Currents in Contemporary Islam in Indonesia

James J. Fox*
Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies
The Australian National University

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*Email Address: jjf400@coombs.anu.edu.au
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Introduction

On the 29th of February 2004, thousands of robed members of Hizbut Tahrir marched through the streets of downtown Jakarta to mark the 80th anniversary of the fall of the caliphate – when Kemal Ataturk in the name of Turkish nationalism, having already abolished the Ottoman sultanate, deposed its last sultan as Caliph.

Hizbut Tahrir is a ‘new’ Islamic movement in Indonesia, one among many whose primary roots are planted within a wider Islamic ambience outside of Indonesia1. Its call for the restoration of a universal caliphate and its rejection of nationalism and state power would have, in an earlier period under President Suharto, met with immediate suspicion and probable suppression. The movement is a good exemplar of the changing Indonesian Islamic community, pointing metaphorically in two directions: to the contemporary state of ferment in the Islamic world and to historical developments of the past century. Thus the present situation in Indonesia, as indeed within the Islamic world as a whole, may be considered in all of its immediacy or as the continuation of a long and as yet unresolved phase in Muslim history.

For those who follow current Islamic debates on the Internet, Hizbut Tahrir is also instructive. Within days of Syaikh ‘Abdurrahman Ad Dimasqiyah’s denunciation of the Hizbut Tahrir in a sermon given in English (and probably delivered in England), an appropriately edited version of this sermon appeared in Indonesian on the As-Salafy website. Thus, as has been the case for centuries, Indonesia is firmly, intimately and inextricably linked to diverse sources of ideas and debate in the Islamic world and consequently subject to its many internal reverberations2.

1 Hizbut Tahrir (Hizb-e Tahrir) is by no means a ‘new’ movement elsewhere. Founded in the Middle East, it has been in existence for decades and has active branches in Europe and the United States. Hizbut Tahrir was brought to Indonesia from Australia. See Marcia Hermansen’s “How to put the Genie Back in the Bottle? ‘Identity’ Islam and Muslim Youth Cultures in America” pp.313-314 in Omid Safi (ed), Progressive Muslims (2003); Elizabeth Collins, “Dakwah and Democracy” (nd).

2 Because of its historical receptiveness, Indonesia has some of the richest and most diverse traditions in the Islamic world. The founding traditions of Islam in Indonesia derive from a variety of sources – the Arab world, Persia, India and, as is becoming increasingly evident, from the Muslim trading communities of southern China. Equally important to the historical development of Islam has been the active pursuit of Islamic teaching by generations of Indonesian Muslims who have journeyed to study in Mecca, Cairo and other centers of learning in the Middle East. Although Sunni by long tradition, Indonesian Muslims have also been open – and continue to be open – to Shia religious ideas. There is therefore hardly a development in the Muslim world that does not have its
**Historical Observations: Foundations of Mutuality and Difference**

_Hizbut Tahrir’s_ agenda is a reminder that the period of the 1920s was as tumultuous a time in Islamic history as the present. The end of the caliphate occurred in the same year as the conquest of the Hejaz (Mecca and Medina) by the Wahabis under al-Saud. These two events in 1924 produced reactions throughout the Islamic world including Indonesia.

Through much of the 19th century, there was an increasing movement of Indonesian pilgrims to Mecca, many of whom stayed on to form what was called the Jawi community. By the late 19th century this Jawi was one of the largest communities in Mecca with its own contingent of distinguished teachers, some of whom were granted the privilege of teaching within the Haram.

The Jawi community in Mecca was at the center of the activities of the _tarekat_ (tariqa), the Sufi mystic orders, whose reach extended widely in Indonesia. Of particular importance was Shaykh Ahmad Khatib Sambas, a teacher at Masjid al-Haram, who is credited with founding Tarekat Qadiriyyah-Naqsabandiyah, a fusion of the separate Qadiriyyah and Nashabandiyah orders. He initiated various Indonesian _kalifah_ whose authority through different _pesantren_ perpetuated the religious teachings ( _tasawwuf_ ) and devotional practices that are an essential (and characteristic) component of Indonesian, particularly Javanese, Islam.

Increasingly, however, Cairo with its great teaching center, al-Azar, offered an alternative to Mecca as a source of reforming ideas. A new generation of Indonesians were attracted to Cairo and became deeply influenced by the ideas of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1839-97) interpreted initially by Muhammad `Abduh (1849-1905) and later by his successor, Rashid Rida (1865-1935). In particular, `Abduh ideas on educational reform and technical advancement for Muslims were crucial to the founding of Muhammadiyah in 1912, which, to this day, continues as a major institution for the Islamic community of Indonesia.

3 These ideas were transmitted to Indonesia through two key literary publications: `Abduh and Rida’s _al-Manar_ (The Beacon) and its Sumatran counterpart _al-Munir_ (The Radiant). For a period of a few years from 1912, there was also a Malay paper, _Al-Ittihahad_ (Unity) published in Cairo by the small Jawi community studying there (see Laffan, 2003 pp.136-141). Also of great importance for reformist ideas was the Malay publication, _al-Imam_, published in Singapore. These and other print media sources were part of a wider national awakening that drew upon an increasing educated population.

4 Achmad Dachlan (1868-1923), the founder of Muhammadiyah, was the son of a _khatib_ from Yogyakarta. He studied in Mecca in the 1890s and was influenced by Achmad Khatib al-Minangakabawi who was the leading Jawi teacher of his time. However, he was also strongly
In Indonesia in the 1920s, amid strong nationalist stirrings, a division between self-proclaimed ‘reformists and modernists’ and so-called ‘traditionalists’ came to the fore over issues of the caliphate and of the conquest of Mecca by the Wahabi. The traditionalists whose links were to the learned community of Jawi teachers in Mecca were deeply disturbed by the actions of the Wahabi and fearful of what might occur next. A number of prominent members of the Jawi community were killed in the fighting and many more suffered privations from the lack of supplies following the seizure of the holy places. More importantly, however, core religious practices of the traditional Jawi – particularly visitation (ziarah) to the tombs in Mecca and Medina, many of which were the gathering place of the Sufi orders (tarekat) – were seen as heretical by the Wahabi and forcibly suppressed.

Of these the most serious was the destruction of the tombs at the grave complex at Medina. To the Kaum Tua Jawa this was seen as gross religious desecration. The community feared that the tomb of the prophet would also be destroyed. As a result, more than a third of the Jawi community returned to Indonesia en masse in a number of chartered relief ships, bringing with them stories of sacrilege and atrocities.

