

DAYAK RESISTANCE TO OIL PALM PLANTATIONS IN WEST KALIMANTAN, INDONESIA¹

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Introduction

This paper examines local resistance in West Kalimantan to aspects of Southeast Asia's agrarian transition, notably agricultural intensification and a greater intrusion of global markets into local systems. The case concerns the replacement of the swidden-based mixed farming of the indigenous Dayak² population by large oil palm plantations. While farmers have long produced export commodities such as rubber, the oil palm plantation is quite foreign to their experience, reducing them to the status of labourers or smallholder out-growers on tiny plots and restricting their capacity for independent decision-making.

West Kalimantan is still overwhelmingly rural, with only 26 per cent of the population urban at the 2000 census (BPS, 2001). While Dayaks are well represented as both farmers and smallholders in most rural areas, Malays are prominent in district administration and the security forces. Transmigrants, largely from Java, form an important minority, especially of plantation smallholders. Ethnicity affects the forms of resistance to oil palm. The protests of transmigrants are typically confined to estate working conditions and issues concerning smallholdings, while Dayaks have usually

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² 'Dayak' is the generic term given to indigenous groups in Kalimantan, Indonesian Borneo.

lost land to the plantation and fear the extinction of cultural elements related to their traditional livelihoods.

Resistance in rural areas: some questions from the literature

Foucault sees power and resistance as inextricably intertwined (Foucault 1976/98). In West Kalimantan, not only is the plantation representative of the forces of globalisation, its establishment has been supported by the local power structure: provincial and district governments, the police and the army. The protests of farmers and smallholders who confront these hegemonic forces have been mainly confined to their own communities, though civil society organizations have recently sought to provide them with a wider audience. Their resistance techniques include those described by Scott (1990) as ‘infra-politics’, only detectable through detailed local fieldwork. More open defiance has taken the form of demonstrations, road closures, crop destruction, camp burning and seizures of machinery. The more violent forms of resistance often follow the failure of previous efforts at compromise and dialogue.

Chin and Mittleman (1997) suggest three possible frameworks for studying resistance to globalisation and neoliberalism: Gramsci’s idea of counter-hegemony, Polanyi’s counter-movements and Scott’s infra-politics. In West Kalimantan the hegemonic grouping of plantation, government and the security forces suggests Gramsci’s model. The Kalimantan experience resembles that described for Colombia’s Pacific Coast by Escobar (2004), although there has not been the same level of violence in land expropriation in Indonesia. Neither is collective resistance as organised as in Gramsci’s ‘wars of movement’ or ‘wars of position’. Polanyi’s ‘counter-movement’, represented by groups such as Mexico’s Zapatista, is not yet a feature of the Indonesian scene, though a national organisation of indigenous people exists and a similar movement for oil palm farmers is foreshadowed.

The question of whether resistance must be visible has been a contentious topic (Hollander and Einwohner 2004:539-542). Scott’s well known works on hidden forms and everyday politics (1986, 1990) have received support from Kerkvliet (2005), who documented the silent undermining of collective farming by Vietnamese villagers until officials modified the system. To date the forms of everyday politics adopted by

oil palm smallholders in West Kalimantan have been directed largely to improving their local situation, with some small-scale successes.

The political background

The time frame extends from the mid-1970s, the beginning of modern ‘development’ in West Kalimantan, to 2007. After the fall of the authoritarian Suharto regime in 1998, there followed a short transition period of ‘reformation’ and increasing democracy from 1998 to 2000. The decentralization of governance to district level in 2001, forcing each district to raise part of its own revenue, underlined the attraction of investment by large corporations. District governments thus supported plantation interests at the expense of local farmers.

Between 1984³ and 2005 the area under oil palm in West Kalimantan increased exponentially, from 5,000ha to 382,000ha. Although government estates were the first to be established, private enterprises now dominate. Most estates have arrangements for accommodating smallholders, who were often transmigrants in the Suharto era. During the mid-1990s more than 60% of the lands planted in oil palm were occupied by smallholders; since decentralisation this has declined to below 50%. New estates now limit their exposure, as smallholders are more difficult to control. The total lands occupied by oil palm continue to grow, although the momentum has slowed somewhat, despite recent high prices. The activities of NGOs are considered partly to blame, as they encourage communities to reject the crop (*Pontianak Post* 13.4.07; 24.4.07; 11.6.07).

