrangement between the two different phases of deliberation, it is now possible for Dryzek to argue the benefits of deliberation oriented to social learning through its own parameters without reverting back to premise where the rules of decision-making dominate. In other words, Dryzek is now one step closer to overcoming the dilemma that has marred the theories of McCarthy, Benhabib and Young. The ontological
shift that this step requires is also within the vicinity of Dryzek’s framework. His argument in favour of contestation of discourses in a timeless and spaceless fashion brings attention to the analysis of the pockets of deliberative activities in various forms and shapes oriented to mutual understanding.

So far I have defended that deliberative theory is due for a new approach in designing deliberative practice. This becomes particularly apparent when the social learning aspect of deliberation is brought into the foreground. Deliberative activity is sum of two different, but complementary stages: social learning and decision-making. Deliberative theory in general treats the decision-making stage as the loci of deliberative activity. As discussed, this is true even in the cases of theorists, who make great inroads into the informal zones of deliberation. Their attempts underline the importance of deliberative activity outside the formal territory of decision-making procedures, yet the way they conceptualise deliberative practice is still tied into the parameters of decision-making procedures. In this sense, they, with the exception of Dryzek, do not offer a clear plan to salvage social learning from the pressures of decision-making oriented activities.

A plan as such involves allocating social learning its own sphere decoupled from decision-making procedures. This is not to suggest that social learning and decision-making become mutually exclusive activities. Rather, they still function together, but in a more efficient way in that interpretive, hermeneutic qualities of social learning freed from the strict time and space requirements of decision-making procedures prosper in their own space. This will not only create a better environment for dialog oriented to mutual understanding between opposing parties, but will also effect the quality of decisions due to the enhancement in perceiving the position of others. The importance of this move will be seen more clearly in the next coming chapters, investigating the relationship between the competing groups of the Turkish public sphere.
2. BACKGROUND TO THE CASE OF TURKEY

In the previous sections I have constructed a new deliberative framework on the basis of an analytic separation of the social learning phase of deliberation with the decision-making phase. I have also argued that this move is specifically important in societies where ethical, religious and cultural divisions cut deep across the whole society. Recognition of deliberation as social learning opens up a more adequate space allowing members of these societies to deal more effectively with differences separating them. Turkey is one of these societies, not only because of its diverse social fabric, but also because it is one of the rare examples in the Islamic world where Islam coexists with a secular system in which religious rules play no role in the conduct of public affairs. In Turkey, Islam sits at the background of the secular regime established by Mustafa Kemal in 1923. Examining the impact this sudden move created on the Turkish society is not the aim of my discussion. For better or worse, though, those dramatic steps towards secularisation transformed the circumstances in which religion and politics interacted in Turkey. Having lost its dominant position, for the first time, Islam had to play a defensive role against an unfriendly state. This required a different type of interaction, changing continuously according to the dynamics of the time. It is the dynamics of this interaction that makes Turkey a good case to study in terms of the alternative ways that deliberative processes function.

The importance of the example of Turkey has become even more significant with the decisive victory of the Islamic leaning AKP in the 2002 general elections. For the first time in the eighty-year-old history of the Republic, Turkey is now being governed by an Islamic leaning party bringing to the surface all types of fears and controversies that preoccupy most secular minds. The division along religious and secular lines has always been sharp in Turkey, yet the decisiveness of the AKP’s victory almost caused a sense of despair among secular minded Turks. As I will explain, the AKP’s victory came in the midst of an increasingly bitter conflict between the army and the
representatives of Islamic politics. For a secular eye, then, seeing the election result as a defiance to the secular regime was not a remote possibility. Furthermore, the Turkish seculars were not alone to be troubled by the AKP's election victory. A strong degree of astonishment was also observable in the Western world, struggling to recover from the impact of September the 11th. While the main concern for secular Turks was the fear of losing the long secular tradition and perhaps being forced to live under some Islamic rules, the West preoccupied itself with the question of whether Islamic fundamentalism was about to flourish in a country perceived as exemplary by some for combining secularism and Islam. Despite the AKP leadership's continuous conciliatory gestures, indicating no intentions to harm or change Turkey's existing secular system, in the eyes of Kemalists the AKP still remains a threat to the secular system. For instance, the only opposition party in parliament and the main political voice of the Kemalist line, the CHP, claims that the AKP indeed has a hidden agenda to overturn the secular system. Along these lines, for instance, the Deputy Chairman of the CHP, Ali Topuz, once declared that the CHP was now engaging in a guerrilla war against the Government to protect the secular system. Similar views, though not so aggressively but mainly anxiously expressed revealing the same concern, are also heard from the Army ranks as well as from the country's President Sezer. The President for instance did not invite the parliamentarians and public servants' spouses, to some official ceremonies if they were wearing the scarf. This was officially justified as protecting the public sphere from religiously motivated actions. Thus, at the level of formal politics Turkey's current climate shows deep divisions between Islamic and secular groups.

What is important here from the point of my argument is that those divisions, endemic to Turkish social and political life, have a limited chance to be reconciled within the boundaries of formal politics. As I will show in the background sections on the different political discourses, the commonalities between Islamic and secular lines are in fact surprisingly larger than one could expect. However, making those commonalities functional in the sense that they contribute to the formation of a democratic polity around which
different groups could gather regardless of what their background is, requires an alternative way of conceiving the democratic process. Deliberation oriented to social learning and understanding offers this alternative, that is, Turkey’s current dilemma between Islamic and secular politics may be resolved if the social learning model of deliberation can secure itself a place in the public sphere to function towards the enhancement of mutual understanding between conflicting groups. The examples of dialog and cooperation at grassroots levels between some groups that traditionally are not considered as allies are already at work within Turkey’s vibrant public sphere. Examples of this are the cooperation between Islamic and secular groups, most notably between some leftist and Islamic women organisations, to be discussed later. As I will show, those interactions are not common practice yet, but nevertheless they exemplify the genesis of a new democratic politics in Turkey. The Q study findings in Turkey will show that the root of this unlikely alliance is a paradigm shift towards individual rights in both Islamic and left politics. However, this shift has not been properly comprehended yet by neither secular, nor Islamic sections of Turkish society. It is therefore important that the development of interaction between secular and Islamic groups should be investigated. This would not only help to appreciate why social learning plays a crucial role in social development but would also reveal the conditions for a new type of politics for both Islamic and secular sections of the Turkish community.

Within this framework I will first look at the nature of the relationship between Islam and democracy; since it is important to see whether Islam can indeed submit itself to a secular order or not. This requires first looking at the arguments defending the possibility of compatibility between Islam and democracy in the liberal Islamic tradition in general. Arguments, accepting and refuting the possibility of a relationship between Islam and democracy, will be briefly visited to lay the foundation of a discussion about Islam’s interaction with democratic values. Then I will focus on the relationship between Islam and the State in Turkey, particularly by examining the developments within Islamic politics since the formation of the AKP.
2.1 Islam and Democracy

Let me first describe what constitutes the main problem about Islam’s relationship with democracy. It has long been argued that from a liberal point of view, the problem for a Muslim, whose sole aspiration is to become selfless in the service to God, is how to establish an autonomous, worldly notion of sovereignty without challenging God’s. There is a large amount of literature on the topic but, in a nutshell, critiques point out the fundamental role the principle of *tawhid* plays in Islam. As the very foundation of Islamic belief, the *tawhid* refers to the oneness of God, that is, he is the greatest, he is unique and transcendent, and has no associates. With the *tawhid*, for a Muslim, anything other than God becomes secondary. So, for instance, the dual structure of public and private in any imagined democratic society becomes at the best blurry, but most probably impossible since the *tawhid* only envisages a monolithic code of orders to reflect the unity of God and His believers (*Umma*). Therefore, the divine order covers any aspect of life to such a degree that it becomes meaningless to separate religion from politics, the state and the law. In line with this argument, Roy, for instance, claims that the *tawhid* principle, has been interpreted in such a way that the divine oneness of God is also sought to be reflected in the society where no segmentation in any form, social, ethnic, tribal (even national), and no political authority detached from God, are allowed (1994: 40-41). It is easy then to conclude that Islam, as an inclusive, total order, excludes any secular space, even a contingent one simply because it does not recognise any sovereign other than God. Following a similar logic, Huntington blatantly claimed “the underlying problem for the West is not Islamic fundamentalism. It is Islam” (1996: 217).

My main objection to this type of critique would be that only focusing on the textual interpretation of the Quran pays little attention to the contextual reality in which Islam evolves. This does not reflect the diversity in Islam, and undermines the attempts of many Islamic scholars endeavouring to develop a liberal interpretation of Islam. It fails, for instance, to explain the attempts made by a large number of states, such as Turkey, Malaysia and
Indonesia, to create a legal arena based on fundamental human rights; nor does it explain why Islamic fundamentalism has not been able to find mass support among Muslims. In fact, Stepan (2001) shows that in countries like Indonesia, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Turkey and even post-1997 Iran Islamic fundamentalism is retreating rather than advancing. Similarly, Esposito and Voll (1996) analyse the way Islamic states have evolved in different Islamic countries and concludes that these experiences reflect the great diversity in the Islamic world. Therefore, paying attention to the democratic dimension in Islam becomes critical.

The (in)compatibility between Islam and democracy is well researched (Esposito & Voll, 1996; Surush, 2000; Sharif, 1999; Kabuli, 1994). Scholars investigating liberal interpretations of Islam have extensively argued that Islam does not allow the separation of divine and worldly affairs. David Little (1988: 28-31), for instance, asserts that the Quran clearly considers the religious belief as a deeply inward personal matter, a matter of the heart leading to tolerance towards religious diversity. He quotes several verses from the Quran: “To you your religion and to me my religion” (Sura; 109), “To each among you, have we prescribed a Law and Open Way. And if God enforced His Will, He would have made of you all one people” (Sura 5/48), “Let there be no compulsion in religion” (2/256). Little maintains that these and many other verses in the Quran confirm the differentiation of the spiritual and civic realms in Islamic thought. What is more, Little argues, both Western and Islamic traditions share a common framework in reference to freedom of consciousness and religious liberty, thus rendering current human rights formulations also relevant to cultures outside the West.

Along the same lines, Khurshid Ahmad (1976: 38-43), a contemporary Islamic thinker, maintains that the Islamic way of living subscribes to the view that individuals are responsible for their own actions and that everybody is personally accountable to God. Khurshid also quotes several verses from the Quran, such as “Man shall have nothing but what he strives for” (53:39); “God does not change the condition of a people unless they first change that which is in their hearts” (13:11) to assert that God only
revealed the broad principles of an ethical life and left men free to apply these principles according to their conditions.

Another Islamic scholar Ashgar Khan (1986) speaks even more confidently about the division of religious and political affairs in Islam. He asserts that, in an Islamic setting, the state cannot even be termed Islamic, precisely because the Quran contains no reference to an Islamic state with a particular kind of structure or ideology. Thus, he concludes “in the absence of a definition of the nature of the state in either the Quran or the Ahadith, it is not only possible but essential for Muslims to evolve appropriate forms of government, keeping in view the social, economic and political imperatives of the time” (1986: 80-82). Following the same line of thinking Muhammad Iqbal asserts that “the Republican form of government is not only thoroughly consistent with the spirit of Islam, but has also become a necessity in view of the new forces that are set free in the world of Islam” (1986: 260).

The relationships between Islam and democracy have also been extensively debated among Turkey’s Islamic intelligentsia, whose arguments have not only analysed this relationship in general terms but also focused on the special circumstances of Turkish Islam (Arslan, 1999, 1996; Yaran, 2001; Guler, 2002; Alper, 2000; Uyanik, 1999, Bulac, 2001). One theme that appears consistently in those arguments is Islam’s natural affinity with democracy. Since the Quran orders that God’s authority can only be assigned to the community of individual believers (the umma), in any ideal Islamic society only the people are supposed to be the sovereign. Even the authority of Mohammed in this sense is restricted to being a messenger only. The Quran, Islamic scholars argue, does not make any explicit reference to any kind of governing structure or style, yet it asserts certain norms to reflect the will of people in political and administrative affairs. Shura (consultation) is one of those rules, which should play a central role in governing people. The Quran commands Muslims to make decisions after consultation. Because they are the agents of God (vicegerents) they should be consulted by the ruler as a matter of respect. In this regard, shurah represents a general right for people, carrying a progressive potential in any
discussion on Islam and democracy. Similarly *ijma* (consensus) has been an important concept particularly in the development of Islamic law. Even though it has been mostly used to indicate consensus among *ulema* (Islamic scholars) rather than among the general community, the concept of *ijma* can be directed towards the establishment of a legitimate political order (Esposito & Voll; 1996).

Apart from these general arguments about the compatibility of Islam and democracy, the unique characteristics of Turkish Islam have also been dealt with extensively. Caha (1999), for instance, argues that under the Ottoman rule a civil code (*kanun*) always run parallel to the religious code (*sheria*). In fact, particularly in the 19th century the civil code had become gradually more dominant in relation to the conduct of public affairs, restricting the application of religious code mainly to the private sphere. Caha points to the fact that since the Ottomans had never been dominated by the West, they did not develop any strong anti-Western sentiments and adopted the principles of Western-style governing without much hesitation, such as a constitutional parliamentary system based on democratic individual rights. This alone perhaps represents one of the most important reasons that Turkey today displays a different picture compared to most of other Islamic countries.

The role of *tasavvuf* in the development of Islam in Turkey is another theme raised by Islamic scholars. Prof. Mehmed Aydin (1994), who is currently the Minister for Religious Affairs, for instance argues that the *tasavvuf* (Sufii) tradition in Turkey has greatly enhanced the role of dialog in Islamic tradition, since Sufis, through dialog with God, always perceive themselves to be engaging in an equal and sincere learning process, contrary to a master-slave type of relation prevailing in most theological (scriptural) traditions. Caha and Aras express similar views about Turkish Islam in their analysis of Fetullah Gulen’s liberal Islamic movement (2000). A prominent Islamic intellectual Ali Bulac (2001), makes the positive note that the conditions of dialog traditionally exist within Turkish society, thus the main task in Turkey now is to discern points of convergence between different
views through dialog. Bulac maintains that the Islamic rule is not only geared to the demands of a pluralistic society, but also orders to practice Islam accordingly. The Quran acknowledges that there are other ways of living than those advanced by Islam and that judging those will ultimately be done by God himself on the Judgement Day, thus there should be no compulsion in religious matters. Then, Bulac concludes that the actual task is to discern the point of convergence between different views through dialog. Once the common way is established it becomes the basis for a social contract drawn by the parties involved (2001: 92-100).

These are only few examples of the abundant literature refuting the incompatibility between Islam and democracy. Yet none of them suggests that building a framework, in which both Islam and democracy work cooperatively, is an easy task particularly in the face of the fact that since the establishment of Emevi dynasty in the 7th century there has been almost no example of a properly functioning democratic system within the Islamic world. Perhaps more importantly, the challenges that a democratic polity imposes on the Islamic way of living still have not been resolved properly in the minds of the majority of Muslims. Here I have in mind issues related to universal individual rights, particularly in sex and gender. In relation to women's place in Islam, at least it might have been possible to claim that there has been an increasing awareness on equity matters, which are consistently brought to the agenda by Islamic women's organisations (Gole, 2002; Tuksal, 2000). Yet, on the other hand gay and lesbian rights, for instance, appear to be an awkward issue for Islamic politics as the Quran explicitly bans homosexual relationships.

Nevertheless, the arguments outlined above in favour of compatibility between Islam and democracy at least show that Islam does have resources available to be utilised for a democratic polity, but only in different forms depending on the historical circumstances in which Islam evolves. In other words, the context is important to interpret textual references to the Quran. This is, I believe, the key to appreciate the dynamics of Islam in relation to its interaction with the social and political surroundings.
In this sense, Gellner’s analysis of the development of Islam as a social order appears to be a promising starting point. Gellner (1981) points to the different ways in which Christianity and Islam evolved. He argues that from the beginning Christianity contained an understanding of a separation between religious and political affairs, since it grew out of a context dominated by Roman rule. The political structure of Palestine, at the time of Christ, was directly subordinated to the Roman Empire through a governor. For Christianity then there was no other solution but to constraint the theocratic aspirations with some political modesty, which meant acknowledging the difference between civil and religious law, formulated in the New Testament as “render to God that which is God’s and to Caesar that which is Caesar’s”. Hence, Gellner concludes “a faith which begins, and for sometime remains, without political power, cannot but accommodate itself to a political order which is not, or is not yet, under its control” (1981: 1-2).

Islam’s development, on the other hand, followed a completely different pattern. Its success was so rapid that it owed nothing to any sovereign, thus inhibiting “the handing over of some sphere of life to non-religious authority” (1981: 2). Indeed, there was no Caesar in the Arabic peninsula in Muhammad’s time. On the contrary, the political power was grounded in different customs and beliefs, which were disseminated in a sporadic fashion. Therefore, the challenge for Muhammad was to introduce a new political system to unify the anarchic rivalry among different tribes, rather than to try to work out ways to handle the pressures of a strong central authority. The consequence of this was the simultaneous development of political and religious spheres in which the rules of politics were easily subordinated to the rule of Islam. Arkoun also argues the development of Christianity and Islam in a similar vein and asserts there are in fact no differences among the Judaic, Christian and Islamic way of internalising the authority of the Revelation. Speaking of a separation between the realms of power in civic and religious terms is in a theological sense not conceivable. Thus, he contends, without taking into account the historical conditions of
the day, establishing any contrast between Christianity and Islam would be too hasty, superficial and unacceptable (1994; 18-23)

Gellner’s and Arkoun’s analysis’s highlight the fact that the development of Islam as a blueprint of social order is the product of certain historical circumstances. Thus, if the circumstances change, a change in the dialog between the state and Islamic forces should also be expected. It is worth mentioning that Gellner’s contextual sensitivity does not go any further than pointing to the conditions under which Islam flourished. The rest of his argument leads to the conclusion that Islam cannot be secularised (also see 1994). Nevertheless, his emphasis on the contextual sensitivity of Islam can be helpful in understanding why Islam can take different shapes under different circumstances. The development of Islam under the secular regime of the Turkish Republic constitutes a good example in favour of this assertion.

2.2 Islam and the State Relationship in Turkey

In the previous section, I have argued that Islam and democracy are not mutually exclusive and the political form Islam takes up depends upon the circumstances of the day. In this sense, in Turkey the conditions under which Islam has been interacting with the state since the foundation of the Republic provides valuable insights into the political capacity of Islam to deal with surrounding social and political conditions. In this section therefore I will look at the development of the relationship between Islam and the state following the emergence of the new Turkish Republic after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Rather than to provide a full historical account of what happened, my aim here is to depict the contours of the interaction of Islam with a secular system to which it is subordinated. To this end, I will analyse the development of Islam under the Turkish Republic in five stages, which will follow how the relationship between Islam and the state evolved from the dawn of the Turkish Republic in 1923 to the current day.
2.2.1 The Five Stages of Islam and the State Relationship

The proclamation of the Kemalist Turkish Republic in 1923 was the beginning of a new era in Turkey for Islam, which now had to adapt to a new political culture. Having for the first time, since the establishment of the Ottoman Empire, lost its dominant position, Islam had to defend itself against an unfriendly state. This required a different type of interaction, which over the years changed continuously according to the dynamics of the time. The unique relationship between Islam and the secular state in Turkey is captured succinctly in Gellner’s assertion, “Islam is unique among world religions, and Turkey is unique within the Muslim world” (1997; 233).

In this section I will construct five main stages to highlight the cornerstones in Islam’s interaction with the Kemalist state, indicating the different level of engagement in each stage. The five stage construction of Islam’s evolvement under the Turkish Republic also aims to provide the background to my claim that the social learning model of deliberation could play a crucial role in divided societies such as Turkey. This background will also be functional to appreciate the findings of the Q Study set out in the next section.

The first stage goes from 1923 to 1946. This was a period of almost complete retreat for Islam, particularly during Mustafa Kemal’s rule. The separation between religious and political affairs was the most dramatic and forceful step taken by the Kemalist forces in their attempt to establish a Western style regime. The radical shift towards secularisation was grounded by equally radical changes at the bureaucratic, legal and legislative levels. Some of these changes are the abolition of the Sultanate and the Caliphate in 1924, the banning of all religious sects in 1925, the adoption of the secular civil code of law from Switzerland and the Dress and Headgear Law in 1926, the abolition of religious courts and religious titles in 1928, and a constitutional amendment in 1937 declaring that the Turkish Republic was a secular state. Meanwhile, the state tried to control the influence of Islam. All religious activities were placed under the state supervision and the Directory...
of Religious Affairs was established. Largely removed from the political sphere Islam retreated to the private sphere, where it continued to maintain a strong presence. Yet, in terms of the interaction between Islam and the state it was a one-way traffic, since Islam was placed under control of the state.

The second stage goes from 1946 to 1970. The beginning of the second stage marks the end of the single party ruling. Following the establishment of the DP (Democrat Party) the first multi party elections were held in 1946. The establishment of the DP was for the religious segments of the Turkish society, mainly constituted of the rural population, the first opportunity to gain a breathing space within the public arena. Islamic groups, some of them influential sects such as Nakshibendis, quickly gathered around the newly established DP. Even though it lost the first multi party election in 1946, the DP continued gaining the support of Islamic votes and won the 1950 election. The DP government kept promises made to its Islamic constituency and relaxed some rules concerning religious practice and education, but more importantly opened the doors of the public service to some well-educated religious people, mostly coming from rural areas. This was a turning point in the relations between the religious periphery and the secular centre. Apart from giving access to the state to the rural population, this interaction was helpful in closing the gap between the Kemalist elite and the rural population, which was usually looked upon as being uneducated and backwards (Mert, 2001: 48) The DP, in a sense, became the public face of Islam until it was ousted after the 1960 military coup. The leader of the DP, Adnan Menderes, and his two deputies were charged with treason and executed a year later. The rest of the party executive was jailed for charges similar to those that led to their leader’s tragic fate. The army asked Ismet Inonu, the leader of the CHP (Mustafa Kemal’s secular party), to form a government and work on a new constitution. Even though this was not the intention of the Army, this new Constitution, usually considered as the most democratic constitution of the Turkish Republic to date, provided more opportunities for religious groups to legally appear in the public realm mainly because of its provision for extended rights to set up civil associations.
(Mazici, 2002: 555). Meanwhile, the followers of the DP formed a new party, the AP (Justice Party). The AP openly indicated that they continued the DP tradition. The AP, as the DP used to, appealed to religious voters and successfully gained their support to win the general elections with a big margin in 1965. The AP government continued the DP’s tolerant approach to Islam opening up the party and public institutions to committed Muslims.

**The third stage** covers the period going from 1970 to 1981. The year 1970 marks the beginning of political Islam’s long walk to the power. Up until the 2002 general elections, this was mainly the work of one Islamic party, even though it had to change its name several times due to military interventions. Though the name changed, the party’s staff and organisational structure usually remained the same.

In 1970, the first Islamic party, the MNP (National Order Party) was founded. With the MNP, the Islamic tradition finally succeeded to be represented by its own rights in the political system. The Islamic discourse was now a legitimate part of the political sphere. Within a short period of time the MNP had branches all over Turkey. However, this rapid growth was halted in 1971 by a second military coup. During the transition government which followed, the Constitutional Court abolished the MNP. However, in 1972, the MNP supporters formed a new party, the MSP (National Salvation Party), which again received the support of Islamic groups. The 1973 general elections were a big success for the MSP. Collecting more than 11% of the votes they placed forty-eight representatives in parliament. The election results required forming a coalition government. After lengthy negotiations, the MSP agreed to form a coalition government with the CHP, Mustafa Kemal’s secular party. The coalition collapsed in 1975, but the MSP managed to be part of another coalition with the AP and the MHP, the Nationalistic Front Coalition. Unlike in its first coalition attempt with the CHP, this time the MSP was part of a right wing government, which lasted until the 1980 military coup. During its time in those coalition governments, the MSP, as the political face of the Islamic Discourse, was careful not to be distinguished as representing a challenge to the secular system. The main
intention of the leadership was to create a base within the state; hence they rigorously tried to hold as many positions as possible within the state bureaucracy. The electoral success of the MSP had a definite impact on other right wing parties, which all tried to adjust their discourse according to the Islamic tone developed by the MSP. The Islamic references used in Turkish politics increased considerably.

The third stage ended with the third military coup in 1980, which was triggered by the rapid, and almost uncontrollable, increase in clashes between left and right wing groups threatening the stability of the regime. In the early hours of 12 September 1980, the army launched a coup and took control of the whole political and administrative institutions including the parliament. Most party leaders and politicians, including the Prime Minister, were arrested. This was followed by an onslaught on militants of political groups. Even though the army’s main target looked like left wing organisations, some right wing and Islamic militants, who instigated the pre-coup violence, were also targeted.

The fourth stage, covering the period between 1981 and 1997, witnessed the ascendance of Islam in Turkish politics. For the first time, Islam tried to be increasingly more assertive, some time even aggressive, in its dialog with the state, particularly between 1995 and 1997. Ironically though, the most crucial support for Islam came from an unexpected source, the army.

The aim of the 1980 military coup was the elimination of leftist organisations, seen as a real threat to the unity of the state and the nation. Since the army did not see Islam as a threat, even though most leaders of the MSP were arrested after the coup, they were soon released. The army’s choice to control the ideological vacuum created by the defeat of the left was Islam. Hence strong Islamic themes imprinted most public speeches performed by the leadership of the army. The Chief of the Staff, General Kenan Evren, is remembered even today for his emphasis on the importance of Islam as a mean to maintain national unity. Along this line, the military regime made religious classes compulsory in public schools. In the first years of the coup, leftist staff members in schools, universities and the
public service were sacked and replaced by religious people. The same trend continued under the ANAP (Motherland Party) Government, which in 1984 won the first general elections after the coup. In fact, the most prominent members of the ANAP, including the leader, Turgut Ozal, were members of the MSP before the military coup.

In 1982, the remaining members of the MSP formed another party, the RP (Welfare Party). After a relatively slow start, the RP managed to obtain 9.8% of the votes in the 1989 elections, then almost doubled its vote in the 1994 local elections. With 19% of the votes, the RP won local councils all around Turkey, including in Istanbul and the capital city Ankara. Finally, in the 1995 general elections, they became the largest party in parliament after collecting 20% of the general vote and formed a coalition government with the DYP (True Path Party), which was established by the AP followers after the military coup. The leader of the RP, Prof Necmettin Erbakan, became Prime Minister. This was a turning point in the sense that the RP, perhaps with the confidence gained by winning the support of large numbers, shifted its discourse to adopt a more aggressive style. Issues resulting from the competing features between Islamic and modern ways of living were brought on the political agenda. For instance, in the universities the admission of female students wearing the scarf became a battleground for how to draw a line between Islamic and secular values. This was accompanied by an increasing number of critiques about the secular regime and Kemalism. The RP’s antagonistic style finally prompted the National Security Council to issue an ultimatum on the 28th of February 1997, forcing the RP to resign from the government. A few months later, the Constitutional Court abolished the RP. This represented a corner stone marking a fundamental shift in the relationship between RP, the state and the army. From 1997 onwards, while some of the RP followers tried to develop a different vision of Islamic politics as an alternative to the RP’s aggressive rhetoric, the army put an end to its tolerant approach to Islam.

**The fifth stage** goes from 1997 to 2002. Soon after the abolishment of the RP, the party faithful formed another party, the FP (Virtue Party) and
participated in the 1999 general elections. However, the result was rather disappointing compared to RP's success in the previous election. The bad result was a reflection of the discontent of the Muslims towards the aggressive style of the RP. The FP only managed to become the third party in parliament after the DSP (Democratic Left Party) and the MHP. The FP's misfortune continued with a new decision of the Constitutional Court that their formation replicated too much of the old RP, hence they had to be closed down. As usual, a new party was quickly established, the SP (Prosperity Party). However, the long running internal divisions within the party, which started with the abolishment of the RP, finally surfaced. After bitter debates in different party forums the liberal wing of the party resigned from the SP and formed the AKP (Justice and Development Party). The result of this move was remarkable. Established less than a year before the general elections in November 2002, the AKP managed to draw support not only from the SP’s Islamic grassroots, but also from other conservative but secular parties, most notably the ultra nationalist MHP. The AKP won the election with 34% of votes, twice as much as the CHP, the Kemalist secular party, and secured one of the biggest majorities in the history of the Turkish parliament. Meanwhile, the SP, even though it claimed to be the real flag bearer of the long running tradition of Islam’s political struggle in Turkey accusing the AKP of betraying this tradition, had to satisfy itself with only 2% of the votes.

2.2.2 The AKP’s Paradigm Shift

The current political climate in Turkey shows that this result represented a fundamental shift in Turkish politics both in terms of voters' behaviour and party politics. As one television commentator suggested “nothing would be the same again in Turkey” in terms of Islam’s relationship with the secular state. Yet, the major change in this framework occurred mainly in the Islamic discourse, which decided to remove Islam from being the backbone of their politics to define itself from the angle of a different paradigm, based on the liberal idea of individual rights. The AKP’s remarkable achievement
was a clear sign by the Islamic camp of, not only a rethinking process over the position of Islam in a secular setting, but also the acceptance, by the majority of the Turkey’s Muslim community, of AKP’s more liberal attitude. It simply testifies to an Islamic party’s eventual capacity to accommodate to surrounding conditions.

Behind the success of the AKP a break from the rhetoric of the thirty-year-old Islamic politics was crucial. The leadership of the party was keen not to commit the errors made by the SP’s predecessor, the RP, who had developed an increasingly aggressive tone throughout the ascendency of the party. The AKP was aware that this aggressive style, which led to the rising tension between the army and the party and ultimately to the closure of the RP by the Constitutional Court, was not received well in the Muslim community. The public image of the RP as an Islamic party was also challenged by the AKP, branding itself as a centre-conservative party committed to secular principles. During the election campaign, religious themes, including the scarf issue, were put in the background in favour of economic and anti-corruption themes. Women candidates harbouring a modern look (not wearing a scarf) were introduced and brought forward. However, more important than the image the AKP created was the change in its understanding of the relationship between Islam and the state. The party leadership was keen not to run a religious agenda. The muddling of Islam with politics was seen as the main reason for the stagnation of the relationship with broader sections of the Turkish electorate. During the election campaign, the AKP continuously reiterated its loyalty to the main principles of the secular system. This continued after the election as well. The leader of the AKP, Tayyip Erdogan, in a post election interview with The Washington Post’s Lally Weymouth (2002) indicated this commitment clearly:

(Weymouth) In the West, some fear that your party is a threat to the secular state. Is this so?

(Erdogan) “Our party sees secularism as an important segment of democracy. Secularism establishes the administrative structure of this country.”
(Weymouth) People in the West admire Turkey as a secular, democratic, Muslim country. They are worried that your party is really an Islamic party that will change the nation’s character.

(Erdogan) “Our political party is not Islamic. It is not based on religion. A political party cannot be Islamist. It cannot be for Islam. These are inaccurate terminologies. Islam is a religion, and a party is just a political institution.”

AKP’s story testifies of the different modes Islam can go through in its relationship with the state and politics, depending on the circumstances of the day. The years of uncertainty about how to deal with the Kemalist secular regime during the MSP, the RP, the FP and the SP leadership (mainly under Prof Necmettin Erbakan) appears to be heading to a resolution. The clearest and the most important sign of this came at the beginning of 2004. In January the 10th the AKP declared itself as a conservative democratic party following a weekend long international conference in Istanbul. In his speech at the conference, the Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan said that the AKP’s predecessors (referring to the tradition of the RP, the FP and the SP) were acting as a “political community”, on the basis of a certain ideology and appealing only to supporters of that ideology. Erdogan described this as a dangerous politics of polarisation and drew a clear line between religion and politics. He asserted that establishing a party in the name of religion would be an injustice to religion and he reiterated that the solution to this problem is to maintain a secular system. Secularism, Erdogan described, provides an essential tool to regulate the balance between religion and politics by keeping the state neutral towards and at an equal distance to all faiths and religions (Turkish Daily News, 12.01.04).

One week later, Erdogan repeated his views to a different audience within a different context. Attending a business conference in Saudi Arabia, Erdogan said “I do not find the idea of an Islamic common market to be a good one. Whatever happens, we will not base relations on ethnic and religious roots. Polarisation will emerge if we start to establish institutions as such” (Turkish Daily News; 20.01.04)
The acknowledgment by the AKP of the most fundamental secular principle, the separation of religious and political affairs, is of primary importance to the enhancement of democratic aspirations in Turkey. This is a clear paradigm shift in Islamic politics responding to the conditions of the day. Comparing the differences between the SP and the AKP party programs Atakan draws attention to this shift in Islamic politics. She asserts that with the AKP breaking up from the long running National view tradition, Islam has lost its backbone role in Turkish politics (2003). Muzaffer Turkone, in his analysis of the 2002 general elections, opines that the reason behind the AKP’s clear break from a politics oriented to Islam is its determination to escape from the pressures of the Kemalist elite and the state. The AKP leadership found a once and for all solution, that is, the social, political and economic rights of Muslims could only be protected under a Western universal law system based on the protection of individual rights (2002). It is hard not to see here the proximity between Islam’s response to Turkey’s secular status-quo and the reaction of Christianity to the Roman rule as evaluated by Gellner.

To sum up, from the point of my argument perhaps the most important consequence of the paradigm shift by the AKP is that it has created a climate for dialog between once extremely alienated sections of Turkish society. Interestingly, the closest ally of Muslims appears to be the Liberal Left. The Q study findings will testify to this reality quite strongly. On issues such as the role of the army in politics, the perception of the scarf issue as a human rights problem, the anti-state sentiment and anti-Kemalism, Islamic and the Left discourses displays strong similarities, which herald a new kind of alliance in Turkish politics. Even though the examples of this alliance are not widespread yet, some close cooperation between the left and Islamic groups can be discerned in various forums and platforms. The most notable example of it can be seen among organisations dealing with human rights issues. This is certainly no coincidence, giving that the nature of this cooperation is based on the acknowledgement of individual rights. The crucial point here for both sides is that the notion of individual rights was a new concept demanding a substantial review of their traditional way of
defining the parameters of their politics. Their inquiry into a new political
terrain, as a result, has broadened the political scope of both sides leading
to a new level of interaction, thus understanding between them.
3. THE Q STUDY

In the previous chapter I outlined the dynamics of Islam’s relationship with the state in the Turkish Republic. It is against this background that the study, based on Q Methodology was conducted in Turkey. The study aimed to identify the characteristics of discourses available in the Turkish public sphere in relation to Islam, democracy and secularism. The Q study provides a map of subjective viewpoints about the topic at hand. In the case of Turkey, I aimed to use the Q study to pinpoint the possible moments of dialog or cooperation between different discourses on Islam, democracy and secularism. Those are the moments when different views could converge on how they conceive the problem, indicating in return important clues about how to develop a framework to reconcile differences between them. In this sense Q methodology is a powerful tool providing a broad range of options to be articulated by the researcher. I will start this section by explaining what Q methodology is and how it is conducted. After providing a brief background I will clarify the difference between normal R methodology statistical techniques and Q methodology in order to establish why I chose Q methodology. This will be followed by a detailed elaboration of the technical aspects of Q methodology. The section on Q in Turkey will represent an application of Q methodology aiming at developing an account of discourses on Islam, democracy and secularism in the Turkish public sphere.

3.1 General Background

Q methodology was developed by British physicist/psychologist William Stephenson from the 1930s onward, as a technique to examine human subjectivity (1935, 1953, 1985). Stephenson’s main interest was to measure and correlate different subjective viewpoints individuals held on any matter of personal or social importance and map out a typology of these perspectives, providing a point of convergence and/or disjunctions in relation to each other (Brown 1996, 1993; Block, 1961). The main premise upon which his methodological framework was built was that subjective
views were communicable and always advanced from a position of self-reference in that subjectivity simply means communication of a personal point of view.

The task of Q methodology then is to provide a systematic examination of those personal experiences, with the hope that what a person actually means when he says what he does can be discovered (Brown, 1980; 46). It is this focus on subjective frameworks that makes Q methodology quite a powerful tool to analyse situations in which personal attitudes show different ways of perceiving a matter of concern. Donner (1998) also indicates that because the data are easy to gather, easy to analyze, and easy to present, Q-methodology is good not only as a research tool but also as a participatory exercise.

However, what makes it a special tool and distinguishes it from other statistical techniques, such as those used in R methodology, is that Q methodology, as a result of its recognition of the communicability of personal references, is concerned with patterns of subjective perspectives across individuals. The oppositional characters of Q and R are best explained by Stephenson himself when he first wrote to Nature in 1935 and explained that R methodology referred to “a selected population of $n$ individuals each of whom has been measured in $m$ tests” whereas Q methodology referred to “a population of $n$ different tests (or essays, pictures, traits or other measurable material), each of which is measured or scaled by $m$ individuals” (in Brown, 1980; 9). Brown explains that the main difference between the two is an individuals’ stance in relation to the role they play in the measurement process. In the former R case, the person is passive in that s/he is measured as the object of the study, whereas in the latter case the person is active in that s/he, as the subject of the study, measures the data from her/his standpoint. It is through this self-referential character of Q that its methodology can establish similar and differing views in any given topic available to personal examination. This is done through the assessment of patterns of subjective perspectives across individuals. Yet in the case of R, the assessment is done across objective variables.
rather than individual characteristics, such as professional status and
gender. R methodology studies the relationship between these variables. It
can also correlate opinions, yet does so in isolation from one another. Thus
its real strength is being able to abstract characteristics from individuals to
reach generalisations.

Q methodology, instead of abstracting those individual traits, works to
understand the states of mind revealing how individuals with different views
observe the topic in question. The result of this is more an in-depth analysis
of small but well-selected samples rather than a large –n statistical analysis
seeking to generalise the findings to a larger population, as in the case of R
methodology (Rohrbaugh 1997b).

