Synopsis
The policies of the Polish Social Democratic Party were an obstacle to social democrats who sought to organise the Jewish working class in Galicia during the first decade of the 20th Century. Over a period they developed an organisational and programmatic perspective for mobilising Jewish workers. There were several competing Marxist analyses of the national and Jewish question in eastern Europe at the time. Apart from the Polish Social Democratic Party’s approach, the General Austrian Party, the Polish social democrats of Congress Poland, the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party as well as the Bund had distinctive positions on these questions. The Jewish militants in Galicia eventually adopted a Bundist orientation. Political circumstances in Galicia, the success of the Bundist model in Russia and, initially at least, the hope that it could be reconciled with continuing membership of the Austrian Party were important factors in this choice.

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Jewish socialists in Galicia and
Marxist debates over the national question
before World War I

Socialism is, for Marxists, human emancipation through working class self-emancipation. As capitalism spread it generated the proletariat as a new exploited class which became the majority class. But how can the minority working classes of oppressed minorities engage in socialist practice, beyond supporting the basic strategy of international unity in struggle? In other words, is there a way of combining the fights against oppression and exploitation? This paper examines the choices available to the working class of a relatively small oppressed group in responding to this question and the factors which influenced their answer. The following section examines the condition of the Jewish working class in Galicia at the turn of the Century and the challenges facing activists concerned with organising it into the social democratic movement. The next section outlines the Marxist analyses of the Jewish and national questions available at the time, particularly those of the Polish Social Democratic Party in Galicia, the General Austrian Party or ‘small international’, the Bund, the Polish social democrats in Congress Poland and the Russian social democrats. The organisational and programmatic choices the Jewish militants took are considered in the final section.

The Jewish working class of Galicia

The 812 000 Jews in Galicia, the Austrian occupied section of the Polish partition, in 1900 made up eleven per cent of the population and Jews constituted about the same proportion (ten per cent) of the small working class. Jews were, however, concentrated in urban areas, especially the capitals, Krakow in the west and Lemberg (the German name; Lwow in Polish; Lviv in Ukrainian) in the east, where they were 21 and 27 per cent of the population. So they were a somewhat more significant proportion of the mainly artisanal working class in the larger towns. Galicia was one of the least developed parts of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. It was much less industrialised than the Russian occupied ‘Congress Kingdom of Poland’, an economically advanced area of the Tsarist Empire.

Where was the difficulty in organising Jews? In Russia Jews were not emancipated until 1917. But the Austro-Hungarian Government had been, in 1867, forced into a series of liberal reforms that established the constitutional framework of the Empire until its collapse in 1918. The new dispensation emancipated the Jews and defined them as a religious group. Most Galician Jews, however, spoke Yiddish in domestic and daily life. The reforms had guaranteed linguistic rights to Austria’s nationalities. But Jews, classified as a religious community, were denied these rights. And this position was reaffirmed by the Austrian judiciary on several occasions. So there was no state support for education conducted in Yiddish. Yiddish documents were not recognised by courts. In the 1910 census Jews who identified their vernacular language as Yiddish were fined and even jailed for failing to specify an officially recognised language. The Austrian state enforced the oppression of Galician Jewry by discrimination against Yiddish. The Galician authorities, dominated by the Polish landowning nobility, and large sections of the Austrian ruling class discriminated against Jews in other ways too. Jews were under represented in the public service. The promotion of rural cooperatives by the Galician administration was designed to undermine Jewish merchants. The provincial government in Lemberg rescinded the licences to sell alcohol held by thousands of Jews shortly before World War I. In 1898 widespread rural pogroms had broken out in western Galicia, prompted by the anti-semitic agitation of the populist leader Father Stojakowski. Western Galicia was overwhelmingly Polish, was more economically and culturally developed than the eastern half of the province, with its Ruthenian (Ukrainian) majority, and had a
lower proportion of Jews in the population. Jewish workers were clearly both exploited and oppressed.

In the first years of the 20th Century Jewish social democrats in Galicia were faced with a practical problem. How to consolidate the organisations of the Jewish working class of the province in the struggle against exploitation and oppression. From around 1903, after an economic downturn, Jewish workers’ organisations with a social democratic orientation were set up or revived. A handful of Jewish university students played a leading role in this activity. So, from 1903, a law student at the Jagiellonian University, Henryk Grossman, was the secretary of the association of Jewish workers, Postep (Progress), in Krakow. Two other young intellectuals played a decisive role: Jakob Bross in Krakow and Karol Einäugler in Lemberg. Together with worker activists and other students they built organisations in Krakow, Tarnow, Przemysl, Lemberg and other towns. The organisations included both local, general associations, often engaged in both union and educational activities, open to all Jewish workers and branches of craft trade unions.

Economic growth not only increased the number of workers increased as did their self-confidence. But the social democrats, organised in the Polish Social Democratic Party (PPSD), a component of the General Austrian Social Democratic Workers Party (ÖSDAP), had competitors for the allegiance of Jewish workers. The first political Zionist group was established in Galicia in 1897. By the end of the decade a Zionist union centre was set up in Vienna under the leadership of two former social democrats from Galicia, Nathan Gross and Solomon Rubinstein. A Zionist union of commercial workers in Galicia was set up in 1903. So labour Zionism, with a base amongst white collar workers, became an increasingly well organised rival to social democracy inside the Jewish working class. Austrian unions with a Zionist orientation held a conference in Krakow in May 1904. This was regarded as the founding Congress of the Austrian Socialist Workers Party Poale Zion (Labour Zionist) Party. The Yidishe Arbeyter, Poale Zion’s newspaper started appearing in Yiddish instead of German in 1904 and was directed towards propagandising Jewish workers in the PPSD.

A handful of social democratic activists, many of them young students or professionals, with an orientation to the Jewish working class wanted to combat Zionism and avoid repeating the collapse of the promising the Jewish workers’ movement of the 1890s around the end of the previous decade. This task required more coordinated and concerted activity and agitation across the province and more socialist publications in Yiddish. To achieve these things they needed an orientation that was both programmatic and organisational. That is, they required an analysis of the situation of Jewish workers and a conception of how they should be organised. The two were closely related. But, given the small size of the movement and its limited resources, there was an initial tendency to focus on the question of organisation. Several different social democratic models were available.

The political models available

Marx’s own writings did not specifically address the problems faced by the Jewish activists. His discussion of the Jewish question was confined to his critique of Bruno Bauer’s position. This was primarily an occasion to establish his still evolving but distinctive approach to the broader question of human emancipation. The essay did support Jewish emancipation, against Bauer. But Marx’s recourse to Jewish stereotypes, while a convenient literary device in his argument, reinforced obstacles to a systematic understanding of the place of Jews in contemporary society. Particularly from the 1890s, later Marxists, however, developed analyses of both the Jewish and national questions which were of greater practical relevance to struggles against oppression and exploitation.

Marxists began to take a specific interest in the Jewish question only from the late 1870s as a consequence of three related developments. First the emergence of modern anti-semitism organised as political movements initially in Germany but then across Europe from France to Russia. Second, the social democratic movement extended to eastern Europe, as modern working classes began to form. The majority of the world’s Jews lived in this region. The Austro-Hungarian Government
which in 1867 introduced a series of liberal reforms that established the constitutional framework of
the Empire until its collapse in 1918, also emancipated the Jews and defined them as a religious
group.10

The third factor which contributed to social democratic concern with the Jewish question was the
emergence of political Zionism as a significant current in the late 1890s. Zionism was itself a
consequence of anti-semitism and of the same capitalist development which, in a different way,
underpinned the expansion of social democracy. Capitalist development and the concomitant growth
of a modern working class was a direct precondition for social democracy. Zionism, ‘Jewish
nationalism was in the first place a reflex nationalism, a defensive reaction against the rising
bourgeoisie which justified its anti-Semitism through the exaltation of national sentiment.’11 The
Jewish intelligentsia, sections of which provided the leadership and, especially in Austria, much of
its active membership around the turn of the Century,12 was itself the product of the breakdown of
traditional Jewish life-styles, as capitalism transformed eastern European societies.

The early hostility of the German Social Democrats to anti-semitism was strongly expressed in
the 1883 nomination of a Jew, Paul Singer, as a socialist candidate, when the Party was illegal.
Despite the fact that Singer was also a garment manufacturer, he won a predominantly working
class Reichstag seat in Berlin in a provocation against Stoecker’s anti-semitic movement.13 During
the 1880s, social democrats also argued that social tensions had given rise to anti-semitic actions
and parties. Once anti-semitism proved ineffective, these conditions would turn the movement’s
supporters in the direction of social democracy.14 This mechanical approach was apparent in later,
more systematic accounts of anti-semitism.

A brief statement by Engels was particularly influential.15 He elaborated a more sophisticated
account of the social base of anti-semitism, arguing that it was a movement of social classes, petty
aristocrats, artisans and peasants, with roots in the middle ages, increasingly eliminated by capitalist
competition. It was, in other words a variant of ‘feudal socialism,’ a current discussed in the
Communist Manifesto. Unlike Prussia and Austria, in places where capitalism was more developed,
Engels argued, these classes no longer dominated production, capital was not characteristically
Jewish and anti-semitism did not exist. While this social analysis was telling, the Dreyfus Affair in
France soon indicated that Engels’ assumption that capitalist development would undermine anti-
semitism was too optimistic.

August Bebel, with Wilhelm Liebknecht the pre-eminent leader of the German Social
Democratic Party, in 1893 elaborated on Engels’ analysis. His account added more details to the
explanation of anti-semitism in class terms. He identified modern, as opposed to precapitalist anti-
semitism in terms of its political forms of organisation. Non-Jewish merchants, artisans and students
attributed their problems to Jewish competitors, while these groups together with public employees,
officers and petty aristocrats were hostile to Jewish creditors or commercial intermediaries.
According to Bebel, Jews had, since the fall of the Jewish state in Palestine, characteristically
performed social functions associated with commerce. But, following Engels, he pointed out that it
was capitalism, not Jews, that were undermining the existence of these middle classes. Reflecting
the mechanical conception of social development characteristic of Second International Marxism
and earlier German social democratic accounts, Bebel gave much greater emphasis than Engels to
the inexorable decline of anti-semitism. While there was little social democracy could do to combat
it in the short term, middle class anti-semitism played an objectively revolutionary role: politically
mobilised by anti-semitism, petty bourgeois and peasants in the process of proletarianisation would
eventually discover that their real enemy was not Jewish capitalists, but the capitalist class in
general and push the movement in an anti-capitalist direction.16 Wilhelm Ellenbogen offered a
systematic analysis of Austrian anti-semitism along similar lines. The Catholic Church, sections of
the aristocracy and conservative politicians had promoted anti-semitism to play on petty bourgeois
fears about and competition with modern capitalism. But Karl Lueger’s anti-semitic Christian Social
Party had ‘provided itself in no way capable of fighting Jewish or Christian big capital’. Anti-
semitism was therefore ‘a necessary transition period in the development of social relations’. The
further development of capitalism would undermine clericalism, feudalism and the reactionary petty bourgeoisie and open the way for the working class.17

Until the late 1890s, Marxist discussions of the Jewish question were primarily concerned with the issue of anti-semitism. Subsequently, with the emergence of the social democratic Bund and modern political Zionism, there was an intersection of the Jewish and national questions. Distinctive positions on these questions were represented by the Polish Social Democratic Party in Galicia, the theoreticians in the German-Austrian Social Democratic Party, the Bund itself, the Social Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania and the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party.

The PPSD

The Jewish socialists in Galicia who sought to mobilise Jewish workers after the turn of the Century were members of the PPSD, as it was known from 1899. Its account of the Jewish question was readily accessible to them. The social democratic movement in Galicia achieved a stable organisational form in 1892. The same year an attempt was made to set up a Jewish social democratic party in Lemberg. This rapidly failed.18 Jewish workers in Galicia were first systematically organised under the auspices of the PPSD, which included separate Jewish educational associations and later local unions and published a Yiddish newspaper. The Party’s most prominent leader, Ignacy Daszyński, in the early 1890s explicitly recognised the national status of Galician Jews.19 As early as the Congress of the General Austrian Social Democratic Party in Vienna in 1892, the Polish leadership declared that, in view of the situation of their country and ties with Poles outside Austria they could not be as closely tied to the Austrian organisation as its statutes provided. In 1896, Rosa Luxemburg predicted that the logic of the Galician social democrats’ nationalism would lead them to place more and more programmatic stress on Polish independence.20 This process had just begun in the mid 1890s when the Party’s rhetoric about proletarian internationalism was accompanied a growing preoccupation with Polish nationalism.21 This was associated with increasingly assimilationist attitudes to Jewish workers and neglect of their political needs and activity. The Party’s Yiddish press appeared sporadically (mainly before elections), slender resources were devoted to organising Jewish workers and sections of the leadership, notably Herman Diamand, an assimilated Jew, expressed assimilationist attitudes. This paralleled the stance of Polish liberalism. The Jewish population were regarded as distinctive only because they were ‘Poles of mosaic faith’.22

In the face of this indifference, some Jewish workers started to argue that a separate Jewish social democratic organisation was necessary. The proposal surfaced at a conference of Jewish workers in the PPSD in 1899, but was defeated. In response, Max Zetterbaum, a Jewish member of the Party, spelt out the PPSD’s position on the Jewish question in Die Neue Zeit. He addressed two issues: political Zionism and the national status of Jews in eastern Europe23 His stance had immediate organisation implications, providing arguments against a separate Jewish social democratic party. The first part of Zetterbaum’s article was an effective synthesis of Marxist analyses of Zionism.24 The crux was that ‘Zionism is the reaction of the Jewish bourgeoisie to modern anti-semitism.’ Political anti-semitism, in turn, had emerged amongst the petty and middle bourgeoisie and peasantry whose existence was threatened by capitalism, under the leadership of aristocrats, clerics and military officers whose status was also being undermined by capitalism. Anti-semitism’s popular mobilising capacity made the movement a potential counterweight to the rise of social democracy amongst workers. So it elicited some sympathy from governments and the Christian big bourgeoisie. Christian intellectuals, moreover, could use anti-semitism to marginalise their Jewish competitors. The oppression of Jews increased as a consequence.25 ‘Social democracy has no principled objections to Zionism’s final goal, the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine,’ Zetterbaum maintained. But there were a series of parallels between the practices of anti-semitism and Zionism that prevented social democratic sympathy for Herzl’s movement.
The first and main reason social democrats rejected Zionism was its assertion of Jewish solidarity and hence rejection of class struggle and indifference to the interests of the Jewish working class. It may be that 'the most progressive, expelled social democrats or commercial employees in the process of politicisation, want to set up a Jewish social-national workers movement on the model of the Christian Socials. But they advise the proletariat to have nothing to do with class struggle until the Jewish state has been established.' When Zetterbaum wrote, labour Zionism, was still in a very embryonic state and, in Austria, it remained for some years hostile to social democratic militancy.

