Based on the assessment of security environment and unique characteristics of the Asia-Pacific region, the most recent *Diplomatic Bluebook* of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) of Japan articulates that “the most realistic and appropriate approaches for the enhancement of the region’s security environment should be viewed as developing and strengthening both bilateral and multilateral frameworks for dialogue and cooperation in a multi-tiered manner.”\(^1\) Since the end of World War II, the fundamental pillar of Japan’s security policy has been and continues to be its bilateral alliance with the United States. This was explicitly confirmed by Prime Minister Hashimoto and President Clinton in the April 1996 Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security. Tokyo’s favourable reference to multilateral security cooperation is relatively a new development. This paper examines the evolution of Japanese policies on multilateral security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region.

**Multilateralism and Asia-Pacific in Japan’s Policy**

The term regional multilateral security cooperation contains at least two different aspects, namely ‘regional’ and ‘multilateral’. This requires us to look at Japan’s policy from the two dimensions: functional and geopolitical. Simply put, the term ‘multilateral’ suggests functional dimension whereas the term ‘regional’ suggests geopolitical dimension.

**Multilateralism: Functional Dimension**

Even though MOFA’s first *Diplomatic Bluebook* published in 1957 enunciated the UN-centred diplomacy as one of the three principles of the keynote of Japan’s diplomacy, the basis of Japanese foreign and security policy has been far from UN-centred or multilateral. Instead, Tokyo preferred bilateralism to multilateralism, the United States to the United Nations. The so-called Yoshida Doctrine has had enormous effect on the centrality of the United States in
Japan’s security policy. Japan’s reluctant multilateralism comes partly from its bitter experience in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

One example is the Triple Intervention in 1895. The Treaty of Shimonoseki, which ended the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95, ceded Taiwan, the Pescadores Islands and the Liaotung Peninsula which included a port city Dalian or Port Arthur to Japan. However, concerned that Japan’s control over the Liaotung Peninsula would be a threat to southern Manchuria where Russia had strategic interests, Russia, in cooperation with France and Germany, compelled Japan to return the peninsula to China. Japanese leaders were outraged by this Triple Intervention. Another example is the Washington Naval Conference of 1921-22. Increasingly becoming suspicious of growing Japanese power, the United States convened a Five-Power conference with an aim to prevent a naval arms race. The conference produced the Washington Treaty that curbed the number of warships among the United States, the United Kingdom and Japan to a ratio of 10:10:6. Having insisted on the ratio of 10:10:7, Japan was highly dissatisfied. Furthermore, the Conference replaced the Anglo-Japanese alliance with the Four-Power Treaty involving Japan, the United States, the United Kingdom and France, which was a much weaker arrangement than the former. In short, at the Washington Conference, Japan “failed to achieve a single diplomatic success.” These historical experiences left Japan with “lingering psychological resistance” towards multilateralism.

Asia-Pacific: Geopolitical Dimension

The geographic conception of the Asia-Pacific first appeared in the Japanese diplomatic language in then Foreign Minister Takeo Miki’s Diet speech in December 1966. Generally speaking, Japan’s diplomacy has been said to be reactive or adaptive in that the Japanese diplomacy evolves from the necessity to react or adapt itself to international situation. But, Tokyo’s Asian policy has been shaped by Japan’s desire for an autonomous diplomacy. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the reduction of American military presence and the Nixon Doctrine, which underscored the principle of self-help, led Japan to conduct its autonomous diplomacy. Japan’s normalization with China in 1972 and recognition of North Vietnam in 1973 are cases in point. Nonetheless, the Japanese government dealt with these two cases separately and lacked in its diplomatic thinking to relate to one another. In other words, Japanese
policymakers handled them only in a bilateral context and did not extend their thinking in a broader context to see these matters from the perspective of multilateralism.6

The basic framework of Japan’s Asia-Pacific policy, especially that of Southeast Asia, was laid out by the so-called Fukuda Doctrine. The Fukuda Doctrine refers to the statement made by Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda in Manila in August 1977. Fukuda enumerated three principles of Japan’s Asian policy: (1) Japan is firmly committed to peace and is determined not to become a military power; (2) Japan will establish a heart-to-heart relationship of mutual trust not only in political and economic areas but also in the social and cultural areas; and (3) Japan will cooperate actively with ASEAN’s efforts to strengthen solidarity and resilience and to develop relations with the Indochinese states on the basis of mutual understanding.7 As Hisashi Owada, who was one of the chief drafters of Fukuda’s Manila speech, put it, the Fukuda Doctrine was “a serious attempt to define the future role of Japan with respect to this part of the world, and by extension, to a wider world, not in terms of abstract philosophy, but in terms of a specific policy direction for Japan to follow.”8 The significance of the Fukuda Doctrine is that first, it proclaimed Japan’s will to serve as a bridge between ASEAN and the Indochinese states by encouraging peaceful coexistence between them. Second, it attached importance to ASEAN as a regional institution, and aimed at ASEAN-centred regional cooperation.9

Japan’s policy in the Cambodian peace process is a good illustration of Tokyo’s autonomous diplomacy. Japan’s activism in the Cambodian settlement is partly due to Cambodian Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhaven's desire that Japan play an active and larger role.10 The Cambodian problem demonstrates Japan’s determination to become a full-fledged participant in regional and international affairs.