Here, McKeown (1988) suggests that the difference between R and Q
method can be best described as a distinction between the methods of
expression and impression. Methods of expression, McKeown maintains,
measure the traits from an external point of view in that “the respondent's
own point of view on the matter is of little theoretical interest and technical
significance” (1988; 23). In other words, the investigator holds interest
neither in what kind of meanings respondents assign to questions, nor in the
intentions of respondents when they answer the questions. With methods of
impression under Q method, on the other hand, the respondents’ subjective
view gains prime importance. When assigning scores to the items with
which he/she is confronted, the internal frame of reference of each subject
is embedded into their responses. In this sense Q methodology fully
engages with the respondents’ own logic and their personal experiences.
This reveals itself also in the fact that Q methodologically does not ascribe
any a priori meaning to the items in question. Meanings are created during
the process of responses, which contrasts with R techniques in which both
variables and traits in question are constructed by the researcher’s frame of
reference (1988: 22-24). In short, by emphasising the importance of
subjectivity Q methodology proceeds in a naturalistic way in the sense that
the research is “less contaminated by the scientist’s intrusions” (Brown,
1993; 14).
3.2 Technique and Method

The idea that Q methodology is a naturalistic study of human subjectivity conditions the logic of any Q study. This is best understood by looking at the techniques of administering a Q study, particularly at the process of Q-sampling and Q-sorting.

A Q-sample is a collection of statements related to the topic in question to be ranked by subjects in the process of Q-sorting. There is not a universal fixed formula to construct Q-samples as they can be developed in various ways depending on the approach researchers adopt. However, McKeown offers a two-way typology to identify Q-samples, according to the way they are collected, as “naturalistic” and “ready-made” (1988).

Naturalistic Q-samples represent those taken from subjects’ own oral or written communications. They can be devised through various ways such as interviews, written narratives or reports, as well as secondary sources such as letters to the editor, television and radio talk shows. The advantage of naturalistic Q-samples, according to McKeown, is that by reflecting the opinion of the subjects performing the Q sorts, they avoid confusing the meaning subjects give them with other meanings drawn from an external source such as the person administering the Q study (1988; 25).

Ready-made Q-samples, on the other hand, are drawn from sources other than the subjects of the study. Sub categories include quasi-naturalistic Q-samples, Q-samples drawn from conventional rating scales and standardised Q-samples. Quasi-naturalistic Q-samples are also collected from interviews, but unlike the naturalistic ones, they do not belong to the subjects of the study. Alternatively, attitude and attribute scales can be used in Q-samples. For instance in several Q studies (Thomas and Siegalman, 1984; Thomas, 1979; Baas, 1979) Q-sample items were drawn from Anderson’s (1968) compilation of 555 personality-descriptive traits (McKeown, 1988; 27).
3.3 Designing the Q-sample

After collecting statements, they need to be sampled to finalise the Q-sample for the subjects’ assessment process. Usually around 40-60 statements are used. Much more than this and the subjects’ capacities to sort statements are likely to be overloaded. The main concern in designing a Q-sample is to include as much representation of different views as possible. As the final shaping of a Q-sample will involve selection and rejection of statements, then a fair distribution of available views becomes important to avoid a bias of some kind. The usual practice is a factorial classification of statements breaking down the topic in question into some sub categories reflecting alternative views. This resembles representing a large set of statements in miniature, “in a way analogous to that in which person populations are miniaturised through survey sampling” (Brown, 1980; 187).

To explain this process better, suppose several hundred statements about the recent war in Iraq were collected to form a Q-sample. This large set of statements could now be sampled to give a reasonably sized Q-sample. Then follows the factorial development. This is done by dividing the statements according to people’s reaction to them. Suppose three major categories of reasons to react to the war, whether in favour or against, are established: Humanitarian, Pragmatic and Religious. A further examination realises that these three categories can be related to other subcategories such as Ontological, Motivational and Historical. The result of this examination appears to be a 3X3 matrix, consisted of nine cells:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ontological</th>
<th>Motivational</th>
<th>Historical</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pragmatic</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1
1. Humanitarian-Ontological
2. Humanitarian-Motivational
3. Humanitarian-Historical
4. Pragmatic-Ontological
5. Pragmatic-Motivational
6. Pragmatic-Historical
7. Religious-Ontological
8. Religious-Motivational
9. Religious-Historical

To give a few examples, while a statement in cell 1 could acclaim, “No state should involve killing people unless its homeland is attacked”, a statement in cell 5 might suggest, “It is not uncommon that war has been used to maintain power by the ruling elite”, or cell 7 might include a statement such as “The past experiences show us that no religious authority can be fully immune from inflicting war”.

This 9-cell matrix can be further extended depending on how the researcher conceptualises the entire project. In any case, the idea behind structuring a population of statements is to bring light to different aspects of the topic. Once the matrix is designed the next step is the selection of the statements. If the researcher decides to select for instance 5 statements for each cell in the matrix, then a total sample size of 9X5= 45 is reached. In the selection of statements for each cell, if a certain degree of heterogeneity is achieved by choosing relatively different statements, this will allow for the production of a desirable level of comprehensiveness in the Q-sample as a whole. As Brown asserts “by selecting the most unalike statements from those which are alike in kind serves to minimise the constraining effects of the design and tends to produce a sample of stimuli more nearly approximating the complexity of the phenomenon under investigation” (1980; 189).
3.4 Selecting Subjects (P sets)

The completion of the Q-sample signals the next step, that is, subject selection, or P sets as known in Q literature. Selecting subjects is a topic where the difference between Q and R techniques becomes very distinctive. As opposed to the large number of subjects R methodology requires, Q operates with only a small number of participants. The reason for this contrast is the fact that the research orientations of the two differ substantially. As Brown explains, in Q studies the subjects are treated as variables rather than sample elements like a set of items as in the case of R studies (1980; 192). In other words, the purpose of the Q methodology is to study individual perspectives intensively from their own point of reference. In McKeown and Thomas's words (1988; 45), “the major concern of Q methodology is not with how many people believe such-and-such, but with why and how they believe what they do”. Indeed all that is required for Q studies are enough number of subjects to form a pattern (factor). The subjects are only needed to establish different patterns (factors) in order to compare one factor with another. Thus, Q is only interested in numbers of subjects up to a point where all such patterns are captured. Adding more subjects beyond this point produces no new information.

The nature of Q studies also brings the law of diminishing returns into play rather quickly since “the number of independent assessments of value preferences…is apt to be limited” (Brown, 1980; 194). That is to say that once a point of view is established there is no need to confirm it with the rest of the entire population. Surely, none of this is to suggest that Q methodology does not have to pay attention to the design of P sets. As a general rule, persons are chosen with the expectation that they might help to define a factor (Brown, 1980; 194). Still though, a certain level of comprehensiveness, as in the case of designing Q samples, can be expected from designing P sets since the basis of a P set selection is really variety across subjects. Hence, in order to ensure that variety of views are reflected in the study, as many different kinds of people as possible should be interviewed.
3.5 Q Sorting

Q sorting is the data collection stage of a Q study whereby selected subjects rank order the statements in the Q-sample under the guidance of some instructions provided by the researcher/instructor. The instructions might involve getting a subject to sort the statements from most agree to most disagree. The statements in the Q-sample are presented as a deck of cards, with one statement on each card. The subject is instructed to first read all statements and then divide them into three main groups: agree, disagree and remainders. From this very first moment of grouping the statements the personal frameworks of subjects assert themselves as a regulatory force. The role of the instructor here should be no more than simply to let the subject know what to do at each step to minimise the risk of polluting the natural flow of the sorting process.

The process continues in order to produce a quasi-normal distribution. Table x shows a template for a Q-sort with 34 statements:

<p>| | | | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+1</td>
<td>+2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-4</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-4</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2

Most Disagree                             Most Agree

As a next step, subjects are asked to select the two most agreed upon statements to be placed in the +4 column, and then do the same for the most disagree −4 column. The process is repeated with the statements that remain until all columns are filled. The final outcome is a distribution of all 34 statements from most agree to most disagree, indicating what is most
salient and what is not for each subject, from the point of their personal framework.

A last option before finalising the Q-sort for researchers is a follow-up interview clarifying the logic subjects applied during the sorting process. Interviews could particularly be useful if a subject responds unusually, that is, differently from what the researcher was expecting. Through the interview, the subject could explain his/her reasoning further, providing the researcher with a better understanding of the sorting process and the subject's point of view.

3.6 Factor Analysis

The insertion of each participant’s subjectivity into the sorting process plays an important role at the next stage in which factors emerge as the categories of subjective positions. Subjective attitudes of participants shape the overall meaning of the Q study carried over from sorting to factor analysis. At this stage, the Q Sorts are analysed through some statistical calculations to find out categorical similarities or dissimilarities between them. This process provides clarity to the different orders of subjective interpretations, which substantially simplifies the interpretive task since it provides a typology of subjects' perceptions of any domain in question (McKeown & Thomas 1988). In a nutshell, factor analysis identifies similar sets of subjects and reduces the number of viewpoints such that a structure in the relationship between subjects becomes available for the interpretation of researchers.

One advantage of Q factor analysis is that it does not assume mutually exclusive categories in that people can resemble more than one prototype (factor) to differing degrees, represented by their factor loadings or the correlation between their profile and the prototypes (Brown: 1980). Factor analysis, therefore, uncovers some concealed aspects of a set of subjects. It determines which sets of subjects cluster together. In this sense it is a fundamental part of Q methodology since it provides the statistical means to
group subjects. It is at this stage that Q and R techniques look alike most. Once Q sorts are collected and correlated, states McKeown, “the mathematics of the factoring process are virtually identical to those followed in R method applications” (1988: 49). Hence, from the point of Q studies, the issue is how the factor analysis is applied rather than the kinds of statistical techniques used in the process.

In relation to this interpretive task, Brown asserts that determining factors by statistical criteria alone is not necessarily sufficient for Q studies. In determining the importance of a factor, Brown asserts that the researcher must take into account “the social and political setting, to which the factor is organically connected” (1980; 42). What this means is that some factors with significant statistical loadings may not carry a substance at all. Alternatively, factors with less statistical significance may have a link with the theoretical framework of the research. Distinguishing between the statistical and theoretical significances of a factor, in this sense, is in line with the principle aim of a Q study, which aspires to ascertain subjective behaviours.

As a statistical procedure, factor analysis can be quite demanding in the mathematics involved. Yet, Q methodology only requires a minimal knowledge of those technicalities behind the analysis. Currently available software packages minimise the need to understand the mathematical calculations during factor analysis, freeing considerable intellectual resources to be used in the interpretation of data.
4. THE TURKISH STUDY

The topic (concourse in Q terminology) for the Q study administered in Turkey during November the 3rd election campaign in 2002 was Islam, secularism and democracy. The aim of the study was to determine the kind and number of discourses present in Turkey in relation to the topic in question. The term discourse is chosen with two specific reasons in mind. The first is to define the meaning that people attribute to the domain in question, that is, revealing how people perceive the relationship between Islam, Democracy and Secularism in their daily engagement with those issues. In this sense, following Dryzek (2000, 2002), a discourse is seen as an active part of the political process, capable of changing the course of political development. Therefore, the meaning that people attribute to Islam, Democracy and Secularism will not only show what they understand from those concepts, but also demonstrate what they can do with them in their own terms. This is also the main reason for choosing Q methodology as the principle research medium for this study. The ability of Q methodology to work thorough the subjective values, judgements and preferences of individuals and create a typological map of those subjective frameworks makes it an ideal methodology for comparing discourses. The second reason is to observe whether, and to what extend, deliberative concepts, such as understanding each other through dialog or mutual respect, are embedded within their discourses. Turkey is a divided society along lines related to Islam, Democracy and Secularism. There has been a societal segmentation between religious and secular forces. By analysing the types of discourses through Q methodology, the study will provide an understanding of the points of convergence and divergence in relation to what kind of understanding different groups have about the conditions of deliberation. As we shall see, when people define their positions through discourses they do this in relation to the social context they are in, thus offering sometimes implicit, sometimes explicit ways of interacting with others in their encounters. Therefore, developing an account of discourses can provide important clues for the available resources of deliberation.
among contesting groups in a given time. Within this framework, administering the Q study in Turkey followed the techniques and principles outlined in the previous chapter.

4.1 Discussion Groups

In the Q study conducted in Turkey, the Q-sample was drawn from three discussion groups, whose participants freely debated Islam, democracy and secularism. Participants in those discussion groups were different from those who later took part in the assessment of the Q-sample. The idea behind forming three discussion groups was first to have separate discussions in Islamist and secularist groups so that ideas could flow without feeling the pressure of an opposition, then to have the discussion in a mixed group to see what the reactions are in a potentially more defensive position. The format of the discussion in all groups was designed to provide participants with a fully free discussion environment. There was no constraint applied to discussions at any stage. Participants were able to express themselves freely on any issue. Approximate discussion time for each group was two hours, though in the last group it took almost three hours to finalise the debate.

The first group consisted of only secular minded people. The group consisted of nine participants from various backgrounds. The second group was attended by only Islamic people. All participants of the second group defined themselves as practising Muslims. (They indeed stopped discussion during the praying time.) The third group was a mixed group, attended by over twenty people from both secular and Islamic backgrounds.

The initial idea was to record discussions and then transcribe those discussions; however, the idea was abandoned because of objections from some participants. Instead an additional two people attended each group to take notes. Over two hundred statements were drawn from the discussion groups. Statements were not edited unless a grammatical correction was
necessary. A total number of sixty-four statements were selected for the Q-sample.

### 4.2 Choosing Statements

The main principle behind designing a Q-sample, as explained in the previous section, is to ensure comprehensive selection of statements. The matrix applied to the selection of statements is borrowed from Dryzek and Holmes (2002). To analyse discourses of democracy in the post-communist countries Dryzek and Holmes constructed a 4X4 matrix using principles of political discourse analysis as well as Toulmin’s (1958) classification of claims about the world. The first four elements chosen for the matrix are:

1. **Ontology** refers to the acknowledgment of a set of entities in the political system, such as the state, religion, social classes, civil society, individuals.
2. **Agency** refers to who actually has, or is expected to have, the capacity to act.
3. **Motives** underlines the intentions behind actions, which can be related to a wide range of issues from self-interest to well-being.
4. **Natural and unnatural political relationships** refers to relationships between different entities, such as conflict and hierarchal structure between Islamic and secular forces, competition or harmony.

The second four elements based on Toulmin’s typology are

1. **Definitive** statements that define the meaning of the issue at hand,
2. **Designative** statements that attribute some empirical existence or nonexistence to the issue,
3. **Evaluative** statements that are concerned with determining the worth of the issue,
4. **Advocative** statements that argue for or against the matter.
At the next stage, these eight elements are combined within a 4X4 matrix providing a structure to categorise the statements. Available statements were assessed and divided according to the cell they fit in. A final selection was made to choose only four statements for each cell, providing 4x16=64 statements to form the final Q-sample.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ontology</th>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Motives</th>
<th>Relationships</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Definitive</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Designative</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluative</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advocative</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3

In the matrix, for instance, the statement 2 (Kemalism and secularism cannot be separated from each other. Separating them will mean the end of secularism. If you are secular you are also Kemalist, or vice versa) belongs to the ‘Definitive-Ontology’ category since first it defines a situation and secondly both Kemalism and secularism are given an ontological emphasis. The statement 7 (The army is the guarantor of democracy and secularism) falls into the ‘Definitive-Agency’ category since while the army is clearly given an agency role, the overall meaning of the statement defines a position. A good example of the ‘Designative-Motives’ category is statement 27 (The important thing is to start from somewhere. If people could start showing respect and tolerance to each other this would force the state to do the same) Here the motives of respect and tolerance are designated for a better outcome. Statement 61 (We should trust our people whether they are Kurds, Turks, Laz, Alevi, whether they wear a scarf or not. The more divisions are created in the name of state protection, the more divided we become. This is the real danger) refers to a relationship between different ethnic and religious groups and advocates a certain position, thus it was categorized in ‘Advocative-Relationships’.
4.3 Determining Participants

Given that the Q methodology is an intensive method of inquiry that works with small number of subjects, a total of thirty-three subjects, who did not attend the previous discussion groups, were chosen to assess the Q-sample. Even though Q methodology does not, as discussed in the previous section, assume that all existing social characteristics in the population are included, special attention was paid to obtain a comprehensive sample reflecting variety in terms of subjects’ social, cultural and religious background. Most of the subjects were chosen from the capital city Ankara because of its cosmopolitan structure. With over four million residents, approximately half of whom migrated from various rural towns, Ankara offers the kind of variety sought by Q methodology. The formation of the P-sample targeted a balanced representation of religious and political affiliations, education, gender, age, and occupation and rural/urban background.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Politics</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Rural/Urban</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>Secular</td>
<td>Admin</td>
<td>H. School</td>
<td>Urban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>Secular/Muslim</td>
<td>Nationalistic</td>
<td>P. Servant</td>
<td>University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>Secular/Muslim</td>
<td>Soc Dem</td>
<td>Retiree</td>
<td>University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>Secular</td>
<td>Left</td>
<td>Mayor</td>
<td>Primary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>Secular</td>
<td>Left</td>
<td>Academic</td>
<td>Post Grad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>Secular</td>
<td>Socialist</td>
<td>Student</td>
<td>University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>Secular</td>
<td>Soc Dem</td>
<td>P. Servant</td>
<td>University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>Secular/Muslim</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>H. School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>Secular/Alevi</td>
<td>Soc Dem</td>
<td>Cleaner</td>
<td>Primary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>Centre Right</td>
<td>Small Buss</td>
<td>University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>Centre Right</td>
<td>Chemist</td>
<td>University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>IslamicLiberal</td>
<td>Student</td>
<td>University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>Secular/Muslim</td>
<td>Soc Dem</td>
<td>Social Work</td>
<td>H. School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>Feminist</td>
<td>Housewife</td>
<td>Primary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>Secular</td>
<td>Left</td>
<td>Academic</td>
<td>Post Grad</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A breakdown of the table shows a certain level of variety in the social and political characteristics of the subjects. In terms of gender distribution, the P-set consisted of eighteen women and fifteen men.

The category ‘religion’ aimed to identify how subjects defined their position in relation to Islam and Secularism. Thirteen subjects identified themselves as secular, eleven as Muslim, eight as secular/Muslim and one as secular/Alevi. The key here was to express which position priority was given without necessarily excluding the other. In this sense, subjects, who defined themselves as Muslim, clearly put Islamic values ahead of secular and democratic values. Subjects in this category all belong to the dominant Sunni sect. Similarly, subjects who defined themselves as secular clearly sided with secular values. On the other hand, subjects, who had a strong religious background but still showed a clear loyalty to the secular system, defined themselves as secular/Muslim. The only representative of the
Islamic Alevi sect defined herself as secular. This is in line with the Alevi tradition, which has always supported the secular Kemalist regime.

The political affiliations of subjects also show that the level of comprehensibility targeted in the study is achieved in the P-sample. One subject describes his/her political affiliation as non political, five as Islamic, one as socialist, eleven as social democrat, six as left, two as conservative, two as feminist, two as centre right. This distribution accurately reflects the types found in Turkish political sphere.

As for the ‘occupation’ category, the first priority was to represent different income levels. In order to achieve this, subjects, with variety of income levels, were selected. Their occupation ranged from being unemployed to working in the manufacturing sector. The second consideration was to maintain the same level of diversity in the types of occupations. Choosing subjects from different occupational backgrounds including housewives and retirees has provided the study with the desired level of variation.

In terms of educational background, the same level of attention was paid to obtain variety. Subjects in the P-sample have a diverse range of educational backgrounds, some having completed only primary school, other a postgraduate level.

As all the other categories, the final category ‘Rural/Urban’ also aimed a balanced representation. The number of subjects from urban and rural background was sixteen and ten respectively. Seven subjects with urban/rural background were brought up in rural areas and then migrated to urban locations. They are still marked by the culture of their rural background, yet have also adapted to urban conditions successfully.
4.4 Evaluation of Statements by Participants

As discussed, Q-sorting is the process of gathering data whereby subjects rank order the statements according to their own personal point of view, under some specific instructions given by the researcher. In the case of Turkey, before starting the sorting process the researcher explained to subjects the purpose of the study and ensured them that all information gathered, including the post Q-sorting interviews, would remain anonymous. They were also asked to rank the statements on a purely individual basis, that is, without feeling the pressure to reflect the position of their political affiliations in their responses.

The statements were presented as a deck of cards, with on each card separate statement. As a first step, subjects were asked to read through the statements in order to get a general sense of the topic under investigation and then to sort them into three piles: agree, disagree and remainder. The last group may include statements about which subjects are either unsure or indifferent. Brown argues that subjects can also place in this category those statements, which create conflict for subjects, such as things that are possibly true but not easy to openly acknowledge (1980; 196).

After the initial breakdown of the statements, the subjects were asked to proceed with a more detailed sorting procedure by using a template, similar to the one on page 9, with a distribution from –6 (most disagree) to +6 (most agree):

At this stage, subjects were asked to read the statements in the agreed pile one more time and select the two most agreed statements. Upon selection, these statements were placed in +6 cells. The order of the statements with the same value does not constitute a problem, thus any statement with the same value can go to any cell with the same value. Then subjects were asked to go back to the ‘disagree’ pile and select the two statements they
most disagreed with and place them in the –6 cells. After completing this, subjects were asked to return to the ‘agree’ pile and select the three statements they most agreed with from the remainder of the pile, to place them in the +5 cells. Upon completion subjects returned back to the ‘disagree’ pile and repeated the same process to fill the –5 cells. The process was repeated back and forwards until all 64 statements were exhausted. When the sorting process was completed all statements were spread out in a clearly visible view ranging from most disagree to most agree. Here, subjects were given one more chance to reassess the sorting and make changes to make sure the distribution adequately reflected their views. After completing the final assessment by subjects, the final result of the sorting process was recorded by the researcher to be later used in the factor analysis.

4.5 Follow up interviews

As indicated in the previous section, follow up interviews are common practice in Q studies. In this Q study, follow up interviews were used to further examine subjects’ attitudes towards dialog based on mutual understanding. A special attention was paid to understand under what conditions and what kind of framework subjects felt more comfortable to practice dialog, particularly in relation to its location within the public sphere. During the interviews subjects were asked to clarify

1. if they indeed believe that a dialog is possible at all between secular and Islamic groups,

2. how they envisage that this dialog could best occur, that is, what kind of conditions are ideal for achieving the dialog,

3. what they think about the influence of the media in the development of mutual understanding, particularly in the light of current programming practices, such as discussion forums open to public, expert panels on controversial issues, etc.
The findings of the interviews were significant in that they have provided important supplementary data to clarify what was found using the factor analysis.
5. DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

Following the completion of follow-up interviews, factors were extracted from the Q sorts using the statistical package PQ Method (2.06). The Q-sorts were correlated and subjected to centroid factor analysis and Varimax rotation, which produced four main factors.

1. Kemalist Discourse  
2. Nationalist Discourse  
3. Liberal Left Discourse  
4. Islamic Discourse

The aim of this chapter is to analyse the Q findings about each discourse. In order to provide a proper understanding of each discourse I will follow three steps in each section.

Firstly, under general characteristics, I will introduce the general characteristics of each discourse. This will be a brief depiction of each discourse based on the information provided by the Q findings, showing how the Q study defines each discourse in relation to the concourse. It is not uncommon that the Q analysis could have produced results quite inconsistent with preconceptions. Hence, outlining the general characteristics of each discourse will also display if the outcomes of the Q analysis are any different from common perceptions.

Secondly, I will provide a background section for each discourse. This will be a historical account aiming at tracing the roots and development of each discourse in the Turkish public sphere as well as displaying the complex relationship between them. I use the term Turkish public sphere in a broad sense in regard to its time frame, that is, instead of reflecting the developments only within the Turkish Republic I will expand my investigation into the late Ottoman period. My aim here is to probe into the genesis of the current political tendencies of modern Turkey in order to show that today’s discourses in the Turkish public sphere share a more
complex relationship than it is generally appreciated. Investigating the common ground these discourses share is imperative to gain further insights into the dynamics of interaction between discourses, which will in turn underscore the role of deliberation oriented to mutual understanding and social learning.

Here I should note that the Q study in Turkey identified clusters of opinions remarkably consistent with the main groups of actors in the Turkish public sphere. The most likely reason for this is that the topic in question, Islam, democracy and secularism has constantly been in the public agenda in Turkey in the last ten years. There have possibly been only a few members of the Turkish public, who have not developed a position on the issue yet. Therefore, the fact that each factor in this study accompanies an important strand in Turkish political history is not a coincidence but a sign that the Turkish public is highly polarised on the issue. This is surely an important advantage for the analysis of the findings since factor results and their historical stories run together in a rather complementary fashion.

The third step will involve the actual interpretation of discourses. As there is no simple formula to interpret factors in Q studies, the interpretation is mainly determined by the researcher’s preferred way of exploring meaning behind factors. This is not to suggest that interpretation is arbitrary. Quiet contrary, the process of interpretation is a matter of careful examination of how statements appear in relation to each other.

In this study, statements will be analysed in groups according to the score line they belong to, between +6 and −6, reflecting the way subjects constructed their Q-sorts. The reason behind this method is that the way the statements were selected by the subjects reflects the meaning of their subjective positions in relation to the concourse, which in return shapes the overall meaning of each factor. This is important because, as will be seen, the nature of the relationship between discourses can only be detected properly through an examination of how each discourse groups its responses relative to others. This is in a way imposed by the fact that the
concourse, Islam, Democracy and Secularism, covers a large area and responses of discourses to individual statements signal specific references to certain aspect of the concourse. Hence, identifying the points of convergence and divergence between discourses requires a careful examination of how the statements in each score are related to each other.

One important issue during interpretation is to judge the importance of statements in low scores, such as +1 and -1. These scores are usually considered close to indifference by Q researchers. In fact, it is widely accepted that even though s/he places at +1 an individual may disagree with a statement, if s/he disagrees with most of the statements in the Q set. In this study, a more definitive approach is taken towards +1 and -1 scores. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, during Q sorting all subjects selected their statements very carefully. Particularly towards the end of sorting when statements belonging to low scores were selected subjects made their selections very thoroughly. This I believe reflected an attitude towards agreement or disagreement rather than indifference. Secondly, the ideas in the statements, possibly as a reflection of the nature of the concourse, were cogently expressed. No subjects expressed doubts about the meaning of any of the statements. This was an important factor in sorting the Q set carefully, hence possibly indicating less indifference. Therefore I am inclined to consider +1 and -1 scores as being closer to agreement or disagreement rather than indifference. The scores that I felt reflecting indifference are left without interpretation.
5.1 Factor 1: Kemalist Discourse (THE KD)

5.1.1 General Characteristics

According to the Q study findings, the Kemalist Discourse displays a strong commitment to the Kemalist tradition. It fully adheres to the principles of a Kemalist state advocating a strong division between religious and political affairs. For the KD, this is indeed the single most important aspect of a secular society, which needs to be maintained in order to fully comply with the conditions of modernity. Kemalism and secularism are seen as mutually inclusive. However, it also distinguishes itself from the army’s hardline Kemalism in that while it supports the army in general terms, it does not feel so comfortable with the dominant role the army plays in daily politics. It advocates a system based on the supremacy of law as the regulator of societal harmony. Thus, compared to its conservative counterpart (the ND), the KD favours a more balanced state and citizenship relationship. The KD appears to favour a non-antagonistic style in its dealing with the Islamic population, appreciating the role of dialog and mutual understanding in resolving differences. Yet, it is equally suspicious about the Islamic claims that demand a share from the tightly protected Turkish public sphere. This suspicion mainly stem from its belief that Islamic rule exerts pressure on individual rights and freedom. The KD looks at the scarf issue from this angle and concludes that, as a religious symbol, scarfs should not be allowed in public institutions. In other words the KD does not conceive the scarf problem as a matter of individual freedom. Hence, not allowing university admission to female students with the scarf does not constitute an undemocratic behaviour for the KD. With this the KD places the protection of secularism ahead of democratic principles, which causes an apparent internal tension in its defence of individual rights. The inconsistency that the KD displays, that is, on the one hand defending individual rights as a general rule of democratic governance, on the other hand making exceptions for religious practice, appears to be one of the main challenges that the KD faces.
5.1.2 Historical Origins of the Kemalist Discourse

The origin of Turkey’s current political discourses goes back to the introduction of some key Western concepts within the Ottoman administration when in the 19th century the Ottoman administration finally admitted that their traditional system was no longer capable of handling the problems linked to the dawn of modernity in Europe. The seven hundred year old empire that ruled half of Europe, the Middle East and North Africa, was losing the battle against the new forces of Europe, which were forcibly pushing their ways into the old structure of their archenemy, the Ottoman regime. In order to counter this assault Ottomans waged a series of reforms called Tanzimat.

Following the Tanzimat reforms until its final demise, the politics of the late Ottoman period were mainly shaped by a juggling act aiming at the preservation of traditional values, which were intrinsically non-Western both culturally and religiously, and the incorporation of Western ideals into the traditional system with the hope that a remedy could be found to a prolonged period of deep stagnation. The actors of this juggling act were quite diverse. They ranged from the increasingly desperate heads of Ottoman administration, including the Sultan himself, to some intellectuals as well as military personnel of the day, who had been introduced to the ideas of Western development.

The roots of today's main political discourses in Turkey lie at the heart of this juggling act between the forces of tradition and modernity. A proper understanding of this reform process is essential in order to appreciate the historical trajectory of each discourse revealed by the Q study and the possibilities that the current circumstances of Turkey offer for establishing dialog between these discourses. Within this framework, in order to link Kemalism with the ideas that had an impact on its development, before explaining what Kemalism actually refers to, I will first look at the beginning of the reform period starting with Tanzimat in the mid 19th century. As will be seen, the political tendencies that emerged during this period had a
fundamental impact on the later stages of the Ottoman administration and the Kemalist forces of the new Turkish republic. In the following section, I will deal with the developments of the late 19th century and their aftermath, particularly focusing on the emergence of İttihat ve Terakki.

**Early Ottoman Reforms**

The introduction of Western concepts during the 19th century represents a point of departure for the development of Kemalism. As I will discuss this is not so much because Kemalism was directly affected by the ideas behind those reforms, but because the introduction of the reforms triggered an irreversible trend among Ottoman intelligentsia towards looking at the West and its ideals with a considerable degree of respect.

Following a series of military defeats against Western powers from the end of 17th century onwards, the Ottomans started envisaging reforms from a purely military point of view. Confident of still being an imperial power, the Ottoman administration was not willing to concede that those military defeats were also signs of a losing battle against a superior civilisation. Yet, by the early 19th century the Ottoman state resigned to the fact that the Ottoman Empire was far behind in terms of the scientific and technological developments of the West. As a result, the 1839 Tanzimat reforms were announced. These reforms, which lasted until 1876, represented a fundamental shift from the traditional line of the Ottoman state (Findley, 1980; Karpat, 1972, 2001). They introduced a Western notion of common citizenship and political culture. According to Karpat, the reforms of the Tanzimat era forced a redefinition of the notions of state, community, freedom and faith since the political culture they created “inadvertently moved toward giving political expression to the individual's primordial identities within the nation-state”. (2001: 9). Traditionally the Ottoman state used to categorise its population on the basis of religious affiliations first and then according to whether people were part of the administrative system (one that governs) or not (one that is governed). The Tanzimat reforms represent a clear step away from this traditional line by advocating the
vision of a secular nation and overcoming ethnic and religious differences. That is why the official text of Tanzimat reforms (*Gulhane Hatt-I Humayunu*) is considered as the Magna Carta of Ottomans even though it is still carrying a traditional substance in terms of its authoritarian tone and its loyalty to the religious code (*sheria*) (Somel, 2001)

It might sound ironic, but the emphasis on the individual rights was taught to be a remedy for the growing dissent among different nationalities in the Empire, mainly affected by the nationalist sentiment following the 1789 French Revolution. Yet, the important point here is the fact that instead of developing a reactionary denial of Western values, Ottomans turned their face to the West. Even though this move had not been planned as a long term project, particularly at the initial stages, and mostly remained a spontaneous reaction to the problems of the day, its impact was permanent and continued to eventually shape the ideas of Young Turks, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and the leadership of the young Turkish Republic (Kocak, 2001; Mardin, 1990). It represented a historical moment. That is when the Islamic foundations of the Ottoman regime were for the first time challenged by secular notions coming from the West.

The groups, who defended the principles of *Tanzimat*, were mainly civil bureaucrats and members of the army. This is usually linked to the fact that the Ottoman capitalism was not mature enough to have its own bourgeoisie to carry the flag of progress as it happened in Europe. The army’s involvement was normal since they were the first to be exposed to Western development. As a result, the members of the army and bureaucracy took the lead in opposing the old structure of the Ottoman state. Yet, their opposition was limited since their aim was to protect the state rather than overthrowing or radically changing it. Hence they remained in an awkward position in which they protected the status quo on one hand and defended changes on the other hand. Due to their close connection with the West, they could see the positive impact of the Western style reforms; yet they were equally committed to the protection of the state and Islam (Cetinsaya, 2001). However, their support for change did not become organised until
1865. That year, a group of young bureaucrats formed a secret organisation called the “Young Ottomans”.

**Young Ottomans and Sultan Abdulhamid**

Mardin, in his seminal book *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought* (1962) analyses this period of reforms from the point of view of the Young Ottomans, asserting that Young Ottomans’ liberal views, which were seeking to establish an autonomous legal zone independent from the Sultan, should be considered as the genesis of the liberal thought in the Ottoman regime.

The Young Ottomans’ influence had not only affected the Ottoman administration, but also shaped the thinking of the later opposition movements, such as Young Turks. Due to their constant lobbying for a constitutional regime, in 1876 the first Ottoman constitution (*Kanun-i Esasi*) was announced. This was followed by the establishment of the first Western style parliament under the Ottoman rule a year later. This period called *I. Mesrutiyet* (Constitutional Monarchy) was an attempt to institutionally implement the idea of individual rights in a more binding fashion. As indicated before, those rights were first spelled out in *Gulhane Hatti Humayunu*, but not necessarily put into the practice (Somel: 2001). With *Kanun-i Esasi* not only they were constitutionally grounded, but also linked to the idea of a common citizenship. The item 8 of *Kanun-i Esasi* defined an Ottoman as someone living under the Ottoman rule regardless of religious or ethnic origin (Somel, 2001:105). Under this broad definition of the Ottoman citizen, some basic rights such as the freedom of religious practice and the freedom of education became visible features of the new constitutional arrangements. In this sense, *Kanun-i Esasi* was trying to achieve a balance between the Islamic character of the Ottoman state and the secular features of the liberal reforms. As such it was the promotion of a new policy called Ottomanism, which was an attempt to redefine the state to ensure the allegiance of all people living within the boundaries of the Empire, regardless of their religious and ethnic affiliations (Karpat, 1982; Kayali, 1997; Davison, 1977; Kushner, 1977).
Yet, *l. Mesrutiyet* did not last long. After less than a year, Sultan Abdulhamit banned the parliament until the establishment of 2nd *Mesrutiyet* in 1908. Sultan Abdulhamid ruled the period between the 1st and 2nd *Mesrutiyet* with absolute authority. This was a controversial period, which was represented by Young Turks and the leadership of the new Turkish republic as a regime of oppression (*istibdat*). Yet, Mardin argues that Sultan Abdulhamid was more than a mere oppressor (1991). It was true that after banning the parliament Sultan Abdulhamid viciously pursued the opposition demanding a return to the constitutional regime. The threat of complete disintegration of the Empire led Abdulhamid to pursue a strictly controlled regime, which closely monitored any opposition. However, according to Mardin, even though Abdulhamid’s regime was strictly authoritarian, during his time Sultan Abdulhamid followed much of the liberal reforms which started with *Tanzimat* (1991: 92). He was particularly keen on developing a modern education system, thus reformed much of old religion based schooling and developed a secular public education system. Ironically, Mardin maintains that when in opposition Young Turks gained most of their ideas from the secular education system that Abdulhamid initiated and mainly grew out of this period. Abdulhamid also incorporated much of Young Ottomans’ liberal thoughts into his agenda (Kologlu, 2001). In Deringil’s words (1993; 5), during this period “Although the state spoke the political language of Islam, it was in fact implementing the concrete policy of a rational secular programme” (see also Kasaba, 1988; Mortimer, 1982 and Findley, 1980).

The dilemma of the Abdulhamid period can indeed be linked to the same dilemma that marred the Young Ottoman movement previously: what is to be done to save the Ottoman regime? In this sense, Abdulhamid was a pure pragmatist and used almost whatever was available to this end. For instance, he did not only use Western ideas and technology, but Islam as well. He directed the existing Islamic tendencies into an idea of “Panislamism”, which he used as a catalyst to protect the unity of the Empire (Mardin, 1991; Karpat, 2001). In fact, Karpat defines Abdulhamid as a modern Muslim Ruler.
The tension between the traditional and the modern, the challenge of Western liberalism, had a continuous impact on the political choices made not only by the Ottoman administration, but also by opposition groups such as the Young Turks. The development of the Young Turks opposition, though, brought this tension to a different dimension. Young Turks was a common name given to various opposition groups that flourished during the reign of Sultan Abdulhamid. They had a diverse range of opinions about the future of the Ottoman Empire. Yet, they usually appeared in agreement on the reestablishment of Kanun-i Esasi and the Constitutional regime (Somel, 2001: 108). To better explain this, I will focus on a specific Young Turk organisation Ittahat ve Terakki (IT), which had a strong influence on Kemalism.