By contrast, some reformists among the Kaum Muda saw merit in the changes that were occurring in Mecca, which provided the opportunity to advance the reform ideas of Muhammad ‘Abduh and others in Cairo. That Rashid Rida in Cairo proclaimed the Wahabis to be the faction of ‘purest faith’ in Islam only increased the tension between the two communities in Indonesia. Some of the Kaum Tua even went so far as to label the Kaum Muda as ‘Wahabi’ – the worst possible term of derision. Having failed in an effort to send a unified delegation from Indonesia to a conference on the Caliphate (initially to Cairo, then later to Mecca), a group of twelve ulama, under the spiritual aegis of the Hasyim Ashari (1875-1947) and the political guidance of Abdul Wahab Chasbullah, met in Surabaya in January 1926 and formed the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU: The Awakening of the Ulama) to represent and to defend their traditions of Islam. In Indonesia, Nahdlatul Ulama was to become the largest Islamic grouping in the country. The banner that the NU adopted to represent itself was a globe that portrayed Indonesia within the Muslim world. In membership, NU was also to become the largest Muslim organization in the Islamic world.

influenced by the ideas emanating from Cairo and is known to have subscribed to both al-Manar and al-Munir.

This division was given a generational identification: the reformists who looked to Cairo were identified as the Kaum Moeda (the Young Group); this group had a considerable Sumatran component. By contrast, the traditionalists who had looked to Mecca were identified as the Kaum Tua (the Old Group) and were comprised of a majority of the ulama and their followers in Java.

Because of what was happening in Mecca and Medina, the primary intention of the group of ulama was to establish a “Komite Hijaz” to travel to Mecca to present their views to Ibn Sau’d; the formation of Nahdlatul Ulama was intended to give domestic support to the Komite. Some two years later, Wahab Chasbullah did lead a delegation from NU that met with Ibn Sau’d (see Bruinessen, NU: Tradisi, Relasi-relasi Kuasa, Pencari Wacana Baru, 1994: 34).

Michael Laffan’s Islamic Nationhood and Colonial Indonesia (pp.222-231) provides an excellent account of this period. He points out that the global representation adopted by Nahdlatul
The late 1920s also saw the beginnings of another Muslim organization in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood (Ikwanul Muslimin) under Syahid Hasan al-Banna (1906-1949) that would – some fifty years later – begin to exert influence in Indonesia. It took time and contemporary pressures outside of Indonesia as well as conditions in Indonesia itself for the ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood to assume relevance suitable for their transmission to Indonesia.

**Modernists and Traditionalists in Indonesia**

Historically, mutuality, rather than dichotomous opposition, has characterized relations between ‘modernists’ and ‘traditionalists’ in Indonesia. The modernists, as represented by Muhammadiyah and drawing specifically on the ideas of Muhammad ‘Abduh that called for the scientific and intellectual strengthening of the Muslim community, have had an enormous influence through their own network of schools and universities but have also influenced the traditionalists to adopt new methods of teaching and new subjects of study within their own pesantren schooling system.\(^8\)

In regard to the interpretation of Islamic law, most modernists (despite ‘Abhub’s exhortations) and all traditionalists adhere to the Syafi‘i mazhab. This marks a significant defining characteristic of Islam in Southeast Asia – not just Indonesia but also Malaysia and the Philippines.\(^9\) Modernists, however, claim a degree of interpretative independence (ijtihad) in arriving at decisions within the law whereas traditionalists insist on taqlid, an interpretative process that relies critically on the teachings of the great ulama of the past. This process is by no means as ‘rigid’ as the modernists claim. Indeed, some scholars have observed that in the transition to the 21\(^{st}\) century, traditionalist ulama show a greater degree of flexibility in legal interpretation than modernists who still draw on a position originally developed at the beginning of the 20\(^{th}\) century.

It is largely in the practice of Islam that modernists differ from traditionalists. Modernists do not participate in the tarekat, religious orders that are fundamental to NU, nor do they,

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\(^9\) Sunni Muslims recognize four mazhab: Hanafi, Hanbali, Maliki and Syafi‘i. All are regarded as orthodox but a Muslim should adhere to only one mazhab and not mix and choose among them. As part of his reform agenda, Muhammad ‘Abduh called for the dissolution of the four mazhab. Most of Egypt has continued to adhere to the Syafii mazhab. The Wahabi, in keeping with their claim to follow the earliest forms of Islam (before any differentiation into mazhab) assert that they belong to mazhab, yet their practice, in its literal emphasis, is aligned with the Hanbali tradition.
unlike the traditionalists, see Islamic mystic traditions (tasawwuf) as part of their practice of Islam. Indeed they have little regard for the panoply of rituals that organize the lives of most traditional Muslims\textsuperscript{10}.

The most marked differences occur in regard to practices associated with the dead. These practices for the traditionalists include a variety of ceremonies at the time of death, visitations to the tombs of the so-called Wali Songo, the nine founders of Islam on Java as well as to the graves of other local saints and revered ancestral personages\textsuperscript{11} and large commemorative gatherings, khaul, to honor deceased religious teachers (in Java known as kyai) and their descendants. Modernists reject all of these practices, considering them to be a sinful form of idolatry (syirik).

For traditionalists, such practices are all part of a chain of transmission, through generations of saints and learned teachers, to the companions of the Prophet and to the Prophet himself. As Abdurrahman Wahid is reported to have affirmed, membership in Nahdlatul Ulama is an association that does not end with one’s death\textsuperscript{12}.

The Religious Foundations of the Nahdlatul Ulama

At the outset of his presidency, Abdurrahman Wahid wrote a Foreword for the publication of a short treatise Risalah Ahlussunnah wal Jama’ah by his grandfather, the Great Sheiyk, Hasyim Asy’ari, who was one of the founders of NU. The treatise was originally written to define the ‘traditions’ that NU considers as central to its claim to upholders of ‘sunnah and the Sunni community’ (alhusunnah wal jama’ah: Aswaja).

