Working Paper No. 2000/2

GLOBALISATION AND SECURITY
IN EAST ASIA

Peter Van Ness

Canberra
March 2000

National Library of Australia

Cataloguing-in-Publication Entry

Van Ness, Peter
Globalisation and Security in East Asia

ISBN 0 7315 3107 8.


355.033095

© Peter Van Ness
DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

WORKING PAPERS

The department’s working paper series seeks to provide readers with access to current research on international relations. Reflecting the wide range of interest in the department, it will include topics on global international politics and the international political economy, the Asian–Pacific region and issues of concern to Australian foreign policy.

Publication as a ‘Working Paper’ does not preclude subsequent publication in scholarly journals or books, indeed it may facilitate publication by providing feedback from readers to authors.

Unless otherwise stated, publications of the Department of International Relations are presented without endorsement as contributions to the public record and debate. Authors are responsible for their own analysis and conclusions.
ABSTRACT

The objective of this essay is to analyse the impact of globalisation on security in East Asia during the 1990s. The paper has five parts. It begins with a definition of the key terms: globalisation and security. The next part describes security in the region, focusing on US hegemony and economic interdependence. Part three analyses security threats, old and new, and part four discusses security strategies. The final section, entitled East Asian Security at a Crossroads, assesses the implications for the future, which depend on how the United States understands ‘China threat’ and whether or not Washington decides to deploy ballistic missile defences.
GLOBALISATION AND SECURITY IN EAST ASIA

Peter Van Ness

The objective of this essay is to describe in broad-brush terms the main impacts of globalisation on security issues in East Asia during the 1990s. Since this topic is much too large for a single essay, I have restricted myself to discussing what seem to be the most important changes, since the collapse of the Soviet Union, among three major actors (the United States, Japan, and China) and the member-countries of the Association for Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). I will also briefly mention Korea, Taiwan, and the South China Sea as the three geographical areas where most analysts believe interstate conflict is most likely to break out. I have excluded Russia from this discussion solely in order to narrow the topic to a more manageable size. Russia is clearly a major power in East Asia, but since the collapse of the Soviet Union, it has been playing a much diminished role.

I begin by defining the two key terms: ‘globalisation’ and ‘security.’ One could, and probably should, write an essay solely devoted to assessing the problems involved in defining these terms. In short, I understand globalisation as a multifaceted, structural phenomenon that has progressively intensified since the collapse of the Soviet Union, and that appears to be reshaping understandings of security in the region. Among several important results is the emergence of new, essentially nonmilitary threats to regime survival and changing strategies to enhance security.

Following the discussion of definitions, I address, in turn: security in the region; security threats, old and new; alternative security strategies; and, finally, implications for the future. The period under investigation is the 1990s, or what is usually called the post-Cold War world. Our story begins after the breakup of the Soviet Union, but we should keep in mind the events that lead to its collapse.

1 Peter Van Ness is a visiting fellow at the Contemporary China Centre and lectures on security in the Department of International Relations at the Australian National University. His edited book, Debating Human Rights: Critical Essays from the United States and Asia, was published last year by Routledge.

pvan@coombs.anu.edu.au

I would like to thank Greg Fry, Anne Gunn, Paul Keal, David Kelly, Sam Kim, and Warren Sun for their suggestions to improve this essay. Sole responsibility for what is written remains with me.
Was the Soviet Union the first major victim of globalisation? Does the fall of the Suharto regime in Indonesia show similar features? Does the CCP leadership of China today, for example, infer that this is one of the main threats to their hold on power?

Clearly, one lesson that security policymakers should have learned from the events of the past decade is to expect the unexpected. Our old ways of thinking about security have not prepared us for unexpected events like the collapse of the Soviet Union, the East Asian financial crisis, India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear tests that Western intelligence services failed to anticipate, and the fall of Suharto, previously thought to be one of the most firmly entrenched leaders in the region. Environmental disasters, like the Taiwan earthquake of September 1999, re-emphasise the general point: expect the unexpected.

**Definition of key terms**

*Globalisation*

I conceive of globalisation as those ‘human activities that have a reshaping planetary impact’. I have in mind a combination of historical, economic, military, environmental, and technological factors. Let me briefly introduce each category, and then attempt to weave them into a more integrated whole.

**History.** Indispensable to this concept of globalisation is an understanding that contemporary global relationships have their roots in the 500-year history of Western expansion and conquest of the globe. The interstate and transnational relations of today have been shaped by the history of imperialism, colonialism, wars of national liberation, and struggles for self-determination between what Kishore Mahbubani has called ‘The West and the Rest’. In my opinion, it is not possible to understand contemporary debates about human rights, economic inequality, national security, or global power relationships without placing your analysis firmly in the context of this history.

**Economics.** All analysts agree that globalisation is an economic phenomenon. Most analyses describe globalisation as essentially the result of increasing market participation by virtually all countries in the world plus the growing impact of rapidly changing information and transportation technologies.\(^2\) International trade, investment, foreign aid, and technological transfer within an

---

\(^2\) See, for example, the best-selling book by *New York Times* columnist Thomas L. Friedman (1999). For a withering critique of Friedman (‘a tone of arrogance so grandiose that one suspects the author has taken leave of his senses’) see Frank (1999: 7).
international division of labour increasingly shaped by the power of multinational corporations (MNCs) and liberalised capital and currency markets have made economic competitiveness a universal concern. For any country that wants to modernise and increase its material standard of living, there now appears to be no alternative but to join the cut-throat competition of the global capitalist market—to put on what Friedman calls ‘the golden straitjacket’ of economic reforms to make its economy as competitive as possible (1999: 86–8).

*Military.* The Nuclear Age began with the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, but it was not until the United States and the Soviet Union achieved a capacity to destroy each other completely that it could accurately be said that nuclear weapons had a planetary impact. Often today, nuclear weapons are lumped together with chemical and biological weapons in a category of ‘weapons of mass destruction’. However, although chemical and biological warfare can cause terrible casualties, it is only the quality and quantity of nuclear weapons, so far, that have the capacity to destroy civilisations. Fear of the destructive power of nuclear weapons has altered global strategic calculations, making the Cold War unique when compared to earlier military confrontations. The global ‘peace’ maintained by the strategic standoff among the world’s nuclear powers is also a key element of what we call globalisation.

*Ecology.* Rapid industrialisation has begun to affect the capacity of the global ecological system to support human life on the planet. Evidence of the planetary effects of pollution and other forms of ecological deterioration, like species elimination, greenhouse effect, global warming, ozone depletion, and so on, all contribute to the realisation by inhabitants of the planet that we share a common fate and future. Regional events, like air pollution from the Indonesian forest fires in 1997 which affected public health and economic enterprises in neighbouring Malaysia, Singapore, and Brunei, demonstrate the limits of self-help strategies by individual countries in attempting to deal with these environmental dangers. Increasingly, it has become clear that the world cannot forever seek to solve problems of material sufficiency and equity by encouraging more and more economic growth. There are ecological limits to what the planet can bear.

*Science and Technology.* The driving force behind all of these factors is the power of modern science and technological development. Friedman points

---

3 ‘The advent of nuclear weapons meant that a head-on war, of a classical type, between the two principal contestants would not only spell their mutual destruction but could unleash lethal consequences for a significant portion of humanity. The intensity of the conflict was thus simultaneously subjected to extraordinary self-restraint on the part of both rivals’ (Brzezinski 1997: 6).
especially to changes in ‘how we communicate, how we invest, and how we
learn about the world’ (1999: 40). All analysts acknowledge the significance of
information technology in reshaping how we live, and Bill Gates, head of
Microsoft, predicts that the pace of change in information technologies will
further increase in the future.

