CHAPTER 24

SOUTHEAST ASIA’S EVOLVING SECURITY RELATIONS AND STRATEGIES

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As a collection of small and medium-sized states that gained independence in a relatively peripheral part of the world after the Second World War, Southeast Asia suffers the twin postcolonial curse of weak and divided societies and gross power asymmetries, creating both internal and external strategic insecurities. In examining the foreign security relations and policies of Southeast Asian states, this chapter is divided into four sections, beginning with brief surveys of regional security focuses during the Cold War, and the key strategic challenges posed by the end of the global superpower conflict. In analyzing Southeast Asian responses to these challenges, the third section shows that, over the past quarter-century, the focus of Southeast Asian foreign security priorities has shifted from ensuring regime security and coping with intramural conflicts associated with postcolonial state formation, toward managing the multiple uncertainties wrought by wider structural transitions in the region and the world. This has entailed innovation in terms of renovating and expanding security concepts to include notions of cooperative and “nontraditional” security respectively, as well as in developing pragmatically novel strategies vis-à-vis great powers—developments in which Southeast Asia has led the international relations field both in theory and in practice. In substance, the international relations of Southeast Asia over this period are characterized by a remarkable degree of cumulative experience in interstate and intersector cooperation, including the creation of multiple regional security institutions with increasingly ambitious remits, and growing attempts at regional management of interstate conflicts. This chapter argues that the imperative for most Southeast Asian states—acting out, and out of, their collective ASEAN identity and role—has changed from insulating the subregion from the security dynamics of the wider East Asian context, to integrating and ensuring its relevance and place within a wider Asia-Pacific security complex that is in rapid
transition. In effect, this has led, as one would expect, to bouts of infighting among ten states that have varying strategic interests. More importantly, Southeast Asian security strategies may be neither sustainable in their judicious aims of enmeshing the great powers nor adequate in their ambitious goal of brokering a stable new East Asian order. The final section concludes with recommendations for areas of further research necessary to a more complete understanding of Southeast Asian insecurity and foreign security policies.

### 24.1. Southeast Asian Security during the Cold War

As in other decolonizing world regions, the ideological and often violent independence struggles in Southeast Asia were messily intertwined with the global Cold War. But this region contains stark extremes of how peripheral states were affected by and responded to these structural conditions. On the one hand, Southeast Asia is home to the bloodiest hot war of the Cold War. That ideological conflict and civil war made potent partners was epitomized in the Vietnam War and the Indochinese conflict more generally. These wars were exacerbated and prolonged by the close links between the ethnic Chinese diaspora and mainland China, American support of authoritarian regimes, the direct intervention of these external powers, and their exploitation by civil war factions. On the other hand, Southeast Asia also spawned the leading example of postcolonial states choosing to manage complex domestic and regional transitions by flocking together rather than falling apart. In 1967, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was created by Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, and Thailand to overcome the low-grade war among the first three states that resulted from territorial and political disputes after the creation of the Malaysian Federation. In the subsequent decade, ASEAN played an important role in non-Communist Southeast Asia’s management of the uncertainties of the US defeat and Vietnam’s unification under a Communist northern government, and Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia.

Considerable literature exists on the Indochinese wars, and on the foreign relations and security policies of individual Southeast Asian states, but the international relations literature devoted to Southeast Asia during this earlier period is relatively small, and focused on the interactions between domestic, regional, and global security imperatives, and explaining non-Communist Southeast Asia’s choice of an institutionally light but politically ambitious regime as their mode of managing these security challenges. Because ASEAN lent an easy collective frame to the subregion, the Communist states were overlooked to an extent, limiting a number of these studies to only half of Southeast Asia. The literature is split between realist and constructivist accounts—liberal or institutionalist theories being of limited relevance due to the
paucity of economic interdependence, formalized institutional structures and practices, and liberal ideologies during this period in ASEAN’s history (see Simon 1995; Peou 2002).

The constructivist accounts tend to focus tightly upon ASEAN and the collective and discursive material therein, while realist accounts pay wider attention to national security motivations and interactions within non-Communist Southeast Asia. This renders the realist accounts more conflict- and power-prone. The foundational work on international relations and security in Southeast Asia was laid by Michael Leifer, who worked from a classical realist tradition influenced by the intuitive acknowledgment of the social dimensions of international order associated with the English School (see Liow and Emmers 2006; see also chapter by Buzan in this volume). For Leifer (1973, 1989), the formation of ASEAN was the institutional manifestation of reconciliation between Indonesia and Malaysia, but it was also motivated by strong power-political concerns. For instance, ASEAN’s foundational emphasis on regional autonomy and the region being free of external influence reflected Indonesia’s insistence on its status as first among equals and thus the de facto manager of regional affairs. Subsequent ASEAN norms such as the relatively banal Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN), established in 1971, served further to entrench Indonesian preferences over that of Malaysia, which had wanted neutrality to be guaranteed formally by external powers. Further, the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) spelled out norms of regional interaction that rang hollow when ASEAN could not respond meaningfully to aggression on its doorstep or the invasion of Cambodia by Vietnam in 1978.1 Emmers (2003) reinforces the realist account by his emphasis on how ASEAN’s diplomatic strategies were dependent upon crucial power-constraining behavior, either in the form of self-restraint by Indonesia at the formation of ASEAN, or by China being willing to contain Vietnam militarily while ASEAN led the diplomatic campaign to overturn its invasion of Cambodia.