**Ittihat ve Terakki (IT)**

IT’s roots go back to the Young Ottomans. Aydin points to two main stages in the development of the IT (2001). He asserts that those stages represent a clear rupture in that a different path was followed in order to achieve what seems to be the common aim, ending the absolutist regime of Sultan Abdulhamid. At the initial stage, which is called The First IT, the influence of Young Ottomans was clearly visible. Following Sultan Abdulhamit’s suspension of Kanun-i Esasi and the Parliament, the Young Ottomans continued their activities in Europe. Influenced by their writings, in 1889, young students of a military medical college in Istanbul, formed an illegal organisation, Ittihad-i Osmani, which in 1895 became Osmanli Ittihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti. Intellectual roots of the first IT’s were largely affected by the Young Ottomans’ Ottomanist vision and the principles of the French revolution. Its statute indicated that all its members were absolutely equal regardless of their ethnic and religious background, and had total freedom of opinion and expression. They were seeking freedom not for a specific group but for the entire Ottoman community. The diverse ethnic background of its founding members was a sign of their commitment to egalitarianism (Aydin, 2001). Along this line, the IT argued for the rights of minorities such as Armenians and non-Islamic groups and in fact cooperated with various
ethnic organisations fighting against the Abdulhamid regime. Supporting these groups against Sultan Abdulhamid sometimes caused serious divisions between more conservative and liberal sections of the organisations. In one case for instance, pro-Islamic Mizanci Murat left the organisation and returned to Istanbul to apologise to Sultan Abdulhamid. Nevertheless the leadership of the first IT remained reasonably intact until the differences between the liberal and the pro-state wings of the organisation became apparent. The disagreement between the pro-statist Ahmet Riza and anti-statist Prince Sabahattin ended up breaking the organisation. Two separate groups were formed. This was the end of the first IT (Temo, 1987).

The second IT differed substantially from the first IT. Its leadership had a completely different background. It was mainly composed of military personal and some small bureaucrats, who were unhappy about the Abdulhamid regime. Aydin defines the second IT as a paramilitary group with no substantial intellectual qualities as was the case with the first IT (2001: 124). They mainly carried on using the name IT to show their loyalty to the idea of a constitutional regime, thus indicating that they were part of the Mesrutiyet tradition. Their aim was simple: to assassinate Sultan Abdulhamid. This military activism, coupled with the belief that the Army was the chief protector of the state, was the main characteristic of the second IT. Its influence extended to today’s modern Turkish political culture. The second IT also differed from the first one in terms of its intellectual allegiance. The abstract, intellectual endeavours of the first IT had mainly been influenced by French and Anglo-Saxon traditions (Aydin, 2001:126). The second IT was more influenced by the pragmatic and action oriented German state tradition. This German tradition influenced Ottoman officers, particularly the founding members of the second IT. However, the most important difference of the second IT was a shift from the Ottomanism of the first IT to Turkish nationalism. For the second IT the reformation of the Ottoman Empire could only be achieved through an emphasis on Turkishness. This approach, coupled with the strong state ideal of the Germanic tradition, had a permanent impact on the Kemalist tradition. Yet,
even though Ottomanism gradually slipped away from the second IT platform, Islamism in conjunction with Turkish nationalism always kept a presence (Unuvar, 2001). In fact, this is the root of Milli Gorus (National View), which was used as the intellectual basis of the Islamist political movements created from 1970 onwards. Thus, the intellectual background of the second IT not only affected Kemalists, but Islamic politics as well. Hence, understanding this connection may help to understand the conditions of reconciliation in the contemporary Turkey better.

The Second IT came to an end with the end of the First World War, which flagged the beginning of a new era with the proclamation of the Turkish Republic. Under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, Turkey joined the list of young nations.

**The Principles of Six Arrows**

Mustafa Kemal did not directly get involved with the IT regime, yet his ideas were influenced particularly by the strong secular tendency within the ranks of the IT. He was not a systematic thinker either, however he had strong views on what social development should entail under the circumstances characterising the young Turkish republic. His ideas, expressed in different times and occasions, were presented as Kemalism for the first time in 1935, during the fourth congress of the CHP (People’s Republican Party), founded by Ataturk himself. The CHP remained the only political party in Turkey till 1950, when a multiparty system was put in place (Koker, 2000). Symbolised as “Six Arrows”, Ataturk’s ideas were categorised into six main principles: populism, republicanism, statism, secularism, reformism, and nationalism. The importance of those principles comes from the fact that Turkey’s current wavering between secularism and Islam largely rests on the interplay between the modern core of these principles and the traditional norms that represent a different set of values. In this sense, the principles of the “Six Arrows” represent a synthesis between the remnants of the previous regime and the specific needs of the new regime.
While statism, reformism, nationalism and secularism appeared as the continuation of the second IT policies, the “Six Arrows” concepts of populism and republicanism appeared to be new. Republicanism was a natural consequence of historical circumstances. With the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the priority was shifted protecting the Ottoman state to building a nation-state. The new Turkish Republic in this sense represented the ideal solution since it both advocated a constitutional regime and a new national identity built around the notion of Turkishness. Both nationalism and populism were used towards building a sense of solidarity in the newly formed republic. Following the collapse of the multi-lingual Ottoman Empire, focusing on nationalism was easier than it had been before. Hence, the concept of ‘one nation and one language’ became the new catalyst for the new Republic (Parla, 1993).

Populism was functional to underline the commitment to the role of the public in a republican sense. But it was also used to legitimise the one party rule by linking the idea of a classless society by embodying this idea in the necessity for only one party, which was CHF, (Cumhuriyet Halk Firkasi), that then became CHP (Koker, 2000). In this sense, the reforms instigated in the new Turkish Republic - particularly between 1913-1918-, and made under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal, were a continuation of the second IT reforms. These reforms were aiming at creating a secular and modern society. Not unlike the second IT, the Kemalist regime used its power to impose an absolute authority on society. Its reforms, thus, were implemented largely on the basis of this authority. For instance, as part of the secularisation process the Kemalist regime banned all religious organisations in 1925. This was immediately followed by the introduction of Western style dress codes, the traditional fez was for instance replaced by the European hat. The strong reaction of the public against those rather drastic reforms was heavy-handedly silenced through military courts (Lewis, 1968; Zurcher, 1993)

These secular reforms coexisted with the acknowledgment that Islam was an important part of national identity. Thus, contrary to the common belief, Kemalism tried to position secular reforms without antagonising traditional
religious values. In fact, Mustafa Kemal himself did not refute the religion, but opposed the religious elite's practice of religion as a power game. Instead, Kemalism tried to use religion and made it part of a nation building agenda by keeping it under its control (Koker, 2000; Turkone, 2002). That is the main reason for the creation of an office of religious affairs that took full responsibility for overseeing any religious activity within the republic. In this sense, the process of secularisation went hand in hand with the new arrangements in religion. Turkish politics in a way were shaped by responses to this state controlled religious activity by secular and Islamic sections of Turkey. Hence the tension between Islamic and secular groups has always been related to how the state approached to religion.

In short, the crucial moments in the development of Kemalism can be detected throughout the challenge that the late Ottoman administration faced in order to counter the ultimate collapse of the empire. Mustafa Kemal witnessed the worst moments of this period, which helped him to form his own vision of modern Turkey. He brought the strong state and the army tradition of the Ottoman period as the leading forces of the modernisation process and blended it with the notion of Turkishness on one hand and in terms of its formal institutions a Western like regime on the other hand. In this framework, particularly in the early years of the republic, the idea of secularism always superseded democratic ideals, that is, a democratic state was not necessarily seen as the best option for the protection of the secular state.

The tension that Kemalism created between secularism and democracy continues to be a major dilemma for Turkish politics, which exposes itself clearly in the standoff between the Islamic leaning AKP government and Kemalists. Today, Kemalism in its pure form is mainly represented by Atatürk's party, the CHP (People's Republican Party), and some civic associations, such as the Kemalist Thought Association. The Army also claims to be the guardian of Kemalist principles. The KD, as a discourse of the Turkish public sphere, does not correspond to the position of any Kemalist organisations. Rather, it reflects a broader approach to Kemalism among the population existing at a personal level within ordinary citizens.
Yet, as the factor analysis below will show, it still carries the burden of the major dilemma between secularism and democracy.

5.1.3 Factor Interpretation, Kemalist Discourse

As I have mentioned, exploring meaning behind factors, discourses in this case, requires a thorough examination of how statements relate to each other. Yet, this relationship should not only be looked at from the points of the statements within the same score in the Q sort, but also of the statements grouped in different scores in the Q sort. For example, a careful interpretation of the most prominent issues for each discourse necessitates taking into account +6 (most agree) and –6 (most disagree) scores with equal force. In order to realise this balance I will investigate the scores in order according to their ranking, that is, after I start with +6 score I will move to –6 score to complete a full picture of the most prominent issues for each discourse, then I will repeat the same process for +5 and –5 scores. Switching between + and – scores will not only depict a better picture of the salient issues discourses subscribe to, but also, and perhaps more importantly, will reveal some inconsistencies that discourses display in their attitudes towards Islam, democracy and secularism. In other words, instead of a linear analysis along the +score first, then – score later, shifting between + and – score will play a better role as checks and balances.

Score +6

45. To claim that Muslims in Turkey are not allowed to practice their religion is a totally unfair statement. If we do not count the scarf problem in public institutions there has been no obstacle for Muslims to practice their religion. Quite the contrary, with the Republic, Turkish Muslims have gained substantial individual rights compared to Muslims living in other Islamic countries.

17. The purpose of religion will be defeated when it is carried over to the public arena. Beliefs are personal matters, thus they should be kept within the individual sphere.

The basis of the most contentious issue between Muslims and seculars, that is, the role of the religion in the public sphere, immediately surfaces as the most prominent issue for the KD (17). The idea that religion is a purely private matter and should remain within the private sphere has been the
The single most important line of the Kemalist tradition as explained in previous section on the historical origins of Kemalism. The most forceful manifestation of this matter from the point view of the KD has been the scarf issue in recent years. Muslim women wearing scarf in public institutions such as universities have become a major concern for Kemalist, thinking that this is a breach of secular principles.

Along these lines the statement (45) also indicates that for the KD the relationship between modern development and religion is not a complaisant one precisely because the fundamental basis, upon which Turkey has built itself as a modern country, has provided more substantial individual rights than any other Islamic country to its citizens. Thus the claim that Muslims are not allowed to practice their religion in Turkey is simply unwarranted. However, it is noteworthy that the statement (45) singles out the scarf issue as a problem in relation to the practice of religion in general. This could be indicative of contradictions existing within the KD about the development of the scarf saga, signalling a possibility that the KD might be willing to revisit the issue.

Score –6

3. Secularism is atheism.

19. People are less corrupt under Sharia / sharia regime because it induces the fear of God.

These two statements are reactions to claims raised by some Muslims in the discussion groups. Their rejection complements the tone of the liberal secular discourse set in the +6 score. One of the issues raised continuously by the secular subjects during the follow-up interviews was their frustration at being called anti-Islamic or atheist. Quite contrary, during the interviews, almost all subjects of the Kemalist and Nationalist discourses indicated that they carry some form of religious belief. This is surely another way of saying that secular people have actually more in common with Muslims than is usually believed. What makes this even more interesting, as will be seen in
the section on the factor analysis of the Islamic discourse (ID), is that the ID also disagrees with the statement (3), showing that Muslims do not commonly believe that ‘secularism is atheism’.

Similarly, the ID, like the KD, does not agree with the suggestion that Islamic rule could create a less corrupt society (19). This is surely expected from the KD because of its commitment to the division between religious and public rule, yet it appears quite surprising for the ID.

I will deal with the ID’s position on these issues more in dept when I interpret its Q sort. For the time being though I would like to underline that the Q study has already managed to identify some important misunderstandings between seculars and Muslims, hence paving the way for a possible reconciliation of these issues.

**Score +5**

34. Secularism is the undeniable foundation of religious pluralism and the most important norm for societal peace. We must hold on to it.

38. If Turkey has today become more modern than any other Islamic countries, it is mainly because law and education have been secularised by being separated from the influence of religion.

53. I support our President who defends the supremacy of law. We can only solve our democratic problems by creating a real system of law in our country.

Secularism, the core principle of Kemalism, continues to dominate the KD’s agenda. This time it is also seen as an essential tool for establishing societal peace and religious pluralism (34). It reiterates that the separation of religious affairs is a necessity to achieve a move towards modernity (38). The emphasis on education here helps to explain Kemalists’ uncompromised attitude towards female students with scarf at universities. It also attributes law a role as main intermediary to resolve conflicts (53-38). Indeed, the role of the law has been emphasised most strongly in the KD compared to other discourses. This is also where the KD distinguishes itself from the other Kemalist discourse, ND, which relies more on the influence of
the army for maintaining social order. However, as will become clear soon, the KD’s emphasis on law is not necessarily tied to the basic democratic principle of freedom of expression since it does not conceive wearing scarf as freedom of expression in the public sphere. The KD’s dilemma here is closely linked to the understanding of the public/private divide, which appears to be a confusing issue for the KD, as well as the ND. The KD tend to discriminate individual rights according to its strict secular criteria, that is, whether those rights are acceptable in the public sphere or not, thus leaning more to the protection of secular system rather than establishing a democratic order.

Score –5

49. In a Muslim society, the framework for freedom has to be determined according to Islamic values.

1. Today’s oppressive attitudes against Muslims in the name of secularism are rooted in Kemalist ideology.

20. If everybody tries to live according to Islamic rule, a just system can come into existence.

In the –5 score, the KD rejects the application of any religious rule for the maintenance of a just order (20). This is consistent with the position indicated in the previous scores. However, the rejection of these statements goes one step further by declaring Islamic values incompatible with individual freedom (49). Hence a just society under Islamic rule for the KD is not an achievable task. By rejecting statements (20) and (49) the KD clarifies the line it drew between secular and religious interpretations of a public order. The KD follows a consistent pattern advocating civil law and rejecting the influence of religion on the public issues. Yet, as indicated before, what constitutes a public right is strongly tied to its strict secular criteria. The defence of Kemalism branded as a source of Muslim
oppression is an expected reaction given the level of dedication to Kemalism shown in the KD (1).

**Score +4**

6. *The problem with Islamic law in relation to democracy is that Islamic communities exert social pressure on individuals. This conflicts with the democratic notion of individual freedom and rights.*

54. *The state is not supposed to carry a religious identity. Its task should only be to govern people. It should not question its people on the basis of their religious identities.*

58. *The fundamental condition is respect for others. If we achieve this at the grassroots level, then we can solve the problems created and imposed from above.*

13. *Some remarks made by Islamic leaders contributed to raising the tension between Islamists and Kemalists. An example of this is Mr Erbakan’s remark suggesting that one day the deans, who do not allow students with scarf to the universities, will be forced to salute those students.*

After the initial step of laying out its position in relation to secularism, the KD starts to qualify what a liberal society entails. Individual freedom and rights emerge as fundamental democratic values in the critique of Islamic law (6). Religious rights are also acknowledged as individual rights (54), indicating a possible discontent with the state’s interference with the practice of religion. The liberal secular discourse does not intend to dichotomise the relationship between Islam and secularism. This is supported further with the approval of statement 58 calling for respect between conflicting groups. In the suggestion that the problems are “created and imposed from above” the dissatisfaction with the state, as a potential source of problems, appears again. This also points to support for grassroots initiatives to achieve reconciliation as an alternative to state oriented initiatives. Statement 13 further qualifies the KD’s positive attitude towards respect. It suggests a calm style of dialog in order to keep the tension between the conflicting sides at minimum.
Score –4

30. The reason behind the reaction to Kemalists is their antagonistic attitude towards Islamic people. The problem can be solved easily if they tried to understand Muslim people rather than attacking and dehumanising them.

24. The Quran does not praise a particular political system. Islam can fit into any system as long as it is fair. For instance, Islam could fit in a monarchy if the King were fair.

10. The differences between us are too deep. We cannot reconcile them by talking. This system will remain as it is in the future.

50. We have to produce our own model of democracy. The cultural values of Eastern countries are different from those in the West. Eastern countries should not be governed by an American model of democracy.

The KD continues to defend Kemalism against the idea that it has been a source of antagonism between seculars and Muslims (30). Meanwhile the KD indicates discontent with pessimist attitudes foreseeing no hope, along with a belief that differences can be resolved through dialog (10). This, together with the support for respect for others as a fundamental condition (statement 58) indicates that the KD takes a substantial step towards reconciling differences with Muslims. Mutual respect and dialog are key aspects of this and provide the essential ingredients of a deliberative framework.

The KD also defends a universal model of democracy based on Western liberal values, applicable to different cultural systems, with core principles that do not need amending (50). The rejection of statement 24, suggesting the Quran can fit into any political system, can perhaps be linked to this universalistic approach since it might imply that fitting in the system suggested in the Quran might have ended up tampering with the core values of democracy.
Score +3

18. Democracy cannot be realised before economic equality is achieved.

57. We have no other choice to solve our problems, but dialog. However, we have to be careful of the tone of the dialog, which should favour a rational, non-antagonistic style that respects others. That is to say, it should avoid the styles of Mr Erbakan and Mr Ozden.

60. In a secular society everybody should abide by the law. If the law bans wearing the scarf in public institutions the rule should be respected.

59. We have to find out what is common among us rather than focusing on differences. For instance, we have to emphasise the importance of education at the universities instead of arguing about the scarf controversy.

42. The solution is mutual understanding. Groups, who oppose each other, should try to understand each other.

The emphasis on dialog reaches its peak in the +3 score. Three statements (57, 59, 42) out of five indicate the role of dialog and mutual understanding. The need for rational dialog, raised earlier (statement 13) comes up again in statement 57, but more elaborately qualified. What the KD demands is a rational, non-antagonistic style to achieve a productive style of dialog focused on founding a common ground between Muslims and seculars. The style of the secular leader Mr Ozden is rejected as strongly as that of Mr Erbakan, the Islamic leader. Focusing on what is common rather than on what is different is, together with mutual understanding, seen as the key for the successes (59-42). However, the KD again emphasises the role of law as regulatory force, thus suggesting that challenges to the system should be dealt with through existing rules and regulations. In relation to the scarf issue, for instance, it seems that the KD is suggesting obeying the law first and then discussing it. Economic equality is also perceived as an imperative to the success of democracy (18).
Score –3

44. I am trying to survive economically to be able to feed my children. The debate between Islam and secularism does not interest me.

4. About one thousand female students have been refused entry to the University of Marmara because they dress themselves according to their religious belief. This shows that there is a serious problem with freedom of belief and education in Turkey.

46. The secularists in Turkey claim that women who wear scarf cannot be secular. This is not a democratic attitude.

36. Ataturk (Mustafa Kemal) is a very important personality who could only be respected. However, the Kemalism label, unfortunately, got stuck on him and being unfairly used against Muslims. Kemalism has now become a metaphysical concept with a religious like content. Like democracy, its meaning has been abused and changed.

63. If a law breaches a basic individual right it can be disobeyed.

The KD’s strong reaction against a non-political and pessimist stand comes to the fore again (44). The importance earlier attributed to economic equality does not grant a right to avoid political and social responsibilities to the economically disadvantaged. Thus, an awareness of the issues and a willingness to take part in debates are also marked as necessary for the establishment of a dialog between conflicting sides. The rejection of the statement (4) can be interpreted in relation to the statements on law, such as (53) and (60). The meaning of secularism for theKD as separation of religious and public affairs is also emphasised again as the scarf is seen as a religious symbol. Statement (46) appears to be a confirmation of this position since the KD does not conceive the scarf as part of the democratic struggle in Turkey. Being democratic means to act according to the rule of law, hence disobeying law even if it breaches a fundamental right is not acceptable. Statement (36) reinforces the KD’s strong dedication to Kemalism. The claim that Kemalism itself has been turned into a kind of religion is commonly raised by Muslims in their argument with seculars. The KD’s reaction to this is naturally consistent with its Kemalist stand.
Score +2

9. Islamists are not as tolerant towards atheists as they are towards Islamists.

2. Kemalism and secularism cannot be separated from each other. Separating them will mean the end of secularism. If you are secular you are also Kemalist, or vice versa.

8. Today, the biggest obstacle for democracy in Turkey is not Islam, but the political parties, which offer no solution to corruption.

16. Islam, as a system of law, cannot be compatible with democracy. The role and the place attributed to women by Islamic law, which denies women basic individual rights, is enough to prove this.

40. The fear of communism and fundamentalism, has contributed to the inclusion of very undemocratic rules in the penal code against them (142, 141, 163). If they were let develop freely, they would be able to reach new synthesises, thus avoid today’s problems.

27. The important thing is to start from somewhere. If people could start showing respect and tolerance to each other this would force the state to do the same.

Two new concepts, tolerance and corruption, emerge in the +2 score. Tolerance appears in two different forms. The first refers to lenience between conflicting groups such as atheists and Muslims (9). The second refers to tolerance more at the state level in relation to the state’s treatment of the politically incorrect (40). The state’s heavy handedness in dealing with leftist and Islamic groups is seen as a major source of discontent by the KD. With its position towards statement 40, together with other comments indicating displeasure with anti-democratic state measures, the KD leans towards a democratic state as a fundamental condition for the success of reconciliation. As will be seen, this marks an important distinction between the other Kemalist discourse, the Nationalist discourse (ND) and the KD.

On the other hand, the KD conceives corruption as a bigger threat for democracy than Islam (8). This is indicative of the disenchantment, common to all discourses, with the way the political regime functions. However, the KD also raises doubts about Islam’s compatibility with democratic values, particularly in relation to basic individual rights (16). This indicates that the
KD in its relation with Islam and democracy sits on a sharp edge, in that while it favours a constructive dialog between seculars and Muslims, it is also quite cautious about Islamic rules in relation to women.

A grassroots based initiative for reconciliation surfaces again (27). This resembles the statement (58), but here the state is anticipated to take a more active role, which is probably why it is ranked lower than statement 58.

**Score –2**

51. *If the freedom of belief is overemphasised, Muslim people might be affected by the ideas that are dangerous for the secular regime.*

5. *The state does not want people’s consciousness to rise. Nevertheless, may be thanks to the media, people from different backgrounds have started understanding each other better.*

14. *The universities are important places where secular people and Islamists can close the existing gap between the two groups. When we do not allow female students wearing scarf into the universities we also throw them out of the modern world. By doing this we jeopardise the possibility of living together.*

47. *My wife has been refused to be issued a health card only because she wears a scarf. This is against basic human rights and secularism.*

15. *Islam can accommodate different groups including atheists.*

12. *The debates in media, such as discussion forums on TV channels, are playing an important role in allowing people to understand each other.*

The KD’s divided treatment of individual rights and the scarf issue dominate the –2 score. It defends freedom of belief (51) as a fundamental individual right, yet its support disappears when the scarf issue appears in the agenda. Statement (14) and (47) represent the scarf issue in two different forms, as a right to education and as a right to equal treatment (or to access to public health system). In either case, the KD does not acknowledge that those issues are related to basic individual rights since they are linked to the scarf problem. In other words, the KD insists on conceiving the scarf and issues related to the scarf as an individual right problem. For the KD the
scarf issue is seen as being used to hijack the real meaning of individual rights. This view is also commonly expressed in the follow-up interviews.

The KD also bestows a negative image of the media rejecting the idea that it contributes to the development of mutual understanding in the society. This cynical evaluation of media has also been consistent in the follow-up interviews. Only a handful of subjects commented on the media positively, the others agreed on the negative impact of the media. The cautious approach, shown in the score +2 in relation to Islam’s capacity to deal with democracy, also continues in the doubt the KD casts about Islam’s treatment of minority groups (15).

**Score +1**

56. *The state should lead the reconciliation process. It should not treat some of its citizen as enemies.*

61. *We should trust our people whether they are Kurds, Turks, Laz, Alevi, whether they wear a scarf or not. The more divisions are created in the name of state protection, the more divided we become. This is the real danger.*

43. *The lack of education is the main reason why we are having such problems between secular and Islamic people. People do not like reading and investigating. They believe in whatever they hear.*

64. *The Islamists are only softening their lines because of the strong resistance shown against them by the Army and Kemalists.*

37. *In Turkey, more than eighty percent of Islamic people have a moderate line. They cannot be a threat for the secular regime.*

39. *Against the claim, our state is not a secular one. Forcing people to declare their religion on their identity cards or having compulsory religion lessons in schools are examples of this.*

29. *I trust that secular people and Muslims will come to an agreement when human values are brought into the agenda.*

33. *The military tradition has paralysed the self-reflective ability of our society. That is why we still have been governed by a mentality, which is out of date.*
The KD still manages to extend much of what has been established already. A positive expectation about Muslims and seculars agreeing on a common platform (29) is supported by the belief that most Muslims do not pose a threat to the secular regime (37). Expectations from the state also emerge to lead the reconciliation process (56) and to stop divisive treatment of citizens in the name of the protection of the state’s unity (61). Anti-democratic measures continue to be disapproved (33), however the secular nature of the state is also questioned (39). On the other hand, the sign of double treatment appears again in the statement supporting the tough line of the Army and Kemalists (64). The role of education is emphasised for the first time adding another dimension to the framework for developing a common understanding (43).

Score –1

22. The negative image that some extreme Islamic groups have created has been attributed to the whole Islamic community particularly by media. We have to stop this misinterpretation.

31. I do not see anything wrong with religious sects. People should be able to get together if they believe in the same thing. Everybody, religious people, atheists etc., should be able to live together in peace within the same nation.

32. Recently, Islamic and secular people have been softening their attitudes. It shows that we can solve our problems better when we try to understand each other.

35. Today, the meaning attributed to democracy has gone beyond that it is only a system of governing. It is being perceived almost like another religion interfering with people’s private spheres. Democracy is not a way of living. It is a way of governing.

62. The state must trust its people. We are here for our country and the state. I served in the army and fought against Kurdish separatists in the East. Today, the state considers me as a fundamentalist threat because my wife wears a scarf.

41. Quite a few female students, who had to take off their scarf to be admitted to universities, later became quite happy with their new look. May be this rule allowed them to do what they really want.
21. Whether the state is secular or not should not be dealt by the Constitution. The state should only act as a guarantor of the freedom of religious practice. There should not be a state institution to organise the religious practice.

28. During the Ottoman rule, a variety of ethnic and religious groups lived together. This diversity only became a problem when it was used for political purposes. When people form a system of government, whatever the name or the form of it, there should not be a big problem as long as they can agree on basic moral values.

The −1 score makes some of the uncertainties that the KD has been displaying more visible. The liberal democratic line the KD would like to pursue stops short again in several statements. For instance, the plea for the state to trust its people, made above in the +1 score, is rejected when it is about trusting Muslims (62). Similarly statement 31 shows that religious freedom can only be tolerated at the individual level, and that a more organised practice within the sects is not acceptable (31). It also supports the direct intervention of the state in organising religious practice (21). Parallel to that, the meaning of democracy is given a more active role than that of guarantor of the practice of individual freedoms (35). The −1 score also shows that the KD is concerned about the current level of engagement between Muslims and seculars (32). The rejection of this statement should not be read as a statement against mutual understanding given that the KD has shown strong support for dialog and mutual understanding earlier. More likely that it is a sign of dissatisfaction with the existing situation. The statements on the Ottoman rule (28) and about students being happy after having taken their scarves off (41) seems to indicate uncertainty on the issue instead of a clear position.

Score 0

26. Turkish people tend to be very tolerant towards people who have similar views. The important thing is to be able to show respect to people who hold opposite views.

11. In some religious cities, during the Ramadan people were beaten if they ate or drank in daytime. How can I be sure that Islamists will not do the same if they come to power? How can I trust them?
52. Respect for individual rights, the fundamental principle of democracy and secularism, exists in Islam.

7. The army is the guarantor of democracy and secularism.

25. Whether I cover myself with a scarf or not should be no one’s business. This is what I understand from secularism. Everybody should pay respect to different beliefs.

48. The conflict between secular and Islamic people has been created superficially. The groups who are in control of the state have always created enemies in order to maintain their power. Yesterday it was communism, today fundamentalist Islam.

55. For a state taking measures to help the practice of religious freedom should not be against secularism. Quite contrary, a secular system requires this.

23. One cannot claim to be a real Muslim if one does not interpret Quran in the light of today’s living condition.

According to Brown (1980) subjects tend to delay the assessment of the statements they feel uncertain about. The 0 score reflects this uncertainty. This does not necessarily mean that subjects have no opinion about the statements, but that their position is not as clear relative to other statements. The army’s role, for instance, as the guarantor of the secular regime (7), is a conflicting matter for subjects subscribing to the KD. The general democratic idea supported by the KD negates the role of the army, but the Kemalist traditional support for the army makes it hard to reject it completely, thus the statement is placed in the 0 score. A similar logic can be applied to explain why the KD placed the statements (25), (55) and (48) in 0 score.

5.1.4 Overview

The factor analysis displays clearly that the KD is strongly committed to the principle of Kemalism as explained in the section on the historical origins of Kemalism. The KD favours a forceful separation of public and religious affairs. On the other hand, the KD appears to be committed to a system of law based on the protection of individual rights. In this respect the KD displays a liberal tendency in its conception of democratic politics. Yet, the
scarf issue appears to be a testing point for the KD’s self-proclaimed democratic attitude in the sense that it deals with the problem in a rather uncompromising fashion. In fact, the scarf represents a peculiar dilemma for the KD. As the factor analysis reveals the KD adamantly avoids seeing that the scarf issue constitutes an individual rights problem. This inconstancy is one of the points that represents a potential challenge for the KD. The KD’s dilemma here appears to be a result of the KD’s understanding of the public/private divide. The KD tends to discriminate between individual rights according to its strict secular criteria, that is, if those rights cannot pass the secular criteria, then they have to be confined to the private sphere. As a result, the KD leans more to the protection of the secular system rather than establishing a democratic order.

The important point here, in relation to establishing dialog with Muslims, is that no matter how much the KD talks in favour of the supremacy of law, the more it pursues the incoherent way it relates secularism to democracy the more it will be open to the charge that it represents an undemocratic position in relation to Islam, democracy and secularism. Similarly, the KD displays willingness for dialog oriented to finding common points between different perspectives, yet again it falls victim to its discriminatory tendency towards religious practice and symbols.

What makes the KD’s defence of Kemalist principles promising from a democratic point of view is its critical attitude towards some institutions, such as the army, which claim to be flag bearers of Kemalism. In other words, the KD does not offer unqualified support to the army, which is not seen as above the law when it comes to maintaining the secular system. The KD shows some characteristics that are not representative of the official, hard line Kemalism. In the background section I referred to the close link between the Army and the Kemalist elite. Yet, the commitment to the army among non-elites does not match the commitment of the elites to the army. The KD distinguishes itself from a pro-army approach. It does not dismiss the army, as in the case of Liberal left and Islamic discourses, yet does not approve its mingling with the political process either. In a similar manner the KD displays signs of discontent about the heavy-handed
treatment of the state towards groups that one way or another represent dissenting views. As will be seen, this represents a potential point of agreement with the Liberal Left and the Islamic discourses.

In relation to Islamic groups, the main problem for the KD appears to be trust. The KD does not believe that Islamic values can coexist with democratic principles; hence it prefers to keep them completely out of the public sphere. It perceives the idea that religious practice, as it is defended by Islamic groups in Turkey, is nothing but a deceitful act aimed at occupying the secular public system. As I mentioned in the section on Islam and the state relationship, this is in fact the main reason that there is currently no clear sign of cooperation or dialog between the Islamic and Kemalist sections of the political spectrum at the formal level of politics in Turkey.

Yet, the Q study findings display some possible inroads to develop a better mutual understanding. In the case of the KD, it seems certain that sooner or later the KD will have to revisit the idea of democracy and secularism in relation to individual rights. The key here will be whether the idea of individual rights will consistently be defended by Islamic groups, thus showing their commitment to democratic principles, and gaining the trust of the KD.

The dynamics of Turkish politics is creating a different basis for people who want to follow a more moderate line. As I will explain, the paradigm shift that occurred in Islamic discourse, that is, that Islam does not constitute the backbone of their politics any more has been playing an important role in softening the lines in left and Islamic politics. Hence a discursive interaction between the members of both Islamic and Kemalist groups to resolve their differences seems a viable option.

This brings us back to the role of the social learning model of deliberation in divided societies. The nature of disagreements between the major discourses and their representatives within the Turkish public sphere first
require the settlement of basic differences between those groups. This requires the establishment of discursive practices oriented to mutual understanding between the members of opposing sides. As I have argued before, this is, and should be, the task of deliberative processes acting towards not decision-making but mutual understanding and learning.
5.2 Factor 2: Nationalist Discourse (ND)

5.2.1 General Characteristics

The findings of the Q study indicate that, just like the KD, the ND subscribes to the main principles of a Kemalist state. However it differs from the KD in its strong leaning towards Islamic values and support for the army. The ND is the only of the four discourses identified in the Q study that continuously fluctuates between secular and Islamic values. One way of describing the ND’s dual character is that it is culturally Islamic, but politically secular and authoritarian. It also represents a large section of the community, composed of people who are both dedicated Muslims and supporters of the secular regime. As the next part on the historical origins of the ND will show, nationalism is an important concept in the Turkish Republic, cutting across variety of political entities in a broad spectrum including the left. Yet, the type of nationalist discourse that emerges from the Q study findings is mainly related to the conservative sections of the Turkish society, mostly associated with a rural background, even though they pursue a city life in metropolitan areas.

The dual character of the ND manifests itself best in its approach to the scarf issue. Unlike the KD, for instance, the ND conceives the scarf problem clearly as an individual rights issue. The Q findings show that the ND is not comfortable at all with the way that women with scarf have been treated. Yet, its reaction immediately turns to rebuffing the issue if it threatens the stability of the state or the national unity. In this sense the ND is very suspicious of any reactionary move against the state, as well as the army, as they, in the ND’s eye, ultimately coordinate the cohesiveness of the society. In other words, issues related to individual rights are usually subordinated to the supremacy of the state. The next part on the historical origins of the ND will illuminate the roots of the ND’s dual character.

Not being able to find a consistent way of dealing with the different value systems surely is a dilemma for the ND. However, its conflicting position
also has some advantages. For instance, as in the KD, the notions of dialog and common understanding weigh heavily in the ND’s agenda. With its emphasis on dialog the ND could in fact play a positive role in bridging the gap between seculars and Muslims. Even though it is not clear how supporters of the ND will react to the process of dialog if the state or the army are strongly criticised, by being able to play a bridging role between the secular and Islamic sections of society the ND could make an important contribution to the process of dialog pending to revisiting its authoritarian tendencies in favour of a more democratic approach.

5.2.2 Historical Origins of the Nationalist Discourse

In the section on Kemalism I outlined the conditions that led to the emergence of modern Turkey, following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. One of the critical moments in this period was the surfacing of Turkish nationalism under the second IT. The roots of today’s nationalistic discourse in modern Turkey go back to this period. Yet, today’s nationalism has a broader meaning. It covers a broad spectrum of people with conservative religious and political tendencies, all linked to Turkishness in varying degrees defining their relationship with the process of nation building. Nationalism in this sense influences not only conservative sections of the Turkish society, but also large sections of the left. For instance, even though the ultra nationalist (fascist) MHP (National Action Party), is considered as “the nationalists” by the public eye, it occupies only a small portion within the whole spectrum,. Hence, with nationalism I refer here not specifically to a political formation, but more to a cultural process. In this respect the nationalist discourse departs from a strong emphasis on being a Muslim and a Turk, yet it is also secular to the degree that it fully respects Kemalist principles.

The difference between the early nationalism, which existed at the time of the Ottoman rule, and today’s nationalism is best observed by looking at how issues between Islam, Turkishness and secularism are polarised. While the nationalism of the IT wavers between Turkishness and Islam for a
modern nationalist in Turkey the dilemma would be how to find a balance between secularism and Islam. Since, nationalism carries different meanings for different groups it is essential that the characteristics of different types of nationalism in Turkey are established. In this section, I will identify three types of nationalism in Turkey to reveal their commonalities as well as their differences. The three types of nationalism are

1. Kemalist nationalism
2. Conservative nationalism
3. Left nationalism

**1. Kemalist nationalism**

The nature of the link between Kemalism and nationalism can easily be discerned by observing the development of nationalism. The Kemalist version of Turkey’s history presents the establishment of the Republic as a complete break from the past. Yet historians rightly dispute the validity of this claim (Mardin, 1962; Deringil, 2002; Karpat, 2001). Akman (2002), for instance, maintains that the strong state tradition in the Ottoman period played an important role in the formation of Turkish nationalism under the Turkish Republic. As Mustafa Kemal belongs to the second IT generation, his regime carried the footmarks of the second IT, one of which was nationalism. The IT’s nationalism developed as a reaction to growing ethnic divisions within the Ottoman Empire. The reforms of Tanzimat and I. Mesrutiyet, which emphasised Ottomanism, were carried out to counter this trend, but did not prove to be sufficient. The disintegration of the Ottoman Empire continued steadily. Pan-Turkism was the solution offered by the second IT. However, the IT’s attempt to revive the Ottoman Empire on the basis of Turkish nationalism was doomed to fail since it alienated not only non-Islamic groups but also other ethnic minorities such as Arabs, who, with the exception of a few opposition groups, were initially largely loyal to the Ottoman state. The situation changed when the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire was completed at the end of the First World War. What
remained made it easy for Mustafa Kemal to focus on a national identity based on the idea of a homeland (misak-i milli) and Turkish nationalism. Nationalism in this sense was imposed from above through the creation of a nation in the context of a modernisation project. For the Kemalist regime nationalism was the means to achieve a modern Turkey. In this sense it was tied not so much to ethnicity but rather to the creation of a modern Turkey by Western standards. As such this particular nationalism is also one of the main differences between the Kemalist regime and IT. While IT was favouring a synthesis between Turkism and Islam, the Kemalist regime chose to lean on secularism and Turkish nationalism (Koker, 2001). In fact, Kemalists used Turkish nationalism in conjunction with populism. Where ethnic and cultural sameness in conjunction with the unity of homeland were emphasised through nationalism, populism provided the catalyst for conveying the message of modernity to the population (Karaomerlioglu, 2001)

Belge (2001) draws attention to another difference between Kemalist nationalism and the IT’s nationalism. He asserts that Mustafa Kemal always rejected the IT’s elitist use of nationalism and always tied his nationalism to the legitimacy of its regime. He tried to instigate a legitimate regime by establishing institutions acting only with the power of law. Thus, Kemalist nationalism incorporated its nationalism with the creation of a legal order. Belge defines Mustafa Kemal’s commitment to the legitimacy of the regime on the basis of legal norms as one of the most important contributions to the new republic. In the previous section, I indicated that the KD displayed the same interest in the supremacy of law, even though it was rather inconsistent. Kemalist nationalism’s link to the idea of a legal regime is equally inconsistent since from a nationalistic point of view the unity of state and homeland represents the most important principle. It is in fact through this principle that all nationalist tendencies are connected to each other. Thus, Kemalist nationalism acts as a common denominator between different types of nationalisms of Turkey.
2. Conservative Nationalism

Conservative Nationalism differs from Kemalist Nationalism mainly because of its ethnic and religious emphasis on the origin of Turkish Nationalism. Yet, both share the same strong commitment to the state and to the army in the name of national unity. Bora and Canefe (2001) refer to this kind of nationalism as populist nationalism since it exploits a popular notion of Turkishness, which appears to be a strong but not clearly defined part of the Turkish psyche.

