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the position taken here. Contrary to the
development-led approach to reconstruction
proposed in an inter-agency UNDP document
(Rogge 1995), this paper takes the position that
‘development’ ought not to be the watchword.
Rather, as post-war aid needs for reconstruction
are ascertained, it is a word in reconstruction aid
discourse to watch. Humanitarian concerns, rules
and conditionalities should be uppermost.4

Confronted with such situations, perhaps there
are new challenges for ways of thinking about aid
responses. This paper attempts to identify some.

RECURRING THEMES IN AID STUDIES

What has become known and institutionalised as
‘development studies’ stems from assessments of
reconstruction needs for industrialisation in
Europe after World War II in the 1940’s. But this
original association with war studies has largely
been forgotten. The Marshall Aid to Europe after
that war is rarely included in curricula.

Instead foreign ‘development planning’
missions since, say that in (I think) 1948 to
Burma, carried out under ‘expert’ consultancy
agreements, have come to the fore, in Africa,
Latin America, Asia and the Pacific. The field has
become dominated by ideas about peace not war,
green (not red) revolutions and the like as
alternatives to conflict and war. Debt as
originally approached in the context of war
reparations and re-construction has been
submerged in ideas of debt and ‘development’
loans granted not to recover from, but to avert,
war. Which they didn’t, of course.

Centres for ‘development studies’ have
grown greatly during and since the 1960s. Aid
planning and evaluation missions have
multiplied too. Indeed the two phenomena are
closely related. Recently some of these evaluations
have focused on immediate humanitarian, rather
than long term developmental aid, yet the truth
remains that, taken as a whole, and regardless of
whether they have followed an international or
national war or not, aid evaluation studies have
acquired a notably common agenda. Largely this
transcends distinctions between particular
categories of aid, and so it should: most of the
important issues overlap.

Thus there is much to gain from keeping a
broader picture in mind when thinking about aid
issues for Bougainville.

The issues that most commonly surface in,
and shape, aid studies include

• expert—usually economic—themes,
their translation into policies, and the
reading of actual events in the light of these
and other considerations
• aid seen as a lubricant or fuel
• organisational and administrative issues
of consultation and coordination between all
parties
• environmental resources issues
• aid and the politics of economics, and the
economics of politics
• aid as productive of progress, or
subsidising poverty, in the recipient country
• business and other gains from aid in the
source country
• human resources and their depletion and
sustainability
• capital-intensive big compared with
labour-intensive small projects
• aid and sovereignty; foreign and defence
policy and international relations
• optimal technological solutions regardless
of social circumstances
• aid, conditionality, and absorptive
capacity
• ideology, culture, tradition and
development
• centralisation and decentralisation of
governance
• global, macro, mezo and micro levels;
unanticipated and counterproductive effects;
and language and labelling practices.

Negatively, another commonality of aid
studies as a whole is the lack of social validity (or
validation) of their analyses. For example they
normally almost totally avoid social class
stratification and socioeconomic mobility analysis. Indicators which are not about social solidarity, social mobilisation and so forth are called ‘social indicators’ nonetheless (a trend which current ‘social capital’ concerns in ‘development studies’ are unlikely to change very much).

‘Ethnicity’ is seldom presented in aid studies as a social and political process but as a cultural, or even a racial, given. For example the whole world knows about ‘the Tutsi’ and ‘the Hutu’ Rwanda as ‘tribes’, yet they are not ‘tribes’. So if there is ‘tribalism’ in Rwanda it is ‘tribalism without tribes’ (cf Destexhe 1995).

BOUGAINVILLE AS A ‘COMPLEX EMERGENCY’

According to all press and other accounts of the war and peace processes seen, the armed conflict in the province was about immediate and ultimate statal, governmental and ideological authority over self-determination, personal and group identity, and the control of local and outside resources. Dispute about theories of progress and traditional and new social structure played an important part too. Such multiplicity and complexity of themes—and actors—is common in such complex situations, where much has been destroyed but also much affirmed, and something created.

The term ‘complex emergency’ (see Duffield 1994; Apthorpe and Nevile 1998) is a diplomatic euphemism for ‘man-made’ civil and military conflict, as contrasted with ‘natural’ turbulence such as drought and famine. It was first used in UN circles during Mozambique’s 17 year long civil war. The term has acquired institutional status in relief—and development—instutes since. I use it here for the nearly ten years of war in Papua New Guinea’s Bougainville Province. It remains controversial nevertheless. Policy induced, survival-threatening conflict and hardship resulting in loss of life and major displacements of populations are part of the story of ‘natural disasters’ as well (Alexander 1997). Consider for example the present drought and frost inflicted hardship in Papua New Guinea (which has not seriously affected most of Bougainville), and the 1994 volcanic eruption in Rabaul. Now in North Korea, as recurring in Ethiopia, critical food shortage is as much a matter of institutions as of environments. In Bangladesh in the typhoon season it is poverty that kills more than the floods.

