channel and river bank instability, and aquatic pollution, all of which necessitate more regional cooperation.

The last section of the book surveys the emerging architecture of regional integration. Moon-Soo Chung inquires what model it will follow—the Domino Effect, the Spaghetti Bowl Effect or the Hub-and-Spoke approach? He asserts that CAFTA will accelerate the pace of industrial restructuring; it will add further economies of scale to China’s economy; and it will induce more Chinese FDI to ASEAN. He concludes, however, that FTAs are only second-best options to multilateralism based on the principle of most favored nations.

Lam Peng Er examines the Japanese perspective on China–ASEAN relations. Japan has long been the major foreign aid donor and FDI source for ASEAN countries. After China offered an FTA to ASEAN, Japan responded with counter-offers of economic partnership as well as new initiatives in regional peace-building activities in Aceh and Mindanao and in combating piracy in the Southeast Asian seas, especially the Straits of Malacca. Lam contends that Japan is likely to remain much more affluent and technologically advanced than China and thus still an important actor in Southeast Asia for many years to come.

A lot has happened since this conference was held. China’s economy has continued its rapid growth in total output and in regional trade and FDI. It has become the top trading partner of almost every country in Asia, not just ASEAN. The uneven investment and trade diversion effects of CAFTA have become more evident. China and the ASEAN-5 countries of Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand have benefited more than others, especially Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar. Perhaps the most important recent development is that China, Japan and South Korea have initiated annual summit meetings to deal with their own thorny economic and environmental issues, such as their heavily protected farm sectors. Meanwhile, ASEAN integration has stalled over resurgent territorial disputes, counter-terrorism, Myanmar and the ASEAN Charter and Code of Conduct. If reconciliation continues among the three largest economies of East Asia, then the initiative for regional integration may shift from CAFTA and ASEAN + 3 to “3 + ASEAN”.

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**China-Japan Relations in the Twenty-first Century: Creating a Future Past?**

In 2005, China–Japan relations reached their lowest point since normalization in 1972. Specific events relating to historical memory, including Koizumi’s visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, the revision of Japanese textbooks and Japan’s attempt to become a Security Council member at the United Nations, led to an unprecedented level of demonstrations against Japan in several of China’s major cities. This edited
book is based on a workshop conducted in November 2005, right after the wave of
demonstrations. Its focal point is on unpacking the tensions between the two
countries, paying particular attention to historical memory. The book attempts to
explore how perceptions of the past are shaping, and are shaped by, the present.
Overall, it argues that historical memory and ideological constructions are
important factors in the “hot–cold” nature of Sino–Japanese relations.

The book is divided into four parts. Part I deals with the issue of nationalism
and self-image from China’s perspective, at grassroots, bilateral and global levels.
Jian Zhang offers a very insightful analysis of the changing nature of anti-Japanese
nationalism in China over the last two decades. He disputes the conventional view
that anti-Japanese nationalism in China is primarily “state-led”; rather, the current
expressions of nationalism have been increasingly “society-driven”. Xia Liping
argues that a range of regional multilateral institutions provide a framework in
which China and Japan can cooperate. This is possible only without “irrational—
极端—nationalism” in both countries (p. 37). He argues, however, that Sino–
Japanese cooperation “requires some modification on the part of the Japanese
government and leaders” (p. 51), which makes one wonder about what might be
required of their Chinese counterparts. In the attempt to understand the tensions
between the two countries, Nick Knight goes beyond domestic and bilateral
contexts, and locates China’s (mis)perceptions of Japan within China’s
conception of globalization; within this conception there exist several dichotomies,
including developed and developing countries, and capitalist and socialist nations.
China’s self-image, vis-à-vis Japan’s, is situated in these dichotomies. In this way,
the Chinese perception of difference between the two is clearly articulated.

Part II focuses on recent changes in the nature of Japanese nationalism.
Diverging from the structure of Part I, all three chapters in Part II focus on
popular media in Japan. Rumi Sakamoto analyzes the controversial manga comic
by Kobayashi Yoshinori, Sensōron, which has had a significant impact on popular
expressions of nationalism in Japan, resulting from Kobayashi’s “selective use of
the ‘facts’” (p. 87). Sakamoto warns that Kobayashi’s writing “potentially links
the ‘naïve’ or ‘pop’ nationalism with more political forms of nationalism” (p. 75).
Barbara Hartley focuses on Japanese cultural production, such as short stories,
documentaries and television drama, and argues that they denote popular
resistance to the Japanese “official erasure” of historical memory. Eric Johnston
argues that Japan’s right-wing media have played an important role in shaping
contemporary Japanese nationalism, and have contributed greatly to the current
tensions between Japan and its Northeast Asian neighbors.

While each chapter has its own strengths, it would have been beneficial had Part
II brought to bear more in-depth discussion of how the Japanese government has dealt
with Japanese historical memory. The discussion of popular Japanese resistance to the
Japanese government’s stance on “official erasure” of history is provocative, but
would benefit from more careful description of the extent of this “erasure”.

Part III deals with the security dimension in the China–Japan relationship,
which is, again, often closely related to the perception of the issue of history.
From the Chinese perspective, Jian Yang argues that strategic rivalry is rooted in the deep Chinese distrust of the Japanese, based on not only the issue of history, but also on Japan’s military capabilities and its close ties with the US. Joseph Y. S. Cheng’s discussion is more optimistic, arguing that China’s strained relations with Japan are circumscribed by a network of relationships such as that of China and Russia, of China and the US, and of China and India, added to those with regional multilateral institutions; moreover, China’s “economic imperatives will temper China’s impatience with Japan’s handling of political issues” (p. 150). Michael Heazle emphasizes that tensions are generated in the interplay of three dimensions of the relationship—nationalism, security and economic interdependence. The outlook of the relationship is therefore complicated, and tensions are not likely to be resolved in the short to medium term.

Part IV offers a regional perspective, and its two chapters are very different in nature. Michael Wesley argues that Sino–Japanese tensions are structural, and that, “with the region’s two great powers actively promoting alternative regional visions, any impetus towards regional association will continue to be dissipated” (p. 208). The final chapter, by David Hundt, focuses on another major country in the region: South Korea. He argues that South Korea is attempting to move beyond the Cold War “lens” through which it has viewed the region, and to replace it with a more complex and useful vantage. South Korea finds more convergence between its interests and those of China, particularly in the areas of security and economic relations.

While 2005 is a starting point for the discussion in this book, and reference is made to it in several chapters of the book, an important unanswered question is how special that year was in China–Japan relations of the thirty-some years since normalization in 1972. More broadly, how does one explain the changing relative importance of historical memory in relation to other issues that influence the political and diplomatic relations of the two countries? While historical issues undoubtedly continue to be most important at a popular level, their significance in various diplomatic priorities indeed differs from time to time. Issues of history are not always first and foremost in the agenda of diplomats, and historical memory is, as the book argues, “shaped” by the present. The discussion would have been further enhanced by engagement with a broader historical spectrum.

Nonetheless, the book provides excellent analyses and perspectives which will appeal to a wide readership. Its contribution to the study of China–Japan relations is that many of the chapters analyze the interplay of the domestic and international dimensions to the relationship and use an interdisciplinary approach to research and analysis. A fine analysis of the changing nature of nationalism in both countries brings richness to the discussion.

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