The requirements of European international society: Modernity and nationalism in the Ottoman Empire

AYLA GÖL

Canberra, December 2003
Department of International Relations

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Abstract

This paper critically examines the ‘admittance’ of the Ottoman Empire as the first non-European and non-Christian state into European international society, challenges the idea that international society had a universal character, and explores how the Empire encountered and adapted to the requirements of this society. There are two premises to explore. First, the Empire was never accepted as an equal member of the European society of states. Second, the Ottoman Empire’s desire to enter European international society initiated its modernisation, which gradually led to the emergence of Turkish nationalism in the twentieth century. The first part of this paper deals with the ‘otherness’ of the Ottoman Empire within European international society. The second part explains the paradoxical character of Ottoman–European relations, which initiated the Empire’s modernisation. The last part explores the emergence of Turkish nationalism in relation to the policies of Ottoman modernisation that brought the transition from an Islamic empire into a modern secular nation-state. It concludes by questioning whether or not the modern Turkish state is considered a European member of international society.
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INTRODUCTION

The expansion of international society has become one of the dominant themes of the English School within the discipline of international relations (IR). The idea that the ‘West’ was keenly engaged in establishing relations with ‘other’ societies has usually been presented from the perspective of European states by Western scholars. It was indeed an expansion of Western norms, values and institutions to non-European states. However, non-European states experienced this expansion rather differently, in that they had to fulfil certain entry requirements. The Ottoman Empire is a most interesting sociological case study not only to challenge the idea that international society had a universal character but also to test how far this society was able to affect the behaviour of a non-European state.

The first premise of this paper is that the Ottoman Empire was never accepted as an equal member of the European society of states even after it was formally admitted to the Concert of Europe in 1856. Before its admittance, the Ottoman Empire had always been in contact with European states through warfare, trade and diplomacy because of its geographical proximity. The Empire had an ambiguous status within the European state system due to its different socio-political organisation and religion but it never really became a full member of international society. The Ottomans became the first ‘other’ by which Europeans differentiated themselves from those outside of Europe when they were defining a collective European identity.

1 John Vincent Fellow, Department of International Relations, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, The Australian National University. I am grateful to Heather Rae, Paul Keal, Joel Quirk, Shogo Suzuki, Thuy Do, and Michelle Burgis for their helpful comments and assistance.
The second premise of this paper is that the Ottoman Empire’s desire to enter European international society initiated its modernisation, which gradually led to the emergence of Turkish nationalism in the twentieth century. Ottoman–European relations had a paradoxical character, which is a neglected dimension of the expansion of international society. On the one hand, the Empire’s modernising elite did not anticipate that these policies would create the historical conditions for the rise of nationalism which contributed towards the Empire’s end. On the other hand, their initial aim to catch up with European technological development started an irreversible historical process towards the path of European modernity.

In the first part of this paper, I argue that European identity as the basic notion of international society was defined against the Ottoman Empire through much of European history. The second part will explain how domestic reforms and foreign relations were intertwined during the Empire’s participation in international society. The last part will explore how Ottoman–European relations influenced the socio-political structure of the Islamic Empire within which Turkish nationalism and modern nation-state emerged.

THE ‘OTHERNESS’ OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE IN EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY

The concept of international society can be found in the classic writings of Hedley Bull, Martin Wight, Adam Watson and John Vincent, all well-known representatives of the English School. These scholars characterised a society of states that originated in Europe as based on common norms, values and institutions. Their discussions not only contributed to the development of the English School within IR theory but also introduced a particular approach to understanding the expansion of European international society to non-European states. This article does not deal with the

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3 Following the analysis of the English School scholars, the concepts of Europe and the West are used interchangeably in this paper.
debate among IR scholars about whether the concept of international society is a socio-political fact or an academic myth.\(^4\) Although I accept the existence of international society as presented by the English School I attempt to tell a non-European part of the story from an Islamic society’s perspective. Theoretically, as Paul Keal argues, the inclusion of non-Christian and non-European states is ‘a vital but often neglected part of the story of international society’.\(^5\) The examination of how the Ottoman Empire’s status changed from being Europe’s other by the fifteenth century to a non-European member of international society in the mid-nineteenth century helps us not only to complete at least one neglected part of this story, but also to challenge the claim about this society’s universal character. According to many English School scholars, the Ottoman Empire was the first non-European state to be admitted to international society.\(^6\) Its ‘admission’ was followed by two other non-Christian and non-Western civilisations, Japan and China in the mid-nineteenth century, which arguably gave European international society a universal character. This understanding creates a dilemma since the universal or multi-civilisational character of international society contradicts the idea of its Western origin.\(^7\) The ‘admission’ of these non-European states in accordance with the requirements of international society can hardly be interpreted as evidence of its universal character. As the case of the Ottoman Empire exhibits, the conditions to become a member of this society were not compatible with the non-European norms, values and institutions of an Islamic state, which had to undergo a transformation of its political, social and economic institutions. The adjustment of the Empire’s normative and civilisational differences in


\(^5\) Ibid., p. 64.

\(^6\) The first important work examining the Ottoman Empire’s relations with European states within the English School approach is Thomas Naff, ‘The Ottoman Empire and the European states system’, in Bull and Watson, eds, \textit{The expansion of international society}. However, it was Iver Neumann and Jennifer Welsh’s article that introduced a new research agenda for the scholars of international society by regarding the Ottoman Empire as the other in the definition of European identity. See Iver B. Neumann and Jennifer M. Welsh, ‘The other in European self-definition: An addendum to the literature on international society’, \textit{Review of International Studies} 17(4) 1991, pp. 327–48.

accordance with Western rules imply that European international society was not actually universal.

One can argue that between the fifteenth and twentieth centuries, the Ottoman Empire was, in realpolitik terms, a significant European power, controlling between one-quarter and one-third of the continent at its zenith.\(^8\) ‘The paradox is that it was not. Even though a significant portion of the Empire was based in Europe, it cannot be said to have been of Europe.’\(^9\) According to Carsten Holbraad, the Ottoman Empire was never really part of international society since it was ‘geographically marginal, culturally alien and historically hostile’.\(^10\) The Ottoman Empire had a different socio-political organisation—its millet (nation) system—and a different religion to European states.\(^11\) For the West, the Ottoman Empire was an ‘other’, a non-Western alien society, which had different principles of existence and values from those of Europe.\(^12\) Although the Ottoman Empire was never accepted as a Western great power it had to be taken into account by all major European states as long as it was materially powerful. This caused the dilemma of being part of a European international system but not being a member of European international society.\(^13\) It was in the late fifteenth

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\(^9\) Naff, ‘The Ottoman Empire and the European states system’, p. 143.


\(^11\) The millet system was characterised by religious and cultural autonomy of different groups rather than ethnic communities or language. Thus, the separation was between Muslims (Turks, Kurds, Lazs, Alevi), Christians (Armenians, Greeks), and Jews in the Empire. The number of millets changed throughout the Ottoman history. New millets were created as a consequence of pressure from the Western great powers. For instance, while there were nine recognised millets, of which six were fairly large in 1875, there were seventeen in 1914. Kemal K. Karpat, *An inquiry into the social foundation of nationalism in the Ottoman states: From social estates to classes, from millets to nation* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), pp. 88–98.