**Japan’s Opposition to Multilateral Security Cooperation**

Until the end of the Cold War, Japan had been rejecting multilateral security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region. Tokyo’s official reason for this is that security multilateralism is inappropriate in the Asia-Pacific region because of the diversity in political, economic and social systems as well as the lack of common threat perception shared by the states in the region. In addition to the
stated reason, there are other important elements for Japan’s negative posture toward multilateral security cooperation. Tokyo’s antipathy stems from the fact that the idea had been proposed by the Soviet Union. The Soviet proposal raised two concerns within the Japanese government. First, Moscow’s proposal had implications of its strategic interests. The Soviet Union seemed to be trying to engage the United States and its allies into naval arms control. Since stability in Asia is largely due to the U.S. naval presence, Tokyo, totally dependent on the United States for its security, believed that such Soviet proposal would be counterproductive to regional security.11 Second, as was the case in Europe, the establishment of CSCA or Conference on Security and Cooperation in Asia, which was obviously derived from CSCE, could lead to consolidation of post-war national boundaries. Tokyo was worried that such development would generate a false interpretation that Japan accepted the territorial status quo over the Northern territories.12

Related to the above Soviet factor, there was also a domestic factor opposing multilateral security cooperation. In the 1950s, there were enormous political battles over the conclusion and revision of Japan-U.S. security alliance. The Japanese Left (Japan Socialist Party (JSP) and Japan Communist Party (JCP)) objected the alliance, and one of its anti-American alternative options for Japan’s security was the creation of multilateral security organization in Asia, which inferred cooperation with the communist states. Still in the early 1990s, the idea of multilateral security mechanism embraced the left wing’s ideological notion. For Japanese policymakers, multilateral security cooperation was a product of anti-American feelings intended to undermine Japan-U.S. alliance.13 Tokyo’s explicit opposition to multilateral security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region continued at least as late as July 1990, when Japan rejected the Australian and Canadian proposals advocating a Helsinki-style CSCA.14

Shift in Japan’s Policy

In the early 1990s, Japan’s thinking on security multilateralism began to change. Tokyo’s position was that geopolitical conditions and security environment of the Asia-Pacific region made the idea of a region-wide CSCE process irrelevant. What is suitable for the region, however, would be a set of multilateral arrangements on sub-regional or issue-specific basis. In the minds of Japanese
leaders, such an approach seemed to be a pragmatic one, which was problem-solving driven involving only concerned states.

The first official indication that Tokyo was reconsidering multilateral security cooperation was delivered by then Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama during a Diet address on 25 January 1991. Nakayama’s Diet speech represented Japan’s general position on multilateral security cooperation at the time. While pointing out the differences between Asia and Europe, Nakayama stressed the importance of dialogue and cooperation on sub-regional basis for ensuring long-term stability.

Arguing that a CSCE Helsinki process would be incompatible with regional geopolitical conditions and security environment, Foreign Minister Nakayama indicated four differences between Asia-Pacific and Europe. First, the prime concern of states in the Asia-Pacific region is economic development whereas that of the European states has been alleviation of military tensions including the threat of nuclear war. Second, due to a multiplicity of threat perceptions states in the Asia-Pacific preferred bilateral alliances to multilateral alliance such as NATO in Europe. Third, there still exist such unresolved conflicts and disputes as the Korean Peninsula and other territorial disputes in the Asia-Pacific region while in Europe the CSCE process began after the settlement of territorial disputes. Fourth, the Asia-Pacific region is characterized by the diversity of political systems, society, culture and levels of economic development whereas Europe is moving toward political and economic integration. Based on such characteristics of the Asia-Pacific, Nakayama went further to advocate “strengthening dialogue and cooperative relations on sub-regional basis for ensuring long-term stability.” With regard to region-wide cooperation, Nakayama stated that regional cooperation should advance with focus on economic cooperation. Thus, he was still cautious of region-wide political cooperation. Nevertheless, Nakayama’s Diet address demonstrated Tokyo’s emerging notion that broader political cooperation was also important for the region. In fact, such thinking gradually emerged within the Japanese government, especially the Foreign Ministry, through its participation in the Cambodian peace process.

Tokyo’s positive stance toward region-wide multilateral security cooperation was first made explicit on 22 July of the same year. At the ASEAN PMC in Kuala Lumpur, Foreign Minister Nakayama suggested to utilize ASEAN PMC as
a forum for political dialogue to enhance a sense of mutual reassurance or trust among regional states and proposed that a Senior Officials Meeting (SOM) be created under the auspices of ASEAN PMC.

What is necessary for the Asia-Pacific region is to exploit the various types of existing mechanisms for international cooperation and dialogue in a comprehensive and multi-tiered manner...Should any mechanism be added to these cooperative venues in economic [ASEAN, ASEAN PMC, APEC and PECC (Pacific Economic Cooperation Council)], diplomatic [efforts in Cambodia and the Korean Peninsula] and security [Japan-U.S. security treaty and other bilateral alliances] realms, it would be a political dialogue where friendly nations in the region candidly exchange their mutual concerns...The dialogue that friendly nations have for the sake of mutual reassurance is intended to solidify further the political basis for cooperation between and among one another...I believe utilizing ASEAN PMC as such a political dialogue forum for mutual reassurance is timely and meaningful. In order to make such a political dialogue more effective, I think it is also meaningful, for instance, to establish, under the auspices of this conference, a Senior Officials Meeting to provide the conference with feedback on the result of discussion at the meeting.18

