ASEAN AND THE SOUTHEAST ASIAN ‘HAZE’: CHALLENGING THE PREVAILING MODES OF REGIONAL ENGAGEMENT

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Southeast Asia’s serious ‘haze’ crisis of 1997–98 was a result of forestry and land practices in Indonesia not conforming to state regulations regarding controls on the use of fire for land clearance. ASEAN devoted much time and attention to the issue, but regional cooperation measures were ineffective. Indonesia’s patrimonial political economy was the root cause, and the mobilisation of NGOs proved the only effective check on the problem, an expedient that has large implications for the future of ASEAN modalities.
ASEAN AND THE SOUTHEAST ASIAN ‘HAZE’:
CHALLENGING THE PREVAILING MODES OF REGIONAL ENGAGEMENT

James Cotton

Though much recent commentary has been devoted to the predicament of ASEAN, the problems that have been its focus have been the regional financial crisis, and the internal tensions generated by the enlargement of the membership. These have been serious enough, and their resolution will leave their marks on the organisation. But a further problem, the more serious because it is home-grown, has revealed important failings within the structure of ASEAN. This is the ‘haze’ of 1997–98.

It is the argument of this paper that the haze crisis poses a dual challenge for the group. First, conventional ASEAN modalities have proved a severe disappointment. A proliferation of meetings and plans have produced little of consequence. The Indonesian regime has been unwilling or unable to put the interest of the neighbourhood ahead of those of its closest associates. The effect on the self-image of the group has been corrosive, and the likelihood that these modalities will fail when tested by a crisis of a different kind has increased. Second, alternative approaches have been the desperate resort of ASEAN elites, a strategy that has had major implications. Prominent in these alternatives has been the positive role accorded to NGOs and transnational opinion groups. This has posed a challenge to the character of ASEAN, given that a number of regimes within the group have been reluctant to accept the legitimacy of such political activity, and also in light of the fact that the much vaunted accord and consensus of ASEAN has been largely the creature of agreement among in some cases narrow and unrepresentative national elites.

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1 Australian Defence Force Academy. I am obliged to the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, for the use of the Library, and Priscilla Hon, Mari Pangestu, Tubagus Feridhanusetyawan, Stuart Davies, Simon Tay, Soo Chin Liew, and Ooi Giok Ling, for sharing the results of their work with me. Thanks are due to Sue Moss for research assistance.
The size of the problem

Extensive forest and grass fires, leading to smoke pollution as well as a host of losses and costs, some less immediately visible and more lasting, have become regular events in Southeast Asia. With particular atmospheric conditions, this pollution has persisted for long periods, and has become known, somewhat euphemistically, as ‘haze’. Previous episodes of the haze have occurred in 1982–83, 1987, 1991, and 1994, but that of 1997–98 has been extreme, costly, and in some localities life-threatening (MNS 1997).

Something of the size of the problem can be gauged from the areas of forest and other lands burned. In 1982–83, somewhat more than 3.5 million hectares in East Kalimantan alone were ravaged by fires, with perhaps several million more similarly effected in other parts of Indonesia and East Malaysia (Mackie 1984; Wirawan 1993). With greater attention being paid to environmental problems, the various dimensions of the most recent fires have been more accurately determined. In particular, satellite data has been extensively analysed to provide a reasonably comprehensive mapping of the types and extent of terrain damaged by fire.\(^2\) Satellite derived mapping has also been used as a guide to follow up fieldwork, which has sometimes resulted in detailed study of the conditions and causes of the fires in particular localities. Malaysia and Singapore have also recorded and published regular data on the concentration of pollutants in their atmospheres, thus permitting an analysis of the movement and persistence of the haze over time.

Estimates of the actual amount of land effected by fire vary. Official estimates released by the Indonesian government considerably understated the size of the area in question. Independent studies of East Kalimantan indicate that about four million hectares of forest and other lands were burned in 1997–98, with the total for Indonesia as well as the Malaysian states of Sarawak and Sabah being as much as eight million hectares. To put this figure in perspective, this is more than 120 times the size of Singapore, or twice the size of Taiwan. The total area of Indonesia’s lands which have been granted, in one form or another, to logging concessionaires, stands at about 54 million hectares, so the area burned (though not all forested land) is equivalent to 15 per cent of that area.

While a consistent time-series is not available from Indonesian sites, the degree of pollution caused by the fires can be gauged from measurements made

\(^2\) Satellite analysis is based upon the interpretation of data from four separate systems (see Siegert and Hoffmann 1998; and Fuller and Fulk 1998).
in Malaysia and Singapore. These states employ slightly different forms of measurement (MAPI—Malaysia Air Pollutant Index—and PSI—Pollutants Standard Index—respectively), but both record the presence in the air of pollutants such as sulphur dioxide, oxides of nitrogen, ozone, carbon monoxide and (this being the major cause of the haze phenomenon) particulate matter. A reading of over one hundred is judged as ‘unhealthy’ and in excess of 300 is ‘hazardous’. Singapore recorded a PSI of 140 in two days in September 1997 (as compared with a reading of 153 during the haze of October 1994). Peninsula Malaysia was similarly affected. In East Malaysia, however, the situation was a good deal more serious. A peak MPI reading of 849 was recorded in October 1997 for Kuching in Sarawak. When it is recalled that this site was some hundreds of kilometres from the nearest source of the haze, it is clear that readings of over 1000 must have been common in much of Indonesian Kalimantan. Nor was this reading an isolated event. In early April 1998, the index reached 502 in Miri (Sarawak), a state of emergency was declared and schools were closed. Precisely what these figures imply for everyday life can be inferred from the fact that at the height of the haze the inhabitants of Kuching could hardly see more than a few meters even at noon, and most ordinary social and economic activities came to a halt. In Malaysia, 500 MAPI is the level at which an emergency is declared, though it should be recalled that when the National Haze Contingency Plan was first introduced that level was set at three hundred.

This haze event was costly, though counting the precise dimensions is not a straightforward task. The destruction of forest and plantation resources can be estimated, and the expense of treating the increased incidence of respiratory and other related illnesses can be measured with some degree of precision. Lost tourist earnings and production can also be estimated. Less easy to determine and thus to evaluate are such items as the ultimate health costs, the possible loss of species (including perhaps the orangutan communities in much of Kalimantan) and the consequences of increased erosion and the deterioration of water supplies used for human consumption. Finally, the ultimate cost to the global environment of the increase in greenhouse gases must also be recognised.