Secondly, ‘Just as the origins and features of anti-semitism and Zionism are two sides of the same development of the capitalism, so is the Zionist world view a translation of anti-semitism into the Jewish language.’ This extended, Zetterbaum observed, to the Zionist belief that Arian anti-semitism was eternal. Both anti-semites and Zionists regarded antipathy between Jews and non-Jews as a natural state of affairs. Zionist’s assertion of the common nationality of all Jews and efforts to justify their movement on the basis of biblical quotation and ancient history also gave it, thirdly, a Jewish clerical aspect, that paralleled the Christian clericalism of anti-semitism. A fourth parallel between Zionism and anti-semitism was their conservative preparedness to do deals with the authorities. For example, the Zionists supported the continuation of the state of emergency in Galicia after the pogroms of the late 1890s, even though this was used against the social democrats rather than the anti Jewish press. Zionist diplomacy honoured the Sultan, the German Kaiser and even the Tsar.

In criticising Zionism, Zetterbaum made persuasive Marxist arguments, although he did not recognise, as Pollack had, the decisive role Jewish intellectuals played in the formation and leadership of the movement. Zetterbaum’s method in discussing Zionism was, however, in striking contrast to the Polish nationalist perspective apparent in his assessment of the national status of the Jews. His starting point was to reject conceptions of the nation based on common descent and, in a step which underplayed the significance of subjective identity in the formation of nations, feelings of national unity. The decisive factor was language:

‘All national struggles and demands in a state are linguistic struggles. Even the national struggle for independence is fundamentally a struggle by the oppressed, united by their language, against oppressors speaking a different language.’

‘Jargon’ (Yiddish), Zetterbaum asserted, was a clumsy and inadequate ‘surrogate’. Indeed even ‘Jews themselves do not regard jargon as their real language’. The Jews, given they have no common mother tongue, are not a nation. But their common historical fate, descent and religion mean that they are a specific social unit. Zetterbaum’s views largely coincided with the position of the Austrian state. In the Austrian Empire Yiddish did not have any legal status as a language, while the Jews were designated as a religious group, without national rights. Perhaps, Zetterbaum believed, the Jews would again become a nation by adopting their own language. But it was impossible to know this in advance. It was also possible that their distinctiveness would entirely disappear.

‘Jewish social democracy should therefore neither pursue an assimilationist nor a ‘national’ policy … Jews do not have any national interests and demands of their own in the states in which they live, because they do not have their own language. Social and political equality for Jews is not a specifically Jewish demand, but a general democratic position of all democratic parties. Similarly, the rejection of this equality is more directed against the bulk of the people than the Jews and hurts them more than the latter.’

What is more, the task of Jewish social democrats is to make western culture available to Jewish workers. In the first instance this can be done in jargon. But

‘jargon is too underdeveloped, its literature too poor to provide readers with access to the highest intellectual problems or the best products of literature. There is just about nothing significant translated into jargon: no *Capital* by Marx, no Buckle or anything
similar, no Byron or Mickiewicz. Jargon literature has itself produced little original work that is deep.’

So it was a basic assumption, for the PPSD, that the educational level of the Jewish proletariat would have to be raised in the language of culture in the countries where it lived. This development was also desirable from the viewpoint of political activity. It would facilitate united organisations of Jewish and Christian workers and facilitate understanding in union and political struggles. Zetterbaum’s assessment of Yiddish did not, unfortunately, reflect the very rapid change in Yiddish usage going on around the PPSD. Yiddish was transformed from a largely folk language into ‘a language of scholarship and poetic finesse within a single generation.’ That generation was Zetterbaum’s own. But on the basis of his political convictions and foreshadowing his criticism of the Bund, he argued that the more Jewish activists knew the national language the more agitators there would be to enlighten and organise the national minority. Despite his formal rejection of both assimilationist and Jewish nationalist arguments about the future of the Jews, he was clearly advocating linguistic assimilation and therefore, in his own terms, assimilation to the Polish nation.

It is revealing, to use Zetterbaum’s earlier grounds for condemning Zionism as a standard for judging the balance between nationalism and the class struggle in the political perspectives of the PPS and the PPSD. Zionism was faulted for advising ‘the proletariat to have nothing to do with class struggle until the Jewish state has been established.’ ‘Polish independence,’ on the other hand, ‘is not only a national matter, but a precondition for the development and the power of the proletarian class struggle in the Polish people.’ It is difficult to identify the superiority of the Polish socialists’ position over that of the labour Zionists.

Zetterbaum’s theoretical approach to the question of the national status of the Jews very much accorded with the PPSD’s nationalist and assimilationist practice. While the militants who oriented to the Jewish working class criticised Zionism in terms like Zetterbaum’s, it was hardly surprising, therefore, they saw no merit in his approach to the national question.

At its 8th Congress in January 1903, the PPSD’s assimilationist policy intensified. Diamand argued that Jewish workers should assimilate to superior Polish culture and read either Polish or Ukrainian social democratic newspapers. To assuage the concerns with the direction of the Party expressed at the Congress by Jewish members, Daszynski convened a special conference of Jewish activists in Lemberg on 9-10 May 1903. Before the conference a group from Lemberg argued and organised for the formation of a Jewish Party. But, after an emotive debate, in the wake of the Kishinev pogrom, all but two of those present voted against proposition. One of the exceptions was Henryk Grossman. The conference did lead to the establishment of a Jewish Agitation Committee to coordinate and promote the organisation of Jewish workers on a provincial level. Dominated by members and supporters of the PPSD leadership, like Diamand, it was, however, a dead letter. The Committee was dissolved in the wake of the 9th PPSD Congress in 1904. The Congress also took a hard line against an independent Jewish party and established formal relations with the most nationalist of the ‘socialist’ organisations in Congress Poland, the Polish Socialist Party (PPS), as opposed to two Marxist organisations, the Social Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania (SDKPiL) and the Bund.

In 1904, the prominent PPS theoretician, Kazimierz Kelles-Krauz argued a minority position in the PPS which offered a more sympathetic treatment of the ‘Jewish question’. While valuing Zetterbaum’s critique of Zionism, Kelles-Krauz explicitly rejected his dismissal of Yiddish as the linguistic basis for a Jewish nation in eastern Europe. His approach recognised that the Bund had become a very successful organisation, the hegemonic force in the politically engaged Jewish working class. So, unlike other PPS/PPSD leaders, he did not argue that the Bund or Jewish-Yiddish nationalism had no future and advocate assimilation to Polish culture. In pursuit of the same goal, wining Jewish workers to the cause of Polish independence, he instead sought to coopt an aspect of the Bund’s ideology, within a nationalist rather than a Marxist framework. Jewish national autonomy could be achieved as a dispensation of an independent Polish state. So Jewish workers should join Polish workers in the struggle for Polish independence, while Polish workers should
oppose anti-semitism and advocate equal rights for the Jews. Like Zetterbaum, Kelles-Krauz also
criticised the Bund for its identification with the struggle to democratise Russia.40

Kelles-Krauz’s stance was not that of either the PPS or PPSD leadership. Given the leaders’
attitudes and his own unquestioned commitment to Polish nationalism, his position had no appeal to
the PPSD activists who sought to organise Jewish workers. In January 1905, Grossman, now their
theoretician, ridiculed Kelles-Krauz’s idealist approach in a sustained polemic against both assimilationism and Zionism.41

The PPSD’s trajectory was increasingly nationalist. When the PPS split in 1906, the PPSD
supported the nationalist right wing, led by Jozef Pilsudski. Rising tensions in the Balkans and then
the outbreak of World War I saw the PPSD capitulate completely to Polish nationalism, establishing
formal alliances with other Polish political currents, including the reactionary Polish Circle, which
had dominated Galician politics for decades.

The PPSD’s approach to an oppressed minority was much like that of contemporary social
democratic parties in many countries today. A rhetoric of equality of and opposition to
discrimination combined with a practice which reinforces oppression. This is a good brief
description of the Australian Labor Party’s position on Aborigines over the past decade and a half.

The ‘small international’, Austrian social democracy

When the Jewish Social Democratic Party of Galicia was established on May Day 1905, its
members hoped that it would gain admittance to the federal Austrian Social Democratic Party,
known as the ‘General Party’ and the ‘small international’. The German-Austrian leadership of the
Party and its founding leader Victor Adler were held in very high regard by the Jewish activists in
Galicia. So the political evolution of the Austrian Party and its position on the national question had
a significant impact on the militants who established the new Jewish organisation. Many of their
initial justifications for the split and calls for recognition assumed the form of arguments from the
precedents of Austrian Party history.

In the case of the Austrian Social Democratic Party, the political implications of the idea that
anti-semitism would automatically give way to socialist consciousness were compounded by the
Party’s tactical attitude to anti-semitism, elaborated by its founding figure and long term leader of
the Party, Victor Adler. The dominant position in the German Party was to emphasise the
reactionary nature of anti-semitism. The Austrian Party generally held that the conflict between anti-
semites and ‘philo-semites’ was an internal matter for the ruling classes and therefore a diversion for
the workers’ movement.42 This view was also expressed by some German social democrats and in a
resolution of the Socialist International’s 1891 Brussels Congress.43 In other words, the real, mass
anti-semitic movement mobilising large numbers of peasants, petty bourgeois and, potentially,
workers was equated with the liberal defence of Jewish civil rights, which had little popular
resonance by the late 19th Century. The Austrian social democrats’ stance was designed to
undermine anti-semitic attacks on social democracy as a Jewish movement, by refusing to take an
unequivocal stand against anti-semitism. This accommodation to anti-semitic prejudice proved
utterly ineffective in turning aside anti-semitic attacks on the Austrian Social Democratic Party,
many of whose leaders at all levels, including Adler, Fritz Austerlitz, Otto Bauer, Wilhelm
Ellenbogen and Robert Danneberg, had Jewish antecedents. But it did undermine the capacity of
socialist workers to confront anti-semitism in Austrian society and their own ranks head on. In fact
it was prepared to criticise the anti-semites for inconsistency because their leaders associated with or
were funded by rich Jews.44 In 1893, Eduard Bernstein warned that when ‘comrades of Jewish
descent who, precisely because they themselves are of Jewish origin, consider it their special
obligation to protect the party against all suspicion of favouring Jewish interests’ used the term
themselves, they gave credibility to the anti-semites’ denunciation of ‘philo-semitism’.45

From a Zionist perspective, it has been argued that this response is to be understood in terms of
the psychology of the significant number of Party leaders with Jewish backgrounds, and even in
terms of Jewish ‘self-hatred’.46 But this does not account for their similar lack of preparedness to

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confront nationalism and particularly the nationalism of the dominant Germans in Austria. Changes in the Party’s organisational statute and program, discussed below, made concessions to nationalism, including to the nationalism of the Germans who dominated the Empire and institutionalised nationalist organisational and political norms inside the Party. In this way, the leaders of the Party reinforced the process which led to the disintegration of Austrian social democracy along national lines by 1911.

‘So, even before the multinational state broke up, the international organisation of its proletariat disintegrated. Unified and united action by the whole Austrian proletariat was not possible either on the terrain of trade union or political struggle. The crisis of the state threw a shadow before it, in the form of a crisis in the party.’

The Party’s position on the Jewish question is, therefore, best understood as an aspect of a wider opportunist approach to politics. An increased preparedness to accommodate to the established order, not only on national but also on other issues, was also apparent in an increasingly parliamentarist orientation, reflected in the program adopted at the Party’s Vienna Congress of 1901. The Congress removed reservations about the effectiveness of parliament present in the original 1889 Hainfeld Program.