Nakayama's above speech reflected Tokyo's policy of a 'multiplex mechanism'. A multiplex mechanism, “composed of bilateral and multilateral arrangements and frameworks of cooperation designed for a variety of purposes,”19 has four pillars: (1) economic cooperation; (2) diplomatic efforts to settle sub-regional conflicts and disputes; (3) a broad range of (bilateral) security arrangements and cooperative relations; and (4) a regional political dialogue.20

The first pillar, economic cooperation, refers to bilateral cooperation as well as such existing multilateral cooperation as ASEAN, ASEAN PMC, PECC and ESCAP (Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific). The second pillar of diplomatic efforts to settle sub-regional conflicts and disputes places emphasis on Cambodia and the Korean Peninsula. The third pillar includes a set of bilateral alliances with the United States. The fourth pillar, a regional political dialogue, adds a new dimension to Japan’s policy. The aim of political dialogue, Foreign Ministry's *Diplomatic Bluebook 1991* writes, is to raise a sense of mutual reassurance between Japan and the countries in the Asia-Pacific region.

Tokyo came to realise that region-wide political cooperation would have a positive effect on sub-regional multilateral cooperation. Japan's policy on security multilateralism at this point has two dimensions. Multilateral efforts toward the settlement of conflicts and disputes are at work at the sub-regional
level whereas multilateral dialogue to reduce tension and promote confidence operates at the regional level. This two-dimensional approach was enunciated by then Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa at the National Press Club in Washington D.C. on 2 July 1992.

Miyazawa advocated so-called the two-track approach. After stating Tokyo's perception of and its role in the two serious security challenges in the region, the Korean Peninsula and Cambodia, he alleged the significance of regional political dialogue and told that ASEAN PMC was a niche. He asserted that it was important to construct a regional political dialogue abreast of the existing bilateral and sub-regional cooperation to encounter regional instability.

For the security of the Asia-Pacific region, it is most effective to take the two-track approach, which aims, on the one hand, for the promotion of sub-regional cooperation to settle conflicts and disputes and, on the other hand, for the promotion of regional political dialogue to increase a sense of mutual reassurance. These two efforts should advance in tandem.21

Japan's activism in multilateral security cooperation is followed by Miyazawa’s speech in January 1993. In Bangkok, he placed the promotion of regional political and security dialogue as the first among the four pillars of Japan’s ASEAN policy. Miyazawa’s address was significant because he clearly alleged Japan's will to assume a leadership role in regional security multilateralism.

In this period of transition for the international community, the countries of the Asia-Pacific region need to develop a long-term vision regarding the future order of peace and security for their region. For this, various ideas should be thrashed out through political and security dialogue among the countries in the region. I hope that some picture of the future of this region's security will be gradually distilled through such a process, based on shared perceptions and concerns. Japan will actively take part in such discussions.22

As discussed earlier, a multiplex mechanism remains relevant to date in Japan's security policy. So does Miyazawa’s two-track approach in the sense that Tokyo employs a conflict management approach through its alliance with the United States as well as a conflict prevention approach through multilateral security cooperation with the ARF at its core.

Thus, although Japan was opposing multilateral security cooperation in the region at least as late as July 1990, Tokyo started to change its policy in January and July 1991. Japan shifted its position from opposition to approval of sub-regional security multilateralism in six months, and its endorsement
expanded to region-wide cooperation also in six months. The following discussion addresses the factors behind this policy change.

**Factors behind the Policy Change**

*The End of the Cold War*

The end of the Cold War changed the international environment significantly, and this was reflected in Japan’s security perception. Since the 1990 *Bōei Hakusho* or Defence White paper, JDA has characterized the post-Cold War era as an era of full-fledged talks and cooperation. With regard to security environment in the Asia-Pacific region, the Japanese government recognized it as opaque and uncertain because the dangers and threats were, in contrast to the Cold War period, unspecified, dispersed and latent. Threats may emerge from historical legacies, territorial disputes or domestic insurgencies. In the world of increased interdependence, moreover, events on the other end of the world, as demonstrated by the 1990 Gulf Crisis, would have a significant effect on Japan since they could destabilize the international community as a whole. Such recognition is evident from Nakayama’s opening remarks at the informal dinner meeting with the Asia-Pacific foreign ministers in New York. Nakayama propounded that in the midst of volatile situations in Eastern Europe and the Middle East, the most important task for the leaders in the Asia-Pacific is to discuss how turbulence in these two areas could affect our region and what form of new security order should be constructed in the region. In the same vein, Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa reiterated the above point in Bangkok in 1993 with specific reference to multilateral security dialogue.

It is clear that the collapse of the Cold War structure and the resultant fluidity in international relations are bound to affect the security landscape of this region as a whole. This awareness on the part of the countries of the region has, of late, sharpened their interest in the peace and stability of the region as a whole. It is important for the Asia-Pacific countries to share this interest and to enhance the transparency of their respective policies as well as their sense of mutual reassurance. Highly significant in this regard is the political and security dialogue that has been actively under way in the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference since last year.

The end of the Cold War was itself a significant event leading up to Japan’s policy change. However, it would be more appropriate to consider this event as an underlying factor behind Japan’s policy change rather than an immediate
Having said that, the end of the Cold War is a direct factor behind the following events, which had an immediate effect upon Tokyo’s policy change.