The Great Sheiyk defines this tradition succinctly and authoritatively: Sunnah can be identified by an unbroken continuity with the past and by the avoidance of innovation/deviation (bid’ah). Specifically for the Jawi, this tradition had clear intellectual and religious foundations:

\textsuperscript{10} The best single account of the full range of these rituals can be found in the thesis/book by Muhaimin on the Cirebon region of the north coast of Java, which was one of the earliest centers of Islam on the island. This thesis, The Islamic Traditions of Cirebon: Adat and Ibadat among Javanese Muslims (1995) has been published in Indonesian translation as Islam Dalam Bingkai Budaya Lokal: Potret dari Cirebon (2001). Two other excellent studies of the practice of Islam at the village level are theses by M. Bambang Pranowo, Creating Islamic Tradition in Rural Java (1991) and Jamhari, Popular Voices of Islam: Discourse on Muslim Orientations in South Central Java (2000). An illuminating study of reformism at the village level is Kim Hung-Jun, Reformist Muslims in a Yogyakarta Village: The Islamic Transformation of Contemporary Socio-Religious Life (1996).


\textsuperscript{12} See Martin van Bruinessen, ‘Back to Situbondo? Nahdlatul Ulama Attitudes towards Abdurrahman Wahid’s Presidency and Fall’ (nd).
“Since the beginning, Muslims of the Jawa region have had one philosophy, one mazhab, one source. In law (fiqh), they adhere to the great path, the mazhab of Iman Syafi’i; in theology (ushuluddin), they follow the path of Abu Al-Hasan Al-Asyari; and in mystic teachings (tasawwuf), they follow the path of Imam Al-Ghazali and Imam Abi Al-Hasan As-Syadzili.” (1999:7)

He then goes on to contrast this tradition with the emergence of innovation among Muslims in Java. He alludes to the two most important modernists of his time, Muhammad ‘Abduh and Rasyid Ridla but instead of assigning deviation (bid’ah) to them, he attributes it to the influence in their thinking of Ahmad bin Taimiyah and his students13. This carries the argument within Islam itself back from the 20th century to the 14th century. It is also a prescient perception of a continuing difference.

Virtually all Islamic ‘reformists’ – whether of the Wahabi tradition, or of the Al-Afgani/Abduh modernist tradition, or of the Al-Banna/Sayyid Qutb tradition of the Muslim Brotherhoods – draw inspiration from the writings of Ibn Taimiyah. When combined within Hanbali mazhab, which is the most emphatically literal in its interpretation of fiqh, such reforming ideas stand in stark contrast to the traditions that Hasyim Ashy’ari defines as sunnah. By the same token, these reformists would reject the teachings of Al-Asyari and Al-Ghazali. These differences are therefore not peripheral but central and fundamental.

**Tauhid, Ibadah and Dakwah**

Nothing is more fundamental in Islam than an understanding of tauhid, the conception of the ‘Unity of God’. If one adopts an idea of tauhid that excludes all analogy, similarity or quality – as do the Wahabi in their strict interpretation as true ‘Unitarians’ or as other reformists do in keeping with Ibn Taimiyah’s ideas – then one’s conception can only proceed by negation. The total Otherness of God stands in opposition to, and in total contrast with, the world as it is known.

If, on the other hand, one adopts an inclusive conception of tauhid in accordance with the ideas of Al-Asyari and more particularly those of Al-Ghazali and other Sufi teachers, then one’s conception is based on affirmation. God informs the world and it is possible to strive for the Sufi ideal of union with God – something that reformists regard as inconceivable and utterly blasphemous14.

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13 It is interesting to note that Hasyim Asy’ari reserves his strongest criticism for Ibn Taimiyah over the issue of visitations to the Tomb of the Prophet. He cites Taimiyah’s assertion that however well intentioned Muslims may be in performing ziarah to the Prophet’s tomb as an act of worship (ibadah), such actions are strictly forbidden (1999:8).

14 These differences are said to be expressed in contrasting interpretative views of the Muslim testimony of faith (shahadah): the reformist view by negation: There is no god except Allah; and the traditional view by affirmation: There is no god except Allah. (See Tawhid in the The Concise Encyclopedia of Islam 1989:400.)
These fundamental differences in regard to the world influence the way in which Islam is practiced and most pertinently, the way Islam is preached. For the traditionalists, all actions depend on intention (niyat). Thus intention defines and transforms one’s actions. By this means, all one’s deeds, works and actions can be transformed into a kind of worship (ibadah/ibadat).

This traditionalist view is clearly expressed by Muhaimin in his study of the Islamic traditions of the Javanese of Cirebon. Quoting Nasr, he writes:

“Thus...everything is essentially sacred and nothing is profane because everything bears within itself the fragrance of the Divine.” Therefore, ibadat, in this sense, may range from expressing daily courtesies to such things as the formal and solemn invocation both in and outside of formal prescribed prayers, and other forms of worship...Thus, the distinction between amal [one’s work] and ibadat becomes elusive. Both ibadat and amal require niyat (intention) which becomes the stamp that the work is for God. Another way to ensure intention is by uttering or murmuring Basmalah (a phrase, saying ‘In the name of Allah, the Beneficient, the Merciful’). Thus doing any (good) thing, a religious or worldly matter, become ibadat, by merely preceding it with Basmalah.” (1995:118-119)

In this view, all that is not forbidden (haram) can be made Islamic. For a traditionalist, ‘islamizing’ the world has more to do with consecrating the world than with transforming it. The exemplary methods cited for this process of ‘islamizing’ [mengislamkan] the world are those of the earliest founders of Islam, the great Wali or Saints of Java.

Dakwah, the preaching of Islam, takes on a different sense for most reformists. Among reformists, there are degrees and gradations in how God’s otherness from the world is conceived and in how this effects and directs one’s relation to it. For most reformists, this requires some form of separation and distinction. Flirtation with the ways of the world is not possible. The call for dakwah therefore requires a double transformation: a transformation of the Muslim community (umat) with a corresponding transformation of the world. How radical a transformation is needed depends on how alien or threatening the ways of the world are seen to be. The most convincing models for such transformation draw their inspiration from the actions of the Prophet and his Companions.

15 The five primary guiding principles of NU (al-qawa'id al-khams al kubra) are: 1) Each action depends on the intention; 2) Certainty can not be removed by doubt; 3) Danger must be eliminated; 4) Whatever has become customary is acknowledged; and 5) Difficulty brings ease. Behind these simple seeming maxims lies a complex erudition that supports the application of these principles. See Greg Fealy, Ulama and Politics in Islam: A History of Nahdlatul Ulama, 1952-1967 (1998), particularly Chapter II, Religio-Political Thought, 48-78.
16 S. H. Nasr, Islamic Life and Thought (1981:7)
17 A good example of this view can be found in Widji Saksono’s Mengislamkan Tanah Jawa: Telaah atas Methode Dakwah Walisongo [Islamizing Jawa: A Study based on the Methods of Preaching by the Nine Saints] (1995), a volume that has gone through multiple reprints.
For some, the possibilities for a transformed and viable Muslim community require an Islamic state.