Using a rigorous methodology, the Economy and Environment Program for Southeast Asia (EEPSEA) and the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) prepared an estimate of fire and haze costs for the nations involved. This estimate was presented to the Kuching meeting of ASEAN Environment Ministers in February 1998. The researchers found that the overall cost was US$4.5 billion ($3.1 billion for fire damage, and $1.4 billion for haze costs)
This estimate is based upon conservative assumptions—including that the burned area was limited to five million hectares—and does not incorporate the final toll of loss and damage for 1998, nor does it attempt to compute the longer term health costs, so the actual figure is likely to be somewhat larger. Already some work has been done on the more generalised effects of haze events, which suggests that some climate change—and its associated costs—might be expected to eventuate (Nichol 1997). Further, while it does include a small amount for biodiversity loss, it would be difficult, for example, to put a figure on the devastation of the unique environment of the Kutai National Park in East Kalimantan, much of which was burned in early 1998. It should be recalled that some of the costs were tangible and immediate, including the loss in September 1997 of an Indonesian airliner with 244 passengers, in conditions of low visibility due to the haze. An estimate calculated at the end of 1998, suggested that Sarawak alone experienced agricultural losses of 51 million ringgit ($13.4 million) as a result of the haze in 1997 (Straits Times 2 December 1998).

**The causes of the problem**

The causes of the haze have increasingly become a matter of dispute between governments, forestry interests, and conservationists (Gellert 1998; Dauvergne 1998; Vayda 1998). There is general agreement that an occurrence of the El Nino Seasonal Oscillation (ENSO) event produces the dry conditions which make fires in rainforest and former rainforest—normally moist—terrain possible. While there is some evidence that fires have occurred periodically even in the remote past, in more recent times unprecedented levels of human activity have been a major factor in fire outbreaks. For some time, those connected with large-scale timber extraction have ascribed the major cause to the practice of swidden agriculture, which in dry years has led to deliberately set small fires spreading out of control. Study of the problem, and especially the evidence that came to light as a result of the most recent fires, has shifted the blame from forest dwelling populations practicing simple agricultural techniques to the activities of large commercial concerns.

Both forestry and oil palm producers and production techniques play a role in outbreaks of fire. The granting of extensive timber ‘concessions’ and the poor policing of regulations regarding mandatory selective logging and provisions for reforestation give little incentive to adhere to sound conservation or fire prevention policies. Rather than careful logging of selected plots, extensive areas are opened rapidly with only the best and largest trees felled.
Considerable damage to the forest cover and remaining trees results, and timber debris litters the forest floor. Less and disrupted forest canopy exaggerates the drying of the forest in seasons with low rainfall, rendering the outbreak of fires more likely.

On occasion, logged areas are then converted to timber or oil palm plantations. Such conversion requires the land to be cleared, and burning is the cheapest and easiest method to achieve this result. The establishment of oil plantations from previously forested areas, a program which has received extensive government support in Indonesia, has therefore also been a factor in the production of smoke pollution. Again, the land must be stripped of vegetation, and while a method of clearing without burning has been trialed successfully in Malaysia, it is more expensive and involves the use of machinery (see Potter and Lee 1998; Wakker 1998). The clearing of land through logging has also been linked to transmigration programs which require deforested areas to settle new immigrants. The establishing of large pulp mills in East Kalimantan before the plantations intended to supply them had matured was a further factor in the subsequent fires. The result was timber foraging over wide areas which later figured prominently in the 1997 disaster (Sayer 1998). In all, Indonesia’s commitment to what now is obviously an unsustainable exploitation of its timber resources was a major factor in the environmental crisis (Potter 1993 and 1996).

The draining of peat swamps for rice cultivation—most notoriously in the one million hectare project in Central Kalimantan—has been an additional human activity that has contributed to the fire problem (‘Politics and Peat’ 1996). Dried peat burns easily, and as the fires sometimes extend to deposits deep underground, rainfall does not always extinguish them. Quite apart from the exacerbation of the haze that results, peat deposits are an exceptionally good form of carbon sink, and the overall contribution to the production of greenhouse gasses from peat fires in Indonesia has been estimated as being as large as all the pollution produced by motor vehicles in Europe (Schweithelm/WWF 1998). Correspondingly, the smoke produced from peat fires contains the highest concentration of pollutants, though the Indonesian government did not acknowledge the contribution of these fires during the crisis of 1997–98.

Field studies of areas in which fires were extensive indicate that the land most susceptible to burning was degraded forest that had already been logged. There were also instances of fires set to clear land for plantations spreading beyond the plots in question. A consideration of the causes of the fires must therefore focus on human activity. Preliminary studies with this focus have
indicated that the appearance of logging, palm and timber plantation activity, and related road building and industrial construction in the more remote regions of such places as Kalimantan all help to set in motion a potentially destructive social dynamic (Gonner 1998; Schindler 1998). Often title to land is vague in communities where the once prevailing pattern of communal tenure is at an uncertain stage of dissolution, and disputes arise between those who wish to benefit from cooperating with the new economic order and those who resist its encroachment. Fire becomes a weapon of dispossession, or an expression of envy, or a lever for compensation, as much as a method of land clearance. Many logging companies use sub-contractors or even 'illegal' loggers who have little interest in fire prevention, and such companies devote few if any resources to fire-fighting capability. But the fact that this dynamic has been unleashed can only be understood with reference to the management of forest resources.

Managing resources

The rights to exploit much of Indonesia’s forest resources, and also those of East Malaysia, have been granted to private companies and individuals. But this exploitation is conducted within what appears at first glance to be a densely structured regulatory regime.

