11 Problematising 'linkages' between Southeast Asian and international terrorism

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On 20 September 2001, in response to the terrorist attacks on the United States nine days earlier, President George W. Bush addressed a joint session of the US Congress to explain who had perpetrated the attacks and how his administration would respond. President Bush made clear that '(o)ur war on terror begins with al-Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated' (Bush 2001). Bush described al-Qaeda as 'a collection of loosely affiliated terrorist organizations', led by Osama bin Laden, with a network extending to sixty countries. In sum, Bush committed the US to an open-ended global war on terrorism:

Americans should not expect one battle, but a lengthy campaign, unlike any other we have ever seen. It may include dramatic strikes, visible on TV, and covert operations, secret even in success. We will starve terrorists of funding, turn them one against another, drive them from place to place, until there is no refuge or no rest. And we will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism. Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime. (Bush 2001)

This chapter explores the linkages between international and regional terrorism raised by the US 'global war on terrorism' with specific focus on Southeast Asia. We argue that the framework of international-regional linkages must be extended to include domestic considerations within individual nation-states. Before this complex issue can be explored, however, it is first necessary to raise a number of definitional and methodological issues.

There is no agreed definition of terrorism. Neither the League of Nations nor the United Nations has been able to come up with a definition of terrorism that is acceptable to the international community. Regional organisations such as the Organization of Islamic Conference and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have been similarly unsuccessful. The US government employs at least nineteen

separate definitions, and a study published in 1988 identified 119 separate definitions used by the academic community (Schmid and Jongman 1988: 5–6).

In sum, governments and academic analysts have been free to pick and choose any definition of convenience when discussing groups that resort to political violence. Both the US and the United Kingdom, for example, proscribe terrorist groups. Although their separate lists of terrorist groups overlap, they are not congruent. Both the US and the UK proscribe terrorist groups that are not included on the other's list (Silke 2004: 5). This analytical confusion has carried over into the academic world where sloppy methodology has resulted in the classification of a variety of Southeast Asian militant Islamic groups as part of al-Qaeda's network.

For the purpose of this chapter, a terrorist organisation and its leadership are defined as those groups and individuals who have been proscribed by the United Nations through Security Council Resolution 1267. In Southeast Asia, in addition to al-Qaeda, only two Islamic extremist groups have been declared terrorist organisations: Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG).

Problematising 'linkages'

A central and highly contentious element in the scholarly discourse on terrorism is that of 'linkages'. Nearly all writers on terrorism build their analysis at least in part on 'links' which they assert exist between various terrorist groups and individuals. Some of the scholars who make the most extensive use of the term, such as Rohan Gunaratna, Zachary Abuza and Angel Rabasa, devote little or no space in their texts to defining its meaning. But their usage suggests that 'linkages' are interpreted in the broadest sense, covering everything from fleeting or casual acquaintances through to close and substantive relations of an ideological, familial, financial, political or social nature. Thus, Gunaratna can refer to the senior JI figure Hambali as having 'links' both to the al-Qaeda central leadership as well as to the Islamist movement, Hizbut Tahrir – he asserts Hambali was a member of both (Gunaratna 2002, 2004a). Few scholars would disagree that Hambali had connections to al-Qaeda; indeed there is abundant evidence to show a pattern of regular communications and mutual facilitation between him and his al-Qaeda counterparts. But in the case of Hizbut Tahrir, the connection would appear tenuous, not to say dubious. No evidence is adduced by Gunaratna to support the claim of membership in this organisation and it is doubtful that Hizbut Tahrir had much, if any, influence on Hambali's terrorist thinking. This

example illustrates the risks of using 'links' to cover everything from well-established cases to the highly questionable.

When used in such an indiscriminate way, 'linkage' lacks analytical precision. For 'linkage' to have interpretive value, it needs to be carefully defined and reserved for instances of proven or *prima facie* substantive relationships. Thus, it is insufficient to imply that because particular Islamists trained together in Afghanistan or the Philippines, or draw inspiration from similar works, that they are all terrorists.

The case of Sri Pujimulyo Siswanto, a JI member in Central Java, illustrates this problem of undifferentiated 'links'. He was arrested for involvement in the second Bali bombing in 2005 on the basis that he provided shelter to Noordin Moh. Top and Dr Azhari Husin, the masterminds of the bombing. At first glance, this appears a clear-cut case: Siswanto was a member of a declared terrorist organisation, who harboured Indonesia's two most wanted terrorists. But a closer look at the case suggests that Siswanto may not, himself, have been a terrorist. He told police that in hiding the two fugitives, he 'only thought of protecting fellow Muslims even though I didn't agree with what they were doing and I knew protecting them was wrong'. He said Noordin tried to recruit him to the Bali bombing group but he rebuffed them saying that Indonesia was a 'place of preaching, not a place of war', and he questioned the loss of innocent Indonesian lives in past bombings (Siswanto 2006). So, while it is clear that Siswanto has 'links' to terrorists, he clearly repudiated terrorist acts. Thus, without looking at the specific nature of the contact, establishing that there was a linkage tells us very little.

Some critics of terrorism studies reject the methodological validity of analysing 'links' and networks between terrorists. Natasha Hamilton-Hart, for example, ridicules terrorism scholars for becoming engaged 'in a pointless hunt for . . . terrorist links', as if they were amateur detectives. She contends that 'when it comes to clandestine terrorist activity . . . scholars and journalists are rarely in a position to either contest or add to official information' and this renders the academic study of terrorist networks 'quite pointless' (Hamilton-Hart 2005: 304, 320). Kit Collier, who has written extensively on Philippine Muslim radicalism, attacks this view as a parody of the critique that she is seeking to make of terrorism studies and he asserts that 'in the hands of appropriately qualified, open-minded country specialists', the 'cataloguing of individual terrorists' movements, contacts and orders' is a valuable analytical tool (Collier 2006: 28). There can be little doubt of the value of plotting relationships in order to uncover sources of influence and patterns of behaviour. In one of the most highly regarded works on terrorism, Marc Sageman (2004) has argued persuasively for the importance

of networks and cohort groups to understanding the dynamics of terrorism.

Framing international-regional-nation-state linkages

Immediately after 11 September, individual states in Southeast Asia pledged their support to the US to combat international terrorism. These pledges were reinforced by the heads of government of the original five ASEAN founders who separately made visits to Washington between September 2001 and May 2003. At the regional level both ASEAN and the ASEAN Regional Forum adopted declarations condemning terrorism and outlining measures to combat this threat. Both regional organisations also joined with the US in issuing joint declarations against terrorism.

Despite this outward veneer of unanimity there were distinct differences in how Southeast Asian states collectively and individually framed the issue of combating international terrorism. For example, the Philippines was alone in agreeing to the involvement of US special operations forces on its territory to target the ASG. While it is doubtful that the ASG constituted a 'terrorist group of global reach', Washington chose to frame its involvement as an extension of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan (Maxwell 2004). Thus the Philippines and by extension Southeast Asia was portrayed as the 'second front' in the 'global war on terrorism'. The Philippines sought US assistance in order to bolster its broader national security interests particularly against China.

Other Southeast Asian countries were less enthusiastic in their support for direct US military involvement in the region. They were quite willing to cooperate in such behind the scenes measures as intelligence exchange, anti-money laundering and border security measures. But they preferred to frame their anti-terrorism measures within the broader context of combating transnational crime and under the umbrella of UN-endorsed anti-terrorism measures. Singapore was quick to endorse the US view that terrorism in Southeast Asia was all part of al-Qaeda's international network, but both Malaysia and Indonesia were more circumspect. When Malaysia successfully carried out pre-emptive anti-terror raids on JI's network in late 2001, it stressed these terrorists were domestic Islamic militants (Wain 2002a). Indonesia cooperated mainly with Australia in rounding up the JI network but never proscribed JI as a terrorist organisation in its own right despite its UN Security Council listing. Government leaders in Thailand blamed violence in the southern border provinces which erupted in late 2001 as the work of criminals and bandits. They

continued to deny that al-Qaeda had taken root on Thai soil until as late as August 2003 when JI's operations chief, Hambali, was arrested. As of this writing, intelligence analysts and regional-security specialists have been unable to demonstrate convincing linkages between al-Qaeda and those groups and individuals responsible for the rising wave of violence in the south.

In the aftermath of 11 September, and more particularly after the Bali bombings in October 2002, three distinct methodological approaches have emerged in the analysis of terrorism in Southeast Asia. These may be broadly characterised as international, regional and country-specific. Each approach will now be discussed.

The first methodological approach to the study of terrorism in Southeast Asia is that promoted by international terrorism experts. They have adopted what might be termed the al-Qaeda-centric paradigm. Gunaratna is perhaps the foremost representative of this methodology. His book, *Inside Al Qaeda*, which was hurriedly published in the wake of 11 September but before the Bali bombings of 2002, offered an unequivocal global view of al-Qaeda and its international network with an entire chapter devoted to Asia (Gunaratna 2002: 1). Gunaratna's study has been characterised by one former CIA analyst as a 'data dump' that uncritically includes a variety of militant and politically violent Islamic groups in al-Qaeda's international network (Byman 2003: 141). Quite often Gunaratna's assertions are not documented or rely on the dubious approach of asserting that vaguely defined 'linkages' between Southeast Asian leaders and groups and al-Qaeda constitute a 'command and control' relationship.

Gunaratna quickly became the favoured source of the global media because his book was one of the first available studies. Indeed, Gunaratna became so prominent that he succeeded in virtually colonising the discourse and analysis of terrorism in Southeast Asia. Whenever a major terrorist incident occurred, Gunaratna invariably opined that there was only one organisation – al-Qaeda – with the capability and intention of conducting such an act. In other words, al-Qaeda was put forward as the key variable to explain terrorism in Southeast Asia.

Gunaratna and other international terrorism experts argued that the emergence of Islamic terrorism in Southeast Asia could be explained by the prime leadership role of bin Laden and his lieutenants in recruiting Muslim volunteers to fight alongside the mujahideen in Soviet-occupied Afghanistan (December 1979 to February 1989). In their view, this process began in the early 1980s when the first recruits from Southeast Asia arrived in Pakistan for indoctrination and training. Personal ties were forged between bin Laden and Abdurajak Abubakar Janjalani,

the founder of the ASG in the Philippines, and Abdullah Sungkar, the founder of JI (Gunaratna 2002: 174, 187; Jones forthcoming).

According to this line of analysis, al-Qaeda's operatives made their first appearance in Southeast Asia in the late 1980s. They not only assisted in the recruitment of locals for religious indoctrination and training in terrorist camps in Pakistan but provided finance and operational support for local militant groups such as the ASG. As a result of these linkages both the ASG and JI were co-opted by al-Qaeda. In other words, according to international terrorism experts, bin Laden became a chief executive officer who presided over a network of subordinate franchises and affiliates.

After the US launched Operation Enduring Freedom and successfully dislodged the Taliban from power and smashed al-Qaeda's network of terrorist training camps in Afghanistan in the final quarter of 2001, al-Qaeda operatives were forced to disperse. According to international terrorism experts, Southeast Asia thus became al-Qaeda's second front. This theme was quickly picked up by regional security analysts (for two of the most egregious examples see Rosenthal 2003 and Singh 2007; for a balanced assessment, see Gershman 2002).

Prior to the Bali bombings in 2002, regional security analysts focused on political violence committed by local insurgents and ethno-nationalist separatists. Their research generally overlooked or downplayed the linkages between politically violent Southeast Asian groups and al-Qaeda that were forged during the 1980s. After 11 September and the 2002 Bali bombings, regional security analysts all too readily adopted the al-Qaeda-centric paradigm as the prism through which they viewed Southeast Asia's politically violent groups. As a consequence, their analyses tended to become homogenised. For example, regional security specialists invariably concluded that any international linkage between a local militant Islamic group and al-Qaeda was evidence of the former's subordination to the latter. In sum, the al-Qaeda connection was viewed by regional security analysts as the major variable explaining the emergence and spread of international terrorism in Southeast Asia.

Like international terrorism experts, regional security analysts concluded that local Islamic groups had become franchises subordinate to al-Qaeda. Because of the lack of a common definition of terrorism and the imprecision of 'linkages' as an analytic tool, regional analysts included all manner of militant groups as constituents of the al-Qaeda network. They commonly included such groups as the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), Kumpulan Mujahidin/Militen Malaysia (KMM), Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI – Mujahideen Council of Indonesia), Laskar Jihad, Laskar Jundullah, Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM, Free

Aceh Movement), Pattani United Liberation Organisation (PULO), New PULO, Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), Barisan Nasional Pembebasan Patani (BNP) and so on (the Philippines has resisted US pressures to designate MILF as a terrorist organisation; Wain 2002b). This approach may be termed 'al-Qaeda plus' because regional analysts glossed over the enormous variations among terrorist groups in order to accommodate the al-Qaeda-centric paradigm promoted by international terrorism experts. In sum, they forced round pegs into square holes.

