

**Transcending the National/Asserting the National.  
How Stateless Nations like Scotland, Wales and Catalonia  
React to European Integration'**

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## 1. Introduction<sup>1</sup>

The members of some of Europe's stateless nations belong to the more enthusiastic supporters of European Integration in their respective states. What is perhaps more surprising is that nationalists are so much in favor of it. Catalan nationalists have always stressed the "Europeanness" of their country. Welsh and Scottish nationalists, which initially had rejected the European Community, changed their opinion, and now support the EU and "independence in Europe". How can minority nations, how can minority nationalists who assert their national identity not only accept, but in some cases even actively fight for a process of European integration which may have started to "transcend the National"? If the EU is really undermining the nation-state, why should such nationalists be in favor? And if the contrary is true and the EU is defending the existing states in times of globalization, then again: why should the minority nationalists be in favor?

In a first section I will present my three cases. Particular characteristics which may explain different attitudes to European Integration will be highlighted.<sup>2</sup> In a second chapter, I will analyze what the process of European integrations really "offers" to the minority nations. My third and section will deal with the strategies in response to European integration; I will analyze those of the governments as well as those of the nationalists. Finally, arguments will be given about which manifestations of national identity might be strengthened by the European Integration process. This way, I hope to present a less simplistic vision of the relations between minority nationalism and European Integration.

## 2. Asserting the National: The three nations and their particularities

There are, of course, different conceptions of what national identity is. Some see it as a primordial asset, others stress its functional value in improving communication and willingness to accept majority decisions and social redistribution.<sup>3</sup> Yet others stress the opportunities for the individual to choose his identity, the reality of plural identities, and the possibilities of molding identity. Be that as it may, all States wittingly or not help create, maintain, or destroy identities by exerting selections and pressures. The extent to which this occurs varies, but one cannot shut one's eyes to the fact. Language is a particularly strong feature of identity, not least because of its potential primordial, functional, and instrumental aspects and values. In many, but not in all stateless nations in Europe language is a keystone of their respective claims to a separate identity. Other features which might define a nation are culture, traditions, customs, a common history, even ethnicity understood as common descent, and a territory, eventually marked by a specific

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<sup>2</sup> For comparison between different cases including ours, see Keating, Michael: *Plurinational democracy. Stateless nations in a post-sovereignty era*, Oxford 2001; ; Keating, Michael: *Nations against the state. The new politics of nationalism in Quebec, Catalonia and Scotland*, Basingstoke 1996; MacInnes, John/McCrone, David (eds.): *Stateless nations in the 21<sup>st</sup> century: Scotland, Catalonia and Quebec (=Scottish Affairs Special Issue)*, Edinburgh 2001; MacInnes, John: *Neonacionalisme i identitat nacional a Escòcia i a Catalunya*, *Diàlegs - Revista d'Estudis Polítics i Socials* 2, 1999, 6, p. 7-36. On regions in Europe, there is a rich bibliography; see Jones, Barry/Keating, Michael (eds.): *The European Union and the regions*, Oxford 1995; Loughlin, John: *Subnational democracy in the European Union*, Oxford 2001.

<sup>3</sup> According to Gellner, nationalists are defined by seeking coincidence of the political and cultural borders of their nation. Nationalists may see cultural homogeneity as a value in itself (more in line with human nature), but its instrumental values are stressed as well: Democracy and social redistribution may function better in culturally homogeneous societies, where the minorities are more inclined to endure the government of the majority, and the "have" may accept to give to the "have nots".

economy. Often, a subjective element is seen to be more important than those allegedly objective elements, and for many authors nations are only the result of nationalism, not its cause. This paper obviously does not pretend to answer basic questions of the theory of nationalism<sup>4</sup>; but, for the benefit of the readers who might not be so familiar with the cases studied, I will have to describe shortly the three nationalist movements and the basis of their respective identity construction.

### **7.1. The Catalan case<sup>5</sup>**

Catalonia is situated between France and Spain. Spanish Catalonia has 6 millions of inhabitants; at the beginning of the 20th century it had only 2 million. This growth is basically a result of immigration. Between 1950 and 1975, nearly 1.5 million newcomers arrived, mostly in Barcelona and the surrounding industrial belt. Most of them came from southern Spain. This type of immigration has stopped; today, migrants arrive from Morocco, subsaharian Africa, Pakistan, South America and East Europe. But their share of the Catalan population is still very small, in European comparative terms, and does not even arrive at 5%, but it is growing rapidly. Barcelona, the Catalan capital, is situated on the coastal corridor, the main communication axis. With 15 or 16% of the Spanish population, Catalonia produces about 20% of the Spanish GDP. It is therefore one of the richer Autonomous Communities of Spain, albeit not the richest. Catalonia is famous for its numerous small and middle enterprises, but most of the more important firms are not longer owned by Catalans.

The 1978 Spanish Constitution does not recognize Catalonia as a nation, but concedes autonomy to "nationalities" and "regions". This is regulated by the Catalan Statute of Autonomy, a special law passed by the Spanish Parliament. In 1979, an overwhelming majority of Catalans accepted this law, which establishes a Catalan government and parliament. It gives important executive and also some legislative powers to Catalonia. On the other hand, financial autonomy of the Catalan government is limited.

Language and history are the most important markers of Catalan nationality. Catalan is a romance language spoken by more than 8 million speakers, but, due to linguistic repression and massive immigration, not by all of the 6 million Catalans. Catalans who are Spanish citizens have a constitutional right and duty to speak Spanish, but the Catalan Statute of Autonomy establishes the co-officiality of Catalan in Catalonia. It empowers the Catalan government to procure for the normal use of both languages. Schools use Catalan as medium of most classes. Nine out of ten Catalans say that they understand the language, The programmes of the Catalan public TV are accessible for everybody and get about 25% of the audience share. The main newspapers are Barcelona based, but mostly printed in Spanish. while nearly seven declare to be able to speak it; more than six read and about four out of 10 write Catalan. Social use in Barcelona tends to be much more limited.

Catalan history is said to be millennial. Catalan political independence dates from the 9th century. After a glorious and prosperous middle ages, Catalonia was integrated in the Spanish state. The conquest of Barcelona in 1714 by the Bourbon troops symbolizes the end of political independence; the language was banished from the public sector. On the other hand, Catalonia became the first industrial region of the Iberian peninsula. When during the age of imperialism the Spanish state proved unable to maintain its colonies and foment industrial development, a part of the autochthonous bourgeoisie of Catalonia began to show some sympathy for the national movement. This movement had its origin in cultural romanticism, but had been politizised towards the end of the 19th century. After the defeat of Spain in the Cuban war (1898), it became a political mass movement, with different parties, divided by the class cleavage. The second Spanish Republic (1931-1939) gave Catalonia a Statute of Autonomy, but after Franco's victory in the civil war, political, cultural and linguistic repression followed.

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<sup>4</sup> See McCrone, David: *The sociology of nationalism*, London 1998.

<sup>5</sup> See my synthesis in Nagel, Klaus-Jürgen: *Katalonien*, in: Fischer, Thomas/Frech. Siegfried (eds.): *Baden-Württemberg und seine Partnerregionen*, Stuttgart/Berlin/Köln 2001, p. 179-213. For general information, see Fundació Jaume Bofill (ed.): *Informe per a la Catalunya del 2000*, Barcelona 1999; Giner, Salvador (ed.): *La societat catalana*. Barcelona 1998. For history, see Balcells, Albert: *Història del nacionalisme català dels orígens al nostre temps*, Barcelona (2)1993, and for the current political system, Caminal Badia, Miquel/Matas Dalmasas, Jordi (eds.): *El sistema polític de Catalunya*, Barcelona 1998.

Resistance against the Franco Regime united working class organizations and the broad spectrum of Catalanist cultural and political movements. After Franco's death in 1975, Spanish transition to democracy began and the hour of the political parties had come. Since the first democratic elections to the Spanish parliament in 1977, the Catalan branch organization of the Spanish socialist party wins the general elections in Catalonia. Since the celebration of the first election to the Catalan parliament in 1980, the Catalan government is lead by nationalists.

|      | General Election<br>2000 - MP | General Election<br>2000 - % | Autonomous<br>Election 1999 - MP | Autonomous<br>Election 1999 - % |
|------|-------------------------------|------------------------------|----------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| PSC  | 17                            | 34,1                         | 52                               | 37,9*                           |
| CiU  | 15                            | 28,8                         | 56                               | 37,7                            |
| PP   | 12                            | 22,8                         | 12                               | 9,5                             |
| ERC  | 1                             | 5,6                          | 12                               | 8,7                             |
| IC-V | 1                             | 3,5                          | 3                                | 2,5                             |

Turnout: 2000 64,7%, 1999 59,2%.

\* Common candidatures with Ciutadans del Canvi and IC-Verds included.

PSC: Partit Socialista de Catalunya, CiU: Convergència i Unió, PP: Partit Popular, ERC: Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya, IC-V: Iniciativa per Catalunya - Verds.

A particular Catalan party system has evolved, with Convergència i Unió, a federation of two parties, as its leading nationalist force. CiU tries to amplify Catalan autonomy inside the Spanish state; the second nationalist force, leftist Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC) declares itself independentist. Other politicians may as well see themselves as nationalists (in IC-V, for example) or at least argue more or less far reaching reforms of the Spanish state of autonomies.

According to a poll published by the Barcelona newspaper LA VANGUARDIA (16.2.1997), 10% of the Catalans wish the centralist state back, 36% defend the actual Statute of Autonomy, 29% want more autonomy for Catalonia, and 21% support the opinion that the Spanish state should recognize the possibility of independence of (non-specified) autonomous communities.

### 2.3. The Scottish case<sup>6</sup>

Scotland is situated on the European periphery. But historically, it has been a core region of Imperial British economy, with its ship builders, locomotive factories, and its bankers, and a local Scottish bourgeoisie. After heavy crisis in the 30s and after the second world war, the British state took over (nationalizations) or at least practiced regional planning. In 1975, a Scottish Development Agency was set up. State influenced re-industrialization ended with Margaret Thatcher. More or less at the same time, the exploitation of Scottish North Sea oil began, and co-financed the costs of Thatcher's economic re-structuration. Currently, Scottish economy depends on external capital, management, and technology. More than a quarter of Scottish jobs belong to overseas owned plants. Scottish industry is export orientated (electronics, whisky). But Scotland is no longer richer than England; its GDP per capita is British average. Historically, some Scottish regions have been losing population over long time (the Highlands), but others have a historical record for immigration (the Irish in Glasgow). But currently only a very small part of Scotlands' 5 million habitants is born outside Scotland (7% is born in England). Therefore, to be born in Scotland, to be son of Scottish parents, and to live in Scotland together seem synonymous definitions for being Scottish.

In 1997, Scotland was given home rule, or, to use the somehow centralist British terminology, was given devolved powers.<sup>7</sup> The United Kingdom Parliament retains authority to legislate on any issue,

<sup>6</sup> For a general review, see Keating 1996 and McCrone, David: Understanding Scotland. The sociology of a stateless nation, London/New York 1992.

<sup>7</sup> For devolution see Bogdanor, V.: Devolution in the United Kingdom, Oxford 1999.

whether devolved or not, according to the doctrine of Westminster sovereignty.<sup>8</sup> On the other hand, devolved powers (especially in legislation) go beyond the Catalan competencies, and the block grant Scotland receives according to the much criticized Barnett formula<sup>9</sup> can be regarded as a more favorable solution than the Catalan one.

Language is an absolute non-starter for Scottish nationalism. Celtic Gaelic never had spread to all parts of Scotland. Currently, between 1 and 2% of the Scottish people speak this language. Before the 1707 Union with England, the language of the court had been Germanic Scots, which is still widely spoken but never has been standardized. Contrary to Catalonia, the increasing domination of the state language cannot be linked to language repression by the state.<sup>10</sup> Scottish cultural symbols are often a regional product of a particular Scottish region, the Highlands. Not all of them are common Scottish heritage. Even the repression of Highland identity in the 18th century cannot be correctly interpreted as an "English" repression, because Lowland Scots participated as well. When romanticism constructed the image of the noble savage, the anti-industrial and clannish Scotsman, this was a British construction, not a Scottish nationalist one. Scottish heritage can be seen as a "crucial repository for answers to the identity question"<sup>11</sup>, but the role of language and culture in political nationalism is totally different from the Catalan case.

Like Catalonia, Scotland can be seen as a formerly independent state, and both lost their statehood more or less at the same time. In the Scottish case, a different religious experience (the Presbyterian church) had reinforced the difference. But while Catalonia was conquered in 1714, Scotland entered the Union with England in 1707 on terms of formal equality. "Scots regarded themselves as one of the mother-nations of empire and made a disproportionate contribution to the ranks of imperial administrators, soldiers, teachers, doctors and missionaries" (Keating<sup>12</sup>). Even the oppression of the Highlands, on the long run, may have served Scottish identity, because it eliminated, by force, a possible source of internal division.<sup>13</sup> Scottish elites looked to London as a symbol of progress, in a way no Catalan industrialist could ever look to Madrid. But at the same time, the Treaty of Union safeguarded Scottish institutional autonomy, the continuing separateness of the legal system, an education system of its own and a different local government. The dominant Presbyterian church, the Scottish *kirk*, remained at the heart of the Scottish institutional system. Even when the Church split in 1843, Scottish *de facto* and *de iure* autonomy was not lost. Poor law, public health, prisons, agriculture and other policy fields remained essentially Scottish. After 1885, a Scottish Office, with a Whitehall minister for Scotland, got the power to implement most social policies, education, health, housing, economic development, agriculture, fishing, law and arts, not to mention sports and other policy areas. It became the focal point for a distinctly Scottish civil society with its own pressure groups etc., and it recruited Scotsmen for its bureaucracy (as part of the British civil service).

During the time of the Empire, Scotsmen could combine a Scottish identity with the developing, "fuzzy" (McCrone 1998: 38) British identity. The continuing distinctiveness of a Scottish media system which lasts until today always has been helpful. On the other hand, mass democracy and the expanding welfare state acted as unifying forces. But the pre-modern and somehow weak British state allowed for differences.

Scottish nationalism only developed by the end of the 19th century, first as a Home Rule movement, demanding more Scottish control over Scottish affairs. Most of the Home Rulers went to the Liberal party. The 1919 founded Scots National League merged in 1928 with the Scottish Home Rule

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<sup>8</sup> Memorandum of Understanding, cited in Osmond, John: Devolution "A dynamic, settled process"? Monitoring the National Assembly July to December 1999, Institute of Welsh Affairs, Cardiff, Dezember 1999: 26.

<sup>9</sup> See Heald, David/Geaghan, Neal: The fiscal arrangements for devolution, in: McCarthy, John/Newlands, David (eds.): Governing Scotland: problems and prospects, Aldershot et al. 1999, p. 49-67.

<sup>10</sup> See MacInnes 1999: 10.

<sup>11</sup> McCrone, David: Imagining Scotland: a heritage industry examined (1995), in: Bort, Eberhard/Evans, Neil (eds.): Networking Europe. Essays on regionalism and social democracy, Liverpool 2000: 327.

