Including the excluded: ethnic inequality and development in Northwest Bangladesh

Hasan Shafie and Patrick Kilby
© Asia Pacific Press 2003

This work is copyright. Apart from those uses which may be permitted under the Copyright Act 1968 as amended, no part may be reproduced by any process without written permission from the publisher.

ISSN 1443–6698

Hasan Shafie. Hasan A. Shafie is Assistant Professor in the Department of Anthropology at the University of Dhaka, Bangladesh. Currently he is affiliated as Research Fellow in the Department of Social Anthropology at the University of Bergen, Norway. His areas of research interest are: ethnicity and globalisation of social network; economic institutions and exchange; ethnic minorities, identity and politics of difference; social change and development; Bangladesh, India and Myanmar. He can be reached at: Hasan.Shafie@sosantr.uib.no

Patrick Kilby. Patrick Kilby is with the Asia Pacific School of Economics and Government, and Program Adviser for the NGO Oxfam Community Aid Abroad.

Abbreviations

BBS Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics  
NGO non-governmental organisation  
SHG self help group
This paper addresses the problem of the development of indigenous peoples within the multi-ethnic situation found in Northwest Bangladesh, and it identifies some practices to counteract the processes of discrimination and exploitation that lead to their exclusion and marginalisation. This problem will be looked at in terms of the cultural contrasts that are employed to organise and form identity, social stigma, exclusion and interaction (Barth 1994). Evidence from Northwest Bangladesh suggests that the clustering and hierarchic arrangement of ethnic identities construct social barriers that prevent indigenous people connecting with the wider social networks. This paper will emphasise the significance of sociocultural factors in devising necessary and appropriate strategies to bring about more inclusive social outcomes for indigenous peoples.

The inequality of distribution of material and other resources between indigenous and non-indigenous peoples demonstrates ‘the deep and pervasive disjunction between the ideal of equality and the reality of inequality’. From this it follows that the extensive presence of inequality characterises the ‘relations between individuals, groups and categories of every conceivable kind’ (Beteille 1994). The global situation of indigenous peoples is made more vulnerable as they attempt to re-embrace their traditional norms and practices as a counter to global unifying processes.

Indigenous peoples tend to create defences against the conditions of the globalising world by seeking refuge in isolated areas and forming enclaves (Aguirre Beltran 1973; Albo 1996). As a consequence, indigenous people continue to be the most impoverished sector among the poor (Uquillas and Rivera 1993). Their plight is characterised by poor health, disease, hunger, malnourishment, illiteracy, restricted access to resources, poor housing, unemployment, and lack of access to basic services such as water, sewage, electricity and so forth (Psacharopoulos and Patrinos 1994; Durston 1993).

The multi-ethnic situation of Northwest Bangladesh establishes the conditions for the indigenous people to confront the overwhelming majority of Bengali people, who have a very different social and religious orientation. This difference has significant consequences on the local cultural and social forms that have evolved among indigenous groups. The impediments to minority–majority communication are maintained over time to (re)produce cultural exclusion through an enduring process of rejection of the minorities in the course of these interactions. Cultural/social exclusion emerges from interactions based on the majorities’ insistence on certain value preferences and the minorities’ attempt to cope with and adapt to these preferences. Eventually, the indigenous groups of Northwest Bangladesh are socially isolated from the wider society and have little access to the mainstream sociocultural, economic and political spheres of the country. Moreover, they are subject to the enforcement of imagined political values of national unification1 by the elimination of their own cultural variants of these values.
This paper will clarify the problem both from a theoretical and an empirical perspective and reflect on particular ethnographic materials from Northwest Bangladesh through a discussion of the adibashi\(^2\) (indigenous) people and the intricacies of their relationships and representations. Finally, avenues for adibashi development will be explored with a focus on the analysis of ethnicity and its relation to the prevailing labour and financial markets in Northwest Bangladesh.

**Ethnic inequality and social exclusion**

Concepts like social exclusion, deprivation, multiple marginalisation, social capital, social capability, and civic engagement have gained wide acceptance in much of the recent development literature. The concept of social exclusion is also of relatively recent origin. While extensive empirical work has been done focusing on the range of social, political, institutional, and cultural processes that lead to the exclusion of marginal groups in society, this work has been challenged for being limited in its theoretical underpinning (Oyen 1997 cf. Sen 2000). There is little in the way of conceptual frameworks to help understand the macro-processes of social exclusion and, with no precise definition, the term often means different things to different people (Atkinson and Hills 1998). We shall look at
the relevance of ‘social exclusion’ and its connections to the ‘idea of poverty as capability deprivation’ produced by ethnic inequality, in the context of indigenous people in Northwest Bangladesh.