By contrast, country studies specialists brought a deep knowledge of history, politics, culture, religion, society and languages to their analysis of terrorism in Southeast Asia. Country studies specialists have been both sceptical and critical of the al-Qaeda-centric framework of analysis. The International Crisis Group (ICG 2001: 2) argued in a report published just after 11 September:

International concern has been focussed on the possibility that Muslim violence in Indonesia might be associated with terrorist organisations based in the Middle East but so far, at least, there is little firm public evidence to demonstrate such links. Several hundred Indonesians joined the Islamic resistance to the Soviet Union's occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s and others have apparently received 'training' in that country since then but neither the numbers nor the nature of the 'training' are clear. It has also been claimed that Osama bin Laden's network has provided financial support to a minority Muslim militia in Maluku. In any case, much of the violence in Indonesia involving Muslims can be adequately explained in domestic terms – although there is some evidence of limited involvement of foreigners.

Country specialists were initially put on the defensive because the mainstream international media was not able to digest detailed nuanced analysis about the linkages between al-Qaeda and Southeast Asia. The media wanted to portray 'the big story' that terrorism in Southeast Asia was part of al-Qaeda's international network headed by bin Laden, America's most wanted man. International terrorism experts and regional security analysts obliged with sound bites that were clear and simple and thus drowned out the views of country specialists.

The al-Qaeda–Southeast Asia nexus

The assertion by international and regional terrorism experts that the emergence of Islamic terrorism in Southeast Asia can be best analysed through an al-Qaeda-centric framework may be challenged by exploring three key methodological questions. The first is how to best characterise al-Qaeda as an organisation. The second is how to account for change

over time. And the third is how to assess the question of agency in al-Qaeda's relations with regional terrorist groups such as JI.

International terrorism experts and regional security analysts generally view al-Qaeda as a hierarchical but broad-based organisation comprised of subordinate franchises and affiliates. Gunaratna (2002: 57) portrays al-Qaeda as follows:

In 1998 al-Qaeda was reorganized into four distinct but interrelated entities. The first was a pyramidal structure to facilitate strategic and tactical direction; the second was a global terrorist network; the third was a base force for guerrilla warfare inside Afghanistan; and the fourth was a loose coalition of transnational terrorist and guerrilla groups.

The first entity, the hierarchical leadership structure, consisted of an Emir-General, a consultative council (*majlis shura*), four operational committees (military, finance and business, fatwa and Islamic study, and media and publicity) and dispersed regional 'nodes'. Gunaratna (2002: 58) further notes that bin Laden directed the core inner group and the operational committees ensured the smooth day-to-day running of the organisation. An emir and a deputy headed each committee. The military committee, for example, was responsible for recruiting, training, procuring, transporting and launching terrorist operations. Al-Qaeda also ran its own internal security service and an extensive financial and business empire (Gunaratna 2002: 60–9).

Peter Bergin (2001: 31) argued that al-Qaeda was run like a multinational corporation under the directorship of bin Laden:

Bin Laden organized al-Qaeda in a businesslike manner – he formulates the general-policies of al-Qaeda in consultation with his *shura* council. The *shura* makes executive decisions for the group. Subordinate to that council are other committees responsible for military affairs and the business interests of the group, as well as a *fatwa* committee, which issues rulings on Islamic law, and a media group.

Zachary Abuza (2002: 429–30) writes that al-Qaeda is composed of a central leadership of around thirty individuals, an international network of twenty-four constituent groups, eighty front companies operating in fifty countries and a membership of between 5,000 and 12,000 organised into cells in sixty different countries. Finally, Abuza (2002: 431) concludes that 'Al Qaeda was brilliant in its co-optation of other groups, those with a narrow domestic agenda, and in bringing them into Al Qaeda's structure.'

Both Gunaratna's and Abuza's depiction of al-Qaeda's structure permits them to include virtually all Islamic terrorist groups and militant Muslims as belonging to one centrally directed network. This is one of

the major methodological weaknesses of the al-Qaeda-centric paradigm. Jason Burke presents a powerful critique of this framework. He dismisses the notion that al-Qaeda was 'a coherent and tight-knit organization, with "tentacles everywhere", with a defined ideology and personnel, that had emerged as early as the late 1980s'. Burke argues that to accept such a view 'is to misunderstand not only its true nature but also the nature of Islamic radicalism then and now. The contingent, dynamic and local elements of what is a broad and ill-defined movement rooted in historical trends of great complexity are lost' (Burke 2003: 12).

According to Burke, al-Qaeda, as it is popularly conceived, 'consisted of three elements. This tripartite division is essential to understanding the nature of both the "al-Qaeda" phenomenon and of modern Islamic militancy' (the quotations in this paragraph are taken from Burke 2003: 13–16). The first of these elements were composed of the 'al-Qaeda hardcore', numbering around 100 active 'pre-eminent militants', including a dozen close, long-term associates of bin Laden, many of whom had sworn an oath of loyalty to him. The inner core comprised veterans of the Afghan War or veterans of the conflicts in Bosnia or Chechnya. They acted as trainers and administrators in Afghanistan and on occasion were sent overseas to recruit, act as emissaries or, more rarely, to conduct specific terrorist operations. But, Burke cautions, 'it is a mistake to see even this hardcore as monolithic in any way' (2003: 13).

The second of Burke's three elements comprises the scores of other militant Islamic groups operating around the world. But, Burke cautions, 'a careful examination of the situation shows that the idea that there is an international network of active groups answering to bin Laden is wrong'. To label groups included in this second element as 'al-Qaeda' is 'to denigrate the particular local factors that led to their emergence' (Burke 2003: 14). Burke explains why this second element should not be included as constituting part of al-Qaeda:

But, though they may see bin Laden as a heroic figure, symbolic of their collective struggle, individuals and groups have their own leaders and their own agenda, often ones that are deeply parochial and which they will not subordinate to those of bin Laden or his close associates. Until very recently many were deeply antipathetic to bin Laden. As many remain rivals of bin Laden as have become allies. (Burke 2003: 14)

Burke's assessment is shared by the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (2004: 67) whose final report concluded:

The inner core of al Qaeda continued to be a hierarchical top-down group with defined positions, tasks, and salaries. Most but not all in this core swore fealty (or *bayat*) to Bin Ladin. Other operatives were committed to Bin Ladin or to

his goals and would take assignments for him, but they did not swear bayat and maintained, or tried to maintain, some autonomy. A looser circle of adherents might give money to al Qaeda or train in its camps but remained essentially independent.

Burke's third element comprising al-Qaeda consists of those individuals who subscribe to 'the idea, worldview, ideology of "al-Qaeda"', in other words, 'the vast, amorphous movement of modern radical Islam, with its myriad cells, domestic groups, "groupuscules" and splinters' (2003: 16, 207). In sum, Burke unpacked the all-encompassing al-Qaeda-centric paradigm used by international and regional specialists and concluded that it is the hard core alone that comprises al-Qaeda (2003: 207).

The second methodological question in discussing al-Qaeda's role in Southeast Asia is how to account for change over time. International and regional terrorism experts adopt an approach that can be characterised as 'back to the future'. In other words, their analysis of al-Qaeda's operations in Southeast Asia begins with the events of 11 September and works backwards in an ahistorical manner. Al-Qaeda is portrayed as a purposive international organisation, endowed with virtually unlimited resources, from the very start. It was as if bin Laden's announcement of the formation of the 'World Islamic Front declaring jihad against "Jews and Crusaders" wherever they are found', was made in 1988 and not 1998. According to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (2004: 59):

In now analyzing the terrorist programs carried out by members of this network, it would be misleading to apply the label 'al-Qaeda operations' too often in these early years [1992-6]. Yet it would be misleading to ignore the significance of these connections. And in this network, Bin Laden's agenda stood out.

With respect to Southeast Asia, it is important to note that militants from the region first journeyed to Pakistan as early as 1980 or at least eight years before al-Qaeda was founded and eighteen years before bin Laden launched his global *jihad*. It was during this early period that Southeast Asians forged personal links with leading figures in the mujahideen. One particularly influential figure was Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, a Pushtun warlord and leader of one of the four major mujahideen factions. It was under Sayyaf's patronage that key future leaders of the ASG and JI were trained at Camp Sadah in Pakistan. Sayyaf – not bin Laden – provided training facilities to the bulk of Southeast Asia's Muslim militants.

During this period, bin Laden and the bulk of his supporters were in exile in the Sudan (1991-6). While in the Sudan, bin Laden encountered serious financial difficulties as several of his companies ran out of funds.

Bin Laden was forced 'to cut back his spending and to control his outlays more closely'. Bin Laden also wore out his welcome with the Sudanese government, which 'canceled the registration of the main business enterprises he had set up' and 'seized everything . . . [he] had possessed there'. According to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 'Bin Laden was in his weakest position since his early days in the war against the Soviet Union.' When he left for Afghanistan in May 1996, he and his organisation were 'significantly weakened, despite his ambitions and organizational skills' (2004: 62, 65, 63).

The decision to relocate to Afghanistan resulted in the disengagement by many of his supporters, some of whom went off in their own directions. It should be noted that bin Laden's decision to leave the Sudan for Afghanistan and shift his main objective from the 'near enemy' to the 'far enemy' provoked grave dissension within the ranks of his supporters. According to Sageman, bin Laden returned to Afghanistan with about 150 followers and '[m]any people stayed behind and left the jihad, which they believed was taking an uncomfortable turn. The return to Afghanistan was the occasion for another large purging of al-Qaeda of its less militant elements, who hesitated to take on the United States, with whom they had no quarrel and no legitimate fatwa' (Sageman 2004: 45). When bin Laden arrived in Afghanistan in 1996 the country was embroiled in a civil war as the Taliban initiated its drive to power.

According to Burke (2003: 16), once ensconced in Afghanistan, bin Laden and his supporters 'even had a country they could virtually call their own. They were thus able to offer everything a state could offer to a militant group by way of support.' Al-Qaeda played the role of 'the state' by projecting its power and influence globally by using the huge financial resources and human capital available. Burke (2003: 208) correctly argues, however, that al-Qaeda as an organisation was limited in time and space:

Something that can be labeled 'al-Qaeda' did exist between 1996 and 2001. It was composed of a small number of experienced militants who were able to access resources of a scale and with an ease that was hitherto unknown in Islamic militancy, largely by virtue of their position in Afghanistan and the sympathy of so many wealthy, and not so wealthy, Muslims across the Islamic world, though particularly in the Gulf.

In other words, it was only after bin Laden returned to Afghanistan in May 1996 (and more particularly 1998) that al-Qaeda emerged as an international *jihadist* terrorist organisation in its own right. In August 1996, al-Qaeda shifted its focus from the 'near enemy' and defensive *jihad* to 'War Against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two

Holy Places' with a specific focus on Saudi Arabia. Bin Laden extended his reach globally in 1998 with the founding of the World Islamic Front and his fatwa against 'Jews and Crusaders'. As for Southeast Asia's militants, given the instability of the period when the Taliban initiated its drive to power, they decided in 1995 to decamp and relocate their training camps to the southern Philippines. In sum, from 1996, al-Qaeda in Afghanistan facilitated a global terrorist network through funding, services and facilities but did not control local leaders and their groups.

The third methodological question associated with the al-Qaeda-centric paradigm is how to assess the question of agency in al-Qaeda's relationship with JI and other Southeast Asian militant Islamic groups. International terrorism experts and regional security analysts invariably stress the importance of the role played by bin Laden and key members of al-Qaeda. They devote little attention to the question of agency when discussing Southeast Asians who joined the global *jihād*. And equally important, their analyses often overlook the role of international terrorist 'freelancers'. International and regional terrorism experts invariably portray Muhammed Jamal Khalifa, Ramzi Yousef and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed as al-Qaeda agents when they operated in the Philippines in the late 1980s and mid-1990s, respectively. Historical evidence suggests they were freelancers and that Khalid Sheikh Mohammed affiliated with al-Qaeda at a later date. Yousef was a freelancer when he tried to blow up the World Trade Center in 1993 (Reeve 1999).

Country studies specialists acknowledge the importance of international linkages between Southeast Asian groups and al-Qaeda, particularly the Afghan/Pakistani alumni connection, and regional linkages forged by JI. Where country specialists differ from international and regional terrorism experts is over the question of agency. That is, country specialists critically question the al-Qaeda-centric paradigm. Their focus is 'bottom up', that is, on the ability of Southeast Asians to act independently and to leverage their association with bin Laden and al-Qaeda to pursue their own agendas and objectives. The following section will examine the nexus between international and regional linkages with reference to JI, Southeast Asia's most important terrorist organisation.

Jemaah Islamiyah-al-Qaeda relations

While Jemaah Islamiyah was not subordinate to al-Qaeda, there can be little doubting the latter's impact on JI thinking. Indeed, it can be argued that JI might not have taken the terrorist path from 2000 had it not been for al-Qaeda's influence. There are several elements to this argument. To begin with, bin Laden's fatwa of 1998, in which he called for attacks on

the US and its allies, had a galvanising effect on the most radical sections of JI, the majority of whom were connected to the organisation's First Regional Command (Mantiqi I), which covered Singapore and Malaysia. This group, which included many Afghanistan-trained mujahideen such as Hambali, Mukhlas, Azhari Husin and Ali Imron, was already impatient for the organisation to begin attacking Islam's perceived enemies. Most had joined JI soon after its founding in 1993 and had spent five years building the organisation and strengthening its operational capacities. Following bin Laden's fatwa, Mantiqi I operatives began to plan seriously for bombings, initially against Christian and diplomatic targets in Indonesia, and later against Western targets. (It is important to note that this terrorist inclination was not shared by many other sections of JI, including it seems the organisation's founder, Abdullah Sungkar. His death in late 1999 and replacement as JI's emir by Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, a much less resolute leader, removed a major obstacle to the Mantiqi I militants in launching their attacks.)