The emergence of conservative nationalism can be traced back to the period going from 1950 to 1960, which signified the end of the single party ruling. During this period the DP (Democrat Party) emerged as the first opposition party against the ruling CHP and governed the Turkish Republic for ten years after winning the multiparty elections. The DP linked nationalism to traditional values, particularly to Islam, for the purpose of legitimising its opposition against the Kemalist regime. The DP’s use of nationalism was mainly an opposition building exercise, which substantially differed from the purpose of nation building as in the case of Kemalist nationalism. The emergence of conservative nationalism during the DP period paved the way to the development of more radical nationalist tendencies. Responding to the challenges of the day, those tendencies managed to overpower the role Kemalist nationalism played. From the cold war era on and up until 2002 general elections, the themes conservative nationalism subscribed to much of the political agenda. Therefore, I will look at those tendencies within conservative nationalism under three main headings: anti-communism, ethnic nationalism based on an anti-Kurdish sentiment and Islamic nationalism.

Anti-Communist Tendencies during the Cold War Era

Towards the end of the DP government, the nationalist discourse took another turn with the increasing importance of the Cold War. This time its emphasis was more on patriotism supported by anti-communist, racist and conservative themes. This change in the nationalist discourse represents a
major break from the populist nationalism of the 1950s. With the emphasis on themes, such as anti-communism and the supremacy of Turkishness, the nationalism of late 1950s became a basis for right wing conservative politics and eventually led to the formation of the ultra nationalist MHP (National Action Party) in 1960s (Bora & Canefe, 2002). With the MHP, nationalism in Turkey entered into an era of conflict driven discourses.

The anti-communist character of the MHP was strongly tied to the protection of Turkish identity, which discriminatively and relentlessly attacked the members of the left organisations by accusing them of treachery. Ironically, the members of the CHP, the party Mustafa Kemal Ataturk founded, were also among the MHP’s targets. For the MHP, the CHP’s populist discourse was dangerous enough since its reference point was people rather than Turkishness. ‘The people’s government’, a common term used by the CHP was, for instance, seen as an example of communist terminology by the MHP. The MHP’s anti-communist nationalism was always a potent force since its terminology determined much of conservative politics during 1960s and 70s. For instance, the most popular conservative politics party of during this period, the AP (Justice party), which claimed to carry the tradition of the DP after the 1960 military coup and ruled Turkey for a long time, was largely affected by the MHP’s anti-communist discourse. Today’s conservative nationalism in Turkey is still influenced by this anti-communist, thus anti-left sentiment.

The anti-communist phobia eventually influenced the army as well. The anti-imperialist nationalist discourse of the army, which instigated the main principles of Kemalism during the 1960 coup, changed to follow the conservative nationalistic tendencies. The 1971 and 1980 coups were clearly driven by an anti-communist agenda. In 1980, the generals did not hesitate to abandon even some of Mustafa Kemal’s heritage such as Turk Dil Kurumu (The Institution of Turkish Language), seen as leaning too much towards a left discourse. Also abandoned were the items of the 1960 Constitution regarded as threatening the unity of the nation and the state (Atacan; 2003). This is one of the main reasons that the KD’s support for the
army is not as unconditional as the support of the nationalists. The Q study findings confirm this noticeably. The Kemalist discourse approaches the role of the army in political affairs with caution.

**Emergence of Ethnic Tendencies**

Conservative nationalism reached its peak during the war against the Kurds in East Turkey. From the 1990s onwards, the Turkish public sphere was marked by the rise of Turkish nationalism to its highest level, this time though accompanied by a strong ethnic, racist tendency based on the idea that everybody who lived within the boundaries of Turkey was essentially a Turk. Threatened by the strong nationalist sentiment existing among the Kurdish population, conservative nationalism shifted its paradigm from anti-communism to ethnicity. The Kemalist notion of unity of the state and homeland was still at work, but mostly remained at the background.

The strong anti-Kurdish sentiment of the Turkish public was capitalised successfully by MHP’s populist approach to nationalism. Following the capture of Abdullah Ocalan, the leader of the PKK (The outlawed Kurdish guerrilla organisation fought against the Turkish state during 1980s and 1990s), the MHP attracted 20% of the general vote in the 1999 general elections, to become the second biggest party in parliament. However, the support for the MHP went back to its normal level after 2001, after the Kurdish issue gradually disappeared from the public agenda.

Nevertheless, during the war with Kurdish rebels the MHP’s racist ethnic nationalism affected the whole political spectrum. The expansion of the MHP also represented a new stage in the development of nationalism in terms of its grassroots support in Turkey. MHP’s sizable grassroots support among the rural and urban population, from 1970 to 1980, was based on an anti-communist, anti-leftist stand, and jumped to a record level when the Kurdish issue became a real problem. During that time, the MHP also adopted an anti-intellectual populist discourse polarising the national identity of ordinary people with the so-called elitist culture of the bureaucracy, which
were identified as leftists. Conservative nationalism still carries this anti-intellectual sentiment in Turkey.

**Islamic Aspects**

An equally important distinction of the nationalist discourse was its proximity to Islam. First for the DP and then for the AP and the MHP, Islam was always considered a fundamental part of the national identity and linked to the anti-communist struggle by the representatives of conservative politics such as the MHP and the AP (Bora and Canefe, 2002). The anti-communist struggle was also a fight against the infidel. The Islamic tone of this nationalist reaction was echoed clearly in the war cry “Allah is the greatest!” used when members of leftist organisations were attacked.

The anarchic conditions of the pre-1980 coup period helped to strengthen the link between Islam and the Turkish nationalism. Atacan maintains that the formal ideology behind the 1980 coup was the synthesis of Islam and Turkish nationalism (2000). The roots of the synthesis between Islam and Turkish nationalism go back to the *Aydinlar Ocagi* (The House of Intellectuals) established in 1970. The synthesis asserts that Islam and Turkish nationalism are mutually inclusive, thus cannot be treated separately. Anything threatening this unity is considered as dangerous. Hence, communist or socialist ideologies were seen as harmful for the future of Turkey. Yet, the synthesis was also critical of Kemalism, particularly in its definition of secularism. According to the head of *Aydinlar Ocagi*, Prof Nevzat Yalcintas, secularism, as defined by the principles of “Six Arrows”, was turned into an ideological source of oppression against the freedom of religious practice. A consequence of this for Yalcintas would be the weakening of national identity, which could result in the lost of nationalism within the state culture (Atacan, 2000).

Atacan (2000) argues that the army adopted this synthesis to counter the strong socialist tendencies in the public and to use it as a catalyst to integrate sharply divided social and political divisions. Atacan also draws attention to the interesting fact that while the army supported some groups
in line with this strategy, the generals disregarded some Islamic groups, which did not display an immediate interest in Turkish Nationalism. The ones that were supported by the army were committed to nationalist ideas as much as to Islam, thus reflecting the spirit of the synthesis between Islam and Turkish nationalism.

The synthesis between Islam and Turkish nationalism by *Aydinlar Ocagi* had a profound impact on Turkey’s political culture. Following the first general elections after the coup, the ANAP (Motherland Party) government continued to follow the path of Turkish-Islam synthesis. The result was a flourishing of Turkish nationalism and Islam that filled the vacuum created by forcing the left out of the political sphere. A direct consequence of this was the rapid expansion of the nationalist MHP’s and the Islamist RP (Welfare Party)’s grassroots. The period between 1980 and the early 1990s was also marked by the rise of Islamic rhetoric within the MHP. Can (2002) argues that the main reason for this Islamic influence among the MHP grassroots was the military regime’s relatively tough stand towards the MHP. Having been prosecuted by the army for fighting to protect the state caused a great deal of disillusion among the MHP grassroots. The resentment for the treatment MHP members suffered by the hands of the army is best illustrated in this statement: “We are the only party whose ideas are in power, yet its members are in jail” (quoted in Bora, 2002). As a reaction to this “unfair treatment” some sought refuge within Islam, which affected the overall balance in the party. As a result of this leaning towards Islamic politics, the MHP joined the 1991 general elections by forming a coalition with two other Islamic parties, which was introduced as “the believers are united” (Can, 2002; 678).

Yet, the Islamic influence in the nationalist discourse of the MHP did not last long. The population’s growing reaction against the Kurdish separatist movement provided a golden opportunity for the MHP to return back to its ethnicity-based nationalism. In 1992, the party members who put Islamic values ahead of Turkish values were forced to leave the party. Later they
formed their own party the BBP (The Great Unification Party), which is still around today, though with no electoral achievement.

With the elimination of Islamic influence from its ranks, the MHP reiterated its loyalty to the state, this time though by emphasising secular values. In 1998 when the Army lifted its support to Islam and started pursuing a tough line the MHP clearly sided with the Army. The most crucial moment in this support appeared to be when the MHP sided itself with the Army during the scarf controversy. In the midst of the Kurdish problem the impact of the rejection of the plea of women wearing the scarf was not immediately noticed. However, the Islamic vote almost completely deserted the MHP in the 2002 elections, which was a total change considering the overwhelming support the MHP benefited from in the previous election. As I mentioned previously, this shift in the Islamic vote also affected the traditional Islamic line represented by the SP (The Prosperity Party). The newly established AKP (Justice and Development Party) was the choice of the Islamic votes. In this sense, the shift in the Islamic vote marks a turning point in Islam’s relationship with nationalism, indicating an end to a long-lived alliance within the ranks of conservative politics. The analysis of the Islamic Discourse below will testify to this important development in Turkish politics.

**The Left Nationalism**

Some sections of the Turkish left have been characterised by strong nationalist tendencies. The left and nationalism both had to tackle the same problem, that is, fighting against the invasion of Western powers and rebuilding a nation, particularly in the early days of the Republic. The nationalistic tendency this created in the left still continues today. Other, more subtle reasons for this are the new Soviet regime’s, born out of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, support of national struggles led against imperialist powers. Gaining the support of newly emerging nation-states was crucial for the Soviet regime in order to counter the pressure of the capitalist block.
Yet, Kemalism possibly played a more substantial role in the development of the left in Turkey. The crossovers between the left, ethnic nationalism and Kemalism explain why in today’s political climate some left parties in Turkey do not hesitate to ally themselves with their arch enemy, “the Fascist” MHP, to fight against the new forms of colonialism”, such as the European Union. Concepts such as the National Democratic Revolution, linked to a strong anti-imperialist sentiment, and Galief’s idea of nationalist fighters as the only real revolutionaries are crucial to understand this relationship.

The strong anti-imperialist sentiment, coupled with the patriotic arousal that it created, played a crucial role in the development of the left nationalism. Aydin (2002) links the development of nationalism in the Turkish Left to a strategic move instigated by the new Soviet regime. Aydin argues that the Soviet regime was forced to find itself some allies in order to survive the increasing isolation following the defeat of the German revolution in 1919. Those allies, according to Lenin’s formulation, were the emerging forces of anti-imperialist, nationalist movements, fighting against the old colonial rulers. Lenin grouped nationalism into two categories: oppressive and oppressed nation’s nationalism and allied himself with the latter. For Lenin, the oppressed nation’s nationalism was representing a progressive moment in history since this nationalism was first anti-imperialist and secondly helping to develop the conditions of socialism by defending an independent national economy. The Soviet regime categorised the oppressed nation nationalism under the term of “the National Democratic Revolution” (NDR) and supported the national struggles if they fitted into the NDR category. Turkey’s independent struggle was one of them; hence the term “NDR” became a key concept for the emerging forces of Turkish left.

Another important influence on the Turkish Left, during the early days of the Republic, came from a Marxist nationalist, Sultan Galief. Galief, who developed his theory on the basis of the struggle of the Central Asian Turks against the Old Russian colonialism, defined those nationalist movements as the real revolutionary forces and criticised the Soviet regime for continuing to oppress their struggle. He called for a unity of Turks in Central
Asia and Siberia to oppose the Soviet colonialism. Galief's nationalism was branded by the Soviet regime first as revisionist, then as counter-revolutionary; yet the Turkish Left quickly picked up these major themes (Aydin, 2002; 446).

The ideological foundations of the NDR in Turkey were first established by the TKP (Turkish Communist Party). What was crucial here, according to Aydin, was that the focus on nation as the driving force of the revolution eventually undermined the class-based formulation of the revolution. In other words, the class as the subject of history was replaced by the nation. As a result, concepts, such as national independence, national economic development, national unity, were used as guiding principles of anti-imperialist struggle. Yet the Kemalist regime was already using these concepts successfully. Besides, the Soviet regime was almost unconditionally supporting the Independence War and later the Kemalist regime. This created a strong link between the Left and Kemalism, an impact that has lasted until today. In fact, from the point of left nationalism, the most interesting crossover between the left and the nationalist discourse is currently being realised in some coalitions formed between the main representative of the NDR tradition, the IP (Workers Party), and the ethnic nationalist party, the MHP. For the IP the anti-imperialist struggle today, as during the Independence War, is the main objective to be achieved. For this, the IP calls on the re-implementation of Kemalist principles, as described in the Six Arrows, and supports the army as the protector of national unity and the secular regime against the ethnic separatist and Islamic threats. IP’s nationalism reaches such a degree that its leftism almost disappears behind its nationalist discourse.

I will take up these themes again in the analysis of the Left tradition in Turkey. The analysis has so far showed that there are various overlaps between the Kemalist, the Nationalist and the Leftist discourses in terms of their link with nationalism. Nationalism cuts deep across all discourses in Turkey, including the Islamic discourse as I will show. The only exception to this overwhelming influence can be seen in the socialist left, which
differentiated itself from the left nationalism during the fragmentation of the left in the late 1960s and 1970s. The determining factor in their link to nationalism for the discourses appears to be their affinity with Islam. In the case of the ND for instance its attraction towards Islam plays a crucial role in its dual character, which continuously fluctuates between secular and Islamic values. The factor interpretation below will clearly display this tendency in the case of the ND.

5.2.3 Factor Interpretation, Nationalist Discourse

Score +6

43. The lack of education is the main reason why we are having such problems between secular and Islamic people. People do not like reading and investigating. They believe in whatever they hear.

59. We have to find out what is common among us rather than focusing on differences. For instance, we have to emphasise the importance of education at the universities instead of arguing about the scarf controversy.

The ND immediately points to education as the main reason for tension between Muslims and seculars, and then offers a solution to the problem. The ND’s approach is substantially different from that of its liberal counterpart, the KD, whose first step was to immediately assert the meaning of secularism and defend it. The ND instead emphasises commonalities in the community, which are important to preserve the unity of the Turkish social fabric. In other words, the ND does not immediately dichotomise the relationship between secular and Islamic lines, as in the case of the KD. The emphasis on social unity comes first and maintains its presence throughout sorting.

Score –6

3. Secularism is atheism.
10. The differences between us are too deep. We cannot reconcile them by talking. This system will remain as it is in the future.

Consistent with the emphasis on the commonality in the +6 score, the support for focusing on common issues rather than differences appears again in the rejection of the idea that differences cannot be reconciled (10). The score line the ND brings the idea of dialog to the fore is notably earlier than its counterpart the KD, indicating a stronger desire to solve problems through dialog. The ND, just as the KD, disapproves of the inherent pessimism and apolitical stand inherent in statement 10.

The ND’s reaction to statement 3 is as strong as the KD’s, possibly for different reasons however. It is most likely that those holding an ND oppose the statement since the claim, ‘secularism is atheism’, violates their desire for unity. In other words, subjects defending the ND react to a possible secularism/atheism divide, whereas in the KD it is simply a matter of defending seculars against an unwarranted claim.

Score +5

47. My wife has been refused to be issued a health card only because she wears a scarf. This is against basic human rights and secularism.

32. Recently, Islamic and secular people have been softening their attitudes. It shows that we can solve our problems better when we try to understand each other.

54. The state is not supposed to carry a religious identity. Its task should only be to govern people. It should not question its people on the basis of their religious identities.

The statements scoring +5 are indicative of major differences between the KD and the ND. The ND defines the scarf issue as a human rights problem and expects the secular regime to deal with it positively without completely dismissing the importance of it. Given that this statement scored only –2 with subjects defending the KD, a major breaking point between the two
discourses emerges. Statement 32 represents another point of divergence. By rejecting statement 32 the KD disagrees with the ND’s firm belief that the tension between Islamic and secular people is easing and that mutual understanding is the key to this development. The disagreement is not about the role mutual understanding plays, but about the ND’s belief that the tension between the two sides is easing. The ND’s proximity to the Muslim population is possibly the most likely reason behind its less antagonistic approach to the scarf issue.

On the issue of the state’s neutrality towards religious practices, though, the ND’s score is similar to the KD’s (+4). However, the ND’s line appears to be more consistent than the KD’s since the ND does not treat religious rights and the scarf as separate issues, which is what happens in the KD. In other words, unlike the KD, the ND advocates that the right to wear the scarf in public institutions should be treated as a basic individual right.

Score –5

19. People are less corrupt under sharia regime because it induces the fear of God.

49. In a Muslim society, the framework for freedom has to be determined according to Islamic values.

1. Today’s oppressive attitudes against Muslims in the name of secularism are rooted in Kemalist ideology.

Contrary to statements categorised with a +5 score, those categorised with a –5 score indicate that there are points of convergence between the KD and the ND. The ND, together with the KD, rejects the idea that religious values can neither be the basis of a framework for freedom, nor for a less corrupt society. The idea that Kemalism is a source of oppression against Muslims is rejected, confirming the ND’s commitment to Kemalism. The two discourses, therefore, join each other in their opposition to the reinforcement of religious values forming the rules of the governance and in defence of Kemalism.
Score +4

17. The purpose of religion will be defeated when it is carried over to the public arena. Beliefs are personal matters, thus they should be kept within the individual sphere.

25. Whether I cover myself with a scarf or not should be no one’s business. This is what I understand from secularism. Everybody should pay respect to different beliefs.

50. We have to produce our own model of democracy. The cultural values of Eastern countries are different from those in the West. Eastern countries should not be governed by an American model of democracy.

7. The army is the guarantor of democracy and secularism.

Statements categorised in the +4 score are indicative of divergences between the ND and the KD. The biggest margin of disagreement between the two discourses surfaces in relation to a model of democracy. The ND endorses a shift from the core Western values towards a framework determined more by local values. This move is sharply rejected by the KD (-4). The ND is consistent with its endorsement of the use of scarf and of the freedom of religious practice in that the ND wants to broaden the scope of the existing secular regime by underpinning the importance of local practices. The endorsement of statement (25) is again consistent with this line.

Yet a completely different point of divergence with the KD appears in the ND’s strong support for the army’s role. This is one of the main points defining the ND as conservative. The ND is labelled as conservative first because it supports traditional values, second because of its strong endorsement of the army as an agent defending of the secular system. In contrast, the KD supports the rule of the law rather than the intervention of the military in politics.
Score –4

20. If everybody tries to live according to Islamic rule, a just system can come into existence.

33. The military tradition has paralysed the self-reflective ability of our society. That is why we still have been governed by a mentality, which is out of date.

44. I am trying to survive economically to be able to feed my children. The debate between Islam and secularism does not interest me.

39. Against the claim, our state is not a secular one. Forcing people to declare their religion on their identity cards or having compulsory religion lessons in schools are examples of this.

The ND continues to oppose suggestions that religious rules can be the basis of a just system. The claim that apathy is partly linked with economic difficulties experienced is rejected by the ND, as it was by the KD. However, the main difference between the ND and the KD emerges one more time when the army’s role in democratic development is questioned. The ND’s commitment to the army as the guarantor of the secular system appears to be almost unreserved. The ND’s unreserved support for the army, perhaps, can be linked to its quest for social unity. The army is seen as the only institution capable to maintain social unity in a divided society. Statement 39 also appears as a point of divergence between the ND and the KD, since the ND’s support for the army extends to the state, indicating support for a regime that centrally controls religious affairs.

Score +3

42. The solution is mutual understanding. Groups, who oppose each other, should try to understand each other.
34. Secularism is the undeniable foundation of religious pluralism and the most important norm for societal peace. We must hold on to it.

64. The Islamists are only softening their lines because of the strong resistance shown against them by the Army and Kemalists.

2. Kemalism and secularism cannot be separated from each other. Separating them will mean the end of secularism. If you are secular you are also Kemalist, or vice versa.

37. In Turkey, more than eighty percent of Islamic people have a moderate line. They cannot be a threat for the secular regime.

The +3 score is indicative of major consensus points between the ND and other discourses (42). The role of mutual understanding in reconciling differences is supported by the ND, the KD, the left liberal and the Islamic discourses. The ND also moves to define its position in relation to secularism, stipulating that religious freedom can only be realised within a secular framework (34), though compared to the KD this move appears notably late. Affirming that Kemalism and secularism are inseparable also reinforces the support for a secular framework (2). The simultaneous commitment to Kemalism and to secularism is where the ND and the KD break away from the liberal left and the Islamic discourses. The score obtained for statement 64 indicates a continued support held by the ND’s commitment for the role of the army, this time by approving the tough stand taken by the army against Islamic groups including the RP (Refah Partisi), which was the principle partner of the coalition government in 1998. However, statement (37) is also conciliatory since it suggests that the majority of Muslims do not constitute a fundamentalist threat against the regime (37).
36. Atatürk (Mustafa Kemal) is a very important personality who could only be respected. However, the Kemalism label, unfortunately, got stuck on him and being unfairly used against Muslims. Kemalism has now become a metaphysical concept with a religious like content. Like democracy, its meaning has been abused and changed.

21. Whether the state is secular or not should not be dealt by the Constitution. The state should only act as a guarantor of the freedom of religious practice. There should not be a state institution to organise the religious practice.

16. Islam, as a system of law, cannot be compatible with democracy. The role and the place attributed to women by Islamic law, which denies women basic individual rights, is enough to prove this.

24. The Quran does not praise a particular political system. Islam can fit into any system as long as it is fair. For instance, Islam could fit in a monarchy if the King were fair.

62. The state must trust its people. We are here for our country and the state. I served in the army and fought against Kurdish separatists in the East. Today, the state considers me as a fundamentalist threat because my wife wears a scarf.

The ND’s emphasis on a strong state emerges again with the expectation that the state should take an active stand in the organisation of religious practice (21). The ND’s stand here is stronger than that of the KD (-1). The negation of the statement (62) is another example of the ND’s pro-state attitude even if the matter is related to a statement on the scarf, previously supported. As expected, Kemalism is also backed (36). This is consistent with the ND’s general commitment to Kemalism. Yet, another interesting major difference between the ND and the KD appears in statement (16) on the issue of the compatibility of Islam and democracy. The ND’s proximity to Islamic values prompts the rejection of the assertion that Islam cannot be compatible with democracy. This again leaves the ND at odds with the KD (+2). However, with its support for the next statement (24) the ND again opposes to religion as a political force.
Score +2

29. I trust that secular people and Muslims will come to an agreement when human values are brought into the agenda.

38. If Turkey has today become more modern than any other Islamic countries, it is mainly because law and education have been laicised by being separated from the influence of religion.

61. We should trust our people whether they are Kurds, Turks, Laz, Alevi, whether they wear a scarf or not. The more divisions are created in the name of state protection, the more divided we become. This is the real danger.

56. The state should lead the reconciliation process. It should not treat some of its citizen as enemies.

46. The secularists in Turkey claim that women who wear the scarf cannot be secular. This is not a democratic attitude.

8. Today, the biggest obstacle for democracy in Turkey is not Islam, but the political parties, which offer no solution to corruption.

The +2 score indicates once more an agreement between the ND and the KD. This agreement does not apply to the scarf problem, which appears again as a major rift (the KD scoring –3). This time the issue is linked to the general democratic attitude (46). The ND clearly hold a different line to the KD’s, which believes that the scarf is a threat for the democratic tradition. As for the other statements scoring +2, even though both the ND and the KD agree with them, priorities assigned to the statements are indicative of subtle differences. For instance, statement (38), which receives a high priority treatment in the KD (+5), appears quite low in the ND’s sorting, possibly as a reflection of the ND’s more reluctant attitude to accept modernity as the main purpose of social development. Due to its conservative character and its emphasis on the unity of the state and the nation, the ND prioritises different issues compared to the KD. The difference between them again emerges in statement (61), which the KD scores (+1) behind the ND. A similar difference can be observed in relation
to the statement (56), which is rated (+1) by the KD the ND’s rating is consistent with its pro-state attitude.

The suggestion in statement (8) that the main problem for democracy in Turkey is not Islam but corrupt political parties appears to be one of the main consensus points across discourses. This has indeed important consequences in the sense that when the attitude of seculars towards Islam is measured along with another criteria, such as political parties, economic equality, Islam does not appear to be the most important problem.

**Score –2**

9. Islamists are not as tolerant towards atheists as they are towards Islamists.

51. If the freedom of belief is overemphasised, Muslim people might be affected by the ideas that are dangerous for the secular regime.

40. The fear of communism and fundamentalism, has contributed to the inclusion of very undemocratic rules in the penal code against them (142, 141, 163). If they were let develop freely, they would be able to reach new synthesises, thus avoid today’s problems.

52. Respect for individual rights, the fundamental principle of democracy and secularism, exists in Islam

30. The reason behind the reaction to Kemalists is their antagonistic attitude towards Islamic people. The problem can be solved easily if they tried to understand Muslim people rather than attacking and dehumanising them.

13. Some remarks made by Islamic leaders contributed to raising the tension between Islamists and Kemalists. An example of this is Mr Erbakan’s remark suggesting that one day the deans’, who do not allow students with scarf to the universities, will be forced to salute those students.

The –2 score attributed to statements (9), (40) and (13) surface as main points of contention between the ND and the KD. The biggest margin of difference occurs in statement (13) which scores a high +4 in the KD, and a -2 in the ND. This can also be attributed to the Islamic leanings of the ND.
Particularly when it is considered together with statement (9). The different scores obtained for statement (40), though, are related to the ND’s pro-state attitude. Unlike the KD, the state’s heavy-handed intervention against left and Islamic fundamentalism is acceptable for the ND.

Statement (52) reveals a subtler than an obvious difference. The ND rejects the idea that respect for individual rights exist in Islam, while the KD prefers to be neutral on this issue. Given the ND’s leaning towards Islamic values, this comes as a surprise, pointing to the fact that the ND’s acceptance of Islam is not without reservation.

Statement (51) indicates another point of consensus between all discourses, though ranked higher by the left liberal (-4) and Islamic (-5) discourses.

**Score +1**

53. I support our President who defends the supremacy of law. We can only solve our democratic problems by creating a real system of law in our country.

55. For a state taking measures to help the practice of religious freedom should not be against secularism. Quite contrary, a secular system requires this.

45. To claim that Muslims in Turkey are not allowed to practice their religion is a totally unfair statement. If we do not count the scarf problem in public institutions there has been no obstacle for Muslims to practice their religion. Quite the contrary, with the Republic, Turkish Muslims have gained substantial individual rights compared to Muslims living in other Islamic countries.

12. The debates in media, such as discussion forums on TV channels, are playing an important role in allowing people to understand each other.

6. The problem with Islamic law in relation to democracy is that Islamic communities exert social pressure on individuals. This conflicts with the democratic notion of individual freedom and rights.
27. The important thing is to start from somewhere. If people could start showing respect and tolerance to each other this would force the state to do the same.

57. We have no other choice to solve our problems, but dialog. However, we have to be careful of the tone of the dialog, which should favour a rational, non-antagonistic style that respects others. That is to say, it should avoid the styles of Mr Erbakan and Mr Ozden.

18. Democracy cannot be realised before economic equality is achieved.

It has been clear so far that the rule of law does not constitute a priority for the ND. This explains the low ranking of statement (53), which indicates another rift with the KD (+5). Also, the difference between the two Kemalist secular discourses in relation to the attitude towards Islam becomes even sharper when the KD’s enthusiasm in its response is compared with the ND’s plain agreement (45). The critique of Islamic law (6) is accepted with less enthusiasm by the ND.

In relation to the media’s role (12), though, the ND displays a more positive approach than the KD (-2). However, this is reversed again in relation to the role of dialog, which is supported more by the KD (3). Acceptance by the ND of the state’s proactive role (55) is expected and the ND’s lower support for grassroots based movements (27) can also be linked to its pro-state attitude.

The role that economy plays in the establishment of a democratic polity (18) is also viewed less importantly by the ND than by the KD.

**Score –1**

31. I do not see anything wrong with religious sects. People should be able to get together if they believe in the same thing. Everybody, religious people, atheists etc., should be able to live together in peace within the same nation.

63. If a law breaches a basic individual right it can be disobeyed.

14. The universities are important places where secular people and Islamists can close the existing gap between the two groups. When we do not allow female students wearing scarf
into the universities we also throw them out of the modern world. By doing this we jeopardise the possibility of living together.

4. About one thousand female students have been refused entry to the University of Marmara because they dress themselves according to their religious belief. This shows that there is a serious problem with freedom of belief and education in Turkey.

41. Quite a few female students, who had to take off their scarf to be admitted to universities, later became quite happy with their new look. May be this rule allowed them to do what they really want.

48. The conflict between secular and Islamic people has been created superficially. The groups who are in control of the state have always created enemies in order to maintain their power. Yesterday it was communism, today fundamentalist Islam.

11. In some religious cities, during the Ramadan people were beaten if they ate or drank in daytime. How can I be sure that Islamists will not do the same if they come to power? How can I trust them?

5. The state does not want people’s consciousness to rise. Nevertheless, may be thanks to the media, people from different backgrounds have started understanding each other better.

Statements obtaining a -1 score are mostly about points the ND and the KD agree on. The differences are quite minor. In statement (63), the act of breaching the law, for the ND, is perceived as less important than it is by the KD, even though the KD still disagrees with the act. Similarly, the ND disagrees with (4) with a lower score than the KD. This can be linked again to its pro-state stand, which appears also to be the reason for disagreement (48).

Score 0

22. The negative image that some extreme Islamic groups have created has been attributed to the whole Islamic community particularly by media. We have to stop this misinterpretation.
61. We should trust our people whether they are Kurds, Turks, Laz, Alevi, whether they wear a scarf or not. The more divisions are created in the name of state protection, the more divided we become. This is the real danger.

28. During the Ottoman rule, a variety of ethnic and religious groups lived together. This diversity only became a problem when it was used for political purposes. When people form a system of government, whatever the name or the form of it, there should not be a big problem as long as they can agree on basic moral values.

26. Turkish people tend to be very tolerant towards people who have similar views. The important thing is to be able to show respect to people who hold opposite views.

35. Today, the meaning attributed to democracy has gone beyond that it is only a system of governing. It is being perceived almost like another religion interfering with people’s private spheres. Democracy is not a way of living. It is a way of governing.

15. Islam can accommodate different groups including atheists.

23. One cannot claim to be a real Muslim if one does not interpret Quran in the light of today’s living condition.

58. The fundamental condition is respect for others. If we achieve this at the grassroots level, then we can solve the problems created and imposed from above.

Statement (58) represents the most important point of divergence. Against the KD’s substantial support for this statement, the ND only displays a neutral attitude. This is indeed a good example of the ND’s dual character. The ND’s commitment to reconciling differences immediately retreats to the background when it is implied that the state could be responsible for the current problems and a grassroots movement (as in the case of 27) is suggested as a solution. In statement (15), the ND also displays some uncertainty about the capacity of Islam in dealing with different groups.

5.2.4 Overview

As explained in the background section, nationalism is an overarching concept in the vocabulary of Turkish politics. It cuts deep across the conceptual framework of most political groups, from far right to a large section of the left. The ND, though, mainly represents the conservative
sections of the Turkish politics. The Q study findings reveal that it carries the indicators of Kemalist and ethnic nationalism in that it subscribes to Kemalist principles with a strong emphasis on Turkishness. Yet, because of its strong leaning towards Islamic values, the ND clearly differs from the KD’s Kemalist line. Unlike the KD, the ND perceives Islam as an essential part of Turkish identity. The ND’s strong pro-state and pro-army attitude also diverges from the KD’s. Carrying the remnants of the Ottoman tradition of state’s supremacy and of the army as the protector of the state, the ND subscribes to a rather authoritarian view of the state. Hence, the ND, incoherently wavers between two different concepts, the secular state on the one hand and Islamic values that it culturally associates itself with on the other hand. Yet, here it is the unity of the state, rather than a system of law as is the case with the KD, which plays the most important role in the ND’s conceptual framework. The ND, like the KD, is inconsistent when dealing with the scarf issue for instance. Yet its inconsistency does not stem from a discriminatory attitude against the scarf, as in the KD. Unlike the KD, the ND frames the scarf issue as an individual rights problem, yet its support for the scarf immediately drops when the state is challenged.

The ND’s difference with the KD also surfaces in relation to the importance of local values. Unlike the KD’s pro-Western attitude, the ND displays a more sympathetic approach to the values that reflect a local core. This is possibly one of the reasons that the ND does not subscribe to the idea of individual rights as much as the KD does. Unlike the KD, the ND does not represent the views of Kemalist elite. In this sense it is closer to the periphery of the Turkish society than to its center.

The ND has strong views about the cohesiveness of the society and is willing to find common points between conflicting sides, which indicates openness for dialog. The challenge for the ND will be how to reconcile its traditional cultural and religious views with its strong commitment to the state and the army. It displays its discontent about the way the scarf issue has been dealt with by the state, yet stops short of condemning the state’s action. Instead it eventually reverts back to supporting the state.
However, it is important to distinguish that the ND’s close connection with Islam represents a realistic alternative for providing a bridge between secular and Islamic values. The ND’s proximity to Islam would eventually force it to reconsider its unreserved commitment to the state’s and the army’s actions. In other words, the paradigm shift towards an individual rights based democratic politics within the Islamic camp sooner or later will pressure the ND to rephrase its democratic principles. This is quite similar to the way things might develop for the KD. Yet the ND’s advantage would be the fact that because of its ties with Islamic values, it does not need to establish trust with Islamic groups. The ND’s problem will mainly be the enhancement of its framework for a democratic polity. The effectiveness of this process, though, will mainly depend on how much a proper dialog oriented to understanding and learning would be developed. In its dialog with Muslims, if the ND is sincere in its concern about the treatment of women with scarf, that is, the issue represents a problem from democratic point of view based on protection of individual rights, then the ND would be forced to revisit the unqualified support that it grants to the state and the army. That is, as long as the right framework for dialog is provided the democratic framework that Islamic groups have developed over years would sooner or later pressure the ND.
5.3 Factor 3: The Liberal Left Discourse (LLD)

5.3.1 General Characteristics

The factor analysis findings indicate that the LLD represents a highly democratic secular position, which does not subscribe to the Kemalist vision. What distinguishes the LLD from Kemalist and Nationalist discourses is its strong emphasis on fundamental human rights. Unlike Kemalists, for instance, the role of the army in politics is strongly opposed and the unity of the State is expected to be dependent upon basic individual rights. The diverse nature of Turkish society is not seen as a threat; instead the importance of common points is weighed heavily. In this sense, the LLD has similarities with the Islamic discourse, particularly in its lack of sympathy towards the Army and the state. The LLD also opposes the state’s heavy-handed policy on the scarf issue.

A major difference between the LLD and the other discourses appears to be that the LLD is less optimistic in the role that it attributes to dialog in resolving differences. As the factor analysis will show it does not show a great deal of support for dialog compared to other discourses. The most likely reason for this is the LLD’s historically unfriendly relationship with the other groups including Islamists and nationalists. Unlike the ND, for instance, the LLD does not have the immediate rapport either with the ID or with the KD. Quite contrary, as will be explained below in the discussion of the historical origins of the LLD, the relationship of the left particularly with conservative groups has always been difficult. Also, the having always been prosecuted as the enemy of the state, understandably gives not many options to the left but to maintain its presence through an emphasis on the rule of law. Yet, the LLD’s commitment to the rule of law based on the protection of individual rights does not carry any inconsistencies as in the case of the KD and the ND. It sincerely attends to the problems of Muslim women even though it does not subscribe to any religious assertions made by Muslims. It is in this sense that the LLD looks closer to the Islamic discourse rather than two other secular discourses. In other words, the dichotomy that the KD and the ND creates between secularism and
democracy in that democracy is subservient to secularism, reverses in favour of democracy in the case of the LLD. This in fact is one of the most important findings of the Q study in Turkey, which I will evaluate more in the last section on Prospects for New Forms of Cooperation in Turkey.