In Indonesia, which is the major focus of this text, a number of state agencies are involved in forest management (Pramono and Nababan 1992; Barber 1997: 49–53). Unfortunately, not all of these agencies have acted in concert, and even where they have, state policy capacity has been weak due to the presence of other important actors in formal and informal policy making. Generally speaking, the Environment Minister and the Forestry Minister have endeavoured to restrain production, and to encourage sustainable development of Indonesia’s timber resources. In 1994, the Forestry Minister announced that over the next five years, annual timber production would be reduced to 22.5 million cubic meters. This was regarded as a sustainable harvest, and well short of the levels of production then prevailing, of between 36 million and 44 million cubic meters (the latter figure an estimate from NGOs which includes timber which is felled illegally) (see Dauvergne 1997: 73). However, under the seventh five year development plan (Repelita VII) which covers the period to March 2003, annual timber production is set at 57.17 million cubic meters, 24.8 million cubic meters of this from ‘natural’ and ‘conversion’ forest (Badawi, Walsh and Jhamtani 1998: 7–8).
However, the Environment Minister heads a ‘State’ ministry that has insufficient powers and resources to secure compliance in the provinces, where it lacks local branches. Although Indonesia did establish an environmental agency with potential to exercise real power in the regions—BAPEDAL (Badan Pengendalian Dampak Lingkungan), in 1990—its role has yet to be properly institutionalised (‘BAPEDAL’ 1990). During the crisis of 1997, the environmental authorities, under the leadership of the then Environment Minister Sarwono Kusumaatmaja, sought to enforce regulations which, since 1995, had prohibited the use of fire to clear land. The penalties for ignoring this law were increased in 1997, and the authorities were empowered to seize the assets of companies ignoring the ban. Forestry Minister Jamaludin Suryohadikusumo revoked the logging licences of 176 concessionaires, including Kiani Lestari (owned by Suharto associate Bob Hasan), during the haze crisis of late 1997. On 4 October, many of these licences were restored, and the minister later went on record to assert that the chief cause of the fire problem was not human error or policy failure but El Nino (Inside Indonesia Digest no. 42, 4 October 1997; van Klinken 1998). The Environment Minister then passed the comment that enforcing the nation’s laws in parts of Kalimantan was as difficult as policing the ‘Wild West’.

In practice, provincial governments have played a much greater part in the administration—and in the avoidance—of national regulations on forestry and on fire prevention. Provincial governors are nominated by the central government in Jakarta, and are often individuals from outside the area in question. They are not accountable to local assemblies that have few powers. Provincial authorities have waived regulations, and even ignored directives from Jakarta when it has suited them. In East Kalimantan it was as a consequence of the development occasioned by the timber boom of the 1970s that local elites were eclipsed by economic and political outsiders (Magenda 1991: chapter 6).

But in the Indonesian context, private individuals have played a greater role in establishing policy settings. The term ‘private’ is used advisedly, since their position is a result of important, albeit informal, relationships with Suharto and key members of his regime, including his family.

Approximately 60 million hectares of timber resources are held by about 500 concessionaires, who have been given logging rights (HPH—Hak Pengusahaan Hutan) to designated forest land. These concessionaires, who include some businesses associated with the military, were granted their holdings—directly or indirectly by the President—in the years after 1967, and
enjoy the right to log the land in question for twenty years. A small number of major businesses control the bulk of these HPH concessions. The biggest single concession is held by Prajogo Pangestu (Phang Djun Phen), a Kalimantan Chinese, whose Barito Pacific Group controls about 5.5 million hectares of forest, as well as one of the world’s largest pulp mills, located in Sumatra (Schwarz and Friedland 1992: 42; Jakarta Post 16 July 1998: 1). Suharto’s eldest daughter, Siti Hardijanti Rukmana, is a partner in a number of Barito Pacific’s business concerns.

The archetype of the regime associate is Mohamad ‘Bob’ Hasan (The Kian Seng) who holds in his own right around 1.6 million hectares of timber concessions, but who is the most important figure in the business by virtue of his dominance of the various industry associations in Indonesia. Hasan has been a close associate of Suharto since the 1950s, later serving as a partner in the Nusamba (Nusantara Ampera Bhakti) business group with Suharto’s son, Sigit Harjojudanto, in which Suharto family foundations also participated. Hasan’s timber interests began when he became the local partner (with a 10 per cent interest) in PT Georgia Pacific in the early 1970s to exploit a timber concession in Kalimantan. He later acquired the controlling ownership of the company, which was renamed PT Kiani Lestari, and became part of Hasan’s Kalimanis group. By the 1980s, his business interests had expanded into almost every area of Indonesian industry, and he served as a key administrator of the plethora of ‘philanthropic’ foundations into which Suharto chose to place his money (Reuters 1998; Barr 1998).

Since 1981, when Indonesia announced the banning of exports of raw timber, a measure fully implemented by the beginning of 1985, the government’s policies have helped establish plywood and paper production as the most important forest derived products. In particular, the Indonesian plywood cartel has dominated the world market for this form of processed timber, with marketing policies driving other competitors from the scene. At this time Hasan expanded his business interests to include plywood manufacture and marketing.

‘Private’ organisations play a crucial role in the timber industry. As early as 1974, Bob Hasan appreciated the leverage that a place in such organisations would give him, and formed the Indonesian Timber Society (Masyarakat Peryayuan Indonesia—MPI) with himself as Chair. This strategy was repeated

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3 For an overview of concession holdings in Indonesia, see Ross (1996: appendix 5.2, 176).
in the plywood industry. Apkindo (Asosiasi Produsen Kayu Lapis Indonesia—the Indonesian Wood Panel Association) grew to control the granting of export licences to plywood manufacturers and to set production quotas for domestic producers, as well as to dominate the transport of plywood to and distribution within major markets, notably Japan. Apkindo charged producers a range of fees for development and marketing. These controls and finances, and the fact that Indonesia produces around 70 per cent of all the plywood sold in the international market, makes the organisation a major actor in the nation’s export trade. It was dominated, however, by Bob Hasan, who managed it largely as a personal fiefdom until it was dismantled after pressure from the IMF in 1998. Hasan endeavoured to replicate in the other sectors of the timber industry, his domination of the plywood business. He became chairman of the Indonesian Sawmillers Association and also the Indonesian Furniture Industry Association.

Forestry and palm plantations are intimately linked. Many of the actors and regulations are the same. Land acquired originally for the extraction of timber has often been transformed into oil plantations. Many of the owners of major timber companies also have extensive interests in the production and processing of palm oil. As with the conversion of degraded forest land to plantation timber, the establishment of a plantation requires that the land first be cleared, and fire is by far the cheapest method. Just as the Indonesian government gave a major impetus to forestry exports, so more recently palm plantations have become a national priority. The area of land devoted to oil palms doubled (to 2.5 million hectares) between 1990 and 1997, and government plans to increase the total area to 5.5 million hectares by the year 2000 require a very high continuing rate of conversion.