Second, al-Qaeda attacks, particularly those of 11 September on the World Trade Center and Pentagon, inspired JI militants and confirmed in their minds the rightness of terrorist operations. In subsequent written texts and interviews, these figures rejoiced in the 'success' of the attacks in killing 'infidels' and in creating a fear of Islam in the West. Mukhlas, for example, wrote in his justification of the first Bali bombing that the against-the-odds 'triumph' of 11 September was proof of divine sanction for terrorist assaults against the West. He marvelled at the ability of the al-Qaeda attackers to penetrate the US defences and cause terror and destruction, stating: 'That's how it is when Almighty Allah wants all of this to occur' (Aly Ghufon 2003). Similarly, Imam Samudra described 11 September as a 'truly fantastic jihad operation' which had greatly humiliated the Americans, and commented that those who carried this out were part of a group 'preordained by God' to wage 'holy war' against 'colonising nations and their cronies'. He also praised bin Laden as a 'great jihadist ulama' and urged Muslims to follow his example (Samudra 2004). Clearly the JI terrorists saw themselves as part of the same global *jihadist* movement as al-Qaeda and regarded the latter as a leading exponent of holy war.

Third, al-Qaeda provided valuable financial, technical and ideological assistance to JI operatives in planning and carrying out terrorist attacks. The first Bali bombing received funding from al-Qaeda of about US\$35,000 via the Malaysian Wan Min bin Wan Mat, which appears to have been the main source of money for the attack (ICG 2003: 29). There are similar reports of the JI splinter movement, led by Noordin Top, gaining thousands of dollars in al-Qaeda cash for the second Bali

bombing. Moreover, it is also evident that JI bomb-makers, such as Dr Azhari Husin and Fathur Rahman al-Ghozi, gained information regarding techniques in bomb design and construction from al-Qaeda sources, including al-Qaeda websites and manuals. Lastly, new ideological thinking from al-Qaeda-affiliated scholars quickly made its way into JI circles, and was often translated and published in Indonesian soon after it appeared abroad.

Undoubtedly, the high point of this JI-al-Qaeda contact was between 1998 and 2002. Particularly for the operatives in Mantiqi I, there was frequent communication between key JI figures and their al-Qaeda counterparts. The most important JI leader in this context was Hambali, who had close relations with numerous senior al-Qaeda figures, but secondary lines of communication were also maintained through other JI operatives such as Mukhlas and Zulkarnaen. Even at the peak of this relationship, however, there is little evidence of JI being under the command of al-Qaeda. Indeed, the evidence points overwhelmingly to JI leaders making their own decisions about operations and neither receiving nor seeking direction from the al-Qaeda central leadership. Furthermore, JI's immediate focus throughout this period remained one of establishing an Islamic state in Indonesia rather than the more formal objective of restoring the caliphal system of transnational government.

After the 2002 Bali bombing, ties between JI and al-Qaeda attenuated rapidly. Many of those who had liaised between the two organisations were either captured or put to flight in the subsequent police crackdown, making the task of communicating with central al-Qaeda leaders not only more difficult but also far more hazardous. In addition to this, the JI leaders who replaced Ba'asyir and militants such as Hambali and Mukhlas were intent on leading the organisation away from terrorism and giving greater emphasis to education and preaching. Acting emirs such as Abu Rusdan (2002–3) and Zarkasih (2006–7) made clear their opposition to al-Qaeda-style attacks on non-combatants and argued that such operations had set back JI rather than taken it closer to its stated objective of creating a totally Islamic political, legal and economic system in Indonesia (Jones 2007). This was, in part, a repudiation of bin Laden's globalist 'far enemy' strategy.

The current leadership group within JI would appear to be more influenced by Indonesia's Darul Islam legacy than by al-Qaeda. The Darul Islam movement established an Indonesian Islamic State (NII) in 1949 and waged a violent rebellion until militarily crushed in 1962. Since the early 1970s, Darul Islam has operated as an underground movement, albeit highly fragmented and fractious. It has also been a major source of recruits for JI, and many of that organisation's leaders, such as Abu

Rusdan, Abu Dujana and Zarkasih, come from strong Darul Islam families. While there remain significant differences between Darul Islam and JI, the 'Indonesia first' and 'near enemy' thinking of present JI leaders owes much to Darul Islam (Fealy 2007).

Even among the terrorist offshoots of JI, a growing Indonesia-centrism is also apparent in the popularity of various *jihadi* texts emphasising operations within 'homeland' countries rather than fighting abroad. One example is Sheikh as-Salim's (2005) testament for mujahideen, which circulated widely in JI circles from late 2005. It stated:

I enjoin inhabitants of the Arabian peninsula not to wage jihad in Iraq... Don't go to Iraq but light the fire [of *jihad*] on the [Arabian] peninsula itself. Don't give them – the Crusaders – the chance to feel safe living there and don't allow them to feel calm and happy. In fact, I want your life to be always devoted to driving out the Crusaders.

In a similar vein is a monograph distributed within the JI community entitled 'The Tauhid Cell' in which readers are informed: 'Every day the number of people wanting to wage jihad increases, praise be to Allah. The problem is that they all want to go to Chechnya, Afghanistan or some other country where a jihad has taken place. This is their right. But what is more important than this is for us to liberate our own countries' (Anonymous no date: 1–2). While these texts retain a transnational awareness, they prescribe a local scope of action. The message for Indonesian *jihadists* is that they can better assist the global struggle against Islam's enemies by mounting attacks within Southeast Asia than they can by joining insurgencies in the Middle East or Central Asia. It is also notable that no Indonesians have been among those killed or detained in the post-2003 *jihadist* insurgencies in Iraq or Afghanistan.

Developments in early 2008 suggest that some JI leaders may be turning their attention again to the Middle East, though the reasons for this are not yet entirely clear. In April 2008, two senior JI figures, Abu Husna and Dr Agus Purwantoro, were arrested with false passports in Johor, Malaysia, on their way to Syria. Husna was widely suspected of being the acting *amir* of JI and Agus had headed its operations in Central Sulawesi. Husna told police that he was seeking funding in Syria to train JI members. Singaporean officials have stated that he was seeking al-Qaeda money (*Straits Times*, 30 July 2008). Agus reportedly said that he wanted to join a medical team treating insurgents in Iraq. It is possible that both men left Indonesia to avoid capture by the police, in which case the unrelenting pressure on JI may force more of its members to seek sanctuary and financial support abroad.

Conclusion

This chapter has critically analysed the nexus between international and regional terrorism by examining the relationship between al-Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah. Four main conclusions can be drawn.

First, this analysis has uncovered the problematic nature of much of the literature on 'linkages' in explaining the international-regional nexus. Examining linkages can be a legitimate and valuable aspect of terrorism research, particularly for plotting relationships in order to uncover sources of influence and patterns of behaviour. However, international and regional terrorism specialists often use 'linkage' in such an ill-defined and indiscriminate way that it lacks analytical acuity and explanatory power.

Second, there can be no doubt that al-Qaeda had a significant impact on JI's radical elements by providing them with ideological direction, inspiration for operations, and valuable financial and technical assistance. This chapter has demonstrated that the 'al-Qaeda-centric paradigm' exaggerated the unity and cohesion of al-Qaeda itself as an international actor, and that al-Qaeda's ties to JI fell away after 2002. Further, the empirical evidence demonstrates the overwhelming importance of agency by local actors in their dealings with al-Qaeda. JI and the ASG were never under the control of al-Qaeda. JI's leaders made their own operational decisions, and, particularly from 2003, these were based on parochial agendas, such as establishing an Islamic state in Indonesia, rather than al-Qaeda's objectives of attacking the West and restoring an Islamic caliphate. Indeed, the historical legacy of Darul Islam appears to have had greater impact on JI's mainstream leadership than al-Qaeda.

Third, this chapter has demonstrated the importance of domestic factors when evaluating the international-regional nexus between terrorist organisations. Attempts to portray Southeast Asia as the 'second front' in the war on terrorism gloss over significant differences among regional militant groups, as well as differences within JI itself. For example, no convincing evidence has been brought forward to link the conflict in southern Thailand with either global or regional terrorism. JI itself experienced sharp divisions between Mantiqi I and the rest of the organisation, and in 2002, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir was subject to intense criticism from other JI leaders for founding the formal, pro-sharia lobby movement, Majlis Mujahidin Indonesia. More recently, the splinter group led by Noordin Top has created tensions in JI as Noordin sought to attract, with only limited success, JI members to his network. JI may have created a regional network in its early years but JI was never an effective regional

organisation, and much of its network quickly disintegrated in the face of counter-terrorism efforts by the states concerned.

Fourth, this chapter has demonstrated that many international and regional terrorism specialists have over-generalised the dynamics of terrorism, giving the impression that a single template can be used to view different *jihadi* groups across the regions of the world. We argue that terrorist groups vary markedly across time and place and that what might be true for al-Qaeda does not necessarily hold for JI. The dynamics within particular groups can change quickly. More than anything else, this chapter demonstrates the importance of fine-grained analysis by country specialists in examining the nexus between the international and regional dimensions of terrorism.

Asia is experiencing major changes in its security relations. This book brings together respected experts to assess both the theoretical and empirical dimensions of the Asian security debate. Building on the latest research on Asia's regional security politics, it focuses on the 'regional-global nexus' as a way to understand the dynamics of Asian security politics and its intersection with global security. Contributors to the volume offer diverse but complementary perspectives on which issues and factors are most important in explaining how security politics in Asia can be interpreted at both the regional and global levels of analysis. Issues addressed include power balancing and alliances, governance and democracy, maritime and energy security, the relationship between economics and security, 'human security', terrorism, nuclear non-proliferation, climate change and pandemics. This work will serve as a standard reference on the evolution of key issues in Asian security.

William T. Tow is a Professor of International Security in the Department of International Relations at the Australian National University and a Chief Investigator for the Australian Research Council's Centre of Excellence in Policing and Security (CEPS). He has served on the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade's (DFAT's) Foreign Affairs Council and the Australian-American Fulbright Commission's Board of Directors.

'An important contribution to understanding the security politics of the Asia-Pacific. This volume succeeds in its core objective of analysing "how Asian security politics will affect international security or will, in turn, be influenced by global events and structures". An excellent panel of authors who combine penetrating analysis of existing international relations theories on the global-regional nexus with a firm grasp of the regional environment.'

Barry Desker
Dean of the S. Rajaratnam School of
International Studies

'This is a path-breaking study of the interplay of regional and global security dynamics pertaining to Asia, which has become a core world region. It does an excellent job investigating regional-global connections in both traditional and non-traditional security domains.'

Muthiah Alagappa
Distinguished Senior Fellow, East-West Center

'A truly innovative work on Asian security. Readers will be convinced that Asian security has now become "autonomous" enough to be an "integral" component of an evolving world order.'

Yoshihide Soeya
Professor of Political Science, Faculty of Law,
and Director, Institute of East Asian Studies,
Keio University

Cover designed by Phil Treble
Cover image: © Mike Dobel / Alamy

CAMBRIDGE
UNIVERSITY PRESS
www.cambridge.org

ISBN 978-0-521-76535-0

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SECURITY POLITICS
IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC

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A Regional-Global Nexus?

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CAMBRIDGE
UNIVERSITY PRESS

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore,
São Paulo, Delhi

Cambridge University Press
The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 8RU, UK

Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press,
New York

www.cambridge.org
Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521758826

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First published 2009

Printed in the United Kingdom at the University Press, Cambridge

A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication data
Security politics in the Asia-Pacific / William T. Tow, editor.

p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-0-521-76535-0 (hardback) – ISBN 978-0-521-75882-6 (pbk.)
1. Security, International – Asia. 2. Security, International – Pacific Area.
3. National security – Asia. 4. National security – Pacific Area. 5. Asia –
Politics and government – 21st century. 6. Pacific Area – Politics and
government – 21st century. 7. Asia – Military policy. 8. Pacific Area –
Military policy. I. Tow, William T. II. Title.
JZ6009.A75S43 2009
355'.03305 – dc22 2009021765

ISBN 978-0-521-76535-0 hardback
ISBN 978-0-521-75882-6 paperback

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Preface

As the Cold War recedes further into history, organising security has become manifestly more challenging. Recent international security debates have underscored how even the concept of 'security' is vigorously contested. The traditional preoccupations with state-centric survival and positionality are becoming increasingly supplanted by concerns that transcend sovereign borders and that focus on individuals and intra-state factions. The geopolitics of power-balancing and great power primacy is now coexisting with such dynamics as humanitarian politics, democratisation, climate change and pandemic controls to shape a new and broader set of security referents.