The Tarbiyah Movement

Allegiances to different streams of Muslim orientation in Indonesia are difficult to determine with precision. One recent survey reported that forty-two percent of Indonesia’s Muslim population of over 200 million aligned themselves with the NU traditions and twelve percent with the Muhammadiyah traditions. Historically NU has had a strong rural basis, particularly in Java, whereas Muhammadiyah has been strongly urban and distinctly middle-class in memberships. For the past two decades or more, these distinctions have begun to blur and for many of a younger generation, different streams of thought have merged. Reform and renewal have taken new directions outside the bounds of previous allegiance. Even to identify the directions of various new movements within Indonesia is problematic in that they exist in a flux of development.

The most significant of these movements is identified by different names and includes within it a number of streams. Some observers refer to this movement as the Dakwah movement, others refer to it as the Tarbiyah movement. At its inception, it was called the Salman Mosque movement and became (and remains) a campus-based revival movement. It is also the movement in which the ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood (Ikwanul Muslimin) were able to take root and flourish.

The initial stirrings of this movement in Bandung during the 1970s were considered a prelude to the beginning of the 15th century according to the Islamic calendar, a century anticipated as a period of Islamic resurgence. It also coincided with the Islamic Revolution in Iran. The leader of the movement that began at the Salman Mosque, was an electrical engineer, M. Imaduddin Abdulrahmin, who held a teaching position at the Bandung Institute of Technology (ITB), Indonesia’s most prestigious institution of higher learning for science and technology.

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18 This and other surveys of a similar kind have been conducted by the Centre for the Study of Islam and Society in Indonesia (Pusat Pengkajian Islam dan Masyarakat) in Jakarta and published in Tempo. See, for example, Tempo 29 December 2001.

19 The literature on this movement provides a varied glance at its development. There is an excellent thesis by Rifki Rosyad, A Quest for True Islam: A Study of the Islamic Resurgence Movement among the Youth in Bandung, Indonesia, which focuses on the early phase of the movement in Bandung. V. S. Naipaul happened to visit Bandung at this time and has reproduced an interview with the movement’s founder in his book, Among the Believers. A useful recent book, which began as a sociology thesis at the University of Indonesia, by Ali Said Damanik, Fenomena Partai Keadilan: Transformasi 20 Tahun Gerakan Tarbiyah di Indonesia covers the movement into its political phase. There are also valuable analyses, as yet unpublished: “Dakwah and Democracy: The Significance of Party Keadilan and Hizbut Tharir” by Elizabeth Collins and “Creating ‘Total Muslims’: The Tarbiyah Movement and the Rise of Neo-Revivalism in Indonesia” by Greg Fealy.

20 According to a well-known Hadith, at the turn of each new century there should occur a call for religious renewal and a return to the basic sources of Islam. See Rifki Rosyad, 1995: 9-10.
Imaduddin or “Bang Imad”, as he was popularly referred to, was a Sumatran whose father had studied at Al-Azhar in Cairo and had become one of the leaders of the Masyumi party before President Suharto banned it in his attempt to control and direct Muslim politics during the New Order. Imaduddin studied at ITB and then did a Masters degree at Iowa State University. After returning to teach at ITB, he took up a position at the University of Technology Malaysia (ITM) in Kuala Lumpur. Throughout his career – as a counter to what he regarded as the extreme secularization of national universities – Imaduddin involved himself in student affairs and in a variety of Islamic training activities.

Under the auspices of the International Islamic Federation of Student Organizations, Imaduddin was able to travel widely and to establish contact with other Islamic organizations. On his return to Bandung in the early 1970s, he transformed his Islamic training program, originally known as the Latihan Manajemen Dakwah [Dakwah Management Training], into the Latihan Dakwah Mujahid [Dakwah Defender Training]. For his new training program, he relied upon key ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood [Ikhwanul Muslimeen] of Egypt and, to a lesser extent, those of the Jamiat Islami of Pakistan. These included both religious and organizational ideas, focusing on small groups (referred to as usroh) of university students who underwent intensive training that concluded with a commitment to the group and its struggle and to an involvement in future mentoring at different levels extending to the junior high school level. The teachers (murabbi) for this training were not drawn from Indonesia’s ulama but were those who had been trained in the same process. Commitment was dependent on group cohesion and to becoming ‘complete’ or ‘total’ (kaaffah) Muslims. This invariably required a distinctive expression of life-style such as jilbab for women and beards, if possible, for men and a preference for alternative Muslim forms of music (nasyid). Tarbiyah refers to the whole of the process of education or guidance that is to lead to this personal transformation as a total Muslim.

Although the name of his training exercises was changed and Imaduddin himself was detained and never returned to teach at ITB, the campus movement he initiated spread rapidly from Bandung to other national university campuses throughout Indonesia. During the 1980s and into the 1990s there occurred a succession of national conferences to coordinate Campus Preaching Organization (Lembaga Dakwah Kampus) activities and

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21 The banning of Masyumi led Mohammed Natsir and other leaders of the party to establish the Indonesian Council for Islamic Preaching [DII: Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia] whose purpose was to islamize Indonesian society. Its focus, like that of the movement that Imaduddin initiated, was to the educated community and particularly university students. The two, though independent, worked in tandem and in concert with one another. Natsir and his DII associates, many of them returned graduates from the Middle East, formed the Indonesian Committee for Solidarity with the Muslim World (KISDI: Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam) that called for militant action in the defence of Islam.

22 Imaduddin became involved in ABIM (Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia, Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia) and had Anwar Ibrahim as one of his students.

23 Damanik in his book on the Tarbiyah movement, Fenomena Partai Keadilan (2002: 109-139), provides an outline of the training process of the movement as it had taken shape in the 1990s.
to strengthen the Islamic brotherhood (Ukhuwah Islamiyah) among campus organizations. By 1998, the 10th of these conferences, which was held at Muhammadiyah University Campus in Malang, there were representatives from 64 campuses in Indonesia.