Amartya Sen has approached social exclusion through a broad framework of freedoms and capabilities, to explain causal as well as constitutive processes of poverty and deprivation (2000). The idea of social capital may also have relevance for an understanding of social exclusion, since these two ideas of social capital and social exclusion are inversely correlated. Both include participation or involvement in decisionmaking, including political decisionmaking, and both focus on who is included or excluded. In reality, social groups and networks only operate by including some and excluding others. Social exclusion is therefore defined as ‘a process through which individuals or groups are wholly or partially excluded from full participation in the society within which they live’ (European Foundation 1995 in Haan, 1998:10). The central focus, here, is on the phenomenon of exclusive groups’ membership, which entitles the members to certain benefits and excludes non-members from such benefits. This membership may be based on interest group, political party, ethnicity or class among other things. (Jordan 1996, Haan 1998, Evans 1998). The idea of social exclusion from employment, markets, training, power and so on, has drawn significant attention to the role of social and institutional processes that lead to this marginalisation of individuals or social groups, namely pre-existing endowments—age, gender, strata, class and so forth.

Atkinson and Hills (1998) argue that social exclusion has three aspects. First, it is relative—exclusion is from a particular society, at a particular place and time. Second, it implies an act of exclusion and hence an agent or agency that is responsible. Finally, it has a dynamic aspect, in that people are excluded not just because they are currently without a job or income, but because they have little prospect for the future even though they have the same productive endowments as those who exclude them.

The main concern of this paper is that we can appreciate the idea of social exclusion by placing it in the broader context of our relatively old problem of inequality. Forms of inequality in Bangladesh are manifested in terms of economic inequality, lack of opportunity and power, and inequality of choice and status. In Northwest Bangladesh, ethnic identities are ranked hierarchically and this conditions minority ethnic groups to impoverishment and lack of freedom.

The contexts: ecological and cultural

Conditions and the people

The Barind Tract of Northwest Bangladesh, an area covering over two million acres characterised by high elevation and poor vegetation, is the home of the adibashis. The main limitation for human adaptation here is water; the region has the lowest average annual rainfall in Bangladesh and few irrigation opportunities (Rashid 1991:13). In addition, deforestation has resulted in serious ecological damage, further limiting land use options.
There are 18 different ethnic groups, who speak more than 10 languages and dialects. A majority of Bengalis and a minority *adibashis* co-exist, their multiple traditions producing a colourful cultural landscape. The boundaries between Bengalis and indigenous non-Bengalis are not always clear. For example Hindus, being a religious category, are rather *betwixt and between* in terms of ethnic identification. And there are Bengali Hindus, *adibashi* Hindus, and those *adibashis* in the process of becoming Hindu. Hinduisation is a significant process, and many of the *adibashi* identify themselves as Hindu.

Even being Hindu is contested as most *adibashis* do not make use of the services of Brahmans but have priests of their own caste and community, and perform local, not Hindu, rituals. As a consequence, any statistical representation regarding the Hindu and *adibashi* population does not express the real complexity of the situation. In addition, the presence of various Christian missions has further complicated this situation. Therefore, the study locale exhibits conditions in which ‘cultures are hybrid and mixed rather than homogenous and exactly patterned, and that societies are increasingly interconnected rather than bounded and independent’ (Donham 2000:1). The social and cultural features of Northwest Bangladesh exhibit profound variation—a complex civilisation where there is a great abundance of cultural materials, connections and concerns.

**The labour market and the cost of discrimination**

Indigenous, ethnic, racial and linguistic minorities worldwide are in an inferior economic and social position. The ethnic concentration of poverty and inequality is increasingly being recognised in the development literature (see, for example, Birdsall and Sabot 1991; Klitgaard 1992). However, little investigation has been made of the different economic experiences of *adibashi* people and other minority groups within a society. This paper addresses the problem in economic terms and analyses the consequences of discrimination for minorities. The consequences can be categorised broadly as direct discrimination restricting and constraining *adibashis‘* access to the labour market, and indirect discrimination constraining the *adibashis* prior to entering the labour market.