\(^12\) The conceptual pair of ‘self’/‘other’ allows a simple dichotomy between ‘us’ and ‘them’ to emerge during the process of collective identity formation. Iver B. Neumann, ‘Self and other in international relations’, *European Journal of International Relations* 2(2) 1996, pp. 139–74, at p. 141.

\(^13\) This differentiation is based on Hedley Bull’s classification of system and society in IR literature. According to Bull, ‘[a] system of states (or international system) is formed when two or more states have sufficient contact between them, and have sufficient impact on one another’s decisions, to cause them to behave—at least in some measure—as parts of a whole’. Bull, *Anarchical society*, p. 9. Furthermore, in his analysis, the definition of international society refers to a society of sovereign states. ‘A society of states (or international society) exists when a group of states,
century that the Empire began to be involved in Europe’s affairs, when it was drawn into alliances with Western powers in order to help the Italian city-states against their enemies. The Ottoman Empire was the only state which did not ‘know its place’ in the hierarchy of European powers until the mid-nineteenth century. Although it had extensive possessions in the Balkans and the Treaty of Paris of 1856 formally admitted it to the Concert of Europe, it was never identified as a European state. Being a formal part of the European system in 1856 did not mean that its sense of self-identity was defined as European. Until that time, major historical events such as the Crusades, the fall of Constantinople and the sieges of Vienna were emphasised to create the collective memory of Europeans, and to some extent still exist in their contemporary memories.

The capture of Constantinople (İstanbul) by the Muslim Ottomans in 1453 created a real threat to European security and Christian collective identity. Throughout the history of Ottoman–European relations, the fall of Constantinople and later the Ottoman sieges of Vienna in 1529 and 1683 became symbolic historical events that played important roles in shaping a collective memory and identity among European states. Thus, the Ottomans were the first non-Europeans to counter an ‘us’ and ‘them’ dichotomy while creating a European collective identity that is one of the basic notions of international society. When Constantinople fell, Ottoman historians considered this event as the beginning of a ‘new era’ (Yeni Çağ) in their history, signalling their military superiority. European rulers and observers, on the contrary, did not credit the role of the well-organised and disciplined army of Sultan Mehmet II but used the image of ‘dangerous Ottoman-Turk’ at the

conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions.’ He then argues that the members of an international society are bound by certain common interests, common values and certain rules. ‘At the same time they co-operate in the working of institutions such as the forms of procedures of international law, the machinery of diplomacy and general international organisation, and the customs conventions of war.’ Bull, Anarchical society, p. 13.

14 Naff, ‘The Ottoman Empire and the European states system’, p. 145.
doorstep of Europe to defend the Christian faith and define its identity.\textsuperscript{17} Although the political identity of Western Europe was based on the concept of ‘Christendom’ rather than ‘Europe’, these terms slowly became interchangeable as a result of the Islamic Ottoman threat. After the fall of Constantinople, the statement of Pope Pius III in identifying Europe with Christendom in 1458 had not only a symbolic meaning but also played an important role in the construction of a European collective identity.\textsuperscript{18} The fact that the Christian communities and churches of Asia Minor—Anatolia (Anadolu)—were no longer under Christendom but infidel Ottoman rule which was not ‘European’ became another determining factor in ‘othering’ the Ottomans.\textsuperscript{19}

Most analyses of the Ottoman Empire’s identity and status in international society are generally presented from the perspective of both Western states’ interests and Western scholars. Such works usually regard the relationship between the European states and the Ottoman Empire as the longest and most equal of all European relations with non-European states. As Wight pointed out, ‘the politics of the defence of Europe against the [Ottoman] Turks were religious politics ... The rulers of the West regarded the [Ottoman] Turks with fear and disgust as a barbarian intruder, and revived the idea of a crusade to deliver the Balkans and the Near East from the infidel’.\textsuperscript{20} His emphasis was more on religious politics than identity politics. The idea that European identity developed in relation to the existence of the Ottoman Empire as the dangerous ‘other’ has been put on the research agenda of international society scholars recently. From a different perspective, Edward Said also emphasised that Islam was a source of European fear, within which the Ottoman Empire represented a ‘constant danger’ for the whole of Christian civilisation until the end of the seventeenth

\textsuperscript{17} Iver B. Neumann, \textit{Uses of the other: ‘The East’ in European identity formation} (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), p. 45.
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid., p. 326.
century. Thus, the role of the Ottomans as the other in defining European collective identity is the first neglected dimension of the conventional English School approach.

From the Western point of view, the Ottoman Empire was not regarded as a European state. But there is another side of the coin as well: it was not necessary for the Ottomans to be part of the society of European states at the zenith of its imperial power since Ottoman civilisation was seen as superior to that of the Europeans. From the Ottoman point of view, the West was also the ‘other’ (*kafir* – infidel) in terms of its different socio-political structure and religion. The Ottoman Sultan was accepted as the head of the Muslims, the Caliph, the successor of the prophet Mohammed. As a consequence of this belief, ‘Ottomanisation’ also signified ‘Islamisation’ and its self-identity was that of the ‘protector’ of the Muslim world against the ‘infidel’ Christian world. Arguably, the Ottoman Sultans considered themselves superior to their Western counterparts and chose to exclude the Empire from the European society of states. Although the Ottoman Empire accepted Western ambassadors to Istanbul at certain times for limited periods, Ottoman ambassadors were not sent to European states until the eighteenth century, demonstrating that they did not understand such exchanges to be reciprocal. However, the Sultans had to change their perceptions of the West in order to survive with the help of European allies when the Empire started declining in the mid-seventeenth century.

When the Ottoman Empire was drawn into the politics of European states and reluctantly decided to be a member of international society in the mid-nineteenth century, it was not easy for either the European states or the Ottoman Empire to define the Empire’s identity and place within this society. In fact, the first sign of the Ottoman Empire’s involvement in European affairs was in 1536 when Francis I of France allied himself with the Ottoman Sultan before launching an attack on Italy. However, this involvement was short-lived. A more radical shift in European politics

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21 Said, *Orientalism*, p. 59. Said explains how the ‘orient’ played an important role as the other in defining Europe on a very large historical and geographical scale. During this process, the difference between ‘East’ and ‘West’ based on cultural domination and social power created a new discourse of ‘Orientalism’.

occurred in the seventeenth century. The emergence of the Westphalian political order in Europe in 1648 and the defeat of Ottoman forces in the Vienna siege of 1683 decreased the role of the perceived Islamic threat to European identity and security. The first defeat of the Ottomans by the victorious Christian powers, the Holy League, at Carlowitz in 1699 was a turning point in Ottoman–European relations: while Europeans gained self-confidence about their military superiority, they also decided to invite ‘the dangerous Ottoman-Turk’, for the first time, to participate in a European congress. The subsequent Treaty of Utrecht in 1714 became the last treaty to refer to the notion of *respublica Christiana* in European collective identity as the medieval idea of ‘Christendom’ subsequently lost its power in political thought.