A key text published in 1980 by the Indonesian Council for Islamic Preaching (Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia) through its publishing arm, Media Dakwah was a volume of essays by Sayid Qutb, Petunjuk Jalan (Markers on the Path/Guide to the Path)24. This volume has gone through numerous reprints and has been widely used for intensive cadre training. More than any other text, this volume has brought students within the Campus Preaching Movement into contact with the ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood. This, in turn, has led to the publication of a considerable body of translated literature on the Muslim Brotherhood25 and to a preponderance of the ideas of the Brotherhood within the Dakwah/Tarbiyah movement as a whole26.

The strength of the Tarbiyah movement on campuses throughout Indonesia gave it the capacity to establish active Islamic student groups, KAMMI (Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia) and HAMMAS (Himpunan Mahasiswa Muslim Antar Kampus), that played a key role in the protests and rallies that eventuated in the resignation of President Suharto and led, within the same period, to the founding of its own political party, Partai Keadilan (Justice Party), to contest the 1999 election. It is noteworthy that the Tarbiyah movement’s vision of Islam has taken root and developed among ‘Habibie’s children’ – the generation of students, many with strong technical orientations, who were educated in secular universities as part of a national campaign to modernize the nation.

24 This is actually a composite volume, which includes four chapters from Sayid Qutb’s Fi Zilalil – Quran, plus a number of other essays.


26 There were other haraqah (movements) that entered Indonesia during this period and have vied for followers. These include the Hizbut al-Tahrir, Jama’ah Tablígh and Darul Arqam, which was officially banned in 1994. A formidable “Neo-Salafy” blend of Salafy ideas with those of the Muslim Brotherhood was represented and given Saudi funding through the Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Arab (LIPIA) and its campus dakwah organization, Khairu Ummah (KU). See Elizabeth Collins, pp. 7-9.
Devotional Islam

In the same period of religious ferment that saw the rise of the Taribiyah movement and other haraqah in Indonesia, there was also a considerable development of different forms of devotional Islam. In 1984, under the leadership of Abdurrahman Wahid, the Nahdlatul Ulama chose to withdraw from the political arena and to return to its basic foundations, concentrating on religious education and social welfare. A new generation of NU activists became involved with NGOs and other activists of different persuasions in efforts to improve social conditions in the country. In the process, NU’s rural bias was itself attenuated.

Traditionally, NU has fostered the celebration of the rituals of Islam and through its network of tarekat has promoted a variety of devotional practices, such as intensive, collective and repetitive chanting of the confession of faith or of other Quranic formulae (dzikir/wirid). For an earlier generation, these tarekat rituals attracted an elderly generation. In the 1980s, these practices took on a more popular direction, drawing upon a broader spectrum of interest. In some cases, these practices were organized through recognized tarekat and in other cases, they were developed through new hybrid mechanisms. Emanating from key pesantren such as Suryalaya in West Java, the tarekat, Qadriyyah-Naqshabandiyah, dramatically increased and extended its membership. From Pesantren Buntut, Tijaniyah with its own distinct and relatively simple devotional rituals has become one of the fastest growing tarekat in Indonesia, particularly in urban areas. A good example of a new development during the period is the foundation de novo in the late 1980s of Pesantren Daarut Tauhid in Bandung by the charismatic figure, Abdullah Gymnastiar, commonly known as Aa Gym. Established as part of a personal mission, this pesantren was intended to be a ‘Workshop for Morality’ (Bengkel Akhlaq) among the unemployed youth of Bandung. Hugely popular at the time, one of its chief devotional practices involved ritual weeping for one’s sins in a concentrated effort to achieve purity of heart (qolbun salim). From this initial base in Bandung, Aa Gym has become one of the most popular Islamic preachers in Indonesia today. Like the prolific writer and performer, Emhah Ainul Nadjib in Yogyakarta, Aa Gym combines various strands of Sufi ideas in a popular revivalist mode.

“Pamphlet Islam”

An inevitable consequence of the great effervescence of interest in Islam and of the significant increase in general education and literacy during Suharto’s New Order has been a flood of publications on all aspects of Islam. Over the past quarter century, the number of bookstores in the country has increased markedly and since the 1980s, the

27 This phase for NU called for the ‘return to the Khittah of 1926’.
section on religion in general and on Islam in particular has grown to a third or half of most every bookstore. Sales have soared and as a result, there has been a proliferation of publishers of Muslim books and wave of translations of books on Islam – primarily from Arabic and English. Within this tide of publications have come both works of great importance and a surfeit of pamphlets on every aspect of Muslim life. Many of these pamphlets are simplifications at best and propaganda at worst.

“Pamphlet Islam” is a special arena for the propagation of ideas. The often ephemeral nature of this kind of publication and its relative anonymity leaves it without a clear anchor in a particular community. Pamphlets that are translations from the Arabic and come from different parts of the Middle East are generally accorded a certain authority, even when the particular context of that authority is virtually unknown.

Within this heterogeneous collection of publications, there has appeared a substantial body of literature in Indonesia on the plight of Islam throughout the world, the plots against it and the role of terrorism. Many of these pamphlets are anti-western, anti-capitalist and pointedly anti-American. To provide a sense of these publications, one need cite a selection of titles. There are, first, translations of publications from the Arabic: Terrorist Action in Islam; Terrorism in the Mind of the Zionists; Jihad is not Terrorism or America: Dictator of the World. The original title of this last little volume was ‘Globalization or Americanization?’ but the Indonesian publisher decided upon the preferable title: America: Dictator of the World.

Another category of this literature are tracts – some larger than pamphlets – that offer political analysis from an Islamic perspective: Behind the Invasion of Irak, After the Irak Invasion: America, Oil and the End of Pan-Arabism, or America on the Verge of Collapse. America on the Verge of Collapse is the Indonesian translation from the Arabic of a wide-ranging expose of all the ills in the United States ranging from economic oppression, racism, discrimination, Zionism, media-deception, criminality, prostitution to AIDS, narcotics and the Mafia.