Especially in the case of repeated famine following recurring drought or flooding, the complexity of response that is needed is not measured by the Richter scale, or climatologists’ or geographers’ assessments of land conditions in districts and sub-districts affected by natural disasters. Note, however, that in ‘complex emergency’ and ‘natural disaster’, ‘emergency’ is the noun used in the former, ‘disaster’ in the latter. While civil wars mean disasters for some parties, for others, they are something different: planned civil, military and economic strategies pursued by force of arms to win battles and a war.

My argument proceeds on the assumptions that the main elements of comparability of Bougainville with other complex emergencies are as follows.

• In general, rescue and reconstruction aid seeks similar general outcomes with regard to complex emergencies and their immediate aftermaths: namely, institutional provision for new beginnings, peace and recovery. Which institutions are most involved may vary, but those pertaining to security, justice and human rights come usually to the fore. Humanitarian dimensions loom larger than say those of macroeconomics and structural adjustment.

• Typically, complex emergencies have similar aetiologies and phenomenologies, namely, similar types and expressions of disputed areas of effective responsibility as regards centralisation and decentralisation of politics and planning, and actions taken with regard to these. For example ideas of autonomy, even secession, may come up.
• Matters are complicated by disputed frameworks of regional international (and indeed ‘post-international’ or ‘global’) relations and politics. Key players are seen to be villainous and virtuous at almost the same time. In Bougainville ‘patronising’ Australian involvements are seen as part of the problem, but appropriate Australian involvements as part of the solution.

• As a rule, the disputed national framework involves rival social and economic ideologies and strategies for life and livelihood, including those about the design of welfare and distribution of existing and new resources allocations. Of course there were competing causes also before the war, but with a difference: normally developmentalism’s causes are without armed rebels (or rebels of any description where dissent is uncommon or excluded). A peace process must address causes with rebels, and casualties—rebels who have put their causes violently on the map, and casualties who are in need of urgent help now, not in the notional long run.

EIGHT ISSUES FOR BOUGAINVILLE

The following are among the issues to be addressed before an aid response in Bougainville can be composed. They are not exclusive to this case, but arguably are pertinent to it.

A DOSE OF DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

To take just one example, consider the use of the terms ‘stability’ and ‘chaos’. So often in aid studies these are treated as if they were always dichotomous or polar terms. Official (and other organisational) aid discourse practices rely heavily on polar words, of which only one is loaded with positive value. For example ‘stability’ is contrasted just with ‘chaos’. Language influences thought. The result is that thinking about the varieties and natures of these states, the reasons and prices paid for them, and the many situations in between, gets squeezed out. Everything gets reduced to extremes. The result is not analysis, but lack of analysis. False comparison, over-generalisation, exaggeration, is paraded instead.

There are many kinds and effects of ‘stability’ and ‘chaos’. If ‘development’ is a word in aid discourse to watch, so also are these two words. Like peace, they may bring some chaos and casualties, but wars are strategies fought at great cost for objectives ranked even higher than life itself, not just unfortunate hiccups in a normative linear process. Labelling them just as ‘chaos’ entirely misses this and leads you back too uncritically and too fast to another false analysis—of the ‘stability’ that is said to have gone before.

It is well-known that in complex emergencies ‘government breaks down’. But while this is true for some levels of governance, it is not necessarily true for all. Neither would anyone tuned to the sorts of issues normally grouped as ‘decentralisation’ fail to expect that, while some levels of authority and control are in crisis, other levels may for this very reason become not only more visible to analysts now than they were to analysts not looking for them, but, besides this, also somewhat stronger. In which case surely they are obvious potential to be considered for institutional partnership for reconstruction at least.

For Somalia one thinks for example of ‘clans’ and their heads. In Liberia just before the war ended government ministers told me for example how important ‘traditional authorities’ were for agriculture as well as local governance.

REFOCUS PRIORITIES FROM ‘THE ECONOMIC’ TO ‘THE SOCIAL’

As a peace process sets in after a long emergency, if society and its group and individual psychological fabric is not restored and rebuilt as a first priority, there would be nothing for structural economic aid to build on later.