David Held and his colleagues argue that ‘Far from this being a world of
“discrete civilizations,” or simply an international society of states, it has become
a fundamentally interconnected global order, marked by intense patterns of
exchange as well as by clear patterns of power, hierarchy, and unevenness’
(Held, et al. 1999: 49). The United Nations Development Program (UNDP), in its
understanding of globalisation, emphasises who gets what (‘global progress’
versus ‘global deprivation’) (UNDP 1999). In this analysis, I understand
globalisation as a particular context in which states, social organisations, and
individuals seek to enhance their security.

Clearly, globalisation is controversial, as the demonstrations against the
1999 Seattle meeting of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) illustrated. There
are winners and losers in this new globalised environment. On balance, it would
seem that the most powerful, the most internationalised and innovative, and the
most competitive in world markets gain most. But globalisation has a variety of
impacts through different levels of society right down to the individual
(including influences on sexuality, marriage, and the family) as Anthony Giddens
has shown in his 1999 Reith Lectures (1999a).

‘Security’

Defining ‘security’ is even more problematic. Muthiah Alagappa, in his edited
book, suggests a typology for analysing security comprised of five key
elements: referent (whose security are we talking about?), core values to be
protected, types of threats, nature of the security problem, and approaches to
enhancing security (Alagappa, ed. 1998: 17). Making decisions about the first is
probably the most difficult, and choices made about whose security is at stake
obviously shape the rest of the enterprise as well (that is, with respect to core
values, types of threats, security strategies, and so on). Is the principal task to
protect the security of the individual citizen, the national society, the regime in
power, or the state?

Denny Roy has shown how each of these four different referents can
threaten the security of the others.
Individuals may endanger the state (via treason, sabotage, espionage, and fifth column activities), the regime (through dissent, agitation, insurrection, and assassination), or the nation (via hate crimes). Nations may be a threat to individuals (such as cases of persecution of minorities), the state (via separatism and ethnic nationalism), or the regime (when an ethnic minority controls the government—to the objection of the majority). The regime is often a threat to individuals (extrajudicial detention, execution, torture, or poor social or economic policies that cause the masses to suffer) and occasionally to a nation (genocide) as well. The state can threaten individuals (through a system of government that restricts civil liberties) or even nations (by boundaries that create multistate nations or isolated ethnic minorities) (Roy 1999: 134–5).

Since in most studies of security issues, the subject of analysis becomes the decisions made by national policymakers, almost inevitably the implied referent for those studies is regime security, the policymakers’ preoccupation. In this analysis, I will also focus mainly on the problems of regime security. During the decade of the 1990s, however, policymakers everywhere in East Asia became aware that regime security was in turn dependent upon their fulfilling certain requirements for individual citizens and the national society. The United Nations Development Program has specified these requirements in terms of a concept of ‘human security’ (UNDP 1994: chapter two).

For UNDP, human security essentially means individual ‘freedom from fear and freedom from want’. They argue that conventional concepts of security must be changed from ‘an exclusive stress on territorial security to a much greater stress on people’s security’, and from ‘security through armaments to security through sustainable human development’. The UNDP’s list of component needs includes economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security, and political security (UNDP 1994: 24–5). Agreeing, Chung-In Moon draws the following lesson from his analysis of South Korean security: ‘The existence of military tensions does not necessarily justify the primacy of the military security. Military threats are always prominent. But economic, ecological, and social security concerns can be just as pressing and vital as the military issue’ (1998: 287).

Emphasis on human rights in the foreign policies of Western countries, especially since the Tiananmen student-led demonstrations in China in 1989 and the Beijing massacre, has pressed authoritarian governments in East Asia to give greater priority to the ‘human security’ of their citizens. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Cold War enemy, anti-communist authoritarian governments in the region found that their claims to serving as bulwarks in defence of the Free World no longer made them immune from criticism for domestic human rights
atrocities. Their support was no longer seen to be indispensable in the global anti-communist crusade. On the contrary, as we shall see, for some East Asian governments, Western emphasis on democracy and human rights began to be perceived as an ideological threat to their regime security.

Finally, at the level of state security, the breaking apart of Yugoslavia and of the Soviet Union has raised fears about the territorial integrity of other multi-ethnic nations. The vote by the people of East Timor for independence in August 1999, the subsequent Indonesian military-led scorched earth policy, and the United Nations’ decision to support a multinational intervention force to establish order and defend the survivors have all made the territorial integrity of the state yet another important security concern in the region.

In sum, for the purposes of this essay, ‘security’ will be defined principally in terms of regime survival. An effort is made, however, to incorporate the security concerns of other referents where feasible.

Security in East Asia

East Asia is strategically important from a global perspective because of the interests that major powers (the US, China, Japan, and Russia) have identified in the region. It is often understood to be especially volatile because of the number of wars that have been fought there during the last century and because of the lack of multilateral institutions in the region designed to enhance cooperation. However, interstate relations in East Asia over the past two decades, and especially since 1989, have been quite stable and basically cooperative. Stability and cooperation in the region have been maintained, I argue, by two interlinked structures: the United States hegemonic security regime, and deepening economic interdependence. Each country is enmeshed in these structures to varying degrees, including those countries very much on the periphery, such as North Korea and Burma. Individual East Asian states design and operationalise their security strategies within the structural constraints of hegemony and economic interdependence. For the countries of the region, there is no such thing as a completely autonomous security strategy—not even for China.

United States’ hegemony

The United States today plays the role of the ultimate guarantor of the strategic stability of East Asia. The most recent statement by the Department of Defence of its strategic doctrine immodestly describes three key US responsibilities: ‘to shape the international environment; respond to the full spectrum of crises; and prepare now for an uncertain future’ (Office of International Security Affairs
1998: 8). Committing 100,000 military personnel to the region for the foreseeable future, the US prepares for any eventuality.

This is not just talk. When major crises have occurred (for example, the fear that North Korea would go nuclear in 1994, or the People’s Republic of China (PRC) threat to use force against Taiwan in 1996, or the 1999 East Timor crisis), the United States has either directly intervened or indirectly brokered a solution. The US capacity to project power into the region is built upon an infrastructure of bilateral security ties, most importantly with Japan, South Korea, and Australia, but also including a wide diversity of security understandings with countries like the Philippines, Singapore, and Taiwan—including the ‘three communiques’ relationship with China.

Current US strategic doctrine has its roots in the thinking of Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger thirty years ago about a post-Vietnam design for US policy in East Asia. The Nixon Doctrine, announced in July 1969, articulated a strategy for continued US involvement which insisted on more self-reliant Asian efforts to deal with their own domestic security and development problems. The Nixon opening to China provided an opportunity for the US to play communists against communists while withdrawing from Vietnam ‘with honour’. And, finally, the establishment of formal diplomatic relations with China in 1979, in combination with Deng Xiaoping’s decision to open China to the global capitalist system as the best way to achieve wealth and power, have turned China into a reluctant but fairly consistent supporter of the regional status quo. When the Soviet Union still existed, China enjoyed some strategic leverage on the United States in the triangular relations among the three major powers; but after the general collapse of the communist world, China is less able to exact a price for its strategic collaboration.