Resistance to the relentless spread of the plantation has been strong as local people struggle to retain aspects of their traditional lifestyle. The levels and types of resistance have grown and changed, reflecting the newer political freedoms post-Suharto, but also keeping pace with the changes in the countryside as the industry matures in some areas, while in others the plantation is still new. Specific concerns arise in the early years, from negotiations over land, employment during the planting

³ The first year for which figures exist for planted oil palm

period⁴, arrangements for release of smallholdings, credit and payment for fruit. Meanwhile, trees on the oldest holdings have become senescent⁵ and replanting is a huge problem, especially for smallholders with no alternative income.

NGOs - local, national and sometimes international - are more visible and active now than twenty years ago. 'Resistance' is a highly political concept and may be encouraged or dramatised by NGOs or the media, while media exposure is itself a form of resistance that may induce changes in company behaviour. Despite West Kalimantan's reputation for violence (Davidson, 2002), Dayak resistance has taken both covert and overt forms, but it is the overt forms that attract the headlines and increasingly, international attention.

West Kalimantan: Dayak agriculture, agrarian transitions and oil palm

During the 1970s, in attempts to 'civilise' the Dayaks, the central government introduced Javanese transmigrants to wean local farmers from swidden to wet rice production (Jenkins, 1978). While Dayak authors later emphasised the cultural importance of the swidden for maintaining their identity (Tim Adat Talino, 1997; Edi Peterbang and Bambang Bider, 2001), swidden fallows were perceived by Javanese government officials as 'sleeping land' (*lahan tidur*) or 'critical land' if *Imperata* grass or erosion were visible. The fallows were targeted by Governor Kadarusno, when in 1975 he suggested the introduction of oil palm plantations into West Kalimantan. A survey was carried out in 1978 for the government plantation company PNP VII of North Sumatra, the decision being to set up estates in Sanggau district in the middle Kapuas and at Ngabang, closer to Pontianak (PNPVII, 1984:15)

Traditional Dayak agriculture includes both dry and wet shifting cultivation of rice⁶, tapping of 'jungle rubber'⁷, and harvesting of fruits and nuts from communal fruit groves, locally known as *tembawang*. Some villages retain areas of *adat* or traditional

⁴ It normally takes four years before oil palms bear fruit, with full productivity not reached for another two years.

⁵ Trees may continue bearing for twenty to twenty-five years, but yields sometimes decline prematurely, especially if inadequate fertiliser was used (Potter and Lee 1998:23).

⁶ A wet swidden is known as *padi paya*; it involves sowing the rice in a swampy area after burning the grass or swamp forest.

⁷ Traditional rubber species are mixed with other trees, especially fruit trees.

forest, from which timber and rattans for house building can be extracted and wild vegetables or fungi may be gathered. Strict sanctions exist against the unauthorised felling of particular trees and large fines may be exacted. For Dayak villagers, all parts of their environment are valuable. If asked to give up land to accommodate oil palm, they may offer fallow land infested with *Imperata* or old rubber groves. Clearing of *tembawang* is not generally permitted by adat chiefs, nor is it desired.

Early resistance to government estates

The six government estates were established at various locations between 1979 and 1985, mainly within the Sanggau district. Two, at Parindu and Ngabang, were Nucleus Estate and Smallholder Projects, while the others had no smallholders⁸. In these initial ventures care was taken to woo local leaders, who were sent to North Sumatra to observe the palm oil industry. On returning they agreed to accept plantations in their villages, without understanding the full impact of that decision. Many disputes followed about land and compensation. An educated Dayak (Pak Donatus) was sent as sub-district head to Parindu ‘to calm down the people who had been upset by land acquisition’ (Forest Peoples’ Program 2005:8). He argued that the people needed smallholdings of their own, leaving no room for transmigrants⁹. It was only when oil palm and transmigrants began taking over land that Dayaks put a monetary value on their holdings. Many wanted to sell their land and not join the project, or set up their own estates, which was not permitted (Forest Peoples’ Program 2005). However it was possible for people to opt out, creating ‘many enclaves in the midst of the estate’ (PNP VII, 1984:17).