As European politics became increasingly secularised throughout the eighteenth century, Britain and France established close relations with the Ottoman Empire as an integral part of their political and economic interests. The Ottoman defeat by the Russians in the war of 1768–74 led the Ottomans to recognise that they needed European allies to protect the integrity of the Empire. Although the Ottoman rulers decided to develop close relations with the ‘infidel’ European states, this was not an easy task. They had to fulfil ‘the standard of civilisation’, which was proclaimed as the criteria of membership of international society by the European great powers. The notions of legitimacy, international law and mutual recognition played an important role in determining which state would be included or excluded within the ‘civilised’ international society.

The 1853 Crimean War between the Russians and the Ottomans concluded with the Treaty of Paris in 1856 and had a distinctive meaning for Ottoman history. On the one hand, it emphasised the continual disintegration and decline of the Empire; on the other, the Empire was

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23 Neumann, *Uses of the other*, p. 51.
admitted as a power into the European society of states. As Karl Polanyi argues, its ‘admission’ was granted when the integrity of the Ottoman Empire was declared essential to the equilibrium of Europe in 1856. The Concert of Europe subsequently tried to maintain the integrity of the Empire. After 1878, its dismemberment would also be provided in a similarly orderly manner when its disintegration was deemed essential to that equilibrium. It was after the Treaty of Paris that the Ottoman government—Bab-ı Ali (Sublime Porte)—recognised that it had to develop close economic, political and ideological relations with the European states in order to preserve the Empire’s existence in the international system. After 1856, the Sublime Porte accepted the three main requirements of European international society in order to protect the independence of the Ottoman state. In fact, it was a matter of survival as well as a desire to become an equal member of the society of European states.

First, the Treaty of Paris forced the Sublime Porte to repudiate the Islamic character of the state. By doing so, the Empire started acting more like a secular dynastic state on the European model of the state system. The repudiation of the Empire’s Islamic character was interpreted by the Sublime Porte as accepting all the subjects of the Empire, of whatever religion, as equal, and ensuring that it should be so regarded by other actors in domestic politics.

Second, in relation to the first requirement, the Sublime Porte had to accept modern arguments on the principle of nationality, or of national self-determination. This created a paradox in Ottoman politics since the acceptance of these principles threatened the Empire’s integrity by leading to the disintegration of the millet system. More remarkably, statesmen started using modern secular arguments about the legitimacy of the existing Ottoman regime. This necessitated using the European notion of public law,

27 İlber Ortaylı, İmparatorlukun en uzun Yüzyılı [The longest century of the Ottoman Empire] (İstanbul: Hil Yayıncılık, 1987), p. 90.
because that law tended to support the status quo which the Sublime Porte wanted to preserve.

Third, if the Empire wanted to be part of the European society of states on equal terms, it had to observe European international law. The Islahat Fermanı (Reform Decree) of 1856 was a reflection of these requirements in domestic politics. The document emphasised full equality for all subjects.³⁰ ‘Surely, the Ottomans did not offer equal rights to their subjects—a meaningless anachronism in the context of that time and place. They did however offer a degree of tolerance without precedent or parallel in Christian Europe.’³¹ In fact, the Sublime Porte, during the reign of Sultan Abdulmecid (1839–61), accepted these requirements in order to become an equal member of the European society of states and to protect the independence of the state. Paradoxically, these attempts brought about the demise of the Ottoman Empire.

The second neglected dimension of the expansion of international society is, therefore, to explain how the Empire’s socialisation into this society affected not only its foreign relations but also its domestic politics. The following section will explore four phases of Ottoman history, which will show how close relations with European states initiated the modernisation of the Empire both before and after 1856: the era of military reform, the Tanzimat (political reforms) period, the movement of the Young Ottomans, and the revolution of the Young Turks. Between the eighteenth century and the end of the First World War, the history of the Ottoman Empire was shaped by the policies of modernisation in accordance with the main purpose of preserving the Empire’s integrity. During these periods, the character of the state had gone through a transformation from theocracy and absolutism to a secular and constitutional republic in order to become a recognised member of European international society. The next section, therefore, aims to explain how the Empire’s relations with European states


initiated the policies of Ottoman modernisation that paradoxically contributed towards its disintegration.

THE PARADOXICAL CHARACTER OF OTTOMAN–EUROPEAN RELATIONS AND MODERNISATION

Before developing close diplomatic relations in the nineteenth century which would eventually initiate the Ottoman Empire’s modernisation, interaction between the Empire and European states mainly occurred through warfare. After their major defeat at Carlowitz in 1699 the Ottomans had to learn new concepts and new ways of dealing with European states.32 Most historians agree that the primary weakness of the Ottoman state was its ‘inability to adapt to the military technology of Europe’.33 Consequently, either the viability of the Ottoman system had to be questioned or the superiority of European military technology had to be recognised.34 As Bernard Lewis argues, the question was not only ‘what were the Ottomans doing wrong?’ but also ‘what were the Europeans doing right?’ More importantly, the essential question was ‘how do we catch up with them, and resume our rightful primacy?’ These questions led to the acceptance of a shocking idea to Muslims; that they might learn from the previously despised ‘inferior infidel’. The Ottoman Sultans Selim III (1789–1807) and Mahmud II, the Reformer (1808–39) were the first to acknowledge this.35

Military reform

The need for modernisation of the Ottoman Empire was initially intended to be limited to military technology only. Military reform with the primary purpose of strengthening state power gradually required the import of other ‘infidel’ technological developments. During the reign of Sultan Selim III, the reforms of the Nizami Cedit (New Order) period dictated that a new army be set up and new military schools were opened.

32 Ibid., pp. 17–18.
34 Şerif Mardin, *Türk modernleşmesi* [Turkish modernisation] (İstanbul: İletişim, 1991), p. 12.
Nevertheless, it was clear that the limited military and technological reforms were not enough to prevent the decline of the Empire. The *Nizami Cedit* reforms extended to non-technical areas by recognising the general superiority of the West. On the one hand, Selim III recognised the importance of being part of European diplomacy and decided to establish permanent embassies in major European capitals in 1793. On the other hand, the Sultan aimed at limiting the influence of the *ulema* (Muslim clergy), which became the principal authority of Islamic life and institutions in the Ottoman state and society as the Empire declined. However, the need to modernise all Ottoman institutions and concepts was only recognised by a small number of enlightened army officers and bureaucrats. It was not surprising that the *ulema* opposed the New Order and modernisation attempts. In order to obstruct progressive reforms, the *ulema* used its influence to cooperate with the janissary (*yeniçeri*) army. Hence, the role of religion and the military became pivotal issues in determining both Ottoman/Turkish modernisation and Ottoman/Turkish relations with European states. In particular, the Islamic character of the Empire became the major obstacle in establishing relations with Europe.

Sultan Mahmud II was the first reformist monarch in Ottoman history. The Sultan was tactical enough to gain the support of the *ulema* when he planned a complete reform of the army. This cooperation between the Sultan and religious groups lasted only a short while, until the janissary army was abolished in 1826. Mahmud II’s first achievement was to set up a new army and train army officers according to European models. The second achievement was the more drastic step of depriving the *ulema* of power, preventing them from obstructing modernisation. These reforms, however, only reduced the influence of religion, but did not eliminate Islam from Ottoman society. The modernist army officers and bureaucrats always had a clash of interests with religious groups that highlighted the struggle between the traditional and the modern in Ottoman/Turkish history.