The US strategic role in East Asia is best understood as one of ‘hegemony’ in the Gramscian sense of ‘consensus protected by the “armor of coercion”’ (Robinson 1996: 22). Robert Cox spells out the implications of the Gramscian concept:
Hegemony at the international level is thus not merely an order among states. It is an order within a world economy with a dominant mode of production which penetrates into all countries and links into other subordinate modes of production. It is also a complex of international social relationships which connect the social classes of the different countries. World hegemony can be described as a social structure, an economic structure, and a political structure; and it cannot be simply one of these things but must be all three. World hegemony, furthermore, is expressed in universal norms, institutions, and mechanisms which lay down general rules of behavior for states and for those forces of civil society that act across national boundaries, rules which support the dominant mode of production (Cox 1996: 137).

For Gramsci, ‘ideas and material conditions are always bound together, mutually influencing one another, and not reducible one to the other’. The state ‘maintains cohesion and identity within the bloc through the propagation of a common culture’ (Cox 1996: 132).

In sustaining the US role as hegemon in the East Asian region, then, the propagation of human rights, democracy, and other liberal values by the United States is as important as the maintenance of its military bases. Another way of putting the same point is the distinction that Joseph Nye makes between what he calls ‘soft power’ (values, norms, and ideology) and ‘hard power’ (economic and military capabilities). Both together are vital to maintaining hegemony.

Among the more serious problems for those countries living under the US hegemonic regime are, paradoxically, a lack of strategic autonomy from the US, on the one hand, and worries about the sustainability of the American hegemonic regime, on the other. For example, even a country as powerful as Japan, having successfully built the second largest economy in the world, is nonetheless dependent on US commitments under the US–Japan security treaty to guarantee its national security. China, too, is in some respects a strategic dependent of the US. For example, it is the US that guarantees the strategic stability of the region thus facilitating the free flow of investment, foreign aid, trade, and technology transfer so vital to China’s economic modernisation and to maintaining the high rate of economic growth that the PRC has achieved.

Sustainability is a different matter. The literature on the American role in East Asia written by analysts from the region is one deeply concerned about the question of how long the United States will be willing to remain as guarantor of strategic stability in the region, and under what circumstances it is most likely to withdraw. Especially for those countries most dependent on the US, such as Japan, this is a topic prompting some anxiety. The US Senate’s rejection of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the rise of isolationist sentiment among right-wing Republicans in the US Congress heighten these concerns. Moreover,
judging from the five hundred-year history of Western expansion, it would seem that the hegemony of any Western state over significant portions of the non-Western world is not sustainable for the long term. Contemporary American critics, such as Chalmers Johnson, employ concepts from Paul Kennedy’s *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, like ‘imperial overstretch’ to characterise US power today in East Asia (Johnson 1999; see Kennedy 1987: 515).

**Economic interdependence**

On the other hand, economic interdependence as a basis for interstate cooperation if supported by strategic stability does appear to be indefinitely sustainable (Harris and Mack 1997). The absolute gains from economic relationships based on mutual benefit appear sufficient to encourage interstate cooperation over the long term.

In 1991, I interviewed former foreign minister Okita Saburo in Tokyo. Wondering about the feasibility of certain kinds of multilateral institutions for the region, I asked Okita if he thought an institution like the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE, now OSCE) would be a good idea for East Asia. ‘No’, he replied, ‘but it already exists. It is economic.’ What he was referring to was the structure of foreign trade, aid, investment, and technology transfer between Japan and the rest of East Asia that had been carefully constructed in the post World War II period by the Japanese. Some wag once labelled it ‘Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere II’, suggesting a comparison with Japan’s World War II policies. Many of the objectives were indeed the same: gaining access to vital natural resources and markets for Japan’s industrialisation. But obviously the means are quite different. This time Japan’s relations with Asia would be built on voluntary cooperation rather than enforced compliance, and the result would have substantial benefits for all parties. Building relationships of economic interdependence based on mutual benefit has been a key dimension of Japan’s Asian policy now for decades.

The security regime in East Asia, maintained by a combination of US hegemony and economic interdependence, has facilitated the growing impact of globalisation on the region.

**Security threats, old and new**

It is sometimes said that after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Cold War in Europe ended but not in Asia. Since a Communist China still exists, the argument goes, as well as communist-party states in North Korea, Vietnam, and Laos, the Cold War continues in East Asia, and that is the reason why so many of the
security ties between the US and countries in the region, established many decades ago, remain intact today. As a means of understanding the hostility between North and South Korea, this argument may be somewhat useful; but more broadly in the region, it would be a mistake, I think, to understand contemporary relationships with China, Vietnam, and Laos as a continuation of the Cold War.

All three countries have gradually established formal diplomatic relations with their neighbours in the region, and each is becoming progressively more integrated into the global capitalist system. Vietnam and Laos have both joined ASEAN, and China has joined the ASEAN Regional Forum security dialogue. Communism is not perceived as a security threat in the region as it was during the decades of Cold War, and East Asia is no longer ideologically polarised as it was in the past. If anything, communism has now become something of an embarrassment for those communist-party leaders who still feel compelled to invoke it to defend their claims to monopoly power.  

Problems from the past
Yet many of the most serious security problems of the past persist. The most important are problems of divided nations, territorial disputes, and nuclear proliferation.

Divided nations. Most analysts agree that tensions between North and South Korea, and between China and Taiwan, remain the most potentially serious sources of interstate military conflict in the region. The United States still maintains a military force of more than 37,000 personnel in South Korea, fifty years after the outbreak of the Korean War. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is perhaps the most isolated regime in the world today, a dynastic Communist dictatorship ruled by Kim Jong Il, son of the founder, Kim Il Sung. The four major powers in the region (Russia, China, Japan, and the United States) appear to favour the status quo over the prospect of a reunified Korea, but meanwhile, there is the danger of renewed military conflict between North and South or the implosion of the DPRK state resulting in anarchy and problems associated with the escape of thousands of refugees to the shores of neighbouring countries.

The possibility of North Korea becoming a nuclear power remains a serious concern, as do DPRK missile development and missile exports abroad. In August

---

4 Note, for example, the list of official slogans announced by the Chinese Communist Party to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China (Eckholm 1999).
1998, North Korea tested a three-stage Taepodong-1 with a range of 1500–2000 kilometres that overflew Japan and landed in the Pacific Ocean. During the following year, there were reports that North Korea next intended to test the longer range Taepodong-2 missile (IISS 1999a: 40–1). As the result of negotiations with the United States in Berlin in September 1999, however, North Korea put those plans on hold. Nonetheless, Japanese reaction to North Korea’s missile development prompted support for the US theatre missile defence (TMD) initiative for the region.

Taiwan has continued to be an issue of contention in Sino–American relations since the original Nixon-Mao accommodation of 1972. Officially, the US has adopted a ‘one China’ policy, but it continues informal relations with Taiwan, including sales of modern military equipment under the provisions of the Taiwan Relations Act. The United States has consistently opposed the use of force by the mainland as a means of reunifying the country, but at the same time, maintains a posture of purposeful ambiguity with respect to what it might do if the PRC were to launch a military attack on the island—for fear that any more forthright commitment would encourage Taiwan government to formally declare its independence from China.