<sup>12</sup> 1996: 164.

<sup>13</sup> Keating 1996: 164.

Association to form the National Party of Scotland, the core of the Scottish National Party, founded in 1934. However, until the 1960s (and even later), Scottish people wanted some form of self-government, but did not feel strong enough about it to vote Nationalist.

The SNP had its first electoral successes between 1965 and 1975.<sup>14</sup> In 1979, a tottering Labour administration had offered devolution for the first time. The proposition got a narrow majority in Scotland, but the law had fixed a quorum which had not been reached. The failure of the devolution law signified the end of the Labour administration, and Margaret Thatcher came to power. The Conservative governments demonstrated that the old system of partial Scottish autonomy was over. While Scotland continued to believe in corporatist arrangements, institutional impediments to state power, and civil society, for Thatcher there was no such thing as society. The Scottish Office, the Whitehall department for Scotland, was no longer seen by Scotsmen as a defender of Scotland's interest, but as a form of semi-colonial government.<sup>15</sup> While the Conservatives won the elections in England and (in the poll tax affair) used the Scottish people as "guinea pigs", in Scotland, it was Labour that got the votes. This meant a legitimacy crisis for the Scottish Office. The SNP, which had suffered heavy internal struggles after the 1979 defeat, recovered. In a period of quick social change, it became psychologically easier to vote a formally separatist party. In November 1988, the SNP won the by-election in Glasgow Gowan, a traditional Labour constituency. The Labour party, which in 1986 still had rejected to participate in a Campaign for a Scottish Assembly, began to "tartanize". In 1994, it changed its name to Scottish Labour Party. Labour, the Liberals, the churches and an important part of Scottish civil society participated in the Scottish Constitutional Convention (1989-1996), preparing the way for devolution. Labour had accepted the argument that the Conservatives had no democratic mandate to govern Scotland. It started to lose some of its fear to lose the periphery; Labour victories in the UK (with the exception of the Blair election) have always depended upon the Celtic fringe.

After Blair's victory, Westminster passed the devolution legislation, and Scotland voted with a 74% majority for its own Parliament and with a 63,5% majority for a (limited) power to change the British income tax. Only the Conservatives opposed the proposition. According to the majority of analysts, these considerable majorities cannot be explained only with national identity, nor with social location or individual rational choice. People had confidence, that a Scottish Parliament would develop education, health and welfare policies more in line with a more "Scottish" view of how such policies should be conducted. Voting "yes" was not seen as breaking the Union, and feeling British was no reason to vote against, as poll results prove.<sup>16</sup>

Recent elections have demonstrated that devolutionist Labour is the leading party of Scotland, but needs a coalition with the Liberal Democrats to govern the new Scottish Executive. On the other hand, the

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<sup>14</sup> For the SNP see Sturm, Roland: Nationalismus in Schottland und Wales 1966-1980. Eine Analyse seiner Ursachen und Konsequenzen, Bochum 1981; Newell, James L.: The Scottish National Party. Development and change, in: De Winter, Lieven/Türsan, Huri (eds.): Regionalist parties in western Europe, London/New York 1998, p. 105-124.

<sup>15</sup> Newell 1998: 109.

<sup>16</sup> See Surridge, Paula/Paterson, Lindsay/Brown, Alice/McCone, David: The Scottish electorate and the Scottish Parliament (1998), in: Bort, Eberhard/Evans, Neil (ed.): Networking Europe. Essays on regionalism and social democracy, Liverpool 2000, p. 389-416; Surridge, Paula/McCrone, David: The 1997 Scottish referendum vote, in: Taylor, Bridget/Thompson, Katarina (eds.): Scotland and Wales: nations again?, Cardiff 1999, p. 41-64; McCrone, David: Being British. Changing national and state identities in Scotland and Wales, Journal for the Study of British Cultures 7, 2000, 1, p. 39-49. There is a rational choice explanation forwarded by Dardanelli, Paolo: The europeanisation of regionalisation: European integration and public support for self-government in Scotland 1979/1997, Queen's Papers on Europeanisation 5, 2001. Dardanelli insists on the change of priorities among the Scottish voters (Devolution>status quo>independence in 1979, devolution>independence>status quo in 1997). While this change is obvious, his explanation for the change by a process of Europeanisation of Scotland needs to be questioned. Thatcherism may be the more plausible variable.

SNP, whose (somehow volatile) voter has a profile not so different from the Labour voter, can only hope to govern Scotland in a coalition, too.<sup>17</sup>

Votes and seats in General election, Scotland 2001

|               | per cent of the vote | seats    |
|---------------|----------------------|----------|
| Conservatives | 15,6 (17,5)          | 1 (0)    |
| Labour        | 43,2 (45,6)          | 55* (56) |
| LibDem        | 16,4 (13,0)          | 10 (10)  |
| SNP           | 20,1 (22,1)          | 5 (6)    |
| SSP and other | 3,1 (1,9)            | 1 (0)    |

\* The speaker (Lab) holds Glasgow Springburn

Turnout 2002 58,2%

Votes and seats in Scotland in the 1999 Scottish Parliament Elections

|               | per cent of vote | seats |
|---------------|------------------|-------|
| Conservatives | 15,5/15,4        | 0/18  |
| Labour        | 38,8/33,6        | 53/3  |
| LibDem        | 14,2/12,4        | 12/5  |
| SNP           | 28,7/27,3        | 7/28  |
| SSP and other | 2,7/11,3         | 1/2   |

Second figure: regional lists. Turnout 1999 58,8%.

As in the Catalan case, voting patterns are different according to the character of the elections. But preference for independence is more widespread than in Catalonia. According to an ICM/Scotland on Sunday Poll from February 2000, 27% of the Scottish voters prefer independence (including many Labour voters), 46% favor devolution (including a considerable number of SNP voters), and 22% do not want any Scottish parliament at all.

**2.4. The Welsh case**<sup>18</sup>

Wales is often compared with Scotland, but differences are considerable. As in the Scottish case, the population is concentrated in the south of the country, but Cardiff is not always recognized as the capital. South Wales had been one of the richest regions of the British empire, with its iron industry, steel mills, and the coal mines of the Valleys. After the heavy crisis of the interwar years, it partially converted to oil-and-car fordism, but generated no local elite. After the mines and mills closed during the 80s and the oil economy fell apart, the region has only partially recovered, with a new service sector and female cheapskate jobs. "Cool Cymru" is not entirely hype; by the M4 corridor, Cardiff and part of South Wales are somehow "closer" to London Heathrow than London suburbs on the other side.<sup>19</sup> But Wales is the

<sup>17</sup> There is even a minority current in SNP which presents the party as the home for young anti-corporatist entrepreneurs and bankers; see Kerevan, George: From 'old' to 'new' SNP, in: Hassan, Gerry/Warhurst, Chris (eds.): A different future. A moderniser's guide to Scotland, Glasgow 1999, p. 55-64.

<sup>18</sup> See Dunkerley, David/Thompson, Andrew (eds.): Wales today, Cardiff 1999; Tindale, Stephen (ed.): The state and the nations. The politics of devolution, London 1996.

<sup>19</sup> See Harvie, Christopher: Europe and the Welsh nation, The Welsh Political Archive

poorest economic region of Britain, the one with the lowest GDP per capita, the highest unemployment rates, and the highest inactivity rates. Over one third of the jobs is located in overseas-owned plants.<sup>20</sup>

Imperial south Wales, in its boom years, had attracted Welshmen from other parts of the country, but also Irishmen and some foreigners. Currently, things have changed, but nearly a quarter of the Welsh population of nearly 3 millions is born outside the country, nearly all of them in England. This immigration does not only occur in booming South Wales towns near the frontier; the Welsh heartland and the northern coast attract (retired) Englishmen, too.

Wales has its own devolved authorities which were created in the same devolution process as Scotland's, but are very different. The National Assembly for Wales is no Parliament; as a corporate body it assumed the major part of the powers of the old Welsh Office, the Whitehall ministry for Welsh Affairs; it has only secondary legislative powers. This status of the Assembly already has caused considerable problems. Even the Welsh cabinet had problems how to identify itself. "Welsh Executive" would create an analogy with Scotland which is not at all justified; "Government of the National Assembly" for Wales would be correct but lengthy; Government of Wales seems preposterous, because the UK government still is responsible for half of the public expenditure and can be seen as the true Government of Wales. In November last year First Minister Rhodri Morgan declared that he now preferred the denominations Welsh Assembly Government and Welsh Assembly. The presiding officer of the Assembly, Lord Elis-Thomas, a Welsh nationalist, argued that he hold the term Welsh Assembly to be a restricted concept with linguistic and ethnic connotations, whereas "the National Assembly of Wales" signals inclusiveness to all habitants of Wales, regardless of their birthplace and linguistic or ethnic background.<sup>21</sup> This discussion is symptomatic for the enduring problems with Welsh identity.

The problems with the structure and the functions of the Assembly and the Government show that devolution may not be the "settled will of the Welsh people" (as the Secretary of State Paul Murphy and Alun Michael, the former First Minister hold), but a "process, not an event", as always has been the opinion of former Secretary of State for Wales Ron Davies.

Before the British state started to invent special institutions for Wales in 1964, the Welsh language had become a marker of Welsh nationality. But only one out of five Welshmen speaks this Celtic language. "A Welsh-speaking person would usually say ... that 'Wales is a bilingual nation'. But Welsh-speakers living in rural areas have traditionally described anyone who doesn't speak Welsh as English, even if they were from English-speaking south Wales and their immediate ancestors spoke Welsh. (...) It is nothing to do with where you came from or your racial or ethnic characteristics. If you live in Wales and speak Welsh, you are Welsh. This is not true of English-speaking Wales." In the Valleys people "...describe themselves as Welsh, and react indignantly to any suggestion otherwise."<sup>22</sup> Mainly as a result of economic development, three clearly defined areas had developed: a shrinking Welsh speaking area (*Y Fro Gymraeg*), the non-Welsh speaking but Welsh identifying valleys, and a British, non Welsh-identifying area around Cardiff and on the northeastern and extremely western shores.<sup>23</sup>

Contrary to what happened in Catalonia, the linguistic issue has long been a divisive factor<sup>24</sup> in Welsh politics which generates mistrust. The question is whether this situation has now been surmounted

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Lecture 1994, Aberystwyth 1995: 29.

<sup>20</sup> See Danson, Mike: Scotland and Wales in Europe, in: MacDonald, Roderick/Thomas, Huw (eds.): Nationality and planning in Scotland and Wales, Cardiff 1997, p. 14-31.

<sup>21</sup> See Osmond, John/Richardson, Nia: The Assembly, in: Osmond, John (ed.): Coalition creaks over health. Monitoring the National Assembly. August to December 2001, Institute of Welsh Affairs, Cardiff 2001: 32-4.

<sup>22</sup> Reeves, Robin: Multiculturalism in Wales (1994), in: Bort, Eberhard/Evans, Neil (ed.): Networking Europe. Essays on regionalism and social democracy, Liverpool 2000: 299; Knowles, Anne K.: Migration, nationalism, and the construction of Welsh identity, in: Herb, Guntram H./Kaplan, David H. (eds.): Nested identities. Nationalism, territory, and scale, Lanham 1999: 293.

<sup>23</sup> Balsom, Denis: The three-Wales model, in: Osmond, John (ed.): The national question again. Welsh political identity in the 1980s, Llandysul 1985, p. 1-17.

<sup>24</sup> See Thomas, Alys: Region, culture and function on the Celtic periphery: Wales,



and whether the three Wales model is really over. Curiously, during the Thatcher and Major governments, the status of the language has changed. The introduction of a Welsh medium TV channel (S4C) in 1982, of Welsh as core subject of the National curriculum in 1988, and the Welsh Language Act of 1993 made Wales more bilingual and brought prestige to a language which had been despised as rural and backward.

There seems to exist some political consent in drawing the language issue out of politics. For Labour Minister Ron Davies, the language was no longer a "political football" nor a "hot potato".<sup>25</sup> Plaid Cymru's leading organizer Karl Davies<sup>26</sup> said that the three Welsh model has become obsolete, as the younger generation is no longer showing the traditional antipathy to the language; the Welsh Language Society has become marginal, and people are more exposed to the language. Polls return high quotas of people (up to 80%) declaring "pride" in the language.<sup>27</sup> But whereas parents who brought up their children in Welsh some years ago would have been criticized socially as holding their children back, nowadays, the parents who bring their upspring to Welsh-medium schools might be attacked as elitists and seeking unfair advantages.<sup>28</sup>

Devolution is said to bridge the cleavage, too.<sup>29</sup> The responsible minister, non-Welsh speaker Tom Middlehurst, declared a bilingual Wales to be an "achievable national aim".<sup>30</sup> In fact, there was no debate on the language question between the constitution of the Assembly and summer 2000. But since then, some debates have shown that the old arguments are still around. It will always cost money to improve or even to maintain the situation of the language, and there will always be a competition for resources. Labour Assembly member Delyth Evans declared: "Our priority in Wales at present is to attract new businesses to invest in Wales in order to strengthen the economy. My concern about any kind of linguistic enforcement is that it would send the wrong message to the sector and make companies think twice before coming to Wales at a time when we are trying our best to attract them to invest here."<sup>31</sup> Depolitisation of the language issues proved impossible.<sup>32</sup> Even among the defenders of the Welsh language there are differences whether preference should be given to the creation of a Welsh speaking middle class or whether the conservation of the rural areas where the language is still widely used (but might diminish with the immigration of retired Englishmen) is paramount.<sup>33</sup>

Apart from the language question, it is to be noted that only 13% of the newspapers Welsh people read are Wales based anyway, and that up to one third of the population receive their TV signal from English stations.

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Cornwall and the EU, *Contemporary Wales* 10, 1997, p. 7-31.

<sup>25</sup> Cited in Osmond, John (ed.): *The National Assembly agenda. A handbook for the first four years*, Institute for Welsh Affairs, Cardiff November 1998.

<sup>26</sup> In an interview with the author.

<sup>27</sup> See Reeves 2000: 307.

<sup>28</sup> See Reeves 2000: 306.

<sup>29</sup> See Williams, Colin H.: *Operating through two languages*, in: Osmond, John (ed.): *The National Assembly agenda. A handbook for the first four years*, Institute for Welsh Affairs, Cardiff November 1998: 102.

<sup>30</sup> Assembly Record, 28 June 2000.

<sup>31</sup> Assembly Record, 4 July 2000.

<sup>32</sup> See Aitchison, John/Carter, Harold: *The Welsh language today*, in: Dunkerley/Thompson 1999: 94.

<sup>33</sup> See the highly emotional discussions in the Assembly on the creation of a Welsh medium college and on the creation of "language belts" to protect Welsh speaking communities against non-Welsh speaking immigration, as the 2001 founded Cymuned group claims. See Assembly Record 4 July 2000; Osmond, John/Richardson, Nia: *The Assembly*, in: Osmond, John (ed.): *A period of de-stabilisation. Monitoring the National Assembly. May to August 2001*, Institute of Welsh Affairs, Cardiff 2001, p. 21-39; Osmond, John/Richardson, Nia: *The Assembly*, in: Osmond, John (ed.): *Coalition creaks over health. Monitoring the National Assembly. May to August 2001 [sic: August to December]*, Institute of Welsh Affairs, Cardiff 2001, p. 28-39.