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36 Neumann, *Uses of the other*, p. 53.
38 Ibid., p. 7.
In fact, Mahmud II’s reforms signalled the beginning of the decay of a multinational Empire. While the Sultan managed to control the power of the *ulema*, he did not anticipate the rise of nationalism among his subjects. His aim of decreasing the role of religion in Ottoman society started a new process of change that undermined the structure of the Empire’s religion-based *millet* system, which was functional for several centuries. It was not a surprise that national sentiments gradually moved into the vacuum created by the weakened role of religion in Ottoman socio-political life.

In general, the nineteenth century can be characterised as a century of national unification and the non-Muslim subjects of the Ottoman Empire were the first to explore the meaning of nationalist ideology. The Serbs were the first collective group to launch a national rising against the Ottomans in February 1804. ‘In 1815, a second Serb rising was more successful and won them recognition as an autonomous principality under Ottoman suzerainty. The Greek uprising a few years later evoked widespread European support and achieved a sovereign independent Greek kingdom.’

In the end, Sultan Mahmud II had to accept the independence of Greece, and an autonomous Serbia and Egypt. These movements were the first signals of the emergence of nationalism within the Empire. The impact of nationalism on the Empire’s *millet* system gained a new momentum by the proclamation of the *Tanzimat* era.

*Tanzimat* period

The period from 1839 to 1876 is known in Turkish historiography as the era of the *Tanzimat*, which modernised the Ottoman state and society through diplomatic means. The *Gülhane Hatt-ı Hümâyunu* (Imperial Degree of the Rose-Chamber), which opened a new era of the *Tanzimat* in Ottoman history, was declared in 1839. It was a declaration of certain

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39 Although the Ottoman Empire is described as multinational, the usage of nation (*millet*) here is totally different from the modern usage.

40 Lewis, *What went wrong?*, p. 34.

41 Matran, ed., *Osmanlı imparatorluğu tarihi*, p. 27.

rights and political reforms, which introduced a new meaning to Ottoman citizenship.

It was a statement of intent on the part of the Ottoman government, promising in effect four basic reforms:

- The establishment of guarantees for the life, honour and property of the sultan’s subjects;
- An orderly system of taxation to replace the system of tax-farming;
- A system of conscription for the army; and
- Equality before the law of all subjects, whatever their religion (although this was formulated somewhat ambiguously in the document).\(^43\)

The Tanzimat leaders aimed to reform important institutions of Ottoman society at administrative, judicial, financial and educational levels as well as the military. They left traditional Islamic institutions such as religious schools and courts out of these reforms. Specifically, the continuous theocratic nature of the state created a serious obstacle in the development of Ottoman–European relations.

The third neglected dimension of the international society approach is the expansion of foreign trade to non-European markets. It is not an historical coincidence that the Tanzimat reforms in domestic politics and the system of taxation were promised by the Ottoman state after the British became the major trading partner with the Anglo-Turkish Convention of 1838.\(^44\) The English School approach here largely overlooks the fact that political and economic changes within the European state system during the nineteenth century triggered the political and economic restructuring of the Ottoman Empire. The fruits of these changes were seen in the Ottoman Empire through the interaction between the Ottoman and European states, particularly in trade and diplomacy. Therefore, the signature of the Treaty of Paris

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in 1856 was also related to this economic dimension and should not only be interpreted in political terms as the formal admittance of the Ottoman Empire into international society. Obviously, when the Ottoman ruling elite decided to sign the Treaty they could not anticipate its long-term consequences. After this date, the Ottoman interaction with industrialised, capitalist and expansionist Europe through trade and diplomacy would sound the death-knell of its greatness as an Islamic empire.\footnote{Braudel, \textit{Civilisation and capitalism}, p. 483.} As discussed earlier, when the Ottoman rulers accepted the requirements of European international society with the Treaty of Paris they had to first repudiate its Islamic character, something that would not be easily accepted by certain groups of Ottoman society. For the first time in both Ottoman and Western societies, the compatibility of Islam with Western values was questioned. This compatibility is still a key issue in contemporary relations between Western and Islamic states.

\textbf{The Young Ottomans}

The Young Ottomans movement (1865–76) emerged as being specifically opposed to the era of the \textit{Tanzimat}. According to Elie Kedourie this opposition was an outcome of the political reformation itself:\footnote{Kedourie, \textit{Politics in the Middle East}, p. 50.} ‘They were the first organised opposition group from the Ottoman intelligentsia to use the ideas of the Enlightenment and attempt to [try] modernisation with Islam. They were also the first Ottoman group to use the media as a means of spreading their ideology.’\footnote{Hugh Poulton, \textit{Top hat, grey wolf and crescent: Turkish nationalism and the Turkish republic} (London: Hurst & Company, 1997), p. 55. See also Serif Mardin, \textit{The genesis of young Ottoman thought: A study in the modernization of Turkish political ideas} (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962).} The Young Ottomans’ criticism focused on both the pioneers of the \textit{Tanzimat} movement and the ideology of Westernisation itself. The Young Ottomans believed that the \textit{Tanzimat} movement did not have a solid ideological or ethical basis; instead the means to modernise the state could be found in Islam. For the first time they emphasised the importance of mobilising the ‘Ottomans’ as a conscious group.\footnote{Mardin, \textit{Türk modernleşmesi}, p. 89.} Although the Young Ottomans did not operate within a
modern understanding of nation and nationalism, they initiated the first discussions on this phenomenon, with significant consequences for the process of nation-building in modern Turkey. For the first time in Ottoman history the concept of *vatan* (homeland) as a territorially defined unit was used. If one considers that the new loyalty to the state in non-European societies, especially in the Middle East, appeared in the form of ‘patriotism’, not ‘nationalism’, the importance of *vatan* becomes clear.\(^49\) They not only suggested that it was possible to save the Empire by delinking it from the West, but also questioned the extensive authority of the Sultan. Finally, they had an important impact on another group, the Young Turks, who were the forefathers of Turkish state-building.

The requirements of European international society and the penetration of Western-style concepts and ideas continued to influence Ottoman politics even throughout the authoritarian Abdulhamid II regime (1876–1909). Although ‘Islamism’ was seen as a potential solution to save the Empire during the last period of the Young Ottomans (1870–76) it became the main ideology of absolutist Abdulhamid II rule. In particular, a shift in policy away from the *Tanzimat* ideas occurred when Sultan Abdulhamid II used the policy of pan-Islamism that favoured Islam at the expense of the Empire’s other religious communities to unite the Empire against external and internal threats.\(^50\) Despite the fact that Abdulhamid II was an authoritarian monarch he ordered the establishment of a commission to draft a constitution. The *Kanun-i Esasi* (first Ottoman constitution) was proclaimed on 23 December 1876. This first constitution was not really a Western-style constitution but ‘provided for separation of powers much more in form than fact, and the institutional changes reflected evolution rather than a radical departure from past experience’.\(^51\) However, *Kanun-i Esasi* was effective only for one year between 1877 and 1878 during the first Ottoman Parliament. When Abdulhamid II dissolved parliament and suspended the Ottoman constitution in 1878 his rationale was that the


\(^{51}\) Shaw and Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire*, p. 175.
Ottoman subjects did not have any idea of, and experience with, the practices of constitutional government. When the Empire entered the era of Abdulhamid II’s despotism, the short-lived experience of constitutional government along the lines of the European model left marks in the minds of modernist elites.\textsuperscript{52}

In addition to this short-lived constitutional experience, the ideology of nationalism had its own development during the Young Ottomans. Education and language were the two important instruments of nationalist ideology. The reformation of the state schooling system, which commenced during the Tanzimat era, and that of language by the compulsory use of demotic Turkish aimed to make the Muslim-subjects of the Empire more homogeneous. The impact of Western ideas such as the use of the printing press also brought new definitions of identity. The heterogeneous populations of the Empire were no longer united by the Ottoman socio-political identity. In the age of nationalism, a cultural and linguistic definition of identity within diverse collective groups brought about the end of the millet system.