Although most villagers continued to combine swidden farming and plantation work,¹⁰ they received no compensation for lands surrendered (Dove, 1986).¹¹ Dove

⁸ The nucleus estate and smallholder projects envisaged a plantation core (*inti*) surrounded by smallholdings (*plasma*).

⁹ The original plan was to bring in 3000 households; eventually 350 households were admitted from a failed food crops scheme.

¹⁰ Plantations employed smallholders as labourers until their holdings became productive, after which they had to repay the cost of land preparation and credit for fertiliser and other inputs.

¹¹ Dove told the story of the ‘tea party’ to which plantation managers’ wives invited village wives, only to be shocked when the guests gathered up the food and left. He commented: ‘The Dayak “appropriation” of plantation food must be viewed as a counterpoint to the plantation’s unsanctioned appropriation of ...their land’ (Dove, 1999:211).

argued that the heart of Dayak resistance to the plantation lay in their conviction that they were the equals of the Sumatran managers, who, they believed, wanted too much power. The managers insisted on a hierarchical complaints structure and would use force (the army) if necessary (Dove, 1999:218-9). This erection of barriers between management and farmers prompted the development of the behaviour identified by Scott (1986) as the ‘weapons of the weak’.

By 1997, the government schemes (renamed PTPN XIII) were regarded as more favourable to the people than the privately owned plantations that succeeded them. There was still sufficient land for most farmers to continue making rice swiddens and tapping their rubber groves. They complained, however, that returns were declining as their palm trees aged, so they diverted part of the company’s fertiliser to their rice crops. Instead of an intensively developed oil palm *kapling*, they were reverting to a ‘typically extensive semi-traditional livelihood system’ (Potter and Lee, 1998:25).

Dayaks and PT SIA in Parindu

This Malaysian-owned company is part of Sime Darby Berhad, one of Southeast Asia’s biggest conglomerates. The estate was established gradually between 1997 and 2000 in Parindu and the neighbouring sub-district of Bonti. Its land subdivision was 60% for the estate nucleus, 40% for smallholders, reversing what had previously been the ‘norm’ in West Kalimantan.

The first meeting between PT SIA officials and district farmers was facilitated by the local government. The officials spoke glowingly of oil palm’s advantages but did not involve the communities in the discussion. Farmers were asked to provide 7.5 hectares of land: 5 hectares for the estate, 2 hectares to be returned to the farmer planted in oil palm and 0.5ha for infrastructure (Colchester et al, 2006:126-7). There was initial reluctance to join the scheme, but households were pressured by government officers and some village heads, rumoured to have received ‘incentives’ for compliance.

We carried out fieldwork in the Parindu area in 2002, studying five sub-villages (*dusun*) out of the ten targeted by PT SIA (Potter and Badcock, 2007). While one

(Ensoyong) refused any dealings with the company, and retained all its land including extensive *tembawang*, oil palm was planted on lands released by other communities. People worked as day labourers on the estate as no smallholding had yet been released. In 2002 rubber prices were very low, so farmers were willing to convert old rubber land into oil palm and they appreciated the wages paid by PT SIA. In Dusun Kopar, half the land was covered in *Imperata* grass, so was easily given up. In exchange, the villagers kept the remainder under traditional cultivation; Kopar's strong adat chief refused to allow any clearing of *tembawang*. By 2007 the people had added clonal rubber, which they had bought from the proceeds of oil palm. As oil palm prices were then high, the villagers had increased their incomes and almost paid off their credit (Potter, fieldwork, February 2007).

In 2002 the head of Dusun Engkayuk was most enthusiastic in his embrace of oil palm, so was able to bring to the plantation all except four families, who stubbornly 'enclaved' their land and made a precarious living, selling rubber and fruits from the *tembawang* gardens. Although she had earlier welcomed the plantation, one woman felt the price had been too high: after the land clearance, rats decimated the rice crop. Yields were decreasing every year, so that rice was no longer economic to plant, though people continued for cultural reasons. By 2007 the rat problem had abated, but most villagers purchased at least part of their food needs.

Dusun Semadu had set up two oil palm co-operatives linked to PTPN XIII, which supplied them with seedlings and later bought their fruit, but forced members to find their own credit. One failed during the economic crisis; the other used insufficient fertilizer, so yields and incomes were low. PT SIA insisted that co-operative members join its estate and by 2007 they had capitulated. They complained that they no longer had much *tembawang*, while all their old rubber land was planted to oil palm. Nevertheless, everybody continued to grow rice and they possessed some new cloned rubber. One change was the advent of drinking and gambling, so that although people had more money, they did not necessarily spend it well.