Constructivist accounts do not necessarily dispute realist ones, but rather highlight and place more weight upon the community-building, identity-creating aspects of the ASEAN enterprise. These accounts comprise a belief in deeper social and identity change, most marked in Acharya’s (2001) acceptance of the critical importance of ASEAN norms in forging a “nascent security community” in Southeast Asia. He emphasizes, for instance, ASEAN’s international diplomatic campaign against Vietnam post-1979 based on the power of these norms. The processes of social change are most comprehensively analyzed in Ba’s (2009) study of how ASEAN, driven by the contradictory drive to seek security through regional unity in spite of internal and intra-regional divisions, has had repeatedly to renegotiate consensus bargains or compromises about its identity and interests. She places more emphasis, for example, on the process of negotiation that created the consensus on ZOPFAN and the subsequent constraining effects of this consensus, rather than on the fact that Indonesia ultimately prevailed over Malaysian preferences.
24.2. Strategic Challenges at the End of the Cold War

Strategic shifts over the past quarter-century forced a significant expansion of the scope and domain of Southeast Asian foreign security relations and policies. Since the 1990s, investigations of the subregion’s international relations have become more meaningful because of the integration of Indochina and Myanmar into ASEAN, but also more ambiguous with the attempted export of the “ASEAN Way” to the broader East Asia. The winding down of the Cold War posed three key strategic challenges for Southeast Asian states.

First, the withdrawal of Soviet support for Vietnam forced the latter to end its occupation of Cambodia. The end of the Indochina conflict not only allowed Cambodia to embark on the fraught path to nation-rebuilding, but more generally freed the Communist Southeast Asian states to step onto the regional stage as they sought rapprochement with—and support for reconstruction from—their neighbors. The ASEAN states broadly set out to rehabilitate the Communist countries through accession into the developmental state model and into regionalism. As ASEAN expanded in the 1990s, the challenge was how to integrate the three Indochinese countries, along with Myanmar and its controversial junta regime, into the regional community without jeopardizing ASEAN’s consensus bargain and strategic relevance.

Second, the Soviet withdrawal from Southeast Asia and the triumph of China-ASEAN joint pressure in resolving the Indochina conflicts lent weight to China’s strategic role in the region. A decade into Deng Xiaoping’s reforms, in the late 1980s regional focus had already turned to the brisk rates of growth in China’s economy. However, the settlement of the Indochina conflict also removed the de facto alignment between China and ASEAN, fueling old suspicions about China’s ideological and material influence in mainland Southeast Asia. The imperative of finding new ways to manage a rising China, to harness its economic benefits while constraining the downsides of its growing power, would become more acute over time.

Third, as the Soviet Union imploded and the global Cold War ended, the raison d’être for US forward deployment in Southeast Asia appeared to evaporate completely. This was brought home sharply when Manila, after decades of supporting the anachronistic US presence in spite of ASEAN’s rhetoric about regional autonomy, ejected US forces from air and naval bases in the Philippines in 1991. Rather than fueling a wider ASEAN drive toward substantive security autonomy, however, this brought to a head deep-seated worries about a potential US withdrawal from Southeast Asia and the resulting unstable power vacuum. Essentially, many ASEAN states—particularly Singapore, Indonesia, and Malaysia—evinced a belief in the ability of the United States to provide hegemonic stability in the region, strengthened by their caution in regard to China’s growing power and influence. Thus, Southeast Asia’s chief strategic imperative
in the decade following the Cold War’s end was to keep the United States involved in regional security while resisting its potential neoimperialist tendencies. This translated into an urgent search for new ways of justifying its continued role, and renewed ascription to US global strategic priorities.

**24.3. Southeast Asian Responses**

Southeast Asian responses to the three major challenges at the end of the Cold War took the form of intramural strengthening and external management of great powers. At both these levels, Southeast Asian states demonstrated greater strategic thinking and activism than is usually attributed to small states in international relations; they exhibited significant conceptual innovation and pragmatic adaptation, and carved a central role for ASEAN in the changing East Asian order more broadly. In interpreting and explaining these trends, the literature on post–Cold War Southeast Asian foreign and security policies correspondingly developed a strong institutionalist turn. Furthermore, key studies have contributed to wider IR theory development by deepening constructivist analysis of social and normative processes within ASEAN-led regional institutions, and by introducing innovative conceptual models that transcend the stark neorealist versus neoliberal divide. Yet these achievements have been accompanied by contradictions and limitations that increasingly point to serious inadequacies in Southeast Asian regional security strategies.

**24.3.1. Institutions**

The political and economic landscape of Southeast Asia over the past quarter-century has been dominated by cooperative endeavors and the proliferation of multilateral institutions (see also Ba in this volume). ASEAN became central in managing both intra–Southeast Asian transitions and external relations with great powers. Within the subregion, the founding ASEAN belief in achieving regional security through regional resilience—understood as forging regional unity to forestall external intervention and ensure autonomy—was expanded to realize Southeast Asian integration. Given the shaky domestic political transitions (including the consolidation of a military junta in Burma in 1990 and a coup in Cambodia in 1997); deep intraregional antagonisms (particularly in Vietnam’s relations with Cambodia and China); and worries about China’s growing political influence in mainland Southeast Asia, the non-Communist states hoped to close ranks with their neighbors and to offer the latter an alternative path to security based on collective resilience (Ba 2009, 105).