This paradigmatic evolution has been assessed extensively, and what role the Asia-Pacific region has played in this process has been an important component of the discussion. In recent years, important and highly respected works have appeared to assess this issue. Analysts have continued to disagree, however, over what is most causally important in determining and understanding the increasingly critical link between what happens in that region and how global security politics is ultimately shaped and implemented. It may be that providing a truly comprehensive definition is beyond the reach of any single study. Yet the effort to capture and explain its significance is decidedly relevant as Asia ascends to economic primacy, as it increasingly counts for more within the world's diplomatic channels and as it becomes a central factor in its military balance. The imperative to explore how power and structure in the international system will be affected by new and often amorphous variables situated outside or beyond the conventional processes of order-building appears ever more pressing.

This volume is the product of that conviction. It was initially conceptualised as a product of a workshop held at the Australian National University (ANU) in August 2006. Many of the most respected experts on Asian security politics attended this event. They were drawn together by a mutual desire to build on an already existing and substantial body of theoretical and empirical work that had been undertaken from this decade's

outset that focused on key determinants of Asian regional security and, to a lesser extent, how the policy interests and outcomes generated by those regionally based factors spilled over to influence global security politics as well. The workshop's focus on the 'global-regional nexus' was prompted by a growing realisation shared by nearly all policy-makers in and observers of international relations that what happens in Asia now truly resonates at the global level in both a strategic and politico-economic context – what one of this volume's contributors labels as the Asian 'centre of gravity' driving the most significant trends in international security. This observation by itself does not necessarily unlock the secret of how the regional-global nexus actually operates but it does illuminate the utility of assessing causality as a key dynamic in the shaping of nexus politics as it functions both regionally and globally. Because cause and effect is inherently a highly fluctuating dynamic, reaching sound conclusions or hypotheses about how such a nexus is shaped and what its long-term significance is, can only be a cumulative and painstaking exercise. This volume represents an inaugural effort to initiate this evaluative process.

The ANU's Department of International Relations, a co-sponsor of the workshop from which this volume is derived, is uniquely placed to lead this intellectual quest. Over the past half century, it has been justifiably regarded as producing cutting-edge work that has served as an intersection of theoretical and empirical analysis on the Asia-Pacific's role in international relations. Along with the East-West Center, the other workshop co-sponsor, the ANU is widely recognised as a major source for producing highly valued appraisals of economic, diplomatic and strategic trends in the Asian region. Together, the ANU and the East-West Center constitute two highly appropriate venues for linking regional developments with larger global patterns of security politics. As editor of this volume, it has been a privilege to be associated with this quest.

Acknowledgements

Soon after coming to the Australian National University's Department of International Relations (IR) in early 2005, I was invited by its Head, Professor Chris Reus-Smit, to identify ways to resuscitate its once renowned profile in regional and international security politics. The workshop from which this volume emanates was the product of comprehensive discussions with departmental and other ANU colleagues on how this objective could be met. Any undertaking of this size and complexity involves the effort and goodwill of many people and one could find no finer group of colleagues than those residing in the ANU's Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies (RSPAS) and College of Asia and the Pacific (CAP). To all of them I extend my sincere thanks and gratitude for providing a stimulating and supportive intellectual environment for pursuing academic life.

My departmental colleagues reviewed several 'concept drafts' in preparation for the workshop. I am particularly grateful to Professor Reus-Smit for taking the lead in this process and for graciously providing the funding to make this event a reality. I am also beholden to Paul Keal and Greg Fry, for providing extensive and highly constructive suggestions at the formulative stages of workshop organisation on how to envision and implement 'nexus-related' analysis. Several of my departmental colleagues graciously participated in the workshop either as paper presenters or discussants. Lorraine Elliott, Stuart Harris, Kathy Morton and John Ravenhill fit this category; most other IR colleagues and many of its postgraduate students attended various workshop sessions, making the event a truly departmental enterprise. Credit must also be given to Hugh White, Robert Ayson and Brendan Taylor at the Department of International Relations' 'sister unit' – the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre (SDSC) – for providing additional and highly valued input.

The project would not have seen fruition without the support and guidance of Muthiah Alagappa, then Director of the East-West Center Washington, DC office who graciously co-hosted the workshop at the ANU in August 2006. He was responsible for attracting a number

of distinguished participants and encouraging many of them to follow through with either writing chapters for this book or, in some cases, revising their workshop papers as contributions to the *Australian Journal of International Affairs*. In the latter context, I am particularly grateful to J. J. Suh and Tan See Seng for allowing their conference presentations to appear in that journal with pride-of-place. Plaudits are also due for the workshop dinner's keynote speaker, Michael Costello. As a noted columnist and former political 'insider' during successive Australian Labor governments' years in power, he was able to impart a healthy dose of pragmatism and real-world experience to what was predominantly an academic gathering.

Administrative assistance and overall project support was likewise critical for the workshop's successful culmination. The IR Department's long-time administrator, Ms Amy Chen, once again provided rock-solid oversight and logistical management. She was ably assisted by Ms Lynne Payne on audio-visual aspects and by Mr Gil Oren on the completion of urgent administrative tasks. The ANU's University House proved to be an idyllic setting for our deliberations; Ms Lyn North and her support staff are to be thanked for making it so.

Producing a volume that goes beyond mere conference deliberations is always a challenging endeavour. I am deeply grateful to Cambridge University Press for the understanding and patience it extended during the preparation of this book. John Haslam was particularly supportive during the key phases of manuscript preparation, offering helpful advice and timely feedback on a number of issues. CUP's Carrie Cheek was also a pillar of strength at key phases of the book's production. In Ms Mary-Louise Hickey, the Department of IR has one of the very best copy-editors in the business. Her roles in collating successive drafts, managing editorial procedures and correspondence and helping to construct a viable end-product were absolutely central to whatever contribution the book eventually may make to the subject-at-hand.

Finally, I thank my wife, Leslie, who has endured over three decades of marriage that has involved great levels of tolerance towards my academic life, and my daughter, Shannon, who seems destined to pursue a professional calling in the field of international relations. To them I dedicate this work.

Abbreviations

APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
APP	Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate
ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASEAN+3	ASEAN plus China, Japan and South Korea
ASEAN+3+1	ASEAN plus China, Japan and South Korea, plus Hong Kong
ASEM	Asia-Europe Meeting
ASG	Abu Sayyaf Group
BMD	ballistic missile defence
BSA	Burden Sharing Agreement
CDM	Clean Development Mechanism
CFC	chlorofluorocarbon
CHS	Commission on Human Security
CITES	Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species
CO ₂	carbon dioxide
CSCE	Conference on Security Cooperation in Europe
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
EAEG	East Asian Economic Group
EAS	East Asia Summit
EAVG	East Asia Vision Group
EEZs	exclusive economic zones
EU	European Union
FCCC	Framework Convention on Climate Change
FDI	foreign direct investment
G8	Group of 8
GDP	gross domestic product
GHG	greenhouse gas
GM	genetically modified
GMPI	Global Maritime Partnership Initiative

IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
ICG	International Crisis Group
IHR	International Health Regulations
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IMO	International Maritime Organization
IRBM	intermediate-range ballistic missile
ISA	Internal Security Act (Malaysia)
ISC	Information Sharing Centre
ISPS	International Ship and Port Facility Security
JI	Jemaah Islamiyah
LNG	liquefied natural gas
LTTE	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
MEAs	multilateral environmental agreements
MILF	Moro Islamic Liberation Front
MNLF	Moro National Liberation Front
MWe	megawatt electric
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NFU	no first use
NGO	non-governmental organisation
NPA	New People's Army
NPT	Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
NRDC	Natural Resources Defense Council
NSAB	National Security Advisory Board
ODA	overseas development assistance
OIE	World Organization for Animal Health
OPEC	Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PSI	Proliferation Security Initiative
PWR	pressurised water reactor
ReCAAP	Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia
ROK	Republic of Korea
RSC	regional security complex
SAR	Maritime Search and Rescue Convention
SARS	severe acute respiratory syndrome
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
SEATO	Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
SLOCs	sea lines of communication
SOLAS	Safety of Life at Sea Convention
SRBM	short-range ballistic missile

TAC	Treaty of Amity and Cooperation
TSD	Trilateral Security Dialogue
UN	United Nations
UNCLOS	United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
WHO	World Health Organization
WMD	weapons of mass destruction
WTO	World Trade Organization

1 Setting the context

William T. Tow

Asia has arguably become the most critical region in an evolving international order. Geopolitically, the region includes three of the world's great powers – China, Japan and India – and two others, the United States and Russia, lie just beyond its peripheries and interact with it extensively. Demographically, over half of the world's total population is Asian and that total is forecast to reach 60 per cent by 2050 (United Nations 1999). Economically, it is projected that China and India alone will account for more than 50 per cent of global growth between 2005 and 2030 (*Economist* 2006a).¹ Militarily, four key players in the broader Asia-Pacific – the US, Russia, China and North Korea – are nuclear weapons states. Asian defence budgets constitute the world's largest arms market (US\$150 billion in purchases between 1990 and 2002) and the region's 'defence transformation' programmes are growing (Bitzinger 2004; IISS 2006b: 398–401; Tellis 2006a). The combination of spectacular regional economic growth, the cultural and religious diversity of its massive population base and the sheer material resources it will generate and consume over the course of this century justify the observation that '(t)here is now a broad consensus that the Asian continent is poised to become the new center of gravity in global politics' (Tellis 2006a: 3).

Security analysts are increasingly concerned with how Asian security politics will affect international security or will, in turn, be influenced by global events and structures. 'Offensive realists' such as John Mearsheimer, for example, view global security as a precarious power equilibrium between states exercising hegemony in their own regions but obsessed with precluding any one of them from exercising outright global hegemony. China and the United States, Mearsheimer argues, will inevitably vie for global predominance with Asia as the major arena, precipitating a hegemonic war (Mearsheimer 2001). Intensified competition

¹ Between 2001 and 2005, Asia contributed 21 per cent to the world's total economic growth compared to the United States' contribution of 19 per cent. Also see *Asia Times Online* (2006).

between an expanding NATO that now cultivates links with four Asia-Pacific 'contact countries' (Australia, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea) and a Shanghai Cooperation Organisation led by a geopolitically resurgent Russia and an increasingly self-confident China would appear to authenticate this scenario. A more optimistic variant of great power balancing strategies (i.e., adapting a concert approach) for East Asia anticipates the need to implement a judicious mix of diplomatic and institutional pathways to stabilise regional relationships (Goldstein 2003; for a more sceptical assessment, see Acharya 1999).

Others, including regional security complex theorists, insist Asia's regional security structure can be distinguished from global security dynamics (although admitting that the two levels often overlap) and that the regional-level structure is at least as important as the global level in determining the region's relative stability. Barry Buzan has insisted that because Asia contains great powers, 'Asian regional security dynamics have stronger links to the global level in both directions than one would expect in the global-regional links of a standard region where the global level might well penetrate stronger into the regional' (Buzan 2003: 149). The *degree* or *intensity* of global penetration, however, is contested. Various analysts have noted, for example, that the United Nations has often been an 'adjunct' rather than a primary force in shaping the Asian security order. This has been due to superpower competition in the region during the Cold War marginalising the UN's roles and influence, Asian states' postcolonial scepticism about Security Council motives, and lingering irredentist disputes in the region. Yet extra-regional powers such as the US and Russia often have and still do intervene in Asian regional security issues without the *imprimatur* of international institutions or regimes if they perceive their own national security interests and their particular visions of 'global stability' threatened by such issues. Given the perceived weakness of regional institutions such as ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in alleviating past and present major Asian disputes, that such incursions by both regional and external powers have occurred is hardly surprising (Foot 2003; Harada and Tanaka 1999: 324).²

Another school of thought contends that a growing array of 'transnational security' threats and challenges defies any arbitrary delineation between 'regional' and 'global' security politics. Demographic pressures,

² Harada and Tanaka (1999: 324) assert that great powers will not enter regional conflicts on their own or via international institutions unless their own national security interests are directly involved. Hence, 'Asian countries... are confronted with the challenge of devising some mechanisms to resolve regional conflicts on their own.'

resource depletion, forced migration, climate change, international crime, pandemics and global terrorism constitute 'human security' problems that challenge us all and bestow the onus of security management directly upon those elites who must decide which specific issues will be prioritised or 'securitised' on our behalf.³ None of the major and contending approaches in international relations theory – realism, liberal-institutionalism or constructivism – is sufficient to effectively embrace this range of transnational security dilemmas. This is not just a matter of integrating these approaches into an effective conceptual hybrid (see the discussion of analytical eclecticism below). Rather, transnational security and its human security derivatives underscore the primacy of individual security and welfare in an increasingly globalised interdependent world.

In contrast to this 'seamless' or 'boundary-neutral' version of security politics, however, East Asian elites have often embraced transnational security to reinforce their own style of collective decision-making and to achieve their own nationalist and regionalist visions. The 'ASEAN way' of reaching consensus via low-key and highly private consultations between Asian elites on such issues as climate change, pandemic management or forced migration is illustrative. Establishing whether security is best considered from a 'top-down' (global or state-centric hierarchical-based) or 'bottom-up' (individual or non-state actor-based) perspective remains a core problem for approaching contemporary security politics and it is particularly difficult when addressing transnational security challenges.⁴ Ascertaining what specific framework is best used to reconcile the inherent levels of analysis question posed by these challenges reflects the overall importance and difficulty of reconciling regional and

³ The definitive source on transregional security politics in East Asia is Dupont (2001). Also see Tow, Thakur and Hyun (2000). The 'securitisation' concept was developed by the so-called 'Copenhagen School' and can be regarded as society or its representative elites viewing an issue as a threat to its constructed identity and responding to such a perceived threat with specific policies. See Wæver (1995) and Buzan and Wæver (1997). Critics of this concept accuse its adherents of misrepresenting 'social identity' as a fixed construct rather than as a constantly changing process. See McSweeney (1996). The concept of securitisation is defended as a relevant approach to Asian security politics by Emmers (2004), but is criticised by Sato (2005) who deems it as little more than an alternative constructivist approach to historical interpretation that offers little new to our understanding of why Asia may be 'different' from other regions in choosing what to regard as a security issue.