A government sponsored cloned rubber scheme was located on Dusun Sengorat; farmers legally owned their lands and had sold some to outsiders, so few could find 7.5 hectares for release to PT SIA. One exception was an entrepreneur who had

bought land in the village. He provided 15 hectares, and still had land for cloned rubber, fishponds and other initiatives. He believed that PT.SIA's presence led to intensification in farming practices, being more of a catalyst for change in the region than any government agency.

Though some villagers seemed happy enough with the new arrangements, in 2002 the economic crisis had limited their options, so they were taking oil palm work out of necessity. Thefts became a problem. Some labourers stole fertilisers and herbicides for re-sale elsewhere. The workers, supposed to be employed between 7am and 2pm, sometimes walked off the job after 9am. This was called being *absen* and was a widespread practice. In their work as plantation labourers, local people were displaying some of the typical 'resistance' behaviours identified by Scott (1985), quietly cheating the company with petty larceny and absenteeism.

The farmers worked through a co-operative, which detailed the amounts of land each household contributed. In 2002 only 30% could provide the full 7.5 hectares required by the company, which refused to release the first dividend from the smallholder gardens and attempted to pay for only 26% of the fruit harvested, which represented the proportion contributed by the farmers. The latter demonstrated and were paid the full amount, but from a company perspective the situation was not sustainable. After four years, responsibility for the management and development of the gardens was handed to the co-operative. It was expected in 2002 that the investment fee of Rp26 million per *kapling* would take 12 years for farmers to pay off, but with high commodity prices this was reduced to 8 years (fieldwork, 2007).

The "tension between advancing modernities and resistant traditions" (Rigg, 2001: 45) is still strongly felt in these communities. A modified multi-cropping system is emerging, with oil palm largely replacing jungle rubber, but with rice and certain areas of *tembawang* allowed to remain, for symbolic, rather than practical reasons. Cloned rubber, not so important in 2002, is now desired, due largely to high prices and the better yields achievable from the cloned stock. People are aware of the social and cultural costs of the plantation, but they are no longer resisting the presence of PT SIA. Although there were complaints about the company's initial acquisition of

village land, followed by thefts and ‘foot-dragging’ behaviour, local attitudes are now more ambivalent, and many see the industry as important for local economies.

Overt resistance: demonstrations and violent action

The *reformasi* period following the demise of the Suharto regime produced a large increase in overt resistance in West Kalimantan, as in other provinces. Table 1 lists 12 conflicts between oil palm estates, farmers and smallholders, together with actions taken, as collected by the pro-Dayak journal *Kalimantan Review (KR)* between 1998 and 2001 (Anon, 2001:14).

Table 1 – From Demonstrations to Forceful Action
Examples of conflicts between oil palm estates and the people 1998-2001

No	Date	Company (PT)	Location (district)	Problem	Action by the people
1	May '98	Malindo Jaya (ML)	Bengkayang	The company tricked the village head with an inaccurate map and began operating without a permit	Unanimously rejected: grow pepper, rubber
2	Sept '98	Rana Wastu Kencana (RWK)	Sambas	Took over land including cemeteries and <i>tembawang</i> through trickery: obtained a false signature on blank paper.	Held company machines, sought compensation and went to court: lost
3	May '99	Aimer Agromas (AA)	Landak	The company cut the peoples' adat forest	The company had to pay an adat fine
4	Dec '98	Multi Prima Entakai (MPE)	Sekadau	Did not convert plasma lands. People demanding at least 3-4ha/family	Demo at district legislature
5	Feb '00	MPE	Sekadau	The company promised to construct a road, but built a factory instead.	People were angry and destroyed the company's office.
6	Jan '99	Multi Jaya Perkasa (MJP)	Sekadau	Did not convert plasma lands for local people, only transmigrants.	Demo both at district legislature and at company's office in Pontianak
7	June '99	MJP	Sekadau	The plasma lands still not converted. People felt deceived and apprehensive for their future	The people burned the company camp and all their heavy machinery.
8	Aug '01	MJP	Sekadau	The company did not fulfil its promises to the people, which made life difficult for them	People threaten to take over the company.
9	July '99	Harapan Sawit Lestari (HSL)	Ketapang	The company violated village land rights	Two thousand ha re-occupied and 400 oil palms cut down.
10	Jan '00	HSL	Ketapang	The company cleared land under crop, sacred forest and land about to be opened for swidden	People demanded justice from the Ketapang District Legislature
11	May '00	HSL	Ketapang	The company manipulated data to receive an inflow of foreign investment and sold <i>kapling</i> to officials.	Demo at the district legislature
12	Dec. '99	MAS	Sanggau	The company deceived the people about their activities, arbitrarily clearing their crops	They seized the company's tools, despite police intervention