In another category are Indonesian booklets such as Jihad Osama versus America, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir Opposes America, Western Hatred of Islamic Ideological Movements, or Da’wah and Jihad: An Islamic Movement that is not Terrorist. The subsections of this last volume offer a good idea of its content: America is an enemy of the world; the Palestinian people continue to suffer; Afghanistan has been forgotten; the American

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30 I have taken this phrase, “Pamphlet Islam”, from Omid Safi whose point is the same as the one that I wish to make, namely that the ideas of Islam are by no means simple and that ideas of subtlety and complexity can not be conveyed within a few pages of text by some, often unknown, writer with a strongly held viewpoint. See Omid Safi, ‘Introduction’ to Progressive Muslims: On Justice, Gender and Pluralism: 2003: 22-23. The issue of “Pamphlet Islam” is a contemporary problem that deserves a great deal of consideration. It is particularly at odds with the pesantren tradition of education, which has concentrated on the considered interpretation of classic texts guided by authoritative teachers. See Bruinessen, ‘Kitab Kuning: Books in Arabic Script Used in the Pesantren Milieu” in Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde 146: 226-269 (1990) and Kitab Kuning: Pesantren dan Tarekat: Tradisi-Tradisi Islam di Indonesia (1995).
attack on Iraq represents an attack on the Muslim Community; the American attack is an attack on Islam; the Muslim Community accepts the clash of civilizations. In many of these pamphlets, Samuel Huntington’s work is cited and his thesis is accepted as valid: Islam’s clash with the West is inevitable and has already begun.

The Huntington thesis is interpreted as giving authoritative support to the critical understanding of Sayid Qutb and the Muslim Brotherhood that Islam is engaged in war of ideas (ghazwul fikri). Although manifest in outbreaks of open warfare, the fundamental differences between Islam and the non-Islamic world of ignorance (jahiliyah) are those of ideas. This embraces everything that might be considered as civilization and extends to much of contemporary Muslim culture that has been tainted with foreign ideas. To quote the powerful words of Sayid Qutb:

We are now living in a period of ignorance (jahiliyah) like the period of jahiliyah at the beginning of Islam and perhaps this jahiliyah is deeper now than then. Everything around us is jahiliyah: concepts and beliefs, customs and tradition, sources of knowledge, art and literature, law and forms of order. Still worse, much of what we consider as Islamic culture, Islamic sources, Islamic philosophy, Islamic thought are all fundamentally a product of this jahiliyah (Petunjuk Jalan, p 17).

This stern vision requires not just a rejection of the West but a radical reformation of the Muslim world as it exists at present. This transformation of the world requires Muslims totally committed to Islam.

Therefore within this body of literature, the most chilling pamphlets are those on suicide bombing: Palestinian Women’s Drum-Beat Summons to Jihad; Killing Oneself or a Martyr’s Death; Martyr’s Bombing from the Perspective of Islamic Law.

**Varieties of Mujahidin**

An underlying assumption of much of the Muslim literature published in Indonesia – and not just its pamphlet variety – is the belief that Islam is under grave threat. Whether this is seen as a world-wide threat for which Palestine, Bosnia, Chechnya, Afghanistan and Iraq are prime examples, a national threat for which Ambon, Poso or Timor are taken as bitter instances or the more insidious threat that derives from corrupting and immoral influences on Muslim life, the response has been a call for the defence of Islam. Those who have come forward as defenders of the faith regard themselves as mujahidin. Although this is by no means a new phenomenon in Indonesia, the past decade and particularly the period since the end of Suharto’s New Order has seen the emergence of a great variety of mujahidin organizations or of Muslim organizations with associated militia auxiliary. The diversity of these groups with their varying commitments is worth highlighting. In 1999, the Majalah Tajuk listed no less than twenty-three such groups.\(^{31}\)

\(^{31}\) Majalah Tajuk No 18, p 31, 28 October 1999. In addition to the larger and more nationally identifiable militia groups such as NU’s BANSER, or Front Pembela Islam, or Laskar Jihad, there are many such groups based on local or regional adherence such as Gerakan Reformasi...
By 2004, the number of these groups had, if anything, increased. Given the nature of these groups, their interrelations and the fluidity of members, it is inappropriate to focus on any one group to the exclusion of the wider network comprising a majority of these groups. It is possible, for illustrative purposes, to consider briefly the three most prominent of these groups: Front Pembela Islam, Forum Komunikasi Ahlussunnah Waljama’ah (FKAWJ), which is better known by the name of its armed militia Laskar Jihad and Jemaah Islamiyah.

The Front Pembela Islam (FPI) or Islamic Defence Front is an interesting amalgam of elements. FPI was founded in 1998 by Al-Habib Muhammad Rizieq bin Husein Syihab, a former student at LIPIA who also studied in Saudi Arabia, and by K. H. Misbahul Anam, whose training at Pesantren As-Shidiqiyyah was more in line with that of Nahdlatul Ulama. Habib Rizieq’s authority among his own local community of Jakarta/Betawi followers derives from his descent from the Prophet but the group claimed at one time to have a national membership of many millions. The primary mission of FPI was to protect the Muslim community against the gross immorality evident in Indonesia and its most notable activities have been raids on centers of entertainment (cinemas, restaurants and areas of drinking and known prostitution) in Jakarta.

The Front campaigned actively for the implementation of Syariah Law and for the restoration of the Jakarta Charter to the Indonesian constitution. It also campaigned for Habibie and against the choice of Megawati as a woman for President. The Front’s pesantren base is Pesantren Al-Umm but most activities were run from its headquarters near Habib Rizieq’s home in Petamburan in Jakarta. Although it has a complex administrative structure, the Front’s Anit-Immorality Board was the most prominent feature of the organization along with its uniformed, green-belted militia (Laskar Pembela Islam, Laskar Mujahidah and Laskar Cilik) who were organized into troops, each headed by a commander. This militia was a mechanism for mobilizing armed bands among underemployed urban masses and was considered by many to have close links to elements in the military. The Front was particularly active during 1999 and 2000 and – in face of criticism by various Jakarta ulama including K.H. Misbahul Anam, its founder, who has withdrawn from the organization – has seemingly ceased its operations.

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32 The International Crisis Group in Jakarta under the direction of Sidney Jones has produced a number of exceptionally detailed analyses of the background, interconnections and local activities of the most important of these groups. See, in particular, Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia: The case of the “Nguki Network” in Indonesia, Indonesia Briefing, 21 May 2002; Impact of the Bali Bombings, Indonesia Briefing, 8 August 2002; Indonesia Backgrounder: How The Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network Operates, Asia Report No 43, 11 December 2002; Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: Damaged but Still Dangerous, Asia Report No 63, 26 August 2003 and Indonesia Backgrounder: Jihad in Central Sulawesi, 3 February 2004.
The Forum Komunikasi Ahlussunnah Waljama’ah (FKAWJ) or Laskar Jihad represents yet another kind of mujahidin organization, yet with elements similar to that of Front Pembela Islam. Like Front Pembela Islam, Laskar Jihad was a product of the post-Suharto period. Its stated was to restore the honour and prestige of the Muslim community that has been sullied during the New Order.