The situation in East Malaysia is not much different, though the absolute area of forest land is proportionately smaller, and the timber generally of poorer quality. The power to grant logging concessions in Sarawak is in the gift of the state’s Chief Minister (since 1981), Datuk Patinggi Taib Mahmud, who is also Forestry Minister. Due to a split in the ruling elite in 1987, details of the holders of concessions were published in the press in Sarawak, which demonstrated that political associates, family members and friends of the Chief Minister were the most important concessionaires (Chin et al. 1994: 5–9, 73–4). These include the Environment Minister, Datuk Amar James Wong, whose company, Limbang Trading, controls over 100,000 hectares of concessions. These timber holdings are often exploited by milling companies, with the nominal owners deriving an income from rent. Timber is a vital component of the Sarawak and Sabah economies, accounting for the largest single export
item for each at around 30 per cent of overall exports (Wee 1994: chapter 4). The Malaysian tax regime encourages timber exploitation since the states have the power to tax this sector (unlike petroleum, the bulk of the taxes on which are collected by the federal government). In Sabah, where 2.7 million hectares of the 3.3 million hectares have been designated for commercial use, similar circumstances are to be found. The rate of deforestation through the 1980s was so high that in 1990 the granting of licences for milling timber or producing plywood or veneer was suspended indefinitely, and timber production is now in marked decline (Mohamed and Ti 1993). Nevertheless, around 500,000 hectares of forest or former forest land was devastated in fires which broke out in early 1998 in Sabah.

**Testing the patrimonial thesis**

So far, defective forestry practices in a policy environment in which private individuals and interests under the patronage of Suharto have had the upper hand, would appear to account for Indonesia’s woeful record on fire prevention. This interpretation of the dynamics of policy making is supported by evidence that industry money collected by the government was made available for private purposes. In Indonesia, all logging concessionaires must pay a timber tax. This tax, called the Reforestation Fund (*Dana Reboisasi*: DR), is composed of a levy of (on average) $16 a cubic metre on all raw timber logged. It has been established that Hasan was given presidential approval for a Rp 250 billion (then $100 million) low interest loan to fund the construction of his massive scale Kiani Kertas pulp mill, the operations of which, of course, were bound to lead to the very reverse of reforestation (*Inside Indonesia* Digest no. 46, 8 December 1997). There is evidence that regulations have been waived to the advantage of Hasan’s business. As has been noted, in an attempt to discipline the logging industry, Forestry Minister Jamaludin Suryohadikusumo revoked the licences of many concessionaires, including Hasan’s Kiani Lestari, during the haze crisis of late 1997. Hasan’s licence was very quickly restored even though local reports indicate that his concerns had ignored the prevailing regulations prohibiting the use of fire in land clearing (*Inside Indonesia* Digest no. 42, 4 October 1997).

The fact that Hasan’s power, having reached its zenith in the final days of the Suharto regime when he assumed the office of Minister of Trade and

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4 For an overview of theoretical approaches to political power in Indonesia, see MacIntyre (1990: chapter 2).
Industry, began to disappear once Suharto resigned the presidency again supports the patrimonial hypothesis. Within months, reform groups within Hasan’s industry organisations contested his leadership and management, the state intervened to seize his assets after he failed to follow bank restructuring requirements, and his expenditure of industry levies was scrutinised.

A movement called MPI Reformasi emerged to challenge Hasan’s dominance of the timber industry. His companies lost forest concessions after disputes regarding title and land use. His business empire then suffered debilitating blow after blow. He fell foul of banking laws when it was shown that bank emergency relief funds went—via the bank of which he was co-propriotor, Bank Umum Nasional (BUN)—to his timber business, rather than being used to restore the bank’s creditworthiness. After the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency became aware that Rp 150 trillion ($24 billion) Bank Indonesia loans were directed to debt-ridden PT Kiani Kertas, and BUN was unable to repay the loan, the Agency assumed control of BUN assets (Asian Wall Street Journal 21 October 1998: 2). The conditions of the IMF restructuring program, which required a consolidation of bank debt, then forced Hasan to sell much of his plywood and timber empire, including the PT Kiani Kertas mill in Kalimantan (Asian Wall Street Journal 10 November 1998: 1). His other holdings, including his interests in the Freeport mining operation and in the Astra group, also came under threat.

The legal system, having long functioned to legitimise the power of the ruling elite, then began to deliver judgements against Hasan and his interests. In North Sumatra, thirteen youth organisations were successful in mounting a court case against Hasan’s Indonesian Forest Business Association (APHI), claiming that the magnate had burned forests without any concern for the environment. The judgement of the court was that Hasan pay compensation to these organisations totalling Rp 50 billion (Straits Times 20 June 1998).

If it is the case that the control of the timber industry is best understood with reference to the patrimonial model, or as Dauvergne argues, the ‘patron-client model’, then the ‘cause’ of the haze problem may be identified in those terms. Timber concessionaires may be seen as the holders of benefices from the ruler, a form of transaction which generates complementary power, though at the expense of the general population. On this view, the expense involved initially entailed depriving the indigenes of the use and enjoyment of the forest, and ordinary citizenry of any revenues or income from the timber trade, while creating an extra-legal sphere beyond the reach of normal state regulation. The
forestry practices which arose in these circumstances then generated additional expenses, in the form of the haze and of environmental degradation.

But such an approach requires some reinterpretation, as the Weberian assumption that the corollaries of modernisation, bureaucratic rationality and the market, are necessarily corrosive of the patrimonial impulse has been challenged in the Indonesian case. The development of bureaucratic rationality actually gave Hasan and those like him enhanced power, since they were able to dominate industry organisations from which they stood to benefit financially, just as they were able to frame state regulations to accord to their activities a veneer of legitimacy. Far from engagement with the world economy requiring greater discipline and acceptance of market priorities, these concessionaires were able to exploit their dominance of the export sector to derive additional finances. The characterisation of the New Order state offered by Robison (1988–89: 55), which centres on ‘a pact of domination…between the politico–bureaucrats who dominate the state apparatus and the leading elements of the capital-owning classes based upon a complex conjuncture of interests’ captures the mixed sources of power of the forestry magnates. However, Robison’s contention that ‘the state’s autonomy and its power to determine the structure of capital ownership and investment through regulation and allocation of resources has been diminished, as has the power of officials to appropriate the authority and resources of public office’ (ibid. 73) was, at best, premature. During the ten year period since those words were written, the Suharto regime engaged in a prolonged and ultimately fatal campaign of plunder which saw the property and control of courtiers and cronies reach new heights.