If the Austrian Party’s attitude to anti-semitism gave hostages to its opponents, the evolution of its position on the national question had even more drastic consequences for its internal integrity. In the course of the 1890s, the Party’s internal organisation became increasingly federal. At its Vienna Congress in 1897, the Party transformed itself into a federation of the (Austrian) German, Czech, Polish, Italian, South Slav parties. In 1899 the Ukrainian Social Democratic Party emerged from the Polish, previously the Galician Social Democratic Party (PPSD/GPSD) and became a component of the General Austrian Party. From the early 1890s until Austrian social democracy broke up into its national components, there was an alliance between the Galician/Polish and German Austrian organisations, personified in the relationship between their most prominent leaders, Adler and Ignacy Daszynski. In return for its positive attitude to Polish independence and financial support, the German-Austrian Party gained the assistance of the PPSD in determining the policy of the General Party, in the face of the opposition from the Czech organisation. Daszynski, moreover, was a significant figure in the General Party and not only the PPSD, after he became the leader of the social democratic fraction in the Reichstag in 1897.

The Austrian Party’s concessions to nationalism were encouraged by Karl Kautsky, the most prominent theorist in the international social democratic movement. Kautsky was a very well informed about Austrian affairs. While a member of the SPD and a resident of Berlin, he was born in Bohemia, briefly attended the University of Vienna and was in close contact with Victor Adler. In his analysis of the controversy over the Austrian language regulations in 1897, Kautsky emphasised that language was a key factor in defining a nation. He also argued that the modernisation of the Austrian state was desirable, as the alternative was not its dissolution and the liberation of its nationalities but social and political stagnation. The threat of its destruction by national rivalries could only be overcome through its transformation into a federation of national territories whose borders would follow linguistic boundaries. This resolution of the national question would clear the way for more effective working class struggle. Furthermore, Kautsky asserted that ‘Proletarian internationalism does not mean the absence of nations but the freedom and equality of nations’. In pursuing this objective, social democracy was the only movement which could effectively preserve the Austrian state. He soon described this position bluntly and clearly as ‘conservative’, but necessary given the reactionary period. He opposed the efforts of the Young Czechs to secure a Czech state within Austria, on the territories of the feudal provinces of Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia. Their movement, Kautsky argued, was the Czech equivalent of the anti-semitism of German Austrians. Such a self-governing Czech province would strengthen reactionary forces in the rest of Austria and the oppression of the large German minority in the Czech provinces. Instead the social democrats should raise the demand for federal national autonomy on the basis of linguistically determined borders. This meant, in particular, the partition of Bohemia between Czech
and German areas. Dazynski also contributed to this discussion, stressing the importance of maintaining the Austrian state as a bulwark against Russia, a position with which Kautsky, with some qualifications, agreed.

The decision of the 1899 Brünn Party Congress, that Austria should be transformed into a federation of equal nations, was commensurate with Kautsky’s position and a consequence of the nationalist tendencies in the Austrian party. Organisational issues had been, temporarily, resolved in 1897 through concessions to the nationalism of the oppressed nations. Now, following the leadership’s standing identification with the maintenance of the Austrian state, the chauvinism of the dominant, German, nation was accommodated by postponing the settlement of the concrete issues of the national and language questions until universal suffrage was established and feudalism abolished in Austria. This was because the working class, which maintained the state and society, could only express their views under such conditions. The resolution did not deal specifically with the issue of language rights at all and simply stated that the rights of minorities would be protected in the component national, self-administered territories that made up the federation. This was despite the fact language issues had already been the focus for major political-national conflicts in Austria. No section Austrian social democracy conceived of the idea that by supporting the right of self-determination for Austria’s nations the party could help overcome internal national suspicions and also undermine the Austrian state.

The only alternative approach to the national question offered at the Brünn Congress was presented by the Executive of the South Slav Party. It called for what amounted to national cultural autonomy, an idea also supported by Karl Renner. The Congress, however, supported the demand for territorial national autonomy. But ‘The Austrian Party was subsequently convinced by this position and maintained it until the end of the Habsburg monarchy’, although its national program was not revised. Support for national cultural autonomy was apparent, for example, in the Austrian Party’s parliamentary proposal in 1910 for reorganising the school system.

The Party’s informal position was expressed in treatments of the national question by Renner and Otto Bauer. Renner (as ‘Synopticus’) presented his analysis in Staat und Nation in 1899 and (as ‘Rudolf Springer’) in Der Kampf der österreichischen Nationen um den Staat, in 1902. His focus, as the subtitle of the latter book expressed it, was ‘the national problem as a constitutional and administrative question’. The status and powers of churches, insurance funds, professional associations and chambers in Austria, provided legal models for Renner’s proposed national associations. He envisaged a hybrid system of territorial and cultural autonomy. In areas where there were different national groups, their separate cultural affairs would be administered by special organs. People would identify the nation to which they belonged. They would have the right to elect representatives to administer the affairs of their nation through democratic national organisations which would have the right to tax their members for the support of schools, theatres and other cultural institutions. Renner regarded this ‘personality principle’ or national cultural autonomy as a means to overcome national conflicts and maintain the integrity of the multinational Austrian state. As a rational plan for the improvement of humanity, Renner’s proposals were thoroughly utopian. They presupposed the existence of a democratic Austrian state, a key obstacle to which was precisely the national hostilities they sought to overcome.

Otto Bauer’s Die Nationalitätenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie, the most systematic vindication of the policy of national cultural autonomy produced in the Austrian Party (or elsewhere) appeared in May 1907, though most of it was written and printed during 1906. It was commissioned by Victor Adler as ‘a well thought-out explanation’ for the Party’s refusal to recognise the JSDP. The book’s scope was much broader, using some orthodox Marxist categories and a class analysis to justify Renner’s scheme.

There were, however, serious flaws in Bauer’s understanding of the relationship between nations and class. While national cultures change and can even disappear, Bauer regarded them as a very old feature of human history. The Germanic nation, he argued, existed in the period of the Roman Empire. The modern German nation emerged during the Middle Ages. What is more, nations, or
more specifically the German nation which was Bauer’s central preoccupation, would continue to exist under socialism.61 ‘We have to unify the proletarians of all nations into a powerful body with a united will in order to turn the treasures of our national culture into possessions of the entire nation, in order to win national unity and freedom.’62 National differences, he even maintained, would increase under socialism.63 In his critique of Bauer’s analysis, Kautsky drew on his own earlier analysis in pointing out how modern communications were homogenising cultures and creating conditions for the emergence of a world language or world languages. This was notwithstanding increasing nationalist sentiment.64

Bauer’s approach reproduced the Austrian Party’s concessions to nationalism, especially that of the dominant Germans in the Empire, and to the Empire itself. So, for example, he blamed the oppressed nations of the Empire for the nationalism of workers of the dominant nation: ‘national revisionism’ amongst German workers finds ‘its strongest driving force, however, [in] reaction against the revisionist policy of the social democrats of the nations without a history’.65

In discussing the need to maintain centralised trade unions, Bauer made an excellent case. It was equally applicable to the importance of a centralised Social Democratic Party.66 What is more, he criticised aspects of Austrian social democratic institutions and practices. While the Party had unified institutions at the top, it lacked them at the local, electorate and provincial levels. Such institutions, made up of representatives of the national organisations active in the area proportionate to their memberships, should not only be set up but also operate on the basis of majority votes.67 What is more, in order to combat Czech national revisionism it was essential to fight national revisionism in the German Party to the point of providing examples of internationalism, even if it was electorally unpopular.68 These criticisms sound very similar to Lenin’s arguments for local autonomy in the context of the democratic and centralised determination of the principles of party policy and his emphasis on resisting chauvinism of dominant nations. But they were vitiated by Bauer’s commitment to a federal party structure, preoccupation with German culture, celebration of national culture in general and the limits to his internationalism represented by his support for the transformation of the Habsburg state into a federation,69 rather than its destruction.

Bauer maintained that cultural national autonomy could displace the national question as an issue in Austrian politics, clearing the way for united working class struggles.70 But if people think primarily in nationalist categories then there are no questions which are not national questions.71 As Kautsky pointed out in criticising the Renner and Bauer’s faith in institutions of national cultural autonomy, ‘It is certain that no constitution … is capable of exorcising national conflict or counteracting power struggles amongst nations.’ What is more, a national school system has to be funded and so raises economic questions.72 Lenin’s later criticism bluntly summed up the weaknesses of main argument for national cultural autonomy.

‘When the Bundists, in advocating “cultural-national” autonomy, say that the constituting of nations will keep the class struggle within them clean of all extraneous considerations, then that is manifest and ridiculous sophistry. It is primarily in the economic and political sphere that a serious class struggle is waged in any capitalist society. To separate the sphere of education from this is, firstly, absurdly utopian because schools (like “national culture” in general) cannot be separated from economics and politics; secondly, it is the economic and political life of a capitalist country that necessitates at every step the smashing of the absurd and outmoded national barriers and prejudices, whereas separation of the school system and the like, would only perpetuate, intensify and strengthen “pure” clericalism and “pure” bourgeois chauvinism.’73

Bauer made a special effort, in the chapter following his outline of ‘the personality principle’, i.e. national cultural autonomy, to quarantine the Jewish question from his general conclusions. This was explicitly designed to ensure that the Galician ‘separatists’ could not make use his earlier arguments74 as they had used Renner’s arguments to justify their formal adoption of national cultural autonomy (discussed below). Lenin pointed out that ‘This proves more conclusively than lengthy speeches how inconsistent Otto Bauer is and how little he believes in his own idea, for he excludes
Jewish socialists and the national question

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the only extra-territorial ... nation from his plan for extra-territorial national autonomy'. Using somewhat different arguments from the PPSD, Bauer sought to justify its position that the Jews were not, or rather would soon no longer be, a nation. This had the congenial consequence of avoiding any disturbance to the important relationship between the Polish and German sections of the General Party. The Jews ‘were undoubtedly a nation’ during the middle ages, Bauer maintained. Then, their disincentive social role as representatives of the money economy in predominantly natural economies and by their culture, religion and language bound them together. With the rise of capitalism, their social role dissolved as ‘the money economy gripped the whole of society’. As Marx put it in ‘On the Jewish question’, ‘The real essence of the Jews has been realised and generalised in bourgeois society’. Legal emancipation and hence cultural adaptation followed. ‘It is going too far, perhaps, even in western and central Europe to state that the Jews are not a nation. But one can certainly assert that they are ceasing to be a nation’. In Galicia the direction of development was the same, if slower because large numbers of less well-educated Jewish petty bourgeois and workers were involved. The assimilation of upper class Jews meant that the Jewish nation had consisted only of the lower classes, it had been, in other words a nation without history. Their language was dilapidated and no Jewish national literature existed. But the lower classes were showing signs of national awakening, as was the case amongst other nations without history such as the Czechs. This involved the revival of Yiddish and the emergence of a Yiddish literature.

Full national revival was, Bauer argued, impossible. Jews, unlike the Czechs, possessed no homogenous areas of settlement. The Polish Social Democrats were wrong to say that every nation requires a territory. The Jew’s distinctive economic role preserved them as a territoryless nation. ‘But the moment that Jews and Christians no longer represented different kinds of economic activity and both have to function as parts of the same economic system, the capitalist mode of production, common settlement and hence close contact meant that the retention of cultural peculiarities were no longer possible over time.’ Assimilation was therefore inevitable. This was Bauer’s key argument. For him, national cultural autonomy was a desirable means for preserving and promoting nations. This status would be wasted on Jews because the Jewish nation had no future. He also made practical, though equally unconvincing arguments. National autonomy in education and the administration of justice was not necessary for Jews in Galicia and Bukovina because they already understood the dominant languages. Separate Jewish schools would only hinder Jewish workers’ access to jobs for which the dominant language was required. So ‘the most important task for the Jewish working class is its own education. Jewish workers must become really modern workers’. Paralleling his apologetic account of German workers’ nationalism, Bauer also blamed the Jewish victims of discrimination for their plight: ‘Even today Christian workers in many enterprises do not tolerate any Jewish co-workers: this attitude does not express political anti-semitism, but a naïve instinct against the strange features of unassimilated Jews’. The assumption that cultural advance was impossible in Yiddish, led to his conclusion, that ‘the same legal institutions that we need to make the Czech worker capable of class struggle and to win them to the class struggle, would increase the suffering of Jewish workers.’ In any case, and perhaps with the problems Yiddish might create for his argument in mind, as Kautsky hinted, Bauer played down the significance language in constituting nations.

Bauer did not explain why the acquisition of other languages was necessarily prevented by education in Yiddish schools, nor consider that the lack of state support for such schools, or instruction in Yiddish in public schools, ensured that Yiddish education was dominated by conservative religious authorities. The legal disabilities Yiddish speakerslaboured under were not an issue Bauer considered at all. In other words Bauer did not recognise that Yiddish speaking Jews were oppressed, not only by the dominant social structures and attitudes of Austria and Galicia and Bukovina in particular, but in an even more obvious fashion by the law. His own arguments helped reinforce a major obstacle to winning Jewish workers to the class struggle, the Austrian social democratic movement’s failure to consistently fight the oppression of Jewish workers as Jews, just
as the German Austrian Party never consistently supported the struggle of the oppressed nations of the Empire by affirming their right to national self-determination.