5.3.2 Historical Origins of the Liberal Left Discourse

The emerging anti-establishment groups in the Ottoman regime followed the development of socialism in Europe, particularly from the Paris Commune onwards in 1871, with interest. The ideas of socialism attracted opposition groups, such as the Young Ottomans, who used them against the authoritarian ruling of Sultan Abdulhamid. Yet, none of these groups had the correct class origin for the practice of socialist ideas. The Young Ottomans for instance were mainly young intellectuals from mid to upper classes which had certain links with the state. In other words, in the initial stages socialism seemed more of a romantic idea for the disillusioned, young intellectuals.

The first worker-based movements and organisations flourished during the II Mesrutiyet period. Following the reestablishment of Kanun-i Esasi in 1908, workers of different industries in several cities started a series of strikes. This was a new and surprising phenomenon for the Ottoman regime. The strikes spread very quickly and the state had to resort excessive force to curb them. However, branding these strikes as socialist would be too premature (Mete Tuncay, 2000; 31). Even though the workers supported the move against the Sultan for the reestablishment of the Constitution, Kanun-iEsasi, they were not acting out of class consciousness. In fact, the motives behind their reactions against foreign investors and their representatives were rather characterised by nationalistic tendencies (Akderere and Karadeniz 2000).

Nevertheless, these initial reactions incited the circulation of socialist ideas more among workers. Subsequently, in 1909, the first socialist association, the Socialist Workers Federation, was established in Selanik. This was immediately followed by the establishment of Osmanli Sosyalist Firkasi
(OSF) and its publication *Istirak* (Participation) in 1910. OSF’s socialism was also affected by nationalist and Islamist tendencies. They conceived socialism from an Islamic perspective by arguing that Islam had in fact a socialist essence. Meanwhile, they were critical of the IT government for its failure to establish national unity. The demands of OSF were usually limited to the establishment of a national economy with no specific reference to a socialist ideal (Akdere and Karadeniz, 2000: 28). Following the collapse of the second *Mesrutiyet* in 1913, the IT government retreated from the democratic practice of *Mesrutiyet* and ruled the country with absolute authority. The autocratic style of the IT did not allow any opposition. As a result the OSF and its paper *Istirak* were closed down. Some members of the leadership were prosecuted and sent in exile, others were sentenced to death.

However, after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, which also ended the IT regime, the exiled members of the OSF returned and established a new party, *Turkiye Sosyalist Firkasi* (TSF), in 1919. TSF was more successful among workers. The party members organized several strikes, which ended with some gains for workers, hence helped to increase the popularity of TSF. However, there was not much change in the party’s ideological platform. The effects of Islam and nationalism were still clearly visible. In the journal of the party, *Idrak* (Understanding), the links between socialism and Islam were kept alive (Akdere and Karadeniz, 2000). Yet, TSF’s political life did not last long either. Soon after the murder of its leader, who was becoming increasingly unpopular among the rank and file, the TSF was permanently dismantled in 1922.

The end of the TSF was not the end of socialist struggle in Turkey. While the TSF was active in Istanbul, the TKP (Turkish Communist Party) was getting organised outside Turkey particularly in Baku, Azerbaijan, in 1920. Unlike the OSF and the TSF, which had a short life span, the TKP has managed to survive until today and had a long lasting impact on the Turkish Left. What was interesting in the early days of the TKP was that Mustafa Kemal was monitoring it very closely. In a letter written to the founder of the
TKP, Mustafa Suphi, Mustafa Kemal indicated that the aim of Turkey’s independence struggle was similar to the TKP’s aim. He asked Mustafa Suphi, the founder of the TKP, to join the Great Assembly, instead of following a separate agenda, so that the national unity was not harmed. Yet, today it is usually agreed that Mustafa Kemal’s approach to the TKP’s leadership was motivated by pragmatic thinking, oriented to maintaining the support of the Soviet regime, rather than an expression of genuine interest in socialism. In fact on several occasions he indicated that the idea of socialism would not match the Turkish cultural and moral values (Tuncay, 2000). Mustafa Suphi along with members of the central committee of the TKP were assassinated later on. The role played by Mustafa Kemal in their assassination always remained a mystery. The crucial point here was that even after the assassination of the first leaders of the TKP, the Soviet regime did not withdraw its support from Mustafa Kemal and Turkey’s national independence struggle because of its commitment to “oppressed nation’s nationalism”. This is possibly the key to understanding why the next leadership of the TKP was overwhelmingly pro-Mustafa Kemal. Sefik Husnu, for instance, the new leader of the TKP, regarded the Grand Turkish Assembly founded during the Independence War, as a Soviet kind of governing body. He believed that the Kemalist regime was trying to realise a national democratic revolution by developing a national economy in order to eliminate the feudal structures of the Ottoman period. Here, the influence of the NDR on the theoretical formulations of the TKP is easy to discern. Key socialist concepts, such as ‘workers’ and ‘labour’, were often subordinated by the TKP to nation and national interest. The TKP’s sympathy towards Mustafa Kemal and the Independence War reached such a degree that the Kemalist state, through its overarching national character, was seen as the representative of working class (Akdere and Karadeniz, 2000; 146).

However, despite its sympathy towards the Kemalist leadership and Mustafa Kemal himself, the TKP was never able to gain their trust. In 1927, during a nation wide campaign against the TKP, the Kemalist regime arrested most of TKP’s leadership. In the following year a large number of members deserted the TKP and join the Kemalist ranks. (Aydin, 2002; 444)
In a nutshell, the influence of nationalism and Kemalism on the TKP was so obvious that it would not be far fetched to consider the TKP as a Leftist Kemalism. In fact, they were so much in favour of the Kemalist regime that the Commintern (the peak body of communist parties) criticized them for carelessly supporting national interest ahead of class interest of workers, in its 5th congress (Tuncay, 2000; 191).

Following the 1927 arrests, the left in Turkey entered into a long period of ineffective opposition until the 1961 coup. During the one party regime, dominated by the CHP, the socialist opposition was forced to go underground. From the mid-1960s onwards, following the implementation of some democratic articles in the Constitution after the 1961 military coup, the Turkish left started becoming a vibrant source within Turkish political life. Yet, during this period the issue of the NDR was again brought into the agenda of the Left. During this period the NDR almost became the sole criteria for the groups, which distinguished themselves from others mainly according to how they interpreted the idea of NDR. Hence, the idea of nationalism continued to play a fundamental role in the development of the left. One of the most important of these groups was Yon (Direction). Also affected by the Chinese revolution Yon adopted Mao’s “first democratic, then socialist revolution” principle and changed it to “first Kemalism, then socialism” (Aydin, 2002: 460). Yon, in this sense, was the first group directly linking Kemalist principles with a democratic nationalist revolution to the degree that Kemalism was called national socialism. The nationalistic accent in the discourses of the Left was also affected by other examples of anti-imperialist struggles, such as Nasser’s in Egypt, Nehru’s in India and Musaddik’s in Iran. The army and the armed forces were increasingly favoured as potential coalition partners and quick, top down revolutionary formulations became commonplace. For the Yon, for instance, the army was the driving force of the anti-imperialist struggle.

However, from the mid-1960s onwards a less nationalistic, more socialistic version of the NDR appeared within the Leftist ranks. Mihri Belli, who was a
member of the newly established TIP (Turkish Workers Party), challenged both Yon’s analysis and the TIP leadership’s “mild socialist attitude”, which was seeking a regime change mainly thorough parliamentary and constitutional arrangements. Belli, while recognising Kemalism as a positive step towards the achievement of NDR in Turkey, defined the culture of the Kemalist elite, including the state and the army hierarchy, as ‘petit bourgeois’ and asserted that without the socialist leadership of the working class imperialist forces would easily sway the petit bourgeois into their side. Thus, for Belli cooperation between the revolutionary forces and the representatives of the petit bourgeois was essential in order to realise a revolution. Within this coalition, Belli also included the representatives of national capital as a potential ally against the imperialist forces (Belli, 1988).

Belli’s version of NDR became the main theoretical framework for most of the left factions, which flourished between 1974 and 1980. With the exception of pro-Soviet factions, such as the TKP, the TIP and later on the TSIP (Socialist Worker’s Party of Turkey), most of the factions subscribed to the idea of NDR, though they differed in their interpretations of it. Thus, the idea of a national struggle remained a major theme among the left until its demise after the 1980 military coup. However, with Mihri Belli’s influence, the left - with one major exception - managed to look at the idea of nationalism from a more class-based perspective. A group, called Aydinlik, distinguished itself from the rest of the left by increasingly focusing on nationalism and nationalist struggle rather than socialism. The nationalistic nature of Aydinlik was perhaps the main reason its members survived the 1980 coup with the least possible damage and continued their political activities soon after. Today, the IP (Workers Party) carries the ideas of the Aydinlik tradition with a stronger accent on nationalism directly tied to Kemalism. The nationalism of the Aydinlik tradition reaches a degree such that socialism becomes corollary to nationalistic arguments. A good example of the level of its nationalism is its strong anti-Kurdish position in favour of the Kemalist idea of Misak-i Milli (the unity of nation and homeland). IP’s nationalism eventually reached such a level that they did not hesitate to cooperate with the left’s archenemy, the ethnic nationalist
MHP. The cooperation between the IP and the ethnic nationalist MHP has reached a new level when they recently joined ranks in an anti-European Union campaign and to fight against the UN proposed solution to the Cyprus problem. Aydin argues that the nationalistic character of Aydinlik and the IP has risen so sharply that the Aydinlik tradition is now acting with a mission to carry the socialist tradition in Turkey into the ranks of ethnic nationalism (2002; 474). Whatever their mission is, it is hard to dispute that today the IP represents the highest point of convergence between the Kemalist and the nationalistic discourses within the left. In this sense, though it substantially differs from the Liberal Left Discourse, which followed a different development path after the 1980 military coup.

The 1980 military coup represented a fundamental turning point for the left. The military regime’s assault on the left was relentless. Clearly the army’s agenda was to eliminate the left opposition once and for all. Thousands were arrested, tortured and jailed. With possibly the only exception of Aydinlik, the rest of the left organisations were completely crushed and pushed out of the legal public sphere. Some of these groups formed their legal associations and political parties and tried to revive their old grassroots from the mid-1980s on. Yet none of them was able to obtain previous levels of support. The collapse of the Soviet regime in 1989 was the last nail in the coffin. In the eye of an ordinary person, the idea of socialism was dead and the left discourse had no other alternative to offer than repeating the claim that socialism would win one day.

The incapacitation of the left eventually prompted the rise of a different discourse seeking an alternative approach to the definition of democratic politics by the traditional left. Dissatisfied by the traditional class based analysis, the new left discourse took a liberal turn by focusing on individual rights and freedom. The most apparent manifestation of this was the rapid expansion of the IHD (Human Rights Association), which was formed and supported, in 1986, by members of different left organisations and which defended individual democratic rights in a non-aligned fashion. By 1996, the IHD had 58 branches covering almost every major city in Turkey and over
16,000 members (Plagemann, 2001; 364). The IHD’s consistent defence of individual rights also attracted various community groups into the ranks of the organisation. These groups, such as feminists, gay and lesbian groups and environmentalists, traditionally did not have strong ties with the left in Turkey. The natural outcome of this growth for the IHD was the continuous expansion of its discourse based on individual rights and freedom, which is detected by the Q study. So far in Turkey, the Liberal Left discourse has remained outside mainstream politics in that its characteristics have not been represented fully in any political organisation. Thus, in this sense it remains a potential political force to be tapped into. With the liberal turn in Islamic politics, its influence in establishing a democratic polity in Turkey may be crucial.

5.3.3 Factor Interpretation

Score +6

48. The conflict between secular and Islamic people has been created superficially. The groups who are in control of the state have always created enemies in order to maintain their power. Yesterday it was communism, today fundamentalist Islam.

59. We have to find out what is common among us rather than focusing on differences. For instance, we have to emphasise the importance of education at the universities instead of arguing about the scarf controversy.

Mistrust towards the state and the army emerges immediately in the LLD which points to a superficially created conflict between seculars and Muslims, manipulated by the dominant groups in the state in order to maintain their status-quo (48). The indication here is that the LLD, unlike ND, does not subscribe to an abstract notion of that state that citizens are expected to support unconditionally. Indeed, among four discourses the LLD appears to be the most consistent in its critical approach towards the state and the army.

The hostility towards the state is followed by the suggestion that existing divisions can be overcome by working on commonalities (59). The LLD’s proximity to the ND (+6) is in this case noteworthy, however its emphasis
has a different substance from that of ND. In the case of LLD, the emphasis on the commonality signifies building solidarity around those differences by first acknowledging them, then negotiating the common points, whereas ND underlines commonality primarily in reference to national unity, often ignoring existing cultural and ethnic differences. The LLD’s anti-state and anti-army attitude is also linked to its stand on Kemalism. The LLD does not subscribe to the Kemalist line as the ND and the KD do.

**Score –6**

7. *The army is the guarantor of democracy and secularism.*

49. *In a Muslim society, the framework for freedom has to be determined according to Islamic values.*

The LLD clearly disapproves the idea that the army should play a role in politics. With this, the LLD seems in line more with the Islamic discourse (ID) than the other two secular discourses. However, the LLD also draws a line between the ID and itself by moving against the Islamic idea that religious values should play a role in determining the framework for freedom. In the most prominent score lines the LLD establishes its main priorities. It is clearly a secular line, however with substantial differences from the ND and the KD’s. It wants to see a polity based on the acknowledgment of basic individual rights with no interference from the army nor from religion.

**Score +5**

47. *My wife has been refused to be issued a health card only because she wears a scarf. This is against basic human rights and secularism.*

61. *We should trust our people whether they are Kurds, Turks, Laz, Alevi, whether they wear a scarf or not. The more divisions are created in the name of state protection, the more divided we become. This is the real danger.*
40. The fear of communism and fundamentalism, has contributed to the inclusion of very undemocratic rules in the penal code against them (142, 141, 163). If they were let develop freely, they would be able to reach new synthesises, thus avoid today’s problems.

In the +5 score, the LLD moves to define the scarf problem as a human rights issue (47). Again, this brings the LLD closer to ND (+5). However, their reasons for defending the scarf appear to be different. The LLD is mainly concerned by human rights and sees its position as a sign of its commitment to the recognition of cultural differences. On the other hand, ND is motivated by its conservative, Islamic inclinations, rather than by human rights. The different scores obtained for statement (61) testify of this difference between the two discourses. Compared to the score in the LLD, statement 61 scores a relatively low +2 in ND.

With statement (40), the LLD expands its critique of the state’s undemocratic measures. This is again consistent with its pro-human rights attitude since the codes 141, 141 and 163 are related to freedom of expression. Indeed, the LLD is highly consistent on the issue of human rights compared to other discourses. Statement (40) for instance receives +2 both from the KD and the ID, and is simply rejected by the ND with a –2 score.

Score –5

19. People are less corrupt under sharia regime because it induces the fear of God.

20. If everybody tries to live according to Islamic rule, a just system can come into existence.

60. In a secular society everybody should abide by the law. If the law bans wearing the scarf in public institutions the rule should be respected.

The –5 score reinforces the LLD’s negation of Islamic rule used as a framework for the implementation of a just system. In this sense, The LLD makes its secular position very clear in that it disapproves the interference of religious rule with the rules of public life (19-20). The rule of law appears
to be the most likely medium for the LLD in organising the public life. However, the LLD points to a controversial direction indicating that defying the law is also possible if it is against the basic individual rights (60), thus again emphasising the importance of human rights ahead of other issues. Here, the LLD again moves away from the other secular discourses towards the Islamic discourse (-6).

**Score +4**

39. **Against the claim, our state is not a secular one.** Forcing people to declare their religion on their identity cards or having compulsory religion lessons in schools are examples of this.

25. **Whether I cover myself with a scarf or not should be no one’s business.** This is what I understand from secularism. Everybody should pay respect to different beliefs.

33. **The military tradition has paralysed the self-reflective ability of our society.** That is why we still have been governed by a mentality, which is out of date.

54. **The state is not supposed to carry a religious identity.** Its task should only be to govern people. It should not question its people on the basis of their religious identities.

While statements in the +4 score category reinforce what has been said so far, with the statements (39) and (25) the LLD expands its critique of the state, this time by focusing on its credentials on secularism. It indicates that both compulsory religion lessons and the forceful treatment of the scarf problem run against the state’s claim to secularism. In this sense, the LLD subscribes to a liberal secular line, advocating a freedom of religious practice immune from state intervention. Statement (54) also supports this argument. The LLD’s liberalism here differs from the KD’s liberal secular line since unlike the KD, the LLD does not subscribe to the Kemalist state tradition. Consistent with this, the LLD also affirms that the military tradition has had a negative impact on the intellectual capacity of the society (33).
Score –4

52. Respect for individual rights, the fundamental principle of democracy and secularism, exists in Islam.

24. The Quran does not praise a particular political system. Islam can fit into any system as long as it is fair. For instance, Islam could fit in a monarchy if the King were fair.

51. If the freedom of belief is overemphasised, Muslim people might be affected by the ideas that are dangerous for the secular regime.

15. Islam can accommodate different groups including atheists.

By attributing a –4 to these four statements, the LLD reaffirms its position towards Islam. The LLD does not support Islam as a political entity (24). It expresses concern about the inclusive capacity of Islam in terms of both individual and minority rights (52-15). Indeed, among all discourses it is the LLD that finds Islam’s argument on individual rights the least convincing. However, it still defends the freedom of religious practice (51) as part of its commitment to human rights more extensively than the two other secular discourses do, and nearly as much as the Islamic discourse.

Score +3

21. Whether the state is secular or not should not be dealt by the Constitution. The state should only act as a guarantor of the freedom of religious practice. There should not be a state institution to organise the religious practice.

17. The purpose of religion will be defeated when it is carried over to the public arena. Beliefs are personal matters, thus they should be kept within the individual sphere.

53. I support our President who defends the supremacy of law. We can only solve our democratic problems by creating a real system of law in our country.

1. Today’s oppressive attitudes against Muslims in the name of secularism are rooted in Kemalist ideology.
6. The problem with Islamic law in relation to democracy is that Islamic communities exert social pressure on individuals. This conflicts with the democratic notion of individual freedom and rights.

The +3 score attributed to these five statements confirms that the LLD sees religious practice as a fundamental individual right that should not be interfered with by the state (21). This emerges as a sharp contrast with other discourses including the ID. However, the support for religious practice is also qualified through the indication that it should remain within the individual sphere since it is an individual matter (17). The perceived problem with Islamic law is also brought upon to underline the importance of individual rights (6).

This time, though, the LLD brings the role of the law into attention as well (53). In line with the KD, it advocates the law as the main regulator of the social order.

The LLD’s anti-Kemalist stand emerges most clearly in the +3 score. It agrees that in the secular camp Kemalism is the source of oppressive tendencies towards Muslims (1). This obviously puts the LLD in a sharp contrasting position with the KD and the ND, however this time its reaction against Kemalism appears to be even stronger than the ID’s, which disagrees with the statement as other secular discourses do.

Score –3

23. One cannot claim to be a real Muslim if one does not interpret Quran in the light of today’s living conditions.

3. Secularism is atheism.

10. The differences between us are too deep. We cannot reconcile them by talking. This system will remain as it is in the future.

64. The Islamists are only softening their lines because of the strong resistance shown against them by the Army and Kemalists.
41. Quite a few female students, who had to take off their scarf to be admitted to universities, later became quite happy with their new look. May be this rule allowed them to do what they really want.

An expected reaction to the claim that secular people are atheists (3) is followed by the rejection of the claim that the differences are too deep to be reconciled through dialog (10). This emerges as one of the consensus points across discourses, presenting a high degree of willingness towards understanding each other. However, the LLD takes a further step by refusing the suggestion that the Islamists have soften their lines due to the tough resistance shown by the army and Kemalists (64), thus giving credit to the Islamic movements. With this, the LDD again moves parallel to the ID. The issue of female students becoming happy after they took off their scarfs is rejected (41) by all discourses, yet again, the LDD's score positions it closer to the ID.

Score +2

43. The lack of education is the main reason why we are having such problems between secular and Islamic people. People do not like reading and investigating. They believe in whatever they hear.

26. Turkish people tend to be very tolerant towards people who have similar views. The important thing is to be able to show respect to people who hold opposite views.

11. In some religious cities, during the Ramadan people were beaten if they ate or drank in daytime. How can I be sure that Islamists will not do the same if they come to power? How can I trust them?

18. Democracy cannot be realised before economic equality is achieved.

56. The state should lead the reconciliation process. It should not treat some of its citizen as enemies.
50. We have to produce our own model of democracy. The cultural values of Eastern
countries are different from those in the West. Eastern countries should not be governed by
an American model of democracy.

A line of suggestions that offer different solutions dominates the +2 score. Firstly, the education is accepted as an important step towards independent
reasoning. Secondly, the LLD calls for respect between different views (26). Thirdly, it ties the success of democratic endeavour to economic equality
(18). Fourthly, it suggests that ideally the state should be the initiator of the
reconciliation process (56), which happens to be another strong consensus point across all discourses. Finally, it points to the need to cater to the
needs of local values in a democratic system (50).

While reflecting the LLD’s several suggestions on a democratic model, the
score +2 also brings its discomfort with the mistreatment suffered by
minority groups at the hands of Muslims. Therefore, even though the LDD in
principle supports a free religious practice, the question “can I trust them”
still preoccupies its agenda. By bringing this uneasiness forward the Q
analysis displays an important point of contention between the LLD and the
ID.

Score –2

2. Kemalism and secularism cannot be separated from each other. Separating them will
mean the end of secularism. If you are secular you are also Kemalist, or vica versa.

28. During the Ottoman rule, a variety of ethnic and religious groups lived together. This
diversity only became a problem when it was used for political purposes. When people form
a system of government, whatever the name or the form of it, there should not be a big
problem as long as they can agree on basic moral values.

31. I do not see anything wrong with religious sects. People should be able to get together
if they believe in the same thing. Everybody, religious people, atheists etc., should be able
to live together in peace within the same nation.
13. Some remarks made by Islamic leaders contributed to raising the tension between Islamists and Kemalists. An example of this is Mr Erbakan’s remark suggesting that one day the deans’, who do not allow students with scarf to the universities, will be forced to salute those students.

44. I am trying to survive economically to be able to feed my children. The debate between Islam and secularism does not interest me.

5. The state does not want people’s consciousness to rise. Nevertheless, may be thanks to the media, people from different backgrounds have started understanding each other better.

The statement (2) appears as the confirmation of the LLD’s secular but non-Kemalist line. This is also one of the main points, upon which the LLD and the ID agree. Besides, by disagreeing with the suggestion that Islamic leaders have contributed to raising the tension between seculars and Muslims, the LLD implies that Kemalists should also take some responsibility in the matter (13). Note that ND has the same score (-2) on statement (13), however its awkward position between Kemalism and Islam prevents its position being interpreted clearly against Kemalists as in the case of the LLD.

The LLD does not accept the argument that the Ottoman Empire successfully managed its extremely diverse population. Its objection possibly stems from its commitment to the rule of law rather than arbitrary powers of feudal rulers no matter how just their rule is.

Scores obtained for statements (31), (44) and (5) indicate more points of convergence between the discourses. However, the LDD’s rejection of religious sects (31) appears to be slightly stronger than in other discourses. On the other hand its reaction to apolitical attitude held by the economically disadvantaged (44) is softer than others. The consensus against statement (5) is almost unanimous and the statement obtains almost equal scores in all discourses, except for in ND, which is slightly lagging behind (-1). The anti-media sentiment was strong in follow-up interviews too, mainly focusing on the negative impacts of the rating based, provocative styles of programming.
16. Islam, as a system of law, cannot be compatible with democracy. The role and the place attributed to women by Islamic law, which denies women basic individual rights, is enough to prove this.

14. The universities are important places where secular people and Islamists can close the existing gap between the two groups. When we do not allow female students wearing scarf into the universities we also throw them out of the modern world. By doing this we jeopardise the possibility of living together.

8. Today, the biggest obstacle for democracy in Turkey is not Islam, but the political parties, which offer no solution to corruption.

9. Islamists are not as tolerant towards atheists as they are towards Islamists.

57. We have no other choice to solve our problems, but dialog. However, we have to be careful of the tone of the dialog, which should favour a rational, non-antagonistic style that respects others. That is to say, it should avoid the styles of Mr Erbakan and Mr Ozden.

37. In Turkey, more than eighty percent of Islamic people have a moderate line. They cannot be a threat for the secular regime.

42. The solution is mutual understanding. Groups, who oppose each other, should try to understand each other.

45. To claim that Muslims in Turkey are not allowed to practice their religion is a totally unfair statement. If we do not count the scarf problem in public institutions there has been no obstacle for Muslims to practice their religion. Quite the contrary, with the Republic, Turkish Muslims have gained substantial individual rights compared to Muslims living in other Islamic countries.

The +1 score displays most of the points raised so far with the exception that it reveals a comparatively less comfortable acceptance of the role of dialog by the LLD. Statement (57) for instance, gets only a reluctant affirmation, compared to the top score it receives by the ID (+6) and a reasonably high +3 from the KD. Similarly, statement (42) receives the lowest score in the LLD. In the light of what has been said in the follow-up
interviews, this attitude can be linked to the way the left perceives the notion of change traditionally, subscribing more to structural changes through a class based struggle. The reconciliation in this sense does not have strong connotations in the left vocabulary, except among disadvantaged classes, which also explains the support the LLD provides to the ID. The relatively low scoring of statement (14), given the LDD's strong support for the scarf, can be explained by its reasoning that living together peacefully is grounded on the condition that required changes are realised first. Again, the same line of thinking explains the low scoring for statement (8) since for the LLD neither Islam nor political parties are the real source of the problem.

On the other hand, its cautious approach to Islam reveals itself in statements (9), (37) and (45). Particularly (45) shows a degree of acknowledgement of Kemalist achievements, balancing its anti-Kemalist line.

Score –1

12. The debates in media, such as discussion forums on TV channels, are playing an important role in allowing people to understand each other.

27. The important thing is to start from somewhere. If people could start showing respect and tolerance to each other this would force the state to do the same.

32. Recently, Islamic and secular people have been softening their attitudes. It shows that we can solve our problems better when we try to understand each other.

22. The negative image that some extreme Islamic groups have created has been attributed to the whole Islamic community particularly by media. We have to stop this misinterpretation.

30. The reason behind the reaction to Kemalists is their antagonistic attitude towards Islamic people. The problem can be solved easily if they tried to understand Muslim people rather than attacking and dehumanising them.

55. For a state taking measures to help the practice of religious freedom should not be against secularism. Quite contrary, a secular system requires this.
38. If Turkey has today become more modern than any other Islamic countries, it is mainly because law and education have been secularised by being separated from the influence of religion.

62. The state must trust its people. We are here for our country and the state. I served in the army and fought against Kurdish separatists in the East. Today, the state considers me as a fundamentalist threat because my wife wears a scarf.

The issues which the LDD treats with some scepticism appear again in the –1 score. While the role of media is rebuffed again (12), the LLD does not see the media as the main cause of the negative image created about Muslims (22). Neither, does it blame only Kemalists’ aggressive style for the problem between secular people and Muslims (30). Once more discomfort towards dialog is expressed through the indication that mutual understanding and respect for each other are not perceived as adequate solutions to problems (27-32).

Score 0

4. About one thousand female students have been refused entry to the University of Marmara because they dress themselves according to their religious belief. This shows that there is a serious problem with freedom of belief and education in Turkey.

35. Today, the meaning attributed to democracy has gone beyond that it is only a system of governing. It is being perceived almost like another religion interfering with people’s private spheres. Democracy is not a way of living. It is a way of governing.

63. If a law breaches a basic individual right it can be disobeyed.

46. The secularists in Turkey claim that women who wear the scarf cannot be secular. This is not a democratic attitude.

58. The fundamental condition is respect for others. If we achieve this at the grassroots level, then we can solve the problems created and imposed from above.

34. Secularism is the undeniable foundation of religious pluralism and the most important norm for societal peace. We must hold on to it.
29. I trust that secular people and Muslims will come to an agreement when human values are brought into the agenda.

36. Atatürk (Mustafa Kemal) is a very important personality who could only be respected. However, the Kemalism label, unfortunately, got stuck on him and being unfairly used against Muslims. Kemalism has now become a metaphysical concept with a religious like content. Like democracy, its meaning has been abused and changed.

5.3.4 Overview

Unlike the KD and the ND, the LLD has a coherent position in relation to Islam, democracy and secularism. It does not subscribe to Kemalist principles. Its conception of democratic politics is based on the protection of fundamental individual rights. It is in this sense that the LLD consistently defends the right to religious freedom and conceives the scarf issue as a human rights problem.

In parallel to its commitment to individual rights, the LLD consistently argues against heavy-handed state practices as well as against the role of the army in politics. The LLD is committed to a secular system, yet it defines secularism from a different perspective than the KD and ND do. Since, for the LLD, the basis for democratic polity is the establishment of individual rights, it does not pay much attention to the unity of the state. It supports attempts to reach a common framework between different groups and views of the Turkish public sphere, yet it does so to build solidarity between different groups rather than to secure the unity of the state. In other words, acknowledgement of differences comes first for the LLD and to this end it does prioritise democracy over secularism.

Prioritising democracy over secularism is the main reason that the LLD stands closer not to other secular discourses, the KD and the ND, but to the Islamic Discourse. For the development of democratic politics in Turkey the proximity of the LLD with the ID constitutes a new and important development. I will deal with this issue in detail in chapter 7. For the time being it suffices to say that this unusual alliance between the LLD and the ID could be the genesis of a new chapter in Turkish politics. This is where the individual rights based paradigm shift that occurred both in the left and
Islamic groups represents a potential for a new form of cooperation between groups, once considered at opposite poles of the political spectrum. A politics based on universal acceptance of individual rights, rather than on class or religion based references, constitutes the basis of this new cooperation.

What makes the LLD’s positive approach to religious freedom significant is that the LLD does not compromise the principle of religious freedom even though it is doubtful about the democratic potential of Islam. Unlike the KD and the ND, the LLD does not let any fears hijack the fundamental principle of individual rights and performs consistently on the basis of this principle. The products of this consistency are already at work in the Turkish public sphere. New forms of alliances emerging between the left and Islamic groups point one more time to the importance of deliberation as social learning and understanding. An account of one of those alliances, which I will expand on after the Q study findings, will testify to this fact.
5.4 Factor 4: The Islamic Discourse (ID)

5.4.1 General Characteristics

According to the Q study findings, the ID fully subscribes to the Islamic values and expects them to play a role in public life. This is surely the major point of contention between the ID and secular discourses. Naturally, it opposes many of the Kemalist ideas, particularly those related to secularism. Yet the ID grounds its opposition to secularism from a democratic point of view by emphasising the importance of freedom of religious practice. Hence, it defends the freedom of using scarf as part of a democratic practice. As in the case of the LLD, the ID also prioritises democratic principles over secularism. Similarly, on the role of the army and the state in dealing with religious matters the ID also shares the same sentiment with the LLD. In fact, in those issues the Q findings indicate a remarkable level of similarity between the ID and the LLD. Yet, the Q study findings also indicate that the ID, similar to the KD and the ND, is in need of resolving the issue in relation to public and private divide, that is, even though the ID argues for democratic values it is not clear how it would react if some Islamic concepts conflict with democratic principles. However, aside from its specifically Islamic aspects, what clearly distinguishes the ID from other discourses is its emphasis on the role of dialog and mutual understanding. The Q findings show that all statements related to dialog and mutual understanding are ranked very highly by the ID. Indeed, the emphasis on these points is so distinctive that in terms of prospects for democracy in Turkey it could be described as the most important single finding of the Q study in Turkey. The ID, as the factor analysis will show, consistently argues for reconciling differences through a process of rational dialog and rebuffs suggestions that Islam and democracy are irreconcilable.

5.4.2 Historical Origins of the Islamic Discourse

In the background for the Kemalist discourse I outlined how the process of modernisation developed under the Ottoman rule in the 19th century.
Following the announcement of the first official reforms, Tanzimat, in 1839, the Ottoman culture in both social and political spheres went through an unstoppable change until the collapse of the Empire after the World War I. Islam of course was at the centre of this remarkable transformation process. The roots of the Islamic Discourse in today’s Turkey go back to the beginning of this reform process in the Ottoman administration. After almost 1,300 years of supremacy Islam, for the first time, had to negotiate the conditions of coexistence with a value system that is different, because it is based on Western ideals.

The introduction of the Western liberal principles to the Ottoman administration prompted a reaction from the ranks of the Ottoman elite. This reaction was the basis for the establishment of Young Ottomans, who were aiming at formulating an alternative plan for rescuing the Ottoman state. This plan initially sought to develop a notion of Ottomanism that could be espoused by both Muslims and non-Muslims living under the Ottoman regime. Young Ottomans’ ideas were liberal in essence. Yet, the increasing influence of Western powers over the Ottoman administration, coupled with the successive gains of the non-Muslims in terms of their social and economic rights, stirred an Islamic sentiment among the Young Ottomans even though they still maintained their commitment to liberal values. From this moment onwards, Islamic values became part of a political agenda to be called Islamism.

Islamism in this sense was developed as a reaction of the Ottoman elite to Western values introduced with Tanzimat. Yet, the essence of this reaction by no means aimed to stop the modernisation process. In fact as Turkone asserts (2003) Islamism was representing a positive step towards change. It was seen not so much as a tool to resist the transformation of the bulky Ottoman administration, but rather as a catalyst to achieve accord with Ottoman values so that the change could in fact be sustained. In other words, the development of Islamism was an attempt to accomplish a balance between the traditional and modern ways of living in order to achieve a successful transformation of the state. In this sense it also
represented a challenge against the traditional, scriptural readings of Islam. For instance, with Islamism, a rational way of thinking based on individuals’ reasoning capacity was introduced. The traditional ways of accepting God’s word as a transcendental order was replaced by conscientious actions of individuals. In sum Islamism represented a synthesis of traditional Islam and some key Western concepts (Turkone, 2003: 24-29).

Turkone’s observation is important for two main reasons. Firstly, it shows that the liberal roots of today’s Islamic discourse can be found in the Islamism of the 19th century. Secondly, with the introduction of new concepts to the traditional Islamic way of thinking, Islamism also opened up the possibility of digesting other Western concepts, such as the ideas of nation-state and nationalism, which later on dominated the political discourse. Hence, the interplay between Islamic, nationalist and later on Kemalist discourses was in fact more noteworthy than it is usually appreciated today. I will discuss this issue in detail in the concluding chapter since it is fundamental to appreciating the conditions of dialog in today’s Turkey.

With the beginning of modernisation, Islam became part of the political discourse in the 19th century Ottoman regime. The Young Ottomans were constantly arguing that the failure of the Ottoman regime was mainly due to the erosion in Islamic values. This pro-Islamic stand was also carefully crafted to gain the support of ulema (Islamic intellectuals) (Turkone, 2003: 67-70). Soon the idea of ittihad-i Islam (The unity of Islam) appeared in the political grammar. The ittihad-i Islam was seen as the solution for re-establishing the unity and the authority of the Ottoman state. The initial response to ittihad-i Islam was not received with enthusiasm by the Ottoman elite since it was conflicting with the idea of Ottomanism. Yet following the Ottoman defeat in the Russian War in 1878, when two fifth of Ottoman land inhabited by one fifth of the Empire’s population (mainly non-Muslims) was lost; the idea of Ottomanism lost its appeal. The Ottoman administration, under the ruling of Abdulhamid the second, then adopted a new policy to enhance the living conditions of the Muslim population instead of protecting
the rights of non-Islamic minority groups. This was a clear policy shift towards *ittihad-i Islam*, which resulted in the implementation of several big projects ranging from education to transport to create a strong solidarity among the Muslim communities of the Empire. (Cetinsaya, 2001: 270).

Sultan Abdulhamid’s Islamism was mainly motivated by pragmatic reasons. He was more interested in using Islam to stop the growing sense of nationalism and separatism among Muslim but non-Turkish ethnic groups, such as Albanians, Kurds and Arabs. He did not pay much attention to Pan Islamic ideals; hence his Islamism had a rather defensive character and mainly focused on restoring the internal order. (Alkan, 2001: 390) While doing this, Sultan Abdulhamid also created a state controlled Islam. During his reforms he managed to eliminate the influence of *ulema* by creating a Western type education system and reorganising the religious class under his control. Ironically this is exactly what Mustafa Kemal later did in the Turkish Republic. Hence, the roots of statism in Kemalist principles could easily be traced back to the Ottoman tradition.

Keeping Islam under strict control, Sultan Abdulhamid also tried to incorporate Turkish nationalism into Islamism. (Alkan, 2001; 393) The outcome was an Islam-Turkish synthesis, in which Turkishness was subordinated to Islam in a complementary fashion. Sultan Abdulhamid’s main concern to keep the Empire intact was reflected clearly in his pragmatic approach to Islam. Yet, the end of Abdulhamid regime also signalled the end of Islam’s influence. Following the second *Mesrutiyet* in 1908, Turkish nationalism took over the supremacy from Islam. Alkan defines this period as the transformation of Islam-Turkish synthesis to Turkish-Islam synthesis (2001: 394). The rise of Turkish nationalism and Western secularism were particularly prevalent during the *Ittihat Terakki* regime which lasted from 1911 till the end of World War I. The end of WW I was the beginning of a new era for Turkish Islam. I have already outlined the development of Islam under the Turkish Republic in the section on the five stages of Islam and the state relationship in Turkey. Hence, I will not deal with this issue here again.
To conclude I would like to draw attention to a crucial point that emerged from this background section. There seems to be a strong parallel between the Young Ottoman’s and the AKP’s appropriation of liberal ideas into their Islamic way of thinking. The difference is that while the Young Ottomans never managed to rule the country, the AKP is already in government and it is possible that they could rule for more than one term. What kind of difference this could make will be seen more clearly through the analysis of the Islamic Discourse. But the fact that attempts within the Islamic ranks to reconcile their traditional values with the realities of the modern world is not a novel concept could shed lights on present conditions.