Taiwan, in this sense, is a stage set for war by miscalculation. When in 1995–96, the PRC carried out a series of ‘missile exercises’ to intimidate the electorate on the island prior to their March 1996 election, it was not clear until the last minute what the United States would do. Washington finally sent not one but two aircraft-carrier battle groups to the area to make the point that it would not tolerate use of force. But what will the US do next time? (Garver 1997).

President Lee Teng-hui’s rejection of a ‘one China’ policy, insisting instead that relations with the PRC should be understood in terms of a ‘special state-to-state relationship’, plus Taiwan’s continuous efforts to regain membership in the United Nations and other international institutions, have increased the tension (Lee 1999).5

**Territorial disputes.** East Asia is replete with territorial disputes from North to South. Throughout history a main source of interstate conflict, the territorial disputes in the region have been contained largely as a result of the US hegemonic role. The different parties to the dispute are often closely linked to the United States, thus providing Washington with a capacity to help meliorate the differences on both sides.

---

5 In this essay, Lee expands on his concept of special state-to-state relations, discussing Taiwan’s ‘new sense of identity’.
The most important territorial disputes range from the Northern Islands dispute between Japan and Russia in the far North, to Takeshima/Tok Do between Japan and Korea, to Senkaku/Diaoyu Dao between China and Japan, and finally to the volatile South China Sea where six countries have competing claims (Valencia 1995). Globalisation, so far, seems to have made no difference either in meliorating or exacerbating these conflicts. However, if joint development of the natural resources involved becomes a viable way to resolve some of these disputes, the role of MNCs in implementing joint development plans may help to play a positive role.

Nuclear proliferation. One of the most serious threats to global security and yet one of the most difficult to resolve is the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The unexpected tests by Indian and Pakistan in May 1998 renewed fears of even more extensive proliferation in Asia. North Korea had agreed under US pressure in 1994 to give up its nuclear weapons program, and China had reluctantly agreed to sign the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1996, but the nuclear weapons tests in South Asia once again raised the issue in the region. If, following the Indian and Pakistani tests, Japan, for example, were to decide that, in order to become a ‘normal nation’ (Ozawa 1994), nuclear weapons were an indispensable requirement to achieve the international status that it sought, the entire global nonproliferation regime would be in jeopardy.

These security threats from the past (divided nations, territorial disputes, and nuclear proliferation) appear to have been little affected so far by globalisation. In some respects, they seem to have been held in abeyance while globalisation created both new opportunities for cooperation and new kinds of security threats.

New security threats
If there had been doubts earlier, the Asian financial crisis, which began with a run on the Thai baht in July 1997, soon convinced everyone that, for good or ill, the region was an integral part of a globalised economy. As Friedman put it, ‘Globalization isn’t a choice. It is a reality’. Moreover, ‘No one is in charge’ (Friedman 1999: 93). Environmental disasters in one country often had an impact in neighbouring countries, like the forest fires burning out of control in Kalimantan in 1997. And what had earlier been understood to be exclusively domestic security issues, like East Timor for Indonesia, suddenly became internationalised. The Indonesian Army for the first time was being held to account for its twenty-four-year reign of terror in East Timor. ‘The army has been using tactics lately that are 15 or 20 years out of date’, a senior ambassador to Indonesia commented. ‘It will have to learn that these tactics are unsuitable for
an era of globalization when you’ve got a free press and the world is watching’ (quoted in Mydans 1999).

Economic insecurities. After the financial crisis, few people in the region remain unconvinced that economic viability (or vulnerability) is a security issue. Virtually overnight, the currencies and equity markets of countries that had been previously identified as models of third world development collapsed, forcing millions of people into unemployment, bankruptcy, and material hardship. In Indonesia, hardest hit by the crisis, the Suharto regime, thirty-three years in power, collapsed as a result. Comparing globalisation to the Cold War period, Friedman talks about how globalisation literally blew down the walls among the very different economies of the First World, Second World, and Third World of that time:

What blew away all the walls were three fundamental changes—changes in how we communicate, how we invest and how we learn about the world. These changes were born and incubated during the Cold War and achieved a critical mass by the late 1980s, when they finally came together into a whirlwind strong enough to blow down all the walls of the Cold War system and enable the world to come together as a single, integrated, open plain (Friedman 1999: 40).

Among those countries hardest hit by the crisis, Thailand, Indonesia, and South Korea have all accepted advice from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to more substantially liberalise and to open up their economies to foreign competition—in effect, making them in some respects even more vulnerable than before to the impact of globalisation. Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohamad’s unorthodox decision in September 1998 to impose currency and capital controls appears now only to have been a temporary measure.

All of the countries of the region appear to be faced with the imperative of putting on what Friedman calls ‘the golden straitjacket’—the definition of capitalist economics popularised by Margaret Thatcher in England and Ronald Reagan in the United States in the 1980s. Friedman wants us to believe that there is no alternative: ‘Globalization has only the Golden Straitjacket. If your country has not been fitted for one, it will be soon’ (Friedman 1999: 86).

Whether or not Friedman’s analysis is correct, it has become clear that economic competitiveness has become a security requirement in today’s globalised world. Unlike the days of the Cold War, today there is only one international economic system. Autarky or attempting to be economically self-sufficient apart from the global economy would condemn any country to permanent poverty and material hardship.
Environmental threats. The damaging impact on the environment of virtually universal efforts by countries to industrialise is nothing new. Problems of ozone depletion, species elimination, and global warming have been identified before. During the 1990s in East Asia, however, it became increasing clear that ecological damage in one country could have serious impacts in neighbouring countries. Acid rain, produced by air pollution in China, was a serious problem in South Korea and Japan, while the forest fires burning out of control in Indonesia in 1997 created public health hazards in Singapore and Malaysia (Glover and Jessup 1999).

These problems cannot be controlled simply by any individual country’s self-help strategies. Environmental threats have become regional and global problems, requiring a cooperative response by the affected countries. The United Nations environment program’s GEO-2000 report, published in September 1999, has added water shortage and nitrogen pollution to the growing list of imminent dangers to the survival of the human species, and emphasised the need for immediate action (Brown 1999: 7). Disasters like China’s 1998 Yangtze River floods, which reportedly cost China 2100 lives and some $30 billion, might be controlled in part by reforesting the watersheds upstream, but the broader problems of environmental security require regional and global cooperation. Environmental threats generally present no enemy in the conventional ‘national security’ sense except ourselves. Sending in the military will not help.

Ideological threats. In many East Asian countries, governments have for many years been as much or more concerned about domestic security as they have security from foreign military attack. In fact, some armed forces, like the Indonesian TNI, have been principally organised, both in their overt and covert operations, as a coercive weapon to insure domestic stability. During the Cold War, they fought against communism; but after the collapse of the Soviet Union, everything changed.

Authoritarian governments in the region which had received Western support and training to fight communism in the past, increasingly now felt themselves under ideological threat, especially from the US insistence on human rights and democracy. Allen Whiting, reporting on his research on security issues in ASEAN during 1995–96, found that: ‘On human rights and democracy, ASEAN stands on the side of China insofar as the question involves interference in domestic affairs and the imposition of predominantly Western values... However, when faced with the threatened Chinese use of force, ASEAN sides with U.S. policy as the mainstay of peace and stability in East Asia’ (Whiting 1997: 301).
It is not surprising that communist governments like China and Vietnam would perceive an ideological threat from Western criticism of their human rights practices, but analysts report a similar concern on the part of the governments of Singapore, Malaysia, Burma, and Indonesia as well (see individual country chapters in Alagappa, ed. 1998; see also, Roy 1999; Roy 1996; Van Ness 2000). Typically, it is those governments, both communist and noncommunist, that conflate the security of the state, their regime, and their ruling party that perceive ideological threat from the West.