Economic theory posits that competitive forces in the economy will lead to a gradual elimination of wage and employment discrimination over time and that divisions based on race and ethnicity will diminish in modern societies where social mobility is based upon achieved rather than ascribed status (Hirschman 1983; & Linton 1936). In this world order, inequality based on ‘traditional’ criteria will be replaced by both ‘rational’ or legal criteria and universal criteria—such as education and ability.

Such idealistic expectations are challenged by the reality encountered by the *adibashis* of Northwest Bangladesh. For
example Noren, a 14 year old *adibashi* boy working in a restaurant as an assistant, was sacked because Bengali clients did not like to receive food from an *adibashi* because of a belief that they were ‘unclean’. Such direct discrimination in the labour market clearly has a significant bearing upon earnings, occupational attainment and training access of *adibashis*, since obviously it restricts the acquisition of skills prior to entering the labour market (Chiswick 1987) and it also constrains their engagement in other economic activities.

The local labour market in Northwest Bangladesh is characterised by different returns for the same income-generating activities to workers of different identities. Three factors make up wage discrimination between workers from an economically dominant group and workers from marginal groups:

- identity, for example, non-indigenous (majority) and indigenous (minority)
- labour market earnings
- measured productivity-determining characteristics of the workers, such as education, experience and other control variables.

The earnings gap itself can be explained from two different perspectives—differences in the income generating endowments as shown by the non-indigenous (majority) worker pay structure, and differences in the returns that non-indigenous (majority) and *adibashi* or ethnic minority workers receive for the same income-generating endowments. The latter perspective may be taken as reflecting wage discrimination, while the former reflects access to other resources that develop income-generating endowments, such as education.

### Access to schooling

There is also a strong correlation between *adibashi* identity and lack of access to schooling due to outright discrimination in Northwest Bangladesh. Discrimination against *adibashis* and ethnic minorities affects their access to schooling and the quality of schooling that they receive, which in turn affects their labour market performance. That is, lower schooling levels lead to lower retention rates, lower earnings, and ultimately higher levels of poverty. An example of this process is the case of two *adibashi* boys who were admitted into a local school at Rajbari but then were not allowed to sit with their Bengali classmates because they were considered unclean.

Schooling and education can provide flexibility in making choices and devising strategies to enter the occupational sector from which the *adibashis* are excluded by the prejudiced Bengali majority. The positive relationship between education and earnings is consistent with the human capital approach, in that schooling contributes to individual productivity, which in turn leads to higher individual earnings. The earning advantage of the more educated relative to the less educated is important as the earning advantage of the less educated declines as the minimum qualifications for given jobs rise over time (Schultz 1961; Mincer 1974; Becker 1975). In this context, the *adibashis* are far behind their Bengali counterparts. To overcome
these institutional constraints, affirmative action programs and sanctions against discriminatory behaviour are required to enable *adibashis* to enter the education system on the same footing as the majority of the community.

The evidence from Northwest Bangladesh suggests that occupational segregation and lack of human capital attainment has direct implications for local labour market conditions. The *adibashis* of the study locale do not have specialised skills and productive characteristics besides their traditional agricultural knowledge. But, because they have been deprived of their traditional possession of land, they are forced to sell their labour in the production sector controlled by the Bengali majority—then, as the supply of labour in these sectors increases, wages fall. Compounding the problem, mechanisation has diminished the demand for manual labour to mainly seasonal requirements—land preparation, planting, and harvesting. Eventually, the overcrowding of the *adibashi* labourers forces them to migrate for temporary seasonal employment over a region of 100 kilometres from their home villages. The whole family migrates and they become squatters beside their place of work, often for only two weeks at a time, after which they must move on.

The experience of earning differentials for the *adibashis* of Northwest Bangladesh also has a gender dimension. Female labourers are paid less than male workers. Wages for male labourers were Tk30 (US$0.50) per day plus one and half kilograms of rice while female labourers received Tk20 (US$0.33 cents) and the same amount of rice. Moreover, Bengalis strategically delay payments and make those payments in several small instalments. It can take months for the *adibashis* to receive payment for their work.