5.4.3 Factor Interpretation

Score +6

61. We should trust our people whether they are Kurds, Turks, Laz, Alevi, whether they wear a scarf or not. The more divisions are created in the name of state protection, the more divided we become. This is the real danger.

57. We have no other choice to solve our problems, but dialog. However, we have to be careful of the tone of the dialog, which should favour a rational, non-antagonistic style that respects others. That is to say, it should avoid the styles of Mr Erbakan and Mr Ozden.

Compared to other discourses, the ID makes the strongest plea for dialog and the recognition of different identities. The call for dialog is qualified carefully favouring a rational and conciliatory style (57). The antagonistic style of Mr Erbakan, who had led the rise of Islamic movement in Turkey from the early 70s onwards till he was banned from politics in 1998, is also dismissed indicating a high level of self-critique among Muslims. Willingness for dialog is strongly supported by another call for acknowledging the ethnic and cultural realities of Turkey instead of conceiving them as a potential threat in the name of the unity of the state and the nation (61).
Score –6

7. The army is the guarantor of democracy and secularism.

60. In a secular society everybody should abide by the law. If the law bans wearing the scarf in public institutions the rule should be respected.

The ID’s reaction to two major issues, the scarf and the army’s interference to the politics, emerges strongly through the –6 sores attributed to statements 7 and 60. The ID questions the unreserved support given both to the army and to law. The ID’s reaction against statement (60) expresses its strong discontent with the current situation. This does not necessarily suggest law is to be disobeyed. Quite contrary, later on, with the statement (63) the ID proves that it does not approve of civil disobedience.

Score +5

54. The state is not supposed to carry a religious identity. Its task should only be to govern people. It should not question its people on the basis of their religious identities.

14. The universities are important places where secular people and Islamists can close the existing gap between the two groups. When we do not allow female students wearing scarf into the universities we also throw them out of the modern world. By doing this we jeopardise the possibility of living together.

24. The Quran does not praise a particular political system. Islam can fit into any system as long as it is fair. For instance, Islam could fit in a monarchy if the King were fair.

With the high scoring of statement (54), the ID displays its strong disapproval of the state’s interference with religious affairs. Reaction to the state’s paternalistic involvement with religion in fact appears to be a strong consensus point across all discourses. It is in this sense that the ID points at the Quran’s indifference towards political regimes as long as they are fair (24). From an Islamic perspective this statement is important since it suggests that Islam and a secular regime can indeed coexist together. This claim has been one of the major arguments that Islamic scholars have been
defending in favour of Islam and democracy relationship. It simply suggests that the Quran leaves the issue of how to govern their society to its followers, hence does not offer a blue print for any kind of political regime. Politics, in other words, is a worldly affair to be conducted by believers. Yet, even though the statement offers a positive approach to the Islam and democracy relationship it has not been evaluated positively by other discourses. One reason for this could be that what the statement is meant perhaps understood differently by secular discourses. Rectifying this difference between the ID and others would possibly represent an important step towards reconciliation among all discourses.

The scarf issue remains the top priority (14), this time through the suggestion that allowing students to wear the scarf at university would enhance the chance of reconciliation. The ID acknowledges here that modern university education is not only a medium allowing Muslim students to embrace modernity, but also a melting pot for different groups in society.

**Score –5**

10. The differences between us are too deep. We cannot reconcile them by talking. This system will remain as it is in the future.

51. If the freedom of belief is overemphasised, Muslim people might be affected by the ideas that are dangerous for the secular regime.

17. The purpose of religion will be defeated when it is carried over to the public arena. Beliefs are personal matters, thus they should be kept within the individual sphere.

Along with other discourses, the ID affirms its strong opposition to the suggestion that reconciling the existing differences in society is not achievable (10). Thus, consistent with its call for dialog, it remains committed to the development of mutual understanding between the groups. It is in this respect that it also rejects limiting freedom of belief because too much of it could be dangerous for the secular regime (51).
The ID disagrees with one of secular discourses’ main arguments, that religious beliefs should remain within the private sphere since they are purely personal matters (17). This is one of the most important differences between the ID and other discourses, which shows that the ID perceives public/private divide different from others. The tension here between the ID and the others is of fundamental character, which requires both sides to clarify what they mean by public.

**Score +4**

25. *Whether I cover myself with a scarf or not should be no one’s business. This is what I understand from secularism. Everybody should pay respect to different beliefs.*

58. *The fundamental condition is respect for others. If we achieve this at the grassroots level, then we can solve the problems created and imposed from above.*

49. *In a Muslim society, the framework for freedom has to be determined according to Islamic values.*

15. *Islam can accommodate different groups including atheists.*

The problem in relation to public/private divide in the previous score line immediately reappears, though this time showing the ID’s tendency more clearly. The ID approves of applying religious rules in the conduct of public life (49). In conjunction with the statement 17, the ID is now clearly at odds with secular discourses as well as with the secular idea itself. The strong disparity between the ID and others shows that the issue is a major one and that it requires a certain effort to revamp the idea of public rule particularly from an Islamic point of view. When this is considered together with the way the KD and the ND envisage the public and private divide, it clearly points to one of the major issues to be resolved between the ID on the one hand and the KD and the ND on the other hand. The LLD, with its consistent argument in favour of individual rights, remains outside of this troubled zone.
The scarf issue also appears again (25), though this time more clearly linked to secularism and individual rights. The ID, the LLD and the KD are clearly in consensus on this issue. Mutual respect is reemphasized in statement (58), which affirms that change should start from the grassroots level. Similarly, the skepticism about the treatment of minority groups under Islamic rules is not shared by the ID, which comfortably approves statement (15) indicating its belief that Islam is indeed tolerant towards different groups. Other discourses are clearly skeptical about this claim, indicating a major point of contention.

**Score –4**

2. Kemalism and secularism cannot be separated from each other. Separating them will mean the end of secularism. If you are secular you are also Kemalist, or vica versa.

41. Quite a few female students, who had to take off their scarf to be admitted to universities, later became quite happy with their new look. Maybe this rule allowed them to do what they really want.

16. Islam, as a system of law, cannot be compatible with democracy. The role and the place attributed to women by Islamic law, which denies women basic individual rights, is enough to prove this.

64. The Islamists are only softening their lines because of the strong resistance shown against them by the Army and Kemalists.

The –4 score first time in the ID deals with the issue of Kemalism (2). This is noteworthy given that the issue represents a major rift for the ID and is dealt with almost immediately by the KD. The ID opposes the idea that Kemalism and secularism are mutually inclusive, suggesting that one can be secular without necessarily being Kemalist. The discourse also rejects the suggestion that the pressure from the army and Kemalists has been the only reason Islamists softened their lines (64). On the basis of what has been said in the follow-up interviews, the rejection here is more about representing the issue as the “only” reason. Overall subjects adhering to the
ID acknowledged that the stiff resistance from the army played a role in changing their attitude.

Islam’s compatibility with democracy is defended on the basis that Islamic law does not deny basic individual rights to women (16), again a major contentious issue to be resolved. The suggestion that some students became happy after they took off their scarf to be able to continue their university education is also expectedly rejected, but this time with some support from the other discourses.

**Score +3**

4. About one thousand female students have been refused entry to the University of Marmara because they dress themselves according to their religious belief. This shows that there is a serious problem with freedom of belief and education in Turkey.

42. The solution is mutual understanding. Groups, who oppose each other, should try to understand each other.

47. My wife has been refused to be issued a health card only because she wears a scarf. This is against basic human rights and secularism.

48. The conflict between secular and Islamic people has been created superficially. The groups who are in control of the state have always created enemies in order to maintain their power. Yesterday it was communism, today fundamentalist Islam.

59. We have to find out what is common among us rather than focusing on differences. For instance, we have to emphasise the importance of education at the universities instead of arguing about the scarf controversy.

The ID continues to represent the scarf issue as a major problem by linking it to basic individual rights. While statement (4) elaborates the issue as a problem of freedom of education and belief, statement (47) links it directly to a breach of human rights.
On the other hand, strong support for dialog and mutual understanding continues to surface. Statement (42) directly refers to mutual understanding as the solution to curb the antagonistic tendencies among opposing groups. Statement (59) further supports this by suggesting focusing on commonalities rather than on differences in society. The scarf issue is in this sense seen as an obstacle to achieving a common understanding. More importantly, with statement (48) the ID points to the source of the problem, indicating that it is indeed easier to find a solution outside the state power, thus reaffirming its support of a grassroots based approach to solve the problems.

Score –3

44. I am trying to survive economically to be able to feed my children. The debate between Islam and secularism does not interest me.

11. In some religious cities, during the Ramadan people were beaten if they ate or drank in daytime. How can I be sure that Islamists will not do the same if they come to power? How can I trust them?

34. Secularism is the undeniable foundation of religious pluralism and the most important norm for societal peace. We must hold on to it.

9. Islamists are not as tolerant towards atheists as they are towards Islamists.

13. Some remarks made by Islamic leaders contributed to raising the tension between Islamists and Kemalists. An example of this is Mr Erbakan’s remark suggesting that one day the deans’, who do not allow students with scarf to the universities, will be forced to salute those students.

The –3 score given to these 5 statements mainly indicate skepticism about some secular claims, except the rejection of statement (44), which condones an indifferent attitude towards the topic in question. The ID here displays the same attitude as other discourses.
The ID also rejects drawing up some general patterns on the basis of isolated incidences (11). The follow-up interviews indicated that attacks on non-fasting people during Ramadan are not common practices, thus cannot be used as an example of how Muslims could behave if they came to power. The representation of secularism as the foundation of societal peace (34) is also questioned. The ID’s opposition to secularism here is more linked to Kemalism. The claims that Islamists are less tolerant than atheists (9) and tension between secular and Islamic people has been created by some Islamic leaders’ provocative remarks (13) are both believed to be ungrounded.

Score +2

28. During the Ottoman rule, a variety of ethnic and religious groups lived together. This diversity only became a problem when it was used for political purposes. When people form a system of government, whatever the name or the form of it, there should not be a big problem as long as they can agree on basic moral values.

52. Respect for individual rights, the fundamental principle of democracy and secularism, exists in Islam.

40. The fear of communism and fundamentalism, has contributed to the inclusion of very undemocratic rules in the penal code against them (142, 141, 163). If they were let develop freely, they would be able to reach new synthesises, thus avoid today’s problems.

29. I trust that secular people and Muslims will come to an agreement when human values are brought into the agenda.

55. For a state taking measures to help the practice of religious freedom should not be against secularism. Quite contrary, a secular system requires this.

56. The state should lead the reconciliation process. It should not treat some of its citizen as enemies.

The +2 score for these six statements indicate some support for the idea that reconciliation is possible between secular and Islamic people.
Statement (28) refers to the Ottoman ruling as an example of creating a common ground for its subjects. It also asserts that basic human values are enough to establish such a consensus. Similarly, statement (29) reaffirms this by more specifically suggesting that an agreement between seculars and Muslims is possible if fundamental human values are brought into the agenda.

The state’s anti-democratic measures against left and religious activities are seen as a major obstacle to develop a mutual understanding since the differences have never been allowed to express themselves freely, thus blocking negotiation (40). Instead, the ID suggests that the state should take a leading role in building the reconciliation process (56) and allowing religious freedom as part of its secular agenda (55).

Score –2

45. To claim that Muslims in Turkey are not allowed to practice their religion is a totally unfair statement. If we do not count the scarf problem in public institutions there has been no obstacle for Muslims to practice their religion. Quite the contrary, with the Republic, Turkish Muslims have gained substantial individual rights compared to Muslims living in other Islamic countries.

6. The problem with Islamic law in relation to democracy is that Islamic communities exert social pressure on individuals. This conflicts with the democratic notion of individual freedom and rights.

5. The state does not want people’s consciousness to rise. Nevertheless, may be thanks to the media, people from different backgrounds have started understanding each other better.

39. Against the claim, our state is not a secular one. Forcing people to declare their religion on their identity cards or having compulsory religion lessons in schools are examples of this.

3. Secularism is atheism.

12. The debates in media, such as discussion forums on TV channels, are playing an important role in allowing people to understand each other.
The anti-media sentiment, as in other discourses, appears through the −2 score for statements (5) and (12). The low scoring of statement (5) is more of a rejection of media’s positive impact than that of the state desire to rise people’s consciousness. Statement (12) is a straightforward rejection of the positive role of the media, particularly TV.

The issue of Islamic communities exerting social pressure on individuals is expectedly rejected. This also indicates a rejection of the incompatibility between Islam and individual rights (6). However, statement 3 indicating that secularism is atheism is also rejected. This is a substantial move to comfort secular discourses anxious for seen as atheists. Interestingly, the ID disagrees with the idea that the state is not secular since it favours compulsory religion lessons and forces people to declare their religious affiliations (9). Nevertheless, it is not satisfied with the level of support for the practice of religious freedom, and disagrees with the call that Turkish Muslims are better off than Muslims living in other Islamic countries.

Score +1

36. Ataturk (Mustafa Kemal) is a very important personality who could only be respected. However, the Kemalism label, unfortunately, got stuck on him and being unfairly used against Muslims. Kemalism has now become a metaphysical concept with a religious like content. Like democracy, its meaning has been abused and changed.

32. Recently, Islamic and secular people have been softening their attitudes. It shows that we can solve our problems better when we try to understand each other.

33. The military tradition has paralysed the self-reflective ability of our society. That is why we still have been governed by a mentality, which is out of date.

37. In Turkey, more than eighty percent of Islamic people have a moderate line. They cannot be a threat for the secular regime.

8. Today, the biggest obstacle for democracy in Turkey is not Islam, but the political parties, which offer no solution to corruption.
27. The important thing is to start from somewhere. If people could start showing respect and tolerance to each other this would force the state to do the same.

30. The reason behind the reaction to Kemalists is their antagonistic attitude towards Islamic people. The problem can be solved easily if they tried to understand Muslim people rather than attacking and dehumanising them.

53. I support our President who defends the supremacy of law. We can only solve our democratic problems by creating a real system of law in our country.

The +1 score confirms much of what has been said already. Anti-Kemalist sentiment is elaborated further by offering an explanation for its refusal by the ID. Statement (36) points to the difference between Ataturk and today’s Kemalism, which has become a religious like concept, claiming it has been used against Muslims unfairly. Kemalists are also criticised for their antagonistic, dehumanising attitudes towards Muslims (30), of whom more than eighty percent are believed to be moderate (37). However, the statement also suggests that the problem can easily be resolved if Kemalists attempt to understand Muslims. This optimistic view is also supported by the belief that the tension between the two groups is already showing easing signs, thus proving that developing mutual understanding is indeed the recipe to resolve the problems. Considering the lack of confidence in the state and its representatives, a grassroots based action plan is valued as the best option for a start (27). The military tradition is also blamed for causing today’s main problems by not allowing freethinking (33), while political parties are criticised for allowing corruption (8). Finally, the ID acknowledges the supremacy of law as the main medium to resolve conflict (53).

Score –1

38. If Turkey has today become more modern than any other Islamic countries, it is mainly because law and education have been laicised by being separated from the influence of religion.

18. Democracy cannot be realised before economic equality is achieved.
19. People are less corrupt under sharia regime because it induces the fear of God.

43. The lack of education is the main reason why we are having such problems between secular and Islamic people. People do not like reading and investigating. They believe in whatever they hear.

23. One cannot claim to be a real Muslim if one does not interpret Quran in the light of today’s living condition.

1. Today’s oppressive attitudes against Muslims in the name of secularism are rooted in Kemalist ideology.

21. Whether the state is secular or not should not be dealt by the Constitution. The state should only act as a guarantor of the freedom of religious practice. There should not be a state institution to organise the religious practice.

50. We have to produce our own model of democracy. The cultural values of Eastern countries are different from those in the West. Eastern countries should not be governed by an American model of democracy.

The ID does not attribute a vital role to economic equality for achieving democracy (18), neither does it agree with the idea that Eastern countries need a democracy of their own (50). The role of secularism as separation of religious and political affairs is not acknowledged as an essential path to modernity (38). The lack of education is not conceived as the main reason of current problems since other reasons, such as the state and the army, have already been pointed at (43). Interestingly though, the ID does not accept Kemalism as the source of the problems either (1). However, it agrees along with other discourses that people are not necessarily less corrupt under a sharia regime (19). The suggestion that the state should play a neutral role in religious affairs and act only as guarantor of the religious practice has not been received favourable by the ID (21)
Score 0

35. Today, the meaning attributed to democracy has gone beyond that it is only a system of governing. It is being perceived almost like another religion interfering with people’s private spheres. Democracy is not a way of living. It is a way of governing.

22. The negative image that some extreme Islamic groups have created has been attributed to the whole Islamic community particularly by media. We have to stop this misinterpretation.

63. If a law breaches a basic individual right it can be disobeyed.

31. I do not see anything wrong with religious sects. People should be able to get together if they believe in the same thing. Everybody, religious people, atheists etc., should be able to live together in peace within the same nation.

46. The secularists in Turkey claim that women who wear the scarf cannot be secular. This is not a democratic attitude.

26. Turkish people tend to be very tolerant towards people who have similar views. The important thing is to be able to show respect to people who hold opposite views.

62. The state must trust its people. We are here for our country and the state. I served in the army and fought against Kurdish separatists in the East. Today, the state considers me as a fundamentalist threat because my wife wears a scarf.

The ID displays the most interesting position in relation to the 0 score line. Most of the statements here have an Islamic content, however the ID still displays uncertainty about them. Statement (35) refers to the interference of the secular regime with private dealings of Islamic people. Some subjects indicated in the follow-up interviews that they were not sure the exact meaning of this statement. Statements (22) (31) (46) (62) have also clear Islamic content, yet the ID prefers to remain neutral on these issues.
5.4.4 Overview

The factor analysis clearly displays the ID’s Islamic and anti-Kemalist position. The ID culturally submits itself to Islam and displays a strong anti-Kemalist sentiment. Linked to its anti-Kemalism the ID also exhibits an anti-army and anti-state attitude.

The ID’s reaction to the core institutions of the Kemalist regime represents a crucial step for the future of democratic practice in Turkey, because the ID resorts to a new strategy based on the recognition of individual rights. For instance, the ID’s main argument against Kemalism targets the way Kemalism defines secularism. The ID questions the Kemalist claim of a mutually exclusive relationship between secularism and the freedom of religious practice. The strictly anti-religious standpoint of Kemalists represents an anti-democratic stand for the ID.

The ID’s attempt to define religious freedom from the point of view of democratic rights is a fundamental step away from traditional Islamic politics, which has mainly been preoccupied with defending Islamic values. The ID is now replacing the traditionally defensive strategy with an offensive one, advocating religious freedom within a broader framework of freedom. As part of this strategy, the ID favours the recognition of different cultural and ethical identities and makes a strong plea for dialog between different groups. In fact, the ID’s position for reconciliation is the strongest among the discourses revealed by the Q study.

I have given some background to the paradigm shift in Islamic politics in the Background to the Case of Turkey chapter. The Q study confirmed this tendency within the discourses of Turkish Muslim population. The ID’s emphasis on individual rights signals a new opening for a democratic polity in Turkey. I have already mentioned the proximity between the ID and the LLD and the genesis of a new form of cooperation between these groups. The shift to an individual rights based politics also brings along the
possibility of broadening this new form of cooperation to larger sections of Turkey. The basis of this possibility is signaled in the findings of the Q study. The aim of the next chapter will be to further analyse the Q findings in order to identify the possibilities of a potential dialog between the divided groups of the Turkish public sphere.
6. SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES ACROSS DISCOURSES

The factor interpretation in the previous chapter has revealed some important patterns across the discourses. The information gathered could lead to mapping out possible ways of reaching understanding between the discourses by identifying the points they share or disagree upon, namely the points of convergence and divergence. There are points of convergence across all four discourses, but also, and perhaps more importantly, between pairs of discourses. Thus there are similarities between the Liberal Left and the Islamic discourses as well as the Liberal Secular and Conservative Secular discourses. Hence, a pair wise comparison of discourses provides a more flexible way of finding the potential points upon which mutual understanding can be built. For instance, there are some striking similarities between the Liberal Left and the Islamic discourses, which could only be revealed by looking at these two discourses closely. It is, therefore, the aim of this section that those converging and diverging points are clearly identified so that a better comprehension of how, under the specific conditions of the Turkish public sphere, a framework for mutual understanding can be developed. The comparison of discourses will be done by looking at their attitudes towards the topics that appeared in the statements and in Turkish politics most commonly, such as the scarf, secularism, Islam and democracy. A topic-based comparison will be followed by a discourse-based comparison revealing specific interactions more clearly.
6.1 Dialog for Mutual Understanding

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>KD</th>
<th>ND</th>
<th>LLD</th>
<th>D</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>59. We have to find out what is common among us rather than focusing on differences. For instance, we have to emphasise the importance of education at the universities instead of arguing about the scarf controversy.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42. The solution is mutual understanding. Groups, who oppose each other, should try to understand each other.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. The differences between us are too deep. We cannot reconcile them by talking. This system will remain as it is in the future.</td>
<td>-4</td>
<td>-6</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27. The important thing is to start from somewhere. If people could start showing respect and tolerance to each other this would force the state to do the same.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57. We have no other choice to solve our problems, but dialog. However, we have to be careful of the tone of the dialog, which should favour a rational, non-antagonistic style that respects others. That is to say, it should avoid the styles of Mr Erbakan and Mr Ozden.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30. The reason behind the reaction to Kemalists is their antagonistic attitude towards Islamic people. The problem can be solved easily if they tried to understand Muslim people rather than attacking and dehumanising them.</td>
<td>-4</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.1

Dialog oriented to mutual understanding and respect for differences emerges as the main issue upon which an agreement across discourses seems to be possible. It appears that all discourses agree on the benefits of dialog and mutual understanding in general terms. Some individual differences emerge when the issue is discussed in more specific terms, however they do not display a strong divergence.

There are several statements that emerge as strong consensus points across discourses.

Statement (59) focuses on what is common between groups rather than on differences and is therefore a strong indication of the tendency among the discourses to attempt to reach a common understanding over controversial issues. Even though the KD and the ID’s support of statement 59 are slightly weaker than that of the ND and the LLD’s (both scoring +6), statement (59) represents one of the major consensus points across all discourses. What makes this moment more meaningful, though, is the commitment shown by all sides to mutual understanding as the solution to
current problems between seculars and Muslims (42). Here, the LLD lags slightly behind the others. This is indicative of its cynicism about dialog. But it is more important that the opposite sides of the debate, that is the ID representing Muslims, the KD and the ND representing secular people, agree on the importance of mutual understanding. Thus, the consensus reached on statement (42) even if it excludes the LLD is indicative of the role of mutual understanding in resolving conflict all discourses agree on. The strong rejection of the view in statement (10) that reconciliation is not possible since differences are too deep further boosts the support for dialog and mutual understanding.

Levels of agreement vary according to the issue in question. For instance, the LLD’s anti-state line seems to have a certain impact when it objects to statement (27). The LLD’s indifference here is not so much to the idea of showing respect to each other, but to the suggestion that the state can be forced to do the same.

The LLD’s cynicism towards dialog also shows itself in various degrees. In statement (57), the LLD seems not so enthusiastic with the view that there is no other choice but dialog to resolve the problems. In a similar fashion, the KD’s commitment to Kemalism singles itself out in statement (30). However, those differences do not emerge as sharp divisions between the discourses. The general pattern for dialog and mutual understanding is therefore quite consistent across discourses, which all agree on the importance of dialog as a major medium to resolve conflict. Yet, it is worth stressing that these points of convergence should also be treated with caution since they are likely to change when the issue is discussed in more specific terms. For instance, after reading statement (59) one could easily ask, “if everyone agrees that there should not be argument about the scarf, then why is there so much argument about it?” The differences between discourses appear more clearly when their positions are tested against some specific cases. However, the overall support for dialog and mutual understanding is still important since it becomes a binding force once it is used publicly, no matter how lightly it is treated. So, for instance, after committing themselves to statement (59) the KD and the ND would be
forced to offer a good argument about why they support not allowing scarf wearing students to universities. This is an issue related to being consistent, which I will discuss further in chapter 8.

6.2 The Scarf

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>KD</th>
<th>ND</th>
<th>LLD</th>
<th>ID</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>41. Quite a few female students, who had to take off their scarf to be admitted to universities, later became quite happy with their new look. May be this rule allowed them to do what they really want.</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. Whether I cover myself with a scarf or not should be no one’s business. This is what I understand from secularism. Everybody should pay respect to different beliefs.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47. My wife has been refused to be issued a health card only because she wears a scarf. This is against basic human rights and secularism.</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46. The secularists in Turkey claim that women who wear the scarf cannot be secular. This is not a democratic attitude.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. About one thousand female students have been refused entry to the University of Marmara because they dress themselves according to their religious belief. This shows that there is a serious problem with freedom of belief and education in Turkey.</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. The universities are important places where secular people and Islamists can close the existing gap between the two groups. When we do not allow female students wearing scarf into the universities we also throw them out of the modern world. By doing this we jeopardise the possibility of living together.</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.2

The scarf emerges as one of the most controversial issues in the Q study. There is no clear agreement across the discourses in relation to the scarf issue. The only exception to that is related to the claim that some female students seemed quite content after they took off their scarf (41). This statement has been rejected by all discourses, yet in differing degrees, thus not enough to represent a consensus. Nevertheless, the scores of each statement reveal that consensus between individual discourses is always a possibility.

For instance, statement (25) falls short of a consensus across discourses, yet there is a strong agreement in three discourses (the ID, the LLD and the ND) about the idea that secularism and religious practice (in the form of wearing scarf in the public places) are not necessarily mutually exclusive. The KD does not agree to that. Statement (47) equally receives a similar
type of consensus, since the ID, the LLD and the ND, but not the KD, support framing the scarf problem as a human rights issue. Statement (46) also shows a similar pattern, though with a less strong agreement than statement (47).

On the other hand, the issue of not allowing female students wearing the scarf at university (4-14) points to a different collaboration between discourses. In both statements, The KD and the ND position themselves against the ID and the LLD. In other words, the line of thinking of the KD and the ND forms a consensus, which runs against that of the ID and the LLD. The LLD’s neutral attitude seems closer to the ID’s affirmative position than to its secular counterparts. Hence, even though there seems to be little consensus between the ID and the LLD’s position, it is clearly distinguished from the other two discourses, putting the ID and the LLD in a closer proximity in their understanding of the issue. In this sense, the factor analysis reveals some essential differences about the meaning each discourse attribute to the issue. This is important since it allows interpreting some tendencies more determinately, since differences are interpreted more clearly.

For instance, differences between the secular discourses appear to be quite striking. While the KD shows no signs of compromise, the ND and the LLD joins with the ID by defining the issue as a human rights problem. However, the ND retreats from this coalition and acts together with the KD when the issue is discussed at a more practical level, such as how to deal with the problem at the universities. In fact, the ND displays the most inconsistent attitude towards the scarf issue, due to its simultaneous allegiance to the conflicting values of Islamic and Kemalist ways of living. Whereas, as a secular discourse, the LLD, with the exception of statement (14), appears to be consistently in agreement with the ID on the scarf issue since it argues the problem from a human rights points of view but nothing else, flagging a possible alliance between the two.
6.3 Islam

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>KD</th>
<th>ND</th>
<th>LLD</th>
<th>ID</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>49. In a Muslim society, the framework for freedom has to be determined according to Islamic values.</td>
<td>-5</td>
<td>-5</td>
<td>-6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Islam, as a system of law, cannot be compatible with democracy. The role and the place attributed to women by Islamic law, which denies women basic individual rights, is enough to prove this.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Islamists are not as tolerant towards atheists as they are towards Islamists.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. In some religious cities, during the Ramadan people were beaten if they ate or drank in daytime. How can I be sure that Islamists will not do the same if they come to power? How can I trust them?</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Islam can accommodate different groups including atheists.</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. The purpose of religion will be defeated when it is carried over to the public arena. Beliefs are personal matters, thus they should be kept within the individual sphere.</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. The problem with Islamic law in relation to democracy is that Islamic communities exert social pressure on individuals. This conflicts with the democratic notion of individual freedom and rights.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37. In Turkey, more than eighty percent of Islamic people have a moderate line. They cannot be a threat for the secular regime.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. People are less corrupt under sharia regime because it induces the fear of God.</td>
<td>-6</td>
<td>-5</td>
<td>-5</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. If everybody tries to live according to Islamic rule, a just system can come into existence.</td>
<td>-5</td>
<td>-4</td>
<td>-5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.3

The topic of Islam and its link to democracy portrays a different picture of relationship between discourses than the scarf issue. This time, the KD and the LLD react in a similar way particularly in relation to Islam’s democratic capacity against the ID’s and the ND’s more affirmative approach to the issue. ND again wavers between secular and Islamic positions, however on this issue leans more comfortably to the ID since the statements on Islam are usually related to some general remarks with no clear link to the state and/or to the public affairs (where this happens the ND again shifts into its pro-state position). The KD and the LLD’s objections mainly stem from mistrusting that Islam is indeed compatible with democratic values. Nevertheless, all secular discourses come into a strong consensus against the suggestion that the framework for freedom in a Muslim society should be determined by Islamic values (49). This is indeed the strongest level of consensus achieved among secular discourses. Against their reaction, the
ID strongly agrees with the statement, pointing to one of the most contentious issues to be resolved between the sides.

On the other hand, statements (16-9-11) are clear indications of the polarisation between the ND and the ID on one hand, and the LLD and the KD on the other hand. While the issue of Islam’s compatibility with democratic values in relation to women’s rights is affirmed by the ND and the ID, the KD and the LLD disagrees on the compatibility between Islam and democracy (16). The same pattern continues when it comes to trusting Muslims (11) and tolerating minority groups (9) (15), which are particularly deemed as satanic in Islam, though in (15) the ND remains neutral indicating that the issue of Islam accommodating non-Islamic groups is a problematic one. The ND slightly shifts its position towards other secular discourses when it is suggested that Islam exerts social pressure on individuals (6). The agreement between secular discourses shows a strong tendency in relation to the suggestion that religious affairs belong to the private sphere and should be kept outside the public sphere (17). This issue emerges as one of the strongest disagreement points between the ID and secular discourses. The disagreement peaks when it is suggested that in a Islamic country Islamic values should be used to regulate public affairs (49). The consensus among the secular discourses against the idea of using Islamic values in public affairs reaches its highest point confirming that the issue remains one of the most fundamental problems to be resolved between seculars and Muslims.

However, some issues about Islam are also agreed on by the ID and the secular discourses. Most interestingly, all discourses have a shared understanding that most of Turkey’s Muslim populations represent a moderate line, which does not pose a threat to the secular regime (37). This is indicative of the discontent among both seculars and Muslims about the excessive way in which the state handles the fundamentalist threat. For seculars and Muslims even if there is a real threat it cannot be attributed to the entire Muslim population.
Another consensus point emerges in relation to the suggestion that Islamic law (sharia) can reduce corruption since it induces the fear of God (19). Along with the secular discourses, the ID also tends to disagree with this statement. Even though the ID remains neutral, statement (20) also points to a similar tendency, indicating that creating a just society requires a common approach to public affairs.

Overall, statements referring to Islam indicate what needs to be done between secular and Islamic people. The most contentious issue to be resolved appears to be Islam’s ability to deal with individual rights, as described in a traditional secular system. A constructive dialog on this issue will most likely help to reduce the level of anxiety seculars display when dealing with Muslims.

### 6.4 Kemalism and Secularism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>KD</th>
<th>ND</th>
<th>LLD</th>
<th>ID</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Today’s oppressive attitudes against Muslims in the name of secularism are rooted in Kemalist ideology.</td>
<td>-5</td>
<td>-5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Kemalism and secularism cannot be separated from each other. Separating them will mean the end of secularism. If you are secular you are also Kemalist, or vica versa.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64. The Islamists are only softening their lines because of the strong resistance shown against them by the Army and Kemalists.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36. Ataturk (Mustafa Kemal) is a very important personality who could only be respected. However, the Kemalism label, unfortunately, got stuck on him and being unfairly used against Muslims. Kemalism has now become a metaphysical concept with a religious like content. Like democracy, its meaning has been abused and changed.</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30. The reason behind the reaction to Kemalists is their antagonistic attitude towards Islamic people. The problem can be solved easily if they tried to understand Muslim people rather than attacking and dehumanising them.</td>
<td>-4</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45. To claim that Muslims in Turkey are not allowed to practice their religion is a totally unfair statement. If we do not count the scarf problem in public institutions there has been no obstacle for Muslims to practice their religion. Quite the contrary, with the Republic, Turkish Muslims have gained substantial individual rights compared to Muslims living in other Islamic countries.</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38. If Turkey has today become more modern than any other Islamic countries, it is mainly because law and education have been laicised by being separated from the influence of religion</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Secularism is atheism.</td>
<td>-6</td>
<td>-6</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.4
One of the main arguments of the Kemalist tradition has been that Kemalism and secularism mutually require each other to the point that secularism would hold no meaning without Kemalism and vice versa. This surely is a controversial issue and its legitimacy has been one of the main topics, hotly disputed by both secular and Islamic groups. The Q sort also indicates controversy surrounding this issue, shifting the sand around the discourses one more time. The ranking of the statements related to Kemalism shows that the ID and the LLD again join ranks against the Kemalist line of the KD and the ND. Statement (2) emerges as a clear testimony to this difference. The ID and the LLD reject the idea that Kemalism and secularism are inseparable. Perhaps more strikingly, when the LLD points the finger to Kemalism as the source of oppressive behaviors against Muslims (1) its anti-Kemalism surpasses even the ID’s. The LLD and the ID’s anti-Kemalism line continue with their joint rejection of the assertion that Kemalists and the Army’s stiff resistance are the only reasons behind Islamic groups’ softening attitudes (64).

On the other hand, both the KD and the ND display an almost identical reaction against the LLD and the ID’s anti-Kemalism. In all statements related to Kemalism (1-2-36-30-64), they act in defence of Kemalism. However, this collaboration weakens when the issue shifts from Kemalism to secularism. Most notably in the ranking of statements (45) and (38), both related to the contribution of secularism to Turkey’s more advanced social conditions compared to what happens in other Islamic countries. The ND, even though it agrees with the statements, clearly lags behind the KD’s enthusiastic affirmation. Indeed, on the issue of secularism alone, the ND moves towards the ID and the LLD indicating a more cautious approach to define religious freedom in relation to secularism. The source of this shift can again be seen in ND’s dual commitment to Islamic values and secularism.

In this controversial issue, there is a point still agreed on by all discourses. Statement (3)’s suggestion, that secularism is atheism, is rejected by all
discourses, though most strongly by the KD and the ND. The fact that the ID’s and the LLD’s disagreement with the suggestion is weaker than in other discourses, is a reminder of the division between discourses.

6.5 Democracy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>KD</th>
<th>ND</th>
<th>LLD</th>
<th>ID</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>51. If the freedom of belief is overemphasised, Muslim people might be affected by the ideas that are dangerous for the secular regime.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>-4</td>
<td>-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53. I support our President who defends the supremacy of law. We can only solve our democratic problems by creating a real system of law in our country.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Today, the biggest obstacle for democracy in Turkey is not Islam, but the political parties, which offer no solution to corruption.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40. The fear of communism and fundamentalism, has contributed to the inclusion of very undemocratic rules in the penal code against them (142, 141, 163). If they were let develop freely, they would be able to reach new synthesis, thus avoid today’s problems.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50. We have to produce our own model of democracy. The cultural values of Eastern countries are different from those in the West. Eastern countries should not be governed by an American model of democracy.</td>
<td>-4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52. Respect for individual rights, the fundamental principle of democracy and secularism, exists in Islam</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>-4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.5

The topic of democracy is one where the polarization between discourses does not seem too high. While there is divergence in their position about statements, the difference does not appear to be very strong. Indeed, the statements related to democracy reveal some interesting points upon which all discourses agree. This indicates that the principles of democracy have a common meaning to all parties, reinforcing a shared attitude. For instance, all discourses disagree with the assertion that overemphasising freedom of belief can cause some Muslims to be swayed by fundamentalist arguments, and that it should thus be limited (51). A basic liberty, the freedom of belief, is acknowledged here by all discourses, even though the degree to which they support the idea differs. This shared sentiment is qualified further by agreeing on the principle that the power of law should be the only medium to resolve democratic problems (53). In fact the ID’s agreement with this
The President’s hard line on the scarf issue is considered.

More remarkably, though, what could potentially be a contentious issue turns out to be another consensus point. All discourses share the sentiment that the most important obstacle for democracy in Turkey is not Islam, but political parties that display some corrupt, anti-ethical political behaviour (8). Notably the KD and the ND’s rank this problem even higher than the ID does, indicating that they do not perceive Islam as the only problem for the establishment of a democratic regime. The anti-corruption theme in fact played a major role in the election victory of the AKP in 2002. The fact that AKP attracted a high percentage of vote from other major parties testifies to this finding of the Q study.

Statement (40) points to another agreement between secular and Islamic discourses, with the exception of the ND. The ID, the LLD and the KD agree that the suppression of the freedom of belief by the state led to the current stalemate. Thus these three discourses favour the free circulation of ideas no matter what their content is. ND remains outside of this agreement once again because of its strong pro-state leaning.

The proximity between secular and Islamic discourses takes a different shape when it comes to deciding what kind of democracy is needed (50). The ID and the KD join together to object to the idea that Eastern countries are different from Western countries, and thus should be governed according to their own model of democracy, rather than a Western model. On the other hand, the ND and the LLD defend the need for a localised version of democracy. What is most striking here is that the ID, by objecting to changing democratic values according to local standards, points to a commitment to democracy as a universally applicable system. What this implies is that the ID is indeed ready to negotiate the rules of coexistence between Islam and a Western democratic system. It supports its position by agreeing with another statement stipulating that the fundamental principle of democracy, respect for individual rights, exists in Islam (52). However, the
secular discourses, particularly the LLD, disagree with this assertion, testifying that the issue still remains as one of the main gray areas waiting to be resolved.