⁴ T. J. Pempel notes, however, that the 'top-down/bottom-up' perspective over-simplifies the more complex realities that drive both economic and security politics in Asia. The problem, he asserts, is squaring 'regionalism' where states decide at the top which elements of their national autonomy can be amalgamated from 'regionalisation' which is comprised of 'societally driven processes' (markets, interest group movements and so on) generated from below to derive explanatory power. Indeed, many such processes contain both top-down and bottom-up elements. See Pempel (2005: 13, 19–28).

global security dynamics in an increasingly complex international security arena.

While understanding of the 'regional-global nexus' as it applies to the Asian security approach remains elusive, the importance of such comprehension is undisputed. Both Asia and the world are at a historical crossroad, undergoing monumental structural change. In this context, a group of experts in Asian and international security politics convened a workshop at the Australian National University, Canberra, in August 2006. The workshop had the objective of building on previous efforts to understand how Asian security issues link with their global equivalents. Such knowledge is increasingly compelling as international security problems are more and more shaping the dynamics of Asian security politics.

The regional and international security environment that materialises from this evolution will be forged by Asia's interaction with global security issues. To project the shape of that environment, a brief summary of recent efforts to conceptualise Asian security politics by applying standard international relations theory will be initially offered. A discussion follows on how the 'regional-global nexus' – this book's primary concern – derives from and adds value to these efforts. The final section justifies the book's analytical framework.

Integrating theory and Asian security: precedents

Contemporary literature on Asian security has yielded extensive and profound insights on how such key security concepts as 'order', 'stability', 'polarity' and 'community' interrelate at various levels of analysis. Yet its collective relevance and application to a regional-global security nexus remains elusive. This is due to the murkiness that invariably emerges when contending security paradigms are addressed somewhat randomly or in the spirit of eclecticism. This volume is intended to ascertain with greater clarity why these two levels of analysis are central to understanding and assessing Asia's security politics. Before outlining how it will do so, however, a brief review will be offered of several widely discussed studies that have been conducted to understand how the greater 'Asia-Pacific' relates to and affects the overall post-Cold War international security environment and how this process can be explained in both theoretical and empirical terms.⁵

⁵ 'Asia-Pacific', of course, is a contested term (see Pempel 2005: 24–8). The problem of overcoming ambiguities in striking a definition for the region is discussed by Kang (2003a: 60). For purposes of this study, three distinct 'subregions' and one overlapping geographic sector that includes part of the 'broader Pacific' and the eastern part of

Two books edited by Muthiah Alagappa (1998, 2003) confronted this fundamental question by considering how international relations theory can help explain the interrelationships of material power, ideational perceptions and order-building dynamics within Asia. Both books were landmark and comprehensive efforts to explore why competing theories of international relations could be discriminately but collectively employed to help explain and understand the management of security policies and order in Asia.⁶ Alagappa's edited works were designed to be pathbreaking efforts to bridge international relations theory and area studies supported by in-depth empirical evidence. 'Security' in an Asian context was also treated in both volumes as a dichotomous trend: combining analysis about a regional preoccupation on order-building and hierarchy with a relatively flexible tolerance by Asian elites for 'conceptual traveling' if it could eventually generate the important result of demarcating effective approaches for shaping credible and enduring security norms and practices. Critically, the regional level of analysis was clearly assigned priority over global security dynamics because of Asian regional powers' greater salience in a post-Cold War setting and because of interdependence intensifying at the regional level below the purview of the world's single remaining superpower, the US.

The Alagappa compendiums have been subject to only mild criticisms and these have been constructive in generating additional questions on how even a more integrated conceptual consensus might be achieved.

Russia are included for reasons of both demarcation and conceptualisation. The three subregions are Northeast Asia (China, Japan and the Korean peninsula along with those parts of Russia contiguous to this particular sector); Southeast Asia (including the ten ASEAN member states); and South Asia (including India, Pakistan, the other members of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation and those parts of what is commonly known as 'Central Asia' that impact upon the dynamics of both Russian, Chinese and South Asian geopolitics, and what could be termed as the 'broader Pacific zone' that include maritime powers such as the US, Australia and New Zealand who adopt highly active economic, diplomatic and strategic postures towards the region). I prefer 'Asia-Pacific' as the fundamental geographic descriptor because, as will be argued below, American material power and ideational influences together constitute an integral maritime component of and linkage to any 'regional-global nexus'. By contrast, Muthiah Alagappa prefers to delineate 'Asia' rather than 'Asia-Pacific' as the most analytically pertinent regional nomenclature based on China providing a common linkage for interdependence between various subregions. 'Extra-regional actors' such as the US, he concludes, are not the 'primary drivers' of tensions, conflicts and cooperative initiatives. Yet he acknowledges that Asia, as a distinct region in its own right, is open to external influences and is becoming increasingly integrated into 'global systems'. See Alagappa (2006).

⁶ As noted by Alagappa in a roundtable organised in Taiwan to discuss his second book. The book, he noted, 'was not designed to advance a general theory of international politics... Instead, taking a problem-oriented approach, we sought explanations from the insights of competing theories' (Alagappa 2005: 262).

Concerns raised in relation to the second Alagappa book, in particular, focused around: (1) the limited context in which the notion of Asian 'order' is developed and explained; (2) a perhaps over-optimistic tone adopted by the book in describing Asian 'stability'; (3) a tendency to underplay the role of the US in the shaping of Asian 'regionalism'; and (4) a perceived failure to sufficiently reconcile the disparate theories used to describe different aspects of Asian security. The fourth concern has perhaps been the most enduring: others who have followed Alagappa in favouring an 'inclusiveness approach' to understanding Asian security nevertheless have decried both volumes' tendencies to 'fit too many explanatory variables under one cover, without an overarching intellectual theme that ties the variables together' – a tendency that has been labelled 'additive complementarity' (Carlson and Suh 2004: 231–2; Kihl 2006: 6–7).

Alagappa responded to many of these points in a special workshop convened in Taipei to discuss his second volume in late 2004. Nevertheless, he acknowledged that additional work is required to understand the nature and consequence of changing distributions of economic and political power and resultant patterns of hierarchy or interdependence, the patterns of institutionalisation as they work within and beyond regional confines, and how such institutions incorporate 'socialisation and learning functions' that may emanate from extra-regional sources. One of the workshop commentators observed that while 'multiple pathways' are needed to explain Asia's contemporary security environment, both state-level factors (i.e., national economic growth and the development of military power) and extra-regional variables such as American global hegemony, alliances and international multilateral mechanisms must be integrated in a system-level analysis of Asian security (Zhang 2005: 240). Despite the comprehensiveness of Alagappa's analytical sweep, the levels of analysis clearly remained an impediment to consensus on the Asian security paradigm.

Another influential and constructive study of Asian security was edited by G. John Ikenberry and Michael Mastanduno and appeared in 2003. It offered alternative 'images' of the Asian security order as they related to the increased role that Asian states are playing in 'the larger international system' (Ikenberry and Mastanduno 2003a: 422). More structurally oriented, and less concerned with the nature and interworkings of regional order than the Alagappa volumes, *International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific* focuses on regional power relations as a component of the global security environment. Its basic concern is to assess the extent that three major powers – the US, China and Japan – form the core security cluster driving Asian security dynamics and how that cluster relates to

prospects for American post-Cold War hegemony. They employ what they term five 'frames' that comprise relevant theoretical approaches to understanding stability in the Asian security environment: (1) balance of power; (2) styles of hegemony; (3) history and memory; (4) domestic and international institutions; and (5) economic interdependence. Incorporating the work of some of the same analysts that contributed to the Alagappa texts, most of its chapter selections pursue the question as to whether Western or 'European-centred' international relations theory is useful in evaluating Asia-Pacific politics and security. David Kang's chapter represents a notable exception insofar as it appeals for the development of a localised-hierarchical 'Asian' model to explain Asian security politics (Kang 2003b: 164).

The Ikenberry/Mastanduno book differs from Alagappa's volumes, however, by underscoring the ongoing weakness of existing Asian security institutions relative to their European counterparts. It posits that the United States' early postwar decision to manage power in Asia not by institutionalisation (along the lines of NATO) but by hierarchy (through its bilateral system of alliances there), established 'path dependence' that has since inhibited the establishment of more robust Asian security institutions (Duffield 2003: 256–8). If this interpretation is correct, American power has imposed constraints on Asian order-building that impede an Asian capability to shape and manage regional order autonomously, refuting the arguments of Kang and others who insist that more region-centric models can be applied to this process. On the other hand, American power endows the Asian region with 'breathing space' for developing more self-reliant institutions and processes for achieving security. That power applies distant but useful 'offshore balancing' that is devoid of the historical and cultural baggage that could otherwise impede the successful application of indigenous models.⁷

As noted by one of its reviewers, *International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific* renders an invaluable service by testing the contending American policies of engagement and containment of China against the theoretical perspectives that drive the actual choices and risks involved in opting for either approach (Stuart 2004). Those few critiques that have been directed towards this book focus on what they deem to be an interpretation of Asian security politics that is arguably too 'American-centric' (Carlson and Suh 2004: 231). In reality, the editors simply identify the US role as a 'crucial variable' in successful conflict management and future regional stability in Asia. This is a 'top-down' perspective; it underplays how US power intersects with emerging regional

⁷ The US balancing role in the region is developed by Layne (1997).

institutions affecting the evolving international security order (Carlson and Suh 2004: 232). Indeed, one could make a strong case that American power has been as much a source of regional insecurity or instability as solidity, that American hierarchy has been at least partly overcome by the growth of regionally indigenous diplomacy minimising the path dependency factor.⁸ The book's nearly exclusive emphasis on the US, China and Japan reflects an American 'globalist' perspective that risks marginalising South Korea's and ASEAN's role in region-centric order-building, despite Alastair Iain Johnston's fine chapter on the 'ASEAN way' (Johnston 2003; Stuart 2004). That chapter focuses primarily on the China-ASEAN dyad; it is less concerned about how ASEAN and the ARF shape institutional politics in Asia. If Alagappa's edited studies can be accused of being overly 'region-centric', the Ikenberry/Mastanduno compendium (and especially its concluding chapter) might be regarded as over-emphasising the future course of US geopolitical behaviour as the cardinal determinant for how the Asian security order will be determined.

J. J. Suh, Peter J. Katzenstein and Allen Carlson have argued in their recent study on *Rethinking Security in East Asia* that the problems outlined in both the Alagappa and Ikenberry/Mastanduno studies are largely overcome by 'analytical eclecticism': the selective merging of competing realist, liberal and constructivist research traditions to form a set of observations or 'explanatory sketches' to generate 'a causally significant understanding of empirically significant outcomes' (Katzenstein and Sil 2004: 13). If applied effectively, analytical eclecticism will enrich the study of Asian security by expanding its parameters of reference beyond those currently imposed by separate, predominant, realist, liberal and constructivist research traditions (Katzenstein and Sil 2004: 21–2). It will overcome the 'naturally' pessimist realist assumption that in the absence of robust norms and institutions, Asia is destined to be a war-ridden area of the world (if this has not happened yet, 'just wait').⁹ It will safeguard against overly optimistic liberal prognoses of regional economic development that were in effect prior to the Asian financial crisis. It will modify constructivist predictions about the cultivation of a sufficiently homogeneous regional identity to realise security community-building or (more pessimistically) to sustain long-standing historical-cultural animosities. Analytical eclecticism thus can serve as a useful braking mechanism for modifying the excesses of each paradigm but also nurture

⁸ This perspective is developed by Sugita (2005).

⁹ Fairly or unfairly, the writings of Aaron Friedberg (1993/94) during the mid-1990s are most often cited as the culprit in restricting realism's ability to think outside the zero-sum box in this regard.

the particular strengths of each approach in ways that can interrelate to draw better analogies, comparisons and conclusions about Asian security trends.

To at least some extent, the arguments projected in *Rethinking Security in East Asia* are reflected in Katzenstein's (2005) commensurate and seminal work, *A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium*. Both studies have been widely and properly acclaimed. Yet both have incurred similar concerns to those engendered by the Alagappa and Ikenberry/Mastanduno books, notwithstanding Suh's and Carlson's arguments found in their concluding chapter of *Rethinking Security* aimed to overcome such criticism.