It can be said that history marks the difference between the Welsh on one hand and the Scottish and Catalan on the other.<sup>34</sup> Wales was conquered by England in 1282, and before that debate the country had been fragmented and dynastically divided. After the revolt of Owain Gwynndwr (1400-1409), the Acts of Union in 1536 and 1543 united it to England. No significant administrative structures or institutions survived or were established during the following centuries.<sup>35</sup> Even when religious nonconformity spread, this did not unite the country. Denominations split often and did not represent Wales as such. Since the 1920s, Wales was politically dominated by the Labour party, and the country stuck to the party during the heavy crisis of the early 1930 and the early 1980s.

Welsh Nationalism, after the failure of the home rule movement in the late 19th century, always has been centred on the language question. Even Plaid Cymru, founded in 1925 as a political party, was mainly a language defense movement. Its founder Saunders Lewis stated as late as 1962: "The language is more important than self-government and no government is worth having that does not safeguard and revive the language." "There will be no Wales without the Welsh language."<sup>36</sup> Territory is always important for nationalists, for old Plaid Cymru, the territory of reference was where Welsh speakers lived. As a political party in a country where the language was concentrated in few areas, that brought a problem: If the party concentrates on the language issue, 80% of Welshmen don't matter or even feel repelled. If the party turns its back on the language issue, it may loose its heartland. It was during the 60s when Plaid Cymru began the change from a language movement to a true political party; it embraced socialism, gave itself a socio-economic programme and campaigned on Welsh political autonomy; it renounced direct actions and illegal acts, and left the language campaigns to the newly founded Welsh Language Society. Meanwhile, the first Welsh institutions the British UK government created, above all the Welsh Office (1964), helped to establish the territorial notion of Wales and to "politicize" the party.<sup>37</sup>

As in Scotland, the flailing Callaghan administration organized a referendum on devolution in 1979. But while devolution received a thin majority vote in Scotland, the proposition of a Welsh Assembly was rejected by a clear 4:1 majority. Not even in the Welsh speaking heartland could majorities be found. Welsh speaking Wales feared the supremacy of far away and badly communicated Cardiff and the English speaking majority; English speaking Welshmen were concerned about a possible imposition of bilingualism. Both were afraid of economic inconveniences; and both did not knew where "their" party, Welsh Labour, stood, as prominent Labour politicians like Neil Kinnock were stout anti-devolutionists.

Like in Scotland, the Thatcher years brought the change. The Thatcher administrations, who often could not even found a Welshmen to act as Secretary of State for Wales, nevertheless used the Welsh Office as center for a multitude of bodies which converted Wales into a "quangoland". As a Welsh civil society was lacking, it were these bodies which brought Wales on the political landscape. By the same

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<sup>34</sup> For Welsh history, see Evans, D. Gareth: *A history of Wales, 1906-2000*, Cardiff 2000; Evans, D. Gareth: *A history of Wales 1815-1906*, Cardiff 1989; Williams, Gwyn A.: *When was Wales? A history of the Welsh*, London 1988 (first publ. 1985); Morgan, Kenneth O.: *Rebirth of a nation: Wales 1880-1980*, Oxford/New York 1981.

<sup>35</sup> See Paterson, Lindsay/Jones, Richard Wyn: *Does civil society drive constitutional change?*, in: Taylor, Bridget/Thomson, Katarina (eds.): *Scotland and Wales: nations again?*, Cardiff 1999, p. 169-197.

<sup>36</sup> In a BBC broadcast; cited by Knowles 1999: 289.

<sup>37</sup> For Plaid Cymru and its history, see Lynch 1996; Diekmann, Knut: *Die nationalistische Bewegung in Wales*, Paderborn et al. 1998; Christiansen, Thomas: *Plaid Cymru. Dilemmas and ambiguities of Welsh regional nationalism*, in: de Winter, Lieven/Türsan, Huri (eds.): *Regionalist parties in western Europe*, London/New York 1998, p. 125-142; Lynch, Peter: *From red to green: the political strategy of Plaid Cymru in the 1980s and 1990s*, *Regional & Federal Studies* 5, 1995, 2, p. 197-210; Philip, Alan Butt: *The Welsh question. Nationalism in Welsh politics, 1945-1970*, Cardiff 1975; McAllister, Laura: *The perils of community as a construct for the political ideology of Welsh nationalism*, *Government and Opposition* 33, 1998, 4, p. 497-517.

token, the Conservative administration destroyed the center of anti-devolutionist resistance in 1979, the Labour dominated county governments.<sup>38</sup>

For Plaid Cymru, the big defeat of 1979 brought critical years of inner strife. In the end, the party embraced new ideological elements like environmentalism. It renounced independentist language, talking instead about an elected Welsh Assembly, self-government for Wales, full national status, and a Wales governed democratically by a Welsh parliament.<sup>39</sup> It recognized that the language issue had withheld the party from electoral progress in the south. Finally, it adopted the English suffix "The Party of Wales", to give itself a less threatening and more inclusive image.<sup>40</sup>

The Labour Party in Wales, as it was originally called, rebranded itself, too. Labour Party Wales, finally Welsh Labour Party - and recently it started to use a suffix, too: Welsh Labour, the "true" Party of Wales.<sup>41</sup> Thatcher helped: "We voted Labour, we got Thatcher", was the reaction to the 1987 defeat, and Welsh Labour politicians calculated that if the "English" party had won the same swing they had in Wales, Thatcher would have been beaten<sup>42</sup>. Devolution in Wales always was and still is related to the inner devolution of the Labour Party, which has not yet come to an end.<sup>43</sup>

"New Labour" certainly is quite cool about devolution, but the incoming Blair administration used its honeymoon to keep the promise to organize a referendum for a Welsh Assembly. This time, there was no question where the party stood. In spite of this, the referendum was only won by the smallest margin: 50,3%, with a turnout of barely 50%. No broad civil society and no formidable cross-party campaign backed devolution as had been the case in Scotland. Nevertheless, the swing from a 1:4 defeat in 1979 to the narrow victory in 1997 was bigger than in Scotland. This time, the Welsh speaking heartland and the Welsh identifying valleys voted yes. British identifying Welshmen, among them the habitants of the capital and seat of the Assembly, Cardiff, voted against. In Wales, the relations between national identity and voting in referendum are obvious and can be established much more clearly than in Scotland. 61% of the fluent Welsh-speakers declare to have voted in favor (18% against), while among the non-fluent speakers, the relation is 31:34, and among the non-Welsh speakers, 24:33.<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>38</sup> For quangoland, see Loughlin, John/Mathias, Jörg: Die regionale Frage in Großbritannien: Das Beispiel Wales, in: Krämer, Raimund (ed.): Regionen in der Europäischen Union, Berlin 1998: 113; for the destruction of County administrations, see Osmond, John: The Welsh Assembly 1979 and 1997, in: Bort, Eberhard/Evans, Neil (eds.): Networking Europe. Essays on regionalism and social democracy, Liverpool 2000: 381.

<sup>39</sup> See Christiansen 1998: 132.

<sup>40</sup> See Morgan, Kevin/Mungham, Geoff: Redesigning democracy. The making of the Welsh Assembly, Bridgend 2000: 183.

<sup>41</sup> See Trystan, Dafydd: Political parties, in: Osmond, John (ed.): Devolution in transition. Monitoring the National Assembly. February to May 2000, Institute of Welsh Affairs, Cardiff 2000: 35.

<sup>42</sup> See Davies, Ron: Devolution. A process not an event, The Gregynog Papers 2, 2, Cardiff 1999: 4.

<sup>43</sup> During the campaign of 1999, The Labour Party Press Office distributed a leaflet (The A to Z of separatist madness, Cardiff 1999) which warned that a "separatist" victory would mean heavy language costs, a monopoly for Welsh TV, "customs posts" and (incompatible with this, KJN), increasing powers for Europe.

<sup>44</sup> See Jones, Richard Wyn/Trystan, Dafydd: The 1997 Welsh referendum vote, in: Taylor, Bridget/Thomson, Katarina (eds.): Scotland and Wales: nations again?, Cardiff 1999: 79. For the campaign and the results see Jones, J. Barry/Balsom, Denis (eds.): The road to the National Assembly for Wales, Cardiff 2000; Osmond, John: The Welsh Assembly 1979 and 1997, in: Bort, Eberhard/Evans, Neil (eds.): Networking Europe. Essays on regionalism and social democracy, Liverpool 2000, p. 375-388; Osmond, John (ed.): The National Assembly agenda. A handbook for the first four years, Institute for Welsh Affairs, Cardiff November 1998.

All-Wales election results for 2001, 1999 and 1997<sup>45</sup>

|              | 2001 General Election<br>Turnout 61,6% | 1999 Assembly Election*<br>Turnout 48% | 1997 General Election<br>Turnout 73,6% |
|--------------|--|--|--|
| Labour       | 48,6                                   | 37,6                                   | 54,7                                   |
| Plaid Cymru  | 14,3                                   | 28,4                                   | 9,9                                    |
| Lib Dem      | 13,8                                   | 13,5                                   | 12,4                                   |
| Conservative | 21,0                                   | 15,8                                   | 19,6                                   |

\* Constituency vote. Regional list vote: Lab 35,5%, PC 30,6%, LibDem 12,5%, Cons 16,5%

Labour is still the dominant political power in Wales. It has still problems to combine the red flag with the red dragon. But the short time of existence of the Assembly has already proved that as a result of proportional representation, Labour needs a coalition partner. Plaid Cymru has become the leading opposition force. For the first time this party has a real chance to govern. It had to built up a professional, large group of politicians, with their staff.<sup>46</sup> A special constitutional conference celebrated in November last year adapted its program: Now the party stands for "full national status for Wales within the European Union", for decentralist socialism, a national community based on equal citizenship, a bilingual society which has to be made true by promoting the revival of the Welsh language. Continuing an old tradition, the Party claims Welsh membership to the United Nations.<sup>47</sup>

Whereas in Scotland devolution was forced through by an existing civil society, the National Assembly for Wales, in a way, has to imbue a kind of common civic identity to a people which still lacks such a common civil society and where the language has been all too long an ethnic and not a civic marker.<sup>48</sup>

This game has still to be decided, the first administration and First Minister Alun Michael were widely rejected, and the promised bonfire of the quangos did not take place. Dissatisfaction with devolution is far more widespread than in Scotland.

What concerns the preferred future for Wales, a Market Research Wales Poll, in July 2001 had the following results:<sup>49</sup>

|   |     |
|---|-----|
| Wales should become independent   | 11% |
| Wales should remain part of the UK, with its own elected Parliament, which has law making and taxation powers | 38% |
| ibid, with an Assembly which has limited law making powers only   | 24% |
| ibid. without an elected Assembly   | 24% |

<sup>45</sup> Osmond, John: The general election and the political parties, in: Osmond, John (ed.): A period of de-stabilisation. Monitoring the National Assembly. May to August 2001, Institute of Welsh Affairs, Cardiff 2001: 78.

<sup>46</sup> See Osmond, John (ed.): The economy takes centre stage. Monitoring the National Assembly. December 2000 to March 2001, Institute of Welsh Affairs, Cardiff 2001: 58.

<sup>47</sup> See Osmond, John: Political parties, in: Osmond, John (ed.): Coalition creaks over health. Monitoring the National Assembly. May to August 2001 [sic: August to December], Institute of Welsh Affairs, Cardiff 2001: 59-60.

<sup>48</sup> See for a similar view Jones/Trystan 1999: 60.

<sup>49</sup> Balsom, Denis: Public attitudes, in: Osmond, John (ed.): A period of de-stabilisation. Monitoring the National Assembly. May to August 2001, Institute of Welsh Affairs, Cardiff 2001: 84.

### 3. Transcending the National: Europe's flawed offer<sup>50</sup>

Does the European Union help or hinder the development of the identity of stateless nations, and, in particular, has it encouraged or discouraged the nationalism of stateless nations? For many authors, the nation-state is dying anyway, and in Europe, the European Union on one side and the regions on the other, are said to be its heirs. The Union has often been interpreted as a continental reaction to economic globalization, in order to discipline its economic and cultural forces.<sup>51</sup> While on the one hand, globalization means dominance of multi-national companies, new style communication, a shift towards decentralization in public and private sectors is seen as the other face of the medal. In this constellation, so goes a standard argument, "Foreign direct investment by multi-national concerns is being seen as attracted to regions which have a co-ordinated drive to innovation in specialized areas, with clusters of linked activities and firms, and supply chain networks."<sup>52</sup>

Does the empowerment of regions suit the identity of stateless nations? It has been said that the state, caught in the middle, will be stripped of its power from above and from below, as if we were in a zero-sum game. The scheme has been called the sandwich thesis<sup>53</sup>, and seems attractive for minority nationalists. Its realization would mean co-operation between the regions and Brussels, to the detriment of the State, in a move that has been called the 'pincer'.

A different vision might be what has been called "Europe with the regions", a less hierarchical and democratically less transparent mode of multi-level governance<sup>54</sup>. "Europe with the regions" means "networking" and negotiations between partners at different levels with different competencies and responding to different notions of legitimacy, even including private interests. There has been some discussion whether Europe is actually returning to Medieval times, with unclear or shared competencies and overlapping regimes of governance for single policy fields.<sup>55</sup>

On the other hand, important authors sustain that the European integration process is a proof of the vitality and the adaptability of the nation-state.<sup>56</sup>

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<sup>50</sup> The ideas expressed in this section have already been published in Nagel, Klaus-Jürgen: *The 'Europe of the Regions' and the identity politics of nations without states*, *Scottish Affairs* 36, 2001, p. 48-72; Nagel, Klaus-Jürgen: *A unificación europea. Unha nova escena posible para os nacionalismos non estatais?*, *Grial* 138, 1998, p. 199-237.

<sup>51</sup> For a standard account, see Osmond, John: *Unitary Britain and regional Europe* (1995), in: Bort, Eberhard/Evans, Neil (ed.): *Networking Europe. Essays on regionalism and social democracy*, Liverpool 2000: 81.

<sup>52</sup> Osmond 2000: 95.

<sup>53</sup> See Eser, Thiemo W.: *Europäische Einigung, Föderalismus und Regionalpolitik*, Trier 1991.

<sup>54</sup> See Gustavsson, Sverker/Lewin, Leif (eds.): *The future of the nation state. Essays on cultural pluralism and political integration*, Stockholm 1996; König, Thomas/Rieger, Elmar/Schmitt, Hermann (eds.): *Das europäische Mehrebenensystem*, Frankfurt/New York 1996; Marks, Gary et al.: *Governance in the European Union*, London et al. 1996; Négrier, Emmanuel/Jouve, Bernard (eds.): *Que gouvernement les régions d'Europe?*, Paris/Montréal 1998.

<sup>55</sup> For a discussion of various scenarios, see Schmitter, Philipp: *If the Nation-State Were to Wither Away in Europe, What Might Replace It?*, in: Gustavsson/Lewin (eds.) 1996: 211-244. See also Jáuregui, Gurutz: *Los nacionalismos minoritarios y la Unión Europea*, Barcelona 1997, chapter 4.