The perception of ideological threat among governments in East Asia is directly a result of globalisation, I would argue, in the sense that Anthony Giddens sees globalisation producing ‘global cosmopolitan society’ committed to universal values. He asks:

...can we live in a world where nothing is sacred? I have to say...that I don’t think we can. Cosmopolitans, of whom I count myself one, have to make plain that tolerance and dialogue can themselves be guided by values of a universal kind. All of us need moral commitments that stand above the petty concerns and squabbles of everyday life. We should be prepared to mount an active defence of these values wherever they are poorly developed, or threatened. None of us would have anything to live for, if we didn’t have something worth dying for (Giddens 1999c).

For Giddens, globalisation contains this moral imperative that cannot be ignored.

Concepts of state sovereignty and noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries are increasingly contested in the era of globalisation. Priorities are shifting toward human rights and humanitarian intervention (see, for example, Annan 1999). The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation intervention in Kosovo, and the United Nations decision to support an Australian-led international force to intervene, however belatedly, in East Timor, are setting new precedents. Human rights atrocities, broadcast worldwide by CNN, are helping to mobilise citizens and human rights NGOs to pressure governments to take action.

**Strategies to enhance security**

Changing perceptions of threat are causing the governments of East Asia to design new strategies to enhance the security of their countries. Giddens, again,
in his 1999 Reith Lectures for the BBC, gives us his tentative understanding of what the new global order might look like.

Although this is a contentious point, I would say that, following the dissolving of the cold war, nations no longer have enemies. Who are the enemies of Britain, or France, or Japan? Nations today face risks and dangers rather than enemies, a massive shift in their very nature...As the changes I have described in this lecture gather weight, they are creating something that has never existed before, a global cosmopolitan society. We are the first generation to live in this society, whose contours we can as yet only dimly see. It is shaking up our existing ways of life, no matter where we happen to be. This is not—at least at the moment—a global order driven by collective human will. Instead, it is emerging in an anarchic, haphazard, fashion, carried along by a mixture of economic, technological and cultural imperatives (Giddens 1999b).

This vision may appear utopian for East Asia, a region still confounded by divided countries, territorial disputes, and fears of nuclear proliferation; however, notable in East Asia is a gradual erosion of realist thinking and a new emphasis on cooperative security strategies. Perhaps most striking is the absence of the classic security dilemma in relations among the major powers in the region, a decade after the breaching of the Berlin Wall.

**Erosion of realist thinking**

Kenneth Waltz, a leading realist theorist, describes the security dilemma as

...the condition in which states, unsure of one another’s intentions, arm for the sake of security and in doing so set a vicious circle in motion. Having armed for the sake of security, states feel less secure and buy more arms because the means to anyone’s security is a threat to someone else who in turn responds by arming.

Waltz himself is convinced that there is no way in international politics to avoid the security dilemma: ‘Whatever the weaponry and however many states in the system, states have to live with their security dilemma, which is produced not by their wills but by their situations. A dilemma cannot be solved; it can more less readily be dealt with’ (Waltz 1979: 186–7).7

But Waltz may be wrong about that. In the decade of post-Cold War politics to date, the major powers have thus far avoided creating a new security dilemma among themselves. Despite the many problems in the United States’ relationship with China, for example, Beijing so far has not sought to ‘balance’ the United States, to ally with other major powers (like Russia, India, or Japan) against the

---

7 Waltz, in turn, draws his understanding of the security dilemma from the original essay by Herz (1950).
US, or provoked the United States into a new arms race. Part of the reason is the magnitude of the US predominance of power: militarily (in both the nuclear and ‘conventional’ areas), economically, and technologically. As the US national security adviser, Samuel R. Berger, has put it: ‘Our military expenditures are now larger than those of all other countries combined, [and] our weaponry is a generation ahead of our nearest potential rival’ (quoted in Lewis 1999). Another part of the reason is that China, like virtually all other developing countries, would much prefer to allocate its scarce resources to economic and technological modernisation, rather than to unproductive military expenditures. A final reason why China has avoided a security dilemma so far is that the world has changed: globalisation has transformed the way that states connect with each other—in Waltz’s terms, ‘the situation’ has changed.

In the realist understanding of international politics, the condition of anarchy (that is, the lack of an authoritative global government) produces the necessity for self-help strategies on the part of state actors. The security dilemma is produced in turn by the reliance on self-help. Waltz says it cannot be avoided because of this situation that states find themselves in. But the situation that Waltz describes, which he understands to be anarchy, is being daily transformed by the forces of globalisation.

One of the important benefits from globalisation for security relations is that, in a globalised world, there are already established patterns of cooperation in trade and investment relationships and well-used channels of communication, especially among the major powers. All parties have become accustomed in the use of these globalised relationships to working together on the basis of mutual benefit. Governments have become accustomed to focusing on the absolute benefits for all participants derived from cooperation, rather than the relative benefits that realists insist must be the focus of strategic relations. Moreover, the destructive power of nuclear weapons and the extensive character of growing ecological problems have shown the world the extent to which all countries share a common fate.

Self-help: an illusion?

In the ten years since the fall of the Berlin Wall, we have all become much more aware of new kinds of security problems for which self-help by individual countries is totally inadequate: for example, the economic insecurities so well demonstrated by the recent East Asian financial crisis, and the various threats to environment security that require at least regional and often global remedies. To deal effectively with these kinds of security threats, cooperation among states would seem to be imperative. Can any country in today’s globalised world
assure its own security (military, economic, environmental, or human security) exclusively through self-help? The interconnected nature of our globalised world makes going-it-alone increasingly impracticable.

Even for the United States, self-help alone is not sufficient. In August 1998, when the financial crisis that had begun in Asia reached global proportions, Russia defaulted on its domestic bonds, and many analysts worried that the United States and Europe might be drawn into a global economic meltdown, the United States could not resolve the situation by itself. Despite *Time* magazine’s billing of the combined forces of US Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin, his deputy Lawrence Summers, and US Federal Reserve Bank Chairman Alan Greenspan as ‘The Committee to Save the World’ (15 February 1999: 46–54), the policies proposed by the Clinton administration could not have been implemented successfully without the cooperation of the other G7 rich capitalist countries. Not even the United States, the sole remaining superpower, enjoying the world’s largest economy, was powerful enough to defend its own economic security without the collaboration of other world powers.

*From zero-sum to positive-sum thinking*

Over the past two decades, the governments of East Asia have taught each other the benefits of cooperation rather than war and confrontation—first by means of trade, investment, and foreign aid, and later by participating in multilateral forums associated with the Association for Southeast Asian Nations. The mutual benefit that they have derived from relationships of economic interdependence serves as a model for the kinds of strategic relations they want to build for themselves. Their common enemy is not some other country, like the Soviet Union during the Cold War, but rather instability and possible military conflict. Remarking on ASEAN and the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, Dewi Fortuna Anwar observes: ‘Although many bilateral disputes have remained unresolved, it is now becoming unthinkable that an ASEAN country would go to war against a fellow ASEAN member for any reason’ (Anwar 1998: 508).

