THE NEW PEACEKEEPERS AND
THE NEW PEACEKEEPING

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WORKING PAPERS

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ABSTRACT

Since the end of the Cold War there has been a vast expansion in the number of multilateral peacekeeping operations and in the number and range of countries participating. Those countries which are new to peacekeeping not only have had to cope with the novelty of peacekeeping as traditionally practised but have become involved at the very time that peacekeeping has been undergoing fundamental changes in scope, complexity and character.

This working paper analyses the challenges that have confronted these ‘new peacekeepers’ in participating in the ‘new peacekeeping’. After identifying which countries are involved, the paper analyses their varying national motivations for participating and the evolving characteristics of post-Cold War peacekeeping. Detailed consideration is then given to the various challenges faced, ranging from practical ones such as pre-deployment training and briefing to conceptual developments in traditional peacekeeping norms relating to consensualism, impartiality and the non-use of force. Finally some of the responses to such challenges are analysed, focusing in particular on reform of UN peacekeeping planning and management.
Introduction

Peacekeeping is a child of the Cold War, born of the United Nations’ frustration at its inability to enforce the peace as envisaged in its Charter and its desire to do more to affect the course of international armed conflict than simply mediating and conciliating from a distance. Neither mentioned by name nor given a specific legal basis in the Charter, peacekeeping evolved pragmatically in response to the limited room for manoeuvre afforded the UN by the East–West conflict. As the Western European Union pointed out in a 1993 report, peacekeeping is ‘in many respects a reversal of the use of military personnel foreseen in the Charter. It has been developed for situations where there is no formal determination of aggression. Its practitioners have no enemies, are not there to win, and can use force only in self-defence. Its effectiveness depends on voluntary cooperation’. Awarded the 1988 Nobel Peace Prize and with a long list of successes to its credit, peacekeeping is arguably the UN’s finest invention.

As a product of its time, however, peacekeeping was bound to change once the Cold War ended. Like a hostage released after several years of confinement, peacekeeping has since 1989 cast off its Cold War shackles and vastly extended both the range and pace of its activities. No longer confined to quietly monitoring borders, as in Kashmir since 1949, or conducting somewhat more delicate conflict management tasks, as in Lebanon since 1978, UN peacekeepers are now engaged in complex nation-building exercises that have stretched the limits of both the theory and practice of peacekeeping.

The end of the Cold War has also introduced scores of new players into the peacekeeping enterprise. For many of these ‘new peacekeepers’ there are great challenges in participating for the first time: political and constitutional complexities may delay, constrain or rule out their participation in particular circumstances;

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their national mood or characteristics may not tolerate the subtleties, ambiguities and frustrations of peacekeeping; the military or other personnel being offered may not be trained or equipped for peacekeeping roles; governments may not wish to accept UN command and control of their forces; public opinion may not countenance casualties; and, finally, for a variety of reasons, the performance of new peacekeepers on the ground may not shape up. These ‘new peacekeepers’ have had to face difficult challenges not just because they were new to peacekeeping but because peacekeeping itself was undergoing the most dramatic changes in its history, both in quantitative and qualitative terms.

This paper aims first to determine who the ‘new peacekeepers’ are. Second, it analyses the nature of the ‘new peacekeeping’ that has emerged since 1989. Third, it examines the challenges that the new peacekeeping poses to the new peacekeepers and how this has affected their participation and performance. Third, it considers what attempts have been made to reform the management of peacekeeping in order that it might better meet such challenges. In conclusion, the paper considers the importance of national contributions to the future of peacekeeping.

The new peacekeepers

UN peacekeeping traditionally relied on a handful of states to provide the bulk of the personnel required. These were mostly medium-sized developed states, principally Austria, Australia, Canada, Denmark, Ireland, Finland, Norway, New Zealand and Sweden and larger developing states like India and Pakistan. A handful of smaller developing states, particularly Ghana, Nepal, Senegal and Fiji, was also prominent. However, beginning with the deployment of the UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia between April 1989 and March 1990, a period during which the Cold War is widely considered to have ended,4 there has been an enormous increase in the number of states willing to become involved in UN peacekeeping. In 1988, before UNTAG, only 26 countries were involved.5 By November 1994 there were 76.6

4 The Berlin Wall was breached on 9 November 1989 and by the end of the year Albania was the only remaining communist state in Eastern Europe. The Warsaw Pact formally dissolved itself in March 1991. After a failed coup attempt in August 1991, President Gorbachev abolished the Communist Party. The Soviet Union itself did not formally cease to exist until the Minsk Agreement of December 1991, although by then most of the Soviet republics had declared independence.


Reasons for increasing participation

The principle reason for the increasing involvement is the increased need. With the end of the Cold War more of the world’s armed conflicts became ripe for negotiated settlements as client states lost their superpower mentors and the Security Council achieved a new unity in actively seeking such settlements. The end of the Cold War also unleashed new conflicts as the old order collapsed in the Balkans and within several of the former Soviet republics. The conflict resolution tool of choice in almost all cases has been peacekeeping or some variant thereof: more peacekeeping operations have been established since 1989 than in the previous 45 years of the UN’s history.

Table 1. UN peace and security activities, 1988–94

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>As at 31 Jan 1988</th>
<th>As at 31 Jan 1992</th>
<th>As at 16 Dec 1994</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Security Council resolutions adopted in the preceding 12 months</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disputes and conflicts in which the United Nations was actively involved in preventive diplomacy or peacemaking in the preceding 12 months</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peacekeeping operations deployed:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Classical</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multifunctional</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military personnel deployed</td>
<td>9 570</td>
<td>11 495</td>
<td>73 393</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian police deployed</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>2 130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International civilian personnel deployed</td>
<td>1 516</td>
<td>2 206</td>
<td>2 260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Countries contributing military and police personnel</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations budget for peacekeeping operations (annual, in US $m.)</td>
<td>230.4</td>
<td>1 689.6</td>
<td>3 610.0a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Countries in which the United Nations had undertaken electoral activities in the preceding 12 months</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanctions regimes imposed by the Security Council</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*a* Projected.

Source: Supplement to An Agenda for Peace.
As a result, more UN peacekeeping personnel have been deployed abroad than at any time in its history. While in 1988 the UN had only 9950 troops deployed in just five missions,\(^7\) by its peak year of 1993 it had nearly 80 000 deployed in eighteen operations.\(^8\) Numbers of civilian police and international civilian personnel deployed have also risen sharply. The number of non-UN peacekeeping missions has also increased, from one, the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in the Sinai, to several today.

The Security Council’s willingness to dispatch peacekeeping forces more frequently has created an enormous demand and caused the UN Secretariat, which organises such missions, to cast its net wider than ever before in its search for contributors. Some states have readily volunteered, while others have had to be cajoled and pressured. For instance, many of the Caribbean states (and Israel) which participated in the Multinational Force (MNF) in Haiti and thereafter in the UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH), were pressured to participate by the USA in order to lend multilateralism to a US-dominated mission. Apart from outside pressure, the motives of states in deciding to participate in peacekeeping are invariably mixed.

**National motivations for participating in peacekeeping**

Altruism is one motivating factor, particularly in humanitarian crises, as in Somalia, when public opinion strongly pressed governments, including those of the United States of America and the United Kingdom, to act. Some small and medium powers like Norway, Sweden and Canada regard participation in peacekeeping as the quintessence of good international citizenship. However, such altruism is rarely a sufficient motivating force in international relations and peacekeeping is no exception.

Prestige is a powerful motivator. Having become the most heavily publicised of the UN’s activities since the end of the Cold War, peacekeeping has acquired a certain cachet. Participation is seen as a matter of national prestige and independence and a demonstration of impeccable internationalist credentials. Although much is made of so-called peacekeeping fatigue, so keen have states been to participate, especially in the ‘safer’ missions, that a number of peacekeeping operations have actually been ‘over-subscribed’. More states were willing to volunteer troops for Angola and Haiti, for instance, than could be accommodated.\(^9\)

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As the Egyptian Defence Minister has noted, ‘Choosing Egypt to participate in these forces reflects the confidence and credibility that Egypt receives both regionally and internationally’. Such factors appear especially important to the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union and former Warsaw Pact members whose foreign policies were essentially subordinated to that of the Soviet state for 40 years. For other states, such as those which expect to be favoured candidates for permanent membership of the Security Council (if and when it is expanded), participation in peacekeeping has become a *sine qua non* of the seriousness of their candidacies. All of the most widely touted candidates—Brazil, Germany, India, Indonesia, Japan, Nigeria and Pakistan—are now important contributors to peacekeeping.

Others hope their participation will give them an influence on the course of international events generally and more specifically in the areas of conflict in which peacekeeping operations are deployed. New Zealand’s contribution to the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) during its term as a non-permanent member of the Security Council was at least partly inspired by a desire to enhance its credibility and influence in Council debates on the situation in the former Yugoslavia.

Some states, like Spain, see peacekeeping as contributing, in some largely undefined way, to their national security. The members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), all of which participated in the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), saw that peacekeeping operation as being decidedly in their national security interests. Others are even more certain of peacekeeping’s security benefits, as is Russia in both initiating and dominating operations around its periphery, all of which contribute directly to its national security. In a peculiar innovation in peacekeeping, the states in which these operations have been established also participate in them in partnership with Russian troops and, most extraordinarily, with forces of the self-declared breakaway entities which triggered the conflicts in the first place. This has occurred in Georgia, where a ‘South Ossetia Joint Force’ comprising troops of Georgia, Russia, North Ossetia and South Ossetia is conducting so-called peacekeeping operations. Similar arrangements have been established in Moldova and Tajikistan. The national security interest in the success of the peacekeeping operations in these cases could not be more potent.

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Some states may even view participation in peacekeeping as a down payment for the day when they themselves will need the assistance of the international community. This may be one of the motivations of the three Baltic states, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, all of them new contributors to peacekeeping, who live in the shadow of Russia. The Baltic states also undoubtedly see participation in peacekeeping as demonstrating their ability to contribute to the purposes of the NATO alliance of which they ardently hope for membership. For others, such as Namibia, Israel and Jordan, participation in peacekeeping is a way of repaying a debt for the peacekeeping operations of which they have been past beneficiaries.

States in which the military is not entirely under civilian control, such as Argentina, may view peacekeeping as a means both of keeping their armed forces occupied outside the country rather than meddling in domestic affairs, and helping to rehabilitate them after an authoritarian era in which their integrity and professionalism was compromised. As Argentina's Defence Minister Oscar Camilion has diplomatically expressed it, Argentina's participation in peacekeeping 'not only gives members of the armed forces a deep feeling of professional pride, but also an international outlook which is very much helping to consolidate the military as a pillar of the constitutional system'.

A less edifying motivation, on the part of some developing states, may be a desire to make a profit on the financial reimbursements made by the UN for the costs of their troop contributions (above those they would have incurred if their forces had remained at home). While some poorer states can indeed make a tidy profit on such transactions, the UN is usually so laggardly in paying and the amount so relatively niggardly that it cannot be a sole motivating factor.

Some countries' armed forces may also benefit by receiving equipment from better-equipped force contributors, as happened in the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II). In Bosnia, Germany is supplying protective vehicles to the Pakistani contingent, while the Jordanians are receiving US assistance. Other defence forces may see peacekeeping as their budgetary salvation in an era when defence budgets for traditional military contingencies are being cut.

Perhaps most important to all contributing militaries, whether from rich or poor countries, is the invaluable overseas experience that peacekeeping operations provide them in peacetime and the training and contacts with other military forces that may ensue. Indian Major-General Dipankar Banerjee has characterised the professional benefits to India's armed forces as:

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• providing exposure to other armies of the world to enable a comparison of strengths and weaknesses
• allowing a degree of familiarisation with advanced weapons and equipment
• facilitating training in handling sophisticated communication systems and other equipment, and
• occasionally, the availability of surplus equipment.\(^\text{14}\)

In his view frequent participation in peacekeeping has had a major impact on the capabilities of the Royal Nepalese Army and the Bangladesh Army.