Source: Adapted and translated from *KR* (2001:14).

Examples selected represent less than half of those listed, but provide a suitably wide sample of both the perceived 'bad behaviour' of the plantations, the types of protest and the outcomes. 'Trickery', 'deception' and the breaking of promises were common

reasons for protest, especially over the initial land occupations and the speedy release of smallholdings. The three examples listed from both MJP and HSL illustrate the build up of tensions over time as the estate management refused to modify their behaviour.

The involvement of NGOs in conflict resolution: failure and success

The attempted involvement of NGOs in the process of conflict resolution may sometimes produce a negative outcome; however, on other occasions the results have been favourable to the people. Three case studies illustrate these processes.

PT Harapan Sawit Lestari (HSL) in Ketapang

This plantation began operations in 1993 in the far southwest corner of the province, affecting 15 communities. People were forced to hand over their land by local authorities and village heads, with the police or military pressuring those who refused to comply, calling them ‘communists’ or ‘anti-government’ (WALHI/DTE, 2000). Only a proportion of villagers actually obtained oil palm plots, others being allocated to outsiders. Once the political regime changed, people expressed their resentment, taking direct action for the first time (Table 1 Nos 9-11). In November 2002, 100 ha of land in Terusan village were cleared and a burial ground disturbed. The community, who had not agreed to admit the company, decided it should pay an *adat* fine. Instead, PT HSL asked the district authorities to intervene. The district head (Bupati) called a meeting attended by the DPRD¹², the company and selected Pontianak-based NGOs. The village did not attend as they had not requested third-party mediation. The meeting became heated and NGOs were accused of being ‘anti-development and even terrorists who are... refusing to recognise the authority of the state’ (DTE 2002:1). Part of the dispute centred on village boundaries: Terusan had constructed a village map with NGO assistance, but the Bupati described those mapping activities as ‘invalid, illegal and seditious’; he threatened to send the army into Terusan and to take court action against the NGO (DTE 2002).

¹² Local parliamentary representatives

PT Ledo Lestari vs Semunying village

Semunying village is near the Kalimantan/Malaysia border in Bengkayang district. In 2004 PT Ledo Lestari built a road, destroying rubber gardens, then in October 2005 cut 4000ha of Semunying's traditional forest. After complaints to the company and the acting Bupati only brought more clearing, on December 12 village leaders seized the company's excavator and chainsaws. The police were called and on December 30 the village head and secretary were gaoled. After intense negotiations between the police and the village, assisted by NGOs, they were released twenty days later. This was followed by further NGO pressure in recognition of the environmentally rich nature of the area, after which the estate gradually shut down its activities Aloy (2006); Uyub (2006).

PT Sumatra Makmur Lestari (PT SML) in Sekadau

PT SML, originally from Riau, Sumatra, is an offshoot of PT SIA. Both companies recently obtained permits to occupy land in Sekadau district, with SML concentrating on the subdistrict of Nanga Taman, so far without oil palm (BPN 2006). In 2005 PT SML began offering a 9:1 model: nine hectares for the plantation and one for the smallholder. That changed in 2006 to 8:2, but was still difficult for locals to meet. A team from KR learned that a bonus per hectare of village land delivered had been given to all officials, with an additional large 'sweetener' if 50,000 ha could be acquired. Eight out of 13 villages had agreed to give up between 50 and 100 per cent of their land. In one village the company began clearing rubber, *tembawang* and fallow lands, leaving people scarcely any land around their houses (Gunui, 2006). As a counter to these activities, an internationally funded NGO visited the 13 villages and shared information about the threat of oil palm, enabling them to reject the company's propaganda. As a result all 13 communities decided to oppose PT SML, blockading a road where heavy machinery was to pass, and eventually forcing the company to withdraw from the district. A process of internationalisation is now beginning to have an impact at local level. (www.rainforestinfo.org.au/projects/grants.htm).