First, while those employing the 'explanatory sketches' of analytical eclecticism may intend it to be a safeguard against the excesses of single-theory application, they are so 'risk-averse' as to preclude the adoption of any theoretical elucidation for understanding Asian security's empirical dynamics. In the vernacular, explanatory sketches may 'tie one up in knots' via 'nitpicking' and thus inhibit conclusions being soundly reached on an otherwise valid basis of evidence supporting a realist perspective in one area of enquiry or liberal or constructivist orientations in another. Kang has captured the essence of this problem as part of his appeal for deriving more 'Asia-centric' theories for explaining Asian security: more than a pot-pourri consisting of 'a touch of realism, a dash of constructivism and a pinch of liberalism' is required if contemporary questions of regional security are to be addressed in ways that acquire meaning for those policy-makers that must deal with them on a time-urgent basis and in an inevitably prioritised context (Kang 2003a: 59). 'Hybridising' paradigms under such conditions with the leisure normally related to the evolution of academic discourse are simply inadequate. What may be more promising is an 'action-oriented' model recently proposed by Young Whan Kihl – a 'syncretistic' approach that combines theory-building with field observation over specific timeframes and 'participation analysis' such as policy elite interviews. Integrating empirical data that emerges from such observation and data acquisition with a theoretical 'fit' seems a desirable method of deriving causal explanations (Kihl 2006).

A second concern stems from *Rethinking Security in East Asia*'s somewhat controversial preference for sustained US policy ambiguity in Asia as a necessary precondition for regional stability and order-building. As a global power, the US must project explicitly defined interests and order-building preferences that, whenever possible, avoid misperceptions and reflect leadership through engagement. The book's editors observe that '[regional] stability stands on a precarious, unidimensional foundation'

that successive American administrations often (and unconsciously?) attempt to disrupt by imposing a 'narrow, binary framework of force', presumably in the form of reinforcing alliance politics or imposing the doctrine of strategic pre-emption against sceptical unwilling Asian societies (Carlson and Suh 2004: 230–1). However, the dangers of China misinterpreting American 'imperial' intentions, of ASEAN not being allowed to sustain its soft balancing strategies against larger powers so as to negotiate their own interests and identities and of the US confusing its role on the Korean peninsula between extending deterrence and pre-empting North Korea, all combine to mitigate those 'subtle sources of Asian stability' that are sustained by strategic ambiguity.

Resigning oneself to the permanent condition of ambiguity in the Asian security environment appears to be a tacit concession to the realist vision of permanent anarchy as inherent to international security relations. It allows little room for institutionalist or constructivist approaches to supplement interest-oriented diplomacy in Asia from either a regional or American vantage point and thus is hardly 'eclectic'. It also reflects a subconscious anti-American bias to the extent that policy flowing from Washington is viewed as inevitably problematic. This tendency also emerges in Katzenstein's other works: although globalisation is represented as making regionalism more 'porous' or open in nature, US primacy nevertheless is characterised as impeding a genuinely mutual process of interaction between the imperial power and the region of concern (Lewis 2006: 282). In fact, as the recent formation of ASEAN+3 (ASEAN plus China, Japan and South Korea), the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) and the East Asia Summit (EAS) all clearly demonstrate, regionalism in Asia is not under the control of the US or its bilateral alliance system but may be facilitated by them through the latter providing sufficient 'breathing space' for the mechanisms and identities underwriting these initiatives to mature over time. As Alagappa (2006) has noted, 'a concept that captures the mutuality of interaction between actors and processes at the two levels would be more useful in understanding the global-regional nexus and its implications.'

Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security written by Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver and published in 2003 is a monumental work that argues that the world and its security are best understood by envisioning it as a series of 'regional security complexes' that are distinct from both the international security system and from 'local' (intra-state or state-centric) units within that system. Because it devotes substantial analysis to understanding the interrelationship between regional and global security components, of all the works assessed in this section it comes closest to addressing the issues that are the central

concern of this volume (Buzan and Wæver 2003).¹⁰ Buzan and Wæver are careful to specify that while the concept of 'global security' is naturally macro-analytical or 'top-down' in its orientation, it is *not* synonymous with 'the whole international system' when applied to the problem of regional-global interrelationships. No real consensus exists over what constitutes the 'systematic' structure in a post-Cold War security environment (American unipolarity? Competitive great power multipolarity? An emerging great power concert? A 'war between civilisations?') (Bell 2003; Huntington 1996). In the absence of such consensus, state-centric sovereignty and territoriality nevertheless plays a key role in the formation and maintenance of international security norms and institutions. The significance of the 'globalist approaches' advocated by the neo-realist camp in international relations theory to shaping contemporary international security politics cannot be overplayed – but that of more distinct regional configurations cannot be underestimated (Buzan and Wæver 2003: 28–30).

The problem invoked by this observation, however, is that one must delineate how various regional security components and issues 'fit' into whatever global security system may be operating at a given time. In turn, how regional security complexes must develop and operate in response to continuities and changes in the global security environment must also be explained (see Gleditsch 2005). The best indication that *Regions and Powers* offers us to meet these requirements is an East Asian regional security complex that conforms to a '1+4' power configuration (what Buzan and Wæver term a 'global dynamic') where the '1' is the US superpower and the '4' are the regional powers of China, Japan, Russia and the European Union (EU). Yet the authors concede that China's rising power base could easily change this configuration into a new global pattern more attuned to the Soviet-American dyad (2 superpowers + x great powers including Russia, the EU and perhaps India). The 'revised' polarity would still reflect a predominant East Asian component.¹¹

¹⁰ Previous studies covered selective dimensions of the regional-global security interrelationship (see especially Lake and Morgan 1997a). The Lake and Morgan study focuses on 'externalities' or 'transborder spillovers' to characterise a regional security system's strategic interactions but underplays the role of external (global) forces such as US global power in shaping and influencing the nature and intensity of such externalities. It thus artificially 'conflates' or blends the regional and global dimensions rather than focusing on how the two different levels may shape and influence each other (see Buzan and Wæver 2003: 27; Miller 1998).

¹¹ Buzan and Wæver (2003: 169–70) admit that '(a)ssessing the weight of the global level in the East Asian RSC [regional security complex] is not as straightforward as might first appear' because the US could elect to either decrease its involvement in the absence of a Soviet threat, increase it in response to a China growing strong or default its

Reconciling the 'global-regional nexus'

Where does this inventory of recent works on Asia's security politics lead relative to understanding that region's interrelationships to global security? What specific questions remain to be assessed for understanding the growing impact of Asia within an increasingly complex and potentially turbulent international security environment? Three major areas of enquiry seem particularly relevant.

By now it is clear that predictions of unmitigated US global hegemony that were rampant during the early 1990s were premature. The Bush administration, in particular, overestimated the utility of military technology and the appeal of Western ideals for transforming the rest of the world into a polity with which Washington would be most comfortable. It also underestimated China and ASEAN's ability to adapt to structural change on their own terms following the Asian financial crisis and 11 September 2001. There is certainly little resemblance in the current international security environment to the *pax Americana* that American neo-conservatives imagined could be established at the outset of this century.

Indeed, the international security order that does exist appeared to become increasingly fragmented and contested, lacking enforceable universal norms and institutions that command consensus for shaping a more harmonious and enduring global order. As the Iraq quagmire intensified, US power seemed less able to shape the international security framework that does exist. The UN was often undermined by its permanent Security Council members' geopolitical predilections. In the absence of a strong hierarchical or hegemonic force, do stronger regional security complexes of the type envisioned by Buzan and Wæver or their derivatives in the form of contemporary regional integration movements represent the most viable approach to building a more stable world?¹² To answer this question, the structures and processes underlying both 'regional security' and 'global security' must be carefully explored in terms of how and why they are linked. Just as importantly, the appropriate 'mix' between theoretical propositions and empirical analysis needs to be identified in order to allay policy-makers' scepticism that

predominance to China in favour of becoming an offshore balancer. The latter scenario appeared more likely in 2006–7 and the US remains enmeshed in a highly volatile Middle East and thus may be more prone to 'live with' a relatively stable East Asia even if it is increasingly managed by Chinese or a combination of Chinese and ASEAN policy-makers (see Goh 2005b).

¹² The 'security communities literature' has experienced a recent 'comeback' within the international relations literature in the form of examining regional identity-building as a foundation for realising such communities. See Adler and Barnett (1998) and Peou (2001).

theoretical treatises churned out by the academic sector are little more than a recipe for ambiguity.

A second major concern is that consensus is lacking over the type of Asian security order that will be responsible for helping to shape global security structures. In part, this is due to different interpretations of how synonymous the structuring of global security is with the expansion or reduction of American power. However, discord over the structural context of any Asian-global security dynamic goes beyond the 'American factor' to a debate about how specific 'flashpoints' or 'security dilemmas' (that is, the Korean peninsula, Taiwan or a nuclear-armed subcontinent) transcend exclusively 'region-centric' strategic concerns and become fully globalised in their scope and ramifications. The 'four images' introduced by Ikenberry and Mastanduno in their edited book's final chapter relate to this problem. For example, will China become a 'responsible stakeholder' within a US-centred world order or instead try to reshape that order by leading a predominant Asian regional security complex within it (Ikenberry and Mastanduno 2003a: 424)?¹³ Or will it contest the US and other great powers within Asia in ways that will generate a bipolar or multipolar regional balance of power? Or, in a perhaps less likely scenario, can an Asia fuelled by the vision of growing regional prosperity that requires an ever stronger global marketplace eventually develop a 'shared sense of community' that will lead to a 'Europeanised' type of regional order largely devoid of tensions and security dilemmas (Severino 2006: 342–71)?¹⁴ Unlike the Ikenberry/Mastanduno thesis that future US power will inevitably be the key cause leading to any of these outcomes, this volume will explore a variety of factors that individually or together could shape Asia's future security order and how that order correlates with overall global stability. These include China's bilateral ties with other key regional powers (Japan and India) and actors (ASEAN or other institutions); the role of economics in security; how democratic values relate to regional community-building; and the interplay of transnational security factors with traditional state-centric variables.

¹³ An official American appeal for China to assume the role of 'responsible stakeholder' for an Asian component in a world order preferred by Washington was extended in a widely cited September 2005 address delivered by then Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick (US Department of State 2005). China initially responded favourably to Zoellick's analysis as an American gesture to treat China as an 'equal' within the international system while still acknowledging America's superpower status within that order (*People's Daily* 2006; Jianwei Wang 2006).

¹⁴ The classic treatise on this question remains Acharya (2001).

A third area justifying greater assessment flows from this last component: the linkages between the traditional levels of security analysis (state-centric, regional and global) and emerging transregional security issues that are certain to increasingly dominate both Asian and extra-regional policy-makers' agendas. The second Alagappa volume published in 2003, along with Alan Dupont's (2001) widely discussed work on the politics of alternative security, incorporated analysis linking regional order-building with non-traditional security issue management (the other works discussed above were less concerned with this dimension of Asian security). Both the Alagappa and Dupont volumes, however, were published too soon after 11 September to evaluate the full impact of such contingencies as global terrorism and Southeast Asia's position on radical Islamist movements found within its peripheries, the increasing relationship between energy security and maritime security, intensifying environmental challenges as they relate to transnational crime and to global warming, the looming dangers of regional pandemics exploding into global epidemics and the Bush administration's single-minded determination to export democracy to a myriad of peoples and cultures. The evolving processes that have been applied by states, regions or institutions in response to these challenges merit in-depth discussion as a component of regional-global security relations.

The way forward

This book is thus divided into three broad sub-themes: (1) developing the global-regional security nexus as a broad theoretical concept and assessing the potential value of this concept to regional and international security policy-makers; (2) relating the security nexus question to how an Asian regional security order could unfold; and (3) ascertaining how emerging key security issues that increasingly influence international security policy formulation are evolving in an Asian context.

Developing the concept

Brian Job (chapter 2) commences the first section (Part I) of this volume by directly addressing the security nexus question. He initially considers how the changing international security framework is being shaped by key security actors in Asia, and argues that key Asia-Pacific states have been increasingly integral to shaping the global security system. Asserting that the Asia-Pacific is a major driver for how the international security system is evolving, Job incorporates a 'levels of analysis' framework for explaining

how the region is now a major 'centre of gravity' for international security politics.

He observes that the regional-global nexus is currently indeterminate in an Asia-Pacific context. Exactly demarcating the relationship between material and non-material factors that together comprise any such 'nexus', therefore, is an impossibly elusive undertaking. Short of offering a highly refined causal explanation for how the regional-global nexus precisely works, he nevertheless offers a comprehensive taxonomy of those perspectives favouring the regionalist perspective to provide a theoretical framework that might serve as a basis for further exploring the problem of nexus. He then reviews selected material and ideational factors to test his propositions: those elements relevant to forging the idea of 'region', those instrumental for differentiating 'global' from 'systemic' in international security politics, and those instrumental to underwriting or testing hegemonic behaviour at both the regional and global levels of analysis. After weighing the 'centre of gravity' concept in some depth, he concludes that future efforts to reconcile the regional and global levels of analysis and to understand where the centre of gravity is leading must entail more cohesive investigation than merely relying on analytical eclecticism or other random hybrids of the realist, normative and ideational outlooks to security both in Asia and in the international system.