Josef Strasser, a leftist critic of concessions to nationalism in the Austrian Party, argued that ‘Only in a strictly centralised international organisation is it possible to consistently pursue a policy of internationalism’. This was, as we will see in discussing the stance of Russian social democracy, half true. It focused on the Party’s internal structure, to the neglect of its political commitments to opposing national oppression and anti-semitism. Nationalism within the Austrian Party effectively tore it apart during the decade and a half between the Brünn Congress and World War I. Between 1905 and 1911 Czech participation in the General Austrian Social Democratic Party and the central trade unions broke down. The establishment of separate parliamentary caucuses for the three largest social democratic organisations, the German, Czech and Polish parties, in 1908, was an important step in this process. There were not even any combined caucus meetings after the 1911 elections.

As Kulemann points out, political differences, especially ones that are not clarified or are excluded from discussion, can lead to organisational problems. This was ‘especially the case for the national question in the Austrian social democratic movement.’ Far from the national question being resolved, organisational and programmatic concessions were made the rival nationalisms (of members of both oppressor and oppressed nations) inside the Party at the 1897 Vienna and 1899 Brünn Congresses. One of these concessions, to the PPSD leadership, was the denial to Jewish workers of the rights that workers in a series of nations possessed, both within the General Party and in the Party’s national program. This concession safeguarded the alliance of the German-Austrian with the PPSD leadership.

The Bund

By the time the Jewish militants in Galicia were considering their strategy, the Jewish Workers Union of Lithuania, Poland and Russia (the organisation’s official name from 1901), known as the Bund, had been a major socialist force for years. Given its prominent role across the border in the Russian empire, notably in Russian occupied ‘Congress’ Poland, the prestige of the Bund amongst Jewish socialists in Galicia was considerable. This was particularly the case during the Russo-Japanese War in 1904 and then the revolutionary events of 1905.

The origins of the Bund were in the social democratic movement in Vilna (now Vilnius the capital city of Lithuania, then a major city in the Russian pale of settlement). Socialist activity in Vilna dated to the late 1880s and had been influenced by Yiddish literature smuggled in from London or New York. From 1893, the ‘Vilna Group’ of Jewish militants were the first activists in the Russian social democratic movement to build mass working class organisations. On the basis of the success in agitating around workers economic demands, in Vilna, other cities of the Pale and Warsaw, they set up the General Jewish Workers’ Union of in Russia and Poland, the ‘Bund’, on 7-9 October 1897. This was a year before the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party was set up. For many years the Bund was the most successful and largest element in the Party, whose central organisation was broken up by police repression shortly after its foundation. There were, however, other radical organisations which operated on the same territory as the Bund: the Russian Social Revolutionaries with their peasant orientation, the Social Democratic Party of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania (SDKPiL) and the Polish Socialist Party (PPS). Both the PPS, primarily nationalist in orientation with a large following in areas of the Russian Empire with a significant Polish population, including Vilna, and the orthodox Marxist SDKPiL were founded in 1893.

Iulii Martov, later a leading figure in the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party (RSDLP) and subsequently a key Menshevik figure, called for the establishment of a special Jewish organisation, as part of the general Russian movement in a speech on May Day 1895. The Vilna social democrats, themselves Jewish, had been successful in organising Jewish workers, while the rest of the Russian movement lagged behind. The oppression of Jews meant that Jewish workers had to campaign not only around directly class issues but also the demands for equal rights and religious freedom. The principle involved was ‘The class which cannot fight its own way to freedom does not deserve to
have that freedom,' rather than national autonomy. Similarly, at the founding congress of the Bund Arkady Kremer ‘urged the use of Yiddish as a practical expedient to assure effective development of a segment of the Russian proletariat. National issues were to be treated functionally, not ideologically, Jewish autonomy was essential but only to serve practical revolutionary needs.’

Initially focussing on economic demands and the strike movement, after the turn of the Century the Bund also conducted extensive political work against the autocracy, for democratic rights and socialism through its press and in the form demonstrations, leaflets and agitation including amongst the conscripts of the Tsarist army. By 1905, over 30 000 workers were in organisations associated with the Bund which adopted the name ‘General Jewish Workers’ Union in Lithuania, Poland and Russia’ at its 4th Congress in May 1901. The Bund remained the most influential social democratic organisation in the Russian Empire until the explosive growth of the wider movement in the course of the 1905 revolution. It still outnumbered the Russian membership of the RSDLP in September 1906. And it remained the most effective current in the many cities of the Pale and some areas of Poland until the fall of the autocracy.

There were, however, pressures on the Bund, particularly by Bund activists in Switzerland, intellectuals isolated from the Jewish working class of the Pale, to take up the national question. Clear parallels existed between the nationalist struggles against oppression and demands for rights for Jews in the Russian and Austrian Empires. Zionism held out the prospect of national liberation for Jews by means of diplomacy and colonial ventures rather than struggle. Alternatively, the Jewish proletariat could be understood to be struggling around both class and national issues. In this regard, the Bund discussion of Renner’s proposal for national cultural autonomy and the debate at the Austrian Social Democratic Party’s 1899 Brünn Congress had some influence in the Bund. The fourth Bialystok Congress of the Bund, in May 1901, decided

‘The congress holds that a state such as Russia, consisting as it does of many nationalities, should, in the future, be reconstructed as a federation of nationalities with complete national autonomy for each nationality, independent of the territory in which it is located. The conference holds that the term “nation” is also to be applied to the Jewish people. In the light of existing circumstances, however, it is still too soon to put forth the demand for national autonomy for Jews and hence … for the time the struggle is to be carried on only against all discriminatory laws directed against Jews … against any suppression of the Jewish nationality, but at the same time care must be taken not to fan national feeling into a flame, for that will only obscure the class consciousness of the proletariat and lead to chauvinism.’

The Congress rejected the idea of national self-determination on a territorial basis.

The next Congress, in 1903 was profoundly divided over whether the Bund should dispense with earlier reservations and start to popularise the demand for Jewish national autonomy. The crack in the organisation’s long standing unity was papered over by allowing the 1901 resolution to stand and a decision not to publish any reference to the debate on the issue.

The national question was soon the basis of the split between the Bund and the RSDLP at the 1903 Congress of the all-Russian organisation which, effectively, refounded the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party. The key issue was not whether the Jews were a nation, though this was raised in debates during the Congress. The Bund walked out of the RSDLP when the Iskraist majority at the Congress rejected its proposals for a federal party structure and the demand to be recognised as having exclusive rights to organise Jewish workers and as their sole representative. The Iskraists included Lenin and other figures who were shortly to become Bolsheviks, as well as Martov and other future Mensheviks. The RSDLP’s position on the national and Jewish questions is considered below.

Vladimir Medem’s 1903-1904 theoretical formulation, known as ‘neutralism’ served to blur the issues at stake in earlier debates in the Bund over the national question. He argued on the one hand that nations should be free to determine their own national development and that the Bund should combat limits on the Jewish nation’s exercise of this freedom. It was still unclear how this nation
would develop and whether it would survive. So, on the other hand, the Bund should be neutral on
the question of whether or not the Jewish people would be assimilated. The organisation should not
promote Jewish national identity.98 This formulation gave theoretical ground to the opponents of
Jewish nationalism inside (and outside) the Bund.99 But, its conclusion, legitimating the call for
separate institutions of Jewish self-government, had the practical consequence of promoting
nationalism. This argument and especially the dramatic new political possibilities opened up by the
Russian revolution of 1905 led the Sixth Bund Congress of October to include Jewish national
cultural autonomy in the Party’s minimum program. The same Congress rejected the demand for
Polish independence.100 At the 1906 Stockholm Congress of the all Russian Party, the Bund rejoined
the RSDLP, as an autonomous national organisation.101 This step represented a formal retreat from
the Bund’s earlier federal position and claim to be the sole representative of Jewish workers. But in
practice it did not comply with the All-Russian Party’s organisational statutes. During the period of
reaction, from 1907, all left wing organisations in Russia suffered catastrophic declines. The Bund
almost collapsed. From 1910, it revived102 and particularly after a conference of non-Bolshevik
social democrats in August 1912 in Vienna became, closely allied with the Menshevik current.

Polish revolutionary social democracy

The Social Democratic Party of the Kingdom of Poland (SDKP, from 1900 Social Democratic Party
of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania, SDKPiL), was founded in 1893. A crucial aspect of the
organisation’s politics from the beginning was criticism of the nationalist politics of the PPS/PPSD.
The new Party sought to build support not only among ethnically Polish but also the German and
Jewish workers in Congress Poland, as well as links with the Russian working class in the struggle
against the Tsarist regime. Class relations rather than the national question were the priority for the
Party.

The leading theoretician of the SDKP, Rosa Luxemburg, rejected the demand for Polish
independence. She argued that Polish independence would not hasten the downfall of the
autocracy.103 Furthermore, ‘The economic merging of Poland with Russia into an economic unit …
abolishes the material basis for national separatist tendencies in our society’.104 Only a section of the
petty bourgeoisie and young intelligentsia favour Polish independence. Not only the Russian
regime, but also the Polish bourgeoisie, peasantry and much of the petty bourgeoisie and
intelligentsia were hostile to the reestablishment of a Polish state.105

‘As the Russian government incorporates Poland economically into the empire and
cultivates capitalism as an “antidote” to its nationalist opposition, it breeds up, by this
very process, a new social class in Poland-the industrial proletariat-a class which by its
very nature, is driven to become the resolute opponent of the absolutist regime … The
solidarity of the Russian and Polish bourgeoisie, so coveted by the government is
logically answered by the political solidarity of the Polish and Russian proletariat’106

Given the integration of Congress Poland into the Russian Empire, Polish independence would be a
backwards economic step, divert the working class from its tasks and was politically utopian.107 In
emphasising the economic processes which undermined the scope for national independence,
Luxemburg underestimated the hold of national sentiments (particularly on the part of oppressed
nations) and how they could be mobilised in struggles against national oppression which could
undermine the power of imperial capitalist states in the face of democratic or socialist revolutionary
movements. Her hard line against Polish independence was not always accepted by the Party,
however. After a period of rapid growth, the SDKP inside Poland was broken up by repression in
1894.108 An effective organisation was only refounded, as the SDKPiL, in 1900. Its first Congress
supported federative autonomy for Poland. At the time, Luxemburg regarded this was too much of a
concession to the PSS’s nationalism.109 Her position shifted, however, to support for territorial
national autonomy for Poland.110

Organisationally, the SDKPiL favoured local coordination of Polish, German and Jewish
members through unified territorial rather than national committees.111 But its negotiations on entry
into the RSDLP, collapsed not only over the right of nations to self-determination, but also because the SDKPiL insisted that the all-Russian Party should be federal in structure.\textsuperscript{112}

The SDKPiL actively fought anti-semitism amongst Polish workers. The first issue of the Party organ, \textit{Czerwony sztandar}, in November 1902 proclaimed ‘the Jewish workers are our brothers, they are just as much proletarians as Polish workers’. This defence of the Jews won some Jewish members of the PPS over to the SDKPiL.\textsuperscript{113} But the Bund’s size and influence meant that it had an extremely limited capacity to organise Jewish workers. The Polish social democrats also regarded the Bund’s claims that only it could defend the interests of Jewish workers as undermining their own efforts to mobilise the Polish working class “to defend the Jewish population”.\textsuperscript{114} The SDKPiL opposed the demand for cultural national autonomy and argued that progressive Jews, including the Jewish working class would sooner or later conclude that they must adopt Polish culture. They should not, however, be coerced into this conclusion.\textsuperscript{115} Jewish emancipation was one of the democratic tasks of the socialist movement.\textsuperscript{116}

While the Polish social democrats of Congress Poland were critical of Bund there were in the period before the 1905 revolution close relations between the two organisations, mediated particularly by Feliks Dzierzynski, who in Krakow from late January 1903 was the SDKPiL leader most responsible for coordinating the organisation inside Congress Poland.\textsuperscript{117} The Party’s reestablishment inside Congress Poland from 1899 owed a great deal to the organisational assistance of the Bund. In Lodz, Congress Poland’s most important industrial city, Bund militants established a local SDKP organisation in 1899.\textsuperscript{118} Despite the SDKPiL’s position on the national question, which presented no obstacle to organisational unity, the Party remained outside the RSDLP in 1903. Its leadership regarded the Russian organisation as too soft on Polish nationalism and therefore the PPS.

\textbf{Russian social democracy}

The position of the Bolsheviks, who also fought an empire presiding over many oppressed nations, in which large numbers of Jews formed a significant minority, provided a dramatic organisational and programmatic contrast to policies of the Austrian Party on the national and Jewish questions. The First Congress of the RSDLP affirmed the right of nations to self-determination.\textsuperscript{119} The meaning of the demand was not, however, spelt out and the Party was soon broken up by police repression. A distinctive Russian position first became apparent in the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party at its Second Congress in 1903. This Congress essentially refounded the Party.

The question of Party organisation led to the splits at the Congress. First, as we have seen, the Bundists departed when the Congress rejected their federal conception of the organisation. The Iskraists, the current which had played the main role in convening the Congress, sought to reestablish the Party as a tight, organisation around a central organ. Their views were expressed most systematically in Lenin’s \textit{What is to be done}?\textsuperscript{120} Lenin, however, regarded the ‘autonomy’ accorded to constituent organisations of the Russian Party in its 1898 rules as ‘providing the Jewish working-class movement with all it needs: propaganda and agitation in Yiddish, its own literature and congresses, the right to advance separate demands to supplement a single general Social-Democratic program and to satisfy local needs and requirements arising out of the special features of Jewish life’.\textsuperscript{121} It was precisely these means of organising which the PPSD leadership denied the Jewish workers in Galicia.