A further modification is required to the patron–client model in this instance. This is clearly the logic that is at work, since Bob Hasan would neither have held the concessions, nor controlled the market, nor received special finance if he had not received highly favourable treatment from President Suharto. Moreover, as Michael Ross contends (1996: 43–46), the Indonesian case shows that it is no accident that potential resource rents are most imperfectly captured by such a patronage state. But to describe the situation simply as one dominated by patron–client relations is to miss a major aspect of the Indonesian situation.

Writing in 1979, an influential exponent of the neo-patrimonial interpretation concluded that ‘Indonesia’s apparently patrimonial political structures have been built on nonpatrimonial foundations, with the result that patrimonial-style stability is not likely to endure’ (Crouch 1979: 587).
As William Ascher (1998) and Christopher Barr (1998) further point out, the arrangement whereby Chinese clients are granted by Suharto the use of extensive timber concessions does not conform to the usual patron–client model. Though these individuals may be wealthy, their support is not so apparently crucial to the regime, in the way that the support of military clients was vital in the years immediately after Suharto’s assumption of power. A historical view of the timber sector shows, however, that in the 1970s many of the concession holders were originally companies associated with the military. These largely vacated the industry in the 1980s, with the ban on unprocessed log exports (which was announced in 1981 and came into full effect at the beginning of 1985) and the movement by timber interests to downstream processing which required significant new investments. They were replaced by the Chinese.

Why did Suharto need these clients? They appeared to play several roles. First, they acted to host business activity on the part of members of the Suharto family. Bob Hasan, for example, is associated in various business ventures with three of Suharto’s children, has functioned as manager of the International Timber Corporation of Indonesia on their behalf, and had a major role in the creation of the Nusamba business group which manages many of the interests of the Suharto family foundations. This hosting sometimes took the form of subsidising or even rescuing failed Suharto business and ‘charitable’ ventures. Second, they were used to advance industrialisation projects with ‘nationalist’ ends, often contrary to their own immediate material interests. The ban on raw timber exports, for example, though it artificially lowered the price of timber inputs, required significant investments in wood and pulp processing while wiping out previously handsome export earnings. Chinese capital was also a significant component in investments to create a comprehensive petrochemicals industry. Their dominance of this sector gave Suharto control over a significant source of ‘off-budget’ funding, which allowed him thus to pursue programs sometimes contrary to the policies of his own technocrats. And ethnic Chinese clients were chosen, partly because they had the capital or business expertise, but also because they had no attachment to the generality of the population, and thus would never become alternative sources of power. To pursue this analysis, the ‘haze’ was therefore the outcome of logging concessions and plantation agriculture which were themselves aspects of patronage politics.

Moving from the overall analysis of the Indonesian system to the obstacles that arose to control the fires which were the immediate source of the haze in 1997, policy paralysis and/or lack of state capacity are both in evidence.
Environment and forestry officials and cabinet members sought in vain to have prohibitions on burning enforced; their efforts were undermined by the president, and government reshuffles then removed those individuals who had acknowledged that the state had not behaved in accordance with its formal–legal duty. The character and limitations of state capacity in the late industrialising state has been a major theme of the literature (Deyo 1987: especially chapter 8; Haggard 1990: chapter 2). Donald Crone’s view of the sources of state capacity appears to be borne out by the Indonesian case:

...the capacities of states vary with the structure of political support and the means of political control available to a state’s elite. Narrow, authoritarian regimes tend to be coercive and controlled by powerful interests, which detracts from their states’ capacities to promote economic and political goals. Moderately broad-based regimes, by contrast, provide a greater degree of flexibility and political capacity with which state elites can manage economic and political challenges (Crone 1987–88: 254).

The haze may therefore be attributed both to the New Order’s original patrimonial impulse, as well as to the specific use by the elite of the bureaucratic instruments that came into their hands as a result of the pursuit of modernisation, which compromised and undermined the rational–legal capacity of the state to deal with the problem. It may also be attributed to the regime’s development priorities, which required a free hand to be given to the business activities of the chosen clients. With regard to regional cooperation, what is clear is that the protection of these interests, or perhaps their power of veto over effective policy innovation, was more important than the effective realisation of what had become, by the end of 1997, the increasingly desperate demands of ASEAN elites and publics alike. Indonesia, the pivotal actor in ASEAN, when forced to choose between regime solidarity and regional concern took the former option. This failure to take any real initiative condemned the many attendant examples of ASEAN diplomacy to irrelevance.

ASEAN cooperation and the haze

This regime dynamic within the core state of ASEAN has had the most profound implications for regional order. In effect, domestic priorities have prevailed over the needs of the region, with drastic consequences for cooperation between the states of Southeast Asia and for mutual confidence and security. ASEAN cooperation on the environment has a history of over twenty years, being initiated by the ‘ASEAN Environment Program I’ of
The standing of environmental issues was enhanced when occasional group gatherings of specialists on the issue were upgraded to annual meetings of the ASEAN Senior Officials on the Environment (ASOEN) in 1989. In June 1990, the ASEAN Ministers on the Environment endorsed a document which became known as the Kuala Lumpur Accord on the Environment and Development, and which enunciated a common stand, that could be described as generally ‘pro-development’, on the relationship between these two issues.

Since that time, ASEAN’s approach has changed markedly. In the early days, governments and government nominated specialists were regarded as the chief—or only—relevant actors. In the Strategic Plan of Action on the Environment, adopted in April 1994, however, ASEAN’s implicit policy community has been significantly broadened. The Plan notes that ‘ASOEN in general should establish mechanisms that will motivate, educate, train and build capacities especially among the major groups identified in [the UNCED’s] Agenda 21’ (ASEAN Strategic Plan 1994: 9). Now the latter explicitly includes NGOs and indigenous people, and considers the task of ‘capacity building’ in developing states should include their contribution.7 Given the record of disputed and uncertain legitimacy that has been accorded to NGOs in most ASEAN nations, and also bearing in mind that forestry proceeds often at the cost of indigenous land rights in Indonesia and Malaysia, this is a noteworthy shift.

But ASEAN’s sensitivity to environmental concerns is uneven. Thus the Plan also includes a reference to the Singapore Resolution of 1992 which enjoined ‘joint regional action to counter the anti-tropical timber campaign launched by environmental NGOs and governments in the more developed countries to stop the importation of tropical timber’ (ASEAN Strategic Plan 1994: 16).