The Turks were the last group in the Empire to realise this new process at the beginning of the twentieth century. When the press began to discuss the concept of being a ‘Turk’ and having Anatolia as the central part of a homeland, the basic features for the construction of a modern nation were invoked: language, education, press, public opinion, and homeland. Moreover, the growth of Armenian and Greek nationalism as non-Muslim subjects of the Empire became a catalyst for the raising of Turkish consciousness in Anatolia. The notion of being a Turk was seen as compatible with the concepts of Ottomanism and Islamism. Interestingly, Abdulhamid identified himself as a Turk, even if this view was connected with his use of pan-Islam. However, this identification did not stop the Young Turks overthrowing his absolutist regime.\textsuperscript{53}

\textsuperscript{52} Kili, ‘Turkey’, p. 10.

\textsuperscript{53} Poulton, \textit{Top hat, grey wolf and crescent}, pp. 61–3.
The Young Turks

In 1908, a small number of modernist army officers, bureaucrats and intellectuals in Salonika (modern Thessalonica), rebelled and declared themselves the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), the Young Turks, representatives of enlightenment and revolution. They aimed not only to end the absolutism of Abdulhamid II but also to restore the 1876 Constitution and radical reforms to save the Ottoman Empire. The Young Turk movement, like that of Young Italy and Young Egypt, was a sign of the breakdown in the transmission of political habits from one generation to the next. According to Anthony Smith, the use of the word ‘young’ was not a coincidence.\(^{54}\) However, even the usage of ‘young’ had different implications for the Young Ottomans and the Young Turks. While the Young Ottomans called themselves \textit{Yeni Osmanl\ılar} (literally means the new Ottomans) the Young Turks called themselves \textit{Jöntürkler} (literally means the young Turks) that implied their French inspiration.\(^{55}\) Simply, the Young Turks were opposed to their own ancestors, the Ottomans, and preferred to look towards Europe.

The Young Turks aimed to homogenise the Muslim subjects of the Empire through changing the \textit{millet} system and having a Western representative-type constitution.\(^{56}\) They emphasised the meaning of ‘Turkism’ instead of the previous policies of pan-Ottomanism and pan-Islamism. However, the concept of ‘Turk’ in their usage did not have any connotation with the notion of a modern nation. The Young Turk movement did not rely on any single element of Turkism but on an amalgamation of different elements which can be encapsulated in a quotation from the Turkish poet, Mehmet Emin (Yurdakul): ‘I am a Turk, my religion and my race are noble’.\(^{57}\) Clearly, the first element to differentiate between Muslims and non-Muslims within the Empire was religion. The definition of ‘race’ had different connotations. For many Young Turks the idea of ‘\textit{Turan}’ in


\(^{55}\) Lewis, \textit{What went wrong?}, p. 58.


defining the Turkish ‘race’ became a valid inspiration before the First World War. The Turkish sociologist Ziya Gökalp used the concept of *Turan*. Although *Turan* was originally a Persian word that described the mythical enemy of the Persians and the united homeland of the Turkic people it was used by the Young Turks to develop the ideology of pan-Turanism. The idea of pan-Turanism was a desperate solution to ‘unite the Ottomans, the Azerbaijan Turks, the Crimean Turks, the Uzbek, the Kipchaks, the Kirghiz, and all the other sundered fragments of Turkism into one Turanian nation’. How could they unite with the Turkic peoples of the Russian Empire while the Ottoman Empire itself was in the process of dissolution? This idea could not go beyond being a utopia. Gökalp shifted the focus from Turan to the notion of a modern nation and became the main ideologue of Turkish nationalism. The new alternative of a Turkish national consciousness as opposed to the Ottoman *ümmet* (*umma* – religious community) consciousness of the *millet* system became widespread after the Young Turk revolution of 1908.

The revolution of 1908 accelerated the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. The revolutionaries started a new era with a liberal constitution and parliamentary system, which were the main institutional characteristics of European states. However, their most difficult task was to explain what the notions of ‘constitution’, ‘liberty’, and ‘equality’ meant to the uneducated peasants of Anatolia. They had a restricted sense of revolution that did not

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aim to reform the socio-economic structure of the Empire. However, its effects would be felt in the long term: Turkish nationalism had developed as an unintended consequence of the modernisation of the Ottoman state. While the Ottoman modernist elite decided to reform the Empire, their initial aim was to preserve the Empire’s integrity, not to promote the separatist tendencies of different nationalists, including Turks. The need to take the Empire to the nationalist path could not come about within the existing social order. Although the European concepts of equality, sovereignty and legitimacy were still alien to the Ottoman state, its subjects came into contact with these ideas as a consequence of the Empire’s relations with European states. While the non-Muslim subjects of the Empire were introduced to the ideology of nationalism in the nineteenth century, its Muslim subjects, Turks, Kurds and Arabs, had to wait until the beginning of the twentieth century. As Said reminds us, the ‘Oriental claims for political independence’ were encouraged by the Western Allied powers during the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire.\(^{63}\) Ironically, the Empire’s participation in European international society in order to protect its independence and integrity paved the way for its own destruction at the end of the First World War.

In conjunction with this paradoxical character of Ottoman–European relations, the domestic conditions for the rise of Turkish nationalism were set up through the policies of modernisation. The Young Turk regime’s commitment to modernisation, in fact, meant an implementation of the reform process from above, which served to strengthen the administrative power of the state in an authoritarian way. The most influential aspects of the socio-political reforms can be summarised as follows: the acceptance of the freedom of the press, which emphasised the existence of print capitalism; the idea that political parties were the major actors of the Empire’s political structure; and the enforcement of the use of the Turkish language in schools.\(^{64}\) These reforms served to create a homogeneous Turkish nation in the long term. Before the outbreak of the First World War, the Balkan Wars of 1912–13 were a turning point in Ottoman history. When the Balkan states gained their independence, the Empire lost not only the

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\(^{64}\) Shaw and Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire*, p. 279.
majority of its territories in Europe but also its multi-religious character. The CUP government’s reaction to these losses was a formulation of drastic policies that combined their enlightened authoritarianism with ‘chauvinist nationalism’. The conditions of the First World War created reasons and means under the name of national unity and survival for the CUP leadership to implement the policies of ‘homogenisation and Turkification’.65 The deportation and massacre of the Armenians in 1915 was a result of both internal and external factors that served to facilitate the Young Turks regime’s goal of creating a homogeneous national state.66

Although the CUP regime prepared the conditions for the creation of a modern Turkish nation-state, it could not complete its implementation. After the First World War, the nationalist group under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk eventually ‘brought this process to a logical end, having also profited from the mistakes of their predecessors’.67 The nationalist group not only aimed to reform the administrative and military institutions of the Empire as had its predecessors, but also to transform its political, economic and social structures into a modern state. Their understanding of the national project meant the complete rejection of the Empire. Priority in the national project was given to two areas: the definition of a territorial state and the creation of a homogenised nation through diplomatic means. The next section explains why Turkish nationalist elites preferred the construction of a secular nation-state to the protection of an Islamic empire and how they replaced the Empire’s anachronistic millet system with the approved European model at the end of the First World War.