However, while a pan–Southeast Asian ASEAN might have been thought likely to bring collective leverage, preempt Chinese hegemony and boost the region’s international influence, expansion also posed challenges to the ASEAN norms of
noninterference in domestic affairs, as well as the nonuse of force and autonomy. This was seen in the controversies over the proposals by Thailand and Malaysia for more intrusive “constructive engagement” and “flexible engagement” in relation to the domestic upheavals in Burma and Cambodia, and in response to exacerbated tensions over “Asian values” in ASEAN’s relations with the West (Acharya 2001).

Southeast Asia’s institutional expansion also involved a wider regionalization of the ASEAN Way through the construction of Asian-Pacific and East Asian multilateral institutions modeled on the Association’s diplomatic style, with TAC as the defining norm and ASEAN in the “driver’s seat.” The pathbreaking ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was established in 1994 as the first Asia-Pacific multilateral institution with a security remit encompassing all the major powers with a stake in the region’s security.3 ASEAN played a critical role in shaping this security forum so that it would be acceptable to its own members and, more importantly, to the three regional great powers, the United States, China, and Japan.4 The Association managed to capture the new security institution-building process because of its preexisting structures for multilateral dialog: in the early 1990s, multiple proposals for new regional security arrangements to supplement the core San Francisco system of US alliances ended up being channeled through ASEAN’s annual Post-Ministerial Conferences, which already engaged some of the regional great powers as dialog partners or observers. Here, the network of Southeast Asian think tanks associated with ASEAN led in adapting the concept of “cooperative security”—derived from the European OSCE model of bringing old adversaries together to cooperate on shared security concerns through dialogue and confidence-building—for the Asia-Pacific (Dewitt 1994; Acharya 2004).

The establishment of the ARF represented the triumph of ASEAN-style institutionalism in East Asia. But this was neither a simple case of scaling-up an existing institution, nor of extrapolating ASEAN norms. Ba’s (2009) account is especially useful in highlighting the radical departures ASEAN had to make from its original, hard-won norms against intraregional military or security consultations and against extraregional multilateral security relations, both regarded as violating the principles of noninterference and regional autonomy. ASEAN gave up these objections, but in return insisted on maintaining leadership and using its own political priorities and diplomatic process to shape the nature of the ARF. Thus ARF members endorsed ASEAN’s TAC as a “code of conduct.” Cooperative security in the ARF context also emphasized inclusivity and informality, which implied equality and prevented agenda-hogging by the Western states; a loose dialogue format and nonintrusive voluntary-compliance processes, which assuaged Asian concerns about potentially legalistic negotiations over sensitive issues such as arms control and internal affairs such as human rights, democratization, and territorial claims; and complementarity with existing US alliances (Almonte 1997–98). Further, the innovation of being led by small states that had a “counter-realpolitik” agenda (Johnston 2003, 123) would preclude domination by any one great power. Of particular note here is the way in which Southeast Asian concerns about nontraditional trans-boundary and nonmilitary security issues—including infectious diseases, piracy, trafficking, money laundering, and terrorism—have come
to form the core of regional security cooperation in the ARF and other ASEAN institutions (Acharya and Goh 2007; Caballero-Anthony, Emmers, and Acharya 2006). This widening of the concept of security provides for less strategically demanding cooperation through functional collaboration, but excludes the military alliances and grand strategic consultations and coordination traditionally associated with great powers.

ASEAN’s ability to bring together all the relevant great powers in the ARF was no mean feat considering the initial opposition or reservations in Washington, Beijing, and Tokyo concerning an inclusive regional security dialogue. During this transition to a post–Cold War world order, the Southeast Asian states also helped to establish an extensive definition of the Asia-Pacific region by attaching South Asia—via India and Pakistan—to this framework and by recognizing Russia’s membership. The importance of such an inclusive forum was twofold: first, it helped to legitimize the security interests and role of each of these great powers in East Asia; and second, it also institutionalized the small states’ and middle powers’ claims to a legitimate voice and political relevance in the management of regional security affairs. That ASEAN went on to develop further its bilateral ASEAN+ dialogs with each great power, and then to create additional ASEAN-centered regional institutions—the ASEAN+3, the East Asia Summit, and the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting+—testifies to what Eaton and Stubbs (2006) called its “competence power,” its ability cohesively and normatively to shape and frame regional perceptions and approaches to security cooperation in ways beneficial to itself. This is manifested in the logistics, functions, and norms of the resulting institutions, which meet in Southeast Asia in conjunction with ASEAN’s own summit, have their agendas set by the ASEAN chair, and—in the case of the EAS—have their criteria of membership determined by accession to TAC, formal recognition as an ASEAN dialogue partner, and unanimous acceptance by ASEAN. This driver’s seat grants ASEAN structural power because these large regional institutions are difficult to “reprogram”: subsequent regionalist developments must adapt to, or be grafted onto, these ASEAN-led institutions already entrenched at the heart of the strategic landscape (Emmerson 2010).