Some military establishments may not, however, favour involvement in peacekeeping, either in general or in relation to particular missions. Many will take the view of the Australian military, which is that peacekeeping is a useful exercise, affording operational and training benefits, but that if over-emphasised it risks detracting from the nation's own defence needs.\(^\text{15}\) The Australian Defence Department thus opposes restructuring the Australian Defence Forces for peacekeeping, particularly by designating a brigade as a standby force or repository for accumulating peacekeeping experience. Australia only agreed to participate in the UN Standby Force Arrangement after pressure from UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali during a visit to Canberra in 1995. Even the most willing participants in peacekeeping will eventually reach their limits, as Canada and the UK are currently discovering.

In some cases it will not be the military (or only the military) that seeks a national role in peacekeeping but the foreign ministry, perhaps prodded by its mission to the UN in New York, in turn perhaps pressured by a UN Secretary-General and Secretariat desperately seeking contributors for new or expanded missions. The Secretary-General's attempts since 1993 to ensure the credibility of the UN Standby Force Arrangement by sending a military delegation to as many member states as possible to plead for and organise pledges of contributions, may also have increased the number of actual participants in peacekeeping. As was seen in 1994 in the case of Rwanda, however, when none of the states which had pledged contributions to the Arrangement would actually permit them to be deployed to that benighted country, advance commitments made on paper will not always be translated into an actual contribution.\(^\text{16}\)

\(^\text{15}\) See G. Cheeseman, ‘Defence and the UN: the two-edged sword’, Unity (Canberra: UN Association of Australia, June 1995), p. 8
**Who are the new peacekeepers?**

Since 1989 43 states have contributed to UN peacekeeping operations for the first time (see table 2). Hence more than half of the current UN peacekeepers are ‘new’. An additional twenty states, which have never been involved in UN missions have contributed for the first time to non-UN peacekeeping missions (see table 3).
Table 2. First-time participants in UN peacekeeping and observer missions since 1989

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>First mission</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>UNOMIG</td>
<td>1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>UNAMIC</td>
<td>1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbados</td>
<td>UNTAG</td>
<td>1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>ONUMOZ</td>
<td>1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brunei Darussalam</td>
<td>UNTAC</td>
<td>1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>UNTAC</td>
<td>1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>UNTAC</td>
<td>1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Verde</td>
<td>ONUMOZ</td>
<td>1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>UNAMIR</td>
<td>1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>UNTAG</td>
<td>1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>UNAVEM I</td>
<td>1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>UNTAG</td>
<td>1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>UNOMIG</td>
<td>1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Czechoslovakia]</td>
<td>UNAVEM I</td>
<td>1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>UNPROFOR</td>
<td>1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>UNMIH</td>
<td>1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>UNTAG</td>
<td>1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>MINURSO</td>
<td>1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>UNPROFOR</td>
<td>1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>UNAMIC</td>
<td>1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[FRG]</td>
<td>UNTAG</td>
<td>1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[GDR]</td>
<td>UNTAG</td>
<td>1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>UNTAG</td>
<td>1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>UNMIH</td>
<td>1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea Bissau</td>
<td>UNAVEM II</td>
<td>1991</td>
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<td>Guyana</td>
<td>UNTAG</td>
<td>1989</td>
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<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>MINURSO</td>
<td>1991</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
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<td>1989</td>
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<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>UNTAC</td>
<td>1992</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>UNAVEM I</td>
<td>1989</td>
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<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>UNOSOM II</td>
<td>1993</td>
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<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>UNPROFOR</td>
<td>1994</td>
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<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>UNPROFOR</td>
<td>1992</td>
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<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>UNAMIR</td>
<td>1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>UNAMIR</td>
<td>1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>UNTAC</td>
<td>1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>UNAMIR</td>
<td>1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Korea</td>
<td>UNOSOM II</td>
<td>1993</td>
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<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>UNIKOM</td>
<td>1991</td>
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<tr>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>UNIKOM</td>
<td>1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>UNOSOM II</td>
<td>1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>UNTAG</td>
<td>1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>UNPROFOR</td>
<td>1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>UNAVEM I</td>
<td>1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>UNTAG</td>
<td>1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>UNTAG</td>
<td>1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinidad and Tobago</td>
<td>UNTAG</td>
<td>1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>UNOSOM II</td>
<td>1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>UNPROFOR</td>
<td>1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
<td>UNOSOM I</td>
<td>1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>UNIKOM</td>
<td>1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>UNAVEM II</td>
<td>1991</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Notes: 1 Only missions officially listed by the UN as peacekeeping missions are taken into account.
2 On 31 December 1992 Czechoslovakia split into the Czech Republic and Slovakia.
3 Participated in ONUC 196061 as the United Arab Republic.
4 The Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic merged into one state in 1990.
5 Participated in ONUC in 1960 as a part of the Federation of Mali (now Mali and Senegal). Senegal participated for the first time as an independent state in UNEF II in 1974.
6 The USA was involved in two missions previously, UNTSO (1948 to date) and UNMOGIP (194954), but is included because of its critical importance to the new peacekeeping.

Table 3. First-time participants in non-UN peacekeeping and observer missions since 1989

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>First mission</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Antigua &amp; Barbuda</td>
<td>MNF</td>
<td>1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>OSCE Skopje</td>
<td>1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahamas</td>
<td>MNF</td>
<td>1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belize</td>
<td>MNF</td>
<td>1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>MNF</td>
<td>1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominica</td>
<td>MNF</td>
<td>1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>South Ossetia</td>
<td>1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenada</td>
<td>MNF</td>
<td>1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>MNF</td>
<td>1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>CIS Tajikistan</td>
<td>1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>CIS Tajikistan</td>
<td>1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>Moldova Joint Force</td>
<td>1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ossetia, North</td>
<td>South Ossetia</td>
<td>1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ossetia, South</td>
<td>South Ossetia</td>
<td>1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Kitts &amp; Nevis</td>
<td>MNF</td>
<td>1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Lucia</td>
<td>MNF</td>
<td>1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Vincent &amp; Grenadines</td>
<td>MNF</td>
<td>1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tonga</td>
<td>SPPKF</td>
<td>1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Trans-Dniester Republic’</td>
<td>Moldova Joint Force</td>
<td>1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>CIS Tajikistan</td>
<td>1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vanuatu</td>
<td>SPPKF</td>
<td>1994</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: 1 Only countries which have never participated in UN missions.
2 OSCE Spillover Mission to Skopje in Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
3 South Ossetia Joint Force in Georgia.
4 CIS ‘Tajikistan Buffer Force’ in Tajikistan (Afghan border).
5 ‘Moldova Joint Force’ in Moldova (Trans-Dniester).
There are some complications in determining exactly who is a ‘new peacekeeper’. To begin with, some states which are listed as ‘new’ had participated previously as different entities. For instance, while Malaysia participated for the first time in 1989 in UNTAG, the newly independent state of Malaya had participated in ONUC (Organisation des Nations Unites au Congo) in 1960, before the Federation of Malaysia was established. Egypt also had contributed to ONUC as one half of the United Arab Republic (UAR), along with Syria, before it became a ‘new peacekeeper’ in UNTAG in Namibia in 1989. Notwithstanding the Soviet Union’s participation in a limited number of peacekeeping missions in the Middle East with a tiny number of observers, its principal successor state, Russia, is a new peacekeeper in both name and experience. Although there may have been Ukrainians among Soviet peacekeepers in the Middle East, the new nation of Ukraine should also be considered a new peacekeeper. For its part Czechoslovakia now contributes as the Czech Republic and Slovakia. The two Germanies, which were informally barred as peacekeepers because of their former enemy status and Cold War connections and which had brief separate experiences as ‘new peacekeepers’ towards the end of the Cold War in UNTAG, now of course act as a united state.

In fact all of the Eastern European states of the former Soviet bloc could be considered ‘new peacekeepers’ given the dramatic changes that have affected their armed forces since 1989, particularly the removal of ideology from military doctrine and training and their increasing links with Western military establishments, especially through NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PFP) program and the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). Among these states only Poland, traditionally a substantial participant in peacekeeping, might be called an ‘old

17 A further complication is whether a contributing state can truly be called a new peacekeeper if, since 1989, it has contributed just a few civilians or military observers to one or two missions. Although some new contributors have leaped in with substantial numbers of military personnel, such as Bulgaria did with an infantry battalion and civilian police in the case of UNTAC and Zimbabwe did in the case of UNOSOM II, others, like Albania, Chile and Togo have not moved beyond a limited number of observers or civilian personnel. Some would consider that a nation has not really ‘chanced its arm’ with peacekeeping until it has contributed a substantial number of ground troops. An inclusive view has been taken here and all the new contributors have been listed, whatever the size or character of their contribution.

What is a peacekeeping mission?

This brings us to a further complication, which is to determine what a peacekeeping mission is. The most common approach is to include only UN missions that acquire an acronym. However, this leaves out some missions since not all UN observer missions acquire UN acronyms and the designation ‘peacekeeping operation’. Some that do acquire an acronym are less substantial than some that do not. Missions with acronyms run the gamut from observation operations to full-scale comprehensive peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations. The designation of a UN mission with an acronym is therefore somewhat arbitrary. To further confuse matters, in one instance, the 1990 UN Mission to Verify the Election in Haiti (ONUVEH), the government involved specifically requested, for political reasons, that the operation not be called a peacekeeping mission.\(^\text{18}\)

Acquiring an acronym usually means that the mission has been authorised by the Security Council and funded separately from the normal UN budget. But there are exceptions even here. UNEF I, the first true peacekeeping force in terms of its size and the breadth of its mandate, was established by the General Assembly, as was UNTEA (the UN Transitional Executive Authority) in Irian Jaya in the early 1960s. The UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) was funded by voluntary contributions, largely from Cyprus and Greece, until a 1993 Security Council resolution determined that those costs of the force which could not be covered by voluntary contributions would be charged to all UN members under the normal mandatory contribution system.\(^\text{19}\)

The approach taken here, to avoid arbitrary judgements, is to restrict the chart to those missions considered by the UN to be peacekeeping missions, whatever their size or character. Also included are non-UN missions established since 1989, such as ECOMOG\(^\text{20}\) in Liberia, the UN Interim Task Force in Somalia (UNITAF), the MNF in Haiti and the South Pacific peacekeeping force dispatched to Bougainville in 1994. Missions established by Russia, either in cooperation with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) or trilaterally with other former Soviet republics, have also been included, despite the fact that their character as peacekeeping missions is doubtful because of their different operating procedures, especially their willingness to use force, the predominance of Russian forces in such


\(^{20}\) The ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group. ECOWAS stands for the Economic Community of West African States.
operations and the extent of Russian involvement in the conflicts themselves. They are of interest here primarily because of the inclusion of several new post-Soviet republics in such quasi-peacekeeping missions for the first time and their exposure to at least some of the norms and procedures of traditional peacekeeping.

**Categories of new peacekeepers**

Several categories of new peacekeepers are discernible. A first category, perhaps surprisingly, comprises three of the five permanent members of the Security Council—China, Russia and the USA. These states had largely foregone involvement in the past because of the danger that their Cold War rivalries would be injected into the very conflicts that peacekeeping was designed to insulate them from. Hence, none of the permanent five had extensive experience with UN peacekeeping before the end of the Cold War in the way that, for example, the Scandinavian countries had.