THE EMERGENCE OF TURKISH NATIONALISM AND ITS MODERNITY
When the Ottoman Empire collapsed at the end of the First World War its traditional identity both at state and societal levels also eroded. As discussed in the previous section, the policies of the Young Ottomans and Young Turks had an important consequence: the idea of nationality

65 Rae, State identities and the homogenisation of peoples, pp. 151–3.
66 Ibid., p. 125.
67 Mardin, Türk modernleşmesi, p. 201.
developed dialectically as an antithesis of a multinational Islamic empire. The time was ripe for Muslim subjects of the Empire in Anatolia to meet the ideology of nationalism and define the meaning of ‘Turk’. In order to understand this development, the level of analysis is based upon a broad historical framework within which the relationship between the needs for modernisation and the emergence of nationalism is examined. In this article, nationalism is regarded as an ideology; a modern phenomenon to create an identity; and social and political engineering, which constitutes a political community thorough the agent of a nation-state. This understanding of nationalism relates its emergence to modernity. In the light of these explanations, the emergence of Turkish nationalism is related to the epoch of modernity for the following three reasons.

First, the ideology of Turkish nationalism aimed to create a modern political identity. The need to belong to a separate Turkish nation was the result of the erosion of the traditional ‘Ottoman’ identity at the end of the First World War. There was no conscious idea of Turkishness before the twentieth century—the issue was ‘Ottomanisation’. In general, there is a tendency among Western scholars to use the geographical term ‘Turkey’ in referring both to the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic. The

68 In general, the terms ‘modern’, ‘modernisation’, and ‘modernity’ have been used interchangeably in characterising social changes of non-European societies since the 1960s. In this article, the concept of modernity describes the common technological, political, economic, and social characteristics of an historical epoch and the concept of modernisation describes the process by which non-European societies acquired these characteristics. This process has been described, not only as ‘modernisation’, but also as ‘Europeanisation’ and ‘Westernisation’. The term modernity is therefore the broader context, which denotes the historical epoch that began in Western Europe with a series of profound socio-political transformations in the seventeenth century and reached its maturity with the age of Enlightenment and the rise of the industrial revolution.

69 For instance Eric J. Hobsbawm writes that Egypt won its independence from Turkey in the nineteenth century. Eric J. Hobsbawm, *The age of revolution: Europe 1789–1848* (London: Cardinal, 1973), p. 177. However, the international identity was the Ottoman Empire at that time, not Turkey. Interestingly enough, the name *Turchia* (*Türkiye* – Turkey) was given to the Anatolian territories (Asia Minor) and people by Westerners during the Crusades in the eleventh century. The name of the state was *Osmanlı Devleti* (the Ottoman state) and it was insulting to call the Ottomans as Turks, since the Turks were Anatolian peasants within the Empire. The term ‘Ottoman’ was used to describe the nobility of the Sultanate. Conversely, the Anatolian Turks almost never used this term until the end of the Ottoman Empire in the twentieth century. Bozkurt Güvenç, *Türk kimliği: Kültür tarihinin kaynakları* [The Turkish identity: The sources of cultural history] (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1994), pp. 22–3. Some Western Turkish specialists do not use the terms interchangeably, emphasising that an ‘Ottoman’ is not the same as a ‘Turk’. See Bernard Lewis, *The
Ottoman and Turk are not the same political identities. The equation of these two terms became apparent only when Turkish nationalism emerged in the twentieth century. \({}^{70}\) ‘Until the end of the nineteenth century, the concept of being a “Turk,” as used in modern parlance, was alien to the Ottoman elite, who saw themselves as Ottomans (Osmanlı) rather than “Turks”; the latter seems to have implied “uneducated peasants”’ of Anatolia. \({}^{71}\) The dual usage also creates confusion about the political identity of a modern state and nation. If we accept Ottoman and Turk as the same identity, the process of transition from an Islamic imperial identity to a modern secular one is obscured, leaving us with an incomplete understanding of Turkish nationalism and its modernity.

Second, Turkish nationalism developed in parallel to the idea of constructing a new political identity represented by a modern nation-state, as the most prominent political form of modernity. The whole process of modernisation spanned almost one and a half centuries, which commenced with the declaration of Sened-i İttifak (Document of Agreement) in 1808 and terminated with the declaration of the Turkish Republic as a secular nation-state on 29 October 1923. Scrutiny of four historical periods during the Ottoman modernisation—military reform, the Tanzimat, the Young Ottomans and the Young Turks—shows that each period laid the foundations for the next one. The first period of military reform gradually brought the import of other European technological developments, which initiated the Empire’s modernisation during the Tanzimat era. In the second period, the Young Ottomans opposed to the secular character of the Tanzimat believed that modernisation was compatible with Islam. They found a synthesis in pan-Islamism to provide an alternative as a stabilising factor among all the Muslim subjects during the Empire’s attempts at modernisation. In the third period of modernisation, following pan-Islam’s failure, the Young Turks focused on pan-Turkism after 1913, which emphasised national values and campaigned ‘for an alliance of all Turkish/Turkic

\(\text{emergence of modern Turkey, 2nd edn (London: Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1968); Shaw and Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire.}\)

\(^{70}\) Smith, Theories of nationalism, p. 56.

\(^{71}\) Poulton, Top hat, grey wolf and crescent, p. 43.
groups, within the Empire and outside it’. The final stage was Turkish nationalism as the Young Turks’ major ideology which, under their successor Atatürk, became the basis of modern nation-state building.

Third, the emergence of Turkish nationalism also coincided with the need for modernisation in the Ottoman Empire. In particular, the idea of having a separate Turkish nation was directly related to the development of communication and print capitalism as part of the modernisation policies. The establishment of the printing press was the key development which enabled the translation of Western books into Turkish and the distribution of Western ideas through newspapers. The first Turkish printing press was established by Ibrahim Muteferrika in 1729. One of the earliest books he published in the Ottoman language explained the successes of Christian military arms against the Ottomans and drew attention to attempts to restructure Ottoman military institutions along European lines. The press was closed in 1742 until it resumed printing in 1784 with the order (ferman) of the Sultan. Its publications covered fields such as Ottoman history, geography, and language. The opening of a state-sponsored printing press at the School of Engineering and Artillery in 1795 was a sign of developments in printing that would affect the modernisation of political institutions and the Empire’s social structure. For instance, ‘the French Embassy in Istanbul brought in the message of the Revolution in the Gazette Francaise de Constantinople, established in 1795 and addressed the French-speaking community and of course those who had learned to read French’. Although printing was permitted for the non-Muslim millets in Hebrew,

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74 Lewis, What went wrong?, p. 28.
75 On 7 October 1808, the Ottoman notion of sovereignty was challenged with the signature of the Sened-i İttifak (Document of Agreement) despite the fact that it did not last long. For details of the seven clauses in the agreement, see Shaw and Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire, p. 2. For the first time, the gradual separation of the Ottoman state from the Sultan was introduced legally. Fatma Müge Göçek, Rise of the bourgeoisie, demise of empire: Ottoman Westernisation and social change (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 65.
76 Lewis, What went wrong?, p. 50.
Greek or other European languages it was forbidden for the Muslim-subjects of the Empire until the 1700s. ‘Even after it was permitted, printing in Turkish was not common until the 1800s’.