Whether these regional institutions have indeed moved toward a regional security community, or are merely talk shops playing into the hands of great power interests, is subject to acrimonious debate reflecting differing theoretical positions. Judging the transformative potential of these institutions is difficult for a number of reasons: many of the key “hard” cases of regional security conflicts are not dealt with through these institutions; member states do not treat these institutions as channels of first resort in preventing or resolving conflicts, but instead rely on bilateral and other avenues; and claims of socialization are difficult to test given questions of who is socializing whom (Acharya and Goh 2007; Ba 2006). Attempts to prove or disprove liberal institutional and constructivist theories continue, therefore, to encounter active criticism from realists unconvinced by process for process’s sake (e.g., Jones and Smith 2007). Moreover, as the next section suggests, these cooperative security institutions should not be analyzed in isolation, but in relation to the more realist-oriented security strategies that regional states obviously pursue at the same time.
24.3.2. Innovation

The foregoing section highlighted how the central institutional path to order for Southeast Asia developed on the back of adaptation and innovation in security concepts. Early debates about the ARF already ventured beyond simplistic applications of IR theories—particularly the dichotomy of realist balancing versus liberal institutionalism. For instance, in responding to Leifer’s (1996) assertion that a stable balance of power was a prerequisite for successful regional security institutions, Khong (1997, 296) countered that these institutions could critically help in “defusing the conflictual by-products of power balancing practices” at a juncture where regional states were still trying to forge a stable balance of power. Indeed, scholarly analysis and policy practice of Southeast Asian foreign and security policies since have been characterized by disregard for the rigid categorizations of—especially mainstream US—IR theory. Within key IR debates, these innovations are best captured in studies of Southeast Asia’s management of the great powers to achieve regional stability, which has revolved around the question of whether Southeast Asian states are balancing against or accommodating—even bandwagoning with—China (e.g., Roy 2005; Acharya 1999).

Southeast Asian regional security strategies within the wider Asia-Pacific are characterized by antihegemony. Arising from the small state’s desire to maximize the limited autonomy that it might expect in the international system, this is an extension of ASEAN’s principle of preventing intramural hegemony (Ciocciari 2010). These states hardheaded acknowledge that they cannot avoid the ambit of major powers, but they resist falling into the exclusive sphere of influence of any one great power. This translates into a strong inclination for strategic diversification of dependence—especially in economic and political terms—on the United States, Japan, China, and increasingly, India. But there exists a spectrum of strategic positions, particularly vis-à-vis the relative roles of the United States and China. At one end are the Philippines and Singapore, which engage with China, but place greater faith in their strategic ties with the United States. Indonesia and Malaysia, however, steer a middle course because of geographical distance from China, and domestic political constraints on pursuing closer overt strategic ties with the United States. At the other end are the continental Southeast Asian countries whose security strategies are most constrained by China for historical, geographical, and ideological reasons (see Goh 2005a; Ross 2006). Yet the reformist Myanmar military regime’s decision in 2012 to accelerate reforms and seek normal relations with key states beyond Asia suggests that even the most intransigent of this last group seeks diversification for reasons of national security.

In dealing with China, most analysts of Southeast Asia concur that the region has adopted a twin hedging strategy of deep engagement accompanied by soft or indirect balancing against potential Chinese aggression or disruption of the status quo. Balancing includes national military acquisitions and modernization, but also involves attempts to keep the United States involved in the region as a counterweight to Chinese power (Khong 2004). Hedging refers to taking action to ensure against undesirable outcomes, usually by betting on multiple alternative positions. It allows Southeast
Asian states to cultivate a middle position that forestalls or avoids having to choose one side at the obvious expense of another (Manning and Przystup 1999; Goh 2005b).

Indeed, such strategies of limited alignment—or limited exposure—are common to most developing states anxious to sidestep costly and risky alternatives like balancing, bandwagoning, or neutrality (Ciorciari 2010). It is more accurate, however, to read Southeast Asian great power policies as hedging against three undesirable outcomes: Chinese domination or hegemony; American withdrawal from the region; and an unstable regional order. Engagement and balancing are intimately intertwined elements, not just alternative or complementary tools, of this sophisticated multiple hedging strategy.

Underlying Southeast Asia’s approach to China is deep engagement on the political and economic fronts, with ASEAN taking the lead in inviting China to become a “consultative partner” in 1991, developing dialogue on political, scientific, technological, economic, and nontraditional security issues, and enmeshing Beijing in regional institutions. The expectation is that sustained interaction will persuade Chinese leaders of the utility of abiding by international rules and norms, so as to reintegrate China peacefully into the regional and international order as a responsible great power.8 ASEAN states were key proponents of the position that there remained time to socialize China as it rose, and that engagement was preferable to the alternative of self-fulfilling prophecies if China were treated as an enemy. Motivated by geography—Southeast Asian states would always have to live in the shadow of China—but also by the region’s strategic history and cultural memory of the stable Sino-centric regional hierarchy prior to Western imperialism, these arguments militate against strategies that overtly seek to contain China (Kang 2003).