### 6.6 The State and the Army

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>KD</th>
<th>ND</th>
<th>LLD</th>
<th>ID</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>54. The state is not supposed to carry a religious identity. Its task should only be to govern people. It should not question its people on the basis of their religious identities.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55. For a state taking measures to help the practice of religious freedom should not be against secularism. Quite contrary, a secular system requires this.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56. The state should lead the reconciliation process. It should not treat some of its citizen as enemies.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48. The conflict between secular and Islamic people has been created superficially. The groups who are in control of the state have always created enemies in order to maintain their power. Yesterday it was communism, today fundamentalist Islam.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. The army is the guarantor of democracy and secularism.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-6</td>
<td>-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33. The military tradition has paralysed the self-reflective ability of our society. That is why we still have been governed by a mentality, which is out of date.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.6

Similar to the discourses' response to what a democratic system should entail, there appears a strong agreement across all discourses about the role the state is expected to play. The support shown for statement (54) by all discourses is one of the strongest consensus points, emphasising that the task of the state should be to govern people no matter what their religious backgrounds are. The importance of neutrality in the practice of governing emerges as a shared concept by all discourses.

This is followed by another prerequisite that the state indeed should take an active role in the process of reconciliation (56). Both secular and Islamic discourses also share a strong discontent with the state’s heavy-handed dealing with religious affairs. Expanding on these two points, the ID and the ND joins to call the state to help religious practice instead of preventing it (55). Here, the religious pluralism and the freedom of religious practice are qualified as a prerequisite for a secular system. Against the ID and the ND’s
position, the KD remains neutral and the LLD expresses a low level of disagreement, denoting that they are not too far from agreeing with the others either.

This generic approach to the state, however, changes, especially in the case of the ND, when the matter is related to some practical issues particularly the preservation of the state’s unity. The ND rejects the claim raised in statement (48) that the groups who control the state create the conflict between seculars and Muslims superficially in order to keep the upper hand. The ID and the LLD also agree on the issue while the KD remains neutral. Here, the LLD’s opposition to the state peaks.

A similar attitude is displayed against the Army in statement (7). The ID and the LLD together rebuff the suggestion that the army is the guarantor of democracy and secularism in Turkey. This is indeed one of their most strongly disagreed statements. The ND on the other hand happily accepts the suggestion, in line with its pro-army leaning. The KD, however, consistent with its mild anti-statism, remains neutral. Similarly, the LLD strongly supports the claim made in statement (33) that the military tradition is one of the major reasons why society’s critical thinking ability has not been developed. The KD and the ID expectedly join the LLD in support of the statement, while the ND, maintaining its loyalty to the army, strongly opposes the idea.

6.7 The Media

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>5. The state does not want people’s consciousness to rise. Nevertheless, may be thanks to the media, people from different backgrounds have started understanding each other better.</th>
<th>KD</th>
<th>ND</th>
<th>LLD</th>
<th>ID</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-2</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>12. The debates in media, such as discussion forums on TV channels, are playing an important role in allowing people to understand each other.</th>
<th>KD</th>
<th>ND</th>
<th>LLD</th>
<th>ID</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.7

All discourses converge in their negative opinion about the impact of the media. This is clear in their joint rejection of statement (5), which suggests
that the media contributes to the process of mutual understanding among people. A similar statement (12) is also rebuffed by all discourses except the ND. This reaction towards media also emerged strongly during the follow-up interviews. However, most of the subjects indicated that their discontent with the media mostly related to commercial TV formats used particularly in discussion forums in which different sides usually engaged in fruitless arguments focused not on understanding other parties, but merely on trying to assert their own points. The equation of media with commercial TV might be misleading but also seems quite normal given that it is overwhelmingly preferred by Turkish people as the main medium to receive information. Nevertheless, it also shows an awareness of what a rational argument should entail.

To conclude, the topic based correlation of discourses provides useful insights not only into how and where an interaction is possible between discourses, but also into under what circumstances this interaction could collapse. In other words, the topic based correlation makes the points of convergence and divergence between discourses more discernible. The topics that each discourse reacts to in a certain way also point to areas in which an alternative way of looking at the issues at hand is possible. In the case of the KD, for instance, advocating the rule of law without necessarily acknowledging basic individual rights appears to be a soft spot, which could be exploited easily unless the inconsistency of the argument is fixed. Perhaps more importantly, the correlation shows the points that each discourse could target to clarify more in order to avoid misunderstandings on several issues. The distrust by the secular discourses that Islam can accommodate different groups including atheists represents a certain challenge to the ID. If the ID is sincere in its call for dialog it has to clarify what it means to be different in an Islamic setting. Similarly, it forces the ND to reconsider what it means to be Islamic and secular at the same time. The ND’s double face makes it the most inconsistent discourse among others and this becomes more visible when discourses are correlated through a topic-based analysis.
From a deliberative point of view, the issues that appear in the topic based analysis offers a road map exploring possible avenues of establishing a healthy dialog between conflicting sides. Yet, the possibilities that this map presents can be further elaborated thorough another type of analysis, this time based on a comparison of discourses rather than topics. This way the specificity of relationship between particular discourses can be put under further scrutiny providing additional evidence on how discourses relate to each other.

6.2 Discourse Based Analysis of Similarities and Differences

The topic based comparison in the previous section aimed at identifying the positions of each discourse in relation to the topics appeared in the statements. A discourse based comparison focuses more on the interrelationship between discourses. Through a discourse based comparison it is possible to develop a better understanding of how each discourse could relate to each other in terms of their overall similarities and dissimilarities. I will focus on two correlations here. The first one will look at the general relationship between secular discourses, that is, the KD, the ND and the LLD on the one hand, and the ID on the other. The second one will specifically investigate the relationship between the LLD and the ID in order to look at the similarities that they display closely.

6.2.1 Islamic versus Secular Discourses

Similarities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>KD</th>
<th>ND</th>
<th>LLD</th>
<th>ID</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Today’s oppressive attitudes against Muslims in the name of secularism are rooted in Kemalist ideology.</td>
<td>-5</td>
<td>-5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Secularism is atheism.</td>
<td>-6</td>
<td>-6</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. Whether I cover myself with a scarf or not should be no one’s business. This is what I understand from secularism. Everybody should pay respect to different beliefs.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27. The important thing is to start from somewhere. If people could start showing</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
respect and tolerance to each other this would force the state to do the same.

31. I do not see anything wrong with religious sects. People should be able to get together if they believe in the same thing. Everybody, religious people, atheists etc., should be able to live together in peace within the same nation.

46. The secularists in Turkey claim that women who wear the scarf cannot be secular. This is not a democratic attitude.

47. My wife has been refused to be issued a health card only because she wears a scarf. This is against basic human rights and secularism.

8. Today, the biggest obstacle for democracy in Turkey is not Islam, but the political parties, which offer no solution to corruption.

10. The differences between us are too deep. We cannot reconcile them by talking. This system will remain as it is in the future.

44. I am trying to survive economically to be able to feed my children. The debate between Islam and secularism does not interest me.

Table 6.2.1

In several statements, it is possible to find a certain degree of commonality between discourses. More interestingly though the ID appears to be backing the general sentiment displayed by secular discourses. For instance, the strong anti-Kemalist sentiment in (1) is expectedly rejected by the KD and the ND; however, more importantly also disapproved by the ID. The ID’s rejection is not as strong as that of others, nevertheless it points to the possibility to deal with the misunderstanding that Muslims are strictly anti-Kemalist. What makes the ID’s support important is that it also falls close to the LLD affirmative position, providing an opportunity to be in touch with all secular discourses. A similar observation can be made in relation to the statement (3). The ID, along with other discourses, rejects the claim that secularism is atheism. Again, the ID’s objection is less strong than that of others; however it possibly helps to ease the discomfort felt by secular discourses about the issue.

There is an almost perfect consensus between the ID and secular discourses on seeing the issue of the scarf as a personal matter to be respected (25). Framing the scarf issue as a problem of individual rights gets substantial support form the ID, the LLD and the ND. Only the KD remains neutral. Finding a common point on this most contentious issue is surely crucial for reconciling differences. It also shows the ID has a direction
on how to formulate the issue best in order to gain a more common acceptance.

Another common point emerges in the statement (27), which highlights mutual respect and tolerance to differences, initiated by a grassroots based movement. The only opposition to the idea comes from the LLD, possibly due to the reference to the state in the statement. Nonetheless, an affirmative approach on the key issues of mutual respect as well as a grassroots based initiative provides plenty of scope to develop a common platform to act upon.

Statement (31) highlights another issue around which the ID and secular discourses converge. The ID displays an indifferent attitude towards religious sects, paving the way for rectifying another point that has been mostly misunderstood, that is, that the ID does not necessarily advocate religious sects as an essential part of religious practice, implying that the private sphere is where religious activities should belong. This surely clears the way for a constructive dialog between seculars and Muslims.

The possibility for dialog increases further with the LLD and the KD’s positive approach to the scarf issue. Both in the statements (46) and (47) a consensus emerges between the ID and the LLD and the ND. Even though, the KD remains outside this consensus, the common understanding between the LLD and the ND represents a crucial moment in the development of a strong base for dialog. Statement (47) sends the strongest signal by linking the scarf issue with a breach of human rights and secularism. Notably, the LLD and the ND’s reactions here are stronger than the ID.

Another interesting agreement between discourses emerges in statement (8), which blames corrupt political parties as the real obstacle for democracy rather than Islam. Interestingly the KD and the ND support the statement stronger than the LLD and the ID. This could possibly be linked to the LLD and the ID’s more suspicious approach to the state in that they see
corruption endemic not only within political parties but in the political system as a whole including the state apparatus.

Statements (10) and (44) together also display a strong agreement between secular and Islamic discourses that apathy and pessimism are not acceptable. This commitment towards working for reconciliation shared by all discourses surely aspires an important moment for democratic endeavor in Turkey.

Differences

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>KD</th>
<th>ND</th>
<th>LLD</th>
<th>ID</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17. The purpose of religion will be defeated when it is carried over to the public arena. Beliefs are personal matters, thus they should be kept within the individual sphere.</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49. In a Muslim society, the framework for freedom has to be determined according to Islamic values.</td>
<td>-5</td>
<td>-5</td>
<td>-6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. If everybody tries to live according to Islamic rule, a just system can come into existence.</td>
<td>-5</td>
<td>-4</td>
<td>-5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. The problem with Islamic law in relation to democracy is that Islamic communities exert social pressure on individuals. This conflicts with the democratic notion of individual freedom and rights.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Islam, as a system of law, cannot be compatible with democracy. The role and the place attributed to women by Islamic law, which denies women basic individual rights, is enough to prove this.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. About one thousand female students have been refused entry to the University of Marmara because they dress themselves according to their religious belief. This shows that there is a serious problem with freedom of belief and education in Turkey.</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. The universities are important places where secular people and Islamists can close the existing gap between the two groups. When we do not allow female students wearing scarf into the universities we also throw them out of the modern world. By doing this we jeopardise the possibility of living together.</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45. To claim that Muslims in Turkey are not allowed to practice their religion is a totally unfair statement. If we do not count the scarf problem in public institutions there has been no obstacle for Muslims to practice their religion. Quite the contrary, with the Republic, Turkish Muslims have gained substantial individual rights compared to Muslims living in other Islamic countries.</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38. If Turkey has today become more modern than any other Islamic countries, it is mainly because law and education have been laicised by being separated from the influence of religion</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.2.2
The differences across the secular discourses also reveal important clues on how to establish a more successful dialog between discourses. The KD, the ND and the LLD all agree on general statements about secularism, yet their different treatment of some issues such as the scarf, the army, the state and Islam helps to understand how to narrow the gap between Muslims and seculars.

The major differences between the ID and the secular discourses mostly revolve around issues related to Islam’s political interpretations, particularly its compatibility with democracy. The ID’s affirmative approach to those issues is mostly challenged by secular discourses’ high level of skepticism. The biggest margin of differences appears in relation to the statements (17) and (49). Statement (17) suggests that religion is a personal matter, and thus should be kept within the private sphere. The strong opposition to this statement by the ID testifies of a major difference between the Islamic and secular interpretations of the public and private divide. The issue appears to be difficult, but might be solved more easily than it looks, pending to an agreement on the scarf issue, since the scarf is seen as the symbol of Islam’s invasion of the public sphere in most of secular arguments.

Statement (49) is again related to the public/private divide, but this time endorsing the implementation of Islamic values into the public framework. Similarly, statement (20) argues that a just system can be created if everybody lives according to Islamic rule. All secular discourses predictably oppose these statements strongly, though the difference appears to be more rigorous in statement (20). The opposing role is reversed when for instance Islam’s compatibility with democratic values is questioned in (6) and (16). Those issues are possibly the most critical in the sense that they touch into the heard of the matter, thus resolving them will expectedly be more difficult than the previous one.

It is interesting to note that the differences become less severe when practical matters dominate the agenda, such as the scarf problem at university (4) (14), the role of economic equality (18) or the difference of Turkey’s secular regime in terms of modern rights and conditions compared
to other Islamic countries (45) (38). The practical implications of these issues in daily life render them relatively easy to compare. Hence they represent a good starting point for a dialog aimed at mutual understanding.

6.3 Overview

A topic-based analysis of discourses provides a distinctive depiction of both the discourses themselves and subjects of Islam, democracy and secularism. The importance of this lies in the fact that it points to a direction where understanding differences, and perhaps settling them, becomes more likely. The assumption here is straightforward, that is, once a presumed difference is denied it immediately opens up a possibility for establishing a dialog to rectify misconceptions, thus leading to a better understanding of the parties involved. For instance, the state’s interference with religious affairs is strongly opposed by all discourses in favour of a more liberal approach. This reaction is quite expected in the case of the ID and the LLD, but not in that of other secular discourses, particularly the ND, which has displayed a strong statist attitude as revealed in the study. The resentment towards the state’s heavy handedness, thus, denotes a moment that can be captured as a starting point towards mutual understanding. Another encouraging sign appears when a consensus is reached on the idea that the main obstacle for democracy in Turkey is not Islam and the belief that the majority of Turkey’s Muslim population are not fundamentalist inclined, which could threaten the secular regime.

Reconciling differences emerges as a major priority common to all discourses. In terms of commitment to reconciliation, differences between the discourses do not display a great level of divergence. The high level of support for mutual understanding only slightly decreases when the future prediction for the success of reconciling differences is evaluated. Here, the ID and the ND carry a higher hope for a positive future change. All discourses also agree with the self-critical line that in reality Turkish
people's tolerance usually applies to their inner circles, thus broadening this self-serving attitude will be necessary if a positive outcome towards reconciling differences is to be achieved. Yet, factor analysis also revealed that good intentions towards dialog seem conditional, particularly in the case of the KD and the ND. This inconsistency is the most likely reason that the tendency towards dialog is not always reflected in Turkish politics, particularly at the formal level of engagement between parties. It is through a topic-based analysis that those inconsistencies along with the possible ways of resolving them can be identified.

A topic and discourse based analysis of the Q findings also displays important clues about the nature of the relationship between different views. Areas of agreement and disagreement become discernable for further elaborations. Furthermore, the Q analysis also identifies changes in attitudes when ideas are tested against real life circumstances. For instance, respect for individual rights as a general idea has appeared to be of prime importance for all discourses. Yet when these rights were tested against real life conditions the result displayed major differences between discourses. As seen, for both the Kemalist and the Nationalist discourses the importance of respecting individual rights withered away when the scarf issue appeared on the agenda.

The inconsistencies exhibited in the application of these generic ideas into specific cases mainly stem from preconceptions about each other that create a circle of mistrust between conflicting parties. In the case of scarf issue, for instance, the scarf is seen as a sign of Islam's political ambition to dominate the public sphere with anti-secular values and symbols, particularly by the Kemalist discourse. Yet, for the Islamic discourse, the scarf symbolises a democratic right necessary for the practice of religious freedom. The issue here seems in a deadlock unless the parties clarify what they mean by secularism and individual rights. This is precisely where deliberation oriented to social learning and understanding can play a significant role by simply revealing potential areas of common interest. I will repeat the main argument of this thesis that the chance of turning these
common areas into practical, workable arrangements between parties has only a limited chance within the confines of decision-making oriented deliberative settings. What makes social learning oriented deliberation vital is not only its virtue in turning the areas of agreement into workable arrangements, but also its capacity to reveal participants possible changes in attitudes during their discursive engagement, hence further reinforcing mutual understanding and social learning. This point will be further evaluated in the next chapter through a case study.
7. PROSPECTS FOR NEW FORMS OF COOPERATION

In the previous chapter I mapped out possible points of convergence and divergence between the main discourses of the Turkish public sphere. The background section about each discourse indicated that these discourses share a more common milieu than is usually appreciated today. From the point of the deliberative framework sketched out in the first section as the social learning model of deliberation, these common points constitute the setting for a prospective dialog between the discourses of Turkey. Therefore it is essential that these commonalities be elaborated on further in order to show why the social learning stage of deliberation plays an important role in the consolidation of different views.

The Q study has also picked up the signs of the paradigm change that has occurred both in the Left and the Islamic discourses during the last two decades. An analysis of the dynamics of this shift would provide a further understanding of why deliberation as social learning and understanding could play a crucial role within a socially and culturally divided country such as Turkey. In what follows, firstly I will recapitulate the similarities between the Islamic and Liberal Left discourses as appeared in the Q study findings. This will lay the ground for the rest of this chapter, which will show how the possibility of an unprecedented alliance between Islamic and leftist forces emerges in line with the Q findings. This section will be followed by an account of the development of the notion of individual rights both in the Left and the Islamic groups. Here I will focus on two human rights associations: the IHD (Human Rights Association from the Left and Mazlum-Der (Oppressed People Association), an Islamic group. In the last section I will look at a women’s organisation, Women’s Platform for Peace, in order to show how the emergence of an individual rights based politics helped to form an alliance among a very diverse political and cultural representation of groups from various backgrounds.
7.1 Similarities Between Islamic and Liberal Left Discourses

The factor analysis revealed some important similarities between the ID and the LLD. As I indicated, the level of proximity between these two discourses suggests the beginning of an important phase for democratic practice in Turkey. It is therefore significant that the relationship between the ID and the LLD be monitored more closely. This would not only provide a better picture of the current and future interactions between the two discourses, but also would suggest how to expand the boundaries of this new cooperation into the broader community particularly into other secular sections of the Turkish society. The following table shows how close these two discourses in their understanding of a democratic framework based on a system of rights.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>LLD</th>
<th>ID</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>-6</td>
<td>-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41.</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48.</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60.</td>
<td>-5</td>
<td>-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64.</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59.</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
instance, we have to emphasise the importance of education at the universities instead of arguing about the scarf controversy.

51. If the freedom of belief is overemphasised, Muslim people might be affected by the ideas that are dangerous for the secular regime.

47. My wife has been refused to be issued a health card only because she wears a scarf. This is against basic human rights and secularism.

Table 7.1

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>47. My wife has been refused to be issued a health card only because she wears a scarf. This is against basic human rights and secularism.</td>
<td>5 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51. If the freedom of belief is overemphasised, Muslim people might be affected by the ideas that are dangerous for the secular regime.</td>
<td>-4 -5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As the table shows the similarities between the ID and the LLD are quite substantial. Both the LLD and the ID define individual rights as the main paradigm for their democratic framework. Hence, they both consider the scarf problem as a human rights issue irrespective of its impact on the state (25-41-47). Interestingly, though, the LLD feels even stronger than the ID when the issue is clearly tied to another aspect of individual rights, such as health, as in the case of (1).

Consequently, the LLD and the ID agree that if the law does not comply with human rights it does not deserve respect from citizens (60). This is quite a remarkable result from an Islamic point of view since it simply puts Muslims into the same anti-establishment category along with the LLD. Even though an anti-establishment sentiment can be easily associated with the left in general, it is surely a new phenomenon for the Islamic population particularly when it is brought into the fore with a clear emphasis on human rights. Agreeing on a common framework based on individual rights has fundamental implications for democratic practice in Turkey. This is the basis that provides the opportunity for new forms of cooperation between the LLD and the ID. Yet, equally important, as I will highlight in the next section, is the fact that both discourses and their corresponding formations in the social strata have gone through a significant learning process. Initially, this process was mainly internal in that it mainly occurred with almost no interaction between Islamic and left groups. What was learned mostly remained within their own sphere. However, as I will discuss in the next section, the paradigm shift that occurred first among leftist then Islamic groups created a real opportunity for these groups to gather around the same platform for the first time in the history of Turkish Republic. This
interaction between them, in turn, helped to expand the scope of learning significantly. There will be more on this in the next two sections.

An important result of the LLD’s and the ID’s anti-establishment tendency was also to have an antagonistic relationship with the state. This is one of the main reasons both the LLD and the ID have similar views about the role of the state and the army in democratic practice in Turkey. They strongly disagree with the suggestion that the army is the guarantor of democracy and secularism (7). They also agree that the state’s anti-democratic measures, manipulated by existing power holders, are the main source of conflict between seculars and Muslims (48). Both discourses are clearly anti-Kemalist (1-2), though interestingly the LLD’s reaction to Kemalism surpasses the ID’s (1). Those issues clearly separate them from the KD and the ND.

Another important similarity between the LLD and the ID comes to the fore when they agree that the current system is bound to change and dialog can be an important tool to play a role in stipulating the change (10). Even though the LLD in general is sceptical about the concept of dialog, it still throws its support behind this statement. When this is considered with the LLD’s very strong endorsement of the idea that the conflict between secular and Islamic people is superficially created and provoked by some groups within the state rather than by ordinary people (48), then establishing a ground for a possible cooperation between leftists and Islamists appears to be within reach. A positive approach to people’s empowerment also underlines their suspicion about the kind of politics that promotes a state-centred framework (61).

Overall, it is not difficult to conclude that the LLD and the ID display some similar characteristics in relation to their understanding of a democratic polity. Both of them consistently defend the primacy of individual rights as the normative base for a democratic framework. It is this commitment to a system of rights that makes meaningful their reaction to the state and the army. In this sense, the LLD and the ID clearly part from the KD and the ND.
since they do not consider secularism as the main paradigm for the establishment of a democratic regime.

Here, I am aware that I focus mainly on the similarities between the two discourses. My point here is to make a future projection on the basis of what is currently happening between these discourses. I discussed their differences in detail in relevant sections previously. For instance, the Q findings displayed that there is a sharp contrast between the LLD and the ID about the role of Islamic values in determining societal norms (49). Similarly, the LLD is not convinced that respect for individual rights exist in Islam (52). Yet, it is not those differences that determine the possibility of cooperation between leftist and Islamic groups. The differences will possibly affect the scope of their interaction. Yet, it is, and has been, the underlined similarities that play a decisive role in any form of cooperation between them. The issue here will then be linked to the role of social learning in those settings since the scope can also be expanded under the conditions of social learning. In the next two sections I will show how this process is already at work in some real life cases.

7.2 The Development of Individual Rights in Islamic and Left Groups

Starting within the Left first in the late 1980s, then within the Islamic discourse from mid-1990s onwards, a politics of basic individual rights rather than of class or Islam based politics has become a main paradigm in some segments of the Leftist and Islamic groups. For the future of democracy in Turkey, this shift was one of the most significant steps in the Turkish politics. It helped the AKP (Justice and Development Party) to win the 2002 general elections with one of the biggest majorities in the history of Turkish Parliament, after breaking from the ranks of the SP, the flag bearer of the tradition of political Islam in Turkey since 1970.
The idea of individual rights ironically owes its existence to the intervention of the Turkish army into politics. Before 1980, the issue of human rights was generally limited to discussing torture cases in leftist groups (Plagemann, 2001, 362). Following the 1980 coup, first within the Left, and then within the Islamic movements, the notion of individual rights appeared in the political discourse as offering the possibility to offer protection against the state and the army’s relentless assaults.

The IHD (Human Rights Association) was established, in 1986, by some left wing intellectuals and the members of various left wing organisations. Even though most of the founding members belonged to Left groups with a traditional class based understanding of the world, the IHD adopted a different approach to define its political spectrum. The IHD’s constitution identified working for the defence of basic individual rights and freedom as IHD’s primary task (Article 2). The IHD’s platform based on individual rights provided a viable basis for those who wanted to develop alternative politics. The IHD soon gathered a pool of leftists disgruntled with the traditional left politics (Plagemann, 2001: 364).

The IHD grew steadily. By 1996, the association’s membership reached over 16,000 and fifty-eight branches were established across Turkey. Its initial focus on human rights abuses in prisons, particularly in the form of torture, widened following the increase in the level and the kind of support received. Its agenda was broadened to cover various social issues including the rights of workers, minority groups, women and the environment. A good example of IHD’s shift into a non class based paradigm is the Declaration of Pedestrian Rights issued on the World Environment Day in 1990. This was surely a completely new terrain for left politics, which resulted in a further expansion of the IHD, which started attracting feminists, homosexuals and environmentalists (Plagemann, 2001: 365).

The paradigm shift within the left was soon echoed within Islamic groups as well. Members of different Islamic groups who were ill treated by the 1980 military regime formed their own human rights association, Mazlum-Der
(Organisation of Human Rights & Solidarity for Oppressed People), in 1991. Even though Mazlum-Der initially focused on the human rights abuses inflicted on Islamic people, it soon adopted a more neutral approach and dealt with all sorts of human rights abuses including those related to the Kurdish problem, workers’ rights, and even the rights of patients who were ill-treated in hospitals (Plagemann, 2001: 378).

What is important here for the development of the Islamic discourse is that for the first time Islamic discourse opened itself to a new conceptual terrain. Mazlum-Der’s formulation of human rights was by no means a copy and paste approach. Extensive discussions on the relevance of individual rights to Islam and vice versa were held during the early stages of Mazlum-Der. The founding president of Mazlum-Der, Mehmet Pamak, for instance, argues that the Western notion of human rights does not reflect a universal notion of human rights since it grew out of a power struggle between different ethnic, regional and national powers which inflicted a pragmatic use of human rights. It was mainly applicable to white Europeans, yet in the rest of the world was mainly used to gain colonialist advantages against established rules. Contrary to the Western notion of human rights, Islam is capable of offering a real universal human rights approach based not on any national, ethnic or class based interests but on the universal veneration of individual life (Plagemann, 2001: 378-382).

Thus, the founders of Mazlum-Der tried to cushion the impact of the introduction of a Western notion of individual rights to Islamic thought by trying to distance themselves from the representatives of a more Western approach. For instance they argued that the IHD’s human rights defence was limited to defending leftist people, and was thus not worthy of their cooperation. However, as Plagemann asserts (2001:382) this initial interpretation did not last long. From 1995 onwards, Mazlum-Der adopted a more common interpretation of human rights as formulated in the international treaties. It subscribed to a universal understanding of human rights and even defended resolutions of international treaties enforcing the
application of human rights indiscriminately.  
(www.mazlumder.org.tr/tanitim.htm, p4)

This was a fundamentally important turning point in several respects. Firstly it signalled the end of an initial reactionary period and opened the possibility of dialog with other human rights associations both at national and international level, such as the IHD, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. A special commission was established to coordinate the relations with other organisations. By 2003, Mazlum-Der managed to establish direct links not only with over thirty-five international human rights organisations, but also within the United Nation and the European Union. (www.mazlumder.org.tr/tanitim.htm).

Secondly, as a result of this dialog, traditionally conservative Islamic discourse started developing commonalities with the arguments of the newly developed liberal left discourse on issues of nationalism, secularism and religious freedom. This in return reinforced the dialog, which became cooperation on those common issues. For instance, following the 28 February 1998 crack down of the army on Islamic traditions, such as the wearing of the scarf, the IHD joined Mazlum-Der in condemning actions against women wearing scarf, thus advocating freedom of religious practice and opposing the state’s disciplinary measures on the issue. Another left wing civil rights association, SHI (Civil Rights Initiative), supported the right of attending parliamentary sessions wearing a scarf after a female Member of Parliament was expelled from the chamber when she refused to take her scarf off. In another occasion, the IHD and Mazlum-Der joined the ranks to defend the publishing rights of an Armenian newspaper, Agos (IHD Website).

Yuksel Mutlu, the member of the executive committee of the IHD, explains how this process of cooperation has developed:

In its seventeen-year-old history, the IHD has come a long way to reflect the concerns of a diverse spectrum of views. Our initial left leaning agenda has become more
overarching by emphasising the universal characteristics of individual human rights. It is mainly for this reason that nowadays the IHD is capable of dealing with the problems of variety of groups who are traditionally not aligned with the left. What played an important role in this development is that the notion of individual rights has recently become a common theme within the discourses of Islamic groups. When they formulate their problems with reference to individual rights, instead of some Islamic concepts, it has become a lot easier for us to cooperate with them (Mutlu, 2003).

Yet, at the beginning of this cooperation the members of the IHD also went through a learning process, as Mutlu explains:

I would like to stress that this has also been an important experience for us. The debate on the scarf issue particularly has been a challenging one. Initially, a large number of our members did not consider this problem as our problem. They argued that the Islamic human rights association Mazlum-Der was already dealing with it, so there was no need for us to devote our time and energy. They simply could not associate themselves with the problem. There were of course historical facts behind this reaction. In the past the left was never on good terms with Islamic groups. In fact both the left and Islamic groups always considered themselves as being on opposite sides of the political spectrum. Some of our members put it blatantly by saying “when the state was torturing us what they did for us, nothing. So, why now should we support them?” To tell you the truth even I was feeling pretty much the same way. We were simply communists in the eye of any Islamic group. Yet things have changed specifically with the February the 28th ultimatum of the army by which Islamic groups also became a target of the state. In 1998 and 1999 over 30,000 female students wearing a scarf were not allowed admission to the universities. We could not remain neutral to this kind of state oppression. (Mutlu, 2003)

Those examples of cooperation between Mazlum-Der and other human rights organisations were also reflected in the dialog between the left and the Islamic scholars. The issue of individual rights in Islam, with specific reference to constitutional rights, was extensively discussed in different forums, most notably in Abant meetings between secular and Islamic scholars (Gundem, 1998; Bulac, 2001, 1995).

What was important from the point of view of the deliberative framework I argue for was that these interactions between secular and Islamic groups
naturally enhanced the understanding of the other’s position. Traditionally, the left and the Islamic groups are considered as being on opposite sides of the political spectrum. While the left claimed to be representing development and progress, Islamic groups confined themselves to the dynamics of right wing politics. This started with the support of the DP at the beginning of the multiparty regime in 1946, as explained in the ID’s background section. Until the 1980 military coup, the flirtation of Islamic groups with not only right wing, conservative but also with ultra-nationalistic groups such as the MHP was commonplace. Hence historically the left and Islamic groups have been in a rather antagonistic relationship. Yet, the paradigm shift that occurred both in Islamic and leftist ranks created the opportunity to embark upon a process of understanding. The IHD and Mazlum-Der cooperation has been quite exemplary in this sense. This cooperation has later fashioned the establishment of Women’s Platform For Peace, in which a more organic relationship between the members of Islamic, leftist and some other secular groups has been realised.

7.3 Women’s Platform For Peace (WPFP)

Established as an anti-war alliance between different women’s organisations, WPFP has attracted various groups from an unusually wide range of backgrounds. Zeliha Salci, a member of the executive committee of WPFP, explained that when they formed the platform at the beginning of 2001 they were not so sure what kind of support they would get from other organisations. Hence, they were quite surprised when they realised that a large number of women organisations from various backgrounds, including feminists, Kemalists, Kurds, gays and transsexuals, and Muslims, were interested in joining the platform. As Salci (2003) says

This was a new experience for us. Even though in the past we supported each other in different activities this was the first time we got together under the umbrella of the same organisation. I think for all of us it has been a great learning experience even though it has not always run smoothly and we encountered some serious problems between several groups. (Salci, 2003)
While the emergence of some problems, such as the tension between Kemalist and Muslim women, within the platform was not unexpected, other problems, such as the tension between feminists and leftists, surprised the members of the platform. The problem existing between Kemalist and Muslim women was a familiar problem. The Kemalists pursued a tough line in their relation with Muslim women, some times completely ignoring their presence in meetings. In Salci’s words, “They (Kemalists) were very self-righteous and simply refused to communicate with Muslim women” (Salci, 2003). Another problem surfaced between feminists and leftists. According to feminists the culture of left-wing groups was very masculine. Feminists were not very comfortable with Muslim women either, even though the Muslim women were part of an organisation known as Islamic feminists.

These divisions within the platform reflected the divisions existing within the Turkish public sphere at large. The Q study findings confirm that the problem between Kemalist and Muslim women lies in the intolerance of Kemalists when it comes to issues such as wearing the scarf. What is crucial though is that the WPFP has provided a platform to find a way for reconciling those differences. The outcome has not been completely successful, since the reluctance of Kemalists and feminists to develop a dialog with others eventually led to their withdrawal from the platform. Yet the remaining groups have managed to develop a successful cooperation around the aims of the platform. Salci regrets that they were unable to resolve their differences with Kemalists and feminists.

This was in a way the unsuccessful side of our story. Yet, the ones who remained showed a remarkable persistence for establishing a dialog with each other. These were leftists, Muslims, Kurds, gays and transsexuals. However, I must single out Muslim women for their effort to create a common platform with the rest. They tried so hard that they finally convinced everybody of their sincerity. I sometimes question myself about whether we have made a mistake by allowing other groups to treat Muslim women so negatively. But, I suppose in a way this is how things developed. Everybody needed some time to get know the other and establish confidence. Those who could not believe in that left early. Yet, now we act together a lot more comfortably than we did
initially. For instance, just today we submitted a petition to the French Embassy to protest against the recent decision of the French government disallowing female students to wear a scarf in schools. (Salci, 2003)

Salci’s observation is crucial to the point that the members’ experience within the WPFP has been a process of learning and understanding of each other’s position. According to Salci, once the initial concerns and prejudices were eased the groups within the platform were able to function better, thus to make decisions successfully. If this is also correct for the Muslim women who joined in the WPFP, then the experience of the WFPF appears to be a good example of the importance of social learning in deliberation. In order to assess the reaction of Muslim women I interviewed to Hidayet Tuksal of Baskent Kadin Platformu (Capital Women’s Platform- CWP). Apart from her active role in the management of the CWP, Hidayet Tuksal is a renowned Islamic scholar, who is particularly known for her work on the role of women in Islam. Tuksal maintains that the recent discussions on democracy within Islamic groups have helped them to understand democratic principles better. As a result of these discussions, Tuksal tells,

There has been a sharp increase in the number of women participating in the meetings we have organised. This is important because almost in every meeting we discuss issues related to democratic rights of women. Formulating our problems around some democratic rights not only increased our self-understanding but also our perception about other groups that are not Islamic. I consider this interaction very important because it helps us to define things from women’s perspective. The perception of women in the Islamic community is strongly tied to some religious references, which are very difficult to challenge and change. (Tuksal, 2003)

Tuksal indicates that apart from internal discussions, the platform’s cooperation with other women’s organisations has certainly played a crucial role in learning how to get out of a traditional way of looking at things and better understand the nature of the problems that are specific to their gender. Tuksal (2003) asserts that the Muslim women’s experience in the Women’s Platform for Peace constitutes a good example of this learning
experience. Yet, in parallel to what Salci said before, Tuksal also reiterates that it has not been an easy process for Muslim women, since they encountered some stiff resistance, particularly from Kemalist women.

As you know the platform was organised by members of IHD, but later supported by various women’s organisations including Kemalists, feminists, transsexuals and gays. At the beginning there was a sense of not knowing what to do with us. Kemalist women, for instance, simply did not want to listen to what we said. It was very discouraging I must say. We were of course more willing to communicate because we voluntarily joined the group. So we insisted, stayed and in time our interaction with the others affected their perception about us. I think that when they heard about our problems directly from us they understood our position better. I must say that being a woman has always played an important role in this process. We were able to establish an empathy with the groups who were willing to listen to us. (Tuksal, 2003)

Yet, making themselves accepted was only one side of the coin for Muslim women. On the other side was the fact that it took them a while to feel empathy towards some groups. Tuksal indicates that Muslim women’s relation with gay and transsexual groups was a challenge. As indicated before, this issue is a tough issue for Islamic culture and represents one of the major challenges for Muslim community. As Tuksal explains:

From our point of view, gay and lesbian rights are the most intricate issue since Quran explicitly prohibits homosexual relations. So some of us were scared even to shake hands with them, thinking that it would be a sinful act. I personally feel no problem with cooperating with these groups. For me, it is important that we do not limit ourselves by some scriptural reading of religious texts. Yet, it is not easy to convince Muslims of this. So, it took some time to persuade our friends to communicate with these groups. However, when the dialog started things developed a lot easier. We realised for instance that some of these women (gays and transsexuals) had strong religious convictions. They in fact identified themselves as Muslims. For us this was a big step in understanding and establishing empathy with them. Today, I believe, we are a lot more relaxed in working with these groups. Just recently, our group donated some money to support one of their members to attend a conference in Europe. And in general I can say that our relation with friends from the IHD, who were mainly lefties, as well as with gays and transsexuals, has now reached a certain level of maturity. I think we can comfortably say that we now understand each other better (2003).
Muslim women’s story in the WPFP testifies to the vital role that social learning plays in deliberative processes. Tuksal’s reference to empathy here is particularly important since it underlines a critical dimension of deliberation as social learning and understanding. Without establishing empathy it is hardly imaginable for the process of mutual understanding to survive. This might look like a disadvantage compared to negotiation as decision-making processes, which does not demand so much emotional involvement. However, one can claim that without a sufficient level of emotional involvement, decision-making processes are bound to produce low quality decisions, perhaps just enough to save the day. Hence, if democratic culture is conceived as the catalyst of solidarity in any given society, then establishing empathy between parties that are involved in deliberation becomes an essential part of building solidarity. The social learning phase of deliberation offers the natural venue for this vital process. The level of achievement reached in this phase of deliberation will be reflected in the quality of decisions made during the decision-making phase of deliberation.