As well as employment and wage discrimination, internal cultural dynamics also restrain labour preferences and limit the ‘satisfaction’ of the *adibashi* labourers. Social values concerning leisure, entertainment and alcohol consumption significantly affect the *adibashis’* preferences to remain active in the labour market. In economic terms, their marginal preference for labour is affected by the opportunity cost of time, particularly for social activities. The *adibashis’* preference for leisure limits the employment targets for them. Therefore, among the *adibashis* the ‘rates of labour intensity are considerably lower [than for Bengalis—they]...possess considerable stocks of unused time’ (Chayanov 1966:75–76). A rough equilibrium is reached between the degree of satisfaction and the degree of the drudgery of labour (Chayanov 1966).

Thus, among the *adibashis* it might be argued that their labour power is underused and earnings remain low relative to existing possibilities (Sahlins 1972). They judge opportunities for labour as less important and only use them to achieve specific, short-term ends, such as obtaining cash to finance a rest from the labour market. Also, since the *adibashis* are not accepted into the labour market as equals, they have a lower social incentive to participate.
The underlying assumptions of ‘internal colonialism’ (Hechter 1975) may be relevant concerning the hegemonic relations between the dominant Bengalis and dominated *adibashis* in Northwest Bangladesh. There are two distinct linkages between these two ethnic categories. First are the labour linkages, whereby the *adibashis* are the suppliers of labourers for the production sector operated by the Bengalis. In this sector, a dual system operates in which there are conditions of bonded labour, dual occupational structures, and dual wage scales, with the relatively free and higher rewarding occupations (service and tertiary sector) being reserved for the Bengali majority.

The second linkage is that *adibashis* play the role of a reserve labour force, to be exploited seasonally for lower wages. Poverty, a lower standard of living, lower expectations and ignorance of labour laws condition them to adapt to such a situation. These conditions affect the functioning of labour markets in the study area and produce segmentation in the local labour market. In short, *adibashis* receive lower earnings and have a higher incidence of poverty as a consequence of being ‘imprisoned’ in the low-productivity and low-return sector of the economy. One solution to this problem might be to provide credit and other financial services.

**Financial intermediaries and market situations**

The Barind Multipurpose Development Board, a government institution, has operated since the 1970s to develop rural infrastructure, including roads, electrification, afforestation, large-scale irrigation, and ponds and canals to regulate the water system. This infrastructure, along with modern agricultural technologies, has introduced a wider range of options for the local producers. This in turn has led to a sharp increase in the price of land, which has dispossessed *adibashis* of their traditional lands.

This agricultural intensification in Barind attracted Bengalis from more densely populated places to settle in an area of low population density inhabited mainly by the *adibashis*. The *adibashis* and Bengalis hold drastically different concepts of land. The *adibashi* conceive land not as property to be exchanged in the market, but as Mother Earth (Nieuwkoop and Uquillas 2000), while the Bengalis value land solely as a commodity. In addition, it is common for the *adibashis’* land to be appropriated by the Bengalis both through the Bengalis’ manipulation of administrative processes and ignorance of the *adibashi* relationship with the land. This competition for resources between unevenly distributed populations (Bengalis as the absolute majority and *adibashis* as demographic minority) and populations with different value systems regarding land has several implications for the rural economy. One of these is the demand for rural financial services.

**Credit for Adibashis**

*Adibashi* households demand savings as well as credit, so financial institutions are needed to enable smooth and low cost transactions and allocate resources between savers and investors. *Adibashi*
households require credit for production, consumption, and finally to meet the need for income security and insurance. For the poor adibashi households of the study area, the credit needs for production and consumption cannot be clearly distinguished as their production and consumption preferences are intertwined. Financial services therefore need to offer savings schemes as well as credit at low cost, without collateral or restrictions on the use of funds—that is, credit that can be used for high priority consumption needs (food, health, medicine, school fees, etc.)—and the process needs to be quick and un-bureaucratic.

In Northwest Bangladesh, credit for consumption is an important component of the financial needs of adibashi households. The adibashi households have multiple coping strategies when their food security is at risk: they can reduce consumption, sell assets, or seek support from their relatives and friends. Typically, the adibashi households have limited scope for this beyond reducing consumption since they do not have many assets to sell or resources to support each other. Therefore they have a large need for financial intermediaries and their services. Considering that Northwest Bangladesh has among the lowest annual rainfall averages in the country (Rashid 1991), the features of adibashi food insecurity and the resulting need for financial services can be understood.