The other two members of the Security Council, France and the United Kingdom, were significant partial exceptions. France’s main involvement was with the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), while the United Kingdom’s was with UNFICYP in Cyprus. Both Britain and France also had extensive experience in non-UN missions and gained experience relevant to peacekeeping in numerous situations during the decline of their respective colonial empires. Britain’s experience in Malaya, Zimbabwe and Northern Ireland foreshadowed much of the character of today’s complex multipurpose UN missions, such as in Cambodia and Mozambique. France’s role in Francophone Africa since decolonisation has been intermittently that of peacekeeper between warring factions competing to control its former colonies. Partly because of the size, capability and experience of their forces, Britain and France have been among the most prominent contributors to peacekeeping since the end of the Cold War. By the end of 1994 France and Britain were providing, for instance, the largest components of UNPROFOR in the former Yugoslavia (4545 and 3424 respectively) and in 1995 began boosting their presence there with the deployment of a Rapid Reaction Force which, along with contributions by Belgium and the Netherlands, was scheduled to total an additional 15,000 troops.

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21 Russian political parlance does not differentiate between peacekeeping, peace making and peace enforcement. The term used in Russia—mirotvorchestvo—means, if directly translated, ‘peace creation’; this could cover a very broad range of activities, from political mediation to combat operations aimed at ‘imposing peace’.


Before the early 1990s the high point of US experience with UN peacekeeping was its participation in the UN Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO) in the Middle East, where it contributed aircraft, military observers, pilots, radio operators and mediators. US experience with other UN operations was restricted to providing airlift and technical support, as well as, and not insignificantly, 31 per cent of the funding for most missions. US experience with non-UN peacekeeping, however, included the highly successful and in some respects unprecedented mission in the Sinai, the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO). Since the end of the Cold War the USA has participated in additional major non-UN (but UN-authorised) missions—the successful UN Interim Task Force in Somalia (UNITAF) (deployed from December 1992 to May 1993 between the ill-fated UNOSOM I and II) and the MNF in Haiti in 1994. By 1995 the US was participating in a range of UN peacekeeping operations, including UNTSO, UNIKOM, MINURSO, UNPROFOR (in Croatia and Macedonia), UNMIH in Haiti and UNOMIG in Georgia. Even so it currently ranks only 26th among troop contributors. The US preference continues to be to provide support services rather than ground troops. Moreover, all forms of US support for peacekeeping are currently in doubt because of the Republican-dominated Congress’ scepticism about all UN activities and a reluctance to fund them at the same level as previously. In any event US financial support for peacekeeping operations will drop to 25 per cent by the end of 1995.

As for the two remaining permanent members of the Security Council, the Soviet Union had only a token involvement in the Middle East, while China completely abjured a peacekeeping role during the Cold War. Both are considered incontestably to be ‘new peacekeepers’. Despite its somewhat more significant role in Cold War peacekeeping (although not notably with ground troops), the USA is also considered a new peacekeeper for the purposes of this paper because of its overall importance to the success of the ‘new peacekeeping’.

A second group of new peacekeepers includes countries that were previously unacceptable because of their association with one or other of the Cold War blocs or because of other political sensitivities: these include Bulgaria, Cuba, Israel, Romania, South Korea and Spain. By the end of 1994 Spain, for instance, had become a leading contributor to the new peacekeeping, especially in UNPROFOR where it had 1286 troops.


25 ibid.

A third group comprises the defeated World War II allies, the so-called ‘enemy states’ referred to in the UN Charter.\textsuperscript{27} Germany and Japan, moving finally to assume all the rights and responsibilities of international citizenship, have begun, by incremental steps, to participate in peacekeeping. Unlike these former Axis powers, Italy has participated in peacekeeping operations for some time, mostly by providing observers or air transport.\textsuperscript{28}

A fourth category of new peacekeepers includes newly independent states such as Antigua and Barbuda, Estonia, Kyrgyzstan, Lithuania, Namibia, Trinidad and Tobago, Ukraine, Zimbabwe and Vanuatu, which never had the opportunity to participate before.

A final group includes a wide variety of states which are participating for the first time simply because the current need for peacekeeping forces is so great and they have volunteered or been pressured into contributing. These include Brunei, Cape Verde, Costa Rica, Guyana, Luxembourg, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Switzerland and Uganda. While these contributors may seem inconsequential compared to participation by larger states, they broaden the support base for UN peacekeeping and the range of experience and capabilities available for future missions. It is especially gratifying to see contributions from countries that have themselves been the beneficiaries of past peacekeeping missions: these include Egypt, El Salvador, Greece, Indonesia, Israel, Jordan, Namibia, South Korea and Zimbabwe.

International organisations besides the United Nations are also becoming involved as ‘new peacekeepers’, as sponsors and organisers of peacekeeping missions, or at the very least as developers of peacekeeping doctrine for missions to be employed in the future: these include the European Union (EU), the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), NATO, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

\textsuperscript{27} Charter of the United Nations, Art. 53.2.

The new peacekeeping

In its broadest sense peacekeeping is the deployment of UN or other multilateral personnel in the field as a tool of conflict prevention, management or resolution. Attempts at defining peacekeeping more specifically have always been bedevilled by the peculiar nature of the beast. Peacekeeping is not mentioned in the UN Charter, it has never been guided by established theory or doctrine, the term was invented long after praxis had begun and improvisation has characterised its evolution ever since.

Traditional peacekeeping

The traditional UN definition of a peacekeeping operation was one ‘involving military personnel, but without enforcement powers, undertaken by the United Nations to help maintain or restore international peace and security in areas of conflict’. Yet despite the somewhat heady language of the latter part of this definition the early generation of peacekeeping operations were mostly little more than ad hoc holding operations designed to freeze in place erstwhile combatants and their lines of control until a peaceful solution to a conflict presented itself. The three traditional key characteristics of such missions were:

- consent of all the parties to the presence and activities of the mission;
- impartiality of the peacekeepers in their relationship with the parties;
- minimum use of force, only as a last resort and only in self-defence or to defend the carrying out of the mission.

Such missions have mostly been established explicitly or implicitly under Chapter VI of the UN Charter relating to the pacific settlement of disputes.

These characteristics exclude two types of UN mission authorisable by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter relating to peace enforcement (or in the Charter’s words ‘action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression’) which are clearly not peacekeeping and which will be excluded from this study:

- pure UN peace enforcement missions under UN command, as in Korea in the early 1950s;
- operations by a non-UN multilateral force or a single state authorised to act by the Security Council, as in the case of Operation Desert Storm against Iraq in 1991.

Peacekeeping after the Cold War

After 1989 there evolved quite rapidly, although haphazardly and piecemeal, what has been widely recognised as a new form of peacekeeping, variously called ‘second generation’, ‘muscular’, ‘extended’, ‘wider’, ‘advanced’, ‘broader’, ‘protected’, ‘aggravated’ or ‘enforced’. This new peacekeeping was characterised by a comprehensive, even holistic, and proactive approach to seeking peaceful settlements and an increasing willingness by the UN to breach rigid interpretations of the right of states to non-interference in their internal affairs. The holding operation of yesteryear was superseded by the multifunctional operation linked to and integrated with an entire peace process. Where peacekeepers once studiously avoided tackling the root causes of armed conflict in favour of containment and de-escalation, they were now mandated to seek just and lasting solutions.

In some cases the new peacekeeping was accompanied by a greater propensity to use force. In almost all cases it was conducted in situations of internal, intrastate conflict, commonly known as civil wars, rather than in situations of interstate conflict. Many of these were characterised by the erosion or even the absence of consent of the parties to the presence and activities of UN forces. In some cases, notably the former Yugoslavia and Somalia, there was no peace to keep at the time of the peacekeepers’ deployment.

New conceptual underpinnings

In 1992 UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali attempted to codify, at the request of the Security Council, what had occurred to date and to provide a comprehensive intellectual framework for future developments in the peace and security field. In his *An Agenda for Peace*, and subsequent refinements, the Secretary-General established two important conceptual underpinnings for the new peacekeeping.

The first was that peacekeeping should no longer be thought of as a singular activity conducted in isolation from the surrounding political and diplomatic terrain but should be integrated with the range of hitherto separate UN peace-related activities. In Boutros-Ghali’s terms peacekeeping had to be seen as part of a continuum involving preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, (post-conflict) peace building and, if necessary, peace enforcement.


31 Preventive diplomacy was defined as ‘action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur’. Peacemaking was defined as ‘action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations’. Peace-building was
Experience in several large-scale missions began to indicate, however, that distinctions that seemed clear and obvious in theory, such as that between peacemaking and peacekeeping, may dissolve in the field, where the sole criterion must be whether the particular combination of techniques works. The Secretary-General and others became increasingly aware that peacekeeping was not so much a point on a continuum as a multi-purpose, expansive tool that could be used in conjunction with or even incorporate elements of preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace building (the link between peacekeeping and peace enforcement was discovered to be more problematic, as discussed below). These various activities might intertwine and be performed simultaneously or at varying points in a peace process. Peacekeeping, it was finally recognised, might help prevent, make or build peace as well as keep it.

Boutros-Ghali’s second conceptual signpost concerned the erosion of the shibboleth of non-interference in the internal affairs of states and the relationship between peacekeeping and peace enforcement. While acknowledging that respect for the fundamental sovereignty and integrity of the state was ‘crucial to any common international progress’, he declared that ‘the time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty...has passed; its theory was never matched by its reality’. As a consequence he posited a new definition of peacekeeping as:

...the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto [emphasis added] with the consent of all parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well.

Thus, not only did Boutros-Ghali presage a more proactive, comprehensive and integrated approach to peacekeeping, in which the ultimate goal would be a peace settlement rather than a monitored cessation of hostilities, but such operations apparently might now function, if necessary, without the full consent of all the parties involved. Hence they might operate under Chapter VII authorisation rather than Chapter VI if only to ensure that the peacekeepers could use ‘all necessary means’ to protect themselves. ‘Operation Provide Comfort’ in northern Iraq, initiated in 1991 to protect and provide humanitarian assistance to the Kurds without the consent of the Iraqi authorities, was an important precedent in this respect. The UN presence in Somalia, beginning with UNOSOM I in 1992, was consented to by no Somali government, since there was none, although some of the fighting factions did give at least tacit approval. As Steven Ratner notes, ‘in

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32 Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace*, para. 17.
33 Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace*, para. 20.
anarchical states, the UN could abandon any pretence of consent and establish a presence in the country through enforcement action under Chapter VII of the Charter... Over time the operation could then negotiate with the antagonists on a settlement that would permit the operation to transform itself into one based on consent.\textsuperscript{34} UNPROFOR also deployed forces in Bosnia without the explicit consent of the parties to their composition or command and acquired a Chapter VII mandate initially to protect the peacekeepers. It subsequently used its Chapter VII mandate to attempt to enforce certain Security Council decisions.\textsuperscript{35} The UN missions in Angola, Liberia, Cambodia and along the Iraq–Kuwait border also lacked complete consent either from particular parties or at particular times.

Since the end of the Cold War the Security Council has been willing to override a strict interpretation of the consent rule because of the political or strategic importance of the particular conflict or the scale of the threat it poses to international security, a calculation that the conflict is ripe for settlement despite the absence of appropriate levels of consent and the need to be seen to be acting in a crisis. In May 1993, in response to \textit{An Agenda for Peace}, the Security Council promulgated its own criteria for establishing peacekeeping operations (combined with some guidelines for its own behaviour), among which were:\textsuperscript{36}

\begin{itemize}
  \item the need for the consent of the government and, where appropriate, the parties concerned, save in exceptional circumstances;
  \item the readiness of the Council to take appropriate measures against parties which do not observe its decisions;
  \item the right of the Council to authorise all means necessary for UN forces to carry out their mandate;
  \item the inherent right of peacekeepers to use force in self-defence.
\end{itemize}

This combination of principles suggested that the question of consent was more complex than Boutros-Ghali’s definition of peacekeeping intimated, since it took into account situations in which a peacekeeping mission not only lacked consent to its presence but during whose operations the Security Council might wish to punish one or more of the parties to the conflict, thereby making the retention or rebuilding of consent even more problematic.