Compared to the previous 150-year history of endless warfare in the region, dating from the first Opium War in 1839 to the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia in 1989, this is a magnificent achievement. All countries in East Asia (including those most apparently left out of the present cooperative arrangements, such as North Korea and Burma) have a fundamental interest in deepening these patterns of cooperation in order to help minimise the probability of interstate conflict in the future. As Kofi Annan has argued, ‘In the context of
many of the challenges facing humanity today, the collective interest is the national interest’ (Annan 1999:49–50).

Realists may condemn the ASEAN Regional Forum as ‘just a talking shop’, but the talking has produced the beginnings of a demonstrable change in security behaviour among the participants. For the ASEAN member-countries, in varying degrees, membership has contributed to a growing sense of regional stability—if not yet any greater tangible security.

**East Asian security at a crossroads**

‘In the globalization system’, Thomas Friedman writes, ‘the United States is now the sole and dominant superpower and all other nations are subordinate to it to one degree or another’ (Friedman 1999: 11). Globalisation in the region has strengthened US predominance, and East Asian economic interdependence has been reshaped as the result of the financial crisis in accordance with American notions of economic liberalisation, principally as a result of US-influenced IMF conditions imposed on the most affected countries. From each of the recent crises in the region (North Korea 1994, Taiwan 1996, financial crisis from 1997, and East Timor in 1999), American power has emerged enhanced. In Washington’s view, the United States is ‘the indispensable country’.

The US relationship with China is perhaps the most important one in the region, especially regarding security policy. Unilateral decisions taken by the American hegemon have the power either to increase cooperation in the region or to disrupt it. Two issues high on the US foreign policy agenda appear likely to shape future security relationships in East Asia. They are the issue of ‘China threat’ and the US decision whether or not to deploy ballistic missile defences.

Ironically, it is precisely at the peak of US global power that insecurities in America appear to be prompting decisions in the US that could polarise the region politically and even begin a new cold war.

**‘China threat’**

Since the establishment of formal diplomatic relations twenty years ago, the Chinese have argued that a peaceful and stable international environment was absolutely indispensable for their efforts to modernise their country. On balance, they have practised what they preached, gradually participating more fully and cooperatively in international institutions, and resolving problems with their neighbours (Deng 1998). Taiwan and the competing claims in the South China Sea have been the main exceptions; but in even in 1995-96, when Beijing
attempted to use ‘missile exercises’ to intimidate the citizenry of Taiwan, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) backed off when the US intervened to make the point that use of force would not be tolerated. PRC declaratory policy promotes ‘a new security concept’ and invokes the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and the UN Charter. The core values of this new concept, according to Beijing, are mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, and cooperation.8

China has a huge stake in the status quo. No non-Western country has received more of what it needed from the global capitalist system for its economic modernisation at less cost—China has been even more successful in exploiting the international system during the past twenty years than Japan was during the Meiji era. The training of PRC students and scholars abroad in Western countries and Japan over the past two decades by itself constitutes the most significant case of technology transfer to one country in a short period of time that the world has ever seen.

On the US side, six American administrations from Richard Nixon to Bill Clinton have pursued essentially the same ‘engagement’ strategy toward the PRC, working to co-opt China and to encourage the PRC to behave like a ‘responsible power’. However, in the final years of the Clinton administration, a strange coalition of conservative Republicans on the political right and human rights activists from the political left have become vocal in calling for a harsher policy toward China.

Meanwhile, the list of problems in the Sino-American bilateral relationship has grown. The human rights agenda (political repression, Tibet, abortion, and religious freedom), an ever increasing bilateral trade deficit, the NATO Kosovo intervention that China opposed, charges of illegal PRC contributions to Clinton’s presidential election campaign in 1996, the Cox Report alleging Chinese theft of US nuclear-weapons secrets, and then the NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in May 1999, all contributed to heightened tensions. By year end 1999, the ‘constructive strategic partnership’ promised during the earlier exchange of summit visits by Presidents Clinton and Jiang Zemin was in tatters.

The November agreement on China’s WTO membership gave some hope for a renewal of close Sino-American cooperation, but hardliners on both sides have pressed for confrontation in the new, globalised world. For example, in February 1999, two PLA senior colonels from the Air Force published a book called Unlimited War: Explorations on War and Tactics in an Era of Globalization, in which

8 Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan’s address to the UN General Assembly in September is a good example. For the complete text, see Beijing Review (11 October 1999: 9–11).
they examined a wide range of methods for doing harm to adversaries in unconventional ways (for example, cyberwar, economic warfare) (Qiao and Wang 1999); while on the American side, hardline authors have focused on the theme of ‘China threat’.

Despite the fact that in measurable military, economic, and technological capabilities, China’s power constitutes only a small fraction of US might (Kim 1997; Lijun 1999), these authors insist that China was a threat to American national security. Analyses have ranged from the more measured assessment by Bernstein and Munro of future dangers to the US (Bernstein and Munro 1997), to charges by Timperlake and Triplett that President Clinton had betrayed American national security by appeasing China and cooperating with the PLA (Timperlake and Triplett 1999).

**Ballistic missile defences**

Citing fears of ballistic missile attack from terrorists or so-called ‘rogue states’ (usually thought to mean North Korea, Iran, or Iraq), the United States is about to decide to build and deploy both a national missile defence (NMD) system and a theatre missile defence (TMD) system in East Asia. President Clinton is scheduled to announce his decision in June 2000. The decision to revive Ronald Reagan’s Star Wars concept has received relatively little debate in the US so far (see, for example, Lewis, et al, 1999; O’Hanlon 1999) but if deployed, the strategic implications of both the NMD and TMD in East Asia would be serious. For many supporters of the initiative, the target is not so much terrorists as ‘China threat’.

China and Russia have both opposed the plan as strategically destabilising. All agree that deployment would violate the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, long thought to be a foundation stone of the global nuclear arms control regime. The Clinton administration has approached Russia about revising the Treaty, but Moscow has refused. On 5 November, Russian won support from many US allies and friends when the First Committee of the UN General Assembly voted overwhelmingly in favour of a resolution to preserve the ABM Treaty.⁹ If

---

⁹ Some of the questions that the advocates of ballistic missile defences have not answered are the following. Can an ‘upper tier’ ABM system really be made to work, especially against countermeasures? Why would deterrence not work against potential attackers as it has in the past? Does a system with, at best, such a limited capability justify the immense cost? Wouldn’t deployment give the American public a false sense of safety when the real threat from terrorists and rogue states is not ballistic missile attack but the so-called ‘suitcase bomb’? And, finally, why is it in the American national interest to deploy a system that has a high probability of causing a security dilemma that would make everyone less secure?
unilateral deployment by the United States were to provoke a classic security dilemma and a new arms race, everyone’s security would be diminished.

In contrast with perceptions by some American analysts of a military threat from China, it is the small size of China’s nuclear weapons capability that would make US deployment of ballistic missile defences such a serious problem for China. The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) notes that ‘China’s strategic capability is composed of less than 200 nuclear warheads, of which only perhaps 20-30 would be operational at any given time’ (IISS 1999b: 171). Russia still has the capacity to overwhelm any conceivable ABM system, but for China, the deployment of a NMD would threaten its basic nuclear deterrent. The IISS concludes that if the US decides on deployment, a ‘head-on collision with China will be difficult to avoid’ (IISS 1999a: 50).