**Reduction of U.S. Presence in the Asia-Pacific**

In April 1990, the U.S. Department of Defence produced its East Asia Strategic Initiative (EASI) report entitled *A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim: Looking Toward the 21st Century*, which outlined the Bush administration’s security policy in the post-Cold War Asia-Pacific. Recognizing a diminished Soviet threat and domestic fiscal restraints on the defence budget, EASI showed Washington’s intent to reduce its military forces in the region in a three-phased manner over the next decade. Moreover, the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Subic Bay and Clark Air Base in the Philippines in 1991-1992 further raised Japanese leaders’ misgivings about the American withdrawal.

The Pentagon’s plan to decrease the size of its forward-deployed forces was alarming for Japan since Tokyo’s security policy based on the Yoshida doctrine depended primarily on the United States. Also, American presence acted as ‘the cap in the bottle’—a guarantor to prevent Japan’s military resurgence—to mitigate the fears of regional countries. Since Japan’s active political and military role is constrained by memories of Japan’s past, a Japan assuming greater responsibility without ‘the cap’ would remind many Asians of the past atrocities. Security multilateralism has attracted Japan in two ways. On the one hand, it appeared to be a mechanism to keep the United States engaged in the region, multilateral security cooperation presented itself as an alternative to Japan-U.S. alliance to ensure Japan's national security, on the other.

**The Persian Gulf War of 1990-1991**

On 2 August 1990, the Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait and announced the annexation of Kuwait on 8 August. The invasion marked the beginning of the war in the Persian Gulf in 1990-1991. Under the recognition that economic and social factors are gaining their momentum in the post-Cold War era, the Gulf War revealed that military power still determined international politics to a significant degree. During the Cold War, there was an understanding within the Japanese government that security issues were entrusted to Washington, but the Gulf War proved that it was no longer the case. The seven months between August 1990 and February 1991 exposed Tokyo’s inability to take a prompt and
profound action in case of international crises. This event, the Gulf War, is indeed the driving force in bringing about revaluation of Japan’s security policy.

During the Persian Gulf War, Japan was asked to provide financial and personnel contributions by the international community. Due to its Article Nine of the Constitutional restraints, however, Japan chose to make financial contributions totalled thirteen billion U.S. dollars. Despite the fact that its financial support ultimately exceeded those of any states outside the Gulf area, Japan’s contribution was not only criticized as ‘too little, too late,’ but also failed to receive any gratitude, even from Kuwait. Kuwait expressed its gratitude in American newspapers to those states that helped Kuwait during the Gulf War. It was a major blow for Japan when it found out that its name was off the list. Tokyo’s so-called ‘checkbook diplomacy’ fell short of international expectations and engendered negative responses, especially from the United States.26 Pressure on Japan undoubtedly urged Tokyo to go beyond checkbook diplomacy to live up to international expectations that it plays a global political role commensurate with its economic power.27

In October 1990, the United Nations Peace Cooperation (UNPC) Bill was introduced in the Diet, which enabled Japan to send Self-Defence Forces (SDF) to the Persian Gulf for logistical support. Also, on 24 April 1991, after the Gulf War was over, Tokyo dispatched Maritime Self-Defence Forces (MSDF) minesweepers to help clear international waterways, which marked the first time overseas operation performed since the Korean War. These two actions aroused suspicions from neighbouring countries, especially from China and Korea, that Japan was once again striving to become a military power.28 Hence, Tokyo was faced with a dilemma. On the one hand, Japan was pressured to play its part as a credible ally by Americans and was also expected to contribute significantly to the maintenance of peace and security by the international community. On the other hand, the neighbouring countries are susceptible to such Japan’s role. Therefore, Japanese leaders confronted with the necessity to do both: playing a global political role commensurate with its economic strength while allaying suspicions of the regional countries. The Gulf War, together with the American military reduction, provided an incentive to promote multilateral security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region.
Improvement of the Japanese-Soviet Relations

Taking the opportunity of then Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze’s first visit to Japan in January 1986, Tokyo began its efforts in improving its relations with the Soviet Union. Rapprochement between Tokyo and Moscow was set in motion when their leaders reached an agreement upon Shevardnadze’s third visit to Japan to commence a bilateral security dialogue in September 1990. The first Japanese-Soviet security dialogue was held in December 1990.\(^29\)

The turning point for the Japanese-Soviet relations as well as Japan’s security policy on regional security multilateralism, however, was President Gorvachev’s visit to Japan in April 1991, which represented the first time visit ever in history made by the head of the Soviet Union.\(^30\) Until then, Moscow had been encouraging multilateral security cooperation in the region, which in the minds of Japanese leaders had connotations to naval arms control. But, in April 1991 Gorbachev did not mention the reiterated Soviet proposal. Furthermore, Gorbachev made explicit that Moscow no longer opposed the Japan-U.S. security treaty. The Tokyo-Moscow rapprochement, especially Gorbachev’s April 1991 visit, helped overcome Japan’s apprehension that security multilateralism would weaken the Japan-U.S. alliance, and encouraged Japan to take the initiative on regional security multilateralism.\(^31\) It was only three months after Gorvachev’s visit that Foreign Minister Nakayama put forward his proposal before the Asia-Pacific countries.