This brings us to the issue of risk and insurance. The sources of risk in adibashi households are many, and the timing and intensity of risk and its impact on income are severe. The absence of formal insurance schemes direct the adibashi people to pursue a range of strategies of self-insurance. For example, they save in the form of cash, deposits, food or other assets; they diversify production structure, cropping patterns and income sources; and they build networks of social relationships and mobilise social capital. However, the self-insurance mechanisms are inadequate in intense and extended risk situations. Ensuring potential future access to credit, not the actual borrowing, serves as an important insurance substitute. Thus, their potential access to financial services enables them to transfer part of their risk to the financial market.

The government pursues credits and financial services to the rural areas of Northwest Bangladesh though formal institutions like Krishi Bank and others that follow a supply-lending approach. This approach, injecting cheap and subsidised funds from government and other external sources into rural areas for predetermined productive purposes has a simple rationale: credit is used to enhance the productive capacity of the borrower, it will increase future income, which will allow the borrower to pay interest and repay the loan. The problem is that it fails to reach the poor people (Ahmad 1983, and see Adams 1984 for an international perspective), especially adibashi communities.

Remaining outside of government monetary regulations, moneylenders, traders, pawnbrokers, friends and family members are important sources of finance in Northwest Bangladesh, to the extent that they are playing a decisive role in
determining the fate of the *adibashi* people. This involves a level of exploitation through complex contractual obligations inherent in money-lending. The *adibashis*, being in a vulnerable position, have traditionally received financial services exclusively from the informal networks of moneylenders (mostly Bengali people). Mortgaging land against loans (cash or kind) with high interest almost invariably ends up in land dispossession for the *adibashis*. Loan repayment along with high cumulative interest becomes nearly impossible for the *adibashi* households, and additionally, these people are highly susceptible to secondary exploitation of their illiteracy—all of which leads to further impoverishment.

Some non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have shifted to a demand-oriented approach in building financial markets based on rural client demands, particularly among the *adibashis* of the study area. These NGOs have played a role in transforming domestic and external resources through developing micro-level financial intermediaries, such as self help groups (SHGs) or financial cooperatives. These intermediaries operate on the basis of borrowers and savings members having a voice in the decisionmaking process. This is an important alternative to the informal or traditional sources. The effective functioning of these SHGs or financial cooperatives has increased the *adibashis’* savings capacity and also increased their freedom in borrowing and repayment.

The effective functioning of financial intermediaries should play a strategic role in capital formation that will in time be beneficial for income generation and contribute to poverty alleviation. This paper argues, however, that even if all the general conditions remain favourable the socially constructed barriers of exclusion will significantly prevent the *adibashis* using the flow of scarce financial resources for investments of higher returns.

For example, an *adibashi* of Benipukur village purchased a tea stall in the village market. He set up his stall in competition with other tea shops in the market which were operated by the Bengali shopkeepers. The *adibashi* shopkeeper received even more customers than the competing Bengali shopkeepers, but the Bengali customers took his services in credit, something he could not protest against because of his ascribed identity. The shop lasted no more than two months, and the *adibashi* tea stall owner lost all his venture capital. This is one example of how *adibashis* are disqualified from choosing equivalent roles by members of the dominant group.

**Conclusion**

The analysis presented in this paper supports the argument for a correlation between being indigenous and becoming poor in Northwest Bangladesh. Poverty among the *adibashis* is associated with the interplay of complex interdependent factors, for instance, ethnic inequality, enduring discrimination, lack of education, little access to land, a low degree of market integration, loss of labour-power potential, and lack of employment in the vibrant off-farm rural sector.

The issue of their skill and competence as a labour force being limited to agricultural
production is due to the enduring discrimination *adibashis* face. What is required is an expansion of competencies regardless of social background, but the status clustering has precluded the *adibashis* from acquiring these competencies. They are lacking in the necessary resources, such as money, education, networks, information and awareness to deal with such problems.