However, behind the success of this process there is one more parameter, the process of building solidarity through social learning which is governed by a common principle upon which all parties agree. In other words, the coordination of participants’ dialogic action requires a central principle that holds the process together by acting as the backbone of participants’ interaction. As Salci (2003) indicates, in the case of the WPFP, this principle was individual rights and freedom, which provided the main medium for the groups’ cooperation with each other.

What is important for us here is that we no longer classify people on the basis of their cultural, political, religious or ethnic background. Our point of reference is individual rights and freedom. Some left groups are vehemently opposed to this anti-class approach. For Kemalists, it was only good as long as it did not cause the rise of Islamic claims. Yet, we insisted that the idea of individual rights cannot, and should not, be superseded by any cultural, religious or class based idea. It is through our loyalty to this principle that we have managed today to build a new form of cooperation between
groups that have never been considered as part of a left alliance before. What we have achieved in our anti-war platform in a short period of time is almost impossible to realise within the mainstream political parties or institutions.

The WPFP experience sheds light on the future of a democratic polity in Turkey. Firstly it is essential that groups who are traditionally considered as being in opposite camps should be given the opportunity to get together in order to clearly understand their differences or similarities. This, first of all, would provide a new breathing space for different groups to reflect their problems in the public sphere. Then through their interaction, groups would be able to find out how to reconcile their differences as long as they were able to abide by the principle that governs their interaction.

Two things are crucial here. Firstly, the future of the process is dependent on the practice of social learning within those civic organisations like the WPFP. Platforms or alliances like the WPFP are the real domains for this kind of interaction between groups, since they provide the opportunity for practising the social learning and decision-making aspects of deliberation together. They are oriented to a practical task, yet not limited by the restrictions of decision-making practices. They have the capacity to be more inclusive and less time bounded, that is, they do have the flexibility to sort the things out.

More importantly though the process of social learning should be purposefully organised, that is, it has to be acknowledged as a formal part of the process instead of letting it casually drift during participants' interactions. Surely, social learning is present at any stage of deliberation; yet to be able to maximise its benefit and to function in its own right it needs to be allocated its own space and time.
8. FURTHER REFLECTIONS ON THE SOCIAL LEARNING ASPECT OF DELIBERATION AND ISLAM-DEMOCRACY RELATIONSHIP

In the previous section I discussed the importance of the practice of social learning in civic organizations, such as Women’s Platform for Peace and the Human Rights Association. In their daily routines the members of these associations bring together various groups ranging from gay and lesbians to Muslims. Stories of this kind surely are not an uncommon feature of multicultural societies in general. Trapped between strong substantive claims of different groups and a commitment (at least in theory) to universalist principles of a discursively functioning democratic public sphere, these societies exhibit certain impasses in reconciling the conditions of deliberative practice on one hand and providing a meaningful group identity for those who seek recognition on the other hand. The specific requirements of those cultural groups, who represent conflicting views, pose a challenge to the normative framework of deliberative procedures, which hope to universalise specific claims to justice.

In her recent book The Claims of Culture (2002) Benhabib offers an insightful elaboration of the current dilemmas in multicultural societies. Challenging a common approach to multicultural theory, which states that cultural formations are incommensurable, hence dialog and understanding between different cultural identities are not possible, Benhabib maintains that the norms of deliberative practice and the claims of culture are interwoven. She asserts,

“...even groups and individuals with deeply held divergent beliefs are motivated to engage in democratic deliberation because there is some convergence at the level of material interests and shared life-forms”. (2002; 136)
These shared interests in return would stipulate a constructive dialog “articulating a civic point of view and a civic perspective of ‘enlarged mentality’” (2002; 115).

Benhabib’s emphasis on enlarged mentality clearly points to the learning aspect of deliberation. By giving several examples from multicultural societies such as India and France, Benhabib suggests that the learning process, which takes place in the public sphere during civic and electoral practices would ultimately force groups “to clarify the bigger political game at stake in their actions” (2002; 119). She maintains that old cultural values and traditions are in transition because the claims of the modern world will eventually require them to reconsider their core commitments. In the case of Shah Bano, for instance, when Bano contested the existing norms of marriage in a Muslim community in a federal court, her action prompted a lively debate among a wide range of organizations such as women’s groups, government agencies and international development organizations. This debate prompted the Muslim community to reform the Marriage and Divorce Act. The reevaluation of core commitments within the Muslim community, for Benhabib, is not only a natural progression but also an essential step for the continuing existence of a cohesive community. She contends that “traditions, worldviews, and belief systems can only continue as hermeneutically plausible strands of meaning for their members insofar as they can engage in such creative resignification and renegotiation of their own core commitments” (2004; 293, Constellations).

Benhabib’s observations have significant parallels with the findings of this thesis. The paradigm shift in Islamic politics identified in chapter 2 testifies to the argument that no matter how strong traditions are, the pressures of societal modernization ultimately force these traditions to shift their boundaries. Two case studies that support my argument are the AKP and Capital Women’s Platform. The AKP largely substituted Islamic values, which previously influenced their political vision, with the liberal idea of individual rights. This exemplary paradigm shift demonstrates the power of modernization to facilitate and force social change even within the most
traditional groups in the modern Turkish public sphere. In Benhabib’s sense, it is through resignification and renegotiation of their core political values that the AKP today has managed to evolve to become a party embraced by a large section of the electorate.

Critics of the AKP, mainly from the Kemalist secular camp, question the sincerity of this poignant shift in Islamic politics. Kemalists claim that the shift is a strategic move aimed at invading the secular system, which in time will reveal the AKP’s religious aspirations. As discussed in chapter 2, to date this claim has proven to be unfounded. While the AKP currently enjoys an absolute majority in the parliament, enabling them to make constitutional amendments, they have shown no sign of threatening the foundations of the secular system after two years in government. Even if the Kemalist critics are correct in their assumptions of the AKP, the greater significance of the AKP’s move is the fact that it has placed a major focus upon individual rights, indicating a commitment to core democratic values. The more the AKP comes to the defence of these values in the public sphere the greater will be their leverage to broaden democratic aspirations. The hypothesis that the AKP has a hidden agenda and is therefore insincere in its commitment to liberal and democratic values cannot pre-empt the fact that their commitment to these values creates a discourse of its own. This discourse in turn works to broaden the horizon of individuals among different groups leading to an “enlarged mentality” across society. Discourses of this nature in this sense develop a life of their own independent of the motives of participants leading to two important implications.

Firstly, once a discourse becomes the property of the public sphere it grows to be a binding force for those who subscribe to its terms and conditions. This brings the issue of consistency to the fore. Independent of motives, the more the principles of democratic values are publicly proclaimed the more difficult it is to breach those principles without losing face. In the case of the AKP, the legacy they have built through the proclamation of democratic values has created its own discursive base independent of their motives. One can argue that losing face does not have a binding force in politics. Yet,
deceptive motives cannot prevail without leading to a public outcry threatening the legitimacy of the government.

Secondly, the fact that the values of a discursive practice generate a social base is indicative of a social learning process. In the case of the Turkish public sphere, public discursive practices embrace democratic principles more than ever. The findings of the Q study in this thesis reveal a common acceptance by all discourses about the meaning of democratic principles, which show that the liberal turn in Turkish politics is becoming a common theme. Even though the learning process has had varying impacts on divergent groups it contributes to the development of democratic habits. For instance, in the cases of the Kemalist and Nationalist discourses the findings of the Q study of this thesis has identified the potential points of inconsistencies that these discourses have displayed. In their attitudes towards the application of democratic principles, the gap between what they say and what they mean appears to be quite obvious. Yet, when those principles are accepted and practiced as governing principles of civic engagement, either in decision-making processes or as part of an informal deliberation oriented to understanding, they contribute to the development of a basis upon which the habits of democratic deliberation flourish. The process of social learning which takes place in those settings nurtures trends and patterns that creates a framework for the broader acceptance of the democratic ideal, which in turn expands the scope of deliberative activity.

In this sense, the AKP’s liberal paradigm has had a clear impact upon the development of democratic behaviour in Turkey. An example of this occurred in August 2004 when the ultra-nationalist the MHP sent a letter to 313 generals, including the Chief of General Staff General Hilmi Ozkok, calling on them to issue a warning to the government. The MHP accused the AKP of influencing the judiciary in order to secure the release of the Kurdish deputies of the DEP (Democratic Labour Party), noting that Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul had the audacity to meet with “these convicted separatists” (TDN, 03/08/2004).
The unprecedented action of the MHP received a strong reaction from the press and most of the political parties, which unanimously branded the MHP’s letter as a call for a military coup. Among those was the BBP (Buyuk Birlik Partisi- Grand Unity Party), which branched out of the MHP in 1992. The leader Muhsin Yazicioglu and founding members of the BBP were prominent members of the MHP and their differences with the MHP, specifically in relation to democratic principles, have never been substantial. Yet, in his response to the MHP’s letter, the leader Yazicioglu was very critical of the MHP. By distinguishing himself as a democrat he denounced the MHP’s action and stated that there is no room for such actions in democratic traditions.

One can be quite cynical about the sincerity of Yazicioglu’s proclamation of being a democrat and his emphasis on democratic tradition giving his party’s long running commitment to nationalism with strong authoritarian tendencies. This is, in Robert Dahl’s terms (1989), surely a contradiction in terms. Yet, at the least, Yazicioglu’s reaction reflects the culture of the day in which democratic values take precedence in a prevailing fashion. Even to contemplate a worst-case scenario that Yazicioglu was hypocritical, one could assume that as a matter of consistency he would be forced to reconfigure some of his undemocratic habits. In Elster’s sense (1995), this is “the civilizing force of hypocrisy” through which reasons given to the public rather than base motives would prevail in the public sphere. The end product of this process is the expansion of the scope of democratic politics through learning of the core principles governing discursive engagements in the public sphere. As Benhabib succinctly states

“the process of “giving good reasons in public” will not only determine the legitimacy of the norms followed; it will also enhance the civil virtues of democratic citizenship by cultivating the habits of mind of public reasoning and exchange” (2002; 115).

Therefore, the learning process, which takes place in all discursive activities, is constitutive of not only making better decisions but also
establishing a democratic culture in which the habits of self-governance prevail.

This brings us back to the main proposal of this thesis that if the social learning aspect of deliberation plays such a fundamental role, then it should be treated as an analytically distinct category rather than subjugated into the terms of decision-making procedures. As discussed earlier, in divided societies such as Turkey, the need for a formal acknowledgement of deliberation oriented to social learning exhibits a sense of urgency because the process of mutual understanding, rather than the process of decision-making, plays a more significant role in the establishment of democratic principles. The importance of this step lies in the fact that unless social learning is acknowledged in its own right deliberative theory may fail to produce an effective approach in channelling the scattered habits of democratic practice in the public sphere into the broader framework of the governing rules of public engagement. The key here is to distinguish between different rationality requirements for different deliberative settings. Discourses oriented to agreement in decision-making procedures require a level of rationality that discourses oriented to understanding and social learning do not necessarily rely upon. For instance, the Habermasian criteria that in order to achieve consensus all participants should be convinced on the same grounds does not necessarily have the same weight in deliberative procedures oriented to social learning. The purpose of discursive activity determines the kinds of discourses used in deliberative settings. Max Pensky, (2004, Constellations, V11, No2) captures this moment in his comment on Benhabib. By pointing to an ambiguity in deliberative democratic theory, Pensky contends that this ambiguity stems from “an unclarified distinction between two quite different ways of understanding the purpose of discourse” (2004; 264). While discourse as a political practice functions to exchange views and debate, which emphasises “the horizon-expanding aspect of talking”, discourse as a mode of communicative action operates on the basis of deciding what to do, reflecting the characteristics of an institutionalized political speech. Based on this distinction, Pensky concludes,
“If I am correct that public sphere argument cannot reasonably except cultural members to revise their own core commitments, and that fair bargaining is therefore the more reasonable alternative prior to any attempt at consensus, then we would be looking at a two-stage model in which bargaining (on whatever basis of reasonable argument) would be an appropriate mode of problem-solving in cases pitting a minority culture and the majority culture via the institutionalised legislature, while in the open and contested public sphere, discourses could be far more open, free, interesting, and productive—but precisely because they were not expected to actually decide any specific political or legal problem.” (2004; 265)

Pensky’s suggestion of a two-stage model is based on the distinction between formal and informal ways of deliberating, which represents an initial step towards the differentiation of modes of deliberation. Pensky moves in the right direction by pinpointing the fact that discursive activity offers more substance when it does not aim at arriving at a specific decision. Yet, Pensky does not develop his suggestion any further. Remaining unanswered is Pensky’s main question that how, precisely, are these two kinds of discourse to be thought in their relation. Hence, it is not clear whether his two-track model suggestion advocates decoupling social learning moments of deliberation from that of decision-making. My answer to Pensky’s question is to liberate the open, free, interesting and productive discourses of the public sphere from the pressures of institutionalised, decision-making oriented discourses, as discussed throughout this thesis.

Pensky’s critique also discusses the dilemma in Benhabib’s framework that I have highlighted in Chapter 2. Benhabib provides an intuitive deliberative framework that underlines the importance of ongoing contestation and dialog in the public sphere. In “The Claims of Culture” Benhabib extends her analysis to multicultural settings and refines her framework, opening the way for a deeper understanding of the relationship between particular cultural claims and the universally claimed properties of democratic deliberation. In her framework, the hermeneutic function of deliberation oriented to understanding and social learning still appears to be captured
only within the terms of decision-making procedures. For instance, in response to Bohman and Valadez, Benhabib contends

“while recognising the empirical logic of democratic deliberation and will-formation processes, we need not forfeit the regulative principle that the logic of public justification requires impartiality, through which the best interests of all considered as equal moral and political beings are taken into account” (2002; 145).

Benhabib, following Habermas, insists on the discourse principle, which states that the interests of all involved are taken into account. As argued earlier, this principle is viable for decision-making oriented procedures to ensure a fair outcome. Yet, it is hard to sustain that those procedures that are oriented to understanding require the same strong criteria. For a hermeneutically inspired deliberative procedure, it is sufficient enough to rely on the universal pragmatics of speech, which presupposes a rational attitude towards differences among participants. The most important aspect of this rational attitude is that it assumes a symmetrical distribution of chances to raise and to challenge claims by participants. In other words, when participants interact with a communicative intent the presuppositions of speech prevail and regulate their action. Hence, the internal rules implicit in the structure of language are sufficient enough to form a normative basis to regulate deliberative procedures oriented to mutual understanding.

Benhabib insists on the universal application of the strong discourse principle since she does not analytically distinguish between the two different kinds of deliberation and gives prominence to decision-making procedures. As Pensky points out “the various kinds of cultural conflict that Benhabib describes all, in the end, involve moral and legal matters that must be decided, regardless of whether anyone’s horizons are expanded or not” (2004, 265). As a result, the social learning aspect of deliberation still remains largely at the background of her theory, therefore prompting further elaboration about its unique qualities and internal dynamics. Benhabib concludes that
"The critique in question - that a deliberative democracy framework based on discourse ethics contains too many epistemic and affective biases to make it function fairly within intercultural and cross-cultural contexts - is overstated, and that such concerns can be accommodated without forfeiting the essential premises of the model" (2002; 145)

Yet, it does not appear clearly how this can be achieved without addressing the double character of deliberation and consequently redesigning deliberative procedures. It is true that "contentious multicultural dialogues in the public spheres of democracies may result in narrative resignifications and reappropriations of their culture by minority groups" (2004; 292). However this resignification process could only be fully appreciated and utilised if those dialogues are set free from the constraints of decision-making procedures and are placed within their own spheres operating at a distinctively different dimension in terms of their logic as well as their institutional design. In her example about the scarf affair in France, Benhabib argues that the voices of Muslim girls were not properly passed to the French public and asks “would it not have been more plausible to ask these girls to account for their actions and doings at least to their school communities, and to encourage discourses among the youth about what it means to be a Muslim citizen in a laic French republic?” (2002: 118). The obvious answer to this question is surely a yes. Yet, what is really needed requires more than a yes. These kind of discursive activities oriented to hermeneutic understanding could make a better contribution to democratic culture if they become a permanent feature of the public sphere claiming their own institutionally designed sphere distinct from decision-making procedures. Hence redesigning the public sphere to open up a formal place for social learning and understanding oriented deliberative activities appears to be the next challenge for deliberative theory.
Further Reflections on Islam-Democracy Relationship:

As discussed throughout this thesis, I have emphasised the shortcomings of Habermas' theory of democracy in relation to an analytical treatment of social learning and decision-making aspects of deliberation. Yet, Habermas' deliberative framework still plays an important role in laying the foundation for a discursively functioning public sphere. A distinctive feature of Habermas’s theory, that is, its intersubjectivist theoretical framework focusing on what he calls “the subjectless form of communication” can particularly play a crucial role in developing a better environment for dialog for the members of Islamic communities. When this is coupled with some characteristics of decision-making in Islamic tradition, a better than expected outcome of relationship between Islamic and democratic traditions perhaps become possible. In what follows I will briefly touch upon some possibilities, which may offer a better understanding between the two traditions.

Habermas has long argued that under the increasingly pluralistic conditions of modernity it is no longer possible to apply a single ethical standard to a legitimately functioning political order (1990; 1996, 1998-II). He maintains that the complexity of modern societies and their systemic divisions resulted in the formation of a decentered public sphere in which the self-understanding of different groups relies on a different set of value systems (2001). Thus, he asserts that a viable democratic model should step out of monologically structured frameworks, in which legitimacy is imposed either a priori or from the outside rather than to arise from the practices based on reasoned discussion of actual people. Habermas calls this the 'discourse theory of democracy', which as discussed before refers to a discursive environment in which no one should be able to claim a privileged position to determine the outcome. Instead, all participants have the same opportunity to express their views, intentions and attitudes, as well as the same opportunity to accept and/or refuse other’s views. The outcome of this
dialogic practice, for Habermas, would be, at a minimum, to develop a mutual understanding and at its best to reach a consensus.

What is important in this framework is Habermas’ paradigm shift from a subject-based theory to a theory of intersubjectivity where “the subjectless form of communication” becomes the only sovereign, regulating the democratic process with the force of reasoned argument. The sovereign in this intersubjectively structured framework is no longer a concrete subject, such as people for instance in the republican tradition, or some anonymous agencies representing the constitutional rights, but detached from the subjects of these rights as in the case of liberal tradition. In his words:

“Once one gives up the philosophy of subject, one needs neither to concentrate sovereignty concretely in the people nor to banish it in anonymous constitutional structures and powers. The “self” of the self-organising legal community disappears in the subjectless form of communication that regulates the flow of discursive opinion and will formation in such a way that their fallible results enjoy the presumption of being reasonable. This is not to denounce the intuition connected with the idea of popular sovereignty but to interpret it intersubjectively. Popular sovereignty, even if it becomes anonymous, retreats into democratic procedures and the legal implementation of their demanding communicative presuppositions only in order to make itself felt as communicatively generated power.” (1996;301)

With the implementation of the intersubjective paradigm Habermas seems to offer a promising way of resolving the issue of sovereignty in a Muslim mind. As previously mentioned in chapter 2.1, tying sovereignty to a worldly subject has always been a difficult dilemma for Muslims. Unlike Christianity for whom Christ is the Son of God, and as such God himself, in Islam the prophet Muhammad is only representing God’s authority. He is a messenger, one among other believers. This is where Habermas’ intersubjectively designed subjectless framework might be able to offer some comfort. When the deliberative moment, that is, the discursive practices of people, takes over the authority from any subjectively asserted a priori formulations, it will leave the place for a new sovereign, in the form of an equally structured dialog between participants carrying different
convictions on what is good or bad. What this means for a Muslim is that under the guidance of “the subjectless form of communication” the concern of being subdued to an authority other than God might considerably ease. That is why it is vital for the Muslim community in Turkey to support an open dialog between different groups. The impetus of this motivation towards dialog would also stimulate the availability of other Islamic resources to the practice of deliberation.

Islamic concepts of shurah, ijma and ijtihad could thus be successfully incorporated in deliberative practice, since they resonate with the Habermasian framework sketched out. Shurah (consultation), ijma (consensus) and ijtihad (independent interpretive reasoning) are regularly mentioned in the liberal Islamic literature to indicate the democratic potential in Islam. This is not to suggest that these concepts are used in the same way as the Western concepts into which they are translated. In Islam, they do have a rather broad meaning and are mainly used among ulema (Islamic scholars), particularly for the application of Islamic law. However, it is important to acknowledge that they still carry a substance that could be central to the analysis of the relationship between Islam and democracy. If they are utilised within an appropriate context, then directing these concepts towards the establishment of a legitimate order is far from a remote possibility. Shura, for instance, has long been a central tenet of Islamic polity. The Quran commands the Muslims to make decisions after consultation, because they are the agents of God (vicegerents). Thus while they seek perfection in their decisions, they should also be consulted by the ruler as a matter of respect. In this regard, shurah represents a general right for people, potentially playing a central role in any discussion on Islam and democracy. Similarly ijma has been an important concept particularly in the development of Islamic law. Safi maintains that (in Esposito and Voll, 1996; 29) even though it has been mostly used to indicate consensus among ulema (Islamic scholars) rather than among the general community, Islam has the resources to direct ijma towards the establishment of a legitimate order. Safi asserts that since there is no explicit reference to any kind of governing structure in the Quran, the legitimacy of the state primarily
depends on the principle of *ijma* to the extent that a legitimate order should reflect the will of people. Note that Safi’s view is quite similar to Ashgar Khan’s assertion supporting the division of religious and political affairs in Islam, as discussed previously in Chapter 2. Hence, it is possible to predict that if the popular usage of *ijma* becomes a common procedure in Islamic settings, a deliberative framework would be one step closer to a Muslim mind.

Recently, Adanali, a prominent Islamic scholar raised the possibility of integrating Habermas’s framework into the practice of *Kelam* tradition in Islam (2000). *Kelam* refers to rational argumentation mainly used among Islamic intelligentsia to interpret Kuranic verses and to defend Islam against other beliefs. Adanali draws a parallel between *Kelam* as a dialogic process and Habermas’ theory of communicative action and argues that Habermasian framework can very well be utilised within *Kelam* tradition to develop a less orthodox interpretation of Kuran (2000; 69). Adanali does not go any further than making a suggestion, yet in a parallel fashion with the findings of this thesis he still foresees a possibility in converging two different traditions together.

Finally, the absence of an ecclesiastical structure in Islam could also contribute positively to the debate. Since Islam does not recognise any authority between the individual and the God, no one or no institution can claim arbitrary power over *umma* as representative of God’s sovereignty within the political sphere. Indeed, with the *tawhid* principle, for a Muslim, any source of power, either material or spiritual, claiming sovereignty over people is, at least in theory, meaningless. The result of this could very well be a relatively egalitarian societal structure, a fundamental condition for the Habermasian framework. This could be particularly useful in the face of a common critique, which claims that Habermas’ discourse theory is susceptible to the influence of asymmetrical power relationships during deliberation. These features provide some essential ingredients of deliberative democracy. However, turning them into a practically applicable point of convergence between Islam and democracy requires the support of
right settings, that is, a deliberative framework systematically treated as a social learning process.
9. CONCLUSION

It appears that the challenge for democratic theory to create a legitimately functioning social order has reached a new point. Under current conditions, the question of how to deal with fundamental value differences is emerging as the key issue. The idea of deliberative democracy offers a viable answer to this challenge. By tying the legitimacy of a social order to a discursively functioning framework, in which different perspectives and claims are negotiated through a dialogic process, deliberative democrats have surely opened a new chapter in democratic theory. Yet, this chapter itself is already facing a new challenge. As I have argued the theory of deliberative democracy has now reached a point where an investigation into the internal differentiation of deliberative procedures has become essential. This is particularly true of societies who are divided between moral and ethical issues.

In relation to its internal differentiation I have proposed that deliberation should be conceptualised in two different stages: social learning and decision-making. I have shown that treating deliberation mainly as a decision-making procedure is a common trend among deliberative theorists. This does not necessarily mean that they ignore or do not acknowledge the social learning aspect of deliberation. Rather, it means that these theorists conceive and argue deliberation via the terms of decision-making, which quite substantially differ from those of social learning, hence subordinating the social learning phase of deliberation to decision-making.

In order to rectify this ambiguous treatment of social learning I have suggested a framework in which social learning and decision-making aspects of deliberation are analytically distinguished. That is, that the social learning mode of deliberation should formally be allocated its own dominion in the public sphere equipped with its own resources and operated under its own terms. Here I do not envisage a mutually exclusive relationship
between the two. Quite to the contrary, salvaging social learning from the pressures of decision-making would enable its unique resources to flourish freely and enhance the outcome of decision-making procedures. That is why it is important to develop a dialectic unity between the two rather than to create a dichotomy.

In order to show the importance of this step I have examined the conditions of modern Turkey where social, religious and cultural divisions cut deep across society. With the help of the Q study, I have outlined the main contours of different tendencies about one of the most, if not the most important issues in the Turkish public sphere: the relationship between Islam, democracy and secularism. The Q study has shown that there is a considerable degree of desire for dialog and mutual understanding between Islamic and secular groups who have traditionally been quite hostile towards each other. From the Q study it has also emerged that there are points of convergence and divergence between these groups, which provide clues that a framework for mutual understanding is conceivable. The significance of deliberation oriented to social learning appears precisely at this point. It is least likely that these groups will successfully converge on common ground under the auspices of decision-making procedures. This is simply because the priority at this stage is developing an understanding of each other, rather than being focused upon reaching an agreement at the end.

In the case of Women’s Platform For Peace, I have shown that building a mutual understanding between these groups is achievable. In fact, the experiences of women from different backgrounds in the WPFP, as well as the relationship between the leftist IHD and Islamist Mazlum-Der, signify the genesis of a new form of cooperation in the Turkish public sphere. The paradigm shift towards individual rights-based politics amongst the leftist and Islamist groups played a fundamental role in creating the leverage that inspired mutual cooperation. The dialog and cooperation between these groups testify to the fact that a liberal culture, usually conceived as a prerequisite for the success of deliberative practise, could grow out of grassroots movements without necessarily having the support of an
established democratic order at large. Eventually it is quite likely that in time those movements can influence mainstream political culture. In this sense, the liberal paradigm shift that the AKP carried out within Islamic politics is possibly a projection of the shift that occurred within Islamic intelligentsia prior to the establishment of the AKP. Perhaps more interestingly, today the influence of the liberalisation of Islamic politics has surpassed the boundaries of Turkey and reached Europe. The leftist parties and groups in Europe, who themselves have gone through a similar learning curve, are the main supporters of Turkey’s bid to join the European Union under the leadership of the Islamist AKP government. If one day Turkey joins the European Union, perhaps this day should also be remembered annually as the national day for social learning.

Suggestions for Further Research

Further research based on the framework of this thesis could be developed in two main directions. While one direction of research could focus on further analysing the internal dynamics of social learning, another direction could be used to show how the social learning mode of deliberation functions in different settings.

It is important that more information about the dynamics of social learning is gathered in order to show the viability of deliberative procedures oriented to social learning. The claim of this thesis, that is, the social learning mode of deliberation substantially differs from decision-making oriented procedures both in form and content, can be further tested by comparing these two modes of deliberation. One way of conducting such a project could be to analyse the responses of a group to social learning and decision-making procedures separately. Based on the characteristics of these procedures the group could be instructed differently in each procedure. By applying Q methodology at the beginning and at the end of each procedure, hence detecting changes in the attitudes and/or preferences of group members the
internal dynamics of social learning and decision-making would be examined more shrewdly.

A comparative cross-national research project investigating the ways in which the social learning model of deliberation functions in different settings could be a good example for the second line of research. For instance, given that Turkey has now offered a date to start negotiations with the European Union, a very timely project would be to analyse discourses regarding Turkey and Islam in those European countries who display a visible public discontent about Turkey’s unification with the European Union.

Such a research project would

- Provide further insight into the practical aspects of deliberative theory by presenting a cross-national profile of social learning in the relevant countries.
- Reveal the characteristics of these attitudes
- Contribute to the formation of policies aimed at the dissolution of public discontent.
- Offer the opportunity to repeat the same project in order to determine the shift in opinions at such a time when the discussion about Turkey joining the EU gains further momentum.

Examining these changes over time offers a more systematic evaluation of the social learning mode of deliberation when combined with an analysis of deliberative conditions in these countries.
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11. APPENDIX

9.1 Statements and Rankings

Factor 1: Kemalist
Factor 2: Nationalist
Factor 3: Liberal Left
Factor 4: Islamic

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statements</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Today’s oppressive attitudes against Muslims in the name of secularism are rooted in Kemalist ideology.</td>
<td>-5</td>
<td>-5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Kemalism and secularism cannot be separated from each other. Separating them will mean the end of secularism. If you are secular you are also Kemalist, or vica versa.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Secularism is atheism.</td>
<td>-6</td>
<td>-6</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. About one thousand female students have been refused entry to the University of Marmara because they dress themselves according to their religious belief. This shows that there is a serious problem with freedom of belief and education in Turkey.</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. The state does not want people’s consciousness to rise. Nevertheless, may be thanks to the media, people from different backgrounds have started understanding each other better.</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. The problem with Islamic law in relation to democracy is that Islamic communities exert social pressure on individuals. This conflicts with the democratic notion of individual freedom and rights.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. The army is the guarantor of democracy and secularism.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-6</td>
<td>-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Today, the biggest obstacle for democracy in Turkey is not Islam, but the political parties, which offer no solution to corruption.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Islamists are not as tolerant towards atheists as they are towards Islamists.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. The differences between us are too deep. We cannot reconcile them by talking. This system will remain as it is in the future.</td>
<td>-4</td>
<td>-6</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. In some religious cities, during the Ramadan people were beaten if they ate or drank in daytime. How can I be sure that Islamists will not do the same if they come to power? How can I trust them?</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. The debates in media, such as discussion forums on TV channels, are playing an important role in allowing people to understand each other.</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Some remarks made by Islamic leaders contributed to raising the tension between Islamists and Kemalists. An example of this is Mr Erbakan’s remark suggesting that one day the deans’, who do not allow students with scarf to the universities, will be forced to salute those students.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. The universities are important places where secular people and Islamists can close</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
the existing gap between the two groups. When we do not allow female students wearing scarf into the universities we also throw them out of the modern world. By doing this we jeopardise the possibility of living together.

| 15. Islam can accommodate different groups including atheists. | -2 | 0 | -4 | 4 |
| 16. Islam, as a system of law, cannot be compatible with democracy. The role and the place attributed to women by Islamic law, which denies women basic individual rights, is enough to prove this. | 2 | -3 | 1 | -4 |
| 17. The purpose of religion will be defeated when it is carried over to the public arena. Beliefs are personal matters, thus they should be kept within the individual sphere. | 6 | 4 | 3 | -5 |
| 18. Democracy cannot be realised before economic equality is achieved. | 3 | 1 | 2 | -1 |
| 19. People are less corrupt under sharia regime because it induces the fear of God. | -6 | -5 | -5 | -1 |
| 20. If everybody tries to live according to Islamic rule, a just system can come into existence. | -5 | -4 | -5 | 0 |
| 21. Whether the state is secular or not should not be dealt by the Constitution. The state should only act as a guarantor of the freedom of religious practice. There should not be a state institution to organise the religious practice. | -1 | -3 | 3 | -1 |
| 22. The negative image that some extreme Islamic groups have created has been attributed to the whole Islamic community particularly by media. We have to stop this misinterpretation. | -1 | 0 | -1 | 0 |
| 23. One cannot claim to be a real Muslim if one does not interpret Quran in the light of today’s living condition. | 0 | 0 | -3 | -1 |
| 24. The Quran does not praise a particular political system. Islam can fit into any system as long as it is fair. For instance, Islam could fit in a monarchy if the King were fair. | -4 | -3 | -4 | 5 |
| 25. Whether I cover myself with a scarf or not should be no one’s business. This is what I understand from secularism. Everybody should pay respect to different beliefs. | 0 | 4 | 4 | 4 |
| 26. Turkish people tend to be very tolerant towards people who have similar views. The important thing is to be able to show respect to people who hold opposite views. | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 |
| 27. The important thing is to start from somewhere. If people could start showing respect and tolerance to each other this would force the state to do the same. | 2 | 1 | -1 | 1 |
| 28. During the Ottoman rule, a variety of ethnic and religious groups lived together. This diversity only became a problem when it was used for political purposes. When people form a system of government, whatever the name or the form of it, there should not be a big problem as long as they can agree on basic moral values. | -1 | 0 | -2 | 2 |
| 29. I trust that secular people and Muslims will come to an agreement when human values are brought into the agenda | 1 | 2 | 0 | 2 |
| 30. The reason behind the reaction to Kemalists is their antagonistic attitude towards Islamic people. The problem can be solved easily if they tried to understand Muslim people rather than attacking and dehumanising them. | -4 | -2 | -1 | 1 |
| 31. I do not see anything wrong with religious sects. People should be able to get together if they believe in the same thing. Everybody, religious people, atheists etc., should be able to live together in peace within the same nation | -1 | -1 | -2 | 0 |
| 32. Recently, Islamic and secular people have been softening their attitudes. It shows that we can solve our problems better when we try to understand each other. | -1 | 5 | -1 | 1 |
| 33. The military tradition has paralysised the self-reflective ability of our society. That is | 1 | -4 | 4 | 1 |
why we still have been governed by a mentality, which is out of date.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>34. Secularism is the undeniable foundation of religious pluralism and the most important norm for societal peace. We must hold on to it.</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>-3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>35. Today, the meaning attributed to democracy has gone beyond that it is only a system of governing. It is being perceived almost like another religion interfering with people’s private spheres. Democracy is not a way of living. It is a way of governing.</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36. Ataturk (Mustafa Kemal) is a very important personality who could only be respected. However, the Kemalism label, unfortunately, got stuck on him and being unfairly used against Muslims. Kemalism has now become a metaphysical concept with a religious like content. Like democracy, its meaning has been abused and changed.</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37. In Turkey, more than eighty percent of Islamic people have a moderate line. They cannot be a threat for the secular regime.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38. If Turkey has today become more modern than any other Islamic countries, it is mainly because law and education have been laicised by being separated from the influence of religion</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39. Against the claim, our state is not a secular one. Forcing people to declare their religion on their identity cards or having compulsory religion lessons in schools are examples of this</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40. The fear of communism and fundamentalism, has contributed to the inclusion of very undemocratic rules in the penal code against them (142, 141, 163). If they were let develop freely, they would be able to reach new synthesises, thus avoid today’s problems.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41. Quite a few female students, who had to take off their scarf to be admitted to universities, later became quite happy with their new look. May be this rule allowed them to do what they really want.</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42. The solution is mutual understanding. Groups, who oppose each other, should try to understand each other.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43. The lack of education is the main reason why we are having such problems between secular and Islamic people. People do not like reading and investigating. They believe in whatever they hear.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44. I am trying to survive economically to be able to feed my children. The debate between Islam and secularism does not interest me.</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>-4</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45. To claim that Muslims in Turkey are not allowed to practice their religion is a totally unfair statement. If we do not count the scarf problem in public institutions there has been no obstacle for Muslims to practice their religion. Quite the contrary, with the Republic, Turkish Muslims have gained substantial individual rights compared to Muslims living in other Islamic countries.</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46. The secularists in Turkey claim that women who wear the scarf cannot be secular. This is not a democratic attitude.</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47. My wife has been refused to be issued a health card only because she wears a scarf. This is against basic human rights and secularism.</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48. The conflict between secular and Islamic people has been created superficially. The groups who are in control of the state have always created enemies in order to maintain their power. Yesterday it was communism, today fundamentalist Islam.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
49. In a Muslim society, the framework for freedom has to be determined according to Islamic values.

50. We have to produce our own model of democracy. The cultural values of Eastern countries are different from those in the West. Eastern countries should not be governed by an American model of democracy.

51. If the freedom of belief is overemphasised, Muslim people might be affected by the ideas that are dangerous for the secular regime.

52. Respect for individual rights, the fundamental principle of democracy and secularism, exists in Islam.

53. I support our President who defends the supremacy of law. We can only solve our democratic problems by creating a real system of law in our country.

54. The state is not supposed to carry a religious identity. Its task should only be to govern people. It should not question its people on the basis of their religious identities.

55. For a state taking measures to help the practice of religious freedom should not be against secularism. Quite contrary, a secular system requires this.

56. The state should lead the reconciliation process. It should not treat some of its citizen as enemies.

57. We have no other choice to solve our problems, but dialog. However, we have to be careful of the tone of the dialog, which should favour a rational, non-antagonistic style that respects others. That is to say, it should avoid the styles of Mr Erbakan and Mr Ozden.

58. The fundamental condition is respect for others. If we achieve this at the grassroots level, then we can solve the problems created and imposed from above.

59. We have to find out what is common among us rather than focusing on differences. For instance, we have to emphasise the importance of education at the universities instead of arguing about the scarf controversy.

60. In a secular society everybody should abide by the law. If the law bans wearing the scarf in public institutions the rule should be respected.

61. We should trust our people whether they are Kurds, Turks, Laz, Alevi, whether they wear a scarf or not. The more divisions are created in the name of state protection, the more divided we become. This is the real danger.

62. The state must trust its people. We are here for our country and the state. I served in the army and fought against Kurdish separatists in the East. Today, the state considers me as a fundamentalist threat because my wife wears a scarf.

63. If a law breaches a basic individual right it can be disobeyed.

64. The Islamists are only softening their lines because of the strong resistance shown against them by the Army and Kemalists.