In the 1990s, as Beijing sought to rehabilitate its international reputation after the Tiananmen killings, the ARF especially became a premier demonstration precinct for China to showcase its new sociability and to reassure its neighbors regarding its benign intentions and commitment to a “peaceful rise” (Foot 1998; Johnston 2008; Zheng 2005). Beijing complied with the ARF norm of issuing defense white papers, hosted ARF meetings, and used the ARF to introduce its “new security concept” stressing peaceful coexistence and cooperative security. Along with its initiative for a China-ASEAN free trade area, and participation in multilateral negotiations with ASEAN leading to the 2002 Declaration of Conduct regarding the South China Sea territorial disputes, these all suggested that China was choosing to become socially and morally bound to peaceful modes of interaction (Goh 2007; Shambaugh 2004–5).

Southeast Asian engagement of China is distinctive for the way in which it is embedded within the “omni-enmeshment” of multiple great powers with a stake in East Asian security (Goh 2007–8). As observed above, ASEAN’s enmeshment efforts are aimed not only at China, but also at the United States, Japan, India, and Russia. This makes their aim of great power socialization at once exceedingly ambitious, but also intertwined with balance of power logic and politics. Southeast Asia’s omni-enmeshment of great powers within overlapping regional institutions is a key factor in its balancing strategies, not an alternative to them. By enfolding China into
a web of multilateral cooperation frameworks that also involve other major powers, Southeast Asian states ensure mutual compliance by these great powers’ greater ability to monitor and deter each other. At the same time, great powers can use these institutions as political arenas for containing, constraining, diluting, or blocking each other’s power. For instance, China’s preference for ASEAN+3 versus Japan’s promotion of the EAS is often seen as a prime example of balance of power by other means. Furthermore, in spite of the relatively lower value and profile of their economic and security involvement in Southeast and East Asia, India’s and Russia’s inclusion in the ARF and EAS helps to dilute Chinese influence within these institutions. More constructively, omni-enmeshment also helps to channel great power competition in normative ways within the constraints of institutions. For example, over the last two decades, Beijing’s willingness to stake a large part of its regional legitimacy as a great power on its relationship with Southeast Asia has increased the pressure on Washington to pay more attention to legitimizing its perceived central role in regional security. Thus, the Obama administration was persuaded to sign up to ASEAN’s TAC in 2010, for instance, in order to be included in the EAS alongside China, Japan, and India.

Yet Southeast Asian enmeshment and constrainment of China hinges upon continued US security dominance in the Asia-Pacific, since this is believed to be the most critical element in persuading Beijing that any aggressive action would be too costly and unlikely to succeed. As the Cold War was winding down, in spite of being relatively peripheral “spokes” in the San Francisco system of US alliances in the Asia-Pacific, Southeast Asian states were front runners in facilitating a continued US forward presence and deterrence in the region. In place of the permanent bases in the Philippines, other countries, especially Singapore, provided facilities for maintenance, repair, and the relocation of supporting infrastructure for the Seventh Fleet (see chapter by Cha in this volume). By 1992, worsening US-Japan trade conflicts, Japan’s constitutional revision to allow the overseas deployment of peacekeepers, and the passage of a law in China making extensive claims to the South China Sea all prompted additional access agreements, as well as every ASEAN leader’s public support for the United States to maintain its security role in the region.

Indeed, during this period, ASEAN’s choice of a wide Asia-Pacific membership for the ARF—rather than a membership more geographically limited to East Asia—centered on the need to “keep the United States in.” Faced with the acute uncertainty of continued US security commitments, ASEAN states’ reaction was to reinforce their security binding of the United States using a wide variety of means, including multilateral institutions. This desire to hedge against strategic uncertainty by extending and bolstering one great power’s overwhelming military preponderance required justification, and the ARF crucially helped to lend legitimacy to ASEAN’s desire for the United States’ preponderant role in regional security. As the Singapore prime minister stated: through the ARF, ASEAN had “changed the political context of US engagement” because these countries had “exercised their sovereign prerogative to invite the US to join them in discussing the affairs of Southeast Asia.” As a result, “no one can
argue that the US presence in Southeast Asia is illegitimate or an intrusion into the region” (Goh 2001).

George W. Bush’s “Global War On Terror” (GWOT) in the wake of the terrorist attacks in the United States in September 2001 provided Southeast Asia with opportunities to prove their strategic relevance and entrench security ties with the United States. ASEAN adopted various declarations, enhanced regional cooperation in intelligence-sharing and coordinating antiterrorism laws, and established a regional antiterrorism training center with US funding. The ARF adopted an agenda for implementing UN antiterrorist measures, including measures to block terrorist financing. US alliances with the Philippines and Thailand were revitalized as both were designated “major non-NATO ally” status. In the Philippines, where the decision to terminate the military bases agreement with the United States had been deeply regretted after tensions with China flared in 1995 over territorial disputes in the South China Sea, American combat forces were deployed to support Filipino troops in fighting against Abu Sayyaf insurgents in Mindanao, and a Joint Defense Agreement now gives the United States a long-term advisory role in the modernization of the Philippines Armed Forces. After the 2002 terrorist bombing in Bali established Southeast Asia as the “second front” in the GWOT, Indonesia assumed new importance as the largest Muslim nation in the region, and Washington restored in 2005 military-to-military relations, which had been suspended since 1991 (Foot 2004). In the same year, Washington signed with Singapore a new Strategic Framework Agreement, which expanded bilateral cooperation in counterterrorism, counter-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, joint military exercises and training, policy dialogues, and defense technology. The security agreements with Singapore and the Philippines especially have outlasted the peak of the GWOT, providing the bases for littoral combat ships and increased equipment transfer under the Obama administration’s military refocus on Asia from 2011.