<sup>56</sup> See Mann, Michael: *Nation-states in Europe and other continents: diversifying, developing, not dying*, *Daedalus* 122, 1993, 3, p. 115-140; Milward, Alan S.: *The European rescue of the nation state*, London 1992. For a comparative view see Marks, Gary/Hooghe, Liesbet/Blank, Kermit: *European integration from the 1980s: State-centric v. multi-level governance*, *Journal of Common Market Studies* 34, 1996, 3, 1996,

In my opinion Europe's institutional design opens new chances for regional governments only if they accept certain rules of the game. The actual European Union is the result of the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992, but it has a longer history. It started in 1960 as an Economic Community. It can be discussed and it has been discussed whether intergovernmentalism is still dominating, or whether we already have a supranational political Union. The fact that the Union is not framed by a Constitution, but that it is targeting certain goals which are established by the founding treaties, means that its powers can rise, and arguably again decrease. Realization of a Common Market is still the most important objective. The Community does not only lack a constitution, but also a true common citizenship, common public opinion, common European media, a common civil society, and even true European parties, assets which often are said to characterize the nation-state.

### **3.1. The Council of Ministers**

The most important of all institutions of the EU is still the Council of Ministers. Since 1987, unanimity is not longer necessary for all classes of decisions, but it is still very difficult to bypass any single member state. That is the reason why nationalists may claim "Independence in Europe": Only member states have the right to vote in the Council. As Jim Sillars, the Scottish Labour politician turned Nationalist, wrote in his famous work in 1989: "When the real players gather round the top table of the Council of Ministers, it is only member states that count."<sup>57</sup> But since the Maastricht Treaty came into force, the member states may allow representatives of their regions to cast the vote for them. Federal member states like Germany and Belgium leave the vote to their constituent units, when their competencies are concerned. But on the other hand, this means that the constituent parts of a member state have to arrive at a common position which then is defended accordingly by one of them.

### **3.2. The Commission and Regional Policy**

Existing hopes (or fears) for a "pincer" movement against the state refer to the European Commission. The Commission is the guardian of the treaties, and it is perhaps the most supra-national of the European institutions, together with the European Court of Justice. The Commission has to control the implementation of the common European policies, but its own bureaucracy is very small. Shouldn't there be an interest to circumvent the "egoistical" member states by relying on regional administrations wherever possible, that means, in the cases of the federal or at least strongly decentralized states? Past European Commissions have manifested some interest in this possibility, and the regionalization of centralist states has doubtlessly been helped along by Brussels. But any attempts to homogenize this "third level" have miscarried.

European Commissioners have been chosen by the member states, where they have been socialized politically, and even when they have conflicts with the Council of Ministers, they don't appeal to the European people or to the regions, in order to look for an alternative basis for their political legitimacy. They don't have to. Firstly, because only some of the member states are federal or strongly decentralized. And secondly, because the subsidiarity principle is not including the regional level, but works only between the member states and the Union.

Contact between the regions and the European institutions is therefore mediated by the states. There is one policy field where the regions and the Commission work together in direct contact. This field is regional policy.<sup>58</sup> In the eighties, the funds were reformed and doubled. This was a way of buying off the poorer states like Greece, Portugal and Spain which were admitted to the EC in the 1981 and 1986. Structural funds, as they are called now, prevented them to use their veto in 1988 when the Single European Act opened the way to a really common market.

Partnership between regions and the Commission is a very important factor for some regions. Regional policy was a strong incentive for some states to provide a modicum of decentralization. But partnership does not necessarily encourage minority nationalism. Firstly, because the state sits at the table, too. And according to empirical research, it is still in the position of the gatekeeper.<sup>59</sup> Secondly, because the

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p. 341-378.

<sup>57</sup> Jim Sillars, *Independence in Europe*, Edinburgh 1989: 7.

<sup>58</sup> See Hooghe, Liesbet (ed.): *Cohesion policy and European integration*, Oxford 1996; Leonardi, Robert (ed.): *Regions and the European Community*, London et al. 1993.

<sup>59</sup> Bache, Ian/Jones, Rachel: *Has EU regional policy empowered the regions? A study of*

reasons which receive funds are defined by the European system of NUTS regions, which does not coincide at all with nationalist aspirations or national realities. This system is based on the administrative units of the member states, ordered on three territorial levels regardless of their powers or identities.

Partnership in regional policy is less important for well off stateless nations. But even wealthy regions have found ways to draw on smaller funds and programs, for example for trans-border co-operation schemes (INTERREG). But the truth is that some sort of co-operation with the state is essential to lay hands on European money.<sup>60</sup>

The Maastricht Treaty introduced a new source of subsidies, the cohesion funds for infrastructure and ecology. But cohesion funds money goes to the states, and it depends on them to decide in how far their regions participate in the planning and the implementation of the projects. Catalonia for example fared well when the Madrid governments depended on the votes of Catalan nationalists to get a majority.<sup>61</sup>

Regional policy is, of course, only one side of the coin, freedom of competition is the other. Indeed, one could say that freedom of competition is a stronger feature of Commission policy. Rich regions may want to act autonomously and compete freely with other regions. Therefore, stateless nations may have different visions on European competition policy and regional policy. But one should remember that the economic performance of European regions measured in terms of growth rates or per capita production usually develops in national-state clusters.<sup>62</sup>

### 3.3. The Committee of the Regions

It might be thought that such considerations notwithstanding, "Maastricht" meant a leap forward in the recognition of a third level in Europe. After all, did it not install a new collective regional actor, the Committee of the Regions (CoR)?<sup>63</sup> However, the treaty provisions for the new body proved flawed and the purely consultative functions of this institution have proved a bitter disappointment for the regions which had worked hard to promote the "third level". States are free to decide who is to be sent to the Committee, and many states choose local instead of regional representatives. The first decisions of the CoR showed that strong regions are losing out against weak ones, because the latter often ally themselves with local authorities. If we look at the interior rules of the new agency, we find that regional and municipal representatives alike are treated as representatives of their states, which again are the "gate-keepers".

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Spain and the United Kingdom, *Regional & Federal Studies* 10, 2000, 3, p. 1-20, compare Spain and the UK with regards to a possible empowerment effect of regional policy on the regions. They found that the preexisting distribution of powers between state and regions is a decisive factor. If regions have managed to get power inside their state, their position will be reinforced by regional policy. The lesson is that power can't be get from Europe, and national movements will have to address their own state in order to get empowered.

<sup>60</sup> See Marks, Gary et al.: Competencies, cracks and conflicts: regional mobilization in the European Union, in: Marks, Gary et al.: Governance in the European Union, London et al. 1996, p. 40-63.

<sup>61</sup> See Petschen, Santiago: Kataloniens internationale Politik: Zum auswärtigen Handeln einer spanischen *Comunidad Autónoma*, *WeltTrends* 11, 1996, p. 79; Morata, Francesc/Muñoz, Xavier: Vying for European Funds: territorial restructuring in Spain, in: Hooghe, Liesbet (ed.) 1996, p. 194-218.

<sup>62</sup> See the empirical material presented by Borrás-Alomar, Susanna/Christiansen, Thomas/Rodríguez-Posse, Andrés: Towards a 'Europe of the Regions'? Visions and reality from a critical perspective, *Regional Politics & Policy* 4, 1994, 2, pp. 1-27.

<sup>63</sup> See Dehousse, Renaud/Christiansen, Thomas (eds.): What model for the Committee of the Regions? Past experiences and future perspectives, Florence 1995 (EUI Working Paper EUF 95/2); Farrows, Martyn: The Committee of the Regions: regionalising the Union or pacifying the regionalists?, *Limerick Papers in European Integration* 3, Limerick 1997; Jeffery, Charlie (ed.): The regional dimension of the European Union, London/Portland 1997.

It seems that there is a European interest in legitimizing its institutions by integrating the regions and municipalities in its structure. At the same time, regional and local leaders can present themselves to their voters as influential politicians at a European level. It is questionable if the device will work in the long run. In any case, it does not seem probable that the CoR will become the second chamber of the regions of which several federalists have dreamt. And even this federalist solutions would not necessarily mean a strengthening of non-state national identities, not even of those who have their own regional administrations.

### 3.4. The European Parliament

This leaves us with the European Parliament, the last of the three big institutions of the EU, besides Council and Commission. The treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam have doubtlessly strengthened its role. But it is still true that the Parliament is the weakest among the central institutions. It is neither the main legislator, nor is it the only holder of the "power of the purse", and therefore it cannot be compared to the parliaments of the member states. It may surprise that even here states play an important role. Its them to decide how European elections are celebrated and how constituencies are framed. States like France and Spain are one constituency. In consequence, minority nationalists in these states have only small chances to conquer seats. Therefore, the presence of minority nationalists may be lesser than its local support. On the other hand, minority parties of all kinds can profit from cost-free protests of voters against their state governing parties. European elections are in fact second order elections. When it comes to campaigning, any European election is a series of simultaneously held and loosely connected "national" elections. All attempts to convince the different nationalist parties to fall into line in the EP have miscarried. The European Free Alliance (EFA) is weak, and has never been able to form its own parliamentary group.

Nevertheless, the European Parliament has repeatedly stood up in favor for regional empowerment. The reason may be sympathy of one European "underdog" for another. But when real solutions were asked for, the EP also has known where its institutional interests lay, and the Parliament pronounced itself against a second, regional chamber, which might split its already small influence.

### 3.5. The European Linguistic Regime

We have seen that the political system of the European Union very recently has opened itself to some participation of the regions. But that does not mean that minority national identities and national movements with their cultural and sometimes linguistic demands are equally welcome. Article 128 of the Maastricht Treaty emphasizes the cultural dimension of the European integration but only indirectly hints at the interior diversity of the member states when asking the institutions to contribute to the flowering of the "cultures of the member states, while respecting their national *and regional* diversity"<sup>64</sup> Promotion of culture and heritage conservation are clearly subordinated to the freedom of the markets.

Therefore, minority claims sometimes not only have to face their respective state, but also attempts to promote a European identity<sup>65</sup>, and to "rationalize" European administration, particularly with regards to the language question. Linguistic diversity has often been interpreted as an obstacle to economic progress and competitiveness, which were always at the top of the agenda of European Integration. It has been argued that the realization of a real common market, the main achievement of the integration process, stands opposite to the cultural diversity in Europe.<sup>66</sup>

We may say that Europe has a chance to develop into a culturally more neutral political unit than a nation state. The EU does not have to fix national holidays, it must not organize history and literature lessons. It did, however, give itself a flag and an anthem, for example. And there is at least one field where

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<sup>64</sup> See Toggenburg, Gabriel: A rough orientation through a delicate relationship: The European Union's endeavours for (its) minorities, *European Integration online Papers* 4, 2000, 16, p. 11. My emphasis.

<sup>65</sup> See Winn, Neil: In search of Europe's internal and external borders: Security, identity and the European Union, *Perspectives on European Politics and Society* 1, 2001, 1, 19-48. and Nagel, Klaus-Jürgen: *Nation-building europea? Unificació europea i teories de la nació*, in: Requejo, Ferran (ed.): *Pluralisme nacional i legitimitat democràtica*, Barcelona 1999, p. 187-205.

<sup>66</sup> See Biscoe, Adam: The European Union and minority nations, in: Cumper, P./Wheatley, S. (eds.): *Minority rights in the 'new' Europe*, 1999, p. 89-103.



even the EU cannot be culturally neutral, and where, therefore, European integration may run contrary to nationalist claims. This field is language.

The EU is different from intergovernmental organizations like the UN in respect to working languages. According to article 217 of the Treaty of Rome it is the Council of Ministers which decides on official languages, and this decision has to be made unanimously. Accordingly, in the actual EU with 15 member states, all 13 state languages are official languages of the EU as well. What is more: all of them are official **working** languages, with the only exceptions of Irish and Luxembourgian.<sup>67</sup> Other languages which are co-official in only a part of the territory of a member state like Catalan, Basque, Galician, Welsh, Frisian or Sami/Laponian, or which are subject to special constitutional or legal consideration and respect (Sorbian in some German federal states, Aranese Occitanian in Catalonia, Croatian, Slovenian in Austria) are not subject to any recognition by the Council of Ministers.<sup>68</sup> Of course, languages which are not even recognized by their corresponding states are excluded as well. European multilingualism may seem to be more prone to linguistic respect and protection than nation-state monolingualism. This may be true for national minorities, which live in part of a member state but speak the language of another member, but things are different for minority nations with languages of their own. Between 30 and 50 millions of EU-citizens are said to be speakers of a regional or little spoken language.<sup>69</sup> From the democratic point of view, it is difficult to justify a situation where some of the unrecognized stateless languages have more speakers than some European state languages (for example, more people speak Catalan than Finnish or Danish).<sup>70</sup> The non application of the subsidiary principle to language policies aggravates the normative problems.

Firstly, it should be noted that the most powerful EU institutions do not even consider the subject of non-state languages. This discussion is either left to the Council of Europe, a European institution outside the EU, or to the European Parliament which has no real competencies in this field. We could mention favorable, but non-binding documents passed in 1981, 1983, 1987 and 1994. Typically, they recommend the state governments and sometimes the EU-institutions to protect and subsidize the languages and to promote their use in the media, the administration, the jurisdiction, and school education. But from the perspective of a minority nationalists such resolutions are not sufficient, as long as they don't recognize group rights in defined territories. It has to be said that the resolutions always contain balancing paragraphs which stipulate that no disadvantage for official languages is implied and that the resolutions are not meant to question the territorial integrity of the member states.<sup>71</sup> But the use of languages is, at least in some situations, a zero-sum game, and at least decisions about priorities have to be made. If the choice is left to the market, the strongest will win.

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<sup>67</sup> The last enlargement increased the number of working languages from 9 to 11, that means that the number of language combinations for translation is now 110 (up from 72). If Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Estonia became member states, 16 languages would be official, which means 240 language pairs for translation. See Kraus, Peter A.: Political unity and linguistic diversity in Europe, *Arch. europ. sociol.* 41, 2000, 1: 155.

<sup>68</sup> See Kraus, Peter A.: *Kultureller Pluralismus und politische Integration: Die Sprachenfrage in der Europäischen Union*, *Österreichische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft* 27, 1998, 4, p. 443-458; Coulmas, Florian (ed.): *A language policy for the European Community. Prospects and quandaries*, Berlin 1991; Hagège, Claude: *Welche Sprache für Europa?*, Frankfurt a.M./New York 1992. Actually more than 30 languages are spoken in the EU. Numbers of speakers range from about 20000 (Laponian) to about 90 million (German).

<sup>69</sup> The numbers are mentioned in a resolution of the EP in 1983 (30 millions) and by the Bureau of Lesser Used Languages (50 millions). See Toggenburg 2001: 4 and 9.

<sup>70</sup> Catalan is of course the state language of tiny Andorra, but this state is no member of the European Union.