Reconstruction aid thinking ought to be led by peace, and social and political analysis.
‘Development’ and economic analysis is not to be neglected but put in second place. And surely this is particularly true for Bougainville where a certain type of economic issue—mainly of the mine—played such a critical role in the generation of the conflict.

The United Nations Development Programme 1995–97 report on rehabilitation and reconstruction needs assessment and program proposals (mentioned at the beginning of this paper) says

no evidence was found of a concerted effort be either the government or NGOs aimed at directly facilitating a healing and recovery process. The NGO sector has however been providing basic counselling…and spiritual rehabilitation as part of their rehabilitation activities. These efforts should form the basis of a well developed social rehabilitation programmes (sic) using a strategy which is based upon a participatory approach. Such an approach should be firmly based upon the people’s faith and engage all sectors, including former competence (sic), in a process which builds a sense of unity in the community (Rogge 1995:50).

To which, I would add, ‘justice’ as a path to reconciliation.

Presumably one option for discussion would be a method of ‘truth commission’ and ‘apology’, with or without power to commit to trial. Another path to justice and society could be less individualistic and more group-centred, such as redesign and intensification of sports, cultural and other activities with collective bases of participation.

Of the major studies of complex emergency in other parts of the world which say or imply that ‘the social’ and ‘the institutional’ should be put first, one is Randolph Kent’s on Rwanda. After serving for a period as Humanitarian Coordinator there, this author of the earliest classic text on the anatomy of relief insists on ‘the centrality of the social’ and calls for willingness to address the fundamental requirements of a society in crisis’ (Kent 1995:29). But he found that, because a particularly rapid response is required, a donor community can be at a loss—an impasse even—if the stabilisation requirements fit neither conventional categories of development nor normal assumptions about relief, say after earthquakes.

Kent singled out three problems that bedevilled efforts in Rwanda to respond to what he calls societal ‘stabilisation’ needs urgently, speedily and specifically

- the type of needs themselves for which provision appears too politically sensitive (such as prisons, military facilities, even salaries for soldiers)
- where needs are seen to be less politically sensitive, what really is required—magistrates, courts, legal texts, or more traditional adjudication systems—is controversial
- slow and cumbersome aid procedures for considering and acting on these issues make rapid response difficult anyway.

As regards Bougainville, think for example of the presently sensitive issues concerning incorporating Bougainville Revolutionary Army and Resistance members as auxiliary police, and the role of local and traditional judicial institutions.

Because donors and agencies habitually commission only economic, not social and economic analysis, they do not find it easy to focus on social and political issues. Instead they see them as inherently contentious, beyond intellectual analysis, to be displaced either into the ‘too hard’ basket or that reserved for nuts, protesters, ideologues (on the premise that aid deals now with a non-ideological world—you see capital is non-ideological) or, heaven forbid, socialists.

Per contra, economic issues are regarded as ‘technical’ and ‘managerial’, difficult, yes, especially at the macro level to calculate correctly, but not subjective or inherently open to bias, only occasional and unfortunate error which remedial
technical work can correct. But why the current Asian crisis as it is called came as such a shock to orthodox economists, and why also it will soon be subsumed by them into inevitability, is not a story that can be told here.

When aid thinking does not neglect ‘social aspects’ altogether it tends to trivialise them, to treat them less professionally than other concerns (the assumption being that anyone can deal with social reform issues, but for economic analysis you need specialists—economists—and for ‘global’ analysis particularly: the economism inherent in the current globalisation paradigm is the result of this being the work of orthodox neo-classical economists only). But as regards protracted political emergency, as we have seen ‘social aspects’ and ‘political aspects’ are central and defining. At the extreme, for a change, ‘economic aspects’ may be considered to be marginal or optional extras for an aid design or an evaluation to take note of. Which is why among other things the role of ‘the war economy’ in the longevity of complex emergencies is not seen.

The needs analysis and three year provincial action plan for Bougainville rehabilitation and social re-development prepared by a group including the National Research Institute of Papua New Guinea already cited (Bopp and Ahai n.d.) regrets the preoccupation it reports with restoring only the physical structure. It complains that, apart from formal education and health services, almost everything else is neglected.

About the ‘spiritual, psychological and social wounds’ the crisis has caused, it finds at least five kinds of problems for which healing and rehabilitation are needed: ‘spiritual dislocation and confusion…post trauma shock and distress…grieving and loss…the war zone mentality, payback, conflict and estrangement.’