Following the debacle in Somalia between June and October 1993, in which the attempt to add a peace enforcement function to a peacekeeping mission resulted in the deaths of scores of peacekeepers and many more Somalis, Boutros-Ghali quickly

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{34} Ratner, \textit{The New UN Peacekeeping}, p. 29.
\item \textsuperscript{36} Note by the President of the Security Council, S/25859, 28 May 1993, p. 1.
\end{itemize}
restored the qualification ‘with the consent of the parties’ to his definition of peacekeeping. Peacekeeping and the use of force (other than in self-defence), he declared, ‘should be seen as alternative techniques and not as adjacent points on a continuum, permitting easy transition from one to another’. However the Security Council did not adjust its list of principles, all of which have been played out in Bosnia-Herzegovina: the consent of the Bosnian government and the other parties concerned was meticulously obtained for more than three years; peacekeepers had throughout their deployment exercised, whenever practical, their inherent right of self-defence; the Security Council authorised all means necessary for UN forces to carry out their mandate and finally NATO, with Security Council authorisation, took ‘appropriate measures’ (massive bombing raids in August 1995) against the Bosnian Serbs, the party which had consistently failed to observe Council decisions.

Whether the UN mission in Bosnia has now moved completely and definitively into a peace enforcement model is still being debated at the time of writing. Yet regardless of the outcome of this debate, the UN will continue to find itself involved in missions in which consent is tattered. Even in the best of circumstances consent is unlikely to be perfect. Parties will almost always have reservations about at least some aspects of the UN presence and involvement, especially after initial euphoria over the arrival of blue-helmets has abated. Consent is also hard to measure accurately and may deteriorate rapidly for reasons beyond the peacekeepers’ control, stranding them in a doctrinal no man’s land. The stark choices are then to withdraw, soldier on or convert to peace enforcement. While the transition from consent-based peacekeeping to consent-less peace enforcement is difficult, it is not impossible, as demonstrated by UNPROFOR in July/August 1995. It must, however, be well-planned, deliberate (rather than the result of ‘mission creep’) and be accompanied by the necessary changes in the capability, mandate and commitment of the force involved.

Despite the foregoing enumeration of the new peacekeeping’s characteristics one should not exaggerate its newness. At least three missions before the end of the Cold War presaged the type of missions that would come after it. The first was ONUC in the early 1960s, which became the UN’s first attempt to use troops directly under its command in a peace enforcement role, in this case removing Belgian mercenaries and suppressing a rebellion by the province of Katanga against the central Congolese government. It also undertook a substantial, unprecedented and little known role in administering the Congo in the absence of trained and experienced locals. The second path breaking UN mission was that in Iran Jaya in 1962–63, when a UN Security Force (UNSF) and UNTEA ensured a smooth transition from Dutch to Indonesian rule by taking over temporary administration

37 UN, Supplement to an Agenda for Peace, para. 36.
of the territory, a feat which would not be attempted again until UNTAC in the 1990s. A third defining mission was UNIFIL, which has operated in the midst of both a complex and volatile civil war and a situation of interstate confrontation (between Israel, Lebanon and Syria), while attempting to undertake such tasks as delivery of humanitarian aid and confidence-building. The difference between these early missions and today’s ‘new peacekeeping’ lies more in the number, scale and volume of the operations now being simultaneously fielded and the combination of a multitude of tasks in the one mission, rather than the newness of many of the tasks themselves.

**Challenges for the new peacekeepers**

The consequences of the new peacekeeping for those states participating for the first time are immense. Lacking the experience and training of the old peacekeepers (who themselves are not always adequate to the task of the new peacekeeping) they have been thrown into the peacekeeping enterprise just as its boundaries have been widened, its content vastly expanded and some of its previous norms and assumptions called into question. Unlike the old peacekeepers, whose learning curve began at the point at which the old peacekeeping left off, the new peacekeepers have had to learn all the lessons of peacekeeping immediately. This was most evident in Somalia, where unfamiliarity with, or scepticism about, the traditional approach to peacekeeping, particularly by US personnel, was likely one of the factors which drew UNOSOM II into peace enforcement operations for which it was not prepared. The report of the UN Commission of Enquiry into the debacle in Mogadishu in 1993 recommended, as a consequence, that all future UN missions include experienced peacekeepers.\(^3\)

One of the most significant bones of contention between the old and new peacekeepers in the early days of the new peacekeeping was their differing attitudes to the use of force. While the traditionalists favoured persisting with the ‘Scandinavian model’ of strict adherence to the tried and true principles of peacekeeping, the patient use of persuasion and negotiation and the minimum use of force even in self-defence, some of the new peacekeepers, most notably the USA (along with France on various occasions), advocated greater use of force. Since

Sir Brian Urquhart said of the first peacekeepers, sent to establish UNEF I in 1956, 'We were asking soldiers, against all tradition and training, to take part in non-violent operations in a critical situation—operations, moreover, which were not under the control of their own governments. The new peacekeeping operations touched on the most delicate issues of military psychology, national sovereignty, international politics, and national and international law'. This is even truer of today’s ‘new peacekeeping operations’, which operate in situations of greater complexity and violence and yet still require adherence, as far as is possible, to the traditional peacekeeping ethos. Some of the specific difficulties that the new peacekeepers have encountered will be considered in the following sections.

The decision to participate

For many of the new peacekeepers the decision to participate in the first place can be far from uncomplicated; it may involve the most sensitive and contested of political and constitutional issues. In the German and Japanese cases national debates were triggered about the very nature of their new democracies constructed in the aftermath of World War II. Such debates, despite the decision of Germany and Japan to proceed with involvement in peacekeeping, are far from exhausted. In both cases the evolving circumstances of missions in which they are involved may reopen debate, especially if consent of the parties begins to evaporate, peacekeeping modulates into peace enforcement or the so-called ‘grey area’ between them becomes intolerably murky. Such developments may have profound legal, as well as political, consequences, not only for Germany and Japan whose constitutional problems have received the most publicity, but even for old peacekeepers. The legislation under which Finnish peacekeepers are dispatched, for instance, is ill-adapted to the new peacekeeping, particularly the expanded uses of force, and clearly excludes Finnish involvement in any type of peace enforcement.42

Even if there are no constitutional barriers, the new peacekeeping states may have difficulty rousing sufficient political support for dispatching troops half way around the world to an unknown conflict. In other cases it is public opinion itself that moves governments. While it took strong public sentiment aroused by media coverage of mass starvation before the Bush Administration was moved to send a large US force to Somalia, in the Haiti case it was the US government that strove to convince public opinion of the rightness of the cause.

Pre-deployment briefing, training and preparation

The new peacekeepers, at least until very recently, joined the peacekeeping enterprise at a time when the UN was severely over stretched in its ability to handle a burgeoning number of missions, leading to disorganisation, mismanagement and failure both at UN headquarters and in the field. While more attention and resources are being devoted to peacekeeping than ever before, most funding has been swallowed up by the missions themselves or to employ additional capacity at UN headquarters. Although this benefits the new peacekeepers in helping to ensure a more capable and competent Secretariat, comparatively little effort and resources have been devoted to preparing national personnel for their participation.

Unlike the traditional peacekeeping operations, which were few and far between (the gap between the establishment of UNIFIL and the next new UN operation, the UN Good Office Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP),

was ten years), the UN Secretariat today has been faced with maintaining up to nineteen missions in the field simultaneously, as well as preparing for new missions. In the two years that the UN was planning, organising and administering the huge UNTAC mission in Cambodia the organs of the UN authorised ten other missions—UNOSOM I and II, UNOMSA (a large electoral mission in South Africa), the UN Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), MICIVIH (Haiti), UNOMUR, UNOMIG , UNOMIL, UNMIH (a human rights mission in Haiti) and UNAMIR—while expanding UNPROFOR and the UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) and maintaining the existing first generation missions. In these circumstances there was little time for strategic planning of missions, no time for training of contributing forces and little backup from the Secretariat in New York for new contributors either in the form of advice or assistance. Once an offer of a national contribution was accepted the new peacekeepers were almost entirely left to their own devices.

This resulted, for instance, in civilian police arriving in Cambodia without the requisite language capabilities (English or French), driving skills or even police experience. Some contributors, like Ukraine, had barely established independent military forces before they were dispatched to participate in a very specialised form of military activity, requiring skills that can be the antithesis of those inculcated into military personnel. On the civilian side it was difficult to find personnel with the requisite qualifications and experience for the new peacekeeping tasks. In Cambodia the UN had great problems recruiting international personnel to help, monitor, control and supervise the workings of the State of Cambodia government as required under the 1991 Paris Peace Accords. This unprecedented task foundered in part because of the lack of previous experience with such an exercise.

Little had changed from the old days when peacekeeping was akin to a cottage industry. Pre-deployment briefings then tended to be informal and imparted by the UN Secretariat’s tiny peacekeeping staff in a rather personalised, home-spun fashion. Training was non-existent. Ghanaian Lieutenant-General Emmanuel Erskine, first commander of UNIFIL, records that it was through Under Secretary-General Sir Brian Urquhart that he received his ‘training in peacemaking and

Since the traditional operations tended to have simpler mandates, were much smaller and involved far fewer different nationalities and almost exclusively military personnel this approach proved satisfactory.

Moreover, in several cases of the ‘old peacekeeping’ the UN used experienced peacekeepers from existing operations as a core group around which a new mission

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would be built. In establishing UNIFIL in 1978 military personnel from UNTSO, UNDOF (UN Disengagement Observer Force) and UNEFII were transferred to Lebanon until they could be replaced by a more permanent force.\textsuperscript{45} UN missions in Cyprus and the Congo benefited similarly. New missions established since the end of the Cold War have had to be built from the ground up, being so numerous and large that the use of personnel from existing missions has been impractical. Unlike the old hands at peacekeeping, such as Austria, Canada and Sweden, the new peacekeepers have had no direct experience on which to draw, even in relation to the old peacekeeping, much less the new. Some last-minute pre-deployment training has been provided by the old peacekeepers (for instance the Bulgarian battalion was given a month’s training by the Swedes before being dispatched to Cambodia) but it was often rushed and inadequate. The Bulgarian Parliament, in examining the failure of the Bulgarian contingent to perform well in Cambodia, concluded that the reasons were, along with the Khmer Rouge’s ‘negative attitude towards East Europeans’, a lack of ‘serious training’ and language difficulties.\textsuperscript{46}

\textit{In the field: growing complexity and danger}

Upon arrival in the field the new peacekeepers have had to face increasing complexity in conditions that test the mettle of even the best-trained troops and civilian personnel. Some of the complexity was planned, the result of ambitious peace-building operations as in El Salvador, Namibia and Cambodia. In Bosnia complexity came with deteriorating conditions, forcing ever more ingenious techniques on UNPROFOR to achieve delivery of humanitarian aid and inducing the Security Council to adopt over 100 resolutions and statements in its forlorn attempt to protect UN safe areas, dampen the conflict and achieve a lasting ceasefire and settlement.\textsuperscript{47} The requirements of peace enforcement in a civil war situation in Somalia added further complexity to an already complex mission in that country. ONUSAL, in El Salvador, began as a human rights monitoring exercise and burgeoned into a similar nation-building effort. As Boutros-Ghali has noted, ‘peacekeeping has to be reinvented every day’.\textsuperscript{48}


\textsuperscript{46} N. Behar, ‘Bulgarian peacekeeping prospects: new experience and new dilemmas’, paper presented to SIPRI/Friedrich Ebert Stiftung workshop on ‘Challenges for the 22 April 1994, pp. 56.