After the August 1998 North Korean Taepodong-1 missile shot that passed through Japanese airspace, Tokyo agreed to joint research with the United States on a TMD system that may, at some future time, also include South Korea and Taiwan. Chinese analysts have characterised stated Japanese fears of North Korean missile attack as ‘an excuse’ for participating in a TMD arrangement that is obviously aimed at China (interviews in Beijing, May 1999). Seen from Beijing, an East Asian TMD looks like a new multilateral security alliance against China. If it were to include Taiwan, obviously that would make things much worse (Hong 1998; Xuetong 1999).

American policy toward China is at a crossroads. At stake is the strategic stability of the region. Globalisation in the variety of its many influences on East Asia has, on balance, helped to provide a sense in the region of a common fate and helped to establish patterns of cooperation among governments. Nonetheless, the hegemon has the power either to disrupt or to encourage these tentative relationships of mutual benefit. Making an enemy of China would probably make all countries in the region less secure.

References


Hong, Yuan (1998), ‘The implication of the TMD system in Japan to China’s security’ (Paper presented at the Sixth ISODARCO Beijing Seminar on Arms Control, 29 October–1 November). From HYPERLINK mailto:npp@nautilus.org_npp@nautilus.org Nuclear Policy List.


Department of International Relations

PUBLICATIONS

as at 1 March 2000

WORKING PAPERS

Send all orders to:
Publications Officer
Department of International Relations
Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies
The Australian National University
Canberra ACT 0200 Australia
Phone: (06) 249 4451/279 8089 Fax: (06) 279 8010

WP1989/1 The Changing Central Balance and Australian Policy, by Coral Bell
WP1989/2 Agricultural Trade and Australian Foreign Policy in the 1990s, by Ralph King
WP1989/4 Analysing the Impact of International Sanctions on China, by Peter Van Ness
WP1989/5 Economic Change in the International System Implications for Australia's Prospects, by Stuart Harris
WP1990/1 Middle Power Leadership and Coalition Building: The Cairns Group and the Uruguay Round, by Andrew Fenton Cooper and Richard A. Higgott
WP1990/2 The Soviet Far East, by Geoff Jukes
WP1990/3 The Environmental Challenge: The New International Agenda, by Stuart Harris
WP1990/4 India in Southwest Asia, by Amin Saikal
WP1990/5 Is Unilateral Trade Liberalisation the Answer? by Trevor Matthews and John Ravenhill
WP1990/6 The Politics of Baltic Nationalisms, by William Maley
WP1990/7 Peacekeeping in the South Pacific: Some Questions for Prior Consideration, by Greg Fry
WP1990/8 Informal Theories of Rationality, by James L. Richardson
WP1990/9 The Limits to Liberalisation in Industrialising Asia: Three Views of the State, by James Cotton
WP1991/1 International Trade, Ecologically Sustainable Development and the GATT, by Stuart Harris
WP1991/3 Continuity and Change in Cooperative International Regimes: The Politics of the Recent Environment Debate in Antarctica, by Lorraine M. Elliott
WP1991/4 Foreign Policy Analysis, International Relations Theory, and Social Theory: Critique and Reconstruction, by Ian Bell
WP1991/5 China as a Third World State: Foreign Policy and Official National Identity, by Peter Van Ness
WP1991/6 The Drawbacks of the Detached View: Russia, the USSR and the Pacific, by Artem Rudnitskiy
WP1994/9 Nuclear Endgame on the Korean Peninsula, by Andrew Mack
WP1994/10 China’s Public Order Crisis and Its Strategic Implications, by Greg Austin
WP1995/1 New Light on the Russo-Japanese Territorial Dispute, by Kimie Hara
WP1995/2 Implications of Taiwan–Chinese Relations for Australia, by Stuart Harris
WP1995/3 In Search of a New Identity: Revival of Traditional Politics and Modernisation in Post-Kim Il Sung North Korea, by Alexandre Y. Mansourov
WP1995/5 The World Trade Organisation—Throwing the Baby Out With the Bath Water?, by P.A. Gordon
WP1995/6 Culture, Relativism and Democracy: Political Myths About ‘Asia’ and the ‘West’, by Stephanie Lawson
WP1995/7 Russian Policy Towards the ‘Near Abroad’: The Discourse of Hierarchy, by Alexandre Y. Mansourov
WP1995/8 Recasting Common Security, by Andy Butfoy
WP1995/9 Industry Policy in East Asia: A Literature Review, by Heather Smith
WP1995/10 Contending Liberalisms: Past and Present, by James L. Richardson
WP1996/1 Ameliorating the Security Dilemma: Structural and Perceptual Approaches to Strategic Reform, by Andrew Butfoy
WP1996/2 The New Peacekeepers and the New Peacekeeping, by Trevor Findlay
WP1996/3 Why Democracies Don’t Fight Each Other: Democracy and Integration, by Harvey Starr
WP1996/4 The Constructivist Turn: Critical Theory After the Cold War, by Chris Rees-Smit
WP1996/5 Framing the Islands: Knowledge and Power in Changing Australian Images of ‘The South Pacific’, by Greg Fry
WP1996/6 You Just Don’t Understand: Troubled Engagements Between Feminists and IR Theorists, by J. Ann Tickner
WP1996/7 The China–Japan Relationship and Asia–Pacific Regional Security, by Stuart Harris
WP1996/8 The Declining Probability or War Thesis: How Relevant for the Asia–Pacific?, by James L. Richardson
WP1996/9 The Rajin-Sonbong Free Trade Zone Experiment: North Korea in Pursuit of New International Linkages, by James Cotton
WP1996/10 n/a
WP1997/1 Nuclear ‘Breakout’: Risks and Possible Responses, by Andrew Mack
WP1997/2 Island Disputes in Northeast Asia, by Andrew Mack
WP1997/3 Hedley Bull and International Security, by Samuel M. Makinda
WP1997/4 The Foreign Policy of the Hawke–Keating Governments: An Interim Review, by James L. Richardson
WP1997/5 From Island Factory to Asian Centre: Democracy and Deregulation in Taiwan, by Gregory W. Noble
WP1997/6 Corporate Power in the Forests of the Solomon Islands, by Peter Dauvergne
WP1997/7 Globalisation and deforestation in the Asia-Pacific, by Peter Dauvergne
WP1997/8 From Paternalism to Partnership: Australia’s Relations with ASEAN, by John Ravenhill
WP1998/1 The ASEAN Regional Forum. A Model for Cooperative Security in the Middle East?, by Michael Leifer
WP1998/2  Environmental Insecurity, Forest Management, and State Responses in Southeast Asia, by Peter Dauvergne
WP1998/3  The Rise of an Environmental Superpower? Evaluating Japanese Environmental Aid to Southeast Asia, by Peter Dauvergne

WP1999/1  South Pacific Security and Global Change: The New Agenda
           Greg Fry
WP1999/2  Australia and Nuclear Arms Control as ‘Good International Citizenship’,
           by Marianne Hanson
WP1999/3  ASEAN and the Southeast Asian ‘Haze’: Challenging the Prevailing Modes of Regional Engagement, by James Cotton
WP1999/4  The Asian Regional Response to its Economic Crisis and the Global Implications,
           by Stuart Harris
WP1999/5  Internationalisation: What Scholars Make of It?, by N. Hamilton-Hart

WP2000/1  Managing the US Base Issue in Okinawa: A Test for Japanese Democracy,
           by Aurelia George Mulgan
WP2000/2  Globalisation and Security in East Asia, by Peter Van Ness

Price: All at the one price of $A5.