China

During 1990-1991 when Japan was reassessing its policy on security multilateralism, China did not appear to be an important element in propelling multilateral security cooperation. In fact, the Japanese government was reluctant to include China and Russia in regional security fora. Satoh explicitly stated in his Manila Conference paper that although Chinese and Soviet participation should not be excluded, their participation “must be realized gradually as they come to meet the conditions required.”\(^32\) The importance of engaging China in the region came up as a subject of the Japanese debates in the mid-1993. As Masashi Nishihara highlighted the importance of China,\(^33\) realists in Japan regarded regional security multilateralism as one of the measures to balance against the rising China.\(^34\) Such a realist thinking affected
that of neoliberals in Japan. For instance, Yukio Satoh articulated that since Chinese efforts to modernize its military capability were one of the region’s great concerns, an increased transparency as to Chinese military capability was needed. To this end, “how to engage China in the [multilateral] process is now the question of growing importance.”

Benefit of Multilateral Security Cooperation: Tackling the Dilemma

Regional security multilateralism has a stake in meeting the challenges posed by the U.S. force reduction and the war in the Persian Gulf. First, Japan saw regional security multilateralism as a means to ensure U.S. military presence in the region. The paper presented at the ASEAN-sponsored meeting in Manila on 5-7 June 1991 by Yukio Satoh, then Director-General of the Information Analysis, Research and Planning Bureau of the Foreign Ministry, who played the primary role in advocating multilateral security cooperation within the Japanese government, advocated this point. Satoh stressed that the U.S. participation in such a dialogue was “critically important for the sake of mutual reassurance” as the future direction of American and Japanese policy was the two major concerns in the region. This leads to the discussion of the second challenge to Japanese diplomacy: alleviation of regional anxiety about Japan’s military resurgence.

Tokyo’s dispatch of its MSDF to the Persian Gulf and participation in the Cambodian peace process aroused scepticism and apprehension among the states in the region. This necessitated Japan to reassure its neighbours by engaging itself in a multilateral security dialogue. Satoh’s statement clearly demonstrates the Japanese dilemma discussed in the last section. Satoh articulated:

In the coming years, Japan will engage herself more positively in the process to enhance political stability and security in the Asia and Pacific region…How far Japan should use the SDF in the future UN peace keeping operations and other emergency relief activities is now the subject of political and public debate in Japan. But participation of the SDF, if any, will be limited to the areas of non-combat operation…Yet, anxiety on the part of many Asian countries about the possibility of Japan becoming a ‘military power’ will persist…It is important in this context for Japan to continue to explicitly commit herself to the policy of not becoming a ‘military power.’ But it is equally important for Japan to place herself in multilateral venues, wherein the countries which are worried about the future direction of Japanese defence
policy can express their concern. This must be an important part of Japanese participation in the process for political and stability and security in the Asia and Pacific region.39

The necessity of Tokyo’s reassuring its neighbours was reiterated by Nakayama in Kuala Lumpur in July 1991. After referring to Japan’s intention to participate in UN peacekeeping operations, Nakayama addressed that it was fruitful for both Japan and Asian countries to have a dialogue forum where they frankly exchange their views. Since anxiety and apprehensions about the future direction of Japan’s security policy would grow among the states in the region as Japan expands its political role, Nakayama stated, such anxiety and concerns were a worthy topic for such political dialogues.40

It must be noted here that in the early 1990s when Tokyo was motivated for security multilateralism more than ever before, Japan preferred employing the term ‘mutual reassurance’ to ‘confidence building’. This is primarily because the concept of confidence building was evolved in the process of East-West confrontations in the Cold War Europe with the aim of reducing the risk of war between adversaries. Japan argued that using the term CBMs was inappropriate in the Asia-Pacific since no countries in the region regarded another as an adversary, except in the Korean Peninsula. It is plausible that as suspicion against the future direction of Japanese security policy grew in the region, Tokyo wanted to eradicate any possibilities that could plant doubts in the minds of regional leaders that Japan would be a future adversary. Furthermore, for the Asia-Pacific where states in this region consider security more broadly than other parts of the world where they tend to think of security narrowly in military terms, CBMs, which are designed to elucidate misperceptions arising from military issues, do not meet the requirements of the Asia-Pacific. As Satoh argues, “[t]he complex feelings and concerns which Asian hold toward each other are more deeply rooted than any security concern which adversaries have toward each other.”41 It follows, therefore, that the main thrust of multilateral security dialogue in the Asia-Pacific is to deepen a sense of mutual reassurance, rather than to build confidence. Nakayama reiterated this point in Kuala Lumpur in July 1991:

A dialogue to enhance a sense of mutual reassurance among friendly countries is to solidify political basis for cooperative relations. In this sense, I
believe that such a political dialogue is fundamentally different from confidence-building measures, which aim to mitigate military tensions.\textsuperscript{42}

Multilateral security cooperation, thus, could serve to tackle the dilemma. First, it implies legitimacy for the SDF participation in UN peacekeeping operations abroad. As Yoichi Funabashi, Chief Diplomatic Correspondent and Columnist of the \textit{Asahi Shimbun}, and Kin-ichi Yoshihara, a senior director of Asian Forum Japan, have observed, multilateralism has become a form of rhetoric as well as an excuse to claim both Japan’s participation in regional and international affairs and SDF participation in peacekeeping operations.\textsuperscript{43}

Second, multilateral security cooperation also provides transparency and mutual reassurance for the neighbouring countries. Third, cooperative security arrangements allow Japan to play an active role in political and security affairs since they stress peaceful means to settle disputes without resorting to the use of force, which is in accordance with the Japanese Constitution. Even though uncertainty and unpredictability in the region, which was made prominent in the end of the Cold War, was certainly an important stimulus to Japan’s activism in security multilateralism in the early 1990s, considering that the Gulf Crisis and the reduction of U.S. military forces were, among other things, the most influential elements amounting to Tokyo’s policy change, Japan’s endorsement to multilateral security cooperation arguably came about as a mere response to international and regional demands.