Though ‘transboundary pollution’ was considered in the 1990 document, the Indonesian forest fires of 1994 prompted ASEAN to adopt measures specifically designed to meet this problem, in the form of the ‘ASEAN Cooperation Plan on Transboundary Pollution’, considered at an ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on the Environment convened in Kuching in October 1994. The first ‘programme area’ identified relates to ‘regional haze incidents’, and the strategy outlined to deal with these incidents emphasises fire fighting capability (including early warning of fires) and the prohibition of

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6 ASEAN policy is discussed in Pangestu and Ahmad (1997) and Tay (1998a).
burning during dry periods. Longer term, ‘zero-burning practices’ and ‘awareness building efforts to eliminate the use of fire in land clearing activities through economically sound and environmentally friendly methods in agriculture’ are also recommended (ASEAN Cooperation Plan 1995: 4). What is noteworthy in this document is the avoidance of any mention of the promotion of forest conservation or protection as a means of minimising the generation of smoke. Following from this agreement, a ‘Haze Technical Task Force’ was established by ASOEN in 1995, with the aim of sharing information on fire prevention and containment, including making available satellite data on actual fires.

But even though ASEAN had focused on the haze problem, the mechanisms established moved ponderously. However, the crisis of 1997 mobilised ASOEN to meet three times in the year. Senior official agreed on a regional division of labour in November, with Singapore taking the lead in the monitoring of fire hazards, Malaysia concentrating on fire prevention, and Indonesia dealing with fire fighting. In addition, a ministerial level meeting in December 1997, adopted a ‘Regional Haze Action Plan’ which focused squarely on the problem. This identified three objectives—to develop better management and enforcement so as to prevent fires, to establish cooperative mechanisms to monitor fires, and to build fire-fighting capability. The first appeared to address the difficult question of internal regulations and national policies, but the approach taken was to request that each nation formulate a ‘National Plan’ (RHAP) in these areas, with an emphasis upon strict controls on burning.

These plans were reviewed in 1998, though by that time the financial crisis had come to deflect and absorb crucial government energies. At this stage, the frequent convening of meetings on the haze had brought home to all the nations in the region the full dimensions of the problem. Perhaps felicitously, the meeting of ASEAN environment ministers held in Brunei in April, which declared that RHAP was now in operation, was conducted in severe haze conditions, with the PSI level standing at over 400 in the extremely hazardous range (Straits Times 5 April 1998; Straits Times 8 April 1998). So serious were the fires in East Kalimantan that the ministers concluded that nothing could be done about them, though this decision was not well publicised within ASEAN (‘Let Fires Burn’ 1998). Three days after the meeting the airport at Bandar Seri Begawan was closed to traffic as a result. Confronted with a PSI of over 500, authorities in neighbouring Miri in Sarawak were forced to close all schools. Nor were regional expedients the only devices considered at this time. On 12 December 1997, Malaysia and Indonesia signed
a bilateral memorandum of understanding for joint efforts at disaster relief, including the haze.

As part of the ‘Hanoi Plan of Action’ adopted at the sixth informal summit in December 1998, the ASEAN states agreed to take all necessary steps to protect the environment, declaring (in article 6.1) the following objective:

Fully implement the ASEAN Cooperation Plan on Transboundary Pollution with particular emphasis on the Regional Haze Action Plan by the year 2001.

But the proliferation of plans and acronyms, though it has led to enhanced contact between officials and experts from all the ASEAN nations, did not materially influence the situation on the ground. Reviewing the record of ASEAN cooperation on the issue, Simon Tay’s judgement must be regarded as definitive: ‘ASEAN has to date been unable to supplement failures by Indonesia to address the South East Asian fires’ (Tay 1998a: 110).

International Organisations, NGOs and the haze

As the haze crisis developed, ASEAN turned to various international and foreign institutions for aid, advice, and funding. And as the crisis became more serious, domestic publics were progressively drawn into policy making circles in the hope that they would have an impact.

In 1991, a workshop sponsored by the German government produced a draft of a ‘Long-term Integrated Fire Management System’. GTZ (Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Technische Zusammenarbeit), the international development consultancy funded by the German government, then established the Integrated Forest Fire Management Project (IFFM) in East Kalimantan, which has worked on the fire problem from 1994. In April 1998, the Global Environment Facility (GEF) allocated US$6.75 million to assist the Indonesian fire-fighting effort. Participation by the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) in an ASEAN workshop in May 1998, led to a grant from UNEP of US$850 000 to the GEF to support a fire prevention project in the region, mostly dedicated to providing ‘early warning’ data. UNEP also took responsibility for raising a fund of US$10 million to support a regional fire-fighting effort, though international donors proved unresponsive. At the same time, the Asian Development Bank pledged US$1 million specifically to

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8 The IFFM maintains a web-site cataloguing their activities: http://smd.mega.net.id/iffm
Indonesia, and a further US$1 million to ASEAN as a group, for regional technical assistance (RETA) in preventing and mitigating the haze. Bilateral assistance from twelve nations included US$4 million from the United States, as well as aid from Australia, Canada and Japan. Significantly, the workshop which considered implementing these schemes placed on record that fact that ‘incipient partnerships between the ADB ASEAN–RETA with a Singapore-based legal environmental NGO’ (‘Vanguard ASEAN–ADB Initiative’ 1998) were developing. Indeed, the seriousness of the crisis led ASEAN to entertain offers of help from almost any quarter, including the World Wide Fund for Nature, and a range of forestry conservation organisations, notable among them the Centre for International Forestry Research and the International Centre for Research in Agroforestry.

Domestic interests were also mobilising to confront the haze problem. The Indonesian state has long existed in an uneasy relationship with NGOs. Summarising the situation in the 1980s, Robert Cribb came to the following judgement:

Most environmentalist groups…occupy a terrain of fluctuating size between being banned and being compulsorily incorporated into government-sponsored structures in which they would lose all freedom of action (Cribb 1988: 34).