CANBERRA STUDIES IN WORLD AFFAIRS:

Send all orders to:
Reply paid 440, Bibliotech
ANUTECH
Canberra ACT 0200 Australia
Telephone: (616/06) 249 3811/5662
Fax Order: IDD (616) STD (06) 257 1433

| CS21 | Politics, Diplomacy and Islam: Four Case Studies, edited by Coral Bell | $10.00 |
| CS22 | The Changing Pacific: Four Case Studies, edited by Coral Bell | $10.00 |
| CS23 | New Directions in International Relations? Australian Perspectives, edited by Richard Higgott | $10.00 |
| CS24 | Australia and the Multinationals: A Study of Power and Bargaining in the 1990s, by Neil Renwick | $10.00 |
| CS25 | Refugees in the Modern World, edited by Amin Saikal | $10.00 |
| CS27 | Northeast Asian Challenge: Debating the Garnaut Report, edited by J.L. Richardson | $15.00 |
| CS28 | The ANZUS Documents, edited by Alan Burnett with Thomas-Durell Young and Christine Wilson | $15.00 |
| CS29 | Human Rights in the Asia–Pacific Region, edited by John Girling | $15.00 |
| CS30 | International Relations: Global and Australian Perspectives on an Evolving Discipline, edited by Richard Higgott and J.L. Richardson | $15.00 |

STUDIES IN WORLD AFFAIRS:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Editor(s)</th>
<th>Price</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethics and Foreign Policy</td>
<td>Paul Keal</td>
<td>$24.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea Under Roh Tae-woo: Democratisation, Northern Policy, and</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inter-Korean Relations</td>
<td>James Cotton</td>
<td>$24.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian–Pacific Security After the Cold War</td>
<td>T.B. Millar and James Walter</td>
<td>$24.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Post-Cold War Order: Diagnoses and Prognoses</td>
<td>Richard Leaver and James L. Richardson</td>
<td>$24.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependent Ally: A Study in Australian Foreign Policy, 3rd ed.</td>
<td>Coral Bell</td>
<td>$24.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Peaceful Ocean? Maritime Security in the Pacific in the Post-Cold War Era</td>
<td>Andrew Mack</td>
<td>$24.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian Flashpoint: Security and the Korean Peninsula</td>
<td>Andrew Mack</td>
<td>$24.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan in the Asia-Pacific in the 1990s</td>
<td>Gary Klintworth</td>
<td>$24.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Cooperation: Building Economic and Security Regimes in the Asia-Pacific</td>
<td>Andrew Mack and John Ravenhill</td>
<td>$24.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Gulf War: Critical Perspectives</td>
<td>Michael McKinley</td>
<td>$24.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Search for Security: The Political Economy of Australia’s Postwar Foreign and Defence Policy</td>
<td>David Lee</td>
<td>$24.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The New Agenda for Global Security, Cooperating for Peace and Beyond</td>
<td>Stephanie Lawson</td>
<td>$24.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presumptive Engagement: Australia’s Asia-Pacific Security Policy in the 1990s</td>
<td>Desmond Ball and Pauline Kerr</td>
<td>$24.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discourses of Danger and Dread Frontiers: Australian Defence and Security</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thinking After the Cold War</td>
<td>Graeme Cheeseman and Robert Bruce</td>
<td>$24.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Rim Development: Integration and Globalisation in the Asia-Pacific Economy</td>
<td>Peter J. Rammer</td>
<td>$24.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evatt to Evans: The Labor Tradition in Australian Foreign Policy</td>
<td>David Lee and Christopher Waters</td>
<td>$24.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia—From Red to Blue: Australia’s Initiative for Peace</td>
<td>Ken Berry</td>
<td>$24.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia-Pacific Security: The Economics–Politics Nexus</td>
<td>Stuart Harris and Andrew Mack</td>
<td>$24.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China’s Ocean Frontier: International Law, Military Force and National Development</td>
<td>Greg Austin</td>
<td>$24.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak and Strong States in Asia-Pacific Societies</td>
<td>Peter Dunavergue</td>
<td>$24.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australian Outlook: a History of the Australian Institute of International Affairs</td>
<td>J.D. Legge</td>
<td>$24.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transforming Asian Socialism: China and Vietnam Compared</td>
<td>Anita Chan, Benedict J. Tria Kerkvliet, and Jonathan Unger</td>
<td>$24.95</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**AUSTRALIAN FOREIGN POLICY PAPERS**

Australian Foreign Policy Papers are published by the Australian Foreign Policy Publications Programme in the Department of International Relations:

Send all orders to:
Reply paid 440, Bibliotech
ANUTECH
Canberra ACT 0200 Australia
Telephone: (616/06) 249 3811/5662
Fax Order: IDD (616) STD (06) 257 1433

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Price ($)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia’s Alliance Options: Prospect and Retrospect in a World of Change</td>
<td>by Coral Bell</td>
<td>$15.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coping With Washington: Players, Conventions and Strategies</td>
<td>by Davis Bobrow</td>
<td>$10.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The European Community in Context</td>
<td>by John Groom</td>
<td>$15.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia’s Human Rights Diplomacy</td>
<td>by Ian Russell, Peter Van Ness and Beng-Huat Chua</td>
<td>$15.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selling Mirages: The Politics of Arms Trading</td>
<td>by Graeme Cheeseman</td>
<td>$15.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Search for Substance: Australia-India Relations into the Nineties and Beyond</td>
<td>by Sandy Gordon</td>
<td>$15.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protecting the Antarctic Environment: Australia and the Minerals Convention</td>
<td>by Lorraine Elliott</td>
<td>$15.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia’s Taiwan Policy 1942-1992</td>
<td>by Gary Klintworth</td>
<td>$20.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia and the New World Order: Evatt in San Francisco, 1945</td>
<td>by W.J. Hudson</td>
<td>$20.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Beijing Massacre: Australian Responses</td>
<td>by Kim Richard Nossal</td>
<td>$15.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Pacific Patrol Boat Project: A Case Study of Australian Defence Cooperation</td>
<td>by Anthony Bergin</td>
<td>$10.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Select Bibliography of Australia’s Foreign Relations, 1975-1992</td>
<td>compiled by Pauline Kerr, David Sullivan and Robin Ward</td>
<td>$20.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia’s Evolving American Relationship: Interests, Processes and Prospects for Australian Influence</td>
<td>by Henry S. Albinski</td>
<td>$10.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Plus $3.00 postage and packaging per copy ordered.
DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Publications Order Form

WORKING PAPERS ONLY

Please Supply


* All Working Papers are $A5.

Method of Payment (please tick)

☐ Money Order
☐ Cheque (made payable to: The Australian National University)
☐ Mastercard/Visa Card Number................................ ................................ ............................
    Expiry Date................................ ..................... Signature................................ ..................

For Overseas Orders: Payment by Mastercard/Visa or by Bank Draft in Australian Dollars only, payable to Australian National University.

Name/Organisation: ................................................................................................................
Postal Address: ....................................................................................................................
Suburb: ................................ State: ................................ Postcode: ................................
Signature: ................................................................ Date: ..............................................

Please forward completed form and payment to:

Publications Officer
Department of International Relations
Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies
Australian National University
CANBERRA ACT 0200 AUSTRALIA
Phone: (06) 249 4451/279 8089, Fax: (06) 279 8010
Email: robin.ward@coombs.anu.edu.au

* Standing Orders Welcome *