Amid the fall of LDP rule since 1955, there emerged recognition that Japan’s defence posture, which was formed in the Cold War era, was no longer appropriate in the post-Cold War era and thus its security policy should be re-evaluated to keep abreast of the post-Cold War regional and international security situations. There existed a view that the 1976 National Defence Program Outline (NDPO) should be revised.\textsuperscript{44}

Responding to such various demands, Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa formed his private Advisory Group on Defence Issues (\textit{Bōei Mondai Kondankai}) in February 1994. Advisory Group’s report, \textit{The Modality of the Security and Defense Capability of Japan}, was submitted to then Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama in August of the same year. This Advisory Group was equivalent to
the 1975 Defence Study Group (Bōei wo Kangaeru Kai) which laid out the conceptual framework for the 1976 NDPO and the 1979-1980 task force on Comprehensive Security (Sōgō Anzen Hoshō Kenkyūkai). Advisory Group on Defence Issues was composed of nine members, headed by Hirotaro Higuchi, Chairman of the Board of Asahi Breweries, Ltd. The Group was created to review the NDPO with the task of defining “a direction of security policy appropriate to the new era.”

What is remarkable about the Higuchi Report was its emphasis on the importance of multilateral security cooperation (takakuteki anzen hoshō kyōryoku) and the concept of cooperative security (kyōryokuteki anzen hoshō). In order to remove the sense of insecurity, caused by the opaqueness and uncertainty of the international order “in which the dangers that exist[ed were] dispersed and difficult to predict,” the report stated that the international community needed to “prevent the development of conflicts [and] to contain the expansion of conflicts” through multilateral cooperation. Advisory Group on Defense Issues stressed that Japan should play an active and constructive role. Japan should extricate itself from its security policy of the past that was, if anything, passive, and henceforth play an active role in shaping a new order. Indeed Japan has the responsibility of playing such a role. To prevent the use of force as means of settling international disputes is the intent of the United Nations Charter. That the international community will develop along these lines is extremely desirable for Japan in light of its national interests, since the nation is engaged in economic activities around the globe and yet resolved not to tread the path to a major military power. Consequently, pursuing an active and constructive security policy and making efforts in this direction is not only Japan’s contribution to the international community but also its responsibility to the Japanese people now and in the future.

The question is how Japan should play such an active and constructive role. The Higuchi Report advocated veering from the Cold War defence strategy to the multilateral security strategy in “the present age of cooperative security,” and stated that the task for Japan was how to determine its security policy from the perspective of cooperative security. The report presented “the promotion of multilateral security cooperation on a global and regional scale” as the first of the three pillars of the henceforth Japanese security policy.

Followed by the submission of the Higuchi Report was the revision of the 1976 NDPO. The JDA issued its new NDPO in November 1995. The new
NDPO promotes “security dialogues and exchanges among defence authorities to enhance mutual confidence with countries, including neighbouring states.” Even though the Higuchi Report underlined the importance of multilateral security cooperation, the new National Defence Program Outline did not reflect this point so much. Instead, the NDPO emphasised the importance of Japan-U.S. security alliance. This could be due to misgivings held by officials in the JDA and the U.S. Defence Department. The Higuchi Report’s emphasis on security multilateralism caused fear among them, especially former Assistant Secretary of Defence Richard Armitage and former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence Carl Ford, that the foundations of Japan-U.S. security relations seemed to be faltering. This fear bred awareness that the security relations between Japan and the United States needed to be regenerated. Following the NDPO, the 1996 Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security Alliance and the 1997 revised Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation were put forward in an effort to consolidate their security alliance.

The truth is, however, Tokyo never tried to abandon its security ties with Washington and replace with a multilateral security system. Nonetheless, in the aftermath of the Cold War many scholars in Japan thought that multilateral security arrangements would take over the alliances with the United States in the Asia-Pacific, but no one in the Japanese foreign policy circles today maintains this view. The Japanese official view, represented by the 1994 Higuchi Report and the 1995 new NDPO, is that multilateral security cooperation serves to complement the bilateral Japan-U.S. alliance. To be specific, the bilateral alliance provides for the defence of Japan proper and multilateralism increases overall regional security and prevents conflicts.

**Japan’s ARF Policy**

Even though the ARF is one form of regional multilateral security cooperation among many in the Asia-Pacific, it is necessary to analyse Japan’s ARF policy because the ARF lies at the heart of Tokyo’s regional security multilateralism. It is not too much to say that Japan’s policy on multilateral security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific is equivalent to its ARF policy.
Keynote

The basic posture of Japan’s ARF policy was manifested at the first ARF meeting by Foreign Minister Yohei Kono. Japanese policymakers regarded that the ARF was a venue for propelling in the long term the maintenance and improvement of security environment by encouraging cooperation for enhancing mutual understanding and trust among the states in the Asia-Pacific region. Kono suggested at the first ARF meeting that its security alliance with the United States would continue to be the foundation of Japan’s security policy while in the long run the ARF would serve to contribute in easing tensions or even eradicating the root causes of conflict through the increase in transparency and the enhancement of mutual trust.