Southeast Asian strategic policy toward the United States may be summed up as the facilitation of continued US military dominance in the Asia-Pacific. In this regard, the “balance of power” rhetoric is misleading, because Southeast Asian security policies seek to sustain US preponderance, not to facilitate an even distribution of power in the region. I have argued that these policies also point to a more pervasive goal than just countervailing growing Chinese power, since Southeast Asian states are attempting to integrate China into the regional order while simultaneously seeking to ensure that this order remains US-led. At critical junctures, other key East Asian states—particularly Japan but also South Korea—have consistently opted to support the continuation of the preponderant US military presence. For its part, China has criticized and tried to resist US strategic relationships and agenda in the region, including US military ties with Southeast Asia, but has not yet directly opposed or tried to supplant US leadership (Goh 2013). This reading suggests in turn an alternative conception of East Asia moving toward a multilayered hierarchical order topped by the United States as global superpower but with China as the leading regional great power and other regional powers falling in ranks below them (Goh 2008; Clark 2011, ch. 9). In other words, many
regional states go beyond the demands of diversifying dependencies in supporting US
preponderance or even hegemony. Indeed, the key to understanding contemporary
Southeast Asian regional security policies may lie in answering the fundamental ques-
tion of why so much of the subregion is pro–United States in spite of its clearly mixed
record of managing but also inciting and exacerbating conflicts and instability in East
Asia. (e.g., Acharya and Tan 2006). Some obvious realist/liberal/constructivist answers
can be conjured, but most convincing is Hamilton-Hart’s (2012) argument that US
support has served the interests of ruling regimes well, especially those of the “old
ASEAN” states, and that epistemic communities defined by state-sanctioned historical
narratives and groupthink within the professional policy elites in these countries have
subsequently helped to perpetuate the pro-US bias.

24.3.3. Inadequacies

Southeast Asian responses to post–Cold War security challenges have been adaptive
and innovative, and have often been portrayed as more collective and coherent than
might reasonably be expected of this diverse group of states. Yet there are limitations
to the ASEAN practice of intramural resilience, and contradictions in the subregion’s
strategy of managing great powers that expose significant inadequacies in Southeast
Asia’s ambitions to shape and drive the developing regional security architecture.

In spite of the Southeast Asian enthusiasm for expanding the scope of security coop-
eration into nontraditional issues, important security issues at the subnational and
transregional levels remain outside the regional conceptual and policy frameworks,
which focus overwhelmingly on threats to the state identified on the basis of securi-
tization decisions made by state actors. The myriad communal conflicts, secessionist
movements, and other manifestations of weak or failing state policies and structures
tend to be addressed on the foreign security policy agenda only if they can be linked
to nonstate terrorism, piracy, or some other agreed “non-traditional” security issue.
Threats to the security of individuals or communities posed by state-perpetrated or
sanctioned political violence also tend to be “black-boxed” in continuation of the
ASEAN association of regional resilience with noninterference, in spite of their
impact upon national and regional stability. These issues have been most prominent in
Indonesia’s transition to democracy (e.g., Columbijn and Lindblad 2002; Sidel 2005),
but Myanmar’s political liberalization in 2012 was also immediately destabilized by
the eruption of sectarian violence between Muslims and Buddhists in the northwest
region bordering Bangladesh.

At the subregional level, Southeast Asian states have not been able to overcome dis-
agreement, conflict, and disunity over key security issues and policies. Recognizing
that its driver role in regional security depends upon its internal coherence, over the last
decade ASEAN has sought to regenerate intramural unity by renegotiating a new basis
for collective identity. Begun in 2003, the process of building an ASEAN Community
with economic, security and sociocultural pillars encapsulates this rethinking
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(Severino 2006). However, the ASEAN Charter, agreed in 2007 as the Association’s first legal framework, reflects the prevailing tensions between member states that want to develop more liberal norms of democratization, human rights, and the rule of law on the one hand, and others that prevailed in the defense of ASEAN’s traditional privileging of sovereignty and noninterference (Nesadurai 2009).

Continual disagreements also persist concerning the relative salience of intramural versus extraregional matters. While there is agreement that ASEAN can no longer afford simply to concentrate on the Southeast Asian region, but must attend more broadly to East Asian and Asia-Pacific security issues, the unfinished task of internal consolidation will act as an important constraint on ASEAN’s ability to drive the remaking of East Asian order by mediating between the great powers. This is clear from the way in which Southeast Asian inclinations about just how and how much the region should lean toward the United States and China respectively are scattered across the spectrum of hedging positions. For instance, in creating the EAS, some ASEAN members, such as Malaysia—along with China—wished to limit membership strictly to East Asian states, while Japan, Singapore, and Indonesia eventually prevailed in their insistence on including India, Australia, and New Zealand. Centered on the inclusion of the United States, this disagreement over inclusive or exclusive regionalism flagged how China’s growing influence in Southeast Asia has exacerbated traditional divides. Moreover, since 2009, China’s increasingly assertive stance in its maritime claims, including in the South China Sea, plus the Obama administration’s “pivot” to Asia, have added pressure on these fault lines. In 2012, even as the Philippines’ leadership took the opportunity to rattle its saber by hailing US alliance support and gearing up its antagonistic rhetoric in regard to its disputed claims against China in the South China Sea, ASEAN failed to agree on a joint statement during its summit because Cambodia as chair was reluctant to put pressure on China regarding its conduct in the South China Sea. Indonesian leaders stepped in to warn Manila against jeopardizing the subregion’s hedging strategy and to cobble together a post hoc ASEAN statement. These developments took place in the context of key maritime states—Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Vietnam—steadily raising military spending and arms acquisitions over the last decade, fueling speculation about a nascent arms race in the region in reaction to China’s growing assertiveness (Bitzinger 2010; Economist 2012).