While not every post-Cold War peacekeeping mission has included all of the following, the expanded repertoire of UN peacekeeping operations in 1993, for example, included:

1. Election observation (Eritrea and Liberia) and organisation (Cambodia);
2. Humanitarian assistance and securing safe conditions for its delivery (Bosnia, Somalia, Kurdish areas of Iraq);
3. Observation and separation of combatants along a more or less demarcated boundary (Croatia, southern Lebanon, Cyprus, India–Pakistan, Kuwait–Iraq, Israel–Syria, Israel–Egypt);
4. Disarmament of military and paramilitary forces (Cambodia, Somalia, El Salvador);
5. Promotion and protection of human rights (Cambodia and El Salvador);
6. Mine clearance, training and mine awareness (Afghanistan and Cambodia);
7. Military and police training (Cambodia and Haiti);
8. Boundary demarcation (Kuwait–Iraq border);
9. Civil administration (Cambodia);
10. Provision of assistance to and repatriation of refugees (former Yugoslavia, Cambodia, Somalia);
11. Reconstruction and development (Cambodia, Somalia);
12. Maintenance of law and order (Cambodia, Somalia).

Some of these functions were combined in large, multi-function operations as in Angola, Cambodia, El Salvador, Mozambique, Somalia, and the former Yugoslavia. Steve Ratner describes second-generation UN missions as combining the three roles of administrator (or executor), mediator and guarantor.49

Such complexity has troubled even experienced peacekeepers. As Canadian Major-General John MacInnis has noted, ‘It is the aspect of complexity that poses challenges unthought of by peacekeepers only a few short years ago’.50 In traditional peacekeeping operations, the observation of a ceasefire line or other boundary was the principal purpose of the mission, towards which all other activities could be directed. In the multi-purpose missions of today the peacekeeper may be faced not only with several objectives, such as disarming and cantonment of factional forces, the conduct of free and fair elections and the protection of human rights, but some of the priorities deriving from these tasks may be in conflict. For instance, in Cambodia it was alleged by human rights groups that the pursuit of

human rights violators was subordinated to the goal of holding an election. In Somalia the pursuit of a peaceful settlement was subordinated to the quest for justice against those responsible for killing UN troops.

A major new role in which peacekeepers have become involved for the first time is the delivery of humanitarian aid and the management of huge refugee movements—sometimes in the midst of continuing armed conflict. As a British colonel with extensive experience of delivering humanitarian aid in Bosnia has noted: ‘It wasn’t a task the British Army had done before...we were effectively sitting in the middle of somebody else’s war’. These are often situations in which populations have become targets of the fighting and pawns in the geopolitical aims of the opposing forces. While at home military forces are often called upon to assist their national authorities in disaster relief or crowd management, few forces have the experience or training to handle the movement of huge amounts of humanitarian relief supplies to millions of starving people during a civil conflict, as in Somalia, or the mass movement of terrified refugees, as in Rwanda, Croatia and Bosnia. Although the best militaries are well disciplined, organised and resourceful, few of the new peacekeepers will have the flexibility and sensitivity (not to mention training and equipment) for handling in a foreign environment such delicate situations as crowd control in Mogadishu or intercommunal violence in Croatia. Few military personnel are likely to be well prepared for coping with witnessing massive human rights violations, such as massacres of innocent civilians, and the accompanying sense of helplessness at being able to do nothing to stop them. British units in Bosnia have psychiatric nurses available to help their troops cope with such experiences and their services are increasingly utilised, but many of the new peacekeepers have no such support systems.

Complexity is also introduced into the new peacekeeping by the multinational nature of the mission. UNTAC, the most international of any mission to date, along with its advance mission, the UN Advance Mission to Cambodia (UNAMIC), involved 34 nationalities among its military contingents and 32 among its civilian police. UNTAC’s personnel in total were derived from over 100 countries. Compare this with UNIFIL, which in all its seventeen years has had but fourteen participating countries, most of which were experienced ‘old peacekeepers’. New peacekeeping operations are, therefore, faced with an exponentially greater mix of

52 ibid. p. 56.
capability, procedure, equipment, language, custom and ethos. In Cambodia almost the entire civilian police (CivPol) component was comprised of poorly trained, badly equipped and ill-disciplined personnel, and that in Mozambique seems to have been little better.

While the older peacekeeping operations could afford to be more selective in securing a judicious mix of capabilities and nationalities, today, when peacekeepers are in short supply for particular missions, there can be little choice but for the UN to accept whatever is offered. This has brought with it an inevitable lowering of standards. Sometimes the UN has been forced to knowingly accept contingents which were far from optimal in their training, experience or equipment. As the Secretary-General himself has lamented, ‘You have to accept second-best and if not second-best you have to accept third-best’ in peacekeeping.\(^5\) In some cases corruption, human rights violations and loutish behaviour have distinguished such forces rather than their contribution to peace. The deployment of such troops necessitates greater ability and adaptability on the part of each component and heightened diplomatic skills on the part of the head of mission and the force commander. An added complication is that UN commanders do not have disciplinary authority over the foreign forces under their command and must rely on the goodwill of each contingent commander to enforce order and discipline.

The Secretary-General, unlike in most missions during the old era of peacekeeping, has also been obliged to accept contributions from states which have a direct interest in the outcome of the conflict. This is most notable in the former Yugoslavia, where Russia, the USA, Germany, Turkey and Muslim states from further afield such as Malaysia and Indonesia have obvious biases towards or against parties to the conflict. This was also true in Cambodia, where Thailand and China both provided engineering battalions. While such older peacekeeping missions as UNIFIL and UNFICYP involved former colonial powers with at least a residual interest in the conflict, France and Britain respectively, their presence was less problematic since it was acceptable to all the parties concerned and it provided the UN with local knowledge and specialised capabilities. Today the involvement of the permanent members of the Security Council in most missions raises the missions’ profile, increases their political sensitivity, encourages greater press attention and heightens expectations—perhaps offsetting the obvious advantages in terms of greater force capability, stronger political backing for the mission and heightened prestige that the great powers bring.

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A further complication in the new peacekeeping is a diminution of what Sashi Tharoor calls its 'United Nations-ness'.\textsuperscript{56} Whereas peacekeeping missions during the Cold War era were exclusively UN affairs, today the UN must share responsibilities in the field with regional organisations, as in Georgia where the CIS and OSCE are also operating, or, more problematically with a military alliance, such as NATO in the former Yugoslavia. The complexities of the so-called dual-key system for deciding when to use air power in Bosnia in furtherance of UN objectives is unprecedented in the history of UN peacekeeping. Similarly complex are arrangements in which the UN hands over authority and jurisdiction to a non-UN multilateral force, as occurred in Somalia when UNOSOM I gave way to UNITAF, or when it takes over such authority and jurisdiction from such a force, as occurred at the end of UNITAF's mission and as has subsequently occurred in Haiti. In the case of Iraq, UNIKOM was required to cooperate with and establish a peacekeeping operation on the border of a state which had been defeated in war by a UN-authorised coalition force. The new peacekeepers are thus required to coexist and cooperate with other entities in ways unheard of in the old peacekeeping—where the UN was usually the only player in town.

Complexity is also introduced by the growing civilianisation of peacekeeping. It is a common assumption that UN peacekeeping operations are entirely military affairs. For some of the older missions this is true. For instance, the UN Military Observers Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), deployed in Jammu and Kashmir since 1948, comprises 39 military observers, while UNTSO comprises 220 military observers. These traditional peacekeeping operations are strictly military and have no civilian component. There has however always been a civilian element in some operations. For instance, UNFICYP is supported by 35 civilian police, while UNIFIL has 540 international and local civilian staff. But in traditional peacekeeping missions the civilian staff were present to administer the military operation rather than participate in it (significant exceptions were ONUC and UNTEA). Since the end of the Cold War there have been several UN missions with large civilian components which have been an integral part of the peacekeeping mission and sometimes its raison d'être. Such missions have been deployed in Namibia, El Salvador, Cambodia, Mozambique, Somalia, Western Sahara and Angola. The addition of such substantial civilian components has de-emphasised the military character of peacekeeping, rendering the military component just one among many. Paradoxically it has also increased the range of tasks the military is called upon to perform, especially cooperative activities with civilian components, such as protection of and assistance with electoral activities. Both the military and civilian new peacekeepers have to learn to cope with these new realities.

UNTAC is the epitome of this trend. Deployed between March 1992 and December 1993 it was at the time the largest, most expensive, most complex multi-dimensional peacekeeping operation ever mounted. It had seven components, only one of which was military. The others were concerned with human rights, civil administration, police, repatriation, elections and rehabilitation. The military force totalled approximately 15 000 and was the largest component in terms of its foreign personnel. Its tasks were also among the most important, including the monitoring of Cambodia’s borders, verification of the ceasefire, supervision of cantonment, disarmament and demobilisation of factional forces, weapons control and mine-clearance. However, unlike most previous UN missions, the military component’s activity was not an end in itself, but was geared towards the election of a democratic constitutional government. Other components in UNTAC, therefore, had equally important roles to that of the military. The Electoral Component alone was huge, dwarfing the military presence. At its maximum its total personnel, both local and international, numbered almost 62 000 people. A large UN Civil Police Component was also present comprising 3600 unarmed police to monitor the local police and assist with law and order. In addition there were several UN agencies operating separately from UNTAC, such as the UN Development Program (UNDP), or acting in cooperation with it, such as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Furthermore, a huge range of foreign non-governmental organisations dealing with aid or human rights issues interacted with UNTAC and were sometimes sub-contracted by it to do some of its work. The local and international press were ubiquitous and influential, and they now comprise yet another civilian element with which new peacekeeping missions must increasingly deal.

Finally, complexity is increased because the nature of the conflicts in which peacekeepers find themselves has changed. Peacekeepers today are most likely to be confronted by intrastate wars, a type of conflict in which the UN has traditionally not become involved (with the significant exceptions of the Congo, Cyprus and Lebanon). Of the five peacekeeping operations that existed in early 1988, only one (20 per cent) was deployed in a situation of intrastate conflict. Of the 21 operations established since then only eight have related to interstate wars, whereas thirteen (62 per cent) have related to intrastate conflicts, although some,

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57 For detailed information on UNTAC, see Findlay, Cambodia, pp. 1447.
58 It comprised:
   • 72 international personnel at headquarters
   • 126 international personnel at 21 regional centres
   • 800 Cambodian registration teams totalling 4000 people
   • 1000 International Polling Station Officers
   • 8000 Cambodian electoral teams totalling 56 000 people.
59 Supplement to An Agenda for Peace, p. 3.
especially those in the former Yugoslavia, also have interstate dimensions. Of the eleven operations established since January 1992 all but two (82 per cent) relate to intrastate wars.

These intrastate conflicts usually involve multiple parties, the geographical holdings of each party may be unclear and subject to rapid change, rogue elements within factions may adopt independent positions and take independent action, and outside states may be involved in supporting one side or the other. The stakes tend to be higher than in interstate wars where compromise does not necessarily threaten a state’s existence but merely a slice of its territory. Civil wars are often literally life or death struggles in which the alternative to total control of state power is political or physical oblivion. The forces involved are also often better armed than in the past. Small ragtag armies may have more firepower than that available to the peacekeepers, even those from developed countries. Finally, as Alan James has observed, while a traditional UN border monitoring operation can proceed with its duties relatively unaffected by internal instability within a state, a peacekeeping force in the midst of an intrastate conflict is invariably caught up in events and may through its actions pivotally affect their outcome.