The Forum was founded by Ja’far Umar Thalib who, like Habib Rizieq, is of Arab descent. Ja’far Umar’s father was a religious leader who was active in Al-Irsyad in East Java. Ja’far Umar studied at Pesantren Al-Irsyad in Malang and had association with Pesantren Persis in Bangil. He also studied for three years at LIPIA and then went on to the Maududi Institute in Lahore. From Lahore, he went on to join the mujahidin in Afghanistan where he is said to have known Abu Sayyaf. After his return from Afghanistan and a brief stint in Indonesia, he traveled to the Middle East for further study and became a student of Syaikh Muqbil bin Hadi Al-Wad’i of Dammaz in North Yemen. On his return to Indonesia in 1993, he found Pesantren Iha’aus Sunnah in Yogyakarta as the religious center for the teaching of Salafiyah ideas of Islam and devoted himself to teaching and preaching. The establishment of the Forum, with regional assemblies throughout most of Indonesia, was an extension of these efforts.

Laskar Jihad was created in early 2000 with the express purpose of sending fighters to Ambon to assist local Muslims in their struggle with Christians. On the 6th of April 2000, Ja’far Umar launched Laskar Jihad’s campaign with great fanfare at a rally in Stadium Senayan in Jakarta and he then held well-publicized ‘national’ battle training in Bogor. By September it is estimated that he had sent over 1300 volunteers to Ambon. All underwent military training and all were expected to live by Syariah law and to follow ‘the path of the companions of the Prophet’ (manhaj salafi). These fighters were organized into a command not unlike that of the Indonesian army with battalions of approximately 600 to 700 troops.

Not only did Laskar Jihad send waves of fighters to Ambon who provided a significant component to the fighting, but it also carried on a war of ideas. It produced a bulletin on the fighting highlighting atrocities committed by Christians and the heroic defence of its own fighters. Laskar Jihad also produced a well managed website that gave it international notoriety. Its effective use of the media, its capacity to marshall support from a wide spectrum of Islamic groups and its ability to link elite circles of power with local Muslim communities demonstrated an impressive level of sophistication. Equally sophisticated was Laskar Jihad’s provision of free medical services and of support for the families of those fighting for Laskar Jihad as well as the provision of religious reading.

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33 Al-Irsyad is an historically important Islamic organization of Indonesians of Arab descent.
34 Ja’far Umar is reported to have quarreled with his teacher both at LIPIA in Jakarta and at the Maududi Institute in Lahore and he left both institutions because of his disagreements. On his return from Afghanistan, he was put in charge of Pesantren Al-Irsyad in Salatiga, but when his plans for reform of this pesantren were rejected, he left to travel in the Middle East.
35 The core curriculum included key texts by Muhammad bin Abdul Wahab and Ibnu Taimiyah.
for Ambonese Muslim communities and of education and accommodation at different pesantren for victims of the fighting. All of this required considerable financial resources. As the fighting in Ambon lessened, there was a spillover of elements of Laskar Jihad into Irian and more importantly into Poso in Central Sulawesi, which had become another arena of Muslim-Christian conflict. Then suddenly in the wake of the Bali bombing, Ja’far Umar dissolved *Laskar Jihad* and recalled his fighters, explaining that he was acting on a *fatwa* from his Imam in Medina. His Forum (FKAWJ), however, continued its educational *dakwah*.

The third of these *mujahidin* groups, *Jemaah Islamiyah*, is the most controversial, especially since many of its adherents claim that such a group does not exist. Sidney Jones who has done the most detailed research on this group and its activities refers to it as the “Ngruki network”, Ngruki being the popular designation of the Pesantren Al-Mukmin located at Ngruki in Surakarta, Central Java. Founded by K.H. Abdullah Sungkar, Pesantren Al Mukmin is now headed by Ustadz Abu Bakar Ba’asyir. Both men and many of their most committed followers were forced into exile in Malaysia during the Suharto period but returned after his retirement. Abdullah Sungkar died and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir was left to carry on this work. Ngruki is linked to other similarly oriented pesantren in Indonesia. Members of the Ngruki network have evident international connections with Al-Qaeda but also with other Islamic *mujahidin* groups in Indonesia, Malaysia and the southern Philippines. Graduates of Ngruki or its affiliates form a who’s who of the terrorists and terrorist suspects in Southeast Asia. Abu Bakar Ba’asyir is regarded as the spiritual leader of the group. He is currently in jail and is scheduled for further interrogation on new charges for terrorism when he is released.

From the 5th to the 7th of August 2000, thousands of Muslims from a variety of Islamic organizations gathered in Yogyakarta to hold the founding meeting of the Indonesian Council of Mujahidin (*Majlis Mujahidin Indonesia*: MMI) at which Abu Bakar Ba’asyir was chosen as *Amir*. A number of distinguished academic and intellectual figures were also in attendance. The purpose of the Council was declared to work for the implementation of Syariah Law, the establishment of an Islamic State (*Daulah Islamiyah*: DI; also referred to as *Negara Islam*: NI) in Indonesia and the reconstitution of the caliphate. The gathering included many adherents of the former *Darul Islam* (DI) movement whose members form part of the Ngruki network. Abu Bakar Ba’asyir as Amir of the Council was able to attend its next congress in Tasikmalaya in January 2001, but subsequent trial and imprisonment has prevented him from further active involvement. The Council continues its activities and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir continues to be respected.

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36 No less than seven different *Syaiikh* in Mecca, Medina and Yemen delivered *fatwa* that pertained to Maluku and urged Muslims to go to the protection of their fellow Muslims. For this and other information in the section, I am indebted to the work of Dr Jamhari who has written a detailed but as yet unpublished study of a number of *mujahidin* groups in Indonesia.