As one reviewer observed, this leaves an “uncomfortably wide” disjuncture between the relatively cozy institutionalist accounts of Southeast Asian security and studies of the defense policies of ASEAN members (Hamilton-Hart 2009, 60).

In the wider Asia-Pacific and East Asian context, there is a parallel widening gulf between institutionalist claims for ASEAN’s role in creating a new regional security architecture (see Taylor and Tow 2010), and the evidence of clear limits in Southeast Asian abilities to broker the great power bargain that must underpin a wider regional order. The optimistic view is that ASEAN has helped to create overlapping institutions, which help to mute the security dilemma by offering great powers multiple opportunities to cooperate with different groups of states without generating zero-sum games (Cha 2011). But the more profound task of creating regional order requires great power
relations to be regulated in terms of institutionalized mutual understandings about constraints, rules of conduct, and conflict management. The Southeast Asian claim to mediating great power peace centers on the determination not to take sides among the great powers, but rather to facilitate their dialogue. In spite of constructivist arguments that this would in time shift state interests and create mutual identification, the ASEAN-centered channels do not yet appear to have helped substantively in negotiating mutual constraints and a modus vivendi among the great powers.

The ASEAN style of multilateral institutionalism brought the United States, China, and other major powers to the table because they were reassured that membership in the ARF would be a relatively nondemanding, low-cost, and low-stakes undertaking (Goh 2004). In spite of their rhetorical ascriptions to TAC, the informal character of the ARF assured the United States and China especially that they would not have to be bound by formal agreements; consensual decision-making procedures meant that they could prevent discussion or action on issues against their interest; and the lack of any enforcement mechanism essentially left them with a free hand to pursue unilateral policies when necessary. For instance, Beijing has not felt itself constrained by ARF norms in maritime confrontations with the Philippines, Vietnam, and the United States in the South China Sea; and neither China nor the United States adhered to the noncoercive spirit of TAC during the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis.

Moreover, ASEAN has provided the great powers with a minimalist normative position from which to resist the more difficult processes of negotiating key strategic norms. Notably, while the ASEAN Way was critical in socializing China, it has also institutionalized the means by which China can stall and forestall the development of other norms that would entail more sustained restraint, transparency, and scrutiny. China has lent its considerable weight to the more conservative Southeast Asian states’ wariness about the introduction of potentially intrusive norms, and has successfully hampered progress toward preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution in the ARF, against the efforts of the United States, Australia, and Canada. Beijing also further entrenched ASEAN’s nonintervention principle by ruling out any discussion within these institutions of Taiwan and what it regarded as domestic Chinese security affairs, such as Tibet and Xinjiang. China has also exploited ASEAN’s conflict avoidance norm to resist addressing the South China Sea dispute within these multilateral institutions. ASEAN’s style generated the nonbinding 2002 Declaration of Conduct, which was loose enough to allow China to continue to pursue bilateral actions such as the controversial joint exploration agreement with the Philippines in 2004, and over the next decade to oppose ASEAN’s attempts to negotiate multilaterally on the Code of Conduct.

At the same time, ASEAN’s model of “comfortable” regionalism allows the great powers to treat regional institutions as instruments of so-called “soft” balancing, more than as sites for institutionalizing regional rules of the game that would contribute to a sustainable modus vivendi among the great powers. This could channel great power balancing behavior into a stagnant pool of nonmilitary, but still deeply political and ultimately nonproductive, blocking maneuvers. Witness, for instance, the coexistence
of the EAS alongside the ARF: two regional groupings with overlapping mandates for cooperation in finance, energy, education, disease, and natural disaster management. Paradoxically, such institutional malaise may be related to ASEAN’s imperative of maintaining its relevance in the rapidly changing Asia-Pacific strategic landscape. The fear of being sidelined in regional affairs on the basis of capacity suggests that ASEAN states would logically prefer the perpetuation of some distance among the great powers, to the extent that they would find it difficult to conduct independent dialogue or create a concert to the exclusion of smaller states and entities. As such, ASEAN’s role is limited in—and limiting of—the great power bargain that must underpin the negotiation of the new regional order. This is a task that the regional great powers must themselves undertake. In particular, the Association possesses very limited ability to transform the nature of the vital triangular relationship among the United States, China, and Japan, which has been subject to an intensifying security dilemma in the post–Cold War period due to changes in relative power distribution and, more importantly, due to the dissolution of the de facto strategic bargains that had kept US-China and China-Japan rivalries in check during the Cold War (see Goh 2011).