<sup>71</sup> See Sanmartí Roset, Josep M.: *Las políticas lingüísticas y las lenguas minoritarias en el proceso de construcción de Europa*, Bilbao 1996; Farrows, Martyn: *The European Parliament and the participation of sub-national levels of government in the European Union*, European Parliament Working Document W-22, 1997, and Toggenburg 2001.

The only practical measure the Parliament took is the financing of the Bureau for Lesser Used Languages which was founded in 1982, following the initiative of some MEPs.<sup>72</sup> The minute budget given to the Bureau has always been in danger of succumbing to attack, particularly from France and Greece.

There are EP-resolutions requesting the Commission to include non-state languages in European programmes like Erasmus (interchange of students, now Socrates), Kaleidoscope (cultural co-operation), Tempus (university co-operation), Ariane (translations), Raphael (cultural heritage), Media (audio-visual communication), Babel (dubbing and subtitles). That means that in some cases, activities using or favoring those languages can receive subsidies. In some cases, particular governments, for example the Spanish one, have done their utmost to exclude stateless languages from such schemes, and have had temporal or definitive success in doing so. Those programmes are administered by different General Directorates of the Commission, and for a long time there was no effort to co-ordinate those policies.<sup>73</sup> There is even a budget title (Heading B3 1006) for the Promotion of Regional and Minority Languages, used to finance a minuscule program, Mercator, for non-state language media. All those programs are pretty small beer.

### 3.6. Summary

So as a result of this section we may accept that the role of the regions in Europe has increased and that they have won more access possibilities to the EU-institutions, but that these access points are still strictly controlled by the state. In consequence, I prefer to speak about a Europe "with" and not "of" the regions. Access does not mean real influence. In Gary Marks' words:<sup>74</sup> "When it comes to finances, the EU is a state-centric polity, and a regional government that is oriented to money will operate through national rather than European channels." Whether regions are able to influence on European policies, depends on their power in their respective state. Regions which have the support of their state may be more powerful in Europe than minority nations. The European tendency to treat all regions as if they were on the same level favors weak, recently created regions in mononational, often quasi-unitary central states, but may play against the interests of minority nations, above all in places where administrative and national frontiers do not coincide.

### 4. Government and Nationalist Strategies

After, firstly, presenting three cases of asserting a stateless nation, and, secondly, the European arena, it is now time to discuss the strategies of the governments and the nationalists, who have to cope with the conditions of the European integration process.

In principle, stateless or minority nationalisms can respond to European integration in three ways:

1. They can fight against European integration and/or the European Union. In the sixties and seventies, to be critical with the EEC was the preferred attitude of some national movements. In 1974, the Charte de Brest united left-wing nationalists from Galicia, Ireland, the Basque Country, Wales, Northern and Southern Catalonia, Sardinia, and Occitany to attack "internal colonialism", and many such movements fought what they understood as a united Europe of big capital and repressive nation-states. However, such movements often claimed that against big capital and big nation-states, they represented a "better" Europe. These days are over, and even Occitanian and Galician nationalists who were contrary to the European Union, now only claim for reforms.

2. They can use the chances the EU offers and play the game according to the established rules, eventually with a more or less credible strategy to change (some of) those rules in the long run. This possibility is specially attractive for nationalist movements which operate in a territory recognized as a region by the corresponding state, and who have the chance to get an electoral majority there. An interpretation of the EU as a supranational entity and/or a network approach fits well with this strategy.

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<sup>72</sup> See the documents in Petschen Verdaguer, Santiago: *Las minorías lingüísticas de Europa Occidental: Documentos (1492-1989)*, vol. 2, Gasteiz 1990, pp. 699-703. See Corretja i Torrens, Mercè: *L'acció europea per a la protecció dels drets lingüístics*, Barcelona 1995.

<sup>73</sup> Ariane, Raphael, and Kaleidoscope are now administered by the same directorate-general, under the common title Culture 2000.

<sup>74</sup> Marks, Gary et al. 1996, pp. 40-63.

3. They can aim at "independence in Europe", giving support to the EU but claiming recognition as just another member state. If the Union is to be interpreted as a community of states, such nationalists think that they have to go for statehood. They argue that stateless nations have the right to self-determination. Once a State, the nation would be entitled to the same rights as other members. The national language would be recognized on the same ground as the languages of other member states. "Independence in Europe" can be attractive to the electorate, as it seems less radical than straightforward separatism, and may dissipate fears of the economic costs of statehood.

In any case, we have to be careful to distinguish between the strategies a "regional" government can play and the programmes of nationalist parties which may be realized or not when they come to power.

#### **4.1. Catalonia and the strategy of a "Europe with the regions"**

##### **4.1.1. General remarks**

It has to be remembered that the Catalan autonomous government in its actual form is a result of the Spanish transition to democracy. When the first election for a Catalan Parliament was held in 1980, many of the parties were very young. The parties which led the first Catalan autonomous government, *Convergència i Unió*, have been in power since then. Under these circumstances, government policy and party activities have been somehow in consonance. There is no doubt that Catalan President Jordi Pujol has exercised a special influence both on Government policy and on his party, *Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya*. Foreign policy, or, as he himself calls it, "international presence"<sup>75</sup> of Catalonia has been his personal reserve.

There is no doubt that the European vocation is of special importance for Pujol. To be European (and more European than the Spaniards) was one of the ideological bases of Catalanism under Francoist dictatorship. Most Catalans still pride themselves on possessing a high grade of Europeaness. Spanish elites are specially keen on European integration and Catalan elites may even beat them.<sup>76</sup> Spanish integration into the European Communities and Spanish participation in the Euro produced euphoria, and Catalans were always among the most positively minded, even if a certain disillusion has set in. In a recent poll conducted by the *Patronat Català Pro Europa* people were asked how strongly they felt different identities: Catalan, Spanish and European. On a scale of 1 (none) to 5 (very much), respondents situated themselves as follows: Catalan 4,18, Spanish 3,74 and European 3,63.<sup>77</sup> Spanish research institutes consider Catalans to be Spanish average when asked about their attitude towards the EU.<sup>78</sup> However, *CiU* nationalist voters are more prone to favor a supranational EU than average Spaniards, but intergovernmentalists still prevail.<sup>79</sup>

##### **4.1.2. Catalonia and the Council of Ministers**

The Catalan government indeed claims access to the Council of Ministers. But not as an independent state. The Treaty of Maastricht establishes that states can be represented in the Council of Ministers by regional ministers. Catalonia would like to have that possibility. This would mean that the Spanish regions have to agree a collective position to be defended by the region representing Spain. Although the federalizing

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<sup>75</sup> On Catalan foreign policy see Urgell, Jaume: *Donar protagonisme a Catalunya: cap a una política catalana de relacions exteriors*, *Idees* 6, 2000, p. 54-69, and Garcia Segura, Caterina: *L'activitat exterior de les regions: una dècada de projecció exterior de Catalunya*, Barcelona 1995.

<sup>76</sup> The people may not be as enthusiastic as the political elite; see Keating 1996: 134.

<sup>77</sup> *Patronat Català Pro Europa* (ed.): *Enquesta del Patronat Català Pro Europa sobre els Catalans i la Unió Europea*. Realitzada per l'Institut Opina, març 2002, Barcelona 2002: 6-7.

<sup>78</sup> See the CIS study 2246, realized in 1997; results reproduced in Szmolka, Immaculada: *Opiniones y actitudes de los españoles ante el proceso de integración europea*, Madrid 1999: 61.

<sup>79</sup> See the results of CIS 2204, 1996, as reproduced in Szmolka 1999: 125. Spain returns 19,6% supranationalists for 61,7% intergovernmentalists (18,4% don't know/no answer), *CiU* voters give 29,1:62,0, and only 8,9 don't know.

consequences are obvious, the Spanish governments have always rejected the proposition. The Partido Popular government only allows the Spanish regions to participate in Spanish delegations in selected European working groups and committees.

#### **4.1.3. Regional Policy**

Regional policy is the only field where direct contact between regional administrations and the European bureaucracy is mandatory. Because of its high income regarding to Spanish standards (and average compared with the EU) Catalonia is one of the few Spanish regions not eligible for objective 1 subsidies. Part of its territory qualifies as objective 2 and objective 5b regions. Catalonia's keen interest in transborder cooperation may well have something to do with community initiatives and corresponding financing, too.

In order to receive European money, state cooperation is paramount. Competition between regions is pretty strong. This weakens the role of the regions as collective actor, and limits the significance of their interregional partnerships.

Catalonia is a net payer to Europe.<sup>80</sup> Catalanist nationalists have started to argue about the disadvantages to be a rich nation in a poor state. A few years ago, a Catalan government study quantified Catalan negative balance with Spain to be 8% of its GDP. The negative balance with Europe was 0,35% of the GDP. So Catalonia complains of being a net payer to both, Spain and Europe.<sup>81</sup>

The lesson for territorial nationalists can be twofold: Firstly, in Europe, to receive money, there is no better ally than your state. Second, if you want that the money given to your state reaches your region, much more important than your presence in Brussels is the political power you have in your state capital.

So the conclusion the Catalan leaders draw from the facts is not to pursue more independence, but to improve lobbying, not separation, but more participation and influence. That means voice, not exit.

#### **4.1.4. Catalonia as leader of European regionalism**

It has been said that "Maastricht" introduced a new collective regional actor, the Committee of the Regions (CoR), which includes local administrations. This inclusion and the insufficient powers of this consultative organ have disappointed Jordi Pujol, who had been one of the main lobbyists working for its inclusion in the Treaty. Afterwards, he tried to enhance CoR powers, but the Amsterdam Treaty brought only very small progress. Interregional cooperation has often been seen as a means to improve the situation of the regional level in the EU. The Assembly of the European Regions (AER) founded in 1985 now organizes over 300 regions of all kinds and powers, even from outside the EU. But this success in mobilization weakened the coherence of the movement.

Pujol has been one of the most prominent presidents of the AER, but more radical catalanists argue that the "magma" of the regions only strengthens the position of the states as the holders of effective power in the European Union. Disappointment with the CoR is a feature not limited to stateless nations like Catalonia. It affects federated states, too. In consequence, Catalonia embarked upon two initiatives which are struggling to strengthen the role of stronger regions in Europe. In 2000 and 2001, Conferences of Regions with Legislative Powers were celebrated. In Barcelona in 2000, the presidents of Austrian, Belgian, Portuguese, British, Spanish, Italian, and Swiss regions established a network of cooperation. But in Liège in 2002, a cleavage opened between the German and the Belgian regions and Catalonia and the Basque Country, on one side, and several French and Spanish regions on the other.<sup>82</sup> In the meantime, a group of seven "constitutional" regions had signed a declaration claiming more participation in the European institutions and more consideration of the constitutional regions. Catalonia, Bavaria, Northrhine-Westfalia, Salzburg, Scotland, Valonia and Flanders signed the declaration.<sup>83</sup>

The same year that the AER was founded as a collective organization of the European regions, the first German *länder* installed offices in Brussels for individual representation of their regions. It is symbolic (and it was meant to be) that Catalonia opened its office even before Spain became a member of the Community. It is equally significant that the Catalan "Patronat Pro Europa" took the form of a foundation,

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<sup>80</sup> See EL MUNDO 30.11.1998.

<sup>81</sup> See EXPANSION 28.7.1998.

<sup>82</sup> See EL PAIS 25.11.2000 and LA VANGUARDIA 17.11.2001.

<sup>83</sup> See EL PAIS 29.5.2001.

in order to avoid problems with the monopoly on foreign policy the Spanish state claims. Among the members of the Catalan Patronat there are local administrations, universities, commercial establishments, savings banks, trade unions and Chambers of Commerce.<sup>84</sup> The Patronat has never worked against Spanish government interests in Brussels but looked for close cooperation with the Spanish Permanent Residency to the European Union. When Spanish minority governments of Socialists, first, and Conservatives, later, cooperation was running smoothly.

#### **4.1.5. Interregional cooperation: the Catalan practice**

Interregional networking is fashionable among European regions, and Catalonia is one of the most active in that respect. Catalonia participates among others, in the Working Community of Regions with Industrial Tradition (RETI, 1984), in the Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions (CPMR, 1986), in the Association of European Border Regions (AEBR, 1987), not to forget the Assembly of European Wine Growing Regions (AREV). Some of these associations, which evidently pursue different and even contradictory objectives, are strictly orientated to attract European funds.

The Working Community of the Pyrenees includes Navarre, the Basque Country, Spanish Aragon, three French regions with Occitanian, Catalan and Basque population, the tiny state of Andorra, and Catalonia.<sup>85</sup> At its inception in 1983 the French feared it would become a hotbed for pan-Basque and pan-Catalan activities. The concern was totally unfounded. The activities of the group centered on Transpyrenean communications, and the budget was very low and spend to a high degree in the yearly meetings of the regional presidents from one country or the other. Not surprisingly, the Working Group's output is limited and its discussion of cultural and linguistic issues non-existent. Nevertheless, the French governments sometimes thought necessary to put some obstacles in the way of the Group.

The so-called Euro-region comprising the French regions of Midi-Pyrénées, Languedoc-Roussillon, and Spanish Catalonia is hardly a springboard for pan-Catalanist sentiment either, even if its capital is Perpignan, the capital of the French département Pyrénées-Orientales. This administrative unit roughly coincides with what the Catalans call Northern Catalonia, which the Treaty of the Pyrenees in 1659 tore away from the rest and which has formed part of the French state since then. As in the case of the Pyrenees Group, there is a whole range of official objectives but very little money to realize them.<sup>86</sup> With reference to French and (to a lesser extent) Spanish government fears of pan-catalanism, Catalan president Pujol spoke of senseless central government paranoia and emphasized that all participating regions belong to consolidated states.<sup>87</sup> Publications of the Euro-region are in Catalan and French, however, the language of Occitany gets no mention.<sup>88</sup>

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<sup>84</sup> See Dalmau and Llimona in: Generalitat de Catalunya-Institut d'Estudis Autònoms: Seminari sobre integració europea i participació regional: les regions després de Maastricht, Brusel.les 4 i 5 de juny de 1992, Barcelona 1993 (Quaderns de Treball 39).

<sup>85</sup> See Fernández Sola, Natividad/Peralta Losilla, Esteban: El papel de la Comunidad de Trabajo de los Pirineos y su evolución en el contexto europeo de cooperación transfronteriza territorial, *Revista de Instituciones Europeas* 21, 1994, 2, p. 499-527; Ndiaye, Patrice: La coopération transfrontalière des collectivités décentralisées sur l'arc méditerranéen, *Sciences de la Société* 37, 1996, p. 151-169; Ndiaye, Patrice: Collectivités locales et frontière pyrénéenne: la coopération transfrontalière décentralisée en Languedoc-Roussillon, Paris 1993; Sanguin, André/Guiraud, Frédérique: Les Pyrénées: mort une frontière, naissance d'une charnière?, in: Goetschy, Henri/Sanguin, André (eds.): *Langues régionales et relations transfrontalières en Europe*, Paris 1995, p. 243-254.

<sup>86</sup> See Euroregió-Euroregion. Midi Pyrénées, Languedoc-Roussillon, Catalunya, ed. Generalitat de Catalunya/Région Languedoc-Roussillon/Région Midi-Pyrénées, Barcelona 1993; Ndiaye 1996. The Euroregion hails from 1991.