DO NOT VIEW TURBULENCE ONLY NEGATIVELY

Because aid thinking normally borrows so extensively from secular and neo-classical ideology as to hold, virtually exclusively, that only under un-turbulent conditions could aid achieve its stated aims, it has a severe handicap when faced with complex emergencies: taking only negative views of turbulence, even where politically aid bureaux may be under pressure to break with this tradition.

Finding the will and the way to view turbulence not only negatively, would reveal for example the technological and organisational advances where self-reliance is enforced to an unusual degree that war can bring—as for example in Southern Rhodesia as it was becoming Zimbabwe, and as regards health services in Tigray during the long Ethiopian civil war. Such creativity is ignored because it is assumed it could never have happened.

Where there have been such advances, then surely reconstruction aid would be wise to try to build on them, not overlook what was created as well as what it has destroyed, including what people under conditions of great adversity have invented (or re-invented) to survive.

What is required is not just to forgive and forget, or to take the view that the war was purely a setback. Otherwise those who put their lives at risk and suffered, or even died, as well as those who under great conditions of hardship managed to survive, will be consigned to have done so for nothing.

PUT HUMANITARIAN CONDITIONALITIES FIRST

After, as well as during, a long and destructive war, few would fail to see a strong case for humanitarian emergency aid. Donors tend to see this form of aid, however, as more or less the opposite of structural economic aid despite the increasing proportions of ‘official development aid’ actually spent on emergency aid.

Reconstruction issues after a long and serious complex emergency are peace issues first, development issues second. After a long war it is humanitarian space that is in shortest supply, for which conditionalities such as ‘democracy’ and ‘good governance’ are inappropriate. During and
after a complex emergency, aid should be governed mainly by human rights issues. Where there is a peace process, aid should be governed first by what would make for success for that, and by eventual or ultimate economic development issues only second.

Economic development planning is rarely processual. Much more characteristic are lopsidedly-composed ad hoc missions of outsiders flying in to make master plans all at once with little taste for consultative and negotiatory approaches, and much for standard packages. Civilians and unarmed soldiers monitoring a ceasefire and making humanitarian space, and visiting economic (or for that matter social) planners armed with grants and loans and political conditionality, are as different as chalk and cheese.

Aid agencies with the power to impose their own ‘development’ conditionalities include those prescribing a food-for-work approach to food aid. Their idea is that, so that this aid will not be treated just as a hand-out, recipients must work to receive it. But whatever merits this moral may have for ‘development’, the arguments against it for relief are overpowering. Why assume that in a life-threatening crisis handouts engender dependency? And it is anyway well known that even under the ‘development’ banner the ‘work’ part of the ‘food for work’ approach is often so badly conceived and planned that it is little more than make-work.

Putting ‘development’ first reflects agencies’ positions more than those of the people they try to serve. In the Pacific as elsewhere, ‘displacement’ has many causes and effects yet despite the undoubted traumas that refugees and internally displaced people may suffer acutely, evaluations show survivors to be by no means as passive as relief agencies are inclined to say. There is no reason on that score therefore for the dispossessed to be prevented from being active participants in their own welfare determination, which in the circumstances they are more likely see in terms of relief—and rehabilitation—than development especially while still displaced. If agencies do not consult with their beneficiaries because they don’t know how, they ought to be assisted to learn how—but in relief, as in development, information gaps are only part of the problem.

A recurring problem of humanitarian assistance, as noted for instance in a study on Afghanistan, is the frequent extent to which it labels people as ‘victims’ rather than respecting them as survivors’ and the principal actors in bringing about recovery and change. External interveners should be designing their programs as enabling strategies to ease and facilitate the communities’ own mechanisms for coping, taking due account of the larger picture and the fact that there may be many different, sometimes overlapping, ‘communities’ within any given locality (Donini et al. 1996:41).

Unfortunately, little is known about cases where international, governmental and non-governmental organisations have not failed to work closely with the victims of wars thus making them truly beneficiaries, and whether the opportunities presented for this by their concentration in camps have been duly exploited. Sometimes relief agencies find they need to redefine the concept ‘refugee’ to include ‘internally displaced people’, as both an agency mandate, as well as a human rights issue. Whether internally displaced people are labelled ‘political’ or ‘economic’ refugees is, however, a different important issue, as also is that of the types of assistance merited.

RECONSIDER THE SUPPOSEDLY POOR TRACK-RECORD OF HUMANITARIAN AID

Advocates of structural aid tend to see emergency aid even as a disaster within the disaster, or at least as a poorly thought-through, gut reaction to human suffering.