With such recognition Tokyo set forth the main objective of the ARF as the promotion of measures to enhance mutual understanding and trust, or mutual reassurance measures (MRMs). MRMs comprise three pillars: 1) ‘information sharing’ so as to increase transparency of policies of individual countries; 2) ‘human exchange’ so as to deepen mutual understanding and trust; and 3) ‘cooperation toward the promotion of global activities’. Information in the first pillar refers to that of defence policy and arms procurement. The members of the ARF can achieve information sharing through publication of defence white papers or presentation of defence papers at the ARF as well as the ARF-SOM. Human exchange involves exchanges of security-related personnel such as military exchange and reciprocal visits. Lastly, cooperation toward the promotion of global activities includes, for example, convening seminars on peacekeeping operations, which aims to share experiences of activities at the global level such as the United Nations and to perform such activities more effectively.

Thus, Japan’s interests in the ARF lie in MRMs, or in the words of the ARF, confidence-building measures or CBMs. All of the seven CBMs in Annex A of the ARF Concept Paper correspond to the above mentioned Japan’s three pillars. That is to say, information sharing contains dialogue on security perceptions and defence publications. Human exchange coincides with enhanced contacts, exchanges between military academics, staff colleges and training, and observers at military exercises. Participation in UN Conventional Arms Register and annual seminar for defence officials and military officers on selected international security issues correspond to cooperation toward the
promotion of global activities. In this regard the Japan Defence Agency (JDA) plays an active and important part.

**Multilateralism in Japanese Bilateral Security Policy**

From the functional dimension, the Japanese, compared to the previous policy, have come to have a more positive view on multilateral security cooperation since the end of the Cold War. Japan’s policy in the 1990s shows Tokyo’s growing activism in regional security multilateralism. Nevertheless, it has not yet occupied the heart of Japanese security policy replaced by bilateralism. Nor is it likely in the foreseeable future. However, Japan has a stake in multilateral security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region since this is the field Tokyo feels most comfortable in playing an active and constructive political and security role.

From the geopolitical dimension, Japan’s policy can be considered an extension of its autonomous policy. On the one hand, Japan’s policy change vis-à-vis multilateral security cooperation appears to be a product of Japan’s conventional reactive policy since the change was brought about mainly as a result of the Persian Gulf War and the reduction of U.S. military presence cultivated by the end of the Cold War, on the other hand, Japan’s policy is autonomous vis-à-vis the United States because Tokyo fostered regional security multilateralism despite the American opposition. Reportedly, Tokyo played an important part in “impressing upon Washington the importance of multilateral security dialogue for the Asia-Pacific region.”

Since the mid-1990s, Japan seemed to be losing its momentum toward security multilateralism that it had in the early 1990s. This is due to a series of the North Korean nuclear missile crises and spy vessel incidents and the crisis in the Taiwan Strait. These incidents led Japanese policymakers to strengthen their deterrent capability, including the adoption of the 1999 Surrounding Situations Law (Shuhen Jitai Ho) and the 2000 Ship Inspection Law (Senpaku Kensa Katsudo Ho) as well as the discussion on emergency legislation. It is pertinent for Tokyo to quest for both deterrent and conflict prevention measures. As the 2000 report Japan’s Goals in the 21st Century submitted by Prime Minister’s Commission on Japan’s Goals in the 21st Century writes, it is “necessary for Japan to exert itself both to prepare for eventualities and to improve the overall international environment through steps
including regional confidence-building measures. In countering problems in the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait Japan employs the Japan-U.S. security treaty, while it utilizes the ARF and other multilateral security arrangements to increase transparency and trust in the region. The latter measures are indispensable to ensure long-term peace and security in the Asia-Pacific. Japan has responsibility and a role to play in further fostering multilateral security cooperation in the region.

3 Ibid.
9 Takeda, op.cit., pp. 66-70.


11 The text of Nakayama's address was included in MOFA, Gaiko Seisho: Heisei 3-nen-ban (Diplomatic Bluebook 1991), Tokyo: Ō kurasho Insatsu Kyoku, 1992, pp. 379-386. The following discussion is drawn from his address.

12 For Miyazawa’s speech at the National Press Club, see MOFA, Gaiko Seisho: Heisei 4-nen-ban (Diplomatic Bluebook 1992), Tokyo: Ō kurasho Insatsu Kyoku, 1993, pp. 404-410.


16 The text of Nakayama's address was included in MOFA, Gaiko Seisho: Heisei 3-nen-ban (Diplomatic Bluebook 1991), Tokyo: Ō kurasho Insatsu Kyoku, 1992, pp. 379-386. The following discussion is drawn from his address.