<sup>87</sup> REGIO 7, 5.7.1993.

<sup>88</sup> When asked by an occitanian interviewer how Catalonia helps Occitan, Pujol's answer made it clear that the only help to be expected by French Occitanians was Catalonia's example as a model to realise its claims inside the state. (Interview given to LA

In reality, as in the case of the Pyrenees Working Community, the different administrative systems, competencies, and strategies of the partners limit the scope of the co-operation scheme. And it has to be remembered that these co-operation initiatives do not follow nationalist lines in regards to culture or national frontiers.

There has been the idea of combining the Euroregion with models of a mediterranean arch<sup>89</sup>. The Mediterranean Arch for Technology founded in 1990 includes 10 regions between Tuscany and Andalusia.<sup>90</sup> But those regions only muster 25 millions of pesetas. And the space between Andalusia and Tuscany is not very homogeneous. In consequence, the scheme is not very operative.

Jordi Pujol's most dearly-cherished interregional partnership has been, for many years, the Four Motors for Europe initiative, with the supposedly economically leading regions of Baden-Württemberg, Lombardy, and Rhône-Alpes, and Wales as a latecomer. The motives of this initiative can be interpreted differently. Economic reasons may have been of some importance, interior policy of the members and even personal relations between the leaders may be another. But one thing is clear: the "Four Motors" have nothing to do with the defense of national identities, though two stateless nations (Catalonia and Wales) participate.<sup>91</sup>

#### **4.1.6. The defense of Catalan language and culture in Europe.**

According to Jordi Pujol every person who lives and works in Catalonia, if he likes to, should be considered a Catalan. However, language is still the chief marker of Catalan nationality.

The defense of regional or minority languages is not the main objective for the Catalan foreign policy. Language, is not high on the agenda of Catalan foreign policy. This identity question is to be solved in the Catalan and the Spanish context, and the Catalan government refrained from trying to put it before international forums. Catalan language and even culture have not been made the main issues for Catalan official foreign policy.

However, when it comes to EP resolutions on language questions, Catalan MEPs of all parties use to be in the forefront, but they have always acted very cautiously and the Catalan government as such has been very prudent.<sup>92</sup> It did not allow this issue to disturb its partnership schemes. And it did not want that its language, which has more speakers than Danish, Finnish or some other state-languages, is compared with Manx or Sorbian; therefore it could not embark upon the existing protection schemes of the Council of Europe. In practice, the Catalan government left the language issue to softer forms of exterior activities,

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SETMANA, reprinted in AUE 4.1.1998). See Klaus-Jürgen Nagel: La cooperació de Catalunya amb les regions occitanes. Cap a una Europa de les regions?, *Diàlegs - Revista d'Estudis Polítics i Socials* 2, 1999, 5, p. 89-108.

<sup>89</sup> See Gaudemar, Jean-Paul: Problemàtica general i escenaris possibles de l'arc mediterrani, *Revista Econòmica de Catalunya* 18, 1991, p. 61-70.

<sup>90</sup> See INFORMACION 17.6.1997.

<sup>91</sup> For a more thorough analysis see Knodt, Michèle: 'Vier Motoren für Europa': Symbolische Hochglanzpolitik oder erfolgversprechende regionale Strategie des Landes Baden-Württemberg?, in: Fischer, Thomas (ed.): *Jahrbuch des Föderalismus 2000*, Baden-Baden 2001, p. 405-416; Kukawka, Pierre: Le Quadriège européen (Bade-Wurtemberg, Catalogne, Lombardie, Rhône-Alpes) ou l'Europe par les régions, in: Balme, Richard (ed.): *Les politiques du néo-régionalisme*, Paris 1996, p. 91-106, and the articles in Fischer, Thomas/Frech, Siegfried (eds.): *Baden-Württemberg und seine Partnerregionen*, Stuttgart et al. 2001.

<sup>92</sup> See Generalitat de Catalunya, Departament de la Presidència (ed.): *El català reconegut pel Parlament Europeu*, Barcelona 1991; the articles of Duch i Guillot, Montserrat i Moliner and Argemí in: Schönberger, Axel/Stegmann, Tilbert Dídac (eds.): *Actes del desè col.loqui internacional de Llengua i Literatura Catalanes*. Frankfurt am Main, 18-25 de setembre de 1994, vol. II, Barcelona 1996.

for example financing Catalan lectorates in foreign universities, maintaining offices for cultural promotion, subsidizing organizations of Catalan emigrants in Europe and South America and so on.<sup>93</sup>

#### 4.1.7. Parties and civil society

It has become evident that the Catalan government has not used foreign policy to question or even discuss Catalonia's position inside the Spanish state. But other actors fill the gap. There is a wide range of political cooperation for parties, pressure groups, and other actors, who might or might not receive financial backing, encouragement or disapproval of the Catalan government. That includes the Catalanist parties of the government coalition themselves, which might give a special "nationalist" touch to their international activities.

National movements of non-state nations in the 70s cooperated actively, or at least tried to do so, against their states. But those movements no longer are protagonists. In Catalonia (and not only in Catalonia), political parties and institutions took over. Catalan official interest to support "forlorn" cases of small and chanceless movements is very low. Nevertheless, a lot of work to organize movements of minorities and stateless nations in Europe is still done by associations like the "Centre Internacional Escarré per les Minories Etniques i les Nacions" (CIEMEN). Catalan government and the governing parties seem to collaborate on some issues with CIEMEN, but not to the extent that Catalan government can be related with all CIEMEN engagements. The Conference of European Stateless Nations (CONSEU), largely inspired and maintained by CIEMEN, used the recent European summit in Barcelona to claim self-determination and a direct participation of the stateless nations in the future European constitution.<sup>94</sup>

If we now focus on international party activities, the ruling parties refrain from every intent to form an independentist international.<sup>95</sup> Not even in the EP, the nationalist parties of Catalonia fall into line with other stateless nationalists. While opposition nationalist Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya MEPs, when there are any, form part of the Green group, the MEPs which have been voted on the common ticket of *Convergència i Unió* enter the liberal group, if they are from *Convergència*, or the christian-democratic one, if they are from *Unió Democràtica*. Both prefer relations with statewide parties siding up with non-state nationalists. However, under the auspices of *Convergència* and other nationalist parties, there now exists an intergroup of MEPs of nationalist parties, who have not left their existing groups: While Basque, Galician, Scottish, Welsh and Flemish nationalist MEPs belong to the Greens/European Free Alliance Group, *Convergència* MEPs stay with the liberals, *Unió Democràtica* with the christian democrats.<sup>96</sup>

Other, not directly political civil society activities can be useful for Catalan national recognition, and, of course, many "non"-governmental organizations are supported by Catalan government funds (culture, sports...). Eventually, Catalan government or its ruling parties might drop such support and the NGOs might be left to their destiny, when government judges that superior objectives are at stake. For the government, those activities may be useful mobilizing instruments as long as they serve their cause, and may be dropped if necessary. But in the long run, such treatment may well have a demobilizing effect.

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<sup>93</sup> Those activities cannot be analyzed in this paper; a full account of Catalan foreign activities is to be published this year (Jaume Urgell (ed.): *Donar protagonisme a Catalunya. Acció internacional i política exterior catalana*, Barcelona 2002, in print). This will include the economic promotion of Catalan interests abroad, the cooperation in research and development, linguistic and cultural activities, as well as other forms of foreign policy. It will feature chapters on the exterior activities of the civil society as well.

<sup>94</sup> See AVUI 17.3.2002 and 13.3.2002.

<sup>95</sup> See *L'Italia tra Europa e Padania*, *Limes-Rivista italiana di geopolitica* 3, 1996. For comparative research see Winter, Lieven de (ed.): *Non-state wide parties in Europe*, Barcelona 1994; Winter, Lieven de/Türsan, Huri (eds.): *Regionalist parties in Western Europe*, London/New York 1998; Winter, Lieven de: *The impact of European integration on ethnoregionalist parties*, Institut de Ciències Polítiques i Socials Working Paper 195, Barcelona 2001; Lynch 1996.

<sup>96</sup> AVUI 19.5.2000. Spain being a one and only constituency, regional parties rely on coalitions, which often seem looney and counter-nature.

#### 4.1.8. Concluding remarks

Catalonia is a very active player in the European arena, in fact, by far the most active of all 17 Spanish autonomies. Between 1983 and 1999, 81 agreements with foreign governments were concluded.<sup>97</sup> The Catalan president, on his countless voyages, has seen half the world. He nearly always respects the Spanish diplomacy meticulously, always preparing his trips with the ministry of foreign affairs and the respective embassies. Conflicts with Madrid have widely been avoided. The Generalitat has opened dozens of COPCA (Consorti de Promoció Comercial de Catalunya) commercial promotion offices and some COPEC (Consorti de Promoció Exterior de la Cultura) cultural promotion offices as well. These offices function as partnerships with other institutions and private business, not as institutional representation offices of Catalonia.

This international presence is costly. We have seen that some of the activities can be criticized as being strategically inconsistent, especially in interregional cooperation. In this field, there is much day-to-day business and much lack of transparency. Catalan foreign policy has always been very cautious and sensitive to circumstances; this may explain some inconsistency. The Catalan government is not giving preference to the regions with national identity, but to strong regions in terms of power. The common interests of the hundreds of European regions are very limited. But even the partners of the interregional cooperation schemes Catalonia ventured into have very different particular objectives. The heterogeneity of the regional level is one of the reasons why states have maintained their decisive role in the Union.

Interregional cooperation and foreign policy in general are also image policies for interior use. Opposition parties may censure Pujols' intent to monopolize Catalan sentiment. But regarding contents, opposition parties don't seem to have any comprehensive programme for foreign policy either, and the matter is not high on their agenda. It even is doubtful whether a socialist Catalan government would pursue a very different foreign policy.<sup>98</sup>

There is no doubt of the sincerity and coherence of Pujol's European regionalism, which does not erode, but complement the role of the states in the European Union. Catalonia played region, accepting the game, trying to improve it's rules, but not to change the game.

In reality, Europe added ambivalences, and the Catalan status in European politics is far from being solved definitely. Catalan government is valorizing its administrative powers very high, and is trying to enhance them. But it is not looking for fully fledged nation-state status. In spite of Catalan parliament resolutions insisting on the right to selfdetermination, Pujol defends Catalan autonomy as a cohesive element not only for the Spanish state, but for Europe. He said that the democratic legitimacy of the regions could be justified as a form of recognition of the right to selfdetermination. And he affirmed that his government assumes the role of an international advocate of autonomy as an alternative to secessionist approaches.<sup>99</sup>

Catalonia strives (quite successfully) to give itself a European, cooperative and pragmatism image, setting great store by technological and economic cooperation. Catalan nationalist parties don't rely on the efficiency of co-operation with other stateless nations, in terms of voicing common nationalist grievances. In Catalonia, there is a broad consensus with the opposition on Europeanism and the Catalan role as a region of Europe. Catalanism, which is much broader than *Convergència i Unió*, may be functional for the competition with other regions for inward investment and European funds money. A broad but not deep Catalanism, not totally monopolized by one party, may work wonders in competing with other regions for inward investment and European funds. "Soft" nationalism has incurred no penalties so far in Europe. On the contrary: It is an asset for competition, but if too strong, may endanger collaboration with the Spanish state, which is essential for pursuing interest politics in Europe. On the other hand, if too weak, nationalism may loose its influence on central government. If the votes of minority nationalists decide which party governs the state, for example, their claim may be heard, but they always run the risk of stirring up majority nationalism. Those situations require a high degree of control by the

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<sup>97</sup> Spanish Autonomous Communities have no treaty-making power. Concerning international activities of the Communities, the Spanish Constitution is comparatively restrictive, and the first democratic central governments had tried to curtail the regions, but the Constitutional Tribunal, in a 1994 sentence, provided a more open interpretation.

<sup>98</sup> See the declarations of the practitioner Joaquim Llimona, in REGIO 7, 23.3.2002.

<sup>99</sup> See AVUI 29.4.1999.



respective elites. The fear to provoke "majority" nationalism even inside the territory of the "minority" nation contributes to ensure basic co-operation by the minority nationalists. Europeanism may contribute to this further.

"Independence in Europe" is not on the agenda of the Catalan government, nor is it for the most important of the Catalan nationalist parties, not to speak of the Catalan Socialists. Instead, the official Catalan European policy has always claimed to enhance the role of the European regions. Hereby, it accepted for Catalonia a denomination ("region") which Catalan nationalists don't like to use in Spain. Pujol's European regionalism is not attacking the states.<sup>100</sup>

## **4.2. Independence in Europe? Scotland before and after devolution.**

### **4.2.1 Introductory remarks**

Compared with the autonomous Catalan administration, Scottish and Welsh devolved authorities are young. When they emerged, the EU had already developed to something more than an intergovernmental organization. On the other hand, the new authorities could build upon the infrastructure the UK territorial ministries for Scotland and Wales had developed before devolution. And contrary to Catalonia under Franco, Scottish and Welsh parties had been free to formulate their own alternatives and develop party relations of their own choice.

### **4.2.2. Scotland and Europe before devolution**

Contrary to Catalonia, Scottish sympathies for the European Union<sup>101</sup>, were, to say it prudently, not always very high. In the 1975 referendum on the entry of the UK into the ECC, Scotland's 'yes' vote was lower than in the UK (58,4% with a turnout of 61,7%; UK: 67,2%, turnout 62,7%).<sup>102</sup> The UK entry had been the work of the Conservatives, and Scotland, as part of the geographic periphery, did fear the dominance of the rich countries of the famous "blue banana". Among the Scottish Labour MPs, anti-europeanism was more widespread than among their English colleagues. The SNP, which in the 50s and early 60s had shown some sympathies for the European project, now campaigned against, presenting the Community as a prop for the old state order.<sup>103</sup> A review of the documents passed by the SNP annual conferences shows that the change to the current policy of "independence in Europe" took place in the late 80s. While the annual conference of 1982 still declared "membership of the European Economic Community is incompatible with Scotland's national interests", in 1988, the conference foresaw that "after negotiating an entry into the European Community acceptable to the Scottish people, an independent Scotland will have a full say in all Community policy...".<sup>104</sup> The SNP affirmed that an independent Scotland would

- send a Commissioner,
- eventually preside the EU,
- have as many Council votes as Denmark,
- delegate a judge to the European Court,

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<sup>100</sup> See for example his speech in Santander, 22.7.1988: "Desearía precisar que la Europa unida que se está construyendo va a ser una Europa de estados. No va a ser una Europa de 200 regiones. (...) Europa se hará sobre la base de los estados, los cuales no sólo una realidad incuestionable, sino también una aportación de primera magnitud a la estructuración de las sociedades. Los estados son el esqueleto del cuerpo de Europa, y no hay cuerpo sin esqueleto." (Pujol, Jordi: *Pensar Europa*, Barcelona 1993: 110s.).