The case they make against emergency aid is multifaceted. It is
increasingly excessive (and normally in grant-aid form) in amount (and therefore both envied because it is competitive with other dispositions, suspected for its externalities)

- typically expensive (for example relief is delivered by airlift, and unlike say large development loans difficult to determine and deliver)

- necessarily hit-and-miss (in the sense that it is seldom served by good needs assessment studies and professional \textit{ex ante} appraisals); difficult for the recipient country to absorb (Macrae et al. 1997:227)

- wasteful (given the many media reports of losses, diversions thefts and confused analysis that wrongly equates occasional diversions of relief with the war economy) (Borton 1998)

- unplanned (because on the whole emergency as compared with structural aid is badly monitored and evaluated or not reviewed at all)

- effectively uncoordinated (not least because it is common for many agencies to be involved)

- and, even worse, counter-productive of its stated effects (because emergency aid is widely seen as fuelling the fire as well as saving some of its victims, and a reflex action resulting in relief not being put out to tender in the same way as is structural economic aid typically).

Each of these criticisms should be taken seriously. Indeed some are shared by the proponents of emergency humanitarian aid themselves, when looking more effective approaches. But for proponents of either structural or emergency aid to hold that if only emergency relief aid were more like economic development aid it would have fewer of these crippling characteristics, would make matters worse not better. A short-term throwing of relief aid is obviously not the answer to long-term developmental (nor immediate relief) problems either, but to argue that structural aid is the answer to relief-reconstruction-rehabilitation is to miss the point from the other side. Throwing development aid was not the answer before, nor is it now.

Superficially attractive though such criticisms of emergency aid are, they nevertheless have defects, surely for the Pacific no less than the rest of the world. For one thing it is stubbornly misdirected and therefore irrelevant in crucial regards. For another, it assumes too rosy an impression of the management and outcomes of economic development aid. On this latter issue, about ‘development’, a National Research Institute of Papua New Guinea assisted report (Bopp and Ahai n.d.) notes that all over Bougainville there is unanimous concern that the current restoration and rehabilitation exercise is simply re-building the same type of development process that led to the crisis. There is strong expression of desire by the people to learn development lessons from the crisis so that the rebuilding process does not reproduce the developmental ills that gave rise to the crisis in the first place.

My critique of structural aid’s critique of humanitarian emergency aid is mainly as follows.

First, the economic structural aid’s critique is blind to the specificities and exigencies of emergencies, including the counterfactual case (that nothing done would be better than something done). The grounds and requirements for humanitarian aid are different from those for development aid. They attract different kinds of aid workers, and call for different kinds of evaluation. Rescue for sheer survival now is what motivates the former, and readiness to cope in situations in which otherwise normal concepts of ‘state’ and ‘government’ barely apply, and with all the various parties to the emergency having structurally different perceptions and
expectations of what exactly is in crisis, and what is not.

That the first casualty of complex emergency is numbers (as truth is the first casualty of war, and coordination the first casualty of peace), is another distinguishing feature. Each agency and organisation prefers its own concepts of emergency and, to suit these, its own figures. Neutral or impartial sources are absent. Emergencies are chaotic, but, contrary to the dominant discourse, not entirely chaotic. While they are disastrous for some parties, they are strategies for others. Where sovereignty is disputed, pre-existing norms and organisational arrangements are in the sharpest flux. Therefore pre-set conditionalities such as are familiar in structural aid simply cannot apply, even if they should.

Second, the record of economic development aid everywhere in the world in achieving its stated objectives is poor, and not dependent on the nature and quality of this aid itself, except possibly as lubrication not fuel. I know of no evidence that even large amounts of aid poured into ‘development projects’, however big—such as dams—have averted or contained, let alone prevented, internal (and other) war.

If economic structural aid’s record is poor, there is no prima facie case for it to serve as a model for any other type of aid.

Third, besides overestimating the track-record of structural aid as investment, underestimating that of relief aid as speculation (Apthorpe 1997), and ignoring restoration and rehabilitation issues as such, advocacies of economic structural over emergency aid have the further failing: they do not give the conflict at the heart of the war the attention it deserves.

This third crippling defect is more a syndrome of features than a single point. Structural economic aid, modernisation theory, and globalisation discourse all take a similar disposition to protracted violent political crisis: war is a brutal disruption, a pathology, so as soon as it is over, things should get back to where they were before as if earlier theory and policy were entirely blameless for what followed it.

But war is not the opposite of peace, except in the dictionary.