17 Ibid.

18 Ibid., pp. 424-429.


24 See note 26.


26 For an insider’s account of Japan-U.S. relations during the Gulf War, see former U.S. Ambassador to Japan Michael H. Armacost, Friends or Rivals?, Columbia University Press, 1996, pp. 98-127. U.S. Senate passed a unanimous resolution warning its allies that failing in making appropriate contributions to the Gulf coalition efforts would lead to serious deterioration of relations. The United States demanded of Tokyo’s personnel contribution to the U.S.-led Gulf coalition forces, but the Kaifu government’s reluctance and inability to do so gave rise to resentment and disappointment in the United States toward Japan, which led to the rupture of relations between the two countries.

27 Former Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa stated in his interview with Professor Makoto Iokibe, one of the leading scholars on Japanese diplomatic history in Japan, that he felt it necessary to respond to international criticisms Japan received during the Gulf War. The passage of the International Peace Cooperation Bill, a successor of the UNPC Bill, in June 1992 and the subsequent decision to participate in peacekeeping operations in Cambodia (United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia: UNTAC) in September 1992 were the two specific actions.

in May 1991. Kaifu stated that the dispatch of MSDF to the Gulf was not Japan’s intent to play a military role in the international community and did not represent any change in Japan’s basic defence policy. See MOFA, op.cit., 1992, pp. 401-410.

29 Ibid., p. 317.


31 Satoh notes: “It is encouraging that President Gorbachev did not repeat the hitherto reiterated Soviet proposal to apply a European process to the Asia and Pacific region, when he discussed the subject in Tokyo last time.” Satoh, op.cit., 1991, p. 41. Also see ibid., p. 14.

32 Satoh, op.cit., 1991, p. 43; Satoh, op.cit., 1994, p. 43. According to Paul Midford’s study based on his interview with MOFA officials, MOFA’s China Department wanted to include China, but the Soviet Union Department wanted to exclude the Soviet Union. Chinese membership was considered inseparable from that of the Soviet Union. Given the low priority accorded to China Department in 1991, the Soviet Union Department’s will prevailed. See Midford, op.cit., pp. 385-386.


34 Tsuyoshi Kawasaki argues that there existed three schools of thought in Japan with regard to regional security multilateralism (especially the ARF): Idealism, Realism and Neoliberalism. According to Kawasaki, neoliberal thinking, a blend of idealism and realism but more inclined to the latter, prevailed over the others. Japan’s policy vis-à-vis the ARF, Kawasaki asserts, is the product of neoliberal conception. Kawasaki, op.cit., 1997, pp. 480-503.


37 Satoh was invited as a private participant to the conference, “ASEAN and the Asia-Pacific Region: Prospects for Security Cooperation in the 1990s” in Manila, the Philippines, sponsored by the Department of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Philippines and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand, 5-7 June 1991.


39 Ibid., pp. 44-45.


44 NDPO stipulates the level of defence capability that should be maintained in peacetime Japan, and serves as the guideline for Japan’s defence capability.

45 Among the nine members, four were from the academic community and financial circles (two from each). The rest of the five were former bureaucracies from Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Finance, International Trade and Industry and JDA.


47 Masashi Nishihara points out that Canadian Foreign Minister Joe Clark’s speech in Tokyo in July 1990 advocating the concept of cooperative security affected the Higuchi Report’s emphasis on cooperative security. Masashi Nishihara, op.cit., 1994, p. 68, note 3.


49 Ibid., p. 7.

50 Ibid., pp. 11-13.

51 Ibid., pp. 7-8. It should be noted that although the Higuchi Report attaches importance to multilateral security cooperation on a regional dimension, it places more emphasis on a global
In addition to the impact of the Gulf Crisis, Japan's stress on the United Nations derives from its high expectation that the UN will be activated in the post-Cold War era and its election to be a non-permanent member of the Security Council in 1992. Chapter Three of this report, for instance, discussed the role of the SDF in UN peacekeeping operations for two and a half pages in length whereas the discussion on Japan's role in regional security cooperation was only one paragraph long. One paragraph discussion was hardly sufficient in length or in content to provide Japan's role in concrete terms.


Yoichi Funabashi, Dōmei Hyōryū (Alliance Adrift), Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1997, pp. 251-309. See also Yoichi Funabashi, “Nichi-Bei Anpo Sai-Teigi no Zen-Kaibō” (Anatomy of the Redefinition of Japan-U.S. Security Alliance), Sekai, No. 622, May 1996, pp. 22-53. A paper written by Patrick M. Cronin and Michael J. Green, who were members of a private study group with Paul S. Giarra, Senior Country Director for Japan in the Defence Department, and Ezra F. Vogel, National Intelligence Officer for East Asia for the National Intelligence Council (NIC), clearly expressed such U.S. reservation. The close U.S.-Japan relationship is only a superficial continuation of policy trajectories established during the Cold War. The reality is that today the U.S.-Japan alliance is on shakier ground than most will admit. There are growing signs in Japan's policy planning renewed attention to the United Nations, to regional multilateral mechanisms, and to stronger independent capabilities as means of hedging against possible U.S. withdrawal or fatigue (pp. 1-2).

With specific reference to the Higuchi Report, Cronin and Green write:

Although the report calls for U.S.-centered multilateralism, it does not explain how the alliance roles and missions will be related to the JSDF’s new multilateral agenda. As it now stands, the report’s recommendations suggest that multilateralism is a hedge against waning U.S. commitments to the alliance, and possibly even a distraction from bilateral defense cooperation (p. 9).


Also see Dixon, op.cit., p. 148.


Ibid.