<sup>101</sup> For a general vision on Scotland and Europe, see Day, Graham/Rees, Gareth (ed.): *Regions, nations and European integration. Remaking the Celtic periphery*, Cardiff 1991; Graham; Roberts, Peter: *The Scottish Parliament and the European Union*, in: McCarthy, John/Newlands, David (ed.): *Governing Scotland. Problems and prospects. The impact of the Scottish Parliament*, Aldershot et al. 1999, p. 25-45.

<sup>102</sup> See Lynch 1996: 34-35.

<sup>103</sup> See Keating, Michael/Jones, Barry: *Scotland and Wales: peripheral assertion and European integration*, *Parliamentary Affairs* 44, 1991, 3: 319.

<sup>104</sup> These documents were obtained from the SNP-headquarters.

-double the number of MEPs.<sup>105</sup> In fact, it would even be able to send more people to the CoR.

Nationalists in Scotland argue that after separation no new admission process to the EU would be required. Until now, there has been no precedent case. Probably, no Council of Ministers would refuse membership to a new state if separation were decided by an overwhelming majority of its people, if this new member state guarantees to maintain certain standards of democracy and liberal treatment of its own minorities, and if the former state consented to the separation process. But there is no such "Quebec" situation in sight.<sup>106</sup>

The U-turn of the SNP was not as sudden as it seems. It had been brought forward by fundamentalists like Winnie Ewing, who as MEP for Highlands and Islands had participated in securing European funds for this region, as well as by leftists like Jim Sillars, who in fact seems to be the inventor of the formula.<sup>107</sup>

The concept distances the SNP from boggy separatism. Independence in Europe seemed less menacing. It gives a more modern, realistic and pragmatic stance to the party. It lowers the expected costs for secession. It also distanced the SNP from anti-European Thatcherism.

Scottish Labour, at the beginning of the 80s, had stood for withdrawing the UK from Europe. Thatcher and the SNP caused it to rectify. Thatcher contributed to convince the party that the Community after all, perhaps was not as bad<sup>108</sup>, and the SNP successes of the late 80s made a new formula necessary: Scottish Labour started to campaign for "Scotland in the UK in Europe".<sup>109</sup>

During the years of Conservative administrations, there was of course no room for Scottish protodiplomacy. However, the Scottish Office got involved into the implementation of European funds money for the Highlands and Islands, and for some restructuring of old industrial areas, and the search for the matching funds.<sup>110</sup> In order to prevent the economic interest groups going to Brussels on their own account, the Scotland Europe Office in Brussels was set up in 1992. The then Conservative Secretary of State for Scotland, Ian Lang, thought it necessary to confirm that it was still the UK embassy who represented Scotland. The Scotland Europe Office was only meant to deliver services to the different economic and social interests, and was financed by membership fees.<sup>111</sup> The Scottish seats in the CoR were given to CoSLA, the organization of Scottish local government.

#### 4.2.3. Scotland and Europe after devolution

After devolution, European affairs are still a reserved matter.<sup>112</sup> Before devolution, the UK Secretary of State, as a minister of a member state government, could participate in Council of Minister sessions. Now, the ministers of the Scottish Executive enjoy this privilege, and are therefore sometimes envied by other

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<sup>105</sup> See Macartney, Allan: Independence in Europe, Scottish Government Yearbook 1990: 39.

<sup>106</sup> For an opposite view of the juridical situation, see Schieren, Stefan: Independence in Europe: Scotland's choice?, Scottish Affairs 31, 2000, p. 111-127.

<sup>107</sup> See Lynch 1996: 37 and 40. Until now, independence in Europe is even more acceptable for the party leaders than for the members.

<sup>108</sup> See Keating/Jones 1991: 319.

<sup>109</sup> Burrows, Noreen: Relations with the European Union, in: Hassan, Gerry/Warhurst, Chris (ed.): The new Scottish politics. The first year of the Scottish Parliament and beyond, Norwich 2000, p. 125-129.

<sup>110</sup> See Danson, M.W. et al.: The European structural fund partnerships in Scotland: new forms of governance for regional developments?, Scottish Affairs 27, 1999, p. 23-40.

<sup>111</sup> See Keating 1996: 207-209 and Stolz, Klaus: *Scotland Europa: Paradiplomatischer Akteur einer staatslosen Nation?*, in: Krämer, Raimund (ed.): Regionen in der Europäischen Union, Berlin 1998, p. 124-141.

<sup>112</sup> Peter Hain, the British minister for Europe, recently declared: "The principal vehicle for British and Scottish input will be the British Government, as the matter is reserved." See Scottish Parliament European Committee Official Report 5.11.2001, col. 1267.

European regions. However, they don't make much use of their right.<sup>113</sup> When Scottish ministers take part, they figure as members of the UK delegation, and they are bound by different agreements (memorandum of understanding, concordats) to support and advance the predetermined UK negotiation line. Coordination of UK affairs in Europe is in the hand of the confidential Joint Ministerial Committee, where the UK Government, the Welsh and Northern Irish Assembly Governments, and the Scottish Executive are represented. Legally, the JMC has only advisory status; ultimate sovereignty lies, of course, with Westminster. The extent to which the Scottish Executive can influence UK and European Union positions is reliant upon goodwill between the Executives; until now, no major problem has arisen, but that might change when the political color of the participating governments happens to be different.

The significance of the participation of Scottish Executive members in the Council of Ministers has often been exaggerated; but its symbolic significance is important.<sup>114</sup>

After devolution, Scotland Europe has been enlarged to improve lobbying the Commission and other European authorities. Additionally, the Scottish Executive has opened a representation office of its own in Brussels, with 6 staff, who are, nevertheless, at the same time members of the UK representation to the EU. The devolved Scottish Parliament has changed Scotland's representation in CoR; half of the Scottish CoR members now come from the Parliament, the others are still sent by the local authorities. This decision did not pass without critique: local government saw it as encroachment on its premises; on the other hand, nationalists criticized that Scottish MSPs should sit aside, say, English local councilors, and enjoy the same treatment and status.

Scotland's policy of regional partnerships is very different from Catalonia's. For example, it looks out for agreements with small states in the Baltic and with the Czech Republic. There is no specifically Celtic policy of partnerships, but Scotland takes part in the Council of the Isles, which, as a part of the Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland, brings together members of the Westminster Parliament, the devolved assemblies, and the Irish Dáil. This was welcomed with special warmth by the SNP. Party leader Alex Salmond saw it as an incipient 'Association of British States', a confederal scheme which has been vindicated by the party for the time after independence.<sup>115</sup> And the Scottish Executive signed the aforementioned declaration of the constitutional regions of Europe, calling for reforms to make sure that this kind of region is not lost among the magma of merely administrative units who dominate the CoR.<sup>116</sup>

Scottish MEPs are now voted on a nationwide system of proportionality, giving the smaller parties a better chance; nationalist MEPs ally with the other EFA member parties and sometimes with the members of the Green Group.<sup>117</sup>

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<sup>113</sup> Angus Robertson, a Scottish nationalist MP, criticized that of 4500 working group meetings held between devolution and the European Council in Nice, only 75 were attended by officials from the Scottish Executive, and that by that time, Jack McDonnell, the Minister for European Affairs, had never attended a Council of Ministers session. See *ibid.* 22.10.2001, col. 1182.

<sup>114</sup> "La véritable signification est peut-être plutôt d'ordre symbolique..." (Loughlin, John: *La dimension européenne de la dévolution, Pouvoirs Locaux* 49, 2001, 2: 117). See Sloat, Amanda: *Scotland and Europe: links between Edinburgh, London, and Brussels, Scottish Affairs* 31, 2000, p. 92-93, and the evidence given by her in *Scottish Parliament European Committee...* 5.11.2001, col 1259-1267.

<sup>115</sup> See Loughlin/Mathias 1998, and Salmond, Alex: *Scotland and Ireland, Scottish Affairs* 25, 1998: 73.

<sup>116</sup> According to Jack McDonnell, the Minister for Education, Europe and External Affairs recently promoted to First Minister, "Scotland must step up its involvement with Europe if it is to be in the premier division of legislative regions or nations within EU member states." Press Release of the Scottish Executive SE3124/2000, 4 Dec 2000.

<sup>117</sup> See Henderson, Ailsa: *Scottish international initiatives: Internationalism, the Scottish Parliament and the SNP, Workshop on The Foreign Relations of Constituent Units, Winnipeg, 10-13 May 2001.* <http://www.ciff.on.ca/Reference/documents/docq.htm>

The European Committee of the Scottish Parliament which has the power to implement European legislation, at first tried to scrutinize it, but being overwhelmed, seems to rely more on Westminster decisions.<sup>118</sup>

It can be said that devolution triggered the formulation of a Scottish European policy of its own. Even claims for a Scottish Council (a kind of devolved British Council) have been heard recently.<sup>119</sup> But the main objective of the Executive seems to be to play the game of a powerful region in Europe, albeit with some differences in comparison to Catalonia. There is a possibility that this line, if it succeeds, might contribute to change the SNP stand on Independence in Europe. Officially, this party defends equal status for Scotland with Ireland and Denmark. For them, the Council of the Regions should be a place for Scottish regional and local authorities, not for the Scottish National Parliament. The SNP rejects regional status for Scotland, and points to the small candidate states which would not accept second-rate regional status either.<sup>120</sup>

It may be an advantage of the SNP's point of view that independence probably does not have to be delivered. A SNP led government would probably be a coalition government, and no partner might be disposed to share this objective.

On the other hand, party elites may see the insistence on independence in Europe as sterile; it prevents them from participating in partial EU-reforming. It binds the party to a confederal or at least intergovernmental interpretation of the EU. In line with the doctrine, leading SNP politicians have argued against a second chamber of the EP and have repeatedly defended the powers of the Council of Ministers against encroachment by the EP or the Commission. They have sometimes rejected the growth of EP influence on decisions in the name of preventing a European superstate. It is therefore important that some innovators already try a cautious revision of the nationalist standpoint, against traditional sovereigntists (some of those may even change back to anti-europeanism).<sup>121</sup> It is important that the nationalist MEP Neil MacCormick, recently spoke out in favor of the new concept of a "partner region" of the EU, an idea developed by the French MEP Alain Lamassoure and but finally not accepted by the EP in order to give regions with legislative powers a special status in Europe.<sup>122</sup>

### **4.3. From Nationalism to Regionalism<sup>123</sup>, taking the European gravy train? The Welsh case**

#### **4.3.1. Wales and Europe before devolution**

Some of the confining conditions for Welsh European policies are the same as in the Scottish case. But as we have already seen, Welsh nationalism is very different. Plaid Cymru, right from the start, cultivated an anti-statist bias the SNP never shared. One of the preferred topics of Saunders Lewis, the founder of the PC and long-year leader, was Welsh (re-)integration into Europe. Until the end of the 50s, Plaid Cymru's attitude was supportive to European integration. Welsh nationalists participated in the post war European movement. It is nevertheless correct that the practical policies of the first EEC did not enthrall the Welsh. Plaid Cymru campaigned against British EE-membership in the 70s. The party was one of the founders of the Bureau of Unrepresented European Nations in 1973, it sought to communicate to the voter a principal commitment to European Union, while criticizing the existing EEC, for being capitalist and a satellite of

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<sup>118</sup> The European Committee claims a renegotiation of the concordats on the JMC, in order to open it to parliamentary control, and calls for a Scottish Parliament scrutiny reserve, which would come into play when a Scottish minister was due to attend sessions of the JMC or of the Council of Ministers. See Wright, Alex: Relations with Europe, in: Nations and Regions: The dynamics of devolution. Quarterly monitoring programme. Scotland. Quarterly report. February 2002: 32.

<sup>119</sup> Harvie, Christopher: The cultural and commercial representation of Scotland in Europe, *Scottish Affairs* 35, 2001: 10.

<sup>120</sup> See Salmond 1992, cited by Lynch 1996: 1.

<sup>121</sup> See Newell 1998: 111.

<sup>122</sup> See evidence given before the Scottish Parliament..., 30.10.2001, col 1280.

<sup>123</sup> "Wandel vom Nationalismus zum Regionalismus", see Loughlin, John/Mathias, Jörg: Die regionale Frage in Großbritannien: Das Beispiel Wales, *WeltTrends* 11, 1996: 55.

the USA. At the same time, it attacked the Common Agricultural Policy, which was and is of paramount interest to its agrarian voters in North-West Wales.<sup>124</sup>

During the referendum of 1975, Plaid Cymru used the slogan "Europe Yes, EEC no".<sup>125</sup> The result in Wales was a 64,8% yes vote (turnout 66,7%). That was not so different from the overall UK vote (67,2% yes, turnout 62,7%). But Welsh speaking Gwynedd county had returned a 70,6% yes vote (participation 64,3%). After all, European agrarian policy was getting profitable for Welsh farmers. After the defeat of devolution in the 1979 referendum, Plaid Cymru passed a series of internal and leadership crisis. Its European policy slowly adapted itself to a Wales which received not only agrarian subsidies but ever more copious structural funds money from Europe. In consequence, support for the existing forms of European integration grew. As in Scotland, Thatcher's eurocritical position favored a more EU-friendly attitude in anti-Thatcher Wales.

In the European arena, Plaid Cymru continued an active alliance policy with other parties and movements of stateless nations and with regionalists. It was and is one of the more active members of the 1979 founded European Free Alliance of these parties.<sup>126</sup> At the same time, PC developed a particular vision of the Europe of the Regions, not without internal ambiguities, to say the least.

When the SNP claimed "independence in Europe" and calculated what institutional benefits in Europe would accrue, Plaid Cymru followed suit and calculated the number of MEPs an independent Wales would have. Ieuan Wyn Jones added that being an independent state, Wales would have the right to draw from the cohesion funds<sup>127</sup>, which is only open to states. But when the SNP claimed a seat at the Council of Ministers for Scotland as one more European state, Plaid Cymru talked about adding regional representants to the Council.<sup>128</sup> When the SNP defended an intergovernmental Europe (with Scotland as one of the Governments), Plaid Cymru was much more open to supranational solutions. The official line of the SNP often rejected a second, regional chamber of the EP and criticized the CoR. Plaid Cymru claimed such a second chamber and sometimes conceived the CoR to be its precursor. Ieuan Wyn Jones, for some time president of the party, wrote in 1996:<sup>129</sup> "In Germany support is growing for the idea that the Council of Ministers should become the Union's second Chamber in a bicameral system. We in Wales share the view that the Committee of the Regions should, over time, become the second chamber." "Some even see merit in a second chamber becoming an amalgamation of the two bodies. This would be one way of ensuring that the voice of the small nations and regions is underpinned and reinforced."

While often following the Scottish propositions, on the other hand, Plaid Cymru steered an ambiguous middle course between an intergovernmental Europe of nation-states and a supranational, but decentralized federation of nations and regions.<sup>130</sup> References for Wales were drawn from different levels: Plaid Cymru spokesmen could cite Denmark or Ireland as well as Catalonia and Bavaria. The formula the historic party leader Lord Elis-Thomas used immediately before devolution was "a fully integrated and participating region within the European Union."<sup>131</sup>

Like in Scotland, the existence of a territorial administration, even as a part of the central state, had been important. The Welsh Office, however, had not the same status and powers as the Scottish Office. It had only been created in 1964, and when the UK entered the EEC in 1973, it had not even analyzed what this meant for the Welsh economy.<sup>132</sup> While the Scottish Office was represented on the staff of UKREP in Brussels, the Welsh Office was not. European funds were of course the single most important subject for the European division of the Welsh Office. The existence of this administration surely was an advantage of the Welsh compared with the English regions.