**DITCH THE ‘RELIEF-DEVELOPMENT CONTINUUM’**

Mainly derived from thinking about ‘natural disaster’ in relatively non-conflict-driven situations, the ‘relief-development’ continuum concept emerged in UNDP circles in the early 90s (if not before) as the main precept that ought to guide emergency aid. With the pertinence of this idea to aid after earthquakes or floods, this paper is not concerned. As regards complex emergencies and reconstruction efforts after these, however, it can be more part of the problem than the solution (‘forget the continuum and build the barracks…where the victims are the society itself and the capacity to govern’, Kent 1995:27–8).

It is unfortunate that the 1995–97 UN inter-agency report on Bougainville reconstruction fails to see this. On the contrary, it argues that this continuum must lie at its heart. To quote from its 1995 version

> [t]he underpinning construct for this report is the paradigm of the ‘relief to development continuum’…The basic notion here is that relief should not be conceptually separated from rehabilitation and that rehabilitation be not conceptually separated from development; all should be implemented in unison so that the one rapidly blends into the other [that is as a ‘continuum’]…Few today question this inseparable link between sustainable development and the effective management of natural, conflict-induced and other human-made disasters…Thus, in its coordinating capacity, UNDP must ensure that post-disaster activities are, as far as possible within a developmental construct (Rogge 1995).
It would be better to ditch this continuum concept, or at least development-led versions of it as an axiomatic truth. That, however, a (so far as we can see) permanent player on the foreign-aid scene which is mandated with a coordinating role, should wish to see a coordinated approach within which short and long term aid could be considered together, obviously is unexceptionable. Presumably this is why the continuum idea caught on for the United Nations Development Programme. But other parties involved, with other mandates, ask for example how the content of its two terms (it should at least read ‘relief-rehabilitation-development’) is defined and find problems with this.

‘Few’ may have challenged it but those that have have drawn from actual experience, and hope that aid next time will have fewer counterproductive effects than it had last. They resist being so mesmerised by the abstraction of the continuum idea as to ignore the actual contents of its defining terms of discourse in the pertinent situations, and the frames and contexts in which it is used.

Fortunately, a United Nations Department of Human Affairs (now United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Humanitarian Affairs) document, also of 1995, is in sharp contrast to this United Nations Development Programme position. It does not specifically address the Bougainville case yet it appears to fit it better in noting that the continuum idea...

...is increasingly being challenged...the idea of a ‘linear’ continuum does not reflect the chronic nature of conflict and vulnerability in many countries. Nor does it acknowledge the weaknesses in the development process itself, which has not given sufficient attention to building the capacity of developing countries to deal effectively with the ‘shocks’ of instability and conflict (Kent 1995:8).

This paper then obviously prefers the United Nations Department of Human Affairs position: ‘Any suggestion...that the principles of development can be uncritically transferred into the domain of relief should be treated with some caution’ (idem). Indeed almost all complex emergency policy evaluations now available (for a summary of the main themes, see Borton and Macrae 1997) advise strongly against a development-led approach to relief, and go further than just suggesting caution. Overall there is a very strong case for not a ‘continuum’ but say a ‘contiguum’ (or a ‘dis-continuum’) idea if this would capture the notion of thinking simultaneously about both now and the future. A range of considerations ought indeed to be taken on board not one by one, but all at once.

Further, as an excellent Sudan study (Macrae et al. 1997) based on evaluation of the Operation Lifeline emergency aid program and a penetrating evaluation of a donor’s aid program in Cambodia (Bernander et al. 1995) show, there is nothing institutionally neutral about moving this way, or that way, along the continuum as an agency thinks fit. Different participation, partnership and conditionality implications attach to different positions taken. Complex questions of political neutrality and impartiality arise in conditions of conflict particularly, and in complex forms of conflict especially.

Such institutional policy issues could be regarded as sorting into three broad categories. Some are on the side of the donor and channel agencies and their agendas: different agencies and organisations take different positions as regards not only relief and ‘development’ separately, but their linkage and lack of linkage and what implications arise for programs accordingly. Other policy issues pertain mainly to questions of which partner organisations to work with. Yet others point to beneficiaries: who are considered to be in the greatest need depends partly on which organisations put these questions and which are most affected by the answers.

The Sudan discussion (Macrae et al. 1997) takes up the crucial matter of timing. It asks when would it be legitimate to move from relief to development program planning? Its answer is that three fundamental conditions must be in
place: a minimal level of security and humanitarian access; plain evidence that the emergency is over; and donors’ foreign policy recognition of the legitimacy of all parties in the conflict and peace process.

Finally, the continuum concept is about sequence and overlap over time. It tends to neglect spatial comparisons and linkages, in a word, geographical justice. For instance there are many examples of so much aid being given to refugees in camps as in effect to leave displaced people not in camps, and the ordinary local population relatively much worse off than they were before.