Michael Wesley (chapter 3) contemplates the postwar role of multilateralism and the institutions it has spawned, both regionally and globally, in shaping the Asia-Pacific and international orders. Tensions between regionalism and globalism have been generated in Asia by three fundamental dynamics: (1) the extent to which institutions that have arisen there complement or balance the US bilateral alliance system; (2) the degree to which regional institutions' architects and adherents have applied them towards enhancing the Asia-Pacific's global influence; and (3) the point to which such institutions reflect and adjudicate the region's own evolving balance of power. Wesley examines factors of 'institutional sclerosis' that have impeded the relevance and inhibited the reform required for Asia-Pacific multilateral security initiatives and organisations to complement or supplant the American-led 'San Francisco system' of regional alliances more effectively. In large part, this can be attributed to a striking difference found in postwar US attitudes towards imposing an American version of international order in Asia as opposed to Europe: Washington was intent on comprehensively reconstructing European societies following the demise of Adolf Hitler's Third Reich; it was satisfied to impose a 'minimalist approach' to order-building in the Asia-Pacific that merely ensured its own global power would not be contested by new patterns of hegemonic rise emanating from within

that region. Catalysts for Asia-Pacific institution-building have thus been self-generated, largely in response to distinct and often unexpected catalysts: the emergence of an 'Asian values' movement, the shock of the Asian financial crisis and the phenomenon of China's remarkable economic growth are illustrative. Wesley concludes that in the absence of institutional reform and viability needed to manage overall international security, Asia-Pacific institutions will either develop sufficiently to moderate great power rivalries in the region or will themselves become conduits for those rivalries to be played out. The challenge is to identify the pathway to institutional development that will command the support of all parties beyond merely fulfilling the purpose of balancing or excluding rival powers.

Michael Mastanduno (chapter 4) assesses American power as the core element for bridging the Asian and global security orders. Arguing that the United States remains the world's uncontested global hegemon, he nevertheless observes that American global strategy that was formerly 'region-centric' is no longer viable as events in one region increasingly affect developments in others and in ways that directly impact upon US interests and resources. Washington, however, has yet to adjust to this new reality. It is most likely, he asserts, to 'muddle along reactively', lacking the geopolitical vision and posture commensurate to its ascent to global hegemony at the outset of the postwar era and to its clear determination to exercise uncontested hegemony after its demise. US hegemonic strategy during the 1990s, however, was conservative, reactive and risk-averse: sensitive to the domestic political ramifications of battlefield casualties, the attritional effects of protracted US military deployments and the negative ramifications of force-feeding economic liberalism to newly emergent market economies. Asia's regional pressures and conflicts would be defused or contained by strengthening existing alliance frameworks and encouraging 'open regionalism'.

The eleventh of September, Mastanduno asserts, transformed the US superpower from a status quo power to a revisionist one. The 'triple combination' of terrorism, rogue states and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) shifted US policy-makers' worldview from one where the international system was moving in ways favourable to the United States to one where time was no longer on America's side. The Asia-Pacific allies were increasingly valued for their relative willingness (and capability) to become partners in 'coalitions of the willing' and to help Washington confront new risks surfacing in both regional and extra-regional settings: the Persian Gulf, Central Asia and Southeast Asia. This is even more the case as the Asian region becomes more 'dynamic' and the politico-strategic risks incurred for intervening militarily in the region rise commensurately.

The US has become more 'risk acceptant' since the Iraq War. However, the US electorate's disillusionment with its foreign policy of pre-emption and interventionism is increasing at a time when East Asian stability is also coming under increased strain: that is, deteriorating Sino-Japanese relations, an intractable Taiwan crisis and an ever more bellicose North Korea. The problem Washington faces is that 'its ability to serve as a regional stabiliser is seriously constrained by the developments that have taken place since 11 September' and that 'those in East Asia who prefer a sustained US regional role will perceive that the United States is too preoccupied in the Middle East and Persian Gulf to make more than cosmetic attempts'. Under such conditions, Chinese 'soft power' and other regionally indigenous diplomacy will compare favourably to an American hegemon that is seemingly so distracted or preoccupied with an amorphous war on terrorism that it is prepared to reduce its force presence in Asia on the rationale that 'everything is moving elsewhere' at the global security level.

In assessing how a 'rising China' affects the regional-global nexus, Hugh White and Brendan Taylor (chapter 5) assert that the reluctance of China and the US to cooperate in managing power relations and order-building in the Asia-Pacific will have negative ramifications for international security. Without greater acknowledgement – even deference – to China's aspirations for assuming a leadership role in the region, future economic and security crises in the region may posit greater risks for precipitating Sino-American confrontation. Any such conflict would have dire implications for global security.

The actual prospects for this tradeoff occurring, however, are limited due to the probable intercession of material and ideational impediments. These include a perpetual American tendency to view force build-ups in China as inherently threatening to US global primacy and national security interests. They also entail other key regional actors such as Japan and ASEAN more readily coming to terms with a China growing strong. Future US competition with China will invariably occur in 'broader' security sectors (also known as 'soft power' components) of energy politics, diplomacy, economic growth and trade relations and a fundamental incompatibility over political values. A preferred Sino-American condominium arrangement might take the form of a tacit concert or 'duet' formed to achieve greater capacity for regional conflict management and the mutual projection of power by these two states to realise greater international stability and prosperity. For China to adjust to such a power-sharing arrangement will be challenging but feasible, given its recent Cold War experience with adjudicating its position *vis-à-vis* two superpowers. For the US, such an adjustment, White and Taylor argue, will

be more taxing given its universalist legacy of asserting its interests and values in the international arena with little or no compromise. Hence the chapter concludes with a pessimistic bent that reluctantly posits the dire realist scenarios outlined by Mearsheimer and others as a very distinct possibility.

Structural and normative outlooks

Part II of this book focuses on how key material and ideational factors are shaping the regional–global nexus. Particular attention is directed towards the structural issue of how enduring systemic authority or ‘hegemony’ will be as many Asian states experience the most dynamic change in their history. Attention is also directed towards how likely the forces of liberalisation in both normative and economic terms are developing at the national level or permeating from a more interdependent world in ways that generate new factors of regional competition (contested primacy between great powers) or cooperation (such as community-building).

Evelyn Goh (chapter 6) offers an in-depth examination that considers the development of an Asian power balance sustained by intricate strategies of both state-centric and institutional balancing, engagement and ‘enmeshment’. Taking issue with some other contributors to this volume, she maintains that ‘the US is not the “extra-regional” player that regionally indigenous states often assume it to be: it is at once a global superpower *and* a regional hegemon whose strategic interests and engagement constitute (not merely shape or define) the East Asian regional security order’. Nor should the US be viewed as an ‘imperial’ power in any Asian security order but as a benign hierarchical force that overlays more vigorous great power competition at the intra-regional level. As such, ‘(t)his formulation of US hegemony as regional hierarchy helps to overcome the problem of over-simplification faced by a levels of analysis treatment of the interaction between the “global” and “regional” dimensions of security’. This plays to Job’s assertion that unlocking the levels of analysis puzzle about where the regional–global nexus actually intersects is a major step in understanding the dynamics of Asia-Pacific influence in international security politics.

Along with preceding chapters, Goh’s treatment of Sino-American relations relates to the problems of positionality and self-perception. Not unlike White and Taylor, she regards Chinese power to be niche-oriented and largely region-centric in scope. Ongoing US systemic primacy, however, provides greater consistency for policy elites to calculate how they can manage their own state’s internal forces of change and manoeuvre among the American hegemon and the region’s great powers to extract

maximum strategic and economic gains. After presenting a comprehensive assessment of regional hierarchy in a postwar world, Goh concludes that US–Asian hierarchy ‘clarifies the regional dynamic’ by preventing the unleashing of nationalist forces and the intensification of regional security dilemmas if it did not exist. In this context, she challenges the model recently advanced by Kang that anticipates a Chinese-led regional hierarchy eventually and peacefully supplanting the current American-dominated system (Kang 2003a). Goh anticipates that no alternative to US primacy would be better for ensuring Asia’s regional security and could very well be much worse.

William Case (chapter 7) provides a specific case study of how political liberalisation at the national level flows into the regional–global nexus *problématique*. Cross-comparing authoritarian and relatively democratic Asian regimes to test the proposition that those with more democratic trappings will experience ‘better security outcomes’, he adopts a ‘bottom-up’ approach to the nexus previously referred to by Job. Specific dimensions of the post-Cold War security paradigm as it is evolving in both regional and international security politics are incorporated into his assessment, including economic growth and development, communal and class relations, and human rights.

Case deduces that after accounting for such outliers, ‘the comparative performance of democracy and authoritarianism . . . remains ambiguous’. While national security environments and infrastructures may be subject to new kinds of elites and social forces, democratic procedures have not appeared to be decisive in shaping various Asian states’ behaviour towards their own populaces or towards each other. This is a potentially ideational finding insofar as it directly refutes many generalisations recently advanced by the ‘democratic peace’ school of thought and by other advocates of social liberalisation operating at both the regional and international levels of discourse and policy advocacy.

This section’s third ‘vision’ for operationalising the regional–global nexus is offered by Sorpong Peou (chapter 8) in his treatise on East Asian security community-building. Adopting a somewhat different premise from Case, Peou exudes greater optimism over the capabilities of ideational forces to develop enduring norms and expectations commensurate with genuine community-building processes. The major problem in achieving regional stability, he argues, is not so much the ambiguity of democratic instrumentalities and processes leading to aberrant behaviour among Asian actors but the recent American propensity to rely upon raw material power for shaping a liberal order of its own choosing. US aspirations for determining how the world and, by extension, the Asia-Pacific will be managed – particularly in the context of a

US–Japan condominium exercising primacy over Northeast Asia – have actually undermined regional community-building. Peou's observation that pluralistic community-building is an appropriate vision for Asia's future is clearly at odds with Goh's thesis that US dominance provides a stabilising overlay for an Asia populated by states that are more instrumental than idealistic and who would, in the absence of the American hegemon, become intense rivals, choosing intensified strategies of balancing and conflict to vie for regional power and primacy.

In many ways, the Asia-Pacific region has embraced the 'human security' concept as its own, reiterating constantly its determination to eliminate freedom from fear, freedom from want and freedom to live with dignity. With the post-11 September apprehensions over global terrorism accelerating regionally and globally, however, the human security ethos is now often linked to 'fear of freedom'. Critics of Asian authoritarianism cite the danger of regional elites becoming increasingly prone to securitising the challenge of international terrorism as a means of merely legitimising their own domestic power bases at the expense of cultivating and upholding their peoples' collective well-being. Akiko Fukushima and William Tow (chapter 9) assert that the human security dynamic is invariably more complex, however, than merely serving as an expedient tool for elites' political manipulation of those they govern. Instead, it constitutes 'a mutually reinforcing dynamic between state, societal and individual security' that transcends different levels of analysis along the regional–global security nexus and one that can only be ignored at one's own peril. The authors apply recent Japanese experiences in developing viable human security postures to test this proposition.

Fukushima and Tow identify three 'preconditions' for integrating traditional and human security approaches to craft more effective responses to future contingencies that can transcend borders and project common threats to global populations and resources: (1) minimising ideological rigidity as a basis for political action; (2) minimising hypocritical behaviour that may otherwise be justified in the context of 'national security' by consistently observing the rule of law; and (3) avoiding linkages of threat neutralisation with economic and development assistance. The coexistence of traditional and human security paradigms can be applied throughout Asia, they conclude, to reduce collective human anxieties and to bind institutional commitments towards achieving more egalitarian outcomes for the peoples who inhabit the region. To do so successfully, however, regional policy architects will need to induce the US and intra-regional great powers alike to explore alternative, 'people-centric' security politics even as they maintain alliances, build coalitions and otherwise pursue more traditional forms of strategy and diplomacy. Getting

this coexistence right will determine the extent to which regional initiatives can address looming global security challenges of a non-military nature most effectively.

Economic regional integration's effects on tempering conflicts and underwriting institutional norms comprise the heart of John Ravenhill's (chapter 10) assessment of how the Asia-Pacific 'economic security nexus' reduces the prospect for systemic wars, even during times of significant power transition. In fact, Ravenhill asserts, the costs of conflict go up when power transitions take place within an increasingly interdependent system featuring the diffusion of transnational production centres, the decline of protectionism and the growth of multilateral institutions to regulate trade and investment liberalisation. Statistical evidence is reviewed that supports the liberal arguments about the relationship between interdependence and lower levels of conflicts applicable to the Asian region and, more specifically, to China. That country's integration into the global economy has been instrumental in precluding the development of a regional trading bloc, and has rendered China visibly more dependent on transnational production networks. Ravenhill surmises that any temptation by China or other regional powers to use military force for the securing of resource supplies is outweighed by 'the potential loss of access to markets, finance, components and technology that would occur should an expansionary military policy be pursued'. Moreover, he concludes, globalisation creates domestic factions with 'internationalist outlooks' who perceive a major stake in ensuring the supply and production processes are not interrupted and have a vested interest in the strengthening of confidence-building between major trading states within and beyond regional parameters.

The security nexus and key issue-areas

This book's third section 'tests' those specific concerns that appear to be most relevant in linking Asia-Pacific and global security dynamics. The Bush administration's 2006 National Security Statement labelled such issues as 'challenges of globalisation'. Public health contingencies like 'pandemics', 'illicit trade in drugs and human beings' within the framework of human security concerns, and 'environmental destruction' were all cited under this category while nuclear non-proliferation, global terrorism and maritime/energy security were all assigned crucial status within the administration's overall international security policy framework. The administration also argued in this report that 'these challenges require effective democracies to come together in innovative ways'

(Bush 2006) – a proposition already tested and found wanting in Case's treatment of it in Part II.