Previous development interventions had an economic, rather than a cultural, focus. *Adibashi* development, however, is more about strengthening and reaffirming those cultural resources than inducing substantial changes (Breslin 1986). But there has been some change. The *adibashi* vision of life has expanded its horizon, changing from a fatalistic perspective to hoping and planning for a better life in future despite the high levels of ethnic discrimination. This is what Wikan (1995) calls an expansion in cultural competence. Everyone wants to have a better life but the motivation and spirit to achieve differ greatly between and within populations. An effective aspiration along with ‘relentless zeal and motivation’ for better life increases people’s adaptive abilities and enhances their capacities to act effectively in the present to build a better future (Wikan 1995, and Shafie 2000). Cultural competence is difficult to measure, but it could be said that the *adibashis* are in a process of augmenting their cultural competence, which is a powerful potential source of change for the better.

In Northwest Bangladesh the dominant majorities have attained high economic and symbolic capital (Bourdieu 1993) while the dominated *adibashi* minorities have a high cultural and social capital. These cultural resources, such as their sense of ethnic identity, cultural values, solidarity and social cohesion, can be mobilised as a different form of capital to develop common ground that will in turn enable them to perform joint activities and to attain shared goals. Cultural expressions radiate cultural energy, ‘...a source of motivation that inspires people to confront problems, identify solutions, and participate in carrying them out’ (Kleymeyer 1993, Nieuwkoop and Uquillas 2000).

The policy dilemma that arises in Northwest Bangladesh is the asymmetry between majority and minority groups that has developed into resistance against *adibashi* development. It would be expected that equalising productive characteristics between ethnic groups will effectively reduce, if not eliminate, the entire earning differential. However, if the *adibashi* workers were endowed with the same amounts of productive characteristics as are non-indigenous workers, the difference in earnings between them would narrow by only about 50 per cent, if we extrapolate from the World Bank experience of Guatemala, Mexico and Peru (Patrinos 2002). In Northwest Bangladesh, the overall earning differential between *adibashis* and Bengalis shows that the overall differential may be explained only partly in terms of the inability of human capital to be converted into higher relative earnings. The high levels of discrimination faced by *adibashis* with few sanctions for the perpetrators of discriminatory practices, is another significant institutional constraint.

In most cases, much of the earning disadvantage of minority group workers is
due not only to the discrimination outlined above but also due to lower human capital endowments. Thus, more equality in educational attainment will play a significant role in equalising labour market outcomes and may lead to a significant increase in cash flow. The socioeconomic condition of minority groups can be improved through policy-influenced variables such as education and occupation since these issues are largely responsible for differences in earning power. Part of this policy response would be to remove discriminatory practices from the education system and to introduce affirmative action programs for adibashi access to education. Access to better jobs could also be attained by improving the information network so that adibashi or ethnic minority members would be better informed about labour market opportunities (see Klitgaard 1992). This is justified by the fact that productivity-enhancing characteristics are positively related to earned income, so that an increase in human capital will result in an increase in earnings.

Notes

1 Such policy became explicit by proclaiming Bangladesh as a ‘uni-cultural’ and ‘uni-lingual’ (monolingual) nation-state on the 23 January 1974, while Bengali mono-lingualism was implicitly considered as an essential part of nationhood.

2 The Bengali term adibashi refers to an ethnic category that is inclusive of ethnic groups conventionally known as tribal, indigenous or aboriginal.

3 Social capital depends on building networks of trust, reliability and confidence within the local community. ‘Social capital is not the private property of any of the persons who benefit from it’ (Coleman 1990) rather it is ‘embedded in social structure’ (Narayan 1997) and exists only when it is shared.

4 In Northwest Bangladesh, the religion of the dominant Bengali people is Islam, and a crucial question for the adibashi people today is the ‘search of a Great Tradition’ (Orans 1965). As a response to such quest for a great tradition, a distinct process of Hinduisation is operating among the adibashis of that region by which they exhibit a tendency to merge with Hinduism. This process of convergence, eventually, let them form a separate caste category and allowed them to maintain their primordial identity with least modification.

5 Religious diversity, in Barind, indicates 88 per cent Muslim, 11 per cent Hindu, and 1 per cent adibashi traditional beliefs (BBS 1984; cf. Ali 1998).

6 Besides, there are a very few adibashi groups who have the skill to manufacture bamboo products. Most of such products are for their own use and very small quantities are brought into the market.

7 Food security, at the household level, is defined in its most basic form as access by all household members at all times to the food needed for a healthy life (von Braun et al. 1992).

8 This option is limited to those adibashis, very insignificant in number, who still have access to the means of production by ownership, by sharecropping or by other contractual means.

References