All these considerations make the new peacekeeping considerably more dangerous than the old. UN military casualties rose ten-fold between 1991 and 1994, compared with an eight-fold increase in the number of personnel deployed. In 1993, eleven fatalities occurred among civilian peacekeeping staff. The Secretary-General has reported that of the 33 fatalities incurred between January 1992 and December 1993 ‘16 were killed in areas where no government authorities existed de facto or where such authorities were unable to maintain order and hence to discharge their responsibilities by protecting persons within their jurisdiction...29 suffered from gunshot wounds, and there are grounds to believe that at least 6 were deliberately executed’.

One consequence of these trends is that ‘the normal tendency of contingents to seek guidance from their own capitals increases’. This was seen at its worst in Somalia, where the Italians most famously, but also other contingents, sought

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62 UN, *Report of the Secretary-General on the work of the organization*, A/49/1, 2 September 1994, p. 58
63 UN, Note by the Secretary-General, UN document A/AC.242/1, 1994.
instructions from home and then refused to act in accordance with the UN commander’s directives. As experienced peacekeepers, the Italians should have known better and their contingent commander was withdrawn at UN request. As Iqbal Riza notes, ‘The anxieties of troop contributing countries for the safety of their troops are fully understandable, but it is evident that interference in operations only increases the danger to the personnel of the operation as a whole’. In Cambodia, Japanese government concern over retaining tight control of its troops meant that every task, request or order had to be referred to Tokyo for clearance.

A further consequence is disaffection at home with the peacekeeping mission, particularly in these days of rapid communication and saturation television coverage of peacekeeping’s triumphs and failures. Fatalities among the peacekeepers can trigger demands for withdrawal, debate about the nature of peacekeeping and calls for accountability. The deaths of several Bulgarians in Cambodia was a case in point:

The tension that seized Bulgarian public opinion concerning this classical peacekeeping operation with the participation (for the first time) of Bulgarian troops increased when the first messages of sustained casualties were received. That was a shock of an entirely new type that had not been witnessed by Bulgarian society before. A discussion started in the press and in the Parliament as to whether the ‘blue helmets’ sent to Cambodia were Regular army troopers (that would entail the problem of institutional responsibility for their deaths) or mercenaries (in that case nobody shall be responsible for their deaths).

This occurred despite that fact that Bulgarian opinion and the Bulgarian parliament had been unanimous in supporting the original dispatch of Bulgarian troops to Cambodia.

In the field: challenges to traditional peacekeeping norms

Among the challenges that the new peacekeepers must cope with in second-generation missions are those that stretch to the limit the traditional peacekeeping norms relating to consent, impartiality and the use of force.

Consent of the parties. The life-cycle of a peacekeeping mission may witness several different stages of consent, each presenting different challenges to the new peacekeepers. In the first case consent is shaky at the outset of the mission, perhaps

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66 Kim, ‘Japan and peacekeeping operations’, p. 28.
68 ibid. p. 4.
due to the parties having been inveigled against their will into a peace process or into agreeing to a UN presence. Peacekeepers in these circumstances arrive with a deficit of goodwill rather than the surplus that would normally be expected and must work harder to establish credibility and trust. It has been said, somewhat questionably, of the old peacekeepers that they were ‘not intended to create the conditions for their own success’;\(^{69}\) however, new peacekeepers in conditions of doubtful consent need to do precisely that. The first requirement is to engage in persistent and painstaking negotiation with the parties. Since consent is weak, all manner of matters, from humanitarian aid convoy routes to the location of UN observer posts must be negotiated, and in many instances repeatedly renegotiated. The new peacekeepers also need to engage much more actively in so-called ‘hearts and minds’ campaigns to win over the civilian population, and ‘civil information’ campaigns designed to explain their presence. General Sanderson, the UNTAC force commander, claims that the success of his mission was due to UNTAC’s ability to ‘forge an alliance’ with the Cambodian people against those parties seeking to undermine the peace process and hence to conduct a free and fair election and democratic transfer of power.\(^{70}\)

The military component will also need to be better equipped to defend itself and its mission (including the usually substantial civilian components) and be at a higher stage of readiness and alert than in a situation of assured consent. The overall level of military capability required of the new peacekeepers will be higher, as will the standard of such elements as communications and command and control. While no UN peacekeeping deployment has yet been greeted with armed force (although the original deployment of UNMIH to Haiti sailed away after local thugs brandished weapons at them from the quay), the preferred situation is clearly to be greeted with open arms.

A second, more fraught scenario is one of degrading consent, either following a situation where consent was to all intents and purposes complete at the outset of the mission or where it was tenuous to begin with. Here the new peacekeepers must work even harder at regaining consent and be even more vigilant against threats to the carrying out of their mandate. This can restrict their movements, complicate the tasks of the civilian components and give the UN presence a garrison appearance and mentality. This occurred during the first UN mission to Somalia, UNOSOM I, where 500 Pakistani peacekeepers huddled for months at Mogadishu airport afraid to venture out.

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\(^{69}\) James, ‘A review of UN peacekeeping’, p. 621.

In Cambodia, decaying consent on the part of the Khmer Rouge resulted in a range of actions, from withdrawal of its representatives from the Military Mixed Working Group to attacks on Vietnamese civilians and UN military and civilian personnel. The strain that this can place on a peacekeeping mission became apparent after the killing of a Japanese civilian volunteer and later a Japanese policeman. Heavy pressure was brought to bear by Japanese public opinion on the Japanese government to withdraw its personnel or relocate them to safer areas. The Australian government also indicated that Australian forces, which supplied the communication system for all of UNTAC, could be withdrawn if the situation became too dangerous. Fears for their safety also prompted UN Volunteers (UNVs) in Cambodia to demand greater military protection and in some cases to leave Cambodia altogether. Had the Japanese contingent withdrawn and UNVs departed en masse the morale of UNTAC could have been fatally damaged. Had other contingents like the Australians followed, the mission would have collapsed.

Peacekeeping missions in situations of eroding consent can be surprisingly fragile edifices. They are especially vulnerable to the understandable intolerance that public opinion in contributing countries, especially in the West, has for rising numbers of UN casualties in remote and little understood conflicts.

If the warring parties retain enough interest in the peacekeepers' continued presence, they may tolerate (or in the case of factional leaders wishing to control rogue elements even encourage) a certain amount of enforcement activity by the UN, especially at a tactical level. A complex pattern of voluntary and enforcement elements may evolve that defies logic and is not easily categorised. UNPROFOR's relationship with all the warring parties in the former Yugoslavia is an example, combining an enforcement role (with the assistance of NATO and lately a Rapid Reaction Force) with consent-based humanitarian activities. This makes for a confusing operational environment for the new peacekeepers, where consent can be present one day and not the next, in one situation and not another.

In circumstances of eroding consent peacekeepers need to be better armed and protected. Sir Brian Urquhart has recalled that 'Although military commanders often want them, I have always been strongly opposed to UN peacekeeping operations having offensive or heavy weapons. The real strength of a peacekeeping force lies not in its capacity to use force, but precisely in its not using force and thereby remaining above the conflict and preserving its unique position and prestige'. However, peacekeepers should have the ability to defend themselves properly in situations of eroding consent. This ability, somewhat contrary to Sir Brian's view and depending on the local culture, may afford peacekeepers more authority and prestige. As Alistair Duncan has noted of Bosnia: 'Very sadly the rule

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71 Urquhart, A Life in Peace and War, pp. 1789.
of the gun is what matters...the man with the AK-47 is a big man. I had clout because with 56 Warriors I was considered to be the most powerful man in Central Bosnia'.

New peacekeepers from poorer, developing states will be more vulnerable in such situations unless provided with adequate protective equipment. This was necessary in Somalia, where the forces from developing countries which remained behind after the Western withdrawal were provided with armoured personnel carriers and other equipment to help defend themselves in a mission which was reverting from peace enforcement to pure peacekeeping.

A third and final stage is the complete loss of consent. This is most likely to occur after the UN has attempted to take punitive or retaliatory action against one of the parties as a result of their non-cooperation or violation of agreements or international law. Following the NATO bombing of Bosnian Serb ammunition dumps near Pale in June 1995, after the Serbs refused to return heavy weapons seized from UN collection points, the Bosnian Serb leadership declared that all agreements with the UN were null and void, thereby explicitly withdrawing consent for the presence and activities of UNPROFOR. This was followed by the taking of hundreds of UNPROFOR observers and troops hostage. Such situations clearly place a peacekeeping mission in an impossible situation: with consent withdrawn the very vulnerability that makes them successful peacekeepers permits their capture and use as political pawns. This does not necessarily mean all-out war against the peacekeepers, nor that consent cannot be re-established. Despite the Bosnian Serbs’ apparent abrogation of all agreements with the UN, humanitarian operations resumed shortly thereafter. Even after the massive bombing raids on Bosnian Serbian positions in August 1995 there remained a Russian UNPROFOR contingent in Bosnian Serb territory, presumably on the basis of consent.

The transformation of a UN mission from peacekeeping to peace enforcement, either suddenly or through ‘mission creep’, as well as being dangerous to the forces on the ground is also fundamentally unfair to those nations which have contributed in good faith to what they supposed was a peacekeeping mission. The smaller contributors usually have no say in such transformations unless they happen to be a non-permanent member of the Security Council at the time. The withdrawal of their contingent may be not only politically embarrassing to effect (with implications of cowardice in the face of difficulties) but also physically impossible without the assistance of more powerful states. The fate of the Bangladeshi contingent trapped in Bihac in early 1995 is one example. Not only were they poorly equipped to defend themselves, being armed only with rifles, but they had not anticipated being in a situation of virtual all-out war in which withdrawal was

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72 Duncan, ‘Operating in Bosnia’, p. 54. A Warrior is a tracked mechanised infantry combat vehicle.
impossible. In Somalia an even worse situation occurred when the Western states largely abandoned the UN mission to the non-Western contingents such as India, Pakistan, Egypt and Zimbabwe. While some of the contingents left behind were experienced ‘old peacekeepers’ the spectacle of the more technologically sophisticated and militarily capable states forsaking the mission after having led it into peace enforcement did nothing to promote enthusiasm for the new peacekeeping and made it more difficult to recruit contributors for future missions such as in Rwanda. As Pakistan’s Foreign Minister bluntly asked: ‘Are Pakistani per lives cheaper than those that came from the West?’

**Impartiality.** A second key tenet of traditional peacekeeping under challenge in the new peacekeeping is the maintenance of an impartial, non-discriminatory stance towards all the parties to a conflict. Safeguarding the impartiality of the mission will be a constant preoccupation in situations where consent is fragile and will require some fine judgement calls on the part of the mission commander. Abandonment of impartiality, whether deliberate or inadvertent, runs the risk of turning the peacekeeping force into an enemy of one or more of the parties.

Almost as important as impartiality is the perception of impartiality. The latter often becomes impossible to sustain in situations where rival factions are locked in competition for power and prestige. For instance, if only one party is breaking a ceasefire, impartiality is virtually impossible if only because UN forces may have to adopt defensive measures to protect themselves only against that party and not others. Even though a warring party has brought discrimination on itself it will accuse the UN of bias. The preferred situation may be that in Cambodia where all parties accused the UN of partiality. UNTAC went out of its way to be impartial by attempting to coax the Khmer Rouge into the electoral process, even, ironically, to the extent of extending it favours not afforded to other parties. When the Khmer Rouge failed to cooperate, UNTAC had no choice but to discriminate against it by treating it differently to all those parties that had registered for the election. Similarly, the State of Cambodia government argued that UNTAC was discriminating against it by attempting to control and supervise its administrative machinery while neglecting that of the Khmer Rouge. Since the Khmer Rouge would not permit access to its territory to enable UNTAC to carry out this task, discrimination was in fact occurring, not through a deliberate ploy on the part of UNTAC but because it was obliged to carry out its mandate as far as it could.