At the Congress a division also emerged inside the Iskraist camp over the question of the definition of party membership and discipline. In the spirit of \textit{What is to be done}?\textsuperscript{,} the future Bolsheviks insisted that the party’s political unity and effectiveness were dependent on members being bound to carry out party policy. The future Mensheviks favoured a looser conception of party membership. They found support amongst the longstanding opponents of the \textit{Iskra} proposals for a centralised Party who remained at the Congress.\textsuperscript{122} Lenin’s conception of party organisation was designed to limit the freedom of action of opportunist social democrats who made concessions to bourgeois ideas. They should be obliged to carry out the decisions of the democratically determined
decisions of Party Congresses and the leadership elected by them. At the time of the Second Congress, this applied particularly to the ‘economists’ who maintained that the Russian working class was not yet ready for political activity and should concentrate on struggles over wages and conditions. But the principle was relevant to ensuring unity in struggle over other issues too, not least against national oppression and the oppression of the Jews.\textsuperscript{123}

The Congress reaffirmed the right of self-determination for the oppressed nationalities of the Tsarist Empire.\textsuperscript{124} This meant being prepared to support its dismemberment into independent national states. The Party program also included demands for the right to education in individuals’ native languages and equality of languages in local state institutions. Such rights were as relevant to Yiddish as to other minority languages in the Empire. After the Party split, the Bolsheviks retained these points in their program.\textsuperscript{125} Both before and after the 1903 Congress, the radical wing of Russian social democracy stressed the importance of defending the rights of oppressed groups—women, religious currents and students, subordinate nationalities. This approach was central to Lenin’s conception of Marxist politics, because ‘working-class consciousness cannot be genuine political consciousness unless the workers are trained to respond to all cases of tyranny, oppression, violence, and abuse, no matter what class is affected’.\textsuperscript{126}

The Bolsheviks’ organisational centralisation and their determined support for the struggles of the oppressed, including the possible break up of the Russian Empire on the basis of the right of nations to self-determination, reinforced each other. Consistent and active opposition to oppression gave members of oppressed minorities, including nations, confidence in the Party’s commitment to their interests not only as workers but as the victims of discrimination and persecution. Organisational centralism, made involvement in struggles against oppression an obligation for all Party members, including those from dominant nations and groups. Although the relevance of the principle of supporting the struggles of the oppressed to the national question was apparent in 1902, much of the Bolshevik elaboration of the right of nations to self-determination took place a decade later in the course of their critique of the demand for national cultural autonomy. In 1914 Lenin argued

‘... in Russia the proletariat of both the oppressed and oppressor nations are fighting, and must fight, side by side. The task is to preserve the unity of the proletariat’s class struggle for socialism, and to resist all bourgeois and Black-Hundred nationalist influences.’\textsuperscript{127}

While support for the right to self-determination did not mean that the Party would support the exercise of this right under all circumstances, the Bolsheviks consistently opposed the nationalism of the dominant Great Russian group in the Empire. This made them a pole of political attraction not only for militant Russian socialists and workers, but also for those from other nationalities and oppressed groups in the Empire. Their long term fight against Russian chauvinism was an ingredient in the Bolsheviks’ success in leading the Russian revolution of October 1917. The approach of many leading Mensheviks was rather different. Particularly from 1912 on, influential Mensheviks criticised support for the right to national self-determination, in favour of national cultural autonomy.\textsuperscript{128} This pandered to Russian nationalism because it did not countenance the break-up of the Empire. But it also served to reinforce the nationalism of oppressed nations by supporting the institutionalisation of national differences.

In his \textit{History of the Russian revolution}, Trotsky sketched the fundamental differences in the approaches of the Austrian social democratic Party and the Bolsheviks to the questions of both party structure and national oppression.

‘Bolshevism based itself upon the assumption of an outbreak of national revolutions continuing for decades to come, and instructed the advanced workers in this spirit. The Austrian social democracy, on the contrary, submissively accommodated itself to the policy of the ruling classes; it defended the compulsory co-citizenship of ten nations in the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and at the same time, being absolutely incapable of
achieving a revolutionary union of workers of these different nationalities, fenced them off in the party and in the trade unions with vertical partitions."129

‘Throughout a decade and a half Lenin, in implacable conflict with all shades of Great Russian chauvinism, preached the right of all oppressed nations to cut away from the empire of the Czars. The Bolsheviks were accused of aspiring toward the dismemberment of Russia, but this bold revolutionary formulation of the national problem won for the Bolshevik party the indestructible confidence of the small and oppressed peoples of czarist Russia.’130

Raimund Löw has, moreover, pointed out that ‘despite all the thorough investigations undertaken at the beginning of the Century, the [Austrian] Party never made the distinction between oppressed and oppressing nations, which was the key to Bolshevik nationality policies.’131

**Choices**

Social democrats in Galicia who sought to organise the Jewish working class faced a number of choices in how they could take their task further. In 1904 and 1905, the most pressing issue was organisational. What should the relationship between Jewish workers’ organisations and the rest of the social democratic movement be. This, however, had implications for how they understood the Jewish and national questions. It posed programmatic choices too.

**The question of a national organisation**

It was perfectly clear that the politics of the PPSD leadership offered little to the Yiddish speaking working class of Galicia. The alternative Jewish militants chose was shaped in particular by organisational developments and political circumstances in Galicia and Austria but also by programmatic questions. In mid 1904 there seemed to be two options. The first, to which the leading Jewish activists already leaned, was organisational separation, following the model of the Bund, whose organisation had flourished despite its departure from the RSDLP. In any case, a plausible argument could be made that a Jewish Party in Galicia should be recognised as federal component of the General Austrian Party. The second option was to fight the PPSD leadership in alliance with oppositionists who identified with the politics of the SDKPiL and the small Warsaw based Proletariat organisation. For a period they pursued both strategies at the same time.

Links between Jewish activists in Lemberg dated back a long way. Jewish workers established a committee for social democratic self-education there in 1898. Its members were Isaac Blind, Oziash Neker, Abraham Poch and Leon Stengel. This group made use of Bund and American material in Yiddish and had contact with a Bundist, Rosen, who had passed through Lemberg on his way west. From London, Rosen sent the committee Bundist pamphlets.132 Then, in November 1902, members of the committee sought the Bund’s help in setting up a separate Jewish Party social democratic organisation in Galicia. When the Bund was not prepared to assist them they took no initiatives of their own.133

Contacts between Jewish activists in Krakow developed later. After the 1903 conference of Jewish socialists, the political position of the leading Jewish activists in Krakow hardened. In early 1904 they had contact with Jakobi, a typesetter and experienced Bundist then resident in their city. Jakobi had been a member of the Bund committees in Warsaw and Lodz. Through him the Krakow activists gained access to Bund literature for the first time. And the ‘Bundist world view’ of a small circle of leading activists ‘took hold and crystallised in discussions with him.’134 At the 9th PPSD Congress they advocated an independent Jewish social democratic party.135 Bronislaw Grosser’s presence in Krakow in late 1904 consolidated this orientation. Grosser, a Bundist student from Warsaw, was an excellent speaker and soon, during the 1905 revolution, a prominent Bund leader. While in Krakow, he gave a public address on the Bund, under the auspices of the radical student organisation *Ruch*, in which Henryk Grossman was a leading figure. The event had considerable impact on the left. Participants in the discussion which followed included Emil Häcker,
editor of the PPSD daily Naprzod; Maksymilian Horwitz of the PPS, later a leader of the PPS (Left) and a founder of the Polish Communist Workers Party; Feliks Dzierzynski of the SDKPiL and his associate Karl Radek; and Henryk Grossman. In practical terms, Grossman was also involved in smuggling Bundist literature into Russia. Grossman’s January 1905 polemic against Kelles-Krauz expressed a generally Bundist orientation and demonstrated a familiarity with the Bund’s theoretical literature. He affirmed the existence of a Jewish nation in eastern Europe and that, unlike the Jews of western Europe, would not be assimilated out of existence in the near future. In fact he accused Vladimir Medem (Winnicki) of adopting too conciliatory a position. But his argument was focussed on the question of Jewish working class organisation rather than broader national demands. There was, Grossman maintained, no Jewish question in general, but rather one Jewish question for the Jewish bourgeoisie and another for the Jewish proletariat. Drawing on Helvetius’s description of the contradictions between the two hostile nations, rulers and ruled, concealed in the appearance of national unity, he pointed out that ‘in a capitalist society there is no uniform national consciousness.’ The bourgeois Jewish question, the oppression of the Jews in general despite its specific anti-Jewish form, is only a part of a general campaign in a class society, and the oppression of Jews is a part of a general oppression.

For the proletariat, the Jewish question in this sense has ceased to be an issue. At this stage, Grossman, like the Zetterbaum, the SDKPiL or RSDLP but unlike the Bund, regarded the struggle against the oppression of the Jews as identical with the struggle for democracy and equal rights of all people. For him the real question was how to mobilise Jewish workers, ‘… The Jewish question can only be considered as a question about the choice of the most effective means for attaining the goal of proletarian power.’ The answer was an independent Jewish socialist organisation.

Despite their growing, but as yet incomplete identification with the Bund, the Jewish militants also united with other dissidents in the Party to fight the PPSD leadership. This option was compatible with the positions of the Polish and Russian social democratic parties on the national question. Grossman had longstanding links to the SDKPiL. He had worked alongside SDKPiL sympathisers in radical student organisations, in which he had played a prominent role since high school. On 3 February 1904, he had joined an SDKPiL dominated committee which raised funds for imprisoned socialists in Congress Poland. Grossman’s contact in Krakow with Dzierzynski, who left for Warsaw to participate in the revolution early in 1905, gave rise to his involvement in smuggling material for the SDKPiL into the Russian Empire. This may have reflected cooperation between the SDKPiL and the Bund. At the 9th Congress the Jewish activists joined forces with other oppositionists against the leadership’s commitment to the PPS.

After the Congress, Grossman played an important part in another effort to unite the left. He was the founding editor of the student journal Zjednoczenie (Unity), published from February 1905. The journal brought together radical socialists both inside and outside the PPSD. Its appearance prompted a scurrilous attack in the PPSD’s organ, Naprzod, and a very public conflict. In the course of this fight Grossman was, on 26 February, expelled from the PPSD. Protest meetings were held and Jewish workers expressed their support for Grossman. Eventually a compromise was reached. The PPSD’s Central Committee, regretting the lax supervision of Jewish associations by the Krakow Party Committee, pushed Naprzod to retract some of its allegations and reinstated Grossman’s membership on 16 March. For his part, Grossman, concerned to stay in close contact with Jewish workers inside the PPSD if only for the time being, agreed to resign from Zjednoczenie editorial board on the urging of a meeting of 300, mainly Jewish workers, on 4 March. Subsequently other Jewish activists continued to play an important role in the journal for some years, but they, like Grossman, were by then outside the PPSD.

Walentyna Najdus has noted the influence of the SDKPiL on the Jewish activists. Arguing that their views and especially those ‘of their advocate Grossman were a peculiar amalgam of the positions of Austrian social democracy, the Bund and the SDKPiL. On the one hand, following the SDKPiL, they denied the existence of universal national interests. On the other, they exhibited a
tendency to organisational separateness on the basis of the Bund’s principal of nationality.’147 This over states the impact of Polish social democracy on Grossman. The dominant influence on his stance in The proletariat in the face of the Jewish question was undoubtedly the example and positions of the Bund. He certainly raised original arguments and took the circumstances of the Jewish proletariat into Galicia into account. But his basic class analysis of nationalism was the common property of the Marxist tradition, starting with Marx and Engels, elaborated by Kautsky in the German Party and expressed by Martov in the early Jewish/Russian social democratic movement, Medem in the Bund and Luxemburg in the SDKPiL. Nor was his identification of the struggle against the oppression of the Jews with the broader struggle for civil rights unique to the SDKPiL. It was also the position of the Bund before 1901, the PPS/PPSD, RSDLP and, for that matter, various bourgeois liberal currents.

During spring 1905 space for the pursuing a strategy of opposition inside the PPSD and therefore for adopting the organisational perspectives of either the SDKPiL or RSDLP was eliminated. But before examining how this happened, it is worth considering other reasons for the unattractiveness of the approaches of Polish and Russian social democracy. Most importantly, the Bund’s hegemony meant that the scope of Bolshevik and SDKPiL activities amongst Yiddish speaking workers were very limited. They did not therefore, provide direct, practical models. Two other factors may have diminished the appeal of Luxemburg’s and Lenin’s positions. First, the Russian position, in some respects, could be conflated with the PPSD’s stance. On the one hand it involved a commitment to the right of nations to self-determination and opposition to national oppression. On the other, in the course of polemics with the Bund over the question of Party organisation, around the 1903 RSDLP Congress, Lenin had rejected the idea that Jews were a nation and argued that the alternatives facing the Jews were isolation and assimilation.148 This sounded similar to the PPSD, with its formal position of fighting for Jewish equality (while its assimilationist practice created obstacles to mobilising Jewish workers) and emphasis on Polish independence. Secondly, the adoption of a Bolshevik or SDKPiL position by Jewish social democrats in Galicia would have done little to alleviate their immediate problems. The Bolsheviks mainly represented Russian workers, that is workers from the dominant national group in the Tsarist Empire. Their determined opposition to oppression could inspire confidence, on the part of socialists from oppressed groups, in organisational unity. Similarly, the Jewish activists actually did have a critique of the PPSD/PPS’s nationalism much like that of the SDKPiL. But there was no significant organisation of Polish workers in Galicia which shared this position. So there was no way the Jewish dissidents could organisationally express an anti-nationalist working class internationalism like that of the SDKPiL. In other words, the underlying problem for the leading Jewish militants in Krakow and Lemberg was precisely that the internationalism of the social democratic leaders of the dominant groups in Galicia (Poles) and the Austrian Empire (Germans) was to a large extent rhetorical.