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<sup>124</sup> Lynch 1996: 62.

<sup>125</sup> See Lynch 1996: 70.

<sup>126</sup> Analysed by Lynch 1996.

<sup>127</sup> Jones, Ieuan Wyn: Europe - the challenge for Wales, Ynys Môn 1996: 32.

<sup>128</sup> In an interview with the author, Karl Davies supported Welsh participation in the Council of Ministers in order to influence upon what the UK representant said.

<sup>129</sup> Jones 1996: 44.

<sup>130</sup> See Lynch 1996: 80; Christiansen 1998: 134.

<sup>131</sup> Introduction to Jones 1996: 7.

<sup>132</sup> Lynch 1996: 62.

The Welsh Office waited until 1992 for to set up a kind of representation in Brussels. The Welsh European Centre was set up in 1992, but not as an office of the ministry. At the heart of the initiative, we find the Welsh Development Agency, interested in inward investment. But more than 70 other organizations participate and sponsor the Centre. Universities, 1995 the Welsh Language Board, the new local authorities, in 1996 the Wales Trade-Union Congress, joint as well. In 1997, the WDA paid one third of the budget, Local governments less than a third, and the others the rest.

The bureaucracy at the Conservative Welsh Office saw the WEC as a competitor, and the matter of the funds was declare "no-go area" for the WEC.<sup>133</sup> The Secretary of State for Wales John Redwood, a stout Conservative Unionists, forbade the WDA to promote Wales as a different region of Europe, and insisted on selling the country an integral part of the UK. Officially, there were no contacts between the UKREP during this time, and the WEC had no representative role; its activities were seen as purely functional. Cultural and political identity should not be involved.

The Welsh Office signed a couple of partnership agreements with European and non-European region.<sup>134</sup> The Welsh Office itself was particularly proud to have signed an agreement with Baden-Württemberg, which opened Wales the doors to be an associated member of the Four Motors initiative.<sup>135</sup>

But it was Labour Local Government of Dyfed that ventured into a European financed partnership with southern Ireland. Local government associations represented Wales in the AER and the Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions. The Secretary of State himself visited Council of Ministers sessions only occasionally.

The long years of Conservative UK government convinced Labour, Liberals and Plaid Cymru, that the central government did not the utmost to represent Wales in Europe; sometimes, European money could not be used for lack of British matching funds. The European factor, therefore, was much more influent when it came to the second devolution referendum in 1997 than in the Scottish case.

#### **4.3.2. Wales and Europe after devolution**

Before the power was devolved, quite optimistic visions had been developed on what an Assembly would mean for European policy.<sup>136</sup> The actual Assembly cannot scrutinize European laws at is has only secondary powers in legislation. Its corporate structure proved a nuisance: the chair of the European Committee is Rhodri Morgan, the First Minister himself; that makes parliamentary style control of the Executive difficult. The European Committee was designed as a kind of Committee of the Committees, where the conveners of other committees should meet and been reminded of the importance of Europe. But agriculture and structural aid are dominating the agenda, and the corresponding subject committees are very strong.<sup>137</sup> Nevertheless, the Assembly finally secured objective 1 status for west Wales, that is, roughly, the Welsh speaking areas and the English speaking but Welsh identifying valleys. Until 2006, Europe still is a "gravy train" for Wales. British matching funds could be secured.<sup>138</sup> Wales currently fights

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<sup>133</sup> Lewis, Bethan: Representing Wales in Europe: the origins and evolution of the Wales European Centre, *Contemporary Wales* 11, 1998: 190.

<sup>134</sup> For example, with New South Wales.

<sup>135</sup> For the European policy of the Welsh Office, see Lewis 1998 and Welsh Affairs Committee/House of Commons/Session 1994-95. Fourth Report. Wales in Europe. 2 vols., London 1995; comments on the report: Mathias, Jörg: Wales in Europe and regional policy, *Regional & Federal Studies* 6, 1996, 1, p. 78-80.

<sup>136</sup> See Gray, John/Osmond, John: Wales in Europe. The opportunity presented by a Welsh Assembly, Institute of Welsh Affairs/Welsh Centre for International Affairs, Cardiff (June 1997).

<sup>137</sup> See Loughlin 2001: 119; Lang, Mark: Relations with the European Union, in: Osmond, John (ed.): The economy takes centre stage. Monitoring the National Assembly. December 2000 to March 2001, Institute of Welsh Affairs, Cardiff 2001: 48.

<sup>138</sup> See Jones, Gareth: A guide to European funding in Wales 2000-2006, Institute of Welsh Affairs, May 2001; Morgan, Kevin/Price, Adam: The other Wales. The case for Objective 1 funding post 1999, Institute of Welsh Affairs, Cardiff 1998; Bristow, Gillain/Blewitt, Nigel: Unravelling the knot. The interaction of UK treasury and

on two fronts: To emerge as an economic powerhouse of Europe, and not to lose structural funds money.<sup>139</sup>

The Welsh Assembly changed the instruments of European policy, albeit not in a revolutionary way. Referring to partnerships and European regionalism, it followed the lines which had been pursued either by Labour led local government or by Conservative Welsh Office. With the exception of the Council of the Isles, no Celtic cooperation scheme was sought. Wales continued as associated member of the Four Motors. When Welsh Local Government retreated from AER and CPMR, the Assembly hesitated to continue Welsh membership.<sup>140</sup> The Assembly took over the local government seat in CoR.<sup>141</sup> Wales got involved in the discussions of the regions with legislative powers in Europe to get more influence<sup>142</sup>, but Wales is no member of the constitutional regions. Welsh ministers have assisted Council of Ministers sessions on very few occasions.<sup>143</sup> But on the other hand, the National Assembly became a member of the WEC. Staff of WEC grew from 4 to 11 (but is mostly seconded from sponsoring organizations). And most important: the Assembly set up an own representation office in Brussels, using the WEC building, but in separate rooms. This Office consists of only 2 persons; the director, Des Clifford, is a full diplomatic member of UKREP.

It can be said that the Assembly began its activities hesitantly, with a preference for the official channels of CoR, the MEPs and some (but few) partnerships, giving preference to the issue of the objective 1 status and European structural funds.

Plaid Cymru's reaction as an opposition party was cautious as well. In a new party document published in December 2000, the party presumed to go "towards full national status." Two scenarios appeared: A democratic federal Europe of the Regions with a greatly empowered European Parliament and a written constitution where Wales could find a role; failing that (preferred) alternative, the party would seek full national status for Wales as a member-state within a confederal European Union. The question whether Plaid Cymru follows the SNP claiming independence in Europe or whether it converts to a Convergència style nationalism cum regionalism movement is open, and these may not be the only alternatives in town.

The Welsh see Europe primarily as a source of funds<sup>144</sup>, but deep cultural roots were retained - at least deeper roots than some of the players in a Europe with the Regions can show.<sup>145</sup> "Europe" may help to strengthen the national consciousness, specially if the main pressure groups organize and act on the Welsh

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European Union funding for Wales. Summary Report, Institute of Welsh Affairs, November 1999.

<sup>139</sup> See Thompson, Andrew: Wales in Europe, in: Dunkerley, David/Thompson, Andrew (ed.): Wales today, Cardiff 1999: 313.

<sup>140</sup> See Lewis, Bethan: Relations with the European Union, in: Osmond, John (ed.): Devolution looks ahead. Monitoring the National Assembly May to August 2000, Institute of Welsh Affairs, Cardiff September 2000: 39.

<sup>141</sup> See Thomas, Stephen: The Assembly's international role, in: Osmond, John (ed.): The National Assembly agenda. A handbook for the first four years, Institute for Welsh Affairs, Cardiff November 1998: 376.

<sup>142</sup> See Osmond, John/Lang, Mark: Relations with the European Union, in: Osmond, John (ed.): Coalition creaks over health. Monitoring the National Assembly. May to August 2001 [sic: August to December], Institute of Welsh Affairs, Cardiff 2001: 50.

<sup>143</sup> See Gray, John: Welsh Europeans in Whitehall and Brussels, Agenda. The Journal of the Institute of Welsh Affairs Winter 2000/01: 38.

<sup>144</sup> See Loughlin, John/Mathias, Jörg: Wales in Europe: Welsh regional actors and European integration, Papers in Planning Research 164, Cardiff 1997: 25. For elite views (political and economical), see also Smith, Charles: Elite views of Wales and Europe, Agenda. The Journal of the Institute of Welsh Affairs Winter 2000, p. 23-24; and Lange, Niels: Zwischen Regionalismus und Europäischer Integration. Wirtschaftsinteressen in regionalistischen Konflikten, Baden-Baden 1998.

<sup>145</sup> See Harvie 1995: 6.

level. National conscience can be a cohesion factor favorable for interregional competition for European money and inward investment. But an identity marker like the Welsh language which encounters strong opposition at home might well prove counterproductive for these purposes. European integration may help to "nationalize" up to a degree, but not all symbols and kinds of national identity may profit. In this respect, one may agree with Keating's verdict that "soft ties" are favorable for modernizing a region, whereas "strong ties" are an impediment.<sup>146</sup> European Integration tends to give its support to "soft" ties.

### **5. Asserting the National in an integrating Europe.**

Much has been said on the demise of nation-states as a result of globalization: "Nation" and "state" may now separate. Sovereignty over territory, the main element of the definition of the modern nation-state, seems over.<sup>147</sup> For some, the European integration is part of this process. For others, it is partly a reaction of the states to this process: states give up what cannot be held any longer, but what they lose in autonomy, they gain in co-decision over a wider territory.

Globalization weakens the capacity of the nation-state to control cultural manifestations. From the standpoint of cultures and languages which have suffered from this control, that may be seen as good news, but it may very well be that control will be taken over by the market where those cultures stand no chance either.

In this paper, I adopted the following line of argument. The European Union is no longer a purely intergovernmental body and interpretations in terms of multi-level governance have much in favor. European networks bring together players of unequal status, but the state has kept the role of central player to a degree that many enthusiasts of the policy network approach have not expected. Some nationalists may have believed that the demise of the state would be more complete than it has really been the case till now. Regions have had to accept a complementary position, if they wanted to benefit from the access points the EU offers to them. The political system of the European Union, I argue, still reserves privileged positions for the States, even if they are no longer the only players on the cast list. At the same time, the considerable heterogeneity of the regional actors is one of the main reasons for the failure of collective regional action. Regions governed by nationalists have to collaborate with others who are not and will never be. The European Union supports this kind of functional cooperation. But this does not mean national recognition.

Strong regions can of course act individually. Their chances to reach their policy goals are greater if they can ally themselves with the State they belong to. As a consequence, far-reaching nationalist demands will be moderated and extreme positions penalized in such a framework. Of course, nationalists could go for "independence in Europe", or adopt an outright anti-European stance. So far, very few important nationalist parties in stateless nations have succumbed to the last temptation, which would bring them into conflict with defenders of the state and "pro-Europeans" alike. More often than not, stateless nationalists have presented themselves as better Europeans. Independence in Europe may be attractive, but remains to be seen whether the discourse can be maintained over time, without the good being delivered.

Gary Marks has argued that<sup>148</sup> "The possibility of regional empowerment in Europe has influenced culturally distinctive regional movements away from the demand for full national independence toward the demand for greater autonomy in the context of the EU. (...) In reducing the stateness of the European polity, the development of the EU has diverted ethnic groups away from a focus on forging a separate state as their ultimate goal." But access for administrative regions may be not enough.

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<sup>146</sup> See Keating 1996. See for the Welsh case Jones, Ieuan Wyn: Europe - the challenge for Wales, Ynys Môn 1996; Keating, Michael: The nations and regions of the United Kingdom and European integration, in: Bullmann, Udo (ed.): Die Politik der dritten Ebene, Baden-Baden 1994, p. 225-246; Rhodes, Rodney A. W.: The europeanisation of sub-central government - the case of the UK, Staatswissenschaften und Staatspraxis 3, 1992, 2, p. 272-286; Loughlin, John et al: Regionale Mobilisierung in Wales und Katalonien: Eine vergleichende Analyse, in: Kohler-Koch, Beate et al.: Interaktive Politik in Europa. Regionen im Netzwerk der Integration, Opladen 1998, S. 182-228.

<sup>147</sup> See Keating 1996, 2001; MacCrone, David: The sociology of nationalism, London 1998, last chapter; Guibernau, Montserrat: Nacions sense Estat. Nacionalisme i diversitat en l'era global, Barcelona 1999.

<sup>148</sup> Marks et al. 1996, p. 110.



However, the ways to react differ as nationalist political actors differ, too. Catalans and Basques, Welsh and Scottish, Occitanians, Bretons, Corsicans, Flemish, Frisians and others vary in their capacity to mobilize and organize their people, in movement or party structure, and in electoral success. Besides, their claims for the recognition of difference and of autonomy (of very different shape) are not always accepted by the general public, and their institutional power and influence in their respective states differ. Depending on those variables, European integration has different effects on these nations, their identities, and their respective nationalist movements. Their success in Europe depends primarily on the ability to mobilize at home, because only a strong base at home influences state governments and administrations. European activities, although they should not be underestimated, matter far less. The presence in the European arena is sometimes only a by-product of political battles at home. That is not to say that the European integration process is unimportant for them. But on the other hand, the European Union, nowadays, is of more than symbolic importance because some administrative power -and also money- is involved. Regional administration, where it exists, may capitalise on this, maybe to the detriment of nationalism.

Keating<sup>149</sup> and others have argued about the role of the EU as external support system for stateless nationalisms. This external support is selective. "Independence in Europe" for example is more plausible if economical and social costs for independence seem to be lower. But politically, the system only supports regions, and independence is not even considered. The possibilities of sandwiches and pincers have been highly overestimated, by national movements and (some) political observers. In the cultural dimension, the pluralistic European Union may be seen as an external support system as well, but until now, it gave preference to market integration and not to the protection of cultural diversity, leaving this policy field to the economy and the nation-state. If regional actors have now access to some European institutions, that does not mean that European integration will save or promote a high degree of the cultural identity of stateless nations. Non-state nationalisms, even those based on culture, are not "over". They adapt their policies. Some kinds of cultural identity markers may be "soft" enough to promote regional competitiveness, while "hard" ties may be penalized. "Neo-nationalism"<sup>150</sup> or "new regionalism" now aims at recognition, not necessarily at the fully fledged sovereign nation-state.

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<sup>149</sup> Keating 2001.

<sup>150</sup> MacCrone defines neo-nationalism by a couple of criteria. Those nationalisms fight for political autonomy, are more civic than ethnic, are based on multiple identities, occur in rich regions, are politically progressive but profess mixed ideologies, are supported by a changing social constituency which is not vinculated to the party forever; their origin in recent, their aims are ambiguous. They operate in a variable geometry of power, were supra-state institutions like the EU play an important role. See McCrone 1998: 128-129.