24.4. CONCLUSION

Central to Southeast Asia’s hard-won collective security ideology are the twin principles of resilience and antihegemony. In terms of the region’s international relations, these translate into managing diversity and divergence by cleaving to a political agreement to put aside conflicts while seeking common interests, to avoid interference in domestic affairs, and to diversify external dependencies while negotiating consensual boundaries for the forms of external alignments. This endless pursuit of unity in diversity produces contradictory dynamics because the drive to flock together is political and ideological and often precedes concrete coincidence of interests, but assumes that these will follow. Therefore, while ASEAN endeavors generate the most ambitious of institutionalist and constructivist aspirations for restraining and transforming states, at the same time they create minimalist normative bargains that remain vulnerable to the worst constraints of power politics, internal and external. What this amounts to is a promising research field still rich with avenues of future enquiry, as pressures build for further political reform and transformation within Southeast Asia, and as the wider regional order is renegotiated to accommodate China’s rise and US hierarchical power.

Three areas provide particular promise for future research that might help to breach existing gaps and to develop the field conceptually and empirically. First is the need to address the partial nature of the existing literature by reaching beyond the state-centric focus, as is the intended focus in Part V of this volume. International relations scholars could undertake research that would specify nationally and comparatively across the subregion other pressing security issues at the subnational and transboundary levels, as well as state-sanctioned political violence, which are specifically excluded from the
regional agenda. The aim would be to examine interrelations between the causes, management, and nature of these threats and subregional security concepts and practice, in order to achieve a more coherent picture of Southeast Asian security.

Second, the persistent challenge of managing intramural diversity and conflicts within ASEAN merits more empirical attention and theoretical development. Power politics undoubtedly provide the vital broad-brush strokes for explaining many Southeast Asian security policies, but much of the finer-grained analysis needs to be drawn from approaches that incorporate social and normative elements. As discussed here, various scholars have begun this work, but there remains significant room for developing the connections between regime security and regional security, fleshing out the impacts of variations in political ideology, and drawing on different stages of socialization and dynamics of learning. There is also potential for comparative work involving other postcolonial fragmented regions coping with the legacies of and the transitions after the Cold War.

Finally, Southeast Asia’s foreign and security policies are now inextricably entwined with the evolution of the wider regional order in East Asia and the Asia-Pacific. The end of the Cold War exposed the inadequacies of ASEAN’s attempt to construct an anarchical Southeast Asian society based on reciprocal sovereign equality and autonomy, while relegating hierarchical relations such as alliances and security guarantees to the realm of the extraregional and the ad hoc. Building upon the foundations of recent works, future research would want to explore the processes implicated in overcoming the artificial separation between Southeast and Northeast Asia, and in revealing the crucial roles played by external powers in wielding the sticks that underpin ASEAN’s softly-softly approach to major regional conflicts. A significant part of the story still waiting to be told revolves around how to manage the contradictions within Southeast Asian strategy toward the great powers. In particular, the implicit reliance on US preponderance as the security guarantor for East Asia, and the resulting prolongation of the regional fragmentation that this has long encouraged, mitigates against the crucial great power rapprochement and stable cooperation vital to creating the new regional order. Whatever one’s assessment of Southeast Asia’s record of driving regional security, its central role in shaping the regionalization of East Asia after the Cold War is undeniable, and this collection of disparate states still retains the potential to forestall or facilitate wider regional transformation.

Notes

1. TAC norms include mutual sovereignty, territorial integrity, non-interference in domestic affairs, the peaceful settlement of disputes and the renunciation of the use of force—unexceptional principles drawn from the UN Charter.
3. The ARF currently has 27 members, including the United States, China, Russia, Japan, India, Pakistan, the EU, as well as the two Koreas.
4. Russia, Japan, Australia, and Canada all floated proposals which differed in terms of membership, institutional process, and scope—see Goh (2013), Ch. 3 and Ba in this volume.

5. Created in 1997, the most established East Asian economic cooperation institution, which has spawned a number of free trade agreements and, more significantly, regional financial cooperation mechanisms such as the Chiang Mai Initiative regional currency swap facilities.

6. An annual meeting of the ASEAN+3 plus India, Australia, and New Zealand begun in 2005, and expanded to include the United States and Russia in 2011, which also addresses political and security issues, but in smaller groupings than the ARF.

7. The ADMM was inaugurated in 2006 and expanded in 2010 to include all EAS members (ADMM+). From 2011 the ADMM+8 included the United States and Russia.

8. That is, socialization is the aim and end-point, with engagement as the starting process: see Johnston and Ross (1999).


10. For instance, in 2010 India accounted for 2.7 percent or just over $55 billion worth of ASEAN’s total trade—a similar figure for those of Australia and Hong Kong—compared to China’s 11.3 percent ($232 billion) as ASEAN’s top external trading partner, Japan’s 10.1 percent, and the United States’ 9.1 percent. Russia does not rank among ASEAN’s top ten trading partners (ASEAN Secretariat 2012). See also Dent’s chapter in this volume.

11. Every Southeast Asian state—with the exception of Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia—has established military-to-military relations of some description with the United States today.

References