For the new peacekeepers the implications of the doctrine of impartiality in second generation operations include an increase in complexity and a need for greater care, awareness and sophistication in dealing with the parties. The new peacekeepers’ roles of administrator, arbitrator and enforcer as well as keeping the

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peace require special training in diplomacy, conflict resolution, mediation and other areas not normally imparted to military personnel or even most civilian personnel recruited to UN missions.

Use of force. Enforcement in the new peacekeeping operations may run the gamut from administrative directives being handed down to factional authorities, through the arrest and trial of human rights violators, to the use of military force. A consensus now seems to have emerged that apart from self-defence or defence of the mission, military force can only be used for enforcement purposes, if at all, at a low tactical level, if a peacekeeping mission is not to be fatally jeopardised. In highly-charged civil war situations, even the use of force by peacekeepers at a tactical level may have profound political consequences if the political situation is particularly tense or peace negotiations are in progress. Use of force by peacekeepers must always be discrete, controlled, carried out for specific ends and interwoven with diplomatic and other approaches and constant communication with the parties. In this respect successful peacekeeping is essentially a question of psychology. Threats to use force and the occasional discrete use of force may have a role to play but always with an eye to the overall interests of peace and reconciliation. General Sir Michael Rose, commander of UNPROFOR in Bosnia, insists that ‘Patience, persistence and pressure is how you conduct a peacekeeping mission. Bombing is a last resort because then you cross the Mogadishu line...Hitting a tank is peacekeeping. Hitting infrastructure, command and control, logistics, that is war, and I’m not going to fight a war in white-painted tanks’. Pure peace enforcement operations require a vastly different array of forces, command and control arrangements, military doctrine and political underpinning.

The UN Commission of Enquiry into the virtual war between UNOSOM II and one of the Somali factions in 1993 recommended that the UN ‘refrain from undertaking further peace enforcement actions within the internal conflicts of states’. Aware that this was unlikely to be possible, particularly given the UN’s continuing involvement in peace enforcement in Bosnia, the Commission recommended that if peace enforcement was nevertheless undertaken, the mandate of the force ‘should be limited to specific objectives and the use of force should be applied as the ultimate means after all peaceful remedies have been exhausted’. Increased

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74 International Herald Tribune, 30 September 1994, p. 2.
76 UN, Report of the Commission of Inquiry established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 885 (1993) to investigate armed attacks on UNOSOM II personnel which led to casualties among them.
use of preventive diplomacy, peace building and emergency assistance was recommended.

Despite these sensible admonitions the fact remains that the chances of the new peacekeepers being required to use force are higher than they were in the old peacekeeping. There are also likely to be more complexities involved in regard to the use of force. Rules of engagement may lack detail, change over time or vary with each national contingent. Even when force is used in self-defence there may be ambiguities. The right to self-defence may, in the interpretation of a particular commander, include the right to a pre-emptive attack if peacekeepers believe a strike against them is imminent. Others will only authorise attack if and when attacked. The peacekeeper's right to protect the peace process is also ambiguous and potentially open-ended. In regard to Rwanda it was argued by some that UNAMIR's forces should have positioned themselves between the Hutu killers and their victims and that any use of force which resulted could have been justified on the grounds of 'defending the mission'. Others regard the protection of populations in danger as going beyond protecting the mission unless specified in the mission mandate.

In complex civil war situations, particularly those in which fighting continues and especially if local forces are actively hostile to the UN presence, tight and disciplined command and control arrangements become paramount. UN command and control arrangements traditionally suffer from difficulties because of language problems, incompatible equipment and procedures, the lack of common training and staff structures and the need for geographical balance among participating states.77 They also suffer from multiple chains of command both in the theatre and between the military and civilian sides of the UN.

What is required for the new peacekeepers is clear chains of command, better communication systems, comprehensible guidance from the UN on when and how force should and should not be used. Clearer rules of engagements, applied consistently by all contingents would be of assistance, although even the clearest of ROEs will not cover every contingency nor substitute for well-trained, capable military forces.

Financial implications

An increasing problem for new and old peacekeepers alike, although it hurts the poorer countries in both categories most, is the inability of the UN to reimburse them for their peacekeeping costs. The other side of the coin is that peacekeeping is now more expensive than ever before, throwing an additional financial burden on states least able to afford sudden cost increases. Financial support for UN peacekeeping operations has lagged behind political support despite the fact that

77 Weiss, ‘UN security forces in support of humane values’, p. 333.
assessed contributions are a legal obligation of UN member states. As of 31 May 1995 total outstanding assessments owed by member states to the UN for peacekeeping amounted to $1.03 billion. A special Peacekeeping Reserve Fund, intended to give the UN flexibility in funding start-up costs for new operations, is being used to keep current missions from falling into insolvency and funds are being borrowed from one mission’s account to support another. In the case of ONUMOZ in Mozambique the failure of UN member states to pay their dues threatened to leave the operation’s Special Account with insufficient funds to cover the mission’s liabilities as it was being wound up in early 1995. UN peacekeeping has been described as a ‘financial bungee jump’, undertaken in the blind faith that funding will eventuate. Without significant reforms in this area the UN will be unable to sustain the goodwill of the new peacekeepers, especially those from the developing world. At least one old peacekeeper, Fiji, and one new one, Tunisia, have threatened to abstain from future peacekeeping missions unless they are compensated more readily.

**Meeting the challenges: UN and national reforms**

In response to heightened expectations and demands, problems in the field, and widespread criticism, the United Nations in the last few years has begun a series of reforms of its peacekeeping operations, especially focused on its headquarters in New York. The Secretariat’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), established in March 1992 and headed since March 1993 by Under Secretary General Kofi Annan, has been continually reorganised and expanded. After declining in 1988/89 from around twelve to eight professional officers, it has grown since 1991 to around 25 civilian professionals. The Department has also been organised into geographical divisions for the first time (Africa, Asia/Middle East, and Europe/Latin America) to make tracking and coordination of operations in particular regions easier. The military advice available to the UN has been substantially boosted by expansion of the Office of the Military Adviser (MILAD) in

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78 The funding for all but two peacekeeping operations (UNTSO on Israel’s borders and UNMOGIP in Kashmir) comes from special assessments of member states, rather than from the UN regular budget. A third mission, UNFICYP in Cyprus, is partly funded by voluntary contributions.


80 UN, Press Release DH/1848, UN Office at Geneva, 10 March 1995, p. 3.


DPKO to more than 40 officers, most seconded by national governments. They include advisers on de-mining, civilian police operations and training and coordination. To facilitate long-range planning a Policy and Analysis Cell has been established as well as a unit to coordinate and plan CivPol deployments, deemed especially urgent in light of their poor performance in Cambodia.

A major, long-advocated reform and potentially the most significant, was the integration of the former Field Operations Division into the DPKO, which has attenuated administrative and communication difficulties and bureaucratic rivalry caused by the previous physical and administrative separation of the operational and policy-making arms of UN peacekeeping. To improve coordination within the Secretariat and provide the Secretary-General with options and recommendations on policy, an inter-departmental Task Force on United Nations Operations was established in 1994.

Another much needed reform was the establishment in April 1993 of a ‘Situation Centre’ for UN peace operations. The Centre now operates 24 hours a day with a staff of approximately 24, helping meet a long-standing criticism that the UN Secretariat was a ‘9 to 5’ operation despite the fact that keeping the peace is a 24-hour a day business. It has at least two officers on a 25-hour shift basis at all times to receive and send communications to and from all UN peacekeeping missions in the field. It is also charged with communicating during non-business hours with relevant UN political and military officials when crises develop requiring immediate action. It produces daily written reports on all aspects of peacekeeping for the Secretary-General and Security Council. Briefings are also available as required.

To improve the availability of peacekeeping forces a Standby Force Arrangement has been established whereby states are able to commit, in principle, troop, equipment, other force components or funds to future missions. Memoranda of Understanding are being negotiated between the UN and the participating states,

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although each state will reserve the right to volunteer or withhold its contribution in each specific case. To date only Jordan and Denmark have signed such agreements. A UN Planning Team has visited national capitals to elicit pledges of contributions. The task force was also asked to define the various components of UN forces (for example, ‘helicopter squadron’, ‘mechanised unit’) to introduce some standardisation into future contributions. Progress in establishing the arrangement has been disappointing. By June 1994, despite two years of contacts with over 50 member states, only 21 had offered stand-by resources (including some 30 000 personnel), which could ‘in principle, be called upon’. The Secretary-General noted that these ‘did not yet adequately cover the spectrum of resources required to mount and execute future peace-keeping operations’. By the end of 1994, 34 member states had made pledges, but many were insubstantial and hedged with caveats. Some key states stayed out altogether, arguing that earmarking forces would in fact reduce their capacity to respond in a prompt and flexible manner. The UK, despite supporting the idea, decided that because of its ‘worldwide commitments’ it could not earmark forces solely for UN service. The USA was similarly unwilling. Other initiatives to improve UN peacekeeping operations have to date included:

- the preparation of rosters of civilian experts, with over 5000 names, for multi-dimensional operations; recruiting rules have also been amended to permit more rapid short-term recruitment of staff and procedures established for secondment of nationals of member states to field operations.
- the conduct of a feasibility study to assess current peacekeeping training and future needs for both military and civilian personnel.
- the preparation of a survey mission handbook as a comprehensive guide for the initial stages of organising a peacekeeping operation.
- a review of procurement procedures for United Nations headquarters, peacekeeping and other field missions.

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90 ibid. p. 2.
92 UN, ‘Improving the capacity of the United Nations for peace-keeping’, p. 27.
93 For details of most of these initiatives, see UN, ‘Improving the capacity of the United Nations for peace-keeping’, p. 27.
94 ibid. pp. 1142.
In November 1994 the Secretary-General released a report on command and control, based in part on an informal gathering of states in Canada in late April, which emphasised the need for integrated and strictly international UN operations, strengthened political and executive direction, and command and control by the Secretary-General.  

Significant progress was made in 1994 on providing legal protection for UN peacekeepers and related personnel when the General Assembly adopted and opened for signature a draft Convention on the Safety and Security of United Nations and Associated Personnel. An initiative of New Zealand, a long-time peacekeeping participant, and Ukraine, a new peacekeeping state, the convention obliges states to establish jurisdiction over crimes against UN personnel including murder, kidnapping or threat of attack. It defines the duties of states as being to ensure the safety and security of UN personnel and to release or return personnel captured or detained. It also requires host states and the UN to conclude agreements on the status of UN operations and personnel.

Attempts have been made to give a greater voice to all contributors to peacekeeping operations, not just the Security Council members, permanent or temporary. In 1994 members of the Security Council began attending meetings of the contributors to UNPROFOR and UNOSOM II. The President of the Security Council also began regularly briefing troop-contributing countries on Council discussions and decisions. The Secretariat began distributing a Weekly Digest on peacekeeping matters to all relevant UN missions, while the Council began publishing the detailed agendas of its daily meetings in the UN daily Journal. In November, the Security Council decided to hold meetings with peacekeeping troop-contributing countries as a matter of course before decisions are made to extend, terminate or significantly change the mandate of any particular peacekeeping

100 This may depend on which country has the presidency. Argentina, for instance, briefed delegations every day at 3 pm.
operation and when unforeseen developments occur.\(^{102}\) These measures have helped reduce the concerns of non-Council member states about command and control of UN peacekeeping operations.