The development of print capitalism—i.e. the publishing of books and newspapers—and the use of a standardised language in printing would have a profound impact on the sense of collective identity in the long term. For example, the standardisation of the Turkish language through the replacement of the Arabic alphabet with the Latin alphabet in 1928 severed the link not only with the Ottoman language, but also with the past, recognising Turkish nationhood as opposed to being Ottoman. The main difficulty was transforming the Ottoman umma identity to a secular one during this process of imagination.

As explained earlier, the traditional Ottoman identity was based on the millet system, within which there was a differentiation between Muslim and non-Muslim subjects but no official differentiation among the Muslim ümmets (umma) by language or ethnicity. ‘Ethnicity’ was not a determining factor per se. For instance, many grand vezirs and high officials who came from Albania were Slav Muslims or other Muslim subjects. In the Ottoman system, the concept of the ‘slave elite’ (the ruling official class) and the devşirme system (recruitment of Christian boys to be trained as janissaries) worked against an ‘ethnically pure’ governing class. In terms of language ties, the common language of Muslim subjects was not only Turkish. The state language was Osmanlıca (Ottoman language), which was a mixture of Turkish, Arabic and Persian. Meanwhile, while the sacred language of the ulema was Arabic, the local language of Anatolian peasants was Turkish. ‘Those who did speak Turkish did not identify themselves principally as Turks. Their primary mark of self-identification was their local community of farmers, nomads, or city-people—or Islam as the great brotherhood of believers.’ In particular, the religious character of the Ottoman state prevented the use of ethnic and language ties in defining the meaning of

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79 Curtin, *The world and the West*, p. 177.
Turkishness since Islam was a stronger unifying force than the other two ties.

For the Turkish nationalist elite, it was easier to get rid of the traditional Ottoman identity than the Muslim *umma* identity since ‘the Ottomans came to be hated by Turkish-speakers as apostates’.\(^{80}\) They were aware that changing the *umma* identity of Muslim subjects to a secular identity was their most challenging task. In Ottoman society, religion functioned both as a kind of social cement to hold Muslims together and as a form of legitimacy to maintain an Islamic state. The sense of identity on both state and societal levels was torn apart with the disintegration of the Empire. Indeed, it was a paradox that the new Turkish nation could not be *socially constructed* without both contradicting and containing the identities of its predecessor. The key was in the transformation of the *umma* identity. On the one hand, it was accepted that ‘a “Turk” could be anyone who belonged to the Muslim *umma* during the Ottoman time’.\(^{81}\) On the other hand, one was accepted as a Turk as long as one called oneself a Turk within the boundaries of the sovereign secular state. Hence, the construction of a new Turkish nation was an integral part of the transformation from a caliphate-empire to a secular-territorial state.

The Turkish experience in constructing a modern nation-state has been accepted by both Turkish and Western scholars as a good example of modernisation theory.\(^{82}\) In one of his last books, Ernest Gellner argued that Turkey deserves the special attention of anyone who is interested in the future of liberal societies, economic development and Islam. Among the Asian states, Japan, India and Turkey, with their success in constitutionalism and genuine elections, provide grounds for optimism for Western liberals. Within this trio Turkey stands out in several important aspects: Turkey was

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the first state to embark on the road to building a constitutional government despite its Islamic character. Gellner furthermore argued that Turkey’s commitment to modern political ideas was a result of an endogenous development, rather than being an exogenous imposition. Turkey was never colonised and Turkish nationalists achieved political modernity by choosing their own destiny. Yet, there is a dilemma arising from Gellner’s analysis, because he argued that Turkish commitment to modernisation of the polity and society had both an Ottoman and a Koranic quality.83

This dilemma needs to be eliminated with further clarification: the Turkish nationalists’ commitment to modernisation was based on the rejection of their Ottoman predecessors. Although there was historical continuity between the modernisation attempts of the Young Ottomans, the Young Turks and the nationalists, Turkish and Ottoman modernisations presented themselves differently. While it was inevitable that Ottoman modernisation adopted some aspects of the Western experience, Turkish modernisation was by definition opposed to the Ottoman–Islamic experience and accepted Westernisation as a totality. With the emergence of Turkish nationalism, the modern Turkish nation’s past was Ottoman–Islamic and Central Asian, but its future was secular and European. Yet although Turkish modernisation aimed to cut its ties with the Ottoman past, it could not so easily destroy the Islamic quality of the Empire. This is probably why Gellner argued that Turkish modernisation had both an Ottoman and an Islamic quality.

I challenge Gellner’s conclusion on two grounds: first, Turkish modernisation had a clear-cut break with Ottoman modernisation. The Turkish modernising elite aimed to change the Islamic character of the state in accordance with the secular character of European states. Second, Turkish modernisation was not only a result of internal developments. Gellner downplays the role of external pressures on the Empire. The Turkish elite’s commitment to modernisation was a consequence of both internal developments and external pressures from European powers. There is another dilemma at this stage of Turkish history: although the Turkish modernising elite accepted Westernisation as a totality they, interestingly enough, developed the nationalist ideology against the expansionist policies

of European powers. Therefore, the paradoxical character of Ottoman–European relations took on a new meaning during the emergence of Turkish nationalism. The Turkish nationalists were, in fact, against both the imperialist Ottomans and Europeans. In particular, Turkish nationalism reached its peak when the Allied powers signed the Treaty of Sèvres with the Ottoman state in 1920.

The Treaty of Sèvres was ‘the origin of Turkish nationalism’ as described in a British Foreign Office report, which suggested that the treaty triggered nationalist feelings among the Turks. Despite the Allied powers’ expectations of bringing a final solution to the problem of ‘the sick man of Europe’ it produced further complications. The Treaty of Sèvres was indeed a vindictive document which considered neither the needs of the Muslim subjects of the Empire—the Turks—nor the political or demographic realities of the Ottoman Empire. It represented the demands of the Allies first and those of the Christian subjects of the Empire—the Greeks and Armenians—second. The harsh treatment of the Turks in the treaty was an indication of Allied prejudice and self-interest. Britain, France and Italy easily neglected ethical matters such as self-determination and Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points, since all wanted to gain the territories of the disappearing Ottoman Empire. It was a warning that the Allies had no intention of accepting the principle of national self-determination for the Muslim subjects of Anatolia. The Treaty of Sèvres, like the Treaty of Versailles with Germany, was the result of Allied concerns with the post-war European order.