Regarding some environmental issues, especially land tenure, NGOs have supported the rights of individuals and communities against the state and powerful interests (Eldridge 1995: chapter 7; Eccleston and Potter 1996). In respect of some aspects of environmental protection, however, there have been instances of state partnerships with NGOs and international groups with the objective of conserving resources and natural habitats. Thus SKEPHI, the Indonesian Network for Forest Conservation (Sekretariat Kerjasama Pelestarian Hutan Indonesia), having long served as a vocal critic of government policy went into several partnerships with the government, supporting for example community-based forest conservation in the Mentawi Islands, and became a participant in dialogues on a range of environmental issues (Cohen 1995: 67; MacAndrews 1994). The Indonesia Environment Network, WALHI (Wahana Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia), an umbrella group for a number of NGOs, and the most important of the local civic actors, gained a reputation for balancing advocacy and analysis in the 1980s. During the closing years of the Suharto regime, however, it became more inclined to contest aspects of government policy, developing a strong critique of the costs incurred by the Freeport mining operation in Irian Jaya. Something of a
watershed was crossed when WALHI filed a suit in a state administrative court seeking to invalidate a presidential decree that diverted Rp 400 billion (then $175 million) from the state reforestation fund to the nation’s failing aircraft industry, then the fief of Science and Technology Minister, B. J. Habibie. Although the court ruled that WALHI could not bring the suit, and Habibie promised to return the funds with interest, from that time the government’s record, especially in forestry management, was the subject of trenchant criticism.

International actors have also become involved with environmental issues in Indonesia. The World Wide Fund for Nature has been assisting the Indonesian government in the management of seventeen of its 32 national parks (including the over 1.4 million hectare Kayan Mentarang Nature Reserve in East Kalimantan), and has therefore enjoyed a degree of prominence and influence in Jakarta, sometimes even generating some envy amongst domestic NGOs. A measure of the role of the WWF can be gained from the fact that it drafted the Indonesian National Biodiversity Action Plan in 1991 for the government, and in late 1995, signed a ‘Letter of Intent to Cooperate’ with the Indonesian Ministry of Environment to produce an assessment of Indonesian compliance with the requirements of the Global Biodiversity Convention, to which Indonesia is a signatory.

The events of 1997 brought many of these interests together. Assisted by information and support from the international players, local groups—the most active of which was WALHI—pressured the government to police its own regulations. Activists in Kalimantan and elsewhere exposed the more flagrant violators and also took the lead in delivering immediate relief measures, including the distribution of face masks and first aid for respiratory complaints. In the words of a military participant in fire-relief operations:

…a small number of local intelligentsia, informal native leaders, NGO activists, religious groups, and youth groups initiated a number of direct actions on their own, dismayed that local and national authorities, and particularly the Armed Forces, were reluctant and half-hearted in their response to the crisis. Their actions often generated a sense of solidarity and served to establish a network of concerned, active citizens. These networks succeeded in gathering and distributing relief aid (Djuanda 1998: 9).

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9 For details of the WWF program in Indonesia, see: [http://www.panda.org/resources/inthefield/lop/indonesia.htm](http://www.panda.org/resources/inthefield/lop/indonesia.htm) (accessed 31 December 98).
Widespread dissatisfaction with the crony dominated structure of the timber industry and the environmental disaster it engendered was then a factor in the ouster of Suharto in 1998.

**ASEAN modalities under challenge**

There is an intensive and inconclusive debate on the character of ASEAN, but most commentators accept that it came into existence and has persisted for a mix of security and economic reasons. To address issues in these crucial areas, its internal modalities have developed from the premise that Southeast Asian nations should solve their own problems in their own way. The governments of the region should practice mutual solidarity, and policy between them should be coordinated using the complex network of personal relationships built up over a generation of quiet and informal diplomacy. The key actors in this web have traditionally been governing elites and senior officials and experts. For a long period, NGOs were regarded as having no major part in the ASEAN policy community, and participation by international organisations and transnational NGOs was seen as illegitimate. International regimes—aside from those pertaining to trade—were held to be of limited relevance for the region. ASEAN’s many reservations on the applicability of the global human rights regime, as were expressed in the Bangkok Declaration of 1993, may be taken here as emblematic (Tang 1995).

The position of the Singapore government on ‘civil society’ has long been critical. Interest groups, provided they conform to the Societies Act, may be constituted, but any overtly ‘political’ activity is held to be out of bounds. As Chua Beng-Huat points out, this prevents an autonomous civil sphere from developing:

Civic voluntary associations, quintessential institutions of civil society, are barred by the [Societies] Act from making political statements beyond the interests of their respectively defined constituencies, under threat of being deregistered. The Act effectively suppresses the commonplace activity of a civil society in which voluntary associations establish their solidarity by publicly sympathising with each other’s causes (Chua 1995: 205).

Interest articulation outside established and licensed channels is therefore held to be illegitimate. The extent to which this practice undermines the claims of Singapore to be a democracy is a matter of debate, but there is no doubt that it is a distinctive and prominent feature of the political system. In recent times, an enhanced role for civil, or ‘civic’ society has been mooted by intellectuals and political figures, though as yet with little practical result. In Malaysia,
similar constraints exist on the manifestations of civil society, though at times of political upheaval, these have sometimes been ignored (Jesudason 1995; Case 1996). However, it is noteworthy that in November 1997, the then Education Minister, Najib Tun Razak, banned academics from making comments on the haze on the grounds that this tarnished the nation’s image abroad (Straits Times 13 November 1997). In April 1998, the Information Minister, Mohamed Rahmat, admonished a local television station for using the term ‘haze’, rather than reporting what should have described as ‘low-cloud, dew and smoke’ (Straits Times 21 April 1998). These examples illustrate that the Malaysian government is unwilling to permit free discourse in an untrammelled civic space on a national problem of this magnitude.

Indeed, the ‘Asia values’ discourse arose in part to counter the claims of such agencies and regimes. The Asian values paradigm represented state–society relations as following a distinctive ‘non-Western’ path in the region, with interest groups subsumed within a broad social consensus, and governments enjoying pre-eminent prestige and discharging their role in the manner of a trustee.

As has been shown, the haze has both security and economic dimensions. The short term costs of the haze have been the subject of many estimates, but whatever the precise dimensions, the impact on production, resource depletion, biodiversity loss, tourism, and health, as well as the opportunity cost of financing fire prevention and extinguishing measures, has been to generate immense costs. Ultimately these costs will have to be paid beyond Southeast Asia, given the impact the haze is likely to have on global climate. The security dimensions have been both direct and indirect, striking at the economic foundations of military power as well as weakening regional accord. It would not be an overstatement to maintain that the haze has been Southeast Asia’s biggest internal challenge if not since the era of ‘confrontation’ then since Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia in 1979. While the 1997 financial crisis has had a greater impact, its causes have been partly external, and increasingly it is viewed as a product of the globalisation of finance. Although Peter Dauvergne has argued persuasively that Japan’s ‘ecological shadow’ has encouraged, and even financed, the forestry practices that have been a major cause of the problem, this is nevertheless a secondary or ‘pull’ factor (Dauvergne 1997).