The AMA, a local NGO turned national

The Aliansi Masyarakat Adat (Alliance of Indigenous People) was founded in Pontianak in 1998, two months after the fall of Suharto. Its purpose was to campaign

against the conversion of community land to oil palm, industrial tree plantations, transmigrant settlements and mining, and to stress the quality of Dayak land management (Royo, 2000). Through networking with other NGOs, AMA became a national organization, AMAN (Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara), holding its first meeting in Jakarta in 1999. The national organization is not specifically concerned with oil palm, but with indigenous rights in general. It has continued a strong focus on land, challenging state sovereignty and asserting the competing sovereignty of customary groups (Acciaioli, 2007: 312-13).

Controlling the companies through the market: the Roundtable for Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO)

The RSPO is a voluntary organization constituted in 2004, with support from WWF and mainly European business interests. It is aimed at large companies, together with members of the palm oil commodity chain. The notion of sustainable palm oil has been dismissed as 'greenwash' (DTE, 2004:1). However, if companies can be pressured to change their behaviour or risk losing markets, then there may be positive outcomes. Principles and criteria for operation of large estates were drawn up and ratified after a series of RSPO meetings. In addition to meeting stricter environmental standards, such as no burning, destruction of high value forests or pollution of waterways, estates must assess their social impacts on local communities, install proper systems for dealing with grievances, and provide employees with acceptable pay and conditions. In 2007 draft guidelines were produced for smallholders seeking certification, with mills and plantations given three years to bring their smallholders up to standard (RSPO 2007).

While few Indonesian estates have joined, some important corporations are members. Sime Darby has signed up, hence PT SIA and its subsidiaries, while PT HSL was sold to agro-industry transnational Cargill, also an RSPO member. However, membership does not guarantee that a company will respect the criteria. A recent study of the companies of the Wilmar group (a RSPO member) uncovered several violations, including deliberate use of fire for clearing and failing to properly consult local communities, while correct land acquisition procedures were not followed (Milieudefensie et al, 2007). The limitations of the RSPO are clear: it remains a

voluntary organisation directed mainly toward Europe. Markets such as China and India, by not insisting that oil palm is grown sustainably, allow an escape for rogue plantations.

While compiling the data for the smallholder guidelines, Colchester and his colleagues visited Parindu (Colchester et al, 2006; Colchester and Jiwan, 2006). One result of their activities was the formation of a new NGO, the Organisation of Oil Palm Farmers¹³, aiming to unite smallholders to fight for their rights. So far they have faced strong opposition from government and plantation authorities and have had difficulty in making their voices heard.

Conclusion

Field studies in Parindu sub-district and examples collected from the pro-Dayak journal *Kalimantan Review* have been used to document the kinds of resistance that have emerged as oil palm plantations have expanded their hold on West Kalimantan. It has been argued that the unequal power relations between management and peasant or smallholder have consistently been resisted. Such resistance was at the level of Scott's 'infra-politics' in the Suharto period, and has continued as an undercurrent. Individuals have exercised agency and have either rejected the plantation or sought to modify its impact, specifically by continuing various practices associated with traditional agriculture. Some have benefited financially, while recognising the social disruption which oil palm has brought to the villages.

The more overt types of conflict have surfaced more frequently since 1998, coinciding with the continuous growth of the industry. In their actions of protest and resistance, Dayaks have been keen to retain their cultural practices, which they perceive as essential to their identity and legitimacy as owners of the land. Local NGOs have worked to assist their empowerment, which has led to rejection of the plantation by particular villages. Strong local leaders have also been instrumental in this process. Other NGOs have publicised farmers' problems and the role of civil society has increased, with greater internationalisation of indigenous struggles.

¹³ *Serikat Petani Kelapa Sawit*

‘Why does farmer opposition in West Kalimantan always fail?’ (Purwana 2006). Purwana concludes that in the era of economic liberalism there is no hope that the state will protect the farmer from exploitation by the market: it is the expectation that protection will be provided through the strength of civil society. Despite recent initiatives, there is little evidence that civil society is yet strong enough to fulfil such a role in West Kalimantan.

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