Both were punitive treaties, imposed by victors who adopted a lofty moral tone to hide self-interest. Both treaties contained economic clauses intended to ensure that the vanquished would never rise again. Both

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84 The Treaty of Sèvres was signed on 10 August 1920 between Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Armenia, Belgium, Greece, the Hejaz, Poland, Portugal, Rumania, the Serbo-Croat-Slovene state, and Czecho-Slovakia on the one part and Turkey on the other. There was an interesting dilemma in the Turkish case since Turkey was not regarded as a new state. Although the peace treaty was signed with the Istanbul government the participating side was defined as Turkey, not the Ottoman Empire.

limited the military strength and territory of the loser. However, the Sèvres treaty was the harsher.\textsuperscript{86} But the consequences of these treaties did not meet Allied expectations. The Kemalist nationalists were determined to fight against European imperialism in order to save the Ottoman Empire, which they actually wanted to get rid off. Despite the fact that they were also against the expansionist policies of the Europeans, they aspired to follow the existing Western model of state-building.

The final neglected dimension of expansion of international society to the Ottoman Empire is that the socio-political transformation of the Empire into a modern nation-state based on the European model was, in essence, the last entry requirement of this society. As has been argued, during the Ottoman Empire people associated themselves with each other according to their religion in the \textit{millet} system—i.e. Muslim subjects and non-Muslim subjects (Christians—Greeks and Armenians—and Jews) of the Empire. The replacement of the religious \textit{umma} identity by a secular ‘national’ identity became necessary in accordance with the policies of modernisation. Under these conditions, the idea of a Turkish nation had to be constructed from scratch. More importantly, the construction of a Turkish nation had to be carried out by a semi-functioning state since there was no nation. It had to be carried out in two stages. First, the majority of Muslim Anatolian peasants had to become conscious of their Turkishness. Second, the nationalist group declared itself as a new government of the Turkish nation and claimed national self-determination over Ottoman territory in Anatolia as Turkish territory. The construction of the Turkish nation within the limited boundaries of a territorial-state necessitated the rejection by the nationalists of the imperial, expansionist policies of their predecessors. This indicated a radical change in Turkish identity politics. The nationalist elite focused on the territorial definition of a nation-state and abandoned the concern for Turks living outside the determined boundaries of the state, a preoccupation that had been at the core of previous ideologies, i.e. pan-Islamism, pan-Turanism and pan-Turkism.

The major test of the new nationalist policy materialised when Bolshevik control was established in Azerbaijan in 1920. Turkish nationalists stated that they were determined to restrict their policies within national borders and that they recognised the importance of establishing relations with the Bolsheviks. In the process of nation-building and state transformation, the Turkish-Bolshevik rapprochement played an important role in determining both new Turkey’s problematic borders with the Armenians and the state’s political identity through diplomatic means and mutual recognition in 1921. This rapprochement not only influenced the policies of the Allied powers in planning the Turkish and Russian settlements at the end of the First World War but also played an important role in solving the Turkish identity crisis, by facilitating the newly constructed Turkish nation-state’s participation in international society.87

The creation of a secular Turkish nation-state was again tested through diplomatic relations with European states. When the Allies invited the Ankara government to the peace conference at Lausanne in 1923 the 600-year-old Ottoman Empire came to an end and the new Turkish nation-state sought to take its place with other members of European international society. The Ottoman Empire ceased being the ‘other’ when Turkey was de jure recognised by the British, French, Italian, Japanese, Greek, Romanian and Serbo-Croat-Slovene governments with the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne on 24 July 1923.88 The Ankara government gained full sovereignty of the Turkish nation-state within agreed territorial boundaries. On 29 October 1923, when the new Constitution declared the Turkish state a ‘republic’ with sovereignty coming from the nation, the new Turkish imagined community was defined as a ‘nation’ with de facto territorial sovereignty.89 The final stage of making the new Turkish nation homo-


88 Eighteen separate documents were signed between the contracting parties at Lausanne. Like the Treaty of Sèvres it was a detailed settlement, but was unlikely to be legalised in the creation of a new Turkish state. Reha Parla, ed., Belgelerle Türkiye Cumhuriyet’nin uluslararası temelleri: Lozan, Montrö ve Türkiye’nin konsulararya imzaladığı başlica belgeler (Suriye, İrak, İran, SSCB, Bulgaristan, Yunanistan) [The international foundations of the Turkish Republic in documents] (Lefkoşa: Tezel Ofset ve Matbaacılık, 1985), pp. 1–103.

89 Smith, Theories of nationalism, p. 189.
geneous within the boundaries of the new state was completed when the Greek minorities of Anatolia were exchanged for the Muslims of Greece under the provisions of the agreement signed in Lausanne. In the final analysis, with the Lausanne settlement the Ottoman Empire finally ceased being the other and the modern Turkish state representing the homogeneous Turkish nation was mutually recognised by Western states. The admission of the new nation-state into the European society of states left no questions about the identity of Turkey and Turks.

CONCLUSION
This article has argued that the Ottoman Empire was never accepted as an equal member of European international society even though it was part of the European state system. Europeans needed the mirror image of the ‘other’ in order to define their shared identity against it. The Ottoman Empire was the perfect candidate due to its geographical location on the margins of Europe and different socio-political structure. The Ottomans also defined their identity against the ‘infidels’, i.e. the Christian Europeans. As long as the Empire was powerful there was no need to have relations with the Christians. When the Empire started declining, the ruling elite decided to participate and accept the entry requirements of the European society of states. Its admission as the first non-European and non-Christian state to international society with the Treaty of Paris in 1856 did not stop it functioning as the ‘other’ until the end of the First World War. Prior to the period of the cessation of diplomatic relations with European states, the powerful Islamic Empire did not involve the politics of European balance of power. After the Ottomans decided to participate in the European society of states they were transferred from being the ‘other’ to ‘the sick man of Europe’ as long as it served the interests of the Concert of Europe.

Four important implications of the Ottoman Empire/Turkey’s participation in international society emerge from this analysis, which are largely neglected in the conventional English School literature. First, the identity dimension of international society within which the Ottoman Empire played an important role as a non-Christian and non-European other has not been emphasised until recently. The founding scholars of the English School were more interested in the role of religious politics than identity politics. The Empire’s ambiguous place in European politics challenges the claims
about the universal character of international society. Second, the English School scholars do not pay attention to explain how an Islamic state’s socialisation into European international society affected its behaviour in domestic politics. The Ottoman Empire was the first to see how European concepts, institutions and norms would be compatible with Islam. Third, civilisational and normative discussions about the expansion of international society overlook the fact that the expansion of the European economy to foreign markets required the admittance of the Ottoman Empire, which led the Empire to promote its socio-political and economic modernisation. Fourth, the radical transformation of the Islamic Empire into a secular nation-state as the last entry requirement of international society has not totally changed its status as the other among European states. The Turkish nationalists rejected the identity of the Ottoman Empire and created a homogeneous territorial state based on the approved European national model at the end of the First World War. After the recognition of the secular Turkish nation-state by European states at Lausanne in 1923, they anticipated the discontinuation of being the other in European international society. However, the question still remains whether or not Turkey is considered a European member of international society. In particular, contemporary relations between Turkey and the European Union make us think that the status of Turkey as the ‘other’ is still continuing due to its Islamic and Ottoman characteristics, and consequently is contributing to the politics of exclusion between Turkey and European states.
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