The haze has posed a challenge to every aspect of ASEAN’s character and modalities. Mutual solidarity on the part of governments and a preference for indirect diplomacy have collapsed in the face of the seriousness of the problem. Action plans and ministerial meetings did not prove efficacious, with the
Indonesian government incapable of policing its own regulations. A sign of the shift in policy could be seen in the endorsement, at the Fourth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on the haze held in Singapore on 19 June 1998, of non-official participation in dealing with the issue. In the words of the final communiqué:

The Ministers...welcomed the increasing role of the Non-Government Organisations and the private sector in regional, national and local efforts to combat, prevent and mitigate fires. To this end, the Ministers welcomed regular dialogue between NGOs and the ASOEN Senior Officials on the forest fires and haze matters ('Joint Press Statement' 1998).

At the 1998 summit of foreign ministers, the group openly debated, albeit without success, a more interventionist approach to its common concerns. Meanwhile, in desperation, Singapore and Malaysia provided directly information and resources to NGOs, and sought assistance from international organisations in the hope that the former would change conditions on the ground, and the latter would provide the impetus to move opinion in Jakarta.

In a very significant development, the Centre for Remote Imaging, Sensing and Processing (CRISP) at the National University of Singapore began to publish on the internet satellite imagery which provided ineluctable evidence of the dimensions and location of the fires in Indonesia. Previously CRISP had performed analysis of satellite imagery that had been passed to the Ministry of the Environment in Singapore, who had made this available from time to time to their opposite numbers in Indonesia. The fact that CRISP were permitted to go public using the internet was a calculated strategy. As Garry Rodan has demonstrated (1998), the Singapore government is very sensitive to the political impact of information propagated by way of the internet. The decision, therefore, was clearly intended to have an effect on opinion within Indonesia, and was thus an implicit departure from the ASEAN policy of refraining from intervening in the internal affairs of member states. The orchestration of NGO and interest group pressure on Indonesia was taken a stage further with the convening of the Singapore Environment Council (SEC) ‘Policy Dialogue on the South-east Asian Forest Fires’ in June 1998. The choice of this vehicle indicated that the Singapore government had become

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10 The provision by CRISP of satellite imagery on the internet was discussed by its Director, Professor Lim Hock, during his presentation, ‘Monitoring of Land and Forest Fires by Remote Sensing’ at the Singapore SEC dialogue (see also Soo (1998). International NGOs also began publicising such satellite derived material in 1997.
thoroughly exasperated with Indonesian inaction. The SEC is an example of an entity labelled in the city state a GONGO—‘near-state non-government organisation’—and the meeting was chaired by Ambassador Tommy Koh.¹¹

Simon Tay’s judgement on the international dimensions of the problem is instructive:

If the ASEAN Action Plan is not a solution in itself, it may still be significant for the legitimacy and urgency it gives to assistance from outside ASEAN—from other countries and international organizations (Tay 1998b: 205).

It could be argued that the actual relationship between these two is the reverse of that which is posited—the appeal to international organisations may have been launched in the hope that this would motivate key Indonesian actors to follow a plan that, to that point, had been largely an empty document. The strategy of using the doctrine of state liability for trans-boundary damage and harms, a strategy advocated by Singapore’s former Ambassador to Washington, Tommy Koh, himself a champion in former times of the discourse of ‘Asian values’, represents little less than a sea-change in ASEAN, especially in light of the fact that he openly charges ‘logging companies and palm oil plantations’ with responsibility for the greater bulk of the fires (Koh 1998).¹² Although the sources of the haze within Indonesia are private concerns, nevertheless it is arguable that the state’s failure to police and enforce its own regulations renders the latter culpable.

Meanwhile, in the report on the lessons of the fires produced by the State Ministry for the Environment, in association with the UNDP, NGOs occupy centre stage. The major contribution of NGOs during 1997 in fund raising, networking and sharing vital information, is recorded. Further, the solution proposed to deal with future fire crises is to form a new public–private agency involving NGOs and local stake holders which will empower the communities most affected or threatened by fire to take the necessary preventive steps free from interference from the state and from private interests (Badawi, Walsh and Jhamtani 1998: 72–76).

¹¹ On the GONGO mode of organisation, see Ling and Koh (1998: 99). The SEC was established by the National Council on the Environment, and more than half of its funding is provided by the Singapore government (SEC 1998). On the SEC dialogue, see Straits Times 8 June 1998 and 18 June 1998.

¹² Professor Koh also recommends that interested parties ‘mobilise public opinion’ to condemn the forestry companies responsible.
The acceptance, indeed the endorsement, of the positive role of NGOs poses an additional problem for the newly enlarged ASEAN. The group now incorporates states in which civil society is either underdeveloped (as is the case in Laos) or states dominated by elites who contest or reject outright the legitimacy of autonomous agencies in civil society (as is the case in Cambodia, Vietnam and Myanmar). If ASEAN modalities are to be modified to embrace NGOs as essential actors in the domestic and regional policy community, a significant divide will emerge between the old and new ASEAN states. The established members will then be faced with the decision either to seek to bridge that divide by fostering civil society, and risk alienating the ruling elites in the new member states, or to accept that for an indefinite (but likely prolonged) period, the organisation will observe different rules for different members and thus be less than fully effective.

Commentators on ASEAN are generally in agreement that the group faces a range of new challenges that are testing the structures and even the rationale of the group. Even before the financial crisis, expansion to incorporate economic and social systems—first Vietnam, then Myanmar and Laos—at quite a different level of development and with distinctive priorities, while attempting to take the lead role—through the ASEAN Regional Forum—in developing Asia wide security discourse, and simultaneously committing to ever more ambitious economic liberalisation objectives—both with AFTA and through APEC—would have tested the most resilient institutions (Pangestu 1997; Buszynski 1997–98). The financial crisis has further complicated this agenda. However, the fact that the haze was a locally produced problem, ASEAN structures already existed to deal with it, and previous ‘haze incidents’ had alerted key actors to the need to take strong measures, but in the event ASEAN cooperation was found wanting, has been a salutary reminder of the limitations of regional consciousness. This precedent may even indicate that regarding other issues of good governance, ASEAN will need both to affirm a more critical approach to domestic policy making, and also act to foster and empower civil society especially in those member nations in which it enjoys little autonomy.
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