38 *Darul Islam* was a movement in the 1950s extending from Java to Sumatra and Sulawesi that took up armed struggle for the establishment of an Islamic state.
In 2000 and 2001, the activities of all three of these mujahidin groups – Front Pembela Islam, Laskar Jihad and Jema‘ah Islamiyah – were very much at the forefront of attention. While none of these groups, or more specifically the networks that support them, have disappeared, they are certainly no longer able to mobilize followers as they had previously done. A precarious secession of hostilities has been brokered in Maluku and extended to Central Sulawesi and the police have successfully captured many of those responsible for the Bali bombing and the Marriott Hotel bombing, whose impact on public opinion was considerable. At the same time, the political situation in Indonesia has moved on in preparation for the 2004 general and presidential elections.

The 2004 General Elections in Indonesia

On the 5th of April Indonesia carried out what was the third genuinely democratic election in its history. This single-day election was probably the most complex election of its kind ever undertaken with more than 147 million eligible voters choosing candidates from 24 parties for a National Representative Assembly (DPR), Provincial Representative Assemblies (DPRD) Regency and City Assemblies and – to add to the complexity of the ballot – a new national Regional Representative Assembly (DPD). For the National, Provincial and Regency Assemblies, voters had to choose parties and candidates from those parties whereas for the new Assembly, votes were required to choose candidates without party affiliation. While all of this was done in a day, it will take weeks to sort out the results of the election and come to some understanding of its national and local implications. And all of this is prelude to the election – in one, or possibly two stages – of the next president and vice-president. The election also offers a glimpse of the development of Islam as a factor of political influence within the country.

The results of the election of parties at the national level can be broadly viewed in terms of ‘bundles’ consisting of roughly 20% of the vote. The Golkar Party won the first of these bundles with over 21% of the vote (21.58% to be exact); Megawati’s Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP) won the second of these bundles with over 18% (18.53). Together these two national ‘secular’ parties received 40% of the vote. The next bundle was won by two Islamic parties. Abdurrahman Wahid’s National Awakening Party with just under 11% (10.57%) of the vote and Hamzah Haz’s United Development Party (PPP) with over 8% (8.15%) of the vote (total:18.72% ). This can be viewed as the broadly traditional Islamic vote, though certainly not entirely traditionalist in orientation. The next bundle was captured by three different parties: a new secular party, the Democratic Party headed by a former general and cabinet minister, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, that obtained over 7.45% of the vote; an Islamic party, the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) headed by Hidayat Nur Wahid that obtained 7.34 % of the vote; and another broadly Islamic party, the National Mandate Party headed by a notable political figure and former head of Muhammadiyah, Amien Rais that obtained just under 6.44% of the vote (total:21.23%) The final bundle of roughly 20% consists of the 17 other parties whose success ranged from 2.5% of the vote to less than .5% of the vote. The majority of these
parties are secular in orientation but some of the more successful are Islamic in orientation. The two most successful Islamic parties (PBB and PBR) between them obtained just over 5% of the vote. A division of the total vote for all parties would divide roughly 60/40, secular/Islamic.

Particular attention in the election focused on the remarkable success of the new parties, the Democratic Party and the Prosperous Justice Party. Both campaigned on anti-corruption platforms and both had their greatest success in Jakarta where each gained over 20% of the vote. Whereas the Democratic Party moved immediately to establish a presidential and vice-presidential slate (Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Jusuf Kalla from the Golkar Party), the Properous Justice Party has held back to consider its options and its possibilities for political alliance. The first publicized activity by the Head of the Prosperous Justice Party, Hidayat Nur Wahid, was to pay a visit to the imprisoned Abu Baker Ba'asyir, thus sending a clear signal of his sympathies within the spectrum of Islamic allegiance.

The Properous Justice Party (PKS) is a product of the Tarbiyah movement. It is indeed the continuation of this movement in the political arena. In the previous election, it stood as the Justice Party (PK) but changed its name to be able to contest the 2004 election as a ‘new’ party. PKS is, in many ways, a new kind of party in Indonesia: well-organized by cadres, whose educated members live simply and, if elected, surrender their salaries to the party in return for a living allowance. Committed to Syariah Law and to the ‘Medina Charter’, the party campaigned primarily on an insistence that they would promote justice, good governance and stamp out corruption. Not only did the Party poll 22.8% of the vote in Jakarta, it gained 11.5% in West Sumatra, 11.4% in Banten, 10.8% in West Java, in Banten, 12.8% in North Maluku, 9.6% in Maluku, and 9.5% in East Kalimantan. This is an impressive spread both in key provinces of western Indonesia as well as in eastern Indonesia. One of the areas where the Party gained less than 3% of the vote – one of its lowest showings in a predominantly Muslim area – was East Java where voting of over 30% went to the Abdurrahman Wahid’s National Awakening Party. Central Java was also low at 4.7%. These figures point to differences in orientation among Islamic parties.

To some, the rise of the Prosperous Justice Party will be seen as an ominous political development. It is potentially, however, a fortunate development – one of the most important developments within the Muslim world. It gives voice to an orientation in Islam that can not be denied, minimized or overlooked. This orientation has too often flourished when it has been denigrated or suppressed. As a participant in the political process, the new Properous Justice Party must endeavor to deliver on what it promises or suffer the loss its adherents. The full participation of the Party in the democratic process offers a model for the future.

The Party has, not unexpectedly, an excellent website, [www.keadilan.or.id](http://www.keadilan.or.id) that sets forth the Party’s program and manifesto. Indeed if one wishes to follow the development of ideas within different Muslim groups in Indonesia, one must attend to their different websites. Another website of importance is that of the Liberal Islam Network ([Jaringan Islam Liberal; JIL](http://www.islamlib.com)) which represents the most outspoken critical source of opposition to a narrow, literalist interpretation of Islam. Their site is [www.islamlib.com](http://www.islamlib.com).
Conclusion

In this paper, I have tried to provide some idea of the diversity of Islam in Indonesia and to give a sense of the historical context of this diversity. Some would claim that there is polyphony in this diversity but it is equally possible to identify discordance. There is also a tendency among some observers to distinguish between radical and moderate Muslims. At the extremes, this is undoubtedly possible but it is certainly no longer a simple or straightforward task to sort out clearly the middle ground.

As I have indicated, there is a contrast between traditionalist views that would consecrate the world in the name of Islam and reformist views that would insist on remaking it, but these views now interpenetrate one other. Instead of a clear divide between so-called moderates and so-called radicals, there is a broad spectrum of individual opinions which shift and recombine on different issues. Appreciating this interplay of ideas is crucial to understanding Islam in Indonesia, as it is to understanding Islam throughout the world.
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