In Angola, where to a considerable extent at one period malnutrition was effectively reduced in a war zone, outside this, in urban slums subject to a ‘development’ not a relief aid regime, there was—and still is—steady increase in malnutrition. Exactly as a seasoned medical authority on relief has said of this case (Seaman 1994), the juxtaposition of large sums being spent to feed one group while another starves ‘...is uncomfortable but under the relief-development continuum ideology, the two actions are not necessarily incompatible’ (Seaman 1994).

Such examples of increased inequality are so common that they are anticipatable effects of relief aid.

The continuum concept has been allowed to appear axiomatic where, as it would be put in policy discourse analysis terms, there has been a focus narrowly on denotation only, not broadly taking in connotation as well.

About times of turbulence, lateral thinking is needed. Wars are times of order as well as disorder, concealed to an extent by an exceptional multiplicity of stakeholders, actors, objectives and goals. An inclusive perspective, that learns from them, must be found. It is useless simply to wish they had never happened.

COME TO TERMS WITH THE FACT THAT OURS IS NOT A NON-IDEOLOGICAL AGE

Since what is called ‘the end of the cold war’, it has become common to speak also of ‘the end of ideology’, ‘the end of history’, and so on. But ours is not a non-ideological age. Behind the predatory pragmatism of the market is the ideology of capitalism.

Further, not all conflicts during the cold war were because of the cold war. Indeed some were scarcely affected by it. Consider Biafra for example. While it may be true that since the collapse of the Soviet union there have been more complex emergencies than before, it is simplistic to package all of these wars into just one international relations envelope.

The best accounts of the conflict in Bougainville tell of a complex set of situations in which ideological issues are arguably even more important than those of identity and secession. This is exactly what one would expect of a civil war, despite its banditry and the like.

BE PROFESSIONAL ABOUT ENTRY AND EXIT STRATEGIES

To judge from the Sudan but also for example Rwanda, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Cambodia, deciding exactly when a complex emergency is over is most difficult. Getting the timing wrong, however, can lead not only to a premature move to ‘development’, but also from relief and rehabilitation. Typically governmental pressure to do the former is motivated by wanting to regain international credibility as soon as possible. Perhaps the government originally delayed acknowledgement of the need for relief for the same reason. Donors and agencies on their part, as their resources dwindle, may move not only to targeting strategies they didn’t use earlier but something more: premature change away from the relief mode altogether.

The danger is, in either eventuality, for depleting-resources-driven positions to serve as excuses for, or mask, the missing of relief exit strategies.

Private voluntary organisations’ positions and continuum-riding, in whichever direction, are variable. A few such organisations may be known for careful planning of both their entry
and exit from the relief scene. Most are not. And complex emergencies certainly attract large numbers of non-government organisations—more than 100 in the case of Mozambique, more than 200 in Rwanda. Taken together, their enthusiasms will outrun their competencies.

At all events, as a peace process gets underway, the need for real partnership and cooperation and coordination is immense. Not meeting this challenge leads only to a disaster within a disaster.

CONCLUSION: AN INCLUSIVE APPROACH TO REHABILITATION IS NEEDED

To conclude, reconstruction issues should be approached in a broad frame. Reconstruction in Bougainville, where the war has been long and enclosed, presents challenges to conventional ‘development’ aid practices and responses in the following respects.

Taking a post-emergency perspective alone is not enough: historical analysis of the pre-emergency situation is necessary, including the nature and effects of program and project aid then, and not only in the Province of Bougainville but Papua New Guinea at large. Reconstruction aid should be guided first and foremost by an analysis of the course the war has taken over the past nine years or so, and why, and how, and with what effects.

The extent to which an internal war has raged for ideological reasons among others must be ascertained so that not only the symptoms of a deeper malaise will be addressed. In the Pacific as in Africa, the translation of the cold war in international relations into predatory and inequitable market penetration by the advantaged in the name of globalisation, has only marginally altered the nature of conflict, and relief and rehabilitation, with which humanitarian aspects of an aid program have to deal.

As part of a wider effort to collect information, a positive as well as a negative view of turbulence is required, so as to learn from and build on the constructive things that have been done in a war. In Bougainville these are said to include adaptations of local health systems and innovative mini-hydro schemes.

If the success of the peace process is because it is a broadly based participatory and negotiatory process, then this is the mode that should be projected and continued into reconstruction and beyond.