Southeast Asia has often been deemed by US policy-makers as global terrorism's 'second front', supplementing the Middle East and Central Asia as a source of radical Islamist *jihad* (see, for example, Gershman 2002). This image has been reinforced by various analysts affiliated with Southeast Asian think tanks and by regional academics who have strong professional and entrepreneurial interests in highlighting their own sensationalist interpretations of alleged linkages between Asian and international terrorism networks. Separating myth from fact often becomes an arduous task, however, requiring a sound empirical grounding on the agendas and actions generated by the myriad of ethnic and political groups located in that subregion. Greg Fealy and Carlyle Thayer (chapter 11) offer a dextrous, and admittedly provocative, interpretation of how and why myth perpetuation remains a lucrative if somewhat misguided cottage industry throughout Southeast Asia and how various methodological approaches can either modify or perpetuate this trend. They also focus on the more substantive challenges that regional and extra-regional partners in counter-terrorism are likely to confront over the next decade, providing a particularly useful and nuanced assessment of Jemaah Islamiyah and al-Qaeda terrorist networks spanning the regional-global nexus with varying degrees of intensity.

North Korea's recent nuclear weapons and missile tests have once more highlighted Asia's increasingly central role in global nuclear politics.¹⁵ This development follows a virtual litany of significant WMD-related developments in Asia: the 1998 nuclear tests in India and Pakistan; the US application of ballistic missile technology to a 'theatre missile defence' system intended to defend Japan and other Asian allies from future nuclear strikes; the establishment of a Proliferation Security Initiative (2003) largely in response to the nuclear activities of North Korea and other 'states of concern'; and the collective development of small but technologically proficient nuclear forces by China, India and Pakistan. These developments bring into question the traditional scope of deterrence strategy (Asian nuclear powers are far more proximate to each other than were mutual Soviet and American targets during the Cold War) and its continued applicability in a twenty-first-century environment. 'Tripwires' and other forms of deterrence commitments may become

¹⁵ A major project on nuclear weapons and security in 21st century Asia has been undertaken under the leadership of Alagappa and the East-West Center, Washington, DC. See Alagappa (2008).

less relevant as the number of nuclear players increase under an increasingly tenuous global nuclear non-proliferation regime.

Marianne Hanson and Rajesh Rajagopalan (chapter 12) weigh these considerations in a chapter underlined by their concern that existing norms in regional and global strategic behaviour have become 'unsettled' by nuclear posturing in both North Korea and South Asia. While recent developments point to greater transparency on this issue in both subregions and to only gradual and modest developments in nuclear weapons capabilities, it remains clear that the world's established nuclear powers have achieved little coordination in their approaches to non-proliferation regime management. The authors call for '[a] finely honed reservoir of strategic patience [that] blends well with a carefully calibrated sequence of policy carrots and sticks to condition those nuclear capabilities that do emerge into the broader international security framework'. It may be that WMD modernisation in specific Asian geographic sectors is being driven by 'mostly domestic and regional processes rather than global developments'. But as the North Korean nuclear test and the reactions to it by such powers as Japan, Iran and other states within and beyond Asia demonstrate, the global effects of such processes are not guaranteed to proceed at a relaxed controllable pace of force modernisation and diplomatic compromise. The politics of managing WMD thus perhaps comes closer than any other issue area to demonstrating the imperative of demarcating and anticipating the centre of gravity that binds regional and global dimensions of security tensions in ways that render the levels of analysis problem less relevant to an increasingly threatened world.

The politics of maritime security and energy security are increasingly entwined by an array of economic factors, military concerns and international legal arrangements. Sam Bateman (chapter 13) comes to terms with this integration by presenting extensive analysis of how these components work in tandem to bridge 'Asia-Pacific' and global security politics. Yet he argues at the outset of his analysis that regional interests rather than global issues dominate Asia-Pacific maritime security debates, thereby weakening the nexus between global and regional security concerns. Resistance by regional littoral states to internationalise the security management of the Malacca strait relates directly to concerns about compromising sovereign prerogatives or weakening positions to territorial claims. The assets that are earmarked by maritime littoral states such as Malaysia and Indonesia reflect a distinctively local or regional orientation. It is one, however, that occasionally intersects what Bateman terms 'a classical Mahanian approach' of great power naval forces deploying in the area to extend regional strategic influence, through military exercises, port visits and other means to 'show the flag'. All such activities must be

weighed in the context of unmitigated US naval superiority that prevails throughout the region but which is an extension of American offshore global power projection capabilities.

The international context of the maritime security question is further underscored by strong interest of Northeast Asia's great industrial economies in the 'security of shipping passing through the "choke points" of Southeast Asia, and in the competition for offshore oil and gas resources'. Recent tensions in energy markets have spurred China, India and other regional economies to find diverse methods of ensuring energy supplies, including the reconfiguration of traditional oil routes, the exploitation of new oil fields in distant locales and the accelerated development of alternative energy resources such as natural gas and nuclear power (Asia's oil consumption already surpasses that of the United States) (IISS 2006a: 53–66). Over the next decade, as Bateman notes very appropriately, maritime security regimes may assume a greater role in maritime and energy security management. To do so, however, the United States as the primary Asia-Pacific security actor will need to demonstrate a greater commitment to supporting the viability of these arrangements. Regional naval capabilities could also be increasingly perceived as the best guarantee for sustaining the types of free trade and investment patterns (discussed in chapter 10) that modify international economic rivalries, thus stabilising the world in ways that make widespread international conflict less probable. The security of commercial shipping, of the ports where key refineries are often located, the control of offshore exclusive economic zones, the effects of oil stockpiling and the future viability of maritime security regimes as agents for bridging regional and international approaches to energy security policy all loom as major determinants of impending regional–global security dynamics. The current pattern of reluctance by Asian actors to participate in US-led maritime security initiatives due to sensitivities over issues of sovereignty could render such security even more difficult to achieve in the absence of viable regime politics finessing relevant compromises.

Environmental governance issues, particularly in the areas of climate change and trade in hazardous waste, are now recognised as constituting a major international security challenge. Aynsley Kellow (chapter 14) observes that 'Eurocentric' approaches to confronting these problems have been insufficiently pliable for application to specific Asian environmental security characteristics: the coexistence of wealthy or developed economies with developing ones and the prominent involvement of extra-regional expatriates in key production processes and technologies with less affinity towards how local populations may be affected

by hazardous waste and recycling practices derived for other regions. Kellow employs a case study comparing the emphasis of the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (APP) on building technological approaches to slow emissions growth, and the Kyoto Protocol which has relied on binding commitments to achieve lower emissions ceilings. He concludes that imposed emissions ceilings would never restrain the Asia-Pacific's fastest growing economies (China and Japan) to conform with proscribed Protocol standards. The fundamental incompatibility between economic and development priorities that differentiate Asia and Europe illustrate that 'regional solutions have in fact often proven far more appropriate than an exclusive reliance on global norms and laws, not to mention a weak global civil society that is still in its infancy'.

By contrast, Christian Enemark (chapter 15) investigates the more obvious causal relationships linking regional and global politics to controlling pandemics. The 'framing issue' underlying this challenge, however, is not dissimilar to that which applies to environmental security: the vulnerability of certain state actors to diseases that spill over to become a crisis of global proportions. Developing states regard the world's major pharmaceutical companies more as adversaries than facilitators because of their tendency to charge world market prices for critically needed drugs to stem illnesses among those least capable of paying for them. Nor are there sufficient international financial contributions to ensure that weak states achieve effective disease surveillance and containment. The intersection between the lack of Asia's overall capacity to stem the tide of those many viruses that originate in that region's poorer sectors and a global security interest to ensure that greater regional capacity to do so seems very sharp indeed. National security and securitisation elements also enter into the equation: how can regional governments develop enough consensus amongst their populaces to fund and implement key preventative measures?

The consequences of *not* 'securitising' these issues judiciously and procedurally are becoming ever more evident. The lack of discriminatory criteria for application to *specific* threats of disease has led to a haphazard approach of extending vigilance to all *possible* pandemics. Effective securitisation strategies of prevention may inherently need to start at the local or 'bottom-up' policy levels to preclude knee-jerk reactions at the regional or global levels of action when pandemic crises materialise and quickly become widespread. Enemark argues that in regard to the regional–global nexus, 'the path to security is overwhelmingly through state and non-state actors cooperating to reduce collective vulnerability rather than a competition for power in the international order'.

Conclusion: a new policy agenda?

We are fortunate that Amitav Acharya, a renowned analyst of Asian security politics, has provided a concluding chapter for this volume. Acharya identifies two important concepts as embodying the regional-global security nexus: (1) *transregional security politics* (in an Asia-Pacific context); and (2) *contingent globalism*. Both ideas relate to how localities and regions are instrumental in selectively shaping the global order and both focus on the critical notion that region-centric processes and values are as often balanced against the ongoing evolution of international security politics as they are integrated with it. Without encroaching upon his task of synthesising the basic findings of our chapter contributors, this introduction might logically be brought to a close by offering a brief synthesis summarising the overall discussion and objectives with which these chapters will deal. Readers will find within these chapters analyses of the following:

1. *The need to ascertain how regional security issues are affected by global challenges, threats and norms is critical.*

This is a 'top-down' analytical exercise and emulates the structural approaches of Buzan/Wæver and Ikenberry/Mastanduno. The critical variable here is how great powers located within or proximate to the region under study (that is, Japan, Russia, India and especially China) act on issues without regional boundaries such as nuclear non-proliferation, terrorism and transnational challenges such as the environment, disease and democratic 'global governance'. In the absence of established regional norms and institutional procedures to confront such issues, global level security dynamics are more likely to penetrate and dominate regional outlooks and policies, thereby weakening regional identity and policy cohesion. If this assumption is valid, the arguments forwarded by former Malaysian Prime Minister Mohammad Mahathir (1999) and Singaporean analyst Kishore Mahbubani (1995) promoting 'Asian values' assume a greater resonance. However, China – now undoubtedly the region's most formidable power – appears to be acquiescing to, and increasingly leading, Asia's quest to become a more stable component within a world order. If this trend continues, the prospects for a regional-global *modus vivendi* increase commensurately as regional challenges and norms become increasingly regarded as synonymous with global equivalents.

2. *Determining how global security issues and practices affect Asia-Pacific security politics.*

That both Japan and India are vying for permanent voting status on the UN Security Council speaks volumes about Asian perceptions

that global security politics 'matters' to their region. So too does a sustained and even increasing Asian willingness to contribute to extra-regional military interventions as members of 'coalitions of the willing' (Iraq and Afghanistan are recent examples) and to institutionalise inter-regional dialogues such as ASEM that spill over to assume geopolitical ramifications. Greater policy attention should be directed towards how Asian policy-makers view and how much they support alternative security regimes that would link Asia-Pacific and global security outlooks and behaviour: for example, the prospects of a Chinese regional 'hierarchy' spilling over to shape international geopolitics or the impact of Asian summit or 'security community' politics on the international management of key politico-economic dynamics. Traditional security issues delineated for special attention are cross-comparing the durability of alliance politics and security-institution trends in the Asia-Pacific with those on a more global scale (that is, Asia-Pacific bilateralism versus international multilateral precedents).

3. *Assessing how Asia-Pacific regional politics helps shape international security.*

A growing number of emerging regional security issues in the Asia-Pacific have significant spill-over effects for the world-at-large. Obvious examples include the interrelationship of Jemaah Islamiyah to international terrorism-at-large, the breadth of membership and inclusion of most great powers in both the ARF and APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation). In a more 'traditional' context, the Asia-Pacific is one of the three great sectors of global geopolitical competition (along with Europe and the Middle East) that are becoming increasingly interrelated in the strategic calculations of the US and other great powers. Increasingly, US officials such as the Bush Administration's Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific Christopher Hill have insisted that 'the United States is encouraging the development of multilateral structures for an increased sense of community in Asia, and . . . that European nations could offer useful insights and experience. "[C]ountries in Europe do have a very important role to play in East Asia . . ."' (United States Mission to the European Union 2005). To what extent this development transpires may be a key determinant of how viable future conflict avoidance is in the Asia-Pacific and how much that region will influence overall international security affairs.

4. *Encouraging innovative security solutions for distinctive security: the global-regional nexus.*

Perhaps most importantly, Asian security analysts must work with their international counterparts to determine whether viable

international precedents can be applied to contemporary Asia-Pacific security management. These might include the introduction of regional confidence-building precedents (such as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe); the initiation of conflict avoidance initiatives to regional 'flashpoints'; the transposing of innovative peacekeeping precedents that have worked in southeastern Europe or in parts of the developing world to ARF strategic reassurance practices; the imposition of international law and norms to Asia-Pacific disputes; and the application of both power-balancing and normative-based strategies to those security management challenges that apply equally to regional and global stability such as nuclear non-proliferation or arms control. If successfully implemented, these 'multiple pathways' or 'pillars of stability' could assist in overcoming the incessant dilemma of 'choosing' between 'top-down' and 'bottom-up' approaches for dealing with the regional-global security nexus.

Part I