In March 1905 an administrative decision by the Galician Trade Union Commission, prompted by the PPSD leadership, effectively closed off the possibility following the organisational injunctions of the SDKPiL and RSDLP positions in order to achieve their programmatic precepts. In other words, it became impossible for the leaders of the Jewish working class in Galicia to try to change the politics of the PPSD from within. The Commission moved to liquidate the basic organisations of the Jewish working class: local unions and education associations. The Jewish militants, who had been building these organisations for several years transformed their small clandestine caucus and their public theoretical differences with the Party leadership into an open organisational split. This organisational step had programmatic implications, although these did not come to immediate fruition. News from Russia, about the revolution and the role of the Bund and other social democrats in it, created an optimistic atmosphere in the Austrian socialist movement, particularly amongst the founders of the new Jewish Party.

The establishment of the Jewish Social Democratic Party of Galicia (JSDP) on May Day 1905 was associated with concrete demonstrations of the internationalism of the new organisation. Not only did its followers join the PPSD’s May Day rallies. They even collected money for Naprzod.149
The establishment of the JSDP was justified in two ways, which were not regarded as being contradictory. Henryk Grossman expressed the dominant position: ÖSDAP rhetoric filled with a sometimes explicitly Bundist content in a series of JSDP publications directed at its own membership, rank and file Polish socialists, the Austrian General Party Congress and the Czech Party. As in his earlier pamphlet, he maintained that Galician Jews were a nation. The most effective way to organise Jewish workers was in their own party, affiliated to the General Austrian organisation. In making his case, Grossman displaying an appreciation for the history of the Austrian Party much more sophisticated than that of the PPSD leadership. Unfortunately the Polish leaders had all the advantages of numbers, contacts and resources on their side.

The JSDP’s widespread support amongst Jewish workers was, nevertheless, indicated by the attendance of 52 delegates from eight large urban centres in Galicia at its founding Congress in Lemberg on 9-10 June 1905. The Congress was opened on the anniversary of the death of the Bundist martyr Hersh Lekert, by ‘a well trained male choir giving a beautiful rendition of “Di Shvue”’, the Bund’s anthem. During the Congress, Anselm Mosler, who had not been involved in the preparations for the split, offered a second, pragmatic rationale for the new organisation. Mosler was a long standing and radical PPSD member from Buczacz in eastern Galicia, an outspoken critic of Daszynski’s leadership and active in organising rural Ukrainian workers. At the 1904 PPSD Congress he was physically prevented from continuing his speech against Polish nationalism and the alliance with the PPS. To the members of the JSDP he affirmed that

I personally believe that the best form of organisation is indeed territorial. That is, instead of Polish, Ruthenian and Jewish parties on Galician territory we should have just one party, a Galician one. However, if the Germans, the Czechs, the Poles, the Ruthenians, the Italians and the Southern Slavs have their own organisations, I don’t see any reason why the Jews should not have the same right as the rest. Where is it written that there shall only be six national organisations in Austria (the German, Czech, Polish, Italian, Slovenian and Ruthenian) and not, God forbid, seven?! We can in fact see that the number of national organisations is not fixed. We had three organisations, the German, the Czech and the Polish. After 1897 there were, in addition, the Italians and the Slovenians and finally in 1899 the Ruthenians. So we see that the number of organisations is not fixed. From three it leapt to six and now by magic the seventh, Jewish Party, blossoms forth.

This position was compatible with the analysis behind the RSDLP and SDKPiL positions. Rosa Luxemburg, however, criticised the establishment of the new Party on the basis of Grossman’s arguments for an independent Party. As an aside in a polemic against the PPS, she noted that the PPSD had sown the seed for the JSDP split by supporting the separatism of the PPS in Germany and Russia. At its second Congress, in May 1906, the JSDP adopted a formal position on the Jewish/national question that was quite incompatible with RSDLP and SDKPiL positions.

**The question of a national program**

JSDP publications and pronouncements during the first year of the Party’s existence consistently affirmed the Party’s adherence to the program of the Austrian Party, including its national program. There was a heated discussion at the first Jewish Social Democratic Congress over whether it should raise Jewish national demands. The JSDP’s leading intellectuals, ‘Comrades Rose, Grossman, Bross, Einäugler explained in extensive speeches that not a single socialist organisation had raised national demands at the time of its emergence, nor should the Jewish Party. In setting up a Jewish Agitation Committee in 1903, the PPSD had agreed that the Jewish proletariat had distinct needs in agitation and the Jewish Party was not set up for national purposes but simply to better and more successfully agitate amongst the Jewish proletariat.'156

Their position at the second Congress, at the end of May 1906 in Lemberg, was different. Pressures to take a position on the national question came from competitors, critics and allies. The
influences of the PPSD and Labour Zionists, the Austrian Party, and the Bund are considered in turn below. But the key factor was undoubtedly the need for the Party to provide members with a credible strategy for combating the oppression they suffered as Jews, now that their right to a Jewish Party had been realised and in the absence of powerful allies in the Austrian labour movement committed to the fighting the oppression of Jews.

As we have seen, one of the PPSD leaders’ main criticisms of the new national organisation was that did not have a programmatic rationale for its own existence in the form of specific national demands. Labour Zionists competition with the JSDP for the allegiance of Jewish workers also drew attention to the national question. There were differences in the social composition of Poale Zion and the JSDP. According to Horn, a Zionist, ‘The manual workers were all organised in the ZPS [i.e. JSDP] unions’ while shop assistants and kheder teachers tended to be associated with Poale Zion. But Poale Zion offered an escapist response to the oppression Jewish workers experienced. It promoted both the utopian idea of a Zionist state and the practical escape, though followed by a small minority of the movement’s supporters, of emigration to Palestine. While social democrats mobilised workers to struggle against despotism and for democracy and socialism, Zionism held out the prospect of Jewish emancipation by means of diplomatic and colonial collaboration with emperors. Popular pressure during the upheavals of 1905, however, persuaded Zionist leaders that the movement could not abstain from involvement in the politics in the diaspora.

Poale Zionist influence was apparent at the second JSDP Congress, when a comrade Meyzels was critical of the Party’s lack of a position on the national question. He criticised Grossman in particular for arguing that the Jews were made up of two nations, one proletarian the other bourgeois. While Jewish workers and bosses are only in conflict over economic questions. On cultural affairs they should be united. Meyzels supported the Party adopting the Zionist proposals for electoral reform. This was necessary in order to combat the assimilation of the Jews, which contrary to Grossman, was taking place, mainly due to the fact that Jews were forced to learn Polish at school. But, as we have seen, the Bund’s position on the national question offered an alternative to Zionism and was, to some extent, formulated by Bundists in Switzerland specifically to serve as one. During 1905 the revolution the Bund and the Russian social democratic movement in general had dramatic successes. On the other hand the autocarchy encouraged pogroms to mobilise counter-revolutionary support on the basis of anti-semitism. These developments were the background to the Bund’s fifth Congress, in Zürich in October 1905. As we have seen, the Congress included the demand for Jewish national cultural autonomy in the Bund’s minimum program for the first time.

The General Party Congress of 30 October-2 November 1905 in Vienna took place in the midst of a massive popular movement in favour of universal suffrage in Austria, triggered by the Hungarian government’s support for universal suffrage and the Tsar’s concession of a broad franchise and budgetary control to the Duma (parliament) in the face of the rising revolutionary tide in Russia. The Sotsial-demokrat reported that the Jewish Party’s representatives at the General Party Congress had withdrawn their appeal for affiliation to the General Party in the interests of working class solidarity in order to make space for discussion and organisation of the mass movement. This report indicated that the JSDP had not succeeded in becoming a part of the General organisation. The immediate need for the strictest programmatic orthodoxy in order to impress the General Party had therefore passed. In fact, the same issue of the Party newspaper advocated Springer’s national autonomy on a personal basis. An article ‘On the national question’ argued that democratic associations of all nationalities should be set up. These should administer the cultural affairs, especially the schools of each nationality. The central state’s right to legislate in these areas should be transferred to the national associations’, which should have the power to taxes their members. But membership of any nationality should be voluntary. This solution, the article maintained, would reduce national rivalry in Austria lead to greater clarity in economic and social conflicts.

Precisely this argument was made at JSDP’s second Congress, of 30-31 May in Lemberg, for adopting the demand for national cultural autonomy. The wording of the resolution followed the Bund’s formulation. In fact this was the first JSDP Congress at which the Bund was formally
represented. Its delegate was a founding leader, ‘Lonu’ (Shmuel Gozhansky), whose work in the early 1890s had pioneered agitation (as opposed to small educational groups) amongst workers in Russia. His presence ensured that the Bund’s achievements and positions were well known to Congress participants. Gozhansky’s attendance and that of Nathan Tropper, a member of the executive of the Social Democratic Party in Bukovina, also indicated that the JSDP was not entirely isolated.

‘A powerful organisation, in the Bund, stands on our side. It also had to struggle against the same accusations and slurs as we do and it triumphed over them all. Today the Bund is recognised everywhere as a power, as the avant garde of the Russian revolution. The appearance of the Bund’s representative at our congress gave us a new enthusiasm for the struggle because, to us, the Bund is an eternal model of struggle.’

Gozhansky’s affirmation that ‘the Jewish proletariat, separately organised, marches together with the international proletariat in the struggle for common goals. Long live the international proletariat!’ was greeted with ‘stormy and lengthy applause’. The successes of both the Bund and the JSDP increased the self-confidence of the Galician organisation. Confidence in their own collective capacity, despite the active hostility of the PPSD and the failure of absence of the General Party to extend recognition to the Jewish Party, no doubt extended to the important programmatic decision made at the Congress.

Henryk Grossman delivered the main report to Congress on electoral reform. It demonstrated the Party’s internationalism and militant tactics by placing the issue of universal suffrage in the context of the proletariat’s broader struggle. His analysis of the relationship between periods of revolution and quieter political development, attitude to the mass strike and support for the Bund’s approach in the Russian Empire expressed the views of the centre and left of European social democracy. But they contrasted with Daszynski’s hostility to the general strike tactic in Congress Poland on nationalist grounds.

Having discussed the means through which the working class could achieve the goal of universal suffrage, Grossman offered a critique of other electoral proposals, particularly those supported (inconsistently) by the Zionists in Krakow: proportional representation and national curia. He pointed out, in particular, that advocated these electoral systems as solutions to the national problem. His conclusion was convincing ‘electoral systems, even the best of them, won’t end national struggles’. On the contrary, Grossman maintained, the means to solve the national question lay in institutional changes summed up in the theory of national cultural autonomy. His proposals were along the lines proposed by Renner. Once it was democratised through the introduction of universal suffrage, parliament’s competence in the area of national and cultural affairs, primarily educational matters, should be passed to democratic national cultural institutions. ‘Everyone knows’, he asserted, reproducing the weakness of the General Party’s attitude to the Empire, ‘that only this solution can prevent Austria from falling to pieces’. Grossman also maintained, as the Austrian Party and the nationalist section of the Bund did, that ‘freed from national conflict the central parliament will become a field of transparent class struggle.’ It is true that education was a key issue in national conflicts during the period before World War I and that the absence of state funded instruction in Yiddish was an important question for the Jewish working class. The idea that national cultural autonomy would remove the national question from the political and economic agenda was, however, utopian. Perhaps conflicts over language rights could have been moderated this way, though the disputes over linguistic qualifications for public servants in Bohemia, for example, should have led to scepticism. But, as we have seen, the national question cannot be reduced to linguistic matters. Grossman’s own mention, in passing, of the 1906 controversy over the Hungarian demand for an autonomous tariff was an excellent demonstration of the inextricability of national, economic and political issues.

In 1907 Grossman wrote Bundizm in Galitsien, an account of the development of the Jewish socialist movement in Galicia. The pamphlet provided a systematic justification for the JSDP’s existence. It was also a sophisticated analysis of the relationship between political organisation and
consciousness. Grossman’s arguments in 1907 also represented a huge advance over his 1905 pamphlet in providing a dialectical account of organisational and programmatic aspects of the national question.