By contrast, ‘development planning’ approaches typically take the form not of broadly based and consultative negotiatory processes but incidental, expert, invasive, over-riding, pre-packaged and largely alien interventions. If the ‘development planning’ interventions that preceded the war in Bougainville—and Papua New Guinea as a whole—were of this order, they should be shelved. To resume standard economic planning approaches could derail the peace process. A return to the past may not help usher in the future.

The rules of aid-for-reconstruction design, disbursement and evaluations of outcomes should not be development-led. Rather they should be grounded first and foremost in terms of international humanitarian, and human rights, law and conditionality.

To support protection and negotiated access, societal restoration, and the forms of coordination and cooperation of all parties needed for this, ought to be the prime guide for aid. Not economic rationality, nor of course economic ir-rationality.

As far as socio-psychological trauma is concerned, aid should be guided by the principle that time does not heal. Not everything comes right by itself. Or if by good fortune it should, this might well have to do with the timeliness of aid, not what should be done in the short, the long or another run.

Aid for social healing and stabilisation is reported as lacking in Bougainville and should become an urgent priority.

As mainly a single donor—AusAID—in Bougainville becomes part of a wider cast where
other donors and agencies, including foreign and local non-governmental agencies, come to figure prominently, the urgency for sensitive and effective aid coordination becomes vital.

Some aid should be given specifically to assist this process of coordination. The primary institutional responsibility for cooperation, partnership and coordination should rest with the responsible government, not say the United Nations Development Programme or United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Humanitarian Affairs or any other outside instrumentality.

NOTES

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1 I am indebted above all to Anthony Regan for meticulous comments on the longer version of this paper, for the book he is editing on Bougainville, and sharing his knowledge of the war and peace processes in Bougainville with me. I am grateful too to graduate students from Papua New Guinea in my classes at the National Centre for Development Studies, also an Australian National University seminar by Kapeato Puasia, Leader of the Bougainville Transitional Government negotiating team and Provincial Legal Officer, and those kindly attending the Australian National University seminar at which, at Sinclair Dinnen’s invitation, this paper was given. To whom I am grateful also for helpful comments.

2 My experience of internal war and its aftermath is not as a participant but—one—as an invited peace talks liaison person, in Uganda for the Nigeria-Biafra peace talks, and—three times—as an invited external policy evaluator, once for an international agency, once for a bilateral donor’s programs, and once for a church.

3 This ‘information-in-circulation’ from a variety of sources, official and scholarly, is not fully on the record and in some regards is difficult for an outsider to judge. But it does not appear to be disputed.

4 This is not to say that there is no case for multi-purpose aid, or that all boundary lines between these type-categories are categorically completely clear, or that a more detailed analysis would be satisfied to remain within the relief:development polarity as, for reasons of exposition, this writing does. Nor is it to deny that ‘relief’ too is problematic, or that desired goals, impact and other features are not expressed in conflicting terms—as for example explored in an evaluation of Swedish support to emergency aid in Cambodia (Bernander et al. 1995).

5 My own view is that the conflict in Rwanda would in some regards be better labelled ‘class conflict’ than ‘tribal conflict’. At least this would allow intra-Hutu social and political dynamics, that are so important in the crisis, to be better appreciated, and the institutions of politics not reduced to mechanics and physics. What popularly gets called ‘tribalism’ with regard to Papua New Guinea was critiqued long ago (see for example Nelson 1972).

6 For example Interdepartmental Committee 1997; Adlide 1997; Regan 1998; The Australian 9 May 1998. Again I am grateful to Anthony Regan for putting Bougainville materials at my disposal and tutoring me on their status and implications.

7 For example now there is a lectureship in complex emergency at the London School of Economics and Political Science’s Institute of Development Studies. This year a professional short course and master’s degree module on evaluating complex emergency humanitarian aid in complex emergency was given at The Australian National University’s National Centre for Development Studies. However, besides ‘complex emergency’, other terms which could equally serve our purposes if they were as widely used include for example ‘collective challenge to state sovereignty’, to borrow from a study comparing coups in Bougainville and Fiji.
(Larmour 1992), or ‘war of political dominance’, to borrow from a study comparative of humanitarian intervention in Bosnia, Rwanda and Somalia (Nederveen Pieterse 1997). All these expressions put political, social, economic and other conflict at the heart of the matter, conflict about legitimacy, power, society, the economy, livelihood and much else. The implication is that ‘settlement’ of the conflict must be similarly multi-faceted, not only military, nor, for that matter, political or social or environmental.

The evidence—too conflicting, controversial and massive to enter here—comes now increasingly from officials of (or consultants reporting to) aid agencies themselves, as well as outside sources.

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