Many of the new peacekeepers, especially the developing states, harbour grave doubts about the management of peacekeeping operations by the Security Council. Their concerns focus on the unrepresentative and undemocratic nature of the Council, its domination in peacekeeping matters by the United States, the United Kingdom and France, the ‘triage’ widely practised by the Council (whereby it chooses, seemingly arbitrarily, which instances of armed conflict and humanitarian disaster to deal with), the secretiveness with which its inner circle deliberates matters and its seemingly ever-expanding mandates and definitions of security.\(^{103}\) Above all, the developing states worry that infringements on state sovereignty that have occurred in some of the new peacekeeping operations may pave the way for more radical interference by the Council and its permanent five in their domestic affairs, especially in regard to human rights issues. Ironies abound here, however. It tends to be the older peacekeepers such as India, Pakistan and Nigeria, which echo such concerns most forcibly, yet which continue to volunteer for peacekeeping duties at an unchecked rate. Perhaps the greatest irony is that China, which has approved or at least declined to oppose all of the post-Cold War peacekeeping operations and which has even participated in them, denies to its own people many of the rights (such as the right to vote freely) which such missions have been designed to promulgate and implement.

With regard to training, a Training Unit was established in DPKO in 1992. While recognising that the training of peacekeepers remains essentially the task of UN member states, the unit was mandated to establish basic peacekeeping guidelines and performance standards as well as prepare training materials.\(^{104}\) The Unit has already compiled a UN Peacekeeping Training Manual, including videos (in cooperation with the UN Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR)), curricula for training military observers and civilian police, an English Course for Civilian Police, a UN Peacekeeping Handbook for Junior Ranks, and a Peacekeeping Bibliography. It is currently working on a book on stress management for peacekeepers, a technical manual for infantry units and a Code of Conduct for UN

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\(^{102}\) UN Information Centre for the Nordic Countries, ‘Security Council decides on increased consultations with troop contributors before changing mandate of peacekeeping forces’, Press Release SC/5927, 4 November 1994.

\(^{103}\) For an excellent discussion of these issues see D.G. Dallmeyer, ‘National perspectives on international intervention: from the outside looking in’, in C.F. Daniel and B.C. Hayes (eds), Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping (London: Macmillan, 1995), pp. 2039.

peacekeepers.\textsuperscript{105} For civilian participants in peacekeeping operations a training course has been initiated at the International Training Centre of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) at Turin in Italy.

Clearly UN reform has not run its course, nor has it tackled head-on the question of finance. Some issues, such as the preponderance of great power decision-making over peacekeeping, will only be tackled in the context of wider reform issues, such as expansion of the Security Council. In the meantime states can take a number of unilateral, bilateral or regional measures to improve the performance of the new peacekeepers.

\textit{National, bilateral, regional and other multilateral efforts}

By early 1994 over twenty countries, including some new peacekeepers, had begun special peacekeeping training for UN missions.\textsuperscript{106} The USA established a Peacekeeping Institute at its Army War College and is developing a joint peacekeeping training program to better prepare joint task force commanders and staff for such operations.\textsuperscript{107} One of the newest peacekeepers, Slovakia, which has troops in UNPROFOR, established its own training centre in 1994.\textsuperscript{108} Even regional organisations are beginning to consider such initiatives. The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was due to open its peacekeeping training centre in Cairo in June 1995.\textsuperscript{109}

Developed countries with long-established peacekeeping schools have always admitted participants from other states and have recently begun admitting those from the new peacekeeping states. Prime examples are the peacekeeping training courses run by the ‘old’ Nordic peacekeepers—the UN Military Police Course in Denmark, the UN Military Observer Course in Finland, the UN Logistics Course in Norway and the UN Staff Officer course in Sweden. The Swedish course, now 30 years old, has trained officers from the following new peacekeeping countries: Egypt, Estonia, Germany, Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Romania, Russia, Singapore, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Switzerland and the USA.\textsuperscript{110} Prior to their dispatch to Cambodia, 35 Japanese officers from the Japanese Self Defence Force were

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{105} ibid. p. 39, and interview in January 1995 in Stockholm with Lt. Col Christian Hårlman, former director of the Training Unit.
\item \textsuperscript{106} \textit{Jane's Defence Weekly}, 5 February 1994, p. 13.
\item \textsuperscript{108} UN, Press Release DH/1740, Geneva, 29 September 1994, p. 6.
\item \textsuperscript{109} \textit{International Peacekeeping News}, May 1995, p. 2.
\item \textsuperscript{110} \textit{United Nations Staff Officers Course (ONSOC) 30 Years}, Swedish Armed Forces’ International Centre (SWEDINT), Södertälje, Sweden, 1995, p. 7.
\end{itemize}
trained in Sweden as ceasefire monitors and peacekeeping instructors.\textsuperscript{111} The Australian Defence Force’s Peacekeeping Centre, established in 1993, admits participants from other states in the Asia–Pacific region, including New Zealand. Australia also trained troops for the abortive South Pacific Peacekeeping Force sent to Bougainville in Papua New Guinea in September 1994.\textsuperscript{112} In 1994, Canada established the Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre (named after the former Canadian Prime Minister credited with ‘inventing’ modern peacekeeping), which admits peacekeepers from all over the world.

Other bilateral, trilateral and multilateral training efforts have involved exercises and on-the-job training. Russia and the USA conducted their first joint peacekeeping training exercise (‘Mirotvorets (Peacekeeper) 94’) in September 1994 in the southern Urals near the Kazakh border.\textsuperscript{113} A month later the first naval peacekeeping game session, ‘RUKUS 94’, involving Russian, US and British naval officers, was organised at the US Naval War College.\textsuperscript{114} Meanwhile the Baltic states, the Nordic countries and the UK have cooperated in training a Baltic peacekeeping battalion, while a Lithuanian platoon has been serving with the Danish UNPROFOR battalion in Croatia in order to gain first-hand experience.\textsuperscript{115}

NATO’s Partnership for Peace is one avenue through which peacekeeping experiences are being successfully transmitted at least to the new European and Central Asian peacekeepers. Among the most valuable of the programs activities are peacekeeping exercises. One of the most recent, ‘Cooperative Nugget ’95’, held in August 1995 at Fort Polk in Louisiana in the USA, involved (besides Canada, the UK and the USA) Albania, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Ukraine and Uzbekistan.\textsuperscript{116} Funds have been provided by the USA to permit PFP members to participate in the exercises. Ukraine, for instance, has received $2 million.\textsuperscript{117}

\textsuperscript{111} Kim, ‘Japan and peacekeeping operations’, p. 28.
\textsuperscript{112} Insight, Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Canberra, 14 March 1994, p. 18.
\textsuperscript{113} International Herald Tribune, 2 Aug. 1994, p. 2; and Moscow News, 1622 September 1994, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{117} Information from Ukrainian Embassy, Stockholm.
Conclusion: the reliance of the UN on national contributions

The United Nations is clearly more than simply the aggregate will and activities of its collective membership of 185 sovereign nation-states. It is in some senses an international actor in its own right, particularly since the end of the Cold War. The current Secretary-General has taken a more proactive role in world affairs than any since Dag Hammarskjöld in the 1960s. The Security Council as a body is more influential than ever before, more willing to intervene and less prone to the use of the veto by its permanent members. The Secretariat is involved in conflict prevention, management and resolution as never before. The UN peacekeeping budget alone is now bigger than the national budgets of some of its member states. The UN even has a small guard force of its own, the UN Field Service, which has existed since 1948 and which was used effectively in the Kurdish areas of Iraq after the 1991 Persian Gulf War.

Yet despite these glimmerings of supra-nationalist autonomy and capability there is little that the United Nations can do without the support of at least a significant proportion of its members. As Boutros-Ghali has frustratingly pointed out,

When a United Nations peace-keeping operation is launched it is assumed that the members of the Security Council and other Member states in a position to do so will take the necessary political and diplomatic action to ensure that the decisions of the Council will be carried out.

Nowhere is this truer than in the area of peacekeeping. As the successful Cambodian, Namibian, Mozambican and Haitian operations have demonstrated, the presence or absence of support from UN members can make the difference between success and failure. Sadly, sustained support has been missing in regard to several operations, including the UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II), UNOSOM II, UNOMIL and UNPROFOR. Even the provision of troops has not matched expectations. Despite efforts to draw on its own UN guards, Secretariat personnel and outside contractors, several missions have been hard-pressed to achieve their authorised force levels—including UNPROFOR, UNIKOM and UNOSOM II. The Secretary-General's attempts to secure troop contributions to an expanded UNAMIR in Rwanda in mid-1994 were totally ignored by UN member states.

The United Nations is beholden to its members’ support because it lacks independent means for deploying peacekeeping forces. It has no standing army, no

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118 As of June 1995.
large civilian corps, no pre-stocked or pre-positioned supplies, no transport capacity and no real reserve fund for peacekeeping. It cannot borrow money since it has no independent means of income. Management capacity at UN headquarters is limited, even were it to operate at maximum efficiency, which is implausible for any organisation, much less an international one required to pay due regard (some would say undue regard) to geographical balance in its recruitment of personnel.

This situation will persist for the foreseeable future. UN member states want it that way. As was starkly clear from the reaction to the more radical ideas in *An Agenda for Peace*, most states do not wish the UN to acquire an independent peacekeeping capacity, whether in the form of a standing army or ‘peace enforcement units’ as proposed by Boutros-Ghali, or a small UN volunteer force as proposed by Sir Brian Urquhart.\(^\text{120}\) Even less revolutionary ideas like giving the UN Secretariat more financial flexibility, providing it with a fully-fledged Operations Room and allowing it to pre-purchase and pre-position supplies and military materiel have encountered opposition.\(^\text{121}\)

The success of peacekeeping will, therefore, continue to lie as much with the member states of the United Nations as with the UN itself. Among them the new peacekeepers, whose ranks include some of the most powerful, influential and wealthy states, have a crucial role to play. Their contributions will range from fulfilling international legal obligations, such as paying peacekeeping assessments in full and on time, through assisting with behind-the-scenes diplomacy when a peacekeeping mission starts to go off the rails, to providing equipment and airlift in

\(^{120}\) Boutros-Ghali’s proposal in *An Agenda for Peace* for establishment of ‘peace enforcement units’ (Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace*, para. 44) touched off a debate about force options for the United Nations. In June 1993, former UN Under Secretary-General Sir Brian Urquhart first advocated establishment of a ‘highly trained international volunteer force, willing, if necessary, to fight hard to break the cycle of violence at an early stage in low-level but dangerous conflicts, especially ones involving irregular militias and groups’ (B. Urquhart, *For A UN volunteer military New York Review of Books*, 10 June 1993, p. 3). Critics pointed to the costs and political difficulties associated with such an idea and the danger that it would lead to escalation requiring deployment of a much larger force (‘A UN volunteer military force—The prospects’, *New York Review of Books*, 15 July 1993, pp. 526 and S.S. Rosenfeld, ‘For the UN, a volunteer peace force’, *International Herald Tribune*, 12 July 1993, p. 8). Consensus appeared to coalesce around the less risky option which the UN is in the process of implementing—a Standby Forces Arrangement.

\(^{121}\) This opposition characteristically reveals itself when the Secretariat’s annual budget proposal or peacekeeping cost estimates are being considered by member states in the General Assembly’s Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) or in the Assembly’s Fifth Committee. For instance in 1993 the General Assembly authorised only one new regular budget post in the DPKO, even though ten had been requested by the Secretary-General.
emergency situations. While the UN should be strongly enjoined to improve its capacities and assisted to do so, the improvement of national efforts, particularly those of the ‘new peacekeepers’, will be just as important to the future of peacekeeping.
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