By neglecting the struggle for improving Jewish workers’ immediate conditions, Grossman argued, the PPSD had left the way open for Zionism to win support in the working class.167 In a word, the PPSD turned the class struggle of the Jewish proletariat into a chauvinist fight between two nationalisms.168 While Jewish workers were already turning away from Zionism and Polish socialism, which did not address the practical needs of their struggles, the Bund provided a model for a coherent political alternative.169 The PPSD did not and was theoretically unequipped to undertake the necessary tasks of analysing ‘all the practical interests’ of the Jewish workers’ movement, and all the important phenomena of Jewish social life,170 which was a precondition for giving socialism practical significance to Jewish workers and winning them from rival ideologies.170 Only a Jewish working class party could do these things.171 The Jewish working class in Galicia had been moving towards this conclusion on the basis of practical experience. The Bund’s literature and activity confirmed that it could be successful.172 But Grossman identified an apparent vicious circle in mobilising the Jewish working class. In order to develop its class and national consciousness, the Jewish working class needed national cultural institutions. But in order to gain the institutions it needed to have a high level of consciousness. He identified the experience of the struggle as the way out of this contradiction. In the course of the struggle workers both transform their consciousness and the world:

The solution to this apparent contradiction will be achieved through the very class struggle of the Jewish proletariat: on the one hand, through its political struggles, it achieves national and cultural conditions in the state. At the same time, through the process of struggle, it becomes both class and nationally conscious. By achieving class consciousness through political struggle, it requires its opponent to make concessions and thus both transforms its environment, capitalist society, and prompts it to consider its own national-cultural needs, to the extent that the Jewish proletariat becomes nationally conscious and develops itself.173

An effective party was, again, essential as a catalyst for this kind of struggle.174 Grossman’s arguments in Bundism in Galitsien could just as easily have justified consistent struggle for Jewish civil, including language rights as opposed to national cultural autonomy. But, as a slogan national cultural autonomy expressed the JSDP’s affinity to the Bund and the hope that Jewish rights could be accommodated in the (German-)Austrian Party’s unofficial position on the national question. The Jewish Party’s activities in pursuit of national cultural autonomy were mainly indistinguishable from struggles for civil rights and democracy and against oppression. They included participation in the first Yiddish Language Conference in Czernowitz in 1908; a campaign for recognition of Yiddish as a vernacular language in the 1910 population census; involvement in the affairs of the kehile (local Jewish religious administration which had legal authority over Jews); and (after Grossman had left Krakow for Vienna in late 1908) support for a modern Yiddish school system. The differences between national cultural autonomy and demands for civil rights were, however, particularly apparent in education policy. First national cultural autonomy in education implied national differences were so strong that it was impossible for the institutions of a central democratic state, especially a single education system, to secure the rights of minorities. If achieved, the demand would, secondly, reinforce the separation between national groups by segregating children into different schools.175 Educational segregation was not, it should be added, challenged by any influential section of the Austrian social democratic movement.

For five years, national cultural autonomy was not an issue in the Jewish social democrats’ relations with the General and Polish Parties, given the poisonous hostility of the PPSD leadership to the very concept of the JSDP. It continued, nevertheless, to pursue organisation unity with the General Party and as an expression of its internationalism to participate in its political campaigns. In the period leading up to the 1911 elections to the Austrian Parliament, however, the PPSD’s attitude
to the JSDP softened. Presented with an opportunity to achieve closer ties with the wider social
democratic movement and to bring about a fusion with the rump Jewish Section of the PPSD, the
Jewish Party was prepared to change its position on the national question. It dropped national
cultural autonomy from its program. The fusion of the JSDP and the much smaller Jewish Section
was an important tactical achievement which totally eliminated the JSDP’s only social democratic
rival on the ‘yidishe gas’ (Jewish street). But the PPSD’s policy shift was simply a cynical electoral
manoeuvre. Its commitment to Polish nationalism was in fact deepening during this period. In order
to maintain friendly relations with the Polish Party and under pressure from the former leaders of its
Jewish Section, the united JSDP also made concessions to Polish nationalism in 1911-1913. What is
more, the JSDP’s position on the national question simply reverted to the old Brünn program,
superseded by the German Party’s de facto endorsement of the Renner-Bauer position and rendered
ineffective by the break-up of the General Party in the period after 1907. But no organisational or
programmatic alternative was available. There was no significant or coherent internationalist current
or even the most rudimentary of networks of militants (apart from Strasser’s localised following)
amongst the working classes of the larger nations. Even less in evidence were any advocates of a
position on the national question like that of the Bolsheviks. Jakob Bross’s address to the October
1913 6th JSDP Congress explained that national cultural autonomy had been removed from the
program in order to bring it into line again with the General program in order to facilitate
recognition by the Austrian Party. Nevertheless, he maintained, ‘we remain convinced supporters of
national cultural autonomy’.

The PPSD’s headlong nationalist plunge and devotion to the
Austrian cause in the approaching war eventually led its December 1913 Congress to sever links
with the JSDP. The leaders of the old Jewish Section, but not its rank and file, returned to
the Polish Party.

World War I effectively broke up the JSDP for three years. The Party conferences in Autumn
1917 and October 1918 which reassembled the organisation also formally resurrected the demand
for national cultural autonomy. This position was maintained when, in 1920, the Jewish social
democrats fused with the Polish Bund in independent Poland.

The JSDP did fight both the exploitation and the oppression of Jewish workers. The particular
programmatic and practical form its struggles took was largely shaped by a basic commitment to the
interests of the Jewish working class on the one hand and the politics of the larger organisations of
dominant nations in the Austrian empire on the other. There were flaws in its approach, but they
were conditioned by the stances of these other, more influential Parties.

Endnotes

1 Jakob Thon ‘Die Berufsgliederung der Juden in Galizien’ Zeitschrift für Demographie und Statistik der Juden 3(8-
9) August-September 1907 pp. 114-116. The category ‘Workers’ (Arbeiter) did not include ‘Day Labourers’
(Tagelöhner).

2 Martha Rozenblit, The Jews of Vienna, 1867-1914: assimilation and identify State University of New York Press,
Arbeiterbewegung Europaverlag, Vienna 1975 p. 119.

3 Gerald Stourzh ‘Galten die Juden als Nationalät Altösterreichs?’ in Drabek, Anna, Mordechai Eliav and Gerald
Stourzh Prag, Czernowitz, Jerusalem: der Österreichische Staat und die Juden von Zeitalter des Absolutismus bis
dez Ende der Monarchie, Studia Judaica Austrica 10, Edition Toetzer, Eisenstadt 1984 pp. 73-98; Gerald
Stourzh Die Gleichberechtigung der Nationalitäten in der Verfassung und Verwaltung Österreichs 1848-1918
Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Wien 1985 pp. 74-80; Emil Brix Die
Umgangssprachen in Altösterreich zwischen Agitation und Assimilation: Die Sprachenstatistik in den
zisleithanischen Volkszählungen 1880 bis 1910 Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für Neuere Geschichte
Österreichs Band 72, Herman Böhlaus, Graz 1982 pp. 353-387.

4 Known as Henryk Grossmann in the German and English speaking world, he was, from the late 1920s, the first
Marxist economist to take seriously Marx’s identification of the capitalist production process itself as the cause
of economic crises, see Rick Kuhn ‘Capitalism’s Collapse: Henryk Grossmann’s Marxism’ Science and Society 59
Note, I have only transliterated people’s name from Yiddish where I am not aware of contemporary versions of their names in the Roman alphabet, these contemporary versions were used in Polish or German.


Bunzl Klassenkampf in der Diaspora op. cit. p. 124.


Johann Pollak undertook a persuasive examination of the appeal of Zionism to different classes and concluded that it was principally a movement of intellectuals ‘Der politische Zionismus’ Die Neue Zeit 16 (1) number 19 1897-1898 pp. 596-600.

Robert Wistrich Socialism and the Jews: the dilemmas of assimilation in Germany and Austria-Hungary Littleman Library of Jewish Civilisation, Associated University Presses East Brunswick 1982 p. 96, from a Zionist viewpoint, and Jack Jacobs On socialists and ‘the Jewish question’ after Marx New York University Press, New York 1992, from a Bundist standpoint, provide impressively systematic accounts of German and Austrian social democratic analyses of the Jewish question. The following account draws extensively on their work.

Wistrich Socialism and the Jews op. cit. p. 99

This statement, ‘Über den Antisemitismus’ Karl Marx Friedrich Engels Werke volume 22, Dietz, Berlin 1963 pp. 49-51 appeared in the Vienna Arbeiter-Zeitung 19 on 9 May 1890, the Berliner Volksblatt 109 13 May 1890, the Munich Das Recht auf Arbeit 315 28 May 1890 and Der Sozialdemokrat 7-6-1890. Jacobs On socialists and ‘the Jewish question’ op. cit. pp. 1213, 55-57, points out that Kautsky and Bernstein had already expressed concern over the influence of anti-semitism to Engels during the 1880s. Kautsky started publishing condemnations of anti-semitism during that decade, Bernstein during the early 1890s.

August Bebel ‘Vorschlag einer Resolution zum Thema Antisemitismus und Sozialdemokratie’ in in Irving Fetscher (ed.) Marxisten gegen Antisemitismus op. cit. pp. 58-76. Wistrich pointed out that ‘The spontaneous resistance to the [anti-semitic] Steocke movement which had been so characteristic of the 1880s gave way to a more equivocal, fatalistic interpretation of anti-semitism’ in the 1890s and surveyed optimistic predictions that capitalism would inevitably lead to the decline of anti-semitism in German social democratic press of the 1890s Socialism and the Jews op. cit. pp. 10, 107-115.


Grossman Der Bundizm in Galitse op. cit. pp. 16, 22, 25; Sigmund Glicksman ‘Etapen biz zu der proklamierung fun der JSDP in Galitsie’ (‘Steps leading to the proclamation of the JSDP of Galicia’) Sotsial-demokrat 1-5-1920 pp. 2-4


Rosa Luxemburg ‘Neue Strömungen in der polnischen sozialistischen Bewegung in Deutschland und Österreich’ Neue Zeit 14 (2) numbers 32, 33, 29 April 1896 and 6 May 1896 pp. 177, 206, 209.

For an expression of the connection between Polish nationalism, hostility to Russia and support for the maintenance of the Austrian state (in modernised form) see Ignacy Daszynski ‘Die Tage in Oesterreich’ Die Neue Zeit 16 (1) number 23 1897-1898 pp. 718-723.


24. For earlier contributions see I. Ignatieff (Alexander Helphand/Parvus) ‘Rusisch-jüdische Arbeiter über die Judenfrage’ *Die Neue Zeit* 11 (1) number 6 1893 pp. 175-179 characterised Jewish colonisation of Palestine as a capitalist goal; as Emil Häcker ‘Über den Zionismus’ *Die Neue Zeit* 13 (2) no. 50 1895 pp. 759-760, this polemic characterises Zionism as bourgeois, petty bourgeois and lumpenproletarian; Pollak ‘Der politische Zionismus’ op. cit.; Njewsorow, Sergej ‘Der Zionismus’ *Sozialistische Monatsheft* 1 (12) December 1897 pp. 645-651.


27. ibid. p. 328.

28. ibid. pp. 328-329


37. There are different accounts of the numbers at the conference and the numbers who voted in favour or abstained on the motion for a Jewish social democratic party, but all indicate that only one or two delegates did not oppose a separate organisation, Glicksman ‘Etapen’ op. cit. p. 3; Najdus *Polska Partia Socjaldo-Demokratyczna* op. cit. p. 395; Kerstin Jobst *Zwischen Nationalismus und Internationalismus: Die polnische und ukrainische Sozialdemokratie in Galizien von 1890 bis 1914. Ein Beitrag zur Nationalitätenfrage im Habsburgerreich* Dülling und Galitz, Hamburg 1996 p. 132.


40. For a useful, though completely uncritical account of Kelles-Krauz’s position see Michael Sobelman ‘Polish socialism and Jewish nationality: the views of Kazimierz Kelles-Krauz’ *Soviet Jewish Affairs* 20 (1) 1990 pp. 48-55.

41. Henryk Grossman *Proletariat wobec kwestii zydowskiej z powodu niedyskutowanej dyskusyi w Krytyce* (The proletariat in the face of the Jewish question, arising from the undiscussed discussion in Krytyka) Krakow, Drukani Wladyslawa Teodorczyka, January 1905 also in an edited Yiddish form, ‘Dem proletariat buge tsu der yidenfrage’ in *Der yidisher Sotsial-demokrat* 1, April 1905, Lemberg pp. 6-13, 3, June 1905 pp. 7-11.

42. Wistrich *Socialism and the Jews* op. cit. pp. 242-250.


45. Eduard Bernstein ‘Das Schlagwort und der Antisemitismus’ *Die Neue Zeit* 11-2-35 1892-93 p. 234. The philo-semitic/anti-semitism analysis amounted to an underestimation of the significance of anti-semitic ‘feudal socialism’. It can be compared to Lassalle’s attitude to Bismarck. In both cases a preoccupation with opposing
liberal capitalist politics was associated with an unsatisfactory analysis of the social significance of reactionary politics. In the one case this was the role of Wilhelmine state in Germany in promoting capital accumulation despite the liberal bourgeoisie. In the other, mechanical understanding of capitalist development led to the conclusion that anti-semitism would lose support as the classes which supported it disappeared. As a consequence, the capacity of anti-semitism to sustain the mobilisation of peasants and petty bourgeois and even workers, initially against the wishes of conservative and especially liberal forces and then as a movement which supported the Habsburg state, was underplayed. It should be noted, however, that the Austrian socialists, although they shared Lassalle’s preoccupation with opposing capitalist liberalism, did not seek a formal alliance with the anti-semites. On the relations between the Austrian Social Democratic Party and the anti-semitic Christian Social Party see Wistrich *Socialism and the Jews* op. cit. pp. 225-298.

51 Karl Kautsky ‘Der Kampf der Nationalitäten und das Staatsrecht in Oesterreich’ *Die Neue Zeit* 16(1) numbers 17 and 18, 1897 pp. 516-524, 557-564.
52 Karl Kautsky ‘Das böhmische Staatsrecht und die Sozialdemokratie’ *Die Neue Zeit* 17(1) number 10 1898 pp. 292-301.
53 Ignacy Daszyński ‘Die Tage in Oesterreich’ *Die Neue Zeit* 16 (1) number 23 1897-1898 p. 719; Karl Kautsky ‘Nochmals der Kampf der Nationalitäten in Oesterreich’ *Die Neue Zeit* 16 (1) number 23 1897-1898 p. 725.
54 For the text of the resolution Mommsen *Die Sozialdemokratie und die Nationalitätenfrage* op. cit. pp. 335-336.
55 Leser *Zwischen Reformismus und Bolschewismus* op. cit. p. 250.
57 Otto Bauer *Die Nationalitätenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie*, Verlag der Wiener Volksbuchhandlung Ignaz Brand, Vienna 1907 pvi. This would seem to apply to the chapter on the Jewish question, where the latest indication of when it was written is a reference to *Die Welt* of 10 August 1906, p. 323.
60 ibid. pp. 31, 35.
62 ibid. p. 500. ‘We need not fear the slanderous criticism of those who accuse of national indifference and even treachery against the national interest, because we understand the historical task of the proletarian class struggle in the process of national development.’ ‘Only the development of social production reunifies the entire nation into a united cultural community. We place ourselves in the service of this development, in so far as we extend the national cultural community through class struggle within capitalist society. And because we will finally smash the capitalist shell of social production and can thus realise the united, autonomous national community in education, work and culture.’ ibid p. 499.
63 ibid. p. 92. Also see Otto Bauer ‘Bemerkungen zur Nationalitätenfrage’ *Neue Zeit* 26 volume 1 no. 23, 6 March 1908 p. 802

65 Bauer *Die Nationalitätenfrage* op. cit. pp. 490. Kulemann *Am Beispiel des Austromarximus* op. cit. pp. 126-129 provides an excellent brief critique of Bauer’s analysis. Kautsky pointed out that Renner and Bauer’s hopes that a section of the ruling class might support their proposals were without foundation, ‘Nationalität und Internationalität’ op. cit. pp. 32-34.


67 ibid pp. 496-497.


70 ibid. pp. 461-462.

71 In criticising the demand for national cultural autonomy, Lenin argued that ‘Such institutions contradict the economic conditions of the capitalist countries, they have not been tested in any of the world’s democratic states and are the opportunist dream of people who despair of setting up consistent democratic institutions and are seeking salvation from the national squabbles of the bourgeoisie in the artificial isolation of the proletariat and the bourgeoisie of each nation on a number of (“cultural”) questions.’ Vladimir Ilych Lenin ‘Theses on the national question’ (written June 1913, first published 1925) in *Lenin on the Jewish question* edited by Hyman Lumer, International Publishers, New York 1974 p. 79. In the case of the JSDP, as opposed too Renner, Bauer and the Bund, this dream was motivated less by opportunism and despair of setting up democratic state institutions than despair over the possibility of an Austrian social democratic movement united in opposition to all forms of national oppression.

72 Karl Kautsky ‘Nationalität und Internationalität’ *Die Neue Zeit*, I, 1908 Ergänzungsheft 18 January 1908 pp. 29-31. Kautsky suggested that the constitutional arrangements suggested by Renner and Bauer were only conceivable after the proletariat had taken power.

73 V. I. Lenin ‘Critical remarks on the national question’ (originally published *Prosveshcheniye* 10, 11 and 12, 1913) in V. I. Lenin *Collected Works* volume 20, Progress Publishers, Moscow p. 36.

74 Bauer *Die Nationalitätenfrage* op. cit. p. 318.

75 V. I. Lenin ‘“Cultural-national” autonomy’ (originally published *Za Pravdu* 46 28 November 1913) in *Lenin on the Jewish question* op. cit. p. 91.

76 Bauer *Die Nationalitätenfrage* op. cit. p. 320.

77 cited by Bauer, ibid. p. 321.

78 ibid. p. 322.

79 ibid. p. 325.

80 ibid. p. 330.

81 ibid. p. 329.

82 ibid. p. 329.


84 Kautsky ‘Nationalität und Internationalität’ op. cit. pp. 6-7.


90 ibid. p. 259.

91 V. I. ‘Union of the Bund with the Russian Social-Democratic Labor Party’ (written 1906) in *Lenin on the Jewish question* op. cit. p. 63.

John Bunzl *Klassenkampf in der Diaspora* op. cit. pp. 71-115; John Bunzl ‘Juden und Arbeiterbewegung’ op. cit. p. 294; Frankel *Prophecy and politics* op. cit. pp. 182, 218, 222. Frankel points out that the relationship between Renner’s stance and the Congress decision was distorted by John Mill, a leading nationalist in the Bund and editor of *Der yidisher arbeter* which was published in Switzerland.

*Di Arbaynt Shime* 10 August 1901 quoted in Frankel *Prophecy and politics* op. cit. pp. 220-221 and also in Levin *Jewish socialist movements* op. cit. pp. 276-277.


Levin *Jewish socialist movements* op. cit. p. 338.

Tobias *The Jewish Bund* op. cit. p. 217; Tony Cliff *Lenin, volume 1: building the party* Pluto, London 1975 p. 111. It should be noted that, at this stage, the RSDLP representatives from the Caucasian provinces of the Russian Empire inhabited by national minorities also rejected the Bund’s idea of a federal party, Julius Martow *Geschichte der russischen Sozialdemokratie* Berlin 1926 (Reprint Politladen, Erlangen 1973) p. 86.

Vinniski (Vladimir Medem) ‘Di sotsyalademokratie un di natsionale frage’ (‘Social democracy and the national question’) *Der yidisher arbeyter* 17 1904; Levin *Jewish socialist movements* op. cit. pp. 292-293.

Bunzl *Klassenkampf in der Diaspora* op. cit. p. 81.

ibid pp. 303, 324; Tobias *The Jewish Bund* op. cit. pp. 331-332.


Rosa Luxemburg ‘Foreword’ to *The Polish question and the socialist movement* (originally published Krakow 1905) in Luxemburg *The national question* op. cit. pp. 90-91.

Rosa Luxemburg ‘Der Sozialpatriotismus in Polen’ *Neue Zeit* 14 (2) number 41 1 July 1896 pp. 465-468.


Luxemburg ‘Neue Strömungen’ op. cit. p. 179; Luxemburg ‘Der Sozialpatriotismus in Polen’ op. cit. p. 469.

Georg Strobel *Die Partei Rosa Luxemburgs, Lenin und die polnische "europäische" Internationalismus in der russischen Sozialdemokratie* Wiesbaden, F. Steiner, 1974 p. 108. This book provides the most detailed non-Polish account of the development of the SDKPiL.

ibid. p. 141.

ibid. pp. 173, 181-182. As late as 1905 Luxemburg still maintained that ‘the untarnished class movement of the Polish proletariat … grew to maturity, along with capitalism, on the grave of movements for national autonomy ‘Foreword’ op. cit. p. 97. For the fullest expression of her later support for Polish autonomy, which stood in stark contrast to her earlier strictly economic analysis of the question of Polish independence see Rosa Luxemburg ‘The national question and autonomy’ (originally published *Przeglad socjaldemokratyczny* 14-15, 1909) in Luxemburg *The national question* op. cit. pp. 256-259.

Strobel *Die Partei Rosa Luxemburgs* op. cit. p. 150.

ibid. pp. 186-190.

Quoted by Strobel *Die Partei Rosa Luxemburgs* op. cit. p. 139.


This position was spelt out most clearly in the period after the 1905 revolution. See Rosa Luxemburg ‘Rückzug auf der ganzen Linie’ (originally published *Mlot* 11, 15 October 1910) in Fetscher *Marxisten gegen Antisemitismus* op. cit. pp. 136-140. This article includes citations from earlier SDKPiL publications back to 1908.


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117 Strobel Die Partei Rosa Luxemburgs op. cit. pp. 171
119 Tobias The Jewish Bund p. 161.
120 Vladimir Ilych Lenin What is to be done? (originally published 1902) in V. I. Lenin Collected Works volume 5 Progress Publishers, Moscow 1961.
121 V. I. Lenin ‘Does the Jewish proletariat need an “independent political party”’ (originally published in Iskra 34, 15 February 1903) Lenin on the Jewish question op. cit. p. 24.
122 For a good account of these developments see Paul Le Blanc Lenin and the revolutionary party Humanities Press, New Jersey 1993 pp. 57-78.
123 A draft resolution, not apparently placed before the Congress, Lenin affirmed ‘that, in particular, complete unity between the Jewish and non-Jewish proletariat is moreover especially necessary for a successful struggle against anti-Semitism, this despicable attempt of the government and the exploiting classes to exacerbate racial particularism and national enmity’ V. I. Lenin ‘Draft resolution on the place of the Bund in the Party’ (written in June-July 1903) in Lenin on the Jewish question op. cit. p. 26.
125 Tobias The Jewish Bund op. cit. p. 218. Lenin opposed the demand for the right to education in a person’s mother tongue at the Congress, but apparently changed his mind on the issue subsequently. Vladimir Ilych Lenin ‘Once more on the segregation of the schools according to nationality’ (originally published in Proletarskaya Pravda 9, December 1913) in Lenin on the Jewish question op. cit. p. 99.
126 Lenin What is to be done? op. cit. p. 412.
130 ibid. p. 913.
132 Glicksman ‘Steps leading to the proclamation of the JSDP of Galicia’ op. cit. p. 3; Jakob Bross ‘Tsu der geshichte’ op. cit. p. 40.
133 Karol Einaugler ‘Fun meyne notitsen’ Sotsyal Demokrat 1 May 1920 p. 4; Bross ‘Tsu der geshichte’ op. cit. p. 44.
140 ibid. p. 17.
141 ibid. p. 18.
Dzierzynski, having departed from Krakow to participate in the rising level of struggle in Warsaw wrote on 11 February 1905 concerning Grossman’s involvement in smuggling literature, ‘Listy F. Dzierzynskiego’ Z pola walki 11-12 Moscow 1931 pp. 109-110. On 23 February 1905 he inquired to members of the Foreign Committee of the SDKPiL in Berlin about Grossman’s intentions and sought copies of Zjednoczenie, on, Feliks Dzierzynski Pisma Wybrane Książka i Wiedza, Warsaw, 1951 p 82. In 1904 members of Ruch, a student organisation, were involved in smuggling SDKPiL literature, Strobel Die Partei Rosa Luxemburgs op. cit. pp. 174-175. Grossman and the future SDKPiL and Bolshevik leader Karl Radek/Sobelsohn were both leaders of Ruch 1904, Josef Buszko Ruch socjalistyczny w Krakowie 1890-1914: Na tle ruchu robotniczego w zachodniej Galicji, Wydawnictwo Literackie, Krakow, 1961 p. 213


‘Sprawa Grossmana’ Zespół akt PPS in the Archiwum Akt Nowych, Warsaw 305/V/11-3 includes documents of the controversy over Zjednoczenie from the PPSD leadership. The affair is also covered in Buszko Ruch socjalistyczny op. cit. pp. 234-238.


JSDP Przed Kongresem (Before the Congress) 1905 p. 7.


Lekert was executed for attempting to assassinate the Governor of Vilna as retaliation for police violence against demonstrators and political prisoners.

Der Yidisher Sotsyal Demokrat 3 June 1905 p. 20.


Luxemburg ‘Foreword’ op. cit. p. 90. See Henryk Grossman’s reference to Daszynski’s support for the split by the PPS in German occupied Poland from the German Social Democratic Party, ‘Odpowiedzi Polskiej Partii...

156 Yidisher Sotsial-demokrat 3 June 1905 p. 22.


158 Levin Jewish socialist movements op. cit. p. 319.

159 Sotsial-demokrat 3 November 1905 p. 3.

160 Sotsial-demokrat 8 June 1905 p. 1.

161 Sotsial-demokrat 8 June 1905 p. 4.

162 This self-confidence was very apparent in the tone of the lead article ‘After the congress’ Sotsial-demokrat 8 June 1906.


164 Sotsyal Demokrat 15-6-06 p. 3.


166 For this weakness in Renner’s position, see Kulemann Am Beispiel des Austromarximus op. cit. p. 131.

167 Grossman Der Bundizm in Galitsien op. cit. p. 34.

168 ibid. p. 37.

169 ibid. p. 39.

170 ibid. p. 41.

171 ibid. p. 44.


173 ibid. p. 47

174 ibid. pp. 46-47.

175 See V. I. Lenin ‘The nationality of pupils in Russian schools’ (first published in Proletarskaya Pravda 7, 14 December 1913) in Lenin on the Jewish question op. cit. pp. 92-94 and ‘Once more on the segregation of schools’ op. cit. pp. 98-100.


177 ibid. p. 464.

178 ibid. pp. 475, 479. Sotsial-demokrat 1 May 1920, however, indicates that the 1918 conference took place in November.